Case Name: Victor A. BUSSIE et ux. v. Blanche Revere LONG and Louisiana Tax Commission et al.
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1973-10-26
Citations: 286 So. 2d 689
Docket Number: No. 9519
Parties: Victor A. BUSSIE et ux. v. Blanche Revere LONG and Louisiana Tax Commission et al.
Judges: Before LANDRY, ELLIS and PICKETT, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 286
Pages: 689–706

Head Matter:
Victor A. BUSSIE et ux. v. Blanche Revere LONG and Louisiana Tax Commission et al.
No. 9519.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, First Circuit.
Oct. 26, 1973.
Rehearing Denied Nov. 26, 1973.
Writ Refused Jan. 25, 1974.
Kenneth C. Dejean and P. J. Laborde, Asst. Attys. Gen., Baton Rouge, for appellants.
J. D. DeBlieux and Frank Simoneaux, Baton Rouge, and Helen S. Kohlman and Helen Riley, New Orleans, for plaintiff-appellee.
J. Barry Mouton, Lafayette, for inter-venor Mouton.
Before LANDRY, ELLIS and PICKETT, JJ.

Opinion:
LANDRY, Judge.
The Louisiana Tax Commission (Commission) appeals from judgment, rendered in this class action brought by plaintiffs, Victor A. and Gertrude Bussie, ordering the Commission to perform duties allegedly imposed by the Constitution and laws of Louisiana regarding the assessment of property at actual cash value for ad valo-rem tax purposes and equalization of property taxes, effective beginning with all tax rolls submitted subsequent to January 1, 1975. We affirm with an amendment ex tending compliance time to begin with assessment rolls filed subsequent to January 1, 1976.
This case was filed June 27, 1967, against the then members of the Commission praying that the Commission be mandated to: (1) assess all property in the state at actual cash value for ad valorem tax purposes; (2) fix the percentage of actual cash value on which state ad valo-rem taxes must be collected and paid, and (3) carry out all provisions of law requiring equalization of assessments. Plaintiffs also requested orders restraining the Commission from approving tax rolls which assessed property at less than actual cash value, and further restraining the Commission from engaging in any actions in concert with parish assessors contrary'to law regarding the assessment of property and equalization of taxes.
The named plaintiffs sue on behalf of themselves individually, as citizens and property taxpayers of the State of Louisiana, and on behalf of all other persons similarly situated. They alleged that the rights asserted are common to all property taxpayers who are assessed and pay ad va-lorem taxes. On July 27, 1967, J. Barry Mouton, Lafayette, Louisiana, intervened on behalf of the Commission.
Defendants filed peremptory exceptions based on plaintiffs' failure to file a sworn itemized list of plaintiffs' property as required by LSA-R.S. 47:1998 and Dixon v. Flournoy, 247 La. 1067, 176 So.2d 138, and plaintiffs' alleged failure to exhaust the right to administrative review as provided for by LSA-R.S. 47:1992. Additionally, defendants filed (1) a dilatory exception based on plaintiffs' failure to allege their domicile; (2) an exception to venue on the ground that Caddo Parish is the correct forum; (3) failure to join indispensable parties on the ground that the assessors in each parish were not made defendants herein, and (4) an exception of no cause of action premised on plaintiff's failure to allege that the assessments of plaintiffs or any member of the class represented exceeded 100% of actual cash valuation.
Initially the trial court overruled defendants' exception to the venue but sustained the peremptory exceptions based on failure to exhaust the right of administrative review and failure to attach a sworn itemized list of property to plaintiffs' petition. On appeal this court affirmed the decision of the trial court. Bussie v. Long, et al., La.App., 236 So.2d 68. However, writs were granted by the Supreme Court which reversed the decision of this court and the trial court and remanded this matter for trial on the merits. Bussie v. Long, et al., 257 La. 623, 243 So.2d 776 (1971).
On August 25, 1971, the League of Women Voters, a nonprofit corporation, intervened on behalf of plaintiffs. Trial below was held December 13, 1972, at which time all exceptions not theretofore passed upon were overruled by the trial court. On March 22, 1973, the trial court rendered judgment: (1) Decreeing the present system of administering the ad va-lorem tax laws as contained in La. Const. Article X, Section 1, and numerous statutes, violates the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and Article I, Section 2, of the State Constitution; (2) enjoining the Commission from approving any assessment roll pursuant to LSA-R.S. 47:1993, unless all property listed thereon is assessed at actual cash value, effective commencing with all rolls submitted to the Commission after January 1, 1975; (3) mandating the Commission to immediately take steps to comply with laws requiring assessment of property at actual cash value for ad valo-rem tax purposes, to secure uniformity and equalization in the assessment of all taxable property throughout the state, and devise and submit to the assessors throughout the state a plan for establishment of actual cash value as the criteria for assessment of property and the achievement of uniformity and equalization of taxes throughout the state. The judgment accorded the Commission a delay until January 1, 1975, to implement the decree.
The Commission has not reurged any of the exceptions overruled by the lower court at the commencement of trial. Both in the trial court and on this appeal, the Commission contends the entire matter has become moot because of the passage of numerous acts by the 1972 general and special sessions of the legislature, all of which will be subsequently considered in detail. In effect, the Commission maintains there is no longer a statewide ad valorem tax, neither is there a constitutional or statutory requirement for assessment of property at actual cash value. The Commission further argues that the mandamus issued herein was improvident in that its directives are impossible of attainment because of the Commission's limited staff and personnel.
The record was lodged in this court on May 22, 1973. Two exceptions of no right of action were filed herein by the Commission on June 15, 1973. The first is based on plaintiff's failure to allege and establish that class members were afforded proper notice and opportunity to either join or oppose the action. It is also claimed that plaintiffs have failed to establish adequate class representation as required by our class action statute.
The Commission's second exception of no right of action is founded on plaintiffs' alleged failure to assert a real and actual interest in the subject matter of this litigation or in the judgment prayed for. The Commission notes that plaintiffs allege the rights sought to be enforced are common to all taxpayers in the state who are assessed and pay ad valorem taxes pursuant to the unlawful and discriminatory practices followed by defendants as claimed by plaintiffs. The Commission notes the 1972 repeal" of the state wide ad valorem tax which leaves in force and effect only parish and special district property taxes involving individual parishes or taxing districts composed of one or more parishes. Therefore, the Commission urges, plaintiffs no longer have a common interest with taxpayers outside plaintiffs' parish or such special taxing districts in which plaintiffs own no property.
THE EXCEPTION OF NO RIGHT OF ACTION BASED ON FAILURE TO GIVE NOTICE AND PROVE ADEQUATE CLASS REPRESENTATION
The Louisiana Class Action Statute is contained in LSA-C.C.P. arts. 591-597, in elusive. Article 591 provides as follows:
"A class action may be instituted when the persons constituting the class are so numerous as to make it impracticable for all of them to join or be joined as parties, and the character of the right sought to be enforced for or against the members of the class is:
(1) Common to all members of the class; or
(2) Secondary, in the sense that the owner of a primary right refuses to enforce it, and a member of the class thereby becomes entitled to enforce the right."
The source of the foregoing statute is Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. However, the official revision comment to Article 591, above, makes it clear that Louisiana has not adopted the Federal Class Action in its entirety, but has sanctioned only the "true class action" provided for under Federal Rules. A true class action requires community of interests between the plaintiff and the class he seeks to represent. Verdin v. Thomas, La.App., 191 So.2d 646; Caswell v. Reserve National Insurance Company, La.App., 234 So.2d 250.
An additional requisite for maintenance of a class action is that the member or members bringing suit shall adequately represent the entire class. LSA-C.C.P. art. 592.
A definitive judgment rendered in a properly conducted class action is binding on all members of the class, whether joined or not, provided the members who were joined constitute adequate representation of the class as a whole. LSA-C.C.P. art. 597.
The Commission cites federal authority for the rule that notice is required in all class actions. Conversely, plaintiffs maintain that federal jurisprudence holds notice to be required only in the case of a spurious class action as provided for by F.R. C.P. Rule 23(b)(3), which type of proceeding is not permitted in Louisiana. Therefore, plaintiffs argue, notice is not necessary in the F.R.C.P. 23(b)(1) or true class action, in which category the instant matter falls.
In view of our finding that the exception in question is a dilatory exception of lack of procedural capacity which has been waived because of defendants' failure to plead same prior to answer, it is unnecessary to resolve the conflict noted.
A peremptory exception of no right of action challenges the alleged interest of plaintiff in the subject matter of the litigation. LeSage v. Union Producing Co., 249 La. 42, 184 So.2d 727; Babineaux v. Pernie-Bailey Drilling Co., 261 La. 1080, 262 So.2d 328. The peremptory exception defeats plaintiff's action. It is not waived by failing to plead it prior to answer as is the case in regard to a dilatory exception.
The dilatory exception of lack of procedural capacity puts at issue plaintiff's authority to bring suit as the legal representative of another; it does not defeat the action. Such is the nature of this exception in this case. The Commission challenges plaintiffs' capacity to stand in judgment herein as representatives of a class solely on procedural grounds. The Commission contends that plaintiffs have failed to give proper notice to the remaining class members, and have failed to establish that plaintiffs- constitute adequate class representation. Therefore, the Commission urges, plaintiffs lack legal capacity to represent the class in question. The exception does not defeat plaintiffs' demands; it merely delays prosecution thereof until plaintiffs give the required notice and furnish proof of adequate class representation. The matter addresses itself to procedural defects which could be corrected had the exception been timely presented. The exception is dilatory. Jackson v. Dickens, La.App., 236 So.2d 81.
Our research of Federal authorities discloses instances in which Federal Courts have dismissed class actions upon timely filed exceptions based on alleged lack of notice and inadequate representation. Weeks v. Bareco Oil Co., 7 Cir., 125 F.2d 84; Flaherty v. McDonald, D.C., 178 F.Supp. 544; Molina v. Sovereign Camp W. O. W., D.C.Neb., 6 F.R.D. 385.
We have found only one Federal case in which the court considered a tardily filed exception of this nature. We refer to Clark v. Chase Nat. Bank of City of New York, D.C.N.Y., 45 F.Supp. 820, which held that such an exception filed four years after institution of suit constituted an inordinate delay which operated as a waiver of the objection. We conclude that the Commission's exception of lack of procedural capacity to proceed with this class action has been waived by the Commission's failure to file same timely.
EXCEPTION OF NO RIGHT OF ACTION BASED ON PLAINTIFFS' LACK OF INTEREST IN THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THE ACTION
Succinctly. stated, the Commission urges -that plaintiffs have failed to assert a "real and actual interest" in the subject matter of this litigation as required by LSA-C.C.P. art. 681. Such an exception is peremptory and defeats plaintiffs' claim if well founded. Accordingly, it may be plead at any stage of the proceedings. LSA-C.C.P. art. 928.
The Commission's position founded upon Marshall v. Town of Marksville, 116 La. 746, 41 So. 57; State ex rel. Schoeffner v. Dowling, 158 La. 706, 104 So. 624; Cleveland v. Martin, La.App., 29 So.2d 516. These authorities establish the general rule that a citizen and taxpayer cannot seek mandamus to compel performance of a duty by a public board, officer or commission unless it is first established that plaintiff possesses a special interest in having a law enforced, which interest sets plaintiff apart from the general public as a whole. Also relying on Schoeffner v. Dowling, above, and La. Const. Article 5, Sections 13 and 14, the Commission maintains it is not the duty or prerogative of a private citizen to enforce state laws, but rather the obligation of the Chief Executive or Governor. is
Plaintiffs concede that Schoeffner, above, and the other cited authorities establish the general rule as stated by the Commission. Plaintiffs assert, however, the jurisprudence is equally well established that said general rule is without application to instances involving the alleged illegal or improper expenditure of public funds or the violation of official duties which will impose a discriminatory tax burden upon or otherwise injuriously affect a taxpayer or his property as held in Borden v. Louisiana State Board of Education, 168 La. 1005, 123 So. 655; Graham v. Jones, 198 La. 507, 3 So.2d 761; Stewart v. Stanley, 199 La. 146, 5 So.2d 531.
The general rule urged by the Commission is stated in 52 Am.Jur.2d, Mandamus, § 388, p. 710, and § 390, pp. 712-713, from which we approvingly quote the following:
"As in other civil actions, the person invoking the relief must have a proper interest in, and a proper purpose to be served by, the act sought to be compelled. This interest must be presently existing, and, except in cases in which a party's interest as a taxpayer is sufficient, it must be beneficial, real and actual, direct and tangible, and different from and transcending that interest of citizens generally .
The prevailing view is that where the question is one of public right and the object of the mandamus is to procure the enforcement of a public duty, the rélator need not show that he has any legal or special interest in the result or any exclusive right or interest to be protected, but it is sufficient that he is interested as a citizen or taxpayer in having the laws executed and the duty in question enforced. In a proper case, one who is interested as a citizen or taxpayer in having a public duty enforced may institute the proceeding even though he is also personally interested."
The distinction noted in the foregoing rule is well established within our own jurisprudence. Peck v. Tugwell, 199 La. 125, 5 So.2d 524; Ricks v. Close, 201 La. 242, 9 So.2d 534; Carso v. Board of Liquidation of State Debt, 205 La. 368, 17 So.2d 358; Cully v. City of New Orleans, La.App., 173 So.2d 46; Akin v. Caddo Parish Police Jury, La.App., 234 So.2d 203.
Pertinent herein is the following language appearing in Schoeffner v. Dowling, above:
" . . . we think the great weight of authority is decidedly to the effect that, without some peculiar, special, and individual interest, a citizen, though he be a taxpayer, has no standing in court to champion a cause or subject matter which pertains to the whole people in common, nor has an individual citizen a legal standing in court to enforce the performance of a duty which a public officer owes to the public at large, unless it clearly appears that such individual citizen has a special and peculiar interest in the performance of such duty apart from the interest which he has as one of the general public in having the duty performed."
Our own jurisprudence also recognizes that the requirement of a peculiar and special interest in the performance of an official duty exists and is satisfied in those instances wherein it is charged that an unlawful performance of duty, or refusal to perform, by a public official, discriminates against a citizen-taxpayer by either increasing his tax burden or otherwise injuriously affecting the taxpayer or his property. In this respect, the rule is stated in Donaldson v. Police Jury, 161 La. 471, 109 So. 34, as follows:
"The true doctrine of the cases in which taxpayers have been complainants is that they have the right to resort to judicial authority to restrain their public servants from transcending their lawful powers, or violating their lgal duties in any unauthorized mode which will increase the burden of taxation or otherwise injuriously affect the taxpayers or their property."
To the same effect, see Cully v. City of New Orleans, above, which extended the rule by holding that the magnitude of plaintiff's right is of no consequence. Cully, above, also held that, notwithstanding plaintiff's right might be slight or difficult of measurement, it does not deprive plaintiff of his right of action.
Applying the rule in Schoeffner and Cully, above, we find that plaintiffs have alleged a special and peculiar interest entitling them to prosecute this action to mandamus defendant Commission to perform its lawful duty.
Accordingly, both exceptions of no right of action filed in this court are overruled.