Case Name: AMORY v. WASHINGTON STEAMBOAT CO., Limited
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1907-07-17
Citations: 105 N.Y.S. 999
Docket Number: 
Parties: AMORY v. WASHINGTON STEAMBOAT CO., Limited.
Judges: 
Reporter: West's New York Supplement
Volume: 105
Pages: 999–1006

Head Matter:
(120 App. Div. 818)
AMORY v. WASHINGTON STEAMBOAT CO., Limited.
(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department.
July 17, 1907.)
1. Brokers—Action fob Compensation—Amount of Recovery.
Where a broker undertakes to sell certain steamboats for the owner and to receive his commission from the purchaser, unless the owner shall close the sale without the broker’s consent, in which case the owner is to pay the commission, the broker, on breach of contract by the owner, must recover the value of his services from the owner, based upon a quantum meruit, and is not entitled as a matter of law to the amount he was to receive from the purchaser, had the owner carried- out his contract.
2. Trial—Verdict—Cobreotion by Court
Where the damages were unliquidated and the verdict for plaintiff failed to state any amount, the court had no power to correct the verdict by inserting as damages the entire amount claimed by the plaintiff.
Lambert, J., dissenting.
Appeal from Trial Term, New York County.
Action by William N. Amory against the Washington Steamboat Company, Limited. From a judgment for plaintiff, and an order denying a motion for a new trial, defendant appeals.
Reversed.
Argued before PATTERSON, P. J., and INGRAHAM, CLARKE, HOUGHTON, and LAMBERT, JJ.
Eugene A. Philbin, for appellant.
Henry M. Earle, for respondent.

Opinion:
INGRAHAM, J.
The agreement as alleged in the complaint was that two steamboats, the property of the defendant, should be placed in plaintiff's hands to sell for defendant, and that, if the plaintiff was successful in finding a purchaser willing and able to buy the said steamboats, the plaintiff was to look for his commission from said purchaser and not from the defendant:
"Provided, however, that If the defendant, the Washington Steamboat Company, Limited, effected any sale of the said properties with a purchaser procured by plaintiff, except through and by the consent of the plaintiff, then and in that case the defendant, the Washington Steamboat Company, Limited, was to become liable to the plaintiff for such commission as the plaintiff would have become entitled to from the prospective purchaser, to wit, the sum of five thousand dollars ($5,000).''
The complaint further alleges that the plaintiff found a purchaser willing and able to buy certain properties of the defendant, and submitted to the defendant a proposition of purchase from said purchasers, the terms of which the defendant agreed to; that there was a memorandum in writing of the sale of these steamboats, signed by the purchaser procured by the plaintiff and by the plaintiff on behalf of the defendant, the plaintiff at the same time procuring from the purchaser an agreement that after the transfer of title of the property by the defendant to the purchaser he would pay the plaintiff the sum of five thousand ($5,000) dollars; that subsequently the defendant entered into an agreement with the prospective purchaser procured by the plaintiff, under which the defendant sold to such purchaser these two steamboats, and that the defendant by such acts violated its con tract with and damaged the plaintiff to the extent of $5,000; and the ¡complaint demands judgment against the defendant for that sum.
Upon the trial the plaintiff testified that he received an offer from one Randall, who lived in Washington, to buy the two steamboats belonging to the defendants, named the Wakefield and Arrowsmith; that this purchaser offered the plaintiff $45,000 for these two boats, which sum included the plaintiff's commission. The plaintiff then offered in evidence a written agreement; dated March 4, 1901, signed by Randall, the purchaser, and the plaintiff, which provided that plaintiff had sold to Randall the river steamboats Wakefield and Arrowsmith for $40,-000, in four equal annual payments of $10,000 each, on the first Monday of October in the years 1901, 1902, 1903, and 1904; and another agreement, dated the same day, whereby, in consideration of the sale to Randall of these steamboats, Randall agreed to pay to the plaintiff in cash the sum of $5,000 at the time of the payment of the first installment of the purchase price of said steamboats. The plaintiff also introduced in evidence a letter from one Raulhaber, who was secretary to Henry Hart, president of the defendant, which was as follows:
"Dear Sir: Confirming your understanding with me, Mr. Hart directs me to say, if you are successful in completing the sale of the Washington Steamboat Company, Limited, property, you are to receive no commission from us, but must look for same from the buyers of the property. Please confirm this arrangement, so that no misunderstanding will occur later."
In reply to this letter plaintiff wrote to Raulhaber a letter, dated the same day, as follows:
"Dear Sir: I have your favor of the 20th inst., and confirm our agreement as therein stated, with the understanding, of course, that you are not to close the sale with my purchasers except through me, in which case as I have personally informed you, my commission is to be paid by the purchasers, and X am to receive no commission from Mr. Hart."
Accepting these letters, which stated in substance the verbal agreement as testified to by plaintiff, as constituting the agreement between the plaintiff and the defendant, the plaintiff was authorized to sell the defendant's property, which, it would seem, included these two steamboats, certain ferry franchises and wharf property in the city of Washington and Alexandria, Va., and also two other steam ferryboats. The plaintiff was to receive no commission- from the defendant, upon condition that the defendant was not to close the sale with the purchasers procured by the plaintiff, except through the plaintiff. It further appeared that, after the plaintiff had procured this purchaser, other agents of the defendant finally consummated a sale of the steamboats to the purchaser with whom the plaintiff has made the contract, upon more advantageous terms to the defendant -as to payments, but for the same amount of $40,000 that the purchaser was to pay for the boats under the contract with the plaintiff. Assuming that this was a failure to comply with the conditions under which the plaintiff agreed to look to the purchasers for his commission, the result of such a violation of the conditions that would follow would be that the plaintiff would be entitled to recover his commission from the defendant, based upon a quantum meruit. The fact that the plaintiff and the purchaser had agreed as to the amount of the commission would not entitle the plaintiff as a matter of law to the amount that he was to receive from the purchaser in case the sale had been carried through upon the terms proposed by the plaintiff.
At the end of the trial, the court submitted the question to the jury; the court instructing the jury that they were to determine whether or not there was a contract between the plaintiff and the defendant, then were to determine whether there was a breach of such contract by the defendant that imposed any liability upon it, and whether the plaintiff performed the obligations of his contract, and then, if the jury found these questions in favor of the plaintiff, they were to determine whether or not there was any interference by Hart, the defendant's president, which defeated plaintiff's recovery of his commission from his principal, the purchaser. There was no express instruction to the jury as to the amount to which the plaintiff was entitled, nor did the court leave it to the jury to determine the amount of the recovery in the event that they found the plaintiff entitled to a verdict. The jury then retired, and a sealed verdict was ordered to be returned on the next morning. On the following morning the jury handed in the sealed verdict, which ivas simply a verdict for the plaintiff. No amount being named, the court stated, "You find a verdict for the plaintiff for the full amount of $5,000," to which the foreman answered, "$5,000." The tenth juror then stated that "no amount ivas agreed upon." The court then stated to the jury, "You have no amount returned," and the fourth juror stated that "there was no amount mentioned." Thereupon the court stated to the counsel that the case would have to go back on the calendar, as the jury had separated. When defendant's counsel asked if the court would grant a motion for a new trial, the court said: "There is no new trial about it. This is a mistrial." The jury were then discharged. Subsequently at the same term, upon motion by the plaintiff, the court by order corrected the verdict by inserting the words and figures, "five thousand ($5,000) dollars, with one thousand six hundred and sixty-five ($1,665) dollars interest, amounting to a total of six thousand six hundred and sixty-five ($6,-665) dollars," and directing the clerk to enter judgment in conformity with such sealed verdict as corrected, whereupon judgment was entered for this sum, and the plaintiff appeals from the judgment, and also from the order correcting the verdict.
We think the court was without power to correct the verdict. This is not a case in which the damages were liquidated, so that the plaintiff, if entitled to recover at all, was entitled to a liquidated amount. The court undoubtedly, when the verdict was presented in which no amount was stated, could have sent the jury back to determine the amount to which the plaintiff was entitled; but having failed to do that and having discharged the jury, two jurors having stated that no amount as to the verdict in favor of the plaintiff had been agreed upon by the jury, the amount of the verdict was never fixed by the jury, but it was the court that determined the amount of the plaintiff's recovery and not the jury. In this case we think the damage, if any, was unliquidated, and what plaintiff was entitled to recover was the value of his services, and not the amount that he would have received from the purchaser, had the defendant carried through the contract with the purchaser that he had made under his employment by the defendant. The amount of the plaintiff's damages being thus unliquidated, it was manifestly improper for the court to assume the function of the jury and on motion determine the amount of the verdict. An entirely different question is presented where the damages are liquidated, and where the plaintiff, if entitled to recover at all, is entitled as matter of law to recover a fixed amount; but where the damages are unliquidated, and the question as to the amount of the recovery is a question for the jury, as we think it was in this case, the jury must determine the amount of the verdict, and not the court. In this case, if plaintiff was entitled to recover, he was entitled to a verdict as if there had been no provision in the contract as to the payment of the plaintiff's commission by the purchaser, as the condition upon which the defendant was to be relieved from the payment of the plaintiff's commission was not complied with by the defendant. But the amount of the recovery was the value of the plaintiff's services, and that amount should have been determined by the jury.
It follows that the order correcting the verdict must be reversed, and the judgment entered upon the verdict as corrected must also be reversed, with costs to the appellant to abide the event.
CLARICE and HOUGHTON, JJ., concur. PATTERSON, P. J., concurs in result.