Case Name: JORDAN et al. v. TOWNSEND et al.
Court: Court of Appeals of Georgia
Jurisdiction: Georgia
Decision Date: 1973-02-23
Citations: 128 Ga. App. 583
Docket Number: 47585
Parties: JORDAN et al. v. TOWNSEND et al.
Judges: Bell, C. J., Pannell, Deen, Evans, and Stolz, JJ, concur. Hall, P. J., and Eberhardt, P. J., dissent. Clark, J., not participating.
Reporter: Georgia Appeals Reports
Volume: 128
Pages: 583–590

Head Matter:
47585.
JORDAN et al. v. TOWNSEND et al.

Opinion:
Quillian, Judge.
This is an appeal by the plaintiffs (appellants) from an order granting a summary judgment in favor of the defendant (appellee), Union Camp Corporation.
Plaintiff Rodney Dewayne Jordan, a minor, his three sisters and his mother and father, brought suit against L. C. Townsend, Willie West and Union Camp Corporation as the result of an automobile wreck. The complaint alleges that Union Camp employed Townsend and West to cut pine trees from Union Camp's land in southeast Georgia and to deliver same to Union Camp's plant in Savannah. On the date of the wreck West was driving a tractor-trailer owned by Townsend and had just completed delivery of a load of pine logs to Union Camp's Savannah Plant, which logs had been cut by Townsend, his agents and servants, including West, from Union Camp's property; and that at the time of the matters complained of defendant West was in and about the business of Union Camp.
Union Camp in its answer neither admitted nor denied the allegations with respect to how the collision occurred, but contended at that time L. C. Townsend was an independent contractor and therefore Union Camp could not be held liable for any negligence of L. C. Townsend or his agents or employees.
Union Camp filed a motion for summary judgment which was supported by affidavits and exhibits. The motion was granted and the case is here for review. Held:
The question for determination is whether or not there were genuine issues of material fact with respect to whether L. C. Townsend was an agent-employee of Union Camp Corporation, or was an independent contractor.
"In determining whether the relationship of the parties under a contract for performance of labor is that of employer and servant or that of employer and independent contractor, the chief test lies in whether the contract gives, or the employer assumes, the right to control the time, manner and method of executing the work as distinguished from the right merely to require certain definite results in conformity to the contract." Hotel Storage, Inc. v. Fesler, 120 Ga. App. 672, 674 (172 SE2d 174, 41 ALR3d 1049).
The employment contract between Union Camp and Townsend was an exhibit filed by the defendant in support of the motion for summary judgment. The contract provided that Union Camp would have no control over the time, method or manner in which Townsend performed timber harvesting services. However, the contract further stated: "Contractor will perform such services with his own employees, labor force, and equipment, or by or through his subcontractors. In so doing, contractor or his subcontractors will observe generally accepted forestry and logging practices and the reasonable rules adopted by owner as applicable to timber harvesting on said timberlands. Owner shall have no control over contractor's, or his subcontractors', methods, employees or equipment or the time of the performance of said contract except as herein provided and contractor, or his subcontractors, will perform each contract by his own methods, except for such written specifications as may be furnished by owner."
This provision of the contract retained in Union Camp the authority to control the manner and method of the harvesting. There were no restrictions on what "reasonable rules" might be adopted by Union Camp or what the rules might consist of. Whether Union Camp did in fact exercise this authority is not material; there need only be the right to control the time, method and manner of executing the work. Old Republic Insurance Co. v. Pruitt, 95 Ga. App. 235 (97 SE2d 521).
Argued October 4, 1972
Decided February 23, 1973
Rehearing denied March 22, 1973
Adams, Adams, Brennan & Gradner, Edward T. Brennan, Richard A. Rominger, for appellants.
Bouhan, Williams & Levy, Leamon R. Holliday, III, for appellees.
The granting of the summary judgment was error.
Judgment reversed.
Bell, C. J., Pannell, Deen, Evans, and Stolz, JJ, concur. Hall, P. J., and Eberhardt, P. J., dissent. Clark, J., not participating.