Case Name: George H. JONES, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1974-04-10
Citations: 293 So. 2d 33
Docket Number: No. 43877
Parties: George H. JONES, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: ADKINS, C. J., and BOYD and DEKLE, JJ•, concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 293
Pages: 33–35

Head Matter:
George H. JONES, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. 43877.
Supreme Court of Florida.
April 10, 1974.
Michael J. Minerva, Asst. Public Defender, for appellant.
Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., and A. S. Johnston, Asst. Atty., Gen., for appellee.

Opinion:
McCAIN, Justice.
This cause appears before us for review from a ruling of the trial court upholding the constitutionality of F.S. § 847.05, F.S. A., thereby giving us jurisdiction pursuant to Article V, § 3(b)(1), Florida Constitution, F.S.A.
We agree with the trial court and affirm. To do otherwise would stagger the imagination and lay the groundwork for an entirely new type of public environment.
The facts are relatively simple. Appellant was initially arrested under the purview of the statute under attack, i. e., F.S. § 847.05 F.S.A., which provides:
"Any person who shall publicly use or utter any indecent or obscene language shall be guilty of a misdemeanor of the second degree. . . . "
Following this initial arrest, appellant was then arrested for resisting arrest with violence and for possession of less than 5 grams of marijuana. At trial by jury appellant was convicted of possession of marijuana alone. Thus, he now contends that if F.S. § 847.05, F.S.A., is unconstitutional (the argument being based on the statute's overbreadth), then the resultant search and seizure of the marijuana must fall as well as the conviction resulting therefrom.
Let us first examine the language publicly used by the appellant resulting in the initial arrest, which is as follows: "G-- D— Mother F-, F- Pigs and Son of a B-" Is this indecent or obscene language ? We find that it is.
Appellant relies heavily upon Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 92 S.Ct. 1103, 31 L.Ed.2d 408 (1972) and Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 62 S.Ct. 766, 86 L.Ed. 1031, as well as several other cited cases, however, we can afford him no comfort. For example, Chaplinsky, supra, held inter alia that the right of free speech is not absolute.
At common law any outrage of decency which was injurious to public acceptance was a crime. Winters v. People of State of New York, 333 U.S. 507, 68 S. Ct. 655, 92 L.Ed. 840 (1948). Our State by adopting the common law and through enactment of the statute under review only defines the crime with more specificity. No distortion of the Constitution (State or United States) should prevent our Legislature from keeping its people free from obscene and foul language.
The basic test is to determine whether the words of the statute establish a standard by which the uttered words convey to the transgressor (an average citizen of common understanding) a warning of that conduct prohibited by the statute. F.S. § 847.05, F.S.A., meets this test. Obviously impossible standards are not required. A boy flying a kite can haul it in, but you can not do this with flying words.
Upon careful review, we therefore determine that the statute, sub judice, comes within constitutional bounds and is not void for overbreadth, but to the contrary, contains language sufficient to convey to a person of common understanding its prohibition. State v. Magee, Fla. 1972, 259 So.2d 139; State v. Clein, Fla.1957, 93 So.2d 876; Cantwell v. Conn., 310 U.S. 296, 60 S.Ct. 900, 84 L.Ed. 1213, 128 A.L.R. 1352 (1940); Roth v. U. S., 354 U.S. 476, 77 S.Ct. 1304, 1 L.Ed.2d 1498 (1957).
Accordingly, F.S. § 847.05, F.S.A., is deemed constitutional and the ruling of the trial court is affirmed.
It is so ordered.
ADKINS, C. J., and BOYD and DEKLE, JJ•, concur.
ERVIN, J., dissents with opinion.