Case Name: Phillip M. SLEET d/b/a Phil Sleet Realtor, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. John L. GRAY et al., Defendants-Appellants
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1977-10-17
Citations: 351 So. 2d 286
Docket Number: No. 6133
Parties: Phillip M. SLEET d/b/a Phil Sleet Realtor, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. John L. GRAY et al., Defendants-Appellants.
Judges: Before HOOD, CULPEPPER and GUI-DRY, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 351
Pages: 286–290

Head Matter:
Phillip M. SLEET d/b/a Phil Sleet Realtor, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. John L. GRAY et al., Defendants-Appellants.
No. 6133.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Third Circuit.
Oct. 17, 1977.
Rehearing Denied Nov. 10, 1977.
Neblett & Führer by Leonard Führer, Alexandria, for defendants-appellants.
Provosty & Sadler by Albin A. Provosty, Alexandria, for plaintiff-appellee.
Before HOOD, CULPEPPER and GUI-DRY, JJ.

Opinion:
GUIDRY, Judge.
Defendants appeal from a summary judgment which condemns them to pay plaintiff the principal sum of $3000.00 together with legal interest from date of judicial demand until paid.
The factual circumstances giving rise to the instant litigation are not in dispute. Appellants do not seriously contend that a genuine issue of material fact exists which would preclude rendition of summary judgment. Rather, appellants contend that, considering the undisputed facts, plaintiff is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
The pleadings, affidavits and admissions of the parties reveal the following facts:
Plaintiff owns and operates a real estate agency in Alexandria, Louisiana. Defendants, desiring to sell certain property owned by them in the City of Alexandria, contacted plaintiff and requested his assistance in securing a purchaser. Plaintiff and defendants did not enter into a formal listing contract. Pursuant to the aforesaid verbal arrangement plaintiff procured a purchaser, Charles A. Anderson, and negotiated with him as to the terms and conditions of a proposed sale. Following these negotiations and on May 10,1976 plaintiff prepared a contract to buy and sell on a "standard form" for signature by defendants, as "sellers", and Charles A. Anderson, as "buyer". This contract, which provided for a sale of defendants' property to Charles A. Anderson within 30 days of May 10, 1976 for a cash consideration of $30,000.00, was executed on the aforesaid date by all parties. The "buy-sell" agreement so executed contains the following recital as to the commission to be paid plaintiff by defendants for the services rendered by him, viz.: "We hereby agree to pay Phil Sleet Realtor a 10% sales commission at close of sale".
The sale was not consummated within 30 days because of Anderson's refusal to go through with the deal. A sale by defendants to Anderson of the property described in the "buy-sell" agreement for a cash consideration of $30,000.00 was finally confect-ed on July 28, 1976. Defendants allege in their affidavits that Anderson ultimately took title for the consideration agreed upon as a result of their threats to seek specific performance of the "buy-sell" agreement. After passage of the sale plaintiff made demand upon defendants for his 10% commission which demand was without avail. Plaintiff thereafter instituted this suit.
Appellants contend that the trial court erred in rendering summary judgment in favor of plaintiff because the sale was not passed within 30 days as provided in the "buy-sell" agreement. In the alternative, appellants contend that plaintiff is not entitled to judgment because when Anderson stated that he did not intend to buy the property, plaintiff abandoned his efforts to have Anderson comply with his contract and it was only as a result of the action taken by defendants that the sale was finally confected.
At the outset we observe that if plaintiff is entitled to judgment as a matter of law the trial court properly rendered summary judgment in his favor for there is no genuine issue of material fact. LSA-C.C.P. Article 966.
We determine that plaintiff is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law and affirm.
We find no merit in appellants' contention that plaintiff should be deprived of his commission because the sale was not passed within 30 days as provided in the "buy-sell" agreement.
According to the plain and explicit terms of the agreement in question plaintiff was entitled to his commission "at close of sale". This payment was not made contingent upon the sale being passed within 30 days but rather upon the buyer, Anderson, ultimately taking title under the agreement. As aforesaid, Anderson took title on July 28, 1976, albeit, not within 30 days. It is clear from appellants own admissions that the sale was passed as a direct result of the agreement which plaintiff negotiated on behalf of defendants.
Agreements legally entered into have the effect of law on those who have formed them (LSA-C.C. Article 1901) and the courts are bound to give legal effect to such contracts according to the true intent of the parties. LSA-C.C. Articles 1945 and 1963. The intent of the parties is to be determined by the words of the contract and when these are clear and explicit, the terms of the contract must prevail.
In addition, it is well settled that a realtor is entitled to a commission, even though the sale is consummated after termination of the agency contract, if the realtor was the procuring cause of the sale. Carter v. Hayes, 337 So.2d 295 (La.App. 2nd Cir. 1976, writ refused La., 339 So.2d 854); Cramer v. Guercio, 331 So.2d 550 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1976) and cases therein cited.
Appellants rely on Adams v. Adams, 283 So.2d 503 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1973) as standing for the legal proposition that a landowner cannot be held liable to the real estate broker for his commission where the prospective purchaser fails to purchase within the period of time stipulated in the "buy-sell" agreement. We concede that the cited case appears to so hold. However, a materially distinguishing fact between Adams and the instant case is that in the former, upon default by the prospective buyer, the sale was never consummated. Additionally, the reported opinion in Adams, supra, does not indicate whether or not, under the agreement there in question, payment of the broker's commission was contingent upon the sale being passed within the time stipulated for in the agreement. As aforestated, under the explicit terms of the agreement between plaintiff and defendants the payment of plaintiff's commission was not dependent upon the purchaser taking title within a stipulated time, rather defendants agreed to pay plaintiff his commission "at close of sale". To decide otherwise, under the facts of this case, would lead to the absurd consequence that a broker could be deprived of his commission by the parties to a "buy-sell" agreement simply agreeing that passage of sale should be delayed beyond the time stipulated for in the contract.
Appellants' alternative contention is equally without merit. There is nothing in the contract which required plaintiff to see to it that the prospective vendee specifically comply with his contract to buy. Clearly, plaintiff could not judicially or extra-judicially force the prospective vendee to specifically perform. This right belonged to the prospective vendors, whose threatened enforcement of this right resulted in Anderson's ultimate purchase of the property for the consideration stipulated for in the contract. Under these circumstances, considering the terms of the "buy-sell" agreement, plaintiff is entitled to his commission.
For the reasons assigned the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. Appellants are cast for all costs of this appeal.
AFFIRMED.
CULPEPPER, J., dissents and assigns written reasons.