Case Name: RANDOLPH v. THE STATE
Court: Court of Appeals of Georgia
Jurisdiction: Georgia
Decision Date: 1947-05-21
Citations: 75 Ga. App. 253
Docket Number: 31557
Parties: RANDOLPH v. THE STATE.
Judges: Sutton, O. J., MacIntyre, P. J., and Parlcer, J., concur. Felton, J., concurs in the judgment. Townsend, J., dissents.
Reporter: Georgia Appeals Reports
Volume: 75
Pages: 253–268

Head Matter:
31557.
RANDOLPH v. THE STATE.
Decided May 21, 1947.
Rehearing denied June 5, 1947.
Hamilton Kimzey, Irwin B. Kimzey, Bache Bell, for plaintiff in error.
Hope D. Starlc, Solicitor-General, Charles G. Piitard, contra.

Opinion:
Gardner, J.
In our opinion it would be supererogation for us to here go into an analysis of the evidence to show that the verdict of voluntary manslaughter is supported by the evidence. This is true, since we have set out the evidence in detail. Without doubt, under the evidence, the jury were authorized to find that the defendant, because of passion aroused on account of the alleged attack of the deceased on his mother, killed his father. A cursory reading of the evidence will reveal this fact. The evidence also would have supported a verdict for murder. Indeed the evidence smacks strongly of a conspiracy to take the life of the deceased without legal justification. Of course we do not mean to say that under the defendant's contentions a verdict of not guilty would not have been authorized on account of self-defense. We must judge the accused as standing in the shoes of his mother. The court submitted all of these phases. The jury were within their province to return a verdict for voluntary manslaughter. The court did not err in overruling the motion for a new trial on the ground that the evidence does not support the verdict for voluntary manslaughter.
There are five special grounds in the motion. Special grounds 1, 2, 3, and 4 assign error on the ground that the court erred in failing to charge, without a request, involuntary manslaughter in the commission of an unlawful act and in the commission of a lawful act without due caution and circumspection. These grounds are argued together by counsel, and we will discuss them together. They are based on the defendant's statement and the evidence of his brother and mother to the effect that the brother and mother testified in corroboration of the defendant's statement that the defendant shot the deceased not with any intention to kill him but with the intention of shooting a gun out of the hands of the deceased, which gun was at the time being pointed at the defendant's mother, to prevent the deceased from killing the defendant's mother. The defendant, in his statement, said that he shot his father for the purpose of disarming him to save the life of the defendant's mother.. The defendant's brother and mother testified that the defendant shot the father with this intention and not with any intention to kill. Counsel for the defendant in his argument before the court here very frankly stated that the testimony of the brother as to what intention the defendant had when he fired the fatal shot was not competent testimony. But he further contended that since the evidence was in without objections, the court was bound, to charge on involuntary manslaughter. Counsel further inferentially admitted that the defendant's statement only to the effect that the shot was fired for the purpose of disarming the deceased, the court would not have been required to charge on involuntary manslaughter without a written request. We do not think 'the testimony of the brother and mother in this respect had any probative value. This is true for the reason that they could not. tell what was in the defendant's mind when he shot the deceased, and the law could not permit them to say. Be this as it may, we will deal squarely with the question as to whether under all the facts and circumstances and the defendant's statement the court erred, with or without a written request, in failing to charge the -law applicable to involuntary manslaughter in either of its phases. Counsel for the defendant cite a number of cases upon which they rely for a reversal based on these special grounds. Those cases are: Cain v. State, 39 Ga. App. 128 (2) (146 S. E. 340); Jackson v. State, 43 Ga. App. 468 (159 S. E. 293); Thomas v. State, 47 Ga. App. 237 (3) (170 S. E. 303); Smith v. State, 50 Ga. App. 105 (177 S. E. 76); Greenway v. State, 59 Ga. App. 461 (1 S. E. 2d, 217); Kelly v. State, 145 Ga. 210 (3) (88 S. E. 822). We have read each one of these cases very carefully. Their facts differentiate them from the facts of the instant case. All but two of them involve homicides where no weapon deadly per se was used. Two of them, Jackson v. State, and Cain v. State, supra, involved a gun, but the guns in those two cases were not, as here, being used in the usual and ordinary manner to kill. In the Jackson case there was a tussling over a gun; in the Cain case the deceased was either struck with a gun or hit his head on certain snags while tussling over a gun. In the instant case the defendant used the gun in the usual and natural manner in which a gun is used to kill, and did kill. In such a situation the law presumes that the defendant intended the natural consequences of the result of his act, — that is, that he shot with the intention to kill, and he will not be heard to say that he did not so intend. And we can not very well comprehend how the law could afford any degree of protection for human life should it provide otherwise. When a homicide is neither justifiable nor malicious it is manslaughter, — if intentional it is voluntary manslaughter. Some of the cases on this phase go to the extent of not only holding that the intention will be presumed, but that it will be conclusively presumed where a deadly weapon is used, in its usual and natural manner for killing, and death results. In Kinsey v. State, 24 Ga. App. 342 (100 S. E. 770), this court said: "'When one voluntarily shoots at another and the shot kills, the homicide can not be involuntary.' Smith v. State, 73 Ga. 79 (3)." There are many other cases which militate against the defendant's contentions. We will call attention to some of them, as follows: Hanvey v. State, 68 Ga. 612; Chelsey v. State, 121 Ga. 340 (49 S. E. 258); Napper v. State, 123 Ga. 571 (51 S. E. 592); Nolly v. State, 124 Ga. 10 (52 S. E. 19); McLeod v. State, 128 Ga. 17 (57 S. E. 83); Scott v. State, 132 Ga. 357 (64 S. E. 272); Norton v. State, 137 Ga. 843 (74 S. E. 759); Cullins v. State, 148 Ga. 17 (95 S. E. 675); Burnett v. State, 160 Ga. 593 (128 S. E. 796); Wright v. State, 168 Ga. 690 (148 S. E. 731); Griffin v. State, 183 Ga. 775 (190 S. E. 2); Gaskin v. State, 11 Ga. App. 11 (74 S. E. 554); Hart v. State, 14 Ga. App. 364 (80 S. E. 909); Harris v. State, 55 Ga. App. 189 (189 S. E. 680); Jones v. State, 58 Ga. App. 374 (198 S. E. 566); Greermay v. State, 59 Ga. App. 461 (1 S. E. 2d, 217). There is no error in the contentions of counsel for the defendant as contained in special grounds 1, 2, 3, and 4.
Special ground 5 contends for a reversal because the verdict returned by the jury was illegal and contrary to law in that it did not prescribe a minimum and maximum within the minimum and maximum for voluntary manslaughter as required by the principles of the Code, § 27-2502. It is further contended that the verdict is contrary to the charge of the court. The court charged the jury as alleged in this ground as follows: "and you may then take up and determine whether or not the defendant is guilty of the lesser offense of voluntary manslaughter, and if you convict him of that offense the form of your verdict would be: 'We, the jury, find the defendant guilty of voluntary manslaughter.' It would then be your duty to fix the punishment the defendant would receive within the limits prescribed by law, these limits being from one to twenty years, and you would add to that verdict of 'We, the jury find the defendant guilty of voluntary manslaughter' the following 'and we fix his punishment at minimum term so many years which must not be less than one year, maximum term so many years which must not be greater than 20 years.' You may, if you see fit, fix the minimum and maximum terms the same number of years. . ."
The verdict returned by the jury is as follows: "We, the jury, find the defendant John Randolph, col. guilty of voluntary manslaughter. This 14th day of November. 7-10 years. 1946 [Signed] M. E. Chandler, Foreman."
The court sentenced the defendant to serve not less than seven years, nor more than ten years in the penitentiary.
Counsel cite, in support of this contention, the case of Mitchell v. State, 34 Ga. App. 505 (130 S. E. 355). That verdict was to the effect: "We, the jury, find the defendant guilty and recommend him to the mercy of the court." The appellate court held that that verdict was error for the court to receive it and sentence the defendant to a minimum of five years and a maximum of ten years. Under the charge of the court, considered in connection with the verdict returned in the instant ease, it is clearly discerned that the jury intended the sentence to mean that the defendant was to be sentenced to a minimum of seven and a maximum of ten years. The defendant cites also the case of Camp v. State, 187 Ga. 76 (200 S. E. 126). That case is to the same effect as the case of Mitchell v. State, supra. Counsel also cite the case of Burns v. State, 191 Ga. 60 (11 S. E. 2d, 350). A casual reading of that case shows that it is not applicable to the facts in the instant case. This ground is without merit.
The court did not err in overruling the motion for a new trial for any of the reasons assigned.
Judgment affirmed.
Sutton, O. J., MacIntyre, P. J., and Parlcer, J., concur. Felton, J., concurs in the judgment. Townsend, J., dissents.