Case Name: STIVERS v. BYRKETT
Court: Oregon Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Oregon
Decision Date: 1910-05-24
Citations: 56 Or. 565
Docket Number: 
Parties: STIVERS v. BYRKETT.
Judges: 
Reporter: Oregon Reports
Volume: 56
Pages: 565–575

Head Matter:
Argued April 27,
decided May 24;
rehearing denied June 28, 1910.
STIVERS v. BYRKETT.
[108 Pac. 1014; 109 Pac. 386.]
Judgment — Counterclaim—Failure to Reply — Mistakes—Surprise— Excusable Neglect.
1. Plaintiffs sued defendant on a note for the price of certain cattle and sheep August 30, 1906. On October 28th following the senior member of plaintiff's firm died, and on the 29th defendant answered pleading counterclaim for breach of warranty. On October 2, 1907, judgment was rendered in defendant’s favor on the pleadings for want of a reply, and on June 29, 1908, S. was appointed administrator of the deceased plaintiff with the will annexed, and moved to set aside the default judgment and for leave to reply. The surviving plaintiff knew of the counterclaim September 23, 1907, and that the trial of the case had been set for October 1st following, but took no steps to attend the trial or send his deposition, nor was there any showing made for a postponement. The surviving plaintiff made the sale, and had knowledge of all the facts with reference thereto, and advised plaintiffs’ attorney that the case, so far as plaintiff was concerned, would go by default as against a counterclaim, and the surviving widow also stated to the attorneys if a settlement could not be effected the matter should be dropped. Held, that the administrator was not entitled to a vacation of the judgment and leave to reply, on the ground that the judgment had been taken through mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect, as provided by Section 103, B. & C. Comp.
Abatement and Revival — Death of Party — Substitution of Administrator.
2. When a party to an action dies before the litigation is terminated, the action does not abate if the cause survives, under Sections 379, 380, B. & C. Comp., but the deceased’s personal representatives should be substituted under Section 38, providing that no action shall abate by the death of a party, and, in case of such death, the court may at any time within a year thereafter on motion allow the action to be continued for or against his personal representatives.
Abatement and Revival — Death of Party — Appearance of Administrator — Substitution.
3. Where one of the parties to an action dies pendente lite, his administrator with the will annexed has no right to appear therein unless he has either been substituted in the action or is entitled to be substituted and has applied for substitution within the year, provided by Section 38, B. & C. Comp.
Abatement and Revival — Death of Party — Substitution of Administrator.
4. Where one of the parties to an action dies pendente lite, the death may be suggested by either party, and a motion for substitution should be made by the party desiring to proceed with the action.
Judgment — Joint Judgment — Jurisdiction.
5. Section 61, B. & C. Comp., provides that if summons is served on one or more of the defendants, but not all, in an action on a joint liability, judgment may be entered against all the defendants jointly liable, so far only that it may be enforced against the joint property of all and the separate property of the defendants served. Held, that such section authorized a several judgment as to the defendants served, where there is a joint party over whom the court has not obtained jurisdiction, and hence, where, in an action by a firm, defendant pleaded a joint counterclaim, and the senior member of the firm died before the court obtained jurisdiction over him, and there was no substitution of his personal representatives, a judgment was properly rendered on the counterclaim against both plaintiffs so far as to be enforceable against the firm’s property and also a several judgment against the surviving partner.
Abatement and Revival — Joint or Joint and Several Debtors— Death of Joint Debtor — Effect—Motion to Vacate.
6. A judgment rendered against joint or joint and several debtors, where one of the debtors dies before the rendition of the judgment, is not void, but at most only irregular or erroneous.
Judgment — Irregular Judgment — Vacation—Time.
7. A judgment against joint or joint and several debtors after one of them had died, being irregular only and not void, the court had no jurisdiction to entertain a motion to set it aside, made after the term, except under Section 103, B. & C. Comp., authorizing the court in its discretion within a year after notice ol judgment to relieve a party therefrom, where it is taken against him through mistake, surprise, inadvertence, or excusable neglect.
Pleading — Answer—Piling—Service.
8. Section 81, B. & C. Comp., provides that the answer to the compalint shall be filed with the clerk by the time required to answer, and Section 73 declares that the answer shall contain a statement of new matter constituting a counterclaim, and that the reply must be filed by the 1st day of the next term of court, or, if filed in term time, then within one day after the filing of the answer. Held, that as to plaintiff, service of the answer containing a counterclaim is not required, but he is bound to take notice of the filing thereof within the time specified.
Evidence — Judicial Notice — Rules of Court.
9. The Supreme Court cannot take notice of the rules of the circuit courts unless brought before it by bill of exceptions.
From Multnomah: Calvin U. Gantenbein, Judge.
Statement by Mr. Justice Eakin.
This is an appeal from the order of the court denying a motion to vacate a judgment and for a leave to reply. J. H. Gilde and J. H. Gilde, Jr., partners, doing business as J. H. Gilde & Son, at Sacramento, California, on August 30, 1906, commenced an action in Multnomah County, Oregon, against A. It. Byrkett, to recover upon a promissory note the sum of $1,340, with interest. Thereafter, on October 28, 1906, plaintiff J. H. Gilde, Sr., died.
Defendant, on October 29,1906, answered the complaint by setting forth the contract constituting the consideration for the note, viz., that at Sacramento, California, plaintiffs sold to defendant, to be shipped to his farm in the State of Washington, eighteen head of cattle, at the price of $100 per head, represented by plaintiffs to be healthy, full-bred, registered Shorthorns, and forty-four sheep, represented to be full-bred, registered Shropshires, and not over two years old, for $340, certificate of such registration to be furnished by plaintiffs, showing the pedigree of each animal, and alleged that defendant paid $800 of the purchase price in cattle, which he sold to plaintiffs, and the note in question was given as the balance of the purchase price; that afterward defendant sold to plaintiffs two heifers for $150, which amount was to be credited on the note; that after the stock reached Portland, Oregon, defendant ascertained that three head of the cattle were affected with tuberculosis, and that the cattle were not- pure-bred Shorthorns, and many other breaches of the contract are alleged; and that defendant thereupon rescinded said contract, and pleads as a counterclaim various items of expense and damages suffered by him in consequence of plaintiffs’ breach, amounting to $3,216.59, together with the value of the cattle sold by defendant to plaintiffs, $950 — total $4,166.59; that, upon plaintiffs’ refusal to receive the stock, he sold it for $2,378.95, and credited the claim for that amount. The answer was served October 29,1906, on Edwin Mays, who was plaintiffs’ attorney in bringing the action. After-wards, on October 2, 1907, on motion of defendant, judgment was rendered in his favor upon the pleadings, for want of a reply.
On June 29, 1908, W. H. Stivers, the appointed administrator with will annexed of the estate of J. H. Glide, deceased, filed a motion, supported by affidavits, asking to have the judgment set aside, which is as follows:
“Now come W. H. Stivers, administrator with will annexed of the estate of J. H. Glide, deceased, and J. H. Glide, Jr., and based upon the annexed affidavits and the allegations contained in their proposed reply, move the court that the default judgment heretofore entered against J. H. Glide and J. H. Glide, Jr., on the 2d day of October, 1907, be set aside, and that said W. H. Stivers, as administrator as aforesaid, be made a party plaintiff herein, and that they be permitted to file a reply to the various answers filed herein, which said reply is tendered herewith.”
The motion was denied and plaintiffs appeal.
Affirmed.
For appellants there was a brief and an oral argument by Mr. Samuel B. Huston.
For respondent there was a brief over the names of Messrs. Dolph, Mallory, Simon &■ Gearin, with an oral argument by Mr. Rufus Mallory.

Opinion:
Mr. Justice Eakin
delivered the opinion of the court.
This motion was made under the provisions of Section 103, B. & C. Comp., to be relieved from a judgment taken against plaintiffs through their mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect. The facts set forth in the affidavit of J. H. Glide, Jr., disclose that he knew a counterclaim had been filed against plaintiffs, but that he did not know it was necessary to reply thereto; that he received notice September 23, 1907, that the trial of the cause had been set for October 1, 1907; that it was impossible for him to be at Portland, Oregon, at such time, for the reason that litigation was pending regarding his father's estate. But he states no facts from which the court can say that it was impossible for him to attend the trial or send his deposition. Nor was any showing made to the court for a postponement of the trial. It appears from his affidavit that he made the sales to defendant out of which this action arose, and therefore the knowledge of the facts, in relation to the matters being litigated, were within his knowledge; and, as shown by the affidavit of John F. Logan, who, with Robert Galloway, was acting as attorney for plaintiffs, J. H. Glide, Jr., advised them that the case, so far as plaintiff was concerned, would go by default, as against the counterclaim of Byrkett. The affidavit of Lizzie H. Glide, widow of the deceased, and executrix of his will, states that in March, 1907, she was asked by her attorneys what should be done in the case, and she advised Robert Galloway, her attorney, that she could not obtain any further particulars regarding the matter, and advised him that, if a settlement could not be effected, the matter be dropped. Her affidavit contains no statement of facts from which the court can say that it was impossible for her to attend to the litigation. Although she was not appointed executrix of the will until October 9, 1907, yet the will contest resulted in a decree July 30, 1907, and an administrator of the estate could have been appointed in Oregon at any time to appear in the action. These conditions establish that it was not an abuse of discretion for the lower court to deny the motion.
Counsel for plaintiffs, in his brief, urges that the judgment, so far as it relates to J. H. Glide, deceased, is void and should be vacated, at least as to him, and the reply filed. When a party to an action dies before the litigation is terminated, the action does not abate if the cause is one that survives under Sections 379 and 380, B. & C. Comp.
But the personal representative of deceased should be substituted under Section 38, B. & C. Comp., which provides that no action shall abate by the death of a party, and, in case of such death, the court may, at any time within one year thereafter, on motion, allow the action to be continued for or against his personal representatives. The administrator in this case, has no standing or right to appear therein unless he either has been substituted in the action or is entitled to be substituted, and this is part of the relief he seeks by this motion to vacate, but his application was not made within a year from the death of his testator, and comes too late. In Long v. Thompson, 34 Or. 359 (55 Pac. 978), it is held that the motion for substitution must be made within the year. To the same effect is Dick v. Kendall, 6 Or. 166. And in Barker v. Ladd, 3 Sawy. 44 (Fed. Cas. No. 990), it is held that this Section 38 is a statute of limitations, and if the right to move for substitution is not exercised within one year it is taken away: Matter of Borsdorff, 17 Abb. Pr. (N. Y.) 168, 171. Therefore the administrator has no standing to ask for substitution or to reply in the action.
The death may be suggested by either party, and the motion should be made by the party desiring to proceed with the action. 5 Enc. Pl. & Pr. 841.
Neither the motion, nor the affidavits, attacks the judgment, because it is void, nor is relief asked on that ground. If the judgment is void, as to plaintiff J. H. Glide, then it cannot be enforced against the estate of decedent; but it is not void as to J. H. Glide, Jr., although it purports to be a personal judgment against both plaintiffs, yet as to J. H. Glide, Jr., and the joint property, it is such an one as is provided for by Section 61, B. & C. Comp., viz., that if the summons is served on one or more of the defendants, but not all, in an action upon a joint liability, judgment may be entered against all the defendants jointly liable, so far only that it may be enforced against the joint property of all and the separate property of the defendants served. Although joint liabilities are not declared by our statute to be joint and several, as in the case in Missouri (Holton v. Towner, 81 Mo. 360), it does, by that section, provide for a several judgment as to the defendants served, in cáse there is a joint party over whom the court has not obtained jurisdiction. That statute will apply equally to pláintiffs where the judgment is obtained against them. In this case plaintiffs, being jointly liable upon a cause of action set up in the answer, and but one of them being subject to the jurisdiction of the court, judgment against the one is proper.
There was no error in denying the motion.
Affirmed.