Case Name: In the TERMINATION OF the PARENT-CHILD RELATIONSHIP OF: X.S. (Minor Child), and S.S. (Father), Appellant-Respondent, v. The INDIANA DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SERVICES, Appellee-Petitioner, and Lake County Court Appointed Special Advocate, Appellee.
Court: Court of Appeals of Indiana
Jurisdiction: Indiana
Decision Date: 2018-12-26
Citations: 117 N.E.3d 601
Docket Number: Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-JT-1198
Parties: In the TERMINATION OF the PARENT-CHILD RELATIONSHIP OF: X.S. (Minor Child),
and
S.S. (Father), Appellant-Respondent,
v.
The INDIANA DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SERVICES, Appellee-Petitioner,
and
Lake County Court Appointed Special Advocate, Appellee.
Judges: 
Reporter: North Eastern Reporter 3d
Volume: 117
Pages: 601–614

Head Matter:
In the TERMINATION OF the PARENT-CHILD RELATIONSHIP OF: X.S. (Minor Child),
and
S.S. (Father), Appellant-Respondent,
v.
The INDIANA DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SERVICES, Appellee-Petitioner,
and
Lake County Court Appointed Special Advocate, Appellee.
Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-JT-1198
Court of Appeals of Indiana.
Filed December 26, 2018
Publication Ordered January 16, 2019
Case Summary
[1] S.S. ("Father") challenges the termination of his parental rights in X.S. ("Child"), claiming that the juvenile court violated his due process right to counsel by conducting a termination hearing at which he did not appear and was not represented by counsel. The Indiana Department of Child Services ("DCS") agrees with Father and requests that we reverse the judgment of the juvenile court and remand for the appointment of counsel and a new hearing. The Lake County court appointed special advocate ("CASA"), however, contends that Father's due process rights were not violated because he was given the opportunity to obtain counsel and meaningfully participate in the termination hearing but did nothing to take advantage of that opportunity. Because we agree with the CASA, we affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] On July 21, 2016, DCS petitioned to have Child declared a child in need of services ("CHINS"). On October 18, 2016, the juvenile court found Child to be a CHINS. Other than appearing at the initial hearing, Father did not participate in the CHINS proceeding, and DCS found it increasingly difficult to maintain contact with him. In early May of 2017, DCS learned that Father was incarcerated in the Lake County jail. On May 5, 2017, Family Case Manager Dylan Sheets ("FCM Sheets") visited Father in jail and reported that he "still wants to be in [Child's] life and wants to do whatever he [can] to get him back." Ex. Vol. p. 62. On August 4, 2017, Father pled guilty to a burglary charge and, on October 6, 2017, was sentenced to three years of incarceration, to be served at Westville Correctional Facility.
[3] On October 24, 2017, DCS petitioned to terminate Father's parental rights in Child. On January 25, 2018, FCM Sheets spoke with Father and later testified about the conversation:
[A]fter I spoke with him on the 25th, I explained to him that we're proceeding forward with the termination of parental rights and there's a few things that he would need to be doing in order to attend those hearings, be represented. So, I wrote him a letter on January 30th, very much detailing everything he needed to do in regards to requesting transportation. And requesting a public defender at the time of the fact finding hearing for termination. He was made aware of this over the phone and said that he wanted to participate. Well, we're now in April and he hasn't. Whenever speaking to him[,] I spoke with [Father] three times throughout the duration of this case, he always makes it aware [sic ] that he wants to participate, but he never follows through with any of the court ordered services, things that he would need to do to, in order to reunify with [Child].
Tr. p. 13.
[4] An alias summons was issued to Father by the clerk of the juvenile court on March 7, 2018, and directed to him in prison. The summons provided, in part, as follows:
YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED that a Petition for the Involuntary Termination of Parental Rights of the above name[d] child, a copy of which is attached hereto, has been filed in the above named Court.
YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED AND COMMANDED TO APPEAR before the Judge of the Lake Superior Court, 3000 W. 93rd Avenue, Crown Point, IN 46307, 219-660-6900 for a(n) Factfinding Hearing on 4/12/2018 at 8:30 AM on the petition for termination of parental rights.
YOU ARE FURTHER NOTIFIED that if the allegations of the petition are found to be true and/or you fail to appear at the hearing[ ], the Court may terminate the parent-child relationship; and if the Court terminates the parent-child relationship, you will lose all parental rights, powers, privileges, immunities, duties, obligations[,] including any rights to custody, control, visitation, or support of the child; and if the Court terminates your parent-child relationship, it will be permanently terminated, and thereafter you may not contest an adoption or other placement of said child, and
YOU ARE ENTITLED TO REPRESENTATION BY AN ATTORNEY , provided by the State if necessary, throughout these proceedings to terminate the parent-child relationship.
If this SUMMONS is duly served upon you and you fail to appear for the INITIAL and/or FACT FINDING HEARING, adjudication on said petition and termination of your parental rights may be entered against you without further notice.
CASA's App. p. 3 (emphases in original). Father was personally served with the summons on March 12, 2018, when it was hand-delivered to him by a prison official. In a report filed March 22, 2018, DCS indicated that Father had not yet requested "transportation and a public defender." Ex. Vol. p. 88. In the end, Father would make no request for counsel or transportation and no other attempt to participate in the termination proceedings.
[5] On April 12, 2018, a termination hearing was held at which Father failed to appear personally or by counsel, after which the juvenile court ordered that Father's parental rights in Child be terminated. The juvenile court's order provided, in part, as follows:
[DCS's] case manager spoke with [Father] in May 2017. At that time, he indicated he was not able to care for the child due to incarceration in jail but that he wanted to be a part of [Child's] life. He did nothing to participate, to follow up, or to assert his rights. He made similar comments when [FCM Sheets] telephoned him in Westville on January 30[ ], 2018. Despite these comments, Father has never made any efforts to be a part of the child's life after [DCS] became involved on July 21, 2016. He has not contacted [FCM Sheets].
During that January 30, 2018 telephone conversation, [FCM Sheets] discussed these termination proceedings in detail with Father. They discussed what Father needed to do to assert his rights. Father has done nothing. He has never followed up in writing to the court and he has never attempted to assert his rights. He did not request the appointment of counsel.
Appellant's App. p. 3.
Discussion and Decision
Whether Father Was Denied Due Process
[6] The traditional right of a parent to establish a home and raise his children is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Bester v. Lake Cty. Office of Family & Children , 839 N.E.2d 143, 147 (Ind. 2005). We acknowledge that the parent-child relationship is "one of the most valued relationships of our culture." Id. (citation omitted). However, parental rights are not absolute, and the law allows for the termination of such rights when a parent is unable or unwilling to meet his responsibilities as a parent. In re T.F. , 743 N.E.2d 766, 773 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001), trans. denied . The purpose of terminating parental rights is to protect the child, not to punish the parent. Id.
Although the juvenile court's order indicates that FCM Sheets spoke with Father on the telephone on January 30, 2018, FCM Sheets's testimony is clear that the telephone conversation occurred on January 25 and that a letter was sent on January 30, also providing instructions on how to obtain counsel, etc.

Opinion:
[7] While remaining mindful of the above, we have long had a highly deferential standard of review in cases concerning the termination of parental rights. In re K.S. , 750 N.E.2d 832, 836 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001). "In determining whether the evidence is sufficient to support the judgment terminating parental rights, this court neither reweighs the evidence nor judges the credibility of witnesses." Id. "We consider only the evidence that supports the judgment and the reasonable inferences to be drawn there from." Id. "Findings of fact are clearly erroneous only when the record lacks any evidence or reasonable inferences to support them." Id. Father does not contend that DCS failed to present evidence sufficient to sustain the trial court's termination of his parental rights in Child. As restated, Father contends that he was denied the process due to him in a termination proceeding, namely, that he was effectively denied the statutory right to counsel.
[8] Indiana Code section 31-32-2-5 provides that "[a] parent is entitled to representation by counsel in proceedings to terminate the parent-child relationship." Moreover,
[i]f:
(1) a parent in proceedings to terminate the parent-child relationship does not have an attorney who may represent the parent without a conflict of interest; and
(2) the parent has not lawfully waived the parent's right to counsel under IC 31-32-5 (or IC 31-6-7-3 before its repeal);
the juvenile court shall appoint counsel for the parent at the initial hearing or at any earlier time.
Ind. Code § 31-32-4-3(a). However, "[a] parent who is entitled to representation by counsel may waive that right if the parent does so knowingly and voluntarily." Ind. Code § 31-32-5-5.
A. Notice
[9] As an initial matter, Father contends that DCS failed to produce sufficient evidence to establish that he was ever even informed of his right to counsel. DCS, however, produced evidence that FCM Sheets told Father of this right over the telephone and detailed it in a letter sent a few days later and that the juvenile court informed him in an alias summons. Father denies only that he received the letter from FCM Sheets, failing to address the telephone call from FCM Sheets or the alias summons in his argument. We take these omissions as admissions that the telephone call occurred and that Father actually received the summons, both of which informed him of his right to counsel. So, even if we assume the Father did not receive the letter (which we do not), we conclude that the evidence is still more than sufficient to support a finding that Father was informed of his right to counsel. To the extent that Father asks us to find that he did not receive the letter from FCM Sheets, this is an invitation to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do.
[10] That said, on a somewhat related matter, one of the bases of DCS's desire to concede this appeal is the lack of any indication that DCS sent Father notice of the termination hearing pursuant to Indiana Code section 31-35-2-6.5. Father himself does not make this claim, but even if we assume that DCS failed to properly notify Father pursuant to the statute, we conclude that such a failure does not require reversal under the circumstances of this case, even though it might in other cases. To get straight to the point, there is sufficient evidence to establish that Father had actual notice of the termination hearing via the personally-served summons issued by the juvenile court. Consequently, Father has failed to establish that he suffered any prejudice as a result of any failure by DCS to properly notify him of the hearing. See In re T.W. , 831 N.E.2d 1242, 1247 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (in termination-of-parental-rights case, concluding that, even if notice was defective, there was no due process violation where the record established that the mother had actual notice of the termination hearing).
B. Waiver
[11] Finally, Father contends that, even if one assumes that he was given proper notice of his right to counsel, it was denied without a valid waiver. In other words, Father contends that he was denied counsel without due process. When the State seeks to terminate the parent-child relationship, it must do so in a manner that meets the requirements of due process. Lawson v. Marion Cty. Office of Family & Children , 835 N.E.2d 577, 579 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005). "The fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner." Thompson v. Clark Cty. Div. of Family & Children , 791 N.E.2d 792, 795 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge , 424 U.S. 319, 333, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976) ), trans. denied .
[12] The question, then, is whether the procedures used in this case were sufficient to provide a parent with the process due to him in a termination proceeding. The Indiana Supreme Court has held "that the process due in a termination of parental rights action turns on balancing three Mathews factors: (1) the private interests affected by the proceeding; (2) the risk of error created by the State's chosen procedure; and (3) the countervailing governmental interest supporting use of the challenged procedure." In re K.D. , 962 N.E.2d 1249, 1257 (Ind. 2012). "The balancing of these factors recognizes that although due process is not dependent on the underlying facts of a particular case, it is nevertheless 'flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands.' " Thompson , 791 N.E.2d at 795 (quoting Mathews , 424 U.S. at 334, 96 S.Ct. 893 ).
1. Private Interests
[13] The private interests affected the most in any termination proceeding are obviously those of the parent and the child. We have already noted the value our society places on the parent-child relationship, and while we acknowledge that "a parent's interest in the accuracy and justice of the decision [in a termination proceeding] is commanding[,]" id. , that interest is not as compelling as it would be in a criminal proceeding, where the potential for loss of life or liberty is very often at stake. That said, the child's interest in being raised in a safe, nurturing, and stable environment is also very compelling. As mentioned, the point of termination is to protect the child, not punish the parent, and where a parent is unwilling or unable to properly raise a child, the parent's parental interests must give way. Moreover, "the speedy resolution of termination and adoption proceedings [is] in the best interests of the child." K.S. v. Marion Cty. Dep't of Child Servs. , 917 N.E.2d 158, 165 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). Although it is impossible to assign specific weights to the interests of the parent and the child in a termination proceeding, suffice it to say that the parent's interests do not outweigh the child's interests to such a degree that extraordinary measures are warranted to protect the former at the expense of the latter.
2. Risk of Error
[14] In our view, the procedure used in this case was unlikely to have produced the error of denying representation to a parent who wished to exercise that right. The FCM went to some lengths to find Father and communicate with him regarding his right to counsel and how to obtain it, speaking with him on the telephone and mailing him the materials he needed to obtain counsel. Moreover, the alias summons issued by the juvenile court reminded Father that he had the right to counsel, which was to be appointed at State expense, if necessary. Even though apparently all Father had to do to obtain counsel was make a telephone call, there is no indication that he ever even tried. DCS and the juvenile court's general approach, involving notification and instructions, etc., is unlikely to result in the erroneous denial of representation to a parent who genuinely wishes to have it.
[15] Moreover, even if a wrongful denial of counsel were to occur, the inherent nature of termination proceedings is such that the risk of erroneous disposition due to lack of representation is much lower than in most other legal proceedings. The Indiana Supreme Court has recognized this, adopting the following passage from an opinion of the Pennsylvania Superior Court:
[B]ecause of the doctrine of Parens Patriae and the need to focus on the best interest of the child, the trial judge, who is the fact finder, is required to be an attentive and involved participant in the process. While he must depend upon the litigants to present the evidence to establish the particular elements or defenses in the termination case, he is not limited to their presentations, and as in any custody case, he may require more than they present and direct further investigation, evaluations or expert testimony to assure him that the interests of the child and the respective parties are properly represented. Under the aegis of the court, the role of the lawyer, while important, does not carry the deleterious impact of ineffectiveness that may occur in criminal proceedings.
Baker v. Marion Cty. Office of Family & Children , 810 N.E.2d 1035, 1041 (Ind. 2004) (quoting In re Adoption of T.M.F. , 392 Pa.Super. 598, 573 A.2d 1035, 1042-43 (1990), appeal denied ). In other words, the juvenile court is looking out for the parent's interests in a termination proceeding even if an attorney is not. The low risk of error also weighs against requiring a more involved procedure for determining waiver, such as would generally be required in a more adversarial proceeding.
3. Governmental Interest
[16] Finally, we note the State's significant interest in the speedy, efficient, and cost-effective resolution of termination proceedings:
The State has a significant parens patriae interest in protecting the welfare of the children involved. Santosky v. Kramer , 455 U.S. 745, 102 S.Ct. 1388, 71 L.Ed.2d 599. Although the State does not gain when it separates children from the custody of fit parents, id. , the State has a "compelling interest in protecting the welfare of the child by intervening in the parent-child relationship when parental neglect, abuse, or abandonment are at issue." E.P. v. Marion County Office of Family & Children , 653 N.E.2d at 1032. Delays in the adjudication of a case impose significant costs upon the functions of government as well an intangible cost to the lives of the children involved. See In re M.R. , 316 Ill. App. 3d 399, 249 Ill.Dec. 325, 736 N.E.2d 167 (2000), appeal denied .
J.T. v. Marion Cty. Office of Family & Children , 740 N.E.2d 1261, 1264 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000), trans. denied , abrogated on other grounds by Baker , 810 N.E.2d at 1041. It seems to us that the procedure used in this case adequately informed Father of his right to counsel without incurring significant costs or causing undue delay. The interests of the State are served by the procedure used in this case.
4. Balancing
[17] We conclude that a balancing of the Mathews factors does not require more process in termination proceedings than Father was given in this case. Father was informed on multiple occasions of the right to counsel, and if he wanted counsel, all he would have had to do was make a telephone call. We do not believe that this is too much to ask of a parent in a termination proceeding. Moreover, there is a greatly reduced risk of error in termination proceedings, even without counsel, which also weighs against a more burdensome procedure. Finally, the interests of Child and the State in a speedy resolution are well-served by the procedure used in this case. A more involved process would, in our view, not do much to advance Father's interests while very possibly negatively affecting the interests of Child and the State through delay and unnecessary commitment of resources. In summary, we conclude that the procedure used in this case provided Father with "the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner." Thompson , 791 N.E.2d at 795. Father has failed to establish that his due process rights were violated.
[18] We affirm the judgment of the juvenile court.
Bailey, J., concurs.
Mathias, J, dissents with opinion.
In contrast, the use of a procedure like that typically used in criminal cases (requiring that the trial court generate a record and thoroughly investigate a request to waive counsel) could be quite expensive and time-consuming, especially in cases like this one, where transportation from a correctional facility to a waiver hearing would likely have to be arranged.
The dissent points to indications in the record that Father was denied counsel at the initial hearing in the CHINS proceeding that came before this termination, despite requesting it. Although Father does not make this argument, we acknowledge that "procedural irregularities in a CHINS proceedings may be of such import that they deprive a parent of procedural due process with respect to the termination of his or her parental rights." A.P. v. Porter Cty. Office of Family & Children , 734 N.E.2d 1107, 1112-13 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000), trans. denied . In A.P. , the following errors occurred and were found to require reversal:
(1) the [Porter County Office of Family and Children] admittedly failed to provide Brenda and Elvis with copies of at least some, and possibly all, of A.P.'s case plans as required by Indiana Code Chapter 31-34-15; (2) the termination petition filed in this cause did not comport with the requirements of Indiana Code Section 31-35-2-4 ; (3) the original underlying CHINS petition filed with respect to A.P. was unsigned and unverified in violation of Indiana Code Section 31-34-9-3 ; (4) no permanency hearing was ever held as required by Indiana Code Section 31-34-21-7 ; (5) the original CHINS dispositional order, the modification of that order providing for A.P.'s out-of-home placement, and every other order entered by the trial court, with the exception of the termination judgment, contained no written findings and conclusions upon the record concerning its reasons for those dispositions as required by Indiana Code Section 31-34-19-10 ; (6) the trial court entered a no-contact order against Elvis without following the statutory prerequisites for entry of such an order as contained in Indiana Code Chapter 31-34-17 [now repealed]; and (7) Elvis was deprived, on at least two occasions, of his right to be present at review hearings in A.P.'s CHINS case in violation of Indiana Code Section 31-34-21-4(b).
Id. at 1117. This case, however, is a far cry from A.P. Even if we assume that Father did request counsel in the CHINS case and was denied, this does not approach the wholesale violations in A.P. More importantly, the dissent points to no indication that any denial of counsel in the CHINS case prejudiced Father, much less in any way that carried over into the termination. Put another way, whatever may have happened in the CHINS case, Father was advised multiple times of his right to counsel in this case.