Case Name: Leon JOSEPH, etc., et al., Petitioners, v. Edward S. QUEST, et al., Respondents
Court: Florida Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1982-04-29
Citations: 414 So. 2d 1063
Docket Number: No. 60237
Parties: Leon JOSEPH, etc., et al., Petitioners, v. Edward S. QUEST, et al., Respondents.
Judges: SUNDBERG, C. J., and OVERTON, J., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 414
Pages: 1063–1065

Head Matter:
Leon JOSEPH, etc., et al., Petitioners, v. Edward S. QUEST, et al., Respondents.
No. 60237.
Supreme Court of Florida.
April 29, 1982.
Arnold R. Ginsberg of Horton, Perse & Ginsberg, and Hawkesworth & Sehmick, Miami, for petitioners.
Edward L. Magill of Magill & Reid, Miami, for respondents.

Opinion:
McDonald, justice.
The Third District Court of Appeal certified the following question as being of great public importance:
[Wjhether and under what circumstances an action for contribution lies against the parent of an injured child.
Quest v. Joseph, 392 So.2d 256, 262 n.12 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981). We have jurisdiction. We answer the question by holding that contribution is available against a parent to the extent of existing liability insurance coverage for the parent's tort against the child.
Ten-year-old Daren Joseph was struck by a car driven by Marion Quest. Leon Joseph sued the Quests in negligence both for himself and on behalf of his son Daren. The Quests, in turn, sued Daren's mother, Ellen, in a third party action alleging that Ellen Joseph's negligent supervision of Daren contributed to his injuries.
The jury returned for the plaintiffs in the amount of $150,000 for Daren and $17,000 for Leon Joseph. 'The jury apportioned liability as follows:
Leon Joseph 10%
Daren Joseph 10%
Marion Quest 55%
Ellen Joseph 25%
The trial court reduced Daren's and Leon's awards by their respective ten percent negligence apportionment and awarded them $135,000 and $13,600, respectively. The court then entered judgment against the third party defendant, Ellen Joseph, for twenty-five percent of the total judgment ($148,600), i.e., $37,150, The trial court withheld execution on the third party judgment pending satisfaction of the judgment in the main claim.
Quest appealed, charging that the trial court improperly apportioned the jury verdict and that the court should have allowed a setoff in the amount of the third party judgment. Joseph cross-appealed, challenging the court's entering judgment against his wife. The district court framed the issue as whether a defendant has a right of contribution against the parent of an injured child. Relying on Shor v. Paoli, 353 So.2d 825 (Fla.1977), the court concluded that such a right oí contribution exists but certified the question to this Court.
In Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So.2d 431 (Fla.1973), we established the rule of comparative negligence in this state and held that liability should be equitably apportioned on the basis of fault. Subsequent to Hoffman, the Florida Legislature enacted the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, which grants a joint tortfeasor the right to seek contribution from the other tortfeasors according to the relative degrees of fault.
In Shor v. Paoli we allowed a third party tortfeasor to obtain contribution from the co-tortfeasor spouse of the plaintiff. That case is limited to situations involving husbands and wives and allows the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act to control over interspousal immunity. However, we recognize a legal difference between the husband and wife relationship and that of parent-child. In the former, both are adults capable of bringing suit independently and with full knowledge of the financial relationship. Prior to the institution of any suit either or both spouses can examine the relative strength of their financial positions, including insurance coverage and other assets. They can also evaluate the likelihood of success in the litigation process. With all this they can decide together or as individuals whether or not to bring suit with the possibility of contribution by the other spouse.
The situation is completely different for a minor child, and we do not extend Shor to cases involving parental/family immunity. Minors and infants must bring suits through a representative, next friend, or guardian ad litem. Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.210(b). See Youngblood v. Taylor, 89 So.2d 503 (Fla.1956). Logically, an infant injured through the combined negligence of a parent and a third party would in most cases bring suit through his parents. If the parents feared possible liability through contribution then it would be their decision and not the child's to withhold suit.
Any award that the child received would be his and not a part of the family treasury. The parents would be responsible for using it for the child's welfare or holding the award in trust for the child until he reached the age of majority. And, of course, the parents could not use any of that money as a setoff for their liability. This fact alone can cause a chilling effect on the parents when considering whether to sue where their own negligence is a factor.
In Ard v. Ard, 414 So.2d 1066 (Fla.1982), this Court reaffirmed its adherence to parental/family immunity, but allowed a waiver of that immunity where there is liability insurance covering the action. Ard involved a suit by an unemancipated minor against one of his parents for injuries received when he was injured in an automobile accident. Therefore, because of our decision in Ard we now hold that contribution is available against a parent but only to the extent of existing liability insurance coverage for the parent's tort against the child. In so holding, we make no distinction between the type of negligence of the parent, whether active or passive, so long as it is cause of the injury.
We therefore quash the instant decision and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
SUNDBERG, C. J., and OVERTON, J., concur.
ADKINS, J., concurs specially with an opinion.
ALDERMAN, J., dissents.
BOYD, J., dissents with an opinion.
. Art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla.Const.
.We do not consider this issue, but leave it to the trial court to reexamine the apportionment on remand.
. § 768.31, Fla.Stat. (1975).
. Ch. 76-186, § 1, Laws of Fla., amending § 768.31(3)(a), Fla.Stat. (1975).
. If the parent is without liability insurance, or if the policy contains an exclusion clause for household or family members, then contribution will not be allowed against the co-tort-feasor parent.