Case Name: BERNARD S. FOX, Guardian of the Person and Estate of Catharine Foley, a Minor v. P. O. MINOR, and J. R. WILSON
Court: Supreme Court of California
Jurisdiction: California
Decision Date: 1867
Citations: 32 Cal. 111
Docket Number: 
Parties: BERNARD S. FOX, Guardian of the Person and Estate of Catharine Foley, a Minor v. P. O. MINOR, and J. R. WILSON.
Judges: 
Reporter: California Reports
Volume: 32
Pages: 111–131

Head Matter:
BERNARD S. FOX, Guardian of the Person and Estate of Catharine Foley, a Minor v. P. O. MINOR, and J. R. WILSON.
Trustee of Express Trust.—A guardian of an infant, appointed by the Probate Court, is not a trustee of an express trust within the meaning of section six of the Practice Act.
Party Plaintiff.—A guardian of an infant cannot sue in his own name to recover money due the infant. Such action must be brought in the name of the infant by his guardian.
Guardian cannot Dispute Legality of his Appointment.—One who has been appointed guardian of an infant minor by the Probate Court, and has accepted the appointment, and by virtue thereof become possessed of the infant’s estate, is estopped from denying the jurisdiction of the Court or the legality of his appointment.
Judgment on Bond of Guardian.—In an action against the sureties upon a bond given by the general guardian of an infant minor, but not made payable in any specific kind of money, a judgment should not be rendered payable in gold coin.
Appeal from the District Court, Third Judicial District, Santa Clara County.
On the 22d day of May, 1861, the Probate Court of Santa Clara County appointed the defendant, John R. Wilson, guardian of the person and estate of Catharine Foley, a minor under the age of fourteen years. Said defendant qualified and gave a bond, with the defendant Minor and one H. C. Melone as sureties, and letters of guardianship of the person and estate of said Foley were issued to him. Wilson continued to act in the capacity of guardian until the 25th 'day of March, 1865, when he tendered his resignation, and the same was, on the 6th day of May, 1865, accepted by the Probate Court. During his guardianship, Wilson received and collected for and on account of his said ward, the sum,of two thousand dollars, in gold coin of the United States, which he failed to invest or employ for the benefit of his ward, either under the directions of the Probate Court or otherwise, but used the same for his own gain. Before accepting Wilson’s resignation, the Probate Court investigated his accounts and found him indebted to his ward in the sum of two thousand dollars. After Wilson’s resignation had been accepted, the Probate Court appointed "Bernard S. Fox, the plaintiff, guardian of the person and estate of said Catharine Foley, who qualified and received letters of guardianship. This action was brought by said Fox upon the bond of Wilson, to recover the money due his ward. The plaintiff in the action was “ Bernard S. Fox, guardian of the person and estate of Catharine Foley, a minor.” The suit was commenced August 28th, 1865. The bond of Wilson and his sureties was filed in the Probate Court May 27th, 1861. The following is a copy of the bond:
“ Know all men by these presents: That we, John E. Wilson, Henry C. Melone, and Peter 0. Minor, are held and firmly bound unto Catharine Foley, minor, in the sum of four thousand dollars, lawful money of the United States of America, to be paid to the said Catharine Foley, minor, for which payment well and truly to be made, we bind ourselves jointly and severally firmly by these presents.
“ Sealed with our seals, and dated this 21st day of May, 1861.
“ The condition of the above obligation is such, that whereas application has been made to the Judge of the Probate Court of the County of Santa Clara, State of California, for the appointment of John E. Wilson guardian of the person and estate of the said Catharine Foley. How, therefore, if the said John R. Wilson be appointed such guardian, and shall faithfully perform the duties of his trust according to law, and shall:
“ First—Make a true inventory of all the estate, real and personal, of his said ward, that shall come to his possession or knowledge, and shall return the same within such time as the said Judge shall order;
“Second—Shall dispose of and manage all such estate according to law and for the best interest of said ward, and faithfully discharge his trust in relation thereto, and also in relation to the care, custody, and education of said ward;
“ Third—Shall render an account on oath of the property, estate, and moneys of said ward in his hands, and all proceeds or interest derived therefrom, and of the management and disposition of the same, within one year after his appointment, and at such other times as the Court shall direct; and
“Fourth—At the expiration of his trust shall settle his accounts with the Probate Judge or with the said ward, if she be of full age, or with her legal representatives, and shall pay over and deliver all the estate, moneys and effects remaining in his hands or due from him on such settlement, to the person or persons who shall be lawfully entitled thereto ;
“ Then this obligation shall be void and no effect; else to remain of full force and virtue.
“John E. Wilson, [seal.]
“H. C. Melons, [seal.]
“P. O. Minor.” [seal.]
“State of California, )
“ County of Santa Clara. 5
“ H. C. Melone and Peter 0. Minor being duly sworn, each for himself says that he is a resident in said State and is worth the sum of four thousand dollars, over and above all his just debts and liabilities, exclusive of property exempt from execution.
“H. C. Melons,
“P. 0. Minor.”
“ Subscribed and sworn to before me, this twenty-first day of May, 1861.
“ Geo. M. Yoell, Notary Public.”
“Approved this twenty-second day of May, 1861.
“ John H. Moore, County Judge,
“And ex officio Judge of the Probate Court.”
“ Filed May 27th, 1861.
“John B. Hewson, Clerk.
“By Levi P. Peck, Deputy Clerk.”
The judgment of the Probate Court upon the accounts of Wilson was rendered May 6th, 1865. The defendants demurred to the complaint, because the action was brought in the name of the guardian as such, and not in the name of the ward by her guardian. The Court below overruled the demurrer. Plaintiff recovered judgment for two thousand dollars, payable in gold coin, and defendants appealed.
Frederick Hall, for Appellant Minor, and J. M. Williams, for Appellant Wilson, argued that the action should have been brought in the name of the ward by her guardian; and cited Sec. 40 Guardians’ Act: 19 Cal. 629; 20 Cal. 659; 1 Pet. 46; and 3 Hill, 612; and that the guardian was not the real party in interest, and was not the trustee of an express trust; and cited 10 Paige, 239; and Morris, Iowa, 436. They also argued that the Court below had no authority to render a judgment for gold coin, because the bond was dated before the passage of the Specific Contract Act, and there was no identity of any particular money as a trust fund; and cited Lathrop v. Bampton, 31 Cal. 17. They also claimed that Wilson had never petitioned to be appointed guardian, and that the Probate Court had therefore never acquired any jurisdiction to make the appointment, and the same was void.
S. O. Houghton, and J. A. Yoell, for Respondent, argued that the action was properly brought in the name of the guardian ; and cited Practice Act, Sec. 6 ; and Act concerning guardians, Sec. 162; and that a general guardian had all the elements of a trustee of an express trust, and had a qualified property in the proceeds of the action, under the statute and at common law, and in that respect differed from a guardian ad litem, who had no interest in or claim of control of the subject matter of the action. They argued also that defendants could not raise any objections to the regularity or sufficiency of the proceedings of the Probate Court in the appointment" of Wilson; and cited Gonfier v. Puymirol, 19 Cal. 629 ; and People v. Norton, 5 Selden, 176. They further argued that the judgment for gold coin was right, because the money was received in a fiduciary capacity. To show that the action was properly brought in the name of the guardian, they made the following points and cited the following authorities:
When the complaint shows that the action is by the trustee for the benefit of his cestui que trust, and that defendant would be protected by the judgment, the action is allowed in the name of the trustee. (Fenn v. Craig, 3 Younge and Coll. 216 ; Story’s Eq. Pl., Sec. 150 ; and 2 Paige, 18.) The party having the legal title can sue. (Mellen v. Hamilton Co., 17 N. Y. 609.) An executor or administrator may sue in his own name, or as executor, for the debt due his testator or intestate at the time of his death. (2 Selden, 168; Pugh v. Currie, 5 Saund. 433; 19 Barb. 473; 9 Wend. 302; and 9 How. Pr. 11.) The analogy between an executor and an administrator and a guardian is too close to be disregarded. A guardian has title.to the possession of his ward’s estate, both real and personal, and cannot be ousted of it. (4 Bac. Abr. 557.) Fox is not a mere nominal trustee, but the party to whom the money must come, (Maulin v. Maulin, 2 John. Ch. 239.)

Opinion:
By the Court, Sawyer, J.:
A guardian appointed by the Probate Court, under the Act which provides for the appointment and prescribes the duties of guardians, is not a trustee of an express trust, within the meaning of section six of the Practice Act. Under that Act the Probate Court is vested with the same jurisdiction over the persons and estates of minors who have no testamentary guardians, as was vested at common law in the Court of Chancery. At common law, the King, as parens patria, was considered to have the care of all persons who were unable to take care of themselves, and such care was exercised by the Court of Chancery. Upon petition or bill showing that a minor was without any testamentary or other legal guardian, that Court took charge of his person and estate, and cared for both by appointing a guardian of his person and estate. Such minors became the wards of the Court, and the guardian appointed by the Court was but an officer of the Court, and held respohsible to it as such. The Court was, in effect, the guardian, and the nominal guardian was but the agent through whom the Court acted, and to whom the Court delegated the execution of the trust. In like manner, a guardian appointed by the Probate Court is an officer of that Court, and exercises only a delegated trust. His relation to the Court and the minor is in some, though not all, respects of the same legal complexion as that of an executor, or administrator towards the Court, estate and heirs of a decedent, neither of which is Iwithin the definition of a trustee of an express trust, as given in the sixth, section of the Practice Act. It is possible, as j contended by respondent, that there is no good reason why a I guardian should not be placed, in respect to his capacity to f sue, upon the same level as executors and administrators ; but ^ it is clear that such is not the case. So far as the Practice Act is concerned, when not a trustee of an express trust within the meaning of section six, the capacity of a guardian to sue in his own name, if at all, is limited to actions for the injury or death of his ward (Sec. 11), while executors and administrators are expressly authorized to sue in their official character without joining the person beneficially interested. (See. 6.)
The reason upon which the distinction is based may be that executors and administrators are strictly and technically rep- ; resentatives of the deceased, while guardians are not techni- I cally representatives of anybody. They simply stand in the ' position of protectors. The guardian is the counsel assigned by operation of law to conduct the suit. (Devore v. Pitman, 3 Mo. 187.) If a guardian were permitted to maintain an action in his own name, there might be two suits pending at the same time for the same cause of action—one in the name of the infant, and another in the name of the guardian—and the determination of the question in the suit brought in the name of the guardian alone might not protect the defendant from further litigation in the name of the ward. (Bradley v. Amidon, 10 Paige, 239.)
At common law, and in equity, an infant was required to sue in his own name, but by his guardian or next friend. (1 Chit. Pl. 284; Bradley v. Amidon, 10 Paige, 235 ; Hanly v. Levin, 5 Ohio, 228.) The practice of suing by guardian is expressly continued by our Practice Act. " Where an infant is a party he shall appear by guardian " (Sec. 9); and section ten provides for appointing a guardian " where an infant is a plaintiff," or a " defendant." These provisions for appointing guardians refer to those cases where there is no general guardian, or where, for any other sufficient reason, a guardian ad litem is required. But these provisions contemplate that the infant in person shall be a party to the suit, although he appears by guardian, as adults appear by attorney. Would it be pretended that an action could be maintained against a guardian in his own name alone upon a cause of action against his ward only ? What better reason is there for permitting him to sue alone, than for permitting a suit to be maintained against him in his own name, on a cause of action against another party? The Practice Act upon this subject, then, so' far as the guardian is concerned, is in strict harmony with the practice at common law; and, unless expressly modified by some other statutory provision, it must govern. It also provides that an action, with certain specified exceptions, of which this is not one, shall be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest. (Sec. 4.) The ward is the real' party in interest. The only other provisions of the statute bearing upon the question, to which our attention has been called, are contained in sections sixteen and forty of the Act concerning guardians. Section sixteen provides, that " every such guardian shall also settle all accounts of the ward, and demand, sue for and receive all debts due him, or may, with the approbation of the Probate Judge, compound for the same, and give a discharge to the debtor on receiving a fair and just dividend for his estates and effects; and he shall appear for and represent his ward in all legal suits and proceedings, unless when another person is appointed for that purpose, as guardian or next friend." (Stats. 1850, p. 270, Sec. 16; Hittell, 3,377.) But this proviso does not say that the suit shall be in the name of the guardian. It simply designates the powers and duties of the guardian, and is only a re-enactment of the common law upon the subject. There is nothing in this section inconsistent with the provisions of the Practice Act, which contemplates that the suit shall be in the name of the infant— the real party in interest. And those provisions are not to be construed as repealed unless by some express provision, or by necessary implication. Besides the express provision of section forty of the same Act shows that no such change was contemplated, especially with reference to suits on a guardian's bond. This section provides that " every bond given by a guardian shall be filed and in case of the breach of any condition thereof, may be prosecuted in the name of the ward for the use and benefit of such ward, or of any person interested in the estate." (Ib. 274, Sec. 40 ; Hittell, 3,401.) This point was directly decided by the Supreme Court of Iowa in a similar suit, under a statutory provision in all respects substantially like section sixteen of our Act, and. it was held that the suit could not be maintained in the name of the guardian alone. (Anderson, guardian of W. P. Anderson v. Cameron, Morris, 437.) We think a suit on the bond can only be maintained in the name of the infant, the real party in interest, and that the complaint states no cause of action in favor of the plaintiff. It has been a very general practice in this State—from abundant caution, perhaps—to have a guardian ad litem appointed in pursuance of section eleven of the Practice Act, even where there is a general guardian, the general guardian being usually appointed when there is no objection to his acting. But this practice is held not to be necessary when there is a general guardian who has been duly appointed, against whom no objection lies. (Gronfier v. Puymirol, 19 Cal. 632; Spear v. Ward, 20 Cal. 673.)
There are some other points presented by the record which have been duly argued, and which will necessarily arise should a new suit be brought in the name of the proper party, and for that reason we will dispose of them now.
Neither Wilson nor his sureties can be heard to say that Wilson was not legally appointed guardian. Having accepted the appointment, and by virtue thereof become possessed of the minor's estate, it would be strange indeed if he could now dispute the jurisdiction of the Court, and under the pretense that the Court had acted without authority, retain the estate of his ward. By accepting the appointment and the estate, Wilson placed himself within its jurisdiction and became an officer of the Court, and responsible to it for the faithful performance of his trust, and he is forever estopped by the record from denying his accountability. (People v. Norton, 5 Seld., 9 N. Y., 179.)
The judgment of the Probate Court is conclusive against Wilson and his sureties alike. We so held in Irwin v. Backus, 25 Cal. 214, and we adhere to that decision.
The District Court was not authorized to enter a judgment payable in gold coin against the sureties, and in this respect there was error. The action is not upon a contract "for the direct payment of money 'made payable in a specific kind of money or currency." The obligation is to pay " the sum of four thousand dollars, lawful money of the United States," without otherwise specifying the kind of money. The condition was that Wilson should perform his duties as guardian, not that the obligors would perform Wilson's duties. It may be that Wilson as guardian in a proper suit can be compelled to pay over to the infant the amount of money received by him in his fiduciary capacity, in the specific kind of money received; but in a suit on the bond the sureties are entitled to stand on the terms of the undertaking. The only recovery that can be had on the bond is the damages resulting from Wilson's failure to discharge his duties in the mode prescribed by law, and the damages can only be required to be paid in money generally according to the terms of the bond.
Judgment reversed, with directions to the District Court to dismiss the action.
Mr. Justice Rhodes, being disqualified, did not participate.