Case Name: Raymond L. and Jerry B. HOFFMAN v. SCHWEGMANN GIANT SUPER MARKETS, INC., John Doe, Jack Doe, et al.
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1990-12-27
Citations: 572 So. 2d 825
Docket Number: No. 89-CA-1320
Parties: Raymond L. and Jerry B. HOFFMAN v. SCHWEGMANN GIANT SUPER MARKETS, INC., John Doe, Jack Doe, et al.
Judges: Before BARRY, KLEES, WILLIAMS, PLOTKIN and BECKER, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 572
Pages: 825–830

Head Matter:
Raymond L. and Jerry B. HOFFMAN v. SCHWEGMANN GIANT SUPER MARKETS, INC., John Doe, Jack Doe, et al.
No. 89-CA-1320.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fourth Circuit.
Dec. 27, 1990.
Writ Denied March 1, 1991.
G. Patrick Hand, Jr., Hand & Markey, New Orleans, for plaintiffs.
Stephen M. Little, Blue, Williams, & Buckley, Metairie, for defendant.
Before BARRY, KLEES, WILLIAMS, PLOTKIN and BECKER, JJ.

Opinion:
KLEES, Judge.
This is an appeal by defendant, Schweg-mann Giant Super Markets, from a judgment awarding damages to plaintiffs for injuries sustained by Ms. Hoffman in a slip and fall accident. After reviewing the record and applicable law, we affirm.
On the morning of August 30, 1981, Ms. Hoffman entered the Schwegmann store located at 3620 Veterans Memorial Blvd. in Metairie. She proceeded down the aisle, selected some hair coloring and placed it in her basket. When she attempted to push her basket to continue shopping, she slipped and fell, hitting her right ankle and landing on her left hip, back and hand. Ms. Hoffman testified that she did not look to see what, if anything, caused her to fall.
Ms. Sue B. Mallaun witnessed the accident and testified that she went to Ms. Hoffman's aid and cradled Ms. Hoffman until Mr. Hoffman arrived moments later. Mallaun testified that she did not notice if anything was on the floor in the aisle.
Mr. Hoffman entered the store moments after his wife's fall. When he saw his wife on the floor, Mr. Hoffman went to her side. The two remained in the aisle for approximately fifteen minutes.
Plaintiffs both testified that a Schweg-mann employee identified only as "Mike" then assisted Ms. Hoffman to the front of the store. They stated that Mike then left for a few minutes and went to the site of Ms. Hoffman's fall. They testified that Mike returned and said that there was some hair styling gel which had overturned on a shelf and had dripped onto the floor where plaintiff fell. Over defense counsel's objection, this testimony was introduced first as a declaration against interest and later as "res gestae". After the bench trial, the trial court ruled against defendants and in favor of plaintiffs.
Defendant first contends that the trial court erred in admitting the hearsay testimony of Mike over their objection because plaintiffs failed to introduce any evidence to substantiate that Mike was a Schwegmann's employee or that his statements were within the scope of his employment or agency. We disagree.
La.C.E. art. 801 D(3)(a) provides that "a statement by an agent or employee of the party against whom it is offered concerning a matter within the scope of his agency or employment" is not hearsay. This article goes beyond the traditional "speaking agent" rationale and permits the introduction of such a statement whenever it concerns a matter within the scope of the speaker's agency or employment. A statement is not hearsay if it meets two criteria: (1) it was made by an agent or employee of the party against whom it is offered and (2) it concerns a matter within the scope of his agency or employment, made during the existence of the relationship. Before a statement offered under that provision may be admitted, the party offering the statement must present evidence sufficient to establish that both criteria are met.
In the instant case, there is ample evidence unrebutted in the record to establish employment and scope of employment outside of the statement itself. Mr. Hoffman testified that "Mike" identified himself as a security guard for Schwegmann's. There was also testimony of Ms. Mallaun that a man in a white shirt and tie asked her to come to the office and give a statement, Ms. Hoffman's testimony that Mike was present with the assistant manager on the scene, that Mike got a wheel chair, that plaintiffs went with Mike to a small cubical to fill out an accident form, that Mike in front of the assistant manager told Mr. Hoffman that they would take care of any medical bills, that Mike helped push plaintiff to the car in a wheelchair, and Ms. Hoffman's testimony that Mike filled out forms and had her sign them. In addition, Schwegmann admits in its "Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion for a New Trial or, Alternatively, Remittitur" that "Mike" was subsequently identified as a Schwegmann's employee named Tony La-Fauci. In the absence of rebuttal evidence, the trial judge was not manifestly erroneous in finding that an employer-employee relationship existed. Further, a slip-and-fall accident certainly comes within the scope of a security guard's employment.
It should also be noted that defendant might have had Mr. Lafauci testify to whether or not he saw hair gel on the floor where plaintiff fell. Defendant's failure to call the security guard gives rise to a presumption that he would have testified adversely to defendant's position. Ruthardt v. Tennant, 252 La. 1041, 215 So.2d 805 (La.1968); Bastrop State Bank v. Levy, 106 La. 586, 31 So. 164 (La.1901).
Thus the statement of "Mike" was not hearsay and the trial court was not mani festly erroneous in finding that a hazardous substance did exist on the floor'causing plaintiff to fall.
Defendant next contends that 'the trial court abused its discretion by awarding excessive damages. The trier of fact has much discretion in assessing the measure or amount of damages to award a plaintiff. In reviewing damages awards, an appellate court may not disturb an award unless the record reflects that the trier of fact abused its discretion in making the award. In determining whether there has been an abuse of discretion, the reviewing court must consider the particular facts and circumstances of each ease rather than merely reviewing prior awards. Reck v. Stevens, 373 So.2d 498 (La.1979). Once a clear abuse of discretion is found, the appellate court may look to prior awards to determine the range of damages found where injuries are similar to plaintiff's.
The trial court awarded $30,000 for physical pain and suffering, $60,000 for mental pain and suffering, $8000 for loss of consortium for the husband, and $7800 for lost wages. Under the individual circumstances of this case, we find no abuse of discretion. The trial judge was impressed with the testimony of the plaintiff. Furthermore, the factual basis for the awards is supported by credible evidence in the record. Consequently, we find that the awards do not constitute an abuse of the trial court's broad discretion. We therefore affirm those awards.
AFFIRMED.
. Defendant issued a subpoena to Tyronne La-fauci, who was personally served on February lo, 1989, but did not call him to testify.