Case Name: Socony-Vacuum Oil Company, Incorporated, v. John B. Aderhold
Court: Supreme Court of Texas
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1951-03-14
Citations: 150 Tex. 292
Docket Number: No. A-2790
Parties: Socony-Vacuum Oil Company, Incorporated, v. John B. Aderhold.
Judges: 
Reporter: Texas Reports
Volume: 150
Pages: 292–306

Head Matter:
Socony-Vacuum Oil Company, Incorporated, v. John B. Aderhold.
No. A-2790.
Decided March 14, 1951.
Rehearing overruled June 20, 1951.
(240 S. W., 2d Series, 751.)
Royston & Rayzor and Robert Eikel, all of Houston, for petitioner.
A seaman can recover maintenance only when he has actually incurred expenses, and the court erred in allowing him maintenance at times when he had other employment ashore, or was receiving aid from the G.I. fund to go to school, or was living at his mother’s home with no expense to himself. The Court also erred in allowing a judgment in excess of that asked for in the pleadings. Calmar Steamship Corp. v. Taylor, 303 U.S. 525, 82 L. Ed. 993; International & G. N. R.R. Co. v. Butcher, 98 Texas 462, 84 S.W. 1052; Johnson v. United States, 9 C.C.A. 1947, 160 Fed. 2d 789.
Mandell & Wright and Arthur J. Mandell, all of Houston, for respondent.
A shipowner is obligated to reimburse a seaman for incurred expenses and those for which he obligated himself to pay during disability which manifested itself while attached to his vessel, except for time in marine hospital or in service on another ship. Plaintiff’s pleadings under the cause of action for maintenance based on general maritime law amply supports the court’s judgment. Pacific Mail S. S. Co. v. Lucas, 264 Fed. 938; Emmons v. Pacific Indm. Co., 146 Texas 496, 208 S.W. 2d 884; Brinkman v. Oil Transfer Corp., 88 N. E. 2d 817; Jones v. Waterman Steampship Corp., 155 Fed. 2d 992, 996.

Opinion:
Mr. Justice Wilson
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The parties will be referred to according to their position in the trial court.
Plaintiff, formerly.a seaman on defendant's tanker, the SS SOCONA, filed two causes of action in this suit: first, for maintenance and cure; second, for damages caused by a fall from a shelf on the shelter deck. He contends that the shelf was an unsafe-place to work; that it was negligence to send him upon this shelf with this ship rolling; that it was negligence to have loose fittings stored on the shelf, and that it was negligence to allow a "gob of grease" upon which he slipped to remain on the shelf. The jury found negligence under the Jones Act, Title 46, Section 688, U.S.C.A., and awarded $35,907.00 for a back injury diagnosed by plaintiff's doctor as an herniated disc.
The trial court entered a judgment reflecting the jury's findings, which has been affirmed by the Court of Civil Appeals. 230. S. W. 2d 834.
In response to his action for maintenance and cure, the jury found that plaintiff was injured while employed on defendant's vessel; that. $4.00 a day was a reasonable compensation for maintenance and cure; and that plaintiff would reach his maximum recovery on January 15, 1950, beyond which his condition could not be improved by ordinary treatment known to medical science. The trial judge determined that plaintiff was entitled to 1098 days of maintenance and cure at $4.00 a day, or a total of $4396 in addition to the damages for negligence.
Defendaht contends that during a portion of the period for which maintenance and cure were allowed plaintiff was employed by others and supporting himself; that during another portion of this period plaintiff lived with his mother to whom he was not obligated to pay board and room; and that during another portion of this period plaintiff attended a mortuary school and drew veteran's subsistence payments from the Federal Government. Defendant attacks the entire sum on the ground that plaintiff did not offer positive proof that the sums he expended were reasonable. Defendant asks for a reduction of the sum to $2500 on the grounds that plaintiff plead maintenance and cure in the amount of $2500 and recovered $4396.
Maintenance and cure is an ancient remedy peculiar to Admiralty Law arising out of contract and not negligence. It is an obligation a vessel owes an injured or sick seaman. It was a forerunner of the modern Workmen's Compensation Law.
Plaintiff was discharged fit for duty by a government marine hospital soon after his fall. He sailed one voyage on the SS Cannon Beach. He testified that he was not able to do the work and has made no further attempt to work as a seaman. The trial court properly deducted from the computation of time for maintenance and cure the period plaintiff was in the marine hospital (at government expense) and the period of the voyage on the SS Cannon Beach. The Balsa, 10 Fed. 2d 408.
Within the period for which the trial court allowed maintenance and cure, plaintiff was employed by two different undertakers (one paid wages of $15.00 and the other $35.00 a week) as a part of and during his nine-month course at a mortuary school. Defendant contends that it is under no obligation for maintenance and cure while plaintiff worked for someone else. Plaintiff contends that maintenance and cure is a matured contractual obligation not affected by shore employment. When a seaman signs out on a subsequent voyage his maintenance and cure arising out of a former voyage is suspended during the subsequent voyage, for feeding and caring for him is the obligation of the second vessel, as the trial court correctly held in this case. The mere fact that an injured seaman attempts shore employment should not of itself deprive him of his maintenance and cure. It may raise a question of fact as to whether or not his injury during that time prevented him from supporting himself in whole or in part. The question to be determined is the extent to which the plaintiff's injuries prevented him from fully supporting himself by shore employment. In discussing maintenance and cure in Calmar Steampship Corp. v. Taylor, 303 U. S. 525, 82 L. Ed. 993, 58 Sup. Ct. 651, the court said: "The duty does not extend beyond the seaman's need." In The City of Avalon, 156 Fed. 2d 500, the court said: "The purpose of the historic implied contract to maintain an injured seaman arises from his helplessness during his injury, a right 'every court should watch with jealousy' to maintain. Story J., in Harden v. Gordon, 11 Fed. Cas. 480 No. 6047." In Loverich v. Warner Co., 118 Fed. 2d 690, the court specifically excluded periods of shore employment. To hold that shore employment as a matter of law barred recovery for maintenance and cure, as defendant urges, would discourage an injured seaman from attempting to support himhelf. On the other hand, to hold that sickness or injury arising during a voyage creates an obligation for maintenance and cure irrespective of shore employment, as plaintiff urges, would impose an unreasonable burden upon the vessel. This is a fact question which should be defined in the court's charge and submitted in appropriate special issues.
The specific facts which the jury should find in this type of case are:
(a) the time when maintenance and cure should begin;
(b) the time when maintenance and cure should terminate;
(c) the per diem allowance for maintenance and expenses of cure;
(d) the total amount of money which plaintiff has earned at the time of trial by his shore employment within the bracket of time defined in (a) and (b) above; and
(e) the total amount of expected future earnings from shore employment between the time of trial and the termination of maintenance and cure.
This will allow the trial court in entering judgment to deduct the amount of money earned by shore employment from such sum as may be allowed for maintenance. Of course, the trial court will exclude, as a matter of law, periods when a plaintiff is on other ships or in government hospitals.
Neither plaintiff nor defendant requested additions to the charge or special issues upon this testimony or objected to the court's failure to charge upon this subject. Since issues concerning the amount of short employment are actually part of the defense, they are issues raising an independent ground of defense and the burden rests upon the defense to request them. Not having requested issues in this case, the defense waived this independent defense. Rule 279, T.R.C.P.
Defendant's contention that it is relieved from the payment of maintenance and cure during the period when plaintiff was living with his mother is without merit. In Cortes v. Baltimore Insular Line, 287 U. S. 367, 77 L. Ed. 368, 53 Sup. Ct. 173, the court said, "If the seaman has been able to procure his maintenance and cure out of his own or his friend's money, his remedy is for the outlay". In Brinkman v. Oil Transfer Corp., 300 N. Y. 48, 88 N.E. 2d 817, 13 A.L.R. 2d 623, the court said, "It would, we think, badly serve the interests of these 'wards of the courts' to hold that an owner may escape his burden by standing aside while parents or relatives succor the ailing seaman."
Defendant's contention that it is relieved from the payment of maintenance and cure during the period when the plaintiff was receiving veteran's subsistence payments from the Federal Government is without merit. Plaintiff's rights under what is commonly called the GI Bill of Rights did not arise from his employment contract with defendant, were personal to him, and had no connection with his injury or with defendant's obligation by reason of that injury. This is a completely different situation from that in which plaintiff seeks other employment because other employment demonstrates his ability to work, thus going to the nature and extent of his disability.
Defendant's contention that plaintiff failed to offer proof that the amounts he expended for food and lodging were reasonable is without merit in view of the jury's finding of $4.00 a day. Plaintiff contended for $6.00 a day. In admiralty, if a defendant believes that amounts actually expended for maintenance and cure are unreasonable, he may offer rebuttal proof. The common law rule placing the burden upon plaintiff of producing independent proof of the reasonableness of expenditures for food, lodging, medicine, hospital expense, doctor's charges, etc., would place an undue burden upon seamen who may incur expense for maintenance and cure in seaports all over the world.
Defendant's contention that plaintiff is limited by his pleadings to a total of $2500 for maintenance and cure is correct. It is true that plaintiff pleads maintenance in the amount of $6.00 a day but this is not a liquidated demand because the pleading does not allege a definite number of days. The pleadings establish the boundary of a lawsuit. That boundary should be marked with corner posts "for all the world to see".
Plaintiff contends that since this involves a maritime law the special position of a seaman as a ward of the admiralty court entitles him to special consideration in construing his petition. Hopson v. Gulf Oil Corp., Texas Sup Ct., 150 Texas 1, 237 S.W. 2d 352, resolves this question against plaintiff and we here reaffirm that holding. In admiralty there is no jury. Since in admiralty a trained judicial mind finds the facts and fixes the damage, the practice has always been informal.
In an action brought for personal injuries when the Jones Act was new, a seaman sought to gain damages on the law side of the court under the Jones Act and collect them in admiralty through in rem proceeding against the ship. In Plamals v. The Pinar Del Rio, 277 U. S. 151, 48 Sup. Ct. 457, 72 Law Ed. 827, j;he court said:
" Seamen may invoke, at their election, the relief accorded by the old rules against the ship, or that provided by the new (the Jones Act) against the employer. But they may not have the benefit of both." (Parenthesis added.)
Likewise, when plaintiff elects to bring his action in a Texas court he must conform to Texas rules of pleading and practice just as any other litigant. A judgment must conform to the pleadings. Rule 301, TRCP. A judgment for money damages in excess of the amount pleaded cannot be supported and accordingly the judgment of the trial court should be reformed. City of Dallas v. Jones, 93 Texas 38, 49 S.W. 577 and 53 S.W. 377; Denman v. Stuart, 142 Texas 129, 176 S. W. 2d 730.
Turning now to the second cause of action for negligence, we find that the only questions brought forward are raised by defendant's objections to the form of the special issues.
Since the judgment can be supported under Special Issues Nos. 6 and 7, we will set out Special Issue No. 6, which is:
SPECIAL ISSUE NO. 6.
"Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that the sending of plaintiff, John B. Aderhold, to stand on the shelf in order to paint the overhead and side of the shelter deck of the SS SOCONA, while the vessel was on the high sea and rolling was negligence, as the term is herein defined to you?
"To which the jury answered We do'."
In response to Special Issue No. 7 the jury found that the facts found under Special Issue No. 6 were the proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries.
.Defendant objects to Special Issue No. 6 on the grounds that- it is argumentative and not an ultimate fact issue. This is not well taken. Plaintiff would not. have fallen had he not been upon the shelf.
Defendant's next objection is that the issue is a charge upon the weight of the evidence in that it assumes controverted facts. The evidence is uncontroverted that plaintiff was sent to work upon the shelf, that he did work upon the shelf, and fell from it. Defendant's witness. Calvin Gaeblor testified that he was the boatswain in charge of plaintiff and that he ordered plaintiff on to the shelf to paint. The evidence is also uncontroverted that the vessel was on the high sea (i.e., out of national waters) and rolling. There was a great deal of controversy over the degree of roll but the issue as framed did not comment upon the degree of rolling.
Defendant's last objection, and for us the most difficult attack on this issue, is that painting at sea in places like this shelf was normal routine sailor's work and as a matter of law defendant could not be negligent in. asking an employee to do work he was hired to do. A seaman is by definition a man who can move about and do his work while adjusting his bodily movements to the roll and pitch of the ship.
• Viewing the evidence most favorably to the plaintiff, as we must, we cannot hold as a matter of law that the ship could not be rolling enough at a given time for it to be negligence to require plaintiff at that time to paint on this shelf. Seamen stand in different position from other employees in their absolute duty to obey orders. Plaintiff had no choice. He had to get upon the shelf and paint. He could not quit and leave the ship and was subject to disciplinary action if he refused. The witness Charles E. Brady, Chief Mate of the Socona, made this a fact question when he testified as follows:
"Q. But I believe you testified that if the weather had been what you mariners described as rough you would not have sent a man on that shelf, or permitted him to be sent there?
"A. We would have found other work for him.
"Q. And would you have permitted one of your men to paint on that shelf?
"A. No." (S.F. p. 533.)
It is true that this same witness testified that rolling as the ship was at that time it was not dangerous for men to work on that shelf. Plaintiff testified that in his opinion the ship was rolling too much and that he protested to no avail when the boatswain ordered him upon the shelf.
The witness Glen A. Johnson testified as follows:
"It was pretty rough and the ship was rolling and pitching."
This, coupled with plaintiff's testimony, raised an issue of fact as to the amount of roll of the ship. The Court of Civil Appeals made a specific affirmative finding for the plaintiff on the sufficiency of the evidence. The volume of proof offered by defendant to the effect that the seas were normal was persuasive to this court. Still, a fact issue having been raised, the question was for the jury.
We conclude that Special Issues Nos. 6 and 7 will support the trial court's judgment.
Having determined that Special Issues Nos. 6 and 7 will support the judgment, it becomes unnecessary to discuss Special Issues 1 through 5 and 8 through 18.
The trial court's judgment and that of the Court of Civil Appeals on negligence should be affirmed and it is so ordered. The trial court's judgment and that of the Court of Civil Appeals on maintenance and cure should be reformed. It is ordered that plaintiff be allowed maintenance and cure in the sum of $2500 and no more. All costs of appeal are taxed against plaintiff. Rule 501, T.R.C.P.
Opinion delivered March 14, 1951.