Case Name: Matthews v. Freker
Court: Arkansas Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Arkansas
Decision Date: 1900-05-12
Citations: 68 Ark. 190
Docket Number: 
Parties: Matthews v. Freker.
Judges: 
Reporter: Arkansas Reports
Volume: 68
Pages: 190–205

Head Matter:
Matthews v. Freker.
Opinion delivered May 12, 1900.
Sale — Mutual Assent. — Where a broker sent to his principal an order for a car load of potatoes, which was subsequently countermanded by the purchaser without the broker’s knowledge, and afterwards, in response to a telegram from the principal, the broker telegraphed to rush the potatoes and send him the papers, he will not be liable for the value of the potatoes in case of their loss, as for goods sold, if by his telegram he did not mean to-buy the potatoes, but only meant that in his opinion the purchaser would take them if delivered immediately. (Page I US.)
Appeal from Sebastian Circuit Court.
Edgar E. Bryant, Judge.
statement by the court.
L. A. Freker & Co. commenced an action against J. P. Matthews & Co. and J. Foster & Co. before a justice of the peace of Sebastian county, upon an account in the following words and figures:
“St. Louis, Mo., Feb’y 26th, 1897.
J. P. Matthews & Co.,
Fort Smith, Arks.
Bought of L. A. Freker & Co.
48 bbls. E. Rose.......... 1.60 $76 80
35 bbls. Peerless.......... 1.60 56 00
17 bbls. Burbanks......... 1.60 27 20
5 bbls. E. Ohio’s......... 1.60 8 u0
40 sks. Rurals (5760 lbs). 60 ......... 55 70
224 70
96 00 Less freight, 49 100
$126 70.”
At the time of the giving of this account an affidavit was appended, which was in the words and figures following:
“State of Missouri, City of St. Louis — ss.:
“Before me, August H. Bush, a notary public within and for the city of St. Louis, and state of Missouri, duly commissioned, qualified and acting, on this day personally appeared L. A. Freker, who, being duly sworn, on his oath deposes and says that he is the sole owner doing business as L. A. Freker & Co., a firm composed of L. A. Freker; that the annexed and foregoing account in favor of said firm to [against] said J. P. Matthews & Co., of Fort Smith, Ark., for goods, wares and merchandise sold and delivered by said firm to said J. P. Matthews & Co., showing an amount due of $126.70, is, within the knowledge of this affiant, just, true and correct in all particulars, due and unpaid, and that all just and lawful offsets, credits, deductions and payments have been allowed.
[Signed] “L. A. Freker.
“Subscribed and sworn to,” etc.
The defendants denied being indebted to plaintiff in any sum whatever, and in a trial before the justice of the peace recovered judgment; and the plaintiff appealed to the Sebastian circuit court for the Fort Smith district.
In the circuit court J. P. Matthews & Co. answered orally, and substantially as follows: “Said Matthews & Co. denied being indebted to the plaintiff in any sum whatever; denied receiving, ordering or buying the potatoes in said account named; denied buying any other potatoes from the plaintiff; and denied being indebted to the plaintiff in any sum whatever, and alleged in this answer that they (Matthews & Co.) were the brokers of the plaintiff in the sale of the potatoes mentioned in said account to defendants, J. Foster & Co., and that said Matthews & Co. had, as plaintiff’s brokers, fully and in a business-like manner, discharged their duty as plaintiff’s brokers; and that they were in no way liable for said car of potatoes; and, further answering, denied the right of the plaintiff to sue said Matthews & Co. jointly with-J. Foster & Co. Said Matthews & Co., further answering, state that, as the brokers of the plaintiff, they had negotiated the sale of the potatoes named in the account herein, and had duly performed all their duties with reference to said sale, both to plaintiff and to J. Foster & Co. and that Matthews. & Co., were not liable to said plaintiff in any sum whatever.”
The issues in this ease were tried before a jury, and the plaintiff recovered a verdict and judgment against J. P. Matthews & Co. for $126.70, and Matthews & Co. appealed.
Evidence was adduced in the trial tending to prove the following facts: L. A. Freker was engaged in business in 'St. Louis, Missouri, and dealt in potatoes. J. P. Matthews & Co. were brokers at Fort Smith in this state, and were authorized by Freker to sell potatoes for him. J. Foster & Co. were merchants at Fort Smith. On the 23d of February, 1897, Matthews & Co. ordered Freker to send a car load of potatoes to Foster & Co. at Fort Smith. Freker shipped the potatoes, on the 25th of the same month, to Foster & Co., and they received them at Fort Smith, and paid for them. There is no controversy about these potatoes. On the morning of the 25th of February, 1897, Freker received a letter from Matthews & Co., offering him, for Foster & Co., one dollar and sixty cents per barrel and sixty cents per bushel for a car load of potatoes to be shipped to Mena, in this state. He immediately accepted the proposition by telegram. On the same day he received a message from J. Foster, asking if both cars were shipped. These cars were the the car load of potatoes which were shipped to Fort Smith, and were received and paid for, and the car load to be shipped to Mena. Freker replied to Foster’s message by telegram as follows: “Fort Smith shipped to-day Mena car to-morrow.” In the afternoon of the same day Freker received a telegram frond Foster & Co. countermanding the order, which he answered as follows: “J. Foster & Co., Fort Smith. Ark. Fort Smith ear loaded and ticket signed. Mena order received by mail to-day, and are loading.” Freker commenced loading a car with potatoes to be shipped to Mena for J. Foster & Co. on the 26th of February, when he received a telegram from Foster & Co., saying that they would not accept the Mena ear under any circumstances. The car was then more than half loaded, and the remainder of the potatoes were ready to be taken to the car. Freker thereupon, on the morning of the 26th of February, sent a telegram to Matthews & Co. in the words following: “Mena ear loaded. Goes forward to-day. We are not at fault. Convince Foster.” Later in the same day he received a telegram as follows: “Rush both cars. Send papers of Mena cars to ourselves. [Signed] J. P. Matthews & Co.” He then shipped the car loaded, last ordered, according to directions, and sent the bill of lading to Matthews & Co. The other ear load had already been shipped as before stated, and was afterwards received and paid for by Foster & Co. The last shipment was on the 26th of February, 1897. Ou the 11th of March following, Freker drew a draft on Matthews & Co. for $126.70, the price of the last car load. This draft was returned by Matthews & Co. unpaid. Another draft for the same amount was di'awn by Freker on the same persons, and was returned with this indorsement on it: “Not correct. Insist on Foster & Co. paying the draft. Draw on them again. [Signed] J. P. Matthews & Co.” Afterwards this action was brought for $126.70, the price of the car load last shipped.
J. P. Matthews testified that he completed the negotiations for the sale of both car loads of potatoes, and heard no more of the matter until the morning of the 26th of February, 1897. ‘That morning I called at the office of Mr. Foster, — rather, I saw him as I was passing his place of business. He stated to me that he did not understand the delay, and that he must have his potatoes to fill his orders. Immediately I sent the following telegram to Freker: “Rush both cars. Send papers of Mena cars to ourselves.” Foster asked me from whom he had purchased the potatoes, and I told him Freker & Co., of St. Louis. He then said that he did not like to buy from Freker, because there was always something wrong with his potatoes; but he did not countermand the order. Soon after that, and after I had sent the above telegram, I received the following telegram: ‘Mena car already loaded. Goes forward to day. We are not at fault. Convince Foster.’ * * * Neither Fi-eker nor Foster had said anything to me about telegraphing with each other on the subject of these two cars, and I did not know, and had no means of knowing, what Freker meant by saying, “Convince Foster.”
W. F. Latham testified: “I was present on February 26, 1897, and heard J. Foster ask J. P. Matthews from whom the cars were coming; Matthews said, ‘Freker.’ I heard Foster countermand the orders previously given to Matthews. I walked on, and heard no more of the conversation.”
J. P. Matthews further testified: “The next morning, the 27th of February, 1897, I saw Foster's son, and was told by him that his father had declined to take either car. That same day (27th) I received the invoice and bill of lading for the car sued for in this action, and, having been notified that morning by Mr. Foster’s son, who was in Mr. Foster’s office attending to his (Foster’s) business, that Foster would under no circumstances receive the said car, I at once and about noon of said 27th day of February, 1897, returned said invoice and bill of lading to Freker. I mailed said bill of lading and invoice about noon, and placed thereon the necessary stamps, and addressed the same to L. A. Freker & Co., 1139 North Third street, St. Louis, Missouri. In due course of mail said letter containing said invoice and bill of lading would reach St. Louis, Mo., on the next moi’ning, February 28th, 1897, and before the said car of potatoes could possibly have reached its destination at Mena, Arkansas. * * * Under the custom of the railroad and under the bill of lading the car of potatoes would not have beeu delivered to any oue without the bill of lading. I had this car of potatoes sent in my name in order to get the benefit of a certain freight rate. In telegram ordering car freight was to be sent as to Poteau. I had a guaranty from the railroad that such rate should obtain. I explained to Freker to ship in my name unless he could get that rate. Fearing that he could not get that rate, I wired him to send the papers to Matthews & Co. Both he and Foster knew the reason. I did not buy the potatoes. I did not receive any of them. I never received any notice from the railway company that said potatoes were there.” Freker testified that he heard nothing of the last shipment after he sent tLe bill of lading to Matthews & Co.
J. Foster testified that they “declined to receive the Mena car, both because of too much delay in shipping same, and because their dealings with Freker had never been satisfactory.” The cars of potatoes they bought from Freker through Matthews & Co. were to' be shipped immediately, and when they learned on the 26th that they had not yet been shipped, for that and other reasons they declined to take the same. Their customers were crowding them for potatoes. They had to have them as soon as possible.
Bead & McDonough, for appellants.
There was no contract between appellee and appellant brokers by which title was passed to appellants. 40 Ark. 216; 60 Ai*k. 357. If appellee could recover at all, it would be in an action based on conversion by sending the unauthorized telegram. 36 N. H. 324; 12 N. H. 384; 22 N. H. 572; 14 Johns. 128; 14 Vt. 366; 10 Yt. 208; 31 Ark. 286; 14 Ark, 505; Jaggard, Torts, 706, 717. A factor or broker in posession of goods is only a bailee. Laws. Bail. § 5. Assumpsit it will not lie for such a conversion. 17 Ark. 509; 25 Ark. 100; 27 Ark. 365; 31 Ark. 155; 31 N. Y. 676. No amend-' ment of pleading can be made to change an action begun in contract to tort. Sand. & H. Dig., §§ 5703, 5769n.; Bliss, Code Pld. 233, 429; 34 Wis. 378; Fitnam, Trial Proe. 513; 7 Hun, 525. In actions of tort the measure of damages is at value of the property at time of conversion. 14 Ark. 505; 31 Ark. 256; 39 Ark. 387; 36 Ark. 268; 51 Ark. 19. Appellee could have resold the potatoes, and thus prevented their loss. Hence he cannot recover for whatever of the loss was occasioned by his failure to do this. 57 Ark. 264; 105 U. S. 224; 80 Fed. 818; 37 S. W. 868. It was error to refuse the instructions asked by appellant.
Jo Johnson, for appellee.
The transaction was a sale of the Mena car to appellants. 44 Ark. 556; 43 Ark. 353; Benj. Sales (4 Am. Ed.), 181, 693. Recovery may be had as in assumpsit. 15 Ark. 444; 5 Ark. 651; 4 Enc. PL & Pr. 923. A sale to an agent for an undisclosed principal is a sale to the agent. 2 Kent’s Comm. 630, 631; Story, Ag. 267; Whart. Ag. 500; 50 Ark. 439; 8 S. W. 183; 1 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law (2 Ed.), 1080-1. The instructions of the court were correct. On the fourth instrue-, tion, see 7 Ark. 365; 9 Ark. 85; 22 Ark. 258; 2 Enc. PL & Pr. 1022.

Opinion:
Battle, J.,
(after stating the facts.) This action was for the price of a car load of potatoes, which were alleged to have been sold by L. A. Freker & Go. to J. P. Matthews & Co. In the account filed with the justice of the peace Matthews & Go. were charged with having bought the potatoes. In the affidavit annexed to the account Freker swore that the account "for goods, wares and merchandise sold and delivered by said firm (Freker) to said J. P. Matthews & Co. was just, true and correct in all particulars." Matthews & Co. denied having purchased the potatoes, or being indebted to Freker for the same. The cause of action was the sale of the potatoes. The justice of the peace could not have acquired jurisdiction of the-suit as an action ex delicto, the amount in-volved being $126.70, and his jurisdiction in matters of damage to personal property being limited by the constitution lo cases where the amount in controversy does not exceed the sum of one hundred dollars. The circuit court acquired by the appeal no jurisdiction except that which the justice of the peace had; neither could it try any cause of action except that tried by the justice of the peace. The only question in the case, then, is, did Freker sell to Matthews & Co. the car load of potatoes?
In Benjamin on Sales it is said: "To constitute a valid sale, there must be a concurrence of the following elements, viz.: (l) Parties competent to contract; (2) mutual assent; (3) a thing, the absolute or general property in which is transferred from the seller to the buyer; and (4) a price in money paid or promised." Sec. 1.
Did the mutual assent necessary to constitute a valid sale exist in this case? The right of Freker to recover of Matthews & Co. is based upon the telegram in which they said: "Rush both cars. Send papers of - Mena car to ourselves." Matthews & Co. did not expressly agree to purchase' the potatoes, or to pay for them. The word "rush" might imply that they were of the opinion that Foster & Co. would accept the potatoes if they were promptly shipped. Foster & Co. wanted the potatoes, and were impatient on account of the delay in their shipment. Foster testified that they were to be shipped immediately; that their "customers were crowding them for potatoes, and they had to have them as soon as possible." The order for the potatoes was received by Freker on the morning of the 25th of February. On the same day he received a telegram from Foster & Co., asking if both cars were shipped, and Freker replied: "Fort Smith shipped to-day; Mena car to-morrow." In the afternoon of the same day Freker received another telegram from Foster & Co. countermanding the order, which he answered by saying: "Fort Smith car loaded, and ticket signed. Mena order received by mail to-day, and are loading." Foster & Co. replied by saying "they would not accept the Mena car under any circumstances." They did not countermand the order for the potatoes which were sent to Fort Smith. They had been shipped. When Freker received the last telegram from Foster & Co. countermanding the "Mena order," he wired to Matthews & Co. as follows: "Mena car nearly loaded. Goes forward to-day. We are not at fault. Convince Foster." After this he received a telegram from Matthews & Co. saying: "Rush both cars. Send papers of Mena car to ourselves." J. P. Matthews testified that Matthews & Co. did not receive the telegram asking them to "convince Foster" until after they had sent the telegram to Freker. But, assume that it was received before, did they thereby intend to propose to purchase or pay for the potatoes which were ordered to be shipped to Mena? If so, their telegram might also mean that they proposed to purchase or pay for the car load which had been shipped to Fort Smith, for they said, "Rush both cars." No one contends for this construction, for that order was not countermanded.
The direction in the telegram to "send papers of Mena car to ourselves" did not necessarily imply that they would purchase or pay for the potatoes shipped to Mena, for Matthews testified: "I had this car of potatoes sent íd my name in order to get the benefits of a certain freight rate. I had a guaranty from the railroad that such rate should obtain. I explained to Freker to ship in my name unless he could get that rate. Fearing that he could not get that rate, I wired him to send the papers to Matthews & Co. Both he and Foster knew the reason."
The jury might reasonably have inferred from all the evidence in the case that Matthews & Co. did not intend by their telegram to Freker to purchase the potatoes, but they showed thereby that they were of the opinion that Foster & Co. would pay for the potatoes if they were promptly shipped to, and received at, Mena. But the jury were not permitted to take this view of the facts. The court, over the objections of Matthews & Co., instructed them as follows:
"3. But if they sent said teiegram without the authority of J. Foster & Co., and at the time they sent it they knew that Foster had countermanded the order for the Mena car of potatoes, or if at that time they had received the telegram from plaintiffs, 'Mena car loaded. Goes forward to-day. We are not at fault. Convince Foster' — then defendants J. P. Matthews & Co. are liable for the contract price of the car.
"4. But if Matthews & Co. sent the telegram ('Rush both cars,' etc.) before receipt of the telegram of plaintiff stating that 'We are not at fault. Convince Foster,' and if said telegram, 'Rush both cars,' etc., was without authority of Foster & Co., then the liability of Matthews- & Co. depends on whether or not, after subsequent receipt of the telegram, 'Mena car nearly loaded. Goes forward to-day. We are not at fault. Convince Foster,' Matthews & Co. acted with ordinary care
"5. Ordinary care means the care that would be expected of a reasonable, careful, prudent and competent broker, under all the circumstances. Now, if, after sending the telegram, 'Rush both car's,' etc., Matthews & Co., received the telegram sent by plaintiff, stating, 'We are not at fault. Convince Foster,' — and if ordinary care under all the circumstances would have led them to make inquiries, and they could have thereby ascertained the state of affairs, and informed plaintiffs thereof, and they failed to use such care, then they are liable. But if they did use ordinary care, or if they failed to make inquiry, and snch. failure was want of ordinary care, then they are liable."
In giving these instructions the court erred.
Reversed and remanded for a new trial.