Case Name: In re Determination of WATER RIGHTS OF WILLOW CREEK. WILLOW RIVER WATER USERS ASSOCIATION et al. v. ORCHARDS WATER COMPANY et al.
Court: Oregon Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Oregon
Decision Date: 1925-05-26
Citations: 119 Or. 155
Docket Number: 
Parties: In re Determination of WATER RIGHTS OF WILLOW CREEK. WILLOW RIVER WATER USERS ASSOCIATION et al. v. ORCHARDS WATER COMPANY et al.
Judges: Mr. Justice Belt, not having heard the argument, took no part in this decision.
Reporter: Oregon Reports
Volume: 119
Pages: 155–210

Head Matter:
Argued at Pendleton, October 2, 1924,
motion to dismiss denied and decree modified, May 26,
rehearing denied and decree modified July 14,
mandate issued August 3,
motion to recall mandate filed August 10,
motion denied and decree modified September 15,
mandate as amended issued September 24,
motion to recall mandate filed October 3,
motion allowed and mandate corrected and issued November 30, 1925.
In re Determination of WATER RIGHTS OF WILLOW CREEK. WILLOW RIVER WATER USERS ASSOCIATION et al. v. ORCHARDS WATER COMPANY et al.
(236 Pac. 487; 236 Pac. 763; 237 Pac. 682; 239 Pac. 123.)
For appellant Willow River Water Users Association there was a brief over the name of Messrs. Nichols, Hallock & Donald, with an oral argument by Mr. James H. Nichols.
For cross-appellants W. B. Eaton et ah, there was a brief and oral argument by Mr. P. J. Gallagher.
For cross-appellant Emory Cole there was a brief and oral argument by Mr. G. M. Crandall.
For respondent Orchards Water Company there was a brief over the names of Messrs. Davis & Lytle, Messrs. Cake & Cake and Mr. L. A. Liljeqvist.
For respondents Moline Farms Company and G. J. Magenheimer there was a brief over the name of Mr. George E. Davis.

Opinion:
COSHOW, J.
As appears from the statement of the claim of the Water Users Association, it is a voluntary association organized for the protection of its members, but without a legal entity as such. It is not a corporation.
"In the absence of an enabling statute, a voluntary association cannot be sued by its association name. It has no legal existence, and the persons composing it must be joined individually." Kimball v. Lower Columbia Fire Assn., 67 Or. 249, 252 (135 Pac. 877).
The initial pleading of the Water Users Association in this proceeding is the paper denominated: "Protest, Statement and Proof of Claim of the Members of Willow Eiver Water Users Association." In this statement the names of all the members appear. The association does not appear as a legal entity, but the members thereof are all named and their claims separately stated. The Water Users Association not being satisfied with the findings of the Water Board, appealed to the Circuit Court. In this appeal the names of all the members of the association are again set out in their exceptions to the rulings. Thereafter, in all' of the various steps taken in this suit, the members of the association are referred to as the Willow Eiver Water Users Association as a matter of convenience. That is certain which can be made certain. By referring to the transcript, the names of the members of the association are readily ascertainable. There cannot possibly be any confusion resulting from the use of the name Willow Eiver Water Users Association. All the parties to this litigation are familiar with the names of those composing the association. No defect in tlie notice of appeal is mentioned or pointed ont by the respondents moving to dismiss, excepting that the names of the members of this association are not all set ont in the notice. No question is raised about the validity of the service of the notice of appeal. The notice of appeal contains the name of the court, the title of the cause, and is addressed to all the parties to the litigation excepting the appellants, the members of the Willow River Water Users Association. It has been frequently held by this court that the transcript may be used to determine the sufficiency of the notice of appeal where it is ambiguous or defective: Lee v. Gram, 105 Or. 49 (196 Pac. 373, 209 Pac. 474, 27 A. L. R. 1001).
A notice of appeal was given to all of the adverse parties and was legally served. A transcript was filed in this court within the time limited by statute. The court, therefore, has jurisdiction of the cause. The notice is not void. It may be doubted that it is even defective. But if it be conceded to be defective, the defect is cured by reference to the transcript. No litigant could possibly have been misled by the notice, and no party to the record can in any way be prejudiced thereby. The objection to the notice, because of the omission of the names of the individuals composing the Willow River Water Users Association, is not well taken. It contains sufficient to identify the appellants as parties in the litigation: In re Waters of Chewaucan River, 89 Or. 659, 667 (171 Pac. 402, 175 Pac. 421).
Another reason assigned for dismissing the appeal of the Water Users Association is that several of the members of appellant association are dead. It appears from the affidavit of Mr. Bridwell, which is not controverted in that respect, that the members of the Water Users Association are distributed over a. large part of the United States. The affidavit of Mr. Cake, in support of the motion to dismiss, recites that Prank Buchanan and Charles J. King, members of said Water Users Association, died some time prior to the date the decree appealed from was entered in the Circuit Court. No mention of that fact was made in the Circuit Court. It may be that the attorneys for the Water Users Association had no knowledge of that event. There is nothing in the record that indicates that knowledge of the death of these parties, both of whom lived in-the state of Ohio, was known to the attorneys for the appellant Water Users Association. The fact that two members of the association died during the pendency of the litigation would not deprive the other members of the association from proceeding in the trial. That fact does not deprive this court of the jurisdiction of the cause.
We express no opinion as to what disposition may be made of the interest of the heirs at law' or beneficiaries of the estate of said deceasd members. It does appear from the affidavit of Mr. Cake, which is not controverted in that regard, that M. A. Buchanan was the sole heir at law and widow of the said Prank Buchanan and had conveyed all of her interest in the property involved in this controversy. To whom she conveyed that property is not mentioned. The same state of facts exists as to the heirs at law of the said Charles A. King. It appears that the interest of both of the said decedents is now owned by some other party and that the conveyance was made prior to the rendering and entering of the decree in the Circuit Court in this cause.
The affidavit of Mr. Cake does not set out the time when he became familiar with the facts set up in his affidavit, but it was his duty to have called the attention of the Circuit Court to the death of the parties, before the decree appealed from was entered, if he had knowledge of it then, so that substitution could have been made. In any event, the death of these two parties would not deprive the other forty-two members of the association of the right of appeal: Young's Estate, 59 Or. 348, 360 (116 Pac. 95, 116 Pac. 1060, Ann. Cas. 1913B, 1310).
This litigation is in the nature of a proceeding in rem. The subject matter of the suit is the adjudication of the inchoate water rights of Willow River and its tributaries. All the parties interested in adjudicating that inchoate right are necessary parties to the appeal: In re Willow Creek, 74 Or. 592 (144 Pac. 505, 146 Pac. 475); In re Waters of Chewaucan River, 89 Or. 659 (171 Pac. 402, 175 Pac. 421).
All of the parties to the proceeding who appeared were duly served in the instant case with notices of appeal. Believing as we do, that the notices of appeal given by the Water Users Association substantially complies with every requirement of the statute for taking appeals to this court, we hold it sufficient and that the death of the two parties pending litigation does not deprive the other members of the association of the benefit of the appeal.
A further objection made was that several other members of the association transferred their interest in the subject matter pending the litigation. This, of itself, does not require even a substitution, much less does it deprive this court of jurisdiction: Medynski v. Theiss, 36 Or. 397 (59 Pac. 871).
The undertaking on appeal in this case is signed Willow River Water Users Association, by Charles L. Woodard, President; Attest: A. B. Cox, Secretary. It is not necessary for the appellant to sign the undertaking on appeal: O'Connor v. Towey, 70 Or. 399, 401 (140 Pac. 625). No objection is made to the surety on the undertaking, consequently, the undertaking is sufficient.
The motion to dismiss the appeal of W. B. Eaton et al., while not expressed in the same language,, is based upon the same defect, to wit: That the names of the members of the Water Users Association are not named in the notice of appeal. The motion to dismiss is made by the same respondents who moved to dismiss the appeal of the Water Users Association. That association is not complaining nor attacking in any way the notice of appeal given by W. B. Eaton and others. The notice names the Water Users Association in the same language in which it is designated in the decree of the Circuit Court. We have only to look to the transcript to find the names of the members of that association. Service was made of the notice of appeal exactly as it would have been made, no doubt, in case the names of all the members of said association had been embodied in the notice of appeal, because all of the members of that association appeared by the same firm of attorneys, and service was made upon the association by serving its attorneys of record. It is true, as was so aptly said by Chief Justice Bijenett, September, 1922, in Lee v. Gram, 105 Or. 49, 53 (196 Pac. 373, 27 A. L. R. 1001), that—
"As the Supreme Court is a court of limited jurisdiction, a party desiring to app'eal must at his peril frame the papers necessary to his appeal as required by the statute; for 'not otherwise,' in the language of Section 548, can this court acquire authority to decide the questions involved in an appeal. The party appealing must himself without aid from this court supply the documents necessary to his appeal. Being without jurisdiction until he does so, we cannot reach out an aiding hand and help him into court."
It is necessary that the notice of appeal must be complete in itself. We repeat, that is certain which can be made certain. Applying that maxim of equity, we are of the opinion that the notice of appeal duly given and served by W. B. Eaton et al., is sufficient. As was said by Mr. Chief Justice McBride in Oxman v. Baker County, 115 Or. 436 (234 Pac. 799, 236 Pac. 1040): "It is not the policy of the courts to seek occasion to dismiss appeals upon merely technical grounds."
This language of Mr. Chief Justice McBride is particularly applicable to the notices of appeal moved against in this litigation. The reason assigned for dismissing the appeal is very technical. No one could have been misled by the language of the notices even if we concede the notices to be defective. Buie 23, of this court, prescribes:
"All motions must be filed within ten days after a party or his attorney obtains knowledge of an alleged failure of the adverse party' or his attorney to comply with the requirements of the statute or with the rules of this court and unless so filed all defects, except objections to the jurisdiction of the court, will be taken as waived by the moving party." 100 Or. 752; Iltz v. Krieger, 104 Or. 59 (202 Pac. 409, 206 Pac. 550).
The first of the three notices to dismiss was not filed until more than a year after the respondents obtained knowledge of the alleged defect in the notice of appeal.
In our opinion the defects in the notices were not jursidictional and, therefore, the motion to dismiss came too late. Our conclusion is fortified by • the express provision of our statute, Section 5745, Or. L., which contains the following language:
"At any time prior to the hearing provided for in section 5743, Oregon Laws, as in this act amended, any party or parties jointly interested may file exceptions in writing to such, findings and order of determination, or any part or parts thereof, which exceptions shall state with a reasonable degree of certainty the grounds of the exceptions and shall specify the particular paragraphs or parts of such findings and order excepted to."
There are other provisions in the Water Code clearly indicating the intention of the legislature to provide for those whose interests are joint to unite in the proceedings instituted to determine relative water rights. There can he no doubt that the appellants are jointly interested in the water system though their lands are held in severalty. What we have said regarding the motion to dismiss the appeal of W. B. Eaton et al., applies with equal force to the motion to dismiss the appeal of Emory Cole. All of the motions to dismiss the appeal are denied.