Case Name: Leonard Johnson STAMPS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1993-05-28
Citations: 620 So. 2d 1033
Docket Number: No. 92-00943
Parties: Leonard Johnson STAMPS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: PARKER, J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 620
Pages: 1033–1035

Head Matter:
Leonard Johnson STAMPS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. 92-00943.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
May 28, 1993.
Order Denying Rehearing July 8, 1993.
Robert N. Toward, Bartow, for appellant.
Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Carl R. Hayes, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tampa, for appellee.

Opinion:
LEHAN, Acting Chief Judge.
Defendant appeals his conviction and sentence for the purchase of cocaine within 1,000 feet of a school, in violation of section 893.13(l)(e), Florida Statutes (1991). We reverse.
Defendant, arguing that the trial court erred in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal, contends that the tract within 1,000 feet of which expert testimony of á surveyor showed defendant's purchase was made did not consist of "real property comprising a . school" under section 893.13(l)(e). Defendant further contends that the tract was used only as an overflow parking lot and was separated from the school itself by a soccer field. We would affirm if the evidence would have permitted the jury to infer that defendant's cocaine purchase was made within 1,000 feet of the "boundaries" of the school, that is, within 1,000 feet of the school area consisting of contiguous tracts owned by the school, none of which were separated from one another by any intervening tract having a different owner. See Lyon v. State, 591 So.2d 1107 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992).
However, our review of the record establishes the lack of an evidentiary basis for such an inference. At best, the evidence merely shows that the purchase was made within 1,000 feet of a parking lot owned by the school. Under the rule of lenity applied to criminal statutes, section 775.021(1), it is not sufficient that the school "own" the property. Rather, the property must "comprise" the school. The two terms are not synonymous.
Thus, we reverse defendant's conviction under section 893.13(l)(e). Pursuant to section 924.34 we direct the trial court on remand to enter judgment for the lesser-included offense of purchase of cocaine.
In light of our disposition as to defendant's conviction, we need not address his remaining point on appeal concerning the mandatory minimum sentence he had re ceived, as resentencing for the lesser-included offense is now required.
Reversed and remanded for proceedings consistent herewith.
PARKER, J., concurs.
ALTENBERND, J., concurs specially.