Case Name: Sharon Lennon et al., Respondents, v. Cornwall Central School District, Appellant, et al., Defendant
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 2015-10-21
Citations: 132 A.D.3d 820
Docket Number: 
Parties: Sharon Lennon et al., Respondents, v Cornwall Central School District, Appellant, et al., Defendant.
Judges: Cohen, Hinds-Radix and LaSalle, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Appellate Division Reports
Volume: 132
Pages: 820–823

Head Matter:
Sharon Lennon et al., Respondents, v Cornwall Central School District, Appellant, et al., Defendant.
[18 NYS3d 139]

Opinion:
In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, etc., the defendant Cornwall Central School District appeals, as limited by its brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Orange County (Bartlett, J.), dated December 3, 2013, as denied its motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and all cross claims insofar as asserted against it.
Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.
"Schools are under a duty to adequately supervise the students in their charge and they will be held liable for foreseeable injuries proximately related to the absence of adequate supervision" (Mirand v City of New York, 84 NY2d 44, 49 [1994]). "An injury caused by the impulsive, unanticipated act of a fellow student ordinarily will not give rise to a finding of negligence absent proof of prior conduct that would have put a reasonable person on notice to protect against the injury-causing act" (Khosrova v Hampton Bays Union Free Sch. Dist., 99 AD3d 669, 671 [2012]).
Here, the defendant Cornwall Central School District (hereinafter the School District) failed to make a prima facie showing of its entitlement to judgment as a matter of law dismissing the complaint and all cross claims insofar as asserted against it. In support of its motion, the School District relied on evidence which included the deposition testimony of the two plaintiffs' infant children, who were pushed to the ground by a fellow student during a field trip, and the deposition testimony of School District employees. These submissions failed to eliminate all triable issues of fact as to whether the School District had actual or constructive notice of the fellow student's potential for causing harm, and whether, under the circumstances, the School District provided adequate supervision during the field trip (see Mirand v City of New York, 84 NY2d at 49; Khosrova v Hampton Bays Union Free Sch. Dist., 99 AD3d at 670-671).
Since the School District failed to make a prima facie showing of its entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, we need not review the sufficiency of the plaintiffs' opposition papers (see Winegrad v New York Univ. Med. Ctr., 64 NY2d 851, 853 [1985]). Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly denied the School District's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and all cross claims insofar as asserted against it.
Cohen, Hinds-Radix and LaSalle, JJ., concur.