Case Name: PEOPLE v. VAN VECHTEN
Court: New York Supreme Court, General Term
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1884-01
Citations: 2 N.Y. Crim. 291
Docket Number: 
Parties: PEOPLE v. VAN VECHTEN.
Judges: 
Reporter: New York Criminal Reports
Volume: 2
Pages: 291–294

Head Matter:
Supreme Court—General Term—Third Department.
January, 1884.
PEOPLE v. VAN VECHTEN.
Assault and Battery—Previous Notice not to Enter Premises—Intoxication.
It appeared that complainant, while endeavoring to enter the door of defendant’s hotel, where defendant was entertaining a company at a dance, was seized by the latter, without warning or notice, and ejected with great force and violence. Held, upon the trial of an indictment for assault and battery, that evidence of a previous notice by defendant to complainant, not to enter his premises, was inadmissible in justification of the assault, and that it was still defendant’s duty to notify complainant that he could not enter before ejecting him, it also appearing that defendant used more force than was necessary in ejecting complainant ; further, that evidence that complainant was intoxicated at the time was also inadmissible, that not having been the objection to his entry.
Learned, !., dissenting, wrote for reversal and new trial.
Appeal by defendant from judgment of the County Court of Madison county.
The defendant, Frank Van Vechten, was- convicted in a court of Special Sessions of assault and battery alleged to have been committed on the person of Eli Hibbard, about midnight, September 16, 1882, as 'the latter was about to enter the hotel kept by the defendant. Defendant was sentenced to pay a fine of $40, or be imprisoned twenty days, and appealed to the Madison county Court of Sessions, where the conviction was affirmed, from which judgment he appeals to this court.
The facts appear in the opinion.
C. W. Stapleton, for appellant.
—It was a question of fact to be established, whether Hibbard was a trespasser, or whether he had a license, express or implied, to enter the premises. If he was a trespasser, the defendant might eject him without ceremony, using no more force than was necessary. If he had a license, express or implied, then it would be necessary for defendant to first order him away, and it was error to prevent defendant from showing that Hibbard was a trespasser. Harrington v. People, 6 Barb. 607; 2 Colby’s Cr. Law. 23; 3 Bl. Com. 121.
There is a broad distinction between a case where one enters by a license express or implied, and only becomes a trespasser after being ordered to leave, and one when the party enters after the order has been given, and is a trespasser ab initio.
The question as to whether the complainant was drunk or .sober, was competent, and should have been allowed. People v. Eastwood, 14 N. Y. 562.
John E. Smith, district attorney, for the people, respondent.

Opinion:
Potter, J.
The defendant, was a hotel-keeper, and upon «the night.of the occurrence complained of, was entertaining a company at a dance. The complainant attempted to open the door to enter defendant's house. According to the complainant's testimony and that of the witnesses for the prosecution, who saw the transaction, the defendant immediately seized the complainant by the whiskers and commenced beating him in the face, after making the remark " if complainant comes into my house I ,will kill him." The defendant offered to show upon the trial that he had previously forbidden complainant to come into his house. Ho time when so forbidden is indicated by the question, or the circumstances under which he forbade him. This was offered with view of justifying the beating. I do not think it-shonld be .allowed to serve that purpose. Assuming he had forbidden him to .enter, I think when he attempted to enter or had entered, the defendant should have requested or have ordered him to'leave, and for a failure to comply the defendant might have lawfully used the necessary force to eject him or remove him from the premises. But the defendant made no such request or order, but seized him by the whiskers and struck him repeatedly in the face. It is not the reasonable or lawful way to remove a trespasser from one's premises, to seize him by the whiskers and keep him on the premises while the owner is striking the trespasser in the face. The purpose of the defendant to punish and not simply remove the trespasser is plain. The key to it is found in the defendant's expression, " if complainant comes into my house I will kill him." The offer to prove by the defendant that complainant was drunk was properly overruled. If it were so, it has nothing to do with the justification, for that was not the objection to complainant's entry. Besides it would be going too far to allow any witness to express an opinion upon the subject or question of another's intoxication, until it had appeared by the witness' testimony, that he had made some observations in that direction or had any opportunity of doing so. Upon the whole, I do not believe the ends of public justice require or would justify a new trial.
Boardman, J., wrote for affirmance.