Case Name: Town of Tutwiler v. Gibson
Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Mississippi
Decision Date: 1918-03
Citations: 117 Miss. 879
Docket Number: 
Parties: Town of Tutwiler v. Gibson.
Judges: 
Reporter: Mississippi Reports
Volume: 117
Pages: 879–886

Head Matter:
Town of Tutwiler v. Gibson.
[78 South. 926,
In Banc.]
1. Appeal akd Ebbor. Motion to Dismiss Appeal. Effect.
A motion to dismiss an appeal because taken after tbe expiration of tbe time allowed by statute will be treated as a plea in bar of tbe appeal.
.2. Same.
Where tbe reco.d contains neither a petition nor a bond for appeal, under section 47, Code 1906, (Hemingway’s Code, sec tion 23), the appeal must be considered as haying been taken at the time the record was filed in the supreme court.
3. Appeal ahd Error. Time foi- appeal. Municipal corporations.
' Section 104, constitution 1890, and Code 1906, section 3096 (Hemingway’s Code, section 2460,), Providing that the statute of limitations in civil cases shall not run against municipal corporations have no application to appeals, since the right of appeal exists only by virtue of statute and section 3112 (Hemingway’s , Code, section 2476), fixing the time for taking appeals must be-construed with section 33, Code 1906 (Hemingway’s Code, section 8), authorizing appeals.
Appeal from tie circuit court of Tallahatchie County.
HoN. E. D. Dinkins, Judge.
Suit by Mrs. E, W. Gibson against the town of Tutwiler. From the judgment rendered, the town of' Tutwiler appeals.
The facts are fully stated in the opinion of the court, court.
Hays, Stingley & Whitten and Wells, May & Sanders,. for appellants.
Ward & Ward and B. H. & J. H. Thompson, for appellee.

Opinion:
Smith, C. J.,
delivered the opinion of the court.
This cause comes on to be heard on motion by appel-lee to dismiss the appeal on the ground that it was taken after the expiration of the time allowed by the statute therefor, which motion is in effect, and will be treated as, a plea in bar of the appeal.
The judgment appealed from was rendered on the 11th day of March, 1915, and the record was filed in this court on the 27th day of February, 1918, two years, eleven months, and fifteen days thereafter. The record contains neither a petition nor a bond for appeal, so that, under section 47, Code of 1906 (Hemingway's Code, section 23), the appeal must he considered as having been taken at the time the record was filed in this court.
Section 3112, Code of 1906 (Hemingway's Code, section 2476), provides that appeals to the supreme court shall be taken within two years next after the rendition of the judgment or decree complained of, which time was reduced by the Laws of 1916, chapter 222, to one year. Section 24, Hemingway's Code. Since both of these periods of time had expired when the apppal was taken, we are not called upon here to decide whether the original statute or the amendment thereto governs. Section 104 of our state Constitution, and section 3096, Code of 1906 (Hemingway's Code, seoeion 2460), provide that "statutes of limitation in civil cases shall not run against the state, or any subdivision or municipal corporation thereof. ' ' These sections, however, have no bearing upon the question here presented for the reason that the statute limiting the time within which appeal to the supreme court must he taken is not a statute of limitation in the ordinary sense. The right of appeal exists only by virtue of the statutes which confer it, can be exercised only in accordance therewith and within the time allowed thereby. Section 33, Code of' 1906 (Hemingway's Code, section 8), by which the right of appeal is granted, and section 3112, Code of 1906 (Hemingway's Code, section 2476), are • but• parts of the legislative scheme by which the right to appeal is granted and regulated. Consequently they must be construed together and given the same interpretation as if they were in fact, as they are in effect parts of the same statute; and, when this is done, it will appear that the right granted by the first of these sections is not simply the right to appeal but the right to appeal within a specified time.
It is, for obvious reasons, to the interest of the public that the time within which appeals in civil cases. can be taken should be limited, which reasons apply with equal force to a municipality that they do to a natural person, which fact, we presume, influenced the legislature in making no distinction between them.
Motion sustained.