Case Name: Bliss v. Bliss
Court: New York Court of Common Pleas
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1886-06-07
Citations: 1 N.Y. St. Rep. 281
Docket Number: 
Parties: Bliss v. Bliss.
Judges: 
Reporter: New York State Reporter
Volume: 1
Pages: 281–287

Head Matter:
Bliss v. Bliss.
(New York Common Pleas,
General Term,
Filed Jane 7, 1886.)
Reference—Divorce—Power of court to amend order of reference nunc pro tunc after report of referee.
In an action for divorce where complaint charged defendant with adultery and asked for dissolution of marriage; the answer denied the allegations of the complaint and set up counter allegations of adultery and asked for a divorce a mneulo. The action being at issue, upon consent in writing it was referred to a, referee, “to take proof and report, with his opinion thereon, and also to take proof of service of summons and complaint.” Afterwards a supplemental answer was served by defendant and upon consent in writing of both attorneys, it was ordered: “That the issues raised by said supplemental answer and reply, be tried before the referee heretofore appointed, in like manner as if included in the original order of reference to him.” Testimony was taken on behalf of both parties before the referee, proposed findings and conclusions of law were submitted and passed upon and the referee rendered his report containing findings of fact and conclusions of law to the effect that plaintiff wtv entitled to an absolute divorce. Thereaiter upon motion of plaintiff’s counsel an order was entered amending said order of reference nunc pro tunc, so that the ordering part should read: “Ordered that the above entitled action and all the issues therein be and the same hereby awe referred to J. A. O., referee, to hear and determine the same, and report thereon, with all convenient speed.” On appeal from such order of amendment: Held, that as the intentions of the parties a-s expressed in their stipulations and orders entered thereon, and in all their subsequent proceedings was apparently to have the issues tried privately by a referee instead of in open court, tiie order amending the orders of reference so as to carry out that intention was correct and should be affirmed. Larremore, J., dissenting.
Appeal by defendant from order of special term amending orders of reference nunc pro tunc so that they should read: “Ordered, that the above entitled action and all the issues therein be and the same hereby are referred to John A. Osborn, Esq., as referee, to hear and determine the same and report thereon with all convenient speed.”
The first order of reference, made upon the original pleadings was: “ Ordered, that the above action be referred to John A. Osborn, Esq,, to take proof of the facts stated in the complaint and report to this court with all convenient speed with his opinion thereon; and also to take proof of the servi.ee of the summons and complaint upon this defendant.”
The second order of reference, made when the supplemental answer was interposed was that “ the issues thus raised by supplemental answer and reply be tried before John A. Osborn, Esq., the referee heretofore appointed, herein in like manner as if included in the original order or reference.”

Opinion:
J. F. Daly, J.
The intention of the parties as expressed, in their stipulations and the orders entered thereon and in all their subsequent proceedings was apparently to have the-issues tried privately by a referee instead of in open court- and the order appealed from amending the orders of reference so as to carry out that intention was correct and should, be affirmed.
The first order of reference was made upon a stipulation, in writing that the "right to a trial by jury be waived and that it be referred to a referee to be named by the court to-take proof and to report to this court."
The reference was first suggested in a letter written before that time and when the cause was reached for trial on the-Calendar of the court, by the attorneys for the defendant- and appellant (who is now objecting to the amendment), to-the attorney of the plaintiff and respondent as follows: "We had hardly thought you were serious in pressing the trial of the Bliss case, but as you now seem inclined to do-so we would suggest that it is for the interest of both parties-that the cause should be referred to some suitable person.
If you approve of this we would be glad to have suggestions from you as to who that person snail be."
A subsequent letter from the same writers says, "you are right in assuming that a reference had been decided upon, but before consenting to Judge Bosworth we must have our client acquiesce in the choice."
After the entry of the order of reference a notice of trial was given by plaintiff and accepted by defendant, "that the above action will be brought on for trial before John A. Osborn, Esq., referee appointed by this court to hear and determine the matters in controversy between the parties in the above entitled action, at his office," etc.
When the defendant afterwards obtained leave to serve her supplemental answer, her attorneys and the attorneys for the plaintiff entered into the following stipulation: "It is mutually stipulated that the supplemental answer heretofore served herein be received, that it be considered as denied by the reply already in, and that the issues thus raised be included in the order of reference already entered, and that an order to this effect be entered." It was upon this stipulation that the second order of reference was "entered.
In a petition addressed to this court by defendant and appellant, while the action was pending before the referee for an allowance for the expenses of the action, she states that "the issues in this action, as raised by the original answer, were referred to John A. Osborn, Esq., as sole ref-c oe, to hear and determine the same on the 22d day of November, 1884. The issues raised by the supplemental answer have also been referred to him."
Accompanying such petition is the affidavit of her attorney and counsel, Mr. Wheeler, which begins by stating, "I am counsel for the defendant, and have acted as such since the trial thereof began and prior thereto f ' and repeatedly afterwards refers to the proceedings before the referee as the trial of the action. Accompanying said petition is the affidavit of Mr. Knevals, one of defendant's counsel, stating, among other things, that the action " is now and has been since the 20th day of January, 1885, on trial before the referee."
Upon the decision of the action the defendant requested findings of fact and of law from the referee as upon a trial of the issues, and asked of him "judgment in her favor and against the plaintiff upon the merits," and excepted in writing to his findings of fact and law. It is now her contention that the proceeding before the referee was not a trial, nor intended to be, but was intended merely for the taking of testimony as preparation for a hearing at special term; and that an amendment of the orders of reference requires an amendment of the stipulation, which the court has no power to order.
On the contrary, I find the intention expressed throughout the case by the parties by stipulations and orders and in every possible form of written declaration and admission, is to try the case out of court and before a referee, and that the amendment of the orders of reference expresses exactly what they purposed and designed from the time that a reference was first suggested.
The suggestion that the court should impose terms of the amendment is not, in my opinion, reasonable. No favor is extended to plaintiff; he gets only what he is legally entitled to.
The order should be affirmed.
Van Hoesen, J.
In my opinion, both parties intended that the referee should hear and determine the issues (subject, of course, to the application to the court for its approval of his proceedings that section 1229 and rule YY make an indispensible preliminary to the entry of judgment, in an action for divorce). The attorneys appear not to have had at the time a clear recollection of the requirements of the law, for they assume that they could select the referee though rule Y3 forbids the appointment of a referee selected by the parties. I believe that both parties supposed that the stipulation provided for a trial of the issues first, and then for the submission of the referee's report to the court in obedience to the requirements of rule and section 1229. This was their meaning, imperfectly and inartificially expressed. Judge Allen- did not make a new stipulation for them, but simply gave form to what both parties intended at the time the stipulation was signed.
I concur with Judge Daly.