Case Name: Evans CASSO v. UNITED CABS, INC., et al.
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1997-01-29
Citations: 688 So. 2d 180
Docket Number: No. 96-CA-0982
Parties: Evans CASSO v. UNITED CABS, INC., et al.
Judges: Bfore CIACCIO, PLOTKIN and LANDRIEU, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 688
Pages: 180–187

Head Matter:
Evans CASSO v. UNITED CABS, INC., et al.
No. 96-CA-0982.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fourth Circuit.
Jan. 29, 1997.
Writ Denied April 4, 1997.
William E. Mura, Jr., New Orleans, for Plaintiff/Appellant.
Gregory M. Porobil, New Orleans, for Defendant/Appellee.
Bfore CIACCIO, PLOTKIN and LANDRIEU, JJ.

Opinion:
I iLANDRIEU, Judge.
The sole issue in this appeal is whether the trial court properly granted a motion for summary judgment in favor of defendant Louisiana Insurance Guaranty Association (LIGA), as successor to defendant Certified Lloyds Plan Insurance Co., on the issue of plaintiff Evans Casso's right to recover under the liability portion of an insurance policy issued by Certified Lloyds. The judgment dismissed LIGA from the suit. Finding that Casso's injuries, which he allegedly suffered while riding in LIGA's insured's cab, are not covered under the Certified Lloyds's policy, we affirm the trial court judgment.
In the instant case, the following facts are undisputed: On the night of April 4, 1990, Casso was socializing with his friend at the local neighborhood bar. While there he was befriended by defendant, Francis Segreto. Segreto and Casso played pool and drank together until sometime after midnight, at which time Casso announced that he was going home. Segreto offered Casso a ride home in his cab, and Casso accepted. Casso, Segreto and Michael Prouxl (a friend of Seg-reto's) entered Segreto's cab with Segreto driving, Casso in the rear seat and Prouxl in the front passenger seat. Segreto drove Casso to his home, but upon arrival, refused to let Casso exit the cab. Segreto and Prouxl 12then drove Casso around the city all the while cursing and threatening to shoot him if he tried to get out the cab, if the doors opened, or if he tried to escape. Segreto erroneously believed that Casso had been sleeping with his wife.
At approximately 4:00 a.m., while still in the cab, Prouxl said "Come on, let's shoot him." At that time Segreto then pulled the cab to the side of the street and put the cab into park. Fearing for his life, Casso pulled his revolver and shot and killed Segreto and Prouxl in self-defense. It was later determined that Segreto and Prouxl were unarmed, highly intoxicated, and under the influence of drugs. As a result, Casso was charged with the murder of Segreto and Prouxl. After two jury trials, the result was a unanimous not guilty verdict. Casso spent nine months incarcerated at Orleans Parish Prison.
Casso sued United Cab Company and M.L. LeBlanc, as owner(s) of the cab driven by Segreto; Certified Lloyds Insurance Company, United's insurer ; and Segreto's estate, claiming mental pain and suffering incident to his ordeal and incarceration, plus attorney's fees expended in his criminal defense and this civil proceeding.
Casso filed a motion for summary judgment on the issue of coverage under the policy. The trial court effectively denied Casso's motion, rendering judgment in favor of LIGA. LIGA then filed its own motion for summary judgment on the same issue. The trial court, in effect, granted LIGA's motion and, in a March 3, 1996 judgment, dismissed LIGA from the suit. Casso appeals the March 3 judgment, and the sole issue on appeal is whether the policy at issue provides coverage under the facts as related by Casso.
| .^Appellate courts review summary judgment de novo, using the same criteria applied by trial courts to determine whether summary judgment is appropriate. Reynolds v. Select Properties, Ltd., 93-1480 (La.4/11/94), 634 So.2d 1180, 1183. An appellate court thus asks the same questions as does the trial court in determining whether summary judgment is appropriate: whether there is any genuine issue of material fact, and whether the mover-appellant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Walker v. Kroop, 96-0618 (La.App. 4th Cir. 7/24/96), 678 So.2d 580, 584.
The insurance policy in this case provides coverage for bodily injury or property damage caused by an "occurrence and arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use . of an owned automobile.... "
Casso contends that the trial court erred in granting LIGA's motion for summary judgment because there remain unresolved issues of material fact concerning coverage under the policy. He argues that Segreto's and Prouxl's actions were unexpected and unintended and that decedents' use of the cab was essential to their plan to threaten, scare and intimidate him. As such, Casso maintains that but for the cab, Segreto and Prouxl could not have restrained him or threatened his life. This use of the vehicle, Casso argues, caused him to kill in self-defense and suffer criminal prosecution for murder.
LIGA defends the granting of summary judgment in its favor, arguing that the damages incurred by Casso under his factual situation are not covered under the policy because they were not the result of an "occurrence" as defined by the policy, and because they did not arise out of the "ownership, maintenance or use" of the covered automobile. LIGA maintains that Segreto's and Prouxl's actions can be viewed in no other light than expected and intended. Further, LIGA relies on the holding in Smith v. Estrade, 589 So.2d 1158 (La.App. 5 Cir.1991) that the "arising-out-of-use" requirement of the Upolicy contemplates an injury-causing activity commonly or readily associated with the use of a vehicle, and that the decedents' actions do not fit this requirement.
The automobile insurance policy at issue provides coverage only if the damages claimed arise out of an "occurrence," which is defined as "an accident . which results in bodily injury or property damage neither expected nor intended from the viewpoint of the insured." LIGA contends that Casso's claims do not fall within that definition because the incident itself was not unexpected or unintended considering the deliberate nature of the actions taken by Segreto and Prouxl.
Not only do we have difficulty identifying an "accident" in this case, but we find that the seemingly similar case of Breland v. Schilling, 550 So.2d 609 (La.1989) is easily distinguished. Breland, a case in which a homeowner's insurance policy contained definitions similar to the policy in the instant case, stressed that the phrase "from the standpoint of the insured" emphasizes that it is the insured's subjective intention and expectation which delimit the scope of the exclusion at issue. In the instant case, however, the insured is dead and, given the circumstances, we are unable and unwilling to surmise his subjective intention. Hence, the facts of this case do not fit within the definition of "occurrence" in the policy.
Furthermore, LIGA claims that Casso's damages are not recoverable under the policy because they do not arise out of the "ownership, maintenance or use" of a covered automobile. We agree.
In Carter v. City Parish Government of East Baton Rouge, 423 So.2d 1080 (La.1982), followed in Kessler v. Amica Mutual Insurance Co., 573 So.2d 476 (La.1991), the Louisiana Supreme Court noted that the "arising-out-of use" provision was designed to limit coverage to liability resulting from conduct of |sthe insured which constitutes both a use of the vehicle and a legal cause of the injury. Additionally, the court formulated two questions which courts are required to answer in order to establish whether an arising-out-of-use provision has been met: (1) was the conduct of the insured of which the plaintiff complains a legal cause of the injury? (2) was it a use of the automobile?
To answer the first question, Carter instructs us to undertake a duty-risk analysis. In this case, the risk involved was that Casso was imprisoned for nine months and had to defend himself in two murder trials. This risk is not at all contemplated by a legal duty which Segreto might arguably have to refrain from driving Casso around town while threatening or intimidating him.
Moreover, to conclude that an injury arose out of the use of the automobile, a court must find the vehicle essential to the theory of liability. Lucey v. Harris, 490 So.2d 416 (La.App. 5 Cir.1986), writ denied, 496 So.2d 327 (La.1986). In this regard, a court should apply a common sense approach to determine whether the duty breached by the insured flows from the automobile's "use" under the policy language. Fertitta v. Palmer, 252 La. 336, 211 So.2d 282 (1968). If the duty breached is independent of the use of the car, then no liability can arise. Lucey v. Harris, swpra.
In Lucey, the decedent's widow sued a taxicab driver and his insurer for her husband's death after he was shot by the taxicab's passenger. The insurer successfully moved for summary judgment on the issue of coverage. After analyzing cases from other circuits involving batteries which occurred in a vehicle or in conjunction with the use of a vehicle and in which the issue was whether coverage existed under the respective automobile liability policies, the Fifth Circuit noted that courts have consistently refused to extend the "arising-out-of-use" provision of the policies to instances that involved gunshots and physical attacks. That court affirmed the grant of summary judgment, | ^concluding that the tortfeasor's use of the taxicab was only incidental to the injuries sustained by the decedent, and the accident did not flow ft-om the use of the vehicle within the meaning of the insurance policy.
Similarly, in Currera v. Loyd, 531 So.2d 544 (La.App. 5 Cir.1988), the court applied the Carter test in a suit for damages for injuries sustained in the kidnapping, rape, and murder of the plaintiffs' three year old daughter. Affirming the trial court's dismissal of the defendant's insurer on summary judgment, the court explained that the injuries suffered by the victim and her parents were caused by the defendant's violation of a criminal statute, and not by use of the truck, although the defendant may have used the truck to effect his getaway and may have raped the child in the truck.
In Kessler, supra, alter a near intersee-tional collision between his car and a vehicle driven by an unidentified driver, the plaintiff was shot by the unidentified driver when he blew his horn at the motorist for running a stop sign. The Supreme Court reversed the trial court and rendered summary judgment in favor of the insurance company concluding:
The conduct which was the legal cause of the plaintiff's injury was the unidentified motorist shooting a gun toward the plaintiff. A common-sense analysis reveals that this conduct was not a use of the vehicle despite the fact that the unidentified motorist may have been using the vehicle at the time. The duty that the unidentified motorist breached existed independently of his use of the automobile. The fact that he was in his vehicle at the time of the shooting was incidental to the breach of his duty not to shoot at the plaintiff. This breach did not require the use of the vehicle nor did it involve the use of the vehicle, (citations omitted.)
Applying the foregoing analysis to the undisputed facts in this case, we conclude that the decedents' use of the taxicab was only incidental to the injuries suffered by Casso. Those injuries did not occur as a result of the use of the vehicle within the meaning of the "arising-out-of-use" provision of the |7poIicy. Casso's damages arose from the decedents' criminal behavior, activities which neither flowed from, nor were reasonable and natural consequences of, the use of the vehicle.
Because this case satisfies neither query enunciated in the two-prong test set forth in Carter and does not fall within policy definitions, the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment finding that the policy did not cover the damages alleged by Casso. We affirm the trial court's judgment which Casso appealed. All costs are assessed against appellant.
AFFIRMED.
. Louisiana Insurance Guaranty Association was substituted by amendment as successor to the insolvent Lloyds.