Case Name: THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. $1,124,905 U.S. CURRENCY AND ONE 1988 CHEVROLET ASTRO VAN (Jesus Mena, Appellant)
Court: Illinois Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Illinois
Decision Date: 1997-09-18
Citations: 177 Ill. 2d 314
Docket Number: No. 79106
Parties: THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. $1,124,905 U.S. CURRENCY AND ONE 1988 CHEVROLET ASTRO VAN (Jesus Mena, Appellant).
Judges: 
Reporter: Illinois Reports, Second Series
Volume: 177
Pages: 314–368

Head Matter:
(No. 79106.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. $1,124,905 U.S. CURRENCY AND ONE 1988 CHEVROLET ASTRO VAN (Jesus Mena, Appellant).
Opinion filed September 18, 1997.
BILANDIC, J., specially concurring.
HEIPLE, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.
FREEMAN, C.J., joined by MILLER, J., dissenting.
Jerome Rotenberg, of Chiumento, Katz & Guntharp, P.A., of Palm Coast, Florida, for appellant.
James E. Ryan, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Charles G. Reynard, State’s Attorney, of Blooming-ton (Norbert J. Goetten, Robert J. Biderman and Charles F. Mansfield, of the Office of the State’s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor, of Springfield, of counsel), for the People.

Opinion:
JUSTICE NICKELS
delivered the opinion of the court:
In this appeal, we examine the forfeiture of $1,124,905 police discovered in a van Jesus Mena was driving. The State initiated civil forfeiture proceedings in the circuit court of McLean County by filing a complaint against the currency and the van pursuant to the Drug Asset Forfeiture Procedure Act (725 ILCS 150/1 et seq. (West 1994)). In response, Jesus filed a claim and verified answer and subsequently an amended answer, contesting only the forfeiture of the currency. In his answers, Jesus declined to respond to certain interrogatories required by the Act (725 ILCS 150/9(D) (West 1994)), asserting his fifth amendment privilege. On the State's motion, the circuit court struck Jesus' answers, finding that Jesus lacked standing to contest the forfeiture. Jesus declined to replead and the circuit court entered an order of default and an order of forfeiture. The appellate court declined to determine whether Jesus possessed standing, and instead found it dispositive that the State had established probable cause to forfeit the property. 269 Ill. App. 3d 952. We granted Jesus' petition for leave to appeal. 155 Ill. 2d R 315.
BACKGROUND
On July 9, 1993, the Illinois State Police seized a van containing $1,124,905. Pursuant to the Drug Asset Forfeiture Procedure Act (725 ILCS 150/5 (West 1994)), the police notified the State's Attorney for McLean County of the seizure of the property. On August 19, 1993, the drug enforcement prosecutor for the McLean County State's Attorney's office filed a complaint for forfeiture in the circuit court. The complaint set forth the following allegations:
"1. That on July 9, 1993, a trooper of the Illinois State Police stopped to assist motorists standing outside an apparently stranded 1988 Chevrolet Astro Van, VIN 1GNCM15Z1JB169536, Illinois registration tag SVG543;
2. That said stop occurred on Interstate 55 southbound at or near milepost 185 in McLean County, Illinois;
3. That Jesus Mena, Elena B. Mena and a one year old child were the motorists found outside the vehicle;
4. That following said stop, the trooper and a back-up learned that the automobile [was] registered to Melvin J. DeJesus;
5. That following said stop, the troopers conducted a lawful search of the vehicle;
6. That during the course of said search the troopers found compartments built into the floor of the vehicle;
7. That the troopers found the sum of $1,124,905.00 U.S. Currency in the compartment of the vehicle.
8. That the U.S. Currency was furnished or intended to be furnished in exchange for a substance, or the proceeds thereof, in violation of the Controlled Substances Act;
9. That the troopers seized the above-captioned property which is subject to forfeiture based upon the statutory provisions of 720 ILCS 570/505 (1993) as amended."
After filing the complaint for forfeiture, the State sent a copy of the complaint as notice of the forfeiture to Jesus and Elena Mena, and to Melvin DeJesus. The State also provided notice to other interested parties by publication. In the affidavit for publication, the State's Attorney stated that "I believe Jesus and Elena Mena and Melvin DeJesus to be the owner(s) of the property" and that "there may be other owners or interested parties who, after due and diligent inquiry, I have been unable to ascertain addresses for." All the notices further provided that an answer contesting the forfeiture must be filed within 45 days at the risk of default.
Only Jesus Mena filed a claim and answer contesting the forfeiture. In his answer, Jesus Mena contested forfeiture of the currency only.
The State moved to strike the answer on grounds that the answer did not comply with the requirements of the Drug Asset Forfeiture Procedure Act (725 ILCS 150/1 et seq. (West 1994)). Specifically, the motion challenged Jesus' answer on grounds that the answer did not specify the extent of his interest in the property as required by section 9(D)(iii) of the Act (725 ILCS 150/ 9(D)(iii) (West 1994)); that the answer did not set forth the date, identity of transferor and circumstances of his acquisition of the property as required by section 9(D)(iv) (725 ILCS 150/9(D)(iv) (West 1994)); that the answer did not identify any defenses contained in section 8 of the Act that Jesus intended to rely on as required by section 9(D)(vi) (725 ILCS 150/9(D)(vi) (West 1994)); and that the answer did not include all essential facts supporting each allegation as required by section 9(D)(vii) (725 ILCS 150/9(D)(vii) (West 1994)). The State's motion to strike was granted and Jesus was granted leave to file an amended answer satisfying the statutory requirements.
In the time allowed for filing the amended answer, Jesus instead filed a motion to strike the State's complaint and a motion to make the complaint more definite and certain. The thrust of both motions was an attack on the factual sufficiency of the allegations in the complaint for forfeiture. Jesus challenged the allegations contained in paragraphs five and eight in the complaint, requesting facts to support the allegations that the search was lawful and that the currency was furnished or intended to be furnished for a controlled substance.
The trial court denied Jesus' motion to strike the complaint. The trial court granted in part Jesus' motion to make the complaint more definite by requiring the State to amend its allegation concerning the lawfulness of the search to include the fact that the search was pursuant to the consent of Jesus. The trial court found no problem with the allegation in paragraph eight and therefore accepted the State's amended complaint.
Jesus subsequently filed a timely amended claim and answer. In his amended answer, Jesus claimed exclusive ownership of the currency. Jesus refused, however, to allege the date and circumstances of his acquisition of this ownership interest, asserting his fifth amendment privilege. The trial court granted the State's subsequent motion to strike the amended answer, finding that the allegations in the answer did not satisfy the requirements of the statute necessary to show standing.
Jesus elected to stand on his answer. The State then filed a motion seeking an order of default and forfeiture. Neither Jesus nor his attorney appeared at the hearing on the motion. In support of the motion, the State for the first time submitted the affidavit of Illinois State Police Sergeant Mike Snyders. In his affidavit, Sergeant Snyders recounted the circumstances surrounding his seizure of the van and currency.
In his affidavit, Sergeant Snyders states that he is the coordinator of the Illinois State Police Highway Interdiction Program and that he has extensive training and experience in drug interdiction. On July 9,1993, he observed a van with its hood open on the side of the highway and stopped to assist. At the van, he found a man and woman, later identified as Jesus and Elena Mena, and a small child. Jesus indicated that the van had overheated.
Sergeant Snyders then asked Jesus if the van belonged to him. Jesus responded that the van belonged to a friend, but he did not know the friend's name or how to get in touch with him. Jesus presented Sergeant Snyders with the van's title, which listed the owner as Melvin J. DeJesus. Jesus could not give the owner's address or phone number or explain how he was supposed to return the van. Sergeant Snyders' affidavit further states that Jesus and Elena gave conflicting stories regarding their destination. Jesus reported that they were heading to St. Louis to look for work. Elena reported they were heading to Texas. Sergeant Snyders characterized Jesus and Elena as appearing nervous and scared.
According to the affidavit, Sergeant Snyders told Jesus that he was very suspicious about the story. Sergeant Snyders then asked Jesus if he had any large amounts of cash in the van. Jesus laughed and said that he did not have any large amounts of cash and he was not transporting anything for anyone else. Jesus then gave consent for Sergeant Snyders and a backup officer to search the van.
During the search of the van, Sergeant Snyders observed evidence that the van had been altered to create a compartment in the floor. Sergeant Snyders noticed that the spare tire had been removed from the outside of the van and the undercarriage had been sprayed with a black, oily substance. Sergeant Snyders also noticed that inside the van the floor was flat, but the exterior showed a tapered shape. In addition, the center bench showed evidence it had been removed, including fasteners that did not match and carpeting that did not fit properly.
Sergeant Snyders then pulled back the carpeting and discovered a layer of plywood and a thin metal floor with a trap door. Sergeant Snyders discovered, inside the trap door, a compartment full of cash bundles. There were 112 cellophane and duct tape bundles with the number 10 written on them and one bundle with the number five written on it. A later count revealed a total of $1,124,905.
Sergeant Snyders' affidavit further provides that Jesus, Elena and the child were transported from the scene to the police station. During an interview at the station, Jesus admitted that DeJesus had hired him to transport the van and had given him money for traveling expenses. Jesus denied any knowledge of the trap door or its contents. Jesus further stated that DeJesus gave him two phone numbers to call once he arrived in El Paso, Texas, and he was to receive $3,500 payment for delivery of the van.
Jesus agreed to call DeJesus from the police station while an officer listened to the phone call. When Jesus placed the call, a man answered and asked Jesus if there was a. problem. Jesus told the man that the police had found the money. The man said he would get in touch with DeJesus and told Jesus to call back. Jesus called back 15 minutes later and DeJesus answered the phone. After Jesus related the events surrounding the discovery of the money, DeJesus told him to "tolerate the whip and keep your mouth shut."
Sergeant Snyders' affidavit also detailed the course of his follow-up investigation. Sergeant Snyders obtained Melvin DeJesus' photograph from the Secretary of State and traveled to Chicago to locate and interview DeJesus, the registered owner of the van. The occupants at the address listed on the title and registration told Snyders that they did not know a Melvin DeJesus or recognize his picture. In addition, Sergeant Snyders learned that the social security number listed on DeJesus' driver's license was registered to a Melvin DeJesus, age 11 years.
Relying on the information contained in the affidavit, the trial judge entered an order forfeiting the van and currency. Jesus appealed from the forfeiture order, arguing that the trial court erred in: (1) denying his motion to strike the complaint for forfeiture; (2) finding probable cause to believe that the currency was traceable to an illegal drug transaction; and (3) striking his answer and ruling he did not have standing to contest the forfeiture.
The appellate court held that Jesus waived his objection to the State's complaint by pleading over. 269 Ill. App. 3d at 956. In so finding, the appellate court rejected Jesus' contention that because his answer had been stricken, it was as if his answer had not been filed and therefore he had not waived any objection to the complaint. 269 Ill. App. 3d at 956. The appellate court declined to determine whether Jesus had standing to contest the forfeiture, instead finding that regardless of whether Jesus could demonstrate standing, the State had satisfied its burden for forfeiture. 269 Ill. App. 3d at 955-62.
For reasons that follow, we reverse the order forfeiting the currency and remand this cause to the circuit court. Section I examines the relevant forfeiture provisions of the Illinois Controlled Substances Act (720 ILCS 570/505 (West 1994)). Section II reviews the procedures for judicial forfeiture set forth in the Drug Asset Forfeiture Procedure Act (720 ILCS 570/100 et seq. (West 1994)). Section III analyzes the issue of whether Jesus possesses standing to contest the forfeiture of the currency. Section IV considers the effect of asserting the fifth amendment privilege in response to the statutory interrogatories contained in the Drug Asset Forfeiture Procedure Act. Section V first determines that Jesus did not waive his challenge to the State's complaint. Section V then examines the appropriate standard for pleading probable cause for forfeiture, concluding that the State's complaint fails to state a cause of action. Accordingly, the appropriate relief is to remand the cause to the circuit court for further proceedings.
ANALYSIS
I. Controlled Substances Act
The State sought forfeiture of the property pursuant to section 505 of the Controlled Substances Act (720 ILCS 570/505 (West 1994)). We have previously examined section 505(a)(3), which provides for the forfeiture of vehicles and other conveyances "used * in any manner to facilitate" a drug violation. 720 ILCS 570/505(a)(3) (West 1994); see People ex rel. Waller v. 1989 Ford F350 Truck, 162 Ill. 2d 78 (1994); People v. One 1986 White Mazda Pickup Truck, 162 Ill. 2d 67 (1994). We determined that the term "facilitate" requires that the conveyance make the possession of the controlled substance in some way " 'easier or less difficult' " in order to support forfeiture. One 1986 White Mazda Pickup Truck, 162 Ill. 2d at 69; People v. 1946 Buick, 127 Ill. 2d 374, 377 (1989). Jesus, however, does not contest the forfeiture of the van, instead only contesting the forfeiture of the currency.
The State sought forfeiture of the currency pursuant to section 505(a)(5) of the Act (720 ILCS 570/505(a)(5) (West 1994)). Section 505(a)(5) provides for the forfeiture of:
"everything of value furnished, or intended to be furnished, in exchange for a substance in violation of this Act, all proceeds traceable to such an exchange, and all moneys, negotiable instruments, and securities used, or intended to be used, to commit or in any manner to facilitate any violation of this Act." 720 ILCS 570/505(a)(5) (West 1994).
Thus, three categories of property are subject to forfeiture pursuant to section 505(a)(5):
(1) anything of value which is furnished or intended to be furnished in exchange for a controlled substance;
(2) all proceeds that can be traced to the exchange of a controlled substance; and
(3) all moneys, negotiable instruments, and securities used or intended to be used in any manner to facilitate a controlled substances violation.
The Controlled Substances Act further provides that property subject to forfeiture may be seized by any peace officer without judicial process where the seizure is reasonable and supported by probable cause. See 720 ILCS 570/505(b)(4) (West 1994). In the event of such a seizure, forfeiture proceedings are to be instituted pursuant to the Drug Asset Forfeiture Procedure Act (725 ILCS 150/1 et seq. (West 1994)). 720 ILCS 570/505(c) (West 1994).
II. Drug Asset Forfeiture Procedure Act
In an effort to deter violations of the Controlled Sub stances Act (720 ILCS 570/100 et seq. (West 1994)) and the Cannabis Control Act (720 ILCS 550/1 et seq. (West 1994)), the General Assembly enacted the Drug Asset Forfeiture Procedure Act (725 ILCS 150/1 et seq. (West 1994)) establishing uniform procedures for the seizure and forfeiture of drug related assets. The Act is to be interpreted in light of the federal forfeiture provisions contained in 21 U.S.C. § 881 (1994) as interpreted by the federal courts, except to the extent that the provisions expressly conflict. 725 ILCS 150/2 (West 1994). In addition, the Act is to be liberally construed to effectuate its remedial purpose. 725 ILCS 150/13 (West 1994).
Where the property seized is "non-real property that exceeds $20,000 in value excluding the value of any conveyance, or is real property," the Act provides for a judicial in rem procedure. 725 ILCS 150/9 (West 1994). The State's Attorney initiates the action by filing a verified complaint for forfeiture of the property. 725 ILCS 150/9(A) (West 1994). The Act provides that only an owner or interest holder may file an answer asserting a claim against the property. 725 ILCS 150/9(C) (West 1994). In addition, the answer must contain certain information, including the circumstances surrounding the claimant's acquisition of the property. 725 ILCS 150/ 9(D) (West 1994).
The Act provides that the State shall have the initial burden to show the existence of probable cause for forfeiture of the property. 725 ILCS 150/9(G) (West 1994). Where the State satisfies its burden of establishing probable cause, then the burden shifts to the claimant to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the property is not subject to forfeiture. 725 ILCS 150/9(G) (West 1994). A claimant may satisfy this burden by establishing one of the innocent-owner defenses listed in the Act. 725 ILCS 150/8 (West 1994). During the probable cause portion of the proceeding, "the court must receive and consider, among other things, all relevant hearsay evidence and information." 725 ILCS 150/9(B) (West 1994). During all other portions of the proceeding, the law of evidence relating to civil actions applies. 725 ILCS 150/ 9(B) (West 1994).
III. Standing
We find it appropriate to first consider whether Jesus has standing to contest the forfeiture of the currency. Relying on federal case law, the State argues that a claimant bears an initial burden to establish standing to contest the forfeiture. See, e.g., United States v. $121,100.00 in United States Currency, 999 F.2d 1503, 1505 (11th Cir. 1993). In order to satisfy this burden, the State argues, a claimant must file an answer that satisfies the statutory prerequisites listed in the Drug Asset Forfeiture Procedure Act (725 ILCS 150/9(D) (West 1994)). These prerequisites to standing include alleging facts supporting an ownership interest in the property. See 725 ILCS 150/9(D)(vii) (West 1994). Thus, the State maintains that the trial court properly struck Jesus' answer because it failed to allege specific facts establishing his standing.
The State further argues that a claimant may not assert his fifth amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination to avoid answering questions relating to standing. The State relies on United States v. Rylander, 460 U.S. 752, 75 L. Ed. 2d 521, 103 S. Ct. 1548 (1983), where the Supreme Court noted that the fifth amendment privilege is not a substitute for evidence and may not be used to avoid meeting a burden of production. As a claimant bears the burden of production on the issue of his standing, he may not use the fifth amendment as an excuse for failing to prove his standing. See United States v. United States Currency & Coin: $558,110, 626 F. Supp. 517, 520 (S.D. Ohio 1985).
Jesus argues he demonstrated his standing to contest the forfeiture. Jesus relies on United States v. $38,570 U.S. Currency, 950 F.2d 1108,1113 (5th Cir. 1992), where a claim of exclusive ownership coupled with the allegations in the State's complaint were found sufficient to confer standing to a claimant. Jesus notes that his answer asserted exclusive ownership of the property and the State's complaint alleges that the currency was recovered from a van in which Jesus was traveling. In addition, the State treated Jesus as an owner by sending him a copy of the complaint and listing him as an owner in the affidavit for publication.
Despite the parties' reliance on federal precedent, we believe that Illinois law controls whether an individual possesses standing to contest the forfeiture of property under the Act. The doctrine of standing, like the related doctrines of mootness, ripeness and justiciability, seeks to insure that courts decide actual controversies and not abstract questions. In re Marriage of Rodriguez, 131 Ill. 2d 273, 279-80 (1989). The primary focus of the inquiry is whether a party has a real interest in the outcome of the controversy. In re Marriage of Rodriguez, 131 Ill. 2d at 280. In Illinois, standing is part of the common law. However, federal principles of standing are grounded largely on the jurisdictional case and controversy requirements imposed by article III of the United States Constitution. United States v. One Parcel of Real Property With Buildings, Appurtenances & Improvements Known as 116 Emerson Street, Located in the City of Providence, Rhode Island, 942 F.2d 74, 78 (1st Cir. 1991); see also United States v. U.S. Currency in the Amount of $103,387.27, 863 F.2d 555, 560 n.10 (7th Cir. 1988) (distinguishing between article III standing and statutory standing); United States v. $38,000 in United States Currency, 816 F.2d 1538, 1544 (11th Cir. 1987) (same).
In Greer v. Illinois Housing Development Authority, 122 Ill. 2d 462 (1988), this court rejected federal principles of standing. In Greer, plaintiffs challenged an administrative agency's approval of mortgage financing relating to a housing project. The agency challenged plaintiff's standing, arguing that a plaintiff must demonstrate both prongs of the federal test for standing articulated in Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 25 L. Ed. 2d 184, 90 S. Ct. 827 (1970). The Data Processing test requires that a plaintiff challenging an administrative action demonstrate: (1) that the illegal action will cause the plaintiff to suffer injury in fact; and (2) that the interest asserted by the plaintiff lies within the zone of interest sought to be protected by the statute in question. Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc., 397 U.S. at 155-56, 25 L. Ed. 2d at 189, 90 S. Ct. at 830-31; see also Torres v. $36,256.80 U.S. Currency, 25 F.3d 1154, 1158 (2d Cir. 1994) (applying Data Processing test to determine standing under federal forfeiture statute).
This court in Greer rejected application of the Data Processing test for standing as needlessly restrictive. Greer, 122 Ill. 2d at 492; see also Cusack v. Howlett, 44 Ill. 2d 233, 236 (1969) (rejecting federal law as to ripeness). In so holding, this court recognized that state courts are more liberal in recognizing the standing of parties than the federal courts. Greer, 122 Ill. 2d at 491. In addition, this court criticized the federal zone of interest test as confusing standing with the merits of the underlying suit. Greer, 122 Ill. 2d at 492. Thus, the Greer court concluded that standing in Illinois requires only "some injury in fact to a legally cognizable interest." Greer, 122 Ill. 2d at 492; see also In re Estate of Burgeson, 125 Ill. 2d 477, 486 (1988).
In Greer, this court also rejected the defendant's underlying assumption that a plaintiff bears the burden of establishing standing. The Greer court explained that a plaintiff need not allege facts supporting standing because in Illinois standing is an affirmative defense. Greer, 122 Ill. 2d at 494. Therefore, it was the defendant's burden to plead and prove lack of standing. Greer, 122 Ill. 2d at 494.
We find no reason to depart from these principles when determining standing under the Drug Asset Forfeiture Procedure Act. The doctrine of standing is designed to preclude persons having no interest in a controversy from bringing suit, but it should not be an obstacle to the litigation of a valid claim. In re Marriage of Rodriguez, 131 Ill. 2d at 280. In imposing a burden of proof on a claimant to prove ownership to satisfy standing, the federal courts have muddied the issue of standing with the merits of the underlying suit. Indeed, where the State seeks forfeiture of currency and alleges that the currency was furnished or intended to be furnished for drugs or the proceeds thereof, a basic allegation is who committed the act that makes the property forfeit-able. In addition, ownership of the property is central to an innocent-owner defense.
We further note that the provisions of the Act are entirely consistent with the principles regarding standing articulated in Greer. The Act explicitly lays out the respective burdens imposed on the State and the claimant at the forfeiture hearing. Section 9(G) provides that the State has the burden to establish probable cause, and if that burden is satisfied, then the burden shifts to the claimant to prove that his or her interest is not subject to forfeiture. In explicitly allocating these burdens, the Act does not place any initial burden on a claimant to prove his interest in the property.
The Act does provide that "[o]nly an owner of or interest holder in the property may file an answer asserting a claim against the property in the action in rem." 725 ILCS 150/9(0 (West 1994). The Act further requires that the answer must set forth information relating to' the claimant's acquisition of the property. See 725 ILCS 150/9(D)(i) through (D)(viii) (West 1994). However, the Act does not impose an initial burden on a claimant to prove these mandatory allegations. Instead, the Act contemplates that a claimant must prove these allegations to establish an innocent-owner defense. See 725 ILCS 150/8 (West 1994).
Thus, where a claimant files an answer contesting forfeiture of property under the Act, it is the State's burden to challenge the claimant's standing to contest the forfeiture. Furthermore, the State may successfully satisfy this burden only where the State can prove that the claimant has not suffered an injury in fact to a legally cognizable interest. In addition, the legally cognizable interest should be construed broadly to "include any * recognizable legal or equitable interest in the property seized." S. Rep. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 215 (1984), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 9496, 9522.
The State may quickly dispose of frivolous claims by contesting a claimant's standing by motion. In Greer, this court recognized that controversies regarding standing are best resolved by motions for summary judgment rather than judgments on the pleadings. Greer, 122 Ill. 2d at 494. Indeed, a motion for summary judgment allows a party to demonstrate that particular allegations are a sham or that there is no issue of genuine fact regarding a party's standing. Greer, 122 Ill. 2d at 494. On remand, the State may properly challenge Jesus' standing to contest the forfeiture.
IV. Privilege Against Self-Incrimination
In his amended answer, Jesus claimed exclusive ownership of the currency. Jesus refused, however, to allege the date and circumstances of his acquisition of this ownership interest, asserting his fifth amendment
privilege against compulsory self-incrimination. The State does not contest a claimant's right to assert the fifth amendment privilege in the context of a forfeiture proceeding. See United States v. United States Coin & Currency, 401 U.S. 715, 28 L. Ed. 2d 434, 91 S. Ct. 1041 (1971). However, the State argues that the fifth amendment privilege is not a substitute for evidence and may not be used as an excuse for failing to meet a burden of production. United States v. Rylander, 460 U.S. 752, 75 L. Ed. 2d 521,103 S. a. 1548 (1983). Therefore, the State argues that the trial court did not err in striking Jesus' answer because the answer asserted the fifth amendment privilege in response to the statutory interrogatories necessary to show standing.
We have determined that a claimant does not bear an initial burden of pleading and proving standing. The statutory requirements for an answer contained in section 9(D) do not represent any burden of proof on the issue of standing, but are merely a set of interrogatories to be answered by a claimant to expedite the proceedings. Therefore, Jesus' invocation of the fifth amendment does not serve as a basis for striking his answer because it is not being used to satisfy a burden of production on the issue of standing.
Although asserting a fifth amendment privilege in response to the interrogatories contained in the forfeiture statute is not grounds to strike an answer, a claimant may not decline to answer with impunity. It is "the prevailing rule that the Fifth Amendment does not forbid adverse inferences against parties in civil actions when they refuse to testify in response to probative evidence offered against them." Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 318, 47 L. Ed. 2d 810, 821, 96 S. Ct. 1551, 1558 (1976). Thus, a claimant asserting a fifth amendment privilege may suffer from such an adverse inference in the context of a motion attacking the claimant's stand ing. In addition, a claimant asserting the privilege may ultimately be unable to prove an innocent-owner defense.
V. Review of the State's Complaint
The appellate court did not review the sufficiency of the State's complaint for forfeiture. The appellate court found that Jesus had waived any objection to the complaint by pleading over. 269 Ill. App. 3d 952. Similarly, the State argues that it is the act of filing an answer, and not whether the answer is later stricken, that serves to waive any further challenge to the sufficiency of the complaint. We find that Jesus has not waived his objection to the sufficiency of the State's complaint for forfeiture. On the merits, we conclude that the complaint fails to state a cause of action.
A. Waiver
Generally, where a trial court denies a motion to dismiss a complaint and a defendant pleads over by filing an answer, the defendant waives the objection to the complaint. Adcock v. Brakegate, Ltd., 164 Ill. 2d 54, 60 (1994). The waiver rule is designed to require a party to challenge a complaint at the earliest possible juncture, so that deficiencies may be cured by an amendment. This principle of waiver is a corollary to the doctrine of aider by verdict, which provides that a verdict will cure not only technical defects in a complaint, but also any defect in failing to allege substantial facts which are essential to the cause of action. Adcock, 164 Ill. 2d at 60-61.
Initially, we note that this court has rejected the State's contention that the mere act of filing an answer forever waives the right to challenge a complaint. In Ingersoll v. Klein, 46 Ill. 2d 42 (1970), plaintiff filed a complaint alleging the reckless operation of an automobile. Defendant filed an answer, but the answer was stricken for a technical defect some two years later. In the time for filing an amended answer, defendant instead filed a motion to strike the complaint. This court"rejected the plaintiff's contention that the stricken answer constituted an irrevocable waiver of the right to challenge the complaint. Ingersoll, 46 Ill. 2d at 44.
More importantly, the appellate court erred in applying the waiver rule after a judgment by default. The waiver rule and the corollary doctrine of aider by verdict do not apply to the review of a complaint after a default judgment. The waiver rule and the doctrine of aider by verdict are premised on the understanding that defects in a complaint will be later cured by a verdict based on the evidence and instructions given at the trial. However, where a court enters a judgment by default, there is no evidence presented at trial and no verdict to cure the deficiencies in the complaint.
After a default judgment, a party is entitled to challenge the sufficiency of a complaint on appeal. Suttles v. Vogel, 126 Ill. 2d 186, 193 (1988). A default admits only those material facts stated in the complaint, it does not admit the conclusions of the pleader. 4 C. Nichols, Illinois Civil Practice § 4120, at 236-37 (rev. 1992). On review, a default judgment must be reversed where the complaint upon which that judgment is premised fails to allege facts sufficient to state a cause of action. Suttles, 126 Ill. 2d at 193; Roe v. County of Cook, 358 Ill. 568, 570 (1934).
The appellate court further erred in considering the information contained in Sergeant Snyders' affidavit to determine that the State had satisfied its burden of establishing probable cause. Sergeant Snyders' affidavit was not submitted until after Jesus was found in default. In failing to plead, a party admits by default only the specific factual allegations contained in the complaint. Although the circuit court may request additional proof of the allegations stated in the complaint after a default (see 735 ILCS 5/2 — 1301(d) (West 1994)), it is the allegations stated in the complaint which must state a cause of action. In considering the facts in the affidavit as establishing probable cause, the appellate court effectively allowed the State to amend its complaint after the default. Furthermore, Jesus preserved his right to a thorough review of the sufficiency of the complaint by challenging the complaint as it stood prior to the entry of the default order. See Parrino v. London, 8 Ill. 2d 468, 475 (1956) (applying a deferential standard of review to a complaint after default where challenge was made for the first time on appeal). We therefore review the sufficiency of the State's complaint on its merits.
B. Merits
Pleadings serve to inform the court and the parties of the legal theories relied upon and to give notice of the factual issues which are to be tried. Yeates v. Daily, 13 Ill. 2d 510, 514 (1958). With this purpose in mind, the Civil Practice Law provides that pleadings are to be liberally construed with a view to doing substantial justice between the parties. 735 ILCS 5/2 — 603(c) (West 1994). Furthermore, "[n]o pleading is bad in substance which contains such information as reasonably informs the opposite party of the nature of the claim or defense which he or she is called upon to meet." 725 ILCS 5/2— 612(b) (West 1994).
Although abandoning technical forms of pleading, Illinois remains a fact-pleading state. People ex rel. Fahner v. Carriage Way West, Inc., 88 Ill. 2d 300 (1981). Therefore, the allegations in a complaint must set forth facts that satisfy the elements necessary to support a cause of action. People ex rel. Scott v. College Hills Corp., 91 Ill. 2d 138, 145 (1982). The sufficiency of a complaint is an issue of law and our review is therefore de nova. Toombs v. City of Champaign, 245 Ill. App. 3d 580, 583 (1993).
In order to state a cause of action for forfeiture, the State must allege sufficient facts that, along with favorable inferences, will satisfy the State's burden of establishing probable cause to forfeit the property. The Act is based on the federal narcotics forfeiture statute, and specifically incorporates federal case law. 725 ILCS 150/2 (West 1994). Therefore, we look to the federal courts for guidance regarding the appropriate standard for probable cause in the context of civil forfeiture.
The federal courts define probable cause for forfeiture as reasonable grounds for belief of guilt, supported by less than prima facie proof but more than mere suspicion. United States v. One 1987 Mercedes 560 SEL, 919 F.2d 327, 331 (5th Cir. 1990). In making this determination, there is no need to tie the property to a specific drug transaction. However, suspicions of general criminal activity are not enough; the government must have probable cause to believe that the property is connected specifically to drug activities. United States v. U.S. Currency, $30,060.00, 39 F.3d 1039, 1041 (9th Cir. 1994).
A split of authority exists in the federal circuits concerning the strength of the connection between currency and drug activity necessary to establish probable cause. Several circuits require only a "nexus" between the narcotics activity and currency sought to be forfeited. See, e.g., United States v. Daccarett, 6 F.3d 37, 55-56 (2d Cir. 1993); United States v. $5,644,540 in U.S. Currency, 799 F.2d 1357 (9th Cir. 1986); United States v. U.S. Currency, $30,060.00, 39 F.3d 1039, 1041 (9th Cir. 1994). A similarly liberal standard has been applied by the Second District of our appellate court. See People ex rel. Waller v. $4,175 United States Currency, 239 Ill. App. 3d 857, 863 (1993) (requiring a "rational relationship between the contraband and the illegal activity").
Other federal circuits have determined that a stronger connection to narcotics activity must be demonstrated where the seized property is currency. These circuits have required a "substantial connection" between the currency and drug activity to establish probable cause to forfeit. See, e.g., United States v. $95,945.18, United States Currency, 913 F.2d 1106, 1110 (4th Cir. 1990); United States v. 1964 Beechcraft Baron Aircraft, 691 F.2d 725, 727 (5th Cir. 1982); United States v. $67,220.00 in United States Currency, 957 F.2d 280, 284 (6th Cir. 1992); United States v. $121,100.00 in United States Currency, 999 F.2d 1503, 1506 (11th Cir. 1993). "Under the substantial connection test, the property either must be used or intended to be used to commit a crime, or must facilitate the commission of a crime. At minimum, the property must have more than an incidental or fortuitous connection to criminal activity." United States v. Schifferli, 895 F.2d 987, 990 (4th Cir. 1990).
Those federal circuits applying the substantial connection standard to the forfeiture of currency generally justify its application based on the specific legislative history of section 881(a)(6), which uses the more exacting substantial connection language. See United States v. $364,960 in United States Currency, 661 F.2d 319, 323 (5th Cir. 1981) (citing Joint Explanatory Statement of Titles II and III, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 9518, 9522). However, section 881(a)(6) authorizes the federal government to bring forfeiture actions against only currency and other things of value given in exchange for drugs. 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6) (1994). Thus, many of the federal circuits applying the substantial connection standard to the forfeiture of currency have declined to extend that requirement to other forfeiture actions, such as forfeitures of conveyances or real property used to facilitate drug activity. See, e.g., United States v. One 1974 Cadillac Eldorado Sedan, 548 F.2d 421, 423 (2d Cir. 1977); 1964 Beechcraft Baron Aircraft, 691 F.2d at 727; United States v. One 1984 Cadillac, 888 F.2d 1133, 1135-36 (6th Cir. 1989); United States v. One Parcel of Real Estate Commonly Known as 916 Douglas Avenue, Elgin, Illinois, 903 F.2d 490, 494 (7th Cir. 1990); but see United States v. Parcel of Land & Residence at 28 Emery Street, Merrimac, Massachusetts, 914 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1990) (noting that the first circuit requires a substantial connection for the forfeiture of real property and conveyances because of the drastic nature of the proceedings); Nnadi v. Richter, 976 F.2d 682, 686 (11th Cir. 1992) (same); Schifferli, 895 F.2d at 990. Indeed, in declining to extend the substantial connection requirement to the forfeiture of conveyances and real property, those federal circuits have noted that the plain language of those sections allows for the forfeiture of such property used "in any manner" to facilitate drug-related offenses. See 1964 Beechcraft Baron Aircraft, 691 F.2d at 727; One Parcel of Real Estate Commonly Known as 916 Douglas Avenue, Elgin, Illinois, 903 F.2d at 494.
Similarly, section 505(a)(5) of the Controlled Substances Act does not share the legislative history supporting the more restrictive gloss on probable cause. In addition, like the federal forfeiture provisions applying to real property and conveyances, the Controlled Substances Act provides for forfeiture of all moneys used "in any manner to facilitate" a drug violation. 720 ILCS 570/505(a)(5) (West 1994). For this reason, we agree with the State that forfeiture requires only some nexus, not a substantial connection, between the currency and drug activity. Thus, a complaint for forfeiture must allege facts providing reasonable grounds for the belief that there exists a nexus between the currency and illegal drug activity, supported by less than prima facie proof but more than mere suspicion.
Although we have interpreted the language in the Act consistently with those federal circuits applying a nexus standard, we note that the difference in phraseology that exists in the federal circuits is more semantic than practical. Where the State alleges that the currency was intended to be furnished for a controlled substance or was the proceeds thereof, the alleged nexus is self-evident and substantial. In addition, where the State alleges that the currency in some other way "facilitates" a controlled substances violation, the State must still further allege the manner in which the currency is used to make a controlled substance violation easier in order to demonstrate the necessary nexus. Thus, whatever distinction may exist between each standard, it is unlikely to ever produce different outcomes in the forfeiture of currency.
Applying these considerations, the State's complaint alleges that the police discovered the currency after a search of the van Jesus was driving. Paragraph eight of the State's complaint further alleges "that the U.S. Currency was furnished or intended to be furnished in exchange for a substance, or the proceeds thereof, in violation of the Controlled Substances Act." The State argues that it need not plead its evidence and that the complaint alleges an "ultimate fact" that the money is related to drug trafficking. As it pleads this ultimate fact, the State argues that the complaint adequately states a cause of action for forfeiture.
Whether a particular allegation is deemed to be an ultimate fact or a conclusion is a matter to be determined by a careful consideration of the needs of administering particular litigation. Van Dekerkhov v. City of Herrin, 51 Ill. 2d 374, 376 (1972). In the context of a forfeiture proceeding, we believe that a complaint alleging that currency is drug related must provide some supporting detail that would provide notice to a claimant of the nature of the drug connection. Such factual detail is acutely necessary in the context of a civil forfeiture action, because the police may summarily seize property without judicial sanction. 720 ILCS 570/ 505(b)(4) (West 1994). Thus, an appropriate motion challenging the factual sufficiency of the State's complaint provides the first opportunity for a claimant to challenge the seizure in order to obtain the return of property wrongfully seized.
Federal pleading standards similarly recognize the need for factual specificity in forfeiture complaints to accommodate the drastic nature of the proceedings. Despite the lenient admiralty pleading standards, special rules applicable to forfeiture complaints require the government to "state the circumstances from which the claim arises with such particularity that the defendant or claimant will be able * to commence an investigation of the facts and to frame a responsive pleading." (Emphasis added.) See Fed. R. Civ. P. Supplemental R. E(2)(a). Federal courts have interpreted this language to require greater factual specificity than is generally required under federal notice pleading. See United States v. $39,000 in Canadian Currency, 801 F.2d 1210, 1216 (10th Cir. 1986); United States v. $38,000 in United States Currency, 816 F.2d 1538, 1548 (11th Cir. 1987); United States v. Daccarett, 6 F.3d 37, 47 (2d Cir. 1993).
"[A]n actionable wrong cannot be made out merely by characterizing acts as having been wrongfully done *." Adkins v. Sarah Bush Lincoln Health Center, 129 Ill. 2d 497, 520 (1989). The State's naked allegation that the seized currency is drug related does not reasonably apprise an owner of the nature of the evidence that will be presented. Beyond this allegation, the State's complaint alleges only the discovery of a large amount of cash during the search of a stranded motorist's van. The discovery of a large amount of cash, without more, is insufficient to establish probable cause. United States v. $121,100.00 in United States Currency, 999 F.2d 1503, 1507 (11th Cir. 1993). The complaint provides no additional factual support for the alleged drug connection of the currency. For this reason, the State's complaint for forfeiture fails to state a cause of action.
Although we have determined that the State's complaint is factually insufficient to support a finding of probable cause, we recognize that the State should have an opportunity to amend its complaint. On remand, the State must present some factual support in its complaint for the conclusory allegation that the currency is drug related. The State need not plead its evidence, but must allege some facts providing reasonable grounds for the belief that there exists a nexus between the currency and some illegal drug activity, supported by less than prima facie proof but more than mere suspicion.
CONCLUSION
To summarize, we hold that where a claimant files an answer contesting the forfeiture of property under the Act, it is the State's burden to challenge the claimant's standing to contest the forfeiture. Furthermore, the State may successfully satisfy this burden only where the State can prove that a claimant has not suffered an injury in fact to a legally cognizable interest. We further hold that a claimant may decline to answer the interrogatories contained in the Act pursuant to a claimant's constitutional privilege against self-incrimination, but such a refusal may result in adverse inferences against the claimant. We have further determined that where forfeiture is ordered by default, a claimant is entitled to challenge the sufficiency of the complaint on appeal. To survive such scrutiny, the State's complaint must allege facts supporting a finding of probable cause. Furthermore, probable cause is defined as reasonable grounds for the belief that there exists only a nexus, not a substantial connection, be tween the property and the illegal drug activity, supported by less than prima facie proof but more than mere suspicion. Last, we find that the State's complaint fails to state a cause of action for forfeiture.
For the reasons stated, we reverse the judgments of the circuit and appellate courts and we remand the cause to the circuit court to give the State the opportunity to amend its complaint and for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Appellate court judgment reversed; circuit court judgment reversed; cause remanded.