Case Name: CARTER v. SOUTHERN RAILWAY
Court: Supreme Court of South Carolina
Jurisdiction: South Carolina
Decision Date: 1913-01-08
Citations: 93 S.C. 329
Docket Number: 8401
Parties: CARTER v. SOUTHERN RAILWAY.
Judges: Mr. Chiee Justice Gary and Mr. E. M. Rucker, Acting Associate Justice, concur.
Reporter: South Carolina Reports
Volume: 93
Pages: 329–350

Head Matter:
8401
CARTER v. SOUTHERN RAILWAY.
1. Railroads — Negligence—Issues.—Where a person is seen by the engineer and the fireman on the engine for a thousand yards, when the station signal was given, and he made no effort to get off the track and no effort was made to stop the train or to sound the danger signal until too near to stop the train before striking him, there is evidence of negligence for the jury.
2. Ibid. — Ibid.—A railroad company owes due care to one walking on a railroad track where the public have acquired a right to travel.
3. Contributory Negligence. — Where wantonness and wilfulness are eliminated from a case by consent, the defendant is still required to establish his plea of contributory negligence, and if the evidence shows wilfulness, the plea cannot avail.
4. Railroads — Torts.—In an action against a railroad company and its engineer for a joint and several tort, a verdict against the railroad alone should not be set aside. Here the jury may have thought the engineer could not have seen the man on the track, but that the fireman saw him and did not notify the engineer in time.
5. Ibid.- — Contributory Negligence — Issues.—Whether a deaf man, who, when warned of the danger of walking on a railroad track, said he had been brushed by an automobile on the highway and there seemed no place for him to walk, had considered the matter and concluded the railroad track the safer place on which he would be apprised of the approach of a train by the vibration of the track, was guilty of contributory negligence in so walking on the track is for the jury.
MR. Justice Woods, with whom, concurs Mr. Justice Hydricic, dissents, and states the rules governing the reciprocal rights of railroads and persons walking on their tracks.
Before Watts, J., Fairfield, September term, 1911.
Affirmed.
Action by Mary J. Carter, administratrix of J. T. Carter, against Southern Railway Company and J. FI. Flerring. Defendant, Railway Company, appeals on the following exceptions:
1. “Because his Honor erred in refusing to’ grant the motion' for a nonsuit, and tO' direct a verdict in favor of the defendant upon the first ground, which was ‘that there is no evidence in -the case tending to show any breach of duty owed by the defendant to the plaintiff’s intestate, and no evidence of any negligence whatever upon the part of the defendant company that was the proximate cause of his death,’ the error being that the undisputed evidence shows that there was no negligence on the part of the defendant company, its servants or agents, that was the proximate cause of the death of plaintiff’s intestate.
2. “Because his Flonor erred in refusing the motion for a nonsuit, and to direct a verdict upon the second ground urged, which was ‘that the undisputed evidence shows that at the time of his death the deceased was a trespasser upon the track of the defendant company, and there is no evidence of any recklessness, wantonness or wilfulness on the part of the defendant after he was discovered to be on the track that was the proximate cause of his death,’ the error being that under the undisputed facts and law applicable thereto the plaintiff’s intestate was a trespasser upon the track of the defendant company at the time of his death, and there being no evidence of recklessness, wantonness or wilfulness shown, after he was discovered to be on the track, his Honor, therefore, should have granted the motions for a nonsuit, and for the direction of a verdict.
3. “Because his Honor erred in refusing the motion for a nonsuit, and to direct a verdict upon the third ground, which was 'that there is no evidence that this was a traveled place in the legal sense, and no evidence of negligence in striking the plaintiff at a traveled place, which was the proximate cause of 'his death,’ the error being that the complaint, having alleged that the plaintiff’s intestate was walking on the track of the defendant company 'at a traveled place,’ and there being no testimony in law to 'support such allegation, and no evidence of negligence in striking the plaintiff at a 'traveled place,’ his Honor should have granted said motions.
4. “Because his Honor erred in refusing the motion for a nonsuit, and to direct a verdict upon the fourth ground, which was ‘that if the evidence shows that deceased was a licensee upon the track of the defendant company, then there is no evidence of any negligence on the part of the defendant company, or of any breach of any duty that the defendant owed plaintiff’s intestate, if he was a licensee, there being no evidence of any lack of care on the part of the defendant company that was the proximate cause of his death,’ the error being that there was no evidence of negligence on the part of the defendant company, its servants and agents, even if the plaintiff’s intestate was a licensee, but as the testimony clearly showed, under the law, that the plaintiff’s intestate could not be a licensee upon the track of the defendant company at the point where he was struck and killed; there was absolutely no evidence of any breach of duty that the defendant owed the plaintiff’s intestate; as there was no evidence of any lack of care on the part of the defendant company after it discovered plaintiff’s intestate on the track.
5. “Because his Honor erred in not granting the motion for a nonsuit, and for direction of a verdict upon the fifth ground, which was 'that the undisputed evidence shows, that the deceased was guilty of contributory negligence, which was the proximate cause of his death,’ the error being that the undisputed evidence from which no other reasonable inference can be drawn clearly shows that plaintiff’s intestate was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law.
6. “Because his Honor erred in charging the jury as follows : 'Now, I charge you as a matter of law that if the public generally are permitted by a railroad company to travel on their railroad track openly, notoriously, adversely and continuously for twenty years or more, then that makes them licensees. If the railroad company know that they are using their track and traveling over it, that is the public generally for twenty years or more, openly, notoriously, continuously and adversely, against their claim or against their exclusive right to use it themselves and they acquiesce in that and permit it, and don’t order them off and don’t prevent their doing it, then the law says the public generally acquires a right or license to travel up and down that road, to use it as a thoroughfare for the purposes of walking on it’
The Court: “Is the law twenty or ten years ?
Mr. McDonald: “For adverse possession? Ten years adverse possession, twenty years presumption of the grant.
The Court: “If the railroad company permits the public generally to use their railroad track, for a thoroughfare, people to walk on it, and use it as a passway or anything of that sort, openly, notoriously, adversely and continuously for ten years or more, and they acquiesced in it, and consent to it, or don’t raise any row over it, and permit it, if that goes on for ten or more years openly, notoriously, continuously and adversely, then that gives them a permissive right or a license to use the track for that purpose. It doesn’t mean that one man can use it for that length of time. It means the public generally who go up and down the railroad track. The jury must be satisfied that the public generally have continuously, openly, notoriously and adversely for ten years or more traveled the road as a matter of right, and not as a matter of permission, and that the railroad has acquiesced in that, or that they had knowledge of it and permitted it. When that is the case, they are called licensees. That is the public generally has a license to walk up and down the railroad track,” the error being that neither an individual nor the public by use of a railroad track for any length of time can acquire an adverse use thereof, SO' as to ripen into a right to its use, either as licensee or otherwise, and it was error in his Honor to hold and charge otherwise.
7. “Because his Honor erred in charging the jury as follows: ‘If in this case the railroad company was negligent and careless, that is, if the agents and servants of the company failed to observe due care and due precaution so' as not to injure plaintiff’s intestate in this case, that is Carter, if Carter was a licensee, that is, the public had acquired a right to walk up and down this railroad track under the law, as I have given it to- you, and that carelessness and negligence on their part was the cause of the injury to Carter, and Carter didn’t by any act of negligence or carelessness on his part contribute to the direct and proximate cause of his injury, then under circumstances of that sort the plaintiff would be entitled to recover such actual damages sustained proportionate to the injury sustained,’ the error being that plaintiff’s intestate could not acquire a right to the use of defendant’s track at the point where he was killed by adverse use or otherwise, as a matter of law, and the defendant company, its agents and servants, did not owe to him due care as a licensee, and it was error to charge the jury as above set forth.
8. “Because his Honor erred in charging the jury as follows : 'Now, I charge you further as a matter of law that a railroad company in running its cars over its track has a right to assume in the absence of anything to the contrary, or any proof to the contrary, that when a person is walking on its track and they see or hear the approach of a train, or if they give the necessary signals and everything of that sort, they have a right to assume that the party walking on the track will get off the track and get out of the way of the approaching train. At the same time, the law requires the engineer, the party in charge of the train, the locomotive running it, to observe due care and due precaution not to inflict injury on any person that is on the track. They must observe due care and due precaution, exercise the ordinary care, do what an ordinary prudent person would do under similar circumstances not to inflict any injury on any person on the track and gives the necessary signals, and they don’t get off, and there is any reasonable way whereby he can stop the train and prevent the injury, and he doesn’t observe due care and due precaution, but is careless and negligent, and doesn’t observe due care and due precaution and injures any one under circumstances of -that sort/ and the party injured doesn’t by any act of carelessness and negligence on his part in any manner contribute to the direct and proximate cause of his injury, then the party injured or the party suing' for him would have a right to recover such actual damages as be sustained proportionate to the injury sustained,’ the error being that such charge was confusing to the jury, inasmuch as his Honor failed to distinguish between the duty owed a licensee and a trespasser, and thus charged the jury that even if, under the facts, the jury should find that plaintiff’s intestate was a trespasser, still the defendant company would be liable, if it failed to observe due care and due precaution, or failed to exercise ordinary care, whereas the law is that if he was a trespasser, the mere failure to observe due care or ordinary care would not render the defendant liable.
9. “Because his Honor erred in charging the jury as follows: ‘If you think one defendant was careless and negligent, and the other was not, or the agents and servants of the other, was not, then your verdict can be against one of the defendants. You can say, “We find for the plaintiff against the Southern Railway Company so many dollars damages,” sign your name as foreman, or “We find against the defendant, Herring,” and sign your name as foreman,’ the error being that there could be no verdict against the defendant, railway company, unless its codefendant, Herring, was guilty of negligence, and his Honor should have charged the jury that there could be no separate verdict against the defendant, Southern Railway Company, if the jury concluded that defendant, Herring, was not guilty of negligence.
10. “Because his Honor erred in not granting a new trial upon the first ground, which was ‘that the evidence in this case shows that plaintiff’s intestate was a trespasser upon the railroad track at the time he was killed, as he was not injured at a public crossing, street or traveled way, nor in a populous community, where he had acquired a license to be upon the track, and there is no- evidence of wilfulness, wantonness or recklessness on the part of the defendant, its agents and servants,’ the error being that the undisputed evidence showed that plaintiff’s intestate was a trespasser, and there was no evidence of wilfulness, wantonness or recklessness on the part of the defendant, its agents and servants, that was the proximate cause of his death.
12. “Because 'his Honor erred in refusing motion for new trial, upon the second ground, which was, ‘That even if, under the facts and the law, plaintiff’s intestate was a licensee on the track of the defendant company, there is no- evidence o-f any negligence on the part of the defendant company, or any breach of duty that it owed to plaintiff’s intestate, as there was no evidence of any lack of ordinary care on the part of the defendant company or its agents, after discovering him on the track, and the positive testimony shows that the station signal, was, blown, and 'the danger signals were given in ample time for plaintiff’s intestate to, have stepped off the track, and the evidence further shows, that defendant’s agents and servants used every reasonable measure and precaution by applying the emergency brakes to avoid injury to plaintiff’s intestate, after discovering him on the track,’ the error ‘being that even if plaintiff’s intestate was a licensee, 'there was no evidence of negligence on the part of the defendant company, but, on the contrary, the undisputed evidence showed that every reasonable measure and precaution to prevent injury .to- plaintiff’s intestate was observed by defendant’s agents and servants, after discovering him on the track and that he failed to heed the danger signals.
13. “Because his Honor erred in refusing motion for a new trial on the third ground, which was ‘that whether plaintiff’s intestate be considered a trespasser, or a licensee upon defendant’s track, the undisputed testimony shows that he was guilty of contributory negligence, he having gotten upon the track at a time when he knew that defendant’s train was about due, knowing that he was deaf, walking with his back towards the coming train and failing to- look behind him, or to adopt any other means to discover the approaching train, and such contributory negligence on his part was a proximate cause of his death,’ the error being that whether plaintiff’s intestate was a trespasser or a licensee upon the track, the undisputed evidence showed that he was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law, and such contributory negligence was the proximate cause of his death.”
Messrs. B. L. Abney and McDonald, & McDonald, for appellant. Messrs. McDonald & McDonald
cite: Verdict should not stand against one defendant only: 65 S.. C.’332; 67 S. C. 419; 84 S. C. 190; 89 S. C. 408. Deceased ivas a trespasser: 34 S. C. 292, 444; 63 S. C. 46; 86 S. C. 106; 41 S. C. 1; 59 S. C. 433; 64 S. C. 551-7. He was not a licensee: 79 S. W. 238; 118 S. W. 348; 61 S. C. 556; 86 S. C. 106. The public could not acquire the use of the track at the place of the accident: 67 S. C. 499. There is no evidence of breach of duty to license: 2 Thomp. on Neg., secs. 1601, 1736, 1738; 8 S. E. R. 251; 11 Id. 316; 13 Id. 137; 17 Id. 79; 19 Id. 174; 61 Id. 664; 57 S. C. 243. Deceased was g-uiliy of negligence or contributory negligence: 2 Thomp. on Neg., sec. 1782-; 69 Pac. 582; 9 Am. St. R. 436, 630; 23 Am. St. R. 585; 49 Am. St. R. 321; 10 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. (N. S.) 613; 44 Id. 71; 43 Id. 575; 2 White on Per. Ing. on R. R., secs. 1089, 1098; 2 Thomp. on Neg., sec. 1750; 15 A. & E. R. R. Cas. (N. S.) 703; 33 Id. 97; 13 S. E. 978; 33 Cyc. 839-40; 3 S. E. 397; 36 S. E. 117; 61 N. E. 664; 61 S. E. 665; 5 A. & E. Ann. Cas. 77.
Messrs. A. S. & W. D. Douglass, contra. Mr. W. D. Douglass
cites: Deceased was a licensee and his going on the track was not negligence: 90 S.' C. 331, 262. Contributory negligence is for jury in this case: 90 S. C. 331; 65 S. C. 413; 64 S. C. 499; 57 S. C. 243; 68 S. C. 483; 70 S. C. 183; 86 S. C. 100; 82 S. C. 332. Use of public of track was not adverse but permissive: 61 S. C. 556; 68 S. C. 483; 67 S. C. 499; 70 S. C. 183; 90 S. C. 331; 67 S. C. 508; 70 S. C, 183; 90 S. C. 331; 64 S. C. 109. Both master and servant are liable: 65 S. C. 341, 332; 68 S. C. 55; 69 S. C. 1; 11 L. R. A. (N. S.) 352.
Opinions in this case were first filed on October 2, 1912, but ordered reargued before a full Bench at the November term. The case was argued before a full Bench, Mr. E. M. Rucker sitting in place of Mr. Justice Watts, disqualified.
January 8, 1913.

Opinion:
The opinion of the Court was delivered by
Mr. Justice Fraiser.
This was an action for punitive and actual damages brought by the plaintiff as administratrix, for the wrongful killing of her husband by the defendants.
The defendant, J. IT. Herring, was the engineer operating the train that killed the deceased. The verdict was against the railway company alone, and was for twelve thousand five hundred dollars. This verdict was reduced to nine thousand dollars by an order of Hon. R. C. Watts and accepted by the plaintiff. Judgment was entered for nine thousand dollars and costs. From this judgment the defendant railway appealed on the grounds set out in the exceptions, which will be reported.
It seems that the deceased lived near Blackstock, in Fair-field county, and was going to said town to* his business on the morning of the 6th of Juoe, 1910, and walked on the railway track and not on the public highway that adjoined the track. The deceased had been deaf and dumb, but 'he had learned to^ talk, but was still deaf. The complaint alleged that the deceased was traveling on the track where the public had been accustomed to walk for more than twenty years and the deceased had the right to walk there. The defendant claimed that the deceased was a trespasser, and, being deaf, was guilty of contributory negligence in walking on a railroad track, especially when he ought to have known that the train that killed him was due, and walked in the same direction as the approaching train with his back to it.
The defendant moved for a nonsuit, for the direction of a verdict, and for a new trial, all of which were refused except the partial relief of a new trial nisi. The exceptions raise four questions:
I. Was there any evidence to go> to the jury on the. question of negligence of the defendants ?
II. Did the defendants owe to the deceased due care?
III. When the complaint alleged the joint negligence of the two defendants, could judgment be given against one?
IV. Was there indisputable evidence of contributory negligence.
I. Was there any evidence to go to the jury on the question of negligence of the defendants?
There was evidence that the whistle sounded at the whistle post over a thousand feet away, but that the deceased did not get off the track. That from that point the deceased was in full view of those on the engine and it was a question on the nonsuit as to whether they did see him or not. If they did see him, then the question is answered by Haltiwanger v. Railroad Company, 64 S. C. 23, 41 S. E. 810. "An examination of the 'Case' shows that there was some testimony tending to show that the engineer did see the deceased on the track, and as a person walking on a railroad track in front of an approaching train is always 'in a position of apparent danger,' we think there was, at least, some evidence tending to show that the engineer running the train saw that the deceased was in a position of apparent danger; and, therefore, we are of opinion that there was no error in refusing the motion for a nonsuit upon either of the grounds upon which such motion was based."
The testimony for the defendants shows that as a matter of fact both the engineer and fireman saw him. The testimony further shows that for more than a thousand feet the fireman said nothing to' the engineer about it until the engineer had reached for the brake and whistle. He said, "Mr. Herring blew the whistle before I said anything. He reached up to the whistle. I said, we are going to hit him. Hold it." The conductor said, "About the time the brakes went down, we struck him."
Thus it seems that there was evidence that no effort was made to stop the train or give the danger signal until it was apparent that the deceased would be struck.
Again, the flagman said, "Well, I heard the engineer sound the danger signal, and about the same time felt the brakes go on in emergency and I looked out of the window right quick on the right-hand side and saw the man fly out to one side."
The answer to this question is, there was evidence of negligence.
II. Did the defendant owe the deceased due care ?
It is true his Honor erred in charging that the public could acquire a rig'ht to travel the road, but the practical question is, when the agents of the defendant saw the deceased in a position of danger, did they owe him and to humanity due care?
This question is answered by Sanders v. Railway, 90 S. C. 335. "Plaintiff's testimony tended to show that he was struck while walking alongside of defendant's track in a well-beaten path at a place where the general public had been accustomed to walk for many years, without any objection from defendant; that the train which struck him was running backwards, at the -rate of from twelve -to twenty miles an hour, through a populous section of the city of Charleston -at a place where men, women and children were constantly passing -and repassing along defendant's right of way and upon and near its tracks; that the .train ran upon him from behind, without any signal or warning of its approach being given.
"We think this testimony made out a prima facie case for plaintiff. From it the jury might reasonably have inferred that the use of its right of way by the public was known to and acquiesced in by defendant, and, therefore, that plaintiff was a licensee and entitled to- ordinary care on the part o-f defendant to prevent injury to him; and also-, from the frequency of the use 'by the general public, that defendant should have anticipated the presence o-f persons on or near its tracks at that place, and should have exercised due care to prevent injury to them. Jones v. Ry., 61 S. C. 556, 39 S. E. 758; Matthews v. Ry., 67 S. C. 499, 46 S. E. 335; McKeown v. R. Co., 68 S. C. 483, 47 S. E. 713; Goodwin v. R. Co., 82 S. C. 321, 64 S. E. 242; Bamberg v. R Co., 72 S. C. 389, 51 S. E. 988; Lamb v. R. Co., 86 S. C. 106, 67 S. E. 958."
The testimony here showed that the railroad track to Blacksto-ck had been used for more than twenty years by pedestrians without objection and a great many people used it. But if the deceased had been a trespasser, then in Jones v. Railway, 61 S. C. 559, 39 S. E. 758, it is said: "It is the trespasser's duty to- lookout for himself and to give the railway company a clear track by getting.out of the way. If, however, -the servants of the railroad company should discover a trespasser upon the track, and should then fail to use ordinary care under the circumstances to avoid running him down, this would be evidence from which a jury might infer that the injury was the result no-t o-f mere inadvertence, but of a conscious f ailure to observe due care or of wantonness or wilfulness."
It may be said that wanto-nness and wilfulness had been eliminated from the case. As a foundation f-o-r punitive damages, they were eliminated from the case, but the defendant was still required to- make o-ut its affirmative defense of contrbufo-ry negligence and if the facts subsequently proven showed wilfulness, the p-lea could not prevail.
III. When the complaint alleged the joint negligence of the two defendants, could judgment be given against one?
This question is answered by several comparatively recent cases, and the answer is that it cao. Ruddell v. Ry., 75 S. C. 293-4, 55 S. E. 528. "In the next place, it is insisted the verdict should have been set aside 'because the fact, that the finding was against the railroad company and not against its agent, who was directly responsible for the digging and proper guarding of the hole, shows that the verdict was due to prejudice or partiality; the evidence of negligence and wantonness being much stronger against him than against the railroad company. There was no error of law in refusing the motion on this ground, 'because the liability of -the railway company and Brinkley, its agents and codefendant, was joint and several. Schumpert v. Railway and Hutchinson, 65 S. C. 332, 43 S. E. 813; Gardner v. Railway Company and Pierson, 65 S. C. 341, 43 S. E. 816; Carson v. Railway, Arwood and Miller, 68 S. C. 55, 46 S. E. 525."
The testimony was not clear as to what the engineer could see on the left of the center of the track. The jury may have thought that the engineer's view was obstructed by the boiler and that the fireman, the agent of the defendant company, who was on the left side of the engine, was at fault in not notifying him of the danger in time.
IV. Was there indisputable evidence of contributory negligence ?
The deceased had been warned not to -go on the railroad track and his reply "that an automobile had brushed his clothes and it looked as if there was no place for him to walk on the railroad or public road." There was evidence that when his employer desired to attract the attention of the deceased,, he stamped the floor and the deceased feeling the vibrations of the floor, gave attention. The deceased seems to have depended on the telephonic message of a coming train transmitted along the railroad irons and perceived through his feet.
The deceased had considered the matter and seemed to have considered the railroad the safer place. He had considered the matter and it was for the jury ho say whether his conclusion was negligently formed or was simply an error of judgment.
The judgment of this Court is that the judgment appealed from be affirmed.
Mr. Chiee Justice Gary and Mr. E. M. Rucker, Acting Associate Justice, concur.
Mr. Justice Watts, disqualified.