Case Name: John Dixon vs. Josiah Parmelee
Court: Vermont Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Vermont
Decision Date: 1829-03
Citations: 2 Vt. 185
Docket Number: 
Parties: John Dixon vs. Josiah Parmelee.
Judges: 
Reporter: Vermont Reports
Volume: 2
Pages: 185–193

Head Matter:
John Dixon vs. Josiah Parmelee.
Caledonia,
March, 1829.
"The Court will not grant a new trial when it is manifest it will not avail the applicant.
The privilege from testifying to facts, confidentially communicated to the witness, 19 confined to attorneys, and does'hot^extend to confidential communications made to other professional men in the way of business.
And the privilege does not extend to all disclosures made by a client to his attorney, hut is strictly limited to those which are made in professional business, pending the relation of counsel and client.
This was an action of ejectment mile. Plea, not euiltv. for land in the village of Dan-
It appears from the bill of exceptions in this case, that on the 25th day of November, 1822, the defendant owned the premises in question, and on that day conveyed the same by deed to one Ferguson — That on the 29th of December, 1823, the plaintiff attached said premises, on a debt against Ferguson, and after-wards on the 14-th of August, 1824, set off the same on an execution obtained in the suit in which said premises were attached — - That on the 8th of August, 1823, Ferguson executed a deed of the land in question to one Theodore Hardy, which deed was authenticated by proof instead of an acknowledgment. The proceedings were commenced on the 3d day of August, 1824, before a justice peace, and completed before the county court, June term, 1825 ; and the deed was^ recorded July 25, 1825.
The question, on trial in the county court, was, whether the title of Ferguson passed under the deed to Hardy, or vested in the plaintiff by virtue of this attachment and levy* The defendant relied upon two grounds: 1. That at and before the time of attachment1, Dixon had notice of the deed to Hardy, though it was not then acknowledged or recorded. 2. That all the proceedings in the suit of Dixon against Ferguson were covinous and fraudulent, and intended to defeat the creditors and purchasers of Ferguson of their rights.
As a part of the evidence to the first point the defendant called Charles Story, Esq. and offered to prove by him, among other things, that just before the attachment was made he carried a written communication from Ferguson to the plaintiff containing information of the deed to Hardy, and that the witness also informed the plaintiff of that deed. The witness stated, that at the time in question, he was retained by Ferguson, as counsel in that business, and that whatever message or information he might have conveyed from Ferguson to the plaintiff, was conveyed and given in the exercise of professional trust and confidence $ and declined testifying to the facts aforesaid, unless directed so to do by the court. Whereupon the court decided that he was not compellable to testify to those facts.
As part of the evidence to the second point, the defendant read the deposition of Lucas Parsons. To impeach Parsons, the plaintiff offered to prove by Nathaniel Nichols that in September 1826, Parsons sent the witness to Danville to get back the deposition, unless it was paid for — and to let the party have it who would give most for it — that he directed the witness to demand one hundred dollars, but to accept eighty dollars, if he could get no more. To this evidence the defendant objected ; but the witness was admitted, and he testified to the effect aforesaid.
After the argument was closed, the defendant requested the court to charge the jury, that the title of the plaintiff was not made out, because the record of the execution and levy, which was used in evidence, was not sufficient or proper evidence to show that said execution and levy had been returned to, and recorded in, the office of the clerk of the county court from which the execution issued. The court decided that this objection was out of time, (being then first suggested) and refused to charge as requested. Verdict for plaintiff. To the several decisions of the court, so made by the court as aforesaid, the defendant excepted, and removed the cause to the Supreme Court on a motion for a new trial.
Upon the cause being called for trial, the counsel lor the plaintiff produced copies of the -record of the county court, by which it appeared that the execution and levy thereof had, since the trial in the connty court, been recorded as the law directs. Whereupon the Court suggested that, if upon an inspection of the record, it appeared the statute had been complied with, so that in case a new trial should be granted the verdict would not be varied by th.e records being given in evidence, the Court would not set aside the' verdict, because the recording did not appear on the former trial.
The counsel for the defendant contended — That it did not appear that Story was an attorney, and that the Court could not presume a- fact for the purpose of sustaining the opinion of the court excepted to — that the services done by him were not professional. 6 Mod. 47. — That .when an attorney is employed in business which is not strictly professional, he is to testify. 9 Com. Laxo Rep. 233, Bramioell et al. vs. Lucas et al. — That any.extraneous communications which are not instructions for conducting a suit are not privileged from disclosure, though made to counsel. 2 Stark. Ev. 396,7. — 4 T. Rep. 758. — That the testimony of JYichols was inadmissible — that if such evidence were received, a witness could at any time deprive the party of the benefit of his testimony.
Foi the plaintiff, it was contended — That Story was privileged from testifying — that the information he was called upon to disclose was communicated to him in professional trust and confidence. See 2 Stark. Ev. 395, and the cases there cited.
That JYichols was properly admitted ; for if a witness send his testimony into market, it ought to discredit him.

Opinion:
The opinion bf the Court was delivered by
Paddock:, J.
There is some difficulty in drawing a line be tween those communications made by a client to his counsel, which the latter ought to testify to, if called upon, and those wherein he ought not.
^ ^as ^onS been the established law, that councselors, solicitors and attorneys, ought not to be permited to discover the secrets of their clients ; it is declared repugnant to the policy of the law, to permit the disclosure of secrets by him whom the law has intrusted therewith. It is the privilege of the client, that the mouth of his counsel should be forever sealed against the disclosure of things necessarily communicated to him for the better conducting his cause, pendente lite: but this privilege, in all the cases which have fallen under my observation, has been strictly confín- , ed to the period in which the suit has been pending, and to the party of record, or in interest; and where the substance of the communication was such that it beeamo necessary for the attorney to know it in order to manage the suit. And this distinction seems to give á clue to that which is said to be the origin of the law; which is, that in early days, suitors brought in person their complaints before the King, and afterwards his court; that as business increased, the administration of justice approximating to a science, and the necessity of forms sensibly felt, it became absolutely necessary that there should be a set of men to stand in the place of suitors, called attorneys, and manage their causes; to encourage which, and bring the same into practice, it also became necessary for courts to adopt a rule, by way of pledge to suitors, that their secret and confidential communications to their attorneys should not be drawn form them, either with or without the consent of such attorney. But this rule is not to be extended to all the subjects or conversations which a client may have with his attorney, nor to any period but that from his retainer to the termination of the suit: for tho* an important communication may be made as to the subject matter, after the ending of the suit, yet the attorney must give it in testimony if required. As in Colden vs. Kendrick, 4 T. R. 431, which was' after a compromise between the parties and Colden's paying a part of the demand and giving a warrant to confess a judgment for the balance. Kendrick told Allen, his attorney, he was glad the suit was settled, for the bill grew out of a lottery transaction, which he knew at the time he purchased it. Upon Colden's bringing an action to recover back the amount paid, Allen was held a good witness to show Kendrick's acknowledgment.
Any matter of fact the knowledge of which the attorney had, other than from his client, the attorney is bound to disclose. Spencely vs. Schulenburgh, 7 East, 357. And so of directions given by an attorney, which any person of prudence and forethought would have directed. Bramwell vs. Lucas, 9 Com. Law Rep. 233. — Bull. N. P. 284. And where an attorney is retained generally, and a conversation is had upon a subject which af-terwards gives rise to a suit, the attorney is bound to disclose it, there being no suit in contemplation when the conversation was had; and it was so ruled in the exchequer of Ireland in the case Annesly vs. the Earl of Anglesey, McNall. 241.
I have before observed, that the privilege is that of the party, and not of the attorney; that the attorney is in loco of the client; and reasoning upon the principle of cause and effect, the privilege attaches only to the attorney who is to stand in the court to manage, or participate in managing, the cause; or, at least, was originally so : and upon no other principle can we reconcile the same privilege not attaching where other professional men are consulted. But in the Dutchess of Kingston's case, who was prosecuted for bigamy, her surgeon was directed to testify, though he objected, saying, that whatever he might know, came to his knowledge confidentially, whilst in the exercise of professional service and trust. And a catholic clergyman, being called as a witness, said he knew nothing but what was communicated to him in confidence, whilst in the discharge of his clerical duties; yet, Sir Michael Smith directed him to be sworn. But this is extending the inquiry farther than is necessary for the determination of this case; inasmuch as Story, the witness called, was not an attorney of record j neither had he been retained by either plaintiff or defendant : and if retained by Ferguson, it does not appear, from what the witness said, that he was retained in any wise to defeat Ferguson's deed to Hardy: and we are. not to infer a fraud, on the part of Ferguson, who it appears was both out of the record and out of interest. The offer of counsel to prove by Story was, that just before the attachment was made, he carried a written communication from Ferguson to Dixon, containing information of the deed to Hardy, and that Story also informed Dixon of that deed. Story said, " that at the time in question, he was retained by-Ferguson in that business, and that whatever message or information he might have conveyed from Ferguson to Dixon, was conveyed and given in the exercise of professional trust and confidence." The question might well be asked, " in what business retained?" The language implies no business but the carrying the letter, a knowledge of its contents, and informing Dixon of Hardy's deed. This surely is what any one might have done : no scientific knowledge was necessary to carry a letter, to know its contents, and to inform Dixon, that Hardy had a deed of the land : and this was all proposed to be shewn by the' witness; and was not only gratuitous as respected Dixon, but was' clearly a transaction of that ordinary cast, that Ferguson, had he' been in court, would not have wished to conceal, though Story had some scruples about it. Dixon might wish to conceal it: it was his interest to do so. But Story was not the -attorney of Dixon.
This case clearly falls within the letter and spirit of Dramwell vs. Lucas and others ; and the witness ought to have-testified j and the Court think a new trial ought to-be granted, for Story's testimony having been excluded. As tQ the witness, Nichols, his testimony was properly' admitted.
New trial granted.