Case Name: Irma ROWE and her husband, Wallace Rowe, Appellants, v. WINN-DIXIE STORES, INC. and Winn-DIXIE Montgomery, Inc., Appellees
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1998-08-03
Citations: 714 So. 2d 1180
Docket Number: No. 97-1473
Parties: Irma ROWE and her husband, Wallace Rowe, Appellants, v. WINN-DIXIE STORES, INC. and Winn-DIXIE Montgomery, Inc., Appellees.
Judges: BARFIELD, C.J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 714
Pages: 1180–1185

Head Matter:
Irma ROWE and her husband, Wallace Rowe, Appellants, v. WINN-DIXIE STORES, INC. and Winn-DIXIE Montgomery, Inc., Appellees.
No. 97-1473.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
Aug. 3, 1998.
Pamela Dru Sutton of Stone & Sutton, P.A., Panama City, for Appellants.
Richard N. Blank of Richard N. Blank, P.A., Ft. Lauderdale, for Appellees.

Opinion:
ALLEN, Judge.
The appellants challenge a summary final judgment entered for the appellees in a slip and fall action. Because we conclude that the "negligent method of operation" theory of recovery upon which the appellants rely is not applicable to supermarket slip and fall eases, we affirm the summary final judgment.
The undisputed facts established that Irma Rowe was shopping at the appel-lees' supermarket when she slipped on seafood salad which was on the floor near a self-service display. The display was not attended by an employee of the appellees, and there was no evidence to suggest how long the salad had been on the floor, or that the salad had been dropped by an employee of the appellees, or that the appellees knew that the salad was on the floor, or that seafood salad had been found on the floor around the display in the past. In light of these facts, the appellants do not rely on the well-recognized rule that a store owner may be found liable for negligently failing to take reasonable steps to correct a dangerous condition on a floor after the owner, its agent, or employee has created the condition, or after the owner otherwise has actual or construe- tive notice of the condition. 'See, e.g., Food Fair Stores v. Patty, 109 So.2d 5 (Fla.1959); Brooks v. Phillip Watts Enterprises, 560 So.2d 339 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990). The appellants instead argue that a jury question was presented as to whether the appellees were negligent in the manner in which they operated the seafood salad display, and rely upon the "negligent method of operation" theory of liability expounded in Wells v. Palm Beach Kennel Club, 160 Fla. 502, 35 So.2d 720 (Fla.1948).
In Wells the Florida Supreme Court announced a special rule for slip and fall cases involving places of amusement where large crowds are invited to congregate. Imposing a higher duty of care upon the owners and operators of those establishments, the court indicated that such places of amusement have a continuous duty to look after the safety of their patrons, so that liability may be predicated on a negligent method of operation even without notice or knowledge of a dangerous condition. But the supreme court has declined to extend the special rule announced in Wells to slip and fall cases involving other business establishments, such as supermarkets. See Food Fair Stores v. Trusell, 131 So.2d 730 (Fla.1961); Patty; Carls Markets v. Meyer, 69 So.2d 789 (Fla.1953).
Although the third district recently applied the operational negligence doctrine to a supermarket in the slip and fall case of Publix Super Market v. Sanchez, 700 So.2d 405 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997), the court nevertheless found no liability on facts which are closely analogous to those in the present case. And in approving the operational negligence doctrine in Sanchez the third district apparently failed to give proper effect to the supreme court's prior rulings, as well as this court's decision in Schaap v. Publix Supermarkets, 579 So.2d 831 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991). The supreme court precedent, as cited above, suggests that the doctrine does not apply in this context, and Schaap, upon which the third district relied, is not authority for a contrary view. While one member of the appellate panel in Schaap would have applied the doctrine, another member of the panel concurred in the result only and the third member of the panel dissented. Because a concurrence in result only expresses agreement with the ultimate decision but not the opinion, see Gerald Kogan & Robert Craig Waters, The Operation and Jurisdiction of the Florida Supreme Court, 18 Nova L.Rev. 1151, 1175 (1994), there was no majority opinion in Schaap and the case does not stand as precfedent for the individual views expressed in the separate opinions. See also, Greene v. Massey, 384 So.2d 24 (Fla.1980).
In accordance with our conclusion that the operational negligence doctrine does not apply to supermarket slip and fall actions of the type involved in the present case, the appealed order is affirmed.
BARFIELD, C.J., concurs.
LAWRENCE, J., dissents with written opinion.
. The operational negligence doctrine was applied to a department store in Brisson v. W.T. Grant Co., 79 So.2d 771 (Fla.1955). However, in Brisson the plaintiff alleged that she tripped over an obstruction which had been constructed and maintained on the premises, and the court indicated that the operational negligence doctrine probably would not have applied had the case involved a slip and fall due to a foreign substance on the floor.
In cases involving such slip and fall injuries in stores apart from the Wells amusement context, the court has emphasized that the owner of the premises must have knowledge — through actual
or constructive notice — that there was a foreign substance on the floor. The store's method of operation did not provide a basis for liability in Trussel[Trusell] or the court's other supermarket slip and fall cases, and references to the creation of a dangerous condition in Trussel[Trusell] and other such cases are properly read as referring to the ultimate placement of the foreign substance on the floor, rather than to the store's method of operation. Indeed, in Tmssel[Truseil] the court focused on the important difference of whether the foreign substance was placed on the floor by an employee or a customer.