Case Name: Robert H. MACKENZIE, Appellant, v. HILLSBOROUGH COUNTY, a political sub division of the State of Florida and the State of Florida, Appellees
Court: Florida Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1973-12-12
Citations: 288 So. 2d 200
Docket Number: No. 44211
Parties: Robert H. MACKENZIE, Appellant, v. HILLSBOROUGH COUNTY, a political sub division of the State of Florida and the State of Florida, Appellees.
Judges: CARLTON, C. J., and ROBERTS, ADKINS, McCAIN and DEKLE, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 288
Pages: 200–204

Head Matter:
Robert H. MACKENZIE, Appellant, v. HILLSBOROUGH COUNTY, a political sub division of the State of Florida and the State of Florida, Appellees.
No. 44211.
Supreme Court of Florida.
Dec. 12, 1973.
Rehearing Denied Feb. 5, 1974.
Robert H. Mackenzie, Tampa, for appellant.
Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen. and Charles Corees, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., and Michael O’Brien, County Atty. and David W. Thorpe, Asst. County Atty., for appel-lees.

Opinion:
BOYD, Justice.
This cause is before us on appeal from the Court of Record, Hillsborough County. Appeal was originally taken from the Court of Record to the District Court of Appeal, Second District, and the latter Court has transferred the cause to this Court, pursuant to Rule 2.1, subd. a(5)(d), Florida Appellate Rules, 32 F.S.A.
The facts, as reported by the Second District in a two-to-one decision, are as follows:
"Mackenzie, appointed counsel, sought compensation in excess of the maximum of $750 provided by Fla.Stat. § 925.035 (1971), F.S.A. for defending Warren Carey Riley, claiming that the statutory maximum is unconstitutional. This proceeding, which involves Hillsborough County and Mackenzie as the sole parties in interest, is taken as an appeal from a costs order, and we are asked to rule on the threshold question whether it is reviewable by appeal or by certiorari, as was done in Lunetto v. State, Fla.App.2d 1973, 274 So.2d 251; Dade County v. Strauss, Fla.App.3d 1971, 246 So.2d 137; and Dade County v. Carr, Fla.App.3d 1970, 231 So.2d 844.
"Our view is that the constitutional question involved is • one committed by the Constitution, in Article V, Section 3, F.S.A., to the Supreme Court, and we accordingly transfer the cause there. The trial judge clearly was asked to rule and did rule on the question of the constitutionality of the $750 limitation in Fla.Stat. § 925.035 (1971).
"The cause is transferred to the Supreme Court pursuant to F.A.R. 2.1, subd. a(5)(b), 32 F.S.A."
In dissent, Judge Liles stated:
"I would dissent from the majority transferring this to the Supreme Court for the reason that this is a non-appeala-ble order. Appellant was not a party in the criminal action but was the attorney for defendant Warren Carey Riley.
"Appellant may bring a suit in his own name for attorney fees, but I don't believe he is a proper party to this appeal."
It is apparent that two questions are involved in this appeal. The first question: "Is appellant a proper party to the appeal?" The answer: "Yes." Cf. Dade County v. Strauss, wherein it was held that Dade County, although not a party to a certain criminal case, was entitled to certiorari to review the criminal court's supplemental order, arising out of the same case, which had directed payment of a fee to the special assistant public defender in the case. The "proper party" shoe fits, and appellant may wear it.
The second question: "Is Section 925.035, Florida Statutes, F.S.A., constitutional?" The answer: "Yes." Cf. Dade County v. Strauss, supra, wherein it was noted that the right to recover attorneys' fees as part of the costs in an action did not exist at common law, and therefore it must be provided for by the Legislature's enactment of Section 925.035, Florida Statutes, F.S.A. And, while appellant argues that Section 925.035 fails to comport with the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Constitutions of the United States and of the State of Florida, as applied to the provision by defense counsel of extraordinary services, we are of the opinion that: 1) Section 925.035 does, both on its face and as applied, comport with the foregoing constitutional provisions; and, 2) if a change in the foregoing statutorily-provided compensation be called for, it is within the province of the Legislature, not the courts, to make such change. As the trial judge observed to appellant:
"I think your complaint is more appropriately within the realm of the legislative branch rather than the judicial branch."
We agree.
Accordingly, the Hillsborough County Court of Record's "Order on Report of Court Appointed Counsel and Application for Discharge and Compensation" is affirmed.
It is so ordered.
CARLTON, C. J., and ROBERTS, ADKINS, McCAIN and DEKLE, JJ., concur.
ERVIN, J., dissents with opinion.
. 246 So.2d 137 (Fla.App.3d), cert. denied, 253 So.2d 864 (Fla.1971), reh. denied.
. Said statute provides :
"Appointment and compensation of an attorney in capital cases; appeals from judgments imposing the death penalty.- —
."(1) If the court determines that the defendant in a capital case is indigent and desires counsel, it shall appoint an attorney to represent the defendant. If the court appoints an attorney other than the public defender, the attorney shall be allowed reasonable compensation not to exceed seven hundred fifty dollars for the trial. If more than one attorney is appointed, the total compensation for the trial shall not exceed one thousand dollars. A reasonable amount shall be allowed for the cost of investigation and preparation of the case for trial.
"(2) If the defendant is convicted and the death sentence imposed, the appointed attorney shall prosecute an appeal to the supreme court. The attorney shall be allowed reasonable compensation not to exceed five hundred dollars for the appeal. If the attorney first appointed is unable to prosecute the appeal, the court shall appoint another attorney and allow reasonable compensation not to exceed five hundred dollars.
"(3) If there is a second trial of the same case, the appointed attorney shall be allowed reasonable compensation not to exceed the fee awarded for the defense at the first trial.
" (4) When the appointed attorney in capital cases has completed the duties imposed by this section, he shall file a written report in the trial court stating the duties performed by him and apply for discharge.
"(5) All compensation and costs provided for in this section shall be paid by the county in which the trial is held unless the trial was moved to that county on the ground that a, fair and impartial trial could not be held in another county, in which event the compensation and costs shall be paid by the original county from which the cause was removed."