Case Name: Nola Abshire BROUSSARD et vir, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. NATIONAL FOOD STORES OF LA., INC., Defendant-Appellant
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1970-03-12
Citations: 233 So. 2d 599
Docket Number: No. 2999
Parties: Nola Abshire BROUSSARD et vir, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. NATIONAL FOOD STORES OF LA., INC., Defendant-Appellant.
Judges: Before TATE, FRUGÉ and SAVOY, JJ-
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 233
Pages: 599–606

Head Matter:
Nola Abshire BROUSSARD et vir, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. NATIONAL FOOD STORES OF LA., INC., Defendant-Appellant.
No. 2999.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Third Circuit.
March 12, 1970.
Rehearing Denied April 14, 1970.
Davidson, Meaux, Onebane & Donohoe, by Edward C. Abell, Jr., Lafayette, for defendant-appellant.
Edwards, Edwards & Broadhurst, by Homer E. Barousse, Jr., Crowley, for plaintif f s-appellees.
Before TATE, FRUGÉ and SAVOY, JJ-

Opinion:
TATE, Judge.
Mrs. Broussard, the plaintiff, slipped and fell while shopping. She and her husband sue the National Food Stores for damages sustained, mostly a miscarriage and consequent medical expenses. National Food appeals from adverse judgment.
The Facts
National Food operates a self-service supermarket in Crowley. While shopping there, Mrs. Broussard slipped on a wet spot near the check-out stand.
' She was wearing tennis shoes with rubber soles. After she slipped, the side of her dress was wet from the substance. Her fall on a wet spot in the store aisle was corroborated by her sister, who was shopping with her.
Neither Mrs. Broussard nor her sister were able to identify the substance on the floor, nor did they know how long it had been there, nor whence it came. When Mrs. Broussard and her husband returned to complain to the store manager (about ten minutes later, according to their testimony), neither they nor the store manager were able to find any wet spot on the floor nor any sign of her fall. (The store manager testified that they had not come until 20-30 minutes after they claimed Mrs. Broussard had fallen.)
The time of Mrs. Broussard's fall was during the afternoon. Her husband estimated it to be around 2:30 P.M. The store manager thought that the fall had occurred at about 4:00 P.M. Other witness es could not place the time of the fall, except as being in the afternoon.
The store manager and the store's porter testified that it was the porter's duty to clean the floor three times daily, starting at the front and going back at 7:00 to 8:00 A.M., at 11:00 A.M. to 12:00 Noon, and at 3:00 to 4:00 P.M. The porter additionally testified that he checked the floor for debris at 10:00 A.M., 12:00 Noon, and 3:00 P.M.
Between noon and 3:00 P.M. each day the porter was busy bagging groceries. During this time, he did not have any responsibility to check the floor for spilled substances or other hazards.
No other store employee was charged with the regular duty of removing hazards to customer traffic. A cashier stated that, when she was not busy, she might look for and remove foreign substances from the floor.
The porter also testified that it was his duty to mop up liquids spilled near the check-out stand where Mrs. Broussard fell, one of two being operated at the time. He testified that he had no independent recollection as to whether he had found or had mopped up any spilled liquid the afternoon of the fall.
In allowing recovery, the trial court essentially accepted the testimony of the plaintiff's witness that she had fallen on a wet spot on the floor. The trial court felt that the three sweepings or checks per day did not constitute sufficient precautions to remove any substance on the floor which had caused Mrs. Broussard to fall.
The Law
The general principles applicable are not seriously disputed:
A store proprietor is not an insurer of the safety of his patrons. He does, however, owe an affirmative duty to his customers to use ordinary care to keep his aisles, passageways, and floors in a reasonably safe condition.
The duty to use reasonable care extends to every hazard which creates an unreasonable risk of foreseeable harm to his store invitees. This duty includes reasonable inspection of the premises for defects and obstructions to passageway, and reasonable warning of perils which the customers may not see through the exercise of ordinary care. (In this latter regard, it must be taken into consideration that the invitee's attention may be distracted by the advertising and merchandise along the passageways or by the crowded condition of the premises.)
In determining this duty, consideration must be given to several factors, including the nature of the premises, the business purposes for which it is used, the volume of business, the likelihood that the passageway may become obstructed through shopping activities of employees and other customers, and the nature of the obstacle.
In order to impose liability on the store operator, an injured customer must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that a dangerous condition which caused injury to him: (1) was created by the storekeeper himself (or some person for whom he is legally liable); or (2) either (a) was actually known to the storekeeper or his employees or (b) had existed for a sufficient length of time for the storekeeper to have constructive knowledge of it (i. e., that its presence should have been discovered through the exercise of reasonable care). In this respect, the mere fact that a customer falls while using a store aisle does not by itself create any presumption of fault on the part of the storekeeper.
See, for examples, decisions of this court such as: Hay v. Sears, Roebuck & Company, 224 So.2d 496; Chauvin v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 223 So.2d 441; Lofton v. Travelers Insurance Co., La.App., 208 So.2d 739; Sigler v. Mount Vernon Fire Insurance Co., La.App., 201 So.2d 656; Gauthier v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., La.App., 179 So.2d 437; Provost v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Co., La.App., 154 So.2d 597.
Conclusion
Under the existing jurisprudence, the trial court erred to allow Mrs. Brous-sard to recover for her fall.
Under the trial court's evaluation of the evidence, she may have proved that she fell on a slippery substance which created an unreasonable hazard to the passage of customers. However, she did not also prove how long the substance had been there (if the result of spillage by another customer) nor that the substance had been placed there by the store employees.
Thus, Mrs. Broussard did not prove that National Food had either actual or constructive knowledge of the hazard. It is therefore exempt from liability for the damage sustained by its customer.
Therefore, we must reverse the judgment of the trial court and dismiss the plaintiffs' suit. The costs of this appeal are to be paid by the plaintiffs-appellants.
Reversed.
FRUGÉ, J., dissents, believing that Lof-ton should be overruled.