Case Name: STATE OF OREGON, Appellant, v. CHARLES M. GYENES, Respondent
Court: Oregon Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Oregon
Decision Date: 1993-06-23
Citations: 121 Or. App. 208
Docket Number: 91-085; CA A70620
Parties: STATE OF OREGON, Appellant, v. CHARLES M. GYENES, Respondent.
Judges: WARREN, J.
Reporter: Oregon Reports, Court of Appeals
Volume: 121
Pages: 208–216

Head Matter:
Argued and submitted September 28, 1992,
resubmitted In Banc May 5,
reversed and remanded June 23, 1993
STATE OF OREGON, Appellant, v. CHARLES M. GYENES, Respondent.
(91-085; CA A70620)
855 P2d 642
Janet A. Metcalf, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, argued the cause for appellant. With her on the brief were Charles S. Crookham, Attorney General, and Virginia L. Linder, Solicitor General, Salem.
Lisa A. Maxfield, Portland, argued the cause for respondent. With her on the brief was Ransom, Blackman & Weil, Portland.
WARREN, J.
Edmonds, J., concurring.

Opinion:
WARREN, J.
The state appeals from a judgment allowing defendant's demurrer and dismissing three counts of bribe giving. ORS 162.015. We reverse.
ORS 162.015(1) provides:
"A person commits the crime of bribe giving if the person offers, confers or agrees to confer any pecuniary benefit upon a public servant with the intent to influence the public servant's vote, opinion, judgment, action, decision or exercise of discretion in an official capacity."
The term "pecuniary benefit," as used in ORS 162.015(1), does not include "a political campaign contribution reported in accordance with ORS chapter 260." ORS 162.005(1). Because "pecuniary benefit" is part of ORS 162.015(1), the definition of that term must be read into the bribery statute.
Defendant and the state read those statutes as meaning that unreported campaign contributions are bribes. Defendant contends that the state cannot constitutionally make criminal unreported campaign contributions, because making campaign contributions is a constitutionally protected expressive activity. Therefore, he argues that ORS 162.015(1) violates Article I, section 8, of the Oregon Constitution, on its face, because it is overbroad.
Count one of defendant's indictment provides, in part:
"The said defendant did unlawfully and knowingly offer or confer $200 upon Yamhill County Commissioner Ted Lopuszynski, a public servant, with intent to influence the said public servant's action, vote, opinion, judgment decision or exercise of discretion in said public servant's official capacity
None of those allegations indicates that defendant made a campaign contribution, although conceivably that could have been what defendant intended. Consequently, the facts that defendant relies on to support his demurrer do not appear on the face of the indictment.
Generally, a demurrer must be based on the allegations on the face of the indictment. State v. Gates, 31 Or App 353, 356, 570 P2d 670 (1977), rev den 281 Or 323 (1978). Nevertheless, it is permissible for a defendant to challenge the constitutionality of a statute by way of a demurrer, if the assertion is that the statute is overbroad. State v. Pyritz, 90 Or App 601, 603, 752 P2d 1310 (1988). That is true, even if the indictment does not allege, on its face, that the defendant engaged in the allegedly constitutionally protected conduct. See, e.g., State v. Spencer, 289 Or 225, 229, 611 P2d 1147 (1980).
For example, in State v. Albee, 118 Or App 212, 847 P2d 858 (1993), the defendant moved to dismiss the indictment against him on the ground that ORS 167.355, the statute he was charged with violating, was unconstitutionally overbroad on its face. Part of that statute makes it a crime to promote, conduct or participate in an exhibition of animal fighting. Although defendant did not contend that he had engaged in any expressive activity, he argued that ORS 167.355 was unconstitutional "because it could be read to restrict persons from meeting to discuss [animal fighting]." 118 Or App at 217. We recognized that the defendant could assert that challenge by a motion to dismiss. Nevertheless, we rejected his argument, because we did not read the statute to prohibit that conduct.
Here, as in Alb.ee, defendant asserts an overbreadth challenge to a statute and argues that it could burden protected expression. If defendant is correct that ORS 162.015(1) is overbroad, that statute would be void on its face. Consequently, defendant was entitled to assert his constitutional challenge by demurring to the indictment. Nevertheless, if ORS 162.015(1) does not prohibit what defendant and the state contend that it does, we need not address defendant's constitutional challenge. The parties read ORS 162.015(1) to prohibit unreported campaign contributions. That, however, is not what that statute provides.
Under ORS 162.005(1), "apolitical campaign contribution reported in accordance with ORS chapter 260" cannot constitute a bribe. A campaign contribution cannot be "reported in accordance with ORS chapter 260" unless a report is required or authorized by some provision of that chapter. (Emphasis supplied.) ORS 260.058, ORS 260.063, ORS 260.068, ORS 260.073, ORS 260.102 and ORS 260.112 require candidates and political committees to report campaign contributions. However, no provision of ORS chapter 260 requires or permits an individual donor to report a campaign contribution. Consequently, if we read ORS 162.005(1) literally, a person who makes a legitimate campaign contribution that the recipient fails to report, for whatever reason, has committed bribery. Because that result is absurd, we must resort to the legislative history to glean greater insight of the legislature's intent.
The history of the bill that included the provisions that became ORS 162.015 indicates that the legislature fully intended to exempt campaign contributions from the ambit of the bribery statutes, but was uncertain as to how to accomplish that objective. The subcommittee that reviewed the proposed law debated whether the bribery statute should specifically exempt campaign contributions or whether their intent to exempt those contributions should be expressed in the commentary, leaving the matter for the courts. Wallace P. Carson, chairman of the subcommittee, expressed reservations about leaving the matter for the courts because, as a rule, Oregon courts do not look beyond the face of the statute. See Minutes, Criminal Law Revision Commission, Subcommittee No. 2, June 10, 1969, p 14. He made clear, however, that all of the members of the subcommittee were in agreement that campaign contributions were not bribes. See Minutes, Criminal Law Revision Commission, Subcommittee No. 2, June 10,1969, p 14. Finally, with little further discussion, and no review of the provisions of ORS chapter 260, one of the members of the subcommittee proposed a specific exception in the bribery statute for contributions reported in accordance with ORS chapter 260. That amendment is now codified at ORS 162.005(1). That same member also expressed that he would be willing to rely on the good sense of the courts in interpreting that provision. Minutes, Criminal Law Revision Commission, Subcommittee No. 2, June 10, 1969, p 18.
Considering that the legislature did not intend campaign contributions to be bribes, but that ORS chapter 260 does not require or authorize an individual donor to report a campaign contribution, we should exercise our good sense and read the bribery statute as exempting any campaign contribution that is required to be reported by the donee under ORS chapter 260, even if the donee fails to report it. That will preclude an individual from being held vicariously liable for another's omission, but permit a prosecution for bribery if the state can prove that that individual did not intend a pecuniary benefit as a campaign contribution.
The sole basis for defendant's demurrer was that ORS 162.015(1) criminalizes unreported campaign contributions. Because that statute does not proscribe that conduct, the court erred in concluding that ORS 162.015(1) unconstitutionally burdens defendant's rights under Article I, section 8, for that reason. Because the indictment validly charges a violation of ORS 162.015(1), the court erred in granting defendant's demurrer.
Reversed and remanded.
Article I, section 8, of the Oregon Constitution provides:
"No law shall be passed restraining the free expression of opinion, or restricting the right to speak, write, or print freely on any subject whatever; but every person shall be responsible for the abuse of this right."
In State v. Spencer, supra, 289 Or at 228, the court said:
"If a law concerning free speech on its face violates [Article I, section 8, of the Oregon Constitution], it is unconstitutional; it is not necessary to consider what the conduct is in the individual case." (Emphasis supplied.)
Although defendant cannot be convicted of bribery if the money he allegedly provided to the public servants was a campaign contribution, the indictment does not allege that that was what he intended his donation to be. Because an indictment need not negative any statutory exceptions to its coverage, State v. George, 72 Or App 135, 138, 694 P2d 1011 (1985), the state need not allege that the funds were not campaign contributions for the indictment to validly charge the crime of bribery.