Case Name: Maria L. Hood, as Executrix, etc., Appellant and Respondent, v. John N. Hayward, Impleaded, etc., Appellant and Respondent
Court: New York Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1891-01-14
Citations: 124 N.Y. 1
Docket Number: 
Parties: Maria L. Hood, as Executrix, etc., Appellant and Respondent, v. John N. Hayward, Impleaded, etc., Appellant and Respondent.
Judges: 
Reporter: New York Reports
Volume: 124
Pages: 1–25

Head Matter:
Maria L. Hood, as Executrix, etc., Appellant and Respondent, v. John N. Hayward, Impleaded, etc., Appellant and Respondent.
The provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure in reference to the bring ing of actions upon the bond of an executor or administrator provide three separate and distinct remedies, each independent of the other: First. Where an execution issued upon a surrogate’s decree against the property of the executor or administrator has been returned wholly or partly unsatisfied (§ 2607); Second. Where letters have been revoked and a successor has been appointed (§ 2608); Third. Where letters have been revoked and no successor appointed (§ 2609).
The return of an execution unsatisfied is not essential to the maintenance of an action upon the bond of an executor whose letters have been revoked. (Potter, J., dissenting.)
Where the letters of one of two co-executors are revoked and no successor is required to carry out the express provisions of the will, and none is appointed, as the statute contemplates in such case that the survivor will perform all the duties of the trust (§ 2692), he is the successor of the removed executor within the meaning of the statute, and, as such, can bring an action upon the bond of the latter without the return of an execution unsatisfied. (Potter, J., dissenting.)
In such an action it appeared that plaintiff and the beneficiaries under the will had executed releases, to one of the two co-sureties upon the bond, from all liability under it to the extent of one-half of the penalty thereof, the releases stating that they were intended to operate as a satisfaction and discharge of one-half of the obligation ot the bond so that the surety should be “ released from all claim or demand for contribution on the part of his co-surety.” Also, that they should not be construed as affecting in any manner any claim or demand against said co-surety. Held, that the releases did not operate to discharge the co-surety; but that he remained liable to the extent of one-half of the penalty of the bond.
The letters were revoked because of misappropriation of the funds of the estate by the removed executor. By the surrogate's decree upon the final settlement of his accounts he was directed to pay a sum exceeding the penalty of his bond. The surety was charged with interest upon one-half the penalty from the time of the misappropriation. Held, error but that he was chargeable with interest from the date of the decree. Reported below, 48 Hun, 880.
(Argued October 10, 1890;
decided January 14, 1891.)
Cross-appeals from judgment of tlie General Term of the Supreme Court in the second judicial department, entered upon an order made May 14,1888, which affirmed a judgment in favor of plaintiff entered upon a decision of the court on trial at Special Term.
The plaintiff appealed from so much of the judgment as refused to allow interest from August 1, 1875, or October 1, 1878. The defendant Hayward appealed from the whole judgment. There was no appeal on the part of the defendant Frederick H. Hood.
This action was brought on a bond executed by the defendants Hood, Hayward and one David Moffat upon the issuing of letters testamentary to the defendant Hood as executor of the last will and testament of Andrew Hood, deceased, by the surrogate of Westchester county, to recover damages sustained by the estate in consequence of the misconduct of the executor, Frederick H. Hood.
The plaintiff Maria L. Hood was an executrix and associated with the defendant Frederick H. Hood in the administration of the estate, but the bond was given on behalf of Frederick IT. Hood, who was a non-resident at the time of the granting of letters testamentary.’
The following facts appeared: Andrew Hood, the testator, died on the ISth.day of March, 1864, leaving a last will and testament, which is set forth m the complaint. The will was duly admitted to probate by the surrogate of Westchester county on the 20tli day of April, 1864, and on the "30th day of April, 1864, letters testamentary were issued by said surrogate to Frederick and Maria L. Hood, as executor and executrix named in said will. Upon an accounting had on or- about the 6th day of' J anuary, 1869, there was found to be in the hands of the executor and executrix assets amounting to $53,000 and upwards, and they were directed by the decree of the surrogate to invest the same in accordance with the provisions of the will. The defendant Frederick H. Hood, executor, had the charge ana management of this sum of money, and invested $29,100 thereof in the purchase of real estate situate in the city of ¡Newark m the state of ¡New Jersey, which said sum was wholly lost to the estate. Subsequently and on or about the 7th day of December, 1883, the said surrogate, upon an application for that purpose, revoked the letters testamentary granted to Frederick H. Hood, on account of investments of a portion of the moneys of said estate contrary to the decree of the surrogate made as aforesaid. In the month of May, 1885, the plaintiff instituted a proceeding before the surrogate praying that Frederick H. Hood, executor, account for the moneys received by him, and afterwards and upon the 31st day of July, 1885, the said surrogate made a decree disallowing the said investment of $29,100, and ordering and directing that said sum, together with the further sum of $2,675, amounting in all to the sum of $31,775, be paid by' said Hood, executor, to the plaintiff as executrix. Soon after the making of said decree, a copy thereof was duly served upon Frederick Hood, and payment of the money therein mentioned demanded of him, which was refused; and in September, 1885, the said surrogate granted leave to the plaintiff to bring an action on the bond. Moffat was released from any liability on said bond, excepting one-half the penalty thereof, to wit, the sum of $10,000, leaving and reserving, however, and excepting all cause and causes of action against the defendant in this action and all liability under said bond. The substances of the releases are set forth in the dissenting opinion by Potter, J. This action was commenced on the 15th day of September, 1885. The answer of the defendant sets forth that the bond was satisfied and discharged as to the defendant Hayward by reason of the discharge and release of said Moffat; that there had been no execution issued and returned unsatisfied • upon the decree made by the surrogate fixing the amount of Hood’s liability as executor; that the plaintiff was liable with the defendant Hood for any loss to the estate by reason of the investments above mentioned; the ten years Statute of Limitations and the six years statute were also pleaded. Other facts appear in the opinions.
John J. Maeklim, for plaintiff.
The action was properly brought and all the statutory requirements preliminary thereto were complied with. (Boyle v. St. John, 28 Hun, 455; Sperb v. McCoun, 110 N. Y. 605; Code Civ. Pro. §§ 2481, 2608, 2609, 2610, 2692; Annett v. Kerr, 2 Robt. 556; Haight v. Brisbin, 100 N. Y. 219; McKernan, v. Roberts, 84 id. 105; Earl v. David, 86 id. 634.) The provisions of the Code and Revised Statutes relating to the mode of prosecuting executor’s bonds affect the remedy only. They may be modified by the legislature, and the remedy in force when the action is brought controls. (2 R. S. 85, 116; Gerauld v. Wilson, 81 N. Y. 573; In re Hood, 98 id. 363; 104 id. 103; Potter’s Dwarris on Stat. 472; Code Civ. Pro. § 2610.) The cause of action is based upon the bond; the complaint alleges specific breaches thereof and demands judgment for the damages arising therefrom. The action is to be considered, as to whether or not a breach has been' committed, irrespective of the proceedings in the Surrogate’s Court, which only affect the remedy. The measure of damages is prescribed by statute, and is the loss sustained by the estate in consequence of the executor’s misconduct. (Hood v. Hood, 85 N. Y. 571; Haight v. Brisbin, 100 id. 219; 2 R. S. 70, § 42; Code Civ. Pro. § 2640.) If the last proposition is not correct, it is claimed that the plaim tiff is entitled to recover one-half of the penalty and interest thereon from August 1, 1875, or October 1,1878, and that the judgment should be modified by allowing interest from either of these periods. (Beers v. Shannon, 73 N. Y. 292; Hood v. Hood, 85 id. 561; Haight v. Brisbin, 100 id. 219; Brainerd v. Jones, 18 id. 36; Thompson v. McGregor, 81 id. 598; Berg v. Radcliff, 6 Johns. Ch. 307.) The release to Moffat did not affect or impair the liability of Ms co-surety, Hayward, for half the penalty and interest. (Irvine v. Milbank, 56 N. Y. 635; 1 Pars, on Cont. 28, 29; Benedict v. Rae, 35 Hun, 34, 36; Bronson v. Fitzhugh, 1 Hill, 185; Bank of Poughkeepsie v. Ibbotson, 5 id. 462; Matthews v. Chicopee, 5 Robt. 711; Addison on Cont. [8th Eng. ed.] 1223; Chitty on Cont. 605, 606; Hoyt v. Tuthill, 33 id. 197; Harbeck v. Pupin, 55 id. 335, 339; Code Civ. Pro. § 1942.) The action may be maintained even if the plaintiff were also guilty of a devastavit. (Wetmore v. Parker, 92 N. Y. 76.) No judgment based upon the alleged ground that because plaintiff is as is claimed, a joint wrong-doer, she must make contribution could be allowed in this action. (Boyle v. St. John, 28 Hun, 455; Sperb v. McCoun, 110 N. Y. 605; Springer v. Dwyer, 50 N. Y. 19; Gillespie v. Torrance, 25 id. 306; Lacher v. Williamson, 55 id. 619; O'Blenis v. Karning, 57 id. 649.) None of the grounds upon which the motion for a nonsuit was based are tenable. (In re Hood, 27 Hun, 579; Porter v. Kingsbury, 77 N. Y. 164; Dawley v. Brown, 79 id. 390; Stowed v. Chamberlin, 60 id. 272; Code Civ. Pro. § 2743.)
A. J. Dittenhoefer for defendants.
The appellant became released when his co-surety, Moffat, was, without Ms consent, released under seal. (Bronson v. Fitzhugh, 1 Hill, 185; Williams v. McGinness, 52 Am. Dec. 561; Line v. Nelson, 38 N. J. L. 358; Berry v. Gillis, 17 N. H. 9; Ayer v. Ashmead, 31 Conn. 447; McAlister v. Dennin, 27 Mo. 40; Armstrong v. Hayward, 6 Cal. 183; Frink v. Green, 5 Barb. 455; Shaw v. Pratt, 22 Pick. 305; Frickman v. Newhal, 17 Mass. 580; A. Bank v. Doolittle, 14 Pick. 123; Brown v. Marsh, 7 Vt. 320, 327; Bunson v. Kincaid, 3 Penn. St. 57; Benjamin v. McConnell, 9 Ill. 536; Vandever v. Clark, 16 Ark. 331; Taylor v. Galland, 3 Ia. 17; Booth v. Campbell, 15 Md. 569; Cornell v. Masten, 35 Barb. 157; Schwinger v. Raymond, 83 N. Y. 192; Barrett v. T. A. R. R. Co., 45 id. 628; v. Pangburn, 75 id. 49; Cockloft v. Muller, 71 id. 367; 1 Story on Cont. § 566; Bank of Poughkeepsie v. Ibbotson, 5 Hill, 461; Hoffman v. Dunlap, 1 Barb. 185; Code Civ. Pro. § 3352.) The acceptance of an agreed sum from Moffat and the delivery to him of the release operated as an accord and satisfaction of the entire indebtedness. (Arnold v. Camp, 12 Johns. 409; Frisbee v. Larned, 21 Wend. 450; People ex rel. v. B. C. Asylum, 96 N. Y. 640.) The failure to issue an execution against the executor, Frederick Hood, on the surrogate’s decree is fatal to this action. (Code Civ. Pro. § 2607; Place v. Hayward, 117 N. Y. 487; 100 id. 219; Hood v. Hood, 85 id. 561, 574; Haight v. Brisbin, 100 id. 219; Alexander v. Bryan, 110 U. S. 114.) The court erred in allowing interest against the defendant from the time of the revocation of the letters testamentary of Frederick Hood. (Clark v. Bush, 3 Cow. 151-155; Code Civ. Pro. § 1915; Beers v. Shannon, 73 N. Y. 273, 302; O’Brien v. Young, 95 id. 428; Sanders v. L. S. & M. S. R. R. Co., 94 id. 641.) But if the statute can be disregarded, interest certainly cannot be allowed from a period anterior to the decree on the accounting. (Hood v. Hood, 85 N. Y. 561; Haight v. Brisbin, 100 id. 219; Alexander v. Bryan, 110 U. S. 414; Mansfield v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. R. Co., 114 N. Y. 331.) The respondent, as co-executrix, being a joint tort-feasor with Frederick Hood, cannot in this action recover the full penalty of the bond. (Nanz v. Oakley, 37 Hun, 495; Earle v. Earle, 95 N. Y. 104-117, 403; In re Rugg, 24 Wkly. Dig. 374; Laroe v. Douglas, 2 Beav. 308; Schwell v. Schenck, 1 C. E. Creen, 181; In re Niles, 113 N. Y. 547, 556.) FTo reply or demurrer having been interposed to the counter-claim the defendant w*as entitled to judgment thereon. (Code Civ. Pro. §§ 301, 522; Randolph v. Mayor, etc., 53 How. Pr. 68; Matton v. Baker, 24 id. 329; Prouty v. Eaton, 14 Barb. 309; Wilder v. Boynton, 62 id. 547; H. S. B. Co. v. L. I. Co., 48 id. 355; Coffin v. McLean, 80 N. Y. 560.) The surrogate not having had jurisdiction at the time the bond was executed, to direct the payment of the money to the respondent, or to entertain on her application the proceedings which resulted in the decree, no action lies thereon, against the appellant. (Code Civ. Pro. 2514, 2724; Annett v. Kerr, 2 Robt. 556; Nam v. Oakley, 37 Hun, 495.) The bond not having been assigned to the plaintiff as executrix, or an order made permitting her to sue prior to the commencement of this action, it cannot be maintained. (Farish v. Austin, 25 Hun, 430; Schofield v. Doscher, 72 N. Y. 491; 18 Abb. [N. C.] 149.) The wrongful investment on which the decree of July, 1885, is based, was not made by Frederick Hood as executor, but as trustee, for which appellant is not liable. (Bailey v. Bailey, 28 Hun, 603; Hurlburt v. Durant, 88 N. Y. 121; Marks v. McGlynn, Id. 375; Laytin v. Davidson, 95 id. 263.) The six years Statute of Limitations is a bar to this action. (Shutts v. Fingar, 100 N. Y. 530; Clark v. Ford, 1 Abb. Ct. App. Dec. 359; Drake v. Wilkie, 30 Hun, 537; Pierson v. McCurdy, 1 Cent. Rep. 175; Burt v. Myers, 37 Hun, 287-290; Myers v. Budlong, 70 N. Y. 542-559; Foote v. Farrington, 41 id. 164; Drake v. Wilkie, 30 Hun, 537; Trinity Church v. Yanderbilt, 98 FT. Y. 170.) The court erred in permitting proof of alleged acts of misconduct by the executor. (Haight v. Brisbin, 100 N. Y. 219; Hood v. Hood, 85 id. 561; People v. Barnes, 12 Wend. 492; Annett v. Kerr, 2 Robt. 563.) Appellant’s rights as surety being strictissbmi juris no loose interpretation of the legal questions will be indulged in. (Ward v. Stahl, 81 N. Y. 406.)

Opinion:
Bradley, J.
In 1864 the will of Andrew Hood, deceased, was admitted to probate, and letters testamentary were issued to the plaintiff and the defendant Frederick Hood; and the latter being a non-resident of this state, gave bond in which the defendant Hayward and David Moffat joined as sureties. The executor Hood.was afterwards charged with devastavit, and in 1883 his letters were revoked. On July 31, 1885, in a proceeding before the surrogate, instituted by petition of the plaintiff, a decree was made directing him to pay to her as such executrix the sum of $31,100. This action- was afterwards brought upon such bond. And the objection is taken that it cannot be maintained, because no execution was issued upon such decree and returned wholly or partially unsatisfied. The disposition of this question is dependent upon the statute by which such remedy is regulated. (Code Civ. Pro. § 2607, 2608, 2609.) Those sections provide for three classes of actions upon the official bond of executors and administrators: 1. Where an execution issued upon a surrogate's decree against the property of an executor or administrator has been returned wholly or partly unsatisfied, an action to recover the sum uncollected may be 'maintained upon such bond by and in the name of the person in whose favor the decree was made. (§ 2607.) 2. Where letters have been revoked, the successor of the executor or administrator, whose letters are revoked, may maintain an action upon his predecessor's bond, in which he may recover any money or the value of any other property received by the principal and not duly administered by him, and to the full extent of any injury sustained by the estate of the decedent. And the money recovered is regarded as part of the estate in the hands of the plaintiff, and must be distributed or otherwise disposed of accordingly. (§ 2608.) 3. Where the letters are so revoked and no successor is appointed, any person aggrieved may, upon obtaining leave by order of the surrogate so to do, maintain an action on the bond in behalf of himself and all others interested. And the money so recovered must be paid into the Surrogate's Court for distribution. (§ 2609.)
These are distinct remedies, and each of • them is independent of the others. They were designed to take the place of those given by prior statutes on the subject. Formerly the right to bring actions on such bonds was subject to the direction of the surrogate, or was dependent in the case provided for it, of an assignment by him of the bond to the person in whose favor a decree was made. When an executor or administrator refused or omitted to perform a decree made against him for rendering an account or upon final settlement, the surrogate might cause the bond to be prosecuted. (L. 1830, ch. 320, § 23; 2 E. S. [2d. ed.] 53, § 19.) The provisions of section 2607 are substituted for section 65, chapter 460, Laws of 1837, which provided that after the return of an execution unsatisfied, the person in whose favor the decree upon which it issued was made, might have a right of action upon assignment of the bond to him by the surrogate. The present statute dispenses with the formal act of assignment. And the provisions of sections 260.8 and 2609 seem to be somewhat bro&der in their import than were those of the former statute which provided for the prosecution of the bond of an executor or administrator whose letters had been revoked. . Then it was done by the direction of the surrogate. (2 R. S. 85, § 21.) The actions under such prior statutes other than that of 1837, were prosecuted in the name of the People. Those statutes are referred to in view of the proposition before asserted, that the present remedies are distinct and independent of each other as were those formerly existing. (People v. Guild, 4 Denio, 551.)
The support of an action under section 2607 is dependent upon the return of an execution unsatisfied. That is not requisite for the purpose of actions within the provisions of the two sections following it. This action does not come' within section 2609. The question arises whether it is supported by the provisions of section 2608. And that is mainly dependent upon the fact whether the plaintiff is the successor of the one whose letters were revoked. • When her associate was retired from it, the entire trust was devolved upon her. She succeeded to and necessarily assumed all the powers and duties with which he had been vested and charged as an executor, and in that sense she was his successor. There is apparently no reason for denying to her that relation, for the purposes of the remedy in view, unless the statute requires a con struction which defeats it. The purpose of the statute giving the right of action to the successor of an executor or administrator whose letters are revoked, is to indemnify the estate of the decedent against loss so far as the means afforded by the-official bond of the defaulting representative and the remedy founded upon it will permit. It not only seems that the appointment, if authorized, of a successor to the one of two whose letters have been revoked, would be useless for the accomplishment of that purpose, but such supply of another in that manner in his place is not permitted, except when necessary to comply with the express provisions of a will. The statute contemplates that, except in such ease the survivor will perform all the duties of the trust. (Code, § 2692.) And, with that exception, it is only when all the executors or administrators die or become incapacitated, or the letters of all of them are revoked .that letters will be granted to one or more persons as their successors. (Id. § 2693.) It follows that unless the survivor may be treated as a successor within the meaning of the statute, the provisions of section 2608 cannot be made applicable to an action upon the bond of one of two- or more executors or administrators whose letters have been revoked; and that the remedy upon his bond when there is a survivor, is dependent solely upon the provisions of section 2607. That section provides for an action by the person in whose favor is made a decree against an executor or administrator after the return of an execution unsatisfied. The decree in the present case was not against such an officer, but was made pursuant to the statute providing that, upon the petition of the successor, or of the remaining executor or administrator,, the surrogate may compel the'person whose letters have been revoked to account for or deliver over money or other property, and to settle his account. (Id. § 2605.) It has, however, been held in Sperb v. McCoun (110 N. Y. 605) that in such ease an action may be maintained, under section 2607, when an execution has been issued on such decree and returned unsatisfied. It does not follow, from the determination of that case, that the present one cannot be supported. Nor does the view in that case necessarily preclude the application of the provisions of section 2608 to the cause of action, alleged in this case, and to its determination by the trial court as represented by its findings of fact. For the purposes of an action upon the bond of an executor whose letters have been revoked, the issue of execution upon a decree and its return unsatisfied are not requisite to its maintenance. Hor does the application of the provisions of the statute in that respect seem by its terms- or by reasonable implication to be confined to those cases where no survivor remains to proceed with the execution of the trust j and in that view, inasmuch as the statute imposes its performance wholly upon the latter, the remedy upon the official bond, of him whose letters are revoked is entirely with such survivor. And to hold that the latter is not a successor within the meaning of the statute, is to deny any remedy under the provisions of the section last mentioned. Ho definition of the term " successor " is given in the statute. There is in other sections of it upon the subject under consideration some language used importing its application to a person who receives an appointment in place of one who has been retired from the position of trust. But it is not so restricted by anything in section 2608. And, although by a process of reasoning the application of some provisions of other sections may be so made as to give to the word successor such restricted meaning, that construction is not within the evident spirit and purpose of the statute. The view here taken is that when the plaintiff became the sole remaining executor, she, for all the purposes of the trust, was-the successor of the one who had been removed, as she succeeded to all the powers before then vested in him in his relation to tiie estate of the decedent, as effectually as they could be taken by one appointed in his place, if such appointment were permitted and had been made. And this action was brought solely for the benefit of the estate, to bring to it a fund to reimburse it pro tanto for the loss it had suffered by the breach of trust of the principal in the bond while he was executor, and in violation of the order of the surrogate. Such money, when collected, is part of the estate and to be dis tributed and disposed of under the direction of the surrogate. That is the purpose of an action and recovery under section 2608. And these views lead to the conclusion that this action is within the provisions of that section.
In respect to the other questions, the conclusions of Judge Potteb are adopted to the effect that the release of Moffat did not discharge the defendant Hayward from his liability to the extent of a moiety of the obligation assumed by those persons upon the bond; and that the plaintiff was entitled to recover interest only from July 31, 1885.
The judgment should, therefore, be modified by deducting from the recovery interest upon $10,000 from December Y, 1883, to July 31, 1885, and as so modified affirmed.