Case Name: PEOPLE v. LaLONE
Court: Michigan Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1989-03-30
Citations: 432 Mich. 103
Docket Number: Docket No. 79221
Parties: PEOPLE v LaLONE
Judges: Riley, C.J., and Griffin, J., concurred with Brickley, J.
Reporter: Michigan Reports
Volume: 432
Pages: 103–156

Head Matter:
PEOPLE v LaLONE
Docket No. 79221.
Argued March 8, 1988
(Calendar No. 3).
Decided March 30, 1989.
Rehearing denied post, 1236.
Daniel J. LaLone was convicted by a jury in the Clinton Circuit Court, Randy L. Tahvonen, J., of first-degree criminal sexual conduct. The complainant is his stepdaughter. The Court of Appeals, Cynar, P.J., and R. B. Burns and O’Brien, JJ., affirmed in an unpublished opinion per curiam (Docket No. 84966). The defendant appeals, alleging that the exclusion by the trial court under the rape-shield statute and MRE 404(a)(3) of the complainant’s sexual history with third parties violated his Sixth Amendment right of confrontation, that the rule of evidence supersedes the rape-shield statute, and that admission by the trial court under the medical treatment and diagnosis exception to the hearsay rule of a psychologist’s testimony recounting the complainant’s allegations of sexual abuse was improper.
The Supreme Court held:
—The exclusion of evidence of the complainant’s sexual history was not violative of his Sixth Amendment right of confrontation.
—Leave was improvidently granted on the issue whether MRE 404(a)(3) supersedes the rape-shield statute.
—The admission of hearsay statements of the complainant’s allegations in the psychologist’s testimony was error.
—The case is reversed and remanded for a new trial.
Justice Brickley, joined by Chief Justice Riley and Justice Griffin, stated that the exclusion of the evidence regarding the complainant’s sexual history did not violate the rape-shield statute or the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right of confrontation. However, the admission of hearsay statements of the complainant’s allegations in the psychologist’s testimony was error, requiring reversal and remand for a new trial.
1. The rape-shield statute, MCL 750.520j(l); MSA 28.788(10)(1), excludes all evidence of a complainant’s sexual history regardless of the purpose for which it is introduced unless it falls within an exception enumerated in the statute and is found to be more probative than prejudicial. The focus in a criminal sexual conduct prosecution is on the merits of the accused’s guilt or innocence, rather than the victim’s sexual behavior, because, in the overwhelming majority of such prosecutions, the complainant’s sexual conduct with parties other than the defendant is neither an accurate measure of the complainant’s veracity nor determinative of the likelihood of consensual sexual relations with the defendant. The exclusion of such evidence under the rape-shield statute may violate a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right of confrontation where the evidence is offered for the narrow purpose of showing a complaining witness’ bias, or where such conduct may be probative of a complainant’s ulterior motive for making a false charge. In this case, the evidence proffered by the defendant does not fall within the exceptions enumerated in the statute.
2. The Sixth Amendment right of confrontation rests upon an accused’s ability to cross-examine a particular witness in a fashion which effects an accurate perception of the witness by the trier of fact. While the discovery of any witness’ bias is relevant, a trial court may limit the means by which such bias is determined on cross-examination. A party is guaranteed an opportunity for effective cross-examination, not cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might wish. To determine whether a defendant was denied the opportunity for effective cross-examination, it is necessary to decide whether the exclusion of the evidence proffered for the purpose of showing a witness’ bias or motive to fabricate rises to the level of constitutional error. If constitutional error is present in fact it must be proved to be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. In this case, because the defendant was not precluded from introducing significant nonsexual evidence from which the complainant’s bias could be inferred, the exclusion of her sexual history was not error violative of the defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights. Even if the exclusion were determined to be error, in light of the matters brought out on cross-examination, its effect upon the verdict was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
3. MRE 803(4) provides for the admission of statements made by a victim for the purposes of medical treatment or diagnosis which describe the victim’s medical history or past or present symptoms, pain, or sensations, or the inception or general character of the cause or external source of an injury, reasonably necessary for such diagnosis or treatment. A declarant’s identification of the person responsible for the declarant’s condition may not be admitted under MRE 803(4). Although a patient’s assertion of the identity of an assailant may be relevant to psychological treatment, it has not been shown that the reliability of such statements reaches the level necessary to fall within MRE 803(4). In this case, it is not clear that the actual reason for the meeting between the complainant and the psychologist was in connection with treatment. The complainant had already made accusations against the defendant and was aware that a case against him was being prepared. Thus, the meeting did not have the same measure of reliability as a normal therapy session. The statements of the psychologist did not fall within the literal or the intended purpose of MRE 803(4), and their admission was error.
Justice Archer, concurring in part and dissenting in part, stated that under the facts of the case, the defendant’s inability to cross-examine the complainant concerning her alleged sexual behavior with third parties for the purpose of showing bias and a motive to fabricate did not violate the defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights of confrontation and effective cross-examination; the rape-shield statute is superseded by MRE 404(a)(3) pursuant to the rule-making authority of the Supreme Court under Const 1963, art 6, § 5; and the psychologist’s hearsay testimony was properly admitted under MRE 803(4).
1. The rape-shield statute, MCL 750.520j(l); MSA 28.788(10X1), excludes all evidence of a complainant’s sexual history regardless of the purpose for which it is introduced unless it falls within an exception enumerated in the statute and is found to be more probative than prejudicial. The focus in a criminal sexual conduct prosecution is on the merits of the accused’s guilt or innocence, rather than the victim’s sexual behavior, because, in the overwhelming majority of such prosecutions, the complainant’s sexual conduct with parties other than the defendant is neither an accurate measure of the complainant’s veracity nor determinative of the likelihood of consensual sexual relations with the defendant. The exclusion of such evidence under the rape-shield statute may violate a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right of confrontation where the evidence is offered for the narrow purpose of showing a complaining witness’ bias, or where such conduct may be probative of a complainant’s ulterior motive for making a false charge.
2. The Sixth Amendment right of confrontation rests upon an accused’s ability to cross-examine a particular witness in a fashion which effects an accurate perception of the witness by the trier of fact. While the discovery of any witness’ bias is relevant, a trial court may limit the means by which such bias is determined on cross-examination. A party is guaranteed an opportunity for effective cross-examination, not cross-examina tion that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might wish. To determine whether a defendant was denied the opportunity for effective cross-examination, it is necessary to decide whether the exclusion of the evidence proffered for the purpose of showing a witness’ bias or motive to fabricate rises to the level of constitutional error. If constitutional error is present in fact it must be proved not to be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. In this case, because the defendant was not precluded from introducing significant nonsexual evidence from which the complainant’s bias could be inferred, the exclusion of her sexual history was not error violative of the defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights. Even if the exclusion were determined to be error, in light of the matters brought out on cross-examination, its effect upon the verdict was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Likewise, the exclusion of the defendant’s proffered evidence under MRE 404(a)(3) did not violate the defendant’s right of confrontation.
3. MRE 404(a)(3) supersedes the rape-shield statute. Under the Michigan Constitution, where any rule of practice set forth by statute conflicts with a rule of practice adopted by the Supreme Court, it remains in effect only until it is superseded by a court rule promulgated by the Supreme Court. Because the provisions of MRE 404(a)(3) are at odds with those of the rape-shield statute, the evidentiary rule must be found to supersede the statute and to control in all subsequent prosecutions of criminal sexual conduct.
4. MRE 803(4), the medical diagnosis and treatment exception to the hearsay rule, is applicable in this case. Statements by a declarant need not be made only to a physician. The focus of the exception is on the declarant’s motivation in making the statement, rather than on to whom the statement was made. In determining whether a sexual-assault victim’s statements are reasonably pertinent to diagnosis and treatment, the declarant’s motive in making the statements must be consistent with treatment and diagnosis, and the statements must be shown to be those which would be reasonably relied upon in formulating treatment and diagnosis. Although ordinarily the identification of a sexual-assault victim’s assailant would be inadmissible under MRE 803(4), in instances of parental sexual abuse, such as this case, the nature of the abuse, the relationship between the parties, and the complainant’s age at the time the alleged assaults began, and her awareness of the purpose of the evaluation all support the conclusion that the statements concerning the assaults and the identification of the defendant as the perpetrator were reasonably necessary for diagnosis and treatment.
Justice Boyle, concurring, agreed with Justice Brickley that leave was improvidently granted with regard to whether MRE 404(a)(3) supersedes the rape-shield statute, and with Justice Archer as to parts i and m of his opinion.
Justice Levin, joined by Justice Cavanagh, stated that while the case should be reversed and remanded for a new trial because of the psychologist’s testimony relating hearsay statements, upon retrial the evidence of the conflict between the defendant and the complainant concerning her efforts to have sexual relationships with teenage boys should be admitted because a reasonable jury might have received a significantly different impression of the complainant’s credibility had it been introduced to show bias or a motive to fabricate.
Reversed and remanded.
Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Louis J. Caruso, Solicitor General, Jon Newman, Prosecuting Attorney, and Mary C. Pino, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for the people.
State Appellate Defender (by Herb Jordan) for the defendant.

Opinion:
Brickley, J.
Defendant was convicted of first-degree criminal sexual conduct, MCL 750.520b(l)(b); MSA 28.788(2)(l)(b). The Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction in an unpublished per curiam opinion. Defendant appealed in this Court, and we granted leave to consider the following issues: 1) whether the proposed testimony and cross-examination concerning the complainant's sexual contact with a third person were properly excluded under the rape-shield statute, MCL 750.520j(l); MSA 28.788(10X1); 2) whether the proposed testimony and cross-examination concerning the complainant's sexual contact with a third person were properly excluded under MRE 404(a)(3) and whether MRE 404(a)(3) supersedes the rape-shield statute; and 3) whether the trial court erred by admitting, under MRE 803(4), the medical diagnosis and treatment exception to the hearsay rule, a psychologist's hearsay testimony that complainant named the defendant as her assailant.
i
The facts of this case are set forth in Justice Archer's opinion.
ii
We conclude, for the reasons set forth in sections i(A) and i(b) of Justice Archer's opinion, that the exclusion of evidence of complainant's sexual history did not violate either the rape-shield statute or the defendant's Sixth Amendment right of confrontation.
We do not, however, address whether MRE 404(a)(3) supersedes the statute or whether the exclusion of the evidence of complainant's sexual history violates that rule. Rather, we determine that leave was improvidently granted as to those issues. At trial, defense counsel did not argue that admission was proper under the rule, and the trial judge did not base his rulings in limine on such a conflict. Moreover, the Court of Appeals did not address the claim, having not been asked to do so. While the issues are of significance, we conclude that we should not address them without a full record having been developed below.
hi
The trial court admitted testimony of Dr. Joan Jackson Johnson, the substance of which was the complainant's hearsay statements that she had been sexually abused by the defendant, her stepfather.
Hearsay is "a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted" and may only be admitted if provided for in an exception to the hearsay rule. People v Eady, 409 Mich 356; 294 NW2d 202 (1980). MRE 803(4) provides for admission of
[statements made for purposes of medical treatment or medical diagnosis in connection with treatment and describing medical history, or past or present symptoms, pain, or sensations, or the inception or general character of the cause or external source thereof insofar as reasonably necessary to such diagnosis and treatment.
This Court has never had occasion to consider whether MRE 803(4) may serve as a basis for the admission of hearsay statements as to the identity of the perpetrator of a crime. Further, we have not considered its use where the witness is a psychologist.
A psychologist treats mental and emotional disorders rather than physical ones. Lying to one's health care provider about symptoms and their general causes would be detrimental to the patient, and it is, in part, for this reason that we permit the introduction of such hearsay statements. It is therefore fair to say that, while medical patients may fabricate descriptions of their complaints and the general character of the causes of these complaints, we would think it less likely that they will do so than psychological patients. In addition, although there are psychological tests, fabrications of physical complaints would seem to be far easier to discover through empirical tests than are fabrications which might be heard by an examining psychologist. Indeed, statements which are untrue, and which the examining psychologist knows to be untrue, may nevertheless serve as a basis for accurate diagnosis and treatment. Thus, statements made in the course of the treatment of psychological disorders may not always be as reliable as those made in the course of the treatment of physical disorders.
The introduction of hearsay statements such as those admitted in the instant case is of concern for a second reason. Not only are we less able to ascertain their reliability than those made to a medical doctor, but they identify the person who caused the declarant's pain. It has long been the rule that the declarant's naming of the person responsible for his condition may not be admitted pursuant to the hearsay exception described in MRE 803(4). Indeed, the common-law predecessor of MRE 803(4) was of an even more limiting nature. In an early case discussing that rule, this Court stated:
[Statements of pain and its locality] are admit ted only upon the ground that they are the . natural and ordinary accompaniments and expressions of suffering. It would be impossible in most cases to know of the existence or extent or character of pain without them. They are received therefore as acts rather than declarations, and admitted from necessity. The rule . . . has never been extended so as to include declarations . of the causes in the past of such suffering, so as to make such statements proof of the facts. Declarations concerning the past are narratives and not acts. [Grand Rapids & I R Co v Huntley, 38 Mich 537, 543-544 (1878).]
We do not suggest that the bounds of MRE 803 should be defined by its precodification common-law parallels. In fact, the exception defined in MRE 803(4) inarguably goes beyond that defined in common law because it permits the introduction of statements describing "past . . . symptoms, pain, or sensations, or the inception or general character of the cause or external source thereof . . . ." See also the committee note to MRE 803(4). However, while the drafters of the rule clearly intended to go beyond the common law, we do not believe that they intended that the victim's naming of her assailant should be considered a description of the "general character of the cause or external source" of an injury. To read the exception to provide for such hearsay, particularly in the context of psychological treatment, would clearly broaden the nature of the exception beyond the scope intended by its drafters.
The recent trend to broaden this hearsay exception rests primarily on two decisions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. In United States v Iron Shell, 633 F2d 77 (CA 8, 1980), the court held that the testimony of a physician who examined a nine-year-old victim of a sexual assault could be admitted even though it contained a repetition of the complainant's description of the general cause of her injury, i.e., a sexual assault. The testimony did not include the complainant's naming of the defendant as her assailant. In admitting this testimony, the Iron Shell panel defined a two-pronged test for admission of hearsay evidence pursuant to FRE 803(4). First, the declarant's motive in making the statement must be consistent with the purposes of the rule, i.e., the promotion of treatment. Second, the content of the statement must have been of the type reasonably relied upon by a physician in diagnosis or treatment. Id., p 84. In Iron Shell, the admitted hearsay involved only the occurrence and nature of the attack. No attempt was made to introduce the identity of the assailant. Indeed, the Iron Shell court, supra at 85, cited United States v Nick, 604 F2d 1199, 1201-1202 (CA 9, 1979), and noted that in Nick
the examining physician was allowed under rule 803(4) to repeat the child's description of the assault including the victim's statements concerning the cause of the injury while omitting any comments about the identity of the assailant. [Emphasis supplied.]
In addition, the complainant was treated by a physician immediately after the rape, and the fact that she had been raped was physically confirmed.
While Iron Shell kept within the bounds of the language of the rule by admitting hearsay testimony describing only the general nature of the cause of complainant's injury, the Eighth Circuit later used the Iron Shell test to significantly expand the scope of the hearsay exception in United States v Renville, 779 F2d 430 (CA 8, 1985). In Renville, the eleven-year-old complainant was examined by a physician who testified that the com plainant had told him that she had been subjected to repeated acts of sexual abuse by the defendant. In affirming the admission of the testimony, the panel held that cases of child sexual abuse fell outside the rule that the identity of the individual allegedly responsible for a declarant's injuries may not be revealed pursuant to FRE 803(4), since the knowledge that the assailant is a member of the same household is pertinent to the treatment required. The panel noted that child abuse involves more than physical injury and that proper psychological treatment requires knowledge of which member of the household was the abuser. The court also noted that a physician must take protective actions such as removing the child from the home upon learning that intrafamily child sexual abuse is occurring and that therefore the identity of the perpetrator is a fact "relied on" by the physician.
As we have just discussed, the identity of an assailant cannot fairly be characterized as the "general cause" of an injury. The Renville court did not address this difficulty in its analysis. Further, as we have already noted ante, the statements in this case were made to a psychologist rather than to a physician and this suggests that the statement by the victim in this case may be less reliable than a statement made to a physician. Thus, although we recognize that the patient's assertion of the identity of the assailant is relevant to psychological treatment, it has not been shown that the reliability of the complainant's statement reaches the level necessary to fall within MRE 803(4). In addition, we do not believe that a physician's reliance on the victim's statements in order to take protective action is of the sort envisioned by the drafters of MRE 803(4). The rule is most specific in limiting the exception to "medical treatment or medical diagnosis" or other information "necessary to such diagnosis or treatment." It did not leave room for speculation on hearsay which may indeed be reliable and useful for other kinds of treatment for the victim, such as security from further criminal activity. It is natural and appropriate that a psychologist or physician confronted with such accusations take immediate measures to protect the child even if it is not certain that actual abuse occurred. The determination as to the occurrence of abuse can be reevaluated after protective measures have been taken. In such a setting, it is likely that the nature of the psychologist's reliance on the statement for purposes of taking protective action is of a different and more readily found type than the reliance originally intended to suggest a sufficient level of reliability for admission as hearsay.
In addition, we note that the relevant Michigan rule is narrower than the federal rule construed in Renville. The federal rule permits the introduction of "[statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment," while the Michigan rule requires that the diagnosis be "in connection with treatment." The prosecution claims that complainant's hearsay statements were indeed made during the course of treatment. Defendant claims that the statements were made at a meeting between Dr. Jackson Johnson and complainant held pursuant to a probate court order that complainant and her accusations be evaluated by a psychologist. The record is not clear as to the actual impetus for that meeting. However, it is clear that complainant's September 23, 1983, meeting with Dr. Jackson Johnson occurred after she told police authorities that her stepfather had abused her and the investigation into the truth of those accusations had been initiated. While the precise nature of the September 23, 1983, meeting cannot be determined, it did not have the same measure of reliability as would even a normal psychological therapy session, since the complainant had already made the accusations and she was aware that a case against the defendant was being prepared. Defendant claims that the entire story was fabricated. If so, then surely once complainant had offered the story to the police, she would offer consistent statements to a psychologist.
We also note that Dr. Jackson Johnson testified at the motion in limine that the complainant's assertions to her regarding the identity of the assailant were reliable. While she did not so testify at trial, the concern arises whether we should enter into an area which may involve expert testimony on the credibility of a complainant's allegations. Such testimony might violate other rules of evidence. See State v Aguallo, 318 NC 590, 598-599; 350 SE2d 76 (1986). In addition, the purpose of hearsay exceptions is to permit the introduction of such statements where they possess a sufficient inherent degree of reliability. If, in laying the foundation for admission of a hearsay statement the offering party must provide expert testimony that the hearsay is reliable, then the very basis for the hearsay exception is undercut.
For all these reasons, we conclude that the hearsay statements testified to by Dr. Jackson Johnson do not fall within either the literal or intended purpose of MRE 803(4) and therefore were erroneously admitted. In doing so, we recognize that no court has fully rejected the Renville analysis, although some have disagreed as to its scope and application. However, most of the courts which have adopted the Renville analysis have done so merely by citation of that case and the Iron Shell test without any analysis as to the application of that test to this situation.
The outcome of a child sexual abuse case is often decided by a credibility contest. The narrow and specific wording of MRE 803(4) represents an effort to balance the desire for additional evidence with the need to protect the accused from damaging hearsay. If indeed that balance needs to be shifted to allow nonmedical testimony describing statements of specific fault made after police investigations have begun, then it can best be done by amendment of the current rule. Through the amendment process, expert advice on various types of therapy and the reliability of statements made in the course of such therapies can be obtained and evaluated.
Thus, after a review of MRE 803(4), the facts of this case, and the Renville analysis, we are not satisfied that the hearsay testimony was of the type which MRE 803(4) was designed to admit. We therefore reverse defendant's conviction and remand the case for a new trial in which this evidence shall not be admitted.
Riley, C.J., and Griffin, J., concurred with Brickley, J.
Levin and Cavanagh, JJ. We concur in part iii.
People v LaLone, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, decided June 12, 1986 (Docket No. 84966).
428 Mich 885 (1987).
MRE 801(c).
We note that a psychologist does not provide "medical treatment." However, our holding lies not in a technical reading of the rule, but with broader concerns about the reliability of the hearsay statements.
As a general rule, all statements made in this context, regardless of their content, are relevant to diagnosis and treatment since experts in the field view everything related to the patient as relevant to his personality. [4 Weinstein & Berger, Evidence, ¶ 803(4)[01], p 803-150.]
[This hearsay exception] has never been held to apply to accusations of personal fault, either in a civil or criminal context. [United States v Narciso, 446 F Supp 252, 289 (ED Mich, 1977).]
The Iron Shell court emphasized that
[i]t is important to note that the statements concern what happened rather than who assaulted [the complainant]. The former in most cases is pertinent to diagnosis and treatment while the latter would seldom, if ever, be sufficiently related. [633 F2d 84. Emphasis added.]
Adoption of the Renville analysis would, in contrast to the intended narrow scope of Iron Shell, virtually assure that the identity of the assailant could always be admitted through hearsay testimony where the crime involves sexual abuse of a child.
Indeed, MCL 722.623; MSA 25.248(3) requires physicians, psychologists, and others to report to the Department of Social Services any instances of child abuse which they have "reasonable cause" to suspect. Failure to make such a report creates civil liability and is punishable as a misdemeanor. MCL 722.633; MSA 25.248(13).
See committee note (1) to MRE 803.
See Minnesota v Bellotti, 383 NW2d 308, 312 (Minn App, 1986) ("statements regarding who caused injuries generally are not admissible because they are irrelevant to medical diagnosis and treatment"); State v Nelson, 138 Wis 2d 418, 432; 406 NW2d 385 (1987) (applied Renville in light of the fact that "there is nothing in the record to indicate the [complainant's] motive in making the statements to [the psychologists] was other than as a patient seeking treatment"); Sluka v Alaska, 717 P2d 394, 399, n 3 (Alas App, 1986) (refused to apply Renville because the complainant had not testified nor been certified as unavailable and because there was nothing in the record to indicate that the complainant knew or understood that her statements identifying the defendant were important to her treatment); State v Mueller, 344 NW2d 262, 265 (Iowa App, 1983) (statement made to psychologist identifying the defendant as the assailant was inadmissible under hearsay exception where the young age of the child and the failure of its mother to assure reliable responses rendered the statements insufficiently reliable); State v Stafford, 317 NC 568; 346 SE2d 463 (1986) (statement identifying the assailant was inadmissible where made to a pediatrician only three days prior to trial and for purpose of preparing the state's case); State v Aguallo, 318 NC 590, 600; 350 SE2d 76 (1986) (Billings, C.J., dissenting, stated, "The visit to the physician's office was prompted not by the child's seeking either physical or psychological help necessitated by an act that occurred seven months earlier, but by adults' reaction to information that a criminal act had taken place").
The trial court in this case relied upon People v Wilkins, 134 Mich App 39; 349 NW2d 815 (1984), in admitting the testimony. While this decision preceded Renville, it provided essentially the same analysis and relied upon Iron Shell In re Freiburger, 153 Mich App 251; 395 NW2d 300 (1986), followed Wilkins, as did In re Rinesmith, 144 Mich App 475; 376 NW2d 139 (1985), although the latter involved a far more spontaneous type of statement by the victim. Other Court of Appeals opinions have cited Wilkins, but those cases did not involve statements identifying the defendant as the guilty party, e.g., People v Skinner, 153 Mich App 815; 396 NW2d 548 (1986); People v Zysk, 149 Mich App 452; 386 NW2d 213 (1986); People v Creith, 151 Mich App 217, 226-227; 390 NW2d 234 (1986).
We note that unlike the federal evidence rules, the Michigan hearsay exception does not provide a catchall exception.