Case Name: Jane DOE,. on behalf of herself and all other persons similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. Honorable Calvin L. HAMPTON, Individually and in his capacity as Governor of the State of Utah, and Honorable Vernon B. Romney, Individually and in his capacity as Attorney General of the State of Utah, Defendants
Court: United States District Court for the District of Utah
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 1973-09-07
Citations: 366 F. Supp. 189
Docket Number: No. C 217-73
Parties: Jane DOE,. on behalf of herself and all other persons similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. Honorable Calvin L. HAMPTON, Individually and in his capacity as Governor of the State of Utah, and Honorable Vernon B. Romney, Individually and in his capacity as Attorney General of the State of Utah, Defendants.
Judges: 
Reporter: Federal Supplement
Volume: 366
Pages: 189–205

Head Matter:
Jane DOE,. on behalf of herself and all other persons similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. Honorable Calvin L. HAMPTON, Individually and in his capacity as Governor of the State of Utah, and Honorable Vernon B. Romney, Individually and in his capacity as Attorney General of the State of Utah, Defendants.
No. C 217-73.
United States District Court, D. Utah, C. D.
Sept. 7, 1973.
David S. Dolowitz, Salt Lake City, Utah, for plaintiff.
William T. Evans, Salt Lake City, Utah, for defendants.
LEWIS, Chief Judge, and RITTER and ANDERSON, District Judges.

Opinion:
OPINION
RITTER, District'Judge:
Plaintiff herein sues on behalf of herself, and others similarly situated, for the purpose of obtaining an abortion. A three judge court was convened. Plaintiff is 11 to 15 weeks pregnant, dependent upon public medical assistance, and has the advice and consent of her physician to have the abortion. She seeks a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief against enforcement of a series of recently enacted Utah statutes regulating abortions, claiming invalidity, essentially as violative of her Ninth and Fourteenth Amendment rights of privacy and liberty. The challenged statutes, Section 302(3), 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310, 311, 313, 314, 315, 316, 317, 318, and 319 of Title 76, Chapter 7, Utah Code Annotated 1953, are attached as an appendix.
From conception until the end of the first trimester of pregnancy, the decision whether or not to procure an abortion, and the effectuation of that decision, rests with the pregnant woman and her physician. During this period the state has no compelling interest which overrides the woman's Ninth and Fourteenth Amendment rights of privacy and liberty and justifies regulation of the abortion decision. After this period and until the end of the second trimester of pregnancy, the state's right to regulate the abortion decision, based upon a compelling interest in the health of the pregnant woman, is limited to regulations reasonably related to maternal health, for example, regulations' concerning the qualifications of the physician and the medical standard of the facilities involved. After the second trimester of pregnancy, at the stage of viability of the fetus, the state may regulate the abortion decision for the purpose of protecting the fetus, and this regulation may include prohibition of abortions except where necessary to preserve the life or health of the mother. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 93 S.Ct. 705, 35 L.Ed.2d 147 (1973); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 93 S.Ct. 739, 35 L.Ed.2d 201 (1973). Each of the Utah statutes contested here may apply at any stage of pregnancy: thus, they all affect plaintiff and she has standing to challenge each of them. She presents a justiciable controversy as to each of them and abstention is not warranted.
Each of these statutes imposes burdensome regulations upon the decision whether or not to have or perform an abortion at- any stage of pregnancy, thus they violate the constitutional rules stated above:
Section 76-7-302(3) is too broad a regulation and invalid because it might apply in any trimester of pregnancy, and because it prohibits abortions performed to preserve the mental health of the mother.
Section 76-7-303 is invalid because, in the first two trimesters of pregnancy, it imposes impermissibly upon the judgment of the physician whether to perform an abortion, and, in the third trimester it discriminates against poor persons and prohibits abortions to preserve the mother's mental health.
Section 76-7-304 is invalid because it subjects exercise of the individual right of privacy of the mother, in all abortions at all stages of pregnancy, to the consent of others.
Section 76-7-305 is invalid because it burdens the decision of a woman and her doctor, in all abortions at all stages of pregnancy, with a court proceeding and subjects the decision to judicial scrutiny.
Section 76-7-306 is invalid because it is broad enough to make an abortion impossible to obtain or to perform in any trimester of pregnancy— surely the state may not, as Utah attempts to do in Section 76-7-302, provide that every woman who desires an abortion in Utah must seek the services of a physician licensed and regulated by the state and that the majority of women who desire an abortion in Utah must seek the facilities of a state licensed and regulated hospital, and then provide, as in this section, that all such physicians and hospitals may deny their services and facilities to every such woman in every circumstance.
Sections 76-7-307 and 76-7-308 are invalid because they subject to action by third parties the right of the woman and her physician at all stages of pregnancy to decide upon and carry out an abortion.
Sections 76-7-309 and 76-7-310 are invalid because they might apply in any trimester, and because, regardless of the trimester in which they are applied, they unduly interfere with the professional judgment of the doctor involved.
Section 76-7-311 is invalid because it threatens every woman who has an abortion, at any stage of pregnancy and for any reason, with termination of parental rights without due process of law.
Section 76-7-313 is invalid because it would prevent, at all stages of pregnancy, women from seeking, and doctors from offering to perform, abortions.
Section 76-7-314 is invalid because it would limit exercise of the right to an abortion by the poor in all trimesters, for reasons having no apparent connection to health of the mother or child. The State may not so use its Medicaid program to limit abortions. Klein v. Nassau County Medical Center, 347 F.Supp. 496 (E.D.N.Y.1972), aff'd sub nom. Ryan v. Klein, 412 U.S. 924, 93 S.Ct. 2747, 37 L.Ed.2d 151 (1973); New Jersey Welfare Rights Organization v. Cahill, 411 U.S. 619, 93 S.Ct. 1700, 36 L.Ed.2d 543 (1973).
Section 76-7-315 is invalid because it subjects the abortion decision to public scrutiny by making the details of every abortion a matter of public record and thus chills exercise of the right of privacy in the abortion decision.
Sections 76-7-316, 76-7-317, and 76-7-318 fall with the invalid provisions for which they provide enforcement and penalties.
Section 76-7-319 is invalid because it attempts to make applicable to therapeutic abortions provisions which are invalid as heretofore set forth.
Defendants raise the question whether any part of these statutes is severable and may be preserved. It is clear, and the Court finds, that the overriding purpose and dominant effect of these statutes is the wholly improper one of making the obtaining or performing of an abortion in Utah extremely burdensome or impossible in every ease. Each and every challenged part of these statutes was intended to and does contribute, when each statute is read as a whole, to that improper purpose and effect. In that situation, the Court is neither obliged nor free to scrutinize the minutiae of these statutes to cull out those parts that, given a strained interpretation, might be thought to have an independent constitutionality. The Court cannot and will not edit these statutes in order to alter the legislative purpose, to do so would result in the Court exercising the legislature's constitutional power to legislate — this is a clear violation of the doctrine of separation of powers. We find all of the statutes and portions of statutes contested herein invalid in toto.
In view of the foregoing, it is unnecessary to determine whether this is a proper class action or what the proper class may be. Plaintiff has standing to challenge each of the contested provisions, and we find each invalid. The enforcement of each will be restrained.
APPENDIX
Sections 301 through 320, Title 76, Chapter 7, Utah Code Annotated 1953.
76-7-301. Definitions. — As used in this part:
(1) The word "abortion" means the termination of human pregnancy with an intent other than to produce a live birth or to remove a dead fetus, and includes all procedures undertaken to kill a live fetus and includes all procedures undertaken to produce a miscarriage.
(2) The word "physician" means a medical doctor licensed to practice medicine and surgery in all branches thereof in this state, or a physician in the employment of the government of the United States who is similarly qualified.
(3) The word "hospital" means a general hospital licensed by the state department of health according to Utah Code Annotated 1953, Title 26, chapter 15, and includes a clinic or other medical facility to the extent that such clinic or other medical facility provides equipment and personnel sufficient in quantity and quality to provide the same degree of safety to the pregnant woman and the fetus as would be provided for the particular medical procedures undertaken by a general hospital licensed by the state department of health, It shall be the responsibilty of the state department of health to determine if such clinic or other medical facility so qualifies.
76-7-302. Circumstances under which abortion authorized. — An abortion may be performed in this state only under the following circumstances:
(1) If performed by a physician; and
(2) If performed ninety days or more after the commencement of the pregnancy, it is performed in a hospital; and
(3) If performed when the fetus is sufficiently developed to have any reasonable possibility of survival outside its mother's womb, the abortion is necessary to save the life of the pregnant woman or to prevent serious and permanent damage to her physical health.
76-7-303. Medical reasons required for abortion. — -No abortion may be performed in this state unless, in the best clinical judgment of the pregnant woman's attending physician, there is sufficient medical reasons therefor. If the abortion is performed within the first ninety days of commencement of pregnancy, such medical reason shall be sufficient if in the attending physician's best clinical judgment the abortion is necessary to preserve the life, physical or mental health of the pregnant woman. If the abortion is performed 91 days or more after the commencement of pregnancy, such medical reason shall be sufficient if in the attending physician's best clinical judgment the abortion is necessary to preserve the life or physical health of the pregnant woman. If the abortion is performed 180 days or more after the commencement of pregnancy, such medical reason shall be sufficient if in the attending physician's best clinical judgment, as concurred in by two consulting physicians, the abortion is necessary to save the life of the pregnant woman or to prevent serious and permanent damage to her physical health.
76-7-304. Consent requirements for abortion. — Inasmuch as various persons have an interest in and through an unborn child, before an abortion may be performed written consent to the performance of such abortion must be given by the following individuals:
(1) In all cases such consent must be given by the woman upon whom the abortion is to be performed.
(2) If the woman upon whom the abortion is to be performed is. married at the time of the performance of the abortion, such consent must be given by her husband.
(3) If the woman upon whom the abortion is to be performed was married at the time of conception but was divorced between conception and the time that the abortion is to be performed, such consent must be given by her husband at the time of conception.
(4) If the pregnant woman is unmarried and under eighteen years of age, such consent must be given by the parents or guardian of such pregnant woman.
(5) In all cases, consent must be given by the father of the fetus. Where the father is unknown or cannot be located, the pregnant woman must file with the court at the time of the hearing specified in the next section an affadavit under oath so stating, and showing to the court that she has taken all reasonable efforts to identify him or locate him.
(6) In all other cases not covered by subsections (2), (3), (4), and (5) above, application must be made to the district court for consent to the performance of such abortion.
76-7-305. Hearing on abortion — Notice and procedure — Exception to requirement for hearing. — (1) Before an abortion may be performed a judicial hearing must be held after notice to the father and grandparents of the fetus, the parents or guardian of the mother of the fetus if the mother is unmarried and under 18 years of age, and the county attorney. The hearing may be before a district court or juvenile court in the county in which the pregnant woman resides, and may be advanced on any judicial calendar. If the court finds that the father of the fetus is unknown or cannot be located, and that reasonable efforts have been made to locate him or identify him, notice to him may be waived. Notice to the father of a fetus conceived out of wedlock must include a statement advising the father of his right to acknowledge the child as his own and thereby acquire parental rights.
(2) At such a hearing, findings must be made to the following:
(a) Whether all required consents were given freely while the person whose consent is required was in a state of mind to act voluntarily;
(b) Whether the pregnant woman has been advised-of the availability of adoptive parents for her child;
(c) Whether she has been advised that prospective adoptive parents are willing to pay all of the expenses of the-pregnant woman's maternity and the birth of her child;
(d) Whether the pregnant woman is fully informed as to the details of fetal development and the details of abortion procedures, and the possible civil liabilities that she may incur.
(3) If the court finds in the negative as to (2) (a) above, no abortion may be performed.; if the court finds in the negative as to (2)(b), (c), or (d) above, no abortion may be performed until such information has been provided the pregnant woman under the direction of the court.
(4) If the procedures provided by this section are not fully complied with prior to the performance of an abortion, either parent of the unborn fetus shall have a cause of action for wrongful death against the physician performing the abortion, the right to which cause of action cannot be waived.
(5) The provisions of this section shall not apply in the case of an abor tion necessary to save the life of the pregnant woman or to prevent serious and permanent damage to her physical health.
76-7-306. Physician, hospital employee, or hospital not required to participate in abortion. — (1) A physician, or any other person who is a member of or associated with the staff of a hospital, or any employee of a hospital in which an abortion has been authorized, who shall state an objection to such abortion on moral or religious grounds shall not be required to participate in the medical procedures which will result in the abortion, and the refusal of any such person to participate therein shall not form the basis of any claim for damages on account of such refusal or for any disciplinary or recriminatory action against such person, npr shall any moral or religious scruples or objections to abortions be the grounds for any discrimination in hiring in this state.
(2) Nothing in this part shall require a hospital to admit any patient under the provisions hereof for the purpose of having an abortion.
(3) Nothing in this part shall require a private hospital to admit any patient under the provisions hereof for the purpose of having an abortion.
(4) Nothing in this part shall require a denominational hospital to admit any patient under the provisions hereof for the purpose of having an abortion.
76-7-307. Actions by persons having justiciable interest in child — Damages. —(1) Any person or the legal representative of any- person who is entitled (or who would be entitled if the child had been born alive) to bring an action for prenatal injuries or wrongful death or who could have inherited from the child if it were born living and .then died, or who otherwise would have a justiciable interest in or through the life of the child were it born living, may maintain an action for wrongful death, or the termination of rights to real or personal property, or an action for damages for the violation of any other justiciable interest, against any person who suffers or performs an abortion, which is not necessary to save the life of the pregnant woman or prevent serious and permanent damage to her physical health.
(2) A person awarded damages under section 76-7-307(1), may recover in such action three times the damages found by the court or jury to accrue to such person by reason of such abortion.
(3) If an abortion is performed in violation of this part, punitive damages and costs, including a reasonable attorney's fee, may be added to any such damages award.
76-7-308. Actions by father, grandfather or grandmother. — In addition to all causes of action specified in the foregoing section, the father, grandfather or grandmother of any aborted fetus may maintain an action against the mother of the fetus and/or against the persons performing or assisting in the performance of an abortion not necessary to save the life of the pregnant woman or prevent serious and permanent damage to her physical health, for damages, including loss of care, comfort and society.
76-7-309. Medical procedure where fetus sufficiently developed. — If an abortion is performed when the fetus is sufficiently developed to have any reasonable possibility of survival outside its mother's womb, the medical procedure used must be that procedure which in the medical judgment of 'the physician will give such fet.us the best chance of survival, and no medical procedure designed to kill or injure such fetus may be used.
76-7-310. Medical skills to preserve life of fetus. — The physician performing any abortion must use all of his medical skills to promote, preserve and maintain the life of any fetus sufficiently developed to have any reasonable possibility of survival outside its mother's womb.
76-7-311. Child surviving abortion deemed ward of state. — Any child surviving an abortion shall become a ward of the state and the mother of such child and a father who has consented to such abortion shall have no parental rights with regard to such child.
76-7-312. Experimentation with live fetuses prohibited. — Live fetuses may not be used for experimentation.
76-7-313. Soliciting abortions or selling and buying fetuses prohibited. — The soliciting of abortions, advertising for abortions, selling, buying, offering to sell and offering to buy fetuses are prohibited.
76-7-314. Public assistance grants or state funds not used for abortions— Abortion not a condition to receipt of assistance. — No public assistance grant, medical or otherwise, may be used for an abortion. No state funds may be used, expended or paid for abortions except where an abortion is necessary to save the life of the pregnant woman or to prevent serious and permanent damage to her physical health. The obtaining of an abortion may not be a condition to the receipt of public assistance in any form, nor shall any person intimidate or coerce any person to obtain an abortion in connection with any public assistance program.
76-7-315. Physician's report to state department of health. — In order for the state department of health to maintain necessary statistical information and in order to ensure enforcement of the provisions of this act, any physician performing an abortion must obtain and record in writing the following information: The age of the pregnant woman; her marital status and residence; the number of previous abortions performed on her; the medical reason necessitating the abortion; the hospital or other facility where performed; the weight in grams of the fetus aborted; the pathological description of the fetus; the given menstrual age of the fetus; the measurements; and the medical procedure used. Said information, together with all written consents required for the abortion and a certification by the physician that the fetus was or was not capable of survival outside of the mother's womb, must be filed by the physician with the state department of health within ten days after the abortion.
76-7-316. Injunctive relief in connection with abortion. — Any person may apply to the district court for injunctive relief to enforce any provisions of this act or to preserve any .rights in connection with any abortion proposed, contemplated or threatened.
76-7-317. Violations of abortion laws — Classifications.—(1) Any person who performs or procures or supplies the means for an abortion other than authorized by this chapter is guilty of a felony of the second degree.
(a) A violation of sections 76-7-319 [76-7-309], 76-7-310, 76-7-311, 76-7-312, 76-7-313, or 76-7-314 of this part is a felony of the third degree.
76-7-318. Violation by physician as basis for disciplinary action. — In addition to any other penalties, a violation of any section of this part by a physician may be the basis for disciplinary action against the physician for unprofessional conduct under the provisions of Utah Code Annotated 1953, section 58-12-35.
76-7-319. Laws applicable- to abortion to save life or prevent damage to physical health of woman. — In the event of an abortion performed to save the life of the pregnant woman, or to prevent serious and permanent damage to her physical health, no provision of this act shall apply except sections 76-7-301, 76-7-302, 76-7-304-1 through (5), 76-7-306, 76-7-310, 76-7-315 and 76-7-320.
76-7-320. Separability clause. — If any one or more provisions, section, subsection, sentence, clause, phrase or word of this part or the application thereof to any person or circumstance is found to be unconstitutional, the same is hereby declared to be severable and the balance of this part shall remain effective notwithstanding such uneonstitutionality. The legislature hereby declares that it would have passed this part, and each provision, section, subsection, sentence, clause, phrase or word thereof, irrespective of the fact that any one or more provision, section, subsec tion, sentence, clause, phrase or word be declared unconstitutional.
LEWIS, Circuit Judge:
My study of the Utah Abortion Act and the posture in which this case is presented to the court leaves me'with several areas of concern. The legislature has obviously attempted to limit the performance of abortions in Utah to the , absolute minimum that is constitutionally allowable. This expression of intent is, considered generally, a legislative prerogative for that body is charged with the duty of expressing and determining what is best for the public wel'fare. However, the court is in complete agreement that numerous provisions in the Act are impermissibly restrictive and patent violations of the United States Constitution. And I agree that the overall Act is such as to make the obtaining or performing an abortion in Utah extremely difficult or impossible in every case.
It also seems glaringly apparent to me that the legislature was well aware and well advised that many of the provisions of the Act could not and would not pass judicial constitutional scrutiny. The Act is in direct conflict in many regards to the dictates of Roe and Doe and the legislature has simply rejected the mandate of those decisions with a not too subtle qualification contained in § 76-7-320 which provides:
Separability, clause. — If any one or more provision, section, subsection, sentence, clause, phrase or word of this part or the application thereof to any person or circumstance is found to be unconstitutional, the same is hereby declared to be severable and the balance of this part shall remain effective notwithstanding such unconstitutionally. The legislature hereby declares that it would have passed this part, and each provision, section, subsection, sentence, clause, phrase or word thereof, irrespective of the fact that any one or more provision, section, subsection, sentence, clause, phrase or word be declared unconstitutional.
The background would seem to amount to an open and untraditional invitation for the court to examine the Act word by word, to edit the Act, and to save as much as possible of its substance so as to preserve a highly restrictive Act. Perhaps this aspect of the case climaxes in § 76-7-306 wherein the court is requested to select from a multiple choice group of answers. Section 306(2) states that any hospital may refuse any patient admittance for the purpose of having an abortion; section 306(3) provides that a private hospital may so refuse; section 306(4) provides that a denominational hospital may so refuse. I think it generally improper, under the guise of a severability provision, for a court to accept such a responsibility and certainly would not do so subjectively, absent most compelling circumstances and even then with considerable reluctance.
Judge Ritter has indicated that he rejects in toto what I have termed the legislative invitation and holds that each of the provisions of the Act that is challenged is unconstitutional. He thus would invalidate the entire Act, excepting those sections not challenged.
Judge Anderson has fully accepted the legislative invitation and has expressed his extensive views as to each substantive section. He concludes however that sections 303, 304, 305, 307, 308, 309, 311, 314 and 316 are unconstitutional. Many of the remaining challenged sections he would sever and preserve as operational or qualifiedly so. To me, such drastic severance amounts to a judicial rewriting of the Act and I am not prepared to say that the result would reflect the actual intent of the legislature. A single example, although there are more, can be used to show my concern that a hodgepodge Act should not be declared the law of this state. Section 310, when viewed in isolation, would appear to make it a felony for a physician, faced with the ultimate decision of which life to save — that of a viable baby or the mother — to preserve the life of the mother. Judge Anderson states that this section is ambiguous and can be interpreted differently because of the interplay of interrelated sections. But extensive severance destroys that interplay and I simply want no part in preserving any such statute absent consideration of a clear and unequivocal legislative expression of intent projected against a basically constitutional Act.
In my initial consideration of this case I expressed the view to my colleagues that I was willing, reluctantly, to agree to some judicial severance within the Act to what I then considered the compelling need to preserve a basic Act relating to the right of the state during the third trimester. I was of the opinion, and am now, that such a basic Act, clearly constitutional and standing alone, could be accomplished by severing the word "physical" in section 302(3) and preserving only the last sentence of section 303 with the phrase "as concurred in by two consulting physicians" and again the word "physical" eliminated. Adjustment of the penalty provision in section 317 could be accordingly preserved. I am now informed that the Utah legislature will meet in special session in October 1973 and the compelling need that I subjectively felt has been alleviated. If such compelling need is existent it can be considered by the proper branch of government.
Accordingly, and for the reasons stated by my brothers, I agree that sections 303, 304, 305, 307, 308, 311, 314 and 316 are unconstitutional and totally invalid. I agree with Judge Ritter regarding the remaining sections of the Act to the extent that such sections should not remain operative and consequently join in the result that the entire Act, as challenged, should be declared inoperative and its enforcement restrained. In reaching this conclusion I in no way negative the right of the legislature to consider the subject matter of the unenumerated sections of the Act. Most, and perhaps all, of these matters may be very properly the subject of legislative control. But they should be considered in view of a basically constitutional approach to the subject matter and should not be delegated to the judiciary directly or indirectly. The sensitivity of the subject of abortion is no less difficult for judges than it is for legislators.