Case Name: BATON ROUGE COCA-COLA BOTTLING COMPANY, LTD. v. GENERAL TRUCK DRIVERS, WAREHOUSEMEN AND HELPERS, LOCAL UNION NO. 5, Affiliated with International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America
Court: Louisiana Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1981-06-22
Citations: 403 So. 2d 632
Docket Number: No. 80-C-2700
Parties: BATON ROUGE COCA-COLA BOTTLING COMPANY, LTD. v. GENERAL TRUCK DRIVERS, WAREHOUSEMEN AND HELPERS, LOCAL UNION NO. 5, Affiliated with International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America.
Judges: MARCUS, J., concurs and assigns reasons.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 403
Pages: 632–644

Head Matter:
BATON ROUGE COCA-COLA BOTTLING COMPANY, LTD. v. GENERAL TRUCK DRIVERS, WAREHOUSEMEN AND HELPERS, LOCAL UNION NO. 5, Affiliated with International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America.
No. 80-C-2700.
Supreme Court of Louisiana.
June 22, 1981.
Rehearing Denied Sept. 28, 1981.
Lawrence R. Anderson, Jr. and William Hardy Patrick, III of Anderson, Anderson & Steffes, Baton Rouge, for defendant-applicant.
G. Michael Pharis, Tom F. Phillips and Louis M. Phillips of Taylor, Brooks, Porter & Phillips, Baton Rouge, for plaintiffs-respondents.

Opinion:
WATSON, Justice.
The issues are: (1) whether LSA-R.S. 23:844, the "Little Norris-LaGuardia Act," governs the issuance of an injunction in a labor dispute; and (2) whether a preliminary injunction was issued in compliance with the Act.
Plaintiff, Baton Rouge Coca-Cola Bottling Company, Ltd., filed a petition for a temporary restraining order. Named as defendant was General Truck Drivers, Ware-housemen and Helpers Local Union No. 5, affiliated with International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America. The trial court granted the temporary restraining order, which prohibited the defendant Union from engaging in certain activities and imposed limitations on the location and number of pickets at the entrance to plaintiff's plant. The Union filed a motion to dissolve the temporary restraining order and asked damages, alleging that the order was wrongfully issued. Alternatively, it sought an increase in the $1,000 bond which Coca-Cola had been required to provide. The court denied the motion to dissolve, granted a preliminary injunction and increased the bond to $2,500. The court of appeal affirmed and a writ was granted to review the decision. 394 So.2d 1246 (La., 1980).
Coca-Cola's petition stated that the Union had been recognized by the NLRB as the bargaining representative for employees at Baton Rouge Coca-Cola. Because negotiations were unsuccessful, some of these employees had gone on strike. Defendant had established picket lines at the two employee entrances to the plant.
Coca-Cola's petition alleged that:
". . . mass picketing and congregation of pickets have occurred, intimidation of persons seeking lawful ingress to and egress from the plant has occurred, said picketers have used threatening, vile, and abusive language, ingress to and egress from said plant has been obstructed and hindered. ." (Tr. 5)
Additionally, Coca-Cola contended that participants in the picket line had spit upon those entering and leaving the plant and had disrupted traffic on U.S. Highway 61 (Airline Highway).
Plaintiff's petition asserted that the mass picketing violated its constitutional rights, posed a continuing threat to peace and interfered with operation of its business.
The restraining order issued by the district court provided in pertinent part, as follows:
". . . Teamsters Local No. 5, and all persons in active concert or participation with the said Teamsters Local No. 5, be, and they are hereby, temporarily restrained, enjoined and prohibited from all of the following:
"A. Threatening, intimidating, cussing, using vile, indecent and vulgar language, molesting, restraining, coercing, committing acts of violence and compulsion against, or in any way interfering with petitioners, their agents or employees as they enter or leave or work about the Baton Rouge Coca-Cola plant in East Baton Rouge Parish, Louisiana, or as they make their deliveries or perform their services in the Greater Baton Rouge area. "B. Massing or congregating within four hundred feet (400') of the entrances to the Baton Rouge Coca-Cola plant in East Baton Rouge Parish, Louisiana, or in any way interfering with or obstructing the free access of Baton Rouge Coca-Cola's employees, suppliers, and deliverymen at said plant.
"C. Engaging in any picketing, patrolling or congregating, forming a physical barrier of any kind whatsoever at or near the Baton Rouge Coca-Cola entrances to the Baton Rouge Coca-Cola plant, except that defendants may station not more than three (3) persons at each entrance to the plant, on public property, for the purpose of picketing or other peaceful activities not prohibited hereby except that no picket shall remain stationary but shall continuously walk in a straight line the entire width of the roadway, an interval of ten feet (10') shall be maintained between walking pickets.
"D. Spitting, kicking or striking the vehicles or persons of petitioners agents or employees as they enter, leave or work at the Baton Rouge Coca-Cola plant or as they make their deliveries or work in the Greater Baton Rouge area.
"IT IS FURTHER ORDERED by this Court that the Sheriff of East Baton Rouge Parish and all law enforcement agencies shall enforce this order and require compliance by defendants with the terms hereof. ." (Tr. 10-11)
The preliminary injunction differs in some respects from the temporary restraining order. The injunction reduces the area of restriction from 400 to 200 feet, prohibits picketing within 25 feet of U.S. Highway 61, and omits the provision which directs law enforcement agencies to enforce the order.
The trial court found that this was not a case of peaceful picketing. The trial court concluded that:
". . . there is an extreme possibility that violence will be provoked and intimidation will be engendered." (Tr. 448)
The Union contends that the lower courts failed to apply the provisions of LSA-R.S. 23:844, the "Little Norris-LaGuardia Act," to the facts of this case. The allegations and findings of fact which that statute requires before an injunction can be issued in a labor dispute were not made. In particu lar, the Union maintains that Coca-Cola failed to allege and prove that local law enforcement officers were unable to furnish adequate protection.
The trial court held that the Little Norris-LaGuardia Act is not applicable where injunctive relief is sought to prevent violence. The Court of Appeal affirmed, relying primarily on Douglas Public Service Corp. v. Gaspard, 225 La. 972, 74 So.2d 182 (1954).
In Douglas plaintiff sought injunctive relief against its striking employees. Defendants filed exceptions based on plaintiff's failure to comply with the provisions of LSA-R.S. 23:844. The statute was declared "illegal and ineffective."
Douglas concluded, without supporting reasons, that compliance with the statute denied due process. As Justice Hawthorne noted in dissent, any due process infirmity in our statute is shared by the federal act. In fact, neither law denies due process.
Both acts are legislative determinations of how the conflicting interests of employers and employees should be accommodated. Rather than denying due process, LSA-R.S. 23:844 insures it by providing reasonable notice and an opportunity for workers to be heard prior to the granting of injunctive relief. The declaration of policy in LSA-R.S. 23:843 recognizes that injunctive relief ". . . is peculiarly subject to abuse in labor litigation."
The statute is not an unconstitutional infringement on the courts' jurisdiction to grant injunctive relief. Injunctions are not prohibited in labor disputes, but preclusive procedures and guidelines must be followed before that relief is available.
The legislature has the power to define the substantive and procedural rights of citizens. The Code of Civil Procedure articles on injunctions are representative examples of the exercise of this power. The Little Norris-LaGuardia Act is no less valid than the Code articles. Because of the special considerations present in labor disputes, it establishes a set of special rules. Neither the Code of Civil Procedure articles on injunctions nor LSA-R.S. 23:844 limit the courts' jurisdiction in granting injunc- tive relief. Both are valid legislative provisions.
Coca-Cola argues, in reliance on Douglas, that LSA-R.S. 23:844 deprives a judge of his constitutional power to issue "all other needful writs, orders and process in aid of the jurisdiction of his court." LSA-Const. Art. V, § 2. However, requiring courts to find certain facts and follow certain procedures before issuing injunctions in labor disputes does not infringe on this constitutional authority. The challenged statute does not prohibit the courts from issuing temporary restraining orders and injunctions; it merely imposes restrictions with regard to notice, delay, findings of fact, and opportunity for hearing.
The legislature has seen fit to regulate injunctive relief in other areas. One example is LSA-C.C.P. art. 3601 which prohibits an injunction in some cases involving the expenditure of public funds. In Wall v. Close, 201 La. 986, 10 So.2d 779 (1942) the constitutionality of LSA-R.S. 13:4431, which allows suspensive appeals in certain cases where an injunction has been issued, was upheld against a challenge identical to that made in the present case.
Courts in other states have concluded that the legislature may regulate such proceedings. The Wisconsin Supreme Court held that its Little Norris-LaGuardia Act did not diminish the jurisdiction of its constitutionally created courts but simply changed the substantive law. American Furniture Co. v. I.B. of T.C. and H., Etc., 222 Wis. 338, 268 N.W. 250 (1936). In Goldfinger v. Feintuch, 276 N.Y. 281, 11 N.E.2d 910 (1937) the New York Little Norris-La-Guardia Act was upheld against constitutional attack. A New Jersey court has rejected the contention that procedural requirements for the issuance or labor injunctions breach the constitutional equity jurisdiction of the courts. U.S. Pipe & Foundry Co. v. United Steelworkers, 59 N.J.Super. 240, 157 A.2d 542 (1960). In Fenske Bros. v. Upholsterers' International Union, 358 Ill. 239, 193 N.E. 112 (1934) the Illinois Supreme Court held that forbidding the enjoining of peaceful picketing does not curtail the inherent power of equity courts.
Laws which limit or regulate the courts' power to issue injunctions are not unconstitutional limitations upon a court's power to do what is necessary to aid or preserve its jurisdiction. LSA-R.S. 23:844 is not a restriction on the jurisdiction of the courts. Rather it is a modification of substantive law and serves to protect the rights of laborers to engage in certain types of picketing free from the threat of abusive use of injunctions.
Since LSA-R.S. 23:844 is not constitutionally defective, it must be applied to this proceeding. This is a ease "involving or growing out of a labor dispute." The stat ute requires that testimony be presented and findings of fact be made in six areas.
The Union asserts that Coca-Cola failed to allege and prove the sixth requirement of LSA-R.S. 23:844, which is:
"(6) That the public officers charged with the duty to protect complainant's property have failed or are unable to furnish adequate protection."
A review of Coca-Cola's petition and of the transcript of the preliminary injunction hearing supports this contention. Coca-Cola's petition fails to allege that public officers charged with the duty to protect the company's property (i. e., city police and the sheriff's department) have failed or are unable to furnish adequate protection. The transcript of the hearing on the preliminary injunction reveals that Coca-Cola failed to undertake proof of this element.
LSA-R.S. 23:844 requires allegations and proof of public officers' failure or inability to furnish protection before an injunction may be issued in a labor dispute. Because of failure to comply with this statutory requirement, the preliminary injunction was improperly issued. It must be dissolved.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the court of appeal is reversed. The preliminary injunction issued by the district court is vacated and dissolved. The case is remanded for disposition consistent with this decision.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
MARCUS, J., concurs and assigns reasons.
BLANCHE, J., dissents for reasons assigned.
. Coca-Cola attached to its petition the affidavits of eighteen persons, mostly employees. These affidavits cited various instances of verbal abuse, spitting, and striking of automobiles by picketers.
. So named because it is patterned after the provisions of 29 U.S.C.A. § 101 et seq., the Norris-LaGuardia Act.
. LSA-R.S. 23:844 provides:
"No court shall issue a temporary or permanent injunction in any case involving or growing out of a labor dispute, as herein defined, except after hearing the testimony of witnesses in open court, with opportunity for cross-examination, in support of the allegations of a complaint made under oath, and testimony in opposition thereto, if offered, and except after findings of fact by the court to the effect:
"(1) That unlawful acts have been threatened or committed and will be executed or continued unless restrained;
"(2) That substantial and irreparable injury to complainant's property will follow unless the relief requested is granted;
"(3) That as to each item of relief granted greater injury will be inflicted upon complainant by the denial thereof than will be inflicted upon the defendants by the granting thereof;
"(4) That no item of relief granted is relief that a court has no authority to restrain or enjoin under R.S. 23:841;
"(5) That complainant has no adequate remedy by ordinary legal procedure; and
"(6) That the public officers charged with the duty to protect complainant's property have failed or are unable to furnish adequate protection.
"Such hearing shall be held after due and personal notice thereof has been given, in such manner as the court shall direct, to all known persons against whom relief is sought, and also to those public officers charged with the duty to protect complainant's property.
"If a complainant shall also allege that unless a temporary restraining order is. used before such hearing can be had a substantial and irreparable injury to complainant's property will be unavoidable, such a temporary restraining order may be granted upon the expiration of such reasonable notice of application therefor as the court may direct by order to show cause, but in no case less than forty-eight hours.
"Such order to show cause shall be served upon such party or parties as are sought to be restrained and as shall be specified in said order, and the restraining order shall issue only upon testimony, or in the discretion of the court, upon affidavits, sufficient, if sustained, to justify the court in issuing a temporary injunction upon a hearing as herein provided for.
"Such a temporary restraining order shall be effective for no longer than five days, at the expiration of which time it shall become void and not subject to renewal or extension; provided, that if the hearing for a temporary injunction shall have been begun before the expiration of the said five days the restraining order may, in the court's discretion, be continued until a decision is reached upon the issuance of the temporary injunction. "No temporary restraining order or temporary injunction shall be issued except on condition that complainant shall first file an undertaking with adequate security sufficient to recompense those enjoined for any loss, expense, or damage caused by the improvident or erroneous issuance of such order or injunction, including all reasonable costs, together with a reasonable attorney's fee, and expense against the order or against the granting of any injunctive relief sought in the same proceeding and subsequently denied by the court.
"The undertaking herein mentioned shall be understood to signify an agreement entered into by the complainant and the surety upon which a decree may be rendered in the same suit or proceeding against the said complainant and surety, the said complainant and surety submitting themselves to the jurisdiction of the court for that purpose. But nothing herein contained shall deprive any party having a claim or cause of action under or upon such undertaking from electing to pursue his ordinary remedy by suit at law."
. 74 So.2d 188. The holding of Douglas was criticized by commentators. See e. g., C. Rey-nard, "Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court, 1953-54 Term — Labor Law," 15 La.L.Rev. 324 (1955); Note, 29 Tul.L.Rev. 791 (1955).
. 74 So.2d 187.
. See Reynard, supra, 15 La.L.Rev. at 326.
. See LSA-C.C.P. art. 3601 et seq. The legislature has regulated the issuance of injunctions by prescribing the grounds for issuance, art. 3601; the requirements of notice and delay, art. 3602; the quantum of proof required, art. 3609; and the procedure for appeal, art. 3612.
. See Justice Hawthorne's dissent in Douglas, 74 So.2d at 189.
LSA-R.S. 47:1575 prohibits the issuance of an injunction restraining the collection of taxes. LSA-R.S. 47:1993 forbids an injunction prohibiting the depositing of assessment roles in the office where the records of the parish are kept. LSA-R.S. 13:4432 allows for a suspen-sive appeal, without bond, in certain cases where an injunction has been issued. LSA-R.S. 17:2188 prohibits an injunction enjoining the payment of principle or interest on obligations of indebtedness issued by the Board of Supervisors of Louisiana State University. LSA-R.S. 26:106 forbids an injunction restraining the Alcoholic Beverage Control Board before it has made a decision on a permit application, suspension, or revocation. LSA-R.S. 26:304 forbids the courts to enjoin the action of the Collector of Revenue and the Board of Tax Appeals in certain instances. LSA-R.S. 39:834 prohibits an injunction enjoining the payment on obligations of indebtedness issued by political subdivisions of the state. LSA-R.S. 30:13 forbids the courts to enjoin enforcement of a statute relating to conservation of oil and gas, except under certain conditions. LSA-R.S. 30:218 prohibits the enjoining of exploration for minerals on state lands. LSA-R.S. 23:1635 forbids the issuance of an injunction enjoining the payment of unemployment compensation benefits awarded by the Board of Review.
. LSA-R.S. 23:844.
LSA-R.S. 23:821 provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
"(3) The term 'labor dispute' includes any controversy concerning terms or conditions of employment, or concerning the association or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of employment, or concerning employment relations, or any other controversy arising out of the respective interests of employer and employee, regardless of whether or not the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer and employee."
. LSA-R.S. 23:844 provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
"No court shall issue a temporary or permanent injunction in any case involving or growing out of a labor dispute, as herein defined, except after hearing the testimony of witnesses in open court, with opportunity for cross-examination, in support of the allegations of a complaint made under oath, and testimony in opposition thereto, if offered, and except after findings of fact by the court to the effect:
"(1) That unlawful acts have been threatened or committed and will be executed or continued unless retrained;
"(2) That substantial and irreparable injury to complainant's property will follow unless the relief requested is granted;
"(3) That as to each item of relief granted greater injury will be inflicted upon complainant by the denial thereof than will be inflicted upon the defendants by the granting thereof;
"(4) That no item of relief granted is relief that a court has no authority to restrain or enjoin under R.S. 23:841;
"(5) That complainant has no adequate remedy by ordinary legal procedure; and
"(6) That the public officers charged with the duty to protect complainant's property have failed or are unable to furnish adequate protection."
. The Union also asserts that Coca-Cola failed to prove the first five requirements of the statute. However, because the failure to allege and prove the sixth element alone necessitates a reversal, this contention will not be considered.