Case Name: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Juan Gerardo VALDEZ-BARRIENTOS, Defendant-Appellant
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 2008-09-08
Citations: 291 F. App'x 642
Docket Number: No. 08-40176
Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Juan Gerardo VALDEZ-BARRIENTOS, Defendant-Appellant.
Judges: 
Reporter: West's Federal Appendix
Volume: 291
Pages: 642–644

Head Matter:
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Juan Gerardo VALDEZ-BARRIENTOS, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 08-40176.
United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.
Sept. 8, 2008.
James Lee Turner, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office Southern District of Texas, Houston, TX, for PlaintiffAppellee.
Marjorie A. Meyers, Federal Public Defender, Federal Public Defender’s Office Southern District of Texas, Houston, TX, for Defendant-Appellant.
Before JOLLY, GARZA, and ELROD, Circuit Judges.

Opinion:
PER CURIAM:
Appellant Juan Valdez-Barrientos was convicted below of illegal reentry into the United States in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a)-(b). Prior to being deported, Barrientos was convicted of indecency with a child in violation of Texas Penal Code § 21.11(a)(1). Equating "indecency with a child" under Texas law with "sexual abuse of a minor" for purposes of § 2L1.2 of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, the district court enhanced Barrientos' offense level by sixteen and imposed a sentence of seventy-eight months' imprisonment.
Barrientos contends that § 21.11(a)(1) proscribes conduct beyond that falling within the ordinary and contemporary meaning of "sexual abuse of a minor," and therefore that his prior conviction under that statute is not a legitimate basis for a crime-of-violence enhancement under the Guidelines. Specifically, he argues that the definition of "child" under § 21.11(a)— a person less than seventeen years of age — is inconsistent with the contemporary and ordinary meaning of "minor" because, for purposes of many states' statutory rape laws, a person's "age of consent" is deemed to be sixteen. See generally United States v. Lopez-DeLeon, 513 F.3d 472 (5th Cir.2008) (discussing when children reach the age of consent under various states' statutory rape laws).
As Barrientos admits, we have already addressed the issue of whether a violation of § 21.11(a) constitutes sexual abuse of a minor for purposes of § 2L1.2; in answering in the affirmative, we have stated that " 'a child younger than 17 years[ ]' is clearly a 'minor.' " United States v. Zavala-Sustaita, 214 F.3d 601, 604 (5th Cir.2000) (quoting § 21.11(a)); see also United States v. Najera-Najera, 519 F.3d 509, 511 (5th Cir.2008) (relying on Zavala-Sustaita, in stating "under generic-meaning analysis, a person younger than 17 years old is a 'child' "). Because our precedent forecloses Barrientos' argument, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
Pursuant to Fifth Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in Rule 47.5.4.