Case Name: DAVIS v. UNITED PORTABLE HOISTING ENGINEERS et al.
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1898-04-22
Citations: 51 N.Y.S. 180
Docket Number: 
Parties: DAVIS v. UNITED PORTABLE HOISTING ENGINEERS et al.
Judges: 
Reporter: West's New York Supplement
Volume: 51
Pages: 180–186

Head Matter:
DAVIS v. UNITED PORTABLE HOISTING ENGINEERS et al.
(28 App. Div. 396.)
(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Eirst Department.
April 22, 1898.)
1. Trades Unions—Injunction—Exclusion from Work;
In an action by a nonunion engineer against a union, for an injunction, and founded upon averments that plaintiff was the object of a persecution resulting from a determination to exclude him from working at his trade for anybody or under any circumstances, the testimony given on his behalf by his former employer was that the witness had only employed him temporarily from time to time, while unable to secure a union engineer. Meld, that the evidence was entirely insufficient to establish plaintiff’s case.
2. Same—Rights of Members.
Members of trades unions, as well as other individuals, have a right to say that they will not work with persons who do not belong to their organization; and whether they say this themselves or through their organized societies makes no difference. They have the right, by pursuing that method, to secure employment for their own members.
Rurnsey, J., dissenting.
Appeal from special term.
Action by Benjamin P. Davis against the United Portable Hoisting Engineers and another. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendants appeal.
Reversed.
Argued before VAN BRUNT, P. J., and RUMSEY, McLAUGHLIN, PATTERSON, and INGRAHAM, JJ.
John 0. Robinson, for appellants.
F. 0. Cantine, for respondent.

Opinion:
PATTERSON, J.
The judgment appealed from in this case restrained the defendants from interfering with or in any manner preventing the plaintiff from obtaining employment in bis trade and occupation of hod-hoisting engineer in the city of New York or elsewhere, and from procuring or coercing, by threats or other wise, the dismissal or discharge of the plaintiff by any employer from his employment, and further directed a money judgment for damages against the defendant the United Portable Hoisting Engineers. There is absolutely no foundation in the evidence for a money judgment, and the only subject now requiring consideration is whether, under that evidence, in any aspect in which it may be viewed, the plaintiff was entitled to an injunction. It is averred in the complaint that the defendant corporation was formed for the purpose and with the design chiefly to secure employment in- said trade for its members, and to prevent other persons of the same trade, but not members of said union, from procuring or retaining such employment; that the defendant Gibbons was an officer and agent of that corporation; that the plaintiff was a skilled hod-hoisting engineer by trade and occupation, and depended upon his daily labor therein for the support and maintenance of his family; that in and about the month of June, 1895, the defendant corporation, and its officers and members, with intent to injure the plaintiff, and deprive him of employment in his trade and the means oS support, conspired and agreed together, and with one Merrit ,P, Simpson, and with other persons, not to hire hod-hoisting engineers who were nonunion men, provided union men could be obtained; that thereafter, and in or about the month of June, 1895, and In June, August, and December, 189G, and March, 1897, while the plaintiff was employed by and working for said Simpson in his said trade, said defendants, in pursuance of said conspiracy and agreement, and by threatening said Simpson that, if he did not discharge the plaintiff from his employment, they would order and compel other said engineers, union men, then in his employment, to withdraw from such employment, thus hindering and embarrassing him, by stopping his work on buildings then in course of erection, to his great loss and injury, so intimidated and coerced said Simpson that he, yielding to the demands and threats aforesaid of said defendants, and for no other reason whatever, discharged the plaintiff from his employment, to his great damage; that the defendants have continued so to threaten and to combine and conspire together against the plaintiff, and with the like intent and effect, as aforesaid, from the month of June, 1895, until the commencement of this suit; that by reason of such unlawful combination, conspiracy, threats, and intimidations, and in consequence of his said dismissal, the plaintiff has not been able to procure employment of any other kind since the month of August last. The plaintiff prayed for an injunction and a money judgment.
.No finding was made that any conspiracy existed, the learned judge stating in his opinion that the conspiracy alleged in the complaint was not proved. That much of the complaint failing, the inquiry is left as to the plaintiff being entitled to an injunction against the defendant corporation or Gibbons, by reason- of any act or riling done by Gibbons as directly affecting the plaintiff. All that the proof shows is that the plaintiff was a nonunion hod-hoisting engineer, who worked at various places, and with various persons, at certain times mentioned in his testimony; that he was discharged several times by reason of something done of said by Gibbons to his (the plaintiff's) employers, but what Gibbons said to or did with other employers of the plaintiff than Simpson is not made to appear, and, indeed, the whole case with reference to the plaintiff's relations to employers other than Simpson is so inconclusive and indefinite that it amounts to nothing.
We assume for the purposes of this case that no individual or association of individuals has any right wantonly so to interfere with a man in the exercise of his craft, business, or profession as to prevent him from earning his livelihood in that profession, craft, or business, and that if a case is presented in which it is shown that the only motive which impels the interference is to prevent a particular individual from making his living, irrespective of other considerations, a court of equity will interfere where no adequate remedy at law exists. But that is not this case. The only employer the plaintiff ever had who was called as a witness was Simpson, who swore that he employed the plaintiff on several jobs, "until I could get a union engineer to send in his place. I would send for a union engineer, and couldn't get one; and, sooner than have the work stop, I would send for Mr. Davis, and send him. I discharged him five or six times, I guess." The whole drift of Mr. Simpson's testimony is that he employed the plaintiff only temporarily, until he could get union engineers, and therefore the plaintiff failed in establishing that his discharge was the result of a design on the part of the defendants, under any and all circumstances, to exclude him from making his livelihood. It is true that Simpson says that he understood that Gibbons would stop his engineers in case he did not stop Mr. Davis. But there can be no doubt that members of trades unions, as well as other individuals,have a right to say that they will not work with persons'who do not belong to their organization; and whether they say it themselves or through their organized societies can make no difference. They have the right by that method to secure employment for their own members. Mr. Simpson's testimony clearly establishes that his employment of Davis was only temporary, and until he could get union men. We think, therefore, that the testimony in this' case was entirely inadequate to establish that which it was necessary for the plaintiff to prove under the averments of his complaint, namely, that he was the object of a persecution based upon a determination to exclude him from working at his trade for anybody or under any circumstances.
The judgment should be reversed, and a new trial ordered, with costs to appellant to abide event.
VAN BRUNT, P. J., and McLAUGHLIN, J., concur.