Case Name: Lemuel Moffitt versus Peter Jaquins et al.
Court: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
Jurisdiction: Massachusetts
Decision Date: 1824-09
Citations: 2 Pick. 331
Docket Number: 
Parties: Lemuel Moffitt versus Peter Jaquins et al.
Judges: 
Reporter: Massachusetts Reports
Volume: 19
Pages: 351–352

Head Matter:
Lemuel Moffitt versus Peter Jaquins et al.
An extent of an execution on land was sustained, where it appeared by the return, that two of the appraisers certified, and that the third did not because he disagreed in the appraisement.
The only question in this case, which was a writ of entry, related to the validity of the extent of an execution in favor of the demandant against Jaquins. The objection made was, that by the return of the officer and the certificate of appraisement signed by two of the appraisers, it appeared that the third appraiser, who was chosen, by the debtor and who acted with the other appraisers, did not sign the certificate because he did not agree in the appraisement.
Whiting, for the tenants, and Jarvis, for the demandant,
referred to Whitman v. Tyler, 8 Mass. R. 284 ; Barrett v. Porter, 14 Mass. R. 143.

Opinion:
Parker C. J.
said, in substance, that the Court considered this case settled by the one in 14 Mass. R. 143. The only distinction suggested is, that there it did not appear that the appraiser who omitted to sign did not agree with the other two. But the Court determined, on the ground that it appeared that all were present and acted in the appraisement, that the return was valid. The reason of the case is in favor <7 of this appraisement's being good. It would be impossible otherwise, from the nature of the appointment of appraisers, to execute the statute. One appraiser is to be selected by the creditor and one by the debtor. They would naturally select such as would support their respective interests. Then the officer is to appoint a third as a sort of umpire. The statute thus seems to contemplate a disagreement between the two first appraisers, and if a certificate of a majority, where they all act, should not be sufficient, there might be a constant obstruction of justice.
Tenants defaulted.
Where an authority is confided to several persons for a private purpose, all of them must join in the acts done under it. Green v. Miller, 6 Johns. R. 39. But in matters of public concern, or of a general nature and not of mere private confidence, the voice of the majority shall govern. Grindley v. Barker, 1 Bos. & Pul. 236 ; Green v. Miller, ubi supra ; Jones v. Andover, 9 Pick. 151. In Witnell v. Gratham, 6 T. R. 398, Lawrence J. says, " In general it would be the understanding of a plain man, that where a body of persons is to do an act, a majority of that body would bind the rest." See also Orvis v. Thompson, 1 Johns. R. 500 ; Rex v. Courtenay, 9 East, 246 ; Blacker v. Blizard, 9 Barn. & Cressw. 851 ; King v. Greet, 8 Barn. & Cressw. 363 ; Short v. Pratt, 6 Mass. R. 496 ; Damon v. Granby, post, 345, and cases citc.i there But see United States v. Slade, 2 Mason, 71, contra.