Case Name: DREXEL v. HOLLANDER et al.
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1906-03-16
Citations: 98 N.Y.S. 104
Docket Number: 
Parties: DREXEL v. HOLLANDER et al.
Judges: Argued before O’BRIEN, P. J-, and McLAUGHLIN, INGRAHAM, CLARKE, and HOUGHTON, JJ. '
Reporter: West's New York Supplement
Volume: 98
Pages: 104–108

Head Matter:
(112 App. Div. 25)
DREXEL v. HOLLANDER et al.
(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department.
March 16, 1906.)
Actions — Joinder—Tort and Contract.
Under Code Civ. Proc. § 484, subd. 9, providing that plaintiff may unite causes of action on claims arising out of the same transaction and consistent with each other, an action on the theory that defendant has converted to his own use property belonging to plaintiff cannot be joined with an action on the theory that the title to the property is by agreement in defendant, and demanding payment therefor, though the two causes of action arise out of the same transaction.
[Ed. Note. — For cases in point, see vol. 1, Cent. Dig. Action, §§ 490-510.]
O’Brien, P. J., and Ingraham, J., dissenting.
Appeal from Special Term, New York County.
Action by George W. C. Drexel against Elmer R. Hollander and another. From an interlocutory judgment overruling a demurrer to the complaint, defendants appeal.
Reversed.
Argued before O’BRIEN, P. J-, and McLAUGHLIN, INGRAHAM, CLARKE, and HOUGHTON, JJ. '
Almet R. Latson, for appellants.
J. Woolsey Shepard, for respondent.

Opinion:
McLAUGHLIN, J.
The defendants appeal from an interlocutory judgment overruling their demurrer to the complaint, upon the ground that the causes of action alleged are inconsistent, and have been improperly joined. The material facts alleged, and admitted by the demurrer, are that a written contract was entered into between the parties, by which the defendants agreed to sell, and the plaintiff to pur chase, an automobile for $8,500, $5,500 to be paid in cash, and the balance by the delivery to the defendants of a second-hand automobile, at a valuation of $3,000; that the plaintiff performed on his part_by paying the amount of cash stipulated, and delivering the old automobile ; that thereafter the defendants were unable to deliver the new automobile, and the contract, by mulual arrangement, was rescinded, and defendants returned to the plaintiff the $5,500 cash paid by him, but neglected and refused to return the old automobile. The first cause of action set out in the complaint sets forth the transaction between the parties, the rescission of the agreement, a demand for the return of the old automobile, and the defendants' refusal, and that they "wrongfully converted the same to their own use," to plaintiff's damage of $3,000. In the second cause of action substantially the same facts are pleaded, except as to the demand of the old machine, defendants' refusal to return, and its wrongful conversion, and alleges an agreement by the defendants, in consideration of the cancellation of the original contract, to return to the plaintiff the purchase money,paid, viz., $8,500, no part of which had been repaid except the sum of $5,500, and judgment is demanded for the balance.
The appellants contend that the two causes of action pleaded are inconsistent, and are therefore improperly joined. Whether or not this contention be sound depends upon the construction to be put upon section 484 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The first cause of action being in tort and the second on contract, they do not fall within either of the first eight subdivisions of this section, and cannot be joined under those subdivisions. If properly joined, it is because they come within the provisions of subdivision 9 of the section, which provides that causes of action may be united if they arise "upon claims arising out of the same transaction, or transactions connected with the same subject of action, and not included within one of the foregoing subdivisions of this section. But it must appear, upon the face of the complaint, that all the causes of action so united belong to one of the foregoing subdivisions of this section; that they are consistent with each other."
It may be assumed, as contended in the opinion of Mr. Justice IN-GRAHAM, that the facts pleaded show the two causes of action arise out of the same transaction; but are they "consistent with each other?" To this inquiry it seems to me there can be but one answer. The first cause of action proceeds upon the theorv that the title to the automobile was in the plaintiff, and that the defendants wrongfully deprived him of it by converting the same to their own use. The second cause of action proceeds upon the theory that the title to the automobile was, by agreement, in the defendants. The causes of action are not only inconsistent, but contradictory. The proof to establish one would der stroy the other. For conversion plaintiff would have to prove that at the time the conversion took place he either had the title, or was entitled, by reason of a special property therein,- to possession. To recover under the second cause of action plaintiff would have to prove a breach of contract; that the title to the automobile was in defendants, they having purchased it from him at the agreed price of $3,000. The measure of damage in one case would be the value of the automobile at the time the conversion took place, which might be more or less than $3,000, while in the' other case the measure of damage would be the amount which the defendants agreed to pay or apply on the purchase price of the new machine. It is difficult to see how ffhese two causes of action could be tried together, unless the court received evidence-first as to one and then as to the other, and, if -such trial were had, if is equally, if not more, difficult to imagine how the trial court could-properly submit the subject to the jury. The'truth is, the nature of the two actions is essentially different.' The facts to establish the liability are unlike, the measure of damage is different, and the defense: is.different. That the causes of action are inconsistent and improperly joined in the complaint seems to be established by the following authorities: Keep v. Kaufman, 56 N. Y. 332; Wiles v. Suydam, 64 N. Y. 173; Conde v. Rogers, 74 App. Div. 147, 77 N. Y. Supp. 518; McClure v. Wilson, 13 App. Div. 274, 43 N. Y. Supp. 209; Teall v. City of Syracuse, 32 Hun, 332.
For these'reasons, we think that the interlocutory judgment should be' reversed, with' costs, and the demurrer sustained, with costs, with leave to the plaintiff to amend on payment of costs in this court and in the court below.
CLARKE and HOUGHTON, JJ., concur.