Case Name: LEVI S. NOYES, Appellant, v. WILLIAM TURNBULL, Respondent, Impleaded with SILAS H. POMEROY and CHARLES ATWATER
Court: New York Supreme Court, General Term
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1889-09
Citations: 61 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 26
Docket Number: 
Parties: LEVI S. NOYES, Appellant, v. WILLIAM TURNBULL, Respondent, Impleaded with SILAS H. POMEROY and CHARLES ATWATER.
Judges: Landon, J., concurred.
Reporter: Supreme Court Reports (Hun)
Volume: 61
Pages: 26–43

Head Matter:
LEVI S. NOYES, Appellant, v. WILLIAM TURNBULL, Respondent, Impleaded with SILAS H. POMEROY and CHARLES ATWATER.
Business conducted, by direction of a testator, by trustees named in his will — liability of a trustee who has retired from the trust for debts subsequently contracted.
TlieodoroL. Pomeroy, who liad for some years prior to his death, carried, on a manufacturing business in Massachusetts with his son, Silas H. Pomeroy, as his partner, under the firm name of “ L. Pomeroy’s Sons,” made a will by which he gave all this manufacturing property to three trustees, William Turnbull, Silas H. Pomeroy and Charles Atwater, in trust, to continue and carry on said business until his son, Theodore L., should arrive at twenty-one years of age, incurring liabilities on account of the estate, exercising the same power as the testator exercised, and paying over during the continuance of the trust such portion of the property to Silas II. and Theodore L. as, in their judgment, the administration of the trust would permit.
The trustees accepted the trust and carried on the business under the name of “L. Pomeroy’s Sons,” and in 1882 and 1883 bought from John Consalus wool to be used in the said business. It appeared that prior to the death of Theodore L. Pomeroy the firm had also bought of Mr. Consalus, and that Consalus had no further dealings with L. Pomeroy’s Sons from March 13,1883, to August 28, 18S6 ; that in January or February, 1887, he sold wool to “L. Pomeroy’sSons,” for which he received notes dated, respectively, May 23, 1887, and June 9, 1887, signed “L. Pomeroy’s Sons,” which notes had been transferred to the plaintiff and had not been paid.
Some time prior to May, 1885, an action was brought by Turnbull and Atwater, in Massachusetts, asking to be relieved from the trust and that new trustees be appointed. Under an agreement of the parties a decree was made which authorized Silas H. Pomeroy to act as sole trustee, and directed that the business should be so conducted as to create no liability on the part of the plaintiffs, as trustees, and that they were not to be liable for any debt incurred by him, as trustee, and made by “ L. Pomeroy’s Sons,” or by Silas H. Pomeroy, in that name, and that as soon as William Turnbull & Co. had received their mortgage for a balance due them, and Silas H. had paid or renewed outstanding paper of L. Pomeroy’s Sons, the plaintiffs were to be discharged as trustees.
Prior to the time of this decree the trustees used for correspondence in business-matters paper with the following letter-heads: “ William Turnbull, Charles Atwater and S. Harris Pomeroy, Trustees of L. Pomeroy’s Sons, Pittsfield" Mass.;” all before L. Pomeroy’s Sons being in red ink. After the decree, letter-paper was used with the heading: “L. Pomeroy’s Sons, Pittsfield, Mass., S H. Pomeroy, Trustee; ” with which last-mentioned letter paper S. H. Pomeroy had corresponded with Consalus prior to the purchase for which the notes in question were given.
It was claimed by the plaintiff that Turnbull was liable on the principle that a retiring partner will be held liable for subsequent purchases made of a party with whom the old firm had previously dealt, and who had not been notified of the retirement.
Held, that the three trustees were never partners.
That their rights were very different from those of partners in the respect that they had no beneficial interest in the property; that they were joint tenants and npt tenants in common; that on the death of one of the trustees his representatives would have no interest in the trust estate, and that the trustees could not voluntarily relinquish the trust.
Qucere, as to whether or not all the three trustees were personally liable to Consalus for purchases made prior to the decree.
That, even if Silas H. Pomeroy, who made the purchases prior to the making of the decree, was personally liable, it would not follow that Turnbull was also liable.
That the discharge of Turnbull from his trust under the decree did not, as was claimed by the plaintiff, bear any resemblance to the retiring of a partner from a firm.
That a court- of equity had special power over all express trusts and might remove a trustee, even against his will.
That, considering the change in the letter heading and the number of years that had elapsed between the purchases made before the decree and those made thereafter, a judgment in favor of the defendant Turnbull should be affirmed. (Ingalls, J., dissenting.)
Appeal by the plaintiff from a judgment in favor of the defendant William Turnbull, entered upon the trial of this action, at a Special Term held in Saratoga county, in the office of the clerk of Saratoga county on January 31, 1889.
Theodore L. Pomeroy had for some years prior to his death carried on a manufacturing business in Massachusetts, with his son, Silas H. Pomeroy, as his partner, under the firm name of “ L. Pomeroy’s Sons.” Tie died in September, 1881, having made his will, which was duly proved in that State, in which he resided. By that will he gave all this manufacturing property (which he seemed to consider belonged to himself solely) to three trustees, William Turnbull, Silas H. Pomeroy and Charles Atwater,.in trust, to continue and carry on the said business until his son, Theodore L., should arrive at twenty-one, incurring liabilities on account of the estate, exercising the same power which the testator exercised, and paying over, during the trust, such portion of the profits to Silas and Theodore L. as, in their judgment, the administration of the trust would permit.
The trustees accepted the trust, and in carrying on the business used the name “ L. Pomeroy’s Sons.”
In 1882 and 1883 the trustees bought from John Consalus wool to be used in the said'business, and prior to the death of Mr. Pomeroy the firm of “L. Pomeroy’s Sons had also bought wool of Consalus. But Consalus had no dealings with “ L. Pomeroy’s Sons ” from March 13, 1883, to. August 28, 1886.
Sometime prior to May, 1885, an action was brought by Turnbull and Atwater in the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts against Silas IT. Pomeroy and others, interested in the estate of Theodore Pomeroy, deceased. In the bill of complaint therein the plaintiffs, for reasons therein given, asked to be released from the trust and that new trustees be appointed. Thereupon, May 18, 1885, an agreement in that action was made between the parties. And subsequently, June 1, 1886, a decree was made by the said court. By this decree Silas H. Pomeroy was authorized to act as sole trustee; the business was to be so conducted as to create no liability on the plaintiffs as tnistees, and they were not to be liable for any debt incurred by him as trustee, or on any note or obligation thereafter made by “ L. Pomeroy’s Sons,” or by said Silas H. Pomeroy in that name. As soon as William Turnbull and Company had received their mortgage for a balance due them, and said Silas H. had paid or renewed outstanding commercial paper of “ L. Pomeroy’s Sons,’’ the plaintiffs were to be discharged as trustees.
Subsequently, in January and February, 1887, Consalus sold wool to “ L. Pomeroy’s Sons,” for which he received notes dated, respectively, May 23,1887, and June 9,1887, signed “ L. Pomeroy’s Son’s,” which had been transferred to plaintiff and had not been paid.
Prior to the time of the decree the trustees in their business had used for correspondence letter paper with the 'following letterheads : “William Turnbull, Charles Atwater and S. Harris Pomeroy, trustees of L. Pomeroy’s Sons, Pittsfield, Mass.; ” all before “ L. Pomeroy’s Sons ” being in red ink. After the decree Silas IT. Pomeroy, used letter paper with the letter-head: “ L. Pomeroy’s Sons, Pittsfield, Mass., S. H. Pomeroy, trustee.” The other letter-heads were not in use by defendants after June 1,1886. On paper bearing the second letter-head said S. H. Pomeroy corresponded largely with said Consalus, and that, too, prior to the purchase for which the notes in question were given.
The question was whether William Turnbull was liable on these notes.
E. F. Bullard, for the appellant..
Jesse Johnson, for the respondent.

Opinion:
Learned, P. J.:
It is evident that, as a matter of fact, the defendant Turnbull' was not one of the persons who bought the wool alleged in the complaint, and was not one of the persons who made the notes therein set forth; that wool was, in fact, bought and those notes, in fact, made solely by Silas H. Pomeroy. But the plaintiff claims, that Turnbull is liable on the principle that a retiring partner may be liable for subsequent purchases made by the firm of one with whom the firm has previously dealt, and who has not been notified of the retirement. Two questions are presented, the one whether that principle applies in this case; the other whether Consalus had not, in fact, notice that he was dealing only with Silas H. Pomeroy.
The three trustees were never partners, and in many respects their rights were very different from those of partners; they had no bene ficial interest in the property; they were joint-tenants, not tenants in common; on the death of one, his representatives would have no .interest in the trust estate; one of the trustees could not voluntarily relinquish the trust; they were accountable for the proper management of the trust to the persons beneficially interested therein. All these particulars show that the position of trustees is widely' different from that of partners.
It is not, perhaps, necessary to decide in this case whether or not all of the three trustees were personally liable to Consalus for purchases made prior to the decree. We are not willing to assume that they were thus liable. The cases of Thacher v. Dinsmore (5 Mass., 299); Schmittler v. Simon (101 N. Y., 554) only decide that an executor who signs or indorses or accepts negotiable paper is personally liable, although he adds to his name the word " executor," or the like. Foland v. Dayton (40 Hun, 563) held that an executor will be personally liable for services done for the estate where there is no agreement to look to the estate, and that such agreement may be shown by circumstances. Austin v. Munro (47 N. Y., 360) is to the same effect, for it is said that executors have no right to bind the estate for debts contracted by them. This reason, it will be seen, does not apply to these trustees. So in New v. Nicoll (73 N. Y., 127) it was held that generally trustees cannot change the trust estate, unless so authorized by the instrument creating the trust, but are personally liable on contract made by them.
Now that exception takes the present case out of the two decisions last cited; for these trustees were expressly authorized to incur, on account of the trust, further liabilities, and were to carry on the manufacturing business, which would require a constant incurring of debts. It cannot be assumed that they were to do this on their own responsibility, especially when they were expressly authorized to do this on account of the trust, Nor did they give their personal obligations, the business being throughout conducted in the old name of " L. Pomeroy's Sons."
Even if it should be urged that Silas II. Pomeroy, who made the purchases prior to the decree, was personally liable, it would not follow that Turnbull was liable also. As above pointed out, these trustees were not partners. When a partner purchases in the business of the firm all the partners are liable, because all are interested beneficially in.the purchase in the profits of the business. But it is not so with trustees. They are not interested in the profits of the business. They are conducting a trust for the benefit of others. An executor who gives his note as executor for a purchase made by him for the estate may be personally liable. But it does not follow that his co-executor is also personally liable on that note. So, even if Silas H. was personally liable for purchases made by him, it would not follow that Turnbull was personally liable therefor, although he knew of the fact. Because, as .we have seen, the authority, expressly as well as impliedly given by the will, was to incur liabilities on account of the trust estate. And there was abundant notice given by the letter-heads above mentioned, that the business was in the hands of trustees. Those who dealt with the concern must, therefore, have known that the business was carried on by persons having no beneficial interest therein. And inquiry would at once have disclosed the terms of the will and the authority given thereby.
Passing this question, however, we come to the effect of the discharge of Turnbull from his trust under the decree. Now, the plaintiff compares this transaction to the retiring .of a partner. There is no resemblance. A partner who retires often takes some of the capital with him. At any rate, he withdraws (or assumes to withdraw) that personal liability for the partnership debts which is on him as partner. He retires voluntarily and as a matter of right. The trustee discharged by the decree takes with him no capital. The property of the trust remains unaffected. He withdraws no personal liability; for when the trust deed authorized (as did this) the incurring of liability, then the liabilities incurred must be those of the trust estate, unless by some personal act a trustee makes himself liable. Furthermore, the trustee cannot relinquish his trust at pleasure. lie can only be released by the court. Whatever the misconduct of his co-trustee, he cannot, as^. matter of right, step out of the trust.
In all these respects the supposed analogy between the two cases fails. Furthermore, it may be said generally that a trustee is liable only for his own acts or his own negligence. A partner is often liable for the acts or negligence of his copartner. Hence it is that one dealing with a partnership may look to the liability of all the partners, and therefore arises the principle that the retiring partner must give notice of his retirement, but it is not so with a trustee.
The court of equity has special power over all express trusts. It may discharge a trustee and appoint another. It may remove a trustee against his will. Would the trustee removed against his will be liable for acts subsequently done, even if he did not give notice of his removal?
Some stress is laid on the fact that prior to the decree Turnbull knew that his co-trustee, Pomeroy, was purchasing wool on credit. But it does not appear that Pomeroy was purchasing on the credit of Turnbull; and that Pomeroy should purchase on the credit of the trust estate, or on his own credit, would be no ground of liability against Turnbull. For Pomeroy was not, as co-trustee, an agent of Turnbull. Even if the trustees had divided the trust duties among them, we do not see that one would be responsible for the acts of another.
A further consideration is that which was principally relied upon by the learned justice who tried the case; that is the change in the letter-heads. We must consider that some years had elapsed between the purchases made before the decree and those made after. Then Consalus received some twenty letters in which the letter-head contained, as above stated, the name only of S. Ii. Pomeroy as trustee. As the old letter heads contained the names of the three, this charge should have put him upon inquiry.
For all these reasons we think the judgment should be affirmed, with costs.
Landon, J., concurred.