Case Name: Aleks PLLUMBAJ, Petitioner, v. Loretta E. LYNCH, Attorney General, Respondent
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 2016-12-19
Citations: 671 F. App'x 608
Docket Number: No. 15-72577
Parties: Aleks PLLUMBAJ, Petitioner, v. Loretta E. LYNCH, Attorney General, Respondent.
Judges: Before: WALLACE, LEAVY, and FISHER, Circuit Judges.
Reporter: West's Federal Appendix
Volume: 671
Pages: 608–609

Head Matter:
Aleks PLLUMBAJ, Petitioner, v. Loretta E. LYNCH, Attorney General, Respondent.
No. 15-72577
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
Submitted December 14, 2016
Filed December 19, 2016
Marina Kab, Attorney, Law Offices of Marina Kab, Encino, CA, for Petitioner
Scott Michael Marconda, Esquire, Trial Attorney, OIL, Victor Matthew Lawrence, I, Esquire, Assistant Director, DOJ—U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Division/Office of Immigration Litigation, Washington, DC, Chief Counsel ICE, Office of the Chief Counsel, Department of Homeland Security, San Francisco, CA, for Respondent
Before: WALLACE, LEAVY, and FISHER, Circuit Judges.
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

Opinion:
MEMORANDUM
Aleks Pllumbaj, a native and citizen of Albania, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals' ("BIA") order dismissing his appeal from an immigration judge's ("IJ") order denying his motion to reopen removal proceedings. Our jurisdiction is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for abuse of discretion the denial of a motion to reopen. Avagyan v. Holder, 646 F.3d 672, 674 (9th Cir. 2011). We deny in part and dismiss in part the petition for review.
Pllumbaj's contention that the agency abused its discretion in not properly applying Malty v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 942 (9th Cir. 2004), is not supported, because the agency determined petitioner had demonstrated conditions had changed in Albania since Pllumbaj's initial removal hearing, but had failed to demonstrate a reasonable likelihood of meeting the requirements to establish prima facie eligibility for asylum and related relief. See Malty, 381 F.3d at 947-48; Mendez-Castro v. Mukasey, 552 F.3d 975, 980 (9th Cir. 2009) (concluding that the agency applies the correct legal standard where it expressly cites and ap plies relevant ease law in rendering its decision).
Because the BIA made its determination on the merits and declined to address the IJ's departure bar findings, we need not reach Pllumbaj's contention that the IJ erred in finding that the immigration court lacked jurisdiction to reopen his proceedings.
In light of this decision, we need not reach Pllumbaj's contention that he is eligible for adjustment of status upon reopening of his removal proceedings. See Simeonov v. Ashcroft, 371 F.3d 532, 538 (9th Cir. 2004).
We lack jurisdiction to consider Pllum-baj's unexhausted contention regarding the enforceability of his removal order. See Barron v. Ashcroft, 358 F.3d 674, 678 (9th Cir. 2004) (court lacks jurisdiction to review claims not presented to the agency).
PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED in part; DISMISSED in part.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.