Case Name: GARRIS v. VANDERLAAN
Court: Michigan Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1985-10-22
Citations: 146 Mich. App. 619
Docket Number: Docket No. 80570
Parties: GARRIS v VANDERLAAN
Judges: Before:WAHLS, P.J., and Allen and J. C. Ravitz, JJ.
Reporter: Michigan appeals reports; cases decided in the Michigan Court of Appeals.
Volume: 146
Pages: 619–628

Head Matter:
GARRIS v VANDERLAAN
Docket No. 80570.
Submitted July 8, 1985, at Grand Rapids.
Decided October 22, 1985.
Suzanne Garris brought an action in Muskegon Circuit Court against Gerald R. Vanderlaan, alleging serious impairment of a body function arising out of injuries sustained in an automobile accident caused by defendant. Plaintiff alleged that, as a result of the accident, she suffered a back injury and was psychiatrically disabled. In deposition testimony plaintiff indicated that since the accident she had suffered from back pain which made it more difficult to walk, drive, sit or sleep and that she had experienced psychological problems which were manifested in feelings of anger because of her physical injuries. Plaintiff did, however, indicate that, despite the pain she continued to experience, she could perform almost all the activities she was capable of performing before the accident. Medical testimony indicated that plaintiff was suffering from a post-traumatic neurosis, which is characterized by depression, anxiety, confusion and isolation and may be associated with some type of bodily injury or mental injury, and that plaintiff’s post-traumatic neurosis may have been related to the automobile accident. The medical testimony indicated that there was no objective evidence of traumatic or orthopedic pathology to account for plaintiff’s physical complaints and that the doctors were unable to establish a relationship between the plaintiff’s back problems and the accident. Defendant moved for summary judgment on the basis that plaintiff had failed to establish that she suffered impairment of a body function within the meaning of the no-fault act such that she would be entitled to seek tort recovery for noneconomic losses. The trial court, Michael E. Kobza, J., granted defendant’s motion, holding that plaintiff _had failed to make the requisite showing of a serious impair ment of a body function within the meaning of the no-fault act. Plaintiff appealed. Held:
References for Points in Headnotes
[1-5] Am Jur 2d, Automobile Insurance §§ 340 et seq.
What constitutes sufficiently serious personal injury, disability, impairment, or the like to justify recovery of damages outside of no-fault automobile insurance coverage. 33 ALR4th 767.
1. Since the facts were undisputed as to the nature and extent of plaintiffs condition, the question of whether she had a serious impairment of a body function was a question of law for the trial court.
2. For there to be serious impairment of body function within the meaning of the no-fault act, there must be an objectively manifested injury which results in serious impairment.
3. The post-traumatic neurosis from which plaintiff alledgedly suffers is not an objectively manifested injury. Neither the neurosis nor the alleged back problems constitute a serious impairment, since neither condition had a significant effect
• upon plaintiffs ability to lead a normal life. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in holding that plaintiff had not suffered a serious impairment of a body function.
Affirmed.
J. C. Ravitz, J., dissented. He would hold that there is a serious impairment of a bodily function within the meaning of the no-fault act where, nearly four years after an accident, plaintiff continues to have difficulty sitting, sleeping and driving and suffers from post-traumatic neurosis. He would further hold that the "medical measurement” test should not be used to bar tort recovery for noneconomic losses where an injured person’s serious impairment stems from soft-tissue injuries and psychiatric trauma and where the ordinary means of diagnosis and prescription of treatment are subjective indications from a patient, since that should satisfy the objective manifestation requirement. He would reverse.
Opinion of the Court
1. Insurance — No-Fault Insurance — Serious Impairment of Body Function.
The question of whether an injury is a serious impairment of body function under the no-fault act so as to give rise to tort liability for noneconomic loss must be decided as a matter of law by the trial court where there is no factual dispute regarding the nature and extent of the plaintiffs injuries (MCL 500.3135; MSA 24.13135).
2. Insurance — No-Fault Insurance — Serious Impairment of Body Function.
The question of whether an individual has suffered a serious impairment of a body function within the meaning of the no-fault act must be determined on a case-by-case basis; in making that determination the court must determine: (1) whether the alleged impairment is an impairment of an important body function, (2) whether the impairment is serious, and (3) whether the impairment results from objectively manifested injuries, since any recovery for pain and suffering must flow from pain and suffering associated with injuries that affect the functioning of the body (MCL 500.3135; MSA 24.13135).
3. Insurance — No-Fault Insurance — Post-Traumatic Neurosis — Serious Impairment of Body Function.
Post-traumatic neurosis, when not associated with some objectively manifested serious impairment of a body function, is not sufficient to satisfy the threshold requirement for tort liability for noneconomic loss under the no-fault act (MCL 500.3135; MSA 24.13135).
4. Insurance — No-Fault Insurance — Serious Impairment of Body Function.
A serious impairment of body function under the no-fault act is to be measured by an objective standard which looks to the effect of an injury on a person’s general ability to live a normal life (MCL 500.3135; MSA 24.13135).
Dissent by J. C. Ravitz, J.
'5. Insurance — No-Fault Insurance — Post-Trauma Neurosis.
The Legislature in adopting the serious impairment of a body function test in the no-fault act as the threshold test before there could be tort recovery for noneconomic losses did not intend that only those injuries which are capable of some medical measurement trigger the right to tort recovery; rather, the Legislature’s threshold requirement is met where a doctor, on the basis of the plaintiff’s complaints, diagnoses that the plaintiff is suffering from soft tissue injury and serious physical and emotional manifestations of a post-trauma neurosis caused by the automobile accident (MCL 500.3135; MSA 24.13135).
Tucker, Barbour & Mack, P.C. (by Milton L. Mack, Jr.), for plaintiff.
William J. Hipkiss, for defendant.
Before:WAHLS, P.J., and Allen and J. C. Ravitz, JJ.
Recorder’s Court judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.

Opinion:
Per Curiam.
Plaintiff was injured in an automobile accident on November 24, 1979. She commenced an action on November 22, 1982, alleging serious impairment of body function. Plaintiff contended that she suffered a back injury and was psychiatrically disabled as a result of the accident. Defendant moved for summary judgment pursuant to GCR 1963, 117.2(3), on the basis that plaintiff's alleged injuries did not meet the statutory threshold for recovery of noneconomic losses, MCL 500.3135; MSA 24.13135. Defendant's motion was granted and plaintiff appeals as of right. We affirm.
If there is no material factual dispute as to the nature and extent of plaintiff's injuries, the court has the responsibility to decide as a matter of law the threshold question of whether there is serious impairment of body function. Cassidy v McGovern, 415 Mich 483, 502; 330 NW2d 22 (1982), reh den 417 Mich 1104 (1983). While the threshold question must be decided on a case-by-case basis, a few standards have developed to assist courts in this determination. First, "impairment of a body function" actually refers to an impairment of an important body function. Cassidy, supra, p 504. Second, by its own terms, the statute requires that an impairment be "serious". MCL 500.3135(1); MSA 24.13135(1); Williams v Payne, 131 Mich App 403, 409; 346 NW2d 564 (1984). Third, §3135 applies only to objectively manifested injuries. Recovery for pain and suffering is not predicated on serious pain and suffering, but on injuries that affect the functioning of the body. Cassidy, supra, p 505; Williams, supra, p 409; Routely v Dault, 140 Mich App 190, 193; 363 NW2d 450 (1984).
The general character of plaintiffs injuries are not seriously disputed. Plaintiff testified by way of deposition that she had back problems following the November 24, 1979, automobile accident. She found activities such as walking a couple of miles, driving, sitting and sleeping more difficult than before the accident. Following the accident, plaintiff also experienced psychological problems which were manifested in feelings of anger because of time lost due to her physical injuries. Plaintiffs deposition testimony indicated, however, that, despite the pain she allegedly continued to experience, she could still perform almost all of the activities she was capable of performing before the accident.
On September 29, 1983, plaintiff was examined by defendant's consulting psychiatrist, Charles Brosius, M.D. His deposition testimony indicated that plaintiff complained of anxiety, tension and anger. He found no evidence of psychosis, a mental illness arising in the mind itself, but instead diagnosed plaintiffs condition as post-traumatic neurosis, which is characterized by depression, anxiety, confusion, isolation and may be associated with some type of bodily injury or mental injury. The post-traumatic neurosis may have been related to the November 24, 1979, automobile accident. Dr. Brosius believed that the neurosis was temporary and would subside in a short period of time if plaintiff received psychiatric treatment.
Satyabrata Maitra, M.D., examined plaintiff on October 4, 1983, and found "no objective evidence of traumatic or orthopedic pathology to account for her physical complaints". Dr. Brosius was also unable to establish a relationship between plaintiffs back problem and the automobile accident.
We review the facts of this case, as set forth in depositions, pleadings and affidavits, by giving the benefit of any reasonable doubt to plaintiff as the party opposing the motion for summary judgment. GCR 1963, 117.2(3); Rizzo v Kretschmer, 389 Mich 363, 372; 207 NW2d 316 (1973). We have no trouble concluding that the functioning of the mind represents an important body function, Cassidy, supra, p 504; however, we believe plaintiff has failed to demonstrate: (1) that she suffered a "serious" impairment of that body function; and (2) that she suffered an objectively manifested injury. Cassidy, supra, p 505; Williams, supra, p 409; Routely, supra, p 193.
Cassidy speaks of "objectively manifested injuries", not symptoms. Williams, supra, p 410. When considering the seriousness of the injury, we must be mindful of the other threshold requirements (i.e., death and permanent serious disfigurement) and the legislative reasons for limiting the recovery for noneconomic losses, namely to prevent overcompensation for minor injuries and reduce litigation in automobile cases. Cassidy, supra, p 503; Routely, supra, p 193. Under the facts of this case, while plaintiff's post-traumatic neurosis allegedly resulted in anxiety, nervousness and feelings of anger, such symptoms did not constitute an objectively manifested injury. Williams, supra, p 410. Plaintiff's alleged symptoms are purely subjective. It cannot be said that plaintiff's post-traumatic neurosis surpasses the significant barrier imposed by the Legislature in requiring a "serious impairment of body function" for recovery of noneconomic losses. See Luce v Gerow, 89 Mich App 546; 280 NW2d 592 (1979), a pre-Cassidy interpretation of serious impairment of body function regarding a mental "injury".
In addition, when determining whether a certain injury meets the threshold requirement for recovery of noneconomic loss, the court should apply an objective standard and look to the effect of the injury on the individual's ability to lead a normal life. Braden v Lee, 133 Mich App 215; 348 NW2d 63 (1984); Routely, supra, p 194. In this case, four years after the accident, plaintiff continued to experience pain in her back and suffered from psychiatric problems. Plaintiff's deposition testimony indicated, however, that she was capable of carrying out her normal day-to-day activities.
Plaintiff failed to provide evidentiary support that she suffered a serious impairment of body function. Cassidy, supra. Assuming that plaintiff did suffer a back injury and post-traumatic neurosis, it has not been established that such injuries significantly interfered with her normal activities. Braden, supra. Plaintiff's alleged injuries are not objectively manifested and are not sufficiently "serious" to rise to the level intended by the Legislature to be necessary to support an action for noneconomic losses. Plaintiff is therefore left to her remedies under the no-fault act. We conclude that the trial court correctly granted summary judgment in favor of defendant. GCR 1963, 117.2(3).
The decision of the trial court is affirmed.