Case Name: LOWE'S # 0507, Appellant, v. James A. GREATHOUSE; Hon. Lawrence F. Smith, Administrative Law Judge; and Workers' Compensation Board, Appellees
Court: Supreme Court of Kentucky
Jurisdiction: Kentucky
Decision Date: 2006-01-19
Citations: 182 S.W.3d 524
Docket Number: No. 2005-SC-0515-WC
Parties: LOWE’S # 0507, Appellant, v. James A. GREATHOUSE; Hon. Lawrence F. Smith, Administrative Law Judge; and Workers’ Compensation Board, Appellees.
Judges: COOPER, JOHNSTONE, ROACH, and WINTERSHEIMER, JJ., concur.
Reporter: South Western Reporter Third Series
Volume: 182
Pages: 524–529

Head Matter:
LOWE’S # 0507, Appellant, v. James A. GREATHOUSE; Hon. Lawrence F. Smith, Administrative Law Judge; and Workers’ Compensation Board, Appellees.
No. 2005-SC-0515-WC.
Supreme Court of Kentucky.
Jan. 19, 2006.
Charles E. Lowther, Boehl, Stopher & Graves, LLP, Lexington, ICY, for Appellant.
Kenneth B. Fouts, II, Bussey & Fouts, Lexington, KY, for Appellee, James A. Greathouse.

Opinion:
OPINION OF THE COURT
KRS 842.730(l)(c)l permits an injured worker's income benefit to be tripled if the worker "does not retain the physical capacity to return to the type of work that the employee performed at the time of injury." The claimant was injured while working for the defendant-employer. Although he remained physically capable of performing that job, he lacked the physical capacity to return to his concurrent job for a different employer. Convinced that KRS 342.780(l)(c)l refers to work performed in the employment in which the injury occurred, an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) refused to enhance the claimant's income benefit. The Workers' Compensation Board affirmed, but the Court of Appeals relied upon Highland Heights Volunteer Fire Department v. Ellis, 160 S.W.3d 768 (Ky.2005), and reversed. We reverse.
In 1987, the claimant began working full time for Lowe's, as a salesperson in one of its home-improvement stores. Since 1989, he had also worked as a printing press operator for Mini-Data Forms. It is undisputed that the physical demands of the latter job were different from those of his job for Lowe's and that Lowe's knew of the concurrent employment.
The claimant injured his wrist in July, 2001, while working for Lowe's, and later underwent fusion surgery. An ALJ determined subsequently that the injury was partially disabling and resulted in a 12% impairment. At the time, the claimant's average weekly wage from Lowe's was $420.00; his average weekly wage from Mini-Data Forms was $497.75; but KRS 342.730(l)(b) limited the maximum average weekly wage for calculating his partial disability benefit to $397.00. The ALJ determined that although the injury prevented the claimant from returning to his work for Mini-Data Forms, he was ineligible for the "3 multiplier" permitted by KRS 342.730(l)(c)l because he had returned to his work for Lowe's, earning the same or greater wages.
In concluding that the decision in the present case was erroneous, the Court of Appeals relied upon Highland Heights Volunteer Fire Department v. Ellis, supra, which concerned a volunteer fireman who was injured while fighting a fire. After the injury, he was able to return to his paid employment as a licensed stockbroker but lacked the physical capacity to return to firefighting. On that basis, he asserted that he was entitled to an enhanced award, but this Court disagreed.
The Ellis court noted that individuals who do not work under a "contract of hire" are not covered by the Act; however, KRS 342.640(3) provides coverage for volunteer fire, police, and emergency personnel by deeming them to be employees of the political subdivision that they serve. Under KRS 342.140(3), the average weekly wage for calculating such an individual's benefits is "the average weekly wage in their regular employment." The court noted that an individual who is injured while performing volunteer fire, police, or emergency work but has no paid employment will receive no income benefit. It determined, therefore, that the purpose of KRS 342.640(3) and KRS 342.140(3) is to compensate those individuals who do have regular (¿a, paid) employment for a loss of the ability to perform that work. Therefore, the work to be considered for the purpose of KRS 342.730(l)(c)l is not the gratuitous work but "the individual's regular work, the work from which their average weekly wage is derived." Id., 160 S.W.3d at 770. Mr. Ellis returned to his regular work as a stockbroker, therefore, he was not entitled to an enhanced benefit.
The present case does not involve an injury that occurred in a gratuitous employment and caused a physical incapacity to perform that employment. It involves two paid employments. Yet, the Court of Appeals applied the cited language from Ellis literally, without considering the context in which it was used. As a result, the court determined that the claimant was entitled to have both of his employments considered for the purposes of KRS 342.730(l)(c)l because KRS 342.140(5) included his wages from both. We disagree.
As amended effective July 14, 2000, KRS 342.730(l)(c) provides:
1. If, due to an injury, an employee does not retain the physical capacity to return to the type of work that the employee performed at the time of injury, the benefit for permanent partial disability shall be multiplied by three (3) times the amount otherwise determined under paragraph (b) of this subsection, but this provision shall not be construed so as to extend the duration of payments; or
2. If an employee returns to work at a weekly wage equal to or greater than the average weekly wage at the time of injury, the weekly benefit for permanent partial disability shall be determined under paragraph (b) of this subsection for each week during which that employment is sustained. During any period of cessation of that employment, temporary or permanent, for any reason, with or without cause, payment of weekly benefits for permanent partial disability during the period of cessation shall be two (2) times the amount otherwise payable under paragraph (b) of this subsection. This provision shall not be construed so as to extend the duration of payments.
3. Recognizing that limited education and advancing age impact an employee's post-injury earning capacity, an education and age factor, when applicable, shall be added to the income benefit multiplier set forth in paragraph (c)l. of this subsection. If at the time of injury, the employee had less than eight (8) years of formal education, the multiplier shall be increased by four-tenths (0.4); if the employee had less than twelve (12) years of education or a high school General Educational Development diploma, the multiplier shall be increased by two-tenths (0.2); if the employee was age sixty (60) or older, the multiplier shall be increased by six-tenths (0.6); if the employee was age fifty-five (55) or older, the multiplier shall be increased by four-tenths (0.4); or if the employee was age fifty (50) or older, the multiplier shall be increased by two-tenths (0.2).
4. Notwithstanding the provisions of KRS 342.125, a claim may be reopened at any time during the period of permanent partial disability in order to conform the award payments with the requirements of subparagraph 2. of this paragraph.
KRS 342.730(l)(b) sets forth the basic income benefit for partial disability. When KRS 342.140(5) and KRS 342.730(l)(b) are considered together, it is apparent that the purpose for including concurrent earnings in the average weekly wage does not extend to all partially disabled workers who perform concurrent jobs. We reach that conclusion because although KRS 342.140(5) permits earnings from a concurrent employment to be included in the average weekly wage, KRS 342.730(l)(b) places a cap on the average weekly wage from which a partial disability benefit may be calculated. It appears, therefore, that the purpose for KRS 342.140(3) is more specific, i.e., to account more nearly for the earning capacity of those who perform more than one low-wage or part-time job.
KRS 342.730(l)(c)l provides a triple benefit for a loss of the physical capacity to perform "the type of work that the employee performed at the time of injury." It does not refer to the capacity to perform other types of work. At the time of his injury, the claimant was working in retail sales for Lowe's. His work for Mini-Data Forms was to operate a printing press. Absent an explicit indication that the legislature intended for other types of work to be considered for the purposes of KRS 342.730(l)(c)l, we are not convinced that he is entitled to a triple benefit based on a loss of the physical capacity to operate a printing press.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed.
COOPER, JOHNSTONE, ROACH, and WINTERSHEIMER, JJ., concur.
GRAVES, J., dissents by separate opinion in which LAMBERT, C.J., and SCOTT, J., join.
. Although KRS 342.140(5) permits a worker's earnings from concurrent employments of which the defendant-employer has knowledge to be included in an injured worker's average weekly wage, KRS 342.730(l)(a) and (b) place a cap on the average weekly wage from which benefits may be calculated.
. Under KRS 342.730(l)(b), the maximum average weekly wage to be used when calculating a partial disability benefit is 75% of the state's average weekly wage. In July, 2001, that amount was $397.00, which was less than the claimant's earnings from either job, alone. Therefore, despite KRS 342.140(5), his earnings from Mini-Data Forms had no effect on the benefit that was calculated under KRS 342.730(l)(b).