Case Name: William ARMSTEAD, Jr., and His Wife Debra Frank Armstead v. BOH BROS. CONSTRUCTION CO., INC., T.L. James & Company, Inc., Federal Steel Erection Company, Inc., DMJM-Curtis and Davis, and the State of Louisiana
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1992-11-24
Citations: 609 So. 2d 965
Docket Number: No. 91-CA-2614
Parties: William ARMSTEAD, Jr., and His Wife Debra Frank Armstead v. BOH BROS. CONSTRUCTION CO., INC., T.L. James & Company, Inc., Federal Steel Erection Company, Inc., DMJM-Curtis and Davis, and the State of Louisiana.
Judges: Before KLEES, BYRNES and WALTZER, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 609
Pages: 965–972

Head Matter:
William ARMSTEAD, Jr., and His Wife Debra Frank Armstead v. BOH BROS. CONSTRUCTION CO., INC., T.L. James & Company, Inc., Federal Steel Erection Company, Inc., DMJM-Curtis and Davis, and the State of Louisiana.
No. 91-CA-2614.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fourth Circuit.
Nov. 24, 1992.
Alvin G. Baham, Baham, Curet, Kron-lage & Pastor, Gretna, for plaintiffs-appellants William Armstead, Jr. et al.
H.F. Foster, III, Bienvenu, Foster, Ryan & O’Bannon, New Orleans, for defendants-appellees Boh Bros. Const. Co., Inc., et al.
Before KLEES, BYRNES and WALTZER, JJ.

Opinion:
KLEES, Judge.
Plaintiff, William Armstead, Jr. (Arm-stead), appeals the district court's dismissal of his suit against defendants, Boh Bros. Construction Co., Inc. (Boh Bros.) and T.L. James & Company (T.L. James), on a motion for summary judgment. After a review of the record and applicable law, we affirm.
Armstead was employed by Federal Steel Erection Company, Inc. (Federal Steel Erection) as an iron worker for the construction of the New Orleans Mississippi River Bridge approaches to New Orleans. On October 2, 1986 Armstead was working on a piling approximately 50 feet above ground. While descending the piling, the wooden frame on which he was climbing broke off, causing him to fall to a platform constructed below. Upon landing on the platform, Armstead struck a safety railing which also gave way, causing him to fall to the ground and suffer serious injuries. Armstead filed suit against Federal Steel Erection, Boh Bros., and T.L. James, DMJM-Curtis and Davis, and the Department of Transportation and Development, State of Louisiana (DOTD) alleging negligence and in intentional tort by "said employer."
On November 6, 1986, Boh Bros, and T.L. James filed a motion for summary judgment. In response to this motion, Armstead filed a first amending petition specifically alleging intentional torts by the other defendants, in addition to the "said employer." On September 20, 1991, after an indefinite continuance, the motion for summary judgment was heard. Upon finding that there is no dispute of material fact and that the law and evidence are in favor of the movers, the trial court granted summary judgment. It is from this judgment that Armstead has perfected • his appeal.
Armstead argues that the trial court erred in granting the defendants' motion because there are issues of material fact as to the question of the defendants' intent and whether the defendants knew that his injuries were substantially certain to result from the inadequacy of the safety rail.
In order for the plaintiffs to remove themselves from the scheme of the Louisiana's Worker's Compensation Act, they must prove that the injury resulted from an "intentional act." LSA-R.S. 23:1032(B). The Louisiana Supreme Court, in Bazley v. Tortorich, 397 So.2d 475 (La.1981), gave definition to the term "intentional act" as used in the above mentioned statute:
The meaning of "intent" is that the person who acts either (1) consciously desires the physical result of his act, whatever the likelihood of that result happening from his conduct; or (2) knows that the result is substantially certain to follow from his conduct.
Id. at 481.
To meet the Bazley test, the plaintiff must plead a specific intentional tort. Dycus v. Martin Marietta Corp., 568 So.2d 592 (La.App. 4th Cir.1990); Caudle v. Betts, 512 So.2d 389 (La.1987). The Dycus court in light of Caudle concluded the "substantially certain" test is not an alternative to proving intent, but would be applied only to acts classified as traditional intentional torts such as battery, assault, false imprisonment, etc. Dycus at 594.
The issue here is whether the defendants' actions were intentional acts which fall under the exception to the compensation act. In the instant case, Armstead indicates that the defendants may have failed to provide the plaintiff with a safe place to work and therefore may be negligent. However, as illustrated in Hood v. South Louis Medical Center, 517 So.2d 469 (La.App. 1st Cir.1987), failure to maintain safe conditions in the workplace may give rise to conditions "which, at most, could be said to have made the occurrence of an accident likely, but the circumstances fall short of indicating that injury to plaintiff was inevitable or substantially certain to occur." Id. at 471.
Armstead's allegations that the defendants acted in such a manner that rose to the level of an intentional tort and that injury was substantially certain to follow are insufficient to substantiate any "intent" as established by law, but rather raise the question of negligence. Because of the exclusive provision of the worker's compensation statute, the defendants' negligence is not a material issue. Under Louisiana law, a motion for summary judgment is the proper procedure for the defendant-employers to object to an employee's general allegations that injuries resulted from an intentional tort. Mayer v. Valentine Sugars, Inc., 444 So.2d 618 (La.1984). Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons summary judgment was properly granted and the trial court is affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
WALTZER, J., dissents with reasons.