Case Name: STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA, Respondent, v. IRA PELLET, Appellant
Court: North Dakota Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: North Dakota
Decision Date: 1925-08-12
Citations: 53 N.D. 183
Docket Number: 
Parties: STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA, Respondent, v. IRA PELLET, Appellant.
Judges: OheistiaNSON, Ch. J., and Burke, Birdzell, and Nuessle, JJ., concur.
Reporter: North Dakota Reports
Volume: 53
Pages: 183–188

Head Matter:
STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA, Respondent, v. IRA PELLET, Appellant.
(204 N. W. 983.)
Opinion filed August 12, 1925.
Sinhler & Brehhe, and Dudley L. Nash, for appellant.
L. 8. B. Ritchie, State’s Attorney, and R. A. Olsberg, for respond- . Oeo. F. Bhafer, Attorney General, L. 8. B. Ritchie, State’s Attorney, and R. A. Olsberg, for respondent.

Opinion:
JoiiNsoN, J.
The defendant was convicted of the crime of grand larceny. On or about the 6th day of June, 1924, one Barney Cavin stole an automobile belonging to Charles K. Otto of Valley City, this state, from the owner's garage, and took it to Tolley, a village in Ren-ville county, where the defendant at that time lived. Cavin yas a son-in-law of the defendant. The defendant was convicted as a principal, under § 9218, Comp. Laws 1913, on the theory that he had "advised and encouraged" the commission of the crime. Cavin pleaded guilty to the crime of larceny and testified as a witness in behalf of the state. Cavin had seduced defendant's daughter, and there is evidence tending to show that the marriage, which took place a few days before the conspiracy to steal the automobile was formed, was one entirely of convenience. The third side to the triangle of crime as disclosed in the record, was made by one A. R. Taute, a pool hall proprietor at Tolley. The state contends that Pellet, Cavin and Taute met at the latter's home and there agreed that Cavin would steal a car for Taute, and that Pellet furnished the security for the cash payment of $150, made by Taute at the time in anticipation of Gavin's success in finding a suitable automobile. Taute admits that he knew O&vin intended to steal a car and that when the automobile was delivered to him he knew it was stolen property. Upon the face of the record it is clear that Taute and Cavin were accomplices, and it would Have been proper to so instruct tbe jury. The defendant contends that Mrs. Tante was also an accomplice, and that a peremptory instruction to that effect should have been given. This point need not be decided. She denies knowledge of the conspiracy; her husband's testimony, however, strongly tends to support the view that she knew such suspicious facts, and circumstances of such an incriminating nature that she probably was aware of the existence of the conspiracy in all its essential aspects. In any event, we think it was a question for the jury whether she was an accomplice, and that a peremptory instruction would not have been justified in the circumstances.
Many errors are assigned. Only one need be considered. Taute was under cross examination by defendant's counsel; witness had admitted that he had been guilty of and punished for gambling and bootlegging, whereupon many questions were asked with reference to a fight with defendant and the presence of minors in the pool-room operated by the witness; counsel then left this subject and asked about the transactions between defendant and this witness which culminated in the crime of which defendant was convicted. After the witness had detailed the. circumstances of the conspiracy, the following took place:
Q. I want to get the facts just as they are; you have made a statement to the state's attorney in regard to this matter, haven't you ?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And you made an affidavit about it, didn't you?
A. Yes.
Q. And you have told this same story that you told on the witness stand, haven't you in substance?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And you have never been arrested for these offenses you committed up there, have you ?
Mr. Ritchie: Objected to as immaterial.
The Court: The objection is sustained. The fact of an arrest should not go before the jury. \
Mr. Sinkler: If your honor please, I am not criticising that proposition; but the purpose of this testimony is that if he told the state's attorney just exactly wbat be bas testified to here, be is equally, guilty witb Barney Gavin and nothing bas been done, and it means tbis, that some promises must bave been beld out to tbis man for tbe purpose of influencing bis testimony.
Tbe Court: The jury will disregard all tbis talk as it is not for tbe jury at all and is no part of tbe evidence to come before you.
Tbe defendant contends that it was prejudicial error to exclude inquiry into facts which might disclose that tbe witness had an interest or felt a bias that tended to color bis testimony. Counsel made bis purpose clear. There is no room for tbe construction which tbe state seeks to put on tbis part of tbe record to the effect that tbe true object of tbe examination was obscure and that tbe phrase "these offenses" really referred to tbe offenses of gambling and bootlegging of which Taute bad admitted himself to bave been guilty. That particular subject bad been abandoned and an entirely new line of examination commenced. Moreover, defendant's counsel expressly stated to tbe court that bis purpose was to unfold before tbe jury a situation, with respect to tbe failure of tbe state to prosecute tbis witness, that would east doubt upon the existence of that wholly disinterested frame of mind, essential to complete confidence in tbe candor of a witness. Tbe expression "these offenses" was clearly justified and proper with reference to tbe crime under investigation. Taute's own story up to tbis point in tbe trial, revealed that be was guilty of at least three crimes, namely: conspiracy, receiving stolen property, and grand larceny. We see no escape from the conclusion that it was prejudicial error to close tbis avenue of examination. It bas been the law in tbis jurisdiction for over thirty years that great latitude should be allowed in tbe examination of an accomplice. In tbe -fifth paragraph of tbe syllabus to tbe case of State v. Kent, 4 N. D. 577, 21 L.R.A. 686, 62 N.W. 631, it is said:
"Held, further, that it was error to refuse to permit counsel for tbe accused to prove, as bearing upon tbe credibility of tbe accomplice, that no proceedings whatever bad been instituted against him for tbe murder be bad confessedly committed, although several months bad elapsed since be bad confessed bis connection with tbe crime."
See also State v. Ritz, 65 Mont. 180, 211 Pac. 300; 40 Cyc. 2511. There must be a new trial. It is so ordered.
OheistiaNSON, Ch. J., and Burke, Birdzell, and Nuessle, JJ., concur.