Case Name: William Green, an Infant, by Edward J. Green, his Guardian ad Litem, Respondent, v. Metropolitan Street Railway Company, Appellant
Court: New York Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1902-05-13
Citations: 171 N.Y. 201
Docket Number: 
Parties: William Green, an Infant, by Edward J. Green, his Guardian ad Litem, Respondent, v. Metropolitan Street Railway Company, Appellant.
Judges: 
Reporter: New York Reports
Volume: 171
Pages: 201–207

Head Matter:
William Green, an Infant, by Edward J. Green, his Guardian ad Litem, Respondent, v. Metropolitan Street Railway Company, Appellant.
Evidence—Privileged Communication—-Code Crv. Pro. § 834. Testimony as to how an accident happened, although the witness acquired his information from the injured party while attending him in a professional capacity as a surgeon, does not come within the prohibition of section 834 of the Code of Civil Procedure, unless it also appears that the information was “necessary to enable him to act in that capacity; ” and, in llie absence of evidence of that fact, the exclusion of such testimony, upon the ground that it is privileged, constitutes reversible error.
Green v. Met. St. liy. Go., 65 App. Div. 54, reversed.
(Argued April 14, 1902;
decided May 13, 1902.)
Appeal from a judgment of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the first judicial department, entered November 13, 1901, affirming a judgment in favor of plaintiff entered upon a verdict and an order denying a motion for a new trial.
The action was brought to recover damages for injuries received by the plaintiff from being run over by one of the defendant’s cable cars, in the city of New York. The plaintiff was a boy of . about twelve years of age, living with his father on Columbus avenue, in the vicinity of the scene of the accident. He had been delivering goods between eight and nine o’clock in the evening, and was returning to his employer’s store; when, upon reaching a point in Columbus avenue between street crossings, he stopped near a pillar of the elevated railroad and looked up and down the avenue. He saw a car coming from the north, and another, about the middle of the block, coming from the south. Witlioxit waiting for them to pass, he started to cross the avenue and was struck by the south-bound car. According to his testimony, he was thrown into the air, fell upon the track, and was caught on a small fender under the platform of the car, in front of the wheels. He was carried in that way about one hundred feet, when he fell from the fender and the car wheel cut off his leg. The trial court submitted to the jury the question whether the accident occurred through the negligence of the defendant’s servants and instructed them, whatever the degree of negligence on the part of the plaintiff in the original contact with the car, that, from the moment he was caught upon the fender, a new relation existed between the parties and any act, or omission, on the part of the defendant, exhibiting a lack of care on its part in the then situation, was sufficient to charge it with negligence.
The plaintiff recovered a verdict and the judgment thereupon was affirmed by the Appellate Division, in the first judicial department, by' a divided com-t. The defendant appealed from the affirmance to this court.
Charles F. Brown, Theodore H. Lord and Henry A Robinson for appellant.
The statement made by the plaintiff to Dr. Moorhead, the ambulance surgeon, as to how the accident happened, can in no aspect be regarded as information necessary to the plaintiff’s treatment, and should have been admitted. (People v. Koerner, 154 N. Y. 355; Brown v. R., W. & O. R. R. Co., 45 Hun, 439; Hoyt v. Hoyt, 112 N. Y. 493; People v. Schuyler, 106 N. Y. 299; Morris v. Ry. Co., 148 N. Y. 88.)
Franklin Pierce and William M. K. Olcott for respondent.
The exception taken to the refusal of the court to allow Doctor Moorhead to state what Willie Green had said to him as to how the accident happened, is not well taken. Davis v. Supreme Lodge, 165 N. Y. 163; Nelson v. Vil. of Oneida, 156 N. Y. 219; Fox v. U. T. Co., 59 App. Div. 368.)

Opinion:
Gray, J.
I think this judgment should be reversed, and that a new trial should be had, for the error in excluding the testimony of the witness, Moorhead, when asked by defendant's counsel to state " what he, (the plaintiff), said, if anything, as to how this accident happened." Moorhead was a surgeon, attached to the J. Hood Wright Hospital, and was in charge of the ambulance, which was summoned to convey the plaintiff, after meeting with his accident. It will be observed that the question called for no information, which was acquired by the surgeon to enable him to act as such. It called for evidence, merely, of what had preceded, and had caused, the accident, according to the plaintiff's knowledge. Section 834 of the Code of Civil Procedure, whose privilege has been extended to cover this question, applies, by its language, to cases where information has been acquired by a physician, or a surgeon, while " attending a patient in a professional capacity, and which was necessary to enable him to act in that capacity." We may, readily, admit that Dr. Moorhead acquired the information, which the question called for, while attending the plaintiff in a professional capacity, and, still, we would be far from the point of the legislative purpose in enacting the section of the Code. That was that the information should be of a character necessary to enable Dr. Moor-head, or the hospital staff, to act professionally upon the case. As it was observed in Edington v. Ætna Life Ins. Co., (77 N. Y. 564), "it is not sufficient to authorize the exclusion that the physician acquired, the information while attending the patient; but it must be the necessary information mentioned." The object of the statute, as we are bound to presume, was the accomplishment of a just and salutary purpose; which was that the relations between physician and patient should be protected against public disclosure, so that the patient might unbosom himself, freely, to his medical adviser and, thus, receive the full benefit of his professional skill. Surely, it could not have been intended that any truthful version of a narrative of the events leading to an accidental injury should be excluded and that was all this question called for, as it had come from the' sufferer's lips, and when fresh in his recollection. It is rather more consonant with the requirements of justice, that no witness should be prevented from giving such evidence. The burden was upon the plaintiff, in seeking to exclude this evidence of Dr. Moorhead, to bring the case within the provision of the statute, (People v. Koerner, 154 N. Y. 355), and he did not do so. It was proper to exclude testimony as to any information acquired, which was of a nature to enable a surgeon to treat the plaintiff; but it is unreasonable to say that information of how the accident happened was such as must, or might, have affected the surgical treatment required. Surely, there must be a line, which reason indicates as that where the statutory inhibition ceases. The plaintiff lost his leg, by being run over by the car, and the question of defendant's legal liability was a narrow one, as presented by the trial court, in view of its assumption that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence; hence, all the light, possible to exhibit how the injury was occasioned, should have been permitted upon the case. It seems to me that the exclusion of this evidence was an application of the Code provision, beyond all legitimate and reasonable limits, and was not in accord with the recent decision of this court in Griffiths v. The Metropolitan Street Railway Company (171 N. Y. 106).
The judgment should be reversed and a new trial granted, with costs to abide the event.