Case Name: Manuel VALLE, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1987-01-05
Citations: 502 So. 2d 1225
Docket Number: No. 61176
Parties: Manuel VALLE, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: McDonald, C.J., and BOYD, OVERTON, EHRLICH and SHAW, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 502
Pages: 1225–1227

Head Matter:
Manuel VALLE, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. 61176.
Supreme Court of Florida.
Jan. 5, 1987.
Rehearing Denied March 19, 1987..
Michael Zelman, Miami, for appellant.
Jim Smith, Atty. Gen. and Richard L. Polin, Asst. Atty. Gen., Miami, for appellee.

Opinion:
PER CURIAM.
We recently affirmed appellant's conviction for first-degree murder and sentence of death. Valle v. State, 474 So.2d 796 (Fla.1985). In Valle v. Florida, — U.S. -, 106 S.Ct. 1943, 90 L.Ed.2d 353 (1986), the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari, vacated the sentence of death, and remanded the cause to this Court for further consideration in light of Skipper v. South Carolina, — U.S. - 106 S.Ct. 1669, 90 L.Ed.2d 1 (1986). For the reasons expressed below, we remand for resentenc-ing.
Skipper introduced, as mitigating evidence, the testimony of himself, his former wife, and his mother in proof of his good conduct while in jail awaiting trial. As additional proof of his adjustment to prison life, Skipper proffered the testimony of two jailers and a regular visitor, which testimony was excluded by the trial court as irrelevant and inadmissible. The United States Supreme Court held that the exclusion of this testimony violated the precepts of Ed- dings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 102 S.Ct. 869, 71 L.Ed.2d 1 (1982), and Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 98 S.Ct. 2954, 57 L.Ed.2d 973 (1978), which mandate that "the sentencer . not be precluded from considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant's character or record," and that "the sentencer may not refuse to consider or be precluded from considering 'any relevant mitigating evidence,' " 106 S.Ct. at 1670-71, quoting Eddings, 455 U.S. at 110, 114, 102 S.Ct. at 874, 876. In reaching this conclusion, the Court rejected the state's argument that the excluded testimony was cumulative, finding that the jailers and the visitor were disinterested witnesses whose testimony would be given greater weight by the jury.
A rehabilitation officer testified in the instant case that Valle had been a model prisoner and was rehabilitated during his prior imprisonment. The trial court excluded the expert testimony of a clinical psychologist and two corrections consultants which was proffered in proof of Valle's claim that, if given a sentence of life imprisonment rather than death, he would be a model prisoner. The United States Supreme Court in Skipper found that evidence of probable future conduct in prison is relevant mitigating evidence.
[EJvidence that the defendant would not pose a danger if spared (but incarcerated) must be considered potentially mitigating. Under Eddings, such evidence may not be excluded from the sentencer's consideration.
[A] defendant's disposition to make a well-behaved and peaceful adjustment to life in prison is itself an aspect of his character that is by its nature relevant to the sentencing determination.
106 U.S. at 1671, 1672 (footnotes omitted).
When we first considered this matter, 474 So.2d at 804, we found that this proffered "model prisoner" testimony was cumulative and properly excluded. We are not persuaded that the excluded testimony of these experts differed in quality and substance from that of the rehabilitation officer. The expert testimony was proffered in proof of the probability that Valle would be a model prisoner in the future. It cannot be said that this evidence was cumulative in light of the rehabilitation officer's testimony that he could only vouch for Valle's behavior while previously imprisoned and that he had no opinion as to Valle's ability to adjust, in the future, to prison life.
Although Skipper requires only that we remand to the "sentencer" for consideration of all relevant mitigating evidence, we remand for a new jury recommendation as well. The jury's recommended sentence is given great weight under our bifurcated death penalty system. It is the jury's task to weigh the aggravating and mitigating evidence in arriving at a recommended sentence. Where relevant mitigating evidence is excluded from this balancing process, the scale is more likely to tip in favor of a recommended sentence of death. Since the sentencer must comply with a stricter standard when imposing a death sentence over a jury recommendation of life, a defendant must be allowed to present all relevant mitigating evidence to the jury in his efforts to secure such a recommendation. Therefore, unless it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that the erroneous exclusion of evidence did not affect the jury's recommendation of death, the defendant is entitled to a new jury recommendation on resentencing. Since we cannot say beyond a reasonable doubt that the exclusion did not affect that recommendation, we remand for a new sentencing hearing with a new jury panel.
It is so ordered.
McDonald, C.J., and BOYD, OVERTON, EHRLICH and SHAW, JJ., concur.
ADKINS, J., dissents with opinion.
"In order to sustain a sentence of death following a jury recommendation of life, the facts suggesting death should be so clear and convincing that virtually no reasonable person could differ." Tedder v. State, 322 So.2d 908, 910 (Fla.1975).