Case Name: Henry L. Toomer, plaintiff in error, vs. Henry J. Dickerson, defendant in error
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia
Jurisdiction: Georgia
Decision Date: 1867-12
Citations: 37 Ga. 428
Docket Number: 
Parties: Henry L. Toomer, plaintiff in error, vs. Henry J. Dickerson, defendant in error.
Judges: 
Reporter: Georgia Reports
Volume: 37
Pages: 428–456

Head Matter:
Henry L. Toomer, plaintiff in error, vs. Henry J. Dickerson, defendant in error.
Where D. became security for T., the principal debtor on a bond, for negroes purchased in the. State of South Carolina, and T., the principal debtor, executed a mortgage upon the negroes, so purchased, to the creditor to secure the payment of the debt, which mortgage was recorded in the State of South Carolina, but was not recorded in this State, into which the negroes were removed shortly after the purchase —within six months after the removal of the same, as required by the statute of this State; held that the failure of the creditor to record his mortgage in this State, within six months after the removal of the property therein, was such an act of omission of duty required by law as increased the risk of the security, and exposed him to greater liability, and therefore, under the well settled rule of law in this State, the security was discharged.
Held: also, that when a plaintiff seeks to enforce his remedy upon a contract made in another State, in the Courts of this State, such judgment is to be rendered, as the laws of this State authorize and require, and not such a judgment as the laws of the State where the contract was made, may authorize and allow. The lex fori, and not the lex loci, governs as to the remedy in the Courts of this State in a suit to,enforce the performance of a contract against a surety thereon, made in another State.
Demurrer. - Decided by Judge Flemming. Chatham Superior Court. May Term, 1867.
On the 25th day of June, A. D., 1866, in the County Court of said county, Henry L. Toomer commenced his statutory action against John F. Tucker and Henry J. Dickerson, on their bond for the penal sum of one hundred and seven thousand, three hundred dollars ($107,300,) which, at the trial term, was transferred by consent of parties to. the appeal docket of the Superior Court.
When the cause came up for trial, the defendants having pleaded separately, the plaintiff moved the Court to strike out all the said pleas except the first plea of the defendant Tucker, which was a plea of partial payment; and the motion was sustained, and the pleas stricken out accordingly.
The defendant Dickerson then filed the following pleas :
Henry J. Dickerson, ats. Henry L. Toomer.
1st. That he signed said bond, the subject matter of said action, as surety, and is only liable as such.
2d. That the said plaintiff, at the time when said bond and the first installment therepf became due and payable, forbore to call on said Tucker to piy said bond, and, on the contrary, gave time to said Tucker to pay said bond, and the money thereon, and, by said forbearance and giving time, injured said Dickerson, security, and increased his risk and exposed him to liability.
,3d. That when he signed said bond as security, the said H. L. Toomer took and received from the-said John F. Tucker, a mortgage on ninety negro slaves, as collateral security, to secure the payment of said bond, and. that when said bond and mortgage became due the said H. L. Toomer failed and delayed for over three years to proceed upon said mortgage and collect said money so due, by the sale of said negroes so mortgaged, but delayed until the emancipation of said negro slaves destroyed said collateral security, which delay increased the risk and liability of said defendant, Dickerson.
4th. That when the said H. L. Toomer took said mortgage on said negroes, as above alleged, as collateral security, he entirely neglected and failed (after the said negroes had been brought into the State of Georgia) to record the said mortgage in Georgia, as required by the laws of Georgia, and by such failure impaired the lien upon said ■ negroes, and thereby increased the risk and liability of said defendant, Dickerson.
5th. That the forbearance and delay of said Toomer to proceed and collect the money due on said bond from said Tucker, injured said defendant, inasmuch as during the time given by said delay to said Tucker he became insolvent, by reason of emancipation of the negroes sold to him, and mortgaged by him to Toomer, and by said delay and its consequences the risk of this defendant, as security, was increased.
6th. That by reason of the failure to record the said mort gage on said negroes on the part of said Toomer,’this defendant was injured, Ms risk was increased, and Ms liability extended, inasmuch as judgments were obtained against said Tucker, which took precedence of the lien of said mortgage.
The plaintiff then moved to strike out all of said pleas except the first. The Court sustained said motion as to the 2d, 3d and 5th of the said pleas, which were stricken out accordingly; but allowed the 4th and 6th of the said pleas.
The cause then went to trial on' the 1st plea of the defendant, Tucker, and the 1st, 4th and 6 th pleas of the defendant, Dickerson, on the evidence following; and a verdict was rendered for the plaintiff against the defendant, Tucker, for $50,000, with interest from the 1st day of January, A. D., 1864, and on $3,500 from the 1st day of January, A. D., 1865, and on the like sum from the 1st day of January, A. D., 1866, and on the like sum from the 1st day of January, A. D., 1867; but the defendant, Dickerson, was discharged.
The evidence adduced on the trial was as follows:
The plaintiff introduced in evidence the bond sued on, with the indorsements thereon, which are as follows
The State of .South Carolina. Know all men by these presents, That, We — John F. Tucker and Henry J. Dickerson, of the City of Savannah, in the State of Georgia, are jointly and severally held and firmly bound unto Henry Laurens Toomer, of the city of Charleston, State of South Carolina, in the full and just sum of one hundred and seven thousand three hundred dollars, to be paid unto the said Henry Laurens Toomer< as aforesaid, his certain attorney, executors and administrators or assigns: to which payment, well and truly to be made and done, we bind ourselves and each and every of our heirs, executors and administrators, jointly and severally, firmly by these presents, sealed with our seals and dated the 1st day of December, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and fifty-seven, and in the eighty-second year of the Sovereignty and Independence of the United Slates of America.
The condition of the above obligation is such that if the above bound John F. Tucker and Henry J. Dickerson, as aforesaid, or either of them, their or either of their heirs, executors or administrators, shall and do well and truly pay, or cause to be paid, unto the above named Henry Laurens Toomer, as aforesaid, his certain attorney, executors or administi'ators or assigns, the full and just sum of fifty-three thousand six hundred and fifty dollars, to be paid as follows, viz: The first installment of seventeen thousand eight hundred and eighty-three dollars thirty-three hundredths ($17,883 33) on the 1st day of January, which will be Anno Domini, one thousand eight hundred and sixty-one (1861,) the second installment, of seventeen thousand éight hundred and eighty-three dollars thirty-three hundredths ($17,883 83) to be paid on the 1st day of January, which will be Anno Domini (1862;) and the third and last installment of seventeen thousand eight hundred and eighty-three dollars thirty-three hundredths ($17,883 33) to be paid on the first day of January, which will be Anno Domini (1863,) with interest, annually, from the date hereof on the whole amount unpaid, until the whole principal and any interest.that may become due and unpaid, shall both be paid and satisfied fully — then the obligation to be void and of none effect, or else to remain in full force and virtue. • Sealed and delivered in presence of:
R. P. Akin, Notary Public C. C.
JOHN P. TUCKER, [l. s.]
H. J. DICKERSON, [l. s.]
(Endorsements as on said bond.)
Charleston, January 5th, 1859.
Received from John P. Tucker, thirty-seven hundred and fifty-five 50-100 dollars one year interest on the within bond to 1st January, 1859. $2,755,50-100 H. Laurens Toomer.
Received, Charleston, January 10th, 1860, from J. P. Tucker, thirty-seven hundred and fifty-five 50-100 dollars, being in full of one year’s interest to 1st instant on the within bond.
$3,755,50-100 II. Laurens Toomer.
Received, Charleston, April, 1862, three thousand eight hundred and twenty-three 37-100 dollars, on account of the interest on within bond,, up to the 1st day of December, 1861, and three thousand dollars on account of principal.
$3823.37. ’ H. L. Toomer.
Received, Charleston, January 3d, 1863, from J. P. Tucker, Esq., three thousand five hundred and forty-five 50-100 dollars on account of the interest on within bond for one year, and 650 six hundred and fifty dollars on account of principal.
$4195.50 H. L. Toomer.
Received, Charleston, January 12th, 1864, from John P. Tucker, Esq., three thousand five hundred and eight 50-100 dollars in full of one year’s interest on the within bond to date.
$3503.05. • H. L. Toomer.
The plaintiff then closed his case, and the said Henry J. Dickerson introduced the following testimony:
John E. Tucker was sworn and testified as follows:
Mr. Dickerson signed the bond as surety only, receiving no consideration therefor. The bond was given for the purchase money of ninety-one negroes, which I bought from the plaintiff. The transaction took place in South Carolina? Avhere the negroes Avere. I gave at the same time a mortgage of the negroes to the plaintiff to secure the bond. I brought the negroes about the same time into this county, where I resided, and Avhere they remained until emancipated.
John Cooper Avas sworn for the purpose of proving the execution of a paper presented to him, purporting to be the mortgage above referred to.
The said mortgage was then introduced, and is as folloAVS :
The State op South Carolina :
To all whom these presents shall come:
I, John F. Tucker, of the city of Savannah, in the State of Georgia, send greeting:
Whereas. I, the said John F. Tucker, as aforesaid, in and by my certain bond or obligation, wherein Henry J. Dickerson is named as surety, bearing date even with these presents, stand firmly held and bound unto Henry Laurens Toomer, of the city of Charleston, in the State aforesaid, in the penal sum of one hundred and seven thousand three hundred dollars, ($107,300,) with a condition thereunto written for the payment of the full and just sum of fifty-three thousand six hundred and fifty dollars, ($53,650,) as in and by said bond and condition thereof, reference being thereunto had, will more fully and at large appear.
Now know ye, that I, the said John F. Tucker as aforesaid, for the better securing the payment of the said sum of fifty-three thousand six hundred and fifty dollars, ($53,650,) unto'the said Henry Laurens Toomer, his heirs, executors, administrators or assigns, together with lawful interest for the same, I, the said John 1?. Tucker, as aforesaid, have bargained and sold, and by these presents do bargain and sell, and in plain and open market deliver unto the said Henry Laurens Toomer as aforesaid, the following named ninety-one negro male and female slaves, to-wit: [giving their names] : To have and to hold the said slaves as above named and numbered, together with the future issue and increase of the females, unto the said Henry Laurens Toomer as aforesaid, his executors, administrators and assigns forever.
Provided always, nevertheless, that if the' said John F. Tucker and Henry J. Dickerson as aforesaid, or either of them, their or either of their heirs, executors, or administrators shall and do well and truly pay, or cause to be paid unto the said Henry Laurens Toomer as aforesaid, his certain attorney, executors, administrators, or assigns, the full and just sum of fifty-three thousand six hundred and fifty dollars, ($53,650,) according to the intent and meaning of the bond- aforesaid and of these presents, together with the lawful interest, then this deed of bargain and sale, and all and every clause, article and thing therein contained shall cease, determine and be utterly void and of none effect, anything herein-before contained to the contrary thereof, in any wise, notwithstanding.
And it is hereby declared by and between the said parties, and the said John F. Tucker as aforesaid, his executors, administrators and assigns, doth covenant, promise and agree to and with the said Henry Laurens Toomer as aforesaid, his executors, administrators and assigns, by these presents, that if default shall happen to be made of or in payment of the said sum of fifty-three thousand six hundred and fifty dollars, ($53,650,) as aforesaid, according to the true intent and meaning of the bond aforesaid, that then, in such case, it shall and may be lawful for the said Henry Laurens Toomer, as aforesaid, his executors, administrators, attorneys or agents, from time to time, and at all times hereafter, peaceably and quietly to enter into any or all the messuages, lands or tenements of the said John F. Tucker, as aforesaid, and to take the aforesaid negro male and female slaves, and their increase, into his custody and possession, and the same to hold and detain to his own use and behoof (as his own proper goods and chattels) from thenceforth and forever, or the same to sell and dispose of at will and pleasure; returning the overplus, if any should happen to bo, after paying the said sum of fifty-three thousand six hundred and fifty dollars, interest, costs, and charges of collection, unto the said John F. Tucker as aforesaid, his executors, administrators or assigns.
In wituess whereof, I, the said John F. Tucker as aforesaid, have hereunto set my hand and seal, this first day of December, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and fifty-seven, and of the sovereignty and independence of the United States of America the eighty-second year.
Signed, sealed and delivered in presence of
JOHN COOPER.
R. F. Akin, Notary Public, C. C.
JOHN F. TUCKER, [L. s.
State op Georgia — Chatham County.
By this public instrument, be it remembered that on this eighth day of December, A. D., eighteen hundred and fifty-seven, before me the subscriber, Edward G. Wilson, a Commissioner in and for the State of Georgia, appointed by the Governor of the State of South Carolina, to take proof and acknowledgment of deeds, mortgages, or any other instrument to be used or recorded in the said State of South Carolina, personally came before me at the city of Savannah, within my jurisdiction as commissioner aforesaid, John F. Tucker, the person who executed the within instrument of writing, and who is personally well known unto me, and acknowledged that he executed the within mortgage or instrument of writing for the uses and purposes therein stated, and desires that the same might be used and recorded as such in the State of South Carolina.
In testimony whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed my seal as commissioner as aforesaid, at Savannah, Georgia, this the eighth day of December, A. D., eighteen hundred and fifty-seven.
EDWARD G. WILSON, [l. s.]
Commissioner of Deeds, etc., for the State of S. C., at Savannah, Ga.
[indorsed.]
John P. Tucker, to Henry Laurens Toomer.
Mortgage.
Dated 1st December, 1857.
Received 23d December, 1857.
Secretary State’s Office. Charleston, S. C., Dec. 23d, 1867.
The within mortgage is duly recorded in mortgage book, L.L.L.L., page 195, 196 and 197.
Examined and certified to by James A. Duffits,
Pee 2.50-100 paid. Deputy Secretary, State.
Duffus.
The mortgage bearing no certificate of record in Chatham county, William PI. Bullock, the Clerk of the Superior Court of said county, was sworn, and introducing the County Records, from December, 1856, through December, 1858, showed that the mortgage was not recorded during that time.
Upon this brief of testimony the plaintiff moved for a new trial upon the following grounds:
1. Because his Honor allowed the fourth and sixth pleas contained in the answer of the said Henry J. Dickerson.
2. Because his Honor charged the jury that if they should find that the mortgage of negroes, given by the said John F. Tucker to-the plaintiff to secure the bond sued on, was not recorded in this county within six months after the said negroes were brought into the county, the said Henry J. Dickerson was thereby totally discharged from his liability as surety on said bond.
3. Because his Honor charged the jury that it was not necessary for the said Henry J. Dickerson to prove any actual loss to him by reason of the failure of the plaintiff to record the said mortgage within the time aforesaid, in order to entitle himself to be discharged from his liability as surety on said bond.
4. Because the charge of his Honor upon the defence set up by the said Henry J. Dickerson was contrary to law.
5. Because the verdict of the jury was contrary to law and evidence in so far as it discharged the said Henry J. Dickerson from liability.
The charge of the Court was as set forth in the 2d and 3d grounds.-in said motion.
The motion having' been submitted without argument, it was, ordered, upon the consent of counsel, that the decision of the Judge should be rendered in vacation. He overruled the motion, and refused the new trial. This refusal is assigned as error.
Jackson, Lawton & Basinger, for plaintiff in error,
made the following points and cited the following authorities:
This mortgage was delivered in South Carolina and is governed by the laws of that State. Bl. Com., 307; Toomer vs. Tucker, 36 Geo. R., 138; Story on C. of L., secs. 267, 280 to 395; 4 Geo. R., 3; 13 Peters, 65; 13 Mass., 19; 6 Peters, 297, 298. Want of record would not discharge surety in South Carolina. Hampton vs. Levy, 1 McCord, Ch., 107; Lainy vs. Brevard, 3 Strobh. Eq. R., 59; Capel vs. Butler, 2 S. & S., 457.
The surety is only discharged juro tanto. Capel vs. Butler 15 N. H., 119. Springer vs. Toothaker, 43 Maine, 381; Everly vs. Rice, 20 Penn. (8 Harris) 252; Perrine vs. F. Ins. Co., 22 Ala., 575; Neff’s Appeal, 96; Watts & S., 36; Payne vs. Com. Bk. Natchez, 6 S. & M., 24; Smith vs. McLeod 3 Lee, Ch. 390; Nelson vs. Williams, 2 Dev. & Bat., Ch., 118; Griswold vs. Jackson, 2 Edw., Ch. 461; Cullum vs. Emanuel, 1 Ala. N. S., 23; Ward vs. Vass, 7 Leigh, 135; 2 L. Cas. in Eq., 374; Theobald on Princ. and Surety, 140 to 144.
Thomas E. Loyd and Hartridge & Chisolm made the following points and cited the following authorities for the defendant in error:
That a security on the bond sued on, is entitled to the same defences at law as in equity. 2 Bailey’s R.; 8 Pick; 7 Johns, 337; 2 Johns’ Ch. R., 554.
“ Any act of the creditor tvhich increases the risk of the security, or exposes him to greater liability, will discharge him.” Code of Georgia, sec. 2131.
This is only the enunciation of the principle prevailing in equity prior to the adoption of the Code, arid at law. in Georgia. 4 Geo. R., 401; 3 Kelly, 411, etc.
Any laehes or omission on part of creditor to do what duty to surety and equity require, whereby the surety lias his risk increased, or i§ exposed to greater liability, will also discharge the surety, especially in those cases in which the creditor has taken collateral security from the principal debtor for the payment of the debt. In such cases he is trustee for the surety, and any act or any omission on his part in reference to this collateral security, which increases the risk, or adds to the liability of the surety will discharge the surety. 2 Amer. L. Cases (4th ed.) 343, 345; 8 Pick, 122; 22 Ala., 575; 15 N. Hampshire, 110; 4 Johns’ Ch. R., 223; 19 Eng. L. & Eq., 64, 239; 1 Amer. L. C., 348, 349; 3 Comstock’s R., 459; 2 Sim & Stuart, 457; 5 Eng. Exchequer R., 246; 1 Smedes & Mar., 189; 6 Smedes & Mar., 38. 23 Geo. R., 181; 30 Geo. R., 252, 93.
The failure to record the mortgage, in this case, “ increased the risk” of the surety, and “ exposed him to greater liability.” Therefore he was discharged. Cobb’s Dig., 172; Code of Geo., secs. 1958, 1959.
It is not necessary that the surety should prove any injury, or damnification ; the instant the risk or liability is increased he is discharged. 2 Penn. R., 437; 2 Amer. L. Cases, 340; 4 Geo. R., 401.
The cases apparently opposed to the doctrines above set forth all admit and recognize the principle that the iailure to sue the principal debtor, on the part of the creditor, after a request from the surety, discharges the surety entirely. 3 Strobhart’s Eq. R.; 1 McCord’s Ch. R.
The act of the Legislature of Georgia passed in 1831, in reference to notice to sue, adopts the same principle. 4 Geo. R. 402.
It is not necessary that the surety should pay the debt of his principal before he can avail himself of the acts or omissions of the creditor to discharge him. 3 Kelly, 251; 13 Johns’ R., 174.
The creditor must prove that there was no loss, or its extent. Holt vs. Body, 9 Harris; 15 N. Hampshire, 119; 5 Hill, 466; 2 Ámer. L. Cases, 369. As to Dickerson, this was a Georgia contract. Levy vs. Cohen, 1 Kelly R.

Opinion:
Warner, C. J.
The only question presented, by the record in this case, for our consideration and judgment, is whether Dickerson, the security upon the bond of Tucker, the principal debtor, is discharged from the payment of the debt to the creditor, by reason of the failure of the latter to record his mortgage upon the negro slaves when removed into this State, as required by the laws thereof. The creditor, it- appears, took a mortgage upon ninety-one slaves to secure the payment of his debt, and also took personal security for the payment thereof. The mortgage upon the slaves was executed and recorded in the State of South Carolina; the bond upon which Dickerson became security was executed by him in this State. Shortly after the execution of the mortgage, the negroes mentioned therein were removed into this State by Tucker, the mortgagor, where he resided, at the time of the execution of the same, and at the time of the purchase of the negroes from Toomer, the plaintiff. By the statute law of this State, mortgages on personal property, executed without the limits thereof, when the property so mortgaged is brought within this State, are required to be recorded in the clerk's office of the Superior Court of the county where the mortgagor resides, or if a nonresident, then in the county where the mortgaged property" is, within six months after suoh mortgaged property is brought into the State. Such mortgages, not recorded within the time specified, remain valid as against the mortgagor, but are post poned to all other liens, created or obtained, or purchases made from the mortgagor, prior to the actual record of the mortgage. Revised Code, secs. 1946, 1947.
Whatever may be the rule of law in other States or other countries, as to the discharge of securities from liability : yet, in this State, it is not now an open question upon the statement of facts, contained in this record. In Jones vs. Whitehead, 4 Georgia Rep., 401, this Court asserted, and recognized the rule to be, " that whenever the creditor does an act, whereby injury, or loss, or liability to loss, or increased risk accrues to the surety, without his assent, he is entitled to be discharged. And the Courts uniformly refuse to require of the surety to show that he has in fact been damnified." The same principle was asserted by this Court, in the case of Brown vs. Ex'rs of Riggins, 3 Kelly's Rep., 412. The rule asserted in the two cases just cited, has been adopted by the Legislature, and incorporated into the Code of Laws of this State. By the 2126th section of the Revised Code, it is declared that " any act of the creditor, either before or after judgment against the principal, which injures the surety, or increases his risk, or exposes him to greater liability, will discharge the security." The public law of the State, required the creditor to record his mortgage in the county into which the property had been removed, within six months after its removal, which has not been done. Is this failure to record his mortgage, in obedience to the requirement of the law, such an act of omission on the part of the creditor, as inat'eased the risk of the security, or exposed him to greater liability ? The language of the Code is, " any act of the creditor," which may as well be an act of omission, as any other act, whereby the risk of the security is increased, or exposes him to greater liability. An act of omission on the part of the creditor, when the law requires him to act, may be quite as potent for mischief to the security, as an act of commission. The question to be answered is, did this act of omission on the part of the creditor, in not doing what the law required him to do, increase the risk of the security, or expose him to greater liability ? Whep we take into consider ation the fact, that if the security had been compelled to pay this debt to the creditor, he would have been entitled to the benefit of the mortgage lien upon his principal's property, in short, to have been subrogated to all the creditor's rights and securities, held by him against the principal debtor, we shall then readily discover to what extent his risk has been increased, and to what extent he has been exposed to greater liability by the failure of the creditor to record his mortgage as required by law. By the creditor's act of omission to record his mortgage, his lien upon the principal debtor's property, (to which his security would have been entitled, to .reimburse himself in the event of the payment of the debt by him,) will be postponed to all other leins, created or obtained against that property, or purchases made from his principal debtor prior to the actual record of the mortgage.
But it was insisted in the argument of this case, that the security had suffered no injury from the failure of the creditor to record the mortgage. Upon that point, the X'ecord is silent. The security has shown, that by the act of the creditor, his risk has been increased, and that he has been exposed to greater liability, which is sufficient prima fade at least, to discharge him. The plaintiff has not attempted to show by any evidence in the record, that he was not in fact ixxjxxred in consequence of his increased risk and exposure to greater liability. We know nothing upon that point in the case, except what the record discloses. The record discloses the fact, that in consequence of the failux'e to record the mortgage, as required by law, the risk of the security was increased, and that he has been exposed to greater liability; at least such is necessarily the legal effect, from the facts proved in the record.
It was further insisted in the argument, that although the bond was executed in Georgia, it was intended to be, and was in fact, a South Carolina contract, and as such should be governed by the laws of the latter State in its enforcement in the Courts of this State. Conceding ex gratia, that it is a South Carolina contract, the plaintiff seeks to enforce it in the Courts of this State. Neither the validity nor the construe tion of the contract is questioned. vThe only controversy between the parties is as to the remedy upon that contract in the Courts of this State. The question here is, can the creditor enforce his remedy against the security upon his South Carolina contract in the Courts of this State, in accordance with our laws regulating that remedy f We give to him the same rights and remedies in our Courts, for the enforcement of his contract, as we give to our own citizens; no more, no less. Mr. Justice Story states the rule correctly, when he says: " Whenever a remedy is sought, it is to be administered according to the lex fori, and such a judgment is to bo given as the laws of the State, where the suit is brought, authorize and allow, and not such a judgment as the laws of other States authorize or require." Story's Conflict of Laws, 954, section 572. Dela Verga vs. Vienna 20, Eng. Com. Law Rep., 387. Whittemore vs. Adams, 2 Cowen's Rep., 626. When a party comes into the Courts of this State to enforce his remedy upon his contract, that remedy will be enforced in accordance with the laws of this State regulating that remedy, and not according to the remedy provided for the enforcement of similar contracts in the State of South Carolina, although the contract may have been made in the latter State.
We have already shown what is the rule of law in this State, regulating the remedy against securities, and what acts of the creditor will discharge the security from liability on his contract as such security. But it is contended that the rule asserted by this Court, in regard to the liability of securities, in Jones vs. Whitehead, was not the judgment of the Court, but merely the obiter dictum of the Judge, who delivered the opinion in that case. Perhaps that is quite as convenient a way to dispose of that case, and the reasons contained in it, upon the present occasion as any other: but the majority of the Court do not take that view of it. We think the following legal proposition was necessarily involved in the judgment of the Court in that case: " It is urged, however, by the distinguished counsel for the plaintiff in error, that the statute of 1831, contemplates some act to be done by the creditor. I reply, the law enjoins a duty to be performed. And the neglect, or refusal, of the creditor to sue, after notice, is equally culpable as though he had expressly released the .principal by giving time, accepting a composition, or parting with collaterals, without the privity of the defendant. It was the servant who knew_ Ms master's will, and did it not, that was beaten with many stripes." The question in that case was whether the omission of the creditor to sue one of the securities, after notice to do so, within the time required by the Act of 1881, operated as a discharge of his co-surety. It is insisted in this case that there must be some act done by the creditor in order to release the security; that the Code contemplates only the action of the creditor — not inaction. "We reply, that the Act of 1827, embodied in the Revised Code, requiring the mortgage, held by the creditor in this case, to be recorded in six months after the removal oí the mortgaged property into this State, enjoined a duty to be performed by the creditor holding that mortgage, so as to preserve its lien upon the mortgaged property, that the security might have the benefit of it, in the event he had the debt to pay: for it is not unreasonable to suppose that he may have been mainly induced to become the security for the payment of the debt in view of the fact that the mortgage had been executed by his principal to the plaintiff to secure its payment. If it was now an open question in this Court, which it is not, in the opinion of a majority of the Court, we should be extremely unwilling to establish the rule that a creditor holding a mortgage upon the property of his principal debtor to secure its payment, should be permitted to omit or neglect to perform his duty as required by law, whereby, in consequence of such omission or negligence of duty required by law, the risk of the security is increased or exposed to greater liability, and yet, that such creditor should be allowed, under such circumstances, to hold the security liable for the payment of the debt. For the creditor to remain passive when there is no law requiring him to act, is one thing, but to remain passive when the law enjoins upon Mm a duty to be performed in regard tg matters in which the security, for the payment of his debt, has an interest, is another and different thing. The creditor should not be allowed, simply because he has am/ple personal security for the payment of bis debt, to remain passive and negligent in the performance of his duties enjoined by law, so as to increase the risk of such security, or to expose him to greater liability. And such the majority of the Court believe to be the rule, established by the decisions of this Court, and adopted by the Legislature, in the Code, declaring what is the law of the State upon that subject. We do not consider that we have the right, if we had the inclination, to alter or change that rule of the law applicable to the liability of securities ; our duty is simply to administer the rule as we find it, and as we think the Court below has done in this case. Let the judgment of the Court below be affirmed.
Note. — Walker, J., concurring, wrote out no separate opinion.