Case Name: BARCUS et al. v. J. I. CASE THRESHING MACH. CO.
Court: Texas Courts of Civil Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1917-06-13
Citations: 197 S.W. 478
Docket Number: No. 1208
Parties: BARCUS et al. v. J. I. CASE THRESHING MACH. CO.
Judges: 
Reporter: South Western Reporter
Volume: 197
Pages: 478–481

Head Matter:
BARCUS et al. v. J. I. CASE THRESHING MACH. CO.
(No. 1208.)
(Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. Amarillo.
June 13, 1917.
On the Merits, June 20, 1917.
On Motion for Rehearing, Oct. 3, 1917.)
1. Appeal and Error <&wkey;648 — Amendment op Record — Authority oar District Court.
The statement of facts is a part of the record made by the district court, and motions affecting such record and to make it speak the truth should be filed in that court.
2. Appeal and Error <&wkey;818 — Hearing op Appeal — Postponement.
Submission of an appeal will be postponed on motion filed prior to the submission to permit the taking of proper proceedings in the district court to perfect the record.
On the Merits.
3. Chattel Mortgages <&wkey;273 — Suits to Foreclose — Venue.
An action on notes and to foreclose a chattel mortgage securing them was properly brought in a county in which part of the mortgaged property was situated, irrespective of the residence of the parties, under Vernon’s Sayles’ Ann. Civ. St. 1914, art. 1830, subd. 12, providing that a suit for the foreclosure of a lien may be brought in the county in which the property subject to the lien or a portion thereof is situated.
4. Corporations &wkey;>672(7) — Foreign Corporations — Pleading — Obtaining Permit —Necessity op Proof.
In an action by a foreign corporation on notes for the price of a traction engine and fixtures and to foreclose a chattel mortgage thereon, where plaintiff’s pleadings did not show that the sale of the engine was consummated in Texas, an allegation that plaintiff had obtained a permit to do business in Texas was surplusage, and need not be proved.
5. Appeal and Error <&wkey;17&wkey;RESERVATioN op Grounds op Review — Capacity to Sue.
Where, in an action by a foreign corporation, defendant did not by plea raise an issue as to plaintiff’s failure to obtain a permit to do business in the state, and the fact that the business out of which the cause of action arose was transacted in Texas appeared only from the evidence introduced at the trial, this defense could not be urged for the first time on appeal.
•6. Sales <&wkey;354(8) — Actions por Price — Pleadings — Matters to be Alleged.
In an action on notes for the price of a traction engine and fixtures the answer alleged that to induce defendant to sign the note plaintiff represented that he was selling the engine and fixtures to R.; that R. could not pay sufficient ■cash to justify a sale on the security of the engine and fixtures; that if defendant would sign the notes as surety and the first three of the five notes were paid, plaintiff would on nonpayment of the other notes take the engine back and cancel the notes; that defendant -relied thereon and ■signed the notos as surety; that the first three notes were paid and discharged; that the engine and fixtures were tendered to plaintiff in as good condition as when sold, reasonable wear and tear excepted; that defendant claimed no interest therein; and that plaintiff had taken charge thereof and had the engine and fixtures in its possession and control. Held, that as it was alleged that plaintiff had accepted the engine, it was unnecessary to allege that it was tendered at the same place and in the same condition as when delivered.
7. Pleading <&wkey;228 — Demurrer or Exception.
An exception that the answer was an effort to vary the terms of a written agreement by showing a contemporaneous parol agreement, and that it was not shown that the engine was tendered at the same place and in the same condition as when delivered to the purchaser, was in the nature of a general demurrer rather than a special exception.
8. Sales <&wkey;354(8) — Parol Evidence — Payment and Discharge.
While the allegations as to the parol agreement by themselves would have been bad in view of the parol evidence rule, the effect of the entire pleading was to show a discharge of the remaining notes, and it is always competent for a party to a written contract to show that his liability has been terminated by some method known to the law, though in so doing the parol evidence rule is violated.
On Motion for Rehearing.
9. Appeal and Error <&wkey;1078(3) — Evidence i3&wkey;466 — Review — Matters Not Urged — Fundamental Errors.
Error in sustaining a general demurrer to the answer was fundamental, which it was the duty of the court to consider, though ignored by the parties in-their briefs.
10. Accord and Satisfaction <&wkey;25(2) — Pleading — “Payment.”
In an action on notes for the price of a traction engine and fixtures, an answer alleging a parol agreement to take back the engine and fixtures in settlement of the last two notes if not paid, that the engine and fixtures had been tendered to plaintiff, and that it had taken charge thereof and was holding and claiming the engine and fixtures, was not a plea of accord and satisfaction as distinguished from payment, since “payment” is generally understood to mean a discharge by a compliance with the terms of the obligation or its equivalent, while in an “accord and satisfaction” the discharge is effected by the performance of terms other than those originally agreed on.
[Ed. Note. — For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, Accord and Satisfaction; Payment.]
11. Appeal and Error <&wkey;1040(6) — Harmless Error — Sustaining Demurrer.
The sustaining of a demurrer to such answer was not rendered harmless by the court’s finding that defendant had renewed and extended the notes sued on, thereby waiving all previous agreements, where evidence was not admitted to sustain the facts alleged in the answer demurred to.
Appeal from District Court, Deaf Smith County; D. B. Hill, Judge.
Action by the J. I. Case Threshing Machine Company against G. W. Barcus and others. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendants appeal.
Reversed and remanded.
G. W. Barcus, of Waco, and Turner & Rollins, of Amarillo, for appellants. Kimbrough, Underwood & Jackson, of Amarillo, for ap-pellee.
Second petition for rehearing denied November 14, 1917.

Opinion:
On Motion to Strike Ont Statement of Facts.
PER CURIAM.
Tke statement of facts is a part of tke record made by tke district court, and motions affecting suck record and to make it speak tke truth should be properly filed in that court. Boggess v. Harris, 90 Tex. 476, 39 S. W. 561; Ennis Mercantile Co. v. Wathen, 93 Ter. 622, 57 S. W. 946; Harris v. Stark, 101 Tex. 587, 110 S. W. 737; Willis v. Smith, 90 Tex. 635, 40 S. W. 401; Neville v. Miller, 171 S. W. 1109.
If prior to tke submission of this case tke appellee indicates a desire to have its submission postponed in order that it may take proper proceedings in tke court below to perfect tke record, we will postpone the submission of tke cause for that purpose; otherwise tke motion to strike out the statement of facts will be overruled.