Case Name: ALFRED SHRIMPTON & SONS, Limited, v. ESCHWEGE
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1896-11-13
Citations: 41 N.Y.S. 966
Docket Number: 
Parties: ALFRED SHRIMPTON & SONS, Limited, v. ESCHWEGE.
Judges: 
Reporter: West's New York Supplement
Volume: 41
Pages: 966–970

Head Matter:
(10 App. Div. 56.)
ALFRED SHRIMPTON & SONS, Limited, v. ESCHWEGE.
(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department.
November 13, 1896.)
Contracts—Fraud jn Procurement—Estoppel to Claim.
Plaintiff’s agent procured from defendant an order for one great gross of pins, with an advertisement to be printed on each paper. Plaintiff wrote to defendant, acknowledging order for “one great gross of pins,” and inclosed a copy of the proposed advertisement, with request to “check carefully, * * * making any desired changes.” Defendant replied that everything was correct. Held, that defendant was estopped to claim that the order was procured by fraud, under the belief that it was for one gross. O’Brien and Patterson, JJ., dissenting.
Appeal from trial term, New York county.
Action by Alfred Shrimpton & Sons, Limited, against Simon Eschwege, for the proceeds of goods sold. A judgment in favor of plaintiffs was entered on a verdict directed by the court, and defendant appeals. Affirmed.
Argued before VAN BRUNT, P. J., and WILLIAMS, PATTERSON, O’BRIEN, and INGRAHAM, JJ.
Edward W. S. Johnston, for appellant.
George C. Coffin, for respondents.

Opinion:
VAN BRUNT, P. J.
This action was brought to recover for goods, wares, and merchandise, consisting of "one great gross of pins," with advertisements attached. The defendant, for answer, denied the sale and delivery of the goods, and alleged that the order for one great gross of pins was obtained by the agent of the plaintiffs through fraud or fraudulent concealment and misrepresentation. The question involved in the trial of the case was as to whether the defendant had ordered one gross of pins, or one great gross of pins. It appears that an order for one great gross of pins was signed by the defendant, and given to the agent of the plaintiffs, on or about the 14th of February, 1893; that he turned in the order to the plaintiffs, who, upon the 17th of February, mailed to the defendant a letter in which they acknowledged the receipt of his order given to their salesman for one great gross of pins, to be put up in the manner described in said letter as soon as they could prepare the goods, with the defendant's name and special advertising matter printed thereon, and then follows the printed matter which was to go on the papers in which the pins were to be put up. The letter concludes: "Please check this all over carefully, making any changes or corrections you desire, and, if O. K,, please sign and return to us by first mail in the inclosed stamped envelope, and we will proceed with the order." At the bottom of this letter the defendant signed the following statement: "We have checked this all over carefully, and find it to be correct in every particular. Dated February 23, 1893." This was mailed to the plaintiffs, who thereupon proceeded to complete the goods necessary for the order, and shipped the same after they had been prepared for delivery, to the defendant, who refused to receive the same. The evidence upon the part of the agent of the plaintiffs was that there was a conversation between himself and the defendant as to whether one gross of pins or one great gross should be ordered. The defendant objected at first to one great gross, but, when he was told that the plaintiffs would not print his advertising matter upon a smaller order, he finally consented, and gave the order for one great gross. The defendant insisted that the conversation was as to one gross or half a gross; that he only wanted to order half a gross; and that, upon being told that they would not fill an order except for a gross, he presumed he was signing an order for a gross. A saleswoman of the defendant, of the name of Mattie Goose, corroborated him to a slight extent. She did not hear the whole of the conversation, but testified that there was a conversation between the defendant and the plaintiffs' salesman as to one gross or half a gross. She did not see the order signed or witness the circumstances under which it was done.
Upon the conclusion of the evidence, the court directed a verdict for the plaintiffs, and in this, I think, there was no error. It appears from the evidence that, after receipt of the order by the plaintiffs, they sent to the defendant a statement of what the order was, before they proceeded to complete the manufacture of the goods, which goods were to be put up in a special way, which could be used for no person except the defendant. The defendant replied that the order was correct in every particular, and they thereupon went on and manufactured the goods. It seems to me that it is too late now for the de fendant to say that he did not read the order. Before he approved of it, and stated it to be correct in every particular, he was bound to read it; and, if he did not, the plaintiffs cannot be called upon to sustain the loss occasioned by his negligence. Where the defendant represents that he has seen, and the party acts upon the faith of his having seen, he cannot be heard afterwards to say, "Although I said I saw I did not." It would certainly put a stop to all business transactions if, after the delivery of the ratification over one's own signature of an order to which his attention is especially directed, a seller could not rely upon the representations of a purchaser that the order was correct in every particular.
The judgment should be affirmed, with costs.
INGRAHAM, J., concurs. WILLIAMS, J., concurs in result.