Case Name: Tom Alex O'HARA, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1984-03-01
Citations: 448 So. 2d 524
Docket Number: Nos. 81-894, 82-1248
Parties: Tom Alex O’HARA, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: ORFINGER, C.J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 448
Pages: 524–529

Head Matter:
Tom Alex O’HARA, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Nos. 81-894, 82-1248.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
March 1, 1984.
Rehearings Denied March 30, 1984.
James B. Gibson, Public Defender, and David A. Henson, Asst. Public Defender, Daytona Beach, for appellant.
Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Mark C. Menser, Asst. Atty. Gen., Daytona Beach, for appellee.

Opinion:
DAUKSCH, Judge.
This is an appeal from convictions for grand theft and extortion. It was alleged and proved that appellant threatened to have his victim arrested if she did not pay him money. Thus the extortion conviction. It was also alleged and proved that appellant took money from the same victim. Thus the theft conviction. It was the same money which was extorted from the victim which was stolen from her. The proof at trial was that by virtue of the extortion, the theft occurred. The two were intrinsically connected. But for the extortion there would have been no money taken — that was the method by which it was taken. Only one conviction should have resulted. See Bell v. State, 437 So.2d 1057 (Fla.1983).
One cannot be convicted of two crimes for the taking of only one sum of money, be it through an extortion method as here, or a robbery method as in Rodriquez v. State, 443 So.2d 236 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983). In Rodriquez it is said "It is elementary that, once convicted of petit theft for stealing money, a defendant cannot again be convicted of grand theft and sentenced twice where there has been only one conversion of a single sum of money." The same logic which was applied in Rodriquez, which was a robbery and grand theft case, should apply here — extortion and grand theft. By way of illustration we would say the same logic would also apply if a person stole a motor vehicle and was charged with grand theft of a motor vehicle under Section 812.014(2)(b)4, Florida Statutes (1981); he could not also be convicted of grand theft under Section 812.014(2)(b)l, Florida Statutes (1981). By way of further illustration the same reasoning could apply if one stole a will, codicil or other testamentary instrument; a cow; a horse or a fire extinguisher. If a person steals two hundred dollar bills from one owner in one taking he cannot be convicted of two hundred separate petit larceny charges; or one grand larceny and any number of petit larcenies.
When a person commits an act which constitutes two separate crimes such as armed robbery and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon then it is clear the legislature has meant for the two convictions. But when the legislature has proscribed the taking of money by extortion and the taking of money by theft it is obviously meant to punish for the taking. The crime for which the accused can be convicted depends upon how the taking occurred.
In Bartee v. State, 401 So.2d 890 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981), this court recognized that alternative or disjunctive provisions of separate criminal statutes must be considered in deciding double jeopardy problems, when it said:
When a single statutory offense describes multiple alternative acts, each of which is prohibited, each separate prohibited act does not constitute a separate offense for double jeopardy purposes since there is but one statutory offense. Therefore a charge that an accused has violated a specific criminal statute results in jeopardy as to all alternative acts that could have been alleged and proven to have constituted a violation of the statute although the accusatorial pleading described but one of many alternative factual events proscribed in the one statute. Thus if one is tried for aggravated battery by committing a battery with a deadly weapon, § 784.045(l)(b), Fla. Stat. (1979), and is convicted or acquitted, he cannot thereafter be tried as to the same factual event for aggravated battery by committing a battery causing great bodily harm. § 784.045(l)(a), Fla. Stat. (1979). The alternative prohibited factual events set forth as subsections or alternatives in one criminal statute, constitute but one offense for which an accused cannot be twice placed in jeopardy because the legislature has chosen as a matter of form to make several distinguishable acts violative of but one statutory offense. Conversely, if two separate statutory offenses proscribe acts which are in law the same because they have the same essential constituent factual elements, an accused cannot be placed in jeopardy for a violation of both such statutes because in substance they constitute a single offense — the "same offense" — for which one cannot be placed twice in jeopardy.
Id. at 893.
With this in mind, clearly only one offense was charged here. Section 812.014, Florida Statutes (1981), says that a person is guilty of theft if he knowingly obtains or uses, or endeavors to obtain or use, the property of another with intent:
(a) To deprive the other person of a right to the property or a benefit therefrom.
(b) To appropriate the property to his own or to the use of any person not entitled thereto.
Under the alternative provisions of Section 836.05, Florida Statutes (1981), one commits the crime of extortion by maliciously threatening to do certain acts with the intent to extort money from the victim. Although extortion is also committed in other alternative ways, taking or attempting to take the money of another by means of threats, etc., is extortion, and in proving the crime of extortion by this alternative method, the crime of theft of the money has also been proved; i.e., obtaining or attempting to obtain the property (money) of another with intent to deprive such other person of said money. For the reasons stated in Rodriquez v. State, 443 So.2d 236 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983), the mere fact that the amount taken is greater than $100 does not, by itself, convert the one crime to two.
The theft conviction is reversed, the extortion conviction is affirmed.
AFFIRMED in part; REVERSED in part.
ORFINGER, C.J., concurs.
COWART, J., dissents with opinion.
. § 812.014(2)(b)2, Fla.Stat. (1981).
. § 812.014(2)(b)5, Fla.Stat. (1981).
.§ 812.014(2)(b)6, Fla.Stat. (1981).