Case Name: HOUSING AUTHORITY OF the CITY OF TAMPA, Petitioner, v. Connie BURTON, Respondent
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 2004-03-24
Citations: 874 So. 2d 6
Docket Number: No. 2D03-1163
Parties: HOUSING AUTHORITY OF the CITY OF TAMPA, Petitioner, v. Connie BURTON, Respondent.
Judges: SALCINES, J., Concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 874
Pages: 6–13

Head Matter:
HOUSING AUTHORITY OF the CITY OF TAMPA, Petitioner, v. Connie BURTON, Respondent.
No. 2D03-1163.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
March 24, 2004.
Rehearing Denied June 10, 2004.
J. Frazier Carraway, Astrid Hapanow-icz, and Cheryl J. Lister of Saxon, Gil more, Carraway, Gibbons, Lash & Wilcox, P.A., Tampa, for Petitioner.
Guy M. Burns, Jonathan S. Coleman, and Zachary D. Messa of Johnson, Pope, Bokor, Ruppel & Burns, P.A., Tampa, for Respondent.

Opinion:
WALLACE, Judge.
The Tampa Housing Authority seeks certiorari review of the circuit court's order denying its appeal — treated as a petition for writ of certiorari — from the county court's order granting a new trial in the Housing Authority's suit to evict a tenant. Because the circuit court's order did not depart from the essential requirements of the law, we deny the petition.
In Hillsborough County Court, the Housing Authority obtained a favorable jury verdict in the eviction trial of Connie Burton, a tenant of public housing in Tampa. The tenant moved for a new -trial on two grounds: the verdict was against the manifest weight of the evidence, and one of the jurors had committed misconduct by discussing the case with a dismissed juror. The trial judge denied the tenant's motion on the grounds asserted but ordered a new trial on its own initiative based on the trial judge's personal observation that a juror was "consistently asleep in the jury box during the presentation of evidence" and that "to allow the jury verdict to stand would be a manifest injustice." At trial, neither party had made an objection on account of a sleeping juror, nor had the trial judge mentioned the matter.
The Housing Authority appealed to the Circuit Court for the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit, contending that the trial judge erred by granting a new trial based upon unpreserved error that was not fundamental in nature. The circuit court, believing it lacked jurisdiction to hear a direct appeal, treated the Housing Authority's notice of appeal as a petition for writ of certiorari. The circuit court denied the petition on the ground that "the trial court did not abuse its discretion by ordering a new trial." The Housing Authority seeks certiorari review of the decision of the circuit court sitting in its appellate capacity.
Certiorari review is appellate in character in the sense that it involves a limited review of the proceedings of an inferior jurisdiction. Haines City Cmty. Dev. v. Heggs, 658 So.2d 523, 525 (Fla.1995). However, certiorari should not be used to grant a second appeal but, instead, is limited to those instances in which the lower court did not afford procedural due process or departed from the essential requirements of the law. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Kaklamanos, 843 So.2d 885, 889 (Fla.2003). The Housing Authority does not argue that it was denied procedural due process at any point in the proceedings; thus our inquiry concerns whether the circuit court departed from the essential requirements of law.
The departure from the essential requirements of the law necessary for the issuance of a writ of certiorari is something more than a simple legal error. There must be a violation of a clearly established principle of law resulting in a miscarriage of justice. Ivey v. Allstate Ins. Co., 774 So.2d 679, 682 (Fla.2000). A failure to observe "the essential requirements of law" has been held synonymous with a failure to apply "the correct law." Heggs, 658 So.2d at 530. The district courts of appeal "should not be as concerned with the mere existence of legal error as much as with the seriousness of the error." Id. at 528 (quoting Combs v. State, 436 So.2d 93, 95 (Fla.1983)). In the context of certiorari review of a circuit court's decision sitting in its appellate capacity, certiorari relief may be granted when the circuit court's legal error in applying the incorrect law is sufficiently egregious or fundamental. Bottcher v. Walsh, 834 So.2d 183, 184-85 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002).
In its petition for writ of certiorari to this court, the Housing Authority argues that the circuit court applied incorrect law by failing to apply a de novo standard of review to the trial judge's new trial order, as would be appropriate for review of a decision based on unpreserved fundamental error. Initially, we note that the circuit court's conclusion that it lacked appellate jurisdiction over the trial court's order granting the motion for new trial was incorrect. The circuit court had jurisdiction to hear the appeal pursuant to section 59.04, Florida Statutes (2002). See Blore v. Fierro, 636 So.2d 1329, 1331 (Fla.1994) (explaining that authority for appeals to the circuit court is established by general law). However, whether the circuit court heard the case as an appeal or as a petition for writ of certiorari is not particularly pertinent here unless the decision on this issue affected the circuit court's scope of review. Under the circumstances, we cannot conclude that the circuit court's review of the new trial order under the abuse of discretion standard constituted an application of incorrect law.
The Housing Authority's argument that the circuit court applied the wrong standard of review rests upon the factual assumption that the juror's somnolence was necessarily apparent to the attorneys and that the attorneys made a strategic decision not to object; in other words, the juror's misconduct was an unpreserved error subject to fundamental error, analysis. The Housing Authority did not present to the circuit court evidence in the trial record to suggest that the tenant was aware of the juror's sleeping. The trial record does not refute the conclusion that the juror's sleeping may have been evident only to the trial judge who may very well have had a superior vantage point to observe the juror in question. Thus the issue of the sleeping juror may not have been an unpreserved error depending upon a variety of factors largely unknown to the circuit court and best known to the trial judge. Therefore, the issue of the sleeping juror — and whether any error with regard thereto was preserved or un-preserved — was a question of fact to be determined by the trial judge in his discretion. See Tri-Pak Mach., Inc. v. Harts-horn, 644 So.2d 118, 119-20 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994). Accordingly, the circuit court applied the correct legal standard in its appellate review of the trial court's order for a new trial.
Unlike application of incorrect law, misapplication of correct law by a circuit court sitting in its appellate capacity generally does -not constitute a violation of clearly established law resulting in a miscarriage of justice. Ivey, 774 So.2d at 682. Thus, even if there is legal error' in the circuit' court's decision that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting a new trial, we are unable to conclude that this is one of'"those few extreme cases where the appellate court's decision is so erroneous that justice requires that it be corrected." See Combs v. State, 436 So.2d 93, 95 (Fla.1983). Two cases from this court guide our determination: State v. Roess, 451 So.2d 879, 880 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984), which involved a new trial order; and Haines City Community Development v. Heggs, 647 So.2d 855, 856 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994), approved, 658 So.2d 523, which involved an eviction.
In Roess, the circuit court issued a new trial order when it reversed a conviction of animal cruelty from the county court. The basis for reversal was the county court's exclusion of a prior consistent statement. This court strongly hinted that the circuit court erred in reversing, but we declined to issue the writ because the error did not rise to a miscarriage of justice:
The circuit court reversed the conviction and ordered a new trial. The respondent has not been exonerated of criminal wrongdoing. The state has not been deprived of its day in court. See City of Winter Park v. Jones, 392 So.2d 568 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981). We believe that to grant certiorari under the circumstances of this particular case in which the circuit court sat in its appellate capacity would improperly -afford two appeals from a trial in the county court. See Clermont [Marine Sales, Inc. v. Harmon, 347 So.2d 839 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977)]. We cannot say that this is one of "those few extreme cases where the appellate court's decision is so erroneous that justice requires that it be corrected." Combs, 436 So.2d at 95.
Roess, 451 So.2d at 880.
Roess was the primary authority relied upon in this court's decision in Heggs, 647 So.2d 855. In that case, the county court entered a judgment of eviction against a tenant for nonpayment of rent. The circuit court reversed, holding that the county court abused its discretion in failing to find that the landlord was equitably es-topped from seeking to evict the tenant based on the landlord's past conduct in collecting unpaid rent. Id. at 856. The circuit court did this even though it acknowledged that the county court's judgment came to it clothed with a presumption of correctness and that the tenant had a history of repeated nonpayment of rent. Id. This court refused to issue a writ of certiorari to quash the circuit court's reversal:
In this case, even if we were to conclude that the circuit court's order departed from the essential requirements of the law, we cannot say that such a departure was serious enough to result in a miscarriage of justice. The order did nothing more than reverse a county court's eviction judgment based on a peculiar set of facts. It did not deprive the petitioner of its day in court, nor has it foreclosed the petitioner from seeking eviction of the respondent because of future non-payment of rent. See State v. Roess, 451 So.2d 879 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984). Thus, we are unable to conclude that this is one of "those few extreme cases where the appellate court's decision is so erroneous that justice requires that it be corrected." Combs, 436 So.2d at 95.
Heggs, 647 So.2d at 856. Approving this court's decision, the supreme court commented that the above-quoted analysis "captures the essence" of the certiorari standard. Heggs, 658 So.2d at 531.
In this case, the new trial order did not exonerate the tenant from wrongdoing, nor did it deprive the Housing Authority of its day in court. See Roess, 451 So.2d at 880; cf. Britt v. Mascara, 830 So.2d 221, 223-24 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002) (granting a petition for certiorari when the circuit court incorrectly approved the county court's dismissal of the civil claim of a prison inmate who was denied an opportunity to be heard because of his incarceration). When compared with Heggs, the result for the Housing Authority in this case is less onerous than the result suffered by the landlord in Heggs, who was completely deprived of the right to evict the tenant for the reasons litigated. Here, the Housing Authority is not deprived of its right to pursue eviction on the same grounds in a new trial. A proper application of the certiorari standard leads us to conclude that any error in the proceedings below does not constitute a miscarriage of justice.
There being no departure from the essential requirements of law, we deny the petition for writ of certiorari.
Petition for writ of certiorari denied.
SALCINES, J., Concurs.
VILLANTI, J., Dissents with opinion.