Case Name: CAROL OWEN, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v. CNA INSURANCE/CONTINENTAL CASUALTY COMPANY, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
Court: New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New Jersey
Decision Date: 2000-05-11
Citations: 330 N.J. Super. 608
Docket Number: 
Parties: CAROL OWEN, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v. CNA INSURANCE/CONTINENTAL CASUALTY COMPANY, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
Judges: 
Reporter: New Jersey Superior Court Reports
Volume: 330
Pages: 608–628

Head Matter:
750 A.2d 211
CAROL OWEN, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v. CNA INSURANCE/CONTINENTAL CASUALTY COMPANY, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
Superior Court of New Jersey Appellate Division
Argued January 20, 2000
May 11, 2000.
Before Judges STERN, KESTIN and WEFING.
Lee A. Rosengard argued the cause for appellant (Stradley, Ronon, Stevens & Young, attorneys; Mr. Rosengard and Francis X. Manning, of counsel and on the brief).
Sherry L. Foley argued the cause for respondent (Foley & Foley, attorneys; Ms. Foley, on the brief).

Opinion:
The opinion of the court was delivered by
STERN, P.J.A.D.
Defendant insurance carrier appeals from the grant of summary judgment to plaintiff in this declaratory judgment action seeking to require defendant to honor her assignment of the proceeds of a structured settlement. The settlement agreement provided:
The claimant shall have the right to change the Contingent Payee at any time during the term of this Agreement by filing written notice with the Company, such change to be effective when accepted by the Company in writing as of the date such notice was signed, except as to any payments made by the Company before such change was accepted.
To the extent provided by law, the aforesaid deferred lump sum payments shall not be subject to assignment, transfer, commutation or encumbrance, except as provided herein.
This appeal requires us to consider the extent to which the law may prohibit the assignment. There is a dispute as to whether plaintiff assigned merely the $20,636.48 payment due in December 2001 or also the $30,321.76 payment due in December 2006. However, that issue does not affect the legal question on which summary judgment was granted because the parties agree the same principle would apply if only the payment due in 2001 was assigned.
On this appeal defendant argues that Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) does not prohibit the enforcement of the non-assignment clause in the structured settlement, as claimed by plaintiff; that the trial court failed to consider the effect of Article 2 of the U.C.C.; and that the trial court erred in its analysis of common law and public policy considerations.
I.
On September 15,1983, plaintiff Carol Owen (then Carol Hydo) of Spotswood, New Jersey, signed a release in favor of parties she had sued in a personal injury case arising out of a slip and fall at a Bamberger's store in East Brunswick, New Jersey. Incident thereto, plaintiff entered into a settlement agreement with defendant, the tortfeasors' insurer. Under the terms of the settlement agreement, plaintiff received an initial lump sum of $10,000, attorney's fees of $15,000 and five deferred lump sum payments totaling $81,067.24. The payments were to be made in December 1986, 1991, 1996, 2001 and 2006. In the structured settlement agreement, quoted above, plaintiff agreed that she would not assign or otherwise encumber the deferred lump sum payments.
On December 22, 1997, plaintiff entered into a "Purchase and Sale Agreement" with Metropolitan Mortgage and Securities Company under which she agreed to "sell, convey, transfer and assign" to Metropolitan all her "rights and benefits" under the settlement agreement with defendant for $8,520.20. "Benefits" included "[a]ll of the rights, titles, estates, interests, powers, privileges, and benefits (of every description whatsoever) of the plaintiff . in, to or under . the Settlement Agreement... (including, without limitation, the entire Remaining Balance and excluding therefrom only the Unpurchased Benefits, if any)____" At the time of the sale plaintiff was entitled to receive two more payments under the structured settlement, one for $20,636.48 in December 2001, and one for $30,321.76 in December 2006.
As a result of the agreement with Metropolitan, plaintiff signed an irrevocable special power of attorney, "exhibit G" to the agreement, directing the attorney-in-fact designated by Metropolitan "[tjo accept, sign, endorse . in my name and on my behalf, all checks . payable to my order, . and received pursuant to [the settlement agreement with defendant]." (emphasis added.) Plaintiff also agreed to defend, indemnify and hold Metropolitan harmless from any claim that her benefits were not assignable, and to "order and conduct [her] affairs as to prevent the assertion of any claim that the Benefits were not assignable."
Incident to the agreement, in January 1998 plaintiff sent defendant a notarized letter directing it to send "all future payments and other mail" to an address in Syracuse, New York. Defendant responded by sending her a copy of the settlement agreement and noting that the deferred lump sum payments were "not subject to assignment, transfer, commutation or encumbrance." After plaintiffs attorney wrote several letters to defendant seeking confirmation that defendant had changed the address, defendant requested confirmation that plaintiff resided at the Syracuse address. Plaintiffs counsel responded by enclosing a letter of complaint to the Department of Insurance and indicating that she "will file the complaint" in the absence of "immediate[] written acknowledgment" that defendant changed plaintiffs mailing address. Defendant advised plaintiffs counsel that plaintiff could not assign her payments and that defendant always sends the payments "to the claimant's actual address."
This action was thereafter commenced. In her complaint plaintiff sought to compel defendant to acknowledge the address change. She also sought a declaration that the non-assignment clause in the settlement agreement was void and unenforceable, thereby permitting her assignment to Metropolitan.
In response to plaintiffs motion for summary judgment, defendant presented an affidavit of Susan Goulet, defendant's Vice President. In the affidavit, Ms. Goulet explained why defendant requires that all structured settlements contain a provision prohibiting an assignment. Defendant explained that it is concerned about the "risk of being required to make double payment" because so many tort plaintiffs "are of diminished physical or mental capacity" due to their injuries, and their beneficiaries and heirs attack the assignments based on the diminished capacity. Defendant said it is also concerned about the potential of litigation resulting from competing claims because tort plaintiffs have made multiple assignments of the same interest and have executed documents assigning the entire interest in a structured settlement when they intended to assign only a portion thereof.* Defendant also insists that because the assignment of a structured settlement has tax consequences for the assignor and imposes a tax reporting burden on the carrier, the non-assignment provision assures that defendant "is able to fulfill its [legal] obligations." Moreover, the Goulet affidavit states that defendant incurs administrative expenses in processing an assignment and has been subjected to liens for the amount of "assigned periodic payments on account of a tort plaintiff's failure to make court ordered child support or alimony payments, or due to a tort plaintiffs having past due tax obligations or outstanding judgments."
II.
Defendant suggests that the law of Illinois may apply to this structured settlement because its principal office is located there. But New Jersey follows the governmental interest analysis in deciding choice of law questions, Marinetti v. K-Mart Corp., 318 N.J.Super. 554, 563, 724 A.2d 806 (App.Div.1999), aff'd, 162 N.J. 516, 745 A.2d 508 (2000); and there is no choice of law issue to be considered in the absence of a conflict between the law of the respective states, ibid.; Gantes v. Kason Corp., 145 N.J. 478, 484, 679 A.2d 106 (1996). Because we agree with defendant's major contentions under New Jersey law, there would appear to be no conflict. However, even if there were a conflict, we would apply New Jersey law, given the entry of the structured settlement here upon disposition of New Jersey litigation involving injury to a New Jersey resident. See Marinelli, supra, 318 N.J.Super. at 562, 724 A.2d 806; Gantes, supra, 145 N.J. at 484, 679 A.2d 106.
III.
Plaintiff contends that Article 9 of the U.C.C. addressing secured transactions prohibits the non-assignment provision of her agreement with defendant and renders it void. A provision of Article 9, as adopted in N.J.S.A. 12A:9-318(4), provides:
A term in any contract between an account debtor and an assignor is ineffective if it prohibits assignment of an account or prohibits creation of a security interest in chattel paper or a security interest in a general intangible for money due or to become due or requires the account debtor's consent to the assignment or security interest.
The trial judge agreed with plaintiff's contention.
N.J.S.A 12A:9-104(k) provides that Article 9 does not apply "[t]o a transfer in whole or in part of any claim arising out of tort." The trial court, in a written opinion, found that "[t]he structured settlement agreement was structured and must be viewed as a contract in all respects, inasmuch as it deals with the disposition of proceeds that result from a tort claim, not from the tort claim itself." The judge cited Berkowitz v. Haigood, 256 N.J.Super. 342, 346, 606 A.2d 1157 (Law Div.1992). The trial judge further noted that under Chelsea-Wheeler Coal Co. v. Marvin, 134 N.J. Eq. 432, 437, 35 A.2d 874 (E. & A.1944), a prohibition of assignment "may be disregarded where it is not the main purpose of the contract." The judge therefore concluded "that as a consenting adult, Plaintiff has every right to choose for herself when, and how she wishes to manage her own financial affairs," and that her request "to be relieved of Continental's non-assignment clause is entirely proper under current law."
Defendant contends that "[a] plain reading of section 9-104(k)'s exclusion shows that it applies not only to tort claims, but also the proceeds of such claims, and that if the drafters of Article 9 had wanted section 9—104(k) not to apply to the settlement proceeds of tort claims, they knew how to accomplish that [result]. The proof is in subsections (g) and (1) of section 9-104," which embody express exceptions. Defendant quotes Professor Amanda K. Esquibel, An Article 9 Primer Regarding Uninsured Collateral Destroyed By A Tortfeasor, 46 U. Kan. L.Rev. 211, 215 (1998), for the proposition that because "subsection (k) lacks any exception for proceeds, there can be no doubt that the [U.C.C.] drafters intended no exception for proceeds of tort claims." In Professor Esquibel's words, "section 9-104(k)'s exclusion applies not only to tort claims, but also to the proceeds of such a claim." Id. at 214 (quoted in Insurance Co. of North America v. Della Indus., Inc., 998 F.Supp. 159, 164 (D.Conn.1998)).
This reading of Article 9 was recently adopted by a federal district court in a case involving an alleged breach of an indemnification and security agreement under a performance bond, resulting from the defendant's sale and assignment of a tort claim. In Della Indus., supra, 998 F.Supp. at 163-165, the court held that the claim was not subject to the parties' security agreement and was therefore assignable. The Court noted that tort claims are excluded from Article 9 because, as the U.C.C. Comment notes, "they do not customarily serve as commercial collateral." Ibid. The court quoted from Professor Esquibel's article, supra, and Barclays Bus. Credit, Inc. v. Four Winds Plaza Partnership, 938 F.Supp. 304 (D.Vi.1996), which considered at length the arguments regarding whether the payment of tort-claim proceeds under a settlement agreement were contractual in nature and subject to Article 9, or were tort-claim proceeds excluded from the scope of Article 9. Judge Stanley Brotman, sitting in the Virgin Islands by designation, concluded that "the better rule" was that the U.C.C. exempted tort settlement proceeds, as well as the claims, from the application of Article 9. Della Indus., supra, 998 F.Supp. at 164 (quoting Barclays, supra, 938 F.Supp. at 308-10). See also In re Ore Cargo, Inc., 544 F.2d 80 (2d Cir.1976); Liberty Life Assurance Co. of Boston v. Stone Street Capital, Inc., 93 F.Supp.2d 630, 637-38 (D.Md.2000) (section 9-318(4) "clearly does not enable defendants to avoid the anti-assignment provision in the Settlement Agreement"); Grieve v. General American Life Ins. Co., 58 F.Supp.2d 319, 322-24 (D.Vt.1999) (neither Vermont U.C.C. nor public policy prevented enforcement of anti-assignment clause of structured settlement); Interdevco v. Hollywood Federal Sav. and Loan Ass'n. 523 So.2d 773 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1988); Bluxome Street Assoc. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 206 Cal.App.3d 1149, 254 Cal.Rptr. 198, 202 (1988) (finding that Article 9 does not create security interest in the settlement proceeds of a tort claim).
We agree that Article 9's express exclusion of tort claims includes the proceeds of a tort claim, and therefore conclude that Article 9 does not prohibit the non-assignment provision of plaintiffs contract with defendant. Accordingly, we need not consider the impact of Article 2 or N.J.S.A. 12A:2-210, which defendant asserts to be material in light of N.J.S.A. 12A:9-318.
IV.
Since we have concluded that Article 9 does not prohibit the non-assignment provision of a structured settlement, we must consider whether the non-assignability provision of this settlement agreement is otherwise enforceable under New Jersey law, which generally permits the assignment of settlement proceeds. See Berkowitz v. Haigood, supra, 256 N.J.Super. at 346, 606 A.2d 1157. Indeed, by statute, "all judgments and decrees recovered in any of the courts" in New Jersey are assignable, N.J.S.A. 2A:25-1, unless the parties have expressly agreed otherwise. A prohibition on assignment "may be disregarded where it is not the main purpose of the contract, but is a mere incident to such main purpose." Chelsea-Wheeler, supra, 134 N.J. Eq. at 437, 35 A.2d 874. See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Woolf, 138 N.J. Eq. 450, 457-58, 47 A.2d 340 (E. & A.1946).
Chelsea-Wheeler, supra, 134 N.J. Eq. at 435, 35 A.2d 874, involved an effort by the assignee to collect the proceeds of an insurance policy that contained a non-assignment provision for the benefit of the assignor and other family members. After determining that non-assignability was one of the main purposes of the agreement because it had specifically provided for periodic payments over time, the Court of Errors and Appeals concluded that non-assignment was a material term of the agreement, and enforced the contract according to its terms. Id. at 437-39, 35 A.2d 874. Defendant contends that because "the transaction between Ms. Owen and Metropolitan strikes at the very purpose of the settlement agreement, it should not be enforced." According to defendant:
One main purpose of the settlement agreement is to guarantee payment to Ms. Owen or her heirs over time rather than in a lump sum, in light of Ms. Owen's circumstances. To ensure a continued income stream at five year intervals, and to protect it from dissipation or attachment by creditors prior to the receipt of each periodic payment, the settlement agreement contained non-assignment language designed to achieve that very result.
There can be nothing more central to a structured settlement than the structure itself. In its absence, it is just a plain settlement, and upon receipt of the entire proceeds at the time the agreement is entered into, the full settlement sum is subject to attack from all quarters. That is exactly what Ms. Owen and Continental did not want, and it is why, under Chelsear-Wheeler, the provision prohibiting "assignment, transfer, commutation or encumbrance" must be said to be a main purpose of the contract.
Another reason that the assignment restriction forms a main purpose of the settlement agreement involves the Internal Revenue Code. As noted above, one benefit of structured settlement arrangements is that [it] . is [not] taxable to the original tort plaintiff—here, Ms. Owen. 26 U.S.C. § 104(a)(2). However, if a tort plaintiff receives a lump sum and invests the money, the earnings on the lump sum are taxable. 26 U.S.C. § 1001. By receiving deferred payments, therefore, the plaintiff enjoys a tax-free gain that, had she invested the money herself, would have been taxable income.
If rights to periodic payments were freely assignable, transferable, or able to be accelerated, the plaintiff could lose the tax-free benefit. See Revenue Ruling 79-220, 1979-2 C.B. 74 (a claimant who has actual or constructive receipt of the economic benefit of any lump-sum amount is not permitted to exclude the income from the investment of such payment under section 104(a)(2)). Similarly, if the periodic payments are assigned to a third-party (like Metropolitan), Continental could be found not to be making subsequent settlement payments on account of personal injuries, and the tort plaintiff could lose the exemption provided by Section 104(a)(2). This would put the plaintiff at risk of losing the benefit of future tax-free payments and at risk of being taxed on the payment received from the assignee.
In addition, in the event the periodic payments were freely assignable, the party making the payments (here, Continental) could face tax-reporting issues it bargained to avoid. Because the payments are tax-free to the plaintiff, the payor does not have to report any portion of the payment as income to the plaintiff. Absent restriction on assignment, the payor could have the obligation to report the earnings contained in each future payment. 26 U.S.C. § 6041. Failure to report these earnings could expose the payor to tax-reporting liabilities and penalties. 26 U.S.C. § 6721 (failure to file an information return); § 6722 (failure to file a payee statement); § 6723 (failure to comply with other information reporting requirements). If the payment were deemed to have been received under a commercial annuity contract, it would be subject to withholding under 26 U.S.C. § 3405(a), and could also be subject to backup withholding under 26 U.S.C. § 3406. Protecting both Ms. Owen and Continental from such adverse tax consequences would also have been a main purpose of the non-assignment provision of the settlement agreement.
Defendant points to a recent unpublished federal District Court opinion to support its concerns about potential tax consequences and the resulting burden and risk. We may not rely on unpublished opinions. R. 1:36-3. But see Johnson v. First Colony Life Ins. Co., 26 F.Supp.2d 1227, 1229 (C.D.Cal.1998), where the Federal District Court entered summary judgment for the defendant insurers, holding that the structured settlement contract "very clearly prohibits plaintiffs from assigning their right to receive the proceeds of the contract." The court noted that plaintiffs "failed to overcome the presumption that the nonassignability clause is for the benefit of the [insurer]" and that the tax consequences of an assignment posed a legitimate risk to the carrier. Id. at 1229-30, 1230 n. 4. See also Liberty Life, supra, 93 F.Supp.2d at 636 ("inclusion of an anti-assignment clause manifests [the carriers'] concerns regarding the potential tax implications of an assignment"; court found anti-assignment provision "was a material part of the Settlement Agreement because it increased [the carriers'] ability to predict their tax liability" and "assignment would materially increase the burden or risk imposed on [the carriers]").
Chelsear-Wheeler, as an opinion of the court of last resort in this State, is binding upon us, Bell Atlantic Network Serv., Inc. v. P.M. Video Corp., 322 N.J.Super. 74, 99, 730 A.2d 406 (App.Div.1999), and we are satisfied that the trial judge improperly granted summary judgment to plaintiff in the absence of further development of both the materiality of the anti-assignment provision and the legitimacy or reasonableness of the risks perceived to flow to defendant if the assignment were enforceable. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 317(2)(a) (1981):
A contractual right can be assigned unless
(a) the substitution of a right of the assignee for the right of the assignor would materially change the duty of the obligor, or materially increase the burden or risk imposed on him by his contract, or materially impair his chance of obtaining return performance, or materially reduce its value to him,. . . .
See also Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 322(2) (1981) ("[a] contract term prohibiting assignment of rights under the contract, unless a different intention is manifested, (a) does not forbid assignment of a right to damages for breach of the whole contract or a right arising out of the assignor's due performance of his entire obligation; (b) gives the obligor a right to damages for breach of the terms forbidding assignment but does not render the assignment ineffective; (c) is for the benefit of the obligor, and does not prevent the assignee from acquiring rights against the assignor or the obligor from discharging his duty as if there were no such prohibition"); Garden State Buildings L.P. v. First Fidelity Bank, N.A., 305 N.J.Super. 510, 522, 702 A.2d 1315 (App.Div.1997), certif. denied, 153 N.J. 50, 707 A.2d 153 (1998) (adopting the principle that "such clause must contain express provisions that any assignment shall be void or invalid if not made in a certain specified way"); Bel-Ray Co., Inc. v. Chemrite (Pty) Ltd., 181 F.3d 435, 442 (3d Cir.1999) (stating that the Garden State Buildings court "[i]n adopting § 322, New Jersey joins numerous other jurisdictions that follow the general rule that contractual provisions limiting or prohibiting assignments operate only to limit a parties' right to assign the contract, but not their power to do so, unless the parties' manifest an intent to the contrary with specificity").
In future cases, the impact of a non-assignability provision can be spread on the record at the time the settlement is entered, and a non-assignability clause should be enforced as written unless the record suggests otherwise. We know no policy which would preclude such enforcement as a matter of law if it is a material condition of the settlement, but in this case the record is silent with respect to the counseled negotiations and execution of the settlement at a time the parties acknowledge' the law governing assignability remained unclear. Accordingly, we remand for further proceedings relating to the materiality and enforceability of the provision governing the non-assignability of the structured settlement.
Both parties point to pending federal and state legislation that may preempt or affect our conclusion. Until such legislation is adopted, however, we cannot deem it to be dispositive.
V.
The judgment is reversed, and the matter is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Plaintiff argues that the assignee's rights to the 2006 payment are contingent and would accrue only if it does not obtain the 2001 payment. Defendant insists that because the assignment was of "all . rights and Benefits," there is a factual dispute concerning the scope of the assignment, and the factual dispute surrounding the 2006 payment emphasizes the problems inherent in permitting assignments at all. In any event, the parties appear to agree that any question concerning the scope of the assignment in this regard will be resolved by our resolution of the issue now before us.
Defendant contends that the dispute in this case with regard to the scope of assignment confirms its concerns regarding the ability to assign a structured settlement.
Defendant points to 215 Ill. Comp. Stat Ann. 5/155.34 (erroneously cited as "215 ILCA 5/155.31"), as permitting assignment of structured settlements with court approval. Defendant also contends that the anti-assignment provision does not have to be a "main purpose of the contract" in Illinois, as plaintiff contends it does in New Jersey. Defendant argues that there can be no assignment in this case under the law of either state.
Plaintiff does not address the choice of law issue except to note that defendant ultimately stated "no conflict exists" and that the trial court properly applied New Jersey law.
We recognize that there is respectable authority for the proposition that section 9-104(k) does not exclude tort settlement proceeds from the scope of Article 9, In re Falkenberg, 136 B.R. 481, 485-86 (Bankr.N.D.Ohio 1992); In re Phoenix Marine Corp., 20 B.R. 424 (Bankr.E.D.Va.1982).
Last year the American Law Institute and National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws adopted a revised U.C.C. While the U.C.C. was designed to promote "freedom of contract . between the immediate parties to the security transaction," U.C.C. § 9-101(1998), Official Comment, and the revision considers most proceeds of a settlement to be subject to the provisions of Article 9, the revision also expressly provides that Article 9 "does not apply to . an assignment of a claim arising in tort, other than a commercial tort claim _" and security interests in tort claims that constitute proceeds of other collateral. Revised U.C.C. § 9-109(d)(12)(1999) and Official Comment 15 thereto. See also Revised U.C.C. § 9—102(a)(13)(1999), defining "commercial tort claim." While the revision would support our holding in this case if deemed a clarification of existing law, the New Jersey Legislature has not yet had time to review or adopt the revision. We, therefore, attribute no significance to the revision or to the Legislature's inaction.
We do not necessarily agree with defendant's analysis of the law or agree with some of its concerns, particularly with regard to its obligation to protect plaintiff from the adverse consequences of her own conduct. However, defendant has a right to contract in an effort to avoid legitimate risks.
The parties refer us to a plethora of unpublished opinions upon which we may not rely. R. 1:36-3.
Liberty Life, supra, 93 F.Supp.2d at 637, found the assignment to be void under § 317(2)(c), as prohibiting an assignment "validly precluded by contract," as well as void under 317(2)(a). Given Chelsea-Wheeler, we believe the non-assignment provision must be material.