Case Name: H. H. Camp Company, Respondent, vs. Pabst Brewing Company, imp., Appellant
Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Wisconsin
Decision Date: 1920-09-25
Citations: 172 Wis. 211
Docket Number: 
Parties: H. H. Camp Company, Respondent, vs. Pabst Brewing Company, imp., Appellant.
Judges: 
Reporter: Wisconsin Reports
Volume: 172
Pages: 211–223

Head Matter:
H. H. Camp Company, Respondent, vs. Pabst Brewing Company, imp., Appellant.
January 16
September 25, 1920.
Landlord and tenant: Assignment of lease as security for advances: Covenant by assignee to pay rent: Eviction to mitigate damages: Parol evidence.
1. A brewing company making advances to saloon-keepers and taking as security an assignment of their lease, and, to. procure the consent of the landlord to the assignment, agreeing ■ in writing “to perform all the terms ... of said lease,” is presently liable for the rent.
2. The agreement being clear and unambiguous upon its face and as applied to the subject matter, there is no room for construction nor for oral testimony to show the intent -of the parties in entering into it.
3. The landlord is under no obligation to mitigate damages in behalf of those liable for the rent by evicting the tenant and reletting the premises.
Owen, Siebecker, and Eschweiler, JJ., dissent.
Appeal from a judgment of the circuit court for Milwaukee county: Gustave G. Gehrz, Circuit Judge.
Affirmed.
Action to recover taxes and rent accruing under a lease made by plaintiff to Weber & Stuber and under a written agreement on the part of the Pabst Brewing Company to perform all the terms, covenants, conditions, and agreements of the lease. Plaintiff dealt in real estate and rentals and had a ninety-nine-year lease on the premises occupied by Weber & Stuber, who for many years past had conducted a saloon therein under a contract with the Pabst Brewing ■Company that its beer should be sold there to the exclusion of all other domestic draft beers. As to such premises the Pabst Brewing Company has had a similar contract since 1874. In 1915 Weber &;Stuber’s lease expired and they entered into a new lease , for ten years and agreed to pay rent and taxes and to make certain improvements. They found the cost of the improvements beyond their means and applied to the Pabst Brewing Company for advances, which were made on condition that Weber & Stuber should pay an increased price per barrel for beer, the increase to be in payment of the advances made. A written agreement was entered into between Weber & Stuber and the Pabst Brewing Company to the effect that if Weber & Stuber breached ' their contract with the Pabst Brewing -Company it should be entitled to immediate possession of the leased premises. In the meantime Weber & Stuber 'were to remain in possession. The lease between plaintiff and Weber & Stuber provided that the premises should not be sublet without the consent of the lessor. The Pabst Brezving Company, to secure itself on its agreément with Weber & Stuber, obtained from them an assignment of their lease, but in order to secure the benefit' of such assignment it was necessary to get plaintiff’s consent thereto. In order to secure such consent they executed this agreement: “The said Pabst Brewing Company hereby agrees to perform all the terms, covenants, conditions, and agreements of said lease to be performed by the said lessees therein.” This agreement was written into the assignment of the lease under the signatures of Weber & Stuber and above the written consent of plaintiff. Weber & Stuber at no time defaulted in their contract with the Pabst Brewing Company and the latter at no time entered into possession of the premises. Weber & Stuber remained in possession until about July 1, 1919, and paid rent to plaint iff until about January 1, 1917. The amount due under the lease for rentals, taxes, and interest was $16,891.67, and for such amount judgment was entered against Weber. & Stuber and the Pabst Brewing Company. The latter appealed from the judgment.
For the appellant there was a brief by Quarles, Spence & Quarles, attorneys, and William C. Quarles and Henry W. Stark,- of counsel, all of Milwaukee; and the cause was argued orally by Mr. William C. Quarles and Mr. Stark. ¡
For the respondent' there was a brief by Miller, Mack & Fairchild, and oral argument by James B.'Blake and Paul. W. Newcomb, all of Milwaukee.

Opinion:
The following opinion was filed July 3, 1920:
Vinje, J.
Appellant assigns as error (1) the conclusion of the court that it became, presently .rather than conditionally liable for the performance of the terms of the lease in view of the contracts between' the parties; (2) the refusal • to receive parol testimony in determining the object of the parties in executing and receiving its agreement to perform the terms of the lease and in showing the real nature of the transaction; and (3) in refusing to hold it was the .duty of plaintiff to mitigate its damages by evicting Weber &. Stuber in 1917, and reletting the premises at the best rent obtainable.
We do not deem it advisable in this opinion to treat the arguments of counsel as to many phases of the case, because we deem the plain terms of the written agreement of the parties and their conduct under such 'agreement determine the vital question in the case. The trial court concluded that the written agreement of the Pabst Brezving Company, set out in the statement of facts, created a present contract between it and plaintiff enforceable at once in case Weber & Stuber breached any of the terms of the lease, and did not constitute a conditional relation establishing merely privity of estate in case the Pabst Brewing Company should take possession under the lease, as claimed by appellant. We think the circuit court reached the correct conclusion for these reasons: first, the plain import of the language of the agreement is to that effect; second, the relation of the parties under their contracts made such an agreement a reasonable one; third, the parties so construed it; and fourth, the agreement would be meaningless construed as appellant claims it should be.
Very little can advantageously be added by way of argument to the first reason assigned. The language is plain, simple, and direct to the effect that the Pabst Brewing Company will perform all the terms, covenants, conditions, and agreements of the lease to be performed by the lessees. The obligation to perform is specific, is not contingent upon any future condition such as possession, but is absolute in prcesenti and couched in language that includes any breach by the lessees. The Pabst Brezuing Company agreed to see that from the time of the signature of that agreement the terms of the lease would be met by the lessees or itself.
As to the second reason, it is true that plaintiff had already made its lease to Weber & Stuber and in doing so had relied upon their credit. But they were to make substantial improvements, and when the agreement was signed it was apparent that Weber & Stuber could not make such improvements without financial aid from some one. A different situation then presented itself from what obtained when the lease was first made. The Pabst Brezuing Company was interested in the location and in Weber & Stuber, and it was natural that plaintiff should want to get additional security for its lease. This it could and did do by requiring the Pabst Brezuing Company to enter into its written agreements as a condition of its consent to the assignment of the lease. Of course it was not contemplated by any of the three parties at the time the consent was given that it was likely that Weber & Stuber would breach their contract with the Pabst Brewing Company and thus allow or cotnpU it to take pos session of the premises. That was a mere contingency that the Pabst Brewing Company wished to guard itself against by securing consent to the assignment of the lease. As a consideration for such consent on plaintiff's part the Pabst Brezving Company assumed the obligations of the lease, thinking no doubt that it would be, as perhaps it was, reimbursed by the exclusive sale of its domestic draft beer hy Weber & Stuber. In short, plaintiff wished to make -itself more secure, and the Pabst Brewing Company agreed to secure it believing it was for its interest to do so and that in the end it could give such security without cost to itself.
The agreement in question was executed in December, 1914. In March, 1916, the plaintiff wrote the Pabst Brewing Company that the lessees were in default, setting out the provisions of the lease as to the payment of taxes and rents and informing the Pabst Brewing Company that the total amount iri arrears was $1,744.03 and interest, and closed the letter thus-. "Under the circumstances we feel compelled to direct your attention to the situation covering the defaults which have occurred under the terms of the lease, and request that you arrange for an adjustment of the matter at your early convenience." In reply the Pabst Brewing Company stated that it had had an interview with Weber & Stuber and had agreed to assist them in installing a bookkeeping system that would no doubt materially help them in checking their accounts, and that Weber & Stuber had agreed to make arrangements for the payment of taxes and back rent, and closed by saying: "Please keep us posted on any further developments in the premises, and you can rest assured that all matters will receive our prompt attention." No analysis of this correspondence is necessary to disclose the fact that plaintiff claimed the Pabst Brezving Company was liable for the defaults and that the Pabst Brewing Company admitted it was. Otherwise why should it wish to be kept posted as to a contract relation between plaintiff and Weber & Stuber in which it was not interested. It was not until a year later, after it Rad consulted counsel, that it denied liability. • .
. The agreement, unless construed as.the circuit court construed it, namely, creating an immediate privity of. contract, would be meaningless. If the Pabst Brewing Company .entered. undér the lease a privity of estate would at once exist between it and the landlord, and it would under such privity of. "estate be bound to perform the lease as to rents and taxes accruing under its occupancy. No written agreement to that effect would be necessary. If it be claimed the agreement entered into would compel the Pabst Brewing Company to pay up all arrears in rents and taxes only in case it took.possession under the lease, a sufficient answer is that the agreement does not so provide. It is. not, as before stated, made upon any condition whatever as to the Pabst Brewing Company except that there be a breach by the lessees, Weber & Stuber, in which event the liability of the Pabst Brewing Company is absolute. Many cases have been cited by counsel on both sides bearing upon collateral questions. . We do not deem them of much importance because we base our decision upon the plain language of the agreement, and hold that it creates a present contract relation, specific and unambiguous both upon its face and as applied to the surrounding circumstances; and was so understood by'the parties, as is shown by the correspondence referred to above. Rights and liabilities resulting from the relation of privity of estate do not arise in this case and are therefore not discussed.
Since the contract is clear and unambiguous upon its fáce and as applied to the subject matter, ¡there is no room for construction nor for oral testimony jto show the intent of the parties in entering into it.' Hammond v. Capital City Mut. F. Ins.. Co. 151 Wis. 62, 138 N. W. 92. The trial court's refusal to receive such testimony / was' therefore proper.
' A landlord is under no obligation to mitigate damages by evicting the tenant and reletting the premises. In most jurisdictions it is held that even if the tenant abandons the premises he is under no obligation to re-enter and' relet; that he can stand upon the terms of the lease and recover-rent for the whole term. 24 Cyc. 1164; 16 Ruling Case Law, 669 and cases cited'. It is not here necessary to- hold more than that the landlord is not required to evict the tenant to mitigate damages in behalf of those liable for the rent. -
By the Court. — Judgment affirmed.
The following opinion'was filed July 7, 1920: