Case Name: Eric Ramon MEJIAS, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1999-03-24
Citations: 731 So. 2d 728
Docket Number: No. 97-2266
Parties: Eric Ramon MEJIAS, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: Before NESBITT, COPE, and FLETCHER, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 731
Pages: 728–733

Head Matter:
Eric Ramon MEJIAS, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. 97-2266.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
March 24, 1999.
Rehearing Denied June 9, 1999.
Eric Ramon Mejias, in proper person.
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, and Paulette R. Taylor, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
Before NESBITT, COPE, and FLETCHER, JJ.

Opinion:
NESBITT, J.
Eric Ramon Mejias appeals the trial court's denial of his postconviction motion challenging his 1995 nolo contendere plea to burglary. Upon this Court's order, the trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing on May 28, 1998, to determine if a factual basis existed to support Mejias's 1995 pleas to burglary and possession of burglary tools. The court set aside Meji-as's conviction on the burglary tools charge, on the authority of Green v. State, 604 So.2d 471 (Fla.1992), but found that his plea on the burglary charge was supported by the evidence. We disagree, and hereby reverse.
The scenario which produced the burglary charge against Mejias involved the following: Mejias was discovered at night, in the parking area of an industrial park, adjacent to Tri-Star Industries, which was then his place of employment. A window air-conditioning unit at Tri-Star had been pushed into the building somewhat, setting off an alarm to which the police responded. Upon arrival, the police found Mejias hiding under a truck in the parking area. He had gloves and a diagram of Tri-Star's premises on his person.
Mejias challenged the factual basis of the burglary plea on two independent theories — (1) that because a pedestrian gate into the industrial park was open, he did not enter an area "not open to the public"; and (2) that because the parking area in which he was discovered was common to all businesses in the industrial park, that area could not be considered the curtilage of Tri-Star. Although there was conflicting evidence concerning whether or not the pedestrian gate was open on the night in question, the trial judge found that the gate was closed. Thus, as the area was not then open to the public, Mejias loses on his first theory.
However, Mejias's second theory has merit. The layout of this particular industrial park was not in dispute among the witnesses. The intended target of the purported burglary, Tri-Star, was one of many warehouse businesses located within the industrial park's two buildings. The entire industrial park is enclosed on all sides by either the building itself or a fence. Significantly, the businesses are not separated from each other within the fenced compound; they are housed in adjacent warehouses in the same building. Mejias was discovered within the fenced compound, in the common parking area of all the businesses, under a truck parked near the Tri-Star warehouse. Mejias's argument that, given these facts, he was not on the curtilage of Tri-Star — and, therefore, not within the burglary statute — is supported by a recent first district case.
In Henry v. State, 707 So.2d 370 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998), the defendant had entered a fenced-in compound with five sheds inside of it and had stolen a tool from one of the sheds. The state charged him with burglary not only with regard to the shed from which he had stolen the tool, but also with regard to the other sheds, because he had entered their curtilage. The second district reversed the latter burglary conviction, stating:
[L]and surrounding a building other than a dwelling house, although inside a fenced compound, cannot be the "curti-lage" of a structure not fenced off ("by some form of enclosure") from other structures within the compound.
Henry, 707 So.2d at 373. Mejias argues, and we agree, that despite some factual differences, the instant case is indistinguishable from Henry on principle. Here, Mejias entered land surrounding a building inside a fenced industrial park compound, and the Tri-Star warehouse was not fenced off from the other businesses within the compound. Hence, per the Henry decision, the area Mejias entered was not the curtilage of a structure.
In the instant situation, conviction under the burglary statute required proof of these elements: (1) the defendant entered or remained in a structure; (2) with the intent to commit an offense therein; and (3) the premises were not at the time open to the public, and the defendant had no license to enter or remain. See § 810.02(1), Fla. Stat. (1995). The term "structure" includes, by definition, "the curtilage thereof." See § 810.011(1), Fla. Stat. (1995). Here, the first element was not met, as Mejias did not enter either a structure or its curtilage. Thus, Mejias could not have committed burglary. As in Henry, where the defendant was not guilty of burglary of the unentered sheds by his entry into the fenced compound, likewise Mejias was not guilty of burglary of the unentered Tri-Star warehouse by his entry into the fenced compound of this industrial park. Mejias's nolo contendere plea was, therefore, without a factual basis.
In our view, based on the foregoing discussion, the most the evidence below showed was a factual basis for attempted burglary or for trespassing on property other than a structure. The circumstantial evidence here, while not amounting to burglary, was strongly indicative of the imminent commission of a burglary. In effect, we believe that the evidence showed that Mejias was likely intercepted before he could commit the burglary — he had set off Tri-Star's alarm system but had not yet entered the building. Other factors — Mejias's presence on the premises of the industrial park in the middle of the night, his hiding under a truck, the gloves and map in Mejias's possession, and the air-conditioning unit of the business being pushed in — all support a scenario of an interrupted plan to burglarize the Tri-Star warehouse.
We reverse Mejias's conviction for burglary, as we find his plea was without a factual basis, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. The trial court's vacation of Mejias's conviction on possession of burglary tools is affirmed.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
NESBITT and FLETCHER, JJ., concur.
. We note that the instant situation is not analogous to that in Greer v. State, 354 So.2d 952 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978), where the defendant's burglary conviction was upheld. In Greer, the defendant had entered the fenced-in enclosure surrounding a car dealership. Properly, this court held that this fenced-in area was the curtilage of the dealership building. The distinction between Greer and the instant case (and between Greer and Henry) was that the fence in Greer surrounded only one business entity's building.
. We acknowledge, as have other courts, that the precise definition of "curtilage" with respect to a building that is not a dwelling is problematic. See Henry, 707 So.2d at 373. Indeed, the course of Florida jurisprudence regarding curtilage is a somewhat tortured one. See, e.g., Martinez v. State, 700 So.2d 142, 145 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997) (W. Sharp, J., dissenting); Greer v. State, 354 So.2d at 953-54 (Pearson, J., dissenting).
. See § 810.02(1) and § 777.04(1), Fla. Stat. (1995).
. See § 810.09(1), Fla. Stat. (1995).