Case Name: Andrew G. Washbon et al., App'lts, v. Nancy Cope et al., Resp'ts
Court: New York Supreme Court, General Term
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1893-02-23
Citations: 50 N.Y. St. Rep. 821
Docket Number: 
Parties: Andrew G. Washbon et al., App'lts, v. Nancy Cope et al., Resp'ts.
Judges: 
Reporter: New York State Reporter
Volume: 50
Pages: 821–828

Head Matter:
Andrew G. Washbon et al., App'lts, v. Nancy Cope et al., Resp'ts.
(Supreme Court, General Term, Fourth Department,
Filed February 23, 1893.)
Will—Construction.
The fourth clause of testator’s will was as follows: “ I give and bequeath to my daughter N. the sum of §10,000;” by the seventh clause he devised all the remainder of Ms property to Ms three children, R. K. and H., “to he divided equally,” but by the eighth clause he provides: “ I devise and direct that in the event of my daughter ÍT. shall die without children, the portion herein given to her shall be given to my sons or their heirs.” Meld, that it was the intention of the testator to provide that the portion of his estate given to ÍT., in the event of her death without issue, should pass to his sons or their heirs, and that the “ words of contingency” used by him do not refer to a death in Ms lifetime.
(Merwin, J., dissents.)
Appeal from a judgment of the special term held in Otsego county, dismissing the plaintiffs1 complaint. Andrew Gf. Washbon died March 1st, 1867, leaving a last will and testament bearing date the 31st day of January, 1865. He was in his seventy-seventh year when the will was executed. The first clause of the will provided an annuity for his wife. The second clause devised a farm in trust for his son, John Gf., with the remainder over to the descendants of John “who shall be living at his decease, to whom I devise and bequeath the same so that the descendants of each deceased child, if any, of my said son, John Gf. Washbon, shall take together and per stirpes one share as said deceased child, their parent, would have taken if living, and for the benefit of said descendants of said son, John Gf. Washbon.” The third clause devised a farm to his sou, Henry R., containing 188 acres. The fourth provision was as follows: “ I give and bequeath to my daughter, Haney Cope, wife of John Cope, Jr., the sum of ten thousand ($10,000) dollars.” The fifth clause gave a legacy of $2,000 to John Cope, Jr., husband of Haney. The sixth clause contained a bequest to his second son, Robert, of $12,000. The seventh clause was as follows: “ I give and bequeath and devise all rest, residue and remainder of my property, real and personal; to my three children, Robert Washbon, Haney Cope, wife of John Cope, Jr., and Henry R. Washbon, to be divided equally between them.” “Eighthly: I furthermore desire and direct that in the event of my daughter, Haney Cope, wife of John Cope, Jr., shall die without children, the portion herein given to her shall be given to my sons John Gf., Robert and Henry R, or their heirs, share and share alike.” In the ninth clause there was a provision for his sister and the tenth clause was as follows: “I furthermore direct and authorize my executors hereinafter named to spll. all real estate which I may have, except such as I have otherwise given and devised in this my last will and testament for the benefit of my heirs, at such times as said executors shall deem best.” “Eleventhly. I do hereby nominate and appoint my sons Robert Washbon and Henry R. Washbon, and my son-in-law John Cope, Jr., to be the executors of this my last will and testament, hereby revoking all former wills by me made.” The special term held that the surrogate’s decree was not binding upon Haney Cope; and secondly, that she took under the provisions of her father’s will absolutely under the provisions made in her behalf. ' ■
Carver, Deyo & Jenkins, for app’lts;
Burr Mattice, for resp’ts.

Opinion:
Hardin, P. J.
(1) If Haney Cope only took a life estate or was " entitled to the use of the legacy during her life and nothing more," then this action was properly brought and the. plaintiffs were entitled to some relief. Tyson v. Blake, 22 N. Y., 558; Livingston v. Murray, 68 id., 485. Plaintiffs alleged and sought to establish by evidence that their interests would be imperiled without some security required, and to bring their case within the qualified rule stated in Graham v. N. Y. Life Ins. & Trust Co., 46 Hun, 267, and Matter of Fernbacher, 17 Abb. N. C., 339.
(2) When the will was made Nancy Cope was about forty-four years of age, having been married ten years, and was then and still is childless. It is suggested " the words of contingency refer only to a death in the lifetime of a testator." In the tenth clause of the will -the testator directs and authorizes his executors "to sell all the real estate " which he had, except such as he had "given and devised for the benefit of my (his) heirs, at such times as said executors shall deem best " ; and in the eighth clause he provides as follows: " I furthermore desire and direct that in the event of my daughter, Nancy Cope, wife of John Cope, Jr., shall die without children, the portion herein given to her shall be given to my sons, John G\, Robert and Henry R, or their heirs, share and share alike." The language used indicates an intent on the part of the testator that the portion given to her, in the event she shall die without children, "shall be given " either to his sons, John Gf., Robert and Henry R, "or their heirs, share and share alike; " thus a provision is made for the giving of her share upon her death without children to his sons John, Robert and Henry, and not being content to provide for their reception of it only, he provides still further for the portion being given "to their heirs, share and share alike," using words apt to control the • estate at a time so far in the future as might be subsequent to the death of John Gr., Robert and Henry R, or either of them.
Considering the language just referred to, as well as the facts and circumstances surrounding the testator at the time of his execution of the will, and the whole language of the instrument, and observing the rule " that all the parts of an instrument are to be taken together in ascertaining its meaning, and that no part of it should be rejected as inoperative if the whole can reasonably stand together," Norris v. Beyea, 13 N. Y., 283, the conclusion is reached that it was the intention of the testator to provide that the portion of his estate given to Nancy, in the event of her death witiiout issue, should pass to those of the blood of the testator. And that the " words of contingency " used by the testator do not refer to a death in the lifetime of the testator. Executors of Moffat v. Strong, 10 Johns., 12; Greyston v. Clark, 41 Hun, 125; 4 St. Rep., 4; Nellis v. Nellis, 99 N. Y., 513; Vanderzee v. Slingerland, 103 id., 56; 2 St. Rep., 732; Buel v. Southwick, 70 N. Y., 581; Britton v. Thornton, 112 U. S., 526, and the opinion of Learned, P. J., in Mead v. Maben, 131 N. Y., 255; 43 St. Rep., 167.
In speaking of the rule referring to death without issue to a time prior to the death of a testator, Andrews, J., in Vanderzee v. Slingerland, supra, says, " But the rule established by the courts applies only where the context of the will is silent, and affords no indication of intention other than that disclosed by words of absolute gift, followed by a gift over in case of death, or of death without issue or other specific event. Indeed the tendency is to lay hold of slight circumstances of the will to vary the constructiunjmd to give effect to the language according to its natura;! import." See also his opinion in Soper v. Brown, 49 St. Rep., 206.
In Mullarky v. Sullivan, 49 St. Rep., 333, O'Brien, J., in giving construction to a will, says, " It is perfectly true that in determining what the testator meant every part of the will must be considered, and that the natural and ordinary meaning of the words of a particular clause may be modified by other provisions."
(3) As the foregoing views if adopted would lead to a reversal, it is not important to consider the effect of the surrogate's decree declaring a construction of the will in accordance with the views already expressed. There should be a reversal and a new trial.
Judgment reversed and a new trial ordered, with costs to abide the event.
Martin, J., concurs.