Case Name: W.O. "Chet" DILLARD and Others in Like or Similar Circumstances v. Governor Ronnie MUSGROVE, Lieutenant Governor Amy Tuck, House Speaker Tim Ford, and the Public Employees Retirement System of the State of Mississippi in Their Official Capacity and Not Individually
Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Mississippi
Decision Date: 2003-02-13
Citations: 838 So. 2d 261
Docket Number: No. 2001-CP-00247-SCT
Parties: W.O. “Chet” DILLARD and Others in Like or Similar Circumstances v. Governor Ronnie MUSGROVE, Lieutenant Governor Amy Tuck, House Speaker Tim Ford, and the Public Employees Retirement System of the State of Mississippi in Their Official Capacity and Not Individually.
Judges: PITTMAN, C.J., WALLER, CARLSON AND GRAVES, JJ., CONCUR. EASLEY, J., DISSENTS WITHOUT SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION. PITTMAN, C.J., CONCURS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION JOINED BY SMITH, P.J., WALLER AND CARLSON, JJ. WALLER, J., CONCURS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION JOINED BY PITTMAN, C.J., SMITH, P.J., AND CARLSON, J. McRAE, P.J., DISSENTS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION. COBB AND DIAZ, JJ., NOT PARTICIPATING.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 838
Pages: 261–270

Head Matter:
W.O. “Chet” DILLARD and Others in Like or Similar Circumstances v. Governor Ronnie MUSGROVE, Lieutenant Governor Amy Tuck, House Speaker Tim Ford, and the Public Employees Retirement System of the State of Mississippi in Their Official Capacity and Not Individually.
No. 2001-CP-00247-SCT.
Supreme Court of Mississippi.
Feb. 13, 2003.
W.O. “Chet” Dillard, Pro Se, E. Michael Marks, Jackson, attorney for appellants.
Roger Googe, Jackson, David B. Miller, attorneys for appellees.

Opinion:
SMITH, P.J.,
for the Court.
¶ 1. W.O. "Chet" Dillard filed a complaint in Hinds County Chancery Court alleging that the Supplemental Legislative Retirement Plan ("SLRP") violates his equal protection rights guaranteed under the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution since legislators and the Lieutenant Governor receive retirement benefits under both the Public Employees' Retirement System ("PERS") and SLRP while other state employees only receive benefits under PERS. The chancery court denied Dillard's motion for summary judgment and granted the M.R.C.P. 12(b) motion to dismiss filed by Governor Ronnie Musgrove, Lieutenant Governor Amy Tuck, House Speaker Ford, and PERS ("defendants").
¶2. On appeal Dillard argues that the trial court erroneously treated the defendants' motion to dismiss as a motion for summary judgment and reasserts his argument that SLRP violates his equal protection rights. He also challenges only legislators being allowed to include expenses in "earned compensation" to be attributed toward retirement. Further, he asserts that PERS is not a state agency, that it is improper for liaison members of the Legislature to meet with the Board of Trustees of PERS for the benefit of the Legislature, and that the Lieutenant Governor cannot simultaneously be a member of the executive and legislative branches of the state government.
¶ 3. We affirm the judgment of the chancery court.
FACTS
¶ 4. Dillard has served Mississippi in several capacities over the years and is now receiving state employee retirement benefits under PERS, Miss.Code Ann. § 25-11-1 to 25-11-145 (Rev.1999 & Supp.2002). SLRP was enacted in 1989 to give legislators, as well as the Lieutenant Governor, retirement benefits in addition to those they receive under PERS. Miss. Code Ann. § 25-11-301 to 25-11-3109 (Rev.1999 & Supp.2002). Other state employees, including the Governor, draw from only one retirement system. The State contributions to retirement, which are a percentage of each member's compensation that the State pays to the Board of Trustees of PERS, are higher under SLRP than under PERS. Also, "all remuneration or amounts paid, except mileage allowance" are included as compensation under SLRP, but not under PERS. Compare Id. § 25-11-307(1) with Id. § 25-11-103. Further, SLRP allows legislators and the Lieutenant Governor to receive up to 100% of what they receive under PERS. Id. § 25-11-309.
¶ 5. During the 2000 Regular Session, the Legislature amended SLRP to substantially increase participant and State contribution percentages to SLRP. After much public criticism, Governor Musgrove called the Legislature into extraordinary session wherein the increased contribution percentages were repealed. Before the enactments to SLRP were repealed, Dillard filed a complaint in the Chancery Court of the First Judicial District of Hinds County against defendants seeking declaratory and injunctive relief alleging that SLRP violates the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.
¶ 6. The defendants filed a M.R.C.P. 12(b) motion to dismiss asserting, among other grounds, that Dillard's prayer for relief was mooted by the intervening repeal of portions of Miss.Code Ann. § 25-11-307 & -309, that he failed to state an equal protection violation, and that he failed to state a claim under Article 4, § 46 of the Mississippi Constitution. Dillard subsequently filed a motion for summary judgment supported by his affidavit. The court granted defendants' motion to strike certain portions of Dillard's affidavit. As the case proceeded, all parties agreed there were no genuine issues of material fact and the issues presented were entirely legal issues. After oral arguments on the motions, the special chancellor, appointed by this Court, issued an opinion and final judgment denying Dillard's motion for summary judgment and granting the motion to dismiss on the merits.
¶ 7. Dillard timely appealed to this Court and later sought recusal of all Justices who previously served in the Legislature as well as consolidation with another case before us at the time, Public Employees Retirement System v. Hawkins, 781 So.2d 899 (Miss.2001), wherein all Justices had recused themselves. We denied consolidation and discretionary recusal and now address the issues raised in his appeal here. Even though the contribution percentages of the amendments to SLRP were repealed, the broader challenge that SLRP violates the equal protection clause is still at issue.
DISCUSSION
¶ 8. This is a case of first impression for this Court. The issue is whether a specified portion of a branch of state government and select groups of another branch can supplement over and above the general retirement system. The Legislature has carved out an exception for Mississippi Highway Safety Patrol officers to have a separate retirement system with more benefits. See Miss.Code Ann. § 25-13-1 to -33 (Rev.1999 & Supp.2002). The Fifth Circuit upheld that statute as constitutional and noted that the legislative purpose of the statute was attributed to the dangerous nature of a patrolman's job. See Anderson v. Winter, 631 F.2d 1238, 1240 (5th Cir.1980).
¶ 9. When providing varying benefits to different classes of employees the only requirement is to "look to see whether the distinction has a rational relationship to a legitimate state interest." Jackson Firefighters Ass'n Local 87 v. City of Jackson, 736 F.2d 209, 213 (5th Cir.1984). Further, "[a] legislative enactment is cloaked with a presumption of constitutionality, and in order to rebut this presumption the unconstitutionality must appear beyond reasonable doubt." State v. Jones, 726 So.2d 572, 574 (Miss.1998) (citation omitted). Since the SLRP statute does not interfere with a fundamental right and does not create a suspect class, it violates the equal protection clause only if we find that the statute is not "rationally or reasonably related to a proper legislative purpose." Id. at 574.
¶ 10. The U.S. Supreme Court has spoken on this matter:
equal protection is not a license for courts to judge the wisdom, fairness, or logic of legislative choices. In areas of social and economic policy, a statutory classification that neither proceeds along suspect lines nor infringes fundamental constitutional rights must be upheld against equal protection challenge if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification.
FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313, 321, 113 S.Ct. 2096, 124 L.Ed.2d 211 (1993).
¶ 11. As articulated by the defendants, the rational bases for the enactment of SLRP are (1) the inherent uncertainty in holding a legislative office, (2) the hours during which the legislators are on call to their constituents; (3) the time taken away from other gainful employment or business enterprise; and (4) the need to attract capable, qualified persons to these elected positions. These reasons are certainly plausible, and there was clearly a reasonable basis for the Legislature to create SLRP and a rational relationship between its provisions and legitimate State interests. Clearly, absence from other gainful employment for, at times, an indefinite period of time would potentially put a terrible strain on that business. The uncertainty in serving in the Legislature is a legitimate concern. Additionally, the need to attract capable, qualified people to these four-year elective positions is certainly needed incentive. While the factors listed might be different from a patrolman, nonetheless, they are legitimate, reasonable, and plausible. Thus judicial intervention by this Court is unwarranted.
¶ 12. This Court has held that "a state may confer benefits on some and not others under equal protection, so long as its decision is rational." Westbrook v. City of Jackson, 665 So.2d 833, 838 (Miss.1995). Furthermore, in apportioning limited resources, governments "need not provide the same level of benefits to all recipients." Baker v. City of Concord, 916 F.2d 744, 748 (1st Cir.1990). The rational basis standard of review is highly deferential to the legislative branch. Turner v. Glick-man, 207 F.3d 419, 426 (7th Cir.2000). Also, the United States Supreme Court has held that statutory distinctions based on the character of employment (i.e., service as a legislator versus as a state trooper) rather than its duration do not violate the equal protection clause. United States R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 178, 101 S.Ct. 463, 66 L.Ed.2d 368 (1980).
¶ 13. Although some might question the wisdom, fairness, or logic of the Legislature's decision in establishing SLRP, that is not the function of this Court. It is clear United States Supreme Court precedent holds that so long as it is based upon the rational basis, the Legislature may properly establish a different system of benefits for a specific group such as we have here, i.e., Legislators and the Lieutenant Governor. In referring to the rational basis test, the Supreme Court stated: "Where there are 'plausible reasons' for Congress' action, 'our inquiry is at an end.' " Beach Communications, 508 U.S. at 313-14, 113 S.Ct. 2096 (quoting, Fritz, 449 U.S. at 179, 101 S.Ct. at 461). The Fifth Circuit has addressed this issue and in rejecting the claim of the Bureau of Narcotics Agents who challenged the separate retirement plan that the Mississippi Legislature established for the Mississippi Highway Patrol, noted that "if the challenged classification bears a reasonable relationship to the accomplishment of some legitimate governmental objective, the statute must be upheld." Anderson, 631 F.2d at 1241. Additionally, that court noted that even though the argument of the narcotic agents appeared reasonable, the argument "is made in the wrong forum. It must be addressed to the Mississippi Legislature." Id. Thus, the remedy Dillard seeks from this Court is not judicial, but is political. The proper forum to address his concerns is the Legislature which clearly has the sole authority to establish different systems of benefits for any group including themselves, so long as the judgment of the Legislature has a rational basis for classifying that group differently.
¶ 14. Under Dye v. State ex rel. Hale, 507 So.2d 332, 344-47 (Miss.1987), the Lieutenant Governor may properly exercise some legislative functions as delegated by the Senate. Therefore, the Legislature is within its authority to allow the Lieutenant Governor the privilege of participation along with the Legislature in SLRP.
¶ 15. The benefits which Dillard receives under PERS are in no way diminished by SLRP. Thus, he has failed to state a claim which could be deemed a violation of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. See Jackson Firefighters, 736 F.2d at 213. Dillard has alleged no harm that he has suffered which can be distinguished from any other retiree who receives PERS benefits. Absent an allegation that Dillard's benefits were impaired, his complaint alleging SLRP created disproportionate benefits did not state a claim and Dillard's challenge must fail. See Heath v. New York State Teachers Ret. Bd., 79 A.D.2d 838, 435 N.Y.S.2d 136 (N.Y.App.Div.1980). See also Patton v. Fed. Security Agency, 69 F.Supp. 282 (E.D.N.Y.1946).
¶ 16. Here there are "plausible reasons" for the Legislature's actions and when the rational basis test is applied and considered, this Court cannot judge the wisdom of the adoption of SLRP. Such is the prerogative of the Legislature. There are clearly no material factual issues yet to be determined. We have it all before us at this time for decision. Dillard cannot prevail as a matter of law.
CONCLUSION
¶ 17. There is no violation of the equal protection clause. See Fritz, 449 U.S. at 178 n. 11, 101 S.Ct. 453. The judgment of the chancery court is affirmed. Additionally, we affirm the special chancellor's holding that the Attorney General may represent PERS. It is unnecessary to address the other issues raised on appeal.
¶ 18. AFFIRMED.
PITTMAN, C.J., WALLER, CARLSON AND GRAVES, JJ., CONCUR. EASLEY, J., DISSENTS WITHOUT SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION. PITTMAN, C.J., CONCURS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION JOINED BY SMITH, P.J., WALLER AND CARLSON, JJ. WALLER, J., CONCURS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION JOINED BY PITTMAN, C.J., SMITH, P.J., AND CARLSON, J. McRAE, P.J., DISSENTS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION. COBB AND DIAZ, JJ., NOT PARTICIPATING.
. Dillard has served as a Chancellor, the Commissioner of Public Safety, a District At torney, an Assistant Attorney General, and as a member of the military.
. Member contributions were increased from 3% to 6%. The State was to pay an amount equal to member contributions termed "normal contributions", i.e. match the 6%, in addition to an "accrued liability contribution." The accrued liability contribution was increased from 6 1/3% to 17.09% through the 2000 amendments. See Miss.Code Ann. § 25-11-307 (Supp.2002) Amendment Notes.
. Normal contribution percentages were returned to 3%, and the accrued liability contribution was returned to 6 1/3%. See id.