Case Name: Charles WILLIAMS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 2003-05-23
Citations: 845 So. 2d 987
Docket Number: No. 1D01-3955
Parties: Charles WILLIAMS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: POLSTON, J., concurs, SMITH, LARRY G., Senior Judge, concurs in part and dissents in part.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 845
Pages: 987–991

Head Matter:
Charles WILLIAMS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. 1D01-3955.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
May 23, 2003.
Nancy A. Daniels, Public Defender, and Fred Parker Bingham, II, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
Charlie Crist, Attorney General, and Elizabeth Fletcher Duffy, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.

Opinion:
VAN NORTWICK, J.
Charles Williams appeals his judgment of conviction and sentence for sale or delivery of cocaine within 1000 feet of a child care facility, a violation of section 893.13(l)(c)l, Florida Statutes (2000). We reverse that portion of the sentence in which the trial court imposed a lump sum of costs without further explanation, and remand for further proceedings. We otherwise affirm the conviction and sentence.
With regard to the conviction, appellant has raised several issues, but only one merits discussion. At trial, appellant moved for a judgment of acquittal, arguing that the sign located in front of the child care facility in question was insufficient under the applicable statute to warrant a conviction. Section 893.13(l)(e)l provides that it is unlawful to sell, manufacture, or deliver a controlled substance in, on or within 1000 feet of the real property comprising a child care facility. This statute further provides:
This paragraph does not apply to a child care facility unless the owner or operator of the facility posts a sign that is not less than 2 square feet in size with a word legend identifying the facility as a licensed child care facility in a conspicuous place where the sign is reasonably visible to the public.
Id.
Appellant has not argued that the facility in question was not a licensed child care facility or that the facility's sign was of an insufficient size or was located in an inconspicuous place. Appellant argued below and argues on appeal that the wording of the sign did not meet the statutory requirement that the facility have a sign with "a word legend identifying the facility as a licensed child care facility."
The sign at issue included a drawing of a child and contained text that read:
Episcopal Children's Services Inc.
PECK
HEAD START CENTER
904-261-9010 LIC# 043777
The trial court summarily denied appellant's motion for a judgment of acquittal, as noted, and appellant timely renewed that motion, which was again denied. The appellant did not request a jury instruction regarding the language used on the sign; and the trial court did not specifically instruct the jury to consider the language employed on the sign. Appellant did not object to the instructions.
A motion for a judgment of acquittal is designed to test the legal sufficiency of the evidence. Jones v. State, 790 So.2d 1194, 1197 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001)(en banc). Therefore,
[W]hen a defendant moves for a judgment of acquittal at the close of the State's case, the only issue is whether the State has presented sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case. In viewing the State's evidence, all rea sonable inferences of that evidence are drawn in favor of the State
Leonard v. State, 731 So.2d 712, 717 n. 2 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999)(citing Williams v. State, 511 So.2d 740 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987)).
Below, evidence was introduced as to the location, size, and wording of the sign. We do not read the statute as requiring the sign to include specific "magic words." Rather, the statute requires that language of the sign must be sufficient to place a reasonable person on notice that the facility is a licensed child care facility. Because sufficient evidence was introduced to establish a prima facie case, the trial court properly denied the motion for a judgment of acquittal. The evidence presented a question of fact for the jury as to whether the wording of the sign adequately identified the facility as a licensed childcare facility. Compare McGuire v. State, 738 So.2d 427, 428 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999)(holding that trial court properly denied defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal on the charge of leaving the scene of an accident because there was a factual dispute as to whether the victim in the accident was "in condition to receive the information" within the meaning of section 316.062(2), Florida Statutes, such as the defendant's driver's license number, thus requiring the defendant to report the accident to law enforcement).
Below, the appellant failed to preserve any error as to the jury instructions and, on appeal, did not argue that the instructions were improper and constituted fundamental error, see Reed v. State, 837 So.2d 366 (Fla.2002), until his reply brief. Because appellant failed to raise these issues in the initial brief, we cannot consider them. See Medrano v. State, 795 So.2d 1009, 1010 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001).
In the sentence imposed, the trial court ordered appellant to pay costs in the amount of $376. This lump sum amount was orally pronounced without any further specificity as to the nature of the particular fees constituting that lump sum or the authority for imposition of such fees. This was error. See Smiley v. State, 704 So.2d 191 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997); Fisher v. State, 697 So.2d 1291 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997); Bradshaw v. State, 638 So.2d 1024 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994). On remand, the trial court shall give the appellant an opportunity to be heard regarding the imposition of any costs which are discretionary. See Rhodes v. State, 683 So.2d 640 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996). Accordingly, we strike the assessment of costs and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and REMANDED for further proceedings.
POLSTON, J., concurs, SMITH, LARRY G., Senior Judge, concurs in part and dissents in part.
. The trial court instructed the jury, in pertinent part, as follows:
Certain drugs and chemical substances are by law known as controlled substances. Cocaine is a controlled substance. Before you can find the defendant guilty of sale and/or delivery of cocaine within 1000 feet of a childcare facility, the state must prove
the following four elements beyond a reasonable doubt:
One, Charles Eugene Williams sold or delivered a certain substance: two, the substance was cocaine; three, the substance was sold and/or delivered in, on, or within 1000 feet of a childcare facility; and four, the substance was sold between the hours of 6:00 a.m. and 12:00 a.m.