Case Name: Marilyn I. WEAVER and Joseph N. Weaver, Appellants, v. Melvin T. STONE, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1968-06-25
Citations: 212 So. 2d 80
Docket Number: No. 1081
Parties: Marilyn I. WEAVER and Joseph N. Weaver, Appellants, v. Melvin T. STONE, Appellee.
Judges: NELSON, JAMES 'T., Associate Judge, concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 212
Pages: 80–85

Head Matter:
Marilyn I. WEAVER and Joseph N. Weaver, Appellants, v. Melvin T. STONE, Appellee.
No. 1081.
District Court of Appeal of Florida. Fourth District.
June 25, 1968.
Rehearing Denied July 18, 1968.
Joseph D. Farish, Jr., of Farish & Farish, West Palm Beach, for appellants.
John R. Beranek of Jones, Adams, Paine & Foster, West Palm Beach, for appellee.

Opinion:
McCAIN, Judge.
Plaintiffs, Marilyn J. Weaver and Joseph N. Weaver, appeal a summary final judgment in favor of defendant, Melvin T. Stone. We affirm.
Plaintiffs were injured in a collision with an automobile driven by defendant but owned by defendant's employer. Plaintiffs filed suit against the employer and recovered a judgment grounded on the employer's vicarious liability for the acts of the defendant. It is not disputed that the defendant and his employer were jointly and severally liable for damage caused by the defendant's negligence and that plaintiffs could sue either or both of them. See Fincher Motor Sales, Inc. v. Lakin, Fla.App. 1963, 156 So.2d 672. Plaintiffs chose to sue the employer and were successful. Subsequently they instituted the present action against the defendant driver. After answer defendant moved for summary judgment and in support attached a certified copy of the judgment entered in the prior action. The judgment was noted as satisfied by the clerk. Upon this basis the trial court granted defendant's motion.
F.S.1965, section 55.62, F.S.A. (now F.S.1967, section 55.141, F.S.A.), provides in part as follows:
"(1) All judgments and decrees for the payment of money may be satisfied by payment into the registry of the court where rendered.
" ‡
"(3) Full payment of judgments and decrees as in the preceding subsections of this section provided shall constitute full payment and satisfaction thereof *
Plaintiffs refused a tender of money in satisfaction of the judgment by defendant's employer, who then paid the money into the registry of the court pursuant to the above statute. The clear meaning of F.S. 1965, section 55.62, F.S.A., is that such payment into court satisfies the judgment. There is no requirement that the plaintiff consent to the satisfaction.
Satisfaction of a judgment against one of several persons jointly and severally liable discharges the liability of the others. Leo Jay Rosen Associates, Inc. v. Schultz, Fla.App.1963, 148 So.2d 293; Restatement, Judgments, § 95. This rule obtains even though a judgment has not yet been rendered against the other tort-feasors. Goines v. Pennsylvania Railroad Company, 1958, 6 A.D.2d 531, 179 N.Y.S.2d 960; Restatement, Judgments, § 95, comment a. Accordingly, satisfaction of plaintiff's judgment against defendant's employer in the manner permitted by F.S.1965, section 55.62, F.S.A. (now F.S.1967, section 55.141, F.S.A.), discharged defendant from any liability.
Plaintiffs, however, attempt to question the existence of a valid satisfaction of their prior judgment. This challenge, raised, incidentally, for the first time on appeal, cannot be made in this action. The clerk entered a certificate of satisfaction on the final judgment. If the entry of satisfaction was for any reason improper plaintiffs should have sought amendment or vacation. Under our procedure the proper method to seek such relief is that provided by F.R.C.P. 1.540, 31 F.S.A. and not a collateral attack in a separate action. For procedures adopted in other jurisdictions, see annotation 9 A.L.R.2d 553.
In the case before us defendant presented evidence of satisfaction of a prior judgment which evidence was valid on its face and discharged defendant from further obligation to plaintiffs. The trial court was correct in entering summary judgment and the judgment appealed is therefore affirmed.
Affirmed.
NELSON, JAMES 'T., Associate Judge, concurs.
CROSS, J., dissents with opinion.
. To be a valid defense satisfaction of such a judgment must not be collusive. Goines v. Pennsylvania Railroad Company, 1958, 6 A.D.2d 531, 179 N.Y.S.2d 960.
. It is imperative to note that the mere recovery of the one judgment does not bar a separate action against the other joint tortfeasors. Restatement, Judgments, § 94. But where, as here, liability of one or more persons is secondary and vicarious, this rule is modified and the first suit may, depending on whether the active or passive tortfeasor was sued first and the outcome of that action, either limit the amount recoverable in the second suit or bar it completely. See the discussion in Goines v. Pennsylvania Railroad Company, supra n. 1 and Restatement, Judgments, § 94 to 99.
. It has been held that satisfaction of a judgment entered on stipulation is "no more than a release under the statute, notwithstanding that its ultimate form was that of a judgment duly satisfied." Mathis v. Virgin, Fla.App.1964, 167 So. 2d 897. The statute referred to is F.S. 1965, section 54.28, F.S.A. (now F.S. 1967, section 768.041, F.S.A.), which provides that a release of one joint tort-feasor does not totally relieve other joint tortfeasors of liability but rather operates only as a pro tanto discharge. The court carefully turned its decision on the fact that the judgment was entered on a voluntary stipulation and thus partook of a release. The court cautioned that it was not ruling upon a case where the satisfied judgment was obtained in the ordinary manner.