Case Name: KINNER v. WHIPPLE et al.
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1908-11-25
Citations: 113 N.Y.S. 337
Docket Number: 
Parties: KINNER v. WHIPPLE et al.
Judges: 
Reporter: West's New York Supplement
Volume: 113
Pages: 337–342

Head Matter:
(128 App. Div. 736.)
KINNER v. WHIPPLE et al.
(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Department.
November 25, 1908.)
1. Trial (§ 177 )—Submission to Jury—Waiver.
Where neither party requests the submission of any question of fact to the jury, but each asks the direction of a verdict in his favor, they waive their right to go to the jury and consent that the court shall decide every question of fact in the case.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Trial, Cent. Dig. § 400; Dec. Dig. § 177.*]
2. Appeal and Error (§ 927*)—Review—Presumptions.
On appeal, disputed facts are deemed to have been determined in favor of the party for whom the verdict is directed.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Appeal and Error, Dec. Dig. § 927.*]
3. Trial (§ 148*)—Submission to Jury.
In an action to recover the liquidated damages provided in a contract for the sale of timber, plaintiff’s counsel asked for a direction of a verdict, and, on being asked by the court what dispute of facts there was to go to the jury, replied, “Upon the question of the abandonment of the contract," and, on the court’s asking what important fact there was to go to the jury, said, “If they concede that the contract was abandoned, and stated there was nothing then to do, they are estopped by that, and we have no objections.” The court then said, “That being the only issue counsel can see, I think I shall have to direct a verdict one way or the other,” and on request directed a verdict for defendant. Held, that the suggestion of plaintiff’s counsel that the question of the abandonment of the contract was a disputed fact was not equivalent to a request to go to the jury on that question.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Trial, Cent. Dig. § 331; Dec. Dig. § 148.*]
4. Trial (§ 148*)—Submission to Jury.
A request for submission of a disputed fact must be specific, so that the court may pass directly on it.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Trial, Cent. Dig. § 331; Dec. Dig. § 148.*]
5. Trial (§ 181*)—Direction op Verdict—Exceptions.
Plaintiff’s exception to the direction of a verdict for defendants was not sufficient to notify the court of an objection to its disposal of the case; it only suggesting that plaintiff would have the verdict directed in his favor.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Trial, Cent. Dig. § 406; Dec. Dig. § 181.*]
6. Appeal and Ekeob (§ 169 )—Objections Below—Sufficiency.
Where the attention of the trial justice is not called to the precise thing wanted or objected to, his ruling will not be reviewed on appeal.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Appeal and Error, Cent. Dig. §§ 381-389; Dec. Dig. § 169.*]
Cochrane and Kellogg, 33., dissenting.
Appeal from Trial Term.
Action by Maggie Kinner against Charles R. Whipple and others. Judgment for defendants, and plaintiff appeals.
Affirmed.
This action was brought to recover the liquidated damages provided in a written instrument dated April 21, 1900, wherein the plaintiff sold to the defendants all the marketable pine, and red and black oak timber, of a certain size then standing and growing upon about 400 acres of land. The defendants therein agreed to pay 70 cents for each pine log and $1.50 for the red and black oak, and “if at any time the parties of the second part shall abandon said contract then the said parties of the second part shall pay for all timber cut by them, and in addition thereto the said parties of the second part shall pay the said party of the first part the sum of $500 as fixed and liquidated damages, and not as and for a penalty.” It appeared that the defendants cut and removed timber during the five succeeding years, and until February, 1907, with the knowledge and consent of the plaintiff, and that she accepted and retained the amounts paid for timber cut after the stipulated time.
At the conclusion of the evidence the defendants’ counsel moved for a non-suit upon various grounds, and the motion was denied. Plaintiff’s counsel thereupon asked for a direction of a verdict for $500. The court asked: “What dispute of facts is there to go to the jury?” Plaintiff’s counsel replied: “Upon the question of the abandonment of the contract.” The court said: “I do not see any issue to go to the jury. There is practically no dispute in the proof. What important fact is there in this case to go to the jury?” Plaintiff’s counsel then said: “If they concede that the contract was abandoned, and stated there was nothing then to do, they are estopped by that, and we have no objections.” The court again asked: “Is there any issue of fact you can point out?” And plaintiff’s counsel answered: “That is the only issue of fact I can think of now.” The court then said: “That being the only issue counsel can see, I think I shall have to direct a verdict one way or the other.” Defendants’ counsel then asked the court to direct a verdict, and a verdict was directed in favor of the defendants.
Argued before SMITH, P. J„ and CHESTER, KELLOGG, COCHRANE, and SEWELL, JJ.
A. D. Arnold, for appellant.
T. D. Trumbull, Jr., and E. D. Morehouse, for respondents.
For other cases see same topic & § number in Dec. & Am. Digs. 1907 to date, & Rep'r Indexes
For other oases see same topic & § number in Dec. & Am. Digs. 1907 to date, & Rep’r Indexes

Opinion:
SEWELL, J.
One of the questions presented by this appeal is whether the plaintiff is precluded by the record from, now raising the question that the court erred in not submitting any question of fact to the jury. The rule is that, where neither party requests to have any question of fact submitted to the jury, but each asks that a verdict be directed in his favor, they waive their right to go to thé jury and consent that the court shall decide every question of fact in the case. As was said by Judge Andrews in Thompson v. Simpson, 128 N. Y. 283, 28 N. E. 630:
"The effect of a request by each party for a direction of a verdict in his favor clothed the court with the functions of a jury, and it is well settled that in such case, where the party whose request is denied does not thereupon re- guest to go to the Jury on the facts, a verdict directed for the other party stands as would the finding of a jury."
Upon appeal the disputed facts are deemed to have been determined in favor of the party for whom the verdict is directed. Dillon v. Cockroft, 90 N. Y. 649; Kirtz v. Peck, 113 N. Y. 222, 21 N. E. 130; Smith v. Weston, 159 N. Y. 194, 54 N. E. 38; Westervelt v. Phelps, 171 N. Y. 212, 63 N. E. 962.
The plaintiff contends, however, that his suggestion that the question of the abandonment of the contract was a disputed fact was equivalent to a request to go to the jury upon that question. I think not. There was nothing in the suggestion, or in what was said on that occasion, to justify the conclusion that he did not desire the court to decide every question of fact, and that he did so intend is apparent from the fact that he acquiesced in the proposed action of the court. If the counsel for the plaintiff supposed that there was a disputed question of fact, material to the issue between the parties, and desired that it should be submitted to the jury, he should have withdrawn his motion for a direction of a verdict and requested the submission of that fact to the jury. The request should have been specific, so that the court could have passed directly upon it. Frantz v. Ireland, 66 Barb. 389; Winchell v. Hicks, 18 N. Y. 565; O'Neill v. James, 43 N. Y. 84; Flandreau v. Elsworth, 151 N. Y. 482, 45 N. E. 853.
I think it would be torturing the language of plaintiff's counsel to give it the effect claimed by him; but, if it could be regarded as tantamount to a withdrawal of the request for a direction and a request to go to the jury upon the question of abandonment, there was no exception to a refusal. The exception was to the direction in favor of the defendants. If the counsel was dissatisfied with the conclusion or opinion of the court that he would "have to direct a verdict one way or the other," he should have expressed his dissatisfaction by objecting or excepting to it. This he did not do. On the contrary, he apparently acquiesced in the conclusion and consented to a determination of the question suggested by the court. The exception to the direction of a verdict in favor of the defendants was not sufficient to notify the court of an objection to his disposing of the case. It only suggested to his mind that the counsel would have the verdict directed in favor of the plaintiff.
A trial justice is entitled to have his attention called to the precise thing wanted or objected to, so that the court which reviews his decision may be clearly and distinctly appraised of the ruling complained of. If this is not done, a court of review will not regard it. This rule is not too technical or severe. It has its foundation in a just regard to the fair administration of justice, which requires that when an error has been committed there should be an opportunity to correct it at once. It does not permit a party to lie by at the trial, and take the chances of success on the grounds stated by the court, and then, if he fails to succeed, avail himself of an objection which, if it had been stated, might have been removed. Frantz v. Ireland, 66 Barb. 386; Tilden v. Aitkin, 37 App. Div. 28, 55 N. Y. Supp. 735; Walsh v. Washington Ins. Co., 32 N. Y. 440; Chamberlin v. Pratt, 33 N. Y. 52; Magee v. Badger, 34 N. Y. 247, 90 Am. Dec. 691; Walsh v. Kelly, 40 N. Y. 558; Trimble v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. R. Co., 162 N. Y. 84, 56 N. E. 532, 48 L. R. A. 115.
"Doubt as to the application of an exception defeats it, for a judgment should stand unless the appellant can point to a definite error raised distinctly by a specific exception. The counsel excepting must lay his finger on the point he seeks to raise, so that neither the court nor the opposing counsel will be misled, but both may act advisedly and correct the error, if, on reflection, after the point is clearly presented, it is regarded as an error." Clark v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. R. Co., 191 N. Y. 416, 84 N. E. 397.
"When it is intended to except to a specific proposition or to a particular remark of a judge in his charge to the jury, the counsel making the exception should put his finger on the proposition clearly and distinctly, beyond any question, and employ language entirely plain, so that there "can be no doubt as to the real character of the exception or as to what was actually intended. This is essential to enable the judge to correct, modify, or change the language used, if he deems it proper, and to prevent any misconception or misapprehension as to what portion of the charge the exception was intended to apply." McGinley v. U. S. Life Ins. Co., 77 N. Y. 495.
This practice is well settled and firmly established, and the tendency is to increased strictness rather than to relaxation. Brozek v. Steinway Railway Co., 161 N. Y. 63, 55 N. E. 395. If, therefore, it be assumed that there was a request to submit and a refusal to do so, I am of the opinion that the court had the right to assume that the exception was taken to the direction of a verdict in favor of the defendants, and not to the first proposition. As before observed, it did not bring to the mind of the court or of the opposing counsel that the plaintiff objected to the proposition "to direct a verdict one way or the other." If it had clearly and distinctly covered this proposition, the point would have been understood, and an opportunity would have been afforded for correction, if the court so desired, or the opposing counsel wished to consent to the modification. This was not done, and I do not think it was intended.
The exception, therefore, only presents for review the question whether there is sufficient evidence to uphold the decision in favor of the defendants; and, as there is no question in that regard, it follows that the judgment should be affirmed, with costs. All concur, except COCHRANE and KELLOGG, JJ., who dissent.