Case Name: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Noe MACIAS-ARIAS, Defendant-Appellant
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 2012-07-19
Citations: 474 F. App'x 635
Docket Number: No. 11-50449
Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff—Appellee, v. Noe MACIAS-ARIAS, Defendant—Appellant.
Judges: Before: SCHROEDER, THOMAS, and SILVERMAN, Circuit Judges.
Reporter: West's Federal Appendix
Volume: 474
Pages: 635–636

Head Matter:
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff—Appellee, v. Noe MACIAS-ARIAS, Defendant—Appellant.
No. 11-50449.
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
Submitted July 17, 2012.
Filed July 19, 2012.
Lawrence Casper, Assistant U.S., Bruce R. Castetter, Assistant U.S., Office of the U.S. Attorney, San Diego, CA, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Benjamin P. Davis, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Federal Defenders of San Diego, Inc., San Diego, CA, for Defendant-Appellant.
Before: SCHROEDER, THOMAS, and SILVERMAN, Circuit Judges.
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

Opinion:
MEMORANDUM
Noe Macias-Arias appeals from the 42-month sentence imposed following his guilty-plea conviction for attempted entry after deportation, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
Macias-Arias contends that the district court procedurally erred by: (1) giving excessive weight to deterrence to the exclusion of other 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors; (2) using an incorrect legal standard to determine the extent of the variance; and (3) failing to explain adequately the basis for the upward variance and why a 42-month sentence is necessary. The record belies these contentions. The district court considered and discussed the advisory Guidelines range and the section 3553(a) sentencing factors, and explained at length the reasons for the variance and the sentence.
Macias-Arias also contends that his sentence is substantively unreasonable because it is greater than necessary to achieve the section 3553(a) sentencing objectives. The record reflects that, under the totality of the circumstances and the section 3553(a) sentencing factors, the sen- fence is substantively reasonable. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51, 128 S.Ct. 586, 169 L.Ed.2d 445 (2007).
AFFIRMED.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9 th Cir. R. 36-3.