Case Name: Burnham, Appellee, v. Cleveland Clinic et al., Appellants
Court: Supreme Court of Ohio
Jurisdiction: Ohio
Decision Date: 2016-12-07
Citations: 151 Ohio St. 3d 356
Docket Number: No. 2015-1127
Parties: Burnham, Appellee, v. Cleveland Clinic et al., Appellants.
Judges: O’Connor, C.J., and O’Neill, J., concur.
Reporter: Ohio State Reports, Third Service
Volume: 151
Pages: 356–377

Head Matter:
Burnham, Appellee, v. Cleveland Clinic et al., Appellants.
2016-Ohio-8000.]
(No. 2015-1127
Submitted May 4, 2016
Decided December 7, 2016.)

Opinion:
Lanzinger, J.
{¶ 1} We accepted this discretionary appeal to resolve whether an order compelling the production of documents allegedly protected by the attorney-client privilege is a final, appealable order under R.C. 2505.02(B)(4). We also accepted review to clarify our holding regarding privilege, the attorney-work-product doctrine, and R.C. 2505.02(B)(4)(b) in Smith v. Chen, 142 Ohio St.3d 411, 2015-Ohio-1480, 31 N.E.3d 633.
{¶ 2} We hold that an order requiring the production of information protected by the attorney-client privilege causes harm and prejudice that inherently cannot be meaningfully or effectively remedied by a later appeal. Thus, a discovery order that is alleged to breach the confidentiality guaranteed by the attorney-client privilege satisfies R.C. 2505.02(B)(4)(b) and is a final, appealable order that is potentially subject to immediate review. Other discovery protections that do not involve common-law, constitutional, or statutory guarantees of confidentiality, such as the attorney-work-product doctrine, may require a showing under R.C. 2505.02(B)(4)(b) beyond the mere statement that the matter is privileged. Our holding in Chen is limited to the latter context.
{¶ 3} Because appellants, the Cleveland Clinic and Cleveland Clinic Health System ("Clinic"), have plausibly alleged that the attorney-client privilege would be breached by disclosure of the requested materials, the order compelling the disclosure is a final, appealable order. Contrary to the dissent's view, we are not characterizing the requested material as being covered by the attorney-client privilege but are merely requiring appellate review of the trial court's decision. We therefore reverse the dismissal of the appeal and remand to the court of appeals to determine whether the trial court erred in ordering the incident report released.
Background
{¶ 4} In March 2014, appellee, Darlene Burnham, brought a personal-injury action against the Clinic and certain Clinic employees. She alleged that she had slipped and fallen in her sister's hospital room at the Clinic in July 2012. Allegedly, an employee had poured liquid on the floor and had failed to warn Burnham of the hazardous condition.
{¶ 5} During discovery, Burnham requested identification of any person who had made statements or reports about her accident and copies of any written statements or reports. Although the employee involved was identified, neither party could locate her for deposition. Burnham also requested an incident report that she learned had been created. But the Clinic alleged that the report was not discoverable because it was shielded by various discovery protections, including the attorney-client privilege.
{¶ 6} Burnham filed a motion to compel discovery. The trial court ordered the Clinic to provide Burnham with a privilege log and directed the parties to brief the issue of privilege. Included with the Clinic's privilege log, filed under seal, was a copy of the report and an affidavit from the Clinic's deputy chief legal officer averring that the report had been generated as part of its protocol to notify the Clinic's legal department of events that might be the basis for legal action. After reviewing the parties' briefs and the privilege log, the court concluded that Burnham's motion to compel should be granted. The court ordered the Clinic to produce the July 2012 incident report.
{¶ 7} The Clinic appealed to the Eighth District Court of Appeals, arguing that the incident report was protected by the attorney-client privilege and was not discoverable. The Eighth District dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, citing Smith v. Chen, 142 Ohio St.3d 411, 2015-Ohio-1480, 31 N.E.3d 633. The appellate court held that there was no final, appealable order to review because the Clinic had faded to affirmatively establish that there would be prejudice resulting from disclosure of the incident report sufficient to satisfy R.C. 2505.02(B)(4). 2015-Ohio-2044, 2015 WL 3421460, ¶ 13.
{¶ 8} We accepted the appeal on one proposition of law: "An order requiring production of privileged documents, conversations or other materials is a final, appealable order pursuant to R.C. 2505.02(B)(4), thereby conferring jurisdiction over the issue to the court of appeals under Article TV, Section 3(B)(2)." 144 Ohio St.3d 1425, 2015-Ohio-5225, 42 N.E.3d 762.
Legal Analysis
{¶ 9} We accepted jurisdiction to clarify Chen, a case that reviewed R.C. 2505.02(B)(4)(b) to determine whether a discovery order involving attorney work product was final and appealable. As some confusion seems to exist over the breadth of that decision, we limit it solely to its facts. We see no need to overrule the case altogether despite the impassioned arguments within the lengthy concurring opinion.
{¶ 10} Here, the Clinic asserts that its report is protected under the attorney-client privilege and that an order requiring disclosure should be reviewable immediately. R.C. 2505.02(B) states that an order is final and reviewable when it is:
(4) An order that grants or denies a provisional remedy and both of the following apply:
(a) The order in effect determines the action with respect to the provisional remedy and prevents a judgment in the action in favor of the appealing party with respect to the provisional remedy.
(b) The appealing party would not be afforded a meaningful or effective remedy by an appeal following final judgment as to all proceedings, issues, claims, and parties in the action.
A provisional remedy is defined as "a proceeding ancillary to an action, including, but not limited to discovery of privileged matter." R.C. 2505.02(A)(3).
{¶ 11} Chen, although considering the same statutory language, involved only the attorney-work-product doctrine rather than the attorney-client privilege and does not determine the outcome here.
Smith v. Chen
{¶ 12} In a medical-malpractice action brought by Henry Smith against Dr. Ying Chen and OrthoNeuro (collectively "Chen"), the trial court ordered Chen to disclose a video-surveillance recording that his attorney had prepared for use as impeachment evidence at trial. Smith v. Chen, Franklin C.P. No. 10 CV 18058, 2012 WL 11966963 (Dec. 5, 2012). Chen had claimed that the video was privileged as attorney work product pursuant to Civ.R. 26(B)(3), which allows discovery of the opposing party's attorney work product "only upon a showing of good cause." The trial court found the plaintiff to have shown good cause because the risk to Smith of surprise and unfairness during trial outweighed Chen's interest in nondisclosure prior to trial.
{¶ 13} The Tenth District Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's order. While acknowledging that discovery orders are interlocutory and therefore generally not final and appealable, it held that it had appellate jurisdiction over discovery orders involving privilege. Smith v. Chen, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 12AP-1027, 2013-Ohio-4931, 2013 WL 5972391, ¶ 10. The court of appeals stated that because the attorney-work-product doctrine is a "qualified privilege," an order for the disclosure of attorney work product is final and appealable. Id. at ¶ 11.
{¶ 14} We initially accepted discretionary review to decide whether an order compelling production of surveillance video created only for impeachment purposes violates the attorney-work-product doctrine of Civ.R. 26(B)(3). 138 Ohio St.3d 1447, 2014-Ohio-1182, 5 N.E.3d 666. We later ordered the parties to show cause why the matter should not have been dismissed for lack of a final, appealable order pursuant to R.C. 2505.02. 141 Ohio St.3d 1461, 2015-Ohio-370, 24 N.E.3d 1180. In his response, Chen merely repeated the appellate court's observation regarding qualified privileges. We concluded that Chen had failed to satisfy R.C. 2505.02(B)(4)(b), which requires an appellant to establish that he " "would not be afforded a meaningful or effective remedy by an appeal following final judgment as to all proceedings, issues, claims, and parties in the action.' " Chen, 142 Ohio St.3d 411, 2015-Ohio-1480, 31 N.E.3d 633, at ¶ 5, quoting R.C. 2505.02(B)(4). We noted:
This ruling does not adopt a new rule, nor does it make an appeal from an order compelling disclosure of privileged material more difficult to maintain. An order compelling disclosure of privileged material that would truly render a postjudgment appeal meaningless or ineffective may still be considered on an immediate appeal.
(Emphasis sic.) Id. at ¶ 9. This language concerning "privilege" may seem to extend to all discovery orders. However, we emphasized that Chen involved a failure to respond to the issue being adjudicated:
Dr. Chen and OrthoNeuro have never argued, much less established, that they would not be afforded a meaningful or effective remedy through an appeal after a final judgment is entered by the trial court resolving the entire case. They did not address the issue in any of their briefs here or in the court of appeals. The only reference to the statute defining final, appealable order that Dr. Chen and OrthoNeuro make is in their docketing statement filed in the court of appeals, in which the statute is listed as a statute requiring interpretation or application on appeal. Notably, Dr. Chen and OrthoNeuro again failed to address the requirement in R.C. 2505.02(B)(4)(b) after this court ordered them to show cause why this matter should not be dismissed for lack of a final, appealable order.
Chen at ¶ 6.
{¶ 15} In addition to the explicitly limited nature of our holding in Chen, differences between the attorney-client privilege and the attorney-work-product doctrine make clear why Chen does not control the outcome of this case. The attorney-client privilege and the attorney-work-product doctrine provide different levels of protection over distinct interests, meaning that orders forcing disclosure in these two types of discovery disputes do not necessarily have the same result that allows an immediate appeal.
Attorney-client privilege v. work product
{¶ 16} The concurring justices would have us overrule Chen and treat the attorney-work-product doctrine and attorney-client privilege the same. But the attorney-client privilege and the attorney-work-product doctrine do not share the same origins or occupy the same provisions of statutory or common law. The main purpose behind the attorney-client privilege is to promote " 'full and frank communication between attorneys and their clients and thereby promote broader public interests in the observance of law and the administration of justice.' " Boone v. Vanliner Ins. Co., 91 Ohio St.3d 209, 210, 744 N.E.2d 154 (2001), fn. 2, quoting Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389, 101 S.Ct. 677, 66 L.Ed.2d 584 (1981). On the other hand, "[t]he purpose of the work-product doctrine is 'to prevent an attorney from taking undue advantage of his adversary's industry or efforts.' " Id., quoting Civ.R. 26(A)(2). Although both the attorney-client privilege and the work-product doctrine might often apply to the same material, the protections do not overlap completely. See In re Election of Nov. 6, 1990 for Office of Atty. Gen. of Ohio, 57 Ohio St.3d 614, 615, 567 N.E.2d 243 (1991).
{¶ 17} The attorney-client privilege is one of the oldest privileges recognized in the common law. Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399, 403, 118 S.Ct. 2081, 141 L.Ed.2d 379 (1998). In Ohio, the testimonial privilege is governed by R.C. 2317.02, which prohibits attorneys from revealing communications that a client made to an attorney. The privilege belongs to the client, and unless a waiver or other exception causes the privilege to not apply, it offers full protection from discovery. R.C. 2317.02(A); Civ.R. 26(B)(1).
{¶ 18} By contrast, an attorney's work product is not included among the privileges protected by R.C. 2317.02 or the common law. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 508, 67 S.Ct. 385, 91 L.Ed. 451 (1947) (the protections of attorney-client privilege do not extend to an attorney's work or information collected). In Ohio, protection for an attorney's work product is codified in Civ.R. 26, which notably recognizes work product as separate from privileged matters. See Civ.R. 26(B)(6) (differentiating between privilege and protection of trial-preparation material). See also 1980 Staff Note, Evid. R. 501 (attorney work product is not governed by privilege rules, as held in Hickman). The protection belongs to the attorney, but Civ.R. 26(B)(6) allows the protection to be removed by an opposing party's demonstration of a need for the materials. Jackson v. Greger, 110 Ohio St.3d 488, 2006-Ohio-4968, 854 N.E.2d 487, paragraph two of the syllabus and ¶ 16; Civ.R. 26(B)(3). Thus, the common law and judicial rules recognize the attorney-work-product doctrine as a rule that may provide protection from discovery.
{¶ 19} We have long recognized that the protection against discovery of matters identified as "privileged" in Civ.R. 26(B)(1) is limited to those derived from a specific constitutional or statutory provision. State ex rel. Grandview Hosp. & Med. Ctr. v. Gorman, 51 Ohio St.3d 94, 95, 554 N.E.2d 1297 (1990), citing In re Story, 159 Ohio St. 144, 147, 111 N.E.2d 385 (1953). Although not technically a privilege in the strict sense, the attorney-work-product doctrine is frequently called a privilege in the popular sense. See, e.g., United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 239, 95 S.Ct. 2160, 45 L.Ed.2d 141 (1975); Squire, Sanders & Dempsey, L.L.P. v. Givaudan Flavors Corp., 127 Ohio St.3d 161, 2010-Ohio-4469, 937 N.E.2d 533, ¶ 55; Chen, 142 Ohio St.3d 411, 2015-Ohio-1480, 31 N.E.3d 633, at ¶ 9. Using "privilege" as shorthand for the attorney-work-product doctrine can be useful in many contexts when it promotes conceptual simplicity. But the use of "privilege" as shorthand does not cause an attorney's work product to be on the same footing as a client's substantive right to confidentiality.
Interlocutory appeal of discovery orders
{¶ 20} To show that an order for a provisional remedy such as the discovery of privileged or protected materials is final and appealable, R.C. 2505.02(B)(4)(a) requires a showing that the order determines the privilege issue and prevents a judgment in favor of the appellant regarding that issue, while R.C. 2505.02(B)(4)(b) requires a showing that the harm caused by the privilege-related discovery order cannot be meaningfully or effectively remedied by an appeal after final judgment. See State v. Muncie, 91 Ohio St.3d 440, 446, 746 N.E.2d 1092 (2001).
{¶ 21} Any order compelling the production of privileged or protected materials certainly satisfies R.C. 2505.02(B)(4)(a) because it would be impossible to later obtain a judgment denying the motion to compel disclosure if the party has already disclosed the materials. But the irreversible nature of the order alone does not satisfy R.C. 2505.02(B)(4)(b), which requires consideration of whether an appeal after judgment can rectify the damage of an erroneous trial-court ruling. Muncie at 451. Given the differing interests and protections of the attorney-client privilege and the attorney-work-product doctrine, the damage that needs to be rectified and the need for immediate appeal may differ as well.
{¶ 22} R.C. 2505.02(B)(4)(b) recognizes that in certain situations, the need for immediate review outweighs the substantial interest in avoiding piecemeal litigation. This recognition has its roots in Amato v. Gen. Motors Corp., 67 Ohio St.2d 258, 423 N.E.2d 452 (1981), overruled by Polikoff v. Adam, 67 Ohio St.3d 100, 616 N.E.2d 213 (1993), syllabus. Amato expanded upon the special-proceeding standard now found in R.C. 2505.02(A)(2) and provided a balancing test to determine whether a special proceeding—and thereby a final, appealable order— was involved: "This test weighs the harm to the 'prompt and orderly disposition of litigation/ and the consequent waste of judicial resources, resulting from the allowance of an appeal, with the need for immediate review because appeal after final judgment is not practicable." Amato at 258, quoting Squire v. Guardian Trust Co., 147 Ohio St. 1, 5, 58 N.E.2d 312 (1946).
{¶ 23} Polikoff rejected this balancing test to determine whether a "special proceeding" existed and overruled Amato. Although discovery orders were then held to be interlocutory and not immediately appealable, we noted that it was the General Assembly's prerogative to expand the scope of R.C. 2505.02 to include matters such as discovery orders. Walters v. Enrichment Ctr. of Wishing Well, Inc., 78 Ohio St.3d 118, 122-123, 676 N.E.2d 890 (1997), fn. 2. Shortly after Walters, the legislature amended R.C. 2505.02(B)(4)(b), 1998 Sub.H.B. No. 394, 147 Ohio Laws, Part II, 3277, 3278, to essentially adopt the Amato balancing test. Thus, although Amato and related cases were overruled, the reasoning in those cases provides insight into the application of R.C. 2505.02(B)(4)(b).
{¶ 24} Under the Amato standard, we had held that discovery orders that breached a protected interest in confidentiality were final, appealable orders. Humphry v. Riverside Methodist Hosp., 22 Ohio St.3d 94, 488 N.E.2d 877 (1986) (physician-patient privilege); State v. Port Clinton Fisheries, Inc., 12 Ohio St.3d 114, 465 N.E.2d 865 (1984) (informant confidentiality). The reason for finding an immediate need for review in those cases was that they
implicated underlying privacy or law enforcement interests that extended beyond any particular litigation. While an appellate court could provide some relief after final judgment from the disclosure of such privileged information, such relief could not adequately undo the extrajudicial harm done to those interests by disclosure.
Nelson v. Toledo Oxygen & Equip. Co., Inc., 63 Ohio St.3d 385, 389, 588 N.E.2d 789 (1992). Under the same standard, we determined that an order compelling production of materials allegedly protected by the work-product doctrine under Civ.R. 26(B)(3) was not a final, appealable order. Nelson at syllabus. The reason for finding no need for immediate review in this latter situation was:
Because the work-product exemption protects materials that are peculiarly related to litigation, any harm that might result from the disclosure of those materials will likewise be related to litigation. An appellate court review of such litigation will necessarily be able to provide relief from the erroneous disclosure of work-product materials.
Id. at 389.
{¶ 25} Exposure of the information that is to be protected by attorney-client privilege destroys the confidentiality of possibly highly personal or sensitive information that must be presumed to be unreachable. Taylor v. Sheldon, 172 Ohio St. 118, 121, 173 N.E.2d 892 (1961). We have already recognized that an order compelling production of material covered by the attorney-client privilege is an example of that for which there is no effective remedy other than immediate appeal as contemplated by R.C. 2505.02(B)(4)(b). Muncie, 91 Ohio St.3d at 451, 746 N.E.2d 1092 (2001), citing Cuervo v. Snell, 10th Dist. Franklin Nos. 99AP-1442, 99AP-1443, and 99AP-1458, 2000 WL 1376510 (Sept. 26, 2000).
{¶26} But the same guarantee of confidentiality is not at risk with an attorney's work product. And as we stated in Nelson, any harm from disclosure would likely relate to the case being litigated, meaning that appellate review would more likely provide appropriate relief. Nelson at 389. This is not to say that compelling the disclosure of an attorney's work product pursuant to Civ.R. 26(B)(3) would never satisfy R.C. 2505.02(B)(4)(b) and require an interlocutory appeal. But it does not necessarily involve the inherent, extrajudicial harm involved with a breach of the attorney-client privilege.
Limitation of Chen
{¶ 27} We were unable to explore the relationship between the attorney-work-product doctrine and R.C. 2505.02(B)(4)(b) in Chen despite our request to show cause. We dismissed Chen for lack of a final, appealable order, holding that an appellant must demonstrate that "[a]n order compelling disclosure of privileged material would truly render a postjudgment appeal meaningless or ineffective." (Emphasis sic.) Chen, 142 Ohio St.3d 411, 2015-Ohio-1480, 31 N.E.3d 633, at ¶ 9. Our use of "privilege" in the looser, popular sense seems to have suggested that Chen did create a new rule. But Chen 's actual holding was not broad or expansive, being limited to the attorney-work-product doctrine. We now clarify that Chen did not apply to the attorney-client privilege.
{¶ 28} Finally, because responses to motions to compel may assert various claims of privilege in resisting disclosure of materials, a trial court should explain why a motion to compel production has been granted. In that way, a reviewing court can determine the pertinent issues and whether the requirements of R.C. 2505.02(B)(4)(a) and (b) are satisfied.
{¶ 29} Here, although the trial court's order compelling the disclosure of the Clinic's incident report did not specify why it was rejecting the claim of attorney-client privilege or other protections claimed, it is clear from the briefing that the attorney-client privilege had been rejected and that it was the only remaining discovery protection being sought. Because the Clinic raised a colorable claim that its report was protected by the attorney-client privilege, the court's order compelling disclosure of that report was a final, appealable order.
Conclusion
{¶ 30} An order compelling the production of materials alleged to be protected by the attorney-client privilege is a final, appealable order under R.C. 2505.02(B)(4). Prejudice would be inherent in violating the confidentiality guaranteed by the attorney-client privilege, and therefore, an appeal after final judgment would not provide an adequate remedy. We reverse the judgment of the Eighth District Court of Appeals and remand the cause to that court for consideration of the merits of the Clinic's appeal.
Judgment reversed and cause remanded.
O'Connor, C.J., and O'Neill, J., concur.
Kennedy, J., concurs in judgment only, with an opinion joined by O'Donnell and French, JJ.
Pfeifer, J., dissents, with an opinion.
. This provision of the Ohio Constitution states: "Courts of appeals shall have such jurisdiction as may be provided by law to review and affirm, modify, or reverse judgments or final orders of the courts of record inferior to the court of appeals within the district