Case Name: Miles Parker, Resp't, v. Orville M. Knox, App'lt
Court: New York Supreme Court, General Term
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1891-07-07
Citations: 40 N.Y. St. Rep. 34
Docket Number: 
Parties: Miles Parker, Resp’t, v. Orville M. Knox, App’lt
Judges: 
Reporter: New York State Reporter
Volume: 40
Pages: 34–40

Head Matter:
Miles Parker, Resp’t, v. Orville M. Knox, App’lt
(Supreme Court, General Term, Fourth Department,
Filed July 7, 1891.)
1. Fraud—Principal and agent—Evidence—Principal presumed to be SOLVENT.
Defendant falsely represented himself to be the agent of one Elkins in purchasing plaintiff’s hops in order to obtain them for speculative purposes. Upon the trial of an action to recover damages the judge refused to charge that plaintiff must show affirmatively that the alleged principal was solvent and responsible. Reid, no error.
3. Same—Election oe remedies.
The court declined to charge, on defendant’s request, that a verdict or judgment in this .case would not be a bar to an action by the plaintiff against the agent for a breach of contract to buy the hops on his own account, adding, that “ having selected this remedy and the method for enforcing it, that it is a selection which he must stand by.” Reid, error, as this was not a case where the doctrine of election applied. (Martin, J., dissenting.)
Appeal from a judgment entered in Madison county upon a verdict taken at a circuit in that county for $1,700.74. Also an appeal from an order denying a motion for a new trial heard upon the case and exceptions at a special term. Plaintiff in his complaint alleges that on the 26 th day of June, 1889, he was the owner of a quantity of hops, and that the defendant “for the purpose of obtaining control of the same for speculative purposes, falsely and fraudulently represented and stated to the plaintiff that he, the defendant, was duly authorized by one George W. Elkins, who was well known to the plaintiff to be a reputable and solvent hop dealer, to buy the plaintiff’s hops, and offered the plaintiff for said hops as the alleged agent of said Elkins the sum of twenty-two cents per pound. * * * That the plaintiff, relying on the said representations of the defendant, that he was the agent of said Elkins and had the right to buy said hops for him, and believing that the sale was made to said Elkins as the principal of said defendant, sold his ninety-seven bales of hops, weighing 18,456 net, to the defendant as per his offer of twenty-two cents per pound. That the defendant paid the plaintiff on account of said sale twenty dollars, and agreed to weigh, inspect and pay for said hops at the plaintiff’s hop kiln in the town of Madison, county of Madison, where said hops then were, on the following Saturday or Tuesday. That the plaintiff, on both of said days, was prepared to deliver said hops, as aforesaid, but the defendant failed to put in an appearance and to take said hops. That the defendant promised from time to time to take said hops, alleging as an excuse that his principal, said Elkins, was away from his place of business among the brewers, or had no place for them just at the time, and would fix new dates, but always defaulted, and failed to take said hops and pay for the same the purchase price aforesaid. That thereafter and about the month of August, 1889, plaintiff learned that the defendant had no authority for said Elkins to buy said hops as aforesaid, and plaintiff alleges on information and belief that defendant had no authority to buy said hops for said Elkins, and was not his agent and had no authority to bind him on said purchase.” The plaintiff also alleges that on the 26th of June the hops were worth twenty-two cents in the market; “ that thereafter the market value of hops declined so that when plaintiff learned that said defendant was not the agent for said Elkins in making said purchase, and that said sale had not in fact been made to said Elkins and the defendant refused to take said hops and pay for the same, said hops were only worth in the market the sum of nine cents per pound, at which said sum the plaintiff sold said hops as soon as he reasonably could, on or about September 25, 1889, and said sale at nine cents per pound was the full value of said hops and all that the plaintiff could obtain for the same.”
The answer of the defendant contained a denial of the allegations of the complaint.
Jenkins & Devereux, for app’lt; Haskell & Coley, for resp’t.

Opinion:
Hardin, P. J.
Upon an inspection of the evidence it is seen that the same is sufficient to sustain the verdict. The evidence sustains the allegations of fraud; we may not, therefore, interfere with the verdict as being against the weight of evidence. Upon the facts found by the verdict a cause of action is made out against the defendant. Brackett v. Griswold, 112 N. Y., 454; 21 N. Y. State Rep., 791.
(2.) In the course of the charge delivered by the learned trial judge to the jury he said: "If you say that the plaintiff is entitled to recover in this case the rule would be the actual loss which he has sustained by reason of this false and fraudulent representation, and, gentlemen, that would be the difference between the contract price of these hops at which they were sold and were to have been taken and the price which they were actually worth at the time they ought to have been delivered."
At another point in the charge the court observed: " If the plaintiff is entitled to recover in this action, he is entitled within the rules of law of this state to recover the actual damage which he has sustained, and the rule is not very much different, or very widely different, in actions sounding in tort under the facts in this case than upon a breach of contract, or if the action had been brought for a breach of contract in an action at law merely." The defendant's counsel took a general exception " to that part of the charge in which the court states the rule of damages in this case," and accompanying the exception was a request " to say to the jury that the plaintiff must show affirmatively that Elkins was solvent and responsible." In response to that request the court declined to charge the proposition. We think there was no error in declining to yield to the request; the presumption was that Elkins was "solvent and responsible," and so far as the evidence bears upon that question it indicates that he was solvent and responsible.
(3) The defendant's counsel asked the court "to charge directly that a verdict or judgment for the defendant in this case would not be a bar to an action by the plaintiff against Knox for a breach of contract to buy the hops upon his own account." In response to that request the court observed: " I decline to charge that. I think the rule is, having selected this remedy and the method of enforcing it, that it is a selection which he must stand by, and I decline to charge the proposition." If the court had simply declined to yield to the request, we might say that the request was not upon a material issue in the case, but we must consider the further language used by. the court, to wit:' " The rule is, having selected this remedy and the method of enforcing it, that it is a selection which he must stand by, and I decline to charge the proposition." We think this is not a case where the doctrine of election applies. The plaintiff charges the defendant in his. complaint, and in the evidence produced, with having committed a fraud, and that he fraudulently represented that he was the agent for Elkins. It might well be that there was no fraud, and the jury might have been properly instructed that if they found there was no fraud, there could not be a recovery against the defendant in the form of action adopted here. We fail to see, however, that such failure would have prevented the plaintiff from recovering against the defendant upon the theory that he himself had become the purchaser of the hops and was liable as upon the contract made by the plaintiff. It is a familiar principle that when a party assumes to act as agent for another and induces a contract upon that assumption, and it turns out that there was no authority in fact to act for the supposed or alleged principal, the agent himself is liable upon the contract. We think it does not require the same evidence to support an action for alleging that defendant is liable upon the contract made as it does to support an action alleging that he fraudulently represented that he was authorized as agent for a party to act. As was said in Bowen v. Mandeville, 95 N. Y., 241, " In the one case the recovery is based upon the express liability assumed by the party in his contract, and in the other upon the liability incurred for a violation of the duty- of honesty and fair dealing which the law enjoins upon one in his dealings with another." We think for the error pointed out that there must be a new trial.
Judgment and order reversed and a new trial ordered, with costs to abide the event
Merwin, J., concurs.