Case Name: TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, Appellant, v. Scott Hamilton HENSON, Appellee
Court: Texas Courts of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1992-11-12
Citations: 843 S.W.2d 648
Docket Number: No. C14-91-01311-CV
Parties: TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, Appellant, v. Scott Hamilton HENSON, Appellee.
Judges: Before JUNELL, ROBERTSON and DRAUGHN, JJ.
Reporter: South Western Reporter Second Series
Volume: 843
Pages: 648–657

Head Matter:
TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, Appellant, v. Scott Hamilton HENSON, Appellee.
No. C14-91-01311-CV.
Court of Appeals of Texas, Houston (14th Dist.).
Nov. 12, 1992.
Rehearing Denied Dec. 23, 1992.
Richard Mason, Mark Heidenheimer, Austin, for appellant.
Richard N. Laminack, Thomas W. Pirtle, Houston, for appellee.
Before JUNELL, ROBERTSON and DRAUGHN, JJ.

Opinion:
OPINION
JUNELL, Justice.
This is an appeal from a judgment in favor of appellee for damages of $100,000.
Scott Henson, appellee, brought a personal injury suit against the State of Texas, by and through the Texas Department of Transportation, formerly known as the State Department of Highways and Public Transportation. Suit was brought under the Texas Tort Claims Act for negligence involving some condition or some use of personal property. Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 6252-19 § 3 (Vernon 1976).
On September 6, 1981, appellee, while driving his pickup truck, struck two barrel-sign devices on State Highway 288. The 55-gallon orange and white barrels are used as warning devices on many roads in Texas. A barrel-sign consists of a warning sign panel attached to a vertical wooden post that is secured to the inside of a 30 or 55-gallon drum.
At the time of appellee's one-car accident, eleven barrel-signs were used on a portion of Highway 288 to delineate where a lane under construction curved onto another lane. MICA Corporation, the original contractor, constructed the devices using bolts to secure both the signs and the posts. In April 1981, appellant assumed the maintenance of the devices.
When appellee's vehicle struck two of the barrels, the signs separated from the vertical posts and went through the windshield of appellee's vehicle. One of the signs struck appellee and was imbedded in his forehead four inches. Appellee suffered brain damage and disfigurement. Before appellee's accident, several of the barrel-signs were struck by motorists and replaced by appellant. Appellant constructed the replacement devices using nails instead of bolts to secure the warning sign panels to the posts. Appellee argued the State was negligent because it used nails instead of bolts for the construction.
The jury found appellant negligent and also found appellee suffered $885,000 in damages. Appellee's damages were reduced to $100,000 by the trial court pursuant to the Texas Tort Claims Act. Id.
Before addressing appellant's sole point of error, it is necessary to determine if appellee's claim states a cause of action that can be brought properly under the Texas Tort Claims Act.
Section 13 requires that the provisions of the act be "... liberally construed to achieve the purposes hereof." Tex.Rev.Civ. Stat.Ann. art. 6252-19 § 13 (Vernon 1976). The stated purposes of the act include: "to make liable for tort claims for personal injury all units of government in Texas and setting certain limits; abolishing certain immunities of the sovereign to suit, and granting permission for such suit; ." Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 6252-19 (Vernon 1976).
Section 3 provides for waiver of governmental immunity in three general areas: use of publicly owned automobiles; premises defects; and injuries arising out of conditions or use of property. Lowe v. Texas Tech University, 540 S.W.2d 297, 298 (Tex.1976).
The first part of § 3, deals with injuries or death arising from the operation or use of a motor-driven vehicle and motor-driven equipment and refers to acts that are "proximately caused by the negligence or wrongful act or omission of any officer or employee acting within the scope of his employment or office". Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat. Ann. art. 6252-19 § 3 (Vernon 1976). Ap-pellee's claim does not involve a governmental unit's operation or use of a motor-driven vehicle or motor-driven equipment; therefore, the State can be held liable under the act only if appellee's injuries arose from some condition or some use of property. The second part of § 3 states:
. death or personal injuries so caused from some condition or some use of tangible property, real or personal, under circumstances where such unit of government, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of this state....
Id. (emphasis supplied).
Courts have struggled with the meaning of the words "so caused" and "condition" as used in this part of § 3. The court in Lowe determined "so caused" meant "proximately caused by the negligence or wrongful act or omission of any officer or employee acting within the scope of his employment or office ." 540 S.W.2d at 299. Appellee's amended petition alleges his injuries were proximately caused by the negligence of appellant and the jury found the State's negligence did proximately cause Scott Henson's injuries. We find appellee's cause of action meets the interpretation of "so caused" as used in § 3.
The word "condition" is not as clear as to its meaning and proper interpretation. The concurring opinion in Lowe v. Texas Tech University stated "The statutory language 'condition or use' of property implies that such property was furnished, was in bad or defective condition or was wrongly used." 540 S.W.2d at 302. This is a broad interpretation of "condition" as used in this section.
This court, in Creek v. Department of Highways & Public Transp., 826 S.W.2d 797 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, writ denied), following the rationale of Lawson v. Estate of McDonald, 524 S.W.2d 351 (Tex.App.—Waco 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.), found that, when applied to cases involving traffic signs, the word "condition" refers to the maintenance of a sign or signal in a condition sufficient to properly perform the function of traffic control for which it is relied upon by the travelling public. 826 S.W.2d at 802.
Both Lawson and Creek involved injuries sustained because stop signs were either missing or in a down condition. In Lawson, an automobile accident occurred at an intersection between Mr. and Mrs. Lawson in one vehicle, and Mr. McDonald in another vehicle. The stop sign that should have been in place as Mr. McDonald approached the intersection had been removed by van- dais. The Lawsons asserted the stop sign was in a dangerous condition because it was easily removable and because the State Highway Department was aware of this condition. 524 S.W.2d at 356. The court held the condition referred to in the statute was not intended to refer to the State's installation or maintenance of a sign insofar as ease of its removal by thieves was concerned. Id. at 356.
In Creek, a fatal accident occurred because of a collision at an intersection where a traffic control sign was in a down condition. Appellants maintained the stop sign was improperly installed because it did not have sufficient concrete around the two inch pipe to which the stop sign was secured to hold the sign upright. 826 S.W.2d at 799. The court found the State would be liable only if it had knowledge the sign was not performing its function. Id. at 802.
In both Lawson and Creek this court's definition of condition was narrowly construed, restrictive and applied to the removal or destruction of signs. The only function of the stop signs was to serve as a traffic control device. Under this definition it is necessary to determine if the State maintained the barrel-signs in a condition sufficient to perform properly the functions for which they were relied upon by the travelling public.
The State Department of Highways and Public Transportation's long-term goal "is to reduce traffic crashes and the resulting deaths, injuries, and property damage to the lowest possible level." 43 Tex.Admin.Code § 25.904.
A highway department's interoffice memo entered at trial stated the traffic control devices placed in effect at this particular location conformed both to the State's Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices for Streets and Highways and to the guidelines and standards endorsed and issued by the Federal Highway Administrator. An expert witness testified the Federal Highway standards require that basic hardware used to erect signs consist of bolts, washers, clamps, fittings, and brackets. These were to be used to fasten the sign to the post and to solidify the connection so that wind, vandals, or the impact by outside forces did not destroy or degrade the intended use of the sign. The standards require the fasteners and braces be designed to insure that the signs remain attached to the post throughout the impact sequence should they be impacted by an errant vehicle. The witness testified this indicated there would be possible impacts.
The expert witness also testified the subcommittee on bridges and structures of the American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials (AASHTO) requires breakaway supports be designed to yield when struck by a vehicle, thereby minimizing injury to the occupants of the vehicle and damage to the vehicle itself.
The term "breakaway supports" refers to all types of signs, and traffic signal supports designed to be safely displaced under vehicle impacts. The expert witness testified a barrel-sign is a breakaway barrier and is designed to move and not completely damage the vehicle or injure the occupants therein.
The witness further testified AASHTO determined the standards after recognizing that signs going through windshields when hit were a hazard. The AASHTO manual stated the structures should also be designed to prevent the structure or its parts from penetrating the vehicle occupant compartment. AASHTO established these standards after crashes with some sign installations resulted in the sign panels or sign panels and their support penetrating the windshields of impacting vehicles. AASHTO established standards for increasing the strength of the support to panel attachments to reduce the chances of a sign penetrating a windshield. Hitting these barrels is a recognized hazard.
The travelling public is aware that in many situations it is better to hit these barrels than to run off a road under construction, run off an overpass on the highway, or hit an on-coming car. The specifications from the State Department of Highways and Public Transportation, Barricade and Construction Standards, state the barrel-drums should not be weighted with sand, water or other material to the extent that would make them dangerous to motorists. The highway department obviously anticipates motorists hitting the barrels. Testimony at trial established that before appellee's accident, several of the barrels had been hit by motorists.
The barrel-signs have two functions: to warn motorists of road conditions and to protect motorists from injury or death should it be necessary for a motorist to hit them, in other words, to serve as crash-barrels. The barrel-signs should not create a hazard greater than the hazard the sign is warning about. The State did not maintain the barrel-signs in a condition sufficient to properly perform the functions relied upon by the travelling public.
The Tort Claims Act holds the governmental unit liable for any malfunction, absence or condition for which the governmental unit has notice unless the absence, condition, or malfunction is corrected within a reasonable time after notice. Tex.Rev. Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 6252-19 § 14(12) (Vernon 1976). The State created a dangerous condition not visible to the driving public. Appellant, by creating the condition of the barrel-signs is deemed to have actual notice of the defect. Appellee had no notice or knowledge of the defect. Appellant had a duty to warn appellee and other motorists or to make the condition reasonably safe. Prairie View A & M University v. Thomas, 684 S.W.2d 169 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
We find the evidence supports the jury finding that the injury suffered by appellee was proximately caused by appellant's negligence. The barrel-signs were not maintained in a condition sufficient to perform properly the functions of traffic control for which they were relied upon by the travel-ling public; the State had notice of the defect; and the State had a duty either to warn appellee or make the condition reasonably safe. Appellee's claim was properly brought under the Texas Tort Claims Act.
In its sole point of error, appellant complains the trial court erred by submitting a jury charge based upon general negligence law instead of a charge based upon premise liability law. Appellant argues the barrel-signs were part of the premises of the highway and appellee's claim arises from a premise defect. Appellee argues the claim arose out of a condition of property and not from a premise defect.
As a premise defect claim, appellee is owed the duty a private person owes to a licensee on private property. Tex.Rev.Civ. Stat.Ann. art. 6252-19 § 18(b) (Vernon 1976). A licensor must avoid injuring a licensee by willful, wanton or grossly negligent conduct. When the licensor has actual knowledge of a dangerous condition and the licensee does not, the licensor's duty is to warn the licensee or make the condition reasonably safe. 684 S.W.2d at 170.
Because the Texas Tort Claims Act does not define "premises defects" the common and ordinary meaning is applied. Billstrom v. Memorial Medical Center, 598 S.W.2d 642 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1980, no writ). The word "premises" is commonly defined as "a building or part of a building with its grounds or other appurtenances." Id. at 646. A legal definition of premises is "Lands and tenements; an estate, including land and buildings thereon; . Land and its appurtenances." Id. at 646. Appellant argues the barrel-signs were added to the land, are appurtenances to the land and are part of the premises.
There are numerous cases involving premise defects. Unfortunately, the cases do not establish set guidelines or factors to determine what is or what is not a premise defect. One factor, however, that the courts examine is the permanent or temporary nature of the item in question. In Harris County v. Dowleam, 489 S.W.2d 140 (Tex.Civ.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.), appellee was injured when an unattached wall panel used as a room divider in the county courthouse fell on her. The court found the claim was not based on a premise defect. Id. at 147.
In Billstrom, a mental patient was injured when he fell to the ground after removing a security screen and attempting to lower himself from a window. The court found the screen and window analogous to a floor in a building and determined the claim arose from a premise defect. 598 S.W.2d at 647.
In City of Baytown v. Townsend, 548 S.W.2d 935 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1977, writ ref d n.r.e.), appellee's arm was severely lacerated on a bolt protruding from a net post on a tennis court constructed, owned and maintained by the city. The bolt was part of a tumbuckle used to raise and lower the tennis net. On appeal, the city argued that the protruding bolt, if defective, was a premise defect, and therefore no duty was owed by the city to appel-lee. Id. at 938. The court found the protruding bolt was a simple machine; a mechanical device used to raise and lower the tennis net. It was tangible property, built and maintained by the city and was in a defective and dangerous condition at the time of the incidence. Id. at 939.
Similar to the unattached wall panel, the barrel-signs were moveable, portable and temporary in nature, much like other construction equipment. The barrel-signs, unlike a window and screen or a floor in a building, were not intended to be a permanent part of the highway. Also, similar to the bolt protruding from the turnbuckle in City of Baytown, the barrel-signs were simple devices constructed and maintained by appellant to delineate traffic through a construction area. We find the barrel-signs to be tangible personal property and the trial court did not err in submitting a jury charge of general negligence.
It is important to note two exceptions apply to the licensor-licensee limitation of duty in a premise defect case brought under the Texas Tort Claims Act. The limitation does not apply "... to the duty to warn of special defects . nor shall it apply to any such duty to warn of the absence, condition, or malfunction of traffic signs, signals, or warning devices.... Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 6252-19 § 18(b) (Vernon 1976). One federal case has interpreted this limitation to mean that the Texas Legislature did not intend for the limited licensee rationale to apply to use of state highways where the safety of the traveling public is concerned. Flores v. Norton & Ramsey Line, Inc., 352 F.Supp. 150, 155 (1972).
The barrel-signs clearly are warning devices. They were used to warn motorists that the lane ended and curved onto an adjacent lane. Even if we determined the barrel-signs to be a premise defect, which we do not, the exception to the limitation of duty would apply in this case and the trial court's charge of general negligence would not be in error.
We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
. Now codified as Tex.Civ.Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. § 101.021, et seq. (Vernon Supp.1992).