Case Name: POOL v. NEW ENGLAND MUT. LIFE INS. CO.
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1908-01-17
Citations: 108 N.Y.S. 431
Docket Number: 
Parties: POOL v. NEW ENGLAND MUT. LIFE INS. CO.
Judges: 
Reporter: West's New York Supplement
Volume: 108
Pages: 431–437

Head Matter:
POOL v. NEW ENGLAND MUT. LIFE INS. CO.
(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department.
January 17, 1908.)
1. Insubance—Life Policy—Conflict of Laws.
A life policy issued by a Massachusetts company to a resident of New York is governed by the laws of New York, where it provided that it should not be effective until signed and a premium was paid, and where the application was made at a branch office within the state and the policy was received and the premiums paid through such office.
[Ed. Note.—For cases in point, see Cent. Dig. vol. 28, Insurance, §§ 173-175.]
2. Same—Beneficiaries.
Where a life policy on assured’s husband’s life was. payable to assured, her executors, administrators, and assigns, and she predeceased him, the money, on his death, passed to her executor as part of her personal estate, and not to the husband’s executor, though the husband was assured’s sole devisee and legatee.
[Ed. Note.—For cases in point, see Cent. Dig. vol. 28, Insurance, § 1474.]
Woodward, J., dissenting.
Submitted controversy between J. Lawrence Pool, John H. Pool’s executor, and the New England Mutual Life Insurance Company. Judgment for defendant dismissing the complaint, and adjudging plaintiff not entitled to recover upon a life policy.
Argued before WOODWARD, JENKS, RICH, MILLER, and GAYNOR, JJ.
William R. Wilder (Ward B. Chamberlin, on the brief), for plaintiff.
Roger Foster, for defendant.

Opinion:
JENKS, J.
This is a submitted controversy. A Massachusetts corporation issued a policy of life insurance in consideration of a premium paid by Sophie S. Pool "being the assured in this policy," and of a like sum to be paid annually insuring the life of her husband. The company therein agreed with the "said assured, her executors, administrators and assigns" to pay the' said sum insured to the "said assured, her executors, administrators and assigns." It was further pro vided that the policy did not take effect until it is signed and the premium is settled for according to the rules of the company. Application for the policy was made at the branch office of the company in the city, county, and state of New York. The policy was received through the New York office, and the premiums thereon were always paid at that office. Sophie S. Pool, the assured, died in 1901, domiciled in the state of New York, testate and naming her husband as her executor and also her sole legatee and devisee. Her husband qualified. Five children of her said husband and herself survived her and now live. After her death her husband paid the premiums. He died in 1907, testate, and in his will his wife (who had predeceased the testator), J. L. Pool, and W. H. Macy, Jr., were named as executors. Mr. Macy renounced, and J. L. Pool alone qualified. No special bequest was made of this policy by the said husband. The plaintiff, J. L. Pool, as executor of the estate of the husband, contends that he is entitled to receive the proceeds of the policy and its reversionary additions. The defendant, insurer, resists. I am of opinion that the contract must be construed under the laws of this state. Equitable Life Assurance Society v. Clements, 140 U. S. 226, 11 Sup. Ct. 822, 35 L. Ed. 497; Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hill, 193 U. S. 551, 24 Sup. Ct. 538, 48 L. Ed. 788; Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Cohen, 179 U. S. 162, 21 Sup. Ct. 106, 45 L. Ed. 181; Hicks v. National Life Ins. Co., 60 Fed. 690, 9 C. C. A. 215; O'Neill v. Massachusetts Benefit Ass'n, 63 Hun, 292, 18 N. Y. Supp. 22; 1 May on Insurance, note A. The policy is expressly payable to Sophie S. Pool (who is expressly declared io be the assured), her executors, administrators, or assigns. In Fidelity Trust Co. v. Marshall, 178 N. Y. 472, 71 N. E. 9, the court, per Vann, J., said:
"The function of the words 'her executors, administrators or assigns,' as used in the first policy, and of 'her legal representatives,' as used in the second, is not now involved. They may cover the contingency that the wife might survive her husband and die, or assign the policy before it was paid, or the possibility that no child would survive the father, or both."
The contract was not with the husband, but with the wife to pay to her if she survived the husband, and, if she did not, to her administrators, executors, and assigns. In U. S. Trust Co. v. Mut. Ben. Life Ins. Co., 115 N. Y. 152, 21 N. E. 1025, the court, per Earl, J., say:
"The insurance could be for the benefit of the wife alone, in which case the amount insured would, upon the death of the husband, be payable to her if she survived; but, if she died before him, it would then vest in and be payable to her personal representatives, and not to her children."
I think that upon the death of the insured the insurance moneys passed to the executor of the estate of Sophie S. Pool as her representative, and as part of her personal estate. U. S. Trust Co. v. Mut. Ben. Life Ins. Co., supra; Geoffroy v. Gilbert, 5 App. Div. 98, 38 N. Y. Supp. 643, affirmed on opinion below, 154 N. Y. 741, 49 N. E. 1097; Millard v. Brayton, 177 Mass. 533, 59 N. E. 436, 52 L. R. A. 117, 83 Am. St. Rep. 294. In Geoffroy v. Gilbert, supra, the policy provided that on the occasion of the death of Clarkson the company would pay the insurance money to his daughter or her legal representa tive. The action was brought by the administrator of the daughter against the executor of the father; the insurance company having paid the money into court. It was held that the daughter had a vested interest in the policy which was not divested by her death, that the policy was a mere chose in action, and passed to the person entitled to take the personal property; "legal representatives" being held to mean in this case executors or administrators. The court further said that the very fact that it was made payable to her legal representatives (i. e., executors or administrators) necessarily led to the inference that it was to belong to her estate after her death. In Millard v. Brayton, supra, the court lay down the rule:
"The general rule is that a promise to pay money at a time in the future sure to arrive inures to the benefit of the legal representatives of the person to whom the money is to he paid, if he be not alive at the time the payment is due, and we see no reason why this rule is not applicable in this case. See Connecticut Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. Fish, 59 N. H. 126. In the opinion of the majority of the court the plaintiff, as the administrator of the estate of one of the children, is entitled to recover. For decisions in other states bearing upon the question involved, in addition to the cases above cited, see United States Trust Co. v. Mutual Ben. L. Ins. Co., 115 N. Y. 152, 21 N. E. 1025; Walsh v. Mutual L. Ins. Co., 133 N. Y. 408, 31 N. E. 228, 28 Am. St. Rep. 651, and the authorities collected in May, Ins. (3d Ed.) 399, note; Voss v. Connecticut Mut. L. Ins. Co., 119 Mich. 161, 77 N. W. 697, 44 L. R. A. 689; Harley v. Heist, 86 Ind. 196, 45 Am. Rep. 285. See, also, for a collection of some of the authorities, Hooker v. Sugg, 102 N. C. 115, 8 S. E. 919, 3 L. R. A. 217, 11 Am. St. Rep. 721 et seq."
I think that the plaintiff as executor of the last will and testament is not entitled to the insurance moneys. It was payable to the representative of the wife's estate, and cannot be administered upon by this plaintiff; nor can this plaintiff receive it as executor of the husband, in that the husband was the sole devisee and legatee under the will of the assured. Matter of Moehring, 154 N. Y. 423, 430, et seq., 48 N. E. 818, 820.
Judgment for the defendant, dismissing the complaint, with costs, and adjudging that the plaintiff is not entitled to recover upon the policy of life insurance in accord with the terms of submission. All concur, except WOODWARD, J., who dissents.