Case Name: STATE of Louisiana v. Eddie LAWRENCE
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1991-12-27
Citations: 600 So. 2d 1341
Docket Number: No. 90 KA 1625
Parties: STATE of Louisiana v. Eddie LAWRENCE.
Judges: Before SHORTESS, LANIER and CRAIN, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 600
Pages: 1341–1352

Head Matter:
STATE of Louisiana v. Eddie LAWRENCE.
No. 90 KA 1625.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, First Circuit.
Dec. 27, 1991.
Bryan Bush, Dist. Atty. by Richard Johnson, Asst. Dist. Atty., Office of Dist. Atty., Baton Rouge, for plaintiff, appellant.
Office of Public Defender, Baton Rouge, for defendant, appellee.
Before SHORTESS, LANIER and CRAIN, JJ.

Opinion:
SHORTESS, Judge.
Eddie Lawrence (defendant) was charged by bill of information with driving while intoxicated (DWI), third offense, LSA-R.S. 14:98. After entering a not guilty plea, defendant filed a motion to quash the bill of information insofar as it sought to enhance the charge using two prior DWI convictions as predicates. He contends those pleas were "constitutionally and statutorily defective" and, more specifically, that the pleas were entered into in violation of defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel. The trial court granted the relief requested by ruling that the predicate guilty pleas could not validly be used by the state to enhance the charge from a first offense to a third offense, leaving defendant charged with only a first offense DWI. When the prosecutor objected to the ruling and informed the court he wished to appeal, the court stayed the proceedings during the pendency of the appeal. Here, in a single assignment of error, the state alleges the ruling should be reversed because the trial court erred in granting defendant's motion to quash.
In order for a misdemeanor guilty plea to be used as a basis for actual imprisonment, enhancement of actual imprisonment, or conversion of a subsequent misdemeanor into a felony, the trial judge must inform the defendant that by pleading guilty he waives (a) his privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, (b) his right to trial and jury trial where it is applicable, and (c) his right to confront his accuser. The trial judge must also ascertain that the accused understands what the plea connotes and its consequences. State v. Jones, 404 So.2d 1192, 1196 (La.1981). It is the state's burden to show that the defendant's plea was taken in compliance with Boykin's requirement that the defendant expressly and knowingly waived his rights. State v. Santiago, 416 So.2d 524, 526 (La.1982).
Additionally, an uncounseled DWI conviction may not be used to enhance punishment of a subsequent offense, absent a knowing and intelligent waiver of counsel. State v. Wiggins, 399 So.2d 206, 207-08 (La.1981). In State v. Strain, 573 So.2d 517 (La.App. 1st Cir.1990), affirmed, 585 So.2d 540 (La.1991), this court, sitting en banc, reconsidered and reaffirmed the holding of its opinion in State v. Carson, 527 So.2d 1018 (La.App. 1st Cir.1988), concerning the rule applicable to waiver of the right to counsel for DWI predicate offenses. In setting forth the applicable rule in Carson, this court stated the following:
Whether a criminal defendant has knowingly and intelligently waived his constitutional right to counsel is a question which depends upon the particular facts and circumstances of each case. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938). Factors which should be considered are (1) the background, experience and conduct of the accused, (2) the seriousness of the charge (whether it is a felony or a misdemeanor) and (3) the nature of the accused's anticipated self-representation (whether he will defend a jury trial or a judge trial, or enter a plea of guilty). If an accused wished to waive counsel and personally defend himself in a felony jury trial, the record must show that he was advised by the trial court of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation and he had sufficient literacy, competency and understanding to represent himself. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975); State v. Bell, 381 So.2d 393 (La.1980); State v. Dupre, 500 So.2d 873 (La.App. 1st Cir.1986), writ denied, 505 So.2d 55 (La.1987). This jurisprudence has been extended to apply to cases where an accused wishes to waive counsel and plead guilty in felony cases. State v. LaFleur, 391 So.2d 445 (La.1980); State v. Hart, 472 So.2d 280 (La.App. 1st Cir.1985); State v. Nevels, 457 So.2d 1254 (La.App. 1st Cir.1984). However, it would be unrealistic and impractical to require such a showing where an accused is charged with a minor traffic misdemeanor and intends to plead guilty and pay a fine without the benefit of counsel, [footnote omitted]
527 So.2d at 1022.
Strain and Carson each involved the validity of a waiver of the right to counsel at the time defendant entered a guilty plea to a misdemeanor DWI offense which the state later sought to use as a predicate to enhance punishment for a subsequent DWI charge. In affirming the court's decision in Strain, the supreme court said:
The Faretta Court observed that an accused, in order to represent himself, must knowingly and intelligently waive the benefits associated with the right to counsel. In this context, and referring to the Johnson v. Zerbst and Von Moltke v. Gillies [332 U.S. 708, 68 S.Ct. 316, 92 L.Ed. 309 (1948)] decisions, the Court stated that the accused "should be made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation" in order to establish on the record a knowing and intelligent decision as to the waiver. 422 U.S. at 835 [95 S.Ct. at 2541].
In the present case defendant relies on the quoted language from Faretta and on this court's decision in City of Monroe v. Wyrick, 393 So.2d 1273 (La.1981). He contends that the trial judge, by failing to warn him against the dangers of self-representation, did not perform the requisite judicial inquiry in the DWI-2 guilty plea to establish a valid waiver of counsel. We disagree, at least in the context of a waiver of counsel at a guilty plea.
While an accused who desires to waive counsel at trial generally should be made aware of the difficulties he might encounter in defending himself during the trial, there is little need to inform him of the pitfalls of self-representation at trial when he intends to plead guilty. The principal function of a lawyer for an accused who desires to plead guilty is to assist him in deciding whether to go to trial, and the judge who accepts an un-counseled guilty plea must satisfy himself that the accused knows and under stands that by his waiver of counsel he is giving up his right to this assistance. The critical issue on review of the waiver is whether the accused understood the waiver. What the accused understood is determined in terms of the entire record and not just by certain magic words used by the judge.
When an accused waives his right to counsel in pleading guilty to a misdemeanor, the trial judge should expressly advise him of his right to counsel and to appointed counsel if he is indigent. The judge should further determine on the record that the waiver is made knowingly and intelligently under the circumstances. Factors bearing on the validity of this determination include the age, education, experience, background, competency and conduct of the accused, as well as the nature, complexity and seriousness of the charge. The nature of the self-representation to be undertaken is also significant, since a layman obviously can more easily understand from a brief explanation by the judge the significance of a guilty plea than he can the significance of defending himself in a felony trial, with the latent dangers and pitfalls attendant thereto. Determining the defendant's understanding of his waiver of counsel in a guilty plea to an uncomplicated misdemeanor requires less judicial inquiry than determining his understanding of his waiver of counsel for a felony trial, [footnotes omitted]
585 So.2d at 543-544.
The state relied upon two prior convictions to enhance the DWI charged in the bill of information: (1) an April 15, 1988, guilty plea to third offense DWI in Twentieth Judicial District Court under docket number W-88-1-26, and (2) a January 29, 1985, guilty plea to first offense DWI in the Eighteenth Judicial District Court bearing docket number 844960. Both predicate pleas were entered without presence of counsel.
PREDICATE OFFENSE NUMBER ONE
In regard to the April 15, 1988, predicate guilty plea, the record shows that the evidence upon which the state relied to support its use of this predicate consisted of certified copies of the pertinent court minutes of the arraignment proceeding at which the plea was tendered and another document which is captioned "Transcript of arraignment at St. Francisville, Louisiana, on the 15[th] day of April, 1988."
The minute entry shows that defendant entered this predicate guilty plea "unaccompanied by counsel" and states, in pertinent part:
The Court advised him of his right to counsel and the nature of the charge and proceedings against him and found he could and did intelligently and knowingly waive the presence of counsel and permitted him to withdraw his prior plea of not guilty....
. The Court questioned the accused as to his understanding of his rights and he answered the questions of the Court and signed an affidavit in regard to his rights_
. The Court explained the enhanced penalty possibilities to the accused. The Court accepted the [guilty] plea, finding it was knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily made....
The other document purported to be a transcript of arraignment is not an actual transcript. Instead, it is a four-page, typed, fill-in-the-blank form (which has been filled in by hand) bearing the signatures of the judge, assistant district attorney, and defendant. The form contains a series of typed questions which (according to the form) the judge propounded to defendant and handwritten responses given by defendant. These questions and responses indicate that the judge advised defendant of the triad of Boykin rights and that defendant waived each of those rights. It indicates that (in response to specific questioning of the trial court) defendant answered that he was thirty-three years old; that he could read and write; that he was employed in construction work; and that he understood he was charged with third offense DWI. The form reflects that the judge read the statutory provisions defining DWI to defendant. The judge also specifically informed defendant as to the exact penalties for first, second and third offense DWI. Immediately thereafter, defendant responded affirmatively that he understood the crime and possible penalties. The judge informed defendant that by pleading guilty to third offense DWI he might, upon a subsequent criminal conviction, be subjected to enhanced penalties based on this plea. Defendant indicated to the judge that he so understood. The form also indicates the judge advised defendant and defendant understood that if he could not afford the services of an attorney at any stage of the proceedings, including appeal, the judge would appoint an attorney to represent him. Defendant further indicated he had discussed the case with his attorney on the telephone on the same day he entered the guilty plea and waived her appearance at the arraignment proceeding.
At the hearing oh the motion to quash, the trial court noted the April 15, 1988, minute entry indicated the judge advised defendant of his right to counsel but failed to note any advice as to the right to counsel if defendant was indigent. Noting that the other document (the form) did indicate that defendant was advised of the right to appointed counsel in case of indigency, the trial court nevertheless ruled that, absent an actual transcript of the arraignment, the state had not proved that defendant had knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his rights.
We conclude that this minute entry, coupled with the questions and responses in the form, affirmatively established advice and knowing waiver of the three Boykin rights. Nevertheless, because the challenged guilty plea was to third offense DWI, a felony, the more stringent standards applicable to waiver of the right to counsel when a defendant pleads guilty to a felony (rather than the less stringent standards this court found applicable to misdemeanor predicates in Carson and Strain) apply to the challenged predicate. The judge's only attempt to assess defendant's literacy, competency, understanding, and volition was to inquire into defendant's age, educational background, and ability to read and write and to read the statutory definition of DWI and statement of the possible penalties, including possible application of enhanced penalties in the future by virtue of pleading guilty. The defendant responded that he understood the crime and possible penalties and had discussed the case with his attorney and waived her presence at arraignment. We note with particularity, however, that the documents relied upon by the state do not reflect that the judge made defendant aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation. Hence, the evidence does not establish that defendant knew what he was doing and that his choice was made with open eyes. Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, we find that the trial court did not err in finding the April 15, 1988, predicate defective.
PREDICATE OFFENSE NUMBER TWO
In regard to the January 29, 1985, predicate guilty plea, the record reflects that the evidence upon which the state relied to support its use of this predicate consisted of certified copies of the pertinent court minutes of the arraignment proceeding at which defendant entered this guilty plea and a guilty plea-rights waiver form pertaining to this predicate signed by defendant.
The minute entry states, in pertinent part, as follows:
The defendant was informed of his right to an attorney, waived his right to an attorney, was informed of his right to go to trial, his right to remain silent, his right to confront his accusers, [and] his right to subpoena witnesses, [and] waived all these rights.
Additionally, the guilty plea-rights waiver form states the following:
I UNDERSTAND THAT . I AM ENTITLED TO BE REPRESENTED BY AN ATTORNEY; I UNDERSTAND THAT IF I AM INDIGENT, THAT IS UNABLE TO OBTAIN LEGAL REPRESENTATION, AND YET DESIRE TO BE REPRESENTED BY AN ATTORNEY, THAT THE COURT WILL APPOINT AN ATTORNEY TO REPRESENT ME.
I FURTHER UNDERSTAND THAT, WHETHER I AM REPRESENTED BY AN ATTORNEY OR NOT, IF I ENTER A PLEA OF GUILTY, BY THE ENTRY OF THE PLEA OF GUILTY, I WILL BE GIVING UP MY CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS: (1) TO BE TRIED IN OPEN COURT BY A JUDGE; (2) TO [CONFRONT] MY ACCUSERS AND THE RIGHT TO CROSS EXAMINE THE WITNESSES AGAINST ME THROUGH COUNSEL [OR] SELF; (3) TO SUMMON WITNESSES IN MY BEHALF; (4) I NEED NOT TAKE THE STAND TO INCRIMINATE MYSELF IN ANY WAY; AND (5) I HAVE THE RIGHT TO APPEAL, IF THE CASE IS LOST. BY PLEADING GUILTY, I WAIVE ALL THESE RIGHTS.
In granting the motion to quash regarding the January 29, 1985, predicate guilty plea, the trial court noted that, although the minute entry indicated the court which accepted this guilty plea had informed defendant of his right to counsel, there was nothing in the minute entry indicating the court had explained to defendant his right to court-appointed counsel if indigent or had attempted to determine if defendant understood and knowingly waived his rights. While noting the existence of the guilty plea-rights waiver form signed by defendant, the trial court stated it felt the waiver form did not serve to supplement the minutes. We disagree with the trial court's conclusion that the waiver form did not supplement the minutes. The minute entry alone clearly established that defendant knowingly waived the triad of Boykin rights; and, considering the minute entry together with the waiver form in light of the applicable rule (relative to misdemeanor predicate offenses) stated in State v. Strain and State v. Carson, we find these documents establish that defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel at the arraignment proceeding at which defendant pled guilty to first offense DWI (a misdemeanor) on January 29, 1985. See State v. Carson, 527 So.2d at 1022-23. Accordingly, the trial court erred in granting the motion to quash in reference to this predicate which may validly be used by the state to elevate the DWI charged in the instant bill to the level of a second offense DWI.
AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED.