Case Name: BIDDLE BOGGS v. THE MERCED MINING CO.
Court: Supreme Court of California
Jurisdiction: California
Decision Date: 1859
Citations: 14 Cal. 279
Docket Number: 
Parties: BIDDLE BOGGS v. THE MERCED MINING CO.
Judges: 
Reporter: California Reports
Volume: 14
Pages: 279–380

Head Matter:
BIDDLE BOGGS v. THE MERCED MINING CO.
A CoritT cannot properly, even upon consent of parties, pass upon questions-not raised by the written allegations of the pleadings.
There is no obligation resting upon the claimant of land under a Mexican grant, or upon the United States Surveyor-General, to give notice of the official survey, directed by the firi&l decree of confirmation, to any one, and it is of no consequence how secretly or how openly the survey is made.
A private survey of a Mexican grant, made by the claimant, and presented with Ms petition to the Board of Land Commissioners for confirmation of the grant, is not binding upon the government. And, although in the case of Fremont, the claim was confirmed by the decree of the Board to the land embraced within suelr private survey so presented, yet, as that decree was reversed by the District Court; and, as, when the case was remanded to the District Court, from the Supremo Court, it was accompanied with directions to take further proceedings in conformity with the opinion of the latter Court, which opinion directed that a survey be made under the authority of the United States; and in the form and divisions prescribed by law for surveys in California; and, as the District Court did, accordingly, in entering its final decree, order that the land be i so surveyed; and, as a survey was, in accordance with this decree, made by the Surveyor-General, and the patent was issued to Fremont in accordance therewith—this is the only survey which has any standing in Court, and there is no ground for the charge of fraud because this survey differs from the private survey made by Fremont, and annexed to his petition for confirmation.
The grant to Alvarado passed a present and immediate interest to ten square leagues, to be afterwards surveyed and laid off witMn the exterior limits of the general tract by the government. Such survey could only be made under the former government by its officers, and could not be made by the grantee himself. The right of survey passed with all other public rights, to the government of the United States, upon the cession of the country, and is now to be exercised by its officers, and in conformity with its laws. By the legislation of Congress the subject of surveys is intrusted to the Executive Department of government, and is not left to the direction or control of the grantee. The action of that department in the location of confirmed grants, when the quantity granted is without specific boundaries, lying within a larger tract, is conclusive and binding upon him. It may be true that under the recent decision of the Supreme Court in the Fossat Case, the United States District Court possesses jurisdiction to control the location made upon its decree, whilst the proceedings for confirmation are pending before it, hut, subject to this qualification, the action of the department in the case mentioned is a finality with the claimant.
In ejectment on a patent issued upon a final decree of confirmation of land claimed under a Mexican grant, defendant cannot set up fraud in the survey or the procurement of the patent, to defeat the action. If the defendant have vested rights, so as to avail him against the assertion of any claim of the government respecting the premises in controversy, it would only follow that the patent was inoperative to that extent—not that it was void. The rights of the defendant would, in that case, be effectually protected by the provisions of the 15th Section of the Act of March 3d, 1851, and the patent would be like a second deed to premises previously granted, and pass, as to the property, no interest.
Nor would the fraud alleged in the answer here, and supposed to consist in a variance between the private survey made by Fremont, and the official survey by the Surveyor-General, and concealment of this latter survey, avail defendant in avoiding or resisting the patent, even if presented in an original or cross bill.
It would also be a fatal objection to a bill in equity by defendant, to set aside the patent in this case for fraud in its procurement, that Fremont, the patentee, is not a party. He would be a necessary party to any proceeding to avoid or set aside his patent, on the ground that it was issued through fraud or misrepresentation. His rights cannot be determined or impaired in any side suit between third parties.
The proceeding by bill in equity, which an individual is allowed to take to set aside a patent or control its operation, is in the nature of a bill to quiet title—to determine an estate held adversely to him—to remove what would otherwise be a cloud upon his own title; or is in the nature of a bill to enforce a transfer of the interest from the patentee, on the ground that the latter has, by mistake or fraud, acquired a title in his'own name, which he should in equity hold for the benefit of the complainant. The individual complainant must therefore possess a title superior to that of his adversary, and of course, to that of the government through -whom his adversary claims, or he must possess equities which will control the title in his adversary’s name.
A party will, in many instances, be concluded by his declarations or conduct, which have influenced the conduct of another to his injury. The party is said, in such cases, to be estopped from denying the truth of his admissions. But to the application of this principle, with respect to the title of property, it must appear: 1. That the party making the admission by his declarations or conduct, was apprised of the true state of his own title; 2. That he made the admission with the express intention to deceive, or with such careless and culpable negligence as to amount to constructive fraud; 3. That the other party was not only destitute of all knowledge of the true state of the title, but of the means of acquiring such knowledge; and, 4. That he relied directly upon such admission, and will be injured by allowing its truth to be disproved. There must be some degree of turpitude in the conduct of a party, before a Court of Equity will estop him from the assertion of his title—the effect of the estoppel being to forfeit his property and transfer its enjoyment to another.
The private survey of Fremont in 1849, and his presentation of the same to the Board of Land Commissioners, as embracing and identifying the tract he claimed, and subsequent public and repeated disclaimers by him, at the time the defendant took possession of the premises in controversy in 1851, and afterwards, up to July, 1855, of any title or claim to the property, and of any title or claim to any land within the exterior bounds of the grant to Alvarado, except that designated in his survey; and the fact that he knew of the occupation and improvements of the defendant from the time possession was taken, without forbidding the same or^claiming the premises until July, 1855, do not estop him from claiming the premises under his patent—there being no proof that he made such declarations and disclaimers willfully, or that he intended to deceive or defraud defendant, or influence its conduct.
Fremont’s claim, under the grant to Alvarado, was to no specific tract. It was only an interest to a specified quantity, to be afterwards surveyed and laid off by the officers of the government. He evidently thought otherwise, and hence made his survey in 1849, and claimed a specific tract. His title to the land in controversy did not become perfect until the approval of the official survey, after the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in his case. The representations and disclaimers made by him previous to this final survey and approval, were clearly made under a misapprehension of his rights. These representations and disclaimers, under the circumstances, and under the law governing the location of land under floating Mexican grants, were not more than expressions of opinion as to what ought to be its location, or of a desire where it should be located. The law was as well known to defendant as to Fremont. Both must be presumed to have known it, although both were equally mistaken in its rule. There was no actual fraud in the conduct of Fremont, and to estop him by his declarations and disclaimers, under the circumstances, would be inequitable and unjust.
Defendant has no title to the land in controversy; that vested absolutely in Fremont by the final decree and approved survey, evidenced as they are by the patent under the signature of the President of the United States. Defendant does not claim under the pre-emption laws, and if it did, the claim would be untenable, as mineral land is expressly exempted from pre-emption by the legislation of Congress.
Conceding the land in controversy to be public land, as claimed by defendant, and that Fremont so represented it, and thus induced defendant to enter, occupy, and improve, yet he was not prohibited from subsequently acquiring the title from the government. The pre-emption laws not extending to mineral lands, defendant was a mere tenant at sufferance; by mere occupation it could acquire no rights which could control the action of the government, as the superior proprietor; and if that proprietor saw proper to give the land to Fremont, or to any other person, the defendant could interpose no objection.
By the patent, the government is estopped from asserting title to the premises, and if Fremont is estopped from asserting title against defendant, then it would have, by merely occupying the land as public land, rights superior to both, and that, too, in the face of an express prohibition of the sale by the government of the mineral lands.
Any right defendant, as a mining corporation, may have, as against Fremont, to the possession and use of the land for the purpose of extracting the gold, must be based upon the ground that the mineral does not pass with the soil as an incident to it, but belongs either to the United States, or the State of California, and that defendant has an effectual license to enter upon the premises and extract the same.
The statement of the existence of a general license from the United States to work the mines which the public lands contain, is inaccurate as applied to the action, or rather, want of action, of the government. There is no license in the legal meaning of that term. A license to work the mines, implies a permission to extract and remove the mineral. Such license from an individual owner can be created only by writing, and from the General Government only by Act of Congress. But Congress has adopted no specific action on the subject, and has left that matter to be controlled by it's previous general legislation respecting the public domain. The supposed license from the General Government, consists ■ in its simple forbearance.
It is a very convenient rule, in determining controversies between parties on the-public lands, where neither can have absolute rights, to presume a grant from the government, of mines, water privileges, and the like, to the first appropriator; but such a presumption can have no place for consideration against the superior proprietor.
If the forbearance of the government were entitled to any consideration, as a legal objection to the assertion of the title of the government, it could only be so in those cases where it has been accompanied with such knowledge, on its part, of the working of the mines and the removal of the mineral, as to have induced investigation and action, had this been intended or desired. Such knowledge must be affirmatively shown by those who assert a license from forbearance.
The United States—holding as they do, with reference to the public property in the minerals only the position of a private proprietor, with the exception of exemption from State taxation, having no municipal sovereignty or right of eminent domain within the limits of the State—cannot, in derogation-of the rights of the local sovereign, to govern the relations of the citizens of the State, and to prescribe the rules of property, and its mode of disposition, and its tenure—enter upon, or authorize an entry upon, private property, for the purpose of extracting minerals. The United States, like any other proprietor, can only exercise their rights to the mineral in private property, in subordination to such rules and regulations as the local sovereign may prescribe. Until such rules and regulations are established, the landed proprietor may successfully resist, in the Courts of the State, all attempts at invasion of his property, whether by the direct action of the United States, or by virtue of any pretended license under their authority.
The general course of legislation in this State, authorizes the inference of a license from her to the miner to enter upon lands and remove the gold, so far as she has any right—but this license is restricted to the public lands.
The Act of 1850, (Ch. 97,) respecting the mines, the Practice Act of 1851, (See. 631,) relative to proof in actions respecting mining claims, the Act of 1853, relative to possessory actions, commented on, and the conclusion reached, that, so far as .they touch the question of a license from the State to mine, they refer to public lands alone.
Appeal from the Thirteenth District.
Ejectment for premises situate in Mariposa County. Plaintiff was the lessee of John 0. Fremont, to whom a patent was issued by the United States, hearing date February 19th, 1856, embracing a tract, including the premises in controversy. The case was tried by the Court without a jury, by consent of parties. The Court found the facts to be as follows:
1. That J. C. Fremont, at the time of demising the premises sued for, to the plaintiff, as stated in complaint, was the owner, and seized "in fee simple of the tract of land called “Las Mariposas,” mentioned in the complaint by virtue of a patent from the United States, dated the 19th day of February, 1856, signed by the President of the United States, countersigned by the Becorder of the General Land Office, and sealed with the seal of said office, and granting to the said Fremont, his heirs and as-assigns forever, the said tract of land called “Las Mariposas,” according to the plat and survey thereof made and approved by the United States Surveyor-General for California, on the 31st day of July, 1855, as stated in the complaint, and that the said Fremont entered on said tract of land called “ Las Mariposas,” claiming title thereto under said patent.
2. That the premises sued for in this action, are parcel of the said tract of land, so as aforesaid granted and patented by the United States to the said Fremont.
3. That on the 22d day of April, 1857, the said John C. Fremont (by Rufus A. Lockwood, his Attorney in fact in that behalf, duly authorized) being seized, as aforesaid, of the said tract called “Las Mariposas,” executed and delivered to the plaintiff the deed set out in said complaint, and thereby bargained, leased, and demised, the premises sued for, to the plaintiff, for the term of seven years then next ensuing, as stated in the complaint ; and that, by virtue of said deed, the plaintiff thereupon became, and still is, the owner of the premises sued for, with the appurtenances, and entitled to the possession and use thereof, for the said term of seven years.
4. That there are appurtenant to the premises sued for, affixed to the soil and freehold, and parcel thereof, a quartz mill, machinery, fixtures, and other buildings and works, known as the “Mount Ophir Reduction Works;” and that the same were, and are, included in the said lease and demise to the plaintiff, and that the plaintiff is in like manner owner of, and entitled to, the possession and the use of the same, for the said term of seven years.
5. That at the commencement of this action, to wit: on the 23d day of April, 1857, the defendant was, and ever since has been, and still is, in possession of the premises sued for with the appurtenances, and occupying and using the same, and claiming and holding the same, without the consent and against the will of the plaintiff, and adversely to the title of the plaintiff, and of his said lessor.
6. That the defendant has been running and working said mill and machinery a part of the time since the commencement of this suit, when there was sufficient water for the purpose, but the defendant is not now running or working the same, for want of sufficient water; that the creek on which said mill is erected does not afford sufficient water, at all times, to run said mill; that said creek does not become entirely dry, but that the water does not now run in the same where said mill is, and will not probably run there during the dry season, which usually continues till late in ¡November.
7. That the wear and tear of said mill and machinery from running and working the same, amounts to the sum of three hundred dollars per month while the same is run and worked, but in order to work the same to advantage, it is necessary to keep the same constantly in repair, and the defendant has done so since the commencement of this suit.
8. That the monthly value of the said premises amounts to the sum of seven hundred and fifty dollars.
9. That the defendant is guilty of the trespass and ejectment laid in the complaint; and that the plaintiff has thereby sustained damages at the rate of seven hundred and fifty dollars per month, from the commencement of this suit, hitherto making in all, the sum of sixteen hundred and ninety dollars.
10. That the defendant continues to exclude the plaintiff from the premises, and to detain the same from him; and that the defendant intends to continue to run and work the said mill and machinery against the will of the plaintiff; and assuming the admissibility of all the evidence produced by the defendant, the Court further finds:
11. That the survey and plat set forth in said patent to said Fremont, and mentioned in the defendant’s answer, are within the limits described in the original grant to Alvarado, confirmed to said Fremont, as mentioned in said patent.
12. That the charge set up in the defendant’s answer, of fraud, concealment, and collusion, in the survey and certificate on which said patent issues, is not proved.
13. That the charge in the defendant’s answer, that in procuring-the issuance of said patent, a fraud was practiced upon the government in misrepresenting the quality and character of the lands embraced in the survey and patent, is not proved.
14. That the lands embraced in the patent to Fremont are mineral lands, containing gold-bearing quartz and placer gold mines; that the lands are rough and hilly, but there are small ranches on various portions of the land. A portion of the hills and valleys is also used for grazing cattle, and to some extent for raising and cultivating vegetables and grain, but the principal business of the settlers on said lands is mining.
15. That in May, 1851, the premises sued for were vacant and unoccupied; that the defendant then entered upon said premises under a quitclaim deed from one Moffat, but it is not shown that said Moffat had any title to the premises, but on the contrary, the premises were then the public domain of the United States, except so far as the same were subject to Fremont’s unconfirmed right to locate the Alvarado grant within the limits therein prescribed; that the defendant commenced improving the premises for mining purposes, in 1851, and has ever since used and occupied the same for such purposes, pursuant to the mining regulations prevailing in the district, and has made improvements and expenditures in the manner and to the extent stated in the answer; and, that until the month of July, 1855, Fremont never claimed the premises sued for as being within the lines of his Alvarado grant, but stated that the lines of his grant did not approach within one or two miles of the premises, and caused a survey of his claim to be made in 1852, the lines of which did not include the premises; and which survey the said Fremont published and represented as including the tract of land claimed by him under said Alvarado grant, but at the time of making-such representations and disclaimers, said grant had not been finally confirmed and located; and it is not shown that in making such representations and disclaimers, the said Fremont willfully made any misrepresentations, or intended to deceive, or defraud, the defendant, or others, nor that he intended thereby to influence the conduct of the defendant.
16. That Fremont knew of the occupation, claim, working, and improvements, of the defendant from the time the defendant took possession till the present, without claiming the premises sued for till July, 1855, and without forbidding the defendant from working or improving the same, though he knew the defendant claimed the property; and that the said Fremont made the representations and disclaimers stated in the fifteenth finding, but without any fraudulent intent, and before the final location of his claim, and when it was unknown where the lines thereof would be fixed.
17. That no facts amounting to fraud or to a legal or equitable estoppel are proved in this cause, either as against the plaintiff or as against his lessor, the said Fremont. And upon the said pleadings, stipulations, proofs, and facts, the Court decides and finds the following points and matters of law, to wit:
1. That it is not competent for the defendant to attack or impeach the patent mentioned in the complaint and answer.
2. That the plaintiff is not estopped from insisting on his legal title to the premises sued for.
3. That the defendant is not entitled to any legal or equitable relief against the plaintiff’s title.
4. That the plaintiff is entitled to the judgment and decree of the Court against the defendant for the recovery of the possession of the premises sued for, as described in the complaint, with the appurtenances and for the sum of sixteen hundred and ninety dollars, damages and costs of suit, and it is ordered that judgment be entered accordingly.
It is, therefore, considered, adjudged, and decreed, by the Court, that the said plaintiff, Biddle Boggs, do have and recover of and from the said defendant, the Merced Mining Co. the possession of the said premises set forth in said complaint, and described as follows, to wit: Beginning at a point where a line drawn from the northeast corner of Township, 3STo. 5, South Range, hlo. 17, east, and running south twenty-four and a half degrees west, one hundred and twenty-nine chains, will terminate (said point of beginning being on the south side of the road leading from Mariposa to Stockton, by way of Mt. Ophir,) and running thence south forty chains to a stake; thence west forty chains to a stake; thence north forty chains to a stake near said road; and thence east along the direction of the said road forty chains to the place of beginning, and containing one hundred and sixty acres, (being part and parcel of the tract known as “Las Mariposas,”) together with all the tenements, hereditaments, works, mills, machinery, fixtures, buildings, and appurtenances whatsoever, thereunto belonging, and including the works known as the “Mount Ophir Reduction Works.”
And it is further considered, adjudged, and decreed, by the Court, that the said plaintiff do have and recover of and from the said defendant, the sum of sixteen hundred and ninety dol lars, in damages by the Court found and assessed, together with his costs and charges in this behalf laid out and expended, taxed at the further sum of-dollars, and that the plaintiff have a writ of possession and execution against the defendant accordingly.
All other material facts of the case are stated in the opinion of the Court.
S. W. Inge, for Appellant.
Under the stipulations in this case the controversy became, in effect, a chancery case, subject to the principles of equity jurisprudence. This Court will, therefore, examine the facts, (5 Cal. 192,) and will correct the errors below in whatever shape they appear. (4 Cal. 123.)
1. It was competent for defendant to attack or impeach the patent mentioned in the complaint and answer. The plaintiff can claim for his lessor’s patent, only that, in a Court of law, in a common law action, where all equitable defenses are excluded, it is conclusive. But those who hold against a patent may show, in a Court of Equity, that it is issued by mistake or fraud. (Bagnell v. Broderick, 13 Pet. 450; Gaines v. Nicholson, 9 How. 364.) Although, in a Court of Law, a patent is conclusive of the location, in a Court of Equity the survey may be examined, and, in case of mistake or fraud, the patent issued thereon may be set aside. (West v. Cochran, 17 How. 403; Stanford v. Taylor, 18 Id. 410.) The proof of fraudulent collusion between Fremont and the Deputy Surveyor who made the survey, and the proof of fraud in procuring the patent at Washington, are established, and Appellant stands in a better position to resist the patent than that of the adverse parties in the cases cited, because claiming and holding under the State of California, and by the express sanction of her laws, it is protected against the patent by the 15th Section of the Act of 3d March, 1851. (Vol. 10, Stat. at Large, 634.)
2. The plaintiff was estopped from insisting on his legal title to the premises sued for.
The Appellant took possession in May, 1851, when the premises were vacant and unoccupied, and the mines therein unappropriated. The claim of Fremont as assignee of the grant to Alvarado, was well known; but this was understood to be a grant for grazing lands, located in the valley of the river Las Mariposas, between the Snow Mountains and the San Joaquin. Appellant took possession, expended eight hundred thousand dollars in valuable improvements. Fremont knew of this, did not claim the premises till July, 1855, or forbid Appellant from working the mines; always, prior to 1855, stated his lines did not come within one or two miles of the premises, and in 1852 caused a survey of his grant to be made, which did not include the premises, and published it to the world as a true survey and map of his grant. Further, the proof shows Appellant was encouraged by Fremont to make the improvements named. Fremont is, therefore, estopped. Whether he acted with fraudulent intent or not is immaterial. The effect of his acts and declarations was to influence Appellant’s conduct. (Doe ex dem. Eyre v. Lanby, 2 Esp. 635; 4 Monroe, 52; 5 N. H. 452.) The doctrine of estoppel is founded on the principle that it is wrong and unjust to permit a party to revoke or deny declarations, whether true or false, or prompted by mistake or fraud, which have influenced the conduct of another, as in the case at bar. (B. N. P. 142; Co. Lit. 332; Sugden on Vendors, Ch. 22, Sec. 30; 4 Wend. 483 et seq.; Cow. & Hill’s Notes, Part 1, 369, 374, Note 225; 14 Johns. 446; Dewey v. Bardwell, 9 Wend. 65; Welland Canal Co. v. Hathaway, 8 Id. 480; 19 Id. 557; 5 Cal. 85.)
3. Lefendant was entitled to full and complete relief against plaintiff’s pretended title, independent of the two preceding propositions, and within the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in Fremont's case.
Fremont had no title to any specific portion of land; his grant-was a float; he had a vested interest in the quantity only, and an official survey was necessary to attach the grant to any specific ten leagues, and this did not occur till July, 1855. The lands in controversy being mineral lands, and as such exempt from pre-emption, and being unappropriated, were, in 1851, when defendant took possession, open to the lawful occupation of any one who desired to work the mines. By first occupation and appropriation, therefore, Appellant acquired a right, perfect against all the world, except the sovereign to whom the mines belong, to wit: the State of California. (Hicks v. Bell, 3 Cal. 227; Stokes v. Barrett, 5 Id. 39; Irwin v. Phillips, Id. 146; Mer ced Mining Co. v. Fremont, 7 Id. 317.) And the State, at the first session of her Legislature, before Appellant commenced improvements on the premises, “ gave whatever right the State might have in the mineral of the soil, and the right to mine, to all native born and naturalized citizens of the United States, who may wish to toil.” (5 Cal. 97.) Subsequent legislation is to the same effect. The real controversy here is as to the gold, not the land. The State may authorize, (what would otherwise be a trespass,) persons to go upon the lands of a private individual to search for and procure the gold, which is the property of the State. (5 Cal. 37.) Fremont may own the soil, but the ownership of the gold is a separate thing. The rights acquired by defendant by working the mine are vested and protected by State legislation. The mining interest is favored beyond the agricultural interest. (Irwin v. Phillips, 5 Cal. 146; Conger v. Weaver, 6 Id. 548, and cases above cited.)
4. Appellant is entitled to a decree declaring the pretended lease void, and that it be delivered up and canceled, and that the action of ejectment be perpetually enjoined. (3 How. 463; 1 Baldw. 205, 232; 1 Story’s Eq. 82,491—493; 1 Henn. & Man. 18; 1 Monroe, 65; Paeon v. Conn, 1 Sm. & M. Ch. 348; 11 Ala. 310; Pr. Act, Ch. 3, Sec. 254.)
Joseph G. Baldwin and S. Heydenfeldt, for Respondent.
1. What is the effect of the patent to Fremont ?
It passes all the interest of the government to the land described, with the appurtenances, with appropriate words of grant in fee; and if it be conceded that the United States owned the minerals, which are but part of the earth, there can be no serious question that, under the term “ land,” they would pass to the grantee. (2 Blac. Com. 18; 1 Cruise on Real Prop. 58; 2 Bouvier, L. D. 4, Tit. Land.)
It matters not if, under the Spanish and Mexican system, the ownership of the minerals was held in distinct property from the ownership of the soil, and if grants of land did not carry a title to the minerals. This distinction, if it exist, originated from the peculiar mining systems and jurisprudence of Spain and Mexico; which, of course, do not obtain in our country. If the United States owned the mineral with the land, they had a right to keep it or part with it, and the government has choSen to part with it, as is evidenced by the patent, which only follows the law. (Act 3d March, 1851.)
The Mexican system of denouncement, by which a person was permitted, under certain forms, to enter on the land of another, and use his property in extracting ores from it, is entirely inconsistent with our system of government. To hold, that one man has a right to bring a troop of men to dig up another’s farm, to hunt for gold or silver, would be as odious a doctrine as an assize of bread. It would be such an interference with rights of property and domestic commerce, as could not be maintained. Hence, our government invests the grantee of its lands with all the claim of the government. It,is not material whether an immediate title to this land vested in Eremont by the grant, the survey, or the patent. If the grant vested it, then defendant was a trespasser j if the survey vested it, then the company was a trespasser from that time j if the patent vested it, then the company was a trespasser from the date of the patent. But, assuming that a title to this particular tract did not vest until the patent, still Fremont had an incohate right before, which became definite and located by the patent. Any implied license defendant may have from State legislation, to work the mines of gold upon public lands, must be subject to a change of ownership, and the cessation of the right to mine, must necessarily follow the purchase of the land by a citizen. Otherwise, the right of invasion of private property without consideration, would be established without any such specific legislation as was held to be requisite in Tartar v. Spring Creek Water Co, 5 Cal. 375 ; Stokes v. Barret, Id. 36, and other subsequent cases. The license ceases whenever the land ceases to be public.
But this land was not public land. The fact, that the grant was of a certain quantity within larger boundaries, did not lessen the right, nor make the title less operative, as a grant of a present interest. (Fremont v. United States, 17 How.; Rutherford v. Green’s Heirs, 2 Wheat. 196.) Under these decisions, the land was private land ever since the grant, though this case does not require this much.
2. Out of caution, we take the position, that in land granted by the Mexican Government in California, before its acquisition by the United States, the owner of the land is the owner of the precious metals, and this doctrine does not conflict with Hicks v. Bell, (3 Cal. 219.)
We concede, that in such grants the mines were subject to be denounced by the discoverer, according to the Mexican code. But they were not denounced in this case when the country was ceded to the United States, and the United States could not take the mines of precious metals in private lands, nor indeed in any lands, because that government had no local municipal sovereignty which could invest in it anything composing the jura regalia, either by the civil or the common law. It was the proprietor of the lands, but only held the eminent domain in trust for the future sovereign. (Pollard’s Lessee v. Hagan, 3 How. 221, 223.) Mow, when lands pass into private ownership, everything passes with them which is contained in them, unless there is an express reservation, either by deed or by operation of some rule of law, and when the law ceases, then the reservation must end, and everything must pass. So, if the common law rule, which secures mines of gold and silver to the sovereign, was abrogated, the right to such mines would be in the owner of the soil, without further provision—cujus est solum, ejus est usque ad cmlum—and a maxim of the law of nations is, quod nullius est, id ratione naturali occupanti conceditur.
This doctrine was fully maintained by this Court in People v. Folsom’s Ex'rs, (5 Cal. 373.) Upon the cession of the territory by Mexico to the United States, the sovereign right of Mexico to the mines ceased, and there was no sovereign to take. The Mexican law of denouncement was gone, for the mines could only be denohneed by virtue of her proprietorship. The necessary result was, that as far as concerned mines in granted lands, they went with the land, and became the property of the owner, for the law does not tolerate the want of an owner for anything of value. The rule, in other words, working the reservation in every grant, is abrogated, and so the mines must pass to the owner of the fee.
If it be asked why the proprietorship of the United States of the lands, does not carry with it ownership of the mines—the answer is obvious—she takes merely as a Trustee holding for the future sovereign, as was decided in the case cited from 3 How. and although she thus holds, her trust powers cannot keep in operation the Mexican law which reserves the mines in private lands —and she has no rule of her own by which she can maintain this exception from the general proprietary right. It is, therefore, from the loss of the rule making the reservation, that the owner of the land becomes vested with the right to the gold and silver, and being once invested, by virtue of existing laws, can not afterwards be divested.
If we concede the title of the mineral in the lands to be in the State, but the property in the soil to be in Fremont, it does not help Appellant. Ko law authorizes A to go on B’s land and dig up soil, divert or use the water, and occupy the premises, in order to search for gold or anything else, merely because the gold belongs to C. Kot even if C had given a general license to A to go and get the gold. True, the State Government might protect A against a trespasser in such a case. The owner of the land not objecting to the possession thus taken and held by A, it might give him priority over all subsequent possessors with no better right; but it could not give him any right against the holder of the title. Even if the Legislature had passed such a law, it would be flagrantly unconstitutional. It would be taking private property and appropriating it to the private uses of another, without even making compensation to the owner. Such a law would not bind the government of the United States, without its consent. The State cannot even tax public land, much less appropriate it to its own purposes, or that of its citizens, against the will of the proprietor. The State could not enter upon the land of the United States to dig up the soil for gold, even if it owned the gold. But the State has never claimed any such right. She has merely protected the entry upon and possession of public land, for the purpose of working the mines, against trespassers entering under no better title. She has merely regulated settlers’ rights inter sese. Clearly, the General Government can take possession of its mining lands; can use them as it pleases—can build forts, custom-houses, trading stations, etc. or cultivate them. It could have taken possession of this tract—had it been owner—and the Merced Mining Co. would have been forced to abandon it. Fremont has the same right. A perfect right in the grantor, gives a perfect right in the grantee. If the occupier held by the mere forbearance, or even by the license of the government, the owner—does not the right to hold cease, whenever the government intervenes and revokes the license; and is not a transfer of the property a revocation ? But there was no license—a mere toleration of this use and possession.
A license to enter on land, is not an interest. (Ex parte Coburn, 1 Cow. 568.) It is a mere authority, personal to the grantee, and revocable at the will of the grantor. Mor can a right to enter upon and occupy lands for an indefinite period (for rail roads or anything else) be granted without a conveyance sufficient under the Statute of Frauds to carry a freehold. (Miller v. Auburn & Syracuse Railroad, 6 Hill, 61; 4 East, 108.) So an easement cannot be acquired by parol license, because that is revocable—but can pass only by deed. (Id.) Hence, Appellant never had any license, except one which was revocable. Mor does it follow that the Appellant had any right to enter upon this land and extract the gold, even if we concede the State could have so done; because, before the State could authorize others to exercise this right, she must have established some system constitutional in itself and properly guarded in its provisions. Appellant, justifying under the State, must, within the eases, show written authority from the State, or positive legislative enactment. And even this would be unconstitutional, unless compensation be made for the land taken.
The company, then, having no rights against the General Government, the government could dispose of the land as it pleased. Even if the patent can be attacked for fraud, it must be done directly—not collaterally. (19 How.) And if the government is willing to be defrauded, no one else can object. This privilege of entering on public land is a mere gratuity, and the holder of the possession a mere tenant at will. (8 Por. 326; 5 Stew. 82; 1 Id. 500; 7 Mo. 503.)
As to any policy of the United States Government in this matter, it changes no rule of law or vests any rights of property. The whole legislation of Congress shows this. In 1807, Congress passed a law forbidding, under severe penalties, intrusions on public lands, and this Act has never been repealed. The preemption laws are acts of exemption and grace. (1 Scam. 113.) So with decisions in Mississippi, Indiana, and Alabama. Besides, the pre-emption laws exclude from their operation mineral lands, or lands claimed under grants. (Act Congress, 1853, p. 247.) Ho policy on this subject could be fixed except by Act of Congress. (McConnell v. Wilcox, 1 Scam. 344.)
As to estoppel. The defendant got all it contracted for—all Fremont was estopped from disputing. It claims that Fremont induced it to go upon this land, as public land—that going there, it acquired certain rights, to wit: a permit to stay as long as the government chose to allow; that is to say, it got a revocable license. This privilege it has enjoyed; the government has put an end to it. If Fremont had given the license, defendant could have claimed nothing more. How, then, can it be fraud in Fremont to take a title from the government, which was perfectly consistent with the rights and the title of the defendant, any more than if Fremont had induced the defendant to take a lease for a year, and then he had purchased the reversion ? And if he had procured the reversion by fraud, how could defendant, who held his full term, complain, or defeat Fremont’s title, by setting up for the landlord the fraud which he was willing should remain undisturbed ?
Matters in pais relied on as estoppel, are not properly such at law or equity. They are regarded as frauds which equity will act on and compel the guilty party to convey his interest which he kept concealed when he ought to have discovered it. (Roberts on Frauds, 528; Adams’ Equity 373, top; 150, side.) But this doctrine is only applicable to purchasers. The rule even, as to them, is limited to a purchase (permitted or encouraged by the holder of the title) of property from the vendor having no title, and of yvhich defect of title he was at the time aware. The doctrine is further qualified in Gray v. Bartlett, (20 Pick. 193.) If the act be an encroachment on the soil or rights of another, an acknowledged tort, equally well known, or equally open to the knowledge of both parties, it gives no right. There can be no concealment or fraud where both parties have access to the facts, especially when the facts are of record—of general notoriety; and they are charged with knowledge of the law. (See, on this doctrine of estoppel, Raw v. Pope, 2 Ver. 239; 1 Dev. 452, 465.) To introduce this equity by way of estoppel, there must be intentional deceit, or such gross negligence as amounts to the same thing. (Adams’ Equity, 374; 1 Sto. Equity Jurisp. 391—393.) Mere representation that one has no title to land, does not prevent his acquiring the title afterwards. (4 Wend. 300; 6 Munroe, 50; Harr. 76; 2 Ala. 514; 7 Pick. 169; Id. 551; 9 Id. 520; 6 N. H. 521; 12 Wend. 105; 7 J. J. Marshall, 12; 3 A. K. M. 168; 1 Scam.)
As to setting aside a patent for fraud by a direct proceeding in equity, see Seabury v. Field, 19 How. 332, and cases cited; 6 Pet. 328; Id. 438; 15 Id. 93; 13 Id. 493; 13 How. 18; 9 Cranch, 87; 4 Wheat. 213; 11 Id. 380; 3 Pet. 340; 10 How. 348; 11 Id. 552; 5 Wheat. 293; 6 Cow. 281; 10 Johns. 23; 12 Id. 82; 5 Denio, 398.
Ho case can be found which upholds the right of any man to intervene to set aside a patent for fraud in its procurement, unless he is interested by right, recognized as such by law, in the subject of the controversy. A mere tenant at will or sufferance, claiming, not against, but only in subordination to, the title of the government—a mere gratuitous settler on the land of the government, cannot dispute his landlord’s grant—reform his superior’s proceeding—annul his superior’s deeds.
As to impeachment of deeds by voluntary grantee, etc. see Twynes’ Case, 3 Coke, 81; Roberts on Frauds, 369; 4 Cruise’s Dig. 382, 383, 406; 1 Ch. Ca. 99; 3 Murph. 429.
But this patent cannot be attacked for fraud in this case, because the United States, being directly interested, must be a party. The government has given Fremont by deed binding on it ten leagues in All for his claim. And the consequence of setting aside this deed in favor of defendant, would be to give the land to defendant for nothing, and not only so, but to give the mineral land, which is not subject to sale. Fremont would come on the government, or lose the land by forfeiture. That is, one man loses a title without law, while another gains one without gift, grant, or inheritance. If it bo said that the decision in this case does not affect the right of the United States, then this shows the conclusiveness of the argument; for it would result that Fremont’s title might be divested because we had not located it in the right place, so far as regards the land and the defendant, and yet the United States could and would hold him to that place. The United States could not claim it, because es-topped by deed; Fremont could not claim it because bound by estoppel in pais; and the defendant would get it, because claiming through title, under or by the acts of Fremont, who himself got nothing. This legal paradox would have to be maintained, that a man having no claim has given another a title, and that other contesting a patent on the ground of fraud, gets by the mere fraud, the title under the patent, after he sets it aside. For it is clear that the United States would not be bound by the judgment between defendant and Fremont—consequently, Fremont would not be bound as against the United States; the patent would be still good as between them; but not good as against defendant; but defendant being in possession, and having better title than Fremont, and Fremont having better title than the United States, the defendant, of course, has a perfect title to all intents and purposes, in fee simple absolute. The defendant has thus turned by the doctrine of estoppel in pais, a mere trespass, at most a license, into a fee. In a contest between two claimants holding under the same title, one of which must get the land, the government is not a necessary party, for it is immaterial to her which gets it. But that is not this case.
Again, the claim of Fremont was in litigation; it was adjudicated between him and the United States. It was decided in his favor. The ministerial and executive act of putting him in possession alone remained. Executive discretion was the sole arbiter in this matter. Ho individual could contest. If any one, the legislative department alone could control it. (Fremont’s Case, 18 How. 40.)
The patent or right to it can be contested in no other way than is provided by the Act of 1851. The patent is conclusive evidence of the then title of the government to the land conveyed.
As to estoppel on the ground of fraud. It is not favored in law, must be formally plead, and be certain to every intent. (Co. Lit. 352.) Here, there is no certainty, but everything is by argument. Again, an estoppel only binds for the interest sold or dealt with. (Co. Lit. 47 b.) There can be no estoppel against the law. (1 Term, 169; Jones v. Lasser, 1 Dev. & Bat. 457.) Here the estate was, at most, a tenancy at will, which had expired.
Defendant shows itself out of Court by answering, that Fremont had only a float—not a title to this particular spot. How could he fraudulently disclaim title to this spot, when he had no title, as defendant alleged ?
It is not averred that defendant knew Fremont had title and fraudulently suppressed the fact, or fraudulently misrepresented the title, or made these statements as to not'claiming the land in dispute, to the defendant, or in his hearing, or with a view to induce it to enter on, or to make improvements; nor is it averred that defendant entered in consequence of these statements. (See 3 Starkie’s Ev. 28—36; 2 Starkie’s N. P. 396; 2 M. & Payne, 293; 1 B. & P. 293; 2 Esp. N. P. C. 657; 1 Camp. 245; Cowp. 232; 6 Pick. 245; Greenl. Ev.; 14 Johns. 446.)
As to fraud in survey—Fremont was not bound to give defendant any notice of it.
Baldwin, in addition to the foregoing, filed an argument maintaining that the minerals in the public lands, so called, belong to the General Government as much as does the soil. His argument being mainly, that the doctrine of the common law in regard to the rights of the Crown are not applicable in the United States, for the reason that the original ownership of the minerals was in the Crown, and the Crown had never parted with that ownership; that here, the Crown of Spain had parted with the ownership of the mines to Mexico—to the Eepublic—to be held, not as a royal franchise, but merely as public property, subject to the laws and dominion applicable to other property; that the fact of the mines being a source of public revenue could make no difference, as this is true of all other property; that even conceding the property in the mines was strictly jura regalia, as held by Mexico, that it did not remain so in the hands of the United States Government, because Mexico sold her property in the minerals to the United States, who took as a proprietor; that it does not follow because a thing is held in a particular right, for a particular purpose, as incident to a particular object, to be used by the then possessor in a particular way, but with a full right of disposal, that the alienee takes it to be used, held, and applied, in the same way; that when Mexico parted with the minerals by treaty, as she undoubtedly did, the United States took them free from any claim of the State, afterwards created, just as an individual would had Mexico granted all her mines to him; that gold and silver bear no such relation to sovereignty, State or national, that, perforce, the proprietor of the mines by purchase can hold them only as a sovereign, and that they cannot belong to any one but the local sovereign.
To say that, by the common law, the King owned the metals by virtue of his sovereignty, proves nothing, for the peculiar laws of England, touching the royal character and prerogative, give him this right, as it gave him his throne, his scepter, the right to declare war, and the right to administer justice, and to be irresponsible for his acts. But the common law, which establishes the right of royalty, has no effect in a Republic, where there is no King; the government here is what the laws have made it, and holds property only according to those laws, and those laws allow her to hold mines of gold and silver, as property, as well as gold and silver coin; and to take this source of revenue, whether a branch of the royal revenue before or not, as well as the customs, the public lands or anything else.
The legislation of Pennsylvania and Kew York do not imply a different doctrine; those States claiming the mines of gold and silver, because the King had never granted them.
Cook & Fenner, also, for Appellant.
1. That part of the brief of Respondent’s counsel which is signed by both counsel, admits that the mines of precious metals within her limits belong to the State, in right of her sovereignty, and also that every citizen under our State legislation has a right to work the mines on the public lands, but insists that as soon as any portion of those lands becomes private property, the right of any citizen so to mine ceases. This we admit, so far as regards entries made subsequent to the land becoming private property, but deny it in cases where the entry for mining purposes was made while it belonged to the United States, as in this case. This State has, by specific laws, as well as by its general policy, permitted and invited her citizens to enter upon and work the mines upon public lands, and even to enter upon lands in which private property has already been acquired for agricultural purposes, for the purpose of mining. (Hicks v. Bell, 3 Cal. 227; Stokes v. Barrett, 5 Id. 39; McClintock v. Bryden, Id. 99,100; Irwin v. Phillips, Id. 145—147.)
The defendant, then, entered by invitation of the State when her authority was supreme, and this license or permission has never been recalled, and its continuance, therefore, is lawful and right. The defendant did not enter under the Federal Government. Mo act of the Federal Government could or can make the original entry wrongful, or the continuance unlawful. All that Respondent's counsel say as to the authority under which defendant entered, being revocable at pleasure, is foreign to the case, because it has never been recalled. The patent from the United States cannot amount to a revocation of a permission given by the State. If this State had the power to make the original entry legal, it remains so, for there is nothing in the laws of the State, which requires any citizen, who has commenced mining on public lands, to retire as soon as they become private property; and defendant cannot be expelled from the land in dispute so long as there remains any gold in the soil, without establishing a doctrine which would strip the State of one of her highest attributes of sovereignty. It matters not whether the doctrine that mines of precious metals belonged to the sovereign in right of his sovereignty was originally founded on sufficient reasons, or not, for it has been part of the common law since the days of Edward the Confessor. (1 Plowden, 321, a.)
The argument that the mine in dispute passed to Fremont, because at the time of the cession, by Mexico, of her rights over California, there was no sovereign capable of taking sovereign rights in regard to the mine, California not being then in existence, may be answered thus:
1. The grant, under which Fremont claims, was made long before the cession, at a time when Mexico retained the jura regalia in regard to these mines, and it no more passed to Fremont than to any other citizen of the United States. 2. Previous to his patent, Fremont had no title to the land in dispute, and long before that time, California existed as a State, with full powers of sovereignty. 3. As soon as territory is acquired by the United States, an embryo State is begotten, and is as capable of taking legal rights as a foetus in ventre sa mere.
2. Fremont is estopped by his acts and disclaimers, as set forth in the record.
He was not bound to take the land surveyed, for there was no compulsion. He procured the survey to he made in this particular locality. And he ought not now to claim the improvements and mineral, without at least putting the parties in the same position they were before he disclaimed. It is clear that no granting power would have covered the land in question, with all its inrprovements, by the patent, had it known the circumstances. There must have been fraud.
Nor is the doctrine of estoppel confined to purchasers. Both Fremont and defendant knew his grant was not located, and he, when applied to, took the responsibility of saying it will not be located upon the particular property in dispute. A party, who takes unoccupied and vacant land, subject to a grant, occupies the position of a purchaser, particularly when he is encouraged by a paz'ty who knows he has a claim to land in the county, yet to be located, and positively disclaims as to the particular locality.
As to the proposition of Respondent, that Fremont could not, by acts in pais, part with the title afterwards obtained, because that would be to establish a parol gift of land, without consideration, the answer is, that Fremont had no title to this particular piece of land. Fremont merely disclaimed all claim to land he did not own, but which, by chance, might be allotted to him.
¡Nor does the Statute of Frauds apply; that simply provides that no interest in real estate shall pass, unless in writing, etc.; but here there was no interest to pass, only a future possibility, and he conveyed nothing.
Lockwood & Wallace, also, for Respondent.
No bz’ief appears among the papers, though an elaborate one was filed.
Charles T. Botts, also, for Respondent.
This case presents but two questions for the consideration of the Court: 1. Did the right to the gold in the soil pass to Fremont by his patent from the United States; and, 2. Has he done anything whereby he is estopped from asserting that right against the defendant?
Of these questions, I propose only to discuss the first.
That Fremozzt, the plaintiffs grantor, is the legal owner of the locus in quo, is not denied; but, it is asserted that, under our political system, the gold and silver in the earth belong to the sovereign, even when the soil in which it is embedded may have become individual property. It is asserted that, by the common law of England, the title to the royal metals vested in the crown by right of sovereignty. To sustain this assertion, we are referred to two authorities—one at the beginning, and the other at the end, of reported eases: 1st of Plowden, and 3d of California. There never was any such doctrine known to the common law of England. The doctrine of that law was, cujus est solum, ejus est, db imo usque ad ccelum.
In Hicks v. Bell, two things, distinct and separate in their nature, viz.: the sovereign right of eminent domain, and a personal prerogative of the King of Great Britain, are confounded. There are certain inherent rights, inseparable from the power of government that must necessarily attach to sovereignty wherever it exists. Such is the power to take private property for public use, known as the right of eminent domain. Of the same nature is the right to control navigable streams, although the freehold may be in a private individual. To the same class may possibly belong the power to coin money. All these are powers absolutely necessary to the very existence of civilized government, and, consequently, they appertain to it wherever it exists. All that has been effected by the most jealous guardians of private rights has been to place a restriction upon the power of taking private property for public use, by making compensation a prerequisite to the taking. Mow, among these inherent sovereign powers, we may reckon the power of taxation, or that power by which revenue for the necessary expenses of the government is created. The power to raise revenue is a general one, and attaches to all governments by virtue of sovereignty; but the particular sources of revenue are fluctuating, and vary with the will of each particular sovereign. ; The mines of gold and silver were once one of the sources of revenue of the government of Great Britain, and it would be as reasonable to claim tunnage and poundage, and the sale of monopolies to be inherent, indefeasible appurtenances of sovereignty, as to claim that the sovereignty of California invested her with a right to the mines of gold and silver within her limits. Appurtenances of sovereignty are those rights, privileges, and powers, of which the State cannot divest herself without self-destruction. Tried by this test, a gold mine cannot be an appurtenance of sovereignty.
The distinction between this general power of eminent domain and the right of property in a particular source of royal revenue, is noticed by the English Judges in the “ saltpetre case,” reported in 7th of Coke, as early as the year 1608. The report says: “ It was resolved that this taking of saltpetre is a purveyance of it for the making of gunpowder, for the necessary defense and safety of the realm, and for this cause, as in other purveyances, it is an incident inseparable to the crown, and cannot be granted, demised, or transferred, to any other, and cannot be converted to any use than for the defense of the realm, for which purpose only the law gave to the King this prerogative. And it is not like to the mines of gold and silver, for there the King hath interest in the metal.”
Here we see the Judges draw a distinction between powers absolutely necessary for the general welfare and those rights of property in which the representative of the crown had a personal interest. In the latter category are classed mines of gold and silver. How, what is there in common between the government of California and the representative of the sovereignty of England, from which we are to infer that every species of personal property conceded to the one attaches to the other? If it were true that the rights of property in the State of California were to be measured by the claims of the absolute sovereigns of Britain, she would be entitled to all the whale and sturgeon taken on the coast, or in her waters; to first fruits, and tithes, and to all the property wrecked upon her coast. These were all sources of the ordinary revenue of the British Crown, peculiar to it, exacted in early times by an absolute master, and yielded by an enslaved people.
To sustain this claim upon the part of the State, it is not sufficient to show that this species of property was once vested in the sovereign of Great Britain, but it must appear that it vested in him by virtue of that, which alone the State holds in common with him, the quality of sovereignty. How, the only sovereign power to which this right has ever been referred, is that doubtful one of the right of coinage. In the first place, it is difficult to perceive how the possession of bullion is necessary to the monopoly of coinage. If the proposition ever presented any difficulty to our inexperienced ancestors, the later experience of European and American governments has abundantly demonstrated, that the power of coinage in the government is entirely compatible with the private ownership of bullion. But if this right to the precious metal depends upon the right of coinage, it must come and go with that right. Mow, it so happens, that the sovereign State of California possesses no such sovereign right. Cessante ratione, cessat lex.
Although this royal prerogative of coinage may have been the subtle pretense, or excuse, for this claim to the private property of the subject, certain it is, that the funds from this source were not devoted to the creation of a circulating medium, but were mingled with those derived from escheats, fines, deodands, wrecks, etc. and constituted what was called the ordinary revenue of the Crown. When these resources were not sufficient to meet the expenses of the prince’s household and the wars he set on foot, the extraordinary measure of a subsidy aid or supply was resorted to. By degrees, these extraordinary sources" of revenue, under the name of taxation, as being more equal, and as possessing the advantage of being self-imposed, have super-ceded the arbitrary and despotic sources of revenue known to earlier times. It is upon this happy change, that Mr. Stephen, the latest and ablest of the commentators upon the laws of England, congratulates his fellow subjects.
“The decay,” says he, “of the sovereign’s private patrimony ought to be considered, as in some degree, compensatory for the burden of taxation. For, if every gentleman in the kingdom was to be stripped of such' of his lands as were formerly the property of the Crown; was to be again subject to the inconveniences of purveyance and pre-emption, the oppression of forest laws, and the slavery of feudal tenures; and was to resign into his sovereign's hands all his royal franchises, of waifs, wrecks, estrayS) treasure trove, mines, deodands, forfeitures, and the like, many would perhaps find themselves greater losers than by paying their quota of such taxes as are necessary to the support of government.”

Opinion:
At the January Term, 1858, Burnett, J. delivered the following opinion:
On the 29th day of February, 1844, Governor Mieheltorena granted to Juan B. Alvarado, a tract of land known by the name of the " Mariposas," to the extent of ten square leagues. On the 10th of February, 1847, Alvarado conveyed his title, by warranty deed, to John 0. Fremont. The claim was presented to the Board of United States Land Commissioners, and finally confirmed by the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States, at the December Term, 1854. A survey was made in July, 1855, and a patent issued to Colonel Fremont, February 19th, 1856. On the 22d day of April, 1857, Colonel Fremont leased a part of the tract, being the premises in dispute, to the plaintiff, for seven years, at a monthly rent of one thousand dollars. In May, 1851, the defendant, then and ever since, a corporation for mining purposes, entered upon and took possession of the premises, and has continued in possession, working the quartz veins, and extracting the gold therefrom, and has expended, in the erection of machinery and other improvements, upwards of eight hundred thousand dollars. This action was brought by the plaintiff to recover possession of the property and damages for its detention since the date of the lease. By a stipulation between the Attorneys, the defendant was allowed to set up in defense any matter that could be the subject of a bill in equity. The plaintiff had judgment in the Court below, and the defendant appealed.
The case presented by the record is one of the most important that has ever been considered by this Court, not' only in regard to the pecuniary value of the subject in controversy, but in reference to the consequences likely to flow from the decision. We have given to the case that careful consideration which its magnitude demanded.
Under the view we have taken of this case, there are only two positions necessary to be examined :
1. Whether the title to the mineral passed to Col. Fremont ?
2. Whether, conceding that it did not, the defendant has the right to extract the gold, while the title in fee simple of the land is in the lessor of the plaintiff?
If the gold in the premises in controversy now belongs either to the State or to the United States, it does not belong to Col. Fremont, and the effect must be the same upon the right of the the plaintiff to recover.
If we concede, for the sake of the argument, that the " United States could only occupy the position of any private proprietor, with the exception of an express exemption from State taxation; and that the mines of gold and silver on the public lands are as much the property of this State, by virtue of her sovereignty, as are similar mines in the lands of private citizens," as held by this Court in the case of Hicks v. Bell, (3 Cal. 227,) then it follows that the gold found in the premises in controversy belongs to this State; provided, the title to the mineral did not pass to the grantee by virtue of the original grant. If the State, by virtue of her sovereignty, succeeded to the rights of Mexico in the mines of gold and silver in the public lands, then, upon the same principle, the State must have succeeded to the rights of Mexico to the mines in the lands of private proprietors. It would seem to be impossible to make any substantial distinction between the two cases. We cannot perceive any reason or principle for the distinction. The right of the State must be the same in both cases, for the reason that the right of Mexico, as to the mineral, was the same in both.
But if we take the opposite theory to be true, that the property in the mineral did not pass to the grantee, but passed from Mexico to the United States, and did not vest in the State by virtue of her sovereignty, or otherwise, then the question arises, how did the title to the minerals pass from the United States to Col. Fremont?
In examining the question, as to whether the title to the mineral passed from the United States to the grantee, we must take the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States as conclusive upon this Court.
The object of the Act of Congress of March 3d, 1851, was, as its title imports, " to ascertain and settle private land claims in the State of California." The purpose and scope of the Act were only to ascertain and settle private titles derived from Spain and Mexico; not to grant new, but to ascertain and settle or confirm the old titles. Hence, the decree was one simply of confirmation or rejection. To confirm is "to make firm or certain; to give new assurance of truth or certainty; to put past doubt."— Webster. The confirmation must be of some title previously existing, and the confirmation only becomes conclusive evidence of that which it concedes existed before. Confirmation can only be matter of evidence. It makes certain, gives new assurance, puts past all doubt. The decision was only upon the validity of a pre-existing title. And when the title or claim was finally confirmed, and the patent issued, the final decree and the patent were only conclusive, between the United States and the claimant, as to the matters involved, and no more. The claimant presented Ms petition, setting forth Ms title, and praying for a confirmation of the same. When confirmed, he had only the title originally granted, with a " new assurance " of its validity. The effect of the patent was only such as the Act of March 3d, 1851, gave it. The patent could not go beyond the decree of confirmation, and the decree itself could not go beyond the original title. In other words, the decree could not vest in the grantee a title to that which was not included in the original grant.
In the case of Fremont v. The United States, (17 How. 542,) the validity of his title was confirmed by the Supreme Court of the United States. The opinion was well considered, and distinctly settles positions from which certain conclusions must logically flow. Among the points substantially determined were these:
1. That the Governor had the power to make the grant.
2. That it conveyed to the grantee the title it purported to convey.
3. That the title was in fee.
4. That the grant contained conditions, but these were conditions subsequent.
5. That the definitive grant was "intended as the evidence that the conditions annexed to the grant have all been complied with."
6. That " the right to so much land, to be afterwards laid off by official authority, in the territory described, passed from the government to the grantee by the execution of the instrument granting it."
7. That whatever interest remained vested in the grantee or his assigns at the date of the treaty, " the United States are bound in good faith to uphold and protect."
The conditions annexed to the grant, including the approval of the Departmental Assembly, being conditions subsequent, their non-performance could only divest a title previously vested. And the effect of the definitive grant being only evidence that these conditions had been fulfilled, no title passed by it; but the title must have passed by the original grant, if it passed at all. And it was only such title as existed at the date of the treaty that the United States were bound to protect. They were not bound to make the original grant convey a title to property, which was not included in its terms when issued. In the case of Osborn v. Hendrickson, July Term, 1857, we held that "parol evidence could not add to the writing a description of property not embraced in it." And so, if the original grant to Alvarado did not convey the title to the mineral, the subsequent confirmation and patent did not do so. This seems to be the result of the Act of March 3, lá51, and the decision of the Supreme Court. In the opinion, the Chief Justice says:
" The only question before the Court is the validity of the title. And whether there be any mines on this land, and, if there be any, what are the rights of the .sovereignty in them, are questions which must be settled in another form of proceeding, and are not subjected to the jurisdiction of the Commissioners or the x Court, by the Act of 1851."
From this it would seem to be clear that no new rights were subjected to the Commissioners or the Court; and, therefore, the effect of the decree and patent could not be to convey any additional title to the claimant.
If, then, the title to the mineral was reserved by the laws of Mexico when the grant was made, and was still retained by Mexico up to the date of the treaty, this right must have passed to the United States, unless the General Government did not possess the capacity to receive it. The law existing at the time the grant was made entered into and formed a part of the grant, without any express stipulation to that effect. If, therefore, by the terms of the grant, as controlled by the existing law, the title to the mineral was reserved to the government of Mexico, that title passed out of Mexico and vested in the United States, or in the claimant; and if it vested in the United States it was either in their own right, or as Trustee for the future State.
It is insisted by the learned counsel for the plaintiff, that " upon the cession of the territory by Mexico to the United States, the sovereign right of Mexico to the mines ceased, and there was no sovereignty to take. The Mexican law of denouncement was gone, for the mines could only be denounced by virtue of her proprietorship. The necessary result was, that as far as concerned mines in granted lands, they went with the land, and became the property of the owner, for the law does not tolerate the want of an owner for any thing of value."
This position of the learned counsel is no doubt true, if we concede that the United States had no capacity to take, either in their own right, or as Trustee for the new State. But it is also clear, that if the United States had the capacity to take, in their own right, then the title remains in them, and the State has no more right to the mineral than to the land containing it.
It must be conceded that there are certain inseparable incidents of sovereignty that must exist wherever sovereignty itself is found. Among these is the right to take private property for public purposes, the right of taxation, and the right to control navigable streams. These powers are necessary to the very existence of government. But it is equally true, that there are other powers that may belong to one government, under its own Constitution, that do not belong to another government, based upon different principles. For this reason, only so much of the common law is in force in this country as is consistent with our institutions. There are certain powers inherent in all governments; otherwise, they would not be governments at all. And it is equally clear, that these governments must differ from each other in certain other respects; otherwise, they would all possess the same powers.
In the case of The Queen v. The Earl of Northumberland, (1 Plowden, 310,) the Court of Exchequer decided, after very full argument and great deliberation, that " all mines of gold and silver within the realm, whether they be in lands of the Queen, or of subjects, belong to the Queen by prerogative, with liberty to dig and carry away the ores thereof, and with other such incidents thereto, as are necessary to be used for the getting of the ore." (Id. 386.)
In the argument, the counsel for the Queen based this preroga tive upon these grounds: 1. That gold and silver were the most excellent of all things, and, for that reason, belonged to the Queen, as the most excellent of all persons. 2. The necessity of the thing, as the Queen could not maintain an army without treasure. 3. As an incident to the right to coin money.
The last ground is the one given by Blackstone. (1 Com. 294.) "A twelfth branch of the royal revenue, the right to mines, has its original from the King's prerogative of coinage, in order to supply him with materials."
This right of the Crown is, no doubt, the settled law of England, upon whatever reasons it may be predicated. (Bainbridge on Mines, 40.) The different reasons assigned by different writers for this right, seem not to have been satisfatory to those who sustain it. It is the settled law, and that would seem to be about all that can be said in its favor.
But in deciding the question, whether the title to the mineral in the premises in controversy, must, of necessity, be either in the United States or in the State of California, it becomes material to consider the reasons upon which this right of the Crown was based. For, though such is the positive law of England, the ground upon which such a rule is predicated may be wholly inapplicable to the nature and powers of our own government. If this right of the Crown be an inseparable incident of sovereignty, then the same right must belong either to the United States or to this State; but if, on the other hand, such right be not, in its own nature, an inseparable incident of sovereignty, then the mineral may, or may not, belong to either government, and may be the property of a private individual.
The incidents of sovereignty are those powers of which a State cannot divest itself, without materially impairing its efficient action. All the powers necessary to accomplish the legitimate ends and purposes of government must be sovereign, and, therefore, must exist in all practical governments.
If, then, we try the question by this test, is a gold mine a necesssary incident of sovereignty ?
The first and second reasons assigned by the Queen's counsel, in the case from Plowden, seem to have no force and no application; and the only ground to which this right can be referred with any apparent reason is the power of coinage. The State does not need the mine for the purpose of revenue, as the power of taxation is ample for that end. And it is difficult to perceive how the title to the mineral is a necessary incident to the • exclusive right of coinage. In practice, we see such a theory refuted every day. By the Constitution of the United States, the power to coin money, to regulate its value, and of foreign coin, is conferred upon the General Government; and the States are prohibited from making anything but gold and silver a lawful tender in payment of debts. These provisions, taken together, give all the power necessary to the Federal Government, without the ownership of the materials out of which the coin is made. And, as the State has no power to coin money, or regulate its value, she could have no claim to the mineral upon that ground.
If we consider the positions established by the decision of the Judges, in the Earl of Northumberland's case, and m that of the Saltpetre case, in 7 Coke, 13, it will be seen, that this right of the Crown was not considered as an inseparable incinont of sovereignty. In the first case, it was held, " that a royal mine may, by the grant of the King, be severed from the Crown, and be granted to another; for, it is not an incident inseparable to the Crown, but may be severed from it by apt and precise words," (1 Plowden, 336, a.) And, in the second case, " it was resolved, that this taking of saltpetre is a purveyance of it for the making of gunpowder, for the necessary defense and safety of the realm; and for this cause, as in other purveyances, it is an incident inseparable to the Crown, and cannot be granted, demised, or transferred, to any other, and cannot be converted to any use, than for the defense of the realm, for which purpose the law gave to the King this prerogative. And it is not like to the mines of gold and silver, for there the King hath an interest in the metal."
The right to royal mines was a personal prerogative of the Crown, like many others, and could be alienated at the pleasure of the King. The right was not, in its nature, an incident of sovereignty; because, such incidents cannot be transferred to an individual without materially impairing the' powers of the State.
If these views be correct, there would seem to be no sufficient reason to sustain the position, that the title to the mineral is in this State. She cannot claim it on the ground of sovereignty, nor upon any other ground that we are aware of; and we are equally convinced, that the United States cannot claim this right upon the ground of sovereignty. But we can perceive no reason why the mineral could not belong to the United States, as well as to any other proprietor. The capacity to own the mineral is inherent in both the State and Federal governments. If they possess the capacity to own the land containing the mineral, then they can own the mineral itself. And if the title to the land can be in one party, and the title to the mineral in another, then the title to the premises in controversy may be in Col. Fremont, and the title to the mineral in the United States.
It is true, that the general rule of the common law is, that he who owns the land, owns all that the land contains. But, notwithstanding this general rule, the proprietor of the land may sell it, reserving to himself the title to the mineral in the land. There is nothing in the common law, nor in the reason and nature of the case, to prevent parties from making such a transfer of property, subject to such a reservation. Without such a reservation, either express or by the terms of the law then existing, the right to everything contained in the land would necessarily pass by the deed.
The title to the land in controversy was, before the date of the grant, in the Republic of Mexico. By the grant, the title to the land, with a reservation of the mineral to the government, passed to the grantee. This right of Mexico was a public right— a right of property in the nation; and, in the language of the Supreme Court of the United States, in the Fremont case, "passed with all other public rights, to the United States." (17 How. 565.)
It does not matter upon what ground the Republic claimed this ownership, nor in what manner she exercised such a right; while she could not transfer her functions to the United States, she could transfer her right of property in the public lands, and the right to minerals in the lands of individuals. The United States could receive this title to the minerals, and could enforce the right in any form, or by any proceeding consistent with the frame of the government, and the substantial rights of the land ed proprietor. The mere change in the mode of asserting "or exercising the right, would not defeat the right itself, unless this change materially impaired the rights of the other party.
The legislation of New York and Pennsylvania is not opposed to the view we have taken, but supports it. Those States claimed the mines of gold and silver within their respective limits, for the reason that the King of Great Britain had never granted them to individuals at the date of the treaty acknowledging our independence. The right of property in these mines, being in the King, passed to the States in which they were found. The Federal Government, under the old Confederation, could take no title. And this legislation is based upon the principle that the ownership of the mineral may be distinct from the title to the land, and that this right in the State was not.incompatible with her Constitution, or with her relation to the Federal Government, or with the rights of the landed proprietor.
Our conclusion upon this branch of the case is, that the right to mines of gold and silver found in the lands of private persons was a personal prerogative of the British Crown, and not based upon any right incident to sovereignty3 that such a right is not incident to our governments, either State or Federal, but that the capacity to own land and all that it contains is possessed by both 3 that the capacity to own, and the fact of ownership, are distinct things 3 that the title to the gold, in the premises in controversy, in this case, was reserved by Mexico, and passed, by treaty, to the United States, and has not passed from them to the lessor of the plaintiff.
The second and last position to be examined is, whether the defendant has the right to extract the gold, while the title in fee simple of the land is in Colonel Fremont.
The learned counsel for the plaintiff insist that,-conceding the title to the mineral to be in the State, this fact cannot help the defendant. If this ground be correct, conceding the ownership to be in the State, it must be equally correct, if the ownership be in the United States. They insist that a party has no right to enter upon the land of another to search for gold, because the gold belongs to a third party 3 not even under a general license from the owner of the gold. It is conceded that the State, as the. owner, might protect the party licensed against a trespasser, in such a case.
But wo cannot perceive the force of this reasoning. The right to the gold carries with it the right to search and dig, as necessary incidents, as was held in the case from Plowden. The ownership of the mineral would be of no value without the right to extract it. And this right in the government could only be exercised through its agents. The owner of the gold, whether a natural or artificial person, could do that by agent that could be done by the principal. The right to grant a license to another is not injurious to the owner of the land, but beneficial to the owner of the mineral. Of course, the party licensed could do no more than the proprietor of the gold could do.
The only remaining inquiry is, whether the defendant, under the circumstances, has a license from the United States. This question was very fully considered by this Court in the case of the Merced Mining Co. v. John O. Fremont et als. decided at the last April Term. In that case, we said: "When we consider the current and the spirit of the legislation of both governments, taken in connection with the history and the known circumstances of the country, the conclusion is irresistible, that the mines are occupied and worked with the clear assent and encouragement of both governments. And while the terms of this license and the relation which the miner sustains to the superior proprietor may not be expressly laid down, and the duration of the estate not clearly designated by any positive law, and we may not, for these reasons, be able to give any exact definition of the precise nature of the right, yet one thing is well understood and indisputable: they are there by the clear license of both governments, and have such a title as will hardly be divested, even by the act of the superior proprietor. There are equitable circumstances connected with these mining claims that are clearly binding upon the conscience of the governmental proprietor, and that this Court must, with all due respect, presume will never be disregarded. If these views be correct, the owner of a mining claim has, in practical effect, a good vested title to the property, and should be so treated until his title is divested by the exercise of the higher right of the superior proprietor. His right and remedies, in the meantime, are not trammeled by the consideration that the higher right to reclaim the property exists in another, which right maj possibly, but will not
Si probably be exercised. His right to protect the property for the time being, under the peculiar circumstances of the case, is as full and perfect as if he was the tenant of the superior proprietor for years or for life'."
We have seen no reason to change the views we then expressed. These views are as applicable to this case as to the one then before the Court. We can see no reason or equity in allowing the plaintiff to turn off the defendant for doing that which is no injury to the right conveyed by the grant to Alvarado. As Colonel Fremont had no title to the mineral himself, and could only take it as any other individual, his tenant has no such interest in the premises as will entitle him to recover. The defendant occupies simply and solely for mining purposes, under the general license of the Federal Government. It is very true, that there has been no express Act of Congress creating this license. But the circumstances are peculiar. Had the government simply permitted persons' to occupy its lands for agricultural or mechanical purposes, when such occupancy could not impair, but enhance, the value of the property, then the implication of a license would not be so strong as in the case of mineral lands, where the property is continually and rapidly wasting away under the process of mining, which, in fact, removes all that is of any value in the estate itself. We cannot, under such circumstances, believe that the government intends to object. It must be its will that the mineral should be thus taken. And if this be its will, no one else can complain.
For these reasons, the judgment is reversed and cause remanded, and the Court below directed to enter judgment for the defendants.