Case Name: Bernice LOSEY, Petitioner, v. Dean LOSEY, Ruth Bowers, Howard Losey, Jr., and Howard Losey, Respondents
Court: Florida Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1969-04-09
Citations: 221 So. 2d 417
Docket Number: No. 37390
Parties: Bernice LOSEY, Petitioner, v. Dean LOSEY, Ruth Bowers, Howard Losey, Jr., and Howard Losey, Respondents.
Judges: ROBERTS, THORNAL, CARLTON, ADKINS and BOYD, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 221
Pages: 417–422

Head Matter:
Bernice LOSEY, Petitioner, v. Dean LOSEY, Ruth Bowers, Howard Losey, Jr., and Howard Losey, Respondents.
No. 37390.
Supreme Court of Florida.
April 9, 1969.
Rehearing Denied May 2, 1969.
Edward A. Perse, of Carey, Dwyer, Austin, Cole & Selwood, Miami, for petitioner.
Starr W. Horton, Miami, for respondents.

Opinion:
DREW, Justice.
The petition for certiorari in this case is directed to a decision of the District Court of Appeal, Third District, 207 So.2d 283, which affirmed a decree quieting title to real property and holding a deed to be void.
The petitioner Bernice Losey is the second wife of Howard Losey, Sr. They were defendants in this suit instituted by the three grown children of his first marriage to Esther who died in 1964, leaving a will devising her property to her children. Howard and Esther had acquired title to three parcels of land "as husband and wife" and in 1950 and 1951 conveyed a 14 interest to each of their three offspring, with whom they also executed partnership agreements acknowledging that all parties had an "equal" interest in the properties and in partnership assets and proceeds. In 1966, Howard married the petitioner Bernice and executed a deed which on its face created an estate by entirety in Howard and Bernice covering a 14-interest in the three parcels, and a interest in a fourth parcel not directly involved in this litigation.
The trial court held that the deeds to Howard and Esther as husband and wife did not create an estate by entirety because of "circumstances and admissions" in evidence portraying a contrary intent. The decision of the appellate court, however, was that their estate by entirety (assuming its existence) "was terminated and a tenancy in common with the children created by the deeds and partnership agreements."
The facts stated in the opinion and reflected by the record show deeds by Howard and Esther conveying a )4 interest to their children without reference to the 14 interest retained by them, together with partnership agreements between them and their children acknowledging all parties had an "equal" interest in the properties and proceeds. These agreements are clearly consistent with the continued existence of an estate by entirety in the parents' }4 interest in the property. The writ of certiorari has been issued on the ground of conflict created by the decision that these agreements converted the estate to one of tenancy in common, on the basis of earlier opinions, acknowledged as controlling precedent, establishing the principle that a husband and wife's estate by entirety in real property "can be terminated only when both convey" or by death or divorce.
We conclude that the decision on this point in the present case must be quashed. The finding of the trial court was that the original deeds to Howard and Esther as husband and wife created a tenancy in common and not by entirety, predicated in part on testimony of the surviving husband who now seeks to void in part his conveyance to himself and petitioner, his second wife. That judgment should in our opinion be reversed under the long standing doctrine of the cases holding "Where property is acquired specifically in the name of both husband and wife, they become seized of the estate thus granted per tout et non per my, and not as tenants in common. There can be oji^ severance of the estate by the act of either This reasoning seems particularly appropriate in the case of an attempt, subsequent to the death of one spouse, to define the estate vested by such a deed. The cases, in any event, do not support the contention that the creation of an estate by entirety by such a conveyance rests on a rebuttable presumption. The textbook statement of the common law doctrine quoted in our cases is that the doctrine rests "upon a rule of construction based on the presumption of intention," rather than on any peculiarity of-marital incapacity. We find no authority for variance of the ordinary rule governing the effect of such a deed in the present case.
Further issues raised on appeal below related to impropriety of the judgment of the trial court declaring the above-described 1966 deed to be void:
"Whether as a matter of law on this record Howard Losey and Esther M. Losey at all times pertinent hereto held the subject property as tenants by the entireties thereby vesting in Howard Losey an undivided one-fourth (14 th) interest therein upon the death of Esther M. Losey, which interest was validly conveyed to himself and Bernice Losey, as tenants by the entireties." (e. s.)
"Whether or not the trial court erred in making any disposition with regard to parcel 4 when no relief with regard to this parcel was requested by plaintiffs in their complaint."
Decisions relied on by respondent and apparently by the Trial Court and the District Court to sustain the invalidation of the deed relate to alleged insufficiency of consideration. On the record in this case the point, in our opinion, is governed by the rule that "conclusive evidence is necessary to overcome the presumption of a gift to the wife upon a transfer to an estate by the entirety."'
Insofar as the deed covers the respondent husband's l/jj interest in all the lands, which could not have passed under the will of the decedent wife, even on the plaintiffs' theory of tenancy in common, neither the pleadings nor briefs present any theory whatever on which plaintiffs might be accorded relief. It is an elementary principle that a conveyance of a greater interest than that owned by the grantor is a good conveyance of the lesser interest.
The decision is accordingly quashed and the cause remanded with directions for disposition consistent with this opinion.
ROBERTS, THORNAL, CARLTON, ADKINS and BOYD, JJ., concur.
ERVIN, C. J., dissents with Opinion.
. In re Lyons' Estate, Fla., 90 So.2d 39, 64 A.L.R.2d 1.
. Bailey v. Smith, 89 Fla. 303, 103 So. 833, 834; English v. English, 66 Fla. 427, 63 So. 822.
. Ibid.
. Holton v. Holton, Fla.App.1966, 189 So.2d 214, citing Lauderdale v. Lauderdale, Fla.App.1957, 96 So.2d 663; McFarland v. McFarland, Fla.App.1961, 131 So.2d 749.
. "A deed will convey such estate as the grantor has even though it purports to convey a larger estate." 10 Fla.Jur. p. 157, § 152, and authorities there cited.