Case Name: MILES PARKER, Respondent, v. ORVILLE M. KNOX, Appellant
Court: New York Supreme Court, General Term
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1891-07
Citations: 67 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 550
Docket Number: 
Parties: MILES PARKER, Respondent, v. ORVILLE M. KNOX, Appellant.
Judges: MerwiN, J., concurred.
Reporter: Supreme Court Reports (Hun)
Volume: 67
Pages: 550–558

Head Matter:
MILES PARKER, Respondent, v. ORVILLE M. KNOX, Appellant.
Vromdulent representations as to agency — measure of damages on sales for future delivery — proof that the alleged, principal was solvent — election of remedies.
An action was brought to recover tlie damages alleged to have resulted to the plaintiff from the defendant’s fraudulent act, in falsely representing himself to< the plaintiff tobe the agent of a third person, and in having thus bought from the plaintiff for future delivery hops which he subsequently refused to take, by reason of which a loss resulted to the plaintiff through their fall in price:
Held, that the measure of damages was the difference between the contract-price and what the hops were worth at the time when they should, by the terms of the contract, have been delivered.
That, in connection with the subject of damages, it was not requisite for the plaintiff to show affirmatively that the third party represented by the defendant to be his principal was “solvent and responsible.”
The defendant’s counsel asked the court “to charge directly that a verdict or judgment for the defendant in this case would not be a bar to an action by the. plaintiff against Knox for a breach of contract to buy the hops upon his own account.”
To this request the court replied: “I decline to charge that," and then added, "I think the rule is, having selected this remedy and the method of enforcing- it, that it is a selection which he must stand by, and I decline to charge the proposition.”
that had the court simply refused the request the appellate court held that the request was not upon a material issue, but that the words added were erroneous, as the doctrine of election did not apply.
That the plaintiff, had he failed to prove fraud in this action, might still have held the defendant liable, in another action, as the purchaser of the hops, because of his having assumed to have an authority which he did not, in fact, have.
That because of such statement to the jury a new trial should be granted. (Martin, J., dissenting upon this last point.)
Appeal by tlie defendant Orville M. Knox from a judgment, entered in the office of the clerk of Madison county on the 30th day of April, 1890, in favor of the plaintiff, after a trial at the Madison Circuit before the court and a jury, at which a verdict was rendered in favor of the plaintiff for $1,700.74, with notice of an intention to bring up for review upon said appeal an order, entered in said clerk’s office on the 12th day of December, 1890, denying the defendant’s motion for a new trial.
Plaintiff in his complaint alleged that on the 26th day of June, 1889, he was the owner of a quantity of hops and that the defendant, “ for the purpose of obtaining control of the same for speculative purposes, falsely and fraudulently represented and stated to the plaintiff that he, the defendant, was duly authorized by one George W. Elkins, who was well known to the plaintiff to be a reputable and solvent hop dealer, to buy the plaintiff’s hops, and offered the plaintiff for said hops, as the alleged agent of said Elkins, the sum of twenty-two cents per pound. * * * That the plaintiff, relying on the said representations of the defendant, that he was the agent of said Elkins and had the right to buy said hops for him, and believing that the sale was made to said Elkins, as the principal of said defendant, sold his ninety-seven bales of hops, weighing 18,456 net, to the defendant as per his offer of twenty-two cents per pound. That the defendant paid the plaintiff on account of said sale twenty dollars, and agreed to weigh, inspect and pay for said hops at the plaintiff’s hop-kiln, in the town of Madison, county of Madison, where said hops then were, on the following Saturday or Tuesday. That the plaintiff, on both of said days was prepared to deliver said hops, as aforesaid, but the defendant failed to put in an appearance and to take said hops.. That the defendant promised, from time to time, to take said bops alleging as an excuse that his principal, said Elkins, was away from bis place of business among tlie brewers, or bad no place for them just at the time, and would fix new dates, but always defaulted and failed to take said hops and pay for the same the purchase-price aforesaid. That thereafter, and about the month of August, 1889, plaintiff learned that the defendant bad no authority from said Elkins to buy said bops, as aforesaid, and plaintiff alleges, on information and belief, that, defendant bad no authority to buy said bops for said Elkins, and was not bis agent and bad no authority to bind him on said purchase.”
The plaintiff also alleged that on the twenty-sixth of June the hops were worth twenty-two cents in the market; “that thereafter the market-value of hops declined so that when plaintiff learned that said defendant was not the agent for said Elkins in making said purchase, and that said sale had not, in fact, been made to said Elkins, and the defendant refused to take said hops and pay for the same, said hops were only worth in the market the sum of nine cents per pound, at which said sum the plaintiff sold said hops as soon as he reasonably could on or about September 25, 1889, and said sale, at nine cents per pound, was the full value of said hops and all that the plaintiff could obtain for the same.”
The answer of the defendant contained a denial of the allegations of the complaint.
Jenldns dé Demreux, for the appellant.
Haskell dé Ooley, for the respondent.

Opinion:
HaediN, P. J.:
Upon an insj)ection of the evidence it is seen that the same is sufficient to sustain the verdict. The evidence sustains the allegations of fraud; we may not, therefore, interfere with the verdict as being against the weight of evidence. Upon the facts found by the verdict, a cause of action is made out against the defendant. (Brackett v. Griswold, 112 N. Y., 454.)
In the course of the charge delivered by the learned trial judge to the jury, he said: " If you say that the plaintiff is entitled to recover in this case, the rule would be the actual loss which he lias sustained by reason of this false and fraudulent representation, ,-and, gentlemen, that would be tlie difference between tbe contract-price of these bops, at which they were sold and were to have been taken, and the price which they were actually worth at the time they ought to have been delivered." At another point in the charge the court observed: " If the plaintiff is entitled to recover in this .action, he is entitled, within the rules of law of this State, to recover the actual damage which he has sustained, and the rule is not very much different, or very widely different in actions sounding in tort under the facts in this case, than upon a breach of contract, or if the action had been brought for a breach of contract in an action at law merely." The defendant's counsel took a general exception " to that part of the charge in which the court states the rule of damages in this case," and accompanying the exception was a request " to .say to the jury that the plaintiff must show affirmatively that Elkins was solvent and responsible; " in response to that request the court declined to charge the proposition. "We think there was no error in declining to yield to the request; the presumption was that Elkins was " solvent and responsible," and so far as the evidence bears upon that question it indicates that he was solvent and responsible.
The defendant's counsel asked the court' "to charge directly that a verdict or judgment for the defendant in this case would not be a bar to an action by the plaintiff against Knox for a breach of contract to buy the hops upon his own account." In response to that request the court observed " I decline to charge that. I think the rule is, having selected this remedy and the method of enforcing it, that it is a selection which he must stand by, and I decline to charge the proposition." If the court had simply declined to yield to the request, we might say that the request was not upon a material issue in the case, but we must consider the further language used by the court, to wit: "The rule is, having selected this remedy and the method of enforcing it, that it is a selection which he must stand by, and I decline to charge the proposition." We think this is not a case where the doctrine of election, applies. The plaintiff charges the defendant, in his complaint and in the evidence produced, with having committed a fraud, and that he fraudulently represented that he was the agent for Elkins. It might well be that there was> no fraud, and the jury might have been properly instructed that if they found there was no fraud there could not be a recovery against the defendant in the form of action adopted here. ¥e fail to see, however, that such failure would have prevented the plaintiff: from recovering against the defendant, upon the theory that he himself had become the purchaser of the hops, and was liable as upon the contract made with the plaintiff. It is a familiar principle that when a party assumes to act as agent for another and induces a contract upon, that assumption, and it turns out that there was no authority-in fact to act for the supposed or alleged principal, the agent himself is liable upon the contract. ¥e think it does not require the same evidence to support an action for alleging the defendant, is liable upon the contract made as it does to support an action alleging that he fraudulently represented that he was authorized as, agent for a party to act. As was said in Bowen v. Mandeville (95 N. Y., 241): " In the one case the recovery is based upon the-express liability assumed by the party in his contract, and in the other upon the liability incurred for a violation of the duty of honesty and fair dealing, which the law enjoins upon one in his dealings with another." We think for the error pointed out that there must be a new trial.
MerwiN, J., concurred.