Case Name: C. L. Robeson, et al, Appellants, v. Don Helland, et al, Respondents
Court: Washington Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Washington
Decision Date: 1982-07-12
Citations: 32 Wash. App. 487
Docket Number: No. 9319-3-I
Parties: C. L. Robeson, et al, Appellants, v. Don Helland, et al, Respondents.
Judges: 
Reporter: Washington Appellate Reports
Volume: 32
Pages: 487–492

Head Matter:
[No. 9319-3-I.
Division One.
July 12, 1982.]
C. L. Robeson, et al, Appellants, v. Don Helland, et al, Respondents.
William V. Vetter and Walter E. Webster, Jr., for appellants.
Kris Chrey, Paul Silver, V. A. Retaceo, Andrew Curtis, Jr., Marlin Vortman, Norm Maleng, Prosecuting Attorney, and Thomas Wolfendale, Deputy, for respondents.

Opinion:
Williams, J.
This is an appeal from an order denying a motion made by C. L. and Jean Robeson to enforce a post-judgment settlement agreement superseding a judgment quieting title to their home in Donald and Lynn Helland. The sole issue is the propriety of the procedure used.
The pertinent facts are these: In 1976, Washington Credit, Inc. took a default judgment in district court against the Robesons for an unpaid candy bill of $205.20. Judgment was docketed in superior court and the Robe-sons' Bellevue home sold on execution by the sheriff on February 10, 1978, to Douglas Von Bismark and Frank T. Wiechert, minor children of Gary Culver, the attorney for Washington Credit, who transferred it to the Hellands on March 23, 1979, by special warranty deed. On May 8, 1980, the Hellands transferred title by special warranty deed to William Miebach for $33,000 stated consideration with excise tax paid; and 6 days later, Miebach gave a special warranty deed to Barry Klepper and Lieneka Lashley for $41,000 stated consideration but no excise tax paid.
In the meantime, in June of 1979, the Robesons brought a quiet title action against the Hellands, Washington Credit, Inc., Gary Culver, Safeco Title Insurance Company, and the King County Sheriff, which resulted in judgment being entered on March 3, 1980, quieting title in the Hel-lands. No appeal was taken from this judgment, the parties on February 29, 1980, having signed a settlement agreement whereby the Robesons would regain title to the property if each of the parties paid the Hellands the following sums no later than April 2, 1980:
Robesons $11,500
Safeco Title Ins. Co. 5,500
Culver/Washington Credit 5.500
King County Sheriff 3.500
On April 2, the Robesons told their attorney that they were having difficulty raising the money but would have it soon. The attorney called Kris A. Chrey, Safeco's attorney, who had been designated in the agreement as the stakeholder, telling her of the problem and asking for relief. Her reply was ambiguous in that she was uncertain of the extent of her authority to extend the time for performance. It is disputed whether it was Safeco's or Robesons' attorney who was to contact the other parties to the contract but the Robesons say that if they did not hear to the contrary, subsequent performance was acceptable. On April 15, Kris Chrey received a $7,000 tender which she rejected because "I have no instructions at this point to either hold or disburse the $7,000 and am therefore returning the cashier's check to you", and on April 23, she rejected the Robesons' tender of full performance. There is no evidence that any of the other parties performed as promised.
In May, the Robesons, having been served with a Writ of Execution calling for their eviction, moved in a show cause proceeding to enforce the agreement on the basis that they had tendered performance and were entitled to their home, any delay having been excused. Following issuance of a temporary restraining order, the court heard the motion on affidavits and then entered findings of fact and conclusions of law that the Robesons had not performed, performance had not been waived and the agreement became void on April 2, 1980. The motion was then denied leaving the judgment and Writ of Execution in the quiet title action in effect.
Because no oral evidence was offered for or against the motion, the proceedings took the form of a summary judgment. CR 56; Fisher v. Clem, 25 Wn. App. 303, 607 P.2d 326 (1980). Accordingly, the findings of fact and conclusions of law entered will be treated as surplusage. Duckworth v. Bonney Lk., 91 Wn.2d 19, 586 P.2d 860 (1978). The question on appeal is whether there are any issues of material fact requiring a trial. Rainier Nat'l Bank v. Inland Mach. Co., 29 Wn. App. 725, 631 P.2d 389 (1981). There are at least four.
First, was time of the essence? The agreement provides that it "is not effective nor binding on any parties unless signed by all parties within 15 days hereof, and performance by all parties take place on or before April 2, 1980." Also specified is that all parties perform "exactly" as set forth. But there is no evidence that any of the parties performed by April 2, or at all. By not doing so, did the parties, as shown by their conduct, intend that the contract die by its own terms or was the time of their performance not particularly important so long as it was within a reasonable time? See Carr v. Settle Constr. Co., 11 Wn. App. 336, 522 P.2d 849 (1974).
Second, even though time be of the essence, was strict performance waived? See Reeploeg v. Jensen, 5 Wn. App. 695, 490 P.2d 445 (1971), rev'd on other grounds, 81 Wn.2d 541, 503 P.2d 99 (1972). The record shows a dispute over the content of a telephone call made on April 2, 1980, from Robesons' attorney to Safeco's. If Safeco's attorney did say she would contact the Robesons if delay was not acceptable to the other parties and did not do so, then was the time provision waived? See Waldrop v. Holland, 22 Wn. App. 336, 588 P.2d 1237 (1979).
Third, there is the question of whether the subsequent transferees were bona fide purchasers. The intervenors, Klepper and Lashley, took a virtually unwarranted title; at least one transfer was made without paying the excise tax; each transferee took title from an "owner" who was not in possession; and the sheriff's transfer was to two minor children who may not have been competent. These and other factors may defeat bona fide status.
Fourth, there is the question of whether the parties contracted in good faith. Liebergesell v. Evans, 93 Wn.2d 881, 613 P.2d 1170 (1980). The whole case is disconcerting and must be carefully examined before final adjudication.
Reversed and remanded for trial.
Corbett, J., concurs.
The deed excludes all statutory warranties, simply promising that the grantor has not alienated the title from the time he received it.