Case Name: Rennie Truly COWAN, an individual, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. WILLIAM MORRIS AGENCY, INC., Defendant-Appellee
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 2014-07-02
Citations: 582 F. App'x 675
Docket Number: No. 12-55149
Parties: Rennie Truly COWAN, an individual, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. WILLIAM MORRIS AGENCY, INC., Defendant-Appellee.
Judges: 
Reporter: West's Federal Appendix
Volume: 582
Pages: 675–676

Head Matter:
Rennie Truly COWAN, an individual, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. WILLIAM MORRIS AGENCY, INC., Defendant-Appellee.
No. 12-55149.
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
Submitted June 25, 2014.
Filed July 2, 2014.
Rennie Truly Cowan, Riverside, CA, pro se.
Michelle Marie Lamar, Esquire, Erin M. Smith, Esquire, Loeb & Loeb LLP, Los Angeles, CA, for Defendant-Appellee.
Before: HAWKINS, TALLMAN, and NGUYEN, Circuit Judges.
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

Opinion:
MEMORANDUM
Rennie Truly Cowan appeals pro se from the district court's order denying her motion to seal the entire record in her employment discrimination and retaliation action. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review for an abuse of discretion, Oliner v. Kontrabecki, 745 F.3d 1024, 1025 (9th Cir.2014), and we affirm.
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Cowan's motion to seal the entire record in her case because Co-wan failed to establish compelling reasons to do so. See id. at 1026 (applying the "compelling reasons" standard to request to seal the entire record of the district court proceedings, including the court's opinion); Pintos v. Pac. Creditors Ass'n, 605 F.3d 665, 677-79 (9th Cir.2010) (discussing the "compelling reasons" standard and explaining that a court may not rely on hypothesis or conjecture in ruling on a motion to seal); Kamakana v. City & County of Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172, 1179 (9th Cir.2006) ("The mere fact that the production of records may lead to a litigant's embarrassment, incrimination, or exposure to further litigation will not, without more, compel the court to seal its records.").
We do not consider Cowan's challenge to the district court's entry of a vexatious litigant order against her because Cowan failed to file a timely notice of appeal from the entry of judgment and the vexatious litigant order. See Fed. R.App. P. 4(a)(1)(A) (establishing the time for filing a notice of appeal).
AFFIRMED.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provid ed by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.