Case Name: Hendrickson against The People
Court: New York Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1854
Citations: 10 N.Y. 13
Docket Number: 
Parties: Hendrickson against The People.
Judges: 
Reporter: New York Reports
Volume: 10
Pages: 13–51

Head Matter:
Hendrickson against The People.
Upon a trial for murder, statements made by the prisoner, as a witness at the coroner’s inquest upon the body of the deceased, before the witness had been charged with the murder, and before it was ascertained that a murder had been committed, are admissible in evidence against him. Selden and Allen, 3s., dissented.
Upon tlie trial of a man for the murder of his wife, it is proper for the prosecutor to show that the father of the deceased had so disposed of Iris estate by will, as to disappoint the expectations of the prisoner. Gardiner, Ch. J., and Selden, J., dissented.
The wife of .Hendrickson died suddenly on the morning of Monday, the 7th of March, 1853, at his residence in Bethlehem, Albany county. When the prisoner, who was occupying the same bed with her, gave the alarm to the family about two o’clock, the death had apparently taken place but a few minutes before. In the evening of the same day a coroner’s jury was empanneled, and Hendrickson was called and sworn as a witness upon theinquest. Upon his examination, being called upon to give an account of the circumstances attending the death of his wife, he stated that he had gone to church with her on the afternoon of the previous day, and returned home in the evening ; that his wife had for some weeks been in poor health, and had complained of much pain in her hips and loins, and that after returning from church she complained of more pain than usual; that between the hours of ten and eleven they retired to bed ; that about two o’clock in the morning, being awoke by a noise in the barn, as of horses kicking, he spoke to his wife; that receiving no answer he endeavored to awake her, and found her motionless and her face cold; that he then thought her dead, and alarmed the family. When interrogated as to having been in Albany, he said he had been there two weeks ago last Saturday; and when asked if he had not been there since, he said, “ Oh yes, I believe I was a week ago last Saturday,” as if correcting himself. Being still further interrogated as to whether he had been in the city since that, he said, “ I was last Saturday.” He was then asked what he went to Albany for; he stated that he took a load of timber to the mills there, and gave an account of the places he and his brother visited after disposing of the timber; he said that he did not remember going to Springsteed’s drug store, nor to any other drug store. When asked if he had been in a drug store, he started up, as if startled at the question; he had been rather in a reclining posture, as if he were grieving; he hesitated, and finally said he did not remember.
The prisoner was afterwards indicted for the murder of the deceased, and was tried at the Albany oyer and terminer, Hon. Richard P. Harvest, presiding judge. Upon the trial, which commenced on the 13th of June, 1853, and continued until the 7th of July, the public prosecutor offered to prove what the prisoner had said upon his examination before the coroner’s juiy. This was objected to as inadmissible, but admitted, and the prisoner’s counsel excepted.
The public prosecutor also offered in evidence the last will and testament of Lawrence Van Deusen, the father of the. prisoner’s wife, by which the testator had. devised all his estate to bis wife for life, with remainder over, one-lialf to his only son, and the other half to be- divided equally between his two daughters, Maria Hendrickson, who was the prisoner’s wife, and Susannah Hungerford. This evidence was objected to as irrelevant and improper; tho objection was overruled, and the prisoner’s counsel excepted.
The jury found the prisoner guilty, and he was sentenced to be hung. The supreme court at general term affirmed the judgment, and the prisoner brought error to this court.
John K. Porter for the plaintiff in error.
I. The statements drawn from the prisoner by his examination before the coroner’s jury were inadmissible and should have been rejected. I. Our law, contrary to the policy of the civilians, discourages a resort to self-criminative statements, and never seeks for them. ( Gilbert's Er., 139, 140, London ed. 1756 ; Best's Prin. of Ev., 418 ; Balt. Justice, 544; Spendlow v. Smith, Hob., 84; 1 Phil. Ev., 114, note; 1 Wheel. Cr. Cas., 55, 57, note ; Warringham's case, 6 British Cr. Cas., 447, note; 2 Hale's P. C., 225; Kelham's Britton, 49 ; 2 72. S., 40C, § 72; id, 708, §§ 14, 15, 16.) 2. It has always been required, therefore, that such statements, in order to be admissible, should be perfectly free and voluntary. (Best's Prin. of Ev., 418, 66 Law Library; 1 Greenl. \Ev., §§ 193, 219, 225, 6; Taylor's case, 5 Cush., 605, 610.) (1.) The reason is, that the law is especially careful not to suffer a man to be made the deluded instrument of his own conviction; one of its primary maxims being nemo tenctur pyodere seipsum vel accusare. ( Gilbert's Ev., 139, 140, London ed. 1756; 2 Hawlc. P. C., 595, § 34, Curw. ed.; Balt. Justice, 544; 2 Stark. Ev., 29, Phil. ed. 1837; 1 Leach's Cr. Cas., 293, ed. 1815; 1 Greenl. Ev., %% 225, 6 ; 1 Wheel. Cr. Cas., 69, note; 1 It. S., 94, § 13, bill of rights; Hard. R., 139, per Hardres, arg.) (2.) And hence, if there be reason even to suspect that the maxim has Been violated by any influence, however minute, the statements are to be rejected. ( Warrin gharri’s case, 2 Denn., 447, note ; S. C., 6 British Cr. Cas., 445, .note; Field’s case, Peck's R., 140 ; 2 Hawk. P. C., 595, (x) 34, Curw. ed.; Lewis’ case, 25 Eng. Com. L. R., 383, 4, per Gurney, B.; Thompson's case, 1 Leach’s Cr. Cas-., 291, 293; Ward's case, 15 ■ Wend., 231; Taylor’s case, 5 Cush., 605, 610; Fleming’s case, 1 Arms., Macart. Ogle, 330; Regina v. Garner, 1 Denn., ■ 329; 5 British Cr. Cas., 335; 1 Phil. Sf Amos, 427, note 5.) 3. The above cases relate to instances where mere moral influences, such as promises, &c., have been used. If the influence of legal forms has been employed, especially if the constraint of an oath was imposed, the rule is still more exacting. (1 Grecnl. Ev., §§ 225, 6; Rivers’ case, 32 Eng. Com. L. R., 486; Spendlow v. Smith, Hob., 84; Sir John Kelynge's R., 19; Broughton’s case, 7 Iredell, 96 ; Harman’s case, 4 Barr, 269, 270, 1.) (1.) It has been applied in those cases where the prisoner was arrested or suspected, and under the constraint of an oath, though privileged. (1 Grecnl. Ev., § 225; 2 Russ, on Cr., 650, Am. ed. 1836; 2 Stark. Ev., 29, Phil. ed. 1837; Rivers’ case, 7 Carr. Sf Payne, 177; Pikesley’s case, 9 id., 124; Smith’s case, 1 Stark., 242; Harman’s case, 4 Barr, 269.) (2.) So even where no oath was imposed, but the answers were to questions put by one having seeming legal authority to do so. ( Wilson’s case, 1 Holt, 597 ; 2 Russ, on Cr., 649, 650, Am. ed. 1836 ; 2 Stark. Ev., 29, note h, Phil, ed. 1837; 1 Phil. Ev., 114, note; Ry. Sf Mood. N. P. Cas., 432.) 4. In the following cases, the testimony given before the coroner’s jury, by the party afterwards charged with the crime, was rejected on the trial as inadmissible. (Owen’s case, 9 Ca.rr. Payne, 238, Gurney, B.; Wheeley’s case, 8 id., 250, Alderson, B.; note to Ha,worth’s case, 4 id., 254, Park, J.) (1.) In neither of these cases was the party, at the time he testified, a prisoner charged with the crime. In one of the cases, he was in custody as a witness, though the fact did not appear, and was not even in that case the ground of the decision. (1 Burns' Justice, 695,858,22ded.; Stat. 8 EdwardTV., “ de officio coronatoris," 2 Hawk. P. C., 78; Joy on Confessions, 68.) (2.) In the previous case of Owen {supra), the point was not decided, but merely “ reserved” for the consideration of the judges. Besides, it was conceded by Williams, J., that the reception of the evidence was against the previous dgcisions. In the subsequent case of Owen the evidence Ywrejected. 5. Evidence of this kind was excluded on the same principle, and under circumstances precisely analogous, in Lewis' case {6 Carr. 8f Payne, 161); Davis' case (6 id., 177). 6. The foregoing cases establish that, upon the trial of an indictment, the declarations of the party accused are inadmissible, if made when his mind was disturbed by apprehensions of a criminal charge, and under the constraint of an oath administered with apparent legal authority, upon an inquisition for the crime, by those having power to accuse and commit him as the culprit. Under such circumstances the examination is deemed compulsory in all cases, unless it appear either that he was advised of his privilege to decline answering and chose not to avail himself of the right, or that he voluntarily availed himself of the oath to make a false accusation against an innocent party. The only question which is left in doubt by the authorities is whether, even in those cases, the evidence should be received or rejected. Hendrickson attended in obedience to the mandate of a subpoena, and was sworn by the coroner, who had authority to enforce obedience by commitment, and before the jury who were making inquisition for the crime. He was not advised of his privilege, nor did he seek to shelter himself by accusing the innocent. (2 R. S., 743, §§ 3-7.) 7. There is not a single reported adjudication in conflict with the foregoing proposition; and every case cited for the prosecution is clearly distinguishable from the case at bar. {Merceron's case, 2 Stark., 366; Haworth's case, 4 Carr. 8f Payne, 254 j Swatkins' case, 19 E. C. L., 520 ; Tubby's case, 5 Carr. Sf Payne, 530 ; Sandys' case, 1 Carr. Sf Marsh., 345; Wheater's case, 2 Moody's C. C., 45; Broughton's case, 7 Iredell, 96.) 8. The argument that the evidence of Hendrickson was voluntary, because he might have refused to answer if he had been aware of his privilege, is at war with all the cases. (1.) It confounds the distinction between the case of a mere witness, sworn as such, between third parties, and that of one who is required to swear on an inquisition as to the very crime, and to aid those making search by legal authority in detecting him as the criminal whom it is their duty to arrest and accuse. (2.) In both cases the privilege exists; but in the last, the party, perplexed and appalled by the impending danger, is in no condition to deliberate and decide as to his legal rights, and, unless warned, is not deemed to have waived them. (3.) This rule is maintained alike for the protection of the innocent and the guilty. Neither is to be deluded into self-destruction by the forms of law. (4.) The theory of the prosecution is that Hendrickson was guilty; and yet it is claimed that he is to be deemed a mere witness, called to testify upon an issue to which he was indifferent. (5.) The inquisition assumed that crime was suspected; it was conceded that he was alone with the deceased when she died; he attended as a witness under legal compulsion; a surgeon was appointed to record his evidence ; he was interrogated as to his going to the Albany drug stores; and yet it is insisted that he had no reason to suppose that there was any suspicion either of the crime or the culprit. (6.) These are just the circumstances in which the rules of artificial presumption have no application, and in which the whole theory of our law, written as well as unwritten, requires the party to be advised of his rights before he shall be deemed to have waived them. ' (2 R. S., 708, <j§ 14, 15; Wheeley’s case, supra.) (7.) To hold that such statements are free and voluntary, merely because the witness was privileged, though under suspicion and sworn, is contrary to reason, and to eveiy case where the the question has been adjudicated. (1 Greenl. Ev., %% 225, 6; Lewis’ case, 6 Carr. Sf Payne, 161; Davis’ case, 6 id., 177; Wheeley’s case, 8 id., 250; Owen’s case, 9 id., 238; 19 Eng. Com. L. R., 371, note a; 2 Russ, on Cr., 650, Am. ed. 1836; Rivers’ case, 7 Carr. Sf Payne, 177 ; Smith’s case, 1 Stark., 242; Harman’s case, 4 Barr, 269; Pikesley’s case, 9 Carr. Sf Payne, 124.) 9. The present case is directly within the reason of the principle of exclusion, and the circumstances of constraint are stronger than in those cited. (1.) The attendance of the accused was coerced, and he could not lawfully refuse to be sworn. (2 R. S., 742, 3, §§ 3, 4; id., 241, § 85 ; Cow. Sf Hill’s Notes, 735 ; 1 Denio, 322, 3.) (2.) The law thus placed him in a position where he had reason to believe he was bound to answer, and no one can know that he was aware of his privilege. (Cases cited, supra; 2 Hawk. P. C., 594, § 34, Curw. ed.; 2 Denn., 447 [6 British C. C., 445], note Warringham’s case ; 1 Greenl. Ev., § 219; Best’s Prin. oj Ev., 418; 2 East’s P. C., 657.) (3.) If he had been advised of his privilege, he was constrained to exercise it under circumstances of mental torture, apprehension and perplexity, hindering the calm and free exercise of his faculties. (1 Greenl. Ev., %% 225, 6; 2 Hawk. P. C., 595, § 34, Curw. ed.) (4.) If he spoke, except to declare his criminality and claim his privilege, he was not free to say what he deemed for his own interest; but, if guilty, was obliged to divulge it, or encounter the penalty of peijury. (1 Greenl. Ev., 225, 6 ; 2 Hawk. P. C., 595, § 26, Curw. ed.) 10. But if we concede it to be even doubtful whether the statements in question are to be deemed free and voluntary, either in point of law or fact, they must be rejected. (9 Cow., 707, 720; 1 Gilh. Ev., 216, 17; 6 British Cr. Cas., 445, note; 2 Denn., 447, note, S. C.)
II. But if there was nó other question in the case, the defendant is clearly entitled to a new trial on the ground that the court admitted the will of Lawrence Van Deusen as competent evidence of the guilt of the prisoner. 1. The effect of holding this evidence to be relevant was to set the jury to speculating as to the motive of the marriage, the probable expectations of the prisoner, and the question whether the will was more or less favorable than he anticipated. 2. It also set them to speculating on the probability of an assumed resentment towards the father, on account of the will, operating as a motive to the murder of the daughter, an innocent and common sufferer. 3. If the indictment had been for the murder of the tenant for life, the evidence might possibly have been relevant, as in that case an intervening estate would have been removed; but here it was clearly irrelevant. 4. The jury were left to infer a motive to murder his wife from the very fact which made him the loser by her death, as it deprived him of a tenancy by the curtesy. (4 Kent’s Corn., 29, 30.) 5. The reasons assigned by the authorities for granting a new trial, where evidence of this kind has been introduced, apply in this case with peculiar force. {Myers v. Malcolm, 6 Hill, 292, 296, note b ; Cunliff v. Mayor, Sfc., 2 Barb., 194, per Harris, J.; Farmers’ Bank v. Whinfield,, 24 Wend., 426, 7; 1 Greenl. Ev., § 52.)
Hamilton Harris for the defendants in error,
I. The statements made by Hendrickson at the coroner’s inquest were properly received in evidence against him on the trial. 1. Confessions made by a party, freely and voluntarily, are admissible in evidence against him. This is the general rule. {Hawk. P. C., B. 2, ch. 46, §§ 31, 32, 33; Lambe’s case, 2 Leach C. C., 552, 4íA ed.; 1 Phil. Ev., 110, 5th Am. ed.; 1 Greenl. Ev., § 215; 2 Russ, on Cr., 822, 7th Am. ed.) (1.) The only exception to this rule is when the confession has been made upon a judicial examination. In that case the examination of a prisoner or party accused of crime cannot be given in evidence, unless it has been taken in pursuance of the statute. {2R. S., 891, §§ 13,14,15,16, 4th ed.; 1 Phil. Ev., 402, 6th Am. ed.; 1 Greenl. Ev. §§ 224, 5; Rivers’ case, 7 Carr. Sf Payne, 177; Smith’s case, 1 Stark., 242; Lewis’ case, 6 Carr. 8f Payne, 161; Pikesley’s case, 9 id., 124; Baldres' case, 2 jVenn. Cr. Cas., 420.) (2.) It is not a valid objection that a confession has been made when the party was under oath as a witness. (2 Stark. Ev., 50, 4th Am. ed.; Roscoe’s Cr. Ev., 48, 4th Am. ed.; 1 Phil. Ev., 404, 6th Am. ed. ; 2 Russ, on Cr., 857; 1 Greenl. Ev., §225 ; Joy on Confessions, 8¡c., 62; Merceron’s case, 2 Stark., 366; Haworth’s case, 4 Carr. 8f Payne, 253; Tubby’s case, 5 id., 530; Owen's case, 9 id., 238 ; Sandys' case, 1 Carr. 8f Marsh., 345; Wheater’s case, 2 Moody’s C. C., 45; Broughton's case, 7 Iredell, 96.) 2. The statements of the prisoner before the coroner were made freely and voluntarily, and were not procured or influenced by hope or fear. They were statements of a witness, not of a prisoner, before a coroner’s jury, not before a committing magistrate, when not in custody or charged with crime, and without obj ection. They were therefore extra-judicial, and made voluntarily. 3. The statements were not in the nature of a confession, and therefore it is immaterial whether they were voluntary or not. (State v. Broughton, 7 Iredell, 96.)
II. The proof of the will of Lawrence Van Deusen (the prisoner’s father-in-law) was not irrelevant. 1. It was objected to solely on the ground that it was irrelevant. 2. It was competent, as showing or tending to show that the prisoner had been disappointed in any pecuniary expectations which he had entertained from his alliance with the family. 3. It was competent as tending to show that there was no tie of interest between prisoner and his wife. (State v. Watkins, 9 Conn., 47 ; State v. Zellers, 2 Halst., 220, 230, 234; 1 Greenl. Ev., § 51.)

Opinion:
Parker, J.
The general rule is, that all a party has said, which is relevant to the questions involved in the trial, is admissible in evidence against him. The exceptions to this rule are where the confession has been drawn from the prisoner by means of a threat or a promise, or where it is not voluntary, because obtained compulsorily or by improper influence. It is not claimed in this case that the statement in question was obtained by means of any promise or threat or by any inducement whatever; nor is it supposed that there was any compulsion or any influence affirmatively exercised upon the mind of the prisoner, beyond what is sought to be inferred from the fact that he was required to testify as a witness. But it is contended that because he was so required to testify, upon a general inquiry into the cause of the death of his wife, his statement was not voluntary and should have been excluded. The record shows that the objection at the trial 'was placed only on the ground that the statement was not voluntary. Hendrickson was not in custody. He made no objection to being sworn as a witness or to answering any question that was put to him. He was treated, in every respect, like the other witnesses. At the time of his examination, no circumstances had been developed warranting a suspicion against him. The post mortem examination did not take place till the next day, and it was not until the second day after his testimony before the coroner's inquest that he xvas arrested under a warrant, issued, not by the coroner, but by a police justice of the city of Albany. His statement as a witness was in no respect an admission of guilt. On the contrary, it was a denial of material facts attempted, on his trial, to be established by other witnesses. His testimony was calculated to ward off suspicion from himself, not to attract it towards him. The question presented, therefore, is, whether, under the circumstances, the statement of a witness is to be excluded on the ground that it was not voluntarily made. Several English nisi prius decisions were cited on the argument, which it is necessary to examine.
Merceron's case (2 Starkie, 366), decided in 1818, was an indictment against a magistrate for having corruptly and improperly granted licenses to public-houses which were his own property. .Abbott, J., permitted the prosecution to prove what the defendant had said in the course of his examination before a committee of the House of Commons, appointed for the purpose of inquiring into the police of the metropolis, though it was objected that the statement had been made under a compulsory process from the House of Commons, and that the declarations were not voluntary.
In the case of Haworth (4 Carr. & Payne, 254), decided in 1830, it appeared that, before the prisoner was charged or suspected, a person named Shearer had been examined on the charge of forgery, and that the prisoner was called as a witness and his deposition taken. The counsel for the prosecution proposed to read this deposition as evidence against Haworth, which was objected to. Justice J. Parke said: " I think that I ought to receive this evidence. The prisoner was not, when he made this deposition, charged with any offence, and he might, on that as well as on any other occasion when called as a witness, have objected to answer any question which might have a tendency to expose him to a criminal charge; and not having done so, his deposition is evidence against him."
In a note by the reporter to this case it is said that, in a case tried at Worcester, where it appeared that a coroner's inquest had been held on the body of A, and it not being suspected that B was at all concerned in the murder of A, the coroner had examined B upon oath as a witness, Parke, J., would not allow the deposition of B, so taken on oath on the coroner's inquest, to be read in evidence on the trial of an' indictment afterwards found against B for the same murder.
I cannot find that this anonymous case is anywhere reported more fully. It would be much more satisfactory to know the particular circumstances of the case and the grounds for the decision. Without them, it is entitled to but little weight as authority. And so it seems to have been viewed by Littledale, J., in the case of Rex v. Clewes, tried before him during the same year, and reported, as to other points, in 4 Carr. & Payne, 221. In Mr. Greaves' note, w (2 Russ. on Cr., 860, 7th Am. ed.), on the authority of his manuscript notes, he says the grand jury asked Littledale, J., " Can evidence of a prisoner, who was examined on oath before the coroner as a witness, be admitted as evidence against the same person when subsequently indicted for the murder of the person on whose body the inquest was held ?" Littledale, J., answered in the affirmative; when, the case referred to in the anonymous note being mentioned, the judge (Littledale) directed the grand jury to receive the evidence and leave the point for discussion on the trial.
Tubby's case (5 Carr. & Payne, 530), tried in 1833, was an indictment for burglary. Andrews, for the prosecution, proposed to read a statement made upon oath by the prisoner at a time when he was not under any suspicion. Prendergast objected that it was a violation of the rule of law which held that a prisoner could not be sworn. Vaughan, B., said: "I do not see any objection to its being read, as no suspicion attached to the party at the time. The question is, is it the statement of the prisoner under oath ? Clearly it is not, for he was not a prisoner at the time he made it." In Rex v. Lewis (6 Carr. & Payne, 161), decided also in 1833, several persons, one of whom was the prisoner, were summoned before the committing magistrate touching the poisoning of C. No person was then specifically charged with the offence. The prisoner was sworn and made a statement, and at the conclusion of the examination she was committed for trial. It was held that this statement was not receivable in evidence against the prisoner. Gurnet, B., said this case was quite distinguishable from that of Rex v. Tubby, and that under the circumstances he should have agreed with his brother Vaughan; "but," he said, "this being a deposition made by the prisoner at the same time as all the other depositions on which she was committed, and on the very same day on which she was committed,' I think it was not receivable. I do not think this examination perfectly voluntary." It has been supposed the prisoner was brought before the magistrate on a charge or suspicion of guilt, but Mr. G-reaves says in his note (2 Russ. on Cr., 857, note n, 7th Am. eel.) that he was counsel in this case, and that the prisoner was summoned in the ordinary way, as a person who could give some evidence touching the matter, and not because any suspicion attached to her. In Rex v. Davis (6 Carr. & Payne, 177), also decided in 1833, the daughter had been examined as a witness before the committing magistrate against her father, and was then committed as a joint receiver of stolen goods with him. Her statement was excluded as evidence against her on her trial, by G-üENEY, B., on the same ground as in Rex v. Lewis. In regard to this case, Mr. G-reaves says (2 Russ. on Cr., 857, note n, 7th Am. ed.) that the ground of the decision was, not that there was a suspicion in the mind of the magistrate, nor even that the prisoner might be aware that there was such á suspicion, but that the prisoner had been examined on oath as a witness; and says that, after the decision in the late case of Rex v. Wheater (to which I shall refer hereafter), it may be doubted whether that was a sufficient reason for rejecting the deposition. In Regina v. Wheeley (8 Carr. & Payne, 250), decided in 1838, a party who was charged with murder made a statement before the coroner at the inquest, which was taken down. The paper purported that the statement was made on oath. Aedeeson, B., held, on the trial of the party for murder, that the statement was not receivable, and that parol evidence was not admissible to show that no oath had in fact been administered to the prisoner. If this was a case of the examination of a prisoner, and not of a witness, as it has been understood to be by commentators (2 Russ. on Cr., 855, 860, and notes), its correctness will not be questioned, and it can have no bearing upon the question now before us. The next case in order • of time was Regina v. Wheater (2 Moody's Cr. Cas., 45), decided in 1838, which was an indictment for forgery. On the trial, before Coleridge, J., the examination of the prisoner, previously taken on oath, as a witness, before the commissioners of bankruptcy, concerning the bills alleged to be forged, was held admissible as evidence against him. The opinion of all the judges was desired on this point, and the case was argued before all the judges except Park, J., and Gurney, B., who held that the evidence had been properly received. In Regina v. Owen et al. (9 Carr. & Payne, 83), tried in 1839, the defendants were indicted for rape. The prosecution offered to prove the statements made by Owen on oath, at the inquest held on the body of the person ravished, while the defendants were in custody. The counsel for the prisoner admitted that, where witnesses had been examined voluntarily, their depositions might afterwards be read against them, but objected that these defendants were in custody, and cited the case of Wheeley, where Baron Alderson rejected the deposition because it was on oath and taken while in custody. But Williams, J., said: " I know that my brother Alderson did so, but I also know that there has been a reaction in opinion, if I may be allowed the expression. I shall therefore receive the evidence, and reserve the point, if it shall become necessary." It is said that Baron Alderson, who had tried Wheeley's case, was in the next court at this time, and that Williams, J., had consulted with him in an earlier part of the case. (Joy on Confessions, 62.)
In Regina v. Owen and others (9 Carr. & Payne, 238), the same defendants were tried in 1840 for the murder of the person ravished; and Gurney, B., refused to receive in evidence the depositions, on oath, of the prisoners taken before the coroner's inquest, though it must have been known they had been received on the previous trial of the same prisoners for rape. Baron Gurney, however, cited Wheater's case, then recently tried before Coleridge, and admitted he could not, on principle, see the distinction between that and some of the other, cases. In the late case of Regina v. Sandys (1 Carr. $ Marsh., 345), decided in 1841, the prisoner was tried for murder, and Erskine, J., admitted in evidence her deposition taken at the coroner's inquest, and reserved the points for the consideration of the fifteen judges. All the decisions to which I have referred, except that in the case of Wheater, were made at nisi frites, and their general current is certainly in favor of the admissibility of the evidence in question; but to give them, or any of them, much weight as authority, it is necessary to understand the reasons that governed, and to see on what principles they are based. Without that, decisions made at the assizes, necessarily without time for consultation and examination, can avail but little in deciding a controverted question of law. So far as the evidence was rejected on the ground that the statement was on oath, as in the case of Davis and others, it must now be regarded as settled by the decision of all the judges in Wheater's case, above cited, that that, of itself, constitutes no objection. Mr. Joy, in his treatise on the admissibility of confessions, reviews all the decisions at nisi prives apparently conflicting, and comes to the conclusion that the decision, by all the judges, in Wheater's case, establishes the principle that a statement, not compulsory, made by a party not at the time a prisoner under a criminal charge, is admissible in evidence against him, although it is made upon oath. (Joy on Confessions, % 8, 62.)
It is now regarded as a well settled rule, and recognized in the elementary books, that where a witness answers questions upon examination on a trial tending to criminate himself, and to which he might have demurred, his answers may be used for all purposes. (2 Stark. Ev., 50; Roscoe's Cr. Ev., 45.) Such answers are deemed voluntary, because the witness may refuse to answer any question tending to criminate him. (1 Greenl. Ev., % 225.) If, however,he should be compelled to answer, after claiming his privilege, his answer will be deemed compulsory and cannot be given in evidence against him. When the evidence offered has been rejected on the ground that the statement was made when the prisoner was in custody charged with crime, as in Wheeley's case and Owen's case, it seems to me clear that it was properly excluded, because these were cases of the examination of a prisoner, not of a witness. In such cases it is a judicial examination, and it should not be on oath, and certain precautions for the protection of the accused are always to be observed. In this state such examinations are regulated by statute. (2 R. S., 794, 2d ed.) But neither is the statute, nor were the common law rules of which it is declaratory, applicable to any examina* tion except that of a person brought before a magistrate on a charge of crime. All other examinations are classified as extrajudicial (1 Greenl. Ev., § 216), and are to be conducted like other cases of the examination of witnesses. It is evident that in deciding the case of Lewis, above cited, the mind of the presiding judge was influenced, to some extent, by the supposition that the facts peculiar to it gave to the testimony the character of a judicial examination; for Baron Gurney lays stress upon the facts that the deposition was made at the same time as all the other depositions on which she was committed. In both these resemblances to a judicial examination, the case of Lewis differs from that now before us; for Hendrickson was arrested on a complaint made before a different magistrate and on a subsequent day. It is unnecessary, therefore, to express an opinion as to the soundness of the reasons given by Baron Gurney for his decision in the case of Lewis. The examination of a witness before a coroner's inquest bears even less resemblance to a judicial examination than that taken before a committing magistrate or a grand jury. A coroner's inquest may be held in all cases of sudden death; but an examination before a committing magistrate or a grand jury takes place on complaint made that a crime has been committed. It is only where a person is charged with crime, and is examined with regard to the truth of such charge, that his examination can be considered judicial.
In the case of the State v. Broughton (7 Iredell, 96), decided in North Carolina in 1846, where the grand jury were investigating an offence with a view to discover the perpetrator, and the person who was subsequently indicted was examined before them on oath, and charged another with the commission of the offence, it was held that the examination might be given in evidence against the prisoner on the trial of his indictment. Ruffin, Ch. J., said, however, that if the evidence given by the prisoner had been a confession of his guilt, and the grand jury had found a presentment on it, the court would have held that it could not be given in evidence against him. It is not material to the decision of this case to inquire whether the chief justice was right or not in the distinction he made between a confession, and a statement not a confession, because neither in that case nor in the one now before us was there any confession. Both statements tended to turn attention away from the witness. I am inclined, however, to think the chief justice erred, in the case of Broughton, in the reason assigned for his decision; for the law seems to be, that the rule as to confessions applies not only to direct confessions, but to every other declaration tending to implicate the prisoner in the crime charged, even though in terms it is an accusation of another, or a refusal to confess. (1 Greenl. Ev., § 219, note 2, and cases cited.) But while the decision in the case of Broughton is in accordance with the ruling in the case before us, the reason given for that decision, if it be erroneous, does not conflict with such ruling. Independent of any supposed authority, I do not see how, upon principle, the evidence of a witness, not in custody and not charged with crime, taken either on a coroner's inquest or before a committing magistrate or a grand jury, could be rejected. It ought not to be excluded on the ground that it was taken on oath. That reason would exclude also the statements of witnesses on the trials of issues. The evidence is certainly none the less reliable because taken under the solemnity of an oath. No injustice is done to the witness, for he was not bound to criminate himself, nor to answer in regard to any circumstance tending to do so. If it is a good ground of exclusion, that the statement was made as a witness on oath, then the rule of law that protects a witness from criminating himself is of no value, and may at once be abrogated. The rule was adopted upon the supposition that the answer might be introduced in evidence against the witness. If it cannot be, the witness has no longer any reason for claiming his privi-. lege. Nor can the éxclusion of the evidence depend on the question whether there was any suspicion of the guilt of the witness lurking in the heart of any person at the time the testimony was taken. That would be the most dangerous of all tests, as well because of the readiness with which proof of such suspicion might be procured, as of the impossibility of refuting it. Besides, the witness might have no Knowledge of the existence of any suspicion, so that his mind could not be affected or his testimony influenced by it. It is only when he is charged with crime, and examined on such charge, that there is good reason for treating him as a party to the proceeding. The common law has been as tender of the rights of witnesses as of parties. It is the policy of the common law never to compel a person to criminate himself. That policy secures as well to a witness as to a party the privilege of declining to answer. The former is supposed to know his rights; the latter is to be specially instructed in regard to them by the presiding magistrate. But if either fail to avail himself of the privilege, his answer is deemed voluntary, and may be used as evidence. It is only upon a judicial examination, viz., in the case provided for by statute, when the prisoner is brought before a magistrate, charged with crime, that the preliminaries required by the statute are to be observed and the examination taken without oath. All other examinations are extrajudicial. The former is the examination of a party; the latter of a witness. In all cases, as well before coroners' inquests as on the trial of issues in court, when the witness is not under arrest, or is not before the officer on a charge of crime, he stands on the same footing as other witnesses. He may refuse to answer, and his answers are to be deemed voluntary, unless he is compelled to answer after having declined to do so; in the latter case only will they be deemed compulsory, and excluded. Applying these rules to the case before us, Hendrickson's answers before the coroner's inquest were voluntary, and were properly received as evidence against him.
The second ground on which the prisoner asks a reversal of the judgment is, that the will of Lawrence Yan Deusen, the father of the deceased, was improperly admitted in evidence. This evidence was received as bearing upon the question of motive. If it tended in the least to show that the prisoner-had been disappointed in the pecuniary expectations he had entertained from his alliance with the family, in not being able to realize them till after the death of his wife's mother, and then not in an equal proportion with the brother; or, if it tended to show how little property he might expect from his wife, if she lived; in either case, whether the supposed motive was resentment or avarice, it was properly received. It was competent to show whether the prisoner would gain or lose by the death of the deceased, and to compare the small amount, expected to be realized at a distant day, with the intermediate burthen of her maintenance. Taken in connection with the previous testimony, tending to show a want of affection on the part of the prisoner towards his wife, this evidence was clearly admissible. Considerable latitude is allowed on the question of motive. Just in proportion to the depravity of the mind, would a motive be trifling and insignificant which might prompt to the commission of a great crime. We can never say the motive was adequate to the offence; for human minds would differ in their ideas of adequacy, according to their own estimate of the enormity of crime, and a virtuous mind would find no motive sufficient to justify the felonious taking of human life. I think the evidence of the will was properly received. It was the province of the jury to determine the weight to which it was entitled. My conclusion is, that there was no error committed on the trial, and that the judgment of the supreme court should be affirmed.
Buggles, Johnson, Denio and Edwards, Js., concurred.