Case Name: STATE of Louisiana, Relator, v. Larry McNEAL, Respondent
Court: Louisiana Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1976-02-23
Citations: 337 So. 2d 178
Docket Number: No. 56872
Parties: STATE of Louisiana, Relator, v. Larry McNEAL, Respondent.
Judges: DENNIS, J., dissents and assigns reasons.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 337
Pages: 178–181

Head Matter:
STATE of Louisiana, Relator, v. Larry McNEAL, Respondent.
No. 56872.
Supreme Court of Louisiana.
Feb. 23, 1976.
On Rehearing Sept. 13, 1976.
William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Barbara Rutledge, Asst. Atty. Gen., J. Eddie Knoll, Dist. Atty., Jeannette Theriot Knoll, Asst. Dist. Atty., for plaintiff-relator.
W. Miguel Swanwick, Swanwick & Rivers, Alexandria, for defendant-respondent.

Opinion:
TATE, Justice.
The issue before us is whether Miranda rights may be intelligently waived by the accused's reading and signing a printed form, without any oral explanation of them by the interrogating officers to assure the accused's understanding of them.
The defendant is charged with aggravated battery, La.R.S. 14:34, arising out of an incident when a brick was thrown at and hit a motorcyclist passing on the road. The trial court granted his motion to suppress a written confession made by him after he was arrested and brought to the courthouse.
The trial court held that suppression of the statement was required by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). By this decision, the United States Supreme Court held that statements of an accused made under custodial interrogation will be regarded as involuntary and cannot be used against the accuse.d unless he is informed of his right to remain silent and of his right to the assistance of a lawyer. Nevertheless, "The defendant may waive effectuation of these rights, provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently." Miranda, at 394 U.S. 444, 86 S.Ct. 1612, 16 L.Ed.2d 707.
We granted certiorari, 320 So.2d 909 (1975), because we felt that the trial court was in error in its apparent ruling that an intelligent waiver cannot be made on the basis of reading a written statement of the rights, unless by oral explanation at the time the interrogating officers ascertain the accused's understanding of them.
We find no error in the trial court's factual finding that no oral Miranda warnings were given when the arresting officer .picked up the accused at the scene of the offense. Further, if the arresting police officer then asked the accused about his participation in the crime, we do not find from the evidence that the accused made any statement, exculpatory or inculpatory, at that time (nor, apparently, does the State contend that any was made at that time).
When the accused was brought to the courthouse, he was not orally explained his Miranda rights. However, he was handed a sheet which explained them, asked if he could read, then requested to read them, and then asked to check boxes ("Yes" or "No") whch indicated whether he understood his rights and wished to waive them.
The defendant took about two minutes to read the forms and, at the interrogating officers' request, checked the appropriate boxes. The defendant checked "Yes" that he understood the rights and "Yes" that he waived them.
The defendant conceded that he signed the form and the confession. He contends, however, that due to his nervous state, he could neither read nor understand his rights, although he did tell the police officers that he read and understood them. (He also denied making any checkmarks on the rights waiver, but we accept as preponderating the testimony of the two officers to the contrary, seemingly corroborated by the similarity of the pen stroke of the checks and the defendant's signature.)
All witnesses agreed that a deputy's wife wrote the confession from listening to the interrogation of the defendant, who was too nervous to write it himself. No evidence intimates that any coercion, threats, promises, or violence was used to obtain the confession. At the hearing, the defendant indicated understanding of the contents of the written explanation, but stated he was too nervous to do so at the time it was handed to him to read. He further contradicted both officers' testimony that he again read his rights, as printed on the form on which the confession was written, prior to signing the statement.
Basically, the defendant's contention is that because the police officers never told him or explained to him his Miranda rights, due to his nervous state his waiver of these rights was not knowing and intelligent.
We agree that an oral as well as written explanation of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and the Sixth Amendment right to counsel may be the most effective means of insuring that the defendant comprehends these rights. Nevertheless, we cannot agree with the trial court's determination that, in the absence of such oral explanation, the defendant in this case did not intelligently and knowingly waive these rights.
In Miranda, the Supreme Court expressly notes freedom in the procedure to be adopted for the protection of the privilege against self-incrimination as long as it is fully effective. Miranda at 384 U.S. 490, 86 S.Ct. 1636, 16 L.Ed.2d 732.
In the present case, the preponderance of the evidence shows that the defendant knew his rights, intelligently waived them, and voluntarily confessed. Even if defendant was not orally informed of his rights, his present contentions are belied by (1) his signatures on the rights waiver and confession and (2) his admission that he informed the officers that he read and understood his rights, combined with (3) the officers' testimony that they saw him reading the forms and that he indicated a comprehension of his rights, and- (4) the fact that he can read and write and has a twelfth grade education.
For these reasons, the trial judge erred in suppressing the written confession. We reverse this ruling, overrule the motion to suppress, and remand this case for further proceedings in accordance with law.
Decree
Motion to suppress overruled; case remanded for trial.
DENNIS, J., dissents and assigns reasons.