Case Name: Lizzie Butcher, Resp't, v. Richard Hyde et al., App'lts
Court: Brooklyn City Court
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1894-11-26
Citations: 63 N.Y. St. Rep. 312
Docket Number: 
Parties: Lizzie Butcher, Resp’t, v. Richard Hyde et al., App’lts.
Judges: 
Reporter: New York State Reporter
Volume: 63
Pages: 312–313

Head Matter:
Lizzie Butcher, Resp’t, v. Richard Hyde et al., App’lts.
(Brooklyn Oily Oourt, General Term,
Filed November 26, 1894.)
Negligence—Dangerous condition—Notice.
Where the stairs of a theater become dangerous, notice to the proprietors can be implied by the jury from the lapse of a very short space of time.
Appeal from a judgment entered on a verdict in favor of plaintiff.
Wm. M. Benedict, for app’lts; Bailey, Bell & Crane, for resp’t

Opinion:
Clement, C. J.
was the duty of the defendants to exercise reasonable care over the stairs which were in use at their theater. They were bound to exercise more care than the owner of a tenement house in the control of stairs in common use by tenants, and more care even than the officers of an elevated railroad over the stairs in use at their stations. It was the duty of defendants to be vigilant to see.that the stairs of the theater, which were crowded every weekday, should be in such a condition that a theater-goer, though a lady 72 years of age, could with safety descend the stairs, provided the care of a reasonably prudent person was exercised. If the stairs of a theater become dangerous, notice to the owners can be implied by a jury by the lapse of a very short space. of time. We think that the jury could infer that 24 hours, and perhaps less, was ample notice to the proprietors of any patent defect in the means of egress. It would not be a great hardship, to hold that the managers of a theater or of a public hall in daily use should,, at the close of each performance, inspect the halls, pas: sageways, and stairs. We have read with care the record in this case, and conclude that there were sufficient evidence on the part of the plaintiff to justify the verdict of the jury. There was testimony tending to show that the rubber on the sixth step was out of order, and liable to trip a person descending the stairs. The other question—whether the plaintiff fell by reason of the defect in the step, or for some other , reason—is close. There does not seem to be any direct testimony showing that the plaintiff stepped on the spot where the defective rubber was. There is testimony tending to show that her foot caught in the fifth or or sixth step, and that there was no other defect in the stairs except at the sixth step. In this case it was difficult for the plaintiff to describe accurately the exact spot where the injury occurred, and yet, from all the surrounding circumstances, the jury could infer that she fell on account of the defective covering of the sixth step. The plaintiff testified that she was descending the stairs, and that, at about the fifth or sixth step, her foot became caught in some way, and that she fell' and was injured. Proof is given that at the sixth step the rubber covering was raised up, and liable to produce the result testified to by plaintiff. It would be a refinement to hold, as matter of law, that it was not for the jury to determine whether the defect in the sixth step was the cause of her fall.
Judgment and order denying new trial affirmed, with costs.