Case Name: Edward H. Gillilan, surviving Partner, &c. v. James K. Spratt
Court: New York Court of Common Pleas
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1871-03
Citations: 3 Daly (N.Y.) 440
Docket Number: 
Parties: Edward H. Gillilan, surviving Partner, &c. v. James K. Spratt.
Judges: 
Reporter: Daly's Common Pleas Reports
Volume: 3
Pages: 440–454

Head Matter:
Edward H. Gillilan, surviving Partner, &c. v. James K. Spratt.
The rule that after a cause in a justice’s court is finally submitted for decision, a discontinuance by the plaintiff operates as an adjudication on the merits in favor of the defendant, and is res adjudicataoi the subject matter between the parties, will be limited in its operation to the particular issue involved in the action, and cannot operate as a bar to an action between the same parties, involving other issues, though in the same subject matter.
The statute does not, in express terms, prescribe any time beyond the day of trial within which a magistrate shall render his decision in summary proceedings for the recovery of the possession of demised premises, and it seems that, in such proceedings; an indefinite postponement of the matter, after trial, for the purpose of deliberation and decision, is unauthorized and ousts the magistrate of jurisdiction. (Per Robinson, J.)
In summary proceedings instituted by a landlord before a justice of a district court, to disposses a tenant for holding over after the expiration of the term without permission of the landlord, the tenant interposed a counter affidavit denying that he held over, and also denied the landlord’s title on the ground that the title to the premises was vested in the Mayor, &c., of the city .and county of Sew York, under certain proceedings taking the land for a public street. Ten days after the trial and submission of the matter to the justice, he discontinued the proceeding, on motion of the landlord, without notice to the tenant. Held, in an action Subsequently brought by the landlord to recover the rent reserved in the lease and for damages for use and occupation after the expiration of the term, that the discontinuance of the summary proceedings before the justice was not an adjudication in favor of the tenant so as to be a bar to this action.
Until the opening of a street; the land appropriated therefor by the public authorities cannot be used by them for any other purpose, and in the meantime and until such opening is actually commenced, the owner of the building on the land (unless.required to remove it) can retain possession of it, and is entitled to all the benefits of such possession.
And it seems, the landlord of premises so appropriated may dispossess his tenant for holding over, although the lease provides that in case the building is required tobe removed in consequence of street extensions, the lease shall become null and void from the time the building is ordered to be removed by the city authorities, it not appearing that the removal had yet been ordered.
Appeal by the plaintiff from a judgment at trial term.
The action was brought to recover the sum of §900, being rent of premises Ho. 100 Liberty street, for the months of April, May, and June, 1868.
By an indenture of lease between the parties, dated March 6,1867, the premises in question were demised to the defendant by the plaintiff, for the term of one year, from May 1, 1867, at the yearly rent of $3,600, payable monthly on the first day of each succeeding month. The lease, among others, contained the following covenant, to wit: that in case the building was required to be removed, in consequence of the extension of Church street, then from the time said building was ordered to be removed by the city authorities, said lease should become null and void, and rent paid to that date.
On the 30th day of December, 1867, proceedings were taken, and an order duly made and entered by the Supreme-Court, at general term, confirming the report of commissioners of estimate and assessment appointed for that purpose, whereby it was ordered that the premises in question would be required to be taken for the extension of Church street.
On the 2d day of May, 1868, summary proceedings were instituted by the plaintiff before a justice of a district court to remove the defendant from the premises, for holding over after the expiration of the term without permission of the plaintiff. Issue was joined therein, and a trial had thereon on the 7-th and 9th days of May, 1868, when the whole case was submitted to the justice, who, on the 19th day of May, 1868, on motion of the landlord in said proceedings (the plaintiff in this action), and without notice to the other party, discontinued the same. ■
The judge below before whom this action was tried, found as questions of fact, in addition to the summary proceedings above stated, the making, delivery and acceptance of said lease, the occupation of the premises therein described by the defendant from May 1,1867, to May 1,1868; the continuance of such occupancy by him through the months of May and June, and until after the 1st of July, 1868 ; and that the value of the use of the premises from May 1, 1868, to July 1, 1868, was $600, which added to the rent for the month of April, 1868, was $900; and that the interest on said several sums up to the day of trial was $58.95, making in all $958.95, no portion of which had been paid by the defendant to the plaintiff.
He also found as conclusions of law, that the action of the justice, in the summary proceedings, was an adjudication and judgment in favor of the tenant therein (the defendant in this action), and was final and conclusive between the parties as to the subject-matter of the action, and was a bar to the plaintiff’s alleged right to recover rent or damages for the use and occupation of the premises, and thereupon dismissed the complaint, with costs.
The court below rendered the following opinion :
Halt, Chief Justice.—After a cause is submitted to a justice for his final decision, it is no longer in the power of the plaintiff to submit to a nonsuit, or in the power of the justice to grant one. The cause having been tried, is submitted for a final decision upon the merits, and no other disposition of it can be made. If the justice after that enters an order which he calls a nonsuit, it will be regarded as a judgment for the defendant, and will be a bar to another action for the samé cause, or of any action for another trial of the same question between the same parties, and in the application of this rule it makes no difference whether it was in a formal action or in summary proceedings. (Elmell v. McQueen, 10 Wend. 521; Peters v. Piossy, 3 E. D. Smith, 116 ; Pemarest v. Pa/rg, 32 N. Y. 290; White v. Ooatsworth, 6 N. T. 137.)
In this case, the matter in controversy was tried upon the merits, and was submitted to the justice for his decision. He did not pass upon the merits, but, as he testifies, after he had the case under advisement to make up his judgment, the counsel for the landlord appeared before him and moved to discontinue the proceedings; and the justice, without any notice or intimation to the defendant or his counsel, discontinued the proceedings, as he says, and made an entry that they were discontinued upon the motion of the attorney for the landlord. This he had no power to do. It is said, in Hess v. Beehmcm (11 Johns. 457), that “ while the cause is under advisement, the justice ought to hold no communication with either of the parties ;” that “ they are not in court for any other purpose except, to receive judgment.” The case having been tried and submitted, the defendant has a right to have the matter decided; the decision or judgment, if in his favor, being a bar to any farther suit or proceeding against him for the same cause; and of this right he cannot be deprived by the justice discontinuing the proceeding, whether upon his own motion or upon the request of the plaintiff.
The act of the justice in discontinuing is, and can only be treated as, a decision in favor of the defendant, which, however informal and imperfect it may be, is and must be a bar to any further suit or proceeding for the same matter. If this were not the conclusion, and it wfere held that the proceeding was discontinued by the act of the plaintiff and the justice, after the matter in controversy between the parties had been tried and submitted to the justice for a final decision, it would be equivalent to contradicting what has been repeatedly held, that a nonsuit cannot be granted after the cause has been submitted to the justice or to the jury; and that, if a judgment of non-suit is afterwards rendered, either by the justice, or upon the verdict of the jury, it is equivalent to a judgment for the defendant upon the merits, and will be so regarded. {Félter v. Mvlliner, 2 Johns. 181; Hess v. Beekman, 11 Id. 457; Young v. ILubbeTl, 3 Id. 430; Platt v. Storer, 5 Id. 346; Flwell v. McQueen, 10 Wend. 519; Peters v. JDiossy, 3 E. D. Smith, 115.) When the case is submitted upon summary proceedings, there must be an adjudication, for the only" power of review is upon a certiorari, to be awarded by the Supreme Court; and by the statute the certiorari is for the examination of any adjudication made upon any application authorized by the act providing for summary proceedings. (2 Bev. Stat., 2 ed.-425, § 47.) If the matter put in issue by the affidavit denying the facts upon which the summons issued, has been tried and submitted, and the justice afterwards makes any final disposition of the case other than granting the warrant to dispossess, it is an adjudication in favor of the defendant, to which the maxim applies,, nemo Ms debet vexaripro eadem causa, as fully as to any formal decision or judgment for the defendant.
Judgment will accordingly be rendered for the defendant.
The defendant appealed to the general term.
John Ely, William Fullerton, and Henry E. Knox, for appellants.
James J. Thomson, for respondent.

Opinion:
Larremore, J.
It was held by the general term of this court, in December, 1869, in Detmold v. Drake et al. (a case similar to the one at bar), that until the opening of the street, the land appropriated therefor by the public authorities cannot be employed by them for any other purpose than that contemplated and established by the report of the commissioners. In the meantime, from the date of the confirmation of said report until such opening is actually commenced, the owner of "the building (unless required to remove it) can retain possession of it, and is entitled to all the benefits of such possession.
The parties hereto evidently contemplated such a contingency in relation to the premises in question, and provided in the lease, that the same should become null and void, from the time the building was ordered to be removed by the city authorities.
There is no evidence before us, that any order for such a removal was ever given, and it is fair to conclude that the defendant was not disturbed in his possession during the continuance of the lease. Besides, it appears affirmatively from the findings of the judge at the trial, that the defendant continued in the occupation of the premises until after July 1st, 1868, and that the value of the unpaid rent therefor up to that time was $900. It is not pretended that any claim for that rent has been made by any one, except the plaintiff, and I think his right thereto unquestioned, unless the summary proceedings hereinbefore mentioned constitute a bar to its recovery.
The proceedings referred to were taken May 2d, 1868, after the lease had expired by its own limitation, to dispossess the defendant herein as the tenant of the premises,/or holding over after the expiration of the term, without permission of the; landlord. The defendant by his counter-affidavit denied that he thus held over, and also denied that plaintiff was his landlord, on the ground that the title to the premises was by the said order of the Supreme Court, of December 30th, 1867, vested in the mayor, alderman, and commonalty of the city of New York. The question of rent was not raised or at issue upon that trial, and, consequently, could not have been submitted to the justice for adjudication. The justice did not decide the case as submitted, but on application of the relator discontinued the proceedings.
We are asked to hold such action on his part to be a final and conclusive judgment in favor of the defendant. But what is the nature and effect of such an'adjudication? Is it thereby only established that defendant did not hold over after the expiration of his term and without permission, or are all the averments in defendant's counter-affidavit, of which proof was offered on the trial, to be redeemed res adjudicatg? This would compel us to hold, that the plaintiff was not entitled to the possession of the premises, after the order confirming the report of the commissioners of estimate and assessment was made, when, as we have already seen in the case of Detmold v. Drake, a directly opposite theory was maintained by the general term of this court.
The cases cited to sustain the position of the respondent (Hess v. Beekman, 11 Johns. 457; Elwell v. McQueen, 10 Wend,, 521; Peters v. Diossy, 3 E. D. Smith, 115; White v. Coatsworth, 6 N. Y. 137; Demarest v. Darg, 32 N. Y. 284.) all proceed upon the theory, that the judicial mind had acted upon the merits of the case, as submitted, and given expression to such action by a judgment or final determination. The defendant in Hess v. Beekman " suffered judgment to be entered against himself' for costs." In Elwell v. McQueen the court say: " Although he (the justice) may call his judgment a nonsuit and enter it accordingly, if the record or minutes of the trial show that it was rendered after the canse was submitted to him, and after he took time to deliberate, and not at the trial, it will be considered a judgment for the defendant, and will be a bar to any subsequent action."
It might be claimed that as the justice had no authority to discontinue said summary proceedings, that the same are still under advisement by him, and his decision thereon might be enforced. Whether this view be correct or not, it is evident that the justice, by allowing such discontinuance, plainly indicated that he had not passed upon the merits of the case, but intended to leave the parties in the same position, as if no such proceeding had been instituted.
To construe such action on his part as a final determination, is to compel him by implication to do that which he never intended, but expressly disavowed.
Nor are we to presume that the justice would have decided contrary to law, and as the whole case turned upon the question of ownership, as decided by this court in the case of Detmold v. Drake above referred to, it is fair to assume that if the justice had finally determined the matter, such determination* would have been in accordance with the law as thus established. No review could have been had on a discontinuance of those proceedings, and if said action be regarded as final, the party concluded thereby is without remedy.
In the case before us, the question of rent was not raised or litigated, and as it appears that nofinal adjudication was intended, it would be a severe application of the rule, where the occupation of the premises and the value thereof, are conceded, to deny a recovery on the ground of a former adjudication, in which the same merits were not involved, and, especially, when it appears that the greater portion of the rent was for a period of time after the expiration of the lease, and was claimed solely on the ground of the use and occupation by the defendant of the premises in question.
The judgment appealed from should be reversed and a new trial granted.