Case Name: Leonard P. CONTELLA, Petitioner, v. Alice St. Onge CONTELLA and Walter J. Gallagher, Sheriff of Orange County, Florida, Respondents
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1990-02-01
Citations: 557 So. 2d 880
Docket Number: No. 89-2225
Parties: Leonard P. CONTELLA, Petitioner, v. Alice St. Onge CONTELLA and Walter J. Gallagher, Sheriff of Orange County, Florida, Respondents.
Judges: COWART, J., concurs and concurs specially with opinion.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 557
Pages: 880–885

Head Matter:
Leonard P. CONTELLA, Petitioner, v. Alice St. Onge CONTELLA and Walter J. Gallagher, Sheriff of Orange County, Florida, Respondents.
No. 89-2225.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
Feb. 1, 1990.
Rehearing Denied March 15, 1990.
Robert L. “Mac” McLeod, II, of Walton, Townsend & McLeod Palatka, for petitioner.
Andrea L. Cain and John M. Cain of Cain & Ewald, Orlando, for respondents.

Opinion:
HARRIS, Judge.
Leonard P. Contella petitions this court for a writ of habeas corpus. He contends that he was improperly denied the opportunity to prove at his contempt hearing that he lacked the present financial ability to comply with the court's support order in his dissolution of marriage case.
Judge Cornelius issued a rule to show cause directing Contella to show why he should not be held in indirect criminal contempt for willfully violating the court's support order. After an extended hearing the court found Contella had "willfully failed and refused" to comply with the order and that he "did affirmatively act to divest himself of assets and property with which he could have complied." The court also found Contella had in the past and at the time of the hearing the ability to comply with its order. The court then sentenced Contella to 179 days in jail but deferred the sentence for approximately two weeks in order to give Contella time to purge. The judge also continued the option to purge even after incarceration.
Contella moved for an emergency stay pending review and, in Judge Cornelius' absence, Judge Powell modified the terms of the previous order to require an additional hearing prior to incarceration pursuant to Cokonougher v. Cokonougher, 543 So.2d 460 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1989). When Con-tella failed to "purge", a subsequent hearing was held before Judge Kaney which resulted in the action herein being challenged. Judge Kaney found that the original Cornelius order held Contella in criminal contempt and that, therefore, additional testimony as to his present ability to pay would be irrelevant. Judge Kaney determined that since Contella failed to comply with the conditions of the deferred sentence for criminal contempt (compliance with the purge conditions), he should immediately begin serving his jail term. We agree.
Clearly Contella was brought before the Cornelius court to be tried for criminal contempt — not civil. Contella was so notified, given the requisite statement of his rights, and was represented at the hearing. The finding that Contella intentionally divested himself of assets in order to avoid his financial obligation to his family justified a finding of criminal contempt. See Bowen v. Bowen, 471 So.2d 1274 (Fla.1985). The finding of present ability to pay perhaps encouraged the court to pattern the sentence in a way to solve an ongoing domestic problem, but so far as the criminal contempt was concerned it was surplus-age. If the law imposes the obligation to enforce support orders upon the trial court, it must also give it the authority to pattern its orders to achieve that purpose. Having found criminal contempt the court could have punished Contella with straight jail time; it chose instead to encourage Contel-la to re-acquire the divested assets and meet his obligation to his family. If he could not re-acquire the assets then, and with no further ado, incarceration should proceed. No further hearing should be required. Contella is being punished not for his inability to pay support, but for his inability or unwillingness to right an intentional wrong.
While it is essential that a civil contempt order contain a purge provision, why is it wrong to pattern a criminal contempt order to include a purge provision when this might achieve a more desirable result? By facing a sure jail term, the respondent in such a case would be highly motivated to use his best efforts to correct the situation he deliberately brought about. Instead Contella argues that since the trial court gave him the privilege of purging (not at all necessary in this case) he must now be given the opportunity to show that he lacks the present ability to purge. His position is not unlike the young man who murders his parents and pleads for mercy because he is an orphan. He claims he cannot be jailed for his inability to provide the court-ordered support because he has voluntarily divested himself of the assets which would have provided that support.
Application DENIED.
COWART, J., concurs and concurs specially with opinion.
DAUKSCH, J., dissents with opinion.
.Here he is referring to the contempt hearing held before Judge Kaney in which Judge Kaney determined that Contella was in criminal contempt for failing to comply with the previous order of commitment for criminal contempt entered by Judge Cornelius.
. Although not entirely clear from the record, it appears that Contella transferred $274,108.69 to a third party trustee.
. Judge Cornelius had recused himself from further proceedings.
. See Baker v. State, 239 So.2d 153 (Fla. 1st DCA 1970). In Baker the appellate court found Baker in "direct contempt" for his failure to perform his assigned duties as appellate counsel. However the court gave him additional time to "purge" by properly performing his duties, taxed costs against him and deferred "further punitive action" to see how he complied with the purge provision.