Case Name: State vs. Daniel Brown, John J. Swan and Michael Lynch
Court: Court of Oyer and Terminer of Delaware
Jurisdiction: Delaware
Decision Date: 1896-02
Citations: 2 Marv. 380
Docket Number: 
Parties: State vs. Daniel Brown, John J. Swan and Michael Lynch.
Judges: 
Reporter: Delaware Reports
Volume: 16
Pages: 380–423

Head Matter:
State vs. Daniel Brown, John J. Swan and Michael Lynch.
New Castle County,
February Term, 1896.
Homicide. Manslaughter.—Manslaughter is the killing of a human being without malice, but under such circumstances as cannot render it wholly innocent, or excusable or justifiable in law.
Homicide. Murder of the Second Degree.—Where one kills another without any, or without any considerable provocation, when the killing in done, or the mortal wound is inflicted with a deadly weapon, or arises from any unlawful act of violence, from which the law raises the presumption of malice, the crime is murder of the second degree.
Homicide, Insanity.—-In the management of an asylum for the insane, so much force must be used in each particular case as may be necessary to enforce and maintain wholesome discipline and sanitary regulations.
Same. —The law will not measure with extreme nicety or exact calculation, just how much force the attendant in an asylum for the insane may use, provided he acts reasonably and without intentional cruelty or viciousness.
Indictment. Grand Jury. Pleading. Arrest of Judgment.—Where an indictment was found by a grand jury, sitting, as such, in and for the Court of Oyer and Terminer, and no order to summon a grand jury was contained in the precept for holding the Court, but a direction to summon a grand jury was written on the margin of the precept by the Clerk oi the Court, upon the verbal order of the Chief Justice, and no plea of abatement was entered but the case proceeded to trial and verdict; held, by a divided Court, that the objection was waived by failure to plead in abatement and a motion in arrest of judgment would not be entertained.
Practice. Witness. Division of Opinion.—In the Court of Oyer and Terminer where the Court is equally divided upon an objection to the competency of a witness, the objection fails and the witness may testily. So where the Court is divided upon a motion for a new trial or in arrest of judgment the motion fails.
Practice. Post Mortem Examination.—An application before indictment, on behalf of persons held, upon a charge óf murder, to await the action of the Grand Jury, for leave to have an examination made of a portion of the body of the deceased, in the possession of the Coroner and subject to the control of the Attorney-General, will not be granted.
Practice. Witness. Cross-examination.—Where several defendants in a case in the Court of Oyer and Terminer have different counsel, one for each defendant separately represented will be premitted to cross-examine witnesses for the State.
Practice. Jury. Challenge,—Where the peremptory challenges allowed to the State are waived and the exercise of the right of challenge by the defendant causes Vacancies in the jury as previously drawn, the right of challenge on behalf of the State may still be exercised with respéct to persons drawn to fill such vacancies.
Witness. Stenographer. Privileged Communications. Public Policy,—A stenographer employed by the Attorney-General to assist in preparing a case for trial will not be permitted to disclose facts coming to his knowledge in the course of said employment. Such communications are privileged and the disclosure of them is against public policy.
Practice. Judgment, Sentence.—After a conviction of manslaughter and denial of a motion in arrest of judgment by a divided Court, judgment passes as a matter of course, and sentence will be pronounced without a motion for judgment on behalf of the State.
Practice, Jury. Verdict. Sunday.—Where the Court has taken a recess on Saturday without an adjournment and the jury comes into Court on Sunday, having reached an agreement, by consent the verdict may be taken by the Clerk on that day, and formally entered by order of the Court on the following day.
Practice. Jury." -On the trial of an indictment for murder in the second degree the jury will not be permitted to separate.
Insanity. Witness.—Where a witness had been, at the time of the commission of the act which was in question in the trial, an inmate of an insane asylum, duly committed thereto, under the statute, on a certificate of two physicians, held, by a divided Court, that that fact did not per se render him incompetent as a wit- . ness.
Same. Burden of Proof.—Where objection is made to the competency of a witness on the ground of insanity, the question of competency is to be determined exclusively by the Court, and the burden of proof is on the party, who makes the objection, to sustain it.
The defendants, Daniel Brown, John J. Swan and Michael Lynch were indicted for murder in the second degree, upon the charge of killing Leon Pisa, an inmate of the Delaware Hospital for the insane at Farnhurst. The first and second counts of the indictment charged that all three of the prisoners feloniously assaulted Leon Pisa, the deceased. In the first count it was charged that the mortal wound was inflicted by Daniel Brown ; in the second count, by John J. Swan, while the other two prisoners were aiding and abetting in the murder as accomplices. It appeared at the trial that on the fifth day of October, 1895, between eight and nine o’clock in the morning, at the Delaware State Hospital for the Insane, at Farnhurst, in New Castle County, Leon Pisa, an inmate of the asylum, died from injuries received at that time. The State produced evidence to prove that the prisoner Brown, aided by one Thomas Oakes, took the deceased from the west end of the corridor, to the bath-room door in the east end of corridor C to bath him; that he was there stripped by Brown, thrown down with violence upon the floor; jumped on and punched by the knees of Brown, and kicked in the side by Swan. That his skull over the temporal bone on the right side of the head was fractured and crushed, the ninth and tenth ribs on the right side were broken in two. That Brown and Swan then roughly picked him up from the floor, Brown pushing him through the door into the bath-room and down upon the floor; that they were then joined by Lynch, who stripped off the clothing of the deceased, and, aided by Swan, threw him roughly into the bath tub. That death resulted from the injuries thus received. .
The defendants, on the other hand, offered evidence to prove that Pisa was not maltreated. That under the rules of the institution it was necessary to bathe him, and to use so much force as was reasonably necessary to effect that purpose ; this being essential to the maintenance of discipline and the sanitary regulations of the asylum. That Pisa violently resisted the attempt to bathe him. That at the bath-room door he seized Brown by the throat and a violent struggle there ensued. When Pisa’s grip was broken, he was much exhausted; was lifted up aud pushed inside the bathroom door, walked to the end of the bath-tub, there reeled, fell and received the injuries which caused his death. That he was stripped of his clothing by Lynch, aided by Swan ; placed in the bath tub, but did not revive; that his body was then taken out, dried and carried across the corridor practically dead. That in the .transaction no more force was used than was absolutely necessary.
At the trial the following questions were passed upon.
H. H. Ward and Andrew C. Gray, for Daniel Brown and John J. Swan, two of the defendants who were held upon the charge of murder, to await the action of the Grand Jury, made an application to the Court, before indictment found, stating that the heart of the deceased was in the possession of the Coroner of New Castle County, and under the control of the Attorney General, and that an expert analysis and examination of it was material to the defence, and asked for an order on the Coroner and the Attorney General to produce said heart (it not to be taken from the custody of the Coroner or any person designated by the Attorney General), to be examined in order that their expert might testify in the case intelligently.
Lore, C. J. We refuse to make the order at this time. The parties have not yet been indicted, and there is no case before this Court.
Subsequently, Walter H. Hayes, for Michael Lynch, one of the defendants, stated to the Court that there was no rule in the Court of Oyer and Terminer, as there was in the Superior Court, as to the examination and cross-examination of witnesses; that in this case he and Mr. John K. Bradford represented Michael Lynch, while Messrs. Ch'ay and Ward represented the other two defendants, Brown and Swan. He asked that one of the counsel for Lynch, and also one of the counsel for Brown and Swan be allowed by the Court to cross-examine the State’s witnesses.
It was so ordered by the Court.
Under the statute law the State is entitled to three challenges and the prisoners to six. While empanelling the jury, White, Attorney General, waived his right to challenge three times, but exercised it upon the jurors called to fill the vacancy made by the fourth challenge of the defendant, claiming the right to challenge any objectionable man that might be placed in the box by reason of the exercise of any or all of the last three challenges to which the defense were entitled.
This was objected to by Hayes and Ward, for the prisoners, who contended that the State could not reserve its challenges, that having passed them three times, it had thereby exhausted the number of challenges to which it was entitled, just the same as if the right of challenge had been exercised in each case. They cited the unreported case of State vs. Farra, as to which there was difference of recollection among the members of the Bar.
Lore, C. J. There is doubt about the ruling in the Farra case, and we think we should rule upon this matter. The rule applying in civil cases is that each counsel has an opportunity to pass upon the whole jury, except the last challenge, and if he passes his right to challenge, there is reason why he should forfeit that right. But here we are confronted with the peculiar case of one party challenging six, and the other only three. The reason which would sustain the rule in a civil case does not hold here, because as we explained, there, (excepting the last man) each side passes upon the entire jury; but here, under the contention, the State could pass only upon nine jurors and the other three men are put in the box irrespective of the right of the State to say whether they are proper men or not. The reason ceases; and I should be very unwilling to be bound by such a precedent as that cited, unless it was perfectly clear. We therefore rule that the State may exercise its right to challenge after it has waived its right three times, but not upon any juror who is in the box at the time of the waiver. The Attorney General may now exercise his right to challenge the juror called since he passed his challenge.
White, Attorney General, here stated to the Court that it had been the practice in Sussex County, in a case of murder in the second degree not to allow the jury to separate, but to keep them together under the charge of a bailiff, until the verdict was rendered, and asked that such an order might be made in the present case. Counsel for defendants neither opposed nor assented, but stated that it was a matter for the discretion of the Court.
Lore, C. J. A majority of the Court think that in felonies of as high a grade as murder in the second degree, the jury ought not to separate.
David M. Waples, being produced by the State as a witness, was objected to by the counsel for the defense on the ground of incompetency to testify by reason of insanity.
Dr. Hiram R. Burton, a witness produced by the defense, testified that he had been a practising physician for about twenty-eight years, but that he was not an expert or specialist in insanity. He proved the execution of a certificate, dated June 5,1895, signed by himself and Dr. J. W. Marsh, whose signature was • admitted, upon which the witness, David M. Waples, was admitted to the Hospital for the Insane at Farnhurst.
The certificate was offered in evidence and was admitted as such for the Court, upon the question of competency, but not for the jury.
Dr. Burton then testified further that the certificate was in his judgment a true statement of the mental condition of David M. Waples at the time of its date. On cross-examination, by the Attorney-General, he gave a detailed statement of the physical and mental condition of the proposed witness prior to the making of the certificate. The history of the case satisfied him that the mental condition of Waples “ had not been right for a good while.” The witness testified that the information from his family was that he had been acting strangely, and that he was very violent, and even vicious at times. The effect upon him at stated periods or irregular periods, was that he neglected his business without apparent reason, and having first complained of severe pains in his head became violent so that his family, including his wife, were afraid to stay in the house with him. On the first visit, the witness, being unable to go immediately, saw Waples and talked with him but did not “ think that he was a proper subject to be sent to Farnhurst.” The witness was told that the paroxysm had passed, but it was much desired by the family that he should see the patient in one of them. Accordingly, in four or five days he went again, and found Waples not quite so well and his mind was a little out of balance • but still the witness did not form an opinion at that visit. He made as much inquiry as possible, and told them that he would prefer to wait. In three or four days more he made a third visit and found him “ unmistakably deranged.” He thought that the disorder was caused by nocturnal epilepsy; that Waples “ would have convulsions in the night and no one know anything about it, as he was in the habit of sleeping by himself, and that was the cause of the mental disturbance; and I was very firmly convinced that he was a proper subject for treatment in a hospital, or at Farnhurst, and so gave that certificate.”
The witness testified further as to symptoms and mental delusions from which the patient suffered, and said that the commitment to Farnhurst was for insanity not for physical treatment j that in his judgment the mental disease grew out of epilepsy. Neither at the time the witness gave the certificate, nor the last time he saw him would he say that Waples was capable of giving an account of what might happen before him in his presence; at other times witness saw him there was nothing conclusive; he had pain but no fever and did not talk intelligently in answer to questions. At these visits he could understand what was going on in his presence and give an account of it, and, added the witness, “ had I not known the man and his history, I should have taken as correct anything that he told me.” “ I don’t say that I thought he was perfectly sane at all of those other times; I was in doubt about it.” In reply to a question from the Court the witness said that at the time of the certificate, the insanity did not manifest itself in any special manner, it was a general mental disturbance.
Dr. John H. Hammond, a witness called on behalf of the defendant, testified that he was assistant physician at the Delaware State Insane Asylum at Farnhurst; that David M. Waples was a patient there on October 5, 1895, and had not been discharged but allowed to go home on parole about the night before Thanksgiving. It was the custom very often where cases were not considered dangerous to let their people take them away. In the opinion of the witness while Waples was in the institution and when he left it, reliance could not be placed upon his memory and judgment. Not having seen him to talk to him since he left the asylum, he declined to express an opinion as to his condition at the time of the trial. On cross-examination the witness characterized the form of insanity, when Waples came to the asylum, as primary dementia, and expressed the opinion that while there he was not capable of giving an intelligent or correct account of anything which occurred in his presence,as to his mental condition at the present time the witness de dined to express an opinion. On the redirect examination the witness said that from his knowledge of the case and of the condition of Waples while he was in the asylum, the witness would not think that he was in a condition to give a correct account at the trial of what happened while he was in the asylum.
David M. Waples being called for the purpose of being interrogated with a view of determining his sanity, Hayes, for the prisoners, objected to his being sworn.
Lore, C. J. In examining a witness as to his competency, it is not proper to swear him. The objection is sustained.
The witness was then examined and cross-examined at length. He testified that he was fifty-four years of age, that he understood the obligation of an oath and believed in God, he was a member of church and attended service when practicable; he went to Farnhurst June 6th, and left November 20th, going home with his son who came after him; he never had any trouble at the asylum; he remembered when Dr. Burton called to see him; his trouble at that time was pain in the head, he had been working in truck during some very hot days and the sun overcame him and caused neuralgia in the head ; he had been sunstruck when he was twenty-one years of age. He went to Farnhurst by train with Dr. Orr, and also returned by an express train which was stopped at the request of the doctor at the asylum. He narrated intelligently and in detail the circumstances of his arrival at Farnhurst, and also other circumstances affecting himself referred to by date.

Opinion:
Lore, C. J.
We are equally divided upon this question. Judge Cullen and I are clearly of the opinion that this witness ought not to testify. According to the statute law of this State, he has been proven to be insane, and as such has been committed to the Insane Asylum of the State of Delaware, at Farnhurst, where he was received as such and for a time confined. Finding that he was not violent and therefore could be safely left to the care of his family, he was permitted to go home upon parole and has been there for some time.
Insanity once proved, is presumed to continue until it is removed beyond a donbt. This was decided some years ago in the well contested case of State vs. Thomas, where Thomas was charged with killing his little daughter. He was proved by several physicians, in their judgment, to be insane a short time—one or two days—before. Chief Justice Comegys maintained that not withstanding he may have been. insane at that time, unless he was insane at the time of the commission of the act, and so proved, the criminal incapacity would be removed.
On behalf of the prisoner it was contended with great force that insanity once proved, the cloud remains and must be rebutted with positive testimony, and after a most elaborate argument and against the personal conviction of Chief Justice Comegys, the Court so ruled.
Such in this case is the status upon the facts, of these men before us and such is the law governing it. Two witnesses, competent, skillful physicians of this State, under the law, committed the witness as insane. One of the physicians in charge of the institution says he was not discharged as a sane man, and his opinion is that the insane condition remains to this day, so as to unfit him to give a correct statement of what occurred. These men are being tried not for their lives, but upon a charge in which the penalty is imprisonment for life, if found guilty.
I am not willing, where that cloud once exists, unless it is clearly removed, that any man's life or any man's liberty should depend upon such testimony.