Case Name: Barbara L. FREYHOLTZ, Relator, v. BLACKDUCK SCHOOL DISTRICT # 32 and American Compensation Ins. Co./RTW, Inc., Respondents
Court: Minnesota Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Minnesota
Decision Date: 2000-07-13
Citations: 613 N.W.2d 757
Docket Number: No. C1-00-268
Parties: Barbara L. FREYHOLTZ, Relator, v. BLACKDUCK SCHOOL DISTRICT # 32 and American Compensation Ins. Co./RTW, Inc., Respondents.
Judges: 
Reporter: North Western Reporter 2d
Volume: 613
Pages: 757–760

Head Matter:
Barbara L. FREYHOLTZ, Relator, v. BLACKDUCK SCHOOL DISTRICT # 32 and American Compensation Ins. Co./RTW, Inc., Respondents.
No. C1-00-268.
Supreme Court of Minnesota.
July 13, 2000.
Rehearing Denied Aug. 14, 2000.
Hazelton & Rodgers, P.C., Mark L. Rodgers, Bemidji, for relator.
Cousineau, McGuire & Anderson, Chartered, Thomas V. Maguire, Justin A. Hanson, Minneapolis, for respondent.

Opinion:
OPINION
STRINGER, Justice.
This workers' compensation matter comes before us by certiorari upon the petition of the employee to review a decision of the Workers' Compensation Court of Appeals affirming the compensation judge's determination that the employer did not have timely notice of the employee's work-related back injury. We affirm.
On September 17, 1996, while engaged in cleaning work for the Blaekduek School District, employee Barbara Freyholtz had an onset of back pain while moving a desk. She reported the injury to her chiropractor the next day when she was seen at a previously scheduled appointment for unrelated, pre-existing medical conditions. The chiropractor told the employee that her back injury was causally related to the work incident. The employee was reluctant to report the injury to her employer, however, as she "felt maybe it wasn't too big of a deal" and "didn't take it too seriously at first," although she continued to receive regular chiropractic care for her back. Ultimately, the employee reported the injury to her employer on October 22, 1996, and subsequently petitioned for workers' compensation benefits. Following a hearing, benefits were denied by the compensation judge on finding that the employee had not provided timely notice of injury. On appeal, the Workers' Compensation Court of Appeals affirmed.
By statute, where notice of injury is provided within 30 days from the occurrence of the injury, "no want, failure, or inaccuracy of a notice" will bar compensation unless the employer shows prejudice. Minn.Stat. § 176.141 (1998). Where notice is provided to the employer more than 30 days but less than 180 days from the occurrence of the injury, compensation is still payable if the employee "shows that failure to give prior notice was due to the employee's mistake, inadvertence, ignorance of fact or law, or inability, or to the fraud, misrepresentation, or deceit of the employer or agent." Id. Late notice may also be excused by the trivial injury rule. See Issacson v. Minnetonka, Inc., 411 N.W.2d 865, 867 (Minn.1987). Here, the compensation judge found that the employee's late notice was not excused by reason of mistake, inadvertence, ignorance of fact or law, inability, employer conduct or the trivial injury rule.
When a workers' compensation matter comes to this court on certiorari, if the compensation judge's findings have been reversed, we look at the record to see if the compensation judge's findings had substantial evidentiary support. See, e.g, Ruether v. State, 455 N.W.2d 475, 478 (Minn.1990); Polaschek v. Asbestos Products, Inc., 361 N.W.2d 37, 42 (Minn.1985). If the findings have been affirmed, however, we will not intrude unless the findings are "manifestly contrary to the evidence" or unless "the evidence clearly requires reasonable minds to adopt a contrary conclusion." Egeland v. City of Minneapolis, 344 N.W.2d 597, 601 (Minn.1984) (quoting McClish v. Pan-O-Gold Baking Co., 336 N.W.2d 538, 541 (Minn.1983)). We are also committed to the principle that if different inferences can justifiably be drawn from the same evidence in the case, the inference drawn by the factfinder will not be disturbed on appeal. See Dille v. Knox Lumber/Div. of Southwest Forest, 452 N.W.2d 679, 681 (Minn.1990) (citing Gerhardt v. Welch, 267 Minn. 206, 210, 125 N.W.2d 721, 724 (1964)). "It is not the function of this court to weigh the evidence to find facts to meet our preference." Dille, 452 N.W.2d at 681 (citing Hengemuhle v. Long Prairie Jaycees, 358 N.W.2d 54, 60 (Minn.1984)). That we might have found the facts differently is not the basis for reversal in a case such as this where the facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the findings, sustain the determination of the compensation judge and the Workers' Compensation Court of Appeals that the notice requirements of section 176.141 had not been met.
Affirmed.
. The assertion of the dissent that there is no evidence to support the finding of the compensation judge that the employee's failure to give timely notice was not excused by mistake, inadvertence, or ignorance of fact or law is not supported by the record and is an overstatement.