Case Name: Angelo LISAK, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent
Court: Florida Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1983-01-27
Citations: 433 So. 2d 487
Docket Number: No. 61830
Parties: Angelo LISAK, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
Judges: ALDERMAN, C.J., and ADKINS and OVERTON, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 433
Pages: 487–491

Head Matter:
Angelo LISAK, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
No. 61830.
Supreme Court of Florida.
Jan. 27, 1983.
Rehearing Denied July 11, 1983.
Peter M. de Manió and Teresa H. Harrison of the Law Offices of Peter M. de Manió, P.A., Sarasota, for petitioner.
Jim Smith, Atty. Gen. and Peggy A. Quince, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tampa, for respondent.

Opinion:
McDONALD, Justice.
We have accepted jurisdiction to review the decision of the Second District Court of Appeal in State v. Lisak, 409 So.2d 1149 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982), because it conflicts with McCarver v. State, 379 So.2d 979 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980). We have jurisdiction pursuant to article V, section 3(b)(3), Florida Constitution. We approve Lisak and in doing so disapprove McCarver.
The facts are fully recited in the opinion of the district court:
Appellee was arrested on April 11, 1980, for an armed robbery committed on November 27, 1979. On April 16, 1980, a delinquency petition for this offense was filed against him.
On April 21, 1980, appellee appeared before the juvenile court, and Assistant Public Defender James Birkhold entered an admission to the petition on appellee's behalf. Birkhold and Deputy Clerk Patricia Woods later testified that Assistant State Attorney Richard Brown was present at this hearing. The prosecutor said nothing during the proceeding. Birkhold laid a factual basis for appellee's plea. Appellee himself said nothing, however. Mr. Smith from HRS agreed to have an oral predispositional report pre pared by the next morning, and the matter was continued to the next morning.
The following day, Brown asked for a continuance because "there has been a conflict as to the boys [sic] age and we would like some additional time to investigate and subpoena some records to be sure before we proceed to disposition." Brown further noted that the charged offense was a life felony and "we do have twenty one days, if we wish (inaudible)." The case was then continued until April 25, 1980, "for the State to verify." At the outset of the April 15, 1980, hearing Brown announced: "Your Honor, at this time it's the State's intention to form a Grand Jury, uh, the first of next week under our authority under Florida Statute 29025C. This is a life felony." Birk-hold noted that appellee had already entered a plea, and the trial court agreed.
An indictment against appellee was filed on April 30, 1980, and the juvenile petition was apparently nolle pressed on May 2, 1980. On September 12, 1980, appellee filed a motion to dismiss the indictment on the ground that he had already been charged with and pled guilty to the crime charged in the indictment. After hearing testimony and reviewing memoranda of law submitted by both sides, the trial court (criminal division) on November 10, 1980, entered the following order:
[I]t is the
FINDING OF THE COURT THAT:
1) The Defendant was properly before Court in the Juvenile Division on April 21, 1980;
2) The Defendant tendered a plea of guilty in open court in the Juvenile Division on April 21, 1980;
3) The Court in the Juvenile Division accepted the Defendant's plea of guilty on April 21, 1980;
4) The Court in the Juvenile Division subsequently ordered a pre-disposition report as a consequence of accepting the Defendant's plea of guilty; and
5)The Defendant was then ordered to return to Court in the Juvenile Division for disposition,
accordingly, it is hereby
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the Defendant has previously been placed in jeopardy and therefore the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is granted, and the Defendant is ordered transferred to Juvenile Division for further proceedings.
On November 20, 1980, appellee was committed "to H.R.S. for the maximum period of time under the law but not beyond his nineteenth birthday."
409 So.2d at 1150.
The question to be resolved is whether a minor's plea of guilty to a petition for delinquency predicated on a capital or life sentence offense and made within twenty-one days of the arrest of the minor bars prosecution of the minor as an adult on the capital offense. In answering this question in the negative we adopt additional portions of the second district opinion in this cause:
Section 39.06(7), Florida Statutes (1979), gives the juvenile court general jurisdiction over all juveniles brought before the courts. However, Section 39.-02(5)(c), Florida Statutes (1979), provides:
A child of any age charged with a violation of Florida law punishable by death or by life imprisonment shall be subject to the jurisdiction of the court as set forth in s. 39.06(7) unless and until an indictment on such charge is returned by the grand jury. When an indictment is returned, the petition for delinquency, if any, shall be dismissed. The child shall be tried and handled in every respect as if he were an adult:
No adjudicatory hearing shall be held within 21 days from the date that the child is taken into custody and charged with having committed an offense punishable by death or by life imprisonment unless the state attorney advises the court in writing that he does not intend to present the case to the grand jury or that he has presented the case to the grand jury and the grand jury has returned a no true bill. If the court receives such a notice from the state attorney, or if the grand jury fails to act within the 21-day period, the court may proceed as otherwise authorized under this chapter.
(Emphasis added.) State v. Cain, 381 So.2d 1361 (Fla.1980), which involved another statutory exception to the juvenile court's general jurisdiction over all juveniles, held that this exclusive general jurisdiction is expressly qualified to the extent of the statutory exceptions.
Appellee was arrested on April 11, 1980, so the twenty-one days during which no adjudicatory hearing could be held did not run until May 2, 1980. The hearing at which appellee attempted to enter his guilty plea was held on April 21, 1980. Following the rationale of State v. Cain, we hold that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to hold an adjudicatory hearing on that date.
Since the entry and the juvenile court's apparent acceptance of appellee's guilty plea is an adjudication, this action by the juvenile court exceeded its authority and was void ab initio. To hold otherwise would permit the juvenile court to exercise jurisdiction expressly forbidden without recourse by the state. The legislative intent of Section 39.02(5)(c), to give the prosecutor adequate time to go before the grand jury, would also be frustrated. Thus a virtual race to the courthouse could result.
409 So.2d at 1150-52.
In Tilghman v. Mayo, 82 So.2d 136 (Fla.1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 942, 76 S.Ct. 317, 100 L.Ed. 821 (1956), we said:
[T]o constitute a proper basis for the claim of former jeopardy a proceeding must be valid, and if the proceedings are "lacking in any fundamental prerequisite which renders the judgment void" they will not constitute a proper predicate for such a claim.
Id. at 137. In Vinson v. State, 345 So.2d 711 (Fla.1977), we held that a trial judge improperly acquitted a defendant following a nolo contendere plea because the trial judge had no authority to enter a judgment of not guilty on a nolo contendere plea and that his action in doing so was a nullity. We further held that double jeopardy did not bar his prosecution. In State v. Cox, 399 So.2d 1067 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981), approved, 412 So.2d 354 (Fla.1982), the court held that a trial judge could not accept a plea to a lesser degree crime without the consent of the state, that his actions were therefore a nullity, and that jeopardy did not attach to prosecution for the higher offense.
The legislature's acts determine whether a person can be treated as a juvenile or not. We construe sections 39.06(7) and 39.02(5)(c), Florida Statutes (1979), to prohibit a plea of guilty, as a juvenile delinquent act, within twenty-one days of the minor's arrest for a capital offense unless agreed to by the state. The plea here was a nullity. This being true, jeopardy did not attach, and Lisak can properly be tried as an adult.
The decision and opinion of the district court are approved.
It is so ordered.
ALDERMAN, C.J., and ADKINS and OVERTON, JJ., concur.
BOYD, J., dissents with an opinion.
. In view of our holding, we do not decide whether the trial court actually accepted appel-lee's tendered plea or if such an acceptance would otherwise have been proper under the circumstances.