Case Name: HETTIE BUTTERFIELD v. STATE INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT COMMISSION
Court: Oregon Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Oregon
Decision Date: 1924-03-18
Citations: 111 Or. 149
Docket Number: 
Parties: HETTIE BUTTERFIELD v. STATE INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT COMMISSION.
Judges: Burnett, J., concurs in the result.
Reporter: Oregon Reports
Volume: 111
Pages: 149–164

Head Matter:
Submitted, on motion to dismiss February 19,
motion allowed) March 18,
rehearing denied May 13, 1924.
HETTIE BUTTERFIELD v. STATE INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT COMMISSION.
(223 Pac. 941; 226 Pac. 216.)
Master and Servant — Industrial Accident Commission is a Body Corporate.
1. The Industrial Accident Commission which, under Section 6611, Or. L., may sue and be sued in its name, and shall have a seal, and which is given other powers exercised by a corporation under Section 6629 as amended by Laws of 1921, page 580, Section 8, is a creature of the legislature, and is a body corporate.
Constitutional Law — Master and Servant — Incidental Exercise by Commission of Judicial Functions Held not to Invalidate Workmen’s Compensation Act.
2. Workmen’s Compensation Act, which makes it the primary duty of the Industrial Accident Commission to administer the act (§ 6611, Or. L.), is not unconstitutional merely because in performing its primary duty the commission incidentally exercises judicial functions.
Master and Servant — Compensation Act not Unconstitutional by Reason of Manner of Payments from Accident Fund.
3. Under the Workmen’s 'Compensation Act (§ 6638, Or. L., amended by Laws of 1921, p. 584, § 11), payment from the accident fund can be made only upon vouchers submitted by the commission, the Secretary of State and the State Treasurer being without discretion in regard to that fund, and the statute is not unconstitutional merely because the payments from the funds are to be made by the State Treasurer on warrants drawn by the Secretary of State; the state being interested in the fund in the same manner as it is interested in the fund of the state board of agriculture.
Master and Servant — State not Entitled to Appeal in Compensation Cases.
4. The state is not a party to cases initiated before the Industrial Accident Commission, and hence cannot appeal from the final action of the commission, or from a judgment of the Circuit Court based upon such final' action, in view of Section 549, Or. L., and Section 6637, as amended by Laws of 1921, page 583, Section 10, providing notice of appeal from, final action of commission shall be served upon the commission.
Validity of workmen’s compensation and industrial insurance statutes, see notes in Ann. Cas. 1912B, 174; Ann. Cas. 1915A, 247; Ann. Cas. 1916B, 1286; Ann. Cas. 1918B, 611; 34 L. R. A. (N. S.), 162; 37 L. R. A. (H. S.) 466; L. R. A. 1916A, 409; L. R. A. 1917D, 51.
Right and extent of review of findings of the Industrial Accident Commission, see notes in Ann. Cas. 1916B, 475; Ann. Cas. 1918B, 647; L. R. A. 1917D, 186.
Master and Servant — Compensation Act not Invalid by Eeason of Peculiar Procedure.
5. The procedure on appeals, provided by Workmen’s Compensation Act (§ 6637, Or. L., as amended by laws 1921, p. 583, § 10), being statutory, must be followed just as the procedure for presenting claims, but the peculiarity of the procedure does not render the statute invalid.
ON PETITION FOR REHEARING.
Master and Servant — Title of Compensation Case Held not Changed on Appeal.
6. The title of proceedings by one making a claim against state industrial accident fund is a formal matter, and, where appeal is. taken to the Supreme Court by the Attorney General, an opinion under a title naming claimant as party claiming against State Industrial Accident Commission is not improper as changing the title in violation of Section 549, Or. L.
Master and Servant — State not Entitled to Appeal in Compensation Case.
7. The state is not a party, and cannot be made a party, to a proceeding to adjust a claim under Workmen’s Compensation Act against the industrial accident fund, and cannot therefore appeal.
Master and Servant — Industrial Accident Commission Corporation for Purpose of Supporting Proceedings.
S. For the purpose of supporting a proceeding in its name as a party to a ease involving a claim against the state industrial accident fund provided for by Section 6625, Or. L., as amended by General Laws of 1923, page 363, the State Industrial Accident Commission is a corporation, though not in the ordinary sense of the word, such as a private or municipal corporation.
States — State’s Immunity from Suit Inapplicable to State’s Agency.
9. State’s immunity from suit under Constitution, Article IV, Section 24, does not obtain where agency of state is party.
Master and Servant — Industrial Accident Commission Party to Appeal in Compensation Case.
10. Under Section 6629, Or. L., as amended by General Laws of 1921, page 580, as to assignment of causes of action for compensation to Industrial Accident Commission for benefit of accident fund, and Section 6637, as amended by General Laws of 1921, page 584, as to prosecution and defense of proceeding by or against commission by Attorney General, commission is party to litigation arising under act, and Attorney General may appeal in its name.
Statutes — Workmen’s Compensation Act not Unconstitutional as Creating Municipal Corporation by Special Act.
11. Workmen’s Compensation Act, creating Industrial Accident Commission, is not a special act creating corporation in contraven tion of Constitution, Article XI, Section 2, as tlie commission is not a municipal corporation.
Master and Servant — Pleadings may be Required on Appeal in Compensation Case.
12. Absence of specified mode of procedure in Workmen’s Compensation Act for joining issues on questions of fact on appeal to Circuit Court from final order of Industrial Accident Commission does mot prevent fair and orderly trial of issues raised by appeal (§ 983, Or. L.), as Circuit Court may require preparation of complaint or paper in nature thereof by appellant.
Master and Servant — Industrial Accident Commission Defaulted on Appeal Should Apply to Court to Set Aside Default.
13. If default is improperly rendered against Industrial Accident Commission in Circuit Court to which, appeal is taken from order of commission, it should apply to< Circuit Court under Section 103, Or. L., to set aside default.
Constitutional Law — Wisdom of Legislation not for Court.
14. Whether provision of Section 6637, Or. L., as amended by General Laws of 1921, page 584, expressly providing for appeals to Circuit Court from final orders of Industrial Accident Commission and trial thereafter like other civil eases, except that either party may demand jury trial on fact question, in which ease it shall be tried at regular term and have precedence over other civil cases, is foolish or wise, is not for Supreme Court to determine.
From Coos: John C. Kendall, Judge.
In Banc.
This cause comes on to he heard upon the motion of the respondent, Hettie Butterfield, to dismiss the appeal. The husband of the respondent received an injury, while in the employ as a blacksmith of the Coos Bay Lumber Company, resulting in his death.' In due time the respondent presented her claim for compensation to the State Industrial Accident Commission. The claim was disallowed, after a hearing, because the injury was not the cause of decedent’s death. Thereupon and in due time, the claimant, the respondent here, appealed from the final action of the commission to the Circuit Court. No appearance was made on behalf of the commission in that court. The Circuit Court reversed the final action of the commission, and entered judgment by default in favor of the claimant. The commission has not appealed.
A notice of appeal was seasonably served upon the claimant, in words and figures as follows, to wit:
“In the Circuit Court of the State of Oregon for the County of Coos.
“In the Matter of the Appeal of Hettie Butter-field.
“Notice of Appeal.
“To Hettie Butterfield, Appellant, and to J. "W. Mclntnrff, Attorney for Appellant:
“You and each of you will please take notice that the state of Oregon, as trustee of the accident fund, hereby appeals to the supreme court of the state of Oregon from the whole of that judgment or decree made and rendered herein on or about the 13th day of June, A. D. 1923.
“I. H. VanWinkle,
“Attorney General,
“James West,
“Assistant Attorney General,
“Attorneys for State of Oregon, Trustee.”
The claimant moves to dismiss the appeal because no appeal has been taken by the State Industrial Accident Commission from the judgment rendered in the court below.
Motion Allowed.
For the motion, Mr. J. W. McInturff.
Contra, Mr. I. H. Van Winkle, Attorney General, and Mr. James West, Assistant Attorney General.

Opinion:
COSHOW, J.
It is the contention of the Attorney General that the State Industrial Accident Commission is an arm of the state, administering the act commonly known as the Workmen's Compensation Act, and that the state is, therefore, the real party in interest. From these premises he argues, because the state cannot be sued, the Industrial Accident Commission cannot be. The legislature has provided that the Industrial Accident Commission "in its name may sue and be sued, and shall have a seal which shall bear the name of the commission." Section 6611, Or. L. The commission is given other powers exercised by a corporation: Section 6629, Or. L.; Laws 1921, c. 311. It is a creature of the legislature and is a body corporate.
This court has held the act creating the commission to be constitutional: Evanhoff v. Industrial Acc. Com., 78 Or. 503 (154 Pac. 106). The primary duty of the commission is to administer the act: Section 6611, Or. L. The exercise of judicial functions is incidental to its primary duty, and the act is not unconstitutional on that account: In re Willow Creek, 74 Or. 592 (144 Pac. 505, 146 Pac. 475). Nor does the fact that payments from the fund created by the act are to be made by the State. Treasurer on warrants drawn by the Secretary of State render it unconstitutional. Both the Secretary of State and the State Treasurer are without discretion in regard to that fund. Payments from the fund can be made only upon vouchers transmitted by the commission: Section 6638, Or. L.; Laws 1921, c. 311. The state is a contributor to the fund, and is, therefore, interested in the fund in the same manner as it is in the fund of the state board of agriculture: Tongue v. State Board of Agriculture, 55 Or. 61 (105 Pac. 250).
The state is not a party to cases initiated before the Industrial Accident Commission and, therefore, cannot appeal from the final action of the commission, or a judgment of the Circuit Court based upon such final action: Sections 549 and 6637, Or. L.; Laws 1921, c. 311. The act provides that notice of appeal from the final action of the commission shall be served upon the commission: Section 6637, Or. L.; Laws 1921, c. 311. This provision indicates the intention of the legislature to make the commission a party to the appeal. That has been the uniform practice during the many years the act has been in force.
This court in Lough v. Industrial Acc. Com., 104 Or. 313 (207 Pac. 354), was not considering the matter of appeals, but the procedure for presenting a claim by an injured workman. The procedure provided by the act for presenting claims must be followed, and the procedure on appeals must likewise be followed. Both are statutory: Chebot v. Industrial Acc. Com., 106 Or. 660, 669, 670 (212 Pac. 792); Smith v. Industrial Acc. Com., 104 Or. 640 (208 Pac. 746, 748). The procedure is peculiar to the Workmen's Compensation Act, but is not, on that account, invalid: Evanhoff v. Industrial Acc. Com., above.
"Appeals shall lie on the judgment of the Circuit Court, as in other civil cases." Section 6637, Or. L.; Laws 1921, c. 311.
The motion to dismiss the appeal to this court is allowed and the appeal is dismissed.
Motion to Dismiss Appeal Allowed.
Mr. I. H. Van Winkle, Attorney General, and Mr. James West, Assistant Attorney General, for the motion.
Mr. J. W. McInturff, contra.