Case Name: Rahmon Iturbe HENDERSON ON BEHALF OF Wyonea Henderson ROLLAND v. Sharlene Ray RUFFINO
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 2017-10-25
Citations: 231 So. 3d 912
Docket Number: NO. 17-CA-158
Parties: Rahmon Iturbe HENDERSON ON BEHALF OF Wyonea Henderson ROLLAND v. Sharlene Ray RUFFINO
Judges: Panel composed of Judges Fredericka Homberg Wicker, Robert M. Murphy, and Hans J. Liljeberg
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Third Series
Volume: 231
Pages: 912–933

Head Matter:
Rahmon Iturbe HENDERSON ON BEHALF OF Wyonea Henderson ROLLAND v. Sharlene Ray RUFFINO
NO. 17-CA-158
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fifth Circuit.
October 25, 2017
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT,’ RAHMON ITURBE HENDERSON ON BEHALF OF WYO-NEA HENDERSON ROLLAND, Jessica W. Hayes
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/AP-PELLEE, SHARLENE RAY RUFFINO, F. Evans Schmidt, Bryce M. Addison, New Orleans
Panel composed of Judges Fredericka Homberg Wicker, Robert M. Murphy, and Hans J. Liljeberg

Opinion:
MURPHY, J.-
| -|The plaintiff, Rahmon Iturbe Henderson (hereinafter "Rahmon"), appeals from an adverse judgment rendered on December 9, 2016 in favor of the defendant, Sharlene Ray Ruffino (hereinafter "Sharlene"), wherein the trial court dismissed Rahmon's motion to strike and granted the following brought by Sharlene: (1) motion to quash ex parte motion for voluntary substitution; (2) peremptory exception of no right of action; and, (3) motion for voluntary substitution. For the following reasons, we affirm the trial court's judgment.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Wyonea Henderson Rolland (hereinafter "Wyonea") was the mother of Rahmon and the grandmother of the defendant, Sharlene. In 2004, while Sharlene was living in Australia, Wyonea desired to purchase a home located at 8905 26th Street, Metairie, Louisiana, in Sharlene's name. In order to accomplish this, Sharlene gave Wyonea a power of attorney to act on her behalf in the purchase of the home. Wyo-nea used her own money, which she pur portedly donated to Sharlene, in order to purchase the home in Sharlene's name. At the end of 2004, when Sharlene returned to Metairie, she moved into the home with Wyonea and began, caring for her. When Hurricane Katrina hit in 2005, Wyonea evacuated to Houston and then settled in Tucson, Arizona. Sharlene split her time between Arizona and Louisiana while trying to find a home on the North-shore where she and her grandmother could live.
|2Before Wyonea could join Sharlene in Louisiana, Rahmon went to Arizona and took his mother and all of her belongings with him to Mexico. Prior to her death in 2011, Wyonea never returned to live in the United States.
Rahmon filed a petition for damages on November-22, 2006 on behalf of his mother, Wyonea, pursuant to a power , of attorney she. executed in Rahmon's favor. The petition alleged that Wyonea's granddaughter, Sharlene, -owed damages for conversion and breach of fiduciary duty as a result of her alleged unauthorized taking of immovable and movable property belonging to Wyonea following Hurricane Katrina. In March 2009, Rahmon amended the petition, wherein he reasserted the prior claims for conversion and breach óf fiduciary duty, and asserted an alternative claim for revocation of any alleged donation inter vivos made by Wyonea to Sharlene based on nullity for want of form, failure to reserve enough property for subsistence, and nonperformance of conditions.
Wyonea died on October 14, 2011 during the course of these proceedings. Thereafter, on May 11, 2015, Rahmon filed an ex parte motion for voluntary substitution claiming to be the sole and universal heir of Wyoena. In support" Of his motion, Rah-mon attached an "Open Public Testament," allegedly executed on April 19, 2011 by Wyonea in Mexico naming him as Wyo-nea's sole and universal heir (hereinafter the "Mexican will"). On May 18," 2015, in accordance with La. C.C. art. 801, the, trial court granted an ex parte motion to substitute Rahmon for Wyonea as the plaintiff.
|30n September 22, 2015, Sharlene filed a motion for summary judgment seeking dismissal of the claims made against her. By judgment dated December 10, 2015, the trial court granted Sharlene's motion for summary judgment, in part, dismissing the claims for breach of fiduciary duty and conversion, leaving solely before the court "any claims for revocation of donations inter vivos of any movables."
On August 1, 2016, Sharlene filed: (1) a motion to quash Rahmon's motion for voluntary substitution on the basis that the 2011 Mexican will was invalid under the laws of the Mexican! State of Baja California Sur; (2) a peremptory exception of no right of action; and (3) a motion for voluntary substitution based on a 20Q3 Last Will and Testament allegedly executed by Wyo-nea making Sharlene her universal successor. In response, Rahmon filed a motion to strike claiming Sharlene's motions were untimely pursuant .to the, deadlines set forth in the court's scheduling order. Rah-mon also filed an opposition to the motions and exception-urged by Sharlene.
The matter, originally set for trial September 12, 2016, came for hearing on November 2, 2016, at which tíme the trial court conducted an extensive evidentiary hearing. The evidence presented focused primarily on the. .validity of the Mexican will purporting to make Rahmon the universal successor of Wyonea. The trial court considered expert testimony presented by both parties regarding the laws of 14Mexico, in addition to testimony from fact witnesses as to Wyonea's eyesight and ability to speak Spanish. Over Rahmon's objection, the court also admitted into evidence the transcript of a recorded telephone conversation in which Rahmon, Wyonea, and Sharlene all took part. Additionally, after review by both parties as to accuracy and there being no objection, the trial court allowed a translator to read into the record translations of the relevant Mexican laws at issue.
The following is a'summary of the testimony and evidence presented at the hearing.
Testimony of Sharlene Ray Ruffino
Sharlene testified that as a young girl, she lived with her brother and parents in a four-plex owned by Wyonea. When she was sixteen months old, her mother, who was Wyonea's daughter, committed suicide. Following her mother's death, Sharlene continued to live with her father, brother, and Wyonea in the four-plex for years. According to Sharlene, Wyonea was like a mother to her. Even after Sharlene and her family eventually moved out of Wyonea's property, they continued to spend almost every weekend with Wyonea, .as well as extended periods of time over the summer. As .Sharlene lived in different places, they maintained their close relationship by speaking on the phone often and writing letters to each other. Sharlene testified that when she was in high school, she. sought' help from Wyonea for her Spanish .class. Although Wyonea knew a few words of Spanish, Sharlene stated that Wyonea was unable to help her with the class. Sharlene visited Mexico with Wyo-nea when she was growing up, and though Wyonea 'was able to speak a few words in Spanish while there, Wyonea never engaged in a conversation in Spanish with anyone. Sharlene further testified that Wyonea was an avid reader until she developed Macular Degeneration and, [5by 2004, Wyoena was no longer able to read. According to Sharlene, when she lived with Wyonea in 2004 and 2005, Wyonea was no longer able to watch television due to her inability to see the television.
Sharlene also testified that Wyonea had become very forgetful during 2005. In support of this testimony, Sharlene introduced a document, dated November 9, 2005, entitled "Mini-Mental State Examination ("MMSE")," which was accepted into evidence. The report of this examination indicated that Wyonea had developed mild dementia.
Sharlene testified that she lived in Australia for a period of time in 2004. While there, Wyonea contacted her and explained that she was selling the four-plex and desired to buy a house in Sharlene's name. In order to accomplish this, Sharlene stated that she had to execute a power of attorney in Australia and send it to Wyonea. Once the power of attorney was properly in place, Wyonea then purchased a home located in Metairie, Louisiana in Sharlene's name. When Sharlene returned to the United States in the fall of 2004, she went to live in this home with Wyonea.
Sharlene testified that, on August 27, 2005, two days before Hurricane Katrina struck south Louisiana, she went to Los Angeles, leaving Wyonea in the care of Vincent, Sharlene's brother. Vincent evacuated with Wyonea to Houston and when they learned they would not be able to return to the Metairie home, they proceeded to Tucson, Arizona. According to Sharlene, she met Vincent and Wyonea in Tucson, where they were assisted by Treena Cross in caring for and finding an assisted living facility for Wyonea. Sharlene testified that she returned to Metairie and then found a place for her and Wyonea to live on the North Shore. Before Wyonea could join Sharlene in Louisiana, however, Rah-mon went to Arizona and took his mother and all of her belongings with him to Mexico. According to Sharlene, Rahmon prevented Wyonea from speaking to her on the | fiphone after Wyonea went to live with him in Mexico. Wyonea never returned to live in the United States.
Recorded Telephone Conversation
Sharlene testified regarding a telephone conversation she recorded that took place between Rahmon, Wyonea and herself in the summer of 2005. Over Rahmon's objection, the recording of the conversation was played and a transcript of the conversation was admitted into evidence. In this conversation, Rahmon suggested that Wyonea come to live with him in Mexico and that she rent the Metairie house for $1,600.00 per month. Wyonea responded by advising Rahmon that the Metairie house belonged to Sharlene. Rahmon referenced a conversation he had with Wyonea the 'previous day wherein he told Wyonea that he would come to Metairie on August 15 to help her pack up the Metairie house. Wyonea became upset and denied having ever told Rahmon that the house was in both her name and Sharlene's name. Wyonea repeated that the house was in Sharlene's name only and that Sharlene could sell the house right now. Rahmon suggested to Wyonea that she have Sharlene sign a document stating that the house would belong to Wyonea until she died, at which time Sharlene would then own the house. Wyonea refused to follow his suggestion. Rahmon then stated that there was $7,500.00 "in that house which belongs to me." Rahmon reminded Wyonea that she had "5 or 6 grandchildren, just not one." Rahmon suggested for a second time that Wyonea agree to live with him and rent out the Metairie house. Wyonea responded that she did not want to rent out the house and stated "[t]his is my home. This is where I live." Sharlene and Rahmon then discussed Wyonea going to Mexico to visit' in September when the weather would be cooler.
Deposition Testimony of Wyonea• Henderson Rolland
Wyoena's deposition, which was taken on May 13, 2008 when she was 89 years old, was admitted into evidence. At that time, Wyonea testified that she was |7not able to see people's features. She was unable to read any of the documents presented to her during the deposition. Wyonea appeared to be confused; she was unsure as to how many grandchildren she had, where she lived, how long she had been in Metairie, or where she was currently staying. Further, Wyonea could not remember any details concerning the purchase' of the Metairie home. When asked whether she had made any phone calls while she was living in Mexico, she stated that she did not have "that much acknowledge [sic] -of Spanish." Elaborating further,- Wyonea testified that, "I understand a — Spanish a little bit. But not very much."
Wyonea's deposition testimony regarding the allegations set forth in the lawsuit Rahmon filed on her behalf was very unclear. She testified that the Metaire house was her house and that Sharlene would have the house after she died. Wyonea denied that Sharlene had taken any of her property. When asked to describe the damages she suffered as a result of Sharlene allegedly taking her property, Wyo-nea could not think of any.
Testimony of Teena Cross
Teena Cross testified that she was a nurse and that she assisted Wyonea and Sharlene in Tucson following Hurricane Katrina; Specifically, Treena explained that she helped to find an assisted living facility where Wyonea could live. Treena testified that when she presented Wyonea with the lease for the assisted living community, Wyonea was unable to read it and that the lease had to be read to her. Teena explained that she and the business manager had to place their finger 6n the lease to show Wyonea where to sign and that without them doing so, Wyonea would not have known where to sign her name. Tee-na testified that she spoke Spanish fluently and was with Wyonea in the company of other persons who were conversing in Spanish. Teena stated that she never witnessed Wyonea engaging in Spanish conversation.
Is Testimony of Homero Castaneda Mupoz
Over Rahmon's objection, Homero Castaneda was accepted by the court as an expert on Mexican law regarding "wills and testaments." Mr. Castaneda testified that, although he was not a public notary in Mexico, he was an attorney located in California and was licensed to practice law in Mexico. He explained that he often assisted people who own property in Mexico with wills and helped "people probate wills in Mexico." Specifically, Mr. Castaneda testified that he was familiar with the Civil Code Rfor the Mexican State of Baja California,. which contains a specific chapter regarding the requirements for the issuance of wills. Mr. Castaneda testified that he reviewed the April 19, 2011 Mexican will prepared for Wyonea and, thereafter, prepared a "declaration" that set forth and explained his findings. This declaration-was admitted into evidence. According to Mr. Castaneda, if Wyonea was blind at the time she executed the Mexican will, the will would be null and void because it does not comport with the requirements of the' Civil Code for the Mexican State of Baja California pertaining to the preparation of a will for a blind person. Mr. Castaneda further testified that if the person executing a Mexican will was unable to speak Spanish, the .Civil Code for the Mexican State of Baja California required that an interpreter be present for the issuance of the will and the signing of the will. He further explained that, in this instance, Mexican law requires that both the Spanish testament and the translated testament be attached as an exhibit to the formalized testament. Mr. Castaneda testified that there was no translated testament attached to the Mexican will prepared for Wyonea. He further testified that there was no indication that an interpreter or translator performed the requisite duties pursuant to the Civil Code for the Mexican State of Baja California for preparing a testament for a person who does not speak Spanish.
Mr. Castaneda was questioned regarding a medical certificate that was attached to tile Mexican will,, which stated that Wyonea was "healthy" and "cognitive." He explained that it was not customary to issue a medical certificate in this 'broad arid nonspecific way. Rather, customarily, thé iriedical certificate, which" rinder Mexican law is required to be attached to the testainent, indicates the type of tests that were" done and the results of those tests, based upon which a determination would be made as to the testator's physical and mental state at the time of executing the testament. The medical certificate attached to the Mexican will did not indicate what tests were completed in order to determine Wyonea's physical and mental-condition at the .time she executed the will.
Testimony of Rahmon Iturbe Henderson
At the hearing, Rahmon testified that his mother, Wyonea, rnarried his father, a Mexican man, in 1937 and lived in Mexico for ten or'twelve years. He stated that' Wyonea spoke Spanish and was able to communicate in Spanish with his family and friends. When confronted with a greet-' ing card he sent to Wyonea in 1990, which contained a handwritten' English translation of the Spanish message in-the card, Rahmon explained that when he saw a "nice message," he translated it and spread it among his Mexican and English speaking friends. Rahmon elaborated that "if it was a card I wanted my mother to understand better yet, I would [translate] it."
According to Rahmon, in 2006 and 2007, after Wyonea had moved with him to Mexico, she played- bridge. When she stopped playing bridge, she played solitaire using a magnifying glass. Rahmon testified that Wyonea could read and that she'used a magnifying glass to read letters from friends. Rahmon acknowledged that Wyo-nea had been diagnosed with Macular Degeneration. |inFurther, Rahmon admitted that he had previously testified in his 2008 depositiori that Wyonea did not socialize because "she can't see well."
Rahmon testified that he was registered as a certified translator of the.superior court of justice in La Paz, Mexico. Rahmon retained a notary to perform- the April 19, 2011 Mexican will. . -
Testimony of Raquel Iturbe
Raquel, 'Rahmon's daughter, was called to testify on Rahmon's behalf. She claimed that when she was a child, Wyonea spoke to her and her siblings in Spanish. According to Raquel, during the time Wyonea lived in Mexico with Rahmon, from 2005 until 2011, she and Wyonea communicated in English, although she witnessed Wyo-nea communicating with her caretakers in Spanish. Raquel testifed that during the last several weeks of Wyonea's life, Wyo-nea came to stay with her in Oregon where she lives and, at that time, Wyonea was not blind, but was able to see Raquel and her children.
Testimony of Anna Watt
Anna, also Rahmon's daughter, testified that she had lived in the New Orleans area since 2001. Anna claimed that from 2001 until August 2005, she visited her grandmother, Wyonea, every weekend. She stated that Wyonea stayed, with her for a few weeks in 2011 and, at that time, Wyonea was able to walk with a walker and was able to see. Anna acknowledged that Wyo-nea had been diagnosed with Macular Degeneration, a progressive disease, and that by 2008, Wyonea could not see well enough to read. Anna explained, however, that Wyonea was not like Helen Keller with "no sense of light." Anna also testified that when she was with her in 2011, Wyonea spoke Spanish. Further, Anna testified that, to her knowledge, Wyonea had not been diagnosed with either Alzheimer's disease or senility.
\ ^Testimony of Jose Antonio Alegre Ochoa
Mr. Alegre was called to testify, through an interpreter, as an expert witness on behalf of Rahmon. He testified that he is an attorney licensed to practice law in Mexico and lives in La Paz of California Baja Sur. The trial court accepted Mr. Alegre as an expert on "Mexican law," however, it was established that Mr. Al-egre, in fact, does not have a law license and, while his Mexican notary license allows him to intervene in contracts and commercial matters, it does' not allow him to prepare wills.
Mr. Alegre testified that Article 1418 of the Civil Code for the Mexican State of Baja California applies to a testator that is blind. According to Mr. Alegre, this provision is applicable to persons completely devoid of sight, not to persons with diminished sight. He further testified that Article 1422 applies to a testator that does not speak the Spanish language at all. When questioned regarding the medical certificate that-was attached to the Mexican will, Mr. Alegre testified that he found it to be "completely normal" and, in his expert opinion, established that Wyonea "had physical and mental health" at the time she executed the Mexican will.
On cross-examination, Mr. Alegre testified that he and Rahmon were friends and had known one another for over thirty years. Further, he conceded that the medical certificate attached to the Mexican will contained no information identifying the testing performed to support the conclusion that Wyonea was in good physical and mental health at the time she executed the will.
An interpreter, who assisted the court in the testimony of Mr. Alegre, was asked by the trial court to translate into the record those provisions of the Civil Code for the Mexican State of Baja California pertaining to the execution of testaments by persons who are blind and by persons who are unable to speak | iaSpanish. Article 1421 of the Civil Code for the Mexican State of Baja California was translated by the interpreter as follows:
[W]hen the testator is blind or cannot or does not know how to read, the testament will be read twice, once by the public notary as provided in Article 1417, and again in the same manner by one of the witnesses or another person the testator designates.
Additionally, Article 1422 was translated by the interpreter as follows:
[W]hen the testator does not know the language of the country, if they can — if they can, they will write their testament. That [testament] will be translated into Spanish- by the interpreter designated by same. The translation will be transcribed as the testament in the respective protocol and the original will be filed in the corresponding appendix of the notary who intervenes in the act.
At the close of the hearing, having found the Mexican will to be invalid based on the testimony and evidence presented, the trial court issued an oral judgment granting Sharlene's motion to quash the ex parte judgment substituting Rahmon as plaintiff, granting the exception of np right of action, and granting the motion to substitute Sharlene as the proper plaintiff in this case. The trial court also denied Rahmon's motion to strike.
On December 2, 2016, Rahmon moved to appeal the'trial court's rulings on his motion to strike and Sharlene's motions and exception, which the trial court granted on December 9, 2016. On that same date, the trial court issued a written judgment memorializing its prior oral rulings rendered at the close of the November 2, 2016 hearing. The trial court designated the judgment as final in accordance with La. C.C.P. art. 1915.
¡[^ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
On appeal, Rahmon assigns as error the trial court's abuse of discretion in denying his motion to strike the untimely motions and exception brought by Sharlene. Rah-mon also assigns as error the trial court's erroneous grant of Sharlene's exception of no right of action claiming the Mexican will naming him as Wyonea's universal heir to have been validly executed.
Conversely, Sharlene avers that the trial court correctly determined the Mexican will to be invalid, leaving in effect the 2003 will, which names Sharlene as the executrix and universal legatee. Hence, a determination as to the proper party to substitute as the plaintiff for the deceased, Wyonea, in these proceedings hinges on the validity of the Mexican will.
LAW AND DISCUSSION
I. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
A trial court is vested with vast discretion in deciding whether to modify a pretrial order when it is necessary to prevent manifest injustice. Absent an abuse of discretion, the decision of the trial court will be upheld. In deciding whether to modify a pretrial order, a trial court must be ever mindful of the fact that the objective of our legal system is to render justice between litigants upon the merits of the controversy rather than to defeat justice upon the basis of technicalities.
The function of the exception of no right of action is to determine whether a plaintiff has a real and actual interest in an action or belongs to a particular class to which the law grants a remedy for a particular harm alleged. The burden of proof of establishing the exception of no right.of action is on the exceptor. The 1^exception of no right of action tests whether the plaintiff has a "real and actual interest" in the action, but it does not raise questions of the plaintiff's ability to prevail on the merits or whether the defendant may have a valid defense. At the hearing on the exception of no right of action, the exception may be submitted on the pleadings, or evidence may be introduced either in support of or to controvert the objection raised when the grounds thereof do not appear from the petition. An appellate court reviewing a lower court's ruling on an exception of no right of action should focus on whether the particular' plaintiff has a right to bring the suit and is a member of the class of persons that has a legal interest in the subject matter of the litigation, assuming the petition states a valid cause of action for some person. The determination as to whether a plaintiff has a right to bring an action raises a question of law, which requires de novo review.
Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 801 provides for the substitution of a deceased party when a party dies during the pendency of an action that is not extinguished by his death. If such is the case, the party's "legal successor" may have himself substituted for the deceased party, on ex parte written motion supported by "proof of his quality." Legal successor is defined, in pertinent part, as "the heirs and legatees of the deceased, if the deceased's succession is not under administration."
While the determination regarding whether a plaintiff is the proper party with the right to bring an action pursuant to La. C.C.P. art. 801 is a question of law subject to de novo review, in the case sub judice, the trial- court made factual | ^findings prior to making its'decision on the law. This court reviews factual findings under the-manifest error/clearly wrong standard of review. ' Under this standard, a lower court's factual findings can only be reversed when (1) the record reflects that a reasonable basis does not exist for the lower court's finding, and (2) the record establishes that the finding is clearly wrong. Where there is a conflict in the testimony, reasonable evaluations of credibility and reasonable inferences of fact should not be disturbed on review, even though the appellate court may feel that its own evaluations and inferences are as reasonable. The -appellate review of fact is not completed by reading only so much of the record as will reveal a reasonable factual basis for the finding in the trial court, but rather, if the trial court's findings are reasonable in light of the record when reviewed in its entirety, the court of appeal may not reverse even though convinced that had it been sitting as. the trier of fact, it would have weighed the evidence differently. Where there are two permissible views of the evidence, the fact finder's choice between them cannot be manifestly erroneous or clearly wrong.
The trial judge has broad discretion in determining the admissibility of expert testimony and who should or should not be permitted to testify as an expert. The trial court's ruling on the admissibility of expert testimony will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. . A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if the expert's scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to | lfidetermine a fact in issue. Generally, the test of competency of an expert is the expert's knowledge of the subject about which he.is called upon to express an opinion. A combination of specialized training, work experience, and practical application of the expert's knowledge can combine to establish that person as an expert, Whether a witness has previously been qualified as an expert is also something the court can take into consideration when determining whether to qualify a witness as an expert. Although domestic law testimony is not admissible on the theory that the court itself is the expert on domestic law, foreign law testimony is admissible in order to assist the trier of fact.
Applying'' the legal precepts outlined above, we now turn to the facts presented in the instant case to determine whether the trial court erred in denying Rahmon's motion to strike and in granting Sharlene's exception of no right of action.
1. Motion to Strike
Rahmon contends that the trial court erred in failing to grant his motion to strike the motions and exception of no right of action brought by Sharlene on the basis that they were filed after the expiration of the pretrial order's deadline for filing contradictory and dispositive' motions. As noted previously, absent an abuse of discretion, the decision of the trial court will be upheld. •
Based upon our review of the record in its entirety, and finding no prejudice to Rahmon in allowing the motions and exception to go forward, we find no abuse of the trial court's vast discretion in denying •Rahmon's motion to strike. This assignment of error is without merit.
|172. Exception of No Right of Action
In his next assignment of error, Rahmon avers the trial 'court erred in' granting Sharlene's exception of no right of action and in dismissing his claim to proceed as the plaintiff in this case. Rahmon- argues the trial court's conclusion that he had no right of action was based on the reliance on inadmissible evidence, which led to the erroneous finding that the Mexican will was invalid. Specifically, Rahmon contends that: Homero Casteneda Munoz was erroneously qualified to provide expert testimony; the testimony elicited at the hearing pertaining to alleged donations inter vivos made by Wyonea to Sharlene was inadmissible because it was irrelevant to the determination of whether or not Rah-mon fell within the class of persons having a legal right or interest in pursuing the suit as plaintiff; the transcript of the recorded telephone conversation between Rahmon, Wyonea, and Sharlene was inadmissible as neither Rahmon nor Wyonea were allegedly aware that the conversation was being recorded; and the Mini-Mental State Examination ("MMSE") of Wyonea relating to a 2005 examination conducted by a physician in Arizona, which indicated Wyonea suffered from mild dementia, was inadmissible hearsay evidence.
a. The Alleged Inadmissible Evidence
As noted previously, absent a clear abuse of discretion, a trial court's ruling on the admissibility and relevancy of evidence will not be disturbed on appeal.
i. Expert Testimony of Homero Casteneda Munoz
Rahmon argues that Mr. Castaneda was not qualified to testify as an expert at the hearing because he was not a Nota-rio Publico in Mexico, he had never before prepared an open public testament, and he had not previously been admitted in any court as an expert in Mexican law related to testaments. To the contrary, it was established that Mr. Castaneda's law practice involved probate matters, including having assisted clients with the probation of wills in Mexico. Further, |1sMr. Castaneda testified that he was licensed and had practiced as an attorney in Mexico for 14 years and, as such,, was familiar with the Civil Code for the State of Baja California, especially those provisions that regulate how wills are issued and the requirements for the issuance, of such wills. Moreover, Mr. Castaneda testified that he was familiar with the types, roles, appointments and limits of authority , of Mexican Notario Pú-blicos. He explained that he had previously appeared with non-speaking Spanish clients in the course of their having executed a Mexican will and had, on occasion, acted as an interpreter. Additionally, Mr. Castaneda testified that he had been admitted as an expert in Mexican law in an Arizona magistrate court. The record reflects that the trial judge specifically questioned Mr. Castaneda regarding his knowledge of wills in Mexico. Based upon our review of the record, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's decision to qualify Mr. Castaneda as an expert on Mexican law regarding "wills and testaments."
ii. Miscellaneous Testimony and Exhibits
Rahmon also avers the trial court abused its discretion in admitting into evidence the testimony pertaining to the alleged inter vivos donations, the recording and transcript of the telephone conversation that took place between Rahmon, Wyonea and Sharlene, and the MMSE test. We find no indication in the record that the trial court relied on this evidence in ruling on the exception of no right of action, which was based solely on a finding that the Mexican will was invalid due to Wyonea's inability to see and her inability to speak and/or read in Spanish.- Accord- irigly, we find this assignment of error is without merit.
b. The Mexican Will
As part and parcel of his assignment of error that the trial court erroneously granted Sharlene's exception of no right of action, Rahmon contends the trial court erred in finding that the formal requirements to execute a Mexican testament for a hstestator who is blind and cannot speak the Spanish language were not met in this case, and in ruling that the Mexican will was invalid under Mexican law. According to Rahmon, the testimony and evidence presented at the hearing established that when Wyonea executed the Mexican will in 2011, she was clinically healthy, medically competent, able to see, and knew the Spanish language. Consequently, Rahmon argues, the Codal provisions relating to blind persons and persons unable to speak Spanish did not apply to Wyonea and, therefore, the testament should have been deemed valid and Sharlene's exception of no right of action overruled.
When making its determination regarding whether or not the formal requirements for executing a testament in Mexico were met, and in ruling on the applicability of these provisions to Wyonea at the time she executed the 2011 Mexican will, Rah-mon argues the trial court should have relied on the testimony of his expert, Mr. Alegre, over that of Sharlene's expert, Mr. Castaneda. Concerning the requirements for a testator who is "blind or cannot or does not know how to read," Mr. Alegre testified that "blindness" means the state of being "devoid of sight." According to Mr. Alegre, Mexican law requires a testament to be read aloud to the testator only when the testator is completely blind or devoid of sight, not when the testator is unable to see due to diminished eyesight.
To the contrary, Mr. Castaneda testified that "blindness" refers to the inability to see what is in front of a person. According to Mr. Castaneda, if Wyonea was unable to identify documents or unable to see what was placed in front of her at the time she executed the Mexican will in 2011, the testament would be invalid under Mexican law because it was, admittedly, not previously read aloud to her.
The trial judge made a factual determination based on the credibility of the witnesses when deciding to credit Mr. Castaneda's testimony over Mr. Alegre's | ^regarding what Mexican law requires when a testator is unable to see. We find no error as the record provides a reasonable factual basis for the trial court's decision. The evidence presented at the hearing established that Wyonea suffered from Macular Degeneration, a condition that negatively affects a person's ability to see. As early as May 2008, when Wyonea was deposed in this case, she was unable to read or even recognize various documents that were presented to her and was unable to identify facial features of the deposing attorney. The record establishes that she quit driving in 2005 and no longer played bridge because she was unable to see. Further, in Rahmon's own 2008 deposition, he testified that his mother "can't see well." The testimony of Teena Cross further confirmed that Wyonea was unable to see. She testified that in 2006, Wyonea was unable to see or read a lease agreement and required assistance in order to know where to sign her name on the document.
The trial court found that the credible evidence, particularly Wyonea's own deposition testimony, established that Wyonea "was sight impaired by 2009 and could not have possibly executed or read a will in 2011." Our review of the record convinces us that the trial court's conclusion was neither clearly wrong nor manifestly erroneous.
As to the requirements under Mexican law regarding a testator's ability to speak Spanish, Mr. Alegre testified that the Civil Code for the Mexican State of Baja California does not require Spanish to be the testator's first language, but' rather, only applies "when [the testator does not] speak any Spanish." ,The trial court similarly rejected, this interpretation and concluded, based on the evidence presented, that Wyonea was not able to read or understand Spanish at the time she executed the 2011 Mexican will. We find the record supports the trial court's factual determination.
| In her 2008 deposition, Wyonea testified that she did not have much knowledge of the Spanish language, and that she understood Spanish "a little bit. But not very much." Wyonea's testimony regarding her limited ability to understand Spanish was bolstered by the testimony of Treena Cross, who is fluent in. Spanish. Ms. Cross testified that during the time she spent with Wyonea, she made 'several attempts to converse with Wyonea in Spanish, and Wyonea never gave any indication that she even understood the Spanish language. We find this evidence provides a reasonable factual basis for the trial court's conclusion that, at the time Wyonea. executed the Mexican will in 2011, she was unable to sufficiently read, speak, or understand the Spanish language.
Considering the testimony and evidence submitted at the hearing, we find no error in the trial court's determination that, at the time Wyonea executed the Mexican will in 2011, she was unable to see and unable to speak and understand the Spanish language. Further, we find no error in the trial court's determination that, under Mexican law, because the requirements governing the execution of a testament by a person who cannot see and who cannot read or speak Spanish were not followed, the 2011 Mexican will is null and void.
Once it concluded that the Mexican will was invalid, the trial court properly turned to the 2003 testament executed by Wyonea in order to determine whether Rahmon had a right of action to proceed as the voluntarily substituted plaintiff for Wyonea in this ease. The 2003 will named Sharlene as the universal legatee, not Rah-mon. Accordingly, the trial court correctly determined that, under La. C.C.P. art. 801(2), Rahmon, who is not a legatee under the 2003 testament, was not the proper party to be substituted for Wyonea as the plaintiff in this matter and that Rahmon has no right of action or interest in this suit. Based on the record evidence, the proper party to be substituted for Wyonea is Sharlene. Consequently, the trial court was correct in granting Sharlene's exception of no right of action.
|22Based upon our review of the record in its entirety, we'find no error in the trial court's denial of Rahmon's motion to strike. Additionally, we find the trial court correctly granted Sharlene's exception of no right of action and dismissed Rahmon's claim to Wyonea's action. We further find the trial court was correct in quashing Rahmon's ex parte motion recognizing him as the voluntarily substituted plaintiff, and in granting Sharlene's motion for voluntary substitution, substituting Sharlene, the universal legatee, as the plaintiff in accordance'with La. C.C.P. art. 801(2).
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court's judgment.
AFFIRMED.
. Rahmon is not the father of Sharlene.
. According to the record, the alleged motivation for the donation stemmed from Wyonea's personal' experience when her own mother passed away leaving a home, and Wyonea experienced difficulties in selling the home because a succession was never opened placing Wyonea in possession, Thé record reflects that Wyonea allegedly wanted Sharlene to have the new home she was purchasing and did not want Sharlene to have to open a succession upon Wyonea's death,
. According to Rahmon, his intent was to take his mother on a vacation to Mexico. However, allegedly because Sharlene had taken all of Wyonea-s property and Wyonea had no place to live, she did not return to live in the United States, but remained with him in Mexico.
. Wyonea was living at the time suit was filed.
. Sharlene was alleged to have taken Wyo-nea's home located at 8905 26th Street, Me-tairie, Louisiana, in addition to cash, bank accounts, CDs, an automobile, and other personal property belonging to Wyonea. The petition further alleged that -Wyonea had previously executed a power of attorney naming Sharlene as mandate and that Sharlene had breached her fiduciary duty owed to Wyonea.
.Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 801 provides: -
When a party dies during the pendency of an action which is not extinguished by his death, his legal successor may have himself substituted for the deceased party, on ex parte written motion supported by proof of his quality.
As used in Articles 801 through'804, "legal successor" means:
(1) The survivors designated in Article 2315.1 of the Civil Code, if the action survives in their favor; and
(2) Otherwise, it méans the succession representative of the deceased appointed by a court of this state, if the succession is under administration therein; or the heirs and legatées of the deceased, if the deceased's succession is not under administration therein.
. Also pending before the court was an exception of prescription filed by Sharlene, which by séparatc judgment rendered the same day, the trial court determined to be moot in light of its ruling on the motion for summary judgment. Rahmon does not appeal either of these judgments.
. Macular Degeneration causes loss of central vision in the eye and, at present, is considered to be an incurable disease.
. The basis of Rahmon's objection was that Mr. Castaneda was not qualified to testify as an expert witness because he was not a public notáry, which Rahmon contended was an elite, specialized position.
.Though Rahmon filed his motion for appeal prior to the trial court having signed the written judgment designating it as final, the Louisiana Supreme Court, noting that appeals are favored in law, has held that if a judgment is signed before anyone moves to dismiss the appeal, then the defect is cured. Overmier v. Traylor, 475 So.2d 1094, 1095 (La. 1985).
. La. C.C.P. art. 1551; Naylor v. Louisiana Dept. of Public Highways, 423 So.2d 674, 679 (La. App. 1 Cir. 1982).
. Naylor, 423 So.2d at 679-680.
. Hood v. Cotter, 08-0215, p. 17 (La. 12/2/08), 5 So.3d 819, 829; Dufrene v. Insurance Co. of State of Pennsylvania, 01-47, pp. 17-18 (La. App. 5 Cir. 5/30/01), 790 So.2d 660, 668.
. Roubion Shoring Co., LLC v. Crescent Shoring, L.L.C., 16-540, 16-541, p. 7 (La. App. 5 Cir. 5/17/17), 222 So.3d 921, 926.
. Lemmon Law Firm, LLC v. Sch. Bd. of St. Charles, 13-376, pp. 11-12 (La. App. 5 Cir. 12/12/13), 131 So.3d 231, 236.
. La. C.C.P. art. 931.
. Eagle Pipe & Supply, Inc. v. Amerada Hess Corp., 10-2267, pp, 11-12 (La. 10/25/11), 79 So.3d 246, 256.
. Holly & Smith Architects, Inc. v. St. Helena Congregate Facility, Inc., 06-0582, p. 9 (La. 11/29/06), 943 So.2d 1037, 1045.
. La. C.C.P. art. 801(2).
. Bonin v. Ferrellgas, 03-3024, p. 11 (La. 7/2/04), 877 So.2d 89, 94.
. Baumeister v. Plunkett, 95-2270, p. 7 (La. 5/21/96), 673 So.2d 994, 998.
. Riser v. American Medical Int'l, Inc., 620 So.2d 372, 376 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1993) citing Rosell v. ESCO, 549 So.2d 840, 844-5 (La. 1989).
. Id.
. Id.
. Cheairs v. State, 03-0680, p. 10 (La. 12/3/03), 861 So.2d 536, 541.
. State v. Otkins-Victor, 15-340, p. 108 (La. App. 5 Cir. 5/26/16), 193 So.3d 479, 525.
. La. C.E. art. 702(1).
. Otkins-Victor, 15-340, p. 108, 193 So.3d at 525.
. Id., 15-340, p. 109, 193 So.3d at 525.
. State v. Craig, 95-2499, p. 14 (La. 5/20/97), 699 So.2d 865, 870, cert. denied, 522 U.S. 935, 118 S.Ct. 343, 139 L.Ed.2d 266 (1997).
. Crowe v. Bio-Medical Application of La., LLC, 14-0917, p. 19 (La. App. 1 Cir. 6/3/16), 208 So.3d 473, 482.