Case Name: HERRING v. FERRELL
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia
Jurisdiction: Georgia
Decision Date: 1974-10-08
Citations: 233 Ga. 1
Docket Number: 28671
Parties: HERRING v. FERRELL.
Judges: All the Justices concur, except Gunter and Hall, JJ, who dissent.
Reporter: Georgia Reports
Volume: 233
Pages: 1–7

Head Matter:
28671.
HERRING v. FERRELL.

Opinion:
Jordan, Justice.
This case is here on writ of certiorari to the Court of Appeals. See Herring v. Ferrell, 130 Ga. App. 431 (203 SE2d 617).
In October, 1972, five persons, including petitioner Herring, brought an action on their own behalf and on behalf of all other taxpayers of Grady County who were similarly situated. They sought a judgment declaring the ad valorem tax digest void because it had been factored by the State Revenue Commissioner. On April 2 the trial judge entered an order which held inter alia that this was not a class action. The trial court further stated: "We reaffirm and make a part of this judgment the stipulation and announcement which was made in open court as to the plaintiffs [on December 4, 1972] that they could pay their 1972 state and county taxes, as due on December 20, 1972,.. .Without prejudice to any rights they might have in the litigation, and with right of refund to any sum in excess of his liability as finally determined and that such payments would not be considered voluntary."
The trial judge denied petitioner's motion for summary judgment, and the Court of Appeals reversed on the basis of Griggs v. Greene, 230 Ga. 257 (197 SE2d 116). As to the class action feature of the case the effect of the Court of Appeals decision was to affirm the trial court's holding that it was not a class action. On review, we are concerned only with the class action question. Held:
1. This is a class action. This case is controlled by Anderson v. Blackmon, 232 Ga. 4 (205 SE2d 250) where we held that a proper class action was presented in a similar taxpayer's suit. Although facts as to the value of individual parcels or realty may vary considerably, the gravamen of petitioner's complaint is that the action taken by the Revenue Commissioner was illegal as applied to every taxpayer. "The character of the right sought to be enforced may be common although the facts may be different as to each member of the alleged class. The rights may be several in that each member of the alleged class is dependent upon a different factual situation to establish his right to prevail, yet they may be of a common character." Georgia Investment Co. v. Norman, 229 Ga. 160, 162 (190 SE2d 48).
2. All payments of taxes made prior to the trial court's protective order are voluntary and cannot be recovered. Blackmon v. Ewing, 231 Ga. 239 (201 SE2d 138). As to those who paid subsequent to the order, Anderson, supra, is again controlling. In that case, the trial court found that no proper class action was presented, and entered an order which was limited to "any plaintiff in this suit," effectively protecting only the named plaintiffs. The existence of the order was witness to the fact that the trial court intended to protect those persons entitled to protection. This court reversed the trial court and held that since the entire digest was to be voided, the elements necessary to constitute a class and maintain an action in behalf of all those who had not paid their taxes was sufficiently met.
3. Since this is a class action, it is necessary to establish the effective date of the trial court's protective order. Here, the protective order was made orally on December 4, 1972, and was reaffirmed in the written order of April 2,1973. Where, as here, the trial court, in the exercise of its equitable powers, recites the previous oral order, and reaffirms that order in writing, the order is effective as of the former date, which in the present case was December 4, 1972.
Argued July 8, 1974 —
Decided October 8, 1974.
Alexander, Vann & Lilly, Roy M. Lilly, Thomas K. Vann, Jr., for appellants.
Carlisle & Chason, Willard H. Chason, Arthur K. Bolton, Attorney General, Richard L. Chambers, Gary B. Andrews, Assistant Attorneys General, Harold N. Hill, Jr., Deputy Assistant Attorney General, for appellees.
4. We affirm that portion of the Court of Appeals opinion which reversed the trial court's denial of petitioner's motion for summary judgment.
Judgment affirmed in part; reversed in part.
All the Justices concur, except Gunter and Hall, JJ, who dissent.