Case Name: Isidor Wiesbader, Appellant, v. Marcus M. Marks, as President of the Borough of Manhattan, City of New York, and Others, Respondents
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1915-03-19
Citations: 166 A.D. 725
Docket Number: 
Parties: Isidor Wiesbader, Appellant, v. Marcus M. Marks, as President of the Borough of Manhattan, City of New York, and Others, Respondents.
Judges: 
Reporter: Appellate Division Reports
Volume: 166
Pages: 725–728

Head Matter:
Isidor Wiesbader, Appellant, v. Marcus M. Marks, as President of the Borough of Manhattan, City of New York, and Others, Respondents.
First Department,
March 19, 1915.
Municipal corporation — taxpayer’s action to restrain use of public places for open markets — injunction pendente lite.
In a taxpayer’s action to restrain the president of the borough of Manhattan, the commissioner of docks and ferries, and the commissioner of bridges of the city of New York from continuing or allowing to be con- tinned certain open markets upon public places belonging to said city, an injunction pendente lite should not be granted, where it appears that the municipal authorities are taking or have taken the appropriate steps to correct any illegal acts by the defendants.
If it should appear, however, that the defendants, after being advised of the illegality of their acts, persisted in continuing them, the court may be justified in interfering.
Downing-, J., dissented, with opinion.
Appeal by the plaintiff, Isidor Wiesbader, from an order of the Supreme Court, made at the New York Special Term and entered in the office of the clerk of the county of New York on the 30th day of January, 1915, denying his motion for an injunction pendente lite.
Abraham Gruber, for the appellant.
John F. O’Brien, for the respondents.

Opinion:
Scott, J.:
This is a taxpayer's action to restrain the defendants, who are respectively president of the borough of Manhattan, commissioner of docks and ferries, and commissioner of bridges of the city of New York, from continuing or allowing to be continued certain open markets upon public places belonging to said city.
It seems that in the summer or early autumn of the year 1914 the defendant Marks, with the cooperation of the other defendants, undertook to establish and did establish open markets on public lands belonging to the city of New York, at the Fort Lee ferry, at First avenue and Fifty-ninth street, and at Third avenue and One Hundred and Twenty-ninth street. The location of the Fort Lee Ferry market was on property acquired by the city of New York for dock purposes. The location of the other two markets was on land acquired by the city for bridge purposes.
Strictly speaking, the defendants in attempting to establish these markets acted beyond their authority, although no question is made by any one as to the motives by which they were actuated.
If it appeared that the defendants, having been advised of the illegality of their acts, persisted in .doing that which they have no lawful authority to do, a case might be made for the interference of the court. But it does not so appear.
On the contrary, the proper municipal authorities have taken the matter in hand and have acted within the provisions of the charter.
As to the markets at First avenue and Fifty-ninth street, and at Third avenue and One Hundred and Twenty-ninth street, the board of aldermen, who have the power so to do, have adopted ordinances establishing markets, subject to such rules and regulations as may be made by the comptroller. As to the market established on dock property at Fort Lee ferry, it is represented to us that the commissioner of docks and ferries, within whose jurisdiction the land lies, has ordered the market to be removed, having been advised by the corporation counsel that a market may not lawfully be maintained upon land acquired for dock and bulkhead purposes. It, therefore, appears that the constituted municipal authorities are taking, or have taken, the appropriate steps to correct any illegality committed by the defendants. Under these circumstances we see no occasion to exercise our discretion to grant an injunction pendente lite.
The order appealed from is, therefore affirmed, with ten dollars costs and disbursements.
Laughlin, Clarke and Hotchkiss, JJ., concurred; Dowling, J., dissented.