Case Name: A. J. HAWS v. ST. PAUL F. & M. INS. CO.
Court: Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
Jurisdiction: Pennsylvania
Decision Date: 1888-10-29
Citations: 130 Pa. 113
Docket Number: No. 130
Parties: A. J. HAWS v. ST. PAUL F. & M. INS. CO.
Judges: Before Gordon, C. J., Paxson, Sterrett, Green, Clark, Williams and Hand, JJ.
Reporter: Pennsylvania State Reports
Volume: 130
Pages: 113–123

Head Matter:
A. J. HAWS v. ST. PAUL F. & M. INS. CO.
APPEAL BY PLAINTIFF FROM THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF MERCER COUNTY.
Argued October 10, 1888
Decided October 29, 1888.
Re-argued October 14, 1889
Re-affirmed November 4, 1889.
[To be reported.]
1. Where 'written and printed portions of a contract are repugnant to each other, the printed form must yield to the written clauses of the instrument, as the latter are presumed to be the deliberate expression of the real intent of the parties.
(a) A policy of insurance upon a barn, and also upon hay, etc., buggies, etc., and horses, all contained in said barn, was written upon an ordinary fire blank. The printed part contained a provision that it should not cover a loss solely by lightning, but by the written part such loss was included in the risk.
(5) There was contained a printed clause to the effect that the policy did not insure personal property while removed from the particular building mentioned, or kept or used in any other place or location, unless otherwise specified in the policy. One of the horses insured was killed by lightning in a pasture field.
2. The printed clause as to removal from the barn was not repugnant to the genera] purpose of the parties as manifested in the written part of the policy, and on such a policy the insurance company is not liable for the value of a horse killed by lightning elsewhere than in the barn: Haws v. Tire Association, 114 Pa. 431, and American etc. Ins. Co. v. Haws, 20 W. N. 370, distinguished.
Before Gordon, C. J., Paxson, Sterrett, Green, Clark, Williams and Hand, JJ.
No. 130 October Term 1888, Sup. Ct.; court below, No. 156 June Term 1885, C. P.'
On May 23, 1885, A. J. Haws brought assumpsit against the St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Company, upon a policy of insurance against fire and lightning. The defendant pleaded non-assumpsit.
At the trial on April 1,1887, the following facts were shown: The plaintiff was the owner of a stock farm in Mercer county, and engaged in raising thereon finely bred horses. On March 19, 1883, he obtained from the defendant company a policy of insurance to run for three years from March 20,1883, at noon. The policy was written by filling up a printed blank in the ordinary form of a fire policy, and the material parts of it were as follows, the parts in Italics being written, and the parts in Roman being printed:
“ In consideration of thirty-seven and 50-100 dollars and of the requirements, limitations and conditions hereinafter contained and hereon endorsed, does insure A. J. Haws, of Johns-town, Penria, against loss or damage by fire not exceeding the sum of Twenty-five hundred dollars on the following specified and located property, namely: $750 on his frame bank barn, in-eluding foundations, situate on his farm in Hemp field Twp., Mercer Oo., Pa., about one mile east of G-reenville. $250 on hay, straw, grain and feed. $500 on buggies, sleighs, wagons, harness, whips, robes, blankets, bells and farming tools and utensils of every description. $1,000 on'horses, not to exceed $200 on any one horse. All contained in above described barn. This will also cover against loss or damage by lightning whether fire ensues or not. $2,500 concurrent insurance.”
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“ This policy does not cover or insure personal property of any kind, while removed from the particular building herein described, or kept or used in any other place or location, unless otherwise specified in the policy.”
Certain printed conditions or provisions of the policy provided, also, that the company should not be liable by virtue of the policy for any loss caused “ by lightning, or explosions of any kind, unless fire ensues, and then for the loss or damage by fire only; . . . . nor for loss or damage caused by removal of property from a building, except it be proved that such removal was necessary to preserve the property.” It was also provided that the agent of the company “has no authority to waive, modify or strike from this policy any of its printed conditions.”
On the night of June 8, 1885, a suckling colt belonging to the plaintiff was struck by lightning while in a pasture field on the plaintiff’s farm, and on the morning of the 9th was found dead in the field at a distance of 300 or 400 yards from the barn mentioned in the policy. On August 16,1884, proofs of loss were made out by the plaintiff, claiming from the defendant $100, one half of the sum at which he valued the colt, as the ratable proportion of the loss chargeable to the defendant. Upon the receipt of these proofs payment was declined. The defendant testified that the colt was worth $200. It was admitted that there was concurrent insurance upon the plaintiff’s horses, including this colt, of $1,000, and that the other insurance company paid the plaintiff $100, on account of the loss of the colt.
At the conclusion of the testimony, the court, Mehakd, P. J., submitted the case to the jury reserving the question whether the plaintiff was entitled to recover, in view of the following condition of the policy: “ This policy does not cover or insure personal property of any kind while removed from the particular building herein described, or kept or used in any other place or location, unless otherwise specified in the policy.”
The jury rendered a verdict in favor of the plaintiff for $114.66, subject to the question of law reserved. After argument the court entered judgment for the defendant, non obstante veredicto, Mehabd, P. J., filing this opinion:
The question reserved is whether plaintiff is entitled to recover in view of the following part of the insurance policy: “ This policy does not cover or insure personal property of any kind while removed from the particular building herein described, or kept or used in any other place or location, unless otherwise specified in this policy.” ' The property insured was a horse; the building in the policy described and in which the horse was contained, as stated in the policy, was a barn on plaintiff’s farm in Hempfield township, Mercer county, Pa. [The horse having been removed from the barn, was in a field when killed. It was not within the insurance of the policy at that time.] 1
This case is not covered, by the decision in Haws v. Fire Association, 114 Pa. 481. The questions there considered, as stated in the opinion, were: First, What was meant by the expression in the lightning clause attached to the policy, “ subject to the terms and conditions referred to; ” and second, was the clause “ contained in his two story frame barn,” etc., intended as a contract that the policy should cease to cover the property insured the moment it left the barn. But neither question can arise under the policy sued on in this action, for both are answered by the explicit clause above quoted.
Judgment is therefore directed for defendant, non obstante veredicto.8
Judgment having been entered for the defendant, the plaintiff took this appeal specifying that the court erred:
1. In the portion of the opinion embraced in [ ] 1
2. In entering the judgment non obstante veredicto.8
Mr. S-. B. Griffith (with him Mr. Samuel Griffith and Mr. E. P. Gillespie), for the appellant.
Mr. S. E. Thompson (with him Mr. Samuel Redmond), for the appellee.

Opinion:
Opinion,
Mb. Justice Clark :
This action was brought upon a policy of insurance of the St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Company, to recover for the loss of a suckling colt, killed by lightning. The plaintiff, A. J. Haws, is the owner of a stock farm in Mercer county, upon which was erected a frame bank barn. The policy of insurance is dated March 19, 1883, and the company by its terms agreed to insure the plaintiff against loss or damage by fire, to an amount not exceeding $2,500 on the barn and its contents. The property insured is classified and recited in the policy, the last item being " $1,000 on horses, not to exceed $200 on any one horse; " and as part of the general description of the personal property, it is added in writing, " all contained in above-described barn." There is a clause in the printed parts of the policy to the effect that the company shall not be liable for loss by lightning, or explosions of any kind, unless fire ensues, and then for the loss or damage by fire only. But there is a clause written in the policy to a different effect, as follows : " This will also cover against loss or damage by lightning, whether fire ensues or not." In such a case the written clause will, of course, be taken to express the real intention of the parties; The settled rule, as we said in Grandin v. Insurance Co., 107 Pa. 36, is that where the written and printed portions of a paper are repugnant to each other, the printed form must yield to the deliberate written expression, citing Harper v. Insurance Co., 22 N. Y. 443.
There was $2,500 of concurrent insurance, and in addition $1,000 on horses alone. On the night of June 8, 1885, two of the plaintiff's brood mares and this suckling colt were killed by lightning whilst in the field at pasture. Proofs were made claiming one hundred dollars for the loss of the colt; one hundred dollars having been paid by the company carrying the concurrent insurance.
The policy contains a general printed clause in the following words : " This policy does not cover or insure personal property of any kind while removed from the particular building herein described, or kept or used in any other place or location, unless otherwise specified in the policy." The company contends that as the colt was not in the barn at the time of the casualty, it was not embraced within the terms and conditions of the policy, and that, therefore, there can be no recovery. The plaintiff maintains, however, that the clause last quoted is inconsistent with the manifest purpose of the policy in respect of the insurance of horses; that to give it full effect is to deny the owner the ordinary use of his property, as well as the privilege of pasturage, which in the summer months, at least, is well known to constitute the chief food supply; that the clause in question is in the printed form, and is repugnant to the general purpose of the parties, as manifested in the written portions of the policy. We cannot adopt the plaintiff's view of this case. The manifest and obvious purpose of the parties, we think, was to place the insurance on the barn and its contents as specified in the policy. In Haws v. Fire Association, 114 Pa. 431, which is much relied upon by the plaintiff, there was no such clause in the policy as quoted above, and the insurance was upon horses alone. The horses, it is true, were described as " contained in his new two-story frame barn," etc.; but this was held to be mere matter of description, and that such a description did not constitute a condition which would relieve the company from obligation the moment the horse left the barn. This case is also readily distinguished from the American etc. Ins. Co. v. Haws, 20 W. N. 370, where the insurance was also on horses only, and it was provided as follows: " This policy shall be void and of no effect if the property insured be removed to any other building or location from that described herein." In both of these cases the opinion of the court proceeds upon the ground that as the insurance was upon horses alone, and the contract was inserted into a printed form designed for the insurance of a different class of property, it could not have been, in contemplation of the parties that the animals were insured only when inside the bam. In this case, however, the restrictive clause is not a mere matter of description. It is a plain direct provision, applicable alike to all the personal property embraced in the policy, and consistent with the obvious general purpose of the parties to insure the bam and its contents. It may be that such a provision interferes with the ordinary use of the property, but the same may be said of the " buggies, sleighs, wagons, harness, whips, robes, blankets, bells, farmer's tools, and utensils of every description," which do not appear to have been kept in store, but for the ordinary and common use of the owner.
For anything that appears, the insurei', on the one hand, may have relied upon the location or structure, or upon the appliances attached to the building, as a protection from lightning, and estimated his risk accordingly; or, the owner, on the other hand, knowing the fact that barns are, for some reason, not well understood, more liable to injury from lightning than other buildings, and that the risks from this cause attaches as well to the contents as to the building itself, contemplated an indemnity only as against this extraordinary risk. However this may be, in view of the explicit and plain language of the policy, we are constrained to hold that the restriction applies to the horses, as well as to the other property embraced in the policy.
The judgment is affirmed.