Case Name: Joseph O. BLACKWELL v. C. O. SESSUMS, Sheriff of Sunflower County, Mississippi
Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Mississippi
Decision Date: 1973-10-08
Citations: 284 So. 2d 38
Docket Number: No. 47835
Parties: Joseph O. BLACKWELL v. C. O. SESSUMS, Sheriff of Sunflower County, Mississippi.
Judges: GILLESPIE, C. J., and SMITH, SUGG and BROOM, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 284
Pages: 38–41

Head Matter:
Joseph O. BLACKWELL v. C. O. SESSUMS, Sheriff of Sunflower County, Mississippi.
No. 47835.
Supreme Court of Mississippi.
Oct. 8, 1973.
Rehearing Denied Oct. 29, 1973.
Barnett, Montgomery, McClintock & Cunningham, Jackson, for appellant.
A. F. Summer, Atty. Gen., by Timmie Hancock, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., Jackson, for appellee.

Opinion:
WALKER, Justice:
This is an appeal from an order of the Circuit Judge of Sunflower County denying bail to appellant after a habeas corpus hearing.
On August 21, 1973, the appellant was charged with the murder of one L. C. Nelson and after a preliminary hearing before a justice of the peace, was bound over to await action of the Grand Jury on a charge of murder without the benefit of bail. He thereafter filed his petition for a writ of habeas corpus contending that he was entitled to bail as a matter of right for the reason that the evidence against him did not rise to the high standards required by the Constitution of the State of Mississippi.
At the habeas corpus hearing, the Judge had the benefit of the testimony of the State's witnesses from the record made at the preliminary hearing. He also had the benefit of personally observing the appellant testify as he gave his version of the incident and in so doing could observe appellant's mannerisms, state of composure, facial expressions and tone of his voice and from this could determine the weight and worth to be given his testimony.
Since this case has not been tried, we will not detail the testimony, but suffice it to say that if the witnesses for the State are believed, then a jury would be warranted in finding the appellant guilty of murder. On the other hand, if the testimony of the defendant is believed, they could find him guilty of manslaughter or perhaps acquit him.
The question for determination here is whether or not the appellant is entitled to bail. We have held recently in Hudson v. McAdory, 268 So.2d 916 (Miss.1972) that even though we no longer impose the death penalty, nevertheless, murder falls within a class of cases referred to as capital cases that are not bailable offenses when the proof is evident or presumption of guilt is great. We are also committed to the proposition that where the evidence is in conflict on this question of whether the proof is evident or presumption of guilt is great that the Judge at the habeas corpus hearing is the trier of fact, and, that it is presumed that he has properly applied the law to the facts as found, and his findings will not be set aside or overturned unless, from the evidence, it is manifest to us that he is clearly in error. Prine v. Polk, 189 So. 823 (Miss.1939); Lee v. Hudson, 165 Miss. 756, 144 So. 240 (1932); Stokes v. Terrell, 154 Miss. 230, 122 So. 470 (1929); Martin v. State, 97 Miss. 567, 52 So. 258 (1910).
In Ex Parte Bridewell, 57 Miss. 39, 42 (1879), Judge Chalmers, speaking for the Court, observed:
What rule should be applied in determining whether the applicant for bail has negatived the existence of evident proof or great presumption of the commission of a capital offence, and has thereby established his constitutional right to be released from imprisonment? We remark, in the first place, that the judicial officer who hears the application is the trier of the facts, and acts upon the conviction that the testimony leaves upon his own mind. He must give or deny bail according to his opinion upon the question whether a case has been made out which brings the prisoner within or without the constitutional rule. When we sit in revision of his judgment, we act upon the conviction made upon us by a perusal of the testimony contained in the record, giving to the judgment of the inferior officer that prima facie presumption of correctness, which attaches to the judgment of all courts of competent jurisdiction, strengthened in this class of cases by the fact that he has seen the witnesses, and heard them testify under circumstances which made it his duty to attend to their bearing and determine their credibility.
We are unable to say from the evidence in this record that the trial judge was wrong in denying bail to appellant. See Huff v. Edwards, 241 So.2d 654 (Miss.1970) for a discussion of the test to be applied in determining whether the proof is evident and the presumption great.
The fact that the appellant is an elderly man with a heart condition is a factor that may be considered by the trial judge in passing upon bail for the accused and he has indicated in the record that he will take this into consideration if the accused is not given a speedy trial, if indicted by the Grand Jury.
The judgment of the lower court denying bail is affirmed.
Affirmed.
GILLESPIE, C. J., and SMITH, SUGG and BROOM, JJ., concur.
RODGERS, P. J., and PATTERSON, INZER and ROBERTSON, JJ., dissent.
. Mississippi Constitution Article 3, section 29 (1890) reads: "Excessive bail shall not be required, and all persons shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, except for capital offenses when the proof is evident or presumption great."
. The transcript of the preliminary hearing was entered into evidence by agreement of the State and Defendant.