Case Name: Kistler, Respondent, vs. Kistler, Appellant
Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Wisconsin
Decision Date: 1910-02-01
Citations: 141 Wis. 491
Docket Number: 
Parties: Kistler, Respondent, vs. Kistler, Appellant.
Judges: 
Reporter: Wisconsin Reports
Volume: 141
Pages: 491–496

Head Matter:
Kistler, Respondent, vs. Kistler, Appellant.
January 12
February 1, 1910.
Divorce: Judgment:Division of property: Remarriage of parties: Second action: Agreement in ■aid of divorce: Satisfaction of prior judgment.
1. A judgment in a divorce action awarding a certain sum as and for “permanent alimony and division of property” must be construed as mailing a final division of tbe property, not open to. change after the term at which it was rendered.
2. Such a judgment becomes the separate property of the wife and is not affected by remarriage of the parties to each other.
3. A stipulation between the parties to a divorce action, reciting their agreement to separate and providing that' the wife should prosecute the action and should accept a certain sum as alimony and should not demand any further sum, was void as being an agreement in aid of divorce.
4. Payment of the sum mentioned in accordance with such void stipulation did not operate to satisfy the judgment in a prior divorce action between the same parties, in which the wife was. awarded a certain sum as a final division of property. Mabsiiall, X, dissents.
Appeal from an order of tbe circuit court for Grant county: Geoege Clemeetsoh; Circuit Judge.
Affirmed.
Tbe defendant petitioned for an order satisfying a judgment obtained against bim by tbe plaintiff, and appeals from, an order denying bis petition.
Tbe facts were that tbe parties were busband and wife, and that on August 30, 1898, tbe plaintiff obtained judgment of divorce against tbe defendant, wherein it was adjudged that tbe defendant pay to tbe plaintiff $1,000 “as and for ber permanent alimony and division of property;” that tbe parties remarried September 28, 1898, and lived together for some months; that tbe plaintiff commenced another divorce action early in tbe year 1901; and that tbe parties entered into a stipulation at or just prior to tbe commencement of this sec-' ond action reciting their agreement to separate, and proceeding as follows:
“And said Josephme M. Kistler having agreed and by these presents agreeing to prosecute tbe suit for divorce which has been commenced, and agrees to accept tbe sum of three hundred dollars as alimony, and further agrees to not ask for or demand any further sum or sums whatever." One hundred and fifty dollars to be paid down at the ensealing of these presents and the other one hundred and fifty dollars on or before February 22, 1901.”
This $300' was paid and another judgment of divorce was taken by default June 11, 1901, without any provision as to alimony. The original judgment of $1,000 in the first action was never in fact paid, but the defendant’s contention is that the $300 paid pursuant to the stipulation in the second action was in fact paid in settlement not only of all claim for alimony in that action, but in settlement of the judgment for division of property in the first action.
Eor the appellant there was a brief by Kopp & BrnmJc-horst, and oral argument by L. A. B'nmclchorst.
B. A. ’Waileins, for the respondent.

Opinion:
WiNsnow, C. J.
There are two questions in the case: First What was the effect of the remarriage on the judgment for division of property in the first divorce action? Second. Was that judgment paid and.satisfied by the stipulation made, in the second action and the payment of the $300 thereunder ?
1. The judgment for $1,000 in the first action is confused and inaccurate because it describes that sum as and for "permanent alimony and division of property," whereas it cannot be both. It must, however, be construed as a division of property. Von Trott v. Von Trott, 118 Wis. 29, 94 N. W. 198. So construing it, the result necessarily follows that it was a final adjudication, not open to revision after the term at which it was rendered, and became the separate estate of the plaintiff. Being her separate estate, it continued to be such after her remarriage to the defendant, and was manifestly unaffected thereby. Sec. 2341, Stats. (1898). Had it been a judgment for alimony proper, i. e. support payable periodically, remarriage of the wife, even to a third person, would probably justify the court in reducing or taking away the provision entirely. 2 Bishop, Mar., Div. & Sep. § 1058; 14 Cyc. 787, and cases cited in note 24. But, as we have seen, a judgment for division of the property is final, conclusive, and not .open to change after the term at which it is rendered.
2. The judgment not being affected by the remarriage, was it. satisfied by the stipulation ? This question must on principle be answered in the negative. This court has said, in accordance with the prevailing rule of law, that "agreements promotive of marriage are valid, and those in aid of separation and divorce are void." Baum v. Baum, 109 Wis. 47, 85 N. W. 122; Oppenheimer v. Collins, 115 Wis. 283, 91 N. W. 690. The stipulation in question was an agreement in aid of divorce. The expressed consideration for the agreement to pay the $300 was the agreement by plaintiff to prosecute an action for divorce. While there is no direct agreement on defendant's part to abstain from defending the divorce action, it is very evident that the object and purpose of the agreement was that plaintiff should diligently prosecute her suit for divorce and receive from defendant $300 for so doing. This must be considered an agreement having for its object the facilitating of the procurement of a divorce and hence void. 15 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law (2d ed.) 956. If the agreement to pay the $300 was void, the agreement by plaintiff that such sum should he accepted in satisfaction of all claims for alimony is necessarily void, because they are both parts of the same transaction and so woven together as to be inseparable.
By the Court. — Order affirmed.