Case Name: Jesse M. MONTAGUE, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1995-05-12
Citations: 656 So. 2d 508
Docket Number: No. 94-01131
Parties: Jesse M. MONTAGUE, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: FRANK, C.J., and DANAHY, J., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 656
Pages: 508–510

Head Matter:
Jesse M. MONTAGUE, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. 94-01131.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
May 12, 1995.
Rehearing Denied and Question Certified June 23, 1995.
James Marion Moorman, Public Defender, and Julia Diaz, Asst. Public Defender, Bar-tow, for appellant.
Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Ron Napolitano, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tampa, for appellee.

Opinion:
LAZZARA, Judge.
The appellant, Jesse M. Montague, challenges the sentences imposed after a jury trial for three counts of sexual activity with a child by a person in familial authority. Citing Karchesky v. State, 591 So.2d 930 (Fla. 1992), he argues the trial court erred in assessing one hundred twenty points for victim injury (forty points for each offense) based on penetration alone without any showing that the victim suffered "any specifically identified physical injury or trauma" as a result of these criminal acts. Under the circumstances presented in this case, we reverse and remand for the trial court to conduct a new sentencing hearing to determine the extent, if any, of victim injury as to each count.
As calculated, appellant's sentencing guidelines scoresheet placed him in the recommended range of seventeen to twenty-two years with a permitted range of twelve to twenty-seven years. If victim injury points are deleted, the recommended range drops three cells to seven to nine years with a permitted range of five and one-half to twelve years. Because the trial court sentenced appellant to three concurrent prison terms of twenty-five years, any error in the assessment of victim injury points obviously cannot be considered harmless.
The resolution of this case is made difficult by the fact that defense counsel did not object to the inclusion of victim injury points. Instead, as he announced to the trial court, he assumed the scoresheet had been calculated correctly. Although the failure to raise a contemporaneous objection does not preclude our independent review of this issue, e.g., Singleton v. State, 620 So.2d 1038 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993), the practical effect has been to leave the record barren as to the trial court's basis for concluding that the victim suffered physical injury or trauma as a result of the appellant's acts. See Jiles v. State, 652 So.2d 959 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995). Had such an objection been raised, it would have alerted the trial court to the necessity of receiving additional evidence at the sentencing hearing regarding the extent of victim injury, which otherwise may have been inadmissible at appellant's trial. Accordingly, as in Jiles, we remand this case for a de novo sentencing hearing to determine the extent of victim injury as to each count, after which the trial court may reassess victim injury points if appropriate. Accord Wilson v. State, 648 So.2d 1219 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995); cf. Kalina v. State, 596 So.2d 1114 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992); English v. State, 529 So.2d 1272 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988) (guidelines scoresheet to be recalculated on remand to reflect prior convictions state could verify).
To assist the trial court in this determination, we specifically hold that pregnancy followed by a miscarriage resulting from an unlawful sexual act constitutes physical injury or trauma which may be scored as victim injury under the sentencing guidelines. See Fenelon v. State, 629 So.2d 955 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993) (pregnancy and childbirth resulting from a sexual battery constitute physical injury). Of course, "the extent of actual injury may be debated by the parties[,]" subject to resolution by the trial court using the same standards applicable to non-sexual offenses. Morris v. State, 605 So.2d 511, 514 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992) (footnote omitted).
Reversed and remanded for new sentencing hearing.
FRANK, C.J., and DANAHY, J., concur.
. § 794.041(2)(b), Fla.Stat. (1991).
. We note, however, that because appellant committed his crimes prior to the effective date of section 921.001(8), Florida Statutes (Supp.1992), which abrogated the holding of Karchesky, the terms of this statute may not be retroactively applied to justify the assessment of victim injury points in this case. E.g., Ribas v. State, 641 So.2d 492 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994).
. We note, in that regard, that victim injury is not an element of the offenses appellant was charged with committing.
. To avoid any possibility of intradistrict conflict, we specifically agree with the Fenelon court's analysis that our earlier case of Thompson v. State, 483 So.2d 1 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985), approved, Karchesky v. State, 591 So.2d 930 (Fla.1992), is distinguishable and does not conflict with this holding.