Case Name: Wallace BLOOM, Petitioner, v. The TEXAS STATE BOARD OF EXAMINERS OF PSYCHOLOGISTS et al., Respondents
Court: Supreme Court of Texas
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1973-03-21
Citations: 492 S.W.2d 460
Docket Number: No. B-3243
Parties: Wallace BLOOM, Petitioner, v. The TEXAS STATE BOARD OF EXAMINERS OF PSYCHOLOGISTS et al., Respondents.
Judges: Dissenting Opinion by WALKER, J., in which GREENHILL, C. J., and REAV-LEY, J., join.
Reporter: South Western Reporter Second Series
Volume: 492
Pages: 460–466

Head Matter:
Wallace BLOOM, Petitioner, v. The TEXAS STATE BOARD OF EXAMINERS OF PSYCHOLOGISTS et al., Respondents.
No. B-3243.
Supreme Court of Texas.
March 21, 1973.
Mitchell, Yeakel, Orr & Trickey, Earl L. Yeakel, III, Austin, for petitioner.
John L. Hill, Atty. Gen., Harry C. Green, Asst. Atty. Gen., Austin, for respondents.

Opinion:
ON MOTION FOR REHEARING
POPE, Justice.
The motion for rehearing is granted, the original and dissenting opinions are withdrawn and this opinion is substituted as the majority opinion of the court.
Dr. Wallace Bloom instituted suit in the 167th District Court of Travis County to obtain a writ of mandamus requiring the Texas State Board of Examiners of Psychologists to certify him as a psychologist under the grandfather clause of the Psychologists' Certification and Licensing Act, Acts 1969, 61st Leg., p. 2059, ch. 713, Art. 4512c. Vernon's Ann.Tex.Civ.Stats. The trial court, sitting without a jury, denied the writ, and the court of civil appeals with a divided court, affirmed. 475 S.W. 2d 374. We reverse the judgments below and grant petitioner's prayer for a mandamus.
The legal question presented for our decision is whether Dr. Bloom complied with the grandfather provisions of the Act, as stated in Section 15(b)(2) of Article 4512c:
Sec. 15(b) Until December 31, 1970 a person who is at least twenty-one years of age, a resident of this state, of good moral character, and is a citizen of the United States or has legally declared his intention of becoming a citizen may, upon application and payment of the certification fee, be certified without examination by the Board as a psychologist if [he]
(1)
(2) has a master's degree from an accredited institution based upon a program which is primarily psychological and, in addition, has had eight years of professional psychological experience.
Dr. Bloom was practicing his profession at the time the Act became effective and he qualified under the grandfather clause of the Act, which entitles him to a certificate. The purpose of grandfather provisions in licensing acts is to exempt from statutory regulations those members who have acceptably followed their profession or trade for a required period of years. Such exemptions are granted upon the presumption that those already practicing their profession were lawfully and satisfactorily performing their services on the date the regulatory act became effective. Watson v. Maryland, 218 U.S. 173, 30 S.Ct. 644, 54 L.Ed. 987 (1910); Krausmann v. Streeter, 226 Minn. 458, 33 N.W.2d 56 (1948); Annot., 4 A.L.R.2d 667; Hart v. Folsom, 70 N.H. 213, 47 A. 603 (1900); Annot., 136 A.L.R. 219.
The trial court made findings that Dr. Bloom met all of the statutory requirements for a license embodied in the provisions of the Act quoted above. The court of civil appeals agreed with those findings, saying: "The parties to this lawsuit are agreed that Applicant has fulfilled all of the requirements for licensing without an examination including the educational requirements." The court of civil appeals summarized Dr. Bloom's educational qualifications in this manner:
In this latter respect, while Appellant's Ph.D. degree is in education as opposed to psychology, his record reflects no fewer than 127 hours of graduate level courses in psychology and education psychology. In addition he has worked as Chief Psychologist at the Child Guidance Clinic, Lackland Air Force Base, San Antonio, Texas, as Staff Clinical Psychologist at the Porterville State Hospital in California, and as Industrial Psychologist with the United Technology Corporation. In addition to belonging to many associations connected with psychology, Appellant has taught courses in the field of psychology at Our Lady of the Lake College in San Antonio, Texas and Fresno State College in Bakersfield, California.
The legal basis for the Board's refusal of Dr. Bloom's license and the refusal by the courts below to grant his prayer for mandamus is the Legislature's use of the word, "may," in section 15(b) quoted above. The argument is that the word, "may," used in section 15(b), does not mean "must," but is a word which vested broad discretion in the Board so long as it acted reasonably and not arbitrarily.
In our opinion, a larger problem than the meaning of "may" is presented by the Board's denial of the license. The real question is whether the Legislature could constitutionally empower an administrative agency to do whatever it "may" consider in the best interest of the public without regard to statutory standards or published agency rules. We have no problem in this case concerning any broadened powers arising under rules which the Board may have promulgated, and the Board does not urge that it acted by force of any power other than the words of the statute.
The correct meaning of the word, "may," is that the Board has discretion in its administration of the statute's stated standards, but the word does not empower the Board to make standards which are different from or inconsistent with the statute, even though they may be reasonable and may be administered reasonably. "May" does not empower the agency to require an examination in instances where the Legislature has excused an examination. Instead, the statute deems competent an applicant who proves that he has a master's degree in psychology and has practiced his profession for as long as eight years. If the Board may enact unstated, unpromulgated and additional requirements for an applicant under the grandfather clause, the Board may, upon the same reasoning, require such applicants to take a designated refresher course of study or publish a minimum number of research papers. Under such a rule, the Board could decide to give an applicant credit for the time served in the armed forces to apply against the eight years of required practice or require any number of other compli-ances which are not required by the statute.
Our former decision in Railroad Commission v. Shell Oil Co., 139 Tex. 66, 161 S.W.2d 1022, 1025-1027 (1942), explains the limits of powers delegated to an administrative agency. Pursuant to a proper delegation of powers, the Railroad Commission adopted Rule 37, the well-spacing rule. The rule contained a provision under which the Commission could grant exceptions to the rule and permit the drilling in smaller areas when the Commission determined that such exceptions were necessary to prevent waste. The Commission in that case possessed rule-making powers, but its rules did not set forth any standards by which such exceptions would be recognized. This court wrote, "The Commission has never fixed any standard or rule by which it would be guided in determining under what circumstances an applicant would be entitled to such a permit, except that it will grant the permit 'whenever the Commission shall determine that such exceptions are necessary to prevent waste.' " Seeking to uphold the grant of a permit under that broad rule, the Commission urged that it had discretion to determine the density of wells and matters of waste, and so long as there was substantial evidence in support of its decision, its acts were valid. This court ruled that the Commission exceeded its authority and that its construction of the rule would amount to the grant of arbitrary powers. The court said:
It is a well-established principle of constitutional law that any statute or ordinance regulating the conduct of a lawful business or industry and authorizing the granting or withholding of licenses or-permits as the designated officials arbitrarily choose, without setting forth any guide or standard to govern such officials in distinguishing between individuals entitled to such permits or licenses and those not so entitled, is unconstitutional and void.
In Texas State Board of Examiners in Optometry v. Carp, 412 S.W.2d 307 (Tex.1967), we examined the powers of the Board of Optometry under a statute which was in terms of "may refuse to issue a license" and "may cancel, revoke or suspend any license . . ." Art. 4563. The problem in that case was to decide whether the Board, in the exercise of its delegated rule-making powers, had kept within the framework of the statutory grounds for licensing and revoking or canceling a license. Our decision was that the rules which the Optometry Board had promulgated and which were in question were covered by one or more of the statutory delegations of power. See also Kee v. Baber, 157 Tex. 387, 303 S.W.2d 376 (1957).
We conclude that Dr. Bloom has met every statutory requirement for a certification under the grandfather clause of the Act. The judgments of the courts below are reversed and judgment is here rendered that the Texas State Board of Examiners of Psychologists issue the certificate to Dr. Bloom as required by law. Writ of mandamus will issue only if the Board refuses to do so.
Dissenting Opinion by WALKER, J., in which GREENHILL, C. J., and REAV-LEY, J., join.
SAM D. JOHNSON, J., not sitting.