Case Name: Watson GRENE, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1996-05-15
Citations: 702 So. 2d 510
Docket Number: No. 95-2063
Parties: Watson GRENE, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: Before COPE, LEVY and GERSTEN, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 702
Pages: 510–512

Head Matter:
Watson GRENE, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. 95-2063.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
May 15, 1996.
Opinion Modified on Grant of Rehearing En Banc Sept. 3, 1997.
Bennett H. Brummer, Public Defender, and Harvey J. Sepler, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant.
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, and Doquyen T. Nguyen, Assistant, Attorney General, for appellee.
Before COPE, LEVY and GERSTEN, JJ.

Opinion:
PER CURIAM.
Appellant, Watson Grene, appeals his conviction and sentence for possession of a controlled substance and possession of a controlled substance with the intent to sell within 1000' of a school. Both counts were premised upon possession of the same quantity of controlled substance at the same time and place.
The State concedes that while appellant waived his double jeopardy rights with respect to his convictions, appellant did not waive his double jeopardy rights with respect to his sentences. See Laines v. State, 662 So.2d 1248 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995), rev. denied, 670 So.2d 940 (Fla.1996); Graham v. State, 631 So.2d 388 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994). We agree that the trial court erred in sentencing appellant for the lesser-included charge of simple possession, and hence, vacate the sentence for possession of a controlled substance. See Laines, 662 So.2d at 1249; Perrin v. State, 599 So.2d 1365 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992); Lundy v. State, 596 So.2d 1167 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992).
Further, appellant argues that the trial court erred in sentencing him as a habitual offender for possession with intent to sell within 1000' of a school. Section 775.084(l)(a)(3), Florida Statutes (1995), allows enhanced sentencing as a habitual offender so long as "the felony for which the defendant is to be sentenced . is not a violation of § 893.13 relating to the purchase or possession of a controlled substance." § 775.084(l)(a)(3) (emphasis added).
Here, since possession with intent to sell is a violation of § 893.13 which relates to the possession of a controlled substance, habitual offender sentencing was improper. See § 775.084(l)(a)(3); Williams v. State, 667 So.2d 914 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996); Houser v. State, 666 So.2d 158 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995); Palmer v. State, 664 So.2d 1162 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995); Jackson v. State, 651 So.2d 242 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995); Perez v. State, 647 So.2d 1007 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994); cf. Tucker v. State, 608 So.2d 122 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992), aff'd on other grounds, 620 So.2d 1241 (Fla.1993).
Accordingly, appellant's sentence for possession of a controlled substance is vacated and his enhanced sentence for possession with intent to sell is remanded for resentenc-ing. See § 775.084(l)(a)(3); Williams, 667 So.2d at 914; Houser, 666 So.2d at 158. In all other respects, the case is affirmed.
Affirmed in part; vacated in part; remanded for resentencing.
Before SCHWARTZ, C.J., and NESBITT, JORGENSON, COPE, LEVY, GERSTEN, GODERICH, GREEN, FLETCHER, SHEVIN and SORONDO, JJ.