Case Name: William BUELL, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1997-06-11
Citations: 704 So. 2d 552
Docket Number: Nos. 96-2289, 96-3132
Parties: William BUELL, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: GLICKSTEIN and GROSS, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 704
Pages: 552–555

Head Matter:
William BUELL, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Nos. 96-2289, 96-3132.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
June 11, 1997.
Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc Denied Dec. 3, 1997.
Richard L. Jorandby, Public Defender, and Steven H. Malone, Assistant Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Carol Cobourn Asbury, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.

Opinion:
PER CURIAM.
Appellant entered a plea which contemplated that he would be sentenced two weeks later. Two times during the plea conference the trial judge told appellant that if he were arrested for committing another crime between the plea conference and the sentencing, then his plea would be an open one; instead of a six-month sentence concurrent to other charges, the court could sentence appellant in its discretion to any sentence within the sentencing guidelines. Neither appellant nor his lawyer objected to this condition; nor did either ask any questions about the condition.
Before the sentencing hearing, appellant was arrested for committing another crime. The trial judge denied appellant's motion to withdraw his plea, noting that the condition of the open plea had been adequately explained at the plea conference.
We reject appellant's assertion that this case is controlled by Green v. State, 680 So.2d 1072 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996). The defendant in Green failed to appear for his sentencing hearing despite a condition of the plea agreement that if he so failed to appear or committed a new offense, then his five-year sentence would be increased to three consecutive 30 year terms. At a later sentencing hearing, the higher sentence was imposed. This court reversed the sentence and remanded for a new sentencing hearing where findings could be made concerning the circumstances of the defendant's arrest while on furlough and whether he violated the condition of his furlough by willfully failing to appear for sentencing. Id. at 1073. Green stands for the proposition that an enhanced sentence for a violation of a condition of a plea agreement must be based on a willful transgression or on evidence that the agreement was breached by out of court conduct, such as the commission of another crime.
Unlike Green, this case does not involve any disagreement about the fact of appellant's commission of another crime before his sentencing. Appellant conceded that he had been arrested and recognized that the new arrest created an open plea.
We also find no error in the trial court's refusal to allow appellant to withdraw his plea, since the potential of sentencing enhancement for the failure to appear was part of the negotiated plea. See Payne v. State, 624 So.2d 815, 816 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993). Although Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.172 requires a trial judge to "verbally engage a defendant who seeks to enter a plea," Lu v. State, 683 So.2d 1110, 1111 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996), nothing in the rule mandates that the trial judge obtain an express, on the record, verbal acknowledgement as to the matters contained in every subsection of the rule, as the dissent contends. Under Rule 3.172(e), the trial judge "shall determine" that the defendant "understands" the various aspects of the plea bargain, including the complete terms of any plea agreement under subsection (7). The trial judge made the necessary determination in this case, based on his face to face contact with appellant and his counsel. Many things happen in a courtroom which do not filter through the. court reporter's ears to the printed page of a transcript. This is why great weight is placed on a trial judge's findings made pursuant to Rule 3.172.
Rule 3.172(i) states that the "[f]ailure to follow any of the procedures of this rule shall not render a plea void absent a showing of prejudice." At the time appellant moved to withdraw his plea, he made no evidentiary showing that the conduct of the plea conference had prejudiced him. Absent such a showing, the trial court did not err in denying appellant's motion to withdraw his plea. Wuornos v. State, 676 So.2d 966, 969 (Fla.1995), cert. denied, —. U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 395, 136 L.Ed.2d 310 (1996).
AFFIRMED.
GLICKSTEIN and GROSS, JJ., concur.
FARMER, J., dissents with opinion.