Case Name: Clarence M. STAMP, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY, Defendant and Appellant
Court: Utah Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Utah
Decision Date: 1956-11-07
Citations: 5 Utah 2d 397
Docket Number: No. 8463
Parties: Clarence M. STAMP, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY, Defendant and Appellant.
Judges: WADE, J., concurs in result.
Reporter: Utah Reports, Second Series
Volume: 5
Pages: 397–407

Head Matter:
303 P.2d 279
Clarence M. STAMP, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY, Defendant and Appellant.
No. 8463.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Nov. 7, 1956.
Bryan P. Leverich, M. J. Bronson, A. U. Miner, Howard F.'Coray, Marvin J. Ber-toch, Salt Lake City; for appellant.
Rawlings, Wallace, Roberts & Black, Salt Lake City, for respondent.

Opinion:
WORTHEN, Justice.
Appeal from a judgment on a verdict for plaintiff. Plaintiff sustained injury to his eyes and the only matter on appeal questions whether the verdict was, as a matter of law, so excessive as to indicate that the same was given under the influence of passion or prejudice, warranting either a new trial or a remission of part of the award conditioned on new trial if plaintiff refused to remit.
No issue is raised here on liability but only the amount of damages. This action arose under the Federal Employers' Liability Act.
On November 6, 1954, plaintiff, a brakeman for defendant, was injured when a signal torpedo exploded in his face. Blinded temporarily, his face appeared to be "perspiring blood" to quote one witness. Plaintiff was examined by an eye expert about nine hours after the injury. During that period plaintiff could distinguish the light of a match with his right eye only. After two days he could see with his right eye sufficiently to get around the hospital. On the third, he was unable to read a chart with his left eye. On the fourth day, the bandage was removed and plaintiff went home. He was discharged from the doctor's care on the 11th day and returned to work on the 12th. • During the first few days' he was off work the pain was quite intense but became progressively less during the balance of the off work period.
Plaintiff continued to suffer recurrent pain as particles which had been lodged in the eyeballs worked out. Such particles continued to work out till the time the case was tried about a year after the accident. He complained of headaches on sunny days when he didn't wear dark glasses. Plaintiff testified that he feared loss of his eyesight and that he worried, although he had not inquired of his doctors as to any justification for his fear.
Dr. Bascom W. Palmer, an eye specialist called as a witness by plaintiff, testified that he examined plaintiff on November 19, 1954, just 13 days after his injury. He testified that plaintiff's injuries were comparatively minor and that his sight was 20/20 without correction. He testified that he examined plaintiff again on September 27, 1955, the day before he testified; that in his opinion plaintiff was not in any danger; that the accident had not in any way impaired his vision, and that he so advised plaintiff at the time of his first examination 13 days after the accident, and that no damage was done to plaintiff's ability to see.
On the facts outlined above the jury awarded $12,500 damages, about $200 of which was for work lost. It deducted $2,- 500 on account of plaintiff's .contributory negligence.
The jury must necessarily have awarded plaintiff $12,300 for physical and mental pain and suffering. We have held that mere excessiveness of the verdict is not necessarily the standard for determining prejudice, although it might be.
We are convinced that the verdict here was most excessive. In fact, to suggest that such an award could be in any way remotely related to plaintiffs injury is to ignore facts. It is inconceivable that the jury could have made such an award under the facts here presented, without having been motivated by passion or prejudice. This court in the case of Wheat v. Denver & R. G. W. R. Co., speaking through Mr. Justice Crockett said:
"We do not doubt that when a verdict is so grossly disproportionate to any amount of damages which could have fairly been awarded as to make manifest that the verdict was so suffused with passion and prejudice that the defendant could not have had a fair trial on the issues, the trial court should unconditionally grant a new trial.
"Notwithstanding what was said therein, we regard the true rule to be that if the verdict is so excessive as to show that it must have been motivated by prejudice or ill will toward a litigant, or that passion such as anger, resentment, indignation or some kindred emotion has so overcome or distorted the jury's reason that the verdict is vindictive, vengeful or punitive, it should be unconditionally set aside."
Not every verdict that appears to be excessive will warrant a new trial or a reduction in the award, but the consideration which a court owes to a jury cannot be permitted to blind our eyes where the award can be accounted for only by the presence of passion or prejudice.
In the opinion of the writer, the verdict in this case would appear to have been arrived at only under the influence of passion and prejudice.
In the case of Pauly v. McCarthy, a case in which the admitted injuries were both severe and permanent, and well calculated to warrant the verdict, this court observed at page 436 of 109 Utah, and at page 126 of 184 P.2d:
"Where we can say, as a matter of law, that the verdict was so excessive as to appear to have been given under the influence of passion or prejudice, and the trial court abused its discretion or acted arbitrarily or capriciously in denying a motion for new trial, we may order the verdict set aside and a new trial granted."
Attention is called to the language of this court in that case as follows, at pages 434-436 of 109 Utah, and at page 125 of 184 P.2d:
" from the language used in these and other decisions, a view developed that this court was powerless to interfere with a jury verdict, no matter how outrageous. This view was exploded in the case of Jensen v. Denver and R. G. R. Co., 44 Utah 100, 138 P. 1185, 1192, where, after citing with approval many of the cases above cited, we said: 'Still the jury cannot be permitted to go unbridled and unchecked. Hence the Code that a new trial on motion of the aggrieved party may be granted by the court below on the ground of "excessive damages appearing to have been given under the influence of passion or prejudice." Whenever that is made to appear, the court, when its action is properly invoked, should require a remission or set the verdict aside and grant a new trial. " (Emphasis added.)
In our opinion it cannot be justly denied that the injuries suffered by the plaintiff in Duffy v. Union Pacific R. Co. were of much longer duration and well calculated to result in more permanent disability. Duffy, like Stamp, suffered extreme pain; he was off work three and one-half months compared to the 13 days that plaintiff in this case was off.
The jury awarded Duffy $12,500 and deducted the sum of $3,500 for plaintiff's contributory negligence, making the net verdict $9,000. This court, in ordering a new trial unless respondent within 15 days from the date of filing the opinion file a remitti-tur in the sum of $4,000 and accept a net verdict of $5,000, observed at page 91 of 118 Utah, at page 1084 of 218 P.2d:
"We must assume that the jury awarded plaintiff the sum of $1,300 for loss of wages, which were his only established special damages, and this leaves the sum of $11,200 for general damages. When we get in this domain reasonable minds might differ as to what amount is excessive. However, there must be a limit beyond which a reasonable jury cannot go and the limit must be determined on the gross amount of the verdict and not the net amount. Conceding that jurors in different states and counties have different monetary standards and different ideas as to the value of pain and suffering; that present day costs of living are com paratively high; that the purchasing power of the dollar' has decreased to approximately one-half of what it was some ten years ago; that we are seemingly in an inflationary spiral; and, that by all reasonable standards verdicts should be larger than they were at that period; we are, nevertheless, of the opinion in this case that the damages awarded by the jury have no foundation in fact, and are so grossly excessive and exorbitant as to convince the members of this Court that the verdict is far in excess of what a reasonable jury could determine as the maximum amount awardable for this type of injury. For these reasons it appears to us to have been given under the influence of passion and prejudice.
"Previously decided cases are of little value fixing present day standards or in assisting courts in determining excessive awards. Both the court and jury are required to deal with many unknown factors and a good guess is about the best that can be hoped for. The permissible minimum and maximum limits within which a jury may operate for a given injury are presently far apart and must continue to be widespread so long as pain and suffering must be measured by money standards."
We are of the opinion that the award made by the jury has no basis in fact. Such an award is so excessive as to be shocking to one's conscience and to clearly indicate passion or prejudice, and it abundantly appears that there is no evidence to support or justify the verdict. The trial court abused its discretion in refusing to grant a new trial or in ordering a remittitur.
Holding as we do, that the verdict is without all reasonable bounds for the detailed injury, we then have the duty of ordering a new trial, or ordering a remittitur. Since the jury's verdict can be of no help to us, we must exercise our best judgment in arriving at a fair and just amount to compensate plaintiff for his injury.
Therefore, the judgment is reversed and a new trial granted, with costs to appellant, unless respondent within 15 days from the date of filing this opinion files with the Clerk of this court a remittitur in the sum of $4,000 and agrees to accept a net verdict of $6,000. If such a remittitur is filed, the judgment will be modified in accordance therewith, and as modified, affirmed. Each party to meet its own costs.
WADE, J., concurs in result.
McDONOUGH, C. J., concurs in the result for the reasons stated in the opinion of CROCKETT, J.
. 45 U.S.C.A. § 51 et seq.
. Pauly v. McCarthy, 109 Utah 431, 184 P.2d 123.
. Duffy v. Union Pacific Co., 118 Utah 82, 218 P.2d 1080.
. Utah, 250 P.2d 932, 935.
. 109 Utah 431, 184 P.2d 123.
. 118 Utah 82, 218 P.2d 1080.
. Pauly v. McCarthy, 109 Utah 431, 184 P.2d 123; Geary v. Cain, 69 Utah 340, 255 P. 418; 5 C.J.S., Appeal and Error, § 1651, p. 646.