Case Name: Samuel D. MAGAVERN, as Executor and Trustee of the Last Will and Testament of Margaret C. Duncan, Deceased, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Defendant-Appellee
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 1977-02-24
Citations: 550 F.2d 797
Docket Number: No. 362, Docket 76-6111
Parties: Samuel D. MAGAVERN, as Executor and Trustee of the Last Will and Testament of Margaret C. Duncan, Deceased, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Defendant-Appellee.
Judges: 
Reporter: Federal Reporter 2d Series
Volume: 550
Pages: 797–804

Head Matter:
Samuel D. MAGAVERN, as Executor and Trustee of the Last Will and Testament of Margaret C. Duncan, Deceased, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Defendant-Appellee.
No. 362, Docket 76-6111.
United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
Argued Jan. 5, 1977.
Decided Feb. 24, 1977.
Samuel D. Magavern, Buffalo, N. Y. (Ma-gavern, Magavern, Lowe, Beilewich & Dop-kins, Charles B. Draper, Buffalo, N. Y., of counsel), for plaintiff-appellant.
Alfred S. Lombardi, Atty., Tax Div., Dept, of Justice, Washington, D. C. (Scott P. Crampton, Asst. Atty. Gen., Gilbert E. Andrews, Ernest J. Brown, Attys., Washington, D. C., on the brief, Richard J. Ar-cara, U. S. Atty., Buffalo, N. Y., of counsel), for defendant-appellee.
Before MOORE, OAKES and TIMBERS, Circuit Judges.

Opinion:
MOORE, Circuit Judge:
This case arises out of the efforts of the Internal Revenue Service to satisfy an outstanding tax assessment by levying on what it asserts is the taxpayer's interest in a testamentary trust established by his mother. The dollar amount being contested is relatively small, the parties having stipulated that the Government seeks to acquire only approximately $2300. The legal issues confronted, however, are nonetheless significant.
I.
Thomas W. Doran ("Doran"), the taxpayer herein, was deficient in his federal tax payments for various amounts during 1965, 1966 and 1968-1971, resulting in the assessment against him of federal taxes and interest in the aggregate amount of $112,-753.51. On November 7, 1974 a total of $108,303.96, plus penalties and interest, remained unpaid. As might be expected, the Government began to seek assets against which it could levy to satisfy this large unpaid assessment.
One asset against which the Government proceeded is the trust at issue here. Margaret C. Duncan, Doran's mother, had died in 1965 leaving the residue of her estate in trust for her husband, her son, Doran, and the children and grandchildren of Doran. In each of the years from 1968 to 1973, Doran had received small monetary amounts from the trust. On December 5, 1973, the Government served a notice of levy under § 6321 and 6331 of the Internal Revenue Code ("Code"), 26 U.S.C. § 6321 and 6331, on the trustee of the trust, appellant herein, Samuel D. Magavern. The levy purported to cover "all property and rights to property" belonging to Doran. However, the trustee refused to honor the levy on the ground that under the terms of the trust, Doran had no rights in the trust property.
On June 27,1974, the trustee commenced a proceeding in the Surrogate's Court of Erie County, New York, seeking to determine the validity and effect, if any, of the notice of levy on Doran's beneficial interest in the trust. The Government appeared specially in the Surrogate's Court, arguing only that the Surrogate had no jurisdiction to affect the levy. On December 27, 1974 the Surrogate filed a decision holding that he did not have jurisdiction to "vacate, annul, cancel or discharge" the levy, but that pursuant to his continuing jurisdiction over Margaret Duncan's Last Will and Testament he could decide whether or not the trust beneficiaries had any property rights in the trust. Accordingly, he proceeded to hold that by the trust's terms the trustee had complete and sole discretion to withhold the income from any individual member of the family group, and that as a consequence Doran had no property rights in the trust. In re Will of Duncan, 80 Misc.2d 32, 362 N.Y.S.2d 788 (Surr.Ct.Erie Co., 1974).
On August 23,1974, while the Surrogate's Court proceeding was still pending, the trustee commenced the instant action in the Western District of New York seeking, pursuant to § 7426(a) of the Code, 26 U.S.C. § 7426(a), to enjoin enforcement of the levy. Upon announcement of the Surrogate's decision, the trustee moved for summary judgment on the basis of the Surrogate's finding that Doran had no right to property in the trust, and the Government cross-moved for enforcement of the levy. The district court on June 8, 1976, rendered its decision, reported in 415 F.Supp. 217. It reasoned that under New York law the trust instrument by mandatory language requires the trustee to pay at least some income to each of the beneficiaries, including Doran, so that Doran had a right to the trust property which was subject to levy. Moreover, the district court held that the contrary decision of the Surrogate's Court, though it must be afforded proper regard, was not binding on a federal court. Judgment was entered for the Government in the stipulated amount, and the trustee timely brought this appeal.
II.
The Internal Revenue Code contains several sections dealing with the use of federal tax liens to collect unpaid taxes. See Plumb and Wright, Federal Tax Liens (2d ed. 1967). Section 6321 provides that a lien shall attach in favor of the United States on all property and rights to property of any person who, after demand, neglects or refuses to pay federal taxes for which he liable. Section 6332 provides that any person in possession of property or rights subject to levy must surrender them upon demand of the Secretary or his delegate.
It is long-established, and conceded by both parties to this case, that in asserting its federal tax lien, the Government must look to state law for a determination of what legal rights and interests, if any, comprise "property and rights to property" to be attached. Aquilino v. United States, 363 U.S. 509, 80 S.Ct. 1277, 4 L.Ed.2d 1365 (1960); United States v. Durham Lumber Co., 363 U.S. 522, 80 S.Ct. 1282, 4 L.Ed.2d 1371 (1960); United States v. Bess, 357 U.S. 51, 78 S.Ct. 1054, 2 L.Ed.2d 1135 (1958). As the Supreme Court stated in Aquilino:
"The threshold question in this case, as in all eases where the Federal Government asserts its tax lien, is whether and to what extent the taxpayer had 'property' or 'rights to property' to which the tax lien could attach. In answering that question, both federal and state courts must look to state law, for it has long been the rule that 'in the application of a federal revenue act, state law controls in determining the nature of the legal interest which the taxpayer had in the property . . sought to be reached by the statute.' Morgan v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 309 U.S. 78, 82 [60 S.Ct. 424, 84 L.Ed. 585]." 363 U.S. at 512-13, 80 S.Ct. at 1280 (footnote omitted).
Both parties here agree that the question before us is thus whether or not under New York law Doran had a property interest or right to property in the trust established by his mother.
Unfortunately, the parties' agreement as to the authority of New York law does not insure accord as to what that applicable law is, or how the federal courts should discover it. The trustee strongly urges upon us that the decision of the Surrogate's Court is binding on the federal courts. He suggests that under New York law the Surrogate's Court, the court which originally probated Mrs. Duncan's will, has continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over her estate, including construction of her will. He concludes that the Surrogate's interpretation of the trust instrument must be considered an in rem judgment binding for all purposes, in effect prohibiting any varying interpretations of the language of the will by federal courts. •
But the Supreme Court has conclusively rebutted the trustee's argument. In Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Estate of Bosch, 387 U.S. 456, 87 S.Ct. 1776, 18 L.Ed.2d 886 (1967), the Court decided two cases concerned with the effect a federal court should give to a decision by a lower state court. In Bosch, the state court holding concerned the validity of a decedent's release of a power of appointment over a New York trust. The taxpayer had filed a petition in the Supreme Court of New York to obtain a decision on the validity of the release, which if declared invalid could have qualified the corpus of the trust for the federal tax marital deduction, 26 U.S.C. § 2056. The state court held the release a nullity and the United States Tax Court looked on that decision as binding. A divided panel of this court affirmed, 363 F.2d 1009 (1966), but the Supreme Court reversed. The Court explained that a lower state court decision was a significant factor for a federal court in ascertaining state law, but federal tribunals should not consider lower state court decisions binding where the highest state court has not spoken on the point. As Mr. Justice Clark stated, speaking for the Court:
"[W]hen the application of a federal statute is involved, the decision of a state trial court as to an underlying issue of state law should a fortiori not be controlling. This is but an application of the rule of Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins [304 U.S. 64, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 1188 (1938)], where state law as announced by the highest court of the State is to be followed. This is not a diversity case but the same principle may be applied for the same reasons, viz., the underlying substantive rule involved is based on state law and the State's highest court is the best authority on its own law." 387 U.S. at 465, 87 S.Ct. at 1782.
The companion case decided in Bosch further confirms the point. The Supreme Court there affirmed the opinion of this court in Second National Bank v. United States, 351 F.2d 489 (1965), where this court had expressly upheld a federal district court's finding that "decrees of the Connecticut Probate Court . . . under no circumstances can be construed as binding and conclusive upon a federal court in construing and applying the federal revenue laws." 351 F.2d at 494, aff'g in part 222 F.Supp. 446, 457 (D.Conn.1963).
The trustee tries to avoid the consequences of the holdings in Bosch by suggesting that the instant case is distinguishable because here the Government appeared in the Surrogate's Court. But the Government only appeared specially, solely to contest that court's jurisdiction. It did not in any way address the merits of the trustee's claim and did not become a party to the proceedings. Indeed, the Surrogate recognized the limited purpose of the Government's appearance in ruling that he had no jurisdiction to affect the tax levy. 80 Misc.2d at 33-34, 362 N.Y.S.2d at 790. We are bound by the reasoning in Bosch, and we conclude that the decision of the Surrogate that Doran had no property rights in the trust was not binding on the district court.
Bosch also provides guidance for a federal court faced, as was the district court, with a state law question on which the highest state court has not yet ruled. The directive of the Supreme Court is that
"[i]f there be no decision by [the highest state] court then federal authorities must apply what they find to be the state law after giving 'proper regard' to relevant rulings of other courts of the State. In this respect, it may be said to be, in effect, sitting as a state court." 387 U.S. at 465, 87 S.Ct. at 1783.
The district court, a decision by the highest court of New York on the issue before it being lacking, was thus required to sit "as a state court" to decide the case as might a state tribunal, giving proper consideration to the ruling of the Surrogate's Court. Though the question is not without some doubt, we feel that the district court properly decided the merits here.
The relevant part of Mrs. Duncan's trust provision reads as follows:
"ARTICLE THIRD:
4c
1. This Trust shall be held and administered for the benefit of the family group consisting of those from time to time living of my husband, MATTHEW DUNCAN, my son, THOMAS W. DO-RAN, his children and the issue of his children. My Trustee shall pay over or use, apply and expend whatever part or all of the net income or principal (even to the point of exhaustion thereof), or both, thereof he shall deem proper or necessary in order to provide comfortable support, maintenance and/or education (at any level) to the individual members of the said family group. My Trustee shall not feel bound, in making such payments, uses, applications or expenditures, to observe any rule or precept of equality as between the individual members of said family group."
While the meaning of these phrases is far from clear, the first sentence sets out in mandatory terms the trustee's duty to pay over: he "shall pay . . . whatever part or all of the net income or principal . to the individual members of the said family group" (emphasis added). The plain meaning of this primary sentence is to direct some payment to each beneficiary. The following sentence grants the trustee discretion to divide such payments unequally among the beneficiaries, but it does not give him the authority to deny a particular beneficiary anything at all. The trustee's discretion is not to determine who gets something, but rather to decide how much each is to be given. To interpret otherwise would allow the subordinate sentence, designed only to explain the permissible relativity of the payments, to swallow entirely the mandatory directive language.
The New York Court of Appeals has on only two occasions interpreted trust language at all similar to that presented here. The trustee relies heavily upon Hamilton v. Drogo, 241 N.Y. 401, 150 N.E. 496 (1926), in which the Court of Appeals held that a beneficiary of a testamentary trust did not have any right to income which a creditor could attach. But the will in that case expressly granted to the trustee uncontrolled discretion to use the trust income "for the maintenance and support or otherwise, for the benefit of all or any one or more exclusively of the other or others of him my said son" (emphasis added).
The Court of Appeals stressed the importance of this express instruction in discussing the Drogo case in Sand v. Beach, 270 N.Y. 281, 284-85, 200 N.E. 821, 822 (1936). In Sand, the trustee was directed to pay the trust income "either direct and in person to my nephew . .- . or for the use and benefit of my said nephew and those dependent upon him. . . ." The court reasoned that this directive gave the trustee discretion to distribute income either to the nephew directly or for the benefit of the nephew and his dependents. But absent clear language giving the trustee the choice of withholding all income from the nephew, he could not choose to deny the nephew any income at all.
As the district court found after a reasoned consideration of both these cases, the facts in the instant case are more akin to Sand than they are to Drogo. The trustee under the Duncan will "shall pay over" what amounts he deems proper "to the individual members of the . . . group." The trustee is bound to distribute some trust income to each of the beneficiaries for their "comfortable support, maintenance and/or education." Nothing in the will, either expressly or by reasonable implication, allows an entire deletion of any beneficiary. Nor is the trustee's own action in making annual payments to Doran from 1968 to October 31, 1973 to be ignored. Obviously Doran was considered one of the group regarded as entitled to some distribution.
New York law clearly establishes, moreover, that an aggrieved trust beneficiary can enforce his right to trust property or income against a trustee who refuses to exercise his discretion as directed in the trust instrument. Matter of Rosenberg, 269 N.Y. 247, 199 N.E. 206 (1935); Collister v. Fassitt, 163 N.Y. 281, 57 N.E. 490 (1900); Ireland v. Ireland, 84 N.Y. 321 (1881).
We also note, though the trustee has not contended otherwise, that the New York Court of Appeals has included taxes within the definition of the term "support" in a case involving enforcement of a federal tax lien against a beneficiary's rights in a spendthrift trust. Matter of Rosenberg, supra.
The district court, after proper consideration of relevant New York cases, found that Thomas W. Doran had a right to property in his mother's trust under New York law, a right which can be attached pursuant to the federal tax lien. We agree with that decision.
Affirmed.
. The breakdown of this amount was as follows:
Date Unpaid
Period Type of Tax Assessed Balance
1965 Income :10/2/72 $ 3,382.98
1966 Income 5/19/67 4,804.48
1969 Income 6/5/70 6,809.56
1970 Income 7/33/73 248.77
3965
(IQ & 2Q) W/H & FICA 32/3/72 1,441.82
1968
(2Q-4Q) W/H & FICA 13/36/72 48.857.67
3965-1971 W/H & FICA 32/1/72 44.958.68
$108,303.96
. Payments were made to Doran as follows:
Year Amount of Distribution
1968 $1,500.00
1969 2,000.00
1970 1,039.61
3971 3.000. 00
1/1/72-10/33/72 2.000. 00
31/1/72-10/31/73 3,500.00
The Trustee had not paid Doran any trust proceeds from the date of the levy until Doran's death on February 19, 1975. The amount here in issue, stipulated by the parties to be $2,305.50, is thus the amount allegedly due Doran for the period of December 5, 1973 (the date of the levy) to the date of his death.
. Section 6321, 26 U.S.C. § 6321, reads as follows:
"If any person liable to pay any tax neglects or refuses to pay the same after demand, the amount (including any interest, additional amount, addition to tax, or assessable penalty, together with any costs that may accrue in addition thereto) shall be a lien in favor of the United States upon all property and rights to property, whether real or personal, belonging to such person."
. Section 6332, 26 U.S.C. § 6332, reads as follows:
"(a) Requirement. — Except as otherwise provided in subsection (b), any person in possession of (or obligated with respect to) property or rights to property subject to levy upon which a levy has been made shall, upon demand of the Secretary or his delegate, surrender such property or rights (or discharge such obligation) to the Secretary or his delegate, except such part of the property or rights as is, at the time of such demand, subject to an attachment or execution under any judicial process."
. It is significant that annual payments ceased only after the levying of the Government's tax lien on December 5, 1973.