Case Name: In the Matter of the Claim of Shannon M. Connerton, Appellant. Thousand Island Central School District, Respondent; Commissioner of Labor, Respondent
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 2015-10-29
Citations: 132 A.D.3d 1210
Docket Number: 
Parties: In the Matter of the Claim of Shannon M. Connerton, Appellant. Thousand Island Central School District, Respondent; Commissioner of Labor, Respondent.
Judges: Lahtinen, J.P., Garry, Rose and Devine, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Appellate Division Reports
Volume: 132
Pages: 1210–1211

Head Matter:
In the Matter of the Claim of Shannon M. Connerton, Appellant. Thousand Island Central School District, Respondent; Commissioner of Labor, Respondent.
[19 NYS3d 613]

Opinion:
Appeal from a decision of the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board, filed April 16, 2014, which ruled that claimant was ineligible to receive unemployment insurance benefits because she was not totally unemployed.
Claimant, an elementary school teacher, cared for a coworker's young daughter at various times between September 2011 and June 2012 during a period when she was laid off from her teaching job. She did so while she was at home caring for her own young son and the coworker did not pay her for her services. During the time that claimant provided childcare for the coworker, she received unemployment insurance benefits. Following extended proceedings addressing claimant's eligibility to receive such benefits, the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board ultimately ruled that she was ineligible because she was not totally unemployed. Claimant now appeals.
Resolution of this case turns on whether claimant's activities in caring for her coworker's child without compensation while she was laid off constitute a lack of total unemployment rendering her ineligible to receive unemployment insurance benefits. Labor Law § 591 (1) limits eligibility for benefits to those claimants who are "totally unemployed" {see Matter of Aim [Commissioner of Labor], 302 AD2d 777, 778 [2003]), which has been defined as "the total lack of any employment on any day" (Labor Law § 522; see Matter of Smith [Commissioner of Labor], 8 AD3d 744, 745 [2004]). In this context, the term employment contemplates that a claimant will potentially receive some type of monetary payment or future benefit in exchange for services rendered (see e.g. Matter of McCann [Commissioner of Labor], 117 AD3d 1259, 1260 [2014]; Matter of Yamamura [Commissioner of Labor], 111 AD3d 1049, 1049 [2013]; Matter of Gazzara [Commissioner of Labor], 60 AD3d 1226, 1227 [2009]; Matter of Falus [Commissioner of Labor], 276 AD2d 1009, 1010 [2000]; Matter of Solomon [Commissioner of Labor], 256 AD2d 774, 775 [1998]).
Here, it is undisputed that claimant did not receive any compensation for caring for her coworker's son and there is no evidence in the record that she was likely to obtain a future financial benefit for doing so. Consequently, we must conclude that the Board's finding that claimant's activities in this regard amounted to a lack of total unemployment is not supported by substantial evidence (see generally Matter of Masferer [Hudacs], 197 AD2d 763, 764 [1993]; compare Matter of Smith [Ross], 78 AD2d 961 [1980]; Matter of Staheli [Ross], 60 AD2d 670 [1977]). Accordingly, its decision must be reversed.
Lahtinen, J.P., Garry, Rose and Devine, JJ., concur.
Ordered that the decision is reversed, without costs, and matter remitted to the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board for further proceedings not inconsistent with this Court's decision.