Case Name: Watry, Appellant, vs. Carmelite Sisters of the Divine Heart of Jesus, Respondent
Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Wisconsin
Decision Date: 1957-01-07
Citations: 274 Wis. 415
Docket Number: 
Parties: Watry, Appellant, vs. Carmelite Sisters of the Divine Heart of Jesus, Respondent.
Judges: 
Reporter: Wisconsin Reports
Volume: 274
Pages: 415–422

Head Matter:
Watry, Appellant, vs. Carmelite Sisters of the Divine Heart of Jesus, Respondent.
December 5, 1956
January 7, 1957.
For the appellant there was a brief by Hanley & Wede-meyer, attorneys, and William P. McGovern and Robert P. Cavanaugh of counsel, all of Milwaukee, and oral argument by Mr. McGovern.
For the respondent there was a brief-by Lines, Spooner & Quarles, attorneys, and James C. Mallien of counsel, all of Milwaukee, and oral argument by Mr. Mallien.
Motion for rehearing denied, with $25 costs, on March 5, 1957.

Opinion:
Brown, J.
Appellant does not challenge the conclusion that respondent's liability is that of an owner of a public building subject to such an owner's obligations under the Wisconsin safe-place statute. The material parts of that statute are:
"Sec. 101.06 Employer's duty to furnish safe employment and place. . . . Every employer and every owner of a place of employment or a public building now or hereafter constructed shall so construct, repair, or maintain such place of employment or public building, . as to render the same safe."
Tlie word "safe" is defined in sec. 101.01 (11), Stats.:
"The term 'safe' . as applied to . a public building, shall mean such freedom from danger to the life, health, safety, or welfare of employees or frequenters, or the public, . as the nature of the employment, . or public building, will reasonably permit."
Wilson v. Evangelical Lutheran Church (1930), 202 Wis. 111, 230 N. W. 708, cited by appellant, did not touch on owner's obligations as master for the act or neglect of a servant. It held only that charitable corporations which are owners of public buildings are not exempt from the obligations imposed on owners, generally, by the safe-place statute. That we have held uniformly that the charitable corporation is not liable for the common-law negligence of its servants and agents is demonstrated by the following cases which are cited in appellant's brief to other points: Harnett v. St. Mary's Congregation (1956), 271 Wis. 603, 607, 74 N. W. (2d) 382; Grabinski v. St. Francis Hospital (1954), 266 Wis. 339, 342, 63 N. W. (2d) 693; Jaeger v. Evangelical Lutheran Holy Ghost Congregation (1935), 219 Wis. 209, 210, 262 N. W. 585. See also Baldwin v. St. Peter's Congregation (1953), 264 Wis. 626, 630, 60 N. W. (2d) 349, and Bachman v. Young Women's Christian Asso. (1922), 179 Wis. 178, 180, 181, 191 N. W. 751. Conceding, then, for the purpose of the argument that the janitor was negligent in absenting himself without providing a safeguard at the place where he was working, liability for the results of his negligence cannot be transferred to his employer, a charitable corporation, by the doctrine of respondeat superior. The liability, if any, must arise because the action of the employee, whether negligent or not, created a building which was unsafe within the terms of the statute.
In the contemplation of the statute the charitable corporation-owner is just like any other owner, so in our search for authority we need not confine ourselves to decisions dealing only with charitable corporations. In Holcomb v. Szymczyk (1925), 186 Wis. 99, 202 N. W. 188, and Baldwin v. St. Peter's Congregation, supra, we have held that a building is safe, within the meaning of the statute, if it is composed of proper materials and is structurally safe and the statute does not apply to temporary conditions having no relation to the structure of the building or the materials of which it is composed. In the Holcomb Case the owner was not liable when a platform became slippery from an accumulation of ice and plaintiff slipped, fell, and was injured. In Grabinski v. St. Francis Hospital, supra, storm water blew into the building making the floor slippery and a frequenter was injured. We observed that the water on the floor was a temporary condition unrelated to the structure or the materials of which it was composed, and decided as we did in Holcomb.
In Jaeger v. Evangelical Lutheran Holy Ghost Congregation, supra, we affirmed the obligation of an owner of a public building in his duty of maintenance to prevent the floors from becoming oily, greasy, and slippery. In Juul v. School Dist. (1918), 168 Wis. 111, 169 N. W. 309, a pupil fell over a pail containing hot water and chemicals to be used in cleaning the schoolroom floor. We held that "maintain" especially when used in connection with "construct" and "repair" must be held to relate to some act more closely related to the structure of a building than the operations involved in keeping its floors clean. Cronce v. Schuetz (1942), 239 Wis. 425, 1 N. W. (2d) 789, was an action by a frequenter against the owner of a building under the safe-place statute. At the time and place of plaintiff's fall a cleaning woman was mopping the floor which was wet with soapy water and was slippery. The jury found the owner failed to maintain the hall in a safe condition. We reversed a judgment for plaintiff saying that no claim was made that the floor was defective, only that it was slippery. "The safe-place statutes do not require the owner of the premises resorted to by the public to do the impossible or the unreasonable in maintaining its premises in a safe condition." (p. 429.) Also (p. 431) :
"Granting as we must that the scrubbing or mopping of the hallways in a public building is an indispensable act in the maintenance of the building, we think it cannot be held that the temporary wetting of the floor in the process of scrubbing or mopping, even though such a wet condition may tend to make the floor for the time being slippery, can be made the basis of liability against the owner."
As shown by the Juul and Cronce Cases, supra, a plaintiff seeking recovery under the safe-place statute from the owner of a public building must do more than show that the hazard from which he suffered was caused by a maintenance activity. He must show, also, that the defect is not due to a mere temporary condition attendant upon that activity and that the operation of whose details he complains is connected to a reasonable degree with the safety of the structure or the materials of which it is composed. We consider that the excess wax momentarily present during the waxing operation is like the soapy water temporarily on the floor in the Cronce Case and did not render the building unsafe within the meaning of sec. 101.06, Stats.
A caution must be noted, however, that respondent escapes liability in this action because it is a charitable corporation to whom in negligence matters the doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply. The ordinary owner of such a building on these facts would not be so fortunate.
By the Court. — Judgment affirmed.