Case Name: David Gene MORRIS, Appellant, v. James A. COLLINS, Appellee
Court: Texas Courts of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1995-08-17
Citations: 916 S.W.2d 527
Docket Number: No. 01-94-00950-CV
Parties: David Gene MORRIS, Appellant, v. James A. COLLINS, Appellee.
Judges: Before HUTSON-DUNN and O’CONNOR, JJ.
Reporter: South Western Reporter Second Series
Volume: 916
Pages: 527–531

Head Matter:
David Gene MORRIS, Appellant, v. James A. COLLINS, Appellee.
No. 01-94-00950-CV.
Court of Appeals of Texas, Houston (1st Dist.).
Aug. 17, 1995.
David Gene Morris, for appellant.
Dan Morales, Ann Kraatz, Hirge Vega, Georgia L. Meaney, Drew T. Durham, Austin, for appellee.
Before HUTSON-DUNN and O’CONNOR, JJ.

Opinion:
OPINION
WILSON, Justice.
David Gene Morris, a Texas Department of Corrections inmate, filed suit pro se in forma pauperis against the appellee, James Collins, the executive director of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice (TDCJ). Morris challenges the constitutionality of TDCJ's grooming standards under the equal rights amendment to the Texas Constitution, article 1, section 3a, and Tex. Gov't Code § 501.001. The trial court, without a hearing, dismissed the case with prejudice as frivolous under Tex.Civ.PRAC. & Rem.Code § 13.001. We affirm.
In his sole point of error, Morris contends the trial court improperly dismissed his case because there is an arguable basis in law as to whether the TDCJ's haircut policy violates the equal rights amendment of the Texas Constitution and Tex.Gov't Code § 501.001.
A trial court has broad discretion to determine whether to dismiss a suit under Tex.Civ.PRAC. & Rem.Code § 13.001. Brown v. Lynaugh, 817 S.W.2d 813, 815 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, no writ). A court may dismiss an action if: (1) the allegation of poverty in the affidavit is false; or (2) the action is frivolous or malicious. Tex.Civ. PRAC. & Rem.Code § 13.001(a). To determine whether an action is frivolous or malicious, the court can consider if (1) the action's realistic chance of ultimate success is slight; (2) the claim has no arguable basis in law or fact; or (3) it is clear that the party cannot prove a set of facts in support of the claim. Tex.Civ.Prac. & Rem.Code § 13.001(b).
When, as in the present case, the trial court dismisses a suit without a fact hearing, the court could not have determined the suit had no arguable basis in fact. Hector v. Thaler, 862 S.W.2d 176, 178 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, no writ); Birdo v. Williams, 859 S.W.2d 571, 572 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, no writ). The supreme court has held that, in such a case, we must consider whether the trial court properly determined there is no arguable basis in law for the suit. Johnson v. Lynaugh, 796 S.W.2d 705, 706 (Tex.1990); see also Brown, 817 S.W.2d at 814.
Fact Summary
Moms complains the prison's grooming policy caused him to lose his individuality and self-esteem because he is not able to grow his hair in a way that flatters him to compensate for hereditary hair loss. Morris argues that TDCJ's Inmate Orientation Handbook requires male inmates to have hair that is neatly trimmed up the back of the neck and head and cut around the ears. He claims the policy also forbids any "block," "Afro," "natural," or "shag" haircuts. TDCJ's grooming policy for female inmates apparently only forbids "mohawks" and shaved or partially shaved heads.
The reality of incarceration is that inmates do not share the same quality of constitutional protection as the general public. Powell v. Estelle, 959 F.2d 22, 23 (5th Cir.1992). The various penological objectives require that courts circumscribe the constitutional protections extended inmates. O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348, 107 S.Ct. 2400, 2404, 96 L.Ed.2d 282 (1987); see Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822-23, 94 S.Ct. 2800, 2804, 41 L.Ed.2d 495 (1974). Thus, we review a prisoner's claim of infringements of constitutional rights under a less exacting standard than we review those of the population at large. Powell, 959 F.2d at 23.
In Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 107 S.Ct. 2254, 96 L.Ed.2d 64 (1987), the Supreme Court set forth the standard for evaluating prison regulations challenged as violating the federal constitution: "When a prison regulation impinges on inmates' constitutional rights, the regulation is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests." 482 U.S. at 89, 107 S.Ct. at 2261; Powell, 959 F.2d at 22. The Turner Court discussed several factors relevant to determining a regulation's validity:
1. whether there is a valid, rational connection between the regulation and the legitimate, neutral governmental interest used to justify it;
2. whether there are alternative means for prisoners to exercise the constitutional right at issue;
3. the impact of an accommodation on prison staff, inmates, and allocation of prison resources; and
4. whether any alternative exists that would fully accommodate prisoners' rights at low costs to valid penological interests.
Id. at 89-91, 107 S.Ct. at 2261-62. The Turner decision did not require a court to weigh evenly, or even consider, each of these factors. Scott v. Mississippi Dept. of Corrections, 961 F.2d 77, 80 (6th Cir.1992).
In Powell, the TDJC advanced justifications for hair grooming rules which further penological interests. Security problems result because prisoners can hide weapons in long hair. More prison resources then have to be allocated for guards to perform individual searches for weapons. Long hair also makes it harder to identify prisoners and apprehend them if they escape. Other legitimate penological interests include job safety and hygiene concerns. Id. at 24.
The TDJC presents similar justifications for the regulation Morris complains of in this ease. We conclude the grooming regulation forbidding long hair and challenged by Morris is reasonably related to the legitimate penological interests of security, allocation of resources, and health and safety, and is therefore valid. We conclude there is no arguable basis in law for Morris's claim. Therefore, we hold the trial court's dismissal of this ease as frivolous under Tex.Civ.Prac. & Rem.Code § 13.001 was not improper. We overrule Morris's point of error.
Finding no reversible error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
. Act of May 11, 1989, 71st Leg., R.S., ch. 212 sec. 2.01, § 500.001, 1989 Tex.Gen.Laws 918, 955, amended by Act of Mar. 25, 72d Leg., R.S., ch. 16, sec. 10.01, § 501.001, 1991 Tex.Gen.Laws 244, 308.
. A copy of the handbook does not appear in the record.