Case Name: STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF, v. ROBERT HUBBARD, DEFENDANT
Court: New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New Jersey
Decision Date: 1980-10-01
Citations: 176 N.J. Super. 174
Docket Number: 
Parties: STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF, v. ROBERT HUBBARD, DEFENDANT.
Judges: 
Reporter: New Jersey Superior Court Reports
Volume: 176
Pages: 174–189

Head Matter:
STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF, v. ROBERT HUBBARD, DEFENDANT.
Superior Court of New Jersey Resentencing Panel
Decided October 1, 1980.
Before Judges COLEMAN, MARZULLI and YANOFF.
Carol Henderson, Deputy Attorney General, for the State (John J. Degnan, Attorney General, Attorney).
Eldridge Hawkins for defendant.

Opinion:
PER CURIAM.
On December 18, 1979 a motion for stay of further proceedings in the above was granted. In September 1980 the Resentencing Panel called for argument on whether the stay should be vacated. This opinion is the result of that argument.
In addition to the problems posed by State v. Maguire, 176 N.J.Super. 164 (Resentencing Panel 1979), now pending in the New Jersey Supreme Court, the issue in this case is disparity. In skeleton outline: Hubbard, Rainey, Anderson and Arrington participated in a homicide. The killing took place during the course of a robbery. The precise roles played by each of the participants is not clear, but it seems conceded that Hubbard did not pull the trigger. Anderson and Arrington pleaded non vult to a murder charge, and each received a term of eight to ten years. Rainey went to trial and was convicted of second-degree murder and sentenced to 20 to 25 years. Rainey, apparently, was the "trigger man." Hubbard was tried separately, found guilty of first-degree murder and automatically sentenced to life imprisonment. Hubbard had sold Rainey the murder weapon, but, it seems, not for the purpose of committing the murder.
We need not repeat the reasons set forth in State v. Maguire, supra, as to why Hubbard is entitled to be considered for resentencing under N.J.S.A. 2C:1-1 d(2). In this case there are additional reasons. The obvious purpose of N.J.S.A. 2C:1-1 d(2) is to diminish disparity. One can ascribe no statutory intent to it other than that persons convicted under the Title 2A scheme should not be required to serve a greater sentence than persons of equal culpability convicted under the Code. The two Supreme Court orders, dated October 18,1979 and November 29, 1979 (104 N.J.L.J. 369, 489 (1979), under which the Resentencing Panel was created, have diminution of disparity as their objective, not only between persons convicted under Title 2A and under Title 2C, but in the administration of N.J.S.A. 2C:1 1 d(2). A major reason for the orders is prevention of disparity in resentencing which may arise from judgments of resentence imposed by judges throughout the State, by creating a single tribunal whose rulings are more likely to be internally consistent.
While the Supreme Court has said that the mere fact that one defendant receives a different sentence than that of a codefendant does not entitle him to relief (State v. Hicks, 54 N.J. 390,391 (1969)), in actuality it views disparity in sentencing with disfavor. In Hicks itself sentence was reduced to that of his coperpetrator, Gardiner. There is an obvious sense of unfairness in having disparate punishment for equally culpable perpetrators. See State v. Whitehead, 159 N.J.Super. 433 (Law Div.1978), aff'd 80 N.J. 343 (1979). In this case, because Hubbard was tried separately and because of the nondiscretionary application of N.J.S.A. 2A:113 4, he received a life sentence. Whether he was equally or more culpable than the others who received more lenient sentences, or whether he deserved the sentence he received, is not known; this must await the good cause hearing. Had he pleaded non vult, as did Anderson and Arrington, he might well be walking the streets now, as they are. There is an inherent constitutional problem in exposing a person who pleads not guilty and goes to trial to a greater term than that of one who pleads guilty. This was explored in State v. Forcella, 52 N.J. 263 (1968), rev'd sub nom. State v. Funicello, 403 U.S. 948, 91 S.Ct. 2278, 29 L.Ed.2d 859 (1971), and United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 88 S.Ct. 1209, 20 L.Ed.2d 138 (1968). Cf. Corbitt v. New Jersey, 439 U.S. 212, 99 S.Ct. 492, 58 L.Ed.2A 466 (1978).
We need not at this time determine that the principles applied in Funieello and Jackson, supra, are relevant in a case such as this, where a defendant, ostensibly similarly situated to other defendants, probably received more stringent treatment because he exercised his constitutional right to put the State to its proof. It is sufficient to conclude that they are pertinent enough to constitute an additional reason why Hubbard should be afforded a resentencing hearing.
In consequence, the stay ordered by this court barring further proceeding in this cause is revoked and the case will be scheduled for hearing as to "good cause."