Case Name: Earnest MOORE, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES, Appellee
Court: District of Columbia Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: District of Columbia
Decision Date: 1992-05-12
Citations: 608 A.2d 144
Docket Number: No. 91-CO-285
Parties: Earnest MOORE, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES, Appellee.
Judges: Before ROGERS, Chief Judge, and STEADMAN and SCHWELB, Associate Judges.
Reporter: West's Atlantic Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 608
Pages: 144–148

Head Matter:
Earnest MOORE, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES, Appellee.
No. 91-CO-285.
District of Columbia Court of Appeals.
Submitted April 1, 1992.
Decided May 12, 1992.
Daniel M. Schember, Washington, D.C., appointed by this court, was on the brief, for appellant.
Jay B. Stephens, U.S. Atty., John R. Fisher, Thomas C. Black, and Kristan Peters-Hamlin, Asst. U.S. Attys., Washington, D.C., were on the brief, for appellee.
Before ROGERS, Chief Judge, and STEADMAN and SCHWELB, Associate Judges.

Opinion:
PER CURIAM:
Appellant Earnest Moore appeals from the denial of his motion for relief, pursuant to Super.Ct.Crim.R. 35 and D.C.Code § 23-110 (1989 Repl.), from a sentence of 86 years to life for ten counts of carnal knowledge, four counts of taking indecent liber ties with a minor, and one count of enticing a minor. We affirm.
I
After a jury trial for repeated offenses against six different young girls, Judge Reggie Walton sentenced appellant to 86 years to life on ten counts of carnal knowledge of two girls ages 12 and 15 years, D.C.Code § 22-2801 (1989 RepL), four counts of taking indecent liberties with a minor involving four girls ages 9 to 15 years, id. § 22-3501(a), and one count of enticing a 9 year old child, id. § 22-3501(b). At the time of the offenses, appellant was over 45 years of age, had been the former track coach of one of the girls and was the golf coach of another.
On direct appeal from his convictions and sentences, appellant contended that his entire sentence, and in particular his sentence of 48 years and 8 months to 146 years for eight counts of carnal knowledge and one count of taking indecent liberties with a 15 year old girl, violated the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. Appellant also contended that the sentencing judge based his decision on unsupported assumptions that appellant could not be rehabilitated and that he had "destroyed" the lives of his victims.
A two judge panel of the court summarily affirmed the judgment upon appellant's direct appeal. Moore v. United States, No. 87-825 (D.C. June 12, 1989). Subsequently the court denied appellant's motion for a rehearing en banc. Id., reh'g en banc denied (D.C. Sept. 20, 1989) (Judge Mack voting to grant rehearing petition; Judge Farrell recused).
Thereafter, on January 10, 1990, appellant filed a motion for reduction of sen-fences, for relief from illegal sentences and sentences illegally imposed, and sought discovery and a hearing, on the grounds that his sentence violated the Eighth Amendment and that the sentencing judge relied on the unsupported assumptions that appellant could not be rehabilitated and that the victim's lives had been destroyed. The motions judge denied the motion, noting that as to Rule 35(a) the sentences were not illegal, and that as to Rule 35(b), appellant offered nothing new that would have altered the sentencing judge's view toward sentencing since all that was offered was based on speculation, and that his statutory argument based on the laws of other jurisdictions was flawed; the motions judge denied relief under § 23-110 citing Head v. United States, 489 A.2d 450, 451 (D.C.1985).
II
Appellant contends that the motions judge based his decision on an erroneous view of the Eighth Amendment, referring to the fact that the motions judge did not consider the relevant factors under Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 103 S.Ct. 3001, 77 L.Ed.2d 637 (1983). He also contends that the motions judge erred by denying discovery and a hearing on whether the sentencing judge had relied on the mistaken assumptions that appellant, as a pedophile, could not be rehabilitated and that pedophiles destroy their victims.
While an illegal sentence may be corrected at any time pursuant to a motion under Super.Ct.Crim.R. 35(a) or D.C.Code § 23-110, "[a] trial court may, in the exercise of discretion, refuse to entertain a second Rule 35 motion relying on objections previously advanced unsuccessfully." Neverdon v. District of Columbia, 468 A.2d 974, 975 (D.C.1983). Although appellant filed only one Rule 35 motion, he did so after this court had rejected identical claims in his direct appeal. Consequently, the motions judge had no basis on which to rule that appellant's sentences were illegal under Rule 35(a).
Further, the motions judge did not abuse his discretion in denying appellant's motion to reduce sentence under Rule 35(b). Walden v. United States, 366 A.2d 1075, 1076-77 (D.C.1976). Appellant offered almost no new rationale to justify a lighter sentence. Although appellant submitted an affidavit of Ian Gallacher, a law student employed by appellant's counsel, that summarized interviews with some family members of some of the victims about the effect of appellant's crimes on the victims, the motions judge could reasonably and readily conclude that the affidavit was unpersuasive because the family members (two grandmothers and one aunt) were not experts and their opinions were either tentative or very general.
Finally, appellant's contention that the motions judge erred in denying relief under D.C.Code § 23-110 is meritless. The motions judge properly relied on Head, supra, 489 A.2d at 451. The issues raised in appellant's motion were identical to those resolved by the court in his direct appeal. To the extent appellant submitted "new" evidence — an article on pedophilia, excerpts from a manual of mental disorders, and the Gallacher affidavit — he failed to show cause for not presenting such evidence in connection with his direct appeal or to demonstrate prejudice. Id. Appellant's argument that the Gallacher affidavit presents new evidence requiring a hearing is unpersuasive; the affidavit offers no basis on which to conclude that the sentencing judge erred in imposing sentence on a mistaken assumption about the effect of appellant's conduct on his victims. See United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 447, 92 S.Ct. 589, 592, 30 L.Ed.2d 592 (1972).
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment.
. In light of the posture of appellant's case, our concurring colleague's concern comes too late, although it may cause the court hereafter to reevaluate the appropriateness of summary disposition in such cases.
. The trial judge had resigned from the bench.
. This appeal does not present the occasion to examine the Eighth Amendment. We note, however, the Supreme Court's decision in Harmelin v. Michigan, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 2680, 115 L.Ed.2d 836 (1991), where a majority of the Court was of the opinion that either Solem should be overturned as incorrectly concluding that the Eighth Amendment contains a proportionality guarantee, id, at 2686 (Scalia, J., with whom Rehnquist, C.J., joins), or construed only to prohibit sentences that are grossly disproportionate to the crime. Id. at 2705 (Kennedy, J. with whom O'Connor and Souter, JJ., join, concurring in part and dissenting in part).