Case Name: Frank J. ARNONA, Sr. v. Lorraine Terrel ARNONA
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1985-08-06
Citations: 477 So. 2d 120
Docket Number: No. CA 3508
Parties: Frank J. ARNONA, Sr. v. Lorraine Terrel ARNONA.
Judges: Before SCHOTT, GARRISON and WARD, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 477
Pages: 120–123

Head Matter:
Frank J. ARNONA, Sr. v. Lorraine Terrel ARNONA.
No. CA 3508.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fourth Circuit.
Aug. 6, 1985.
Rehearing Denied Oct. 30, 1985.
Writ Denied Dec. 13, 1985.
Adelaide Baudier, Metairie, for plaintiff-appellee.
Martin A. Welp, New Orleans, for defendant-appellant.
Before SCHOTT, GARRISON and WARD, JJ.

Opinion:
GARRISON, Judge.
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Second City Court, City of New Orleans dated January 23,1985 rendered in favor of plaintiff Frank J. Arnona, Sr. and against defendant Lorraine Terrell Arnona, ordering her to vacate the premises at 1334 Pace Blvd. in New Orleans within 24 hours. From that judgment, defendant has sus-pensively appealed. Plaintiff has answered arguing that the appeal is frivolous, that it was taken solely for delay, and that he should be awarded attorney's fees and costs.
In her brief, defendant states the following facts:
"Lorraine Terrell and Francis J. Arnona, Sr., were married on October 1, 1955. Twenty-five years later, a legal separation was granted based on mutual fault. Subsequently, Mr. Arnona filed a Petition for a Partition in the Civil District Court for the Parish of Orleans under Proceeding No. 79-12554. The said partition is not yet completed. However, after a hearing, the District Court rendered a judgment that fixes the value of the community assets and the community liabilities. The judgment also decreed that the resident at 1334 Pace Boulevard, New Orleans, Louisiana, is the separate property of Francis J. Arnona, Sr. Francis J. Arnona, Sr., then filed a Rule for Possession of the Premises in the Second City Court for the City of New Orleans."
Apparently a hearing was held on a "rule" docket, but no argument was recorded or transcribed and no testimony was offered. Accordingly, there is no transcript. The trial court judge provided a narrative stating:
"No testimony was taken at trial of the rule and it was stipulated that the residence in question was the separate property of the Mover in Rule.
After hearing arguments of counsel the Court rendered Judgment making the rule absolute."
On appeal, defendant argues that the judgment rendered is an absolute nullity and that the trial court erred when it made the rule absolute without proof of jurisdiction being entered into the record.
C.C.P. Art. 4841 provides as follows: "A. The subject matter jurisdiction of parish courts, city courts, and justice of the peace courts is limited by the amount in dispute and by the nature of the proceeding, as provided in this Chapter." (emphasis added).
C.C.P. Art. 4845(A)(5) provides:
"A. A parish court or city court shall have jurisdiction, concurrent with the district court, over suits by owners and landlords for the possession of leased premises within its territorial jurisdiction, as follows:

"(5) Where the suit is to evict an occupant as defined by Article 4704, if the annual value of the right of occupancy does not exceed the amount in dispute to which the jurisdiction of the court is limited by Articles 4842 and 4843."
C.C.P. Art. 4843 provides:
"The civil jurisdiction of a city court is concurrent with the district court in cases where the amount in dispute, or the value of the property involved, does not exceed five thousand dollars."
Thus the subject matter jurisdiction of Second City Court is limited by an annual value of the right of occupancy not exceeding $5,000.00.
There is neither evidence nor an allegation in the record indicating what the value of Mr. Arnona's right of occupancy might be.
C.C.P. Art. 4 provides as follows:
"When the jurisdiction of a court over the subject matter of an action depends upon the amount in dispute, or value of the right asserted, it shall be determined by the amount demanded or value asserted in good faith by the plaintiff." (emphasis added).
Thus the burden rests upon plaintiff to allege and show the value of the right. Plaintiff in the instant case failed to meet that burden.
C.C.P. Art. 2 defines subject matter or "jurisdiction ratione materiae" as follows:
"Jurisdiction over the subject matter is the legal power and authority of a court to hear and determine a particular class of actions or proceedings, based upon the object of the demand, the amount in dispute, or the value of the right asserted."
Unlike "jurisdiction ratione personae" or jurisdiction over the person, subject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived either by a general appearance under C.C.P. Art. 7 or by failure to object by declinatory exception under C.C.P. Art. 925. Lastly, C.C.P. Art. 3 provides as follows:
"The jurisdiction of a court over the subject matter of an action or proceeding cannot be conferred by consent of the parties. A judgment rendered by a court which has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action or proceeding is void."
Accordingly, Second City Court was without subject matter jurisdiction over this proceeding and the judgment rendered is an absolute nullity. For the reasons discussed, the judgment of the Second City Court is vacated, annulled and set aside.
VACATED, ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE.