Case Name: Michael D. CLAUSEN, Appellant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee
Court: Supreme Court of Indiana
Jurisdiction: Indiana
Decision Date: 1993-10-26
Citations: 622 N.E.2d 925
Docket Number: No. 76S03-9310-CR-1172
Parties: Michael D. CLAUSEN, Appellant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee.
Judges: SHEPARD, C.J., DeBRULER and GIVAN, JJ., concur.
Reporter: North Eastern Reporter 2d
Volume: 622
Pages: 925–930

Head Matter:
Michael D. CLAUSEN, Appellant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee.
No. 76S03-9310-CR-1172.
Supreme Court of Indiana.
Oct. 26, 1993.
Latriealle Wheat, Wheat and Stout, Angola, for appellant.
Pamela Carter, Atty. Gen. of Indiana, Sue A. Bradley, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellee.

Opinion:
ON PETITION TO TRANSFER
KRAHULIK, Justice.
Michael D. Clausen (Defendant-Appellant) was found guilty by jury on two counts of child molesting, class B felonies, Ind. Code Ann. § 35-42-4-3(a) (West 1986). He received a sentence of eight years on each count to be served concurrently, with two years on each count suspended with probation. The Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions. Clausen v. State (1993), Ind.App., 612 N.E.2d 147. In his petition to transfer, Clausen raises the following issues which we restate as:
(1) Whether the trial court erred in admitting evidence of Clausen's prior acts of sexual misconduct; and
(2) Whether the trial court erred in ordering Clausen to make restitution to the victim by paying for her counselling sessions.
The events which form the basis of the charges against Clausen occurred while S.E., an eleven-year-old child, lived with her grandmother, mother, siblings, and Clau-sen, who is her step-father, in her grandmother's house. On April 19, 1987, as S.E. prepared for bed, Clausen came into her room, removed his clothes and began kissing her. Clausen then removed S.E.'s clothes and forced her to perform and to submit to oral sex.
Before trial, Clausen filed a motion in limine which would have required the State to refrain from mentioning any prior acts of sexual misconduct by Clausen. The motion was denied.
At trial, S.E. testified in detail to the acts which occurred the night of April 19, 1987. S.E. also testified about other acts of sexual misconduct involving Clausen which occurred while S.E. was between the ages of eight and twelve. In addition, Clausen's thirty-six year old adopted daughter, R.R., testified that, from the age of five or six until the age of ten or twelve, Clausen had fondled her on numerous occasions while she was in bed. Clausen admitted at trial to one incident of sexual misconduct with R.R., but denied touching S.E. in any sexual way.
Clausen did not object at trial to R.R.'s testimony. The day of the sentencing hearing, Clausen filed a motion to reopen the record for the purpose of inserting an objection to precede R.R.'s testimony. The trial court granted the motion and placed the following in the record immediately preceding R.R.'s testimony:
Upon motion of Defendant made and filed at sentencing hearing and granted by the Court, the following objection is inserted in the record in order to preserve appeal on an issue raised by Defendant by Motion in Limine.
"OBJECTION"
THE DEFENDANT: The defense objects to the testimony of this witness for all of the reasons specified in the Motion in Limine previously filed.
THE COURT: Objection overruled. The witness may testify.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions after determining that Clausen waived any error for appellate review regarding the testimony of R.R. because he failed to make a timely objection at trial. In his petition to transfer, Clausen asserts that because the trial court granted his motion and inserted the objection into the record, the error was preserved for appeal.
Clausen supports his position with Walker v. State (1992), Ind., 587 N.E.2d 675. In Walker, after both parties had rested, defense counsel received a telephone call from a potential witness who would have testified in an attempt to impeach one of the State's witnesses. The trial court refused to reopen the case. This Court held that the determination of whether to reopen a case for additional evidence rests within the sound discretion of the trial court and the ruling will be reversed only if it was unreasonable in light of the surrounding circumstances. Id. at 677. Thus, defense counsel intended to present a witness of which counsel was not aware during the trial. Here, in contrast, Clausen was aware that the evidence of his prior sexual misconduct would be presented, realized "almost immediately that I had not [made the objection]" but failed to correct the error at that time. The granting of a motion to reopen a case is intended to allow the introduction of additional evidence. On the other hand, an objection to the admission of testimony is not evidence, but rather a means of protecting and creating the record. Therefore, the holding of Walker does not control.
This Court has consistently held that in order to preserve error in the overruling of a pre-trial motion in limine, the appealing party also must have objected to the admission of the evidence at the time it was offered. Conner v. State (1991), Ind., 580 N.E.2d 214, 220, cert. denied — U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 1501, 117 L.Ed.2d 640 (1992); Emerson v. State (1988), Ind., 524 N.E.2d 314, 315; Waters v. State (1981), 275 Ind. 182, 415 N.E.2d 711, 713. Failure to object at trial to the admission of the evidence results in waiver of the error. Conner, 580 N.E.2d at 220.
Clausen did not object before R.R. testified about the prior sexual misconduct. In fact, the record reveals that the only objection made by Clausen during R.R.'s testimony was an objection asserting that the answer to a question would be hearsay. The trial court sustained that objection. But, in regards to R.R.'s testimony of prior sexual misconduct by Clausen, at no time preceding or during the testimony of R.R. did Clausen object. Clausen's objection to R.R.'s testimony occurred subsequent to the trial by means of a motion filed on the day of the sentencing hearing.
A motion in limine is used as a protective order against prejudicial questions-and statements being asked during trial. Baker v. State (1981), Ind., 425 N.E.2d 98, 101. The ruling does not determine the ultimate admissibility of the evidence; that determination is made by the trial court in the context of the trial itself. Id. at 101-102. Because the pre-trial denial of a motion in limine is a preliminary rul ing, this denial alone is insufficient to preserve error for an incorrect ruling on the motion. Conner, 580 N.E.2d at 220. By requiring that an objection be made during the trial at the time when the testimony is offered into evidence, the trial court is able to consider the evidence in the context in which it is being offered and is able to make a final determination on admissibility. The parties and trial court may not take it upon themselves to create a hypothetical record of what would have occurred had the appropriate objection been made at the appropriate time during the trial. By inserting the objection after the trial as a means of "cleaning-up" the record, the trial court is stripped of the opportunity to rule on the admissibility of the evidence in context. Additionally, on review, this Court will only examine what actually transpired at the trial. Consequently, a defendant is unable to resurrect an error once it is waived, even if the State acquiesces in the defendant's attempt to do so. Because Clausen failed to make a timely objection to the evidence at trial, he has waived the error on appellate review.
Additionally, Clausen challenged the admissibility of R.R.'s testimony regarding previous alleged sexual misconduct relying on Lannan v. State (1992), Ind., 600 N.E.2d 1334. However, in Pirnat v. State (1993), Ind., 607 N.E.2d 973, 974, we determined that only those cases pending on direct appeal where the error had been preserved would be reviewed under Lannan. Because Clausen failed to preserve the error, we need not address the issue.
The Court of Appeals also addressed Clausen's arguments that the trial court erred in ordering him to make restitution by paying the costs of S.E.'s counsel-ling sessions. We have considered the arguments on this issue and conclude that the Court of Appeals correctly decided the issue. Therefore, pursuant to Indiana Appellate Rule 11(B)(3), we adopt and incorporate by reference that portion of the Court of Appeals opinion which addresses the restitution issue.
Conclusion
Accordingly, we grant transfer, vacate the opinion of the Court of Appeals except as to the issue adopted and incorporated by reference, affirm the convictions and remand for a hearing on restitution.
SHEPARD, C.J., DeBRULER and GIVAN, JJ., concur.
DICKSON, J., dissents, with separate opinion.