Case Name: Steven FINN, Appellant v. STATE of Mississippi, Appellee
Court: Mississippi Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Mississippi
Decision Date: 2007-06-26
Citations: 979 So. 2d 1
Docket Number: No. 2006-CA-00393-COA
Parties: Steven FINN, Appellant v. STATE of Mississippi, Appellee.
Judges: Before KING, C.J., IRVING and ROBERTS, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 979
Pages: 1–6

Head Matter:
Steven FINN, Appellant v. STATE of Mississippi, Appellee.
No. 2006-CA-00393-COA.
Court of Appeals of Mississippi.
June 26, 2007.
Rehearing Denied Oct. 23, 2007.
John Carl Helmert, attorney for appellant.
Office of the Attorney General by Deirdre McCrory, attorney for appellee.
Before KING, C.J., IRVING and ROBERTS, JJ.

Opinion:
KING, C.J., for the Court.
¶ 1. Steven Finn appeals the Lee County Circuit Court's decision denying his post-conviction relief motion. On appeal, Finn argues that he is serving an illegal sentence because his underlying conduct had not been declared criminal by the appropriate statute. Finding error in the trial court's denial of post-conviction relief, we reverse and render.
FACTS
¶ 2. On February 7, 2004, Steven Finn was indicted by a Lee County grand jury for the unlawful possession of pseu-doephedrine in a quantity greater than fifteen grams, and where he knew or should have known that the pseudoephed-rine would be used to unlawfully manufacture a controlled substance, in violation of the Uniform Controlled Substance Act of the State of Mississippi, Mississippi Code Annotated Sections 41-29-101 to -187 (Rev.2005). Finn possessed 180 commercially manufactured and unaltered tablets of pseudoephedrine at the time of his arrest.
¶ 3. On July 7, 2005, the circuit court conducted a guilty plea and sentencing hearing. At the hearing, Finn pled guilty and the court sentenced him to five years in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections with three of those years suspended.
¶ 4. Finn filed his petition for post-conviction relief on August 16, 2005. He argued that his sentence was illegal because the specific statute he was charged under, Miss.Code Ann Section 41 — 29—313(2)(c)(ii) (Rev.2006), does not criminalize the possession of greater than fifteen grams of pseudoephedrine if the pseudoephedrine is solely in dosage form. The trial court ordered the State to file a written response to the post-conviction motion. The State responded by asserting Section 41-29-313 grants prosecutors discretion in the unit of measurement used to prosecute the pseudoephedrine possession, whether in grams or tablets. The circuit court, after reviewing both Finn's motion and the State's response, found that Finn had been sufficiently informed of his rights and the consequences of entering a guilty plea. The court agreed with the State's position and summarily dismissed Finn's motion for post-conviction relief without addressing the legal application of Section 41-29-313. On March 8, 2006, Finn filed his notice of appeal of the circuit court's decision.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶ 5. This Court will not disturb a trial court's factual findings in its decision to deny a petition for post-conviction relief unless the findings are clearly erroneous. King v. State, 936 So.2d 481, 485(¶ 13) (Miss.Ct.App.2006). However, where questions of law exist, the review is de novo. White v. State, 940 So.2d 958, 960(¶ 7) (Miss.Ct.App.2006). The issue before this Court is one of law.
ANALYSIS
Whether the trial court erred in dismissing Finn's post-conviction relief motion.
¶ 6. Finn asserts that the trial court erred in dismissing his post-conviction relief motion because he is serving an illegal sentence. Finn was charged with unlawful possession of pseudoephedrine under Section 41-29-313(2)(e)(i), which reads as follows:
It is unlawful for any person to purchase, possess, transfer or distribute two hundred fifty (250) dosage units or fifteen (15) grams in weight (dosage units and weight as defined in Section 41-29-139) of pseudoephedrine or ephedrine, knowing, or under circumstances where one reasonably should know, that the pseudoephedrine or ephedrine will be used to unlawfully manufacture a controlled substance.
¶ 7. At issue is in this case is whether Section 41-29-313 grants prosecutors discretion in determining the measurement units (either dosage units or weight in grams) that are used to prosecute pseu-doephedrine possession cases or whether, as Finn asserts, there is a statutory preference for prosecutors to use particular measurement units.
¶ 8. Finn was arrested while in possession of one hundred eighty unaltered tablets of pseudoephedrine. After Finn's arrest, the Tupelo (Mississippi) Crime Lab analyzed the drugs and concluded that one hundred twenty tablets of the pseu-doephedrine weighed 18.05 grams and the remaining sixty tablets of the pseu-doephedrine weighed 37.52 grams. The total weight of the drugs was 55.57 grams. Finn's possession of one hundred eighty tablets falls below Section 41-29-313(2)(c)(i)'s prohibition of possessing two hundred fifty dosage units but above the prohibition of possessing fifteen grams in weight. The State charged Finn with possession of greater than fifty-five grams. The State argues that it is within the discretion of the prosecutors as to whether the State will use dosage units or weight in grams in prosecuting defendants who unlawfully possess pseudoephedrine.
¶ 9. This is a case of first impression in the State of Mississippi. The Court bears in mind that criminal statutes must be strictly construed, and any ambiguous interpretations must be resolved in favor of leniency. United States v. Enmons, 410 U.S. 396, 411, 93 S.Ct. 1007, 35 L.Ed.2d 379 (1973).
¶ 10. This Court finds that the legislative intent in Section 41-29-313 is clear and unambiguous. The law criminalizes the unlawful purchase, possession, transfer, or distribution of "two hundred fifty (250) dosage units or fifteen (15) grams in weight (dosage unit and weight as defined in Section 41-29-139) of pseu-doephedrine or ephedrine.... "
¶ 11. The statute's interpretation turns on the definition of the measuring units "dosage unit and weight." Section 41-29-139(c) (Rev.2006) defines dosage units and weight, in pertinent part, as the following:
"Dosage unit (d.u.)" means a tablet or capsule, or in the case of a liquid solution, one (1) milliliter. In the case of lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD) the term, "dosage unit" means a stamp, square, dot, microdot, tablet, or capsule of a controlled substance. For any controlled substance that does not fall within the definition of the term "dosage unit, " the penalties shall be based upon the weight of the controlled substance. (emphasis added).
The legislature has established that dosage units are to be considered the standard form of measuring unlawful possession of pseudoephedrine or ephedrine. The weight of the drug is considered a default measurement for those cases where the drug is not found in a "dosage unit" form.
¶ 12. The State asserts that Section 41-29-313 clearly allows prosecutors discretion as to how to charge defendants under the statute. Prosecutors are generally afforded discretion regarding a range of decisions, such as what charges to file against defendants and whether or not to prosecute a defendant at all. Watts v. State, 717 So.2d 314, 320(¶ 14) (Miss.1998). Section 41-29-313, however, does not provide any discretionary privileges to prosecutors concerning the unit of measurement that should be used in prosecuting these drug cases.
¶ 13. It is well-settled law that a defendant's right to be free from an illegal sentence is a fundamental right. Alexander v. State, 879 So.2d 512, 514-15(¶ 9) (Miss.Ct.App.2004). The trial court erred in denying Finn's post-conviction relief motion. Finn has sufficiently proved, by the preponderance of the evidence, that he is entitled to post-conviction relief. McClendon v. State, 539 So.2d 1375, 1377 (Miss.1989). In the interest of justice, this Court is required to act accordingly, and reverse and render the trial court's decision that denied Finn's post-conviction relief request.
¶ 14. THE JUDGMENT OF THE LEE COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT DENYING POST-CONVICTION RELIEF IS REVERSED AND RENDERED. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO LEE COUNTY.
MYERS, P.J., CHANDLER, ISHEE, ROBERTS AND CARLTON, JJ" CONCUR. IRVING, J., DISSENTS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION JOINED BY LEE, P.J., GRIFFIS AND BARNES, JJ.