Case Name: ATTORNEY U v. THE MISSISSIPPI BAR
Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Mississippi
Decision Date: 1996-06-20
Citations: 678 So. 2d 963
Docket Number: No. 92-BA-01201-SCT
Parties: ATTORNEY U v. THE MISSISSIPPI BAR.
Judges: DAN LEE, C.J., PRATHER, P.J., PITTMAN and SMITH, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 678
Pages: 963–981

Head Matter:
ATTORNEY U v. THE MISSISSIPPI BAR.
No. 92-BA-01201-SCT.
Supreme Court of Mississippi.
June 20, 1996.
James A. Becker, Jr., Leah D. McDowell, C. Maison Heidelberg, Watkins & Eager, Jackson, Myles A. Parker, Jackson, for Appellant.
Michael B. Martz, Jackson, Charles J. Mikhail, Pascagoula, for Appellee.

Opinion:
ON PETITION FOR REHEARING
JAMES L. ROBERTS, Jr., Justice,
for the Court:
INTRODUCTION
The petitions for rehearing are granted. Original opinions are withdrawn and these opinions are substituted therefor. This case is reversed and rendered, as it is now determined that ah issues are finalized.
In this matter we are presented with the opportunity to define the point at which a member of the bar has sufficient knowledge concerning an unprofessional act of another member of the bar to be compelled to report that knowledge to the disciplinary authority. The range to be considered stretches from "any information" to "personal knowledge" sufficient to qualify one as a witness under our rules of evidence. M.R.E. 602. We opt for a line short of the latter but considerably beyond the former. In the instant case, wherein the charged lawyer's chent related a story concerning his relationship with another lawyer which indicated fee-splitting, we are unable to conclude that the line was crossed. Further, we find that supplemental additional information within the record reflects that the previously remanded issue regarding improper "threats of a bar complaint to exact a settlement" was originally dismissed by the Committee on Professional Responsibility and never forwarded to the Complaint Tribunal due to the Committee's finding of a lack of probable cause to support said violations. Accordingly, we now determine this lengthy matter concluded.
I.
Pulmonary Function Laboratory (PFL) began performing pulmonary function testing and other similar services for clients of Attorney S in 1988. The details of their agreement are unclear. At the time this action was commenced there still existed a dispute between William T. McNeese, part owner of PFL, and S as to the exact financial agreement between the two of them.
In the summer of 1989, a dispute arose between S and McNeese over the amount of money S was to pay PFL. To aid them in settling this dispute, both parties obtained legal counsel with S hiring Frank Trapp and McNeese hiring attorney U. According to U, soon after he began representing McNeese, McNeese brought him a writing which he said was a proposed contract which provided for a splitting of legal fees between PFL and, at that time, an unidentified attorney. The terms of the proposed contract, as alleged by McNeese, provided that McNeese and S were to split evenly $175 of a $400 fee for each client. U advised McNeese that the proposed agreement, as written, was unenforceable because it violated the Rules of Professional Conduct. U then prepared for his client McNeese a "substitute contingent fee agreement to be used between PFL and individuals it tested and for whom it per formed other services who could not afford to pay for them, not with the attorney."
In September, 1989, MeNeese told U that PFL had been operating under an oral fee-splitting agreement with S for several months and that S was now denying the existence of the agreement and disputing the amounts owed PFL under it. MeNeese also told U "that Trapp was representing S in this dispute; and that Trapp, on behalf of S, had suggested a flat fee arrangement, though the parties were not able to agree on the amount."
There followed a series of letters between U and Frank Trapp. In a letter to Trapp dated October 10, 1989, U wrote the following:
I am advised that since February 19, 1988, 1,061 clients of Mr. [S's] have been given pulmonary function tests by Pulmonary Function Lab, and that all of these clients were referred to Mr. [S] by the lab. Pulmonary Function Laboratory had agreed with Mr. [S] to finance the testing for Mr. [S], that is, to perform the testing and to pay any medical cost involved for x-rays, physical examinations by physicians, as well as any cost involved in further evaluation or medical consultation, further x-ray readings, further physical examinations, etc. In return for handling the financing of the medical end of the cases, Pulmonary Function Laboratory was to receive one-half of any fees realized by Mr. [S] from the cases, as well as reimbursement of some of the medical costs. At that time, of course, Pulmonary Function Laboratory neither knew, nor had reason to know, of the provisions of Rule 5.4(a) of the Mississippi Rules of Professional Conduct. Mr. [S] now claims that since the Rules of Professional Conduct applying to him as a lawyer prohibit such fee-sharing, he will be unable to fulfill his obligations to Pulmonary Function Laboratory under that agreement.
In order to resolve this controversy, Pulmonary Function Laboratory is willing to do the following:
1. It will waive any claim it may have against Mr. [S] under the verbal contract.
2. Subject to a payment schedule to be agreed upon by the parties, for a flat fee of $4,000 per patient, less a credit of $200 for each patient already tested, Pulmonary Function Laboratory will....
The letter then goes on to list several services that PFL was to provide under this new proposed agreement. It concludes by saying:
Pulmonary Function Laboratory feels that under this proposal, their compensation will be significantly less than it would have been under the verbal fee sharing arrangement, but will compensate them to some extent for the risk they took in financing Mr. S's venture into asbestos litigation. I have advised Pulmonary Function Laboratory of the availability of the complaint proceedings available through the Mississippi State Bar Association. Unless something can be worked out along the lines of this proposal, it is the intention of Pulmonary Function Laboratory to seek relief through whatever legal avenues are available to it.
(Emphasis supplied.)
U again wrote Trapp on October 27, 1989:
PFL has advised me that they have had discussions with Mr. [S] and that he has agreed to pay a flat testing fee of $4,000 per client, less a credit of $200 for each client already tested by PFL. He has also agreed to renegotiate a twenty-five percent contingent fee with each of his clients previously tested by PFL. Under this flat fee arrangement, once PFL has performed the first retesting on a client, Mr. [SJ will be liable for the entire fee in accordance with the payment schedule set forth below. This flat fee is not contingent on the retested person's remaining a client of Mr. [S]'s. For the agreed flat fee, PFL will....
The letter again enumerates the services mentioned in the letter of October 10, 1989, and proposes a fee payment schedule.
On November 8, 1989, Frank Trapp wrote U:
This letter is written in response to your October 10, 1989 and October 27, 1989 letters. It also is to confirm my conversa tion with you and [your associate] on October 31,1989.
First I would reiterate, on behalf of my client, [S], that, without admitting or conceding any arrangement ever existed, he does renounce, declare void and disclaim any arrangement with Pulmonary Functions Laboratory (the "Lab") or Bill McNeese to (1) share legal fees or (2) pay compensation or give anything in connection with the referral of clients who had tests performed at the Lab. Under no circumstances shall Mr. [S] pay the Lab or Mr. McNeese any part of his legal fees. Mr. [S] shall not pay the Lab or Mr. McNeese any compensation or give anything of value for any matter that has transpired before the date of this letter, except the $400.00 fee which his clients agreed to pay to the Lab for their testing and diagnosis.
As we discussed in our meeting, the arrangement as characterized by Mr. McNeese could be held to violate criminal laws. To reiterate, Mr. [S], without admission or concession to the existence of such an arrangement, has now specifically renounced and disclaimed any such arrangement. Again, no payment will be made beyond the $400.00 which each client of Mr. S who was tested by the Lab had agreed to pay to the Lab....
In order to avoid any appearance of continuing any improper conduct, Mr. S makes absolutely no commitment or promise of future use of the Lab....
U responded on November 17,1989:
PFL has advised me that they have no intention of renouncing the fact that there was a fee-sharing arrangement between them and Mr. S. Further, PFL will do no further retesting on any of Mr. S's clients until a flat fee agreement has been negotiated and signed.
As you know, I have advised PFL of its options, including the availability of the complaint proceedings available through the Mississippi State Bar Association. Again, unless something can be worked out along the lines of a negotiated flat fee arrangement, it is the intention of PFL to seek relief through whatever legal avenues are available to it.
Please discuss this with Mr. S and inform us of his decision. If we have not received a response from Mr. S by November 27, 1989, our clients will perform no further retesting on Mr. S's clients and will pursue whatever legal remedies it considers appropriate.
U again wrote Trapp on December 1, 1989:
[My associate] has passed on to me the substance of your various recent telephone conversations. Bill McNeese informs me that the services offered by Mobile Diagnostic Center in no way compare with the nature and extent of the diagnostic and interpretive services offered by Pulmonary Function Lab. Pulmonary Function Lab is not willing to do the retesting for the $435.00 you mentioned to [my associate]. They are willing to extend their retesting period for two years, but the flat fee for providing their services still remains significantly above the figure mentioned by Mobile Diagnostic Center.
This matter has now drug [sic] on for some time. We have been instructed to obtain the necessary forms from the Mississippi State Bar Association for Pulmonary Function Laboratory to proceed unth a bar complaint against Mr. S.
(Emphasis supplied.)
The final letter was sent by Trapp to U on December 6,1989.
I am in receipt of your letter of December 1,1989. In that letter, you unilaterally announce that Bill McNeese's retesting would only be done at a significant sum above the competitive quote of $423.00 given by a pulmonologist. You did not specify what that "significant" figure is. Also, your letter again couples the demand with a reference to filing a bar complaint.
Mr. McNeese charges the clients of Paul Minor and other lawyers less than the $400.00 fee paid for the initial testing. I ask you: How can Mr. [S] justify having his clients pay a $4,000.00 or other "significantly" higher fee when his clients can obtain the equivalent services for $423.00?, It was at [your associate's] request that we obtained written verification of that quote. Having complied with her request, how can we now ignore that quote?
Everyone recognizes the arrangement alleged by Mr. McNeese would be an unenforceable contract. Moreover, that alleged arrangement runs afoul with the spirit of the runner and champerty statutes. Thus it is clear Mr. McNeese's demand for $4,000.00 per client is either (1) to pay blackmail to keep Mr. McNeese from filing a complaint with the bar association or (2) to pay Mr. McNeese for allegedly referring clients to Mr.[S]. In either case, the payment would be illegal.
Over the past several weeks, I had talked with [your associate] about the situation. I reiterated Mr. [S]'s disavowal of the arrangement alleged by Mr. McNeese....
Your letter of December 1, 1989 is a unilateral rejection of our good faith effort to come up with a fair fee schedule. Your letter does not state what figure you are referring to that is "significantly above the [$423.00 quote]." I can only assume it is another effort to extract some excessive fee from Mr. [S]. Any payment on that basis would not be legitimate. I cannot advise my client to agree with any fee schedule which is only a guise for an illegal payment.
(Emphasis original.)
U did not reply to this letter. In January," 1990, McNeese filed a bar complaint against S. One year later, in January of 1991, S filed a bar complaint against U. U never filed a bar complaint against S.
S's complaint against U was investigated by the bar's Assistant General Counsel who found that "the evidence does not establish 'probable cause' that S violated Rules 1.16(a) (mandatory withdrawal), 1.2(d) (counseling a client to engage in, or assist a client in conduct the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent), or 8.4(d) (conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice)." Accordingly, the issue of "threats of a bar complaint to exact a settlement" was determined to be lacking probable cause, thus without merit, and was not forwarded to a Complaint Tribunal to pursue formal charges as required by Smith v. Mississippi State Bar, 475 So.2d 148, 149-50 (1985) and Rule of Discipline 7.1. As the Court is "bound by its own disciplinary rules," The Mississippi Bar v. Attorney G, 630 So.2d 344, 348 (1994), we are unable to properly address the issue of "threats of a bar complaint to exact a settlement" because the Complaints Committee did not file a Formal Complaint with the Clerk of this Court as required by Disciplinary Rule 8(a) and Attorney G.
On March 20,1992, the Committee on Professional Responsibility of the Mississippi Bar issued a directive to General Counsel to "prepare and file a Formal Complaint against U, in accordance with the provisions of Rule 8 of the Rules of Discipline for the Mississippi State Bar." The complaint was duly filed and the issue joined. This Formal Complaint concerned the alleged failure of U to report professional misconduct.
A motion styled Complainant's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, or in the Alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment was filed by the Mississippi Bar on September 4, 1992. This motion asked the Complaint Tribunal to grant either a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings under M.R.C.P. Rule 12(c) or a Motion for Summary Judgment under M.R.C.P. Rule 56 on the grounds that:
1. The material facts alleged in the Bar's Formal Complaint . are admitted by [U] in his Answer and Defenses, . except that he denies personal knowledge of certain facts and denies characterizations by the Bar of the contents of certain letters attached as exhibits to the Formal Complaint, as is more fully argued in the Bar's Memorandum Brief accompanying this Motion; or
2. The pleadings . and the affidavits of Mr. [U] . and William T. McNeese, . show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the Bar is entitled to a judgment in its favor as a matter of law, as is more fully argued in the Bar's Memorandum Brief accompanying this Motion.
Affidavits by U and McNeese accompanied the Mississippi Bar's motion. In his affidavit, dated February 18,1991, U stated:
2. When my firm and I were first engaged by Mr. Bill McNeese of Pulmonary Function Laboratory (PFL) we were asked to review a proposed fee splitting agreement between PFL and one or more unidentified attorneys. This was in August 1989. I did not learn at that time that PFL was supposedly operating with any attorney under any such agreement.
3. We expressed our professional opinion about the agreement furnished to us by PFL for review. We prepared a substitute agreement for a contingent fee arrangement between PFL and certain individuals for whom PFL proposed to do testing and to render other services.
4. Thereafter, in September, 1989, I learned for the first time that PFL was (and had been for several months) operating under an oral fee-splitting arrangement with [S]. At about that same time I learned that Mr. [S] was disputing the amount he owed PFL and was disputing the enforceability of the alleged agreement with PFL. Several months later in 1990,1 learned that Mr. [S] had supposedly prepared the agreement which McNeese brought to our firm in August, 1989.
7. At all times material hereto, I have been told by PFL and its principals that PFL had an agreement with [S] pursuant to which PFL was to refer persons it tested to [S] for representation in asbestosis claims, was to perform services in addition to mere testing, and was not to be paid for its services until the persons being tested received payment of settlements.
12. I never threatened or coerced either Mr. [S] or his attorney. I never sought to extort anything from either of them. I never told Mr. Trapp or Mr. [S] of any intent to file a bar complaint except as stated in my letters which are exhibits to the complaint.
13. I certainly never personally threatened or otherwise said that I would file a bar complaint against Mr. [S] because I have never known to my personal knowledge that he committed any violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct. In any event, PFL, the party claiming such conduct on the part of Mr. [S], filed a complaint against him within ninety (90) days of telling me of its complaint against Mr. [S].
14.I have not sought at any time material hereto to induce anyone to commit any crime or to violate the Rules of Professional Conduct of the Mississippi State Bar and I have not done so myself.
Parts of McNeese's affidavit, dated February 14,1991, are also quite illuminating:
2. In August, 1989, on behalf of PFL, a general partnership, I retained [U's firm] to assist the laboratory in formulating a proposed contingency fee contract to be executed between the laboratory and its clients who desired pulmonary function testing, but could not afford to pay for it. I presented the attorneys with a sample contract which they thought was prepared by PFL. I did not tell the attorneys until later that, in fact, the suggested contract had been prepared by Mr.[S].
3. A month or so after retaining [the firm] for that purpose, I later consulted with Mr. [U] and [an associate of the firm] with regard to a dispute between PFL and Mr. [S], an attorney representing some asbestosis claimants, on whom pulmonary function testing had been performed by PFL. That was the first time they were told of Mr. [S]'s involvement in any contract with PFL....
4. In the course of my discussions with Mr. [U] and [the associate] about the ethical prohibitions of Mr. [S] entering into a fee-splitting arrangement with PFL, as PFL contended he had done, Mr. [U] advised me that if, in fact, such an agreement had existed, it might be the basis for a complaint with the Mississippi State Bar Association against Mr. [S] by PFL.
5. At no time prior to PFL filing a bar complaint against Mr. [S] did Mr. [U] encourage PFL to file such a bar complaint, nor did Mr. [U] advise PFL that it should use the threat of a bar complaint as a means of forcing Mr. [S] to resolve the differences between [sic] he and PFL.
6. Once PFL realized that it .had the basis for a bar complaint against Mr. [S], it was my intention to file such a bar complaint. .
7. The first suggestion to PFL that a flat fee agreement might be entered into between Mr. [S] and PFL, in lieu of the prior contingency fee agreement, was made to me by the attorney for Mr. [S ]. The $4,000.00 flat fee proposal made on behalf of PFL to Mr. [S] suggested in Mr. [U]'s letter to Mr. Frank Trapp of October 27, 1989, was in lieu of the former agreement and was for services to be provided by PFL over and above the usual pulmonary function testing provided in such cases.
(Emphasis original.)
U filed a cross-motion for summary judgment. In it, he stated that he "did not have knowledge " that S or any other attorney had violated the Rules of Professional Conduct. He further stated that he had no knowledge of a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct by another attorney that "raised a substantial question as to that lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects" and that he had no duty to inform the appropriate professional authority of S's alleged conduct.
The day after he submitted his cross-motion for summary judgment, U submitted an affidavit in support of this motion dated September 9,1992. In it he stated:
2. I make the following statements so the record in this matter will be perfectly clear, (a) I do not now, nor have I ever had, personal knowledge that Mr. S engaged in any conduct which violated any of the Mississippi Rules of Professional Conduct. (b) My only knowledge of Mr. S's conduct is what my client told me. (c) When I first confronted Mr. S's attorney with the "facts" as recited to me by my client, that attorney vehemently denied that his client had engaged in any conduct which constituted a violation of the Mississippi Rules of Professional Conduct, (d) Mr. S's attorney had persisted in that denial and, so far as I know, persists in that denial and, so far as I know, persists in that denial to this day.
3. I have never been told, nor have I otherwise learned, that Mr. S is alleged to have engaged in any conduct prohibited by the Mississippi Rules of Professional Conduct, except his alleged (but steadfastly denied) violation of Rule 5.4(a).
A hearing was held on this matter before the Complaint Tribunal on September 25, 1992. The Tribunal unanimously found that there was no genuine issue of material fact and that U had violated Rule 8.3(a) and 8.4(a) of the Rules of Professional Conduct. U's cross-motion for summary judgment was denied. The Bar's motion was treated as one for summary judgment and granted. Based on its conclusion that a violation had occurred the Tribunal imposed a sanction of public reprimand.
U filed a Notice of Appeal to this Court on November 24,1992.
II.
a.
This Court conducts a:
de novo review in a bar disciplinary matter which necessarily includes a review of the sanctions imposed. Hoffman v. MS State Bar Association, 508 So.2d 1120, 1124 (Miss.1987); Myers v. Mississippi State Bar, 480 So.2d 1080, 1089 (Miss.1985). Deference is accorded the findings of the Complaint Tribunal but this Court "has the non-delegable duty of ultimately satisfying itself as to the facts, and reaching such conclusions and making such judgments as it considers appropriate and just."
Mississippi State Bar v. Varnado, 557 So.2d 558, 559 (Miss.1990).
Furthermore, although "Bar disciplinary proceedings are quasi-criminal in nature," Attorney Q v. Mississippi State Bar, 587 So.2d 228, 231 (Miss.1991), "[t]he beyond-a-reasonable doubt standard does not apply; rather, we require an intermediate level of certainty regarding the facts at issue, to-wit; a clear and convincing evidence standard." Id. at 232.
b.
Rule 8.3(a) of the Mississippi Rules of Professional Conduct reads:
A lawyer having knowledge that another lawyer has committed a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct that raises a substantial question as to that lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects, shall inform the appropriate professional authority.
M.R.P.C. Rule 8.3(a).
The central issue here is whether the attorney in question had sufficient knowledge of another attorney's misconduct to require his reporting it to the proper authority. Proper determination of this issue is hampered by Rule 8.3(a)'s failure to define "knowledge." The Official Comment adds nothing at all. "Self-regulation of the legal profession requires that members of the profession initiate disciplinary investigation when they know of a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct-" M.R.P.C. Rule 8.3(a), Official Comment. The Terminology section of the Rules does not define "knowledge" but it does define similar terms. " 'Knowingly,' 'Known', or 'Knows' denotes actual knowledge of the fact in question. A person's knowledge may be inferred from circumstances." M.R.P.C. Terminology. Nowhere, however, is "actual knowledge" defined. Black's Law Dictionary defines "actual" in part as "a legal term in contradistinction to virtual or constructive....'' Black's Law Dictionary (4th ed.1968). The term can be definitively viewed only as something other than constructive or imputed knowledge. Black's relates definitions of the term "knowledge" ranging from "acquaintance with fact or truth" to "information and circumstances which engender belief to moral certainty or induce state of mind that one considers that he knows." Id.
This question has rarely been addressed by the courts, and this is the first instance for this Court. We have found but three cases discussing the duty to report, Matter of Lefkowitz, 105 A.D.2d 161, 483 N.Y.S.2d 281 (A.D. 1 Dept.1984); In re Himmel, 125 III.2d 531, 127 Ill.Dee. 708, 533 N.E.2d 790 (1988); and In re Ethics Advisory Panel Opinion No. 92-1, 627 A.2d 317 (R.I.1993). Unfortunately, all fail to discuss "knowledge."
Various state bar associations through their Ethics Opinions treated the subject. The Maine Professional Ethics Commission of the Board of Overseers of the Bar wrote in 1989, "The lawyer has no duty to report the other lawyer's misconduct to disciplinary authorities unless the lawyer himself has knowledge, based on a substantial degree of certainty, that the lawyer has committed an offense that raises a substantial question regarding his honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness to practice law." Maine Ethics, Op. 100 (1989). The Advisory Committee of the Nebraska State Bar Association has also addressed this issue, writing, "[BJecause knowledge in the reporting rule means more than a suspicion, a lawyer need not report mere suspicions of code violations." Nebraska Ethics, Op. 89-4, (undated). That opinion does not, however, reach the issue as to what must be reported.
According to the Advisory Opinions Committee of the State Bar of New Mexico:
The duty to report misconduct is mandatory and arises when a lawyer has a substantial basis for believing a serious ethical violation has occurred, regardless of the source of that information. This "substantial basis" test for knowledge of misconduct is intended to be greater than a "mere suspicion" or "probable cause" testWhile no duty to report arises without a substantial basis for knowledge of misconduct, a lawyer may choose to report information of misconduct to the appropriate professional authority.
New Mexico Ethics, Op.1988-8 (undated).
The Committee on Professional Ethics of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York gives one of the stricter definitions of knowledge stating, "The degree of certainty required to constitute knowledge under the rule must be greater than a mere suspicion; the reporting lawyer must be in possession of facts that clearly establish a violation of the disciplinary rules." New York City Ethics, Op. 1990-3 (1990). In contrast, the guidelines given by the Committee on Legal Ethics and Professional Responsibility of the Pennsylvania Bar Association appear more subjective — "If the lawyer believes that opposing counsel's conduct raises a substantial question about his honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness to practice, then the lawyer should report the other lawyer's misconduct to the disciplinary counsel." Pennsylvania Ethics, Op. 89-247 (undated). It is unclear from the materials available, however, whether the word "believed" refers to the legal conclusion whether the conduct is a violation or to the factual conclusion whether the conduct occurred.
Just recently the District of Columbia Bar adopted the position that a lawyer is compelled to report "only if she has a clear belief that misconduct has occurred, and possesses actual knowledge of the pertinent facts." D.C. Bar, Op. 246 (Revised 1994).
An excellent discussion of "knowledge" in the context of the Rules of Professional Conduct can be found in The Law of Lawyering by Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., and W. William Hodes. Section 402 states:
In the final analysis, all conclusions about someone else's state of mind must be derived from circumstantial evidence. Where a rule provides that a lawyer "reasonably should have known," the reference is to circumstances that would lead to awareness on the part of reasonable people with a lawyer's training. But circumstantial evidence must also be the basis for inferring a lawyer's actual knowledge or belief, where that is the relevant legal standard. It is impossible to look into a lawyer's head, and it is unacceptable simply to take his word for his state of mind when the probity of his own conduct is at issue. As the Terminology section points out, a person's belief or knowledge "may be inferred from circumstances."
This practical method of proof has enormous significance. Even where a violation requires "knowledge," the circumstances may be such that a disciplinary authority will infer that a lawyer must have known. In such a ease the lawyer will be legally chargeable as if actual knowledge had been proved. In terms of what can be proved, the "knows" standard thus begins to merge with the "should have known" standard, for often it will be impossible to believe that a lawyer lacked knowledge unless he deliberately tried to evade it. But one who knows enough to evade legally significant knowledge already knows too much.
Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., and W. William Hodes, The Law of Lawyering § 402 (1993).
Hazard and Hodes write of a lawyer's unbelief as opposed to his knowledge:
Although his professional role may require a lawyer to take a detached attitude of unbelief, the law of lawyering does not permit a lawyer to escape all accountability by suspending as well his intelligence and common sense.
. [A]ll authorities agree . that there comes a point where only brute rationalization, moral irresponsibility, and pure sophistry can support the contention that the lawyer does not "know" what the situation is.
Id., at § 403.
Here is the Hazard and Hodes pragmatic approach to knowledge:
[A] lawyer's conduct will be assessed according to a legal standard that assumes a lawyer can "know" the truth of a situation, even if he cannot be absolutely sure. Even the criminal law, after all, does not require absolute certainty; it requires only a conclusion that is beyond a reasonable doubt. As noted in § 402, the law of law-yering as set forth in the Terminology section of the Rules of Professional Conduct permits a disciplinary authority to "infer from circumstances" that a lawyer knows what a reasonable person would know. More than this, the law takes account of a lawyer's legal training and experience in assessing his or her state of mind. A lawyer is an adult, a man or a woman of the world, not a child. He or she is also better educated than most people, more sophisticated and more sharply sensitized to the legal implications of a situation. The law will make inferences as to a lawyer's knowledge with those considerations in mind.
Looking forward into his professional conduct as it proceeds, a lawyer must imagine how his conduct will appear to others, later looking back at it. And he must imagine the inferences that -will be drawn as to what he must have known at the time. In pragmatic terms, this is what a lawyer knows.
Id., at § 404.
U would have this court define "actual knowledge" as "personal knowledge". Only if a lawyer had such knowledge as would enable him to testify as a witness that a another lawyer had violated the Rules of Professional Conduct would he have to inform the proper authorities. We believe that a higher standard may be fairly inferred to be required. That standard must be an objective one, however, not tied to the subjective beliefs of the lawyer in question. The supporting evidence must be such that a reasonable lawyer under the circumstances would have formed a firm opinion that the conduct in question had more likely than not occurred and that the conduct, if it did occur, raises a substantial question as to the purported offender's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness to practice law in other respects.
c.
The circumstances under consideration here reflect that U's client told him of an arrangement which appeared to be fee splitting. The record tells us nothing concerning corroboration of the client's story or of the client's trustworthiness. The other party to the purported arrangement denies that it existed. These circumstances do not dictate a firm opinion on the part of a reasonable lawyer that the conduct in fact occurred.
It is suggested that the fact that the lawyer relied upon what he was told by his client to assert the client's claim is significant. The fact that in one of the affidavits U states that he "learned" of the fee splitting arrangement is also fastened upon as supportive of a finding of a violation. A moment's reflection would reveal the fallacy of these arguments.
It is not for the lawyer to believe or disbelieve the client. Ultimately, it is for the fact-finder, either judge or jury. A lawyer must be free to assert his client's claims, at least until there is evidence apparent that the client is lying. The state of mind necessary to assert the claim, however, falls well short of that required for a "firm opinion" as to whether specific conduct occurred. We must allow lawyers at least this degree of detachment if we are to assure the competent and vigorous representation essential to our adversary system of justice.
As to the affidavit, the argument is seman-tical. It is clear from all that has been introduced in this case, that the evidence of an improper arrangement is confined to the unsworn description of a client. U clearly denied knowing of such an arrangement by any other means. Indeed, in the same paragraph in which he said he "learned" he referred to it as an "alleged" agreement. This is clearly not an admission of personal knowledge. Neither is it an admission of a firm opinion.
As measured by the standard we announce here, the proof falls short of that necessary to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that lawyer U had sufficient evidence before him such that any reasonable lawyer would have formed a firm opinion that the conduct alleged by his client had in fact occurred.
Because we conclude that the evidence was insufficient to support a finding of "knowledge" we need not reach the issue whether the alleged entry into a fee-splitting arrangement, which was apparently renounced before any fees were actually split, was conduct bearing on S's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness to practice law. We pause only to note that a lawyer is not obliged to report every transgression of our disciplinary rules, only the most serious of them. M.R.P.C. Rule 8.3(a), Comment.
Whether a particular violation of the disciplinary rules meets the "substantial question" test must be determined on a case-by-case basis, using "a measure of judgment" rather than a clear litmus test. Advisory opinions from other jurisdictions are somewhat helpful in this regard but suggest no bright line test. Compare Arizona Op. 87-26 (failure to file tax returns should have been reported), Alabama Op. 90-97 (same for misappropriation of escrow funds), and New Mexico Op.1988-8 (same for attempt to bribe witnesses); with Illinois Op. 90-36 (threats to bring criminal charges to gain advantage in a civil suit need not be reported), Virginia Op. 962 (1987) (same for attempt to persuade clients to change wills to detriment of Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals), and Pennsylvania Op. 88-225 (same for failure to comply with statute of limitations).
D.C. Bar, Op. 2⅛6.
There are eases and opinions from other jurisdictions dealing with the question of fee-splitting. Where substantial sanctions are imposed, the fee-splitting transgression is usually attended by other misconduct. It should suffice to say, however, that the sanction to be imposed in a particular case will depend upon all of the attendant circumstances. State Bar of Texas v. Faubion, 821 S.W.2d 203 (Tex.Ct.App.1991); In the Matter of an Anonymous Member of the South Carolina Bar, 295 S.C. 25, 367 S.E.2d 17 (1988); The Florida Bar v. Stafford, 542 So.2d 1321 (Fla.1989); In the Matter of Elias Quintana, 104 N.M. 511, 724 P.2d 220 (1986); In re Clarence A Potts, 301 Or. 57, 718 P.2d 1363 (1986); Committee on Professional Ethics and Conduct of the Iowa State Bar Ass. v. Lawler, 342 N.W.2d 486 (Iowa 1984); Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Jackson, 536 Pa. 26, 637 A.2d 615 (1994); In the Matter of Charles E. Houston, 314 S.C. 94, 442 S.E.2d 175 (1994); and In the Matter of Theodore Friedman, 196 A.D.2d 280, 609 N.Y.S.2d 578 (1994).
.III.
Having found that U never had a Formal Complaint filed with the Clerk of this Court to pursue charges against him for violation of M.R.P.C. 1.16(a), or 1.2(d), the issue regarding the "threats of a bar complaint to exact a settlement" was not previously and is not now properly before the Court. Additionally, to institute disciplinary proceedings at the appellate level raises glaring due process concerns. See In the Matter of Richard Thalheim, Jr., Plaintiff-Appellant, 853 F.2d 383, 388 (5th Cir.1988); The Mississippi Bar v. Attorney G, 630 So.2d 344, 348 (1994). Accordingly, there is no issue requiring remand, and instead the Court is required to render this aspect of the case.
A significant amount of time has elapsed since this dispute began, and this opinion is the final word in the charges, counter-charges, hearings and findings which have occurred. The time has come to put an end to this matter once and for all. We do not in any manner condone the alleged acts of U, but are required to construe the disciplinary rules strictly. Therefore, U will not have any more disciplinary proceedings instigated against him with regard to the issues already addressed by this Court or originally found to be lacking probable cause by the Complaints Committee absent a reinstitution of proceedings by the Bar Complaints Committee. It is hoped that similar cases shall not arise. Those so tempted would be better served by persistent and continual study of the Mississippi Rules of Professional Conduct. The conclusion of this ease is based upon its peculiar history, as are all eases, and its very close decision affords little comfort to those who may be similarly situated.
IV.
For the aforementioned reasons, the judgment of the Complaint Tribunal is reversed and this matter is rendered consistent with this opinion.
REVERSED AND RENDERED.
DAN LEE, C.J., PRATHER, P.J., PITTMAN and SMITH, JJ., concur.
MILLS, J., concurs in result only.
BANKS, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with separate written opinion joined by SULLIVAN, P.J., and McRAE, J.
McRAE, J., dissents with separate written opinion.
. Several portions of Justice Bank's original majority opinion have been used verbatim, as those portions accurately explain the procedural history and facts involved.