Case Name: Clark v. Miles and another
Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Wisconsin
Decision Date: 1850-06
Citations: 2 Pin. 432
Docket Number: 
Parties: Clark v. Miles and another.
Judges: 
Reporter: Pinney
Volume: 2
Pages: 432–438

Head Matter:
Clark v. Miles and another.
1. Appeal. — Where in taking an appeal from the judgment of a justice of the peace, the party does not fully comply with the statute, it will he dismissed, notwithstanding the statutory security has keen given.
2. Same — recognizance.—Where an appeal is dismissed, the party who brought it, with his sureties in the recognizance, will be immediately liable thereon for the amount of the judgment rendered by the justice. Jackson & Hubbell, JJ., dissenting. Love v. Rockwell, 1 Wis. 382.
(2 Ghand. 94.)
ERROR to the Circuit Court for La Fayette County.
The • case was this : Miles, one of the defendants in error, undertook to take an appeal from a judgment rendered against him, but in that proceeding neglected to file before the justice the affidavit required by the statute. The justice, nevertheless, allowed the appeal, but the late district court dismissed it when brought before that tribunal. An action was then brought by the plaintiff in the judgment, against Miles and his surety on the bond given on taking the appeal, and that court rendered judgment against the plaintiff in error, upon the ground that the dismissal of the appeal carried with it and invalidated the appeal bond, and that an action in that case could not be maintained upon it. The writ of error in this case is to procure a reversal of such judgment.
John ATi Williams, for plaintiff in error.
J. II. Ilnowllon, for defendants in error.

Opinion:
Larrabee, J.
It appears from the record in this cause that the defendant Miles took every step to entitle him to an appeal, with the single exception of filing an affidavit with the justice, as is required by the statute. An appeal was allowed by the justice, and subsequently dismissed by the district court. Thereupon the plaintiff brought his suit in the circuit court, upon the recognizance filed by the defendant, with Barretto as surety, and that court rendered judgment against him.
The appeal was properly dismissed in the first instance, as the affidavit was absolutely required by the statute; but the question now presented, is, whether that dismissal rendered the recognizance void. We think not. One of the conditions of the recognizance (of which a form is given in the statute) is, that the appellant shall pay the amount of the judgment rendered against him before the justice, including costs of appeal, with interest, in case his appeal shall be dismissed or discontinued.
It was not the fault of the appellee that no affidavit was filed, nor can he be made to suffer for either the negligence of the appellant or of the justice. It was not for Mm to inquire into the reason for the dismissal of the appeal; he was satisfied that it was dismissed. He had been subjected to delay and expense because of the voluntary action of his antagonist, and it would be harsh indeed to drive Mm back to bis execution upon the justice's judgment, and thus deprive Mm of all indemnity for tbe delay and costs of the appeal.
We regard his right to sue upon the recognizance as perfect from the time of the judgment of the district court. It was a voluntary.security for the payment of the judgment, and once given, could not, be withdrawn by the party, nor invalidated by the judgment of the supreme court.
We think, therefore, that the judgment of the circuit court was wrong, and must be reversed.
Judgment reversed.
That a bond not good as a statutory one, is nevertheless binding as a voluntary obligation upon which an action at common law may be maintained, and is not void unless the statute so declares it, is a position well established. See Lewis, governor, etc. v. Stout, 22 Wis., where the principal authorities are collated in the opinion of DixoN, C. J. But in the case of Love v. Rockwell, 1 Wis. 386, the liability of the defendant in a like case, is placed upon the ground o estoppel. The statute required the security on an appeal to be by recognizance and in a form prescribed by it, which recites among other things that an appeal has been taken, etc. B. S. 1849, ch. 88, $ 229. And in that case the court held that the defendant was estopped from contradicting such recital, and from alleging that an appeal had not been taken.