Case Name: Jennings, Plaintiff in error, vs. The State, Defendant in error
Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Wisconsin
Decision Date: 1908-01-08
Citations: 134 Wis. 307
Docket Number: 
Parties: Jennings, Plaintiff in error, vs. The State, Defendant in error.
Judges: 
Reporter: Wisconsin Reports
Volume: 134
Pages: 307–316

Head Matter:
Jennings, Plaintiff in error, vs. The State, Defendant in error.
December 18, 1907
January 8, 1908.
Criminal law and practice: Trial: What constitutes a jury: Constituí tional law: Right of accused to waive trial "by twelve jurors.
1. The jury contemplated by secs. 7, 8, art. I, Const., is a common-law jury of twelve jurors.
2. In a criminal proceeding on an information charging abandonment of his wife by the accused and failure to support her, the accused pleaded not guilty, and, a jury of twelve having been impaneled, the trial of the accused proceeded to a point where the evidence had been received and the arguments of counsel completed, when the court adjourned to the following day. On the reconvening of the court on,e juror of the panel was missing, and, upon stipulation of the accused, the cause was submitted to the remaining eleven jurymen upon instructions then given by the court. Held, in the absence of a statuté conferring such right, that the consent of the accused to waive the right to be tried by the full number of twelve jurors was ineffectual and rendered the verdict and judgment erroneous.
Marshall, J., dissents.
EkeoR to review a judgment of tbe circuit court for Fond du Lac county: Chester A. Fowler, Circuit Judge.
Reversed.
Plaintiff in error pleaded not guilty to an information charging him with abandonment of and failure to support his wife. A jury of twelve men was duly impaneled and sworn to try the case. When all the evidence had been received and the counsel had concluded their arguments the court adjourned until the following morning. When court opened in the morning one of the jurors failed to appear and after search he could not be found, and the judge thereupon made the following statement:
“One of the jurors, Mr. Pride, is not here. It is half an hour after the time that the jurors were directed to be present this morning. Mr. Pride not being in his seat at the time we met, I directed the sheriff to find him. The sheriff has been to his home and has telephoned the clerk, so the clerk informs me; he is not there and has not been there since yesterday, I believe, at dinner. ... Of course the defendant has the right to have his case tried by a jury of twelve men. It is a right he may waive, however, tinder the circumstances, gentlemen, do you prefer to have the jury charged and have the case submitted — ”
Mr. McKenna, attorney for’ defendant: “We desire to have the ease submitted to the eleven gentlemen sitting here.”
By the court: “Let the stipulation be made of record, and the defendant being in court I think we will proceed and submit this case to the eleven jurors on the stand.”
The court then charged the jury and submitted the case to the eleven jurors. They returned a verdict of guilty. This was received and recorded and the jury discharged. Plaintiff in error moved to set aside the verdict because only eleven of the jurymen sworn in the action participated in the verdict, because the verdict was rendered by only eleven jurors, and because this did not constitute a lawful jury. This motion was denied and the court rendered judgment on the verdict. Plaintiff in error sued out this writ of error to reverse the judgment.
B. D. Tillotson, for the plaintiff in error.
For the defendant in error there was a brief by the Attorney General and A. G. Titus, assistant attorney general, and oral argument by Mr. Titus.

Opinion:
SiebecKjse, J.
The single question presented is-, Has the accused, after plea of not guilty to the charge preferred in file information, under the provisions of secs. 7 and 8, art. I, of the state constitution, the right to waive trial by a jury of twelve persons ? The question was considered by this court in two cases—State v. Lockwood, 43 Wis. 403, and In re Staff, 63 Wis. 285, 23 N. W. 587. In the former case the accused waived the jury entirely, the case was submitted to the court upon the evidence, and the court found him guilty. In passing upon the right of the accused in criminal cases it was there declared: "A plea of not guilty to an information or indictment for crime, whether felony or misdemeanor, puts the accused upon the country, and can be tried by a jury only," and that this right "is secured by the constitution, upon a principle of public policy, and cannot be waived." It is unquestioned that a common-law jury of twelve jurors constitutes the jury contemplated by the constitution. It has been held that any less number is not such a jury. See Norval v. Rice, 2 Wis. 22; May v. M. & M. R. Co. 3 Wis. 219. It seems necessarily to follow that if a person on trial in a criminal case has no power to waive a jury he has no right to be tried by a less number than a common-law jury of twelve, and when he puts himself on the country it requires a jury of twelve to comply with the demands of the constitution. The fact that the jury in the instant case had the required number of twelve up to the stage in the trial when the cause was to be submitted to them under the instructions of the court cannot operate to satisfy the constitutional demand. At this point the trial was incomplete, for the very essential duty of having the jury deliberate upon the evidence and agree upon a verdict respecting defendant's guilt or innocence remained unperformed. Without the verdict of a jury of twelve it cannot be said to be a verdict of the jury required by the constitution. Such a verdict is illegal and insufficient to support a judgment.
Further consideration of this constitutional right was had in the Staff Case, wherein the decision of the Lockwood Case was adhered to; but the court determined that this construction of the constitutional provision did not deprive the legislature of the power to permit a person accused of crime to waive a jury when put upon trial. It is there said: "In the absence of a statute conferring it [such right], there may be some good reason resting in considerations of public policy . . . why he should not have such privilege;" but it is held that legislation conferring such privilege is a declaration of a legislative ehange in such policy, and "that the public policy which stood in the way of an effectual waiver of a jury by the accused in a criminal case is not so inherent in the form and framework of our government as to place it beyond the reach of legislative interference, but that it is the subject of legislative control." We deem these cases controlling upon the question presented by the plaintiff in error. In view of this interpretation of the constitutional provision on the question and the legislative power in respect thereto, we are of opinion that this court should adhere to the doctrine of these cases. If it is deemed good public policy to extend the privilege of waiving a jury in criminal cases, such policy should find expression in appropriate legislative action. Under the existing law the consent of the plaintiff in error to waive the right to be tried by the full number of twelve jurors was ineffectual and rendered the verdict and judgment erroneous. The situation demands a reversal of the judgment and a setting aside of the verdict received and entered as the verdict in the case.
By the Court. — Judgment reversed, and the cause remanded to the lower court for further proceedings according to law.