Case Name: Frederick CHAMPLOVIER, Appellant/Cross-Appellee, v. CITY OF MIAMI, Appellee/Cross-Appellant
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1995-10-12
Citations: 667 So. 2d 315
Docket Number: No. 93-710
Parties: Frederick CHAMPLOVIER, Appellant/Cross-Appellee, v. CITY OF MIAMI, Appellee/Cross-Appellant.
Judges: ZEHMER, C.J., and ERVIN, JOANOS, BARFIELD, ALLEN, WOLF, KAHN, WEBSTER, MICKLE, DAVIS and VAN NORTWICK, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 667
Pages: 315–321

Head Matter:
Frederick CHAMPLOVIER, Appellant/Cross-Appellee, v. CITY OF MIAMI, Appellee/Cross-Appellant.
No. 93-710.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
Oct. 12, 1995.
As Amended on Motion for Clarification Dec. 19, 1995.
George M. Nachwalter, Andrew B. Sapiro, and Joseph C. Segor, Miami, for Appel-lantyCross-Appellee.
A. Quinn Jones, III, City Attorney; Ramon Irizarri and Kathryn S. Peeko, Assistant City Attorneys, Miami, for Appellee/Cross-Appellant.

Opinion:
PER CURIAM.
Frederick Champlovier was injured in 1978 in a compensable accident. His claim for disability compensation from the City of Mami was followed by a stipulation of the parties that his average weekly wage at the time of the accident was $385.71. The stipulation was approved by the deputy commissioner in his order on temporary total disability in 1981, in which he adjudicated the amount of disability compensation. Cham-plovier was subsequently accepted as permanently and totally disabled after reaching maximum medical improvement.
Champlovier now seeks a redetermi-nation of his average weekly wage to enhance his benefits as a result of the decision in Barragan v. City of Miami, 545 So.2d 252 (Fla.1989). It appears from the record that he knew or believed at the time of the stipulation that the average weekly wage was higher than that to which he agreed. It follows that there is no evidence of fraud, misrepresentation, or other circumstance that would render the stipulation void. The judge of compensation claims ruled with the City of Miami and held that the 1981 compensation order was conclusive on the issue of average weekly wage. We agree and affirm.
The parties to this litigation stipulated to the exact amount of average weekly wage in 1981 thus obviating the need for proof on this issue. Average weekly wage was, nevertheless, an issue because the compensation rate could not have been set without it. Section 440.14(1), Florida Statutes (1977), provided that "... the average weekly wages of the injured employee at the time of the injury shall be taken as the basis upon which to compute compensation...." The issue of average weekly wage was a necessary element of the claim for disability compensation in 1981 and remains so today for the same injury occurring in 1978. It is many years too late to modify the 1981 order under section 440.28, Florida Statutes (1977). Battle v. General Sand and Stone, 478 So.2d 396 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985). The principle of estoppel by judgment bars going behind the 1981 order to relitigate the same issue whether the claim is identical or collateral. Gordon v. Gordon, 59 So.2d 40 (Fla.1952). The policy in Florida which strongly favors finality of judgments is applicable whether a judgment is reached through contest or consent. Arrieta-Gimenez v. Arrieta-Negron, 551 So.2d 1184 (Fla.1989).
ZEHMER, C.J., and ERVIN, JOANOS, BARFIELD, ALLEN, WOLF, KAHN, WEBSTER, MICKLE, DAVIS and VAN NORTWICK, JJ., concur.
BENTON, J., dissents with opinion in which BOOTH, MINER and LAWRENCE, JJ., concur.