Case Name: JOHNSON v. JOHNSON
Court: Court of Appeals of Maryland
Jurisdiction: Maryland
Decision Date: 1953-06-12
Citations: 202 Md. 547
Docket Number: No. 167
Parties: JOHNSON v. JOHNSON
Judges: 
Reporter: Maryland Reports
Volume: 202
Pages: 547–562

Head Matter:
JOHNSON v. JOHNSON
[No. 167,
October Term, 1952.]
Decided June 12, 1953.
The cause was argued before Sobeloff, C. J., and Delaplaine, Collins, Henderson and Hammond, JJ.
Wilfred T. McQuaid for the appellant.
Paul R. Koch, with whom was Karl F. Steinmann on the brief, for the appellee.

Opinion:
Henderson, J.,
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This appeal is from a decree of December 23, 1952 dismissing a petition filed by the appellant to obtain a release of his stock in Johnson Motor Lines, Inc. held by the Clerk of Court, under court order, to secure payment of alimony of $100 a week to his former wife and $25 a week to support his infant son. The alimony and support were awarded in a decree of the Circuit Court No. 2 of Baltimore City granting her a divorce a mensa on the ground of desertion on November 15, 1948. By this decree Johnson, nonresident, was also enjoined, subject to further order of court, from disposing of his partnership interest in a local enterprise. At that time the partnership was in process of dissolution and on December 15, 1950 Johnson's interest, amounting to about $51,000, was ordered paid into court to secure the payments of the alimony and support. Under a stipulation of the parties, the court on January 5, 1951 passed a consent decree, subject to further order of court, releasing this sum to Johnson upon condition that he assign and deliver to the clerk of court certain stock in Johnson Motor Lines, Inc., owned by him, having a par value of $28,000. The present book value of this stock is about $225,000.
Meanwhile, on January 18, 1950, Johnson obtained a decree of divorce a vinculo from his wife on the ground of cruelty by a decree of the Circuit Court for Dade County, Florida. Mrs. Johnson did not ask for alimony, but on February 21,1950 the court passed a supplemental decree declaring that "nothing in this decree shall be held or construed to relieve the plaintiff in any manner from complying with the support and maintenance provisions of that certain decree rendered by the Circuit Court No. 2 of Baltimore City, State of Maryland, on the 15th day of November, 1948 On November 17, 1950, Johnson petitioned the Maryland court to have its decree amended to eliminate the alimony award, in view of the Florida divorce, but his petition was dismissed voluntarily at or about the time of the passage of the consent decree of January 5, 1951.
On May 14, 1951 Mrs. Johnson filed in the lower court an "amended petition for support and maintenance" reciting that the decree of the Circuit Court for Dade County, dated January 18, 1950 had been appealed by her to the Supreme Court of Florida on the ground that the issues, had been decided in the previous Maryland proceeding and were res judicata,. That court affirmed without opinion. She asked the Maryland court to increase its maintenance award to provide funds to perfect a petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United States from the Florida decree. (It may be noted that certiorari was subsequently denied by the Supreme Court. Johnson v. Johnson, 342 U. S. 941, 72 S. Ct. 550, 90 L. Ed. 700).
On July 30, 1951, the Circuit Court No. 2 of Baltimore City passed a decree that its decree of November 15, 1948 "be modified to increase the maintenance provision" and that Johnson pay $2,058.70 "the costs and expenses incurred and estimated costs to be deposited with the Clerk of the Supreme Court of the United States, in order to perfect plaintiff's petition [for] certiorari " On appeal to this court the decree was reverse'd. Johnson v. Johnson, 199 Md. 329, 86 A. 2d 520.
It was pointed out in the opinion cited that the husband's domicile in Florida was never questioned and the wife appeared and actively contested the case. The question of "divisible divorce", discussed in Estin v. Estin, 334 U. S. 541, 68 S. Ct. 1213, 92 L. Ed. 1561, and foreshadowed in Esenwein v. Commonwealth, 325 U. S. 279, 65 S. Ct. 1118, 89 L. Ed. 1608, is not presented. In Lynn v. Lynn, 302 N. Y. 193, 97 N. E. 2d 748, it was held by the New York Court of Appeals that a divorce decree in Nevada, following a personal appearance, even where the court failed to grant alimony or the wife to seek it, nullified the alimony provisions of a prior judgment of separation obtained by her in New York. It was recognized that the question was one of New York law. In Rodda v. Rodda, 185 Or. 140, 200 P. 2d 616, 202 P. 2d 638, it was held that even without a personal appearance an absolute divorce obtained by publication had the same effect under Oregon law, although under the Estin case Oregon was not required to give it that effect by the full faith and credit clause of the federal constitution.
In the former appeal we discussed this question and also the validity and effect of the supplemental decree of the Florida court, and said: "If the Maryland court actually possesses any of the jurisdiction which seems to be reserved to it in the Florida decree, obviously neither the Florida decree nor the full faith and credit clause prevents the Maryland court from exercising such jurisdiction. If, however, under Maryland law the Maryland court has no authority to act as permitted under the Florida decree, then obviously the Florida court has no power to confer jurisdiction upon the Maryland court, and the Maryland court has no right or duty, under the full faith and credit clause or otherwise, to exercise such jurisdiction." 199 Md. 329, 337. Assuming that the Florida decree was broad enough to comprehend modifications of the maintenance provisions in the Maryland decree, we held that "In Maryland the court has no authority to make, change or enforce provision for payment by a former husband to his former wife of alimony (except power reserved, expressly or by implication, to modify provision for alimony in a decree for divorce a vinculo) or 'suit money'. Tabeling v. Tabeling, 157 Md. 429, 146 A. 389; Staub v. Staub, [170 Md. 202] ; Tome v. Tome, 180 Md. 31, 22 A. 2d 549. It is immaterial whether the marriage relation was terminated by death, by a Maryland divorce, or by a divorce in another state, 199 Md. 329, 338.
Although the case might, perhaps, have been decided on a narrower ground, our decision was rested squarely on the proposition that the alimony provision could not, under Maryland law, survive.the dissolution of the marriage by the Florida court. The dissolution was not conditional upon the validity or effectiveness of the supplemental decree. That decree was obviously based on the erroneous assumption that the obligation to pay-alimony in Maryland would survive a dissolution of the marriage in Florida. Under the laws of some states the obligation would survive, but we have held otherwise. Johnson v.. Johnson, supra; Staub v. Staub, supra. On that question the Maryland law must control, despite the declaration of the Florida court disavowing any intention to relieve the plaintiff from his obligations under the Maryland decree. It may be noted that the supplemental decree did not purport to impose an obligation to pay alimony in Florida, where it was not asked for. It may well be that the Florida court had, and may still have, authority to award alimony in its own right. Cf. Roseman v. Roseman, 155 Fla. 750, 21 S. 2d 215. We leave open the question whether, if alimony were awarded in Florida the decree would be enforceable here. Cf. Rosenberg v. Rosenberg, 152 Md. 49, 135 A. 840.
Nor do we find any merit in the appellee's contention that jurisdiction could only be challenged by petition to modify the original Maryland decree, and not by petition to modify the order as to security. The petition alleged a lack of jurisdiction to enforce the award. It is generally held that a final decree, without more, terminates an award, although it has been also held that installments accruing down to the time of the filing of a petition are collectable. See note 1 A. L. R. 2d 1423, 1436. No such question is presented in the instant case as payments are not in arrears. The right to retain security could not survive the termination of the alimony award. "When, therefore, the jurisdiction to pass a decree is ended, no jurisdiction can survive as to matters purely ancillary to that object." McCurley v. McCurley, 60 Md. 185, 189. Johnson v. Johnson, supra, 199 Md. 329, 339, 86 A. 2d 520, 524.
The appellee contends that even if the award terminated upon the passage of the Florida decree, which was not stayed by the Supreme Court of Florida or the Supreme Court of the United States, the award of alimony passed on November 15, 1948 was converted into a contractual obligation by the consent decree and stipulation as to substituted security filed January 5, 1951, after the. Florida decree. It is pointed out that that order was made "subject to such further order of this Court as may from time to time be required in accordance with the original Decree of November 15, 3948, and any petitions of either party that may have been or shall be hereafter filed herein." We do not construe this clause as an agreement, either as to the amount of the award or the type or amount of security, which matters were, in this order and in the previous orders, made subject to change by the court upon petition or otherwise. Nor do we think that the voluntary action of the appellant in dismissing his pending petition to modify the award amounted to a waiver. Moreover, the stipulation on which the order was based did not contain any agreement as to alimony or property settlement, but on the contrary expressly "stipulated and agreed that the substitution of said stock in lieu of said cash shall be without prejudice to the rights of either party herein." The facts in the instant case do not bring it within the rule laid down in Marshall v. Marshall, 164 Md. 107, 109, 163 A. 874, and cases there cited.
The chancellor in his opinion filed in the instant case stated, "The only question here presented is as- to the security which is now deposited in the hands of the Clerk, and as to that, it is conceded that there is still an obligation for the support of the child, which is one of the provisions of the decree, and, consequently, since there is that obligation, this court would still be justified, in view of the history of the case, in requiring security for the performance of that obligation, and since the security was selected by agreement of the parties, and was deposited as a result of an agreement and stipulation signed between them, it is like a consent decree which the court ought not to disturb in the absence of fraud or imposition, or some violent overreaching on the part of one of the parties which is wholly unjustified by the circumstances. And in view of the fact that the obligation for the support of the child, as conceded by both sides, still exists, the court feels that the petition for the discharge of the security in the hands of the Clerk ought to be denied."
As we have indicated, we think the argument as to a contractual obligation to pay the amount fixed by the award in lieu of alimony cannot be sustained, and the petitioner is not barred by the consent decree and stipulation from challenging the court's jurisdiction to enforce it. Nor did the stipulation foreclose a petition for further substitution or modification in amount. It is conceded here, as it was coneeded below, that the decree as to support for the child is still in effect and may be appropriately secured as against the nonresident petitioner. In fact, the petition only averred that the court was without jurisdiction "insofar as the payment of alimony or support to Mary B. Johnson is concerned, and that this Honorable Court should now modify its Decree of January 5, 1951 so as to release to your Petitioner the stock now being held to secure payment of alimony,". We think the court abused its discretion in refusing to modify its decree, insofar as it secured the payment of an award of $25 a week for the support of a child by the deposit of stock which, according to the testimony, has a present book value of $225,000. On the record, we cannot say what would be an adequate security. The factors to be considered would be the present age of the child, his present and future needs for education and maintenance until he reaches maturity, and the possibility that those needs may increase. If the parties cannot agree as to the amount, the Chancellor should fix an amount that will insure support for the child but eliminate the element of alimony.
Decree reversed and case remanded for the passage of a decree in accordance with the views expressed in this opinion, costs to be paid by the appellant.