Case Name: Joseph Betor, by Michael Betor, His Guardian ad Litem, Respondent, v. The City of Albany, Appellant
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1920-09-08
Citations: 193 A.D. 349
Docket Number: 
Parties: Joseph Betor, by Michael Betor, His Guardian ad Litem, Respondent, v. The City of Albany, Appellant.
Judges: 
Reporter: Appellate Division Reports
Volume: 193
Pages: 349–354

Head Matter:
Joseph Betor, by Michael Betor, His Guardian ad Litem, Respondent, v. The City of Albany, Appellant.
Third Department,
September 8, 1920.
Appeal — demurrer to defense tried as contested motion—order of County Court sustaining demurrer afiects substantial rights— judgment—when judgment in favor of landowner sued for , negligence is bar to subsequent action against city for allowing maintenance of nuisance.
An order of a County Court sustaining a plaintiff’s demurrer to a defense contained in an answer after a trial as a contested motion is appealable. The result of such motion is an order and not a judgment and said order afiects a substantial right.
Where a plaintiff who was injured by falling into a cellarway extending from the house line into the sidewalk was defeated upon .the merits in an action brought against the owner of the house, the judgment in said action is a bar to a subsequent action against the city for allowing the existence of such nuisance, where it is not claimed that the city created the nuisance and its liability is based only upon the fact that it permitted the nuisance to remain. Under the circumstances the owner of the house would be liable over to the city, and the judgment in his favor frees the city from liability.
Woodward, J., dissents, with opinion.
Appeal by the defendant, The City of Albany, from an order made at a Special Term of the County Court of the county of Albany and entered in the office of the clerk of the county of Albany on the 27th day of March, 1920, sustaining the plaintiff’s demurrer to the defense set forth in the fifth paragraph of defendant’s answer, upon the ground that said defense is insufficient in law on the face thereof.
The issue of law herein was brought on and tried as a contested motion pursuant to section 976 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
Arthur L. Andrews [John J. McManus of counsel], for the appellant.
Thomas F. Wilkinson, for the respondent.

Opinion:
John M. Kellogg, P. J.:
One O'Neill maintained a cellarway extending from the house line into the sidewalk, and a frame erection prevented pedestrians from falling into it from the side, or at one end; the other end apparently was open. It is claimed that the cellarway extending into the sidewalk was a nuisance and that the defendant is liable for the damages sustained by the plaintiff who, in using the sidewalk, fell into the cellarway. The answer alleges that the plaintiff had brought an action against O'Neill for the same injury, and had been defeated upon the merits, and that if the city was liable O'Neill would be liable over to it and, therefore, that the O'Neill judgment constituted a defense.
I think the order is appealable. A judgment of the County Court, to be appealable, must be final. (Code Civ. Proc. § 1340.) And clearly an interlocutory judgment is not a final judgment and, therefore, is not appealable. (Henn v. City of Mount Vernon, 190 App. Div. 533.) The question here does not relate to a judgment but to an order. The plaintiff brought the demurrer on for trial as a contested motion, and the result of the motion is an order and not a judgment. (National Park Bank v. Billings, 144 App. Div. 536; affd., 203 N. Y. 556.) The order contemplates no judgment upon it, but is a final determination that the alleged defense is without force. It, therefore, affects a substantial right. (See Code Civ. Proc. § 1342.)
It is not claimed that the city created the nuisance. It resulted from the acts of O'Neill, and any liability of this defendant is in permitting it to remain. The fault of O'Neill was the cause of the accident. The city was liable for permitting O'Neill's wrong to continue. Therefore, O'Neill would be liable over to the city, and the judgment in his favor frees the city from liability, as it cannot be liable if he is not. (Featherston v. N. & C. Turnpike, 71 Hun, 109; City of New York v. Hearst, 142 App. Div. 343; affd., 221 N. Y. 671; Pangburn v. Buick Motor Co., 211 id. 228.) I, therefore, favor a reversal.
All concur, except Woodward, J., who votes to dismiss the appeal, with an opinion.