Case Name: VICKERS v. STATE
Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1912-12-11
Citations: 154 S.W. 578
Docket Number: 
Parties: VICKERS v. STATE.
Judges: 
Reporter: South Western Reporter
Volume: 154
Pages: 578–581

Head Matter:
VICKERS v. STATE.
(Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
Dec. 11, 1912.
On Motion for Rehearing, March 19, 1913.)
1. Incest (§ 15 ) — Evidence—Corroboration of Prosecutrix.
Evidence, consisting in part of proof that defendant attempted to commit suicide, and gave the prosecuting witness medicine to produce an abortion, held sufficient to corroborate the prosecutrix in a prosecution for incest.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Incest, Cent. Dig. § 13; Dec. Dig. § 15. ]
2. Incest (§ 14 ) — Evidence—Relationship —Stepchild — Prior Marriage — Dissolution.
Where it affirmatively appears that the defendant has been married prior to the marriage of the mother of the prosecuting witness in an incest case, it should affirmatively appear that the first marriage had been legally dissolved by death or otherwise.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Incest, Cent. Dig. § 12; Dec. Dig. § 14. ]
3. Criminal Daw (§ 448 ) — Evidence—Opinion.
In a prosecution for incest with a step-’ daughter, that a third person told accused that another might be the father of the child is inadmissible. i
[Ed. Note. — For. other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 1035-1039, 1041-1043, 1045, 1048-1051; Dec. Dig. § 448. ]
4. Criminal Law (§ 721 ) — Argument op Counsel — Comment on Failure of Accused TO TESTIFY'.
Argument of prosecuting attorney in an incest prosecution, that they say ’that the prosecuting witness has not been corroborated, but they dare not put a witness on the stand to contradict her testimony, is error, as commenting on failure of accused to testify.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. § 1672; Dec. Dig. § 721. ]
On Motion for Rehearing.
5. Witnesses (§ 64 )—Husband and Wife— Incest.
Under Code Cr. Proc. 1911, arts. 794 and 795, providing that husband and wife may testify for, but not against, each other in criminal cases, except in prosecutions for offenses by one against the other, and that the prohibition remains, though the marriage be dissolved, a wife, in a prosecution against the husband for incest with the wife’s daughter by a . former husband, may not testify, though since divorced, that she was pregnant at the time of the offense, to show the likelihood that accused committed the offense.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Witnesses, Cent. Dig. §§ ISO, 181; Dee. Dig. § 64. ]
6. Incest (§ 14 )—Former Marriage of Husband-Dissolution.
In a prosecution for incest by a man with his stepdaughter, in which it was shown that accused had a son prior to his present marriage, the proof is sufficient that the former marriage was valid, though- it would not be sufficient where the accused was a woman, since an illegitimate child is only the child of the mother, so as to require proof that such marriage had been dissolved before the present marriage.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Incest, Cent. Dig. § 12; Dec. Dig. § 14. ]
Appeal from Criminal Court, Williamson County; C. A. Wilcox, Judge.
Jim Vickers was convicted of incest, and he appeals.
Reversed and remanded.
J. F. Taulbee and Richard Critz, both of Georgetown, for appellant. Nunn & Love, of Georgetown, Jas. R. Hamilton, Dist. Atty., of Austin, and C. E. Lane, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.
For other cases see same topic and section NUMBER in Dec. Dig. & Am. Dig. Key-No. Series & Rep’r.Indexea
For other cases see same topic and section NUMBER in Dec. Dig. & Am. Dig. Key-No. Series & Rep’r Indexes

Opinion:
HARPER, J.
Appellant was prosecuted' and convicted of the offense of haying carnal knowledge of his stepdaughter, Miss Ollie Walston, and his punishment assessed at five years' confinement in the penitentiary.
Appellant earnestly insists that the testimony of the prosecuting witness is not sufficiently corroborated to sustain the conviction. We have carefully reviewed the testimony. Her testimony makes a clear case, and we are of the opinion that the testimony of Dr. Stone, who says he sold the appellant the medicine which the prosecuting witness says appellant delivered to her to produce an abortion and miscarriage, the fact that he attempted to commit suicide, as he said he told her he would if she told about the matter, and the conversation testified to by the witness Arthur Walston, would support the verdict, although it would be more satisfactory if the testimony would show that in fact the medicine sold by Dr. Stone to appellant and by him delivered to prosecuting witness was in fact calculated to produce a miscarriage. However, we do not think the' testimony of Mrs. Ella Vickers, the wife of appellant, ought to have been admitted in ev-. idenee. It is true that at the time she testified she had been divorced, but the matter she testified in regard to took place while she was the wife of appellant. It is also true that the matters she testified in regard to on direct examination might be said to be collateral matters; but the defendant's theory was that there was a collusion between Mrs. Vickers and her two children to run appellant off, and the defendant proved that subsequent to the separation Mrs. Vick-ers had deeded Arthur Whlston certain lands, and intended to deed the prosecuting witness certain lands. This was introduced to affect their credit as witnesses. The testimony of Mrs. Vickers would show there was no such agreement, and the land, although in appellant's name and purchased after his marriage, was in fact paid for with funds belonging to the community estate of her first marriage; and therefore it was proper for her to make the deeds. This testimony was introduced to strengthen the testimony of the two main witnesses for the state, and is it permissible to prove by the wife facts which will support the witnesses against her husband? Article 775 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1895 provides: "The husband and wife may in all criminal actions be witnesses for each other, but they shall in no case testify against each other, except in a criminal prosecution for an offense committed by one against the other." And article 774 provides that this inhibition continues after the marriage relation ceases as to matters taking place during the married relation. In section 983 of White's Ann. Code of. Crim. Proc. will be found a long list of authorities, which hold that Mrs. Vickers should not have been permitted to testify in this case. The state had an object and purpose in introducing her as a witness, and we cannot now be permitted to say that her testimony was immaterial, and therefore no ground for reversal. In fact, the purpose is plainly manifest, which was to strengthen the testimony of Ollie and Arthur Walston, and on these two witnesses the state must rely for a conviction.
Again, it appears that appellant had been married prior to his marriage to the mother of the prosecuting witness, the present Mrs. Vickers. There is no evidence'that the former Mrs. Vickers was dead, or appellant had secured a divorce from her. Where it affirmatively appears that the defendant had been married prior to the marriage to the mother of the prosecuting' witness in an incest case, it should also affirmatively appear that the first marriage had been legally dissolved by death or otherwise. McGrew v. State, 13 Tex. App. 340.
There was no' error in excluding what Arthur Walston told defendant about another might be the father of the child of the prosecuting witness. What Arthur Wal- stem's opinion may have been in the premises would not be legitimate testimony. Neither do the other bills in regard to admitting testimony present any error.
In bill No. 5 it is shown that W. H. Nunn, in addressing the jury, said: "They tell you the prosecuting witness 'has not been corroborated; they will tell you no one saw the act of intercourse, except the two [prosecutrix and defendant]. 'Tis true that no one was present at the act of intercourse but these two; 'tis true that Ollie Walston testifies that no one was present, when the defendant told her to take the turpentine, except herself and the defendant; but, gentlemen she has testified to both of these transactions, and they have not dared to put a witness on the stand to contradict her testimony in any particular." These remarks were excepted to, and if they do not challenge the attention of the jury to the fact that defendant had not testified we are unable to understand the English language. Prosecuting officers should not thus seek to indirectly call the attention of the jury to the fact that a defendant has not testified in the case. This is a right given in law, hut he is not bound to avail himself of that privilege ; and if he is willing to rest his case on the weakness of the state's case he has a right to do so.
The court did not err in refusing to quash the indictment. The indictment is drawn in terms frequently approved by this court.
There are many assignments in the motion for new trial, and we have carefully reviewed each, and none of the others present error; but, on account of the errors above pointed out, the judgment is reversed, and thp cause is remanded.