Case Name: Lyman T. Tingier, Administrator, vs. James F. Chamberlin, Executor
Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Connecticut
Decision Date: 1899-03-09
Citations: 71 Conn. 466
Docket Number: 
Parties: Lyman T. Tingier, Administrator, vs. James F. Chamberlin, Executor.
Judges: 
Reporter: Connecticut Reports
Volume: 71
Pages: 466–472

Head Matter:
Lyman T. Tingier, Administrator, vs. James F. Chamberlin, Executor.
First Judicial District, Hartford,
January Term, 1899.
Andrews, 0. J., Torrance, Baldwin, Hahersley and Hall, Js.
A devise or bequest which might possibly go to the issue or descendants of persons unborn at the death of the testator, has for nearly seventy years been uniformly held to be in violation of the statute against perpetuities (§2952, repealed in 1895); and this construction must now be regarded as a rule of property and no longer open to doubt or question. {One judge dissenting.)
A testatrix, authorized by her husband’s will which took effect in 1879, gave the residue of his estate, and also the greater part of her own property, in trust for the use and support of her son during his life, and at his death to those persons who were then his natural heirs at law. Her will was made in 1879 and took effect in 1884. Held that the disposition to the heirs at law of the son contravened the statute of perpetuities then existing (§ 2952), and was void.
Argued January 4th
decided March 9th, 1899.
Suit to determine the validity and construction of the will of Eunice Chapman of Yernon, deceased, brought to the Superior Court in Tolland County and reserved by that court, Q-eorge W. Wheeler, J., upon a finding of facts, for the consideration and advice of this court.
The facts found in the present case are substantially the same as those stated in 70 Conn. 868, when, in another phase of it, this case was before this court; and for the purposes of this case it is unnecessary to recite them here at length.
The plaintiff is administrator de bonis non with the will annexed, both upon the estate of Eunice Chapman and upon the estate of Elijah S. Chapman, her husband. Elijah S. Chapman died in March, 1879, leaving a will, the material portions of which were as follows: —
“Second: I give, devise and bequeath unto my beloved wife, Eunice Chapman, the use and improvement, rents, profits and income of all my estate, real and personal, and wheresoever the same may be situated, to her during her nat ural life. Third: I give, devise and bequeath all my said estate, at the decease of my said wife, unto such person or persons, and in such shares or portions, as my said wife, Eunice Chapman, by her last will and testament, duly executed, shall name, designate and appoint (provided she shall not give the same to Otis and Ambrose D. Snow, or either of them), to them and their heirs forever.”
He left surviving him Eunice, his widow, and three children, Adeline, wife of Ambrose Snow, Mary, wife of Otis Snow, and Doremus.
Eunice, the widow, died in April, 1884, leaving a will, in which she gave all the estate of her husband of which she had the power to dispose under his will, and all her own estate, to a trustee in trust to pay over the net income to her son Doremus during his life, with power in the trustee to appropriate and apply, in his discretion, so much of the principal of the trust estate for the purposes of the trust, as he should deem necessary. The trust estate that might remain at the death of Doremus she disposed of as follows: —
“ Fourth,: If, upon the decease of my said son, Doremus D. Chapman, any portion of said trust estate shall be remaining in the hands of said trustee, undisposed of, I authorize and direct said trustee to distribute, transfer and convey all said remaining estate, absolutely to such persons as would then be entitled to the same as heirs-at-law of the said Doremus D. Chapman, if said estate belonged to him, under the statute laws of the State of Connecticut then in force, if the same were intestate estate, that is to say: said trustee shall distribute said estate as aforesaid, to those persons who are the natural heirs-at-law of my said son at the time of his decease.”
She left surviving her the three children aforesaid, and three grandchildren, children of her daughter Mary, all of whom with the exception of her son Doremus are now living.
Doremus, after the death of his mother, married, and subsequently, in December, 1896, died without ever having had any child bom to him. He left a widow, who is still living, and a will by which he gave her all of his estate. The duly qualified executor of his will, and his widow, are parties to this suit.
The trust estate, the life use of which was given to Doremus, consisted of the estate of his father Elijah S. Chapman, and the estate of his mother Eunice Chapman, including both real and personal estate ; and what remained of both of said estates is now in the possession and control of the plaintiff, to be disposed of according to law.
The complaint sets forth several questions concerning which it is alleged that the plaintiff is in doubt, but they may all be resolved into this single question, namely, whether the disposition of what remains of these estates, after the death of Doremus, contained in the will of Eunice Chapman, does or does not contravene the provisions of the statute of perpetuities in force when her will took effect in April, 1884.
Lewis Sperry and Charles Phelps, for Mrs. Otis Snow and Mrs. Ambrose Snow.
William W. Hyde and Joel H Reed, for Mrs. Ella H. S. Chapman.

Opinion:
Torrance, J.
Under the will of her husband, Mrs. Eunice Chapman had the power to dispose by will of the remainder of her husband's estate, after her life use thereof, to such persons, except Otis and Ambrose D. Snow, and in such portions, as she pleased; and under the law she had the power, of course, to dispose of her own estate by will as she chose.
By her will she gave her son Doremus, through her trustee, the life use of the property belonging to both estates, and concerning this disposition of such property no question is made in the present case. She further provided in her will, that Avhat remained of this property after the death of Doremus should go " to those. persons who are the natural heirs-at-law of my said son at the time of his decease."
Whether this is a valid or a void disposition is substantially the only question in the case; and its validity must be determined by the law as it was when her will took effect in 1884. Security Co. v. Snow, 70 Conn. 288, 292. At that time the statute against perpetuities (§ 2952, Rev. Stat. 1888) was in full force, though it has since been repealed. Public Acts of 1895, Chap. 249.
Under this statute, as construed by this court, the issue or descendants of persons unborn at the death of a testator cannot take under his will; and a gift, devise, or bequest, which may by possibility offend against the statute in this respect is void and of no effect. This has been the construction put upon the statute, whenever its construction has been before this court, for a period of nearly seventy years, from the decision in Allyn v. Mather, 9 Conn. 114, in 1832, down to that in Security Co. v. Snow, supra, in 1898. This uniform construction, for so long a period, has acquired the force of a fixed rule of property, and is no longer open to doubt or question. If a gift, devise or bequest offends against the statute as thus construed, it is void and of no effect. That the disposition here in question does thus offend against the statute, is clear beyond all question.
The testatrix used the words " heirs at law " of Doremus, not as meaning his children, but in their natural and proper sense, as including all those persons who shall be capable of inheriting from him or taking his property under the statute of distributions, if he died intestate. In the clause under consideration those who are to take are expressly and with great precision described as his heirs at law, in the strictly technical sense of those words, and there is nothing in any other part of the will which in any way qualifies or modifies this descriptive language. Under such a description, all of the property remaining, of both estates, may go to the issue or descendants of persons not in being when the testatrix died, and the gift over is therefore void.
The Superior Court is advised that the disposition made in the fourth clause of the will of Eunice Chapman, to the heirs at law of Doremus, is void; and that the property in the hands of the plaintiff belonging to the estate of Eunice Chapman, and to the estate of Elijah S. Chapman, is intestate estate, and is to be dealt with and disposed of as such.
In this opinion the other judges concurred, except Hamersley, J., who dissented.