Case Name: Thomas Charles KLEVE, Petitioner-Appellant, v. D.R. HILL, Warden CCI; J. Gomez; Attorney General of the State of California; Daniel E. Lungren, Attorney General, Respondents-Appellees
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 2001-03-16
Citations: 243 F.3d 1149
Docket Number: No. 97-56182
Parties: Thomas Charles KLEVE, Petitioner-Appellant, v. D.R. HILL, Warden CCI; J. Gomez; Attorney General of the State of California; Daniel E. Lungren, Attorney General, Respondents-Appellees.
Judges: Before: D.W. NELSON, FERNANDEZ, and W. FLETCHER, Circuit Judges.
Reporter: Federal Reporter 3d Series
Volume: 243
Pages: 1149–1154

Head Matter:
Thomas Charles KLEVE, Petitioner-Appellant, v. D.R. HILL, Warden CCI; J. Gomez; Attorney General of the State of California; Daniel E. Lungren, Attorney General, Respondents-Appellees.
No. 97-56182.
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
Filed March 16, 2001
Jeffrey A. Aaron, Twin Peaks, CA, for petitioner-appellant.
Douglas L. Wilson, Office of the Attorney General of California, Los Angeles, California, for the respondents-appellees.
Before: D.W. NELSON, FERNANDEZ, and W. FLETCHER, Circuit Judges.

Opinion:
Opinion by Judge WILLIAM A. FLETCHER; Dissent by Judge D.W. NELSON
OPINION ON REMAND
WILLIAM A. FLETCHER, Circuit Judge:
The Supreme Court has granted certio-rari, vacated and remanded for reconsideration in light of its decision in Fiore v. White, 531 U.S. 225, 121 S.Ct. 712, 148 L.Ed.2d 629 (2001). See Kleve v. Hill, — U.S. —, 121 S.Ct. 851, 148 L.Ed.2d 766 (2001). For the reasons that follow, we believe that the Court's decision and rationale in Fiore do not affect the analysis in this case.
Fiore and a codefendant, Scarpone, were convicted in Pennsylvania state court of operating a hazardous waste facility without a permit. Both Fiore and Scarpone argued on appeal that they had committed no crime under Pennsylvania state law because they in fact had a permit, though they may have deviated from its terms. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court refused to hear Fiore's appeal, and his conviction became final. It then heard Scarpone's appeal and reversed his conviction, based on the argument both Fiore and Scarpone had made.
Fiore was unsuccessful in obtaining a writ of habeas corpus in state court. On federal habeas, the Third Circuit denied relief on the ground that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court had no obligation retroactively to apply its construction of the Pennsylvania hazardous waste statute, announced in Scarpone's appeal, to Fiore's case. The United States Supreme Court, which heard Fiore's case on certiorari, was unsure whether the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's decision in Scarpone's appeal had announced a new rule of law in construing the statute. In response to a certified question, the Pennsylvania Court stated that its decision in Scarpone's appeal did not rest on a new construction of Pennsylvania law. See Fiore v. White, 562 Pa. 684, 757 A.2d 842 (2000).
Relying on this response, the Supreme Court reversed Fiore's conviction. Because a basic element of the crime under Pennsylvania law was operating a hazardous waste facility without a permit, and because Fiore indisputably possessed a permit, "the parties agree[d] that the Commonwealth [of Pennsylvania] presented no evidence whatsoever to prove that basic element." 121 S.Ct. at 714. The Supreme Court's decision rests on the well-established principle that the state must present sufficient evidence to prove each element of the crime with which a criminal defendant is charged. The requisite quantum of evidence for determining a challenge to a conviction on federal habeas corpus is specified in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 324, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979): A petitioner "is entitled to habeas corpus relief if it is found that upon the record evidence adduced at the trial no rational trier of fact could have found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt."
There is nothing in our earlier decision in this case that is inconsistent with the Supreme Court's decision in Fiore. Petitioner Kleve was arrested by the police when he and a friend were found late at night, near the house of their would-be victim, in possession of a dagger, a semiautomatic 9-millimeter pistol, and an explosive device. At Kleve's 1989 trial, the jury was given a then-standard instruction under California law. Depending on its view of the evidence, the jury was told it could find Kleve guilty of either conspiracy to commit first degree murder or conspiracy to commit second degree murder. See People v. Horn, 12 Cal.3d 290, 115 Cal.Rptr. 516, 524 P.2d 1300 (1974) (stating that conspiracy to commit second degree murder was a crime under California law). The jury acquitted Kleve of the former, but convicted him of the latter.
In 1998, nine years after Kleve's conviction, the California Supreme Court held that under California law there is no crime of conspiracy to commit second degree murder. See People v. Cortez, 18 Cal.4th 1223, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 733, 960 P.2d 537 (1998). On federal habeas, we sustained Kleve's conviction of conspiracy to commit second degree murder despite the California Court's decision in Cortez. We relied on two grounds, either one of which is sufficient to sustain the conviction.
First, the Court's decision in Cortez may have changed California law. A change of law does not invalidate a conviction obtained under an earlier law. See Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 42, 104 S.Ct. 871, 79 L.Ed.2d 29 (1984); Wainwright v. Stone, 414 U.S. 21, 23-24, 94 S.Ct. 190, 38 L.Ed.2d 179 (1973); La Rue v. McCarthy, 833 F.2d 140, 142-43 (9th Cir.1987).
Second, even if Cortez did not change the law, Kleve was nonetheless properly convicted under its reasoning. The California Supreme Court held in Cortez that under California law there is no distinct crime of conspiracy to commit second degree murder, because any defendant who satisfies the elements of conspiracy to commit second degree also satisfies the elements of conspiracy to commit first degree murder. The Court wrote:
The mental state required for conviction of conspiracy to commit murder necessarily establishes premeditation and deliberation of the target offense of murder' — hence all murder conspiracies are conspiracies to commit first degree murder, so to speak. More accurately stated, conspiracy to commit murder is a unitary offense punishable in every instance in the same manner as is first degree murder[.]
18 Cal.4th at 1232, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 733, 960 P.2d 537 (citations omitted).
When given a choice between the two crimes, Kleve's jury acquitted him of conspiracy to commit first degree murder, and convicted him of conspiracy to commit second degree murder. These two verdicts were consistent under the instructions the jury had been given, but they arguably became inconsistent after CoHez. Even if the verdicts are inconsistent under Cortez, Kleve's conviction may stand, for inconsistent verdicts are not invalid. See United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57, 64-68, 105 S.Ct. 471, 83 L.Ed.2d 461 (1984). But they are not even necessarily inconsistent, for Cortez may be read not as holding that the two kinds of conspiracy are identical, but, rather, that they are merely functional equivalents for purposes of punishment.
When we first decided this case a year and a half ago, we regarded it as difficult. One of our panel members dissented, see 185 F.3d 1009, 1014 (9th Cir.1999) (D.W. Nelson, J., dissenting), and nine members of the court dissented from the full court's decision not to take the case en banc. See Kleve v. Hill, 202 F.3d 1155 (9th Cir.2000). We regret that the Supreme Court's decision in Fiore v. White does not make it any less difficult. We knew when we decided this case in 1999 that a federal habeas petitioner is entitled to relief when the evidence fails to satisfy Jackson v. Virginia, and Fiore does no more than to reiterate that principle.
The issue in this case is not whether there was sufficient evidence to convict Kleve of conspiracy to commit first degree murder or its equivalent under Jackson v. Virginia. There was ample evidence to support such a conviction. The issue is whether under the federal Constitution the California Supreme Court's decision in Cortez is fatally inconsistent with petitioner Kleve's conviction. We continue to believe that it is not. The holding and rationale of Cortez may mean that Kleve's crime was mislabeled as conspiracy to commit second degree murder, and that Kleve was therefore sentenced with undeserved lenity. Cortez does not mean, however, that Kleve was convicted and sentenced in violation of the United States Constitution.
For the foregoing reasons we adhere to our previous decision in this case, and AFFIRM the decision of the district court.