Case Name: Delashmut v. Trau et al.
Court: Iowa Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Iowa
Decision Date: 1876-10-24
Citations: 44 Iowa 613
Docket Number: 
Parties: Delashmut v. Trau et al.
Judges: Mr. Justice Beck concurs in the views above expressed by me, and adheres to his dissenting opinion originally filed.
Reporter: Iowa Reports
Volume: 44
Pages: 613–620

Head Matter:
Delashmut v. Trau et al.
1. Conveyance: when voluntary: rights of creditors. A voluntary conveyance will be held void as against creditors only when it embraces property which is liable to be taken in execution for the payment of debts.
2. -:-: homestead. A voluntary conveyance of the homestead by its owner, even when made with a fraudulent intent, vests the title absolutely in the grantee, so far as the grantor is'concerned, and it does not become subject to the lien of a judgment previously obtained against the latter. Beck and Adams, JJ., dissenting.
3. -: rule applied. T. conveyed her homestead to her son, receiving no consideration therefor; the son went into occupation of the property and paid the mother rent for its use; plaintiff had previously obtained a judgment against her, and asks that the conveyance be set aside and his judgment declared a lien upon the property: Held, that the mother had the legal light to make the conveyance; that the property was exempt at the time it was made, and that the rights of the plaintiff were not prejudiced thereby, and that he was not entitled to ■ relief. Beck and Adams, JJ., dissenting.
Appeal from Des Moines District Qowrt.
Tuesday, October 24.
The petition in substance alleges that about August 29th, 1871, plaintiff recovered against Matilda Trau a judgment for $391.64, and that at that time Matilda Trau was the owner and in possession of lot No. 462, in the City of Burlington, with the buildings thereon, upon which plaintiff’s judgment became a lien; that about the 2d day of July, 1872, Matilda Trau being about to remove permanently out of the State, made and caused to be recorded a deed conveying said' lot to her son, "William Trau; that "William is a young man, without means to invest in property of this value, and that the deed to him was without consideration, not in good faith, but fraudulent, and for the purpose of hindering and delaying plaintiff and other creditors of Matilda in the collection of their claims against her, and that she is in fact still the owner of the property, and in control of the same; that plaintiff caused to be issued a general execution and tbe sheriff levied the same on said lot 462, but that he is unwilling to sell the property so long as the deed to William is allowed to stand. He prays that said deed be declared fraudulent and void, and be set aside.
The defendant, Matilda Trau, admits that at the time the judgment was obtained she was the owner and in possession of the property described; she avers that she is a widow and the head of a family, and that long prior to the date of the judgment and the indebtedness on which it is based she owned and possessed said property, and occupied and lived upon it with her family as a homestead, and that she so occupied and held it at the time she sold it to William Trau; she denies , that she conveyed the property with any fraudulent intent, and avers that she had a lawful right to make said sale and conveyance, the property being exempt from execution against her.
The defendant William Trau admits that he purchased the lot, but denies that the sale to him was fraudulent, and alleges that it was held by said Matilda as her homestead, and that she was the head of a family and entitled to it as'such.
The court entered a decree setting aside the conveyance, and subjecting the property to the lien of plaintiff’s judgment. Defendants appeal.
Theo. GuelAch and Stutsman <& Trueloch, for the appellants.
Sail c& Baldwin, for the'appellee.

Opinion:
Day, J.
There is no conflict in the evidence that when the debt was contracted, the judgment rendered, and the conveyance executed to William Trau, the property in question was the homestead of Matilda Trau, and was occupied by her as such.
The deed of Matilda Trau to William bears date July 25, 1872, is for the expressed consideration of $500.00, and is subject to a mortgage of $700.00.
On the 18th day -of March, 1873, the plaintiff caused execution to issue, which was levied on the property in controversy. It seems from the evidence that Matilda remained in the property until May or June, 1873, when she removed to Chicago. It is not disputed that, at the time this suit was commenced, she was - a non-resident of the State. The plaintiff does not, as we understand, controvert the right of Matilda Tran to make a voluntary conveyance of her homestead. Plaintiff in his argument states that he rests his case upon one question of fact, and that is, that Matilda Trau is a non-resident of the State, and is in fact the owner of the property in controversy, although nominally the title is in the name, of her son William. And it is claimed that the decree below was upon this ground. The argument of plaintiff employs the following language: "If Matilda Trau is'a non-resident of Iowa, and owns real estate in Des Moines county, and plaintiff owns a judgment of record in that county, does it affect the lien of that judgment to say that the property was once her homstead, and while it was such she had the legal right to convey it? If she did not convey it, why trouble our minds with the legal.question of her right to do so?" If she did not in fact convey the property, it is quite clear there is an end of the controversy. The real and material question for our inquiry is, what did she do respecting the property? The answer is, as deduced, from the evidence in the case, she' executed a deed of conveyance of it to her son William, on the 25th day of July, 1873. What was the effect of this conveyance? Plaintiff claims that, notwithstanding this deed, the property in controversy continued as before to belong to Matilda Trau. He rests his right to relief upon the existence of that fact. Let us examine this position. The. conveyance from Mrs. Trau toiler son William possessed one of two characters: it was either in good faith or it was fraudulent. If it was in good faith, it passed the title absolutely to the son, and no one has any ground of complaint; if it was fraudulent, Mrs. Trau cannot set it aside. As between her and her son, it vests the title in the son just as absolutely as though it had been made in good faith. It is said that the son, after the conveyance to him, recognized his mother's ownership and -paid-her rent. Suppose he did? This act was purely volun tary on his part. The mother was not in a condition to compel such payment of rent. Whenever the son sees fit to cease such payment, there is no legal means whereby the mother can compel him to continue it. If, then, the legal title has passed from Mrs. Trau in such manner that she has no legal means of re-investing herself with it, how can it be said that she is still the owner in fact of the property? Is not that an anomalous ownership which confers no rights which the law will protect or enforce?
Suppose the conveyance was intended to keep the property beyond the reach of plaintiff. What legal ground of com-' plaint has he? He could not reach the property for the satisfaction of his debt before the conveyance, and he was in no worse condition after it. • His basis for relief must be that the conveyance was fraudulent as to him. But how is he to make this fraud to appear? The most and all that he can claim is that the conveyance was voluntary, and made for the purpose of hindering him in the collection of his debt. But the conveyance does not create any exemption of property; it merely perpetuates one which existed before.
In order to make a voluntary conveyance void as against creditors, it is indispensable that it should convey property •which would be liable to be taken in execution for the payment of debts. Dearman v. Dearman & Coffman, 4 Ala., 521; Planters' Bank v. Henderson, 4 Humph., 75; Kerr on Fraud and Mistake, 209, and cases cited; Wolf v. Van Metre, 23 Iowa, 397.
The case, we think, resolves itself into the following propositions, which exist beyond question: That the title to the property has passed from Matilda Trau beyond her power of recall, and that the plaintiff, because of such alienation, is in no worse condition than he was before.
In our opinion the-court erred in setting the conveyance aside upon plaintiff's application.
Eeveesed.