Case Name: Ambrose Sperry et al., Respondents, v. Orin H. Reynolds, Appellant
Court: New York Commission of Appeals
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1875-05
Citations: 65 N.Y. 179
Docket Number: 
Parties: Ambrose Sperry et al., Respondents, v. Orin H. Reynolds, Appellant.
Judges: 
Reporter: New York Reports
Volume: 65
Pages: 179–195

Head Matter:
Ambrose Sperry et al., Respondents, v. Orin H. Reynolds, Appellant.
A constable’s return to a Justice’s Court summons was as follows: “ Served, copy left the 9th day of February, 1869.” Held, that the return was insufficient to show a legal service by copy, or to authorize the justice to proceed in the action in the absence of defendant.
Where the jurisdiction of a justice in an action depends upon the voluntary appearance of a party, such party may assail or defend against a judgment rendered against him by showing that he did not appear, or that the appearance of any one for him was unauthorized.
Where an appearance has been put in for a party by another person, the authority of the latter cannot be presumed, but must be made to appear in order to bind the party or to give the justice jurisdiction. (Lott, Ch. C., and Gray, C., dissenting.)
The provision of the Revised Statutes (1 R. S., 233, § 45) providing that the authority to appear in Justice’s Court by attorney must be proved unless admitted by the opposite party, was designed simply to protect the opposite party from an unauthorized appearance. A waiver of proof by such party cannot affect the rights of the party for whom the appearance is made. (Lott, Ch. C., and Gray, C., dissenting.)
Accordingly, held (Lott, Ch. C., and Gray, C., dissenting), where the record upon appeal from Justice’s Court showed no legal service of the summons, that defendant did not appear, but that one C. appeared for him, without showing any authority in the latter, that the record failed to show jurisdiction ¡and the judgment could not be sustained. (Lott, Ch. C., and Gray, 0., dissenting.)
The distinction in this respect between Justices’ Courts and courts of record having attorneys, pointed out.
It is not necessary in order to present upon appeal the point that the return to a summons in Justice’s Court is insufficient to give jurisdiction, or that it does not appear that the appearance of another person for defendant was authorized, that these grounds should be specifically stated in the notice of appeal; a general statement therein as a ground for appeal that the justice had no jurisdiction is sufficient. (Lott, Ch. C., and Gray, C., dissenting.)
Sperry et ad. v. Reynolds (5 Lans., 407) reversed.
(Argued January 7, 1875;
decided May term, 1875.)
Appeal from judgment of the General Term of the Supreme Court in the third judicial department affirming a judgment of the County Court of Cortland county, which affirmed a judgment, in favor of plaintiff, of a justice of the peace.
The return to the summons issued by the justice was as follows: “ Served, copy left the 9th day of February, 1869, by David Wallace, constable.” On the return day the plaintiffs appeared and complained. One Silas Crandall appeared and answered for defendant. There was no proof whether Crandall was or was not, in fact, authorized to appear for defendant. After the issue was joined, the cause was, by consent, adjourned from February eighteenth to March ninth. On the latter day the plaintiff again appeared, and no one appearing for defendant, they gave proof, and the justice gave judgment in their favor.
The defendant appealed to the County Court. In his notice of appeal, he stated, as one of the grounds of appeal, “ that the justice had no jurisdiction of the action or of the person of the defendant.”
Further facts appear in the opinions.
If. M. Waters for the appellant.
The justice did not obtain jurisdiction of defendant’s person by the appearance of Crandall for him. (42 N. Y., 41; Osborn v. Bk. U. S., 9 Wheat., 738, 741, 752, 829; 1 T. R, 62; 38 How., 417; 6 How. [U. S.], 163, 186; Am. L. Reg., May, 1866; 9 Abb. [H. S.], 1, 8, 9; 5 Fans., 411, 416.)
If. Ballard for the respondents.'
The justice obtained jurisdiction by the appearance of Crandall and the service of the summons. (2 R. S., 228, § 15 [o. p.]; id., § 18, subd. 2; id., 232, § 41; 233, § 45; Ackerman v. Finch, 15 Wend., 652; Armstrong v. Craig, 18 Barb., 387, 391.) The question whether Crandall was in fact authorized to appear is not before the court, because the notice of appeal does not state that he had no authority, and because it was not established that he appeared without authority. (Code, § 353, as amended in 1852; Fowler v. Milliman, 2 Hun, 408; Delong v. Brainard, 1 T. & C., 1; Nolan v. Page, id., Ad. 2; 2 Wait’s L. and Pr., 856; Code, § 366; Hurd v. Beeman, 8 How., 254; N. Y. and E. R. R. Co. v. Purdy, 18 Barb., 574; Roberts v. Burrell, 3 T. & C., 30; Miller v. Larmon, 38 How., 417.)

Opinion:
Earl, C.
The sole ground upon which defendant seeks a reversal of the judgment is, that it was not proved before the justice that Crandall was authorized to appear for him on the return day of the summons served by copy.
Suits may be instituted before justices of the peace, either by the voluntary appearance and agreement of the parties or by process. Suits instituted upon process by summons are considered as commenced when the summons is delivered to a constable for service, and suits instituted without process, at the time when the parties join issue. (2 R. S., 228, § 11, 12.) When a constable having a summons for service cannot find the defendant, he must serve the same " by leaving a copy thereof at the defendant's last place of abode, in the presence of some one of the family of suitable age and discretion, who shall be informed of its contents; " and after service, he must " return thereupon, in writing, the time and manner in which he executed the same, and sign his name thereto." (§§ 15, 16.) But mere service by copy does not give the justice jurisdiction of the person of the defendant, nor the right to try the action or render judgment therein. (2 R. S., 234, § 46; 2 Wait's Law and Pr., 55, 69, 12; 1 Cowen's Tr. [2d ed.], 504.) Here there was not even competent proof that the summons was ever properly served by copy. The only return signed by the constable was as follows : " Served, copy left the 9th day of February, 1869." The return does not state that the defendant could not be found. Such a return is insufficient to show a legal service, or to authorize the justice to proceed in the action in the absence of the defendant. (Bromley v. Smith,, 2 Hill, 517; 2 Wait, 72; 1 Cow. Tr., 503, 504.) Hence the justice did not obtain jurisdiction of the defendant unless it was obtained by the voluntary appearance of the parties and joining issue; and the sole question to be determined is, whether, from what appears in the record, we can say that the parties did appear and join issue.
In Justice's Courts there are no attorneys at law. All persons who appear there for parties are mere agents or attorneys in fact. The statute provides that any plaintiff or defendant, of lawful age, may appear in the suit by attorney. (2 R. S., 233, § 39, 41.) The authority to appear1 by attorney may be either written or verbal, and must in all eases be proved, unless admitted by the opposite party; and the justice must not permit any person to appear without such proof or admission. (§ 45.) This statute was not passed for the protection of a party for whom an attorney may appear, but for the protection of the opposite party, and hence that party can waive any proof of the attorney's authority. The plaintiffs did waive it in this case by not objecting to Crandall's authority to appear (Ackerman v. Finch, 15 Wend., 652), and hence they were concluded by his appearance. There is no statute requiring the justice to take any proof of the authority to appear, looting to the protection of the party for whom the appearance is made. His rights are left to rest upon a common-law basis.
In courts of record which have attorneys it has been held, for reasons of convenience and public policy, that a party may be bound by an unuathorized appearance of a responsible attorney. In those courts the attorneys are licensed as such, and are authorized to appear and represent parties in the court. They are, in a certain sense, officers of the court, and, to a certain extent, are under the control of the courts, which can exercise a coercive power over them ; and the courts can, in the action in which an unauthorized appearance has been put in, give a party such relief against it as he ought to have. (Denton v. Hoyes, 6 J. R., 296; Hamilton v. Wright, 37 N. Y., 502; Brown v. Hichols, 42 id., 26.) But the principle of these cases cannot be applied to courts which have no attorneys, in which any person may appear for a party and which have not power to administer relief in the action which is possessed by courts of record. My opinion is, that in all cases where the jurisdiction of the justice depends upon the appearance of a party, the party may show that he did not appear, or that the appearance of any one for him was unauthorized, and that he may thus assail or defend against the judgment entered against him. This is upon the principle that a judgment rendered against a party, of whose person no jm'isdiction was obtained, cannot be binding upon him. But while a party is not absolutely bound by an unauthorized appearance for him, the next question to be considered is, whether, when an appearance has been put in for a party in Justice's Court, it must be presumed to have been authorized. Such is undoubtedly the rule in courts of record which have attorneys. When an attorney appears there for a party the presumption is that he was authorized, and the party asserting that the appear anee was unauthorized must show it if he claims any relief on that account. But this is so for reasons applicable to such courts only. In Osborn, v. United States Bank (9 Wheat., 138) Chief Justice Marshall says, that the authority to appear must exist, " but its production has not been considered as indispensable. Certain gentlemen first licensed by government are admitted, by order of court, to stand at the bar with general capacity to represent all the suitors in the court. The appearance of any one of these gentlemen in a cause has always been received as evidence of his authority, and no additional evidence, so far as we are informed, has ever been required. This practice, we believe, has existed from the first establishment of our courts, and no departure from it has been made in those of any State or of the Union." These reasons are not applicable to the case of an appearance in Justice's Court by one acting as a mere agent or attorney in fact. Such an appearance must be governed by the general law of agency. If unauthorized, it does not bind the party; if authorized, the authority must appear. As said by Ch. J. Marshall in the case above cited: "Ho man has a right to appear as the attorney of another without the authority of that other. In ordinary cases the authority must be produced, because there is, in the nature of things, no 'prima faeie evidence that one man is in fact the attorney of another." In all ordinary cases where one man is-sought to be bound by the act of another who has assumed to act as his agent, the party seeking to hold him bound by such act must show the agency. We can perceive no reason for not applying the same rule to this case. The statute provides, that the parties may appear and join issue and thus confer jurisdiction; and hence, in such case the record must show that the parties did thus appeal*. What does this record show? It shows that the plaintiff appeared and that defendant did not appear in person, but that one Crandall appeared for him. The record shows no appearance by defendant without proof, in some form, that Crandall was authorized to represent him. This conclusion I believe to be in consonance with sound policy. It can cause no practical inconvenience. The opposite party or the justice can always require proof of authority to appear for an absent party, and thus the record will show an authorized appearance. A different conclusion would impose upon an innocent party, for whom an attorney has made an unauthorized appearance, the uncertain remedy of a suit against the attorney, and would in all cases place upon him the burden of showing a negative that the appearance was not authorized and would subject him to the hazard of paying a judgment of which he knew nothing until an execution was presented for its collection. For the reason, therefore, that this record does not show an appearance of this defendant before the justice by an authorized attorney so as to give jurisdiction of his person, I favor a reversal of all the judgments below, with costs.
Dwight, C.
The question in this cause is, whether, in case a summons issuing from a justice of the peace is served by copy, an appearance by some person in his behalf is such presumptive evidence of authority as to give the justice jurisdiction over the case.
The Revised Statutes (vol. 2, p. 228, § 15) provide that where the defendant shall not be found, the summons shall be served by leaving a copy thereof at the defendant's last place of abode, in the presence of some one of the family, of suitable age and discretion, who shall be informed of its contents.
The eighteenth section provides, in this case, that on the return day of the summons, if the defendant shall not have appeared or shown good cause for not appearing, the suit shall be deemed discontinued, unless a warrant, etc., against the defendant be issued on that day; and if so issued, the suit shall be deemed to have been continued thereby.
There was no continuance of the present action, unless there was a sufficient appearance by the defendant. The return of the justice on the appeal showed that the defendant did not appear in person, but that one Silas Crandall appeared for him, and that Crandall did not swear to his authority to appear for the defendant, and did not in any manner prove his authority to appear for the defendant in the action at the time of joining issue. By consent of the plaintiffs and Crandall, professing to act for the .defendant, the cause was adjourned from the return day, February 9, 1869, to March ninth. This adjournment, unless it was in fact assented to by the defendant, deprived the justice of jurisdiction over the cause, if he previously had any. (2 R. S., 288, § 67-69.) It did not appear that Crandall was an attorney and counselor at law. Under such circumstances can there be any presumption raised that this person was authorized to appear for the defendant, or is it essential to the jurisdiction of the justice that Crandall's authority should have appeared affirmatively ?
It must now be deemed to be established as law in this State that a judgment recovered in a court of record cannot be attacked collaterally for want of jurisdiction, though the defendant was not Served with process and had no knowledge of the suit, provided that an attorney appeared for him, not having authority. (Brown v. Nichols, 42 N. Y., 26.) This conclusion was arrived at on the authority of Denton v. Noyes (6 Johns., 296), by a bare majority of the court. The doctrine is in opposition to the ruling of the Supreme Court of the United States in Shelton v. Tiffin (6 How. [U. S.], 163). The decision of the court in Brown v. Nichols was not placed solely on the law of agency, but partly on grounds of public policy. It was, no doubt, as far as judgments concerning real property were concerned, rested largely upon the ground that if the judgment were made a nullity, it would be a great hardship to compel persons in tracing their titles through the records of the courts to inquire, in every instance where a judgment had been entered, into the particular authority which the attorney had to appear in such actions. (See p. 32.)
It is a very different question, however, whether a defendant wholly without fault ought not to be relieved in the same action in which the unauthorized appearance is had, by motion or other appropriate proceedings. Flo sound argument of public policy can be urged against such relief, where the rights of purchasers in good faith are not 'affected. This power of the courts should be exercised with much liberality, and with a desire to prevent the abuse or perversion of legal process. It is no good answer in such a case to say that the party injured by the unauthorized appearance has a legal remedy against the-attorney. This would be, in many instances, but a barren remedy. The pecuniary responsibility of the attorney is a matter of collateral inquiry, and cannot be properly considered by the court. This point was carefully examined in Bayley v. Buckland (1 Exch., 1). In that case the correct rule was held to be, that if the defendant has been served with process, and an attorney without authority appears for him, the court must proceed as if the attorney really had authority, because in that case the defendant having knowledge of his suit being commenced, is guilty of an omission in not appearing and making defence by his attorney. In other words, the plaintiff is without blame and the defendant is guilty of negligence. Even in that case, if the attorney were not solvent the defendant would be relieved on equitable terms. On the other hand, if the plaintiff, without serving the defendant, accepts the appearance of an unauthorized attorney for the defendant, he is not wholly free from the imputation of negligence. The defendant is wholly free from blame, and the plaintiff not so. On this last branch of the rule the court proceeded to set aside the judgment, execution and all proceedings subsequent to the summons, that having been personally served. See, to the same effect, Coxe v. Nicholls (2 Yeates, 546); Compher v. Anawalt (2 Watts, 490); Holker v. Parker (7 Cranch, 436); Critchfield v. Porter (3 Ohio, 518).
This want of authority may not only be raised by motion, but also by writ of error. The technical ground on which that goes is, that to be strictly regular a warrant of attorney must be filed and become a part of the record. If the attorney were in fact authorized that might be filed mmc pro twic, and the want of it would be cured after verdict by the statutes of jeofaAls. If he was wholly unauthorized he of course could not, on proper proceedings for the reversal of the judgment, file any such warrant, and the judgment must accordingly be reversed. (See Tidd's Practice.) Denton v. Noyes (6 J. R., 296) is, perhaps, opposed to these views. It has, however, been severely criticised as to the extent to which the doctrine there was carried. I see no good reason for following it. So far as it is adverse to a review of the proceedings in the same action, whether by motion or writ of error, see remarks of an able writer (Judge Dillon), in 5 American Law Register (N. S.), 392; Meacham v. Dudley (6 Wend., 514); Williams v. Van Valkenburgh (16 How. Pr., 144); Ellsworth v. Campbell (31 Barb., 134); Allen v. Stone (10 id., 541); Shelton v. Tiffin (6 How. [U. S.], 163); Price v. Ward (1 Dutcher, 225; 25 N. J. L. R.).
The ruling in the case of Denton v. Noyes should not, in any event, be applied in favor of the present plaintiff. That case is expressly put upon the ground that the party appearing was a licensed attorney, and that he was an officer of the court, and upon the great public inconvenience of holding the plaintiff bound to inquire into the attorney's authority. It was a rule intended for the government of proceedings in a court of record, and applied to officers over whom that tribunal has summary authority. There are no reasons in favor of extending such a rule to the inferior courts where attorneys at law do not necessarily appear for a client, but where any person of sufficient judgment and discretion, without an attorney's license, may represent either of the parties. In such a case, where a summons is served by copy, the authority of the attorney should be made to appear affirmatively in some appropriate manner. Mr. Parsons, in his work on contracts, volume 1, pages 113, 114, makes this distinction, in substance, between the appearance of an attorney at law, and one in fact, holding in the one case that the authority may be presumed, and in the other that it must be proved, if required.
If these views are correct, the defendant was not bound to object, nor to attend on the return day, nor to take any steps whatever. He was only under such an obligation in case of personal service. . The question then recurs, can Crandall, by his own unauthorized act, put the defendant in a position where he is bound to object? I think not. The ease must be governed by the usual rules of agency. Nothing is better settled than that a person cannot, by his own acts, make himself an agent. The true inquiry always is, what has the principal done to authorize the agent's acts? It is, however, said that the question is not before the court, first, because it is not stated in the notice of appeal as a ground of error that Crandall appeared without authority; and, second, that the notice of appeal refers to errors of fact to be established by affidavits to be hereafter served, and no such affidavits were served.
These objections are untenable. This was a question of law. If the proof of the authority must appear affirmatively, the justice had no jurisdiction. This was expressly stated in the notice as a ground of appeal. It was wholly unnecessary to establish any errors in fact; and the notice of appeal, in that aspect, simply contained superfluous matters.
This case is reviewable by this court, as the error is apparent on the face of the proceedings. A motion for a new trial could, of course, not be made before the justice. The error is subject to correction at every stage of the appeal
These conclusions are not affected by the provisions of 2 Revised Statutes, 233, section 45. That section provides that " the authority to appear by attorney may be written or verbal, and shall in all cases be proved, either by the attorney himself or other competent testimony, unless admitted by the opposite party; and the justice shall not permit any person to appear for another without such proof or admission." This clause, from its terms, was manifestly designed, in the main, to protect the opposite party to the action from unauthorized appearances. A waiver by that party cannot affect the rights of the person for whom such an appearance is made. On general principles of law, the court gained no jurisdiction over the defendant, except from a personal service of the summons, or from his appearance. This appear anee must be the defendant's own act, and the statute above cited was not designed to affect that rule. Its general intent rather is to protect the rights of an opposing party in all cases, whether the court has jurisdiction or not; and to give him information whether the opposite party is legally present, so as to justify adjournments and other steps in the cause whose validity may depend on the presence or assent of a party.
The judgment of the court below should be reversed, with costs.