Case Name: WILLIAM J. PEASE v. MAURICE J. WALSH
Court: New York Superior Court Special Term
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1875-06
Citations: 7 Jones & S. 514
Docket Number: 
Parties: WILLIAM J. PEASE v. MAURICE J. WALSH.
Judges: 
Reporter: Reports of cases argued and determined in the Superior Court of the city of New York
Volume: 39
Pages: 514–518

Head Matter:
SPECIAL TERM,
JUNE, 1875.
WILLIAM J. PEASE v. MAURICE J. WALSH.
I. CONTRACT ILLEGAL.
1. No right of action can spring out of it, whether it be prohibited by positive law, or is opposed to public policy, or contrary to good morals.
H. DOCK DEPARTMENT OP THE CITY OP NEW YORK.
1. Contract to use inpluence with that department, or all OR ANT OP ITS MEMBERS, TO PROCURE A LEASE OP CERTAIN PREMISES IS VOID WITHIN THE ABOVE PRINCIPLE.
a. Thus when the complaint averred that the plaintiff was employed by the defendant to use his influence with the department of docks, either with all the commissioners thereof, or some one of them, and in such manner as he might see fit and proper, for the purpose of procuring a lease of certain piers for the term of one year or more, at as low a rent as fifty thousand dollars per annum, for which use of his influence defendant agreed to pay him fifteen thousand dollars if the lease was procured on those terms; that he had used his influence with said commissioners, had had many interviews with some one of them, and had finally succeeded in procuring a lease from the dock department at annual rent of forty-five thousand dollars for one year, with a privilege of a renewal for fifteen years; but did not show the plaintiff’s business or profession, or that the services to be rendered by him, were those of a lawyer, broker, agent, or person devoted to any special lawful pursuit, in itself either useful or valuable.
Held,
a demurrer to the complaint to be well taken.
Moody P. Smith, for the plaintiff.
H. J. Scudder, for the defendant.

Opinion:
Vah Vorst, J. (at special term).
No right of action can spring out of an illegal contract, nor will the court aid either party to enforce a contract which is prohibited by positive law, or is opposed to public policy, or if it be contrary to good morals.
" Where the consideration is vicious, the contract begets no obligation."
The plaintiff alleges in this case, that he was employed by the defendant "to use his influence" with the department of docks of the city of New York, either with all or with some one member of the same, and in such manner as he might see fit and proper, for the purpose of procuring for the White Star Line Steamship Company, a lease of piers Nos. 51 and 52 on North River in the city of New York, for the term of one year or more, at as low a rent as fifty thousand dollars per annum, for which use of his influence, the defendant agreed to pay the plaintiff fifteen thousand dollars, if the lease was procured on those terms.
The plaintiff claims to have used his influence with the commissioners of docks, and to have had many interviews with some one member of the same, and to have finally succeeded in procuring a lease from the dock department, for the "White Star Line," a.t an annual rent of forty-five thousand dollars for one year, with a privilege of a renewal for fifteen years.
The complaint does not show the plaintiff's business, or profession, nor that the services to be rendered by him were those of a lawyer, broker, agent, or person devoted to any special lawful pursuit, in itself either useful or valuable.
The consideration to support a contract must have some appreciable value, moving to the party obliged.
The cause of action disclosed by the complaint may be regarded either as a sale of the plaintiff's "influence" in the direction indicated, or as an agreement to exercise it, over all or some one of the members of the dock commission, for the sum of fifteen thousand dollars, the payment, however, dependent upon the success of this influence, to secure the lease in question.
Judged by the allegations in the complaint, the influence was successful, for as plaintiff claims it secured a lease for fifteen years instead of one, and at an annual rental five thousand dollars less than the sum the defendant was willing to pay for a lease of the piers in question.
It may be well judged, that the members of the dock commission are not to be. moved to the granting of leases of the public docks and piers through the influence of the plaintiff, exercised over one or more of its members.
To yield to such suggestions, and throw a loose rein on such practice, would lead to the sacrifice of public and private interests and morals. How such influence through one, over all the members of the commission, could be exercised in a truly useful manner, is not disclosed, and it is difficult to be conceived.
The dock commissioners are public officers, upon whom rest responsible duties. They have the care and oversight of the docks, wharves, and piers.
The board may appropriate any of such wharves or piers to the sole use of special kinds of commerce, and may in the name and for the benefit of the corporation of the city of New York, lease any or all of such property for a term not exceeding ten years, and contract for renewals of such leases at advanced rates for additional terms of ten years each.
All leases, other than for districts appointed by the board to special commercial interests shall be made at public auction to the highest bidder (Session Laws of 1871, ch. 574; Laws of 1870, ch. 383, § 37). The setting aside of districts for special kinds of commerce is doubtless a great public convenience. The result is to gather, and perhaps limit to some distinct quarter, the separate branches of commerce, of which this city is the center.
Such appropriation and designation would depend upon the good, impartial judgment of the commissioners, so as best to meet the convenience of all concerned, and is not to be controlled or swayed by the influence of a party interested in procuring a lease for a particular steamship line, of a pier, to be devoted to its exclusive use.
Any secret influence of this kind could not be other than pernicious.
With regard to leases to be granted to the highest bidder at public auction, no influence to control, thwart, or defeat such method could be sanctioned.
The tendency of judicial decision is to frown upon all efforts, by the exercise of illegitimate,influence, to control the deliberations, judgments and action of public bodies and officers. In Harris v. Roof's Executors (10 Barb. 489), it was decided that no action will lie for services as a lobby agent, in attending to a claim against the state before the legislature; agreements in respect to such services, being against public policy and prejudicial to sound legislation. In Davidson v. Seymour (1 Bos. 88), the plaintiff was employed by the firm of H. C. Seymour & Co., to procure for the firm, from the directors of a railroad company, a contract for the building of its road, and agreed to pay him for his services should he succeed in obtaining the contract, the sum of ten thousand dollars. The contract was obtained by the plaintiff, through the influence with the directors of third parties employed by him, his own agency being concealed ; it was held that the agreement was contrary to morality and public policy. In Gray v. Hook (4 Comst. 449), it was held that an agreement to pay a person for his aid and influence in obtaining an office is illegal and void.
Sedgwick v. Stanton (14 N. Y. 289) and Burke v. Child, decided in the supreme court of the United States in October term 1874, would seem to establish that claims of the nature of the one disclosed in this action can not be enforced by the courts.
This latter is a highly important case, and whilst it may be said that it announces nomew principle, its cogent reasoning applies a law of condemnation to the present and kindred claims.
That any influence was in fact exercised over any member of the dock commission, to secure the lease in •question, rests exclusively upon the plaintiff's allegations, made for the purpose of recovering his alleged •compensation from the defendant.
The question is now raised upon a demurrer to the plaintiff's complaint.
There should be judgment for the defendant on the demurrer, with liberty to the plaintiff to amend on the usual terms.