Case Name: The State of Maryland vs. The Cumberland and Pennsylvania Railroad Company
Court: Court of Appeals of Maryland
Jurisdiction: Maryland
Decision Date: 1874-03-05
Citations: 40 Md. 22
Docket Number: 
Parties: The State of Maryland vs. The Cumberland and Pennsylvania Railroad Company.
Judges: 
Reporter: Maryland Reports
Volume: 40
Pages: 22–73

Head Matter:
The State of Maryland vs. The Cumberland and Pennsylvania Railroad Company.
Act of 1872, ch. 274, imposing a Tax upon all Coal mined in the State, and Transported to any place in the State, or elsewhere, for Sale, declared Unconstitutional—Liability of the capital Stock of the Mining Companies of the State to Taxation—Rate of Taxation to be Equal and Uniform.
The Act of 1872, ch. 2Y4 imposing a tax of two cents per ton upon all coal mined in the State and transported by any of the ways enumerated, to any place in the State, or elsewhere, for sale, in so far as it affects to impose the tax upon coal transported from the mines in 'the State to places beyond the State, for sale, is unconstitutional and void, being repugnant to that provision of the Constitution of the United States which declares that “Congress shall have power to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States.1 ’
The Act of 18Y2, ch. 2Y4, is unconstitutional and void, for the further reason that in violation of the I5th Article of the Bill of Rights of the State, it imposes a direct and specific tax on a part of the personal property of the State, without regard to value, uniformity or equality.
The capital stock of the several mining companies of the State is liable to taxation according to a fixed and certain rate; and the stock being the representative of the whole property of the corporation, the payment of the tax on the capital stock exempts from taxation all the property both real and personal of the company. And although the State may elect to tax either the capital stock, or the real and personal property of the company, yet it cannot tax both; and if it elect to tax the real and personal property, and not the stock, such property must be assessed according .to the same equal and uniform rate, in proportion to its value, as all other property in the State, whether owned by individuals or corporations.
It is not competent for the Legislature to discriminate as between the different species of property, and to tax some by one rule, and some by another. All must bear the burthen alike.
Appeal from the Circuit Court for Allegany County.
This was an action of debt instituted by the appellant, in the Circuit Court for Allegany County, to recover from the appellee the sum of $13,488.10, together with the penalty of ten per cent, thereon, for the tax sought to be imposed by the Act of 1872, eh. 274, of two cents per ton upon the coal alleged to have been mined in the State, and received for transportation over the railroad of the appellee to points within tbe State, and elsewhere, for sale, during the months of April, May and June, 1872.
The pleas were never indebted as alleged; and a special pica avowing that the Act of 1872, cli. 274, was, wholly inoperative, unconstitutional, null and void. The State demurred to the special plea. The Court overruled the demurrer and entered judgment thereon for the defendant. The State appealed.
The cause was argued before Bartol O. J., Stewart, Miller, Alvey and Robinson, J., and was afterwards re-argued before Bartol, C. J., Stewart, Bowie, Grason, Miller, Alvey and Robinson, J.
John H. Handy and Attorney General Syester, for tbe appellant.
Two leading objections to tbe Act of 1872, ch. 274, are urged.
1st. That its provisions are in violation of tbe 15tli Article of the Bill of Rights of this State.
2nd. That it is in violation of that provision of section 8 of Article 1, of the Constitution of the United States, which declares that Congress shall have power to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States.
1st. As to the 15th Article of the Bill of Rights, we are told that because certain measures, adopted to ascertain tlic value of all other property liable to taxation, have not been resorted to for the ascertainment of the value of the property taxed in this case, therefore, this tax is laid without regard to, and in violation of, the Bill of Rights on this subject. It is to be noted in the first place, that this tax is in lieu of all other taxation on the entire property and franchises of these companies, and that the appellee has taken no steps to demonstrate, that the property and franchises of the mining companies are valued too high, or that a rate of taxation higher than that applied to other property, has been imposed upon the valuation. The entire objection lies in the fact that there was no assessment, and hence the tax is not uniform, being greater than that laid on other property.
There is nothing in the record, from which this Court can say, that the mining companies are paying more than their just proportion, in support of the Government according to their “actual worth in real and personal property. ’ ’
All this is assumed; and it is assumed for no other reason, than because the Legislature has not adopted the same mode of ascertaining the value of the property of these companies, that is adojjted in reference to other property, and laid the tax according to that valuation. But the answer to all this, is that there is nothing in the Constitution of this State, requiring the Legislature to adopt any one uniform mode of valuation; on the contrary, it may adopt different modes of valuation for different classes of property, and may dispense with all agencies, or tribunals for that purpose; and value the property, and impose the tax directly by legislative Act. “The duty of ascertaining taxable values, and of assessing * * the taxes thereon, necessarily rests in the discretion of the Legislature, and it may perform that duty by its own legislative Acts." * * * The State vs. Sterling, 20 Md., 517.
Indeed, to have construed the 15th Article of the Bill of Rights to mean what is contended for by the appellee in this case, would demolish almost the entire system of taxation in this State.
But it is insisted further by the appellee, that a rate of taxation, has been adopted in respect to this class of property, different from that imposed on other classes of property ; and numerous cases are relied on from other States to establish the proposition, that where different rates of taxation, are applied to different classes of property, the assessment is obnoxious to the constitutional provision, requiring the rate to be uniform, and that the true interpretation of the 15th Article of the Bill of Rights, requires nbt only uniformity in the mode of ascertaing taxable values, but also uniformity of tax rates as to every class of property.
Row it must be remembered, that the power of taxation is inherent and absolute, acknowledging no other limits than those prescribed in the Constitution; that a State may adopt any mode of rating, and any rate of taxation it sees fit, and in the exercise of this acknowledged power may even destroy.
There is nothing in the 15th Article that requires either the mode of assessment, or the rate of taxation to be alike or uniform, as to every species and class of property. The case of Tyson vs. State, 28 Md., 577, when properly considered is decisive of both propositions.
In 28 Md., the subject of the tax on collateral inheritances was considered in its relations, to the very section of the Bill of Rights now before us. The 124th section of Article 81 of the Code, imposes a tax of two and one-half per centum on every hundred dollars of the clear value of the estates, money or securities therein mentioned.
The section singles out a particular class of property, and subjects that property to a rate of taxation, different from all other property in the State. “All estates, real, personal, and mixed, and all securities, money,” &c., mentioned in that section are subjected to this tax, notwith standing the same property is taxed under the assessment and according to the rates levied under the general law.
It results in a double tax on the property. It is a burden on that particular class of property not borne by any other property. And yet it is upheld as being within the jDower of the Legislature, and distinctly declared not to be obnoxious to the 15th Article of the Bill of Rights. It is answered to all this, that it “is a tax on the privilege of talcing.” But the party talcing, pays nothing. The property is taxed; it goes to the donee shorn of so much of its value; it is a tax on the property itself, “all estates * * * shall be subject to a tax” * *. The donee is not considered at all, it is his property, not himself, nor his privilege that is taxed.
But there is nothing in the 15th Article, requiring taxes to be laid on all classes of property according to the same rates. The doctrine of uniformity of taxation has. never been so understood or applied, except under Constitutions expressly requiring that the same method of rating property shall be applied to all classes of property alike. There is nothing like this in the 15th Article, nor any where else in our Constitution. The most that can be said in behalf of this argument is, that the proper interpretation of that Article requires the rate of taxation to be uniform. It is nothing other than the result of a construction of the Article.
But to say that the proper interpretation of the Article is, that taxes shall be laid at a uniform rate on all classes of property, will not helj) the appellee. Something more must be found either expressed, or arising by necessary implication. For the declaration that taxes shall be uniform, has nowhere been held to mean that the same rate of taxation, shall and must be levied on every class of property alike. The requirement of uniformity is gratified by laying the same rates on the same class of property, throughout the taxing district.
Tlie Constitution of the United States requires “that all duties, imposts and excises shall be uniform throughout the United States.” But did it ever occur to any Court, to suppose that this meant that the same -duty, &c., must be laid on every class of property subject to that tax?
The letter and spirit of the clause is gratified, by laying the sa,me duly (or tax,) &c., on the same class of property, and is not violated by laying heavier burdens on one class, and lighter burdens on another.
The idea of uniformity, as contended for by the appellee, and as enforced in the decisions cited and relied on,' never has prevailed in this State; and never can, without impregnating the 15th Article with a meaning that would break up a large and important part of the system of taxation now prevailing. The license system of this State would at once bo destroyed. The merchant is paying more in support of Government, than the “actual worth” of his property would yield under a uniform rate of taxation, as understood and contended for by the appellee. His stock in trade is taxed, according to the usual and general rate. But this very same property is required to yield a specific tax, in addition to that levied under the general assessment.' The license he pays burdens the merchant’s property toiih a double lax. It is no answer to this, that the license is a tax on the business of the merchant. Because such taxation is expressly declared to be a tax on the property employed in the business. Nathan vs. State of Lousiana, 8 Howard, 77 ; Woodruff vs. Parham, 8 Wall., 140.
But we are answered, that such a tax falls within the police power of the State, and is laid with a “political view” for the “ good government and benefit of the community,” within the last clause of the 15th Article. But what police regulations are conserved in taxing the merchandise of a people? The sale of a yard of cloth, or purchase of a pound of sugar, cannot affect the health or morals of a people. These are not habits or practices that tend to evil. The tone of society is not affected in the most distant manner.
The license system of the State applied to merchandise, hears no touch of the police poiuer of the State. The colonization' tax was an instance of a tax laid with a political view. Waters vs. State, 1 Grill, 302. The tax on billiard tables and sales of liquor, &c., are instances of taxes laid with a view to “the good government and benefit of the community,” for these last affect the habits, and to some extent, the peace and morals of the community.
We are told that this tax is “ arbitrary,” and “laid with out regard to value.” The long established policy of the State, the acquiescence of the people in modes of taxation precisely similar in principle and practical effect, cannot be without. their great weight in considering subjects of this character. The license system imposes a double tax on the property of the merchant. The collateral inheritance tax does the same, and conspicuous examples are not wanting in which taxation has been imposed on a particular class of property, at rates having no reference whatever to its value, but expressly referred to an entirely different standard. The tax on slaves is distinctly in point. There was no valuation whatever on that doss of property. The tax was not laid according to any ascertained value, but according to age. Neither was the mode or rate of taxation uniform; for that class of property in Baltimore City was subject to a rate, and standard of taxation wholly different from the same class of property in the counties. Yet for three-quarters of a century this large, and valuable class of property was thus taxed without challenge or question. The tax was arbitrary in the sense applied by the appellee. Neither was it uniform, because it was not laid according to value like other classes of property, and the same class of property was differently taxed in different localities.
The tax in the case at bar, is uniform on the same class of property throughout the State.
It is laid directly by legislative Act, and before this tax is pronounced unconstitutional, it ought to be made to appear that the persons or property taxed are not made to contribute according to their actual worth in real and personal property. What relation the tax here imposed bears to the value of the franchise granted, and the value of the whole of the property of these companies does not appear. It cannot be assumed that the Legislature had not the proper data upon which to act; on the contrary, we are bound to assume that it had such evidence, information, and data before it, as guided its judgment in this particular. The burden of showing the contrary is on the appellee. Waters vs. State, 1 Gill, 302.
It is further contended that the law is void, because it necessarily imposes a double tax.
The Act of 1872, ch. 274, of itself, certainly imposes but a single tax, and that is the tax of two cents per ton. If that tax be a double one, it must be so by reason of some other tax elsewhere imposed by the Legislature, and which it is incumbent on the coal companies to pay irrespective of the'tax imposed by chap. 274. Now, what other tax is there on stock in corporations? None, except that imposed by the Act of 1872, chap. 419, passed on the same day with the Act of 1872, chap. 274. Those Acts then being in pari materia are to be construed together, and being so construed, clearly impose but one tax, at the same time upon the same tax payer. Billingsley vs. State, 14 Md., 376; Dugan vs. Gittings, 3 Gill, 154; Ranoul vs. Griffie, 3 Md., 60.
The tax imposed by the provisions of the first Act, is only to be collected from such companies as may be doing the character of business by that Act described; and the 7th section expressly states, that “the meaning and intent of this Act” is, “that said coal mining companies shall not be taxed at the same time on their production of coal, and also on their capital stock.” Now, if the coal companies act in good faith, how can there be any conflict in the execution of the two laws, taken as parís of the whole legislation on the subject?
Chapter 274, is really but a proviso to chapter 419. Properly read, in view of chapter 274, chapter 419, would be on this wise, “and except coal companies, bona fide working their mines,” &c. If then the coal company is bona fide working its mine, it is not required to make return to the Comptroller of the Treasury, of the amount, &c. of its capital stock, under the provisions of chapter 419. If the Comptroller undertook to proceed against the President, &c. of any such company for failure to do so, under the provisions of the last named Act, the defendant could plead the facts of the case to be, that his company was bona fide working its mines, and paying its taxes under chap. 274, and if the plea were true, then it would be a complete defence, and a flat bar to either criminal or civil proceeding upon the part of the State’s officer.
But it is said the Comptroller must collect the tax on the capital stock of corporations on or before the 1st of July, in each year. Where is the law making any such provision? Those persons bound to pay the taxes are required to settle on that day, but the Comptroller is not bound to pursue them at once for delinquency, either civilly or criminally. In truth, the law presumes that the taxes will not be paid on that day, for by the Act of 1872, ch. 255, passed on the same day, and in pari materia with chapters 274 and 419, a.discount of five per cent, is allowed on State taxes, of “all persons and incorporate institutions,” paid before the 1st of September; four per cent, on all paid before the 1st of October, and three per cent, on all paid before the 1st of November. The Comptroller however, has the power to collect by law the taxes on the capital stock of corporations after the expiration of the current year. In this particular, he has as to corporations generally a discretion as to the time he may allow before proceeding to collect.
Two things are clear:—First. That if the coal companies act honestly, they cannot he compelled to pay a double tax. Secondly. That the Comptroller is not hound to collect the taxes on the capital stock of any corporations on July 1st, of each year-—hut may’ collect them after the expiration of the year, and that if he attempted to collect two taxes, he could he successfully resisted "by the companies.
2nd. The tax is not in violation of the provision of the Constitution of the United States, which ordains, that “Congress shall have power to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States.”
Whether it is treated as a tax on the business, or on the property of these companies, does not vary the principle contended for in this branch of the argument. For whilst such tax does in fact affect inter-State commerce in the distance, yet no discrimination is made against the article intended for extra territorial sale, and in favor of that designed for sale within the State. No case can be found wherein the right of a Slate to tax business or property within its own territory, has ever been denied tdhere no discrimination is made against the commodity received from, or intended for the markets of another State, and that designed for sale within the State.
The right of a State to tax business or property within her territory, has never been surrendered to the Federal Government, except so far as to restrain the States against making discriminations against extra territorial commerce.
Within this limit the legitimate subjects of State taxation arc all property, and every description of business, except the property of the United States, and the instrumentalities of the Federal Government, created to carry out its own laws. Nathan vs. The State of Louisiana, 8 How., 73.
The proposition that a tax on property intended for commerce, hut which lays no burden on that intended for extra territorial markets, greater than is borne by that intended for markets within the State, may be imposed, seems well established. In Hinson vs. Lott, 8 Wall.; 152, the State of Alabama levied a given tax on dealers in whiskey manufactured abroad, and carried into that State and sold. It was insisted that this was in effect a tax on the article carried into the State and sold, and because carried in, and hence a restriction on inter-State commerce. But the State had previously laid the same rate of taxation on dealers in whiskey manufactured within the State, and the tax was therefore maintained.
So too in Woodruff vs. Parham, 8 Wall., 123, the City of Mobile had laid a tax among other things, “ on sales at auction,” and Woodruff, an auctioneer, received and sold at auction, “products of States, other than Alabama, and sold the same in Mobile, in the original and unbroken packages. He was sued 'for the tax, and it was urged, among other objections, to the constitutionality of the tax, that it was a burden on inter-State commerce, and prohibited by the 8th section of Article 1st, of the Constitution of the United States. But in answer to that, the Court say at page 140, “ There is no attempt to discriminate inuriously against the products of other States, or the rights of their citizens, and the case is not, therefore, an attempt to fetter commerce among the States, or to deprive the citizens of other States of any privilege or immunity possessed by citizens of Alabama. But a law having such operation would, in our opinion, be an infringement of the provisions of the Constitution, which relate to those subjects, and therefore void.” If it be sound law that a State may tax the property or business within her borders, making no discrimination against that employed in interstate trade, the Act in question, is constitutional.
The causes which led to the adoption of the section under consideration, and the understanding of those ac- quainter! with the condition of public affairs that prompted it, all concur in demonstrating that it was never intended to restrict the right of taxation in the State, except so far as to restrain it against, measures which discriminated against the commerce and trade of sister States. See Letter 22 of the Federalist.
This is a tax on the property or business, if you chose, of the mining companies, without any discrimination against commodities intended for extra territorial markets. It is none the less a tax on the mining companies, because the transportation companies are made the agents to collect it. It is a tax imposed on the property or business of those required to pay it, and the selection of the transportation companies, as agents to collect the tax, still leaves it a tax to be paid by the mining companies. The State vs. Mayhew, 2 Gill, 487.
It is insisted however by the appellee that the provisions of the Act of 1812, are identical with those of the Pennsylvania Act, declared to be unconstitutional in the case of the State Freight Tax, 15 Wall., 232.
By no rules of construction can the Maryland Act, be understood to be anything other than a tax on the property, or business of the “mining companies of the State,” and they, and they alone, pay the tax, and the transportation companies are the mere agents selected by the State to collect the tax. Not only does the title of the Act so declare, but its ■ substantial provisions import this, and nothing else. The Supreme Court in 1 i)th Wallace did not so interpret the Pennsylvania Act. A majority of that Court held that the Pennsylvania Act imposed the tax, “not on the company” appointed to gather the tax, neither on the mining companies whose produce was carried, “bid upon the freight, carried, and, beca,use carried,.” That the burden rested “ upon the freight transported, or upon the consignor or consignee of the freight imposed, because the freight is transported.” '
And at page 275, they say that a tax upon freight transported from State to State, is a regulation of inter-State transportation, and, therefore, “a regulation of commerce among the States.”
The payment of the tax Avas understood to he a condition, upon which this branch of business was made to depend. 15 Wall., 276. And the “branch of business” spoken of, is understood to be, and described, as “freight transported from State to State. ” It was not understood or construed to he a tax either upon the property or the business of the tranportation companies ; such a tax was held valid in the Gross Receipts Cases, 15 Wall., 284, although it affected the articles of commerce to the same extent as the tax in the Freight Cases. Neither was it interpreted to be a tax on the business or property as such, of the mining companies, or others, whose property was transported. But it was held to be a tax on freight transported from State to State, and because transported. Gross Receipts Cases, 15 Wall., 292. It is true that the consignors or consignees of the freight were the parties charged, but they were charged not because their property was within the State, but because that “property was- transported.” The contribution came from the owner or shipper, because he was sending his property into or out of the State of Pennsylvania. This is regarded as “a regulation of commerce.” These views are very plainly stated in the State Freight Gases; and accentuated and emphasized, in the Gross Receipts Cases, in 15 Wall., where the Court distinguishes the one from the other, whilst in each case, the practical results of the tax are alike.
It is plain, that if the majority of the Court in the State Freight Gases, had agreed with the dissenting Judges, and had interpreted the Act to impose a tax on the property or business of the companies and parties within the State, which were required to pay it, the validity of that law would have been upheld; and it is submitted, that such is the only interpretation that can be placed on the Act of 1872.
The 2nd section forbids any transportation company from receiving for carriage, any coal mined in this State until the tax imposed “shall have been paid by the company, association, or individual mining the same. ’ ’ It 'is a tax imposed on property in the State, to be paid by the persons owning the property, and because it is property, and not on “the business of transportation,” not a tax on “freight carried, because carried;” neither is it a tax on the “consignor, or consignee of the freight, * * * because the freight is transported;” but it is a tax on persons who mine, and own the coal, because the coal, the franchises, and estates of the parties, constitute property in the State, and like any other kind of property and estates, should be made to contribute to the burdens of government.
Julian I. Alexander and John P. Poe, for the appellee.
The Act of 1872, ch. 274 is unconstitutional.
1st. Because it is repugnant to the Constitution of the United States,—and
2nd. Because it is repugnant to the Constitution of the State of Maryland.
1st. It is in plain conflict with that provision of the Federal Constitution, which ordains that “Congress shall have power to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States.” The recent decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of the Pennsylvania Stale Freight Tax, 15 Wallace, 232, reported since the judgment of the Court below, clearly establishes this proposition.
The Pennsylvania State law is almost identical with the Act of 1872. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held it to be constitutional, but the Supreme Court of the United States reversed that decision, and declared that a statute of a State imposing a tax upon freight taken up within the State and carried out of it, or taken up without the State and brought within it, is repugnant to that provision of the Constitution of the United States, which ordains that “Congress shall have power to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the several States, and with, the Indian Tribes.”
By the terms of the Maryland Act, the tax is sought to he levied upon all coal mined and sent to market in this State or elsewhere, and the declaration alleges that the veiy coal upon which this tax is claimed, was received by the appellee upon “its cars for transportation immediately from the mines, out of which it was produced, to sundry points, to wit, in said State and elsewhere.” The decision of the Supreme Court covers this case, and therefore this law should like the Pennsylvania statute, he held to he unconstitutional and void. See Passenger Cases, 7 Howard, 283; License Cases, 5 Howard, 504; Almy vs. State of California, 24 Howard, 169; Woodruff vs. Parham, 8 Wallace, 123.
2nd. It is repugnant to the Constitution of Maryland.
Because in connection with an Act passed at the same session, (1812, ch. 419,) and approved on the same day, a double tax is imposed. By chapter 419, a State tax of nineteen cents on each one hundred dollars in value of the shares of the capital stock of any corporation created by this State, or under its laws, is exacted.
This tax is required to he paid to the Treasurer by these corporations annually, prior to July 1st in each year.
By chapter 214, (the Act under which this suit is brought,) a State tax of two cents per ton upon all coal mined and sent to market in this State or out of it, is attempted to he levied.
This tax the appellee is required to collect from the coal mining companies before it can lawfully receive their coal upon its cars for transportation, and is required also to pay into tlie State treasury, in quarterly payments, on tiie first day of January, April, July and October in each year.
Both these taxes must be paid. They are not substitutional, nor in the alternative, but are cumulative. They are imposed upon the same companies, by laws of equal, co-existing and co-incident obligation passed at the same session, approved by the Governor on the same day, and designed by the Legislature to be alike operative, a reference being in fact made in the 7th section of chapter 274 to the provisions of chapter 419.
Jdie mining companies, therefore, who are required to pay to the appellee, as the involuntary collector designated by the Act, the tax of two cents per ton on all tlie coal they mine and send to market, are likewise required to pay to the Treasurer of the State, a tax of nineteen cents on every hundred dollars of their capital stock, and tliese two taxes being concurrent and levied for tlie same period, and by laws equally operative, necessarily amount to a plain and palpable case of double taxation.
A tax upon the capital stock of a corporation is a tax upon its franchise, and upon all its property, real and personal, because the capital stock is the representative of its franchise, and of all the other property held under it. Gordon vs. Mayor, &c. of Baltimore, 5 Gill, 236; Mayor, &c. of Baltimore vs. Balto. & O. R. R. Co., 6 Gill, 294.
When the shares of stock, therefore, are taxed, the coal in the mines, which that stock represents, is taxed also, and to tax both coal and stock is necessarily to tax the same property twice.
This is clearly prohibited by Art. 15 of our Bill of Rights, “ To tax both the real or personal property and the stock would be a double tax, and therefore illegal and unjust.” Gordon vs. The Mayor, &c. of Baltimore, 5 Gill, 236 ; Stale vs. Sterling, 20 Md., 520.
Eor do the provisions of the 7th section of the Act relieve the case of this difficulty. This section provides “ That whenever it shall appear to the Comptroller, hy the return of the officers of fhe said transporting companies, as aforesaid, that any coal mining company in this State has bona fide worked its mine, and has paid the tax upon the coal mined hy said company, in accordance with the provisions of this Act, the said Comptroller shall issue to the said coal mining company a quietus for State taxes on the capital stock of said coal mining company, for the year in which said payment has been made hy said coal company as aforesaid, it being the meaning and intent of this Act that said coal mining companies shall not he taxed at the same time on their production of coal, and also on their capital stock, hut the tax imposed hy this Act shall, when paid, he a discharge of the State tax on the capital stock of said company so paying as aforesaid.”
The tax of two cents per ton is to he paid from day to day hy the mining companies, as their coal is mined and offered to the appellee for transportation. The tax on the capital stock must he paid hy the first of July in each year. The one is paid from day to day hy the mining companies to the appellee, as the State’s collector. The other is to he paid “to the Treasurer.” Now, as until the end of each 'year, the Comptroller cannot lawfully issue his quietus to the company which shall bona fide work its mine, for the plain reason, that until then he cannot know that it has,' in fact, so worked it, and as the tax on the capital stock must, hy the terms of the law, he due, payable and paid before the quietus can he issued, this provision for such quietus cannot possibly help the case. Of what advantage is a quietus against a tax, which cannot lawfully he issued until after the tax is actually paid?
The Comptroller has no power to dispense with the ex-actions of either law. He must collect from the corporations the tax on their capital stock hy the first of July. He must collect from the appellee the tax of two cents per ton on the coal mined and transported by it, in quarterly payments, on the first day of January, April, July and October.
It is clear, therefore, that under the operation of these two laws two taxes must be paid. The bona, fide working and regular payment of the tax on coal will authorize alike end of the year, a quietus on the tax on the capital stock for the same year, but this last must be paid six mouths before the quietus can be issued, and of course, therefore, before the quietus can be given both taxes will be in the State treasury, from which they cannot be withdrawn, except by means of a law yet to be passed.
By the plain and express provisions of these two laws the same mining companies are required to pay two taxes upon the same property for the same year, under circumstances which make it impossible that the tax which is to be paid first can be refunded or recovered if the whole of the other tax, as levied, should prove to be regularly paid at the stated quarterly periods.
Manifestly, therefore, the taxation is double, and consequently unconstitutional.
This law is also unconstitutional, because it is a specific tax in violation of the 15th Article of the Maryland Bill of Rights.
Equality of taxation, according to the actual worth of the tax payers in real or personal property, is the principle asserted in this article, to which all our legislation must of' necessity conform.
The Legislature cannot lawfully levy taxes for the support of the government upon different classes or species of property, at different rates, without regard to the real values, nor upon one class of property alone. Neither one class of our citizens, nor one species of the property of' our citizens, can be selected as the persons or the property upon whom the burden of taxation can be cast. All the property of all the people must he fairly assessed, and then all this assessed property must he equally taxed. Any other principle would enable the Legislature to collect the whole State tax from the owners of any one description of property, which it might capriciously select, and thus to burden one class of people or one species of property, and exempt another class or a different species altogether.
That the tax imposed by this Act is a special tax on property, must be. conceded; that it is levied for the support of the government is apparent upon the face of the Act and its title ; and that it is destructive of the principle of equality in proportion to actual worth cannot be successfully denied.
It is, therefore, just such a tax as the 15th Article of the Bill of Rights was designed to prohibit. Mayor, &c. of Baltimore vs. Balto. & O. R. R. Co., 6 Gill, 291, 292; State vs. Sterling, 20 Md., 520; Tyson, et al. vs. The State, 28 Md., 581; See also Cooley on Constitutional Limitations, 501, 504, 514; Knowlton vs. Supervisors of Rock Co., 9 Wis., 410; Gilman vs. City of Sheboygan, 2 Black, 510; City of Zanesville vs. Richards, 5 Ohio St. Rep., 589; The People vs. McCreary, 34 Cal., 433; Atty. Gen. vs. Winnebago, &c., Plank R. Co., 11 Wis., 42; Bureau Co. vs. Chicago, &c. R. R. Co., 44 Ills., 229 ; Chicago & N. W. R. W. Co. vs. Boone Co., 44 Ill., 240; Sawyer vs. The City of Alton, 3 Scam., 127; Motz vs. The City of Detroit, 18 Mich., 495 ; State of Nevada vs. Eastabrook, 3 Nevada, 173 ; State of Louisiana vs. Merchants Ins. Co., 12 La. Ann., 802; Adams vs. Mayor, &c. of Somerville, 2 Head, (Tenn.,) 363 ; Crow, et al. vs. The State of Missouri, 14 Missouri, 231; Stevens & Woods vs. State, 2 Ark., 299; Society for Savings vs. Coite, 6 Wall., 594; Provident Institution vs. Massachusetts, 6 Wall., 611; Hamilton Company vs. Mass, 6 Wall., 632.
The collateral inheritance tax is not a tax on property, but is rather the price exacted by the State from the col lateral representatives of a deceased person, for the waiver of its right as a sovereign to possess itself of the property of such deceased person, or as the condition upon which they shall be permitted to inherit it.
Stamp taxes are not a tax upon property within the meaning of the first clause of the 15th Article of -the Bill of Rights. They are merely governmental regulations as to the form of contracts, and 'the nature of the evidence necessary to the admissibility of certain written instruments.
Licenses are not taxes upon property, but are merely the price of a privilege, permission or authority granted by. the State to certain persons or classes of persons to carry on within its borders, certain occupations, business employments, trades or professions. They are police regulations designed primarily for political purposes, and though incidentally sources of revenue, yet are not issued originally with that view. Williams’ Case, 3 Bland, 257.
Neither licenses, stamp duties, excise duties, fines or the collateral inheritance tax can he regarded as furnishing any ground for this tax upon coal—for they all stand upon principles entirely in harmony with the constitutional restriction relied on as prohibitory of this particular tax.

Opinion:
Alvby, J.,
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The only question intended to he presented by this appeal, and which has been argued in this Court, is, whether the Act of the Legislature of 1872, ch. 274, is constitutional or not. All other questions arising on the pleadings have been waived, and the issue of fact disposed of by agreement.
The Act in question, is entitled "An Act to regulate the taxation of Coal Mining Companies in this State, for State purposes."
By the first section it is provided, " That it shall not he lawful for any Coal Mining Company or association in this State, to transport any coal mined in this State, on any railroad, canal, or by any boat or vessel, from any mine in this State, to any place in this State or elsewhere, for sale, until a State tax of two cents per ton of two thousand, two hundred and forty pounds, on said coal, be first paid to the railroad conrpany, canal company, or transportation company, undertaking to transport the same immediately from the said mine, or payment of the same be provided for, to the satisfaction of the said company undertaking to transport the same as aforesaid." And the second section makes it unlawful for any transportation company, doing business in this State, to receive any coal mined in this State for transportation, immediately from the mine out of which the same may be produced, to any point in this State or elsewhere for sale, until the tax of two cents per ton shall be first paid by the party mining the same, to the transportation company; and every transjjortation company receiving coal so mined for transportation, shall be liable to the State for such tax; and it is expressly made the duty of the transportation company transporting the coal, to collect the tax before receiving the coal for transportation.
The third section makes it the duty of the financial officers of the transportation companies, so receiving coal for transportation, to make returns in writing to the Comptroller of the Treasury, within thirty days after the first day of January, April, July and October of every year, stating fully and particularly the number of tons of coal mined in this State, and transported on or over their works, for the three months immediately preceding each of the above mentioned days; and it is made the duty of such transporting companies, at the time of making such returns, to pay into the treasury of the State, the tax so by them required to be collected.
The fourth, fifth and sixth sections provide penalties for failure or neglect by the transportation companies, or their officers, to collect and pay over the tax as directed by the Act, and as to the manner of suing, the extent of recovery, and the enforcement of the judgment.
By the seventh section, it is provided that whenever it shall appear to the Comptroller, by the returns of the officers of the transportation companies, tlmt any coal mining company in this State lias bona Jide worked its mine, and paid the tax upon the coal mined by it, in accordance with the requirement of the Act, the Comptroller shall give such company a discharge for State taxes on its capital stock for the year in which such tax on the coal mined lias been paid; it being declared to be tbe meaning of tbe Act that such mining companies shall not. be taxed at tlie same time on both their production, and their capital stock.
The eighth section clothes the Comptroller with power to examine the officers of the several transportation companies, and other persons, under oath, as to the amount of coal mined and transported, and provides a penalty for refusing to he sworn to give information.
The Act was made to take effect from the day of its passage, and was approved on the 1st of April, 1872.
The present suit was brought under this Act by the State against the appellee, the defendant; the latter being a transportation company, engaged in transporting the coal mined in Allegany Comity, directly and, immediately from the mines, thence to he put in course of transportation to the various markets of the country for sale; the amount in controversy, and for which the action is brought, being the alleged amount of tax on the coal transported by the defendant from the date of the Act, to and including the thirtieth of June, 1872, and the penalty of ten per cent, on the amount of the tax alleged to heulue.
The question of the constitutionality of the Act is raised by a demurrer, and though interposed by tbe State to the second plea of the defendant, it brings before the Court the sufficiency of the declaration as well as the plea.
The declaration discloses upon its face the fact that the claim of the State against the defendant, arises solely under the Act just recited, and hence the question of the validity of the Act is fully presented by the demurrer.
The validity of the Act is called in question upon two distinct grounds ; first, that it is in conflict with the Constitution of the United States; and, secondly, that it is in conflict with the Constitution of this State.
Preliminary to the consideration of these questions, it is proper to say, that the taxing power of the State is of vital importance to it; indeed, so essential is the power, that the very existence of the State dep>ends upon the right to exercise it. All persons and property, therefore, within the jurisdiction of the State are liable to it; and the' power is conferred upon the State for the benefit of the • entire body politic. The power resides in the State as an attribute of its sovereignity, and the right of the Legislature, as the representatives of the people, to exercise it, should never be questioned, except in plain cases, where, the power is relinquished for valid consideration, or where to prevent its abuse, it has been placed under restriction, either as to the subjects liable to it, or the mode and manner of its exercise.
That the State's power of taxation has been restrained and made subject to limitation by the Federal Constitution, as to certain subjects, is clear, and it is equally clear, that, with respect to the mode and manner of exercising the power by the Legislature, it has been restrained by the Constitution of the State.
1. Proceeding then to consider the questions immediately involved in this case, the first is, whether the tax upon coal, imposed by the Act of 1872, chapter 274, is repugnant to, or in violation of that provision of the Constitution of the United States, which declares that " Congress shall have power to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States."
With respect to this question, it is .to be observed that the Act imposes the tax of two cents per ton upon all coal mined in the State, and transported by any of the ways enumerated, to any point in the State or elseiohere, for sale. By the regular course of the coal trade of the State, as is well known as matter of public concern and notoriety, much the larger portion of all the coal mined in this State is transported without change of ownership directly from the mines, either to points beyond the State, or to points within the State, to be shipped for markets beyond the State limits. The Act, however, imposing the tax, makes no discrimination between that portion of the coal that may be transported to places within the State for sale, and that portion transported beyond the State for sale. All coal mined in the State and transported, whether in or beyond the State, is taxed alike.
Of course, it is not pretended that the clause referred to of the Constitution of the United States has any application, or creates any restriction, as to the tax imposed on the coal transported for sale exclusively within the State. The internal commerce of the State is exclusively within her control, and is liable to such taxation as the Legislature may think proper to impose upon it, provided there be no restriction in the State Constitution. But, in regard to the tax now under consideration, it is imposed directly upon the coal transported, and only that transported for sale; and as to all such portion of the coal as may be transported directly from the mines to places or markets beyond the limits of the State for sale, the tax would plainly appear to be an interference with and a restriction on inter-State commerce, and hence in contravention of that provision of the Federal Constitution which gives to Congress the power to regulate commerce among the several States.
Indeed, we are not left to construction or speculation as to this question. It has been recently before the Supreme Court of the United States, and has been there decided in a case so entirely analogous to the present, that we are relieved from doing more than to state the nature and ruling of that case.
The case referred to is that of The Reading R. Co. vs. State of Pennsylvania, 15 Wall., 232. There the Act of the' State of Pennsylvania inrposing the tax, contained many of the provisions that are found in the Act now under consideration. The Pennsylvania Act required the officers of the transportation companies of that State, to make returns to the auditor-general of the number of tons of freight carried over, through, or upon the works of such companies, for the three months immediately preceding the first days of January, April, July and October of every year; and the several companies were required, at the time of making such returns, to pay to the State treasurer, for the use of the State, certain rates of tax per ton on each ton of freight carried ; the rate on coal being two cents per ton, the same as ju'escribed by the Act before 'us. The Act of Pennsylvania, in an action by the State for the recovery of the tax, was held to be valid and in all respects constitutional, by the Supreme Court of that State, notwithstanding it imposed a tax upon freight, taken up within the State, and carried out of it, or taken up without the State and brought within it. But on writ of error, the Supreme Court of the United States decided otherwise, and held the Act to be repugnant to the provision of the Constitution of the United States which we have before referred to, so far as it operated to tax interstate commerce; and it was held that the transportation of freight, the subjects of commerce, is a constituent of commerce itself, and that a tax upon freight, transported from State to State, is a regulation of commerce among the States.
In that case, a question was made and much discussed, as to the nature of the tax, and upon what it was really and substantially imposed. On the one side, it was contended that it was simply a tax upon the franchises of the carrying companies, or upon their business, measured by the number of tons of freight carried. While on the other side it was contended, that the tax was laid upon the freight carried, and not at all upon the carrying companies ; and in accordance with this latter proposition was the opinion of the Court. The question arose from the ambiguity of the statute. But in the case before us there is no such question. The Maryland Act has made plain what the Court had to arrive at, in deciding upon the Pennsylvania Act, by inference and construction. Here the tax, by the very terms of the Act, is imposed upon the coal transported, and only upon such as may be transported for sale, and the carrying companies are, in terms, made tax collectors for the State.
The Supreme Court, in the case referred to, after concluding as to the nature of the tax, and that it was really, though not in terms, imposed upon the freight carried, say that beyond all question the transportation of freight, the subjects of commerce, for the purpose of exchange or sale, is a constituent of commerce itself; and that this is a proposition that has never been doubted. They then ash, "why is not a tax upon freight transported from State to State a regulation of inter-State transportation, and, therefore, a regulation of commerce among the States ? Is it not prescribing a rule for the transporter, by which he is to be controlled in bringing the subjects of commerce into the State, and in taking them out? The present case," they continue, " is the best possible illustration. The Legislature of Pennsylvania has in effect declared that every ton of freight taken up within the State and carried' out, or taken up in other States and brought within her limits, shall pay a specified tax. The payment of that tax is a condition, upon which is made dependent the prosecution of this branch of commerce. And as there is no limit to the rate of taxation she may impose, if she can tax at all, it is obvious the condition may be made so onerous, that an interchange of commodities with other States would be rendered impossible. The same power that may impose a tax of two cents per ton upon coal carried out of the State, may impose one of five dollars. Such an imposition, whether large or small, is a restraint of the privilege or right to have the subjects of commerce pass freely from one State to another, without being obstructed by the intervention of State lines." And in concluding then-opinion, the Court say that "transportation is essential to commerce; and every burden laid upon it is pro tanto a restriction. Whatever, therefore, may be the true doctrine respecting the exclusiveness of the power vested in Congress to regulate commerce among the States, we regard it as established that no State can impose a tax upon freight transported from State to State, or upon the transporter, because of such transportation." In other words, the State has no power to impose a tax upon inter-State transportation, such transportation being a constituent of commerce. This proposition is re-affirmed in the case of Osborne vs. The City of Mobile, 16 Wall., 479.
By the Act before us there is a positive prohibition to the transportation of coal "from any mine in this State to any place in this State or elsewhere, for sale," until a State tax of two cents per ton is first paid, or provided to be paid. ' It is only the coal transported for sale that is the subject of this tax, and therefore it is by reason of the fact of transportation that the coal becomes liable to the tax at all; and it is quite clear that the Act contemplates the transportation of coal as freight beyond the State for sale ; and thus the payment of the tax becomes a condition precedent, and consequently an impediment to the prosecution of this branch of commerce. And though the tax be levied upon all coal transported, as well that transported to places within the State, as that transported beyond its limits, still, that can make no difference in the effect of the law. The State is at liberty to tax her internal commerce, but if an Act to tax inter-State commerce be unconstitutional, it is not cured by including in its provisions subjects within the taxing power of the State. This is explicitly decided by the case in 15 Wall., 276, 277.
Without saying more in regard to this question, we are of opinion, upon the authority cited, that the Act of 1872, chapter 274, so far as it affects to impose the tax upon coal transported from the mines in this State to places beyond the State for sale, is unconstitutional and void.
And having thus declared the Act so far void, as being in conflict with the Constitution of the United States, it becomes a grave question whether the Act in its entirety, irrespective of any other constitutional objection, does not fail. As a general rule, where a statute is partly void, and its provisions all relate to a single subject-matter, the question whether the other parts shall remain operative, depends in a great measure upon a consideration of the object in view in the passage of the Act, and in what manner and to what extent the unconstitutional part affects the remainder. Here we can hardly suppose that the Legislature would have passed the Act in question with a knowledge that it could only be effectual as to the coal transported to places within the State; and thus intentionally have discriminated against the citizens of the State and in favor of those beyond its limits. It would not be fair to indulge such a presumption with respect to the purpose of the Legislature. But, without deciding this question, wo shall proceed to consider the second constitutional objection urged to the Act.
2. This question is founded on the 15th Article of the Bill of Eights of this State. It is said that the Act in question is in violation of this Article of the Bill of Eights, because it imposes a specific tax, without regard to the value of the article taxed, and without regard to the prin ciple of equality and uniformity prescribed by tbe Bill of Rights.
The article of the Bill of Rights relied on declares that "every person in the State, or person holding property therein, ought to contribute Ms proportion of public taxes for. the support of the Government, according to his actual worth in real or personal property; yet fines, duties or taxes may properly and justly be imposed or laid with a political view, for the good government and benefit of the community."
This is a fundamental declaration of the right of the citizen against unequal and undue assessments of taxes by the Government. It was not deemed a sufficient guarantee that no tax should be' imposed but by the representatives of the citizen in the Legislature, but, in order to prevent abuse of the power, which would otherwise be unlimited, the Legislature is required to cause all public taxation for the support of the Government to be fair and equal in proportion to the value of the property assessed, so that no class or species of property shall be unequally or unduly taxed. And this declaration of the right of the citizen is not simply directory to the Legislature, to be observed or not as that department of the Government may determine or think proper ; but it is a positive limitation or restriction on the power, and whenever it is transcended or disregarded, it becomes the duty of the Courts to declare the Act void. Hence, this Court has repeatedly declared that taxes, if imposed in violation of this fundamental rule, would be illegal and void. In the case of the Mayor & City Council vs. Balto. & Ohio R. R. Co., 6 Gill, 291, the Court, in referring to a tax on the franchise of an incorporated bank, say, if it were a special tax, technically speaking, levied for the support of the government of the State, it would be clearly unconstitutional and void, as being repugnant to the 15th Article of the Declaration of Rights. And in another part of the same opinion the Court say: "The argument is wholly unsound when applied to Maryland, that a franchise, if subject to taxation, may, by its excessive exercise be destroyed or rendered valueless; because by the 13th, (now 15th) Article of the Bill of Eights, the Legislature can impose no tax upon it, which is not equally borne by every other species of property in the State in proportion to its value.'' And language equally decisive, has been used in other cases; as in the case of the State vs. Sterling, 20 Md., 520; and also that of Tyson vs. The State, 28 Md., 587.
In construing this declaration of right, however, the terms employed can only apply to a direct tax on property, and not that the power of the Legislature should be limited as to the objects of taxation. The restriction is only intended to prevent an arbitrary taxation of property according to kind or quality, without regard to value. Sedg. on St. Law, 557. There are many other species of taxes that have been imposed from the foundation of the State goverment to the present time; and a power so long exercised unquestioned, could only be doubted upon the most conclusive argument against it.
What then is the character of the tax imposed by the Act in question? It is, beyond all doubt, a direct and specific tax upon coal, and therefore a tax upon property. It is not assessed with reference to any uniform value of the coal, nor with reference and in conformity to any rate of taxation imposed upon the other property of the State. It is therefore a specific, arbitrary tax levied for the support of the government, on a part of the personal property of the State, without regard to value, uniformity or equality. Upon the same principle that this tax of two cents per toil is attempted to be imposed, if legal, the State could impose fifty cents, or even a dollar per ton on all the coal mined and transported.
ISTow, the capital stock of the several mining companies of the State is liable to taxation according to a fixed and certain rate; and the stock being the representative of the whole property of the corporation, the payment of the tax on the capital stock exempts from taxation all the property both real and personal of the company. And although the State may elect to tax either the capital stock, or the real and personal property of the company, yet it cannot tax both; and if it elect to tax the real and personal property, and not the stock, such property must be assessed according to the same equal and uniform rate, in proportion to its value, as all other property in the State, whether owned by individuals or corporations. It is not competent to the Legislature to discriminate as between the different species of property, and to tax some by one rule and some by another. All must bear the burthen alike; for if it were otherwise, it would be impossible to observe the rule, which requires that every person in the State, or person holding property therein, shall contribute his proportion of public taxes for the support of government, according to his actual worth in real or personal property. The protection afforded by the rule, consists in the equality and. uniformity required, whereby one person shall not be taxed more nor less than another, because he may happen to own a different species of property from that owned by the other. Hence, the Legislature could not do what was attempted to be done by the Act under consideration; for although the State might elect to tax the property of the coal companies rather than their capital stock, yet the entire tax exacted from them could not be, in the shape of a special tax, laid exclusively upon one species of personal property, namely, their coal mined for transportation. Such legislation most clearly violates the Article of the Bill of Rights to which we have referred; and so declaring, we shall affirm the judgment of the Court below.
(Decided 5th March, 1874.)
Judgment affirmed.