Case Name: CROWN CENTRAL PETROLEUM CORPORATION, a corporation, Appellant, v. STANDARD OIL COMPANY, a corporation, and R. A. Gray, as Secretary of State of the State of Florida, Appellees
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1961-11-21
Citations: 135 So. 2d 26
Docket Number: No. C-367
Parties: CROWN CENTRAL PETROLEUM CORPORATION, a corporation, Appellant, v. STANDARD OIL COMPANY, a corporation, and R. A. Gray, as Secretary of State of the State of Florida, Appellees.
Judges: CARROLL, DONALD K., Chief judge, concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 135
Pages: 26–38

Head Matter:
CROWN CENTRAL PETROLEUM CORPORATION, a corporation, Appellant, v. STANDARD OIL COMPANY, a corporation, and R. A. Gray, as Secretary of State of the State of Florida, Appellees.
No. C-367.
District Court of Appeal of Florida. First District.
Nov. 21, 1961.
Rehearing Denied Dec. 14, 1961.
Ausley, Ausley, McMullen, O’Bryan, Michaels & McGehee, Tallahassee, for appellant.
Botts, Mahoney, Whitehead, Ramsaur & Hadlow, Jacksonville, Richard W. Ervin, Atty. Gen. and Wilson W. Wright, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellees.

Opinion:
RAWLS, Judge.
This appeal involves a trademark case wherein the rights of the parties to the use of the word "Crown" in the State of Florida are in issue. The Chancellor outlined the rights of each party in the summary final decree from which appellant has appealed. Defendant appellant will be referred to as Crown Central and plaintiff appellee will be referred to as Standard Oil. The basic facts are not in dispute.
Prior to the year 1919, and continuously to the present time, Standard Oil has sold large quantities of gasoline and lubricating oil and other petroleum products in the State of Florida. The gasoline has predominantly been sold under a label or trade-name of "Crown", sometimes alone, or sometimes in connection with other words such as "Crown Extra." Other petroleum products, including lubricating oils, sold by Standard Oil have not been labeled "Crown". During this period of time, Standard Oil has conducted extensive advertising efforts by publishing maps, signs at its retail service stations, and newspaper advertising in promoting the sale of its petroleum products, including the emphasizing of its "Crown" brand of gasoline. As early as 1921, newspaper advertising has been exhibited featuring the word "Crown." Standard Oil made no effort to register its trademark "Crown" with the Secretary of State until 1957, at which time it discovered that Crown' Central had registered its trademark of "Crown," and derivatives thereof, with the Secretary of State in 1947, and had tendered to the Secretary of State in September 1958, its applications to renew each registration. Shortly thereafter Standard brought complaint in the instant cause.
Crown Central registered the word "Crown" as a trademark in the United States Patent Office on May 9, 1903, and again in accordance with the Lanham Act on July 5, 1946, and it now contends that it was the first user of said word and the derivatives therefrom, including "Crown Oil*Gas," "Crownzol," "Crown Winged Power," and "Crown Oil Burner." Crown Central takes the position that it is the exclusive owner of these trademarks, and that it is entitled to renew its registrations of same and to use the same in the State of Florida.
Crown Central has from time to time, made wholesale sales of lubricating oil in the State of Florida in bulk containers such as drums, barges, and by pipe line to various independent distributors or jobbers, who thereafter did not use the mark "Crown," or any related mark when selling the product in Florida. In 1947, an isolated wholesale sale in Florida of lubricating oil in containers bearing the trademark "Crown" was shown by Crown Central. Save for this isolated sale, the record does not reflect competent evidence of any other sales by Crown Central of petroleum products, to the general public in Florida utilizing the trade name "Crown" or derivatives therefrom. Crown Central has never maintained any bulk terminals, offices, service stations, or other place of business in Florida, nor has it ever conducted any method of advertising directed toward the general public in the State of Florida concerning its petroleum products. Its business in Florida is in the words of the Chairman of the Board of Crown Central: "Whatever business we do in Florida is handled as a part of the wholesale operation which is headquartered in Atlanta."
In substance, the facts show that Standard Oil has developed and marketed its retail gasoline sales in the State of Florida for more than forty years primarily under the trademark of "Crown" and that such marketing has been of an intensive nature in every county of the state. During this same period of time, Crown Central, save for an isolated sale, marketed in bulk in Florida its petroleum products at wholesale including lubricating oil and gasoline in such a manner that same had no identity to the general public of Florida as a "Crown" product.
Standard Oil takes the position that its long usage of the word "Crown" in the sale and distribution in Florida of gasoline at retail prohibits Crown Central from moving into the Florida market and utilizing any of its "Crown" trademarks in the sale of gasoline or lubricating oil at retail.
Common law rights in trademarks are now and have always been recognized in Florida. Section 495.02(6), Florida Statutes 1959, F.S.A., specifically provides that a trademark shall not be registered which so resembles a trademark used in this state by another and not abandoned, as to be likely when applied to the goods of the applicant, to cause confusion or mistake or to deceive. Standard's common law ownership of the word "Crown" as to gasoline sales at retail in the State of Florida is undisputed. Standard has not used the word "Crown" as it relates to sale of lubricating oil at either wholesale or retail. Therefore, the main issue before the Chancellor was whether the use of its trademarks in the sale of lubricating oil at retail in the State of Florida, when applied to the goods sold by Standard, would likely cause confusion. Crown Central urges that since Standard has not used and has displayed no intention to use the word "Crown" in the sale of lubricating oils at retail in Florida, that Section 495.01 precludes Standard from claiming any right to same as it relates to lubricating oils since lubricating oils are separate "goods." The Chancellor found that Standard has acquired and now owns the title to the word "Crown" as a slogan or tradename for the sale of gasoline in the State of Florida, and that the sale of lubricating oils at retail is so closely associated with the sale of gasoline that the use of the word "Crown" by a competitor selling both gasoline and lubricating oil would necessarily cause confusion and likely lead to mistake by the public in the purchase of these products; that the registration or use by Crown Central in the State of Florida of the words "Crown Oil and Gas," "Crownzol," or "Crown Winged Power" in the merchandising of gasoline or lubricating oil except bulk sales at wholesale, would be in violation of Standard's rights. Included in the Chancellor's decree was a finding that Crown Central owned the trademark "Crown Oil Burner" and that Standard had no right to same. The record reflects ample evidence to sustain the Chancellor's findings.
"Crown Winged Power" has been promoted by Crown Central in adjoining areas as a trademark for gasoline. The wording of the trademark "Crown Oil*Gas" within itself ties the two petroleum products to gether as single "goods." Crown Central in its answer, affirmatively alleged that it uses the word "Crown" and derivatives thereof to identify all types of petroleum products manufactured and marketed by it, including gasoline and lubricating oils, and that it also used the word "Crown" to identify its service stations at which gasoline manufactured by it and various other petroleum products are sold. The Chancellor was confronted with Standard, retailer of gasoline, that had over a period of forty years, extensively advertised and promoted the word "Crown" in its sale of gasoline at retail throughout Florida; and Crown Central, which insofar as Florida was concerned had never exploited the general retail market, however, displaying an intention to so do some time in the future, with petroleum products labeled "Crown" and derivatives thereof, intertwined with service stations, gasoline, and lubricating oils.
The law controlling trademark cases in Florida was clearly enunciated in the El Modelo Cigar Mfg. Co. v. Gato, 25 Fla. 886, 7 So. 23, 6 L.R.A. 823, when the Court stated in its syllabus on page 24:
"Every manufacturer has the unquestionable right to distinguish the goods that he manufactures and sells by a peculiar label, symbol, or trademark, and no other person has a right to adopt his label or trademark, or one so like his as to lead the public to suppose the article to which it is affixed is the manufacturer's."
In Quality Courts United v. Jones (Fla.1952), 59 So.2d 20, 23, Mr. Justice Terrell again enunciated the rule of Florida when he stated:
"In this holding we do not mean to infer the plaintiff has acquired a copyright on the word 'quality' vesting it with the exclusive use of that term. What we hold is that appellant has employed the word 'quality' in relation to his business so as to give its tourist accommodations a distinct and popular favor with the public which it has a right to preserve. When one has employed an emblem or a legend so as to make it a symbol for a public desire and by acts of courtesy fortifies it with good will, it becomes an elemental part of his business that the law will protect. Many of the great businesses of the country have been built on slogans and symbols that point to superior goods or to superior performance. The volume of good will accumulated with such businesses is one of their most valuable assets. The word 'quality' as applied to app^lant's courts was such an asset."
A situation similar to this one is Food Fair Stores, Inc. v. Square Deal Market Co., 206 F.2d 482 (D.C.Cir., 1953). In that case, Food Fair Stores opened its first "Food Fair" supermarket in Baltimore in 1935, and subsequently enlarged the chain to 151 stores, almost all of which bore the name "Food Fair." Square Deal Market Co. had a small chain of stores opening its first store named "Food Fair" in the District of Columbia in 1936, subsequently enlarging its chain in the District area. In 1948, Food Fair Stores sought to enjoin the use by Square Deal Market Co. of the name "Food Fair" and after trial, the District Court granted Square Deal Market Co.'s counterclaim for an injunction within the Washington, D. C. area. The end result was that Food Fair Stores was not only enjoined from using the words "Food Fair" as a name for its store, but was enjoined from using the words "Food Fair" in marketing any of its merchandise. On pages 485-486 the Court stated:
"Appellant's final contention is to the effect that, since 'Food Fair' is its registered trade mark for use on packaged butter and eggs, it should not in any event have been enjoined from that use of the words in the Washington area. But the fact of registration is immaterial in the present context. United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 1918, 248 U.S. 90, 39 S.Ct. 48, 63 L.Ed. 141; Griesedieck Western [Brewery] Brewing Co. v. Peoples Brewing Co., 8 Cir., 1945, 149 F.2d 1019. And the fact that, so far as the record shows, appellee has never used the contested vthrds as a trade mark on merchandise is not controlling. All parties agree in this case that the sale of packaged items bearing the label 'Food Fair' in appellant's Food Lane stores in the Washington area tends to create public confusion as to whose the merchandise is or what connection, if any, appellee has with it. There is no doubt that the injunction will create a serious operating problem for appellant. Blit appellant itself provoked this result when it sought to enter cm area in which, as it plainly knew, the words 'Food Fail-' had already become associated with another enterprise." (Emphasis supplied.)
Great reliance is placed by Crown Central upon a recent Florida case decided by the United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit, Webb's City, Inc. v. Bell Bakeries, 226 F.2d 700 (1955). The factual situation involved the sale of "Dandee" bread by defendant, Bell Bakeries, Inc., in retail stores in the St. Petersburg area, as opposed to the promotion and sale by plaintiff, Webb's City, of "Dandy" bread for a period of some fourteen prior years. The trial Court found that Webb's City introduced evidence that no confusion would occur in that "Dandy" bread was only available in Webb's City store while "Dandee" bread was available in the general market. The Appellate Court obviously gave great weight to the trial Court's findings when it stated on page 702:
"Here the fact and the likelihood of customer confusion were not only not proved by the plaintiff; they were disproved by the defendant. What the plaintiff would have us do here, therefore, is make a finding as a matter of law, contrary to what has already been found below, as a matter of fact."
To the above enunciation we can agree. However, the Court went further in this opinion by stating on the same page:
"Under the law of Florida, as under the common law of most states, customer confusion is the gist of the actionable wrong. The common law does not give anyone the exclusive use of a trade name, even where that name is distinctively associated by the public with his product. The prior user has a remedy in the Courts only where a competitor so disguises his product, by means of its name or package, or so promotes it, by any type or combination of advertising schemes, as to lead the casual buyer to purchase the imitation because he believes it to be the original."
Crown Central construed the above statement to mean that either actual confusion must be proven or a fraudulent design must be shown on the part of a competitor. We do not find such a proposition to be the controlling law in Florida. To accept such a doctrine, would in our opinion abrogate that part of Section 495.-02(6), supra, which states: " as to be likely, when applied to the goods of the applicant, to cause confusion or mistake or deceive," and would be in conflict with the decisions of the Supreme Court of Florida on the subject. We do not find any proof of actual confusion in the Quality Courts United v. Jones, supra. Standard employed the word "Crown" in relation to its business and it is an elemental part of its business that the law will protect.
Finally, it is urged that where all the evidence considered by the Chancellor was of a documentary nature, as in this case, that the question of likelihood of confusion was a matter of law and for judgment by the Court, and, therefore, this Court is at liberty to reach its own conclusions from the record as a whole without being restricted by the Chancellor's findings. Such an approach, we think, would cause confusion to the bench and the bar. A like proposition was urged before the United States Court of Appeals in Esso Standard Oil Company v. Sun Oil Co., 97 U.S.App.D.C. 154, 229 F.2d 37, 42 (D.C.Cir., 1956), where the Court in disposing of this question stated:
"It may perhaps be suggested that the District Judge, after consideration of all the evidence, was entitled to rule that in his own independent judgment there was no likelihood of confusion, and that his determination should prevail unless upon appeal the reviewing Court takes a different view and substitutes its own independent judgment about the matter. Such a rule would, we think, be quite unworkable, would create confusion, discrimination and uncertainty, and would be outside the permissible scope of judicial review of administrative action — even where, as here, Congress has authorized an action de novo to review the administrative ruling."
The true test in this type of case is succinctly stated in Callmann's Unfair Competition and Trade Marks, Vol. 3, 2nd Edition, on page 1361:
"Where the public is deceived 'into believing that good will, or investment, of another, are enjoyed by or is a part of another's business, so that the ordinary public would be led to believe that, in dealing with such person, it was also dealing in some way with the other' we have an evident confusion of businesses. This, it will be seen, is a confusion with respect to source and origin alone, for, while the products of the litigants may actually differ in make, purpose and function, it is conceivable that the confusion will be such that the defendant's goods might be supposed to have come from the plaintiff, or that the business of the plaintiff might be supposed to have a connection with the business of the defendant, which sometimes is called 'confusion as to sponsorship.' "
The Chancellor found that Crown Central had not tapped the retail market for gas and oil in Florida, and that it had other established brands that it could merchandise in Florida without working any hardship upon Crown Central. Since the record clearly shows Crown Central's present intention to expand its Crown Service Stations and to market at retail petroleum products under its "Crown" trademarks, a disservice would have been rendered to both parties had the Chancellor held that Standard Oil could take no action until Crown Central had actually entered the Florida market and had promoted its goods and services under a "Crown" trademark to the extent that actual confusion could be proven. This seemingly is what Crown Central urges must be done prior to adjudication of the rights of these parties. To accept such a proposition would in effect encourage the development of a factual situation analogous to Food Fair Stores v. Square Deal Market Co., supra. This, in our opinion, is not the settled law of Florida.
We find that the Chancellor had ample competent evidence with which to reach his findings. The rule is too well settled to require the citation of authorities that the decree of the Chancellor on the evidence will not be reversed if there is, as in the present case, sufficient evidence to sustain the decree.
The decree appealed from is affirmed.
CARROLL, DONALD K., Chief judge, concurs.
WIGGINTON, J., dissents.
. 495.02 "A trademark by which the goods of any applicant for registrant may be distinguished from the goods of others shall not be registered if it; (0) Consists of or comprises a trademark which so resembles a trademark registered in this state or a trademark or trade name previously used in this state by another and not abandoned, as to be likely, when applied to tlie goods of tlie applicant, to cause confusion or mistake or to deceive."
. 495.01(1) "Tlie 'trademark' as used herein means any word, name, symbol, or device or any combination thereof adopted and used by a person to identify goods made or sold by him and to distinguish them from goods made or sold by others."'