Case Name: Theodore C. SHOVE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. M. MARTEL, Warden; et al., Defendants-Appellees
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 2013-02-20
Citations: 510 F. App'x 503
Docket Number: No. 12-16148
Parties: Theodore C. SHOVE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. M. MARTEL, Warden; et al., Defendants-Appellees.
Judges: Before: FERNANDEZ, TASHIMA, and WARDLAW, Circuit Judges.
Reporter: West's Federal Appendix
Volume: 510
Pages: 503–504

Head Matter:
Theodore C. SHOVE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. M. MARTEL, Warden; et al., Defendants-Appellees.
No. 12-16148.
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
Submitted Feb. 11, 2013.
Filed Feb. 20, 2013.
Theodore C. Shove, pro se.
Before: FERNANDEZ, TASHIMA, and WARDLAW, Circuit Judges.
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

Opinion:
MEMORANDUM
California state prisoner Theodore C. Shove appeals pro se from the district court's judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action under Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, Resnick, v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir.2000), and whether Younger abstention is applicable, Gilbertson v. Albright, 381 F.3d 965, 982 n. 19 (9th Cir.2004)(en banc). We affirm.
The district court properly determined that abstention under Younger was appropriate because Shove's state habeas corpus proceeding, still pending before the California Supreme Court, raises similar issues as presented in his federal complaint, implicates important state interests, and provides an adequate opportunity to litigate his federal claims. See San Jose Silicon Valley Chamber of Commerce Political Action Comm. v. City of San Jose, 546 F.3d 1087, 1092 (9th Cir.2008) (discussing Younger factors).
The district court judge's recusal was not required because Shove has not demonstrated that the judge's impartiality might be reasonably questioned or that the judge had a plausible personal bias or prejudice. See 28 U.S.C. § 455; Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555, 114 S.Ct. 1147, 127 L.Ed.2d 474 (1994) ("[Judicial rulings alone almost never constitute a valid basis for a bias or partiality motion."); United States v. Johnson, 610 F.3d 1138, 1148 (9th Cir.2010) (the fact that a district judge presided over the litigant's prior civil case was not a basis for recusal in a later proceeding).
AFFIRMED.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.