Case Name: Henry F. Hall vs. Fortis H. Allis
Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Connecticut
Decision Date: 1900-10-04
Citations: 73 Conn. 238
Docket Number: 
Parties: Henry F. Hall vs. Fortis H. Allis.
Judges: Andrews, C. J., Torrance, Baldwin, Hamersley and Hall, Js.
Reporter: Connecticut Reports
Volume: 73
Pages: 238–247

Head Matter:
Henry F. Hall vs. Fortis H. Allis.
Third Judicial District, New Haven,
June Term, 1900.
Andrews, C. J., Torrance, Baldwin, Hamersley and Hall, Js.
In bis warranty deed the defendant covenanted that the land conveyed therein was free from all incumbrances except a certain mortgage of $8,000, that he would pay all interest thereon as it became due, also all taxes, and would “ save the grantee harmless from all incumbrances to date.” Reid that inasmuch as the words quoted were those of the grantor, any doubt as to their import must be resolved in favor of the grantee; and that thus construed they included the principal as well as the interest of the $8,000 mortgage. (One judge dissenting.)
Argued June 12th
decided October 4th, 1900.
Action to recover damages for breach of covenant, brought to the Superior Court in New Haven County and tried to the court, Elmer, J.; facts found and judgment rendered for the defendant, and appeal by the plaintiff for alleged errors in the rulings and findings of the court.
Error, judgment set aside and cause remanded.
On or about November 15th, 1893, the defendant executed and delivered to the plaintiff a deed of land in the city of New Haven, the material parts of which are as follows:—
“ To have and to hold the above granted and bargained premises, with the appurtenances thereof, unto him, the said grantee, his heirs and assigns forever, to his and their proper use and behoof. And also I, the said grantor, do for myself and my heirs, executors and administrators, covenant with the said grantee, his heirs and assigns, that at and until the ensealing of these presents I am well seized of the premises as a good indefeasible estate in fee simple, and have good right to bargain and sell the same in manner and form as is above written, and that the same is free from all incumbrances whatsoever, except mortgage of eight thousand dollars ($8,000), holden by Yale College; and the grantor hereby agrees to keep all interest on said first mortgage paid when due, also all taxes on said property as they mature, and save grantee harmless from all incumbrances to date.
“ And furthermore I, the said grantor, do by these presents bind myself and my heirs forever to warrant and defend the above granted and bargained premises to him, the said grantee, his heirs and assigns, against all claims and demands whatsoever, except said mortgage.
“ In witness whereof I have hereunto set my hand and seal, this fifteenth day of November, A. D. 1893.
“ The condition of this deed is such that whereas Edward P. Yale, of New Haven, Ct., is justly indebted to the said grantee in the sum of six thousand dollars, as evidenced by three several promissory notes, each for two thousand dollars, and each of even date herewith, payable at New Britain National Bank, to said grantee, or order, two, three, and four years after date, respectively, with interest annually.
“Now therefore, if said notes shall he well and truly paid according to their tenor, then this deed shall be void; otherwise, to remain in full force and effect.”
Further facts are stated in the opinion.
Henry Gr. Newton and Harrison Hewitt, for the appellant (plaintiff).
Frank L. Hungerford, for the appellee (defendant).

Opinion:
Andrews, C. J.
The only question in controversy in this case is whether or not the covenant in the mortgage deed given by the defendant to the plaintiff bound the defendant to save the plaintiff harmless from all the incumbrances on the land therein conveyed, including the principal sum due to Yale University, or only bound him to save the plaintiff from the interest on that debt and other incumbrances, if any, not including the said principal sum.
The covenant, read literally, is to save the plaintiff harmless from all the incumbrances on the land. This would seem to include the principal more certainly than it does the interest. The principal was an incumbrance then outstanding. The interest, some of it at least, did not accrue until after-wards. The trial court, after hearing the evidence, decided that the defendant was not bound to save the plaintiff harmless from that principal sum.
The circumstances which were shown in evidence and which were supposed to aid the court in the construction of the deed, may be condensed from the finding and stated as follows: Edward P. Yale was the president of the Yale Brick Company, a corporation doing business in Berlin. He desired to obtain control of the stock of that company. A. J. Sloper and John B. Minor, individually and as trustees for certain others, owned #14,500 worth, par value, of that stock. If Mr. Yale could obtain their stock he could control the entire stock of the company. They were willing to exchange that stock for certain pieces of land owned by the plaintiff situated in Meriden, and to give #500 in money in addition. The plaintiff was willing to sell these pieces of land for their fair value, $7,500, but did not want the Brick Company stock. Mr. Yale was apparently without sufficient capital or credit of his own to carry out his plans. The defendant was the son-in-law of Mr. Yale. He had both capital and credit, and was desirous to aid Mr. Yale in getting control of the stock. Negotiations were had by Mr. Yale and the defendant with the plaintiff, the result of which was that the plaintiff conveyed his land to A. J. Sloper and the others. They conveyed to the defendant their stock and gave him $500 in money. The Brick Company gave to the plaintiff its note for $500 and an agreement to deliver to him $1,000 worth of brick. Mr. Yale gave to the plaintiff his three notes, each for the sum of $2,000 with interest, payable in two, three and four years from date, respectively; and the defendant gave to the plaintiff the said mortgage deed with the covenants as therein set forth.
The arrangement between these persons seems to have been a tripartite one. The plaintiff was one of these parties; the defendant and Mr. Yale were another; while Sloper and the others were the third. It may be true that as between himself and Mr. Yale the defendant was only a surety; but in this transaction with the plaintiff, he and Mr. Yale were only one party, just as Sloper and Minor and the persons for whom they were trustees were only one party.
The $500 note of the Brick Company to the plaintiff was paid. The $1,000 worth of biick were delivered; at least no question is made in respect to them in this case. The interest on Mr. Yale's three notes was paid for two years. Mr. Yale died insolvent in November, 1896. His estate has paid nothing. The Yale Brick Company went into insolvency in October, 1896, and nothing has been paid by its trustees. Yale University brought its foreclosure action in March, 1897, against the defendant and the plaintiff, and recovered judgment. The law day for the defendant expired on the first Monday of May, 1898, and for the plaintiff on the second Monday of the same month. Neither redeemed, and the title of the University became absolute. The defendant paid to the University all the interest on said debt, and all the taxes and liens on the property. He did not pay the principal. The value of that property at the date of the mortgage was $12,000; at the time of the foreclosure it was about $8,000, just the amount for which it was mortgaged to the University. The said three notes of Mr. Yale, with the interest after two years from their date, are still due and unpaid.
If by the proper construction of said mortgage deed of the defendant he covenanted therein to save the plaintiff harmless from the principal sum of the debt due to Yale University, then there is error in the judgment; that covenant has been broken, and judgment should be rendered for the plaintiff to recover the damages he has sustained, that is, the amount of the said notes and interest.
The language of this deed is the language of the defendant. He prepared the covenant. If the language is doubtful, it is because he made it doubtful. He cannot have the doubts solved in his favor. He who speaks by any writing ought to express himself with clearness. If he does not do so any doubt must be explained to the advantage of the other party. 1 Sw. Dig. 239; 1 Shep. Touch. 87. Reading the words of this deed in the light of the facts shown by the evidence, and applying to the case the rules of construction we have cited, it seems to us that the plaintiff is entitled to have the covenant read so as to save him harmless from all the incumbrances that were on the land conveyed, including the principal of the University debt as well as the interest and the liens and costs.
In the view of the ease which we have taken it is unnecessary to consider the testimony of Mr. John Q. Thayer.
Upon the facts set forth in the finding we think the plaintiff is entitled to a judgment for the notes and interest.
There is error and the judgment is set aside; the case is remanded to the Superior Court to be proceeded with according to law.
In this opinion the other judges, except Hall, J., concurred.