Case Name: Kent LESTER, Appellant, v. Timothy K. ARB, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1995-07-05
Citations: 658 So. 2d 583
Docket Number: No. 94-632
Parties: Kent LESTER, Appellant, v. Timothy K. ARB, Appellee.
Judges: Before HUBBART, BASKIN and COPE, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 658
Pages: 583–589

Head Matter:
Kent LESTER, Appellant, v. Timothy K. ARB, Appellee.
No. 94-632.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
July 5, 1995.
Rehearing Denied Aug. 23, 1995.
Allen D. Fuller, Coconut Grove, for appellant.
David J. Volk, Merritt Island, for appellee.
Before HUBBART, BASKIN and COPE, JJ.

Opinion:
PER CURIAM.
This is an appeal by the defendant Kent Lester from a non-final order denying his motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction over the defendant. The basic ground urged in the motion to dismiss is that the complaint filed in this cause fails to allege sufficient jurisdictional facts to invoke Florida's long-arm statute [§ 48.193, Fla.Stat. (1991) ] against the defendant who, the plaintiff Timothy Arb now concedes, is a nonresident of Florida; secondarily, the defendant also urged in the motion to dismiss that the allegation in the complaint that he was a resident of the state of Florida was "false," and, as proof thereof, attached an affidavit stating that he was a resident of the state of South Carolina. The plaintiff Arb filed a counter affidavit, but did not dispute the defendant's non-residence status. Neither party requested an evidentiary hearing on the motion to dismiss or the filed affidavits.
The sole point raised on appeal is that the trial court erred in denying the motion to dismiss because the complaint fails to allege sufficient jurisdictional allegations to invoke the application of Florida's long-arm statute [§ 48.193, Fla.Stat. (1991) ]. We disagree. The complaint, although not specifically referencing or tracking the long arm-statute, alleges sufficient jurisdictional facts that the defendant was "conducting . a business venture in Florida," § 48.193(l)(a), Fla.Stat. (1991), as well as, "[bjreaehing a contract in [Florida] by failing to perform acts required by the contract to be performed in [Florida]," § 48.193(l)(g), Fla.Stat. (1991), and attaches thereto a written agreement to sell motor homes in Florida which the defendant allegedly breached in Florida. See Holton v. Prosperity Bank of St. Augustine, 602 So.2d 659, 660 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992); Pellerito Foods, Inc. v. American Conveyors Corp., 542 So.2d 426 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989); Renda v. Peoples Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n of Tarentum, Pa., 538 So.2d 860, 862 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988), rev. denied, 542 So.2d 1334 (Fla.1989); W.C.T.U. Ry. v. Szilagyi, 511 So.2d 727, 728 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987).
Affirmed.
HUBBART and BASKIN, JJ., concur.
. The defendant's motion to dismiss states the following:
"MOTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION
COMES NOW Defendant, KENT LESTER, through the undersigned counsel and makes this special appearance specifically to contest jurisdiction. The Defendant by filing this Motion to Dismiss does not consent to jurisdiction nor waive any rights to contest jurisdiction or otherwise contest the claims raised by the Complaint or the sufficiency of the Complaint and alleges:
1) The record will reflect that the Defendant was served in South Carolina.
2) As set forth in the affidavit attached as Exhibit 'A' and incorporated herein, the allegation of paragraph 3 of the Complaint upon which jurisdiction apparently was based: 3. Defendant Lester is a resident of Dade County, Florida.' is false. The Defendant is not, nor has he ever been a resident of Dade County, Florida. At all times material he was and is a resident of South Carolina.
3) Failure to adequately allege in the Complaint a basis for invoking long-arm jurisdiction under F.S. 48.193 voids any service of process made pursuant to F.S. 48.194. Plummer v. Hoover, 519 So.2d 1158 (Fla. 5th DC A, 1988).
4) While there are various vague allegations in the Complaint concerning activities in or nexus with the State of Florida, the Complaint fails to clearly allege any of the requirement of F.S. 48.193. Language which could arguably be amended to allege one of the specifically enumerated acts subjecting a person to jurisdiction of Courts through the State under F.S. 48.193, is not a sufficient basis to effectuate service under F.S. 48.194.
5) 'When a Defendant raises, through affidavits, documents or testimony a meritorious challenge to personal jurisdiction, the burden shifts to the Plaintiff to prove jurisdiction by affidavits, testimony, or documents' Jet Charter Service, Inc. v. Koeck, 907 F.2d 1110, 1112 (11th DCA, 1990). In fact, the affidavits, testimony, or documents to be produced to meet this burden should be limited to supporting the allegations of the Complaint. They should not serve as a means to amend the Complaint. To the extent that they provide anything not clearly alleged in the Complaint, they cannot support a prior service of process.
6) In fact, 'even if the requirements of a state long-arm statute are met, personal jurisdiction cannot be exercised over a Defendant that does not have sufficient 'minimum contacts' with the forum state to satisfy the requirement of due process.' Jet Charter Service, Inc. v. Koeck, id. at 1113.
7)Maybe the Plaintiff could allege one or more of the requirement of F.S. 48.193 and sufficient contacts to satisfy due process. Maybe they cannot. Clearly, to date they have not.
WHEREFORE, the Defendant, while not consenting to jurisdiction and reserving all rights to move to dismiss or otherwise contest this Complaint seeks the dismissal of this action based on lack of jurisdiction."
Appendix to Appellant's Brief at A.3 (emphasis added). Nowhere in this motion does the defendant Lester contend that the trial court has no personal jurisdiction over him by virtue of the corporate shield doctrine. Contrary to the dissent's suggestion, paragraph 5 makes no reference to the corporate shield doctrine.
Attached to the motion to dismiss is the defendant Lester's affidavit stating that he is a resident South Carolina, not Florida, which allegation is expressly incorporated by reference under paragraph 2 of the motion to dismiss; the balance of the affidavit refers to matters not alleged or expressly incorporated in the motion to dismiss.
. Contrary to Fla.R.App.P. 9.210(b)(1), the defendant does not list "the issues presented for review" in the table of contents of his initial brief or, indeed, anywhere else in the brief. He does, however, present his basic position on appeal in the summary of argument in his initial brief as follows:
"SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Defendant asserts that the jurisdiction depends upon an allegation that the Defendant breached a contract in this state by failing to perform acts required by the contract to be performed in this state pursuant to § 48.193(l)(g). In this complaint for accounting and dissolution of a partnership the only breach alleged is a failure to divide profits. There is no allegation that profits were divided in Florida, or supposed to be divided in Florida. More significantly, there is no allegation that Defendant KENT LESTER individually received any profits or failed to divide any profits that he received or conducted any business individually in Florida (or elsewhere). Jurisdiction should not be upheld over this Defendant, individually, absent a clear and unambiguous allegation that he, individually, has committed one of the acts subjecting a person to jurisdiction of the Courts of this State pursuant to Florida Statute § 48.193."
Appellant's Initial Brief at 6-7 (emphasis added). There is no mention in this summary of the corporate shield doctrine as being a ground for reversal.
Moreover, the first sentence of the body of the argument in the initial appellant's brief states the defendant's basic position on appeal: "The allegations of the complaint are not sufficient to invoke long-arm jurisdiction". Appellant's Initial Brief at 7. Although the affidavit and corporate shield doctrine are later referred to in the brief, it is not presented, as the dissent suggests, as a separate ground for reversal — but, in context, in support of the basic argument that the complaint failed to contain sufficient jurisdictional allegations. Beyond that, there is utterly no authority for the proposition that a new point on appeal can be raised in such an offhand fashion for the first time in the middle of a brief relating to a different point.
. We do not address the corporate shield ground for reversal discussed by the dissent because the ground was not properly preserved for appellate review in the defendant's motion to dismiss below; moreover, it is not properly urged as a point on appeal in defendant's main brief. "It is the declared policy of this court to confine the parties litigant to the points raised and determined in the court below, and not to permit the presentation of points, grounds, or objections for the first time in this court, when the same might have been cured or obviated by amendment, if attention had been called to them in the trial court." Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Hollis, 58 Fla. 268, 50 So. 985 (1909) (Syllabus by ct., no. 2); see also Paul v. Kanter, 155 So.2d 402, 403 (Fla. 3d DCA 1963); Castor v. State, 365 So.2d 701, 703 (Fla. 1978).