Case Name: STATE of Louisiana In the Interest of the Minor Senedra Madrell BARTEE
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1984-02-13
Citations: 446 So. 2d 512
Docket Number: No. CA-1244
Parties: STATE of Louisiana In the Interest of the Minor Senedra Madrell BARTEE.
Judges: Before LOBRANO, BYRNES and WILLIAMS, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 446
Pages: 512–522

Head Matter:
STATE of Louisiana In the Interest of the Minor Senedra Madrell BARTEE.
No. CA-1244.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fourth Circuit.
Feb. 13, 1984.
Rehearing Denied March 21, 1984.
Writ Denied May 11, 1984.
Lee W. Rand, Max Zelden, Zelden & Zel-den, New Orleans, for plaintiff/appellant.
Roger R. Roy, New Orleans, for defendant/appellee.
Before LOBRANO, BYRNES and WILLIAMS, JJ.
. At the time of writing there are no reported cases citing Matter of Harrell or Wheat v. Street.

Opinion:
LOBRANO, Judge.
The sole issue in this appeal is whether or not La.R.S. 9:403 allows an individual, (other than a State agency or officer of the Court) to institute proceedings to have a child declared legally abandoned. The facts of this case are as follows:
On or about February 9, 1983, Mrs. Mabel Barley (maternal grandmother of the minor child) executed and filed into the record of the Orleans Parish Juvenile Court an affidavit of abandonment alleging that George Bartee, father of the minor child, Senedra Madrill Bartee, had not seen, contributed to the support of or in any way exercised parental rights with respect to that minor child since on or before January 11, 1976. In her affidavit Mrs. Barley alleged that the minor had resided with her since February 12, 1975. She sought an order declaring her to be legally abandoned by her father George Bartee. The child's mother died in November of 1982.
On the day of trial, June 20, 1983, respondent appellee, George Bartee filed a Motion to Dismiss alleging that the abandonment proceeding was not instituted in accordance with La.R.S. 9:403(B) in that the proceedings were not brought by the State. The trial judge granted the motion without a hearing declaring that Mrs. Barley in her capacity as a private person was without standing to bring the abandonment proceeding. This appeal followed.
Appellant contends that despite the wording of La.R.S. 9:403(B) , the juvenile court was in error for not following this Court's holding in State in the Interest of Banks, 392 So.2d 497 (La.App. 4th Cir.1980). Banks held that an individual could institute abandonment proceedings pursuant to La.R.S. 9:403, and that the plenary authority of the Court permitted a finding that the child was in fact abandoned. Prior to the Banks decision, this Court traditionally held that private persons could not bring abandonment proceedings. In the Interest of Jackson, 312 So.2d 912 (La.App. 4th Cir.1975); In Re State in Interest of Fischbein, 194 So.2d 388 (La.App. 4th Cir.1967); In Re Meir's Adoption, 169 So.2d 583 (La.App. 4th Cir.1964). Our brethren of the First Circuit also follow the pre-Banks approach in interpreting La.R.S. 9:403. Wheat v. Street, 428 So.2d 930 (La.App. 1st Cir.1983); In the Matter of Harrell, 413 So.2d 1346 (La.App. 1st Cir.1982); In Re Allain, 407 So.2d 767 (La.App. 1st Cir.1981).
Although we can fully understand the equities of allowing a private individual to institute abandonment proceedings, especially under factual situations such as those set forth in Banks, supra, we still cannot ignore the plain language of La.R.S. 9:403(B). The abandonment statute is replete with language which clearly shows that the legislature intended that all such procedures be brought by and handled through the State. It sets forth the procedures to be taken by the department when a parent cannot be located, and it instructs the department to report its findings to the Court, and allows for necessary delays for good cause. See footnote 1, supra.
Clearly the legislature is the proper body to correct the abandonment statute and not the Court. We do feel that under certain circumstances a private individual should be allowed to institute abandonment proceedings, however .we cannot authorize such actions. We interpret, not legislate.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court, and in so doing we reverse the holding of State in the Interest of Banks, supra.
AFFIRMED.
. La.R.S. 9:403(B) provides:
"B. An affidavit may be made by an agency, or an officer of the court, before the judge or clerk of the juvenile court having jurisdiction over the child setting forth in general terms the facts constituting abandonment and the place or residence of the parent of the child if known to the deponent. The judge shall then by order fix a time and place for the hearing of this matter not less than sixty days after the date of the order. If the parent of the child resides within the state, notice of the hearing shall be served upon the parent as in civil proceedings, at least thirty days prior to the date fixed for hearing which and if the residence of the parent be out of state, notice of the hearing shall be sent by the clerk of court to the parent by registered mail, if his address be shown in the affidavit, at least thirty days prior to the hearing. If the parent resides out of the state or cannot be served in the state within ten days after the issuance of process, the court shall appoint an attorney at law as curator ad hoc and legal representative of the parent, and notice of the hearing shall be served upon the curator ad hoc. The curator ad hoc shall make a diligent effort to locate the parent. In the event that the curator ad hoc shall fail to locate the parent within twenty days to notify him of the pendency of the proceedings, he shall report his failure to the court whereupon the court shall then direct the department by mail or otherwise to make a diligent effort to locate the parent and inform him of the pendency of the proceedings. The department shall report its findings in writing to the court on or before the date fixed by the court which shall not be less than twenty days from service of notice. The department may ask for a further delay which may be granted for good cause. Proceedings insofar as the parent are concerned shall be had contradictorily with the curator ad hoc and be of full force and legal effect against the parent. The date of the hearing may be continued from time to time by the judge for good cause, upon such notice to parties as he may determine.
. In compliance with this court's internal rule the question of overruling Banks has been submitted to the entire court, a majority of which join in the overruling, with GULOTTA, SCHOTT, GARRISON and CIACCIO, JJ., dissenting. GARRISON, J., assigns reasons.