Case Name: NICKELS v. PREWITT AUTO CO.
Court: Texas Courts of Civil Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1912-05-01
Citations: 149 S.W. 1094
Docket Number: 
Parties: NICKELS v. PREWITT AUTO CO.
Judges: 
Reporter: South Western Reporter
Volume: 149
Pages: 1094–1095

Head Matter:
NICKELS v. PREWITT AUTO CO.
(Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. Austin.
May 1, 1912.
On Motion for Rehearing, Oct. 9, 1912.)
1. Conteacts (§ 312 ) — Construction.
Where a contract gave defendant the exclusive right to sell certain automobiles and supplies in a fixed locality, plaintiff did not violate the agreement by selling to a resident of that locality at its own place of business, which was outside of the boundaries fixed by the contract.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Contracts, Cent. Dig. § 1279% ; Dec. Dig. § 312. ]
On Motion for Rehearing.
2. Principal and Agent (§ 3 ) — Construction or? Contract.
A contract whereby plaintiff gave to defendant the exclusive .and sole right to sell certain automobiles and supplies in a designated locality for a fixed length of time is not a mere contract for an exclusive agency, but is an attempt to confer upon defendant the sole right to sell those articles in the territory mentioned, and prohibits plaintiff from making any sales in that territory within the time prescribed.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Principal and Agent, Cent. Dig. §§ 3-9, 11, 12; Dec. Dig. § 3. ]
3. Monopolies (§ 17 ) — 'Trusts—Combinations— Statutes.
An agreement whereby plaintiff was to give defendant the sole and exclusive right to sell certain automobiles and supplies in a fixed territory for a given length of time is not in violation of Rev. Civ. St. 1911, art. 7796, defining a trust as a combination of cap’tal, skill, or acts by two or more persons for specified purposes; there being no combination in this case.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Monopolies, Cent. Dig. § 13; Dec. Dig. § 17.
For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, vol. 8, pp. 7116-7119]
4. Monopolies (§ 17 ) — Trusts—Combina-tio ns — Statutes.
Where neither party to a contract giving an exclusive selling agency in specified territory was a corporation, and there being no evidence of a combination or consolidation, the agreement was not in violation of Rev. Civ. St. 1911, art. 7797, defining a monopoly as a consolidation or combination of two or more corporations.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Monopolies, Cent. Dig. § 13; Dee. Dig. § 17.
For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, vol. 5, pp. 4570-4574.]
5. Monopolies <§ 17 ) — Trusts—Combinations — Statutes—“Conspiracies Against Trade.”
Where neither party to the contract was engaged in buying or selling automobiles or any other article of merchandise, a contract whereby plaintiff gave defendant the exclusive right to sell certain machines and supplies in a designated locality for a given length of time is not in violation of Rev. Civ. St. 1911, art. 7798, defining as conspiracies against trade agreements or understandings whereby any two or more persons engaged in buying or selling any article of merchandise refuse to buy or sell from any other persons, or threaten to or boycott any other persons.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Monopolies, Cent. Dig. § 13; Dec. Dig. § 17. ]
For other definit:ons, see Words and Phrases, vol. 2, pp. 1454-1461; vol. 8, p. 7613.]
Appeal from Williamson County Court; Richard Critz, Judge.
Action by the Prewitt Auto Company against J. A. Nickels'. From a judgment for plaintiff defendant appeals.
Affirmed.
* Luther Nickels, of Hillsboro, for appellant. W. A. Barlow, of Taylor, for appellee.
For other oases see same topic and section NUMBER in Dec. Dig. & Am. Dig. Key-No. Series & Rep’r Indexes

Opinion:
KEY, C. J.
This is a suit upon a promissory note for 8300, with interest and attorney's fees, and from a judgment in favor of the plaintiff the defendant has appealed.
The appeal involves but two questions, and these are: First, that the note sued on is part of a contract which contravenes the anti-trust statute of this state, and therefore the note is not enforceable; and, second, that, if the contract does not contravene the statute referred to, the plaintiff had violated its terms, and that the defendant should be awarded damages as an offset against the note. The contract referred to shows that the note sued upon was executed in part payment for certain automobiles; and, among others, it contains this stipulation: "And the said Prewitt Auto Co. hereby gives the said J. A. Nickels the 'exclusive and sole right to sell the Moon Motoring Car Company's automobiles and supplies in the counties of Falls and Limestone and in Mart, McLennan Co., and the trade territory of Mart, and this right shall be in force until the first of October, 1911." It is upon that stipulation that appellant bases the proposition that the contract is in conflict with the anti-trust statute, and therefore not enforceable. We overrule that contention, and hold that the stipulation referred to does not require or authorize apything to be done that is prohibited by said statute. It merely conferred upon appellant an exclusive agency, in a restricted territory, and for a short period of time. It did not prohibit the other party from making sales elsewhere; nor did it attempt to fix prices or prohibit appellant from purchasing or selling other articles of the same kind obtained elsewhere. Norton v. Thomas & Sons, 99 Tex. 578, 91 S. W. 780; s. c., 93 S. W. 711; Redland Fruit Co. v. Sargent, 51 Tex. Civ. App. 619, 113 S. W. 330; Forrest Photographic Co. v. Hutchinson Grocery Co., 108 S. W. 768; 3 King's Conflicting Cases, p. 297.
The other question is based upon the fact that during the time covered by the contract appellee sold to one Robert Nickels an automobile of the kind and class referred to in the contract, and at the time of that sale Robert Nickels resided within the territory specified in the contract, which sale, "however, was not made in that territory, but at Dallas, Tex. Appellant's contention is that he had the exclusive right to sell to residents of the territory specified in the contract, but that contention is not borne out by the terms of the contract. That instrument vested in appellant the exclusive right to sell in the territory referred to, but did not prohibit sales by appellee to residents of that territory, who might desire to go to Dallas, or elsewhere outside of that territory, and purchase automobiles or supplies.
No error has been shown and the judgment is affirmed.
Affirmed.