Case Name: Anthony Edward MORGAN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1976-12-08
Citations: 341 So. 2d 201
Docket Number: No. 76-611
Parties: Anthony Edward MORGAN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: BOARDMAN, A. C. J., and SCHEB, J., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 341
Pages: 201–203

Head Matter:
Anthony Edward MORGAN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. 76-611.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
Dec. 8, 1976.
Concurring Opinion on Denial of Rehearing Jan. 28, 1977.
Jack 0. Johnson, Public Defender, Bar-tow, and Douglas A. Wallace, Asst. Public Defender, Bradenton, for appellant.
Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and C. Marie King, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tampa, for appellee.

Opinion:
GOBBIE, EVELYN, Associate Judge.-
This is an appeal from revocation of appellant's probation. We hold such revocation was erroneous.
Appellant, pursuant to a plea negotiation, pled guilty to robbery. At arraignment, it was agreed that:
1. Appellant would serve no more than one year in county jail, if the presen-tence investigation proved negative as to any prior record;
2. Appellant would keep out of trouble prior to sentencing; and
3. Appellant would testify truthfully against the other persons involved.
At sentencing, appellant was placed on five years probation conditioned upon his serving one year in jail plus other conditions. However, no mention was made at that time as to his testifying for the state, nor was this condition imposed in writing.
One Mildred Ward was one of the persons involved in the robbery. At her trial, appellant refused to testify against her, although he did give evidence against a Willie Barnes, also involved. After Ward was tried, appellant was charged with violating one of the conditions of his probation by his refusal to testify against her, and a revocation hearing was held.
At the hearing, appellant told the court that his reason for not testifying against Mildred Ward was that Willie Barnes had threatened "he would kill me for making his broad go to prison." Upon conclusion of that hearing, appellant's probation was revoked and he was sentenced to serve from six months to life imprisonment. This appeal ensued. We reverse.
The pivotal point of any appeal from a judicial proceeding, be it civil or criminal, jury or nonjury, juvenile court or probate, is "fairness." It is a simple word, but constitutes the very root of our judicial system. Without fairness, the system would not function and the proper administration of justice would fall by the wayside.
This court is in complete agreement with the appellee when it asserts that a court must have some recourse when a defendant violates a condition of probation. However, before such recourse becomes a reality, surely the defendant has to be put on notice as to what he must do or cannot do as special conditions of his probation. Is this not fairness? Basic justice makes this fairness mandatory. Throughout the judicial years, this concept of notice to a defendant has been well recognized as 'an essential element of "due process."
Since appellant's original agreement to testify was not made a condition of his probation, he had a right to assume that the requirement to testify had been abandoned, with respect to being a condition of his probation. The revocation being based upon an act not proscribed by the conditions of his probation was, therefore, improper. To hold otherwise would result in utter chaos in the criminal justice system. It is hoped that in the future, all understandings which are to be conditions of probation be expressly set forth in the probation order.
The order of revocation is vacated and probation reinstated.
BOARDMAN, A. C. J., and SCHEB, J., concur.