Case Name: John Burns, App'lt, v. Theodore M. Norton, Resp't
Court: New York Supreme Court, General Term
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1891-01-23
Citations: 35 N.Y. St. Rep. 416
Docket Number: 
Parties: John Burns, App’lt, v. Theodore M. Norton, Resp’t.
Judges: 
Reporter: New York State Reporter
Volume: 35
Pages: 416–422

Head Matter:
John Burns, App’lt, v. Theodore M. Norton, Resp’t.
(Supreme Court, General Term, Fifth Department,
Filed January 23, 1891.)
Duress—Justice oe the peace.
Plaintiff was convicted before defendant, a justice of the peace, of the_ crime of assault in the third degree, and was sentenced to pay a fine of $100, and in default of payment to be committed to jail until the fine was paid, not exceeding 100 days. The justice then informed him that he would commit him unless the fine was paid forthwith, and plaintiff then paid the fine, but afterwards demanded the same before it was paid to the county treasurer. Held, that an action to recover from the justice the moneys so paid could not be maintained.
(Oltw'Jcr. Holdridge, 58 Barb., 61, followed.)
(Macomber, J., dissents.)
Appeal from judgment in favor of defendant on trial by the court, a jury having been waived.
The following facts were agreed upon:
That the defendant was, on the 5th day of August, 1889, an acting justice of the peace in and for the town of Victor, in the county of Ontario, and was from that time and now is; that on that day John Burns, the plaintiff, was arrested by virtue of a warrant charging him with having committed an assault in the third degree on the person of Julius Madison on the 3d day of August, 1889, duly and regularly issued by the defendant. That the said plaintiff was brought before the defendapt, at his office in the said town, where the defendant was holding a court of special sessions ; that the plaintiff was then, and there charged before the said defendant with having committed an assault on said Madison, in said town of Victor, as charged in said warrant
That said defendant, as such court of special sessions, arraigned the said plaintiff upon such charge of assault in the third degree ; that the said plaintiff pleaded not guilty and demanded a trial by jury; that on the 22nd and 23d days of August said trial was had and the testimony taken and the case was submitted to the jury, who found the said plaintiff guilty of said assault; whereupon the said defendant, acting as such court of special sessions, in due form, sentenced this plaintiff to pay a fine of $100, and in -default of the payment thereof, to be committed to jail until said fine should be paid, not to exceed 10,0 days.
That this plaintiff was before the said court, and on the same day paid to, and this defendant did receive from this plaintiff the ;said sum of $100, when this plaintiff was discharged. That this defendant acted in good faith in imposing said fine, believing he had a right to impose $100. That the same defendant afterwards on or about the ■ day of , 1889, paid said sum of $100 into the county treasury of Ontario county. That the defendant refused to pay back to the plaintiff the said sum of $100. That said $100 Was paid by the plaintiff under protest, and to avoid being committed to the jail of Ontario county. That the verdict of the jury was rendered and the sentence imposed at about 11 P. M. of Friday, the 23d day of August. That the plaintiff asked the defendant to pay back the money that night', which the defendant declined to do, saying that he would if he was wrong, but that he thought he was right and had a right to keep it, and that the defendant declared he, intended to commit the plaintiff unless the fine was paid.
It was also stipulated that the said defendant, as such court of special sessions, had full and competent jurisdiction and authority "to try and sentence said plaintiff for said offense.
The following opinion was filed by the trial judge:
Adams, J.—IJpon the undisputed facts of this case, there can be no question but the defendant exceeded the jurisdiction conferred upon him as a court of special sessions when he rendered the judgment complained of, and the error on his part was doubtless occasioned by his confounding § 15 of the Penal Code with § 717 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the latter of which pro vides-for and limits the judgment of a court of special sessions, and was, of course, controlling in this case. It follows, therefore, that an excessive, erroneous and unlawful judgment was imposed upon the plaintiff, and his contention is, that he is thereby entitled to the remedy sought by this action.
The plaintiff’s counsel bases his right to recover upon the theory that the defendant in passing judgment acted without, jurisdiction, and therefore his act was absolutely-void. In support of this proposition the attention of the court is directed to the celebrated case of the People ex rel. Tweed v. Liscomb, 60 N. Y., 559, which it is contended determines the precise question here presented. It is true that a similar view was taken of the effect of that decision in two instances cited by counsel,' People ex rel. Knowlton v. Sadler, 2 N. Y. Grim., 438; People ex rel Stokes v. Risley, 4 id., 109, in each of which it was held that where the penalty imposed was in excess of that authorized by law, the judgment by which it was imposed was void and the prisoner was entitled to a discharge by habeas corpus. But such a construction is in direct conflict with a decision of the court of appeals, rendered subsequent to that in the case of Tweed, in which it was. held that a judgment in excess of jurisdiction, although void, did not entitle the party to his discharge. People ex reí. Devoe v. Kelly, 2 N. Y. Grim., 437. It is likewise contrary to an adjudication by the general term of this district upon facts identical with those relied upon by plaintiff. Clark v. Holdridge, 58 Barb., 61. In that case, as in this, it was contended that the imposition of a. fine so largely in excess of the amount authorized was as much a nullity as would have been a sentence that the person convicted should be hanged or imprisoned in the state prison, but as was said by Johnson, J., “ this is a. confusion of ideas and principles, essentially and fundamentally different” In the case suggested the punishment inflicted would be different in kind and degree, but here the court having acquired jurisdiction of the person and of the offense, erred in the degree but not in the quality of the punishment contemplated by the statute, and to quote once more from the opinion of Johnson, J., this constitutes “the true distinction between the acts of an inferior magistrate which are coram non judice and void, and those which are erroneous and voidable-merely.”
In this connection it may be worth while to call attention to a. very obvious distinction between this case and that of Tweed. The only question there considered relates to the right of the court to impose cumulative sentences in a case where a party was convicted of several separate and distinct misdemeanors, identical m character and charged in one indictment, such sentences ex ceeding in the aggregate what is prescribed by statute as the maximum punishment for one offense of the character charged, and it was held that the power of the court was exhausted when it had imposed the first sentence of the maximum punishment fixed by the statute; that it then ceased to be competent to render, a further judgment in the case, and where the judgment included more than this a party was entitled to his discharge by habeas corpus.
That this was all that was intended to be decided in that case the court is careful to state in a later decision, People ex rel. Woolf v. Jacobs, 661ST. Y., 8, and what is said by way of illustrating the principles enunciated must be regarded as merely obiter. The case of G lark v. Holdridge, supra, was decided prior to the Tweed case, it is true, but in my view of the latter case there is no conflict in principle between them, and until the former authority is expressly overruled I shall feel constrained to follow it, and this course is pursued the more willingly inasmuch as the principle it establishes is not only in harmony with my own views but is likewise supported by authorities so numerous that it would seem “ mere ostentation to cite them. Assuming however that the Tweed case does establish the principle contended for by plaintiff’s counsel, the most that could be claimed for it in this case would be that it authorized the recovery of such portion of the money paid by plaintiff as was in excess of the penalty imposed by statute, which would be the sum of fifty dollars. It by no means follows, however, that if the judgment was void to the extent claimed, it entitles the plaintiff to maintain this action; for as was said in substance by Hale, Oh. J., in Bushell’s case, 1 Mod., 119, while the judgment may be void so far as the plaintiff’s right to be discharged is concerned, it gives him no right of action against the defendant, because he acted judicially, although erroneously. This princiSle was recognized and followed by the supreme court of the hited States in Lange's case, 18 Wall., 163, where it was said that “ the distinctions between void and voidable judgments are very nice and they may fall under one class or the other as they are regarded for different purposes."
If this action can be maintained then one for false imprisonment could be had the sentence been imprisonment for a period in excess of the term prescribed by statute. The court of appeals has said, however, that where a court of superior or general jurisdiction acts judicially, although in excess of its power, it is not liable in a civil action, Lange v. Benedict, 73 1ST. Y., 12, and the same rule has been held applicable to courts of inferior and limited jurisdiction by the general term of this department Kenner v. Morrison, 12 Hun, 204.
It follows, therefore, in no view of the question presented by the facts of this case, can the action be maintained, and the defendant is consequently entitled to judgment
Charles H. Paddock, for app’lt; Edwin T. Hicks, for resp’t

Opinion:
Judgment affirmed, on the authority of Clark v. Holdridge, 58 Barb., 61.
Dwight, P. J., and Corlett, J., concur.