Case Name: Teresa THEOBALD, Appellant-Petitioner, v. Gregory THEOBALD, Appellee-Respondent
Court: Court of Appeals of Indiana
Jurisdiction: Indiana
Decision Date: 2004-03-09
Citations: 804 N.E.2d 284
Docket Number: No. 15A01-0305-CV-163
Parties: Teresa THEOBALD, Appellant-Petitioner, v. Gregory THEOBALD, Appellee-Respondent.
Judges: BAILEY, J., concurs.
Reporter: North Eastern Reporter 2d
Volume: 804
Pages: 284–289

Head Matter:
Teresa THEOBALD, Appellant-Petitioner, v. Gregory THEOBALD, Appellee-Respondent.
No. 15A01-0305-CV-163.
Court of Appeals of Indiana.
March 9, 2004.
Deborah L. Farmer, Campbell Kyle Profitt LLP, Carmel, IN, Attorney for Appellant.
Leanna Weissmann, Lawrenceburg, IN, Attorney for Appellee.

Opinion:
OPINION
BAKER, Judge.
Appellant-petitioner Teresa Theobald (Teresa) appeals the trial court's ruling in the dissolution of her marriage to appellee-respondent Gregory Theobald (Gregory). Specifically, she argues that the trial court erred in admitting a home study report because she was not given the opportunity to cross-examine the person who prepared the report. Finding that Teresa waived her right to conduct such a cross-examination, we affirm the decision of the trial court.
FACTS
Gregory and Teresa were married on December 26, 1991. Three children were born of the marriage-Nicklaus on June 20, 1991, Nathan on August 30, 1994, and Spencer on November 6, 2000. Teresa has experienced mental health problems during the marriage. She has been diagnosed with depression and paranoid delusions as well as other mental illnesses that include paranoia. In 2000, while pregnant with Spencer, she experienced a psychotic episode for which she was hospitalized for several days.
On April 3, 2001, Teresa filed for dissolution of marriage. By agreement of the parties, Dr. Gayla Kaibel conducted a custody evaluation. Dr. Kaibel testified before the court on July 31, 2002, that Teresa's paranoia was influencing the children in that they were much more afraid of the world than they need be. Dr. Kaibel noted two concerns about Teresa being the custodial parent: first that the children may become more distrustful and worried about other people and second that Teresa's anger and distrust of Gregory could turn the children against their father. Nevertheless, Dr. Kaibel recommended that Teresa have primary custody of the children, partly because Teresa had been the primary caregiver. Gene Colina, another expert witness, testified that Teresa's mental health was "fine," "strong," "involved," and "in good shape." Tr. p. 165.
Following the presentation of evidence at the December 2, 2002 hearing, the trial court sought an additional home study of both parent's homes to be conducted by White's Residential and Family Services (White's). The trial court then asked if either party's counsel expected there to be "any need to hear any further evidence after that report's received," and Teresa's trial counsel responded, "I don't." Tr. p. 519.
On February 3, 2008, Violet Robinson, on behalf of White's, reported to the court that the children would be best placed with the father. Robinson noted that in Teresa's home Nicklaus cares for Spencer and is unable to act like a child. She also reported that the children were not allowed outside often at Teresa's home because of Teresa's fears that they would get sick. Robinson further noted that at Gregory's home, Nicklaus acted like a child and had fun. Robinson expressed concern for the children's emotional health and stated, "these children will be more emotionally healthy if they live with their father." Appellant's App. p. 13.
On February 18, 2003, Teresa moved to quash Robinson's report. Gregory filed his objection thereto the next day, but no further hearings were held. On March 26, 20083, the trial court issued its Decree of Dissolution, which overruled Teresa's objection and motion to quash, stating that, "the report is entered as part of the record for consideration by the Court in these proceedings as agreed upon by the parties." Appellant's Br. p. 5. The trial court granted custody of the minor children to Gregory, and Teresa now appeals.
DISCUSSION AND DECISION
This case involves statutory interpretation. Our standard of review for the interpretation of statutes is de novo. We review legal determinations to ascertain whether the trial court erred in application of the law. Clark v. Madden, 725 N.E.2d 100, 104 (Ind.Ct.App.2000). Thus, we review the trial court's decision to deny Teresa's motion to quash without a hearing, which requires interpretation of an Indiana statute, de novo.
The trial court's order does not specify whether the home study was to be made pursuant to Indiana Code section 31-17-2-10 or to Indiana Code section 31-17-2-12. However, section 12 requires that a parent or the child's custodian request such a study. Because that did not occur in this case, we can only assume that the trial court entered its order pursuant to Indiana Code section 81-17-2-10, which states:
(a) The Court may seek the advice of professional personnel even if the professional personnel are not employed on a regular basis by the court. The advice shall be given in writing and made available by the court to counsel upon request. (b) Counsel may call for cross-examination of any professional personnel consulted by the court.
(Emphasis added). The right to eross-examine witnesses under oath is a fundamental right which cannot be denied unless waived. Courter v. Fugitt, 714 N.E.2d 1129, 1132 (Ind.Ct.App.1999).
Here, at the conclusion of the final hearing, the trial court discussed the matter with both Teresa and Gregory's attorneys in chambers. On the record, the trial court stated its intention to seek input from White's. Tr. p. 518. After the trial court asked the parties if any additional evidence needed to be presented after the report was prepared, Teresa's counsel specifically acknowledged that no further evidence would be offered. Tr. p. 519. As a result, Teresa waived her right to cross-examine Robinson. See Archem, Inc. v. Simo, 549 N.E.2d 1054, 1060 (Ind.Ct.App.1990) (finding right to cross-examination waived by mere failure to object when trial court did not provide opportunity to cross-examine the witness). Simply put, it would be inequitable to the opposing party and a waste of judicial resources to allow a litigant who has previously waived the right to cross-examination to rekindle this right through a motion to the trial court only after she discovers that the report is unfavorable to her position. In the context of Indiana Code section 81-17-2-10, once a party has waived the right to cross-examination, it remains waived.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
BAILEY, J., concurs.
MAY, J., dissents with opinion.