Case Name: FAUST v. RICHLAND COUNTY; KELLY v. RICHLAND COUNTY
Court: Supreme Court of South Carolina
Jurisdiction: South Carolina
Decision Date: 1921-11-11
Citations: 117 S.C. 251
Docket Number: 10752
Parties: FAUST v. RICHLAND COUNTY KELLY v. RICHLAND COUNTY
Judges: Mr. Justice Watts concurs.
Reporter: South Carolina Reports
Volume: 117
Pages: 251–291

Head Matter:
10752
FAUST v. RICHLAND COUNTY KELLY v. RICHLAND COUNTY
(109 S.E. 151)
Eminent Domain—Highways—Complaint Held to State Cause op Action for Damages Against County And for Taking op Private Property for Public Use/—Complaint in action against county, alleging that defendant in repairing highway filled ditch and diverted water on plaintiff’s premises, to his damage, held to set forth a cause of action for damages against the county and a good cause of action for the recovery of compensation for taking' of private property for public use, under Const. Art. 1; § 17.
Before Whaley, J., County Court.
Affirmed.
Actions by J. H. Faust and Ben E. Kelly against Rich-land County. From an order overruling demurrer to the complaints the defendant appeals.
The complaint in substance alleged: that plaintiff is the owner of three acres and a dwelling on the right hand side of the Two Notch Road on the side of a hill which slopes toward the east so that ti^e drainage from a considerable area to the west flows over plaintiff’s property, first flowing under the highway. That prior to the repairs on the highway there was on each side thereof in front of plaintiff’s dwelling a drainage ditch which conveyed the rain water from lands in that immediate vicinity to another ditch intersecting said highway at right angles which passes through and over plaintiff’s premises by means of which the water was conveyed away without injury to plaintiff’s premises. That defendant while making repairs to said highway carelessly and negligently and in utter disregard of rights of plaintiff, filled in the drainage ditches along the side of the road in front of plaintiff’s house and elevated the road bed so as to cause the rain which falls upon the roads and lots adjacent thereto to accumulate in great volume and flow with great force across plaintiff’s yard and under his house and through his premises thereby damaging said premises.
That defendant by elevating the road bed has built a dam which prevents the natural flow of rain water that accumulates on lands adjacent to plaintiff’s premises, ponds the same in front of plaintiff’s premises in great volume, and from which it flows in great volume and with great force through a ditch and culvert leading through said highway and through plaintiff’s premises in great and unnatural volume, to his damage.
The defendant demurred on the grounds that it appears upon the face of the complaint herein.
1. That under the act referred to in said complaint and under which this cause of action is alleged to be brought, there is not allowed to any person a recovery for injury or damage under the facts and circumstances alleged in said .complaint.
2. There is no allegation of any injury or damage caused by any defect or in the negligent repair of said highway which interfered with or affected its use for legitimate highway purposes.
The order of Judge M. S. Whaley, overruling the Demurrer, omitting the formal portions; and the statement of facts, which is incorporated in the dissenting opinion, was as follows:
The complaint concerns surface water only. Lawton v. Ry., 39 S. E., 752. There being no allegation of any prescriptive right or facts ,from which such a right might be inferred, the plaintiff has no right of action from that source. Id., 754.
In ascertaining what are the rights, of the parties in the instant case, one must keep in mind that under the common law doctrine, which exists in this State, “there is a manifest distinction between casting water upon another’s land and preventing the flow of surface water upon your own.” Brandenburg v. Zeigler, 32 S. C., 18; 39 S. E., 790; Cain v. Ry., 39 S. E., 792. In the former case it was held actionable for the owner of land to drain surface water by a ditch onto the lands of a lower proprietor. The Court therein called attention to the 'other class of cases in this. State, among which were Lawton v. Ry., 62 S. C.; 39 S. E., 752, and Baltseger v. Ry., 54‘S. C. 245; 32 S- E., 385; 71 Am. St. Rep., 789, which hold that the lower' proprietor has the right to protect by embankment his property from surface water ravages, even if in so doing “he throws.it back upon a coterminous proprietor to his damage. . . .”
We are now dealing with a case of the latter class. That last cited is conclusive of the issue here against the plaintiff, unless under Section 3053 of the Code of 1912, there was created a right in plaintiff’s favor, irrespective of the common law. In all cases above referred to negligence was not an essential element. Touchberry v. Ry., 69 S. E., 877. Under Section 1972 of the Code, which is substantially the same as Section 3053, School District v. Marion County, 114 S. C., 382, except for several provisions which can not affect this issue, a defect in a highway resulting from negligence or mismanagement, or the negligent repair of a highway, when injury ensues, gives rise to a cause of action, regardless of what might or might not have been other theories of remedial relief under the common law. To that extent these two sections may give relief where at common law there was none.
In the case of Columbia v. Melton, 85 S. C., 558; 67 S. E., 902 (see 62 S- E., 248), where surface water was in question, and the facts of which were very similar to those here, Mr. Justice Woods clearly pointed out that “if the injury to the defendant’s land was due to the negligence or mismanagement”' of the plaintiff, “the defendant has a right of action under Section 2023 (now 3053) of the Civil Code-,” quoting same. That case is conclusive of plaintiff’s right to relief. See also Scott v. Richland County, 83 S. C., 506; School District v. Marion County, supra.
Mr. W. C. McLain, for appellant,
cites: Demurrer should have been sustained: 111 S: C. 7. Legislature by Sec. 1972, 1 Civ. Code 1912, did not mean to fix a liability for a county exceeding in scope the liability of an individual under the same facts and circumstances: 20 S. C. 495; 40 S. C. 390; 111 S. C. 7.
Messrs. Jas. H. Venter and Jas. H. Hammond, for respondents.
Oral argument.
November 11, 1921.

Opinion:
The opinion of the Court en banc was delivered by
Mr. Chiee Justice Gary.
The only question properly and specifically raised is by the second exception. The cases of Lawton v. Railway, 61 S. C. 548, 39 S. E. 752, Brandenberg v. Zeigler, 62 S. C. 18, 39 S. E. 790, 55 L. R. A. 414, 89 Am. St. Rep. 887, Cain v. Railway, 62 S. C. 25, and Hopkins v. Clemson College, 221 U. S. 636, 31 Sup. Ct. 654, 55 L. Ed. 890, 35 L. R. A. (N. S.) 243, clearly show that if an individual, instead of the defendant, had flooded the lands of the plaintiff in the manner alleged in paragraph 6 of the complaint, he would have subjected himself to an action for damages.
_But there is even a stronger reason why the demurrer was properly overruled, to wit: The overflowing of.the plaintiff's lands in the manner alleged in the complaint was in violation of the constitutional provisions prohibiting the taking of property without due process of law, and likewise without just compensation-being first made.
In Hopkins v. Clemson College, 221 U. S. 636, 31 Sup. Ct. 654, 55 L. Ed. 890, 35 L. R. A. (N. S.) 243, the plaintiff sued the defendant for damages to his farm resulting from the college having built a dyke, which forced the waters of-the Seneca River across his land, whereby the soil was washed away and the land rendered unfit for agricultural purposes.
The Supreme Court of the State dismissed the complaint, on the ground that the State was a necessary party, and had not consented to be sued. Thereupon the plaintiff sued out a writ of error to the United States Supreme Court. In that case the United States Supreme Court said: '
"Neither a State nor an individual can confer upon an agent authority to commit a tort, so as to excuse the perpetrator. In such cases the law of agency has no application—the wrongdoer is treated as á principal and individually liable for the damages inflicted and subject to injunc tion' against the commission of acts causing irreparable injury.
"Neither public corporations nor political subdivisions are clothed with that immunity from suit which belongs to the State alone by virture if its sovereignty. Tn Lincoln County v. Luning, 133 U. S. 520, 530, the Court said that: 'While the county is territorially a part of the State, yet politically it is also a corporation, created by and with such powers as are given to it by the State. In this respect it is a part of the State only in that remote sense in which any city, town, or other municipal corporation may be s'aid to be a part.' The Court there held that the Eleventh Amendment was limited to those cases in which the State is the real party, or party on the record, but that counties were corporations which might be sued. Undoubtedly counties, cities, townships, and similar bodies politic often, have ¡a defense which relieves them from responsibility where a private corporation would be liable. But they must at least make that defense. They cannot rely upon freedom from accountability, as could a State. If the State had in so 'many words granted the college authority to take or damage the plaintiff's property, for its corporate advantage without compensation, the Constitution would have substituted liability for the attempted exemption. But the State of South Carolina passed no such Act, and attempted to grant no such immunity from suit, as is claimed by the college.
"But an examination of the cases cited, in any respect similar to this, will show that they involve questions of liability in a suit, rather than immunity from suit. Most of them were actions- for torts committed, not by the public corporation itself, but the officers of the law. That general rule is of force in South Carolina, as appears from Gibbs v. Beaufort, 20 S. C. 213, 218, cited in the opinion of the Court below, where it was said that a municipal corporation, instituted for the purpose of assisting the State in the conduct of local civil government, is not liable to be sued in an action of tort for nonfeasance or misfeasance of its officers, in regard to their public duties, unless expressly made so by statute.' But the plaintiff is not seeking here to hold the college liable for nonfeasance or misfeasance either of its own officers or officers of the public. This is a suit against the college itself for its own corporate act in building a dyke, whereby the channel had been narrowed, the swift current had been diverted from the usual course across the plaintiff's farm, and, as is alleged, destroying the banks, washing away the soil, and for all practical purposes as effectually depriving him of his property as if there had been a physical taking. *. . "For protecting the bottom land, the college, for its own corporate purpose and advantages, constructed the dyke. In so doing it was not acting in any governmental capacity. The embankment was, in law similar to one which might have been built for private purposes by the plaintiff on the other side of the river. If he had there constructed a dyke to protect his farm,, and in so doing had taken or damaged the land of the college, he would have been sued and held liable. In the same way and on similar principles of justice and legal liability, the college .is responsible to him if, for its own benefit and for protecting land which it held and used, it built a dyke which resulted in taking or damaging the plaintiff's farm. These suggestions, though made in a plea tO' the jurisdiction, afford no reason" why the college should be granted immunity from suit, when it is claimed that, in violation of the Constitution, it has taken private property for its corporate purposes without compensation. And if the facts hereafter warrant it, the college may be en joined against further acts looking to the maintenance or reconstruction of the dyke."
The judgment óf the State Court was reversed. We have quoted somewhat at length from the- case of Hopkins v. Clemson College, supra, for the reason that its authority is binding upon the Courts 'of the several States; and it is contended that our decisions are in irreconcilable conflict.
In the. cases of Irvine v. Greenwood, 89 S. C. 511; 72 S. E. 228, 36 L. R. A. ( N. S. ) 363, and Triplett v. Columbia, 111 S. C. 7, 96 S. E. 675, 1 A. L. R. 349, this Court has cited the Hopkins Case with approval.
• The facts in the Triplett Case alleged by the plaintiff were' in substance, as follows: That the defendant, through its negligence and mismanagement, permitted a large pool of stagnant water, containing large quantities of decaying matter, to remain upon one of the streets of Columbia; that the plaintiff, who resided near the said pool, was caused to contract colitis, whereby she was made sick, to her damage in an alleged amount mentioned in her complaint.
A motion was made to dismiss the complaint, and the sole question was whether the municipality was liable under Section 3053 of the Code of Eaws 1912. The Circuit Court ruled that she was not, and dismissed the complaint. On appeal to the Supreme Court the judgment of the Circuit Court was affirmed. In delivering the opinion of the Supreme Court, Mr. Justice Hydrick reviewed the decision in the case of Mayrant v. Columbia, 77 S. C. 281, 57 S. E. 857, 10 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1094, saying: water (which had theretofore been carried off by the sur-, face drains) that it was thrown and ponded upon plaintiff's lot. If we follow our previous decisions construing Section 3053, the conclusion is inevitable that the decision in the Mayrant Case was rested upon an untenable ground. It might have been rested upon ' Section 3026 of the Civil Code of 1912. The decision might have also been rested upon the principle upon which the decision of this Court in Hopkins v. Clemson College, 77 S. C. 12, was reversed by the Supreme Court of the' United States (221 U. S. 636), in which liability was'iniposed on the ground that the diversion of the waters of Seneca River upon the plaintiff's land was tantamount to' a taking thereof without compensation."
"Though the decision in the Mayrant Case was right, it was not put upon the right ground. In the Mayrant Case the wrong was alleged to' have been caused by negligence in raising the level of the street, closing up the existing surface drains, and so negligently installing drain pipes of insufficient size and fall to carry off the surface
He then refers to the consideration of that ground in Irvine v. Greenwood, supra. Turning to that case, we find that Mr. Justice Woods, who delivered the opinion of the Court, used this language:
"In Hopkins v. Clemson College, 77 S. C. 12, 57 S. E. 853 the question was whether Clemson College, a corporation created for a public purpose, was liable for overflowing plaintiff's land in constructing a dyke to protect the crops oh the college lands from the floods in the Seneca River This Court held that the case fell within the rule laid down in Gibbes v. Beaufort, 20 S. C. 213, Dunn v. Barnwell, 43 S. C. 398, 21 S. E. 315, and the other cases decided in this State cited above, and that therefore the plaintiff could not recover. On appeal the Supreme Court of the United States reversed the judgment of this Court holding that the flooding of plaintiff's land was the taking of private property without due process of law, .and that the taking was by the corporation itself for corporate purposes, and not by its officers or agents. As we understand, it was on these grounds that the case was distinguished from Gibbes v. Beaufort, supra, and other like cases decided, in'this State. The doctrine of the decision, however, is not applicable to this case, for the reason that here there is no taking of private property by the corporation, but an injury resulting in death from the alleged failure of an employee of the municipality to perform the duties imposed on him by the municipality."
It will thus be seen that this Court recognized the fact that the case of Dunn v. Barnwell, 43 S. C. 398, 21 S. E. 315, 49 Am. St. Rep. 843, and other cases announcing the same doctrine, are inapplicable to cases involving the taking of property without due process of law or just compensation being first made, and, in this respect, that they were practically overruled by the case of Hopkins v. Clemson College.
We call attention also to the fact that Mr. Justice Hydrick, in the Triplett Case, did not mention the case of Hopkins v. Clemson College as applicable to the facts in the Triplett Case, but stated that the judgment in the May-rant Case could be sustained by the Hopkins Case, on the ground that in the Mayrant Case there was a taking of private property without compensation. The right to throw surface water upon the lands of another was involved, both in the Mayrant Case and the Triplett Case. The reason why he did not apply the same doctrine as to taking property without due process of law in both cases was because the facts in the Mayrant Case were sufficient to constitute a cause of action against an individual, and brought the case within the doctrine announced in Brandenburg v. Zcigler, 62 S. C. 18, 39 S. E. 790, 55 L. R. A. 414, 89 Am. St. Rep. 887, while the facts in the Triplett Case were not sufficient to constitute a cause of action, even if the defendant in that case had been an individual, which is the true test, as the case of Hopkins v. Clemson College shows that in cases involving the taking of property without due process of law the governmental sub divisions of the State are to be regarded as if they lyere individuals. The case of School District v. Marion County, 114 S. C. 382, 103 S. E. 767, is sustained by the Hopkins Case.
If these were not the reasons which governed Mr. Justice Hydrick, then he was in error in stating that the judgment in the Mayrant Case was right, as otherwise the judgment in both cases should have been the same.
Affirmed.
Mr. Justice Watts concurs.