Case Name: Nalonni PETERSEN, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. SIOUX VALLEY HOSPITAL ASSOCIATION, Defendant and Appellee
Court: South Dakota Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: South Dakota
Decision Date: 1992-10-21
Citations: 491 N.W.2d 467
Docket Number: No. 17570
Parties: Nalonni PETERSEN, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. SIOUX VALLEY HOSPITAL ASSOCIATION, Defendant and Appellee.
Judges: MILLER, C.J., and, AMUNDSON, J., concur.
Reporter: North Western Reporter 2d
Volume: 491
Pages: 467–470

Head Matter:
Nalonni PETERSEN, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. SIOUX VALLEY HOSPITAL ASSOCIATION, Defendant and Appellee.
No. 17570.
Supreme Court of South Dakota.
Considered on Briefs on Rehearing Aug. 31, 1992.
Decided Oct. 21, 1992.
Rita Haverly Allen of Hagen, Wilka, Schreier & Archer, P.C., Sioux Falls, for plaintiff and appellant.
Michael L. Luce and Susan Jansa Brun-ick of Davenport, Evans, Hurwitz & Smith, Sioux Falls, for defendant and appellee.

Opinion:
SABERS, Justice.
On April 22, 1992, in Petersen v. Sioux Valley Hosp. Ass'n, 486 N.W.2d 516 (S.D.1992), reh'g granted, 491 N.W.2d 467 (1992), (Petersen I), we reversed the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Hospital on Petersen's cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Hospital filed a petition for a rehearing on the ground that Petersen I overlooked and failed to consider Tibke v. McDougall, 479 N.W.2d 898 (S.D.1992). Petersen I failed to cite to Tibke, in part, because Tibke, while encompassing intentional infliction of emotional distress, failed to cite to South Dakota precedent regarding reckless infliction of emotional distress as found in Wangen v. Knudson, 428 N.W.2d 242 (S.D.1988).
In considering the petition for rehearing, we refer the reader to the facts as set forth in Petersen I.
ISSUE
Whether intentional infliction of emotional distress includes reckless conduct resulting in emotional distress.
In Wangen v. Knudson, 428 N.W.2d 242 (S.D.1988), this court cited with approval the Restatement (Second) of Torts and specifically found that the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress imposes liability on the defendant for intentional and reckless conduct resulting in emotional distress. In defining reckless conduct, we stated:
Liability may attach where a defendant engages in 'reckless' conduct, conduct which constitutes a deliberate disregard of a high degree of probability that the emotional distress will follow.
Id. at 248 (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 cmt. i (1965)).
The elements necessary to establish a prima facie case for intentional infliction of emotional distress as stated in Tibke v. McDougall include:
(1) an act by defendant amounting to extreme and outrageous conduct;
(2) intent on the part of the defendant to cause plaintiff severe emotional distress;
(3) the defendant's conduct was the cause in-fact of plaintiff's injuries; and
(4) the plaintiff suffered án extreme disabling emotional response to defendant's conduct.
Tibke, 479 N.W.2d at 906; (citing Mackintosh v. Carter, 451 N.W.2d 285 (S.D.1990)); Groseth Int'l, Inc. v. Tenneco, Inc., 410 N.W.2d 159, 169 (S.D.1987) (Groseth I) (citing Alsteen v. Gehl, 21 Wis.2d 349, 124 N.W.2d 312 (1963)). In Tibke, we specifically adopted the elements outlined in Gro-seth I and Mackintosh and rejected the "broader rule" found in Ruple v. Brooks, 352 N.W.2d 652, 654 (S.D.1984); Ruane v. Murray 380 N.W.2d 362, 364 (S.D.1986); and Groseth Int'l, Inc. v. Tenneco, Inc., 440 N.W.2d 276, 280 (S.D.1989) (Groseth II). We did not discuss, however, the inclusion or exclusion of liability for reckless conduct within the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress because the issue was not before us.
While we noted in Tibke that this court has cited, with approval, the elements as outlined in Alsteen v. Gehl, 21 Wis.2d 349, 124 N.W.2d 312 (1963), this court has never explicitly rejected, as did Alsteen, the Restatement (Second) of Torts standard of liability incorporating reckless infliction of emotional distress within the rule. In fact, this court has consistently looked toward the reasonableness of the defendant's behavior in determining liability on his part. See Groseth Int'l, Inc. v. Tenneco, Inc., 410 N.W.2d 159, 169 (S.D.1987). See also Mackintosh v. Carter, 451 N.W.2d 285, 287 (S.D.1990).
In Petersen I, we reiterated the elements as outlined in Tibke. Consistent with the Restatement (Second) of Torts and previous case law, we also noted that the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress includes liability on the part of the defendant for reckless conduct resulting in emotional distress. We maintain this position.
Because Tibke did not address reckless infliction of emotional distress, we take this opportunity to clarify the law in South Dakota regarding this tort. While we adhere to the elements outlined in Tibke, we also adhere to Wangen and specifically find that the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress encompasses liability for reckless infliction of emotional distress as stated therein.
MILLER, C.J., and, AMUNDSON, J., concur.
HENDERSON, J., concurs with a writing.
WUEST, J., dissents.
. The Restatement (Second) of Torts provides: One who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress to another is subject to liability for such emotional distress, and if bodily harm to the other results from it, for such bodily harm.
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46(1) (1965).
. The necessary elements of the 'broader rule" include (1) that the act was intentional; (2) that it was unreasonable; and (3) that the actor should have recognized it as likely to result in illness (emotional distress).
."The trial court did not find any evidence of unreasonable conduct by IHC or any evidence that IHC's discontinuation of the Groseth franchise was intended or calculated to cause any mental distress." Groseth, 410 N.W.2d at 169. (Emphasis added.)
. We stated, in Petersen I, that
[n]othing in the record reflects that Karel was intentionally extreme or outrageous.... However, when viewing the evidence most favorably to Petersen, the failure to warn her as to the nature of the September meeting could be considered reckless, given Karel's knowledge of Petersen's fear of confrontational group meetings. Petersen argues that this and other conduct was intentional and reckless in view of her nature and condition. Where reasonable minds differ, it is for the jury to determine, not the circuit court nor this court.
Petersen, 486 N.W.2d at 519-20. (Citation omitted.)