Case Name: RYLAND v. HARVE M. WHEELER LUMBER CO.
Court: Louisiana Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1919-04-29
Citations: 146 La. 787
Docket Number: No. 22935
Parties: RYLAND v. HARVE M. WHEELER LUMBER CO.
Judges: 
Reporter: Louisiana Reports
Volume: 146
Pages: 787–797

Head Matter:
(84 South. 55)
No. 22935.
RYLAND v. HARVE M. WHEELER LUMBER CO.
(April 29, 1919.
On the Merits, Nov. 3, 1919.
On Rehearing, March 1, 1926.)
(Syllabus by the Court.)
On Motion to Dismiss Appeal.
1. Appeal and error <©^396 — Appeal taken in November eeom judgment rendered in October held taken during the term, so THAT CITATION NOT NECESSARY.
Where it appears that a district court has set apart the months of August and September as the period of its annual vacation, it necessarily follows that the months from October to July, inclusive, constitute the ten months’ continuous session or term required by article 117 of the Constitution, and it also follows that an appeal taken in November from a judgment rendered in October is taken during the term at which the judgment was rendered, even though at a session subsequent to that at which the rendition took place, and that it is properly taken by motion and without citation of the appellee.
2. Appeal and error <&wkey;347(l) — “Rendered,” as used in Code requiring appeal to BE TAKEN DURING TERM, MEANS RENDERED AND SIGNED.
The word “rendered,” as used in Code Prac. art. 573, is to be construed with Code Prac. art. 546, and Act No. 40 of 1904, and, as thus construed, means rendered and signed; and, it is from the 'signing (if not premature) and not from the rendition, of a judgment, that it becomes executory and appealable, and that the delay within which the appeal may be taken begins to run.
On the Merits.
3. Master and servant <&wkey;367 — Logger HELD TO BE “INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR” not within Employers’ Liability Act.
A person who engages in hauling logs, under a contract at so much per 1,000 feet, and who supplies his own teams, employs and discharges his own labor, and is his own master in the matter of handling his outfit and of the method to be adopted in the execution of the contract, is an independent contractor, and his claim for damages for personal injuries sustained while so engaged is not within the purview of the Employers’ Liability Act, No. 20 of 1914.
[Ed. Note. — For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, Independent Contractor.]
4. Master and servant <&wkey;230(l) — If independent CONTRACTOR CHOOSES TO WORK IN UNSAFE PLACE, HE DOES SO AT HIS OWN RISK.
The rule which entitles an employé to rely upon the prevision and superior knowledge of his employer in the matter of providing a safe place wherein the employs is to do his work is. in general inapplicable to the relations between an independent contractor and the person with whom he contracts. Ordinarily the independent contractor is expected to determine that matter for himself; and, if he chooses to work in an unsafe place, when a safe place would be.provided for the asking, he does so at his own risk.
On Rehearing.
(Additional Syllabus by Editorial Staff.)
5. Appeal and error <&wkey;835(3) — Appellant’s ACQUIESCENCE IN JUDGMENT BELOW IS A QUESTION FOR COURT BELOW.
The Supreme Court has no original jurisdiction to consider and pass upon the letters annexed to the petition for rehearing and filed as evidence of tlie aHeged acquiescence of appellant in the judgment of the district court when judgment was rendered on appeal by the Supreme Court, and the question of acquiescence must be determined by the district court, for which purpose the case must be remanded to it.
Appeal from Eighth Judicial District Court, Parish of Catahoula; S. B. Holstein, Judge.
Action by Joseph T. Byland against the Harve M. Wheeler Lumber Company for personal injuries, under the law of torts, and in the alternative for compensation under the Employers’ Liability Act. Judgment for plaintiff under the Employers’ Liability Act, and defendant appeals.
Motion to dismiss the appeal denied, and judgment reversed, and plaintiff’s demand rejected, and, on rehearing, case remanded for determination oí question whether defendant had agreed to abide by the judgment of the district court when judgment was rendered by the Supreme Court.
B. M. Taliaferro, of Harrisburg, for appellant.
Blackman, Overton & Dawkins, of Alexandria, for appellee.

Opinion:
On Motion to Dismiss Appeal.
MONROE, C. J.
Defendant having appealed front a judgment awarding plaintiff damages for personal injuries alleged to have been sustained while in the discharge of functions pertaining to his employment, plaintiff moves that the appeal be dismissed, on the ground that it was obtained by motion at a term of court subsequent to that at which it was rendered, and that it (defendant) was not cited, or prayed to be cited, to answer thereto.
The transcript contains the following "statement of facts" by the trial judge, to wit:
"This cause was tried before the undersigned on June 8, 1913, and taken under advisement for decision on briefs to be filed by both sides. August and September being the months of vacation . of the Eighth district court, the case was decided and judgment rendered and signed in open court the 20th day of October, 1917. This date was not of regular term of court for Catahoula parish. The court opened for the express purposes of rendering and signing judgment in this case, and immediately after doing so adjourned sine die. The motion for new trial in this case was filed on Monday, the first legal day following the date of judgment. The motion for new trial was taken up, tried, and overruled on the [first] day the court was opened and in session after signing the judgment."
The minutes of the court show the rendition and signing of the judgment, the granting of an appeal, and (with the statement of the judge) the immediate adjournment of the court sine die on October 20, 1917, the hearing and overruling on November 12th of a motion for new trial (which had been filed on October 22d); and the filing of a motion for, and granting of, an appeal on the same day, followed on Novemfoer 21st by the filing of a bond for a suspensive appeal.
Opinion.
The Constitution (article 117) requires the district courts to hold continuous "sessions" during ten months of the year, and the session thus required to be held is the equivalent of the "term" referred to in C. P. art. 573, in declaring that—
"Whoever intends to appeal, may do so either by petition, or by motion in open court at the same term at which the judgment was rendered," etc. Act No. 163 of 1898; State ex rel. Murray v. Judge, 50 La. Ann. 985, 24 South. 132; McCutchen v. Hudson, 132 La. 178, 61 South. 157.
As it appears from the statement of the trial judge that August and September are the months during which his court is in vacation, it follows that the months from October to July, inclusive, are the ten months constituting his continuous term or session, and that the appeal herein taken on November 12th from a judgment rendered on Oc tober 20th. was taken at the same term at which the judgment was rendered. If it he argued that it was not taken within the ten days required to 'stay execution, the answer is: First, that that question is not presented by the motion to dismiss; and, second, that the appeal was taken within that delay, since the judgment did not become executory or appealable until signed, was not ready for signature until after the expiration of three days from its rendition, until which the signing was premature and ineffectual, and, by reason of the filing of a motion for new trial within that period, did not become executory, or appealable, until the motion had been denied. Act No. 40 of 1904; Mercer v. Natchez, B. & S. Ry.. Co., 136 La. 187, 66 South. 774; State ex rel. Mack Wellman v. Bell, Judge, 77 South. 493, 142 La. 662, No. 22872 of -the docket of this court. It may be stated in this connection that the word "rendered," as used in C. P. arts. 568, 565, 570, 571, 573 (and perhaps other articles), is to be construed with article 546 of the Code of Practice, as also with Act No. 40 of 1904, above cited, and, as thus construed, means rendered and signed, and that it is from the signing (if not premature), and not from the rendition, of a judgment that it becomes ex-ecutory and appealable, and that the delay within which the appeal may be taken begins to run. 1 Hen. Dig. p. 730, IV.
The motion to dismiss is therefore overruled.