Case Name: HOLMES v. HAMILTON RIDGE LUMBER CORP'N
Court: Supreme Court of South Carolina
Jurisdiction: South Carolina
Decision Date: 1922-05-26
Citations: 120 S.C. 165
Docket Number: 10891
Parties: HOLMES v. HAMILTON RIDGE LUMBER CORP’N.
Judges: Mr. Chiee Justice Gary and Mr. Justice Marion concur.
Reporter: South Carolina Reports
Volume: 120
Pages: 165–176

Head Matter:
10891
HOLMES v. HAMILTON RIDGE LUMBER CORP’N.
(112 S. E. 536.)
1. Master- and Servant—Lumber Corporation Operating Logging Railroad Held a "Railroad Corporation” Within Constitutional Rule as to Assumption op Risk.—Where defendant corporation engaged in the manufacture of lumber operated a logging railroad for its own use, and also hauled some freight for persons who lived along its line, it. was a “railroad corporation” within Const., Art. 9, § 15, eliminating as to railroad corporations the defense of assumption of risk based on knowledge on the part of the injured servant.
2. New Trial—Granting a New Trial Because op Erroneous Charge Held Proper.—Where a trial Judge gave an erroneous charge that defendant' was not a railroad within the meaning of Const., Art. 9, § 15, granting a new trial was not an abuse of discretion.
Before Shipp, J. Hampton, Ball term, 1920.
Affirmed.
Action by William Holmes against Hamilton Ridge Lumber Corporation. Verdict for defendant, and an order for a new trial from which defendant appeals. •
Mr. Randolph Murdaugh, for appellant,
cites : Party cannot complain of error in his own requests to charge: 98 S. C., 42; 84 S. C.-, 283 “Railroad Corporation” in Sec. 15, Art. 9, Const. S. C., 1895, does not include logging railroad: Logging road liable for damages by fire under Secs. 3226 and 3098, 1 Civ. Code 1912; 110 S. C., 318. Under similar provision of Mississippi Constitution, Courts have held that such a railroad is not included: 42 So., 174. Others hold to same effect: 104 U. S., 533; 113 Fed., 385; 102 N. W., 332; 29 Atl, 1087; 25 Pac., 48; 10 L. R. A., 839; 54 So., 904; 19 S. E., 21; 64 S. E., 102.
Note: On the question as to whether logging railroad is a common carrier, see note in L. R. A., 1918-B, 685.
Messrs. Hugh O. Hmna and George Warren, for respondent,
cite: Railroad corporations: Sec. 3898, 1 Civ. Code 1912; 110 S. C., 318. Logging railroad included in the term: 54 S. C., 420; 75 S. E., 1075; 55 S. E., 727; 89 S. E. 1013; 94 S. E. 347; 94 S. E. 408; 65 L. R. A. 887; 165 S. W., 127; 148 Pac., 1122. Remedial provision should be so constructed as to advance the remdey: 48 N. E., 271.
May 26, 1922.

Opinion:
The opinion of the Court was delivered by
Mr. Justice Fraser.
The appellant, in his argument makes the following statement of the issues involved in this appeal :
"This is an action' for damages for personal injury sustained by plaintiff while making a coupling of two cars loaded with logs. The plaintiff was employed by defendant as fireman and switchman on what is known as the 'makeup' train, the engine thereof being engaged in the making up of trains of cars loaded with logs in the woods to be transported by other engines over the tramroad or railroad of the defendant from the woods to the mill. The complaint alleg'es that the defendant is a corporation engaged in the manufacture of lumber. In connection with its sawmill the defendant operates a tramroad or railroad for its own use in transporting the logs from the woods to the mill. The jury found for the defendant, and, on plaintiff's motion, a new trial was granted by the Court on the ground that the Court had erred 'in failing to charge the law set forth in Section 15, Art. 9, of the Constitution of 1895, and in regard to assumption of risk, and the Court further erred in charging the request of the defendant in conflict with said section of the Constitution, and in the general charge relating to such matters.' While there are five exceptions to the order granting a new trial, there are really but two questions involved: First, whether a request to charge can be withdrawn, and then failure to charge the law as therein requested be assigned as error on the part of the presiding Judge; and, second, whether or not an ordinary corporation, authorized under the laws of the State of South Carolina to engage in the manufacture of lumber, which in the conduct of its private business operates a logging railroad for the purpose of getting its timber from the woods to the mill, comes within the purview of Section 15, Art. 9, of the Constitution of 1895. From the order granting a new trial, defendant appeals."
In addition to this statement it is well to say that the defendant also carried freight for persons who lived along its line of railroad.
I. The first question to be determined is: Did his Honor make a mistake in charging that the defendant was not a railroad corporation within the meaning of Section 15 of Article 9 of the Constitution of this State. The record shows that the defendant was carrying on the business of a railroad corporation as to freight. The defendant is a foreign corporation, and it must be presumed that the business it was conducting was within its corporate powers. No valid reason has been suggested, and we know of none, to differentiate it from other railroad corporations in this respect. We agree with his Honor that there was error in holding that the defendant is not within the provision of Section 15 of Article 9. Appellant's first proposition cannot be sustained.
II. His Honor was not in error in holding that he had the right to grant a new trial based on the error. It is true his Honor was misled into the error by the withdrawal of -plaintiff's request to charge. The respondent who was responsible for the error could not, as a matter of right, demand a new trial. It was, however, within his Honor's discretion, when it appeared to him that there was error and prejudicial error in the case to grant a new trial. We do not see that there was -an abuse of discretion. Here there was not only a failure to charge, but a positive charge that was erroneous. There no error in granting a new trial, and the order granting a new trial is affirmed.
Mr. Chiee Justice Gary and Mr. Justice Marion concur.