Case Name: GRICE v. OREGON-WASH. R. & N. CO.
Court: Oregon Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Oregon
Decision Date: 1915-07-27
Citations: 78 Or. 17
Docket Number: 
Parties: GRICE v. OREGON-WASH. R. & N. CO.
Judges: Mr. Chief Justice Moore, Mr. Justice McBride and Mr. Justice Benson concur.
Reporter: Oregon Reports
Volume: 78
Pages: 17–38

Head Matter:
Argued July 9,
affirmed July 27, 1915.
Rehearing granted September 21, reargued October 11, former opinion approved November 9, 1915.
GRICE v. OREGON-WASH. R. & N. CO.
(150 Pac. 862; 152 Pac. 509.)
Appeal and Error—Presentation of Grounds of Review in Court Below—Exceptions—Necessity.
1. Where the facts were all stipulated, no exception to the court’s decision need be taken under Section 172, L. O. L., declaring that no exception need be taken to any decision upon a matter of law; the judgment being merely an application of the law to the facts.
Commerce—Interstate Commerce—Regulations—Liability of Carriers.
2. The interstate Commerce law (Act Peb. 4, 1887, e. 104, 24 Stat. 379), which was designed to prevent preferences, does not prohibit a carrier from assuming the common-law liability in carrying goods from one state to another.
[As to effect of Interstate Commerce Act upon carrier’s liability for loss of or injury to goods or baggage, see note in Ann. Cas. 1912B, 672.]
Carriers—Carriage of Goods—Action—Burden of Proof.
3. A carrier, seeking to reduce its liability for goods lost in transit, must allege and prove facts entitling it to the reduction.
Principal and Agent—Authority of Agent.
4. A transfer company, authorized to deliver household goods to a particular railroad company for shipment has no authority to consent to a reduction of the carrier’s common-law liability, and the agreement reducing the liability is not binding on the shipper.
Carriers—Carriage of Goods—Liability—Stipulation.
5. A bill of lading provided that the amount of any loss or damage for which the carrier was liable should be computed upon the basis
of tlie value of the property, being the bona fide invoice price, unless a lower value had been represented in writing by the shipper, or agreed upon, or is determined by the classification or tariff upon which the rate was based. A carrier lost goods delivered under such a bill. Neither the bill of lading nor the statement of faets on whieh the cause was tried showed the valuation of the property. The statement of faets failed to show that a value lower than the invoice price had been represented by the shipper, or that a lower value had been agreed upon, or the value as determined by the classification or tariff upon which the rate was based. Held that, as none of these matters were disclosed by the pleadings or statement of faets, the carrier was liable for the actual value of the goods under the common-law rule.
[As to limiting by bill of lading carrier’s liability, see note in 88 Am. St. Rep. 74.]
Principal and Agent — Waivers—Ratification.
6. For a waiver of liability made by a drayman to an express company to become binding on a shipper by ratification, the company must show that the shipper was fully advised regarding the waiver soon enough to have rejected it.
Principal and Agent — Custody of Goods — Presumption—Waiver to Express Company.
7. Custody of goods at the moment of shipping is not such indicia of authority that agency to waive liability on the part of an express company by which he is shipping them will be presumed.
From Multnomali: Bobert G. Morrow, Judge.
Department 1.
Statement by Mr. Justice Burnett.
This is an action by Otto Grice and Florence Grice against the Oregon-Washington Bailroad & Navigation Company, to recover damages from the defendant, a common carrier engaged in interstate commerce, for failure to deliver goods intrusted to it by the plaintiffs for shipment from Spokane, Washington, to Portland, Oregon. The corporate character of the defendant and the nature of its business are admitted. The complaint alleges that on or about January 21, 1913, in Spokane, Washington, the plaintiffs delivered to the defendant, and it accepted, for transportation by freight to Portland, Oregon, certain of their household goods. It is also alleged and admitted that the plaintiffs paid to the defendant the amount demanded by it as a freight charge for the service contemplated. The plaintiffs charge, also, that the defendant failed to deliver all the goods, the portion not delivered amounting in value to $545.54, for which sum they demand judgment. The defendant admits receiving the goods, and that it was unable to deliver a part of the shipment. Other allegations of the complaint are denied, except as stated in the affirmative matter of the answer. The pleading, after averring the corporate character and business of the defendant, proceeds as follows:
“That heretofore, and on or about the twenty-second day of January, 1913, at Spokane, Washington, Otto Grice and Florence Grice, plaintiffs herein, acting by and through one Pacific Transfer Company, which was then and there in the possession of the goods hereinafter mentioned, caused to be delivered to the defendant a shipment of freight, contents and condition of package unknown, and- represented by the shipper to be two boxes of household goods, one boxed trunk, one crated cedar chest, and one barrel and contents, weighing 1,280 pounds, prepaying the charges thereon in the sum of $12.70, with instructions to transport said freight over its line of railroad from Spokane, Washington, to Bast Portland, Oregon, and there deliver said shipment to Otto Grice. That at the time of delivering said shipment to the defendant, said plaintiffs, by and through their agents and employees, and particularly the Pacific Transfer Company, the shipper in possession, and in charge of said shipment, elected to have said goods transported under the terms and conditions of the uniform bill of lading hereinafter set forth, and then and there issued and delivered to the said shipper, for the said plaintiffs herein, and did then and there release to a valuation of ten dollars per hundred-weight the said shipment, in case of loss or damage to said goods while in transit, and did indorse said agreement upon the bill of lading, issued and delivered to, and received and accepted by, the said plaintiffs, under which agreement'the said shipment was transported. The defendant, Oregon-Washington Railroad & Navigation Company, at all the times mentioned, had in force and effect a rate covering the said shipment, where the same was released to a valuation of ten ($10) dollars per cwt., and which rate was and is less than the rate charged for shipments not released to ten ($10) dollars per cwt., and said rates were duly filed, posted, and published as required by the interstate commerce law, and that the shipment moving from Spokane, Washington, to Portland, Oregon, was and is an interstate shipment, and at all times, subject to the rules, regulations, and rates so posted, filed, and published with said Interstate Commerce Commission. That in and by the terms and conditions of said bill of lading under which said shipment moved, it is provided, among other things, as follows: ‘The amount of any loss or damage for which any carrier is liable shall be computed upon the basis of the value of the property (being the bona fide invoice . price, if any, to the consignee, including the freight charges, if prepared) and at the place and time of shipment under this bill of lading, unless a lower value has been represented in writing by the shipper or has been agreed upon or is determined by the classification or tariffs upon which the rate is based, in any of which events such lower value shall be the maiimnm amount to govern such computation, whether or not such loss or damage occurs from any negligence.’ And said bill of lading further provides: ‘It is mutually ag’reed as to each carrier of all or any of said property over all or any portion of said route to destination, and as to each party at any time interested in all or any of said property, that every service to be performed hereunder shall be subject to all the conditions, whether printed or written, herein contained (including conditions on back hereof), and which are agreed to by the shipper and accepted for himself and his assigns. ’ That at the time plaintiffs delivered this shipment to the defendant at Spokane, Washington, they represented to said de fendant that said shipment weighed 1,280 pounds, and was of the value of ten dollars per cwt., to wit, of the value of $128.00, and agreed that in case of loss or damage to said property, or any part thereof, the total value of the same, or the portion lost and damaged, was ten dollars per cwt., and, having so agreed and represented, they secured the lower rate applying on shipments so released and valued. That thereafter, and while said shipment was being transported over the line of railroad of the defendant, a portion of the said shipment was lost, stolen, or damaged, the exact manner of which is unknown to this defendant. That the portion of the shipment which was lost or damaged, as hereinbefore mentioned, weighed 670 pounds, and, under the tariffs, bills of lading, reduced rate, and agreement, as to value of ten ($10) dollars per cwt., under which this shipment moved, the value of said portion of said shipment so lost and damaged, was and is $67. That the prepaid charges on 25 pounds — being the portion of said shipment lost or stolen, at the rate of 99 cents per cwt., which was and is the lawful rate applicable thereto — amount to the sum of 24 cents, making a total amount due the plaintiffs of $67.24. Thereafter, and prior to the commencement of this action, this defendant offered and tendered to the plaintiffs, in full settlement of all liability arising out of the alleged loss set forth in the complaint, the sum of $67.24, but plaintiffs refused to accept the same. By reason of the premises, the plaintiffs are and ought to be estopped from asserting or from claiming or recovering from defendant any greater sum than $67.24, for said alleged loss and damage, and this defendant offers to permit the plaintiffs to take judgment for the sum of $67.24, and that the defendant recover against the plaintiffs its costs and disbursements of this action.”
This new matter is denied by the reply. At the hearing it was agreed in writing by the parties that the cause should be tried, argued and submitted upon the following statement of facts:
“That defendant is now and during all the dates hereinafter mentioned has been, a corporation organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the State of Oregon, with its principal office and place of business in the City of Portland, State of Oregon, and was engaged, at the times herein named, in the operation of a line of railroad extending from Portland, in the State of Oregon, to Spokane, in the State of Washington, and elsewhere, and was engaged in interstate commerce, and subject to all the provisions and terms of an act of Congress, approved February 4, 1887, entitled ‘An act to regulate commerce’ and acts amendatory thereof. That heretofore, and on or about the twenty-second day of January, 1913, at Spokane, Washington, Otto Grice and Florence Grice, plaintiffs herein, acting by and through one Pacific Transfer Company, which was then and there in possession of the goods hereinafter set forth, caused to be delivered to the defendant a shipment of freight, to wit, two boxes, one trunk, one cedar chest, and one barrel, which said boxes, trunk, cedar chest, and barrel, contained household goods, silverware, and cut glass, weight being 1,280 pounds, prepaying the charges thereon in the sum of $12.70, with instructions to transport said goods by freight over its line of railroad from Spokane, Washington, to East Portland, Oregon, and there deliver said shipment to Otto Grice. That the plaintiffs instructed the said Pacific Transfer Company to deliver the shipment above mentioned to the defendant, for shipment from Spokane, Washington, to East Portland, Oregon, and said plaintiff gave the Pacific Transfer Company no other or further instructions whatsoever. That defendant, Oregon-Washington Railroad & Navigation Company, at all times mentioned, had in force and effect a rate covering the said shipment, where the same was released to a valuation of $10 per hundredweight, and which rate was and is less than the rate charged for shipments not released to $10 per hundredweight, which rate was duly filed, posted and published as required by the interstate commerce law. That a bill of lading was issued for said shipment of freight as herein referred to, and was given to Pacific Transfer Company and hy it sent to plaintiffs at City of Portland, Oregon, at which place plaintiffs were at the time said goods were delivered to defendant. That a copy of said bill of lading as so issued is hereto attached, marked ‘Exhibit A,’ and made a part of this stipulation. That the agent of said defendant company, who received said shipment at Spokane, Washington, did not inform the Pacific Transfer Company of a valuation having been placed on said shipment, nor of a difference of freight rates for shipments so taken at an agreed valuation and shipments taken without an agreed valuation, and that defendant made no inquiry as to the value of the goods. That while in transit over the line of defendant the goods shipped were lost by theft, and damaged by thieves, as of the agreed loss and damage of $545.52, which has been demanded of defendant and payment refused. That said goods so lost and damaged belonged to the plaintiffs. That the. portion of the shipment which was lost or damaged, as herein mentioned, weighed 670 pounds, and under the released valuation of $10 per hundredweight the valuation of said portion of said shipment so lost and damaged was and is $67. That the prepaid charges on 25 pounds, being the portion of said shipment lost or stolen, at the rate of 99 cents per hundredweight, amounting to the sum of 24 cents, making a total due under said released valuation of $67.24. That defendant, prior to the commencement of this action, tendered to the plaintiffs, in full settlement of all liability arising out of the alleged loss, the sum of $67.24, but plaintiffs refused to accept the same.”
Affirmed.
For appellant there was a brief over the names of Mr. John P. Hannon, Mr. Arthur C. Spencer and Mr. Charles E. Cochran, with an oral argument by Mr. Hannon.
For respondents there was a brief and an oral argument by Mr. Lotus L. Langley.

Opinion:
Me. Justice Buenett
delivered the opinion of the court.
It is insisted by the plaintiffs that, according to the bill of exceptions, no exception appears to have been taken to the decision of the Circuit Court, and hence nothing is here presented for our consideration.
It is said in Section 172, L. O. L.:
"No exception need be taken or allowed to any decision upon a matter of law, when the same is entered in the journal, or made wholly.upon matters in writing and on file in the court. " ,
The parties agreed upon the facts involved in this litigation. To all intents and purposes their agreement constituted a verdict or declaration of the truth concerning the matters in controversy. It was filed in the court as part of its record, and was binding upon their tribunal, as well as upon its makers; consequently, in the language of the statute referred to, no exception was necessary. The whole question is whether the circuit court reached the proper conclusion from the facts and pleadings submitted to it by the parties.
On inspecting "A" attached to the bill of exceptions, almost the first language that meets the eye is this:
"This memorandum is an acknowledgment that a bill of lading has been issued, and is not the original bill of lading, nor a copy or duplicate, covering the property named herein, and is intended solely for filing or record."
"We may well doubt if this is a sufficient bill to present the question raised. Omitting-, however, the quoted memorandum, the document contains this matter:
"Oregon-Washington Railroad & Navigation Company.
"Received, subject to the classifications and tariffs in effect on the date of the receipt by the carrier of the property described in the original bill of lading, at Spokane, 1/21/1913, from Pacific Trans. Co., the property described below, in apparent good order, except as noted (contents and condition of contents of packages unknown), marked, consigned and destined as indicated below, which said company agrees to carry to its usual place of delivery at said destination, if on its road, otherwise to deliver to another carrier on the ronte to said destination. It is mutually agreed, as to each carrier of all or any of said property over all or any portion of said route to destination, and as to each party at any time interested in all or any of said property, that every service to be performed hereunder shall be subject to all the conditions, whether printed or written, herein contained (including- conditions on back hereof) and which are agreed to by the shipper and accepted for himself and his assigns. The surrender of the original order bill of lading properly indorsed shall be required before the delivery of the property. Inspection of property covered by the bill of lading will not be permitted, unless provided by law or unless permission is indorsed on the original bill of lading or given in writing by the shipper. # *
"Consigned to order of Pacific Trans. Co.
"Destination, East Portland, State of Ore. * #
"Notify Otto Grice.
"At East Portland, State of Ore. "
Under head of "Description of Articles and Special Marks" appear these items:
"2 Box H. H. Goods.
"1 " Trunk.
"1 crt. cedar chest.
"1 bhl. and contents.
"Declared valuation, $10.00
"Accomplished 1/ 28/ 13.
" J. B. Glover.
"Spokane 1098 1/22/13 Pro. 2986 1/28/13."
The weight is given at 1,280, presumably in pounds. The following names appear at the end of the document:
"Pacific Trans. Co. Shipper.
"Per Coker.
"J. C. Mayo, Agent, "Per H. Agent.
"Per -."
On the back of this exhibit among others, appear the conditions quoted in the defendant's answer.
In our judgment there is nothing in the interstate commerce law that forbids a common carrier from assuming the common-law liability in the carriage of goods from one state to another. The design of the national legislation on this subject was to extirpate preferences and advantages given by transportation companies to favored shippers, and to compel interstate carriers to treat all alike under the same circumstances. Subject to that congressional statute and the authority of the Interstate Commerce Commission, the carrier is permitted to make reasonable contracts limiting its liability to more favorable terms than the stringent rules of the common law. In the instant case the plaintiffs seek to recover the full value of the goods lost on the hypothesis that they were intrusted to the carrier for shipment and that it has failed to deliver them, and if nothing else is shown that would be the measure of damages. If it would escape responsibility for this amount, the defendant must allege and prove facts sufficient to entitle it to the desired reduction of its liability. Regarding the stipulation of facts as a full declaration of the truth, it becomes necessary to compare it with the pleading of the defendant, to ascertain how much of the answer is sustained by this conventional verdict.
As noted above, the defendant's pleading states in substance that, acting by their agent, the Pacific Transfer Company, the plaintiffs elected to have the goods transported under the uniform bill of lading, then and there released the property to a value of $10 per hundredweight in case of loss or damage while in transit, and indorsed the agreement upon the bill of lading. It is conceded on both sides that the property was delivered to the defendant at Spokane by the transfer company as the agent of the plaintiffs. As to the extent of the agency the stipulation is to this effect: That the plaintiffs instructed the Pacific Transfer Company to deliver the shipment to the defendant company for shipment from Spokane to Portland, but gave the transfer company no other or further instructions whatsoever. As stated by Mr. Justice Eakin in Baker v. Seaweard, 63 Or. 350 (127 Pac. 961) : "Any person dealing with an agent does so at his peril." It is a general principle, well established by precedent, that if one would charge another by the act of a third party the former must establish the real or apparent authority of the alleged agent. In this instance the extent of the agent's power is stipulated. It was simply to deliver the goods for shipment. The fact has been thus ascertained by the stipulation, and, having been so settled, it is a question of law as to what the agent may do by virtue of such a warrant: Glenn v. Savage, 14 Or. 567 ( 13 Pac. 442).
As a matter of law, it cannot be said that the power of the plaintiffs' agent as defined by the statement of facts was extensive enough to sanction the stipulation for the principals about the value of goods or the agreement to the various conditions and provisos that are usually found on the back of documents like the one in question, unless something more is shown in the way of customary dealings between the parties, or some general usage of which all concerned are deemed to have taken notice as a binding rule of business. It is not pretended that the plaintiffs themselves executed or specially authorized the transfer company to execute for them the so-called bill of lading. Neither is there anything in the stipulation of facts about the plaintiffs having elected to ship under the uniform bill of lading. According to that statement it does not appear that they released the property at a value of $10 per hundredweight. This converted allegation of the answer about election of conditions and release of value must therefore be held to have failed of proof.
The principal controversy is upon the effect of the clause quoted in the answer about the basis upon which damage shall be calculated. An analysis of that excerpt reveals that there are four conditions affecting the calculation of damage in case of loss. The first is the bona fide invoice price, if any, to the consignee; but no such valuation appears on the bill of lading or in the stipulation. The second is an exception in case a lower value has been represented in writing by the shipper. The third is when a lower value has been agreed upon; but' nothing appears in the statement of facts on either of these subjects. Anri the fourth is when the value is determined by the classification or tariff upon which the valuation is based. The classification of freight and the tariff applicable thereto are not disclosed by either the pleadings or the stipulation. Hence there is nothing in the case in the final analysis to affect the valuation one way or the other, with the result that only the true and actual worth of the goods is open to consideration. The statement of facts is also silent upon the allegation of the answer that the plaintiffs represented the shipment to be of the value of $10 per hundredweight. In short, the proof as agreed upon by the litigants does not establish the defendant's case as made in its answer. Having admitted that it received the goods for transportation and that it failed to deliver part of them, the defendant was liable under the common-law rule for the actual value of the lost chattels, unless-it had shown a lawfuFcontract lessening its liability. The declaration of the truth settled by the parties does not disclose the necessary excuse in favor of the defendant. In this state of the case the Circuit Court drew the only proper conclusion from the agreed facts.
The judgment is affirmed.
Affirmed. Rehearing Granted.
Mr. Chief Justice Moore, Mr. Justice McBride and Mr. Justice Benson concur.