Case Name: R. Lamar BAIRD, a resident of the State of Utah for and on behalf of all other residents similarly situated, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. STATE of Utah, State Industrial Commission, Occupational Safety and Health Division, Utah Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission, Defendants and Appellants
Court: Utah Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Utah
Decision Date: 1978-01-09
Citations: 574 P.2d 713
Docket Number: No. 14984
Parties: R. Lamar BAIRD, a resident of the State of Utah for and on behalf of all other residents similarly situated, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. STATE of Utah, State Industrial Commission, Occupational Safety and Health Division, Utah Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission, Defendants and Appellants.
Judges: WILKINS and HALL, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Pacific Reporter 2d
Volume: 574
Pages: 713–722

Head Matter:
R. Lamar BAIRD, a resident of the State of Utah for and on behalf of all other residents similarly situated, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. STATE of Utah, State Industrial Commission, Occupational Safety and Health Division, Utah Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission, Defendants and Appellants.
No. 14984.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Jan. 9, 1978.
Robert B. Hansen, Atty. Gen., Harry E. McCoy II, Spec. Asst. Atty. Gen., James B. Lee, Kent W. Winterholler of Parsons, Behle & Latimer, Salt Lake City, for defendants and appellants.
Loren D. Martin, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and respondent.

Opinion:
MAUGHAN, Justice:
Before us is a judgment of the District Court declaring Chapter 9, Title 35, as enacted 1973, U.C.A.1953, unconstitutional. Based on the record before us, the trial court should have dismissed this action for declaratory judgment ex mero motu. It should have done so on the ground it lacked jurisdiction to render an advisory opinion. We reverse. No costs awarded.
Plaintiff merely alleged that he was employed and employing within the geographical confines of Utah and that he was a member of a class of persons with complaints similar to his. The alleged adverse actions of defendant consisted of the creation, administration, and enforcement of a legislative act. The allegations concerning the unconstitutionality of the act were all pleaded in the abstract. There were no concrete facts pleaded indicating any specific injury sustained or threatened to plaintiff personally. There were no allegations that plaintiff had sustained a particularized injury that set him apart from the public generally and would give him standing to challenge the constitutionality of the act.
In Lyon v. Bateman, this Court stated that while statutes authorizing courts to render declaratory relief should be liberally construed, the courts must, nevertheless, operate within the constitutional and statutory powers and duties imposed upon them. The courts are not a forum for hearing academic contentions or rendering advisory opinions. To maintain an action for declaratory relief, plaintiff must show that the justiciable and jurisdictional elements requisite in ordinary actions are present, for a judgment can be rendered only in a real controversy between adverse parties.
Generally, courts have held that the conditions which must exist before a declaratory judgment action can be maintained are: (1) a justiciable controversy; (2) the interests of the parties must be adverse; (3) the party seeking such relief must have a legally protectible interest in the controversy; and (4) the issues between the parties involved must be ripe for judicial determination.
To entertain an action for declaratory relief, there must be a justiciable controversy, for the courts do not give advisory opinions upon abstract questions. The use of the term "rights, status and other legal relations" in the. declaratory judgment "statute (§ 78-33-2, U.C.A.1953) relates to a justiciable controversy where there is an actual conflict between interested parties asserting adverse claims on an accrued state of facts as opposed to a hypothetical state of facts.
When it is ascertained that there is no jurisdiction in the court because of the absence of a justiciable controversy, then the court can go no further, and its immediate duty is to dismiss the action, and jurisdiction cannot be conferred by consent or any other act of the parties.
A Declaratory Judgment Statute cannot be so construed as to authorize the courts to deliver advisory opinions or pronounce judgments on abstract questions, but there must be the invariable justicia-ble controversy present in such cases.
The Declaratory Judgment Statute recognizes the constitutional limitations upon the courts to determine only cases and controversies.
The courts have-no jurisdiction to render a declaratory judgment in the absence of a justiciable or actual controversy. A mere general contention between parties, which has not been formulated into a definite controversy, does not warrant declaratory relief. For an adjudication, concrete legal issues must be present — not abstractions, as is required in other fields as well as declaratory judgments. ". . . Judicial adherence to the doctrine of separation of powers preserves the courts for the decision of issues between litigants capable of effective determination."
A justiciable controversy authorizing entry of a declaratory judgment is one wherein the plaintiff is possessed of a protectible interest at law or in equity and the right to a judgment, and the judgment, when pronounced, must be such as would give specific relief.
In order to obtain adjudication of an issue with respect to the validity of a statute in a declaratory action it is necessary that there be presented to the court concrete legal issues tendered in actual cases, and abstractions or the seeking of an advisory opinion or the presenting of a non-justiciable controversy, or the raising of a mere moot question will not enable a court, state or federal, to pass upon the constitutionality of statute.
A party seeking a declaration of the constitutionality of a statute must have a real interest therein as against his adversary, whose rights and contentions must be opposition to those of the plaintiff. A party to whom a statute is inapplicable cannot question its constitutionality by seeking a declaration of rights.
The general rule is applicable that a party having only such interest as the public generally cannot maintain an action. In order to pass upon the validity of a statute, the proceeding must be initiated by one whose special interest is affected, and it must be a civil or property right that is so affected.
The necessity of alleging in the pleading a justiciable controversy is regarded as of such importance as to require the court to raise the question of its own motion, if the parties neglect or fail to do so. A plaintiff may seek and obtain a declaration as to whether a statute is constitutional by averring in his pleading the grounds upon which he will be directly damaged in his person or property by its enforcement; by alleging facts indicating how he will be damaged by its enforcement; that defendant is enforcing such statute or has a duty or ability to enforce it; and the enforcement will impinge upon plaintiff's legal or constitutional rights. A complaint is insufficient which merely challenges the constitutionality of a statute, without in some way indicating that plaintiff will be affected by its operation or is subject to its terms and provisions.
Did plaintiff's allegation that he was employed and employing constitute a sufficient basis to give him standing to challenge the constitutionality of the act?
. The law is that one who is regulated lacks standing unless he can show an interest that is adversely affected.
To invoke judicial power to determine the validity of executive or legislative action, claimant must show that he has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining a direct injury as a result of that action. It is insufficient to assert a general interest he shares in common with all members of the public, viz., a generalized grievance.
To grant standing to a litigant, who cannot distinguish himself from all citizens, would be a significant inroad on the representative form of government, and cast the courts in the role of supervising the coordinate branches of government. It would convert the judiciary into an open forum for the resolution of political and ideological disputes about the performance of government.
Plaintiff alleged the act combined in one agency, legislative, executive, and judicial authority contrary to Article V, Sec. 1, Constitution of Utah. Specifically, he claimed this combination constituted a violation of the fundamental principles of free government, viz., the doctrine of separation of powers.
In his allegations, plaintiff neither asserted a legally protectible interest in the subject matter of the action nor did he plead any facts indicating he would be directly affected by enforcement of the act. The wrong of which he complained was public in character, and his complaint disclosed no special injury affecting him differently from other citizens. He, therefore, had no standing to urge the unlawfulness of the governmental action. It is not the duty of this Court to sit in judgment upon the action of the legislative branch of government, except when a litigant claims to be adversely affected on a particular ground by a legislative act.
Plaintiff further alleged the act denied equal protection of the law, in that it conferred on the administrator authority to grant a variance, viz., he has discretion to determine whether the laws or rules shall apply to a particular person. In his complaint, plaintiff alleged the act was designed to circumvent the restrictions imposed upon governmental activity associated with criminal investigations and procedures by denominating the penalties for violations of the act as "civil assessments." Plaintiff asserted the act thus deprived an "accused" of a panoply of rights accorded in a criminal action, e. g., trial by jury, search and seizure only pursuant to a warrant, right of confrontation, proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and the right against self-incrimination. Plaintiff asserted the act deprived an accused of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.
Plaintiff may assert only his own legal rights. He may not base his claim upon the legal rights of third parties. The denial of equal rights can be urged only by those who can show they belong to the alleged discriminated class. An asserted violation of due process can be urged only by those who claim an impairment of their rights in the application of the statute to them. Plaintiff's claims are presented as abstract propositions; he does not allege he has been denied these rights by enforcement of the act. Challenges such as these may only be urged by those whose rights are impaired by the contested legislation.
Plaintiff alleged the act improperly delegated legislative power in violation of Article VI, Sec. 1, Constitution of Utah. He asserted the legislature did not establish sufficient standards to guide the commission in the exercise of its rule-making power; that the act permitted a federal agency to make rules for the State of Utah; and the discretionary authority granted in making civil assessments constituted a legislative function which could not be delegated. He further alleged the grant of quasi-judicial powers to the Review Commission, was, in fact, a delegation of judicial authority in violation of Article VIII, Sec. 1, Constitution of Utah.
Section 35-9-6(6), provides that any person adversely affected by a standard issued by the commission may file a petition challenging' its validity with the District Court for judicial review. Section 35-9-11(1), provides for judicial review of any order, citation or decree heard by the commission in accordance with Secs. 35-1-19 through 35-1-40, U.C.A.1953. Section 35-1-34 provides for an action in the District Court to set aside, amend, or vacate any order of the commission, on the ground that the order is unreasonable or unlawful.
Where an appeal from an action of an administrative body is provided by statute, a remedy by way of declaratory judgment will be denied. The proper procedure to challenge the statute and the administration thereof is by judicial review after final administrative action has been taken.
This extended opinion has attempted to illustrate the succinct statement in Cran-ston v. Thomson:
Actually the requests presented by the three complaints were for advisory opinions on multifaceted matters, answers to which could scarcely fail to proliferate rather than resolve controversy.
WILKINS and HALL, JJ., concur.
. 119 Utah 434, 439, 228 P.2d 818, 820 (1951).
. 1 Anderson, Declaratory Judgments (2d Ed.), § 9, pp. 38, 44.
.1 Anderson, Declaratory Judgments (2d Ed.), 1959 Supp. § 9, p. 13.
. 1 Anderson, Declaratory Judgments (2d Ed.), § 9, pp. 49-50.
. Id., § 16, pp. 65-66.
. Id., § 17, p. 67.
. Id., § 18, p. 68.
. Id., § 159, pp. 302-303.
. Id., § 162, pp. 313, 314.
. Id., § 258, pp. 605-606.
. Id., § 291, p. 676.
. Davis, Administrative Law of the Seventies, 1977 Supp., § 22.00-5, p. 177.
. United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 177-180, 94 S.Ct. 2940, 41 L.Ed.2d 678 (1974).
. United States v. Richardson, note 13, supra, concurring opinion Justice Powell, 418 U.S. 188-192, 94 S.Ct. 2940.
. Eastham v. Public Employees' Retirement Ass'n Bd" 89 N.M. 399, 553 P.2d 679 (1976); De Grief v. City of Seattle, 50 Wash.2d 1, 297 P.2d 940 (1956); Greer v. Lewiston Golf & Country Club, Inc., 81 Idaho 393, 342 P.2d 719 (1959); Bayly Manufacturing Co. v. Department of Employment, 155 Colo. 433, 395 P.2d 216 (1964); Patton v. Fortuna Corporation, 68 N.M. 40, 357 P.2d 1090 (1960); State v. Human Relations Research Foundation, 64 Wash.2d 262, 391 P.2d 513 (1964); Eacret v. Holmes, 215 Or. 121, 333 P.2d 741 (1958); 174 A.L.R. 549, Anno: Interest necessary to maintenance of declaratory determination of statute or ordinance, Secs. 2, p. 551 and 11, p. 564.
. Kelly v. Silver, 25 Or.App. 441, 549 P.2d 1134 (1976); State v. Hines, 78 N.M. 471, 432 P.2d 827 (1967); American Metal Climax, Inc. v. Claimant of Butler, 188 Colo. 116, 532 P.2d 951 (1975); Budd v. Bishop, Wyo., 543 P.2d 368 (1975).
. Tite v. State Tax Commission, 89 Utah 404, 416-418, 57 P.2d 734 (1936).
. 1 Anderson, Declaratory Judgments (2d Ed.) § 201, p. 418.
. Colorado Department of Revenue v. District Court In And For County of Adams, 172 Colo. 144, 470 P.2d 864 (1970).
. Wyo., 530 P.2d 726, 730 (1975).