Case Name: George S. Clay and Others, Appellants, v. Lucretia M. Wood and Others, Respondents
Court: New York Supreme Court, General Term
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1895-12
Citations: 98 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 398
Docket Number: 
Parties: George S. Clay and Others, Appellants, v. Lucretia M. Wood and Others, Respondents.
Judges: Follett, J., concurred.
Reporter: Supreme Court Reports (Hun)
Volume: 98
Pages: 398–409

Head Matter:
George S. Clay and Others, Appellants, v. Lucretia M. Wood and Others, Respondents.
Will — an absolute gift followed by a request — when it does not limit the fee first given.
In an action brought, among other tilings, to construe the will of William W. Clay, it appeared that after payment of his debts he gave to his wife his house and furniture and also a legacy, which he directed should he paid before any other legacies given thereby; that after making certain other bequests, he gave her all his residuary estate, which latter gift was followed by a clause in these words; “And it is my desire and request that my said wife do sustain, provide* for and educate Lucretia M. Wood, the daughter of my said adopted daughter, Josephine M. Wood. And it is my further desire and request that my wife do make the said Lucretia M. Wood, Josephine M. Wood and my nephews and nieces, the children of my brothers, Caleb S. Clay and George Clay, joint heirs after her death in the said estate, which by this will I have bequeathed to my said wife.”
After the death of the testator his widow made a will, by which she undertook to give all the property to persons other than the children of Caleb S. Clay and George Clay, and subsequently this action was brought to construe the will of William W. Clay and for an accounting.
IFdd, that under the terms of the will the widow took an absolute fee in the residuary estate;
That the clause relative, to the disposition of the residuary estate, which the testator desired his widow to make, contained merely a request;
That it did not limit the absolute gift to her of such estate, nor did it give the nephews and nieces of the testator a vested interest in the residuary estate. Parker, J., dissenting.
Appeal by tlie plaintiffs, George S. Olay and others, from a judgment, of the Supreme Court in favor of the defendants, entered in the office of the clerk of the county of New York on the 21st day of March, 1S95, upon the decision of the court, rendered after a trial at the New York Special Term dismissing the plaintiffs’ complaint.
William W. Clay died on the 21st of October, 1875, leaving a last will dated May 24, 1859. By the said will the testator devised and bequeathed his property as follows : First, he directed his debts and funeral and testamentary expenses to be paid, among which debts was included the mortgage then a lien upon his house and lot No. 23 West Thirty-first street, Now York city, provided it should not be paid before his death. Second, he gave to his wife the said house and lot and the household furniture, etc., contained in the house, and also the sum of §20,000, which sum was to be paid before any legacies thereinafter bequeathed. Third, he bequeathed to his two brothers, Caleb S. Clay and George play, and to his sister, Lucinda S. Clay, each the sum of §5,000. Fourth, he gave to his nephew William W. Clay, Jr., the son of his brother George Clay, $1,000 and one share of stock in a library association; to his nephew Edmund P. Clay, the son of his brother Caleb S. Clay, $500; and to his adopted daughter, Mrs. Josephine M. Wood, $3,000. lie then provided that, in case his estate was insufficient to pay these legacies in full after the payment of his debts, funeral expenses and legacies to his wife, these legacies should be reduced proportionably, and that in no case should they be a lien or charge upon the house and lot or household goods devised and bequeathed to his wife. The fifth clause, which occasions the controversy in this case, is as follows:
£i Fifth. All the rest, residue and remainder of iny estate, real, personal and mixed, of which I shall or may die' seized and pos sessed, or to which. I shall be entitled at the time of my decease, after paying my debts and funeral expenses and testamentary expenses and the legacies above bequeathed, I do give, devise and bequeath to my beloved wife, Lucretia 1VI. Clay, and to her heirs, executors, administrators and assigns forever. And it is my desire and request that my said wife do sustain, provide for and educate Lucretia M. Wood, the daughter of my said adopted daughter, Josephine M. Wood. And it is my further desire and request that my wife do make the said Lucretia M. Wood, Josephine M. Wood and my nephews and nieces, the children of my brothers, Caleb S. Clay and George Clay, joint heirs after her death in the said estate, which by this will I have bequeathed to my said wife.”
Shortly after the death of William W. Olay, his widow, Lucretia M. Clay, made her will, by which she undertook to give all of the property to persons other than the children of Caleb S. Clay and George Olay.
After the death of Lucretia M. Clay and the probate of her will, this action was brought to obtain a judicial construction of the will of William W. Olay, deceased, late of the city and county of New York, and for an accounting of the personal property bequeathed therein and a partition thereof, and for an account of the rents and profits and partition of the real estate devised therein.
Jolm F. Dillon, Dusk Taggart and Ila/rry Hubbard, for the appellants.
James L. Bishop, for the respondents.

Opinion:
YaN BbuNt, P. J.:
I cannot concur in the conclusion arrived at by Mr. Justice Par-KER in this case. It seems clear to me that it was not the intention of the testator to limit the estate which he had given, devised and bequeathed to his wife in such absolute and unmistakable terms by' anything that was subsequently contained in the will. It seems to me idle to suppose that the testator in one breath should give to his wife all the rest, residue and remainder of his estate and to her heirs, executors, administrators and assigns forever, and then in the very next sentence say that she should have only a life estate therein. The words do not require the assumption of any such inconsistent action upon tlie part of the testator, and in my judgment such a limitation upon the estate given to the testator's wife would be contrary to his intentions.
In the very next sentence, after having given to his wife all the residue of his estate as absolutely as it was possible for language to do so, using words of succession, which were not at all necessary, giving it to her heirs, executors, administrators and assigns forever, he says: " And it is my desire and request that my said wife do sustain, provide for and educate Lucretia M. Wood, the daughter of my said adopted daughter, Josephine M. Wood. And it is my further desire and request that my wife do make the said Lucretia M. W ood, Josephine M. Wood and my nephews and nieces, the children of my brothers, Caleb S. Olay and George Olay, joint heirs after her death in the said estate which by this will I have bequeathed to my said wife," thus in the very last words of the clause declaring that he had given the estate to his wife.
How can such language be construed to be a limitation upon an absolute gift 1 It is a request. He wished her to do it; but he did not intend to impose any obligation upon her so to do unless she saw fit to comply with his desire and request. He did not intend to give these nephews and nieces a vested interest in this estate. He put the title in his wife, and then he says: " When you get through with it I would like to have you give it to the nephews and nieces." The testator did not give it to them; he did not intend to give.it to them; he only made the request that his wife should do so, evidently intending to give her the1 option, if she saw fit, not to make such disposition of her estate, because it was hers; he said it was to be hers after his death; and it was the wife who was to give it — a thing which the testator never attempted to do. (In re Hamilton, L. E. [1895] 2 Chan. 370;)
The judgment should be affirmed, with costs.
Follett, J., concurred.