Case Name: Daniel Dolan et al., Resp'ts, v. The Newburgh, Dutchess & Conn. R. R. Co., App'lt
Court: New York Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1890-06-17
Citations: 31 N.Y. St. Rep. 852
Docket Number: 
Parties: Daniel Dolan et al., Resp’ts, v. The Newburgh, Dutchess & Conn. R. R. Co., App’lt.
Judges: 
Reporter: New York State Reporter
Volume: 31
Pages: 852–858

Head Matter:
Daniel Dolan et al., Resp’ts, v. The Newburgh, Dutchess & Conn. R. R. Co., App’lt.
(Court of Appeals, Second Division,
Filed June 17, 1890.)
1. Railroads—Liability as to fencing.
Defendant’s road ran about fifty-nine feet norlh of a mill, whose owner had bound the railroad to leave its land opposite his mill unfenced so as to permit free passage to it. Plaintiff’s driver, while delivering a load of wheat, left a team standing unattended upon a strip of land in front of the mill, which strip was so narrow that part of the wagon occupied a part of the right of way of the railroad, and the team escaping upon the railroad tracks was killed by an approaching train. Held, that defendant was not liable. (Vann, Bradley and Brown, JJ., dissent.)
2. Same.
The fencing statute was not designed to prevent the owners of a team from voluntarily driving it onto the lands of the corporation, or being so on, to compel the corporation to indemnify its owners for the loss occasioned by the negligence of their agent in permitting the team to escape onto the track in front of a moving train.
3. Same.
The railroad, under the circumstances, was not required to fence its road at this point within § 8 of chap. 282, Laws 1854.
Appeal from a judgment of the general term of the supreme court, in the second judicial department, affirming a judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, entered upon a verdict directed by the court.
This action was brought to recover damages from the defendant on account of its failure to fence its track as required by law, whereby, as it is alleged, two horses belonging to the plaintiffs were run over and killed by a train of cars operated by the New York & New England Railroad Company, while running upon said track, pursuant to a contract for the joint use of the same by the two companies.
At the point where the accident happened, near Brinkerhoffville, Dutchess county, the general direction of the defendant’s track is east and west. There was a grist mill directly south of the track, between fifty and sixty feet therefrom, at the locality in question. The only way of reaching the mill, except by crossing private property, was by a lane, leading from a highway at the north and terminating at the mill after crossing the track a little to the east thereof. On the 25th of September, 1886, said horses, hitched to a wagon loaded with grain in bags, were driven by plaintiffs’ agent across the track to the door of the mill fronting the railroad, which was fenced on the north and partially on the south, but there was no fence between the'mill and the track. After the wagon was unloaded, as the miller was busy, the agent of the plaintiffs stepped across the threshold of the mill to get the empty bags, leaving the team loose. At that instant a west bound freight train, belonging to the New York & New England road, came suddenly from behind another train standing upon a side track and frightened the horses, which ran west and turning to the north went upon the track in front of the moving engine and were killed. If there had been a fence upon the south side of the railroad in front of the mill they could not have gone upon the track. In 1868 the former owners of the mill property conveyed a strip of land in front thereof to the defendant for a right of way, and its railroad was subsequently built thereon. The deed contained a covenant on the part of the railroad company that the land so conveyed, or so much thereof as the grantors should elect, should “forever remain unenclosed so that the parties of the first part, their heirs and assigns, and all persons whom they may desire to have to do so, may pass and repass over said railroad and lands of said company to and from their mill and other buildings of parties of the first part, their heirs and assigns.”
Milton A. Fowler, for app’lt; 0. JD. M. Baker, for resp’ts.
Reversing 46 Hun, 681, mem.

Opinion:
Follett, Oh. J.
The mill stands 59 feet 4 1-2 inches south of the center line of the railroad. Five feet of the space between the mill and the land of the railroad is occupied by a platform in front of the mill, which is ten feet long and about as high as the top of a wagon. The boundary line between the mill property and the railroad land is but four feet and ten inches north of the north edge of the platform. Teams in approaching the mill and while standing at it occupy a part of the right of way of the railroad. East and west of the mill and on the south side of the railroad it is fenced, and it is fenced on its north side, except where the lane which leads to the mill crosses the track. When the right of way was granted from the mill property its owner bound the railroad to leave its land opposite his mill unfenced, so as to permit free passage to and from it This mill was about 150 feet west of the freight depot, and the land in front of it may be said to form an extension of the station grounds. This being the situation, the agent of the owners of the team drove it on this strip of land, stopped in front of the mill, and there left it standing partly on the land belonging to the owners of the mill and partly on that of the railroad corporation, for the purpose of delivering a load of wheat. The driver left the team so standing, unattended, and it escaped upon the railroad tracks and the horses were killed. The railroad corporation permitted its land to be used as a way for the owner of the mill and his patrons to go to and from it, of which privilege the plaintiffs were in the act of availing themselves when their team was killed. To hold that the fencing statute was designed to prevent the owners of a team from voluntarily driving it on to the lands of the corporation, or being so on, to compel the corporation to indemnify its owners for the loss occasioned by the negligence of their agent in permitting the team to escape on the track in front of a moving train, is to give the statute an effect not contemplated by its authors, and not thought of, I think, heretofore.
Many places adjacent to railroad stations, which are not highways nor strictly station grounds, are necessarily left unfenced for the accommodation of the adjoining owners and the public ; and to hold that in all such cases a railroad is absolutely liable for an injury sustained by teams which enter on the track while in the care of their drivers, without regard to the question of the negligence of their owners or drivers, is to impose an unreasonable liability on the roads, and one altogether foreign to the purpose of the statute.
The court erred in refusing to hold that the railroad was not required to fence its road at this point, within § 8 of chap. 282 of the Laws of 1854, which provides: " But no railroad corporation shall be required to fence the sides of its roads except when such fence is necessary to protect horses, cattle, sheep and hogs from going on to the track of the railroad from the lands adjoining the same."
I am unable to concur in the reasoning that the escape of this team on to the railroad land proves that a fence was necessary to protect horses from getting' on the track from lands adjoining the same. If this conclusion follows from the facts in this case it is difficult to'see why the injury of a team by a collision with a moving train, at points other than at highway or farm crossings, will not always amount to proof that a fence was required by the statuta
. The judgment should be reversed and a new trial granted, with costs to abide the event.
Haight, J.
Had the mill stood upon the line of the defendant's right of way, there could be no question but that it would serve the purpose and be regarded as an ample fence, and the fact that it stands back from the railroad lands four feet and ten inches does not materially change the situation.
If the plaintiffs, or their agent, had driven their team in by the side of the track wholly upon the railroad lands and the horses had escaped upon the track and been killed, it could not be said that they had escaped from lands adjoining the railroad lands, or that a fence on the line of the right of way would have afforded any protection. The escape in question was partially from the railroad lands; it was from a point between the platform of the mill and the tracks ; and whilst one of the horses may have stood on land adjoining the defendant's right of way, it does not appear to me as materially changing the situation. A fence would not have afforded a protection to the team ; it only would have prevented the plaintiffs' agent from driving so close to the platform of the mill, and forced him to drive in wholly upon the railroad lands.