Case Name: A. J. Collins v. The State of Texas
Court: Supreme Court of Texas
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1860-10
Citations: 25 Supp. Tex. 202
Docket Number: 
Parties: A. J. Collins v. The State of Texas.
Judges: 
Reporter: Texas Reports
Volume: 25 Supp.
Pages: 202–205

Head Matter:
A. J. Collins v. The State of Texas.
The 250th article of the Penal Code declares, that if any person shall bribe, or offer to bribe, any officer, with intent to influence his decision, &c., he shall be punished, &a. The indictment charged an offer to bribe the district attorney. It should have alleged the character of suit or dutyjhi which the district attorney was engaged, with such averments as to show that the offer was to bribe him with respect to his official duties.
Appeal from Bexar. The case was tried before Hon. Thomas J. Devine, one of the district judges.
The appellant was indicted under the 250th article of the Penal Code. (Paschal’s Dig., Art. 1869.)
Indictment charged, “ that A. J. Collins, late of the county aforesaid, on the 12th day of September, A. D. 1860, at said county of Bexar, one M. Gr. Anderson, then and there being duly elected to the office of district attorney in and for the fourth judicial district of the State of Texas, and then and there being duly appointed, qualified, and acting district attorney, pro tem., in and for said Bexar county, with intent to influence the act, opinion, decision, and judgment of him the said M. U. Anderson, as such officer aforesaid, on, in, and concerning a certain cause or criminal charge and proceeding then and in the district court of said Bexar county pending, it being case Ho.-, wherein, the said A. J. Collins is charged with, did fraudulently and feloniously offer, tender, and promise the said M. G-. Anderson the sum of $15 in money, on condition that the said Anderson, as such officer aforesaid, would dismiss, or have set aside and annulled, the said cause so pending against the said Collins, as aforesaid, and free or clear him from the aforesaid charge.”
Defendant éxcepted to the sufficiency of the indictment, which was overruled, and he was convicted; from which he appealed.
S. G. Newton, for appellant.
—It seems to me that, to sustain the conviction, it was necessary to prove some particular cause or criminal charge; and, if necessary to prove it, it must he necessary to charge it. (Art. 395, div. 7, Code Crim. Pro.) “ The offense must he set forth in plain and intelligible words.” (Art. 396.) “It is not necessary to state in an indictment anything which it is not necessary to prove.” And'we must hold the converse to he true: that it is necessary to set forth, with reasonable certainty, the facts that are necessary to be proved. (Art. 399, Code Crim. Pro.) The • admission of proof by officers of the ■court, that there was no indictment but the one offered in evidence, does not, nor can it, supply'the omission in this accusation. It was illegal, and operated to the prejudice of the defendant.
George Flournoy, Attorney General, for the State.
—Art. 487 Code Crim. Pro., (O. & W. Dig., p. 624,) provides, that there is no exception to the substance of an indictment or information, except, &c., setting out three grounds of exception, by numbers 1, 2, and 3, and prescribing in what each shall consist.
The appellant should have pleaded the first of said exceptions, to wit, “that it does not appear from the face of the same, that any offense against the law was committed by the defendant.” The only part of the exceptions filed in this cause by the defendant below, which can he supposed as intended to relate to this, is a sentence, as follows: “And, further, said defendant is no,t legally charged with any crime in said indictment.”
This cannot well he thought to embrace anything further than the manner of making the charge. It clearly does not question the sufficiency of the description of the offense.
Art. 678, Code Crim. Pro., (O. & W. p. 644,) provides, that “motion in arrest of judgment shall be granted upon any ground, which would be good upon exception to an indictment or information for any substantial defect therein.”
But the defect comjjlained of is not really a matter of substance, but of form only. It should have been complained of under the rule for exceptions to the form of an indictment. Art. 403, Code of Crim. Pro., (O. & W., p. 615,) provides, as the seventh formal requisite of an indictment, that “the offense shall be set forth in plain and intelligible words.”

Opinion:
Roberts, J.
—The indictment in this case is founded. on art. 250 of the Penal Code, which makes it an offense for any person to offer a bribe to any executive, legislative, or judicial officer, "with intent to influence his act, vote, opinion, decision, or judgment, on any matter, question, cause, or proceeding which may be then pending, or may thereafter by law be brought before such officer in his official capacity."
Besides others, the substantial exception was taken to the indictment, that "the defendant is not legally charged with any crime in said indictment." This is, in substance, the same as one of the exceptions which the Code permits to be takerf to an indictment, to wit: art. 487, "1. That it does not appear from the face of the same that any offense against the law was committed by the defendant."
The indictment states, that defendant offered to bribe the district attorney, with intent to influence his act, " as an officer," in and concerning "a certain cause or criminal charge and proceeding then and in the District Court of said Bexar county pending, it being case Mo.-, wherein the said A. J. Collins is charged with," &e.
The omission to state the cause or charge and proceeding, or to give some definite description of it, renders the indictment -defective not only in form, but also in substance; because it does not appear to be a matter pending in court, upon which the district attorney was required or authorized by law to act in his official capacity. The oiler to bribe the officer, the intent to influence his official act thereby, in relation to a cause pending in court, may or may not come within the denunciation of the provision of the Penal Code above quoted. If it relate to a cause upon which the district attorney is required or authorized to act officially, it does; otherwise it does not. There should, therefore, be some averment or description which would show it to be such a cause.
The court should have sustained this exception, and for the error in not doing so, the judgment must be reversed and the cause
Remanded.