Case Name: American Fidelity Fire Ins. Co. v. Winfield
Court: Arkansas Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Arkansas
Decision Date: 1955-05-30
Citations: 225 Ark. 139
Docket Number: 5-688
Parties: American Fidelity Fire Ins. Co. v. Winfield.
Judges: Justices McFaddiN and George Eose Smith dissent.
Reporter: Arkansas Reports
Volume: 225
Pages: 139–145

Head Matter:
American Fidelity Fire Ins. Co. v. Winfield.
5-688
279 S. W. 2d 836
Opinion delivered May 30, 1955.
[Rehearing denied June 27, 1955.]
E. J. Butter, for appellant.
Fletcher Long, for appellee.

Opinion:
Robinson, J.
This is a suit brought by appellee Ethel Lee Winfield against appellant American Fidelity Fire Insurance Company to collect on a policy of fire insurance covering an automobile which was destroyed by fire.
The insurance company contends that notice and proof of loss were not given according to the terms of the policy. The cause was tried before the court sitting as a jury and there was a judgment for the policyholder in the sum of $700.00. It is further maintained by appellant that the judgment is excessive.
Appellee lives on a farm, owned by C. B. Walker, which is about one and a half miles south of Whitmore, Arkansas. In July of 1952, she bought an automobile from the McCall Chevrolet Company in West Memphis. The purchase was financed through the Mid-Continent Finance Company, and that company procured the policy of insurance. Appellee never had any contact with the insurance company except through the finance company, and the policy was sent to her by the finance company. For its services in connection with the sale of the policy, the finance company was paid a portion of the premium by the insurance company.
On the 4th day of July, 1953, Walker, appellee's landlord, borrowed her car to go down in the fields to inspect his crops. While on this trip the car caught fire and was destroyed. Mr. Walker, in behalf of appellee, undertook to notify the insurance company of the loss. He wrote to the finance company from whom appellee had received the policy in the first instance. Receipt of this letter was acknowledged. It appears from the evidence that he also wrote to the insurance company by sending a letter in accordance with the terms of the policy to the Central States Insurance Agency, 1 Brentwood Street, Clayton, Missouri. In this letter he requested that forms be furnished to make proof of loss. Although the insurance company contends this letter was not received, it was never returned to the sender.
Where a letter is properly mailed, it is presumed that it is received by the party to whom it was addressed, and that it reached him in due course of mail. Southern Engine & Boiler Works v. Vaughan, 98 Ark. 388, 135 S. W. 913; Ann. Cas. 1912D, 1062.
In Travelers Insurance Company v. Thompson, 193 Ark. 332, 99 S. W. 2d 254, this Court quoted from the Southern Engine & Boiler Works case as follows: ' ' ' This presumption could he rebutted by testimony that it was not in fact received, but the positive denial by plaintiff that same was received would not be sufficient, as a matter of law, to nullify the presumption of its receipt. Such testimony simply left the question as to the receipt of the letter for the determination of the jury under all the testimony adduced at the trial. ' ' '
Walker testified to the effect that he properly mailed the notice in accordance with the terms of the policy. This testimony, coupled with the presumption that it was received by the addressee, constitutes substantial evidence to sustain the court's finding that the notice was in fact received by the company.
It being determined that the company received notice of the loss, the next question that arises is: Did the insurance company's failure to acknowledge receipt of the notice of loss relieve the policyholder from furnishing proof of loss within the 60-day period provided by the policy?
When appellee received no reply to the letter written to the insurance company, she engaged an attorney to look after her interests. The attorney wrote to the insurance company at 7 Brentwood Street, Clayton, Missouri, the address given as the office of the insurance company's agent, but the name of the insurance company was given as the addressee instead of the agency. This letter was .unclaimed and returned to the attorney. He then notified the finance company as follows: "On July 7th, you wrote Mr. Walker that this claim should be taken up with the insurance carrier involved. A letter written by me to the address shown on the policy has been returned. Unless you can put me in touch with the company at once and some adjustment can be made of this loss, it will be necessary for Ethel to sue American Fidelity Insurance Company."
The finance company, which, had received part of the premium in the first instance as its commission in selling the policy to appellee, merely replied to the attorney that they thought an American Fidelity Insurance Company policy had been mailed to appellee. We do not reach the point, however, as to whether the finance company was acting as agent for the insurance company, because Walker's testimony was sufficient to make a jury question as to the insurance company's being notified directly.
The insurance company did not acknowledge receipt of the notification, and proof of loss was not furnished within the 60 day period as provided by the policy; but, in the circumstances, the company is not in a position to declare a forfeiture by reason of the failure of the policyholder to furnish proof of loss. On the subject of acts constituting waiver of proof of loss, it is said in Apple-man's Insurance Law and Practice, Volume 5, § 3633: "It has been stated that unless there is a bona fide attempt by the company to adjust a loss, there is a refusal to pay. Therefore, the mere effect of silence or inaction might be sufficient to excuse compliance. ' '
In Ward v. Pacific Fire Insurance Company, 115 S. C. 53, 104 S. E. 316, it is said: "While there was no express or unequivocal denial of liability during the period of time prescribed in the policy within which proofs of loss were to be and might have been furnished, yet defendant's silence, in the light of facts and circumstances, clearly warranted the inference that liability was and would be denied, as it was in fact denied, and plaintiff was warranted in so believing and in acting accordingly. . . . The company received the notice of loss in due time, and, in fairness, it should have notified plaintiff that he must furnish proofs of loss, as required by the policy, if it intended to pay the loss."
In the case at bar, the court, sitting as a jury, found from substantial evidence that the company received notice of the loss. Having received such notice, and failing to acknowledge it or request proofs of loss, the company could not declare a forfeiture because proofs of loss were not furnished.
As to the value of the car, Ben Few, Jr., an expert, testified that in his opinion the automobile was worth somewhere between $695.00 and $795.00. There was no other testimony on evaluation. The testimony given by Few was substantial evidence of a value of $700.00.
Affirmed.
Justices McFaddiN and George Eose Smith dissent.