Case Name: Davina Agnes Goodrich, Appellee, v. Mark Judson Goodrich, Appellant
Court: Iowa Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Iowa
Decision Date: 1927-12-17
Citations: 205 Iowa 1096
Docket Number: 
Parties: Davina Agnes Goodrich, Appellee, v. Mark Judson Goodrich, Appellant.
Judges: 
Reporter: Iowa Reports
Volume: 205
Pages: 1096–1099

Head Matter:
Davina Agnes Goodrich, Appellee, v. Mark Judson Goodrich, Appellant.
December 17, 1927.
Rehearing Denied April 5, 1928.
Alex Holmes and D. D. Murphy & Son, for appellant.
A. M. Cloud, George S. Banta, and E. H. Estey, for ap-pellee.

Opinion:
Evans, C. J.
— I. The parties w,ere married in Linn County ill December, 1907. The plaintiff ivas at that time eighteen years of age, and the defendant two or three years older. Prior to their marriage, the plaintiff had been the victim of seduction by the defendant. During the first twelve years of their marriage, eight children were born, four of whom are now living. Prior to the birth of the first child, the defendant had infected the plaintiff with a venereal disease, and this was responsible for premature and defective births. For the first years of their marriage, they lived at Cedar Rapids, from, which place they removed in 1913 to Strawberry Point. Here the defendant entered into the poultry business, and amassed a fortune therein. Their separation occurred on March 6, 1925. This was the culmination of a long series of criminations and recriminations between them.
The record before us is very voluminous, comprising the testimony of more than 100 witnesses. The fighting issues in the ease are wholly issues of fact. No debatable question of law is contended for by either party. It will be wholly impracticable for us to discuss the evidence within the proper, limits of an opinion, and we must be cOntent to state our conclusions in general terms. That the defendant was guilty of cruel and in-]iumaii treatment is denied by his counsel only in. a qualified sense. The claim for him is that his provocation was such by the wrongful conduct of his wife that it should be deemed a initi-gation and justification of conduct on his part whicb otherwise would be cr'~e1 and inhuman, within the meaning of the statute. We shall, therefore, not di~cuss at all the specific instances of e~uelty. Su~cient to say that the defendant's conduct was cruel and inhuman, and wa~ persistently so.
The contention on the part of the defendant is that the plaintiff was repeatedly guilty of ~dnltery, and tI~e volume of evidence offered by him was directed to the proof of such fact. The record is an• unsavory one, and much of it is quite unprintable. It is flatly contradictory at nearly every material point. It is impossible to find the issues of fact with either siae without finding, of necessity, that the contrary evidence of the other side was untrue. The veracity of the witnesses becomes the turning of the scales.
The evidence introduced by the defendant was circumstantial. Some of the circumstances testified to, if true, were very damaging. But the more damaging evidence carried the quality of improb~bility to a very high degree, ~nd put the credibility of the witness to a severe test. Every damaging circumstance not fairly explained was positively denied. Reading this evidence pro and con, we are not at all convinced of the ~ruth of the t'estinion3~ of the defendant's wItnesses at many points, to say nothing of the inferences which should properly be drawn from such testimony. On the contrary, we ~re convinced that a substantial part of the testimony offered by the defendant is false. Th~ testimony ~of the witness Hutchinson, for instance, may be `spe~ified as a cleai~ fabrication. On its fa~e, this is the most damaging testimony in the record. Some of the evidence of the defendant himself should come under like condemnation. We need not further `particularize. Our conclusion is that the defendant has not sustained the charges of criminality made by him in his cross-petition, and that the trial court, therefore, properly rendered' decree for the plaintiff.
II. On the question of alimony, it is contended that the amount allowed is excessive. Tlie defendant, as a witness, testified to his net worth at $75,000. There is plausible evidence in the. record that his net worth is even in-excess °f such sum. • But accepting his own testimony therefor, we do not deem an award of $22,000 to the wife excessive. True, additional provision is made for a monthly payment for the support of the children.' This "provision is not an onerous one, in view of the net worth of the defendant and in view of his great earning capacity. He is in the wrong, and has driven his wife out of her home. . No reason has been suggested, or can be, why, under such circumstances, a husband should, hold his property intact and should leave his divorced wife scantily provided for.
We hold that the award of alimony was not excessive. The decree below is affirmed in all respects. — A firmed. .
All the justices concur.