Case Name: DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION and the State Board of Education, Appellants, v. The SCHOOL BOARD OF COLLIER COUNTY, Florida et al., Appellees
Court: Florida Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1981-02-26
Citations: 394 So. 2d 1010
Docket Number: No. 56570
Parties: DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION and the State Board of Education, Appellants, v. The SCHOOL BOARD OF COLLIER COUNTY, Florida et al., Appellees.
Judges: ENGLAND, ALDERMAN and MCDONALD, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 394
Pages: 1010–1015

Head Matter:
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION and the State Board of Education, Appellants, v. The SCHOOL BOARD OF COLLIER COUNTY, Florida et al., Appellees.
No. 56570.
Supreme Court of Florida.
Feb. 26, 1981.
James D. Little, Gen. Counsel, State Bd. of Ed., Tallahassee, for appellants.
James H. Siesky, Naples, for appellees.
Larry Levy of Dickinson, Levy & Taylor, Tallahassee, and Louis F. Ray, Jr. and Robert W. Kievit, Pensacola, for Escambia County School Bd., amicus curiae.
Douglas K. Sands, Stuart, for School Bd. of Martin County, amicus curiae.
Talbot D’Alemberte of Steel, Hector & Davis, Miami, and Sharyn L. Smith, House of Representatives, Tallahassee, for Hyatt Brown, amicus curiae.

Opinion:
OVERTON, Justice.
This appeal concerns the constitutionality of a condition in the 1978-79 appropriations bill guaranteeing a minimum increase of 7.25 percent in school funding for all counties except those counties that have a millage value per student of more than twenty percent over the statewide average.
The School Board of Collier County, one of four counties excluded from this 7.25 percent guaranteed increase, brought this action alleging this appropriation condition was unconstitutional under article III, section 12, of the Florida Constitution on the principal grounds the condition amended and modified the substantive law already in effect and contained in section 236.081(6)(c), Florida Statutes (1977).
This action commenced in a declaratory judgment proceeding, and the circuit court made the following findings in its final judgment:
4. Item 353A within that appropriations bill eliminated minimum level funding for those School .Districts whose value of a mill per WFTE exceeded the statewide average of 20% or more.
5. The action taken in paragraph 4 above constitutes a modification of the substantive law expressed in Florida Statute 236.081(6)(c).
6. That portion of Item 353A, 78 — 401 Laws of Florida which purports to deny minimum level funding to some districts is contrary to the precepts of Art. Ill Section 12 of the Florida Constitution.
7. Plaintiffs have suffered irreparable injury as a result of Item 353A 78-401 Laws of Florida and will continue to suffer such injury in the future unless this Court takes remedial action.
8. Plaintiffs have a right to minimum funding under the provisions of Florida Statute Section 236.081(6)(c).
10. No allegation has been made regarding the constitutionality of the 7.25% increase in minimum level funding that is stated in the Appropriations Act of 1978.
11. Even if the allegation stated in paragraph 10 had been made, the 7.25% increase is a permissible matter for inclusion in an appropriations act under the doctrine of Thomas v. Askew, 270 So.2d 707 (Fla.1972).
The trial court then specifically struck from the appropriations bill the following portion of Item 353A: "except that those districts with a value of a mill per WFTE 20% or more over the statewide average value of a mill per WFTE shall not receive such guarantee," and directed the Department of Education to give full force and effect to the remaining portion of Item 353A. The effect of this ruling was to give the benefit of this 7.25 percent increase to the four excluded county school districts which produced the most tax dollars from their assessment of property. Proportionate equality in the distribution of school funds was not relied on by the trial judge and is not an issue in these proceedings.
We disagree with the holding of the trial judge and reverse. For the reasons expressed, we find the 7.25 percent guaranteed increase in funding is a supplement to the statutory formula in existence at the time the appropriations bill was adopted. We recognize that an appropriations bill must not change or amend existing law on subjects, other than appropriations, but that principle is subject to the exception that a general appropriations bill may allocate state funds for an authorized purpose in amounts in addition to those previously allocated or substitute adequate specific appropriations for continuing appropriations. Brown v. Firestone, 382 So.2d 654 (Fla.1980); Thomas v. Askew, 270 So.2d 707 (Fla.1972); In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 239 So.2d 1 (Fla.1970).
Section 236.081, Florida Statutes, contains very complicated formulae and variables which are devoted to determining the annual state allocation to each school district. These variables include funds generated locally from real estate property taxes and funds contributed to the local school districts by the state from various revenue sources. To ensure that school districts do not receive less money than they received in the prior budget year, there is a "no loss" or "hold harmless" provision in section 236.-081(6)(c), which reads in part as follows: "[Notwithstanding any of the provisions herein, each district shall be guaranteed a minimum level of funding in the amount and manner prescribed . " The effect of this provision guarantees a minimum level of funding for the new year, ensuring the district that its allocation will not fall below the level of funding from the previous year. It acts as an alternative to the allocation formula set forth in prior sections.
The School Board of Collier County contends this "hold harmless" provision was amended by the 7.25 percent guaranteed increase condition in the appropriations bill. We disagree and find the condition was a one-time 7.25 percent guaranteed supplemental increase for all but those four districts which received revenue from property taxes in an amount twenty percent above the average for all districts.
The appellees concede that the legislature, if it desires, may allocate more funds to property poor counties than it does to property rich counties. Their claim of unconstitutionality rests solely on whether the condition modifies an existing statute. The Collier County district and the three other districts did not receive less than they received in the prior budget year, and, in fact, the Collier County district actually recognized a 7.13 percent increase under the statutory formula. All the excluded county school districts were entitled to the funds properly allocated under the provisions of the formula set forth in section 236.081. What they did not receive was the one-time additional 7.25 percent guaranteed increase for the year 1978-79. The "hold harmless" provision of section 236.081(6Xc) does not conflict with the concept of a guaranteed 7.25 percent increase for districts with a logical need as determined by the legislature. This "hold harmless" provision was not amended and in fact was not activated because all districts received an increase over the previous year's funding. Under the present statutory scheme, the legislature cannot reduce in the appropriations bill the amount the four excluded districts would receive as determined by the "hold harmless" provision without amending the substantive statute. That principle, however, does not prohibit the legislature from providing a specific amount of additional money for specifically identified school districts.
The legislature is not required to distribute educational funds to all school districts in an equal mathematical proportion. The legislature may, if it so desires, distribute the state funds on the basis of public educational need. That need is readily apparent in this record. The legislature determined that this guaranteed supplemental increase of 7.25 percent should not apply to districts that had a millage yield per student of twenty percent above the average because those districts had much greater local resources. There is a substantial difference in what a district may produce in school funding from local real property taxes. The average statewide yield of a mill for all counties for 1978-79 was $79. The variance is graphically illustrated by the fact that the Collier County tax roll generates $134 per mill, while the Gadsden County tax roll generates only $18 per mill. This disparity in school funding between rich and poor districts was clearly the reason the legislature decided to provide supplemental money only to those districts which had a value of a mill of less than twenty percent over the statewide average. In our view, the legislature was clearly acting within its constitutional authority in providing these additional educational funds in the appropriations bill.
The amicus, Brown, has contended that this cause is moot because the funds have been distributed in accordance with the appropriations bill as enacted by the legislature for the 1978-79 period. This distribution occurred even though the trial court directed otherwise because the judgment was stayed pending this appeal. In view of the trial court specifically holding the condition unconstitutional, we believe it is necessary to resolve the issue and, consequently, we reject the contention of mootness.
We reverse the holding of the trial court, but since the funds have already been distributed in accordance with the appropriation condition, no further directions are necessary.
It is so ordered.
ENGLAND, ALDERMAN and MCDONALD, JJ., concur.
SUNDBERG, C. J., concurs in result only.
ADKINS, J., dissents with an opinion, with which BOYD, J., concurs.
. The condition in the appropriation law, chapter 78-401, is identified in section 1, item 353A, and reads in part as follows:
IN THE ALLOCATION OF THE FEFP EACH DISTRICT SHALL BE GUARANTEED A MINIMUM INCREASE OF 7.25% IN TOTAL POTENTIAL FUNDING PER UNWEIGHTED FTE FOR 1978-79 OVER THE TOTAL FUNDING AVAILABLE PER UNWEIGHTED FTE IN 1977-78, EXCEPT THAT THOSE DISTRICTS WITH A VALUE OF A MILL PER WFTE 20% OR MORE OVER THE STATEWIDE AVERAGE VALUE OF A MILL PER WFTE SHALL NOT RECEIVE SUCH GUARANTEE. TOTAL POTENTIAL FUNDING SHALL INCLUDE THE 1978-79 STATE ALLOCATION FOR CURRENT OPERATION EXCLUSIVE OF ALL CATEGORICAL PROGRAMS, POST-SECONDARY VOCATIONAL FEES AND THE CALCULATED YIELD OF 8 MILLS. TOTAL FUNDING AVAILABLE IN 1977-78 SHALL INCLUDE THE 1977-78 ALLOCATION FOR CURRENT OPERATION EXCLUSIVE OF ALL CATEGORICAL PROGRAMS, POST-SECONDARY FEES AND THE CALCULATED YIELD OF THE ACTUAL NONVOTED MILLAGE LEVIED IN 1977-78. THE CALCULATIONS SHALL BE BEFORE PRIOR YEAR ADJUSTMENTS AND SHALL BE ON THE SAME TAX ROLL USED IN THE OTHER FEFP CALCULATIONS. [Emphasis supplied.]
. The four counties are Charlotte, Collier, Highlands, and Martin.