Case Name: John Armstrong v. The Heirs of William Huston
Court: Supreme Court of Ohio
Jurisdiction: Ohio
Decision Date: 1838-12
Citations: 8 Ohio 552
Docket Number: 
Parties: John Armstrong v. The Heirs of William Huston.
Judges: 
Reporter: Cases decided in the supreme court of ohio : upon the circuit at the special sessions in Columbus
Volume: 8
Pages: 561–568

Head Matter:
John Armstrong v. The Heirs of William Huston.
Where an appraisor of lands to be sold by an administrator becomes a purchaser, the sale may be set aside on application of the heir, as infected, with fraud.
This is a bill filed in the county of Mercer, to review a decree in the Supreme Court, rendered in 1837, and reserved for decision in bank.
The original bill, filed by the heirs of Huston, sets forth that he died seized of land, parts of which were sold in the due course of administration. That the administrator preferred a supple mpntary ^petition, showing further sales necessary; that the court appointed appraisers, of whom John Armstrong was one, to assign dower and value the lands. Upon the return of the commissioners’ report, the court confirmed the assignment of dower, and directed a sale of so much of the land as will produce the sum of $500. Sales were made under this order to the extent ■of $621, which were confirmed by the court, and conveyances ■duly made. John Armstrong was one of the purchasers. The plaintiffs, who were minors at the time of this sale to Armstrong, .claim relief against it, upon the following ground :
1. That more land was sold than was authorized by the order.
2. That Armstrong assumed to buy for the benefit of the famnly.
3. That being an appraiser, his purchase may be set aside by >them.
At the term of the common pleas to which the report of the • ■sale to Armstrong was made, it was found necessary to sell the -remainder of the lands. The estate, on its final settlement, proved 'insolvent.
This suit came on for hearing at the Supreme Court for Mercer .county, in 1837, and a decree was made setting aside the sale to Armstrong, on the plaintiff’s repayment of the sum advanced, and interest. This decree is complained of as erroneous, and this bill lis brought to review it.
Thomas and Hall, for plaintiffs.
Crane, for defendant.

Opinion:
Opinion of the court, by
Judge Lane:
The present case presents the single question, whether the appraiser of land at an administrator's sale stands in such a relation that his purchase, without fraud, will be set aside at the instance •of the heirs; for the question respecting the quantity to be sold, is to be made only before the court granting the order and confirmation. 10 Pet. 450; 6 Ohio, 269; 7 Ohio, pt. 1, p. 262. There seems no reason to distrust the integrity of Armstrong, or the fairness of the sale. The appraisal is not shown to be too low, when made, although the land has since appreciated. The sale was at public vendue, and no proof is made that Armstrong assumed to purchase for the benefit of the family.
The statute of 1824 (2 Chase's L. 1300, sec. 12), forbidding purchasers by appraisers, relates to sales by execution only. The disability of the appraiser in the present case, if it exists, arises *under those general principles of equity, which prevents those from acquiring a title, to whose discretion or agency the management of a sale is confided.
The application of this doctrine to trustees, executors, attorneys, and agents is familiar in all the books. A majority of the court unite in the opinion, that the principle of exclusion attaches to every person, to whose integrity and judgment is committed the execution of any step needful in making the sale.
Where the law creates fiduciary relations, it seeks to prevent the abuse of confidence, by insuring the disinterestedness of its agents. It holds the relations of judge and party, of buyer and iseller, to be entirely inconsistent. The temptation to abuse power for selfish purposes is so great that nothing less than that incapacity is effectual, and thus a disqualification is wrought by the mere necessity of the case. Fullness of price, absence of fraud, and fairness of purchase are not sufficient to countervail this rule of policy. To give it effect, it is necessary to recognize a right in the former owner, to set the sale aside in all cases on repayment of the money advanced. 2 Johns. Ch. Cas. 252, and eases cited; 1 Story's Eq. 315, et seq.
The appraiser of land is interposed between the buyer and seller in judicial sales, to prevent sacrifices, at undue prices, to the detriment of those interested in its value. If he were permitted to profit by his position, the law would lose its strongest security for his integrity. The legislature has acted in view of this, by imposing on him a disability by statute to purchase at sales under execution; but in this it only adopted a well-established rule of policy applicable to all analogous eases.
Bill of review dismissed.