Case Name: THE STATE v. LATTIMORE
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia
Jurisdiction: Georgia
Decision Date: 2010-06-07
Citations: 287 Ga. 505
Docket Number: S10A0172
Parties: THE STATE v. LATTIMORE.
Judges: All the Justices concur, except Carley, P. J., and Melton and Nahmias, JJ., who dissent.
Reporter: Georgia Reports
Volume: 287
Pages: 505–510

Head Matter:
S10A0172.
THE STATE v. LATTIMORE.
(696 SE2d 613)

Opinion:
HINES, Justice.
Shaquan Lattimore's motion to dismiss his indictment on the ground that he was not afforded a speedy trial was granted by the trial court, and the State appeals. See OCGA § 5-7-1 (a) (1). For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
Bryan Thompson was shot and killed on August 27, 2004; that same day, Lattimore was arrested on suspicion of murdering him. On September 10, 2004, at a hearing, the trial court found that there was not probable cause to support a charge of malice murder against Lattimore, but there was probable cause to support charges of involuntary manslaughter and reckless conduct. The court set bond, and Lattimore was released from custody on September 12, 2004. On June 30, 2006, he was indicted on one count of malice murder for the 2004 killing. During a case management conference on October 27, 2006, the prosecutor stated that the charge of malice murder was inappropriate and that the State intended to re-indict the case. On several occasions between October 2006 and February 2008, various prosecutors informed Lattimore's counsel that the State intended to re-indict Lattimore on a lesser charge. The case was on the trial calendar in both May and August 2007 but was not reached either time, and was again on a trial calendar for February 7, 2008. On February 5, 2008, the State re-indicted Lattimore on charges of malice murder, felony murder while in the commission of aggravated assault, aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. On July 17, 2009, Lattimore moved to dismiss the indictment for violation of his constitutional right to a speedy trial, citing the Constitutions of the United States and Georgia. See U. S. Const, amends. VI & XIV; Ga. Const. Art. I, Sec. I, Par. XI (a).
A trial court's ruling on a motion to dismiss based on a violation of the right to a speedy trial found in the Federal and State Constitutions is reviewed under the analysis found in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U. S. 514 (92 SC 2182, 33 LE2d 101) (1972). Ruffin v. State, 284 Ga. 52, 55 (2) (663 SE2d 189) (2008).
In Barker v. Wingo [...], the Supreme Court of the United States identified four factors to be considered by a court in determining whether an accused's constitutional right to a speedy trial had been violated . (a) the length of the delay, (b) the reason for the delay, (c) the defendant's assertion of his right, and (d) the prejudice to the defendant. 407 U. S. at 530. The Supreme Court further stated that it regarded none of the factors as either a necessary or sufficient condition to a finding of a deprivation of the right of speedy trial but rather that the factors should be considered together in a balancing test of the conduct of the prosecution and the defendant. [Cit.]
State v. Redding, 274 Ga. 831, 831-832 (561 SE2d 79) (2002). "The question is whether the trial court abused its discretion in ruling that [Lattimore's] speedy trial rights were violated. [Cit.]" Id. at 832.
As to the first factor set forth in Barker v. Wingo, the length of the delay, the State concedes that the length of the time between arrest and the motion to dismiss, almost five years, raises a threshold presumption of prejudice. See State v. Carr, 278 Ga. 124, 126 (598 SE2d 468) (2004).
In reviewing the second Barker v. Wingo factor, the trial court found that the delay was attributable to the State's negligence. At the hearing on the motion, the State advanced staffing shortages as a reason for the delay before the first indictment, but recognized that such a staffing issue is a factor to be weighed against the State, although not weighed so heavily as a delay deliberately created by the State. State v. Johnson, 274 Ga. 511, 513 (2) (555 SE2d 710) (2001). To the extent that the State offered a reason for the delay before re-indictment, it repeated that staffing issues caused the delay, coupled with the case being assigned from one judge to another. The trial court found that the reason for the delay was negligence on the part of the State, and this was not an abuse of discretion.
Regarding Lattimore's assertion of his right to a speedy trial, the third Barker v. Wingo factor, the State notes that he did not file a statutory speedy trial demand prior to filing his motion to dismiss the indictment. However, as the trial court noted, in October 2006 and afterward, the State represented to Lattimore that the case had been incorrectly indicted, and that the State would re-indict him, which the State failed to do until February 2008. The trial court properly found that under these circumstances, the failure to demand a speedy trial was not to be weighed against Lattimore. See Hayes v. State, 298 Ga. App. 338, 345 (2) (c) (680 SE2d 182) (2009).
Finally, the State urges that the trial court erred in granting Lattimore's motion because he failed to show sufficient prejudice arising from the delay, citing the principle that
[i]n evaluating the final Barker v. Wingo factor, prejudice to the defendant, we consider three interests which the speedy trial right is designed to protect: preventing oppressive pretrial incarceration, minimizing anxiety and concern of the defendant, and, most importantly, limiting the possibility that the defense will be impaired. [Cit.]
Nelloms v. State, 274 Ga. 179, 181 (549 SE2d 381) (2001). The State asserts that Lattimore has not suffered oppressive detention, as he was released 16 days after his arrest. And, although Lattimore, who was 18 years old when Thompson was killed, testified that he suffered anxiety from the pending case, including sleeplessness and being refused desired employment in the military, firefighting, and corrections fields, the State contends that none of this is unusual, and thus such anxiety should not be weighed in Lattimore's favor. See Layman v. State, 284 Ga. 83, 86 (663 SE2d 169) (2008). Further, the State notes that there is no evidence of any impairment to Lattimore's defense arising from the delay, that no witnesses are alleged to be missing, and that Lattimore testified that memory of the circumstances of Thompson's death remains clear. See Tripp v. State, 276 Ga. 104 (575 SE2d 507) (2003).
However, the considerations addressed in Nelloms are not necessarily dispositive of the analysis regarding prejudice.
The Supreme Court [of the United States] in Doggett [v. United States, 505 U. S. 647, 652 (II) (112 SC 2686, 120 LE2d 520) (1992)] held that "consideration of prejudice is not limited to the specifically demonstrable." [Cit.] The Court held that the presumption of prejudice that arises from the passage of time strengthens with the length of the delay and may tilt the prejudice factor in a defendant's favor, although it may not alone carry a Sixth Amendment claim without regard to the other Barker criteria. [Cits.]
State v. Johnson, supra at 514 (4). And, "affirmative proof of particularized prejudice is not essential to every speedy trial claim." Ruffin, supra at 65 (2) (b) (iv).
Here the delay was lengthy, almost five years, and Lattimore was not appointed counsel until two years after his arrest, preventing timely investigation of the incident. As the trial court noted, " [excessive delay has a tendency to compromise the reliability of trials in ways that neither party can prove or, for that matter, identify." Ruffin, supra at 56 (2) (b) (i) (citation and punctuation omitted). Under the circumstances of this case, we cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in balancing the Barker v. Wingo factors, and thus find no err in the grant of Lattimore's motion to dismiss the indictment. Redding, supra.
Judgment affirmed.
All the Justices concur, except Carley, P. J., and Melton and Nahmias, JJ., who dissent.