Case Name: The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v. George Gonzalez, Appellant; The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Luis Lopez, Appellant
Court: New York Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 2002-10-24
Citations: 99 N.Y.2d 76
Docket Number: 
Parties: The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v George Gonzalez, Appellant. The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Luis Lopez, Appellant.
Judges: 
Reporter: New York Reports
Volume: 99
Pages: 76–91

Head Matter:
[781 NE2d 894, 751 NYS2d 830]
The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v George Gonzalez, Appellant. The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Luis Lopez, Appellant.
Argued September 6, 2002;
decided October 24, 2002
POINTS OF COUNSEL
White & Case LLP, New York City (Douglas A. Eisner, Marc L. Moore and Stefan M. Mentzer of counsel), and Legal Aid Society Criminal Appeals Bureau, Brooklyn (Andrew C. Fine of counsel) for appellant in the first above-entitled action.
I. The People failed to demonstrate probable cause to arrest appellant, because the message of “positive buy” and the descriptions of multiple suspects by the undercover to the arresting officer did not provide the required information to either the arresting officer or the suppression court to independently justify such action. (People v Dodt, 61 NY2d 408; People v McRay, 51 NY2d 594; People v Parris, 83 NY2d 342; Spinelli v United States, 393 US 410; Aguilar v Texas, 378 US 108; People v Petralia, 62 NY2d 47; People v Bouton, 50 NY2d 130; People v Maldonado, 86 NY2d 631; People v Ketcham, 93 NY2d 416; People v Washington, 87 NY2d 945.) II. The People failed to present sufficient evidence to allow a factfinder to determine culpability where greater levels of participation were deemed legally insufficient as a matter of law. (People v Bello, 92 NY2d 523; People v Kaplan, 76 NY2d 140; People v Rosario, 193 AD2d 445; People v Lopez, 213 AD2d 255; People v Johnson, 238 AD2d 267.) III. Appellant’s concurrent sentences for the same act result in impermissible punishment under the principle of double jeopardy under the United States and New York State Constitutions. (United States v Halper, 490 US 435; North Carolina v Pearce, 395 US 711; Rutledge v United States, 517 US 292; Missouri v Hunter, 459 US 359; Ball v United States, 470 US 856; Blockburger v United States, 284 US 299; People v Leung, 272 AD2d 88; People v Michael, 48 NY2d 1.)
Robert M. Morgenthau, District Attorney, New York City (Christopher P. Marinetti and Mark Dwyer of counsel), for respondent in the first above-entitled action.
I. Detective Hurley had probable cause to arrest Gonzalez, as demonstrated by the People at the suppression hearing. (People v Wharton, 46 NY2d 924, 444 US 880; People v Harrison, 57 NY2d 470; People v McRay, 51 NY2d 594; People v Mercado, 68 NY2d 874, 479 US 1095; United States v Ventresca, 380 US 102; People v Johnson, 66 NY2d 398; People v Bigelow, 66 NY2d 417; People v Landy, 59 NY2d 369; People v Rodriguez, 52 NY2d 483; People v Ketcham, 93 NY2d 416.) II. Overwhelming evidence established all elements of Gonzalez’s crimes beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v Contes, 60 NY2d 620; People v Kennedy, 47 NY2d 196; People v Montanez, 41 NY2d 53; People v Williams, 84 NY2d 925; People v Bello, 92 NY2d 523; People v Kaplan, 76 NY2d 140.) III. Gonzalez has failed to preserve his double jeopardy claim. In any event, Gonzalez was properly sentenced on the sale and the school ground counts. (People v Ingram, 67 NY2d 897; People v Lemon, 62 NY2d 745; People v Michael, 48 NY2d 1; Ohio v Johnson, 467 US 493; Missouri v Hunter, 459 US 359; Whalen v United States, 445 US 684; Brown v Ohio, 432 US 161; People v Ramirez, 89 NY2d 444; Garrett v United States, 471 US 773; People v Gaul, 63 AD2d 563.)
Center for Appellate Litigation, New York City (Jonathan M. Kirshbaum and Robert S. Dean of counsel), for appellant in the second above-entitled action.
I. The trial court abused its discretion by permitting expert testimony in this simple “buy and bust” case where the testimony was unnecessary to assist the jury in its understanding of the roles of the two participants and why buy money may not have been recovered on the alleged sellers over 20 minutes after the sale occurred. (People v Brown, 97 NY2d 500; People v Lee, 96 NY2d 157; People v All-weiss, 48 NY2d 40; People v Colon, 238 AD2d 18, 92 NY2d 909; United States v Castillo, 14 F3d 802, 513 US 829; United States v Cruz, 981 F2d 659; People v Reinat, 271 AD2d 622; People v Kelsey, 194 AD2d 248; People v Crimmins, 36 NY2d 230.) II. The Federal Double Jeopardy Clause bars the simultaneous conviction, for the exact same act, of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree and criminal sale of a controlled substance in or near school grounds since they are considered the “same offense” under the Blockburger test. (People v Wood, 95 NY2d 509; People v Gonzalez, 240 AD2d 255; Brown v Ohio, 432 US 161; People v Gonzalez, 279 AD2d 273, 96 NY2d 863; United States v Halper, 490 US 435; Ohio v Johnson, 467 US 493; Missouri v Hunter, 459 US 359; North Carolina v Pearce, 395 US 711; Jackson v Leonardo, 162 F3d 81; People v Grier, 37 NY2d 847.) III. Appellant’s guilty plea to Indictment Number 5040/98 should also be vacated because it was induced by a promise of a concurrent sentence to the sentence imposed on his unlawful conviction under Indictment Number 7890/98. (People v Boston, 75 NY2d 585; People v Fuggazzatto, 62 NY2d 862; People v Roberts, 215 AD2d 148.)
Robert T. Johnson, District Attorney, Bronx (Kimberly Morgan, Joseph N. Ferdenzi and Nancy D. Killian of counsel), for respondent in the second above-entitled action.
I. Defendant’s guilt was proven beyond a reasonable doubt by overwhelming evidence. (People v Malizia, 62 NY2d 755, 469 US 932; People v Contes, 60 NY2d 620.) II. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing limited expert testimony on the operation of street-level drug sales and the reasons why prerecorded buy money might not be recovered where such testimony was relevant and probative of contested issues, did not unfairly prejudice defendant and was followed by appropriate instructions. (People v Brown, 97 NY2d 500; People v Buckley, 75 NY2d 843; People v Tevaha, 84 NY2d 879; People v Garcia, 83 NY2d 817; People v Fleming, 70 NY2d 947; People v Weston, 56 NY2d 844; People v Davis, 61 NY2d 202; People v Robinson, 88 NY2d 1001; People v Stephens, 84 NY2d 990; People v Iannelli, 69 NY2d 684, 482 US 914.) III. The Appellate Division properly affirmed defendant’s conviction of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree. The third-degree sale count is a different offense than criminal sale of a controlled substance in or near school grounds and does not implicate the prohibition against double jeopardy. (People v Michael, 48 NY2d 1; People v Stephens, 84 NY2d 990; People v Iannelli, 69 NY2d 684, 482 US 914; Blockburger v United States, 284 US 299; People v Wood, 95 NY2d 509; Iannelli v United States, 420 US 770; People v Grier, 37 NY2d 847; People v Brown, 67 NY2d 555; United States v Freyre-Lazaro, 3 F3d 1496, cert denied sub nom. Llerena-Acosta v United States, 511 US 1011; United States v White, 240 F3d 127.) IV. In the event that this Court reverses defendant’s conviction after trial, his guilty plea may be vacated since the plea was induced by a promise that the sentence imposed on his plea conviction would run concurrently to the sentence imposed on the convictions after trial. (People v Fuggazzatto, 62 NY2d 862.)

Opinion:
OPINION OF THE COURT
Ciparick, J.
Defendant in each of these unrelated appeals was convicted of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree (Penal Law § 220.39 [1]) and criminal sale of a controlled substance in or near school grounds (Penal Law § 220.44 [2]) based on a single drug transaction. Defendants now claim that their simultaneous convictions for offenses based on a single act violate the Fifth Amendment's prohibition against double jeopardy.
The facts of these "buy-and-bust" cases are straightforward. In People v Gonzalez, an undercover narcotics officer approached a man entering a store in Manhattan and asked where he could purchase drugs. Without answering, the man walked over to defendant, asked him if he had "anything" and told him that the undercover was "looking." Defendant said "you know how it works."
Defendant then whistled across the street to Frederico Sepulveda and raised two fingers. Defendant instructed the officer to follow the man across the street to a Chinese restaurant around the corner from a school. The two men entered the restaurant with Sepulveda following behind them. Inside the restaurant, the man told Sepulveda that defendant said to "give [the officer] one and to give me one too." After handing the man a "small object" in exchange for a sum of money, Sepulveda asked the officer, "how many do you want?" The officer replied, "one," and handed Sepulveda $10 in prerecorded buy money in exchange for a glassine of heroin.
After the sale, the officer radioed the field team that he made a "positive buy" and gave a description and location of the sellers. Within minutes, the field team arrived at the location and apprehended defendant and Sepulveda, both of whom matched the descriptions given by the undercover officer. Shortly thereafter, the undercover officer made a drive-by confirmatory identification of both men. Although the arresting officer recovered heroin and prerecorded buy money from Sepulveda, no drugs were recovered from defendant.
Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of two counts of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree and one count of criminal sale of a controlled substance in or near school grounds, all class B felonies for which he received concurrent sentences. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction and a Judge of this Court granted defendant leave to appeal.
In People v Lopez, an undercover narcotics officer approached defendant and Melvin Rennock who were standing outside a building located 420 feet from a public school in Bronx County. The officer asked defendant for heroin and defendant instructed him to follow Rennock inside the building. Rennock led the officer to a small "mailbox area" where he asked the officer how many he wanted. The officer replied that he wanted one and handed Rennock $10 in prerecorded buy money. In return, Rennock handed the officer one glassine of heroin.
After completing the transaction, the officer returned to his car and radioed the backup team with a description and location of the sellers. Approximately 20 minutes later, defendant was apprehended after another officer, acting as ghost, observed him leave the building and enter a car. After a drive-by confirmatory identification by the undercover officer, defendant was placed under arrest; no drugs or prerecorded buy money were recovered from defendant's person.
Defendant was convicted, following a jury trial, of criminal sale of a controlled substance in or near school grounds, crimi nal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree and two counts of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree, all class B felonies for which he was sentenced concurrently. The Appellate Division modified by vacating defendant's conviction of one count of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree and dismissing that count and, as modified, affirmed. A Judge of this Court granted defendant leave to appeal.
Analysis
The Double Jeopardy Clause consists of three separate guarantees: (1) "It protects against a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal. [(2)] It protects against a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction. [(3)] And it protects against multiple punishments for the same offense" (North Carolina v Pearce, 395 US 711, 717 [1969]). The cases before us fall within the third category as each involves a single trial based on the same act, resulting in concurrent sentences.
The first two categories implicate the jurisdiction and authority of the court and are thus reviewable by this Court despite a defendant's failure to object (see People v Michael, 48 NY2d 1 [1979]). As we stated in Michael, the "obvious jurisdictional overtones" attendant to a double jeopardy claim presented the Court with a question of law so fundamental that it rendered preservation of the issue unnecessary (see Michael, 48 NY2d at 7). Thus where a defendant is retried, despite a constitutional double jeopardy defense, a failure to object is not fatal to his claim.
The cases before us, however, are quite different. Each defendant faced multiple charges arising out of a single act that led to concurrent sentences. These cases, as contrasted to Michael, turn not on the jurisdiction or authority of the court but on whether the Legislature intended to authorize such multiple punishments (see Missouri v Hunter, 459 US 359, 366-368 [1983]). That question may only be reached following a threshold determination of "what punishments the Legislative Branch has authorized" (Whalen v United States, 445 US 684, 688 [1980]). As long as the Legislature intended to impose cumulative punishments for a single offense, "a court's task of statutory construction is at an end" and no constitutional double jeopardy claim is implicated (Missouri v Hunter, 459 US at 368-369).
Since the permissibility of multiple punishments in this situation presents a question of statutory interpretation, a defen dant is required to preserve such a claim. Neither defendant did so, and we therefore may not consider their claims here (see CPL 470.05 [2]).
With respect to defendant Lopez, we perceive no abuse of discretion in the trial court's admission of expert testimony on street-level narcotics transactions. The expert's brief testimony was admitted for the limited purpose of explaining the absence of prerecorded buy money and the sellers' respective roles in street-level drug sales (see People v Brown, 97 NY2d 500 [2002]). To the extent defendant claims that the court failed to give an appropriate limiting instruction, he waived this claim by declining the court's offer to deliver such an instruction.
Defendant Gonzalez's challenge to the hearing court's probable cause determination involves a mixed question of law and fact (see People v Brown, 95 NY2d 942, 943 [2000]), and therefore our review is limited to whether there is record support for the lower courts' determinations (see People v McIntosh, 96 NY2d 521, 524 [2001]). Such record evidence exists here. Defendant's remaining challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is without merit.
Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division, in each case, should be affirmed.
Judge Smith is of the opinion that preservation is not required but nevertheless concludes that the Legislature intended to authorize multiple punishments under the circumstances presented here.