Case Name: J. WILTON JONES COMPANY, Inc. and Rene G. Delacroix v. LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1970-07-06
Citations: 248 So. 2d 878
Docket Number: No. 3999
Parties: J. WILTON JONES COMPANY, Inc. and Rene G. Delacroix v. LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY.
Judges: Before REDMANN, LeSUEUR and DOMENGEAUX, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 248
Pages: 878–901

Head Matter:
J. WILTON JONES COMPANY, Inc. and Rene G. Delacroix v. LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY.
No. 3999.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fourth Circuit.
July 6, 1970.
Rehearing Denied May 10, 1971.
Writ Refused June 21, 1971.
Remy F. Gross, II, La Place, for J. Wilton Jones Co., Inc., and Rene G. Delacroix, plaintiffs-appellants.
Drury, Lozes, Young & Curry, Felicien P. Lozes, New Orleans, for The Employers’ Liability Assurance Corp., Ltd., inter-venor-appellant.
Jones, Walker, Waechter, Poitevent, Carrere & Denegre, John V. Baus, and James R. Murrell, III, New Orleans, for Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., defendant-appellee.
Before REDMANN, LeSUEUR and DOMENGEAUX, JJ.

Opinion:
LeSUEUR, Judge.
Rene G. Delacroix, one of the two original plaintiffs in this automobile-personal injury action, died on October 9, 1965, some eighteen months after suit was filed. The case had yet to be heard and, on February 23, 1966, Ella Moore Delacroix, Mr. Delacroix's widow, filed a "supplemental and amended petition" as "administratrix of decedent's succession" in which she alleged that, as administratrix, she was entitled to be placed in her late husband's stead as plaintiff and prayed for judgment in favor of the estate. On November 22, 1966 (more than a year after her husband's death) she filed a "second amended and supplemental petition" asking for both survival and wrongful death benefits. The defense lodged exceptions founded upon the peremptory provisions of LSA-C.C. Art. 2315.
At trial, the case was presented by joint stipulation of fact and dismissed on the exceptions. The stipulation has narrowed the issues before this court to two: (1) whether a timely substitution with reference to survivorship benefits was made (the wrongful death claim being withdrawn) ; and (2), if so, what amount of damages will adequately compensate Mrs. Delacroix.
In our view, the imposition of peremption is predicated on two errors. First, such an approach inextricably confuses rights to the survival of an action already filed (a right exercised) with a nonexer-cised right of action for wrongful death. Second, it overlooks statutory amendments adopted with the Code of Civil Procedure in 1960.
THE EFFECT OF DEATH UPON A CAUSE OF ACTION.
The defendant's view of the abatement of an action which was filed timely is grounded on a long series of decisions interpreting rights granted under Art. 2315 as personal. If this view was once correct, it can most certainly no longer prevail. Both Art. 2315 and the modes of Louisiana procedure concerning abatement and substitution were radically altered in 1960. Specifically, the following provisions were adopted:
1. Art. 428 of the Code of Civil Procedure which provides, unequivocally, that an action once commenced does not abate upon the death of a party;
2. Art. 801 of the Code of Civil Procedure which provides specifically that the succession representative may substitute for any deceased party in a civil action. It is important to note that no time limit is provided for in this article;
3. Art. 2315 of the Civil Code was amended to provide that "a right [of action] to recover damages under the provisions of this paragraph is a property right."
This final change bears close scrutiny. As Professor McMahon observes by explanatory note, these rights are not only heritable, but heritable in two distinct categories. If suit has not been filed, then the right to sue is heritable subject to the limitations of peremption. But, if suit has been filed, then the action itself is inherited. As such an action has already been filed and all served parties given fair notice, there is no question of either peremption or prescription. The question is one of abatement. LSA-C.C.P. Art. 428 specifically excludes that possibility.
The means for continuing the still-living action is found in the substitution provi sions of Art. 801. No time limit is set out, and for good reason. The Code of Civil Procedure already provides a S-year time limit for abatement. Substitution is subject to this delay.
These principles seem to have been accepted at the time the statutory changes were made. Judge McBride, for example, in 1962, denied substitution for survivorship past the one year delay on the specific ground that the cause of action before him arose before 1960. Maher v. Schlosser, La.App., 144 So.2d 706 (4th Cir. 1962). The thrust of his thinking seems clear.
In this connection, it is significant to note that with the principal exceptions of Davis v. State Farm Mutual Insurance Company, La.App., 208 So.2d 412 (4th Cir. 1968), Succession of Roux v. Guidry, La.App., 182 So.2d 109 (4th Cir. 1966) (both of which deal explicitly with wrongful death rather than survival benefits), and Marvin v. Toye Brothers Yellow Cab Company, La.App., 214 So.2d 196 (4th Cir. 1968), the defense relies chiefly upon decisions in which the causes of action predated the relevant legislative acts. Under these circumstances, an examination of the statutes passed or amended in 1960 and 1962 (LSA-C.C. Art. 2315, and LSA-C.C. P. Arts. 421, 426, 428 and 801) seems in order.
THE SCOPE OF THE ONE YEAR DELAY PROVIDED BY ART. 2315.
LSA-C.C. Art. 2315, as amended by Act 30 of 1960, Sec. 1, provides:
"Every act whatever of man that causes damage to another obliges him by whose fault it happened to repair it.
"The right to recover damages to property caused by an offense or quasi-offense is a property right which, on the death of the obligee, is inherited by his legal, instituted, or irregular heirs, subject to the community rights of the surviving spouse.
"The right to recover all other damages caused by an offense or quasi-offense, if the injured person dies, shall survive for a period of one year from the death of the deceased in favor of: (1) the surviving spouse and child or children of the deceased, or either such spouse or such child or children; (2) the surviving father and mother of the deceased, or either of them, if he left no spouse or child surviving; and (3) the surviving brothers and sisters of the deceased, or any of them, if he left no spouse, child, or parent surviving. The survivors in whose favor this right of action survives may also recover the damages which they sustained through the wrongful death of the deceased. A right to recover damages under the provisions of this paragraph is a property right which, on the death of the survivor in whose favor the right of action survived, is inherited by his legal, instituted, or irregular heirs, whether suit has been instituted thereon by the survivor or not."
(Emphasis added.)
This article, by its express language, deals with a right of action, twice using this specific phrase. The one year delay expressly refers to the time in which a right of action must be exercised. The importance of this cannot be too strongly emphasized. As it is pointed out in the comments to LSA-C.C.P. Art. 421, defining the word "action":
"The word 'action' has a double meaning meaning both the 'instituted action' and the 'right to institute the action.' This double meaning has proved most unfortunate whenever the word 'action' is employed . To avoid this difficulty, throughout this Code 'action' has been given only the meaning ascribed to it in the definition of the above article — 'instituted action.' Whenever the 'right to institute the action,' is meant express language to this effect clearly indicating this meaning is employed. (Emphasis added.)
The Louisiana Law Institute also drafted the amendment to Art. 2315. The consistent and purposeful use of terms suggests, at least on a preliminary basis, that it is only when a right of action rather than an action itself is inherited that the one year peremptive delay applies.
This, however, is more than a logical conclusion; it is a necessary one. An instituted action is property. In its essential nature it is no different in this respect than a brick. LSA-C.C.P. Art. 426 specifically so provides:
"An action to enforce an obligation is the property of the obligee which on his death is transmitted with his estate to his heirs, (Emphasis added.)
LSA-C.C.P. Art. 428 makes it plain that the inherited action is a viable, living one, providing that it does not abate on the death of a party. The comments to the Article are to the point:
" the' line of demarcation is the institution of suit. Cf. Art. 421, supra. If the plaintiff has elected to enforce a right of action by instituting suit thereon, then his heirs, or his survivors under the amended Art. 2315 of the Civil Code, have the right to continue its prosecution, if the plaintiff dies." (Emphasis added.)
Here, the legislature deals with the "right to continue." So long as the action is not abated, this is an absolute right, not bound by the restrictions placed upon a "right of action."
Within this framework, the entire schema of Art. 2315 seems clear. It deals with "rights of action" because the inheritance of an instituted action is governed by the provisions of LSA-C.C.P. Arts. 421 and 426, and the succession articles of the Civil Code. It makes the right property because the action itself is so treated by Art. 426. It deals in its final sentence with the surviv- or of a survivor because an immediate survivor, where suit is filed, already has fixed rights under Arts. 426 and 428. In short, it seems that the Institute, in its use of language, said precisely what it intended.
Confusion is generated only because, in some cases, the vehicle for enforcing the heirs' new right of action (wrongful death as in Roux) may be to substitute themselves into and amend the deceased's action which was for damages only.
If the heirs receive a right of action under Art. 2315, then in order to exercise it by substitution and amendment, they must accept the limits imposed by Art. 2315 and act within a year. But, if the heirs inherit an instituted action as defined in Art. 421, they are bound only by the restrictions in Arts. 426 and 428, together with the substitution provisions of LSA-C.C.P. Arts. 801 through 804.
The legislature, itself, has taken this distinction into consideration by amending Art. 801 in 1962 to provide for different party plaintiffs in each situation. If the heirs are the beneficiaries under Art. 2315 they so proceed. But, if the heirs are different from the beneficiaries, then the succession representative is the proper party plaintiff (see McMahon's comments at 23 La.Law Rev. 27). These heirs who differ from beneficiaries must take their procedural rights from LSA-C.C.P. Arts. 426 and 428.
In this case, the widow seeks to continue an instituted action. Her rights, then, are determined by the source of those rights, LSA-C.C.P. Arts. 426 and 428, coupled with Art. 801. The delay of one year does not govern because she asserts no new "right of action" under LSA-C.C. Art. 2315. Thus, pursuant to LSA-C.C.P. Art. 801, substitution eighteen months past the death of the original plaintiff is clearly allowed.
SUBSTITUTION WAS PROPER UNDER ARTS. 801-804 OF THE CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.
LSA-C.C.P. Art. 801, which provides for substitution, contains no time limit. It creates an absolute right so long as the cause of action has not been extinguished and the action has not been abated. Neither caveat is applicable to the case at bar.
The cause of action is not extinguished because it has been exercised. If there is a peremption in LSA-C.C. Art. 2315, it is, by the terms of the article itself, applicable only to a right of action, not an instituted suit, as was discussed above. Inasmuch as five years have not passed, the action has not abated.
THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT.
The central question is rooted in a century-long struggle between the courts and legislature which continued until 1960 when the governing law was adopted. On no less than three occasions, decisions consistent with the defendant's position were handed down. On each of these occasions, the legislature amended the basic statutes. The needs of the public, the bench, and the bar demand that this struggle be ended. The legislature has acted once more. The amendment to LSA-C.C. Art. 2315 and the adoption of the cited articles of the Code of Civil Procedure are, in a sense, a legislative package intended to abrogate the specific case law urged by the defendant. It remains only for the courts to implement this intent.
The relationship between these statutory amendments and the problem now before this court is clear. Professor McMahon, at 21 La.Law Rev. 1, discussed these questions at length, showing clearly that the matter of abatement of actions was clearly tied in with the problems posed by Art. 2315. Thus, says Professor McMahon, "after months of groping for effective solutions," it was decided "that no effective solutions were possible without an amendment of Art. 2315 of the Civil Code." At p. 26 he also discusses the four changes effected by the amendment to Art. 2315. The fourth numbered change is pertinent.
"(4^ the transmitted and individual rights of a designated beneficiary are recognized as property rights which, on his death either before judgment or even before the filing of suit, are inherited by the heirs of this beneficiary. " (Emphasis added.)
The emphasized language unequivocally suggests that the last sentence of Art. 2315, third paragraph, quoted herein, means that: all rights for personal injury and death are made property rights. McMahon's language, "the transmitted and individual rights of a designated beneficiary are recognized as property rights," seems to embrace all such rights. It seems wholly unwarranted to twist the language of the amended article so as to imply that there is a sort of judicial interregnum situation whereby the surviving rights for personal injuries were not property rights of the injured party but that they became such in the hands of the beneficiary.
The answer to this is that once suit has been filed, the action itself is a property right which is also heritable. As a fact in point, Art. 2315 itself, terms the limitation as one upon "this right of action." This thought, however, has already been developed.
It seems clear, therefore, as Professor McMahon points out, that when the framers of the Code of Civil Procedure set out to do what they wanted to do quoad the nonabatement of actions, they felt it necessary to amend Art. 2315 specifically to prevent judicial interference with the intent to make instituted actions nonabateable.
In Gabriel v. United Theatres, 221 La. 219, 59 So.2d 127, 1952, for example, the courts had held the former nonabatement statute repealed by implication when a former amendment to Art. 2315 was passed. By amending Art. 2315, itself, so as to make the rights created thereunder property rights, the legislature intended to bring the abatement-nonabatement struggle to a close. As Professor McMahon concludes:
"With these changes the remaining problems of abatement of actions are solved simply through a basic article (Article 428) providing that no actions abate on the death of a party, except those to enforce a right or obligation strictly personal."
In essence, the Gabriel decision is conclusive for it makes at least one thought crystal clear: the line of decisions favoring the arguments for peremption is incompatible with the legislative intent inherent in the nonabatement and substitution statutes. We are constrained to abide by that intent and we thus hold that Mrs. Delacroix's substitution eighteen months after the death of her husband was proper.
MARVIN. V. TO YE BROTHERS YELLOW CAB COMPANY.
We are aware that our conclusion is opposed in both concept and ruling to this circuit's earlier decision in Marvin v. Toye Brothers Yellow Cab Company, supra. Our reading of that decision, however, convinces us that the distinction between an instituted action and a right of action was not adequately presented to the Marvin court and our view of the significance of that distinction makes it impossible to follow the Marvin holding.
DAMAGES.
The joint stipulation provides that in the event judgment is rendered for plaintiff (liability was conceded) it shall be limited to the sum of $14,283.00 (lost wages), plus a sum for the personal injuries, pain and suffering borne by the decedent from July 3, 1963, the date of the accident, until October 9, 1965, the date of his death. Pursuant to the stipulation, no other claims are to be considered.
Mr. Delacroix's injuries were most certainly severe and included an open sucking lung puncture and fractured ribs. Fragments of the fractured rib cut arteries within the chest and there was a contusion of the left lung. His face was cut which led to scarring.
He was rushed to the emergency room at Charity Hospital in New Orleans where a tube was inserted in the chest for drainage and then into surgery where the wounds were closed. On July 10, 1963, he was transferred to Touro Infirmary.
Inasmuch as an electrocardiographic abnormality had been noted at Charity, follow-up care was instituted, and continued past his discharge from the hospital on July 25, 1963.
The heart condition was diagnosed as a complete left bundle branch block, and in view of his negative cardiac history and in view of the evidence of Dr. G. E. Burch, a cardiac specialist, it seems reasonably clear that the condition was caused by the trauma, He was enfeebled by this problem and required to restrict all activities and to spend a great deal of time in bed. To some extent, these disabilities remained with him until his death and account for the lost wages covered by the stipulation.
All things considered, we feel that an award of $15,000.00 will provide adequate compensation for the injuries and pain and suffering that extended from the date of the accident until the date of his death. This, together with the $14,283.00 sum, which represents lost earnings, will bring the total judgment to $29,283.00.
Accordingly, the judgment appealed is reversed, and judgment is hereby entered in favor of Ella Moore Delacroix and against the defendant in the sum of $29,-283.00, together with legal interest and costs in both courts.
Reversed and rendered.