Case Name: SULLIVAN v. ROSS' ESTATE
Court: Michigan Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1898-09-20
Citations: 113 Mich. 311
Docket Number: 
Parties: SULLIVAN v. ROSS’ ESTATE.
Judges: Montgomery, Hooker, and Long, JJ., concurred with Moore, J.
Reporter: Michigan Reports
Volume: 113
Pages: 311–321

Head Matter:
SULLIVAN v. ROSS’ ESTATE.
1. Judgment — Res Judicata — Claims Against Estates.
The Supreme Court reversed a judgment in favor of one who had appealed to the circuit court from the disallowance by commissioners of his claim against a decedent’s estate, for error in permitting a recovery upon an alleged oral contract, when, as was found, claimant’s own evidence showed a contract in writing. Thereafter, permission to amend the pleadings so as to set up a breach of trust under the written contract was refused by the circuit judge, and mandamus to compel the allowance of the amendment was denied in the Supreme Court, without discussion of the merits. The claim sought to be so interposed was subsequently disallowed in the probate court, and an appeal was taken to the circuit. Held, that the effect of the previous decision was not to render the controversy res judicata, but merely to determine what should be the basis of the judgment, and that the denial of mandamus did not affect the issue.
3. Election of Remedies — Mistake.
While it is true that a person is bound by an election between two inconsistent remedies, one having a meritorious claim, who mistakes his remedy, and attempts to enforce it in an inappropriate action, wherein no recovery can be had, is not precluded thereby from resorting to his proper remedy.
3. Same — Deception oe Court — Public Policy — Estoppel.
The prosecution of a claim against a decedent’s estate for the purchase price of logs alleged to have been sold and delivered to decedent under an oral agreement, though carried on with knowledge that the claim as presented is unfounded, and with an intent to deceive the court by keeping it in ignorance of a written contract by which the relations of the parties are defined, will not, on grounds of public policy, estop the claimant from thereafter asserting his rights under the written contract, and from seeking a recovery based upon the breach of a trust thereby created. Grant,
C. J., dissenting.
4. Estates of Decedents — Presentation of Claims — Accounting —Equity.
A claim for an accounting against an estate on a contract creating a trust relation between claimant and decedent, where the transactions were all completed during decedent’s lifetime, and were of such a character that, had he lived, the entire controversy could have been settled in a court of law, maybe presented in probate court, without a resort to equity.
Error to Marquette; Stone, J.
Submitted January 13, 1897; original opinion, for affirmance, June 7, 1897. Rehearing granted April 5, 1898; reargued June 7, 1898;
final opinion, overruling the earlier one, September 20, 1898.
Thomas G. Sullivan presented a claim against the estate of James G. Ross, deceased. The claim was disallowed by the probate judge, and claimant appealed to the circuit court. From a judgment for defendant on verdict directed by the court, claimant brings error.
Reversed.
The facts, merits, and contention involved in this suit are fully stated and discussed in an exhaustive opinion by Chief Justice McGrath in 98 Mich. 570, which was concurred in by the entire court. After that opinion was rendered, the claimant made a motion in the circuit court for leave to amend his claim, based upon the theory that Ross & Co. had violated the agreement-of June 24th, and that “in the execution of the trust [ci’eated thereby] they did not exercise reasonable care, but, on the contrary, carelessly, negligently, and recklessly lost a portion of said logs, of the value of $40,000, and carelessly, negligently, and recklessly sawed the balance of said logs into lumber, whereby the lumber was worth $40,000 less than it would have been if said logs had been cut into lumber with reasonable care.” Other matters are set up in the motion, but the above quotation states the principal claim. This motion was denied by the circuit court for the following reasons:
‘ ‘ (1) In the exercise of the discretion which the court has to grant amendments for the furtherance of justice, I do not think that the ends of justice would be promoted, nor the cause of justice encouraged, to continue this litigation. Further, it seems to me that the Supreme Court has disposed of the case upon the merits, and that claimant is not in a position to better his standing in this court by an amendment of his claim.
“ (2) The claimant has elected his cause and remedy. He alleged and swore to a sale and delivery of these logs after the contract of June 24, 1884, was produced. He having pursued this remedy and course, the other is gone. Not only does the averment of a sale and delivery amount to a solemn admission of a fact, but the claimant’s testimony, often repeated, estops him from taking the position which he now, by amendment, seeks to assume. This cannot be permitted where the party has a choice of remedies or courses to take. Parties are bound by their written admissions made in the progress of a case, and cannot be permitted to repudiate them at pleasure. The same rule applies with equal force to the horses and other property.
“ (3) To grant this motion would be to allow the claimant to enlarge and change the case presented to the commissioners. The claim now proposed was never passed upon by the commissioners. They passed upon the question of a sale; not on the conduct of a trustee. This court has no original jurisdiction over claims against estates of deceased persons. Such cases must come on appeal from the probate court, and nothing can be tried in the circuit court that was not presented to the commissioners. I think that the Supreme Court of this State has gone far enough upon this branch of the case to warrant me in denying the motion on this ground. ”
Claimant then petitioned this court for the writ of mandamus to compel the circuit court to allow the amendment. An order to show cause was granted, and upon the hearing the relief prayed for was denied. No written opinion was filed. Claimant then filed the present claim in the probate court, setting up substantially the same claim that was made upon the motion for leave to amend in the circuit court. It was again disallowed by the probate court, and appeal taken to the circuit court, which directed a verdict and judgment for the defendant upon the ground that claimant was seeking a remedy utterly inconsistent with the remedy pursued in his former suit.
Moore & Moore (Ball & Ball and T. JS. Tarsney, of counsel), for appellant.
Clark & Péarl (John D. Conely, of counsel), for appellee.

Opinion:
Grant, J.
(after stating the facts). The circuit court was right in directing a verdict for the defendant.
The question was res judicata. The questions presented to the circuit court upon a motion to amend are precisely the same as those now presented. The court denied the amendment, whereupon the claimant filed his petition for a mandamus in this court. The questions were fully argued in briefs and orally, and the writ was denied, and the same reasons are now presented against the order of the court that were then presented.
Claimant in the former suit chose his remedy, and the law does not now permit him to assert another. Counsel cite several cases in support of the rule, about which there is no dispute, that "a judgment given against a plaintiff on the single ground that he has mistaken his remedy or form of action is no bar to his subsequent suit brought in the proper form." But these authorities do not cover the present case. Claimant presented his claim in the probate court upon the basis that he had sold his interest in these logs to Ross & Co. as 9,000,000 feet and at $,9 per 1,000. He was defeated, appealed to the circuit, where two trials were had. Whatever may be said about his knowledge of the contract of June 24th upon the hearing in the probate court and upon the first trial in the circuit, he had such knowledge upon the second trial, and still insisted upon a sale, — a claim for which we held there was not the slightest foundation. If upon that trial verdict had been against him, would he have been permitted to bring another suit, based upon the trust relation ? If he had set forth his claim in two counts in the declaration, one based upon the contract of sale, and the other based upon a breach of trust under the contract of June 24th, the court would, upon motion, have compelled him to elect upon which count he would proceed. If he had elected, and been beaten upon the count so elected, would the court then permit him to bring suit upon the other, count? Claimant stands in no better position than he would if he had put two such counts in his declaration. With full knowledge of all the facts, he deliberately chose his remedy, and put the estate to a very large expense .in his attempt to sustain his claim. It is not a case of a mistake in the remedy, but a deliberate choice of remedies. The law does not permit litigants to thus play fast and loose, especially with the estates of dead men, but leaves them to lie upon the beds of their own making.
Judgment affirmed.
The other Justices concurred.