Case Name: SELMA A. JOHNSON, Appellant, v. JOHN MULLEN, H. C. Hanson, and Emil Everson, as Supervisors of Hendrickson Township, and Hendrickson Township, a Municipal Corporation, Respondents
Court: North Dakota Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: North Dakota
Decision Date: 1918-03-22
Citations: 39 N.D. 246
Docket Number: 
Parties: SELMA A. JOHNSON, Appellant, v. JOHN MULLEN, H. C. Hanson, and Emil Everson, as Supervisors of Hendrickson Township, and Hendrickson Township, a Municipal Corporation, Respondents.
Judges: Grace, J. I concur in the result.
Reporter: North Dakota Reports
Volume: 39
Pages: 246–256

Head Matter:
SELMA A. JOHNSON, Appellant, v. JOHN MULLEN, H. C. Hanson, and Emil Everson, as Supervisors of Hendrickson Township, and Hendrickson Township, a Municipal Corporation, Respondents.
(167 N. W. 326.)
Township board — laying out highway — dividing farm into two tracts — damages — action for — award of damages — reasonable — absence of passion or prejudice — reduction or new trial —order for —error.
In district court the jury awarded plaintiff $450 damages for a highway dividing his farm into two tracts of 11 and 61 acres. Held, that the verdict is well sustained by reason and evidence. It is not affected by passion or prejudice, and the court was wrong in ordering a new trial unless the plaintiff should accept $200 as the damages.
Opinion filed March 22, 1918.
Appeal from the District Court of McHenry County, Honorable A. G. Burr, Judge.
Plaintiff appeals.
Reversed.
Theo. Kaldor, for appellant.
The charge of the court to the jury, standing unchallenged, becomes the law of the case, so far as the parties are concerned. Kramer v. N. W. Elev. Co. 106 N. W. 86; 8 Enc. PI. & Pr. 253.
Misconduct of an attorney must be objected to at the time it occurs and the attention of the trial court called to it, and the objections must appear of record or the supreme court cannot review them. Lindsay v. Pettigrew (S. D.) 2 N. W. 874; Pierce v. Manning (S. D.) 51 N. W. 332; Burdick v. Haggart (Dak.) 22 N. W. 589.
A witness upon the question of value of lands must show knowledge of such subject, before being permitted to testify. His competency must be established. Schuler v. Board of Supervisors (S. D.) 81 N. W. 890; Idaho, W. B. P. Oo. v. Columbia Conference, 38 L.B.A. (N.S.) 497; Washburn v. Milwaukee B. B. Co. (Wis.) 18 N. W. 328; 5 Ene. Ev. p. 206.
A trial court has no power to reduce a -verdict, except in cases where from the pleadings and evidence the court is able to calculate and to determine the excess. The rule has no reference to cases where the damages claimed are uncertain, and where the jury are the sole judges •of the amount to award. Murray v. Leonard, 11 S. D. 22, 75 N. W. 272; Southern P. Co. v. Eitchett (Ariz.) 80 Pac. 359; Tifton v. Chastain (Ga.) 50 S. E. 105; Louisville B. Co. v. Earl (Ky.) 22 S. W. 607; Umfried v. Baltimore B. Co. (W. Va.) 12 N. E. 512; Brown v. McLeish (Iowa) 32 N. W. 385.
The discretion vested in the trial court to grant or refuse a new trial is neither an arbitrary nor a general discretion. It is a discretion that should be exercised with great care. Braitwaite v. Aiken, 2 N. D. 57, 49 N. W. 421; Hicks v. Stone, 13 Minn. 434.
The privacy of the home, the unusual noises and dangers caused by the running of automobiles, the inconvenience in crossing the road dividing plaintiff’s farm in two pails, the expense of constructing-fences, cattle ways, and all such matters, are proper for consideration by the jury in awarding damages. Chicago & A. B. Co. v. Stanley, 221 111. 405; Chicago & I. B. P. Co. v. Hopkins, 90 111. 316; Somerville B. Co. v. Doughty, 22 N. Y. L. 495; Littlerock B. Co. v. Allen, 41 Ark. 431; Whitewalk B. Co. v. McClure, 29 Ind. 526; Pittsburg B. Co. v. McClusky, 110 Pa. 436; Fayetteville B.- Co. v. Comes, 41 Ark. 324; Weyer v. Chicago, W. & N. B. Oo. (Wis.) 31 N. W. 710; Walker v. Coloney & N. B. Co. 103 Mass. 10'; Blue Earth County v. St. Paul B. Co. 28 Minn. 503,-11 N. W. 73.
Bagley & Thorpe, for respondents.
It is the settled law in this state that a motion for a new trial upon the ground of excessive damages appearing to have been given under ¿he influence of passion and prejudice is addressed to the sound discre tion of the trial court, and that its decision will not be disturbed except in case of clear abuse, apparent from the record. Reid v. Ehr, 36 N. D. 552, 162 N. W. 903; Wagoner v. Bodal (N. D.) 164 N. W. 147; Skarr v. Eppeland, 35 N. D. 116, 159 N. W. 707; Blaekorby v. Ginther, 34 N. D. 248, 158 N. W. 354; 2 R. O. L. § 182.
Courts discriminate in favor of orders granting new trials because the -same are not final, but are such as open the way for reinvestigation and possibly a better ascertainment of the facts. Pengilly v. J. I. Case Threshing Mach. Co. 11 N. D. 249, 91 N. W. 63; Patch v. N. P. R. Co. 5 N. D. 55, 63 N. W. 207; Gull River Lumber Co. v. Osborn McMillan Elev. Co. 6 N. D. 276, 69 N. W. 691; Galvin v. Tibbs, 17 N. D. 600, 119 N. W. 39; Ross v. Robertson, 12 N. D. 27, 94 N. W. 765; Dinnie v. Johnson, 8 N. D'. 153, 77.N. W. 612; Aylmer v. Adams, 30 N. D. 514^ 153 W. 419; 2 R. O. L. § 184; 4 O. J. 830.

Opinion:
Robinson, J.
The plaintiff owns and occupies as her home 72 acres of land south of and adjoining the village of Simcoe. The land is mainly the S. ½ of the S. E. quarter, section 18 — 154—79. The township supervisors caused to be laid out a highway 4 rods wide and 842 feet long, .cutting off 11 acres of the east side of the land. They assessed plaintiff's damages at $100. The jury assessed the damages at $450, and the court made an order granting a new trial unless the plaintiff accepted $200, and she appeals to this court.
The motion for a new trial was made on these grounds: (1) That the damages are excessive and were given under the influence of passion and prejudice; (2) that the evidence is insufficient to justify the verdict. There is nothing in the case — the nature of the case — or the evidence, to warrant an inference that the verdict was in any way affected by passion or prejudice. The fair inference is that the verdict represents the calm, deliberate judgment of the jury, and as the record shows it is well sustained by the evidence. There is positive testimony of more than one witness that by reason of the highway the value of the entire tract is depreciated to the amount of $10 per acre, that the 11 acres east of the highway is made practically worthless, and the rest of the land is reduced in value.
• In the memorandum decision the trial judge says: "It appears from the evidence that the taking of the strip results in a division of plain tiff's farm of 70 acres into two sections of 60 acres and 10 acres respectively. It appears to me there can be no diminution of value per acre in a farm of 70 acres by reason of a severance of 10 acres therefrom, — that is, a farm of 60 acres situated as plaintiff's farm is, is worth as much per acre as a farm of 70 acres." But that is wrong. Any person having experience in farming knows that a large farm is cultivated more advantageously than a small farm. In cultivating a small tract too much time is lost in turning the team and the machinery around and around. Hence, there may be no profit at all in cultivating a tract of 5 or 10 acres when there would be a good profit in cultivating a large tract. For ordinary cultivation an acre of land is obviously worth less even when a quarter section is worth $100 an acre.
The road which divides the plaintiff's farm must forever be a source-of inconvenience and expense to anyone using the farm, and it must reduce the sale price at least $500. The verdict is not excessive, and it is well sustained by evidence and by reason.
Order reversed and judgment affirmed.
Grace, J. I concur in the result.