Case Name: Freddie Lee MOORE, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1980-11-26
Citations: 392 So. 2d 277
Docket Number: No. 79-948/T4-522
Parties: Freddie Lee MOORE, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: FRANK D. UPCHURCH, Jr., J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 392
Pages: 277–280

Head Matter:
Freddie Lee MOORE, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. 79-948/T4-522.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
Nov. 26, 1980.
Rehearing Denied Jan. 13, 1981.
Richard L. Jorandby, Public Defender, and Denise Banjavic, Asst. Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.
Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Edwin H. Duff, III, Asst. Atty. Gen., Day-tona Beach, for appellee.

Opinion:
DAUKSCH, Chief Judge.
In this appeal from a sentence in a murder case the appellant assigns as error the method by which the trial judge retained jurisdiction to review any parole release order issued during the first third of appellant's term of confinement.
Under the provisions of section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (Supp.1978), a sentencing judge, in certain enumerated cases, "may enter an order retaining jurisdiction over the offender for review of a [parole] commission release order. This jurisdiction . . [shall apply] to the first third of the . . . sentence . . . " The statute also requires that "In retaining jurisdiction . ., the trial court judge shall state the justification with individual particularity, and said justification shall be made a part of the court record."
While we agree the statute mandates a sentencing judge to state justification for his retention of a veto power over the release of a convict, we find no guidelines for the trial judge to follow. Thus we assume each order retaining jurisdiction must be based upon articulated substantial reasonable grounds to be determined in each case and, as the statute says, "with individual particularity."
It is our assumption that the Legislature meant to allow review of these orders retaining jurisdiction because the statute requires the justification to be made a part of the court record. This review is rather like the review in a habitual felony offender sentence, section 775.084, Florida Statutes (1979), where it is necessary for the trial judge to properly determine it is "necessary for the protection of the public" to sentence the convict to an enhanced period of confinement. Without such a finding the appellate courts have reversed sentences and required new sentencing. Eutsey v. State, 383 So.2d 219 (Fla.1980); King v. State, 369 So.2d 1031 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979); Grey v. State, 362 So.2d 425 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978); Grimmett v. State, 357 So.2d 461 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978); Chukes v. State, 334 So.2d 289 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976).
Without going into the basis of our government and a treatise on the theories and applications of the separation of powers, it is sufficient, hopefully, to say that the Legislature has the sole authority to determine what acts are criminal acts and what the penalties for crimes are to be. The legislative authority in the penalties area allows for the setting of máximums and minimums, both of confinement and probation, the limits and guidelines for parole, and the particular means and methods of execution of sentences. The courts have the sole province over the particular sentence to be given an individual, but only within the statutory authority given in the various sentencing statutes, and the executive has the duty to see that the sentences are enforced. The executive performs its function through the governor and cabinet in its pardon and parole authority, and with the parole and probation commission in its statutorily limited powers, and finally, the Department of Corrections in its particular field, also statutorily limited.
All of this is to say the Legislature had the authority to say how a sentencing judge may retain jurisdiction over an offender and thus had the authority to require that it be done only with individually particularized justification. In this case the sentencing judge justified in the record the reasons for retaining jurisdiction by pointing out that the appellant had committed the most serious offense of murder, she has a reputation of aggressive behavior and she had served a sentence for hitting someone with an iron. A reputation for and a conviction of aggressive and injurious behavior is certainly sufficient justification for the retention of jurisdiction in a murder case. We affirm the sentence.
AFFIRMED.
FRANK D. UPCHURCH, Jr., J., concurs.
COWART, J., concurs specially with opinion.