Case Name: PLANNED PARENTHOOD OF ALASKA and Susan Wingrove, Appellants/Cross-Appellees, v. Craig CAMPBELL, in his capacity as Lieutenant Governor of the State of Alaska, Loren Leman, Kim Hummer-Minnery and Mia Costello, Appellees/Cross-Appellants
Court: Alaska Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Alaska
Decision Date: 2010-06-02
Citations: 232 P.3d 725
Docket Number: Nos. S-13826, S-13835, S-13845
Parties: PLANNED PARENTHOOD OF ALASKA and Susan Wingrove, Appellants/Cross-Appellees, v. Craig CAMPBELL, in his capacity as Lieutenant Governor of the State of Alaska, Loren Leman, Kim Hummer-Minnery and Mia Costello, Appellees/Cross-Appellants.
Judges: CARPENETI, Chief Justice, and CHRISTEN, Justice, not participating.
Reporter: Pacific Reporter 3d
Volume: 232
Pages: 725–739

Head Matter:
PLANNED PARENTHOOD OF ALASKA and Susan Wingrove, Appellants/Cross-Appellees, v. Craig CAMPBELL, in his capacity as Lieutenant Governor of the State of Alaska, Loren Leman, Kim Hummer-Minnery and Mia Costello, Appellees/Cross-Appellants.
Nos. S-13826, S-13835, S-13845.
Supreme Court of Alaska.
June 2, 2010.

Opinion:
Before: FABE, WINFREE, and STOWERS, Justices.
Order
IT IS ORDERED:
1. This expedited appeal concerns the question whether deficiencies in an initiative petition summary can ever be cured for a ballot summary without requiring the sponsors to recirculate petitions and gather new signatures. Although this case involves a challenge to the lieutenant governor's petition summary for an initiative proposing a parental notification requirement for abortions performed on minors, the question it presents applies to all statewide initiatives whether they relate to abortion notification, mining, hunting, fishing, drug use, or any other proper subject.
2. In 2007 we struck down the Parental Consent Act (PCA), which prohibited a doctor from performing an abortion on an unmarried, unemancipated woman younger than seventeen years old without parental consent or judicial authorization. We held that the statute violated a minor's constitutional right to privacy under the Alaska Constitution. However, "we determine^] that the constitution permits a statutory scheme which ensures that parents are notified so that they can be engaged in their daughters' important decisions in these matters."
3. On May 6, 2009, Loren Leman, Kim Hummer-Minnery, and Mia Costello (sponsors) submitted an application for an initiative entitled "The Parental Involvement Initiative: An Act relating to parental involvement for a minor's abortion" (PNI) to then-Lieutenant Governor Sean Parnell. The PNI would prohibit, in most cases, a doctor from performing an abortion on an unmarried, unemancipated woman younger than eighteen years old without providing notice to — or, alternatively, obtaining consent from — a parent. The PNI is structured as a proposed amendment to the PCA, rather than a stand-alone law.
4. On July 2, 2009, the lieutenant governor certified the sponsors' application, determining that the proposed bill was in the required form, that the application was substantially in the required form, and that there were a sufficient number of qualified sponsors. The lieutenant governor adopted a summary the attorney general had proposed after reviewing the PNI, and the Division of Elections prepared petition booklets to be circulated for signature-gathering.
5. On July 31, 2009, Planned Parenthood of Alaska and Susan Wingrove (Planned Par enthood) filed suit in the superior court against Craig Campbell, who had become lieutenant governor, requesting declaratory and injunctive relief. Planned Parenthood's complaint alleged that the lieutenant governor had violated Alaska law, both statutory and constitutional, by certifying the application and by adopting a defective summary. On August 14, 2009, Planned Parenthood filed a motion for a preliminary injunction, which the superior court, by stipulation of the parties, converted into a motion for summary judgment. Planned Parenthood argued that: (1) the lieutenant governor should not have certified the application because it impermissibly prescribed court rules; (2) the PNI itself was incomprehensible and would mislead voters; and (3) the lieutenant governor's summary was not accurate and impartial as required by Alaska law. In September the sponsors intervened as a party in the lawsuit. Both the lieutenant governor and the sponsors filed oppositions to Planned Parenthood's summary judgment motion and cross-motions for summary judgment on September 29, 2009. The superior court heard oral argument on all the summary judgment motions on February 24, 2010.
6. On March 12, 2010, after the sponsors had submitted the petition with more than the requisite 32,734 signatures, the lieutenant governor determined that the petition was properly filed, contained the requisite signatures, and should therefore appear on the ballot. The lieutenant governor intended to employ the same summary for the ballot that he had used for the petition.
7. On March 16, 2010, the superior court issued its order on the summary judgment motions. It granted summary judgment in part to Planned Parenthood and in part to the lieutenant governor and sponsors, concluding:
that the PNI's validation of the PCA is not clearly unconstitutional; that the PNI is understandable by voters; that the PNI unconstitutionally prescribes a limited number of court rules; that the court can sever the offending court prescriptions from the rest of the PNI; and that the summary of the PNI certified by the lieutenant governor is not impartial and accurate but that the summary can be corrected by the lieutenant governor for the ballot and the election pamphlet.
The superior court enjoined the use of the petition summary, identifying three facts the omission of which rendered the summary not impartial and accurate:
1. The PNI would restrict current law, which does not require parental notification before a minor obtains an abortion.
2. The PNI modifies and revalidates the PCA, a prior legislative enactment that the Alaska Supreme Court found to be unconstitutional because it did not provide the least restrictive means available to impact the minor's fundamental right to privacy. The PNI modifies the PCA by providing for parental notification, the least restrictive means available that meets the state's compelling interest in protecting the health of the minor and in fostering family involvement in a minor's decision regarding her pregnancy.
3. If adopted, the PNI would implicate other laws that make it a criminal offense (a felony with imprisonment for up to five years) for a physician to knowingly violate the statutory notification provisions for giving the minor's parents notice of the minor's intent to have an abortion.
The court ruled that if these facts were set out in a revised ballot summary, the initiative could be placed on a ballot at the next scheduled election. The court entered final judgment on March 31.
8.All three parties appeal the superior court's order. Planned Parenthood appeals the superior court's conclusion that the summary can be corrected for the ballot without recirculating a petition with a revised summary for new signatures. The lieutenant governor and the sponsors cross-appeal the superior court's conclusion that the summary was not impartial and accurate given the three omissions. We heard oral argument on May 20, 2010.
9. In general, we review "the grant of a summary judgment motion de novo, affirming if the record presents no genuine issue of material fact and if the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." We review the superior court's determination regarding the legal sufficiency of a petition or ballot summary de novo. But we give deference to the lieutenant governor's summary itself; "[i]n reviewing the adequacy of a lieutenant governor's ballot summary we apply a 'deferential standard of review.'" The same deferential standard applies to our review of a lieutenant governor's petition summary. "[W]e will not invalidate the summary simply because we believe a better one could be written; instead, 'the lieutenant governor's summary [will] be upheld unless we [cannot] reasonably conclude that the summary [is] impartial and accurate.' " "In matters of initiative and referendum . the people are exercising a power reserved to them by the constitution and the laws of the state, and . the constitutional and statutory provisions under which they proceed should be liberally construed." "[A]ll doubts as to all technical deficiencies or failure to comply with the exact letter of procedure will be resolved in favor of the accomplishment of that purpose." In other words, we "preserve [initiatives] whenever possible." "Those attacking the summary bear the burden 'to demonstrate that it is biased or misleading.' " Whether a deficient summary can be "cured" by correcting it for the ballot, but not recirculating the petition, is a question of law. We apply our "independent judgment to questions of law, adopting 'the rule of law most persuasive in light of precedent, reason, and policy.' "
10. Although we hold petition summaries and ballot summaries to the same standards for accuracy and impartiality, there are important differences between the functions served by initiative petition summaries and ballot summaries. "The signature-gathering requirement . serves an important screening purpose" ; it "ensures that only propositions with significant public support are included on the ballot." The requirement that signatures be gathered on a petition with an accurate and impartial summary prevents the state and the opponents of an initiative from "spending] the large sums of money required when a proposed bill is put on the ballot if there is not sufficient public support for the initiative." "[T]he basic purpose of the ballot summary," on the other hand, "is to enable voters to reach informed and intelligent decisions on how to cast their ballots—decisions free from any partisan suasion."
11. We have noted that omissions, as well as commissions, can render a petition or ballot summary legally deficient. " 'The summary need not recite every detail of the proposed measure,' but 'if the information would give the elector serious grounds for reflection it is not a mere detail, and it must be disclosed.' "
12. In the present case, we are persuaded that the superior court correctly concluded that the three omissions it identified render the lieutenant governor's petition summary inaccurate in the sense that the information, were it to be included in the summary, would give petition signers "serious grounds for reflection." We are particularly concerned about the summary's omission of the fact that the PNI would make a physician's violation of its terms a felony punishable by up to five years in prison. Both the lieutenant governor and the sponsors argue that the summary gives sufficient notice that a doctor who violates the PNI would face legal consequences because the summary mentions a doctor's legal defense under the PNI. But the type and severity of legal consequences a doctor might face could reasonably give a voter "serious grounds for reflection." The lieutenant governor also argues that the punishment is not a main feature of the proposed law because the PNI concerns primarily parents and children; "the doctor's role . is secondary," he argues. We are unpersuaded by this argument. The PNI's primary enforcement mechanism is the punishment a doctor would face, and in that sense it is a main feature of the initiative. The omissions the superior court identified (particularly the first and third omitted facts) are main features of the PNI and should have been disclosed in the petition summary, as the superior court correctly concluded. As we have held, the fact that the summary is deficient for the purposes of the petition means it would also be deficient for the purposes of the ballot.
13. We conclude that for any initiative that regulates conduct and creates criminal penalties for a violation of its code of conduct, the petition and ballot summaries must, as a matter of law, describe both the regulated conduct and the penalties.
14. The question in this case is whether a deficient petition summary can ever be corrected for the ballot without recir culating the petition for new signatures. This issue requires consideration of competing interests and principles: the people's right to enact legislation by initiative is in tension with the procedural safeguards ensuring that the initiative power be exercised in an informed manner, and that only initiatives with sufficient support appear on the ballot. On one hand, the Alaska Constitution gives to the people of Alaska the right to "propose and enact laws by the initiative." We have stated that "[i]n matters of initiative and referendum . the people are exercising a power reserved to them by the constitution and the laws of the state, and . the constitutional and statutory provisions under which they proceed should be liberally construed." As such, we "preserve [initiatives] whenever possible." On the other hand, the Alaska Constitution limits the people's right to enact legislation by initiative. First, some subjects are simply off-limits to the initiative process. Second, serving as a screening function, an initiative must be presented to the public for a demonstration of sufficient support to allow it to go to the voters on the ballot. The legislature has clarified that the presentation to the public must be impartial. As we have said, "[t]he public interest in informed lawmaking requires that referendum and initiative petitions meet minimum standards of accuracy and fairness. '[0]ur main concern should be that . initiative petitions . should be presented clearly and honestly to the people of Alaska.' " To further this goal, an initiative summary must be "a fair, concise, true and impartial statement of the intent of the proposed measure," "free from any misleading tendency, whether of amplification, of omission, or of fallacy, and . must contain no partisan coloring." The lieutenant governor and sponsors emphasize the importance of the people's right to enact laws by initiative; Planned Parenthood emphasizes the importance of the procedures designed to ensure petition-signers are informed and only initiatives with sufficient support reach the ballot. We must consider the people's fundamental interests in exercising their constitutional right to initiate legislation and in safeguards ensuring informed lawmaking.
15. We stated in Faipeas v. Municipality of Anchorage that requiring petition summaries for initiatives to be clear and honest "is necessary '[t]o guard against inadvertence by petition-signers and voters and to discourage stealth by initiative drafters and promoters.' " Because the PNI is a statewide initiative and the lieutenant governor, not the sponsors, prepared the petition summary for the PNI, we are not here presented with a case concerning sponsor or promoter stealth. Of the two factors we discussed in Faipeas, only guarding against petition-signer inadvertence is an appreciable concern in the present case. We must therefore attempt to determine the likelihood that, and the degree to which, the PNI's deficient petition summary contributed to petition-signer inadvertence.
16. While we have developed a growing body of case law on initiatives, we have never had occasion to examine an initiative in precisely this procedural posture. The petition summary in this case was misleading by omission, rather than commission. Furthermore, this case involves a petition for a statewide initiative, not a petition for a municipal initiative like those involved in Faipeas and Citizens for Implementing Medical Marijuana v. Municipality of Anchorage. As such, it is significant that it was the lieutenant governor, acting in accordance with his lawful mandate, who prepared the petition summary. As far as the record reveals, the initiative sponsors had no role in preparing the petition summary and depended entirely on the lieutenant governor to prepare a valid summary in order to advance their initiative to the ballot.
17.Though we have not had occasion to address a case in precisely this procedural posture, we have previously considered a case where the people were permitted to vote on a ballot initiative whose content was modified by the court after concluding that the initiative as originally proposed at the petition stage was legally impermissible. In McAlpine v. University of Alaska, we severed an impermissible appropriation provision from an initiative to establish a separate community college system within state government, allowing the altered initiative to go on the ballot. Planned Parenthood argues that severance cases are distinguishable from, and not particularly useful in analyzing, cases involving deficient summaries. Although there are undoubtedly differences between cases like the present case, in which a petition is circulated with a legally deficient summary, and cases in which a petition is circulated for an initiative containing an impermissible provision, we think there are important similarities that make our severance eases instructive in the present context. In both types of cases signatures are gathered on petitions that do not precisely reflect the final initiative on which the voters will ultimately vote. And in both types of cases we must determine whether those signatures nevertheless satisfy constitutional and statutory requirements, in other words, whether the petition has "serve[d] [its] important screening purpose," allowing the initiative to go on the ballot without recirculating petitions.
18. In the severance context we have noted:
[W]hen the requisite number of voters have already subscribed to an initiative, a reviewing court should sever an impermissible portion of the proposed bill when the following conditions are met: (1) standing alone, the remainder of the proposed bill can be given legal effect; (2) deleting the impermissible portion would not substantially change the spirit of the measure; and (3) it is evident from the content of the measure and the circumstances surrounding its proposal that the sponsors and subscribers would prefer the measure to stand as altered, rather than to be invalidated in its entirety.[ ]
We have cautioned that "[w]e exercise our power to sever an impermissible section of an initiative 'circumspectly.' " Only the second and third factors are readily adaptable to the deficient petition summary context. The second factor would ask whether omitting the required information from the petition summary substantially changed — or misrepresented — the spirit of the measure. The third factor would ask whether it is evident from the content of the measure and the circumstances surrounding its proposal that the subscribers, fully understanding the proposal (as if they had been presented a proper summary), would prefer the measure to stand (in other words, go on the ballot), rather than to be invalidated in its entirety. This formulation instructs us to look to the content of the measure and the circumstances surrounding its proposal (the degree to which the summary was defective, for example) in discerning the likelihood and extent of petition-signer inadvertence.
19. Our severance cases also instruct us to look to the hardship that invalidating petition signatures would cause to an initiative's sponsors. In McAlpine we noted that invalidating signatures "forces the sponsors to choose between abandoning their efforts altogether and submitting a new application and expending, for the second time, the significant time and effort required to generate public enthusiasm and gather the requisite number of signatures." This hardship must be balanced against the danger that initiative opponents will be required to respond to an initiative for which there is insufficient public support:
The signature gathering requirement is important because it eliminates the initiation of an expensive campaign process when there is insufficient public support for an initiative. Neither the state nor the opponents of a proposed bill should be required to spend the large sums of money required when a proposed bill is put on the ballot if there is not sufficient public support for the initiative[ ]
20. We conclude that a court, when faced with statewide initiative petitions that have been circulated with a defective summary, must consider the nature and magnitude of the misleading statement or omission, the likelihood and extent of petition-signer inadvertence, the hardship to initiative sponsors that invalidating signatures would cause, and the hardship to the initiative's opponents that permitting the initiative to go forward would cause.
21.Although the petition summary in this case was deficient and misleading by omission, it was not as misleading as the petitions in Faipeas and Citizens for Implementing Medical Marijuana> and petition-signer inadvertence was unlikely or minimal in this case. The petition summary's omissions did not substantially misrepresent the essential nature of the PNI. Furthermore, like the initiative's sponsors in McAlpine, the sponsors here have already expended a significant amount of time and resources to gather all of the required signatures, so the hardship to them would be great were we to invalidate the signatures. Finally, we discern little hardship to the initiative opponents if the corrected summary is allowed to be used as the ballot summary. We agree with the superior court and conclude that the lieutenant governor may place the PNI on the ballot without requiring the sponsors to recirculate the petition.
22. Provided that the summary is corrected and provided that the PCA and the enforcement provisions implicated by the PNI are made available to the voters along with the PNI, we conclude that the integrity of the initiative process, along with our adherence to standards that favor the people's right to enact laws by initiative and that favor voters' rights to be informed about proposed initiative measures, will be maintained.
23. We AFFIRM the superior court's order to the extent we have addressed the issues presented in these cross-appeals. Entered by direction of the court.
CARPENETI, Chief Justice, and CHRISTEN, Justice, not participating.
WINFREE, Justice, concurring in part and dissenting in part.
. AS 18.16.010-.020.
. State v. Planned Parenthood of Alaska (Planned Parenthood II), 171 P.3d 577 (Alaska 2007). We have previously held that a minor's constitutional right to privacy is implicated by a statute restricting her ability to receive an abortion, and that the state may "constrain a minor's privacy right only when necessary to further a compelling state interest and only if no less restrictive means exist to advance that interest." State v. Planned Parenthood of Alaska (Planned Parenthood I), 35 P.3d 30, 41 (Alaska 2001) (citing Valley Hosp. Ass'n v. Mat-Su Coal, for Choice, 948 P.2d 963, 969 (Alaska 1997)).
. Planned Parenthood II, 171 P.3d at 583-85.
. Id. at 579.
. The summary read:
Abortion for minor requires notice to or consent from parent or guardian or judicial bypass
This bill would require notice to the parent or guardian of a female under the age of 18 before she has an abortion. Notice must be received at least 48 hours before the procedure. This waiting period would be waived if a parent or guardian gives consent.
The bill also allows the minor to go to court to authorize an abortion without giving notice to her parent or guardian. The minor could ask the court to excuse her from school to attend the hearings and to have the abortion. The court could direct the school not to tell the minor's parent or guardian of the minor's pregnancy, abortion, or absence from school.
The bill allows a minor who is a victim of abuse by her parent or guardian to get an abortion without notice or consent. To do this, the minor and an adult relative or authorized official with personal knowledge of the abuse must sign a notarized statement about the abuse.
The bill sets out a doctor's defense for performing an abortion without first providing notice or obtaining consent where the minor faces an immediate threat of death or permanent physical harm from continuing the pregnancy. Doctors who perform abortions on a minor would have to submit reports.
Should this initiative become law?
. The lieutenant governor prepared a revised summary including the omitted information following the superior court's order.
. Beegan v. State, Dep't of Transp. & Pub. Facilities, 195 P.3d 134, 138 (Alaska 2008) (citing Matanuska Elec. Ass'n v. Chugach Elec. Ass'n, 152 P.3d 460, 465 (Alaska 2007)).
. See Citizens for Implementing Med. Marijuana v. Municipality of Anchorage, 129 P.3d 898, 901 (Alaska 2006) ("We review de novo the superior court's determination that the petition was legally insufficient.").
. Alaskans for Efficient Gov't, Inc. v. State, 52 P.3d 732, 735 (Alaska 2002) (quoting Burgess v. Alaska Lieutenant Governor, 654 P.2d 273, 276 (Alaska 1982)).
. Pebble Ltd. P'ship ex rel. Pebble Mines Corp. v. Parnell, 215 P.3d 1064, 1082 (Alaska 2009) (citing id.). We have recognized that in practice the lieutenant governor employs the same summary for both the petition and ballot and noted that the standards for the adequacy of a summary are the same regardless of whether it is a petition or ballot summary. Id. at 1082 n. 80.
. Alaskans for Efficient Gov't, 52 P.3d at 735 (quoting Faipeas v. Municipality of Anchorage, 860 P.2d 1214, 1217 (Alaska 1993)) (some alteration in original).
. Yute Air Alaska, Inc. v. McAlpine, 698 P.2d 1173, 1181 (Alaska 1985) (quoting Boucher v. Engstrom, 528 P.2d 456, 462 (Alaska 1974)); see also Citizens Coal, for Tort Reform, Inc. v. McAlpine, 810 P.2d 162, 168 (Alaska 1991).
. Yute Air Alaska, 698 P.2d at 1181 (quoting Boucher, 528 P.2d at 462).
. See Pullen v. Ulmer, 923 P.2d 54, 58 (Alaska 1996) (quoting Fairbanks v. Convention & Visitors Bureau, 818 P.2d 1153, 1155 (Alaska 1991)).
. Pebble Ltd. P'ship, 215 P.3d at 1083 (quoting Burgess, 654 P.2d at 276).
. Cf. Alaska Action Ctr., Inc. v. Municipality of Anchorage, 84 P.3d 989, 991 (Alaska 2004) (stating that whether an impermissible provision of an initiative can be severed, allowing the initiative to appear on the ballot without recirculating the petition for new signatures, is a question of law).
. Jacob v. State, Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., 177 P.3d 1181, 1184 (Alaska 2008) (quoting Gum v. Ha, 591 P.2d 1281, 1284 n. 6 (Alaska 1979)).
. Pebble Ltd. P'ship, 215 P.3d at 1082 n. 80.
. Faipeas, 860 P.2d at 1219.
. Citizens for Implementing Med. Marijuana, 129 P.3d at 901 (citing id.).
. Faipeas, 860 P.2d at 1219-20 (quoting Cynthia L. Fountaine, Note, Lousy Lawmaking: Questioning the Desirability and Constitutionality of Legislating by Initiative, 61 S. Cal. L.Rev. 733, 746 (1988)).
. Alaskans for Efficient Gov't, 52 P.3d at 735.
. Burgess, 654 P.2d at 275 (stating that a summary "ought to be free from any misleading tendency, whether of amplification, of omission, or of fallacy" (quoting Hope v. Hall, 229 Ark. 407, 316 S.W.2d 199, 201 (1958))).
. Pebble Ltd. P'ship, 215 P.3d at 1082 (quoting Alaskans for Efficient Gov't, 52 P.3d at 736).
. The sponsors erroneously suggest that the superior court improperly classified the violation of the initiative as a felony because a violation of the PNI would not necessarily be punished by more than a year in prison. Alaska Statute 11.81.900(b)(24) defines a felony, however, as "a crime for which a sentence of imprisonment for a term of more than one year is authorized," rather than actually imposed. (Emphasis added.) See also Black's Law Dictionary 651 (8th ed. 2004) (defining a felony as a serious crime usually "punishable by imprisonment for more than one year" (emphasis added)).
. AS 18.16.010(c).
. See Pebble Ltd. P'ship, 215 P.3d at 1082 (quoting Alaskans for Efficient Gov't, 52 P.3d at 736).
. See AS 18.16.010(c). Because the PNI would modify and revalidate AS 18.16.010(a)(3), it would also reinvigorate AS 18.16.010(e), subjecting a doctor who violated the PNI to civil liability-
. See Pebble Ltd. P'ship, 215 P.3d at 1082 n. 80.
. Alaska Const, art. XI, § 1; see also AS 15.45.010.
. Yute Air Alaska, 698 P.2d at 1181 (quoting Municipality of Anchorage v. Frohne, 568 P.2d 3, 8 (Alaska 1977)).
. See Pullen, 923 P.2d at 58 (quoting Convention & Visitors Bureau, 818 P.2d at 1155).
. Alaska Const, art. XI, § 7 ("The initiative shall not be used to dedicate revenues, make or repeal appropriations, create courts, define the jurisdiction of courts or prescribe their rules, or enact local or special legislation."); see also AS 15.45.010.
. See Alaska Const, art. XI, § 3; see also Citizens for Implementing Med. Marijuana v. Municipality of Anchorage, 129 P.3d 898, 901 (Alaska 2006) ("The signature-gathering requirement ensures that only propositions with significant public support are included on the ballot.") (citation omitted); cf. Faipeas v. Municipality of Anchorage, 860 P.2d 1214, 1219 (Alaska 1993) (stating, with respect to a referendum, that "[a] substantial showing of popular disapproval is required").
It is noteworthy that the Alaska Constitution was amended not that long ago to make the screening process more stringent — the demonstration of public support for an initiative now must include petition signatures by qualified voters who, in each of at least three-fourths of the State's house districts, "are equal in number to at least seven percent of those who voted in the preceding general election in" that district. SLA 2004, L.R. 48 (approved Nov. 2, 2004 and effective Jan. 2, 2005) (amending Alaska Const, art. XI, § 3).
. AS 15.45.090(a)(2).
. Faipeas, 860 P.2d at 1221 (quoting Yute Air Alaska, 698 P.2d at 1188 (Moore, J., dissenting)) (emphasis in original).
. Burgess, 654 P.2d at 275 (quoting In re Second Initiated Constitutional Amendment Respecting the Rights of the Pub. to Uninterrupted Serv. by Pub. Employees of 1980, 200 Colo. 141, 613 P.2d 867, 869 (1980)).
. Id. (quoting Hope v. Hall, 229 Ark. 407, 316 S.W.2d 199, 201 (1958)).
. See Citizens Coal, for Tort Reform, 810 P.2d at 168 ("[T]he people's broad constitutional right to legislate by initiative 'should be liberally construed to permit exercise of that right.' " (quoting Thomas v. Bailey, 595 P.2d 1, 3 & n. 13 (Alaska 1979))).
. See Faipeas, 860 P.2d at 1220 ("[Pjetitions . are formal documents which are part of the lawmaking process. They should be a source of accurate information for all citizens concerning what is proposed.").
. Faipeas, 860 P.2d at 1221 (quoting Yute Air Alaska, 698 P.2d at 1189 (Moore, J., dissenting)) (alteration in original).
. AS 15.45.090; Alaska Const, art. XI, § 3. See also Faipeas, 860 P.2d at 1218-19 (noting that for statewide initiatives, "the lieutenant governor prepares a petition which must contain 'a summary of the subject matter' " whereas for municipal initiatives in Anchorage, like the one at issue in that case, proponents "are not required to file an application for a petition with the municipality, nor does a city official prepare the petition").
. The dissent suggests we are abandoning Fai-peas. Vie disagree. This decision does not abandon the Burgess standard for determining whether an initiative summary is accurate and impartial as applied in Faipeas. Nor does this opinion abandon in all cases the remedy articulated in Faipeas requiring initiative sponsors to recirculate their petition for new signatures. Instead, this decision addresses a question we have never previously addressed — whether the remedy articulated in Faipeas must always be applied when the lieutenant governor, rather than initiative sponsors and promoters, drafted the defective initiative summary.
.' Faipeas, 860 P.2d at 1215.
. Citizens for Implementing Med. Marijuana, 129 P.3d at 898.
. AS 15.45.090(a) ("If the application is certified, the lieutenant governor shall prepare a sufficient number of sequentially numbered petitions to allow full circulation throughout the state. Each petition must contain . an impartial summary of the subject matter of the bill...."); Alaska Const, art. XI, § 3 ("After certification of the application, a petition containing a summary of the subject matter shall be prepared by the lieutenant governor for circulation by the sponsors."); see also Faipeas, 860 P.2d at 1218-19 (noting that "[i]n contrast" to municipal initiatives, for statewide initiatives, "the lieutenant governor prepares a petition which must contain 'a summary of the subject matter.' "); Alaskans for Efficient Gov't, 52 P.3d at 737 (Eastaugh, J., dissenting) ("The responsibility for developing [summary] language is vested by constitution and statute in the lieutenant governor." (internal citations omitted)).
. McAlpine v. Univ. of Alaska, 762 P.2d 81, 96 (Alaska 1988).
. E.g., id.; Alaska Action Ctr., 84 P.3d at 995.
. Faipeas, 860 P.2d at 1219.
. McAlpine, 762 P.2d at 94-95; see also Alaska Action Ctr., 84 P.3d at 995 (applying the three severability factors).
. Alaska Action Ctr., 84 P.3d at 995; see also McAlpine, 762 P.2d at 93.
. McAlpine, 762 P.2d at 93.
. See Faipeas, 860 P.2d at 1219-20 (quoting Cynthia L. Fountaine, Note, Lousy Lawmaking: Questioning the Desirability and Constitutionality of Legislating by Initiative, 61 S. Cal L.Rev. 733, 746 (1988)).
. We do not decide whether this balancing test will apply to local level municipal or home rule initiatives, where initiative summaries are drafted by the initiative sponsors and the requirement that summaries be clear and honest therefore serves the additional purpose of "discouraging] stealth by initiative drafters and promoters." See supra ¶ 15 & n. 43; Faipeas, 860 P.2d at 1221.
. See Faipeas, 860 P.2d at 1221; cf. McAlpine, 762 P.2d at 94-95.
. See McAlpine, 762 P.2d at 93.
. See Faipeas, 860 P.2d at 1219-20.
. In Faipeas, the primary issue was not whether the petition was inaccurate, but whether municipal petitions were required to be fair and accurate at all. Id. at 1218.
. In Citizens for Implementing Medical Marijuana, we held that a municipal clerk properly refused to certify a petition to legalize medical marijuana because the petition title was confusing; the proposition did not explain whether it created or abolished rights; and even if the petition's sponsors' interpretation of the petition were accepted, the petition was misleading. Citizens for Implementing Med. Marijuana, 129 P.3d at 902-05. In this case, the petition's language was so confusing and misleading that it was impossible to discern what the subscribers intended to support when they signed the petition, and therefore no remedy could be fashioned at the ballot summary stage. See id.
. See McAlpine, 762 P.2d at 94-95.
. AS 18.16.010(a)(3), .020.
. AS 18.16.010(c), (e).
. AS 15.45.200 provides that "[t]he director shall provide each election board with at least five copies of the proposed law being initiated, and the election board shall display at least one copy of the proposed law in a conspicuous place in the room where the election is held."
. Some of the superior court's conclusions were not appealed. We did not review, nor do we express an opinion on, the superior court's conclusions regarding the constitutionality of the PNI's revalidation of the PCA, the PNI's understandability, and the PNI's court rules provisions and their severability.