Case Name: THE STATE ex rel. C. G. GILMAN et al. v. W. R. ROBERTSON et al., Judges of Springfield Court of Appeals
Court: Supreme Court of Missouri
Jurisdiction: Missouri
Decision Date: 1915-04-02
Citations: 264 Mo. 661
Docket Number: 
Parties: THE STATE ex rel. C. G. GILMAN et al. v. W. R. ROBERTSON et al., Judges of Springfield Court of Appeals.
Judges: Broivn, J., concurs in result; Graves, Walker, Baris and Blair, JJ., concur in result in a separate opinion by Grcuves, J.; Bond, J., dissents in an opinion filed.
Reporter: Missouri Reports
Volume: 264
Pages: 661–693

Head Matter:
THE STATE ex rel. C. G. GILMAN et al. v. W. R. ROBERTSON et al., Judges of Springfield Court of Appeals.
In Banc,
April 2, 1915.
1. REVIEW OF ERROR OF COURT OF APPEALS: Certiorari. The Supreme Court has power to review upon certiorari errors (not the jurisdiction) of a Court of Appeals. It has power by such writ to quash the opinion of a Court of Appeals in a case over which it has appellate jurisdiction, in which that court has failed to follow the last previous ruling of the Supreme Court in “any question of law or equity.”
2. -: -: Matters of Jurisdiction and Error. Section 3 of article 6 of the Constitution, declaring that “the Supreme Court shall have a general superintending control over all inferior courts” and “shall have power to issue writs of habeas corpus, mandamus, quo warranto, certiorari and other original remedial writs, and to hear and determine the same,” and sec-’ tion 6 of the Amendment of 1884, declaring that “the last previous rulings of the Supreme Court on any question of law or equity shall, in all cases, be controlling authority in said Courts of Appeals” and section 8 of said amendment, declaring “the Supreme Court shall have superintending control over the Courts of Appeals by mandamus, prohibition and certiorari,” should all be read together and considered as rounding out the judicial system created by the Constitution, of which it clearly maltes the Supreme Court the head; and under them, if a Court of Appeals refuses to assume its constitutional jurisdiction, the Supreme Court by mandamus can compel it to exercise it; if it exceeds its constitutional jurisdiction, the Supreme Court by its writ of prohibition can restrain and confine it within its jurisdictional lines; and if it refuses to follow “the last previous rulings of the Supreme Court,” which in effect would be to transgress the lines of its constitutional jurisdiction, that court by its writ of certiorari can quash its record (including its opinion, which is a part • of its record). A refusal to follow the last previous rulings of the Supreme Court is not a mere matter of error, but in its essence and effect is to exceed its jurisdiction, for which certiorari is an appropriate remedy.
MM, by BOND, X, dissenting, that the Supreme Court cannot by its writ of certiorari quash the record (including the opinion) of a Court of Appeals on the ground that its decision ■is in conflict with the last previous ruling of the Supreme-Court; that the writ cannot be used as a substitute for •an appeal or writ of error, and the Constitution vests in a Court of Appeals jurisdiction in certain cases, and makes its decision therein final; that jurisdiction means power to decide, and power to decide includes power to determine whether or not its decision is in conflict with the last pre- , vious rulings of the Supreme Court; and it would be illogical and contradictory to rule that the Supreme Court has' power by certiorari to quash the opinion of a Court of' Appeals when it is in conflict with the last previous rulings of the Supreme Court and not power to quash such opinion when no such conflict exists; and section 6 of the Amendment of 1884 clearly gives to the judges of a Court of Appeals power to determine whether or not its decision is in conflict with the last previous decision of the Supreme-Court, or of a decision of another Court of Appeals, and if' they or any judge of said court, conceive there is such conflict, the case is required to be certified to the Supreme-Court, but if they are of the opinion no such conflict exists it is mere error in decision, and does not impair their constitutional jurisdiction to make a final decision in-the case.
3. -: -: Untimely Filing, of Transcript: Duty of Clerk-It is not the duty of the clerk of the trial court to file in the-proper Court of Appeals a certified copy of the judgment and order of appeal in a -case falling within its jurisdiction, but that duty rests upon appellant; and if it is not filed within the time prescribed by the statute, said appellate court is authorized' to affirm or dismiss, and such action is not in conflict with the last previous ruling of the Supreme Court, and will not be disturbed by writ of certiorari.
Certiorari.
Writ quashed.
M. R. Lively for relators.
(1) Certiorari is proper procedure. State v. Smith, 176 Mo. 90; State ex rel. v, Edwards, 104 Mo. 125; State ex rel. v. Shelton, 154 Mo. 670; State ex rel. v. Guinnotte, 156 Mo. 513; State ex rel. v. Broaddus, 238 Mo. 189; Curtis v. Sexton, 252 Mo. 221. The peti tion is sufficient in all of its allegations. Certiorari is proper procedure and writ will be granted where exigencies of the case are such that a total or partial failure of justice may'result. State ex rel. v. Guinnotte, 156 Mo. 513. Certiorari is properly granted in all cases where an inferior tribunal is alleged to have exceeded its proper jurisdiction, or is otherwise acting illegally, where there is no plain, speedy and adequate remedy. State ex rel. v. Guinnotte, 156 Mo. 513; Witherall v. Shupe, 109 Pa. St. 391; Bob v. State, 2 Yeager, 176. The petition contains every allegation necessary to authorize the relief prayed for; and the adjudication by this court of all matters complained of. Railroad v. Smith, 154 Mo. 308. Writ of error will not lie from affirmance of judgment of circuit court for failure to prosecute appeal; the judgment is final. Brummitt v. Phillips, 79 Mo. App. 116. (2) Motion to continue was timely; the judge’s certificate sufficient. It was mandatory on the court to continue the cause. The court had jurisdiction for that purpose; continuance was denied. .The proceeding was illegal; in excess of jurisdiction, and an unlawful exercise of jurisdiction ; and in conflict with an express statute of this State, to-wit,. section 2029, Laws 1911, and in conflict with decisions of this court in Curtis v. Sexton, 252 Mo. 221; State ex rel. v.' Broaddus, 238 Mo. 189. Section 2029, Laws 1911, provides, that “if for any reason the bill of exceptions cannot be allowed and filed within the time above provided, then the judge before whom said cause was tried shall certify in writing such fact to the appellate court in which the appeal is pending, and such appellate court shall re-set or continue such case for a sufficient time in which to enable said bill of exceptions to be allowed and filed,” and further “hereafter no case, now or hereafter pending in any appellate court, shall be affirmed for failure to file bill of exceptions within the time allowed by the trial court, but such case may be- affirmed for failure' to file bill of ex ceptions within the time in this section provided if error do not appear in the record of the case. ’ ’ The case at issue is clearly within this section of the statute, and the action of the court was in violation of that statute'. (3) Respondent’s motion to affirm judgment of the circuit court, filed in the Springfield Court of appeals, does not state facts sufficient to authorize an affirmance of the judgment under Sec. 2029, Laws 1911; and the order affirming the judgment on the motion filed is in conflict with said statute, and in conflict with Curtis v. Sexton, 252 Mo. 221. Respondent’s motion to affirm does not state facts sufficient to authorize the affirmance of the judgment under Sec. 2047, R. S. 1909, for the reason the petition and the records show that respondent in the Springfield Court of Appeals did not produce in court the certificate of the clerk of the court in which the appeal was granted, stating therein the title of the cause, the date and amount of the judgment appealed from, against whom the same was rendered, the name of the party in whose favor the appeal was granted, and the time when the appeal was granted, as a basis for such motion; and said motion did not allege that the clerk had notified Appellants or their attorney of record of the completion of the transcript in time to have' enabled them to have the same filed in the appellate court at an' earlier date, and the respondents, by making an order affirming said judgment on said motion, proceeded illegally, in excess of jurisdiction, and an unlAwful exercise of jurisdiction, and in violation of said section 2047; and in conflict with the decisions of this court in Estey v. Post, 76 Mo. 412; Caldwell v. Hawkins, 46 Mo. 263; Land & Inv. Co. v. Martin, 125 Mo.’117; and said action was in violation of Sec. 2029, Laws 1911. (4) The proceedings of the respondents in affirming said judgment' is in violation of Sec. 2047; R. S. 1909, for the reason the motion does not allege that the clerk of the circuit court notified appellants, or their attorney of record of the completion of the transcript at any time, which must be alleged and affirmatively shown by the motion. Said section provides: “And the court shall affirm the judgment unless good cause to the contrary be shown; and the failure of the clerk to notify the appellants, or his attorney of record, of the completion of the transcript in time to enable him to have the same filed in the appellate court in the time required by law, shall be considered and is hereby declared to be good cause for refusing to affirm the judgment of the lower court 'on such motion.” The statute is mandatory on the clerk to notify appellants, or their attorney of record, of the completion of the transcript; and mandatory on the court to overrule the motion to affirm for failure to prosecute with diligence as alleged in this motion, unless the motion affirmatively shows notice by the clerk; and the clerk has not discharged his official duty until notice is served; and the statute does not leave that question to the discretion of the court; and said proceeding was in conflict with Sec. 2047, R. S. 1909, for that reason; and in conflict with Dare v. Smith, 59 Mo. App. 52; and Land & Inv. Co. v. Martin, 125 Mo. 117. (5) Sec. 2053, R. S. 1909, is mandatory on the clerk “to without delay make out and send to the clerk’ of the appellate court a short form of transcript.” He cannot wait for appellants ’ order. Appellants can only order a complete transcript of the record. This statute becomes operative and in effect as soon as an appeal is granted. The failure of the clerk to discharge his statutory duty will not defeat an appeal; and appellants will not be in default or guilty of negligence in prosecuting their appeal by reason of the clerk’s failure to discharge his statutory duty, as in this case. The petition alleges, and the record shows, the appellants were diligent in having the transcript filed promptly when made out by the clerk. It was made September 21, 1914; filed- September 22, 1914, and the same was in time and constituted dili genee as a matter of law. The petition alleges, and the record shows, appellants made an order on the clerk June 3, 1914, to make out a short form of transcript in said canse. But the statute demanded that without order. The order could not effect the clerk’s duty under the statute, and would not cause the clerk to act and discharge his statutory duty under said section. Section 2047, as amended in 1891, by adding the clause, “and the failure of the clerk to notify the appellant, or his attorney of record, of the completion of the transcript in time to enable him to have the same filed in the appellate court in the time required by law, shall be considered and is hereby declared to be good cause for refusing to affirm the judgment of the lower court on such motion ’ ’ makes it the official duty of the clerk to notify appellants, or their attorney of record, when the transcript is made out and sent to the appellate court. The motion does not allegé such notice. The petition alleges, and the record shows, the clerk did not notify appellants, or their attorney, and discharge his official and statutory duty. The clerk’s duty would then have been discharged, but not until then. Sec. 2047, R. S. 1909; Dare v. Smith, 59 Mo. App. 52; Land & Investment Co. v. Martin, 125 Mo. 117. (6) Sec. 2048, R. S. 1909 provides “the appellant shall cause to be filed in the office of the appellate court in cases of appeals, fifteen days before the first day of the term of such court, a perfect transcript, or in lieu thereof, a certified copy of the record entries, etc., with order granting appeal.” Relators could act under this statute and cause a transcript to be filed only after the clerk had made out same. But if the clerk failed to discharge his duty, as provided in Sec. 2053, R. S. 1909, and failed to make out such transcript, short form .or complete, appellant could not cause it to be filed in the office of the appellate court; and the appellants or their attorney of record could not know that such transcript, short form or complete, had been made out until noti lied by the clerk of such fact, as required by Sec. 2047, R. S. 1909.
R. A. Mooneyham and Frank L. Forlow for respondents ; W. M. Williams, Kendall B. Randolph, E. P. *Garnett, Atwood & Hill and Park & Brown of counsel.
(1) Certiorari is not proper under the facts in this case and this court is without jurisdiction. Britton v. Steber, 62 Mo-. 370; In re Garesche, 85 Mo. 469; State ex rel. v. Phillips, 96 Mo. 570; State ex rel. v. Court ■of Appeals, 99 Mo. 216; State ex rel. v. Court of Appeals, 101 Mo. 174; State ex rel. v. Smith, 104 Mo. 419; State ex rel. v. Smith, 105 Mo. 6; State ex rel. v. Rombauer, 125 Mo. 632; State ex rel. v. Smith, 129 Mo. 585; State ex rel. v. Rombauer, 140 Mo. 121; Smith v. Railroad, 143 Mo. 33; Schaffer v. Railroad, 144 Mo. 170; Hess v. Gang, 145 Mo. 54; Railroad v. Smith, 154 Mo. 300; Bradley v. Ins. Co., 163 Mo. 553; State ex rel. v. Smith, 173 Mo. 399; State ex rel. v. Smith, 176 Mo. -90; Wilden v. McAllister, 178 Mo. 732; Clark v. Railroad, 179 Mo. 66; Manning v. Smith, 188 Mo. 167; Sublet! y. Railroad, 198 Mo. 190; State ex rel. v. Broad■dus, 207 Mo. 107; Houck v. Water Works Co., 215 Mo. 475; State ex rel. v. Broaddus, 245 Mo. 136; In re Brick, 252 Mo. 323. (2) The law is well settled that it is the •duty of appellant (not the clerk as contended by relators) to see that the transcript of the record is made and filed, and he has no right to rely on the clerk of the circuit court to perform that duty. McCafferty v. Railroad, 31 Mo. App. 340; Barnes v. Winn, 31 Mo. App. 487; Caldwell v. Hawkins, 46 Mo. 263; State v. Caldwell, 21 Mo. App. 645; State v. Dempsey, 168 Mo. App. .300; R. S. 1909, secs. 2047, 2048; Rule 28, Supreme Court, adopted October term, 1909. (3) Sec. 2047, R. S. 1909, requires appellants to file a certificate of judgment and order granting an appeal fifteen days before the first day of return term of the appellate court.- Sec. 2048, R. S. 1909 ■ Crawford v. Railroad, 171 Mo. 77; State-ex rel. v. Gibson, 187 Mo. 558; Rule 16, Springfield Court of Appeals. Where appellant fails to prosecute his appeal as required by law the judgment will be afifirmed. R. S. 1909, sec. 2047; Crawford v. Railroad, 171 Mo. 68; Long v. Hawkins, 178 Mo. 103; Rules 16 and 26, Springfield Court of Appeals. “The mere fact that the appellant has on file or presents a copy of the transcript at the time such motion [to affirm] is made shall not of itself be deemed good cause within the meaning of said law.” Rule 26, Spring-field Court of Appeals. (4) The cases of Estey v. Post, 76 Mo. 412,, Caldwell v. Plawkins, 46 Mo. 263, and Land & Investment Co. v. Martin, 125 Mo. 117, were all decided prior to the adoption of rule 28 of the Supreme Court and! do not apply in any way to the case at bar.

Opinion:
WOODSON, C. J.
This is an original proceeding-instituted in this court praying for a writ of certiorari to review the record of the Springfield Court of Appeals, in the case of Nick Gooch, respondent, v. C. G. Gilman, O. B. McKnight, H. C. McElhaney, Bart Morrow and C. W. McAbee, appellants, relators here, and asking that the judgment of the Springfield Court of' Appeals be quashed, etc.
The facts as here presented are few and undisputed.
On the 2nd day of May, 1914, Nick Gooch recovered a judgment for $1406 against the relators in the-circuit court of Jasper county. The defendants there,, the relators here, took an appeal to the Springfield Court of Appeals, but failed, as counsel for respondents here contend, to file in that court a certified copy of the judgment and order granting the appeal; also failed to pay the $10 docket fee in the appellate court.
On October 5, 1914, the October term of the Court of Appeals convened; and on September 22, 1914, the: respondent Gooch filed in that court a motion to affirm the judgment of the circuit court. Notice of said motion was duly served upon the appellants there, the relators here. On the same day, the appellants there, the relators here, caused to be filed in the Court of Appeals a certified copy of the judgment of the circuit court, and of the order granting the appeal. On September 29th of the same year the relators here made application for a continuance and thereafter, on the 12th day of October, 1914, the Court of Appeals sustained the respondent's (Gooch's) motion to affirm the judgment of the circuit court.
On the. 20th day of October, same year, relators here filed in the Court of Appeals, a motion for a rehearing, which was by that court overruled, and thereupon the relators filed in this court their petition for a writ of certiorari, which was duly issued and returnable to the present January call of this court.
I. The facts of this case, as previously stated, are undisputed-, and upon those facts there are here presented but two legal propositions for determination, namely:
First: Has this court the constitutional power or authority to review the errors (not the jurisdiction) of the various Courts of Appeals of the ex x • , n , • -mi otate, upon writs of certiorari? and second: If so, did the Springfield Court of Appeals correctly dispose of the case of Gooch, respondent, v. C. G. Gilman et al., appellants, pending in that court, according to the last rulings of this court?
Attending the first: This question is like Banquo's ghost, it seems as though it will not down, and is being continually presented here for reconsideration, ever •since the ruling of this court in the cases of State ex rel. v. Broaddus, 238 Mo. 189, and Curtis v. Sexton, 252 Mo. 221, overruling a long list of opinions delivered by this court, covering a period of more than a quarter of a century.
While I have not changed my opinion as regards the soundness of the law as announced in the earlier cases, nor as to the unsoundness of the rule announced in the cases just mentioned, however, since the court adheres to the latter doctrine, it seems to me that it is exceedingly unwise to have this question continually agitated in this court.
The fundamental principles of jurisprudence and the rules of procedure should remain firm and unchangeable, except by legislative enactment, for there is nothing which subjects the courts of the country to more just criticism than instability and vacillation in the rulings regarding their jurisdiction and power and authority, as well as to the rides of procedure.
After these years of acquiescence to the new rule by a majority of the members of the court, at this late date to overturn the present rulings upon this question and return to the former doctrine, would in my opinion be as unwise as the record of this court for the last few years clearly shows the former change was unwise and harmful to jurisprudence.
But since the bench and bar and counsel and litigants have readjusted themselves to the new procedure, a change back to the old rule would, to say the least, produce as much evil as good, if not more, and raise a new conflict in the ordinary administration of justice, which would take years to settle and to restore confidence in the stability of the courts, and the proper administration of the law.
For the reasons stated I am of the opinion that it would, at this late day, be unwise to again change front upon this all-important question; and I am therefore of the opinion that later rulings should be adhered to.
II. Returning to the second proposition presented for determination, namely, whose duty is it to file the transcript of the record of a judgment of the circuit court in the appellate court when an appeal is taken, that of appellant or that of the clerk of the circuit court?
This court has repeatedly held that that duty rests upon the appellant and that he cannot shift it upon the clerk. [Caldwell v. Hawkins, 46 Mo. 263; State v. Dempsey, 168 Mo. App. l. c. 300; Secs. 2047, 2048 and 2049, R. S. 1909; Rule 28, Supreme Court, Oct. 1909; Crawford v. Railroad, 171 Mo. 68, l. c. 77; State ex rel. v. Gibson, 187 Mo. 536, l. c. 558.]
That being true, and the record showing that he did not perform that duty within the time prescribed by the statutes and rules of this court, we are of the opinion that the Springfield Court of Appeals properly dismissed the appeal.
We are therefore of the opinion that the writ of certiorari heretofore issued by this court was improvidently done, and for that reason should be quashed; and it is so ordered.
Broivn, J., concurs in result; Graves, Walker, Baris and Blair, JJ., concur in result in a separate opinion by Grcuves, J.; Bond, J., dissents in an opinion filed.