Case Name: STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Frank Joseph CIANELLI, Defendant-Appellant; STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Raymond Charles JEFF, Defendant-Appellant
Court: Idaho Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Idaho
Decision Date: 1980-06-10
Citations: 101 Idaho 313
Docket Number: Nos. 12927, 13051
Parties: STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Frank Joseph CIANELLI, Defendant-Appellant. STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Raymond Charles JEFF, Defendant-Appellant.
Judges: 
Reporter: Idaho Reports
Volume: 101
Pages: 313–314

Head Matter:
612 P.2d 550
STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Frank Joseph CIANELLI, Defendant-Appellant. STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Raymond Charles JEFF, Defendant-Appellant.
Nos. 12927, 13051.
Supreme Court of Idaho.
June 10, 1980.
Greg J. Fuller, Jones & Fuller, Jerome, for defendant-appellant.
David H. Leroy, Atty. Gen., Lynn E. Thomas, Deputy Atty. Gen., Boise, for plaintiff-respondent.

Opinion:
PER CURIAM:
Appellants bring these consolidated appeals from their respective judgments of conviction for delivery of cocaine. The sole issue is the constitutionality of the legislature's classification of cocaine as a Schedule II controlled substance. I.C. § 37-2701(o)(4) and -2707(b)(4). In particular, defendants maintain that the legislature's classification of cocaine as a narcotic for regulatory and penalty purposes is in conflict with constitutional principles of due process, equal protection, and cruel and unusual punishment. Defendants cite Illinois and Michigan cases, e. g., People v. McCabe, 49 Ill.2d 338, 275 N.E.2d 407 (1971); People v. Sinclair, 387 Mich. 91, 194 N.W.2d 878 (1972), in which the courts of those states invalidated legislation regulating marijuana use. Those courts apparently felt that their state legislatures overreacted to the marijuana problem. We are not inclined to similarly curtail the Idaho legislature's ability to deal with the societal evils which it feels are presented by illicit use of cocaine.
At the outset, we reject defendants' contention that the possession of cocaine is a fundamental right. See State v. Kincaid, 98 Idaho 440, 566 P.2d 763 (1977). The legislation in question is therefore subject only to that limited judicial scrutiny characteristic of the familiar "rational relationship" test. See Jones v. State Board of Medicine, 97 Idaho 859, 866, 555 P.2d 399, 406 (1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 914, 97 S.Ct. 2173, 52 L.Ed.2d 223 (1977).
Other state and federal courts have held that classifying cocaine as a narcotic for penal purposes bears a rational relationship to legitimate legislative goals. United States v. Hobbs, 392 F.Supp. 444 (D.Mass.1975); State v. Erickson, 574 P.2d 1 (Alaska 1978); Cardwell v. State, 575 S.W.2d 682 (Ark.1979); People v. Billi, 90 Misc.2d 568, 395 N.Y.S.2d 353 (Sup.1977); State v. Stitt, 24 Wash.App. 260, 600 P.2d 671 (1979). Accordingly, we hold that the classification of cocaine as a Schedule II controlled substance in I.C. § 37-2701(o )(4) and -2707(b)(4) is constitutional.
Affirmed.