Case Name: Will of Ruggles: Rose, Appellant, vs. Ruggles, Trustee, Respondent
Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Wisconsin
Decision Date: 1909-01-05
Citations: 137 Wis. 439
Docket Number: 
Parties: Will of Ruggles: Rose, Appellant, vs. Ruggles, Trustee, Respondent.
Judges: 
Reporter: Wisconsin Reports
Volume: 137
Pages: 439–450

Head Matter:
Will of Ruggles: Rose, Appellant, vs. Ruggles, Trustee, Respondent.
December 18, 1908 —
January 5, 1909.
Wills: Construction: Advancements.
Testator gave to trustees the residue of Bis estate to Be divided into as many equal shares or portions as he had children (there were two), and directed that there should he paid to a daughter, within one year after the prohate of his will, one fourth of her share, and otherwise directed as to the disposition of the. residue of her share. The will also provided that any advancements to his children “shall he added to and deemed a part of my estate in this will bequeathed and devised in- trust,” and' that “in the division of said estate into shares, as hereinbefore provided, the [advancements] shall he deducted from the share of the child or children against whom such charges or charge shall he made.” Held:
(1) The bequest to the trustees being of money and property belonging to the deceased at the time of his death, advance- meats made by tlie testator did not come to the trustees, since such advancements were not such property as belonged to the testator at the time of his death.
(2) The conception and intent of the language of the will was merely to direct such method of computation as that the proportioning of the actual property held by the trustees between the children should give to the one receiving less advances a proportionate superiority over the other child. '
(3) The words used aptly expressed an intention that, as preliminary to the action of the trustees, the one-half of the estate attributable to the daughter should be ascertained by dividing the estate plus the advancement by two, one half for each child, and that the amount of the advancement to her should be deducted from the same one-half share, and the remainder pass to the trustees to be managed and divided by them in the proportions prescribed by the will.
Timlin, J., dissents.
Appeal from a judgment of tbe circuit court for Eond du Lao county: Chester A. Eowler, Circuit Judge.
Reversed.
Petition by tbe executor for construction of certain clauses in the will of Augustus G-. Ruggles, deceased. Tbe will, after making several bequests, provided by its fifth paragraph as follows:
“I give, bequeath and devise unto said George D. Ruggles, James B. Perry and said Anna Ruggles Peck, and the survivors and survivor of them and their successors, all the rest, residue and remainder of my property, whether real, personal or mixed, and wherever situated, in trust, nevertheless, to and for the uses and purposes following, that is to say: To convert the same into money, stocks or other securities, •■and divide them into as many equal shares or portions as there shall be living of children born to me, including any child or children begotten by me and bom after my decease, to be held in trust by them, one share for each such child, and dispose of them as follows, to wit: Pay to my daughter Gertrude Golden Ruggles Rose, within one year after the proof and allowance of this my will, or as soon thereafter as practicable, one fourth of her share or portion, retaining the residue thereof, and investing and keeping invested the same in such manner as to them, the survivors and survivor of them .and their successors shall best seem, and pay to my said ■daughter the interest and income derived therefrom until she shall attain the age of fifty years, if she shall live so long, at which time they shall pay to her one third of said residue, retaining the remaining two thirds of such residue, and pay to her during her natural life all interest and income derived 'therefrom quarterly, or as near'quarterly as practicable; and from and after her death, without issue her surviving, such • residue to go to my heirs at law who may be living at that time; provided that if my said daughter shall survive her husband, H. PL Rose, my said trustees are hereby authorized and empowered to pay to her, should she desire, as soon after the death of said'PL H. Rose'as practicable, one half of said two-thirds residue, and the income of the remaining one half thereof during her natural life, the principal of which after her death, without issue her surviving, shall go to my heirs at law then living. To invest and keep invested the share or portion set apart for my son Augustus G. Buggies, and during his minority, pay over to his guardian from time to time as said guardian may require, the -income derived therefrom, and said guardian is hereby authorized and requested to use the same, or so much thereof as in his judgment may be necessary for the support, maintenance and education of my said son until he attains the age of twenty-one years, at which time there shall be paid to my said son one fourth of said share or portion, and the income from the residue thereof until he attains the age of twenty-five years, at which time he shall receive from said trustees another one fourth or one third of said residue, and the income from the remainder until he attains the age of thirty years, when the remaining portion of the principal sum of his share shall be paid to him. Provided, that if my said son, Augustus G. Buggies, or my daughter Gertrude Golden Buggies Bose shall die, leaving no issue, before receiving the full shares or portions herein provided to. be paid to him or her, such shares or portions not received by him or her, shall go to my heirs at law who shall be living at the time of his or her death. . . . Provided, that if any of my said children shall die before receiving his, her or their share, the portion thereof not received by him, her or them, shall go to his or her children if any are left surviving; but if no issue survives, then to my heirs at law who shall be living at tbe time. Provided further, that if prior to my decease I shall have made any advancements to any of' my children, either of money, stocks, other personal property or real estate, such advancement shall be added to and deemed a part of my estate in this my will bequeathed and devised in trust, for the benefit of my children, at the price of valuation named in the charge against any such child or children in my books of account, and in the division of said estate into shares, ■as hereinbefore provided, the same shall be deducted from the share of the child or children against whom such charges- or charge shall be made, at the face of such charge without interest.”
And by a codicil, which recited the proviso of said paragraph with reference to the payment to Gertrude in the event of her survival of her husband, modified the same in following words:
“Provided, that if my said daughter shall survive her husband, LL H. Rose, and live to be fifty years of age, one third of said two-thirds residue, that is one sixth of the original amount set apart as her share or portion, may be paid to her by my said trustees, should she desire it, as soon after the-death of said TI. H. Rose as practicable, but not however until after she is at least fifty years of age, and the income of the remaining portion of said two-thirds residue, during her natural life shall be paid to her, and the principal sum of said two-thirds residue, or so much thereof as shall not be paid to her as herein provided, shall after her death go to-her issue her surviving, but if she shall die leaving no issue her surviving, the same shall go to my heirs at law then living.”
Upon settlement by the executors the residue of the estate' remaining applicable to the fifth paragraph of the will was $225,600, including an advancement of $8,000 to appellant There being but two children, that total was divided into' halves, or $112,800 each, one of said halves pertaining to a brother of the appellant, and the other to her. The trustees paid her $20,200 in money, which was $8,000 less than one quarter of said one-half. Later, after attaining the age of' fifty years, sbe petitioned tbe county court for construction,, and tbe county court construed tbe will as requiring payment to ber witbin one year after testator’s death of one quarter of all tbe property actually coming to tbe bands of tbe trustees-for ber, wbicb be found to be $104,800, and a like stun upon ber attaining tbe age of fifty years, and accordingly ordered that an additional $6,000 be paid ber in satisfaction of the-second instalment. Upon appeal tbe circuit coifrt rendered judgment to tbe effect that tbe $8,000 of advancement should be treated as constituent part 'of tbe share passing to the trustees for tbe benefit of appellant and should be charged to ber as a payment upon Hie first instalment, so that sbe should receive nothing additional in money upon that instalment, but should receive $28,200 as ber second one-quarter by reason of having reached tbe age of fifty years. From that portion of tbe circuit court’s judgment Gertrude Golden Buggies Bose brings this appeal.
For tbe appellant tbe cause was submitted on tbe brief of J. M. Gooding and TI. II. Bose.
For the respondent there was a brief by Doyle & Hard-grove, and oral argument by T. L. Doyle.

Opinion:
Dodge, J.
There is usually little gain from discussion of different theories of construction of language used in a will. We have carefully studied tbe provisions of this will, separately and in their contest and correlation with each other, and are persuaded that tbe intention of tbe testator was correctly apprehended and executed by the judgment of the-county court. Certain considerations leading to and confirming that view may be briefly stated: The bequest to tbe trustees was of money and property belonging to tbe deceased at bis death. Any advancements were not such property.' They did not belong to tbe testator at tbe time of bis death. They could not come to tbe trustees. Tbe duties imposed upon tbe trustees with, reference, to the property coming to them under the bequest were such, as to be consistent only with actual property which could be sold, converted into interest-bearing securities, and, in the words of the will, paid •over, all of which tend to negative a mental conception in the testator of an estate made up of property and of advancements which could not be so handled and disposed of by trustees. We think the conception and intent plain merely to direct such method of computation as that the proportioning of the actual property held by the trustees between the children should give to the one receiving less advances a proportionate superiority over the other child. While the will directs that for purposes of such apportionment the advances should be deemed a portion of the estate, it nowhere declares that they should be deemed a portion of the share of the beneficiary, or that they should be taken in. payment pro tanto upon such share, but commands that they should be deducted from the aliquot portion of the estate attributable to the ad-vancee upon computation as above described. Had such conception or purpose as is effectuated by the judgment of the circuit court existed, nothing was easier than to express it in words identical with or similar to those used in sec. 3956, Stats. (1898), where it is declared that'the advancement "shall be considered as a part of the estate . . . and shall be taken by such child or other descendant toward his share of the estate of the intestate." The will under consideration is couched in apt and legal phrases throughout, evidently prepared by a trained lawyer with much clearness and accuracy of expression. When such a writer directs that, after dividing the estate, including advancements, into halves, the amount of the advancement shall be deducted from one of the halves, there is strong presumption that he meant a different result from that which would be expressed by the phrase "shall be taken by the beneficiary toward her share." We think the words used aptly express the intention that, as preliminary to the action of the trustees, the one-half of the estate attributable to appellant should be ascertained by dividing the estate plus the advancement by two, one half for each child, and that the amount of advancement to her should be-deducted from the same one-half share, and the remainder pass to the trustees to be managed and divided by them in the proportions prescribed by the will.
By the Court. — Judgment of the circuit court is reversed, and cause remanded with directions to affirm the judgment, of the county court.