Case Name: NEWBERRY ET AL. v. UNITED STATES
Court: Supreme Court of the United States
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 1921-05-02
Citations: 256 U.S. 232
Docket Number: No. 559
Parties: NEWBERRY ET AL. v. UNITED STATES.
Judges: Mr. Justice McKenna concurs in this opinion as applied to the statute under consideration which was enacted prior to the Seventeenth Amendment; but he reserves the question of the power of Congress under that Amendment.
Reporter: United States Reports
Volume: 256
Pages: 232–295

Head Matter:
NEWBERRY ET AL. v. UNITED STATES.
ERROR TO THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN.
No. 559.
Argued January 7, 10, 1921.
Decided May 2, 1921.
1. Section*8 of the “Federal Corrupt Practices Act ” (June 25,,1910, c. 392, 36 Stat. 822; amended August 19, 1911, c. 33, 37 Stat. 25), which undertakes to limit the amount of money which any candidate for the office of Representative in Congress or of United States Senator shall give, contribute, expend, use, or promise, or cause to be given, contributed, expended, used, or promised, in procuring his nomination or election, is unconstitutional. So held, as applied to a primary election of candidates for a seat in the Senate. P. 247.
2. The power of Congress over elections of Senators and Representatives has its source in § 4 of Art. I of the Constitution, which provides: “The times, places and manner of holding elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by law make or alter such regulations, except as to the places of chusing Senators.” P. 247.
3. An indefinite, undefined power in Congress over elections of Senators and Representatives, not derived from Art. I, § 4, cannot be inferred from the fact that the offices were created by the Constitution, or by assuming that the Government must be free from any control by the States over matters affecting the choice of its officers, — a false assumption, ignoring powers clearly vested in the States under the Constitution and the federal, character of the Government. P. 249.
•4. Elections, within the original intendment of §4 of Art. I, were those wherein Senators should be chosen by legislatures and Representatives by voters possessmg “the qualifications requisite for ■ electors of the most numerous branch of the State Legislature.” Art. I, §§ 2 and 3. P. 250.'
5. The Seventeenth Amendment neither announced nor requires a new meaning of election, and the word now has the same general significance as it did when the Constitution came into existence,— final choice of an officer by the duly qualified electors. P. 250.
6. Primaries are in no sense elections for office, but merely methods by which party adherents agree upon candidates whom they intend to offer and support for ultimate choice by all qualified electors. P. 250.
7. The Seventeenth Amendment does not modify Art. I,' § 4, the source of congressional power to regulate the times, places and manner of holding elections; that section remains intact and applicable to the election of both Representatives and Senators. P. 252.
8. The Act of June 4,1914, e. 103, 38 Stat. 384, providing a temporary method of conducting the nomination and election of Senators, sheds no light on the power of Congress to regulate primaries and conventions. P. 253.
9. Even if the Seventeenth Amendment gave power to regulate primaries for the choice of senatorial candidates, its adoption did not validate the earlier penal statute on the subject (Act of 1910-1911, swpra, par. 1); an after-acquired power cannot ex proprio vigore validate a statute void when enacted. P. 254.
10. Section 2 of the Act of June 4, 1914, supra, if it could be regarded as an attempt to regulate nominations of Senators, based on the Amendment, would have no bearing on a prosecution under the Act of 1910-1911, for conduct occurring after that section expired by its own limitation. P. 254.
11. The power to control party primaries for designating candidates for the Senate is not within the grant of power “to regulate the manner of holding elections ” (Art. I, § 4)., — neither within the fair intendment of the words -used nor the meaning ascribed to them by the framers of the Constitution; it is not necessary in order to effectuate the power expressly granted (Art. I, § 8, cl. 18); and its exercise would interfere with.purely domestic affairs of the States and infringe upon liberties reserved to the people. P. 256.
Reversed.
Wbit of error to a conviction and sentence under an indictment charging conspiracy to violate the Federal Corrupt Practices Act. The case is stated in the opinion, post, 243.
. Mr. Charles E. Hughes, with whom Mr. James O. Murfin, Mr. Martin W. Littleton and Mr. George E. Nichols were on the briefs, for plaintiffs in error:
The statutory provision in question is without constitutional authority. Article I, § 4, of the Constitution, is the only provision of the Constitution which can be invoked in the attempt to find authority for the legislation upon which this prosecution is. based. United States v. Gradwell, 243 U. S. 476, 481, 482.. The power thus conferred upon Congress is a limited one, confined to regulations of “the times, places and manner of holding elections.”
The qualifications of electors, and of those who might be elected, ¿re defined in other provisions. It is apparent that while Congress should have the power to regulate the times, places and manner of holding elections, it was not intended otherwise to detract from the freedom of the people of the States with respect to their political activities. The conditions with respect to suffrage in the several States, at the time of the adoption of the Constitution, are stated in Minor v. Happersett, 21 Wall. 162, 172. Each State had determined for itself who should have the right to vote, and, in creating the new government, it was provided, with respect to the choice of members of the House, that “the electors in each State shall have the qualifications requisite for electors of the most numerous branch of the state legislature ” (Art. I, § 2); and with respect to the Senators that they should be “chosen by the legislature ” of each State (Art. I, § 3). And when the Seventeenth Amendment was adopted, a provision was made with respect to the qualifications of electors similar to that which obtains in the case of electors of the members of the House.
With these provisions as to qualifications of electors, the measure of control given to Congress was the control of “the times, places and manner of holding elections ” with the exception as to “the places of chusing Senators.” As to the Senate, the extent of the power was to regulate the “time ” and “manner” The Federalist, No. LX. See, also, Farrand, Records of Federal Convention, vol. 3, pp. 194, 195, 267, 311, 319, 344, 345, 359.
The sole question then is whether the statute is a regulation of the “manner of holding elections.”
The “election ” is the choice of the Senator or Representative, and the “holding ” of the election is the taking of the vote to determine the choice. The regulation of the “manner ” of holding elections is manifestly the regulation of the way in which the vote to determine the choice shall be taken and registered.
As Congress has the power to regulate the taking of the vote, Congress has the power to protect the qualified voters in exercising their right to vote at the time when the vote is taken. Congress also has the power to supervise the taking of the vote in order to make sure that the vote is duly taken, and Congress may also prescribe how the vote shall be counted and the result registered. In this power to regulate there would be involved the power to protect the voter in the casting of his vote, to protect the evidence of the vote, to insure freedom from any improper tampering with the vote or with the counting of the vote or with the registration of its result.
Congress is thus authorized to surround the election. that is, the taking of the vote, with appropriate safeguards and with such adequate supervision as will insure to the voter the free exercise of his right and establish the choice as shown by the vote properly taken and counted. Ex parte Siebold, 100 U. S. 371, 396; Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U. S. 651, 661; United States v. Mosley, 238 TJ. S. 383; In re Coy, 127 U. S. 731, 752.
The history of the action of Congress under the authority conferred by Art. I, § 4, reviewed by Mr. Justice Clarke in United States v. Gradwell, supra, 482-484, is most instructive. A distinction is at once apparent between the regulation of the manner of holding elections, in order to protect the rights of the voter and to secure a fair count, and the attempt to interfere with or control the activities of the people of the States in the conduct of political campaigns. In other words, if we assume the validity of regulations which protect each qualified voter in the exercise of his right to vote and which provide for the supervision of the casting of the vote and the proper ascertainment of the result, then the question is whether Congress can go further and at|pmpt to control the educational campaign. Upon what ground can it be said that Congress can provide how many meetings shall be held, where meetings shall be held, how many speakers shall be allowed to speak for a candidate, how many circulars may be distributed, how many committees may act in behalf of a candidate, how they shall be organized and what shall be the limit of their honest activity?
In the exercise of the power conferred, prior to the legislation now under consideration, Congress always dealt with the election and the conduct of the election, and never with the nominating process.
If it be sa:'.d that it was not the intention of Congress by this legislation to regulate the “election,” but to impose a restriction upon the candidate as an individual, the act nevertheless would be invalid.
The so-called “nominating primary ” was unknown at the time of the adoption of the Constitution; it is a development of comparatively recent years. The nominating primary, like the nominating convention and its predecessor, the caucus, is not the “election.” The nominating process is distinct from the election, and it was so regarded at the time of the adoption of the Constitution.
What the term “elections ” meant at the time of the adoption of the Constitution, it means now. See Hawke v. Smith, 253 U. S. 221, 227, 228, involving the meaning of the word “legislatures,” as used in Article V with respect to the ratification of amendments. The ruling in that case is not at all at variance with the familiar decisions that when a constitutional provision embodies a certain concept, whatever is properly within the concept is embraced within the words of the Constitution, although it lay far beyond the vision of the framers of the Constitution! In re Debs, 158 U. S. 564, 591; Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U. S. 251.
No one would have the hardihood'to suggest that within the meaning of the framers of the Constitution the word “elections ” had reference to anything else than the taking of the vote for Senators or Representatives.
At the time of ‘the adoption of the Constitution, the nomination process was a very simple one. No one could have confused it with an “election.” Nominations were early made at the caucus, which was either an iniormal gathering of the voters of a particular district or a “legislative” or “congressional” caucus. It was not regulated by law and no one regarded it as an “election.” Later, the caucus gave way to the nominating convention to which delegates were chosen. But no one supposed that the nominating convention was an “election.” It is only recently that nominating conventions have been subject to legal regulation in the States. The introduction of the so-called primary system was simply another phase of the nominating process. The primary was no more an “election,” within the meaning of the Constitution, than the nominating convention or the caucus was an “election.” It is a mere accidental circumstance that because of the method adopted in the primary there has come into use the expression “primary election.” The present use of this term has nothing to do with the meaning of “elections ” as used in Art. I, § 4.
In providing that Congress might substitute its regulation for that of the States with reference to the “election ” the framers of the Constitution had reference to a very distinct subject of regulation, to-wit,. the “election ” itself. There had been no attempt to regulate by law the nominating process. There was nothing at the time of the adoption of the Constitution, or for approximately a hundred years after, which savored of an attempt to. regulate the political activities of citizens so far as these related to nominations.
It follows then that the Constitution used a term with a well-defined meaning. There is nothing in the knowledge, spirit or coriditions of the times which suggests any purpose to widen that term so to embrace that which according to its natural significance it did not embrace. It is inconceivable that, had there been any intention to delegate power to regulate the process of nominations, the framers of the Constitution would have been content to provide for the regulation of the “times, places and manner of holding elections.”
We think there is far more to be said for the proposition that the word “legislatures ” in Art. V referred to those who legislated whether a representative body or the people themselves than to say that the word “elections ” in Art. I, § 4, embraces the nominating process.
Even under state constitutions the term “elections ” does not embrace so-called “primary elections ” when the term refers to the election of public officers.
State v. Erickson, 119 Minnesota, 152, 156; State v. Taylor, 220 Missouri, 618, 631; Zentv. Nicholsj 50 Washington,. 508, 522; Ledgerivood v. Pitts, 122 Tennessee, 570, 587; State v. Woodruff, 68 N. J. L. 89, 94; Commonwealth v. Wells, 110 Pa. St. 463, 468; People v. Cavanaugh, 112 California, 674, 676, 677, and other cases, including United Stales v. O’Toole, 236 Fed. Rep. 993, 996 (heard with United States v. Gradwell, 243 U. S. 476, and affirmed).
We find in Art. I, § 6, subdiv. 2, the provision that “No Senator or Representative shall, during the time for which he was elected, be appointed to any civil office under the authority of the United States/’ etc. It is obvious that the word “elected ” does not mean “nominated.” And the Senator or Representative is elected at the “election ” and not before.
The “elections” of Representatives to which Art. I, § 4, refers, and the manner of holding which may be regulated by Congress, are the “elections ” at which the “electors,” to whom reference is made in Art. I, §2, vote. It is because they vote at the “elections ” for members of the House that they are called “electors.” But the term “electors ” like the term “elections ” has no reference to a nominating primary. If Congress has the power to regulate -a nominating primary, it has also the power to regulate a nominating convention and the vote of delegates at a nominating convention.
We venture to say that there is not a word in the Constitution, or in any contemporary document, which can be tortured into a support of the view that “elections ” in Art. I, § 4, comprehends any nominating system.
The meaning of the word “elections ” is not extended by the expression “manner of holding ” elections, for the manner of holding the election is necessarily limited to the election which is held.
If Congress under Art. I, §4, has the power which it has sought to exercise in the statute in question, it has the power to abolish all primary elections for Senators and Representatives in every State of the Union. It has the power to establish conventions, to overthrow conventions, to provide any sort of a primary that it may desire to provide. Such interferences with the rights and privileges of the citizens of the several States have no warrant in the Constitution*
The Solicitor General and Mr. Frank C. Dailey, Special Assistant to the Attorney General, for the United States:
A Senator being an officer of the United States holding an office created by the Constitution and constituting a part of the Federal Government, all matters relating to his election belong to the Government of the United States, which has the same power over them that the States have over matters relating to the election of state officers, unless restricted by the Constitution itself.
It is assumed in the argument in behalf of the plaintiffs in error that the only power which Congress has over the election of Senators and Representatives is derived from Art. I, § 4, of the Constitution, relating to the times, places, and manner of holding such elections. This is by no means true. That section, on the contrary, contains only a grant of power to the States to be exercised subject to the control of Congress, in the exercise of a power which would, be its, even if this section were not in the Constitution.
The Government of the United States is not a confederation of States. It is a government ordained by the people of the United States and, within the sphere of its powers, wholly independent of the state governments. A Senator or a Representative in Congress holds an office which was created by the Constitution. He is chosen not by the States but by that portion ©f the people of the United States who reside in the State in which he is elected. He is an officer, not of any State but of the Federal Government. Lamar v. United States, 241 U. S. 103, 112. Unless, therefore, the Constitution itself indicates a contrary intention, his election is a matter which concerns only the Federal Government and in no way a state government. It would certainly be an anomaly if one government had the unrestricted power to control matters affecting the choice- of the officers of another and entirely independent government. Control of matters relating to the selection of those who are to function as a part of a particular government would seem necessarily to inhere in that government itself. Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U. S. 651, 657.
It is true that the Constitution, fixes the qualification of voters by reference to state laws. This does not mean, however, that the voter derives his right to vote from the State rather than from the' Constitution of the United States. Ex parte Yarbrough, supra, 663.
Whatever power the . States have over matters relating to the election of federal officers is not one of their reserved powers but a power expressly conferred by the Constitution.
The only power conferred on the States by the Constitution over matters relating to the election of Senators and Representatives is' expressly made subordinate to the power of Congress' over the same matter. Const., Art. I, § 4; Seventeenth Arndt. In effect, what was done by § 4 was to provide that the first Congress should be elected' through the use of the election machinery of the various States, and that this method of electing congressmen should continue, except as Congress might, from time to time, see fit to alter it or to supplant it with election machinery of its own. If, therefore, the power to make regulations relating to primary elections is included in the power to prescribe the manner of holding elections, the exercise of this power is subject to the control of Congress. Whatever power the States may exert over congressional or senatorial primaries, -in the absence of action by Congress, may be exerted under the express provision of § 4 by Congress whenever deemed necessary.
If Congress has no power to make regulations of the kind now involved, neither have States, and there is no power anywhere which can control and prevent excessive expenditures- by candidates for senatorial or congressional nominations. And yet, practically, and to all intents and purposes in many States, the most important and decisive act in the choosing of officers is the nomination.
The States undoubtedly have the power to regulate primary elections for the selection of candidates for state offices, because such regulations are necessary to protect the integrity of elections themselves. For the same reason Congress has the power to regulate primary elections for choosing candidates for federal offices.
Ample authority to sustain this legislation is found in Art. I, § 4, of the Constitution, even if the necessary power must be derived from that section; and, even if the word “elections” as there used is not construed as including primary elections, the law is still constitutional. This section must be read in connection with the last clause of Art. I, § 8, which confers upon Congress the power to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the powers expressly granted. Ex parte Siebold, 100 TJ. S. 374, 396; Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U. S. 651, 658; United States v. Gradwell, 243 U. S. 476, 482...
Manifestly, this provision of the Constitution grew out of the conviction that it would be suicidal for the new government to commit-to. any other government a controlling power over the choosing of its officers without reserving to itself a .-supervisory power. For a State to arrange its election laws by providing for two elections, the first for the purpose of reducing the number of candidates and the second for the purpose of choosing between the surviving candidates, is, in many States, for all practicable purposes, equivalent to .choosing the officials in the first or primary elections.

Opinion:
Me. Justice McReynolds
delivered the opinion of the court.
Plaintiffs in error — Trumán H. Newberry, Paul H. King and fifteen others — were found guilty of conspiring (Criminal Code, §37) .to violate §8, Act of Congress approved June 25, 1910, c. 392, 36 Stat. 822-824, as amended by Act of August 19,1911, c. 33, 37 Stat. 25-29,— The Federal Corrupt Practices Act — which provides: "No candidate for Representative in Congress or for Senator of the United States shall give, contribute, expend, use, or promise, or cause to be given, contributed, expended, used, or promised, in procuring his nomination and election, any sum, in the aggregate, in excess of the amount which he may lawfully give, contribute, expend, or promise under the laws of the State in which he resides: Provided, That no candidate for Representative in Congress shall give, contribute, expend, usé, or promise any sum, in the aggregate, exceeding five thousand dollars in any campaign for his nomination and election; and no candidate for Senator of the United States shall give, contribute, expend, use, or promise any sum, in the aggregate, exceeding ten thousand dollars in any campaign for his nomination and election: Provided further, That money expended by any such candidate to meet and'discharge any assessment, fee, or charge made or levied upon candidates by the laws of the State in which he resides, or for his necessary personal expenses, incurred for himself alone, for travel and subsistence, stationery and postage, writing or printing (other than in newspapers), and distributing letters, circulars, and posters, and for telegraph and telephone service, shall not be regarded as an expenditure within the meaning of this section, and shall not be considered any part of the sum herein fixed as the limit of expense and need not be shown in the statements herein required to be filed."
Act No. 109, § 1, Michigan Legislature, 1913, prohibits expenditure by or on behalf of a candidate, to be paid by him, in securing his nomination, of any sum exceeding twenty-five per céntima of one year's compensation; and puts like limitation upon expenditures to obtain election after nomination. Section 1 is copied below.
Taken with ühe state enactment, the federal statute in effect declares a candidate, for the United States .Senate, punishable by fine and imprisonment, if (except foi cer tain specified purposes) he give, contribute, expend, use, promise or cause to be given, contributed, expended, used or promised in procuring his nomination and election more than $3,750.00 — one-half of one year's salary. Under the construction of the act urged .by the Government and adopted by the court below it is not necessary that the inhibited sum be paid, promised or expended by the candidate himself, or be devoted to any secret or immoral purpose. For example, its open and avowed contribution and use by supporters upon suggestion by him or with his approval and cooperation in order to promote public discussion and debate touching vital questions or to pay necessary expenses of speakers, etc., is enough. And upon such interpretation the conviction below was asked and obtained.
The indictment charges: That Truman H. Newberry became a candidate for the Republican nomination for United States Senator from' Michigan at the primary election held August-27, 1918; that by reason of selection and nomination therein he became a candidate at the general election, November 5, 1918; that he and 134 others (who are named) at divers times from December 1, 1917, to November 5, 1918, unlawfully and feloniously did conspire, combine, confederate, and agree together to commit the offense on his part of wilfully violating the Act of Congress approved June 25, 1910,' as amended, by giving, contributing, expending, and using and by causing to be given, contributed, expended and used, in procuring his nomination and election at said primary and general elections, a greater sum than the laws of Michigan permitted and above ten thousand dollars, to wit, $100,000.00, and on the part of the other defendants of aiding, counseling, inducing, and procuring Newberry as such candidate to give, contribute, expend, and use or cause to be given, contributed, expended and used said large and excessive sum in order to procure his nomination and election. Plaintiffs in error were convicted under count one, set out in the margin.
The court below overruled a duly interposed demurrer which challenged the constitutionality of § 8; and by so doing we'think fell into error.
Manifestly, this section applies not only to final elections for choosing Senators but also to primaries and conventions of political parties for selection of candidates. Michigan and many other States undertake to control -these primaries by statutes and give recognition -to their results. And the ultimate question for solution here is whether under the grant of power to regulate "the manner of holding elections " Congress may fix the maximum sum which a candidate therein may spend, or advise or cause to be contributed and spent by others to procure his nomination.
Section 4, Art. I, of the Constitution provides: "The times, places and manner of holding elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by law make or alter such regulations, except as to the places of choosing Senators." Here is the source of congressional power oyer the elections specified. It has been so declared by this court—Ex parte Siebold, 100 U. S. 371; United States v. Gradwell, 243 U. S. 476, 481—and the early discussions clearly show that this was then the accepted opinion. The Federalist, LVIII, LIX, LX; Elliot's Debates, vol. II, 50, 73, 311; vol. Ill, 86, 183, 344, 375; vol. IV, 75, 78, 211.
We find' no support in reason or authority for the argument that because the offices were created by the Constitution, Congress has some indefinite, undefined power over elections for Senators and Representatives not derived from § 4. "The government, then, of the United States, can claim no powers which are not granted to it by the Constitution, and the powers actually granted, must be such as are expressly given, or given by necessary implication." Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 1 Wheat. 304, 326. Clear constitutional provisions also negative any possible inference of such authority because of the supposed anomaly "if one government had the unrestricted power to control matters affecting the choice of the officers of another." Mr. Iredell (afterwards of this court) in the North Carolina Convention of 1788, pointed out that the States may — must indeed — exert some unrestricted control over the Federal Government. "The very existence of the general government depends on that of the state governments. The state legislatures are to choose the senators. Without a Senate there can be no Congress. The state legislatures are also to direct -the manner of choosing the President. Unless, therefore, there are state legislatures to direct that manner, no President can be chosen. The same observation may be made as to the House of Representatives, since, as they, are to be chosen by the electors of the most numerous branch of each state legislature, if there are no state legislatures, there are no persons to choose the House of Representatives. Thus it is evident that the very existence of the general government depends on that of the state legislatures." Elliot's Debates, vol. IV, p. 52. See also The Federalist, XLIY. The federal features of our Government are so clear and have been so often declared that no valuable discussion can proceed upon the opposite assumption.
Undoubtedly elections within the original intendment of § 4 were those wherein- Senators should be chosen by Legislatures and Representatives by voters possessing "the qualifications requisite for electors of the most numerous branch of the State Legislature." Art. I, § 2 and 3. The Seventeenth Amendment, which directs that Senators be chosen by the people, neither announced nor requires a new meaning of election and the word now has the same general significance as it did when the Constitution came into existence — final choice of an officer by the duly qualified electors. Hawke v. Smith, 253 U. S. 221. Primaries were then unknown. Moreover, they are in no sense elections for an office, but merely methods by which party adherents agree upon candidates whom they intend to offer and support, for ultimate choice by all qualified electors. General provisions touching elections in constitutions or statutes are not necessarily applicable to primaries — the two things are radically different. And this view has been declared by many state courts. People v. Cavanaugh, 112 California, 674; State v. Erickson, 119 Minnesota, 152; State v. Taylor, 220 Missouri, 618; State v. Woodruff, 68 N. J. L. 89; Commonwealth v. Wells, 110 Pa. St. 463; Ledgerwood v. Pitts, 122 Tennessee, 570.
Sundry provisions of the Constitution indicate plainly enough what its framers meant by elections and the "manner of holding " them. "The House of Representatives shall be composed of members chosen every second year by the people of the several States." "No person shall be a Representative. . . who shall not, when elected, be an inhabitant of that State in which he shall be chosen." "When vacancies happen in the representation from any State, the executive authority thereof shall issue writs of election to fill such vacancies." "Immediately after they [the Senators] shall be assembled in consequence of the first election, they shall be divided as equally as may be into three classes." "No person shall be a Senator . . . who shall not, when elected, be an inhabitant of that State for which he shall be chosen." "Each House shall be the judge of the elections, returns and qualifications of its own members." "No Senator or Representative shall, during the time for which he was elected, be appointed to any civil office," etc. "The executive power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America. He shall hold his office during the term of four years, and, together with the Vice-President, chosen for the same term, be elected as follows." "The President shall, at stated times, receive for his services a compensation, which shall'neither be increased nor diminished during the period for which he shall have been elected." And provisions in the Seventeenth Amendment are of like effect.
The plain words of the Seventeenth Amendment and those portions of the original Constitution directly affected by it, should be kept in mind. Art. I, § 3 — "The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two Senators from each State, chosen by the Legislature thereof, for six years; and each Senator shall have one vote. Immediately after they shall be assembled in consequence of the first election, they shall be divided as equally as may be into three classes." "And if vacancies happen by resignation, or otherwise, during the' recess of the legislature of any State, the executive thereof may make temporary appointments until the next meeting of the legislature, which shall then fill such vacancies." Seventeenth Amendment — "The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two Senators from each State, elected by the people thereof, for six years; and each Senator shall have one vote. The electors in each State shall have the qualifications requisite for electors of the most numerous branch of the State legislatures. When vacancies happen in the representation of any State in the Senate, the executive authority of such State shall issue writs of election to fill such vacancies: Provided, That the legislature of any State may empower the executive thereof to make temporary appointment until the people fill the vacancies by election as the legislature may direct. This amendment shall not be so construed as to affect the election or term of any Senator chosen before it becomes valid as part .of the Constitution."
As finally submitted and adopted the Amendment does not undertake to modify Art. I, § 4, the source of congressional power to regulate the times, places and manner of holding elections. That section remains "intact and applicable both to the election of Representatives and Senators." (Cong. Rec., vol. 46, p. 848.) When first reported, January 11, 1911, by Senator Borah for the Judiciary Committee, the proposed Seventeenth Amendment contained a clause providing, "The times, places and manner of holding elections for Senators shall be as prescribed in each state by the legislature thereof ' '— the avowed purpose being thereby to modify § 4, Art. I, by depriving Congress of power to regulate the manner of holding elections for Senators. (A copy, of the original resolution as presented to the Senate is in the margin.) Upon recommendation of a minority of the Judiciary Committee this clause was eliminated and reference to § 4, Art. I, omitted from the Resolution. After pro-. longed debate in the 61st 'and 62nd Congresses the Amendment in its present form was submitted for ratification. See Sen. Rep. 961, 61st Cong., 3rd sess.; Sen. Rep. 35, 62nd Cong., 1st sess.; Cong. Rec. vol. 46, pp. 847, 851, et seq.; vol. 47, passim, and pp. 1924, 1925, 1966.
Apparently because deemed unimportant no counsel on either side referred to "An Act Providing a temporary, method of conducting the nomination • and election of United States Senators," approved June 4, 1914, c.' 103, 38 Stat. 384. To show its irrelevancy and prevent misapprehension the act is copied in the margin. Section 2,.which contains the only reference to nomination of candidates for Senator, expired by express limitation June 4, 1917, more than a year prior to the conduct here challenged. The act has no criminal provisions, makes no reference to the earlier statute upon which this prosecution is founded and sheds no light on the power of Congress to regulate primaries and conventions. Its terms indicate intention that the machinery for designating party candidates shall remain under state control. But in no view can an attempt to exercise power be treated as conclusive evidence that Congress possesses such power. Otherwise serious discussion of constitutional limitations must cease. Moreover, the criminal statute now relied upon antedates the Seventeenth Amendment and must be tested by powers possessed at the time of its enactment. An after-acquired power can not ex proprio vigore validate a statute void when enacted. See Sutherland Stat. Constr., 2nd ed., vol. I, § 107.
"An Act Providing a temporary method of conducting the nomination and election of United States Senators.
A concession that the Seventeenth Amendment might be applicable in this controversy if assisted by appropriate legislation would be unimportant since there is none. Section 2, Act of June 4, 1914, had expired by express limitation many months before Newberry became a candidate, and counsel very properly disregarded it.
"Sec. 2. That in any State wherein a United States Senator is hereafter to be elected either at a general election or at any special election called by the executive authority thereof to fill a vacancy, until or unless otherwise specially provided by the legislature' thereof, the nomination of candidates for such office not heretofore made shall be made, the election to fill the same conducted, and the result thereof .determined, as near as may be in accordance with the laws of such State regulating the nomination of candidates for and election of Members at Large of the National House of Representatives: Provided, That in case no provision is made in any State for the nomination or election of Representatives at Large, the procedure shall be in accordance with the laws of such State respecting the ordinary executive and administrative officers thereof who are elected by the vote of the people of the entire State: And provided further, That in any case the candidate for Senator receiving the highest number of votes shall be deemed elected.
"Sec. 3. That section two of this Act shall expire by limitation at the end of three years from the date of its approval."
Approved, June 4, 1914.
Because deemed appropriate in order effectively to regulate the manner of holding general elections, this court has. upheld federal statutes providing for supervisors and prohibiting interference with them, declaring criminal failure by election officers to perform duties imposed by the State, and denouncing conspiracies to prevent voters from freely casting their ballots or having them counted. Ex parte Siebold, 100 U. S. 371; Ex parte Clarke, 100 U. S. 399; Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U. S. 651; In re Coy, 127 IT. S. 731; United States v. Mosley, 238 U. S. 383. These enactments had direct and immediate reference to elections by the people and decisions sustaining them do not control the present controversy. Cóngress clearly exercised its power to regulate the manner of holding- an election when it directed that voting must be by written or printed ballot or voting machines, c. 154, 30 Stat. 836.
Section 4 was bitterly attacked in the State Conventions of 1787-1789, because of its alleged possible use to create preferred classes and finally to destroy the States. In defense, the danger incident to absolute control of elections by the States and the express limitations upon the power, were dwelt upon. Mr. Hamilton asserted: "The truth is that there is no method of securing to the rich the preference apprehended, but by prescribing qualifications of property either for those who may elect, or be elected. But this forms no part of the power to be conferred upon the National Government. Its authority would be expressly restricted to the regulation of the times, the places, and the manner of elections. The qualifications of the persons who may choose, or be chosen, as has been remarked upon other occasions, are defined and fixed in the Constitution, and are unalterable by the Legislature/'' The- Federalist, LIX, LI. The history of the times indicates beyond reasonable doubt that, if the Constitution ^makers had claimed for this section the latitude we are now asked to sanction, it would not have been ratified. See Story on the Const., § 814, et seq.
Our immediate concern is with the clause which grants power by law to regulate, the "manner of holding elections for Senators and Representatives " — not broadly to regulate them. As an incident to the grant there is, of course, power to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying it into effect. Art. I, § 8, cl. 18. Although the Seventeenth Amendment now requires Senators to be chosen by the people, reference to the original plan of selection by the legislatures may aid in interpretation.
Who should participate in the specified elections was clearly indicated — members of state legislatures and those having "the qualifications requisite for electors of the- most numerous branch of the state legislature." Who should be eligible for election was also stated. "No person shall be a Representative who shall not have attained the age of twenty-five years, and been seven years a citizen of the United States, and who .shall not, when elected, be an inhabitant of that State in which he shall be chosen." "No person shall be a Senator who shall not have attained to the age of thirty years, and been nine years- a citizen of the United States, and who shall not, when elected, be an inhabitant of that State for which he shall be chosen." Two Senators were allotted to each State and the method was prescribed for deter-, mining the number of Representatives. Subject to these important limitations, Congress was empowered by law to regulate the times, places and manner of holding the elections, except as to the places of choosing Senators. • "These words are used without any veiled or obscure significance " "but in their natural and usual sense.
If it b,e practically true that under present - conditions a designated party candidate is necessary for an election— a preliminary thereto — nevertheless his selection is in no real sense part of the manner of holding the election. This does not depend upon the scheme by which candidates are put forward. Whether the candidate .be offered through primary, or convention, or petition, or request of a few, or as the result of his own unsupported ambition,' does not directly affect the manner of holding the election. Birth must precede but it is no part of either funeral or apotheosis.
Many things are prerequisites to elections or may affect their outcome — voters, education, means of transportation, health, public discussion, immigration, private animosities, even the face and figure of the candidate; but authority to regulate the manner of holding them gives no right to control any of these. It is settled, e. g., that the power to regulate interstate and foreign commerce does not reach whatever is essential thereto. Without agriculture, manufacturing, mining, etc., commerce could not exist, but this fact does not suffice to subject them to the control of Congress. Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U. S. 1.
Elections of Senators by state legislatures presupposed selection of their members by the people; but it would hardly be argued that therefore Congress could regulate such selection. In the Constitutional Convention, of 1787, when replying to the suggestion that state legislatures should have uncontrolled power over elections of members of Congress, Mr. Madison said: "It seems as improper in principle, though it might be less inconvenient in practice, to give to the state legislatures this great authority over the election of the representatives of the people in the general legislature, as it would be to give to the latter a like power over' the election of their representatives in the . state legislatures." Supplement to Elliot's Debates, vol. V, p. 402.
' We cannot conclude that authority to control party primaries or conventions for designating candidates was bestowed on Congress by the grant of power to regulate the manner of holding elections. The fair intendment of the words does not extend so far; the framers of the Constitution did not ascribe to them any such meaning. Nor is this control necessary in order to effectuate the power expressly granted. On the other hand, its exercise would interfere with purely domestic affairs of the State and infringe upon liberties reserved to the people.
It should not be forgotten that, exercising inherent police power, the State may suppress whatever evils may be incident to primary or convention. As "Each House shall be the judge of the elections, returns and qualifications of its own members," and as Congress may by law regulate the times, places and manner of holding elections, the National Government is not without power to protect itself against corruption, fraud or other malign influences.
The judgment of the court below must be reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings in conformity with this opinion.
Reversed.
Mr. Justice McKenna concurs in this opinion as applied to the statute under consideration which was enacted prior to the Seventeenth Amendment; but he reserves the question of the power of Congress under that Amendment.
Act No. 109, Michigan Legislature, 1913:
"Section 1. No sums of money shall be paid, and no expenses authorized or incurred by or on behalf of any candidate to be paid by him in order to secure or aid in securing his nomination to any public office or position in this State, in excess of twenty-five per cent of one year's compensation or salary of the office for which he is candidate: Provided, That a sum not exceeding fifty per cent of one year's salary may be expended by the candidates for Governor and Lieutenant Governor; or where the office is that of member of either branch of the Legislature of the State, the twenty-five per cent shall be computed on the.salary fixed for-the term of two years: Provided further, That no candidate shall be restricted to less than one hundred dollars in his campaign for such nomination. No- sums of money shall be paid and no expense authorized or incurred by or on behalf of any candidate who has received the nomination to any public office or position in this State, in excess of twenty-five per cent of one year's salary or compensation of the office for which he is nominated; or where the office is that of.member-of eitherbranch of the Legislature of the State, the twenty-five ^per cent shall be computed on the salary fixed for the term of two years: Provided, That no candidate, shall be restricted to less than one hundred dollars. No sum of money shall be paid and no expenses authorized or incurred by or on behalf of any candidate contrary- to the provisions of this act."
(Count One)
1 That Truman H. Newberry, Chase S. Osborne, Henry Ford and William B. Simpson, before and on August 27, 1918, were candidates for the Republican nomination for the office of Senator in the Congress of the United States from the State of Michigan at the primary election held in said State on that day under the laws of said. State, and Henry Ford and James Helm, before and on said August 27, 1918, were candidates for the Democratic nomination for the same office at said Primary election; that from said August 27, 1918, to and including November 5, 1918, said Truman H. Newberry and said Henry Ford, by reason of their election and nomination at said Primary election, became and were opposing candidates for election to the office of Senator in the Congress of the United States from said State of Michigan at the general election held in said State on said November 5,1918, —said Truman H. Newberry of the Republican Party and said Henry Ford of the Democratic Party, — each of said candidates having, on said August 27, 19Í8, and said November 5, 1918, attained to the age of thirty years and upwards and been a citizen of the United States for more than nine years and each then being an inhabitant and resident of said State; and that said Truman H. Newberry, Paul H. King [and 133 others], hereinafter called the defendants, continuously and at all and divers times throughout the period of time from December 1, 1917, to and including said November 5, 1918, at and within said Southern Division of said Western District of Michigan, unlawfully and feloniously did conspire, combine, confederate and agree together, and with divers other persons to said grand jurors unknown, to commit an offense against the United States, to-wit, the offense on the part of said Truman H. Newberry of wilfully -violating the Act of Congress approved June 25, 1910, as amended by the Acts of August 19, 1911, and August 23, 1912, by giving, contributing, expending and using and by causing to be given, contributed, expended and used, in procuring his nomination and election as such Senator at said primary and general elections, a sum, in the aggregate, in excess of the amount which he might lawfully give, contribute, expend, or use, or cause to be given, contributed, expended or used for such purpose under the laws of. said State of Michigan, to-wit the sum of one hundred thousand dollars, and by giving, contributing, expending and using and causing to be given, contributed, expended and used in .procuring his nomination and election as such Senator,-at said primary and general elections, a sum in the aggregate, in excess of ten thousand dollars, to-wit, said sum of one hundred thousand dollars, and on the part of said other defendants of aiding, counseling, inducing and procuring said Truman H. Newberry so to give, contribute, expend and use and cause to be given, contributed, expended and used said large sum of money in excess of the amounts permitted by the laws of the State of Michigan and the said Acts of Congress; the. same to be money so unlawfully given, contributed, expended and used by said Truman H. Newberry and by him caused to be given, contributed, expended and .used as such candidate for the following and other purposes, objects and things, to-wit:
Advertisements in newspapers and other publications;
Print paper, cuts, plates and other supplies furnished to newspaper publishers;
Subscriptions to newspapers;
Production, distribution and exhibition of moving pictures;
Traveling and subsistence expenses of campaign managers, public speakers, secret propagandists, field, district and county agents and solicitors, and of voters not infirm or disabled
Compensation of campaign managers, public speakers and secret propagandists, and of field, district and county agents and solicitors;
Appropriating and converting to the use óf the. defendants them selves, arid each of them, large sums of money under the guise and pretense of payment of their expenses and compensation for their services;
Rent of offices and public halls;
Bribery of election officials;
Unlawful assistance of election officials;
Bribery of voters;
Expenses and compensation of Democratic obstructionist candidates at the primary election;
Expenses and' compensation of detectives;
Dinners, banquet and other entertainments given to persons believed to be influential in said State of Michigan;
And no part of which said money was to be money expended by said Truman H. Newberry, as such candidate, to meet or discharge assessments, fees, or charges made or levied upon candidates by the laws of said State, or for his necessary personal expenses, incurred for himself alone, for .travel and subsistence, stationery and postage, writing or printing (other than in newspapers), or for distributing letters, circulars, or postage, or for telegraph or telephone service, or for proper legal expenses in maintaining or contesting the results of either of said elections.
[38 distinct and separate overt acts are specified].
And so the grand jurors aforesaid, upon their oaths aforesaid, do say, that said defendants, continuously and at all and divers times throughout the period of time in this count mentioned, at and within said division and district, in manner and form in this count aforesaid, unlawfully and feloniously did conspire to commit an offense against the United States, and certain of them did do acts to effect the object of the conspiracy; Against the peace and dignity of the United States, and contrary to the form of the statute of the same in such case made and provided.
S. J. Res., 134, 61st Congress, Cong. Rec., vol. 46, p. 847.
"Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled (two-thirds of each House concurring therein), That in lieu of the first paragraph of section 3 of' Article I of the Constitution of the United States, and in lieu of so much of paragraph 2 of the same section as relates to the filling of vacancies, and in lieu of all of paragraph 1 of section 4 of said Article I, in so far as same relates to any authority in Congress to make or alter regulations as to the times or manner of holding elections for Senators, the following be proposed as an amendment to the Constitution, which shall be valid to all intents and purposes as part of the Constitution when ratified by the legislatures of three-fourths of the States:
" 'The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two Senators from each State, elected by the people thereof for six years; and each Senator shall have one vote. The electors in each State shall have the qualifications requisite for electors of the most numerous branch of the State legislatures.
" 'The times, places, and manner of holding elections for Senators shall be as prescribed in each State by the legislature thereof.
" 'When vacancies happen in the representation of any State in the Senate, the executive authority of such State shall issue writs of election. to fill such vacancies: Provided, That the legislature of any State may empower the executive thereof to make temporary appointments until the people fill the vacancies by election, as the legislature may direct.
" 'This amendment shall not be so construed as to affect the election or term of any Senator chosen before it becomes valid as part of the Constitution.' "
Act of June 4, 1914, c. 103, 38 Stat. 384.
"Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United, States of America in Congress assembled, That at the regular election held in any State next preceding, the expiration of the term for which any Senator was elected to represent such State in Congress, at which election a Representative to Congress is regularly by law to be chosen, a United States Senator from said: State shall be elected by the people thereof for the term commencing on the fourth day of March next thereafter. . -