Case Name: Metteyya BRAHMANA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Joseph Lowell HENARD; County of Santa Cruz, Defendants-Appellees
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 2012-06-29
Citations: 474 F. App'x 513
Docket Number: No. 11-15790
Parties: Metteyya BRAHMANA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Joseph Lowell HENARD; County of Santa Cruz, Defendants-Appellees.
Judges: Before: SCHROEDER, HAWKINS, and GOULD, Circuit Judges.
Reporter: West's Federal Appendix
Volume: 474
Pages: 513–514

Head Matter:
Metteyya BRAHMANA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Joseph Lowell HENARD; County of Santa Cruz, Defendants-Appellees.
No. 11-15790.
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
Submitted June 26, 2012.
Filed June 29, 2012.
Metteyya Brahmana, San Francisco, CA, pro se.
Jason Michael Heath, Assistant County Counsel, Santa Cruz, CA, for Defendants-Appellees.
Before: SCHROEDER, HAWKINS, and GOULD, Circuit Judges.
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

Opinion:
MEMORANDUM
Metteyya Brahmana appeals pro se from the district court's judgment dismissing his lawsuit alleging that Officer Joseph Henard violated numerous federal and state laws when he informed third parties of a criminal investigation against Brahma-na that was ultimately dropped. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo, Mullins v. Oregon, 57 F.3d 789, 792 (9th Cir.1995), and we affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Brahmana's due process claims because Brahmana failed to allege either a violation of a liberty interest protected by the substantive aspect of the Due Process Clause, or insufficient procedural protections of his state-created liberty interests in violation of the procedural aspect of the Due Process Clause. See id. at 793-95 (explaining that while procedural due process claims may arise from state-created liberty inter-' ests, a substantive due process claim requires a violation of a fundamental liberty).
The district court properly dismissed Brahmana's equal protection claim premised on a "class of one" theory because such a claim is inapplicable to the inherently discretionary decision by officials to investigate him. See Engquist v. Or. Dep't of Agric., 553 U.S. 591, 602-03, 128 S.Ct. 2146, 170 L.Ed.2d 975 (2008) (explaining the inapplicability of the "class of one" theory to discretionary decisions).
The district court properly dismissed Brahmana's state law claims on immunity grounds because, under California law, Officer Henard's public statements concerning the investigation are immunized, even if he acted maliciously and without probable cause and officials ultimately decided not to bring charges against Brahmana. See Cal. Gov't Code § 821.6 (a public employee is not liable for "injury caused by his instituting or prosecuting any judicial or administrative proceeding within the scope of his employment, even if he acts maliciously and without probable cause"); Gillan v. City of San Marino, 147 Cal. App.4th 1033, 55 Cal.Rptr.3d 158, 171 (2007) (applying § 821.6 to statements during investigations, even if the authorities decide later not to bring charges); of Cappuccio, Inc. v. Harmon, 208 Cal. App.3d 1496, 257 Cal.Rptr. 4, 6 (1989) (applying § 821.6 to announcements of the result of an investigation).
Brahmana's remaining contentions are unpersuasive.
AFFIRMED.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.