Case Name: THE PEOPLE v. GEORGE W. HOPKINS
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1908-06-19
Citations: 22 N.Y. Crim. 425
Docket Number: 
Parties: THE PEOPLE v. GEORGE W. HOPKINS.
Judges: 
Reporter: New York Criminal Reports
Volume: 22
Pages: 425–429

Head Matter:
SUPREME COURT—APP. DIVISION—FIRST DEPARTMENT,
June 19, 1908.
THE PEOPLE v. GEORGE W. HOPKINS.
(126 App. Div. 843.)
(1.) Larceny—Evidence.
One selling goods under an agreement that he is to have fifty per cent of the profits on goods sold by him, his employer to advance him thirty-five dollars per week to be accounted for on the division of the profits, and that any checks for merchandise sold may be made payable to him, but that he is immediately to indorse them over to his employer, cannot defend a charge of larceny for appropriating to his own use a check received for goods sold, on the theory that he is a partner.
(3.) Same—New Trial.
Where, however, the People fail to prove that full payment had been made to defendant according to the contract and defendant’s counsel proceeds on the erroneous theory of a partnership, in the interest of justice the court will exercise the right given it under section 527 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and grant a new trial.
Clarice and Scott, J. J., dissented, with opinion. «
Appeal by the defendant, George W. Hopkins, from a judgment of the Court of General Sessions of the Peace in and for the county of New York, rendered on the 5th day of December, 1907, convicting the defendant of the crime of grand larceny in, the second degree, and also from an order denying the defendant’s motion for a new trial made upon the minutes.
• Ilenry HardwicJce, for the appellant.
William Travers Jerome, District Attorney [Robert 8. John-stone,, Deputy], for the respondent.

Opinion:
Houghton, J-:
The defendant was indicted for the crime of grand larceny in the second degree in having while acting as agent for the Sp angenbcrg-McLe an Company appropriated to his own use the proceeds of a check of fifty-six dollars and seventy-five cents belonging to such corporation.
Prior to the receipt of the check defendant had entered into a written agreement with the complainant corporation that ho would act as salesman for it for the period of six months for fifty per cent of the profits of goods sold by himself.
By the agreement it was provided that the corporation should advance to defendant thirty-five dollars per week, which advancement should be accounted for on the division of profits. It was also provided that any checks for merchandise sold by defendant might be made payable to him, but that he was to immediately indorse them over to the corporation.
The agreement continued in force for two months, when it is claimed it was terminated by mutual consent. After such termination it was discovered that the defendant had indorsed and placed to his own account in bank a check of fifty-six dollars and seventy-five cents given to him in payment for goods sold belonging to the corporation, and it was for the appropriation to his own use of the proceeds of this check that the defendant was indicted and convicted.
On the trial the defendant introduced no evidence in his own behalf, and the only testimony on the part of the People was that of the president of the complainant corporation. The defendant rested 'his defense on the proposition of law that he bore a partnership relation to the corporation in the sale of the goods and in the collection of the moneys from purchasers, and hence could not be guilty of larceny in retaining to his own use any of the money collected.
This position was wholly untenable, and the learned trial court was right in holding that no partnership relation existed. If any defense upon the merits existed it should have been developed instead of resting the defendant's rights and liberty upon any such theory.
While it was proved that the defendant and the corporation mutually terminated their relations at the end of the second month of the defendant's service, and while it was shown that the amount of sales which the defendant was able to make were small, and that fifty per cent of the profits upon them did not amount to thirty-five dollars per week, the evidence does not clearly establish that the corporation in fact advanced each week the thirty-five dollars which it obligated itself by its contract to do. If it had not made these advancements, and if the defendant openly and avowedly under claim of title to the money, preferred in good faith, retained the proceeds of the check as belonging to himself, he would not be guilty of larceny. So, too, if there was no termination of the contract or determination -or settlement of the share of profits to which defendant was entitled, and he being lawfully in posession openly and in good faith claimed the money as belonging to himself as his share of the profits he would not be guilty of larceny.
It is true that no claim of title to the moneys was proven, and it is possible that none made openly and in good faith can be made, but in view of the lack of proof on the part of the People that full payment had been made according to the terms of the contract, and of the erroneous theory of defendant's former counsel upon the trial, we are of the opinion that it is our duty in the interest of justice to exercise the right given us by section 527 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and order a new trial where all the facts can be developed, and it can be determined upon the merits whether or not the defendant is guilty of the -crime charged against him.
The judgment, of conviction should be reversed and a new-trial granted.
Ingbaham and McLaughlin, JJ., concurred; Claeice and Scott, JJ., dissented.