Case Name: John WILDER, Petitioner, v. Gladys Williams WRIGHT and Colonial Penn Insurance Company, a corporation, Respondents
Court: Florida Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1973-05-02
Citations: 278 So. 2d 1
Docket Number: No. 43158
Parties: John WILDER, Petitioner, v. Gladys Williams WRIGHT and Colonial Penn Insurance Company, a corporation, Respondents.
Judges: CARLTON, C. J„ and McCAIN and DEKLE, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 278
Pages: 1–4

Head Matter:
John WILDER, Petitioner, v. Gladys Williams WRIGHT and Colonial Penn Insurance Company, a corporation, Respondents.
No. 43158.
Supreme Court of Florida.
May 2, 1973.
Rehearing Denied June 15, 1973.
George F. Wilsey, Fisher & Wilsey, St. Petersburg, for petitioner.
Stephen F. Myers, Shackleford, Farrior, Stallings & Evans, "lampa, for respondents.

Opinion:
ROBERTS, Justice.
This cause is before us on petition for writ of certiorari, buttressed by the District Court's certificate that in disposing of the case it had passed upon a question of great public interest. We have jurisdiction under Art. V., Section 3(b)(3), Florida Constitution, F.S.A.
An automobile collision occurred between a vehicle operated by petitioner and one by respondent, with both parties sustaining severe injuries. Petitioner filed suit against respondent and her insurance carrier to recover for injuries caused by respondent's alleged negligence in operating her vehicle. The insurance company did not deny the insurance coverage. Verdict was in favor of petitioner and against respondent and her insurance carrier.
In his complaint petitioner had alleged the existence of respondent's liability insurance policy written by Colonial Penn and claimed recovery from the carrier for an attorney's fee for petitioner's attorney based upon F.S. § 627.428 F.S.A. At the trial, petitioner filed his Motion to Tax Costs and for allowance of Attorney's fees. The amount of costs was stipulated and the parties also stipulated to the sum of $2,000.00 as being a reasonable fee for petitioner's attorney, contingent upon the Court thereafter allowing such fees as a matter of law. Thereafter, the Court rendered judgment on the jury verdict but denied petitioner's motion for allowance of attorney's fees, holding that F.S. Section 627.428 F.S.A. was not applicable to the • situation involved, whereupon the petitioner appealed to the District Court. The only point before that Court was whether or not, under § 627.428 and the above stated facts, petitioner was entitled to allowance of attorney's fees. The District Court, 269 So.2d 434, agreed with the trial court and affirmed.
F.S. Section 627.428 F.S.A. reads as follows :
"(1) Upon the rendition of a judgment or decree by any of the courts of this state against an insurer and in favor of an insured or the named beneficiary under a policy or contract executed by the insurer, the trial court, or, in the event of an appeal in which the insured or beneficiary prevails, the appellate court, shall adjudge or decree against the insurer and in favor of the insured or beneficiary a reasonable sum as fees or compensation for the insured's or beneficiary's attorney prosecuting the suit in which the recovery is had." (Emphasis supplied.)
The controlling question presented as stated by the District Court and certified to this court is:
Is a successful tort claimant entitled to attorney's fees under F.S. § 627.428, F. S.A. (formerly § 627.0127 F.S.) in a direct action on the issue of liability against the tort-feasor and her insurance carrier where the question of liability coverage is not an issue ?
This is a case of first impression in Florida, and for its resolution we must return to the basic principles set forth by this court in Shingleton v. Bussey, 223 So.2d 713 (Fla.1969), and subsequent cases.
Petitioner's basic argument is that the third party beneficiary rationale of Shingleton v. Bussey, supra, makes him a "named beneficiary" under § 627.428, Fla. Stat, F.S.A., and thus entitles him to attorney's fees in the initial action on the issue of liability. We disagree.
Petitioner cites Travelers Insurance Co. v. Tallahassee Bank & Trust Co., 133 So.2d 463 (1st DCA Fla.1961), Johnson v. Atlantic National Insurance Co., 163 So.2d 340 (3rd DCA Fla.1964) and Thompson v. Commercial Union Insurance Company of New York, 250 So.2d 259 (Fla.1971) in support of his position. However, the District Court correctly explained why those cases are inapplicable to the present situation. In each case the third party seeking attorney's fees was "standing in the shoes" of the insured under the policy. In that context, the claim was made in the name of the insured, not directly in the name of the third party. Here, the petitioner is ad mittedly seeking attorney's fees in his own right, claiming the statute as authority. There appeared to be no controversy between the insured and the insurance company.
It is clear to us that § 627.428, Fla.Stat., F.S.A., was intended to govern the relationship between the contracting parties to the insurance policy. While the injured party may become a third party beneficiary under the policy, as stated in Shingleton v. Bussey, supra, that third party may not automatically invoke all the provisions of the contract or statutes governing the rights and responsibilities flowing between insurer and insured.
Our decision in Shingleton v. Bussey extended the third party beneficiary doctrine to the insurance contract as it provides for the payment of damages for injuries for which the insured is liable. That decision cannot be read to allow the injured party to enforce any and every provision of law or of the insurance contract.
For example, the common provision in most policies requiring the insurance carrier to provide counsel for the insured in the event of a suit cannot be said to inure to the benefit of the injured third party. If the insurance carrier and the insured chose to ignore that provision, thereby allowing the insured to hire and use his own counsel to the exclusion of the carrier's counsel, the injured third party could not insist on the enforcement of that provision.
Likewise, the attorney fee provision of § 627.428 was not intended to benefit the party injured by the insured automobile, but as stated by the District Court:
"The purpose of the statute is to discourage contesting of valid claims of insureds against insurance companies . and to reimburse successful insureds reasonably for their outlays for attorney's fees when they are compelled to defend or to sue to enforce their contracts . . . . "
Accordingly, we approve the decision of the District Court of Appeal and the writ of certiorari heretofore issued is hereby
Discharged.
CARLTON, C. J" and McCAIN and DEKLE, JJ., concur.
ERVIN, J., dissents with Opinion.