Case Name: James F. Towle et al. plaintiffs and appellants, vs. David Jones, defendant and respondent
Court: New York Superior Court
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1863-06-27
Citations: 1 Rob. 87
Docket Number: 
Parties: James F. Towle et al. plaintiffs and appellants, vs. David Jones, defendant and respondent.
Judges: 
Reporter: Reports of cases argued and determined in the Superior Court of the city of New York
Volume: 24
Pages: 87–108

Head Matter:
James F. Towle et al. plaintiffs and appellants, vs. David Jones, defendant and respondent.
1. Where the summons and demand of relief in the complaint is for a remedy at law only, to wit, the recovery of money, it renders equitable relief so far inconsistent “with the case made hy the complaint” and excluded “from the issue,” within the meaning of the 275th section of the' Code, that the plaintiff is not entitled to it if he failed on- the trial to establish a right to such legal relief.
2. So held where the plaintiffs, being vendors of real property, sued the purchaser for breach of his contract to take the title, not claiming to recover the amount of the purchase-money, but merely damages hy reason of his alleged failure to perform, and upon the trial before a justice of the court alone, a jury being waived, the plaintiffs failed to make out a right to recover such damages.
3. And further held that in such case the court could not give judgment for specific performance in favor of such plaintiffs, although upon the evidence they might have maintained an action for such relief. (Eobertsob, J. dissented.)
(Before Bosworth, Ch. J. and Robertson and Barbour, JJ.)
Heard December 10,1862;
decided June 27, 1863.
THis..was an appeal from a judgment entered in favor of the defendant, on a trial on the 10th to the 17th of January, 1862, before Mr. Justice Monell, a jury having been waived by consent of the parties.
The action was brought by James F. Towle and Charles F. Eover, to recover damages from the defendant, for the non-performance of a contract for the purchase of the unexpired' term in certain leasehold premises in the city of Hew York. The contract was bipartite, one part being signed by the plaintiffs and the other by the defendant. The part signed by the defendant, which was substantially the same as that signed by the plaintiff, was as follows :
“ Hew York, September 15th, 1860.
This is to certify, that I, David J ones, have this day purchased of Towle and Rover the lease and improvements on lot Ho. 202 Sixth street, known and occupied by them as a stable and carriage repository, free and clear of all incumbrances, for seventy-five hundred dollars, twenty-five dollars of which, the receipt I hereby acknowledge. David J ones.”
The plaintiffs averred and proved, that on the 26th day of March, 1861, they tendered to the defendant an assignment of the lease of the premises, which he declined to accept. The contents of the summons and nature of the demand for relief in the complaint, is stated in the opinion of the chief justice.
The defendant in his answer insisted as a defense, that the plaintiffs had not a good and valid title to the premises ; and that the same were not free and clear of incumbrance, but were incumbered by judgments and assessments. The justice before whom the cause was tried found, among other things, that the plaintiffs’ title was subject to incumbrances, which by their contract they were bound to remove, and, that not having done so after notice, the defendant had a right to rescind the contract, and had rescinded it; and he ordered judgment for the defendant for his costs. He refused to find, as requested - by the plaintiffs’ counsel, that the defendant had a right to retain out of the purchase money sufficient to pay off the incumbrances. The plaintiff excepted to his decision, and appealed from the judgment entered thereon.
C. H. Tracy, for the plaintiffs, appellants.
I. The special term erred in respect to there being incumbrances.
II. The several liens on the premises, for the payment of sums of money, being much less than the consideration money of the sale, were no valid objection to the assignment of the lease; the vendee being entitled to accept the property, and then to withhold or apply from the purchase money the. necessary sums to pay off such liens. (Dart on Vendors, 281-283, 381. Fagen v. Davison, 2 Duer, 153. Holmes v. Holmes, 5 Seld. 525.)
III. The defendant having never applied for a conveyance, he has never put the plaintiffs in default. He can not now object'that there was any defect in the title, which has not been supplied since the commencement of the suit. (3 Stark. Ev. 1610, " Vendor and Vendee.” Todd v. Hoggart, 1 Moo. & Mal. 128, Thompson v. Miles, 1 Epinasse’s Cases, 184.)
IV. There was no valid or effectual rescission of the contract by the defendant.
V. The plaintiffs have a clear and meritorious cause of action.
1. The bargain was made in the simplest form.
2. The arrangment about possession and occupation was in conformity with the contract, and suited to the mutual convenience of the parties The defendant thus had the use of the premises for several months.
3. The plaintiffs sacrificed their business to prepare to give up full possession; and when the market value of the lease fell off, the defendant sought to escape from the bargain upon the pretense of a trifling incumbrance, which he could at once discharge out of the purchase money.
P. G. Clarke, for the defendant, respondent.
I. Assuming that the contract of sale was valid and binding upon the respective parties, as no time was fixed for its performance, each party was bound to perform within a reasonable time. (Atwood v. Cobb, 16 Pick. 227. Chitty on Cont. 625, and cases cited.)
II. The plaintiffs did not perform, or offer to perform within a reasonable time, and the defendant was justified in refusing the assignment, and the plaintiffs are not entitled to recover. What is a reasonable time, is a question of fact. , (Story on Cont. 405, § 665, 1st ed.)
III. At the time of making the contract, and at the time the defendant gave notice that he should decline completing the purchase, there were incumbrances.
IY. By the terms of the contract the plaintiffs were to transfer the term free and clear of all incumbrances.
V. To entitle the plaintiffs to recover, they were bound to prove: That they could, within a reasonable time after the making of the contract, transfer a good title to the premises. That they offered to do so ; and that at the time of the offer the premises were free and clear of all incumbrances. They failed in every particular, and the judgment in favor of the defendant should be affirmed. (Morange v. Morris, 34 Barb. Rep. 311.)

Opinion:
Bosworth, Ch. J.
Unless in an action for the recovery of money only, brought upon a contract to purchase and take a conveyance of real estate, and brought to recover damages specially stated in the complaint, but not to recover any part of the purchase money, a plaintiff may have a judgment for specific performance, although he fails to establish a right to recover any part of the moneys for which judgment is prayed, the judgment appealed from in this case must be affirmed.
The Code provides that certain actions shall be tried by a jury, and that all other actions are triable by the court. (§§ 253, 254.) Those now required to be tried by a jury, were formerly known as actions at law ; and those triable by the court, as equity suits.
Section 253 declares that an issue of fact in an action for the recovery of money only, must be tried by a jury,
&c. What is the test by which it is to be determined, whether an action is for the recovery of money only ?
When the action arises on contract, and is for the recovery of money only, the summons must state that the plaintiff will take judgment for a sum specified therein. The summons in this Case states that judgment will be taken for a sum named therein. The complaint states a contract between the parties, by which the plaintiffs were to sell and the defendant to purchase an unincumbered leasehold property for the sum of $7500; payment of $25 of the purchase money ; that defend-ant took possession : a tender of an assignment of the lease, and the defendant's refusal to accept or to perform the agreement on his part; a sale of other property by the plaintiffs, in consequence of the making of this Contract, at a loss of $300 ; and of still other property at a loss of $500 ; a loss of the use of other property to the amount of $200, and generally that the plaintiffs u sustained damages in consequence of the said defendant refusing to perform his said contract, to the sum of $5000 over and above the use and occupation of the building," alleged to bé worth $150. Wherefore the plaintiffs " demand judgment against the defendant for the sum of $5150 damages, besides the costs and disbursements of the action."
The Code (section 142) requires that a complaint contain " A demand of the relief to which the plaintiff supposes himself entitled. If the recovery of money be demanded, the amount thereof shall be stated."
The summons shows the action to be one on contract, and for the recovery of money only. The complaint states a cause of action arising on contract, and demands no relief except the recovery of money. The sum demanded is only $5150; while the amount of purchase money remaining unpaid is $7475; of the' $5150 claimed, $150 is for the use by the defendant, of the leasehold premises.
If, therefore, the plaintiffs could recover for such causes of damages as they specify, a recovery for them only would leave them without a verdict for any part of the purchase money, and payment by the defendant of the sum recovered would not confer on him any right to an assignment of the lease ; for the reason that it would not include any part of the purchase money. And it was evidently the view and intent of the pleader who drew the complaint, that the recovery of damages, of the nature and on the grounds therein stated, would leave the plaintiffs the owners of the lease, and freed from obligation to transfer it to the defendant.
This view and intent are manifest from the facts that there is no prayer for judgment for the unpaid purchase money. Judgment is prayed for $5150, and the claims composing that sum do not include any part of the purchase money; the part of it unpaid being $7450; or $2300 more than the amount sought to be recovered. The allegations of the complaint, therefore, not only do not attempt to make a case for the recovery of the purchase money, but it could not be recovered even if the allegations of the complaint made a case for it, without amending the summons and prayer for relief, in respect to the sum demanded. These plaintiffs no more seek, on the case made, a recovery of purchase money than would a vendor of personal property deliverable at a future day, who should sue, alleging as a breach of the purchaser's contract, his refusal to take and pay, and claim as damages the difference between the contract price and the market value, on the day the contract should have been performed.
The action was noticed for trial as a jury cause, and was tried by the court only because a jury trial was waived. Had it been tried by a jury, the verdict, if for the plaintiffs, would have been for money only, and for such sum as upon the evidence and under the law as charged 'by the court, the jury thought the damages amounted to. The jury have in such a case an absolute right to render a general verdict, though they may be required "to find upon particular questions of fact to be stated in writing" (Code, § 261.) The clerk must enter judgment in conformity with the verdict, (section 264,) unless the case be reserved for argument or further consideration.
The only relief the defendant can have, if the verdict be against him, is a new trial, if there were errors in the trial; if he has no right to a new trial, judgment follows upon the verdict and in conformity with it,' as a matter of course. (§§ 264, 265.) It is of course conceded, that if the defendant alleged and proved facts entitling himself to relief on equitable principles against the plaintiffs' strictly legal rights, it would be granted to him, in the judgment to be rendered. But this fact does not aid a solution of the question, what is the case made by the complaint, and what is the extent of the relief grantable to the plaintiffs thereupon ?
In this action, if the plaintiffs recover $50 or more, they recover costs as a matter of course, (§ 304, sub. 4,) and if they fail to recover any thing, the defendant recovers costs (§ 305 ;) whereas if it could be treated as an action in which equitable relief might be given, the costs of it would be in the discretion of the court. (Section 306.)
A plaintiff oh a given state of facts may not be able to recover at law, (or as legal relief to which he is entitled,) either the purchase money, or any damages for a refusal to take a deed, and yet may have a right to a decree for a spe-. ciñe performance. If he had not the title when the action was brought, or if the contract was void by the statute of frauds, he could not at law recover the purchase money, even though there was part performance of the contract.
While in case of part performance, if he could make a good title at the trial, he might have a decree for a specific performance. (3 R. S. 5th ed. 222, §. 10. Lowry v. Tew, 3 Barb. Ch. 407. 4 Comst. 403.)
The plaintiffs having made a case for the recovery of legal relief only, and having brought their action to obtain legal relief only, viz. to recover money only, and having failed to establish a right to any part of the relief prayed, they are not at liberty to say on an appeal from the judgment, that the facts found entitle them to equitable relief, and that the judgment should be reversed because equitable relief was not granted. (Cole v. Reynolds, 18 N. Y. Rep. 74. Wood v. Wood, 26 Barb. 356. Stevenson v. Buxton, 8 Abb. Pr. 414. N. Y. Ice Co. v. N. Wn. Ins. Co., 23 N. Y. Rep. 357, 360.)
No case has been cited and none has fallen under my observation where in an action on contract, brought to recover iponey only, and where the plaintiff failed to establish' a right to recover any thing on legal grounds, equitable relief has beep granted him upon the trial.
Section 275 does not aid the plaintiffs—where an action is brought to obtain legal relief only, and that relief is a recovery of money only, the granting of equitable relief is not consistent with the case made by the complaint.
To enable the court to grant equitable relief, and in order that the granting of it may be consistent with the case made by the complaint, the action must be brought to obtain such relief, wholly or in part, and whether it is so brought must be determined by the tests provided by the Code.
In a suit brought to obtain equitable as well as legal relief, it is consistent with the case made by the complaint to grant legal relief) though equitable relief be denied, where enough of the allegations embraced in the complaint and embraced within the issue to entitle the plaintiff to legal relief, are established, at the trial. (Marquat v. Marquat, 2 Kern. 336. Bidwell v. The Astor Mut. Ins. Co., 16 N. Y. Rep. 263. The N. Y. Ice Co. v. The North Western Ins. Co., 23 id. 357. See v. Partridge, 2 Duer, 463.)
Actions to obtain legal relief only, and actions to obtain equitable relief, or both equitable and legal relief, are contra-distinguished throughout the Code. The summons may be and in some cases must be different. The former must be tried by a jury, and without some special order, the latter can not be tried by a jury. In the former, the recovery of costs by the prevailing party is a matter of strict right; in the latter the court may impose them upon either party, as it deems justice requires. ,
The present case, viewed in the light of every test contained in the Code, is an action for the recovery of money only; or for legal relief only. On the facts found, no action at law would lie, and the plaintiff would not be entitled to recover any thing.
The premises were incumbered when this suit was brought, and continued to be at the time of the trial. The defendant, by the contract, was to have "the lease and improvements, free and clear of all incumbrances." The plaintiffs never tendered such a title, and whatever title they had, was subject to incumbrances. If the cause had been tried before a jury, it would have been the duty of the court to nonsuit the plaintiffs.
The judgment should be affirmed.
Barbour, J. concurred in this opinion.