Case Name: Lester A. FIRKEY, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1989-07-19
Citations: 557 So. 2d 582
Docket Number: No. 88-0086
Parties: Lester A. FIRKEY, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: ÁNSTEAD and GARRETT, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 557
Pages: 582–586

Head Matter:
Lester A. FIRKEY, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. 88-0086.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
July 19, 1989.
On Rehearing Feb. 14, 1990.
Second Rehearing Denied March 28, 1990.
Richard L. Jorandby, Public Defender, and Tanja Ostapoff, Asst. Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.
Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, Carolyn V. McCann, (on the brief) and James J. Carney, Asst. Attys. Gen., West Palm Beach, for appellee.

Opinion:
LETTS, Judge.
Found guilty of sexual battery on a child under the age of eleven and of engaging in a sexual performance (he videotaped the encounter), the defendant appeals claiming no penetration and no performance in front of an audience. We affirm.
The victim's testimony clearly established a sexual battery predicated on a union with the defendant's penis. However, the charge sub judice was sexual battery with a finger, under section 794.-011(l)(h), Florida Statutes (1987), which requires penetration of the vagina or anus. The defendant concedes finger contact with the vaginal folds. However, as proof that there was no actual penetration, the defense cites the testimony of the victim herself:
A. Around my vagina and around my privates and then he would go in them but he wouldn't get his finger inside my vagina, he just went right in the crack and just rubbed on it.
Q. Do you know whether or not he put his finger in your vagina?
A. No.
We have read and reread this excerpt from the victim's testimony, which was never further enlarged upon in cross-examination or on redirect and we cannot conclude that it unequivocally establishes lack of penetration, such as would support a judgment of acquittal as a matter of law.
The defendant also claims that a lack of penetration is conclusively established from the tape he made of the encounter. We have viewed it and find it likewise inconclusive.
The jury heard the evidence and viewed the tape. It found the defendant guilty as charged, a result which we leave undisturbed, deeming it to involve questions of fact. See Tibbs v. State, 397 So.2d 1120 (Fla.1981), aff'd, 457 U.S. 31, 102 S.Ct. 2211, 72 L.Ed.2d 652 (1982); Stone v. State, 547 So.2d 657 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989).
The defendant also urges us to reverse his conviction for having a child engage in a sexual performance in contravention of section 827.071, Florida Statutes (1987), because the videotape had never been exhibited before an audience as required by section 827.071(1)(b) which states:
(b) "Performance" means any play, motion picture, photograph, or dance or any other visual representation exhibited before an audience.
Conceding that the quoted statutory language might be ambiguous, we choose to interpret it to mean that the making of such a motion picture is in and of itself sufficient when any of the participants is unaware of what is going on. Obviously, the recording is made with the intention of being replayed; otherwise, the taping has no purpose. Whoever witnesses the replay constitutes an audience. See State v. George, 717 S.W.2d 857 (Mo.App.1986). The natural mother constituted an audience when she accidently played the tape and viewed the performance which led her to call the police. It is obvious that the child, albeit unwittingly, was induced to become a participant in a sexual performance and we are confident that the legislature did not intend that the creator of such a motion picture, complete with sound, should escape prosecution because he had not, as yet, had time to exhibit his vile handiwork.
Finally, the state concedes that the defendant is entitled to a guidelines score-sheet for his non-capital convictions. See Disinger v. State, 526 So.2d 213 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988). We, therefore, remand for resentencing.
We find no other reversible error.
AFFIRMED EXCEPT AS OTHERWISE DIRECTED.
ÁNSTEAD and GARRETT, JJ., concur.