Case Name: Elena PLANA and John Plana, Appellants, v. Eduardo SAINZ and NAP Dispositions, Inc., Appellees
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 2008-06-18
Citations: 990 So. 2d 554
Docket Number: No. 3D06-1512
Parties: Elena PLANA and John Plana, Appellants, v. Eduardo SAINZ and NAP Dispositions, Inc., Appellees.
Judges: Before GREEN, ROTHENBERG, and SALTER, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 990
Pages: 554–562

Head Matter:
Elena PLANA and John Plana, Appellants, v. Eduardo SAINZ and NAP Dispositions, Inc., Appellees.
No. 3D06-1512.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
June 18, 2008.
Rehearing Denied Sept. 23, 2008.
Arthur J. Morburger, Miami, for appellants.
Adams, Adams & Baca, and Jaime J. Baca, Miami; Shelley Ray Senecal, for appellees.
Before GREEN, ROTHENBERG, and SALTER, JJ.

Opinion:
ROTHENBERG, J.
Elena ("Elena") and John Plana (collectively "the plaintiffs") appeal from an adverse final judgment entered following the jury's zero verdict, and from the order denying their motion for a new trial in their personal injury action against Eduardo Sainz and NAP Dispositions, Inc. (collectively "the defendants"). The plaintiffs assert that the trial court abused its discretion by denying their motion for new trial where the jury failed to award them expenses incurred for diagnostic testing to determine whether Elena's complained-of injuries were as a result of the subject accident. Because whether the diagnostic tests performed on Elena were reasonable and necessary was a disputed issue of fact, and it was the jury's prerogative to weigh the credibility of the witnesses, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the plaintiffs' motion for a new trial.
On October 10, 2000, Elena was a passenger in a vehicle that was involved in an automobile accident with a pick-up truck driven by Mr. Sainz and owned by NAP Dispositions, Inc. Prior to trial, the defendants admitted liability, and therefore, the issues at trial were whether the subject accident caused Elena's injury and damages, if any.
At trial, contrary to Elena's deposition testimony, it was revealed that she was involved in a prior automobile accident in September 1999, and following that accident, she complained of pain to her lower back and left knee. Dr. Tejeiro, the orthopedist who examined Elena on the day of the subject accident in 2000, testified that based upon Elena's complaints and the medical history she provided, which did not include the prior accident and injuries, he ordered several diagnostic tests, including x-rays, an ultrasound, and an MRI, which confirmed that Elena had a tear to the meniscus of her left knee. While Dr. Tejeiro initially opined that Elena's complaints in 2000 were related to the 2000 accident, he explained that this diagnosis was a result of Elena's failure to inform him of her prior accident in 1999, and that unless the patient tells him about a prior problem, he has to assume the complaints are related to the subject accident.
The defendants' expert, Dr. Lang, an orthopedic surgeon, testified that the tear to Elena's meniscus was a horizontal tear; horizontal tears are degenerative; if Elena hit the dashboard, as she claimed, the tear would have been a vertical tear, not a horizontal tear; and in his opinion, the tear to the meniscus pre-dated the subject accident. Dr. Lang's testimony, therefore, was consistent with the MRI findings by Dr. Mendez, who opined that the meniscus tearing was degenerative. Dr. Lang also noted that Elena initially did not tell him about her prior accident, and when confronted, she denied any prior problems with her left knee. However, when he studied Dr. Seideri's report, he learned that, prior to the subject accident, Elena had complained about recurring problems with her left knee, which included pain and swelling. Dr. Lang also questioned whether the CT Scan of Elena's back was the proper test to perform because it shows bone, not soft tissue, and stated that an MRI should have been ordered instead. Lastly, Dr. Lang testified that it was very unlikely that Elena's knee struck the dashboard of the car.
Dr. Aptman, who conducted a neurological examination of Elena, testified that he found no neurological deficits, and that Elena's failure to tell Dr. Tejeiro about the 1999 accident affected Dr. Tejeiro's evaluation and treatment. Dr. Aptman also testified that Elena told him that she did not have any direct trauma as a result of the subject accident. When asked about whether the diagnostic tests that were performed on Elena were reasonable and necessary, he stated that most of them were unnecessary, not performed properly, and misinterpreted.
Although the defendants admitted liability, the jury found that Mr. Sainz's negligence was not the legal cause of Elena's injury, and entered a zero damage award. The plaintiffs filed a motion for new trial on damages, arguing that, at a minimum, they were entitled to recover the medical expenses they incurred for medical examinations and diagnostic testing that were reasonably necessary to determine whether the subject accident caused Elena's injury-
We conclude that the jury's finding on the issue of causation is not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Thus, we do not disturb that finding. See Martin v. Chapman, 780 So.2d 929, 930 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001). The issue remaining is, therefore, whether there was record evidence to support the jury's verdict of zero damages even though medical tests and diagnostic tests were performed.
It is generally true that even when a jury finds that the plaintiff was not injured as a result of the subject accident, the plaintiff is entitled to recover those expenses incurred for medical examinations and diagnostic testing reasonably necessary to determine whether the subject accident caused the injuries. See Sparks-Book v. Sports Auth., Inc., 699 So.2d 767, 768 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997); Blanford v. Polk County, 410 So.2d 667, 669 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982); Peek v. Stevens, 395 So.2d 617, 617-18 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981); Ridenour v. Sharek, 388 So.2d 222, 224 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980).
However, the Second District in State, Department of Transportation v. Rosario, 782 So.2d 927 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001), essentially distinguished Sparks-Book when it upheld the jury's verdict of zero damages. Regarding the diagnostic testing, the Rosario court found that because of Rosario's pre-existing back problems, his lack of candor with his treating physicians regarding his pre-existing back problems, his lack of candor in answers to interrogatories, the videotape depicting his capabilities, and the conflicting medical opinions as to the issue of causation, the jury could conclude that Rosario suffered no damages as a result of the subject accident. Id. at 928.
The instant case and Rosario are strikingly similar. Both plaintiffs had pre-ex-isting injuries that they failed to disclose to their treating physicians and to opposing counsel; they both demonstrated a lack of candor; there were videotapes depicting their capabilities; the jury awarded no damages based upon a finding that the plaintiff had suffered no damages as a result of the subject accident; and each claimed on appeal that, at a minimum, they were entitled to an award as to expenses incurred for diagnostic testing. Id.
We, therefore, find Rosario persuasive, and conclude that based upon Elena's prior lower back and left knee injuries, her failure to disclose the prior complaints and prior accident to her treating physicians, and the conflicting expert testimony as to whether the diagnostic tests were necessary or appropriate, the jury's award of zero damages to the plaintiffs was supported by the manifest weight of the evidence. We, therefore, distinguish the instant case from the holding in Sparks-Book, which addresses none of these factors.
We additionally conclude that, because the instant plaintiffs failed to object to the verdict form and the trial court's instructions, they waived any objection to the zero damage award. The verdict form the plaintiffs agreed to provided as follows:
1. Was the negligence on the part of defendant, Eduardo Sainz, a legal cause of injury to plaintiff, Elena Plana?
YES.NO.
If your answer to question 1 is NO, your verdict is for the defendants, and you should not proceed further, except to date and sign this verdict for[m] and return it to the courtroom. If your answer to question 1 is YES, please answer questions 2 and 3. By answering the following questions you will determine the damages, if any that Elena Plana sustained as a result of the incident in question.
The jury cannot be faulted for doing exactly what it was instructed to do. As the verdict form instructed, when the jury found that the subject accident was not the legal cause of Elena's injury, it proceeded no further, except to sign the verdict form. Because counsel for the plaintiffs agreed to the wording of the verdict form, instructing the jury to go no further if it concluded that Mr. Sainz's negligence was not the legal cause of Elena's injury, the plaintiffs are precluded from asserting that the zero damage award entered by the jury was error. See Beverly Health & Rehab. Servs., Inc. v. Freeman, 709 So.2d 549, 551 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998) (holding that the plaintiff "waived the issue of nominal damages by agreeing to the verdict form that instructed the jury to skip the damages issue if its answer to the causation question was 'no' "); Papcun v. Piggy Bag Disc. Souvenirs, Food & Gas Corp., 472 So.2d 880, 881 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985) (citing to well-established Florida law that "failure to object to a verdict form regarding defects not of a constitutional or fundamental character constitutes a waiver of such defects").
We additionally note that the verdict form used in Sparks-Book differs from the verdict form used in the instant case. In Sparks-Book the question the jury was asked to resolve was the following: 'Was the negligence on the part of the Defen dant, The Sports Authority, Inc., the legal cause of any loss, injury, or damage to Plaintiff Lila Sparks-Book?" 699 So.2d at 768 (emphasis added). In the instant case, the verdict form limited the jury's consideration to injury only in answering the question, and the jury was instructed to go no further if its answer to this question was "No."
Because counsel for the plaintiffs agreed to the verdict form that instructed the jury to go no further (and thus not consider any loss or damages) if it concluded that Mr. Sainz's negligence was not the legal cause of Elena's injury, we conclude that the argument raised on appeal was not preserved below.
Affirmed.
SALTER, J., concurs.