Case Name: CHARLES A. BURT, Appellant, v. ONEIDA COMMUNITY (Limited) and Others, Respondents
Court: New York Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1891-02
Citations: 66 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 234
Docket Number: 
Parties: CHARLES A. BURT, Appellant, v. ONEIDA COMMUNITY (Limited) and Others, Respondents.
Judges: MebwiN, J., concurred.
Reporter: Supreme Court Reports (Hun)
Volume: 66
Pages: 234–237

Head Matter:
CHARLES A. BURT, Appellant, v. ONEIDA COMMUNITY (Limited) and Others, Respondents.
Stipulation that a referee may fix the amount of his fees — valid.
Upon the trial of an action before a referee a stipulation was signed by the parties, and by their attorneys, “that the referee in this action may fix the amount of his fees without regard to the provisions of the statute.” A decision was rendered in favor of the defendant, who, relying upon this stipulation, paid the fees of the referee, as fixed by the referee under the stipulation, which were subsequently taxed.
Upon an appeal from an order, made at the Special Term sustaining such taxation:
Held, that the stipulation was sufficient to sustain the taxation of the referee’s fees and that the order should be affirmed. (Martin, J., dissenting, on the ground that no rate of compensation had been fixed by the stipulation.)
Appeal by the plaintiff Charles A. Burt from an order, entered in the office of the clerk of the county of Madison on the 15th day of February, 1890, denying a motion for retaxation of costs in the-above-entitled action.
Upon the hearing before the referee a stipulation was entered in his minutes to the effect that the referee might fix his own fees ; and thereafter a stipulation was signed by the parties in the following language: “ It is hereby stipulated that the referee in this action may fix the amount of his fees without regard to the provisions of the statute. Dated July 10, 1889.” This stipulation was also signed by the attorneys of the parties to the action. There was proof that the sum of $500, for referee’s fees, had been paid to the referee by the successful party, relying upon the stipulation made by the attorneys and by the parties.
J. & Q. Van VoorMs, for the appellant.
W. G. Tracy, for the respondents.

Opinion:
Hardin, P. J.:
I think the facts presented upon the motion for taxation are such that this case is distinguishable from those cases cited in the opinion of Brother Martin. Here, in addition to the stipulation entered in the referee's minutes, there is a formal stipulation of the parties confiding to the referee the amount to be charged hy him. The parties acted upon that stipulation; the successful party, having in mind that stipulation when the amount of fees were stated by the referee,, relied upon the stipulation and paid the saíne to him. It is a familiar principle that a party may waive a constitutional provision or a, statutory provision in his own interest or benefit or protection. Evidently the parties intended that the referee should, in his performance of his duties as referee, be paid such sum as he deemed reasonable for his services as a referee. It is not too much to say that the referee performed the services in reliance upon the stipulation so given. It is not too much to say that the party wlio paid the sum to the referee after he had fixed it, relied upon the stipulation. The facts and circumstances disclosed are'such as to indicate that no public policy was violated either by the referee or by the parties. Tinder the circumstances disclosed, I hesitate to come to a conclusion that shall disregard the action of the parties and the referee. The party who paid the fees of the referee, having relied on the stipulation of his adversary, it seems to me, ought to be protected by an allowance of the sum so stated, fixed and determined by the referee in accordance with the assent of the defeated party, coupled with the approval of his attorney and counsel.
I do not, therefore, favor a reversal of the order of the Special Term.
MebwiN, J., concurred.