Case Name: Martha CREASY, as Personal Representative and Trustee of the Martha P. Creasy Revocable Trust Dated December 10, 1993, a Creditor to the Estate of Lefferts L. Mabie, Jr., Appellant, v. ESTATE OF Lefferts L. MABIE, Jr., Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 2007-06-21
Citations: 958 So. 2d 1111
Docket Number: No. 1D07-1156
Parties: Martha CREASY, as Personal Representative and Trustee of the Martha P. Creasy Revocable Trust Dated December 10, 1993, a Creditor to the Estate of Lefferts L. Mabie, Jr., Appellant, v. ESTATE OF Lefferts L. MABIE, Jr., Appellee.
Judges: VAN NORTWICK, LEWIS, and HAWKES, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 958
Pages: 1111–1112

Head Matter:
Martha CREASY, as Personal Representative and Trustee of the Martha P. Creasy Revocable Trust Dated December 10, 1993, a Creditor to the Estate of Lefferts L. Mabie, Jr., Appellant, v. ESTATE OF Lefferts L. MABIE, Jr., Appellee.
No. 1D07-1156.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
June 21, 2007.
Scott A. Remington of Clark, Parting-ton, Hart, Larry, Bond & Stackhouse, Pensacola, and J. Patrick Mensching of Lyone, Clark & Mensching, Inc., Tulsa, OK, for appellant.
William V. Linne, Pensacola, for Appel-lee.

Opinion:
PER CURIAM.
Upon consideration of the appellant's response to the Court's order of March 26, 2007, the Court has determined that the order on appeal is not an appealable order. Specifically, although it was captioned as a motion to vacate the lower tribunal's September 5, 2006, orders striking claims against the estate, the appellant's motion to vacate was in the nature of a motion for rehearing challenging the lower tribunal's legal ruling. Therefore, the Court concludes that the motion, which was filed on December 18, 2006, was an untimely motion for rehearing. Consequently, the appeal is untimely with respect to the underlying orders striking the claims. Fla. R.App. P. 9.110; 9.020(h). Furthermore, the order denying the motion to vacate is not itself an independently appealable order. Fla. R.App. P. 9.130(a)(4). Based on the foregoing, the appeal is hereby dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
VAN NORTWICK, LEWIS, and HAWKES, JJ., concur.