Case Name: SCHOLASTIC SYSTEMS, INC. and the Travelers Ins. Co., Petitioners, v. Robert LeLOUP and State of Florida Industrial Relations Commission, Respondents
Court: Florida Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1974-10-24
Citations: 307 So. 2d 166
Docket Number: No. 45320
Parties: SCHOLASTIC SYSTEMS, INC. and the Travelers Ins. Co., Petitioners, v. Robert LeLOUP and State of Florida Industrial Relations Commission, Respondents.
Judges: ADKINS, C. J., and ROBERTS, BOYD, McCAIN and OVERTON, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 307
Pages: 166–176

Head Matter:
SCHOLASTIC SYSTEMS, INC. and the Travelers Ins. Co., Petitioners, v. Robert LeLOUP and State of Florida Industrial Relations Commission, Respondents.
No. 45320.
Supreme Court of Florida.
Oct. 24, 1974.
Rehearing Denied Feb. 19, 1975.
Charles A. Zinn of Shackleford, Farrior, Stallings & Evans, Tampa, for petitioners.
Joseph L. Thury of Antinori, Cohen & Thury, Tampa, for respondents.

Opinion:
DEKLE, Justice.
We have for consideration a petition for writ of certiorari directed to the Industrial Relations Commission, our jurisdiction arising under Art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla.Const., which provides that this Court "may issue writs of certiorari to commissions established by general law having statewide jurisdiction." The Industrial Relations Commission is within the purview of this constitutional language and its provision is clear that we may review the decisions of the Commission by way of certiorari; it is not, however, a mandatory review as is provided under Art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla.Const., which sets forth that this Court shall hear appeals falling within the scope of that provision. Thus, from a constitutional standpoint, our consideration of decisions of the Industrial Relations Commission is discretionary, a fact too often overlooked in our conscientious efforts to provide a review of IRC cases in the past.
This Court has from time to time reconsidered the manner in which it can best utilize its judicial resources within the framework of its extensive constitutional jurisdiction; otherwise, it would become physically impossible to give proper consideration to all cases which equally demand our careful review. One of the best known examples of such a re-appraisal was Foley v. Weaver Drugs, Inc., 177 So.2d 221 (Fla.1965), requiring that conflict cer-tiorari must appear from the "record proper" as a basis for review.
We have concluded after much "soul searching" and upon careful analysis that there is no constitutional requirement for the extensive, appellate type of review previously afforded here in workmen's compensation cases. The United States Supreme Court has recently pointed out in a holding on the right to counsel that constitutional rights with respect to appeal do not include discretionary reviews.
Accordingly, our consideration of decisions of the Industrial Relations Commission will henceforth be governed by the traditional standard of "departure from the essential requirements of law," the same standard currently applied in certiorari review of orders of the Public Service Commission and in interlocutory petitions and common law certiorari.
Our review of orders of the Industrial Relations Commission, as initially noted, is prescribed by Art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla.Const., providing that we "may issue writs of cer-tiorari to commissions established by general law having statewide jurisdiction." (emphasis ours) A different provision of Art. V, § 3(b)(7), states that we "[sjhall have the power of direct review of administrative action prescribed by law." (emphasis ours) Workmen's compensation review has been implemented by F.S. § 440.-25 (4) (d) and 440.27. In relevant part, § 440.25(4)(d) provides:
"The order of the commission shall become final upon expiration of the period within which any interested party may file a petition for writ of certiorari requesting review of such order by the supreme court unless within said time any interested party shall file a petition for writ of certiorari in accordance with § 440.27."
In pertinent part, § 440.27 states:
"Orders of the commission entered pursuant to § 440.25 shall be subject to review only by petition for writ of cer-tiorari to the supreme court."
Neither of these two statutes attempts to make it mandatory (as of course a statute could not do) for an appellate court to exercise certiorari review fixed by the constitution. The statutes merely provide that certiorari is the sole means by which an IRC order may be reviewed. Common law certiorari lies only in the sound judicial discretion of an appellate court, and is not a matter of right. 5 Fla. Jur., Certiorari, § 10 (p. 494). It therefore appears that there is no right to certiorari review in this Court of orders of the Industrial Relations Commission, unless it is otherwise compelled by other constitutional provisions.
The only constitutional provisions which appear to have any bearing on this question are Art. I, § 9 (due process) and 21 (access to the courts). Due process requires that no one shall be personally bound until he has had his "day in court." 6 Fla.Jur., Constitutional Law, § 320 (p. 547). A party is afforded his "day in court" with respect to administrative decisions when he has a right to a hearing and has the right of an appeal to a judicial tribunal of the action of an administrative body. One of the texts expressly refers to the hearing by a commission as meeting the due process requirement when it is stated in 16 Am.Jur.2d, Constitutional Law, § 581, at p. 987:
"In many matters the tribunal requirement of due process may be met by a board or commission . . . . "
Clearly, the right to a hearing is afforded by Ch. 440, F.S.; thus, the only question remaining is whether an appeal ("Petition for Review") to the Industrial Relations Commission constitutes the required appellate judicial review. It might be asked in another way: "May the IRC properly be considered a judicial body?" If so, the parties have their right of appeal, thus fulfilling the requirement of § 9, Art. I, Fla.Const., without the additional full "appellate" review here. The right of access to the courts in § 21, Art. I, is provided by the availability in this Court of traditional certiorari application to require compliance with the essential requirements of law which we are preserving.
We recently treated the IRC as a judicial body in our opinion at 285 So.2d 601 (Fla.1973), adopting its Workmen's Compensation Rules of Procedure. In our opinion we delineated the review of workmen's compensation cases by the IRC as "judicial" and expressly recognized the judicial nature of its function. The federal court system has both "Article I courts" and "Article III courts," an example of the former being the tax court. A body may be a "court" without being named within the constitutional article dealing with the judiciary (in the case of our state constitution, Art. V), so long as it fulfills the requirements making it a judicial body of review. Our task is to determine what qualities are necessary in order for a body exercising judicial functions to meet constitutional requirements. Black's Law Dictionary, Rev. 4th Ed., informs us that such a body is: (p. 425)
"A tribunal officially assembled under authority of law at the appropriate time and place, for the administration of justice. In re Carter's Estate, 254 Pa. 518, 99 A. 58.
"An agency of the sovereign created by it directly or indirectly under its authority, consisting of one or more offi cers, established and maintained for the purpose of hearing- and determining issues of law and fact regarding legal rights and alleged violations thereof, and of applying the sanctions of the law, authorized to exercise its powers in due course of law at times and places previously determined by lawful authority, Isbill v. Stovall, Tex.Civ.App., 92 S.W.2d 1067, 1070."
and further at p. 426 as:
". . . having power and authority of law at the time of acting to do the particular act. Ex parte Plaistridge, 68 Old. 256, 173 P. 646, 647."
The term "judicial function" is defined by Ballentine's Law Dictionary as: (p. 685)
"A function exercised by the employment of judicial powers."
And in turn, "judicial power" is defined as: (p. 686)'
"That part of the sovereign power which belongs to the courts or, at least, does not belong to the legislative or executive department."
Measured by these standards, the Industrial Relations Commission easily fits within these definitions as a judicial tribunal meeting constitutional requirements.
In recognizing the IRC as a judicial tribunal performing the functions of a court for purposes of the "due process" provision of the constitution, we do not intend to imply that the IRC is literally a "court," for Art. V, § 1, Fla.Const., expressly prohibits the creation of any courts not expressly listed therein. We are merely recognizing that decisions of the IRC, in its capacity as a body reviewing determinations of Judges of Industrial Claims, are of such judicial nature as to satisfy this constitutional provision; nor does anything contained herein affect any organizational or administrative duties of the IRC or any applicability otherwise of the Administrative Procedure Act.
We have previously recognized the elevation of the status of the IRC as now constituted. Pierce v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 279 So.2d 281 (Fla.1973).
In that learned opinion, our thrice Chief Justice Roberts stated:
"In 1971, the Industrial Relations Commission began a new era when the Governor reorganized it into the fashion of a court. Legislative sanction was given to this reorganization by Section 20.17(7), Florida Statutes, F.S.A., which creates an Industrial Relations Commission, providing, in pertinent part,
" '(7) There is created within the department of commerce an industrial relations commission to consist of a chairman and two other members all to be appointed by the governor, with the advice and consent of the senate, and all to serve full time. Not more than one appointee shall be a person who, on account of his previous vocation, employment, or affiliation, shall be classified as a representative of employers; and not more than one such appointee shall be a person who, on account of his previous vocation, employment, or affiliation, shall be classified as a representative of employees. Each appointee shall have the qualifications required by law for circuit judges. . . (emphasis supplied)
"The Commissioners are now required to be full-time and to have been members of The Florida Bar for at least five years. They have research assistants and operate much like our District Courts of Appeal. Also, Judges of Industrial Claims (formerly Deputy Commissioners) have consequently been elevated in the sphere of workmen's compensation to a status somewhat akin to circuit judges. The process from the time the claim is filed through the time petition for writ of certiorari is filed with this Court has become more judicial in nature since the 1971 reorganization. In view of these facts, particularly the fact that the Commissioners are now full-time lawyers, we feel compelled to reevaluate our prior decisions of Ball v. Mann, supra; [75 So.2d 758 (Fla.)] Hardy v. City of Tarpon Springs, supra, [81 So.2d 503, (Fla.)] and Brown v. Griffin, supra [229 So.2d 225 (Fla.)] respecting requirements imposed upon the Judge of Industrial Claims in making his findings of fact." (pp. 283-284)
In addition to the statutory provisions of F.S. § 20.17(7) noted by Mr. Justice Roberts in the above quote, we would further point out that F.S. § 440.44(4) provides: "No person shall be appointed judge of industrial claims who is not an attorney-at-law admitted to practice in this state." and that the recently concluded session of the Legislature increased the salary of the members of the Industrial Relations Commission so that it is now equivalent to that paid to judges of the district courts of appeal, by amending F.S. § 440.441. This same act (Ch. 74 — 363, Senate Bill 873) also amended F.S. § 20.17(7) to provide that each appointee to the Industrial Relations Commission "shall have the qualifications required by law for judges of the district courts of appeal," rather than those of circuit judges as previously required, thus further "upgrading" the status of the IRC to the level of an appellate court.
All of these provisions make eminently clear the legislative intent to elevate the status of the IRC to that of a judicial body. That intent has been studiously carried out and its able "judges" have been most carefully screened and chosen for the highest qualifications in this specialized field of the law. The IRC now occupies a position in the structure of our state government equivalent to the "Article I" courts found in the federal system. The lack of the word "court" in its title is irrelevant; the Board of Tax Appeals was no less a judicial body before its title was changed to that of "Tax Court of the United States." As Shakespeare said: "What's in a name? That which we call a rose by any other name would smell as sweet." We conclude, then, that whatever its title, the Industrial Relations Commission fulfills the requirements of a judicial body of review.
This being the case, there is no constitutional requirement for this Court to review orders of the IRC as a matter of right; nor is it required that our review be in the manner of an appeal. Rather, cer-tiorari to the IRC is regulated by the provisions of Art. V, § 3(b)(3), giving this Court discretionary power to review such orders by certiorari. The provisions of Art. V, § 3(b)(7), giving us the power — but not the duty — to review administrative actions, are not applicable here. Orders of the IRC are not administrative actions, but are judicial functions in their reviews of workmen's compensation appeals, just as are appeals to the state district courts which enjoy only certiorari as the principal means of review in this Court. Since the IRC as a "due process" judicial tribunal provides the equivalent review of workmen's compensation litigation that the DCA's provide in other cases, the judicial review of these two appellate bodies is mutually exclusive, so that another "appeal" from a ruling of the IRC to a DCA does not lie. Review by certiorari only, and this to the Florida Supreme Court, provides the only further appellate step in either instance.
The "administrative action" mentioned in Fla.Const., Art. V, § 4(b)(1) and (2) cannot apply as a predicate for review by the district courts of appeals in workmen's compensation cases. We have just above elucidated the judicial nature of the IRC review; moreover, JIC hearings are not "administrative action" in this sense but rather are quasijudicial in nature and therefore not within the purview of Art. V, § 4(b)(1) and (2) either. Even if IRC decisions were deemed to include the "administrative action" mentioned in Art. V, § 4(b)(1), that section further provides that the appeals be those "not directly appeala-ble to [reviewable by] the supreme court." Here § 3(b)(3) of Art. V comes into play, since it provides that this Court in affording that review "may issue writs of certio-rari to commissions established by general law having statewide jurisdiction," which clearly includes the Industrial Relations Commission.
It must also be noted that the appeals to the DCAs contemplated by Art. V, § 4(b)(1) are those "that may be taken as a. matter of right." (emphasis ours) Since we are holding in this opinion that the appeal of workmen's compensation cases to the IRC meets the requirements of due process for a "judicial review" and that "access to the courts" is available through certiorari to the Florida Supreme Court, there is no appeal "as a matter of right" remaining to be taken to the DCA under Art. V, § 4(b)(1). The authorities hold that one adequate method of judicial review is sufficient to meet the requirement of due process. Our erudite and prolific opinion writer, the late Supreme Court Justice Glenn Terrell, cited the U.S. Supreme Court holding to such effect in finding this result in Johnson v. McNeill, 151 Fla. 606, 10 So.2d 143 (1942): (at p. 145)
"The Supreme Court of the United States has held that due process is met if one adequate method of judicial review of the orders of administrative agencies is set up and that such method may be made exclusive by statute. Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41, 58 S.Ct. 459, 82 L.Ed. 638; Securities & Exchange Commission v. Andrews, 2 Cir., 88 F.2d 441."
Furthermore, Art. V, § 4(b)(2), gives the district courts of appeal "power of direct review of administrative action, as prescribed by general law." As noted earlier, general law does not prescribe review power over IRC decisions to the district courts of appeal, but rather expressly states that orders of the IRC in workmen's compensation cases "shall be subject to review only by petition for writ of certiorari to the supreme court." F.S. § 440.27. More fundamentally, however, the constitution itself, as aforesaid, expressly precludes review of IRC orders in workmen's compensation cases by the district courts of appeal. Fla.Const., Art. V, § 4(b) (1).
Appeals to the district court from opinions rendered by the IRC are, therefore, neither expressly provided nor inferred in Art. V; moreover, since all of such reviews would be heaped upon the First District, in which the IRC sits, needless to say, the result would be an unmanageable increase in that one court's caseload that is already overwhelming, thus taxing those able judges' capacity to extend to these important cases the thorough consideration which they deserve. The review contemplated by Article V continues in the Florida Supreme Court but only on the basis of certiorari demonstrating a departure from the essential requirements of law, although such petition and briefs can submit and argue together the contended jurisdiction and merits without, necessarily, first submitting the matter separately on jurisdiction. Either way, the submission of the record and any testimony should now be substantially reduced.
In the exercise of our sound judicial discretion we find, upon our review of the record, no departure from the essential requirements of law sub fudice, so that the petition for review in this Court must be denied. We accordingly deny the petition for writ of certiorari in the cause before us. This discretionary consideration shall be the basis of our future consideration of IRC cases sought to be brought to us.
IRC cases shall hereafter be reviewed by this Court upon traditional certiorari grounds based upon a departure from the essential requirements of law, rather than upon general appellate considerations. Appellate review shall be solely for the IRC, with review only in the Florida Supreme Court upon traditional certiorari grounds upon a failure to conform to the essential requirements of law below.
It is so ordered.
ADKINS, C. J., and ROBERTS, BOYD, McCAIN and OVERTON, JJ., concur.
ERVIN, J., dissents with opinion.
. Ross and North Carolina v. Moffit, 417 U.S. 600, 94 S.Ct. 2437, 41 L.Ed.2d 341 (1974); Douglas v. Calif., 372 U.S. 353, 83 S.Ct. 814, 9 L.Ed.2d 811 (1963).
. Tamiami Trail Tours v. Railroad Commission, 128 Fla. 25, 174 So. 451 (1937); Sauls v. De Loach, 182 So.2d 304 (Fla.App. 1st 1966); Olin's Rent-a-Car System v. Avis Rental Car System, 135 So.2d 434 (Fla.App.3d 1961); Bloomfield v. Mayo, 119 So.2d 417 (Fla.App.1st 1960); 3 Fla. Law and Practice, Certiorari, § 2 and 3 (pp. 603-605).
. It appears that the recently amended F.S. § 120.68(2) terminology of "proceedings for review" does not modify this provision of F.S. § 440.27 in any material aspect.
. Permenter v. Younan, 159 Fla. 226, 31 So.2d 387 (1947); 73 C.J.S. Public Administrative Bodies § 161, p. 504.
. Romeo and Juliet, Act II, Scene II, line 43.
. See footnote 4, supra.