Case Name: William R. DANYLCHUK, Jr., Appellant, v. DES MOINES REGISTER & TRIBUNE CO., Appellee
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 1997-10-21
Citations: 128 F.3d 653
Docket Number: No. 97-1322
Parties: William R. DANYLCHUK, Jr., Appellant, v. DES MOINES REGISTER & TRIBUNE CO., Appellee.
Judges: Before RICHARD S. ARNOLD, Chief Judge, HEANEY and BEAM, Circuit Judges.
Reporter: Federal Reporter 3d Series
Volume: 128
Pages: 653–655

Head Matter:
William R. DANYLCHUK, Jr., Appellant, v. DES MOINES REGISTER & TRIBUNE CO., Appellee.
No. 97-1322.
United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.
Submitted Sept. 8, 1997.
Decided Oct. 21, 1997.
Kevin M. Kirlin, Des Moines, IA, argued, for appellant.
Theresa H. Kenninger, Des Moines, IA, argued (Michael A. Giudieessi and Elizábeth M. Misiaveg-Patel, on the brief), for appellee.
Before RICHARD S. ARNOLD, Chief Judge, HEANEY and BEAM, Circuit Judges.

Opinion:
RÍCHARD S. ARNOLD, Chief Judge.
This is an action for breach of a collective-bargaining agreement under § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29' U1S.C. § 185 (1994). The plaintiff, William L. Danylchuk, Jr., alleges that the defendant, Des Moines Register & Tribune Co., discharged him without good cause and is violating the agreement by refusing to submit the matter to binding arbitration. The company's defense turns on the fact that the union representing the.bargaining unit of which Danyl-' chuk was a member, Des Moines Mailers Union Local 358, has chosen not to pursue the arbitration remedy. The District Court held that the union, in choosing not to pursue the arbitration, had violated no duty owed to Danylehuk, and therefore granted the employer's motion for summary judgment. (The union itself, originally sued as an additional defendant, had earlier settled with thé plaintiff.)
The key question presented has to do with the union's conduct. Was the union in breach of its duty of fair representation? Tp show such a breach, plaintiff must demonstrate that the union has acted in án arbi trary or discriminatory manner, or in bad faith. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 186, 87 S.Ct. 903, 914-15, 17 L.Ed.2d 842 (1967); Smith v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 96 F.3d 1066, 1068 (8th Cir.1996). Moreover, the employer, in addition to asserting that the union's conduct was not to blame under this stringent standard, claims that no agreement to arbitrate existed in any event, the collecr tive-bargaining agreement between it' and the union having expired.
In brief, the relevant facts are these. There was an agreement between the union and the company including an arbitration clause. The agreement expired on February 3, 1994, but one of its provisions stated that "the terms and conditions of the expired Agreement shall be maintained until a new Agreement is reached or other action is authorized by the .,. Union or by the Company." After the agreement expired, the union took the position that the arbitration process, together with the other terms and conditions of the agreement, survived. The company took the position that it did not, on the ground, among others, that it, the company, had taken "other action" to terminate the agreement to arbitrate. We need not resolve this dispute in order to decide the present case. It is sufficient to note that the dispute existed, with the union and the company taking opposite sides.
On January 5, 1995, Danylchuk was fired from his job as a mailroom employee. The company claimed that he had failed to report for work twice within one year, in violation of mailroom office rules. Danylchuk asserted that his failure to report for work was not. voluntary and should be excused on account of illness. Representatives of the company and the union adjusted the grievance through steps 1 and 2 of the grievance procedure set forth in the expired Agreement. Thereafter, the company refused to submit the grievance to a board of arbitration. For a time, the union insisted that the arbitration clause' had survived the expiration of the agreement, and that the company had to abide by it, but, in the course of negotiations with the company for a new collective-bargaining agreement, the union ultimately abandoned its position. As part of these negotiations, and in order to secure a new agreement, the union dropped efforts to submit Danylchuk's case to binding arbitration, and consented to refer it instead to non-binding mediation. Danylchuk then brought this action, claiming that the union had abandoned him in breach of its duty of fair representation.
We affirm the judgment of the District Court, substantially for the reasons given in that court's opinion. William R. Danylchuk, Jr. v. Des Moines Register & Tribune Co., Civil No. 4-95-CV-10355 (S.D.Iowa, December 17, 1996). Danylchuk concedes that the union was not motivated by any animus against him. Brief for Appellant 17. The union simply decided that the welfare of its membership as a whole would be sufficiently advanced by .the conclusion of a new collective-bargaining agreement to justify its change of position with respect to Danylchuk's personal situation. The union, of course, has to represent all employees in the bargaining • unit. Whether Danylchuk's cause would ultimately have been upheld by the arbitrators was unknown. Whether the union's position that the company was obligated to arbitrate would ultimately prevail was also unknown. The company was interested in disposing of the Danylchuk matter as part of the over-all settlement. The union was willing, having balanced all the relevant considerations, to make this concession. We cannot say that this choice was arbitrary, discriminatory, or taken in bad faith. There is no evidence that any of those things occurred. The result, we recognize, was not favorable to Danylchuk as an individual, but a fiduciary who has to balance the interests of many beneficiaries will often have to,make such a choice. We hold that no breach of duty on the part of the 'union has been demonstrated, that there is no genuine issue of material fact, and that the company was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Affirmed.
. The Hon. Ronald E. Longstaff, United States District Judge for the Southern District of" Iowa.