Case Name: William H. Feeny v. The State
Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1911-02-08
Citations: 62 Tex. Crim. 585
Docket Number: No. 928
Parties: William H. Feeny v. The State.
Judges: 
Reporter: Texas Criminal Reports
Volume: 62
Pages: 585–592

Head Matter:
William H. Feeny v. The State.
No. 928.
Decided February 8, 1911.
Rehearing Denied June 14, 1911.
1. —Forgery—Certificate—Practice on Appeal.
Original papers sent up to the Court of Criminal Appeals must be verified by the certificate of the clerk in the trial court.
2. —Same—Fictitious Person—Evidence.
Where the indictment alleged that the alleged maker of the check was a fictitious person, there was no error in admitting proof of this allegation, especially where the endorsement on the check purported to show contractual relations between defendant and said fictitious maker.
3. ^-Same—Charge of Court—Deposit—Collection.
Where, upon trial of forgery, the evidence showed that the defendant left the alleged check with a bank and drew against it, the amount having been passed to his credit, this showed that the check was left for deposit and not for collection, and there was no error in the court’s failure to submit the question of collection to the jury. But even if left in the bank for collection he must have known the fraud.
4. —Same—Variance—Charge of Court.
Where, upon appeal from a conviction of forgery, the appellant claimed a variance between the allegations in the indictment and the instrument introduced in evidence, and the original written instrument was sent up with the record and simply showed bad handwriting and no material variance, there was no error in the court’s failure to submit a requested charge on the question of variance.
5. —Same—Variance—Non Est Factum.
Where, upon appeal from a conviction of forgery, the appellant claimed a variance between the allegation in the indictment and the written instrument in evidence as to the name of the maker, and it further appeared from the record that the appellant had pleaded non est factum, spelling the name of the alleged maker of the instrument as set out in the indictment, he could not be heard to claim a variance.
6. —Same—Variance—Rule Stated.
Where the allegation is sufficiently certain that the accused may know the instrument which he is charged to have forged or passed, and is sufficiently identified to enable the defendant to plead former acquittal or conviction, no substantial variance can he claimed,
7.—Same—Statement of Facts.
Where it is shown on appeal that the statement of facts was filed within time, an order of the Appellate Court declining to consider the same will be set aside and the case heard on its merits.
Appeal from the District Court of Potter. Tried below before the Hon. J. N. Browning.
Appeal from a conviction of forgery; penalty, three years imprisonment in the penitentiary.
■The opinion states the case.
Reeder & Graham, for appellant.
On question of filing statement of facts: Haak v. State, 60 Texas Crim. Rep., 366, 132 S. W. Rep., 358.
C. E. Lane, Assistant Attorney-General, for the State.

Opinion:
DAVIDSON, Presiding Judge.
Appellant was convicted of forgery, his punishment being assessed at three years confinement in the penitentiary.
Motion is made by the assistant attorney-general to strike out the statement of facts because not filed within the time allowed by the court under orders entered. The court adjourned on the 2d of April, 1910. The court held over eight weeks. The order allowing time after adjournment of the court to file statement of facts and bills of exception was entered on the 26th day of March, allowing sixty days' time in which appellant could prepare and file his bills of exception and statement of facts. Subsequently another order was granted extending the time to eighty days in which to file bills of exception and statement of facts. Under this order appellant had eighty days from the 26th day of March in which to file statement of facts and bills of exception. The bills of exception and statement of facts were not filed until the 18th of June, which was about eighty-three days, instead of eighty allowed by the court. There is no reason shown in the record why the statement of facts was not filed within the time authorized. The order of the court included as well the bills of exception as it did the statement of facts. Under this showing of the record we are of opinion the motion of the assistant attorney-general is well taken, and same will be sustained.
As the record presents the case to us, with the exceptions and evidence eliminated, there are no questions that can be reviewed or revised. The charges given by the court are applicable to a' state of case provable under the indictment. With the evidence eliminated, we are unable to say that the court erred in refusing the special requested instructions.
We find among the papers what purports to be the original instrument upon which the indictment was predicated. The record shows that there was an order entered sending up the original papers, but those found, in the record are not in any way verified by certificate of the clerk as being the original papers as used on the trial, nor is that instrument, supposedly the basis of the indictment, certified as such. In fact there is no certificate of the clerk verifying or certifying that these are the original papers. It has been the practice since State v. Morris, 43 Texas, 372, that all original papers sent up must be so sent independent of and not a part of the transcript, and verified by the certificate of the clerk as such original papers; otherwise they can not be considered. The same rule laid down by the Supreme Court in Morris v. State, supra, has been followed by this court in its decisions. Carroll v. State, 24 Texas Crim. App., 313; Brewer v. State, 32 Texas Crim. Rep., 74; Kennedy v. State, 33 Texas Crim. Rep., 183.
Under the condition of the record there-are no questions which authorize a reversal of the judgment, and it is therefore affirmed.
Affirmed.