Case Name: Bostwick, Respondent, vs. The Mutual Life Insurance Company of New York, Appellant
Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Wisconsin
Decision Date: 1903-02-03
Citations: 116 Wis. 392
Docket Number: 
Parties: Bostwick, Respondent, vs. The Mutual Life Insurance Company of New York, Appellant.
Judges: 
Reporter: Wisconsin Reports
Volume: 116
Pages: 392–444

Head Matter:
Bostwick, Respondent, vs. The Mutual Life Insurance Company of New York, Appellant.
February 24
March 11, 1902.
September 6, 1902
February 3, 1903.
Life insurance: Contracts: Fraud: Waiver: Presumption from signing written instrument: Failure to read: Ignorance of contents of written instrument: Negligence: Acceptance of performance: Reasonable time: Contributory negligence: Defenses: Constructive notice: Rescission: Recovery of consideration: Laches: Appeal and error: Actions tried by court: Practice: Mandate on reversal.
1. Plaintiff agreed for a policy of life insurance but received one different from that contracted for. On receiving tbe policy be threw it into a drawer in his desk, without examination, although a casual glance at the policy and accompanying letter would disclose that it was not the policy he expected. Several months afterward, on discovery of the different character of the policy, plaintiff for the first time objected, and brought action to recover the premium paid. Held, that the fraud, if any, was ■ waived, and the policy accepted.
On rehearing: Syllabus by Marshall, J.:
2. A person who, in a business deal with another, signs a written instrument, is conclusively presumed, as to that other and all persons claiming under him through such instrument, to know the contents thereof, no fraud or deceit being used by such other or by any one for whose conduct he is responsible, reasonably calculated to and which does induce such person to become a party to such instrument without reading it.
3. If a person, by the fraud of another, or of some one for whose conduct he is responsible, becomes a party to a written instrument without reading it or personally knowing the contents thereof, he is not precluded thereby from obtaining judicial redress in some form of action, for any injury which may be thereby caused to him through such instrument not being what he supposed it to be.
4. Mere ignorance of the contents of a paper by one who becomes a party thereto under a mistake as to its import, will not enable him to avoid his act.
5. The doctrine that a person is not inexcusably negligent in signing a paper in a business transaction with another, relying upon positive false statements on the part of that other or of some one for whose conduct he is responsible, as to its import, applies only where the deceit is practiced at the time, and in the transaction, of such signing.
■6. If a person contracts with another for an article to be delivered or gives an order therefor, and thereafter a thing is delivered to him ostensibly in compliance with the order or fulfillment of the contract, unless, at the time thereof or within a reasonable time thereafter, he notifies such other that such article will not be accepted as satisfying the contract or order, he will be conclusively presumed to have waived all departures therein from the thing bargained for which are obvious to the senses by ordinary exercise thereof. This is subject to what follows.
7. The reasonable time mentioned in the foregoing rule commences to run from the time the person receiving the article has reasonable opportunity to observe its defects, unless the opposite party, by fraud or deceit, prevents such person from examining it or induces him not to do so; but such person cannot successfully refer merely to deception practiced upon him at the time of his giving the order or 'entering into the contract, to excuse failure to observe obvious departures in the thing delivered from that bargained for, at or within a reasonable time after the delivery.
8. Upon the reception of an article by a person under the circumstances stated in the two foregoing rules, nothing occurring then for which the opposite party is responsible, reasonably preventing him from using, or inducing him not to use, his senses so as to discover obvious departures therein from the thing bargained for, the rule applies that the law requires men, in their dealings with each other, to exercise proper diligence and apply their attention to those particulars which may be supposed to be within reach of their judgment, and not to close their eyes to means of information which are accessible to them. Tigilanti-bus et non dormientibus jura subveniunt.
9. The rule that contributory negligence is not a defense to an intentional wrong does not apply to a situation where negligence is so inexcusable as not to be really a contributing cause, but to be really a cause intervening between the wrong and the injury as the real producing cause thereof.
10.He who is inexcusably negligent in a business transaction forfeits the right to judicial remedies for relief, and not because or any favor or indulgence which the law extends to the wrongdoer, but because of failure on the part of the injured person to exercise that care for his own protection which the policy of the law requires as a condition of its protection, such policy being to aid only those who exercise some reasonable care to guard their own interests.
11. Negligence of a person in not asserting his right against another by whom he has been defrauded in a business transaction,, is not a defense, strictly so called, to an action on the former’s part for redress, but is evidence of submission to or waiver of the wrong, more or less strong according to the circumstances, and may be conclusive evidence thereof; or, it may be so gross, as to forfeit such person’s right to judicial redress; or, in connection with some injury to the wrongdoer, it may operate to estop such person from claiming redress for the wrong first inflicted.
12. If a person, in a business transaction with another, is deceived by the latter to his injury, such person may rescind the transaction within a reasonable time after he discovers or has reasonable opportunity to discover the fraud, constructive knowledge thereof being just as effective as actual knowledge to set the time for rescission running and to mark its limits.
13. If a person receives a policy of insurance ostensibly in response to an application therefor, which he signed and parted with in the belief, induced by the fraud of the agent taking the same, that it called for a policy different from that which it called for in fact, he is bound as a matter of law to examine the policy within a reasonable time after it comes to his hand, and to discover obvious departures therein from the one which he supposed he was to get, and promptly, upon discovering the same, to rescind the transaction, give the company due notice thereof, and do all on his part which justice requires to restore the former situation, or he will be held to have accepted the policy as satisfying his application, so as to be precluded from rescinding the same.
14. The reasonable time, for discovering that the policy differs from the one supposed to have been applied for in the circumstances* stated in the foregoing rule, commences to run immediately upon the reception of the paper, nothing occurring then to reasonably excuse the applicant for omitting to examine his contract. In such circumstances four and one half months’ delay in discovering the fraud and exercising the right of rescission is, as a matter of law, too long a time.
15. If, in the situation stated in the last foregoing paragraph, the element be added of the applicant for insurance being fraudulently deterred from examining his policy by something occurring at the time of the delivery thereof to him, four and one half montlis’ delay in discovering the fraud is not, as a matter o£ law, so long as to forfeit the right of rescission.
16. The existence of a cause of action at law to recover the consideration parted with upon a contract, on the ground of fraud, presupposes the actual termination of the contract because of the fraud, and that requires a repudiation of such contract hy the-insured person in toto, or so far as justice may require, and an. unconditional offer on his part, so far as justice may require, to* restore the wrongdoer to his former situation, or a waiver of' such offer hy such conduct on the latter’s part as to clearly indicate that a tender to him of that which he parted with in the-transaction would be useless because he would not accept it.
17. If a judgment in an equity case or an action at law tried by the-court be reversed on appeal to this court, and there is an unsolved question of fact that must be determined before final judgment can be rendered, and there are conflicting reasonable-inferences as to how such issue should be solved, rendering it doubtful which way is the right of the matter, lest injustice may be done by the exercise of jurisdiction to decide the issue here-as an original matter, the court will remand the cause to the-trial court to determine such issue and then to apply the law to the case as directed.
Cassoday, C. J., dissents.
Appeal from a judgment of the circuit court for Eock county: B. E. DuNwiddie, Circuit Judge.
Reversed.
Action to recover money paid to defendant for three insurance policies. Plaintiff claimed that George S. Parker,. Arthur H. Barrington and himself were each fraudulently induced to sign an application for an insurance policy of a different character than he intended; that each, as soon as he-discovered the fraud, repudiated the transaction; and that Parker and Barrington thereafter, and before the commencement of this action, assigned to plaintiff their claims for the return of the money paid to the defendant. The answer put in issue all the allegations constituting.the alleged' fraud. There was evidence tending to show that defendant’s-agent and plaintiff negotiated, from time to time for several days, in respect to the latter taking a $10,000 policy of life-insurance in the defendant company; that the agent strongly recommended what he called a “five per cent, debenture policy”; tbat plaintiff, from first to last, insisted that he did not want a policy that could not be paid np in ten years; that he would take a ten-payment policy and no other- — one that would be fully paid in ten years; that the agent, from first to last, continued to recommend a five per cent, debenture policy, but did not say that such policy would require annual payments for life; that finally the agent said he would obtain for plaintiff what the latter wanted, and made out an application, representing that it was in accordance with the latter’s wishes; that plaintiff had the paper in his possession'for a ■considerable length of time and had ample opportunity to read and understand it, but did not do so, relying entirely upon the belief that the agent had written it in accordance with the understanding which had been reached; that the policy was received about April 1, 1897, accompanied by a letter, the opening lines of which were to the effect that it was a five per cent, debenture annual premium payment policy, -such as the agent had urged plaintiff to take; that the letter. further explained that the payment upon the policy would be $2 less per year than had been talked, and that $2 had been ■credited to plaintiff because he had given his paper for $1,064 when $1,062 was the proper amount; that when plaintiff received the policy he-threw it into his drawer and did not ex•amine it or pay any attention to it to discover whether it was according to his understanding or not; that circumstances led’ him to examine the policy sometime thereafter, and that about August 22, 1897, he discovered that it was entirely -different from the policy he was to obtain; that he thereupon notified defendant’s agent of such fact and demanded an explanation ; that considerable correspondence was subsequently had between plaintiff and the agent, resulting in an absolute repudiation of the policy by plaintiff on March 19, 1898. 'The evidence tended to show that Parker desired the agent to obtain for him a twenty-payment policy; that he signed an •.application without reading it, supposing the agent had writ ten it according to bis request; tbat when bis policy came be pnt it away without reading it and did not examine tbe paper or discover tbat it was not in accordance with bis understanding, till about five months after it was received; tbat be then rescinded tbe insurance contract as far as it was possible for him to do so. Tbe testimony as to Barrington was substantially tbe same. Tbe evidence on tbe part of defendant was to tbe effect tbat tbe several applications for insurance were made in accordance with tbe understanding between tbe applicants and tbe agent and tbat tbe policies were issued accordingly. Tbe court decided tbat tbe application made by plaintiff was written by tbe agent and signed by plaintiff without bis reading it, though be was perfectly competent to do'so and to understand it, and tbat be.bad ample opportunity therefor; tbat tbe reason why be did not do so was because be relied upon tbe agent to write it in accordance with bis request ; tbat plaintiff desired tbe agent to write tbe application for a ten-year annual payment policy, which be agreed to do ;v tbat be received tbe policy about April 1, 1897; tbat it was an annual premium policy, but tbat be did not discover tbat fact till August 22, 1897; that within a reasonable length of time thereafter be tendered tbe policy back to defendant and demanded a restoration of bis money and notes. Tbe circumstances as to Parker and Barrington are of tbe same character. Before the commencement of this action they assigned their claims for restitution to plaintiff. Tbe conclusion of law reached was tbat plaintiff was entitled to recover of tbe defendant tbe money paid on tbe several policies, aggregating $1,401.50, with interest upon each such payment from tbe time it was made with costs. Judgment was rendered accordingly.
Por tbe appellant there was a brief by Fethers, Jeffris & Mount, and oral argument by M. G. Jeffris.
Por tbe respondent there were briefs by Huger & Huger, and oral argument by Wm. Huger.

Opinion:
The following opinion was filed March 11, 1902:
Mat?.sttat,t.; J.
Two propositions are presented for consideration : First, were tbe applicants for insurance bound by .their applications because of their failure to know what they .signed ? Second, did the retention of the policies by the applicants for several -months, without objection, constitute an acceptance thereof and waive the fraud, if there was fraud, 'in securing the applications? The learned counsel for respondent devoted nearly all their printed argument, as they •did nearly all their oral argument, to the first proposition. As we do not think it is necessarily decisive of the case, we •shall assume that in deciding it the trial court did not err. •On the second proposition the court held that the applicants •did not accept the policies because they repudiated them -within a reasonable time after knowing that the instruments •were not what they supposed their applications called for; that the mere retention of the policies without such knowledge • did not constitute an acceptance. Appellant's counsel contend that when the policies were received the applicants were, as ordinarily prudent persons, put upon inquiry as to the character thereof, that they should have examined the policies, •and that their failure to do so, and retention thereof for sev•eral months before making any complaint, was an acceptance of them as fulfilling the applications as they supposed such ; applications were made, and a waiver of fraud, if there was -fraud, in obtaining the same.
As we view the turning question above suggested, the law 'has been firmly settled in favor of appellant, and has been applied by this court in many cases. It does not militate, as -counsel for respondent seem to think, against the maxim that a person cannot take advantage of his own wrong, büt en-forces that other one, which is quite as well established, that the court will not constitute itself the guardian of persons of rmature age and ordinary intelligence, protecting them against the results of their own negligence; that it will not furnish a person a remedy for a wrong where he cannot prove a legal claim for damages without showing that his own negligence intervened between the act of the alleged wrongdoer and the result complained of, and was the real, efficient, producing •cause of his injury; that in such a case it will be'conclusively presumed that he voluntarily accepted the situation, because, if he had used ordinary care, the injury complained of would have been prevented. Applying that in the decision of the cases, it has been repeatedly held that if a person contracts for an' article to be delivered, and delivery is made ostensibly in fulfillment of the contract, under such circumstances that he has ample opportunity to test the thing delivered by the contract, he is put upon inquiry as to all departures therefrom which are open and obvious to ordinary inspection; that he is bound to see those things which are plainly observable and is charged with knowledge thereof from the time he ought, in the exercise of ordinary care, to have discovered them; and that if he does not, within a reasonable time thereafter, give notice that the thing delivered is not accepted as satisfying the agreement to purchase, he will be deemed to have accepted it and waived obvious departures from the agreement if there are such. Counsel for respondent vigorously attack that doctrine, but it is too firmly intrenched in our jurisprudence, and in the law generally, to be open to question.
The first case in which the principle above stated is distinctly declared in the decisions of this court is Locke v. Williamson, 40 Wis. 377. The court there said:
"We have concluded to hold this rule in respect to an ex-ecutory contract: that when the defects in the goods are patent and obvious to the senses, when the purchaser has a full opportunity for examination, and knows of such defects, he must, either when he receives the goods or within what under the circumstances is a reasonable time thereafter, notify the seller that the goods are not accepted as fulfilling the warranty; otherwise the defects will be deemed waived."
In subsequent cases that rule was considerably expanded in accordance with the current of authority, to the effect that reasonable opportunity for obtaining knowledge is equivalent to knowledge, as the following citations will show. In Mamlock v. Fairbanks, 46 Wis. 415, 1 N. W. 167, it was said that present means of knowledge must be considered; that the doctrine that one must observe what he has reasonable opportunity for knowing in matters of contract is within the rule of caveat emptor; that the law for the protection of persons against fraud will not he extended to those who, "having the means in their own hand, neglect to protect themselves ;" that "the law requires men, in their dealings with each other, to exercise proper vigilance, and apply their attention to those particulars which may be supposed to be within reach of their observation and judgment, and not close their eyes to the means of information which are accessible to them." "Vigi-lantibus non dormientibus jura subveniunt." In Warner v. Benjamin, 89 Wis. 290, 62 N. W. 179, it was held that, if a person is put upon inquiry in respect to the quality of a thing offered for sale to him, he is bound to know what is discoverable in regard thereto by the exercise of ordinary care; that he cannot "close his eyes to defects which are before him or to the information which is at hand." In Farr v. Peterson, 91 Wis. 182, 64 N. W. 863, it was held that, 'if the defects in the subject-matter of the contract are patent and should be discerned by the exercise of ordinary diligence, the purchaser is bound to discover them at his peril; that in dealings between individuals each is bound to apply his attention reasonably to the subject-matter thereof and to discover those things which are within reach of ordinary observation and judgment, and which they are not prevented from discovering by artifice or fraud.' Again, in Thompson Mfg. Co. v. Gunderson, 106 Wis. 449, 453, 82 N. W. 299, it was held that if an article is delivered in fulfilment of an executory contract, and the receiver thereof has full opportunity for examining tbe same and observing variations therein from the article contracted for, and fails within a reasonable time to give notice that the article is not accepted as fulfilling the contract, the variances, if any, will be deemed waived.
It is easy to apply the foregoing to the' facts of this case. The applicants for insurance had ample opportunity to examine their policies when the same were received. It was their duty to do that. An examination of the policies, even of a casual character, would have revealed all the material facts. The applicants did nothing by way of examining the papers for months after receiving them, during all of which time the defendant carried the risks it had assumed. What appears to counsel for respondent to be want of harmony in the authorities, in respect to such a situation, in the main, grows out of failure to take in the full scope of the -rule that every person must use reasonable diligence for his own protection, or in confusing it with other rules with which it does-not conflict. Counsel errs most grievously in the idea advanced, that negligence is never a defense in a case grounded on fraud against the wrong-doer, as the cases above cited amply show, though it is true that there are,expressions in legal opinions that may be referred to in justification of the error, and later we will refer to an instance of that kind in our own decisions, and probably there are others. However, on a question so well settled, contrary statements in opinions,, used arguendoought not, it would seem, to lead one astray. In 14 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law (2d ed.) 115-117, the rule stated is supported by citations from English decisions, and from most of the states of the Union. The author says:
"This doctrine is not based upon any consideration for the-party who has been guilty of the false representations, but upon the ground that public policy requires that persons shall be required to exercise at least ordinary prudence in their-dealings, instead of calling upon the court- to relieve them from the consequences of their inattention and negligence.''
Counsel for respondent cite to our attention cases to the effect that the time for a person who receives property upon an executory contract, or wlio is defrauded in tbe making of a contract, to rescind the transaction, does not begin to run till he has knowledge of the facts. That is true, but, as we have seen, the rule does not require actual knowledge; constructive knowledge is just as efficient as actual knowledge. A person is presumed to know those things which reasonable diligence on his part would bring to his attention. If he accepts the article furnished without exercising that diligence, he does so at his peril. In that sense the maxim caveat emptor applies, as said in Mamlock v. Fairbanks, supra. The observation in Beetle v. Anderson, 98 Wis. 5, 73 N. W. 560, that "the rule caveat emptor has no application to cases of fraud," as it might be understood, is wrong. The idea which the court intended to convey is that, where a person is so circumstanced that he may, consistently with reasonable care, rely upon the representations of the person with whom he is contracting, the rule caveat emptor does not apply. That is, where the fraud complained of is actually produced by the wrongful conduct of the defendant, he cannot invoke the doc-, trine of caveat emptor to protect himself from the consequences thereof. But a person acts at the peril of suffering the consequences in relying upon the representations of another with whom he is contracting if the exercise of reasonable care would uncover to him the truth. Cases are cited to the effect that a person cannot profit by his own wrong. That is true as a general proposition, but it is just as true, as we have seen, that a person cannot have the protection of the law where he fails to use reasonable care to protect himself. When it is said that a person cannot take advantage of his own wrong, it is meant that he cannot do so as against a person who is injured by that wrong. The mere fact that one person relies upon false representations made by another to- his injury does not constitute a cause of action against such other. There must be a further circumstance. Such person must be induced to rely upon the fraudulent representations, and that circumstance does not exist where such person would not be so induced but for his own heedlessness.
The rule we have discussed has been applied elsewhere generally, and in many cases quite similar to the one before us, some of the more important of which are cited in the brief of counsel for appellant. In New York Life Ins. Co. v. McMaster, 87 Fed. 63, it was held that where a person receives an insurance policy pursuant to an application it is his duty to examine it and see those things in respect thereto which are open to ordinary observation by a person of ordinary intelligence, and that if he neglects to do so, taking it for granted that he has received what he applied for or intended to apply for, he is guilty of inexcusable negligence and in law his conduct amounts to an acceptance of the policy received regardless of whether it corresponds to the policy applied for or intended to have been applied for or not; that representations made by an insurance agent at the time of the application for a policy of insurance is made constitute no excuse for failure of the applicant to look at his policy when it is delivered to him, to see if it corresponds to the one expected, and to discover the facts in that regard if that can be done by a reasonable examination of the paper; that if one fails to read his contract under such circumstances, having full opportunity for doing so and ability to read, he is guilty of gross negligence and cannot be heard successfully to say that he kept it in ignorance of its character; that the rule in that regard applies to all contracts, insurance contracts being no exception. In Fennell v. Zimmerman, 96 Va. 197, 31 S. E. 22, it was held that it is the duty of a person, on receipt of an insurance policy pursuant to his application, to examine it; that he commences receiving benefits immediately upon the policy coming to his hand, and that it is his duty to examine the paper upon its receipt and to return it within a reasonable, time if it is not satisfactory, and tbat a failure to do so is in law an acceptance of tbe policy. In McMaster v. New York Life Ins. Co. 99 Fed. 856, cited by counsel for respondent, the doctrine in the previous case, regarding the same policy (New York Life Ins. Co. v. McMasters, 87 Fed. 63), was discussed at length, and it was said to apply both at law and in equity. There are many cases of like character, which might be referred to, but the principle upon which they rest is so universally recognized that we shall omit further reference to cases, except to cite American Ins. Co. v. Neiberger, 74 Mo. 167, as an indication of the current of authority as regards the length of time held by courts to constitute ratification of a policy not issued according to the representations of the agent, where no objection is made in that regard within a reasonable time after the assured has had a fair opportunity to read and understand it. In that case no objection was made for about three months, and it was held that the delay constituted an acceptance of the policy.
In this case the representations made to the applicants for insurance in no way prevented them from examining the policies when they were received. It was their duty to malee such examination. Had they performed that duty they would have easily discovered all that they complain of. The opening lines of the letter sent appellant with his policy told the whole story. A casual glance at it would have informed him that the policy was not such as he expected to receive. Certainly he cannot, under any rule, be excused for omitting to read the first three lines of a letter addressed to him on so important a business matter, which contained other information of interest to him than that with reference to the character of his policy, viz., information in regard to the amount of his annual payment. All the parties were insured for months before appellant had any intimation that the policies were not satisfactory. It cannot be doubted that, if death had come to any of them in that period, his policy would have been enforced. Under those circumstances the applicants for insurance must be presumed to hare accepted their policies long before their attempted rescission thereof and demand for the payment of the money paid thereon. The trial court and the learned counsel for respondent fell into a grievous error in supposing that the omission by the policy holders to look at their policies can be justified by what occurred at the time thempplications for insurance were made, and that as against a party charged with fraud in the making of an executory contract the injured party was not bound to object in order to preserve his rights, till he has actual knowledge; that negligence on his part in failing to make the discovery is not to be considered. The law is otherwise, as we have seen. It seems perfectly clear that plaintiff entirely failed to establish any cause of action against the defendant, and that the complaint should have been dismissed.
By the Court.- — The judgment of the circuit court is reversed and the cause remanded with directions to render judg-ement in favor of defendant for costs.
On June 19, 1902, a motion by the respondent for a rehearing was granted.
For the appellant there was a brief by Fethers, Jeffris & Mouat, and oral argument by M. Q. Jeffris.
For the respondent there was a brief by Buyer & Buyer, and oral argument by Wm. Buyer. They contended, inter alia, that there was no negligence in plaintiff's failing to read the applications and policies; that the plaintiff did not, either at the time of signing the application or after receipt of the policy, owe to the defendant any duty requiring him to suspect that its representations were false, and take precautions accordingly by reading the application before signing, or the policy when received; that the defendant is estopped from imputing negligence because of plaintiff's reliance upon its representations; that mere negligence in failing to guard against injury is not a defense in favor of a party intentionally inflicting it, through false representations, or other wrong doing involving evil motive; imprudence or carelessness is not necessarily negligence in contemplation of law. Dowd v. C., M. & St. P. R. Co. 84 Wis. 105, 115; Groth v. Thomann, 110 Wis. 488, 496; 16 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, 466, 468, 469, 472; Shearman & Redfield, Negligence, § 1, 5; 1 Thompson, Commentaries on Negligence (2d ed.) § 1, 3, 192, 193; Klix v. Nieman, 68 Wis. 271; Zieman v. Kieckhefer E. M. Co. 90 Wis. 497; Peake v. Buell, 90 Wis. 515; Kellogg v. C. & N. W. R. Co. 26 Wis. 223, 255; McClellan v. Scott, 24 Wis. 86, 87; Broom's Legal Maxims, 228; Wharton, Negligence, § 131; Terre Haute & I. R. Co. v. Graham, 95 Ind. 293; Strohn v. D. & M. R. Co. 21 Wis. 554, 561; Birdsey v. Butterfield, 34 Wis. 52; Warder, B. & G. Co. v. Whitish, 77 Wis. 433, 434; Barndt v. Frederick, 78 Wis. 11; Beetle v. Anderson, 98 Wis. 5, 8, 9; McCarty v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co. 74 Minn. 530, 77 N. W. 426, 428; Palmer v. Hartford Ins. Co. 54 Conn. 509, 510; Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v, Norwood, 69 Fed. 77; Hay v. Star F. Ins. Co. 77 N. Y. 235; McElroy v. British Am. A. Co. 94 Fed. 1000; Kansas, M. O. & M. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Central Nat. Bank, 60 Kan. 630, 57 Pac. 527; Equitable Safety Ins. Co. v. Hearne, 20 Wall. 494; McMaster v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co. 99 Fed. 856; Duffield v. E. T. Barnum W. & I. Works, 64 Mich. 293, 31 N. W. 314; Nat. Bank of Dakota v. Taylor, 5 S. Dak. 99, 58 N. W. 299; Baker v. Lever, 67 N. Y. 309; Fargo G. & C. Co. v. Fargo G. & E. Co. 4 N. Dak. 219, 59 N. W. 1067; Strand v. Griffith, 97 Fed. 856; Erickson v. Fisher, 51 Minn. 300, 53 N. W. 638; Stanley v. M'Gauran, L. R. 11 Ir. 331, 334, 343; Hale v. Philbrick, 42 Ia. 83; C. Aultman & Co. v. Olson, 34 Minn. 450, 26 N. W. 451; Bennett v. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. 107 Tenn. 371, 64 S. W. 760. The doctrine of constructive notice is equitable and cannot be invoked for the purpose of allowing a party guilty of fraud to profit thereby; it will serve equity but not inequity. 21 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law (2d ed.) 585, 590, 684; Kilbourn v. Sunderland, 130 U. S. 518, 519; Stanley v. M'Gauran, L. R. 11 Ir. 331, 334, 343; Converse v. Blumrich, 14 Mich. 109; Groton Sav. Bank v. Batty, 30 N. J. Eq. 131; Gill v. Hardin, 48 Ark. 412; Wild v. Gibson, 1 House Lords Cas. 623; Kerr, Fraud & M. 80; Cordova v. Hood, 17 Wall. 8; Hopkins v. Langton, 30 Wis. 379, 381, 382; Brinkman v. Jones, 44 Wis. 519; Dutchess Co. M. Ins. Co. v. Hachfield, 73 N. Y. 226, 228; 1 Thompson, Commentaries on Negligence, sec. 846. Tbe doctrines of laches, acquiescence and waiver have the same purpose of serving equity as the doctrine of constructive notice, and largely the same elements and scope of application; it is essential to a waiver of a right by plaintiff that there be facts sufficient to create, in favor of the defendant, an equitable estoppel to assert the right. 18 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, (2d ed.) 97, 99, 101-103, 111, 115; 28 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, 526; Ripley v. Ætna Ins. Co. 30 N. Y. 136, 164; Ross v. Swan, 7 Lea (Tenn.) 467; Deihl v. Adams Co. Mut. Ins. Co. 98 Am. Dec. 307; Pence v. Langdon, 99 U. S. 581; Ellis v. S. W. L. Co. 102 Wis. 407; Tarkington v. Purvis, 128 Ind. 182, 25 N. E. 880; Bennecke v. Conn. Mut. L. Ins. Co. 105 U. S. 359. The plaintiff was never insured; the sending to him of a policy he never applied for, and his retention of the same in ignorance of its character, did not operate to make it even a voidable contract, — it was absolutely void. Strohn v. D. & M. R. Co. 21 Wis. 561; Walker v. Ebert, 29 Wis. 194; Blaeser v. Milwaukee M. M. Ins. Co. 37 Wis. 31, 40; Aultman v. Olson, 34 Minn. 450; Bishop, Contracts, sec. 646-8, 671. A person cannot raise an equity in his own favor by his own wrong doing. Guckenheimer v. Angevine, 81 N. Y. 397; Neblett v. Macfarland, 92 U. S. 105; Dunn v. Amos, 14 Wis. 115; Honzik v. Delaglise, 65 Wis. 500, 501; Titus v. Glens Falls Ins. Co. 81 N. Y. 419; Bidwell v. Astor M. Ins. Co. 16 N. Y. 266; Hamlin v. Sears, 82 N. Y. 331; Girod v. Michoud, 4 How. 503, 561; Conn. Gen. L. Ins. Co. v. Eldredge, 102 U. S. 245; Gay v. Havermale, 27 Wash. 390, 67 Pac. 806; Hendrickson v. Hendrickson, 51 Iowa, 68, 50 N. W. 287; Directors C. R. Co. of V. v. Kisch, 2 Eng. & Ir. App. 120; Redgrave v. Hurd, L. R. 20 Ch. Div. 13.