Case Name: Addison Curtis Bond, Resp't, v. Charles Brewster, App'lt
Court: New York Court of Common Pleas
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1890-04-07
Citations: 30 N.Y. St. Rep. 658
Docket Number: 
Parties: Addison Curtis Bond, Resp’t, v. Charles Brewster, App’lt.
Judges: 
Reporter: New York State Reporter
Volume: 30
Pages: 658–663

Head Matter:
Addison Curtis Bond, Resp’t, v. Charles Brewster, App’lt.
(New York Common Pleas,
General Term,
Filed April 7, 1890.)
1. Slander—Words alleged must be proved.
In actions for slander the words complained of must he proved as laid. Proof of words to the same effect is not sufficient.
2. Same.
The complaint alleged that defendant said of plaintiff to an officer of the company hy which the latter was employed, in answer to a question, “We have'not paid him any commissions. We have lent him money which he has not repaid; we have done printing for him for which no charge has been made;” that the words were accompanied hy inflections of the voice, glances, gestures, etc., showing the ironical sense of the words, and that the meaning was that said loan and services were in fact commissions; and that in consequence plaintiff was discharged. The evidence was that defendant confessed that he had told the officer that plaintiff had exacted a commission or equivalent words,and the officer testified that defendant said he had done a little work for plaintiff and loaned him money which he had never paid. There was no proof of the alleged inflections of voice, gestures, etc. Held, that there was a total absence of proof to support the cause of action.
(Dalt, J., dissents.)
Appeal by defendant from a judgment of this court, entered upon the verdict of a jury for $500 in favor of plaintiff.
This is an action for slander. The alleged slanderous words ■set forth, in the complaint are that defendant said of plaintiff: “We have not paid him any commissions. We have lent him money which he has not repaid; we have done printing for him for which no charge has been made.” It is further alleged in said complaint that said words were spoken in answer to an inquiry as to whether commissions had. been paid by defendant to plaintiff, and that the words above quoted were accompanied with “ certain inflections of voice, glances, gestures and movements, indicating the ironical sense of , the words, * * * and explaining the true meaning of the language used to be that the said loan and services were, in fact, payments as commissions or rewards.” At the time when these alleged words were uttered plaintiff was in the employ of the Waterbury Watch Company, and it is charged that such conversation took place between defendant and an officer or agent of said company, and that the result thereof was that plaintiff was discharged from his position. ' x
George W. Miller, for app’lt; Charles De Mart Brower, forresp’t.

Opinion:
Larkemore, Oh. J.
It is well settled that in actions for slander the words complained of "must be proved as laid," and that it is not sufficient to prove equivalent language. " Words to the same-effect are not the same words. The plaintiff need not prove all the words on the record; yet he must prove so much of them as will be sufficient to sustain his cause of action." 2 Phillips on Evidence, 97, quoted with approval in Fox v. Vanderbeck, 5 Cowen, 513. This same rule was applied in Olmsted v. Miller, 1 Wend., 506, which was a case in which special damage was alleged, the words declared upon not being actionable per se. I cannot discover that the principle established by the early cases has ever been departed from or seriously modified. These authorities are cited apparently with approval in Lynde v. Johnson, 39 Hun, 12.
The evidence offered before plaintiff originally rested was insufficient to prove the alleged slanderous words " as laid." Such evidence consisted entirely of plaintiff's own testimony, and was to the effect that he called on defendant and said: " I understand that you have told Mr. Merritt that I had exacted a commission from you, and you know it is false and I don't understand why you should make it; " and that defendant confessed that he had used this language or its equivalent, and apologized for what he had said.
The only thing, therefore, offered, in chief, in support of the action was an alleged admission of defendant that he had uttered something entirely different in phraseology from what was charged in the complaint. Indeed, plaintiff himself testified that he did not state in what manner the commission was claimed to have been given. There was, therefore, down to the time of the motion to dismiss at the close of plaintiff's case, a failure of proof to' support the cause of action.
The trial judge, however, refused a non-suit, and defendant was examined; and, after he had rested, Mr. Merritt, the gentleman with whom the conversation took place, was called in rebuttal. I fail to find even in his evidence sufficient to make out, with what had gone before, a prima facie case. Be said that defendant told him: " We have done a little work for Mr. Bond, and loaned him money, which he has never paid; " but he failed to show anything tending to support the innuendo relied on. There is no proof of the alleged ironical inflections of voice, glances, gestures and movements. There is nothing to indicate that these words wTere not spoken in their ordinary sense, with no intention that any different meaning should be drawn from them. The court directed the witness to state the whole conversation, and the only material thing added was that Mr. Brewster said he did not expect to be paid for the work done or money loaned. As far as we can judge from the evidence, as it appears in print, the natural impression for a fair-minded man to draw from the whole interview was that the defendant did not intend to convey the idea that the printing and money loaned were in lieu of reward or commissions for business influenced in defendant's favor by plaintiff. Certainly, the evidence falls short of .affirmatively proving an intent of slander. The whole gist of this action is not in the words, which of themselves were innocent, but in an alleged something emanating from defendant in addition to and accompanying the words. Even if Mr. Merritt got an erroneous impression, there is nothing to show that any utterance or action of defendant is responsible for it. When he called upon the defendant he was evidently prejudiced against plaintiff by statements that had been made to him by Mr. Thompson. If the words uttered by defendant were colored in Mr. Merritt's mind by Thompson's previous charges, certainly •defendant should not be held liable for the unjust imputation, unless he himself said or did something by which he intended, directly or by innuendo, to slander the plaintiff, or from which such imputation might fairly be inferred. The case is barren of any evidence of this kind; and for the reason that there was a total absence of proof to support the cause of action the complaint should have been dismissed, and the judgment appealed from .should be reversed, with costs.
Bischoff, J., concurs.