Case Name: STATE of Louisiana v. Kenneth POLLARD
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 2000-02-09
Citations: 760 So. 2d 362
Docket Number: No. 98-KA-1376
Parties: STATE of Louisiana v. Kenneth POLLARD.
Judges: (Court composed of Judge CHARLES R. JONES, Judge DENNIS R. BAGNERIS, Sr., and Judge ROBERT A. KATZ). ■
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 760
Pages: 362–375

Head Matter:
STATE of Louisiana v. Kenneth POLLARD.
No. 98-KA-1376.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fourth Circuit.
Feb. 9, 2000.
Dissenting Opinion Feb. 11, 2000.
Harry F. Connick, District Attorney, Charles E. F. Heuer, Assistant District Attorney, New Orleans, LA, Counsel for Plaintiff.
Milton P. Masinter, Metairie, LA Counsel for Defendant.
(Court composed of Judge CHARLES R. JONES, Judge DENNIS R. BAGNERIS, Sr., and Judge ROBERT A. KATZ). ■

Opinion:
JjBAGNERIS, Judge.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On January 10, 1996, Pollard, the defendant, was charged by bill of information with forcible rape, a violation of LSA-R.S. 14:42.1. Pollard pled not guilty at the arraignment. The State filed notice of its intent to use other crimes evidence, pursuant to LSA-C.E. art. 404 B.
On September 4, 1996, and on October 18,1996, the trial court conducted a Prieur hearing. The trial court denied the State's motion to use other crimes evidence. The State sought writs to this court. State v. Pollard, 96-2327, (La.App. 4 Cir. 10/31/96). This court determined that the alleged rapes of April Jones and Jacqueline Jackson fit the exception for the use of other crimes evidence and granted the writ, thereby reversing the trial court and allowing the evidence of other crimes into evidence, specifically the testimony from the alleged victim April Jones. Pollard sought writs to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court denied the defendant's writ. State v. Pollard, 96-2742 (La.1/10/97), 685 So.2d 145. The trial in this matter was set for April 7, 1997; however, on that day, the State nolle prosequi the case, reserving the right to re-institute prosecution of Pollard.
|2On October 2, 1997, the State filed a new bill of information against Pollard, charging him with forcible rape, a violation of LSA-R.S. 14:42.1. Pollard pled not guilty at his arraignment. The defense for Pollard adopted all previous motions filed and heard in Case # 382-977.
On November 6, 1997, trial was held. During this trial, the State called April Jones to testify as to an alleged rape that occurred in 1987. The jury found Pollard guilty as charged. Pollard then filed a Motion for New Trial that the trial court denied. Pollard was sentenced to twenty years at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. Pollard appealed his conviction and sentence.
On appeal, Pollard contends that the trial court erred in admitting "other crimes evidence" into evidence. We agree.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Pollard and the victim, M.N., met at the New Orleans International Airport, where Pollard worked as a skycap for Southwest Airlines. M.N. was a college student at Xavier University. She was returning from Thanksgiving vacation at her parents' home in Illinois. Pollard approached M.N. while she was waiting for her baggage. Pollard and M.N. engaged in conversation. Pollard invited M.N. to a party he was giving, and he gave M.N. his phone number.
Pollard and M.N. had no other communication until M.N. was again at the airport and leaving New Orleans to go to her parents' home for the Christmas holiday. Pollard and M.N. talked a while and exchanged phone numbers. M.N. spoke with Pollard twice during the Christmas holiday, and she agreed to see him after she returned to New Orleans.
lsOn January 10, 1996, Pollard picked M.N. up at Xavier. They went to Houston's in Metairie for lunch. Pollard and M.N. then went for a drive around New Orleans. As they were driving, Pollard claimed that he heard noise coming from his car, and he needed to have a mechanic check it out. Pollard drove to a house that he claimed was a mechanic's house, and he went inside. M.N. remained inside the car. Pollard returned to the car and informed M.N. that the mechanic would be back in fifteen minutes.
Pollard and M.N. went inside Pollard's house to wait for the mechanic to return. There was no one inside the house. Pollard and M.N. went into the den. M.N. sat in a recliner, and Pollard played a video game.
Pollard asked M.N. if she wanted to see a movie. He explained that the- VCR was in a bedroom. Pollard and M.N. went into a bedroom and sat on his bed in order to watch the movie.
Pollard began to massage M.N. and her bra became ' unbuttoned. M.N. testified that she was not intimidated and felt in control. M.N. testified that she felt like she was losing control when Pollard pushed her back forcefully onto the bed. M.N. testified that Pollard unfastened her pants, pulled her panties to the side, and inserted his penis inside of her.
M.N. testified that she cried and pushed Pollard to get him off of her. M.N. testified that Pollard became "really emotional". M.N. testified that Pollard stopped when she became emotional. M.N. testified that she collected her things and went to the bathroom. M.N. further testified that Pollard was apologetic and that he drove her home.
[¿LAW AND DISCUSSION
Pollard contends that the trial court erred when it allowed evidence of another crime to be used against him during trial, in violation of Rules 403 and 404 B of the Louisiana Code of Evidence. In support of Pollard's argument, he cites State v. Prieur, 277 So.2d 126 (La.1973), which provides that evidence of extraneous offenses is inadmissible because of the prejudicial effect upon the accused's constitutional presumption of innocence. Further, the introduction of evidence of other acts of misconduct involves substantial risk of prejudice to a defendant.
Prior to trial, the State filed a Motion to Use Other Crimes Evidence. Pollard opposed the uses of this "other crimes" evidence. The trial court conducted a Prieur hearing, and subsequently denied the State's Motion. The State sought writs to this Court. This Court granted the State's writ application. State v. Pollard, 96-2327 (La.App. 4 Cir. -). The Court opined as follows:
Both of the prior acts fit the criteria set by State v. Prieur, 277 So.2d 126 (1973). Respondent argues that the prior acts cannot be used to show consent. This court has ruled that intent and consent are intertwined. State v. Moore, 534 So.2d 1275 (La.App. 4th Cir.1988), writ granted, 539 So.2d 44 (La.1989), writ denied, 560 So.2d 21 (La.1990).
Respondents argue that this case should be overruled. We are not inclined to do so. The distinctive details of the prior acts make them probative and persuasive to this court.
In the instant case, at the Prieur hearing, the State moved to introduce evidence of two prior alleged incidents for the purpose of showing that Pollard had a "system, pattern, or plan" to befriend women and then rape them.
| .¡Evidence of crimes related to the offenses with which a defendant is charged is inadmissible except under special circumstances. Aside from related offenses admissible as part of the res gestae, and convictions admissible for impeachment purposes, there are three exceptions provided by statute: acts relevant to show intent, knowledge and system. LSA-R.S. 15:445 and 15:446.
LSA-R.S. 15:445 provides:
In order to show intent, evidence is admissible of similar acts, independent of the act charged as a crime in the indictment, for though intent is a question of fact, it need not be proven as a fact. It may be inferred from the circumstances of the transaction.
LSA-R.S. 15:446 provides:
When knowledge or intent forms an essential part of the inquiry, testimony may be offered of such acts, conduct, or declarations of the accused as tend to establish such knowledge or intent, and where the offense is one of a system, evidencé is admissible to prove the continuing of the offense, and the commission of similar offenses for the purpose of showing guilty knowledge and intent, but not to prove the offenses charged.
The Supreme Court in State v. Moore, 440 So.2d 134 (La.1983) opined that:
Evidence of other crimes is inadmissible when the only purpose of the evidence is to show the defendant's propensity to violate the criminal laws since the relevancy of such evidence for the purpose of showing that the defendant was the perpetrator is so marginal that its probative value is heavily outweighed by its prejudicial effect.
| ¿The underlying purpose of this rule excluding such evidence is to protect the defendant from undué prejudice resulting from the use of evidence, which has only marginal relevance to, disputed issues.
In State v. Hatcher, 372 So.2d 1024 (La.1979), the Supreme Court sets forth guidelines for determining the admissibility of evidence of other crimes:
(1) There must be clear and convincing evidence that the defendant committed the other crimes (See State v. Prieur, 277 So.2d 126 (La.1973); State v. Gaines, 340 So.2d 1294, 1298 (La.1976).)
(2) The other crimes evidence must be substantially relevant for some other purpose than to show the defendant's general criminal character (See State v. Jackson, 352 So.2d 195 (La.1977); State v. Lee, 340 So.2d 1339, 1345 (La.1976) concurring opinion);
(3) The other crimes evidence must tend to prove a material fact genuinely at issue (See State v. Frederick, 340 So.2d 1353 (La.1976);
(4) The method of commission of both the charged and the' uncharged crime must be so distinctively similar that one may logically infer that the same person committed both crimes (See State v. Ledet, 345 So.2d 474 (La.1977);
(5) The probative value of the other crimes must outweigh its prejudicial effect (See State v. Sutfield, 354 So.2d 1334 (La.1978)).
Great deference should be accorded to an appellate court's pre-trial decision on admissibility unless it is apparent in light of the subsequent trial record that the decision was patently erroneous and produced an unjust result. State v. Carey, 609 So.2d 897, 898 (La.App. 4th Cir.1992), citing State v. Humphrey, 412 So.2d 507 (La.1981) (on rehearing) and State v. Moran, 584 So.2d 318 (La.App. 4th Cir.), writ den. 585 So.2d 576 (La.1991). The appellate court's prior decision of ^admissibility on a pre-trial writ does not absolutely preclude a different decision on appeal. State v. Carey, 609 So.2d at 898, citing State v. Johnson, 438 So.2d 1091 (La.1983).
In Carey the trial court denied the defendant's motion to suppress and this Court considered the admissibility of the evidence in a pre-trial writ application. We held that reasonable suspicion for an investigatory stop of the defendant's automobile existed and that the evidence was properly seized under the plain view doctrine. The defendant was convicted on appeal and argued that the evidence should have been suppressed. After considering testimony from the hearing on the motion to suppress and from trial, this Court held that there was no reasonable cause to stop the vehicle and that the Court's decision on the pre-trial writ was patently erroneous. The Court reversed the conviction and sentence, granted the motion to suppress, and remanded for further proceedings.
In the instant case, after review of the record in its entirety, it is apparent that the evidence of the other alleged rapes was offered to show that Pollard had a bad character, not to establish any common system, guilty knowledge, or intent. But a defendant's character is not properly at issue unless he chooses to put it at issue. See generally LSA-R.S. 15:481.
In the case at bar, the State's case against Pollard was strong without the testimony of April Jones, the alleged victim from the 1987 incident. Further, April Jones' testimony at trial was inconsistent and failed to meet the requirements of LSA-R.S. 15:445-15:446 (i.e., common system, guilty knowledge and intent). Furthermore, the police report, dated July 29, 1987, regarding the alleged incident [son that date, indicates that April Jones was raped while Pollard was armed with a knife. However, at the Prieur hearing of September 4, 1996, Jones testified that Pollard never attacked her with a knife. Jones only testified that Pollard pushed her down on the bed and straddled her so she could not move. Jones further testified that Pollard pulled out his penis; pulled off her clothes; pried her legs open; and raped her.
Jones' testimony at trial on November 6, 1997, was that Pollard pushed her on the bed; pinned her down; pulled her underclothes to the side and put his penis inside of her. Jones never testified that Pollard threatened her with the knife or used the knife in any manner against her. Jones testified that Pollard only had a knife in his hand. Further, Jones admitted that she dropped the charges against Pollard.
In the present case, there was no clear and convincing evidence that Pollard committed the other alleged crimes (i.e., two forcible rapes). Secondly, the' other crimes evidence was not substantially relevant to the charged offense other than to show Pollard's general bad character. Thirdly, the other crimes evidence was not offered to prove a material fact genuinely at issue in the charged offense. See State v. Moore, supra. Fourth, the method of commission of both the charged and uncharged crimes was not so distinctively similar. Fifth, the probative value of the other crimes evidence failed to outweigh its prejudicial effect.
[30n November 6, 1997, the trial court allowed the testimony of April Jopes. The following is an excerpt of the dialogue between defense counsel, the assistant district attorney, and the trial court regarding April Jones' testimony to "other crimes evidence":
MR. PHILLIPS:
I just would like to put on the record that we object to the introduction of Ms. Jones in a piecemeal testimony that was a first presented in the Prieur Hearings as part of a pattern, which was supported, by other testimony. And it's my contention that that pattern information comes and is taken as a whole entity and should be presented as. a whole entity and not be allowed to pick and choose from that. And I just wanted to get my objection on the record, Your Honor.
THE COURT:
Any response?
MR. BRAVO:
In response, Your Honor, this evidence was previously Prieured in. There was no stipulation, and the State had to call the witnesses. It was simply, the State was able to show that the defendant has a pattern of raping women and the Court accepted that. And there was simply no contingency plan that the State had to call all of its witnesses. It was deemed that the witnesses that it had were rehable and fit within the Prieur Exception.
THE COURT:
For the record, this Prieur Hearing was held in this court, and I issued a ruling on October 18, 1996, 'ruling denying the Motion for Prieur testimony in this case. And I think both Ms. Jones and Ms. Jackson both testified, and I, at that time, ruled I would not permit it to be used as Prieur testimony.
ImThe State sought writs to the Fourth Circuit. The Fourth Circuit, on October 31, 1996, granted the State's writ and said that both of the prior acts fit the criteria of State v. Prieur, 'and that the respondent argued that the pri- or acts cannot be used to show consent: The Fourth Circuit stated that this court, meaning that the Fourth Circuit has ruled that "intent" and "consent" are intertwined. They cited State v. Moore. And I think, Mr. Phillips, you had argued that that case should be overruled, and they said they were not inclined to do so at that time.
The Fourth Circuit further said that the distinctive details of the prior acts make them probative and persuasive. And so therefore, the Fourth Circuit reversed my ruling.
And I think you sought writs to the Supreme Court, and the Supreme Court subsequently, on January 10, 1997, denied your writ. So it doesn't say in the ruling that both have to testify. They said both acts were persuasive, and so I take that to mean, each, both, or either one could be used as Prieur testimony. And we'll note your objection for the record.
MR. PHILLIPS:
And I object that their prejudice is greatly - individually, is much greater than the probative. And let's go ahead.
THE COURT:
Well, of course, I agree with you in my ruling, and you and I both got shot down on it, Mr. Phillips.
MR. PHILLIPS:
Yes, sir.
THE COURT:
So based on that, I will, of course, you and I both will have to follow the rulings of the Fourth Circuit and the Louisiana Supreme Court.
|1TIn the instant case, the testimony of April Jones, who was the alleged victim of the unadjudicated crime of aggravated rape and who was a fifteen-year-old minor at the time of the alleged offense in which she was attacked and raped with a knife, was so prejudicial, that its probative value was minimal in this forcible rape offense. Further, the facts of an unadjudicated aggravated rape dwarfed the facts of the forcible rape for which Pollard was- on trial. Thus, we find that April Jones' testimony should not have been allowed and the trial court was correct in denying the motion to use other crimes evidence.
Further, we note that the trial transcript is devoid of any evidence that the trial court instructed the jury as to the limited purpose of other crime evidence before allowing April Jones to testify. In addition, we find that the trial court transcript is also devoid of any evidence that, at the close of arguments, the trial charged the jury as to the limited purpose of other crimes evidence before the jury retired to deliberate in this matter. We find these omissions to be error.
Additionally, we find that the probative value of the other crime evidence failed to outweigh its prejudicial effect. Further, it is reasonable to conclude that the jury would not allow this untried, unpunished, would-be-rapist of other young women to go free in this trial.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, defendant's conviction and sentence is reversed. The trial court's denial of the Motion for New Trial is reversed, and this case is remanded for a new trial consistent with this opinion.
CONVICTION AND SENTENCE VACATED.
REVERSED AND REMANDED FOR NEW TRIAL.
' KATZ, J" DISSENTS WITH REASONS TO BE ASSIGNED.
. LSA-R.S. 15:481's prohibition against the use of evidence of the defendant's bad character effectively excludes the use of evidence of other crimes except as proof of some independently relevant and material issue other than the defendant's general criminal propensity.