Case Name: HANNAH M. CARTER, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. DANIEL S. YOUNGS and JENNIE YOUNGS, Defendants and Appellants
Court: New York Superior Court
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1877-03-05
Citations: 10 Jones & S. 169
Docket Number: 
Parties: HANNAH M. CARTER, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. DANIEL S. YOUNGS and JENNIE YOUNGS, Defendants and Appellants.
Judges: 
Reporter: Reports of cases argued and determined in the Superior Court of the city of New York
Volume: 42
Pages: 169–175

Head Matter:
HANNAH M. CARTER, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. DANIEL S. YOUNGS and JENNIE YOUNGS, Defendants and Appellants.
Substituted service op summons and complaint, under the ACT TO FACILITATE THE SERVICE OP PROCESS IN CERTAIN CASES,
Session Laws of 1853.
This act is applicable to cases in Which the defendant, if a resident of the State, cannot he found, after proper 'and diligent effort to effect service upon him, or, to cases in which, if found, he avoids or evades such 'service. These provisions are in the alternative form, "and are not coupled conjunctively; if, therefore, it sufficiently appeared by the affidavit upon which the order was made, that the defendant could not he found (no question being raised as to the earnestness or diligence of the effort to find him) the order was properly granted.
The word found, as used in the statute, is the equivalent of the Latin word inventus. The primary definition of the verb to find, is to come to, to meet, and hence to reach, to attain to, to arrive at,
It appears by the affidavit upon Which the order was granted in the case at bar, that the officer charged with the service of the summons, was unable to reach or get at the defendant so as to serve him personally, and such inability afforded sufficient grounds for a resort to other service, which this statute provides in cases where the defendant cannot be found, even although the defendant did not attempt to evade or avoid personal service.
Although the order appears to have been made on the ground of an evasion or avoidance of service, it was not irregularly or improvidently granted. The question is, does the law authorize the act upon the facts appearing in the case, namely, that the defendant could not he found hy the officer.
Jurisdiction does not depend upon the intention of the officer or tribunal undertaking to act, but upon the facts upon which they act.
Ch. J. Curtis, in an opinion that concurs in the result, holds that under the facts in the case, the defendant, through his wife as his agent, or acting for him in the premises at the time, declined or avoided the service, and the order for substituted service was authorized thereby.
Before Curtis, Ch. J., and Sanford and Freedman, JJ.
Decided March 5, 1877.
Appeal from an order denying defendant’s motion to set aside an order made for a substituted service of the summons and complaint on the defendant Daniel S. Youngs.
The summons and complaint were served, on March 27, on the defendant Mrs. Youngs, at the-residence of the defendants, by a deputy sheriff. She informed him that her husband was ill within the house, and declined to give him permission to see him or to serve him. The officer in Ms affidavit stated he was unable for these reasons to make such service, and an order was made for a substituted service. The affidavits to vacate the order for a substituted service show that at the time the defendant Darnel S. Youngs was ill in the house, and that a personal service, by disturbing and exciting Mm, would probably have been detrimental to Mm.
Luther R. Marsh, for appellants.
George W. Lord, for respondent.

Opinion:
By the Court.—Sanford, J.
The "Act to facilitate the service of process in certain cases" (Laws of 1853, ch. 511), materially enlarges the power of courts and 'judges to dispense with the necessity of personal service; and, without directly amending the Code, in terms, greatly modifies its provisions with respect to the manner in which the service of a summons may be made. Under subdivision 2 of section 135 of the Code, service by publication can only be made when it appears by affidavit to the satisfaction of the' court not only that the person upon whom service is to be made cannot, after due diligence, be found within the State, but also, if he be a resident of the State, that he has departed therefrom, with intent to defraud his creditors, or to avoid the service of a summons, or keeps himself concealed therein with the like intent. Satisfactory proof must be furnished, as well of such departure or concealment, and with the intent aforesaid, as of the fact that the person upon whom service is to be made cannot be found.
In Towsley v. McDonald (32 Barb. 604), a judgment rendered upon service by publication was held void for want of jurisdiction, because the affidavits on which the order of publication was made failed to show an intent to defraud creditors or to avoid the service of a summons, although it sufficiently appeared that the defendant was a resident of the State, and could not be found therein, but had either departed therefrom or kept himself concealed. And in that case the court refused to infer an intent to avoid service from the fact of departure or concealment, in the absence of proof that a suit was threatened, expected or feared.
In Van Rensselaer v. Dunbar (4 How. Pr. 151), an order for publication was refused, where the officer who had the summons saw and pursued the defendant, but failed to effect service, by reason of the superior fleetness of defendant's horse. It was remarked in that case, that if the statute had only required, generally, that the defendant could- not be found within the State, and the sheriff had returned non est inventus, that might have been sufficient; as it is said that a return non est inventus is good, even if the plaintiff know where to find defendant. But inasmuch as the defendant, although not to Yucfound, could not also be said to have concealed himself with intent to avoid the ser vice of a summons, it was held that the case was not brought within the statute, and the application was denied.
The act of 1853, authorizing substituted service, is applicable either to cases in which the defendant, if a resident of the State, cannot be found, after proper and diligent effort to effect service upon him, or to cases in which, if found, he avoids or evades such service. The provisions of the act are in the alternative form. They are not coupled conjunctively, as is the case in the Code. If, therefore, it sufficiently appeared by the affidavit upon which the order was made, that the defendant Daniel S. Youngs could not be found, no question being made as to the earnestness and diligence of the effort to find him, the order was properly granted, and the motion to vacate it was properly denied.
I think the word found is used in the statute in its technical sense, as the equivalent of the Latin word inventus, which has long been employed in legal practice. Indeed, the two words are synonymous, as well in them general as in their technical use. " To find," says Webster, "coincides in origin with venio, but in sense with invenio." And the literal signification of invenio is to come upon, to get at. The primary definition of to find, as given by Webster, is to come to, to meet; and hence, to reach, to attain to, to arrive at. It appears by the affidavit upon which the order now in question was made, that the deputy charged with the service of the summons in this suit was quite unable to reach or get at the defendant so as to serve him personally; and such inability afforded sufficient warrant for resorting to the remedy which the statute affords in cases where the defendant cannot be found, even although no attempt may have been made by the defendant to avoid or evade such service. For this reason, I am of opinion that the order for substituted service was not irregularly or improvidently granted, notwithstanding it appears on its face to have been made on the ground of an avoidance or evasion of service, and not upon the ground above considered. Every intendment is in favor of the jurisdiction ; and ' jurisdiction does not depend upon the intention of the officer or tribunal undertaking to act. The question is, Does the law authorize the act?" (Snyder v. Plass, 28 N. Y. 465).
I cannot assent to the proposition that the affidavit shows either an avoidance or evasion of service on the part of Mr. Youngs, since there is no proof whatever that he suspected or believed, or had reason to suppose that a suit was about to be instituted against him, or that process or papers were about to be served. But inasmuch as it appeared that he could not by proper and diligent effort be found, and personal service could not, for that reason be made, I am of opinion that the motion to vacate was properly denied, and that the order appealed from should be affirmed with costs.
Freedman, J., concurred.