Case Name: Gregory L. ALEXANDER, Appellant, v. MUNICIPALITY OF ANCHORAGE, Appellee
Court: Alaska Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Alaska
Decision Date: 2000-12-15
Citations: 15 P.3d 269
Docket Number: No. A-7502
Parties: Gregory L. ALEXANDER, Appellant, v. MUNICIPALITY OF ANCHORAGE, Appellee.
Judges: Before MANNHEIMER and STEWART, Judges, and RABINOWITZ, Senior Supreme Court Justice.
Reporter: Pacific Reporter 3d
Volume: 15
Pages: 269–275

Head Matter:
Gregory L. ALEXANDER, Appellant, v. MUNICIPALITY OF ANCHORAGE, Appellee.
No. A-7502.
Court of Appeals of Alaska.
Dec. 15, 2000.
Randall S. Cavanaugh, Kalamarides & Associates, Anchorage, for Appellant.
Carmen E. ClarkWeeks, Assistant Municipal Prosecutor, and Mary K. Hughes, Municipal Attorney, Anchorage, for Appellee.
Before MANNHEIMER and STEWART, Judges, and RABINOWITZ, Senior Supreme Court Justice.
Sitting by assignment made pursuant to article IV, section 11 of the Alaska Constitution and Administrative Rule 23(a).

Opinion:
OPINION
STEWART, Judge.
Following a bench trial on stipulated facts, District Court Judge James N. Wanamaker convicted Gregory L. Alexander of driving while intoxicated (DWI), a misdemeanor. Alexander appeals, contending that District Court Judge Natalie K. Finn erroneously denied his motion to suppress the results of his breath test and his independent blood test. Alexander claims that the police interfered with his right to consult with his attorney before taking a breath test. We affirm because Judge Finn's findings are supported by the record and we agree with Judge Finn that on that record, suppression of evidence was not warranted.
Facts and Proceedings
On March 12, 1999, at about two in the morning, Anchorage Police Officer Chris Goldberg stopped Alexander for driving the wrong way on 5th Avenue, a one-way street. When Goldberg contacted Alexander, he noticed signs indicating that Alexander had been drinking. Goldberg administered some field sobriety tests. After Alexander completed these tests, Goldberg arrested him for DWI.
Goldberg transported Alexander to the 5th Avenue police substation for a breath test. At the substation, Goldberg kept Alexander's hands cuffed behind his back. Goldberg testified that Alexander was intoxicated and uncooperative; he was also upset that he had been arrested, and angry that his vehicle was impounded. Goldberg also testified that based on his eight years experience as a street officer, he has found that intoxicated people are unpredictable, and that, for safety purposes, with very few exceptions, he keeps their hands cuffed behind their backs. Goldberg also testified that it was department policy to keep all DWI arrestees' hands cuffed behind their backs during DWI processing.
While at the substation, Alexander asked to use a phone. Alexander wanted to call a specific attorney, but did not know the attorney's home telephone number. Goldberg helped Alexander call Alexander's wife to get the attorney's home phone number; then Goldberg called the attorney. Before calling Alexander's wife, Goldberg turned off the substation's tape recorder but forgot to turn off the personal tape recorder that Goldberg had in his pocket. The substation's recorder remained off until Alexander completed his calls. - Alexander did not know - about Goldberg's personal recorder.
Onee Alexander's attorney answered the phone, Goldberg switched the phone from the speakerphone to the handset, and placed the handset between Alexander's shoulder and head. Goldberg testified that he regularly does this, and it usually works. However, Alexander was unable to keep the phone from slipping out, so Goldberg held the phone to Alexander's head. Goldberg heard Alexander's side of the conversation, but could not hear the attorney.
Goldberg testified that in his experience, regardless of where he stood in the substation, had the speakerphone been used, he would have heard both sides of the conversation. Goldberg said he always tries to have arrestees use the handset because it is more private.
Alexander also testified. He said that Goldberg was approximately a foot and a half away, and that having Goldberg stand so close made him nervous and uneasy when talking to the attorney; as a result, he lied to his attorney, and told him that he had only had one drink. Based on this information, the attorney © Ivised Alexander to request an independent blood test. After this conversation, Alexander provided a breath sample for the Intoximeter. The result showed that his blood alcohol content (BAC) was .120 percent. Alexander requested an independent test, and was transported to a hospital. Alexander's independent test showed a blood alcohol content of .106 percent.
Alexander moved to suppress the results of both the breath and the blood tests. He argued that the police violated his right to consult privately with counsel because Goldberg stood close enough to hold the phone, tape recorded the conversation, and kept Alexander's hands cuffed behind his back.
At an evidentiary hearing before Judge Finn, the Municipality conceded that Goldberg's inadvertent tape recording of Alexander's conversation should be excluded. However, the Municipality argued that there was no basis for suppressing the test results. Judge Finn accepted the Municipality's concession regarding the tape, but denied Alexander's motion to suppress the test results.
On September 47, 1999, following a bench trial based on stipulated facts, Judge Wanamaker found Alexander guilty of DWL.
Did the police interfere with Alexander's right to confer with an attorney?
On appeal, Alexander contends that under Farrell v. Anchorage, Goldberg did not make a reasonable effort to accommodate Alexander's right to consult privately with counsel. While Alexander acknowledges that the privacy right at issue here is balanced against the police duty to maintain custodial observation, he argues that Goldberg took no action to provide any privacy. This argument, however, is contradicted by the evidence. According to the record, Goldberg did make efforts to provide privacy-Goldberg turned off the substation's tape reec_der before calling the attorney and switched from speaker phone to the handset when the attorney answered. - Goldberg placed the phone between Alexander's shoulder and head, and took no notes or other action that Alexander can identify as additionally intrusive. Goldberg held the phone only when Alexander was unable to keep the phone in position without assistance.
Alexander argues that Goldberg did not satisfy Farrell because he kept Alexander's hands cuffed behind his back, which in turn required Goldberg to stand close enough to hold the phone. He also argues that Goldberg violated his rights by inadvertently recording the conversation.
Following the supreme court's decision in Copelin v. State, we have held that even though police officers have a duty to maintain custodial observation of an arrestee before administration of the breath test, the arrestee must be given a reasonable opportunity to hold a private conversation with his or her attorney. We have also held that "an arrestee's right to confer with counsel 'is not violated merely because the arresting officer maintains physical proximity to the [arrestee]. " As we said in Mangiapane v. Anchorage, "this court has suppressed Intox-imeter results only when, in addition to maintaining physical proximity, 'the police engaged in additional intrusive measures, intrusions that convinced [arrestees] that the officers were intent on overhearing and reporting [the arrestees'] conversations with their attorneys." "
Alexander testified that he was nervous and uneasy when talking to his attorney because Goldberg stood approximately a foot and a half away from him while helping him with the phone. However, Alexander did not identify anything other than Goldberg's proximity that made him uneasy. Nor did he claim that he thought that Goldberg was trying to listen to the conversation. The record shows that Alexander was aware that Goldberg had turned off the substation tape recorder, and was not aware that Goldberg had a personal tape recorder.
In addition, the record shows that Goldberg did not insist upon holding the phone to stay close to Alexander-instead, he first tried to have Alexander cradle the phone between his shoulder and head. Goldberg said that in his experience, this usually works; only when this was unsue-cessful did he hold the phone. In short, while Goldberg did not release Alexander from his handcuffs, he also did not stand next to Alexander to hold the phone until he had to. Thus, except for Goldberg's proximity, Alexander did not identify anything that Goldberg did that intruded on Alexander's conversation, or made him believe that Goldberg intended to overhear and report the conversation.
While Alexander condemns Goldberg's decision to keep Alexander handcuffed, this fact is but one of the cireumstances reviewed when determining what "measures [to pro vide privacy] should be deemed reasonable." We ha' 3 recognized that police do not have to compromise their safety to allow a defendant a greater degree of privacy when making a phone call. For example, in Kameroff v. State, we said that "an arrestee's right to call an attorney is not absolute. Police officers certainly need not jeopardize their own safety (or the safety of others) to allow a prisoner to make a telephone call," Applying the test in Farrell, if Goldberg's decision was reasonable, then keeping Alexander handcuffed would not violate Alexander's right to consult privately with counsel.
At the evidentiary hearing, Goldberg testified that he kept Alexander's hands cuffed behind his back because he did not trust Alexander. Goldberg testified that, based on eight years as a police officer, he had general safety concerns when dealing with intoxicated people in general because they are unpredictable. But he also testified that he specifically distrusted Alexander. In addition to being intoxicated (and, thus, unpredictable), Alexander had been uncooperative, and was angry and upset because he had been arrested and because his vehicle had been impounded. Also, Judge Finn had reviewed part of the audiotape that Goldberg inadvertently made of the DWI processing. She found that Alexander's "demeanor when talking to [his] wife and when talking to the officers [was] somewhere between aggressive and obnoxious...." Based on the testimony and the tape, Judge Finn found that Goldberg kept Alexander "[handjeuffed behind his back for safety reasons.... And while the defendant claims that the officer's presence had a chilling effect on his conversation with counsel, to the court it sounded: like the defendant was simply posturing within the officer's earshot for the benefit of the officer and the attorney." The record supports Judge Finn's findings.
Alexander also argues that Goldberg intruded upon the privacy of his consultation with his attorney because Goldberg tape recorded Alexander's side of the conversation. However, we rejected a similar argument in Kiehl v. State. In Kiehl, we upheld the admissibility of the defendant's breath test even though the police officer surreptitiously and intentionally recorded Kiehl's conversation with his attorney. "Kiehl remained oblivious [to] the recording" and thus "the surreptitious recording resulted in no discernible impairment of Kiehl's consultation with counsel." Alexander's position is similar to Kiehl's; Alexander has not shown that his consultation with counsel was impaired because Goldberg inadvertently recorded Alexander's side of the conversation.
Looking at all the cireumstances, Alexander has not shown that Judge Finn's findings are clearly erroneous. Based on those findings, we agree with Judge Finn that Goldberg did not violate Alexander's statutory right to confer with counsel.
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
COATS, Chief Judge, not participating.
. Anchorage Municipal Code § 9.28.020.
. Goldberg said he cuffed Alexander's hands in front for a short period when Alexander had to use the restroom. - Later, during the blood test at the hospital, Goldberg had to remove the cuffs to allow blood to be drawn.
. 682 P.2d 1128 (Alaska App.1984).
. 659 P.2d 1206 (Alaska 1983).
. See Farrell v. Anchorage, 682 P.2d at 1130 ("Copelin . makes it clear that, in order to comply with the statutory mandate of AS 12.25.150(b), police must make a reasonable effort to accommodate an arrestee's right to consult privately with counsel once a call has been made".); see also Mangiapane v. Anchorage, 974 P.2d 427, 429 (Alaska App.1999); Kiehl v. State, 901 P.2d 445, 446 (Alaska App.1995); Reekie v. Anchorage, 803 P.2d 412, 414 (Alaska App.1990); Anchorage v. Marrs, 694 P.2d 1163, 1165 (Alaska App.1985) (accord).
. Mangiapane, 974 P.2d at 429 (quoting Kiehl, 901 P.2d at 447).
. Id.
. - Farrell, 682 P.2d at 1131 ("Precisely what measures should be deemed reasonable will necessarily depend upon the circumstances of the individual case.") (citing Copelin, 659 P.2d at 1212).
. 926 P.2d 1174 (Alaska App.1996).
. Id. at 1178.
. As noted above, Goldberg also said that police department policy requires that officers keep DWI arrestees handcuffed.
. At one point during the processing, Alexander, before calling the attorney, told Goldberg that, 'I've been really super polite, but I am getting pissed."
. 901 P.2d at 445.
. Id. at 447.
. Appellee urges this court to reexamine its precedents in this area and hold that suppression of any breath or blood alcohol test results is only warranted when there has been a total denial of the arrestee's right under Copelin and AS 12.25.150(b) to consult privately with an attorney. We find it unnecessary to address this contention given our holding.