Case Name: Ream against Rank
Court: Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
Jurisdiction: Pennsylvania
Decision Date: 1817-05-26
Citations: 3 Serg. & Rawl. 215
Docket Number: 
Parties: Ream against Rank.
Judges: Gibson J. concurred.
Reporter: Reports of cases adjudged in the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania (Sergeant & Rawle)
Volume: 3
Pages: 215–219

Head Matter:
Ream against Rank.
Monday, May 26,
Case lies for debauching a man’s daughter and getting her with-child, by which he lost her service, &c. and is the most proper form of action.
When the defendant has entered the plaintiff’s house, and thereby committed a trespass, the plain*» tiff may bring trespass, and lay the debauching his daughter and losing her ser* vice as a consequential injury.
Query, whe* ther trespass lies where there is no such entry ?
In Error.
ERROR to the Common Pleas of Lancaster county, in an action on the case, brought by Rank, the plaintiff below, against Ream, for debauching his daughter and getting her with child, by which the plaintiff lost the service and comfort of his daughter and servant, and was put to great trouble and expense, and was subject to great pain, anxiety, and distress of mind, &c.
Frazier, for the plaintiff in error,
contended, that the action was improper. It should have been trespass. The action on the case prevailed in England', near thirty years ago, but has since been changed. It was a mistake of Judge Buller, which introduced a wrong practice. The practice here may also have been to support case ; - but that practice has been erroneous. The forms in the old books, in these actions, and others which are analogous, are in trespass vi et armis; as for taking away an apprentice, per quod, &c. Reg. brev. 109 ; for putting poison in meat, per quod, &c. Ib. 97 for assault and battery on a servant, per. quod, &c. lb. 102. Rast. Ent. 455.pl. 20. 605. pl. 1. 592. pl. 4. Thomps. Ent. 388. pl, 160; for taking the plaintiff’s wife and goods, per quod, &c. Lill. Ent. 441. Cro. Jac. 538. So in a similar case, for breaking and entering the plaintiff’s house and debauching his servant, per quod, &fc. the action was trespass. 2 Lutw. 1496. In Russell v. Corne, it is said by Holt C. J. that “aman cannot maintain an action “ against another for assaulting his daughter, and getting her “ with child; but he may maintain an action against another “for entering his house, and assaulting and getting his “ daughter with child, per quod servitium amisit; and that “is a great aggravation. In Turridge v. Wade, in the year 1769, the suit was trespass; and an assault and battery on the .daughter was laid. So an assault on the plaintiff’s daughter was laid in Postlethwait v. Parkes. Trespass was .brought for taking plaintiff’s son and heir, and marrying him. Fitz. N. B. 206. G.
P. Ross, contra.
I do not deny that trespass lies; but the plaintiff has his election to bring case or trespass. He may wave the trespass if he pleases. The criterion that distinguishes trespass from case is, whether the injury is immediate or not. Reynolds v. Clark. Scott v. Shepherd. In this action the consequential damage is the foundation of the claim. Three cases have been tried in this county like the present, in all of which the action was an action on the case. Lyon v. Hamilton, in 1800, in the Circuit Court of Lancaster county. Spear v. Patterson and Zurtman v. Miller, in the Common Pleas.
2 Ld. Raym. 1042.
3 Wils. 18.
3 Burr. X 878.
1 Sir. 635. Ld. Ray, 1402. S. C.
2 Bl. Rep. 892.

Opinion:
Tilghman C. J.
This is an action on the case, brought by Philip Rank, the defendant in error, against Curtis Ream, for debauching the plaintiff's daughter, and getting Her with-child, &c. by which the plaintiff lost the service of his daughter, &c. The question is, whether trespass was not the proper action, and whether case can be supported.
That actions of trespass have been brought in such cases, for a long period of time in England, cannot be denied. Neither can it be denied, that actions on the case have also been supported, both in England and in this country. The plaintiff's counsel have cited, Lyon v. Hamilton, tried before Judges Yeates and Smith, in the Circuit Court of Lancaster county, at April Term, 1800; also, Spear v. Patterson, and Zurtman v. Miller, in the Common Pleas of Lancaster county. In support of the action on the case, we have likewise the authority of Martin v. Payne, in the Supreme Court'of New York, 9 Johns. 387. It is to be considered, then, whether there be any thing so contrary to principle, in the action on the case, that, notwithstanding the authorities which have been mentioned, it would be absurd to support it. The ground of this action is, the injury sustained by the plaintiff in the loss of the services of -his daughter. When the defendant has also committed á trespass on the plaintiff's property, (as by entering his house, &c.) the plaintiff may very properly bring trespass, and lay the debauching of his daughter and loss of service, &c. as a consequential injury. But where no trespass has been in truth committed, it seems rather absurd to bring the action of trespass. If my servant is beaten, in consequence of which I lose his service, it is reasonable that trespass should be the form of action, because a trespass was in fact committed; but if he is seduced from my service, without force, I may allege the truth, and recover damages for the loss of service, in an action on the case. Of this there is no doubt. Is there any thing then, in the seduction of a woman and getting her with child, which necessarily imports a trespass? It should seem not, because the seduction operates on the mind, to which no bodily force can be applied; and the mind being corrupted, the child is begotten with the woman's consent. Indeed, if the act is done forcibly, and against her will, it is a rape, for which, being a felony, no action will lie. In order to support an action of trespass, a fiction is resorted to, viz. that the defendant committed an assault on the woman. I will not say, that such fiction, resting on long practice, may not be supported; because it is not very material, in what form the suit is brought, provided the cause be tried on its merits ; but I may safely say, that a different form, in which truth is told, and fiction discarded, is not only maintainable, but most proper. Without deciding, therefore, that trespass would not lie, I am of opinion, that the actiqn on the case is good.
Gibson J. concurred.