Case Name: W. H. Garrett v. Aaron Burleson
Court: Supreme Court of Texas
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1860-10
Citations: 25 Supp. Tex. 41
Docket Number: 
Parties: W. H. Garrett v. Aaron Burleson.
Judges: 
Reporter: Texas Reports
Volume: 25 Supp.
Pages: 41–44

Head Matter:
W. H. Garrett v. Aaron Burleson.
Where the purchase of a saw-mill, fixtures, and pinery connected therewith, was in gross, (the timber not being sold by the tree,) if the quantity of timber suitable for sawing into lumber turns out to be less than the purchaser had supposed to be contained in the pinery when he contracted; if he, in making the contract, relied upon his own judgment, and the information he obtained from sources other than any representations of the seller; and if he were not misled by any deception practiced upon him by the seller, nor relied upon his representations or judgment, he cannot obtain an abatement of the price agreed upon on account of such deficit.
Having been put upon inquiry, it was his own negligence not to inform himself.
Appeal from Bastrop. Tried below before Hon. A. W. Terrell, one of the district judges.
This was a suit brought by Burleson against the appellant for $2,000 and interest on a note made by the defendant to the plaintiff, it being a part of the consideration of a sale made by plaintiff to defendant of Ms interest in a saw-mill, fixtures, and the pinery connected with the mill.
The defendant pleaded in set-off and reconvention, his damages sustained by the false representations of the plaintiff, upon which he relied, and which induced him to enter into the contract, to the effect that he, the plaintiff, and one Rector, had counted the timber-trees belonging to said sawmill, of which there were found to be 1,300 good pine trees which would square a foot at the saw-mill; that he relied upon the truth of said representations; and whereas, in truth, instead of said number, there were only 800 trees. The defendant alleged the value of the deficit of the 500 timber-trees to be $4,166 67. The interest of said defendant being one-half of the said property, he alleged that he was directly damaged, by reason of said deficiency, one-half of said sum.
Faucett, a witness for the defendant, testified that he was a partner with Burleson in the mill, appurtenances, and. timber aforesaid; that the mill had been in operation near a year, when one Bector came to the mill, for the purpose of trading for the partnership property; that Bector and Burleson went on the land to count the timber-trees, and reported 1,300 trees, which was a less number than Burleson had supposed to be on the tract. Bector declined purchasing at the price proposed. The witness stated, that a few^ weeks after the negotiation with Bector, the defendant came to the mill on the business of purchasing Burleson’s interest in the property; that the parties went out to look at the timber, it having been represented by the plaintiff to defendant that Bector had counted the timber, as aforesaid, who said that there were 1,300 trees. When the parties returned, witness and defendant made a calculation as to the quantity of lumber the trees would yield, upon the basis of there being 1,300 trees, averaging the trees at 400 feet of lumber per tree; that during the making the calculation plaintiff came up. Witness told defendant he did not believe there were so many trees; that there were only 2,100 trees when the mill commenced sawing, about a year previously, and that the defendant had better count the trees. The defendant had previously remarked, that it appeared to him there was enough timber to run the mill for two years, as he could see twice as many trees as stumps. The witness made the foregoing suggestions to the defendant, in reply to said remark, stating further, that if the timber should not be sawed up within a year, it would be a losing business. Witness further stated, that the plaintiff remarked, pending the negotiation, that he wished the defendant to be satisfied that he could make money by the purchase; that he thought he could; that he, plaintiff, desired to get out of the business, and was anxious to sell. Witness suggested to defendant, during the conversation between them above stated, that he had better see Bector; to which he replied, that he had done so. The witness understood, from the manner of the defendant, that he meant to convey the - idea that the plaintiff was not aware of the fact that he had seen Rector on the subject. The witness farther stated, that seeing that defendant was very eager to make the trade, he desisted from making further suggestions as to the quantity of timber; and the trade was consummated. The witness also stated, that defendant and himself ran the mill together a little over a year; that about five months after the purchase, upon counting the timber again, and estimating from their books the amount of timber they had already sawed, it was found that there were, at the time of the purchase, 900 trees; and that 50 or 60 trees besides had been sawed from the pinery in the interval of time from the counting by Rector to the date of defendant’s purchase. Witness stated, that he expressed to defendant the opinion, before he purchased, that the trees would average over 400 feet of lumber— would average 500 feet; and the result of their operations confirmed its correctness, as; upon calculation, they found that the pine timber yielded $11,000, at $25 per thousand, making 1,100 trees, at the average of 400 feet per tree.
Rector, examined for the defendant, testified that the plaintiff, at the time referred to, whilst he himself was negotiating for the purchase of the mill, pointed out to him the timber, and he counted 1,300 trees, of which he thought not more than 1,000 were suitable for lumber. That just before the defendant purchased, he told him he thought there were not more than 1,000 good trees suitable for sawing, yet advised him to purchase, saying to him, that he thought it would be to him a profitable trade. The testimony in the case need not be more fully stated.
Verdict for the plaintiff, and judgment accordingly, for the sum of $2,115 75, the full amount of the note sued on.
I. A. £ Geo. W. Paschal, for the appellant.
Jones Petty, for the appellee.

Opinion:
Wheeler, C. J.
—We are of opinion that there is no error in the'judgment. The ground relied on to obtain an abatement of the price contracted to be paid for the property was, that the plaintiff had represented that there were a greater number of trees included in the purchase which were suitable for sawing into lumber than really were there; that the defendant relied on this representation; that it was the inducement to the purchase, and that he was misled by it to his injury. We do not think the evidence sustains this defense. The purchase was not by the tree, hut was a purchase of property in gross, including the pinery. The number of trees fit for the use intended was a matter of judgment, as well as computation, upon which there might he, and it seems there were, differences of opinion among those who had equal means of observation and of judging for themselves. And we think the evidence very clearly shows that the defendant relied upon his own judgment, and the information he obtained from sources other than any representations of the plaintiff. He was put upon his guard; was advised that there had been an over-estimate of the number of trees fit for the use intended; he was put upon inquiry, with the means of information; and if he did not obtain full and accurate information as to the extent and value of the property, before he made the purchase, it is to he ascribed to his own negligence or error in judgment, rather than to any representation of the plaintiff. We do not think the evidence warrants the belief that any deception was practiced, or sought to be practiced, on the defendant, or that he relied upon the representation or judgment of the plaintiff in making the purchase, and we see no cause to be dissatisfied with the verdict.
We think the charge of the court embraced sufficiently the law applicable to the case, and are of opinion that there is no error in the judgment. It is, therefore,
Aeeirmed.