Case Name: Ex Parte Elbert Muncy
Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1913-11-05
Citations: 72 Tex. Crim. 541
Docket Number: No. 2687
Parties: Ex Parte Elbert Muncy.
Judges: 
Reporter: Texas Criminal Reports
Volume: 72
Pages: 541–587

Head Matter:
Ex Parte Elbert Muncy.
No. 2687.
Decided November 5, 1913.
Rehearing denied January 21, 1914.
1. —Contempt—Witness—Immunity—Case Stated—Witness.
Where the relator was extended and accepted immunity and testified for the State before the grand jury, and was never charged by complaint or otherwise with the offense concerning which he was to testify, but when the habeas corpus trial was called he refused to testify, although the district attorney and the district judge presiding- at the trial promised him absolute immunity from punishment and prosecution for said offense, there was no error in committing such witness to jail for contempt after a refusal by him to testify for the State under such circumstances. Following Floyd v. State, 7 Texas, 215, and other cases. Davidson, Judge, dissenting.
2. —Same—Rule Stated—Election by State.
Where a witness who has been given and accepted immunity under an agreement with the State approved by the trial judge refuses to testify for the State, he can be compelled to do so, and in default held for contempt, and this although the State could proceed to prosecute relator if it desired to do so.
3. —Same—Immunity—Constitutional Inhibition.
Where a witness has been given complete immunity from punishment for the offense about which he is to testify for the State, he is thereby absolutely protected and the constitutional inhibition that he can not be forced to testify against himself has no application any more than if he had been tried and acquitted or the offense was barred by the statute of limitation. Davidson, Judge, dissenting.
4. —Same—Power to Give Immunity—District Judge—District Attorney.
The district judge and district attorney have the authority and power under our law to guarantee and give to a witness who testifies for the State immunity from prosecution of the offense about which he is to testify. Following Barrara v. State, 42 Texas, 260, and other cases.
5. —Same—Rule Stated—Absolute Immunity—Witness.
If complete and absolute’ immunity from punishment is extended and accepted by the witness concerning the offense about which he is to testify for the State, and he afterwards refuses to do so, he may be compelled to testify under contempt proceedings. Davidson, Judge, dissenting.
6. —Same—Rule Stated—In this and Other States—Immunity.
While it is the right of an individual under the Constitution to refuse to give testimony incriminating himself, yet where he is extended and has accepted immunity from punishment, the interests of the State and society demand that he shall give such testimony within his knowledge as will aid in bringing criminals to justice. This is not only the rule in this State, but in other States.
7. —Same—Practice on Appeal—Other Offenses Not Included.
The fact that on the trial the relator may not testify truthfully and thereby become subject to a prosecution for perjury need not be considered, as the immunity extends simply to the offense about which he is to testify.
8. —Same—Accomplice—Accessory—Principal—Immunity Extends to All.
Under an agreement of immunity duly extended, the same covers any connected offense such as accomplice and accessory which in good faith he discloses as a part of the one to which he was admitted as a witness, although in truth the transaction constitutes a separate crime, but not two distinct offenses. Following Young v. State, 45 Texas Crim. Rep., 202, and other cases.
9. —Same—Statement in Opinion—Practice on Appeal.
The contention that the statement of this court in the original opinion was not correct is not borne out by the record; however, as relator was given immunity in the habeas corpus trial by the district attorney and district judge, this question becomes immaterial.
10. —Same—Statement of Facts in Opinion—Case Pending.
The statement by this court that there is no ease pending against relator is borne out by the record, and, therefore, can not be assailed.
11. —Same—Authority to Give Immunity—District Court.
Under the Code of Criminal Procedure the district judge and district attorney are authorized to grant and give complete immunity from punishment to a witness who testifies for the State, and the witness can be compelled to testify. Following Camron v. State, 32 Texas Crim. Rep., 180. Overruling Holmes v. State, 20 Texas Crim. App., 509. Distinguishing Snodgrass v. State, 67 Texas Crim. Rep., 615, 150 S. W. Rep., 162. Davidson, Judge, dissenting.
12.—Same—Inherent Power of Courts—Immunity—Suspension of Laws.
The courts have no inherent power to grant immunity, but they are given this power by the laws enacted by the Legislature and under the decisions of this court, and such power can not be construed to give the courts authority to suspend the laws of the State. Articles 37, 630, and 790, White’s Ann. Code Criminal Procedure.
From Floyd County.
Original habeas corpus proceeding asking release from commitment to jail for contempt, in refusing to testify for the State.
The opinion states the case.
L. C. Penry and Martin & Zimmerman, for relator.
The Constitution of Texas having vested pardoning power in the executive department of the government, and the right to define crime, prescribe punishment therefor, and repeal law relating thereto, in the legislative department of the government only, the exercise by the court of the power and right to grant immunity and wipe out all offenses against a witness, is a transgression by the judicial department of the government, both upon the executive and legislative departments, contrary to article 1, section 3 of the Constitution of Texas.
"A careful review of the authorities upon this question will show that in England, as well as in this country, it has always been conceded that the granting of immunity from prosecution was a right properly belonging to the executive department of the government, and that the courts of the several States came finally to the conclusion that the prosecuting attorney, with the advice and consent of the court, could grant immunity with the consent of the party to be affected, largely upon grounds of expediency, without denying the correctness of the principle announced by all earlier law writers that such a power belonged only in the executive department of the government. A very careful review of the authorities will demonstrate this. 1 Greenleaf on Evidence, sec. 379, lays down the proposition, “If an accomplice having made a private confession, upon promise of pardon by the Attorney-General, should afterwards refuse to testify, he may be convicted upon the evidence of that confession.” In Commonwealth v. Knapp, 10 Pick., 478, it is stated that in England, if a witness for the crown conducts himself fairly and makes and testifies to a full disclosure, he is recommended to mercy and a pardon is always granted.
When there has been a promise of immunity and the prosecuting attorney refuses to recognize it, the court will simply continue the case to permit him to apply to the executive department for a pardon. 1 Bishop’s Criminal Procedure, sec. 1164. In the case of U. S. v. Ford, 99 U. S., 594, 35 Led., 399, it was held that the defendant could not plead a contract of immunity in bar of prosecution, his remedy being only to have case postponed to give opportunity to apply to pardoning power for executive clemency.
In the Hardin case, 13 Texas Crim. App., 189, in a similar case to the one at bar, Judge Hurt uses the following language: “The great weight of authority is to the effect that the defendant must look to executive clemency in such cases.” Judge Wilson, in the Holmes case, 30 Texas Crim. App., 518, expresses doubt that the court may grant immunity, because such matters may be entertained only by the pardoning powers. The case of Camron v. State, 33 S. W. Rep., 683, is a case upon which the doctrine invoked by the State in this case must of necessity rest, as will be shown hereafter, because expressions found in both the Hughes case and the Hapolean case hereafter mentioned are based upon this case as authority, but it will be noted that while the Holmes case is in some effects disapproved, the principle of law enunciated therein, towit, that the granting of immunity to a prisoner belonged solely to the pardoning power, was not disapproved. The court in the Camron case bases its decision upon a question of expediency, as shown by the following expression contained therein: “We can "see no good reason why, when a defendant has in good faith carried out his agreement, the labor and expense of the State of a solemn trial should be incurred for the purpose of remitting the defendant to his remedy of pardon, to which it is admitted he is entitled as a matter of right. It is seen therefore that Judge Simkins, in disposing of the matter, finally rested upon the proposition that, it would be useless to put the defendant to the trouble and the State to the expense of a trial, in order to secure a right to which he was enitled.
Following the Camron case comes the Parks case, 40 S. W. Rep., 301, upon which the Hapolean case, 144 S. W. Rep., 368, is based. It will be noted that the Parks case is based upon the Camron case above referred to, the Heeley case, 11 S. W. Rep., 376, and the Flemming case, 13 S. W. Rep., 605. So, if there is any law in Texas authorizing the procedure taken in this case, it will be found in the three last mentioned cases; but in each of these cases it will be seen that there was an agreement upon the part of the witness to testify, and in none of them was immunity attempted to be thrust upon the witness as in this case. The three above mentioned cases follow closely in point of time the expres sions above quoted in the earlier decisions, the court having finally come reluctantly to the view that the judicial department of the government could exercise the right to grant immunity solely and only because it was a right to which he was entitled anyway, upon application to the executive department, and each and all being cases in which there was an agreement upon the part of the State to grant immunity in consideration of the witness giving testimony fully and fairly to the facts within his knowledge.
If it is doubtful, as above shown, that the courts have power to grant immunity, with the consent of the defendant, what could be said of the right of a court to pardon a defendant and repeal absolutely all the State law applying to his offense, against his consent ? Again, if the Camron, Neeley and Flemming cases' furnish authority for the action of the court in this case, they also furnish authority for the rule of law that a person who fails to testify fully and fairly to the facts within his knowledge may be thereafter prosecuted. See Nicks v. State, 48 S. W. Rep., 186; Neeley v. State, 11 S. W. Rep., 376; Tullis v. State, 52 S. W. Rep., 83, and authorities there cited, and it must be conceded that under these authorities the State would hereafter have the right to prosecute the relator, if he hereafter refused to testify fully and fairly to the facts within his knowledge; and that he could not claim immunity unless his disclosures were full and fair as to all facts within his knowledge; and consequently if relator is compelled to testify in this ease and if hereafter his testimony does not suit the prosecuting attorney, by reason of his having failed to comply with above conditions, he could then be prosecuted and the offense would therefore be suspended during the intervening time, and we are therefore driven to this:
That a power vested in the District Courts to thrust immunity upon a witness and compel his testimony, would amount to a delegation of authority to them to suspend the laws of the State as to such offenses, pending the giving of his testimony, contrary to section 28 of the Bill of Rights.
Either the State is utterly without a remedy, in the event the relator hereafter fails to testify fully and fairly as to the facts within his knowledge, or he may be prosecuted under the principles announced in the above cases, which support the fabric of the State’s contention and are the foundation stones upon which its theory is built, giving the court the right of granting immunity; and in the event it is conceded that he may be hereafter prosecuted, the conclusion is irresistible that this case would then come squarely within the principle announced in the case of Ex parte Smythe, 120 S. W. Rep., 200, in Which it was held that the wife abandonment law was unconstitutional, because it authorized the court to suspend punishment in violation of section 28 of the Bill of Rights. In other words, the court would be authorized, against the consent of the defendant, as he was under the wife abandonment law, to hold the offense over him pending the giving of full and fair testimony.
Again, if the State in this case, can thrust immunity upon relator against his consent, compel his testimony and could under any circumstances hereafter prosecute him for any offenses growing out of, incident to or connected with the murder of J. M. Muncey, we would be driven to this:
Such a power vested in the District Courts would give them the right to deprive the defendant of his constitutional right to a speedy trial.
In the case of Waldon v. State, 98 S. W. Rep., 848, it was held that the Acts of the Twenty-eighth Legislature, 136, suspending prosecution in a seduction case for two years, upon certain conditions, was unconstitutional because it deprived the defendant of a speedy public trial. Now, if the relator has immunity thrust upon him upon condition that he testify fairly, his case comes squarely within the principle of law announced in the Waldon case, supra; and if any offense against him can be suspended and held over him upon such condition as this, it might be upon any other condition.
If the State replies that he is under no indictment or accusation of any kind, and hence the above argument is not applicable, we answer that section 10 of the Bill of Rights, providing that no person shall be compelled to give evidence against himself, has reference to possible and prospective prosecutions, as well as to present and existing ones, and the protection offered by it is not limited to cases in which the party called as a witness has been in some manner legally accused of crime. See Ex parte Carter, 166 Mo., 604; Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U. S., 547; 35 Led., 1110, and Ex parte Parks, 40 S. W. Rep., 300.
The language of the Constitution is plain and unequivocal, section 10 of the Bill of Rights providing, “that no person shall be compelled to give evidence' against himself.” Certainly this plain provision of the Constitution ought not to be abrogated and destroyed by reading into the statute law of the State a meaning that at the very most it only impliedly conveys. Articles 37, 630 and 709 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1895 are the only expressions contained in legislative enactments of the State of Texas that can possibly be construed into granting the courts of Texas the right to thrust immunity upon a witness and compel his testimony, and such provisions can not be said to be express .authority for it, and at best can be only vaguely implied.
We have found no case sustaining the State’s theory, but we find the following cases, that exactly decide the point in our favor, and seem to be decisive of the question that the court is without power to thrust immunity upon a witness. Ex parte Irvine, 75 Fed. Rep., 954; Foot v. Buchanan, 113 Fed. Rep., 156; Temple v. Commonwealth, 75 Va., 892; Rex v. England, 2 Leach C. C., 767. See also: Stanford v. State, 42 Texas Crim. Rep., 343; Mueller v. State, 79 Tenn. (11 Lea), 18. For full annotation of authorities, see State v. Jack, A. & E. Am. Cases, vol. 2, p. 177. See also following English and Canadian cases, holding that the privilege of a witness to refuse to give incriminating testimony, may be taken away by a statute clearly intended to have that effect. England: 24 and 25 Vict. C., 96, secs. 75-84; 26 and 27 Vict. C., 119, sec. 5; Reg. v. Scott, 7 Cox C. C., 164; Reg. v. Cross, 7 Cox C. C., 226; Ex parte Schofield, 6 Ch. D., 230; Reg. v. Cherry, 12 Cox C. C., 32. Canada: Reg. v. McLineby, 2 Can. Crim. Cases, 416; Reg. v. Hammond, 29 Ont., 211; Reg. v. Fee, 13 Ont., 590.
This question has certainly not been decided in Texas adversely to our contention, unless it can be said that the views expressed in the Hughes case, 136 S. W. Rep., 1071, and the Napolean case, supra, so hold, and in each and both of these cases this exact question was not before the trial court, and could not have been properly before the appellate court for a decision, and any expression contained in these cases would therefore be orbiter dicta, and certainly neither of these cases could be properly based upon the Parks case, the Neeley and Camron cases, supra, because these cases, upon careful analysis, will be found to be against the contention of the State, rather than for it, and certainly not decisive that the courts of Texas can pardon a witness, can virtually repeal the laws with reference to any offense he may have committed, conditioned upon his testifying fully and fairly. We do not believe this court intended to so decide.
We submit and earnestly insist that the legislative department of this Government has been vested with the power alone to define and prescribe punishment for offenses and to repeal laws relating thereto, and in numerous cases where the Legislature has attempted to take away from the witness his constitutional right of testifying against himself, the courts have uniformly held that before the Legislature had power to do so, such witness must be protected by a statute that was as broad as his constitutional guaranty of silence. See following' cases: People ex rel. Lemsolm v. O’Brien, 176 N. Y., 253; Ex parte Clarke, 103 Cal., 352; People ex rel. Akin v. Butler St. Foundry & Iron Co., 201 Ill., 236; Samson v. Boyden, 160 Ill., 613; Ex parte Carter, 66 S. W. Rep., 540; Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U. S., 547; State v. Nowell, 58 N. H., 314; Re Scott, 95 Fed., 815; Re Rosser, 96 Fed., 305; Re Feldstein, 103 Fed., 269; Re Walch, 104 Fed., 518; Re Shera, 114 Fed., 207.
Briefly reviewing the authorities showing it has never been the recognized rule, that immunity can be thrust upon a witness, except with his consent, we note the following: The Barara case, supra, was the case of a contract presupposing consent. The Bowden case was likewise a contract, in which the proposition was laid down that a case could be dismissed and the defendant’s testimony used with his consent and the further expression therein made that the effect of the nolle prosequi would be different without it, and that he is amenable to any indictment in any court having jurisdiction of the offense. The next case is the Hardin case, in which Judge Hurt expresses the opinion that the great weight of authority was to the effect that “immunity could be granted only by the pardoning power,” and rests his opinion upon the doctrine of estoppel against the State, and not upon the court’s right to give immunity. The next is the Holmes case, supra, in which Judge Wilson denied the right of the court to even contract immunity. The next case is the Camron case by Simkins, who impliedly admits the correctness of the Holmes case, but says there is no use to put the defendant to the trouble and the State to the expense of a trial merely for the purpose of remitting the defendant to his remedy of pardon, to which he is always entitled, and this was a case of a contract which he agrees carried with it the idea of consent. About the next case is the Parks case in an opinion by Judge Henderson, where the relator was discharged because it appeared that upon cross-examination the witness might have to incriminate himself. The next case is the Stanford case by Judge Davidson, in which the right of the court to force a witness to. testify upon granting him immunity, was expressly denied and which opinion was concurred in by Henderson and Brooks. This case was decided many years before the Hughes or Napolean case, and to our mind follows the principles announced in the Bowden and Camron cases, supra. We don’t think the court has grasped the distinction which we have attempted to draw between the right of the court to make a contract with the consent of the witness, and their inherent right under the Constitution and laws to force testimony by the use of the dungeon or jail. In the former, there would not be necessity for positive statutory law, because the defendant could naturally do away with or waive his right; in the latter, the courts are attempting to take away a right guaranteed him by the State and Federal Constitution, and this naturally presupposes an absolute right in the court to perform that identical act derived from the organic law of the State.
All the authorities hold that a contract for immunity by the court merely suspends the offense, that he can be thereafter prosecuted; that the ofíense is alive all the time; that it has never been obliterated, else how could he thereafter be prosecuted, as stated in the Neeley and Greenhaw cases. This amounts in effect to a suspension of the laws of the State, which might be done with the consent of the defendant, but certainly could not be done against his consent, without violating section 28 of the Bill of Rights, providing that no law should be suspended, and which was applied in the Smythe case, 120 S. W. Rep., 200. For this very reason, the defendant can at any time withdraw from the contract, and the only remedy of the State is to prosecute. The promise operates against the State by way of estoppel, but the court has not the inherent right to hold a case over a defendant year in and year out and deny him a speedy public trial against his consent.
In the well considered case of Ex parte Carter, 66 S. W. Rep., 542, in discussing the clause of the Constitution protecting a witness from incriminating himself, the following language is used: “Referring to the expression, 'or furnish evidence against himself,’ the opinion says this clause can be equally extensive in its application, and in its interpretation may be presumed to be intended to add something to the significance of that which precedes. Aside from this consideration, and upon the language of the proposition standing by itself, it is a reasonable con struction to hold that it protects a person from being compelled to disclose the circumstances of his offense, the sources from which or the means by which evidence of its commission, or if his connection with it, may be obtained or made effectual for his conviction, without using the answers as direct admissions against him. For all practical purposes, such disclosures would have the effect to furnish evidence against the party making them. They might furnish the only means of discovering the names of those who could give evidence concerning the transaction, the instrument by which a crime was perpetrated, or even the corpus delicti itself.” Ex parte Greenhaw v. State, 53 S. W. Rep., 1024; Ex parte Gibson, 62 S. W. Rep., 755; Ex parte Carter, 62 Texas Crim. Rep., 113, 136 S. W. Rep., 778; Oates v. State, 86 S. W. Rep., 769, and cases stated in the minority motion.
C. E. Lane, Assistant Attorney-General, and Crudington & Works, for the State.
Cases cited in opinion.

Opinion:
HARPER, Judge.
Relator was called as a witness before the grand jury of Floyd County, Texas, when said body was examining witnesses in regard to the killing of J. M. Muncy. The relator is a boy twelve years of age, and is the son of J. M. Muncy, deceased, and Mrs. Bertie Muncy, and on his testimony and the testimony of other witnesses Mrs. Bertie Muncy and Horace Peters were indicted charged with the murder of J. M. Muncy.
Mrs. Muncy and Horace Peters sued out a writ of habeas corpus, and on this hearing relator was offered as a witness by the State, and refused to testify on the ground that any testimony he might give might incriminate him. The district attorney in open court stated that he would- agree that relator should not be prosecuted for any offense growing out of the killing of J. M. Muncy, and L. S. Kinder, judge of the Sixty-fourth Judicial District Court, acquiesced and approved said offer of immunity from prosecution, and informed relator that he would not be prosecuted for any offense growing out of the killing of his father, but the witness still refused to testify, when the court entered an order adjudging relator guilty of contempt, the order being as follows :
"And the said witness refused to answer any and all questions, and gave, while on the stand, and in open court, his reason for his refusal to answer said question that it would incriminate him, and the State, by its counsel in open court promised the said witness immunity from prosecution and punishment for said offense, and said promise was acquiesced in by the court, and the said witness was assured of immunity from prosecution for said offense, and it appearing to the court that there is no indictment or complaint or prosecution of any kind pending against said witness, and the court thereupon being of the opinion that the questions propounded would not incriminate the witness, and the said witness having been promised immunity from prosecution, and he having agreed with the district attorney to testify herein, upon said promise of immunity, it is therefore ordered and adjudged by the court that said witness is in contempt of court for his refusal to answer said questions, and it is further the order, judgment and decree of the court that he, the said Elbert Muncy, be confined in jail of Floyd County, Texas, until he shall answer said questions, and it is therefore ordered by the court that the said witness, Elbert Muncy, be and he is hereby remanded to the custody of the sheriff of said Floyd County, Texas, until he shall answer said questions and testify as a witness in said causes."
It is thus seen that when relator was called before the grand jury he was offered immunity and accepted same, and did testify before the grand jury, a sworn statement of such testimony being incorporated in the record, and is as follows:
"About a week ago, I heard Horace Peters tell mama she ought to kill my papa. Yesterday evening mama said would I kill papa. I told' her I would kill him if I could, but I was too nervous. While papa was gone to town, mama said she might kill papa if she could. Yesterday evening I told mama I would say I shot papa. I got up this morning and went out to the closet and told them the horse was out in the yard. Papa said 'let him go.' As I came in, mama stepped out on the floor. I lay down on the bed. I then heard the pistol shot or fire. I then heard it fall on the floor. I went out and told Judge Stalbird I did it, and when I told you all I killed him I did it to save my mama."
After being remanded to jail for refusing to testify on the habeas corpus trial, relator sued out a writ of habeas corpus, which was granted by Judge Davidson, and the cause set for hearing on the 8th day of October, it being the first day set for hearing of causes at this term of court. At the hearing of the case the testimony offered was substantially as above, the relator claiming that he could not be forced to testify as section 10 of the Bill of Rights provides that no person shall be compelled to testify against himself. There is and can be no question that no person can be compelled to testify in a . criminal case pending against him, nor give testimony on the trial of another on which a prosecution may or can be founded against him. To this expression of the law we give our full assent and approve what is said in the case of Ex parte Wilson, 47 S. W. Rep., 996, cited by relator, but in that case no immunity was tendered, offered nor accepted. A different question arises here, and that is, after giving the witness immunity from prosecution, was the court attempting to force the witness to testify in regard to any matter upon which a prosecution might or could be founded against the witness ? That there was no case pending against him is an admitted fact; that he had testified in regard to the same matter before the grand jury under promise of immunity is an admitted fact, but for some reason on the habeas corpus trial he declines to testify, giving as his reason that his answers might incriminate him. The district judge and district attorney again pledged him immunity from prosecution, but he declines to testify.
Relator's able attorney argues and earnestly insists that although relator had testified before the grand jury under an agreement that he would not be prosecuted, that relator had the right to withdraw from such an agreement, and the State could not enforce it, but all the State could do would be to prosecute relator if it desired to do so. There is no doubt the State could proceed in that manner, if it desired to do so, but if the State elected not to do so, and again assured relator he would not be prosecuted for any offense growing out of this matter, why could he not be compelled to testify? In an unbroken line of decisions in this court, and the courts of other States, it is held that if a person has been tried and acquitted, he can then be compelled to testify against another, although his testimony might show a criminal connection with the offense; that if the statute of limitation furnishes a complete bar to him being prosecuted for the offense, he can be compelled to testify,' on the ground that in either of these events, he would not be giving evidence against himself, for no criminal prosecution against him would lie. In an unbroken line, of decisions this court has held, where the statutes of the State furnish complete immunity from prosecution for an offense, about which the witness is called to testify, he may be compelled to testify. The first case we find on this question, wherein our court passed on that question, is that of Floyd v. State, 7 Texas, 215, rendered in 1855. Judge Wheeler in rendering the opinion held that where a statute prescribes that a witness shall be exempt from liability for any offense of which he is compelled to give evidence, he can not claim the privilege of not answering, but he may be compelled to testify. This has been the unbroken rule of decision by our Supreme Court and this court from that day to this, and the law as thus announced is .supported by the decisions of the United States Supreme Court and the great weight of authority both in this country and in England.
And while relator does not seriously contest this rule of law, yet he says the Legislature of this State by no statutory enactment has declared such to be the rule in cases of murder, and similar cases. Upon what ground is it the courts hold that the witness is compelled to testify? It is that either by an acquittal, by limitation, or by statutory enactment, no prosecution would lie against the witness about which he may be called to testify, and we might here say that we agree to the rule, that the exemption from prosecution must be so broad as to absolutely prohibit his prosecution and conviction for any offense about which he may be called to testify, otherwise he will be within the protection of the Constitution, and he can not be compelled to testify. But if the immunity given him by the law of the State is such as to absolutely protect him from all punishment for the offense about which he is called to testify, then under such circumstances he could not be said to be giving evidence against himself, and the constitutional inhibition has no appli cation any more than if he has been tried and acquitted, or the offense was barred by the statute of limitation, for in any and all of said events he is protected against the evidence he may give being used against him, and this is what the Constitution guarantees him—nothing more and nothing less.
The question then would be, do the laws of this State furnish relator full and ample immunity from punishment, if he should be compelled to testify? If so, he should be remanded to undergo the punishment assessed by the trial judge for contempt; if the law does not guarantee him absolute immunity from punishment in regard to the matters about which he would be compelled to testify, he is entitled to be discharged. The record, as hereinbefore recited, discloses that under an agreement of immunity from prosecution he did testify before the grand jury; that when called to testify on the habeas corpus trial of his mother and Peters he refused to testify, when he was again guaranteed immunity from prosecution by the district attorney, in open court, with the knowledge, sanction and approval of the district judge, and he was so informed. So the sole question is, did the district judge and district attorney have the authority and power under our law to guarantee and give this immunity from prosecution, and would our law and the courts enforce that immunity and protect relator from prosecution and punishment for any matter about which he might be called to testify in regard to the killing of his father? The right under our law of the district attorney, with the knowledge and consent of the district judge, to guarantee immunity from prosecution and punishment, has never been seriously questioned in this State. In the case of Barrara v. State, 43 Texas, 260, and other cases when our Supreme Court had criminal jurisdiction, it was recognized that they had this authority and power under our laws. When this court was created in 1876, in the first volume of its reports, in the case of Bowden v. State, 1 Texas Crim. App., 137, it recognized and enforced the rule. In that case the district attorney, with the approval of the district judge, agreed with Bowden that he would dismiss the case against him if he would testify against Arnold, who was also indicted for the offense. The case was dismissed, but subsequently Bowden was reindicted, tried and convicted, although he had regularly attended court, and stood ready to testify at any and all times should Arnold be tried. In passing on that case, this court said: "There has been no default on his (Bowden's) part, and until there is, the plighted faith of the State should have been kept inviolate in his immunity from further prosecution and punishment," and the conviction was reversed on this sole ground. And this rule of law has been reaffirmed by this court in the cases of Holmes v. State, 30 Texas Crim. App., 509; Ex parte Greenhau, 53 S. W. Rep., 1024; Hardin v. State, 12 Texas Crim. App., 186; Cameron v. State, 32 Texas Crim. Rep., 180. In the Greenhau and Cameron cases, supra, this question is discussed at length, and it is held that the courts of this State, under our Code, have authority to give and guarantee absolute immunity to a person who may be called to testify in regard to the transaction. If the rule of law was otherwise, and there was any question that the immunity given and tendered by the court was not an absolute immunity from punishment for the matters about which he is called to testify, then we think relator's contention would be sound. In the case of Young v. State, 45 Texas Crim. Rep., 202, it was held that a dismissal of a case in one court in consideration of the appellant's testifying was binding upon all the courts of the State, and the defendant could not be prosecuted for any matter growing out of the transaction in another, and upon appeal the case was reversed and dismissed. In that case the trial judge testified that there were two cases pending in Grimes County against the appellant, and upon the district attorney making a motion to dismiss to obtain the testimony of Young against Dunlap, he permitted the cases, one charging burglary and the one charging theft, against Young, to be dismissed but says he at the time remanded Young to the custody of the sheriff of Brazos County, where an indictment for theft growing out of the same transaction was pending, the stolen property having been carried into that county. This court held that the dismissal of the cases for burglary and theft in consideration of Young testifying carried with it complete immunity for any matter growing out of the transaction, and he could not thereafter be prosecuted for the theft in Brazos County, as hereinbefore stated reversing and dismissing the case against Young. Thus it is seen that our courts have construed the law to carry complete immunity from prosecution for any matter growing out. of the transaction, and will not countenance nor permit the prosecution of a person under such circumstances. See also Stanford v. State, 42 Texas Crim. Rep., 343; Griffin v. State, 43 Texas Crim. Rep., 428; Taylor v. State, 50 Texas Crim. Rep., 380; Kain v. State, 16 Texas Crim. App., 282; Elliott v. State, 19 S. W. Rep., 249, and other cases.
Shortly after the writer's accession to this court the case of Hughes v. State, 62 Texas Crim. Rep., 288, was decided, and we therein held, in accordance with the authorities above cited as we understood them, that if complete immunity from prosecution for the transaction was tendered the witness, he could be compelled to testify. There was no dissent filed in that case, but in the later case of Ex parte Napoleon, 65 Texas Crim. Rep., 307, 144 S. W. Rep., 269, where we announced the same rule, Judge Davidson filed a vigorous dissent. At the time the opinion was handed down Judge Davidson stated that he would file a dissenting opinion, but the dissent was not prepared at the time, and the writer did not see it until it was published in the Southwestern Reporter. In this dissenting opinion Judge Davidson does not deny that the courts of this State, under our laws, have the authority to give and guarantee immunity from prosecution, but his dissent is based upon the proposition that he can not be compelled to testify against others in matters in which he is criminally liable without his consent, citing-section 10 of the Bill of Rights, and cases cited, which we do not think sustain his proposition, and later we will take up each of these cases and discuss them. He says:
"An inspection of the cases cited in the Park case shows that in each case there was an agreement with the witness to testify upon guaranteed immunity from prosecution. No case has been cited, and I believe none can be found in Texas, holding that a witness can be forced to testify against his confederates in a criminal prosecution, unless he has agreed so to do. He can not even then be forced to testify. If he agrees to do so upon promise of immunity and fails or refuses to carry out his agreement, he may be prosecuted in the case in which he made the agreement. Neely v. State, 27 Texas Crim. App., 324, 11 S. W. Rep., 376; Nicks v. State, 40 Texas Crim. Rep., 1, 48 S. W. Rep., 186; Ex parte Park, 37 Texas Crim. Rep., 590, 40 S. W. Rep., 300, 6.6 Am. St. Rep., 835; Stevens v. State, 42 Texas Crim. Rep., 154, 59 S. W. Rep., 545. The State may hold the indictment against him until he has complied with the agreement. Ex parte Greenhaw, 41 Texas Crim. Rep., 278, 53 S. W. Rep., 1024, and other cases cited, supra. In the Cameron case, 32 Texas Crim. Rep., 180, 22 S. W. Rep., 682, 40 Am. St. Rep., 763, an agreement made with the prosecution was required to be fulfilled. It was further held that, where the State has made such agreement, and the witness has complied with its terms, he is entitled to immunity. But in no case has it been held that the witness can be compelled to testify to any fact which would incriminate him. He may agree to do so, and if he fails or refuses h.e may be prosecuted as if he had not entered into such agreement.
"With the constitutional inhibition and guaranty that he shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself, it is not readily to be comprehended how it is to be held that the State can force the witness, to testify against himself, even by agreeing not to prosecute. The witness may testify if he chooses; but it is a matter within his discretion to be controlled by him, and not by the prosecuting officers."
Thus it is seen he admits the witness can contract for immunity from prosecution, and then the immunity given is binding on the State and all its officers, and Judge Davidson, in an opinion by him, specifically so held in the case of Young v. State, 42 Texas Crim. Rep., 301, to which opinion we refer to show what authority the District Court has in the premises, and how complete immunity it can and does give even by agreeing to a dismissal of a case, when the case is dismissed in consideration of the witness testifying. So the question resolves itself down to the proposition, can the witness be compelled to testify, when immunity from prosecution is given him, if he does not desire to do so ? There is and can be no question that if the witness has been tried and acquitted he can be compelled to testify; if limitation bars a prosecution against him he can be compelled to testify. All the decisions so hold, and what reason can be given, if he can be compelled to testify in those instances, that if immunity from prosecution is absolutely given him, under the laws of a State he can not then be compelled to testify. No legal prosecution can be instituted against him in regard to the matters about which he may be called to testify in that instance, any more than in the other two instances, and as hereinbefore stated, in the ease of Floyd v. State, 7 Texas, 215, our Supreme Court, in an opinion by Judge Wheeler, held that "if a prosecution is barred by the statute of limitations, he was "bound to answer the question, for then he would not be liable to punishment. The same principle applies if the witness is exempted by statute from punishment in consequence of his being made a witness. And though the answer of a witness, called to testify respecting the offense to which the exemption relates, would tend to inculpate Mm as a participant in the crime, he could not refuse to answer, for his participation in the offense could not subject him to punishment." In that case the question before the court was, could the witness be compelled to testify when he did not desire to accept the immunity, and Judge Wheeler held he could. In fact, in that case the witness was fined for contempt for refusing to answer the questions as in this case, and the court held he was entitled to no relief, he being guaranteed immunity from prosecution, and should have answered the question. As hereinbefore stated, this opinion was handed down by our Supreme Court in 1855 when it had jurisdiction in criminal matters, and we know of no opinion even questioning the soundness' of the law there announced, until the dissenting opinion in the Napoleon case, supra, was filed. Certainly the case of Ex parte Park, 37 Texas Crim. Rep., 540, cited by Judge Davidson as sustaining his dissent, does not question the soundness of the rule of law announced in Floyd case, supra, but on the other hand in the Park case, that case is cited approvingly, and the relator was discharged solely upon the ground that immunity was not given appellant from prosecution for such offenses as his testimony might and probably would necessarily be disclosed on his examination, and in the case it is held: "Article 709 further provides: "The attorney representing the State may at any time, under the rules provided in article 37, dismiss a prosecution as to one or more defendants jointly indicted with others, and the person so discharged may be introduced as a witness by either party.' This would seem to imply the power on the part of the State to dismiss a case against defendant, and require his testimony. Of course, such dismissal must be with the guaranty to the witness on the part of the court against any other or further prosecution for the same offense; and this statute has been so construed. See Camron v. State, 32 Texas Crim. Rep., 180; Neeley v. State, 27 Texas Crim. App., 324; Fleming v. State, 28 Texas Crim. App., 234."
If the immunity offered would not absolutely protect the witness against prosecution for matters about which he was called to testify, then we would not question his right to refuse to answer the questions, but if complete and absolute immunity is offered, the Park case in the excerpt above quoted holds with the Floyd case, that he may be compelled to testify, and the Floyd case is cited as authority in the Park case that the immunity must absolutely protect the witness from prosecution. In the Wilson case cited by Judge Davidson no immunity from prosecution was offered or tendered the witness, and the question of whether the witness can be compelled to testify when given absolute immunity is not even discussed nor questioned, but the relator was discharged because the testimony could be used, in a criminal prosecution against him. In the other eases cited by Judge Davidson in his dissent the question of whether a witness can be compelled to answer when given immunity from prosecution is not mentioned nor discussed, and have no bearing on that question. In the case of Griffin v. State, 43 Texas Crim. Rep., 428, article 391 of the Penal Code is quoted, this court saying: "This article provides 'Any court, officer or tribunal having jurisdiction of the offenses enumerated in this chapter or any district or county attorney may subpoena persons and compel their attendance as witnesses to testify as to violations of any of the provisions of the foregoing articles. Any person so summoned and examined shall not be liable to prosecution for any violation of said articles about which he may testify and for any offense enumerated in this chapter a conviction may be had upon the unsupported evidence of an accomplice or participant.' Kain v. State, 16 Texas Crim. App., 282; Day v. State,. 27 Texas Crim. App., 143; Wright v. State, 23 Texas Crim. App., 313. And it would make no difference whether the grand jury had returned a bill or was simply examining into the transaction. If the testimony of one of the participants is used by any of these tribunals, courts, or officers in behalf of the State, it exonerates the witness whose testimony is used by virtue of the terms of the statute. Nor does it make any difference at what stage of the investigation or trial the evidence of the participant is used. The grand jury may not have been satisfied that the evidence upon which the bill was returned was sufficient to justify a conviction, but, if they had been, still, under the terms of the law, the use of the testimony of one of the participants exonerates him from prosecution. In cases where indictments have been returned, and one of the indicted parties was used as a witness for the State, this' would exonerate, even though he be one of the indicted parties. Article 391, supra, was enacted for the purpose of forcing witnesses to testify in behalf of the State. He can not plead that rule of evidence which does not permit a witness to incriminate himself, because when he testifies he is exonerated from punishment, and the incriminating testimony can never be used against him. The mere fact that the participant is required to testify for the State exonerates him from punishment."
This opinion was written by Judge Davidson and concurred in by the entire court, and in it is seen this expression and used: "This article was enacted for the purpose of forcing witnesses to testify, and that when a witness is exonerated from punishment he can not plead the rule of evidence which does not permit a witness to incriminate himself." No more terse and forcible expression of the law could be made. See also Elliott v. State, 19 S. W. Rep., 249; Taylor v. State, 50 Texas Crim. Rep., 183, and eases therein cited. So it may be said to be an unbroken rule of decisions both in this court and in the Supreme Court from 1855 down to the present time that a witness may be compelled to testify when under the law he is given complete immunity from punishment for the transaction about which he is called to testify, and the dissenting opinion in the Napoleon case is the first time that any judge of either this court or the Supreme Court has announced the rule that the consent of the witness must first be obtained. This would render'ineffective our laws in regard to immunity from punishment, and place a barrier to the enforcement of the law in many instances. The sovereignty of this country rests in the individuals composing it, and we believe as firmly as any in protecting the individual in all his rights, and believe the declaration in our Constitution that "no citizen shall be compelled to give evidence against himself" a wise provision, and that the history of the times past when inquisitorial methods were adopted, and the citizen punished for matters thus disclosed by himself proves the wisdom of the fathers in first placing it in the Constitution of 1776, and in engrafting it in every State Constitution since that time. It is right, the individual should thus be protected, but when the law immunes him from punishment and he seeks to use this provision, not as a shield to himself but as a shield to others, the reason for this rule of law no longer prevails, and he will not be permitted to protect others from punishment. He is and must be protected before he can be compelled to testify, but when afforded ample and full protection from punishment, then the interest of the State, the interest of society, and the law requires that he shall give such testimony within his knowledge as will aid in bringing criminals to justice and mete out to them their merited punishment.
Not only is this the rule of law in this State, but owing to the importance of this question, we have studied the law as applied in other jurisdictions, and the great weight of authority is that the witness may be compelled to testify when he has been granted immunity, and is no longer subject to punishment in regard to the matters inquired about. Relator in his brief cites us to the case of Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U. S., 547, in which case Counselman was adjudged guilty of contempt for refusing to answer certain questions propounded to him by the grand jury, on the ground that to answer such questions might tend to criminate him. The court held that as the law then in force did not give Counselman complete immunity from punishment he was not compelled to answer the questions and discharged him. In that case it was held: "We are clearly of opinion that no statute which leaves the party or witness subject to prosecution after he answers the criminating questions put to him, can have the effect of supplanting the privilege conferred by the Constitution of the United States. Section 860 of the Revised Statute does not supply a complete protection from all the perils against which the constitutional prohibition was designed to guard, and is not a full substitute for that prohibition. In view of the constitutional pro vision, a statutory enactment, to be valid, must afford absolute immunity against future prosecution for the offense to which the question relates." To this statement of the true rule of law we give our hearty assent— the "law must afford absolute immunity against future prosecution for the offense to which the question relates," or the witness can not be compelled to testify. After the rendition of the above opinion, Congress amended section 860 referred to as to give complete immunity from punishment, and the question again came before the Supreme Court of the United States in the ease of Brown v. Walker, 161 U. S., 591 (40 L. Ed., 819). In this case Brown had been summoned before the grand jury and refused to answer questions propounded to him on the ground that to do so would tend to incriminate him. The court holds, speaking through Justice Brown:
"1. The Act of Congress of February 11, 1893 (27 Stat. at L., 443). exempting a witness from any prosecution on account of any transaction to which he may testify, sufficiently satisfies the constitutional guaranty of protection against being compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.
"2. Where one State adopts the laws of another, it is also presumed to adopt the known and settled construction of those laws by the courts of the State from which they are taken.
"3. The fact that a witness can not be shielded by statute from the personal disgrace or opprobrium attaching to the exposure of his crime does not render a statute exempting him from prosecution therefor insufficient to satisfy the constitutional guaranty of protection against being compelled to be a witness against himself."
The law furnishing Brown complete immunity, he was remanded to custody, and he was compelled to answer the questions propounded. The opinion in that case discusses the reasons for the rule at length, and it is referred to for a learned discussion of the question. This question was again before the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of Interstate Commerce Commission v. Baird et al., 194 U. S., 25, and it was again held that where the law furnishes complete immunity from prosecution a witness may be compelled to testify. For other cases so holding see Ex parte Cohen, 104 Cal., 524; People ex rel. Akin v. Butler, 201 Ill., 236; State v. Nowell, 58 N. H., 314; People v. Sharp, 107 N. Y., 427; State v. Morgan, 133 N. C., 743; Hendrick v. Com., 78 Va., 490; Ex parte Burkett, 106 Mo., 602; State v. Quarles, 13 Árk., 307; Higdon v. Heard, 14 Ga., 255; Wilkins v. Malonee, 14 Ind., 153; Hirsch v. State, 8 Bext (Tenn.), 89; Frizzee v. State, 58 Ind., 8; State v. Jack, 76 Pac. Rep., 911; People ex rel. Lewisohn, 179 N. Y., 594; Re Briggs, 135 N. C., 118. Many other cases could be cited and we quote as stated in Cyc., vol. 30, page 1161:
"In a number of the States having constitutional provisions similar to that contained in the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, it has been held that statutes which provide that a witness may be compelled to give self-criminating evidence, but that his answers shall not thereafter be used as evidence against him, fully preserve the constitutional privilege.
"It is the better opinion, however, that the constitutional privilege of refusing to answer can not be taken away by statute, unless absolute indemnity is provided, and that nothing short of complete immunity to the witness, an absolute wiping out of the offense as to him, so that he can no longer be prosecuted for it, will furnish that indemnity, and that statutes aiming to take away the constitutional privilege without providing complete immunity are unconstitutional.
"If, however, he is thus fully protected by statute, he may be compelled to answer, though his testimony may show that he has committed a crime."
Under these texts is cited cases from almost every State in the Union, and we adhere to the rule that, "nothing short of complete immunity to the witness" will justify a court in compelling a witness to testify, and if the Codes of our State, as construed in an unbroken line of decisions, had not held that when the district attorney tenders immunity from punishment, and such offer receives the sanction and approval of the district judge, that this furnished absolute and complete immunity from punishment for offenses about which he might be questioned and called to testify, we would hold that relator was within the protection of-section 10 of the Bill of Rights and he could not be compelled to testify. But as the proof in this case shows that relator was extended and accepted immunity and testified before the grand jury; that that body returned no bill against him, and he has never been charged by complaint or otherwise with this offense; that when the habeas corpus trial was called, and he refused to testify, he was again tendered complete immunity from punishment by the district attorney and the district judge which gave him absolute immunity from punishment, and he was only committed to jail for contempt after a refusal to testify under such circumstances, it is our opinion that he should be remanded to custody, and it is so ordered.
The fact that on the trial the relator may not testify truthfully and thereby become subject to a prosecution for perjury, need not be considered. The immunity given relator was immunity from punishment for any connection he may have had with the killing of his father, and if he thereafter commits perjury, be connected with the killing of another, if another, or thereafter commits any other offense, the immunity given for this crime would be no bar to a prosecution for an offense of any character thereafter committed.
The relator is remanded.
Relator remanded to custody.
DAVIDSON, Judge, dissents.