Case Name: J. Goodrich Scott, plaintiff in error, vs. The People, defendants in error
Court: New York Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1872-03-05
Citations: 62 Barb. 62
Docket Number: 
Parties: J. Goodrich Scott, plaintiff in error, vs. The People, defendants in error.
Judges: 
Reporter: Barbour's Supreme Court Reports
Volume: 62
Pages: 62–84

Head Matter:
J. Goodrich Scott, plaintiff in error, vs. The People, defendants in error.
To sustain an indictment for obtaining the signature of an individual to promissory notes given for the price of property sold to him, by false pretenses, the pretenses alleged to be false must be shown to be of some existing fact, and made for the purpose of inducing the purchaser to execute the notes.
Both the inducement and the fraudulent purpose are facts to be proved, and are not to be presumed.
An indictment for obtaining the signature of a purchaser to promissory notes given for the purchase price of property sold to him, by false pretenses and representations as to the price asked for the property by a third person, who was the owner, cannot be sustained, where the proof shows' that no representations were made by the defendant, in regard to the price, except that he told the purchaser, in the course of the negotiations, that he did not think the seller would take less than a sum named; and that the only representations as to price, at the time of the sale and purchase, were made by the seller. Mullin, P. J., dissented.
Although the price asked, and finally agreed to be paid by the purchaser, be fixed by collusion between the owner of the property and the defendant, for the purpose of defrauding the purchaser, such collusion, though it may be an indictable offense, is not the offense charged..
If, in fact, the price agreed to be paid by the purchaser was the price demanded by the seller, at the time of the sale, the motive in asking that price is of-no consequence, so far as the offense charged is concerned.
WRIT of error to the Jefferson oyer and terminer. The plaintiff in error, Scott, was indicted jointly with one William-B. Nicholson, for obtaining, under false pre tenses, the signature of one George A. Wilson to six promissory notes of $>1000 each.
At the close of the proof the prisoner’s counsel moved the discharge of the prisoner, on the grounds generally of the insufficiency of the indictment and the proofs; which motion was denied.
The jury found a verdict of guilty in manner and form as charged in the indictment. A motion in arrest of judgment and for a new trial was made upon the case as settled. The motion was denied, with exceptions.
F. W. Hubbard, for the plaintiff in error.
I. The indictment fails to charge Scott with the crime, under the statute, of obtaining the notes in question from Wilson under false representations. It is alleged that Hicholson obtained the notes in payment for the one-half of the purchase price of the patent. It is not alleged in the indictment, that Scott had any interest in.them. The theory is that Scott confederated with Hicliolson to enable him to obtain the signature of Wilson to these notes. If that is true, Scott may perhaps be liable under the statute in regard to conspiracy. (3 R. S. 972, § 8. See statute of Cheats, 3 R. S. 556, § 55.) To be liable under this statute, a person must obtain the signature of another. Webster defines “ obtain ” to mean, “to get—to gain— to gain possession of a thing—to acquire—to keep—to hold.” The indictment fails to bring Scott within this definition.
II. The indictment does not charge any offense punishable under the statute of Cheats. (3 R. S. 956, § 55.) In order to a conviction under this statute, it will be conceded that the false representation must be of some existing fact known to be false, and uttered with intent to deceive and defraud. (1 Colby, 562. 1 Wheeler’s Cr. Cas. 459. Barb. Crim. Law, 131. The People v. Tompkins, 1 Park. 224. 2 Bishop’s Crim. Law, §§ 397, 409. U. S. Crim. Law, 172, 156. 11 Wend. 558. 14 id. 565. 25 id. 401. 41 Eng. C. L. R. 183. 7 Car. & P. 825. Wharton’s Am. Crim. Law, § 208. Barbour’s Crim. Law, 137, 2d ed. 3 Term R. 98.) It must not be the expression of an opinion, or a mere act done, however calculated to deceive, (1 Wheeler’s Orim. Law, 448,) or a promise of something to be done in the future. (Ranney v. The People, 22 N. Y. 413.) These principles are recognized by the court in its charge to the jury, and hence excluded from the jury the 1st, 3d, and 4th allegations in the indictment. The first, because it was a.mere expression of opinion, in regard to the value of the patent. The third, because it was promissory in its character, that Scott would purchase one-half the patent; and the fourth, because it related to an act done—the turning out the securities. The court held that the second allegation embraced a representation as. to an existing fact, and if made and was knowingly untrue, it was punishable under this statute. This ruling was excepted to, and the court was requested to charge the converse, which it declined to do, with exception. The allegation is this : “ That the real and true price in money asked, named and fixed for the said improvement, and letters patent by the said William Bi Nicholson, was the said sum of $12,000.” The negation is: “Whereas, in truth and in fact the real and true price in money asked, named and fixed for the said improvement and letters patent by the said William. B. Nicholson, was not the said sum of $12,000, but, on the contrary, was the sum of $3000 only.” 1. In the first place, we say there is no allegation in the indictment that Scott made any representation on the subject. It is alleged that the price was named and fixed by Nicholson alone, upon his own patent, and for his own benefit. 2. We submit, that if the indictment is sufficient as it' respects Scott, in form, it does not charge an offense under the statute. The statement of a price at which Nicholson will sell the patent, is not a statement of an existing fact, much, less is it a representation. It is neither a statement or representation of any fact—it is simply the expression of a proposition; an offer. The asking price of a thing is ideal, speculative, does not embody any fact or reality. Webster defines a foot to be, “ 1. Anything done, or that comes to pass—an act—a deed—an effect produced or achieved—an event; 2. Reality—truth.” An existing fact must be some definable thing, event or reality—something existing, to which the representation relates—not created or existing only in the representation itself. The attempt was made on the trial, to prove that the price had been fixed between Nicholson and Scott at $3000 ; but the difficulty is, there is no representation alleged as to that. The case would be different if it had been alleged that it was represented that the price fixed between Nicholson and Scott was $12,000, whereas, in fact, it was but $3000. There would be a misrepresentation of an existing fact. Here the only thing alleged is that $12,000 was the price Nicholson asked, or named for the patent. This, as before remarked, is not a fact—a representation of some collateral—it is simply a statement of the price he then fixed upon his patent. The negation cannot enlarge the representation alleged. The office of a negation is to affirm the falsity of the representation, and nothing more. 3. The representation, as alleged, does not state with whom, or between whom, the price of the patent was fixed. It simply states that Nicholson said his price was $12,000. As between Nicholson and Wilson that was true; that was the price he then named. 4. The statute does not authorize conviction, because of the suppression of the truth. Responsibility arises only upon the truthfulness of the representations of facts actually made, not upon omissions. There is no allegation in this indictment in regard to any other price than the one stated by Nicholson to Wilson of $12,000—no allegation that any price had been previously named to Scott. 5. To prove that Nicholson had previously proposed to sell to Scott for $3000, does not falsify the statement that his price was $12,000; as to Wilson, that was his price. Hence we insist that the indictment does not allege, in this particular, any'offense, cognizable under the statute, in relation to false pretenses.
III. The representation, as charged in the indictment, is not one calculated to deceive or mislead, and therefore not indictable. A person of ordinary prudence could not be prejudiced. ' (1 Colby, 563. 4 Hill, 9.) Wilson must have understood that the price of a patent is a mere fanciful, indeterminate thing—may be $1000, or $25,000. The bantering about the price, by the parties, shows it was so understood. Wilson got all he bargained for, and would not be defrauded by this representation of value. The court must see that this matter of price was of slight consideration with Wilson, in inducing him to give these notes. The fact that Scott was purchasing one-half at $6000, must have, been most potential with him.
IV. It was not competent, on the trial, for the prosecution to prove that the price between Nicholson and Scott was fixed at $3000. The representation, as alleged, does not embrace any such fact; no allusion is made to any price of the patent, except as there stated by Nicholson to Wilson. But conceding the proof competent, it fails to show that the price of the patent, as between Nicholson and Scott, was $3000. Nicholson is the only witness who speaks on the subj'ect, and this is all he says: “ He (Scott) asked what I would take for it; I said $3000 ; he said he would get me three good notes for it, but I must ask $12,000, or $15,000 for it, so he could make something out of it.” Here is no. sale, or proposal of sale, of the patent to Scott. Scott merely inquires what he would . take, and Nicholson says $3000. Here was no price fixed on the patent. The substance is, Nicholson is content if he can get $3000, and is willing that Scott should have thé surplus for his services. We insist that this evidence does not sustain the negation in the indictment; that the price was, in fact, fixed at $3000 instead of $12,000.
V. It may be insisted on the other side, that the representation by Nicholson, fixing the price at $12.000, was done at the instance and request of Scott. Suppose that be conceded, we say, in answer, that according to the testimony of Nicholson quoted above, it is true—it is precisely according to the arrangement between Nicholson and Scott. As between them, Nicholson would be satisfied with $3000, but as to the purchaser, Nicholson was to ask from $12,000 to $15,000. This was an arrangement which they had a right to make, and it is no fraud upon the purchaser not to disclose the fact that Scott was to have all that could be obtained over $3000. Under this statute a party is only liable for a false statement made by .him, with intent to cheat. Here then, was no false statement ; what Nicholson did say was, that he would take $12,000 for the patent. That was in and of itself true, and was in accordance with the arrangement made with Scott.
VI. Upon the theory that there was but one representation in the indictment properly before the jury, as the court finally held, all the evidence which pertained solely to the other specifications, which was objected to, was erroneously received.
VII. We ask a reversal of the conviction, upon the several grounds above mentioned, but especially upon the ground that the indictment does not charge a criminal offense against Scott under the statute; that the asking or fixing a price on a patent, is not a representation of any existing fact; that if it is, the representation is not proved to be false; that there was no fixing of any price upon the patent, as between Nicholson and Scott; that what Nicholson did say to Wilson about the price, was truthful, and was not in any sense false; that whatever question of morals there may be in the case, there has been no crime committed under the statute in regard to false pretenses, which, under well settled adjudications, is to be rigidly construed.
P. C. Williams, (district attorney,) for the people.
I. The representation alleged in the indictment, and submitted to the jury, is sufficient to sustain a conviction. It is a representation of an existing fact. If there was a real, true price named and fixed by Hicholson for the patent, it was an existing fact, a misrepresentation of which would be sufficient to sustain a conviction.
II. The evidence is sufficient to sustain the allegation in the indictment, that the prisoner made the representation. The prisoner and Hicholson were acting in concert, and according to a previous arrangement, that the price, though $3000 in fact, should be stated by Hicholson to be $12,000, in order to deceive Wilson, induce him to give six notes, and thus put $3000. into the prisoner’s pocket; Hicholson stated the price to be $12,000, by the defendant’s procurement, and according to such previous arrangement. The prisoner was present and acquiesced in it, and by all his acts and words, aided in making the representation, and in inducing Wilson to believe it to be true. Where two parties are thus acting in concert in the commission of an • offense, each is responsible for the words and acts of the other. Ho authority would seem to be necessary to establish this general proposition. The attention of the court is asked to the following cases, however, as peculiarly applicable to this branch of this case : Fowler v. The People, (18 How. 493;) Adams v. The People, (1 Comst. 173.)
III. The falsity of the representation is fully established by the evidence. Hicholson’s real price for the patent was $3000 ; he so told the prisoner, and that was the amount he actually received for it. He never, in good faith, stated or named any other price, except in pursuance of the arrangement with the prisoner, and that was done, not because his price was changed or different, or because he expected to receive any different price, but simply and only to enable the prisoner to cheat and defraud Wilson out of the balance over and above his real price, §3000. In other words, I say if this judgment can be legally sustained, it ought to be.

Opinion:
Johnson, J.
The plaintiff in error was indicted with one Nicholson, for obtaining the signature of G-eorge A. Wilson, to six promissory notes of $1000 each, by false pretenses, upon the purchase by the latter of Nicholson, of the title to one half of a certain'patent right. Several pretenses alleged to have been false were set out in the indictment, only one of which it will be necessary to consider, as the judge who presided upon the trial, when submitting the case to the jury, charged and instructed them that upon that one only could the plaintiff in error be convicted of the offense charged.
That pretense was in regard to the real and true price for the whole right. The charge in the indictment upon this subject, was that Scott, the plaintiff in error, and Nicholson, falsely pretended and represented that the real and true price in money, asked and fixed by Nicholson for the said right, was the sum of $12,000, whereas, in truth, the true price in money, asked and fixed for said right by said Nicholson, was only $3000. The plaintiff in error was convicted on this charge in the indictment, his accomplice, Nicholson, the owner and vendor of the patent, being used as a witness by the people. The only facts in regard to the price, and the representations in respect to it which the evidence tended to prove, were that Nicholson, who was the owner of the patented right, desired to sell the same, and wished the plaintiff in error to assist him in making the sale. That the plaintiff in error in quired of Nicholson what he would take for his right, and was informed by Nicholson that he would take $3000. That thereupon the plaintiff in error informed Nicholson that he would get him three good notes for it, but he, Nicholson, must ask $12,000 or $15,000 for it, so that he, the plaintiff in error, could make something out of it. On the evening of the same' day, the plaintiff in error and Nicholson together saw "Wilson,' and negotiations commenced for the purchase of the right. Nicholson at first asked $15,000. Wilson thought the price ought not to be over $10,000; but it was finally fixed by Nicholson at $12,000, and the bargain was made at that price. The plaintiff in. error pretended to be a joint purchaser with Wilson of the right, Wilson gave the notes in question for his half of the purchase price, and the plaintiff in error pretended to give separate securities for his half. The patent was then duly transferred to Wilson and the plaintiff in error, who became the owners thereof. After the trade was thus consummated, Nicholson returned to the plaintiff in error, the securities he had turned out, and the six notes 'given by Wilson were divided between Nicholson and the plaintiff in error, each taking three. There was some conflict in the evidence in regard to the representations-as to the price ; but the judge charged the jury that if they found the representations in respect to the price to be false, as charged in the indictment, they should 'render a verdict of guilty, against the plaintiff in. error.
The question whether the indictment in this particular, set out any such offense, and also whether.the evidence on the subject of price, admitting all that was testified to on behalf of the people to be true, was sufficient to establish the crime of obtaining the signatures to the notes by false pretenses, was sufficiently raised in various forms by the counsel for the plaintiff in error. That the contrivance between Nicholson and the plaintiff in error, by which the trade was effected, and the notes obtained from Wilson was grossly unfair and dishonest, in a moral point of view, must, of course, be admitted. But it does not follow from this, that the transaction constituted the crime of obtaining the signatures to the notes by false pretenses, as charged in the indictment. Wilson, by the bargain, got all he bargained for, and all he expected to get, to wit, the title to one half the patent right, and whether it was worth more or less than the price he agreed to pay by his notes, the "case does not disclose. The case, as it stands upon the evidence, is, not that Wilson was really injured and suffered loss by the bargain, but that he might have made a more advantageous purchase, and gained more, had the facts in regard to what Nicholson was to receive been stated and made known to him. The point is, was there a false representation as to price, at the time of the trade, which was material in the eye of the law. There is no evidence to show that the plaintiff in error made any representation whatever in regard to the price, except that he told Wilson, in the course of the negotiation, that he did not think Nicholson would take less than $12,000. This was a Jalse and dishonest expression of an opinion as to what Nicholson would or would not do ; but it was no representation as to what .Nicholson's price in fact was. All the representations as to the price, were made by Nicholson. Had the indictment been for a conspiracy to cheat, between Nicholson and the plaintiff in error, Nicholson's representations, for the purpose of effecting the common object, might be held to be those of the plaintiff in error. But that rule, I apprehend, does not apply to a case like this. But whether this is so or not, it is perfectly well settled that the pretense alleged to be false, must have formed some part of the inducement to the doing of the act, and must be of some existing fact, and made for the purpose of inducing the prosecutor to part with his property, or to do the act. Both the inducement and the fraudulent purpose are facts to be proved, and are not to be presumed. It is to be borne in mind that the false pretense charged, and upon which the conviction was had, was that .the price of the patent was $12,000, when in truth it was only $3000;' and we are to look at the case now, as though nothing else had been charged in the indictment, and no proof given in regard to any other pretense which was there charged, as the other pretenses, and the evidence relating thereto, were all stricken out, or held to be out of the case. The notes, it is certáin, were signed by Wilson, to complete his purchase, and obtain his title to one half of the patent right. It is quite apparent .that he would not have given his notes for $6000 for ¡this interest, if the price asked had' been only $1500, or $3000 for the entire right. To suppose the contrary, would be against all experience in commercial transactions, and all the grounds of common inference.
We all know that the higher price enters into the inducement of the seller to sell, and the lower price enters into the inducement of the purchaser to purchase. The old struggle for the higher price on the part of the seller, and the lower price on the part of the purchaser, which began at the beginning of traffic between men, still continues, and from the very nature of things, must continue as long as commerce is carried on. When, therefore, Wilson, the purchaser, testifies that he would not have signed these notes for $6000 if he had supposed the price was not $12,000, but only $3000, we can see that he only intends"to say that he would not have given that price if he had understood he he could have purchased for less; and not that the fixing of the high price formed, pr entered into, the inducement to make the purchase and sign any notes to complete it.
But in regard to the existing fact as to the price, how is that ? Price is the value which a seller places upon his goods for sale. It is not a fixed and unchangeable thing. It may be one thing to-day and another tomorrow, and one valuation to one customer, and a different one to another on the same day or hour. Whatever a seller asks any one to give is the price, until he changes it for another. The price asked is the existing fact, until it' is changed. When the price asked is changed to another price, the former price is no longer an existing fact. The existing fact is not what a party may be willing to take in case he cannot do better, but what he then proposes to take. The indictment in this case, in this respect, and the evidence on the part of the people, and the charge of the judge to the jury, all proceed upon the assumption that the price asked, when this bargain was made, was not the price, but something different; a mere false pretense. This is a mere confusion of ideas. That $12,000 was the price that Hicholson in fact asked on the occasion of that trade, no one denies, but all the evidence, on both sides, conclusively establishes. He first asked $15,000, and was offered $10,000. He finally came down to $12,000, and avowed his intention not to sell at that time unless he could get that price. There is no chance for dispute about this, at least on behalf of the people. But it is said that this price was fixed by collusion between. Hicholson and the plaintiff in error for the purpose of defrauding Wilson. This may be so, but it does not affect the question we are considering. That may have been an offense of another character, but it was not the offense in question.
Ho matter, so far as this question is concerned, how the price came to be fixed, and asked, or pretended, at that amount. It was in fact asked, and though it may have been asked for the purpose of taking a dishonest advantage of Wilson, the asking was the existing fact. Ho other price was asked, or named, or fixed between the parties to the transaction, on that occasion, than those above referred to.
The motive in asking this large price is of no consequence, so far as this offense is concerned, if, in fact, the price was demanded by the seller. It would be a most extraordinary and unheard of thing to convict a merchant of obtaining money, or the signature to a note, by false pretenses, because in selling his goods, by which the money or the note was obtained, he had asked the purchaser, and obtained, a higher price for the goods than his 'price mark, or than he had offered to sell the same goods to another customer, Or than he would have been willing to take, had the purchaser refused to give the pretended price asked, and insisted strongly enough upon a lower price.
Or, take the case of a person who procures the aid of an agent or broker to assist him in making sale of his property, real or personal, and who is willing, and proposes to such agent to' sell at a given price, but who at the suggestion of the agent consents to ask a higher price, and to give the difference between the two prices to the agent in case the higher price can be obtained; can it be pretended for a moment, that either the principal or the agent could be convicted of obtaining money, or the signature of the purchaser to obligations, by false pretenses in regard to price, even though, as in the case before us, they had pretended that the higher price was the true and only price, and that they would refuse to sell for anything less. The cases are precisely analogous, so far as the false pretense is concerned. The element of collusion and conspiracy, which has been brought into the case at bar, belongs to another and different class of offenses. It must be seen, we think, and admitted, that the false pretense as to the price charged and sought to be proved in this case, is not the false pretense contemplated by the statute, and that the plaintiff in error was wrongfully convicted of that offense.
The judgment should therefore be reversed, and the plaintiff in error discharged absolutely.
Talcott, J. concurred.