Case Name: Willard Allen BUMGARDEN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. WACKENHUT CORRECTIONS CORPORATION, et al., Defendants-Appellees
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1994-09-21
Citations: 645 So. 2d 655
Docket Number: No. 93-1349
Parties: Willard Allen BUMGARDEN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. WACKENHUT CORRECTIONS CORPORATION, et al., Defendants-Appellees.
Judges: Before DOUCET, LABORDE, YELVERTON, KNOLL and WOODARD, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 645
Pages: 655–661

Head Matter:
Willard Allen BUMGARDEN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. WACKENHUT CORRECTIONS CORPORATION, et al., Defendants-Appellees.
No. 93-1349.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Third Circuit.
Sept. 21, 1994.
Rehearing Denied Dec. 14, 1994.
Robert E. Morgan, Lake Charles, for Willard Allen Bumgarden.
Mark Edmond Falcon, Baton Rouge, for Wackenhut Corrections Corp, et al.
Victoria Fontana Suplee, Baton Rouge, for State, DPS.
James Carl Hrdlicka, II, Baton Rouge, for State, Dept, of Justice.
Before DOUCET, LABORDE, YELVERTON, KNOLL and WOODARD, JJ.

Opinion:
|1KNOLL, Judge.
This appeal concerns the application of the Corrections Administrative Remedy Procedure (ARP), LSA-R.S. 15:1171, et seq, to a private prison facility. Plaintiff, Willard Bumgarden, brought a personal injury suit against defendant, Wackenhut Corrections Corporation (Wackenhut), the contractor operating the private prison facility in which Bumgarden was incarcerated. The trial court dismissed Bumgarden's suit, finding: (1) he failed to exhaust his administrative remedies under the ARP; and (2) the 19th Judicial District Court was the only proper jurisdiction in which to seek review of a decision under the ARP. Bumgarden appeals this ruling.
FACTS
Bumgarden was seriously injured while incarcerated at the Allen Correctional Institute, in Allen Parish, which is operated by Wackenhut. Bumgarden alleges that on June 17, 1991, prison guards ordered him to ride an injured horse, which reared and fell |2backwards onto him. Bumgarden was released from the institution on October 2, 1991, and filed this suit on April 6, 1992, for injuries sustained in the riding accident. Judgment dismissing Bumgarden's suit on the aforesaid grounds was signed March 10, 1993.
Bumgarden bases his appeal on the contention that the ARP is applicable only to public bodies and not private corporations. However, we believe the dispositive issue is whether the ARP is applicable to the plaintiff since he was not in the physical custody of defendant when he filed his suit.
APPLICATION OF ARP TO PLAINTIFF
The ARP is an administrative grievance procedure designed to resolve inmate complaints within the correctional system. It significantly modifies the conditions under which an inmate may bring actions for personal injuries. The inmate must initiate his administrative action within 30 days of the accident. Furthermore, unless the inmate timely initiates the procedure and exhausts all administrative remedies, he may not. seek judicial review of the administrative decision. Louisiana Registry, Vol. 17, No. 1, p. 70, January 20, 1991. However, none of the parties address the threshold question of whether the ARP applies to a plaintiff whose cause of action arose in prison, but who has timely brought suit after being released. Our research indicates the case law in this area to date has only dealt with the filing of suits by inmates who are still in custody. Since this issue is res nova, we base our decision on traditional canons of statutory interpretation. In interpreting the scope of the ARP, we will rely on the literal wording of the statute to the extent such wording does not lead to absurd consequences. LSA-C.C. Art. 9.
Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997 et seq., the "Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act", the Louisiana legislature enacted LSA-R.S. 15:1171 et seq. These statutes are the enabling legislation for the ARP and provide in part:
1171. Authority
"B. The department [of Public Safety and Corrections] or sheriff may also adopt, in accordance with the Administrative Proce-dureJjAct, administrative remedy procedures for receiving, hearing, and disposing of any and all complaints and grievances by adult or juvenile offenders against the state, the governor, or the department . which arise while an offender is within the custody or under the supervision of the department ."
1172. Effect
"A. [T]his procedure shall constitute the administrative remedies available to offenders for the purpose of preserving any cause of action they may claim to have against the state ."
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"B. No state court shall entertain an offender's grievance or complaint which falls under the purview of the administrative remedy procedure unless and until the offender shall have exhausted the remedies as provided in said procedure. If the offender has failed timely to pursue administrative remedies through this procedure, any petition he files shall be dismissed. ."
1174. Definitions
"For purposes of this Part:
(2) "Offender" means an adult or juvenile offender in the physical custody of the Department of Public Safety and Corrections or a sheriff." (Emphasis added.)
In the literal wording of the statute, the ARP clearly addresses itself to actions brought by "offenders." R.S. 15:1174(2) makes it equally clear that an "offender" is someone who is in the physical custody of the State or a sheriff. To the contrary, Bumgar-den had been released from custody at the time he filed this lawsuit. The only way to find the ARP applicable in the case suib judice is to hold that the ARP applies to all causes of action arising while the plaintiff is in custody, regardless of whether the plaintiff is in custody at the time he files suit. However, when the definition of "offender" is read into the statute, it negates this interpretation since the term "offender" is limited to offenders in physical custody. Where section 1171(B) provides the ARP applies to "all complaints and grievances by adult or juvenile offenders against the state," this should be read as applying to complaints and grievances by offenders in custody. Similarly,' where section 1172(B) prohibits a court from entertaining an offender's grievance unless the offender has exhausted his administrative remedies, this also should be read as |4prohibiting petitions by offenders in custody. Not only do we find the literal language of R.S. 15:1171 et seq. compels this result, but also, a review of the history and purpose of the ARP convinces us that any other interpretation would lead to clearly absurd consequences.
While we have found sparse authority defining the purpose and boundaries of R.S. 15:1171 et seq. and the ARP, it is clear the provisions were enacted pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997 et seq., the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act (CRIPA).
1171. Authority
A. The Department of Public Safety and Corrections and each sheriff is hereby authorized to adopt an administrative remedy procedure at each of its adult and juvenile institutions, in compliance with 42 United States Code 1997, the "Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act", or CRIPA,
By reviewing the congressional history of the Federal statute authorizing States to implement inmate grievance procedures and administrative remedies, we believe some light may be shed on the purpose of Louisiana's ARP.
One of the purposes of the CRIPA was to authorize States to establish inmate grievance procedures, which became the ARP in Louisiana.
"A secondary purpose of H.R. 9400 [CRI-PA], one which is strongly endorsed by the States, is an optional provision which will permit the continuance of cases brought in Federal court by State prisoners in order to require exhaustion of certified grievance procedures. This provision will not only help the clogged Federal court dockets, but will free the States of the burden of defending themselves in court against many individual prisoner complaints and will provide prisoners with a speedier, more appropriate forum for the resolution of their complaints." Conf.Rep. 9; 124 Congressional Record 11976.
42 U.S.C. § 1997e authorizes the establishment of grievance procedures and allows courts to require the exhaustion of these procedures. While section 1997e was intended to reduce the number of civil suits, primarily 42 U.S.C. § 1983 actions, filed in Federal courts, the exhaustion requirement was not intended for blanket application. The congressional history indicates the exhaustion of ^grievance procedures is only required when the procedures have a realistic chance of resolving the dispute.
This section [1997e(e) ] provides, in certain cases, for exhaustion of correctional grievance procedures prior to consideration of a prisoner suit in Federal court filed under 42 U.S.C. 1983.
*
Subsection (a) [of 1997e(3) ] authorizes a Federal court in which an adult prisoner's suit filed under 42 U.S.C. 1983 is pending, to continue that action for a period not to exceed 90 days if the prisoner has access to a grievance resolution system which is in substantial compliance with the minimum standards promulgated pursuant to this section. Such limited continuance would be for the purpose of requiring exhaustion of the approved resolution system. In order to order such a continuance, the court must find it would be "appropriate and in the interest of justice."
It is the intent of the committee that the court not find such a requirement appropriate in those situations in which the action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983 raises issues which cannot, in reasonable probability, be resolved by the grievance resolution system, including cases where imminent danger to life is alleged. Allegations unrelated to conditions of confinement . would not appropriately be continued for resolution by the grievance resolution system." 1980 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News 787, 816.
We do not believe it was the intent of Congress to require the exhaustion of grievance procedures for all suits filed by inmates. In discussing the above quoted'language and the state of Virginia's experience with its grievance procedure, one commentator noted:
According to this view, exhaustion should most appropriately be required in cases involving relatively routine complaints dealing with common incidents of institutional environment. Most section 1983 suits filed by prisoners in the Western District of Virginia fall within this category. Many involve perhaps unpleasant, but not serious, conditions of confinement; isolated incidents of excessive force or inadequate medical attention; property deprivations, both intentional and negligent; violations of religious freedoms; and many other complaints. Logically, then, section 1997(e) should be an effective instrument for keeping routine inmate complaints out of federal court." 7 Am.J. Trial Advoc. 1, 5 (1983). (Footnotes omitted).
|6To interpret the term "offender" as including former inmates would place such plaintiffs in an untenable position. For instance, under such an interpretation, an inmate injured the day prior to being released would have his rights governed by the ARP. Must such a plaintiff file his complaint in the prison system? Would he even be allowed to since he is no longer an inmate? Has such a plaintiff lost his rights before both the prison administration and the courts? These questions demonstrate the procedural quagmire this court would be blundering into by defining offender to include former inmates.
Obviously, since the ARP envisions review of inmate grievances by the district courts, it was not intended to eliminate an inmate's access to the courts. Rather, the purpose of the grievance procedures is to give "routine inmate complaints" a chance to be resolved at the prison level before turning to the courts. The Federal jurisprudence in this area evidences the reluctance of courts to bar inmate plaintiffs' suits. Federal courts rarely dismiss outright an inmate's suit based solely on the grounds of not exhausting the grievance procedure. Rather, the practice is invariably to continue the case and order the inmate to attempt a solution through the grievance system. Dismissals are then considered when and if the inmate does not follow this order. See Rocky v. Vittorie, 813 F.2d 734 (5th Cir.1987); Lewis v. Meyer, 815 F.2d 43 (7th Cir.1987); Francis v. Marquez, 741 F.2d 1127 (9th Cir.1984); Kennedy v. Herschler, 655 F.2d 210 (10th Cir.1981).
Since the plaintiff in the case sub judice was not incarcerated at the time he filed this suit in State court, denying him access to the courts could not possibly further the purpose of the ARP, i.e., giving the inmate and prison officials a chance to resolve the issue. By applying the ARP to a former inmate, the grievance procedure, instead of a mechanism for reaching out-of-court solutions, becomes a procedural trap for the unwary plaintiff. The congressional history and Federal jurisprudence clearly indicate that this was not the purpose of authorizing |7States to establish grievance procedures. Where the plaintiff is no longer a prison inmat.e, applying the ARP to that plaintiff would lead to absurd consequences.
CONCLUSION
We find the definition of the term "offender" clearly places a former inmate no longer in custody outside the scope of the ARP's exhaustion requirement. We hold the ARP does not apply to suits brought by a plaintiff not in custody, regardless of whether the cause of action arose while the plaintiff was in custody.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial court is reversed and this case is remanded to the district court for further proceedings.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
DOUCET and WOODARD, JJ., dissent and assign reasons.