Case Name: Rupert et al. v. The People
Court: Colorado Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Colorado
Decision Date: 1894-09
Citations: 20 Colo. 424
Docket Number: 
Parties: Rupert et al. v. The People.
Judges: 
Reporter: Colorado Reports
Volume: 20
Pages: 424–437

Head Matter:
Rupert et al. v. The People.
1. Recognizance, by -whom Appbovable.
Where a prisoner is committed by an examining magistrate in default of hail, the sheriff has no power to approve a bond and release the prisoner from custody. Iu such a oase, the power to let to bail is conferred upon a judge or two justices of the peace.
2. Same — Appboval by Unauthobized Oeeiceb.
A justice of the peace having committed a prisoner in default of hail in an amount required, the sheriff afterwards approved a bond aud released the prisoner; held, thatthe recognizance, having been taken and approved by an officer -without authority, was void, both as a statutory bond and as a common law obligation.
Error to the County Court of Baea County.
This is an action brought upon a criminal recognizance, in the name of The People, against the plaintiffs in error. So much of the complaint as is necessary to a proper understanding of the question presented for our consideration upon this review is as follows:
“ That on the 24th day of January, A. D. 1891, one Henry J. Rupert was examined before S. W. Cole, Esq., a justice of the peace, within and for the county of Baca and state aforesaid, upon a charge of grand larceny; * * * and upon said day the said charge was inquired into by and before the said S. W. Cole, who did then and there, sitting as a justice of the peace, as aforesaid, for the trial of said charge, order and require the said Henry J. Rupert, to give bail with good and sufficient surety in the sum of two hundred dollars for his appearance at the next term of the district court in and for Baca county, conditioned according to law. And the said Henry J. Rupert, failing to give such bail as -required, in default thereof was duly committed to the jail of said county by the commitment issued by the said justice, to be there confined until the said bail should be by him given, or lie be discharged according to law. * * *
“ That afterwards, to wit, von the 81st day of January, A. D. 1891, while the said-Henry J. Rupert was confined in default of bail as aforesaid, the defendants above named, R. W. Devinney, Charles M. Gordon and John H. Rupert, for the purpose of securing the discharge of the said Henry J. Rupert from the said jail, as sureties of and with the said Henry J. Rupert, signed, executed and entered into a recognizance for the sum of two hundred dollars, as required by the said S. W. Cole, justice of the peace. * * *
“ The conditions of said recognizance were and are such that if the said Henry J. Rupert shall personalty be and appear at the district court of the third judicial district of the state of Colorado, sitting in and for said county of Baca, on the first day of the next term thereof, and from day to day thereafter, and remain at and abide the order of the said court, and not depart the court without leave’, then and there to answer to the said charge of grand larceny, * * * then and in that case the said recognizance to become void, otherwise to be and.remain in full force and effect. * * * And the said recognizance was duty signed by said sureties. * * * And the said bond was indorsed as follows: ‘Approved by me January 31, 1891. Signed R. C. Winecup, Sheriff of Baca County.’
“ That after the execution, approval and delivery of said bond or recognizance to the said sheriff, who then had and held the said Henry J. Rupert in custody under and by virtue of the commitment issued and delivered to him by the said S. W. Cole, justice of the peace, released him, the said Henry J. Rupert, from custody and returned the recognizance to the clerk of the district court in whose custodyit now is. * * *
“That afterward, on the 4th day of June, A. D. 1891, on the second day of said term of said district court, the said Henry J. Rupert * * * failed and neglected to come into court,” etc., and thereupon the said recognizance was declared forfeited. The plaintiffs in error, R. W. Devinney and Charles M. Gordon, appeared and demurred to the complaint upon the grounds that it does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action; and, second, there is a defect of parties plaintiff.
This demurrer was overruled, and, they electing to stand upon their demurrer, judgment was rendered against them for |200, the penaltjr of the bond and costs. To reverse this judgment they prosecute this writ of error.
Mr. A. F. Hollenbeck, for plaintiffs in error.
No appearance for the People.

Opinion:
Mr. Justice Goddard
delivered the opinion of the court.
It appears upon the face of the complaint that the recognizance upon which the right of action is predicated was approved by the sheriff in a case where the prisoner was committed to the county jail in default of bail. Under these circumstances, the sheriff has no authority to approve a bond and release a prisoner from custody. In such case, the power to let to bail is expressly conferred upon a judge or two justices of the peace, by sec. 981, Gen. Stats., 1888, (Mills' An. Stats., sec. 1487,) which enacts :
" Where anjr person shall be committed to jail on a criminal charge for want of good and sufficient bail, except for murder or other offense punishable with death, or for not entering into a recognizance to appear and testify, any judge or any two justices of the peace may take such bail or recognizance in vacancy, and may discharge such prisoner from his or her imprisonment."
The recognizance, therefore, having been taken and approved by an officer without authority, is void, both as a statutory bond and as a common law obligation. People v. Mellor, 2 Colo. 705; Haney v. People, 12 Colo. 345; State v. Winninger, 81 Ind. 51; State v. Russell, 24 Tex. 505; State v. Kruise, 32 N. J. Law, 313; State v. Young, 56 Me. 219; Dickenson v. State, 20 Neb. 72; Harris v. Simpson, 14 Am. Dec. 101 (4 Littell, 165); Powell v. State, 15 Ohio, 579; Williams v. Shelby, 2 Ore. 144.
As was said in the case of Haney v. People, supra: " Without discussion, and without analysis of the authorities, we shall assume that if, in a case like the one at bar, bail be taken by a court having no jurisdiction, or by an officer destitute of legal authority, the instrument, whether denominated a ' recognizance ' or ' bond,' is void as to both principal and surety, and that such fact, when shown by the surety, constitutes a good defense to an action against him for the penalty."
The only cases that we have been able to find, that hold a recognizance so approved good as a common law obligation even, are State v. Cannon, 34 Ia. 325, and Dennard v. State, 2 Ga. 137.
Judge Freeman, in his note to the case of Harris v. Simpson, supra, in speaking of these cases, says: " The soundness of this doctrine is very questionable. Since the magistrate had no jurisdiction to admit to bail in such a case, the sheriff had no right to release his prisoner upon a bond so taken, and if he did so it was an escape; and since there is no distinction between voluntary and negligent escape in criminal matters, it was the sheriff's duty immediately to retake the accused. Surely a breach of duty on the part of the sheriff could not furnish a valid consideration for a bail bond. It would certainly be contrary to the policy of the law to enforce an obligation founded upon such a consideration." •
And as was said in Dickenson v. State, supra: " To hold that an unauthorized person may accept a recognizance running to the state, which will bind the person entering into it, is to hold that one private unauthorized person may make another the debtor of the state, a proposition illogical in theory and dangerous in practice."
It is clear, upon reason and authority, that the recognizance upon which this action is brought was void, and is not enforceable against the plaintiffs in error; and, its invalidity appearing upon the face of the complaint, the court below erred in overruling .the demurrer and entering. the judgment complained of. This conclusion being decisive of the case, we need not notice the further objection to the right of defendants in error to bring the action. For the foregoing reasons the judgment is reversed.
Reversed.