Case Name: Daisy Clark ARMSTRONG, et al. v. HANOVER INSURANCE COMPANY, et al.
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1993-02-11
Citations: 614 So. 2d 312
Docket Number: No. 92-CA-0670
Parties: Daisy Clark ARMSTRONG, et al. v. HANOVER INSURANCE COMPANY, et al.
Judges: Before SCHOTT, C.J., and BARRY and PLOTKIN, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 614
Pages: 312–316

Head Matter:
Daisy Clark ARMSTRONG, et al. v. HANOVER INSURANCE COMPANY, et al.
No. 92-CA-0670.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fourth Circuit.
Feb. 11, 1993.
Writ Denied May 7, 1993.
Harry T. Widmann, New Orleans, for plaintiffs/appellants.
Burt K. Carnahan, Lane A. Schaffer, Lobman, Carnahan & Batt, Metairie, for defendants/appellees.
Before SCHOTT, C.J., and BARRY and PLOTKIN, JJ.

Opinion:
SCHOTT, Chief Judge.
Plaintiff is the widow of Walter J. Armstrong, Jr. who was killed while working as a flagman in connection with a construction project alongside a highway in Plaque-mines Parish. She has appealed from a summary judgment which dismissed her suit brought under the uninsured motorist (UM) provisions of the insurance policy issued by Hanover Insurance Company to decedent's employer. The issue is whether he could possibly be construed as "occupying" one of the insured vehicles while he was working as a flagman.
In her petition plaintiff alleges that decedent was employed by Hebert Brothers Engineers, Inc. as a flagman in connection with a water line repair project taking place along the highway when an uninsured motorist ran his vehicle into the decedent causing his death. At this time decedent was serving as flagman for his employer's tractor and he was assigned a company pick-up truck in connection with the job.
In the UM endorsement of the policy an insured is defined in pertinent part as anyone "occupying" a covered "auto". It defines "occupying" to mean "in, upon, getting in, on, out or off."
When the words of a contract are clear and explicit and lead to no absurd consequences, no further interpretation may be made in search of the parties' intent. LSA-C.C. art. 2046. The words of a contract must be given their generally prevailing meaning. Art. 2047. When the accident occurred the decedent was functioning as a flagman on the highway. His activity with respect to a tractor working on the side of the highway and a pick-up truck assigned to him cannot possibly be construed as "in" one of these vehicles, "upon" one, "getting in" one, "getting on" one, "getting out" one, or "getting off" one without distorting the plain words of the policy.
Plaintiff's reliance on Westerfield v. LeFleur, 493 So.2d 600 (La.1986) is misplaced because that case dealt with an entirely different definition than the one in Hanover's policy discussed above. In Wes-terfield the policy defined "occupying" to mean "in or upon or entering into or alighting from" the insured school bus. The court focused upon the words "entering into" and concluded they were ambiguous and could be construed to cover this child who was crossing the road to board the school bus. Those words "entering into" are not included in Hanover's policy so that the Westerfield case has no application to the present case.
Our conclusion is consistent with this court's decision in Davis v. Brock, 602 So.2d 104 (La.App. 4th Cir.1992).
Accordingly, the judgment appealed from is affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
BARRY, J., dissents with reasons.