Case Name: STATE OF MISSOURI, Respondent, v. McCORD, Appellant
Court: St. Louis Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Missouri
Decision Date: 1907-03-19
Citations: 124 Mo. App. 63
Docket Number: 
Parties: STATE OF MISSOURI, Respondent, v. McCORD, Appellant.
Judges: Bland, P. J., concurs.
Reporter: Missouri Appeal Reports
Volume: 124
Pages: 63–79

Head Matter:
STATE OF MISSOURI, Respondent, v. McCORD, Appellant.
St. Louis Court of Appeals,
March 19, 1907.
(Opinion by Goode, J.)
1. JURISDICTION: Inferior Courts: Finding of Jurisdictional Facts. When a court of inferior jurisdiction is empowered to find the facts which give it jurisdiction in a given instance, its finding of such facts is conclusive against collateral attack, and if the record does not recite a finding hut shows the court exercised jurisdiction, the presumption is that it found the necessary facts to give it jurisdiction. On the other hand if the record affirmatively shows a want of the facts to give it jurisdiction in a given instance, its judgment is void.
2. -: Local Option: Jurisdictional Facts. Where the record of the county court in ordering an election to determine whether the local option law should he adopted in the county under section 3027, Revised Statutes 1899, recited that a petition for such election was presented by “one-tenth of the qualified voters and ■ taxpayers” of the county, this recital shows that the county court did not undertake to find the existence of the jurisdictional fact required by the statute that the petition should be signed by “one-tenth of the qualified voters;” the natural meaning of the language is that the court determined the petitioners should be both voters and taxpayers and that it was sufficient if one-tenth of those who were voters and taxpayers of the county were signers of the petition, which did not necessarily mean one-tenth of those who were only voters; therefore the'record shows the court did not find the fact necessary to give it jurisdiction and there is no presumption that such fact existed, hence the court was without power to order a local option election.
(Dissenting Opinion by Nortoni, J.)
3. -: Inferior Courts: Presumptions. In courts of limited jurisdiction all jurisdictional facts must appear affirmatively upon the face of the record in order to validate the action of such courts against direct attack; hut in the prosecution of one for a violation of the local option law, an attack upon the validity of the order of the county court by which the election adopting the local option law was ordered, is a collateral attack and it is not necessary that the jurisdictional fact should affirmatively appear on the face of the record; where the record is silent 'in such cases as to jurisdictional facts, jurisdiction is presumed and no presumption will be indulged against the jurisdicton.
4. -: Local Option: Jurisdictional Facts. Where the record of the order by which the county court ordered a local option election recited that the petition for the order was signed by "one-tenth of the qualified voters and taxpayers” of the county, this did not affirmatively show a want of jurisdiction, did not show that the order was made upon a petition signed by less than one-tenth of the voters. There are several constructions of the recital by which one-tenth of the qualified voters of the county could be said to have signed the petition and in a collateral attack it should be presumed that the county court in such case acted correctly.
5. -: -: Petition. Where the petition for a local option election under section 3027, Revised Statutes 1899, prayed the court to submit to the voters the question “whether dramshop licenses shall not be granted in such county, commonly'called local option,” this is a sufficient compliance with the statute which provides that the election is “to determine whether or not spirituous or intoxiqating liquors, including wine and beer, shall be sold.”
Appeal from Christian Circuit Court. — Eon. John T. Moore, Judge.
Reversed and certified to Supreme Court.
Harrington & Long and G. A. Watson for appellant.
The finding of the court in its order for the election is fatally defective, in that it finds that the signers of the petition constitute one-tenth of the voters, and tax payers of Christian county, section 3027 requires such petitions to be signed by one-tenth of the qualified voters of the county. For ought that appears from the finding of the court, many or all the signers are nonvoting taxpayers, and may constitute one-tenth of both classes when combined, but the number of voters signing-may fall far short of the required number. State ex rel. v. Bird, 108 Mo. App. 167. The said order is fatally defective as to the means by which the sufficiency of the petition was tested. The second proviso of section 3027 is as follows: “Provided that the county court shall determine the sufficiency of the petition presented by the poll books of the last previous general election.” “There should have been, at least, a substantial compliance with the statute as the adoption of the local option law involved one of the most vexatious and grave questions of the times.” State v. Baldwin, 109 M'o. App. 579.
G. Purd Hays, Prosecuting Attorney, and Leonard Walker for respondent.
The petition filed with the county court is sufficient to confer jurisdiction on the court. The question of dramshop license was not before the court that day nor was the question of referendum, but the petitioners asked the court to allow the qualified voters to vote on the question “commonly called local option according to section 3027, B. S. 1899, of the State of Missouri.” That was the only question submitted to the voters at the election held on the 10th day of June, 1905. This court will take judicial notice that there is only one local option law in this State, namely the Act of April 5, 1887, and that section 3027 of the Revised Statutes of 1899 of Missouri, is one of the sections of the same law. State v. Munch, 57 Mo. App. 207; State ex rel. v. St. Louis, 174 Mo. 125; Louisiana v. Anderson, 100 Mo. App. 341; State ex rel. y. Railroad, 105 Mo. App. 207; State ex rel. y. Huff, 105 Mo. App. 362; State ex rel. y. Week, 38 Mo. App. 566. The findings of the county court cannot be attacked in a collateral proceeding, but in an action to annul its record or judgment, and the finding of the county court that one-tenth of the qualified voters had signed the petition is res adjudicata as far as the legal status of this defendant is concerned, and the mere silence of its record is not sufficient to overthrow its jurisdiction, but the presumption of right acting must be indulged until the contrary is shown in a direct proceeding brought to annul the judgment of the county court. State v. Searcy, 39 Mo. App. 393; State v. Dugan, 110 Mo. 145; State ex rel. v. Railroad, 105 Mr. App. 207; State v. Hutton, 39 Mo. App. 413; Hadley v. Bernero, 103 Mo. App. 549; State v. Evans, 83 Mo. 322; Macey v. Stark, 116 Mo. 494; Leonard v. Sparks, 117 Mo. 108; State v. Houts, 36 Mo. App. 271; Breman v. Maute, 108 Mo. App. 339; Hathaway v. Railroad, 94 Mr. App. 343. Whether the petition filed with the county court contained the one-tenth of the qualified voters of the county or not, is conclusive against this defendant, as it is a judicial finding, and is the record of a fact judicially determined. State v. Evans, 83 Mo. 322; State ex rel. v. Weatherby, 45 Mo. 17; Jefferies v. Wright, 51 Mo. 220; Johnson v. Beazley? 65 Mo. 250; Sims v. Gray, 66 Mo. 614; Fulkerson v. Davenport, 70 Mo. 546; Scott v. Crews, 72 Mo. 263; Gray v. Boles, 74 Mo. 423; Henry v. McKerlie, 78 Mr. 416; Mechem on Pub. Officers, sec. 219; In re Rotkwell, 44 Mo. App. 215; State v. Prather, '41 Mo. App. 451.

Opinion:
GOODE, J.
We deem it unnecessary to restate the facts of this case because they have been given accurately by our associate, in whose conclusion we are unable to concur. We do not dissent from much of what he says concerning the law of cases of this character. It is the established rule in this State that when a court of inferior jurisdiction is entrusted by law with the duty of determining whether the facts exist authorizing it to exercise jurisdiction in a given instance, its finding of those facts is conclusive against collateral attack. Moreover, if the record in the cause does not recite a finding, but merely shows the court exercised jurisdiction, the presumption is that it found the necessary facts existed. But if the record of a court of general jurisdiction shows affirmatively that it had no jurisdiction in a given case, its judgment is void. [Smith's Lead. Cas. (8 Fed.), part 2, pp. 1113, 1114; 1 Freeman, Judgments, concluding sentences of sec. 132; McClanahan v. West, 100 Mo. 309, 320, 33 S. W. 674.] A fortiori is this so if the court is an inferior one. The case presented for determination is not one in which the record of the county court is silent as to the jurisdictional facts, but is one in which the court undertook to recite its finding of those facts. It recited them in these words:
"Now at this day come T. M. Maples, P. L. Little, Samuel Angus, J. A. Wasson et al., one-tenth of the qualified voters and tax payers of Christian county, Missouri, and by leave of court present their petition, praying the court to make an order submitting to the qualified voters of said county," etc.
The statute regulating local option elections prescribes that a petition for such an election shall be signed by one-tenth of the qualified voters of said county, residing outside the corporate limits of any city or town having a population of 2,500, who are qualified to vote for members of the Legislature. [R. S. 1899, sec. 3027.] No one will dispute the proposition that the presentation of a petition signed by the requisite number of petitioners of the class designated in the statute to the county court is essential to give said court jurisdiction of the matter and warrant it to order an election. If the county court had recorded no determination of this question in the present instance, it would he presumed in favor of its jurisdiction, that it determined such a petition as the statute required had been presented. But its own record shows it made no finding of that sort The law required a petition signed by one-tenth of the qualified voters. Instead of finding this had been done, the court found a petiton had been filed signed by one-tenth of the qualified voters and taxpayers of the county. That is to say, the county court proceeded on a wrong opinion in respect to what the law prescribed and this error of law apparent on the record, can be reviewed as in other cases. The court supposed the law required a petition to be signed by one-tenth of the qualified voters and taxpayers and not merely by one-ténth of the qualified vor ters; that is, that the petitioners must be taxpayers as well as voters. Now it is obvious that this theory was totally erroneous. Therefore the county court's record shows on its face that it neither found, nor undertook to find, the jurisdictional facts existed; and there can be no presumption in the face of this record that it did so find. The law is that when there is a full record of all matters going to a court's jurisdiction, the question of its jurisdiction must be determined from the record and there is no room for presumptions. [Williams v. Monroe, 125 Mo. 574, 28 S. W. 853.] In the cited case, wheré in a title turned on condemnation proceedings, the question of jurisdiction of the defendant in said proceedings was raised. The notice to the defendant was contained in the record and the return showed on its face that the service of the notice was void. Thereupon it was contended that presumptions in favor of service and consequent jurisdiction should be indulged, but the Supreme Court held there could be no presumption, as the matter was shown' affirmatively in the proceedings (loe. cit. 587).'
It is true, as stated in the opinion of our colleague, that it was within the range of possibility for the taxpayers and voters in Christian county to coincide. And the same may be said of the theory that the petition was signed by one-tenth of the qualified voters and also by one-tenth of the taxpayers. These possibilities do not go to the point nor satisfy the law. The essence of the matter is not, that it was possible for such things to be, but that it Avas necessary for the county court to determine that a petition signed by one-tenth of the qualified voters had been presented. There can be no presumption, in the instance of a proceeding in a court of inferior jurisdiction, that facts existed essential to an exercise of judical poAver. The very utmost that will be presumed is that the court found the facts existed, if the record does not show it failed so to find. Hence the case comes doAvn to this question: Which is' the fair and reasonable interpretation of the language of the recital in the judgment of the county court, that the recital shows the court determined, or shows it failed to> determine that one-tenth of the qualified voters had signed the petition? Any reasonable interpretation in favor of the right exercise of jurisdction by the court ought to be adopted. [Mastin v. Stoller, 107 Mo. 317, 326, 17 S. W. 1011.] We consider that the natural and only reasonable meaning of the language of the recital in the judgment is, that the county court proceeded on the theory that under a correct view of the statutes, nobody but persons who were both qualified voters and taxpayers ought to be counted in ascertainng whether or not the petition was signed by the requisite one-tenth. This is, in fact, the requirement for some special elections which a county court may order. [R. S. 1899, sec. 5172.] We do not consider it a fair view of the language of the judgment to say it meant, either that the taxpayers and qualified voters coincided in number or that the petition was signed by one-tenth of both classes of citi zens. These interpretations are unreasonable because, if the court understood the statute correctly and intended to follow it and to order no election unless one-tenth of the entire number of the qualified voters of the county had petitioned, the recital regarding taxpayers was wholly superfluous and simply words inserted in the judgment for no purpose. But it ought not to be taken for granted that the county court would insert purposeless words in the record, when the natural inference from what was said is that the court regarded the signatures of taxpayers as essential. A leading canon for the interpretation of documents or laws is that force must be given, when possible, to all their words. [Calloway v. Henderson, 130 Mo. 77, 86, 32 S. W. 34.] We hold the recital shows the court proceeded on a false theory of law and did not determine the fact essential to give it jurisdiction. As it did not determine that fact, and there is no presumption in the case of an inferior tribunal, that the fact existed, it must be ruled the county court had no power to order the election. It is worthy of remark, too, that said court was proceeding, in the matter under special and statutory authority, and not according to the course of the common law; a circumstance which, according to many authorities, would affect the presumptions to be indulged in regard to the right exercise of jurisdiction.
The judgment is reversed.
Bland, P. J., concurs.