Case Name: Nicholas V. Bailey and Eliza A. H. Bailey, per pro. amie, v. Ker Boyce et al.
Court: South Carolina Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: South Carolina
Decision Date: 1850-01
Citations: 4 Strob. Eq. 84
Docket Number: 
Parties: Nicholas V. Bailey and Eliza A. H. Bailey, per pro. amie, v. Ker Boyce et al.
Judges: DunkiN, Ch. concurred.
Reporter: South Carolina Equity Reports
Volume: 23
Pages: 84–102

Head Matter:
Nicholas V. Bailey and Eliza A. H. Bailey, per pro. amie, v. Ker Boyce et al.
Charleston,
Jan. 1850.
Testator left athis death, his widow and an only daughter, and by his last will and testament, devised and bequeathed to them each, absolutely, “one moiety” of all his estate, both real and personal. The widow, having accepted of the provisions in her favor under the will, subsequently set up a claim to be endowed of all the real estate of testator. Her claim was rejected as inconsistent with the provisions of the will, and conflicting with the evident intention of the testator, to make an equal partition of his property.
Before Dargan, Oh., at Charleston, June Sittings, 1848.
George Henry died in August, 1837. He left a considerable property, real and personal; and he also left surviving him, his wife, Eliza Woodward, one of the defendants, and. his daughter, Eliza A. H. Bailey, one of the complainants, and wife of the complainant Nicholas V. Bailey. The real property of George Henry, deceased, consisted chiefly of houses and lots in the city of Charleston, and in the towns of Columbia and Camden, and his personal estate of slaves and choses in action, the latter being debts due him in the mercantile houses of Ker Boyce & Co., Boyce & Henry, and Boyce, Henry <fc Walter. By his last will and testament, duly executed, and which he left unrevoked, after giving a few legacies of inconsiderable amount, he gave to his wife, Eliza Henry, one half of his estate, real and personal, and the other half to his daughter, Eliza A. H. Henry, now Eliza A. H. Bailey, and appointed Ker Boyce and John Magrath the executors of his will. The will was admitted to probate, and the executors qualified and possessed themselves of the real and personal estate. The widow of the testator after-wards intermarried with William T. Woodward, and in contemplation of the solemnization of the marriage, and pending the same, the widow of the testator, and the said William T. Woodward, executed a deed of marriage settlement, dated 14th October, 1839, by which, among other covenants and agreements, the said Eliza Henry conveyed to the said William T. Woodward, his heirs and assigns, “one half part of all her property, real and personal, devised and bequeathed to her by the will of the said George Henry, deceased,” the other half being conveyed to the trustees for her own use, &c. The marriage was duly solemnized, and afterwards William T. Woodward died in August, 1842, having duly executed his will, bearing date 14th December, 1841. William T. Woodward devised and bequeathed to his wife the oue half of her share in the real and personal estate of George Henry, which she had conveyed to him by the deed of mar riage settlement, and which remained undivided, and this he devised and beqeuathed to her in bar and in lieu of all claims of dower in his real estate. The widow, Eliza Woodward, elected to take her dower of the lands of her late husband, William T. Woodward, and by the proper judicial proceedings, her dower has been assigned to her, and she put in possession thereof. By this election of the widow, the devise and bequest to her lapses into the estate of William T. Woodward, to be disposed of as by the terms of his will is directed. The heirs at law and legal representatives of William T. Woodward, are consequently interested in the estate of the said George Henry to the extent of one half of the real and personal estate devised and bequeathed by him to the said Eliza Woodward. And this being a bill tor the partition and for an account of the estate of the said George Henry, they are made parties defendants. The real estate has all been sold, and the proceeds are now to be distributed. And the only question presented at this time for the judgment of the Court, is upon the claim set up by the defendant Eliza Woodward, to be endowed of the real estate of her first husband, the said George Henry. She has accepted the provisions in her favor under the will, as far back as the date of the marriage settlement deed, but contends that such acceptance is not inconsistent with her claim of dower, not being in bar or lieu thereof, or repugnant thereto ; whilst this claim is resisted on the part of the complainant, on the ground, that although the provisions for Mrs. Woodward in the will are not expressly given in bar of her right of dower, it is so repugnant to the other provisions of the will that she will be put to her election ; and that she has already elected to take under the will, and therefore is now concluded from asserting her right to dower. And this is the only question which I am now to consider.
The right of dower is a highly favored claim, and will always be sustained, unless in opposition to the declared intentions of the testator, or in such manifest repugnancy to the will, that the claim to dower and the provisions of the will cannot stand together. The rule thus stated seems plain enough. But when it comes to be practically applied on the question, as to what is such repugnancy as will deprive the wife of her right of dower, or put her upon her election, it not unfrequently presents embarrassments and difficulties. One thing is very clear, and for this there is a host of authorities, that it is not sufficient to make the claim of dower repugnant to the provisions of the will, in a sense that will put the widow upon her election, that the former will make some encroachments or inroads upon property generally devised to other persons by the will. The repugnancy which is to have this, effect must be a technical repugnancy ; that is to say, a repugnancy as explained and illustrated by the decisions upon subject. To such an extent has this claim been favored, that Comts of justice have been charged with extravagan-cies in sustaining the right of the widow to her dower. But if we will look a little into.the nature of the right, it seems to me that the course of the decisions can be vindicated as being perfectly consistent with the rights of the husband and those claiming under him. Dower is an estate to all intents and purposes ; an estate of freehold for the life of the wife in one third of the lands of which the husband was seized during the coverture. It is inchoate during the coverture, but becomes consummated and vested at the death of the husband. And it is as much her estate as if it had been conveyed to her by a stranger, or by the husband before the marriage, or as if it had descended to her as her own inheritance. It is not a part of the husband’s estate at his death ; she does not take it as such, but in her own right by the law of the land. The assertion of her right to dower, therefore, no more bars her of her devise or legacy under the will, than the assertion of her right to her separate estate, or to her entire land or chose in action which survive to. her. Her claim to these last mentioned interests' is not more perfect, or independent of the will of the husband, than is her right of dower. If he affect to dispose specifically of any of these interests of the wife to others, and makes- provision for her by his will, he may by express words, or by a necessary implication, put the widow to her election. It is clear that a mere devise in general terms of the whole of the testator’s real estate, does not create such a manifest implication of intention on the part of the testator to dispose of her estate of dower, or such a repug-nancy as will put her to her election. For he might intend to give only what he had a right to dispose of. The dower of the wife, at his death, constitutes no part of his estate, that will descend to his heirs, or that-can be controlled by his will. And when he disposes of the whole of his real estate, or a particular part of it, he must be construed to mean such part of it as he had a right to dispose of, and as would constitute a part of his estate at his death • and not which belonged to the wife by another and independent title.
When the testator, George Henry, gave to his wife the one half of his real and personal estate, without, any violence to the rules of construction, he may be construed to mean that he gave her that estate, subject to her own claim of dower, which she held by an independent title, and which (as if she held it by a title derived from a stranger) would be merged in the fee devised by the will. And when he gave to his daughter the other half of his real estate, by the same consistent rules of construction, he may be supposed to mean that he gave her the half of that estate which belonged to him, and which he had a right to control. Thus the words of the will would in every sense be fully satisfied by her taking one half of his estate, the dower of the widow constituting in contemplation of law no part thereof.
It is not to be denied that there are decisions of the English Chancery Courts, that seem to be opposed to the view that I have taken of this case. In the case of Chalmers v. /Storril, the testator gave to his wife and his two children, “ all his estates whatsoever, to be equally divided amongst them, whether real or personal.” He then specified and described the property devised and bequeathed by him. The master of the Rolls, (Sir William Grant) in pronouncing his judgment, observes, as to the widow’s claim of dower, “ whether she took under the will an absolute interest, or for life only, it is a case of election ; the claim of law, &c. being directly inconsistent with the disposition of the will. The testator directing all his real and personal estate to be equally divided, &c., the same equality is intended to take place in the division of the real, as of the personal estate, which cannot be if the widow first takes out of it her dower, and then a third of the remaining two-thirds. Further by describing his English estates, he excludes the ambiguity which Lord Thurlow, in Foster v. Cook, imputes to the words “ my estate” as not necessarily excluding dower. Here the testator says the property thus bequeathed by him consists of these particulars. It is therefore the property itself thus described that is the subject of the devise, and not what might in contemplation of law be the testator’s interest in that property. This, therefore, is a case of election.”
Gordon v. Stephens, 2 Hill's Ch.Whilden, Ri- ¿ 222, Gordon v. Stephens, 2 Hill’s Ch. 471; Brown v. Caldwell, 1 Spear Eq. 322: Whilden v.
3 Bro.C. C. 347,
It is to be observed, that the case now being considered, is unlike the case of Chalmers v. Storril, in the fact, that in the latter the testator’s will contained a specification of the property ; a circumstance on which the master of the Rolls laid great stress. In Foster v. Cook, the testator had given “ all his estate and substance,” and in reference to the argument to be deduced therefrom, that there was a necessary implication of intention to exclude dower, Lord Thurlow remarked, “ because he gives all his property to trustees, am I to gather from his having given all he has, that he has given that which he has not ?” In French v. Davies, Lord Alvanly said, that in order to exclude the claim of dower, it ought “ to be clear, plain and incontrovertible, that the testator could not possibly give what he has given, consistently with her claim of dower.” And this seems to be the principle on which this class of cases is always adjudicated. And it seems to me that the decision in Chalmers v. Storril, which has been followed by Dickson v. Robinson, and Roberts v. Smith, is neither in harmony with this principle, nor with the current of decisions. The construction applied to all the cases where dower has been allowed out of lands devised by the testator to others, is, that the testator only meant to devise the estate in those lands which he had a right to devise. “ In order to raise a case of election, it must be clear and conclusive; for if the testator’s expressions will admit of being restricted to property belonging to or disposable by him, the implication will be, that he did not mean them to apply to that, over which. }je had no disposing power.” Now, applying this doctrine to the construction of George Henry’s will, he gives one half of his estate, real and personal, to his daughter Eliza. According to the principle which has just been cited, (and on which alone the widow can be dowable of lands devised to another,) what does he mean by the one half of his real estate? Do not the words, in connexion with the principle of construction, explain themselves ? Did he mean to include in the devise the estate of another ? Suppose a stranger to his house, to have possessed a title for life to one third of those lands, could it by any possible construction be contended that the testator meant that outstanding estate for life to pass by the terms of the devise? • Is the case m any way different where the widow possesses the outstanding title for life? For the purpose of illustrating .this principle more fully, I will imagine a case. Suppose the testator seized of an estate, in one third of which A B has an estate for life in his own right; and the testator devises all his real estate to A B and another, equally to be divided between them; would any one be so extravagant as to say, that in the partition of the estate so derived, that A B would not be entitled to take out his third for life, and then divide equally with his co-tenant the residue, w.hich was the testator’s real estate, and which alone fell within the description ? That is precisely the case which we have before us. The testator, George Henry, gave to his daughter one half of his own estate, not of his wife’s estate, and has not indicated by words, nor by necessary implication, that the legacy and devise to his wife would be in bar and in lieu of dower. I refer to 1 Jarman on Wills, 402 and 403, for his able, and in my judgment, conclusive argument against the authority of Chalmers v. Storril.
2 yes. 576.
jacot, 503. j Sim. & S.513.
l Jarman on Wills, 393.
It is ordered and decreed, that Eliza Woodward be endowed of the lands of her first husband, George Henry, one half of which claim is included in her own share of those lands, and the other half in the lands devised to testator’s daughter. And as the lands have been sold, it is ordered that it be referred to the master to report the value of the dower, according to the principles of this decree, to be paid out of the purchase money. The claim for dower can in no event be chargeable on that portion of the real estate conveyed by Eliza Woodward to her late husband, William T. Woodward, before the marriage. And it is so adjudged and decreed.
Complainants appealed from the decree, and moved that it be so’ modified as not to allow dower to the widow, in any portion of the lands of testator, the provisions of the will being manifestly intended in lien of dower.
PERONNEAUS & HAYNE, CompVts. SoVrs.
Mrs. Eliza Britton and her husband moved the Court of Appeals to modify the decree of the Chancellor in this case,
Because the decree is inconsistent with itself in refusing to allow the widow’s dower as against the representatives of Woodward, when the only interest conveyed to Woodward was that which was given her by the will of George Henry.
Memminger & Jervey, for the motion.
Bailey & Brewster, contra.

Opinion:
Caldwell, Ch.
delivered the opinion of the Court.
George Henry, by his last will and testament, of the 9th of February, A. D. 1836, among other things, devised as follows: — "I give, devise, and bequeath unto my beloved wife, one moiety or half part of my estate, real and personal, of whatsoever kind and description I may die possessed of, to her, and her heirs and assigns absolutely and forever. I also, give, devise, and bequeath unto my dear daughter, Ann Boyce Henry, the other moiety or half of my estate, real and personal, of whatever kind and description, when my said daughter shall attain the age of twenty-one years, or day of marriage, which shall first happen ; the said proportion of my daughter's estate, to be under the controul and management of my beloved wife during éaid period ; provided, my said wife remains single and unmarried. And it is my further will and desire, that my beloved wife shall educate my dear child, and keep her under her management and care, for which she shall be entitled to the whole income of my daughter's estate, so long as my said wife shall remain single and unmarried, and no longer. But should my said wife marry, it is my will, and I direct, that my daughter's proportion of my estate, real and personal, shall be managed by my friends, Ker Boyce and John Magrath, my executors hereinafter named; and the income arising from my daughter's proportion, shall be invested for the use, benefit and be-hoof of my said daughter; still, my beloved wife is to have the sole controul, management and care of my daughter, in educating and bringing her up, for which she shall be allowed a full and adequate compensation. In requesting my executors to take charge and management of my daughter's proportion of my estate, in the event of my beloved wife marrying, is not from a want of confidence in her, who has been an affectionate wife and doating mother, but to protect my dear child's property from being subject to the controul or intermeddling of any future husband who may feel no jnterest in her welfare."
Decided in 1715, 3 Bro Parl. Cases, 478.
The testator died in August, 1837, and his widow, Eliza pjenry, entered into a deed of marriage settlement with William T. Woodward, on the 14th of October, 1839, conveying to him and his heirs and assigns, one-half part of all her property, real and personal, devised and bequeathed to her by the will of George Henry; the other half being conveyed to the trustees, therein named, for her own use. William T. Woodward devised the half she had conveyed to him by the deed of marriage settlement, to her, by his will of the 14th December, 1841, and died in August, 1842. She elected to take her dower in his lands, which has been assigned to her, and. of which she has possession. All the real estate of George Henry has been sold, and the proceeds are to be distributed^ and she claims her dower in his real estate; and the question is, is she entitled to it?
The law so highly regards the widow's right to dower, that the husband can neither aliene it in his lifetime, or devise it at his death, although he has the extraordinary power to deprive her of every other interest in his estate. As the husband has the absolute right to dispose of his estate, he may, in making provision for his wife by will, annex the express condition, that it shall be in lieu and bar of her dower; her acceptance of the legacy is, in law, a renunciation of her dower. The second class of cases is where the testator has not expressly excluded her claim of dower, but if she enforces it, it is inconsistent with the provisions of the will and defeats the testator's intention. This is denominated a bar by necessary implication.
There has been great contrariety of opinion in many of the cases in the English reports, and it seems that every case must depend upon the plain and manifest intention of the testator, and the inconsistency of the claim of dower with the provisions of the will. In one of the earliest cases which was carried up to the House of Lords, a man devised a moiety of his estate, after payment of his debts, legacies and portions, to his wife for life; it was held that this would not bar her of dower, but she ought to elect whether she would insist on her dower or waive it and take under the will.
In Chalmers v. Storril, the words of the will were, ctI give to my dear wife, Anna Maria Chalmers, and my two children, namely — my daughter, Anna Maria Chalmers, and my son, John Chalmers, all my estates whatsoever, to be equally divided amongst them — whether real or personal— making no distinction in favour of the male, as it is my intent that my daughter shall have an equal share with my son of all my property," &c. Sir William Grant, the Master of the Rolls, was of opinion that it was a case of election on the part of the widow, and that her claim of dower would be directly inconsistent with the disposition of the will; the equality in the division of the real estate would' have been defeated if the widow took out of it her dower, and then a third of the remaining two-thirds.
t Jam. on Wills, 402,.
• Sir Thomas Plumer, who succeeded him as Master of the Nolls, adopted and applied the same principle in Dickson v. Robinson, where the testator gave his real and personal estate to his widow, upon trust, for the equal benefit of herself, his two daughters, and the child or children with which she was then pregnant.
And Sir John Leach, the Yice Chancellor, in the more recent case of Roberts v. Smith, held that where the testator devised gavel-kind lands to his wife and two other persons, in trust, as. to one moiety for his wife during her widowhood, and as to the other moiety for his children, the wife must elect between her dower and the provision under the will. This case recognizes and approves the principle in Chalmers v. Storril.
Notwithstanding Mr. Jarman's disapproval of the three last cases, he has produced no case to contradict, much less to overrule them. JHis objection arises from the presumption. "that as a testator means to dispose of his own interest, exclusively of that of any co-owner, it follows that every devise is first to be read as applying to that interest, and unless some repugnance or inaptitude occurs in such an application of the testator's language, there is no ground for extending the devise to that portion of interest which is not disposable by him."
No rule is better established than that one cannot claim under and against a deed or will. Where a testator disposes of property not his own, but which belongs to the legatee, the latter cannot come in and take a legacy under the will without relinquishing his right. This occurs in cases where the title is clear and established. The claim of dower, during the lifetime of the husband, is contingent and inchoate; it cannot be enforced until after his death, and when he devises the' whole estate out of which it is to be taken to his wife and children to be equally divided, her asserting her claim of dower, not only disturbs her co-tenants in the enjoyment of their estate, but defeats the main object 'of the testator, an equal partition of the property. If the testator had, in this case, declined to make a will, the Act of distributions would have given the widow one-third and his daughter the other two-thirds of his estate; in such case no claim of dower could have been set up; and can it be inferred, that when he has established a more favorable division of his estate between them, that he used such inappropriate terms, " one moiety," when he meant that his widow should take her third out of his real estate, and then come in for an equal part of the remainder of his real and of the whole of his personal estate 1
2 Ves. & B. m.
The widow's demand of dower would thus defeat the manifest intention of the testator, to put her and his daughter upon a perfect equality, and while it would destroy the proper proportion he had devised to each of them, would disturb his daughter in the enjoyment of the moiety which he had expressly provided for her.
The ingenious suggestions of Mr. Jarman are not sufficient to raise the presumption, that the testator's intention is not defeated by the claim of dower, and cannot be permitted to prevail against the construction that should be put on the provisions of the will, and the authority of so many decided cases. Our own cases do not in the slightest degree conflict with these views.
It is therefore adjudged and declared, that the said Eliza Woodward is not entitled to be endowed o.f the real estate of her first husband, George Henry. And it is ordered and decreed that the Circuit decree be modified according to this opinion.
DunkiN, Ch. concurred.
JohnstoN, Ch. absent at the hearing.
Decree modified.