Case Name: PATTERSON v. ESTATE OF FLICK
Court: Michigan Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1976-05-27
Citations: 69 Mich. App. 101
Docket Number: Docket No. 22324
Parties: PATTERSON v ESTATE OF FLICK
Judges: Before: Bashara, P. J., and D. F. Walsh, and W. S. White, JJ.
Reporter: Michigan appeals reports; cases decided in the Michigan Court of Appeals.
Volume: 69
Pages: 101–113

Head Matter:
PATTERSON v ESTATE OF FLICK
Opinion of the Court
1. Limitation of Actions — Malpractice—Physicians and Surgeons.
A cause of action based on malpractice against a state licensed physician must be brought within two years of the time when the physician discontinues treating or otherwise serving the plaintiff, or within two years of the time when plaintiff discovers, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered, the asserted malpractice, whichever is later.
2. Limitation of Actions — Malpractice—Discovery of Malpractice — Discontinuance of Treatment — Statutes—Physicians and Surgeons.
The plaintiff in a malpractice action, arising after plaintiffs right femoral nerve was severed during an appendectomy, discovered the asserted malpractice immediately following the operation when she experienced paralysis and numbness in her right leg and she was informed by her doctor that he severed the nerve; therefore, plaintiffs action was barred by the statute of limitations where the litigation was commenced approximately 4-1/2 years after discovery of the asserted malpractice and 3-1/2 years after discontinuance of treatment by the doctor (MCLA 600.5805[3], 600.5838; MSA 27A.5805[3]; 27A.5838).
3. Limitation of Actions — Fraudulent Concealment — Affirmative Acts.
Fraudulent concealment requires actions of an affirmative character to purposely conceal the right of action from a plaintiff.
Dissent by W. S. White, J.
4. Limitation of Actions — Malpractice—Discovery Rule.
The limitation statute in malpractice cases does not start to run until the date of discovery or the date when, by the exercise of reasonable care, the plaintiff should have discovered the invasion of a legal right belonging to the plaintiff.
References for Points in Headnotes
[1, 2, 4, 5] 61 Am Jur 2d, Physicians and Surgeons §§ 181-185.
51 Am Jur 2d, Limitation of Actions §§ 146-152.
61 Am Jur 2d, Physicians and Surgeons §§ 212-214.
47 Am Jur 2d, Jury § 14.
51 Am Jur 2d, Limitation of Actions § 450.
37 Am Jur 2d, Fraud and Deceit §§ 331, 423-425, 432-436.
5. Limitation of Actions — Malpractice—Discovery of Malpractice — Jury—Reasonable Person — Physicians and Surgeons.
The plaintiff in a malpractice action, arising after plaintiff’s right femoral nerve was severed during an appendectomy, did not discover her cause of action until she visited a specialist over four years after the operation who told her she would never recover total use of the leg, although the plaintiff had been informed immediately after the operation that her nerve had been cut and that her right leg was at least temporarily paralyzed; however, the case should be remanded for a jury disposition of whether a reasonable person would have discovered the malpractice at an earlier date.
6. Trial — Malpractice—Determination of Facts — Jury—Pleadings — Reasonable Minds.
A trial court should, after a motion for accelerated judgment in a malpractice case, avoid empaneling a jury for a determination of facts where reasonable minds could not differ as to the facts and conclusions to be drawn from the pleadings.
7. Jury — Reasonability.
The determination of reasonability is generally within the sole province of the jury.
8. Limitation of Actions — Fraudulent Concealment — Estoppel.
A party who has deliberately misled a potential plaintiff by concealment or otherwise in order to induce a belief that a cause of action does not exist is estopped from relying upon the statute of limitations.
9. Fraud — Pleadings—Court Rules.
Fraud must be specially pleaded (GCR 1963, 112.2).
Appeal from Oakland, James S. Thorburn, J.
Submitted November 14, 1975, at Detroit.
(Docket No. 22324.)
Decided May 27, 1976.
Leave to appeal applied for.
Complaint by Margaret Patterson against the estate of Dr. John R. Flick, deceased, for damages for malpractice. Accelerated judgment for defendant. Plaintiff appeals.
Affirmed.
Marston, Sachs, O’Connell, Nunn & Freíd, P. C. (by Barry P. Waldman), for plaintiff.
Kitch & Suhrheinrich, P. C. (by Paul W. Hines), for defendant.
Before: Bashara, P. J., and D. F. Walsh, and W. S. White, JJ.
Circuit judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.

Opinion:
Bashara, P. J.
We adopt the statement of facts from the dissenting opinion of Judge White. However, we cannot agree with the result reached by Judge White.
In Michigan a cause of action based on malpractice against a state licensed physician must be brought within two years of the time when the physician discontinues treating or otherwise serving the plaintiff, or within two years of the time when the plaintiff discovers, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered, the asserted malpractice, whichever is later. Dyke v Richard, 390 Mich 739, 747; 213 NW2d 185 (1973).
The complaint alleges negligence on the part of Dr. Flick in severing the appellant's femoral nerve during an appendectomy in April of 1969. As a matter of law the appellant discovered the asserted malpractice when she was informed by Dr. Flick immediately following the operation that he severed the nerve and she experienced paralysis and numbness in her right leg. Dr. Flick continued to treat the appellant for approximately one more year.
The litigation in the case at bar commenced in November of 1973, approximately 4-1/2 years after discovery of the asserted malpractice and 3-1/2 years after discontinuance of treatment by Dr. Flick. The trial judge correctly granted accelerated judgment, GCR 1963, 116.1(5), on the ground the action was barred by the statute of limitations. MCLA 600.5805(3); MSA 27A.5805(3), and MCLA 600.5838; MSA 27A.5838. Dyke v Richard, supra.
We believe that if the discovery rule is expanded to the extent suggested in the dissenting opinion, it would virtually be impossible to obtain accelerated judgment grounded on the statute of limitations. Most people do not recognize the fact that they have suffered an "invasion of a legal right" until they consult with an attorney. To forestall the running of the statute of limitations to that point would, for all practical purposes, abolish the statute of limitations in medical malpractice cases.
Nor do we agree with appellant's contention that Dr. Flick fraudulently concealed the malpractice tolling the statute of limitations. MCLA 600.5855; MSA 27A.5855. Fraudulent concealment requires actions of an affirmative character to purposely conceal the right of action from the plaintiff. De Haan v Winter, 258 Mich 293; 241 NW 923 (1932). Appellant's complaint failed to allege that Dr. Flick intentionally concealed the cause of action.
Affirmed. Costs to appellees.
D. F. Walsh, J., concurred.