Case Name: Kline & Berry v. Wynne, Haynes & Co.
Court: Supreme Court of Ohio
Jurisdiction: Ohio
Decision Date: 1859-12
Citations: 10 Ohio St. 223
Docket Number: 
Parties: *Kline & Berry v. Wynne, Haynes & Co.
Judges: Brinkerhoee, C. J.-, and Scott and Peck, JJ., concurred.
Reporter: Ohio State Reports, New Service
Volume: 10
Pages: 179–190

Head Matter:
*Kline & Berry v. Wynne, Haynes & Co.
A court is not authorized to grant a new trial for the cause .of error of law occurring at the trial (the cause provided by the 8th subdivision of section 297 of the code), unless the decision of the court upon the matter of law was excepted to by the party making the application, at the time the decision was made. If the exception, though in fact taken, be not reduced to writing during the term, it is to be regarded, in'law, as no exception; and the court has no power to dispense with this consequence by a continuance of the motion for a new trial.
Error to the Superior Court of Cincinnati.
The petition of the plaintiffs, filed in the Superior Court of Cin•cinnati, on the 24th of September, 1856, stated, that the plaintiffs, on the 16th of'September, 1856, were the owners of a certain stock of dry goods, clothing, and jewelry, of the value of nine thousand seven hundred and sixty-one dollars and thirty-five cents, contained in a certain frame house in the town of M ount Sterling, in the county ■of Brown, and State of Illinois ; that plaintiffs held the said personal property in their possession, and were justly entitled to the .same; that on the said 16th day of September, the defendants, with a knowledge of the plaintiffs’ right, caused the said stock of goods to be taken away from the possession of the plaintiffs and converted to the use of them, the defendants; whereby the plaintiffs have been deprived of the said property, and have been damaged by the acts of the defendants to the amount of the value of said property. And a judgment was asked for the said sum of $9,761.35 with interest from the 16th of September, 1856, and for costs.
To the petition of the plaintiffs, the defendants filed an answer, •stating, “ that the said plaintiffs were not, on the 16th day of Sep tember, a. d. 1856, the owners of a certain stock of dry goods,, clothing, and jewelry, of the value of nine thousand seven hundred and sixty-one dollars and thirty-five cents, as alleged in their said petition, nor of any other stock of goods of any value-whatever ; ” and “further, that they did not, with a knowledge of plaintiffs1 right and in defiance of said right, cause the said stock of goods to be taken away from the plaintiffs and converted to-the use of said defendants, as is alleged in said petition.”
At the April term, 1857, of the Superior Court of Cincinnati, the issue thus made, was submitted to a jury, and a verdict rendered for the defendants.
At the same term, the plaintiffs filed a motion for a new trial, assigning as reasons : “ 1. The court misdirected the jury as to the law; 2. The verdict was against the evidence.” “And the cause-was to the next, to wit, the term of May, 1857, continued.”
At the May term, 1857, the defendants filed an agreement to the effect that the judgment in this action should not be relied upon as a bar to another action; and “ upon the 30th day of May, of the term and year last aforesaid, this cause having been brought on for a hearing upon the verdict, motion for a new trial, and the-aforesaid agreement of the defendants, judgment as follows was-had and entered : The motion of the plaintiffs for a new trial coming on to be heard, the defendants in open court agree, that if the plaintiff, Benjamin Berry, or Kline & Berry, shall hereafter bring-an action for the recovery of the jewelry named in the proceedings-of the sherriff of Lasalle county, Illinois, as it appears in the testimony on file in this cause, that the defendants will not plead the-judgment in this case as a bar to the right of the said Berry, or Kline & Berry, to recover said jewelry, or its value, and that any suit or action hereafter to be brought for said jewelry, shall be tried upon its merits, and as if this action had not been brought or a judgment rendered therein; and thereupon the court overruled the said motion for a new trial. Therefore, it is considered" by the court that the said defendants go hence without day, and recover of the said ^plaintiffs their costs herein to be taxed. And now come the said plaintiffs and tender to the court their bill of exceptions herein, which is by the court signed and sealed, and ordered to be made part of the record.”
The bill of exceptions thus allowed and signed at the May term, 1857, states:. “That on the trial of this cause, the plaintiffs, to-. Maintain the issue on their part, offered testimony tending to show that on the-day of September, A. d. 1856, the plaintiffs were the owners, and were in possession of the goods and chattels described in their petition, in the town of Mount Sterling, Illinois; and that, on said day, the sheriff of the county of Lasalle, in Illinois, by virtue of a writ of attachment, issued in a suit wherein said defendants were plaintiffs, and one Jacob Eice was defendant, seized said goods as the property of said Eice, and took the same from the possession of the plaintiffs, and that said chattels were of the value of nine thousand dollars, and rested. The defendants, to maintain the issue on their part, offered in evidence the testimony of Edward Samos, tending to contradict the said testimony of the plaintiffs as to the ownership and value of the said goods and chattels, and rested. And the testimony of both parties having closed, plaintiffs thereupon asked the court to charge the jury that the only issue made by the pleadings, as to the right of recovery in the case, was whether the ownership of said goods and chattels was in the plaintiffs at the time of said seizure, stated in the petition; which charge ■the court declined to give, and charged the jury that the following issue was made in the pleadings, viz : 1. Whether the defendants •caused such seizure to be made; 2. Whether, at the time of the seizure, they belonged to the plaintiffs. To which ruling and •charge the plaintiffs’ counsel excepted. The jury found a verdict for the defendants. The plaintiffs moved the court for a new trial, on the ground that the court had misdirected the jury, and that the verdict was against the law and the evidence; which motion the •court ^overruled, and gave judgment upon the verdict for the defendants; to which said ruling and judgment of the court, the plaintiffs, by their counsel, excepted.”
Upon a petition in error, filed in the Superior Court of Cincinnati in general term, the judgment of the court at special term was ■affirmed.
To reverse this judgment of affirmance, a petition in error was filed in this court.
B. M. Corwine, for plaintiffs in error.
Jolliffe & Gitchell, for defendants in error.

Opinion:
Gholson, J.
The error assigned in this case is the refusal of the court to grant a new trial, upon the ground of a misdirection to the jury. The code provides, as one of the causes for which a verdict shall be vacated and a new trial granted, " error of law occurring at the trial, and excepted to by the party making the application." Sec. 297, subd. 8. Another cause provided-in the same-section is, " That the verdict, report, or decision is not sustained by sufficient evidence, or is contrary to law." Subd. 6. If the error1 of law, occurring at the trial, be such as to make the verdict contrary to law, a new trial should be granted, though no exception was taken to the ruling of the court. It is evident, therefore, that, the cases intended to be reached by the eighth subdivision of section 297 are those in which a party, by taking an exception to a ruling of the court, is in a condition to attack the verdict upon a ground which does not involve an inquiry into the whole merits of the case. The errors of law, within the meaning of the eighth subdivision, embrace those occurring not only in the direction of the court to the jury, but in the admission or rejection of evidence. Instances very frequently occur in practice. Evidence is offered which is objected to as irrelevant; it is received, and an exception is taken. A charge is asked and refused, and an exception Mistaken. To make such exceptions available, so much of the evidence as is necessary to explain them, and no more, need be stated. Code, sec. 292. The court which, upon a proceeding in error, inquires into these exceptions, can only determine whether they should have been allowed or disallowed, and has nothing to do with the general merits of the case. Now, if the judge who presided at the trial becomes convinced that, in any such rulings to which an exception was taken, there was error in law, which in a court of eri'or would lead to a reversal of the judgment he might render on the verdict, it is both proper and convenient that he should be allowed to grant a new trial, and thus save the expense and delay of the application to a court of error. But, if no exception betaken, or an exception be not taken in such a manner as to be available in a court of error, the pxdnciple does not apply, and a new trial ought not to be granted, unless the justice of the case should so require. It would so require if the verdict was contrary to law; but every misdirection of the court, or error of law occurring at the trial, does not make the verdict contrary to law.
In New York, from the code of which state ours was to a considerable extent borrowed, the distinction to which we have referred, is stated, as between a motion for a new trial on a case and on a bill of exceptions. Under the English practice, a motion for a new trial could not be made upon the bill of exceptions. The question upon the motion for a new trial always was, whether substantial justice had' been done. And we believe the practice was to require a party who relied upon a bill of exceptions, to go to the court of evror, or if he preferred being heard upon a motion for a new trial upon the ground of misdirection, to waive his bill of exceptions. It was not deemed proper, as a general rule, to allow the matter to be .twice heard.
The distinction between a motion for a new trial, upon a bill of exceptions or for error of law occurring at the *trial and on a case, or upon a full statement of all that occurred at the trial, is quite manifest. The distinction is between the demand of another trial ex debito justitice, on the ground of error appearing on the record, and the asking another trial to be granted in the discretion of the court, because injustice has been suffered. In the one case only the alleged matter of error is examined, and if found as alleged a venire de novo is awarded; in the other, all the facts and circumstances are considered, and a now trial is granted, as the discretion of the court may determine. Bank of Ireland v. Evans' Trustees, 5 Ho. L. Cas. 389-405; Lord Trimlestown v. Kemmis, 9 Cl. & Fin. 749-770; Zeller v. Eckert, 4 How. 289, 297; Kinney v. Beverly, 2 Hen. & Munf. 313-327.
A party who claims a new trial upon points of law, irrespective of the justice and merits of the case, has no right to complain, if he is required, not only to take his exception at the proper time, but to procure the evidence of it required by law, and within the time which the law requires.
The code defines an exception to be " an objection taken to a decision of the court upon a matter of law." Sec. 290. "The party objecting to the decision must except at the time the decision is made, and time may be given to reduce the exceptton to writing, but hot beyond the term." Sec. 291. "As to the propriety, nay, as to the absolute necessity of this rule, there can be no controversy. The whole matter should be closed, while all the facts and circumstances are fresh in the recollection of the counsel and the court. To postpone it to a subsequent term, would or might be a fruitful cause of error and mistake. But, even if there were doubt as to the policy of the rule, there can be no doubt as to the positive provisions of the law." Hicks v. Person, 19 Ohio, 426, 437. And yet, if upon a motion for a new trial, for the cause of error of law occurring at the trial, a continuance of that motion to a subsequent *term, will enable the court to reduce the exception to writing at such subsequent term, with precisely the same effect as if it had been done at the trial term, it is evident that the rule would have no positive or binding obligation, but might, in every case, be dispensed with at the pleasure, or in the discretion, of the court. We are satisfied that such was not the intention of the legislature. The court is not authorized to grant a new trial, for the causo of error of law occurring at the trial, unless excepted to by the party making the application, and if the exception be not reduced to writing during the term, in law there was no exception. The court has no power to dispense with this consequence, by a continuance of the motion for a new trial.
It may be said that the views we have stated are in conflict with the opinion of the court, in the case of Coleman v. Edwards, 5 Ohio St. 51. It. might suffice to say, that the code which now regulates our practico, did not apply to that case. And, certainly, since the code, it can not be claimed, as appears to have been held in that case, that a party is entitled to a new trial for a misdirection to the jury, although he took no exception. The only point which the code leaves in any doubt, is the one which has been considered, the effect of a continuance of the. motion for a new trial to dispense with the necessity of reducing the exception to writing during the term at which it is taken. But we do not desire to be understood as admitting that the code really made any substantial difference in the former law or practice as to granting motions for new trials. And we suppose that the act of March 12, 1845, in view of which the cases before cited, of Hicks v. Person, and Coleman v. Edwards, were decided, was not intended to affect the rules and practice of the inferior courts in granting or refusing new trials, but to aliow their action in such cases to be reviewed upon a bill of exceptions and writ of error. When the only ground for a new trial is a misdirection to the jury, not excepted to, and * therefore not available upon a proceeding in error, neither the court acting in the .first instance upon the motion, nor the court reviewing that action, can be bound to grant a new trial as a matter of right, when it is apparent that, notwithstanding an error in the direction of the court, real and substantial justice has been done. As before observed, a party who sits by during the charge •of the court to the jury, and hears without objection an erroneous instruction, perhaps inadvertently given, and which upon a suggestion then made, would have been corrected, is not in a position to claim more than real and substantial justice, in view of all the evidence in the case and the rules of law applicable to that evidence. That this is the correct rule of practice in reference to new trials, is, we think, sustained by the authorities. Moore v. Tuckwell, 1 M. G. & S. 607; Hughes v. Hughes, 15 M. & W. 701; Brazier v. Clapp, 5 Mass. 1-10; Doe ex dem. Teynham v. Tyler, 6 Bingh. 561; McLanahan v. Universal Ins. Co., 1 Pet. 170-183; Gordon v. Graham, 8 Cl. & Fin. 107-119; Househill Coal and Iron Co. v. Neilson, 9 Cl. & Fin. 788.
The foregoing views are decisive of the present case. The only .ground for a now trial is an alleged misdirection to the jury. "We are not authorized to decide whether there was error in the direction the judge gave to the jury, because we have no evidence, which we can regard, that an exception was taken, and unless the error •of law was excepted to, that ground for a now trial can not be sustained. The judgment must therefore be affirmed.
Brinkerhoee, C. J.-, and Scott and Peck, JJ., concurred.