Case Name: Arthur Bernard SOREY, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Court: District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 2018-08-10
Citations: 252 So. 3d 853
Docket Number: No. 1D17-901
Parties: Arthur Bernard SOREY, Appellant,
v.
STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: 
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Third Series
Volume: 252
Pages: 853–856

Head Matter:
Arthur Bernard SOREY, Appellant,
v.
STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. 1D17-901
District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
August 10, 2018
Andy Thomas, Public Defender, and Kevin Steiger, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Virginia Harris, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.

Opinion:
Per Curiam.
Appellant Arthur Bernard Sorey challenges his convictions and sentences for possession with intent to sell a controlled substance within 1,000 feet of a place of worship and possession of drug paraphernalia. The first two issues raised on appeal are affirmed without further comment. We write to address the third issue in which Sorey alleges trial counsel was ineffective on the face of the record for failing to move for judgment of acquittal, where the State failed to prove the offense was committed within 1,000 feet of a church which regularly conducted religious services.
Section 893.13(1)(e), Florida Statutes (2016), provides that it is unlawful for any person to "sell, manufacture, or deliver, or possess with intent to sell, manufacture or deliver, a controlled substance not authorized by law in, on, or within 1,000 feet of a physical place for worship at which a church or religious organization regularly conducts religious services...." As this Court noted in Fletcher v. State , 168 So.3d 330, 331 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015), the statute in question has frequently been construed to require the State to prove that regular religious services were being held at the time of the offense. The instant case is almost identical to Fletcher with one important distinction. Unlike Fletcher trial counsel for Sorey failed to argue, as a basis for judgment of acquittal, that the State failed to prove the offense occurred within 1,000 feet of a place of regular worship.
Sorey now raises the issue on direct appeal as an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. The State argues this is not the proper vehicle for the challenge, and that Sorey is required to file a postconviction motion pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. We recognize that "[a]s a general rule, claims asserting ineffective assistance of defense counsel are not cognizable on direct appeal 'because the trial court never had the opportunity to consider the issue below, and the issue often involves collateral questions of fact that cannot be determined by the trial record,' alone." Fox v. State , 104 So.3d 371, 371-72 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012) (quoting Loren v. State , 601 So.2d 271, 272 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992) ). "The 'rare' exception to this general rule exists where '(1) the ineffectiveness is apparent on the face of the record, and (2) it would be 'a waste of judicial resources to require the trial court to address the issue.' " Id. at 372 (quoting Ellerbee v. State , 87 So.3d 730, 739 (Fla. 2012) ).
Sorey relies on Monroe v. State , 191 So.3d 395, 402 (Fla. 2016), in which the Florida Supreme Court held, "the failure of [defendant's] trial counsel to preserve the sufficiency of the evidence issue for appellate review constitute[d] ineffective assistance of counsel that is apparent from the face of this record." However, Monroe is limited to its facts and constitutes a rare example of ineffective assistance of counsel that should have been remedied on direct appeal. Id. at 404. In Monroe , the Florida Supreme Court found the failure of trial counsel to move for judgment of acquittal during or after trial was "patently unreasonable." Id. at 403. Furthermore, the court detailed, "[w]e can think of no plausible justification for these decisions of trial counsel, and during oral argument, neither could [defendant's] appellate counsel nor the State." Id. Here, the facts do not constitute the rare circumstance where ineffective assistance of counsel is evident on the face of the record.
On appeal, Sorey does not raise a single claim of preserved error or even a claim that any error below was fundamental. The trial court is the more appropriate forum to present claims of ineffective assistance of counsel where evidence may be reviewed to determine why actions were taken or omitted by counsel. McKinney v. State , 579 So.2d 80, 82 (Fla. 1991). An appellate court "normally considers the merits of ineffective assistance of counsel claims after a postconviction motion has been filed under the applicable rule of criminal procedure and ruled upon by the trial court following the completion of any necessary evidentiary proceedings." Robards v. State , 112 So.3d 1256, 1266 (Fla. 2013). An appellant should not be permitted to circumvent the standard of fundamental error by claiming that the failure to raise the issues constitutes ineffective assistance, "which entails a different standard that could provide an easier path to reversal, and which deprives trial counsel of the opportunity to defend themselves against allegations of unprofessional conduct." Latson v. State , 193 So.3d 1070, 1074 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016) (Winokur, J., concurring).
Accordingly, we affirm Sorey's conviction and sentence for possession with intent to sell a controlled substance within 1,000 feet of a place of worship. This does not preclude his ability to file a motion pursuant to rule 3.850.
Jay and M.K. Thomas, JJ., concur; Winsor, J., concurs with written opinion.