Case Name: Frederica E. BREAUX, etc., Petitioner, v. CITY OF MIAMI BEACH, Respondent; Rabbi Israel Poleyeff, etc., Petitioner, v. City of Miami Beach, Respondent
Court: Florida Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 2005-03-24
Citations: 899 So. 2d 1059
Docket Number: Nos. SC02-1568, SC02-1569
Parties: Frederica E. BREAUX, etc., Petitioner, v. CITY OF MIAMI BEACH, Respondent, Rabbi Israel Poleyeff, etc., Petitioner, v. City of Miami Beach, Respondent.
Judges: ANSTEAD, LEWIS, and QUINCE, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 899
Pages: 1059–1074

Head Matter:
Frederica E. BREAUX, etc., Petitioner, v. CITY OF MIAMI BEACH, Respondent, Rabbi Israel Poleyeff, etc., Petitioner, v. City of Miami Beach, Respondent.
Nos. SC02-1568, SC02-1569.
Supreme Court of Florida.
March 24, 2005.
Nancy Little Hoffmann, Pompano Beach, Florida and Howard L. Pomerantz of Abramowitz and Pomerantz, P.A., Sunrise, Florida on behalf of Frederica E. Breaux, etc.; and Joel D. Eaton of Po-dhurst, Orseck, Josefsberg, Eaton, Meadow, Olin and Perwin, P.A., Miami, Florida on behalf of Rabbi Israel Poleyeff, etc., for Petitioner.
Christopher N. Bellows and Daniel S. Pearson of Holland and Knight, Miami, Florida, and Murray H. Dubbin, City of Attorney, Miami Beach, Florida on behalf of City of Miami Beach, for Respondent.
Edward G. Guedes of Weiss, Serota, Helfman, Pastoriza, Guedes, Cole and Bon-iske, P.A., Miami, Florida on behalf of Village of Key Biscayne and Bal Harbour Village; John C. Dellagloria, City Attorney, North Miami, Florida, Stephen H. Cypen, Town Attorney, Miami Beach, Florida, and Lynn M. Dannheisser, City Attorney, Sunny Isles Beach, Florida on behalf of City of North Miami and Town of Surfside, As Amici Curiae.

Opinion:
PARIENTE, C.J.
We have for review the Third District Court of Appeal's decision in Poleyeff v. City of Miami Beach, 818 So.2d 672 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002) (Poleyeff II), which expressly and directly conflicts with this Court's decision in Florida Department of Natural Resources v. Garcia, 753 So.2d 72 (Fla.2000). We hold that when a municipality, such as the City of Miami Beach, operates a public beach as a swimming area by having public restrooms, showers, water fountains, parking, and a beach concessionaire from which it derives revenues, the municipality has a duty to exercise reasonable care under the circumstances to those foreseeable users of that swimming area. This holding is based on our longstanding and well-settled precedent addressing governmental entities that operate public swimming areas. We make no determination about whether the City of Miami Beach was negligent or whether any such negligence was the legal cause of the plaintiffs' damages. Nor do we determine what effect, if any, the principle of comparative negligence has on the plaintiffs' claims. Moreover, we note that as with all governmental entities, the City's liability is limited by the cap in the State's waiver of sovereign immunity set forth in section 768.28, Florida Statutes (2004). Accordingly, we quash the Third District's decision and remand for further proceedings.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On February 20, 1997, Eugenie Poleyeff and her husband, who were guests at the Saxony Hotel in Miami Beach, walked three blocks to the beach area behind the Seville Hotel at 29th Street to rent a beach chair and umbrella from a concessionaire, Hurricane Beach Rentals. While swimming in the Atlantic Ocean adjacent to the 29th Street beach area, Ms. Poleyeff was caught in rip currents. Upon hearing Ms. Poleyeffs calls for help, Zachary Breaux, who was a guest at the Seville, attempted to save her. Tragically, they were both overcome by the rip currents and drowned.
The estates of Ms. Poleyeff and Mr. Breaux brought wrongful death actions against multiple defendants, including the City of Miami Beach, the Seville Hotel, the Saxony Hotel, and Hurricane Beach Rentals. The trial court dismissed the complaints against the Seville Hotel, the Saxony Hotel, and Hurricane Beach Rentals with prejudice, and the Third District affirmed. See Poleyeff v. Seville Beach Hotel Corp., 782 So.2d 422 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001) (Poleyeff I), review denied, 817 So.2d 849 (Fla.2002).
With regard to the City, the complaints alleged that the City controlled the beach under a lease agreement with the State of Florida and was negligent in failing to warn swimmers of the danger of rip currents or take other action to safeguard swimmers who used the beach. The City filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that it was entitled to sovereign immunity.
The record contains evidence that the City was aware that the public was using the beach area at 29th Street for swimming. The Poleyeffs saw other people swimming and wading in the ocean, and believed the area was a swimming area. The Poleyeffs saw no signs warning that the area was not a swimming area or that there were no lifeguards in the area. Similarly, the Breaux family saw many people swimming there on that day and the previous day, and believed the area was a swimming area.
Evidence was also presented to the trial court that at the 29th Street beach area, the City provided public restrooms with showers, water fountains, telephones, and picnic tables, and that there was metered parking adjacent to the beach on 29th Street. In addition, the City licensed Hurricane Beach Rentals to operate at that location. Hurricane Beach Rentals rented to beach users a variety of equipment, including lounge chairs, umbrellas, and watercraft. The City required the concessionaire and its employees to wear identification badges issued or approved by the City.
Although the City provided lifeguards at various other locations along the beach, at the time of the accident the beach area at 29th Street did not have a lifeguard station. The City's Parks and Recreation Director testified during a deposition that the 29th Street beach area was the only beach area that had public restrooms, showers, water fountains, and a beach concessionaire but not also a lifeguard station.
At those beaches where the City provided lifeguards, the public was warned of rip currents in the area. On the day of the accident, the lifeguard at the 21st Street beach area, which is eight blocks from the 29th Street beach area where the decedents were swimming, posted rip current warning flags.
The trial court granted the City's motion for summary judgment, finding that the City was immune from suit, and the estates appealed to the Third District. The district court affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment, but not on the basis of sovereign immunity. Instead, relying exclusively on its prior en banc decision in Poleyeff I, the Third District held that the City had no duty to warn the decedents of, or safeguard them from, the naturally occurring rip currents because it did "not control the area or undertake a particular responsibility to do so." Poleyeff II, 818 So.2d at 673 (quoting Poleyeff I, 782 So.2d at 424). This holding conflicts with Garcia, both on the issue of the City's control of the beach area and on the issue of whether the City was operating a swimming area so that a duty of reasonable care arose.
ANALYSIS
We begin by resolving the conflict between the Third District's decision in this case and Garcia on the issue of control of the beach area. The Third District affirmed the trial court's order granting the City summary judgment on the authority of its en banc decision in Poleyeff I. In that case, the district court concluded that the Seville Hotel, the Saxony Hotel and Hurricane Beach Rentals had no "duty to warn, correct, or safeguard others from naturally occurring, even if hidden, dangers common to the waters in which they are found" because they did "not control the area or undertake a particular responsibility to do so." Poleyeff I, 782 So.2d at 424 (footnotes omitted).
Unlike the hotels and concessionaire dismissed as defendants in Poleyeff I, the City does control the area of Miami Beach, based upon a 1982 management agreement with the State. As we explained in Garcia,
[t]he management agreement: (1) provided that the State "holds title" to the beach property; (2) granted the City "management responsibilities" of the beach for twenty-five years; (3) required the City to submit a "management plan" providing for "the limitation and control of land and water related activities such as boating, bathing, surfing, rental of beach equipment, and sale of goods and services to the public;" and (4) required the City to pay the State twenty-five percent of revenues collected from private concessionaires.
753 So.2d at 74. We therefore conclude that the Third District erred to the extent it held that the City does not control the beach of Miami Beach.
We next turn to the issues of duty and sovereign immunity. In cases involving governmental tort liability, we generally determine whether the defendant owes a duty of care to the plaintiff before we address whether the governmental entity is immune from liability. See Henderson v. Bowden, 737 So.2d 532, 535 (Fla.1999) ("A threshold matter is whether the [defendant] had a duty to act with care toward the decedents.... Assuming a duty is owed, we must then determine whether sovereign immunity bars an action for an alleged breach of that duty."); Kaisner v. Kolb, 543 So.2d 732, 734 (Fla.1989) ("Conceptually, the question of the applicability of . immunity does not even arise until it is determined that a defendant otherwise owes a duty of care to the plaintiff and thus would be liable in the absence of such immunity.") (quoting Williams v. State, 34 Cal.3d 18, 192 Cal. Rptr. 233, 664 P.2d 137, 139 (1983)). However, in cases that involve injuries suffered while swimming, the issues of duty and sovereign immunity merge because the determination of both questions turns on the same inquiry — whether the governmental entity was operating a public swimming area when the accident occurred. We have explained that
[a] government unit has the discretionary authority to operate or not operate swimming facilities and is immune from suit on that discretionary question. However, once the unit decides to operate the swimming facility, it assumes the common law duty to operate the facility safely, just as a private individual is obligated under like circumstances.
Avallone v. Board of County Comm'rs, 493 So.2d 1002, 1005 (Fla.1986); see also Butler v. Sarasota County, 501 So.2d 579, 579 (Fla.1986) (quoting Avallone). This duty includes "keeping] the premises in a reasonably safe condition and . warning] the public of any dangerous conditions of which [the governmental entity] knew or should have known." Garcia, 753 So.2d at 75.
On the issue of whether a governmental entity is operating a public swimming area, Garcia held
that the fact that the [governmental entity] never formally "designated" the beach as a public swimming area is not dispositive of whether the government owes an operational-level duty[ ] to safely operate a public swimming area if sufficient facts exist to demonstrate that the area was held out to the public as a public swimming area. The focus of the inquiry is not whether a formal designation occurred. Rather, . the actions of the government entity must be examined to determine whether, based on all the circumstances, the government entity held the area out to the public as a swimming area or led the public to believe the area was a designated swimming area.
. [T]he "common use" of an area for swimming may be one factor to consider in order to determine if a governmental entity held out the area as a public swimming area or, as in Andrews [v. Department of Natural Resources, 557 So.2d 85 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990)], led the public to believe that the area was designated as a swimming area. At one end of the spectrum is the circumstance where the government entity formally designates an area for public swimming. At the other end of the spectrum are circumstances where either the government entity actively attempts to prohibit swimming or has no knowledge that some part of an undesignated beach is being used by swimmers.
753 So.2d at 76-77 (emphasis supplied).
Although the facts presented in Garcia are different from the facts of this case, the general principle of law Garcia established is applicable to all cases dealing with governmental tort liability for swimming accidents. If "the government[al] entity held the area out to the public as a swimming area or led the public to believe the area was a designated swimming area," the governmental entity owes an operational-level duty of care to those using the swimming area. Garcia, 753 So.2d at 76.
In concluding that the City was not operating a swimming area at the 29th Street beach location, the dissent narrowly focuses on the city council's decision not to formally designate the area for swimming or post lifeguards there. However, under Garcia these facts are not dispositive. Indeed, Garcia expressly rejected the requirement of formal designation, see 753 So.2d at 76 ("The focus of the inquiry is not whether a formal designation occurred."), and relying on the presence of a lifeguard station as a litmus test for establishing a public swimming area is even more exacting than requiring "formal designation." Instead, we must consider all of the circumstances to determine whether the City was operating a swimming area at the 29th Street beach location.
We conclude that the totality of the circumstances in this case demonstrates that the City was operating a "public swimming area" at the 29th Street location. The City knew that the public was using this location for swimming. There were no signs warning the public not to swim and both the Poleyeff family and the Breaux family saw people using the area for swimming. Moreover, although the City did not have a lifeguard station at the 29th Street beach area, the City built beach facilities at this location and provided metered parking at the end of 29th Street. Of even greater significance, the City licensed a concessionaire to rent beach chairs, umbrellas, and watercraft at this location, thereby deriving revenue from the public's use of this particular beach area.
Thus, contrary to the dissent's assertion, it is not the City's decision to open the beach to the public that creates the duty in this case. See dissenting op. at 1071-72. The City did more at the 29th Street location than simply allowing access to the water. By providing parking, public facilities, and concessions, the City created more than just a "chance that residents of the State may, on their own, select" the 29th Street location "to enjoy the ocean." Garcia, 758 So.2d at 77. In fact, at the time of the drownings, the 29th Street beach area was the only beach area along Miami Beach that had public restrooms, showers, water fountains, and a beach concessionaire, but had not been formally designated a swimming area by the City.
Under the analysis we set forth in Garcia, we conclude the City "held the [the 29th Street beach] area out to the public as a swimming area or led the public to believe the area was a designated swimming area." Id. at 76. The City therefore had an operational-level duty of care "to warn the public of any dangerous conditions of which it knew or should have known" at the 29th Street beach area. Id. at 75.
In reaching this conclusion, we expressly disagree with the Third District's statement that "drowning because of a natural characteristic of the very waters in which it occurs is simply one of the perhaps rapidly diminishing set of circumstances for which, without more, no human being or entity should be . held civilly liable." Poleyeff II, 818 So.2d at 673 n. 2 (quoting Poleyeff I, 782 So.2d at 425). Rather, we agree with Judge Cope's conclusion that the City's argument "that it has no duty to warn . [of] naturally occurring conditions in the water" is contrary to our controlling precedent in Garcia. Id. at 677 (Cope, J., dissenting). The analysis set forth in Garcia is not limited to man-made dangers. Garcia cites with approval the Second District Court of Appeal's decision in Andrews, which involved natural dangerous currents. See Garcia, 753 So.2d at 75-76. Moreover, as noted by Judge Cope, in Butler, which is also cited with approval in Garcia, a majority of this Court rejected Chief Justice McDonald's assertion that "[governmental entities should not be liable for naturally occurring dangerous conditions in bodies of water adjacent to public beaches." Butler, 501 So.2d at 580 (McDonald, C.J., dissenting), quoted in Poleyeff II, 818 So.2d at 678 (Cope, J., dissenting).
Lastly, the fact that rip currents are transient in nature is not dispositive on the issue of the City's duty to warn. Under Garcia, the focus is not on the nature of the dangerous condition but on whether the governmental entity knew or should have known of the dangerous condition. Whether the City knew or should have known of the dangerous rip currents at the 29th Street beach location on the day of the accident is an issue of fact to be decided by a jury.
Evidence was presented to the trial court that most people do not know the danger that rip currents pose, that the presence of rip currents is not obvious to the untrained observer, and that people tend to enter the water where a rip current exists because the water looks calmer than the surrounding area. Further, on the day that the decedents were killed, the City's lifeguard at the 21st Street beach identified rip currents at that location and posted a warning flag. Thus, the City warned beachgoers at a nearby location of a known dangerous condition while neglecting to similarly warn beachgoers at the 29th Street beach where the same condition existed. Considering the evidence in the record, the question of the City's actual or imputed knowledge regarding rip currents at the 29th Street beach area raises genuine issues of material fact not properly decided as a matter of law.
CONCLUSION
We hold that based on the undisputed facts, the City controls the beach area and was operating a public swimming area at the 29th Street location at the time of the accident. Thus, the City had a duty of care to warn of dangers that were known or should have been known, and is not shielded from liability as a matter of law based on sovereign immunity. We expressly do not decide the issues of whether the City knew or should have known of the rip currents at the 29th Street location on the day the decedents drowned or whether the City breached its duty of care to the decedents. Nor do we decide any issues regarding causation or damages. We quash the Third District's decision in Po-leyeff II and remand for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
ANSTEAD, LEWIS, and QUINCE, JJ., concur.
LEWIS, J., concurs with an opinion, in which PARIENTE, C.J., and ANSTEAD, J., concur.
WELLS, J., dissents with an opinion, in which CANTERO, and BELL, JJ., concur.
. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const.
. The Legislature has set a cap on damages recoverable from a governmental entity at $100,000 per person and $200,000 per accident. See § 768.28(5), Fla. Stat. (2004). So, although a judgment may be obtained for a larger amount, the statutory caps make it impossible, absent a special claims bill passed by the Legislature, for a claimant to collect more than the caps provide.
. This is the duty an owner or controller of property owes an invitee. See Garcia, 753 So.2d at 75. An invitee "is a licensee on the premises by invitation, either express or reasonably implied, of the owner or controller of the property." Barrio v. City of Miami Beach, 698 So.2d 1241, 1243 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997).
. We have distinguished between a governmental entity's "planning-level" activities, which are immune from suit, and a governmental entity's "operational-level" activities, which are subject to traditional tort liability. See Commercial Carrier Corp. v. Indian River County, 371 So.2d 1010, 1021 (Fla.1979).
. Although an operator of a swimming area also generally has a duty to keep the premises in a reasonably safe condition, see Garcia, 753 So.2d at 75, we conclude that this applies only to the extent the premises are improved or maintained by the operator. An operator cannot be charged with keeping an unaltered natural body of water "safe" because a natural body of water contains inherent natural hazards. The natural character of a hazard does not, however, relieve the operator of the duty to warn if it knew or should have known the hazard was present.