Case Name: MASON COUNTY CIVIC RESEARCH COUNCIL v. MASON COUNTY
Court: Michigan Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1955-10-03
Citations: 343 Mich. 313
Docket Number: Docket No. 18, Calendar No. 46,423
Parties: MASON COUNTY CIVIC RESEARCH COUNCIL v. MASON COUNTY.
Judges: Butzel and Smith, JJ., concurred with Boyles, J.
Reporter: Michigan Reports
Volume: 343
Pages: 313–334

Head Matter:
MASON COUNTY CIVIC RESEARCH COUNCIL v. MASON COUNTY.
3. Counties — Board op Supervisors — Powers.
A county board of supervisors has no inherent powers when considered as an administrative body, the Constitution declaring that it shall have “such powers as shall be prescribed by law” (Const 1908, art 8, § 7).
2. Same — Erection op Infirmary — Administrative Power
Declaration in statute conferring upon a county board of supervisors power to erect a county infirmary in a county “in which a county infirmary is not already erected” implied that the legislature intended to grant administrative authority, rather than powers of a loeal legislative character (Const 1908, art 8, § 7; CL 1948, § 402.6).
3. Same — Board op Supervisors — Choice of Sites for County Buildings.
A provision in a statute restricting power granted to boards of supervisors “to fix upon and determine the site of any such building, if not previously located” applies to both preceding subdivisions of statute (1) relative to “erection of buildings for the support of the poor of such county” and (2) “for the site of any courthouse, jail, clerk’s office, or any other county building in such county,” in the absence of language limiting the restriction to the second clause and especially in view of similar restrictive language in statute giving board of supervisors certain powers in connection with erection of county infirmary (CL 1948, §§ 46.11, 402.6).
References for Points in Headnotes
1-3,10] 14 Am Jur, Counties § 28.
4, 5] 42 Am Jur, Public Administrative Law § 26.
. ‘7 — 9] 50 Am Jur, Statutes § 225 et seq.
11] 50 Am Jur, Statutes §§ 303-308.
“12] 50 Am Jur, Statutes §§ 223, 247.
13] 50 Am Jur, Statutes § 358.
14] 50 Am Jur, Statutes § 225.
15] 28 Am Jur, Injunctions § 61 et seq.
16] 14 Am Jur, Costs § 35.
4. Administrative Law — Express Grants op Power — Construction op Statutes.
An express grant of power to administrative officers, boards or commissions, is subject to a strict interpretation.
5. Same — Doubtful Powers.
The power and authority to be exercised by administrative boards or commissions must be’ conferred by clear and unmistakable language, since a doubtful power does not exist.
•6. Officers — Measure of Authority.
The extent of the authority of the people’s public agents is measured by the statute from which they derive their authoiity, not by their own acts and assumption of authority.
7. Statutes — Construction.
Whether or not the remodeling of an existing structure may be regarded as within the term “erected” or the equivalent of erecting, building, or constructing, is not determined' where unnecessary to decision in ease involving the construction of a statute.
8. Same — Construction of Statutes — “Erected” Construed as “Established.”
The term “erected” in statutory provision authorizing a county board of supervisors to erect a county infirmary in a county “in which a county infirmary is not already erected” in the context used, was intended to mean “established,” since there must be facilities supplied to the end that the inmates may receive proper care (CL 1948, § 402.6).
9. Words and Phrases — Erect—Establish.
The word “erected” may properly mean more than just the term “to build,” if the context requires that it be construed as “to set up” or to “establish.”
10. Counties — Infirmaries—Change of Sites — “Erected’? ’ Construed as “Established.”
A board of supervisors may not select a new site for the county infirmary, where previously its infirmary had been established by the purchase of a convalescent home and the remodeling thereof for use as an infirmary, the provision restricting the board as to change of sites where an infirmary had been “erected,” such term being construed as “established” (CL 1948, § 402.6).
11. Statutes — Construction.
The courts are not concerned with the wisdom or policy of legislation, but must construe statutes as enacted, in the light of the purpose to be accomplished and giving due and proper meaning to all provisions.
12. Same — Intent.
It is a cardinal rule that the legislature must be held to intend the meaning wliieh it has plainly expressed, and in such cases there is no room for construction, or attempted interpretation to vary such meaning.
13. Same — Construction—Effect Given to Every Word.
EfEeet must be given, if possible, to every word, sentence and section when construing a statute to produce a harmonious and consistent enactment as a whole.
14. Same — Construction—Clear Language.
A court may not alter or change the clear, distinct and unequivocal wording of a legislative enactment.
15. Injunction — Questions Reviewable — Acquiescence.
The legality of the establishment of county infirmary at its present site some 13 years ago may not be questioned in proceedings instituted to enjoin the county from erecting a new infirmary on other land given to it by a municipality within the county, where it appears that all parties involved had acquiesced in the earlier action taken.
16. Costs — Injunction—Construction of Statutes.
No costs are allowed in suit to enjoin county from changing site of county infirmary in county which had previously established such institution at its present location, a question of statutory construction being involved (Const 1908, art 8, § 7; CL 1948, §§ 46.11, 402.6).
Butzel, Smith, and Boyles, JJ., dissenting.
Appeal from Mason; Elliott (Philip), J., presiding.
Submitted April 5, 1955.
(Docket No. 18, Calendar No. 46,423.)
Decided October 3, 1955.
Rehearing denied December 1, 1955.
Bill by Mason County Civic Research Council, a voluntary taxpayers’ association, against County of Mason and ■ City of. Scottville, municipal corporations, to restrain transfer of property by city to county for purposes of infirmary. Bill dismissed. Plaintiff appeals.
Reversed.-
Eugene Christman, for plaintiff;
Vernon Keiser and Hathaway, Latimer, Clink & Robb (H. Winston Hathaway, of counsel), for defendant County ,of Masón.
William W. Stapleton and H. Winston Hathaway, for defendant County of Mason on application for rehearing.
Hathaway, Latimer, Clink <$> Robb (H. Winston Hathaway, of counsel), for defendant city of Scott-ville.

Opinion:
Boyles, J.
(dissenting). Plaintiff, consisting of certain residents and taxpayers of the city of Ludington in Mason county, filed the bill of complaint in this case to enjoin the defendants from proceeding with the proposed construction of a county infirmary in the city of Scottville in said county. These taxpayers adopted the designation Mason County Civic Research Council. The defendants are the county of Mason and the' city of Scottville. The trial court, after a hearing on stipulated facts, filed a comprehensive written opinion and entered an order dismissing the bill of complaint. Plaintiff appeals.
Two principal questions are here for decision: (1) Does the board of supervisors of Mason county have authority to erect a county convalescent .home and infirmary building at. the proposed location in Scottville; and (2) does the city of Scottville have authority to deed to the county the parcel óf land on which the building is to be located. Appellant adds a third incidental question, involving the right of the board of supervisors to use' county sinking funds to erect an infirmary.' •
The facts have been stipulated. In 1942 the county acquired and has since maintained a place in Ludington as an infirmary, under the name of Mason County Convalescent Home, and under the manage^ ment and control of the county social welfare board. In 1949, by a vote of the electors in said county, a county sinking fund was created and taxes voted for the purpose of constructing a new county jail and a new county convalescent home. No action has been taken by the county sinking fund commission to allocate or use the fund. In 1952 the board of supervisors authorized its building committee to procure plans for a new jail and a new convalescent home or infirmary, which was done. Also, in 1952, the electors of the county voted favorably for a bond issue of $165,000 for the purpose of constructing and equipping "a new county convalescent home (infirmary)." In 1953 the city of Scottville offered to deed to the county approximately 3 acres of land out of an 18-acre park known as McPhail Field, as the site for the proposed new "county convalescent hospital (infirmary)." The board of supervisors voted to accept the offer, subject to providing a merchantable title. In June, 1953, the county prosecuting attorney gave the board of supervisors a written opinion approving the title to the Scottville site, and the board of supervisors adopted a resolution "accepting the proposed Scottville site and approving the construction of the infirmary in aceord anee with the plans and specifications prepared by the architect upon the site in the' city of Scottville."
In July, 1953, the plaintiff Mason County Civic Research Council filed the instant bill of complaint seeking temporary and permanent injunctions to restrain the city of Scottville from conveying the proposed site to the county, and to restrain the county from further proceeding with the plan for the construction of the proposed county infirmary in Scottville. Plaintiff appeals from the dismissal, by the trial court, of its bill of complaint.
1. Does the county board of supervisors have authority to erect a county infirmary at Scottville, under the facts in the case?
The applicable constitutional and statutory provisions are as follows:
"Each county may also maintain an infirmary for the care and support of its indigent poor and unfortunate, and all county poor houses shall hereafter be designated and maintained as county infirmaries." Const (1908), art 8, § 11.
"The board of supervisors of any county in this State in which a county infirmary is not already erected, may, at any annual or special meeting thereof, determine to erect such a house for the reception of the poor of their county." CL 1948, § 402.6 (Stat Ann 1950 Rev § 16.147).
"The said several boards of supervisors shall have power and they are hereby authorized at any meeting thereof lawfully held:
"First, To purchase for the use of the county any real estate necessary for the erection of buildings for the support of the poor of such county, and for a farm to be used in connection therewith;
"Second, To purchase any real estate necessary for the site of any court house, jail, clerk's office, or any other county building in such county;
"Third, To fix upon and determine the site of any ¡such building, if not previously located; - *
"Fifth, To remove or designate a new site for any county buildings required to be at the county seats, when such removal shall not exceed the limits of the village or city at which the county seat is situated, as previously located;
"Sixth, To cause to be erected the necessary buildings for poorhouses, jails, clerk's offices, and other county buildings, and to prescribe the time and manner of erecting the same." CL 1948, § 46.11 (Stat Ann 1953 Cum Supp § 5.331).
Plaintiff mainly relies on the language in the first sentence of CL 1948, § 402.6 (Stat Ann 1950 Rev '§ 16.147), supra, authorizing the board of supervisors to erect a county infirmary in any county "in which a county infirmary is not already erected." Plaintiff claims that a county infirmary has already been erected in Ludington, hence, the county has no authority to' change the location and "erect" an infirmary in Scottville. The legislative intent may readily be gathered from the ensuing provisions in the same act, as well as in the other acts above referred to. Obviously, there was no legislative intent that once a county infirmary had been "erected" in a certain place, the county must be limited in perpetuity to that one location for an infirmary. In fact, the record here shows that the Mason county infirmary was originally located in Amber township, which farm site was disposed of when the infirmary was relocated (apparently in conjunction with a "county convalescent home") in a large former residence building in Ludington. Under plaintiff's theory, the farm site would be the only lawful place for a county infirmary. There is no merit in appellant's claim that the board of supervisors may not acquire a different site for the infirmary.
. ."The board of supervisors of the county have exclusive authority over the subject of the erection of! houses for the reception of the poor of their county, ¡ and in the exercise , of this authority they may employ such agents as they choose to execute what they have determined upon to do." Plummer v. Kennedy, 72 Mich 295, 300.
2. Does the city of Scottville have the right to convey to the county a part of the so-called McPhail park in Scottville ?
This 18-acre tract was acquired hy the city in 1925 by gift from Curtis W. McPhail, the conveyance stating:
"This deed is made and executed by said first parties with the agreement and understanding that the land above conveyed is to be used for a public park and for no other purpose; except that such a portion as is necessary for an athletic field may be enclosed for such purpose."
The city, anticipating in an excess of caution a possible claim that this entire 18-acre tract would have to be held by the city in perpetuity as a public park, cleared the title from the possibility by other claimants of an interest in the title. It should be noted that the conveyance from McPhail to the city did not contain a reverter clause, and was not expressly made subject to reversionary interests. When McPhail died testate in 1939 he devised the residue of his estate (which would include any possible interest in the park) to 2 churches, both of which have executed deeds to the city releasing any restrictions or right to the park property. Also, all of McPhail's heirs have joined in a similar deed to the city, reciting that it was given for the same purpose. The city council of Scottville took formal action vacating the park as to the 3-acre parcel and authorizing the conveyance to the county for an infirmary site. In effect, plaintiff would insist that once a parcel of land had been conveyed to a municipality for a park, without a reverter or reversionary clause, it must be held forever by the city as a park. In Briggs v. City of Grand Rapids, 261 Mich 11, we held (syllabus):
"Where there was no reverter clause, statement in deed to city for valuable consideration that land was purchased for park purposes is merely declaration of purpose of conveyance, without effect to limit grant, and therefore city was under no obligation to maintain park in perpetuity."
"It seems to be the weight of authority that, where there is no reverter clause, a statement of use is merely a declaration of the purpose of conveyance, without effect to limit the grant." Quinn v. Pere Marquette Railway Co., 256 Mich 143, 151.
Furthermore, the city council took formal action vacating for park purposes the 3-aere parcel to be conveyed to the county. It had statutory authority to do so. CL 1948, § 100.3 (Stat Ann 1949 Rev § 5.1787). The city of Scottville had authority to convey the 3-acre site to the county.
Finally, appellant asks whether the board of supervisors has the right to "ignore" the county board of sinking fund commissioners and order the construction of a county infirmary partly out of sinking funds. Nothing here in the record indicates that the board of supervisors will fail to recognize any statutory authority of the board of sinking fund commissioners. It consists of the county treasurer, county clerk, register of deeds, chairman of the board of supervisors, and chairman of the finance committee of that board. By statute, the sinking fund is under the control of said board of county sinking fund commissioners, "subject to the supervision and direction of the board of supervisors." We are in accord with the thorough opinion of the trial court, which is in the record, indicating that the board of supervisors, if it desires to use sinking fund moneys, should have no difficulty in "directing" the sinking fund commissioners.
This opinion is based upon an analysis of the statutory powers conferred upon boards. of supervisors by the legislature. The Michigan Constitution (1908) provides:
"The legislature may by general law confer upon the boards of supervisors of the several counties such powers of a local, legislative and administrative character, not inconsistent' with the provisions of this Constitution, as it may deem proper." (Italics supplied.)
It has been argued that boards of supervisors are administrative agencies, lacking authority to change the site of a county infirmary. A board of supervisors is the legislative agency of the county, and if it lacks that authority, obviously it must follow, if existing law is as now argued by appellant, that the location of a county infirmary must remain, perhaps in perpetuity, as originally located, unless further authorized by the legislature.
In some instances the Constitution itself has plainly defined the location of certain county agencies. Article 8, § 13, forbids a change in the location of the county seat of government, once it has been established, until the change in location has been approved by a majority vote of the electors. Article 8, § 4, requires that the sheriff, county clerk, county treasurer, judge of probate and register of deeds "shall hold their offices at the county seat." Sig nificaritly, a change in location of the county infirmary has been left to other Constitutional provisions, and to the legislature.
There is neither a constitutional nor statutory requirement that a change in the loeation of the county infirmary shall require a majority vote of the electors. Unless the board of supervisors has that authority* none exists.
Decree should be affirmed. . No costs, a public question being involved.
Butzel and Smith, JJ., concurred with Boyles, J.
See CLS 1954, § 400.55(e) (Stat Ann 1953 Cum Supp § 16.455. [ft]).
See CL 1948, § 141.51 (Stat Ann § 5.671).
See CL 1948, § 141.31 et seq. (Stat Ann § 5.651 et seq.). i
Reference will be' made later to a claim of defect in the titlftj which the city might convey to. the county, ;
This must now be qualified by a later requirement in CL 1948, § 402.6 (Stat Ann 1950 Rev § 16.147), that before a county infirmary 'is erected, the plans must be approved by the State department of welfare, which has been done in this case.
CL 1948, § 141.32 (Stat Ann § 5.652).
CL 1948, §141.55 (Stat Ann §5.675).
Art 8, § 8.