Case Name: MEREDITH v. STATE
Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1918-06-12
Citations: 211 S.W. 227
Docket Number: No. 4941
Parties: MEREDITH v. STATE.
Judges: 
Reporter: South Western Reporter
Volume: 211
Pages: 227–230

Head Matter:
(85 Tex. Cr. R. 239)
MEREDITH v. STATE.
(No. 4941.)
(Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
June 12, 1918.
On Motion for Rehearing, April 23, 1919.)
1. Criminal Law <&wkey;511(2) — Accomplice Testimony — Corroboration.
The law does not require that the evidence, independently of that of an accomplice, should establish guilt, but only that there should be criminative facts proved which tend to connect accused definitely and immediately with the commission of the offense.
2. Criminal Law <&wkey;511(l) — Accomplice Testimony— Corroboration — Sufficiency.
In a prosecution for burglary, evidence corroborating the accomplice testimony, implicating defendant as a principal, held sufficient to support verdict of guilty.
3. Criminal Law <&wkey;59(3) — Guilt as Prin-cipai>-Presence at Scene oe Crime.
The mere presence of defendant at the scene of a burglary would not make him guilty as a principal.
On Motion for Rehearing.
4. Criminal Law <&wkey;33S(2) — Circumstantial Evibence — Attainability oe Direct Evidence,.
Where positive and direct evidence is attainable, it is not permissible for the state to resort to circumstances to verify or prove a fact.
5. Criminal Law <&wkey;562, 1036(1) — Appeal-Reservation oe Objections — Circumstantial Evidence.
To invoke the rule with reference to the inadmissibility of circumstantial evidence, where positive and direct evidence is attainable, it is necessary to urge it at trial, any failure to object being a waiver; but conviction cannot stand unless the evidence is sufficient to overcome the presumption of innocence and to establish necessary facts.
6. Burglary <&wkey;41(l) — Circumstantial Evidence— Sueeiciency.
In a prosecution for burglary of a store, circumstantial evidence that defendant did not have the owner’s consent to enter and take the property held sufficient to support conviction.
Appeal from District Court, Caldwell County; M. C. Jeffrey, Judge.
Clyde Meredith was convicted of burglary, and appeals.
Affirmed.
Graves & Williamson, of Lockhart, for appellant.
E. B. Hendricks, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.

Opinion:
MORROW, J.
The conviction is for the offense of burglary. It appears that Van Dusen was the owner of a country store near Lytton Springs, which was burglarized on the 29th of May, 1917. Van Dusen said that he alone attended to the store; that he closed it and fastened the doors and windows about dusk; that on the following morning he found the doors had been broken open; that he gave appellant, and no other one, consent to do so; that a number of articles, including soda water in bottles, had been taken from the store. Bottles of the same brand were two or three days later found in a field near the road, as though thrown into the field from the road. They were a half mile from the store and in the direction of Mendoza, winch was other than that which would be traveled in going to Lockhart.
George Dillard testified: That he, together with appellant and his brother, Joe Meredith, got a buggy from. Mr. Sternberg, starting on a fishing trip. That on the way they made an agreement to go into Van Dusen's store. He said that they passed the store without stopping, because they saw a buggy coming from the opposite direction toward the store. They met the buggy, which was occupied by .Mr. Smith and Mr. Strong. After some conversation with these parties, the witness and his alleged companions and Smith drove back past the store; Strong getting out at his home on the way. After passing the store a short distance, at the fork of the road, they separated, Smith going towards his home, and the witness and his companions taking the road toward Lockhart, subsequently turning around, however, and driving back to the store. Joe Meredith, he said, went in one of the side doors, which he forced open, while appellant and the witness were watching to see if anybody came. Joe got some soda water, and then appellant went in, and he thought he got a box of candy. He (witness) did not go in the.store. That after appellant and his brother came out they showed witness soda water, candy, and sausages. They then went up the road toward Mendoza, drinking soda water and throwing the bottles out on the side of the road.
Mr. Sternberg testified that appellant and Dillard arranged with him and his brother for a. buggy, which was later turned over to them; that he did not know when they returned, but saw tire buggy back in the yard next morning. This was some 10 days before the witness heard of the burglary of Van Dusen's store.
Smith testified that, on the night that the store was burglarized, he started for his home from Lytton Springs about 10 o'clock. Strawn was with him. They stopped at Strawn's house, which was some 200 yards from Van Dusen's store, between Lytton's Springs and Van Dusen's store. Appellant, his brother, and George Dillard came up in a buggy and had a conversation for a while, after which Strawn went into his house, and witness,' 'appellant, and his companions drove down the road, passing Van Dusen's store; witness turning off towards his home, and the others driving on towards Lockhart. He heard of the burglary next day. The witness thought it was about 10 o'clock when they first met, and that he reached home about 10:30 o'clock. A witness for appellant testified that he met appellant and his brother and another person driving in a buggy on the night in question, about 5 or 6 miles from Van Dusen's store in the direction of Lockhart, in which direction they were traveling. This the witness thought was about 10 o'clock. The witness was not certain this occurred on the night of the burglary. Another witness testified to the same facts. Clayton Meredith, a brother of appellant, testified that he saw appellant and his brother Joe and Dillard start out in Sternberg's buggy about sundown. He next saw them about 11 o'clock that night when they came in; that he was positive that appellant returned at that time, but was not certain with reference to Dillard coming at that time or not; did not see him. Appellant testified that he had arranged to go to Lytton Springs, in that neighborhood, and that Dillard requested the privilege of accompanying him; that they left Lockhart about sundown in Sternberg's buggy; that they reached the point on the edge of Bastrop county, which was his destination, about 8 or 8:30 in the evening, remaining there about 15 minuteé, and returning, overtook Smith and Strawn between Lytton Springs and Van Dusen's store; stopped and talked with them at Strawn's store probably a half an hour; drove in company with Smith some 700 or 800 yards from Strawn's house, separating at the fork of the road; that he and his companions continued their trip toward Lockhart, met Mr. Ebersole and Mr. Starling on the road about 6 miles from Van Dusen's store, reaching home about 11 o'clock. He denied any connection with, or knowledge of the burglary.
The question is: Is there sufficient, evidence corroborating the accomplice? The law does not require that the evidence, independent of that of the accomplice, should establish guilt. Nourse v. State, 2 Tex. App. 317, and other cases listed in Branch's Ann. P. C. § 719. It requires only that there should be criminative facts proved which tend to connect the accused directly and immediately with the commission of the offense. Welden v. State, 10 Tex. App. 400 and other eases listed in Branch's Ann. P. C. p. 368. Our statute on the subject is as follows:
"A conviction cannot be bad upon tbe testimony of an accomplice, unless corroborated by other evidence tending to connect the defendant •with the offense committed; and the corroboration is not sufficient, if it merely shows the commission of the offense."
On the subject we quote from Wharton, Crim. Ev. vol. 2, § 442, as follows:
"There may be many witnesses, therefore, who give testimony which agrees with that of the accomplice, but which, if it does not serve to identify the accused parties, is no corroboration of the accomplice; the real danger being that the accomplice should relate the circumstances truly, and at the same time attribute a share in the transaction to an innocent person. It may, indeed, be taken that it is almost the universal opinion that the testimony of the accomplice should be corroborated as to the person of the prisoner against whom he speaks."
The evidence shows that the burglary was committed. The accomplice testifies that appellant participated. The evidence, independent of the accomplice, tends to show that appellant was present at the time the offense was committed, and was the companion of the accomplice before and after its commission. The accomplice and appellant started together, were seen together near the burglarized premises, and according to appellant's own testimony remained together throughout the journey and returned together. It is true, as contended by appellant, that his mere presence would not alone make him guilty as a principal;'but, the accomplice having testified to facts showing that appellant was a principal, the other facts showing that, at the time and place the offense was committed, he was present with the accomplice we think meets the requirements of the law intending to establish his identity as one of those who committed the offense. We are therefore constrained to believe that we are not authorized to sustain appellant's contention that the evidence fails to support the conviction.
The judgment of the lower court is therefore affirmed.
(gssFor otter cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes