Case Name: THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. STEVEN WAYNE HOLMES, Defendant-Appellant
Court: Illinois Appellate Court
Jurisdiction: Illinois
Decision Date: 1993-05-12
Citations: 246 Ill. App. 3d 179
Docket Number: No. 3-92-0052
Parties: THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. STEVEN WAYNE HOLMES, Defendant-Appellant.
Judges: 
Reporter: Illinois Appellate Court Reports, Third Series
Volume: 246
Pages: 179–187

Head Matter:
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. STEVEN WAYNE HOLMES, Defendant-Appellant.
Third District
No. 3 — 92—0052
Opinion filed May 12, 1993.
Modified on denial of rehearing July 28, 1993.
McCUSKEY, P.J., dissenting.
Mark D. Fisher, of State Appellate Defender’s Office, of Ottawa, for appellant.
Kevin W. Lyons, State’s Attorney, of Peoria (John X. Breslin and Terry A. Mertel, both of State’s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor’s Office, of counsel), for the People.

Opinion:
JUSTICE BARRY
delivered the opinion of the court;
A jury convicted the defendant, Steven Wayne Holmes, of murder (720 ILCS 5/9 — 1(a)(2) (West 1992)). He was thereafter sentenced to 70 years' imprisonment. He appeals, and we reverse and remand.
The record shows that the defendant shook his seven-month-old daughter Crystal, thereby causing her death. While the defendant admitted he shook his daughter, he testified that he did not intend to hurt her, and he did not know that shaking her could hurt her. The defendant also stated that he had a seventh-grade education.
The defendant's wife, Janelle Holmes, also testified that the defendant shook Crystal but that he was not trying to hurt her. The record also shows that prior to the trial Janelle gave a statement to the police regarding the incident that was inconsistent with her trial testimony. However, in her statement to the police she never stated that the defendant intended to hurt Crystal.
Crystal's treating doctors opined that Crystal had been vigorously shaken, which caused her brain to swell and inhibited blood flow to the brain. They both agreed that the brain injury and her death resulted from a one-time shaking incident.
Other evidence showed that Crystal had prior injuries which were indicative of a pattern of child abuse. However, the evidence presented does not prove that these prior injuries were caused by the defendant's shaking. At trial, the defendant objected to the admission of these other incidents of abuse. He claimed that the State could not show that he inflicted these prior injuries.
The defendant reiterates that argument on appeal, and he also claims that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request a limiting instruction. That is, the jury should have been advised that it could not consider the prior incidents of abuse for any other purpose than the purpose for which they were admitted.
The jury found the defendant guilty of first degree murder. On appeal, the defendant first argues that he was not proved guilty of murder beyond a reasonable doubt. Specifically, he contends that the evidence was insufficient to show that the defendant knew that shaking Crystal would cause death or great bodily harm. As such, he asks this court to reverse his conviction, or, in the alternative, to reduce his conviction from first degree murder to involuntary manslaughter. He concedes that the evidence was sufficient to support a conviction for involuntary manslaughter.
A person who kills an individual without lawful justification commits first degree murder if, in performing the acts which cause the death, he knows that such acts create a strong probability of death or great bodily harm. (720 ILCS 5/9 — 1(a)(2) (West 1992).) Upon judicial review of a conviction, a reviewing court will preserve the trier of fact's role as weigher of the evidence by viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution. The relevant question is whether any rational trier of fact could have found the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Collins (1985), 106 Ill. 2d 237, 478 N.E.2d 267.
After reviewing the evidence in light of the above principles, we conclude that a rational trier of fact could not have found the defendant guilty of first degree murder. Here, the evidence was insufficient to show that the defendant knew his actions could cause death or great bodily harm.
The evidence showed that the defendant had only a seventh-grade education and that the death was caused by a one-time shaking. The defendant testified that he did not know shaking a child could kill a child. In addition, the defendant and his wife both testified that he did not intend to harm Crystal. Furthermore, no evidence was introduced by the State which showed that the defendant knew his actions could cause Crystal's death. As such, we find that the State's evidence was insufficient to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant knew his actions could cause death or great bodily harm.
However, we are satisfied that the evidence in this case proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was guilty of involuntary manslaughter, a lesser included offense of murder. We therefore find that the defendant's murder conviction should be reduced to involuntary manslaughter.
In support of our finding, we may reduce the degree of the offense of which the defendant was convicted. (134 Ill. 2d R. 615(b)(3).) This rule allows the appellate court to reduce the offense of which a defendant is convicted to a lesser offense where the evidence failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt an element of the greater offense. People v. Kick (1991), 216 Ill. App. 3d 787, 576 N.E.2d 395.
A person who unintentionally kills an individual without lawful justification commits involuntary manslaughter if his acts, whether lawful or unlawful, which cause the death are likely to cause death or great bodily harm to some individual, and he performs them recklessly. (720 ILCS 5/9 — 3 (West 1992).) The crux of the offense of involuntary manslaughter is recklessness. Unlike murder, involuntary manslaughter does not require felonious intent; rather, the only mental state required is the conscious disregard of a substantial and unjustifiable risk. People v. Hancock (1983), 113 Ill. App. 3d 564, 447 N.E.2d 994.
As previously noted, the evidence in this case does not establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant knew, or intended, that his actions could or would cause death or serious harm. However, it does establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty of involuntary manslaughter since the evidence shows that the defendant acted recklessly and with a conscious disregard of a substantial risk.
We note that the defendant raised two additional errors on appeal. However, due to our disposition of the first issue we find that these alleged errors, if they occurred, were harmless since the evidence overwhelmingly established the defendant's guilt of involuntary manslaughter. See People v. Bryant (1983), 94 Ill. 2d 514, 447 N.E.2d 301.
Accordingly, the judgment of the circuit court of Peoria County is reversed and the defendant's conviction for first degree murder is reduced to involuntary manslaughter. The cause is remanded for re-sentencing.
Reversed and remanded.
STOUDER, J., concurs.