Case Name: DOYLE et al. v. PENTON LUMBER CO., Inc.
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1952-01-23
Citations: 56 So. 2d 774
Docket Number: No. 3492
Parties: DOYLE et al. v. PENTON LUMBER CO., Inc.
Judges: 
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 56
Pages: 774–785

Head Matter:
DOYLE et al. v. PENTON LUMBER CO., Inc.
No. 3492.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana. First Circuit.
Jan. 23, 1952.
Rehearing Denied March 24, 1952.
Writ of Certiorari Denied April 28, 1952.
Edward K. Alexander, De Quincy, for appellants.
Murray Anderson, Lake Charles, for ap-pellee.

Opinion:
DORÉ, Judge.
This suit arises out of the accidental injury sustained by Curtis Doyle, an employee of the defendant Penton Lumber Company,' Inc. on the night of July 29, 1950 while en route to' his employment and his subsequent death from such injuries on the morning of July 30, 1950. The.plaintiff, Mrs. Erma Doyle, is the surviving widow of Curtis Doyle and she sues individually and as natuial tutrix of four minor children born of the marriage, under the dependency provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act, praying for compensation at the maximum rate for three hundred (300) weeks. She alleges in her petition that at the time of his accidental injury, Curtis Doyle was, under the terms of the compensation law and its jurisprudence, within the course and scope of his employment by the defendant company.
The defendant admits that the accident occurred as alleged and admits that Curtis Doyle was in its employ at the time of the accident and that defendant was engaged in a hazardous occupation and further it was stipulated between the parties that in the event of liability the rate of compensation in this case should be $30.00 per week. However, the defendant denies liability on the ground that at the time of the accidental injury and resulting death, Curtis Doyle was not in the course and scope of his employment.
After trial of the case, the trial judge, for reasons set forth in a thorough, well written opinion, rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff, granting compensation to her individually and as natural tutrix of the four minor children in the sum of $30.-00 per week for three hundred (300) weeks; beginning on July 29, 1950 with interest at 5% per annum on all delinquent installments plus all costs. The defendant has appealed.
The sole question involved in the case is whether or not Curtis Doyle af the time of his accidental injury was in the course and scope of his employment.
The facts are briefly as follows: Curtis Doyle -lived at a community known as Lunita some seven miles from De'Quincy. The lumber company by whom he was employed as a fireman was situated on the outskirts of De Quincy. His hours of work were from 11:00 p. m. to 7:00 o'clock a. m. In order to reach his place of employment he had to travel from his home in Lunita across the town of De Quincy to a gravel road which crossed the tracks of the main line of the Missouri-Pacific Railroad. Upon arriving at this gravel road he had two routes by which he could reach his place of employment. One route was to cross the track • at the gravel' road and then follow the gravel road approximately four hundred (400) feet to the company lumber yard. The other route was along the Missouri-Pacific Railroad right of way. It appears that the second route was the shorter of the two for Curtis Doyle to -his particular place of employment and that this was the route which he usually took when -traveling on foot. Of course, when traveling by vehicle, the only route available was the gravel road. It is shown that the decedent in going to ' work at times used a bus and at other times was taken to his place of employment by a neighbor, named Joe Holley. On the night of the fatal accident it is shown that Joe Holley drove his automobile to the home of Curtis Doyle and picked him up at 10:10 o'clock and discharged him later at a point where the gravel road intersects the railroad right of way and that thereupon Curtis Doyle started walking along the south side of the railroad on his way to the defendant's mill; that he had to travel a' distance of about 313 feet along said right of way before he could actually enter upon -the premises of his employer; that before he had traveled far enough to enter the premises he was struck by a train of the New Orleans, Texas and Mexico Railway Company traveling on said main line of the Missouri-Pacific Railroad and as a result thereof both of his legs were severed, causing his death some hours thereafter.
It is clearly shown that if there is any liability on the part of the defendant, under the terms of the Workmen's Compensation Act, LSA-R.S. 23:1021 ét seq., it must be established under one of the exceptions to the general rule that, to be compensable, an accident must occur on the premises of the employer, during working hours and while the employee is engaged in the business of his employment. The exception relied upon by the plaintiff is that the injury occurred near decedent's place of employment and resulted from a hazard to' which 'the decedent was exposed because of his employment. This exception, commonly referred to as the proximity rule, has been applied frequently by our courts where employees have been injured while going to and returning from work.
As set forth by the trial judge in his written opinion, two of the leading cases with reference to the proximity rule are, Cudahy Packing Co. of Nebraska v. Parramore, 263 U.S. 418, 44 S.Ct. 153, 68 L.Ed. 366, and Bountiful Brick Co. v. Giles, 276 U.S. 154, 48 S.Ct. 221, 222, 72 L.Ed. 507 involving facts similar to those in the present case and wherein in each case the proximity rule was applied and it was held that the injury was compensable. In the Bountiful Bride Company case the 'Court said: "The present case, though it comes nearer the border line, falls within the principle of the Parramore Case. Since the only way of access to1 its brickyard from the east was across the railway tracts, the company necessarily contemplated the crossing of them by its employees. No definite line of travel being indicated by the company or followed by the employees, who, with the company's full knowledge and acquiescence, habitually crossed wherever they saw fit, it results that, however the crossing was made, the risk thereby incurred was reasonably incidental to the employment and became annexed as an implied term thereof." See also Jones v. Louisiana Central Lumber Co., 2 La.App. 260; Ward v. Standard Lumber Co., 4 La.App. 89; LeBlanc v. Ohio Oil Co., 7 La.App. 721, and Guient v. Mathieson Chemical Works, Inc., La.App., 41 So.2d 493.
Counsel for defendant contends that the case at bar can be distinguished from the cited cases on two grounds; one, that the evidence shows that the decedent was discharged from his friend's automobile at 10:45 and that the accident happened at 11:20 and that therefore he was clearly loitering at the time of the accident and the case is thereby removed from the proximity rule, and, two, that the only hazard the decedent had to surmount was to cross the railroad at the gravel road and that having done so, the subsequent hazard of walking on the railroad right of way, which was not necessary, was assumed by the decedent, citing the case of Walker v. Lykes Brothers-Ripley S. S. Co., Inc., La.App., 166 So. 624.
With reference to the first point relied upon by the defendant, it is very true that Holley, the man who took decedent to the point where he began to walk to' his employment, stated that he discharged him at 10:45 and the preponderance of the evidence is to the effect that he was struck by the train at about 11:20 p. m. It is argued by the defendant that since the decedent spent thirty-five minutes between the point of discharge and the point where he was to enter his employer's premises, a distance of only 313 feet, it is evident that he could not have been walking toward his place of employment all of that time and that it should therefore be concluded that he had been loitering or had turned aside to other acts which were not connected with his employment. As stated by the trial judge, such an argument, of course, is based on the assumption that Holley's estimate of the time when decedent left his car and started walking toward-the mill is correct.
The evidence further shows that after the accident, decedent's lunch enclosed in a paper bag, a package of cigarettes, a thermos bottle and a pint of whiskey about half full were found in the middle of the main line of the railroad trade all together and not scattered; that none of these articles were broken or damaged in any manner. The defendant argues that this evidence is further proof that the decedent had stopped and placed these items on the ground before the accident occurred and that therefore he was not en route bo his place of employment.
(1) In so far as the time element is concerned, as stated above, the contention of defendant is based wholly on the estimate made by the witness Holley and obviously the trial judge, who had the opportunity of seeing and hearing Holley on the witness stand, did not place too much reliance on that estimate. It is noted from reading Holley's testimony that he is not exactly logical. He states that he left the decedent's home at 10:10 and stopped only once on his way to the destination' and that was at the bus station at De Quincy where they merely partook of a soft drink and then proceeded to the destination. In other words, according to> him, it took thirty-five minutes to travel from the home of decedent, a distance of about eight miles and to take one soft drink. There is one place in his testimony, upon being questioned, as to the time that decedent was discharged. He states, "About a quarter of eleven. He was a little late." (Emphasis supplied). The fact that the pint of whiskey found on the track was half empty, combined with the apparent uncertainty as to the time element on the part of the witness Holley, raises a reasonable supposition that the drinks indulged in by him and decedent were not soft drinks and it is common knowledge that alcoholic stimulation makes it difficult for a person to make correct estimates, especially of time.
As to the presence of the various articles on the middle of the tracks, it seems impossible to make any accurate conclusion with reference thereto. The defendant surmises that the decedent was necessarily loitering or else these articles would have been scattered at the time of the accident. It can just as well be surmised that upon seeing the approaching train the decedent placed his articles in a position of safety and that thereafter tried to remove himself from his precarious posi-tion and in doing so slipped across the rail and as a result the wheels of the train ran over his legs. It is fundamental that the compensation law should be interpreted liberally by the courts in favor of an injured employee. In this case there is no question that when the decedent alighted from the car of witness Holley he did so with a sincere intention of proceeding to his work along the route which he usually followed and that he did start on that route and was injured while traveling thereon. It does not seem reasonable to believe, ini spite of the peculiar circumstances set forth, that decedent would have been loitering on the railroad right of way, for had he desired to loiter he could have found a much more desirable place to do so. To accuse him of loitering, under the. circumstances involved, would require a strict, instead of liberal interpretation of the compensation law.
The second contention of defendant, to the effect that the decedent had surmounted the only obstacle on his route to his employment, to-wit, crossing of the railroad tracks at the gravel road, in our opinion, does not require lengthly discussion. It is clearly shown by the evidence that neither decedent nor the other employees had ever been instructed to use the gravel road exclusively or not to use the railroad right of way. It is also clearly shown that the decedent used the railroad right of way as often, if not oftener, than the gravel road to the knowledge of his foreman; that he did so for the simple reason that it was shorter and a more convenient route to his particular place of employment. Moreover, it is not shown by the evidence that the gravel road was any less hazardous than the railroad right of way. On the first, an employee on foot was subjected to the hazards of motor vehicles and on the second he was subjected to oncoming trains and it is testified that upon seeing an approaching train a person could place himself in a position of safety.
As set forth by the trial judge and contended by counsel for plaintiff, the case of Walker v. Lykes Brothers does not appear to be apposite to the case at bar. In the Walker case the plaintiff had left his place of employment and had crossed a roadway which he had to cross .to a place of safety. He then proceeded approximately 1200 feet away from his employer's premises and at said point again reentered the roadway and while in the roadway was struck by a vehicle. As.set forth herein in the case at bar, the deceased had not surmounted the obstacle or hazard but as the trial judge found was actually in the process of surmounting the hazard at the time of sustaining his fatal injuries. We feel that defendant's contention is therefore untenable.
For these reasons, our final conclusion is that the trial court committed no manifest error in his findings of fact and we fully agree with his conclusion that this case comes within the proximity rule.
Therefore, the judgment is affirmed.