Case Name: William B. Smith, v. The Times Publishing Company, Alexander K. McClure and Frank McLaughlin, Appellants
Court: Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
Jurisdiction: Pennsylvania
Decision Date: 1897-01-04
Citations: 178 Pa. 481
Docket Number: Appeal, No. 212
Parties: William B. Smith, v. The Times Publishing Company, Alexander K. McClure and Frank McLaughlin, Appellants.
Judges: Before Sterrett, C. J., Green, Williams, McCollum, Mitchell, Dean and Fell, JJ.
Reporter: Pennsylvania State Reports
Volume: 178
Pages: 481–533

Head Matter:
William B. Smith, v. The Times Publishing Company, Alexander K. McClure and Frank McLaughlin, Appellants.
Practice, 8. C. — Assignments of error — Charge—Bill of exceptions.
The filing of the stenographer’s notes of the charge, and the printing of the charge in the paper-book will not make it part of the record. In order that assignments to it may be considered, it must affirmatively appear that the filing was the act of the judge himself, or by his express direction, evidenced by his signature either to the charge itself or to the bill of exceptions : Janney v. Howard, 150 Pa. 339, explained and definitively overruled so far as it appears to give countenance to anything beyond a charge properly filed: Pool v. White, 171 Pa. 500; Commonwealth v. Arnold, 161 Pa. 327; Hill v. Egan, 160 Pa. 119; Connell v. O’Neil, 154 Pa. 582, followed.
Constitutional law — Trial by jury — Act of May 20, 1891.
The meaning of section 6 of article I. of the constitution of Pennsylvania which provides that trial by jury shall be as heretofore, and the right thereof remain inviolate ” is that as to all matters which were the subject of jury trials at the date of the constitution, the right which is to remain inviolate is to a jury “ as heretofore” of twelve men who shall render a unanimous verdict.
Trial by jury is by twelve free and lawful men for the purpose of establishing the truth of the matter in issue. Any legislation which merely points out the mode of arriving at this object, but does not rob it of any of its essential ingredients cannot be considered an infringement of the right. The constitutional provision as to jury trials does not extend to changes of the preliminaries, or of the minor details, or to subsequent steps between verdict and judgment.
Section 6 of article I. of the constitution of Pennsylvania which provides “ that trial by jury shall be as heretofore, and the right thereof remain inviolate,” is not infringed by the act of May 20, 1891, P. L. 101, which neither changes nor denies the right of trial by jury, but simply declares that “ the Supreme Court shall have power in all cases to affirm, reverse, amend or modify a judgment, order or decree appealed from, and to enLor such judgment, order or decree in the case as the Supreme Court may deem proper and just, without returning the record for amendment or modification to the court below, and may order a verdict and judgment set aside, and a new trial had.”
In this 'case the Supreme Court set aside a verdict and judgment for $15,000 in favor of the plaintiff in a libel suit against the publisher of 'a newspaper, as disproportionate to the offense, but deemed it inexpedient to fix an amount and to give the plaintiff the choice to accept it, or take the chances of a new trial.
Dean, J., concurred in the decision in this case, but dissented from so much of the opinion of the court as held the act of May 20, 1891, constitutional.
Sterrett, C. J., also filed a concurring opinion.
Argued. Jan. 28, 1896.
Appeal, No. 212, July T., 1895, by defendant, from judgment of C. P. No. 3, Pbila, Co., Sept. T., 1892, No. 549, on verdict for plaintiff.
Before Sterrett, C. J., Green, Williams, McCollum, Mitchell, Dean and Fell, JJ.
Reversed.
/Sterrett, C. J., and Dean, J., concurred in the decision, but the former also favored sustaining the fourth assignment of >error, and the latter favored reversing on the fourth assignment of error alone, and dissented from so much of the opinion of the court as held the act of May 20, 1891, constitutional.
Trespass for libel. Before Gordon, J.
The alleged libelous matter was contained in two articles, published in the “Times” on the second and third days of October, 1892, and offered in evidence. The libelous part is sufficiently .quoted in the charge of the court.
During the progress of the trial Mr. Shields, counsel for plaintiff, said: “We challenge the defendants to prove the article and justify it if they will.”
Mr. Rothermel: “ Fortunately we are hi a position in which that is not necessary, as Mr. Smith has proved the truth of it himself while upon the stand.”
The Court: “ It comes down, then, to the same point, as counsel alleges that the article is true.”
Mr. Rothermel: “ I will ask for an exception to that remark.” Exception granted. [4]
The court charged in part as follows:
The plaintiff, William B. Smith, seeks at your hands damages for a libel alleged to have been published by. the defendants, injurious to his character, and hurtful to his reputation as a man, a citizen, and a neighbor. He alleges that this wrong was done him while he was a private citizen, and that it was done maliciously, wickedly, and wrongfully, and with the specific intent to injure and defame him. The defendants are the publishers and the editor of a newspaper published in this city. The publication complained of was made in the defendants’ journal on the second and third days of October, 1892. . . .
The publication complained of by this plaintiff related to the acts of a private citizen, and in making them the subject of a printed statement, the defendants in this «ase had no shield of privilege; and in the first instance, therefore, I charge you that the matter complained of as libelous was not a subject of “privilege.” The simple question, or questions, therefore, for you to determine, is whether the publication was true or not, and whether it was injurious to the character of the plaintiff; whether it was defamatory to his reputation. If it was, then it is a libel, and he is entitled to recover a verdict at your hands.
The plaintiff alleges also that this libel was published with express malice, and with the intent to injure him, to work him harm, to make his character a subject of contempt and hatred, and to cause him to be believed to be guilty of a criminal offense. The. effgct of this allegation of express malice I will elaborate later on — for the present I will merely say that if established it is a matter for which the jury may impose additional damages in computing the. injuries sustained. The first thing which you will consider is whether the published matter for which the plaintiff seeks, redress at your hands'was-true or not. If it was true then there was no libel and there can be no verdict for the plaintiff. If it was untrue,,if it was false, then the verdict must be for him.
The nature of the defense in this case, as raised by the defendants’ own plea, is such that the question of the truth or falsity of the publication has a peculiar and limited relation to the. defense itself; but I say to you generally that for a libel such as that complained of by this plaintiff there can be no defense which will defeat his right to a verdict except proof of the substantial truth of all the substantial matters contained in the publication.
The law bearing upon the question of damages I shall state to you at length in that part of my charge wherein I refer to the facts. For the present, however, I will state these two pro-, positions: That if the matter is found by you to be libelous the plaintiff would be entitled, first, to compensation for the injury which he has suffered; and next, if you should find from the evidence in the case that the libel was published with the express intent to defame and harm him in his character and reputation, or, to use the language of his complaint in this case, if you should find that the publication was made wickedly, maliciously, and wrongfully, intending to injure him then you have a right, to award him such additional damages as you may think the circumstances of the case justify by way of example and punishment for such wanton abuse of the liberty of publication.
In a case such as this there may be two defenses, one that the matter published is true, and therefore not libelous. This defense is called justification, and when it is intended to be relied upon by a defendant it must be pleaded specially, so that the plaintiff may know when he comes into court that he must establish the untruth of the charges. Second, another defense which may be set up is a denial of the publication of the alleged libel. This defense involves either that the defendants did not publish the matter complained of, or that the matter complained of was not libelous in that it did not defame the plaintiff in the manner and form alleged. In the present case the defendants have entered a plea of “ not guilty,” and this plea therefore confines this defense, upon the question of libel or not, to whether the printed matter was defamatory of the character of the plain tiff, as alleged by Mm, and was published by the defendants. In other words, the defendants do not plead, by way of defense, that the libelous matter is true, but that they did not publish the libelous matter. This brings up the question of the tendency and meamng of the publication itself.
The plaintiff, in Ms statement filed, has not only set out the language of the publication, but has averred also the meaning and effect of the words as published, or, in technical legal language, he has accompanied the words with an innuendo; the innuendoes contain plaintiff’s allegation of the effect of the publication whereby it is alleged to be libelous. It is this that the defendants’ plea denies, that is, it denies that a libel, as alleged by the plaintiff, was published by them, and does not assert that the words with their innuendoes were true.
Evidence has been introduced by the defendants tending to establish the truth of some of the facts contained in the entire article as published in the paper, but only with the avowed purpose, as stated by counsel, of mitigating the damages which you should give the plaintiff if you should find the article to be libelous. Such evidence could, under the plea, only have been admitted for this purpose, and as I shall explain to you later in my charge, when you come to consider it, you will regard it only to the extent limited by the purpose for which it has been offered.
[Where a defendant, charged with libel, justifies the publication by pleading its truth, such a defense, if not established, may be considered by the jury as a reason for imposing additional damages for the persistence in asserting as true that which is failed to be proved.] [3] . . .
The plaintiff in this case has offered in evidence the newspapers which contain the alleged libel, and he has in his pleading set out the particular parts of the publication wMch he says are untruthful, injurious, and libelous, and I will read these to you first without the innuendoes, and then with the innuendoes which are contained in his declaration. Let me say that I do. not intend to go fully into all the facts in this case. I do not think it is called for. Nevertheless, I wish to leave nothing of substance uncovered by my charge, for I do not wish that any one may be able to complain justly that the court has not treated with judicial fairness and fullness every proper matter in the cause.
Tbe libelous matter alleged in tbe declaration or statement of the plaintiff is as follows : “ The dandy Mayor skips. Col. William B. Smith shakes Philadelphia dust from his feet. A sudden flight to the West. His legacy of bogus checks, protested notes, and bad debts. Escaping prosecution. The gallant colonel is at .last overwhelmed by his financial irregularities and dares not wait to meet the issue. Overwhelmed with debt, ex-Mayor William B. Smith suddenly shook the dust of Philadelphia from his feet this week and started West, leaving behind a legacy of bogus checks, protested notes, and broken contracts. This time the gallant colonel left for good. It was on Wednesday that his ill-omened star westward took its way.” Those are the libelous words contained in the article first published complained of by this plaintiff. In his declaration he avers that those words conveyed to those who read them, and reasonably might convey, a certain meaning injurious to his character, and he has set out what he says those meanings were in the paper filed by him in the cause. Now let me read you the same words with the allegation of what.they mean, and what effect they had upon those who read them: “ The dandy Mayor skips.” “ Thereby,” says the plaintiff, “ meaning that the said plaintiff was a fugitive from justice, and had left the city of Philadelphia for the purpose of escaping prosecution for crimes and offenses committed by him against the law.” “ Col. William B. Smith shakes Philadelphia dust from his feet. A sudden flight to the West,” “thereby meaning that the said plaintiff had fled from the city of Philadelphia for the purpose of escaping prosecution for crimes and offenses against the law Committed by him.” “ His legacy of bogus checks,” “ thereby meaning fraudulent and unlawful checks for the payment of money drawn upon banks by the said plaintiff for the purpose of obtaining money by means of false pretenses and with the intent to cheat and defraud.” “Protested notes and bad debts. Escaping prosecution,” “ thereby meaning that the said plaintiff had committed crimes and offenses against the law and by a sudden flight had escaped legal prosecution by arrest and indictment for the same.”
And so", gentlemen, as to the other parts which I read to you, there are similar innuendoes alleged; that is, averments that the words meant that he had been guilty of crimes, that he hacl passed fraudulent and unlawful checks for dishonest purposes, and had gone away to escape the criminal consequence of his acts. On the day following the publication complained of in the manner I have read, there appeared another article, a part of which I will read to you, as contained in the plaintiff’s declaration. I will read it first without the innuendoes alleged by the plaintiff, and then I will state to you the innuendoes. “ Billy’s last grab. The dandy Mayor would let nobody escape this time. Colonel Smith’s autograph as a legacy to his fellow citizens. A trained sharper’s great work. Before he emigrated to the West, the enterprising colonel gathered in all the money that was not chained down, and his friends say that his bad debts will run into many thousands. The sudden emigration of ex-Mayor William B. Smith has caused more excitement in the way of talk about bogus checks and bad debts than this town has known since the dandy Mayor’s great grab-game administration. There are those who contemplate his latest move without reflecting that they are out of pocket, but they seem to be the ones with whom the enterprising colonel had not succeeded in striking up an acquaintance. Everybody else is in mourning. Colonel Smith’s list of acquaintances possessing more or less boodle was something that would appall an ordinary sharper, but with a majority of them the irrepressible ‘ Billy,’ as the boys jocularly greet him, seems to have maintained himself upon a negotiable footing to the last. The story of his sudden departure last Wednesday for the West, as published in the Times yesterday, was the sensation of the day. With the bogus checks, protested notes, broken contracts, and bad debts which he left behind as a legacy to the city that had proudly elevated him to its chief magistracy, hundreds were plastered, yet, as showing the wonderful popularity of the man, there are few who exhibited heated indignation over the matter, and many of the victims expressed the hope that where-ever he might go he would continue to do well. It all seemed like corroboration of Barnum’s theory that people like to be humbugged. Some of the remarks made by the Sunday pedestrians, who always halt at the Times bulletin board, were especially instructive. Everybody seemed to know Billy Smith, and they invariably expressed the greatest delight over the announcement of his greatest exploit. One individual rubbed his hands and gleefully remarked to" his companion,- ‘ I’ve said all along that Smithy would come out ahead.’ The house he rented. One man of some anxiety as to the colonel’s abrupt departure was conveyancer Daniel H. Buck, from whom he had rented the house he recently occupied, at 1426 Mt. Vernon Street, acting as an agent for Grant Megargee, the owner of the property. Colonel Smith leased the house for one year, and had occupied it only seven months, so that a claim can be made against him for five months’ rent. Mr. Buck was on the point of writing to him to call at his office and settle existing accounts when he learned of his flight. To-day he expects to make an inspection of the house in order to see if there is any furniture in it. The neighbors say that Colonel Smith moved a lot of furniture into the house last Spring and they have not seen any of it come out. They think, however, that it has been pretty thoroughly levied upon by various people. One of the neighbors said last night that she saw Colonel Smith and his wife take their departure on Wednesday morning. First, the gallant colonel came to the door and made a reconnoissance, after which he boldly issued upon the steps with a huge valise in his hands. Mrs. Smith followed him, carrying a hand bag. They walked rapidly in the direction of the Broad Street Station. Their daughter had gone on the previous night to Germantown, where she will live with the parents of her husband, who is dead. Their son, a bright young man of twenty, is living down town where he is employed.”
You will understand, gentlemen of the jury, that what I have read to you does not contain the entire article as published, but the matter complained of as libelous, some of it being in the headline at the top, some of it being by way of introduction, some of it being by way of subheading, and some of it being in the body of the articles. That which I have read you he avers in his statement to have been intended to convey the idea that this man had committed a crime and was running away to escape the law; that he was running away to escape criminal prosecution: that the words “bogus checks,” “sudden flight to the West,” “escaping prosecution,” “dare not meet the issue,” “financial irregularity,” and other expressions that I have read, all taken together or singly were intended and did convey the meaning that this man was guilty of criminal dis honesty or fraud, and that he had gone from Ms home, and gone for good, in order that the criminal law" might not reach him and punish him for his crimes.
You will have the two papers containing these articles out with you. They have all been read in evidence. It is for you to consider their meaning. You twelve men of average intelligence are asked, from your own reading of these articles, to say what was the reasonable meaning attached to those words. Do they accuse William B. Smith of committing crimes for which he was liable to prosecution, and that he had fled because of those crimes and to escape the legal result? If you find such a meaning, and that is for you, your verdict in tMs case must be for the plaintiff.
The defendants’ plea does not aver that that meaning is true. They say the words hadn’t that meaning, and, therefore, I say at the door of this case, before you go a step further, and as decisive of your verdict, you must say what the reasonable construction of those words is — considering the whole article, the appearance of it, the manner in which it is printed — and if you find that the averment of the plaintiff is true, and that those words did convey the meaning that he had committed crime for wMeh he was fleeing from this jurisdiction, your verdict must be for Mm.
The defense in this ease, as I have said, is a dernal that that was the meaning of the words. If you find, after reading all these articles, that that was not the meaning, that no part of them meant or could mean that, to those who read the article, of course your verdict should be for the defendant, because if those words did not mean that thing, if those words did not accuse him of crime and thus did not expose him to hatred, ridicule, contempt, and defamation of character, then there is no libel; but if they did make that accusation, then your verdict must be for him.
If you should find those facts in his favor, then you would be brought to consider the question of damages. What are the damages to which, if you find this publication to be a libel he is entitled? He is entitled to compensation. By the word “ compensation ” is meant in law that wlfich men ordinarily mean by it. Compensation is that wMch makes one whole, one thing for another, and if you find the publication to be a libel in tlie way I have stated, if you find that publication was a libel, then he is entitled to recover, first, compensation for any damages he has suffered in his character, reputation, peace, and happiness by reason of such defamation, and the determination of that question is for you.
The defendants in this case presented evidence up to the time when they left the court room, began the presentation of evidence, first, to show the truth of some of the statements of this alleged libel, and they offered the truth, admitted by them, only in mitigation of damages, because, as I have said, in not having put the truth of the alleged libel in issue by their plea, they can only afterwards set it up to mitigate the damages. When they endeavored, for any purpose, to establish the truth of this publication, it became a matter for your consideration, and you will say whether the facts testified to from the witness stand justify or prove to any extent the truth of the allegation in the libelous matter. If they did, you can consider that, and ought to, in determining the amount of damage, but only to that extent. When for any purpose a defendant in libel endeavors to establish the truth, he must establish the substantial truth, in order to prevent the recovery of a verdict.
The defendants also, up to the time when they left the court room, had introduced some evidence intended to show that this plaintiff was a man of bad character for honesty and integrity. The weight of that testimony is for you. The plaintiff, on the other hand, called a number of witnesses this morning in rebuttal, to show that his character for integrity and honesty was good. The introduction of this testimony on the part of the defendants, as to his honesty, was also only for the purpose of mitigating or reducing the amount ofiyour verdict if you should find the publication libelous, and it can only have that effect; but in order that you should for this reason reduce your finding from what it otherwise would be, you must be satisfied from what they did establish that this man had a general character in the community for honesty and probity.which was bad. [If it does not satisfy you of that which they endeavored to establish, to wit, that he had a bad general character for honesty, you may take into consideration, in fixing the amount of damages, the fact that on the trial they endeavored to establish that he had a bad character, and failed, if they did fail, in so establishing it.] [5]
Let me say to you, character in this view of the law is the general estimation of men. Good character is the one thing which we all strive to build up, and which probably is the dearest possession of humanity. It is that which sweetens life and makes it happy, and the deprivation of which is probably the severest calamity which could happen to man. Unlike substantial and material things which we might possess to-day and lose to-morrow, and possess again, character has in it those elements which, when it is destroyed, makes it almost impossible of subsequent rehabilitation. It is because of the injury to his character that this plaintiff seeks damages at your hands, and if he has been libeled he is entitled to your verdict. [And if the defendants have sought to prove that his character was bad, and have failed, you may consider the fact that they have persisted in impugning his character, and done so without sufficient evidence, if you should so find.] [6]
The plaintiff also says that these publications were malicious and intended; that the injury was intended and expressly and deliberately done; in other words, that there was express malice. Look at it, read it, consider it in all its details and make-up, and if you should find it libelous, say whether it bears upon its face the evidence of malicious purpose. By malice is meant ill will, an injurious intent towards a person, a specific desire to injure. If you find it in the article itself, then that is called intrinsic or inherent evidence. In addition to that the plaintiff says there is extrinsic evidence of malice outside of the article, and he took the stand and testified to you that some years before these articles were published he had an interview, which he detailed, with the editor of this newspaper, in which a conversation took place respecting committees of councils, and the plaintiff says after he was requested by this editor to retain a certain person as chairman of the railroad committee and declined, he was threatened thereafter with punishment in his political life, and that he would be driven from the city. You are asked to find from that express and deliberate malice. The editor of the paper took the witness stand and denied that he used that threat. He admitted having a conversation with the plaintiff, and that the conversation generally related to the subject of the composition of-committees of council over which Mr. Smith had been elected to preside. He denied, however, that he had used any language containing threafe. It is for you to say which of those two persons you will believe. You have heard them, you saw them upon the stand, you observed their manner, and their credibility is for you. If you believe the plaintiff, that such a threat was made, it would be evidence of express malice from which you might find the continuance of a desire to do him wrong; but whether you believe him, or whether you believe the editor who denied making that threat, is entirely for you. Those two persons on the witness stand are simply two sworn witnesses, to be judged by the same rules that every other witness is to be judged by, to be given the same fair treatment -with absolute impartiality, and it is for you to say which one is to be believed and which to be disbelieved.
[If you find there was express malice — and I leave that ¿ntirely to you — if you find there was express malice or any wantonness in this attack which would amount to a reckless disregard of consequences, you would be entitled to also give this plaintiff, if you should find the articles libelous, an additional sum by way of example and punishment for the wrong which has been done him; to give what is called exemplary damages, and I want to read to you a very brief definition of what exemplary damages are, a definition from a text book of approved authority. “ The generalrule is, that when the injury has been inflicted maliciously or wantonly or with circumstances of contumely or indignity, the jury are not restricted to actual damages, but may give such damages in addition thereto as the circumstances of the case seem to warrant, to deter others from like offenses.” Such is what exemplary damages are. In this case, if you find express malice, you may add such damages to your verdict in addition to compensation.] [11]
Now, gentlemen of the jury, I don’t mean to go over this evidence any further. I leave it, as I leave all the case, to you for your determination. The law I have explained. Be governed by that implicitly. As I have said, if I have made a mistake in that, I can be corrected. You follow the law as I have given it to you, and consider the facts being governed by the law. [If you believe this article was not libelous in that it did not say the things of the plaintiff which he alleges it did say, and with the meaning which he alleges, then your verdict should be for the defendants ; but if you find it did contain the meaning which he alleges and was injurious to him, find a verdict for him and fix the damages under the instructions I have given you — first, for compensation; next, and only then, for exemplary damages, if you should find that there was express malice, wantonness, and an intent to injure him specifically.] [9] [Letime beg you to consider this case as one of solemn obligation, and to render such a verdict as will satisfy the ends of justice. The plaintiff has fixed his damages in his statement at the sum of $50,000. That is the utmost limit towards which you may go. But between this amount and the smallest sum your discretion is absolute.] [10] Consider its importance, its importance to this man, its importance to these defendants, and let your verdict be rendered without fear and without favor. This is a court of justice, and you and I and those learned gentlemen who represent the parties, are all officers sworn to perform our duties with integrity, and let us perform them with integrity, without fear, and without partiality, so that what we do shall redound to the promotion of justice, to the promotion of good order, and to social welfare.
Verdict and judgment for plaintiff for $45,000. Defendants appealed.
jErrors assigned were .(1) the verdict was excessive; (2) the court below erred in not setting aside the verdict as excessive; (8, 5, 6, 9, 10, 11) portions of charge as above, quoting them; (4) ruling on remark of counsel as above; (7, 8) that the charge was defective as a whole; (12) that the trial judge erred in refusing defendants’ motion to instruct the official stenographer to place upon his notes the remarks of counsel; (13) that the trial judge erred in not granting the defendants’ motion to withdraw a juror,- and' continue the case, and in’ declining' to hear, or permit the filing of reasons for such motion.
The record did not show that the stenographer’s notes of the charge had been filed by the direction of the trial judge.
P. F. Rothermel, Jr., with him James H. Shakespeare, for appellants.
The act of May 20, 1891, is constitutional: Baker v. Madison, 62 Wis. 137; Abbott v. Tolliver, 71 Wis. 64; Waterman v. Railroad, 82 Wis. 613; McCarthy v. Niskern, 22 Minn. 90; Woodward v. Glidden, 33 Minn. 108; Gunderson v. Elevator Co., 47 Minn. 161; Haynes v. Trenton, 108 Mo. 123; Gurley v. R. R., 104 Mo. 211; Furnish v. R. R., 102 Mo. 438; R. R. v. Brown, 26 Kan. 443; R. R. v. Peavey, 29 Kan. 170; Upcher v. Oberlender, 50 Kan. 315; Kelly v. McDonald, 39 Ark. 387; Fordyce v. Jackson, 56 Ark. 594; Fordyce v. Nix, 58 Ark. 136; R. R. Co. v. Sponier, 85 Ind. 165; Turnpike Co. v. Andrews, 102 Ind. 138; Howard County v. Legg, 110 Ind. 479; R. R. v. Finlayson, 16 Neb. 578; Orleans v. Perry, 24 Neb. 831; Meharrey v. Halligan, 29 Neb. 565; Collins v. Council Bluffs, 35 Iowa, 432; Rose v. R. R. 39 Iowa, 246; Cooper v. Mills County, 69 Iowa, 350.
The filing of a plea of justification and the failure to convince the jury of the truth thereof is only evidence of malice when it is maliciously filed, and the question of the bona fides of the filing thereof is for the jury: Pallet v. Sergent, 36 N. H. 496; Ward v. Dick, 47 Conn. 300; Parke v. Blackiston, 3 Harr. 373; In New York, by statute; In Massachusetts, by statute; Rayner v. Kinney, 14 Ohio, 283; Byrket v. Monohon, 7 Blackford, 83; Henderson v. Fox, 83 Ga. 233; Thomas v. Dunnaway, 30 Ill. 373; In Michigan, hy statute; In Wisconsin, by statute; Lowe v. Herald, 6 Utah, 175; Shortel v. Hutchinson, 3 Ore. 337; Gorman v. Sutton, 32 Pa. 247; Updegrove v. Zimmerman, 13 Pa. 619; Howard v. Thomson, 1 Am. Leading Cases, 178; Dewit v. Greenfield, 5 Ohio, 225; Rush v. Cavenaugh, 2 Pa. 190.
It is error for the trial judge to call the attention of the jury in- detail and at length to the evidence on one side of the case without going equally into the evidence on the other: Peirson v. Duncan, 162 Pa. 187; Burke v. Maxwell, 81 Pa. 139; Herstine v. R. R. 151 Pa. 244; Schwenk v. Kehler, 122 Pa. 67; Reber v. Herring, 115 Pa. 599; R. R. Co. v. Enches, 127 Pa. 316; Reichenbach v. Ruddach, 127 Pa. 564.
The charge on the subject of damages was erroneous; Neeb v. Hope, 111 Pa. 145; 1 Sedgwick on Damages, 546; W. St. L. & P. R. R. v. Rector, 104 Ill. 296; Snow v. Carpenter, 49 Vt. 426; Kenyon v. Cameron, 20 Atl. Rep. 233; R. R. v. Gastineau, 83 Ky. 119; R. R. v. Burke, 53 Miss. 200; Nicholson v. Rogers, 31 S. W. 260; Boardman v. Goldsmith, 48 Vt. 403; R. R. v. Brooks, 88 Ky. 129; Bryant v. Acel, 27 Ga. 37; Willis v. McNeill, 57 Texas 465; Reese v. Hershey, 163 Pa. 253.
The judge erred in not granting the defendants’ motion to withdraw a juror and continue the case, and in declining to hear or permit the filing of reasons for such motion: Com. v. Weber, 167 Pa. 153; Holden v. Penna. R. R. 169 Pa. 1.
A. S. L. Shields, for appellee.
The appeal should be quashed: Burkholder v. Stahl, 58 Pa. 371; Neiss v. Foster, 64 Pa. 495; Collins v. Leafey, 124 Pa. 203; Pool & Son v. White, 171 Pa. 500.
Juries are the sole judges of the amount of damages where there is no criterion by which they can be determined, and where the charge has correctly stated the law. When, therefore, the trial court sitting in banc has refused to exercise its discretionary power to grant a new trial for alleged excessive damages, appellate courts will decline to interfere: Seeley v. Alden, 61 Pa. 302; Penna. R. R. v. Spicker, 105 Pa. 142; Penna. R. R. v. Allen, 53 Pa. 276; Vallo v. United States Express Co., 29 W. N. C. 423.
There is an unbroken line of English and American cases which establishes the principle that, in cases of this kind, no verdict should be set aside because in the opinion of the court the damages are excessive : Huckle v. Money, 2 Wilson, 205; Beardmore v. Carrington, 2 Wilson, 244; Townsend v. Hughes, 2 Mod. 150; Merest v. Harvey, 5 Taunton, 442; Gilbert v. Buckinshaw, Lofft. 771; Hewlett v. Cruchley, 5 Taunton, 277; Rendell v. Hayward, 5 Bing. N. C. 424; Kelly v. Sherlock, L. R. 1 Q. B. Cases, 686; Forsdike v. Stone, L. R. 3 C. P. Cases, 607; Haywood v. Newton, 2 Str. 940; Archbold’s Practice, 1525; Duberley v. Gunning, 4 T. R. 651; Berry v. Vreeland, 1 Zab. (N. J.) 183; Lehigh Valley R. R. v. McKeen, 90 Pa. 127; Orbann v. Phila. Traction Co., 19 Phila. 413; Thurston v. Martin, 5 Mason, 496; Whipple v. Cumberland Mfg. Co. 2 Story, 661; Leith v. Pope, 2 W. Bl. 1327; Waters v. Bristol, 26 Conn. 406; Clark v. Pendleton, 20 Conn. 495; Brown v. Tanner, 1 Car. & P. 651; New Orleans v. McBride, 38 Miss. 32; Chenowith v. Hicks, 5 Ind. 224; Blanchard v. Morris, 15 Ill. 35; Goodall v. Thurman, 1 Head, 209; Danville, &c. v. Stewart, 2 Metcalf, (Ky.)119; Smith v. Woodfine, 1 Com. B. (U. S.) 659; Birchard v. Booth, 4 Wis. 67; Creed v. Fisher, 26 Eng. Law and Eq. 384; Boyce v. Cal. Sage Co., 25 Cal. 460; Reuck v. McGregor, 3 Vroom, 70; Aldrich v. Palmer, 24 Cal. 513; Ross v. Innis, 35 Ill. 487; Kennedy v. North, 36 Miss. 351; McCarty v. Fremont, 23 Cal. 196; Treanor v. Donahoe, 9 Cush. 228; Sexton v. Brock, 15 Ark. 345; Wells v. Sawyer, 21 Miss. 354; Lang v. Hopkins, 10 Geo. 37; Barnette v. Hicks, 6 Tex. 352; Cook v. Garza, 9 Tex. 358; Goetz v. Ambs. 27 Miss. 28; Sargent v. Deniston, 5 Cow. 106; Payne v. The Pacific, etc., 1 Cal. 33; George v. Law, 1 Cal. 363; Allen v. Blunt, 2 W. & M. 121; Aiken v. Bemis, 3 W. & M. 348; Carr v. Gale, 3 W. & M. 38; Rice v. Sims, 8 Rich. 416; Clapp v. Hudson R. R. R. Co. 19 Barb. 461; Murrey v. Basnett, 18 Fla. 609; St. Paul v. Kuby, 8 Minn. 125; Miss. &c., R. R. Co. v. Caruth, 51 Miss. 77; Hinchman v. Whetstone, 23 Ill. 108; Stevenson v. Belknap, 6 Clark (Iowa), 97; Coleman v. Southwick, 9 Johns. (N. Y.) 45.
If the act of May 20, 1891 is to be interpreted according to the defendants’ contention it is unconstitutional, because it denies the right to a “trial by jury as heretofore Vallo v. United States Express Co., 147 Pa. 404; R. R. Co. v. Fraloff, 100 U. S. 24; R. R. v. McDaniels, 107 U. S. 454; R. R. v. Winter, 143 U. S. 60; Morning Journal Association v. Rutherford, 51 Fed. Rep. 513; Gale v. R. R., 53 Howard, 385; Schenck v. Ringler, 11 N. E. 382; Hovey v. Brown, 59 N. H. 114; Merrill v. Perkins, 61 N. H. 262; Ry. Co. v. Call, 143 Ill. 179; R. R. v. Bode, 150 Ill. 396; Hunn v. R. R., 78 Mich. 513; Nelson v. Ry. Co., 13 Ore. 141; Steele v. R. R., 11 S. C. 589; Dobson v. Cothran, 34 S. C. 518; Thornton v. Britton, 144 Pa. 126; Kelber v. Plough Co., 146 Pa. 485; Terry v. Wenderoth, 147 Pa. 519; Gates v. Penna. R. R., 154 Pa. 566.
If it were the law that an appellate court might reverse the judgment below because it believed the verdict to be excessive, the facts of the present case would not justify this court in so deciding.
It is a good defense to an action for libel if the defendant can show that the statements alleged to be libelous are true. But the plaintiff has the right to be informed by the nature of the plea what defense will be offered. When the attempt is to be made to prove that the statements alleged to be libelous are true, there must be a plea of justification as a warning to the plaintiff that his whole character would be assailed: Johnson v. Phila. etc. R. R., 163 Pa. 127; Smith v. Smith, 39 Pa. 441; Gorman v. Sutton, 32 Pa. 247; Struthers v. Peacock, 11 Phila. 287.
The thirteenth assignment relates to a matter exclusively within the discretion of the learned trial court, and not reviewable here: Thompson v. Stevens, 71 Pa. 161; Evans v. Mengel, 3 Pa. 239.
January 4, 1897:

Opinion:
Opinion by
Mb,. Justice Mitchell
The charge of the learned trial judge to the jury is not before us, and the assignments of error in regard to it must be dismissed for this reason. The filing of the stenographer's notes of the charge, and printing it in the paper-book will not make it part of the record. It must affirmatively appear that the filing was the act of the judge himself, or by his express direction evidenced by his signature either to the charge itself or to the bill of exceptions. This has been so explicitly and so repeatedly decided within the last few years that it ought not to be necessary to say it again: Pool v. White, 171 Pa. 500; Com. v. Arnold, 161 Pa. 327; Hill v. Egan, 160 Pa. 119; Connell v. O'Neil, 154 Pa. 582. The case of Janney v. Howard, 150 Pa. 339, has been so persistently misapplied that it seems almost hopeless to endeavor to set the profession right in regard to it. What that case decided was that when the charge was properly filed it became by virtue of the act of March 24, 1877, P. L. 38, a part of the record for the purpose of assignment of errors although the exceptions had not been made in the court below, as required by previous practice. The case is authority for this construction of the act of 1877 but decided nothing further. An inadvertent expression in the opinion however that errors may be assigned " to any part of a charge which has been filed with or without request " fell in so conveniently with the indolence or carelessness of some practitioners that it has been constantly harped upon since as if it meant that this court would take judicial notice of the charge without inquiring how it came before us, and this idea still persists notwithstanding the explicit and reiterated rulings to the contrary in the cases already referred to. Fries v. Null, 154 Pa. 573, and Grugan v. Phila., 158 Pa. 337, followed Janney v. Howard as to the assignment of errors-to a charge properly filed, but did not go beyond that, and so far as Janney v. Howard appears to give countenance to anything further it is now definitively overruled, and is not to be cited again as authority on that point.
In the case before us owing no doubt to the defendants having left the court room before the charge was delivered the judge was not asked to file it, and although he signed a bill of exceptions to the evidence and his rulings thereon, he did not include the charge. It is therefore no part of the record, and the assignments of error to it must be dismissed.
There remain the exceptions based on the amount of the verdict. This is a matter which has not been within our province to consider, until it'was made so by the act of May 20, 1891, P. L. 101. It is a new power, a wide departure from the policy of centuries in regard to appellate courts, and so clearly exceptional in character that no case has been presented until now, in which we have felt called upon to exercise it. But the duty has been put upon us by the law-making authority of the state, and'we must perform it in accordance with the spirit of the enactment. The argument against the constitutional validity of the act has had the most deliberate consideration, but we do not think it can prevail.
The provision of the constitution is that " trial by jury shall be as heretofore, and the right thereof remain inviolate." The same or very similar language is contained in the constitution of nearly every state, and the uniform construction by judges and text writers has been that the phrase " shall be as heretofore " -refers to the method of trial itself and means that it shall be preserved with its substantial elements, while the second phrase, "the right thereof shall remain inviolate " refers to the right to a jury trial before the final decision in all cases where it would have existed at the time of the adoption of the constitution. " The object of the provision " says Shabswood, J., "was.to preserve the jury as a tribunal for the decision of all questions <of fact:" Wynkoop v. Cooch, 89 Pa. 450. "The general idea intended to be conveyed by the constitutional guarantee of the trial by jury undoubtedly is that all contested issues of fact shall be determined by a jury, and in no other way. . It was not intended to tie np the hands of the legislature so that no regulations of the trial by jury could be made, and it has been held that the provision is not violated so long as the trial by jury is not substantially impaired, although it be made subject to new modes: " Sedgwick on Stat. and Const. Law, 2d ed. 496. "Trial by jury is by twelve free and lawful men who are not of kin to either party, for the purpose of establishing the truth of the matter in issue. . . . Any legislation which merely points out the mode of arriving at this object but does not rob it of any of its essential ingredients, cannot be considered an infringement of the right: " Dowling v. The State, 5 Sm. & M. 685. The definition of a jury adopted by so distinguished a jurist as Mr. Justice Miller, though more elaborate than this, is not materially different, Miller, Lectures on the Constitution 511, and all the authorities agree that the substantial features, which are to be " as heretofore," are the number twelve, and the unanimity of the verdict. These cannot be altered, and the uniform result of the very numerous cases growing out of legislative attempts to make juries of less number, or to authorize less than the whole to render a verdict, is that as to all matters which were the subject of jury trials at the date of the constitution, the right which is to remain inviolate, is to a jury " as heretofore " of twelve men who shall render a unanimous verdict. Matters not at that time entitled to jury trial, and matters arising under subsequent statutes prescribing a different proceeding, are not included. " The constitutional provisions do not extend the right, they only secure it in cases in which it was a matter of right before. But in doing this they preserve the historical jury of twelve men, with all its incidents : " Cooley, Const. Limitations, 504 (ed. 1890), and see Black on Const. Law, 451 and cases there cited.
The constitutional provision does not however go beyond the essentials of the jury trial as understood at the time. It does not extend to changes of the preliminaries, or of the minor details or to subsequent steps between verdict and judgment. The jury as an institution, has been frequently commented upon by the most learned historians as one of the most remarkable in the history of the world, for the length of time which it has existed and the zealous care with which it has been cherished by the English speaking race. But while its essential features have been preserved it has undergone grSat changes in all other respects. Originally the sworn twelve were witnesses as well as jurors, and they were summoned from the vicinage on account of their knowledge of the case or its surroundings. Forsyth, Trial by Jury, ch. 7, sec. 3. The very qualifications which originally put them in the box, would now be generally held to exclude them, and send them, instead, to the witness stand. The jury is above everything a practical part of the administration of justice, and changes of non-essential features, in order to adapt it to the habits and convenience of the people have therefore always been made without hesitation even in this country under the restrictions of the constitutions.
The preliminary pleadings and mode of making up the issue are no part of the jury trial itself. The affidavit of defense law, now of general application in this state to actions ex contractu, originated by agreement among the members of the bar, (see 3 Weekly Notes, 567), but there were two, according to Chief Justice Tilghman who thought it an infringement of the right of trial by jury and therefore never gave or took judgment under it. The Supreme Court had no such difficulty: Vanatta v. Anderson, 3 Binn. 417. Constitutional scruples however or the lack of other pegs on winch to hang a writ of error, brought the question up again after the adoption of the present constitution, and this Court again found no violation of the right: Lawrence v. Borm, 86 Pa. 225. So the statute for compulsory nonsuits though a change in the jury trial, was held not an infringement of the right: Munn v. Mayor of Pittsburg, 40 Pa. 364; and other changes, such as the qualifications of the jurors themselves, the vicinage from which they shall come, the mode of selecting and summoning them, the regulation of venires, and notably, even the matter of challenges: Warren v. Com., 37 Pa. 45, have been held to be within legislative control. In the case last cited, the whole subject of the constitutional provision, and the changes in jury trial under it, receives a very full and comprehensive discussion from Chief Justice Thompson. He quotes Chief Justice Tilghman in Biddle v. Com., 13 S. & R. 405, that the act for collection of a license fee by suit before a jus tice without a jury was not unconstitutional because it required an affidavit that injustice had been done, before an appeal could be taken to the common pleas, " laws such as these promote justice and leave the existence of trial by jury unimpaired, and that is all that is required by the expression in the constitution that trial by jury shall be as heretofore." Chief Justice Thompson then proceeds: " It is a mistake that is often made, to suppose that every modification of its accompanying powers detracts from the right. This is too narrow and rigid a rule for the practical workings of the constitution and the rights guaranteed by it in the particular in question. There is no violation of the right unless the remedy is denied, or so clogged as not conveniently to be enjoyed. . . . The framers of the constitution . . . undoubtedly knew and intended that legislation must provide the forms under which the right was to be enjoyed, and they meant no more than that it should be enjoyed under regulations which should not take away the right." And fin Haines v. Levin, 51 Pa. 412, the same principle is reiterated by Chief Justice Agnew : " The great purpose of the constitution in providing that ' trial by jury shall be as heretofore, and the right thereof remain inviolate ' was not to contract the power to furnish modes of civil procedure in courts of justice, but to secure the right of trial by jury in its accustomed form before rights of person or property shall be finally decided," id. p. 414.
The act of 1891 makes no change in the trial itself, nor does it deny the right. All that it does is to provide for another step between the verdict and final judgment, of exactly the same nature and the same effect as the long established power of the lower courts. The authority of the common pleas in the control and revision of excessive verdicts through the means of new trials was firmly settled in England before the foundation of this colony, and has always existed here without challenge under any of our constitutions. It is a power to examine the whole case on the law and the evidence with a view to securing a result not merely legal, but also not manifestly against justice, a power exercised in pursuance of a sound judicial discretion without which the jury system would be a capricious and intolerable tyranny which no people could long endure. This court has had occasion more than once recently to say that it was a power the courts ought to exercise unflinchingly. It has never been thought to be confined to the judge who heard and saw the witnesses, but belongs to the full court in banc, and was freely exercised by this court 'when the judges sat separately for jury trials. See for example, Sommer v. Wilt, 4 S. & R. 19. The act of 1891 vests a further power of revision, of the same nature, in this court. It is an authority to review the exercise of the discretion of the court below in this respect, as we do in some others. It is a power of review only, before final judgment, and does not violate the right to a jury trial nor even interfere with it in the particular case more than was or might have been done by the court below. We do not see that it transgresses the constitutional command.
The diligence of counsel for appellants has brought to our attention the decisions upon statutes of substantially the same import in eight of our sister states, and we have examined them enough to be able to say that they uniformly sustain the construction and the validity of the statutes upon the same lines as we have followed in discussing the act of 1891.
The bill of exceptions in the present case brings up the whole evidence, and the study of it compels the conclusion that the amount of the verdict must have been largely influenced by other considerations than calm judgment. The license which the press assumes to itself in the ruthless hunt for sensational news, and in the unsparing invasion of private affairs with which the public has no rightful concern, is the disgrace of modern journalism, and one of the greatest menaces to free institutions. It may well dispose juries in a proper case to give large damages both compensatory and punitive, and with such verdicts the courts will not be readily moved to interfere. In the present case the persistent attacks on the plaintiff long after he had ceased to be an office holder or prominent in public affairs, gave plausibility to the charge that they were further induced by actual malice and the vindictive use of the power of a great newspaper for the gratification of personal objects. These considerations would naturally lead to a large verdict, and all the more so as the defendant's leaving the court room which appears to have been entirely without adequate cause, would be apt to be construed by the jury as an abandonment of the defense and an admission of the malice charged, or perhaps even as showing a want of confidence in the jury themselves, and therefore an affront. We are unable to resist the conclusion that this very impolitic and unexplained move of the defendants in leaving the court room and instructing their counsel to retire from the' trial, was more responsible than all the other circumstances for the amount of the verdict.
January 4, 1897:
Taking all the facts of the ease into consideration, and giving great weight as it deserves to the opinion of the learned court below, we are still constrained to believe that the penalty was disproportionate to the offense, and that the interests of public justice and the administration of the law, which always suffer in the reaction from undue severity, require that the verdict should not be allowed to stand. As to the exact form which the order shall take, the court is not entirely agreed. It is customary in setting aside verdicts as excessive, for the common pleas to fix an amount which in their judgment would not be unreasonable, and to give the party the choice to accept it, or take the chances of a new trial. Speaking for myself, I think that course should be pursued here. The plaintiff has won a signal victory, and I do not think he should be deprived of the whole fruits of it except at his own option. I would therefore name a sum which though large and substantial would not have been deemed unreasonable had the jury fixed it, and would give plaintiff the choice to reduce the verdict to that amount or go to another jury. But the majority of my brethren think it inexpedient to enter into the consideration of amounts, and in obedience to their directions the verdict must be set aside generally.
Judgment reversed and venire de novo awarded.