Case Name: STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v. EARL ADAMS, A/K/A KAHLID, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
Court: Supreme Court of New Jersey
Jurisdiction: New Jersey
Decision Date: 1992-05-11
Citations: 127 N.J. 438
Docket Number: 
Parties: STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v. EARL ADAMS, A/K/A KAHLID, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
Judges: 
Reporter: New Jersey Reports
Volume: 127
Pages: 438–457

Head Matter:
605 A.2d 1097
STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v. EARL ADAMS, A/K/A KAHLID, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
Argued October 8, 1991
Decided May 11, 1992.
Bernadette DeCastro, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for appellant (Wilfredo Caraballo, Public Defender, attorney).
Virginia M. Lincoln, Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause for respondent (Herbert H. Tate, Jr., Essex County Prosecutor, attorney).
Teresa A. Blair, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for amicus curiae, Attorney General of New Jersey (Robert J. Del Tufo, Attorney General, attorney).

Opinion:
The opinion of the Court was delivered by
CLIFFORD, J.
A jury convicted defendant, Earl Adams, of purposeful or knowing murder and of four weapons-possession charges. He contends that the trial court's admission of his oral statements in response to a police interrogation was reversible error because he had not validly waived his constitutional protection against self-incrimination. At the interrogation he had refused to sign a written statement but had volunteered to discuss the events surrounding the victim's death.
The Appellate Division affirmed the convictions, and we granted defendant's petition for certification, 126 N.J. 321, 598 A.2d 881 (1991). We hold that defendant's invocation of his right to silence for written statements only did not preclude admission of oral statements that he made at his interrogation. We therefore affirm.
-I-
The events leading up to the death of the victim, Joseph Beaulieu, originated in what has come to be recognized as "a drug deal gone bad." The victim's friend, Arnold, gave defendant $80 in exchange for cocaine. Believing that he had been "short-weighted," Arnold, accompanied by Beaulieu and two women, confronted defendant. According to the State, when questioned by Beaulieu, Adams produced a gun and shot the victim. According to Adams, he was unarmed when Beaulieu and the others complained angrily about the drug transaction. He testified at trial that Beaulieu had brandished a gun and had hit defendant with it. Beaulieu then dropped the gun, and although several people lunged for it, defendant picked it up. Just then, Arnold swung a machete, which hit defendant's hand and caused the gun to fire accidentally. The bullet struck and killed Beaulieu.
Defendant fled from the scene. The police obtained a warrant for his arrest, and defendant surrendered three days after the shooting.
On turning himself in, defendant was immediately placed under arrest by Detective William Thomas, who informed him of his rights as required by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). Detective Thomas then gave defendant a form to read, entitled "Preamble to Signed Statements (Miranda Warning)." At the officer's request, defendant read the first line aloud to demonstrate literacy; he then read the rest to himself. The form listed defendant's rights and contained a waiver. Defendant told Detective Thomas that although he did not wish to sign a written statement, he would talk about the incident. He then wrote on the form "I do not wish to give a statement at this time," and signed it.
Defendant thereupon told the officer that Beaulieu had approached him with a machete, demanding that defendant return the $80 that Arnold had given him, and that defendant had turned to run away, had taken the gun, and had shot over his shoulder.
A grand jury returned an indictment charging Adams with knowing and purposeful murder, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3a(1) and (2); first-degree armed robbery, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1; two counts of third-degree unlawful possession of a handgun without a permit, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5b; and two counts of second-degree possession of a handgun for unlawful use against another person, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4a.
Defendant sought to suppress the oral statement he had made during the interrogation. At a Miranda hearing, Detective Thomas testified that he had inferred from their conversation that defendant had intended to invoke only his right not to make a written statement. Cross-examination produced the following exchange between defense counsel and Detective Thomas:
Q. Did you make him aware that your records, you would then tell the jury what he said?
A. I once again repeat he understood that, and I told him that.
Q. How did he indicate he understood that?
A. By his conversation telling me, well, okay, but I am not going to give you a signed statement, and the man is intelligent enough, impressed me to be intelligent enough to understand what I am telling him.
Q. Did you tell him that the oral statement can be used against him in a court of law?
A. I repeat again, I told him that what he told me would be incorporated in my record and I would have to testify from my records in court.
*
Q. How did you learn from [defendant] he knew [that an oral statement would be used and given to the jury]?
A. I am talking to him, it's my impression from him he knows I am telling him I am going to incorporate what he is telling me. He says all right, but I am not going to give you a signed statement. He knew the difference between a signed statement and my report.
In denying the motion to suppress, the trial court made the following findings of fact: (1) Detective Thomas properly informed defendant of his constitutional rights; (2) defendant read those rights and signed them with an indication of his refusal to give a statement; (3) although defendant refused to sign any written statement, he indicated a willingness to tell the officer what had happened and attempted to exculpate himself by telling the officer that Beaulieu had attacked him with a machete and defendant had shot over his shoulder; (4) defendant made his oral statements after being advised of his constitutional rights; and (5) defendant fully understood his constitutional rights and did not intend to give a written statement but only to tell his version of the events leading to Beaulieu's death.
The jury acquitted defendant of robbery but convicted on the other charges. The trial court sentenced defendant to life in prison with thirty years' parole ineligibility for the murder, four years' imprisonment for unlawful possession of a handgun without a permit, and seven years' imprisonment for unlawful possession of a handgun for unlawful use against another person, the latter sentences to run concurrently with the murder sentence. For sentencing purposes, the court merged the duplicative weapons-possession charges. The court also assessed $90 in Violent Crimes Compensation Board penalties.
On appeal defendant claimed that the trial court had improperly admitted his oral statements made at the interrogation; that improper conduct by the prosecutor during his closing argument had prejudiced defendant's state and federal fair-trial rights; that the trial court should have charged passion/provocation manslaughter; that the trial court had abused its discretion by admitting a prior conviction to impeach defendant if he testified at trial; and that the trial court had committed reversible error by allowing an investigator from the prosecutor's office to offer expert testimony regarding ballistics.
The Appellate Division affirmed in an unreported opinion. The court found that defendant had waived his right to silence "knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently" and that the police had scrupulously honored his right to remain silent. We limited our grant of defendant's petition for certification to the single issue of whether police conduct at defendant's interrogation had violated his constitutional right against self-incrimination. We hold that under both federal constitutional law and State common law, defendant's invocation of his right to silence only for written statements did not preclude admission of oral statements he had made at his interrogation.
-II-
-A-
Federal and state courts have developed an intricate body of law addressing the means and effect of a suspect's waiver of the constitutional rights of silence and of counsel (also an integral part of New Jersey's common law. See, e.g., State v. Hartley, 103 N.J. 252, 260, 511 A.2d 80 (1986).). The United States Supreme Court stated in Miranda, supra, that procedural safeguards were necessary "to assure that the exercise of the right [of silence] will be scrupulously honoredI.]" 384 U.S. at 478-79, 86 S.Ct. at 1630, 16 L.Ed.2d at 726 (emphasis added). In Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 96 S.Ct. 321, 46 L.Ed.2d 313 (1975), that Court found that police had scrupulously honored the defendant's invocation of the right to silence when they ceased questioning after the defendant's invocation of his rights, waited more than two hours after that invocation, and issued fresh Miranda warnings before questioning the defendant about a crime unrelated to the one about which he had asserted the right to silence. Id. at 104-07, 96 S.Ct. at 326-28, 46 L.Ed.2d at 321-23.
This Court has imposed a bright-line, state-law rule stating that once a defendant invokes the right to silence, officers may not resume questioning until they have issued fresh Miranda warnings. Hartley, supra, 103 N.J. at 256, 511 A.2d 80.
In Hartley, we defined the analysis to be used in deciding whether to suppress a confession alleged to have been extracted in violation of a defendant's constitutional protection against compelled self-incrimination. A court's first inquiry is whether the suspect invoked the right to silence. Once it finds that invocation, the court should next determine whether law-enforcement officials have scrupulously honored the suspect's right to silence under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. 103 N.J. at 261, 511 A.2d 80. Lastly, if the suspect has invoked the right to silence and law-enforcement officials have scrupulously honored that right, the court must ascertain whether the confession is a result of the suspect's knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver of the right against self-incrimination. Ibid. If the police have not scrupulously honored the suspect's right to silence, the court should not reach the waiver issue. "Care must be taken that there be no blurring of the separate lines of analysis that are followed in respect of the 'scrupulously honor' requirement on the one hand and the waiver issue on the other." Ibid.
When a defendant does not invoke his or her Miranda rights, an examination of whether those rights were scrupulously honored is not necessary, and the inquiry must focus on whether the defendant's waiver was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. State v. Gerald, 113 N.J. 40, 117, 549 A.2d 792 (1988).
-B-
Defendant refused to make a written statement but was willing to make an oral statement. However, he contends that by invoking his right not to make a written statement and writing "I do not wish to give a statement at this time" on the Miranda waiver form, he unequivocally invoked the right to silence for all purposes. He also claims that because Detective Thomas realized that defendant believed that only a signed statement was admissible, and because the officer did not clarify the alleged misconception, the waiver was neither knowing, intelligent, nor voluntary. The State counters that defendant's invocation included only written statements. The Appellate Division found that defendant had completely invoked the right to silence, but had knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived it almost immediately afterwards by offering to discuss the shooting with Detective Thomas.
Defendant never invoked the right to silence beyond his refusal to sign a written statement. Any confusion about his intent when he wrote "I do not wish to give a statement at this time" is dispelled by his contemporaneously-stated, unambiguous willingness to talk to Detective Thomas about the circumstances surrounding the shooting. (Furthermore, Detective Thomas scrupulously honored defendant's rights to the extent of the invocation: when defendant refused to give a written statement, the officer dropped the matter.)
In Connecticut v. Barrett, 479 U.S. 523, 107 S.Ct. 828, 93 L.Ed.2d 920 (1987), the Supreme Court held that a defendant can invoke Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination for a limited purpose, and that statements outside the scope of that invocation are admissible. Id. at 529, 107 S.Ct. at 832, 93 L.Ed.2d at 928. The circumstances in Barrett were similar to those presented in this case: local police informed the defendant of his rights and he signed and dated a form acknowledging those rights. Barrett also told the police that although he refused to give a written statement without counsel present, he was willing to discuss the incident. Id. at 525, 107 S.Ct. at 830, 93 L.Ed.2d at 925-26. The Court reasoned that "Barrett's limited requests for counsel were accompanied by affirmative announcements of his willingness to speak with the authorities," and that therefore he had simply taken advantage of the right that Miranda affords defendants "to choose between speech and silence Id. at 529, 107 S.Ct. at 832, 93 L.Ed.2d at 928.
. Defendant attempts to distinguish Barrett on the ground that although Barrett had been unambiguously willing to talk and had clearly understood the Miranda warnings, the same is not true in this case. The argument is unpersuasive. Defendant's desire to discuss the shooting with Detective Thomas was entirely unambiguous, and, as the trial court found, he thoroughly understood his rights. The waiver sheet that he read and signed said: "Anything you say can be used against you in a court of law" (emphasis added). Moreover, Thomas told Adams that "what he is telling me" would be included in the detective's report and would form the basis for Thomas' testimony in court.
-III-
A suspect's waiver of his Fifth Amendment right to silence is valid only if made "voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently." Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. at 444, 86 S.Ct. at 1612, 16 L.Ed.2d at 707; cf. State v. Kennedy, 97 N.J. 278, 286, 478 A.2d 723 (1984) (regarding waiver of right to counsel). In New Jersey, the State must demonstrate validity of waiver beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Gerald, supra, 113 N.J. at 118, 549 A.2d 792 (citing State v. Bey, 112 N.J. 123, 134, 548 A.2d 887 (1988); State v. Miller, 76 N.J. 392, 404-05, 388 A.2d 218 (1978); State v. Kelly, 61 N.J. 283, 294, 294 A.2d 41 (1972); State v. Yough, 49 N.J. 587, 600-01, 231 A.2d 598 (1967)). The trial court must make its determination by examining the totality of the circumstances. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1023, 82 L.Ed. 1461, 1466 (1938) (determination depends on "particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused").
Defendant claims that his oral statement was not a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of his Fifth Amendment rights. He argues that Detective Thomas knew that defendant believed that an oral statement could not be used against him at trial, and that the officer failed to rectify the misconception. (Defendant has never contended that he actually believed his oral statements to be inadmissible.) However, the trial court found that Detective Thomas had properly advised defendant of his Fifth Amendment rights and that defendant understood them when he made his statement. The responsibility of law-enforcement authorities to inform defendants of their rights ends with the proper administration of Miranda warnings. State v. McKnight, 52 N.J. 35, 47, 55, 243 A.2d 240 (1968); cf. Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 292-94, 108 S.Ct. 2389, 2395-96,101 L.Ed.2d 261, 272-73 (1988) (holding that because Miranda warnings make defendant aware of right to counsel and of consequences of waiving Sixth Amendment rights, defendant's waiver of right to counsel after receiving such warnings is valid). That Detective Thomas told defendant his Fifth Amendment rights, gave him a waiver form to read, ensured that defendant was able to read and had read the form, and informed defendant that the detective's testimony in court would be based on defendant's oral recitation as included in the investigation report are all undisputed.
The concurrence argues that any invocation of the right to silence embraces that right as it relates to all forms of communication, noting the obvious fact that a conviction based on an oral statement is just as onerous as one based on a written statement. Post at 454, 605 A.2d at 1104. The facts of this case undercut the former assertion. Detective Thomas properly informed defendant of his rights. Whatever reason Adams had for choosing to invoke his right to silence with respect only to written statements clearly did not include ignorance of those rights. Adams' decision, unwise though it may have been, was expressed with no ambiguity whatsoever.
Speaking to the question of waiver of the right to silence, this Court has held that the imprudence of a defendant's waiver does not alter our conclusion that the waiver was otherwise knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. A defendant's waiver is not unintelligent merely because it is unwise. In McKnight, supra, this Court declared that a properly-warned defendant's waiver is "no less 'voluntary' and 'knowing' and 'intelligent' because he misconceived the inculpatory thrust of the facts he admitted, or because he thought that what he said could not be used because it was only oral 52 N.J. at 55, 243 A.2d 240. "The Constitution is not at all offended when a guilty man stubs his toe." Id. at 52, 243 A.2d 240.
The United States Supreme Court adheres to the same rule. In Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564,107 S.Ct. 851, 93 L.Ed.2d 954 (1987), the Court rejected the defendant's contention that his waiver of his Fifth Amendment rights did not extend to later questioning about a crime different from the one for which he had been arrested. The Court said, "The Constitution does not require that a criminal suspect know and understand every possible consequence of a waiver of the Fifth Amendment privilege." Id. at 574, 107 S.Ct. at 857, 93 L.Ed.2d at 966; accord Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 316, 105 S.Ct. 1285, 1297, 84 L.Ed.2d 222, 237 (1985) ("This Court has never embraced the theory that a defendant's ignorance of the full consequences of his decisions vitiates their voluntariness.").
A police officer has no duty to probe for a defendant's unstated misconceptions about the effect of the waiver of Fifth Amendment rights. Cf. Elstad, supra, 470 U.S. at 316, 105 S.Ct. at 1297, 84 L.Ed.2d at 237 (noting that law-enforcement officers are "ill-equipped to pinch-hit for counsel" for the purpose of telling defendants about the admissibility of their statements). Furthermore, if defendant was confused about the legal effect of his making an oral statement, Detective Thomas was not the source of his confusion. As noted above, that the officer told defendant that the oral statement would go into the report from which he would testify is uncontroverted.
-IV-
Because defendant invoked his Fifth Amendment and common-law rights to silence only to the extent of written statements, and because his waiver regarding oral statements was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, we affirm the judgment of the Appellate Division upholding defendant's convictions.