Case Name: PONS et al. v. PONS
Court: Louisiana Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1914-04-27
Citations: 137 La. 25
Docket Number: No. 20553
Parties: PONS et al. v. PONS
Judges: 
Reporter: Louisiana Reports
Volume: 137
Pages: 25–51

Head Matter:
(68 South. 201)
No. 20553.
PONS et al. v. PONS
(April 27, 1914.
On the Merits, Nov. 30, 1914.
On Rehearing, April 26, 1915.)
(Syllabus by Editorial Staff.)
1. Insane Persons <&wkey;30 — Interdiction — Persons Liable — “Incapable oe Administering their Estates.”
As used in Rev. Oiv. Code, art. 422, providing that all persons who are “incapable of administering their estates” shall be liable to be interdicted, the words quoted, however definite and fixed their meaning in the abstract, become elastic and relative when applied to some particular state of facts; there being kinds and degrees of incapacity, some of which do not fall within such article.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Insane Persons, Cent. Dig. §§ 43, 45, 61; Dec. Dig. <&wkey;> 30.]
(Syllabus by the Court.)
On Rehearing.
2. Insane Persons &wkey;>30 — Interdiction — Judgment.
The law declares that “No person above the age of majority, who is subject to an habitual state of imbecility, insanity or madness, shall be allowed to take care of his own person and administer his own estate, although such person shall, at times, appear to have the possession of his reason,” and that “Not only lunatics and idiots are liable to be interdicted, but, likewise, all persons who, owing to any infirmity, are incapable of taking care of their persons and administering their estates,” and that, “Such persons shall be placed under the care of a curator,” etc. Hence, in a suit for interdiction, where the defendant is found to have been insane when the suit was brought, and to have so continued, the necessity for the interdiction arises from the obligation imposed on the court to comply with the law, and there should be judgment accordingly.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Insane Persons, Cent. Dig. §§ 43, 45, 61; Dec. Dig. <&wkey;
3. Insane Persons <&wkey;2 — Interdiction—Evidence.
Though the question to be determined, in a proceeding for interdiction, be whether the defendant was sane or insane when the proceeding was instituted, the evidence should not be confined to that moment, since light may be thrown upon such question by information as to defendant’s mental condition, on the day before, or at some other time, in the past, or as to his heredity ; but the inquiry for such information should be confined within reasonable limits, depending on the character of the case.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Insane Persons, Cent. Dig. §§ 4-10; Dec. Dig. <<&wkey;2.]
4. Insane Persons <&wkey;33 — Interdiction—Appeal — Exclusion oe Evidence — Expenses.
Where, in a suit for interdiction, because of alleged senile dementia, the existence of the malady is shown by the testimony of specialists and other medical practitioners, based upon information obtained, for the most part, through examinations made several months after the filing of the suit; but all testimony as to defendant’s condition, prior to the filing of the suit, is excluded, as irrelevant; and an offer is made to show, by numerous witnesses, that up to the filing of the suit defendant was competent to, and actually did, take care of her person and property, and appeared to be sane and normal, the case will be remanded in order that the excluded testimony, concerning defendant’s condition, of those who saw and dealt with her during the period anterior to the filing of the suit, may be weighed with the deductions, as to that condition, of those who had not seen her, but predicated those deductions upon her condition as they found it after the filing of the suit; for, though the interdiction must eventually be pronounced, it becomes important, where heavy expenses have been incurred, to ascertain whether a sufficient cause existed when the suit was filed, or whether it arose at a later period, and whether the mental shock, resulting from the suit, had the effect of developing, or making apparent, that which otherwise might have remained undeveloped and nonapparent.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Insane Persons, Cent. Dig. §§ 44-46, 48, 50, 51, 59; Dec. Dig. <&wkey;>33.]
O’Neill, J., dissenting.
(Additional Syllabus by Editorial Staf.)
5. Insane Persons <&wkey;30 — Interdiction — “Imbecility, Insanity, or Madness.”
As used iu Rev. Oiv. Code, art. 3S9, providing that no person above the age of majority who is subject to an habitual state of “imbecility, insanity or madness” shall be allowed to take care of his own person and administer his estate, though at times in apparent possession of his reason, the words quoted are translations of “d’imbécilité, de demence ou de fureur,” found in French text of the Codes of 1808 and 1825, and are the identical words of Code Napoleon, art. 489, which are held by the French commentators to be declaratory of what is, in reality, the one ground of interdiction, to wit, mental alienation consisting of absence of, or change in, the faculty of reasoning and discerning, and which renders the person incapable of taking care of himself and administering his affairs. '
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Insane Persons, Cent. Dig. §§ 43, 45, 61; Dec. Dig. <@^30.]
Appeal from Civil District Court, Parish of Orleans; T. C. W. Ellis, Judge.
Action by Josephine Pons, wife of Salvadore Ruiz, and others against Marie Madeline Pons, widow. From judgment for defendant, plaintiffs appeal.
Remanded.
Lazarus, Michel & Lazarus, of New Orleans (W. S. Parkerson, of New Orleans, of counsel), for appellants. P. L. Fourchy and Woodville & Woodville, all of New Orleans, for appellee.

Opinion:
On Motion to Dismiss Appeal.
PROVOSTY, J.
Nothing showing that the American Surety Company of New York, surety on the appeal bond, had qualified, under Act 41, p. 45, of 1894, and Act 71, p. 185, of 1904, to do business in this state, motion was made to dismiss the appeal for want of a proper bond; but on certiorari the proper proof of such qualification has now been furnished, and hence, the said motion to dismiss must be overruled.
The motion to dismiss the appeal is overruled.