Case Name: F. A. Comfort, Appellee, v. L. D. Kittle, Appellant
Court: Iowa Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Iowa
Decision Date: 1890-10-17
Citations: 81 Iowa 179
Docket Number: 
Parties: F. A. Comfort, Appellee, v. L. D. Kittle, Appellant.
Judges: 
Reporter: Iowa Reports
Volume: 81
Pages: 179–189

Head Matter:
F. A. Comfort, Appellee, v. L. D. Kittle, Appellant.
1. Criminal Procedure: witnesses: Recognizance : statute. Section 4385 of the Code being an exact transcript of section 4744 of the Revision of I860, except in the substitution of the word “ cognizance” in the later statute for “recognizance,” and from the inapplicability of a cognizance to the evident purposes of the statute, the ’above change of words must be deemed to have been made by mistake in transcribing the section of the revision, and the section as it now stands in the Code is to be construed as authorizing courts and judges to require a “recognizance” for the appearance of witnesses in criminal proceedings.
2.-:-:-: order at chambers. An order requiring a witness to enter into a recognizance for his appearance may be made by a judge at chambers, in a distant county, without notice to the witness, and without his being heard.
3.-:-: bond with sureties. Section 4385 of the Code does not authorize district courts or judges to require of witnesses written undertakings, with sureties, conditioned upon their attendance at criminal proceedings, nor to order their arrest and imprisonment as security for such attendance. The provisions of sections 4248 to 4251 of the Code, giving such authority to magistrates on preliminary examination, are not applicable to judges of the district court.
Appeal from the Superior Court of Council Bluffs. Host. E. E. Aylesworth, Judge.
Friday, October 17, 1890.
Proceedings in habeas corpus. The case is submitted on an agreed abstract which shows that plaintiff presented his petition, alleging that he was illegally restrained of his liberty by the defendant by virtue of the order hereinafter referred' to. Defendant answered, denying the illegality of the restraint, and alleging .that he detained the defendant for refusing to comply with said order. On the hearing the plaintiff testified that he had no knowledge of an application for said order until the defendant had him arrested, and that on the nineteenth or twehtieth of May, .1889,. he was served with a subpoena in the case of State of Iowa v. P. Cad-well and W. C. Cadwell, for the September term, 1889, of the Monona county district court. Defendant introduced the order under which he held the plaintiff, and his return thereon, which is as follows:
“Application having been made this day to me requesting that witnesses, F. A. Comfort and John X. Aleck, be required to enter into recognizance for their appearance as witnesses in the case of the state of Iowa against P. Cadwell and W. C. Cadwell, now pending in the district court of Monona county, state of Iowa, where the same has been transferred by change of venue from the Harrison county district court, the undersigned, having found the application sufficient, makes the following order: First. That John X. Aleck and F. A. Comfort each execute a bond in the sum of three hundred and fifty dollars to the state of Iowa, with sureties, to be approved by the clerk of the district court of the state of Iowa for Monona county, conditioned that they will appear as witnesses in the said cause of the State of Iowa v. P. Cadwell and W. C. Cadwell, at the first day of the September term of the district court of said Monona county, Iowa, in and for the year 1889, and not depart therefrom until further ordered by the court. Second. That the sheriff of Monona county, Iowa, is hereby authorized and ordered to serve this order on the said F. A. Comfort and John X. Aleck, and personally require them to execute their' said bonds in accordance with this order, and, upon their' failure so to do, to arrest the said F. A. Comfort and John X. Aleck, and keep them in his custody until they comply with this order or be otherwise legally discharged.
“Done at Sheldon, Iowa, this twenty-third day of May, A. D. 1889.
“[Signed.] ' Scott M. Ladd,
“Judge Fourth Judicial District of Iowa.”
Exhibit “ B.”
“State of Iowa, )
“Monona County, )
“I, L. D. Kittle, sheriff of Monona county, Iowa, hereby certify and return, that the annexed order came into my hands for service on the twenty-fourth day of May, A. D. 1889, and in compliance with said writ he (F. A. Comfort) refused to give bond, and I arrested him, the said F. A. Comfort, on the twenty-ninth day of May, A. D. 1889, in the town of Logan, Harrison county, Iowa, and I now hold him for the further order of this court. L. D. Kittle,
“Sheriff.”
There being no further testimony Judge Ayles-wortii ordered that the plaintiff be released and discharged, from which defendant appeals.
G. E. Underhill, County Attorney, for Monona County.
S. H. Oochran and Joe II. Smith, for appellant.
J. W. Barnhart and L. R. Bolter & Sons, lor appellee.

Opinion:
GiveN, J.
I. The power to require persons, without accusation of wrong and without a hearing, to give even their own pledge for their appearance as witnesses, is surely an extraordinary power, and still more extraordinary when security may' be required and imprisonment imposed for a failure to give it. The power to bind witnesses by recognizance to appear and give evidence has long since been conferred upon courts and judges by the statutes of many, if not all, of the states. We are not aware that it has ever been exercised in the absence of statutory authority. It is a familiar rule that when the statute confers authority upon any given subject it is to the exclusion of all other authority than that expressed in the statute. The question before us is whether, under the law and facts, Judge Ladd had authority to make the order under which the petitioner is detained.
In the chapter of the Code authorizing changes of venue in criminal cases from one county to another, it is provided in section 4385, that when any prosecution has been transferred, the accused shall give bond for his appearance. "And the court or judge may require all material witnesses, in behalf of the prosecution, to enter into cognizance for their appearance at the district court of the county to which the prosecution is transferred." This section is an exact transcript of section 4144 of the revision, except that the word "recognizance" is used in the revision, instead of "cognizance," as in the Code. Lexicographers define cognizance to mean, in law, knowledge or notice; judicial knowledge or jurisdiction ; an acknowledgment or confession, as an acknowledgment of a fine. Recognizance is defined to be, an obligation of record entered into before some court of record or magistrate duly authorized, with condition to do some particular act, as to appear at the same or some other court, to keep the peace or pay a debt. In view of these definitions, and the inapplicability of a cognizance to the evident purposes of the statute, we are satisfied that this change of words occurred by mistake in transcribing the section of the revision, and that section 4385 of the Code should be construed as authorizing courts and judges to require recognizance.
II. Some question is made as to whether the case against Cadwells was a criminal prosecution. While it is not so stated in terms, we think it fairly appears from the record that it was a . . , . • criminal prosecution, ana that petitioner was deemed a material witness for the prosecution.
The petitioner claims that the order is illegal because made at chambers, distant from Monona county, without notice to him, and without his being heard. The proceeding is summary; no provision is made for notice or hearing. Judge Ladd might make whatever order he had power to make when, where and as this one was made.
III. The material question is whether Judge Ladd had authority to require the petitioner to execute a bond with sureties, conditioned that he would appear as a witness, and to order that, upon failure, he be arrested and kept in custody.
From what we have said, it will be seen that we regard the judge as having authority to require the petitioner to enter into recognizance. There is a difference between a recognizance and a bond. Webster says, "A recognizance differs from a bond, being witnessed by the record only, and not by the parties' seal." He defines a bond to be, in law, " A writing under seal by which a person binds himself, his heirs, executors and administrators." It is certainly questionable whether authority to require a recognizance confers power to require a bond, and yet, as it cannot be very material to the witness in which form he gives his obligation, we might not hold the order unauthorized merely because a bond instead of a recognizance is required. It is of grave importance to" a witness whether he may be required to give other security than his own promise, and graver still whether for failure, through inability or otherwise, he may be arrested and imprisoned. To require sureties, and to order imprisonment in such oases, is the exercise of an unusual and extraordinary power, and should not be exercised where the authority is doubtful. The authority being conferred by statute, and the statute excluding all authority not conferred by it, we are to look to it alone.
The statute quoted is the only one conferring power upon district courts and judges in such cases. There is not the remotest reference therein to either sureties', arrest or imprisonment. Sections 4248 to 4251 of the Code do authorize magistrates, on holding the defendants to answer in the district court on preliminary examination, to take from each material witness examined by him, on the part of the state, a written undertaking for his appearance- in the district court, and, if satisfied that the witness will not fulfill his undertaking, to require him to enter into it with sureties, and, in case of refusal, to copimit him until he comply or be legally discharged. These provisions are expressly limited to preliminary examination before magistrates. If it was intended thereby to confer the same authority upon district judges, in cases of change of venue, there would be no necessity for the provision contained in section 4385 as to witnesses. These provisions being expressly limited to preliminary examinations before magistrates, we are not at liberty to-engraft them upon the other statute, even though there are good reasons why district courts and judges should possess the same authority. The powers being statutory, it is for the legislature alone to say who shall possess them, and to what extent. Much is said as to the necessity of the district courts and judges having power to require witnesses to give surety for their attendance, and the failure to detain them in custody to prevent failure of justice. Such arguments are rather for the lawmaking power than for the courts. Statutes conferring such powers as we are considering are justified by necessity, for without them the enforcement of criminal statutes would frequently fail, but while the necessity justifies the law it does not justify the exercise of these powers in the absence of authority in the law.
It is very clear that, taken alone, section 4385 of the Code does not authorize district courts or judges to require sureties from witnesses, nor to order their arrest and imprisonment. In the opinion of a majority of the court such authority in the district courts and judges may not be inferred from the statutes in respect to preliminary examinations, nor from the necessities of the case, and hence that the learned district judge acted without authority in requiring the petitioner to furnish sureties, and in ordering his arrest and detention upon failure so to do.
For these reasons the detention of the plaintiff is illegal, and the judgment of the superior court in ordering his release should be affirmed.