Case Name: Rice v. Palmer
Court: Arkansas Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Arkansas
Decision Date: 1906-04-23
Citations: 78 Ark. 432
Docket Number: 
Parties: Rice v. Palmer.
Judges: Justices Battre and Wood concur.
Reporter: Arkansas Reports
Volume: 78
Pages: 432–468

Head Matter:
Rice v. Palmer.
Opinion delivered April 23, 1906.
1. Constitutional amendment — adoption.—The question whether an amendment to the Constitution has been adopted by the required majority is not concluded by the action of the Speaker in joint session of the two houses of the Legislature in declaring it adopted, followed by the Governor’s proclamation to the same effect, but is a judicial question to be settled by the courts. (Page 438.)
2. Same, — power oe speaker to declare result of election. — Kirby’s Digest, § 718, providing that “if it shall appear that a majority of the electors voting at such election adopt such amendment, then the Speaker shall declare such proposed amendment duly adopted by the people of Arkansas,” only calls for a decision by the Speaker from the face of the retúrns, and does not deprive the courts of jurisdiction to determine whether any particular amendment has been adopted by the constitutional majority. (Page 440.)
3. Same — majority required To adopt. — Under Const. 1874, art. 19, § 22, providing that amendments to the Constitution shall be submitted to the electors of the State for approval or rejection at a general election for senators and representatives, and that “if a majority of the electors voting in such election adopt such amendments the same shall become a part of the Constitution,” the majority necessary to adopt an amendment must be a majority of the electors voting at a general election for senators and representatives, and not a mere majority of those voting on (he subject of the amendment. (Page 446.)
Appeal from Lincoln Circuit . Court; Antonio B. Grace, Judge;
reversed.
R. R. Rice brought suit, under the usurpation statute (Kirby’s Digest, c. 155), against Henry D. Palmer to recover possession-of the office of circuit clerk of Lincoln County.
The cause was tried before the circuit judge sitting as a jury, and these findings of facts were made, towit:
“That the plaintiff is a citizen of Lincoln County, Arkansas, and was on the 31st of October, 1904, eligible to the office of clerk of the circuit court of that county. That at the general election held in that county in September, 1902, the defendant, H. D. Palmer, was duly elected to the said office of circuit clerk. That he qualified as such on the 31st of October, 1902, entered upon the discharge of his duties as such, and has continued to hold such office from that time to this. That in the general elec tion held in said county in 1904 one B. A. Meroney was duly elected to the office for the ensuing term, and thereafter, but before he had received a commission or qualified, he departed this life. That on the 31st day of October, 1904, the Governor of the State, by commission of that date, appointed and commissioned the plaintiff to be the circuit clerk of the county during the term made vacant by the death of said Meroney. That said commission was duly received by the plaintiff, who gave bond as the law prescribes, which was presented to the judge of the county court of Rincoln County during the vacation of the court, and was by him approved. That plaintiff took and subscribed the oath prescribed in the Constitution, and thereupon demanded of the defendant that he surrender to plaintiff the office of circuit clerk, which defendant declined to do. That the Governor, in appointing the plaintiff to the office of clerk, assumed to act under and by virtue of the authority contained in Amendment No. 3 to the Constitution of the State of Arkansas; that said amendment was duly submitted to the qualified voters of the State at the general election in September, 1894; that the vote upon said amendment was duly submitted to the joint assembly of the two houses of the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas on January 17, 1895, when it was ascertained that there had been 43,446 votes in favor of the amendment and 40,207 against it; and thereupon the said amendment was declared by the-Speaker of the House of Representatives, as presiding officer of the said joint assembly, to have been duly adopted by the people of Arkansas; and thereupon the said speaker caused a true copy of said amendment to be signed by the President of the Senate and himself, and attested by the secretary of the Senate and the Clerk of the House of Representatives, and to be filed in the office of the Secretary of State,-there to remain as a record in said office; and thereupon the Governor published his proclamation in a newspaper of general circulation, announcing the ratification and adoption of said amendment. That the return made to the said joint assembly of the vote cast in said election in 1894, showed that there had been a total vote of 126,986 cast for the office of Governor.”
And upon said finding of facts the court declares the law to be as follows:
“1. That there was a vacancy in the office of circuit clerk of Lincoln County on the 31st of October, 1904, to be filled in the manner prescribed by law.
“2. That Amendment No. 3 to the Constitution of the State of Arkansas was not ratified and adopted by vote of the people at the general election in September, 1894, and is not a part of the Constitution of the State.
“3. That the defendant by virtue of his election and qualification as circuit clerk in 1902, and the subsequent death of B. A. Meroney before his qualification in 1904, is entitled to hold the office and perform the duties of same until his successor is elected in the manner provided by section 50, article 7, of the Constitution of this State.”
Judgment was entered for defendant, and plaintiff appealed.
Cantrell & Loughborough and Rose, Hemingway & Rose, for appellant.
I. The finding of the joint session of the Legislature, being upon a political question, is final, and is not subject to review in the courts. Section 22, art. 19, Const., prescribes the essential steps for the valid adoption of an amendment. 'No provision exists in the Constitution specifying the details for submitting the amendment, and necessarily these matters were reserved for the Legislature to provide for. These details are found in Kirby’s Digest, § § 703, 718. A State constitution is not an enumeration of powers in the legislative department, but is a restriction of supreme legislative power. The Legislature can exercise all the power not expressly or impliedly prohibited by the Constitution. 1 Ark. 513; 15 Ark. 619; 31 Ark. 511; 26 Ark. 323; Cooley on Const. Lim. 205. The power, therefore, since there is no prohibition in the Constitution, existed in the Legislature to constitute a body to ascertain the result of an election for an amendment, and to make the finding of this body conclusive. Such an act does not invade the province of the judiciary. Cooley on Const. Lim. no. The General Assembly is empowered to provide by law the mode of contesting elections in cases not specifically provided for in the Constitution. Sec. 24, art. 19, Const. Since it appears by sec. 31, art. 7, Const., that the framers of the Constitution intended that contests for the offices there enumerated should be taken to the courts, they must have intended that in contests of other elections the Legislature should be supreme. It has been held that the Legislature might create a special tribunal to hear election contests. 32 Ark. 533. See also 62 Mich. 466; 1 Met. (Ky.), 533; 15 Ohio St. 114; 531 Ohio St. 250. And the finding of that tribunal or person is conclusive. 22 Md. 170; 77 Ga. 544. See also 83 Ga. 180; 27 La. Am. 544; 84 N. C. 158; 86 N. C. 8; Cooley, Const. Lim. 75; 40 Atl. 740; 29 Ark. 173; 7 Plow. 1-7; 69 Ind. 505; 32 Me. 508. Having the power to constitute a body to ascertain the result of an election for an amendment, the Legislature has done so by the enactment of sections 717 and 718, Kirby’s Digest, and the result of the election as announced by the joint assembly is conclusive. 78 Md. 152, and authorities supra.
2. The finding of the joint assembly can be reviewed, if at all, only in a direct proceeding. The conclusions of canvassing boards on the result of an election are not open to collateral attack. 15 Cyc. 387; McCrary on Elections, § 316; Cooley, Const. Lim. 938; 32 Tex. 243.
3. If the court holds that it is at liberty to inquire into the number of votes cast at the election upon the amendment, then it is submitted that the amendment received the number of votes required by the Constitution. Sec. 22, art. 19, Const. - If the term “electors voting at such election” was intended by the framers of the Constitution to refer to all who might appear at the polls and vote on measures other than the amendment, then the majority required is foreign to the spirit of our gbvernment and to the spirit of the Constitution itself, as evidenced by its other provisions. Electors present at an election and not voting acquiesce in the election made by those who do vote. 2 Burrow, 1017; 16 Wall. 644. See also 20 Wis. 572; 130 N. Y. 319; 29 Kan. 36; 68 Md. 146; 5 N. D. 594; 20 Ore. 154; 22 Minn. 400 ; 20 N. Y. App. 53; 49 La. Ann. 442; 40 Atl. (N. J.) 740, 47 S. W. (Ky.) 773; 41 Eed. 322; 1 Wash. 303; 16 Wall. 644; 95 U. S. 360; 111 U. S. 565; 45 Ark. 400; 67 Ark. 591; 69 Ark. 336.
4. There was a vacancy in the office at the time appellant was appointed, by reason of the death of Meroney, who had been elected but had died before the time came to qualify. Appellee, the former incumbent, had no title to the term, but only had au thority to hold over for the public convenience until the vacancy could be filled. 73 Pac. 582.
Taylor & Jones, for appellee.
1. The amendment was never legally adopted. Appellee contends that the framers of the Constitution intended by the provisions of sec. 22, art. 19 Const. 1874, that the adoption of a proposed amendment should be by a majority of the electors voting at a general election at which senators and representatives were to be chosen, and not by a mere majority of electors voting on the question of the amendment. Knight v. Shelton, 134 Fed. 423; 17 Neb. 188; 51 Neb. 801; 46 Ohio St. 677; 77 Miss. 545; 37 Wis. 524, criticising, if not overruling, 20 Wis. 544; 54 Mo. 392; 73 Mo. 435; 138 Mo. 187; 16 Minn. 249; 22 Minn. 53; 102 Cal. 298; 108 Mich. 693; 99 Ky. 475; 20 Ill. 160; 48 Ill. 263; 68 Ill. 132; 15 Kan. 500; 47 Pac. 259; 20 Ore. 154; 68 Md. 140. The importance of contemporaneous legislative and executive construction is recognized, but such construction, to influence courts, must have been uniform, and within a reasonable time of the enactment construed. Cooley on Const. Tim. (5 Ed.), 67; 105 U. S. 691, 695; 110 U. S. 219-21; 147 U. S. 661; 152 U. S. 384; 163 U. S. 331; 181 U. S. 283. In this State such construction has not been uniform. The State Board, composed of the Governor, Attorney General and Secretary of State, declared that the “First Fishback Amendment,” which had received a majority of the votes cast on the question of the adoption of that amendment, but had failed of a majority of the votes cast in the general election of 1880, was not adopted. The only object of the subsequent enactment (Kirby’s Digest, § 717) requiring the returns of the election to be made to the Secretary of State, and by him sent to the Speaker of the House of Representatives, was to enable the latter to determine from the returns of the election for’ the principal offices whether the vote cast in favor of an amendment was a majority of all votes cast at such election. The rule of stare decisis does not apply in this case. The validity of the amendment was not raised in 69 Ark. 336, nor that of amendment No. 2 in 67 Ark. 591. Courts seldom pass upon the validity of legislation unless the question is raised by the parties. 94 U. S. 645. By comparing the different clauses of the present Constitution on the subject of elections and majorities with those of the Constitution of 1868 on the same subjects, it becomes clear that the framers of the present Constitution intended to„ establish a different rule for different elections.
2. The question as to whether or not an amendment to the Constitution has been legally adopted is judicial, and the action of the legislative and executive departments thereon is not conclusive upon the courts. 77 Miss. 545;. 6 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, 906; 11 Ark. 481; 4 Mo. 303; 56 N. J. L. 480; 8 Cyc. 728; 24 Ala. 100; 69 Ind. 505; 60 Iowa, 534; 29 Minn. 474; Ib. 555; 54 Wis. 318; James. Const. Conv. (4 Ed.), 617; 6 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law (2 Ed.), 1052; 3 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, 671 and cases cited; 6 Cush. (Mass) 573; 14 R. I. 649.
3. There was no vacancy. “All officers shall continue in office after the expiration of their official terms until their successors are elected and qualified.” Art. 5, sec. 19, Const.; 42 Ark. 398. A vacant office is an office without an incumbent; and it can make no difference whether the office be a new one or an old. 48 Ark. 89. The death of a person elected to an office before he qualifies does not create a vacancy where the Constitution provides that the incumbent shall hold the office for his term, and until the election and qualification of his successor. 14 L. R. A. 858. See also McCrary on Elec. (4 Ed.), § 349.
R. R. Rice, appellant, per se.
1. An incumbent in office is not entitled to hold beyond the duration of the term of his office unless the law grants the right to hold beyond the term fixed. The term of circuit clerk is limited to two years, with no hold-over privilege. Sec. 19, art. 7, Const. Before appellee could set up any right under sec. 5, art. 19, Const., two things must concur, (1) his official term must have expired, and (2) there must be a vacancy in the official term succeeding his. If there is a vacancy, he is continued in office for the public convenience until a successor is lawfully qualified, not as a matter of right, but of grace merely. This court has held that Amendment No. 3 applied to elective offices only. 72 Ark. 94. That in all cases where, prior to its adoption, vacancies wére filled by special elections, subsequent to its adoption it was the duty of the Governor to appoint persons to fill such vacancies. 69 Ark. 336. Ib. 392. It was, therefore, the duty of the Governor to appoint some one to fill the vacancy caused by the death of Meroney, since, if the amendment had never been adopted, a special election would have been necessary.
2. The court is concluded by the doctrine of stare decisis. 69 Ark. 336; Ib. 392.

Opinion:
Hill, C. J.
This is a contest over the office of circuit clerk of Lincoln County, and calls for a decision as to whether Amendment No. 3, authorizing the Governor to fill vacancies by appointment, was legally adopted as part of the Constitution. Rice holds under an appointment made by the Governor; and against his claim to the office thereunder Palmer asserts, first, that Amendment No. 3 was not legally adopted, and, second, that there was no vacancy in the office, within the meaning of the law. The view the court takes of the first question renders unnecessary a decision of the second.
The clause of the Constitution under question is section 22, art. 19, as follows:
"Either branch of the General Assembly at a regular session thereof may propose amendments to this Constitution, and, if the same be agreed to by a majority of all the members elected to each house, such proposed amendments shall be entered on the journals with the yeas and nays, and published in at least one newspaper in each county, where a newspaper is published, for six months immediately preceding the next general election for senators and representatives, at which time the same shall be submitted to the electors of the State for approval or rejection; and if a majority of the electors voting at such election adopt such amendments, the same shall become a part of this Constitution; but no more than three amendments shall be proposed or submitted at the same time. They shall be so submitted as to enable the electors to vote on each amendment separately."
The county election commissioners are required to certify the vote on the amendment to the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of State is required to transmit these sealed returns to the Speaker of the House of Representatives at the time and in the same manner that the returns for Governor and other executive officers are required to be transmitted to the Speaker. Kirby's Digest, § 716. The Speaker is required, during the first week of the session, in the presence of both Plouses of the Gen eral Assembly, to open and publish the votes cast for Governor, Secretary of State, Treasurer, Auditor and Attorney General, and the person having the highest number of votes for each respective office shall be declared duly elected thereto, and the President of the Senate and Speaker of the House shall file a certificate with the Secretary of State, declaring what persons have been elected to the offices named. Kirby's Digest, § 2852.
On the occasion of the ascertainment and declaration of the vote for Governor and said other executive officers, the returns on the amendment "shall be opened and counted in the presence of the General Assembly in joint convention assembled." Kirby's Digest, § 717.
Then follows this provision: "If it shall appear that a majority of the electors voting at such election adopt such amendment, then the Speaker shall declare such proposed amendment duly adopted by the people of Arkansas." Then follow provisions for certificate to be filed with the Secretary of State, and for the Governor to make proclamation of the adoption of this amendment. Kirby's Digest, § 718.
The declaration of the Speaker as to the result of the vote for Governor, Secretary of State, Treasurer, Auditor and Attorney General is not necessarily the final conclusion, for a contest may be had thereafter, and it shall be settled by the joint vote of both Houses, in which joint meeting the President of the Senate shall preside. Kirby's Digest, § 2877.
There is no statutory provision for any tribunal to determine a contest over the result of the election on an amendment, and the section above quoted, requiring the Speaker to declare the result from the votes then before him, is the only method of ascertainment of the result prescribed by statute.
In the general election of 1899 Amendment No. 3 received 43,446 votes, and there were 40,207 votes against it, and there were 126,986 votes cast for governor.
The Speaker in joint session of the General Assembly of 1895, upon the votes aforesaid then before him, declared the amendment adopted; it was duly certified by the President of the Senate and Speaker, and proclamation made by the Governor. Two questions are involved: First, is the action of the Speaker, followed by the executive proclamation, the ultimate decision of this question which the courts can not review because committed to the other departments of State to determine, or is it a judicial question not to be settled until settled rightly in a judicial court? Second. Does an amendment require a majority of all the votes cast in the election or a majority voting on the question ?
First. It is strongly pressed upon the court that the General Assembly has delegated to the Speaker, as the servant and the mouthpiece of the joint session, the power to determine as to whether a constitutional amendment has been adopted; and that question is a political one, determined by a co-ordinate department of government, and the judiciary is precluded from entertaining it. This argument has often been made in similar cases to the courts, and it is found in many dissenting opinions, but, with possibly a few exceptions, it it not found in the prevailing opinion of any court of last resort. The authorities are practically uniform in holding that whether a constitutional amendment has been properly adopted according to the requirements of the existing constitution is a judicial question, and it is a paramount duty, of the courts to pass upon it. An examination of some of the leading cases may be both interesting and profitable. This exact question came before the New Jersey Court of Errors and Appeals on writ of error from the Supreme Court. The law of New Jersey provided that the Governor should summon four or more members of the Senate to sit with him, and they should constitute a board of canvassers to canvass and estimate the vote given for and against a constitutional amendment which had been voted on, and the board was empowered to "determine and declare" which amendments were adopted, and to certify the same, and its certificate would make the amendment part of the organic law. After the board had decided that an amendment relating to lotteries and one relating to appointments to office were adopted, and one on woman's suffrage was rejected, citizens and taxpayers caused the question to get into the courts, and the final court said:
"The question naturally arising first in this case concerns the legitimate scope of our inquiry: Have we authority to consider and decide whether the determination of the board of State canvassers that the proposed amendment had been adopted was lawful, or did that determination, followed by the proclamation of the Governor, preclude judicial cognizance of the subject?" After stating the exact questions involved in regard to the amendments and how the case arose in the Supreme Court (there a court of general and original jurisdiction), the court continues: "It thus -becomes manifest that there was present in the Supreme Court, and is now present in this court, every element tending to maintain jurisdiction over the subject-matter, unless it be true, as insisted, that the judicial department of the Government has not the right to consider whether the legislative department and its agencies have observed constitutional injunctions in attempting to amend the Constitution, and to annul their acts in case they have not done so. That such a proposition is not true seems to be indicated by the whole history of jurisprudence in this country." The court then goes into an interesting review of the authorities, and then says: "The examination made supports the assertion of Chief Justice Day (of Iowa) that the decisions, so far as they deal with the existence of the principle, are not in conflict. The only case found in which, the jurisdiction of the court was denied is Worman v. Hagan, 78 Md. 152." (The court then discusses this case, which will be referred to later.) State v. Bott, 45 L. R. A. 251, 43 Atlantic Rep. 744.
In Mississippi a case arose as to the adoption of a constitutional amendment, and the first question which arrested the attention of the court was whether it was a judicial or a political question. Chief Justice Whitfield, in a clear and positive decision, puts at rest any doubts on the question. He' reviews the decided cases on the subject, and says it is settled by an overwhelming weight of authority that this is a judicial question; and then he continues:
"The true view is that the Constitution, the organic law of the land, is paramount and supreme over Governor, Legislature and courts. When it prescribes the exact method in which an amendment should be submitted, and prescribes positively the majority necessary to its adoption, these are constitutional directions mandatory on all the departments of government, and without strict compliance with which no amendment can be validly adopted. Whether an amendment has been validly submitted or validly adopted depends upon the fact of compliance or non-compliance with the constitutional directions as to how such amendment shall be submitted and adopted, and whether such compliance has in fact been had, must, in the nature of the case, be a judicial question." State v. Powell, 77 Miss. 545, 48 L. R. A. 652.
In the case of Koehler v. Hill, 60 Ia. 545, a very exhaustive examination of this question was had. There was a majority and minority opinion, and then on motion for rehearing this question was threshed over. Chief Justice Day delivered a vigorous opinion, overruling the motion for rehearing. He reviewed the adjudged cases fully, and concluded his opinion on this branch of the case as follows:
"We have then seven States, Alabama, Missouri, Kansas, Michigan, North Carolina, Wisconsin and Indiana, in which the jurisdiction of the courts over the adoption of an amendment to a constitution has been recognized and asserted. In no decision, either State or Federal, has this jurisdiction been denied. We may securely rest our jurisdiction upon the authority of these cases. ITe would be a bold jurist, indeed, who would ride roughshod over such an unbroken current of judicial authority, so fortified in principle, sustained by reason, and so necessary to the peaceful administration of the government."
The Alabama court said:
"The Constitution is the supreme and paramount law. The mode by which amendments are to be made under it is clearly defined. It is said that certain acts are to be done, certain requisitions are to be observed, before a change can be effected. But to what purpose are these acts required or the requisitions enjoined, if the Degislature or any other department of the government can dispense with them? To do so would be to violate the instrument they are sworn to support; and every principle of public law and sound constitutional policy requires the court to pronounce against every amendment which is shown not to have been made in accordance with the rules prescribed by the fundamental law." Collier v. Frierson, 24 Ala. 108.
The following States in the following cases have entertained jurisdiction of suits to determine the validity of the adoption of constitutional amendments, and treated such questions as judicial questions: Missouri, State v. McBride, 4 Mo. 303; North Carolina, University of N. C. v. McIver, 72 N. C. 76; Michigan, Westinghausen v. People, 44 Mich. 265; Indiana, State v. Swift, 69 Ind. 505; Wisconsin, State v. Timme, 54 Wis. 318; California, Oakland Paving Co. v. Hilton, 69 Cal. 479; Kansas, Prohibitory Amendment Cases, 24 Kan. 700; Minnesota, Secombe v. Kittelson, 29 Minn. 555; New Jersey, State v. Wurts, 45 L. R. A. 251, s. c. 43 Atl. Rep. 244; Alabama, Collier v. Frierson, 24 Ala. 108; Iowa, Koehler v. 60 Ia. 543; Mississippi, State v. Powell, 77 Miss. 545. And against this array of authorities is only the Maryland court in Worman v. Hagan, 78 Md. 152.
The strength of appellant's contention is in the argument that the General Assembly delegated to the Speaker, as the presiding officer of the joint session, the determination of this question. Chief Justice Whitfield said in State v. Powell, supra, "It may be that where the Constitution creates a special tribunal, and confides to that tribunal the exclusive power to canvass votes and declare the result, and make the amendment part of the Constitution, as a result of such declaration, by proclamation, or otherwise prescribed method fixed for such tribunal by the Constitution, then the action of the special tribunal would be final and conclusive, whether its action be judicial or not. This is so because it was competent for the sovereign people, speaking through their Constitution, so to provide."
v It will be noted that Chief Justice WhiteiErd limits the exception to constitutionally created tribunals, but other courts recognize statutory tribunals as possessing the same power of ultimate conclusion where the Legislature exoressly provided. Judge Cooley thus expressed it in an analogous proposition:
"As the election officers perform for the most part ministerial functions only, their returns, and certificates of election which are issued upon them, are not conclusive in favor of the officers who would thereby appear to be chosen, but the final decision must rest with the courts. This is the general rule, and the exceptions are those cases where the law under which the canvass is made declares' the decision conclusive, or where a special statutory board is established with power of final decision." Cooley, Const. Lim. p. 937..
In view of this exception to the rule of judicial review, which has in a few instances been applied to adoption of constitutional amendments, it is important to consider whether sec tion 718, Kirby's Digest, can be construed as creating the Speaker, either individually or as the representative of the joint session, a tribunal to determine the result of the election on amendments.
It is true that he must make declaration of the apparent result from the votes before him, just as he makes declaration of the election of governor and other officers from the votes before him. In the event of contest over one of the executive offices it is expressly provided that the joint session at a meeting presided over by the President of the Senate shall determine it, thereby showing clearly that there is no finality to this declaration from the face of the returns. Must it be taken, because there is no express provision for the joint session or other tribunal to determine a contest over an election on the amendment, that the only determination of it shall be the prima facie one from the face of the returns before the Speaker?
Suppose a few votes determine the fate of an amendment, and the returns from one county are known to be indubitably stained with fraud, and the proof is at hand. The Speaker is powerless to do more than declare the result as it appears from these returns sent him by the Secretary of State, who hands them to him as received from the county boards. Is it to be thought for a moment that it was ever intended that this, perfunctory duty of the Speaker, limited to the face of the returns, should preclude inquiry and permit the organic law to be changed contrary to the expressed wishes of a majority of the people? Can it be possible that the lawmakers intended the organic law to be changed on the face of the returns, and yet no officer, from Governor to constable, is necessarily concluded by the face of the returns? The statement of the position carries its own refutation. Certainly no such intention can be imported into the legislation which imposed this formal duty on the Speaker, as the words of the act negative the thought of a final decision of the question by the Speaker. "If it shall appear that a majority," etc., is the language employed.
The Century Dictionary gives six definitions of the word "appear," comprehending all shades of meaning attached to it, and none of them convey the idea of judicial or final determination or decision, but all convey the thought of the surface, the apparent, the obvious, that which is to be seen at first sight. The use of this word in defining the duties of the Speaker in this regard was quite apt, and properly imposed the formal and ministerial functions of casting up and declaring in open session what would appear to be the result. The votes on the principal State offices were then before him, and from these he could reach, at least approximately, the votes in the election, and the votes on the amendment would give the other necessary data to a prima facie decision from the face of the returns, and, in the language of Judge Cooley, "the final decision must rest with the courts."
The strongest qase cited by appellant is State V. Wurts, 40 Atl. Rep. 740, but this was not the final decision of that case, and while the judgment was affirmed the ultimate conclusion' on this question was different in the court of last resort, the gist of which has been given. Worman v. Hagan, 78 Md. 152, s. c. 21 L. R. A. 716, seems to support the appellant, although Chief Justice Whitfield in State v. Powell, supra, treats this case as one where a constitutionally created special tribunal took it out.of the general rule, and does not regard it as antagonistic in principle with the other cases. While it is possible for that distinction to be made and save it from being an exception, yet the Maryland court itself did not make that distinction, and this appears to be merely a case out of plumb.
Luther v. Borden, 7 How. 1, is relied upon by counsel here, as it has been by counsel on the losing side in most of the other cases. There is a statement in the body of the opinion to this effect: that in forming the Constitution of the various States, and in the various changes and alterations which have since been made, the political department has always determined whether the proposed constitution or amendment was ratified or not by the people, and the judical power has followed the decision. This was not a point decided in the case, and the statement was made merely in the course of the argument leading to the points decided. The case grew out of "Dorr's Rebellion" in Rhode Island. The question was not as to an amendment of the Constitution, nor as to the adoption of the "Dorr Constitution," but was that where there were two opposing governments in a State, the determination of which was the legitimate government was a political, and not a judicial, question, and where the courts of the State decide which was the proper government under its own laws, the Federal courts must follow the State decision. That this case, notwithstanding some general language, is not an authority for appellant is obvious; but if any doubt remains on the subject, the analysis-of the case by Chief Justice Day in Koehler v. Hill, supra, will remove it. There can be little doubt that the consensus of judicial opinion is that it is the absolute duty of the judiciary to determine whether the Constitution has-been amended in the exact and precise manner required by the Constitution, unless perchance a special tribunal has been erected to determine this question; and even then many of the authorities hold that this tribunal can not be permitted to illegally amend the organic law. Therefore it is the duty of the court to decide the question on its merits.
Second. This brings a consideration of the question whether in fact the amendment was adopted as required by the Constitution. The Constitution provides how an amendment shall be passed through the General Assembly for submission to the people and for publication for at least six months "immediately preceding the next general election for senators and representatives, at which time the.same shall be submitted to the electors of 'the State for approval or rejection; and if a majority of the electors voting in such election adopt such amendments, the same shall become a part of the Constitution." Art. 19, § 22.
"Such elections" evidently refers to the general election for senators and representatives. Any other construction would be straining the natural meaning of clear and proper English. The majority necessary to adopt it must be the majority of electors voting at the general election for senators and representatives, and not a mere majority voting on the subject of the amendment. The framers of the Constitution of 1874 used plain and simple English. 'They knew what they wanted, and what they did not want, and this, more than any other Constitution of the State, is full of details and explicit limitations. The time in which it was framed begot positiveness and strong convictions. This method of amending the Constitution by direct vote of the people is an adaptation to the American constitutional system of the initiative and referendum of the Swiss Republic. For a change there to be made in the organic law, it must secure a majority, not only of all the citizens of the Republic, but of all the Cantons of the Republic. This system is common to many States, and the prevailing rule is to require a majority of all the voters in the election, and not a mere majority of those voting on the question. Of course, the framers of the Constitution could have provided for either method; there were precedents for either of them when that clause was written, but, having deliberately and clearly adopted the rule that it must be a majority of the electors voting in the election, instead of a majority voting on this question, it is only for the court to bow to the express terms of the Constitution. This language needs no extrinsic aids to discover its meaning, but the court is not without authority for this construction. Similar or almost similar language has been before the courts many times, and while there is some conflict in the decisions, still the conflict is more apparent than real, and arises more from difference in language employed than in principles of construction. The authorities on. this subject are reviewed at length by Judge Trieber in Knight v. Shledon, 134 Fed. 423, and by Chief Justice Whitfield in State v. Powell, 77 Miss. 545. The case law is carefully gone over in these opinions, and it would be an idle task to repeat what has been so well done. These two decisions demonstrate that the great weight of áuthority sustains the construction reached by the court as above stated.
In view of the foregoing opinion, it necessarily follows that the conclusion,,.is that Amendment No. 3 was not adopted, and therefore the Governor did not have authority to appoint Rice circuit clerk. This was the judgment of the circuit court, and it is affirmed.
Justices Battre and Wood concur.
Mr. Justice Riddick concurs in the judgment; his reasons will be stated in an individual opinion.
Mr. Justice McCulloch dissents.