Case Name: Kenneth WOODFORK, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Petitioner
Court: Court of Appeals of Indiana
Jurisdiction: Indiana
Decision Date: 1992-06-22
Citations: 594 N.E.2d 468
Docket Number: No. 49A02-9018-CR-363
Parties: Kenneth WOODFORK, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Petitioner.
Judges: MILLER, J., concurs.
Reporter: North Eastern Reporter 2d
Volume: 594
Pages: 468–473

Head Matter:
Kenneth WOODFORK, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Petitioner.
No. 49A02-9018-CR-363.
Court of Appeals of Indiana, Second District.
June 22, 1992.
S. Sargent Visher, Choate Visher & Haith, Indianapolis, for appellant-defendant.
Linley E. Pearson, Atty. Gen., Cynthia L. Ploughe, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellee-petitioner.

Opinion:
BUCHANAN, Judge.
CASE SUMMARY
Appellant-defendant Kenneth Woodfork (Woodfork) appeals his convictions for two counts of forgery , both as Class C felonies and theft , a Class D felony, claiming that the trial court erred by refusing to grant a continuance so a defense witness could obtain a document and that the evidence was insufficient to support the convictions.
We affirm.
FACTS
The facts which most support the convie-tions show that on September 19, 1989, Woodfork met Dalonda Clay (Clay) at a liquor store in Indianapolis. As they drove to Clay's apartment, Woodfork told her he had obtained some Richmond State Hospital Employees Credit Union checks where he worked. When they arrived at the apartment, Clay gave Woodfork an American Express picture identification card. Woodfork cut out Clay's photograph and placed it on a white piece of paper which had typed on it "Richmond Hospital" and "Rochelle Jones". Woodfork then inserted the photograph and paper into a plastic overlay and sealed it with a hot iron. Finally, Woodfork punched a hole in the card and inserted a clip so it would look like a Richmond State Hospital identification badge.
Woodfork and Clay drove to the Check Exchange in Indianapolis, where Clay attempted use the manufactured identification card and other falsified identification to cash a Richmond State Hospital check for $5,000 that was made out to "Rochelle Jones" and signed by "Mary Hunt." The owner of the Check Exchange, Larry Skeen (Skeen), went to a back room and called Richmond State Hospital to verify the check. Upon learning from Mary Hunt that she had not signed the check and the check had been among those stolen from the credit union, Skeen called the police.
Clay was still in the store when the sheriff's deputies arrived. After some questioning by the officers, Clay admitted to having attempted to cash the check using false identification and gave a physical description of her accomplice, Woodfork. Skeen informed the deputies that he had seen someone matching the description just leaving the store. A search proved fruit legs, however, and the officers took Clay to the police station.
Skeen later saw someone matching the description of Woodfork walking in front of the Check Exchange. Skeen called the police and told them he was going to follow the suspect. Using the telephone in his car, Skeen kept the deputies apprised of Woodfork's location until they could effect an arrest. At the station, Clay identified Woodfork as her accomplice.
Woodfork was charged with two counts of forgery and one count of theft. A jury trial was held on November 16, 1989, which ended in a mistrial. A second jury trial, presided over by Master Commissioner Craig Wellnitz was held on February 8, 1990, at which Woodfork was convicted on all three counts. Commissioner Wellnits sentenced Woodfork to two concurrent eight year sentences on the forgery charges and four years for the theft conviction and ordered that the sentence for the theft conviction be served consecutively to the eight year sentences.
As there was no evidence in the record that final judgment on the sentence was entered by the regular judge of the court, the Honorable John Barney, Jr., an order signed by the Chief Judge of this court suspended consideration of the appeal and Judge Barney was ordered "to cause sentence to be entered by a proper judicial officer...." Soon thereafter Judge Barney complied with the order.
ISSUES
Woodfork now appeals, raising two issues, which we restate and reorder as:
1. Did the trial judge err in refusing to continue the trial to permit a defense witness to obtain a document which, Woodfork maintains, would have corroborated his testimony?
2. Was the evidence sufficient to support the convictions?
DECISION
ISSUE ONE-Did the trial judge err in refusing to continue the trial to permit a defense witness to obtain a doe-ument which, Woodfork maintains, would have corroborated his testimony?
PARTIES' CONTENTIONS-Woodfork argues that the admission of a sign-in log would have corroborated his alibi claim and that the court abused its discretion in refusing to grant a continuance so the log could be obtained. The State counters that Woodfork was not harmed by the denial of the continuance because a witness was permitted to testify regarding the contents of the log including the time Woodfork had signed out on the day of the forgery.
CONCLUSIONS-Woodfork was not prejudiced by the court's refusal to continue the case.
At trial, Woodfork sought to introduce through Craig Thomas (Thomas), an employee of Riverside Residential Center (the Center), the place where Woodfork was living on September 19, 1989, a copy of the sign-out log, which Woodfork elaims would have shown that he was at the Center during the time he was supposedly involved in the forgery. However, as the Center had closed for the day, Thomas could not obtain the log until the day after the trial. Woodfork's request that the court continue the trial to the following day so the log could be entered into evidence was denied.
Whether to grant a continuance falls within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be reversed on appeal absent a showing that the trial court's discretion has been abused. Conner v. State (1991), Ind., 580 N.E.2d 214. To meet this burden, a defendant must demonstrate that he was prejudiced as a result of the court's denial of the continuance. Parr v. State (1987), Ind., 504 N.E.2d 1014.
Although the trial court's ruling prevented Woodfork from entering the sign-out log, nonetheless he was permitted to call as a witness Thomas who indicated that he had reviewed the sign-out log prior to the trial and testified regarding the time Wood-fork had signed out on February 19, 1988. Woodfork has not demonstrated how he was prejudiced by the court's denial of his motion for continuance to obtain the sign-out log. Parr, supra.
ISSUE TWO-Was the evidence sufficient to support the convictions?
PARTIES' CONTENTIONS-Woodfork contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions because the information provided that he was accused of making an official Richmond State Hospital identification card so that it appeared like it was made by the bearer of the card, Clay, who was pretending to be Rochelle Jones. In addition, Woodfork claims the evidence was insufficient because the court's judgment rested solely on the testimony of Clay who had repeatedly lied during the investigation into the matter and while under oath. The State responds that Woodfork was not entitled to reversal based on a variance between the proof offered at trial and the allegation contained in the information because the information, which contained a clerical error, was not likely to mislead Woodfork or place him in the position of being subject to double jeopardy. As to the reliability of Clay's testimony, the State argues that Woodfork is simply wanting to reweigh the evidence.
CONCLUSION-The evidence was sufficient to support the convictions.
Woodfork first claims that the evi-denee was insufficient to show, as alleged in Count I, that he had falsified a Richmond State Hospital identification badge so that it looked like it was made by "Rochelle Jones":
"Count I
[Kenneth Woodfork] did unlawfully and with intent to defraud, make a written instrument, to wit A RICHMOND STATE HOSPITAL EMPLOYEE IDENTIFICATION CARD, said instrument being of the following tenor:
[identification ecard was reproduced here]
in such a manner that said written instrument purposed to have been made by another person, to-wit: ROCHELLE R. JONES, all of which is contrary to the form of the statute...."
Record at 2-8.
The information should have alleged that the employee card was falsified to look like it was made by Richmond State Hospital rather than "Rochelle Jones." This is an obvious clerical error, however, and does not nullify Woodfork's conviction under the forgery count. The purpose of an information is to advise a defendant of the particular crime charged so he can prepare a defense. Cash v. State (1990), Ind., 557 N.E.2d 1023. A variance between a charging instrument and the proof offered at trial is only fatal when it misleads the defendant in the preparation of his defense or is of such a degree as to likely place him in danger of double jeopardy. Grassmyer v. State (1981), Ind., 429 N.E.2d 248. Woodfork has shown neither.
Finally, Woodfork claims that the evidence is insufficient because the State's case depended on the testimony of Clay who had lied repeatedly to the arresting officers and while under oath,. Clay's inconsistencies and untruths, however, were known to the jury which is charged with the responsibility of assessing witness credibility and weighing all the evidence presented at trial. Carter v. State (1987), Ind., 512 N.E.2d 158.
In addition, Clay's testimony was supported by other evidence such as Wood-fork's access to the checks and check writing machine, record at 298-99, 818, the testimony of a handwriting analyst who noted "excellent similarities" between the forged signature on the checks and Wood-fork's handwriting, record at 361, and the testimony of a fingerprint examiner who identified Woodfork's fingerprint on the white paper inside the cellophane covering the falsified employee badge. Record at 877, 880. The evidence was not insufficient. See Clark v. State (1990), Ind., 562 N.E.2d 11, cert. denied - U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 425, 116 L.Ed.2d 445 (1991).
Judgment affirmed.
MILLER, J., concurs.
SULLIVAN, J., concurs in result with opinion.
. Ind.Code 35-43-5-2.
. IC 35-43-4-2.
. In several cases this court has suspended the consideration of an appeal taken from a master commissioner's ruling and ordered the judge of the trial court to enter final judgment on the case. Green v. State (1989), Ind.App., 540 N.E.2d 130; Eakins v. State (1985), Ind.App., 482 N.E.2d 1157; Ingmire v. Butts (1974), 160 Ind.App. 575, 312 N.E.2d 885.