Case Name: CLARENCE LEISCHNER and MERLE JOHNS, Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. EARLE KNIGHT and WILLIAM J. FRY, JR., Mayor and Clerk, Respectively, of the City of Billings, et al., Defendants and Respondents
Court: Montana Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Montana
Decision Date: 1959-02-26
Citations: 135 Mont. 109
Docket Number: No. 9880
Parties: CLARENCE LEISCHNER and MERLE JOHNS, Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. EARLE KNIGHT and WILLIAM J. FRY, JR., Mayor and Clerk, Respectively, of the City of Billings, et al., Defendants and Respondents.
Judges: MR. JUSTICE ADAIR dissented in part and MR. JUSTICE BOTTOMLY dissented. .
Reporter: Montana Reports
Volume: 135
Pages: 109–121

Head Matter:
CLARENCE LEISCHNER and MERLE JOHNS, Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. EARLE KNIGHT and WILLIAM J. FRY, JR., Mayor and Clerk, Respectively, of the City of Billings, et al., Defendants and Respondents.
No. 9880.
Submitted January 15, 1959.
Decided February 26, 1959.
Rehearing Denied April 16, 1959.
337 Pac. (2d) 359.
MR. JUSTICE ADAIR dissented in part and MR. JUSTICE BOTTOMLY dissented. .
Mouat & Overfelt, Lee Overfelt, Billings, argued orally, for appellants. .
James F. Battin, City Atty., Billings for respondent.

Opinion:
MR. JUSTICE CASTLES:
This suit was brought by appellants, plaintiffs below, as'taxpayers. and representatives of others similarly situated (plumb ing contractors in the City of Billings) to enjoin the respondents, defendants below, including the City of Billings as a municipal corporation and public utility, from doing certain work in connection with installing new water "services" for customers of the city water system. The district court received evidence, both oral and documentary, made findings of fact and conclusions of law favorable to the defendants, and refused the relief asked by the plaintiff. The findings are amply supported by the evidence, and the questions involved in this appeal are primarily legal rather than factual.
The record indicates that the City of Billings has for many years operated a water system providing service both in and out of the city limits. As:: a part of this system, water mains are maintained in the streets. To make the water available for use it is necessary to tap into the main and run pipe to the edge of the street and at that point install a shut-off valve accessible from the surface of the land.
The pipe, valve, curb box, etc., when installed are referred to as a "service." These "services" are located entirely within the public right of way. The shut-off valve is located at the consumer's property line and is the point at which the consumer attaches his own pipe to run the water on into his building.
Effective July 1, 1956, the city established a flat rate schedule for installing these "services" and took for itself the exclusive right to do this work. Prior to that date, independent plumbing contractors could sell the required pipe and parts to the consumer and perform the necessary installation work. Since the city commenced doing the work it has supplied the material and performed the work with its own employees who are not licensed plumbers.
As we .view the. case, two significant issues are. raised. The first concerns the right and power of the city to make these installations and charge for cloing so on a flat rate basis. Second, if the city has the right to make the installations, is it required to employ licensed plumbers to do the work ?
It is well-settled law in this state that cities have only those powers granted them by statute or which are necessarily implied as adjuncts to powers granted by statute. This court has -repeatedly stated that "unless a power is vested in the municipality by express law [or by necessary implication therefrom], the presumption is against the exercise by the city of any such power." State ex rel. Great Falls Housing Authority v. City of Great Falls, 110 Mont. 318, 328, 100 Pac. (2d) 915, 921. This rule requires that we look to the statutes for the solutions to the problems raised by this case.
Cities and towns of this state are expressly granted power to secure supplies of water for use of their inhabitants by R. C. M. 1947, section 11-981, which provides:
"Securing water supply. The city or town council has power: To adopt, enter into, and carry out means for securing a supply of water for the use of a city or town or its inhabitants."
A city engaging in the water business is a public utility and subject to regulation by the Public Service Commission under the provisions of Title 70, Chapter I, R. C. M. 1947. Public Service Comm. v. City of Helena, 52 Mont. 527, 159 Pac. 24.
Any public utility including a city such as Billings is entitled to make a reasonable charge for service rendered in connection with its functions as such public utility under the provisions of R. C. M. 1947, section 70-105, reading as follows:
"Public utilities to furnish service for reasonable charges. Every public utility is required to furnish reasonably adequate service and facilities. The charge made by any public utility for any heat, light, power, water, telegraph, or telephone service, produced, transmitted, delivered, or furnished, or for any service tobe rendered as or in connection with any public utility, shall be reasonable and just, and every unjust and unreasonable charge .is prohibited and declared unlawful." Emphasis supplied.
By R. C. M. 1947, section 11-966, subd. (4), it is provided that "Cities and towns shall have jurisdiction and control over the territory occupied by their public works, and over and along the line of reservoirs, streams, trenches, pipes, drains, and other appurtenances used in the construction and operation of such works, for the enforcement of its sanitary ordinances ." Emphasis supplied.
These sections form the statutory basis upon which the right of the city to engage in the water business and make charges for the water and services provided is predicated. Section 11-981 is the basic grant of power; section 70-103 defines a city engaging in the water business under section 11-981 as a public utility; section 70-105 authorizes public utilities including cities to charge reasonable rates for both the product and the service in connection with its provision; and section 11-966 assures the city of control over its system.
All of these sections are written in very general terms and in truth they could hardly be written in any other way. Conditions vary over the state to such an extent that it would not be practical to attempt by specific legislation to spell out the methods to be used for procurement or maintenance of a water supply.
This court said in State v. Stark, 100 Mont. 365, 370, 52 Pac. (2d) 890, 892:
"Where a power is conferred upon a municipality and the mode is prescribed, such mode must be followed (State ex rel. Daly v. Dryburgh, 62 Mont. 36, 203 PaC. 508); but if no mode is prescribed, the power is to be exercised in such manner as municipal officials, in their discretion, shall determine upon. Fisher v. Stillwater County, 81 Mont. 31, 261 PaC. 607; Arnold v. Custer County, 83 Mont. 130, 269 P. 396; Lang v. City of Cavalier, 59 N. D. 75, 228 N. W. 819 ; Christensen v. Town of Kimballton, 212 Iowa 384, 233 N. W. 789, 236 N. W. 406, 407."
In Milligan v. City of Miles City, 51 Mont. 374, 153 Pac. 276, L. R. A. 1916 C, 395, this court held in effect that cities are to operate their affairs, when engaged in proprietary activities, in a businesslike manner.
To provide water for its inhabitants, the city must make some provision for tapping the main and .installing the "services. ' ' The statutes are silent as to the mode by which this is to be accomplished and therefore the city has discretionary power to decide the matter. State v. Stark, supra, and cases cited therein.
Only two practical possibilities exist, either the city must undertake to build the "services" or the work must be done by private contractors. The defendant has elected to operate under the first alternative and unless it has abused its discretion in so doing its election is unobjectionable. The alternative suggested by the appellants is to let them and other contractors do the work and pay a fee to the city for tapping into the mains. But they suggest no reason why this would better accomplish the result required, provision of adequate "services," than the method the city is presently using.
By following its present procedure'the city is assured firm control over the timing of street openings to minimize inconvenience to traffic, control over the methods and materials used, and it can be sure that the resurfacing of the street is done promptly and well.
It appears from the testimony' in the record that the cast iron mains are subject to cracking and rupture if the tapping job is not done correctly and skillfully. Interruption of water service due to ruptures in the mains are of great concern to the city not only from the standpoint of the investment involved but also from the viewpoint of public convenience and fire protection. These are interests which the city may legitimately guard under its powers to provide for the general welfare of its inhabitants. R. C. M. 1947, section 11-901; State ex rel. Altop v. City of Billings, 79 Mont. 25, 32, 255 Pac. 11, 54 A. L. R. 1091.
The appellants object to the flat rate method of charging for "service" installation. These rates were established on the basis of average cost experience over a period of years' and yield no over-all profit to the city.. For the rate charged, the consumer gets a complete job from excavation- to resurfacing., the street. The materials used are figured into the cost of the- job and no-separate- charge is made for them. ' •'
The appellants-suggest that the general water rates should be- raised 'sufficiently to provide revenue for meeting the expense of ' 'service- -installations.
However,'wé think that charging the consumer for the "service" installed for his benefit is within the scope of section 70-105, R. C. M.' -1947, and so long as the charge is reasonable and just the practice is unobjectionable.
Charging flat rates in Billings seems particularly fair since the city runs its mains on one side or the other of the street thus requiring a longer trench and pipe to reach some abutting property.. However, each abutting owner pays an equalized share of the cost of the main and it would not be equitable to charge a water user more than his neighbor across the street to use the main for' which he' paid at the same rate. Whether or not the flat rate charged is reasonable and just may be a question for the Public Service Commission under its rate-making authority, but is not a part of this action.
We are next compelled to determine whether or not section 66-2401, R. C. M. 1947, requires that the men engaged in the installation of the "services" be licensed plumbers. That section reads:
"Plumbers in' cities and towns of more than 1,000 — license required: Any person working at the business of plumbing, in any incorporated city or town in this state containing more than one thousand inhabitants, either as a master plumber or as a journeyman plumber, shall first secure a state license as hereinafter • provided. ' '
There is no question but that the work involved in putting a service into-operation includes .cutting, fitting, and handling pipes and valves. We will not rulé whether or not this is plumbing within the"méaning of the statute because, plumbing or not, we do hot think this statute contemplates the' work done by cities in constructing, maintaining, - and operating their water systems.'
Statutes such as the plumber's license provisions of Chapter 24, Title 66, it. C. M. 1947, are police regulations established in the interest of public health and welfare. See Board of Examiners of Plumbers of City of Phoenix v. Marchese, 49 Ariz. 350, 66 Pac. (2d) 1035; City of Spokane v. Latham, 181 Wash. 161, 42 Pac. (2d) 427; In re Nicholls, 74 Cal. App. 504, 241 Pac. 399, and see also State v. Stark, 100 Mont. 365, 52 Pac. (2d) 890. Police regulations are valid only so far as they bear a "reasonable relation to the public health, or safety." Pike v. Porter, 126 Mont. 482, 253 Pac. (2d) 1055, 1056.
The provisions for licensing plumbers after they have passed an examination are designed to prevent injury to the public and to individual householders from escaping water and sewage from faulty piping. But requiring licensed plumbers to install "services" would not provide the public any more protection than it has when the city itself is doing the work through employees hired and trained for the job. Since application of the statute here would not tend to promote public health and welfare, it would be an unnecessary and invalid restriction on an otherwise legitimate undertaking by the city. Protection of the public is provided by city ordinance, state law, and rules and regulations of the Public Service Commission.
If we were to rule to the contrary we would raise more problems than we would solve. Endless litigation could ensue from claims that licensed plumbers are required for every job involving pipe in city water systems. The principle might even carry over to gas pipe, electrical and telephone wires in the distribution systems of power, light, and telephone utilities, public and private. We therefore hold that section 66-2401, R. C. M. 1947, does not require the city to hire only licensed plumbers to install water "services" for its customers.
The dissenting opinion suggests that we are granting an exclusive right to cities and towns to go into the business of plumbing or other business in competition with free enterprise. Such is not the case. The record in the instant case is confined to the City's water system on its own right-of-way under the statutes of the state and rules and regulations of the Public Service Commission. It does not reveal any warehousing, furnishing and selling plumbing supplies and installation of same except as stated, and confined to its own system.
Also, we have not gone beyond the public utility field which is regulated by statute, franchise, and rules and regulations so that the suggestion that we are opening up the hiring of unlicensed persons in any field is unwarranted.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is affirmed.
MR. JUSTICE ANGSTMAN, and THE HONORABLE C. B. ELWELL, District Judge, concur.