Case Name: STATE of Louisiana v. Harry O. CRAMER
Court: Louisiana Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1978-05-22
Citations: 358 So. 2d 1277
Docket Number: No. 61150
Parties: STATE of Louisiana v. Harry O. CRAMER.
Judges: TATE, J., concurs and assigns reasons.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 358
Pages: 1277–1282

Head Matter:
STATE of Louisiana v. Harry O. CRAMER.
No. 61150.
Supreme Court of Louisiana.
May 22, 1978.
Elizabeth W. Cole, Orleans Indigent Defender Program, New Orleans, for defendant-appellant.
William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Barbara Rutledge, Asst. Atty. Gen., Harry F. Con-nick, Dist. Atty., Brian G. Meissner, Asst. Dist. Atty., for plaintiff-appellee.

Opinion:
SANDERS, Chief Justice.
The State charged the defendant, Harry 0. Cramer, with twenty-six counts of aggravated crime against nature, violations of LSA-R.S. 14:89.1(5). After a bench trial, the court found him guilty, and sentenced him to fifteen years imprisonment on three counts, to run consecutively, and to five years imprisonment on the remaining counts, to run concurrently with each other and with the fifteen year sentences.
The defendant appeals. He relies on five assignments of error for reversal of his convictions and sentences. As he failed to brief or argue five assignments of error, we consider them abandoned. State v. Phillips, La., 337 So.2d 1157 (1976); State v. Blanton, La., 325 So.2d 586 (1976); State v. Carlisle, La., 315 So.2d 675 (1975).
We adduce the following context facts:
The defendant was an assistant scout master for a New Orleans Boy Scout troop. Over a period of two and one-half years, he had unnatural carnal copulation with seven young boys associated with the troop.
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR NOS. 1, 9, AND 10
The defendant's principal contention is that neither the bill of information nor the bill of particulars supplied him with adequate data concerning the exact times of the offenses to enable him to identify each criminal transaction and defend against them.
Although the bill of information did not give the exact dates of any offenses, it set forth periods of times during which the offenses occurred, e. g., October 19, 1973 through April 5, 1974, December, 1975, April, 1976. The defense filed a motion for bill of particulars requesting the precise dates of the offenses. In response, the State reiterated dates already given in the bill of information and stated that it did not have more definite dates. Thereafter, the defense filed a supplemental motion for bill of particulars asking which offenses grew out of the same transaction. The State answered, grouping those offenses which occurred "on the same day at approximately the same time." The judge found the State's answers to both motions "good and sufficient in law."
Testimony and evidence at trial narrowed some of the periods of time during which the offenses occurred. However, during trial, the State amended the bill of information and the answers to the bills of particulars to reflect the evidence at trial. Thus, count eight, which the State had alleged occurred in April, 1975, was amended to state that it occurred between April and June of 1975.
Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure Article 468 provides that the "date or time of the commission of the offense need not be alleged in the indictment, unless the date or time is essential to the offense." The State charged the defendant with unnatural carnal copulation when the victim was under the. age of seventeen and the defendant is at least three years older than the victim.
The bill of information contained each victim's age at the time of the offense and stated that the defendant was three years older than the victims. The State provided the defense with the birth dates of each victim in the answer to the bill of particulars. Therefore, the defense had the essential information as to the ages of the victims. See State v. Hunt, La., 310 So.2d 563 (1975).
The victims in the instant case were unable to recall the dates. The State did not withhold them and introduce them at trial to the defendant's surprise. Rather, the State supplied the defense with all the available information concerning the dates.
We conclude that the defendant possessed enough data to identify each criminal offense and defend against it.
These assignments of error are without merit.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 4
The defense complains of the denial of his motion to quash. His main allegation is that the bill of information is multiplicious and thus, subjects him to double jeopardy. He avers that the State should have charged him with one sexual encounter with the same victim at approximately the same time, rather than with one sexual act.
Double jeopardy prohibits subjecting a defendant to multiple punishments for one offense. State v. Cox, La., 352 So.2d 638 (1977); State v. Cotton, La., 341 So.2d 362 (1976).
Thus, the issue presented is whether charging the defendant with aggravated crime against nature for each sexual act subjects him to punishment more than once for the same offense. To resolve this issue we must determine if the Legislature intended each sexual act or each sexual encounter to constitute an offense under LSA-R.S. 14:89.1. State v. Allied Supermarkets, Inc., La., 353 So.2d 999 (1977); State v. McCarroll, La., 337 So.2d 475 (1976).
LSA-R.S. 14:89.1(5), the statute under which the State charged the defendant, provides:
"Aggravated crime against nature is crime against nature committed under any one or more of the following circumstances:
"(5) Where the victim is under the age of seventeen years and the offender is at least three years older than the victim."
As crimes occurred both before and after the amendment to the statute defining crime against nature, LSA-R.S. 14:89, the former and present articles are relevant. The former article provided, in pertinent part:
"Crime against nature is the unnatural carnal copulation by a human being with another of the same or opposite sex or with an animal. Emission is not necessary, and, when committed by a human being with another, the use of the genital organ of one of the offenders of whatever sex is sufficient to constitute the crime."
The present LSA-R.S. 14:89 is identical to the former, but for an exception embodied in the amendment, which exception is immaterial to the present case.
Initially, we note that the court sentenced the defendant to concurrent sentences on twenty-three of the twenty-six counts.
The intent of the Legislature is clearly expressed in the statutory language. The use of the singular tense indicates that each "unnatural carnal copulation" or "use of the genital organ" is a crime against nature. See State v. Allied Supermarkets, Inc., supra. We reject the defense's theory that the Legislature intended to punish a defendant only once for a series of unnatural carnal copulations.
LSA-R.S. 14:8(1) supports our conclusion. That statute provides that criminal conduct consists of "an act or failure to act that produces criminal consequences, and which is combined with criminal intent." [Emphasis supplied.] In describing the theory of "criminal act" the Reporter's Comment states:
"As used in [LSA-R.S. 14:8], 'act' refers to an external manifestation of will which produces consequences.
"All positive conduct includes at some point a voluntary muscular movement (external manifestations of will) which we call an act. See Restatement of the Law of Torts (1934) § 2."
We conclude that the defendant was not subject to multiple punishments for one offense. Each sexual act is a separate offense under LSA-R.S. 14:89.1. The trial judge, therefore, properly denied the motion to quash.
This assignment of error is without merit.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 5
The defense filed a motion for severance in which he prayed that only those counts relating to the same victim and the same date be tried together. This procedure would have necessitated thirteen trials. The court denied the motion and the defendant now challenges the ruling.
When the defense moves for a severance prior to trial, the court shall grant his motion if "it is deemed appropriate to promote a fair determination of the defendant's guilt or innocence of each offense . . ." LSA-C.Cr.P. Art. 495.1(a).
The substantial issue presented is whether the trial on the twenty-six counts prevented a fair determination of his guilt on each count. Under the circumstances before us, we find that it did not.
The present case was tried before a judge without a jury. This circumstance is of considerable import. Because of his legal education and judicial experience, a judge has superior skill in evaluating the evidence as to the multiple offenses charged.
The State charged the defendant with committing unnatural carnal copulation, per anus and per os, with seven young boys. The evidence consisted primarily of the boys' testimony. The State presented the evidence in a logical and organized fashion. The victims described the crimes in a simple, clear, and largely identical manner. There were several photographs depicting the defendant and a victim during the sexual acts. Often the prosecutor announced to the judge the counts to be proven prior to the introduction of evidence on those counts. The trial judge stated that he was following the evidence presented with the counts contained in the bill of information.
The offense charged is a fairly simple one with few elements. LSA-R.S. 14:89.1. See State v. Frentz, La., 354 So.2d 1007 (1978). The identical law applied to all counts.
The non-complex nature of the evidence rendered the case appropriate for joint trial. The judge could readily compartmentalize the evidence and apply the law to each offense. See State v. Mitchell, La., 356 So.2d 974 (1978); State v. Holstead, La., 354 So.2d 493 (1977). Thus, the trial judge properly denied the motion for a severance.
This assignment of error is without merit.
For the reasons assigned, the convictions and sentences are affirmed.
TATE, J., concurs and assigns reasons.
DENNIS, J., concurs in the decree.
DIXON, J., dissents with reasons.
CALOGERO, J., dissents and assigns reasons.
. An example best illustrates his argument. Counts one through four charge him with four separate crimes which occurred at approximately the same time with the same victim. The defendant alleges that these four actions constitute a single transaction and one criminal offense. According to this theory, he would then stand trial for thirteen, rather than twenty-six crimes.