Case Name: Lazarus Stern, trading as L. Stern & Company vs. Sigmund Rosenheim
Court: Court of Appeals of Maryland
Jurisdiction: Maryland
Decision Date: 1887-06-23
Citations: 67 Md. 503
Docket Number: 
Parties: Lazarus Stern, trading as L. Stern & Company vs. Sigmund Rosenheim.
Judges: 
Reporter: Maryland Reports
Volume: 67
Pages: 503–511

Head Matter:
Lazarus Stern, trading as L. Stern & Company vs. Sigmund Rosenheim.
Contract— Construction— Conjectural profits.
S. contracted in writing to employ R. as a travelling salesman, for one year at a fixed salary, payable in equal monthly instalments; and it was stipulated in the contract that if during the year the sales made by R. should exceed a specified amount, he should receive an additional compensation of ten per cent, on the excess; S. reserving the right to annul the contract at the expiration of six months. R. was discharged before the six months expired. In an action by R. for a breach of the contract, it was Held :
That the plaintiff was entitled to no commissions unless he sold goods to the amount specified ; and could not claim commissions on goods that he might have sold if he had been allowed to remain for the full period of six months, the amount of such sales being too speculative and conjectural to form the basis of a recovery of damages.
Appeal from the Baltimore City Court.
This suit was brought by Signiund. Rosenheim to recover from Lazarus Stern, trading as L. Stern & Co., for ■a breach of the following written contract;
Baltimore, March 24, 1886.
This contract, entered, into between L. Stern & Co., of the first part, and S. Rosenheim of the second part, is as follows, viz.,
S. Rosenheim, of the second part, is to receive eighteen hundred dollars ($1,800) per annum, payable in monthly instalments of one hundred and fifty dollars, ($150,) for which the said S. Rosenheim is to represent the said L. Stern & Oo., of the first part, as travelling salesman for one year, commencing April 1, 1886, and to travel such territory as may be selected by L. Stern & Oo.
And it is further agreed, that should the sales of said S. Rosenheim exceed the sum of thirty thousand dollars ($30,000) during the existence of this contract, then the said S. Rosenheim is to receive a further compensation of ten per cent, on all sales in excess of thirty thousand dollars.
It is further agreed, that the said L. Stern & Go. reserve the right.and privilege to reject and refuse to ship any orders or hills sold by the said S. Rosenheim, if in their judgment they consider it advisable to do so.
It is also further agreed, that the said L. Stern & Oo., of the first part, reserve the right and privilege to annul and terminate their contract at the expiration of six months from April 1, ’86, if the services of the said S. Rosenheim are not satisfactory, in the event of which the said Rosenheim is to-receive no further compensation.
L. Stern & Co.,
S. Rosenheim.
The opinion of the Court and the dissenting opinion of Judge Bryan, furnish a statement of the case.
Exception. — The plaintiff offered a prayer which the Court, (Stewart, J.) modified, and granted as follows :
If the jury believe from the evidence that the plaintiff was employed by the defendant as salesman for one year, commencing on the 1st day of April, 1886, at the salary of $1800, and ten per cent, on all sales made by plaintiff for defendant in excess of $30,000, and that the defendant had the right to annul said contract of employment at the end of six months; and shall find that plaintiff faithfully-discharged his duties as salesman until the 28th day of August, 1886, when he was dismissed from said employment before the expiration of six months, then the plaintiff under said written contract (offered in evidence) is entitled to recover one-half of the said sum of $1800, and also to ten per cent, on all sales in excess of .$15,000 made by plaintiff whilst so employed, or which he could reasonably have made if he had been permitted to continue in said employment to the end of six months, less such sums as the jury may believe the defendant paid the plaintiff on account of his said salary, and also less such sum as the plaintiff actually earned after his discharge by the defendant, and before 1st of October, 1886, or might by due and reasonable diligence have earned during that period ; in ascertaining which sum so earned by the plaintiff, the jury are to take iuto consideration any expense the plaintiff may have incurred in seeking new employment, if they believe he did incur expense for that purpose ; and the jury are to allow the defendant any freight paid by him on goods returned to him, which may have been ordered by plaintiff tobe shipped.to parties without authority from said parties, if the jury so believe. If the jury from the evidence believe that no commissions (in addition to his salary) were earned by the plaintiff, but that sums were paid hv the defendant to him on anticipated sales in excess of the amount mentioned in the agreement, with the understanding that the said sums of money, if not earned in commissions, were to be applied on account of salary, then the jury must make said application, and if the said sums amount to or are in excess of the amount of salary, if any, which the jury may find to be due, their verdict must he for defendant.
The defendant offered the following prayer, which the Court refused:
That the plaintiff is not entitled to recover any salary in this case if the jury find that when the plaintiff was dis charged he had already received from the defendant $900. And the jury is further instructed, that the only commissions to which the plaintiff was entitled was ten per cent, on such amount of sales made by him and- accepted by the defendant, over and above the sum of $12,500. And that from such commissions, if they find any have thus been-earned by the plaintiff, the defendant is entitled to deduct such sums of money as the plaintiff actually earned after his discharge, and prior to 1st of October, 1886, or might by due and reasonable diligence have earned during that period, and also any freight which the defendant may have been compelled to pay on goods returned to him not ordered as represented by plaintiff. And in ascertaining what the plaintiff did earn during that period, the jury can take into consideration such expenses as they believe the plaintiff incurred.
To the granting of the plaintiff's prayer as modified, and to the rejection of the defendant’s prayer, the defendant excepted and filed also special exceptions as follows to the plaintiff’s prayer :
1st. That there is no evidence in the case by which the jury can estimate what amount of goods the plaintiff could have sold by the 1st October, 1886, if he had not been discharged.
2nd. Because it leaves it to the jury to determine whether or not the defendant had the right to annul said contract at the end of six months.
3rd. That there is no evidence of the plaintiff having sold as much as $15,000 while in the employ of defendant, or that he could have earned that amount.
The verdict and judgment being for the plaintiff, the defendant appealed.
The cause was argued before Alvey, C. J., Stone, Miller, Robinson, and Bryan, J.
H. W. Williams, and Randolph Barton, for the appellant.
(Decided 23rd June, 1887.)
J. J. Wade, for the appellee.

Opinion:
Stone, J.,
delivered, the opinion of the Court.
A majority of the Court think upon a fair construction of the contract between Stern and Rosenheim, that the plaintiff's right to commissions only began when he had sold the $30,000 worth of goods. He was engaged for a year at a fixed salary, with the further promise that if during that year he sold over $30,000 he should have a commission on the excess. But the contract gave the defendant the right to discharge him at the end of six months. Unless he had sold $30,000 worth of' goods while in the service of the defendant, we do not think he was entitled to any commissions.
But if we concede that if he had remained in the employ of the defendant for six months only, he would have been entitled to commissions on all over $15,000 worth of goods, we think his right to commissions could only exist on the amount he actually sold.
That the plaintiff could not claim an allowance for commissions on goods that he might have sold, if he had been allowed to remain for the full period of six months. What he might have sold for the period between 28th August and 1st October, is entirely speculative and conjectural, and depends upon too many contingencies to be allowed as the basis of a recovery of damages.
We, therefore, think that the Court, was in error in allowing the jury to take into consideration the amount of goods that he might have sold, and the judgment should be reversed. As it appears that the plaintiff had actually received the amount of money due to him as salary for the six months, this case will be reversed without awarding a new trial.
Judgment reversed, without awarding a new trial.