Case Name: AMERICAN TRANSMISSIONS, INC v. ATTORNEY GENERAL
Court: Michigan Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1996-03-29
Citations: 216 Mich. App. 119
Docket Number: Docket No. 175472
Parties: AMERICAN TRANSMISSIONS, INC v ATTORNEY GENERAL
Judges: Before: Fitzgerald, P.J., and Sawyer and Young, JJ.
Reporter: Michigan appeals reports; cases decided in the Michigan Court of Appeals.
Volume: 216
Pages: 119–125

Head Matter:
AMERICAN TRANSMISSIONS, INC v ATTORNEY GENERAL
Docket No. 175472.
Submitted January 16, 1996, at Lansing.
Decided March 29, 1996, at 9:15 A.M.
Leave to appeal sought.
American Transmissions, Inc., and others brought an action in the Court of Claims against the Attorney General, alleging that the defendant defamed the plaintiffs when interviewed on television about his office’s investigation of the plaintiffs’ business practices. The court, James R. Giddings, J., granted summary disposition for the defendant, ruling that the defendant was entitled to absolute immunity pursuant to MCL 691.1407(5); MSA 3.996(107)(5). The plaintiffs appealed.
The Court of Appeals held:
MCL 691.1407(5); MSA 3.996(107)(5) provides elective executive officials such as the defendant immunity from tort liability for injuries to persons or damage to property whenever they are acting within the scope of their executive authority. In Gracey v Wayne Co Clerk, 213 Mich App 412 (1995), the Court of Appeals, relying on Marrocco v Randlett, 431 Mich 700 (1988), held that there is an exception to such immunity for the intentional use or misuse of a badge of governmental authority for a purpose not authorized by law.
In this case, the plaintiffs have alleged that the defendant participated in the interview for a purpose not authorized by law, i.e., to disseminate false information about the plaintiffs. The matter must be remanded for a determination by the trial court whether there is a question of material fact concerning whether the defendant acted within the scope of his executive authority.
Remanded.
Young, J., concurring, stated that Administrative Order No. 1994-4 binds the Court of Appeals to follow the directive in Gracey to conduct an inquiry into an official’s motivation when determining whether the official is entitled to statutory immunity from tort liability. But for the administrative order, Judge Young would hold that Gracey was wrongly decided to the extent that the Gracey panel believed that Marrocco required an inquiry into an official’s motivation.
Governmental Immunity — Executive Officials.
Absolute immunity from tort liability for acts within an elective executive official’s authority does not extend to intentional use or misuse of a badge of governmental authority for a purpose not authorized by law (MCL 691.1407[5]; MSA 3.996[107][5]).
Mark Granzotto and Neal Bush, for the plaintiffs.
Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Thomas L. Casey, Solicitor General, and Thomas R. Wheeker, Assistant Attorney General, for the defendant.
Before: Fitzgerald, P.J., and Sawyer and Young, JJ.

Opinion:
Fitzgerald, P.J.
Plaintiffs appeal as of right the order granting summary disposition to defendant on the ground that defendant was entitled to absolute immunity for the allegedly defamatory statements made about plaintiffs, automobile transmission repair facilities, during a television interview. We remand.
There is no dispute that the Attorney General is authorized to claim absolute immunity under MCL 691.1407(5); MSA 3.996(107)(5), which provides:
Judges, legislators, and the elective or highest appointive executive officials of all levels of government are immune from tort liability for injuries to persons or damage to property whenever they are acting within the scope of their judicial, legislative, or executive authority.
Plaintiffs contend, however, that defendant was not acting within the scope of his executive authority when he responded to a media request for an interview regarding the investigation of several automobile transmission repair facilities because the investigation had been concluded by the time of the interview. Plaintiffs cite no authority, however, to support their position that defendant's authority to participate in a media interview relates only to currently pending matters. A party may not leave it to this Court to search for authority to sustain or reject the party's position. People v Hunter, 202 Mich App 23, 27; 507 NW2d 768 (1993).
Plaintiffs rely on Marrocco v Randlett, 431 Mich 700; 433 NW2d 68 (1988), and Gracey v Wayne Co Clerk, 213 Mich App 412; 540 NW2d 710 (1995), to support their argument that defendant was not entitled to absolute immunity because his purpose in participating in the interview was not authorized by law. In Gracey, the Court, interpreting Marrocco, held that there is an intentional tort exception to governmental immunity for the intentional use or misuse of a badge of governmental authority for a purpose unauthorized by law. Gracey, supra at 417. Therefore, assuming that defendant had authority to participate in the interview to address an investigation conducted by his office, he nevertheless did not have authority to participate in the interview for the purpose of disseminating false information regarding plaintiffs. If that was defendant's purpose, as claimed by plaintiffs, he was not acting within the scope of his executive authority, and he is not entitled to immunity for those acts. On remand, therefore, the trial court must determine if there is a question of material fact regarding whether defendant was acting within the scope of his executive authority.
Remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Jurisdiction is not retained.
Sawyer, J., concurred.
We concur with the Gracey majority's reluctance in applying the intentional tort exception to governmental immunity found in Marrocco, supra.