Case Name: The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Nathan Abramson and Aaron Fichhandler, Appellants
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1911-11-15
Citations: 147 A.D. 491
Docket Number: 
Parties: The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Nathan Abramson and Aaron Fichhandler, Appellants.
Judges: 
Reporter: Appellate Division Reports
Volume: 147
Pages: 491–494

Head Matter:
The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Nathan Abramson and Aaron Fichhandler, Appellants.
Third Department,
November 15, 1911.
Public health—foods — selling adulterated milk — cumulative penalty.
One who delivers adulterated milk to a railroad station in this State under a contract made here, whereby the. title vested in the vendees upon delivery at the shipping point and whereby they were to pay freight, is liable for the penalty for a violation of section 32 of the Agricultural Law, although it was agreed between the parties that the milk was to be sold only in New Jersey and it complied with the standard of purity in that State.
As the statute provides that “ Any person delivering milk to any * * * railway station to be shipped to any city * ■ * * shall be deemed to expose or offer the Same for sale,” the question as to whether it would be a violation of law for a resident of this State to agree with a resident of another State to deliver and sell to him in that State adulterated milk produced here, does not az-ise.
A cumulative recovery for violations of a statute will be allowed where the legislative intent is clearly expressed.
Where the statute provides that “the sale of each one of' several paek- ' ages shall constitute a separate violation,” and imposes a penalty for' each violation, a separate penalty may be recovered for each can of adulterated milk in the shipment.
Appeal by the defendants, Nathan Abramson and another, from a judgment of the Supreme Court in favor of the plaintiff, entered in the office of the clerk of the' county of Delaware on the 25th day of February, 1911, upon the verdict of a jury rendered by direction of' the court, and also from an order .entered.insaid clerk’s office on the 21st day of February, 1911, denying the defendants’ motion for a new trial made upon the minutes.
C. L. Andrus, for the appellants.
Charles R. O’Connor, for the respondent.

Opinion:
Sewell, J:
This action was brought to recover a judgment for penalties for selling adulterated, milk contrary to the provisions of section 22 of the "former Agricultural Law (Gen. Laws, chap. 33 [Laws of 1893, chap. 338],as amd. by Laws of 1907, chap. 241), which is now. section 32 of the present Agricultural Law (Consol. Laws, chap. 1; Laws of 1909, chap. 9).
The defendants operated a creamery at Dunraven in the town of Middletown, Delaware county, and during the month of October, 1908, sold to G. Kotcher and J. Breadstone, wholesale milk dealers, doing business in the city of Brooklyn and New York city, 336 cans of milk of forty quarts each. The milk was adulterated by. the defendants before it was shipped by taking from each can three and one-half quarts of cream.
The defendants claimed and gave evidence tending to show that it was understood and agreed that the milk should be sold only in the State of New Jersey, and that the milk was up to the standard in that State, but it is undisputed that the contract was made in ¡New York, that the milk was to he shipped on hoard the cars of the Delaware and Eastern Railway Company at Dunraven, and that the purchasers were to pay the freight. It was also undisputed that each can was properly marked with the name of the purchaser, that they were transported to Weehawken, and, when they arrived there, they were taken by the purchasers to the city of New York or Brooklyn, where they were sold or otherwise disposed of. It is clear, I think, that the defendants delivered the milk to the carrier with the intention to vest the title in the purchasers, and that their title was then complete; that the purchaser could thereafter transport it to any point in or without the State; that it was at their risk, and they were Hable to pay for it, although it shquld be lost. It is also to be observed that the statute in question expressly provides that "Any person dehvering milk to any butter or cheese factory, condensary, milk gathering station or railway station to be shipped to any city, town or village shall be deemed to expose or offer the same for sale whether the said milk is delivered or consigned to himself or another."
This being so, the question whether it would be a violation of the provisions of the Agricultural Law for a resident of this State to agree with a resident of a foreign State to deliver and sell him in "such foreign State adulterated or unwholesome milk is not in the case.
The only other question presented is whether the trial court correctly held that the sale of each can was a violation of the statute for which a penalty could be recovered.
The statute in question provides that "the sale of each one of several packages shall constitute a separate violation," and imposes a penalty for each violation of the law. (See Gen. Laws, chap. 33 [Laws of 1893, chap. 338], § 37, as amd. by Laws of 1901, chap. 656; now Consol. Laws, chap. 1 [Laws of 1909, chap. 9], § 52.) From this language I think it is evident that the Legislature intended that there should be cumulative recoveries. I do not see how it could make that meaning plainer. This conclusion is not in conflict with the previous decision of this court in United States Condensed Milk Co. v. Smith (116 App. Div. 15). The recovery in that case was under a statute providing a penalty for buying or selling or having in possession marked milk cans belonging to another and allowing a recovery of a penalty "for every such violation." (Laws of 1896, chap. 376, § 29, as amd. by Laws of 1902, chap. 482.) It was there held that the language of the statute limited the recovery in any action to each violation and that the possession of one can or more than One can was a single violation of the statute. It is well settled that a cumulative recovery will be allowed where the legislative intent in that respect appears in the language of the statute. (Suydam v. Smith, 52 N. Y. 383; Grover v. Morris, 73 id. 473; Griffin v. Interurban St. R. Co., 179 id. 438; 180 id. 538; People v. Spencer, 201 id. 105.)
It follows that the judgment and order appealed from should be affirmed, with costs.
All concurred.
Judgment unanimously affirmed, with costs.