Case Name: James H. PRICE, Individually and as Last Director and Trustee of James H. Price & Co., Inc., a dissolved Florida corporation, Appellant, v. AIRLIFT INTERNATIONAL, INC., a Florida corporation et al., Appellees
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1967-07-20
Citations: 201 So. 2d 264
Docket Number: No. 67-584
Parties: James H. PRICE, Individually and as Last Director and Trustee of James H. Price & Co., Inc., a dissolved Florida corporation, Appellant, v. AIRLIFT INTERNATIONAL, INC., a Florida corporation et al., Appellees.
Judges: Before PEARSON, HENDRY and SWANN, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 201
Pages: 264–264

Head Matter:
James H. PRICE, Individually and as Last Director and Trustee of James H. Price & Co., Inc., a dissolved Florida corporation, Appellant, v. AIRLIFT INTERNATIONAL, INC., a Florida corporation et al., Appellees.
No. 67-584.
District Court of Appeal of Florida. Third District.
July 20, 1967.
Horton & Schwartz, Miami, for appellant.
Sibley, Giblin, Levenson & Ward, Miami Beach, and Dixon, Dejarnette, Bradford, Williams, McKay & Kimbrell, Miami, for Airlift International.
Earl Faircloth, Atty. Gen., and Milton J. Wallace, Asst. Atty. Gen., for Florida Securities Comm.
Hansford D. Tyler, Jr. and David D. Phillips, Miami, for Voyle C. Johnson.
Roger H. Edwards, South Miami, for Harold Swartz.
Marchant & Perkins, Miami, for Robert M. Hewitt.
Shutts & Bowen, Miami, for Hargis and McKeller.
Boris Spaseff, Miami, for Leo Gutstein.
Moore & Moore, Miami, for William R. Price.
Robert L. Achor, Miami, receiver.
Before PEARSON, HENDRY and SWANN, JJ.

Opinion:
PER CURIAM.
This interlocutory appeal is brought by one of several defendants to review an in-junctive order and an order appointing a receiver for that defendant. The receiver was appointed pursuant to the motion of the intervening Florida Securities Commission acting under authority of Sections 517.19(6) and 517.19(7), Fla.Stat., F.S.A.
Appellant contends that the statute does not authorize the injunctive order and the appointment of the receiver, and that if authorized the trial judge has abused the discretion vested in him by the statute. We hold that the record fully sustains the action of the chancellor, and that the statute clearly intended the action taken when necessary or advisable for the purpose of protecting the public.
Affirmed.