Case Name: STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Henry Sylvester ZIMMER, Petitioner, Appellant
Court: Minnesota Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Minnesota
Decision Date: 1992-08-07
Citations: 487 N.W.2d 886
Docket Number: No. C2-91-500
Parties: STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Henry Sylvester ZIMMER, Petitioner, Appellant.
Judges: 
Reporter: North Western Reporter 2d
Volume: 487
Pages: 886–891

Head Matter:
STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Henry Sylvester ZIMMER, Petitioner, Appellant.
No. C2-91-500.
Supreme Court of Minnesota.
Aug. 7, 1992.
Richard P. Clem, Clem & Crosby, Minneapolis, for appellant.
Hubert H. Humphrey, III, Atty. Gen., St. Paul, and Paul A. Thompson, Kalina, Wills & Woods, Minneapolis, for respondent.

Opinion:
SIMONETT, Justice.
In this conviction for criminal trespass on church property, the defendant-appellant raises the single issue of whether the trial judge erred in refusing to admit the Code of Canon Law. The court of appeals held that the trial judge did not err. We agree and affirm.
Defendant Henry Zimmer is a long-time member of the Church of the Immaculate Conception in Columbia Heights. Some time after Father Walter Sochacki was appointed pastor of the parish in 1981, defendant became dissatisfied with some of the pastor's liturgical practices, such as cover ing the crucifix during Lent. There were confrontations between the two men, and defendant began distributing leaflets at services and carrying a 2-foot cross with him to mass.
On April 3, 1990, the pastor personally handed defendant a letter, signed by the pastor, ordering defendant to stay away from the church. The letter read:
During the past weeks your presence and your actions have intimidated and harassed many members of our parish both during weekend liturgies and at daily mass. You have been a constant source of fear to many of our parishioners.
With this letter I would like to take the opportunity to inform you that you are no longer allowed on our property (City Ordinance 609.605). If you chose [sic] to return to the property, you will be arrested.
It is only after long deliberation and consultation with our Parish Council that I have come to this conclusion. Your presence has been a constant intimidation and harassment over the past two years. It is our feeling that this must stop. Please be advised of our intention.
At trial, the pastor testified that while he had discussed the situation with his bishop (who suggested the problem might go away if ignored), and while he had also consulted with the Parish Council, the decision to ban defendant from church property was his decision. The pastor further testified that before issuing the letter he spoke with defendant several times and asked him to stop harassing people and making a nuisance of himself.
On April 4, 1990, the day after receiving the letter, defendant came on church property to attend a school meeting at the parish school. When the pastor reminded him of the letter, defendant left and sat in his car, where, shortly thereafter, a police officer tagged him for trespass. On July 4, 1990, defendant came to the church for mass. The pastor informed defendant "he was not welcome and he was in violation," but defendant stayed for the mass and then left. The pastor signed a citizen's arrest and defendant was issued a second tag for trespass.
Criminal complaints for violating Minn. Stat. § 609.605, subd. 1(b)(3) were filed, and the matter came on for trial the following January. (The reference in the pastor's letter to City Ordinance 609.605 was evidently intended to be a reference to the state statute.) Before the jury was impaneled, defendant offered in evidence the Code of Canon Law "for the purpose of informing the jury what constitutes (a) a possessor, and (b) a claim of right on the part of a parishioner to attend church." The offer was rejected. The jury found defendant guilty on both counts, and he was given a $200 fine and 1 year probation conditioned on his obeying the pastor's letter.
The court of appeals dismissed the April 4 trespass conviction because defendant had immediately left the property when asked, but affirmed the second conviction. The panel reasoned that the Code was irrelevant to defendant's claim of right and, moreover, a civil court should avoid deciding criminal matters on the basis of church doctrine as set out in the Code. State v. Zimmer, 478 N.W.2d 764 (Minn.App.1991). We granted defendant's petition for further review.
As indicated, the only issue raised here by defendant-appellant is whether the trial court erred in refusing to admit the Code of Canon Law.
At trial, the pastor testified that he, as the duly appointed pastor of the parish, had the authority on behalf of the church as the "lawful possessor" of the church property to order defendant to stay off the property. Defendant claimed the pastor lacked this authority, and he testified he entered upon the church premises under a good faith claim of right as a parish member to attend services at the parish. The pastor testified defendant was free to attend mass and other liturgical services at any other Catholic church.
Before addressing the legal issue, it is important to note that this case does not pose questions of church doctrine. Defendant was not barred from church property because of his views about church liturgy and doctrine but because he persisted in actions which, as the pastor's letter clearly states, "have intimidated and harassed many members of our parish" and "have been a constant source of fear to many of our parishioners."
Now for the issue of the Code's relevance. Arguably, some parts of the Code of Canon Law may have been relevant to some issues in the case, such as whether the pastor could act for the "lawful possessor." The difficulty, however, is that any potential probative value of the Code was clearly outweighed by the prejudice and confusion which would have ensued from the manner in which the defendant intended to use this evidence. Minn.R.Evid. 403; Vikse v. Flaby, 316 N.W.2d 276, 285 (Minn.1982) (affirming exclusion of evidence that would have overly confused the jury).
Here defendant offered in evidence the entire Code consisting of 1,752 canons, most couched in terminology unfamiliar to lay people. The canons reflect a form of church governance which is hierarchical rather than congregational, again a matter not familiar to everyone, particularly those from a different church background. Defendant apparently intended to call the jury's attention to certain canons of his own selection, which would have required the jurors to interpret isolated provisions out of context and without any understanding of how they might interact with other canons. Also, many of the canons reflect church doctrine, which would be an invitation to the jurors to go beyond the "neutral principles of law" analysis to which civil courts are limited, Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 604, 99 S.Ct. 3020, 3025-26, 61 L.Ed.2d 775 (1979), and to embark on matters entirely irrelevant to the case.
Without expert assistance, the trial court and jury, unschooled in canon law, would be left on their own to interpret unfamiliar and ambiguous canons for answers to the legal issues of "lawful possessor" and "claim of right." Indeed, the introduction to the edition of the Code which defendant offered as evidence stresses the dangers of an untutored interpretation of the Code. "The canons are marked by a certain abstractness — even artificiality. In the concrete, therefore, it often admits of varying interpretations and applications. An exclusively literal reading can be especially risky in canon law." The Code of Canon Law: A Text and Commentary 13 (J. Cori-den, T. Green & D. Heintschel eds. 1985). If defendant had called an expert on canon law to testify, portions of the Code (subject to requirements of relevancy and nonentan-glement) might have been admissible. See Stevens v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Fresno, 49 Cal.App.3d 877, 123 Cal.Rptr. 171 (1975) (canon law experts testified on issue of whether a priest was the bishop's agent and acting within the scope of that agency when he was involved in an auto accident). But defendant did not do this, much less attempt to use the Code in his cross-examination of the pastor. Thus we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's offer of proof.
Affirmed.
. The jury did not have to make an assumption (as the dissent suggests) that the pastor had "lawful possessor" authority to keep defendant from being disruptive at church services. The pastor, whose qualifications to give an expert opinion on his pastoral authority were not challenged, testified without objection that he had the requisite authority. Nor was defendant's claim of right to enter upon church premises to fulfill his religious duties disputed, only whether defendant's claim of right extended to include intimidation and harassment of the congregation.
In this appeal defendant does not question the sufficiency of the evidence. Instead, he claims that he should have been allowed to put the Code of' Canon Law in evidence to dispute the pastor's testimony (although the canons cited by defendant are very opaque on this point), and to show he had a right to attend church to fulfill his religious obligations (a claim not disputed). Our opinion concedes the Code might have had some relevance to the case, provided, however, it was accompanied by expert interpretation. Here that proviso was not met, and that is all we decide and all we have been asked to decide.