Case Name: SECOND BAPTIST CHURCH, for itself and on behalf of BUFFINGTON TOWERS LIMITED PARTNERSHIP v. LITTLE ROCK HISTORIC DISTRICT COMMISSION
Court: Arkansas Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Arkansas
Decision Date: 1987-07-20
Citations: 293 Ark. 155
Docket Number: 86-308
Parties: SECOND BAPTIST CHURCH, for itself and on behalf of BUFFINGTON TOWERS LIMITED PARTNERSHIP v. LITTLE ROCK HISTORIC DISTRICT COMMISSION
Judges: Purtle and Glaze, JJ., dissent.
Reporter: Arkansas Reports
Volume: 293
Pages: 155–166

Head Matter:
SECOND BAPTIST CHURCH, for itself and on behalf of BUFFINGTON TOWERS LIMITED PARTNERSHIP v. LITTLE ROCK HISTORIC DISTRICT COMMISSION
86-308
732 S.W.2d 483
Supreme Court of Arkansas
Opinion delivered July 20, 1987
Mitchell, Williams, Selig & Tucker, by: Jim Guy Tucker, Cynthia J. Davis, and Joe E. Madden, Jr., for appellant.
MarkStodola, City Att’y, by: Thomas M. Carpenter, Asst. City Att’y, for appellee.
Youngdahl & Youngdahl, P.A., by: Thomas H. McGowan, for amicus curiae, Quapaw Quarter Association.

Opinion:
A. Watson Bell, Special Justice.
Appellant appeals from an Order of the Chancery Court affirming Appellee's denial of Appellant's Application for a Certificate of Appropriateness for the construction of a parking lot in the McArthur Park Historic District in downtown Little Rock.
For reversal, the Appellant argues that the Chancellor erred by (1) finding that the Appellee had the authority to reach the decision it did because neither the Historic District Act nor a Little Rock Municipal Ordinance allowed the Appellee to consider use, (2) finding that Appellee's decision was not a denial of equal protection, and (3) finding that Appellee's decision was not arbitrary and capricious. We disagree with Appellant's contentions and affirm.
Appellant owns property in the 600 block of Rock Street in Little Rock, which is located within the McArthur Park Historic District and is bordered on the west by Cumberland Street and on the east by Rock Street. Appellant's church is located adjacent to but outside of the District and one block south of the property.
In 1982, the Appellant voluntarily gave its parking lot to their development of Buffington Towers in order to achieve federal funding for the apartment complex from the Department of Housing and Urban Development. In August of 1983, the Appellant made application to the McArthur Park Historic District Commission for a Certificate of Appropriateness to use the subject property as a parking lot for the church. The application was denied. There was an appeal made on the record of that case to the Chancery Court of Pulaski County, and the decision of the Commission was affirmed. (Second Baptist Church v. Little Rock Historic District Commission, 83-3694, Pulaski County Chancery Court, Second Division). No appeal was taken from the Chancery decision.
In 1985, the church for itself and on behalf of Buffington Towers Limited Partnership, filed a new Application for Certificate of Appropriateness for a noncommercial, private parking lot on the property. Buffington Towers had entered into a contract to purchase the property from the church. After an evidentiary hearing, the Commission denied the application on September 5, 1985.
The decision of the Commission was appealed to the Chancery Court of Pulaski County, Third Division, pursuant to Ark. Stat. Ann. §19-5009 (Repl. 1980). After a hearing, the Court affirmed the Commission's decision and dismissed the church's appeal.
Appellant first argues that the Trial Court erred in finding that the decision of the Commission was within its authority alleging that neither the Historic District Act nor Little Rock Municipal Ordinance No. 14 grant the Commission the authority to consider proposed use. Our review herein requires us to pass for the first time on the legislature's enactment of the Historic District Act, Ark. Stat. Ann. § 19-5001, et seq. (Repl. 1980). With the passage of the Historic District Act, the Arkansas Legislature allowed qualified municipalities to take steps to protect places of historic interest within their boundaries. Ark. Stat. Ann. § 19-5002 (Repl. 1980). It authorizes the use of historic districts to promote the educational, cultural and economic welfare of a community which has been deemed a legitimate use of the police powers by numerous state and federal courts. See e.g., Maher v. City of New Orleans, 516 F.2d 1051, 1058-59 (5th Cir. 1975); Opinion of the Justices, 128 N.E.2d 557, 562 (1955); City of Sanie Fe v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc. 73 N.M. 410, 389 P.2d 13 (1964); Town of Deering v. Tibbets, 105 N.H. 481, 202 A.2d 232, 234 (1964); Lafayette Park Baptist Church v. Scott, 553 S.W.2d 856 (1977).
In order to avail itself of the Act, a municipality must take measures to form an Historic District Commission to act upon requests for Certificates of Appropriateness to build, destroy or modify structures within an historic district. Ark. Stat. Ann. § 19-5003 (Repl. 1980). The Act includes an absolute prohibition against property owners taking any of these steps before obtaining a certificate. Ark. Stat. Ann. § 19-5005 (Repl. 1980).
Appellant argues that pursuant to Ark. Stat. Ann. § 19-5005 (Repl. 1980), the legislative intent of the Act was to limit the authority of the Commission to matters dealing with exterior architectural features only, and does not permit the Commission to consider the proposed use in determining whether to approve or deny an application. The Appellant's argument ignores, when read as a whole, Ark. Stat. Ann. § 19-5006 (Repl. 1980), which states:
Commission not to be concerned with interior architectural features. — In its deliberations under this Act, the Commission shall not consider interior arrangement or use and shall take no action under this Act except for the purpose of preventing the construction, reconstruction, alteration, moving or demolition of buildings, structures or appurtenant fixtures, in the Historic District obviously incongruous with the historic aspects of the District. (Emphasis added)
In construing the legislative intent of the Act, we must consider the plain wording of the Act and must look to the legislative objectives in applying the legislation. Ragland v. Alpha Aviation, Inc., 285 Ark. 182, 686 S.W.2d 391 (1985). It is quite clear that an Historic District Commission may consider use only for the purpose of denying a certificate and, while the Commission does not have the authority to grant certain uses of property, it does have the authority to deny certain uses if those uses are "obviously incongruous with the historic aspects of the District." Here, the Commission found that construction of the parking lot as proposed in the Appellant's application would be totally incongruous with the historic aspects of the District, especially in view of the proposed location of the parking lot on a fringe or border area of the District. We cannot say that this finding by the Commission was outside of the scope of what the legislature intended with the passage of the Historic District Act. In fact, we believe that the statute grants the Commission the authority to make the precise finding that it did in this case. The General Assembly declared that the purpose of the Act
. . .is to promote the educational, cultural, economic and general welfare of the public through the preservation and protection of. . . sites, places and districts of historic interest. . . through the development of appropriate settings for "historical" buildings, places and districts. Ark. Stat. Ann. § 19-5002 (Repl. 1980)
Thus, an Historic District Commission may prohibit a particular use of property within a district in order to develop an appropriate setting for historical buildings if that use is obviously incongruous with the historic nature of the district. We believe that an Historic District Commission is given authority to preserve the district.
Tom Johnson, an architect who testified before the Commission, introduced several photographs and maps showing the Commission the number of parking lots in the area. He pointed out that approximately 50% of the land outside the District is surfaced parking. Johnson then quoted, from the criteria for meeting the National Register of Historic Places as follows:
. . .1 would like to tell you the National Register criteria for a Historic District, and I quote to you, "is a geographically defined area, urban or rural possession, and significant concentration linkage for continuity of site, building, structures, or objects united by past events or by plan or by physical development."
And in evaluating the Historic District for National Register eligibility, "Parking lots are considered to be incompatible intrusions whereas vacant lots are not considered to detract from the history." [Testimony of Tom Johnson (R. 70)] [Emphasis added]
Mr. Johnson's testimony was credible evidence which supports the Commission's finding that a parking lot at that particular location would be obviously incongruous with the historical aspects of the District.
Appellant next argues that the Commission denied it equal protection of law because it is not being allowed to build the subject parking lot. Discriminatory action by a governmental administrative body must have a rational basis in order to withstand an equal protection challenge. Milnot v. Arkansas State Board of Health, 388 F. Supp. 901 (E.D.Ark. 1975). Establishing that different applicants are treated differently does not prove the denial of equal protection. City of Sante Fe v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 73 N.M. 1401, 389 P.2d 19 (1964). A sufficient explanation of different treatment to applicants will meet an equal protection challenge. Id. In this case, there was sufficient evidence presented to the Commission explaining why two other parking lot applications were approved and the one herein was not. The fact that the property in question is on a "fragile" boundary of the District distinguishes this application from the others, and the Appellant did not demonstrate a systematic course of conduct evidencing discrimination against nonresident landowners within the District. The record is silent with respect to any evidence that any landowner within the District had been permitted by the Commission to build a parking lot where a non-landowner had been denied on the same request. To establish purposeful discrimination, it must be shown that the decision makers selected a course of action in part because of its adverse effects on an identifiable group. Norcross v. Sneed, 573 F. Supp. 533 (W.D. Ark. 1983) and Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979). Appellant's assertion that although neither the statute nor the ordinance distinguish between residents and nonresidents of the District, there is substantial evidence of inherent prejudice by the Commission against property owners outside the District is not supported in the record. Even so, municipalities are permitted to impose restrictions on nonresidents if doing so would further a legitimate state interest. See, Arlington County Board v. Richards, 434 U.S. 5 (1977). We do not find that the Appellant has been singled out as the only group prohibited from building such a parking lot. The Commission's decision was a valid exercise of a legitimate state interest.
Finally, the Appellant argues that the Commission's decision was arbitrary and capricious. In zoning cases, the Chancellor does not conduct a de novo review, but rather determines if the municipality's action is arbitrary and capricious. McMinn v. City of Little Rock, 275 Ark. 458, 631 S.W.2d 288 (1982). If there is a reasonable basis for the finding, the Chancellor should find the decision was not arbitrary and capricious. The standard of appellate review of a Chancellor's finding that a City Zoning Board did not act arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable is whether it is clearly against the preponderance of the evidence. McMinn v. City of Little Rock, supra. The question before this Court is whether there is evidence in the record to support the Commission's finding.
In viewing the totality of the evidence presented to the Commission, we cannot say that the Chancellor's finding that the Commission's action was not arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable was clearly against the preponderance of the evidence. In this case, the Commission took supporting evidence from both sides on the issue of whether the building of the subject parking lot at the particular location in question would be obviously incongruous with the historic aspects of the District. Based upon all of the evidentiary matters presented, the Commission found the parking lot impermissible. The Chancellor applied the proper standard of review as required by law and even if our judgment on the issue would differ from the Commission's, we are compelled to reverse only if we find the Chancellor's decision clearly against the preponderance of the evidence. Rule 52, Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure. We do not and, thus, find the Appellant's argument without merit.
In conclusion, we do not believe that the Commission exceeded its quasi-legislative authority in its finding that a parking lot at this particular location would be obviously incongruous with the historic aspects of the District, nor do we believe that the Appellant was denied equal protection of the law. The Chancellor's finding that the Commission's decision was not arbitrary or capricious is not clearly against the preponderance of the evidence presented before the Commission, and must be affirmed.
Affirmed.
Purtle and Glaze, JJ., dissent.
Hays and Newbern, JJ., not participating.