Case Name: Commonwealth v. Kozak, Appellant
Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
Jurisdiction: Pennsylvania
Decision Date: 1975-03-31
Citations: 233 Pa. Super. 348
Docket Number: Appeal, No. 307
Parties: Commonwealth v. Kozak, Appellant.
Judges: Before Watkins, P. J., Jacobs, Hoffman, Cercone, Price, Van der Voort, and Spaeth, JJ.
Reporter: Pennsylvania Superior Court Reports
Volume: 233
Pages: 348–366

Head Matter:
Commonwealth v. Kozak, Appellant.
Argued November 16, 1974.
Before Watkins, P. J., Jacobs, Hoffman, Cercone, Price, Van der Voort, and Spaeth, JJ.
Stanton D. Levenson, with him Watzman, Levenson & Snyder, for appellant.
Gordon L. Young, with him Robert L. Eberhardt, Assistant District Attorney, John M. Tighe, First Assistant District Attorney, and John J. Hickton, District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
March 31, 1975:

Opinion:
Opinion by
Price, J.,
Following a non-jury trial, the appellant, Dolores J. Kozak, was found guilty of possession of marijuana and possession with intent to deliver marijuana. She con tends that the search and seizure by the private individual of two suitcases containing the marijuana was unlawful and that the evidence obtained should have been suppressed, and that the search made pursuant to the warrant was also invalid because the warrant was based on illegally obtained information. We find no merit in these contentions and will, therefore, affirm the judgment of the lower court.
The facts reveal the following: early in the morning of May 3, 1973, Stephen Patrick, an employee of Trans World Airlines (TWA), noticed two suitcases sitting some distance from the baggage claim area of the airport. Mr. Patrick assumed the bags were misplaced, and since one of his responsibilities as a TWA employee was returning lost luggage to the proper owners, he placed these suitcases in his car with other luggage to be delivered.
By the time Mr. Patrick's work shift was over, the lost and found department was closed. He took the luggage to his house and opened the suitcases in an attempt to discover the identity of the owner. Although his search of the luggage failed to reveal the owner, he did find a number of packages wrapped in paper and plastic bags. He opened one of the packages and found a sweet smelling, grassy, leafy material. Mr. Patrick's experience with drugs was limited, and he was unable to make a positive identification of the substance. He did, however, suspect that the material was marijuana. He closed the suitcases and called his supervisor who in turn notified the police. Experienced narcotics agents were sent to Mr. Patrick's home to investigate.
Mr. Patrick showed the police the suitcases and explained what had happened. Although it is not clear from the record whether Mr. Patrick reopened the first suitcase or whether the police officers reopened it, the lower court found that Mr. Patrick reopened at least one of the suitcases. The officers examined the contents and im mediately determined that the packaged substance was marijuana. The suitcases were closed and taken to the lost and found department at the airport where they were kept under surveillance. A search warrant was obtained and appellant was arrested when she claimed the luggage.
Appellant moved to suppress the evidence seized as a result of the search at Mr. Patrick's house on the ground that the search was conducted by police without a warrant. She also moved to suppress all the evidence seized at her arrest, alleging that the warrant used was invalid because it had been obtained as a result of information arising from an illegal search.
Although this case involves issues that present virgin territory beyond the expanding frontiers of the law in the Commonwealth, the points have been frequently covered by the federal courts. It is well settled that a search conducted by a private individual is not subject to the restraints of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465 (1921); Commonwealth v. Dingfelt, 227 Pa. Superior Ct. 380, 323 A.2d 145 (1974). However, a search initiated by a private citizen may lose its immunity if the police take an active part. Corngold v. United States, 367 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1966). Therefore, in order to agree with appellant that the warrantless search at Mr. Patrick's house was unlawful and that the evidence found should have been suppressed, we would have to find that the police participated to such an extent as to make the search a police action. This we do not find.
We are not dealing with a case wherein the police requested the search, Corngold v. United States, supra; aided the private citizen in making the search, United States v. Issod, 370 F. Supp. 1110 (E. D. Wis. 1974); exercised some control over the area to be searched, United States v. Small, 297 F. Supp. 582 (D. Mass. 1969); or allowed the search to be conducted while the object searched was in government custody, Cash v. Williams, 455 F.2d 1227 (6th Cir. 1972). We are instead dealing with a search made entirely by a private citizen on his own initiative with no police participation or control during the search.
Mr. Patrick opened the unlocked suitcases and searched them in his home in an attempt to ascertain the owner's identity. This was standard procedure as part of his job with the lost and found department of TWA. There is no doubt that the police were not in the house when Mr. Patrick first opened the suitcases, did not request the initial search, and had no knowledge of the search until Mr. Patrick's supervisor called them. These factors evidence a lack of police participation.
In the case of United States v. Issod, supra, a girl delivered two large trunks to a United Airlines Freight Terminal, to be shipped from California to Milwaukee. Due to the girl's actions and nervous behavior, the airline employee became suspicious and contacted a narcotics agent. After the agent arrived on the scene and conferred with the airline employee, the employee opened the trunks for the first time. The agent then determined that the trunks did contain marijuana.
Although this search after consultation with the narcotics agent renders Issod easily distinguishable from the present case, the court there discussed government intervention in a private search. The court stated: "A search cannot be viewed as a purely private action if it was encouraged or ordered by government officers. There must be a showing that any involvement of government officers did not influence the actions of a private party. (Citation omitted).
"Prior knowledge by government authorities that a search would be conducted is a crucial factor in determining government influence. Courts holding a seizure of evidence to be a private action have consistently looked to the lack of prior awareness on the part of authorities. (Citations omitted)." 370 F. Supp. at 1113.
The court went on to say: "When a search has no other purpose than to further a government investigation, it must be considered to be within the scope of the Fourth Amendment. (Citations omitted). . It is an entirely different matter when an employee inadvertently discovers evidence while engaged in a regular course of duties unrelated to criminal investigation." 370 F. Supp. at 1114.
These guidelines cover the case at bar completely. Mr. Patrick conducted the search as part of his employment duties and not to further a criminal investigation. The police had no influence over the initial search and actually had no prior notice that the search was taking place.
The case of United States v. Echols, 477 F.2d 37 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 825 (1973), presents a situation analogous to that facing us. A TWA employee opened an apparently misplaced travel bag in an attempt to ascertain the owner's identity. During the search of the bag, the employee found a revolver and subsequently alerted a deputy United States Marshal who, after examining the bag and observing the gun, seized it as evidence. In discussing the contention that the search was actually conducted by the police and that the evidence should not have been admitted because there was no warrant, the court noted: "There is not a scintilla of evidence that any government agent requested that the search be made, was present when the travel bag was opened, or had any knowledge concerning the activity until after the gun had been discovered." 477 F.2d at 40.
Even though the marshal did not have a warrant when he examined the travel bag and seized the revolver, the court refused to exclude this evidence. As in the present case, the search was completed before the police intervened and their belated presence did not affect the validity of the initial search or of the subsequent examination.
In her attempt to have the search declared invalid, appellant places great weight on her contention that the suitcases were closed by Mr. Patrick after he made his initial search and the police were thus required to reopen them before they could examine the evidence. She would have us hold that this reopening of the suitcases constituted a separate search by the police which fell within proscription of the Fourth Amendment.
While there is some question as to who reopened the suitcases on the arrival of the police, the ultimate validity of the entire proceedings will remain unassailed regardless of who was the moving force behind the reopening of the suitcases. This problem was dealt with in the case of Wolf Low v. United States, 391 F.2d 61 (9th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 893 U.S. 849 (1968). In Wolf Low, airline employees became suspicious of the contents of several pieces of luggage and opened them. Inside they found watch movements. They then notified the customs officers that they had found something which appeared suspicious. The customs officers came to the airport, examined the suitcases and the watch movements inside, and later arrested defendant as a result of these observations.
The court noted that the record was unclear as to whether the lids of the suitcases were physically lifted by airport employees or by the customs officers. The court, however, dismissed this question, holding that the search had already been completed when the officers arrived on the scene. The court stated: "The airport employees had no thought of returning the suitcases to the passenger without first getting the opinion of the customs officers as to whether the airline was being used for the transportation of contraband." 391 F.2d at 63.
That is exactly the situation with which we are dealing. The airline employee had conducted the search and found what he believed to be marijuana. He requested police aid to confirm his belief. The suitcases had already been opened and the packaging around one of the blocks of marijuana had been torn apart before the police arrived. The police expert could identify the drug immediately after the lid was lifted. Even if we assume the police did lift the suitcase lids in order to view the contents, under these circumstances, we will not construe that act as an entirely new and separate search, nor will we include it as part of Mr. Patrick's initial search.
The case of United States v. Berger, 355 F. Supp. 919 (W. D. N.Y. 1973), also dealt with this question. The facts of Berger reveal that a United Airlines baggage handler at O'Hare International Airport in Chicago noticed a sweet odor emanating from a bag transfer cart. After notifying his supervisor that he suspected the bags contained marijuana, the employee opened one of four green duffle bags on the cart. Inside he found what appeared to be marijuana. He closed the bag and notified Federal Air Security Marshals.
When the marshals arrived, they reopened the bag that had already been searched as well as the remaining three bags and identified the contents as marijuana. The bags were then marked, resealed, and sent to their destination, under surveillance. When defendant attempted to claim the bags, he was arrested.
In upholding the validity of the entire proceeding, the court stated: "The search of the single bag was undoubtedly proper. The fact that the federal agents reopened it after [the airline employee] had closed it is of no constitutional significance where his actions indicated an intention to reveal his findings to them. (Citations omitted)." 355 F. Supp. at 921. In the case at bar, Mr. Patrick revealed his findings to the police officers before they examined the evidence. Regardless of who reopened the suitcases, Mr. Patrick's search was valid.
In accord is United States v. Hodges, 448 F.2d 1309 (6th Cir. 1971). Mrs. Hodges, the defendant's mother, accepted a letter from the postmaster addressed to the defendant. She opened the letter and found a small box of pills. She then telephoned her attorney who told her to bring the pills to his office. This lawyer then called the Chief of Police and asked him to come to his office. Mrs. Hodges had resealed the envelope and either she or the attorney reopened the letter in the presence of the Police Chief. In discussing the propriety of the search at the office, the court stated: "Mrs. Hodges' decision to take the envelope to her attorney, after she had opened it and observed the contents and the resulting inspection of the items by the private attorney-prosecutor and the Chief of Police, also involved no violation of the Fourth Amendment. The police need no search warrant to search an envelope and its contents brought to them by a private individual who, without governmental instigation, has previously opened and inspected the items and discovered and disclosed their contents. (Citation omitted). We attach no significance to the fact that Mrs. Hodges resealed the original masking tape on the envelope before giving it to [her attorney]. Her method of repackaging the items she had searched does not affect the legality of the sub sequent government inspection." 448 F.2d at 1312. Once the search by the private citizen is completed, the package (suitcase, envelope, box, trunk, etc.), is closed or resealed, and the police are notified, subsequent warrantless examination of the evidence already found will not render the evidence inadmissible, even if the authorities are required to reopen the package.
Other Federal cases have affirmed private searches where official influence was much more extensive than in this appeal. The cases of Gold v. United States, 378 F.2d 588 (9th Cir. 1967) and United States v. Cangiano, 464 F.2d 320 (2d Cir. 1972), vacated on other grounds, 413 U.S. 913 (1973, aff'd, 491 F.2d 905 (2d Cir. 1973), are examples wherein officials have in effect been the moving force behind the searches. In both cases, Federal Bureau of Investigation agents suspected that obscene material was contained in air freight packages. They notified the air freight employees that they believed the contents of the packages were not as listed and that the addresses on the waybills were false. After receiving this information, airline employees opened the packages, found obscene material (films), and notified the FBI. The agents returned, examined the evidence, secured warrants, and made the arrests. The courts upheld this procedure on the premise that the employees had a right to open the packages even without the FBI tip. The police intervention in the present case did not even remotely approach that amount of intervention permitted in the above two cases.
Finally, the case of United States v. Capra, 501 F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 1974), also permitted officials to aid a private citizen in a search. A railroad employee opened a suitcase because he thought it contained a bomb, but found instead heroin and cocaiiie: He notified the police who assisted in the identification of the drugs. The court noted in a footnote: "And wllen police are merely assisting a private party, who has authority to search and a legitimate need to do so, (Citation omitted), courts are reluctant to exclude resulting evidence. (Citations omitted) ." 501 F.2d at 273, n. 4.
We are aware that there were no pressing exigent circumstances involved in the present case. However, we believe the rule should be where the search is begun and completed by a private citizen before the police are even aware that a search is being made, and where the police did nothing more than confirm the suspicions of the private citizen, a warrant is not required.
We will now turn our attention to appellant's second contention: that the evidence seized by the police at the time of appellant's arrest must be suppressed because the search warrant used to obtain the evidence was based on illegally obtained information. We have already determined that the search made at Mr. Patrick's house was an entirely private action, free from government intervention. After the police examined the evidence discovered by Mr. Patrick and determined that they had sufficient probable cause to obtain a search warrant, they did secure a warrant before the search of the suitcases at the time appellant claimed the luggage. As we find no problem with the initial search and the subsequent police participation, we find the warrant also valid. The probable cause was based on information from a legal search and was more than ample to support the warrant.
Judgment of sentence of the lower court is affirmed.
. Appellant was arrested for violation of The Controlled Substance, Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act, Act of April 14, 1972, P. L. 233, No. 64, §1 (35 P.S. §780-101) et seq.
. See United States v. Capra, 501 F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 1974); United States v. Echols, 477 F. 2d 37 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 825 (1973); Cash v. Williams, 455 F.2d 1227 (6th Cir. 1972); United States v. Hodges, 448 F.2d 1309 (6th Cir. 1971); Wolf Low v. United States, 391 F.2d 61 (9th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 849 (1968); United States v. Issod, 370 F. Supp. 1110 (E.D. Wis. 1974); United States v. Berger, 355 F. Supp. 919 (W.D. N.Y. 1973); United States v. Coles, 302 F. Supp. 99 (D. Me., N.D. 1969); United States v. Small, 297 F. Supp. 582 (D. Mass. 1969).
. While the court did discuss exigent circumstances, this was done only to justify the immediate warrantless search of the remaining three bags which had not been opened by a private individual. This discussion had no bearing on the search by the marshals of the first bag.
. The attorney also served as a part-time assistant county prosecutor. However, it was not disputed that Mrs. Hodges called this attorney in his capacity as her private attorney.