Case Name: Luke VIDRINE, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Robert L. SIMONEAUX et al., Defendants and Appellants
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1962-09-24
Citations: 145 So. 2d 400
Docket Number: No. 616
Parties: Luke VIDRINE, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Robert L. SIMONEAUX et al., Defendants and Appellants.
Judges: Before TATE, CULPEPPER and; HOOD, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 145
Pages: 400–411

Head Matter:
Luke VIDRINE, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Robert L. SIMONEAUX et al., Defendants and Appellants.
No. 616.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana. Third Circuit.
Sept. 24, 1962.
Rehearing Denied Oct. 18, 1962.
Certiorari Denied Dec. 10, 1962.
Voorhies, Labbe, Voorhies, Fontenot & Leonard, by ■ H. Lee Leonard, Lafayette, for third-party plaintiff-appellant.
Joseph A. LaHaye, Opelousas, for defendant-appellant.
Leon S. Haas, Jr., Opelousas, for third-party defendant-appellee.
Preston N. Aucoin, Ville Platte, for plaintiffs-appellees.
Before TATE, CULPEPPER and; HOOD, JJ.

Opinion:
HOOD, Judge.
This is a tort action arising out of a motor-vehicle collision in which four automobiles-were involved. The suit was instituted by-Luke Vidrine, the owner and driver of one-of the cars involved. The defendants named' in the suit are Robert Simoneaux, Marion J-Stelly and Aetna Casualty and Surety Company, the last named defendant being the public liability and property damage insurer of an automobile being driven by Charles. A. Rice, which automobile was one of those: involved in the collision.
Another tort action arising out of this accident was instituted by Leon Vidrine and; his wife, Beulah Vidrine, against the same-three defendants, the plaintiffs in that suit alleging that they were guest passengers in-the Luke Vidrine car and that they sustained personal injuries as a result of this, accident. Both of these suits were consolidated for the purposes of trial and appeal,, and judgment is being rendered by us in the-companion case on this date. See Vidrine et ux. v. R. Simoneaux et al., La.App., 145 So.2d 411.
Answers were filed by the defendants in-both of these suits, and in addition thereto-defendant Aetna Casualty and Surety Company filed a third party action in each suit: against defendants Simoneaux and Stelly,. praying alternatively that if Aetna be-found to be liable that either or both of the- other defendants, because of their concurrent negligence, be compelled to contribute proportionately to the amount awarded to plaintiffs.
After trial of these consolidated cases, judgment was rendered by the trial court in favor of plaintiff in this suit, and in favor of plaintiffs in the companion suit, against Simoneaux and Aetna Casualty and Surety Company. Judgment further was rendered rejecting the demands of plaintiffs in both suits against defendant Stelly, and dismissing the third party actions filed by Aetna Casualty and Surety Company against that defendant. Defendants Simoneaux and Aetna Casualty and Surety Company have appealed from the judgments rendered in both cases. Plaintiffs in the companion suit, Leon Vidrine and Beulah Vidrine, have answered the appeal in that case asking that the awards made to them be increased.
The suit arose out of an accident which occurred at approximately 5:00 P.M., on April 12, 1961, on U. S. Highway 167 in St. Landry Parish. The evidence establishes that immediately before the collision occurred Charles A. Rice was driving his employer's automobile in an easterly direction on U. S. Highway 167, approaching Sebastian's Bar, which was located on the south side of the road. Defendant Simon-eaux also was driving his automobile in an easterly direction along the same highway about 150 or 175 feet behind Rice. As these two cars approached Sebastian's Bar at a speed of approximately 60 miles per hour, an automobile owned and operated by defendant Stelly entered the highway from the parking lot surrounding this bar, and proceeded to travel in an easterly direction on the highway, in front of the Rice car, at a speed of about 15 miles per hour. The Stelly vehicle entered the highway about 150 to 250 feet in front of the approaching Rice car.
At about the same time, the vehicle owned and operated by plaintiff, Luke Vi-drine, was approaching from the east, with Mr. and Mrs. Leon Vidrine riding in the car as passengers. When Rice saw the Stelly vehicle enter the highway in front of him, he immediately applied his brakes, sounded his horn and thereafter brought his car practically to a stop on the highway a few feet behind the Stelly car. There is some question as to whether Rice applied his brakes continuously from the time he first saw the Stelly car enter the highway until he stopped, but the evidence indicates to us that he applied them lightly at first, and then with greater force until his car was brought practically to a stop about five feet behind Stelly. While Rice was in the process of trying to stop his vehicle, and when he reached a point just a few feet behind the Stelly car, the latter vehicle left the highway and was driven onto the right or south shoulder. Immediately after the Stelly car left the highway, Rice heard a car approaching from his rear, and he thereupon attempted to accellerate his automobile in order to avoid a collision, but in spite of this attempt the right rear of his car was struck by the left front portion of the Simoneaux automobile. The force of this collision caused the rear of the Simoneaux vehicle to swing to its left, into the westbound lane, where it was struck by the Vidrine car.
The Vidrine vehicle, just prior to the accident, was in its proper lane of traffic. It was being driven at a speed of about 45 miles per hour, and the driver had pulled about two feet onto the north shoulder of the road in an effort to avoid a collision. We think the trial court was correct in holding that Luke Vidrine, the driver of that car, as well as the passengers, Mr. and Mrs. Leon Vidrine, were free from contributory negligence.
Stelly immediately left the scene of the accident, but Rice pursued him down the highway and attempted to persuade him to return. Although Stelly did not return, his license number was obtained and upon being questioned the next day, he admitted that he was present when the accident occurred.
The collision occurred about 290 feet east of the northeast corner of Sebastian's Bar. The Rice vehicle was 150 to 250 feet west of the entrance to the bar when the Stelly vehicle entered the highway. Since Rice applied his brakes immediately after seeing Stelly enter the highway, it is apparent that the Rice car traveled a distance of at least 450 feet between the time he first applied his brakes until he was struck in the rear by the Simoneaux car.
As a result of this accident, plaintiff in this suit, Luke Vidrine, suffered property damages, and Mr. and Mrs. Leon Vidrine, plaintiffs in the companion suit, both suffered personal injuries.
Plaintiff alleges that Rice was negligent in the following particulars: (a) in stopping too sharply and abruptly on a highway where traffic was heavy, (b) in not giving appropriate and adequate signals for stopping, (c) in failing to keep a proper lookout for traffic entering the highway from a crowded night club parking lot, (d) in traveling at a unsafe speed for the conditions of traffic and the highway at the time of the accident, and (e) in failing to see what he should have seen and to do what he should have done to avoid the accident. The trial court found that Rice was negligent in stopping too abruptly on the highway, and in driving at an excessive rate of speed. Defendant Aetna contends that the court erred in arriving at these conclusions.
The evidence establishes that as Rice approached Sebastian's Bar he was driving at a speed not in excess of 60 miles per hour. The highway at that point was hard surfaced, and the accident occurred in open country, not in any city or town. Plaintiff contends that the speed was excessive, however, because this particular portion of the road was under construction at the time. The evidence shows that an asphalt spreading project was under way along an 11-mile stretch of road which included the site where the accident occurred, the construction work extending from a point seven miles west of that site to a point four miles east- of it. Large signs were located at both ends of the project, indicating that the driver was entering a zone of road construction and stating a speed limit of 45 miles per hour. The speed limit on highways generally in that area was 60 miles per hour. There also were "soft shoulder" signs placed at intervals of approximately one-half mile throughout the zone of construction, and there were pieces of heavy equipment on the road where the actual work was being performed. Although these conditions were present on the day of the accident, it appears from the evidence that no work was actually being done and no equipment or crews were located within one mile of the place where the accident occurred. Although other layers of asphalt were to be spread before the job was completed, it appears to us from this evidence that at the time this accident occurred the highway in the immediate vicinity of the place where the accident occurred was smooth and unobstructed and there was no greater danger in driving at a speed of 60 miles per hour there than there would have been had no construction work been in progress. We are convinced that Rice was not negligent in driving at an excessive rate of speed under the facts and circumstances presented here. Even though he should be held to be negligent in driving at an excessive rate of speed, however, we think the speed at which he was traveling was not a contributing or proximate cause of the accident.
Counsel for plaintiff contends, and we assume the trial court concluded, that Rice continued to travel at a high rate of speed after Stelly had entered the highway until he reached a point a very short distance behind Stelly, and that he then applied his brakes suddenly, coming to an abrupt stop, and thus he created an emergency which contributed to the accident. We do not think the facts support such a contention. Rice testified that he applied his brakes immediately when the Stelly car entered the highway and that he continued to apply them until his car was brought almost to a stop. Simoneaux, the driver of the following vehicle, confirms the fact that Rice did apply his brakes immediately when Stelly entered the highway, although he recalls that the stop lights on the Rice car then went off but momentarily came on again and remained on until the Rice car almost came to a stop. We think the testimony of these two witnesses shows without question that Rice began applying his brakes about 450 feet before he reached the point where the collision occurred.
The physical facts also indicate that Rice did not make a more sudden or abrupt stop than was necessary under the circumstances. His car did not skid on the highway at any time, as did the Simoneaux car, and he remained in complete control of it during the entire maneuver. Also, since Rice was traveling at a speed approximately four times as fast as that of Stelly, it is apparent that had he continued to drive at that speed after Stelly entered the highway he would have overtaken and passed the Stelly car after the latter had driven a distance of only 50 or 75 feet from Sebastian's Bar. The accident actually occurred 290 feet beyond that bar, so it is obvious that Rice either must have reduced the speed of his car gradually or he did so suddenly immediately after Stelly entered the highway and then followed Stelly at a very slow rate of speed (Stelly was traveling at a speed of 15 miles per hour) a substantial distance before the Simoneaux car collided with him. We are convinced that Rice brought his vehicle virtually to a stop as evenly as it was reasonably possible for him to do so under the emergency with which he was confronted.
Plaintiffs contend that it was not necessary for Rice to bring his vehicle to a stop at all, and that he was negligent in doing so, because Stelly had pulled off the highway and Rice could have continued in an easterly direction without stopping. We find no merit to this argument, because the evidence shows that Stelly did not pull off the highway until immediately before Rice reached a point within a few feet behind him, and that Rice thereupon immediately attempted to accellerate his car.
Plaintiff further contends that Rice was negligent in failing to give a hand signal indicating that he intended to stop. We think the electrical stop signals on the Rice car, which were operating and which were actually observed by the following driver, served as sufficient warning of Rice's intent to bring his vehicle to a stop, and that he was not negligent in failing to give a hand signal. See LSA-R.S. 32:236.
After considering all of the evidence and circumstances presented in this case, we are compelled to conclude that the trial court erred in holding that Rice was negligent, and accordingly that portion of the judgment which condemns the insurer of the Rice automobile to pay damages must be reversed.
The trial court found that defendant Simoneaux was negligent in following too closely to the Rice vehicle, and that his negligence in that respect was the proximate cause of the accident. LSA-R.S. 32:234(A) provides that:
"The driver of a motor vehicle shall not follow another vehicle more closely than is reasonable and prudent, having due regard to the speed of such vehicle and the traffic upon and condition of the highway."
Simoneaux testified that he was 150 to 175 feet behind Rice when the Stelly car first entered the highway. He saw Stelly enter the highway in front of Rice, he observed that the stop lights on the Rice car came on immediately, indicating that the brakes of that car had been applied, and he then applied his own brakes. According to his testimony, the distance between his car and the Rice vehicle was reduced to some extent by the time he applied his brakes, but that they were still a substantial distance apart while Simoneaux was applying his brakes. The facts show that the collision occurred at a point approximately 600 feet east of or beyond the point where Simoneaux first observed the danger. It seems apparent to us that Simoneaux either was negligent in following the Rice vehicle too closely, as found by the trial judge, or he was negligent in failing to bring his vehicle to a stop after the danger was observed and before the collision occurred. Under either of these circumstances his negligence was a proximate and contributing cause of the accident.
The trial court concluded that "Stelly was not guilty of any negligence in any respect." Both appellants contend that the trial judge erred in arriving at that conclusion. A procedural question is presented, however, which we think should be disposed of before determining the factual and substantive issues involved here. The trial court dismissed the plaintiff's suit and Aetna's third party action against defendant Stelly, and since plaintiff has not appealed from the judgment there is some question as to whether on this appeal we can inquire into the liability vel non of defendant Stelly. This question is raised because of a line of jurisprudence in this state which holds that where two persons are sued as solidary obligors, and the plaintiff takes no appeal from a judgment dismissing the suit as to one defendant while condemning the other, an appeal by the latter has no effect on the former defendant and, hence, does not bring him before the appellate court. Aetna Life Insurance Company v. De Jean, 185 La. 1074, 171 So. 450; Spanja v. Thibodaux Boiler Works, La.App.Orl., 37 So.2d 615; De Cuers v. Crane Company, La.App.Orl., 40 So.2d 61; Kahn v. Urania Lumber Company, La.App. 2 Cir., 103 So.2d 476; Haindel v. Sewerage and Water Board, La.App. Orl., 115 So.2d 871; Waggonner v. Allstate Insurance Company, La.App. 2 Cir., 128 So.2d 214. See also Stevens v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, 242 La. 1006, 141 So.2d 346 (affirming La.App. 2 Cir., 133 So.2d 1).
In determining whether Stelly, the discharged defendant in this case, may be continued in litigation by the appeal of his co-defendant, we think it is necessary to consider the laws of this state relating to third party actions and those dealing with the right of contribution among joint tort-feasors. Prior to January 1, 1961, the governing rule relating to contribution among joint tort-feasors was that announced in Kahn v. Urania Lumber Company, supra, and other cases above cited, which rule is to the effect that a defendant had no independent right to enforce contribution among other tort-feasors unless the plaintiff had initially- sued them. However, the controlling codal provision relating to this subject, Article 2103 of the Civil Code, was amended by Act 30 of 1960, and the pertinent portion of that article now reads as follows:
"A defendant who is sued on an obligation which, if it exists, is solidary may seek to enforce contribution, if he is cast, against his solidary co-debtor by making him a third party defendant in the suit, whether or not the third party defendant was sued by the plaintiff initially
This amendment which became effective on January 1, 1961, was intended to implement Articles 1111-1116 of the LSA-Code of Civil Procedure, relating to third party actions, and it legislatively overruled Kahn v. Urania Lumber Company, supra. See explanatory note under LSA-C.C. Art. 2103. (1961 P.P.); Brown v. New Amsterdam Casualty Company, La.App. 3 Cir., 136 So.2d 283; Sam v. Deville Gin, Inc. et al., La.App. 3 Cir., 143 So.2d 838; and Comment, Contribution Among Tort-Feasors, 22 L.L.R. 818.
We think this amendment to R.C.C. Article 2103, relating to the right of contribution among tort-feasors, as well as the introduction of a broad third party practice procedure (Act 433 of 1954, later included as LSA-C.C.P. Arts 1111-1116), has effected a change in the rules which were enunciated in the above cited cases. In Ensminger v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Company, La.App. 2 Cir., 134 So.2d 686, it was said that:
"The purpose of the third party action is to allow a defendant in civil actions to implead one who will be secondarily liable to him if plaintiff's suit against him is successful. It is intended to avoid a multiplicity of actions."
See also Bourree v. A. K. Roy, Inc., 232 La. 149, 94 So.2d 13.
In the instant suit, if the trial court had rendered judgment against Stelly and held him solidarily liable with defendant Simoneaux, either of these co-defendants would have had the right to enforce contribution against the other. Accordingly, Simoneaux then would have had the right to enforce contribution against Stelly. The district court, however, determined that Stelly was not liable, and Simoneaux has appealed, seeking inter alia to have the judgment reversed insofar as it dismisses the suit against his co-defendant Stelly. If we should determine that the judgment dismissing the suit against Stelly is final insofar as that defendant is concerned, then we in effect would be depriving Simoneaux of his right to contribution from Stelly without giving him an opportunity to have the issue considered on appeal. Under such a holding, Simoneaux's right to have the matter reviewed on appeal would depend solely upon the whim or wishes of either the plaintiff or Stelly, that is, it would depend upon whether either of them appealed. It was not necessary in this case for Simoneaux to file a third party action against Stelly, because the latter had already been named as a party-defendant. Also, we do not think it would be proper for us to reserve unto Simoneaux the right to demand contribution from Stelly in a separate proceeding, because all interested parties were represented in this case on the trial on its merits and no useful purpose would be served by requiring a separate procedure to determine an issue which is being resolved here.
In view of the recent amendment to Article 2103 of the Civil Code, therefore, we hold that where two persons are sued as solidary obligors, and the plaintiff takes no appeal from a judgment which dismisses the suit as to one defendant and condemns the other, an appeal by the latter brings the discharged defendant before the appellate court, and the litigation may be continued against him as though an appeal from the judgment of dismissal had been taken by plaintiff.
In the instant suit we conclude that the appeal taken by Simoneaux brings his co-defendant Stelly before the appellate court, and, accordingly, it is proper for us to consider and determine on this appeal the liability vel non of Stelly.
The trial court found that Stelly "was proceeding at a moderate rate of speed in his proper lane of traffic," and for that reason he was not negligent. We agree that he traveled at a moderate rate of speed (IS miles per hour) after he entered the highway, but we feel that he was negligent in entering the highway from a private parking area directly in front of the approaching Rice and Simoneaux vehicles, when it should have been obvious to him that he could not do so in safety.
In this case Stelly admits that at the time he entered the highway from the private parking lot he saw the Vidrine car approaching from his right and the Rice car approaching from his left. He states that as he was leaving the parking lot he stopped at the edge of the highway, and after seeing these vehicles approaching from both directions he nevertheless started again and entered the lane of the highway in which Rice was traveling. He estimated that the Rice car was about "ISO or 200 feet," or "over a half of a block," from him when he entered the highway. In our opinion it should have been obvious to Stelly that under the condi tions which existed there he could not safely have entered the highway directly in front of the Rice vehicle, and that under any circumstance it would have required an emergency stop by Rice in order to avoid a collision. Rice, of course, succeeded in making the emergency stop without colliding with Stelly, but the fact that he was compelled to stop so suddenly was one of the precipitating causes of the accident which did occur.
LSA-R.S. 32:237(E) provides that:
"The driver of a vehicle entering a public highway from a private road shall yield the right of way to all vehicles approaching on the public highway
In the absence of unusual circumstances, this statute places a much greater duty of care upon the driver of a vehicle who is entering the public highway from a private road than it does upon the driver who is proceeding upon that highway. Goff v. Sinclair Refining Company, La.App. 2 Cir., 162 So. 452. While a driver may not simply rely on the right of way accorded him by law and recklessly drive along the highway with complete abandon of all caution, yet such a motorist has a right to assume that this right of way law will be obeyed, and he is not under a duty to search in anticipation of careless drivers who may violate his right of way. Gutierrez v. Columbia Casualty Company, La.App.Orl., 100 So.2d 537.
In Lofton v. Cottingham, La.App. 2 Cir., 172 So. 377, in holding that a driver who entered a public highway from a private road at a point about 150 to 200 feet in front of oncoming traffic was negligent, the court said:
"The creation of an imminently perilous situation was inevitable on the projection of his car onto the pavement. This should have been appreciated by him, and duty required that he await the passage of the speeding machine."
A case which involved facts somewhat similar to those involved here is that of Gay v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., La.App. 2 Cir., 76 So.2d 60, in which case the defendant's insured, a mail carrier, had been placing mail in boxes along the highway at the time the plaintiff's car was approaching him from the rear. When the plaintiff's car was 250 or 300 feet from the mail carrier's vehicle, and traveling at a speed of 55 to 60 miles per hour, the mail carrier started to project his car onto the main highway, despite the warning which the plaintiff had given by blowing his horn. The mail carrier then stopped his car completely, but started it up again, and pulled out onto the highway directly in the path of the plaintiff's oncoming vehicle. At that time, a'truck was approaching in the opposite lane of traffic, and the plaintiff's car skidded down the road and collided with the truck. The mail carrier's car was not touched by the wreckage, and he drove away from the site of the accident, as did Stelly in the case at bar. The negligence of the mail carrier was found to he the proximate cause of the accident.
In Holland v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Company, La.App. 2 Cir., 131 So.2d 574, the Court, quoting from an earlier decision, Payton v. Great American Indemnity Co., La.App. 2 Cir., 83 So.2d 575, said:
" 'It is recognized that the primary duty of avoiding a collision rests upon the driver of a vehicle entering a public highway from a private drive. He is required to keep a lookout for vehicles upon the favored street and must keep his car under control and exercise due care and caution.' "
The case of Roeling v. Fidelity-Phenix Fire Insurance Company of New York, La.App. 4 Cir., 125 So.2d 661, involved an intersectional collision, but we think the rule applied there is also applicable here because, certainly, a motorist. entering a highway from a private parking lot, as did Stelly in this case, is required to exercise at least as much care as that re quired of a motorist entering a favored highway at an intersection. In that case the Court said:
"It is well established that, before a motorist can properly preempt an intersection, he must show his entry into the intersection at proper speed, sufficiently in advance of a motorist approaching the intersection, to permit him to clear .the intersection without an emergency stop by the approaching motorist. »
Under what we consider to he the well established law and jurisprudence of this state, we conclude that Stelly was negligent in pulling onto the public highway from a private parking lot directly in the path of the oncoming Rice and Simoneaux vehicles when he saw or should have seen that such a maneuver could not reasonably be made in safety. His negligence in that respect was a proximate cause of the accident rendering him liable in solido with Simoneaux for the damages sustained by plaintiff in this suit, as well as for the damages sustained by plaintiffs in the companion case.
In the instant suit judgment was rendered in favor of plaintiff for the principal sum of $676.00, and no issue has been raised on this appeal as to the amount of that award.
For the reasons herein assigned, the judgment of the trial court is amended and recast to read as follows:
IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that there be judgment herein in favor of plaintiff, Luke Vidrine, and against defendants, Robert L. Simoneaux and Marion J. Stelly, jointly and in solido, for the sum of $676.00, together with interest thereon at the rate of five percent (5%) per annum from date of judicial demand until paid, and for all costs of these proceedings.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that the demands of plaintiff, Luke Vidrine, against defendant Aetna Casualty and Surety Company, be rejected, and that the third party-petition filed by Aetna Casualty and Surety-Company be dismissed.
Except as herein amended and recast, the-judgment appealed from is affirmed. A1E1 costs of this appeal are assessed to defendant-appellant, Robert L. Simoneaux, and to> defendant-appellee, Marion J. Stelly.
Amended and affirmed.
TATE, J., concurs in part and dissents-in part.