Case Name: BON HOMME RICHARD RESTAURANTS, INC., a Pennsylvania Corporation, Appellant, v. THREE RIVERS BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, a Pennsylvania Corporation
Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
Jurisdiction: Pennsylvania
Decision Date: 1982-04-23
Citations: 298 Pa. Super. 454
Docket Number: No. 457
Parties: BON HOMME RICHARD RESTAURANTS, INC., a Pennsylvania Corporation, Appellant, v. THREE RIVERS BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, a Pennsylvania Corporation.
Judges: Before WIEAND, JOHNSON and MONTEMURO, JJ.
Reporter: Pennsylvania Superior Court Reports
Volume: 298
Pages: 454–458

Head Matter:
444 A.2d 1272
BON HOMME RICHARD RESTAURANTS, INC., a Pennsylvania Corporation, Appellant, v. THREE RIVERS BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, a Pennsylvania Corporation.
Superior Court of Pennsylvania.
Argued Oct. 14, 1981.
Filed April 23, 1982.
Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied Sept. 16, 1982.
Howard T. Gilfillan, Pittsburgh, for appellant.
Stephen Laidhold, Pittsburgh, for appellee.
Before WIEAND, JOHNSON and MONTEMURO, JJ.

Opinion:
MONTEMURO, Judge:
The instant matter was begun by complaint in equity on April 21,1975. There was activity on the docket until March of 1976. When the plaintiff-appellant filed notice of deposi tion in March of 1978, on a date slightly beyond the two-year period of inactivity provided for termination of cases under Local Rule 229(e), defendant-appellee filed a petition to strike requesting that the case be dismissed pursuant to that rule.
The appellant did not petition either for reactivation of the 1975 complaint or for permission to bring a second action. Such a petition would have been required to allege that: (1) the petition was timely filed; (2) the reason for the default was reasonably excused; (3) facts constituting a meritorious cause of action were alleged. International Telephone and Telegraph Corp. v. Philadelphia Electric Co., 250 Pa.Super. 378, 378 A.2d 986 (1977).
Instead, appellant simply began another action under another court term and number on January 29, 1981. The appellee filed preliminary objections, which were sustained, and the second complaint was dismissed by Order of March 24, 1981.
The various arguments appellant advances in refutation of the lower court's action in dismissing the instant complaint all resolve themselves into a simple misunderstanding of the statutory language. Appellant bases his argument on wording in Thompson v. Cortese, 41 Pa.Cmwlth. 174, 182, 398 A.2d 1079, 1083 (1979) and lists as an "accord" the case of Commonwealth Department of Public Welfare v. Flowers, 46 Pa.Cmwlth. 326, 407 A.2d 896 (1979). Examination of the phrase as set forth in those two cases easily solves the problem posited. Thompson's version is as follows:
However, if a plaintiff's stale claim is dismissed, he may still petition the court to take off the non pros or bring a second action regardless of whether or not a formal entry of judgment has been made. (Emphasis as supplied by appellant's brief)
Where the case supposedly in "accord" is reviewed, however, we find the rule set out as follows:
In Thompson, we recognized that Pa.R.J.A. No. 1901 sets forth a judicial policy to resolve pending cases as promptly as possible and, if a plaintiff's stale claim is dismissed, he may still petition the court to (1) take off the non pros or (2) bring a second action. Flowers, supra, at 897, n.2.
Clearly, the alternatives do not permit unilateral action by the party seeking reinstatement of its action. A petition setting forth the three necessary allegations in excuse of delay must be submitted to the court.
Whether the party requests that the original case be reinstated or requests permission to start the same cause of action under a new term and number is evidently not material. What is important is that he shall give cogent reasons for his inactivity, and that the court shall determine whether permission to proceed will be forthcoming.
For a plaintiff to simply have the option of re-filing under a new number at will after the statute of limitations has run would make a mockery of the judicial policy Pa.R.J.A. 1901, supra, was designed to serve: to bring each pending matter to a final conclusion promptly and to remove from the docket the cases cluttering it for an unreasonable length of time.
Plaintiff in this case had a remedy to pursue, but simply chose to make an "end run" around the Rules. The court below was proper in refusing to permit this action.
Order affirmed.
WIEAND, J., files dissenting opinion.