Case Name: CHANDLER v. STATE
Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1921-05-11
Citations: 232 S.W. 337
Docket Number: No. 6255
Parties: CHANDLER v. STATE.
Judges: 
Reporter: South Western Reporter
Volume: 232
Pages: 337–339

Head Matter:
CHANDLER v. STATE.
(No. 6255.)
(Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
May 11, 1921.
Rehearing Denied June 22, 1921.)
1. Criminal iaw <&wkey;507(l) — Statens witness held an accomplice necessary to be corroborated.
In a prosecution for the unlawful possession of intoxicating liquor, a state’s witness who went to the home of a third person, saw defendant and another, and discussed the purchase of a quart of whisky, etc., was an accomplice witness as a matter of law, and under Code Cr. Proc. 1911, art. 801. his uncorroborated testimony would not support conviction.
2. Criminal law <&wkey;742‘(2) — State's witness not an accomplice as matter of law.
In a prosecution for the unlawful possession of intoxicating liquors, a state’s witness who accompanied another such witness to the home of a third person, and saw the( other witness talk to such person, but heard no part of the conversation, and testified that on their return to the home of the third person he saw another and defendant, defendant having a bucket in his hand, etc., was not an accomplice as a matter of law, he/ merely having taken a drink which was in possession of another, and the jury could find he was not an accomplice witness.
3. Intoxicating liquors <&wkey;236(7) — Evidence sufficient to show defendant’s possession was to make unlawful sale.
In a prosecution for unlawful possession of intoxicating liquor, evidence held, sufficient to show defendant’s possession of the liquor was to make an unlawful sale.
On Motion for Rehearing.
4. Criminal law <&wkey;200 (4) — Selling and possessing intoxicating liquor distinct offenses.
Under the Dean Law, the act of selling intoxicating liquor is one offense and that of possessing such liquor is a separate and distinct offense, and previous conviction or acquittal of the sale of liquor does not bar prosecution for possession of the same liquor.
5. Criminal law <&wkey;780 (I) — Failure to charge on accomplice testimony not erroneous.
In a prosecution for the unlawful possession of intoxicating! liquor, failure to charge on accomplice testimony held, not erroneous.
6. Criminal law &wkey;>507(l) — Law of accomplice testimony applicable where witness testifies as to sale or possession of liquor bought by him.
When a witness testifies in a prosecution for the sale of liquor or possession only of that liquor bought by such -witness he is an accomplice, and the law of accomplice testimony is applicable.
7. Criminal law &wkey;>507(l, 5) — -Witness, who purchased liquor other than that of which defendant is charged with possession, not an “accomplice”; receiver of stolen property is an “accomplice.”
One who connects himself with a criminal enterprise at any stage becomes an “accomplice,” and one who receives stolen property is an “accomplice”; but a witness who purchased liquor from defendant other than that of which defendant is charged to have had unlawful possession was not an accomplice, and does not come within any of the rules of accomplice testimony.
[Ed. Note. — For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, Accomplice.] .
Appeal from District Court, Kaufman County; Joel R. Bond, Judge.
Clyde Chandler was convicted of the unlawful possession of intoxicating liquor, and he appeals.
Affirmed.
Wynne & Wynne, of Kaufman, Miller & Miller, of Athens, and Huffmaster & Huff-master, of Kaufman, for appellant.
R. H. Hamilton, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.

Opinion:
MORROW, P. J.
Conviction is for the unlawful possession of intoxicating liquors.
Holley testified in behalf of the state that, after going to the home of John Chandler, and failing to find him, he, in company with Jenkins, went to see John Chandler at another place, learning from him that on his premises, there was a cotton picker named Slim who could furnish the witness with some whisky. The witness, on going to the home of John Chandler, saw Clyde Chandler and Slim, and discussed the purchase of a quart of whisky. Clyde and Slim went into the house, leaving the witness outside. Later, they called him in, and upon entering the room he found some whisky in fruit jars. Pie left some money and took the whisky.
Jenkins testified that he accompanied PIol-ley to the home of John Chandler and saw Holley talk to him, but heard no part of the •conversation; that, upon their return to John Chandler's home, he saw Slim and Clyde Chandler, Clyde having a bucket in his hand. They went to the well and then to the house. Upon leaving, Holley was in possession of some whisky, of which the witness took a drink. Jenkins admitted that he drank some of the liquor, but claimed that he had no connection with the purchase and no knowledge of Holley's intention to obtain the intoxicant.
Holley's connection with the offense made him an accomplice witness, as a matter of law. Franklin v. State, 227 S. W. 486. His testimony, uncorroborated would not support the conviction. Code of Crim. Procedure, art. 801. The facts related by Jenkins tended to connect appellant with the commission of the offense, and, unless Jenkins was an accomplice, the evidence is sufficient to support the verdict.
There are facts revealed which would have justified the court in calling upon the jury to determine whether' Jenkins was an accomplice witness or not; and, on request, he would have been obliged to so charge the jury. Huggins v. State, 85 Tex. Cr. R. 205, 210 S. W. S04. Jenkins was not an accomplice, as a matter of law. He disclaimed any participation in the offense or any knowledge of the unlawful intent of Holley or of the appellant. From his testimony, his sole connection with the transaction consisted in his presence, and the fact that he took a drink of the whisky which was in Holley's possession. Upon this testimony the jury was privileged to find that he was not an accomplice witness. The verdict implies that this was done.
The evidence, we think, is sufficient to show that the appellant's possession of the liquor was for the purpose of making an unlawful sale. The definite testimony of Holley, who was an accomplice, being sufficiently corroborated by the testimony of Jenkins, who is not shown to have been an accomplice, renders the evidence sufficient to support the conviction.
The judgment is therefore affirmed.
dfcoFor other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes 232 S.W. — 22'
cSssFor other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes