Case Name: PEOPLE v. PENN
Court: Michigan Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1976-10-18
Citations: 71 Mich. App. 517
Docket Number: Docket No. 21857
Parties: PEOPLE v PENN
Judges: Before: T. M. Burns, P. J., and V. J. Brennan and D. E. Holbrook, Jr., JJ.
Reporter: Michigan appeals reports; cases decided in the Michigan Court of Appeals.
Volume: 71
Pages: 517–525

Head Matter:
PEOPLE v PENN
Opinion op T. M. Burns, J.
1. Appeal and Error — Criminal Law — Dependant’s Prior Convictions — Motion to Exclude — Exercise of Discretion — Record.
A trial court erred reversibly in failing to exercise its discretion to consider and rule upon a defendant’s motion to exclude evidence of the defendant’s prior convictions; the error could not be harmless where the defendant’s guilt clearly was not established by overwhelming evidence.
2. Criminal Law — Evidence—Prior Convictions — Admissibility— Remoteness in Time.
The remoteness in time of a defendant’s prior convictions is relevant to their admissibility into evidence and should be considered by the trial court.
Dissent by V. J. Brennan, J.
3. Courts — Criminal Law — Exercise of Discretion — Requests— Prior Convictions — Record—Appeal and Error.
The Supreme Court ruling which held that reversible error occurs when a trial court fails to exercise and record the exercise of its discretion regarding the admissibility of evidence of a defendant’s prior convictions upon request is not retroactive; even where the rule is properly applied, reversal is not required where the record does sufficiently demonstrate that the court exercised necessary discretion.
References for Points in Headnotes
[1, 3] 29 Am Jur 2d, Evidence §§ 321, 333.
29 Am Jur 2d, Evidence §§ 330, 348.
Admissibility of evidence of accused’s good reputation as affected by remoteness of time to which it relates. 87 ALR2d 968.
29 Am Jur 2d, Evidence §§ 320-333.
75 Am Jur 2d, Trial § 31.
40 Am Jur 2d, Homicide § 500.
75 Am Jur 2d, Trial § 605.
40 Am Jur 2d, Homicide §§ 246, 247.
4. Criminal Law — Evidence—Impeachment—Prior Convictions— Credibility — Similar Crimes — Remoteness.
Evidence of prior felony convictions which relate to violent crimes need not necessarily involve credibility to be admissible for purposes of impeachment, nor must the evidence of prior convictions be excluded because convictions are for crimes which have a nature similar to the crime charged, or because those convictions were remote in time.
5. Courts — Discretion—Postponement—Specific Language.
There is no basis for ñnding that a trial court has postponed the exercise of its discretion where no speciñc language to that effect appears.
6. Homicide — Malice—Inferences—Tendency of Action — Question of Fact.
A court should not instruct a jury that as a matter of law the use of a deadly weapon implies malice; malice is a permissible inference rather than a presumption of law and the intent to kill may be implied where the actor intends to indict great bodily harm or the natural tendency of his behavior is to cause death or great bodily harm.
7. Courts — Instructions to Jury — Entirety—Single Phrases— Prejudices.
Jury instructions must be considered in their entirety and error cannot be established by one phrase lifted from the whole charge unless the phrase prejudices the whole charge.
8. Homicide — Intent—Burden of Proof — Explicit Imposition.
A defendant in a trial for second-degree murder was not directly burdened to initiate evidence contrary to any "presumption” of intent to kill where the record reveals the trial court did not explicitly and improperly impose such a burden.
Appeal from St. Clair, Halford I. Streeter, J.
Submitted April 6, 1976, at Lansing.
(Docket No. 21857.)
Decided October 18, 1976.
Leave to appeal applied for.
Robert E. Penn was convicted of second-degree murder. Defendant appeals.
Reversed and remanded.
Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Robert A. Derengoski, Solicitor General, Peter E. Deegan, Prosecuting Attorney, and Peter R. George, Chief Appellate Counsel, for the people.
Daniel J. Wright, Assistant State Appellate Defender, for defendant.
Before: T. M. Burns, P. J., and V. J. Brennan and D. E. Holbrook, Jr., JJ.

Opinion:
T. M. Burns, P. J.
On August 20, 1973, the defendant was convicted by a jury of second-degree murder, MCLA 750.317; MSA 28.549, and assault with intent to do great bodily harm less than murder, MCLA 750.84; MSA 28.279. He was later sentenced to life imprisonment for the first offense and 6 to 10 years in prison on the second.
Defendant was charged with the murder of Letha Reckker, with whom he had previously cohabited. It was alleged that the defendant fatally wounded the deceased with a knife while the two were fighting.
Prior to trial defense counsel requested that the prosecution be prevented from impeaching the defendant's credibility by inquiring into two prior felony convictions. The prosecutor objected and after discussion of the question, the trial court merely stated that the prosecutor would not be permitted to go outside the rap sheet or introduce evidence of prior criminal charges which had not resulted in convictions.
The trial court erred reversibly in failing to exercise its discretion to exclude the defendant's prior convictions from the evidence. Although defense counsel's motion to exclude the record was poorly made, the issue was sufficiently raised and should have been considered and ruled upon by the trial court.
The record indicates that the trial court did not exercise its discretion in deciding the question. In fact, it appears that the judge did not explicitly rule on the admissibility of the prior felony convictions at all. While at the time of this trial there was no requirement that the trial judge had to indicate his exercise of discretion on the record, the record reveals that the judge did not have sufficient facts before him to properly exercise such discretion. He knew only the nature of the offenses. No inquiry was made of the dates of the convictions, the most recent of which was in 1955. The remoteness in time of a prior conviction is certainly relevant to its admissibility and should be considered by the trial court. See People v Townsend, 60 Mich App 204, 206; 230 NW2d 378 (1975). The staleness of the convictions in this case, if considered by the trial court, may well have been found' to render their admission into evidence improper.
The trial court's failure to exercise discretion in ruling on defendant's motion could not be considered harmless error; the defendant's guilt clearly was not established by "overwhelming evidence". People v Johnson, 46 Mich App 212, 221; 207 NW2d 914 (1973). Being the only witness to the entire incident, defendant's credibility was critical to the weight given to his version of the fight.
Reversed and remanded for a new trial.
D. E. Holbrook, Jr., J. concurs in the result only.