Case Name: PEOPLE v. THOMAS
Court: Michigan Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1979-06-19
Citations: 90 Mich. App. 703
Docket Number: Docket No. 77-3717
Parties: PEOPLE v THOMAS
Judges: Before: D. C. Riley, P.J., and M. J. Kelly and Beasley, JJ.
Reporter: Michigan appeals reports; cases decided in the Michigan Court of Appeals.
Volume: 90
Pages: 703–712

Head Matter:
PEOPLE v THOMAS
Docket No. 77-3717.
Submitted March 20, 1979, at Detroit.
Decided June 19, 1979.
Leave to appeal applied for.
Defendant, David W. Thomas, was charged, along with Robert K. Dyche, with larceny in a building. Thomas was the manager of St. Thomas Rug Cleaning of Kalamazoo, which was hired by Meijer Thrifty Acres to clean the carpet in one of its party stores in Wyoming, Kent County, Michigan. Both Thomas and Dyche were locked in the store after closing, along with their equipment, four large buckets and a large carpet cleaning machine. Before allowing the men out, the acting night manager came to the store and inspected the equipment for store property. At first he found nothing, but, as he watched the men load the machine into a van, he noticed a partially open panel in the bottom of the machine and, on closer examination, discovered four bottles of liquor tucked in the motor compartment of the machine. Both men denied knowledge of the presence of the bottles at the scene and neither testified at trial. Defendant was convicted in a bench trial in Kent Circuit Court, John T. Letts, J. Defendant appeals. Held:
In order to infer from the fact of possession of stolen goods that the possessor was a thief the possession must be recent, exclusive and involve a conscious assertion of property. Here there was inadequate evidence that the possession was exclusive.
Reversed.
Beasley, J., dissented. He would hold that there was some evidence sufficient to find that defendant’s theory that Dyche acted alone had been negated.
References for Points in Headnotes
50 Am Jur 2d, Larceny §§ 160-163.
What amounts to "exclusive” possession of stolen goods to support inference of burglary or other felonious taking. 51 ALR3d.
76 Am Jur 2d, Trial §§ 1257, 1264, 1267, 1268.
50 Am Jur 2d, Larceny §§ 15-17, 19, 22, 23, 49.
Opinion of the Court
1. Criminal Law — Inferences — Possession.
Possession of stolen property, to be grounds for the inference that the possessor is a thief, must be exclusive, recent and involve a conscious assertion of property.
Dissent by Beasley, J.
2. Criminal Law — Findings of Fact — Bench Trial — Appeal and Error.
The trial judge in a bench trial is the trier of fact, and he may give such weight to the testimony as, in his opinion, it is entitled; the Court of Appeals will not set aside such ñndings of fact unless it concludes they are clearly erroneous.
3. Criminal Law — Larceny in a Building.
The elements of larceny in a building are: (1) an actual or constructive taking of goods or property; (2) a carrying away or asportation; (3) the carrying away must be with felonious intent; (4) the subject matter must be the goods or personal property of another; (5) the taking must be without the consent and against the will of the owner; and (6) the taking must be done within the confínes of a building.
Frank J. Kelly, Attorney General, Robert A. Derengoski, Solicitor General, David H. Sawyer, Prosecuting Attorney, and Donald A. Johnston, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for the people.
Robert L. Redmond, for defendant on appeal.
Before: D. C. Riley, P.J., and M. J. Kelly and Beasley, JJ.

Opinion:
M. J. Kelly, J.
The facts are accurately set forth in Judge Beasley's dissenting opinion. However, after careful consideration of those facts in light of the relevant legal principles, we are convinced that the people did not produce evidence sufficient to permit a finder of fact to determine that defendant Thomas, acting alone or in concert with Dyche, was the perpetrator of that larceny.
We conclude that there is nothing in the tran script which compels, or even inferentially permits, the conclusion that defendant Thomas knew that the liquor bottles were hidden with the carpet cleaning machine. Because the bottles were out of sight, the defendant did not necessarily know they were hidden inside the machine. If Dyche had put them inside the cleaner, it strains credulity to conclude that defendant would have had to see him because a person standing inside this Meijers Thrifty Acres store could "clearly see all of the store". The liquor counter lined a 60-foot wall and, even if defendant's head was mounted on a swivel, it is highly improbable that Dyche was never out of his sight during the several hours it took to clean the carpeting, even though neither left the premises. Although there was testimony concerning the height of the shelves on the premises, there was no testimony concerning the reach of the hoses, the manipulation of the nozzles or the frequency of need for emptying the buckets and refilling the machine which would support the conclusion that the workers were always in sight of each other. We conclude from this record that it was entirely possible for the coworker, Dyche, to have committed the larceny without Thomas's knowledge or assistance.
In making the case for affirmance, the people contend that Thomas's possession of the carpet cleaner, and of the recently stolen property contained within, permits the inference that he was the thief. People v Fry, 17 Mich App 229; 169 NW2d 168 (1969). We disagree. In order for possession to be grounds for an inference, it must be exclusive, recent and involve a conscious assertion of property by defendant. 1 Wharton's Criminal Evidence (13th ed), § 139, pp 234-240. Although there was testimony that Thomas customarily operated the machine and that Dyche only assisted him by moving hoses and dumping water, we think this evidence insufficient to establish the "exclusive" element of possession; absent this predicate, we cannot make the inferential leap from possession of stolen property to perpetration of larceny.
We reverse and order the defendant discharged for the failure of the people to produce evidence from which a trier of fact could find defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crime of larceny in a building.
D. C. Riley, P.J., concurred.