Case Name: Lucius N. Littauer and Eugene Littauer, Appellants, v. James Stern, Respondent
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1903
Citations: 88 A.D. 274
Docket Number: 
Parties: Lucius N. Littauer and Eugene Littauer, Appellants, v. James Stern, Respondent.
Judges: 
Reporter: Appellate Division Reports
Volume: 88
Pages: 274–278

Head Matter:
Lucius N. Littauer and Eugene Littauer, Appellants, v. James Stern, Respondent.
Appearance — a failure to serve notice thereof does not entitle the plaintiff to enter judgment by default where an order extending defendant's time to answer is served.
Where the attorney for the defendant in an action, within twenty days after the' service of the summons, serves upon the attorney for the plaintiff an order-extending the defendant’s time to answer, the failure of the defendant’s attorney to serve a notice of appearance does not entitle the plaintiff to enter judgment against the defendant by default, under section 1212 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
If, in such a case, an order extending the defendant’s time to appear is necessary to prevent the plaintiff from proceeding as upon a default, the order extend. ■. ing the time to answer may, by implication, be construed to extend also th& ' time to appear,
Parker, P.J., dissented.
Appeal by the plaintiffs, Lucius N. Littauer and another, from ■ an order of the Supreme Court, made at the St. Lawrence Special Term and entered in the office of the clerk of the county of Fulton on the 3d day of July, 1903, vacating a judgment theretofore entered by default against the defendant Stern.
The action was commenced by the service of a summons and complaint upon April 23, 1903. Upon the ninth of May following the defendant procured an order extending his time to answer twenty days. Copies of this order and of the affidavits upon which it was obtained were sent to the plaintiffs’ attorney with the following notice : “ Take notice: That the inclosed is a copy of an order this day granted by Judge Kellogg in the within action. Dated May 9th, 1903. Hiram 0. Todd, attorney for defendant. To Andrew J. Nellis, attorney for plaintiffs.” Ón May 14, 1903, judgment was entered as upon the defendant’s default, and an execution issued to the sheriff, who made a levy. Thereafter defendant made a motion to set asidé the judgment as “ irregular, it having been entered in the Fulton County Clerk’s office after an affidavit and order extending defendant’s time t.o plead, twenty days, had been duly served on the plaintiffs’ attorney and before said extension of time to plead had expired; and that said plaintiffs’ attorney had failed to return said' affidavit and order to defendant’s attorney with notice of any defect in said affidavit and order extending defendant’s time to plead.” From the order entered upon the granting of this motion plaintiffs have appealed.
Andrew J. Nellis, for the appellants.
Hiram, C. Todd and Edgar T. Brackett, for the respondent.

Opinion:
Smith, J.:
Section 421 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that the defendant's appearance must be made by serving upon the plaintiff's attorney, within twenty days after the service of the summons, a notice of appearance or a copy of a demurrer or of an answer. By section 422 of the Code it is provided that a defendant upon whom the plaintiff has served with the summons a copy of the complaint must serve a copy of his demurrer or answer upon the plaintiff's attorney before the expiration of the time within which the summons requires him to answer. By section 781 of the Code it is provided that where the time within which a proceeding in an action, after its commencement, must be taken has begun to run, and has not- expired, it may be enlarged, upon affidavit showing grounds therefor, by the court, or by a judge authorized to make an order in the- action. Section 1212 makes provision for the entry of judgment by default in case a defendant has made default either in appearing or pleading. Under the decision in the case of Paine Lumber Co. v. Galbraith (38 App. Div. 68) it would seem that it cannot be held 'that the service of an order extending the time to answer in itself constitutes an appearance under the Code as it now reads. In Bragelman v. Berding (15 Abb. Pr. [N. S.] 22) Judge Daly, at Special Term, says that he knows of no practice .which permits of an extension of time to appear.
The different provisions of the Code must be read together and must- be so construed as not to present an absurd system of practice. An order extending the defendant's time to answer or demur is wholly ineffective if the plaintiff is left at liberty to enter judgment by default notwithstanding such order. In common practice the service of a notice of appearance with the service of such an order would be regarded as surplusage, and the court cannot wholly ignore, in construing the effects of a practice provision of the statute, the commonly accepted interpretation of such provision by the bar of the State. I am not prepared to wholly accept the dictum of Judge Daly in the Bragelman Case (supra), that there is no authority for extending the time to appear. It would seem to me that- such authority came directly within the provisions of section 781 of the Oode. It would be difficult to conceive of a case which would move the court to grant an order extending the time to appear except where such order was made in connection with an order extending the time to answer, and an extension of time to answer may fairly be construed to contain by implication, if such be necessary, an extension of the time to appear, so far, certainly,- as to deny to a plaintiff the right to ignore the order extending the time to answer and to proceed as upon a default. Within this construction the defendant was never in default, and the order of the Special Term was right.
All concurred, except Parker, P. J., who dissented in opinion ; Houghtoe, J., not sitting.