Case Name: Thomas CAPRARO, Petitioner, v. LANIER BUSINESS PRODUCTS, INC., Respondent
Court: Florida Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1985-03-21
Citations: 466 So. 2d 212
Docket Number: No. 65125
Parties: Thomas CAPRARO, Petitioner, v. LANIER BUSINESS PRODUCTS, INC., Respondent.
Judges: BOYD, C.J., and ADKINS, ALDERMAN, McDonald and EHRLICH, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 466
Pages: 212–214

Head Matter:
Thomas CAPRARO, Petitioner, v. LANIER BUSINESS PRODUCTS, INC., Respondent.
No. 65125.
Supreme Court of Florida.
March 21, 1985.
Edward A. Marod of Gunster, Yoakley, Criser & Stewart, Palm Beach, for petitioner.
Bruce Zeidel of Cohen, Scherer & Cohn, North Palm Beach, for respondent.

Opinion:
SHAW, Justice.
We review Capraro v. Lanier Business Products, Inc., 445 So.2d 719 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984), because of express and direct conflict with Uni-Chem Corp. v. Maret, 338 So.2d 885 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1976). We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const.
The facts of the case are set forth fully in the district court decision below. For our purposes, Lanier obtained a temporary injunction prohibiting its former employee, Capraro, from breaching his covenant not to compete. There was no showing of irreparable injury. The district court affirmed, holding that where such covenants are violated, irreparable injury is presumed and does not have to be proven. In doing so, the court relied on Silvers v. Dis-Com Securities, Inc., 403 So.2d 1133 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981), which recognized inter-district conflict with Uni-Chem which held that
[notwithstanding statutory right to in-junctive relief [see: § 542.12, Fla.Stat.], upon proof of a valid covenant not to compete said statutory provision does not negate the necessity of showing irreparable harm as a prerequisite to the granting of a temporary injunction. Wilson v. Sandstrom, 317 So.2d 732 (Fla.1975).
Uni-Chem, 338 So.2d at 887.
In Miller Mechanical, Inc. v. Ruth, 300 So.2d 11 (Fla.1974), we acknowledged that, as a general rule, agreements not to compete were disfavored under common law but that the legislature has created exceptions to this general rule. See § 542.33, Fla.Stat. (1981) (formerly § 542.12). In Miller we recognized that "[t]he court may award damages for breach of contract but the normal remedy is to grant an injunction. This is so because of the inherently difficult, although not impossible, task of determining just what damage actually is caused by the employee's breach of the agreement." 300 So.2d at 12 (citations omitted).
Having determined that injunction is a proper remedy, we face the issue of whether irreparable injury may be presumed upon proof of breach of a valid covenant not to compete. Injury occasioned by such breaches may fall into one or all of three categories: past, ongoing, and potential. To require that a plaintiff prove irreparable injury as a prerequisite to injunctive relief, as petitioner urges, would, in most instances, defeat the purpose of the plaintiffs action. Immediate injunctive relief is the essence of such suits and oftentimes the only effectual relief. It truly can be said in this type of litigation that relief delayed is relief denied. For these reasons we agree with the district court that irreparable injury should be presumed.
Petitioner raises various other points. We agree with the district court's disposition of these points and see no merit in additional discussion.
We approve the decisions of the district court below in Capraro and Silvers. To •the degree it conflicts, we disapprove the decision in Uni-Chem.
It is so ordered.
BOYD, C.J., and ADKINS, ALDERMAN, McDonald and EHRLICH, JJ., concur.
OVERTON, J., dissents with an opinion.