Case Name: BENJAMIN H. DYE et al., Appellants, v. H. C. CRARY et al., Appellees
Court: Supreme Court of New Mexico
Jurisdiction: New Mexico
Decision Date: 1904-10-17
Citations: 12 N.M. 460
Docket Number: No. 988
Parties: BENJAMIN H. DYE et al., Appellants, v. H. C. CRARY et al., Appellees.
Judges: Pope, Mann, and' Parker, JJ., concur.
Reporter: New Mexico Reports
Volume: 12
Pages: 460–482

Head Matter:
[No. 988.
October 17, 1904.]
BENJAMIN H. DYE et al., Appellants, v. H. C. CRARY et al., Appellees.
SYLLABUS.
There is no authority in this Territory for issuing an alias writ of attachment, and property levied upon under such a writ gives the court no jurisdiction over such property.
Appeal, from the district court of Socorro county, before Daniel H. McMillen, Associate Justice.
Reversed and remanded.
W. B. Childers for appellants.
The notice in this case did not inform the defendant that his property would be sold to satisfy the judgment that Avould be rendered against him if he failed to appear.
Smith v. Montoya, 3 N. M. 13, 22 and 23; Comp. Laws, sec. 2701.
As to the attachment affidavits.
Drake on Attachments, sec. 440; Durrasett’s Aclm., v. Hale, 38 Mo. 346; Atkins v. Arnick, 25 Mo. 404.
Notice by publication should notify the defendant that his property has been attached.
Smith v. Montoya, supra; Durrassett’s Admr. v. Hale, supra; Smith y. McOutchen, 38 Mo. 415; Moore v. Stanley, 51 Mo. 317; Harris v. Grodner, 42 Mo. 159; Wapples on Attachment, 268-9, sec. 5, citing Westcott v. Archer, 12 Neb. 345; Anderson v. Coburn, 27 Wis. 558.
Where there is not and cannot be any direct personal service, the notice by publication must be made in strict accordance with the provisions of the attachment statutes.
Haywood, v. Collinsi, 60 111. 328; Firbaugh v. Hall, 63 111. 81; Cummings y. Tabor, 61 Wis. 185; Anderson y. Coburn, 27 Wis. 558; Harris y. Nardeman et al., 14 How. 334; Thatcher y. Powell, 6 Wheat. 119.
When a court or judicial officer exercises a special statutory power, the records of the proceeding must show that the statutory authority has been strictly pursued.
OoAvdery y. Town of Caneadea, 16 Fed. 532; Gray v. Larrimore, 10 Fed. Cases 1028; Gilpin v. Page, 3 SaAvyer 93; 9 Fed. Cases 5206; Gilpin v. Page, 18 Wall. 350; U. S. v. Allen, 14 Fed. 264; Wayman y. Campbell, 6 Porter 219; 31 Am. Dec. 677; Gunn y. Howell, 27 Ala. 663; Bradley v. Jamison, 4 loAva 73; Wright y.. Werner, 1 Douglass (Mich.) ; Whitney y. Brunette, 15 Wis. 68; Malone v. Samuel (Ky.), 13 Am. Dec. 180; 4 Ency. of Law and Procedure, 814-15; Earle v. McVeigh, 91 U. S. 510; Guaranty Trust Company y. Green Cove Railroad Co., 139 U. S. 146-148; Williamson y. Berry, 8 Hoav. 495-540; Rose v. Himely, 4 Granch 241; Elliott y. Piersol, 1 Peters 328; Wilcox y. Jackson, 13 Pet. 498; Shrover’s Lessee y. Lynn, 2 Hoav. 43; Lessee of Hickey y. Stewart, 3 How. 750; Webster v. Reid, 11 Hoav. 437; Hunt y. Wickliffe, 2 Pet. 201; Settlemier v. Sullivan, 97 U. S. 444; Oheely v. Clayton, 110 U. S. 701; Applegate v. Lexington, etc., Mining Co., 117 U. S. 255.
There is scarcely a State in the Union in which the same principle has not been announced and affirmed.
Guaranty Trust Co. v. Green Cove Rd., 129 U. S. 148.
The court acquires jurisdiction over the property in such cases by its seizure, and of the subsequent proceedings by public citation to the world, of .which the owner is at liberty to avail himself by appearing as a claimant in the case.
Freeman v. .Anderson, 119 U. S. 187; McDonald v. Cooper, 32 Fed. 751; Windsor v. McVeigh, 93 U. S. 274.
Proceeding by attachment, is wholly statutory, in derogation of the common law, and its rules will be strictly construed.
1 Shinn on Attachment, sec. 8; 1 Wade on Attachment, secs. 2, 3, 4; Waples on Attachment 24, sec. 7; 3 Am. and Eng. Ency. of LaOv' (2 Ed.), 184; Ballard, etc., v. Great Western, etc., Co., 39 W. Va. 394; Branshaw v. Tinsley, 4 Tex. Civ. App. 131; Pack, Woods & Co. v. American Trust & Savings Bank, 172 111. 192, 50 N. E. 327.
The Illinois statute is almost identical with ours.
Carr v. Kelley Brewing Company, 94 111. App. 225; American Hydraulic Dredging Company v." Richardson, etc., 90 111, App. 376; Buck v. Cay, 73 111. App. 160; Deumson v. Blumenthal, 37 111. App. 385; State v. Noblett, 47 Atl. 348; Wilson v. Strickler, 66 Ga. 575; Harris v. Linnard, 9 N. J. L. 58; Cummings v. Blair, 18 N. J. L. 328; Del Hays v. Brundred, 20 N. J. L. 328; Favrot v. Dell Piane, 4 La. Ann. 584; Hamil v. Phenicie, 9 Iowa 525: Miller v. White, 46 W. Va. 67; 33 S. E. 332.
Abandonment of the levy under the original writ, . is an abandonment of the seizure of the property, which alone gave jurisdiction to the court to proceed with the case.
Drake on Attachment, secs. 202, 257, 290; 1 Wade on Attachments, sec. 272; Pinnoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 728.
When there is an outstanding levy, no alias execution can issue.
1 Freeman on Executions, sec. 50; Freyer v. McNoughton, 67 N. W. (Mich.), 987; Tropnell v. Richardson, 58 Am. Dec. 338.
The Avrit must be issued within a reasonable' time after* making the affidavit.
Adams v. Lockwood, 30 Kas. 373, 2 Pac. 626; Avery v. Good, 114 Mo. 320, 21 S. W. 815; ' O’Neal v. New York, etc., Mining Co., 3 Nev. 141; Foster v. Illinki, 3 111. App. 345; Lewis v. SteAvart, 62 Texas 352; Horton v. Monroe, 48 Mich. 195; Spreen v. Delignor, 94 Fed. 71.
Without a valid levy the court is without jurisdiction; Avithout a valid writ there can be no valid levy.
Dohrv. Pohr, 82 Va. 359; McGillan v. Claflin, 52 Fed. 657; Plummer v. Hatton, 51 Minn. 183; Tuffs v. Volkeming, 51 Mo*. App. 7; Grigsby v. Barr, 14 Bush 139; Mickey v. Stratton, 5 Sawyer 483; Keyser v. Guggenheim, 21 S. E. 475-6; Ludlow v. Ramsey, 11 Wall. 588; Avery v. Warner, 59 Tenn. 559; Peters v. Conway, 67 Ky. 565; Freeman on Judicial Laws, sec. 8; Grignon v. Astor, 2 Hoav. 319; Harvey v. Tyler, 2 Wall.
The element of fraud is essential either in the intention of the party estopped or in the effect of the evidence he attempts to set up.
Hill v. Eppley, 31 Penn. St. 334; Henshaw v. Bissell, 18 Wall. 271; Biddle Boggs v. Merced Mining Co., 14 Cal. 368; Davis v. Davis, 26 Cal. 23; Commonwealth v. Moltz, 10 Barr. 531; Copeland v. Copeland, 28 Me. 639; Delaplaine v. Hitchcock, 6 Hill. 616; Havis v. Merchant, 1 Curt. C. C. 136; Zuchtmann v. Roberts, 109 Mass. 53.
When the condition of the title is known to both parties, or both have the same means of ascertaining the truth, there can be no estoppel.
Crest v. Jacks, 3 Watts 240; Knouff v. Thompson, 4 Harris 361; Brant v. Virginia Coal & Iron Co. et a!., 93 U. S. 335-336; Hobbs v. McLean, 117 U. S. 581; Sturm v. Boker, 150 U. S. 335-336.
As to equal means of acquiring knowledge.
Sloan v. Chambers, 48 Mich. 359, 12 N. W. 488; Slatton v. Bryant, 55 Miss.; Kingman v. Graham, 51 Wis. 217; Mueller v. Kaessman, 84 Mo. 329; Clark v. Parsons (N. H.), 39 Atl. 900; Bank v. Bank, 83 Fed. 363; Sinckot v. Ry. Co., 16 Fed. 363; Wilson v. McGehee, 13 S. E. (Ga.) 86.
Matters of estoppel are personal and are not assignable.
John Shillito Co. v. McClung, 51 Fed. Rep. 876; Ketchum v. Duncan, 96 U. S. 666; Deery v. Crary, 5 Wall. 803; Houser v. Austin, 2 Idaho 90, 10 Pac. 44; and see Pearce v. Hardin, 54 N. W. 906, 95 M'ich. 360; Pearce v*. Andrew, 6 Cush. 4; Folrain v. Collins, 3 Mass. 328; Jami-.son v. Rixey, 94 Va. 64, 64 Am. St. 26, 26 S. E. 863; Steele v. Smelting Co., 106 U. S. 456.
Forfeiture can operate only in favor of a co-tenant.
Turner v. Sawyer, 150 U. S. 578; Brundy v. Mayfield, 15 Montana 38; 2 Bindley on Mines, 645-6; Royston v. Miller, 76 Fed. 51; Justice v. Bradley, 82 Fed. 555.
Naked trespassers cannot set up an outstanding title in another.
Craig y. Thompson, 16 Pac. 29, 10 Colo. 517; Utah Mining Co. y. Dickert, 21 Pac. 1002; Sedgwick and Wait on Trial of Title to Land, secs. 58, 477, 718; Christy y. Scott, 14 How. 282; Belk v. Meagher, 104 U. S. 279.
Where claim is wrongfully held by another, owner is excused from doing work.
Erhart y. Board, 113 U. S. 963, 8 Fed. 693; Slavonia Mining Co. v. Peraside, 7 Fed. 337; Travaskis v. Peard, 44 Pac. (Cal.) 246; Mills v. Fletcher, 34 Pac. (Cal.) 637; Robinson v. Imperial S. & M. Co., 5 Nev. 44.
A sheriff’s deed executed before the period of exemption has expired is void.
Rorer on Judicial Sales, sec. 956; Graham v. Wing, 10 Mich. 486; Gross v. Fowler, 21 Cal. 392; Bernal v. Glein, 33 Cal. 668; Moore v. Martin, 38 Cal. 428; Hall.v. Yoell, 45 Cal. 587; Freeman on Execution (3 Ed.), sec. 328.
What is necessary to be shown to support sheriff’s deed.
Rorer on Judicial Sales, 794; Wheaton v. ' Saxton, 4 Wheaton 503; Cooper v. Galbraith, 3 Wash. Cit. Ct. Rep., 546; 6 Fed. Cases No. 193; Mickey v. Stratton, 17 Fed. Cases No. 9530.
H. B. Febgtjsson for appellees.
This ejectment suit is a collateral attack on the judgment in the attachment suit.
1 Black on Judgments, secs. 252, 245, 246; McGoon y. Scales, 9 Wall. 23.
Such an attack will not be sustained unless the judgment is absolutely void. The statutes of New Mexico authorize an alias writ of attachment.
Compiled Laws 1897, sec. 2871; Browning v. Browning, 3 N. M. 460.
Alias and plnries writs are the practice at common law.
Am, and Eng. Ency. of Law (old Ed.), 24, 524.
Elsewhere alias writs of attachment are sustained.
Hamill v. Phenicie, 9 Iowa 525; Elliott v. Stevens, 10 Iowa 418.
Defects treated as irregularities rather than as jurisdictional.
17 Am. and Eng. Ency. of Law (2 Ed.),. 1066; Majorieta v. Saenz, 80 N. T. 547; Van Bonschoten v. Foies, 85 N. W. 476; Cleland v. Travenier, 11 Minn. 126-194; Harbor Pitt Shoe Co. v. Dixon, 60 S. W. 186.
Irregularities in issuance of writ not jurisdictional.
20 Enc. of PI. and Pr., 1179; Keybers v. McComber, 7 Pac. (Cal.) 838; Dore v. Dougherty, 13 Pac. (Cal.) 621; Ensign v. Roggencamp, 12 N. W.; Axtell v. Gibbs,. 52 Mich. 639.
Although the writ may have been groundlessly issued, the lien will still be operative until dissolved.
1 Shinn., 314-326; Bittick v. Wilkins, 7 Heisk. (Tenn.) 307.
Attachment proceedings in New Mexico against a non-resident is a proceeding in rem.
S. Cal. Fruit Exch. v. Stamm, 54 Pac. 345.,
A judgment cannot be attacked collaterally, and defects in publication cannot be reached by collateral attack.
Schryock v. Buckman, 15 A. 480; Comstock v. Crawford, 3 Wall. 396; Paine v. Mooreland, 15 Ohio 445; Cochran v. Loring, 17 Ohio 432; Cooper v. Raynolds, 10 Wall. 308; Mohr v. Maniere, 101 U. S. 417; 17 Ency. PI. and Pr.,. sec. 120; Quart v. Abbott, 1 N. E. 476; Den-man v. McGuire, 4 N. E. 276; Crusen v. Stevens, 27 S. W. 557; and see also, Keybers y. McComber, 7 Pac. 838; 17 Am. and Eng. Ency. of Law (2 Ed.), p. 1047; Van Wagener v. Carpenter, 61 Pac. 698; Burke y. Interstate Sayings and Loan Association, 64 Pac. 882; 1 Freeman on Judgments, secs. 130, 126; 1 Black on Judgments, sec. 170; Ensign v. Roggencamp, 12 N. W. 811; 1 Wade on Attachments, sec. 38, note 6.
The Legislature remitted this matter of the alias writ to the court. Therefore its discretion cannot he collaterally attacked.
1 Smith’s Leading Cases, 1009; Robinson v. Hesser, 4 N.' M. 282-288; Cleland y. Tavernier, 11 Minn. 126.
Jurisdiction is the power to hear and determine.
Cornett y. Williams, 20 Wall. 249.
Jurisdiction having been acquired, the judgment cannot be attacked collaterally.
Drake on Attachments, secs. 447, 448; Voorhes v. Bank of E. S., 10 Peters 449; Grignon’s Lessee v. Astor, 2 How. 319; Tillon v. Cofield, 93 U. S. 163; Beglew v. Chattenton, 51 Fed. 614; Gibbs v. Southern, 22 S. W. 713; Harrison y. Pender, 57 Am. Dec. 573; Brown v. Christie, 84 Am. Dec. 607; Hoagland v. Hoag-, land, 57 Pac. 20; Colfax y. Richardson, 54 Pac. 359; McNitty. Turner, 16 Wall. 366; F. C. No. 12251, Idem 13092, Id. 7097; 12 Am. and Eng. Ency. of LaAV (Old Ed.), pp. 282-280; Sheldon v. Newton, 3 Ohio St. 494; Gibbons v. Bressler, 61 111. 110; C. B. & Q. R. y. Chamberlain, 84 111. 333; Paine v. Mooreland, 15 Ohio 445; Cochran v. Loring, 17 Ohio 432; Bell y. Gay-lord, 6 N. M. 227; Cornett v. Williams, 20 Wall. 226; Mathews v. Densmore, 109 U. S. 439; Simmons y. Saul, 138 U. S. 439; Moore v.. Manure, 101 U. S. 417; Bruce v.. Osgood, 56 N. E. 25; Jackson v. Smith, 22 N. E. 431; Otis v. The Rio Grande, Fed. Cas. No. 10613; 1 Black on Judgments, sec. 274; 1 Smith’s Leading Cases, 1001; Schlosser v. Beemer, 67 Pac. 299; Manson y. Duncanson, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1101; Ludlow y. Johnstone, 3 Ohio 561.
When the adjudication is within the power of the court to make, it is, when made, binding upon all parties unless reversed by a proper and direct proceeding to that end.
Gaff v. Louis, 71 Fed. 591; Dowell v. Applegate, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 617; 12 Am. and Eng. Ency. of Law (Old Ed.), 1472, and citations in note 2; 1 Freeman on Judgments', sec. 130.
The court below passed upon the jurisdictional questions. Its decision may have been erroneous. Even if so, such error cannot be considered on a collateral attack on the judgment.
1 Black on Judgments, sec. 274; 1 Smith’s Leading Cases, 1001; Schlosser y. Breemer, 67 Pac. 299.
Appellants by Dye’s abandonment, acquiescence, laches, acts, silence, and representations are estopped to claim the property in question. These defenses may be made under the plea of the general issue in ejectment, (¡specially under our ejectment statute.
1 Am. and Eng. Enc. of PI. and Pr., under Estoppel; Comp. Laws 1897, sec. 3165; Kirk v. Hamilton, 102 U. S. 68; Morgan v. Railroad, 96 U. S. 716; Baker y. Humphery, 101 U. S. 494; Dickerson v. Colgrove, 100 U. S. 578; Bigelow on Estoppel, pp. 492, 493, note; Rat-cliff v. Belfort & Co., 10 S. W. 365; Gray v. Crockett, 10 Pac. 452; 49 Mich. 444; Beardsley y. Foot, 14 Ohio St. 414; Tennessee C. I. & R. Co. y. McDowell, 47 S. W. 153; Bigelow Estoppel, p. 530; Payment y. Church, 38 Mich. 776; Dexell y. Odell, 3 Hill. 215; Delaplaine y. Hitchcock, 6 Hill. (N. Y.) 14; Nelson y. Kelly, 8 So. 690; Comp. Laws N. M. 1897, sec. 2685, subsec. 137; Truesdail y. Ward, 24 Mich. 117; Smith’s Leading Cases, p. 770; Patterson y. Hitchcock, 5 M. M. R. 543; Appeal of Chase, 18 Atl. 96; 2 Pom. Eq. Jur., sec. 809; Scharman y. Scharman, 56 N. W. 704; Cady v. Owen, 34 Vt. 598; Parkkurst y. Van Courtland, 14 Johnson (N. Yi) 43; Anderson y. Hubble, 47 Am. Rep. 394; Snow y. Hutchins, 35 N. E. 315; Story Eq. Jur., secs. 193, 385, 387, 388; Bloch y. Sammons, 62 Pac. 290; Storrs v. Baker, 10 Am. Dec. 316; Moelle v. Sherwood, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 426; Coogler v. Rogers, 70 So. 780; McConnell y. Rowland, 37 S. E. 586; Quick v. Milligan, 9 N. E. 392; Golden Tierra M. Co. v. Mohler, 4 Mor. Min. Rep. 390; Rice v. Bnnce, 49 Mo. 231; Raley y. Williams, 73 Mo. —; Ins. Co. y. Mowry, 96 U. S. 544; Spragg y. Shriver, 64 Am. Dec. 698; Maple v. Kassart, 91 Am. Dec. 214; Black v. Elkhorn Min. Co., 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1101; Dowell v. Applegate, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 616; Kent v. Lake, etc., Co., 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 655; Mainer v. TrurnbO', Fed. Cases, 18309; Morgan y. McKee, 3 Mor. Min. Rep. 129; Mc-Banev. Wilson, 8 Fed. 734; Titus v. Morse, 63 Am. Dec. 665; Beaupland v. McKeen, 70 Am. Dec. 115; Horn y. Cole, 12 Am. Rep. Ill; Power y. Larrabee, 57 N. W. 789; Two Rivers Mfg. Co. y. Day, 78 N. W. 440.
STATEMENT OF FACTS.
This is a suit in ejectment to recover the undivided five-sixths of a mining claim known as the “Compromise Mine,” situate at White Oaks, Lincoln county, New Mexico. On March 3, 1898, defendant John Taliaferro commenced attachment proceedings in the district court against Benjamin H. Dye, on two certain promissory notes. The affidavit for the writ of attachment alleged that Dye was at the time of the commencement of the suit a non-resident of the Territory. The Avrit of attachment was issued and delivered to the sheriff and returned by the sheriff on the sixteenth day of March, 1898, executed, as shoAvn by the return, by levying upon and attaching Dye’s right and interest in lots 2, 8, and 11, in section 25, township 6, south of range 11 east. Notice of the pendency of the suit Avas given by publication in the White Oaks Eagle. The first publication thereof was on March 17, 1898, and the last on April 14, 1898, it having been published each Aveek in said neAvspaper. It further appeared that on March 7, 1898, there had been levied an attachment in favor of Zeigle Brothers, for the sum of $73.70 on the same property. On March 11, 1898, the plaintiff procured from the clerk of said court an alias writ of attachment, the record showing no- new affidavit and no neAV bond given. The sheriff’s return on said alias Avrit shows that he returned the said alias writ executed on May 27, 1898, upon the property in controversy. On the nineteenth of August, 1898, the plaintiff filed motion for a judgment, and on the thirty-first of December, 1898, judgment was rendered by the court against Dye, sustaining the attachment and ordering the attached property sold. A writ of venditioni exponas was issued, reciting the attachment and the levy on the mine, but saying nothing about the levy upon the lots. The mine Avas sold under said writ in February, 1899, to Jones Taliaferro-. On December 4, 1900, Dye conveyed an undivided one-half of his undivided interest in said mining claim to Wm. B. Oliilders. This cause came on for trial before a jury. After the evidence was introduced the court directed a verdict in favor of the defendants to which plaintiffs excepted. Plaintiffs filed motion for a neAV trial Avhich was'overruled and exceptions preserved. Judgment was rendered upon the verdict; appeal prayed for and allowed.

Opinion:
OPINION OF THE COURT.
BAKER, J.
If the court acquired jurisdiction of the subject-matter in this case all the irregularities complained of must be "brushed aside. Voorhees v. U. S. Bank, 35 U. S. 447; Cooper v. Reynolds, 77 U. S. 308. If the alias writ- of attachment was lawfully issued the court in Taliaferro v. Dye had jurisdiction of 'the rom and power to order the sale, of the property attached. Was the alias writ of attachment issued by authority of law ? The answer to this question must settle the controversy in this case. The Legislature has undertaken to give us an attachment procedure. Compiled Law's of 1897, sections 2686 to 2736, inclusive. If alias writs of attachment are not authorized by our statutes then they can not issue. Section 2686 provides that when a claim is one hundred dollars or over one may sue in the district court by attachment, by setting up the statutory grounds therefor. Section 2690 of the Compiled Laws provides that the bond (approved by the clerk), the affidavit and petition shall be filed before the attachment shall be issued. Section 2696 provides that original -writs of attachment shall be directed to the sheriff. Section 2697 provides that "original writs of attachment shall be' issued and returned in like manner as ordinary writs of citations." Why the use in sections 2690, 2696 and 2697 of the words "original attachments"? Did the Legislature mean thereby to exclude alias writs of attachment? Section 2715, Compiled Lws, provides the form of the bond as well as the conditions thereof, as follows: "Know all men by these presents, that we (A. B. as principal or O. D. agent, for A. B. principal, as the case may be) and N. M. and M. M. his sureties, are held and firmly bound unto the Territory of New Mexico in the sum of dollars, for the payment of which well and truly to be made, we bind ourselves, our heirs, executors and administrators firmly by these presents, sealed -with our seals and dated this - day of -A. D. -.
"The condition of the above obligation is such that whereas, the above-named A. B. has this day sued out an attachment before J. J., clerk of the district court, against E. F. for the sum of-dollars, returnable to the next term of the district court for the county of _."
The original writ of attachment would be returnable at the next term of the' court, while the alias writ of attachment might not be issued until long after such term. Could it be said that the bondsmen would be holden for damages for the wrongful suing out of the alias writ of attachment when the bond provides that "the conditions of the above obligation are such that whereas the above-named A. B. has this day sued out an attachment against E. F. for —-dollars returnable at the-term of the district court for the county of-"? We think not. The ground for the attachment might exist when the bond was given and the original writ issued, but might not exist at the time of the issuance of an alias writ. For instance, the first ground of attachment provided for in the statute, non-residence, existing at the time of the issuance of the original writ, might not exist at the time of the issuance of the alias writ, for the defendant long before the issuance of the alias writ might have become a resident of the Territory, and if an alias writ of attachment can be issued at all, it can as well be issued one year after the issuing of the original writ as one day or one month thereafter. The conditions of the parties might change very materially and the bondsmen might not be willing under such changed conditions to stand sponsor for the damage that might result from the issuance of an alias or any other writ of attachment under the then existing circumstances. Yet, if an alias writ may issue, it must carry with it the obligations of the bondsmen, otherwise you have a writ of attachment without bond, which cer tainly can not be contended. Sections 2721 and 2722 of the Compiled Laws provide for ancillary writs of attachment and the mode of procedure, but they shed no light on the subject of an alias writ of attachment.
Attachment being in derogation of the common law, must comply with the statute, Cyc., 4 Procedure, p. 400, par. 4 and citations; 3 Am. and Eng. Ency. of Law, 184 (2 Ed.) ; Drake on Attachment (5 Ed.), sec. 4; Wapple on Attachment, p. 24, sec. 7; 1 Wade on Attachment, sec. 2; 1 Shin on Attachment, sec. 8; 3 Blackstone's Com., ch. 19.
The common law is the rule of practice and- decision in this Territory. Compiled Laws of 1897, sec. 2871.
Attachment being in derogation of the common law, we must look to our statutes. If our statutes do not authorize the issuance of an alias writ of attachment, then one can not be issued. Certainly our statutes do not provide for an alias writ of attachment in express terms nor do we think, by implication.
The position of the appellees that section 2727, Compiled Laws, gives the court jurisdiction of the property of the defendant from and after the issuance of the writ is tenable only so far as it relates to the property actually levied upon. The court acquires its jurisdiction from a legal writ, a levy thereof, and a return thereon by the proper officer. In Cooper v. Reynolds, supra, at page 319, the court says: "Now, in this class of cases, on what does the jurisdiction of the court depend? It seems to us that the seizure of the property, or that which in this case is the same in effect, the levy of the writ of attachment on it, is the one essential requisite to jurisdiction, as it unquestionably is in proceedings purely in rem. Without this, the court can proceed no further with it; the court cannot proceed to subject the property to the demand of the plaintiff. If the writ of attachment is the lawful writ of the court, issued in proper form under the seal of the court, and if it is by the proper officer levied, upon property liable to the attachment, when such writ is returned into court the power of the court over the res is established." This case is much relied upon by appellees. They also cite with much reliance, the case of Voorhees v. Bank, supra, in which case at page 440, the court says: "On comparing the record of the proceedings on the attachment with the provisions of the act of 1865 (Chase's Ohio Laws, 462, etc.), the acts of the court in all of the course of the pause appears to be in conformity therewith, except in the following particulars on which the objections to the validity of the sale are, founded." The five objections in short, were: 1, that the affidavit was not in proper form; 2, that there was not sufficient notice given for sale; 3, that the defendants were not three times called as provided by law; 4, that the sale was made before the expiration of the time of notice, and 5, that the return of the auditor showed the deed executed to a person other than the purchaser. It will be observed that these objections were merely irregularities, and further, that the record as stated by the court showed that the court had jurisdiction that is to say, there was a legal writ of attachment; that it was levied, and that a proper return by the proper officer was made thereon. Á judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction is presumed to be regular and correct and that all things to be done to make it so were done, unless the contrary affirmatively appear on the face of .the record of such case. This proposition is settled by an unbroken line of authorities, and no citations are called for.
The record in the case of Taliaferro v. Dye shows that on March 3, 1898, the suit was begun; that a writ of attachment issued and was delivered to the sheriff on the fifteenth of March 1898, on which day plaintiff executed the same by levying upon the undivided one-half of lots 2, 8 and 11, in section 25, and on other property (not the property levied upon by the alias writ of attachment), in township 6, south of range 11 E. The sheriff made due return of his doings under the writ on the sixteenth of March, and on the seventeenth of March notice of suit by publication was begun and continued weekly in a weekly newspaper until the fourteenth day of April, 1898.
The record also shows that on the eleventh day of May, 1898, an alias writ of attachment was issued and that no additional or other affidavit or bond was filed. It will be thus observed that the record in the case of Taliaferro v. Dye, expressly and clearly shows that the original writ of-attachment was issued, executed and returned, thus ending the life of that writ of attachment and that the alias writ of attachment thereafter issued. So, then, if there is no authority to issue an alias writ of attachment, the record disclosing that one was issued, shows upon its face the want of jurisdiction of the court over the property levied upon under such alias writ. We are of the opinion that the alias writ of attachment in the case of Taliaferro against Dye was issued without authority of law and conferred no jurisdiction upon the court over the property attached thereunder. Therefore, the court acted without jurisdiction and the purchaser at the sale of the property under such alias writ of attachment got no title, and those claiming said property under said Taliaferro in whole or in part, as well as said Taliaferro, acquired no title and have no title to the property in controversy.
This case must be reversed and remanded for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion; and it is 'so ordered.
Pope, Mann, and' Parker, JJ., concur.