Case Name: Charles A. KETTELL, Sr., Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 2007-03-07
Citations: 950 So. 2d 505
Docket Number: No. 2D05-2882
Parties: Charles A. KETTELL, Sr., Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: STRINGER, J., Concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 950
Pages: 505–510

Head Matter:
Charles A. KETTELL, Sr., Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. 2D05-2882.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
March 7, 2007.
James Marion Moorman, Public Defender, and Bruce P. Taylor, Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellant.
Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Amanda Lea Colón, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee.

Opinion:
CANADY, Judge.
Charles A. Kettell, Sr., appeals his second-degree felony conviction for shooting at, within, or into a building. Because the trial court gave — over Kettell's objection— an erroneous instruction concerning the elements of the offense, we reverse the conviction.
Section 790.19, Florida Statutes (2003), provides: "Whoever, wantonly or maliciously, shoots at, within, or into . any public or private building, occupied or unoccupied, . shall be guilty of a felony of the second degree_" The State alleged that while Kettell was in his dwelling, he shot into an interior wall of the dwelling. Among the instructions the trial court gave to the jury concerning the elements of the offense was the following statement:
In order to sustain a conviction for wantonly or maliciously shooting at, within or into a building, the conduct must have been done with an intent to cause damage or injury. This intent element is fulfilled by a person who intentionally shoots at, within, or into a building for the primary purpose, or with the specific intent, of shooting at a person in or near the building, as well as by a person who shoots at, within, or into a building per se.
(Emphasis added.)
The defense objected to this instruction because the use of the phrase "per se" suggested that "just shooting into a building creates per se liability and that's not the law." The trial court abused its discretion in giving the instruction over Ket-tell's objection.
The instruction states that the wanton or malicious "intent element is fulfilled . by a person who shoots at, within, or into a building per se." Per se means "[o]f, in, or by itself; standing alone, without reference to additional facts." Black's Lam Dictionary 1178 (8th ed.2004). The term per se carries with it a connotation of absolute liability. The instruction thus indicates that shooting at, within, or into a building is an act that "standing alone" — that is, without reference to the intent to cause damage or injury — is sufficient to satisfy the intent element of the offense. This is not a correct statement of the law. To prove a violation of section 790.19, it must be established that the act is done wantonly or maliciously. See Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Crim.) 10.13.
In giving the incorrect instruction, the trial court relied on language in Holtsclaw v. State, 542 So.2d 437, 438-39 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989). See also Skinner v. State, 450 So.2d 595, 596 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984). As we have explained, we cannot accept the view that the language at issue constitutes a correct and clear statement of the law. The Holtsclaw court undoubtedly sought to express the view that an offense under section 790.19 may be established without showing that the defendant shot at someone. In other words, a defendant who shoots into a building can do so wantonly or maliciously even though he does not shoot at someone. Unfortunately, the language employed in Holtsclaw suggests that the intent element is fulfilled simply by showing that someone shot into a building without proving that the shooting was done wantonly or maliciously.
It is no doubt possible that a perceptive juror considering the full context of the instructions would discern that "the intent to cause damage or injury" was required both with respect to circumstances where the shooting is "at a person" and with respect to circumstances where it is not. But such a possibility is no basis for affirming a conviction based on the verdict of a jury given an instruction that was "confusing, contradictory, or misleading." Butler v. State, 493 So.2d 451, 452 (Fla.1986).
This is not a case where "it appears from the whole record that the jury could not have been misled by the instructions." Johnson v. State, 252 So.2d 361, 364 (Fla.1971), judgment vacated in part on other grounds, 408 U.S. 939, 92 S.Ct. 2875, 33 L.Ed.2d 762 (1972). The problem with the instructions is not that a portion of the instructions is unclear when viewed in isolation from the remainder of the instructions but clear when viewed in context. On the contrary, when the instructions here are considered in full context, the best that can be said of them is that they are contradictory and therefore confusing and misleading. "[Tjaken as a whole, the instructions . given are [not] clear, comprehensive, and correct." Maynard v. State, 660 So.2d 293, 297 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995).
Kettell was entitled to be judged by a jury which was given correct instructions concerning the elements of the offense charged against him. This is not a trivial technicality.
"It is an inherent and indispensable requisite of a fair and impartial trial under the protective powers of our Federal and State Constitutions as contained in the due process of law clauses that a defendant be accorded the right to have a Court correctly and intelligently instruct the jury on the essential and material elements of the crime charged and required to be proven by competent evidence."
Scott v. State, 808 So.2d 166, 170 (Fla.2002) (quoting Gerds v. State, 64 So.2d 915, 916 (Fla.1953)), superseded on other grounds by statute, § 893.101, Fla. Stat. (2002), as recognized in Garcia v. State, 901 So.2d 788, 792 n. 1 (Fla.2005).
Here, the trial court did not " 'correctly and intelligently instruct the jury on the essential and material elements of the crime charged.' " Scott, 808 So.2d at 170 (quoting Gerds, 64 So.2d at 916). Accordingly, the judgment and sentence are re versed and the case is remanded for a new trial.
Reversed and remanded.
STRINGER, J., Concurs.
LaROSE, J., Dissents with opinion.