Case Name: Thomas J. Bull, Appellee, v. James W. Southwick, Appellant; John D. Barncastle, Appellee, v. Martin Amador, Appellant; Evangelisto Chaves, Appellee, v. Maximo Castenada, Appellant
Court: Supreme Court of New Mexico
Jurisdiction: New Mexico
Decision Date: 1882-11
Citations: 2 N.M. 321
Docket Number: 
Parties: Thomas J. Bull, Appellee, v. James W. Southwick, Appellant. John D. Barncastle, Appellee, v. Martin Amador, Appellant. Evangelisto Chaves, Appellee, v. Maximo Castenada, Appellant.
Judges: 
Reporter: New Mexico Reports
Volume: 2
Pages: 321–389

Head Matter:
Thomas J. Bull, Appellee, v. James W. Southwick, Appellant. John D. Barncastle, Appellee, v. Martin Amador, Appellant. Evangelisto Chaves, Appellee, v. Maximo Castenada, Appellant.
August and November, 1882.
Elections. (1) Duties of canvassing boards ministerial, not judicial.
Same. (2) Judges of election; their failure to take oath does not vitiate thei/t' returns.
Same. (3) Canvassing boards, duty of, as to counting votes returned.
Same. (4) Contest to be made in district court.
Same. (5) False returns rejected as evidence.
Same. (6) Mode and form of making up returns.
Same. (7) Contest, amendment of pleadings in.
Same. (8) Contest, pleadings, failure to deny, admits allegations.
Same. (9) Contest, nature of proceeding.
Same. (10) Quo warranto not superseded by statutory proceedings to contest.
1. Canvassing boards of elections have only ministerial functions to canvass and count votes as returned by the judges of election, to ascertain and declare the respective majorities of votes received by the respective candidates for office from the aggregate number of votes so returned by the judges of election. They have no judicial powers whatever to pass upon and decide as to the illegality of individual votes received and returned to them by the judges of election.
2. The canvassing board of elections cannot reject as illegal the votes of any precinct, on the ground that the judges of election in such precinct did not take and subscribe the oath of office as required by law. The judges of election of such precinct, notwithstanding they may not have taken and subscribed the oath required by the statute, are nevertheless defacto judges of election, and their official acts otherwise regular, are entitled to full faith and credit. Their omission to take the oath, while it might render them liable to prosecution and severe penalties, can not in any way affect the legality of votes received and returned by them; and it is the duty of the canvassing board to canvass and count all such votes for the respective candidates for whom they are cast.
3. Whenever votes have passed the' judges of election, and have been received by them as votes, and as such returned by them to the canvassing board, as having been cast for certain candidates respectively —the returns showing in an intelligible manner the number of votes, and for whom cast — it becomes the ministerial duty of the canvassing board to count all such votes, and declare the result from such returns alone, without sitting as a court of review — in the absence of the parties interested — for the purpose of passing upon the illegality or legality of individual voters whose votes have been so returned to them.
4. After votes have been received and regularly returned by the judges of election, and questions as to the illegality of any such votes shall subsequently be raised, the respective candidates for whom such votes are cast are on principle and as a matter of law, as much entitled to their day in court, and to be heard thereon before such votes are rejected, as are the litigants in any other form of judicial proceeding. The only lawful tribunal having original jurisdiction to determine questions of this kind is the district court, which is to proceed in the mode prescribed by the act of 1876: Prince’s Laws N. Id., 134.
5. When the election returns of a certain precinct were false, in that certain persons were therein stated to have voted, who did not in fact vote at such precinct at all, and it further appeared from such returns that all the voters at such precinct voted in al/phabetieal order, and it could not be ascertained from the poll books and returns of such precinct, for whom or what ballot any voter voted, it was held that they were not evidence that any of the persons whose names were recorded in such poll books and returns voted, and that to determine this matter a resort must be had to evidence aliunde.
6. The mode and form prescribed by law for making out poll books and election returns, is as follows: The ballot of the first voter appearing at the polls and voting is to be numbered one by the judges of election. The same number is to be put down by them in the poll books, and opposite the same number in the proper column therein, is to be written the name of such voter. The ballot so numbered is then to be deposited m the ballot box.
The ballot of the second voter appearing and voting is to be num bered two, and the same number put down in the poll book next in order after No. 1, and the name of the voter voting that ballot so numbered is to be written down opposite that number in the poll book, and the ballot then deposited in the ballot box.
The same numerical order and record is to be observed and kept with each voter as he appears and votes. ^
At the close of the polls the names of the respective candidates voted for by each ballot so numbered and recorded are to be written down in the appropriate columns, and in the proper column under the name of each candidate so voted for, and opposite the same number in the poll book which the ballot bears, and opposite the name of the voter voting the same, is to be recorded the vote showing that the voter has cast one vote for each candidate so voted for by him.
The poll books of the several precincts with the proper certificates attached and so filled out, constitute the returns of the judges of election, to be transmitted to the canvassing board.
7. The notice of contest alleged the illegality of sixty-nine votes. Tlie respondents failed to deny this allegation in their answers, but some time after the expiration of the time allowed by law for them to answer in, moved for leave to file a supplemental answer denying this allegation, urging that the failure to deny in the first answer was solely owing to the negligence and omission of counsel This motion was overruled.
Meld, that the statutory provisions as to the time of filing and serving the notice of contest, answer and reply are in efiect, statutes of limitation, taking from the judge all discretion as to extending the time.
8. The failure to deny such allegation admits it to be true, and if evidence is taken, as if an issue had in fact been made by filing a denial in proper time, such evidence will be disregarded as immaterial.
9. A proceeding to contest an election is a proceeding exclusively between rival candidates for office, and the people are in no sense parties to it.
10. The proceedings authorized by statute to contest elections do not supersede the proceeding on behalf of the people by writ of quo warwanto, to oust from office one who was not elected thereto by a majority of legal votes. Prince, Chief Justice, dissents.
Appeals from tbe District Court of Doña Ana county
These were proceedings under the statute to contest the respective elections of appellants to the offices of sheriff, treasurer and judge of probate for the county of Doña Ana, at an election held on November 2, 1880. By stipulation of counsel the three cases were heard and determined together in the court below, and they were in like manner argued and submitted in this court.
In the first case Thomas J. Bull served and filed notice of contest upon the respondent, James W. South wick, for the office of sheriff of Doña Ana county. In the notice of contest, the contestant used printed forms, alleging, among other things, illegal votes cast and counted for respondent at the last election for said office, and set out various causes, rendering said votes illegal. The contestant also alleged irregularity of the returns of the election at the Las Cruces precinct.
The respondent replied, serving and filing his answer within the time required by the statute, specifically denying the allegations in contestant’s notice, except that in the denials, which were made in the order of the allegations in contestant’s notice, by a clerical error, one of the allegations is not specifically denied.
Following the several specific allegations touching the individual voter; the contestant, in his notice,' alleges generally that the vote, etc., was unlawfully registered, received, and counted, etc. These allegations are specifically denied by the respondent’s answer.
The contestant filed his replication, and served the same within the time contemplated by law.
The respondent applied to the judge to fix the time within which to take testimony, and at the same time applied for leave to file an amendment to his answer, which motion for leave was overruled by the court, and the respondent excepted. Thereafter, upon notice by respondent to contestant, testimony was taken. Contestant took testimony regarding quite all the votes alleged by him to be illegal votes. The contestant introduced no jDroof to sustain his allegations as to the Las Cruces precinct, except the poll-book and tally list of votes. The respondent introduced proof to show the regularity of the election at La§ Cruces precinct, etc., etc.
The respondent asked again for leave to amend his answer. The court overruled motion for leave to amend, and ruled out certain evidence, to wit, all evidence of the respondent’s touching the legality of the votes alleged by contestant’s notice to be illegal votes, and without finding that the contestant received a majority of the votes cast at said election, rendered judgment in favor of contestant. To all of which respondent excepted.
On June 1, 1881, the case was argued and submitted, and on December 14, 1881, the court rendered its judgment.
The facts found and the conclusions drawn by the court are .the following:
That it appears from the returns of the judges and clerks of election, from each of the precincts in. the county, that the contestant, Thomas J. Bull, received for the office of sheriff two more votes than the respondent, James W. South-wick; contestant, Barncastle, received nine more votes for the office of treasurer than respondent, Amador, and respondent Oasteñada, received twelve more votes than contestant, Chaves, for the office of judge of probate.
That the board of county commissioners, acting under the statute as, ex officio, a board of canvassers, illegally assuming judicial functions, went behind the returns and rejected certain votes as illegal, in such manner as to show a majority for Southwiek of nine votes, for Amador of two votes, and for Oasteñada of twenty-three votes, and (wrongfully as to the first two) issued to them, respectively, the certificates of election to the several offices.
That the returns of the judges and clerks of precinct No. 3, which gave a majority of fifty-six votes for Soxithwick, of sixty votes for Amado/, and of eighty-nine votes for Oasteñada, were so false, contradictory and unreliable as to' fender it impossible to determine therefrom what persons voted for the respective offices.
That the testimony taken before the master on the part .of respondents against the objection of contestants, tending to show that the sixty-nine persons before mentioned had been residents of the county for three months immediately preceding said election, ivas irrelevant, improperly taken and not to be considered, and that said sixty-nine votes for respondent were illegal, as appeared by the pleadings.
The contestant Bull received a majority of the legal votes cast, and was entitled to the office of sheriff. The same result followed in the other two cases, and judgment was accordingly entered, from which the respondents respectively appealed to this court.
No motion for a rehearing or in arrest of judgment appears to have been made.
The other cases are the same in facts and questions of law as Bull v. Soxi-thwich.
S. B. Newcomb, W. L. Rynerson and John D. Bml, for appellants.
The judge did not, in his opinion, find facts upon which to base his judgment.
The court below erred in refusing the amendments to supply what is plainly a clerical omission. This is evident from the answer itself: Act of N. M. Legislature, 1878, par. 54, p. 1220, Prince’s Statutes.
The special law of 1876 in regard to the mode of procedure in contested election cases has been changed and modified by statute of 1878 above cited, and secs. 1, 2 and 5, at p. 54, Session Laws 1878.
The main question to be decided by this court is: Did the court below err in refusing to allow the appellants to amend their answers ? In order to arrive at a true solution of this question, it will be necessary to briefly review the general principles underlying all election laws in reference to contests. The rule is universal that the person having a legal majority of the votes cast must prevail. And to arrive at this determination the case must be considered upon the merits. It is true different states have different laws and methods of trying cases of this description, but they all have the same end in view; all conform to the same universal doctrine, that the will of the people, as expressed through the ballot box, must be respected ; in other words, whoever has received a majority of the legal votes cast shall be entitled to and shall receive the office to which he was elected by the people.
Such proceedings are not to be strangled by technicalities, but examined upon their merits, and the courts are to adjudge and decree which of the candidates received the highest number of legal votes: Re Duffy, 4 Brews. (Pa.), 531; United States Digest, new series, vol. 4, p. 259, sec. 24.
“Mistakes should always be corrected, and in'determining this and similar questions, on cases of contested elections, it should be kept constantly in mind that the ultimate purpose of the proceeding is to ascertain and give expression'to the will of the majority as expressed through the ballot box and according to law. Rules should be adopted and construed to this end and to this end only : ” McCrary, p. 137, sec. 132.
The problem is to secure, first, to the voter a free and untrammelled vote, and secondly, a correct record and return of the vote. It is mainly with reference to these two results that the rules for conducting elections are prescribed by the legislative power. But these rules are only means. The end is freedom -and purity of elections. To hold that these rules are mandatory and essential to a valid election, is to subordinate substance to form, the end to the means : ” McCrary, p. 155, sec.' 200.
An election with us is the deliberate choice of a majority or plurality of the electors. Any doctrine whi<?h opens the way for minority rule in any case is anti-Republican and anti-American: McCrary, p. 209, sec. 234.
The broad doctrine was asserted that in this country an election by a minority of the persons voting is not to be tolerated under any circumstance: Id., sec. 235.
A contested election case, whatever the form of the proceedings may be, is in its essence a proceeding in which the people are primarily interested: Id., sec. 316; Whisor v. Kidder, 43 Cal., 237; Sawders v. Haynes, 13 Cal., 154; Learey v. Snow, 15 Cal., 118.
Nowhere does a different doctrine obtain. Can it be conceived, then, that it has been left to New Mexico alone to run counter to all recognized law and authority on this subject? Did the legislators of New Mexico intend to make a law that would turn a man out of an office to which the people had duly elected him, because, forsooth, his attorneys had made a mere slip of the pen ? The learned judge below admits that Oastañada was duly and fairly elected. Still he curns him out and puts into his place a man whom the people had rejected. Could the makers of the law ever have intended or even contemplated the possibility of such a proceeding ? To state so startling a proposition is to answer it.
Keeping in view these well settled principles, how should our statute be construed ? So that the will of the people should be disregarded and minority condidates inducted into office, or rather that the will of the people should be respected and the candidate who received a majority of the votes cast, should be declared elected?
That the candidate receiving a majority of the legal votes cast, shall in all cases prevail, the authorities say, is the chief object of all legislation on this subject; and, indeed, our own statute — this arbitrary, tyrannical, technical statute, as counsel for appellees would have us believe — positively enacts that whoever receives the majority of the legal votes shall be declared elected ; thereby conclusively showing that they never intended that a minority candidate should receive the office under any circumstances whatever.
Counsel for appellees say that the words in the statute, “ within the time aforesaid,’’.render it mandatory and nullify the clause that a majority shall prevail. This we deny. We say the majority clause qualifies and„explains the limitation clause. ¥e have clearly shown that all election laws must be construed to give effect to the will of the people as expressed at the ballot box. To this end all such laws are made. In the construction of statutes, affirmative words enjoining the performance of an act by a public officer are generally regarded as directory only; negative words make a statute imperative : Dwarris on Statutes, 175 ; Stephenson v. Lawrence, Brightley’s Leading Cases on Elections, p. 527; Bacon’s Abridgment, vol. 9, p. 234.
In our statute no negative words are employed. It is in effect the same as the statutes of other states, where they provide that whatever is not specifically denied in pleadings shall be taken as true. The Iowa statute provides that. “ a reply shall be filed before noon of the day succeeding that on which the answer was filed,” and if not so filed, the material allegations of the answer shall be deemed true. Under this statute the court allowed a reply to be filed after the time allowed for the filing had elapsed: Williams <o. The Niagara Fire Ins. Go., 50 Iowa, 562.
California has a similar statute, and there amendments are allowed: Fish v. Redington, 31 Cal., 185 to 195.
The Illinois statute provides that a person desiring to contest an election “ shall, within thirty days after the person whose election is contested is declared elected, file with the clerk of the proper court a statement in writing setting forth the points on which he will contest the election.”
The supreme court decided that such could be amended after the expiration of the thirty days: Dale v. Snow, 78 111., 171.
Here we have three supreme courts, under statutes in effect the same as ours, deciding that amendments should be al lowed. No case can be found where a contrary doctrine has been held under like statutes.
We understand that the chief justice of this court allowed (and properly) full and liberal amendments to petitions in contested election cases, under our statute, after the time limited by said law had elapsed.
. It is undoubtedly a well-established principle in the exposition of statutes that every part is to be considered, and the intention of the legislature to be taken from the whole. It is also true that when great inconvenience will result from a particular construction, that construction is to be avoided, unless the meaning of the legislature is plain, in. which case it must be obeyed Fisher v. Blight, 2 Cranch, 386 ; Marshall, C. J.
Can it be contended that the meaning of the legislature is plain that no amendments can be allowed in these cases under our statutes in furtherance of justice? From the principles and authorities above quoted, it- is evident the legislature never intended to deprive a legally elected candidate of his office on a mere mistake or clerical'error, or failure to make a mere denial. Is not the great inconvenience to the public plain here ? They are deprived of their choice by a narrow, illiberal and technical construction of an election law, which all the authorities say should be liberally construed, and with the' sole end in view of seating the candidate whom the people elected — who had a majority of the legal votes.
A material admission in an answer against a defendant even after evidence taken, upon application should be amended: United States Digest, first series, vol. 1, secs. 1211, 1212, 1213, 1211 and 121S, p. 238 ; Taylor v. Dodd, 5 Porter (Ind.), 216 ; Stringer v. Davis, 30 Cal., 318.
As to amendments generally, see United States Digest, first series, vol 1, secs. 122,121 and 137, p. 202 ; lb., sec. 772, p. 218 ; lb., sec. 1031, p. 232 ; Soper v. Soper, 5 Wend. (N. Y.), 112; Wait’s' N.’Y. Digest, vól. 2, secs. 2042, 2048, p. 1333.
The learned judge below raises a point, viz.: That the answer of CasteBada was not served until after the twenty-days allowed by law. • A sufficient answer to this objection is that the contestant Chaves replied to the answer and went to trial without objection. He thereby waived the irregularity, if any there was; under these circumstances it would make no difference if the answer had never been served. This principle is so well settled that we hardly deem it necessary to quote authorities. We may refer, however, to McCrary on Elections, sec. 394, p. 330, and Wait’s N. Y. Digest, secs. 70, 71, p. 1396.
When a court has a discretion to allow amendments and refuses on the ground of want 'of power, such refusal is error: Ct. App., Russell v. Gown., 20 N. Y. (6 Smith), 81; .3 Wend., '336; Hill & Denio, 103 ; 12 Abbt., 16 ; Wait’s N. Y. Digest, vol 1, sec. 9, p. 79.
As to Cruces precinct, No. 3. Informality in making election returns not allowed to operate to disfranchise voters : 29 111., 414; People v. CooJc, 14 Barb., 259 ; Andrews v. Saucier, 13 A., 301; Weaver v. Given, 1 Brewster (Pa.)i 140, Contested Election, 5 Phil. (Pa.), 102.
Names arranged alphabetically, no objection: McCrary, see. 100 ; Hogan v. Pile, 2 Bartlett, 281.
Ballot implies secrecy : U. S. Digest, new series, vol. 4, sec. 10, p. 258; McCrary, sec. 413, p. 353, also same, p. 455, Maine court.
Our own statutes provide for a secret ballot: Compiled Laws, sec. 22, p. 436.
As to the second count of ballots, we contend that the county commissioners had no authority to reopen the ballot boxes and recount the ballots. The only semblance of authority for such proceeding is to be found in see. 22 of the act of ,20th of July, 1851, p. 426, Compiled Laws. The mode of contesting elections under that law, was entirely different from the present (see secs. 48 to 55, of said act), the whole machinery of which has been repealed, this recounting section included. The law simply states that the result (of' such recount) shall be forwarded to the powers authorized by law, to determine the legality of the election. The law entirely fails to state what “ the powers ” shall do with it,, when they get it, and what effect it shall have. This is certainly not conclusive evidence. It might possibly be used to-assist the court in the examination of the case, as briefs of counsel, but can have no greater effect. We consider this proceeding an unlawful and unauthorized interference with the ballot boxes, and at least gave an opportunity for tampering with the ballots. This recounting of the ballots after the-result has been declared, is not favored by the courts : Me Oary on Elections, secs. 93 to 96, 279, 280.
We are satisfied that the recount in the case of Bull v. Southwiok, was not correctly made; that there are no such ballots as “Aimes Sandi” or as “Sandique.” We believe this latter ballot will be found to read upon examination,. “ Saudique,” the Mexican way of spelling Southwick, andi the first named ballot will be found to read “ llimes saure,”’ also the Mexican way of spelling James Southwick.
As to imperfect ballots, the whole law on the question of imperfect ballots is fully laid down in McCrary onElections,. secs. 395 to 398, inclusive.
The county commissioners, in their pretended recount of January 6th and 7th, 1881, have reported the following, as imperfect ballots voted for the office of sheriff, to wit:
T. J. Bull,.......6
Thomas Bull,.......3
T. Bui,........1
Th. Bull,........2
James Southwick, - - - - 4
Southwick, ------ - 3
James M. Soulhowyck, - - ■ - - 1
J. M. Southwick, ------ 3
James Southwith,......1
Sandique, - - - - - - - . - 5
Aimes Sandi, ------ 1
We think that the ballots written “ Thomas Bull,” and “ James Southwick,” are not imperfect ballots. A man’s middle name, is no part of his name in law. Therefore we think the three votes cast for “ Thomas Bull ” and the four cast for “James Southwick,” should be counted for Thomas J. Bull and James W. Southwick respectively, without proof aliunde as to their identity.
The law is well settled, that if ballots are cast for a candidate, written with merely the initials of his first name, or even his surname alone without initials, if proof be introduced showing that they were cast for that candidate, such as, that there was no other person of that name running for that office, or that the candidate commonly wrote his name in that way, or that others commonly wrote his name in that way, etc., the ballot must be counted for the party intended.
The contestant, Thomas J. Bull, has entirely failed to offer any evidence tending to show that any of these imperfect ballots were intended for him, therefore, none of them can be counted for him; while on the other hand, the respondent, James W. Southwick, has introduced evidence plainly showing that the ballots written “ James Southwick,” “ South-wick,” “ J. W. Southwick,” “ James Southwith,” “ James W. Soulhowyck,” “ Saudique ” (reported by commissioners “Sandique”), “llimes saure” (reported by commissioners “Aimes Sandi ”), were intended and cast for him. The ballots James W. Soulhowyck and James Southwith, although poorly spelled, are so evidently intended for the respondent, that, in fact, they prove themselves upon their face ; they are in fact idem sonans. As to the ballots “ Saudique ” and “ llimes saure,” it will be remembered that they are written by Mexicans in the Spanish language, and in the manner in which they spell and pronounce “ Soutliwick,” as shown by the evidence.
By a strict construction of law none of the imperfect ballots can be counted for the contestant, Bull; but respondent’s proof as to the imperfect ballots is amply sufficient to admit them for him. The presumption is very strong, that the' judges and clerks of election counted these imperfect ballots for the persons for whom they were intended ; for this reason, we think it fair that they all be counted for the respective parties, as certified by the judges and clerks of the respective precincts, but we are not willing that they should be. counted for the contestant, and any of the respondent’s thrown out.
There is another question worthy of the ..serious consideration of the court: Frdm the fact that no allegation has been made on either side in reference to these imperfect ballots, will the court go behind the certificate of the judges and clerks of election to ascertain for whom they were cast ? Or, in other words, will the court, in the absence of all allegations in the pleadings, change the count as certified by the judges and clerks of election, and reject these votes, simply on the ground of their informality ?
The identity of parties will be presumed from identity of names. It was intimated by contestants’ counsel that the respondents, in proving up the three months’ residence of. the voters challenged by contestants, failed to prove the identity of the men examined by them, with that of the men challenged by contestants. ¥e reply that “the identity of name is prima facie evidence of the identity of the person.” See People v. Thompson, 28 Oal., 215; Garwood v. Gar-wood, 29 Oal., 515 ; Douglass v. Dakin, 46 Oal., 50; Thompson v. Maureu, 1 Oal., 428; l.Grreenleaf on Evidence, sec. 575, note 1.
We again call the attention of the court to the legal points made by us in the beginning of this case.
First. The question to be decided in this case, is: Which party really received a majority of the legal votes cast ? This question must be determined by the proofs: Brightley’s Leading Election Cases, p. 381; McCrary on Elections, secs. 132, 511.
Second. A liberal construction should be given to election laws, with the view of ascertaining and giving effect to the will of the people, as expressed by them at the polls: Mc-Crary on Elections, secs. 387, 551, 353; U. S. Digest (new series), vol. 9, sec. 20, p. 259. ,
Third. The ordinary rules of procedure and practice ought not to be strictly applied, because the people as well as the adversary parties are interested, whatever the form of the procedure — whether by quo wcvrrtmto, or under a special statute: Budd v. Holden, 28 Cal., 139 ; McCrary on Elections, secs. 316, 371, 382.
Fourth. The case must be determined upon the merits, and judgment rendered for the party which the proofs show received the majority of the legal votes: Prince’s Statutes, p. 316, sec. 8. And judgment cannot be given upon the pleadings; the law itself negatives such a conclusion. And this is the principle running through all the authorities: Keller v. Cha/pman, 31 Cal., 610; Searcy v. Grow, 15 Cal., 119 ; Mim,or v. Kidder, 13 Cal., 236, 237, 238 ; McCrary on Elections, sec. 359 ; United States Digest (new series), vol. 1, p. 258, secs. 19, 21.
Fifth. The court below erred in refusing to allow respondents to amend their answers. See authorities cited on this and last page. The pleadings can be amended at any time in the furtherance of justice: Kneass's Case, Brightley’s Leading Election Cases, p. 337, et seq., and note; McCrary on Elections, secs. 283, 285. And this may be done nunc pro tunc at any time before judgment or decree..
In conclusion, according to the returns, as certified to by the judges and clerks of election of the respective precincts, the whole number of votes cast and counted for the respective parties hereto, stood as follows : Thomas J. Bull, sheriff, 643; James W. Southwick, sheriff, 641; J. D. Barncastle, treasurer, 638 ; Martin Amador, treasurer, 629 ; Evangelisto Chaves, probate judge, 629; Maximo Casteflada, probate judge, 641.
The following statement shows the state of the poll of the respective parties, after deducting the illegal votes cast, as shown by the evidence:
Thomas J. Bull, ----- 643
Illegal votes, ----- 63
Legal vote for Bull, - 580
James W. Southwick, - - - - 641
Illegal votes, ------ 15
Legal vote for Southwick, - - 626
Majority for Southwick, - - - 46 •
John I). Barncastle, - 63S
Illegal votes, ------- 66
Legal vote for Barncastle, - - 572
Martin Amador, ----- 629
Illegal votes,.....15
Legal vote for Amador, - - - 614
Majority for Amadox*, - - 42
Evangelisto Chaves, ----- 629
Illegal votes, ----- 66
Legal vote for Chaves, - - - 563
Maximo Casteflada, - 641
Illegal votes, ------ 15
Legal vote for Casteflada, - - -' 626
Majority for Casteflada, - - 63
We claim that the three votes proven to have been illegal, in the evidence taken in the case of Chaves v. Gastenada, above alluded to, should be deducted from the number of votes cast for Bull. This would leave Southwick’s majoritv 49.
It will be observed that we have conceded in the above statement that the contestants have proven that fifteen of the votes cast for respondents were illegal. We think this is a liberal estimate, and that we have over, rather than under, stated the number. This concession is made, upon our view of the law, and understanding of the evidence; applying the same rules to these fifteen persons, which we insist' should be applied to the sixty-six, which we claim should be deducted from contestants.
Finally, we insist that the evidence is conclusive that all the respondents were fairly elected by a majority of all the legal votes cast. That the will of the people, thus expressed at the ballot box, should, and we believe will, be respected by the court, and judgment given for the respondents accordingly.
A. J. Fountcmi, Gat/ron & Thornton and Fiske <& Warren, for appellees.
As to the pleadings. The court below correctly held that “ any material fact alleged in the notice of contest, not specifically denied by the answer, within the time aforesaid, shall be taken and considered as true.” This is the clear and unmistakable language of the act of 1876; Prince’s Comp., p. 344.
Was there any material fact so alleged and not denied ? It is incontestable, and stands admitted, that the notice named sixty-nine different persons who voted for appellant, as to each of whom it is distinctly charged that “he had not resided in said county of Doña Ana for three months immediately preceding said election.” That this is a “material fact ” must be conceded: Act of 1868, Prince’s Comp., 339. That no specific denial of this fact, within twenty-days, was made, is also undisputed. The inevitable conclusion is that reached by the trial court, that this fact was admitted by the pleadings, and hence, that these sixty-nine persons did not possess one of the indispensable qualifications, and their ballots were absolute nullities in contemplation of law.
Inasmuch as these sixty-nine illegal votes are essential to give appellants any pretense of a majority, under any claim whatever, it would seem unnecessary to pursue the matter further, unless there be some authority higher than the legislative assembly to negative its plainly expressed will, or some mysterious power of construction vested in the courts which, while admitting the plain enactment, can dispense with obedience to its requirement.
Counsel for the appellants say the case must be determined upon the evidence and the merits, and that judgment cannot be given upon the pleadings, yet they allege as error that the court below refused leave to appellant to amend his answer.
It would seem an idle thing to ask leave to amend a pleading which cuts no figure in the proceedings; and if counsel really believed that the judgment of the trial court in this statutory proceeding must be based only upon the evidence produced, without regard to the pleadings, they surely would not have asked leave more than fifty days after the time had elapsed for answering, after the reply had been filed and evidence taken, to amend the answer or to file a supplemental answer; or, if they did so, they would not assign as error in this court, the refusal of such leave. By their own act they admit that which is too evident for argument, that their proposed amendment, denying the allegation of notice of contest as to the three months’ residence in the county of the sixty-nine voters in question, was material and necessary.
The only point to consider is whether the refusal of leave to amend constituted error sufficient for reversal.
This is a special statutory proceeding. The legislature has spoken in plain language, and there is no room for judicial construction or legislation. The answer must be filed ■within twenty days, and any material fact “ not specifically denied within the time aforesaid, shall be taken and considered as true.”
The court has no discretionary or dispensing power, even in matters of practice when the legislature has spoken : Sedgwick on Stat. and Const. Law, p. 322; Dwarris on Stat. Law, p. 477. Where a statute declares that a judge at chambers may direct a new trial if application is made within ten days after judgment it has been said “ he can no more enlarge the time than he can legislate in any other matter:” Seymour v. Judd, 2 Const., 464; Bleeker v. Wiseburn, 5 Wend., 136.
When a statute fixes the time within which an act must be done, the courts have no power to enlarge it, although it relates to a mere question of practice. So, where an appeal to be valid must be made within ten days, it is void if taken on the eleventh : Bleeker v. Wisebu/m, supra; Seymour v. Judd, supra; Ex parte Ostrander, 1 Denis, 680-1; Barclay v. Brown, 7 Paige, 245 ; Caldwell v. The Mayor, eto., 9 Paige, 572; The Queen v. The Mayor, eto., 11 A. and E., 512; Hobert, 298 (3L B., 1625); Siderfin, 56 (K. B., 1670); Strange, 1125 (K. B., 1710); 2 T. Rep., 395 ; The Bank, etc., v. Widner, 11 Paige, 529.
The proceedings in cases of contested elections are properly regulated by territorial legislation under the organic act. It is “ a rightful subject of legislation.”
Each state has provided for itself some summary method of proceeding in such cases, incorporating such provisions as seemed to its legislative power wisest and best adapted to its peculiar condition.
The power of each state is only limited by constitutional restriction, state or federal, and that of each territory only by the constitution and acts of congress.
In the abseiice of such restriction, the act of our legislative assembly is supreme, and it is the plain duty of the courts, as of all others, to give it obedience.
The diversity of state legislation upon the-subject renders the local decisions of one state of little aid in construing the election laws of another. Each act must be viewed in the light of the legislative will, as expressed, and hence the citations of authorities by appellee under the particular enactments of different states, such as California and Pennsylvania, are inapplicable here.
In California an election may be contested by any elector, and “ the court must be governed in the trial and determination of such contested election, by the rules of law and evidence governing the determination of questions of law and fact, so far as the same may be applicable: Codes of Cal., vol. 2, secs. 11,111 — 11,122.
In other words, the general law governing other actions are expressly made applicable to this special proceeding, so far as applicable.
In Pennsylvania the statute, as appears in Boilecm’s Case, 2 Parsons, 503, cited in Brightley’s Leading Cases on Elections, p. 268, required the court to proceed “ upon the merits ” of the election, but this is not held to mean that the pleadings are not to be considered.
In Kneass’s Case, Brightley, 338, et seq., which seems to be much relied upon by appellant, the Court of Quarter Sessions, Philadelphia, simply held that under their statute there was nothing to prevent the exercise by the trial court of the common law discretionary power of permitting amendments under certain circumstances.
Such is not the case under our statute, which we are justified in saying stands unexcelled among the many similar enactments, not only for clearness and simplicity, but for wise precautions against frauds and partisan manipulations.
While the fullest opportunity is afforded both parties for the vindication of their rights, the delays and subterfuges by which justice is so often defeated, are effectually prevented.
It was not intended to, and does not, leave anything to the “.discretion ” of thé court, and in this respect, it profits by the universal experience of mankind as expressed in the often quoted language of Lord Camden cited in the note to JSheass’s Gase, supra.
“ Any material fact alleged in the notice of contest not specifically denied by the answer, within the time aforesaid, shall be taken and considered as trim.”
N o precedent can be found among the most extreme instances of judicial legislation, for pretending that this language is merely directory, and not mandatory. The wo'rds, “ within the time aforesaid,” were wholly unnecessary unless for the express purpose of limiting the time, and where the legislative purpose appears in the act, no court has ever gone to the extent of disregarding it. The widest latitude allowed is that “ when statutes direct certain proceedings to be done in a certain way, or at a certain time, and a strict compliance with these provisions of time and form does not appear essential to the judicial mind, the proceedings are held valid, though the command of the statute is disregardedSedg. on Stat. Law, p. 368.
And this is only when-the language used fails to enjoin a strict compliance, and when the requirement relates to some immaterial matter, where a. compliance is a matter of convenience rather than of substance:” The People v. Sehermerhorn, 19 Barb., 540 ; Sedgwick, p. 374.
Of course the provision of the civil procedure act in regard to amendments of pleadings in actions generally do not apply to this special proceeding. It is complete in itself.
.We might well submit this_ point, upon the plain proposi tion that the court, in refusing leave to amend the answer, was simply acting in obedience to the law.
Rut even if the court had possessed either the statute or common-law power of permitting the amendment in question, there can be no possible doubt that the exercise of the power was a matter resting in the sound discretion of the trial court, which this court will not review.
The case in Pennsylvania cited by appellant is conclusive upon this subject. The court says: “ From these and many other authorities which might be cited, it is well settled that amendments not regulated by the act of 1806 must be granted or refused under the exercise of a sound discretion of the court, for the furtherance of justice, and is not the subject of revision by a higher court; in short, it is an appeal to the conscience of a judge Hneass’s Case, 2 Parsons 553 ; Harrison v. Cotton, 31 Iowa, 16; Bloom v. Price, 44 JVCiss., 73 ; Mott v. Mustian, 43 Ga., 380 ; Clark v. Spencer, 14 Kan., 398; Culvet v. Hide & L. Bank, 78 111., 625 ; Cross v. Johnson, 30 Ark., 396; Scarlett v. Academy, 43 Md., 203; Dob-son v. Chambers, 78 N. C., 334; Reid v. Allen, 18 Tex., 241: Forrest's. Forrest, 25 N. Y., 501; Phimcle v. Vaughan, 12 Barb. (N. Y.), 215; Sayre v. Frazer, 46 Barb. (N. Y.), 26; Walden v. Craig, 9 Wheaton, 576 ; Mamdeville v. Wilson, 5 Cranch, 15; Chu/rch v. Syracuse, 32 Conn., 372; Schermerhorn v. Wood, 80 How. (N. Y.), Pr., 316; Moore v. Shaw, 47 Me., 88; United States v. Buford, 3 Peters, 12; Ensworth v. Barton, 67 Mo., 622.
If the court should go farther, and wish to review the action of the court below, we resjaectfully refer to the record to show that, so far from the refusal of leave to amend being an abuse of discretion, permission, if given, wmuld have been a gross outrage upon the contestant, and would virtually have deprived him of his rights under the law.
It will be seen that leave was not asked until February 17, 1881; this was fifty-five days, after the answer was filed— forty-eight days after the reply had been filed and served, calling specific attention to the omission — and forty-eight days after the period of taking testimony had commenced”to run, which was limited by law to three months, or ninety days. Contestant was not bound to take evidence on this point before: Moore v. Sanborin, 42 Mo., 490.
Of course the effect of the amendment would have been to require proof on the part of contestant as to the residence of these sixty-nine voters, and to deprive him of the time which had elapsed, and which the law gave him ; and in support of this application the respondent filed no affidavits and furnished no excuse for their delay which could be considered by the court.
Assuredly the court, under such circumstances, exercised a most sound discretion in refusing an application which would have enabled the respondent, by means of his own laches, to deal the contestant so fatal a blow.

Opinion:
Bristol, Associated Justice:
The above three contested elections cases for the respective offices of sheriff, treasurer and judge of probate, are here by appeal from the third judicial district court for the county of Doña Ana.
Over seventy cases of illegal voting on various grounds are alleged by each of the contestants, and between two hundred and three hundred by each of the respondents.
The testimony is very voluminous, each alleged ground of illegality in voting presents a separate and distinct issue to be ruled upon. I will consider the several cases together without reference to the testimony taken -before the master, except so far as may be necessary for a final disposition of the case.
The official returns of the judges of election for each of the precincts in the county are in evidence.
From these returns it clearly appears that the contestant, Thomas J. Bull, for the office of sheriff, received two more votes than the respondent, James W. Southwick. That the contestant, John D. Barncastle, for the office of treasurer, received nine more votes than the respondent, Martin Amador, and that the respondent, Maximo Casteñada, for the office of probate judge, received twelve more votes than the contestant, Evangelisto Chaves.
Casteñada having received a majority of votes, very properly received his certificate of election from the canvassing-board.
This same canvassing board, however, refused to issue certificates to either Bull or Barncastle, but instead thereof gave certificates of election to the minority candidates, Southwick and Amador.
Why was this ?
There is nothing before me to clear up this mystery, except certain undisputed facts in relation thereto, appearing on the face of the pleadings, and the official returns of the judges of election of the several precincts.
The notice of contest for the office of sheriff, among other things, contains the allegations substantially, that the judges of election of precinct No. 2, returned to the canvassing-board for the contestant, Bull, sixty-four votes; that of said votes the canvassing board unlawfully, designedly and fraudulently neglected and refused to canvass and count for the contestant one of said votes.
Also that the judges of election of precinct No. 8, returned to said canvassing board forty votes for said contestant, Bull; that of said votes the canvassing board unlawfully, designedly and fraudulently neglected and refused to canvass and count for the contestant two votes.
And also that the judges of election of precinct No. 9, returned to said canvassing board nineteen votes for the contestant, Bull; that of said nineteen votes the canvassing board unlawfully, designedly and fraudulently neglected and re fused to canvass and count for the contestant each and everyone of said votes.
The respective notices of contest for the offices of treasurer and probate judge contain the same allegations as to the return of votes from precincts Nos.'2, 8 and 9 respectively, except that for treasurer. Barncastle received sixty-six votes in precinct No. 2, and forty votes in precinct No. 8. Also that the contestant, Chaves, received sixty-seven votes in precinct No. 2, and thirty-nine votes in precinct No. 8.
The answers of the respective respondents to these allegations are somewhat peculiar, and deserve especial notice. Each of these answers is to the same effect, and one will answer for all. I will take that of the respondent, Amador, for office of treasurer as,a sample. He denies generally:
" That the said county commisioners failed at any time or neglected or refused to count, canvass, or allow for said contestant the full number of votes returned as having been cast for him, said contestant, at said county for said office of treasurer, and denies that said commissioners as a canvassing board at the canvass of returns of said election did wrongfully, unlawfully or fraudulently neglect or fail or refuse or omit to count, canvass and allow you, the said contestant, for said office 'of treasurer twenty-two votes or any number whatever which appeared from said returns to have been received by said contestant for the said office of treasurer; and he, said respondent, denies that at said canvass of the election returns of said election for said office of treasurer the commissioners unlawfully or fraudulently or without sufficient cause threw out or refused to consider or canvass the returns of precinct No. 9 of said county, or to in any manner deprive him, said contestant, of nineteen votes or any vote or votes whatever. This respondent denies that the county commissioners sitting as a canvassing board as aforesaid, ever at any time wrongfully or fraudulently or in violation of law, did omit of fail or neglect or refuse to count and canvass and allow for said contestants the full number of votes returned as having been cast and counted at precinct No. 8, or any other precinct of said county at said election for said office of treasurer; and denies that said contestant was by said commissioners then and there as aforesaid deprived of the benefit of any votes whatever, which or any of which had been lawfully cast, counted or returned for said contestant at said election for said office of treasurer.
" This respondent avers the fact to be that at the election aforesaid at precinct No. 2, the vote of Adolph Lea was received by the judges of election at said precinct, which vote was illegal and not entitled to be cast, canvassed or counted; the said Adolph Lea not then being registered at said precinct, nor having a certificate of registration as required by law.
" And that at precinct No. 8, aforesaid, the votes of Atanacio Rivera and Senobio Nevares, were each and both received by the judges of election at said precinct; which votes and each of them were illegal; they, the said Atanacio Rivera and Senobio Nevares, and each of them not then and there being citizens of the United States, and not then and there being registered as voters as provided by law ; and this respondent charges and specifies that the votes of said Adolph Lea and of Atanacio Rivera and Senobio Nevares, and each and every one of them so illegally voted and received, were voted for you for said office of treasurer, and wrongfully attempted to be counted for you, said contestant.
" And " (this respondent) " avers the fact to be that the returns and papers to wit: poll books and registration lists of said precincts, to wit: precincts Nos. 2, 8 and 9 respectively, show that at precinct No. 2 aforesaid, John D. Barncastle received but sixty-five votes at said precinct No. 8, John I). Barncastle received but thirty-eight votes, at said precinct No., 9, John D. Barncastle received no votes."
Answers substantially the same were made to these allegations in the notices of contests for the offices' of sheriff and probate judge by the respective respondents, Southwick and Casteñada, with the exceptions of the averments in the answer of Southwick that Bull received but sixty-three votes in precinct No. 2, and but thirty-eight in precinct No. 8; and in the answer of Casteñada that Chaves received but sixty-six votes in precinct No. 2, and but thirty-seven in precinct No. 8. The logic, significance and effect of these several answers to the allegations under consideration, are virtual admissions that the canvassing board threw out one vote for the contestants from precinct No. 2, also two votes from precinct No. 8, and the entire returns from precinct No. 9, accompanied, however, by the general denial that this was done unlawfully or fraudulently.
That in precinct No. 2, one vote, that of Adolph Lea, was received by the judges of election for the respective contestants, and counted and returned by them as such to the canvassing board; but, as is claimed by the respondents, such vote being an illegal vote, was no vote, and being no vote, the several contestants received in that precinct one vote less than the number returned by the judges of election, and on that ground the canvassing board canvassed and counted for the contestants one vote less from that precinct than was returned by the judges of election.
That in precinct No. 8, two votes, those of Atanacio Rivera and Senobio Nevares, were in like manner received by the judges of election for the respective contestants, and counted and returned by them to the canvassing board as legal votes, but such votes being illegal were not votes, and not being votes, the contestants received in said precinct No. 8, two votes less than were returned by the judges of election, and therefore the canvassing board canvassed and counted for the contestants two votes less than were so returned.
And that in precinct No. 9, neither of the contestants received either nineteen or any votes whatever — and therefore none were or could be canvassed and counted by the canvassing board for either of the contestants.
That is to say, the canvassing board usurped the functions of the judges of election and assumed the powers of a judicial tribunal — in the absence of the parties interested — to decide and determine the legality of the vote of Adolph Lea in precinct No. 2, as also the legality of the votes of Atanacio Rivera and Senobio Nevares in precinct No. 8.
The returns from precinct No. 9 by the judges of elections certainly show that nineteen' votes were cast for each of the contestants. These returns in every respect are in strict conformity to the requirements of the statute, except that the printed form of the oath to be taken by the judges of election is not filled up and signed by them, nor is there any evidence appearing thereby that they took such oath. It may be fairly assumed, therefore, that the only ground on which the canvassing board and the respondents considered or pretended that neither of the contestants received any votes at all in precinct No. 9, is that the judges of election thereof did not take and subscribe the oath required by law, and therefore, in consequence of that omission, all the votes cast in that precinct were- illegal, and being illegal, were not votes, and were not and ought not to be counted or canvassed by the canvassing board. In this instance, also, the canvassing board assumed the functions of a judicial tribunal to pass upon the legality of the votes cast in precinct No. 9.
Long before these answers were put in by the respondents, these same questions came before me in a mandamus proceeding instituted to compel this canvassing board to canvass and count for one of these contestants said nineteen votes so thrown out by them from precinct No. 9; also said two votes from precinct No. 8, and the one vote from precinct No. 2, so thrown out by them.
There were various delays in consequence of the case not being properly presented with all the facts, but it was finally presented with all the returns and data that were before the canvassing board, and upon which they based their action in the premises, and all these questions arose upon a motion to quash the alternative writ of mcmdamus.
The law was carefully considered, precedents and authorities were cited and read. The motion to quash was overruled, and the canvassing board ordered to canvass and count said votes or show cause to the contrary by a certain day. An evasive return was put in, which was quashed and the board ordered to file a proper return by another day. In the meantime, the board went out of office and a new board became their successors, and the case was never pressed for a final determination.
On the motion to quash the alternative writ of mcmdamus, all the questions were ruled upon. It was then decided that the canvassing board had only ministerial functions to canvass and count the votes as returned by the judges of election, to ascertain and declare the respective majorities of votes received by the respective candidates for office from the aggregate number of votes so returned by the judges of election. That they had no judicial powers whatever to pass upon and decide as to the illegality of individual votes received and returned to them by the judges of election, and particularly so as to precinct No. 9. That the judges of election of that precinct, notwithstanding they may not have taken and subscribed the oath as required by statute, were nevertheless defacto judges of election, and their official acts otherwise regular, were entitled to full faith and credit; and that their omission to take such oath, while it might render them liable to prosecution and severe penalties, could not in any way affect the legality of votes received and returned by them; and that it was the duty of the canvassing board to canvass and count all such votes for the respective candidates for whom they were cast.
In making these rulings, I simply followed the uniform decisions of the courts on the subject. I had not then, nor have I now, any doubts as to their correctness. Each of these respondents in their answers has substantially reiterated, the same grounds so ruled against, in justification of the acts of the canvassing board in throwing out the returns from precinct No. 9; one vote for the contestants in precinct No. 2, and two votes in precinct No. 8.
In precinct No. 9, nineteen votes were cast for each of the contestants, eleven for each of the respondents. By throwing out the returns from this precinct by the canvassing board, the result of the election, as shown by the returns, was changed so that the contestant, Bull, instead of having a majority of two for the office of. sheriff, his competitor, Southwick, had a majority of six. And the contestant, Barn-castle, instead of having a majority of nine votes for the office of treasurer, had only one majority. And the respondent, Casteñada, instead of having a majority of twelve for the office of probate judge, had a majority of twenty; and by throwing out one vote for each of the contestants in precinct No. 2, and two votes in precinct No. 8, the result of the election, as shown by the returns of the judges of election, was further changed so as to give Southwick, for sheriff, a majority of nine; to Amador, for treasurer, a majority of two, and to Casteñada, for judge of probate, a majority -of twenty-three.
This then, is the explanation, and the reason why South-wick received from the canvassing board the certificate of election for sheriff, instead of Bull; and why Amador received the certificate of election for treasurer instead of Barn-castle.
The powers and duties of the county commissioners as a canvassing board are clearly and specifically defined in the ninth subdivision of section 4, of the act of 1876.
The provision of the act is as follows:
" Said board of commissioners shall " " also act as boards of canvassers of the elections within their respective counties; and shall count the votes cast in any election within their respective counties, and shall determine the result thereof from the returns of "the judges of election of the various precincts, and shall declare the result of said election, and shall immediately issue a certificate to the person that may have received the highest number of votes for any office." " The votes east in any election shall be canvassed and counted within the time now prescribed by law, and the said board of commissioners shall discharge all the duties, and shall exercise all the powers now exercised by the several probate judges, relative to elections, as now required by law, and shall be subject to the same penalties for any failure in the discharge of their duties, or abuse or usurpation of power:" Vide laws of N. M., by Prince, chief justice, page 226, sub. 9, sec. 14. This law is concise and plain. Whatever votes have passed the judges of election, and received by them as votes, and as such returned by them to the canvassing board as having been cast for certain candidates respectively — the returns showing in an intelligible manner the number of votes and for whom cast — it becomes the ministerial duty of the canvassing board to count all such votes, and declare the result from such returns alone, without sitting as a court of review — in the absence of the parties interested — -for the purpose of passing upon the illegality or legality of individual voters, whose votes have been so returned to them.
But it was suggested by one of the counsel for respondents, that at and previous to the date of the act creating county commissioners and conferring upon them the powers of a canvassing board and of probate judges in regard to elections, the judges of probate did possess some sort of judicial power to determine the illegality of votes at the time the returns were canvassed ; and that under the provisions of the statute last above quoted, the canvassing board could exercise the same functions in determining the illegality of voters.
The only provision of statute at any time in force, on which any such suggestion could be based is contained in the act of July 20th, 1851, which provides as follows :
" Within six days after the election, the probate judge shall call to his assistance one of the justices of the peace of the county, and publicly examine the votes polled for each candidate, giving notice thereof two days previous, which notice shall be posted up at the court house for the information of the people where the examination is to be held,, and any citizen shall have the right to question the legality or 'illegality of any vote:" Laws N. M., Prince's ed., sec. 17, p. 328.
Whatever significance may be given to .this statute, it certainly never conferred the power on the canvassing officers to determine the illegality of votes and to reject them on that ground, for section 55 of the same act specifically prescribes the mode in which the illegality of votes shall be determined and the votes rejected. That section provides as follows:
" To reject any illegal votes that may be polled at any election in this territory it shall not be necessary to contest or question them at the .polls, but they may be rejected by the authorities qualified by law to determine the validity of said elections, by being proved, after due notice is given by the party contesting said election to the opposing party; said notice in any county election shall not be less than eight days, and shall, in all cases be within thirty days thereafter:" Laws N. M., Prince's ed., sec. 55, p. 333.
This, then, was the only mode by which illegal votes received and returned by the judges of election could be deter mined and rejected under the former administration of the probate judges; and that mode certainly was not to be executed by the canvassing officers at the time the returns from the several precincts were canvassed by them.
It is a well authenticated fact that one of the most disgraceful episodes in the history of the politics of this same county was, some years ago, enacted by a judge of probate and justice of the peace, acting as a canvassing board under the supposed authority of sec. 17 of said act of 20th July, 1851.
As such board of canvassers, they assumed judicial power to pass upon the illegality of and reject votes without any other ceremony than because partisan bystanders challenged them as illegal.
In this way hundreds of votes were thrown out and the result of the election thereby arbitrarily changed. This is but another illustration of what experience has long since demonstrated, which is, that if such judicial power should be conferred upon mere canvassing boards, to be exercised at the close of a hotly contested election — in the absence of the real parties interested, and almost always with the partisan advisors of such boards in the background — rtheir sittings would be marked by the exercise of arbitrary power that would be more aggressive and odious than that of the ancient court of Star Chamber.
After votes have been received and regularly returned by the judges of election, and questions as to the illegality of any such votes shall subsequently be raised, the respective candidates for whom such are cast are, on principle and as a matter of law, as much entitled to their day in court and to be heard thereon before such votes are rejected, as are the litigants in any other form of judicial proceeding.
The only lawful tribunal having original jurisdiction to determine questions of this kind is the district court: Act of 1874, Prince's Laws N. M., 344.
The only mode by which such questions can be determined by the district court in a proceeding between rival candidates alone, is that prescribed by the act of 1876: Prince's Laws N. M., 134.
For the reasons assigned it is clearly my opinion, as. a matter of law that the -canvassing board, wrongfully and without authority of law, issued certificates of election to Sonthwick and Amador; that such certificates ought to have been issued to Bull for sheriff, and to Barncastle for treasurer; that by reason of said certificates so as aforesaid wrongfully issued, the respondents, South wick and Amador, have improperly held the respective offices in question, pending the termination of these contested election cases; that in the meantime, though said respondents have been such officers defacto, and their official acts entitled to full faith and credit as such, yet they have not been such officers de jure.
I have gone over this branch of the case very much in detail and as thoroughly as I was able, because the questions involved are really important, and have not, to my knowledge, ever been ruled upon by our courts. If there is any misapprehension in the minds of canvassing boards as to their precise powers and duties, it is of the greatest importance to -the public, as well as for their own protection against severe statutory penalties, that the matter should be settled and determined by the courts.
There is another branch of the cases, bearing upon certain duties of judges of election, that is of sufficient importance to merit some attention.
The judges of election of pre'einct No. 3 returned 114 votes- for the respondent, Southwick, for sheriff, and 58 for the contestant, Bull; also 114 votes for Amador for treasurer,_ and 54 for the contestant, Barncastle; also 129 votes for the respondent, CasteBada, for probate judge, and 40 for the contestant, Chaves; all the respondents receiving large majorities. \
In each of the notices of contest for the respective offices in question there are allegations, substantially, that the returns and poll books of this precinct show upon their face that they are so contradictory, unreliable, defective and tainted with fraud as to render them entirely worthless as election returns, because: 1st. It cannot be determined from said returns and poll books, with any degree of certainty, how many or what particular- persons voted thereat for said officers respectively. 2d. Because the numbers written respectively on the tickets voted thereat do not conform to the respective numbers set .opposite the names of voters on the poll book. 3d. Because the whole conduct of the election officers who held said election at precinct No. 3, then and there amounted to such a disregard of their official duties as to render their doings unintelligible and unworthy of credence, and the results of their action unreliable for any purpose. 4th. Because it appears from the poll books of said precinct that S. II. Newman voted for eacli of said respondents for the said respective offices for which they were candidates, whereas, in truth and in fact, said Newman did not vote at said precinct at all, and did not vote at said election for either'of the respondents. 5th. Because it appears from the poll book that one Jacinto Armijo then and there voted for the respondents, Southwick and Casteñada, and for the contestant, Barncastle, whereas, in truth and in fact, he did not then and there so vote. 6th. Because it appears from said poll book that one S. M. Blun voted for each of said respondents, whereas, in truth and in fact, he did not so vote; and, 7 th. Because it appears from such poll book of precinct No. 3 that S. B. Newcomb and ¥m. L. Rynerson voted at said precinct at said election, whereas, in truth and in fact, neither of them then and there voted.
In response to these allegations the respective respondents in their answers deny all fraud, negligence and irregularity-on the part of the judges of election of this precinct.
As to the allegations in regard to the' voting of S. H. Newman, Jacinto Armijo and Wm. L. Bynerson, they simply deny that they, or either of them, at said election, voted at said precinct; thus virtually admitting- the allegations in respect thereto contained in the notices of contest.
There is no answer to the allegations in regard to the voting of S. B. Newcomb and S. M. Blun — which allegations are of course admitted.
In further answer to such allegations the respondents aver that the county clerk, Horace F. Stephenson, a strong partisan of the contestants, wilfully, corruptly and fraudulently neglected and refused to deliver the poll books and ballot box of said precinct to the judges of election, thereof, for the purpose of obstructing and preventing a full and fair election thereat; and that he left the same locked up in his office on the morning of the day of said election, and absented himself, so that said poll books and ballot box could not be obtained at the time for opening the polls for said election, nor were they obtained until the doors of his office had been forced open, when they were conveyed to said judges of election.
In further response to said allegations they aver that any irregularity touching said returns from precinct No. 3 was the result of said action on the part of said Stephenson. They further aver that by the numbers on the ballots and the numbers opposite each voter's name on the poll books it can be determined by whom and for whom each and every ballot was cast.
Now, it is apparent from an examination of the returns of this precinct, that in some respects either these returns are false, or these answers are false. For instance, these answers aver that said S. H. Newman, Jacinto Armijo and W. L. Rynerson did not, at said election, at said precinct, vote in any manner whatever; whereas the judges of election thereof certainly recorded in the poll books and returns that said S. H. Newman did vote thereat ballot numbered 161, for each of the respondents; also that said Jacinto Armijo thereat voted ballot numbered 3, for each of the respondents, South-wick. and Casteflada, and for the contestant, Barncastle; also that said W. L. Rynerson voted ballot numbered 183, for no candidate whatever; that is to say, he voted a blank ballot so numbered. These poll books and returns further show that said S. M. Blun voted thereat ballot numbered 41, for each of the respondents, and that S. B. Newcomb voted ballot numbered 160, for Manuel Nevares, for justice of the peace, and for no other candidate.
But the returns from another precinct (No. 10), show that thereat, at said election, said S. B. Newcomb voted ballot numbered 3, for each of the respondents, on a certificate of registration from precinct No. 3 ; also that the returns from precinct No. 18 show that W. L. Rynerson voted thereat ballot numbered 112, for each of the respondents, on a certificate of registration from said precinct No. 3.
On examining the poll books and returns from this precinct, No. 3, the first 'thing that must impress anyone as extraordinary and incredible is the fact that, according to such returns, all the voters at said precinct marched to the polls and voted in alphabetical order.
That is, all those voters whose surname commenced with the letter " A" — thirty-nine in all — voted before anyone else with names commencing with any other letter voted. Those voters under the initial " A" are recorded as having voted ballots numbered from and including ballot numbered 1, to and including ballot numbered 39, in regular mmierical order.
After these had all voted, then all those voters, the initial letter'of whose surnames was "B," voted in regular numerical order ballots numbered from and including ballot numbered 40, to and including ballot numbered 60 — twenty-one in all. Then, in like manner, all those under the initial " C " voted, and then those under the initial " D," and so on through tbe entire alphabet in regular numerical order, until the initial "Q"is reached. The "Qs" commenced with ballot numbered 175. One voter, the first under this initial — one Jesus Quesada — is recorded as having voted that ballot. Those under the remainder of this initial "Q," and extending through the initials R, S, T, U, V, W and Y, in regular alphabetical and numerical order — fifty in all — from and including ballot numbered 176, to and including ballot numbered 225, are recorded as having voted blank ballots.
The law in regard to making out these poll books and returns is very plain and simple. The statute has not only prescribed the mode, but has prescribed a form for executing that mode. The judges of election of precinct No. 3 had one of these forms in print, with appropriate columns marked and with suitable headings, also in print, indicating precisely how the poll books and returns should be made out.
The mode and form prescribed by law is as follows : The ballot of the first voter appearing at the polls and voting is to be numbered one by the judges of election. The same number is to be put down by them in the poll book, and opposite the same number, in the proper column therein, is to be written the name of such voter. The ballot so numbered is then deposited in the ballot box.
The ballot of the second voter appearing and voting is' to be numbered two, and the same number put down in the poll book next in order after No. 1, and the name of the voter voting that ballot so numbered is to be written down opposite that number in the poll book, and the ballot then deposited in the ballot box.
The same numerical order and record are to be observed and kept with each voter as he appears and votes.
At the close of the polls the names of the respective candidates voted for by each ballot so numbered and recorded are to be written down in the appropriate columns, and in the proper column under the name of each candidate so voted for, and opposite the same number in the poll book which the ballot bears, and opposite the name of the voter voting the same, is to be recorded the vote, showing that the voter has cast one vote for each candidate so voted for by him.
The poll books of the several precincts with the proper certificates attached and so filled out, constitute the returns of the judges of election to be transmitted to the canvassing board.
With these printed forms of poll books and returns before them, what excuse was there for the judges of election of this precinct to make out false returns as to who voted and how they voted ? If the clerk, Stephenson, was guilty of the charges alleged in the answers, he certainly merits the severest censure, and ought to be prosecuted for gross breach of duty.
But I am unable to perceive how this breach of duty, under the circumstances, could be the occasion for or constitute any justification for making out a false return in any respect. The judges of election could not proceed without the ballot box and poll books. There may have been some delay in procuring them. But it seems they did procure them and proceed with the election. They had the legal forms before them. They filled out these forms in a. certain illegal mode, so as to bear falsity on their face in the respects I have pointed out.
It is quite clear that it cannot be ascertained from the poll books and returns of this precinct how or for whom or what ballot any voter voted, nor are they in and of themselves any evidence that can be relied on that any of the persons whose names are recorded in the poll books and returns voted at all, and that to determine this matter a resort must be had to evidence atiunde.
In these answers it is averred that from the ballots cast at this precinct; the number of votes for each candidate may be determined. That» may be true, but the ballots sealed up and locked up in the ballot box and deposited for safe keeping pending any election contest that might be instituted, constitute no part of the returns of the judges of election to be canvassed by the board of canvassers.
The contestants complain — and I think justly — that in consequence of the falsity of the returns from this precinct, in recording the names of votes opposite the numbers of ballots which they did not vote, it was impossible for them to ascertain therefrom what illegal votes, if any, had been cast for the respondents, and that thereby they were prevented from including any such illegal votes in their notices of contest. If this was designed, it was certainly a fraud.
Whether designed or not, it was an infringement of the rights of candidates desiring to contest the election.
Whether there was or was not any fraud committed at this precinct, one thing is quite certain, and that is, that by reason of the falsity of the returns that I have ¡Jointed out, the door was opened whereby the grossest frauds might have entered, and the greatest obstacles thrown in the way of their detection.
The notices of contest for the respective offices of sheriff and treasurer were duly served on the respective respondents, Soutliwick and Amador, on the fourth day of December, 1880, and the notice of contest for probate judge -was served on the respondent, Oasteflada, on the seventh day of December, 1880.
The provisions of statute under which the cases are brought, so far as they relate to the question involved, are as follows:
" In all cases of contested elections triable in the district court, the notice of contest when filed and served as now provided by law, shall be taken and considered as the only petition and process necessary for the court to acquire jurisdiction."
" The respondent shall file his answer to the notice of con test within twenty days from and after the service of such notice of contest upon him exclusive of the day of such service ; and any material fact alleged in the notice of contest, not specifically denied by the answer within the time aforesaid, shall be taken and considered as true."
" The respondent may allege in his answer any matter material to the issue, showing that the contestant is not legally entitled to the office in controversy; and if he claims that illegal votes have been cast or counted for the contestant, he must specify in his answer the name of each person whose vote was so illegally cast or counted, the precinct where he voted, and the facts showing such illegality."
" The contestant shall file his reply to any new matter set up in the answer, and serve a copy thereof on the respondent within twenty days from and after the service of the answer, exclusive of the day of such service; and any new matter in the answer material to the issue not specifically denied by such reply within the time aforesaid, shall betaken and considered as true :" Act 1876, Prince's General Laws N. M., 344—5.
Under the foregoing provisions of law, the time for answering and specifically denying each material allegation in the respective notices of contest for the offices of sheriff and treasurer, and filing and serving the same expired at the end of the 2éth day of December, 1880, and the time for so answering and denying the allegations in the notice of contest for probate judge, and filing and serving the samé expired at the close of the 27th day of December, 1880.
Each of the notices of contest contained allegations that sixty-nine voters, naming them and the precincts where they voted, voted at said election for each of the respondents.
That each of said voters was not qualified to vote, on the ground, among others, that he had-not resided in said county for three months immediately preceding the election.
These allegations, of course, are material, and if true rend ered the vote of each of said voters illegal and void ; and whatever the number of illegal votes the testimony may show were cast for the contestants, it is clear they are insufficient in numbers to overbalance these sixty-nine alleged illegal votes for respondents ; and that if these allegations are to be considered as true, then it necessarily follows that each of these cases must be decided in favor of the contestants, Bull, Barncastle and Chaves.
The respondents, South wick and Amador, filed and served answers on the 2-lth day of December, 1880, that being the last day on which the same could be done. But in neither of said answers is there any denial of any of the aforesaid allegations as to the illegality of these sixty-nine votes.
The respondent Casteñada, filed an answer on the 27th of December, 1880, that being the last day for such filing ; but such answer was not served until the expiration of the time for such service, to wit: on the 22d day of that month. Neither does this answer contain any denial of the aforesaid allegations touching the illegality of said sixty-nine votes.
On the 17th day of February, 1881, fifty-nine days after the expiration of the time for Southwick and Amador to answer, and fifty-two days after the time expired for Casteñada to answer, each of the respondents made a motion for leave to file a supplemental answer denying the allegations as to the illegality of said sixty-nine votes, a proposed supplemental answer being attached to the motion in each case.
These motions were set down for hearing on notice to opposing counsel on the first day of February, 1881. A hearing was had on that day — all the parties appearing by counsel, and the application for leave to file such supplemental answers was denied and overruled by the court.
Nothwithstanding this ruling, the respondents, under objection by contestants, have taken testimony before the master, tending to show that said sixty-nine voters had been residents of the county for three months prior to the election.
This testimony has been reported by the master. On the final hearing of the causes, the respondents renewed their motions for leave to file said supplemental answers, for the purpose of having the pleadings conform to the evidence. These motions also, were overruled by the court, and excepted to by respondents.
It is my opinion that this evidence was improperly taken, and might not to be considered ; the same not being responsive or pertinent to any issue in either of the cases.
It is also my opinion that the very object of the statute, in regard to the pleadings and .practice in contested election cases, is to afford, and at the same time to compel the observance of, a speedy mode for conducting and terminating such cases. Its language is plain and free from all ambiguity. There is no room for mistaking its purport and meaning, and I cannot conceive of any reasonable excuse for not following its provisions by either party.
These statutory provisions, as to the time. of filing and serving the notice of contest, answer and reply, are in effect statutes of limitation, taken from the judge all discretion as to extending the time.
In my opinion this is one of the most salutary of our statutory laws. Experience has demonstrated that without some such compulsory, mode as to the time of making -up issues and their trial in contested election cases, subterfuges and delays might, and would be successfully resorted to, so that a final determination could not be reached before the term of office would expire.
At the time the motions for leave to file the supplemental answers were made and heard, no excuse whatever was presented for the delay, nor was any excuse at any time offered, except the negligence and oversight of counsel for the respondents.
If any error was committed by the court below in the premises, it was in overruling the motions in the first instance.
After such ruling, the contestants and their counsel had a right to consider that issue disposed of, and were excused from offering any evidence in support of their allegations.
Nevertheless it was claimed by respondents' counsel on the argument of the cases, that inasmuch as the people were interested in securing the officers of 1;heir choice, the contestants were bound to prove those allegations, though not denied by the answers.
In reply to this, it may be said, 1st, that it is absurd to introduce evidence to prove the truth of what the law declares " shall be taken and considered as true ; " 2d, that this is a proceeding exclusively between rival candidates for office, in which the people in no sense are parties.
That it is competent for an officer to resign — to admit facts that will deprive him of an office and give it to another in a proceeding between them — or by his own negligence in conducting his defense, to produce the same result, there can be no doubt.
If by any such means the candidate should obtain the office, who, in fact, was not elected in a majority of legal votes, and this could be shown by competent evidence, the people would have their remedy in a direct proceeding on their part, by writ of quo warranto. And if successful, while it would not restore to office the candidate who had lost it by his own act or omission, it would oust the other candidate. Both would then be out of office, and the vacancy could be filled in the mode prescribed by law.
The theory of our statute in regard to the institution and prosecution of contested election cases between rival candidates undoubtedly is, that such candidates, being personally interested and desirous of obtaining and holding the office in question, will do all that is necessary to secure their respective rights under the law.
It must be conceded that this statute, when followed by the parties, affords a speedy, consistent and effectual rem edy, whereby the rights of the parties, as well as the interests of the people, are well protected.
It is clear, however, that this statutory remedy does not supersede the proceeding by writ of quo warrcmto, on behalf of the people. It is also clear that under this statutory remedy no act or omission by either party can jeopardize the rights of the people, and if by any such act or omission the wrong candidate should obtain office, the people could resort to their remedy by quo wa/rranto.
This statutory proceeding between rival candidates alone is a special proceeding complete in itself, conferring a special jurisdiction on the district court, and to which the general law and rules of the court as to the time of pleading and the discretion of the district judge in extending such time, do not apply.
The special proceeding, therefore, must be strictly followed. It is so plain that there can be no excuse for not following it. When followed, no occasion can ever arise for resorting to a writ of quo warranto.
From the opinion herein expressed, it follows that the record discloses no error, and that the judgment of the court below in each of these contested election cases ought to be affirmed.
Parks, Associate Justice:
Nearly a year since in a contested election cáse in my own district, I was obliged to examine and construe the statute which is in question in this. I then held that the law was mandatory, and have not found any reason in the argument or in the examination of this case to change my opinion.
The correct rule for the interpretation of such statutes is that " no specific requirement of a statute may be dispensed with except when it is clearly manifest that the legislature did not deem a compliance with it material, or unless it appears to have been prescribed simply as a matter of form." " If it is evident from the ordinary grammatical construction of the words used that it intended a right should be enjoyed only upon some specified conditions, there is no power in the courts or elsewhere to dispense with the conditions imposed, or to hold that a thing which it deemed essential to be done at one time, may nevertheless be done at another."
It is insisted that the statute is directory and that the court had the right in its discretion to give the respondents time to amend their answer in a vital point or to extend the time for answering on one material point, which is substantially the same thing, and that the refusal of the court to do so was an abuse of its discretion. One and a sufficient answer to this is, that leave to amend the answer or to file an amended answer was not asked for till nearly eight weeks had elapsed after the time for answering had expired, and that a corresponding liberality in the court in the exercise of its discretion in. all other respects, would defeat the manifest object of the law, which is a prompt and speedy trial of election contests. It is laid down in • McCrary on the Law of Elections, that amendments should be immediate and for reasons too obvious to need statement here. If the district court had the discretion to permit amendments as claimed, that discretion must be reasonably exercised, and could not be extended so as to relieve the respondents in this case from the consequences of their long and unreasonable delay in asking leave to amend. The authorities cited o.n the argument were numerous, and many of them not applicable. Mr. Mc-Crary's doctrine that election laws are only means to an end, is not applied by him and cannot be properly applied by anybody to the trial of contested election cases, and the eloquent opinion of the supreme court of Maine, quoting the still more eloquent speech of Mr. Lincoln, is subject to the same objection.
It is not intended to review these authorities. Many of them are profitable study, but none of them are conclusive of this case. It is the duty of the court to avail itself of all such lights, but to use its own judgment in construing this statute and not permit it to be practically repealed by a construction not only too liberal to be wise, but too loose to be safe.
The opinion of the district court is filed with the record in this case, and is believed to be correct. It is so full and complete as to obviate any necessity there might otherwise be for a more lengthy and thorough opinion by this court.
The judgment of the district court is affirmed.