Case Name: Leigh B. Woodside, Appellant, v. Bertha Durham
Court: Supreme Court of Missouri
Jurisdiction: Missouri
Decision Date: 1927-05-23
Citations: 317 Mo. 15
Docket Number: 
Parties: Leigh B. Woodside, Appellant, v. Bertha Durham.
Judges: Lindsay, C., concurs.
Reporter: Missouri Reports
Volume: 317
Pages: 15–41

Head Matter:
Leigh B. Woodside, Appellant, v. Bertha Durham.
295 S. W. 772.
Court en Banc,
May 23, 1927.
Gratia Woodside Monegan for .appellant.
Wm, P. Elmer for respondent.

Opinion:
SEDDON, C.
'Action to . determine, or. quiet, the title to the northwest .quarter of the northeast quarter- and the soutl} half of the northeast ¡quarter and the' southeast quarter. of. Section 21* Township 32 north, Range 6 west, in Dent County, Missouri. . The petition, filed on October 9, 1923, is. conventional, plaintiff, alleging that he is the owner in fee simple of the land in controversy and, that defendant is claiming title thereto, wherefore plaintiff prays, the court to hear the evidence bearing upon the title to said .real estate-, determine the rights, claims and interests of the parties therein, and that plaintiff be adjudged to.be the true, legal and absolute owner thereof and that defendant be debarred from setting up, or claiming, any fight, title or interest therein. -, ,
The answer is.as-follows:.
"Now on this day comes the defendant and for answer .to; plaintiff's petition admits that she has a deed of -record to the lands, described in the plaintiff's petition and that she is claiming title to the said lands.
"Further answering the defendant denies each and every-other allegation in the plaintiff's petition.
"Further answering the defendant says that the plaintiff's cause of action, if any ever existed in his behalf, accrued -mox-e than.ten years prior to the date of the filing of his petition and that the plaintiff is debarred from asserting any right, title, or interest, .in..or to said land,, by reason of the ten-year Statute-of Limitations of the State of Missouri. T^-M the defendant, and those under whom she claims title, have been in the lawful occupancy and possession- of lands described in plaintiff's petition under color of title to said premises, and claiming title thereto, exclusive and hostile to the plaintiff's title, and that her- claim of title has been made in good faith, believing that she had a good title to said lands and that her occupation and possession has been actual, peaceable, continuous, uninterrupted, notorious and hostile to any other right .or title to said lands, for a period of ten years prior to the commencement-of this action, and during all that time the defendant claimed title to said lands* by deeds and color, of title duly recorded upon the deed records of Dent County, Missouri, and over that part of said lands not in the actual possession of the defendant 'she has exercised the usual and customary acts of ownership as are usually exercised over that character and kind of land in the vicinity where the said lands are located.' That the defendant is the owner of entire Section 21, Township 32 north, Range 6 west, and that the said section constitutes one tract of land and has been conveyed as one tract of land to the defendant and those under whom the defendant claims title and was conveyed as one tract of land prior to the date of the entrance of the defendant into the possession thereof, and that the defendant has had the actual, open, notorious, hostile,' adverse and continuous possession of a portion of said tract of land for more than ten years prior to the date of the filing of plaintiff's petition, and she has exercised the usual and: customary acts of ownership over the remainder of the said tract of land during the said period that are generally exercised over that kind and character of land in the vicinity where said lands are located, and that she has protected the said lands against trespassers, paid the taxes thereon and performed every other act of ownership.
"The defendant further avers that the title to all of said Section 21 "emanated from the United States Government more than ten years prior to the date of the filing of plaintiff's petition, and that the defendant has been in the actual and lawful possession of a portion of said lands for 'more than one year prior to the date of the filing of plaintiff's petition under color of title by deeds, duly recorded upon the deed records of Dent County, and under which she was claiming title to said lands, and that the defendant has been in the actual and lawful possession of a- portion of the lands described in the plaintiff's petition for more than one year prior to the time of the filing of. plaintiff's petition and claiming the same under color of title and exercising over that portion of land not in possession the usual and customary acts of ownership exercised over that kind and character of land in the vicinity where said land is located, and that neither the plaintiff, nor any person or persons, by, through or under whom they claim, or might claim, title, nor any person or persons claiming title by, through or under the plaintiff, or who might be claiming by, through or under the plaintiff, have been in the actual possession of the said lands for more than thirty-one years prior to the date of the filing of plaintiff's petition, nor have they during said period paid any taxes thereon. That the plaintiff's cause of action, if any he had, accrued more than thirty-one years prior to the date of the filing of his petition and he is debarred from asserting or claiming ¿any right, title or interest in or to said lands.
' '"Defendant further states that on the 27th day of June, 1893, John' R. Callahan and the plaintiff were partners engaged in the business of buying and selling tax lands, and that the plaintiff here in was a silenf partner and the title to all of said lands were taken in the name of the said John R. Callahan and held in title for himself and the plaintiff, and that the lands described in the. plaintiff's petition, and other lands, were purchased by the said John R. Callahan at tax sales and plaintiff paid the purchase money- with. the understanding and agreement between himself and the said John R. Callahan that the title should be taken in the name of the said John R. Callahan and when the lands were sold the proceeds thereof were to be divided between the plaintiff and the said John R. Callahan. That on the said 27th day of June, 1893, the said John R. Callahan sold the said lands described in plaintiff's petition to H. 0. Balch, and made, executed and delivered to the said H. 0. Balch a warranty deed fully describing said lands and the said H. 0. Balch paid for said lands and the proceeds thereof were divided between the plaintiff and the said John R. Callahan. That the plaintiff and John R.Callahan paid the taxes on the said lands up to and including the year 1922, and that neither the said John R. Callahan nor plaintiff, has paid any taxes on said lands thereafter. That the deed made by the said John R. Callahan to H. 0. Balch was a general warranty deed with full covenants and warranties of title. That by reason of the acts of the plaintiff and said John R. Callahan as aforesaid, the plaintiff is now estopped from asserting any claim, right, title or interest, in or to the lands, described in his petition.
"Wherefore, the defendant prays the court to ascertain and determine and find the title to said lands and divest the plaintiff of all claim or title thereto, and vest the same in the defendant, and perfect the plaintiff's record title to said lands and for other proper relief."
The reply is as follows.:
"Now comes the plaintiff and for replication to defendant's answer denies that the said defendant or any person under whom she claims has ever had possession of any part of the east half of Section Twenty-one, Township Thirty-two, Range Six, or has done any act by which she or they have acquired any title by limitation.
"On the other hand, the plaintiff states that the only act done by the defendant or those under whom-she claims was to sell some of the timber growing on said land, and authorizing other parties to go on and cut and remove the same, and that the acts done under such arrangement were merely a trespass, and would not give the defendant any title whatever to the land.
"Plaintiff denies that the east half of said section and the west half are one and the same tract, and upon the other hand he states that they never have been owned by the same person.
"Plaintiff admits that the west half of said section'was bought by J. R. Callahan and himself, and the deed taken thereto jointly in about the year 1879, but- all'egés that he solch'his interest- therein', to tlie 'said Callahan'and made him a quit-claim deed therefor.
"Plaintiff' denies that he was ever in partnership with John R. Callahan in the buying and selling of tax lands.' He admits that the said 'Callahan did buy some land and took the deeds in his own name'''for-whicli plaintiff' paid part of the purchase price on sale for taxés, but as to'-whether the east half of Section Twénty-one was a tract so purchased by said Callahan, plaintiff is unable to find any record showing whether such is true or not, but he states to the court that-if he- did furnish any portion of the money to buy the said east half of Section Twenty-one, he sold out his interest therein to 'the said' John R. Callahan before his deal thereon was had with H. 0. Balch, and' that if the said Callahan made a warranty deed to the said Balch, he did it of his own accord, and without any authority or suggestion from' this plaintiff.
"This plaintiff had-nothing whatever to do with the transaction-alleged in defendant's answer regarding the sale of said land to the-said Balch,- and doesn't know what consideration the said Callahan received therefor, -but he does know and states that he made no guaranty, either oral or written, to the said Balch as to the title of'said land1 or anything in regard thereto.
"Plaintiff- further says that at the timé of the transaction between the said Callahan and the said Balch, the said east half of Section Twenty-one- Was 'the property of one MacGrane Coxe, who had purchased thé sanie from A. Willard Humphreys by deed dated July 8, 1891, and that the plaintiff derived his title from the said Coxe.
"That neither the said Coxe nor the said Humphreys ever made any claim to the west half of Section Twenty-one, and this plaintiff purchased the east half of Section Twenty-One from the said Coxe in the month of August;' 1896, long after the making of his quit claim deed-aforesaid to the said Callahan for the west half and long after the said Callahan conveyed to Balch the east half of Section Twenty-one, and since which time the plaintiff has made no- claim whatever to the ivest half ' of Section -Twenty-one. "
Plaintiff's claim of title to the real estate in controversy rests upon the following deed's, or muniments of title, all duly filed of record in Dent County, Missouri, recorded upon the deed records of. said county, and put in evidence at the trial: On September 1, 1859, the United States issued to Mary Bradley, as the purchaser, a patent to the east half of Section Twenty-one, Township 32 north, Range 6 west, in Dent County;' on January 22, 1861, said Mary Bradley, a single woman, by warranty deed filed for record on July 13, 1872, conveyed the east half of said Section 21 to William Drew; on March 6,. 1873, said William Drew, a single man, by warranty deed filed for-record-on-May 10, 1873, conveyed the' east half of said Section 21 to A. Willard Humphreys of New York City, New York; on March' 13, 1874, Mary McDonald, formerly Mary Bradley, and her husband,Patrick McDonald, executed and delivered a quit-claim deed, filed for record on May 12, 1874, purporting to convey the east half of said Section 21 to Solomon Bellew; on July 8, 1891,-said A.. Willard Humphreys and Mary C. Humphreys, his wife, both of Brooklyn, New York, by quit-claim deed filed for record on August 5, 1891, conveyed the east half of said Section 21 to MacGrane Coxe of-Tuxedo, New York; the last-mentioned deed is signed, "A. W. Hum-phreys," but the grantor is described in the body of the deed", and in the acknowledgment thereof, as "A. Willard Humphreys;'' on August 27, 1896, said MacGrane Coxe and Lena Coxe, his wife, both of Tuxedo, New York, by quit-claim deed filed for record on December 1, 1897, conveyed the east half of said Section 21 to Leigh- B. Woodside, the plaintiff herein.
Plaintiff also read in evidence a sheriff's deed, dated October '9, 1879, and filed for record on December 18, 1882, purporting to convey the east half of said Section 21 to J. R. Callahan.- The said sheriff's deed contains the recitals that two separate judgments were entered on April 14 and 15, respectively, 1879, in favor of the- State of Missouri, at the relation and.to the use of the Collector of Revenue of Dent County, against Solomon Bellew and A. W. Humphreys, respectively, for delinquent state, county and special taxes levied,assessed and found to" be due upon the east half of said Section- 21 for the years 1868 to 1876, inclusive; that special executions, or or-' ders of sale, were duly issued upon said judgments; that the east-half of said Section 21 was duly levied upon and seized under said' writs of execution, and the said real estate duly advertised and sold by the sheriff, under authority of said writs of execution, on October 9, 1879, to said J. R. Callahan, he being the highest bidder therefor. Plaintiff also put in evidence the order of publication and judgment by default in the tax suit, entitled, "State of Missouri, at the relation and to the use of the Collector of Revenue of Dent County, Missouri, against A. W. Humphreys,'' which shows that A. W. Hum-phreys was a non-resident of this State and was notified of' the pen-dency of said tax suit by publication, and that the judgment 'by default was bottomed upon the published notice given to the defendant named therein, A. W. Humphreys.
Plaintiff also put in evidence a tax deed, dated October 8, 1879, conveying to J. R. Callahan and L. B. Woodside the west half of Section 21, Township 32, Range 6, under a judgment for delinquent taxes against Benjamin Barker, and special execution thereunder; also a quit-claim deed, dated July 3, 1893, and filed for record on July 6, 1893, from L. B. Woodside and wife, Martha Woodside, conveying to said J. R. Callahan, "the undivided one-half of the west half of Section 21, in Township'32 north, Range 6 west," in Dent County, Missouri.
Defendant's claim of title rests upon the following deeds, duly recorded and put in evidence: On June 27,1893, said J. R. Callahan and wife, by warranty deed filed for record on July 17, 1893, con-, veyed all of said Section 21 to H. 0. Balch; said H. 0. Balch and wife, by deed filed for record on November 2, 1893, conveyed all of said Section 21 to William D. Lane; said William D. Lane and wife, by deed filed for record on December 22, 1893, conveyed all of said Section 21 to Julius R. Jamble; said Julius R. Jamble, a single man, by deed filed for record on December 22, 1893, conveyed-all of said Section 21 to J. R. Balch; said J. R. Balch and wife, by deed filed for record on February 1, 1895, conveyed all of said Section 21 to Mary Jane Lane; said Mary Jane Lane and husband, by deed filed for record on February 1, 1895, conveyed all'of said Section 21 to W. M. Durham and Bertha A. Durham, of Kankakee County, Illinois; said W. M. Durham (or Welton M. Durham) and Bertha A. Durham, by warranty deed dated February 4, 1896, and filed for record on February 6, 1896, conveyed the purported half interest of Welton M. Durham in all of said Section 21 to Frank Hamilton; said Frank Hamilton, assignee of W. M. Durham, by deed filed for record on June 20, 1898, purported to convey all of said Section 21 to Hiram Goodwin.; said Bertha A. Durham and W. M. Durham, her husband, by warranty deed dated October 4, 1902, and filed for record on October 6, 1902, purported to convey all of said Section 21 to George H. White; on March 20, 1909, the executors of the last will and testament of said Hiram Goodwin, deceased, under power of sale granted in said will, by deed filed for record on August 4, 1909, purported to convey all of said Section 21 to said George' H. White; and' on February 10, 1916, said George H. White," by-quit-claim deed filed for record ' on February 23, 1916, conveyed to defendant, Bertha A. Durham, the northwest quarter of the 'northeast quarter, the south half of the northeast quarter,- and the southeast quarter of said Section 21, being the land in controversy, together -with the west half of said Section 21, all in Township 32, Range 6, in Dent County, Missouri.
The plaintiff, Leigh B. Woodside, testified at the trial: "I was personally acquainted with Humphreys and I knew his name; the 'A' in his name stood for Asahel, but he was generally called A. Willard Humphreys, or Willard Humphreys; I never heard him called Asahel, but I asked him once what the 'A'' was for and he told me, and that is the way I know."
The defendant's evidence tended to show that, some twenty-five or more years prior to the commencement of the instant suit, W. M. Durham, or Welton Durham, husband of defendant, allowed-and per mitted John Schafer, Jacob Schafer and Dave Medlock to fence and cultivate two separate parcels in the west half of said Section 21, said tracts or parcels of land being referred to by the witnesses as "the Durham field." The Schafers and Medlock fenced and have continuously cultivated the two tracts in the west half of said section up to the time of the trial of the instant suit. The land comprising the whole, or, at least, the larger part, of said Section 21 is rough, wild and uncultivated, and its chief, or principal, value is because of' the uncut timber on the larger portion thereof. The testimony of defendant's witnesses was to the effect that no portion of the east half of said section had ever been fenced, nor had any improvements of any kind ever been placed thereon. One witness testified that a "few ties had been cut at one time on the east half of said section, presumably, but not conclusively, by Durham's permission and consent: The plaintiff, Woodside, adduced no testimony that he had ever taken or asserted actual possession of any part of the land in controversy. There is no convincing or substantial evidence in the record that any person, at any time, had taken, or exercised, actual possession over any part of the east half of said section. It was agreed by the parties at the trial, as disclosed* by the abstract of record, that, for the year 1892, L. B. Woodside paid one-half of the taxes and J. R. Callahan paid one-half of the taxes on the land in controversy, and that, since the year 1893, the defendant, and those under whom she claims, have paid all the taxes thereon. It was also admitted that Bertha A. and W. M. Durham are husband and wife.
The cause was tried and submitted to the trial court without the aid of a jury. At the conclusion of the evidence, the court gave the following declarations of law at the request of plaintiff:
" (1) There is no evidence in the ease of former ownership or interest that would create an estoppel against the plaintiff to claim the land sued for if he has the legal title thereto.
" (3) Where two judgments are rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction upon the same cause of action, the second judgment is void, the matter having been disposed of by the first judgment.
" (4) The possession of a part of a tract of land will not extend to a tract of adjoining land owned by a different person when there are no acts of possession on such adjoining land, and such possession will not put in force the Statute of Limitations.
"(5) Payment of taxes and cutting timber are not evidence of the possession, of land. ' '
The plaintiff asked, but the court refused, the following declarations of law:
" (2) The judgment under which the land sued for was sold for taxes was void, and no valid sale could be made thereunder.
" (6) Under all tbe evidence in this case, the plaintiff is the owner of the east half of Section 21, Township 32, Range 6 west, and is entitled to have the title quieted in his favor.
"(7). Where' a judgment rendered for taxes against a party is void on account of, the fact that his name was.not set forth in,the petition, order of publication and judgment, a purchaser from him is not estopped fo claim the title because of any recital in the deed which he obtains or in the manner in which it is .signed.
" (8)- Where'the. title to land was taken in the name, of A. Willard -Humphreys, and was so entered of record, and if the initial '.'A'^was for the name Asahel, but he was never called by that name, but called by the name of Willard Humphreys, a tax deed in a-suit against A. W. Humphreys would not convey the title .of A. Willard Humphreys to the land, where the service was by publication; and if his'title was not affected by said suit and judgment, and sale thereunder, the land still belongs to him after such sale, and he could do with it as he wished, and a purchase from him where the deed recited that it was made by A. Willard Humphreys and the acknowledgment shows that it was acknowledged by A. Willard Humphreys would pass the title to such purchaser notwithstanding the fact that he signed by the initials- A. W. "
No declarations of law were requested by defendant. The trial court thereupon found the issues for the defendant and rendered judgment accordingly, declaring the title to the real estate in controversy to be well and fully vested in the defendant. After unsuccessfully seeking a new trial, plaintiff appealed to this court.
The original plaintiff and appellant, Leigh B. Woodside, having died during the pendency of his appeal, and his death .having been suggested in this court, the cause was revived in the names- of the heirs- of said Leigh B. Woodside, as parties plaintiff and appellant, and .they have entered their appearance herein and have been substituted as parties plaintiff and appellant in this court.
I. The .appellants assign error in the refusal by the trial court of plaintiff's requested declaration of law numbered 2, to the effect that the judgment under which the land in controversy was sold for taxes was void, and no valid sale could be made thereunder, and in tlie reillsal of plaintiff's requested declaration of law numbered 8, to the effect that the .record title of A. Willard Humphreys was not affected by the tax suit, publication order, and default judgment against A. W. Humphreys-, notwithstanding the fact that said A. Willard Humphreys subsequently executed and signed the deed to MaeGrane Coxe (undér which plaintiff and his substituted heirs claim title) by the initials "A. W." Appellants also assert that the trial court erred in finding and holding, in effect, that the plaintiff was estopped. from- claiming the tax judgment to be void for, the reason that Humphreys, in his subsequent deed to Coxe, signed his name by his initials, .The,-three separate assignments of error, aforesaid,, will be treated .and considered by us as a single assignment of error..
Respondent, on the other hand, contends that the. tax judgment, and sale thereunder, against A. W. Humphreys is good as against A. Willard Humphreys, and those claiming under the tax.deed, and, furthermore, .that Humphreys and his successors in title,, uncler and by virtue of the deed from Humphreys to Coxe, are. ¡estopped to question, the validity of the tax proceedings and sale .thereunder by reason of the fact that Humphreys executed the deed to. Coxe, by his initials. Respondent plants her contention • squarely upon the ruling of this court in Mosely v. Reily, 126 Mo. 124. It must be conceded that the Mosely ease fully, supports respondent's contention. In that case, title to the land in controversy was taken in the name of Charles T. Clements, by deed duly placed of record. Subsequently, suit for delinquent taxes levied against the land was commenced against C. T. Clements, service. by publication had against O. T. Clements, as the owner of the land, judgment by default rendered against him, a sale made under special execution issued-, upon the judgment, and a sheriff's deed delivered purporting to convey to the defendant, Reily, the interest or title of C. T. Clements. Thereafter, said Challes T. Clements, by deed which he executed by his initials., conveyed his title and interest in the land to the plaintiff, Mosely. It was ruled that the tax-judgment was not subject to, collateral attack by .plaintiff, who was the grantee, of the de.ed of .later date.
In a later case, White v. Gramley, 236 Mo. 647, l. c. 648, this division of this court remarked: "This court has uniformly held (Skelton v. Sackett, 91 Mo. 377; Vincent v. Means, 184 Mo. l. c. 344; Williams v. Lobban, 206 Mo. l. c. 408; Evarts v. Lumber & Milling Co. 193 Mo. l. c. 449; Proctor v. Nance, 220 Mo. l. c. 112; Spore v. Land Co., 186 Mo. l. c. 660; Turner v. Gregory, 151 Mo. 100) that, except in cases presenting certain elements of estoppel, publication directed to a defendant by initials in lieu of his Christian name, is wholly insufficient and a judgment rendered pursuant to such void publication is itself void." (Italics ours.)
In Vincent v. Means, 184 Mo. 327, l. c. 344, Division Two of this court said: " As a general rule the full name, that is, the first or Christian name, of both plaintiff and defendant in. all judicial proceedings should be set forth in full. 'Initials are not a legal part of the name, the authorities holding the full Christian name to be essential. ' [Monroe Cattle Company v. Becker, 47; U. S. 47; Turner v. Gregory, 151 Mo. 100.] , It .is true there is an exception to this .rule where the party against whom judgment is. rendered has received., deeds .to land, and conveyed land using his initial letter or letters, but there was no evidence iii this ease that Minos C. Vincent had ever done so." (Italics ours.)
In Turner v. Gregory, 151 Mo. 100, plaintiff took title to certain land by deed, duly recorded, describing and naming him as Singleton V. Turner. Having subsequently removed to the State of California, a suit for delinquent taxes, levied against the same land, was commenced against Vaughn Turner, service had by publication, a default judgment rendered therein, and the land was sold under said judgment to defendant^ grantor. Plaintiff testified at the trial that he had lived for several years in Johnson County, Missouri, some fifteen miles from the land in suit, where' he had been generally known by the name of Vaughn Turner and "had answered to that name always. ' ' Said Judge GaNtt, speaking for Division Two of this court: "It is at once apparent that one of the prime questions in this case is whether a suit against Vaughn Turner and an order of publication against Vaughn Turner and a judgment against Vaughn Turner is sufficient to divest the title of Singleton Vaughn Turner, whose title •to the land depends upon a warranty deed to Singleton V. Turner, duly recorded prior to the assessment and levy of the taxes, which are the basis of the judgment, and prior to the commencement of the suit against Vaughn Turner. .
"It is a fundamental rule of our law, founded in the plainest principles of natural justice, that no man shall be deprived of his life, liberty or property without due process of law. Notice of the proceedings against him is essential to their validity. Accordingly, whenever it is feasible, our laws provide for actual, personal service on the defendant of the notice of the action, and in all proceedings the Christian and surname of both the plaintiff and the defendant should be set forth in the pleadings and process with accuracy. [Martin v. Barron, 37 Mo. l. c. 304 and 305.] When a party is sued by a wrong name and actually served with process, if he does not appear and plead the misnomer in abatement the judgment will not be void. [Corrigan v. Schmidt, 126 Mo. l. c. 311.] But a distinction exists between a case of personal service and a case where the defendant is a non-resident, where the only notice is by publication. This, at best, is but constructive service of notice, and where resort is had to this method, a substantial, even rigid, observance of the law is required, otherwise the judgment will be void. ([Hutchinson v. Shelley, 133 Mo. 400; Winningham v. Trueblood, 149 Mo. 572; Young v. Downey, 145 Mo. 250.] Hence, in notifying a person by publication, as he can only be designated by his name, if his name be omitted, or á wrong name is attributed to him, it is at once evident that he re-céives no notice in fact and has no opportunity of filing a plea in abatement. . . .We have then, as to this class of cases, a rea sonable rule for the determination of this question of the name of the owner. Apply this rule to this case and we find that tlm record owner of this land was Singleton V. Turner. In his deed of record he is designated Singleton Y. Turner no less than four times, and strange to say he signs his own name in full after that of his grantors, making in all five times his name appears on the record to which the collector was required to go to find the owner of this land before bringing suit. It is argued, however, that he was known by his middle name of Yaughn. There is no evidence that he ever signed his name that way, nor is he responsible for the fact that others so designated him. He has done nothing to estop himself from disputing the validity of these proceedings against him. Not having been sued by his real name, and that name appearing of record as owner of the land in suit in the county in which he was sued, the order of publication and judgment must be held void and subject to; attack collaterally as. well as directly. This conclusion is in harmony with all of our decisions."
In Stevenson v. Brown, 264 Mo. 182, the question was again discussed by Graves, P. J., delivering the opinion of this division of this court, thus: "Defendants rely upon the cases of Vincent v. Means, 184 Mo. 337, and Mosely v. Reily, 126 Mo. l. c. 130. The contention of defendant is that as it appears in this record that the plaintiff had received deeds to other lands in the county in the name of 'M. E'. Stevenson,' she is estopped from denying the validity of the notice by publication in the tax proceeding involved in the case at bar. We do not think that these' cases go to the extent contended for by defendant. Had the plaintiff received the title to the land here involved in the name of 'M. E. Stevenson,' she would be clearly-estopped under these cases. The reason for the rule is found in the statute itself, which requires these tax suits to be brought against the record owner. . . . That rule is, that if a person takes and puts of record a deed to land with his initials instead of the full name, he will be estopped from claiming the insufficiency of a notice giving his name, as found in the recorded deed, in a tax suit to enforce the lien of the State as against this particular tract of land. As to that tract of land he may be said to have ad'optéd, as for his own, the name in the deed. But this doctrine of estoppel cannot be carried further.. Thus in the Turner case, 151 Mo. l. c. 105, it was sought to invoke the doctrine contended for here, by showing that Turner used the name Yaughn, or his initials 'S. V.', in other business transactions. This was held to be of no avail."
The precise question was last involved (so far as we find) in the case of Brown v. Peak, 177 S. W. 645, before this court in banc. In that case, a deed (involving lands other than those now in controversy) was executed and delivered to A, Willard Humphreys, as grantee, and duly recorded. Subsequently, a sheriff's deed was executed, conveying the' title of A. W. Humphreys in said land, upon a sále thereof'under a judgment for delinquent taxes against him, to plaintiff's predecessors in title. Later, a quit-claim deed, signed 'A. W.'Humphreys,' ' as grantor, was executed and delivered to defendant. Bond; J., wrote an opinion therein, which according to the per curiam, was "'concurred in and adopted by the court in banc as its opinion in the case. ' ' The' recorded vote of the then judges of this court shows, however,'that BrowN, J., concurred in a separate opinion; and Faris and James T. Blair, JJ., concurred in the. result; Craves J., dissented in a separate opinion, in which Waleer, J., concurred; Woodson, C. J., dissented in a separate opinion; and James 'T. Blair, J., in an addendum to the dissenting opinion of Judge Graves, "agrees, that.the Mosely case (supra) is wrong and ought to- be overruled. ' ' Bond, J., bottoms his opinion squarely upmi the'Mosely case; saying: "The case directly in point, and one which has been- repeatedly affirmed as falling without the limits of the rule, is Mosely v. Reily, 126 Mo. 124. . . . For aught that appears in the record of this case, the initial Á may have been the full Christ-tian name of A: W. Humphreys,- for it is within the general, if not judicial, knowledge of this court that letters of the alphabet frequently constitute the entire Christian name of an individual.' [29 Cyc. p. 269 (e)':] But, however that may be, if the letter A was not the full • Christian name of the said Humphreys, j^et it was the name, together-with a middle'initial, which he signed to the deed, under which the defendant in this cause sets up title against a prior conveyance in all respects regular, through the conduit of a sheriff's deed, of' all the interest and estate of A. W. Humphreys in the same land; After such an affirmance of the correctness of his own name by. Humphreys, in using it to denude himself of title to the land in question, it- does not lie in his mouth, nor that of any grantee from him under a:quit-claim deed,- to assert that the State's lien for taxes could not be enforced against the identical land by the use of the same name while it was owned by Humphreys. This case falls clearly within the principle and point in judgment before this court in the case of Mosely v. Reily, supra."