Case Name: Ahmed HABIBZADAH, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff
Court: Court of Appeals of Indiana
Jurisdiction: Indiana
Decision Date: 2009-04-17
Citations: 904 N.E.2d 367
Docket Number: No. 49A04-0807-CR-400
Parties: Ahmed HABIBZADAH, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
Judges: BAILEY, J., concurs.
Reporter: North Eastern Reporter 2d
Volume: 904
Pages: 367–371

Head Matter:
Ahmed HABIBZADAH, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
No. 49A04-0807-CR-400.
Court of Appeals of Indiana.
April 17, 2009.
Transfer Denied June 11, 2009.
Anna E. Onaitis, Marion County Public Defender Agency, Indianapolis, IN, Attorney for Appellant.
Gregory F. Zoeller, Attorney General of Indiana, J.T. Whitehead, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.

Opinion:
OPINION
BARNES, Judge.
Case Summary
Ahmed Habibzadah appeals the denial of his motion to dismiss criminal charges following the determination that he was incompetent to stand trial. We affirm.
Issue
Habibzadah raises two issues, which we consolidate and restate as whether the trial court properly denied his motion to dismiss.
Facts
According to the probable cause affidavit, on November 11, 2005, Habibzadah allegedly stabbed his wife B.Z. in the chest and head and then "stabbed himself in the stomach and sliced his neck." App. p. 36.
On November 16, 2005, the State charged Habibzadah with Class A felony attempted murder. On November 21, 2005, the State amended the information to include a charge of Class B felony aggravated battery.
On June 22, 2007, Habibzadah was committed to the Indiana Department of Mental Health after a determination that he was not competent to stand trial because he did not "have sufficient comprehension to understand the nature of the criminal action against him and the proceedings therein and to make his defense." Id. at 87. Habibzadah has been diagnosed with receptive expressive language disorder because as a child Habibzadah sustained a traumatic brain injury and has "severe hearing difficulties." Tr. p. 15. Habibza-dah is "essentially deaf" and has "some cognitive impairment that . extends beyond any hearing deficits." Id.
On January 28, 2008, Habibzadah's doe-tors informed the trial court that Habib-zadah had not attained competency and "would not retain competency in the foreseeable future." App. p. 105. Accordingly, civil commitment proceedings were initiated. While the civil commitment proceedings were pending, Habibzadah moved to have the pending eriminal charges dismissed. Following a hearing, the trial court determined that it did not have the authority to dismiss the charges and that it would be premature to grant the motion because of the possibility that Habibzadah could become competent. Habibzadah now appeals.
Analysis
Initially, we address Habibzadah's argument that the trial court did have authority to dismiss the charges. This issue was addressed in State v. Davis, 898 N.E.2d 281 (Ind.2008). On February 21, 2004, Davis was charged with Class D felony criminal recklessness after she walked into a bank, waved a knife in the air, and demanded money from a closed account. Davis was later determined to be incompetent to stand trial and was committed to an appropriate psychiatric institution. Davis's doctor advised the trial court that she "cannot be restored to competence" and that she "is too guarded and paranoid to ever be able to work for her legal counsel." Davis, 898 N.E.2d at 284. On March 27, 2007, Davis filed a motion to dismiss the pending criminal charges arguing that she had already been hospitalized more days than the maximum possible confinement she could have received if she was eventually convicted. The trial court granted her motion, and the State appealed.
In addressing Davis's claims, our supreme court recognized a trial court's "inherent authority to dismiss eriminal charges where the prosecution of such charges would violate a defendant's constitutional rights." Davis, 898 N.E.2d at 285. The court also recognized the statutory authority to dismiss provided by Indiana Code Section 385-34-1-4. In addressing this statute, the Davis court observed, "the open ended eatchall provision of subsection (a)(11) [ ] is recognition that there may be additional reasons for the dismissal of criminal charges. A violation of a defendant's constitutional right to due process certainly fits in that category." Id.
Having determined that the trial court is inherently and statutorily authorized to dismiss charges, the Davis court then considered "whether there is an inherent denial of due process in holding pending cerimi-nal charges indefinitely over the head of one who will never have a chance to prove her innocence." Id. at 287 (emphasis added). The court concluded:
Because Davis' pretrial confinement has extended beyond the maximum period of any sentence the trial court can impose, and because the State has advanced no argument that its interests outweigh Davis' substantial liberty interest, we conclude it is a violation of basic notions of fundamental fairness as embodied in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to hold criminal charges over the head of Davis, an incompetent defendant, when it is apparent she will never be able to stand trial.
Id. at 290.
In making his claim that the charges pending against him should be dismissed, Habibzadah contends that his "right to fundamental fairness and substantial justice is an adequate basis for dismissal as a matter of law." Appellant's Br. p. 6. Based on Davis, we conclude that a trial court has inherent authority and statutory authority to dismiss eriminal charges where the prosecution would violate a defendant's constitutional due process rights. See id. at 285. However, whether permitting the charges to remain pending in this case violates Habibzadah's due process rights is another question.
Under the facts of this case, we conclude that Habibzadah has not established a violation of his due process rights. First, unlike Davis, there has not been a determination that Habibzadah will never be restored to competency. Although the evidence suggests that such restoration is unlikely, the possibility exists. See Tr. pp. 19-20. Moreover, unlike Davis, Habibza-dah has not been confined beyond the maximum period of any sentence that the trial court could impose if he were conviet-ed of the pending charges. The maximum possible sentence that Habibzadah faces for Class A felony attempted murder is fifty years. Assuming Habibzadah has been confined since he allegedly committed the offense in November 2005, with good time credit Habibzadah would not be eligible for release until 2080.
Because it is possible that Habibzadah may be restored to competency and because he has not been confined for longer than the potential maximum sentence he faces, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying his motion to dismiss. See Davis, 898 N.E.2d at 285 ("Abuse of discretion is the appropriate standard for appellate review of a trial court's decision to dismiss a charging information"). Under these circumstances, we cannot conclude that due process, which includes the concepts of equity and fundamental fairness, requires the dismissal of the charges against Habibzadah.
Conclusion
Although a trial court has the inherent and statutory authority to dismiss charges where the prosecution would violate a defendant's constitutional rights to due process, the facts of this case do not warrant dismissal. We affirm.
Affirmed.
BAILEY, J., concurs.
MATHIAS, J., concurs with separate opinion.
. Indiana Code Section 35-34-1-4(a)(11) permits dismissal upon "[alny other ground that is a basis for dismissal as a matter of law."