Case Name: PEOPLE ex rel. JACOBUS v. VAN WYCK, Mayor
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1898-10-07
Citations: 53 N.Y.S. 914
Docket Number: 
Parties: PEOPLE ex rel. JACOBUS v. VAN WYCK, Mayor.
Judges: 
Reporter: West's New York Supplement
Volume: 53
Pages: 914–918

Head Matter:
(33 App. Div. 318.)
PEOPLE ex rel. JACOBUS v. VAN WYCK, Mayor.
(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department.
October 7, 1898.)
Municipal Corporations—Officers—Removal—Veterans.
Under Greater New York Charter, § 943, directing the mayor to appoint five persons to constitute a board oí assessors; and section 95, authorizing him, before the end of the first six months of his term, to remove any officer appointed by him,—he can remove a veteran member of the board of assessors of the former city government before the adoption of the charter, notwithstanding section 127, which provides that veterans who cannot under existing law be removed except for cause and on a hearing shall be retained under the new government in like position and under the same conditions as before.
Rumsey, J., dissenting.
Appeal from special term.
Mandamus by the people, on the relation of John W. Jacobus, against Robert A. Van Wyck, as mayor of the city of New York. There was an order granting a peremptory writ (53 N. Y. Supp. 71), and defendant appeals.
Reversed.
Argued before VAN BRUNT, P. J., and RUMSEY, PATTERSON, and INGRAHAM, JJ.
Theodore Connoly, for appellant.
Henry L. Stimson, for respondent.

Opinion:
PATTERSON, J.
If the relator's rights were dependent only upon the provisions of section 127 of the Greater New York Charter, and the fact that under the consolidated city government there are certain officials whose duties in some respects are the same as those performed by the relator prior to January 1,1898, there would be no question of his right to the mandamus issued in this proceeding, and from the order granting which this appeal is taken. My first impressions were that the discussion was limited to those considerations, and that the decision of the special term was right, but more mature reflection and a study of other provisions of the charter satisfy me that the relator was not entitled to the writ. It is incontestable that on the 31st day of December, 1897, the relator was the incumbent of an office from which, as the law then stood, he could not be removed except for cause and after hearing; and he was then entitled to all the protection afforded him by the constitu tion and the laws of the state as a veteran soldier. Section 127 of the Greater New York Charter was undoubtedly intended to continue in office certain veterans of the army and navy and volunteer fire department, and it is to be observed that the whole force of that section is to retain in office such veterans, "in like positions and under the same conditions, to serve under such titles and in such way as the head of the appropriate department or the mayor may direct." The officials referred to do not require appointment, but merely a transfer from one position to another. They are kept in office by force of the statute. We have therefore a provision by which the persons referred to in that section are to be retained in office "under the same conditions, one of which conditions is that they are irremovable, except for cause and upon a hearing. The ' necessary construction of this section, therefore, must be that those who come within its protection cannot be removed except as stated. The relator was one of four who constituted the board of assessors of the mayor, aldermen, and commonalty of the city of New York, for local improvements. By section 943 of the Greater New York Charter, the mayor is specifically directed to constitute a new board. The provision is: "The mayor shall appoint five persons who shall constitute the board of assessors." Here is a provision which looks to the establishment of an entirely new board, to be constituted by direct "appointment. There are five persons, each of whom is to derive his authority, not from retention in office under section 127, but from the act of appointment by the mayor. There is no other title by which the office can be held. Manifestly, this provision is inconsistent with the idea of the retention of office provided for by the 127th section; and the purpose of the specific legislation made by the 943d section becomes apparent when we consider the 95th section of the charter, which provides that, at any time within six months after the commencement of his term of office, the mayor, etc., may remove from office any public officer holding office by appointment from the mayor, except members of the board of education and school boards, and except judicial officers for whose removal other provisions are made by the constitution. The provision of section 943 imposing upon the mayor the duty of appointing the five persons who shall constitute the board of assessors, read in connection with the provisions of the 95th section giving to the mayor the absolute power of removal of any of his appointees within the period of six months after the commencement of his term of office, excludes the idea that either of the five persons constituting the board of assessors can claim the right of retention under section 127, and irremovability, otherwise than under the statute relating to veterans. In other words, the intent of section 943 is that the assessors therein mentioned holding office by appointment are to be subject to the removal provided for by section 95, and therefore, by special provision, section 127 cannot apply to the particular officers mentioned in section 943. The present case is not therefore affected by the Haverty Case, 149 N. Y. 607, 45 N. E, 1133; and the relator was not entitled to the writ.
The order must be reversed.
INGRAHAM, J., concurs.
Order reversed, with costs.