Case Name: In the Matter of the Probate of the Alleged Last Will and Testament of SUSAN W. FREEMAN, Deceased
Court: New York Supreme Court, General Term
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1887-11
Citations: 53 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 458
Docket Number: 
Parties: In the Matter of the Probate of the Alleged Last Will and Testament of SUSAN W. FREEMAN, Deceased.
Judges: 
Reporter: Supreme Court Reports (Hun)
Volume: 53
Pages: 458–468

Head Matter:
In the Matter of the Probate of the Alleged Last Will and Testament of SUSAN W. FREEMAN, Deceased.
Proof of the capacity of a testatrix to execute a will — lohen the testimony of physician» signing the will at her request is admissible— Oode of Civil Procedure, sec. 881— an objection as to the testatrix age must state the specific defect with certainty.
Upon the hearing of an appeal from a decree of a surrogate admitting a -will to probate, it appeared that the two witnesses to the will were, at the time of signing the same, and had been for a long time prior thereto, duly authorized to practice, and had been practicing physic and surgery at Saratoga Springs; that, on the day the will was executed, the witnesses were each called to see the testatrix, and did so call and examine the testatrix professionally as to her mental condition on that day; that the will was read at their request by one of them; that neither of them had seen her before during her last sickness; that neither of them had, at any time prior thereto, acted as her family physician or treated her; that after signing the will the testatrix declared that the writing was her last will and testament, and requested each of the witnesses to execute the same as witnesses thereto. These witnesses were the only persons sworn upon the trial before the surrogate.
Held, that their, testimony was properly received and that the decree should be affirmed. (Williams, J.. dissenting )
That the relation of physician and patient did not exist in this case, as the testatrix, who was conscious and capable of acting, did not accept the services of the witnesses as physicians, nor were they employed to attend her in a professional capacity, and that the information acquired by them was not information acquired while attending a patient in a professional capacity, which was necessary to enable him to act in that capacity. (Per Learned, P. J.)
That the testatrix, by expressly requesting the physicians to be subscribing witnesses, in legal effect, expressly requested them to testify, at the proper time before the proper court, to the whole truth within their knowledge touching the matters material to be inquired of, in order to establish the probate of the will, and thereby expressly waived her privilege, if she had any, to prevent their giving such testimony. (Per Lanbon, J.)
The surrogate found that the testatrix was of full age. TJpon this appeal the appellants claimed that no proof was given on'that point. The only objection taken by the contestants before the surrogate relating to this point was that the proponents had not shown that the testatrix was of the class of persons named in the statute as capable of executing a will.
Held, that this did not point out the specific defect in the proof. (Williams, J., dissenting.
Appeal from a decree of tbe surrogate of Saratoga county, admitting to probate tbe will of Susan M. Freeman, deceased.
Tbe two witnesses to tbe will were physicians and surgeons. These were tbe only witnesses sworn on tbe bearing, and tbe main question involved on this appeal is whether their evidence was properly received as to mental capacity, under section 834 of tbe Code of Civil Procedure. Tbe case, as settled by tbe surrogate, contains tbe statement that tbe subscribing witnesses to tbe will were, at tbe time, duly qualified and practicing physicians and surgeons. Some evidence appears in tbe case on tbe subject, and tbe surrogate upon request of contestants, found, as a fact, in deciding tbe matter, that at tbe time of tbe execution of the will, tbe subscribing witnesses-were, and for a long time prior thereto bad been, duly authorized to practice physics and surgery, and bad been so practicing tbe same.
Dr. Boyce testified, among other things, that be bad beard, before tbe day of execution of tbe will, that tbe deceased was sick, and that at tbe time tbe will was executed be went to her place for the purpose of examining into her mental condition, and that lie made such examination before tbe will was executed; that Dr. ITodgman was with him and in consultation as to her mental condition; that Mr. Pettit (named as executor in the will), came for him and was at deceased’s place when tbe doctors were there, but not in tbe room of deceased with them; that Mr. McCall tbe attorney, who drew tbe will, was in tbe deceased’s room with ■ tbe doctors; that one of tbe doctors requested that tbe will should be read, and it was so read there; that be did not examine deceased’s physical condition very closely; that she bad an emaciated look to her face; looked in a-feeble physical condition; weak; that witness bad heard she bad a cancer, but never saw it; that he was not her physician or surgeon at tbe time, and didn’t prescribe for her, was not called, as be understood it, to prescribe for her; that be was not her family physician that be made a charge for making tbe examination, upon bis books,. ■to tbe attorney, McCall, which had been since paid; that he made the examination the same as he always did, when called upon to ■examine a person with regard to sanity, and after the examination the will was at once executed.
Dr. Hodgman testified, among other things, that lie went to deceased’s place for the purpose of making an examination of her mental condition, and did make the examination, just before the will was executed; that he made such examination by the means usually employed by physicians in determining as to the sanity of persons ; -and that sanity is determined to some extent by observation as to ■the looks and speech and conduct and general appearance of the person; that he asked that the will be read, and McCall, the attorney, handed the will to him and he read it; that he had not then been her family physician; had never tx-eated her then, but did afterwards. And the surrogate found, as facts, upon the request of the contestants, in deciding fhe matter, that the subscribing witnesses were each ■of them called to see deceased, and did call and examine her professionally, as to her mental condition, on the occasion the will was •executed, and before such execution, and that neither of them had seen her before during her last sickness. The case also contains the statement that deceased, at the time the will was executed, was sick, ■and the surrogate found, as a fact, that she had for some time been .sick, and at the time the will was executed was in bed.
Thei’e seems to have been no proof in the case as to the age of •deceased, and contestant at the close of the evidence moved to dismiss the pi-oceedings and for a decx-ee denying probate to the will, on the ground that proponents had not shown that deceased was of a class ■of persons named in the statute as persons capable of executing wills ■of real and personal estate. Upon request of contestants, the surrogate found the fact that there was no proof of deceased’s age, but refused to find she was not competent, by reason of lack of age, to make a will of real and personal property. He also found that :after signing the will the testati’ix declai’ed that the said writing was her last will and testament and xequested the pei’sons, who ■signed as witnesses, and each of them to execute the same as witnesses thereof and thereto. The suiTOgate refused, on l’equest of contestants, to find no waiver, express or implied, by deceased, as to the doctors being witnesses to her will.
J. W. Houghton, Willard J. Miner and A. 8. Burdick, for the appellants.
W. B. French for the respondents.

Opinion:
LeabNed, P. J.:
The relation of physician and patient is one of contract between the parties, the patient employing the physician to examine the patient's condition, and if necessary to administer remedies.
It has been classed among the confidential, relations, such as that of trustee and cestui que trust and the like. Of course it is not necessary that there should be any administering of remedies. Medicus cptimus, medicamentu/m minimum. But there must bean employment of the physician by the patient, except as hereinafter stated. Thus in People v. Murphy (101 N. Y., 126), where the physician was selected by the public prosecutor and sent to-attend upon the person, it was held that the relation of physician and patient was established, because that person accepted his services,, and he rendered them in that character There was, therefore,, practically, an employment of the physician by the person who was held to have become his patient, although his compensation did not come from her. So, too, in the case of an infant, though the-employment is made by the parent, and the infant be even incapable-of acting, the relation of physician and patient is established.
The case might also be suggested of one who was unconscious and for whom friends employed a physician. No doubt, in such a case, the-relation of physician and patient would be established, although the patient was unable to act for himself and others had acted for him. But nothing of that kind existed in this case. The deceased was conscious and capable of acting. She did not accept the services of these physicians, and they were not employed to attend her in a professional capacity. The information which a physician is forbidden to disclose is that which he has acquired in attending a patient in a professional capacity, and which was necessary to enable him to act in that capacity. (Code Civ. Pro., § 834.) Attendance on a patient means more than being in the same room; and acting in a professional capacity means acting in reference to that patient. A physician by merely being in the company of a person and observing his appearance, might be satisfied that the person was ill with some disease, for instance, consumption, but this section would not forbid the disclosure of that opinion.
In Grattan v. Insurance Company (24 Hun, 43; S. C., 92 N. Y., 274); Renihan v. Dennin (103 id., 573), there could be no doubt that the physician was called to attend the patient professionally, and that the relation of physician and patient existed. But in the present case the physicians were not called to prescribe for the deceased or to advise as to professional treatment; nor did they so prescribe or advise. If the deceased, at the time of their visit, had been in great need of good medical advice, and they had given no advice; they would not have been chargeable with malpractice or neglect of •duty; because they were not under any obligation to advise or to prescribe. Any advice or prescription would have been an improper act, because they were not the attending or consulting physicians, .and they were under no obligation to her. If they had conversed with her as to her health, then, possibly, she might have conceived the idea that they were consulting physicians. And if, in such mistaken belief, she had stated anything as to her health, very possibly that might have come within the prohibition of this section. But there is nothing of that kind. There is no reason to believe that she thought' them to be consulting physicians, or recognized them to be anything more than proper witnesses to her will.
The section implies that the physician is to do some act in his professional capacity. Of course, this act may be merely negative, that is, the physician may decide that no medicine is needed. But in this case these physicians were not to do, or to omit to do, any-, thing for the deceased. The signing of the will as witnesses was not a professional act. I think there was no error in allowing these physicians to testify.
Another objection is that proof was not given of the age of the •deceased. The surrogate finds that she was of full age. There .appears to be no proof on that point. Probably it was assumed as a matter not disputed. No objection was taken by the contestants on this point. One ground of objection was that the proponents had not shown that the testatrix was of the class of persons capable of executing a will. But this did not point out the specific defect in the proof. If it was intended to be an objection on the ground that the age of the testatrix had not been proved, then it was expressed in such a manner as to conceal its meaning. One object in requiring parties to take objections is to give tlie oilier side notice of the alleged defect. No sncli notice was here given. The petition for probate is not before us. That may have stated the age of the testatrix. The contesting allegation of the husband and heirs and next of kin set up no such matter.
If there be any defect in this respect, then this is a case where we should take the proof or refer the matter under section 2586.
LaNdoN, J.:
I advise affirmance, upon the ground that the testatrix expressly requested these physicians to be subscribing witnesses. She thereby, in legal effect, expressly requested them to do two things, first, to sign their names to her will as witnesses to this execution and publication ; second, to testify, at the proper time before the proper court, to the whole truth within their knowledge touching the matters material to be inquired of in order to establish the probate of the will.
Having expressly requested them to give this testimony, she expressly waived her privilege, if she had any, to prevent their giving it.