Case Name: TUDOR v. EBNER
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1905-12-08
Citations: 96 N.Y.S. 392
Docket Number: 
Parties: TUDOR v. EBNER.
Judges: 
Reporter: West's New York Supplement
Volume: 96
Pages: 392–396

Head Matter:
(109 App. Div. 521)
TUDOR v. EBNER.
(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department.
December 8, 1905.)
1. Pleading—Withdrawal or Demurrer—Interlocutory Judgment—Notioe or Entry.
Where a demurrer was overruled and an interlocutory judgment entered, giving to plaintiff leave to withdraw his demurrer within 10 days after service of a copy of the interlocutory judgment with notice of entry thereof on payment of costs, and in default permitting defendant to enter final judgment overruling demurrer and dismissing the complaint, the service on plaintiff’s attorney of the copy of a judgment, giving the venue of the action as “Supreme Court, New York County,” with a notice that on that day it had been “duly entered in the office oí the clerk of this court,” was insufficient notice of entry to set running plaintiff’s 10 days within which to pay costs and withdraw his demurrer. __
[Eil. Note.-—For cases in point, see vol. 2, Cent. Dig. Appeal and Error, § 1002.]
2. Judgment—Default—Pboof.
Where plaintiff was given leave to withdraw a demurrer within 10 days after service of a copy of an interlocutory judgment with notice of entry thereof on payment of costs, and in default permitting defendant to enter final judgment overruling the demurrer, statements in the affidavit of default from which a conclusion might be drawn that the time so limited expired on a certain day was not equivalent to proof of service of a valid notice of entry and default of plaintiff, and, when a default judgment is sought, proof of the facts showing the default must be made.
[Ed. Note.—For cases in point, see vol. 30, Cent. Dig. Judgment, § 227.1
O’Brien, P. J., and Ingraham, J., dissenting.
Appeal from Special Term, New York County.
Action by William Tudor against William M. Ebner. From an order denying a motion to vacate a final judgment entered on an interlocutory judgment, the plaintiff appeals.
Reversed.
See 93 N. Y. Supp. 1067.
Argued before O’BRIEN, P. J., and McEAUGHLIN, PATTERSON, INGRAHAM, and LAUGHEIN, JJ.
Plerbert Frasier, for appellant.
Henry W. Clark, for respondent.

Opinion:
McLAUGHLIN, J.
The defendant pleaded as a separate defense the statute of limitations of Alaska, to which the plaintiff demurred. •The demurrer was overruled, and an interlocutory judgment entered, in which leave was given to the plaintiff to withdraw his demurrer within 10 days after service of a copy of the interlocutory judgment "with notice of entry thereof" upon payment of costs, and in default thereof permitting defendant to enter final judgment overruling demurrer and dismissing the complaint. This judgment was dated April 4, 1905, and had the usual title, stating that it was granted at a Special Term of the Supreme Court held in and for the county of New York. On the following day a copy of the judgment, in which the venue of the action was given as "Supreme Court, New York County," was served on plaintiff's attorney, together with a notice that on that day it had been "duly entered in the office of the clerk of this court" and service of such copy of judgment and notice of entry was admitted. The costs were not paid within the 10 days, nor was the demurrer withdrawn ; but, on .the contrary, an appeal was taken, without stay, to this court, where the judgment was affirmed, and thereafter permission given on certified questions to appeal to the Court of Appeals. Without applying to the court, and on alleged affidavit of default, on the 29th of May, 1905, defendant entered final judgment on the demurrer, which dismissed plaintiff's complaint, with costs. Thereupon the plaintiff made a motion to set aside such final judgment on the ground that its entry was unauthorized, because no sufficient notice of entry of the interlocutory judgment had been given to limit his time to withdraw the demurrer and pay the costs, and that sufficient proof of de fault had not been made. The motion was denied, and plaintiff appeals.
Manifestly there was no default in withdrawing the demurrer and paying the costs, unless the notice of entry of the interlocutory judgment was sufficient to set running the 10 days' limitation given within which the defendant might act. The learned justice at Special Term was of the opinion that the notice of entry should not be construed as rigidly in the present case as is the practice in limiting the time to appeal, but there is no reason for a relaxation of the rule. The questions involved by the demurrer are still pending in the Court of Appeals and may ultimately be decided in plaintiff's favor, and, if such should be the case, plaintiff could,reap no benefit therefrom, because he would be met with a final judgment in which his complaint had been dismissed. This situation calls rather for a strict than a liberal construction of the notice. There is a clerk of the Supreme Court in each of the counties of the state, who maintains an office for the entry of judgments and orders. In Livingston v. New York Elev. R. R. Co., 60 Hun, 473, 15 N. Y. Supp. 191, the late General Term held that a notice which stated that the judgment was entered "in the office of the clerk of the Supreme Court" did not limit the time to appeal of the opposing party, notwithstanding such party had admitted service of the paper and supposed his time to appeal had been" set running. There was an admission of receipt of a copy of the paper served in the present case, but that did not cure the defect in the notice. It is only where "due and proper service" is admitted that a party is deemed to have waived any defect. Patterson v. McCunn, 38 Hun, 531.
We are of the opinion that the notice of entry was insufficient to set running plaintiff's 10 'days within which to pay costs and withdraw his demurrer, and in addition to this there was no proof before the clerk on his entry of the final judgment that any notice whatever of the entry of the interlocutory judgment had been given to the opposing party. Service of a copy of the interlocutory judgment only is mentioned in the affidavit of default. It is true statements are made in the affidavit from which a conclusion might be drawn that the time so limited expired on the 15th day of April, 1905, but this was not equivalent to proof of service of a valid notice of entry and default on the part of the plaintiff. Where judgment is sought Jo be entered on a default, proof of facts which show the default must be made.
The order appealed from, therefore, must be reversed, with $10 costs and disbursements, and the motion to vacate granted, with $10 costs.
PATTERSON and LAUGHLIN, JJ" concur.