Case Name: Floyd H. VINSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 1986-12-03
Citations: 806 F.2d 686
Docket Number: No. 85-5976
Parties: Floyd H. VINSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee.
Judges: 
Reporter: Federal Reporter 2d Series
Volume: 806
Pages: 686–689

Head Matter:
Floyd H. VINSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee.
No. 85-5976.
United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.
Argued Sept. 29, 1986.
Decided Dec. 3, 1986.
Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc Denied Jan. 16, 1987.
Arthur R. Samuel, Louisville, Ky., for plaintiff-appellant.
Jon L. Fleischaker, argued, K.K. Greene, Louisville, Ky., for defendant-appellee.
Before MERRITT, GUY, and NORRIS, Circuit Judges.

Opinion:
RALPH B. GUY, Jr., Circuit Judge.
Plaintiff appeals the entry of judgment notwithstanding the verdict in favor of defendant after a jury trial on his age discrimination claim. For the reasons stated below, we affirm.
Plaintiff is a long-term employee of the Ford Motor Company's Louisville Assembly Plant in Kentucky. In January, 1980, plaintiff filed a complaint with the EEOC alleging age discrimination. The interview with the EEOC indicates that plaintiff complained about a series of events beginning in November, 1977. Included was the fact that in January, 1979, plaintiff had been demoted. The interview sheet ended by plaintiff claiming that
[i]n April 1979 I was promised by Joe Weingart, Material Manager, that I would be placed in the position of Parts Control and volume scheduling manager, a job I am qualified and held previously for three years. On 1-16-80 this job was assigned to A1 Pierce, age 35-36 years old, no experience and less time with the Co.
The charge, as framed by the EEOC, stated: "I believe I were (sic) denied a promotion because of my age."
Plaintiff filed suit in April, 1982, alleging discrimination in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. § 623, asserting that (1) he was demoted in January, 1979, because of his age, and (2) he was denied a promotion in January, 1980, because of his age. Before trial, defendant moved for summary judgment as to the 1979 demotion, arguing that plaintiff had never filed an administrative complaint concerning the demotion, and therefore, he had failed to comply with a jurisdictional prerequisite for filing a civil action under ADEA. 29 U.S.C. § 626(d). The trial court denied defendant's motion, noting that plaintiff had referred to the demotion in his interview statement with the EEOC. The case was tried to a jury from January 7 to January 11, 1985. The jury found for plaintiff on his 1979 demotion claim, but against plaintiff on his 1980 failure to promote claim. The jury awarded $2,057.16 for lost wages as a result of the demotion, and also awarded liquidated damages on that claim, for a total award of $5,014.32.
After trial, defendant moved for judgment n.o.v., reasserting the same claims presented in its motion for summary judgment. The court, based on the evidence presented at trial, this time sustained defendant's motion, finding that, in fact, plaintiff did not file any charge of age discrimination concerning the 1979 demotion with the EEOC or any administrative agency. Accordingly, the court determined that it was without jurisdiction as to that claim.
It is well settled that the filing of a charge with the EEOC is a jurisdictional prerequisite to the filing of a civil action under ADEA. Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U.S. 750, 99 S.Ct. 2066, 60 L.Ed.2d 609 (1979); 29 U.S.C. § 626(d). Moreover, when jurisdiction is challenged, the burden of establishing jurisdiction lies with the party asserting it. The only evidence to support plaintiff's contention that he complained about the 1979 demotion in relation to his age discrimination claim is the interview statement of the EEOC. However, in that statement plaintiff complained about a series of events, the demotion being one of many, which culminated in plaintiff's belief he had been discriminated against based on age when he was denied a promotion in 1980. Plaintiff does not indicate that these other incidents were other than historical background relative to the specific EEOC charge filed. Furthermore, plaintiff presented no evidence as to the scope of the investigation conducted by the EEOC. The court thus had no way of knowing whether the EEOC attempted to conciliate the demotion claim. Conciliation is an important purpose of the requirement that a claimant first file with an administrative agency. Finally, we note that the requirement that a claimant file a charge which identifies the conduct he believes is discriminatory is not a hypertechnical legal prerequisite. All plaintiff was required to do was identify that conduct which he felt was the result of age discrimination. It does not constitute an unjustifiable burden on claimants to require them to specify each such event. And it is necessary, if the administrative process is to work, that a claimant so articulate his beliefs. Accordingly, the district court did not err in granting judgment n.o.v. in favor of defendant.
In view of our disposition of this claim, we need not discuss other issues raised by plaintiff. The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.