Case Name: Bennie SLOCUM, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Odell LAMARTINIERE, Defendant-Appellee
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1979-03-07
Citations: 369 So. 2d 201
Docket Number: No. 6850
Parties: Bennie SLOCUM, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Odell LAMARTINIERE, Defendant-Appellee.
Judges: Before WATSON, GUIDRY, CUTRER, STOKER and DOUCET, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 369
Pages: 201–210

Head Matter:
Bennie SLOCUM, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Odell LAMARTINIERE, Defendant-Appellee.
No. 6850.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Third Circuit.
March 7, 1979.
Concurring Opinion March 8, 1979.
Dissenting Opinion March 13, 1979.
Rehearing Denied April 19, 1979.
Guidry and Doucet, JJ., voted for rehearing.
Boatner & Luke, R. H. Luke, Bunkie, for plaintiff-appellant.
Gravel, Roy & Burnes, Chris J. Roy, Alexandria, for defendant-appellee.
Before WATSON, GUIDRY, CUTRER, STOKER and DOUCET, JJ.

Opinion:
WATSON, Judge.
This is a suit to recover workmen's compensation benefits. Defendant, Odell La-martiniere, a grocer for thirty-two years, undertook the construction of a new grocery store and engaged plaintiff, Bennie Slocum, a carpenter, to perform all of the necessary carpentry work. On January 4, 1977, plaintiff was injured in a fall from a ladder and filed suit against defendant for permanent partial disability benefits. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of defendant Lamartiniere and plaintiff has appealed.
The facts are uncomplicated:
It is undisputed that plaintiff spent his work time in manual labor. He was assisted by his son, Lynn Slocum. Both were paid by check each Friday: plaintiff earned $7 an hour and his son $6. The construction materials were ordered and paid for by defendant Lamartiniere who selected the grade of materials desired. (TR. 53). Slocum paid for his own tools and transportation. Defendant had also engaged Ted La-borde to do the electrical work on the new store, Raymond Blanchard to do the plumbing; and a bricklayer to do the brick work. Slocum testified that he had been hired by the hour to do whatever Lamartiniere wanted done. (TR. 82). His work for La-martiniere was identical to the work he had done for general contractors. (TR. 62).
When the new store was completed, defendant Lamartiniere moved his business into it with no interruption of grocery store activity.
The liability issue is whether Slocum's work was part of Lamartiniere's trade, business or occupation.
CONTENTIONS OF THE PARTIES
The parties have argued this case twice, both times taking the position that Slocum was an independent contractor. We are not certain that their appreciation of Slocum's status is correct, but in any event, the question is whether the construction of the grocery store was part of Lamartiniere's trade, business or occupation.
Counsel for defendant says that his client is a grocer and that the construction work in which Slocum was engaged formed no part of Lamartiniere's grocery "business." Therefore, according to defendant's counsel, Lamartiniere owes Slocum no compensation benefits.
Counsel for plaintiff argues that, either (1) building a new grocery store is part of a grocer's business or (2) when defendant began building the new store he became not only a grocer but a building contractor, and under either alternative, Lamartiniere is liable to Slocum for compensation benefits.
LIABILITY
A person rendering services for another is presumed to be an employee. LSA-R.S. 23:1044. Slocum could be regarded as an employee under these circumstances. See Thomas v. Holland, 345 So.2d 1000 (La.App. 2 Cir. 1977). If Slocum is regarded as an independent contractor, doing manual labor, rather than an employee, he would be covered under the provisions of the compensation act unless otherwise exempted. LSA-R.S. 23:1021(5). LSA-R.S. 23:1035 and LSA-R.S. 23:1061 provide that the services rendered by an employee or independent contractor must be "in the course of" or "part of" the employer's "trade, business or occupation." In Lushute v. Diesi, 354 So.2d 179 (La., 1978) the Louisiana Supreme Court held that such work must be a "necessary," rather than incidental, part of the business. 354 So.2d 183. Lushute concluded that air conditioning is not an essential part of a restaurant business. However, a building is an essential part of a grocery store; Lushute is not controlling here. Defendant Lamartiniere had determined that his business required a' new building, and this decision was his to make, not ours.
Clearly, Lamartiniere was not building his new store as a hobby. Whether the building be regarded as a continuation of the grocery business or a venture into the construction business, it was a commercial enterprise in every respect and those employed for the labor are covered by the compensation act. Speed v. Page, 222 La. 529, 62 So.2d 824 (1952); Doss v. American Ventures, Inc., 261 La. 920, 261 So.2d 615 (1972). Here, as in Doss, Lamartiniere undertook to contract the construction of his new store and could be considered engaged in a second trade or business as a contractor. It is well established that an individual may be engaged in more than one trade or business. Broussard v. Adams, 270 So.2d 913 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1972); Evans v. Naihaus, 326 So.2d 601 (La.App. 4 Cir. 1976).
The trial court was clearly wrong in deciding that Slocum's employment by La-martiniere was not a part of the latter's trade, business or occupation.
BENEFITS
The medical evidence is contained in the deposition of Dr. Douglas Gamburg, an or-thopaedic surgeon of Alexandria. He described plaintiff's injury as a comminuted fracture of the upper humerus. He assigned 10% partial permanent disability of the "shoulder" or "upper extremity." (TR. 33). Plaintiff's brief states that the parties agree that he has 10% partial permanent impairment of the "shoulder" and that the medical expenses totaled $328 as of trial.
The compensation act does not include "shoulder" as a body part so we will consider the loss referable to Dr. Gamburg's other description, the "upper extremity" or arm, the loss of which is compensable for 200 weeks. LSA-R.S. 2S:1221(4)(f).
The award of compensation is as provided by LSA-R.S. 23:1221(4)(o), 10% of weekly benefits for 200 weeks, but this amount must be increased to the 20% minimum of LSA-R.S. 23:1202.
Plaintiff's compensation rate is alleged to be $130 per week and this has not been disputed by defendant. The award, therefore, is $26 for 200 weeks.
Plaintiff's demand for penalties and attorney's fees is without merit and is denied.
DECREE
It is ordered, adjudged and decreed that there be judgment herein in favor of Bennie Slocum, plaintiff, and against Odell La-martiniere, defendant, for weekly compensation benefits in the amount of $26 per week payable weekly beginning January 4, 1977, for a period of 200 weeks, together with legal interest on all past due payments from due date until paid, and for medical expenses in the amount of $328 plus any other medical expenses legally due.
Costs of all proceedings at trial and on appeal are taxed against defendant.
REVERSED AND RENDERED.
STOKER, J., concurs and assigns written reasons.
DOUCET, J., dissents and assigns written reasons.
GUIDRY, J., dissents for the reasons assigned by DOUCET, J.
. LSA-R.S. 23:1044
"A person rendering service for another in any trades, businesses or occupations covered by this Chapter is presumed to be an employee under this Chapter."
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. LSA-R.S. 23:1021(5)
" 'Independent contractor' means any person who renders service, other than manual labor, for a specified recompense for a specified result either as a unit or as a whole, under the control of his principal as to results of his work only, and not as to the means by which such result is accomplished, and are expressly excluded from the provisions of this Chapter unless a substantial part of the work time of an independent contractor is spent in manual labor by him in carrying out the terms of the contract, in which case the independent contractor is expressly covered by the provisions of this Chapter."
.The opinion states that this is a factual issue but reversed a contrary factual determination by the trier of fact, which had been affirmed by this court. The nature of the manifest error is not specified.