Case Name: John J. Hopper, Plaintiff, v. William R. Willcox and Others, Constituting the Public Service Commission of the State of New York in and for the First District, Defendants
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1913-02-28
Citations: 155 A.D. 224
Docket Number: 
Parties: John J. Hopper, Plaintiff, v. William R. Willcox and Others, Constituting the Public Service Commission of the State of New York in and for the First District, Defendants.
Judges: 
Reporter: Appellate Division Reports
Volume: 155
Pages: 224–228

Head Matter:
John J. Hopper, Plaintiff, v. William R. Willcox and Others, Constituting the Public Service Commission of the State of New York in and for the First District, Defendants.
First Department,
February 28, 1913.
Appeal — certification of question to Court of Appeals — order denying temporary injunction.
The Appellate Division will not certify a question or allow an appeal to the Court of Appeals from an order denying a motion for a temporary injunction unless the parties stipulate that on the determination of the one question of law, which the court can determine in favor of the plaintiff, the plaintiff will be entitled to a permanent injunction.
Motion to certify a question to the Court of Appeals on an appeal from an order denying a motion for a temporary injunction denied.
Laugh lis", J., dissented, with opinion.
Motion to certify question to the Court of Appeals on an appeal from an order of this court denying a motion for a temporary injunction. (See 155 App. Div. 213.)
Clarence J. Shearn, for the motion.
Morgan J. O’Brien, George S. Coleman, James L. Quackenbush, George D. Yeomans and Archibald B. Watson, Corporation Counsel, opposed.

Opinion:
Ingraham, P. J.:
This court has consistently refused to certify a question to the Court of Appeals or to allow an appeal to the Court of Appeals from an order denying a motion for a temporary injunction, excepting when the parties stipulate that on the determination of one question of law, which the court can determine, in favor of the plaintiff, the plaintiff would be entitled to a permanent injunction. The cases cited by the counsel for the moving party were all cases where the question was as to the constitutionality of a statute (as Miller v. City of New York, 202 N. Y. 430, where the sole question was as to the right of the plaintiff to maintain the action; County of Albany v. Hooker, 204 N. Y. 1); or where the action was brought to restrain the city of New York from exceeding the limit of indebtedness under the Constitution (Art. 8, § 10), and where the question was submitted to the court on conceded facts, and there were presented but questions of law based on those facts, as in Levy v. McClellan (196 N. Y. 178).
In a former case, involving the power to execute the contract, the Court of Appeals has decided that the amendments of 1912 to the Eapid Transit Act (Laws of 1891, chap. 4, as amd.) were constitutional, and the fundamental provisions of these contracts were authorized by the Eapid Transit Act, as amended by chapter 226 of the Laws of 1912. (Admiral Realty Co. v. City of New York, 206 N. Y. 110.) It was then settled that defendants would not commit an illegal act by the execution of these contracts. The other question, as to whether the execution of these contracts would be a waste of the funds of the city, was not a question of law, and, therefore, no question of law could be certified which the Court of Appeals would consider.
The motion is, therefore, denied, with ten dollars costs.
McLaughlin, Clarice and Scott, JJ., concurred; Laughlin, J., dissented.