Case Name: State of Nebraska, appellant, v. Edward Marion Cialkowski, also known as Edward Marion Hall, appellee
Court: Nebraska Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Nebraska
Decision Date: 1975-03-27
Citations: 193 Neb. 372
Docket Number: No. 39691
Parties: State of Nebraska, appellant, v. Edward Marion Cialkowski, also known as Edward Marion Hall, appellee.
Judges: Heard before White, C. J., Spencer, Boslaugh, McCown, Newton, Clinton, and Brodkey, JJ.
Reporter: Nebraska Reports
Volume: 193
Pages: 372–379

Head Matter:
State of Nebraska, appellant, v. Edward Marion Cialkowski, also known as Edward Marion Hall, appellee.
227 N. W. 2d 406
Filed March 27, 1975.
No. 39691.
Raymond Baker and Douglas R. Milbourn, for appellant.
William G. Line of Kerrigan, Line, Martin & Hanson, for appellee.
Heard before White, C. J., Spencer, Boslaugh, McCown, Newton, Clinton, and Brodkey, JJ.

Opinion:
Newton, J.
Defendant was charged with contributing to the delinquency of two minor girls. He persuaded them to enter a dancing contest in a place akin to a roadhouse and during the dances to bare breasts and/or buttocks. Following conviction, a motion for new trial was sustained and the case dismissed on the ground that the statutes violated were void because they were vague and indefinite. We reverse the judgment of the District Court.
Section 28-477, R. S. Supp., 1974, provides: "Any person who by any act, encourages, causes, or contributes to the delinquency, neglect, or need for special supervision, of a child under eighteen years of age, so that such child becomes, or will tend to become, a delinquent or neglected child, or a child in need of special supervision as defined by section 43-201, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor." Section 43-201, R. R. S. .1943, provided: "(5) A child in need of special supervision shall mean any child under the age of eighteen years (c) who deports himself so as to injure or endanger seriously the morals or health of himself or others;
These statutes are intended for the protection of children. Being children they are not yet capable of mature judgment and require the protection of society. It is true that the terms of the statutes are somewhat broad, yet it is practically impossible to draw them with greater specificity and still adequately protect the young. The ways in which a child may be influenced to become delinquent or immoral are multitudinous and often difficult to anticipate. In Commonwealth v. Randall, 183 Pa. Super. 603, 133 A. 2d 276, may be found appropriate language. "The comprehensive words of the statute, 'Whoever, being of the age of twenty-one years and upwards, by any act corrupts or tends to corrupt the morals of any child under the age of eighteen years' certainly convey concrete impressions to the ordinary person. The common sense of the community, as well as the sense of decency, propriety and the morality which most people entertain is sufficient to apply the statute to each particular case, and to individuate what particular conduct is rendered criminal by it.
"It is obvious that the mandates of the statute are salutary measures designed to protect children. 'The ways and means by which the venal mind may corrupt and debauch the youth of our land, both male and female, are so multitudinous that to compel a complete enumeration in any statute designed for protection of the young before giving it validity would be to confess the inability of modern society to cope with the problem of juvenile delinquency.'
"The highest court in the land has recognized that the 'Use of common experience as a glossary is necessary to meet the practical demands of legislation' and that the 'requirement of reasonable certainty does not preclude the use of ordinary terms to express ideas which find adequate interpretation in common usage and understanding.' Sproles v. Binford, 286 U. S. 374, 393, 52 S. Ct. 581, 587, 76 L. Ed. 1167."
Statutes practically identical with ours were upheld against similar attacks in Brockmueller v. State, 86 Ariz. 82, 340 P. 2d 992; State v. McKinley, 53 N. M. 106, 202 P. 2d 964; Jung v. State, 55 Wis. 2d 714, 201 N. W. 2d 58. In numerous instances statutes which simply forbid acts tending to cause child delinquency have been upheld as sufficiently specific. See, State v. Coterel, 97 Ohio App. 48, 123 N. E. 2d 438; State v. Sparrow, 276 N. C. 499, 173 S. E. 2d 897, which states: "Even so, impossible standards of statutory clarity are not required by the constitution. When the language of a statute provides an adequate warning as to the conduct it condemns and prescribes boundaries sufficiently distinct for judges and juries to interpret and administer it uniformly, constitutional requirements are fully met. United States v. Petrillo, 332 U. S. 1, 91 L. ed. 1877, 67 S. Ct. 1538."; McDonald v. Kentucky (Ky. App.), 331 S. W. 2d 716; State v. Barone (Fla.), 124 So. 2d 490; State v. Montalbo, 33 N. J. Super. 462, 110 A. 2d 572; and People v. Bergerson, 17 N. Y. 2d 398, 271 N. Y. Supp. 236, 218 N. E. 2d 288, wherein it is stated: "The test to be applied was recently stated by this court: 'The test is whether a reasonable man subject to the statute would be informed of the nature of the offense prohibited and what is required of him. Such warning must be unequivocal but this requirement does not preclude the use of ordinary terms to express ideas which find adequate interpretation in common usage and understanding.' "
We are unable to agree that the statutes are unconstitutional. See State v. Simants, 182 Neb. 491, 155 N. W. 2d 788. The judgment of the District Court is reversed and the cause remanded.
Reversed and remanded.