Case Name: MILLAUDON vs. LAPICE
Court: Louisiana Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1831-06
Citations: 2 La. 511
Docket Number: 
Parties: MILLAUDON vs. LAPICE.
Judges: 
Reporter: Louisiana Reports
Volume: 2
Pages: 511–512

Head Matter:
MILLAUDON vs. LAPICE.
The supreme court, whilst sitting in the eastern district, during the term prescribed by the constitution, will not transact business arising in the wes-. tern.
The supreme court whilst sitting in the eastern district during the term prescribed by the constitution, will not transact business arising in the western.
This was a rule on the judge of the sixth judicial district,, presiding at the seventh, to shew cause why a mandamus, should not issue to him to grant an appeal from a judgment, rendered by him, overruling certain exceptions to an attachment sued out in the parish o.f Concordia, by L. Millaudon vs. P. M. Lapice.
In answer to the rule, the judge replied that the judgment ¡was not final — but interlocutory, and no appeal would lie from such.

Opinion:
Martin, J.
delivered the opinion of the court,
A rule to shew cause, why a mandamus should not issue ko the judge of the sixth district, commanding him to allow him an appeal from a judgment lately rendered by him, in the district court for the parish of Concordia, in the seventh district. He has shewn cause, But the party in whose favor was rendered the judgment, from which an appeal is pray-id, has contended that we are without authority, while siting in one district, to act on any business of the other.
We are directed by the constitution, to sit in New Or-eans during the months of November, December, January, i'ebruary, March, April, May, June and July, for the eastern listrict; and during-the rest of the year fir the western clis~ net.
It it now asked of us to transact business for the western district at New Orleans, in the month of June, i. e. at aplace and time, quite different from those that have been provided for by the constitution.
Eastern District,
June 1831.
It is urged the district judge has shewn cause, and thereby waived any objection on his part, and therefore we can act. Admitting what is extremely doubtful, that the consent of parties would authorize us to act, that of the party in possession of the judgment, is wanting.
It is therefore ordered, that the rule be discharged at the costs of the applicant.