Case Name: Helen CULLUM, Appellant, v. GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES FINANCIAL CORPORATION, Appellee
Court: Texas Courts of Civil Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1974-11-21
Citations: 517 S.W.2d 317
Docket Number: No. 7641
Parties: Helen CULLUM, Appellant, v. GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES FINANCIAL CORPORATION, Appellee.
Judges: 
Reporter: South Western Reporter Second Series
Volume: 517
Pages: 317–319

Head Matter:
Helen CULLUM, Appellant, v. GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES FINANCIAL CORPORATION, Appellee.
No. 7641.
Court of Civil Appeals of Texas, Beaumont.
Nov. 21, 1974.
Rehearing Denied Dec. 12, 1974.
Dale E. Muller, Austin, for appellant.
Coleman Gay, Austin, for appellee.

Opinion:
DIES, Chief Justice.
Helen Cullum, plaintiff-appellant, and husband borrowed money from Government Employees Financial Corporation, defendant-appellee. On July 25, 1973, defendant wrote a letter to plaintiff's employer seeking assistance in collecting the debt. A copy of this letter is appended to this opinion.
Thereafter, plaintiff sued defendant for "invasion of her right of privacy." Trial was to a jury which answered all issues favorable to plaintiff. The trial court thereafter entered judgment non obstante veredicto for the defendant, from which plaintiff perfects this appeal.
Plaintiff's first point of error complains of the trial court's failure to grant plaintiff's motion for judgment based on the jury's answer to the special issues. Since we believe plaintiff failed to allege or prove a cause of action as alleged, it is unnecessary for us to discuss plaintiff's other points.
In 1973 the Texas Supreme Court—Billings v. Atkinson, 489 S.W.2d 858 (Tex.1973) — established the right to maintain an action for an invasion of the right of privacy. This right was defined as "the right to be free from the unwarranted appropriation or exploitation of one's personality, the publicizing of one's private affairs with which the public has no legitimate concern, or the wrongful intrusion into one's private activities in such manner as to outrage or cause mental suffering, shame or humiliation to a person of ordinary sensibilities." (Page 859)
There plaintiff's telephone had been wiretapped.
We do not believe our Supreme Court meant to extend this doctrine to a situation such as we have here where one letter was sent to the employer which contained no inflammatory, humiliating, or misleading statement. No Texas case has ever — so far as our research reveals — so held. The following authorities support our position : Patton v. Jacobs, 118 Ind.App. 358, 78 N.E.2d 789 (1948) ; Lewis v. Physicians & Dentists Credit Bureau, 27 Wash.2d 267, 177 P.2d 896 (1947) ; Voneye v. Turner, 240 S.W.2d 588 (Ky.Ct.App.1951); Gouldman-Taber Pontiac v. Zerbst, 213 Ga. 682, 100 S.E.2d 881 (1957); Household Finance Corporation v. Bridge, 252 Md. 531, 250 A.2d 878 (1969).
The result which we reach is in accord with the view of the American Law Institute as expressed in Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652A-J (Tentative Draft No. 13, April 27, 1967). See also Vogel v. W. T. Grant Co., Pa., 327 A.2d 133 (1974); W. Prosser, The Law of Torts, § 117 at 804 (4th Ed. 1971).
In Vogel, supra, a disclosure of plaintiff's indebtedness to his employer and three relatives was held, as a matter of law, not to constitute publication under the authorities cited, and continued: "Without proof of publication, appellees have not established an actionable invasion of privacy." (327 A.2d p. 138). We follow the rationale of the Vogel Court.
Plaintiff's points of error are all overruled. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.