Case Name: Elbridge G. Fuller versus Seth Loring
Court: Maine Supreme Judicial Court
Jurisdiction: Maine
Decision Date: 1856
Citations: 42 Me. 481
Docket Number: 
Parties: Elbridge G. Fuller versus Seth Loring.
Judges: Shepley, C. J., and Appleton, J., concurred.
Reporter: Maine Reports
Volume: 42
Pages: 481–496

Head Matter:
Elbridge G. Fuller versus Seth Loring.
By the seizure of goods on execution the officer acquires only a special property in them. The general property remains in tho debtor until the goods are sold.
If the officer wastes the goods seized, or misappropriates the money derived from the pale of thorn, or fails to return the execution, the debtor is thereby discharged.
A creditor holding a demand against a principal debtor and surety, may attach the property of either. He is not bound to resort to the debtor’s property first, in order to collect the debt.
A. hold a note against B. as principal and C. as surety, upon which he brought a suit, and recovered judgment against both. Upon the execution which issued on that judgment an officer, by the direction of A.’s attorney, seized and advertised for sale certain property of B. After such seizure and notice of sale, another officer in another county, by direction of A.’s attorney, seized and sold on the same execution certain property of the surety C. After this the said property of B. was sold as advertised. G. then brought his action of trespass against A., claiming that the seizure and advertisement of B.’s properly, followed by its sale on the execution, protected his (C.’s) property from seizure and sale on the execution, B.’s property having been shown to be ample to satisfy the execution : — Held, that the property of C. was legally sold and that he could not maintain his action against A.
[But see Springer v. Toothaker, 43 Maine, 381.]
On Retort from Nisi Prius, Howard, J., presiding.
This was an action of trespass. The general issue was pleaded and joined.
It was proved, subject to all legal objections, that the defendant, on the thirtieth day of October, 1849, sued out a writ of attachment against one Charles Higgins and the plaintiff, upon a note of hand given by said Higgins as principal and the plaintiff as surety; the said Higgins residing at Lewiston, then in the county of Lincoln, and tho plaintiff at Turner, in Oxford county.
The plaintiff, at the June term of the District Court, 1850. for Oxford county, recovered judgment in that suit for §80,62, debt, and §11,85 cost. The plaintiff’s attorney caused a certain building or shop, situate at said Lewiston, to be attached on said writ, at 5 o’clock P. M., by one Benjamin Dunn, a deputy sheriff for said county of Lincoln. The plaintiff took out execution on his judgment, and within thirty days from the rendition thereof, S. P. McKenney, his attorney, caused the said execution to be placed in the hands of Dunn, or showed it to him, with directions to seize and advertise the building; and told Dunn that he would return the execution in season to have it sold. Before the sale of said building, McKenney placed the said execution in the hands of Philo Clark, a deputy sheriff for the county of Oxford, with directions to seize and sell the property sued for in the plaintiff’s writ; and the said Clark did thereupon, on the 15th day of July, 1850, seize said property, and afterwards sold the same, as appears by his return on the back of said execution; said execution having had no return by said Dunn on it at that time.
The execution was then replaced in the hands of said Dunn, who thereafter sold the building aforesaid, as appears by his return on said execution.
It was further proved, that the defendant’s attorney, on the same 30th day of October, 1849, sued out a writ of attachment in defendant’s favor, against said Charles Higgins, upon a note against Higgins alone, and caused the same building to be attached on said writ, upon the same day. The writ was entered at the next November Term of the W. D. Court for Oxford county, to which the same was returnable, and the action was continued from term to term until the November Term of said Court, 1850, when the plaintiff recovered judgment against Higgins for $31,20 debt, and $12,56 cost.
George A. Mitchell, for the plaintiff,
testified, that he was present at 'the sale of the goods and chattels sued for in this writ. The sale was made by Philo Clark, and he, the witness, purchased the same; that there was at that time, and before, in the possession of the plaintiff Fuller, a lot of boards, bed posts, nails, glass, joist, and other property, of the value of about $200 there; and in a house near there, which Clark did not sell, a part of which, viz., some joist and bass-wood boards, were mentioned in the said Clark’s notice or advertisement of the sale, of the value of $25; that at the time of the sale the plaintiff told Clark he had better not sell; and that if the}’' would sell the building attached at Lewiston, and it did not bring enough to pay the debt and cost, he would pay the balance.
Danville A. Richer, for the plaintiff,
testified, that in the fore part of July, 1850, he was at the store of one Blake, in Turner, and there hoard a conversation between the defendant and Blake about this matter. Witness asked defendant if he had attached Fuller’s lumber, and he said he had, or Clark had done it. Witness asked him why; and the defendant said he had a note against Higgins of Lewiston, and the plaintiff Fuller, was holden on it as surety. He thought the note was near 8100, and he ’had a lien on a shop or building at Lewiston for it. Witness then asked defendant why he attached plaintiff’s lumber if he had a lien on the shop at Lewiston. He then said he wanted his money, as he had worked hard for it; and he had another note against Higgins, but smaller than the other. He knew the shop at Lewiston, and had seen it, and thought the shop without any land worth 8300. This conversation was before the sale of the lumber by Clark.
S. P. McKenney, called by defendant,
said he was defendant’s attorney in the two suits, and that he never had any instructions from the defendant as to attaching the property sued for in this action. On cross examination, he testified, that when defendant left the notes with him for collection, he simply told him to collect them; and that he took said execution, Loring v. Higgins & al., and gave it to Mr. Dunn at Lewiston, and told him to advertise said building, and then took it to said Clark and told him to seme and sell the property which is sued for. I received the money on both executions for defendant and paid it over to him.
Philo Clark, for defendant,
testified, that he received said execution, Loring v. Higgins & al., from Mr. S. P. HcKenney, who directed him to attach and sell the property sued for; that he supposed he did sell all the property he attached, but the advertisement produced, which was in his handwrit ing, mentioned some joist as attached, which he did not sell; witness thought he should not have advertised any joist if he had not attached them. Did not sell the clapboards attached because Mr. Ludden claimed them; he did not recollect as he had any direction to sell to any particular amount, or to a less amount.than the sum due on the execution. He was not aware at the time that the plaintiff Fuller, had other attachable property, and he had no directions from the defendant to attach the property sued for.
The case was taken, by consent, from the jury, and the parties agreed that the Court, upon the whole case, or so much of the testimony and facts stated, as were legally admissible, (the Court being at liberty to draw such inferences from the testimony as a jury might,) may enter a nonsuit, or default, as the law in the case may require; and if plaintiff recovers, the defendant is to be heard in damages.
Seth May, for plaintiff.
The seizure and sale of personal property upon an execution, is a satisfaction of such execution from the time of the seizure. In the case of Ladd v. Blunt, 4 Mass. 402, C. J. Parsons says: — “When goods, sufficient to satisfy the judgment, are seized on a fieri facias, the debtor is discharged, even if the sheriff waste the goods, or misapply the money accruing from the sale, or does not return his execution; for, by a lawful seizure, the debtor has lost his property in the goods;” a fortiori, then, a seizure, and a subsequent sale upon the execution, is a satisfaction. And there is much good sense in the rule; the debtor has parted with sufficient personal property to pay his debt; the officer is the agent of the creditor in collecting it; and if he fails to do his whole duty, the creditor has a full and adequate remedy on the sheriff’s bond. By the proceedings in this case, by Dunn, the deputy, at Lewiston, the defendant’s execution was satisfied and discharged, though no entry of satisfaction was made thereon. Hammatt v. Wyman, 9 Mass. 138.
In the case of Chandler v. Furbush, 8 Greenl. 408, the case of Ladd v. Blunt is affirmed; and Weston, Judge, says: — “In Ladd v. Blunt, Parsons, C. J., distinguishes between a seizure of goods on execution and an extent upon land. By the former, the debtor is discharged, although the sheriff misapply or waste the goods, or does not return the execution.” See Hoyt v. Hudson, 12 Johns. 208, where the same doctrine is laid down.
The building or shop which was seized and sold by Dunn, being personal property, according to the authorities cited, (and I find none to the contrary,) would, if sufficient, be a payment and satisfaction of the execution the defendant had against Higgins and the plaintiff. It would be so as it regards Higgins, the principal; and much more so against the plaintiff, who was a mere surety. The law delights in the protection of sureties, and Often compels the holder of the debt to dispose of the debtor’s property on which he may have a lien in such a way as to relieve the surety. In the case of Furbush v. Willard, 16 Pick. 42, where personal property and an equity of redemption, were attached, the officer was held to apply the personal property in such a way as to relieve a bona fide purchaser of the equity of redemption; and, for the same reasons, a surety should be protected. If the creditor take property from the principal debtor, as a pledge or security for the debt, he is bound to hold it for the benefit of the surety; and if he give it up without his consent, the surety is discharged to the amount given up. Baker v. Briggs, 8 Pick. 122. The same rule should apply to a lien created by attachment. It is true, the creditor may not be obliged to make an attachment, even at the request of the surety, without an offer of indemnity; but if he does make it he must hold on to it; neither is he obliged to take a pledge or security; but if he does he must hold on to it.
A surety, who pays the debt for his principal, is entitled to be put in the place of the creditor, and to all the means which the creditor possessed to enforce payment against the debtor. Clason v. Morris, 10 Johns. 524; Norton v. Soule, 2 G-reenl. 341.
But it may be said, that the defendant in this suit caused the shop or building attached in the suit against Higgins and this plaintiff, to be attached on the same day in another action against Higgins alone. If he did so, it was not until he had caused it to be attached in the suit against Higgins and the plaintiff. In this last case, the attachment was made, as appears by the officer’s return, at 5 o’clock P. M. In the other suit it was made on the same day; but no hour is mentioned in the return. It might, therefore, have been made at the last hour of the day. In such case, it is settled by this Court, that the attachment, made at a particular hour specified in the return, takes precedence of the other. Fairfield 8/ al. v. Faine, 23 Maine, 498.
We say, then, that the attachment of the building at Lewis-ton, its sale upon the execution, Loring v. Higgins and the plaintiff, by Dunn, under the direction of McKenney, the attorney of Loring, was a satisfaction of that execution; and all the acts done by Loring, or by direction of his attorney, in the county of Oxford, in regard to the seizure and sale of the property of the present plaintiff, were tortious and wrongful, and this action will lie to repair the injury which he has sustained. The law will not thus permit the rights of a surety to be trampled under foot.
The acts of the attorney in this case, are the acts of the principal himself. “ Qui facit per alium facit per se;” and especially, when he receives the fruit of those acts.
Defendant told Danville A. Ricker, in July, 1850, that he had attached the plaintiff’s lumber, or Clark had for him; and then went on to explain the reasons why, viz., he had worked hard, and had another note against Higgins alone. McKenney said he received the money of Clark for the property sold, and paid it to the defendant Loring; thus ratifying and adopting the acts of McKenney and Clark. He cannot, therefore, now skulk behind his attorney, and protect himself against the consequences of those acts which he has either caused to be done, or ratified after they were done.
If the cases before cited, be good law, it is not perceived how this action can fail to be maintained.
N. Clifford, for defendant.
1. A judgment creditor is not responsible for the irregular execution of his process, unless he commands or expressly ratifies the illegal acts of the officer. West v. Shockeley, 4 Har. 287.
2. It is competent for a judgment creditor or his attorney, where there are two or more judgment debtors, to collect the whole amount from one, or partly from one and partly from another, at his election. Rogers v. Sumner, 16 Pick. 387; Parker v. Rennie, 6 Pick. 227; Harrington v. Ward, 9 Mass. 251.
3. The irregularity, if any, in this case, was on the part of the officer, Dunn, and not on the part of Clark, who sold the property in dispute.

Opinion:
Howard, J.
The doctrine, that the property of the debtor in goods, is changed and lost by a mere seizure on execution, rests, mainly, upon incidental dicta of Judges, that may be gathered from books, and not upon settled opinions of courts, where the point has been directly raised and considered. And so are derived the notions that the property is altered from the owner, and given to the party at whose suit it was seized, and that the general property in goods, after seizure on execution, is in abeyance. Such dicta may be found in Wilbraham v. Snow, Lev. 282; Clerk v. Withers, 6 Mod. 293; 1 Salk. 323; 3 Salk. 159; Ladd v. North, 2 Mass. 517; Ladd v. Blunt, 4 Mass. 403; Bailey v. French, 2 Pick. 590.
The law is, manifestly, otherwise. For, by the seizure of goods on execution, the officer acquires a special property in them; but the general property remains in the debtor until they are sold. The seizure is but the inceptive step in the transmutation of the property, which may be abandoned by the officer, before a change is consummated. Ho may restore the goods to the debtor, or they may be taken from Mm by the latter, "or by act of God," or the public enemy ; and in neither ease, would the execution be satisfied, or the debt cancelled, or the debtor be discharged, though the goods were of sufficient value to satisfy the judgment. But should the officer waste the goods, or misappropriate the money derived from their sale, or fail to return the execution, the debtor would be discharged. Shelton's case, Dyer, 676, note; Thomson v. Clark, Cro. Eliz. 504; Payne v. Drewe, 4 East, 522; The King v. Allnutt, 9 East, 282; Blake v. Shaw, 7 Mass. 506; Ludden v. Leavitt, 9 Mass. 105; Rice v. Tower, 1 Gray, 429; Nichols v. Valentine, 36 Maine, 322; Churchill v. Warren, 2 N. H., 298; Folsom v. Chesley, 2 N. H., 432; Lewis v. Richardson, 6 Rich. 382; Nelson v. Rockwell, 14 Ill. 375.
The execution was in force when the plaintiff's goods were seized and sold, and the sale was effective to pass the property to the purchaser. The plaintiff, though a surety upon the note, was a joint debtor in the judgment and execution, and was under the same obligation, as the principal, to pay the judgment creditor; and it was competent for the latter to cause the property of either to be taken to effect the payment of the debt. The mere seizure of the goods of the principal, as has been shown, did not discharge the debt, or release the debtors. By abandoning to the owner the property seized, wholly, or in part, the creditor, in the case under consideration, did no wrong to the principal; and there is no proof that it was detrimental to the surety, otherwise than would have been the fulfillment of his contract. The shop, first seized, was not wasted; but the creditor not choosing to risk his whole debt upon it, might well seek payment or satisfaction more readily from other property of either debtor. He was under no obligation to pursue the seizure of the principal's property, for the benefit of the surety, without request or indemnity, and upon his own hazard.
This is not of the class of cases where the creditor takes security from the principal which he is bound to appropriate in payment of the debt. Neither the attachment, nor the seizure of the property of the principal, constituted security in that sense. It was not given by the principal, or received as such by the creditor, but taken by the officer per invitum. It might be taken from him by legal process; the title might be questionable, and it might not then appear to be sufficient on sale, to discharge the debt and costs. Compelling the creditor, therefore, to resort to the debtor's property first seized, in order to collect the debt, would impose an unreasonable restriction upon his rights, which might, in many cases, operate much to his inconvenience and detriment. He was not bound by his general duty to active diligence in collecting the debt, to collect it in a particular manner, or from a particular source. If the surety would compel the creditor to collect the debt of the principal, he should give suitable indemnity against the risk, delay, and expense that might be incurred. Wright v. Simpson, 6 Ves. 734; Hayes v. Ward, 4 Johns. Ch. 123; Page v. Webster, 15 Maine, 249, where it was held, (258,) that an indorser of a note is not discharged, by the holder's releasing property of the maker's attached on a writ, which was afterwards conveyed, when they became insolvent. Warner v. Beardsley, 8 Wend. 194; 1 Story's Eq. § 327.
Whether the seizure and sale of the plaintiff's goods, was such an abandonment of the prior seizure of the principal debtor's property, as to require a new seizure and proceedings for the sale of it, to satisfy the remainder due upon the execution, it is not necessary to decide. It is sufficient for the defence, that the plaintiff was not injured by the measure adopted by the defendant, in enforcing payment from his debtor, who chose to make no effort to save himself from the legitimate consequences resulting from his contract.
Plaintiff nonsuit.
Shepley, C. J., and Appleton, J., concurred.
Rice, J., did not sit.