Case Name: Allcorn and another v. Butler, Adm'x
Court: Supreme Court of Texas
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1852
Citations: 9 Tex. 56
Docket Number: 
Parties: Allcorn and another v. Butler, Adm'x.
Judges: 
Reporter: Texas Reports
Volume: 9
Pages: 28–29

Head Matter:
Allcorn and another v. Butler, Adm'x.
Iri a suit for specific performance ifc is proper to make a previous vendor in whom the legal-title yet remains a party; and in sucha caso a letter from the previous vendor to tiio plaintiff, informing him when he expected to bo able to convey, is admissible in evidence as conducing to prove that he had contracted to convey but had not conveyed to the plaintiff's immediate vendor (the other defendant) the land in question.
Where one attorney at law procures another to represent him in a case of which the client has notice and makes no objection, the client cannot alterwards, when sued by the attorney whom he employed for his fee, object to tlio right of the latter to make the substitution.
A contract between attorney and client for a specific fee is not affected by a compromise of the suit. (Note 10.)
Error from Washington. This suit was brought by the, defendant in error against the plaintiffs in error, Alleorn and Chi-isinan, for the. specific performance of a contract to convey land evidenced by a bond for tide made1 by Alleorn in favor of Butler, in September, 1839. Alleorn bad purchased the land of Chrisman, who still retained the legal title.
The plaintiff offered in e-vidence a letter from Chrisman to Butler, dated in March, 1843, iuformiug Butler when he expected to be able to malee, title, to which the defendant objected, but the court overruled the objection. The defendant Alleorn contested the plain!ill’s right to a conveyance, on the ground that the consideration of the contract had failed. It; appeared that the bond to make title was given in consideration of the professional services of Butler as an attorney at law in a suit in which Alleorn was defendant. Butler appeared for Alleorn in the suit, and conducted the defence during-several years previous to 1S47. In filio spring- of that year lie told the brother of the defendant (who came to consult with him about the suit at the. defendant’s request) to tell the latter to employ another attorney, that he could not attend to the case any longer. Afterwards, intending to go abroad, he engaged tlu-ec other attorneys to re.pre.sont him in. this and other oases. They did represent him in this case with the. knowledge of the defendant, who made no objection. He employed no other attorney, "nor did those who represented Bufler charge or receive any fee for (heir ¡services. The parties subsequently settled their controversy by compromise, and the, suit was dismissed. These were tlie principal facts relied on to establish the failure of consideration. There was a verdict and judgment for the piaintili'.
Noth U). — Cases might undoubtedly present themselves in which the attorney would not be $>ermiitt<d to control tile suit so as to prevent a compromise; or, in other words, where the attorney would not be permitted to continue the litigation to the injury of the client. (Hill v. •Cunningham, -5 T., 25.)
A. AT. Lewis, for plaintiffs in error.
J. 8anl.es and J. D. Giddings, for defendant in error.

Opinion:
Wheeler, J.-
It does not appear on what ground the objection to tlie ad-rnissibiiiiy in evidence of Chrisniau's letter was founded. It certainly was proper to make him a party to tlie suit; and his letter t:o Butler was as certainly admissible in evidence as conducing to prove that he had contracted to convey hut. had not conveyed to Allcorn the legal title, to the land in question.
The only question in the case deserving- of notice is whether the defence of a failure of consideration was made out in evidence; and we arc of opinion that it. wn- not. The defendant Allcorn received the professional services of Butler in pursuance of their contract through a scries of years; aud although the latter did make the declaration that liccould no longer attend to the case, lie did not act in accordance with that declaration, but on the contrary engaged others to attend to the ease for hint. The acceptance of their services by the defendant precluded him from afterwards objecting to tlie right of Butler to make the substitution. The fact that the defendant saw fit to compromise t lie. suit did not deprive the at torney of his right to his fee. The compromise appears to have been advantageous to tlie defendant, and there can he no pretense, that lie suffered any injury in consequence of the absence of liis at torney. AYe are of opinion that there is no error in the judgment, and that it he affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.