Case Name: Douglass vs. Morford and Terrel
Court: Tennessee Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Tennessee
Decision Date: 1834-08
Citations: 7 Yer. 79
Docket Number: 
Parties: Douglass vs. Morford and Terrel.
Judges: 
Reporter: Tennessee Reports
Volume: 15
Pages: 79–81

Head Matter:
Douglass vs. Morford and Terrel.
Where an administrator has a right to sue, as such; he has the consequent right to revive and continue a suit commenced in the lifetime of the intestate.
A sued B in trover; judgment was rendered in favor of B, and an appeal in the nature of a writ of error was prosecuted by A to the supreme court. Whilst the writ of error was pending in the supreme court, A died: Held, that it could be revived by his administrator.
This was an action of trover, brought by Douglass against Morford and Terrel for the conversion of a slave alleged by the plaintiff ip be his property. A verdict was returned for the defendants, Morford and Terrel; upon which judgment was rendered in the circuit court. From this judgment Douglass prosecuted an appeal in the nature of a writ of error to the supreme court. Whilst the cause was pending in the supreme court, Douglass died, and a motion was made by Ins administrator to revive the suit in his name. The motion was resisted by the counsel of the defendants.
jjf. Taul, for plaintiff in error.
By the act of 1785^ ch. 2, sec. 2, (1 Scott, 331) it is provided, “that no appeal in any cause or court whatsoever, shall be abated by the death of either plaintiff or defendant, but may be proceeded on by the application of the heirs, executors, administrators or assigns of either party. This act was re-enacted in 1794, by ch. 1, sec. 64, 1 Scott, 480. By ch. 1, sec. 1, of the act of 1784, (1 Scott, 368) it is provided, “that in future it shall and may be lawful for the heirs, executors or guardians to carry on every suit or action in court after the death of either plaintiff or defendant,” &c. From the general terms used in the above statutes, it might with much propriety be contended, that the maxim of the common law, that personal actions did with the person, is no longer in force. “No appeal iii any cause or court shall be abated,” &c. Again, “it shall be lawful for the heirs, executors or guardians to carry on “every suit or action in court, after the death of* dither plaintiff or defendant,” &c.
I had indeed supposed that at this day it would not seriously be insisted, that if a person^ “goods” are damnified, and he dies, that the right of action dies with him. It cannot be so.
An executof is entitled, pursuant to the statute of 4 Ed. Ill, ch. 7, tb h compensation iii damages for a trespass committed on the testator’s goods in his lifetime. Vidi Toller’s Law of Executors, 158-9.
And in general an executor has a right to compensation, whenever the testator’s personajfestate has been damnified, and the wrong remains unredressed at the time of his death. Toller, 159-60, 431 to 444: Vide 3 Bacon’s Ab. Title, Executors, and Administrators, page 9/7, (page 2) &c.
At page 98, the distinction between injuries by the testator, and to the testator, and the reason for it, is clearly drawn.
The case of Glass and Jones vs. Littlefield, &c. re ported in 3 Yerger’s Reports, is a case where the dé-fendant, not the plaintiff, had died. I understand the act of assembly before referred to, to mean, that in all cases where the action could be maintained by an executor or administrator, if one had not been brought by the testator or intestate in his life time, if suit shall have been brought, and the plaintiff dies, it may be revived.
Rucks, contra,
insisted that according to the true construction of the acts of 17S5, sec. 2, 1794, ch. 1, sec. 64, and 1784, ch. 1, sec. 1, this suit could not be revived.

Opinion:
Cateow, Ch. J.
delivered the opinion of the court.
Douglass sued Morford and Terrel in trover for a negro slave, and there was judgment for the defendants. Douglass appealed in error to the supreme court, and since the last term has died; and it is now moved to revive the appeal and suit, in the name of the administrator of Douglass; which is resisted.
By the 4 Edw. III, ch. 7, the administrator of Douglass has the right to sue for and recover in trover for a conversion of the goods of the intestate in his lifetime. 1 Chit. Pl. 57, 58: Toller 158-9. And by the act of 1786, ch. 14, sec. 1, the administrator is authorized to carry on the suit after the death of the plaintiff on application; and by the acts of 1785, ch. 2, sec. 2, and 1794, chapter I, section 63, the administrator is authorized to proceed with the appeal. Where the administrator has the right of action', we hold he has the consequent right to revive and continue the suit commenced in the life time of the intestate. The motion to revive is therefore sustained..
Motion sustained.