Case Name: Ronald Ray RUSS, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent
Court: Florida Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1975-02-26
Citations: 313 So. 2d 758
Docket Number: No. 44278
Parties: Ronald Ray RUSS, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
Judges: ADKINS, C. J., and ROBERTS and ENGLAND, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 313
Pages: 758–761

Head Matter:
Ronald Ray RUSS, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
No. 44278.
Supreme Court of Florida.
Feb. 26, 1975.
Louis O. Frost, Jr., Public Defender, and James O. Brecher, Asst. Public Defender, for petitioner.
Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., and Raymond L. Marky, Asst. Atty. Gen., for respondent.

Opinion:
OVERTON, Justice.
Because of an apparent conflict with Hooks v. State, 207 So.2d 459 (Fla. App. 2nd 1968), we initially granted cer-tiorari from the First District Court of Appeal's per curiam affirmance approving a probation revocation on facts which were not sufficient to convince a jury to convict for a criminal offense. The determining factor in Hooks v. State, supra, was the failure of the trial judge to follow the appropriate procedure for disqualification of a judge. The Court, in Hooks, also grounded its reversal on the lack of due process in probationer's revocation hearing. The apparent conflict on that point between Hooks and this case is dispelled by the record in this proceeding because it shows the presiding judge afforded the probationer, through his counsel, an opportunity to testify or to present any evidence on the question of probation revocation. The probationer's counsel in the case sub judice simply declined to present any evidence which was not already before the Court.
The District Court's per curiam af-firmance of this cause was in full accordance with our decision in Bernhardt v. State, 288 So.2d 490 (Fla.1974), and the First District's own subsequent decision in Anderson v. State, 287 So.2d 322 (Fla.App.1st 1973). It should be noted that the United States Supreme Court has stated that due process rights are more limited for probationers and parolees than for an individual initially charged with' a criminal offense.
The petitioner's contention that double jeopardy applies by collateral estop-pel is without merit. This is not a second prosecution for the same offense after an acquittal. If it were, a second and separate punishment could be imposed in addition to punishment for the offense previously established for which the petitioner is on- probation. A revocation proceeding concerns conduct which violates the terms of probation for an already-established criminal offense. "Proof sufficient to support a criminal conviction is not required to support a judge's discretionary order revoking probation." Bernhardt v. State, supra, 288 So.2d at 501. To apply collateral estoppel, as urged by petitioner, would substantially extend that doctrine not in any way authorized or contemplated by Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 90 S.Ct. 1189, 25 L.Ed.2d 469 (1970); Turner v. Arkansas, 407 U.S. 366, 92 S.Ct. 2096, 32 L.Ed.2d 798 (1972); Harris v. Washington, 404 U.S. 55, 92 S.Ct. 183, 30 L.Ed.2d 212 (1971); Simpson v. Florida, 403 U.S. 384, 91 S.Ct. 1801, 29 L.Ed.2d 549 (1971). The ultimate facts necessary to convict for a criminal offense and the ultimate facts necessary to establish a violation of probation are not the same. It is analogous to the decision of the United States Supreme Court in One Lot Stones v. United States, 409 U.S. 232, 93 S.Ct. 489, 34 L.Ed.2d 438 (1972), which held that an acquittal in a criminal case does not collaterally estop the same issue from being tried in a civil case because the burden of proof as well as the elements that must be established differ.
Accordingly, no direct conflict having been demonstrated, the writ is hereby discharged.
It is so ordered.
ADKINS, C. J., and ROBERTS and ENGLAND, JJ., concur.
ERVIN (Retired), J., dissents with opinion.
McCAIN, J., dissents and concurs with ERVIN (Retired), J.
. Article Y, Section 3(b)(3), Florida Constitution.
. ". . . Without denying that there is some force in this argument, we think it a sufficient answer that we deal here, not with the right of an accused to counsel in a criminal prosecution, but with the more limited due process right of one who is a probationer or parolee only because he has been convicted of a crime." Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 789, 93 S.Ct. 1766, 1763, 36 L.Ed.2d 656, 666 (1973).
"Of. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 18 L.Ed.2d 527 (1967), establishing a juvenile's right to appointed counsel in a delinquency proceeding which, while denominated civil, was functionally akin to a criminal trial. A juvenile charged with violation of a generally applicable statute is differently situated from an already-convicted probationer or parolee, and is entitled to a higher degree of protection. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970) (the standard of proof in a juvenile delinquency proceeding must be 'proqf beyond a reasonable doubt')." Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, n. 12 at 790, 93 S.Ct. 1756 at 1763.