Case Name: Henoch MENDELSUND, as Treasurer of Joint Board of Cloak, Suit, Skirt and Reefer Makers Unions, an unincorporated association, Appellant, v. SOUTHERN-AIRE COATS OF FLORIDA, INC., a Florida corporation, and Louis Dworkin, Appellees
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1968-05-07
Citations: 210 So. 2d 229
Docket Number: No. 67-43
Parties: Henoch MENDELSUND, as Treasurer of Joint Board of Cloak, Suit, Skirt and Reefer Makers Unions, an unincorporated association, Appellant, v. SOUTHERN-AIRE COATS OF FLORIDA, INC., a Florida corporation, and Louis Dworkin, Appellees.
Judges: Before CHARLES CARROLL, C. J., and PEARSON and SWANN, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 210
Pages: 229–233

Head Matter:
Henoch MENDELSUND, as Treasurer of Joint Board of Cloak, Suit, Skirt and Reefer Makers Unions, an unincorporated association, Appellant, v. SOUTHERN-AIRE COATS OF FLORIDA, INC., a Florida corporation, and Louis Dworkin, Appellees.
No. 67-43.
District Court of Appeal of Florida. Third District.
May 7, 1968.
Kaplan & Shapiro, Miami Beach, Emil Schlesinger, New York City, for appellant.
Bernard B. Weksler; Roy Schenerlein, Miami, for appellees.
Before CHARLES CARROLL, C. J., and PEARSON and SWANN, JJ.

Opinion:
SWANN, Judge.
The question before us on this appeal is whether certain judgments entered in New York confirming an award in arbitration proceedings are binding in Florida upon Southern-Aire, appellee.
The appellant, referred to herein as the union, originally instituted arbitration proceedings in New York against Larry Levine, Inc. and its two 50% stockholders, Larry Levine and Louis Dworkin. The union asserted that Larry Levine, Inc., a member of the New York Coat and Suit Association, had violated the collective labor agreement that existed between the Union and the Association. In particular, Larry Levine, Inc. was charged with operating, conducting and maintaining a nonunion shop for the manufacture of certain garments and the failure to maintain proper and adequate books. This non-union shop was alleged to be Southern-Aire Coats of Florida, Inc., a defendant below. Southern-Aire is a Florida corporation, of which the stockholders at the time the union filed its original charges were Larry Levine, Louis Dworkin and Martin Goldberg, a salesman for Larry Levine, Inc. Levine and Dworkin were the holders of two-thirds of all the outstanding common and all of the preferred stock of Southern-Aire.
During the New York arbitration proceedings, the attorney for Larry Levine, Inc. made the following statement before the impartial chairman:

"Mr. Hirsch: Mr. Chairman, I wish to state on behalf of Larry Levine, Inc., and Southern-Aire Coats of Florida, Inc. that all of the facts in the complaint are true; that Southern-Aire Coats of Florida is the alter ego of Larry Levine, Inc., and I am authorized to represent both Larry Levine, Inc. and Southern-Aire Coats of Florida, Inc., and both submit to the jurisdiction of the Impartial Chairman of the Coat and Suit Industry."
*
He also stated that he was authorized to represent both Dworkin and Larry Levine, individually.
On July 14, 1965, at the hearing before the Impartial Chairman, attorney Hirsch made an offer of settlement on behalf of the respondents therein, which provided, inter alia, that Southern-Aire would liquidate its . business not later than September 30, 1965.
The Impartial Chairman withheld his award pending a report as to whether there had been compliance with this settlement offer. He was subsequently advised that although Larry Levine and Louis Dworkin had disassociated themselves from Southern-Aire in October, 1965, Martin Goldberg had become its sole stockholder and Louis Dworkin was continuing to participate, directly or indirectly, in the affairs of Southern-Aire. In addition, Goldberg had refused to reveal whether he intended to liquidate Southern-Aire, and was expanding its operations while maintaining it as a non-union shop.
Accordingly, the Impartial Chairman entered his award which provided, inter alia, that Southern-Aire liquidate its business and that Larry Levine individually and Louis Dworkin individually were not to become associated in any capacity whatsoever, directly or indirectly, with Southern-Aire.
The Union then successfully brought action in the New York Supreme Court to confirm the Impartial Chairman's award in all respects against Larry Levine, Inc., Larry Levine, individually, Louis Dwork-in individually, and Southern-Aire. Personal service was obtained on all parties and defaults entered therein against all parties except Southern-Aire, which was represented during the New York Supreme Court proceedings by new and separate counsel.
The judgment of the New York Supreme Court confirming the Impartial Chairman's award was subsequently affirmed on appeal by the New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division.
The Union filed its Motion and Application for Enforcement of Foreign Judgment upon Award of Arbitrator in Florida pursuant to Fla.Stat. § 57.26 and 57.27(2) (1965). This relief was denied by the trial court's final decree, and the union has taken this appeal. We reverse.
Southern-Aire was subject to the jurisdiction of the New York Supreme Court. It was personally served, entered its appearance by its attorney, was party to a stipulation for an extension of time, and also filed a cross-motion for an order vacating or modifying the award of the Arbitrator.
Furthermore, on the basis of sufficient, competent evidence in the record, the Impartial Chairman made a finding in his award that the truth of the union's charge that Southern-Aire was the alter ego of Larry Levine, Inc. had been established. This award was confirmed in all respects by the New York Supreme Court.
In Fisser v. International Bank, 282 F.2d 231, 234 (2d Cir. 1960), the court stated that:
" [T]he consequence of applying the alter ego doctrine is that the corporation and those who have controlled it without regard to its separate entity are treated as but one entity, and at least in the area of contracts, the acts of one are the acts of all."
In addition, the representations made before the Impartial Chairman by the attorney for Larry Levine, Inc.—that he was authorized to represent Southern-Aire and that they submitted to the Impartial Chairman's jurisdiction—were not subsequently challenged or disproven by Southern-Aire in the New York court proceedings.
Generally, there is a presumption that an attorney, as an officer of the court, is duly authorized to act for a client whom he professes to represent. See 7 C.J.S. Attorney and Client § 73. In the absence of some pleading questioning the attorney's acts upon the ground of fraud, or otherwise, the presumption is conclusive. National Bond & Investment Co. v. McCoy, 263 S.W. 1089 (Tex.Civ.App.1924). In Louth v. Woodard, 114 Or. 603, 236 P. 480 (1925) and Johnson v. Baumhoff, 322 Mo. 1017, 18 S.W.2d 13 (1929) it was held that a domestic judgment cannot be collaterally attacked on the ground that it was rendered upon the unauthorized appearance of an attorney. See also Tatum v. Maloney, 226 App.Div. 62, 234 N.Y.S. 614 (1929); United States Plywood Corp. v. Neidlinger, 41 N.J. 66, 194 A.2d 730, 8 A.L.R.3d 896 (1963).
Consequently, we conclude that Southern-Aire was afforded ample opportunity to litigate in the New York proceedings any and all of matters which it sought to litigate in the court below. In Midessa Television Co. v. Motion Pictures for Television, 290 F.2d 203 (5th Cir. 1961), it was stated:
"There is no better settled principle in the law than that a judgment for the merits in one suit is res judicata in another, where the parties and the subject matter are the same, not only as respects matters actually presented to sustain or defeat the right asserted but also as to any other available matter which might have been presented. Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U.S. 351, 24 L.Ed. 195; Baltimore Steamship Co. v. Phillips, 274 U.S. 316, 47 S.Ct. 600, 71 L.Ed. 1069. The defendant, having voluntarily chosen not to assert any defenses in the New York proceeding, is foreclosed from asserting them now. Such matters are res judicata and the New York judgment must be given full faith and credit. The appellant had every opportunity to litigate the case in New York. It failed through its negligence or deliberate omission to do so and was not prevented from doing so by any act of appellee, and it may not litigate the issue in a collateral attack upon the judgment."
Southern-Aire has sought to equate the New York judgment requiring liquidation of its business with an order requiring corporate dissolution. It argues that this exceeds the New York Court's power and authority since a New York Court has no jurisdiction, or authority, to order dissolution of a Florida corporation.
The New York judgment confirmed the Impartial Chairman's award, which, in turn, incorporated the settlement offered by the Respondents, through their counsel. This settlement offered by the respondents provided, in part, that, "Southern Aire Coats of Florida, Inc. will liquidate its business not later than September 30, 1965."
We do not construe the New York judgment as requiring corporate dissolution—merely the liquidation of Southern-Aire's business. While liquidation of a corporation is usually a step in its dissolution, the latter is not a necessary element of the former. In re Burger's Estate, 276 Mich. 485, 267 N.W. 887 (1936); 16A Fletcher, Cyclopedia Corporations § 7968. Further more, it would appear that Levine and Dworkin, as holders of two-thirds of Southern-Aire's common stock and all of its preferred stock, were empowered to effect voluntary dissolution of Southern-Aire had this been the extent of the settlement offer. See Fla.Stat. § 608.27, F.S.A. (1965).
Accordingly, we reverse the final decree of the lower court and remand this matter with instructions to enter a decree granting the union's application for enforcement of the New York judgment.
. Larry Levine, Inc., Southern-Aire Coats of Florida, Inc., Larry Levine, and Louis Dworkin.
. See Fla.Stat. § 682.17 and 682.18(2), F.S.A. (1967).