Case Name: SCHMIDT v. YOUNGS
Court: Michigan Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1996-01-19
Citations: 215 Mich. App. 222
Docket Number: Docket No. 171695
Parties: SCHMIDT v YOUNGS
Judges: Before: Holbrook, Jr., P.J., and Michael J. Kelly and D. J. Kelly, JJ._
Reporter: Michigan appeals reports; cases decided in the Michigan Court of Appeals.
Volume: 215
Pages: 222–233

Head Matter:
SCHMIDT v YOUNGS
Docket No. 171695.
Submitted June 20, 1995, at Detroit.
Decided January 19, 1996, at 9:00 a.m.
Frederick Schmidt brought an action in the Oakland Circuit Court against Robert Youngs, III, seeking damages for injuries sustained when a golf ball hit by the defendant, who was playing in the same foursome as the plaintiff, struck the plaintiff. The plaintiff had positioned himself in front of the defendant’s ball, to the right of the green, and behind a tree for protection. After becoming impatient waiting for the defendant’s shot, the plaintiff moved from his place of safety just as the ball was hit. The shot was shanked to the right, which the defendant apparently had a propensity to do, and the ball struck the- plaintiff. The plaintiff alleged the defendant breached a duty to give adequate and timely warning of his intention to strike the ball and of its errant flight after being struck. The defendant sought summary disposition, alleging that there was no common-law or statutory duty to warn the plaintiff. The court, John J. McDonald, J., agreed with the defendant and granted summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(8). The plaintiff appealed.
The Court of Appeals held:
1. Under the facts of this case, the defendant did not have a duty to issue an audible warning to the plaintiff upon striking his ball. The plaintiff was aware of the defendant’s intention to hit the ball and, to the extent that the plaintiff had positioned himself to the right of the green and behind a tree, the plaintiff was not in the line of play. The granting of summary disposition was appropriate.
2. The trial court’s passing reference to the doctrine of assumption of risk was appropriate under the facts of this case.
3. The defendant owed no duty to the plaintiff to protect him from injuries that might result from the ordinary and ever-risks of the sport of golf, as contrasted with those injuries that might be caused by the defendant’s lack of due care.
References
Am Jur 2d, Amusements and Exhibitions §§86-87; 97-98; Negligence § 835.
See ALR Index under Golf and Golf Courses.
Affirmed.
Michael J. Kelly, J., dissenting, stated that peremptory disposition was premature in this matter. The trial court inappropriately decided questions of fact and prematurely applied the "rules of the game” of golf, which were not supported by an evidentiary basis. The trial court erred in finding that the defendant exercised reasonable care before he struck his ball and that the risk of coming in contact with a wayward ball is a risk foreseeable during a game of golf. It was error to decide, as a matter of law, that the defendant was under no obligation to the plaintiff to avoid negligent conduct in the context of this complaint.
1. Negligence — Golf — Duty to Give Warnings.
A person who engages in the game of golf is not an insurer of the safety of others and is only required to exercise ordinary care for the safety of persons reasonably within the range of danger; a golfer who is about to strike a golf ball must, in the exercise of ordinary care, give adequate and timely notice to those who are unaware of the golfer’s intention to play and who may be endangered by the play; there is no duty to give advance warning to persons on contiguous holes or fairways or to those not in the line of play if danger to them is not reasonably to be anticipated; where a person injured by the golfer’s ball was in a place of reasonable safety and was aware of the golfer’s intention to play the ball, an oral or audible warning would have been superfluous and unnecessary.
2. Negligence — Sports — Consent to Risks.
A person may consent to the inherent risks of being a spectator or participant in a sport but ordinarily does not consent to another’s negligence.
Rifkin & Kingsley, P.C. (by Michael J. Kingsley), for the plaintiff.
State Farm Fire & Casualty Company (by Donna M. Skelcy), for the defendant.
Before: Holbrook, Jr., P.J., and Michael J. Kelly and D. J. Kelly, JJ._
Circuit judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.

Opinion:
Holbrook, Jr., P.J.
In this personal injury case, plaintiff appeals as of right from a circuit court order granting summary disposition for defendant pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(8). We affirm.
Ón May 8, 1991, plaintiff and defendant were playing golf in a foursome at the Rochester Hills Golf Club. After their second shots on the first hole of play, defendant's ball was furthest from the hole, meaning that he would play next. Rather than stay behind defendant's ball, as is customary, plaintiff drove his golf cart in front of defendant's ball, parked it next to a large tree that was to the right of the green, and positioned himself behind that tree for protection. When defendant's preparation time for his shot exceeded several minutes (between two and five minutes), plaintiff's impatience led him to turn around just as defendant hit his ball. Defendant's shot was shanked to the right, which he apparently had a propensity to do, and the ball struck plaintiff in the eye, causing serious injury.
Plaintiff's complaint alleged that defendant had breached his duty to give an adequate and timely warning to plaintiff of his intention to strike the ball and of its errant flight in plaintiff's direction after being struck. Defendant moved for summary disposition, asserting that he had no common-law or statutory duty to warn. The trial court agreed with defendant and granted him summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(8).
i
Whether a defendant owes any duty to a plaintiff to avoid negligent conduct in a particular circumstance is a question of law for the court to determine. Simko v Blake, 448 Mich 648, 655; 532 NW2d 842 (1995). Where no legal duty exists, the plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and summary disposition in favor of the defendant is appropriate pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(8). Schneider v Nectarine Ballroom, Inc (On Remand), 204 Mich App 1, 4; 514 NW2d 486 (1994).
The general rules regarding the liability of a golfer have been summarized as follows:
A person who engages in the game of golf is not an insurer of the safety of others, and he is only required to exercise ordinary care for the safety of persons reasonably within the range of danger.
Generally, one who is about to strike a golf ball must, in the exercise of ordinary care, give an adequate and timely notice to those who are unaware of his intention to play and who may be endangered by the play. Conversely, there is no duty to give advance warning to persons who are on contiguous holes or fairways, and not in the line of play, if danger to them is not reasonably to be anticipated. Also, where the person injured was in a place where he should have been reasonably safe, and he was aware of the player's intention to play the ball, an oral or audible warning would have been superfluous and is therefore unnecessary. [4 Am Jur 2d, Amusements and Exhibitions, § 87, pp 211-212 (1995 interim pamphlet).]
See also anno: Liability to one struck by golf ball, 53 ALR4th 282, § 2; Williams v Wood, 260 Mich 322, 326; 244 NW 490 (1932) (citing, in dicta, the general rules of liability in golf).
Here, there is no dispute that plaintiff knew defendant was preparing to shoot next, that plaintiff drove his golf cart in front of defendant's ball in contravention of common sense and custom, that plaintiff intended to place himself outside the line of defendant's shot by positioning himself behind a tree, and that plaintiff was struck when he moved from his place of safety behind that tree. Under such facts, defendant had absolutely no duty to issue an audible warning to plaintiff upon striking his ball because plaintiff was aware of defendant's intention to play and, to the extent that plaintiff had positioned himself to the right of the green and behind a tree, he was not in the line of play. Cardozo had it right when he summarized the lesson to be learned from this type of case: "The timorous may stay at home."
Accordingly, summary disposition for defendant was properly granted pursuant to MCR 2.116(C) (8).
ii
The trial court's passing reference to the doctrine of assumption of risk was not inappropriate under these facts.
Language to the effect that a plaintiff "assumed the risk" of injury has long been misapplied and misinterpreted by the courts of this state and others. In Felgner v Anderson, 375 Mich 23; 133 NW2d 136 (1965), our Supreme Court conceded that, in a long line of precedent, it had inadvertently broadened the scope of the doctrine of assumption of risk beyond its proper boundaries. Hence, the Court held that assumption of risk may not be asserted as a defense in an ordinary negligence case, except in limited circumstances consistent with the doctrine's common-law origins. Id. at 56.
Recognizing the inexactness surrounding its use, some courts have divided the assumption of risk doctrine into its "primary" and "secondary" senses. Felgner, supra at 54, citing Meistrich v Casino Arena Attractions, Inc, 31 NJ 44; 155 A2d 90 (1959). In its "primary sense," assumption of risk means that either the defendant owed no duty or did not breach any duty owed to the plaintiff, while, in its "secondary sense," the doctrine is used as an affirmative defense to an established breach of duty, i.e., the plaintiffs contributory negligence. Felgner, supra. The fallacy of the doctrine's "secondary sense" is widely recognized, leading to its banishment, yet the bench and bar continue to " 'cling to the terminology of assumption of risk and continue to be misled by it.' " Id. at 55, quoting McGrath v American Cyanamid Co, 41 NJ 272; 196 A2d 238 (1963).
Pertinent for our purposes, the Felgner Court, supra at 45, n 6, explained:
Another type of case falling within this general classification, where assumption of risk is [inappropriately] used to limit the scope of a defendant's liability, is the sport spectator case. Although there is authority for the proposition that a spectator injured while attending a baseball game, e.g., by being struck by a ball, may be met with the affirmative defense that he "assumed this particular risk of injury," Waltanen v Wiitala, 361 Mich 504, 509 [105 NW2d 400 (I960)], the correct rule is stated in Williams v Wood, 260 Mich 322, 327 [244 NW 490 (1932)]:
"The general rule that may be deduced from the cases hereinbefore cited is that certain risks of accident attend all outdoor sports and recovery may be had only if an injury is the result of negligence that could and should have been avoided by the use of ordinary care."
The correctness of this statement may have been obscured by the fact that elsewhere in the opinion the Court implicitly approved the use in such cases of the terminology of assumed risk. E.g., 260 Mich 322, 330.
Thus, analysis indicates that the spectator's suit is barred not by his assumption of risk but rather by a lack of negligence on the part of the park owner. This, of course, is in the ordinary instance of a batted ball flying into unscreened stands. Certainly the situation would be different if a spectator sitting in a screened portion of the stands were injured because a batted ball passed through a hole which the park owner had neglected to repair. Then the owner might be liable for negligence and the spectator would not be barred by any "assumption of risk."
Simply put, one may consent to the inherent risks of being a spectator or participant in a sport, but one does not ordinarily consent to another's negligence.
Here, defendant owed no duty to plaintiff to protect him from injuries that might result from the ordinary and ever-present risks of the sport of golf, as contrasted with those injuries that might be caused by defendant's lack of due care. Felgner, supra at 43. To the extent that plaintiff's injury was not the result of any breach of duty by defendant, the assumption of risk doctrine played a role only in its "primary sense."
Affirmed.
D. J: Kelly, J., concurred.
Murphy v Steeplechase Amusement Co, Inc, 250 NY 479, 483; 166 NE 173 (1929).
Given that certain facts cited in this opinion were not in the parties' pleadings, but are not in dispute because of statements made by counsel at the motion hearing and in their briefs, summary disposition would also be appropriate under MCR 2.116(C)(10).