Case Name: Richard ROWE, Respondent, v. FARMERS INSURANCE COMPANY, INC., a Corporation, Appellant
Court: Supreme Court of Missouri
Jurisdiction: Missouri
Decision Date: 1985-10-16
Citations: 699 S.W.2d 423
Docket Number: No. 66595
Parties: Richard ROWE, Respondent, v. FARMERS INSURANCE COMPANY, INC., a Corporation, Appellant.
Judges: HIGGINS, C.J., and FINCH, Senior Judge, concur.
Reporter: South Western Reporter Second Series
Volume: 699
Pages: 423–439

Head Matter:
Richard ROWE, Respondent, v. FARMERS INSURANCE COMPANY, INC., a Corporation, Appellant.
No. 66595.
Supreme Court of Missouri, En Banc.
Oct. 16, 1985.
Daniel E. Wilke, Richard R. Korden-brock, Clayton, for appellant.
James E. Spain, Poplar Bluff, for respondent.

Opinion:
WELLIVER, Judge.
The appellant, Farmers Insurance Company, appeals from the jury verdict which held appellant liable on a contract of insurance issued to the respondent, Richard Rowe. The Court of Appeals, Southern District, affirmed the judgment. This Court ordered transfer to consider whether a party could impeach his own witness. We reverse and remand the case for a new trial.
I
Respondent's car was found burning by Missouri Highway Patrol Officer Overbey, at about 1:00 A.M., on August 13, 1982. The 1981 Ford L.T.D. was aflame in a lonely rural field approximately 7 miles from respondent's home. Respondent filed a claim with appellant, his automobile insurance company. The claim was disallowed and respondent brought this action.
At trial, appellant contended that respondent either had his car torched to collect the insurance proceeds or later learned who burned his car and did not report this information to the police or to appellant. Appellant called Chester Carroll as a witness. Carroll is respondent's first cousin. On November 22, 1982, Carroll allegedly made several statements to Officer Overbey. Officer Overbey was prepared to testify that Carroll told him on November 22, 1982, that he overheard respondent tell another man that respondent was going to burn his Ford L.T.D. in order to acquire a four wheel drive pickup truck. This conversation, overheard by Carroll, occurred before the Ford was burned.
Carroll's deposition had been taken on June 23, 1983. Respondent visited Carroll about one week before the deposition. In this meeting, respondent and Carroll talked about respondent's suit against the appellant. At trial and in his deposition, Carroll denied overhearing any conversation between respondent and another man. The trial court did not allow the appellant to introduce evidence and expose Carroll's pri- or inconsistent statement made to Officer Overbey, relying on the rule that a party may not impeach his own witness.
Appellant also sought to introduce deposition testimony of Ms. Peggy Slavings. Slavings was living with respondent at the time his car was burned. She could not be found to be subpoenaed to testify and she did not appear at trial. On the evening of September 19, 1982, Slavings gave a signed statement to Officer Overbey in which she stated that she saw respondent give his car to three people the night it was burned. In addition, she stated that later respondent's son told respondent that someone saw the son deliver the car to Clyde and Lloyd Brown on the night the car was set ablaze. The court did not allow appellant to read the portion of Slavings' deposition in which she denied making the assertions contained in the signed statement. The court also refused to allow the signed statement obtained by Trooper Overbey to be admitted into evidence. The court gave as its reason that a party cannot impeach its own witness.
The jury returned a verdict for respondent.
II
Missouri has consistently followed the ancient rule that a party cannot impeach his own witness. State v. Armbruster, 641 S.W.2d 763 (Mo.1982). This rule had its beginnings in the primitive English practice of each side to a dispute gathering oath helpers to swear off against the oath helpers for the opposing side. 3A Wigmore, Evidence § 896 (Chadbourn rev. 1970). Oath helpers were partisans and never were witnesses in the modern sense of having personal knowledge of the matter at issue. The credibility accorded oath helpers could influence the outcome of the litigation. The practice of not questioning the credibility of a party's own oath helpers later was applied to the party's own witnesses by English common law courts and later by Missouri courts. See 3A Wigmore, Evidence § 896 (Chadbourn rev. 1970); Dunn v. Dunnaker, 87 Mo. 597 (1885); Chandler v. Fleeman, 50 Mo. 239 (1872), overruled, Wells v. GoForth, 443 S.W.2d 155 (Mo. banc 1969); Brown v. Wood, 19 Mo. 475 (1854).
No valid reason for this anachronistic rule would seem to exist today. Commentators have favored abolishing the rule and during the last few decades the overwhelming majority of jurisdictions have followed by allowing a party to impeach his own witnesses with prior inconsistent statements. Comment, Impeaching One's Own Witness in Missouri, 37 Mo.L.Rev. 507, 522-23 (1972). See also McCormick, Handbook of the Law of Evidence § 38 (3d ed. 1984); Ladd, Impeachment of One's Own Witness — New Developments, 4 U.Chi.L. Rev. 69 (1936); Morgan & Maguire, Looking Backward and Forward at Evidence, 50 Harv.L.Rev. 926 (1937); Schatz, Impeachment of One's Own Witness: Present New York Law and Proposed Changes, 27 Cornell L.Q. 377 (1942); Comment, Impeaching One's Own Witness, 49 U.Va.L.Rev. 996 (1963). Professor Morgan stated that the rule "has no place in any rational system of investigation today." 1 Morgan, Basic Problems of Evidence 64 (1954).
Parties no longer freely pick their witnesses as they freely picked "oath helpers." Today, parties are forced to take their witnesses as they find them. Since parties may not know their witnesses or be familiar with their honesty or credibility, it seems foolish to talk about a party guaranteeing the credibility of his witnesses.
Witnesses are not made to order. — at least, not by honest people.... If a lawsuit was a manufacture, and the party bringing it could select his materials— facts and witnesses — there might be some propriety in holding him responsible for the character of these materials; but, as both are beyond his control, his responsibility for their character is out of the question.
3A Wigmore, Evidence § 898 (Chadbourn rev. 1970) (quoting May, Some Rules of Evidence, 11 Am.L.Rev. 264 (1876)).
The ability of courts and juries to determine the truth of an event is not served by creating a limitation that a party not im peach his own witnesses. 3A Wigmore, Evidence § 898 (Chadbourn rev. 1970). With the information provided by impeachment, the jury can consider the witness's credibility and more accurately draw inferences from the testimony. The jury should not be denied information about the credibility of witnesses solely because of who called the witness.
Some supporters of the orthodox rule contend that allowing impeachment permits the calling party to coerce favorable testimony. Dean Wigmore dismissed this justification stating:
But, after all it is a reason of trifling weight. It cannot appreciably affect an honest and reputable witness. The only person whom it could really concern is the disreputable and shifty witness; and what good reason is there why he should not be exposed?
3A Wigmore, Evidence § 899 (Chadbourn rev. 1970).
These reasons have persuaded the overwhelming majority of jurisdictions to abandon the orthodox rule. McCormick, Handbook of the Law of Evidence § 38, at 84 (3d ed. 1984). Along with these jurisdictions, the American Law Institute's Model Code of Evidence, adopted more than 40 years ago, expressly stated that the calling party could impeach a witness. Model Code of Evidence Rule 106 (1942). More recently, the Federal Rules of Evidence provide that, "[t]he credibility of a witness may be attacked by any party, including the party calling him." Federal R. of Evid. 607. The Uniform Rules of Evidence, promulgated in 1974, have a provision identical to that of the Federal Rules of Evidence allowing impeachment of a witness by a calling party. Uniform Rules of Evidence 607 (1974).
Based upon our own analysis and the experience of the vast majority of jurisdictions including the federal courts, we conclude that the time has come for us to recognize the right of any party to introduce a prior inconsistent statement to impeach any witness regardless of by whom the witness may have been subpoenaed or called. To the extent that prior civil cases have held to the contrary, they shall no longer be followed.
Ill
Having decided that a party may introduce prior inconsistent statements to impeach his own witness, we must now address the related question of whether prior inconsistent statements can be considered as substantive evidence in civil trials. Missouri generally has followed the orthodox standard that inconsistent statements made by a witness out of court are hearsay and inadmissible for the truth of the matter asserted.
The traditional rule requiring the exclusion of all prior inconsistent statements as substantive evidence is flawed. See generally, State v. Granberry, 491 S.W.2d 528, 534, (Mo. banc 1973) (Finch, J., concurring). The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has observed:
The rule limiting the use of prior statements by a witness subject to cross-examination to their effect on his credibility has been described by eminent scholars and judges as "pious fraud," "artificial," "basically misguided," "mere verbal rit ual," and an anachronism "that still impede(s) our pursuit of the truth."
United States v. DeSisto, 329 F.2d 929 (2nd Cir.1964) (quoting Morgan, Hearsay Dangers and the Application of the Hearsay Concept, 62 Harv.L.Rev. 177, 193 (1948)). The chief flaw is that the inconsistent statements of witnesses often are relevant to more than just the credibility of the witness. State v. Copeland, 278 S.C. 572, 300 S.E.2d 63 (1982); Nugent v. Commonwealth, 639 S.W.2d 761 (Ky.1982). The inconsistent statement made by a witness may be more reliable and believable than a statement made at trial.
The possible relevance of inconsistent statements can be seen in the facts of the present case. The trial court did not allow the jury to learn of the statements made by Chester Carroll to Officer Overbey. Carroll had told Officer Overbey that he heard the respondent tell a man that he was going to burn his Ford L.T.D. to collect the insurance and buy a four wheel drive automobile. After a meeting between the respondent and Carroll, Carroll denied in his deposition and at trial that he ever overheard the respondent. A reasonable person could find this statement helpful in resolving the truth or falsity of the witness's testimony.
While the majority of jurisdictions have dealt with this question by statute or rule, some have done so by opinion. In Gibbons v. State, 248 Ga. 858, 286 S.E.2d 717 (1982), the Supreme Court of Georgia held that prior inconsistent statements may be admitted as substantive evidence when the witness is available for cross-examination. The Georgia court noted that allowing inconsistent statements to be used as substantive evidence has several salutory effects: (1) trial courts will become more adept at determining truth; (2) parties will be partially protected from the erratic witness who changes his story; (3) parties will be protected from the efforts of the other to influence witness testimony; and (4) witnesses will be partially protected from efforts to influence their testimony since the rewards of changing testimony are less. Gibbons v. State, 248 Ga. 858, 286 S.E.2d 717, 722 (1982).
Research regarding human memory indicates several advantages prior inconsistent statements have over trial testimony. Studies have disclosed that the ability to remember an incident declines as time passes. J. Marshall, Law and Psychology in Conflict 29-30 (2d ed. 1980). McCormick explains that "[t]he prior statement is always nearer and usually very much nearer to the event than is the testimony. The fresher the memory, the fuller and more accurate [any statement] is." McCormick, Handbook of the Law of Evidence § 251, at 745 (3d ed. 1984). See also 3A Wigmore, Evidence § 1018 (Chadbourn rev. 1970); Morgan, Hearsay Dangers and the Application of the Hearsay Concept, 62 Harv.L. Rev. 177, 192 (1948).
Investigations into human recall also have shown that witnesses are more prone to forget facts which support propositions with which they disagree. J. Marshall, Law and Psychology in Conflict 29 (Second Edition 1980). Once a legal dispute is created, the honest recollection of witnesses may change and favor the side they favor. Prior inconsistent statements are not as prone to this phenomenon as trial testimony. Inconsistent statements are often made before a legal dispute has been commenced and they are made sooner after the event when less time has elapsed allowing selective forgetting to operate. Prior inconsistent statements also may be made before a motive for perjury has arisen and perhaps are less likely to be untruthful.
The instruction to jurors to use a prior inconsistent statement only for assessing the credibility of the declarant, but not for the truth of the matter asserted in the inconsistent statement, is at best confusing. The repetitive effect of calling attention to the prior inconsistent statement by the instruction probably cannot do other than highlight the matter in the minds of the jurors thereby making them more inclined to rely on the statement than to disregard it. See generally Broeder, The University of Chicago Jury Project, 38 Neb. L.Rev. 744, 754 (1959).
It has been said that when the declarant is available for cross-examination enough of the dangers of hearsay are absent. State v. Copeland, 278 S.C. 572, 300 S.E.2d 63, 69 (1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1103, 103 S.Ct. 1802, 76 L.Ed.2d 367 (1983); Advisory Committee's Note to Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(1)(A); Comment, Prior Inconsistent Statements: Conflict Between State and Federal Rules of Evidence, 34 Mercer L.Rev. 1495, 1498 (1983). Wigmore supports the proposition that when the witness is present and subject to cross-examination on his prior inconsistent statements, "[t]he whole purpose of the hearsay rule has already been satisfied." 3A Wigmore, Evidence § 1018 (Chadbourn rev. 1970). Justice Learned Hand asserted: "If, from all that the jury see of the witness, they conclude that what he says now is not the truth, but what he said before [is the truth], they are nonetheless deciding from what they see and hear of that person in court." DiCarlo v. United States, 6 F.2d 364, 368 (2nd Cir.1925).
The more "sensible and realistic view" and the weight of authority would appear to be to reject the orthodox rule and to view cross-examination of the declarant at trial as sufficient. 2 Jones on Evidence § 10.18 (6th ed. 1972). The Model Code of Evidence and the Uniform Rules of Evidence both allow the use of inconsistent statements as substantive evidence when the declarant is available for cross-examination. Model Code of Evidence Rule 503(b) (1942); Uniform Rule of Evidence 63(1) (1974).
The Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(A), as submitted by the United States Supreme Court to Congress, would have allowed a prior inconsistent statement of any witness who was available for cross-examination to be admitted. Report of Senate Committee on the Judiciary to Fed. R.Evid. 801. Out of a political compromise, the present Federal Rule of Evidence arose, with the requirement that for a prior inconsistent statement to be admissible as substantive evidence the inconsistent statement must have been made under oath, in a proceeding, subject to the penalty of perjury. Report of Senate Committee on the Judiciary to Fed.R.Evid. 801. These limitations have been criticized for disregarding the benefits of allowing inconsistent statements to be considered as substantive evidence and the adequacy of cross-examination of the witness at trial. Ordover, Surprise: That Damaging Turncoat Witness Is Still With Us: An Analysis of Federal Rules of Evidence, 607, 801(d)(1)(A) and 403, 5 Hofstra L.Rev. 65 (1976-1977); Graham, Employing Inconsistent Statements For Impeachment And As Substantive Evidence: A Critical Review and Proposed Amendments of Federal Rules of Evidence 801(d)(1)(A), 613, and 607, 75 Mich.L.Rev. 1565 (1976-1977).
Nineteen American jurisdictions allow the prior inconsistent statements of a witness to be used substantively where the witness is available for cross-examination. A number of other jurisdictions also admit the prior inconsistent statements as substantive evidence subject to certain limitations. Only a handful of jurisdictions now refuse to permit prior inconsistent statements to be used as substantive evidence. It should be noted that the Missouri Legislature passed a law providing that the prior inconsistent statement of any witness in a criminal trial is substantive evidence. Mo. Rev.Stat. § 491.074 (1985). There has been no evidence from the experience of other jurisdictions that the admissibility of prior inconsistent statements has resulted in any abuse. J. Maguire, Evidence Common Sense and Common Law 63 (1947); McCormick, Handbook of the Law of Evidence § 251 (3d ed. 1984).
We believe that only when the de-clarant is available for cross-examination are enough of the dangers of hearsay and unreliability absent to justify the substantive use of prior inconsistent statements in civil cases. The cause is reversed and remanded for a new trial consistent with this opinion.
HIGGINS, C.J., and FINCH, Senior Judge, concur.
BLACKMAR and DONNELLY, JJ" concur in separate opinions filed.
BILLINGS, J., dissents in separate opinion filed.
RENDLEN, J., dissents and concurs in separate dissenting opinion of BILLINGS, J.
ROBERTSON, J., not participating because not a member of the Court when cause was submitted.
. Alaska Rule of Evid. 607 (1979); Arizona Rule of Evid. 607 (1977); Arkansas Uniform Rule of Evid. 607 (1976); West Ann.Cal.Evid.Code § 785 (1965); Colorado Rule of Evid. 607 (1979); Delaware Uniform Rule of Evid. 607 (1980); Davis v. State, 249 Ga. 309, 290 S.E.2d 273 (1982); Hawaii Rule of Evid. 607 (1980); Illinois Supreme Court Rule 238 (1984) (criminal cases); Iowa Rule of Evid. 607 (1983); Kansas Stat.Ann. § 60-420 (1963); Tri-City Van & Storage, Inc., v. Slone, 437 S.W.2d 211 (Ky.1969); Maine Rule of Evid. 607 (1976); Minnesota Rule of Evid. 607 (1977); Montana Rule of Evid. 607(a) (1976); Nebraska Rev.Stat. § 27-607 (1979); Nevada Rev.Stat. § 50-075 (1971); New Mexico Rule of Evid. 607 (1973); North Carolina Rule of Evid. 607 (1983); North Dakota Rule of Evid. 607 (1977); Oklahoma Stat.Ann. tit. 12 § 2607 (1980); South Dakota Comp.Laws Ann. § 19-14-8 (1979); Texas Rule of Evid. 607 (1982); Utah Rule of Evid. 20 (1983); Vermont Rule of Evid. 607 (1983); Washington Rule of Evid. 607 (1978); Wisconsin Rule of Evid. 906.07 (1974); Wyoming Rule of Evid. 607 (1977); Puerto Rico, 32 L.P.R.A.App. IV, R.44(A) (1979); Federal Rule of Evid. 607 (1975).
. Alaska R.Evid. 801(d)(1)(A); Ark.R.Evid. 801(d)(1)(A); Ark.Unif.R.Evid. 801(d)(1)(i) (civil); Cal.Evid.Code § 1235; Colo.R.Evid. 801(d)(1)(A); Del.Code Ann. tit. 11 § 3507(a) (1979) (criminal); Gibbons v. State, 248 Ga. 858, 286 S.E.2d 717 (1982); Patterson v. State, 263 Ind. 55, 324 N.E.2d 482 (1975); State v. Holt, 228 Kan. 16, 612 P.2d 570 (1980); Nugent v. Commonwealth, 639 S.W.2d 761 (Ky.1982); Mont.R.Evid. 801(d)(1); Nev.Rev.Stat. tit. 4 § 51.035(2)(a) (1971); N.M.R.Evid. 801(d)(1)(A); N.D.R.Evid. 801(d)(1)(i) (civil); State v. Copeland, 278 S.C. 572, 300 S.E.2d 63 (1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1103, 103 S.Ct. 1802, 76 L.Ed.2d 367 (1983); Utah R.Evid. 801(d)(1)(A); Wis.R.Evid. 908.01(4)(a)(1); Wyo. R.Evid. 801(d)(1)(A) (civil); Puerto Rico, 32 L.P. R.A.App. IV, R. 63 (1979).
. See Note 2.
. See e.g., Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(1)(A); Ark.Unif.R. Evid. 801(d)(1) (1975) (criminal only); Fla.Stat. Ann. § 90-801(2)(a) (Harrison 1979); Hawaii R.Evid. 802.1(1); Maine R.Evid. 801(d)(1); Minn.R.Evid. 801(d)(1); Neb.Rev.Stat. § 27-801(4)(a) (1979); NJ.R.Evid. 63(1); N.D.R.Evid. 801(d)(1) (criminal only); Ohio R.Evid. 801(D)(1); Okla.Stat.Ann. tit. 12 § 2801(4)(a) (1980); Ore.R.Evid. 801(4)(a)(A); S.D.C.L.Ann. § 19-16-2 (1979); Texas R.Evid. 801(e)(1); Vt. R.Evid. 801(d)(1); Wash.R.Evid. 801(d)(1); W.Va.R.Evid. 801(d)(1)(A).
. See e.g., Cloud v. Moon, 290 Ala. 33, 273 So.2d 196 (1973); Turner v. United States, 443 A.2d 542 (D.C.1982); People v. Gant, 58 Ill.2d 178, 317 N.E.2d 564 (1974); State v. Ray, 259 La. 105, 249 So.2d 540 (1971); Capital Raceway v. Smith, 22 Md.App. 224, 322 A.2d 238 (1974); Sims v. State, 313 So.2d 388 (Miss.1975); Mich. R.Evid. 801(d)(1); State v. Gomes, 116 N.H. 113, 352 A.2d 713 (1976); State v. Sinclair, 45 N.C.App. 586, 263 S.E.2d 811, revd. on other grounds, 301 N.C. 193, 270 S.E.2d 418 (1980); State v. Roddy, 401 A.2d 23 (R.I.1979); Martin v. State, 584 S.W.2d 830 (Tenn.Cr.App.1979).