Case Name: STATE of Florida, Petitioner, v. Richard CRENSHAW, Respondent
Court: Florida Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1989-08-31
Citations: 548 So. 2d 223
Docket Number: No. 72181
Parties: STATE of Florida, Petitioner, v. Richard CRENSHAW, Respondent.
Judges: EHRLICH, C.J., and McDONALD and GRIMES, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 548
Pages: 223–230

Head Matter:
STATE of Florida, Petitioner, v. Richard CRENSHAW, Respondent.
No. 72181.
Supreme Court of Florida.
Aug. 31, 1989.
Rehearing Denied Nov. 1,1989.
Curtis A. Golden, State Atty., and Jerry T. Allred, Asst. State Atty., Pensacola, for petitioner.
William B. Richbourg, Pensacola, for respondent.

Opinion:
OVERTON, Justice.
This is a petition to review Crenshaw v. State, 521 So.2d 138 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988), in which the First District Court set aside the trial court's order of a forfeiture, holding that, before there can be a forfeiture of a vehicle for a felony possession of drugs found on a person in the vehicle, there must be a showing that the vehicle played some part in the drug activity. We disagree and find that the instant decision conflicts with Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles v. Pollack, 462 So.2d 1199 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985); In re Forfeiture of a 1977 Datsun 280Z, 448 So.2d 78 (Fla. 4th DCA), review denied 453 So.2d 43 (Fla.1984); City of Clearwater v. Malick, 429 So.2d 718 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983), and Naples Police Department v. Small, 426 So.2d 72 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983). We have jurisdiction. We hold that the legislature intended for forfeiture to be an appropriate penalty where an individual possesses a felony amount of drugs while in a vehicle, even if the drugs are intended solely for personal use. The pertinent portions of the Florida Contraband Forfeiture Act, namely, sections 932.701-932.704, Florida Statutes (1985), are as follows:
932.701 Short title; definition of "contraband article".—
(1)Sections 932.701-932.704 shall be known and may be cited as the "Florida Contraband Forfeiture Act."
932.702 Unlawful to transport, conceal, or possess contraband articles; use of vessel, motor vehicle, or aircraft. — It is unlawful:
(1) To transport, carry, or convey any contraband article in, upon, or by means of any vessel, motor vehicle, or aircraft.
(2) To conceal or possess any contraband article in or upon any vessel, motor vehicle, or aircraft.
(3) To use any vessel, motor vehicle, or aircraft to facilitate the transportation, carriage, conveyance, concealment, receipt, possession, purchase, sale, barter, exchange, or giving away of any contraband article.
(4) To conceal or possess any contraband article.
932.703 Forfeiture of vessel, motor vehicle, aircraft, other personal property, or contraband article; exceptions.—
(1) Any vessel, motor vehicle, aircraft, and other personal property which has been or is being used in violation of any provision of s. 932.702, or in, upon, or by means of which any violation of that section has taken or is taking place, as well as any contraband article involved in the violation, may be seized and shall be forfeited subject to the provisions of this act_ In any incident in which possession of any contraband article defined in s. 932.701(2)(a)~(d) constitutes a felony, the vessel, motor vehicle, aircraft, or personal property in or on which such contraband article is located at the time of seizure shall be con traband subject to forfeiture. It shall be presumed in the manner provided in s. 90.302(2) that the vessel, motor vehicle, aircraft, or personal property in or on which such contraband article is located at the time of seizure is being used or was intended to be used in a manner to facilitate the transportation, carriage, conveyance, concealment, receipt, possession, purchase, sale, barter, exchange, or giving away of a contraband article defined in s. 932.701(2)(a)-(d).
(Emphasis added.)
The unrefuted facts reflect that, after an informant gave the Pensacola Police Department information that the driver of a 1984 Volvo was carrying cocaine, the police stopped Crenshaw, the driver of that car, searched him, and found a vial of cocaine containing less than one gram on his person. Subsequently, the police arrested him for possession of cocaine, took his automobile into custody, and timely filed a petition for forfeiture. Crenshaw admitted possessing the cocaine for his own use. At the forfeiture hearing, he admitted to a prior federal conviction and prison sentence for possession of illegal drugs with the intent to distribute.
The First District Court of Appeal set aside the forfeiture ordered by the trial judge, stating that the "use of the vehicle must play some part in carrying out a prohibited criminal transaction involving the contraband drugs that is shown to be more than remotely incidental to an occupant's possession of illicit drugs for purely personal use." 521 So.2d at 141. The district court rejected the state's claim that section 932.702(4), a 1980 amendment to the forfeiture statute, eliminated the necessity to show a nexus between the possession of the drugs and the illicit use of the vehicle, reasoning that the amendment "did not clearly and unambiguously eliminate the necessity for any nexus or relationship between the concealment or possession of contraband drugs and an illicit use of the vehicle." Id.
The issue in this case is whether the provisions of Florida's Contraband Forfeiture Act direct vehicle forfeiture when the driver or occupant unlawfully possesses drugs constituting a felony on his person without evidence that the drugs were for sale or distribution.
Civil forfeitures of property belonging to defendants convicted of criminal offenses is not something new. Under the English common law, a convicted person's property could be confiscated even though it was not connected to the crime. See Comment, State and Federal Forfeiture of Property Involved in Drug Transactions, 92 Dick-enson L.Rev. 461, 463 (1988) (citing I. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 298-300 (1898)). Recently, the United States Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of statutes allowing the pretrial restraint of criminal defendants' assets which the defendants plan to use to pay legal fees. See Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered, — U.S. —, 109 S.Ct. 2646, 105 L.Ed.2d 528 (1989); United States v. Monsanto, — U.S. —, 109 S.Ct. 2657, 105 L.Ed.2d 512 (1989).
In Griffis v. State, 356 So.2d 297 (Fla.1978), receded from, Duckham v. State, 478 So.2d 347 (Fla.1985), we construed sections 943.41-943.44, Florida Statutes (1975), to require a nexus and explained that mere possession of a controlled substance was insufficient to justify a forfeiture. We based that construction on the legislative intent of. the statute, stating: Griffis, 356 So.2d at 299. Our reasoning was in part controlled by language in chapter 943, which bound our forfeiture statute to the federal forfeiture provisions.
Although a literal reading of the language contained in Section 943.42, Florida Statutes (1975), would support the trial court's finding that the statute does not require that a vehicle be used in an illegal drug "operation," this literal reading must give way to the legislative intent in enacting the statute which is plainly to the contrary. To effect the legislative intent, we must construe Sections 943.41, et seq., Florida Statutes (1975), as requiring a showing by the State that the seized vehicle is involved in a drug trafficking operation before forfeiture can be ordered....
In 1980, the legislature substantially amended our forfeiture law. Subsequently, in Duckham v. State, 478 So.2d 347 (Fla.1985), we held that the forfeiture of an automobile was an appropriate penalty for a defendant who solely used that automobile to take him to the location where the drug deal transpired. No drugs had been transported nor had any conversation taken place in the car. In permitting forfeiture, we noted that the legislature had substantially amended the relevant provisions of the forfeiture statute since Griffis, changing the title from "Florida Uniform Contraband Transportation Act" to "Florida Contraband Forfeiture Act," and adding paragraph (4) to section 932.702 "making it unlawful to 'conceal or possess any contraband article.' " Id. at 349.
Since the amendment, three district courts of appeal have approved forfeitures when the drugs in the vehicle appeared to be possessed for personal use and no nexus with the vehicle was established. In In re Forfeiture of a 1977 Datsun 280Z, 448 So.2d 78 (Fla. 4th DCA), review denied, 453 So.2d 43 (Fla.1984), the police observed an individual in the process of loading a cube of hashish into a pipe while in his automobile and eventually found two and one-half diazepam tablets and eight grams of hashish in the automobile. In approving forfeiture, the court stated: "There is no exception for cases involving small quantities of drugs, provided a felony amount is at issue." Id. at 79 (citation omitted). In City of Clearwater v. Malick, 429 So.2d 718 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983), the Second District Court permitted the forfeiture of a van where the owner and a friend were preparing to snort cocaine in the van when the police arrived. The district court held that the forfeiture act "provides for seizure and forfeiture of a vehicle when contraband is . possessed in it, if possession of the contraband constitutes a felony." Id. at 719 (citations omitted). In Naples Police Department v. Small, 426 So.2d 72 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983), the police arrested Small and found twelve methaqualone tablets in a briefcase in the trunk of his automobile. The trial court denied forfeiture because the facts showed mere possession of the tablets. On appeal, the district court reversed and approved the forfeiture, stating that "if a vehicle contained a felony amount of contraband, then the state could forfeit the vehicle." Id. (citation omitted). In Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles v. Pollack, 462 So.2d 1199 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985), a highway patrolman found methaqualone on the seat and the console of Pollack's vehicle while conducting an authorized search for Pollack's keys. The district court permitted a forfeiture and stated: "While the penalty is admittedly harsh, the legislature has apparently decided that the forfeiture of vehicles for mere felony possession will be helpful in the fight against the trafficking, transportation, sale, use and possession of drugs." Id. at 1201.
We find that the legislature unambiguously intended that a forfeiture is proper under the instant facts. Section 932.702(4), added in 1980, makes it unlawful "to conceal or possess any contraband article." Further, section 932.703(1) in pertinent part states: "In any incident in which possession of any contraband article defined in s. 932.701(2)(aHd) constitutes a felony, the vessel, motor vehicle, aircraft, or personal property in or on which such contraband article is located at the time of seizure shall be contraband subject to forfeiture." (Emphasis added.) We find that the legislative message was clear: possessing drugs, even solely for personal use, subjects individuals not only to criminal penalties but also to forfeiture of the vehicle, boat, or aircraft in which the drugs are found. It makes no difference whether the drugs are on the seat, in the console, or in the occupant's pocket.
Accordingly, we quash the decision of the district court of appeal and remand with directions to reinstate the forfeiture judgment entered by the trial court.
It is so ordered.
EHRLICH, C.J., and McDONALD and GRIMES, JJ., concur.
KOGAN, J., dissents with an opinion, in which SHAW and BARKETT, JJ., concur.
. Art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const.
. These sections were amended in 1980 and subsequently renumbered as 932.701-932.704.