Case Name: THE PEOPLE, Petitioner, v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF SACRAMENTO COUNTY, Respondent; RICHARD JAMES VALDEZ, Real Party in Interest
Court: Supreme Court of California
Jurisdiction: California
Decision Date: 1983-11-17
Citations: 35 Cal. 3d 11
Docket Number: S.F. No. 24183
Parties: THE PEOPLE, Petitioner, v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF SACRAMENTO COUNTY, Respondent; RICHARD JAMES VALDEZ, Real Party in Interest.
Judges: 
Reporter: California Reports
Volume: 35
Pages: 11–23

Head Matter:
[S.F. No. 24183.
Nov. 17, 1983.]
THE PEOPLE, Petitioner, v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF SACRAMENTO COUNTY, Respondent; RICHARD JAMES VALDEZ, Real Party in Interest.
Counsel
George Deukmejian and John K. Van de Kamp, Attorneys General, Robert H. Philibosian, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Arnold O. Overoye, As sistant Attorney General, James T. McNally and Constance M. Barton, Deputy Attorneys General, for Petitioner.
No appearance for Respondent.
Kenneth M. Wells, Public Defender, Caroline R. Lange and Everett J. Avila, Assistant Public Defenders, for Real Party in Interest.
Quin Denvir, State Public Defender, Steffan Imhoff, Deputy State Public Defender, Marshall W. Krause, Krause, Timan, Baskin, Shell & Grant, Ephriam Margolin, Amitai Schwartz, Margaret C. Crosby and Alan L. Schlosser as Amici Curiae on behalf of Real Party in Interest.

Opinion:
Opinion
RICHARDSON, J.
In this proceeding, the People seek a writ of mandate to compel the trial court to vacate a pretrial order suppressing several items discovered by the police in a warrantless search of an automobile trunk. Although the trial court determined that the police had probable cause to search the car trunk in question, the court apparently concluded that the search was improper because in its view the prosecution had not adequately demonstrated the existence of sufficient "exigent circumstances" to justify the search.
As we shall explain, we have concluded that the on-the-scene warrantless search of the automobile trunk in this case was permissible under the traditional, well established contours of the "automobile exception" to the general warrant requirement. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court erred in suppressing the evidence found in the trunk and we issue the requested writ.
1. The Facts
At approximately 10 a.m. on January 24, 1979, Richard Stevens went to the premises of an old abandoned house near the intersection of Franklin and Mack Roads in Sacramento County to gather firewood. Stevens testified that he had obtained firewood from the premises on several occasions in the past and that he knew the property had been abandoned for at least two years.
On the morning in question, however, he discovered a blue Ford Courier pickup truck parked in a detached garage at the back of the property. Seeing no one else on the premises, Stevens approached and inspected the pickup and found that its hood was open, its battery was missing, its radio equipment had apparently been taken since wires were hanging under the dashboard and its mirrors had been removed. Surmising that the pickup had been stolen and stripped, Stevens took a checkbook from the dashboard of the pickup and brought it to the California Highway Patrol office where he reported the incident. The highway patrol confirmed that the owner of the pickup had reported that the truck had been stolen.
About 1 p.m. that same day, two Sacramento County police officers who had learned of the stolen vehicle approached the abandoned premises. When the officers drove by the property, they saw—in addition to the pickup in the garage—a second vehicle, a "black over blue" Oldsmobile sedan, backed up to the garage. Believing that those persons who had stolen the pickup might have returned to the truck, the officers summoned additional policemen; when three or four more officers arrived, the police drove onto the property.
As the police entered the premises, defendant Richard James Valdez and a second suspect walked out of the garage where the stolen pickup was located and approached the Oldsmobile. The officers ordered the two suspects away from the immediate vicinity of the pickup and Oldsmobile and detained the two in police cars while they investigated the premises. The officers inspected the pickup and found that various parts of the truck, including the radiator, mirrors, radio and speakers, were missing; in addition, oil and hydraulic fluid were seen dripping from the underside of the pickup.
The officers then looked into the Oldsmobile, noticed various tools but no car parts on the floor of the car, and saw the car keys in the ignition. Without obtaining the consent of either Valdez or his companion, and without securing a search warrant, one officer took the keys of the car and opened the trunk of the Oldsmobile in search of the missing parts of the pickup. In the trunk, the officer found a radiator, mirrors, and a car radio and speakers which he believed had been removed from the pickup track.
Subsequently, defendant was charged with vehicle theft (Veh. Code, § 10851) and receiving stolen property (Pen. Code, § 496). After the preliminary hearing disclosed, inter alia, the facts set forth above, defendant moved pursuant to Penal Code section 1538.5 to suppress the evidence found in the search of the automobile trunk. Although the trial court concluded that the police had probable cause to believe that evidence of the pickup theft might be located in the trunk of the Oldsmobile, the court ultimately ruled that the search of the trunk was illegal, reasoning that in light of the number of officers present and the possibility of obtaining a warrant, the prosecution had failed to prove the existence of sufficient "exigent circumstances" to justify the warrantless search.
The People then instituted the present mandate proceeding pursuant to Penal Code section 1538.5, subdivision (o). The Court of Appeal granted an alternative writ and, after briefing and argument, ultimately ruled, in a divided decision, in favor of the People. Because of a conflict in recent Court of Appeal decisions involving warrantless searches of automobile trunks, we granted a hearing in this and several other cases to clarify the governing legal principles in this area.
2. Under the Traditional "Automobile Exception" to the Warrant Requirement, the Immediate, On-the-scene Search of the Automobile Trunk in This Case Was Valid
As we recently explained in People v. Chavers (1983) 33 Cal.3d 462, 466-467 [189 Cal.Rptr. 169, 658 P.2d 96], the United States Supreme Court has adopted a rule that police officers who lawfully stop a vehicle, having probable cause to believe that contraband is located or concealed somewhere therein, may conduct a warrantless search of the vehicle that is as thorough (as to location and type of container searched) as that which a magistrate could authorize by warrant. (United States v. Ross (1982) 456 U.S. 798 [72 L.Ed.2d 572, 102 S.Ct. 2157].)
We further explained in Chavers that prior decisions of this court likewise would sustain a warrantless automobile search based upon probable cause, so long as some exigent circumstances existed, and that "sufficient exigency generally exists whenever probable cause is first discovered at the time the police stop a vehicle and thus have not had a prior opportunity to obtain a warrant." (33 Cal.3d at pp. 467-468.) We concluded in Chavers that, "Accordingly, we hold that probable cause to believe that a lawfully stopped automobile contains contraband justifies an immediate warrantless search of the automobile despite the absence of any additional exigent circumstances." (Id., at p. 469, italics added.) We agreed with the United States Supreme Court in Ross, supra, that the scope and character of such a search would be "limited by the reason for the search and the kind of object believed to be concealed." (Id., at p. 470.)
In the present case, defense counsel conceded at oral argument that the police did indeed have probable cause to believe that the trunk of the Oldsmobile contained seizable evidence. Defense counsel argued, however, that despite the existence of probable cause to search the trunk, the warrantless search was nonetheless invalid because the prosecution assertedly failed to prove the existence of sufficient "exigent circumstances" to justify an immediate search of the vehicle. As noted, the trial court agreed with this assertion and relied upon the alleged absence of such exigent circumstances in concluding that the evidence found in the trunk should be suppressed.
Our analysis in Chavers indicates, however, that the trial court's conclusion was based on a misapprehension of the nature of the "exigency" required to justify a warrantless search. Under the governing authorities, (1) the ready mobility of automobiles, (2) the lesser expectation of privacy in their contents, (3) the significant administrative expense, delay and risk of loss of contents entailed in requiring the police either to secure all automobiles at the scene or to tow all suspected vehicles to a securely maintained depot, and (4) the need for clear guidelines by which police may guide and regulate their conduct, have led to the adoption of a general rule permitting the police to conduct an immediate, on-the-scene warrantless search of an automobile under such circumstances. (See Chavers, at p. 469; Arkansas v. Sanders (1979) 442 U.S. 753, 760-761, 765, fn. 14 [61 L.Ed.2d 235, 242-243, 246, 99 S.Ct. 2586].)
In the instant case, although the police did not literally "stop" the Oldsmobile "on the highway," the police did not even know of the existence of the Oldsmobile prior to discovering it next to the stolen pickup. Thus, they certainly cannot be faulted for failing to obtain a warrant to seize and search the vehicle before proceeding to the premises in question. (Cf. Coolidge v. New Hampshire (1971) 403 U.S. 443 [29 L.Ed.2d 564, 91 S.Ct. 2022].) While it may well have been possible for the police, after discovering the Oldsmobile on the premises, simply to have seized the vehicle and to have postponed a search of its trunk until after a warrant had been obtained, a prompt on-the-scene warrantless search of the automobile does not violate the state or federal Constitutions. (See Chavers, at pp. 468-469.)
Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court erred in suppressing the numerous items found in the car trunk.
Let a peremptory writ of mandate issue as requested.
Kaus, J., Broussard, J., and Grodin, J., concurred.