Case Name: Theodore C. HARRIS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1988-07-01
Citations: 528 So. 2d 361
Docket Number: No. 72589
Parties: Theodore C. HARRIS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: McDonald and GRIMES, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 528
Pages: 361–367

Head Matter:
Theodore C. HARRIS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. 72589.
Supreme Court of Florida.
July 1, 1988.
Daniel L. Rabinowitz and Keith E. Ly-nott of McCarter & English, Boca Raton, and Newark, N.J., for appellant.
Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., Charles M. Fahlbusch, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Richard L. Kaplan, Capital Collateral Coordinator, Miami, for appellee.

Opinion:
OVERTON, Justice.
In this postconviction relief proceeding, Theodore C. Harris appeals the denial of his Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 motion to vacate his conviction and sentence of death, and also seeks a stay of execution from his death warrant. We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const. For the reasons expressed below, we affirm the trial court's denial of the requested relief and deny the stay of execution.
This is Harris' first death warrant but his third appearance before this Court. We affirmed his conviction and sentence of death in Harris v. State, 438 So.2d 787 (Fla.1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 963, 104 S.Ct. 2181, 80 L.Ed.2d 563 (1984). As reflected in that decision:
The victim, a seventy-three-year-old woman, was found dead in her home on the morning of Sunday, March 22, 1981. She had died during the night from multiple stab wounds and wounds inflicted by a blunt instrument. A knife, a bloody rock, and a blood-covered wooden chair were found in the house. The autopsy revealed that the victim had suffered numerous defensive wounds on her arms, hands, and shoulders. Blood was spattered over the walls and furnishings of the bedroom, living room, and kitchen, indicating that the victim had tried to escape her assailant while she was being stabbed and beaten.
Id. at 789. At the time of the murder, Harris was living with the victim's granddaughter in the same neighborhood. He had previously been married to that granddaughter's sister. Harris had signed a written confession which was fully set forth in our prior opinion. He presented no evidence in his own behalf in the guilt phase of the trial.
During the penalty phase, the state presented evidence that Harris had been previously convicted of robbery and that he was on parole at the time of the murder. At the conclusion of the penalty phase, defense counsel requested a continuance to bring Harris' ex-wife, other family members, and a minister from Jacksonville to testify in Harris' behalf. When the court reconvened, counsel advised the court the ex-wife was hospitalized and he had been unable to contact the minister. As a result of the unavailability of these witnesses, Harris presented no evidence in mitigation during the penalty phase. We affirmed the imposition of the death sentence and agreed that the following aggravating circumstances applied: (1) Harris was under a sentence of imprisonment when he committed the murder; (2) he had previously been convicted of a felony involving violence; (3) the murder was committed while Harris was engaged in committing a robbery or burglary; and (4) the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, and cruel. We rejected the aggravating circumstance that the murder was committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner, but concluded that the improper finding of this aggravating circumstance did not require a new sentencing proceeding. Id. at 798.
Subsequently, Harris petitioned this Court for a writ of habeas corpus, claiming he was denied effective assistance of counsel during his direct appeal on the grounds his attorneys "failed to adequately challenge the validity of the affidavit of probable cause that supported the warrant for his arrest." Harris v. Wainwright, 473 So.2d 1246, 1247 (Fla.1985). We rejected that claim, noting that Harris was seeking a second review of an issue which was previously raised and expressly addressed by the Court. Further, we found that his counsel was not ineffective and that the allegations did not establish prejudicial appellate counsel deficiencies.
This 3.860 motion raises multiple issues, fifteen of which the trial court rejected because they were "either barred on the grounds of res judicata, collateral estoppel and the law of the case, having previously been ruled upon [by this Court, or that they were] procedurally barred because they were issues which could have and should have been raised on direct appeal but were not and which were not properly preserved by request or objection at trial." The trial court held an evidentiary hearing regarding the ineffective assistance of counsel claims and, in denying relief, concluded that "defense counsel did not commit any deficiency below the standards expected of counsel." In addressing the question of whether Harris was prejudiced because of the failure to present certain testimony, the court concluded that "the testimony of the witnesses heard during this hearing would not, in any way, shape or form, have altered the verdict that the original jury reached."
This appeal addresses principally the claim that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to properly investigate and obtain character evidence through Harris' service and school records and from members of his family and former employers. Harris also claims that his trial counsel was ineffective in the manner in which he argued the case before the jury.
These ineffective assistance of counsel claims are governed by the principles set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). In determining ineffectiveness of counsel, the issue is whether counsel's conduct "so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result." Id. at 669, 104 S.Ct. at 2055. To reverse a conviction or set aside a death sentence on these grounds, the defendant must show "first, that counsel's performance was deficient and, second, that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense so as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial." Id. Further, "[w]hen a defendant challenges a death sentence . the question is whether there is a reasonable probability that, absent the errors, the sentencer — including an appellate court, to the extent it independently reweighs the evidence — would have concluded that the balance of aggravating and mitigating circumstances did not warrant death." Id. at 695, 104 S.Ct. at 2068. The Strickland Court noted that, in answering the question, a court need not first determine whether counsel's performance was deficient before examining whether the claimed deficiency resulted in prejudice to the defendant. We previously explained how the Strickland test is to be applied in Downs v. State, 453 So.2d 1102 (Fla.1984).
The claim of ineffectiveness presented in Strickland asserted that counsel was deficient in failing to investigate and present character witnesses and obtain a psychiatric report for the defendant. The evidence that was alleged should have been presented in Strickland would have shown that numerous people thought the defendant was generally a good person and that a psychiatrist and psychologist believed he was under considerable emotional stress. The United States Supreme Court rejected this claim, noting that the evidence would not have sufficiently altered the sentencing profile and, because of the aggravating factors, there was no reasonable probability that the omitted evidence would have changed the conclusion.
The claim in Harris' case is similar. He asserts counsel was ineffective for failing to have presented certain mitigating evidence. He argues that, cumulatively, the testimony from relatives and friends which should have been presented would have established that Harris was a kind, decent man dedicated to his family, a warm and loving parent, a good provider, a timid person and not the kind who would ever harm anyone, a regular church-goer, a dependa ble and trustworthy employee, and a loyal and valued friend.
He also argues that his school and military records should have been presented to the jury to demonstrate, inter alia, that during his service in the army Harris was commended for assisting the Red Cross in a blood drive on one day. He received a commendation letter thanking him and seven other servicemen for assisting the driver in setting up and breaking down the mobile blood unit.
To this evidence the state could respond that when Harris committed this murder, he was burglarizing the home of the grandmother of the woman who had befriended him and given him a place to stay. Further, that his military records show he was undesirably discharged and had been absent without leave on several occasions. Additionally, that evidence would allow the state to present evidence that Harris had been convicted of two prior burglaries and a robbery in which he broke an elderly woman's arm while snatching her purse. These circumstances, coupled with the statutory aggravating circumstances, including the fact that this seventy-three-year-old woman had six stab wounds and forty-one incision wounds caused by a knife and five lacerations caused by a blunt instrument, overwhelm the suggested mitigating evidence. We conclude there is no reasonable probability the omitted mitigating evidence would have affected the jury's recommendation or the sentence imposed by the trial judge. See, e.g., McCrae v. State, 510 So.2d 874 (Fla.1987); Maxwell v. Wainwright, 490 So.2d 927 (Fla.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 972, 107 S.Ct. 474, 93 L.Ed.2d 418 (1986); Porter v. State, 478 So.2d 33 (Fla.1985). We also reject as without merit the claim that his counsel's argument in the penalty phase was so ineffective that it requires a new sentencing proceeding.
Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's order and deny Harris' application for a stay of execution.
It is so ordered.
McDonald and GRIMES, JJ., concur.
EHRLICH, C.J., concurs specially with opinion.
SHAW, J., concurs specially with opinion with which EHRLICH, C.J., concurs.
BARKETT, J., dissents with opinion with which KOGAN, J., concurs.
KOGAN, J., dissents with opinion with which BARKETT, J., concurs.