Case Name: Bassett, Respondent, vs. Chicago & Northwestern Railway Company, Appellant
Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Wisconsin
Decision Date: 1919-04-02
Citations: 168 Wis. 617
Docket Number: 
Parties: Bassett, Respondent, vs. Chicago & Northwestern Railway Company, Appellant.
Judges: 
Reporter: Wisconsin Reports
Volume: 168
Pages: 617–628

Head Matter:
Bassett, Respondent, vs. Chicago & Northwestern Railway Company, Appellant.
November 9, 1918
April 2, 1919.
Commerce: Interstate shipments: Bill of lading and published rates, when binding: Connecting carriers: Responsibility for loss or damage: Valuation as limit of recovery: Negligence: Joint tortfeasors: Supreme court: Jurisdiction, when ceases: Motions for rehearing: Failure of coitnsel to call attention to statutes.
1. Under the Carmack amendment (of June 29, 1906) to the interstate commerce act (34 U. S. Stats, at Large, ch. 3591, p. 595), the carrier receiving property for interstate transportation was required to “issue a receipt or bill of lading therefor,” and this constituted the contract between the shipper and all the carriers participating in the service.
2. The published rates prescribed by said act, based upon valuation, were presumed to be equally within the knowledge of carrier and shipper, and both were bound by them as a matter of law.
3. While the receiving carrier was responsible, under said statute, for the whole carriage, each participating carrier might be sued for loss or damage occurring on its own line, and the liability of the carrier sued was fixed by the applicable valid terms of the original bill of lading. t
4. Under said statute, where the parties to an interstate shipment agreed upon a valuation of the property, for the purpose of determining the rates to be charged, or where the shipper paid an alternative rate based upon a certain valuation, such valuation limited the amount which he might recover for loss or damage due to defaults of the carriers; and it was immaterial whether such loss or damage was caused by ordinary negligence or by gross negligence as defined in the law of this state. Tradewell v. C. & N. W. R. Co. ISO Wis. 259, so far as it conflicts herewith, overruled.
5. Where damage to property in the course of interstate transportation was caused by concurring negligence of the delivery carrier and of a preceding connecting carrier, they were joint tortfeasors and each was responsible for the entire result, the shipper’s recovery, however, not to exceed the amount limited as above stated.
6. Under sec. 3071, Stats., the jurisdiction of this court in a case brought here by appeal or writ of error ceases at the end of sixty days from the date of its decision of the case, even though the clerk has not actually remitted the papers to the lower court, unless such papers have been retained by order of this court made within said sixty days.
7. After the jurisdiction of this court has so terminated, an order therein opening the default of a party to move for a rehearing and permitting him to file such a motion is a nullity.
8. Although, owing to the omission of counsel for both parties to call attention to the Cummins amendments (of March 4, 1915, and August 9, 1916) to the interstate commerce act, the decision and judgment in this case were based upon the law as it existed prior to such amendments, yet, no order directing retention of the record and no application for relief by way of a motion for rehearing or otherwise having been made within sixty days after such decision, this court is powerless to reopen the case and determine the rights of the parties under said amendments.
Appeal from a judgment of the municipal court of Lang-lade county: T. W. Hogan, Judge.
Modified and affirmed.
This action was brought by the plaintiff to recover damages for injuries alleged to have been suffered by a race horse belonging to him while in shipment from Ottawa, Illinois, to Manitowoc, Wisconsin.
The complaint alleges in substance that at 6 p. m. August 14, 1917, a race horse, a mare, valued at $1,000, was de livered to and accepted by the Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Ráilway Company at Ottawa, Illinois, for shipment via it and the defendant railroad to Manitowoc, Wisconsin; that the mare was in perfect condition when delivered to the railway company; that she was immediately loaded in a car and remained in that car without unloading for food or water, rest, or exercise, and that she was not properly watered in the car before she arrived at Manitowoc on August 20th, having been in the car continuously for six days; that the mare, at time of shipment, was in racing form and was shipped for the purpose of entering the races at Manitowoc and other points; that the agent at Ottawa, Illinois, was notified at the time of the acceptance of the mare that she was a race horse and that plaintiff expected to use her for the purpose of racing; that it was the duty of the railroad companies, including the defendant, to care for the animal properly and to unload and rest, feed, and water her at least once in every twenty-eight hours for a period of five hours, as required by the provisions of sec. 4386, R. S. of U. S.; that, disregarding these duties, the railway companies, including the defendant, allowed the horse to remain in the car in which it was loaded at Ottawa for a period of five days and nineteen hours without furnishing her sufficient water to sustain her; that as the result of such carelessness and negligence the mare was permanently injured; that the plaintiff expended large sums for the care and nursing of the animal; that the mare has ever since been unfit for service of any kind either as a race horse or driving horse. Damages to the sum of $1,000, together with the costs and expenses of the action, were demanded by the plaintiff.
The defendant denies that the mare was injured by any negligence or carelessness on its part, and alleges that among other terms and provisions of the written contract under which the mare was accepted for shipment were the following: that the Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Rail way Company “will transport for the second party . . . one mare,- value $150;” and that “the second party shall assume all risk and expense of feeding, watering, bedding, and otherwise caring for the live stock covered by this contract while in cars, yards, pens, or elsewhere, and shall load and unload the same at his expense and risk;” and “that the first party shall be exempt from all liability for loss, damage, or injury to the person or persons or live stock covered by this contract arising from derailment, collision, fire, escapement from car, heat, suffocation, overloading, crowding, maiming, or other accidents or causes of any kind or character, unless such loss, damage, or injury is the direct result of negligence on the part of the carrier.”
The defendant further alleges that any duty on the part of the Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railway Company or the defendant to unload the mare from the car for rest, food, and water was abrogated and modified by an indorsement in writing upon the contract of shipment by which it was mutually agreed that the mare was to be fed and watered in the car; that the mare was carried in a car in which it would and did have proper food, water, space, and opportunity to rest, without the necessity of being unloaded; that the mare was not in the defendant’s, possession or carried by it for a longer period than twenty-eight hours without food and water.
The jury found, by a special verdict, that the mare was injured while in transit; that such injuries were not caused by a want of ordinary care on the part of the defendant, but by a reckless or wanton neglect of duty on the part of the defendant; that such reckless or wanton neglect of duty was the proximate cause of. the mare’s injuries; that the consignor and the agent of the Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railway Company did not agree upon $150 as the value of the mare; and that $821.80 was reasonable compensation to the plaintiff for the damage he sustained.
Judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiff for $920.14, damages and costs. Appeal is taken from this judgment.
For the appellant there was a brief by Edward M. Smart, and oral argument by R. N. Van Doren, both of Milwaukee.
Arthur Goodrick of Antigo, for the respondent.

Opinion:
The following opinions were filed December 3, 1918:
Siebecxcer, J.
The rights and liabilities of the parties to this action are governed by the act of Congress of June 29, 1906, regulating interstate commerce. By sec. 20 of this act (Carmack Amendment, 34 U. S. Stats. at Large, 584, ch. 3591) Congress has fixed the liability of carriers respecting loss and damage of interstate shipments. This legislation has been repeatedly declared by the federal supreme court to supersede state regulation on the subject and to provide a uniform system of regulation and rules fixing the liability of interstate carriers and prescribing the effect of bills of lading. Adams Exp. Co. v. Croninger, 226 U. S. 491, 33 Sup. Ct. 148; Kansas City S. R. Co. v. Carl, 227 U. S. 639, 33 Sup. Ct. 391; Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. v. Harriman, 227 U. S. 657, 33 Sup. Ct. 397.
In the Croninger and other cases the provisions of the Carmack amendment were held to impose on the initial carrier liability for loss and damage caused by any connecting carrier as well as for its own defaults, and that its contract of shipment is binding on all carriers for the entire transportation. Cleveland, C., C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Dettlebach, 239 U. S. 588, 36 Sup. Ct. 177; Georgia F. & A. R. Co. v. Blish M. Co. 241 U. S. 190, 36 Sup. Ct. 541.
Under the act every initial carrier is required "to issue a receipt or bill of lading" upon receipt of a shipment, which constitutes the contract between the shipper and all the carriers. Under the act the parties may agree upon a valuation of the property shipped for the purpose of charg ing the published rates prescribed under the act, based upon valuation, and a carrier is obligated to charge such rates to carry out the purposes of Congress in regulating interstate transportation to secure uniformity of rate and prevent unjust discrimination. Such published rates are presumed to be equally within the knowledge of carrier and shipper, and both are bound by them as a matter of law. Chicago & A. R. Co. v. Kirby, 225 U. S. 155, 32 Sup. Ct. 648; Kansas City S. R. Co. v. Carl, 227 U. S. 639, 33 Sup. Ct. 391; Boston & M. R. Co. v. Hooker, 233 U. S. 97, 34 Sup. Ct. 526; Great Northern R. Co. v. O'Connor, 232 U. S. 508, 34 Sup. Ct. 380.
In the O'Connor Case the court declared:
"But so long as the tariff rate, based on value, remained operative, it was binding upon the shipper and carrier alike, and was to be enforced by the courts in fixing the rights and liabilities of the parties. The tariffs are filed with the commission and are open to inspection at every station. In view of the multitude of transactions, it is not necessary that there shall be an inquiry as to each article, or a distinct agreement as to the value of each shipment. If no value is stated, the tariff rate applicable to each state of facts applies. . If sued for their loss it [the carrier] is liable only for the loss of what the shipper had declared them to be in class and value."
The connecting carrier's liability to a shipper was considered in Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. v. Ward, 244 U. S. 383, 37 Sup. Ct. 617, and it was there held:
"While the receiving carrier is thus responsible for the whole carriage, each connecting road may still be sued for damages occurring on its line; and the liability of such participating carrier is fixed by the applicable valid terms of the original bill of lading." Bichlmeir v. M., St. P. & S. S. M. R. Co. 159 Wis. 404, 150 N. W. 508; 10 Corp. Jur. § 894, p. 541.
It is obvious that the shipment of this mare was an interstate shipment and that the provisions of the interstate commerce act apply. There is no dispute but that the ship per paid an alternative rate based on a $150 valuation of the mare. This legally limits the amount plaintiff is entitled to recover for loss and damage to her for any defaults of the carriers in transporting her to destination. In view of the state of the case on this point it is immaterial whether the alleged damage was the proximate result of ordinary or gross negligence as defined in the law of this state.
The defendant contends that there is no evidence in the case to support the finding of the jury that defendant was guilty of either gross or ordinary negligence. We have examined the evidence and find that the evidence tending to show the condition of the mare upon her arrival at Mani-towoc was sufficient to warrant an inference by the jury that she had not been properly cared for during shipment and that such condition was attributable to a lack of water and food combined. If the mare was in fact mistreated as alleged, then such mistreatment is partly attributable to the carrier who had charge of her before defendant received her as delivery carrier; but this fact cannot affect defendant's responsibility to the shipper for the whole damage. Under such a state of facts the carriers are joint tort-feasors.
"Where, although concert is lacking, the separate and independent acts or negligence of several combine to produce directly a single injury, each is responsible for the entire result, even though his act or neglect alone might not have caused it. . . . It is not necessary that they be acting together or in concert if their concurring negligence occasions the injury." 38 Cyc. 488, 489, and cases cited in the note; 10 Corp. Jur. § 894, p. 542; Baltimore & O. S. W. R. Co. v. J. A. Wood & Co. 130 Ky. 839, 850, 114 S. W. 734; Georgia F. & A. R. Co. v. Blish M. Co. 241 U. S. 190, 36 Sup. Ct. 541.
It follows that the plaintiff is entitled to recover his damage to the mare from this defendant as a joint wrongdoer, not to exceed,' however, $150 in amount, this being the valuation recognized by the published tariffs, rates, and rules, pursuant to the interstate commerce act as corresponding to the freight rate he paid for this shipment.
In Tradewell v. C. & N. W. R. Co. 150 Wis. 259, 136 N. W. 794, this court disregarded the published tariffs, schedules, and classifications as to alternative rates based on valuation of the articles shipped, and allowed recovery of the value of the shipment in excess of the value limited by the rate paid for the shipment. In so far as this case conflicts with the rule of the federal cases above cited, it must be deemed overruled.
By ihe Court. — The judgment appealed from is modified by limiting plaintiff's right to recover damages to the sum of $150, and as so modified the judgment is affirmed. The appellant to recover costs and disbursements in this court.