Case Name: Jacquelyn PINDER n/k/a, Jacquelyn Delombard, Appellant, v. Herbert PINDER, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 2002-06-14
Citations: 817 So. 2d 1104
Docket Number: No. 2D01-4702
Parties: Jacquelyn PINDER n/k/a, Jacquelyn Delombard, Appellant, v. Herbert PINDER, Appellee.
Judges: SALCINES, J., Concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 817
Pages: 1104–1106

Head Matter:
Jacquelyn PINDER n/k/a, Jacquelyn Delombard, Appellant, v. Herbert PINDER, Appellee.
No. 2D01-4702.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
June 14, 2002.
Warren A. Wilson, III, and Dennis R. Long of Wilson, Wilson & Long, P.A., Palm Harbor, for Appellant.
Karol K. Williams of Karol K. Williams, P.A., Tampa, for Appellee.

Opinion:
CASANUEVA, Judge.
This is the second appearance of the parties before us in this dissolution of marriage case that is noteworthy for the complicated financial affairs of the parties. In the first appeal, Pinder v. Pinder, 750 So.2d 651 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999), the former wife raised six issues and the former husband raised five on a cross-appeal. We reversed in part and affirmed in part the final judgment of dissolution with instructions to the trial court on remand. As the trial court was wrestling with the issues before it on remand, the former wife brought this appeal from a nonfinal order raising two points: the trial court's interpretation of our instructions to it in the previous appeal on the lump sum alimony issue, Pinder, 750 So.2d at 653, and its imposition of a temporary restraining order against her prohibiting her from encumbering or disposing of her out-of-state property. We conclude that we are without jurisdiction to address the trial court's interpretation of our instructions on the lump sum alimony issue as it is not one of the appealable nonfinal orders enumerated in Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.130(a)(3). We have jurisdiction to address the temporary injunction, see rule 9.130(a)(3)(B), and again reverse in part and affirm in part.
We affirm' that part of the order imposing the temporary injunction because the former wife, as the appellant, has not carried her burden to show that it was error to do so. See Applegate v. Barnett Bank of Tallahassee, 377 So.2d 1150 (Fla.1979). However, it was error for the trial court to fail to require a bond as a prereq uisite to the temporary injunction order. See Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.610(b) ("No temporary injunction shall be entered unless a bond is given by the movant in an amount the court deems proper, conditioned for the payment of costs and damages sustained by the adverse party if the adverse party is wrongfully enjoined."). Under the compulsory language of the rule, the trial court has no discretion to dispense with the requirement of a bond. Bellach v. Huggs of Naples, Inc., 704 So.2d 679 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997); Doss v. Doss, 643 So.2d 1170 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994). On remand, the trial court shall set the bond after providing both parties with the opportunity to present evidence regarding the appropriate amount.
The nonfínal order imposing the temporary injunction is affirmed but the cause is remanded for further proceedings to set the amount of the bond.
SALCINES, J., Concurs.
BLUE, C.J., Concurs with opinion.