Case Name: Roland FUSILIER, Administrator of Estate of His Minor Child Keith Fusilier, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. NORTHBROOK EXCESS & SURPLUS INSURANCE COMPANY and Evangeline Parish School Board, Defendants-Appellants
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1985-05-02
Citations: 471 So. 2d 761
Docket Number: No. 84-184
Parties: Roland FUSILIER, Administrator of Estate of His Minor Child Keith Fusilier, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. NORTHBROOK EXCESS & SURPLUS INSURANCE COMPANY and Evangeline Parish School Board, Defendants-Appellants.
Judges: Before DOMENGEAUX, FORET, DOU-CET, KNOLL and KING, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 471
Pages: 761–769

Head Matter:
Roland FUSILIER, Administrator of Estate of His Minor Child Keith Fusilier, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. NORTHBROOK EXCESS & SURPLUS INSURANCE COMPANY and Evangeline Parish School Board, Defendants-Appellants.
No. 84-184.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Third Circuit.
May 2, 1985.
Writ Denied June 28, 1985.
Gary L. Keyser, Baton Rouge, for defendants-appellants.
C. Brent Cored, Ville Platte, for plaintiff-appellee.
Before DOMENGEAUX, FORET, DOU-CET, KNOLL and KING, JJ.

Opinion:
KNOLL, Judge.
Evangeline Parish School Board (hereafter School Board) and its insurer, North-brook Excess & Surplus Insurance Company, appeal an adverse judgment of $80,-244.15 in favor of Roland Fusilier as administrator of the estate of his six year old son, Keith Fusilier, for personal injuries Keith received while playing on the School Board's property. The School Board contends on appeal that the trial court erred: (1) in failing to find it exempt from liability under LSA-R.S. 9:2791 and 9:2795; (2) in finding the School Board negligent; (3) in rejecting its claim of contributory negligence and assumption of the risk on the part of Keith Fusilier and his parents; and (4) in its finding that Keith proved by a preponderance of the evidence that he was injured at the place alleged. The School Board also specified that the trial court erred in finding Keith's hearing loss was permanent and was the result of medical treatment necessitated by his alleged injury on the School Board's property. However, this last specification of error was not briefed, therefore, it is considered abandoned. Rule 2-12.4, Uniform Rules, Courts of Appeal. We affirm, finding the School Board not exempt from liability, and the trial court's factual determinations not manifestly erroneous.
FACTS
On August 12, 1982, prior to the start of the 1982-83 school year, six year old Keith Fusilier, Eric Fusilier, his older brother, and Brian Southhill, a playmate, entered the School Board's property to watch the Mamou High School football team practice on the football field. It is undisputed that, although a large hurricane fence surrounds the football field, the School Board customarily leaves the school grounds open for public use. When the football practice ended, the three youths began playing tag along the perimeter of the football field. As Keith chased his companions, he ran through an area of uncut grass near one of the light poles which illuminates the football field, and punctured his ankle bone on a section of chain link fence which was hidden by the tall grass. It appears that a portion of the chain link fence which lines the football field had been knocked down and left in disrepair.
Keith's ankle wound was treated in the emergency room of Savoy Memorial Hospital immediately following the accident. Approximately ten days later Keith was readmitted to Savoy Memorial where he was hospitalized thirty days for a severe bacterial infection of the ankle joint and bone; while in the hospital, septicemia, a blood infection, developed as a result of the original ankle injury.
Keith suffered damage to the ankle's hyaline cartilage and may have also damaged the growth plate; arthritis may occur in the ankle as well as osteomyelitis; and, apparently, as a result of the prolonged use of Amakacin, an antibiotic, Keith has also suffered a permanent minor loss of hearing.
IMMUNITY
The School Board and its insurer contend that the district judge erred in finding LSA-R.S. 9:2791 and 9:2795 did not provide them with immunity from liability.
We find Keelen v. State of Louisiana, Department of Culture, Recreation and Tourism, 463 So.2d 1287 (La.1985), dispositive of this issue, and conclude that neither R.S. 9:2791 nor 9:2795 grants the School Board immunity from liability.
In Keelen, supra, the Court stated that, "There is nothing in either statute [R.S. 9:2791 or 9:2795] to suggest that in enacting these statutes, the legislature intended to extend immunity to owners of all property without limit." In particular the Court held:
"The use of the language (land and water areas) [in the statement of purpose of LSA-R.S. 9:2795 contained in 1975 La. Acts, No. 615, Sec 1] is suggestive of open and undeveloped expanses of property. Furthermore, the type of recreational activities enumerated in both statutes — hunting, fishing, trapping, camp ing, nature study, etc. — can normally be accommodated only on large tracts or areas of natural and undeveloped lands located in thinly-populated rural or semi-rural locales. Specification of these types of activities suggests a policy that would encourage landowners to keep their property in a natural, open and environmentally wholesome state. We would stray from this goal were we to construe the statutes to grant a blanket immunity to landowners without regard to the characteristics of their property. Thus, we conclude that the legislature intended to confer immunity upon owners of undeveloped, nonresidential rural or semi-rural land areas. The size, naturalness and remoteness or insulation from populated areas all attribute to the categorization of property as rural or semi-rural. * Sfc Sjt Jfc ⅝
When the injury-causing condition or instrumentality is of the type normally encountered in the true outdoors, then the statutes provide immunity. Conversely, when the instrumentality, whether found in an urban or rural locale, is of the type usually found in someone's backyard, then the statutes afford no protection." (Footnote omitted.) (Emphasis added.)
After analyzing the facts of the case sub judice in light of Keelen, it is clear that an injury on the edge of a football field located in the heart of a city is not the type of property to which R.S. 9:2791 and 9:2795 grant immunity from liability. Compare Thomas v. Jeane, 411 So.2d 744 (La.App. 3rd Cir.1982); Pratt v. State, 408 So.2d 336 (La.App. 3rd Cir.1981), writ denied, 412 So.2d 1098 (La.1982); Rushing v. State, 381 So.2d 1250 (La.App. 1st Cir.1980). Therefore the trial court was correct in its conclusion that R.S. 9:2791 and 9:2795 did not release the School Board and its insurer from liability.
NEGLIGENCE
The School Board next contends that the trial court erred in finding it negligent.
A landowner or occupier of land does not insure against the possibility of an accident, but he must act as a reasonable man in view of the probability of injury to others. Shelton v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 334 So.2d 406 (La.1976). In reviewing a trial court's findings of fact, an appellate court cannot overrule the trial court's evaluation of witnesses and determination of facts unless the record reveals the trial court's findings are entirely wrong. Manuel Truck & Equip. Co. v. B.G. Hooker Petroleum, 430 So.2d 1367 (La.App. 3rd Cir.1983), writ denied, 438 So.2d 568 (La. 1983); Arceneaux v. Domingue, 365 So.2d 1330 (La.1978).
In its determination that the School Board was negligent in the maintenance of its property, the trial court stated in its well-written reasons for judgment:
"The Evangeline Parish School Board employs two custodians, Mr. Walter Shil-low and Mr. Wilbert LaFleur, to maintain the premises on these school grounds. Throughout the summer of 1982, both custodians cut grass along the premises on a weekly basis. The principals of the school are responsible for inspection of the premises, and in seeing to it that the premises are kept in a safe condition at all times.
The Court finds that the Evangeline Parish School Board knew the children were going to be playing on the premises, and in fact, had been doing so for quite sometime. Therefore, the school board has a duty to either maintain the premises in a safe condition, or to provide adequate warning against a dangerous condition in the use of the premises. The Court finds that the school board breached its duty and as a result of the breach of this duty, Derwin Keith Fusilier was injured.
The custodians in charge of maintenance of the premises neglected to repair the fallen fence. Their knowledge of the fallen fence is apparent by the fact that all of the grass surrounding the accident site had been mowed, except for the accident site itself. The photographs introduced into evidence, which were taken shortly after the accident, clearly indicate that the fence had fallen for quite sometime, and the custodians had allowed the grass to grow to a sufficient height as to completely hide the fallen fence.
Equipment was available to the custodians which would have allowed them to cut the grass close to the telephone post; however, they chose to cut around this area instead of repairing the fence. This negligence of the employees of the Evangeline Parish School Board is imputed to the school board under the theory of respondeat superior.
Representative [sic] of the Evangeline Parish School Board admitted knowing the children were going to be present and playing at the site of the accident. The principal of the school was charged with inspection of the premises. The custodians of the school were charged with maintenance of the premises. Therefore, the Court finds that the Evangeline Parish School Board willfully failed to warn against the dangerous propensity and failed to repair this dangerous propensity, knowing the children were going to be playing in this area."
Although it is questionable that the School Board's actions were wilful, we can not say that the trial court was manifestly erroneous in its finding that the School Board was negligent. Arceneaux, supra.
DEFENSES
The School Board contends that Keith and his parents were guilty of contributory negligence and assumption of the risk. The trial judge found Keith and his parents free of contributory negligence and assumption of risk.
Contributory negligence and assumption of the risk are questions of fact determined by the trier-of-fact. Simmons v. Beauregard Parish School Board, 315 So.2d 883 (La.App. 3rd Cir.1975), writ denied, 320 So.2d 207 (La.1975). The party relying on contributory negligence and assumption of the risk has the burden of proving them. Simmons, supra.
Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the plaintiff which falls below the standard to which he should conform for his own protection. The standard of conduct to which Keith's parents must conform for their own protection is that of reasonable persons under like circumstances. Smolinski v. Taulli, 276 So.2d 286 (La.1973). In Smolinski the Supreme Court observed:
"Failure to take every precaution against every foreseeable risk or to use extra ordinary skill, caution, and foresight does not constitute negligence or contributory negligence.A mother of small children is not required to chain them up or to act as their constant jailer in order to absolutely secure them from exposure to hazards negligently created or maintained by a tortfeasor. She is required only to use reasonable precautions, and her conduct in this regard is not negligent if by a common-sense test, it is in accord with that of reasonably prudent persons faced with similar conditions and circumstances.... "
The record clearly establishes that Keith and his brother requested and were granted permission to cross the street to watch the Mamou football team practice. Measured against the principles outlined in Smolinski the action of the parents in allowing Keith to enter the School Board's property was reasonable and does not fall below the standard of care required for their child's protection. The School Board has failed to carry its burden of proving contributory negligence on the parents' part.
In the assessment of contributory negligence a child is not held to the same degree of care as an adult. The test is whether the child, considering his age, background, and inherent intelligence, indulged in the gross disregard of his own safety in the face of known, understood, and perceived danger. Crowe v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 416 So.2d 1376 (La.App. 3rd Cir.1982). We can not say that the trial court was erroneous in concluding that Keith's actions as a six year old running through tall grass while playing tag did not constitute contributory negligence.
In specific reference to the defense of assumption of the risk, Dofflemyer v. Gilley, 384 So.2d 435 (La.1980), held:
"It is fundamental that, in order to assume a risk, one must knowingly and voluntarily encounter a risk which caused him harm. Plaintiff must understand and appreciate the risk involved and must accept the risk as well as the inherent possibility of danger because of the risk."
The School Board failed to produce any evidence whatsoever that Keith or Keith's parents knowingly and voluntarily encountered the risk which caused the harm. Therefore, we will not disturb the trial court's finding of this factual question.
CAUSE OP THE INJURY
The School Board argues that the Fusiliers failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence the place where Keith was injured and what caused his ankle injury.
The trial court's determination of causation in a negligence action is a question of fact which is entitled to great weight and can not be disturbed unless it is clearly wrong. Charles v. Durand, 442 So.2d 916 (La.App. 3rd Cir.1983). In a civil action plaintiff has the burden to prove a controverted fact by a preponderance of the evidence. Proof by a preponderance of evidence is sufficient when the evidence, taken as a whole, shows that the fact sought to be proved is more probable than not. Schouest v. J. Ray McDermott & Co., Inc., 411 So.2d 1042 (La.1982); Jordan v. Travelers Ins. Co., 257 La. 995, 245 So.2d 151 (1971).
We can not say that the trial court was manifestly erroneous in its determination that a fallen portion of the hurricane fence hidden in the tall grass near the light pole was, more probably than not, the cause of Keith's injury; therefore, we will not disturb this finding.
For the foregoing reasons the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. All costs of this appeal are assessed against the appellants, Evangeline Parish School Board and Northbrook Excess & Surplus Insurance Company.
AFFIRMED.