Case Name: Tull v. Ashcraft
Court: Arkansas Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Arkansas
Decision Date: 1960-03-28
Citations: 231 Ark. 928
Docket Number: 5-2085
Parties: Tull v. Ashcraft.
Judges: Harris, C. J., and McFaddin, J., dissent.
Reporter: Arkansas Reports
Volume: 231
Pages: 928–933

Head Matter:
Tull v. Ashcraft.
5-2085
333 S. W. 2d 490
Opinion delivered March 28, 1960.
John L. Hughes, for appellant.
Joe E. Purcell, for appellee.

Opinion:
George Rose Smith, J.
This is a boundary line dispute. A. C. Tull, who owns 26 acres west of the disputed line, brought suit to quiet his title in accordance with a fence that existed for about 35 years. The defendants, Orville Ashcraft and his wife, who own six acres east of the line, contended that the fence did not represent the boundary and that the true line, according to the Government survey, was 35 feet west of the fence. The chancellor found that the fence had not been recognized as a division fence, and upon that finding he fixed the line in conformity with the Government survey. Tull has appealed.
We have concluded that the decree is against the weight of the evidence, for in our opinion the long-continued existence of the fence is decisive of the case.
Both tracts were formerly owned by the appellant's father, John M. Tull. In 1922 the elder Tull sold the east six-acre tract to Ms son-in-law7, W. H. Ashcraft, whose son is the appellee Orville Ashcraft. W. H. Ash-craft took possession of his land, and in 1922 or 1923 he erected the fence in question. He testified that in placing the fence he started at his neighbor's line to the east and stepped off what he thought to be 110 yards, 'which was the width of his own property. Although he erected the fence and evidently tried to put it on the line W. H. testified that he did not recognize it as the line: "I figured all the time I was short." He does not say, however, that he communicated his doubts to anyone at all, and he admits that the fence remained in place for about 35 years, being kept up by the succeeding landowners. W. H. was not asked how long he lived on the property, but we infer that he moved away long ago, as his son Orville testified that he was brought up in a different part of the county. It was not until 1955 that Orville bought the land from Vada Hawkins and returned to his father's former home. At the trial there was no testimony from anyone whose ownership intervened between that of the two Ashcrafts.
On the other side of the fence the appellant, who is Orville's uncle, has been in possession of Ms tract ever since he purchased it from his father in 1926. Tull testified without contradiction that he was in undisturbed possession for 33 years, that the fence was always considered to be the line, and that the fence was maintained by the adjoining owners until part of it was taken down a year or so before the trial. Not only is there no contradiction of Tull's testimony; it is corroborated by his brother and to some extent by W. H. Ashcraft, an adverse witness, who, as we have seen, admits that the fence remained in its original place for -about 35 years.
Upon this testimony it cannot be doubted that Tull has acquired title to the disputed strip by adverse possession. We have frequently held that when adjoining landowners silently acquiesce for many years in the location of a fence as the visible evidence of the division line and thus apparently consent to that line, the fence line becomes the boundary by acquiescence. Deidrech v. Simmons, 75 Ark. 400, 87 S. W. 649; Robinson v. Gaylord, 182 Ark. 849, 33 S. W. 2d 710; Seidenstricker v. Holtzendorff, 214 Ark. 644, 217 S. W. 2d 836. As we said in a very similar case, Gregory v. Jones, 212 Ark. 443, 206 S. W. 2d 18: "It is true that in this case the original rail fence line was established without a prior dispute as to boundary; but the recognition of that line for the many intervening years (34 in this case) shows a quietude and acquiescence for so many years that the law will presume an agreement concerning the boundary."
In deciding the case as he did the chancellor evidently relied upon the appellees' testimony, which was largely directed to showing that Tull, after the present dispute arose, at first conceded the surveyed line to be the boundary. It is shown that Tull did not object to the line's being surveyed and that when the line was found to be west of the fence Tull recognized his nephew's rights by removing some young fruit trees he had planted on the strip in controversy. On the witness stand Tull candidly admitted that when he understood that Orville wasn't getting the acreage that the elder Tull had sold many years ago he (the appellant) at first thought that he was supposed to defend the old title, "but since that time it was called to my attention the 7 year law would hold in this ease; therefore I ceased to be interested."
Tull's conduct did not affect his title, for it had vested many years before by adverse possession. We stated the rule in Shirey v. Whitlow, 80 Ark. 444, 97 S. W. 444: ' ' This continuous possession for the statutory period, if adverse, divested plaintiff and his grantor of the title, and gave it to defendant, and the mere fact that the defendant afterwards in conversation with plaintiff recognized the justness of his claim to the land did not divest the title from defendant or estop him from asserting such title." Later cases to the same effect include Stroud v. Snow, 186 Ark. 550, 54 S. W. 2d 693, and Hart v. Sternberg, 205 Ark. 929, 171 S. W. 2d 475.
Reversed.
Harris, C. J., and McFaddin, J., dissent.