Case Name: The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Calvin Battles, Appellant
Court: New York Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 2010-12-14
Citations: 16 N.Y.3d 54
Docket Number: 
Parties: The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Calvin Battles, Appellant.
Judges: 
Reporter: New York Reports
Volume: 16
Pages: 54–73

Head Matter:
[942 NE2d 1026, 917 NYS2d 601]
The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Calvin Battles, Appellant.
Argued November 15, 2010;
decided December 14, 2010
POINTS OF COUNSEL
Calvin Battles, appellant pro se.
I. Appellant was denied his due process right to a fair trial when nisi prius court failed to follow the mandate of CPL 310.50. (People v Salemmo, 38 NY2d 357; People v Tucker, 55 NY2d 1; People v Worthy, 178 AD2d 454.) II. Appellant was denied his due process right to a fair trial when the prosecutor allowed its witness to testify falsely about material issues in the case and failed to correct this false and misleading testimony. (People v Pelchat, 62 NY2d 97; Mooney v Holohan, 294 US 103; People v Steadman, 82 NY2d 1; People v Savvides, 1 NY2d 554.) III. Appellant was denied his constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel when counsel failed to make a timely objection to the court’s faulty misstatement of a witness’s testimony or otherwise object to the court’s erroneous rulings. (Strickland v Washington, 466 US 668; People v Paul, 212 AD2d 1020; People v Yut Wai Tom, 53 NY2d 44; People v Cooper, 96 AD2d 866; People v Johnson, 79 Misc 2d 880; People v Feingold, 7 NY3d 288; People v Payne, 3 NY3d 266; People v Wall, 29 NY2d 863; People v Suarez, 6 NY3d 202; People v Gallagher, 69 NY2d 525.)
Legal Aid Society, New York City (Svetlana M. Kornfeind, Steven Banks and Andrew C. Fine of counsel), for appellant.
I. The trial court’s imposition of consecutive sentences was illegal under Penal Law § 70.25 (2), where appellant committed multiple offenses through his “single act” of starting a fire. (People v Rosas, 8 NY3d 493; People v Ramirez, 89 NY2d 444; People v Snyder, 241 NY 81; People v Day, 73 NY2d 208; People v Underwood, 52 NY2d 882; People v Laureano, 87 NY2d 640; People v Ruiz, 291 AD2d 418; People v Lopez, 262 AD2d 659; People v Feingold, 7 NY3d 288; People v Kirkwood, 165 AD2d 881.) II. In sentencing appellant as a discretionary persistent felony offender to increased sentences on the assault counts, the court based its determination on facts other than recidivism by a mere preponderance of the evidence, thereby denying appellant his constitutional rights to due process and a jury trial. (Apprendi v New Jersey, 530 US 466; Cunningham v California, 549 US 270; United States v Booker, 543 US 220; Blakely v Washington, 542 US 296; Ring v Arizona, 536 US 584; People v Quinones, 12 NY3d 116; People v Daniels, 5 NY3d 738; People v Rivera, 5 NY3d 61; People v Rosen, 96 NY2d 329.)
Charles J. Hynes, District Attorney, Brooklyn (Solomon Neubort and Leonard Joblove of counsel), for respondent.
I. The imposition of consecutive sentences was proper because separate and distinct acts underlay each of the crimes and the acts constituting each crime were not material elements of any of the other crimes. (People v Laureano, 87 NY2d 640; People v Brown, 80 NY2d 361; People v Di Lapo, 14 NY2d 170; People v Ramirez, 89 NY2d 444; People v Rosas, 8 NY3d 493; People v Day, 73 NY2d 208; People v Ford, 11 NY3d 875; People v Sala, 95 NY2d 254; People v Dekle, 56 NY2d 835; People v Hernandez, 82 NY2d 309.) II. Defendant’s challenge to the constitutionality of his sentencing as a discretionary persistent felony offender is unpreserved and meritless. (Apprendi v New Jersey, 530 US 466; People v Rosen, 96 NY2d 329, 534 US 899; People v Rivera, 9 NY3d 904; Brown v Greiner, 409 F3d 523; Brown v Miller, 451 F3d 54, 549 US 1120; Estelle v McGuire, 502 US 62; Almendarez-Torres v United States, 523 US 224; Cunningham v California, 549 US 270; Blakely v Washington, 542 US 296; People v Quinones, 12 NY3d 116.)

Opinion:
OPINION OF THE COURT
Pigott, J.
One person was burned to death and three others severely burned as a result of defendant's pouring gasoline over several individuals and setting a fire. The primary issue before us is whether, under the facts of this case, following defendant's conviction, the court's sentencing of defendant to consecutive terms of imprisonment was proper. A review of the evidence presented at trial is necessary.
On July 8, 2004 and into the early next morning, several people, including Gregory Davis, Ronald Davis, and Stephen Wheeler, were at Arthur Elliott's apartment, a known crack cocaine den. Defendant Calvin Battles arrived, and at some point got into an argument with Ronald Davis. Defendant left, but later returned, threatening to burn the place. Then using a gasoline can that had been retrieved from his truck, defendant, lighter in hand, began splashing gasoline throughout the apartment. Defendant pushed Ronald Davis to the floor and doused him with gasoline. He then poured gasoline over Gregory Davis's head. After exchanging words with Elliott, defendant threw gasoline on him as well.
As defendant attempted to ignite the lighter, Elliott pushed defendant, who was in the doorway, out of the apartment. Defendant and Elliott scuffled and a fire broke out. The lower part of Elliott's body burst into flames as he fell back into the apartment, igniting the entire living room. As a result, Ronald Davis was burned to death and Gregory Davis, Stephen Wheeler and Arthur Elliott sustained severe burns.
After a jury trial, defendant was convicted of depraved indifference murder (Penal Law § 125.25 [2]), second-degree manslaughter (Penal Law § 125.15 [1]), and three counts of depraved indifference assault (Penal Law § 120.10 [3]). He was sentenced as a persistent felony offender to concurrent sentences of 25 years to life on the depraved indifference murder and manslaughter convictions, to be followed by consecutive terms of 25 years to life on the depraved indifference assault convictions related to Gregory Davis and Wheeler, and a consecutive term of 20 years to life on the depraved indifference assault conviction related to Elliott, for an aggregate sentence of 95 years to life.
Defendant appealed, asserting, among other claims, that the imposition of consecutive sentences was illegal because the victims were all burned in a fire that had a single source of ignition, and that his sentencing as a persistent felony offender was unconstitutional under Apprendi v New Jersey (530 US 466 [2000]).
The Appellate Division modified the judgment by vacating the conviction of second-degree manslaughter (see Penal Law § 125.15 [1]) and the sentence imposed thereon, and otherwise affirmed (65 AD3d 1161 [2d Dept 2009]). As relevant to this appeal, the court held that defendant's Apprendi claim was unpreserved and without merit (id. at 1162). The court further rejected, without discussion, defendant's consecutive sentencing claim as without merit (id.).
A Judge of this Court granted leave to appeal (13 NY3d 905 [2009]) and we now modify.
Defendant contends that the consecutive sentences for the depraved indifference murder and depraved indifference assault counts are illegal under Penal Law § 70.25 (2) because those crimes shared a common actus reus—defendant's single act of starting the fire.
Penal Law § 70.25 requires that concurrent sentences be imposed "for two or more offenses committed through a single act or omission, or through an act or omission which in itself constituted one of the offenses and also was a material element of the other" (Penal Law § 70.25 [2]). To determine whether consecutive sentences are permitted, a court must first look to the statutory definitions of the crimes at issue (People v Frazier, 16 NY3d 36 [2010] [decided today]).
Here, the inquiry begins with the depraved indifference murder statute, which requires proof that "under circumstances evincing a depraved indifference to human life, [the defendant] recklessly engages in conduct which creates a grave risk of death to another person, and thereby causes the death of another person" (Penal Law § 125.25 [2]). The statutory definition of depraved indifference assault (Penal Law § 120.10 [3]) differs from that of depraved indifference murder only in the result created by defendant's conduct: serious physical injury to another.
The imposition of consecutive sentences was permissible in this case with respect to Ronald Davis, Gregory Davis and Elliott because separate acts constituted the actus reus of each of the depraved indifference crimes against those victims. Specifically, the trial judge instructed the jurors that they could find defendant acted with depraved indifference to human life irrespective of whether they were to find that defendant was the one who ignited the fire. Defendant's acts of soaking each victim with gasoline in a room where other people were present, and where one of them (Elliott) was smoking a lit cigarette, were so inherently dangerous to each victim that defendant was found guilty of depraved indifference murder and depraved indifference assault based on those acts alone. A determination of the cause of the ignition of the fire was unnecessary to the determination of defendant's guilt with respect to those depraved indifference counts, and thus, defendant's argument that the actus reus for all of those crimes was the ignition of the fire fails. Because defendant engaged in conduct which created a grave risk of death or serious physical injury to each of those victims, by separate and distinct acts of dousing them with gasoline, imposition of consecutive sentences was authorized under the Penal Law.
We conclude, however, that the sentence imposed pertaining to Wheeler must run concurrent to the other sentences. Wheeler was never doused with gasoline, but rather, was sprayed as a result of the dousing of the others. Thus, the risk-creating conduct for his conviction was the same act as that of the others and running his sentence concurrently is required.
Defendant's challenge to the constitutionality of his sentencing as a persistent felony offender and other claims raised in his pro se brief are without merit (see People v Quinones, 12 NY3d 116 [2009]; see also People v Bell, 15 NY3d 935 [2010] [decided today]).
Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should be modified and the case remitted to Supreme Court for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion and, as so modified, affirmed.