Case Name: STATE of Louisiana v. Mac BROWN
Court: Louisiana Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1975-12-08
Citations: 326 So. 2d 839
Docket Number: No. 56690
Parties: STATE of Louisiana v. Mac BROWN.
Judges: TATE, J., concurs and assigns reasons.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 326
Pages: 839–848

Head Matter:
STATE of Louisiana v. Mac BROWN.
No. 56690.
Supreme Court of Louisiana.
Dec. 8, 1975.
Dissenting Opinion Feb. 23, 1976.
Rehearing Denied Feb. 20, 1976.
Neil H. Mixon, Jr., McCollister, Belcher, McCleary & Fazio, Baton Rouge, for defendant-appellant.
William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Barbara Rutledge, Asst. Atty. Gen., Ossie Brown, Dist. Atty., Ralph L. Roy, James E. Boren, Asst. Dist. Attys., for plaintiff-appellee.

Opinion:
BOLIN, Justice.
Defendant was charged by bill of information with armed robbery, in violation of La.R.S. 14:64. He was convicted and sentenced to ten years' imprisonment. He assigns seventeen errors on this appeal and we affirm.
The evidence adduced at trial indicated that on November 5, 1973, defendant and Ralph Sterling approached Sterling's girlfriend, the State's chief witness in the case, and asked to borrow her car. She agreed to lend the men her car provided they first drop her off at a laundromat. They left her at the laundromat sometime between 9:30 A.M. and 10:45 A.M. and returned at about 12:15 P.M. with a third person, identified by Sterling's girlfriend as Thomas Carter.
Sometime between approximately 12:00 noon and 1:00 P.M., the robbery in question occurred. One witness testified that a small, light colored foreign car was seen near the scene of the crime at about the time of the robbery. Two officers travel-ling on the Interstate with a prisoner in the back of their car saw three black men whom they could not identify, riding on that highway and noted their license plate number after hearing a radio notification to be on the lookout for a light colored foreign car. The car seen by the officers on the Interstate was the gold Toyota station wagon loaned by Ralph Sterling's girlfriend to Sterling and defendant. When Carter, Sterling and defendant returned to the laundromat, they picked up Sterling's girlfriend and let her out at her home. Sterling returned to his girlfriend's house ten minutes later without defendant or Carter. Sterling and his girlfriend then left her home and were driving the car toward an employment office when they were stopped by police who recognized the license number.
The officers then searched the car, with the owner's permission, and discovered a gun in the glove compartment, about which the owner of the car testified that she knew nothing-. $137.00 in small bills was also found on Sterling's person.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 1
Defendant first assigns error in the trial court's refusal to grant his motion to quash because defendant had been denied a speedy trial. The robbery allegedly occurred on November 5, 1973; defendant was arrested on November 8, 1973, and trial was held on January 28, 29 and 30, 1975. Under the four-factor test of Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972), we find defendant has not been denied his right to a speedy trial.
As to the first two factors, the length of the delay and the reasons therefor, the fourteen-month lapse between arrest and trial was neither inordinate nor unusual. The State demonstrated that the crowded docket accounted for the delay and we find that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in accepting this explanation.
The third Barker factor is defendant's assertion of his right to a speedy trial. The defendant did not demand that he be tried until October 24, 1974, at which time he wrote a letter to the assistant district attorney. The trial was held three months after that time, and, considering the intervening Thanksgiving and Christmas holidays, this was not an unnecessary delay.
Finally, defendant has failed, to meet the fourth factor set out in Barker since he failed to prove concrete prejudice flowing from the delay.
Thus, this assignment has no merit.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 2
In this assignment, defendant argues that the trial court committed error by refusing to grant his motion for a severance of his trial from that of his codefend-ant Carter. A severance is required only when the trial court is satisfied that justice requires it. La.C.Cr.P. art. 704.
At the time the motion for severance was denied, there was no potential danger of inconsistent or antagonistic defenses or statements by the co-defendants or of the existence of any other factor which would prevent defendant from receiving a fair trial absent a severance. Nor did any such difficulty materialize during trial. Thus, we find this assignment has no merit.
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR NOS. 3, 4, 12 and 14
Assignments of Error Nos. 3, 4, 12 and 14 involve the issue .of when the rules on criminal conspiracy may be mentioned in a trial not for the inchoate offense of conspiracy but for the commission of a substantive crime. The four assignments were made, (1) when the trial court explained the law of criminal conspiracy to the jury during voir dire examination; (2) when the assistant district at' orney explained the law of criminal conspiracy during his opening statement; (3) when he again made such reference during his closing statement; and (4) when the judge explained to the jury the law of conspiracy during his charge.
In both its original and supplementary briefs and on oral argument, the State justifies references to the law of conspiracy on the basis that La.R.S. 15:455 allows proof by the State of a conspiracy in order to take advantage of the relaxed evidence rules established by that provision. La.R.S. 15:455 provides:
"Each coconspirator is deemed to assent to or to commend whatever is said or done in furtherance of the common enterprise, and it is therefore of no moment that such act was done or such declaration was made out of the presence of the conspirator sought to be bound thereby, or whether the conspirator doing such act or making such declaration -be or be not on trial with his codefend- ant. But to have this effect a prima facie case of conspiracy must have been established."
The State urges that the jury must understand the principles of the law of conspiracy because it must decide as a question of fact whether there has been a conspiracy in order to determine whether the acts of one co-conspirator are to be imputed to the other co-conspirators.
The scope of the voir dire examination of prospective jurors is within the discretion of the trial judge and his rulings will not be disturbed absent manifest error. La.C.Cr.P. art. 786. In order for evidence to be introduced at trial, it must be within the scope of the opening statement. La.C.Cr.P. art. 769. Thus, we hold that whenever more than one person is charged with the commision of a crime and the State intends to prove that a conspiracy existed in order to take advantage of La.R.S. 15:455, it is proper to discuss on voir dire and during the State's opening statement the law of conspiracy.
One of the subjects allowed by La.C.Cr.P. art. 774 to be discussed in the closing argument is the law applicable to the case. Likewise, the judge is required to charge the jury as to the law applicable to the case. La.C.Cr.P. art. 802. Therefore, we hold that if any evidence of conspiracy has been introduced during trial, the district attorney may refer to, and the court may charge the jury, as to the law of conspiracy. Because we find there was circumstantial evidence of a conspiracy in this case, we hold that the comments during argument and the trial court's charge were proper.
We are not faced with the question of what type of showing of conspiracy must be made before evidence of the type allowed by La.R.S. 15:455 may be admitted. There was no objection in this case to any evidence introduced against Mac Brown on the basis that it was admissible only under that provision. We are concerned here only with reference to the law of conspiracy at the various stages of the trial.
These assignments are without merit.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 5
Defendant argues the testimony of Ralph Sterling's girlfriend that " Ralph Sterling asked to borrow my car " was inadmissible hearsay. This testimony was not inadmissible hearsay. The question, "may I borrow your car?" does not convey information the correctness of which must be tested by cross-examination. The only issue raised by the statement was whether Sterling had in fact made the statement, and this was tested by cross-examination of his girlfriend.
Because the statement objected to is not hearsay, this assignment has no merit.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 6
Another error was assigned by defendant when the trial judge allowed Ralph Sterling's girlfriend to testify about the search of her car, and when he allowed into evidence the gun recovered during that search. Defendant apparently maintains that the absence of Ralph Sterling at trial denied him the right of confrontation on these issues.
Defendant's position is untenable. He had the opportunity to fully cross-examine Sterling's girlfriend on the issue, and we know of no rule of evidence that would require that Sterling be present before such evidence could be presented.
As to receiving the gun in evidence, it is the established law of this State that demonstrative evidence may be introduced if a foundation is laid showing that it is more probable than not that the object is connected with the case. See, e. g., State v. Walker, 296 So.2d 310 (La.1974). We find that sufficient evidence had been introduced to meet this standard before the gun was offered.
This assignment has no merit.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 7
This assignment relates to the in-court identification of defendant by the victim as one of the men who robbed her. The basis for the objection is that the identification was tainted by events surrounding a prior line-up identification in which the victim participated.
During that line-up procedure, the victim picked out the defendant as one of the robbers, but qualified that remark somewhat by saying he appeared to be a little lighter than on the day she was robbed. The officer conducting the line-up then told the victim that she had picked out the right man. At trial, the victim identified defendant once again. Upon being questioned about whether her in-court identification was influenced by the officer's comment, she said she did not believe so.
We find no error in the trial court's ruling that the victim's in-court identification was not tainted by the suggestion of the police officer that she had chosen the right person. Her frank estimation that her in-court identification was not influenced- by the events at the line-up coupled with her identification of defendant at the line-up, although it was qualified, convince us that under all the facts defendant was not denied due process. Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 93 S.Ct. 375, 34 L.Ed.2d 401 (1972).
This bill lacks merit.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 8
Defendant assigns as error the trial court's ordering him to stand and be observed standing. This procedure was permissible as it constituted demonstrative rather than testimonial evidence, and thus did not violate defendant's right against self-incrimination. Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 87 S.Ct. 1951, 18 L.Ed.2d 1178 (1967).
This assignment is thus without merit.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 9
This error was assigned when the trial court overruled defendant's objection to a police officer's testimony that he had heard on the police radio the report of the robbery and the description of the car in which the suspects were riding. Defendant contends this testimony was hearsay and thus inadmissible.
Viewing the testimony in the context given, it seems clear that it was admitted to prove why the testifying officer noted the license plate of the car which was eventually stopped. The purpose of introducing the out-of-court statement was not to prove the correctness of the statement (that there were three suspects in a light-colored car). State v. Bluain, 315 So.2d 749 (La.1975).
This assignment is without merit.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 10
This assignment is based upon the trial court's various rulings that certain questions asked by the assistant district attorney were leading. After reviewing the record, we have determined that none of these questions constituted prejudicial error.
This assignment lacks merit.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 11
Defendant assigns as error the trial court's refusal to grant defendant's motion for a directed verdict. Having determined the in-court identification was admissible, there was some evidence against defendant which precludes us from reversing the trial court's refusal to grant a directed verdict. State v. Douglas, 278 So.2d 485 (La.1973).
This assignment has no merit.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 13
Defendant objects to what he alleges are personal comments made by the assistant district attorney during his closing arguments. It is contended the comments are similar to those requiring a reversal in State v. Kaufman, 304 So.2d 300 (La.1974). We have examined the record and can find no such statements of personal opinion as would mandate a reversal under Kaufman. The prosecutor did not exceed the permissible scope of argument allowed by La.C.Cr. P. art. 775.
This assignment lacks merit.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 15
Defendant also complains that the trial court failed to include its requested charge regarding identification testimony in his general charge to the jury. The State argues the requested charge was included in the general charge and thus was properly refused.
We find the thrust of the requested charge was that the State must prove the verity of identification testimony beyond a reasonable doubt. This rule of law was covered in the general charge, which included the instruction that every element of the crime must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
This assignment lacks merit.
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR NOS. 16 and 17
These assignments seek review of the denial by the trial court of defendant's motions for a new trial and for a directed verdict. No new questions are presented by these assignments because the reasons given in support of the two motions are merely reiterations of other assignments previously disposed of herein.
These assignments have no merit.
For the reasons assigned, defendant's conviction and sentence are affirmed.
TATE, J., concurs and assigns reasons.
DIXON, J., dissents. We cannot say that the erroneous instruction on conspiracy did not affect the jury verdict.
CALOGERO, J., dissents and assigns reasons.