Case Name: Philisia BANKS; Rosie Bates; Glenda Collins; King Fountain; Otha Frazier; Melvasteen Frazier; Alberta Hudson; Diane Rogers; Laura A. Williams; Jerry Williams; Paulean Young; Prentiss Young; Wilma Young; Henry Dixon; and Vanessa Jones v. CITY FINANCE COMPANY d/b/a Washington Mutual Finance; Washington Mutual Finance Group, LLC f/k/a City Finance Company; Washington Mutual, Inc.; Union Security Life Insurance Company; American Security Insurance Company; American Bankers Insurance Company of Florida; American Bankers Life Assurance Company of Florida; Martha Frazier; Christyne Hammond; Elaine McWilliams; Dolly Andrews; and Richard Cherry
Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Mississippi
Decision Date: 2002-09-05
Citations: 825 So. 2d 642
Docket Number: No. 2001-CA-00862-SCT
Parties: Philisia BANKS; Rosie Bates; Glenda Collins; King Fountain; Otha Frazier; Melvasteen Frazier; Alberta Hudson; Diane Rogers; Laura A. Williams; Jerry Williams; Paulean Young; Prentiss Young; Wilma Young; Henry Dixon; and Vanessa Jones v. CITY FINANCE COMPANY d/b/a Washington Mutual Finance; Washington Mutual Finance Group, LLC f/k/a City Finance Company; Washington Mutual, Inc.; Union Security Life Insurance Company; American Security Insurance Company; American Bankers Insurance Company of Florida; American Bankers Life Assurance Company of Florida; Martha Frazier; Christyne Hammond; Elaine McWilliams; Dolly Andrews; and Richard Cherry.
Judges: Before SMITH, P.J., CARLSON and GRAVES, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 825
Pages: 642–651

Head Matter:
Philisia BANKS; Rosie Bates; Glenda Collins; King Fountain; Otha Frazier; Melvasteen Frazier; Alberta Hudson; Diane Rogers; Laura A. Williams; Jerry Williams; Paulean Young; Prentiss Young; Wilma Young; Henry Dixon; and Vanessa Jones v. CITY FINANCE COMPANY d/b/a Washington Mutual Finance; Washington Mutual Finance Group, LLC f/k/a City Finance Company; Washington Mutual, Inc.; Union Security Life Insurance Company; American Security Insurance Company; American Bankers Insurance Company of Florida; American Bankers Life Assurance Company of Florida; Martha Frazier; Christyne Hammond; Elaine McWilliams; Dolly Andrews; and Richard Cherry.
No. 2001-CA-00862-SCT.
Supreme Court of Mississippi.
Sept. 5, 2002.
Robert B. Ogletree, Christopher Wayne Cofer, Jackson, attorneys for appellants.
Jess H. Dickinson, Johnny L. Nelms, Katharine Malley Samson, Gulfport, Roy H. Liddell, Walter D. Willson, Jackson, attorneys for appellees.
Before SMITH, P.J., CARLSON and GRAVES, JJ.

Opinion:
CARLSON, J.,
for the Court.
¶ 1. Plaintiffs in this case appeal from the circuit court's order compelling arbitration of all claims asserted in their action pursuant to the terms of the arbitration agreements and the FAA. Finding that the circuit court's order is not an appealable final judgment, we dismiss this appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction.
FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW
¶ 2. On September 19, 2000, Philisia Banks, Rosie Bates, Glenda Collins, Henry Dixon, King Fountain, Otha Frazier, Mel-vasteen Frazier, Alberta Houston, Vanessa Jones, Diane Rogers, Laura A. Williams, Jerry Williams, Paulean Young, Prentiss Young and Wilma Young ("Plaintiffs") filed an action in the Circuit Court of Holmes County against several finance and insurance companies and their employees alleging, among numerous other claims, that arbitration agreements were included in the loan packages sold to the Plaintiffs in order to deprive the Plaintiffs of their right to their day in court.
¶ 3. The Alternative Dispute Resolution Agreements, signed by each plaintiff, were standard documents presented in one of three forms. Each form was set in large type on a separate sheet of paper and was titled "Alternative Dispute Resolution Agreement." Directly above the signature line, the borrower was cautioned not to sign the agreement and to seek legal advice if they did not understand the document. Each agreement stated the arbitration process would be governed by the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA") and the lender would be responsible for most of the costs of arbitration.
¶ 4. The Plaintiffs' complaint alleged eleven different counts for which compensatory and punitive damages were sought for each plaintiff: (1) fraudulent misrepresentations and/or omissions, (2) fraud, (3) constructive fraud, (4) civil conspiracy, (5) unconscionability, (6) violation of the Unfair or Deceptive Acts and Practices Act, (7) fraudulent concealment and deceit, (8) breach of fiduciary duty, (9) breach of implied covenants of good faith and fair dealing, (10) continuing fraud and (11) tor-tious interference with the right to trial by jury under the Mississippi Constitution.
¶ 5. According to the order, the trial judge found the Plaintiffs voluntarily entered into the arbitration agreements, the arbitration agreements were enforceable under Mississippi and Federal law, the arbitration agreements were not procedurally or substantively unconscionable and there was no fraud in securing the arbitration agreements. Upon her findings, the trial judge ordered all matters to be arbitrated pursuant to the terms of the arbitration agreement. The order did not state that the case was dismissed on the merits, nor did it grant a stay pending the arbitration of the claims. The trial court did make findings as to the voluntariness of the parties, the applicable law and the conseionability of the agreements, but the trial court did not address all counts raised in the complaint such as the duty owed to the Plaintiffs by the City Finance, Union Security or their employees.
¶ 6. On February 16, 2001, the City Finance Company d/b/a Washington Mutual Finance Group, LLC ("City Finance") filed a Motion to Compel Arbitration. Union Security Life Insurance Company, American Security Insurance Company, American Bankers Insurance Company of Florida and American Bankers Assurance Company of Florida ("Union Security") filed a separate answer also asking the circuit court to dismiss the action so that the claims could be submitted to arbitration. Plaintiffs opposed these motions by affidavits stating the affiants were rushed through the loan process, the affiants could not afford arbitration costs, the affi-ants did not know what arbitration meant and the affiants did not voluntarily waive their right to a jury trial. Along with their affidavits, the Plaintiffs filed their Demand for Jury Trial, Response to Motion to Compel Arbitration and Motion for Discovery.
¶ 7. The trial court heard the motion to compel arbitration on April 23, 2001, and ruled the arbitration agreements were valid and enforceable. On May 1, 2001, the trial court ordered that the Plaintiffs proceed to arbitration of all claims asserted in their action. Following the court's order, the Plaintiffs timely filed their notice of appeal. They raise the following four issues before us:
I WHETHER THE CIRCUIT COURT ERRED IN GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO ENFORCE ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS WHICH WERE PROCURED BY FRAUD AND ARE UNCONSCIONABLE.
II. WHETHER THE CIRCUIT COURT ERRED IN DENYING PLAINTIFFS' RIGHTS TO A TRIAL BY JURY EVEN THOUGH THERE EXISTED NUMEROUS MATERIAL AND FACTUAL ISSUES IN DISPUTE.
III. WHETHER THE CIRCUIT COURT ERRED IN DENYING PLAINTIFFS THEIR RIGHT TO CONDUCT DISCOVERY IN THIS ACTION IN ORDER TO PRESENT EVIDENCE IN DEFENSE TO THE ARBITRATION AGREEMENT.
IV. WHETHER THE CIRCUIT COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO ENFORCE ARBITRATION SINCE THE ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS ARE INAPPLICABLE PURSUANT TO MISS.CODE ANN. § 83-53-15 AND FAA IS REVERSE PREEMPTED BY THE McCARRAN-FER-GUSON ACT.
City Finance and Union Security also raise the following issue:
V. whether plaintiffs have APPEALED FROM A NON AP-PEALABLE ORDER.
DISCUSSION
¶ 8. The Fifth Circuit has held a district court's grant of a motion to compel arbitration should be reviewed de novo. OPE Intern'l LP v. Chet Morrison Contractors, Inc., 258 F.3d 443, 445 (5th Cir.2001)(citing Local 1351 Int'l Longshoremens Ass'n v. Sear-Land Serv., Inc., 214 F.3d 566, 569 (5th Cir.2000)). See also PaineWebber Inc. v. Chase Manhattan Private Bank (Switzerland), 260 F.3d 453, 459 (5th Cir.2001); Pennzoil Exploration & Prod. Co. v. Ramco Energy Ltd., 139 F.3d 1061, 1065 (5th Cir.1998).
V. WHETHER PLAINTIFFS HAVE APPEALED FROM A NON AP-PEALABLE ORDER.
¶ 9. Although Plaintiffs do not raise this issue, this Court must first address whether the May 1, 2001, order is a final judgment appealable under Miss.Code Ann. § 11-51-3 (Supp.2001). This Court's jurisdiction is expressly set forth in section 11-51-3 as proper only from a "final judgment."
As noted in Bradley v. Holmes, 242 Miss. 247, 134 So.2d 494 (1961), an appeal is not a matter of right but is subject to the statutory provisions, and the basic requirement is that appeals are proper only if from a final judgment. See also Perkins v. Thompson, 127 Miss. 864, 90 So. 710 (1922). There can be no valid appeal until there has been a judgment disposing of the case.... A final judgment has been defined by this Court as a judgment adjudicating the merits of the controversy which settles all the issues as to all the parties. Hindman v. Bridges, 185 So.2d 922 (Miss.1966); Cotton v. Veterans Cab Co., Inc., 344 So.2d 730 (Miss.1977).
Sanford v. Board of Supervisors, 421 So.2d 488, 490-91 (Miss.1982). As defined by M.R.C.P. 54, a judgment includes a "final decree and any order from which an appeal lies."
¶ 10. Section 16 of the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA"), enacted in 1988, governs appellate review of arbitration orders. 9 U.S.C. § 16 (1999). The section provides:
(a) An appeal may be taken from—
(1) an order^—
(A) refusing a stay of any action under section 3 of this title,
(B) denying a petition under section 4 of this title to order arbitration to proceed,
(C) denying an application under section 206 of this title to compel arbitration,
(D) confirming or denying confirmation of an award or partial award, or
(E) modifying, correcting, or vacating an award;
(2) an interlocutory order granting, continuing, or modifying an injunction against an arbitration that is subject to this title; or
(3) a final decision with respect to an arbitration that is subject to this title.
(b) Except as otherwise provided in section 1292(b) of title 28, an appeal may not be taken from an interlocutory order—
(1) granting a stay of any action under section 3 of this title;
(2) directing arbitration to proceed under section 4 of this title;
(3) compelling arbitration under section 206 of this title; or
(4) refusing to enjoin an arbitration that is subject to this title.
"The Federal Arbitration Act prohibits appeals from interlocutory orders compelling arbitration, but permits appeals from final orders compelling arbitration." Sphere Drake Ins. PLC v. Marine Towing, Inc., 16 F.3d 666, 667-68 (5th Cir.1994) (emphasis added). See 9 U.S.C. § 16. An order is considered final if it "ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment." Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233, 65 S.Ct. 631, 633, 89 L.Ed. 911 (1945).
¶ 11. The trial court's order compelling arbitration, if interlocutory, clearly falls under § 16(b), which prohibits appeals from orders "compelling arbitration under section 206 of this title". 9 U.S.C. § 16(b)(3). But if the order is considered a final decision, § 16(a)(3) allows appeal. Therefore, at issue is whether the order is interlocutory or final.
¶ 12. The Plaintiffs argue the matter is properly before this Court because the May 1st Order settled all issues of the matter concerning these Plaintiffs and there is nothing left for the lower court to do but to execute the judgment; therefore, the order should be considered final and thus, appealable. The Plaintiffs cite Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 121 S.Ct. 513, 148 L.Ed.2d 373 (2000) as compelling authority regarding this issue.
¶ 13. In Green Tree, the plaintiff filed suit alleging Truth in Lending and Equal Credit Opportunity violations. 531 U.S. at 83, 121 S.Ct. 513. In response to the suit, the defendant filed a motion to compel arbitration, to stay the action, or in the alternative, to dismiss. Id. The district court granted the motion to compel arbitration, denied all other motions and dismissed the plaintiffs claims with prejudice. Id. The Eleventh Circuit reversed the decision, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari. Id. at 84, 121 S.Ct. 513.
¶ 14. The Supreme Court addressed "whether an order compelling arbitration and dismissing a party's underlying claims is a 'final decision with respect to an arbitration' within the meaning of § 16(a)(3) of the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 16(a)(3), and thus is immediately appeal-able pursuant to that Act." Id. at 82, 121 S.Ct. 513. A final order "ends a decision on its merits and leaves nothing more for the trial court to do but execute the judgment." Id. at 86, 121 S.Ct. 513 (citing Digital Equip. Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863, 867, 114 S.Ct. 1992, 128 L.Ed.2d 842 (1994), and Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 467, 98 S.Ct. 2454, 57 L.Ed.2d 351 (1978) (both quoting Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233, 65 S.Ct. 631, 89 L.Ed. 911 (1945))). See also St. Louis, I.M. & S.Ry. v. Southern Exp. Co., 108 U.S. 24, 28-29, 2 S.Ct. 6, 27 L.Ed. 638 (1883). "The District Court's order directed that the dispute be resolved by arbitration and dismissed respondent's claims with prejudice, leaving the court nothing to do but execute the judgment. That order plainly disposed of the entire case on the merits and left no part of it pending before the court." 531 U.S. at 86, 121 S.Ct. 513. The Supreme Court concluded that where a district court compels arbitration and dismisses the claims before it, the decision is final and therefore appealable pursuant to § 16(a)(3). Id. at 89, 121 S.Ct. 513.
¶ 15. The Supreme Court also stated the plain language of § 16(a)(3) did not "suggest that Congress intended to incorporate the rather complex independent/embedded distinction, and its consequences for finality, into [the statute.]" Id. at 88-89, 121 S.Ct. 447. In a recent decision, the Fifth Circuit has stated "[n]o longer is it necessary to conduct an analysis of whether a lawsuit is an 'independent' action, brought solely to enforce arbitration rights, or an action in which the request to arbitrate is 'embedded' in a case that also raises substantive legal claims." American Heritage Life Ins. Co. v. Orr, 294 F.3d 702, 707 (5th Cir.2002)(citing Green Tree, 531 U.S. at 88, 121 S.Ct. 513).
¶ 16. City Finance argues this appeal is not properly before this Court because the May 1st order does not finally dispose of the Plaintiffs claims. City Finance argues an order compelling arbitration is not ap-pealable under either Miss.Code Ann. § 11-15-141 (Supp.2002) or 9 U.S.C. § 16.
¶ 17. City Finance correctly distinguishes Green Tree from the facts of the ease sub judice. City Finance states in Green Tree, the Plaintiffs' claims were dismissed with prejudice, thus ending the suit in the district court. 531 U.S. at 83, 121 S.Ct. 513. In the case sub judiee, the order which compelled arbitration did not dismiss the claims nor end the lawsuit. City Finance asks this Court to dismiss this appeal and hold the order compelling arbitration is a non-appealable order.
¶ 18. Union Security also argues this appeal is not properly before this Court. Union Security states this appeal is an improper interlocutory appeal from a non-final order. Union Security argues the fact that the May 1st Order to compel arbitration did not dismiss the claims of the Plaintiffs' is fatal to the Plaintiffs' ar gument that their appeal is proper. Union Security also states the remaining plaintiffs from the original suit, who were not compelled to arbitrate their claims, are scheduled to begin trial on September 27, 2002.
¶ 19. Union Security first argues, because the order is an interlocutory appeal and not a final judgment, M.R.A.P. 5 is applicable. Union Security argues because Plaintiffs have not complied with the rule procedurally, this Court is without jurisdiction to review the Plaintiffs' appeal.
¶ 20. Next Union Security argues, even if this Court chooses to review the appeal, the appeal is barred by the FAA. Because the order directed the Plaintiffs to proceed to arbitration, Union Security argues it is a non-appealable interlocutory order under § 16(b)(2).
¶ 21. Union Security, like City Finance, properly contends the Plaintiffs misstate the applicable holding in Green Tree. Unlike the order in Green Tree, the order in the case sub judice did not end the litigation on its merits by dismissing the plaintiffs' claims.
¶ 22. Union Security also asks that this Court dismiss this appeal. To further illustrate their argument that this Court should dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction over interlocutory orders, Union Security cites Jeske v. Brooks, 875 F.2d 71 (4th Cir.1989) and Purdy v. Monex Int'l Ltd., 867 F.2d 1521 (5th Cir.1989).
¶ 23. In Jeske, an investor filed several federal and state claims against his broker. 875 F.2d at 72. The district court compelled arbitration of the state claims but did not order arbitration of the federal claims. Id. at 73. The Fourth Circuit dismissed the appeal challenging the order to compel arbitration after Congress amended the FAA, 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. Id. at 73-74. The Fourth Circuit held:
The amendment makes clear that we have jurisdiction to consider an appeal from an order refusing a stay pending arbitration or an order denying a motion to compel arbitration. However, we have no jurisdiction, absent certain exceptions not applicable here, to review an interlocutory order compelling arbitration or granting a stay pending arbitration.
Id. at 73.
¶ 24. In Purdy, the plaintiffs filed claims in the federal and state courts against the defendants. 867 F.2d at 1522. The district court ordered a stay of the federal action pending arbitration and ordered the parties arbitrate their dispute according to their contract. Id. at 1523. The Fifth Circuit dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction. Id. "The [FAA] provides that appeals may not be taken from interlocutory district court orders that favor arbitration over litigation, although orders with the contrary result may be appealed." Id. See also Jolley v. Paine Webber Jackson & Curtis, Inc., 864 F.2d 402 (5th Cir.), supplemented, 867 F.2d 891 (5th Cir.1989) (orders granting stays or compelling arbitration are interlocutory and not appealable). The court ruled the district court's stay was interlocutory, and the Fifth Circuit had no jurisdiction over the appeal. Id. at 1523.
¶ 25. In light of the above case authority, this Court agrees the case sub judice is distinguishable from Green Tree. Although the order compelled arbitration for all claims asserted, the order did not dismiss the action on its merits, nor did it order a stay of litigation. Since the U.S. Supreme Court has recently held it is no longer necessary to distinguish between an independent proceeding and an embedded proceeding, this Court's analysis may end here. Because the order of the trial court simply compelled arbitration, but did not dismiss the claims or end the litigation on the merits, it must be treated as interlocutory and not as final. This Court does not have jurisdiction to review appeals of interlocutory orders which compel arbitration.
CONCLUSION
¶ 26. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable case law, the May 1st order is not a final order, but an interlocutory order. We conclude this matter is not properly before this Court; and therefore, we dismiss this appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction. Because this Court does not have jurisdiction to hear this appeal, the remaining issues will not be discussed. The holding of this Court does not bar the plaintiffs from raising these issues on appeal from a final judgment.
¶ 27. APPEAL DISMISSED.
PITTMAN, C.J., SMITH, P.J., WALLER, COBB, EASLEY AND GRAVES, JJ., CONCUR. DIAZ, J., DISSENTS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION. McRAE, P.J., NOT PARTICIPATING.