Case Name: REED v. EMPLOYMENT SECURITY COMMISSION
Court: Michigan Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1961-09-23
Citations: 364 Mich. 395
Docket Number: Docket No. 3, Calendar No. 48,400
Parties: REED v. EMPLOYMENT SECURITY COMMISSION.
Judges: Carr and Kelly, JJ., concurred with Dethmers, C. J.
Reporter: Michigan Reports
Volume: 364
Pages: 395–400

Head Matter:
REED v. EMPLOYMENT SECURITY COMMISSION.
Unemployment Compensation — Garnishment—Misconduct Connected with Employee’s Work — Disqualification for Benefits.
Breach of employer’s rule against successive garnishment of an employee’s wages feeing served on the employer does not, as a matter of law, disqualify the employee from receiving unemployment compensation, since it is not “misconduct connected with his work” (CLS 1956, § 421.29).
Appeal from Wayne; Arch (Charles O.), J., presiding.
Submitted January 11, 1961.
(Docket No. 3, Calendar No. 48,400.)
Decided September 23, 1961.
References for Points in Headnotes
48 Am Jur, Social Security, Unemployment Insurance, and Retirement Eunds §§ 35, 38.
Willie Reed presented Ms claim to the Michigan Employment Security Commission and G-rant Brothers Foundry Co., for unemployment compensation. Claim denied because of his discharge as a result of excessive garnishments. Plaintiff appeals.
Reversed and remanded.
Bernard J. Fieger, for plaintiff.
Love, Snyder é Lewis (Robert L. Halbroolc, Jr., of counsel), for defendant G-rant Brothers Foundry Co.
Amicus Curiae:
Henry Clicman, for Clinton Gaston.

Opinion:
Dethmers, C. J.
Plaintiff was employed by.defendant company. It had established a rule that an employee would be discharged from employment if a second writ of garnishment of his wages were served-upon-the company. Within a period of 9 months, 4 garnishments of plaintiff's wages were served on ft. In consequence, he was discharged.
Plaintiff thereafter applied for unemployment compensation. The case went from commission, to referee, to appeal board and circuit court and is now here on appeal from a holding and judgment of disqualification for benefits because, in the language of the statute (CLS 1956, § 421.29 [Stat Ann 1960 Rev § 17.531]), he had been "discharged for misconduct copneeted with his work."
Was.plaintiff discharged for a cause that constituted misconduct connected with his work? We are cited to... no applicable . appellate.. court decisions. Counsel undertake' to compare or distinguish cases decided; with varying or opposite results, by' referees, appeal boards or circuit of other trial courts on the basis of facts with respect to such things as number and frequency of garnishments, the employee's economic, physical or mental condition, and ability or inability to avoid indebtedness, et cetera. We do not discuss or consider them because we deem the question as to whether garnishment of an employee's wages constitutes misconduct, on his part, connected with his work, to be one of law and not of facts to be decided on a case-to-case basis.
Misconduct is conduct that is wrong. Plaintiff's conduct here involved was the incurring of an indebtedness and failure to discharge it. By some standards it may have been wrong. Whether or not, for the purpose of cases like this, it was disqualifying misconduct depends on the legislative intent and meaning of the statute and not merely on the promulgation of a company rule against garnishments. Garnishment of plaintiff's wages may well have been a nuisance to defendant company. Many acts of an employee might meet with the displeasure or disapproval of an employer and be prohibited by rule by him. Breach of such rule might, in a sense, be considered misconduct warranting discharge from employment. Unless the rule and its violation bear some reasonable application and relation to the employee's task, can the breach be said to be misconduct within the disqualifying language of section 29(1) (a)(2) of the statute? The purpose of the act is to benefit unemployed in financial straits, not to penalize them for being in that condition. We do not believe that the language of the statute discloses or its purpose permits reading into it a legislative intent to stamp the conduct here involved as misconduct within the meaning of the cited section.
If plaintiff's going into debt and failure to pay were to be deemed misconduct, it was in no wise connected with his work, even though the consequences might in some manner affect his employer. The statute expressly limits the disqualification to misconduct connected with his work.
We do not suggest that infraction of a company rule governing conduct on the job or connected with the work may never amount to disqualifying misconduct. Here, however, we have a rule of selection rather than one of conduct. That is to say,, the rule does not govern an employee's conduct connected with his work, but, rather, sets forth a condition of employment and continuance therein. It covers the selection and retention of employees, not their conduct on the job or connected with their work. Breach thereof may entitle the employer to discharge his employee, but such discharge is not for misconduct connected with his work as contemplated by the statute.
Reversed, with costs to plaintiff, and remanded to circuit court for remand by it to the appeal board and disposition there in accord herewith.
Carr and Kelly, JJ., concurred with Dethmers, C. J.