Case Name: Jack H. SANDERS, Appellant, v. Marjorie J. SANDERS, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1983-07-28
Citations: 435 So. 2d 372
Docket Number: No. 82-152
Parties: Jack H. SANDERS, Appellant, v. Marjorie J. SANDERS, Appellee.
Judges: WEINBERG, RICHARD G., Associate Judge, concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 435
Pages: 372–375

Head Matter:
Jack H. SANDERS, Appellant, v. Marjorie J. SANDERS, Appellee.
No. 82-152.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
July 28, 1983.
James H. Harrison, Orlando, for appellant.
Marvin Mandell, Orlando, for appellee.

Opinion:
SHARP, Judge.
The husband, Jack Sanders, appeals from a final judgment of dissolution which awarded his wife, Marjorie Sanders, his interest in their jointly-owned marital residence as lump sum alimony. The marital residence consists of a mobile home with a carport, porch, and two greenhouses, and it is located on two lots near Apopka, Florida. The parties valued it at $45,000.00. The husband argues that, because the marital residence constitutes the parties' major asset, the lump sum award was an abuse of discretion. We disagree, based on the facts and circumstances as they appear in the record.
This was a long-term marriage of 18 years. At the time of the dissolution, the wife was 57 years old and the husband was 52. The wife had been employed from time to time during the marriage at sundry jobs — selling costume jewelry on the party plan method, picking oranges, telephone solicitation, and delivering telephone books— none of which were very lucrative. Her best job was managing a Royal Castle restaurant from 1968 to 1976, but the restaurant went out of business.
She was supporting herself at the time of the dissolution by operating a small plant nursery out of the two greenhouses on the marital property, and selling goods at flea-markets on the weekends. She bought goods at garage sales, fixed them up, stored them in her shed, and then sold them. From these endeavors she netted $131.40 per week.
The wife testified that if she were awarded the marital property, she thought she could "get by" until she was eligible for social security. She was in good health at the time, but, because she had a double mastectomy, she became tired easily, and she felt she could not work full time away from her home. She had no cash assets. She had a car which needed repair and which she could not afford to insure.
The husband had job skills and experience as a steel worker. Although he had been unemployed from time to time during the marriage, he was currently employed as a foreman. He netted $345.00 per week. He had two functioning cars. Just prior to the final hearing, he withdrew $2,500.00 from the bank (his earnings), with which he purchased himself a new car and went on a vacation. He had no health problems. He was then living with another family and paying them $100.00 per week.
The wife testified that the reason she filed for a dissolution was because the husband physically abused and harassed her. She had had to' seek medical treatment at hospital emergency rooms. The final judgment entered in this case includes a mutual restraining order similar to one entered at the commencement of the suit.
A trial judge's decision to award lump sum alimony should not be set aside if there is a reasonable basis in the record to support it. If reasonable men could differ on the propriety of the trial judge's decision, it cannot be said the trial court abused its discretion. Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So.2d 1197 (Fla.1980). We were admonished in Canakaris not to establish "inflexible rules" that make the trial court's job of doing equity "difficult, if not impossible." The husband here suggests that in no case should a trial court make a lump sum award to a spouse where the asset so awarded is the parties' primary asset.
If the husband had more earnings, an award of permanent periodic alimony would be appropriate in this case, considering the length of the marriage, the wife's health problems and age, the parties' earning capacities, and their respective assets and accumulations. McAllister v. McAllister, 345 So.2d 352 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977). The lump sum award seems appropriate in this case because it is perhaps the only method the trial judge could devise which would allow both parties to have enough means to subsist after the dissolution. The wife's meager income is essentially produced by her use of the marital property. Vawter v. Vawter, 419 So.2d 747 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982). The husband does not have an income sufficiently large to permit him to pay periodic alimony without great hardship. Further, the pattern of physical abuse of the wife by the husband is another reason to sever any relationship between the parties totally and completely.
Finally, the award does not jeopardize the husband's profession, employment, or his ability to support himself. In Yandell v. Yandell, 39 So.2d 554 (Fla.1949), the supreme court reversed a lump sum award because it would have destroyed the husband's small estate and encumbered "his anticipated income for a limitless period of time if, indeed, it would be possible for him to make the payment at all." Id. at 557. In this case there is no compelling reason to disturb the judgment. Brown v. Brown, 424 So.2d 845 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982).
AFFIRMED.
WEINBERG, RICHARD G., Associate Judge, concurs.
COWART, J., dissents with opinion.
. Gill v. Gill, 431 So.2d 690 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983).
. See Brown v. Brown, 424 So.2d 845 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982).