Case Name: Ex Parte T. W. Hughes
Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1907-02-06
Citations: 50 Tex. Crim. 614
Docket Number: No. 3547
Parties: Ex Parte T. W. Hughes.
Judges: 
Reporter: Texas Criminal Reports
Volume: 50
Pages: 614–619

Head Matter:
Ex Parte T. W. Hughes.
No. 3547.
Decided February 6, 1907.
1. —Habeas Corpus—City Charter and Ordinances—Constitutional Law—Delegation of legislative Power—Scalper’s Tickets.
Where upon habeas corpus, the record showed that the charter of the City of San Antonio authorized an ordinance restricting the sale of railroad tickets, and prohibiting the issuance or sale thereof by any other than duly authorized agents of said company in said city, under which relator was, arrested for a violation thereof, and claimed his discharge because said ordinance was violative of section 1, article 3, and section 2, article 10, of the State Constitution, in delegating legislative power to said city to regulate railway traffic, etc. Held, that in the absence of a State law regulating the sale of railroad tickets by scalpers, the Legislature had constitutional power to authorize said city to make penal the sale of such tickets by other than the agent of such railroad, and an ordinance under such authority is held valid. Distinguishing Jannin v. State, 42 .Texas Grim. Rep., 641.
2. —Same—Absolute Forfeiture—Question not Decided.
The question as to whether such ticket can be absolutely forfeited if the party purchasing it does not see fit to use it, is not presented or decided in this case.
3. —8ame—Due Process of Law—Police Power.
Where upon habeas corpus it was shown that the City of San Antonio, under special legislative authority in its charter, had passed an ordinance prohibiting the issuance and sale of certain railroad tickets within its limits. Held, that in the absence of a State law on this subject, the relator, who was arrested for a violation of said ordinance, was not denied due process of law, etc., by the granting of special privileges to said railroads; and that the grant of authority to the city is within the police power of the Legislature. Davidson, Presiding Judge, dissenting.
From Bexar County.
Original application for habeas corpus for release and discharge from arrest, for a violation of a city ordinance prohibiting the issuance and sale of scalper’s tickets.
The opinion states the case.
Ogden & Brooks, W. H. Lipscomb, for relator.
Curtis v. Ry. Co., 63 S. W. Rep., 149; Arroyo v. State, 69 S. W. Rep., 504; People v. Warden, 51 N. E. Rep., 1006; Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356; Jannin v. State, 51 S. W. Rep., 1126; Martin v. Ry. Co., 19 S. W. Rep., 315; Ry. v. Ing., 68 S. W. Rep., 722; Burdick v. People, 36 N. E. Rep., 949; In re Jacobs, 98 N. Y., 106; Hirshfield v. Dallas, 15 S. W. Rep., 125; Peo. v. Caldwell, 168 N. Y., 671; Clark v. Finley, 93 Texas, 180.
J. E. Yantis, Assistant Attorney-General; Baker, Botts, Parker & Garwood, Newton & Ward, Watkins & Jones, J. E. Webb, City Attorney, for respondent.
Cooley, Con. Lim. (5th ed.), pages 228 and 229, 241, 734, 745; Black on Const. Law, page 339; Dillon on Mun. Corp., sections 21, 48; Tiedeman Lim. Police Powers, pages 683, 639; Com. v. Wilson, 14 Phila., 384; Fry v. State, 63 Ind., 560; Statev. Corbett, 59 N. W. Rep., 317; Post v. Ry., 14 Neb., 110. Also the following cases upon the general question of ticket scalping and State laws upon the subject: Schubach v. McDonald, 78 S. W., 1020; Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S., 113; Thompson on Carrier of Passengers, p. 65; Angel on Carriers (5th ed.), sec. 609; Logan v. Hannibal & St. J. Ry. Co., 12 Am. and Eng.; Railroad Cases, p. 141 (77 Mo., 663); Beach on Railways, vol. 2 (sec. 869); Railway Co. v. Daniels, 29 S. W. Rep., 427; Elliott on Railroads, vol. 4, secs. 1593, 1594; vol. 4 Interstate Commerce Commission Rep., p. 392; Mauritz v. R. R. Co., 23 Fed. Rep., 769; Deitrich v. Penn. R. R. Co., 71 Pa. St., 435; Elmore v. Sands, 54 N. Y., 515; Lewis v. N. Y. Sleeping Car Co., 143 Mass., 272; Frank v. Ingalls, 41 Ohio St. Rep., 563.

Opinion:
DAVIDSON, Presiding Judge.
Application for writ of habeas corpus was granted by Judge Henderson (a member of this court) and made returnable before the full court. Applicant was arrested for a violation of an ordinance of the City of San Antonio, prohibiting the sale of unused tickets, in that city, which ordinance reads, as follows:
"An ordinance restricting the sale of tickets, passes or other evidence of the right to travel on any railroad to duly authorized agents of -the railroad company issuing or authorizing the issuance of same, and prohibiting the sale of all tickets, passes, or other evidence of the right to travel on any railroad by any other than duly authorized agents of the railroad company, or authorizing the issuance of same, and providing penalties for a violation of such ordinance, and to repeal an ordinance passed April 2 and approved April 5, 1900, entitled, 'An ordinance licensing and regulating the business of Ticket Brokers or Scalpers, and affixing penalties for its violation/"
Be it ordained by the City Council of the City of San Antonio, Texas:
Sec. 1. It shall be unlawful for any person or persons, firm or corporation, or for any officer, agent or servant, or receiver of any corporation, for or in its behalf, now or hereafter engaged in the business of railroad ticket broker, or any other person or persons, with or without license therefor, in San Antonio, Texas, to sell, barter or transfer, for any consideration whatever, the whole or any part of any railroad ticket or tickets, pass or passes, or other evidence of the holder's right to travel on any railroad unless duly authorized to do so by the railroad or the receiver thereof issuing or authorizing the issuance of same, and unless such authority to sell same is in writing, duly attested by the corporate seal of such railroad company, or the signature of the receiver thereof, if any there be, of such railroad company, or by the signature of the officer whose name is signed upon the tickets or coupons or other evidence of the right to travel on same, which said agent may be authorized to sell,"
It then provides a penalty for the violation of this ordinance, not less than $25, nor more than $100, for each and every offense.
The second section requires that the party having the right to sell these tickets, shall keep a certificate posted in a conspicuous place in his office, for the information of travelers.
In Jannin v. State, 42 Texas Crim. Rep., 631; 51 S. W. Rep., 1126, it is held that the statute enacted by the Legislature of our State, of similar import was unconstitutional and void. The same question involved there is in this case, so far as the right to limit a party in selling or buying unused railroad tickets. That case has been followed by our Supreme Court in T. & P. Ry. Co. v. Mahaffey, 11 Texas Ct. Rep., 858. These authorities are sufficient to show the illegality of the character of legislation set out in the ordinance, even when enacted by the State Legislature.
Section 2 of article 10 of the Constitution provides: The Legislature shall pass laws to regulate railway freight and passenger tariffs, and correct abuses and prevent unjust discrimination and excesses in the rates of freight and passenger traffic on the different railroads in this State, and to enforce the same by adequate penalties, and to the further accomplishment of these objects and purposes may provide and establish all requisite means and agencies invested with such powers as may be deemed adequate and advisable." This clause seems to indicate that the Legislature alone is invested with ppwer to pass laws regulating passenger and freight tariffs, and to provide such agencies as may be necessary to carry out such legislative action and intent. We are of opinion that this does not contemplate a city here and there in the State shall be invested with power at the hands of the Legislature to regulate or control the selling or buying of railroad tickets within a city jurisdiction. That clause of the Constitution pertains to the general management of railroads in the manner specified. For instance, it might delegate its power to the Railroad Commission, or some general agency, but it cannot particularize special localities, such as municipal bodies; and transfer to them the power to regulate these matters. The Constitution has granted no such authority to the Legislature. On the contrary, it has expressly limited this matter to legislative action.'
There are several interesting questions suggested for discussion; but under the Jannin and Mahaffey cases, supra, we deem it unnecessary to enter a discussion thereof. Those eases dispose of the real merits of this ease, and are authority for holding the ordinance of the City of San Antonio invalid. The applicant is ordered discharged.
Relator discharged.
Henderson, Judge, absent.
Brooks, Judge.
The Jannin case supports this decision, but I think the city had authority to pass this ordinance.