Case Name: Randy JOHNS v. Rachelle (McGilvray) JOHNS
Court: Arkansas Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Arkansas
Decision Date: 1996-04-03
Citations: 53 Ark. App. 90
Docket Number: CA 95-92
Parties: Randy JOHNS v. Rachelle (McGilvray) JOHNS
Judges: STROUD, J., joins in this opinion.
Reporter: Arkansas Appellate Reports
Volume: 53
Pages: 90–99

Head Matter:
Randy JOHNS v. Rachelle (McGilvray) JOHNS
CA 95-92
918 S.W.2d 728
Court of Appeals of Arkansas En Banc
Opinion delivered April 3, 1996
Charles P. Allen, for appellant.
Ralph C. Murray, for appellee.

Opinion:
WENDELL L. Griffen, Judge.
Randy Johns appeals from the July 8, 1994, order by the Phillips County Chancery Court that he see that his two minor children attend Sunday School and church during his visitation every other weekend. Appellant and appellee were divorced November 10, 1988. The divorce decree awarded appellee permanent custody of the children subject to the reasonable visitation rights of appellant. On December 1, 1993, appellant filed a petition seeking a contempt citation against appellee for allegedly refusing to permit him visitation with the younger of the two children, Ryan Randall Johns. On January 7, 1994, appellee filed a response to that petition and asserted a counterpetition alleging, inter alia, that appellant had not complied with prior understandings regarding the children attending religious services during the time that they visited him. The chancellor conducted an evidentiary hearing on April 1, 1994, which resulted in the order to which appellant takes exception, specifically that portion of the order which reads as follows:
. . . the Defendant, Randy Johns, is hereby Ordered to see that the children attend Sunday School and Church while they are in his custody during his visitation.
Appellant argues that the chancellor abused his discretion in rendering this order because there was, according to appellant, no material change in circumstances which justified an order that he see that the children attend Sunday School or church services. Next appellant contends that the appellee was not ordered to see that the children attend Sunday School or church services while they were in her custody. Finally, appellant argues that although church attendance may well be a positive factor, the constitutional guarantee of freedom of religion found in the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States means that noncustodial parents may not be compelled to see that their children attend church services and Sunday School during visitation.
This appears to be a case of first impression in Arkansas. However, the controlling principles of law that govern child custody and visitation disputes are well settled. Although this court reviews the evidence in appeals from chancery courts de novo, the decision of a chancellor is not reversed unless it is shown that it was clearly contrary to a preponderance of the evidence. Burns v. Burns, 312 Ark. 61, 847 S.W.2d 23 (1993); Larson v. Larson, 50 Ark. App. 158, 902 S.W.2d 254 (1995); Thigpen v. Carpenter, 21 Ark. App. 194, 730 S.W.2d 510 (1987). Special deference is shown to findings and rulings made by chancellors in child-custody matters because of the special care that is required and the unique opportunity of the chancellor to evaluate the evidence and assess the credibility of witnesses. Larson v. Larson, supra; Ideker v. Short, 48 Ark. App. 118, 892 S.W.2d 278 (1995). And it is fundamental law in Arkansas that the primary consideration in both custody and visitation cases is the welfare and best interest of the child, with all other considerations being secondary. Marler v. Binkley, 29 Ark. App. 73, 776 S.W.2d 839 (1989); Welch v. Welch, 5 Ark. App. 289, 635 S.W.2d 303 (1982).
After conducting a de novo review of the evidence, consistent with the aforementioned principles of law, we conclude that the decision of the chancellor should be affirmed. Although the initial divorce decree and all other orders supplemental to it make no reference to church attendance, the record shows that appellee has been following a consistent course of religious instruction for the children at all relevant times since the divorce occurred. Appellee testified that the children had attended church with her on a regular basis, but that they do not attend church services when they visit appellant. Appellee also testified that when the older child, Casey, did not attend morning church services when she visited appellant,
. . . it is kind of difficult on Sunday nights, because she is laxed (sic) all day. As they get older, I am concerned about the teenage years, when they start wanting to kind of do what they want to do. I want that to be — you know — in their life when they're little so they won't — you know— depart from that. I think it's very important that they have that in their life.
The chancellor was certainly justified in considering this concern expressed by the custodial parent about the need for consistency in the church-attendance routine, especially where there was no indication that the routine was in any way detrimental to the health and welfare of the children. See Clark v. Reiss, 38 Ark. App. 150, 831 S.W.2d 622 (1992).
Appellant's argument that the chancellor abused his discretion by ordering appellant, and not appellee, to see that the children attend Sunday School and church services is unpersuasive because appellee testified that she had attended Sunday School and church services with the children for as long as they had been with her. That testimony was consistent and unrebutted. The chancellor had no reason to order the appellee to do what she had already undertaken to do, especially absent any proof that appellee would discontinue that practice. See McFarland v. McFarland, 318 Ark. 446, 885 S.W.2d 897 (1994).
Appellant's ffeedom-of-religion claim is without merit. The chancellor did not order him to attend religious services, but rather that he see that his children did so in order to maintain consistency in the religious regimen that their mother has set for them. Therefore, no limitation has been placed on appellant's freedom of religion. Because the chancellor's order imposes no duty on him to attend, appellant is free to attend or not attend the services with the children.
Appellant also argues that the chancellor's order constitutes an impermissible encroachment on his visitation rights by requiring him to devote part of his visitation time to activities instituted by the custodial parent. We do not agree with that premise. Even if the requirement to see that his children attend Sunday School and worship does inconvenience appellant, that inconvenience does not justify setting aside the chancellor's order when what the chancellor ordered is consistent with the best interest of the children. In visitation issues, the primary consideration is what is in the best interest of the children, not what is most convenient for the parent seeking to exercise visitation rights. Even parents who live with their children endure certain inconveniences and hardships related to the parenting function. The record contains no proof that the inconvenience appellant claims will ensue from complying with the chancellor's order would rise to the level of a deprivation of a protected right. Also, appellant has offered no proof to establish that consistent Sunday School and worship attendance is contrary to the best interest of the children.
We note that there was no evidence disputing the testimony from appellee that appellant's refusal to see that the children attend Sunday School and worship services during his visitation has begun to have undesirable effects on one of the children. Moral instruction is, like every other aspect of education, the result of accumulated and consistent effort over time. Because appellant has the right to visit his children every other week, his refusal to see that they attend Sunday School and worship services would mean they would miss half of the possible opportunities for the moral instruction that their mother has been trying to instill. Although we express neither approval nor disapproval for whatever religious beliefs the children may be learning, the fact remains that appellant offered no alternative method for instructing his children in moral values during the time that they would have otherwise been receiving that instruction through Sunday School and church attendance. Under these circumstances, we find that the chancellor acted within the discretion afforded him in making his order.
We reach our decision mindful that there are numerous situations similar to the one involved in this case where divorced parents may differ concerning the routine that their children should follow. We recognize that the children will necessarily become the objects of those differences in some, if not many, instances, and that it is not possible for appellate courts to craft hard and fast rules in individual cases that will fit every situation. We are sensitive to the unique difficulties that these disputes present for chancellors faced with pleas by parents with many motivating influences and children whose lives will turn on the decisions that are reached. Nevertheless, until controversies of this nature cease it will be necessary for someone to decide them. Chancellors are accorded considerable deference in their decisions concerning these matters precisely because they are, in the vast majority of instances, familiar with the factual background and procedural history of the cases. Their decisions will not be infallible; they are reviewable de novo by this court and subject to reconsideration at the trial level upon proof of a change in circumstances. However delicate the area of controversy may be, it is the manifest duty of chancery courts to resolve these disputes, and the fact that their decisions will displease one or even both parties must not become a reason for judicial inertia at times when action is both necessary due to the disputing parents and vital in order to protect the best interests of the children.
Affirmed.
STROUD, J., joins in this opinion.
Pittman, J., concurs.
Cooper, Rogers and Robbins, JJ., dissent.