Case Name: Patricia A. McCARTY, Appellant, v. FLORIDA UNEMPLOYMENT APPEALS COMMISSION and St. Augustine Trains, Inc., Appellees
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 2004-07-09
Citations: 878 So. 2d 432
Docket Number: No. 1D03-3116
Parties: Patricia A. McCARTY, Appellant, v. FLORIDA UNEMPLOYMENT APPEALS COMMISSION and St. Augustine Trains, Inc., Appellees.
Judges: LEWIS, J., concurs; ERVIN, J., dissents.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 878
Pages: 432–437

Head Matter:
Patricia A. McCARTY, Appellant, v. FLORIDA UNEMPLOYMENT APPEALS COMMISSION and St. Augustine Trains, Inc., Appellees.
No. 1D03-3116.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
July 9, 2004.
Carol S. Miller, Esquire, Jacksonville Area Legal Aid, Inc., Jacksonville, for Appellant.
Geri Atkinson-Hazelton, General Counsel; John D. Maher, Deputy General Counsel, Tallahassee, for Appellee Florida Unemployment Appeals Commission.

Opinion:
BENTON, J.
Patricia McCarty appeals the order of the Unemployment Appeals Commission upholding the appeals referee's determination that she was ineligible to receive unemployment compensation benefits even though she was discharged from her position with St. Augustine Trains, Inc., as tour guide, salesperson, and driver of an articulated tram. We reverse.
A seven-year employee, Ms. McCarty lost her job after she drove into a driveway that she had been told not to use, and' — when upbraided — defended her choice as necessary to avoid an accident with another tram driver. James Wettach, the president of St. Augustine Trains, explained the reason for the termination and the circumstances that gave rise to his decision:
I did not fire [her] for the driveway. As I told her I fired her for the noncooperation when I went down to talk about the driveway. If I was going to fire her I wouldn't have gone down to speak with her. I got no cooperation.... Other than that I think both of us pretty much agree on the facts and how it happened .
The "noncooperation" to which Mr. Wet-tach alluded consisted of Ms. McCarty's telling him "four times to speak to another driver with whom [Ms. McCarty] alleged she had 'almost' had a head-on collision." Ms. McCarty "would not really admit that she should not have pulled in there. She firmly believed that she should have."
A majority of the Unemployment Appeals Commission concluded that Ms. McCarty was guilty of "misconduct" disqualifying her for unemployment compensation benefits under section 443.036(29), Florida Statutes (2002), but we share the views Chairman Alan Orantes Forst cogently expressed in dissent.
"Misconduct" includes, but is not limited to, the following, which shall not be construed in pari materia with each other:
(a) Conduct evincing such willful or wanton disregard of an employer's interests as is found in deliberate violation or disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has the right to expect of his or her employee; or
(b) Carelessness or negligence of such a degree or recurrence as to manifest culpability, wrongful intent, or evil design or to show an intentional and substantial disregard of the employer's interests or of the employee's duties and obligations to his or her employer.
Section 443.036(29), Florida Statutes (2002). "In defining misconduct, courts are required to liberally construe the [unemployment compensation] statute in favor of the employee." Mason v. Load King Mfg. Co., 758 So.2d 649, 655 (Fla.2000).
Even if Ms. McCarty's deportment justified her discharge, " '[w]hether an employer has the right to terminate an employee's employment and whether a terminated employee meets the disqualification criteria set out in the unemployment compensation statute are separate issues. See Cooks v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 670 So.2d 178, 180 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996); Livingston v. Tucker Constr. & Eng., Inc., 656 So.2d 499, 500 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995); Hummer v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 573 So.2d 135, 137 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991).' Lusby v. Unemplmt. App. Comm'n, 697 So.2d 567, 568 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997). A single, isolated act of negligence does not constitute disqualifying misconduct. See, e.g., Cooks, 670 So.2d at 180; Johnson v. Unemplmt. App. Comm'n, 513 So.2d 1098, 1099 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987). 'While a violation of an employer's policy[ ] may constitute misconduct, '[r]epeated violations of explicit policies, after several warnings, are usually required.' Barchoff v. Shells of St. Pete Beach, Inc., 787 So.2d 935, 936 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001).' Cooksey-James v. Unemplmt. App. Comm'n, 869 So.2d 1209 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004)." Ash v. Unemplmt. App. Comm'n, 872 So.2d 400, 402 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004).
Ms. McCarty's discharge resulted from a single, isolated incident, and did not amount to disqualifying misconduct. See Donnell v. Univ. Cmty. Hosp., 705 So.2d 1031, 1032 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998) (holding claimant's actions did not disqualify her from receiving unemployment compensation benefits, where she had been a good employee for three years, but failed to follow a new policy regarding garbage can liners, which led to a loud argument with her supervisor when he confronted her, and ended in claimant's discharge); see also Cullen v. Neighborly Senior Servs., Inc., 775 So.2d 392, 393-94 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000) (holding that an argument in a private office during which the claimant raised his voice and accused the supervisor of not being truthful was an isolated incident that did not preclude unemployment compensation benefits).
While an isolated incident can be disqualifying, if sufficiently egregious, the single-incident cases cited by the Commission involve unexcused, unequivocal, and deliberate disobedience. The present case is devoid of any evidence that Ms. McCarty deliberately or intentionally acted against her employer's interests, even though a policy was violated. See Finish Line Feed, Inc. v. Acosta, 748 So.2d 1089, 1090 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000) ("[P]roof of the claimant's violation of the employer's known policy did not rise to the level of disqualifying misconduct connected with work. The employer cites . cases in which a single act of misconduct was found as disqualifying. A common thread running through all of the cited cases is a finding, supported by competent substantial evidence, that the claimant acted in deliberate and intentional disobedience (in some instances, in flagrant disregard) of a supervisor's order."). While it was disputed whether safety really required Ms. McCarty to use the forbidden driveway, the evidence that Ms. McCarty "firmly believed that she should have" done it — in her employer's as well as her own interest — was clear and uncontroverted, and expressing these views to Mr. Wettach after the fact was not disqualifying misconduct.
Reversed and remanded.
LEWIS, J., concurs; ERVIN, J., dissents.
. At the time of her discharge on July 3, 2002, Ms. McCarty had worked for St. Augustine Trains without interruption for more than three years, and off and on since February of 1989.
. Mr. Wettach clearly testified that merely entering the driveway — in contradistinction to refusing to concede that the driveway should not have been entered — was not the rationale for the termination, but the appeals referee overlooked this testimony in finding that:
The claimant's deviations from her route, without asking permission, evince an intentional and willful or wanton disregard of the employer's interests. Accordingly, the claimant was discharged for misconduct connected with the work as defined in the unemployment compensation law and she should remain disqualified from receipt of benefits.
Mr. Wettach's testimony that "[i]t's my final call she shouldn't have [pulled into the driveway] and we weren't getting anywhere so I dismissed her at that time at our meeting" does not support the referee's finding that "deviations from her route, without asking permission" occasioned the firing.
. Chairman Forst concluded that "the employer has failed to demonstrate that the claimant's actions constitute disqualifying misconduct connected with work." Chairman Forst summarized the operative facts, as follows:
The claimant testified, without rebuttal, that she was using the center driveway during the incidents at issue in order to avoid an accident. As such, her actions were taken with the intent of furthering the employer's interests. Moreover, the employer's president testified that he did not terminate the claimant because of these [ ] incidents, but because of her being uncooperative when he questioned her about the [ ] incident. However, the record indicates that the claimant did inform the employer's president that she used the center driveway to avoid a head-on collision and repeatedly implored the president to speak with the other bus driver. As such, the record does not support a conclusion that the claimant was insubordinate. Additionally, the claimant had worked for the employer, on and off, for approximately seven years and there is no indication in the referee's decision that the claimant had been previously disciplined.
. Mr. Wettach specifically testified at the hearing that there was nothing else in Ms. McCarty's employee file that contributed to her discharge.