Case Name: John Parkerson v. John T. Wightman
Court: South Carolina Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: South Carolina
Decision Date: 1850-01
Citations: 4 Strob. 363
Docket Number: 
Parties: John Parkerson v. John T. Wightman.
Judges: Evans, Wardlaw, and Frost, JJ. concurred.
Reporter: South Carolina Law Reports
Volume: 35
Pages: 363–372

Head Matter:
John Parkerson v. John T. Wightman.
The Act of 1823, which exempt» from levy and sale, a mechanic’s “tools of his trade” — held to exempt the tools of all mechanics, whether master workmen or journeymen, who personally work with their own tools, and with their own hands — in contradistinction to contractors, superintendants, capitalists, or mere owners of machinery.
A landlord held liable for the trespass committed by his bailiff in distraining for rent in arrear, the tools of his tenant, which, by the Act of 1823, are exempted from levy and sale.
A principal is liable for the conduct of his agent, when he acts improperly and unlawfully, but within the scope of his agency.
Before Evans, J. at Charleston, October Term, 1848.
The plaintiff was the tenant of the defendant. Rent being in arrear, the defendant issued his warrant of distress to one Dennis, as his bailiff, who was one of the constables of the city. Dennis made a levy on sundry tools belonging to the plaintiff. The tools were valued at two hundred and ninety-nine dollars, by the witnesses. They were inventoried and sold by Dennis. The rent due was about thirty dollars, and all tlie goods distrained were sold for about enough to pay the rent. By an Act of the Legislature, passed in 1823, the necessary tools of a mechanic to carry on his business, are exempt from levy and sale. It was contended the tools levied on came within the protection of the Act, and that the landlord, Wightman, was liable for the trespass committed by his bailiff, Dennis. The evidence was as follows.
J. M. Hap-poldt.
The plaintiff is a general machinist. The articles levied on are necessary tools for his work. He could not do without them in his trade, They were worth two hundred and ninety-nine dollars and thirty-five cents He could not execute most of his jobs without them. He could not carry on his business after the distress. Many of those left were useless by breaking the set. His sign was that of a bell hanger, but that was not his principal occupation. He made more by cutting taps to make screws, than by bell-hanging. After the distress, plaintiff sold him some of his taps. Made some for sale when ordered. They were kept in boxes, to prevent different sizes from mixing. There are none of the tools on the list which he could make himself, except the taps. The tools in his shop were worth five hundred dollars.
It was admitted the constable, Dennis, was dead.
DEFENCE.
Mr. Pressley was the magistrate who issued the dis tress. When plaintiff first came to him, defendant owed two hundred dollars for rent. This was discharged by receiving one hundred and fifty dollars. A new lease was executed, and when a further sum was due, and some time had elapsed, the warrant was prepared and given to Dennis, with directions not to levy -on any of the plaintiff’s tools. Dennis made a return and the sale was ordered. Some arrangements were attempted, to prevent a sacrifice by a distress sale. Plaintiff was at his office. Dont remember that he claimed the articles levied on as his tools. The goods sold for a little more than the rent, thirty dollars. The excess was either paid to the plaintiff, or he had credit for it on his next quarter’s rent. He continued as tenant for six months. Frequently saw him, and he did not complain. He had a large supply of tools. He was sued for the rent accruing, after six months, in the City Court, and then turned out of the possession. Then he began to talk about suing. He issued a writ in his own name for ten thousand dollars damages. Afterwards, a suit was commenced by Mr. May, and then this action was brought. The constable said he took only such tools as defendant had made for sale. Par-kerson refused to point out any tiring for him to levy on, and told him to levy at his peril.
A witness in reply said, he (the witness) was a millwright and engineer. Parkerson’s occupation was that of a general machinist. All the tools on the list of those sold, were such as were proper for his trade. Taking poitions of tools would impair :the value of the rest. Paikerson had tools two years ago, worth nine hundred or one thousand dollars. The tools, such as were necessary for a perfect mechanic. A large portion of them, such as a journeyman should have.
On the law of the case, the Circuit judge charged the jury, that the bailiff, Dennis, was the private agent of the landlord, Wightman, who was liable for any trespass he committed in the execution of the power committed to him for the benefit of his principal.
His Honor submitted to them, as a question of faet, whether the goods levied on were such as were protected from levy and sale by the Act of Assembly.
The tools protected, were such as were necessary to carry on his trade, whatever it might be. That there were kindred employments which might be pursued by the same person, and, in such case, he thought all his tools necessary to carry on these trades would be protected ; but if a man should unite a great many different employments, such as tailor, shoemaker and blacksmith, he did not suppose his tools, in all these, would be exempt from levy, but only those of his principal employment. The jury found for the plaintiff the whole value of his tools as proved, viz: — two hundred and ninety-nine dollars and thirty:five conts. His Honor thought they should have deducted the amount of the rent which the tools were sold to pay.
The defendant moved for a new trial, on the grounds,
1. That his Honor erred .in charging, that the defendant was responsible for the illegal actsof'his-bailiff, though done without his assent or presence.
2. That it being testified in this case, that plaintiff had a perfect set of tools for a master mechanic, his Honor should have charged that the law protects only the necessary tools of a journeyman.
3. Because the amount of tools protected by the verdict in this case, is far greater than intended by the law. -
Prossly. for the motion.

Opinion:
Guria, per RichaudsoN, J.
This, was a special action on the case, for unlawfully distraining the tools of the plain- • tiff, and making an excessive and oppressive distress for rent in arrear. The important inquiry of general interest is, then, what is the proper exposition of the Act. of 1823, in exempting from a levy or seizure, "the tools of a mechanic." The words of the Act are, "If .a mechanic, the tools of his trade." Who is a mechanic? .According to our accredited lexicographer, a mechanic is "a manufacturer, an artificer." Dr. Johnson adds, " a low workman," and he defines "a manufacturer" to be "a workman," "an artificer" — an artificer, he says, "is one by whom any thing is made;" a machinist, he calls "a constructer of engines and machines." According to the evidence of Happoldt, the plaintiff, Parker-son, comes under the last class of mechanics. He was a machinist. His tools, the witness said, were worth five hundred dollars. Therefore, we may in reason conclude, Parker-son was a master workman, and not a mere journeyman, hired by the day, or a jobber to do chance work, &c. which class of'inferior workmen only, according to the opposite argument, comes under the exemption of the Act. Do the tools, then, of such master workmen, fall within the exemption of the Act, or is it to be confined to journeymen, jobbers, and the like ? The question may, possibly, admit of some difference df opinion; but I cannot but apprehend that the Act ought to receive a liberal construction. That it means to exempt the tools of all mechanics, who personally work with their own tools, and with their own hands, in contradistinction to contractors, superintendants, capitalists, or mere owners of machinery — as, for instance, of a cotton manufactory or steam mill. Such capitalists cannot come within the meaning of mechanics. They are more of the class of proprietors, inventors or projectors. That is, none of them work personally with tools, which is the essential characteristic of a mechanic, or what Johnson calls "alow (workman." I would rather call him a labouring artificer— one that can prove his practical operation by the hardened £ngers 0f personai industry. As the case is new aud important, let me illustrate my idea, by the next preceding provision of the Act. "If a farmer, his farming utensils." It cannot be supposed that this exemption would extend to all the utensils of a plantea-or proprietor — but means the utensils actually aud personally used by the labouring farmer — in contradistinction to those kept for his labourers, by a planter; or what the English call a gentleman farmer. Not so. The exemption is for him who, like the virtuous Roman dictator, with hand to handle governed his own plough. In like 'manner, are the labouring mechanic's tools exempt, and so exempt, although, if, for instance, a button-maker, he uses as fine tools as the late royal button maker of our fatherland ; or, if a practical lock-smith, he held the tools of the late French Monarch, who is said to have been enamoured of this useful art. We would not distinguish such tools,-if practically used by the mechanic, from the saw and the axe of the venerated. Joseph, the- carpenter. The practical artist is the test, not the fineness of the tools he uses. If such be the true intendment of the Act, the master machinist, Par-kerson, comes within its exemption ; and his tools were, consequently, protected against the defendant's distress warrant. This settles' the question of general interest, — who is a mechanic under the Act? The next question is — whether Wightman, the defendant, is liable, in this instance, for the unlawful distress made by his bailiff, Dennis, inasmuch as Dennis was directed not to levy upon the tools of Parkerson, meaning, of course, the exempted tools. On this head, the law is well settled. Delegated power must be strictly pursued, or the principal is not liable. (See Welsh v. Parish et al.) But the principal is bound by the acts of the agent, done in the course of his employment. (See Topham v. Roche, Corbet v. the same. And it is conceded that the principal is not bound for the wilful trespass of his agent. But on the other hand, it is equally clear, that he is bound to provide a fit agent, and that he is liable- for his negligence, fraud, or want of skill in executing his agency. Now, it is evident that, either through .negligence, ignorance or misunderstanding his instructions, while Dennis would seem to have avoided distraining, as he was instructed, upon what he considered protected tools, he still levied upon other tools, which were equally protected; and, unfortunately, he levied upbn select portions of such tools as caused great loss to Parkerson, by disjoining them from others ; when the value of both depended greatly upon keeping them united. For instance — it was said Re avoided distraining upon a turning lathe, as a protected tool; but he levied upon the appendages and tools of the lathe, &c. In this way he made the distress so excessive and oppressive, that tools of the value of about three hundred dollars, sold for about thirty dollars. And so far from such selection of tools, by Dennis, being against the instructions of Wightman, it would seem, by the course followed, the sale and the disposition of the proceeds, and the argument before the Court, that he, himself, if he had distrained in person, would have followed the same course of mistaken discrimination between the tools of Parkerson, as if a portion only was exempt.
So that, according to my understanding of the law of principal and agent, the case presents a striking illustration of the liability of a principal for the conduct of his agent, when he acts improperly and unlawfully, but within the scope of his agency. If Dennis had committed a wilful outrage or trespass, 'Wightman could not have been made liable. (See the case of O'Neal v. Reigne.) But he is clearly liable for acts done within the delegated authority; and that is the case before the Court. Without, therefore, resorting to the argument, which I consider conclusive, that Wight-man ratified the acts of Dennis after he knew that the distress had been made, by permitting the sale and receiving the money, this Court concurs with the presiding Judge in both principles of law which are objected to in the appeal, to wit: — that Parkerson was a mechanic, within the meaning of the Act, and Wightman liable for the illegal .distress made by his agent, Dennis, through ignorance, negligence or design, under colour of the distress warrant.
Lastly, as to the suggestion that the amount of the rent, thirty dollars, ought to be deducted from the verdict, it is entirely untenable. Because the verdict aíHrms that the distress was excessive and oppressive, and, of course, unlawful, the defendant, therefore, can have no benefit or advantage from his conduct. A wrong done, can give no legal and pecuniary claim to the wrong doer. In fact, and upon the merits of the case, the excessiveness and manner of the distress, in choosing and separating the tools, might be well considered the true gravamen of the plaintiff's action. The motion is, therefore, dismissed, on all the grounds of the appeal.
Evans, Wardlaw, and Frost, JJ. concurred.
Motion rejused.