Case Name: STATE of Louisiana v. Verna BIBLE, Robert Steven Meziere and Billy W. Moore
Court: Louisiana Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1981-11-16
Citations: 406 So. 2d 138
Docket Number: No. 66584
Parties: STATE of Louisiana v. Verna BIBLE, Robert Steven Meziere and Billy W. Moore.
Judges: BLANCHE, J., dissents.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 406
Pages: 138–143

Head Matter:
STATE of Louisiana v. Verna BIBLE, Robert Steven Meziere and Billy W. Moore.
No. 66584.
Supreme Court of Louisiana.
Nov. 16, 1981.
William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Barbara Rutledge, Asst. Atty. Gen., Lowen B. Lof-tin, Dist. Atty., William R. Coenen, Jr., Asst. Dist. Atty., for plaintiff-appellee.
Carey J. Ellis, Jr. of Ellis & Ellis, Ray-ville, for defendants-appellants.

Opinion:
DIXON, Chief Justice.
Defendants, Verna Bible, Robert Steven Meziere and Billy W. Moore, were convicted of possession of a narcotic drug (marijuana) with intent to distribute, in violation of R. S. 40:966. This court affirmed the defendants' convictions and sentences, finding valid the search of a suitcase (containing marijuana) found during the lawful search of the vehicle in which defendants were riding. State v. Bible, 389 So.2d 42 (La.1980). Defendants sought review of that judgment in the United States Supreme Court. The Supreme Court granted certiorari and subsequently remanded the case to this court, - U.S. -, 101 S.Ct. 3153, 69 L.Ed.2d 1001, for further consideration in light of Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. -, 101 S.Ct. 2841, 69 L.Ed.2d 744 (1981).
The events which led to the search and seizure in question began when a previously reliable and confidential informant told a state trooper of a forthcoming marijuana delivery. The informant told the state trooper of the date, place and approximate time of the delivery. He gave the trooper the name of one of the persons who was to make the delivery and described the automobile in which the delivery was to be made. Based on this information, the police officers set up a surveillance on the house trailer to which the marijuana was to be delivered.
Defendants Meziere and Moore were observed entering and leaving the trailer after having arrived in a vehicle (blue and white Monte Carlo) matching the description given by the informant. Moore carried a brown paper bag and Meziere carried a suitcase as they entered the trailer. Verna Bible remained in the vehicle. Approximately ten minutes later, Moore and Mezi-ere came out of the trailer. Moore was not carrying the paper bag but Meziere was still carrying the suitcase, which he placed back in the trunk of the vehicle. They got back into the vehicle and drove away. However, they were stopped and detained at a roadblock established by the officers. Defendants were then advised of their rights but were told that they were not under arrest.
Meanwhile, the officer who remained at the surveillance site observed Tommy Lin-gefelt leaving the trailer carrying what appeared to be the same paper bag that Moore took into the trailer. Lingefelt placed the bag on the seat of his truck, got in and drove in the same direction as the defendants; however, he was stopped before reaching the roadblock where the defendants were being detained. The officer discovered that the paper bag contained marijuana. He confiscated the marijuana, arrested Lingefelt and proceeded immediately to the roadblock. Upon his arrival, the officer informed the defendants that he intended to search the vehicle. He obtained the keys to the vehicle, opened the trunk and removed the suitcase. He opened the suitcase and found the marijuana which was the target of the defendants' motion to suppress.
This court previously determined that the warrantless search of the suitcase was permissible under the so-called "automobile exception," in that the officers had probable cause to search the entirety of the vehicle, including the trunk, glove compartment, luggage and other areas. This holding now appears inconsistent with the decision in Robbins v. California, supra.
In Robbins the defendant was stopped by officers of the California Highway Patrol because he had been driving erratically. When the defendant opened the station wagon's door to get his registration, the officers smelled marijuana smoke. One of the officers frisked the defendant and discovered a vial of liquid. While searching the passenger compartment of the station wagon, they found marijuana and equipment for using it. After placing the defendant in the patrol car, the officers opened the tailgate, located a handle set flush in the deck, and lifted it to uncover a recessed luggage compartment. They found a tote bag and two packages wrapped in green opaque plastic. The officers unwrapped the packages and found that each contained fifteen pounds of marijuana. The California Court of Appeal, affirming the judgment of the trial court, found the warrantless opening of the packages constitutionally permissible.
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in Robbins "[bjeeause of the continuing uncertainty as to whether closed containers found during a lawful warrant-less search of an automobile may themselves be searched without a warrant." 453 U.S. at -, 101 S.Ct. at 2844, 69 L.Ed.2d at 748. The Court reversed the judgment of the California Court, reaffirming its own decisions in Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 99 S.Ct. 2586, 61 L.Ed.2d 235 (1979) and United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 97 S.Ct. 2476, 53 L.Ed.2d 538 (1977), which disapproved of warrantless searches of personal luggage found in automobiles.
The Court stated that "a closed piece of luggage found in a lawfully searched car is constitutionally protected to the same extent as are closed pieces of luggage found anywhere else." 453 U.S. at -, 101 S.Ct. at 2845, 69 L.Ed.2d at 750. The Robbins decision recognizes that the automobile exception exists only because of the inherent mobility and diminished expectation of privacy which surrounds the automobile. In refusing to extend this exception to encompass closed pieces of luggage, the Court concluded that no diminished expectation of privacy characterizes luggage. It reasoned that when a person places an object in a closed opaque container, that person reasonably manifests an expectation that the contents will remain free from public examination. Because luggage is a common repository of personal effects, it is inevitably associated with privacy. Additionally, the Court noted that the circumstances which make it impracticable for the police to detain a vehicle on the open road while obtaining a search warrant would not be applicable to luggage, as luggage itself may be brought and kept under the control of the police (the Court chose not to discuss the apparent fact that the Constitutions— state and federal — protect against warrant-less seizures as well as warrantless searches); only in exigent circumstances should the warrant requirement be obviated.
We reaffirm our previous conclusion in the present case that the officers had probable cause to search the vehicle, and therefore conducted a lawful warrantless search under the automobile exception. We are unable to affirm, however, our previous conclusion that the lawful search of the vehicle included the warrantless opening of the suitcase. The state does not rely on any other exception to the warrant requirement in justifying its actions. Further, our examination of the record shows that there were no special exigencies of the situation which may have required the immediate opening of the luggage. The officers had possession and control of the suitcase, which, under Robbins, may be constitutionally seized without a warrant when there exist probable cause and exigent circum stances, but may not be opened until a magistrate has issued a warrant.
Accordingly, the defendants' convictions and sentences are hereby reversed and set aside and the case is remanded to the trial court for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
BLANCHE, J., dissents.
LEMMON, J., dissents and assigns reasons.
MARCUS, J., dissents for reasons assigned by LEMMON, J.
. Defendants' petition for certiorari questioned the warrantless search of the suitcase and this court's refusal to reverse their convictions based on United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 97 S.Ct. 2476, 53 L.Ed.2d 538 (1977).
. Warrantless searches are unreasonable unless they fall under one of the specifically established and well delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement. In State v. Tant, 287 So.2d 458 (La.1973), this court stated: "[o]ne exception to the general rule is that a moving vehicle may be stopped and searched where 'exigent circumstances' make the securing of a search warrant impracticable." Id. at 460. The Supreme Court in Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 90 S.Ct. 1975, 26 L.Ed.2d 419 (1970), noting that probable cause is the minimum requirement for a search permitted by the Constitution, stated: "[o]nly in exigent circumstances will the judgment of the police as to probable cause serve as a sufficient authorization for a search." Id. at 51, 90 S.Ct. at 1981, 26 L.Ed.2d at 428.
This exception recognizes the societal costs and burdens placed on police officers by an inflexible requirement to obtain a warrant to search a legally stopped vehicle which is believed to be transporting contraband. Because of the inherent mobility of vehicles, that is, they can be quickly moved out of the jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought, to require officers to obtain warrants to search legally stopped vehicles may prove to be impracticable. In its discussion of the automobile exception, the Court in Chambers v. Maroney, supra, explained:
". . . we see no difference between on the one hand seizing and holding a car [on the open road] before presenting the probable cause issue to a magistrate and on the other hand carrying out an immediate search without a search warrant. Given probable cause to search, either course is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment." 399 U.S. at 52, 90 S.Ct. at 1981, 26 L.Ed.2d at 428. (Emphasis added). The Court in Robbins v. California, supra, reasoned that automobile occupants' expectation of privacy is diminished because the automobile is used for transportation — not as a repository of personal effects. Additionally, the automobile's occupants and contents travel in plain view and automobiles are necessarily highly regulated by government.
It should be noted that the "automobile exception" does not give the police unfettered authority to stop, detain and search vehicles at will or upon mere suspicion that the vehicle or its occupants may be involved in illegal activity. The United States Supreme Court has consistently maintained that "probable cause" is the minimum requirement for a search permitted by the Constitution. See Chambers v. Maroney, supra. It is also clear that "the exception does not invariably apply whenever automobiles are searched." Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. at 760, 99 S.Ct. at 2591 n. 7, 61 L.Ed.2d at 243 n. 7.
. The United States Supreme Court had previously granted certiorari in Robbins, vacated the California Court of Appeal judgment affirming the conviction, and remanded the case for further consideration in light of Arkansas v. Sanders, supra. On remand, the court of appeal again found the warrantless opening of the packages constitutionally permissible.
. The United States Supreme Court has determined that all luggage may not be entitled to the full protection of the Fourth Amendment because the special exigencies of a situation may justify the warrantless opening of the luggage, for example, the police reasonably believe that the luggage contains explosives or other inherently dangerous items, or that it contains evidence which would lose its value unless opened immediately. But whether special exigencies of the situation dictate that the luggage be opened will depend upon its probable contents, not upon whether it is taken from an automobile. See Arkansas v. Sanders, supra.