Case Name: John S. Zumpano, Appellant, v. James F. Quinn, Individually and as Assistant Pastor at St. Agnes Catholic School, et al., Respondents; Estate of Brendan Boyle, Deceased, et al., Appellants, v. James Smith et al., Defendants, and Otto Garcia et al., Respondents
Court: New York Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 2006-02-21
Citations: 6 N.Y.3d 666
Docket Number: 
Parties: John S. Zumpano, Appellant, v James F. Quinn, Individually and as Assistant Pastor at St. Agnes Catholic School, et al., Respondents. Estate of Brendan Boyle, Deceased, et al., Appellants, v James Smith et al., Defendants, and Otto Garcia et al., Respondents.
Judges: 
Reporter: New York Reports
Volume: 6
Pages: 666–686

Head Matter:
[ 849 NE2d 926, 816 NYS2d 703]
John S. Zumpano, Appellant, v James F. Quinn, Individually and as Assistant Pastor at St. Agnes Catholic School, et al., Respondents. Estate of Brendan Boyle, Deceased, et al., Appellants, v James Smith et al., Defendants, and Otto Garcia et al., Respondents.
Argued January 3, 2006;
decided February 21, 2006
POINTS OF COUNSEL
Frank Policelli, Utica, for appellant in the first above-entitled action.
I. Defendants are equitably estopped from asserting the statute of limitations since defendants created John S. Zumpano’s mental condition through their wrongful conduct, thus preventing him from pursuing, protecting or safeguarding his legal rights due to an overall inability to function in society. (McCarthy v Volkswagen of Am., 55 NY2d 543; Graboi v Kibel, 432 F Supp 572.) II. The issue of whether defendants should be barred from asserting the statute of limitations under principles of equity could not be decided without a hearing or trial under CPLR 2218. (General Stencils v Chiappa, 18 NY2d 125; Anonymous v Anonymous, 154 Misc 2d 46; Century Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn. of Long Is. v Net Realty Holding Trust, 87 AD2d 858.) III. Because the conduct of defendant James F. Quinn and defendant Catholic Diocese of Syracuse, New York caused the mental condition that has rendered appellant John S. Zumpano incapable of bringing his lawsuit prior to this time, principles of equity mandate that defendants should not now be allowed to benefit from their wrongdoing, (von Bulow by Auersperg v von Bulow, 634 F Supp 1284; General Stencils v Chiappa, 18 NY2d 125; Glus v Brooklyn Eastern Dist. Terminal, 359 US 231.) IV The doctrine of equitable estoppel is not limited to separate and subsequent acts of fraud and concealment under General Stencils v Chiappa (18 NY2d 125 [1966]), but rather includes any wrongdoing by defendant that produces the long delay between the accrual of the cause of action and the institution of the legal proceeding. (Simcuski v Saeli, 44 NY2d 442; Steo v Cucuzza, 213 AD2d 624; Doe v Holy See [State of Vatican City], 6 AD3d 1228; Glus v Brooklyn Eastern Dist. Terminal, 359 US 231; von Bulow by Auersperg v von Bulow, 634 F Supp 1284; Anonymous v Anonymous, 154 Misc 2d 46; Coopersmith v Gold, 172 AD2d 982.) V Plaintiff has the right to a jury trial on the issues to be decided at the hearing pursuant to CPLR 2218. (Abraham v Kosinski, 305 AD2d 1091; Arbutina v Bahuleyan, 75 AD2d 84; Muhl v Vesta Fire Ins. Corp., 288 AD2d 108; Cerrato v Thurcon Constr. Corp., 92 AD2d 89; Grant v Guidotti, 67 AD2d 736; Marable v Robinson, 102 Misc 2d 96, 114 Misc 2d 437; Harrison v Malcolm, 186 AD2d 502.)
Hancock & Estabrook, LLP, Syracuse (Mark J. Schulte and Paul M. Hanrahan of counsel), for respondents in the first above-entitled action.
I. The lower courts correctly granted the diocesan defendants’ dismissal motion because all causes of action pleaded had been time-barred for more than two decades. (Langford v Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn, 271 AD2d 494; Sharon B. v Reverend S., 244 AD2d 878; Doe v Holy See [State of Vatican City], 17 AD3d 793; State of New York v Cortelle Corp., 38 NY2d 83; Tserotas v Greek Orthodox Archdiocese of N. & S. Am., 251 AD2d 323; Mars v Diocese of Rochester, 6 AD3d 1120, 3 NY3d 608; Bassile v Covenant House, 152 Misc 2d 88, 191 AD2d 188, 82 NY2d 656; Doe v Roe, 192 AD2d 1089; Coopersmith v Gold, 172 AD2d 982; Schmidt v Bishop, 779 F Supp 321.) II. Plaintiff was foreclosed by statute from claiming a 33-year limitations toll on grounds of insanity. (McCarthy v Volkswagen of Am., 55 NY2d 543; Brown v Rochester Gen. Hosp., 292 AD2d 855; Sanchez v Wolkoff, 247 AD2d 529; Steo v Cucuzza, 213 AD2d 624; Schmertz v Friedlander, 36 AD2d 606; Smith v Smith, 830 F2d 11.) III. Plaintiff also failed to plead a factual basis for tolling the applicable statutes of limitations on equitable estoppel grounds. (Smith v Smith, 830 F2d 11; Airco Alloys Div. v Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 76 AD2d 68; Simcuski v Saeli, 44 NY2d 442; Doe v Holy See [State of Vatican City], 17 AD3d 793; Zoe G. v Frederick F.G., 208 AD2d 675; Doe v Roe, 192 AD2d 1089; Hoffman v Hoffman, 162 AD2d 249; Davis v Smith Corp., 262 AD2d 752; Doe v Holy See [State of Vatican City], 6 AD3d 1228; Jordan v Ford Motor Co., 73 AD2d 422.) IV. There is no existing legal authority to support plaintiffs present attempt to combine the legal maxim “no man may benefit from his own wrong” with a barred insanity claim to create an entirely new tolling doctrine. (General Stencils v Chiappa, 18 NY2d 125; Simcuski v Saeli, 44 NY2d 442; Matter of Steyer, 70 NY2d 990; Jordan v Ford Motor Co., 73 AD2d 422; Coopersmith v Gold, 172 AD2d 982; von Bulow by Auersperg v von Bulow, 634 F Supp 1284; Anonymous v Anonymous, 154 Misc 2d 46.) V This Court’s adoption of the expansive new tolling doctrine plaintiff advocates would operate in contravention of statute and erode other existing tolling doctrines. (McCarthy v Volkswagen of Am., 55 NY2d 543; Flanagan v Mount Eden Gen. Hosp., 24 NY2d 427; Goldsmith v Howmedica, Inc., 67 NY2d 120; Matter of Steinhardt v Johns-Manville Corp., 54 NY2d 1008; Bassile v Covenant House, 152 Misc 2d 88, 191 AD2d 188, 82 NY2d 656.)
Michael G. Dowd, New York City, and Edward M. Shaw for appellants in the second above-entitled action.
I. Plaintiffs have far more than adequately alleged a longtime corrupt campaign by the Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn and bishops to create a specious statute of limitations defense by misrepresentations of fact and other active deceit, concealing their own knowing facilitation of the priests’ abuse. On the detailed allegations of this complaint, the pleading of an estoppel did not require any allegation of diligent investigation. (Mclvor v Di Benedetto, 121 AD2d 519; Davis v Smith Corp., 262 AD2d 752; Thoma v Town of Schodack, 6 AD3d 957; Campaign for Fiscal Equity v State of New York, 86 NY2d 307; Skarren v Household Fin. Corp., 296 AD2d 488.) II. The allegations of a fiduciary relationship between the Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn and bishops and the child plaintiffs, and of a continuing breach of said duty thereafter by the diocese’s and bishops’ continuous concealment of their own wrongdoing in order to evade responsibility, constituted an independent basis for the legal sufficiency of the alleged estoppel. Just as in the case of the estoppel theory addressed in point I, pleading an estoppel in the context of a breached fiduciary duty did not require any allegation of diligent investigation. (Penato v George, 52 AD2d 939; Martinelli v Bridgeport R.C. Diocesan Corp., 196 F3d 409; Mars v Diocese of Rochester, 6 AD3d 1120, 3 NY3d 608; Doe v Holy See [State of Vatican City], 17 AD3d 793; Zumpano v Quinn, 12 AD3d 1096.)
Conway, Farrell, Curtin & Kelly, P.C., New York City (Joseph H. Farrell, Jonathan T. Uejio and Kristin G. Shea of counsel), for respondents in the second above-entitled action.
I. The judicial exception of equitable estoppel is inapplicable to nullify the legislative policy expressed in the statutes of limitations because plaintiffs’ amended complaint failed to allege the elements of an estoppel. (Werking v Amity Estates, 2 NY2d 43; Simcuski v Saeli, 44 NY2d 442; Knight v Brown Transp. Corp., 806 F2d 479; East Midtown Plaza Hous. Co. v City of New York, 218 AD2d 628; Irwin v Department of Veterans Affairs, 498 US 89; Gleason v Spota, 194 AD2d 764; Nevling v Chrysler Corp., 206 AD2d 221; Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83; Maas v Cornell Univ., 94 NY2d 87; Windsor Metal Fabrications v General Acc. Ins. Co. of Am., 94 NY2d 124.) II. Plaintiffs’ amended complaint fails to allege facts sufficient to plead a fiduciary relationship between each plaintiff and the Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn. (EBC I, Inc. v Goldman, Sachs & Co., 5 NY3d 11; Sonnenschein v Douglas Elliman-Gibbons & Ives, 96 NY2d 369; Northeast Gen. Corp. v Wellington Adv., 82 NY2d 158; Wende C. v United Methodist Church, N.Y.W. Area, 4 NY3d 293; Langford v Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn, 271 AD2d 494; Doe v Norwich R.C. Diocesan Corp., 268 F Supp 2d 139; Martinelli v Bridgeport R.C. Diocesan Corp., 193 F3d 409; First Presbyt. Church of Schenectady v United Presbyt. Church in U.S. of Am., 62 NY2d 110; Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese for United States & Canada v Milivojevich, 426 US 696; Gonzalez v Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, 280 US 1.)
Sidley Austin Brown & Wood LLP, New York City and Washington, DC (Steven Bierman, Joseph R. Guerra and Eamon P. Joyce of counsel), for American Tort Reform Association, amicus curiae in the second above-entitled action.
I. Appellants seek a new form of equitable estoppel that would improperly override the legislative judgment embodied in the statute of limitations. (Board of Regents of Univ. of State of N. Y. v Tomanio, 446 US 478; Flanagan v Mount Eden Gen. Hosp., 24 NY2d 427; Duffy v Horton Mem. Hosp., 66 NY2d 473; Ratka v St. Francis Hosp., 44 NY2d 604; International Rys. of Cent. Am. v United Fruit Co., 373 F2d 408; Johnson v Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 US 454; McCarthy v Volkswagen of Am., 55 NY2d 543; Morales v County of Nassau, 94 NY2d 218; Rozell v Rozell, 256 App Div 61, 281 NY 106; Texas Industries, Inc. v Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 US 630.)

Opinion:
OPINION OF THE COURT
Ciparick, J.
In recent years, countless priests have been accused of impermissibly touching and sexually exploiting young people entrusted to their care, resulting in a plethora of claims seeking compensation for the injuries caused by these deplorable acts. Regrettably, many of these claims are time-barred, and absent relief from the Legislature will remain unredressed. Two such cases are before us today.
At the outset, we note that these cases present only the legal question whether equitable estoppel applies to toll the statutes of limitations for plaintiffs' claims. The merits of these claims are not before us and we have no occasion to pass upon the strength of the allegations. Plaintiffs, moreover, concede that the applicable statutes of limitations have expired. They assert, however, that defendants should be equitably estopped from invoking the statute of limitations as a defense. We conclude that the actions are time-barred.
Zumpano v Quinn
Zumpano commenced this action in 2003 against defendant Father Quinn, as well as both the Bishop and Catholic Diocese of Syracuse, alleging an ongoing abusive relationship beginning in 1963—when he was 13 years old—and continuing until 1970. The complaint, brought 33 years later, alleges causes of action for sexual abuse, battery, breach of fiduciary duty and negligent retention and/or supervision.
Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint under CPLR 3211 (a) (5), alleging that Zumpano's claims were barred by the appropriate statutes of limitations. In response, Zumpano argued that the statute of limitations should be tolled by CPLR 208 because he suffered from a mental disability created by defendants' conduct, rendering him unable to function in society or to protect his own legal rights. Supreme Court granted the motion and determined that Zumpano's claim was not tolled by the insanity provisions of CPLR 208, and was time-barred. The court also rejected the argument that equitable estoppel should be applied to toll the statute of limitations. The Appellate Division affirmed, finding that Zumpano failed to allege any separate acts by defendants—subsequent to the alleged abuse— that resulted in his delay in bringing this action. We now affirm.
Estate of Boyle v Smith
Forty-two plaintiffs instituted this action in October 2002— likewise for clergy sexual abuse—against 13 individual priests, a monsignor and both the Bishop and the Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn. The complaint alleges that each plaintiff was the victim of at least one sexually abusive act by a defendant priest. Most of the acts occurred while plaintiffs were minor children, between 1960 and 1985. All plaintiffs apparently reached adulthood by 1990.
Plaintiffs asserted several causes of action, including intentional torts of sexual abuse and battery, and negligence causes of action such as failure to supervise, failure to warn and negligent retention. Plaintiffs also asserted a cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty. Specifically, plaintiffs alleged that the bishops and the Diocese were aware that the priests had abused children and that they engaged in a corrupt campaign and a pattern of concealment by failing to investigate and report the conduct to law enforcement authorities, transferring abusive priests to different parishes and making secret payments to victims and their families in return for their silence. As a result of this conduct, plaintiffs allege that they "were deprived of the knowledge of the essential factual elements which would have formed the basis of their rights to legal redress."
Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint under CPLR 3211 arguing, among other things, that the action was barred by the statute of limitations. As in Zumpano, plaintiffs conceded that the applicable limitations period had run, but asserted that defendants should be equitably estopped from invoking the statute of limitations as a defense. Supreme Court granted defendants' motion, finding that equitable estoppel did not apply because plaintiffs had adequate knowledge of the facts and circumstances underlying their claims and had sufficient time to inquire and discover the relevant facts before the statute of limitations expired. The court also found no fiduciary relationship between the parties.
The Appellate Division affirmed, concluding that plaintiffs had personal knowledge of the relevant facts yet failed to timely pursue their claims. Further, the Court noted that, even assuming the existence of a fiduciary relationship, equitable estoppel would not apply because they did not commence this action within a reasonable time after they reached the age of majority and were free from defendants' supervision and control. We now affirm.
Equitable Estoppel
Although sometimes imposing hardship on a plaintiff with a meritorious claim, statutes of limitations "reflect the legislative judgment that individuals should be protected from stale claims" (McCarthy v Volkswagen of Am,., 55 NY2d 543, 548 [1982]). They cannot be deemed arbitrary or unreasonable solely on the basis of a harsh effect.
The doctrine of equitable estoppel applies where it would be unjust to allow a defendant to assert a statute of limitations defense.
"Our courts have long had the power, both at law and equity, to bar the assertion of the affirmative defense of the Statute of Limitations where it is the defendant's affirmative wrongdoing . . . which produced the long delay between the accrual of the cause of action and the institution of the legal proceeding" (General Stencils v Chiappa, 18 NY2d 125, 128 [1966]).
Thus, this Court has held that equitable estoppel will apply "where plaintiff was induced by fraud, misrepresentations or deception to refrain from filing a timely action" (Simcuski v Saeli, 44 NY2d 442, 449 [1978]). Moreover, the plaintiff must demonstrate reasonable reliance on the defendant's misrepresentations (see Simcuski, 44 NY2d at 449).
Citing General Stencils, plaintiffs argue that defendants cannot be permitted to benefit from their own wrongdoing. In General Stencils, defendant was plaintiffs head bookkeeper who stole from her employer and concealed her theft for several years by misrepresenting the state of plaintiffs finances. We held that defendant was equitably estopped from asserting a statute of limitations defense precisely because her affirmative conduct in concealing the crime prevented plaintiff from timely bringing its action (see 18 NY2d at 128). A defendant/wrongdoer cannot take affirmative steps to prevent a plaintiff from bringing a claim and then assert the statute of limitations as a defense. However, if the doctrine of equitable estoppel were to be applied as broadly as plaintiffs suggest, the statute of limitations would rarely be available as a defense. Plaintiffs' proposed rule would revive any lapsed claim where the defendant inflicted some type of injury upon a knowing plaintiff but failed to come forward with further information about his or her wrongdoing.
It is therefore fundamental to the application of equitable estoppel for plaintiffs to establish that subsequent and specific actions by defendants somehow kept them from timely bringing suit (see Matter of Steyer, 70 NY2d 990, 993 [1988]). Plaintiffs have failed to satisfy this burden. As observed by the lower courts, each plaintiff was aware of the sexual abuse he or she suffered at the hands of defendant priests. Certainly they had sufficient knowledge to bring an intentional tort cause of action against the individual priests. Plaintiffs were likewise aware that the priests were employees of the dioceses and could have brought actions against the dioceses, or at least investigated whether a basis for such actions existed. Plaintiffs do not allege they made timely complaints to the dioceses regarding clergy mistreatment. Subsequent conduct by the dioceses did not appear in any way to alter plaintiffs' early awareness of the essential facts and circumstances underlying their causes of action or their ability to timely bring their claims.
It is not enough that plaintiffs alleged defendants were aware of the abuse and remained silent about it. The Boyle plaintiffs allege that defendants had knowledge of the ongoing problem that children were being sexually abused by priests and failed to notify or warn plaintiffs of same. They also allege that, for over 40 years, defendants did not report abuse by priests to law enforcement officials; reassigned offending priests without disclosure of their offenses; and, when victims complained, made private payments to them so that the charges would not be publicized. Conduct like this might be morally questionable in any defendant, let alone a religious institution, but it is not fraudulent concealment as a matter of law. A wrongdoer is not legally obliged to make a public confession, or to alert people who may have claims against it, to get the benefit of a statute of limitations. Plaintiffs do not allege any specific misrepresentation to them by defendants, or any deceptive conduct sufficient to constitute a basis for equitable estoppel. Nor is there any indication that further discovery would yield such information. No new separate and subsequent acts of wrongdoing beyond the sexually abusive acts themselves are alleged, and equitable estoppel is therefore inapplicable to these cases.
Fiduciary Relationship
As a separate basis for equitable estoppel, the Boyle plaintiffs argue that defendants breached a fiduciary duty owed to them by concealing their own actions in covering up the abuse. "Where concealment without actual misrepresentation is claimed to have prevented a plaintiff from commencing a timely action, the plaintiff must demonstrate a fiduciary relationship . . . which gave the defendant an obligation to inform him or her of facts underlying the claim" (Gleason v Spota, 194 AD2d 764, 765 [2d Dept 1993]). We recently left open the question whether a fiduciary relationship existed between a cleric and a congregant (see Wende C. v United Methodist Church, N.Y. W. Area, 4 NY3d 293, 299 [2005]). It is likewise unnecessary to answer that question here.
Even if the Court were to assume that a fiduciary relationship existed between the parties during plaintiffs' infancy and that the diocesan defendants had a legal duty to disclose any knowledge of prior incidents of sexual abuse and breached that duty, plaintiffs still failed to demonstrate how that breach prevented them from bringing a timely action. As noted above, defendants' concealment of their own actions and of the priests' conduct, postwrongdoing, does not alter the fact that plaintiffs were fully aware that they had been abused. Plaintiffs also knew the identity of their abusers and that the abusers were employed by the Diocese. They failed to establish that any concealment by defendants changed their awareness of these facts or that defendants had a direct role in plaintiffs' failure to file suit within an appropriate time period. Thus, plaintiffs did not demonstrate that defendants' failure to inform them of certain facts contributed to their delay in bringing this action. Plaintiffs possessed timely knowledge of the actual misconduct and the relationship between the priests and their respective dioceses to make inquiry and ascertain relevant facts prior to the running of the statute of limitations.
There is also no basis for a claim that any fiduciary duty continued after plaintiffs were adults—and all the plaintiffs reached adulthood in 1990 or earlier, more than a decade before bringing suit. Even assuming that a breach of fiduciary duty continued until then, and was sufficient to support a finding of equitable estoppel, plaintiffs were required to proceed with their lawsuit, or at least with an inquiry into the facts, within the statutory limitations period computed from the time "the conduct relied on [as a basis for equitable estoppel] ceases to be operational" (Simcuski, 44 NY2d at 450). Thus, the alleged breach of fiduciary duty cannot estop defendants from relying on the time that elapsed after the alleged fiduciary relationship no longer existed.
Insanity Toll
Zumpano alone argues that he suffers from a mental disability as a direct result of defendants' abuse and that he was consequently rendered incapable of protecting his legal rights. He no longer argues that CPLR 208 tolls the statute of limitations, but contends that defendants should be equitably estopped from asserting the statute of limitations since their misconduct caused his insanity. This argument also lacks merit as he fails to establish a continuing disability. The record reflects that, as an adult, Zumpano held a full-time job for nine years. He also successfully prosecuted a personal injury action on his own behalf in 1986. As a matter of law, these facts contradict the assertion that Zumpano suffered from an ongoing mental disability and was unable to protect his rights.
Finally, our holding here is in keeping with those in several other jurisdictions addressing similar issues (see e.g. Baselice v Franciscan Friars Assumption BVM Province, Inc., 2005 PA Super 246, 879 A2d 270 [2005] [doctrine of fraudulent concealment inapplicable to toll the statute of limitations where plaintiff failed to allege any affirmative act of concealment causing him to delay bringing suit]; Doe v Roman Catholic Archbishop of Archdiocese of Detroit, 264 Mich App 632, 692 NW2d 398 [2004] [fraudulent concealment unavailable to toll the statute of limitations where plaintiff knew or should have known about his claims against defendants]; Mark K. v Roman Catholic Archbishop of Los Angeles, 67 Cal App 4th 603, 79 Cal Rptr 2d 73 [1998] [finding estoppel by concealment inapplicable to toll the statute of limitations because plaintiff was aware of his injury, the priest's identity and his connection with the church]; Doe v Archdiocese of Washington, 114 Md App 169, 689 A2d 634 [1997] [statute of limitations was not tolled by the fraudulent concealment doctrine where plaintiff did not allege any acts subsequent to the abuse that prevented him from being aware of his claims]; compare Martinelli v Bridgeport R.C. Diocesan Corp., 196 F3d 409, 430 [2d Cir 1999] [finding evidence to support the jury's determination that there was a fiduciary relationship between Martinelli and the diocese and that the diocese owed him a duty to investigate and to warn him in order to prevent harm]).
We conclude as we began: however reprehensible the conduct alleged, these actions are subject to the time limits created by the Legislature. Any exception to be made to allow these types of claims to proceed outside of the applicable statutes of limitations would be for the Legislature, as other states have done.
Accordingly, in each case, the order of the Appellate Division should be affirmed, with costs.
. Two plaintiffs allege that they were abused after the age of 18.
. Plaintiffs in both cases have pleaded a separate breach of fiduciary duty cause of action premised on defendants' knowledge, misrepresentation, concealment and failure to disclose information. In this section, we discuss only an alleged breach of fiduciary duty as it relates to pleading equitable estoppel.
. "If a person entitled to commence an action is under a disability because of infancy or insanity at the time the cause of action accrues, . . . [t]he time within which the action must be commenced shall not be extended by this provision beyond ten years after the cause of action accrues, except . . . where the person was under a disability due to infancy" (CPLR 208).
. See e.g. Conn Gen Stat § 52-577d (extending the time period for minors to bring sexual abuse claims to 30 years from the age of majority); Cal Code Civ Proc § 340.1 (c) (creating a one-year window in 2003 for childhood sexual abuse actions where the applicable statute of limitations had expired).