Case Name: JAMES S. FLYNN, Respondent, v. THE NEW YORK ELEVATED R. R. CO., GEORGE A. WILLIAMS and JOHN TWINAME, Appellants
Court: New York Superior Court
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1883-02-05
Citations: 17 Jones & S. 60
Docket Number: 
Parties: JAMES S. FLYNN, Respondent, v. THE NEW YORK ELEVATED R. R. CO., GEORGE A. WILLIAMS and JOHN TWINAME, Appellants.
Judges: 
Reporter: Reports of cases argued and determined in the Superior Court of the city of New York
Volume: 49
Pages: 60–67

Head Matter:
JAMES S. FLYNN, Respondent, v. THE NEW YORK ELEVATED R. R. CO., GEORGE A. WILLIAMS and JOHN TWINAME, Appellants.
.Negligence—interference with the highway.—Evidence—declaration of servant, when admissible against master.
Whenever a natural person or a corporation is authorized by way of duty or privilege, to disturb the surface or bed of a highway, in the exercise of the right,due diligence must be used to prevent accidents to wayfarers.
This obligation is independent of the obligation to do the work skillfully, and is not lessened by the fact that the right to. interfere with the highway is exercised by means of a contract with other persons. The duty is imperative, so long as the interference with the highway exists, and no notice thereof is necessary to charge the party exercising such, right.
In an action against defendants to recover for damages from an accident happening through a breach of such an obligation, evidence to show that on the night of the accident a watchman employed by defendants, stated “ that it was his last night as watch, and he didn’t think it worth while to put lamps out on the holes,” is inadmissible against said defendants, and its reception is error, demanding a new trial.
Before Sedgwick, Ch. J., Truax and O’Gorman, JJ.
Decided February 5, 1883.
Appeal by defendant The New York Elevated Railroad Company, and a separate appeal by the other defendants jointly, from judgment entered on verdict for plaintiff, and from order denying motion for new trial made upon the minutes.
The action was for damages from the alleged negligence of the defendants. The New York Elevated Railroad Company was a corporation duly authorized by statute to make excavations in the streets of New York, for the purpose of building its road as authorized by statute. It was alleged, that at a certain point on its line, an excavation had been made by it, through contractors, viz.: its co-defendants, Williams and Twinamé; that though the excavation had been partly filled up, the pavement, which was of stone in blocks, had not been replaced ; that the other defendants were the contractors who had made the excavation and had omitted to replace the stones; that the excavation not being guarded in any way or lighted, was dangerous to passers by; that the plaintiff was passing by in a wagon, in a prudent manner, that one of the wheels sunk into the excavation, ‘which caused the plaintiff to be thrown to the ground and injured.
On the trial it was held, under the allegations of the complaint, that the verdict should be for defendants, unless the testimony was sufficient to show that the defendants Williams and Twiname were responsible for negligence in respect of the condition of the excavation.
The jury found for plaintiff.
Further facts appear in the opinions.
R. E. Deyo, for appellants, The New York Elevated R. R. Co
W. R. Spooner, for appellants, Williams & Twiname.
Louis J. Grant, for the respondent.

Opinion:
By the Court.—Sedgwick, Ch. J.
—The liability of all the defendants was made at the trial to turn. upon the verdict of the jury as to whether the defendants Williams and Twiname were liable. They could not be liable unless the evidence showed that they had not replaced the pavement at the place where the accident happened, after they had finished the other work which they had done under their contract with the railroad company. In my opinion, the clear preponderance of evidence in the whole case, was that they had finished the work, replaced the pavement, and were no longer under any responsibility as to anything to be done. For this reason, I think the the motion to dismiss the complaint and also for a new trial should have been granted.
I also am of opinion, that the objection to the question as to a witness's conversation with a watchman should have been sustained. The question was intended to and did call out testimony that the watchman, on the night of the accident, but before its occurrence, said it was his last night on watch, and he didn't think it worth while to put lamps out on the holes. It was shown that the watchman was employed by the defendants Williams and Twiname, but such a declaration by their servant was not evidence against them.
The fundamental obligations of the defendants were not much discussed upon the argument of the appeal. The argument that was made requires some attention. It would not, I conceive, be denied by any of the learned counsel, that whoever, a natural person or corporation, is authorized to disturb the surface or bed of a highway, whether by way of privilege or duty, must in doing it use ordinary diligence to prevent accidents to wayfarers from the impaired condition of the road. For instance, to guard against persons or vehicles falling into the hole, if such be the kind of work, fencing must be made or notice given by lights ; or rather, due diligence must be used to give such kind of protection to passers by.
The giving this kind of protection is a thing separate from the doing of the work that disturbs the highway. The obligation to do the work skillfully and not negligently would not involve the obligation to warn passers by of the fact that the work-was going on. They would be injured by falling into an excavation skillfully made as much as if it were negligently made.
Therefore, when the defendant, the company, exercised its right of making the excavation in question, if proof should show that it did make it, independent of that was their obligation to use due diligence in respect to passers by. The fact that the right is exercised by means of a contract made with other persons, does not lessen the obligation referred to. The obligation is imperative so long as the excavation exists; and, therefore, notice.that it is not sufficiently protected is not a condition of legal responsibility for injuries from the excavation.
For the reasons that have been given, I am of opinion, that the judgment should be reversed and a new trial ordered'with the costs of the appeal to the appellants, severally, to abide the event, and also that the order denying the motion for a new trial should be reversed with §10 costs to the appellants, severally, to abide the event.
Truax, J., concurred.