Case Name: James W. Johnston, appellee, v. New Omaha Thomson-Houston Electric Light Company, appellant
Court: Nebraska Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Nebraska
Decision Date: 1907-01-05
Citations: 78 Neb. 24
Docket Number: No. 14,602
Parties: James W. Johnston, appellee, v. New Omaha Thomson-Houston Electric Light Company, appellant.
Judges: Oldham and Epperson, 00., concur.
Reporter: Nebraska Reports
Volume: 78
Pages: 24–32

Head Matter:
James W. Johnston, appellee, v. New Omaha Thomson-Houston Electric Light Company, appellant.
Filed January 5, 1907.
No. 14,602.
1. Negligence: Injury to Child. In an action for damages for personal injuries to an infant alleged to have been caused by the negligence of another, the foundation for recovery, if there is any, is not the tender years of the child, but the culpable negligence of the defendant.
2. -: Damages. In an action for damages for personal injuries alleged to have been inflicted by the negligence of another, a recovery can be had for such consequences only, of the act complained of, as ought reasonably and probably to have been anticipated to flow therefrom.
Appeal from the district court for Douglas county: Howard Kennedy, Judge.
Reversed.
Greene, Breckenridge, Matters & Einsler, for appellant.
T. W. Blackburn and R. 8. Horton, contra.
Rehearing allowed. See opinion, p. 27, post.

Opinion:
Ames, C.
This is an appeal from a judgment for damages for a personal injury to a son of the plaintiff, a lad 12 years of age.
There is a foot passage way or sidewalk along the side of a viaduct in the city of Omaha. On the outside of this walk, and along the edge of the viaduct, is an iron railing or fence 44 to 46 inches in height, and constructed of three horizontal rails connected with cross-pieces or lattice work. On the outside of this fence and fastened thereto, and to the substructure of the viaduct, a street railway company has erected and maintains trolley poles. From the outside of these poles brackets or arms are extended, and upon insulators at the ends of the arms wires are suspended for the carrying of currents of the defendant, which is an electric lighting company. The apparatus of the defendant was erected in compliance with regulations of the city authorities with' reference to the subject, and under the supervision of the city electrician. The distance to the wires from the top rail of the fence is not less than 18 and is perhaps 30 inches, much the greater weight of the testimony favoring the latter. On the occasion of the happening of the injury, the plaintiff's son and four other boys of about the same age approached the viaduct on foot for the purpose of crossing it, when one of them remarked that another boy, not then present, had received a shock some days before from a wire on one of the poles, which was designated. When the party had arrived at this place one of the boys climbed on the second or middle rail of the fence and proposed to grasp the wire, but was dissuaded from so doing by his companions. After that the plaintiff's son proposed that he would climb on the fence "and see if he could get a shock." All the other lads Avarned him against so doing, but he persisted, telling them to stand at one side, so that if, when he should touch the wire, he should fall he .Avould not hurt them, and after making a second attempt did succeed in touching the wire, from which he received the injury complained of. There is no evidence- with respect to the insulation of the Avire, except what may be inferred from the .circumstances just narrated, and none that the defendant, its agents or servants had any knowledge or notice of the previous occurrence mentioned by the boys, or that their apparatus was out of repair, if it was so. At the close of the trial the defendant asked a peremptory instruction in its behalf, which the court refused, and submitted the case to the jury, who returned a verdict for the plaintiff, from a judgment on which this appeal is prosecuted.
We think that the instruction ought to have been given. It does not appear that the defendant's structure was unskillfully or negligently made, or that it differed in any respect from such as are required by. the regulations and authorities of the city and áre in general use for like purposes elsewhere. If the wire lacked insulation it is not shown that that fact was known to the defendant or its employees, or had existed for so long a time that knowledge thereof by it or them may be presumed, or that want of knowledge was due to negligence. The wire was not within the public highway or so near thereto that travelers thereon were likely to come in contact with it, nor does it appear that any such persons had ever done so. The structure is not of such a character as to be obviously attractive to children or likely to be used by them as a plaything, nor does it appear that it ever was so used, except on the occasion under inquiry. The hearsay testimony about another boy having received a shock at another time is, of course, not evidence, and the event, if it happened, is not shown, even by hearsay, to have come to the notice of the defendant. Even if the wire was negligently allowed to remain insufficiently insulated, of which we think there is not sufficient evidence, the injury complained of is not such a one as could reasonably and naturally have been anticipated would result therefrom, and it is only for the natural and probable consequences of negligence that a person accused of it is responsible. Cole v. German Savings and Loan Society, 124 Fed. 113, and authorities cited; Stark v. Muskegon T. & L. Co., 141 Mich. 175; Powell v. New Omaha T.H. E. L. Co., 74 Neb. 280; City of Crete v. Childs, 11 Neb. 252. This rule is too well settled to require further citation of authority in its support, and we do not understand that it is at all interfered with or affected by the fact that a person who may accidentally suffer an injury is a child of tender years.
1. Negligence: Injury to Child. An ordinarily bright and intelligent boy twelve years old, living in a city in which electric light and power wires are in constant use on nearly all of the principal streets and highways, who, having knowledge of the danger but not of its extent, purposely takes hold of such a wire in order to obtain a shock, and is injured thereby, is, as a matter of law, guilty of contributory negligence.
2. - — : Damages. One who is negligent in a situation of danger, the existence and nature of which he knows, is not entitled to recover damages for an injury which his negligent conduct invites because such injury is greater than he anticipated.
We have not seen occasion for discussing the character and intelligence of the plaintiffs son, which, if there was evidence of negligence by the defendant, would ordinarily be a question for the jury. He showed a somewhat remarkable persistence in the pursuit of a known danger, and seems to have fully and accurately anticipated and appreciated the injuries likely to be, and Avhich were, consequent upon it, namely, a burning of his hand and a considerable shock to his nervous system. It appears to us at least doubtful if a person thus competent to judge of his own conduct, in connection. with known circumstances, can be excused from the charge of contributory negligence because of his youth. But in all such cases the foundation of a right of recovery, if there is any, is not the tender years of the plaintiff, but the culpable negligence of the defendant, which latter is in this case wholly unproved.
For the reasons given, we recommend' that the judgment of the district court be reversed and the cause remanded.
Oldham and Epperson, 00., concur.
By the Court: For the reasons stated in the foregoing opinion, it is ordered that the judgment of the district court be reversed and the cause remanded.
Reversed.