Case Name: Margaret CHAMBERLAIN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. COURT OF APPEALS, NINTH DISTRICT, JEFFERSON COUNTY, TEXAS (BEAUMONT); Alfred S. Gerson, Judge at County Court at Law No. 1, Jefferson County, Texas (Beaumont, Texas); General Motors Acceptance Corporation, Defendants-Appellees
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 2004-06-22
Citations: 102 F. App'x 386
Docket Number: No. 03-41470
Parties: Margaret CHAMBERLAIN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. COURT OF APPEALS, NINTH DISTRICT, JEFFERSON COUNTY, TEXAS (BEAUMONT); Alfred S. Gerson, Judge at County Court at Law No. 1, Jefferson County, Texas (Beaumont, Texas); General Motors Acceptance Corporation, Defendants-Appellees.
Judges: Before BARKSDALE, DeMOSS, and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.
Reporter: West's Federal Appendix
Volume: 102
Pages: 386–387

Head Matter:
Margaret CHAMBERLAIN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. COURT OF APPEALS, NINTH DISTRICT, JEFFERSON COUNTY, TEXAS (BEAUMONT); Alfred S. Gerson, Judge at County Court at Law No. 1, Jefferson County, Texas (Beaumont, Texas); General Motors Acceptance Corporation, Defendants-Appellees.
No. 03-41470
Conference Calendar.
United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.
Decided June 22, 2004.
Margaret Chamberlain, Beaumont, TX, pro se.
James C. Todd, Assistant Attorney General, Austin, TX, James J. McConn, Jr., Hays, McConn, Rice & Pickering, Michael T. Donohue, Libbye Clara Howard, Lawrence, Baca & Donohue, Houston, TX, for Defendants-Appellees.
Before BARKSDALE, DeMOSS, and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.

Opinion:
PER CURIAM:
Margaret Chamberlain appeals the district court's dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction of her 42 U.S.C. § 1983 lawsuit asserting constitutional violations arising out of the way her state-court lawsuit was processed. A district court's dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is reviewed de novo. See Williams v. Dallas Area Rapid Transit, 242 F.3d 315, 318 (5th Cir.2001).
Chamberlain renews her argument that the district court had jurisdiction to review her claims of constitutional deprivations under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, under the Fifth, Seventh, and Fourteenth Amendments, and under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. She also contends that the district court had jurisdiction under Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b) because the state-court judgment was void. This court will not consider this newly raised argument. See Stewart Glass & Mirror, Inc. v. U.S. Auto Glass Discount Centers, Inc., 200 F.3d 307, 316-17 (5th Cir.2000).
Chamberlain's complaint is inextricably intertwined with the merits of her state-court suit, and examination of her claims of constitutional deprivations would require the district court to examine the validity of the state courts' rulings. Accordingly, the complaint was properly dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 476, 482, 103 S.Ct. 1303, 75 L.Ed.2d 206 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415, 44 S.Ct. 149, 68 L.Ed. 362 (1923); see also United States v. Shepherd, 23 F.3d 923, 924 (5th Cir.1994). The district court's judgment is AFFIRMED.
Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.