Case Name: KELLOGG v. CHURCH CHARITY FOUNDATION OF LONG ISLAND
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1909-12-30
Citations: 120 N.Y.S. 406
Docket Number: 
Parties: KELLOGG v. CHURCH CHARITY FOUNDATION OF LONG ISLAND.
Judges: 
Reporter: West's New York Supplement
Volume: 120
Pages: 406–413

Head Matter:
KELLOGG v. CHURCH CHARITY FOUNDATION OF LONG ISLAND.
(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department.
December 30, 1909.)
1. Municipal Corporations (§ 703 )—Use of Streets as Highway—Rules of the Road as Applied to Ambulances.
An ambulance, used for its proper purposes, may be driven in derogation of usual rules of the road, though this does not mean that a stable-keeper, as such and in furtherance of his business, may so drive it, but that one engaged in succoring the sick, injured, or dying may transport them, facilitated by such paramount right.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Municipal Corporations, Dec. Dig. § 703. ]
2. Master and Servant (§ 317 )—Injury to Third Person—Negligence of Ambulance Driver—Persons Liable.
The privilege of driving an ambulance in derogation of the usual rules of the road extends to a hospital corporation or others similarly engaged, to be exercised in expediting their business, and they are primarily responsible for the just use of the concession, and may not delegate the superior right to a stabiekeeper, who furnishes the horse and driver, so as not to be liable for damages for an injury due to the driver’s negligence.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Master and Servant, Cent. Dig. § 1254; Dec. Dig. § 317. ]
3. Municipal Corporations (§ 705 )—Use of Streets as Highway—Negligence of Ambulance Driver in Exercise of. Special Privilege.
Where an ambulance driver drove on the wrong side of the way under an apparent claim of right, and kept it-in making a turn, thereby tending to drive aside a person who had the right of way, it indicated a perversive and negligent use of his special privilege as to the right of way, and was an abuse thereof he hardly would have ventured, if driving with his common rights unaugmented.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Municipal Corporations, Dec. Dig. § 705. ]
4. Master and Servant (§ 317 )—Injury to Third Persons—Existence of Relation—Negligence of Ambulance Driver.
An ambulance of a hospital corporation was furnished by a stable-keeper, but the ambulance was labeled with its name, and the driver wore a cap owned and furnished by it, and on which its name likewise appeared, and he was ordered by it to do its business, and placed under its doctors’ command, when he negligently injured a person in the street in exercise of the special privilege as to the right of way to which it was entitled. Held, that he should be regarded as the servant of the hospital, for whose acts it was responsible.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Master and Servant, Cent. Dig. § 1254 ; Dec. Dig. § 317. ]
Rich, J., dissenting.
Appeal from Trial Term, Kings County.
Action by George A. Kellogg against the Church Charity Foundation of Long Island for personal injuries. From a judgment for plaintiff, and from an order denying a new trial, defendant appeals.
Affirmed.
See, also, 128 App. Div. 214, 112 N. Y. Supp. 566.
Argued before HIRSCHBERG, P. J„ and WOODWARD, THOMAS, RICH, and MILLER, JJ.
Edward M. Shepard (Omri F. Hibbard, on the brief), for appellant.
John J. Kuhn (W. W. Taylor, on the brief), for respondent.
For other cases see same topic & § number in Dec. & Am. Digs. 1907 to date, & Rep’r Indexes
For other cases see same topic & § number in Dec. & Am. Digs. 1907 to date, & Rep’r Indexes

Opinion:
THOMAS, J.
The question whether the driver was the defendant's servant was necessarily decided upon the former appeal, but if it was decided erroneously the error should be corrected at this time. I think that it was decided correctly. When the driver started on the errand in the course of which the accident happened, he was invested with the apparent character of the defendant's servant. The ambulance driven was labeled "St. John's Hospital." The driver wore a cap owned and furnished by the hospital, on which the words "St. John's Hospital" appeared.' Such were the defendant's declarations to the public that the driver was the defendant's servant, engaged in the defendant's business, and clothed with such rights and immunities as the defendant enjoyed in the use of the streets. This manifestation was an invitation to the public to consider the driver the defendant's servant, to respect him as such, to grant him by curtesy the latitude that his mission demands in the matter of speedy passage, and to yield him the rights in the street that belonged to a real servant of the defendant. Such was the defendant's presentation of the driver to the public. The status thus given to the driver did in fact obtain for him privileges and immunities that belonged to the defendant. He thereby became the acknowledged servant of the defendant, abroad on its urgent and merciful errands, and entitled to the right of way allowed to those operating ambulances for their proper purposes. An ambulance in such use may be driven in derogation of 'certain usual rules of the road. That does not mean that a stablelceeper, in his capacity as such, and in furtherance of his business, may so drive a vehicle in the form of an ambulance, but that a person engaged in the business of succoring the sick, injured, or dying may transport them, facilitated by such paramount right.
The defendant accepts and enjoys the superior right. It subjects the public to its right of transit, but urges that the responsibility of exercising the right may be relegated to the stablekeeper, so that the burden of meeting damages will fall upon him, and not on it. By such contention the stablekeeper has the right because he is driving an ambulance, and the considerate exercise of the unusual privilege is vested in him. It is my view that the privilege is extended to the defendant, or others similarly engaged, to be exercised by them in the expedition of their business, and that such persons are primarily responsible for the just use of the concession. Even if the present accident did not happen in the exercise of this power, it is unimportant. It was one of the privileges which the defendant sent the driver out to use, if occasion required, and manifests his representative capacity. But I am not convinced that it was not the intention of the driver to exercise such privilege when the accident happened. His action leading up to the accident indicates a perversive and negligent use of his privilege. He was driving on the wrong side of the way .under an apparent claim of right, and he kept to the wrong side in making the turn, thereby tending to drive the decedent aside. The decedent had the right of way. The driver took it from him. If it be said that such action was not a use of the privilege of right of way, it may be conceded; but it was an abuse of that privilege which he hardly would have ventured, had he been driving in the stablekeeper's place, with his common rights in the road unaugmented.
But it is urged that the privilege is extended to the ambulance, and' not to the hospital, and that " the right of way belongs to the ambulance quoad ambulance, and not to its owner." I assume that this means that the favor is granted to an ambulance in use for the purpose of transporting the sick. However, I cannot conceive that the privilege is extended to a vehicle, but to one operating the sanie. So the question would recur: Who was operating this vehicle ? A stable-keeper might be operating it, and so make the privilege run to him. In the present instance, did the privilege accrue to the "ambulance quoad ambulance" ? Then it ran to the defendant's ambulance, in the possession of the defendant, in its use, under the control of its doctor engaged in its business, proclaimed to the world in a writing to be its ambulance, driven by a man wearing its cap of authority and announced as its servant. What, now, does the legend on the cap mean ? What would it mean in "any other relation of life? What, upon the cap of a porter at an inn, a transportation agent at a depot, a conductor on a.car? The present is a hard case for the defendant, and a great misfortune for the plaintiff. But, if the defendant is liable at all, it must be judged as others would "be judged.
If an ordinance granted to transportation wagons some special right in the use of streets, and a given company marked the wagons used with its name, dressed the drivers in its livery, and marked its name thereon, and sent them on the street to convey passengers, and sent its agent to superintend the business, and to command the driver when and where" to go, and when to stop, would it, in case of a collision, be heard.to say to a person injured on the street: "This is my lettered wagon, my inscribed livery, my conductor, my business, but the horses and harness belong to another, and he hires and pays the man who drives them, and the. liability for the collision attaches only to him?" If a railroad company were operating over the tracks of another company, and marked the cars and locomotive with its name, and put its-name on the conductor's cap, and was engaged in carrying its passengers, could it, in case of a collision with a person at a crossing, acquit itself of liability by showing that it hired the engine and the engineer by the trip of another company? I consider that there could be no-such escape in either of the cases supposed. The driver was initially the stablekeeper's servant; the defendant obliterated all suggestion of it; it sent him out disguised as its servant; it stamped him as its-man; it established and proclaimed him.the driver of its ambulance; it ordered him to do its business; it placed its doctor in command of him; it invited his acceptance by the public as its servant, and should not be permitted to relegate the responsibility for his acts to the stable-keeper, remote, unrevealed, and to all appearances disclaimed in the matter.
The judgment and order should be affirmed, with costs.