Case Name: STATE of Louisiana, Appellee, v. Wilbert JONES, Appellant
Court: Louisiana Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1973-09-24
Citations: 283 So. 2d 476
Docket Number: No. 53421
Parties: STATE of Louisiana, Appellee, v. Wilbert JONES, Appellant.
Judges: SANDERS, C. J., dissents with written reasons.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 283
Pages: 476–482

Head Matter:
STATE of Louisiana, Appellee, v. Wilbert JONES, Appellant.
No. 53421.
Supreme Court of Louisiana.
Sept. 24, 1973.
Warren J. Hebert, New Orleans, for defendant-appellant.
William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., LeRoy A. Hartley, Sp. Counsel to Atty. Gen., Os-sie Brown, Dist. Atty., Nathan E. Wilson, Asst. Dist. Atty., for plaintiff-appellee.

Opinion:
TATE, Justice.
The defendant Jones was convicted of aggravated rape, La.R.S. 14:42, and sentenced to life imprisonment. On his appeal, he relies primarly upon four bills of exceptions. We 'find merit in two of them and reverse.
Bill of Exceptions No. 2
During his opening statement to the jury, the assistant district attorney made the following comment:
" I might indicate, while she [the rape victim] was driving around, the individual, Wilbert Jones, the accused in this instance, related to her something about white people having been taking advantage of the colored people and, of course, he wanted to get even with the white people
The defendant reserved this bill when the trial court overruled his objection to this statement as a prohibited reference to race.
Under Louisiana law, a mistrial is mandatory when a prosecutor refers "directly or indirectly" to race or color, where "the remark or comment is not material and not relevant and might create prejudice against the defendant in the mind of the jury." La.C.Cr.P. Art. 770(1).
The statement in question was clearly of an effect to prejudice the white jury against this black defendant. It was not material or relevant, La.R.S. 15:441, to prove any of the essential elements of aggravated rape, La.R.S. 14:40, 14:42, nor to explain a relevant fact in connection with such proof. Further, as the state admits and as the transcript of evidence shows, the victim did not testify at the trial that the defendant told her he wanted to get even with the white people — that is, the statement of the district attorney appealing to racial prejudice was incorrect and was not supported by evidence introduced at the trial.
In the recent case of State v. Kaufman, 278 So.2d 86, 98 (La.Sup.Ct.1973), we cited an unbroken line of decisions in support of our statement that:
"The purpose of this mandatory prohibition of our 1966 code is to avoid the use of racial prejudice to obtain convictions. This is in accord with our jurisprudence since our earliest days as an American jurisdiction. It is, of course, founded upon a stringent requirement that trials be conducted in accordance with law and that convictions be founded on evidence of guilt and not upon prejudice. Without this mandatory rule of law, the convictions of innocent defendants may be secured, not because of their guilt, but because of their race."
For similar reasons we here find reversible error in a violation of this mandatory prohibition of our Code of Criminal Procedure against prosecutorial comments which, without legal excuse, directly or indirectly appeal to racial prejudice.
Bill of Exceptions No. 6
After evidence was taken that the defendant had been properly identified by the victim at a line-up, one of the police officers was asked to identify pictures of the defendant the night he was arrested. These were "mug shots" showing frontal and side views of the defendant standing before a screen containing ruled lines and numerals indicating the height of the person being photographed. Inserts at the bottom of the photographs indicate the date (1-14-72) and an identifying number (E.B.R.S.0.-102182). The defendant is shown wearing an unpressed, ill-fitting, open color shirt commonly referred to as "jail clothes".
The defendant reserved this bill when his objection was overruled to the admission of these pictures as irrelevant and prejudicial. These pictures were allegedly introduced to show the defendant's hair condition on the night he was arrested, three months after the rape, and his height. Other evidence to prove these marginally relevant points had been admitted and was available. Under the circumstances, the mug shots (which connote a criminal record and create a prejudicial effect upon a jury) were not admissible for this purpose, for their prejudicial effect far outweighed their probative value.
See, e.g.: State v. Hatcher, 277 N.C. 380, 177 S.E.2d 892 (1970); Blue v. State, 235 N.E.2d 471, 30 A.L.R.3d 902, 907 (Indiana Sup.Ct.1968); Barnes v. United States, 124 U.S.App.D.C. 318, 365 F.2d 509 (1966); Annotation, Mug Shots—Admissibility—Prejudice, 30 A.L.R.3d 908 (1970); 29 Am.Jur.2d "Evidence", Section 785 (1967).
Decree
For the foregoing reasons, the conviction and sentence are reversed, and the case is remanded for a new trial.
Reversed and remanded.
SANDERS, C. J., dissents with written reasons.
SUMMERS, J., dissents with written reasons.
MARCUS, J., dissents.
. The full text of the mandatory provision of Article 770 in this regard is:
"Upon motion of a defendant, a' mistrial shall be ordered when a remark or comment, made within the hearing of the jury by the judge, district attorney, or a court official, during the trial or in argument, refers directly or indirectly to :
"(1) Race, religion, color or national origin, if the remark or comment is not material and relevant and might create prejudice against the defendant in the mind of the jury; * :¡! *
"An admonition to the jury to disregard the remark or comment shall not be sufficient to prevent a mistrial. If the defendant, however, request that only an admonition be given, the court shall admonish the jury to disregard the remark or comment but shall not declare a mistrial." (Italics ours.)