Case Name: Leon Cook v. The State
Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1920-12-08
Citations: 88 Tex. Crim. 659
Docket Number: No. 6012
Parties: Leon Cook v. The State.
Judges: 
Reporter: Texas Criminal Reports
Volume: 88
Pages: 659–665

Head Matter:
Leon Cook v. The State.
No. 6012.
Decided December 8, 1920.
Rehearing Denied March 16, 1921.
1. —Rape—Sufficiency of the Evidence.
Where, upon trial of rape upon a female under the age of consent, the evidence supported a conviction under a proper charge of the court, there is no reversible error.
2. —Same—Evidence—Flight—Examining Trial—Harmless Error—Bail.
XTpon trial of rape upon a female under the age of consent, there was no error in permitting proof that at an examining trial the defendant was held under bail to await the action of the grand jury; that while there was no forfeiture of the bail bond, the defendant. did not appear upon the return of an indictment against him, but went to a point in the State of Kansas and was there arrested; to show the flight of the defendant. Following Sorrell v. State, 74 Texas Crim. Rep., 505, 169 S. W. Rep., 104, and other cases; besides, if error, the same was harmless, as the.matter was proved by other evidence without objection.
3. —Same—Jury and Jury Law—Challenge for Cause.
Where, defendant complained that a certain juror had expressed an opinion and demanded to challenge him for cause, which the court overruled, and the juror was excused on peremptory challenge and it appeared that the defendant had failed to exhaust his challenges and that no improper or prejudiced juror was forced upon him, there was no reversible error. Following Carter v. State, 45 Texas Crim. Rep., 433, and other cases.
4. —Same—Evidence—Impeaching Witness—Declarations of Prosecutrix.
Where, upon trial of rape, defendant’s witness testified that the prosecutrix told him at the house of the mother of a certain State’s witness, that the latter was the cause of her pregnancy, and that defendant’s witness had told said' mother, there was no error in permitting the State to place said mother upon the witness stand and have her deny this matter, contradicting the said defendant’s witness.
5. —Same—Rehearing—Evidence—Flight—Examining Trial—Bail Bond—Rule Stated.
Without exception, the rule is that the efforts of one who is accused of crime to evade arrest or trial are available to the State as circumstances against him, and proof that there was a failure to appear in accord with a bail bond or recognizance is admissible in evidence against the accused, and this may be shown, as in the instant case, that the examining court had required bail, and that the defendant did not appear upon- the return of an indictment against him, but left for another State and was there arrested; and this, although there was no forfeiture of the bail bond. Following Brown v. State, 57 Texas Crim. Rep., 572, and other cases.
6. —Same—Sufficiency of the Evidence.
Where, upon trial of rape of a female under the age of consent, the evidence was sufficient to support, although based principally upon prosecutrix testimony, the conviction, ther'e was .no reversible error.
7. —game—Rule Stated—Prosecutrix—Rape—Sufficiency of the Evidence.
The decisions of this court are uniform in holding that verdicts for rape may be sustained by the testimony of prosecutrix under the age of consent. Following Donley v. State, 44 Texas Crim. Rep., 429, and other cases, and we know of no precedent that will warrant this court in holding that the evidence in this case is so intrinsically weak as to render it insufficient to support the verdict of the jury, and the judgment of conviction must be confirmed.
Appeal from the Criminal District Court of Dallas. Tried below before the Honorable C. A. Pippen.
Appeal from a conviction of rape upon a female under the age of consent; penalty, eight years imprisonment in the penitentiary.
The opinion states the case.
Mount & Newberry, and Stroud & Dailey, for appellant.
On question of introducing evidence that examining magistrate fixed bail-and defendant had not appeared upon return of the indictment: Richardson v. State, 9 Texas Crim. App., 618; Thompson v. State, 21 id., 141; Bennett v. State, 39 Texas Crim. Rep., 369.
Alvin M. Owsley, Assistant Attorney General, for the State.

Opinion:
MORROW, Judge.
The conviction is for rape, and punishment fixed at confinement in the penitentiary for a period of eight years. The prosecutrix was a girl under 'fifteen years of age. Her testimony, together with some corroborating circumstances, supports the State's case, and constitutes sufficient evidence to justify the conviction. No complaint is made of the charge of the court.
In Bills of Exceptions Nos. 1 and 2, complaint is made of the action of the court in permitting proof that at an examing trial the appellant was held under bail to await the action of the grand jury; that while there was no forfeiture of the bail bond, the appellant did not appear upon the return of an indictment against him, but went to a point in the • State of Kansas, and was there arrested. The trial court regarded this evidence as admissible as tending to establish flight. The decided cases appear to support the court's ruling. Sorrell v. State, 74 Texas Crim Rep., 505, 169 S. W. Rep., 304; Hart v. State, 22 Texas Crim. App., 567; Gent v. State, 57 Texas Crim. Rep., 414; Brown v. State, 57 Texas Crim. Rep., 570; Gilliland v. State, 24 Texas Crim. App., 528. In Sorrell's case it was held that the judgment of forfeiture would not have been admissible, but the fact of the absence of the accused, in •disobedience of his bail bond, was held admissible. If the correctness •of the ruling is questionable, it was harmless, for the reason that the appellant's witness Kennedy, on cross-examination, testified without objection: "Mr. Cook made bond after the examining trial. He then skipped, and went to Kansas. Mr. Seale brought him back to Dallas."
It is claimed that a juror, on his voir dire, admitted that if he was selected he would enter the jury box with "a feeling against the defendant." A challenge for cause was overruled, and the juror excused upon a peremptory challenge. The action of the court in refusing to sustain the challenge for cause, is complained of in a bill "which is qualified by the statement that the appellant failed to exhaust his challenges, and that no improper or prejudiced jurors were forced upon him. On.the subject, Mr. Branch, in his Ann. Texas Penal Code, sec. 543, states the rule:
"The refusal to sustain a good challenge for cause is not reversible error if the jurors subject to the challenge did not sit on the trial of the case and no other objectionable juror was forced on the defendant."
Loggins v. State, 12 Texas Crim. App., 72; Kramer v. State, 34 Texas Crim. Rep., 84; Carter v. State, 45 Texas Crim. Rep., 433. It has also been held that unless the bill of exc options shows that the de fendant exhausted his peremptory challenges, the point is not available on appeal. Burrell v. State, 18 Texas, 713, and other cases cited in Mr. Branch's work, in the section mentioned. See also Mays v. State, 50 Texas Crim. Rep., 170.
The prosecutrix testified that when she advised appellant of her pregnancy, he suggested that she "go with some other boy, and lay it on him." On the trial, he introduced the witness Maillot, a youth about seventeen years of age, who testified that in conversation with the injured girl she "said something to me about being pregnant; said I had something to do about it." On cross-examination he said that he related this to the appellant on the next day, appellant being connected with a stepfather of the witness in business. He also testified that he never had anything to do with the girl. On the issue thus made, appellant introduced the witness Henry Cook, who said that he talked with the prosecutrix, Ruby Mayben,. on the previous Fall, at the home of Mrs. Nitsche; that she told him that she was in a family way, and that Charley Maillot was the cause of it. It appears from the bill that he testified that he had related the matter to Mrs. Nitsche, who was the mother of Charley Maillot. The State subsequently called Mrs.' Nitsche, and she denied that Henry Cook had related the matter re-, ferred to to her. The action of the court in admitting this impeaching testimony is challenged upon the ground that it infringes the rule against impeaching a witness upon an immaterial matter. We are referred to no authorities supporting the view advanced by the appellant that the court's action was in violation of the rule stated. The witness having claimed that the admission by the State's witness, was made to him at the house of Maillot's mother, and that he discussed the matter with the mother, we think the bill does not show that the court committed error in receiving the mother's testimony contradicting the appellant's witness.
Finding no error in the record justifying a reversal, the judgment is ordered affirmed.
Affirmed.