Case Name: Commonwealth versus The Erie and North-East Railroad Company
Court: Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
Jurisdiction: Pennsylvania
Decision Date: 1854-09-07
Citations: 27 Pa. 339
Docket Number: 
Parties: Commonwealth versus The Erie and North-East Railroad Company.
Judges: Knox, J., concurred.
Reporter: Pennsylvania State Reports
Volume: 27
Pages: 339–379

Head Matter:
Commonwealth versus The Erie and North-East Railroad Company.
1. That which a company is authorized to do by its act of incorporation, it may do; beyond that, all its acts are illegal.
2. The powers of a corporation must be given in plain words or by necessary implication.
3. All powers not given in this direct and unmistakeable manner, are withheld.
4. A corporation can take nothing by construction.
5. The charter of defendants’ company authorized them to build a railroad from the borough of Erie, then bounded south by Twelfth Street. The borough was subsequently extended farther south, afterwards the company built their road from a point within the enlarged borough, 60 rods south of the borough line, as it was at the date of their act of incorporation. Held that this was not a compliance with the terms of their charter.
6. The change of the borough lines did not in the least change the rights and obligations of the railroad company.
7. All laws must be executed according to the sense and meaning which they imported at the time of their passage.
8. The supreme legislative power may authorize the building of a railroad on a street or other public highway.
9. A company has the right to appropriate a street, only where the authority has been given by the sovereign power of the state.
11. If the powers given to a corporation cannot he executed without disregarding the restrictions with which they are coupled, they cannot be executed at all.
12. A charter of incorporation must be construed in favour of the public and agginst the grantees. Contra in a private deed.
13. When a railroad authorized to be made at one place is made at another, it is a mere nuisance on every highway it touches in its illegal course.
14. The act under which the borough of Erie was laid out, enacted that the “ streets, lanes, and alleys thereof” should for ever he and remain public highways. The city councils could not by ordinance modify or repeal said 1 law; they had no “ legal power in the premises.”
Bill in equity.
The bill set out that the respondents were a corporation under the Act of 12th April, 1842, entitled “ an act to incorporate the Erie and North-East Railroad Company, and for other purposes.”
The act provides, inter alia, that the “ president and managers of said company, by themselves or their agents, shall have power to construct a railroad from the borough of Erie to some point on the east boundary line of the township of North-East, in the county of Erie,” &c.; also, that “ the said railroad shall be so constructed as not to impede or obstruct the free use of any public road, street, lane, or bridge, now laid out, opened, or built,” &c.; and also that u if the company aforesaid do not complete the said work so as to bring it into use within ten years after the passage of this act, or after completion shall suffer the road to go to decay and become impassable for the space of two years, then this charter shall become null and void.”
The bill then charges:—
1. That the respondents did not within ten years complete, nor have they yet completed the road from the borough of Erie to the east line of the township of North-East, but that the western terminus of their road is at a point sixty rods south of the borough of Erie.
2. That they occupy, cross, impede, and obstruct the public and established streets and. lanes of the city of Erie, at points where 'they are not authorized by their charter to go, and in such a manner as to hinder and obstruct the travel on said streets, and that said road is a common nuisance, therein endangering the lives of citizens and destructive to property thereon.
3. That they have located and maintained their road upon and along what is known as the Buffalo road, in the township of Harbour Creek, for the distance of 80 rods in one place and 40 ■rods in another, to the exclusion of the public from the use of the same.
4. That they have contracted with and yielded up the control of their road to a foreign corporation, which they had no right to do. With a prayer for an injunction to prevent their occupying the road in Harbour Creek, or the streets of Erie.
5. The Act of 1795, under and by virtue of which the city of ■Erie was laid out, made an express dedication of the streets, lanes, and alleys to be “ public highways for ever;” and neither the legislature nor city councils had any right to make an appropriation of the said streets, lanes, and alleys to a use inconsistent therewith.
To so much of the bill as claimed an injunction by reason that the said company have not duly completed- their road within the time specified in their charter, — and for the reason that the road did not extend to the borough of Erie, as it was in 1842. And for entering into a contract with the Buffalo and State Line Railroad Company, respondents demurred.
• They admitted the chartering of the company, as charged; that they occupy the public streets of the city of Erie, and the public road in the township of Harbour Creek, but claim a right under their charter to do so, and deny that their occupancy constitutes a nuisance.
They admit that the “road never was constructed to what was in the year 1842 the borough of Erie;” that the borough of Erie subsequent to 1842, and before the building of their road, was enlarged, and its boundaries extended southwardly, and that they constructed their road to.what was the borough or city of Erie in 1852, and claim that this'was a compliance with the terms of their charter.
• _ They admit “ that they have entered into a contract with the Buffalo and State Line Railroad Company,” but deny that it was contrary to law, equity, or good conscience.
Examiners were appointed, and the testimony returned by them sustained the material allegations of the bill, in reference to the obstruction of the streets in the city of Erie, and of the public road in Harbour Creek township, Erie county.
Thompson, Williams, Grant, and Griscom, for the complainants.
The equity jurisdiction of the court extends to the restraint by injunction of “ acts contrary to law, as well as prejudicial to the interests of the community, or the rights of individuals:” Hagner v. Heyberger, 7 W. & S. 104.
1. The bill in this case, charges that the company contrary to law, have located the western portion of their road sixty rods south of the borough, as it was when the act of incorporation was passed, and the charter issued, — and have not within ten years constructed their road as required by their charter.
2. That they occupy, cross, impede, and obstruct the public and established streets and lanes of the city of Erie, and have located and constructed their road, leading to the point where it enters the city, on ground not authorized by their charter.
3. And have located and maintained their road upon and along what is known as the Buffalo road, for the distance of 80 rods in one place, and 40 rods in another, to the exclusion of the public from the use of the same.
4. That they have yielded up the control and operation of the road to a foreign corporation, which they had no right to do.
These are the material points in the bill.
The act incorporating the defendants, is dated 12th of April, 1842: P. L. page 267.
By the 6th section of the act, it is enacted that the company “shall have power to construct a railroad from the borough of Erie to some point on the east boundary of the township of NorthEast, in the county of Erie.” This is the New York state line.
The termini having been thus fixed by law, the railroad company was bound to adhere strictly thereto.
The proof establishes and the answer admits, that, in place of beginning at the borough of Erie, as it was when the act passed, the road was located and constructed 60 rods south of the borough as it was in 1842. There is no law to authorize the change.
. The bill charges and the proof establishes, that the road crosses and obstructs the free use of Peach, State, French, Holland, German, Parade, Penn, and Ritner Streets, and Ash Lane, in the city of Erie. There is no grant of the right to the company to do so.
On these points the following Acts of Assembly and authori ties are cited to establish the want of authority in the company to locate their western terminus at the point they have fixed, or to enter upon, cross, or occupy the streets of the city.
By Act of 18th April, 1795, 3 Smith Laws 233-34, four thousand six hundred acres of land was ordered to be laid off in town lots for the town of Erie — and it was provided “ that the land so surveyed shall respectively be laid out into town lots and out lots in such manner and with such streets not more than 100 or less than 60 feet, as the said commissioners shall direct,” and “ all the streets, lanes, and alleys thereof, and of the out lots thereto adjoining, shall be, and for ever remain common highways.” The town was laid out the same year, and all the streets crossed by the railroad above mentioned, were then laid out and established, except Penn and Ritner Streets, the former of which, the answer admits, was dedicated to public use before the railroad was constructed. They were both laid out by the owners of property adjoining thereto in 1850.
The laying out of the streets under the Act of 1795, was a dedication of them, in the most solemn manner, to public use, and it is questionable whether the legislature could revoke it.
“ There is a manifest distinction between a dedication, and a mere reservation of land. The former is irrevocable, and the owner has no power or control over the property inconsistent with the terms of the dedication:” 4 Sanford’s Rep. 608, Pitcher v. The New York and Erie Railroad Company.
But it is not necessary in our case to go this far, as the legislature have not revoked the dedication of the streets made by the Act of 18th April, 1795.
No implication can be allowed the effect of revoking the express grant of the streets to the public, or of extending the rights and powers of the railroad company over them in the absence of any express grant to that effect.
Neither does the act authorize the construction of the road into or across the borough of Erie, as it existed in 1842. The construction of charters is always strict. Nothing is implied by necessary incidents.
Section 10, of the Act of 19th February, 1849, gives the right to any company thereafter chartered to extend their road into any town or village where it is named as the terminus. This is a legislative construction that the right did not therefore exist: Augusta v. Earle, 13 Pet. 591; Commonwealth v. The Franklin Can. Co., 9 Harris 117; Bank of Kentucky v. Schuylkill Bank, 1 Wh. Dig., 245; Walford on Railw. 64-5; 1 Railw. Cas. 591; 4 Id. 560; Blackman v. Glanmorganshire Can. Co., 1 M. & K. 162; Scales v. Pickering, 4 Bing. 448; 1 M. & P. 195; Barnett v. Stockton and Del. R. R. Co., 2 Scott, N. R. 337; Shelford 67.
Thus it will he seen that the construction in the English courts is of the very strictest kind; the same rule obtains in the Supreme Court of the United States: Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 11 Pet. 643; Head & Amory v. The Prov. Ins. Co., 2 Cranch 127; Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 636; Bank of U. S. v. Dundridge, 12 Id. 64.
This same doctrine has been as emphatically announced and as firmly maintained by our own courts: Stormfeltz v. The Manor Turnp. Co., 1 Harris 560; The Commissioners v. The North. Lib. Gas Co., 2 J. 318. Ambiguity in the grant is always construed against the company, and in favour of the public.
There is no ambiguity in this charter. There is no authority to enter the town, and cross and occupy the streets. To begin at some point at the borough of Erie, means the borough as it was when the act was passed, and not as the city of Erie now is, with its extended limits.
The act is imperative and express that the “ railroad shall be so constructed as not to impede or obstruct the free use of any public road, street, lane, or bridge now laid out and opened or built, nor to interfere with any burial-ground, dwelling-house,” &c. These difficulties could all have been avoided by making the road to the harbour of Erie, and where the act contemplated it should be made.
The case of Dedrick v. Wood, 3 Harris 9, the prohibition against impeding the navigation of boats or rafts on a stream declared a public highway, is held to amount to a prohibition against impeding it as to any raft whatever.
The present location of the road, 60 rods south of the borough line as it existed in 1842, is without authority of law, and in derogation of the public rights.
This location, it is said, must be maintained because authorized by the corporate authorities of the city of Erie. But the last section of the ordinance referred to, expressly reserves the right to revoke the license, whenever the interests of the city might require it. And this right of revocation was exercised on the 28th Nov., 1853. Besides, the borough and city authorities had only power to improve and keep the streets, &c., in repair, for the purpose designed in establishing them. There was no power in the Councils to grant them away for another and different purpose : Rush v. The Commonwealth, 2 Harris 191; Gossler v. The Corporation of Georgetown, 6 Wheat. 593; Commonwealth v. Bowman, 3 Barr 206; Rung v. Shoenberger, 2 Watts 24; Lancaster Turnpike v. Rodgers, 2 Barr 114; State v. City of Mobile, 5 Porter 279.
Stanton, Meredith, Hirst, and Campbell, for respondents.
I. The termini of a railroad, or any other work of internal improve ment, may be described by the legislature in general terms, or by fixed points. The terminus a quo of the Erie and North-East Railroad was not specially designated, but only described by a general term “ from the borough of Erie.”
These words are to have a reasonable construction in reference to the subject-matter and the public object of the grant.
The word “from” as terminus a quo is correlative to the word “to” as terminus ad quem, and may be taken inclusively according to the subject-matter: 1 Stra. 179-81.
The word “a” as a terminus a quo, and the word “usque ad” as a terminus ad quem, have been taken inclusively according to the subject-matter: 5 Co. 7, 103, 111; 6 Co. 62, 67; 1 Vent. 292; 3 Keb. 594; 3 Leon. 211.
The “borough of Erie,” as the bridge in the case cited from Strange, was intended as a well known place, without intending its exterior line to form the limit.
In the ease of the Farmers’ Turnpike v. Coventry, 10 Johns. Pep. 388, the act of incorporation authorized the plaintiffs to make a road “from Troy to the city of Hudson,” and prohibited toll-gates within three miles of either extremity. The road was made from Main Street within the city of Hudson, passing through the compact part of the city, and a toll-gate was erected over three miles from the junction, but within less than three miles from the line of the city. By an order of the Common Council of Hudson, the gate was declared a nuisance and thrown down. In an action of trespass, it was held that the road might commence within the city-
Per Curiam. The plaintiffs, by their charter, were entitled to carry the road “to the city of Hudson.” This did not mean that the road was to terminate on arriving at the north bounds of the city, which are the middle of Major- Abraham’s creek, and several miles from the compact part of the city. The words are to receive a more reasonable interpretation in reference to the subject-matter, and the public object of the grant; which was to open a good road from Troy to the compact part of the city of Hudson. The words usque ad are sometimes to be taken inclusively, according to the subject-matter: 1 Stra. 179-81.
In like manner, the words commencing “ at or near the city of Schenectady” were construed to mean at or within the city. The Mohawk Bridge Company v. The Utica and Schenectady Railroad Company, 6 Paige’s Ch. Rep. 554.
To the same effect is the case of Smith et al. v. Helmer, 7 Barb. Sup. Ct. Rep. 416, where it was held that the word from in an act referring to the terminus of a work of public improvement, “must have a reasonable construction in reference to the subject-matter, and unless it is held to include some part of the village of Herkimer (one of the termini), the object of the grant, which "was to construct a good road from the village of Herkimer for practical purposes, and therefore necessarily from the compact part of the village, cannot be accomplished.
While in criminal pleadings the word “ from” has in some instances been regarded as exclusive, yet, when applied to the subject-matter here involved, and as denoting'a notorious place, in reference to which a work of improvement is to be executed, it may seem the same as “in or within.”
The rules for the construction of railroad charters in reference to the work to be performed, is the same as of turnpike companies and other works of public improvement. Although, in a certain sense, they may be said to be monopolies, yet they do not partake of the character of exclusive monopolies, but are favourably and liberally considered in reference to their objects and subject-matter : Philadelphia and Trenton Railroad Company, 1 Whart. 46; Stormfelz v. The Manor Turnpike, 2 Harris 555; The Mohawk Bridge Company v. The Utica and Schenectady Railroad Company, 6 Paige’s Ch. Rep. 555.
This view is illustrated by the legislation in Pennsylvania. The first works of internal improvement were state roads and turnpikes. The termini of such roads and turnpikes were usually described as commencing from a town, city, or borough, and extending to some other town, city, or borough. The charters have invariably been construed as authorizing the company to commence from and proceed to some point within the town or borough limits.
It has never been claimed that the boundary lines of the place mentioned formed the terminus a quo, or the terminus ad quem.
In the construction of canals, the same phraseology was observed. And when the new method of improvement by railroads sprung up, the same phraseology was observed in respect to them.
Whenever it was designed to exclude the work from going within the borough or corporate limits, or that the boundary of the borough, or any definite point within it should be the terminus of the work, it was plainly so expressed.
For example, in the railroad from Philadelphia through Lancaster by Columbia to York, the terminus ad quem, is “ the west end of the borough of York.” So in the railroad from York through Gettysburg to Chambersburg, the terminus “ a quo” is designated “from the west end of the borough of York;” and likewise, in the road from Harrisburg through Carlisle to Chambersburg, “ from a point at or near the west end of the Harrisburg bridge, through or near Carlisle to Chambersburg:” Act of 24th March, 1828.
In like manner the terminus a quo of the Portage Railroad, was designated “from the basin in Holidaysburg to Johnstown.”
The terminus a quo of the Wrightsville, York and Gettysburg road, is fixed “ at or near the west end of the Columbia bridge, in the borough of Wrightsville;” of the Harrisburg and Sunbury Railroad is, “from, at or near the terminus of the Harrisburg, Portsmouth, and Mountjoy road, in the borough of Harrisburg, to Sunbury, at or near the termination of the Sunbury branch,” &c.
Numerous other instances abound in the legislation of this state. The G-eneral Railroad Act of 18th February, 1849, expressly declares “ that all companies thereafter incorporated may commence at or within, and extend to or into any town, city, or village, named as the place of beginning and terminus of such road.”
This act was merely declaratory of the law as it had always been understood and acted upon. It was only an embodiment into a general system of the provisions that experience and practice had shown to be wise, useful, and necessary in regulating railroad companies; consolidating and declaring the law as had been done in England, and other states of the Union.
And hence, by the terms of their charter, the respondents were fully authorized to construct their road within the borough of Erie, if the state could confer such authority.
The power of the state to authorize the use of public streets and roads by a railroad company is denied by the complainants, but is fully sustained by numerous authorities, of which the following only need be cited.
In the case of The Philadelphia and Trenton Railroad Company, 6 Wharton 25, it was held that the legislature may grant to a railroad company the privilege of laying rails on the streets of a city or town, and of using the railroad so made: 6 Wh. 43.
The same power was recognised in favour of a turnpike company, in the case of Stormfelz v. The Manor Turnpike Company, 1 Harris 559.
In Dake v. The Hudson River Railroad Company, 7 Barbour 509, it was held that
“A railroad is not per se a nuisance. Nor is the use of a street in a city, for a railroad track, in such a manner as not to abridge or obstruct the right of passage and repassage for other purposes, such an exclusive appropriation of the street as to amount to a nuisance, or a purpresture.”
“Nor will the construction of a railroad through the streets of a city amount to an infringement of private rights, though the track should cause a slight change in the surface of the streets; provided the passage is left free and unobstructed for the public.”
“ It has been held, both in this state and in other states of the Union, that a railroad is not per se a nuisance: Hamilton v. The New York and Harlem Railroad Company, 9 Paige, 171; Lexington and Ohio Railroad Company v. Applegate, 8 Dana 289; 7 Barb. 551. The use of a street for a railroad consists merely in adapting its surface to a peculiar mode of conveyance; and when so adapted, the running of a railroad car is no more an exclusive appropriation of the street than the running of any other species of conveyance would be.”
The authority of the state to enlarge and extend the limits of the borough cannot be questioned.
This was done by the Act of 10th April, 1848. Within these enlarged limits the depot of the company was afterwards established, and the road extended.
But even if the company have not completed their road within the time limited by their charter, it is no ground of relief in this bill, and there is no prayer for relief upon that ground: Sto. Eq. Pl. §§ 41-44: and the only relief in equity would be an order to complete the road by extending it to the borough line.
II. 1. The second point alleges an obstruction to the streets of Erie, which must be fully established by the complainants.
The obstruction is denied by the answer. The complainant’s proof shows no impediment or obstruction created by the construction of the railroad, but only exhibits inconveniences sometimes arising from the passage of engines, cars, and trains. This does not per se constitute a nuisance. If damage be done from an unnecessary noise or dangerous speed, such damage may be a cause of action. But the bill does not allege an improper use of the road as a ground of injunction. The gravamen of complaint in the bill, is the improper construction of the road, which is unsupported by proof.
The seventh section of the charter requires that “ the said railroad shall be so constructed as not to impede or obstruct the free use of any public road, street, lane, or bridge now laid out, opened, or built; nor to interfere with any burial-ground, dwelling-house, or building, without consent of the owner.”
The use of burial-grounds and dwelling-houses were protected from any interference, but roads and streets are only guarded against obstruction or impediment by the construction of the railroad.
This section implies the use of roads and streets alike by common travel and by the railroad, and contemplated the ordinary incidents of such locomotion, imposing no other obligation upon such use than the general rule of law, that each should observe the conditions necessary and proper for safety under such circumstances.
2. By the ninth section of the Act of 8th April, 1853, power was delegated to the corporate authority of the borough of Erie, “to improve, repair, and keep in good order, the streets, alleys, sidewalks, and public squares, and public grounds in said borough.”
The council having this authority to improve, repair, and keep in good order', the plans of the company in respect to the location and construction of their depot, track, and buildings, were submitted to them, were approved by them, and license given; after which large sums of money were expended by the company. Although the power of withdrawing that license in respect to Penn and Ritner Streets was reserved, equity would require it to be exercised in a reasonable time, and before expenditures were incurred. The proof shows an acquiescence for nearly two years after expenditures were made, which would now be a great and irremediable loss to the company, and also that the withdrawal of license was an effort to compel the company to establish or maintain a gauge prescribed by the city. The license of the city, therefore, shows that the construction of the road upon the streets, and use by the railroad, was consistent with their improvement, repair, and good order, and favoured “public convenience and trade.”
3. The condition of constructing the railroad so as not to obstruct or impede the free use of streets or roads, is to have a reasonable construction. An absolute freedom is not in such cases implied in respect either to highways by land or water. Otherwise the construction of railroads upon or over roads and streets would be impossible.
By “free use,” is not to be understood a freedom from such partial obstacles and impediments as the best interests of society may render necessary: The People v. The Saratoga Railroad Co., 15 Wend. 113. The right to cross streets necessarily implies the existence of some impediment or obstruction, and the condition is only that the obstruction or impediment should not be inconsistent with such use of the street as the nature of the case may require. The terms of this charter are similar in substance with all other charters; in many instances, the same in form: Act to incorporate the Harrisburg and Pinegrove Railroad, March, 1842, Pam. L. 156; Act to incorpora te the Pottsville and Tuscarora Railroad, 1840, Pam. L.; Act of 28th May, 1840 ; Act to incorporate the Bradford Railroad. It is also substantially the same as the proviof the General Railroad Act of 1849: Dunlop 1015, § 12.
Free use signifies nothing more than the lawful use, and does not exclude such limitations as may be imposed by the legislature to promote the general interests of society: Walf. on Railw. 183, § 240.
In the case of the King v. Edmund Pease and others, 1 B. & Ad. 30 (24 E. C. L. 17), it appears that—
“ The railway was made parallel and adjacent to an ancient highway, and in some places came within five yards of it. It did not appear whether or not the line could have been made in those instances to pass at a greater distance. The locomotive engines on the railway frightened the horses of persons using the highway as a carriage-road. On indictment against the company for a nuisance, it was held:
“ The legislature, therefore, must be presumed to have known that the railroad would be adjacent for a mile to the public highway, and consequently that travellers upon the highway would be in all probability incommoded by the passage of locomotive engines along the railroad.”
The Massachusetts Railway Act provided, “that if any railroad shall be so laid out as to cross any turnpike-road or other way, it shall be so made as not to obstruct such turnpike-road or way.” The Eastern Railroad Company raised the Newbury turnpike three feet, so as to pass over at a grade on the same level. On a bill for injunction, it was held that the word “ obstruct,” in its ordinary sense, means to stop up or wholly prevent travel upon a road, or render it unfit for travel. That the section intended to provide against stopping up the road, and for its continuance by alterations in the road, which should increase the impediments and obstructions as little as possible: 23 Pick. R. 328.
III. The third point alleges an obstruction to the Buffalo road at Harbour Creek, by the location of the rails and crossing the road.
By authorizing the construction of a railroad from the borough of Erie to the state line, the authority to cross and occupy intervening roads so far as might be necessary for the purpose, was clearly implied; subject only to the condition of not impeding or obstructing such roads by the construction of the railroad. If the necessity of a straight line for safety, and its advantage to “ the public convenience and trade,” require proof, it is abundantly furnished by the respondent’s evidence.
That cattle may frighten, or casualties occur from imprudence, or want of care or skill in those using the road by horses or steam, need not be questioned.
To that extent only does the complainant’s proof go.
It is not controverted that the rails are laid at grade, the road well planked and gravelled, and such crossings wore essential to avoid a curve; land has been purchased and dedicated by the company, and the road constructed so as to be straight, convenient, and secure; and that dedication has been accepted by the road commissioners of Harbour Creek.
■ By the road laws of Erie county, the charge and supervision of roads is delegated to three road commissioners, and it is shown by the proof, that the Harbour Creek crossing is made in accordance with the directions of the Harbour Creek commissioners.
As in a settled country, no railroad can be constructed without becoming contiguous or crossing established roads, the claim of complainant is inconsistent with the existence of any railroad communication. No effort is made to show the omission of anything in the construction of the road, that would render travel more secure at Harbour Creek.
The claim is, that the railroad should be removed, which of necessity involves an entire change of the route. No route is shown by complainant’s evidence, that would not involve equal or greater difficulties in crossing the same or other roads. The defendant’s proof shows any other route to be wholly impracticable.
In any view, therefore, a change at Harbour Creek involves the existence of the railroad.
The road was located in 1849, and used and occupied from that time without any legal proceeding or objection, until assailed in December, 1853, because of the lawful change of its gauge. In no instance has equity interfered under such circumstances against a company, but it has intervened to protect them against inequitable and harassing litigation.
IY. The allegation that by their contract with the Buffalo and State Line Railroad Company, the defendants “ have yielded up the control and operation of the road to a foreign corporation,” is a misconstruction of the terms and import of that agreement; It might as well be claimed that the Buffalo company had yielded up control of its road to the Erie company.
Both roads are links in a great line of communication, and the agreement imports an arrangement for the harmonious and economical running of the road under a joint superintendent. It is difficult to conceive what could better promote the safety of travellers, or more highly “favour public commerce or trade.” Such arrangements are within the necessary powers of all railroad companies, and their details are to be regulated by the judgment and interest of the parties, in the absence of any positive or implied, prohibition. No objection is assigned to any stipulation in this contract, save only that one of .the parties is a “ foreign corporation.”
“ A corporation may make any contracts that may be incidentally necessary to enable it to fulfil the purposes of its existence, or a usual and proper means to accomplish the purposes of the charter, if not forbidden by the charter or laws of the stateAngelí and Ames on Corporations, 192, § 12.
“ It is well settled that, by the law of comity among nations, a corporation created by one sovereignty is permitted to make contracts in another, and to sue in its courts, and that the same law of comity prevails among the several sovereignties of the Union. The public and well known usages of trade — the general acquiescence of the states — the particular legislation of some of them, as well as the legislation of Congress — all concur in proving the truth of this propositionBank of Augusta v, Earle, 13 Pet. Rep. 520.
September 7, 1854,
“ The comity of a state, giving validity to contracts by foreign corporations is presumed from the comity of suitId. 529, Taney, Ch. J.
“ The comity of suit brings with it the comity of contracts, and where one is expressly adopted by its courts the other must also be presumed, according to the usages of nations, unless the contrary can be shown:” Id. 596, Taney, Ch. J.
“ Comity of suit and contract exists in Pennsylvania :” 2 Troubat and Haly’s Practice 147; 15 S. & R. 176.
No interest of the state is shown to be adversely affected by this contract.
The Buffalo road being a party to it, that company should have been made a party to the bill if any relief were sought against the agreement or its validity impeached.

Opinion:
The opinion of the court was delivered,
by Black, C. J.
This case requires us to give a construction' to the charter of a private corporation. The frequency of such cases excites some surprise, when we reflect that an act of incorporation is and always must be interpreted by a rule so simple, that no man, whether lawyer or layman, can misunderstand or misapply it. That which a company is authorized to do by its act of incorporation, it may do; beyond that all its acts are illegal. And the power must be given in plain words or by necessary implication. All powers not given in this direct and unmistakeable manner are withheld. It is strange that the attorney-general, or anybody else, should complain against a company that keeps itself within bounds, which are always thus clearly marked, and equally strange that a company which has happened to transgress them should come before us with the faintest hope of being sustained. In such cases, ingenuity has nothing to work with, since nothing can be either proved or disproved by logic or inferential reasoning. If you assert that a corporation had- certain privileges, show us the words of the legislature conferring them. Failing in this,, you must give up your claim, for nothing else can possibly avail you. A doubtful charter does not exist; because whatever is doubtful, is decisively certain against the corporation.
If loss or injury comes to anybody in consequence of an ignorant disregard of this principle, it is not our fault. We have done all that in us lay to impress it on the public mind, and to warn corporations of the danger they might incur by disobedience. We enforced it to the utmost in The Bank of Pennsylvania v. The Commonwealth, Susquehanna Railroad Company v. Sunbury and Erie Railroad Company, The Pennsylvania Railroad Company v. Canal Commissioners, The Commonwealth v. The Franklin Canal Company, and in several other cases. All of our predecessors on this bench occupied the same ground. The doctrine is maintained by the Supreme Court of the United States, and in many states of the Union. Even in England, the justice and necessity of.it are universally acknowledged and acted upon. But we do not mean to discuss the subject over again. The lawyer who is not already familiar with the numerous authorities upon it, to be found in every book of reports, will probably never become so; and the citizen who does not believe it to be a most salutary feature in our jurisprudence, would hardly be convinced though one rose from the dead.
Our duty in this ease is, therefore, not a difficult one. If the words of the defendants' charter, understood in their ordinary sense, cover the acts complained of; or if there be a necessary implication of the power to do those acts, and nothing to forbid them, then this bill must be dismissed. But the defendants can take nothing at our hands by construction. We cannot widen the limits set to their privileges, because they have found them inconveniently narrow. We have no more right or authority to stretch an old act of incorporation than we have to make a new one. In either case, we would be usurping legislative power, and granting away from the state privileges which she has seen proper to withhold.
The bill complains — 1st, That the Western terminus of the defendants' railroad is not where the act of incorporation requires it to be. 2d, That it is so constructed as to impede and obstruct the free use of certain streets in the city of Erie. 3d, That it also obstructs and impedes the free use of a public road laid out from Erie in the direction of Buffalo ; and 4th, That the defendants have made a contract by which they have surrendered the control of their road to a foreign corporation.
I. The act of incorporation authorizes the defendants to build a railroad ufrom the borough of Erie to some point on the east boundary of the township of North-East." The defendants' counsel insist that the word from should be taken inclusively, and that a road from any part of the borough to the proposed terminus ad quern is a compliance with the law. On the other hand, the counsel for the plaintiff insist that it must begin at the borough line, and not elsewhere. Our opinion is with the defendants on this point, but we think the argument on it was rather beside the purpose, since the terminus of the railroad is neither at the line of the borough nor inside of it. Coming from the east, it passes the east boundary of the borough at a distance of sixty rods south, and runs on about-rods further, in a direction precisely parallel with the south line of the borough, and there stops or connects with the road built by the Franklin Canal Company to the Ohio line. Certainly this is not a literal compliance with the act of incorporation. Making a road from a point selected by the defendants themselves sixty rods south of the borough, not coming within that distance of the borough at any place, is not making a road from the borough eastward. Is there anything in the peculiar circumstances of this case which will justify us in treating this infraction of the law otherwise than as we treat similar violations of duty when committed by companies ? We shall see.
What I have said concerning the borough of Erie, refers to what it was when the act of incorporation was passed. In 1848, and before the defendants' work was made, its limits were extended so as to include the place where the terminus of the railroad had been fixed. At a still later period, the borough was incorporated as a city. But we are very clear that this alteration of the borough lines did not in the least change the rights or obligations of the railroad company. All laws must be executed according to the sense and meaning which they imported at the time of their passage. A line which did not exist until 1848, could not have been in the mind of the legislature in 1842. The modifications made in the charter of the borough left the defendants' charter just where it was before. The amendment of one is not to be taken as a supplement to the other. If " the east boundary line of North-East township" had been shortened or obliterated, or differently named by an Act of Assembly passed in 1848, the defendants would have understood very well that their right to locate the eastern terminus on any part of the township line as it existed in 1842, was not thereby altered or taken away. The law commanded the defendants to begin their railroad at the borough of Erie as it then was, and that command is in full force notwithstanding the change which has been made in other matters.
Is this violation of the charter so trifling that we can overlook it on the principle of de minimis ? The counsel of the company have not argued that it is — and certainly it is not. The place at which the terminus should be established being precisely and particularly designated by the act of incorporation, in words which rendered mistake impossible, all other places, whether near or far, are as surely excluded as if they had been expressly forbidden. If we cannot hold companies to a strict compliance with their charters, we cannot hold them at all. In some situations (and, for aught we can see, this may be one of them), the purpose and object of allowing the road to be built can be as completely defeated by a deviation of sixty rods as sixty miles. The directors must have thought that they could gain a point of great value to them by changing their terminus, or else they certainly would not have ventured upon it in the teeth of the law. And they must have been conscious, too, that the legislature had some important reason for confining them to the borough, or else they would have sought and got an amendment to their charter. This railroad was probably intended as an outlet to New York for the lake trade of Erie. It could not have been meant as a link in the connexion between Buffalo and Cleveland, for there was not then any authority given to this company or any other to build a road westward from Erie to or towards the Ohio line. Its actual location puts it beyond the reach of the lake trade, being one hundred and ten feet above and three-quarters of a mile distant from the harbour. It connects itself there with a road to Ohio built in violation of law, and by a fraud which has already received its condemnation. By this means it has become part of a continuous line from New York to the West, carrying goods and passengers not to the borough of Erie, but quite around and past it. I mention this merely as showing that the general scope of the law, as well as its literal words, has been disregarded. It is suggested, however, as a mere probability. We do not know nor care what the purpose of the state may have been. But one thing we do know — and that is enough —that the board of directors had no right' to substitute their will for the plain requirement of the law. If the fair interests of the stockholders, — if the accommodation of the neighbouring people,— if a due regard for the commerce of the whole country, — if a magnanimous liberality to the citizens of adjoining states, — if these considerations, or any one of them, required an amendment of the charter, the managers should have asked the proper authority of the government to make it. Assuredly there is no legislative body on the face of the earth to whom such an appeal, if well grounded, could be made with more certainty of success than to the General Assembly of'this state.
II. The right of the supreme legislative power to authorize the building of a railroad on a street or other public highway is not now to be doubted. It has been settled not only in England (1 Barn. & Ad. 30), but in Massachusetts (23 Pick. 328), New York (7 Barb. 509), and in Pennsylvania (6 Whart. 43). If such conversion of a public street to purposes for which it was not originally designed, does operate severely upon a portion of the people, the injury must be borne for the sake of the far greater good which results to the public from the cheap, easy, and rapid conveyance of persons and property by railway. The commerce of a nation must not be stopped or impeded for the convenience of a neighbourhood. But we can say this only in cases where the authority has been given by the sovereign power of the state. That any private individual or incorporated company, not empowered to do so by an act of the legislature, can take possession of a street and make a railroad upon it without being guilty of a criminal offence, is a proposition which I am sure no lawyer would dream of making. The right of a company, therefore, to build a railroad on the street of a city, depends, like the lawfulness of all its other acts, upon the terms of its charter. Of course, when the power is given in express words, there can be no dispute about it. It may also be given by implication; for instance, if a company be authorized to make a railroad, by a straight line, between two designated points, this implies the right to run upon, along, or across all the streets ©r roads which lie in the course of such line. So also when an act of incorporation directs a road to be made between certain termini, by such route as the grantees of the privilege shall think best, it may be located on an intervening street or other common highway, if in the judgment of the directors it be necessary or expedient to do so. But when an act of incorporation authorizes the making of a railroad which it is not possible to make without using the streets of a town for part of it, still such streets cannot be so used if the same act of incorporation forbids it. If the powers given to the corporators cannot be executed rvithout disregarding the restrictions with which they are coupled, they cannot be executed at all. In a private deed, an exception as large as the grant, is void because private deeds are construed most strongly against the grantor. But a grant of privileges by the state, to a body of adventurers, must be construed precisely the other way — 1 in favour of the public and against the grantees. A prohibition, exception, or reservation in a charter, must therefore stand in full force, though it destroy or make nugatory all the powers given to the company.
The act of incorporation now before us, contains the following very emphatic clause: " The said railroad shall be so constructed a-s not to obstruct or impede the free use of any public road, street, lane, or bridge, now laid out, opened, or built, or to interfere with any burial-ground, dwelling-house, or building without the consent of the owner." It would certainly strike most men upon the first look, that a railroad company with such a provision in its charter is on dangerous ground when it takes possession of a street. It is not at all easy to understand how the people of a city can have the use of a street free from obstructions and impediments, when the street is of ordinary width, and has two railroad tracks upon it, along which locomotive engines, with trains of cars, are running every five minutes of the day. Nor is it by any means impossible, that in this case the legislature intended to exclude the company altogether from the streets, even at the risk of having no railroad made; for the desire to preserve to the people of Erie and its neighbourhood the free use of their streets and roads, may have been stronger than the wish to establish a railway communication for them with New York.
An obstruction is anything set in the way, whether it totally closes the passage or only hinders and retards progress. A road may be obstructed more or less. The word impediment is almost synonymous with obstruction, except that it is seldom, if ever, used to signify an entire blocking up of the way. It is an obstacle — not an impassable barrier. To understand these words in their ordinary import, and then say that a railroad is not per se an obstrue tion or impediment to the free use of a street by the public, is rather more than I can do. But perhaps it is not quite safe to interpret them according to their popular sense. Certain it is that they have sometimes been otherwise used in Acts of Assembly. A law of Massachusetts provides, that " if any railroad shall be so laid out as to cross any turnpike or other way, it shall be so made as not to obstruct such turnpike or way." It was decided (23 Pick. 226), that this did not prevent all interference with the road, but required only that it should cause the least possible inconvenience or impediment. By a statute of this state, enacted in 1803, the owners of lands adjoining navigable streams were permitted to build dams, provided that such dams should " not obstruct or impede the navigation of such streams, or prevent the fish from passing up the same." This court (4 Watts 440) declared, that if these words were taken literally, the owners could not avail themselves of the privilege at all; but as this construction would have been contrary to the grant itself, a more liberal one was adopted, and a dam which did not materially hinder the navigation was held not to be within the prohibition. Although the reasoning of these cases does not altogether fit the one before us, they are entitled to much weight. They are decisive, indeed, of one thing which is important, namely: that the words in question may sometimes have a legal signification different from that which we would otherwise have been disposed to assign them. Eor the sake of consistency we must follow in the steps of those who went before us, though it be true that the track is not very clearly marked.
Let it then be conceded as a possible thing, that a railroad can be so constructed on a public street that it will not be an obstruction to its free use; that such railroad is not in any sense a nuisance per se ; that a street may be occupied in common by a railroad and the public without any such inconvenience to the latter as will amount to an impediment, or abridge the freedom of its use for ordinary purposes: still it is not true (as the converse of the argument would make it) that the street is unobstructed as long as travel upon it is not entirely prevented. If it be proved that a man may squeeze himself along beside the track, or dodge across at the peril of his life, it does not follow that the use of the street is free, unobstructed, and unimpeded. We hold, therefore, that under a charter like this, a railroad cannot be built on a street in such a manner as to cause any material obstruction. If we assume, as we do, that the clause under consideration does not entirely forbid the company from going on any street, we must also allow them to create such impediments as cannot be avoided. But those which are not absolutely necessary to the making and using of the railroad, are unlawful; for managers are bound to leave the street as nearly free from obstructions as they can, and for that purpose to spare no reasonable expenditure of money or labour. If, for instance, the railroad be made above the level of the street, they must grade the rest of the street also, if that will make it better for the public accommodation. They cannot say to the city authorities, We have destroyed your street, and rendered it impassable; but we have not impeded its free use, because you can restore it again to a tolerable condition, at your own expense. Neither does it make any difference whether it be a main thoroughfare or an unimportant by-street, for this act of incorporation protects all alike.
We have attentively considered the bill, answer, and evidence in the cause, and they satisfy us of the following facts: 1. A considerable portion of one street within the present limits of Erie city is occupied almost entirely by the railroad in a manner which makes any considerable use of it for other purposes almost impossible ; and this is true, although the defendants themselves say that the street might be safely and conveniently used if it were properly graded — a duty which they left unperformed. 2. Two streets are crossed by the railroad on bridges, which are too low and too narrow for large wagons passing one another, or for a single wagon with a bulky load. 3. Two other streets are crossed on an embankment, considerably above grade, with a ditch on each side, and thus all passage along those streets, by any kind of vehicle, is as completely stopped as it could be by a stone wall twenty feet high. All these things are illegal, for the reasons given. That some of these streets are on low, wet ground, and little used, might be a sort of apology for the defendants, if we were sitting here to take excuses for the violation of the law. But that is no part of our duty.
A large part of the evidence refers to the danger encountered by persons obliged to cross the railroad when trains were approaching, and the delay and inconvenience caused by ears, which totally blocked up the crossing places. If the defendants have a right to make the road on a street, they have also the right to use it when made. They may carry all the freight and passengers they can get. If the number of cars and locomotives necessary to do their business be so great as sometimes to choke the thoroughfares over which they pass, it must be remembered that the same thing would happen in a much greater degree, if the twentieth part of the business were done in carriages, coaches, and common road wagons. If the cars are suffered to stand for an unnecessary length of time, at places inconvenient to the public, the act is indictable as a nuisance, and for any want of proper care, the defendants are liable in damages to the persons injured by it. But it cannot be said that they have violated their charter in causing obstructions of this kind, unless such obstructions could have been prevented or diminished by a different construction of the road.
Under other circumstances, the voluminous body of evidence laid before us might require a much more extended discussion. But we are content with the compendious reference we have liiade to it, because every inch of this railroad which lies upon any street of the city is unlawful, at all events. If the defendants had begun their railroad at the place designated in their act of incorporation, they would not have interfered with any of the streets mentioned in the bill, except Ash Lane, and that-would have been crossed at a different place. When a railroad authorized to be made at one place is made at another, it is a mere nuisance on every highway it touches in its illegal course. The streets in question, not being on any route which the defendants were authorized to take, they are on them in disobedience of their charter, and all they have done there is without the shadow of authority. It is useless, therefore, to inquire how much of the inconvenience complained of might have been avoided by a better construction. It is enough to say that the railroad has no business at all to be where it is.
It appears that the city authorities gave their consent to the use of the streets, and to the location of the railroad on the ground which it now occupies. This privilege was given " so far as the mayor and councils have legal power in the premises," upon condition that the railroad should cause the least possible obstruction to the ordinary travel and business of the streets, and with a reservation of the right to withdraw the privilege whenever it .should appear to the councils to be injurious to the interest and welfare of the city. The condition was broken, and the privilege was revoked. But if the resolution of the councils had remained in full force up to this time, it would have been of no avail here. They had no "legal power in the premises." An act of the legislature cannot be repealed or modified by the ordinance of a city corporation. What the defendants did in disregard of the law was no less an offence against the rights of the public, because the city was in some sort pwrticeps criminis. If both had persisted in it, the Commonwealth's duty would have required her to see that the rights of her citizens were vindicated against both.
III. It is alleged and proved, and not denied, that the railroad has been laid down on and along a public road, called the Buffalo Road, in such a way, that for some distance it cannot be, and is not, used by the public at all, but on the contrary, that portion of the people who would otherwise travel thereon are obliged to , take another way, which the railroad company has opened for them. Of course, this is within the prohibition against obstructions and impediments to the free use of public highways. The answer to this charge is not based on any interpretation which the charter is thought to be capable of. Other grounds are taken. One defence is, that the railroad could not be made in a straight line without taking a part of the Buffalo Road. We can only say, that if a railroad cannot he made straight without violating the law, it must be made crooked, or not made at all. Equally baseless (even if true) is the other argument, that the public has suffered no injury by this act. Those public interests which lie outside of the, defendants' charter are not committed to their: keeping. The legislature has thought proper to guard the right of the people to the free use of their own roads, by enjoining the defendants not to impede or obstruct them. This injunction it was wrong to disregard, even for the sake of a supposed public benefit. The people have rejected the boon which the company tendered them, and the state, parens patrice now demands for them the rights which are secured and reserved by her own laws.
IV. The charge that the defendants have, by contract, surrendered the control of their road to a foreign corporation, was but faintly pressed in the argument. We do not consider the contract illegal, and if our opinion were different, we would withhold it until all the parties could be brought before us.
This disposes of the principal allegations in the bill. But aside from these there are one or two matters suggested by the defendant's counsel, which ought not to be passed without a remark.
They have argued that no decree could be based on obstructions created by the use of the railroad, because the act of incorporation provides only against the road being so constructed as not to impede, &c. And the bill charges nothing else. Whatever impediments are caused by the ordinary and proper use of a railroad we attribute to its construction, if such impediments could have been avoided by a different construction. The legislature said to the corporators, you may make a railroad between certain given points, and use it when made by running cars and steam-engines on it; but you must so make it that its existence and use in this way will not impede the travelling on any highway now laid out. The railroad is so made that locomotives cannot be used on it without impeding travel on a certain highway, previously laid out. Such a railroad is not constructed according to the law. If it were, the use would be proper enough.
The defendants' counsel have made another point which it is right to notice. It is said that though this proceeding is conducted in the name of the state, its real object is to redress a supposed injury, which is private, or at most merely local, in its character. We are urged to look not at the flag, but at the parties who fight under it. These parties — the public authorities of Erie, and the people of the neighbourhood — enepuraged the defendants to expend large sums of money in building the railroad, and the attempt which they are now making to break it up, is denounced in the argument as an act of wanton injustice. The only party before us is the Commonwealth. We do not even know the names of the other persons alluded to. The Commonwealth complains in due form by her accredited legal representative, the attorney-general, that one of her corporations has violated its charter. We have investigated the case and found the complaint to be true. The delinquent corporation cannot justify itself by showing that in the commission of the wrong it received aid and comfort from other persons. If the mayor and councils of Erie, or their constituents, connived at this breach of law, they were guilty of a sin, for which their best excuse is that they seem to have repented of it, and are now disposed to assist the state in bringing the other offenders to the same wholesome state of mind. It cannot be that the defendants were misled by the people or their officers, for they must have known that a city ordinance could not authorize what an act of the legislature forbade. No laches can legally be imputed to the Commonwealth, and in point of fact, she has been guilty of no unfairness. She spoke her will plainly in the act of incorporation, and gave it to the defendants to be a guide to their feet and a lamp to their path. They disregard it. The attorney-general proves the fact, and stands up for judgment. We cannot refuse what law and equity demand.
Decree. — This cause came on to be heard before the Supreme Court, on the bill of complaint, on the answer of the defendants, and on the proofs and evidence taken by both parties, and was argued by counsel; and thereupon it appears to this court that the defendants have built, and do now use and maintain a certain railroad, known as the Erie and North-East Railroad, of which said railroad a part is within the present limits of the city of Erie, and upon certain streets thereof, and another part is upon the bed of a certain public road, known as the Buffalo road, in Harbour Creek township, Erie county; and that the said railroad in those parts thereof, is a public and common nuisance. It is, therefore,
Ordered, adjudged, and decreed, that the defendants shall, on or before the expiration of four months from this date, break up so much of their said road as lies upon the said streets, and upon the Buffalo road, and remove the materials thereof, so as to leave the said streets and road in as good condition as they were in before the construction of said railroad.
And it is further declared and adjudged, that the said defendants are bound to make the borough of Erie, with such limits as it had in 1842, the western terminus of their railroad. It is therefore decreed and ordered, that the said defendants shall, within four months from this date, change the route and construction of their railroad accordingly, and make their western terminus at what was the eastern line of the said borough in 1842, or within the same borough. And the said defendants shall re-construct their railroad to supply the parts hereby ordered to be broken up, according to plans and specifications to be by them made, and to be submitted to and approved by this court, on full notice to the counsel of the Commonwealth, and not otherwise. And the defendants shall pay all lawful costs, to be taxed by the prothonotary.