Case Name: KLAUDER-WELDON DYEING MACHINE CO. v. GILES et al.
Court: United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 1914-03-03
Citations: 212 F. 452
Docket Number: No. 499
Parties: KLAUDER-WELDON DYEING MACHINE CO. v. GILES et al.
Judges: 
Reporter: Federal Reporter
Volume: 212
Pages: 452–452

Head Matter:
KLAUDER-WELDON DYEING MACHINE CO. v. GILES et al.
District Court, D. Massachusetts.
March 3, 1914.
No. 499,
Equity.
Patents (§ 2S3 ) — Suit fob Infringement — Counterclaim.-
New equity rule 30 (33 Sup. Ct. xxvi) does not authorize the defendant in an infringement suit to plead in his answer as a counterclaim a cause of action for infringement of another unrelated patent.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Patents, Cent. Dig. §§ 448-450, 452; Dec. Dig. § 283. ]
In Equity. Suit by the Klauder-Weldon Dyeing Machine Company against John H. Giles and others.
On motion to strike out parts of answer. Sustained in part.
Duell, Warfield & Duell, of New York City, for complainant.
Alfred Wilkinson, of New York City, and Samuel C. Bennett, of Boston, Mass., for defendants.
For other cases see same topic & § number in Dec. & Am. Digs. 1907 to date, & Rep’r Indexes

Opinion:
DODGE, Circuit Judge.
1. If the defendants John H. Giles and John H. Giles Dyeing Machine Company are estopped to deny the validity of the patents sued on because of the assignment of those patents to the plaintiff by the defendant John H. Giles, I do not think that enough appears from the pleadings to warrant the conclusion that the defendant Mason Machine Works was associated with them in the alleged infringing manufacture in such manner or to such extent as to affect it with the same estoppel. The arrangements made by Giles with the Machine Works to build dyeing machines for the Giles Company may or may not have been sufficient for such a conclusion, but merely upon the bill and answer, I cannot say that they were. The motion to strike out the eleventh paragraph of the answer is therefore denied.
2. I am unable to regard the so-called counterclaim set up in paragraph 14 of the answer as within Supreme Court rule 30 (33 Sup. Ct. xxvi). Terry, etc., Co. v. Sturtevant, etc., Co. (D. C.) 204 Fed. 103; Adamson v. Shaler (D. C.) 208 Fed. 566. The motion to strike out so much of the answer as relates to it is therefore granted.