Case Name: ALEXANDER v. J. E. HIXSON & SONS FUNERAL HOME et al.
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1950-02-17
Citations: 44 So. 2d 487
Docket Number: No. 3217
Parties: ALEXANDER v. J. E. HIXSON & SONS FUNERAL HOME et al.
Judges: 
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 44
Pages: 487–492

Head Matter:
ALEXANDER v. J. E. HIXSON & SONS FUNERAL HOME et al.
No. 3217.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana. First Circuit.
Feb. 17, 1950.
King, Anderson & Swift, Lake Charles, W. -R. Jackson, Jr., Lake Charles, Thos. C. Ha-11, Lake Charles, fox appellant. ,- ’
Moss & Graham, Lake Charles, John R. Stewart, Lake Charles, for appellees.

Opinion:
FRUGE, Judge Ad Hoc.
Plaintiff instituted this suit against defendant, J. E. Hixson & Sons Funeral Home, as a partnership, against the partners individually and the funeral home's insurer, Continental Casualty Company under the Workmen's Compensation Act. Act No. 20 of 1914, as amended. After issue joined on merits, the District Judge decided in fayor -of defendants, rejecting plaintiff's demands at his costs. Plaintiff appeals.
Plaintiff-alleges and -contends that -he was an employee of defendant and that on or about the 7th day of May, 1947, he was injured -during, the course of his employment while in the process of lifting a vault .lid in a cemetery near Sulphur, Louisiana. He alleges that he ruptured himself in removing the vault lid and was temporarily totally -disabled to do work -for a period o-f 16 He alleges that he is entitled to receive compensation from defendants at the rate of. $20.00 per week for the sixteen weeks and should be reimbursed for all medical expenses incurred in the treatment of said injury which are in the amount of $232.00. weeks-.
The defendants admit that plaintiff was injured on May 16, 1947, and as a result o-f the injury he was temporarily and totally disabled to do work o-f any reasonable character for a period of sixteen weeks, but they deny that he was their employee.
The facts in this case are without dispute and these, material to the issue, are established as follows:
The plaintiff -owned and operated a florist business in Sulphur, Louisiana. The defendant, J. E. Hixson & Sons, at the -same time owned and operated a branch -funeral home in the t-o-wn of Sulphur, Louisiana, under the management--o-f one James Young.. About -a year before plaintiff's injury, when Young ordered a casket spray from Alexander, the plaintiff, Alexander offered Young a percentage of the price in gratitude for the business. Instead, Young suggested that each man might help the other in their business when not too occupied with their own. This arrangement continued up to the date of the injury to plaintiff. The evidence reveals that Alexander, the plaintiff, worked with Young in the preparation of funerals in that he did take ambulance trips, set up equipment for funerals, and did go to the cemetery to take vault lids off 'before the funeral services. On the other hand, Young, who had once been a florist, did help the plaintiff in the preparation of floral designs.
There is no question involved of the hazardous nature of the business and the question at issue is whether or not the plaintiff was, at the time of his injury, an employee of the defendant, J. E. Hixson & Sons Funeral Home.
The Louisiana Workmen's Compensation Act, as amended, Act. No. 20 of 1914, as amended, lays no. specific definition of what constitutes an "employee", Section 1 of said act merely stating:
"2. Every person performing services arising out of and incidental to his employment in the course of his employer's trade, 'business or occupation in the following hazardous trades, businesses and occupations and thereafter listing the trades and occupations.
The general statement of the law defining the status of Employer-Employee, found in American Jurisprudence, Vol. 35, Sec. 3, p. 445, is to the effect:
The essence of the relationship is the right to control. The four primary eviden-tiary factors considered in deciding the above are—
1. Selection and engagement,
2. Payment of wages.
3. Power of dismissal.
4. Power of control.
Taking up the above factors in chronological order, it appears from the evidence and the testimony of the plaintiff himself, that he and Young developed a working arrangement of mutual benefit to themselves in their complementary work, that there was no selection or engagement.
As to the second factor, the evidence clearly shows that Young and the plaintiff merely helped one another out when called upon and that no wages were ever discussed or contemplated. Plaintiff contends that it is not necessary that there be payment of wages in order that an employer-employee relationship exist and cites the following cases: Roush v. Heffelbower, 1932, 225 Mich. 664, 196 N.W. 185, 35 A.L.R. 196, Michigan Supreme Court; Schumacher v. Schumacher et al., 1939, 67 S.D. 46, 288 N.W. 796, Supreme Court, South Dakota; and Langley v. Findley et al., 1944, 207 La. 307, 21 So.2d 229.
Plaintiff also cites the following rules to support his.contention, to-wit:
Horowitz (Samuel B..,Horowitz-Injury and Death Under Workmen's Compensation Laws, pages 203-204) states the law as follows :
"Compensation is denied also, to most persons who are mer.e volunteers, e.g. assist without pay or contract of hire, but an emergency or authority to 'hire help may make the "volunteer" an employee The absence of wages is no bar. Where the wage is not yet agreed on the law will imply a reasonable remuneration."
For the view in other states we further cite 28 R.C.L. 760:
"According to a rule of general recognition, a person who works for another of his own volition, without the knowledge or request of anyone in authority, cannot thereby establish the relation of employer and employee, so as to base any claim for damages on the duty owed by the employer to his employee. And this- principle must hold true in respect of demands under the compensation acts. But one who actually performs services for another, at the instance of an accredited employee of the latter, is not to be deemed a volunteer, where it appears that the inducing employee was clothed with actual authority to engage assistance, or where there existed an emergency from which the law implies an authority to secure the help of other persons. Accordingly, the driver of a team who, at the request of one whose team had become •mired and unable to draw out its load, hitches his team to the wagon in an attempt to get the same out of the mud, and is in jured, is held to he entitled to compensation from the owner of the, team that was mired, since the driver of that team had implied authority to employ the necessary assistance to extricate his team."
However, in the case at hand the arrangement between Young and Alexander continued for over a year, during which time Alexander neither received nor requested wages or compensation of any kind. It was a reciprocal -good fellowship agreement for mutual .benefit. In most of the cases cited by plaintiff where no definite wage was agreed upon the injury occurred a very short time after employment, and conséquently the court held that wages is no bar, but in this case, as stated, the arrangement between Young and Alexander had continued for over -a year.
Further, Subdivision 3, Section 8 of the Compensation Act, as amended, Act No. 120 of 1944, provides:
"The term 'wages' as used in this act is defined to mean the daily rate, of pay at which the service rendered by the injured employee is recompensed under the contract of hiring in force at the time of the injury, and anything herein contained to the- contrary notwithstanding the maximum compensation to be paid under this act, shall be twenty dollars per week and the minimum compensation shall be three dollars per week; provided that if at the time of - the injury the employee was receiving wages at the rate of three dollars or less per week, then compensation shall be full wages."
The act thus contemplates a contract of employment whereby the employee and employer agree on a fixed wage in order that the court may properly determine the amount of compensation due the employee in case of injury while in the course of employment.'
Alexander testified that he only helped Young when he had sold flowers for the funeral. Such services he performed for Young were in return for Young keeping his, Alexander's', shop whenever he was away from Sulphur.
Taking the third and fourth factor, namely the "Power of Dismissal" and the "Bower of Control" together, the court thinks that these factors were not present in this case. The evidence clearly shows that Alexander was not under any obligation to help the defendant's manager with the preparation of funerals. In fact, on many occasions he did not help Young and was free to go and return as he saw fit. The fact that he did not help Young every time he was called upon reveals that their agreement was one based on cooperative friendship. Young never had the authority, nor did he ever try to exert any power of control over the plaintiff.
The evidence further showed that the defendant, J. E. Hixson & Sons Funeral Home never did carry plaintiff on its books as being in its employ; that the plaintiff never did receive any money of any nature from Hixson; that -further, although it.did report and make a list of employees, which it reported to its Insurance Carrier, the -name -of the plaintiff was omitted even though this agreement between Young and the plaintiff bad existed over ,a year.
For reasons assigned the Judgment is affirmed.