Case Name: Succession of Franklin - Adelicia Acklen, and her minor child Emma, v. J. W. Franklin et al. trustees, &c.
Court: Louisiana Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1852-06
Citations: 7 La. Ann. 395
Docket Number: 
Parties: Succession of Franklin—Adelicia Acklen, and her minor child Emma, v. J. W. Franklin et al. trustees, &c.
Judges: 
Reporter: Louisiana Annual Reports
Volume: 7
Pages: 395–440

Head Matter:
Succession of Franklin—Adelicia Acklen, and her minor child Emma, v. J. W. Franklin et al. trustees, &c.
Depositions will not be rejected, on the ground that the cross questions were not answered;— where the cross questions were irrelevant to the issue, and of such a character as would have justified the district judge in erasing them from the records of his court. Host, J.
The domicil of origin continues until another is acquired, animo et facto. He who seeks to establish that another has changed his domicil, must prove it by express and positive evidence; so long as any reasonable doubt remains, the legal presumption is, that the domicil has not been changed. Host, J.
The law which fixes the domicil of a person at the place where his principal establishment is situated, means the principal domestic establishment; not that where he may have the largest portion of his fortune. Host, J.
Intention to reside, coupled with occasional residence of a few days in each year, is sufficient to continue the original domicil. Host, J.
The testator, a citizen of Tennessee, conveyed immovable property, situated in Louisiana, to his brothers, forever, in trust; the revenues to be employ edin establishing and maintaining an academy in Tennessee, as particularly set forth in the will. He directed also that, after the death of his brothers, (the trustees,) the trusts should be continued, andpass overforever in the heirs of his said brothers, to pass the estate; and that the magistrates of the county court of the county of Sumner and State of Tennessee, and their successors in office, should be thereafter the perpetual superintendents of the aforesaid seminary. Held: The testator’s intention, in this case, was to create a perpetuity, and, as to Louisiana, a new tenure of property; that intention is a legal impossibility, and the disposition falls.
It is impossible to recognize trust estates in Louisiana, without letting in all the laws which regulate that peculiar tenure of property; and the Constitutional inhibition to 'the Legislature to adopt any system of foreign laws, by general reference, would be rendered nugatory, if courts of justice assumed the power to introduce those systems by piecemeal, in this insidious manner. Rost, J. •
Under the hypothesis that the words, “in trust,” in this case, should be reputed not written, the title must have vested in the original trustees in full ownership, and, if it did, tho charge to preserve and return the property to other persons after them, would be such a substitution as would avoid the entire disposition. Host, J.
When the words of the testamentary disposition are sufficient to vest a legal title in the legatee, and the intention of the testator to create sucha title for his benefit, to the exclusion of the heirs at law, and of all other persons, is ascertained, then, in furtherance of that intention, any illegal or impossible condition the disposition may contain, is presumed to have been inserted inadvertently, and is reputed inlaw, not written; but, where the title, created by the will, as ascertained by the words used, and the intention of the testator, is a tenure of property which our laws do not recognize, the attempt to change the nature of it, and to convert it into a title, valid under our laws, would no longer be an interpretation of the will, but the making of a new will for the testator. Host, J.
I put this case upon the principle, that,' where the condition is of the essence of the title created by the bequest, and intended by the testator, so that the will cannot stand without it, if that will be one which the law does not recognize, courts of justice cannot replace it by another, and the disposition must fall. Host, J.
The prohibition contained in art. 1477 C. C., has not exclusive reference to citizens of other countries; it applies to sovereign States or corporations: for corporations, legally ordained, are substituted for persons. Rost, J.
The prohibition to a citizen of Louisiana, to make donations cansa mortis in favor of citizens of other States, does not conflict with 2d sec. of the 4th art. of the Federal Constitution, guaranteeing to the citizen of each State all the privileges of the oitizens of the several States. Rost, J.
Therefore, where a testator bequeathed immovable property situated in Louisiana, to trustees, to be held by them for the benefit of a charity in Tennessee, where the validity of the bequest is disputed, the trustees should show that the laws of Tennessee do not prohibit similar dispositions from being made in favor of a citizen of Louisiana. Rost, J.
The trust, created by the testator, was not uncoupled with an interest; the trustees and their descendants, all had a direct interest in the bequest. The effect of such a bequest is not merely to create a perpetuity; it contains an indefinite series of prohibited substitutions. Rost, J.
A testament is a law, and the first duty of courts, in this as in other laws, is to ascertain the mens legislatoris; when it is once ascertained beyond reasonable doubt, it must be followed, and the disppsition stands or falls, as the intention of the testator can, or cannot be carried into effect, consistently with the rules of law. Rost, J.
Powers given to testators by the code, are exceptions to the general law regulating the devolution of property; they are limited, both as to form and substance ; and it is not enough to say, that perpetuities arc not prohibited, it should be shown that they are authorized. Rost, J.
A trust, as attempted to be created by this will, is a right in equity, to the beneficial enjoyment of lands and slaves, of wbicb the legal title is in another person. X am not aware of any trust estate created in Louisiana, which has been recognized as a legal tenure adversely to third persons having an interest. Rustís, O. J.
The framers of our code never contemplated to abolish naked trusts, uncoupled with an interest, which were to he executed immediately. Rustís, 0. J.
Aman has no more power to create new, or prohibited modes, of conveying property by will, than he has by sale, or by donation inter vwos. Between parties, they may hold their property, by any tenure or terms they please; hut, as to the establishment of titles affecting the property itself, there is no power in man, out of the law; nor has society any interest in attempting to carry into effect the conceits of the dead, to the disturbance of the rules of public order and policy which regulate the living. Rustís, C. J.
A marriage contracted out of the State, between persons who afterwards come here to live, (s’y étáblir,) is also subjected to the community of acquets, with respect to such property as is acquired after their arrival. C, 0. art. 2370. For the true sense of the language of the code, the inquiry should be, did Franklin and his wife live in Louisiana ? Were they established here ? By the words of the code, we are to understand the domestic domicil, the true and permanent home; that domestic hearth, where the husband and wife have surrounded themselves, and their offspring, with the comforts of domestic life; and from which, when he and his wife occasionally depart, for the purposes of business, or pleasure, they do so with the intention to return. Slidell, J.
Where there is doubt on the question of domicil, the original home is to. he considered the true home. Slidell, J.
The bequest, by Franklin, to his brothers and their heirs, forever, in trust, of certain property, the revenues to be employed in establishing and maintaining an academy, in Tennessee, to be superintended by the magistrates of Sumner county, and their successors in office, &c. &c., establishes a tenure of property unknown to the laws of Louisiana, highly inconsistent with their spirit, creating an entail, and substantially involving, in a very aggravated form, a prohibited Jicleicommissum and substitution. Slidell, J.
The act of 1818, added facilities for the acquisition of a residence in this State, but it did not repeal the law of 1816, on the same subject. Preston, X, dissenting.
A declaration, made in the manner pointed out by law, is conclusive of the will and intention to become a citizen and resident of Louisiana. Preston, J., dissenting.
Special legacies are not to he paid out of the portion of theforcedheirs; and, where asumís given by the husband to the wife, in lieu of her interest in his succession, it is a charge upon his general estate. Preston, X, dissenting.
A testator may make every disposition of his property by donations mortis causa, which he could make by donations inter vivos. Unless the law prohibits a testamentary disposition, the testator may make it, if it do not violate some rule of morality or duty. Preston, X, dissenting.
There is, in our code, but a single restriction upon dispositions in favor of a stranger, and that is, where the laws of his country prohibit similar dispositions from being made, in favor of a citizen of this State. Art. 1477. There is no prohibition, of a disposition in favor of a foreign State, or corporation created by it. Preston, J., dissenting.
If article 1477 of our code, was intended, by way of retaliation, to prohibit our citizens from making donations mortis causa, to citizens of Tennessee, both laws would be void, as conflicting with the 2d section of the 4th article of the Constitution of the United States, guaranteeing to the citizens of each State, the privileges of citizens of the several States.
Preston, J., dissenting.
Where a testator is desirous of becoming the founder of a charitable or educational institution, he does so on the implied condition, that the State will ratify his benevolent intentions. If the confirmation is withheld, the will is defeated; but, if granted, it operates like the accomplishment of all suspensive conditions, whether express or implied, and has a retroactive effect. Preston, X, dissentiug.
Legacies, in favor of corporations; do not lapse, by the incapacity of the corporation to receive, at the death of the testator; the incapacity may be removed, retroactively, by the sovereign. Preston, J., dissenting.
The term, substitution, embraces the ownership, and not the administration of property. It implies, that one should hold the property for another, during life, and transmit it to him at his death. It is very similar, in its effects, to the entail of the English law. To constitute a substitution, the donee must be charged to preserve the property until his death, and then return it to the substituted heir or legatee. Franklin did not give the third of his property to his brothers, under a charge to preserve and return it to their heirs. His brothers, and their heirs, were merely appointed to take charge of, and administer it, for the seminary of learning, in Tennessee. Presto», J., dissenting.
A Jidei commission is created, where property is given to one, for another, to vest in the latter, immediately, at a given period, or upon a condition. The will does not contain a jidei commissum, because the property was not given by Franklin to his brothers, for the literary institution, but was given to the institution itself; and, the title remained in the succession of Franklin, until the seminary was incorporated. Preston, J., dissenting.
Article 1507 of the Civil Code, when adopted in the code of 1808, was not intended to introduce new principles of law into Louisiana, but merely to recognize the existing law; and no other than substitutions, andJidei commissa, previously unlawful, were prohibited by , it. Preston, X, dissenting.
Substitutions, which changed the order of descents, and fostered pride and laziness, and, abstracted property from commerce; and, jidei commissa, by which one held property for another, who was incapable of receiving, or for an unlawful purpose, which were prohibited by the law of Spain, in force in 1808, were the substitutions, and Jidei commissa, which the jurisconsults, who framed the code, declared are, and remain, prohibited.
Preston, X, dissenting.
APPEAL from the District Court of West Feliciana. Stirling, J.
W. W. King, for plaintiffs.
Benjamin and Micou, for plaintiffs, maintained:
— In all civilized countries, it has been found indispensable to check by legislation, the unlimited disposal of properly by will. The passion for acquisition of property is so strong, the tenacity with which it is preserved is so great, the reluctance with which it is abandoned by its possessor, even when on the brink of the grave, is so unconquerable, that the propensity of mankind to continue their control over property, even after death, requires the restraint of the most vigorous legislation. In Louisiana, the policy of the State, on this subject, has been uniform: the enactment of the law-giver, and the jurisprudence of the courts, have concurred from the very origin of our State government, in vindicating and maintaining this policy, The grounds on which it rests, are perfectly familiar. It is against public policy, that any individual should be allowed to intervert the order of inheritance established by the general law, and to create a special or exceptional order for his own property. It is against public policy, that estates be lied up in perpetuity, be rendered inalienable or be in any manner withdrawn from commerce. It is against the public policy of the State, that the tenures of title by which property is held, be rendered complex, théreby giving rise to litigation, to difficulties and embarrassments, and to the long train of disastrous results, which ensue-when the titles to property cease to be clear, simple, and intelligible to the ordinary understanding of mankind. It is against public policy, that the elements of the ownership of property be decomposed; that the legal title be vested in one', and the beneficiary interest in another, whereby it almost invariably occurs, that improvement is checked, waste lands remain uncultivated, and vacant lots continue unimproved and untenanted.
In all the changes that our judiciary has undergone, the jurisprudence of the State, on this subject, has been maintained by one unbroken series of decisions.
In the case of Mathurin v. Livaudais, 5 N. S. 302, Judge Porter, in delivering the opinion of the court, declared, that “ our code abolishes substitutions and fidei commissa. The object of this change in our jurisprudence was, as it is well known, to prevent property from being tied up for a length of time in the hands of individuals and placed out of the reach of commerce.”
In the Heirs of Cole et al. v. Cole's Executors, 7 N. S. 416, the same judge, again the organ of the court, observes, “ It is necessary to check the power of the citizen over his property after his decease; for the strong desire in mankind to perpetuate their authority, over what they have acquired, would otherwise induce them to place it for a length of time, and forever, if they could, out of the reach of alienation.”
In Arnaud v. Tarbe et al., 4 L. R. 502, Judge Matthews declared, that “ the policy of our law in prohibiting substitutions, is founded on reasons of public convenience and utility; to preserve the order of successions uniform, to prevent the confusion, difficulties and uncertainties of titles to property held under entails, and to leave it free for the purposes of commerce.”
In Harper v. Stansborough, 2 Ann. 381, Eustis, C. J. says, “It is the attribute of every government, to establish and regulate such modification of the rights of property in things within its jurisdiction, as the public interest requires. Testamentary substitutions are prohibited in this State. The prohibition is established in the interest of public order and state policy. They have always been held null by our courts, the nullity being of that character which is absolute and irremediable.” And again, “ the modifications of the rights of property under our laws are few and easily understood, and answer all the purposes of reasonable use. It is incumbent on courts to maintain them in their simplicity.”
In the case of the Heirs of Henderson v. Ross, 5 Ann. 441, Judge Slidell decided, “ that an attempt by a testator to perpetuate his succession, is in violation of the policy of the law : that the spirit of the law, abolishing substitutions and fidei commissa, is to prevent property being tied up and out of the reach of commerce. That if such bequests be unlawful, a fortiori, is it unlawful to tie up property in the hands of executors and commissioners forever.” And in Roy v. Latiólas, 5 Ann. 557, Judge Preston quotes, with high eulogy, and affirms the principles recognized and maintained by Judge Matthews, in Arnaud v. Tarbe already quoted.
If, after this rapid review of the decisions that are declaratory of the general principles which govern the subject, we refer to the positive legislation of the State, we find that the chapter of our code, which treats of such bequests, is entitled “,of dispositions reprobated by law in donations inter -vivos and mortis causa." There are but four articles in the chapter; they read thus: Art. 1506 : In all dispositions inter vivos and mortis causa, impossible conditions, those which are contrary to law or to morals, are reputed not written. Art. 1507 : Substitutions and fidei commissa are and remain prohibited. Every disposition by which the donee, the heir, or legatee is charged to preserve for, or return a thing to a third person, is null, even with regard to the donee, the instituted heir, or the legatee.
In consequence of this article, the trebellianic portion of the civil law, that is to say, the portion of the property of the testator, which the instituted heir had a right to retain when he was charged with a fidei commissum or a fiduciary bequest, is no longer a part of our law.
Article 1508: The disposition by which a third person is called to take the gift, the inheritance or the legacy, in case the donee, the heir, or the legatee does not take it, shall not be considered a substitution and shall be valid. Art. 1509 : The same shall be observed as to the disposition inter vivos or mortis causa, by which the usufruct is given to one, and the naked property to another.
In connection with these articles, it may not be improper for us to call attention to the terms of one or two other articles of our code, declaratory of well known general principles, which will find constant application in the progress of the argument.
Article 9 : The law is obligatory upon all inhabitants of the State, indiscriminately ; the foreigner, whilst residing there, and his property, within its limits, are subject to it. Art. 12: Whatever is done in contravention of a prohibitory law, is void, although the nullity be not formally directed.
With these general principles kept constantly in view, as the lamps which are to guide our path, we now proceed to the examination and analysis of those provisions of Franklin’s will, which, according to our view of the law, are null and void.
The testator, after making a disposal in favor of his wife of certain revenues, &c., and bequeathing to his children that portion of his estate, which he was by law forbidden to dispose of, to their prejudice, makes the following devise:
“ 8th Item. I give and bequeath all my property, real and personal, of whatever kind or nature, that is situated in the States of Tennessee and Misssissippi, or any other common law States, where trust estates can be created, together with my bank stocks and effects and credits, and an undivided one-third part of all my said property, movable and immovable, slaves, &c., that is situated, lying and being in said State of Louisiana, and also the rest and residue of my estate, wherever situated, in trust, to my two brothers, James and William Franklin, of Sumner county aforesaid, for the following purposes, to wit: the revenues arising from said property, bank stock, and such money, funds or credits due me, as may remain after the payment of the several devises and legacies, annuities, increase and ameliorations of my said plantations in Louisiana and other purposes as directed by this will, together with the revenues arising from my plantations in Tennessee and other property in Tennessee and Mississippi, and other common law States, together with the dividends of my bank stock, and interest on money and notes due me, and the revenues of the one-third of all my property, situated in the State of Louisiana, after the payment of said several devises, &c., to be laid out in building, proper and suitable edifices on my said Fairview plantation, in the county of Sumner and State of Tennessee, for an academy or seminary, the furnishing the same with fixtures and furniture, and the employment and payment of such teachers and professors, male and female, as may be considered necessary by my said trustees, for the education, board and clothing of the children of my brothers and sisters and their descendants, in the best and most suitable and proper manner for American youths, having a particular regard to a substantial and good English education, and such other higher and ornamental branches as the aforesaid revenues, &c., will enable my said trustees to accomplish, and if the revenues, &c., should be sufficient therefor. I also wish that the poor children in said county of Sumner, of unexceptionable character, and such as my said trustees may select, should likewise be educated and supported during the time at the same seminary. And after the death of my aforesaid brothers, it is my will and desire, that the aforesaid trusts be continued and pass over forever in the heirs of my said brothers, to pass the estate, and that the magistrates of the county court of said county of Sumner and State of Tennessee, and their successors in office, be thereafter the perpetual superintendents of the aforesaid seminary, to see that my intentions be fully carried into effect.”
It really seems, that this bequest comes so clearly within the prohibition of our law, and is so utterly opposed to the public policy of the State, that no argument can make the proposition any plainer, and we would at once leave this branch of the case without further comment, if our respect for the eminent counsel opposed to us, did not render imperative the duty of a serious response to the positions assumed by them, and urged with so much apparent conviction on the court. We will, therefore, proceed to sketch rapidly the features, that distinguish the different classes of substitutions and fidei commissa, so that we may be readily able to ascertain the proper denomination of the devise in question. In doing this, we shall spare the court any display of industry or learning, by quoting the various authorities on this most subtle and intricate branch of the civil law, and shall confine ourselves to stating the results of our study, so far as may be necessary in elucidation of the particular provision now under discussion. We understand all the authorities as agreeing, at least, on the following propositions:
Substitutions are of two kinds; the vulgar substitution of the Roman law, being that which is defined in art. 1508 of our code, already quoted, and is not prohibited ; and the substitution, properly so called, equivalent in its nature to the common law entail, by which the donor or testator undertakes to establish the manner in which the property shall descend, on the death of the donee oi legatee, and by which the donee or legatee is prohibited from so disposing of the property as to affect the order of inheritance or descent, thus established by the donor or testator
Fidei commissa are of three kinds: they are all included in what are denominated trusts, in equity jurisprudence.
The first is the naked trust, uncoupled with an interest, to be executed immediately. These, when not intended to vest title in the trustee, are not prohibited, as not being in contravention of the policy of our State, and as being rather mandates than bequests. An example is found in the bequest of a sum of money to a person to purchase the freedom of a.slave, on whom the testator wishes to confer the gift of liberty. Such was the case of Mathurin v. Livaudais, 5 N. S. 302.
The second is termed by the civilians, the fidei commissum de eo quod supererit: that is to say, the gift or bequest of property to A, without any obligation on his part to preserve it, nor prohibition to alienate it, but on condition, that “ what may remain” at his death, shall descend to certain persons indicated by the donor. In such fidei commissa as these, the gift is good as to the donee, but the reversion in favor of the third person, is null, because by the very terms of the art. 1507, it is only when the donee is “charged to preserve for, or return a thing to a third person,” that the disposition is null, even with regard to the donee. Examples of this class of fidei commissa, are frequent in our reports. See the cases of Bernard’s heirs v. Soulé, 18 L. R. 24, and Beaulieu v. Ternoir, 5 Ann. 480.
The third class is that which includes in the bequest to an individual, the duty or trust that he shall not alienate the property, but shall preserve it for, or return it to a third person, either at the death of the donee, or at some distant period from the date of his receiving the property given or bequeathed. This fidei commissum is utterly null and void, even as to the donee, as established by art. 1507.
Let us then test the bequest of Isaac Franklin, and ascertain the extent to which it attempts to carry out purposes “ reprobated” by our law, in order to determine whether it is to be executed in whole or in part, or be set aside entirely.
The testator declares, that he gives the property in question, “in trust to his two brothers, James and William Franklin.” What is the nature of their title 1 This question becomes necessaiy, because however self-evident the answer would seem to the lawyer of any of our sister States, the conveyance in trust is unknown to the civil law. Our code, in treating of ownership, divides it into perfect and imperfect ownership ; and it defines perfect ownership to be that which is perpetual, and which is not incumbered with any charge towards any other person than the owner.
A trust estate is therefore clearly not a perfect ownership.
Ownership is imperfect when it is to terminate at a certain time, or on a condition, or if the thing which is the subject of it, being an immovable, is charged with any real right toward a third person as an usufruct. When an immovable is subject to an usufruct, the owner of it is said to possess the mere ownership. C. C. art. 482.
Absolute ownership gives the right to enjoy or to dispose of one’s property in the most unlimited manner, provided it is not used in a way prohibited by laws or ordinances.
Persons who reside out of the State, cannot dispose of the properly they posses here, in a manner different from that prescribed by its laws. C. C. art. 483.
Usufruct is the right of enjoying a thing, the property of which is vested in another, and to draw from the same all the profit, utility, and advantages which it may. produce, provided it be without altering the substance of the thing. C. C. art. 525.
A comparison of these articles of our code, with the provisions of the will, demonstrate conclusively, that the bequest to James and William Franklin, is a devise of the mere ownership, and that the usufruct or fruits and revenues of the property are bequeathed to the children of the testator’s brothers and sisters and their descendants, or, in other words, to the seminary which has been incorporated by the State of Tennessee, under the name of the Isaac Franklin Institute.
As this devise thus decomposes the perfect ownership of the property into its two constituent elements, and leaves the naked title or mere ownership to one devisee, and the usufruct or beneficiary interest to another, it is necessary to examine the character of each of these two bequests, in order to ascertain whether they are substitutions.
Upon this point, the words of the testator are too clear to admit of doubt or cavil. In bequeathing the naked title to his brothers, he specially prohibits their alienation of it. for he provides that. “ after the death of my aforesaid brothers, it is my will and desire, that the aforesaid trust be continued and pass over forever in the heirs of my said brothers, to pass the estate.” Here then is an entail that is never to be cut off, a property that is never to be alienated, a substitution in its most offensive form, not only tying up the property out of the reach of commerce, but doing this in the hands of persons who have no interest in its improvement, who are not to reap any of its fruits, who are not provided with the means of effecting ameliorations of any kind whatever, because they are vested with no right to, nor control over the revenues, beyond the employment of them in the support of the seminary. Lewin on Trusts, 138, 24 Law Lib. Lewis on Perpetuities, 592, 52 Law Lib.
How stands the case with regard to the devise of the usufruct or revenues 1 They are left for the “education, board and clothing of the children of my brothers and sisters, and their descendants, as well as my own children and their descendants;” and the magistrates of the county court of Sumner county and their successors in office, are to be the perpetual superintendents of the seminary.
Now the art. 601 of our code, declares, that “ the right to the usufruct expires at the death of the usufructuary.” So that, if this devise were perfectly unexceptionable on other grounds, it could by no possibility be extended beyond the children of Isaac Franklin's brothers and sisters in life, at the date of his death; and as it is only granted for their education, board and clothing, whilst pursuing their studies, the whole purpose of the testator, as far as he would be allowed by law to accomplish it, would be already effected, or nearly so ; at this moment, and as the property in Tennessee is more than sufficient for this, the only purpose legally feasible, it would follow, that no effect could be given to this provision of the will as regards the Louisiana property. But the exigencies of our case do not require that we should assume this narrow ground. The clear intent of the testator is, to entail on the children and descendants of himself and of his brothers and sisters, the revenues of this property forever.
There is scarcely a single object of public policy enumerated in the decisions of our judges, which is not contravened in this bequest.
It places property out of the reach of commerce forever. It separates the naked title from the usufruct forever. It conveys the property to the two brothers, in trust, that they shall preserve it and return it to their heirs, in direct violation of the 1507th-article of the code. It places the property beyond the reach of improvement forever. It creates new tenures of property unknown to our law, which does not recognize nor make provision lor trust estates. It complicates and embarrasses titles to property: having reference to laws foreign to our jurisprudence, the title conveyed by it, can only be understood by recurring to those laws : it therefore introduces, as regards this particular property, the entire system of the equity jurisprudence of our sister States in relation to trusts, although by our State Constitution, the Legislature is expressly forbidden to introduce that system, or any other system of foreign laws into this State. • •
Indeed, no provision in a will has ever come to our knowledge more objectionable in its every feature; and, if the court considers that, in the case of Clague’s Widow v. His Executors, 13 L. R. 7, a former bench annulled a clause in a will, which provided that the property of the testator should remain in the hands of his executors, to be delivered to his children at their majority, on the ground that it was a fidei commissum, it is difficult to conceive what possible argument can be advanced to support a devise in which the property is never to be given up at all, but forever to be held and administered for the benefit of others than those who are vested with the title.
We refer the court to the following authorities on the question of domicil and community. As regards substitutions and fidei commissa, the numerous briefs recently submitted to the court, contain all that can be required, and we deem it useless to copy them. On domicil and community : C. C. 2370 ; 42 et seq. Hennen v. Hennen, 12 L. R. 190. Saul v. His Creditors, 5 N. S. 580. Tourní v. Tourné, 9 L. R. 457. Cole’s Widow v. Executors, 7 N. S. 42. Cole v. Lucas, 2 Ann. 950. Ricard v. Kimball, 5 R. R. 142. Nelson v. Bolts, 16 L. R. 596. Williams v. Henderson, 18 L. R. 557. State v. Probate Judge, 2 R. R. 449. Davis v. Binion, 5 Ann. 248. Magee v. Brown, 4 Ann. 186. Waller v. Lea, 8 L. R. 215. Tanner v. King, 11 L. R. 175. Case v. Clark, 5 Mason, 70. Jennison v. Hapgood, 10 Pick. 77. Hill and McLean v. Spangenberg, 4 Ann. 553. Judson v. Lathrop, 1 Ann. 79. Story’s Conflict of Laws, §§44, 47.
C. Roselius, for defendant.
1. The first and most important question is,whether the bequest for the establishment and endowment of the seminary or academy, is valid or not ?
The objection to its validity is, that it contains a substitution and jidei commissum.
The reasons which induced the learned judge of the district court to sustain this objection are, “that the provisions of the will referred to, even if they do not contain a substitution, or Jidei commissum, in the technical sense of those terms, yet tie up the property of the testator in such a manner, as to place it beyond the reach of commerce, and therefore equally reprobated by law, and opposed to the public policy of the State.”
This argument, if argument it can be called, takes for granted, that a testator can, by a disposition of his will, take property out of commerce. But the fallacy of this assumption must be obvious to every legal mind. Things, which are naturally susceptible of private ownership, can only be taken out of commerce by an act of sovereignty; hence, every attempt, by a testator, to take the property of his succession out of commerce, is an impossible condition, and must be reputed as not written. C. C. 1506. N. C. 900. 13 L. R. 7. 12 R. R. 549. 3 Marcadé, No. 485. 5 Toullier, Nos. 241 to 269. 6 Toullier, No. 488. 8 Duranton, Nos. 96 to 111. 9 Duranton, No. 314. 3 Zacharise, No. 692. Coin Deslile, pp. 69 and 70. 1 Grenier, No. 149. 11 Locré, p 7. Journal du Palais for 1807, vol. 6, p. 221; for 1835, vol. 27, p. 38 and p. 1159; for 1841, vol. 37, p. 353 ; for 1842, p. 646. Pandects, b. 28, t. 7,1. 1, and same book, t. 14,1. 9 and 14. Institutes, b. 2, t. 14,1.10. Partidas 6, t. 3,1. 3. See also the clear and conclusive argument of the French jurists on this question, in the McDonogh wjll case.
There is only one illegal condition that will affect the validity of the bequest in which it is inserted. “Every disposition, by which the donee, the heir, or legatee, is charged to procure for, and to return a thing to a third person, is null, even with regard to the donee, the instituted heir, or the legatee.” All other illegal or impossible conditions, I repeat, are reputed as not written. The distinction between a prohibited substitution and a jidei commissum was well explained by this court in the cases of Ducloslange v. Ross, 3 Ann. 432; and Beaulieu v. Ternoir, 5 Ann. 476.
But, let me ask, on what ground can it be pretended, that there is either a substitution, or a jidei commissum, in the will of Isaac Franklin ? Can any candid mind deny that Isaac Franklin intended to establish and endow an academy or seminary ? He does not leave his property to his brothers and trustees, but to the institution which he intended to create. He availed himself of their agency, to carry his intentions into effect immediately after his death, without waiting for the slow and tardy action of the government to give a corporate existence to the educational institution, which was the object of his solicitude.
It is contended, by the learned counsel for Mrs. Aciden, that a bequest for the establishment and endowment of an academy, is reprobated by our law, and they cite quite a number of authorities to support this startling position. The bare statement of the proposition carries with it its own refutation; and the authorities referred to, do not give the remotest countenance to it.
2. Where was the matrimonial domicil of Franklin and his wife ?
No doubt, in the majority of cases, the domicil and residence of a person are in the same place; but it does by no means follow that they are convertible terms. The parliament of Paris decided, on the 8th June, 1742, that a certain Carangeau, who was born in Paris, and died in Brittany, after having resided sixty-four years in the latter place as superintendent of fortifications, had preserved his domicil in Paris, because he had done no act from which an intention to change his domicil could be inferred. This decision is reported by Dénisart verbo Domicile, No. 33.
What is understood by domicil ?
Article 42 of the code defines or describes it as follows: “'Tho domicil of each citizen is in the parish wherein his principal establishment is selected. The principal establishment is that in which he makes his habitual residence; if he resides alternately in several places, and nearly as much in one as in another, and has not declared his intention in the manner hereinafter prescribed, any one of the said places where he resides may be considered as his principal establishment, at the option of the persons whose interests are thereby affected.”
This is but an imperfect translation of the Roman law: “ Et in eodem loco singulos habere domicilium, non ambigitur, ubi quis larem, rerumque ac fortunarum summum constituit, unde rursus non sit discessurus, si nihil avocet: unde cum profectus est, peregrinan videtur: quod si rediit, perigrinari jam destitit. C. 1.10, t. 39,1. 7.”
Which may be translated as follows : “ There is no doubt that every person has his domicil in that place where he has his domestic hearth, the principal part of his property, business and fortune; whence he does not wish to depart, unless called away by business, and is a wanderer when he has left it, but ceases to be so on his return to it.”
The difficulty in the translation of the Latin text of this law into English, consists in finding an equivalent expression for the word larem, which has several meanings. In the glossary it is thus explained: “ Animum habitandi perpetuo, et habitet; nam facto opus est, et hoc etiamsi non habet ibi majorem partem rerum.” I have paraphrased it by the words “domestic hearth,” as more literal, but, there is no doubt, that the sense of the original would be more fully expressed by using the very significant expression “ homestead,” that is to say, the place where all the conveniences and comforts of life are gathered together.
Faeciolati’s definition seems to be in uniformity with this idea, “Domicilium, domus, sides domestica, habitatio certa et diutm'na.”
Judge Story says, *1 two things then must concur to constitute a domicil: first, residence; and secondly, the intention of making it the home of the party.” There must be the fact and the intent; for, asPothierhas truly observed, a person cannot establish a domicil in a place, except it be animo et facto. Yoet emphatically says, “Illud certum est, ñeque solo animo atque destinatione patris familias, aut contestatione solá, siné re et facto, domicilium constitui; ñeque solá domus comparatione in aliquá regions; ñeque solá habitations, sine proposito illic perpetuo morandi.” So D’Argentré says, “ Quamobrem, qui figendi ejus animum non habent, sed usus, necessitatis, aut negatiationis causa alicubi sint, protinus a negotio discessiori, domicilium nullo temporis spatio constituent; cum ñeque animus siné facto, ñeque factum siné animo ad id sufficiat.” Conflict of Laws. s
It is obvious, therefore, that residence alone cannot constitute a domicil; for residence consists in the mere fact of inhabiting a place.
Domicil, says Marcadé, is the legal or judicial location of the person; it is an ideal or moral thing created by the law, which indicates the relation existing between the person and a certain spot of earth. In common parlance, however, we are in the habit of calling domicil the house or place where the juridical location is fixed. But that is not the technical sense of the word. The language of the code is: “ The domicil of each citizen is in the parish wherein his principal establishment is selected.” It is not the establishment or house itself, but at the establishment or house.
The code speaks of civil domicil alone; the political domicil of each citizen is at the place where he exercises his political rights. This kind of domicil is determined by the Constitution and laws of the State, and is not necessarily in the parish, or even State, of the civil domicil.
Domicil may be of three sorts: domicil by birth, domicilium originis ; domicil by choice, domicilium proprio motu; and domicil by the operation of law, as that produced by marriage, minority, &c.
The question of domicil, says Merlin, is frequently not of easy solution; many persons have several establishments at the same time, at different places; they remain six months at one place, and six months at another; return to the first and again go to the second, without any indication where they have selected their domicil. When the facts leave the question doubtful, the domicil of birth is to be preferred, for, as long as there is not clear proof that a person has severed those ties which attach him to the place of his nativity, it is presumed that the true domicil has always continued there. Merlin Rep. verbo Domicil, § 1 and 2.
According to the code, it would seem that a party may have two domicils at the same time: “If he resides alternately in several places, and nearly as much in one as in another, and has not declared his intention, in the manner hereinafter prescribed, any one of said places where he resides, may be considered as his principal establishment, at the option of the person whose interests are thereby affected.”
If the operation of the rule here laid down, is to be limited so as only to regulate the right of bringing a suit, or giving legal notices, etc., at either of the residences of such a person, it is no doubt a salutary provision; but, if an attempt is made to extend it to the question of domicil, raised in this litigation, between Mrs. Acíden and the “ Isaac Franklin Institute,” it is an absurdity ; for each of the contending parties would, of course, choose the domicil of Franklin and his wife, in the State most favorable to his interest.
It is clear, therefore, that although a person may have several residences at the same time, he can not have more than one domicil, properly speaking.
In order to subject a party to a particular tribunal, it has always been considered sufficient to show, that he has an apparent domicil, or rather residence, within the territorial limits of the court. But a very different rule obtains when the right of inheritance, or the question of community, depends on the fact of civil domicil. Merlin establishes this difference in the clearest manner. Rep. verbo Delinatoire, § 1.
Actual residence is not required to retain a domicil once acquired ; it may be retained animo solo; and this intention to retain it is always presumed, until the contrary is made manifest by the animo et facto which must unite to change the former, and to acquire a new domicil.
Our reports abound with cases, in which the question of domicil has presented itself, in its various phases.
In the case of Tanner v. King, 11 L. R. 178, the Supreme Court says: A man’s domicil is his house where he establishes his household, and surrounds himself with the apparatus and comforts of life. Though he departs for a season, it is always his intention to return. When once fixed, it will continue until the contrary be affirmatively shown.
The decision in the case of Hennen v. Hennen, 12 L. R. 190, is clearly erroneous.
The true principle applicable to the subject was recognized in the case of Gravillon v. Richards’ Executors et al., 13 L. R. 297, in which Mr. Justice Eustis says : “The fact of a person remaining in a foreign country, without any intention of establishing himself there, does not operate a change of his domicil; but as soon as the will of making a permanent establishment in the country is combined with the fact of his residence, the residence, even for a few days, fixes the domicil.”
But, in the case of Boone v. Savage, 14 L. R. the court confounded the civil with the political domicil. The judge, who was the organ of the court, observes: “ The urticlos 42 and 43 of the Louisiana Code, referred to, only provide for cases of a change of domicil, by persons already residents of the State. The present case is that of a person, resident in another State, attempting to acquire a residence here. On this subject a law was passed in 1816. See Moreau’s Dig. verbo ‘ Residence,’ 308. It declares that, a ‘ residence within the State shall not be considered as acquired, until the individual, coming into the State, shall have remained within the same twelve months following the date of his notice to the judge, etc.’ And a second act, passed in 1818, (2 Moreau’s Digest, 309,) alters, in some respects, the previous requisites, but still requires a residence of one year.
“ It is already seen that the defendant’s declaration was made in December, 1837, and this suit was instituted in April following. If we take the law of 1818 for onr guide, still the residence of one year is not shown.”
But it is obvious that the laws of 1816 and 1818 have nothing whatever to do with the subject. Those laws evidently refer to political residence, and can have no application to civil domicil. To invoke these laws for the purpose of deciding a question of civil domicil, leads to the most absurd and preposterous results. The court decides that it requires a residence of one year in the State, by persons coming from another State, to acquire a domicil. Until the expiration of that period, they are liable to be sued by attachment as non-residents. But the same law provides, (section 3,) that residence once acquired shall not be forfeited by absence on the business of the State, or of the United States, but by a voluntary absence from this State for two years, or the acquisition of a residence in any of the other States of this Union, shall forfeit a residence within this State.” Thus, then, it follows as a matter of course, by the same process of reasoning, that no attachment will lie against a party who has acquired a residence until after the expiration of two years, to be counted from the day he has voluntarily absented himself from the State, or until he has acquired a new residence in another State of the Union. No doubt the attachment, after such a lapse of time, would be of great benefit to the suing creditor! This is not all: during the same period of time, a citation may be served at the residence of the party, and a judgment may be rendered against him, as if he were present, although in point of fact he may be in France, Germany, China, Russia, rasóme other distant country! No curator can be appointed to him as an absentee, because, in contemplation of law, he is present. It is said that the articles 42 and 43 only provide for a change of domicil, by persons already residents of the State ; but the learned judge who prepared the opinion, seems to have forgotten that these articles of the code contain no new principles, but are only enunciativo of the doctrine of domicil, as old as the law itself. Suppose the code had been silent on the subject, would the same rules not have been applied to the decision of the question of domicil 1 And what possible difference can it make whether the party acquiring a domicil in the parish of Orleans, for instance, comes here from Caddo, or from Kamschatka ? The question is always the same with regard to the elements required to constitute a domicil; it-is always animo et facto. But it is clear that the laws of 1816 and 1818, refer exclusively to political residence ; they were passed in pursuance of the 12th section of the Constitution of the State, which provides, that: “ The Legislature shall point out the manner in which a man coming into the country shall declare his residence.”
This view of the subject is fortified by the 2d section of the act of 1818, which provides, that: “No alien shall be considered as having acquired all the rights of a citizen of this State, and enjoy the rights of suffrage until, in addition to the requisitions contained in the foregoing section, they shall have acquired a naturalization under the laws of the United States, and become a naturalized citizen of the United States. Provided, however, that this shall not be required of any individual who was a resident of this State, at the time of the adoption of the Constitution of this State.
In the case of the Slate v. the Judge of the Court of Probates of New Orleans, 2 R. R. 449, the same blunder was committed.
The organ of the court says: “The question then is, Where is the domicil of R. L. Tilghman ? The Civil Code, articles 44 and 45, says, that where there is no express declaration as to domicil, the proof of intention depends upon circumstances. This court, in Gravillon v. Richards’ Executors et al.,‘ 13 L. R. 297, said, as soon as the will of making a permanent establishment in the country is combined with the fact of his residence, the residence, even for a few days, fixes the domicil.” This was, perhaps, .pressing the principle of domicil too far. The subject was again considered in 14 L. R. 169, when it was held that it required an uninterrupted residence of one year in one of the parishes of the State, to acquire a domicil, and until then a party may be sued by attachment as against a non-resident. The provisions of the acts of the Legislature, passed in 1816 and 1818, are plain. The first section of the latter act says, that there must be a residence of “one year without interruption,” in one of the parishes of the State, the party having, in the mean time, purchased or rented a house or room, or parcel of land, or pursued some profession or employment for a support. Bullard and Curry’s Dig. 286, 287, sec. 1 and 2. The letter of the law is too clear to be misunderstood; and it seems to have been made to operate on that description of persons who come to our State for purposes of their own, and never identify themselves with our interests and institutions.
Shortly after the organization of the present judiciary, the subject came up for decision, in a number of cases, and the correct doctrine was invariably applied.
In the case of Judson v. Lathrop, 1 Ann. 78, it was held, “ that where a party resides alternately in different parishes, the judicial declaration governs, when the residences appear to be nearly of the same nature, si sa residence dans chacune est ápeu prés la mime. See, also, Colev. Lucas, 2 Ann., 950. McGehee v. Brown, 4 Ann. 186. Hill v. Spangenberg, 4 Ann. 554.
A man’s old domicil, says the court in the case of Favrot v. Belle Piane, 4 Ann. 586, can only be changed by the adoption of a new one animo et facto.
Upon a question of domicil, the declarations of a party in an authentic act are admissible against him, but he is not concluded by such declarations, and may disprove them. Davis v. Binion, 5 Ann. 248.
While the suit for the partition was pending, and ready for trial, Mrs. Aciden applied for and obtained an order putting her in possession of all the property for the partition of which the parties were then before the court. From this decree a separate appeal was taken, which may as well be disposed of with the present case, for it is, in fact, only an incident in the main action. The judgment of the district court, on this branch of the case, is so palpably erroneous, that I deem it useless to do more than to state the fact that such a judgment was rendered.
John L. Lobdell, for defendant.
The counsel refers the court to the following authorities on the points raised and argued in this case, to wit:
1st. Citizenship. 0 M. R. 491; 11 do. 440; 4 do. N S. 51; 5 do. 571 to 599; 6 do. 76; 7 do. 44. 8 L. R. 43, 213, 555; 11 do. 175; 12 do. 190 ; 13 do. 293 ; 14 do. 169 ; 16 do. 596; 17 do. 589; 18 do. 557, 563. 2 R. R. 449 ; 3 do. 243; 5 do. 142; 6 do. 192; 8 do. 106; 9 do. 348 ; 12 do. 334. 1 Ann. 78; 2 do. 946. Bullard and Curry’s Digest, p. 286, secs. 1 and 2; p. 287, secs. 3, 4, 5. Civil Code, arts. 10, 42, 43, 44, 45, 77, 175, 929, 1130, 2270. Code of Practice, arts. 164, 166, 167, 168, 1022.
2d. The Notarial Acts, Renunciation, Community, &c. 10 M. R. pp. 577, 571; 12 do. 114; 3 do N. S. 626 ; 4 do. 543; 5 do. 257, 260, 361, 634 ; 6 do. 139, 207, 325. 2 L. R. 214, 565; 3 do. 29, 479 ; 4 do. 190, 191, 316, 461; 5 do. 113, 126, 395 ; 6 do. 105,185, 500; 7 do. 17, 42,156, 216, 226, 292: 8 do. 489; 9 do. 254; 10 do. 291, 453, 580; 11 do. 70, 176, 374; 12 do. 105, 539; 14 do. 523. 1 R. R. pp. 86, 378; 2 do. 182; 3 do. 171; 4 do. 71,128, 208, 207, 290, 335, 397; 5 do. 299, 475; 7 do. 398, 406, 418 ; 9 do. 3. 438. 2 Ann. 30, 226, 259, 575, 762. Civil Code, arts. 1, 10, 42,484,1315,1724,1755, 1761, 1767, 1791, 1792, 1797, 1815 to 1820, 1840, 1854, 1875, 1876, 1887. Acts of Legislature of Louisiana, 25th March, 1844, p. 99.
3d. The validity of the bequest and devise to the Seminary. 6 R. R. 235; 7 do. 146, 425, 481; 8 do. 262, 414 ; 9 do. 438; 12 do. 334, 539. 1 Ann. 162; 2 do. 377, 580, 774, 980. Civil Code, arts. 10, 483, 1652, 1705, 1706, 1708, 1717, 1718, 1721, 1941 to 1957.
5th. Whether the residuary legatees have to pay the specific legacies, or the children and seminary fro rata, or the executors out of the mass of the succession, as directed by the will. 8 L. R. 43; 11 do. 220; 17 do. 312. 2 R. R. 1; 12 do. 334, 639. 2 Ann. 30.
9th. The judgments homologating the administrations of the executors, are res judicata. 5 Mar. N. S. 466. 6 L. R. 472. 2 R. R. 429; 9 do. 438; 12 do. 334. Civil Code, arts. 429, 430, 1230, 1347, 1360, 1369, 1373,1374,1376, 1379,1480, 1489,1491, 1492, 1600, 1601, 1603, 1604, 1606, 1607, 1619, 1626, 1627, 3522, sec. 29.
12th. The ameliorations, &c., having been made on the plantations in the parish of West Feliciana, by.the executors, the' partition ought to be made. 1 Mar. N. S. 324 ; 6 do 350. 3 L. R. 494 ; 3 do. 128 ; 4 do. 300; 5 do. 107 ; 7 do. 383; 16 do. 483. 5 R. R. 453 ; 9 do. 438; 10 do. 118. Civil Code, arts. 1214, 1215, 1216, 1217, 1218, 1219, 1223, 1224, 1246 to 1253, 1258 to 1260, 1269, 1273, 1286 to 1304. Code of Practice, arts. 1020, 1021, 1022 to 1032.
J. A. Patterson, attorney and under-tutor.
We claim, that as the domicil of the father being in Louisiana, all the personal property of every kind and description, and wherever situated, belongs and must be distributed according to the laws of Louisiana, and refer the court to the following pages of the record for the testimony on that point: First, the declaration made and recorded in New Orleans, by Isaac Franklin, p. 352, and the testimony of several witnesses, proving his acts and declarations, pp. 360, 369, 384, 387, 391, 397, 401. See also the will, item 5: “At my death,” he states that it is his “ desire that his house servants shall be removed to Tennessee.”
If the court should be of opinion, that the renunciation made by the mother of the minor is binding and valid, then we claim thatthe community so renounced goes absolutely to the heirs, and no part of it to the residuary legatees, as it never belonged to the deceased in his lifetime, and if renounced by his widow, must go directly to the forced heirs. 7 R. R. 430. For the validity of the renunciations, he relies on the authorities cited by the counsel of the trustees.

Opinion:
By the court: (Preston, J. dissenting.)
Rost, J.
Adelecia Aciden, the former wife of Isaac Franklin, deceased, seeks to set aside, on the ground of error, various acts by which she renounced all her rights in the property composing the succession of her late husband, and claims her community rights therein, on the ground that at the time of her marriage with Franklin, in the State of Tennessee, in April, 1839, he was domiciliated in this State, and that the matrimonial domicil having been in Louisiana until the dissolution of the marriage, the distribution of the real estate acquired here during its continuance, and of the personal estate, wherever situated, should be according to the law of Louisiana.
The plaintiff, also, in her own right as heir of two of her children, deceased since their father, and as tutrix of Fmma Franklin, the only surviving issue of her former marriage, seeks further to annul the universal legacy made by Isaac Franklin, to his brothers James and William Franklin, in trust, for a seminary of learning to be established in Sumner county, in the State of Tennessee, so far as it disposes of property in Louisiana, on the ground that the title thus created is in violation of the laws of Louisiana; that its effect would be to tie up and to place out of commerce the property bequeathed, against the policy of the State; and that if the title was otherwise valid, it would be void by reason of the substitutions andJidei commissa which it contains.
The under-tutor of the minor has also intervened in her behalf, claiming the nullity of the universal legacy.
The defence to these claims is, that the domicil of origin of Isaac Franklin was in Sumner county, State of Tennessee, that he never changed it, and no community, at any time, existed between him and his wife. That he made for her, by his will, ample provisions, which she has accepted; and that she is estopped,.by her acceptance, from contesting the validity of any of its dispositions. That the acts of renunciation were signed by her, of her own free will, and with full knowledge of her legal rights.
The Franklin Institute has been incorporated by the Legislature of the State of Tennessee, with full power to receive the legacy and to carry the dispositions of the will into effect, and the trustees appointed under the act of incorporation, have made themselves parties to the record, and have joined the executors in the defence, averring the legality of the bequest in favor of James and William Franklin, of one-third of the plantations and slaves of Isaac Franklin, in Louisiana.
The record is voluminous, and the pleadings it contains raised many other issues in the district court, but I understand the points stated to be the only ones submitted for our decision; they were decided in the court below, in favor of Mrs. Acklen and her minor child. The executor and the trustees of the Franklin Institute have appealed from the judgment.
Article 2369 of the Civil Code provides, that every marriage contracted in this State, superinduces, of right, a community of acquets and gains, if there be no stipulation to the contrary.
The marriage, in this case, was not contracted in this State; it did not, therefore, superinduce of right a community of acquets and gains, and the existence ofthe community can only be predicated upon the next article of the code, which is as follows: " A marriage, contracted out of this State, between persons who afterwards come here to live, is also subjected to the community of acquets, with respect to such property as is acquired after their arrival."
To establish the position assumed, the plaintiff must show, that, after her Iaarl,jagej jjer husband and herself came here to live. She must make all the proof necessary to establish the domicil of Franklin in Louisiana; and further, that they both came to that domicil to live, and that they did live there until the marriage was dissolved, by the death of Franklin.
I will first dispose of the question of domicil, and, in relation to it, I may premise, that the district judge properly overruled the exception taken by the counsel of Mrs. Acklen, to the admission of the depositions taken under commission by the executors and trustees, to prove that the matrimonial domicil was in Tennessee, and because the cross-interrogatories have not been answered. Those depositions were received by the magistrate to whom the commission was sent, in the presence of the parties and their counsel, and the cross-interrogatories were answered, as far as the parties in interest desired them to be so; the cross-interrogatories, not answered, were irrelevant to the issue, and of such a character, as would have justified the district judge, if he had caused them to be erased from the records of his court.
The district judge says, in his opinion, that he is satisfied, from the evidence, that the domicil of Isaac Franklin, at the time of his marriage, and up to the period of his decease, was in the State of Louisiana. It is with great reluctance that we differ from the judges of the first instance on questions of fact; but'a question of domicil is not a mere question of fact, and we may well agree with our learned brother on all the facts going to show a residence in Louisiana, and, at the same time, differ from him on the legal inferences he draws from those facts, that the residence they establish, was the domicil of Isaac Franklin. His domicil of origin was in Sumner county, State of Tennessee; that domicil, of course, continued until another was acquired, ammo et facto. And the parties seeking to avail themselves of the change of domicil, from Tennessee to Louisiana, must prove it by express and positive evidence ; so long as any reasonable doubt remains, the legal presumption is, that it was not changed. See Grevillon's Heirs v. Richards' Exrs., 13 L. R. 299. Cole v. Lucas, 2 Ann. 250. Merlin Rep. verbo Domicil, § 2. Story's Conflict of Laws, No. 41.
Does the evidence, in this case, establish, beyond reasonable doubt, that the domicil of Isaac Franklin, at the time of his marriage, and up to the period of his decease, was in the State of Louisiana 1
The witnesses for Mrs. Acklen, all testify that much the largest portion of his fortune was in Louisiana ; that they considered him as domicilated in the State before and since his marriage ; and that, they believe, he so considered himself. The witnesses of the executors, in greater number, and of equally unimpeachable character, testify, still more positively, that his domicil was on his Fairview plantation, in Sumner county, State of Tennessee; that he so considered it himself, and that nobody there knew, or suspected, thatithad ever been changed. Conflicting, as this evidence is, the acts and declarations of Franklin himself are, if possible, still more so. He voted in the parish of East Feliciana, where his plantations are situated, for a member of the police jury, and also at the presidential election of 1844; on both occasions his vote was at first challenged, but finally received, on his declaration, that he had voted no where else for seven years. The justice of the peace who presided at those elections, has testified that Franklin was not sworn on those occasions, every body being satisfied with his declaration; yet, there is record evidence that he voted in Sumner county, in the State of Tennessee, at the general elections of 1841 and 1843, and that, up to the time of his death, his name was registered, under a law of the State, as a voter of that county. Many notarial acts are produced, passed between the years 1838 and 1846, in which he represented his domicil, or rather his residence, as being in Louisiana; but, it is in proof, that he availed himself of his privilege, as a citizen of Tennessee, to bring suits in the federal court, in this city, in 1840 and 1844 ; and that, in the latter part of 1845, a few months before his death, he was sued, as a citizen of Tennessee, in one of the courts of this city, and answered to the merits without pleading his domicil in West Feliciana. His statement to Mr. Warfield, that he could change his domicil from Louisiana to Tennessee, and back, for five dollars, when his business required it, shows what he understood by domicil, and that the animus manendi had nothing to do with it. The declaration of intention to change his domicil, from Tennessee to Louisiana, made in 1832, is falsified by his subsequent acts, and the erection of a permanent family residence in Tennessee. He was, at that time, a slave dealer, and was absent every summer from the State; the object of the declaration was, no doubt, to evade the law, as settled by the decisions of the Supreme Court, that the prescription of one year against the redhibitory action, was suspended during the absence of the party, who had sold the unsound slave. Morgan v. Robinson, 12 M. R. 76. Much reliance is placed on two letters from Franklin to his father-in-law; the first was written on board of a steamboat coming down the river, and in it, Franklin says, that he will, without accident, be at home on the next day; the other was written from New Orleans, in January, 1846, in which, after attending to the misconduct of his slaves on the Fairview plantation, he says: "I will be compelled to break up that whole establishment, if I do not change my mind. I will take the greater part of the hands off next fall, and put them on some of my lands in Louisiana; they give me more trouble than all my other property."
I do not attach to this evidence the importance which counsel do; he might well have his domicil in Tennessee, and call his Feliciana plantations his home, while in Louisiana. When he speaks of breaking up his establishment in Tennessee, he evidently contemplates the breaking up of the planting establishment there, by removing the greater part of the one hundred and thirty slaves, attached to the Fairview plantation, to Louisiana, and leaving only such as might be necessary for the care of the grounds and buildings, and of the stables and stock; he might have done all this without the least intention to change his domicil. The law which fixes the domicil of each citizen at the place where his principal establishment is situated, means the principal domestic establishment, not that where he may have the largest portion of his fortune. Art. 42 C. C.
In France, where, owing to the different systems of laws and customs formerly existing in the different provinces, questions of domicil have been much discussed, and are thoroughly understood, it is held, under a legislation which we have copied, that a place where a person exercises his political rights, and where the bulk ofhis property is situated, is not reputed his place of domicil, if that person, having a dwelling house elsewhere, habitually occupies it, and pays there his taxe personnelle et mobiliére. See the case of Saiffert v. Seranega, 10 Sirey, part 2, page 55.
There are other facts, not yet noticed, which far outweigh, in my mind, the statements in Franklin's letters, and the other evidence offered by Mrs. Acklen. Franklin was born in Sumner county, where his father gave him a farm, after he became of age; he then engaged in business, spending the summer months in the district of Columbia, and the remainder of the year in New Orleans and Natchez. He soon became wealthy, purchased the Fairview estat6) neal, his Tennessee farm, and erected upon it a large and costly mansion, which is shown to be the finest country residence in Tennessee. The grounds around were planted with choice trees, and laid out in the best manner; here he had green houses, flower gardens, sumptuous furniture, several fine carriages, choice wines of all kinds, a stable of race horses, a large quantity of blooded stock, and a number of picked servants, more than sufficient even for such an establishment. All this was done with the avowed purpose of making Fairview his permanent domicil. He was engaged in business until 1839, but although, up to that time, he only occupied his new dwelling a few days in each year, his intention, coupled with that occasional residence, was sufficient to continue his domicil on the Fairview estate. In 1838 he acquired a large estate in West Feliciana, and married Mrs. Acklen in the spring of 1839; from that time to his death, with one or two exceptions, he spent his summers with his family on the Fairview estate, leaving about the middle of October, of each year, to return to Louisiana, where he remained until the month of May following. The nature of his residence here is stated as follows, by Mr. Row, one of Mrs. Acklen's witnesses:
" Mr. Franklin usually remained at his plantation, when he returned in the fall, some one, two, or three weeks, and then took his family to New Orleans, where they remained some time, and returned to the plantation, and so went and returned to and from New Orleans, two or three times during the winter." Pie spent more than half of his time in the city of New Orleans, and, it is proved, that he passed the entire winter of 1845 there, in a rented house. The house he occupied, when upon the plantation, was old, and out of repair. The servants who waited upon him there, were those he brought with him every fall from Tennessee. He kept no carriages, had done nothing to improve the grounds, and had none of those comforts and luxuries in which he delighted, and by which his home in Tennessee was rendered conspicuous. The feet, sworn to by some of the witnesses, that he intended to erect a new house in 'West Feliciana, weighs but little on the question of domicil at the time of the marriage. In 1841, when he was declaring, in notarial acts, that his domicil was in this State, he was secretly making his will, in which he represents himself as of Sumner county, State of Tennessee, now residing, for the present, in West Feliciana; designates the Fairview estate as the future residence of his wife and children, and gives his wife the household and kitchen furniture, and the stock of wines and groceries, found on the place at the time of his death. None of these, which so essentially constitute his domestic establishment, appear to have existed on the Louisiana plantation. In that will, also, be ordered his executors to consecrate at least one acre of ground on the Fairview estate, to the erection of an expensive family vault, in which his remains, those of his wife and children, and of such other members of his family as might choose to be entombed there, were to be deposited, and requested them, if he should die at any other place, to have his remains removed there without unnecessary delay. I take this disposition and request to be strong evidence against Mrs. Acklen. The belief of the Romans, that the souls of the departed abided near their earthly remains, and, under the name of lares, were the guardian spirits of their descendants, was a beautiful superstition, and, even Christians may hope, without sin, that they will be permitted, in another life, to watch over and protect their offspring. The reason of the rule of the civil law, which made the presence of the lar indicative of the place of domicil, has survived the superstition that gave it birth.
The place selected by the testator, in this case, for the final resting place of himself and his family, was, I cannot doubt, the home of his choice, the place where his spirit dwelt during life, and whence, in the language of the Roman Code, he had no desire to depart, unless compelled by business, and was a wanderer when he had left it, but ceased to be so when he returned to it. C. 10, 39, 1. 7.
The law of domicil, as it bears upon a case where the party has two residences, was examined with great care by this court, in the case of Hill et al. v. Spangenburg, 4 Ann.; and the authorities adduced in this case, have confirmed us in the view we then took. " Where each of the residences is accompanied by some of the circumstances, going to show the existence of the domicil, the judge should be guided by the most convincing; he should also take their number into consideration ; and if, by their weight and number, they neutralize each other, the presumption that there has been no intention to change the domicil, must prevail; and, if the party has divided his time alternately between the two places, this habitual change should be considered as of no importance, if he has not done, where the new domicil is claimed, a series of acts, proving, beyond reasonable doubt, his intention to abandon his old domicil." 1 Duranton, No. 358. Tested by these principles, the case is clearly against Mrs. Aciden. So far from having shown affirmatively, as she was bound to do, that the domicil had been changed, I think it is satisfactorily proved that the change never took place. Franklin's domicil having continued in Tennessee, it necessarily follows that he and the plaintiff never came here to live, and that their marriage was not subjected to community of acquets and gains.
This case is strikingly similar to that of DeSinceny, c. Ses. Syndics, found in Dalloz, 1849, 2 part. p. 71. The plaintiff, in that case, had established at his new place of residence a large sugar refinery, had lived there many years, had been appointed maire of the commune, chef de bataillon of the national guards, and placed on the list of electors, had represented himself in a great number of acts as a sugar refiner of that commune, and had made.a declaration of domicil, in due form, a short time before his failure.
But the court, considering that the first domicil was that of his nativity; that it had been his habitual place of residence; that the traditions of his family and the habits of his life, as well as the largest portion of his fortune were there; that if, in a great number of acts, under private signature, he stated the last place of residence to be his domicil, those declarations lost their weight when at the same epoch, and in acts more serious, he retained his original domicil; that the declaration of domicil lately made by him, would not have been necessary, if, in truth, his domicil had been as stated, and was, moreover, falsifi ed by the facts of the case ; that his furniture and household establishment were still at the original domicil, and that none of the facts proved, implied the certainty of the complete abandonment of that domicil, maintained the exception to the jurisdic-' tion bf the court of his last place of residence, over the cessio bonorum.
Having come to the conclusion that no community ever existed between Mrs. Acklen and Isaac Franklin, it is unnecessary to examine the grounds of nullity alleged against the acts of renunciation, which she signed; her rights against the succession rest upon the will alone, and the errors set up by her have not impaired those rights.
The only question remaining is as to the validity of the bequest of one-third of the real estate and slaves belonging to the succession of Isaac Franklin, in Louisiana, to James and William Franklin, in trust, for the Franklin Institute,
The bequest is as follows: " I give and bequeath all my property, real and personal, of whatever kind or nature, that is situated in the States of Tennessee and Mississippi, or any other common law State where trust estates can be created, together with my bank stocks, and effects, and credits; and in case I should have no other children by my said marriage, except my said daughter Victoria, then two-thirds of all my property, movable and immovable, that is situated in the State of Louisiana; but if there should be two children born of said marriage, then only an undivided half of all my said property, movable and immovable, slaves, &c., that is situated in said State of Louisiana; and, if there should be three or more children born of said marriage, then I only give an undivided one-third part of all my said property, movable and immovable, slaves, &c., that is situated, lying and being in said State of Louisiana; and, also, the rest and residue of my estate, wherever situated, in trust to my two brothers James and William Franklin, of Sumner county aforesaid, for the following purposes, to wit: The revenues arising from said property, bank stock, and such money, funds or other credits due me, as may remain after the payment of the several legacies and devises, annuities, increase and ameliorations of my said plantations in Louisiana, and other purposes, as directed by this will, together with the revenues arising from my plantations in Tennessee, and other property in Tennessee and Mississippi and other common law States, together with the dividends of my bank stock and interest on money and debts due me ; and the revenues of the one-third, one-half, or two-thirds of all my property situated in the State of Louisiana', as the case may be, by the birth of children of my said marriage, after the payment of said several devises and legacies, annuities and expenditures, increase and ameliorations of said plantations in Louisiana, &c., to be laid out in building proper and suitable edifices, on my said Fairview plantation, in the county of Sumner and State of Tennessee, for an academy or seminary; the furnishing the same with fixtures and furniture, and the employment of such teachers and professors, male and female, as may be considered necessary by my said trustees for the education, board and clothing of the children of my brothers and sisters and their descendants, as well as my own children and their descendants, in the best and most suitable and proper manner for American youths, having a particular regard to a substantial and good English education, and such other, higher and ornamental branches as the aforesaid revenues, &c., will enable my said trustees to accomplish; and if the revenues, &c., should be sufficient therefor, I also wish that the poor children in said county of Sumner, of unexceptionable character, and such as my said trustees may select, should likewise be educated and supported, during the time, at the same seminary; and after the death of my aforesaid brothers, it is my will and desire that the aforesaid trust shall be continued and pass over forever in the heirs of my said brothers, to pass the estate, and that the magistrates of the county court of said county of Sumner, and State of Tennessee, and their successors in office, be hereafter the perpetual superintendents of the aforesaid seminary, to see that my intentions are fully carried into effect."
The title which the testator has attempted to create, belongs to a class of tenures familiar in the other States of this Union, where the common law prevails, but unknown to the laws of Louisiana. And the jurisprudence regulating and defining the almost infinite variety of those tenures, and the rights of obligations arising under each, forms one of the most important and intricate portions of that artificial system of laws. I do not see the possibility of recognizing trust j estates here, without letting in all the law which regulates that peculiar tenure j of property. Counsel hare referred us to no precedent that would authorize or justify the enforcement of such a title; and it is a self-evident proposition, that the constitutional inhibition to the Legislature to adopt any system of foreign laws, by general reference, would be rendered nugatory, if courts of justice assumed the power to introduce those systems, by piecemeal, in this insidious manner.
The case of Harper v. Stansborough, 2 Ann. 380, was a much stronger one than the present in favor of the legatee ; in that case the bequest had been made in the State of Mississippi, where it was authorized by law; the testator had died there, and the law of that State had had its full effect on the slaves in dispute, during several years, when they were removed to Louisiana, where the surviving son of the testator came to claim them from Stansborough, who had purchased them at the probate sale of the succession of the other son, on the ground, that by the dispositions of the will they were to revert to him after the death of his brother. Even under that state of facts we held, that as no such title to property, as that under which the plaintiff claimed, was recognized by the laws of Louisiana, the courts of the State could not enforce it upon property found here, although it might be valid in the place where it was created. The chief justice, who was the organ of the court in that case, says, " slaves are considered in Louisiana as immovables, and it rests with the legislative power of the State, exclusively, to regulate the different descriptions of property, or ownership in relation to them. The modifications of the rights of property, under our laws, are few and easily understood, and answer all the purposes of reasonable use; it is incumbent on courts to maintain them in their simplicity."
This opinion has since been reviewed and affirmed in the case of Terrell et al. v. Allen, 7 Ann., and the principle it involves is recognized in every system of jurisprudence. It is thus elucidated by Lord Brougham, in the case of Kippell v. Bayley, 8th English Chancery Reports, 120: " There are certain known incidents to property and its enjoyment; among others, certain burdens wherewith it may be affected, or rights which may be created and enjoined over it by parties other than the owner, all which incidents were recognized by law.
" All kinds of property, however, all these holdings, are known to the law, and familiarly dealt with by its principles. But it must not, therefore, be supposed that incidents of a moral kind can be devised and attached to property, at the fancy or caprice of any owner. It is clearly inconvenient to the science of the law and the public weal, that such latitude should be given. There can be no harm in allowing the fullest latitude to men in binding themselves and their representatives — that is, their assets, real and personal, to answer in damages for breach of their obligations. This tends to no mischief, and is a reasonable liberty to bestow; but, great detriment would arise, and much confusion of rights, if parties were allowed to invent new modes of holding and enjoying real property, and to impress upon their lands and tenements a peculiar character, which should follow them into all hands, however remote."
It was contended, in argument, that the only illegal conditions which could affect the validity of a testamentary disposition, were those containing prohibited subsitutions; that all other illegal or impossible conditions were to be reputed not written.
Under the hypothesis, that the words in trust, in this case, should be reputed not written, the title must have vested in the original trustees, in full ownership; and, if it did, the charge to preserve and return the property to other persons after them, would be such a substitution as would avoid the entire disposition. gut I am satisfied that this case does not come within the rule established by al.|.jc]e J5O0 0f the code.
When the words of the testamentary disposition are sufficient to vest a legal title in the legatee, and the intention of the testator to create such a title for his benefit, to the exclusion of the heirs at law, and of all other persons, is ascertained, then, in furtherance of that intention, any impossible or illegal condition the disposition may contain, is presumed to. have been inserted inadvertently and is reputed in law, not written; but where the title, created by the will, as ascertained by the words used and the intention of the testator is a tenure of property which our laws do not recognize, the attempt to change the nature of it and to convert it into a title valid under our laws, would no longer be an interpretation of the will, but the making of a new will for the testator. When it is manifest, says Coin Delisle, that the testator has not correctly expressed his thoughts, the proper, natural and unusual sense of the words should only be departed from, to adopt the less usual and less correct sense which the will shows he gave to them, without placing arbitrarily in the place of the written disposition, another disposition which the terms used in no sense authorize; this would no longer be interpreting or explaining the will, it would be disposing for the testator. Donat, and Test, book 3, tit. 2, No. 7.
I put this case upon the principle, that when the conviction is of the essence of the title created by the bequest, and intended by the testator, so that the title cannot stand without it, if that title be one which the law does not recognize, courts of justice cannot replace it by another, and the disposition must fall.
There is another serious objection to the claim of the trustees. Art. 1477 of the code provides, that donations mortis causa may be made in favor of a stranger, when the laws of his country do not prohibit similar dispositions from being made in favor of a citizen of this State. The property bequeathed, now in controversy, is all immovable under our laws, and is to be held in Tennessee, for the benefit -of a charity created there. The trustees have not shown, that neither a citizen or a corporation of Louisiana, can take real estate by will in Tennessee, or if they can, that they would have power to hold and administer it, for a charity in Louisiana. It is said they may, because the prohibition of the code has exclusive reference to citizens of other countries, and should not be extended to sovereign States or corporations. This is manifestly wrong; the authority of Maekeldy, cited in support of another part of this case, shows, that under the civil law, corporations required the action of government to give them the powers of natural persons, and that they possess no others.
By the textual provision of our code, corporations legally ordained, are substituted for persons. Art. 423. Milne's Heirs v. Milne's Executors, 17 L.R. 54. The only questions which have heretofore arisen under that provision, were, whether corporations had the capacity to take by will, as natural persons ; it has never been pretended before, that they enjoyed all the rights without being subject to the disabilities of natural persons. It has' been urged, that the prohibition to a citizen of Louisiana to make donations mortis causa in favor of citizens of other States, conflicts with the second section of the 4th article of the Federal Constitution, guaranteeing to the citizens of each State, all the privileges of citizens of the several States. This argument may be answered by inquiring, whether the article of the Constitution also applies to black citizens of Massachusetts or Ohio coming to Louisiana, and whether such a Iatitu diñarían construction would not be destructive of the sovereignty of the State, as well as of the security of its inhabitants.
The disability of citizens of one State to inherit real estate in another, as well as the disabilities resulting from color in the slave States, existed before the adoption of the Federal Constitution, and during the sixty three years it has been in operation, the article invoked has never been held to apply to either class of cases. It is too late now to adopt a different interpretation.
But all this argument assumes, that there is in this case a foreign corporation created, in execution of the will of the testator. The fact is not so. The bequest is not made to a corporation to be created after the death. And I do not understand how the trustees under the will, can be viewed merely as detainers of the estate until the charity was incorporated, and the bequest itself, a naked trust, uncoupled with an interest, to be executed as soon as practicable, when the testator, so far from providing for such an incorporation, expressly directs that the trust shall be continued and pass over forever in the trustees appointed and their heirs. Nor is it true, that the trust was uncoupled with an interest. The charity of the testator began at home; the institution contemplated by him, is for the education of the descendants of the trustees, who were, in succession, to manage the trust to the end of time; they all had a direct interest in the bequest, and on that ground also, if the title was otherwise valid, I would be inclined to consider the bequest not merely as an attempt to create a perpetuity, but as containing an indefinite series of prohibited substitutions. In principle, this case cannot be distinguished from that of the Philadelphia Baptist Association et al. v. Hart's Executors, 4 Wheaton, p. 1, decided under a system of laws, which goes further than ours in the maintenance of charitable bequests. In that case, the bequest was made in trust to an association unknown to the law; the court held, that it could not take, and that its subsequent incorporation could not give it capacity to receive, to the prejudice of the next of kin ; the court intimated, that if the trustees named in the will had been authorized to execute it, as individuals, the bequest would have been sustained, because trust estates are recognized at common law; but as they are unknown to the laws of Louisiana, the trustees in this case occupy identically the same position which the individual members of the unincorporated association occupied in the other. Chief Justice Marshall, the organ of 'the court in that case, said .in his opinion, " the bequest was intended for a society which was not at the time, and might never be, capable of taking it; according to law, it is gone forever; the legacy is void, and the property vests, if not otherwise disposed of by the will, in the next of kin. A body corporate, afterwards created, had it even fitted the description of the will, cannot divest this interest, and claim it for their corporation." ,
In a subsequent case, Mr. Justice Story says, with reference to that opinion, " upon that occasion, I had prepared a separate opinion, but that of the chief justice was so satisfactory to me, that I did not deem it necessary to deliver my own." 3 Peters, 148.
The case of Milne's Heirs v. Milne's Executors, already quoted, was one of a bequest per verba de futuro to corporations not then in existence, which was to take effect when the corporations should be created. And in the case of Inglis v. The Trustees of the Sailors' Snugharbor, 3 Peters, 145, the majority of the Supreme Court of the United States, interpreted the devise as being one of the same class; neither of these cases conflicts with the decision in the case of the Baptist Association, which is on all hands, admitted to be law. I concede, that the weight of authority, under our system of jurisprudence as well as at common law, is in favor of the validity of dispositions per verba de futuro, to corporations not in esse, to take effect when they are created. But the bequest in this case, is of a different kind; in the words of Judge Story, " it is a devise in presentí, to persons who should be officers at the death of the testator, and to their successors in the trust; the vesting of the devise was not to be postponed to a future time, until a corporation could be created. It was to take immediate effect, as in the case of the Baptist Association. See the case of the Sailors' Snugharbor.
It has been further urged, that the character of this legacy as a charity, entitles it to the protection of the court, and that we are bound to interpret it in the sense in which it can have effect, rather than that in which it can have none. This rule of interpretation is subordinate to the one which precedes it in the code, that in the construction of acts of last will, the intention of the testator must principally be endeavored to be ascertained, and is only applicable to cases in which that intention is left doubtful. Art. 1705.
A testament is a law, and the first duty of courts in this, as in other laws, is to ascertain the mens legislatoris; when it is once ascertained, beyond reasonable doubt, it must be followed, and the disposition stands or falls, as the intention of the testator can or not be carried into effect consistently with the rules of law. The testator's intention in this case, was to create a perpetuity and a new tenure of property; that intention is a legal impossibility, and the disposition falls.
Under the view I have taken of the case, it is unnecessary to answer the argument, that the establishment of perpetuities by will, is not prohibited in Louisiana. I may state, however, that the powers given to testators by the code, are exceptions to the general law, regulating the devolution of property; that they are limited both as to form and substance, and that it is not enough to say, that perpetuities are not prohibited, it should be shown that they are authorized. The testator has full power to vest in his legatees the title to the property he leaves; but he cannot vest in them a title which he has not, and if he attempts to do so, the legal title of which he does not dispose, passes to his heirs at law; the extent of his power over his property after his death, is the right to separate the usufruct from the ownership for a single life. If he attempts in any manner to control the descent of the properly after the death of the first legatee, the entire disposition falls. He cannot change the nature of the title he transmits, or, in the language of Lord Brougham, " impress upon his lands and tenements a peculiar character, which should follow them into all hands however remote;" such as would be impressed upon them by the creation of a perpetuity. His power is limited to the transmission of the title he holds. He may use, and abuse, his property, while he lives, and delegate those rights to others by will; but he must divest himself of both, when the power to use terminates; by his death the right to abuse also ceases; and if he attempts to exercise that right by creating a title which cannot be enforced, without subjecting the soil of Louisiana to the dominion of foreign laws, the disposition falls, and is superseded by the general law of successions, unless the heirs at law have themselves been superseded by other dispositions in the will.
For the reasons assigned, it is ordered, that the judgment in this case be reversed. It is further ordered, that in the settlement of the succession of Isaac Franklin, his domicil be considered as having been in the county of Sumner in the State of Tennessee. It is -further ordered, that the compromises entered into between Mrs. Acklen and the executors, and the renunciations made by her to the community rights she might have in the property left by Isaac Franklin, be held valid and binding; and that there be judgment against her upon her claim, as common in acquets and gains. It is further ordered, that the universal bequest contained in the will in favor of James and William Franklin, in trust for the purposes therein specified, be set aside and annulled, so far as it bears on the real estate, slaves and immovables, by the destination of law in the State of Louisiana. It is-further ordered, that the said Mrs. Acklen recover from the executors and trustees of the Franklin Institute, all the said real estate, slaves and immovables, by the destination of law in Louisiana, 19-96ths in her own right as heir of her two children, Victoria and Adelicia Franklin, and the other 77-96ths as tutorix of her minor daughter Emma Franklin. It is further ordered, that the costs of the district court be paid by the succession, and those of this appeal by Mrs. Acklen.
Slidem, J.
I. "A marriage, contracted out of this State, between persons who afterwards come here to live, (s'y élablir,) is also subjected to the community of acquets, with respect to such property as is acquired after their arrival." Civil Code, 2370.
Did Franklin and his wife live in Louisiana — were they established here, in the true sense of the language used in the code?
We are first to ascertain the true meaning of those expressions, and then apply them to the facts of the case.
My opinion is, that by these words, we are to understand the domestic domicil, the true and permanent home; that domestic hearth, where the husband and wife have surrounded themselves and their offspring with the comforts of domestic life, and from which, when he and his wife occasionally depart, for the purposes of business or pleasure, they do so with the intention to return.
I acknowledge, that when I attempt to apply these principles to the conflicting testimony in this cause, there is some difficulty. My first impression, at the oral argument, was rather in favor of Mrs. Acklen's pretensions. But, on carefully perusing the evidence, after stripping the case of the difficulties which the untruthfulness of Franklin, in his public acts and declarations, has thrown around it, and endeavoring to ascertain the true intention, the true circumstances, the true acts, which ought to control this question, my mind has been brought to the conclusion, that the true, fixed, and permanent home of the husband and wife was in Tennessee; and that Louisiana was, both to himself and his wife, after their marriage, a temporary resort, for the purposes of business and pleasure. I consider Louisiana their transitory residence, for those purposes, during a portion of the year, and Tennessee their home.
In coming to this conclusion upon this mixed question of law and fact, I have been influenced by the well-settled legal principle, that where there is doubt upon such a question, the original home is to be considered the true home.
1 therefore conclude, that between Franklin and his wife, the community of acquets did not exist.
II. With regard to the bequest to his brothers and their heirs, forever, in trust, of certain property, the revenues to be employed in establishing and maintaining an academy in Tennessee, to be superintended by the magistrates of Sumner county, and their successors in office, as particularly set forth in the will, to which I refer for a more full exhibition of the terms and nature of the bequest. j am cjear]y 0f opinion, and was so from my first perusal of the will, that said bequest is void, so far as concerns the immovables in Louisiana.
I consider it as establishing a tenure of property unknown to our laws, highly inconsistent with their spirit, creating an entail, and, substantially, involving, in a very aggravated form, prohibited fidei commissum and substitution.
I will observe, that it is not pretended that the testator ever had the idea of conferring a benefit upon his brothers, to whom he gave what, in the language of a foreign jurisprudence, with reference to which the will was framed, would be called the legal estate. This point has been satisfactorily discussed in the opinion of Mr. Justice Rost, and I do not think it necessary to enlarge upon it.
For the above reasons, and referring to the views of Mr. Justice Rost, in which, mainly, I concur, for an ample discussion of the law and facts, I accede to the decree prepared by him.
Eustis, O. J. After a very careful examination of the testimony concerning the place where Franklin must be held'as having lived, in ihe sensd of the code, I concur in opinion with Justices Rost and Slidell.
In relation to the validity of the trust estate attempted to be established by the will, I scarcely consider the question as an open one, in the present state of our jurisprudence; and I consider the argument in their favor, as a proposition to make an entire innovation in the law of titles to real property, and to introduce the English trust estate, in opposition to the positive prohibition of the code and the established jurisprudence on that subject.
In the prohibition of the code of 1808, which has remained unchanged by that of 1825, I think the most general and comprehensive terms which the legislator considered appropriate, have been made use of. At the commencement of the dominion of the United States in Louisiana, some of the lawyers from the old States were disposed to introduce here the system of laws with which they were familiar. It was natural for them to prefer a change which would enable them at once to make available what they had already acquired, to the toil of learning a system with which they were unacquainted, and which presented the additional difficulty of being in a foreign language. Efforts were not spared by this portion of the profession'to introduce the common law, as it has been since introduced and prevails in the other States, whose territory formerly belonged to France and Spain.
But of the members of the bar conversant with the common law, the most eminent did not favor its introduction as a general system, and the consequent exclusion of the civil law. In relation to public and personal rights in criminal proceedings, in commercial and maritime cases, the laws of Louisiana were assimilated to those of the other States; but, in relation to real property, and its tenures, the common law or the English equity system has never had place in Louisiana.
The views of these distinguished men, reflecting the evident sense of the people, were impressed on the legislation of the State. The subject was deemed of such moment, that it was not trusted to ordinary legislation; and hence the provisions, in both the Constitutions of 1812 and 1845, which prohibit the introduction of any system of laws by general reference.
In this condition of opinion, the codes of 1808 and 1825 were prepared and enacl ed. The prohibition certainly embraced the substitutions and fidei commissa of the Roman, the French and the Spanish laws. Strange, indeed, would it be if the prohibition, embracing all these, should exclude the English trusts and retainders, with all their train of intricate and, except to the initiated, unintelligible modes and distinctions.
This prohibition was established from policy, in the interest of public order, for the purpose of preserving the simplicity of titles, which were all allodial, and which it was for the interest of society to maintain in their plain and intelligible form.
The terms made use of being thus general, the object of the legislator being known, a construction which would defeat its Salutary purpose, is not to be given to it; and such, a construction never has been given to it, to my knowledge.
Let us suppose at the time, the question had been put to the legislative council which enacted, or the jurisconsults who prepared, the code of 1808, or to the governor under whose authority it was made, whether the English trusts, executory devises, and the appurtenant jurisprudence was excluded from this prohibition, and were to be introduced into the titles to real property, can a doubt exist as to what would have been the answer ? B ut did the term, Jidei commissa, in its general sense, include trusts 1 Was it so intended, and was it so used in the prohibitive clause by the legislator ?
Kent says, " A use is where the use of land is in A. in trust; that B shall take the profits, and that A will make and execute estates according to the direction of B."
"In examining the history of uses, we shall find that they existed in the Roman law, under the name of Jidei commissa, or trusts," vol. 4, p. 289.
Uses and trusts are, in their original, of a nature very similar, or rather exactly the same, answering more to the Jidei commissum than the usus fructus of the civil law. 2 Blackstone, 327.
If the word Jidei cbmmissa was used in the sense in which the learned commentators used it, it must be considered synonymous with the word trusts. Indeed, it cannot be believed that all trusts were prohibited by the code except English trusts, and that the most obnoxious of all titles, from its complicity and origin, were exempted from this sweeping prohibition and allowed to have a place among the tenures of real property.
It is true that the English trust estate did not exist under the Roman law; it had its origin at another period; but it can be assigned to no place under that system of jurisprudence except as a Jidei commissum, in its general sense. In its features it certainly most resembles an usufruct, but it is not one, it wants many of the essential requisites of that title.
A trust, as attempted to be created by this will, is a right in equity to the beneficial enjoyment of lands and slaves, of which the legal title remains vested in some other person.
That Jidei commissa was held to mean trusts, has, I think, been uniformly held by our courts.
In Maihurin v. Livaudais, the testator had a son who was a slave, and he bequeathed a sum of money to the master as a part of the price of his emancipation. This legacy was attacked on the allegation of its being aJidei commissum. The court said, " Our code declares that substitutions and fidei commissa are abolished." But the object of this jurisprudence was, as it is well known, to prevent property from being tied up for a length of time in the hands of individuals and placed out of the reach of commerce.
The framers of our code never contemplated to abolish naked trusts, uncoupled with an interest, which were to be executed immediately. If they had, they would not have provided, in a subsequent part of the work, for testamentary executors, described their duties and recognized the validity of their acts. The obligation imposed on the legatee, by the acts of the testator, cannot be distinguished from that of the executor, except in name. 5 M. R. 302. Judge Martin, in delivering the opinion of the court in the case of Clague v. Clague, in a clause of a will by which the executors were directed to retain the property of the succession until the majority of the testator's children, says: " Such a disposition is indeed afidei commissum or trust, which the law forbids."
I do not deem it important to refer to any other decisions on this point, because I have no knowledge of any trust estate, created under the laws of this State, nor of any case in which the legality of such an estate has ever been recognized by our courts.
There are. cases in which assignments of insolvents, residing out of the State, have been recognized, and foreign assignees, syndics and mandatories have been permitted to sue for and recover property to which they were entitled, for the benefit of creditors. There are certain testamentary trusts, which so far from being prohibited, are expressly recognized by the code, and are absolutely necessary in order to carry into effect the lawful dispositions of testators.
But I am not aware of any trust estate created in Louisiana, which has been recognized as a legal ten ure, adversely to third persons having an interest. Of the difficulty of dealing with this description of title, which has sometimes been under adjudication, or deeds of trust made out of the State, some idea may be formed by referring to the cases of Ricks v. Goodrich, 3 Ann. 212. Hayden v. Nutt, 4 Ann. 65. Gaulden v. McPhaul, 4 Ann. 79.
Mr. Justice McLean, the organ of the Supreme Court of the United States, in the case of Gaines v. Chew, 2 Howards' Reports 650, so understood the jurisprudence of this State. After quoting the article 1507, he says, " This abolishes express trusts," &c.
I feel at liberty to avail myself of the labors of the distinguished jurisconsults, whose memoire has been submitted to us in the case of McDonogh's will, now under advisement, and to add to my humble convictions, the well deserved weight of their learning and eminent position in the science of jurisprudence. I say, I feel myself at liberty, because their opinion on this point has no connection with anything at all questionable, which is to be decided in that case, in the judgment of any of the judges; otherwise, however strong the temptation to secure such aid, my duty would require me not to adopt it on this occasion. These learned gentlemen say, " To us, this word fidei commissa appears to have been added to the article 896 of the French Civil Code, in the article 1507 of the Louisiana Code, in consequence of the English origin of the other States of the Union, and to prohibit, at the sametime, as much the substitutions of the old French law, as the trusts of the English law."
I am under the conviction, that the right which a man has to dispose of his property by will, to take effect after his death, is derived exclusively from the law of the land, which has established this right as an incident to the right of property. The law has, code 476, ordained certain forms, and imposed certain conditions on this species of alienation, which are essential to its validity. Code 1453. A man has no more power to create new or prohibited modes of property, in the exercise of his right to make a will, than he has in a sale or a donation inter vivos. Between parties, they may hold their property by any tenure or terms they please; but as to the establishment of titles effecting the property itself, there is no power in man out of the law. Nor has society any interest in attempting to cany into effect the conceits of the dead, to the disturbance of the rules of public order and policy, which regulate the living.
I am, under this conviction, relieved from the necessity of entering into any other considerations, than those which the law holds as controlling the effect to be given to this will.
It is contended in argument, that the article 1506 of the code, is to be applied to the testamentary disposition under consideration. That article provides, that in all dispositions inter vivos and causa mortis, impossible conditions, and those which are contrary to the laws or to morals, are reputed not written.
I do no't understand this article as applicable to this disposition. It is not conditional. The title it creates is absolute — a trust estate. The trust may, by inference, be called a condition, but the trust is of the essence of the title, and I consider the title not as a conditional one, but as an impossible title. I think it would be a forced and inadmissible construction to give such an application to this article. I have found no authority which would support it.
This testamentary disposition, I conceive, confers no ownership on the legatees, and the court must hold it to be inoperative and of no effect.
Having come to this conclusion, it only remains for me to state my concurrence in the decree prepared by Mr. Justice Rost.