Case Name: Felix J. HERNANDEZ, Appellant, v. Frank P. GISONNI, Jr., Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1995-06-21
Citations: 657 So. 2d 33
Docket Number: No. 93-2446
Parties: Felix J. HERNANDEZ, Appellant, v. Frank P. GISONNI, Jr., Appellee.
Judges: FARMER, J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 657
Pages: 33–36

Head Matter:
Felix J. HERNANDEZ, Appellant, v. Frank P. GISONNI, Jr., Appellee.
No. 93-2446.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
June 21, 1995.
Rehearing, Clarification and Rehearing En Banc Denied August 9, 1995.
Robert H. Schwartz of Gunther & Whitaker, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, for appellant.
Marvin Littky, West Palm Beach, Lawrence U.L. Chandler, West Palm Beach, and Jane Kreusler-Walsh of Jane Kreusler-Walsh, P.A., West Palm Beach, for appellee.

Opinion:
POLEN, Judge.
Felix J. Hernandez appeals the trial court's denial of his post-trial motions in this automobile accident personal injury case. Appellee Frank P. Gisonni, Jr. was seriously injured when appellant's car collided with the car in which Gisonni was a passenger. Prior to trial, Gisonni settled with the two underin-sured motorist insurers with applicable coverage, for a total settlement of $250,000. He then proceeded with his claim against Hernandez, resulting in a jury verdict of $324,-000.
Post-trial, Hernandez filed motions for new trial, remittitur and for setoff of the $250,000 settlement with the underinsured motorist insurers. The trial court denied appellant's motions. (Only the denial of the remittitur and the setoff are the subject of this appeal.) We affirm.
Appellant's motion for remittitur was primarily directed to that portion of the jury's itemized verdict which awarded $64,000 for future medical expenses. Appellant contends the amount, based on the medical evidence, should have been no more than $17,500. Gi-sonni was 18 years old when the accident occurred, and 24 years old at the time of trial. As a result of the injuries sustained in this accident, he had to undergo a cervical fusion whereby a titanium plate was inserted into his neck. He has four levels of cervical disks which could degenerate and require more surgery or the implantation of a nerve stimulator. Based on appellee's fifty-year life expectancy at the time of trial, with medical testimony that appellee would require one or two follow-up doctor visits each year at a cost of approximately $350 per year, there was evidence to support a future medical expense award of at least $17,500. However, there was also medical evidence that appellee may require one or more future surgical procedures because of his injuries, and that he would be unable to secure medical insurance to cover such procedures. Dr. Pettingill, appellee's economist expert testified, for example, that he would have to invest $88,000 today to cover his potential future medical needs.
An order of a trial judge granting or denying a remittitur is discretionary and may not be set aside on appeal unless an abuse of discretion is shown. Lassiter v. Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, 349 So.2d 622, 627 (Fla.1976). The Florida Supreme Court, in Lassiter, states that "the correctness of the jury's verdict is strengthened when the trial judge refuses to grant a new trial or a remittitur." Lassiter, 349 So.2d at 627. That court goes on to state that:
The appellate court should not disturb a verdict as excessive, where the trial court refused to disturb the amount, unless the verdict is so inordinately large as obviously to exceed the maximum limit of a reasonable range within which the jury may properly operate.
A court is never free to reduce a verdict, by remittitur, to that amount which the court itself considers the jury should have allowed. It can only be reduced to the highest amount which the jury could properly have awarded.
Id. at 627 (citations omitted). As we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's denial of appellant's motion for remittitur, we affirm as to that point.
Appellant further claims reversible error in the trial court's denial of his motion for setoff as to the $260,000 settlements ap-pellee agreed to with the underinsured motorist insurers. Appellee correctly responds that appellant is not entitled to a setoff in this scenario under the dictates of International Sales-Rentals Leasing Co. v. Near-hoof, 263 So.2d 569 (Fla.1972). See also Res-pess v. Carter, 585 So.2d 987 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991), relied upon by the trial court, and Economy Fire and Casualty Co. v. Oben-land, 629 So.2d 265 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993), both of which support affirmance. The cases cited by appellant in support of his position are all distinguishable.
We affirm.
FARMER, J., concurs.
OWEN, WILLIAM C., Jr., Senior Judge, dissents in part with opinion.