Case Name: Quinton DRYDEN, et al., Petitioners, v. MADISON COUNTY, Florida, Respondent
Court: Florida Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1997-05-15
Citations: 696 So. 2d 728
Docket Number: No. 87594
Parties: Quinton DRYDEN, et al., Petitioners, v. MADISON COUNTY, Florida, Respondent.
Judges: KOGAN, C.J., and OVERTON, GRIMES, HARDING and ANSTEAD, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 696
Pages: 728–734

Head Matter:
Quinton DRYDEN, et al., Petitioners, v. MADISON COUNTY, Florida, Respondent.
No. 87594.
Supreme Court of Florida.
May 15, 1997.
Rehearing Denied July 9, 1997.
Larry E. Levy and Loren E. Levy of the Levy Law Firm, Tallahassee, for Petitioners.
George T. Reeves and Edwin B. Browning, Jr. of Davis, Browning & Schnitker, P.A., Madison; and Ken Van Assenderp, Tallahassee, for Respondent.
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General; Joseph C. Melliehamp, III, Senior Assistant Attorney General and Thomas P. Crapps and Eric J. Taylor, Assistant Attorneys General, Tallahassee, for Florida Department of Revenue, Amicus Curiae.
Keith C. Hetrick, Tallahassee; and Robert M. Rhodes and Victoria L. Weber of Steel, Hector & Davis L.L.P., Tallahassee, for Florida Home Builders Association, Amicus Curiae.
Robert L. Nabors and Virginia Saunders Delegal of Nabors, Giblin & Nickerson, P.A., Tallahassee; and Herbert W.A. Thiele, President, Florida Assosciation of County Attorneys, Inc., Tallahassee, for Florida Association of Counties and Florida Association of County Attorneys, Amici Curiae.
Daniel C. Brown of Katz, Kutter, Haigler, Alderman, Marks, Bryant & Yon, P.A., Tallahassee, for Water Oak Management Corporation and John Richard Sellars, Amici Curiae.
Sanford A. Minkoff, Lake County Attorney, Tavares, for Lake County, Florida, Ami-cus Curiae.

Opinion:
SHAW, Justice.
We have for review Dryden v. Madison County, 672 So.2d 840 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996), wherein the court certified:
Is the holding of Gulesian v. Dade County School Bd., 281 So.2d 325 (Fla.1973), which provides that under certain circumstances a governmental entity need not refund proceeds from a tax or, in this case, a special assessment that is later determined to be illegal, still valid after the decisions of McKesson v. Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco, 496 U.S. 18, 110 S.Ct. 2238, 110 L.Ed.2d 17 (1990), and Kuhnlein v. Department of Revenue, 662 So.2d 308 (Fla.1995)[?]
Id. at 844. We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. We answer in the affirmative and approve Dryden as explained below.
Madison County in 1989 adopted four ordinances levying special assessments on property located in the county for garbage services, landfill closure, ambulance service, and fire protection. The validity of the ordinances was challenged in 1990 in two suits— one by Foxx, a resident of the City of Madison, and one by Dryden, a class action on behalf of county residents. The suits, wherein the plaintiffs sought a refund of the 1989 and 1990 assessments, were later consolidated.
The court subsequently granted summary judgment in favor of Dryden and ordered refunds, finding that the ordinances had been adopted without the consent of the city dwellers within the county. While the ease was pending on appeal, the plaintiffs in 1992 filed a second suit, seeking refund of 1991, 1992, and 1993 assessments. The parties agreed that the district court decision in the first suit would be binding in both cases. The district court ultimately ruled that 1) the ordinances were invalid, and 2) a refund on motion for summary judgment was premature since factual and legal issues remained. Madison County v. Foxx, 636 So.2d 39 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994).
On remand, the trial court found that the county had acted in good faith in levying the 1989 and 1990 assessments, but not the 1991, 1992, and 1993 assessments. The court ruled that Dryden was not entitled to refunds for 1989 and 1990, but was entitled to refunds for 1991,1992, and 1993, with interest accruing on the date the assessments were paid. The district court affirmed on the refund issue but reversed on the interest issue, concluding that no final money judgment had been entered on the refunds.
Dryden contends that the district court erred in finding him unentitled to refunds for 1989 and 1990. (The county does not contest the refunds for 1991, 1992, and 1993.) Dryden asserts that the court relied on outdated precedent. We disagree.
Where an invalid tax scheme discriminates among citizens without a legal basis and bestows no commensurate benefit, a refund may be in order. Department of Revenue v. Kuhnlein, 646 So.2d 717 (Fla. 1994). Otherwise, the tax could constitute an unlawful taking of property in violation of state and federal rights. McKesson Corp. v. Division of Alcoholic Beverages & Tobacco, 496 U.S. 18, 110 S.Ct. 2238, 110 L.Ed.2d 17 (1990). Where an invalid tax scheme applies across the board and confers a commensurate benefit, on the other hand, "equitable considerations" may preclude a refund. Gulesian v. Dade County School Bd., 281 So.2d 325 (Fla.1973).
In the present case, the 1989 and 1990 assessments fall in the latter category. The assessments were non-discrimmatory (i.e., they applied across the board to all property owners in the county) and they conferred a commensurate benefit (i.e., they provided for garbage collection and disposal, landfill closure, ambulance service, and fire protection). Further, the county acted in good faith in imposing these assessments. Competent substantial evidence supports the denial of refunds for 1989 and 1990.
Dryden also claims that the county should be required to pay interest on the 1991, 1992, and 1993 refunds. We disagree. The amount owed in this class action is still indeterminate and no final money judgment has been rendered. We recently addressed this issue:
The issue in this case is whether those individuals who are due a refund are entitled to prejudgment and postjudgment interest. We answer the question in respect to prejudgment interest in the negative, finding that there is no entitlement to prejudgment interest in this action to recover a tax refund. We answer the question in respect to postjudgment interest by determining that there is not a final money judgment, and therefore there is not at present an entitlement to postjudgment interest in this case under these circumstances.
Kuhnlein v. Department of Revenue, 662 So.2d 308, 308 (Fla.1995) (citations omitted). Under the facts of this ease, Dryden is not presently entitled to postjudgment interest.
We answer the certified question in the affirmative and approve the decision in Dryden as explained herein.
It is so ordered.
KOGAN, C.J., and OVERTON, GRIMES, HARDING and ANSTEAD, JJ., concur.
WELLS, J., dissents with an opinion.
. This Court held that a refund was required where the Florida Legislature imposed an unlawful $295 impact fee on cars purchased in other states and then registered in Florida by Florida residents. Department of Revenue v. Kuhnlein, 646 So.2d 717 (Fla.1994).
. The United States Supreme Court ruled that a refund may be in order where a Florida liquor excise tax gave improper tax breaks for liquor made from products commonly grown in Florida. McKesson Corp. v. Division of Alcoholic Beverages & Tobacco, 496 U.S. 18, 110 S.Ct. 2238, 110 L.Ed.2d 17 (1990).
. This Court held that "equitable considerations" precluded refund of an unlawful .82 mill excess where the school board acted in good faith, where individual refunds to 350,000 taxpayers would be nominal, and where the burden on the school board would be "intolerable". Gulesian v. Dade County School Bd., 281 So.2d 325 (Fla.1973).
.We agree with the district court that the record supports the trial court's finding of good faith. See Dryden, 672 So.2d at 843 ("We find that there was substantial competent evidence to support the trial court's conclusion that the county acted in good faith in enacting the 1989 and 1990 ordinances....").