Case Name: Louis CHARBONNET, III v. James J. HAYES, Respondent-Contestee, and Orleans Parish Democratic Executive Committee Nominal-Respondent
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1975-08-29
Citations: 318 So. 2d 917
Docket Number: No. 7297
Parties: Louis CHARBONNET, III v. James J. HAYES, Respondent-Contestee, and Orleans Parish Democratic Executive Committee Nominal-Respondent.
Judges: Before SAMUEL, REDMANN, LEM-MON, GULOTTA, STOULIG, BOU-TALL, SCHOTT and BEER, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 318
Pages: 917–923

Head Matter:
Louis CHARBONNET, III v. James J. HAYES, Respondent-Contestee, and Orleans Parish Democratic Executive Committee Nominal-Respondent.
No. 7297.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fourth Circuit.
Aug. 29, 1975.
Writ Refused Sept. 10, 1975.
Robert J. Ziblich, New Orleans, for Louis Charbonnet, III, contestant-appellee.
Ronald J. Rakosky, New Orleans, for James J. Hayes, and others, respondents-contestees.
Peter J. Castaño, Associate Trial Counsel, New Orleans, for petitioner-contestant.
Before SAMUEL, REDMANN, LEM-MON, GULOTTA, STOULIG, BOU-TALL, SCHOTT and BEER, JJ.

Opinion:
BOUT ALL, Judge.
Louis Charbonnet, III, as an elector and a candidate for the office of Representative from the Ninety-Sixth Legislative District of Louisiana, brought suit under LSA-R.S. 18:396 objecting to the candidacy of James J. Hayes for that office, contending that Hayes was not qualified to be a candidate because he was not actually domiciled in Legislative District 96 for the full year preceding the time of qualification. After trial, the District Court found that Hayes "was not acutally domiciled for the preceding year in Legislative District Ninety-Six" and rendered judgment in the contestant's favor, enjoining the Orleans Parish Democratic Executive Committee from certifying Hayes as a candidate. Hayes appeals. We affirm.
The controlling principle of law is that set out in Louisiana Constitution of 1974, Article III, § 4(A), as follows:
"Section 4. (A) Age; Residence; Domicile. An elector who at the time of qualification as a candidate has attained the age of eighteen years, resided- in the state for the preceding two years, and been actually domiciled for the proceeding year in the legislative district from which he seeks election is eligible for membership in the legislature."
The Louisiana Civil Code furnishes the following definition of domicile:
"Art. 38. The domicile of each citizen is in the parish wherein he has his principal establishment.
"The principal establishment is that in which he makes his habitual residence; if he resides alternately in several places, and nearly as much in one as in another, and has not declared his intention in the manner hereafter prescribed, any one of the said places where he resides may be considered as his principal establishment, at the option of the persons whose interests are thereby affected."
Our courts have frequently interpreted the meaning of the word "domicile". We refer to a number of cases in which the "domicile" or "principal establishment" has been jurisprudentially restated to be "the principal domestic establishment". Zinko v. Zinko, 204 La. 478, 15 So.2d 859 (1943); Mosely v. Dabezies, 142 La. 256, 76 So. 705 (1917); Hyman, Lichtenstein & Co. v. Schlenker & Hirsch, 44 La.Ann. 108, 10 So. 623 (1892); Succession of Franklin, 7 La.Ann. 395 (1852). This is based upon where a person sleeps, takes his meals, has established his household, and surrounds himself with his family and the comforts of domestic life. In establishing domicile, intent is based on actual state of facts and not what one declares them to be. Successions of Rhea, 227 La. 214, 78 So.2d 838 (1955).
We also note a number of cases involving candidates for election. However, most of these cases involve requirements of "residence" not "domicile". We refer to the case of Hall v. Godchaux, 149 La. 733, 90 So. 145 (1921) involving an interpretation of the phrase "actual bona fide resident". See also Melerine v. Democratic Parish Executive Committee, 164 La. 855, 114. So. 711 (1927). We also refer to the case of Brown v. Democratic Committee, Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, 238 So.2d 48 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1970) wherein we considered only residence.
We relate the above because the new Constitution of 1974 in Article III, § 4(A) sets out for the first time a requirement of being "actually domiciled" in the legislative district. In the previous constitutional provision, Art. 3, § 9 of the Constitution of 1921, the requirement was that a representative candidate be an "actual resident". See Stavis v. Engler, 202 So.2d 672 (La.App.1967) and McIntire v. Carpenter, 202 So.2d 297 (La.App.1967).
The substitution of the word "domiciled" for "resident" effects a considerable change in the requirements of candidacy. Additionally, we do not consider the inclusion of the word "actually" to be a mere surplusage or a redundacy because some act of residing has always been required for establishment of domicile. We consider that the framers of our present constitution intended to ensure that a candidate seeking to represent the people of a district does truly live amongst those people and does not simply establish a domicile by declaration of intentions accompanied by some minimum acts of residence. As we see it, the constitution requires adherence to the factual concept of habitual residence and principal establishment, and, where a person resides alternately in several places, he is only qualified for election purposes in that place where he maintains bona fide living quarters in which he actually lives a substantial part of the time. It emphasizes the facts of living in a place, rather than simply maintaining a bedroom elsewhere which one may occasionally retire to. The determination of actual domicile is dependent on the facts in each particular case. The burden of proof is upon the contestant.
With these principles before us, we proceed to a consideration of the facts herein.
The pertinent period with which we are vitally concerned is the year precedent to August 4, 1975. The contestant concedes that Hayes actually resided in the 96th District until August, 1973. Prior to this time, Hayes, who is a 40 year old bachelor, had an apartment on Ursulines Street, but he testified that he lived with his mother nearby on N. Robertson Street. Both premises are within the District. In August, 1973 Hayes gave up his apartment on Ursulines and moved into an apartment at Smith Hall, 2101 Louisiana Avenue, on August 15, 1973. This apartment house is outside the 96th District. Hayes entered into successive leases on this apartment, the last from May, 1974 to May, 1975. This lease was cancelled by agreement on September 30, 1974 because Hayes, in his capacity as organizer for the Southern Region of the National Tenants Organization, went to Alabama to help organize a group there from October 12, 1974 to the weekend preceding Mardi Gras, Feb. 11, 1975. Thus we are primarily concerned with the narrow issue of whether the actual domicile of Hayes during the period August 5, 1974, to the first part of October, 1974, was at his mother's apartment on N. Robertson St. or his apartment on Louisiana Ave.
We believe a fair evaluation of the evidence leads to a preponderance establishing the actual domicile on Louisiana Avenue. Although Hayes testified that he always lived mainly at his mother's, he could not or would not attempt to say what the extent of his living there amounted to. His mother and a neighbor, Mrs. Queen, gave testimony that he lived there most of the time. Unfortunately they failed to reckon with Hayes' admitted absence from the State of Louisiana from October, 1974 to Mardi Gras weekend, 1975, and testified Hayes was there daily, Mrs. Queen for the entire period and Mrs. Hayes for approximately half. There were a number of conflicts in the testimony of these ladies with other testimony such that the trial judge could have made a credibility decision and disbelieved all of their testimony.
However we place more importance on the credibility of Hayes testimony. His testimony is to the effect that although he leased the Louisiana Avenue apartment from August 15, 1973 to September 30, 1974, he seldom used it, but held it for the convenience of friends, most from out of town, who might call upon him for a place to stay — this, at a monthly rental of $151.-00 on an income of an estimated $1400.00 during the entire time of rental.
Our reading of the record is that the trial judge made a credibility evaluation of the testimony of Hayes, his mother and Mrs. Queen, and gave little weight to their testimony. We accept this credibility call.
At the same time, the record shows sufficient evidence to support the trial judge's finding and preponderates in favor of a Louisiana Avenue domicile. The testimony of the building superintendent, Oliver B. Thompson, Assistant Administrator of Flint-Goodrich Hospital, is to the effect that Hayes actually lived in that apartment. He received his mail there and had his telephone there. Eric Coleman testified that Hayes did not live at his mother's house but lived elsewhere. The testimony of Peter Castaño, although suspect standing alone, nevertheless corroborates the testimony of these witnesses.
We believe the evidence on the whole shows that Hayes used his mother's address simply as a matter of convenience and to maintain a "political domicile" while he was "actually domiciled" on Louisiana Avenue in August and September, 1974. We find no error in the decision of the trial court.
The judgment appealed from is affirmed at appellant's costs.
Affirmed.
REDMANN, LEMMON and GULOT-TA, JJ., dissent.
MORIAL, J., recused.
. We are informed that the official document contains the word "preceding".