Case Name: Percy RELISH, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Bill HOBBS, d/b/a Discount Auto Sales, Defendant and Appellee
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1966-07-01
Citations: 188 So. 2d 479
Docket Number: No. 1749
Parties: Percy RELISH, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Bill HOBBS, d/b/a Discount Auto Sales, Defendant and Appellee.
Judges: Before TATE, HOOD and CULPEP-PER, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 188
Pages: 479–485

Head Matter:
Percy RELISH, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Bill HOBBS, d/b/a Discount Auto Sales, Defendant and Appellee.
No. 1749.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana. Third Circuit.
July 1, 1966.
Rehearing Denied July 28, 1966.
Writ Refused Oct. 11, 1966.
Donald M. Garrett and B. Dexter Ryland, by B. Dexter Ryland, Alexandria, for plaintiff-appellant.
John R. Hunter, Jr., Alexandria, for defendant-appellee.
Before TATE, HOOD and CULPEP-PER, JJ.

Opinion:
CULPEPPER, Judge.
This is a workmen's compensation suit. Plaintiff's arm was broken in a fight with a co-employee, Jessie Daniels. The district judge sustained the defense that the injury was caused "by the injured employee's willful intention to injure himself or to injure another,". LSA-R.S. 23:1081. Plaintiff appealed.
Different witnesses gave different versions of the altercation, but the trial judge specifically commented that Albert Keller appeared to be the most disinterested and credible of those testifying. We will therefore follow generally Keller's version of the incident.
The place of employment was a used car lot, where automobiles were also repaired. The plaintiff, Percy Relish, was a $60 per week mechanic. The co-employee with whom he had the fight, one Jessie Daniels, was a $20 per week car washer and helper. Both are negroes. They constantly bickered and quarreled at work.
On the day in question, while their employer was away, Relish told Daniels to go to an automobile parts store and get a tie-rod. Daniels refused and they started cursing one another. Relish grabbed a hammer and threw it at Daniels, but apparently missed, or only hit him on the arm. Then Relish lunged at Daniels, a smaller man, and threw him to the ground and choked him until bystanders pulled them apart. When they got up, Daniels grabbed a shovel and Relish grabbed a wrench and they started at one another again. Daniels succeeded in hitting Relish on the arm with the shovel, fracturing the bone, and apparently this ended the affray.
Plaintiff made two facual contentions, both of which the trial judge correctly rejected. The first was that plaintiff broke his arm while repairing a car before the fight. The second was that Relish, if the original aggressor, had retired from the fight so as to be exculpated from'fault for the second encounter when Daniels returned with the shovel. Landry v. Gilger Drilling Co., La.App., 92 So.2d 482. The trial judge held the second encounter was a continuation of the first; and that Relish did not withdraw but, instead, wilfully continued the fight.
The statute under consideration is LSA-R.S. 23:1081 which reads in pertinent part as follows:
"No compensation shall be allowed for an injury caused (1) by the injured employee's wilful intention to injure himself or to injure another."
The recent leading case from our Supreme Court, Velotta v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 241 La. 814, 132 So.2d 51 (1961) involved these facts: Velotta was a 58-year-old white man weighing 100 pounds. He was cleaning the locker room where employees changed uniforms when he engaged in an argument with a young negro employee, Bailey, 19 years of age and weighing 180 pounds. Velotta impulsively swung a pair of trousers, striking Bailey in the face, but not causing any injury. Bailey then struck Velotta violently on the jaw with his fist, knocking Velotta back against a locker and causing serious head injuries. The court held that the aggressor doctrine, a rule of tort law, is not, per se, the test under the Workmen's Compensation Act In order to be perfectly clear as to the court's holding, we quote at length from the opinion as follows:
"The appellate courts of this State in many instances have heretofore based their decisions interpreting this provision of the Compensation Act on the aggressor doctrine, generally denying recovery to the injured employee who provoked the assault which resulted in his injury. Although the results reached in these cases would not necessarily be erroneous, it would appear that the statutory provision involved does not require a resort to doctrines not there enunciated. The inquiry, under the mandate of the statute, it appears to us, should he limited to zvhether the employee's injury resulted from the employee's wilful intention to injure himself or another. Impulsive conduct, stick as a push, shove, or a fist-blow, does not render the conduct of the employee sufficiently serious or grave, and there is no wilful intention to injure one's self or another under such circumstances. The mere fact that the employee seeking recovery may have been to blame for the fray is not adequate to meet the test — there must be more. Johnson v. Safreed, 224 Ark. 397, 273 S.W.2d 545. The test should involve an inquiry into the existence of some premeditation and malice on the part of the claimant, coupled with a reasonable expectation of bringing about a real injury to himself or another. If the retaliation which flows from his misconduct is not such as could be reasonably expected, his intention could not be held to envision that result and hence is not within the purview of the quoted provisions of the Act.
"The defense the employer is entitled to invoke is a statutory one expressed in language that is clear and unmistakable and the superimposing of another doctrine, 'aggressor' or otherwise, is not considered appropriate. Hartford Acc. & Ind. Co. v. Cardillo, 2 App.D.C. 52, 112 F.2d 11." (Emphasis supplied.)
As we understand the Velotta case, the court concluded (1) that Velotta's actions, in swinging the trousers, were impulsive, as distinguished from premeditated or malicious and (2) the act was not sufficiently serious or grave that Velotta should have had a reasonable expectation that it would result in a real injury to himself or another.
In Garner v. Avondale Marine Ways, Inc., La.App., 134 So.2d 703 (4th Cir. 1961), our brothers of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal gave this same interpretation to the Velotta case. Plaintiff and a fellow worker, Fowler, were standing on a scaffold when they engaged in an argument. Plaintiff finally struck Fowler in the mouth with his fist and knocked him down. Fowler then grabbed plaintiff by the legs and threw him off the scaffold, injurying plaintiff's back. The court distinguished the Velotta case. It held that, whereas Velotta's actions, in swinging the trousers, were not sufficiently serious to show an intent to injure; Garner's actions, in striking Fowler in the face with his fist while on a scaffold, were sufficiently serious, although impulsive, that Garner should have had a reasonable expectation it would result in serious injury to himself or Fowler.
The author of the case note found in 23 La.Law Review 144 praises the Velotta case for rejecting the aggressor doctrine in Louisiana Workmen's Compensation Law, but then criticizes the decision in the following language:
"After stating that wilful intent is the sole test of recovery, the Supreme Court glossed its rule by saying that whether retaliation might reasonably be expected from the attacked employee is the measure of the aggressor's intent. This is unfortunate in that it tends to lead the court's inquiry away from the primary consideration of wilful intent."
Thus, the author of this case note is apparently of the opinion that wilfulness, as distinguished from impulsiveness, should be the sole test. But, the author recognizes that this is not the sole test applied by our Supreme Court in the Velotta case.
We think the Velotta case holds that wilfulness is not the sole test. The court says: "The test (of wilful intent to injure) should involve an inquiry into (1) the existence of, some premeditation and malice , coupled with (2) a reasonable expectation of bringing about a real injury to himself or another." This clearly means that wilfulness, as distinguished from impulsiveness, is not the sole test. Every impulsive act is not condoned by the statute. Some acts, even though impulsive, are so serious and so likely to result in real injury, that they must be construed to show a wilful intent to injure.
Perhaps an illustration will best show our meaning. Velotta impulsively swung a pair of pants at Bailey, conduct which was not sufficiently serious or grave to show a wilful intention to injure. But suppose that, after engaging in a heated argument, Velotta, instead of swinging pants at Bailey, had pulled out a pistol and shot at him. Would we say that since the act was impulsive, growing out of work-connected tensions, it did not show a wilful intent to injure? Certainly not.
Applying our interpretation of the Velotta case to the present matter, we think that when Relish threw the hammer at Daniels and then knocked him down and started choking him, this was conduct which, although impulsive, was sufficiently grave and serious that Relish should have had a reasonable expectation the affray would result in a real injury to himself or Daniels. Thus, wilful intent to injure is shown.
For the reasons assigned, the judgment appealed is affirmed. All costs of this appeal are assessed against the plaintiff appellant.
Affirmed.