Case Name: Jacob K. Wray, Ex parte
Court: High Court of Errors and Appeals of Mississippi
Jurisdiction: Mississippi
Decision Date: 1856-04
Citations: 30 Miss. 673
Docket Number: 
Parties: Jacob K. Wray, Ex parte.
Judges: 
Reporter: Mississippi Reports
Volume: 30
Pages: 673–687

Head Matter:
Jacob K. Wray, Ex parte.
1. Bail : capital cases. — It is in the discretion of the court, to grant or refusebail to a prisoner, before conviction, when the proof is evident, and the presumption great.
2. Same. — Prisoners have a constitutional right to bail b efore conviction, in all cases, except for capital offences, where the proof is evident, or the presumption great; and if a 'well-founded doubt exist, that the crime charged is capital, bail cannot be refused.
3. Express malice. — “ Express malice is, when one, with a sedate, deliberate mind, and formed design, doth kill another; which formed design, is evidenced by external circumstances, discovering that inward intention, as lying in wait, antecedent menaces, former grudges, and concerted schemes to do him some bodily harm.” 4 Bl. Com. 199.
4. Express malice: declarations oe accused — evidence.—The declarations of a prisoner, made at the time he procured weapons for an anticipated difficulty, that he did not intend to use them unless other parties interfered, are sufficient evidence to disprove express malice, if it appear, that he did not attempt to use them in the tight, until he was so closely pressed and violently beaten by his antagonist, that he may be reasonably supposed to have acted as much from instinct as from reason.
5. Murder : manslaughter. — The prisoner, being much agitated, and disturbed in mind, armed himself with deadly weapons, with the avowed purpose of seeking an explanation from a school teacher, but declaring that he would not use them, unless the school-boys should render it necessary, by interfering against him: he soon afterwards met the teacher, when hot words passed, and the prisoner struck the deceased with his fist, and the "latter thereupon assaulted the prisoner with great violence, and pursued him whilst he retreated : the prisoner then drew his weapon for the first time, and killed the deceased. Held, that it was not murder. Handy, J., dissented.
6. Express malice. — Express malice may exist, without any previous design to . kill: it is sufficient, if an intent exist to do any unlawful act which would probably deprive the party of his life. Handy, J., dissenting.
1. Murder : mutual combat. — To save the party making the first assault, upon an insufficient legal provocation, from the guilt of murder, the occasion must not only be sudden, but the party assaulted must be upon an equal footing, in point of defence at least, at the outset. Handy, J., dissenting.
8. Murder : previous malice : weapons. — The rule is well established, that whenever a party having previous malice, provides himself with deadly weapons, intending to use them if necessary in a conflict, and provokes a fight, in which he uses the deadly weapons and kills his adversary, it is murder. Handy, J. dissenting.
This is a writ of error, sued out by Jacob K. Wray, to tbe judgment of tbe Hon. Phineas T. Scruggs, judge of tbe seventh judicial district, refusing him bail, upon bis application by writ of habeas corpus.
Tbe record is quite voluminous, and many witnesses were examined on both sides. Tbe material facts are substantially as follows:
Clarke S. Brown, tbe deceased, and one Fearnster, were jointly engaged in teaching, at a male academy, in the town of Pontotoc. Two of the younger brothers of the accused, were pupils in this institution. One of them, a few days before the killing, had been whipped by Brown, for a violation of the rules, and a disregard of the discipline of the school. The other resented this by violent and disrespectful language to Brown, used in the face of the school, for which on Monday morning, the 11th day of June, 1855, he was expelled by Brown and Fearnster. This occurred soon after school was opened, and the young man who had been expelled, left the premises, highly excited and enraged, on account of his expulsion. About ten o’clock of the same day, the accused, appearing much excited or disturbed, applied both to Doctors Fountain and Cain at their office, for the loan of a pistol. These gentlemen had no weapons of that character. He was asked by Dr. Fountain, for what purpose he desired to procure a pistol, and he declined to give his reason. In reply to a similar question from Dr. Cain, he also declined to answer, but said, “ if you will let me have a pistol you will see.” These gentlemen then both asked for what purpose, he wanted the pistol, and, “ he then mentioned the name of Brown, in some way,” but witness did not recollect how, but the accused made no threats against Brown. Witness told Wray, if he had any difficulty on hand, he had better take a stick.
Wray soon afterwards went to the printing-office, and applied there for the loan of a pistol. He appeared then to be much agitated, and seemed as if he had been crying. The witness asked him what was the matter, and if any one had been imposing on him: he burst out crying ; said Brown; and witness thought he muttered something else. Witness cautioned him against acting hastily, and told him not to lay himself liable to the law. Wray then had some 'conversation with some friends, which was not detailed in evidence, and then said, in the hearing of witness, “ that if he had a difficulty with Brown, he would take a stick to him, and should the boys ‘ pitch in,’ he would use weapons to defend himself. ” He procured a pistol and a bowie knife, at the printing-office. When he was about to leave, some of the company suggested that he had better take another pistol, which was there, and was better than the one he had: he then expressed himself satisfied with the weapons he had with him, and declined to take it. One of his friends proposed’to go with him to the school-house, but he declined the proffered assistance, “ saying that he did not expect to have a difficulty.” Soon afterwards, and about a half hour before the killing, he applied to the president of the board of trustees of the Male Academy, in relation to the matter of the expulsion of his brother, and was advised by him that it was his duty to see about it.
About fifteen minutes before twelve o’clock he repaired to the school-room, and asked Fearnster for Mr. Brown, and said that he wanted to see him, in relation to the expulsion of his brother. Fearnster replied, “you seem to be much agitated and very angry, and as a friend, I advise you to go away, take time to deliberate, become cool and dispassionate, that you may be prepared to act like a man. Wray then urged the request he had made, saying that he wished to settle that difficulty now.” Fearnster replied, “Mr. Brown and I are both busily engaged, and it • is an unreasonable time, because it will interrupt the school, and that you can select a more seasonable opportunity.” Wray then remarked very respectfully: “ Will you tell Mr. Brown that I will see him on his way to town, or to dinner.” This, witness promised to do, and Wray left, going in the direction towards the town, and Mr. Brown’s boarding house.
Wray was seen shortly after this, seated in the shade of a tree, (the day being hot,) on the road leading from the school-room, to Brown’s boarding-house, it being the route usually travelled by Brown in going to and from his school. He was not at all concealed, but was seated in a perfectly open space, where he could easily ' be seen by those travelling the road or passing in the neighborhood.
The school was dismissed in about fifteen minutes afterwards, when Fearnster communicated to Brown what had transpired, between himself and Wray. Brown asked Fearnster’s advice, as to what he should do in the matter, when the latter declared his inability to advise him, and told him that he must act according to circumstances. Fearnster being unable to accompany Brown, on the road, which the latter usually travelled, (by reason of his being on . horseback, Brown’s road being crossed by a ditch, which was impassable to horses,) suggested to Brown the propriety of going around the ditcb with Mm. This Brown thought unnecessary, and proceeded on his usual way; and approaching the place where Wray was standing, they met and had a conversation. Wray accosted Brown by stating to him, that he had imposed on his brother. Brown stated that he had whipped him for a reasonable cause, and would leave it to any reasonable man in town. Some little conversation then took place between them, which was inaudible to the witness. Wray was next heard to say to Brown, that he was a d — d dog. Brown stepped back, his hands hanging down by his side, and Wray struck him with his fist on the head, or arms or shoulders, the witnesses were not positive which. Brown then drew out of his pocket a small whip, loaded in one end, with two and one-half ounces of lead, and struck Wray, (as some of the witnesses think, with the small end of it,) over the head. Brown repeated the blows over the head and shoulders very rapidly, and Wray fought with his fist, until he was knocked down, or nearly down. Wray pulled himself up, catching hold of Brown or his clothes, and commenced retreating backwards, holding up his left hand to fend off the blows, which Brown, who advanced on him, continued to inflict over Ms head and shoulders, until he was cut and fell. At the same time that Wray was protecting himself from the blows of Brown, with his left hand, he was observed to be using his right hand, as if endeavoring to draw a weapon from his pocket. After he had retreated some twenty or tMrty paces, “ Wray was seen to have in his hand a bowie knife, with which he was striking Brown, who in a short time fell, and soon expired.” Brown received six wounds from the knife, two of which only were severe or serious. All of his wounds were in front, except a scratch near the small of the back.
Wray in a few minutes proceeded to the town, where he was met by two of the witnesses, who, observing that he was staggering and fainty and bloody, assisted him to a room, where he received medical assistance. He had received two wounds on his head, one of them being very severe and serious, being cut nearly to the bone with a blunt instrument: he also had several bruises on his back,— Brown having stricken him with the whip from thirty to fifty times, according to the statement of the witnesses, who saw the fight. Brown was about six feet high, but not fleshy, and Wray weighed one hundred and fifteen pounds. It was in proof, that the whipping given by Brown to the younger Wray was moderate, and such as was usually administered in the school, for similar offences. The knife used by Wray, was ten or twelve inches long, and the whip used by Brown, though small, was stated by some of the witnesess to be sufficiently stout to knock down a man with.
This circuit judge refused the application for bail, and the prisoner sued out this writ of error.
Fontaine and Bradford, for plaintiff in error.
Harris, Freeman and Goodman, on same side.
Glenn, attorney general, contra;.

Opinion:
Fisher, J.,
delivered the opinion of the court.
The petitioner being in custody, awaiting his trial upon an indictment preferred against him by the .grand jury of Pontotoc county, for the murder of one Clarke S. Brown, appliéd to the judge of the seventh judicial district of this state, to be admitted to bail; — and the court, after hearing the testimony, as well on behalf of the petitioner as of the prosecution, refused the application, and remanded him to the custody of the sheriff of said county. The object of the writ of error is, to revise the judgment thus pronounced.
We have given to the testimony, as shown by the record, a patient consideration; and our minds are forced to the conclusion, that under the law which must govern the court, in weighing the evidence, the charge of murder, as made by the indictment, cannot be sustained, and this settles the question as to the prisoner's right to bail. It is neither required nor proper, that we should intimate an opinion, either as to the innocence of the accused, if we entertained it, or as to any degree of manslaughter, of which he might be thought guilty. The question is unimportant, so far as the present application is concerned, whether the party be wholly innocent, or whether the offence, if falling below the crime of murder, be attended with aggravated circumstances, the result in either case is the same; the party is entitled to his liberty; and the court bas nothing to do but to follow the mandate of the constitution on this subject, and admit the party to bail, on his giving, in the language of that instrument, good securities. The provision of the constitution is as follows: " That all prisoners shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient securities, except for capital of-fences, where the proof is evident, or the presumption great." The inquiry is, whether the proof in this case is evident, or the presumption great: — that is to say, is the offence, as shown by the whole testimony, one which must, under the law, be capitally punished; for if so, while a court might, in the exercise of a sound discretion admit a party to bail, he could not certainly claim it as a right. But if the offence is not shown by evident proof or great presumption, to be one for the commission of which the law inflicts capital punishment, bail is not a matter of mere discretion with the court, but of right to the prisoner.
But we will proceed to state, with as little comment as possible on the testimony, the grounds of our opinion. We have seen, that the constitution requires that the proof must be evident, or the presumption great. Evident proof or great presumption of what ? That the offence, as shown by the testimony, is one, which the law denominates as capital. When is a party committing a homicide, guilty of a capital offence ? The answer is, when he is prompted by malice to commit the deed for without malice there can be no murder; and if in this case there is no murder, there is of course, within the meaning of the constitution, no capital offence. As no question can arise, under the testimony in this case, as to implied malice, we will inquire whether there is sufficient proof of express malice, or in other words, whether the proof is evident, or the presumption, arising from the facts and circumstances, great. " Express malice, is when one, with a sedate, deliberate mind, and formed design, doth kill another; which formed design, is evidenced by external circumstances, discovering that inward intention ; as lying in wait, antecedent menaces, former grudges, and concerted schemes to do him some bodily harm." 4 Bl. Com. 199. We will now in a very brief manner glance at the testimony; keeping in view what has already been intimated, that as little of it as is possible to present the point, will be noticed, or made the subject of comment. Brown, the deceased, was a teacher in the Male Academy at the town of Pontotoc : two of the prisoner's younger brothers were pupils of this school; the younger brother had been about a week before the killing, whipped by Brown: but this does not appear to have been noticed by the prisoner. About ten o'clock on the day of the killing, which occurred about twelve o'clock, or a few minutes thereafter, the elder of the two brothers was expelled from the school; and the prisoner, being informed of what had occurred, applied to one or two persons for weapons, — manifesting at the time both excitement and distress of mind. He stated, it seems, to all who approached, on this subject, that his object was to seek an explanation from Brown, and that if he had to have a difficulty with him, he should not use his weapons, but that if the school boys, in the language of the testimony, "pitched in," he would use his weapons in defending himself.
After a conference with the president of the board of trustees, and being told by him that he, the prisoner, could go and see Brown, relative to the expulsion of the brother from the school, he repaired to the school-house, and inquired for Mr. Brown. Being informed that he was busy, and could not be seen, the prisoner left a message that he would see Brown on his way to his boarding-house to dinner. School being a few minutes thereafter dismissed, Brown, informed of the message left by the prisoner, started to his boarding-house, travelling his usual path, or road. The parties met on this path— appeared to converse a short time, when the prisoner was heard to use an epithet, and was seen almost at the same moment to strike with his fist about the shoulder of the deceased. The deceased was almost at the same same instant seen to draw from his side-pocket, what the weight of evidence shows to be a whip, and with it, to strike the prisoner a severe blow on the head, felling him almost to the ground. The prisoner, catching to the clothes of the deceased, recovered from the fall, and commenced backing; the deceased continuing to use this whip, and to follow up the prisoner. The evidence shows that he backed or retreated about thirty yards, before getting out his weapon, with which he inflicted the mortal wounds on the body of the deceased. The testimony shows that the whip, in the hands of a strong man, was a formidable weapon, having in the butt-end about two and a half ounces of lead, covered in the usual way. This is, as briefly as it can be stated, the substance of the evidence, tending to prove malice. Let it be conceded, that the fact of procuring weapons, going to the school-house, and waiting on the road, must each be regarded as a circumstance tending to prove malice, if unexplained. But how is the testimony, when accompanied by the whole explanation ?
1. The declaration of the prisoner at the time of seeking the weapons, that he did not intend to use them on the deceased.
2. He commenced the difficulty by giving a moderate blow with his fist, thus indicating that his declaration was sincere, and consequently there was no sedate deliberate mind or formed design to kill the deceased.
3. No attempt or effort was made to use his weapon in the difficulty, until the resistance had become altogether disproportioned to the assault, and until he was so closely pressed that he may be supposed to have acted as much or more from the instincts of man's nature, than from reason, or in carrying out a former design, to kill his antagonist. The worst, under the whole evidence, that can be said against the prisoner, is, that a doubt may exist as to the malice ; and if a well-founded doubt can even be entertained, then the proof cannot be said to be evident nor the presumption great: and if our decision rested alone on this ground — a well-founded doubt, — we should feel ourselves compelled to bail the prisoner.
Judgment reversed, and judgment in this court, admitting the petitioner to bail.