Case Name: W. H. VAUGHN v. C. H. CONGDON
Court: Vermont Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Vermont
Decision Date: 1883-10
Citations: 56 Vt. 111
Docket Number: 
Parties: W. H. VAUGHN v. C. H. CONGDON.
Judges: 
Reporter: Vermont Reports
Volume: 56
Pages: 111–131

Head Matter:
W. H. VAUGHN v. C. H. CONGDON.
Justice of the peace having issued a Void Complaint, when liable for False Imprisonment.
1. A grand juror’s complaint was exhibited to the defendant, a justice of the peace, November 12, 1880, charging the plaintiff with theft, and alleging the theft to have been committed on September 20, 1874. Thereupon, the defendant, as a justice, on the said 12th day of November, issued his warrant, and the plaintiff was apprehended by a sheriff, brought before the defendant, and after an examination was ordered to procure bail for his appearance to the County Court, and, having failed to do so, was committed to jail on a mittimus issued by the defendant. The statute provides that complaints for theft shall be commenced within six years after the commission of the offense; and that if a complaint is brought after the time thus limited, “ such proceeding shall be void and of no effect.” — K. L., s. 1714. In an action for false imprisonment; Held, that the complaint was void, as it showed on its face that the statute had run on the offense charged; that the defendant had no jurisdiction of the process, and was therefore liable; and that this is so, although it was made to appear to him that the crime had not been discovered until the time when he issued the warrant, as the statute began to run from the commission of the offense, not from its discovery. Powers, J., dissenting.
2. In this State the law makes the same presumptions in favor of the jurisdiction of justices that it does of that of superior courts.
Trespass for false imprisonment. Pleas, general issue, and special plea in bar. Heard on demurrer to the special plea, September Term, 1881, Rutland County. Yeazey, J., presiding, sustained dhe demurrer. The plea alleged that, at the time of the supposed trespasses, the defendant was a justice of the peace, duly commissioned and qualified; that the acts complained of were done by him as such justice without malice; “that, heretofore, to wit, oh the 12th day of November, A. L>. 1880, W. H. Bond, the grand juror of the town of Dariby, in the county of Rutland, exhibited to the defendant as justice of the peace as aforesaid, his complaint in writing,” etc.; and that “it being made to appear to said justice that the larceny of said * * * by said Vaughn complained of as above, had not been discovered until, to wit, the day said complaint was made to said defendant as justice of the peace as aforesaid, issued his warrant directed to-any sheriff, etc., commanding him, etc., to apprehend,” etc. The complaint was set out in full in the plea; and it was alleged in the complaint that the grand juror “ on his oath of office complaint makes that Warren IT. Vaughn * * * on the 20th day of September, A. I). 1874, at * * * took, carried away and stole,” etc. It also appeared by the plea that the plaintiff was arrested on the said warrant by a sheriff, that he was brought before the defendant as such justice, that such proceedings were had that the defendant ordered the plaintiff to “ find good and sufficient sureties in the sum of $300 for his appearance before the County Court,” etc.; that the defendant as a justice on the failure of the plaintiff to procure bail issued a mittimus, and that the plaintiff was committed to jail on said mittimus by a sheriff.
W. G. Dunton and Edward Dana, for the defendant.
All the acts complained of were done by the defendant as justice of the peace, acting in a judicial capacity, in a matter within his jurisdiction. A judge of a court of record is not liable at common law for any act he does as judge, while acting within his jurisdiction. Aire v. Sedgewick, 2 Roll. R. 197, 295; Lange v. Benedict, 73 N. Y. 12; Yates v. Lansing, 9 Johns. 395; Ilannmond v. Hoioell, 2 Mod. B. 219; Hibling v. Clark, 53 Yt. 3Y9. The defendant was a judge of a court of record; he was performing a judicial act. B. L., s. 828; Stone v. Proctor, 2 D. Chip. 113; Marlin v. Blodgett, 1 Aik. 3Y9; Stevens v. Fisher, 30 Yt. 202.
The fact that more than six years had elapsed since the crime was committed, is a defence to the charge preferred, and the sufficiency of such defence is to be determined by the justice. In re White, 1Y Eed. Bep. Y23.
If he decides wrongly, his error can be corrected by another tribunal. The justice, acting judiciously, and deciding a question of law cannot be held liable, however erroneous his decision.
Such a question as the one which was submitted to the justice requires a decision, and if he has jurisdiction of the person and the subject matter, as he had in this case, he is not liable for any error of law committed by him. 2Y Alb. Law Jour. 8Y. As said by Cli. J. Shaw in Pratt v. Gardner, 2 Cush. 69, the justice was not bound, at the peril of an action for damages, or of a personal controversy, to decide right, in matter either of law or fact; but to decide according to his own convictions of right. Boderigas v.- Sav. Institution, 63 N. Y. 464; Lange v. Benedict, supra. There is the same rule of construction in favor of the jurisdiction of justices as in courts of general jurisdiction. Wright v. Hazen, 24 Yt. 143. See In re Cooper, 32 Yt. 253; Ex parte Watkins, 3 Pet. 205; Meyer v. Ralkman, 6 Cal. 582. A judge of a superior court is not liable for a judicial act in a matter within his jurisdiction. Lange v. Benedict, supra-, S. C. 99 IT. S. 68; Ex parte Lange, 18 Wall. 165; Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 351. Tindal, O. J., said in Mills v. Collett, 6 Bing. 85, (19 E. C. L. 4Y) that if a party charged with an offense be brought before a magistrate, he must exercise his judgment on the case, and he is not liable for a mere error of judgment. Jackson v. Wilkinson, 1Y Johns. 145; Prigg v. J dams,2 Salk. 6Y4; Jenkins v. Waldron, 11 Johns. 114; Chickering v. Robinson, 3 Cush. 543; Raymond v. Bolles, 11 Cush. 315; Randall v. Brigham, Y Wall. 523; Barnes v. Yiall, 6 Fed. Rep. 665. See Cunningham v. Bucklin, 8 Cow. 178; Evans v. Foster, 1 N. IT. 374; Dicas v. Brougham, 6 Car. & P. 249. A judge is not liable if lie falls into an error as to bis jurisdiction. Grove v. Van Duyn, 27 Alb. Law Jour. 86. An action will not lie against a justice of the peace who exceeded his jurisdiction unless he acted wilfully. Reid v. Flood, 2 Nott. &■ Me. (S. C.) 168; 10 C. B. (N. S.) 523.
Redington c§ Butler for the plaintiff.
The complaint and warrant were void. The judgment was void, and no mittimus could legally issue thereon; because, the justice never had jurisdiction of the party or subject matter, or authority to issue the original warrant. Coursen v. Powers, 34 Yt. 517; R. L. ss. 1667,1713-14. Issuing the warrant was a ministerial act, not a judicial. Morrill v. Ihurston, 46 Yt. 732; Kelley v. Bemis, 4 Gray 83; Noxton v. FIill, 2 Allen 215; Barber v. Tilson, 7 Gray 54; Piper v. Pearson, 2 Gray 120, 410, 570; and the defendant — it being a ministerial act — is liable for the damages resulting from it. Briggs v. Bardwell, 10 Mass. 356; Kendall v. Powers, 4 Met.. 553; Daggett v. Book, 11 Cush. 262; Sanford v. Nichols, 13 Mass. 286. A justice is liable for the results of void acts. Plant v. Ilallzman, 4 Cranch, C. C. 462; Branican v. Scott 3 Camp. 388; Lange v. Benedict, 73 N. Y. 12; Striker v. Mott, 6 Wend. 465; 1 Swift Dig. 546. Tn Sullivan v. Jones, 2 Gray 570, the justice had rendered a lawful judgment, but illegally issued an execution against the body. He was held liable. So in Kendall v. Powers, 4 Met. 553, where on a valid judgment he had issued a void mittimus. See Spencer v. Perry, 17 Me. 413; Pratt y. FIill, 16 Barb. 303; Aiken v. Richardson, 15 Yt. 500. It must affirmatively appear upon the record that the court had jurisdiction. Turner v. Roly, 3 N. Y. 293. A justice has been held liable for acting under an- unconstitutional statute. Kelley v. Bemis, 4 Gray 83; 1 Chit. PL 90, 209, 213; Borden v. Fitch, 15 Johns. 121; Bigelow v. Stearns, 19 Johns. 39; Allen v. Gray, 11 Conn. 95. Jurisdiction of process is necessary. Grumon v. Raymond, 1 ■Conn. 40; 14 How. 103; 14 Bet. 154; also, of the subject matter. Hunt v. Hunt, 72 N. Y. 217. In the case at bar the court had no. jurisdiction of the subject matter, as his jurisdiction of the subject of larceny only extended over a period of six years.

Opinion:
The opinion of the court was delivered by
Rowell, J.
The statute provides that complaints and prosecutions for theft shall be commenced within six years after the commission of the offense, and that if a complaint, an information or indictment is brought, had, commenced, or prosecuted after the time limited as aforesaid, " such proceeding shall be void and of no effect." The complaint exhibited to the .defendant on November 12, 1880, alleged the offense to have been committed on September 20, 1874, more than six years before the bringing of the complaint, and the (prest-ion is, whether the defendant had any authority to cause the plaintiff to be apprehended and committed to prison.
It is an elementary rule in criminal pleading that when the time for prosecuting an offense is limited, the indictment must lay the offense within the time limited, or it will be fatally •defective, even after verdict. 1 Am. Crim. Law, s. 445; State v. G. S., 1 Tyler, 295; State v. Rust, 8 Blackf. 195; People v. Miller, 12 Cal. 291; People v. Gregory, 30 Mich. 371.
In this case the complaint showed on its face that the statute had run on the offense charged, and thus the defendant had notice that it was "void and of no-effect." He had no authority to issue a warrant on such a complaint; and the fact that it was made to appear to him at the time the complaint Avas exhibited that the larceny had not been discovered till then makes no difference, as the statute began to run. from the commission of the offense, not from its discovery. There was no complaint in laAv. It is the same as though there had been none in fact. He had no jurisdiction of the process, and jurisdiction of the process is as essential as jurisdiction of the person and the subject matter. In Morgan v. Hughes, 2 T. R. 225, it. is said that when a person is committed to prison by the Avarrant of a justice Avithout accusation, some one is guilty of false imprisonment, and that it must be the imprisonment of the justice, who is the immediate and not the remote cause of it. In this State the law makes the same presumption, in favor of the jurisdiction of justices that it does in favor of the jurisdiction of superior courts of general jurisdiction. Wright v. Hazen and Gordon, 24 Vt. 143. Brit, presumptions are indulged in only to supply the absence of evidence or averment respecting the facts presumed. They have no place for consideration when the evidence is disclosed or the averment is made. When, therefore, the record states the evidence, or contains an averment with reference to a jurisdictional fact, it will be taken to speak the truth on that point, and it will not be presumed that there was other or different evidence respecting the fact, nor that the fact was otherwise than as averred. Galpin v. Page, 18 Wall. 350; Wade v. Hancock, 14 Reporter 672; Freeman Judg. s. 125. Hence it cannot be presumed that the allegation of time in this complaint was a mistake, and that the evidence may have shown that the offense was in fact committed within the time limited. The case must stand on the presumption and ground that the offense was in fad committed more than six years before the complaint was exhibited. It does not stand as it would had the complaint laid the offense within the time limited, but the evidence had shown it without the time. Magistrates of neither superior nor inferior courts are answerable for a want of jurisdiction arising from a mistake of fact that they had no means of discovering nor corree,ting, nor when they would have had authority to act had the facts been as alleged by the party. Lawther v. The Earl of Radnor, 8 East. 113; Pike v. Carter, 3 Bing. 78; 1 Smith Lead. Cas. 1135. In Aiken v. Richardson, 15 Vt. 500, it was held — as it has been since in Muzzy v. Howard, 42 Vt. 23 — that under the statute against arrest and imprisonment for debt there was no competent jurisdiction to issue a capias without the requisite affidavit, and that the case was analogous to the cases that proceed on the ground that jurisdiction of the process is as essential as jurisdiction of the person and of the subject matter. And Smith v. Bouchier, 2 Str. 993, was referred to approvingly, which was trespass and false imprisonment against five, who justified under process of the University of Oxford, for that by the custom, a plaintiff making oath that he had a p'ersonal action against any party within the precincts of the university, and that he believed the defendant would not appear but run away, the judge might award a warrant to arrest him, and detain Mm till security was given for his answering the complaint; that the defendant Bouchier made a complaint to the defendant Shippen, the vice-chancellor, of a personal action against the plaintiff, and that he suspected the plaintiff would run away; that he took his oath of and upon the truth of the premises, upon which a warrant was granted to the other defendants, whereon plaintiff was arrested. The court held that the custom was not pursued, for that by it the plaintiff was to swear to his his belief of the defendant's design to run away, whereas he only swore that he suspected it, which was not the same thing; and the plaintiff had judgment against all the defendants. Wright v. Hazen and Gordon, supra, was case for false imprisonment against the party and the justice for an arrest for debt without the requisite affidavit. As to the justice, the pleadings left the case to stand on the fact that the plaintiff was a resident citizen at the time the writ issued, so the plaintiff had judgment on the pleadings ; but in view of a repleader being awarded, the court said that all it would be necessary for the justice to show was, that' the original writ described the plaintiff as a non-resident, and that he signed it supposing such to be the fact, having no mode of trying that question in advance, and that he was not'bound to, know at his peril the facts limiting his jurisdiction. This holding would make the justice liable if the original writ described the plaintiff as a resident, unless the requisite affidavit was filed, for he would then have knowledge of the facts that limited his jurisdiction.
In Carleton v. Taylor, 50 Vt. 220, it is said to be a well settled rule of law that when the court had no jurisdiction of the process it is nugatory and void, and that all persons acting under it are without protection; that if, under our statute exempting from arrest in suits on contracts, the process issues against one not of the class named, or without compliance with the prescribed condition, it issues without warrant of law, and the court has n/> jurisdiction of the process,
In Merrill v. Thurston, 46 Vt. 732, a justice was held liable where the plaintiff was committed on a warrant issued to bail in a recognizance for an appeal in a liquor prosecution, the recognizance not being one authorizing a surrender of the principal in discharge of bail. That was a stronger ease for the defendant than this, for there the facts may fairly be said to have given the defendant colorable jurisdiction, and to have called upon him to decide whether he had jurisdiction and authority to act or not; while here the facts presented had no color of legal value, and tlie defendant's action in the premises was but the commission of an official wrong.
Whatever the decisions elsewhere have been on the subject— and they are not uniform — we deem it impossible to sustain this plea without overruling several decisions of this court that have long been recognized and practiced upon as the settled law of the State.
Judgment affirmed, cause remanded, and repleader awarded on the usual terms.