Case Name: The State of Ohio ex rel. Attorney General v. Joseph C. Bloch
Court: Supreme Court of Ohio
Jurisdiction: Ohio
Decision Date: 1901-12-03
Citations: 65 Ohio St. 370
Docket Number: 
Parties: The State of Ohio ex rel. Attorney General v. Joseph C. Bloch.
Judges: Minshall, C. J., Burket and Davis, JJ., concur. Shauck, J., dissents.
Reporter: Ohio State Reports, New Service
Volume: 65
Pages: 370–393

Head Matter:
The State of Ohio ex rel. Attorney General v. Joseph C. Bloch.
Insolvency court — Act to establish in certain counties — For relief of probate court — 92 O. L., 475 — 93 O. L., —94 O. L., 353 — Validity of the act — Constitutional law.
The act “to establish a court of insolvency in counties containing a city of the second grade of the first class, and for the relief of the probate court in such counties” (92 O. L., 475), and the acts conferring additional and concurrent jurisdiction on such court (93 O. L., 464, and 94 O. L. 353), are constitutional and valid.
(Decided December 3, 1901.)
Quo Warranto.
This cause has been submitted upon a general demurrer to the petition which reads as follows:
■ pirst cause of action.
J. M. Sheets, attorney general of the state of Ohio, gives the court to understand and be informed: That on the 11th day of March, 1896, the general assembly of the state of Ohio passed an act entitled “An act to establish ‘A court of insolvency’ in counties containing a city of the second grade of the first class, and for the relief of the probate court in such counties,” and printed in volume 92, on pages 475 and 478, both inclusive, of Ohio Laws: That the county of Cuyahoga, in said state, at the- time when said act was passed, contained and ever since has contained a city of the second grade of the first class, and is and was the only county in the state containing such city; that at the general election held on the first Tuesday after the first Monday in the month of November, in the year 1896, the defendant, Joseph C. Bloch, in pursuance of the provisions of said act, was elected to the office of judge of the court of insolvency within and for said county of Cuyahoga, and gave bond and qualified in all respects as required by said act; that thereafter, to-wit, on the 8th day of February, 1897, as provided in said act, said defendant entered upon the duties of judge of the court of insolvency, as the same are prescribed in said act, and ever since said date said defendant has been acting, and claiming the right to act, as judge of the court of insolvency within and for said county of Cuyahoga, and to do and perform all and singular the acts, and to exercise all and singular the powers in said act named and provided, for the full period of five years from and after February 9, 1897; and further claims the right to receive, and ever since said 9th day of February, 1897, has been receiving the salary and emoluments provided by law as compensation for the judge of the court of insolvency in said county of Cuyahoga, and the said county has been and now is subjected to large outlays and expenses in preparing a proper court room, books, stationery, clerks and constables for the conduct and maintenance of said court.
And the court is further informed and given to know that said defendant, Joseph C. Bloch, has usurped, entered into and unlawfully holds said office of the judge of the court of insolvency within and for said county of Cuyahoga, and is unlawfully exercising and claiming the right to exercise the aforesaid powers, and each of them, because, as plaintiff avers, the said act purporting to create a court of insolvency within and- for said county of Cuyahoga, and the office of judge of said court within said county, and conferring certain jurisdiction upon said court, and certain judicial and other powers upon said judge, are in violation of the provisions of the constitution of the state of Ohio, especially of section 26 of article 2, which provides that all laws, of a general nature, shall have a uniform operation throughout the state; and of sections 7 and 8 of article 4 of the constitution which permit but one probate court to be established in any county, and confers exclusive jurisdiction upon such probate court in probate and testamentary matters, and the appointment and settlement of accounts of adminisrators, executors and guardians; and of section 10 of article 4 of the constitution Avhich makes the existence of a judicial district a prerequisite to the election of a judge other than those provided for in said constitution, and of section 1 of article 4 of the constitution Avhick in its present amended form does not except the creation of courts from the operation of section 26 of article 2 of the constitution, and of section 2 of article 10 of the constitution which restricts the term of county officers to a period of three years.
SECOND CAUSE OF, ACTION.
Said relator further informs and gives the court to understand that on the 17th day of March, 1898, the general assembly of the state of Ohio passed an act entitled “An act conferring additional jurisdiction on the courts of insolvency in any county containing a city of the second grade of the first class,” printed in volume 93 of page 464 of Ohio laws, that the defendant, Joseph C. Bloch, ever since the passage of said act has been- unlawfully claiming that said court of insolvency has power to entertain, and that he, as judge of said court, has the right and power to hear and determine error cases from justices of the peace, and cases appealed to said court of insolvency from justices of the peace, in said. county of Cuyahoga, and also cases appealed to the court of common pleas in said county and transferred by said court to said court of insolvency, and has been unlawfully exercising the power to entertain, hear and determine such cases in said county; but plaintiff avers that said act is in violation of the above recited provisions of the constitution of Ohio, and especially of section 26 of article 2, for the reason that said act purports to confer a jurisdiction and power upon justices of the peace, judges of the court of common pleas, and the circuit court in said county of Cuyahoga which is not conferred upon like officers and courts in other counties of the state.
THIRD CAUSE OP ACTION.
The relator further informs the court that the act last above referred to is void and of no effect, because, while it purports to confer jurisdiction on said court of insolvency to entertain appeals directly from justices of the peace, there exist no statutes providing a mode for perfecting appeals to said court of insolvency from justices of the peace.
FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION.
Said relator further informs and gives the court to understand that on the 16th day of April, 1900, the general assembly of the state of Ohio passed an act entitled “An act conferring concurrent jurisdiction in certain matters upon courts of insolvency,” printed in volume 94, on page 353 of Ohio Laws, which purports to confer upon said court of insolvency concurrent jurisdiction with the probate court, and with the court of common pleas in certain cases therein enumerated, and to provide for appeals from said court of insolvency to the court of common pleas and circuit court of said county in such cases; and plaintiff avers that the defendant, Joseph C. Bloch, claims the right as judge of said court of insolvency, to exercise, and ever since the passage of said act has been unlawfully exercising the powers and jurisdiction which said act purports to confer upon said court of insolvency, and upon the judge of said court; but plaintiff avers that said act is in violation of section 26 of article 2 of the constitution of the state of Ohio in this, that it purports to confer jurisdiction on the court of common pleas and circuit court of said county of Cuyahoga other than is conferred upon those courts in other counties of the state.
Wherefore your relator prays that said defendant be required to answer by what warrant he holds, uses,; exercises and enjoys,, or claims to hold, use, exercise and enjoy said office of judge of the court of insolvency for said county of Cuyahoga, and why he uses or exercises the powers hereinbefore set forth, or any of them, and that said defendant may be ousted therefrom; and for all other proper relief.”
The three statutes whose constitutional validity is called in question, were passed, respectively, March 11, 1896 (92 O. L., 475, 478); March 17, 1898 (93 O. L., 464), and April 16, 1900 (94 O. L., 353). It is not deemed necessary to copy them here. The first of the acts establishes a court of insolvency in counties containing a city of the second grade of the first class (Cuyahoga county), provides for the election of a judge of that court, prescribes his term of office, and confers on the court jurisdiction of all assignments under the insolvency laws, and of certain other matters. Each of the other two statutes purports to confer additional jurisdiction on the court. The objections made to these statutes will be noticed in the opinion.
J. M. Sheets, Attorney General, and Blandin, Bice & Ginn, for plaintiff.
That the determination of the constitutionality or unconstitutionality of this kind of statutes is difficult is evidenced from the utterances of the different members of this court, as differently constituted from time to time during the last thirty or forty years, and also from the fact that the court in these eases has from time to time been aided by the eminent lawyers of the state, and that yet in Mott v. Hubbard, 59 Ohio St., 199, the learned counsel were unable to extract from the multitude of such cases already determined a governing principle to assist the court in knowing when a statute is or is not in harmony with this requirement of the constitution.
In view of this situation, we have felt that any efforts we might put forth along the line of the citation of cases already decided, and any attempt to extract therefrom a governing principle of decision that might control the case at bar, would not lighten the labors of the court in reaching a correct decision.
However difficult it may be to discover and clearly state a principle that will uniformly guide to a correct determination, and. that would enable both the legislature and the courts to understand and apply this provision of the constitution (that all laws of a general nature shall ' have uniform operation throughout the state), it is certainly of very great importance that it should be done if possible.
No one can doubt, and everyone regrets that almost hopeless complexity lias wrought itself into the statute law of the state in, the effort to obey, upon the one hand, and to evade upon the other, this salutary provision.
This provision was ingrafted into the constitution as the result of, and designed to be a cure for, a series of flagrant evils that had arisen under the constitution of 1802, which was recognized everywhere, and universally deplored. No one can doubt that the men who framed the new constitution recognized the existence of these evils, and believed they had provided in the new constitution protection against their recurrence, and also that they had put the remedy into unmistakably clear, distinct and explicit terms. It may be a matter of curious speculation, therefore, to consider how it. lias happened that this salutary remedy for serious ills has failed of its evident object, but on the contrary, after a long series of years, and a multitude of decisions upon the subject, the matter is in such a state of uncer' tainty and doubt as to be equally perplexing both to the courts and to the legislature, and our statute books are full of laws of doubtful constitutionality.
Under the constitution of 1802, the legislature, the courts, and the people had all become accustomed to special legislation, and the evils resulting therefrom. The evils were evident to all and regretted by all. The elimination of this evil was one of the chief ends, if not the chief end, designed to be accom plished in adopting the new constitution. But the old habits of thought with respect to special and class legislation which had grown up in fifty years under the old constitution, could not be eradicated as quickly as the words of the constitution could be changed. The words of the constitution prohibiting this class legislation were, indeed, changed, but the habits of thought that had developed under old regime remained. They were not to be so summarily disposed of or altered.
The new legislature went at once to work under the influence of the old and fixed habit and mode of thought, and the way was not at once clear to them, how this new principle of general laws -was to be correctly applied to all the many subjects of legislation that were to be dealt with.
Almost immediately the subject of classification of cities and villages came before the legislature to be acted upon; and although the new constitution had expressly required their organization by “general laws” which should “have uniform operation throughout the state,” it was not easily apparent to them, how this was practicable or possible. They conceived the notion that topographical differences, differences in population, and perhaps other differing conditions, rendered it indispensably necessary for different legislation in the “organization” of different cities, and that some device was therefore necessary, to give to this different legislation (which they deemed necessary) the appearance of being a general law and of having apparent uniform operation throughout the state, while in fact it should be a local law and of strictly local and limited application. It may be conceded that at first,- it was not designed by the legislature to evade the constitu' tional requirement; but they did not readily see how; it was practicable to obey it. However this may have been at first, it is now evident to all that a device, adopted at first, perhaps, as a result of a belief that it was necessary, has been since repeatedly employed to effect legislation that was clearly forbidden.
The method employed was to classify cities and villages, fixing the class according to population, and then legislating for cities or villages of a designated class, and by this device pretend to comply with the constitutional requirement of uniformity throughout the state; although it was plain to everyone that the uniformity of operation was throughout the class, rather than throughout the state. It was speciously claimed, however, that this uniformity throughout the class, was necessarily uniformity throughout the state.
This classification, as already stated, was doubtless, at first, resorted to, in view of a supposed necessity. By the careful students of the subject, however, it is now known that there is not, and there never was any such necessity. General laws for the organization of cities and villages, as required by the constitution, having uniform operation throughout the state, are now known to be both practicable and eminently desirable.
When these laws came before the Supreme Court for judgment as to their constitutionality, we may presume that the judges acquiesced in the supposed necessity which the legislature had fancied they saw, and the first fatal step was taken of upholding the classification as being a necessity, and the uniformity throughout the class, was allowed to answer the constitutional requirement of uniformity throughout the state.
When the attitude of the” Supreme Court toward this species of laws was established, and the principle of stare decisis invoked successfully to prevent the court from retracing its steps, then the extension of the scheme began. Territorial classification was continued and extended, for almost numberless purposes. Counties, containing a city or village of a designated grade or class, were made victims of local laws for various purposes: Jury commissions differently chosen and differently constituted were provided for in counties containing a city or village of a 'particular grade or class. Assessors were provided to be designated by appointment by the auditor in counties containing a city of a given grade or class. Roads, county buildings, bridges, school boards, equalization boards, and various other subjects were treated and governed by laws of uniform operation throughout a designated class of counties, when in fact there was only one such county. If the classification of municipalities was not yet fine enough to successfully limit the operation of the law to one county, some artful dodge was sufficient to exclude all but one county.
Some of these laws brought before the Supreme Court, have met a varying fate. Some have been held void, and others valid. This court in its evident desire to give effect to the purpose of the constitutional provision, has sought to discover a test by which to determine when a law was of a “general nature,” so that it must be uniform throughout the state in its operation. If a given law is not embraced within the description of being of a “general nature,” the requirement of uniform operation throughout the state has no application to it. The court has reached the conclusion (Hixson v. Burson, 54 Ohio St., 470) that every law must he either of a “general nature” or of a local nature. It has repeatedly said that this “nature,” whether general or local, must be determined by the subject matter, and not by the operation given by the act itself (as being of local or universal operation). If the subject matter is general, then making it local in its operation instead of making it valid as a local law, makes it void. So the court is evidently seeking a rule by which to determine when it may be clearly and certainly and always known, by the inspection of an act, whether it has, or does not have, for its subject matter a matter of general as distinguished from local significance.
It would seem, therefore, that if it could be cleai’ly, and certainly, and always known, whether the subject matter of a law was “local” or “general,” its operation could be, as clearly, as certainly, and as uniformly, known to be prescribed by the constitutional provision in question; those thus found to be local might have local operation only and be valid; all others must have uniform operation throughout the state, or be void.
No law will ever be uniform in its operation throughout the state, which operates in only a part of the state, although it may operate throughout an artificial class of territory; and any declaration either legislative or judicial, which declares a law to have uniform operation throughout the state, which operates only in part of the state, can never be satisfactorily supported by any logic or argument, until logic and argument can change falsity into truth. Logic and argument may be so skillfully used as sometimes to conceal the truth and so to mislead, but they can never alter the foundations of truth.
This court has said, and doubtless correctly said, that all laws might be classified as “general” or “local.” To say that this could not be done, would be to say that the constitution is incapable of interpretation, and therefore that its provisions could not be enforced. This would be manifestly absurd.
If then laws are either, general or local, and if it is difficult to define the former, can “general” laws be certainly and definitely known by the principle of exclusion?
If law.s are either general or local, then if we can know that a given law is, or is not, local, by that same token we may know that it is, or is not, general.
This court has said, in Hixson v. Burson, 54 Ohio St., 470, 481, that “If the subject (of a given law) does or may exist in, and affect the people of every county in the state, it is of a general nature. On the contrary, if the subject cannot exist in, or affect the people of every county, it is local or special.”
Plainly, then, the character, of the law, as general or local, cannot be determined by any words in the law that restrict its operation. To permit such restrictive words in the law to control its character as general or special, would be to permit the legislature to defeat the constitutional requirement of uniformity.
If the law, in the language of this court above quoted, relates to a subject which cannot exist in any other than the designated locality, plainly it is a local law. Such a law prescribing the boundaries of a special school district, was sustained by this court in State v. Shearer, 46 Ohio St., 275. Fixing by law the boundaries of one of the school districts of the state could not be done by a general law, or by a law that would operate uniformly throughout the state. It would be a local law, and no art or artifice could make it a general law or give it uniform operation throughout the state. It was.a law upon a subject “which cannot exist in or affect the people of” any other locality, and therefore in the language of the court in Hixson v. Burson, supra, was “local” and valid.
In State v. Shearer, 46 Ohio St., 275, the court distinguishes between a “school district” and “a school system,” and considers the former a proper matter for local legislation, and the latter a proper matter for general legislation. The former could not be general, and just as certainly the latter could not, under the constitution, be governed by a local law.
Here, in our opinion, the court has recognized the principle which will give a rational and satisfactory application of this clause of the constitution. Any law which in its nature could not apply except locally may be enacted as a local law without any specious words seeming to make it uniform throughout the state. Every other law must be a general law and operate throughout the state, or it will be void.
P. H. Kaiser, county solicitor, and Frederick L. Taft, assistant county solicitor for Cuyahoga county, for defendant,
submitted a brief consisting mainly of a very complete and scholarly history of the powers and plan of our state judiciary. They cited the following cases: District Court Judges, In re. 34 Ohio St., 431; Cass v. Dillon, 2 Ohio St., 607; Lehman v. McBride, 15 Ohio St., 573; Indiana v. Milliken, 7 Ohio St., 383; State v. Archibald, 52 Ohio St., 1; Meyer v. Dempsey, 62 Ohio St., 637; State v. Ellet, 47 Ohio St., 90; Hixson v. Burson, 54 Ohio St., 470; Mott v. Hubbard, 59 Ohio St., 199; State v. Buckley, 60 Ohio St., 273; State v. Cincinnati, 52 Ohio St., 419.
Gideon C. Wilson, county solicitor; Otway J. Cos-grave and Oliver B. Jones, assistant county solicitors of Hamilton county, Ohio, for defendant.
During the half century that has elapsed since the adoption of our present constitution, no law has been passed establishing a general court throughout the whole state in addition to those named by the constitution. But the power to establish other courts has been continuously construed by the legislature and by the courts to authorize the establishment of numerous local courts, which have been provided to supply local needs.
The,superior court of Cincinnati as it existed prior to the constitution of 1851, having ended its existence in 1853, a new court of the same name was created April 7, 1854, and has since existed to the present time. It is provided by chapter 4, title 4, part 1, of the Revised Statutes (sections 482-503). Its territorial limits are confined to the city of Cincinnati, and the judges are elected by the electors of that municipality, the city and county being named by name in the act providing for the court. It has a large concurrent civil jurisdiction with the court of common pleas, cases going on error from the special to the general term, and from the general term on error direct to the Supreme Court.
By the act of April 18, 1893, 90 O. L., 191, the general term of this court was abolished, and it was provided that appeal and error should lie from its special term to the circuit court. This act was abolished May 16, 1894, 91 O. L., 276, and the gen eral term was restored, and it was further provided that in this county a judge of the common pleas court should have the power to sit in general term in the place of any judge of the superior court who was disqualified by reason of having heard the ease at nisi prius.
These acts have not at any time withdrawn any jurisdiction from the common pleas court, but it might be claimed, as in the case at bar, that they changed the jurisdiction of the circuit court in 1893 and 1894. The same objection made by relator to the court of insolvency would apply with equal force to the superior court of Cincinnati, especially since 1883, when the language of section 1, article 4, was changed. But it can not be claimed that any of these acts with reference to this superior court are invalid, for the judgments of its general term and of the circuit court on error or appeal from the special term have been affirmed on numerous occasions by the Supreme Court. Indiana v. Milliken 7 Ohio St., 383.
A superior court was also established for Montgomery county in 1856, for Franklin county in 1857, and for Greene county at an early day. These courts were in existence for some time, and their constitutionality was never questioned. The laws creating them have now all been repealed.
Those acts are a legislative interpretation oí the constitution at a time when the whole subject was fresh in the minds of the people.
The only limitation specified in section 1, article 4, as to “other courts,” which it authorizes the general assembly to establish, is that they should be “inferior to the Supreme Court.” And the use of the words “from time to time” clearly indicate that local courts were thus provided for, showing that one local court after another might he provided by law from time to time, as the needs for them successively arose. Section 10, article 4.
This section, it will be observed, applies only to judges other than those named in the constitution; that is, it appears only to judges of courts created by the general assembly.
• The judges of the courts established by the constitution are elected under the provisions of other sections; the judges of the Supreme Court by the electors of the state at large (section 2); the judges of the common pleas court by the electors of the respective subdivision of the common pleas districts (section 3); the judges of the circuit court by the electors of each circuit (section 6); the judges of the probate court by the voters of the county (section 7); and the justices of the peace by the electors of each township (section 9).
A distinction has been drawn between the other courts authorized to be established by the general assembly under this section and’those created by the constitution in the case of State v. Wright, 7 Ohio St., 333. Flinn had been elected as judge of the criminal court of Cincinnati for a term of five years from February, 1852. The legislature afterwards abolished that court, by repealing the act under which it was created. Flinn brought suit in mandamus for the payment of his salary, claiming, under section 15, article 4, that his office could not be abolished. The court held that the constitution did not limit the power of the legislature to abolish courts created by it, nor to vacate the office of a judge of such court. This court was a local court of criminal jurisdiction for Hamilton county, and was pro vided by the act printed in 50 O. L., 90. The Supreme Court raised no question as to the constitutionality of such criminal court, but held that while a two-thirds vote was required to establish such a court, a majority vote was sufficient to abolish it. The fifth section of said act gave the criminal court full and complete jurisdiction of all crimes, offenses and misdemeanors such as the common pleas court had in other counties of the state in like cases, and provided that the court of common pleas in Hamilton county should have no concurrent jurisdiction of such cases with said criminal court. Kelley v. State, 6 Ohio St., 269.
The jurisdiction of the probate court is fixed by section 8, article 4, in which, after enumerating their jurisdiction in probate and testamentary matters, they are given “such other jurisdiction, in any county or counties, as may be provided by law.” Under this section laws have been enacted conferring different jurisdiction both in criminal and civil matters on probate courts of the different counties in the state. Sections 525-1, 6454, 6464, Revised Statutes. The phrase “in any county or counties” has been construed by the Supreme Court as being enabling rather than restrictive language.
Immediately upon the first creation of an insolvency court in this state, that of Hamilton county, the law was brought under review by the Supreme Court in State v. Archibald, 52 Ohio St., 1.
This question has again been before the Supreme Court, and has been decided adversely to the position of the relator in Meyer v. Dempsey, 62 Ohio St., 637. There the act of April 25, 1898, 93 O. L., 669, was rightly held to be obnoxious to section 26, article 2, for the reason that its effect was to impair the jur isdiction of the court of common pleas in Hamilton county, and to thus affect the uniformity of the jurisdiction of that court throughout the state, and the rule laid down in Kelley v. State, 6 Ohio St., 269, was followed. This case only went to the jurisdiction of the court, the court holding that entire act, including the repealing section, to be unconstitutional, thus reinstating the old law attempted to be repealed thereby and recognizing the insolvency court to be a constitutional court.
Thus the Hamilton county insolvency court law has been twice before the Supreme Court, and has been sustained each time. The law under consideration in this case is practically the same as the Hamilton county law, having been modeled upon it, and passed at the succeeding session of the general assembly.
The language of this act provides a court of insolvency “in counties contaihing a city of the second grade of the first class.” Such a classification of counties has been reprobated by the Supreme Court (59 Ohio St., 210). Our contention is, that the act being a local one, might as ' well have named Cuyahoga county in terms as-to describe it in the manner in which it was described. The subject matter of the act, however, is, as we have attempted to show, not general in its nature, but local, providing a court for the local needs of a particular district created by the act, to-wit, Cuyahoga county, and any other county that in the future might contain a city of the second grade of the first class within its borders would be able to avail itself of the privileges of such a court.
The objections to the constitutionality of laws under section 26, article 2, have been so often before the courts of late, that it is not necessary to review the decisions. But even if it should be decided that there 'is a conflict in terms between' that section and sections 1 and 15 of article 4, there is no reason why the former should dominate the latter, but on the contrary, under the rules of construction the specific authority granted by the latter sections to establish courts would prevail. Sutherland on Statutory Construction, section 217.
The same rules obtain in ‘ the construction of the constitution as of statutes. The constitution must be construed to harmonize with itself and give effect to every provision. Hill v. Higdon, 5 Ohio St., 243; Wilcox v. Nolze, 34 Ohio St., 520; Lehman v. McBride, 15 Ohio St., 573; Cass v. Dillon, 2 Ohio St., 607.
In no case that we have been able to find has the provision in section 26, article 2, been applied to an act establishing a court. Nor does that section require that all enactments of the legislature shall be of a general nature. Nor does it prohibit the passage of appropriate local laws. State v. Covington, 29 Ohio St., 102.
A law is not necessarily of a general' nature because it is upon a ¡general subject or because the result might have been reached by a general law, so the formation of a special school district has been held valid. State v. Shearer, 46 Ohio St., 275.
The matter of jury trial is clearly of a general nature, and yet special methods of securing juries, differing in different counties, are sustained. McGill v. State, 34 Ohio St., 228; State v. Kendle, 52 Ohio St., 346; Silberman v. Hay, 59 Ohio St., 582.
The amount of compensation for county or local officers has been held to be local in its nature. Cricket v. State, 18 Ohio St., 9; State v. Judges, 21 Ohio St., 1; Hart v. Murray, 48 Ohio St., 605; Pearson v. Stephens, 56 Ohio St., 126.
The act requiring screens for protection of electric street car motormen, making no provision for cable roads or drivers of horse cars or other vehicles was held constitutional in State v. Nelson, 52 Ohio St., 88; Adler v. Whitbeck, 44 Ohio St., 539; Senior v. Ratterman, 44 Ohio St., 661; State v. Turnpike Co., 37 Ohio St., 481.
The Supreme Court of Kansas has sustained an act creating two city courts in Kansas city township, Wyandotte county, Kansas, and defining the jurisdiction thereof, and the powers and duties of the officers thereof, and limiting the jurisdiction of the justices of the peace in said-township. Greer, In re., 58 Kan., 268, and a similar act creating a city court in the city of Topeka, 61 Kan., 94.
And the United States circuit court, in considering the constitutionality of the Kansas court of visitation in Western Union Tel. Co. v. Myatt, 98 Fed. Rep., section 335, recognize the power to create such a' court for the exercise of judicial but not legislative or administrative functions.
In Minnesota, with a similar constitutional provision as to the establishment of courts inferior to the Supreme Court (article 6, section 1), and more stringent and extended provisions prohibiting special legislation (article 3, sections 33 and 34), the Supreme Court has sustained the establishment of a municipal court of Minneapolis, which restricted the jurisdiction of justices of the peace, in Bruke v. Railway Co., 35 Minn., 172.

Opinion:
Williams, J.
The cause of the relator is placed in the argument entirely upon the ground that the first of the statutes referred to in the statement of the case is in conflict with section 26 of article 2 of the constitution; and that statute, which provides for the creation of the court of insolvency, being invalid, as stated, the invalidity of the other two statutes which attempt to confer certain jurisdiction on that court, it is claimed must follow. But, if the first act be held constitutional, then counsel say that "any reasoning leading up to that conclusion would equally justify the conferring of particular jurisdiction upon a court created thereby so long as the jurisdiction thus conferred was not so exclusive as to be an invasion of the concurrent jurisdiction of the court of common pleas in the county where the court exists, and we perceive no reason of either law or policy which would require the insolvency court to be curtailed of any jurisdiction mentioned in the statutes assailed in the various causes of action in the petition."
Accepting that view, it is unnecessary to enlarge the report of the case beyond a consideration of the particular question so presented. No specific provision of the statute is relied on.more than any other as raising the alleged conflict with the constitution. The objection made is a general one, namely, that being local in its operation, it undertakes to provide for the establishment of a court, which, it is claimed, is a subject of a general nature, and upon which legislation is forbidden that is not available and operative alike in all parts of the state. The inquiry here may be further reduced by the concession that the statute is limited in its operation to a single county. That section 26 of article 2 of the constitution imposes a limitation upon the legislative power conferred by section 1 of that article, is not disputed. But, by section T of article 4, there is a special grant of legislative power upon a particular subject, which itself prescribes the rule for the government of the legislative body in the exercise of that power. It provides that: "The judicial power of the state is vested in a Supreme Court, circuit courts, courts of common pleas, courts of probate, justices of the peace, and such other courts inferior to the Supreme Court, as the general assembly may from time to time establish." The power is here undoubtedly granted to the general assembly to create courts other than those enumerated in the section; and the material inquiry is, what other courts may be so created? The answer is found in the language of the section, which is, "such" other courts "as the general assembly may from time to time establish." That language vests in that body full power to determine what other courts it will establish, local, if deemed proper, either for separate counties or districts, and to define their jurisdiction and powers. The only limitation placed upon the exercise of that power is that the courts so established shall be inferior to the Supreme Court, subject, of course, to the further qualification that no legislation can alter the judicial system established by the constitution, nor interfere with the courts designated by that instrument as the recipients of the judicial power. Apparently there could, have been but one purpose in making this special grant of legislative power, and that was to enable the general assembly to meet, the public needs for additional courts, as they might arise in different parts of the state. It is hardly probable that it was considered or contemplated that the same necessities in that respect would arise at the same time in all parts of the state. Hence, the power was given to establish these additional courts from time to time, as in the opinion of the legislative body the public exigencies should appear to render necessary or proper. That such was the scope of the authority granted by this section prior to its amendment in 1883, was held in Steamboat v. Milliken, 7 Ohio St., 383, 387, and is not controverted by counsel. The original section reads as follows: "The judicial power of the state is vested in a Supreme Court, in district courts, courts of common pleas, courts of probate, justices of the peace, and such other courts, inferior to the Supreme Court, in one or more counties, as the general assembly may, from time to time, establish." In the amended section circuit courts were substituted for district courts, and the words "in one or more counties," were omitted. That omission, it is urged, deprived the legislature of the power theretofore possessed by it to create any local court. The conclusion doés not follow.. As has already been noticed, the power to create "such" courts inferior to the Supreme Court, as the general assembly may from time to time establish, includes the necessary power to determine what courts of that kind shall be so established. That power was not enlarged by the presence in the original section, of the words "in one or more counties." It had been claimed prior to the amendment that those words operated as a restraint on the power of the legislature to determine the character of the courts that could be established, to the extent, at least, that they should be coextensive in jurisdiction with the territorial boundaries of a county. Steamboat v. Milliken, supra. That claim was not sustained. And, since the words neither enlarge nor circumscribe the discretionary power of the general assembly, their retention in the amendment would accomplish no purpose.
The question here determined was not raised in State v. Archibald, 52 Ohio St., 1. For that reason that case cannot be regarded as an authority in the present case. The statute there passed upon and sustained related to the court of insolvency of Hamilton county, and the objection made to it was that it was in conflict with section 8 of article 4 of the constitution. Similar provisions contained in the statutes involved in the case now before us are assailed on the same ground; and upon the question raised in the relator's petition with respect to those provisions the former case is applicable by analogy, in so far as the objections made to them are the same as those determined in that case.
It may be proper to correct here a misapprehension which appears to have, arisen in regard to the unreported case of Meyer v. Dempsey, 62 Ohio St., 637. It was not decided in that case that the act establishing the court of insolvency of Hamilton county was in violation of section 26 of article 2 of the constitution. The act there in question (93 O. L., 669) was an amendment to the act creating that, court, and it attempted to confer exclusive jurisdiction on that court of various matters within the jurisdiction of the court of common pleas. It was that feature of the statute, which, it was held, rendered it unconstitutional, leaving the original act creating the court, unaffected.
Demurrer sustained and^petition dismissed.
Minshall, C. J., Burket and Davis, JJ., concur. Shauck, J., dissents.