Case Name: Dennis STOWE, Appellant, v. UNIVERSAL PROPERTY & CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 2006-07-12
Citations: 937 So. 2d 156
Docket Number: No. 4D05-785
Parties: Dennis STOWE, Appellant, v. UNIVERSAL PROPERTY & CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellee.
Judges: WARNER, J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 937
Pages: 156–161

Head Matter:
Dennis STOWE, Appellant, v. UNIVERSAL PROPERTY & CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellee.
No. 4D05-785.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
July 12, 2006.
Rehearing Denied Sept. 27, 2006.
Roderick L. McGee of Roderick L. McGee, P.A., Pompano Beach, for appellant.
Nancy W. Gregoire, Matthew D. Klein, and Todd E. Brant of Bunnell Woulfe Kirschbaum Keller McIntyre Gregoire & Klein, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, for appellee.

Opinion:
GROSS, J.
The issue in this case is whether a motion for trial complies with Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.820(h) if it is filed after a section 44.103 arbitration hearing but before the rendition of the arbitrator's decision. We hold that such a motion for trial fails to comply with the rule and affirm.
In 2001, Dennis Stowe sued Universal Property & Casualty Insurance Company for breach of an insurance contract. Universal answered and asserted that Stowe's claim was not covered under the policy. From 2001 to 2004, the parties conducted discovery.
In May, 2004, Stowe filed a notice to set the case for trial pursuant to Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.440. The trial judge returned the notice to Stowe, because he had failed to comply with the judge's own rule that required a "mandatory hearing" before he would set a trial.
In July, 2004, with the parties' agreement, the trial judge referred the case to non-binding arbitration pursuant to section 44.103, Florida Statutes (2004).
The arbitration took place on September 1, 2004. At the arbitration hearing, Stowe's lawyer perceived that the arbitrator disagreed with his position.
On September 21, 2004, Stowe scheduled a "mandatory hearing" before the trial judge for October 26, 2004, attaching a copy of his May, 2004, rule 1.440 notice for trial. The record does not reflect that a hearing took place on October 26.
On September 29, 2004, the arbitrator rendered his decision, finding that the insurance policy did not cover Stowe's claim. After the arbitrator's decision, Stowe did not file a motion for trial. On October 28, 2004, Universal moved for the entry of a final judgment in accordance with the arbitrator's decision. See § 44.103(5), Fla. Stat. (2004); Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.820(h). The trial judge granted the motion and entered final judgment.
The legal framework for this case derives from section 44.103 and rule 1.820, which created the procedure to effectuate the statute. Section 44.103(5) states that an "arbitration decision shall be final if a request for a trial de novo is not filed within the time provided by rules promulgated by the Supreme Court." Rule 1.820(h) provides that "[i]f a motion for trial is not made within 20 days of service on the parties of the [arbitrator's] decision, the decision shall be referred to the presiding judge, who shall enter such orders and judgments as may be required to carry out the terms of the decision.... " The "failure to request a trial de novo within the time provided in the rules creates a 'right to enforce an arbitration award that has become final and binding as a result of a failure to request a trial.' " Nicholson-Kenny Capital Mgmt., Inc. v. Steinberg, 932 So.2d 321 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006)' (quoting Johnson v. Levine, 736 So.2d 1235, 1238 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999)).
When it comes to interpreting rules of civil procedure, often the job of an intermediate appellate court is to read the tea leaves of Florida supreme court decisions. The recent trend in these decisions is to construe rules of civil procedure according to their plain meaning. Some high court opinions strictly construe provisions to create rules that are clear-cut and easy to apply. Thus, Lamb v. Matetzschk, 906 So.2d 1037 (Fla.2005), adopted a bright line rule concerning the form of a rule 1.442 proposal for settlement. Recently, in Saia Motor Freight Line, Inc. v. Reid, 930 So.2d 598 (Fla.2006), the supreme court described rule 1.525 as establishing "a bright-line time requirement for motions for costs and attorney fees." Wilson v. Salamon, 923 So.2d 363 (Fla.2005) interpreted rule 1.420(e) by its "plain meaning" to "further the purpose of decreasing litigation over the purpose of the rule and fostering the smooth administration of the trial court's docket."
The purpose of a rule 1.820(h) motion for trial "is to hasten the litigation along, make the parties evaluate the award, and either accept it or complete the litigation through trial." Nicholson-Kenny, at 325, at *4. An award cannot be evaluated until it is made by the arbitrator, indicating that the rule contemplates a motion made after an award. We have previously described the 20 day time period. of rule 1.820(h) as a "window," meaning that it opens when an arbitrator serves a decision on the parties and closes 20 days later. State, Dep't of Trans. v. Bellsouth Telecomms., Inc., 859 So.2d 1278, 1279, 1280 n. 1 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003); see Bacon Family Partners, L.P. v. Apollo Condo. Ass'n, Inc., 852 So.2d 882, 888 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003) (describing, rule 1.820(h) as controlling the procedure "[a]fter the completion of the arbitration proceeding and notice to the parties of the arbitrator's decision"). Consistent with our previous decisions, we therefore conclude that Stowe's notice for trial served before the rendition of the arbitration decision did not comply with rule 1.820(h), so that the trial court correctly entered a final judgment.
The position that' Stowe urges us to adopt does violence to the concept of a bright-line rule. If a motion for trial after an arbitration hearing but before a decision complies with the rule, what about a motion after the arbitration is set, but before the hearing, or a motion filed before an order setting arbitration, but after arbitration has been put into play by the court or the parties?
We distinguish two cases discussed at oral argument. Nieholson-Kenny involved a case that had been set for trial prior to the arbitration proceeding, a notice for pretrial conference filed after the arbitration decision was rendered, and the preparation of both sides for the upcoming trial. Under these circumstances, we held that the notice for pretrial conference satisfied the requirements of rule 1.820(h). In this case, Stowe filed no similar notice after the rendition of the arbitration decision.
Swift v. Wilcox, 924 So.2d 885 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006), dealt with a different rule of procedure and a different policy behind the rule. There we found that the "primary evil" addressed by rule 1.525 "was the uncertainty created by excessive tardiness in the filing of motions for fees and costs." Swift, at 887 (quoting Norris v. Treadwell, 907 So.2d 1217, 1218 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005), review granted, 919 So.2d 435 (Fla.2006)). We held that a motion for fees complied with the rule, and the policy behind it, when it was filed after the issuance of the order deciding the case, but before the largely ministerial act of entering the final judgment that conformed with the order.
Affirmed.
WARNER, J., concurs.
HAZOURI, J, dissents with opinion.