Case Name: Marvin BYRD, Appellant, v. NATIONWIDE MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellee
Court: District of Columbia Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: District of Columbia
Decision Date: 1980-06-10
Citations: 415 A.2d 807
Docket Number: No. 79-393
Parties: Marvin BYRD, Appellant, v. NATIONWIDE MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellee.
Judges: Before KERN, FERREN and PRYOR, Associate Judges.
Reporter: West's Atlantic Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 415
Pages: 807–811

Head Matter:
Marvin BYRD, Appellant, v. NATIONWIDE MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellee.
No. 79-393.
District of Columbia Court of Appeals.
Argued March 24, 1980.
Decided June 10, 1980.
Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc Denied July 9,1980.
Robert J. Stanford, Washington, D.C., for appellant.
Gerald Herz, Washington, D.C., with whom Jeffrey W. Ochsman, Washington, D.C., was on brief, for appellee.
Before KERN, FERREN and PRYOR, Associate Judges.

Opinion:
KERN, Associate Judge:
Appellant was convicted in Virginia of attempted murder and possession of a sawed off shotgun. During the criminal episode which led to his arrest and conviction he was shot by police officers and severely wounded. Appellant submitted claim to appellee with whom he was insured at the time of the shooting "against loss resulting from . accidental bodily injury which is the sole cause of the loss." Appellee denied his claim. He brought suit for breach of contract and for a declaratory judgment that the disability income insurance policy was in full force and effect at the time of the criminal incident and applicable to his injury.
Appellant's position, both before the trial court and in this court, is that the language in the policy should be read literally and that in accordance with its terms he is entitled to recover for his loss incurred as the result of his accidental injury. As defined by appellant, any calamitous event resulting in injury is an accidental injury. Only such an event as is specifically enumerated in the Exceptions provided by the policy is excluded, he asserts. Using the policy exceptions as an aid in defining events which are not "accidental" within the meaning of the policy, he asserts that the shooting was accidental and that he is entitled to recovery under the policy for his loss due to the gunshot wounds inflicted upon him by the Virginia police.
The trial court directed a verdict in favor of appellee upon the appropriate motion. The trial judge dealt with the question of what constitutes an accidental injury under a disability insurance policy in his ruling:
The Court is satisfied that the overwhelming majority of jurisdictions embrace one test in determining the instant question. In fact, it would appear that only the State of Indiana excepts from the test, that is, one of foreseeability under all the circumstances, or as stated at 44 Am.Jur.2d 1248 in this language: "Despite some variety in the language used, the general rule is to the effect that the mere fact that a person insured against accidental injury, or death, voluntarily and wrongfully assaulted another will not be sufficient to characterize as nonaccidental all possible injuries which he received in the course of, or as a consequence of his attack, but such injuries may be regarded as accidental unless they were a natural or a probable result of the insured's actions reasonably foreseeable by him, or by a reasonably prudent man in his position. Clearly, injuries or death sustained by an insured in an encounter brought about by an assault committed by him upon another with a deadly weapon, or upon one who he knew had such a weapon, are not sustained by accident or accidental means within the meaning of an accident policy, since under such circumstances the injury or death is the natural and probable cause of his act."
The record discloses that Mr. Byrd initiated the event by firing the weapon at a police officer, obviously an armed individual, and that the return fire by the officer and other officers was, indeed, a natural and probable consequence of that action.
[Supp. Record at 21-22; emphasis added.]
We are satisfied that the trial court's reasoning and conclusion was correct and adopt them as our own. See generally, McCrary v. New York Life Insurance Company, 84 F.2d 790 (8th Cir. 1939); 26 A.L. R.2d 399, 410 (1952). We are further satisfied that the trial court correctly directed a verdict upon the particular evidence presented here.
Appellant also argues that even if the trial court's interpretation of the policy is correct, he is entitled to a new trial at which he can testify that "following commission of the crime, he withdrew from any aggression and rendered himself no threat whatever to the police. . . . [T]his would have made appellant's injury 'accidental' even under the erroneous standard of the trial court. The police would have become the ultimate aggressors." (Reply Brief at 6.)
The record does not reflect that appellant ever made a proffer at trial to support his assertion that he ceased his attack and withdrew from his criminal venture and thereafter was shot and wounded by the police. Indeed, appellant's counsel, in arguing to the trial court on the pending motion for a directed verdict, acknowledged:
Whether those police officers' shots were responsive and required, or whether they were otherwise, we have not sought . nor has the defense to determine. [Supp. Record at 12; emphasis added.]
We conclude appellant is not entitled to a new trial at which he would present evidence which he did not proffer at the first trial.
Affirmed.
. Va. Code § 18.1-21, -16; 18.1-268.1, -268.3.
. Appellant was rendered a paraplegic.
.The court denied an earlier motion for summary judgment by appellee.
. Our decision in Dent v. Virginia Mutual Benefit Life Insurance Co., D.C.App., 226 A.2d 166 (1967), has no bearing on our holding here. There, we held that the phrase "died by his own hand or act" was synonymous with "died by suicide" but the opinion in that case did not address the issue presented here: the meaning of the term "accidental bodily injury."
. Appellant's effort at trial was to prove that he lacked the intent to use the weapon he had been carrying on the night of his confrontation with the police. In sum, he sought only to demonstrate he had never been the aggressor. The trial court quite properly invoked the doctrine of collateral estoppel pursuant to Ross v. Lawson, D.C.App., 395 A.2d 54 (1978), and prevented the parties from going behind the Virginia conviction of appellant for attempted murder to relitigate the issue of his criminal intent.