Case Name: PEOPLE v. JACOBSEN
Court: Michigan Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1994-05-16
Citations: 205 Mich. App. 302
Docket Number: Docket No. 151849
Parties: PEOPLE v. JACOBSEN
Judges: Before: Holbrook, Jr., P.J., and Fitzgerald and Taylor, JJ.
Reporter: Michigan appeals reports; cases decided in the Michigan Court of Appeals.
Volume: 205
Pages: 302–311

Head Matter:
PEOPLE v. JACOBSEN
Docket No. 151849.
Submitted September 13, 1993, at Lansing.
Decided May 16, 1994, at 9:35 a.m.
Leave to appeal sought.
Sheri L. Jacobsen pleaded guilty in the Grand Traverse Circuit Court of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, third offense, and was sentenced to a prison term of forty to sixty months. The defendant had moved for appointment of an expert witness at public expense for the purpose of testimony concerning the reliability of Breathalyzer test results where there was a delay in the administering of the. test, in the hope of supporting her claim that the test had not been administered within a reasonable time after her arrest. The defendant also moved to suppress the Breathalyzer results. The court, Phillip E. Rogers, Jr., J., denied the motions, stating that the defendant had failed to make a prima facie showing of the reasonableness of the request for an expert witness, as required by MCL 775.15; MSA 28.1252. The defendant appealed.
The Court of Appeals held:
1. A trial court must appoint an expert witness for an indigent defendant at public expense where the defendant makes a sufficient showing that the defense cannot safely proceed to trial without the proposed witness. Because this indigent defendant could not have proceeded safely to trial without the appointment of an expert witness to testify concerning the reliability of the Breathalyzer results, the defendant made a sufficient showing that appointment of an expert witness was necessary. Accordingly, it was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to refuse to appoint the requested expert witness.
References
Am Jur 2d, Criminal Law § 1006; Expert and Opinion Evidence §§ 19, 272.
Right of indigent defendant in criminal case to aid of state by appointment of investigator or expert. 34 ALR3d 1256.
Right of indigent defendant under Rule 17(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure to appearance of witnesses necessary to adequate defense. 42 ALR Fed 233.
2. Because a remand for further proceedings is required, it is unnecessary to address the defendant’s sentencing issues.
Reversed and remanded.
Taylor, J., dissenting, stated that, by statute, a defendant seeking appointment of an expert witness must establish that the defense cannot proceed safely to trial without the proposed witness. The defendant’s mere claim that the witness was necessary, without showing what the testimony of the witness would be and how it would benefit the defense, fails to establish a nexus between the facts of the case and the request for the expert witness. The majority has converted the statute’s discretionary determination of the trial court into a mandate on the trial court.
Criminal Law — Expert Witnesses — Indigent Defendants — Judicial Discretion.
It is an abuse of discretion for a trial court to refuse to appoint at public expense an expert witness who could testify concerning Breathalyzer results where an indigent defendant is seeking to suppress as evidence those results on the basis that the test was not administered within a reasonable time of the defendant’s arrest and, therefore, that the results are not reliable (MCL 775.15; MSA 28.1252).
Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Thomas L. Casey, Solicitor General, Dennis M. LaBelle, Prosecuting Attorney, and Alan R. Schneider, Chief Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for the people.
Robert L. Levi, for the defendant.
Before: Holbrook, Jr., P.J., and Fitzgerald and Taylor, JJ.

Opinion:
Holbrook, Jr., P.J.
Defendant pleaded guilty in the Grand Traverse Circuit Court of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, third offense, MCL 257.625(6); MSA 9.2325(6), and was sentenced to forty to sixty months' imprisonment. Defendant appeals as of right. We reverse and remand.
At approximately 8:30 p.m. on July 30, 1991, a state police officer arrested the defendant, suspecting that she was driving while intoxicated. The state police officer took defendant to a state police post and then to a county jail. At the jail, a deputy sheriff administered the first Breathalyzer examination of defendant at 10:02 p.m., and it revealed that defendant's blood alcohol content was 0.17 percent. A second Breathalyzer examination of defendant was taken at 10:11 p.m. and it revealed that defendant's blood alcohol content was 0.18 percent.
Defendant's court-appointed attorney moved for the appointment and payment of an expert witness to testify concerning the reliability of the test results in light of the delay between the time of the initial stop of defendant and the administering of the tests, the rate of alcohol metabolism, and other factors. Defendant's attorney also moved to suppress the results of the Breathalyzer tests. The trial court denied the motions, stating in part that defendant failed to present a "prima facie showing" of the reasonableness of the request for an expert witness. The trial court stated that it had no special knowledge regarding the metabolism of alcohol in the human body or how the delay in administering the tests was unreasonable.
On appeal, defendant first argues that the trial court erred in denying her motion for the appointment and payment of an expert witness to challenge the reliability of the Breathalyzer tests. We note that this issue was preserved by defendant's conditional plea. MCR 6.301(C)(2); People v Reid, 420 Mich 326; 362 NW2d 655 (1984). This Court reviews a trial court's decision whether to appoint an expert witness for an abuse of discretion. In re Attorney Fees of Klevorn, 185 Mich App 672, 678; 463 NW2d 175 (1990).
In order to have the trial court appoint an expert witness for an indigent defendant at public expense, the defendant must show "to the satisfaction of the judge presiding over the court wherein such trial is to be had . . . [that] he cannot safely proceed to a trial [without the proposed witness]." MCL 775.15; MSA 28.1252; People v Miller, 165 Mich App 32, 47; 418 NW2d 668 (1987), (On Remand) 186 Mich App 660; 465 NW2d 47 (1991). We believe that this indigent defendant could not have safely proceeded to trial without the appointment of an expert witness to testify about the reliability of Breathalyzer tests following a delay between the time of arrest and the administering of the test.
The results of Breathalyzer tests are admissible as evidence provided the prosecution meets four foundational requirements: (1) the operátor administering the test is qualified; (2) the proper method or procedure was followed in administering the test; (3) the test was performed within a reasonable time after the arrest; and (4) the testing device was reliable. People v Kozar, 54 Mich App 503, 509, n 2; 221 NW2d 170 (1974). This Court in Kozar, supra at 508, further held:
[A] defendant's blood alcohol content at the time of the offense should be regarded as equivalent to his blood alcohol content as determined by a subsequent chemical test provided such test was administered within a reasonable time after the defendant's arrest. [Emphasis added.]
The reasonableness of the time between the defendant's arrest and the administering of the test is particularly important in the present case, because the defendant was charged with ouil, third offense, an offense punishable by imprisonment for up to five years. MCL 257.625(6)(d); MSA 9.2325(6)(d); see also People v Krulikowski, 60 Mich App 28; 230 NW2d 290 (1975). We further note that the defendant indeed was sentenced to forty to sixty months' imprisonment.
In People v Schwab, 173 Mich App 101; 433 NW2d 824 (1988), the prosecution argued that the trial court erred in determining that the Breathalyzer test results were not sufficiently probative of the defendant's blood alcohol level at the time of his arrest because of the delay in administering the tests. This Court held that the decision whether a sufficient foundation has been laid for the admission of the evidence, including the reasonableness of the time between the arrest and the time of administering the test, is left to the discretion of the trial court. Id. at 103.
In the present case, defendant filed a motion for the appointment of an expert witness in order to challenge the foundational requirement of reasonableness in the delay between the time of arrest and the time of administering the tests. Defendant argued that the delay was unreasonable because it rendered the test results unreliable. Accordingly, the defendant asked for the appointment of an expert to testify with respect to this issue. However, the trial court denied the request, reasoning that defendant failed to make a sufficient offer of proof of the delay's unreasonableness.
In effect, the trial court placed the proverbial cart before the horse by recognizing that the delay in administering the test might affect the test's accuracy in denoting defendant's blood alcohol level at the time she operated her car and yet disallowing defendant the opportunity to show how the circumstances rendered the test results unreliable. Although the prosecution is not required to relate the blood test results back to the time of the improper driving, Kozar, supra at 508, the time between the arrest and the administering of the test must be reasonable to ensure that the test results accurately reflect the defendant's blood alcohol content at the time she was arrested. Indeed, in Schwab, supra at 103-104, the trial court heard extensive testimony from experts from both sides pertaining to the reasonableness of the delay in administering the Breathalyzer tests. In addition, this Court in Kozar, supra at 509, stated that a defendant may introduce into evidence expert witness evidence interpreting the results of the Breathalyzer test as it relates to the time of the arrest.
Because the trial court should consider the evidence, including the metabolism of alcohol and absorption rates, concerning the reliability of the Breathalyzer test results when exercising its discretion to determine whether the test was performed within a reasonable time after the arrest, we believe that the trial court is required to appoint an expert witness on this matter for an indigent defendant. Contrary to the opinion of the dissenting judge, we believe that the Legislature does require a defendant to show that the facts of the case warrant appointing an expert witness. We conclude that the defendant in the case sub judice provided sufficient evidence to require the trial court to appoint an expert witness by showing that the delay was unreasonable and, as a result, the Breathalyzer did not give a reliable indication of her blood alcohol content at the time of the offense. Absent a showing that the delay was unreasonable, the trial court retained the discretion to deny the request for an expert witness. See Schwab, supra at 104-105. The dissenting judge concludes that our decision results in a policy disaster, because it will impede the disposition of criminal matters on the merits. On the contrary, we believe it to be sound public policy to require the appointment of an expert witness to an indi-, gent defendant where it has been shown that the Breathalyzer test results might be unreliable because of the delay between arrest and the administering of the test and where the trial court admits that it has no special knowledge to decide the issue. Thus, the trial court in this case abused its discretion in denying the indigent defendant's motion for the appointment of an expert witness.
Given our resolution of the defendant's first issue, it is unnecessary for us to address the sentencing issues she raises on appeal.
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.
Fitzgerald, J., concurred.