Case Name: STROTHER ET AL. v. FOLK ET AL.
Court: Supreme Court of South Carolina
Jurisdiction: South Carolina
Decision Date: 1922-12-29
Citations: 123 S.C. 127
Docket Number: 11084
Parties: STROTHER ET AL. v. FOLK ET AL.
Judges: Messrs. Bowman, Sease, Maurdin and Peurieoy, Circuit Judges, concur.
Reporter: South Carolina Reports
Volume: 123
Pages: 127–179

Head Matter:
11084
STROTHER ET AL. v. FOLK ET AL.
(115 S. E., 605)
Wilis—Devise Held to Create Fee Conditional Under Rule in Shelley’s Case.—A will providing that all property bequeathed to testator’s daughter, Julia, should “be and remain to her during her natural life and to descend to the heirs of her body, and if she, tne said Julia, should die without issue or children of her body, the said property to. return to my son, Moses,” held, to give the daughter a fee conditional under the rule in Shelley’s Case, and not merely a life estate with remainder over.
. Before Townsend, J., Saluda, January, 1921.
Reversed.
Action for partition by Jane Purdy Strother, et al.. against F. H. Folk, et al. Judgment for plaintiffs and defendants appeal.
The Decree of Judge Townsend follows:
It is admitted that J. A. C. Long died the 14th July, 1848, leaving of force his will, whereby he devised the tract of land, described in the complaint, as containing three hundred and seventy acres, more or less, situate in Saluda County and State of South Carolina, bounded now or formerly as follows: on the North by lands of A. P. Bouknight and of Cothran Bodie; on the East by lands of A/ P. Bouknight and of N. A. Bates; on the South by lands of N. A. Bátes, and on the West by lands of C. H. -Jones, and being the land on which John Long lived at the time said will was made, and sought to be partitioned in this action, to his daughter, Julia Ann Long, then an unmarried child of fourteen years, and provided: “That all the property, both real and which I have willed and bequeathed to said Julia Ann Long, or which shall accrue to her under said will and testament, shall be and remain -to her during her natural life, and to descend to the heirs of her body, and if she the said Julia Ann Long should die without issue or children of her body the said property to return to my son, Moses Long.”
On 21st January, 1851, Julia Ann Long intermarried' with Dr. H. M. Folk, who predeceased her. She died 31st December, 1909, having had the three following named children: (1) William H. Folk, born 4th September, 1852, died intestate 17th May, 1898, leaving as his heirs his widow, Elizabeth IT. Folk, and one child, Julia Folk, defendants herein: (2) Clara Annette Folk, born 12th June, 1854, who intermarried with Dr. E. F. Strother in 1870, who predeceased her. She died intestate 21st May, 1910, leaving as her sole heir her son, Edwin F. Strother, born: 2d September, 1875, who died intestate 29th July, 1915, leaving as his heirs, his widow, Mrs. Jane Purdy Strother, and three infant children, plaintiffs in this action: (3) Edwin H. Folk, born 25th December, 1863, defendant herein. On 4th November, 1896, said Julia Ann Folk, nee Long, executed and delivered her deed whereby she undertook to convey said lands acquired by her under said will of J. A. C. Long to two of her said children, W. H. Folk and E. H. Folk, in fee.
The sole question to be determined in this case, is whether said deed from Julia Ann Folk operated to convey the fee in said land to the grantees, W. PI. Folk and E. H. Folk, or whether the defendants, who claim .under said deed, and the plaintiffs, are tenants in common of said lands, as remaindermen after the expiration of a life estate given Julia Ann Folk under said will.
I cannot say that the case is free from difficulty, but upon the best consideration I have been able to give it, I think J. A. C. Long, the testator, in his will used the words “heirs of her body” as synonymous with “children of her body,” and gave a life estate to Julia Ann Folk-, with a remainder which' vested in her children as they were born.
The rüle is stated by Sir John Romilly, Master of Rolls, in Gommoe v. Harris, 23 Beavan, 184, 187; 53 English Reports, -full reprint, 72, to this effect: “That in wills the words ‘heirs of the body’ are words of limitation, and that they are never to be used as words of purchase, unless they are controlled by clear and express words, showing that the testator used them as synonymous with. children or some other class. Therefore, in all cases where the words ‘heirs of the.body’ are used, the devisee takes an'estate tail, ’ unless^the intent of the testator to the contrary is so clearly expressed that no one can misunderstand it. Thus, for instance, where a- testator devised to one and the heirs of his body, and went on to explain those words by saying, that is to say, to' his first and other sons successively, and the heirs of the body of such first and other sons, which is the case in Lowe v. Davies, 2 Ld., Raymond, 1561 and 2 Strange, 849; Fitz., 112; there the testator expressly states that by the words, heirs of the body, he means sons. There is no rule of law which forbids a testator from employing the words heirs of the body in the sense of children if he pleases so to do, provided he makes his meaning plain; but it is equally clear that in order to arrive at the result, the words of explanation used by the testator must be distinct and susceptible of no other meaning, and if they are ambiguous they do not control the effect of the words ‘heirs of the body.’ ” See our cases of Duckett v. Butler, 67 S. C., 130; Guy v. Osborne, 91 S. C., 293; Pearson v. Basterling, 104 S. C., 178; McWhirter v. Roseman, 114 S. C., 177.
The testator says: “It is also my will and desire that all the property, both real- and which I have willed and bequeathed to said Julia Ann Long, or which may accrue to her under said will and testament, shall be and remain to her during her natural life and descend to the heirs of her body.” If the devise had stopped there, I should not have doubted that Julia Ann took a fee conditional. There would have been nothing to give a different meaning to the words, “heirs of her body,” than their primary legal acceptation. But the will goes on thus : “And if she, the said Julia Ann Long, should die without issue or children of the body, the said property to return to my son, Moses Long.” This second clause is 'not contrary to that immediately preceding, but explains what heirs of the body the testator meant. Lowe v. Davies, supra; North v. Martin, 6 Simons, 266; Milroy v. Milroy, 14 Simons, 54; 60 Eng. Reports, Full Reprint, 277. It' shows to whom the testator intended the property to go upon the death of his daughter—that is, to the children of her body; that the words “heirs of her body” mean “children of her body,” and provided for a contingency upon which the property primarily intended for the children of Julia Ann should go over to their uncle, Moses Long. Dott v. Wilson, 1 Bay., 457; 458; Ramsey v. Joyce, 1 Mc-Mul. Ch., 245; Moone v. Henderson, 4 DeS. Eq., 459, 461. McIntyre v. McIntyre, 16 S. C., 296; Lott v. Thomson, 36 S. C., 44; Robert v. Bilis, 59 S. C., 137, 139, 150, 157; Still v. Creech, 95 S. C., 368. This case is distinguishable from Thomson v. Peake, 38 S. C., 440, and Davis v. Hodge, 102 S. C., 178, 183, as in those cases there was no direct gift to the “heirs of the body” or* children of the first taker; while here there is a direct gift of the remainder, after the life estate of Julia Ann to the children of her body, under the name “heirs of the body.”
It is therefore adjudged and decreed that the plaintiffs and the defendants, F. H. Folk, Elizabeth Folk and Julia Folk, are cotenants of the lands mentioned in the complaint and above described, and are respectively seized of undivided interests in said lands as follows: Jane Purdy Strother, one-ninth undivided interest therein; Annette Folk Strother, Edwin Folk Strother and Harriette Purdy Strother, each two twenty-sevenths undivided interest therein; E. H. Folk one undivided third interest therein; Elizabeth Folk one-ninth undivided interest therein and Julia Folk two-ninths undivided interest therein.
It is further ordered that a writ of partition do issue out of this Court to commissioners, as provided by law, directing them to partition said lands between said parties according to their respective rights as adjudged.
It is further ordered that any of the parties to this action have leave to apply to the Court, at the foot of this order, for such further order as may be necessary to the partition of said lands between them according to their respective rights.
Messrs. Thurmond, Crouch & Ramage, for appellants,
cite: Subsequent clause insufficient to cut down estate previously given: 77 S. C., 458; 4 Rich. Eq.', 384; 29 S. C, 470; 102 S. C, 11; 76 S. C,.36; 5 Rich. Eq, 356; 15 S. C, 440. No estate by implication: 1 McC. Ch, 61; 102 S. C, 11; Bail. Eq, 297. Fee defeasible: 2 Bail. Eq, 23; 38 S. C, 440; 32 S. C„ 563; 41 S. C, 209; 30 S. C, 184; 102 S. C, 178; 102 S. C, 224; 102 S. C,.ll; 105 S. E, 415. Fee conditional: 3 Rich. Eq, 384; 48 S. C, 440 ; 94 S. C, 308;.65 S. C, 345; 72 S. C, 227; 3 Rich: Eq, 271; 110 S. C, 531; 76 S. C, 487; 3 Jarm, Wills, 148; 52 S. C, 554; Bail. Eq, 48; 23 W. Va, 504. “Issue”: 83 S. C, 265; 67 S. C, 309; 86 S. C, 237; 99 S. C, 307; 16 S. C, 294. “Children”: 23 S. C, 238; 10 S. C, 365; 28 S. C„ 242; 1 Hill Ch, 265; 2 McC. Ch, 323; 1 McC. 78; 12 Rich. Eq, 114; 9 Rich. Eq, 13. Limitation is void: 59 S. C, 155; 16 S. C, 325; 2 Brev, 355; 1 Spears L, 234.
Messrs. R. O. Purdy and Bfird & Carroll, for respondents,
cite: Will gave life estate: 67 S. C, 130; 91 S. C, 293; 104 S. C, 178; 114 S. C, 177; 107 S. C, 102; 4 DeS, 459; McMull. Eq.-, 245; Fearne, Rem, Sec. 584; 3 De. Ex, & J. Ch, 44; 1 Strob.' L, 134; 6 Rich. Eq, 88; 6 Coke, 17; McMull, Eq, 345; 6 Rich. Eq, 402. Gift over not too remate: L. R. & E, 290; 2 Cuss & M. 416; L. C. B-, 652; 2 Hare, 14. ,
December 29, 1922.

Opinion:
The opinion of the Court en banc was delivered by
Mr. Chirr Justice Gary.
The provision of the will, out of which this action arose, is as follows:
"It is also my will and desire that all the property both real and which I have willed and bequeathed to said Julia Ann Long or which may accrue to her under said will and testament shall be and remain to her during her natural life and to descend to the heirs of her body, and if she the said Julia Ann Long should die without issue or children of her body the said property to return to my son, Moses Long."
The following appears in the agreed statement of facts:
"The sole question to be determined in this case is whether or not, under the terms of the, will of J. A. C. Long, deceased, herein attached, the said Mrs. Julia A'. Folk (nee Long) had the right and power .to convey by her de.ed of conveyance unto W. H. Folk and E. H. Folk, the grantees therein, a fee-simple title to the aforesaid tract of land; the plaintiffs' contention is that the said Julia A. Folk had only a life estate in said tract of land and had no right to convey anything more than a life estate therein; the defendants' contention is that the said Mrs. Julia A. Folk had the right and power to convey and did convey in and by said deed of conveyance a fee-simple title to said tract of land unto the said W. H. Folk and E. H. Folk, the grantees, in said deed."
It will thus be, seen that, if the words "heirs of her body" must be construed, under the rule in Shelley's Case, as creating a fee conditional, then the judgment of the Circuit Court must necessarily be recovered. The only words in the will which are to be relied upon to show that the testator did not use the words "heirs of her body" in their ordinary acceptation as creating a fee conditional are the words "issue or children of her body." "Issue" is a word of limitation. Williams v. Gause, 83 S. C., 265, 65 S. E., 241. On the other hand, "children of her body" are words of purchase, unless the entire will shows otherwise. The words "and if she the said Julia Ann Long should die without issue or children of her body, the said property to return to my son, Moses Long," are not to be construed as a part of the granting clause, except in so far as they may throw light upon the sense in which the words "heirs of her body" were used; as an estate cannot be created by implication. Shaw v. Erwin, 41 S. C., 209, 19 S. E., 499. If the words "issue" and "children of her body" are both words of limitation, then there is no inconsistency between them and the words "heirs of her body." If, on the other band, the word "issue" and the words "children of her body" are both' words of purchase, and refer to distinct clauses, then they are inconsistent with the words "heirs of her body," which refer to one class only, and this makes their import doubtful.
We here reproduce the following language of another member of this Court, as it brings out clearly the difference in our views:
"The real storm center of the controversy is, as to the effect of this superadded clause upon the question, whether the testator intended that the remainder after the life estate to the 'heirs of her body' should constitute a gift to 'a class of persons to take in succession from generation to generation' as the heirs of the body of the life' tenant or as a gift to such heirs of the body of the life tenant as answered the description of the 'issue or children of her body' at the time of her death, they taking not indefinite succession as heirs of the body of the life tenant, but directly under the will from the testator, as the stock of a new inheritance. . The intention of the testator is made manifest that Julia Ann should take only a life estate; he says so in the plainest terms; he then provides that at her death the estate should descend to the, 'heirs of her body'; in the very next clause he translates this expression into 'issue or children of her body.' He evidently intended that upon the death of Julia Ann the estate should go to her children, and then, thinking that perhaps some of the children might die leaving children, he employed the word 'issue' so as to include the grandchildren in that event. He then provides for the contingency of Julia Ann dying without children or issue by a devise over to his son, Moses. The controversy is over the power of this Court to carry that intention into effect. It can be done unless the rule in Shelley's Case forbids it."
• This construction practically makes another will in every respect, creates two classes of remainders when one only was intended by the, testator, gives validity to an executory devise that was void for remoteness, as the testator died prior to the act of 1853 (now Section 3551 of the Code of Laws 1912), and is different from the construction adopted by his Honor, the' Circuit Judge;. It is truly said that the construction we have mentioned could be carried into effect unless .the rule in Shelley's Case forbids it. That is just the trouble. The rule in Shelley's Case does forbid it. The case of Cureton v. Little (S. C.), 111 S. E., 803, is conclusive of this controversy. In that case the property was devised "to my son, John M. Cureton, Jr., during his natural life, and afterwards to his bodily heirs." It was-properly held that these words created a fee conditional. We quote as follows from that case:
"The following principles are well established in this state in the construction of wills: 'When a gift is made in one-clause of a will in clear and unequivocal terms, the quantity or quality of the estate given should not be cut down or qualified by words of doubtful import found in a subsequent clause. To have that effect, the subsequent words should be at least as clear in expressing that intention as the words in which the interest is given.' Walker v. Alverson, 87 S. C., 60, 68 S. E., 968, 30 L. R. A. (N. S.), 115. 'Where an estate is given by will in words of clear and ascertained legal significance, it will not be enlarged, cut down, or destroyed by superadded words in the same or subsequent clauses, unless they raise an irresistible inference that such was the intent of the testator.' Adams v. Verner, 102 S. C., 7, 86 S. E., 211. 'Where an estate is devised by clear and unequivocal terms, superadded words of doubtful import must be rejected.' Adams v. Verner, 102 S. C., 7, 86 S. E., 211."
If these express words describing a life estate were not sufficient to limit the estate of John M. Cureton, it is scarcely reasonable to suppose that the words herein are sufficient to limit the estate of Julia Ann Long, and confine it to a life estate. '
There is another reason why the judgment should be reversed: There are no words in the will, whatever, showing when the children of Julia Ann (even conceding that they were intended to take) were to go into possession or their remainders become vested. Therefore the presumption is that those were to take who were in esse at the death of the testator; and, as none of the children were then living, none could take under the will. McFadden v. McFadden, 107 S. C., 101, 91 S. E., 986; Avinger v. Avinger, 116 S. C., 125, 107 S. E., 26; Holly v. Still, 91 S. C., 487, 74 S. E., 1065. Another reason why the construction hereinbefore discussed cannot prevail is because it fixes the death of the life tenant, as the time when the remainders were to vest, and would exclude the son—W. H. Folk— who died before the life tenant; and there was no provision in the will for his children to take the share to which he would have been entitled. Under the construction that the death of the life tenant was the time fixed for the vesting of the remainders, they were contingent, and could not vest until that time. Faber v. Police, 10 S. C., 376.
There is still another reason why the judgment should be reversed: Whenever it is necessary to give the word "children" the meaning of the word "heirs" in order to give force and effect to all the provisions of the will, the Courts will so construe it. Robinson v. Harris, 73 S. C., 469, 53 S. E., 755, 6 L. R. A. (N. S.), 330; Dillard v. Yarboro, 77 S. C., 227, 57 S. E., 841; Holley v. Still, 91 S. C., 487, 74 S. E., 1065.
In Dillard v. Yarboro, 77 S. C., 227, 57 S. E., 841, this Court uses the following language:
"As wills are construed with more liberality in carrying into effect the intention of the testator, than in cases involving the construction .of deeds, there is a stronger rea son for holding that the children named'in the deed-herein, did not take any interest as such.- Under such circumstances the word 'children' must be construed to mean 'heirs of the body' by which an estate tail at comnjoh law, and a fee conditional in this state is created. In 3 Jarmán on Wills, 174, it is said: 'The rule of construction commonly referred to as the doctrine of Wild's Cases, is this, that where lands are devised to a person and his children, and he has no child at the time of the devise, the parent takes an estate tail; for it is said, the intent of the devisor is manifest and certain, that the children (or issues) should take, and as immediate devisees they cannot take, because they are not in rerum natura, and-by way of remainder they cannot take, for that was not his (the devisor's) intent, for the gift is immediate, therefore such words shall be taken as words of limitation.' 'Heirs of the body' are words of limitation whereby the parties take by inheritance and not by purchase; therefore, the conveyance of the property by the defendant was as effectual to convey the fee, as if the deed had been to her and her heirs generally, whether she conveyed before or after the birth of issue."
Thus it will be seen that, even if. the testator intended to use the words "heirs of her body," in the sense of "children," nevertheless, as Julia Ann had no children at the time of the testator's death, her life estate was by operation of law converted into a fee conditiqnal.
There are several other reasons that could be assigned which show that the words "issue or children of her body" were inadvertently inserted, instead of the words "heirs of her body," but we do not deem it necessary to prolong this opinion. In conclusion we call attention to the fact that the rule in Shelley's Case is a rule of property; that it is more or less arbitrary in its nature; that it is frequently at variance with the intention of the testator; and that the practical effect of affirming the judgment of the Circuit Court would be to destroy the estate by fee conditional. This is not the first time that the said rule has been attacked.
In the case of Holley v. Still, 91 S. C., 487, 74 S. E., 1065, permission was granted to review the case of Barksdale v. Gamage, 3 Rich. Eq., 271, which discusses the question now before us. In refusing to overrule that case this Court said:
"The doctrine announced in Barksdale v. Gamage has become a settled rule of property; it is arbitrary in its nature, like the rule in Shelley's Case; and we see no greater reason for changing one than the other."
Reversed.
Messrs. Bowman, Sease, Maurdin and Peurieoy, Circuit Judges, concur.