Case Name: J. Sandy SINGLETON and Kay Singleton, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Ned FOSTER et al., Defendants-Respondents
Court: Idaho Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Idaho
Decision Date: 1977-02-02
Citations: 98 Idaho 149
Docket Number: No. 12068
Parties: J. Sandy SINGLETON and Kay Singleton, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Ned FOSTER et al., Defendants-Respondents.
Judges: DONALDSON and BAKES, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Idaho Reports
Volume: 98
Pages: 149–152

Head Matter:
559 P.2d 765
J. Sandy SINGLETON and Kay Singleton, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Ned FOSTER et al., Defendants-Respondents.
No. 12068.
Supreme Court of Idaho.
Feb. 2, 1977.
Bruce J. Collier, of Kneeland, Laggis, Korb & Collier, Ketchum, for appellants.
David B. Lincoln, of Elam, Burke, Jeppesen, Evans & Boyd, Boise, for respondents.

Opinion:
SHEPARD, Justice.
This is an appeal from an order dismissing a plaintiff's complaint which sought specific performance of a contract to convey real property. The order of dismissal was predicated on the expiration of the applicable statute of limitations.
On January 1, 1964, appellants Singleton entered into a contract with respondent Anita Foster and her now deceased husband agreeing to purchase from the Fosters a parcel of real property in Blaine County. The contract provided that the Singletons would make a down payment of $100 and that the balance of $2,300 would be paid in semi-annual installments of $500. Full payment of the contract price was to be made by July 1, 1967, and thereafter the Fosters were obligated to convey the property to the Singletons. The contract provided in part:
" should purchaser fail to comply with any of the covenants all his interest in and to said property shall, at the option of the vendor, be subject to termination and cancellation. Before purchaser's interest may be terminated vendor shall give purchaser written notice specifying the particulars [of the] default [and grant 30 days notice to cure]." Clk.Tr. p. 8 (emphasis added).
It is apparent from the complaint that as of July 1, 1967, a balance of $1,174 was still due on the said contract. It does not appear from the complaint that the Fosters did or did not exercise their option to declare a default for failure to make payments and terminate the interest of the Singletons. On April 15, 1970, Foster allegedly conveyed by quit-claim deed her interest in the property to respondent Pichon and that conveyance was made expressly subject to the Singleton-Foster contract. As best can be determined from the record, the Singletons did not have and never have had possession of the property in question.
On March 27, 1975, some eleven years after the execution of the contract and some eight years after the scheduled com pletion of the Singletons' performance under the contract, the Singletons tendered the balance of $1,174 allegedly due on the contract to Pichón who refused the tender. Thereafter, Singletons filed an action for specific performance of the contract against Foster and Pichón. Rather than an answer, a motion to dismiss was filed on the theory that the applicable statute of limitations had expired. See, I.C. § 5-203 and 5-216. From the order of the court granting the motion to dismiss, this appeal was taken. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.
All facts and inferences must at this juncture be construed in a light most favorable to the plaintiff-appellants. See, Gardner v. Hollifield, 96 Idaho 609, 533 P.2d 730 (1975). Motions to dismiss complaints on the basis of statutes of limitation are generally viewed with disfavor. Duff v. Draper, 96 Idaho 299, 527 P.2d 1257 (1974). The rationale therefore is apparent in the case at bar. While it is unclear at what point a cause of action came into existence in favor of the appellant-vendee, compare Johnson v. Keefer, 48 Idaho 42, 280 P. 324 (1929) and Stockmen's Supply Co. v. Jenne, 72 Idaho 57, 237 P.2d 613 (1951), nevertheless, it is clear that as of the time the cause of action accrued in the vendee the statute of limitations commenced to run. There are, however, numerous reasons why the statute may have been tolled which under the holding of Duff v. Draper, supra, need not have been expressly set forth in the complaint. On the other hand, there may be inherent defenses to the action because of the substantial lapse of time involved here, such as waiver, laches or estoppel.
The order of the trial court is reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings. Costs to appellant.
DONALDSON and BAKES, JJ., concur.