Case Name: Gaetano A. MORGAVI, Jr. v. Fabian S. MUMME et al.
Court: Louisiana Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1972-12-11
Citations: 270 So. 2d 540
Docket Number: No. 51882
Parties: Gaetano A. MORGAVI, Jr. v. Fabian S. MUMME et al.
Judges: HAMLIN, J., dissents with written reasons.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 270
Pages: 540–544

Head Matter:
264 La. 24
Gaetano A. MORGAVI, Jr. v. Fabian S. MUMME et al.
No. 51882.
Supreme Court of Louisiana.
Dec. 11, 1972.
Gauche, Wegener & Oster, Robert J. Os-ter, New Orleans, for defendant-applicant.
Robert L. Redfearn, New Orleans, for plaintiff s-respondents.

Opinion:
SANDERS, Justice.
We granted certiorari to review a judgment of the Court of Appeal that partially reversed the trial court and ordered the return of a deposit of $2100.00 to the prospective purchaser in a contract to sell an improved lot in the City of New Orleans. See 254 So.2d 278; 260 La. 12, 254 So.2d 617.
The operative facts are few. The plaintiff, Gaetano Morgavi, Jr., entered into a contract on a standard form to purchase from Fabian S. Mumme the immovable property located at 5615 West End Boulevard in the City of New Orleans for the sum of $21,000.00. Pursuant to the terms of the contract, Morgavi deposited with Robert J. Oster the sum of $2100.00, representing 10% of the purchase price.
The contract provided:
"In the event the purchaser fails to comply with this agreement within the time specified, the seller shall have the right to declare the deposit, ipso-facto, forfeited, without formality beyond tender of title to purchaser; or the seller may demand specific performance."
After a title examination, Morgavi concluded that the title to the property was un-merchantable. He informed the seller of his conclusion, advising him that he was unwilling to complete the sale. He demanded the return of his deposit. When Mumme and Oster, the agent, refused to comply, he filed suit seeking return of the deposit, plus attorney fees and title examination expenses.
His petition rested upon the allegation that the title was unmerchantable for two reasons:
1. The improvements on the property violate the zoning ordinance of the City of New Orleans; and,
2. The improvements violate title restrictions, which were not made known to him.
Mumme filed an answer and reconven-tional demand. In his answer, the defendant denied that the title was unmerchantable. By the reconventional demand, he sought to have the court declare the deposit forfeited and to recover damages.
On the trial of the case, the factual issue was merchantability of title. The defendant offered no evidence in support of the reconventional demand. The trial court found that the evidence failed to establish that the title was unmerchantable and dismissed plaintiff's suit. Referring to the defendant's failure to offer evidence on the reconventional demand, the trial court also dismissed the reconventional demand.
Plaintiff took a devolutive appeal. Defendant did not appeal or answer the appeal. The Court of Appeal held that the title was merchantable. However, because defendant had offered no evidence at the trial to establish a formal tender of title, the court rendered the following judgment:
"It is now ordered that the deposit in the sum of $2,100 be returned to the plaintiff herein. It is further ordered that plaintiff's demand for damages be and the same is hereby dismissed. It is further ordered that defendant's demand for forfeiture of deposit and for damages be and the same is hereby dismissed. Costs to be paid by defendant-appellee."
Quite clearly, the Court of Appeal erred in passing upon defendant's reconven-tional demand. Since defendant had not answered the appeal, the reconventional demand was not before the appellate court. When an appellee whose reconventional demand has been dismissed files no answer to the appeal, the reconventional demand cannot be reviewed. LSA-C.C.P. Art. 2133; Ober v. Williams, 213 La. 568, 35 So.2d 219 (1948); Brown v. Vernon Parish School Board, 209 La. 725, 25 So.2d 446 (1946); Veillon v. Tramuta, La.App., 237 So.2d 708 (1970); Gibson v. Vining Oil Co., La.App., 236 So.2d 632 (1970); Close v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., La.App., 207 So.2d 571 (1968).
Hence, the only matter before the Court of Appeal was the correctness of the trial court judgment rejecting the demand made in plaintiff's petition. Inasmuch as we review the Court of Appeal judgment, that is also the only matter before us.
Our review of the record convinces us as it did both lower courts, that the plaintiff has failed to establish that the title is unmerchantable. The evidence offered falls far short of that required for title rejection.
The plaintiff contends, however, that Article 2164 of the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure imposes an obligation on the court to do justice on the record irrespective of whether a particular legal point or theory has been presented to or passed upon by the trial court. Hence, plaintiff submits, he is entitled to a return of the deposit because the evidence does not establish tender of title.
Article 2164 provides:
"The appellate court shall render any judgment which is just, legal, and proper upon the record on appeal. The court may award damages for frivolous appeal; and may tax the costs of the lower or appellate court, or any part thereof, against any party to the suit, as in its judgment may be considered equitable."
The foregoing article, it is true, abolished the theory-of-the-case doctrine and gave the appellate courts wide latitude in granting relief to which a litigant is entitled "upon the record on appeal."
As we recently stated in Summerell v. Phillips, 258 La. 587, 247 So.2d 542 (1971), the phrase upon the record on appeal has major significance. It means that the court can render any judgment supported by the pleadings and the evidence.
The plaintiff's petition makes no reference to tender of title. The defendant's answer is also silent as to tender. Assuming arguendo that we can consider judicial admissions in the reconventional demand, not now before us, that pleading makes only a general allegation that the owner "declared the deposit forfeited in accordance with the terms of the said contract."
The evidence is silent as to whether or not tender was made. It relates solely to the merchantability of title.
As in all civil matters, the burden of proof is upon the plaintiff to establish the elements essential for his recovery. This is especially true of the failure to tender title in conformity to a contract. The breach of a contractual duty cannot be presumed. Foshee v. Simkin, La. App., 174 So.2d 915 (1965); Athens Roller Mills v. Com'r of Internal Revenue, 136 F. 2d 125 (6th Cir. 1943); Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Grand Nat. Bank of St. Louis, 69 F. 2d 177 (8th Cir. 1934); 29 Am.Jur., Evidence § 168, pp. 208-210.
We conclude that the record on appeal is inadequate to establish that the seller failed to tender title. Because of this conclusion, we do not reach the defendant's alternative contention that formal tender is unnecessary when the prospective purchaser is unwilling to accept title, so advises the seller, and adheres to this position in the ensuing litigation.
For the reasons assigned, the judgment of the Court of Appeal is reversed, and the judgment of the trial court dismissing plaintiff's petition is reinstated and made the judgment of this Court. All costs are assessed against the plaintiff.
HAMLIN, J., dissents with written reasons.