Case Name: THOMAS P. ELDRIDGE, et al., Survivors, &c. Plaintiffs and Respondents, v. ADOLPH C. STRENZ, et al., Defendants and Appellants
Court: New York Superior Court General Term
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1875-05-03
Citations: 7 Jones & S. 295
Docket Number: 
Parties: THOMAS P. ELDRIDGE, et al., Survivors, &c. Plaintiffs and Respondents, v. ADOLPH C. STRENZ, et al., Defendants and Appellants.
Judges: 
Reporter: Reports of cases argued and determined in the Superior Court of the city of New York
Volume: 39
Pages: 295–301

Head Matter:
THOMAS P. ELDRIDGE, et al., Survivors, &c. Plaintiffs and Respondents, v. ADOLPH C. STRENZ, et al., Defendants and Appellants.
APPEAL PAPERS.
The general term on appeal, should have all the papers upon which the order appealed from was based, placed before it.
In this case the remittitur from the court of appeals to this court, which was before the special term, does not appear among the papers.
COSTS—EXTRA ALLOWANCE.
If the court before which the final determination in the case was had, does not direct an allowance in its judgment, there is no authority elsewhere to adjudge it (McGregor v. Buell, 1 Keyes, 157, 158).
The 56th rule of practice limits this application to the court before which the trial is had or the judgment rendered.
In the case at bar, the plaintiff recovered judgment after a trial before a jury, and an allowance was made to him. The defendant appealed to the general term of this court, and the .judgment was-recovered and a new trial ordered. From this decision the plaintiff appealed to the court of appeals, making the usual stipulation required, that absolute judgment should be rendered against him, if the judgment should be affirmed. It was affirmed, and on the remittitur to this court and on affidavit, the defendant moved at special tern for an allowance, and the motion was denied. Held, no express provision of the code exists, that provides for an allowance in a case like the present, where a judgment has been rendered by the court of appeals under this form of stipulation; and as, from the nature of the proceeding, it might be often inequitable that there should be an allowance, it is more reasonable to consider that there should not be one granted than to seek for it from analogy and implication.. Order of court below affirmed.
The legislature by the word “defense” in the 309th section of the code, meant something more than a case in which an answer or demurrer only was interposed ; it never contemplated that in such a case the plaintiff should be subjected to any greater payment of costs, than the usual fixed amount of taxable costs.
Oh. J. Monell, in a dissenting opinion, holds substantially that in this and all other like cases, the special term of this court could exercise its discretion after the judgment of the court of appeals, and that in all cases where a defense (by pleading) had been interposed, an allowance to the successful party was within the discretion of the court.
Before Monell, Ch. J., and Curtis and Speir, JJ.
Decided May 3, 1875.
Appeal from an order of the special term denying defendant’s motion for an extra allowance.
The action was to recover the amount of a promissory note. The issue formed by the defendant’s answer was tried by a jury. The plaintiff had a verdict, .and judgment was rendered in his favor. The court, granted plaintiff an extra allowance of two and one-half per cent, on the amount of the verdict.
The defendant appealed from the judgment to the general term, where the judgment was reversed and a new trial ordered, with costs to abide the event. From the judgment of the general term, the plaintiff appealed to the court of appeals, making the usual stipulation required, that absolute judgment should be rendered against him in case of affirmation of the judgment below. The court of appeals affirmed the judgment of the general term, and rendered absolute judgment in favor of defendant, and against the plaintiff for costs.
The judgment of the court of appeals was remitted to, and became the judgment of this court.
The defendant thereupon moved for an extra allow anee of costs at the special term of this court, and the motion was denied for “ want of power in this court to grant the same, and for no other reason.”
Miller, Feet & OpdyTce, for appellants.
G. A. Seixas, for respondents.

Opinion:
By the Court.—Curtis, J.
It appears from an affidavit on the part of the plaintiff, that the plaintiff appealed to the Court of Appeals, from a judgment of the general term reversing a judgment of the special term in his favor, and granting a new trial, and stipulated that should the judgment appealed from be affirmed, judgment absolute should be rendered against him.
Under this stipulation, the Court of Appeals after a hearing, ordered judgment absolute against the plaintiff. The motion at special term for an allowance was made, not only upon the affidavit above referred to, but upon the remittitur from the Court of Appeals, which was presented to the judge, who made the order appealed from, and is referred to in that order.
The papers on this appeal, do not contain the remittitur, and the general term under the rules and practice of the court ought, on appeal, to have all the papers upon which the order appealed from is based, placed before it.
Especially is this the case, when the court is called upon to take some action incident to the judgment contained in that very remittitur from the Court of Appeals. Even if we bad it before us, it does not seem clear that this court has any power to add any further adjudication or order to the judgment contained in that remittitur, or to supply any omission or defect. If that court before which the hearing or determination under the stipulation was had, does not direct an al lowance in its judgment, there does not appear to be authority elsewhere to adjudge it (McGregor v. Buell, 1 Keyes, 157, 158). There is another difficulty in our attempting to pass upon it, as the 56th rule limits this application to the court before which the trial is had, or the judgment rendered.
ISTo express provision of the code exists granting an allowance in a case like the present, where a judgment is rendered under this form of stipulation, and as from the nature of the proceeding it might be often inequitable that there should be an allowance, it is more reasonable-to consider that the legislature intended that there should not be one granted, than to seek, for it from analogy and implication.
In that class of cases, where the court has power to grant allowances provided for in the 309th section of the code, in which it is stated, they may be made "in difficult and extraordinary cases, where a defense has been interposed," there is reason to believe, that the legislature intended by the use of the word " defense " to mean something more than an answer or demurrer being interposed, as it may be claimed that it is employed in distinction from those terms ; and if the legislature had intended to refer simply to the interposition of an answer or demurrer, it would, as in other instances throughout the code, have used those specific terms. In addition, it maybe fairly assumed, that as in the current affairs of all enlightened communities, men are encourged to seek a peaceful and just solution of questions and controversies, by commencing suits, the occasion for which often ceases on the interposition of merely an answer, that the legislature never contemplated that in such contingencies, a plaintiff should be subjected to any greater payment than the fixed and determined amount of costs which has usually been given. It can not be presumed that under such circumstances, it was intended to subject the plaintiff to the hazard of being obliged to pay in addition, sums that under the name of allowances, may be severe and ruinous to the law-abiding and peaceable suitor.
The order appealed from should be affirmed, with costs to the respondent.
Speir, J., concurred.