Case Name: James Judge and R. Dennis ads. H. Fiske and W. Eager
Court: South Carolina Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: South Carolina
Decision Date: 1844-01
Citations: 2 Speers 436
Docket Number: 
Parties: James Judge and R. Dennis ads. H. Fiske and W. Eager.
Judges: Richardson, Butler, Wardlaw and Frost, JJ. concurred.
Reporter: South Carolina Law Reports
Volume: 29
Pages: 436–444

Head Matter:
James Judge and R. Dennis ads. H. Fiske and W. Eager.
1. Rent being due on a written lease, under seal, payable quarterly, the landlord accepted the notes of his tenant for the several quarters’ rent due, to be paid at future stated periods, and gave a receipt for them, as in full of rent when paid, but before any of the notes were due, destrained.
2. The acceptance of the notes by the land lord operated as an agreement to suspend the right of distress until there was a default in payment, and this agreement was supported by a sufficient consideration.
3. The mere making of a promissory note or bill is no satisfaction of a precedent debt. It operates to suspend the party’s right to sue on the old debt until there is a right of action on the new. And the reason of the rule makes it applicable to all classes of debts.
4 The cases from 1 Nott & McCord, 187; 3 McCord, 484, and 4 ib. 544, held not to conflict with this decision.
Before Evans, J. Charleston, April Term, 1843.
This was an action of replevin. Fiske leased of Judge a tenement in the city, for the term of three years. It was a written lease, under seal, whereby a rent of $500 was reserved, payable quarterly. On the 1st May, three quarters rent were due, and on the 7th, Fiske gave Judge three notes, one for each quarter, payable at six, seven and eight months, with interest added from the time each quarter’s rent was due. On the 1st August, another quarter’s rent was due, for which the note of Fiske and Eager was given, payable at five months, with interest added. Judge gave a receipt for the notes, as in full of rent when paid. In October, before any of the notes were due, Judge issued a distress warrant; the goods were replevied, and the case came on to be tried at this Term, on the question whether the rent was due at the time of the distress. The case turned on whether the landlord, by taking the notes, had entered into a binding contract to wait for the rent until the notes were due. If he had, then no rent was due. The court was of opinion, and so charged, that the lease, being a higher security, was in no way impaired by the simple contract. 2. That construing the notes into an agreement to extend the time of payment of the rent, yet it was nudum pactum, and void, for want of a consideration. The notes were tendered back at the time of the distress, and were produced in court, to be delivered up. The jury, however, found a verdict for the plaintiffs, for three hundred dollars.
P. S. After the goods were levied on, the store was locked up for a day, and until the plaintiffs could find security for.the replevin.
Defendants appealed, on the following grounds :
1. Because the taking of the notes by the avowant was neither a payment of the rent, nor a suspension of his right to distrain, and he was entitled to recover the whole amount, with interest, for which the distress was made.
2. Because the avowant was stopped by the court from shewing, in the previous case tried of James Judge and JV. Dennis ads. Samuel A. JVelson, that the plaintiff was in insolvent circumstances, and consequently did not offer the evidence in this case.
3. Because the verdict was erroneous, in finding damages for the plaintiffs, when it was not proved that any injury had been sustained from the distress.
4. Because the verdict was contrary to law and evidence.
Phillips, for the motion. Rice, contra.

Opinion:
Curia, per
O'Neall, J.
Two questions arise in this case. 1st. Did the notes accepted by the defendant, Judge, operate as an agreement to suspend his right of distress until there was a default in payment ? 2d. Was there a sufficient consideration to make the agreement to suspend enforcible as a legal contract 1
1st. The receipts given for the notes are, that they, when paid, shall be in full of the respective quarters of rent for which they are given. The plain import of this is, on the part of the landlord, I accept this in lieu of rent, until the security is due, then, if it be not paid, my remedy by distress will be resorted to. It is very true, that making of a promissory note, or bill, is not, of itself, sati faction of an antecedent debt. But yet it is equally if it be accepted as payment, it would have that effe the mere making of a promissory note or bill be faction of a precedent debt, what legal effect does it have1? It unquestionably operates to suspend the party's right to sue on the old debt until a right of action would be given on the new. In the language of some of the cases, it is prima facie satisfaction, and this prima facie conclusion must be removed before the party can recover on the old debt. This cannot be denied in cases of simple contract, for the books are full of such cases, as Burdick vs. Green, 15 Johns. 247; Pintard vs. Tackington, 10 Johns. 103 ; Angel vs. Tilton, 8 Johns. 149; and Holmes & Drake vs. Decamp, 1 Johns. 34. The difficulty is in saying what is the effect of a bill or note on a higher security. Generally speaking, there is no doubt about the rule, that it would not deprive the party of the benefit of such higher security by extinguishing it. But I do not perceive why it may not be considered as a contract to wait on the higher security until the note or bill is due, and then, if not paid, to resort to it. Mr. Chitty, in his treatise on Contracts, 593, after stating generally the rule which I have stated, and which is extracted from cases of simple contracts, says: " The reason that the instrument, during its currency, is a bar to an action for the debt, is, that the entering into a new engagement and security, by becoming a party to an instrument which subjects the debtor to peculiar liabilities, or affords the creditor fresh and peculiar rights, constitutes a new and good consideration for giving credit. During the currency of the security, the original remedy is therefore suspended, or in abeyance." The reason thus given for the rule makes it applicable to all classes of debts, and in all it would have equal effect: for if it be good as a contract, to give time on a contract of equal degree, it must be so of one of superior degree. In Chitty on Bills, 123, the rule is stated, " a person, by taking a bill of exchange or promissory note, in satisfaction of a former debt, or of a debt created at the time, is precluded from afterwards waiving it, and suing the person who gave it to him for the original ebt, before the bill is due; for the taking of the bill mounts to an agreement to give the person delivering it lit for the length of time it has to run." The general terms rule cover all debts, but it is true the cases referred to -re the original contracts were simple contracts. Bat the Judges do not make any thing of that circumstance. Indeed, in all the cases, (as in Steedman vs. Gooch, 1 Esp. 3,) the language is used as was by Lord Kenyon, in that case, who said that "the law was clear, that if in payment of a debt, the creditor is content to take a bill or note, payable at a future day, he cannot legally commence an action on his original debt, until such bill or note becomes payable, or default is made in payment." In Putnam vs. Lewis, Adm'r. of Lewis, 8 Johns. R. 304, where a note was given by the defendant, for an account against his intestate, it was held that the note was no payment of the book debt; it could only suspend the right of action during the time allowed for the payment of'the note. Looking at the note or bill taken in satisfaction as a contract to give time, if it be founded on a sufficient consideration, there can be no difficulty in holding it to be binding upon the creditor by a contract of superior as well as one of equal degree. The cases from 1 N. & McC. 187; 3 McC. 484, and 4 McC. 544, do not militate against this view. For in the case from 1 N. & McC. an order was drawn on a person not in funds, and hence its non-payment cast the landlord back on his original rights. In the case from 3 McC., the single bill expressed upon its face that it was given for rent, and there was no attempt to enforce payment until it was due. In 4 McC., the case was on a penal bond, conditioned to pay in instalments, one of which was due before the distress was resorted to. This was enough ; for the debtor had not kept his contract, and hence the creditor could not be compelled to do it. There is, therefore, I think, no difficulty in concluding that the notes accepted by the landlord were an agreement on his part to extend the time of payment. It is, then, necessary to enquire whether this agreement is supported by a sufficient consideration.
2d. Any thing which confers benefit on the party promising, or is loss or inconvenience to the party to whom the promise is made, is a sufficient consideration. Chitty on Con. 25. Here the enquiry will be, was the making of the notes a benefit to the landlord, ora loss to the tenants? It gave to the landlord an additional security, and that a commercial one, upon which he could raise money, and which, if not paid, would then give place to the former security, the right to distrain.
This, it seems to me, was a plain benefit. So, too, the debtor, the tenant, placed himself in this position: if he failed to pay, he was liable to be protested, and thus lose his credit, which, to a man in trade, would be a great loss. And everywhere, the fact of making a promissory Negotiable note, subjects a party to a new liability ; for if it be negotiated before due, all the maker's defences against the original creditor are gone.
In the extract already made from Chitty on Contracts, 593, the making of such a note or bill is stated to be " a new and good consideration for giving credit." In Leigh's N. P. 1, 29, the same principle is affirmed, and the case of Ikin vs. Brook, 1 B. & A. s. 124, (20 Eng. C. L. 357,) is referred to. That case was brought on a contract of indemnity, which, with the consideration, was set out as follows, in the 1st count, viz : the defendant and one West, as assignees of John Ikin, a bankrupt, preferred certain claims against the plaintiff, and that in consideration of the plaintiff having delivered to them two promissory notes of him, the plaintiff, for £100, and £400, payable to them, as such assignees, as a composition for and in satisfaction of all claims which they, as assignees, had against the plaintiff, they promised to indemnify him against all and every other liability which he was under on account of John Ikin. The 2d count stated the consideration the same as to the notes, and added, uand also a cognovit," and laid the promise to be in consideration of the money so secured to be paid to them, it was held by the court that the consideration thus stated was sufficient, and that the plaintiff might recover on the indemnity without the payment of the money thus secured to be paid. This, it will be seen, is the very case before the court; for there, as well as here, the security for an existing debt was the consideration. Being hence satisfied that the consideration is enough to sustain the contract to give time on the contract for rent until the notes were due, it follows that that contract bound Judge, and that he had no right to distrain for rent arrear; and that he is liable for damages for the trespass committed in levying his distress warrant. The jury were therefore right, and their verdict cannot be disturbed.
The motion is dismissed.
Richardson, Butler, Wardlaw and Frost, JJ. concurred.