Case Name: Charles KING, Appellant, v. EASTERN AIRLINES, INC., Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1987-12-15
Citations: 536 So. 2d 1023
Docket Number: No. 86-938
Parties: Charles KING, Appellant, v. EASTERN AIRLINES, INC., Appellee.
Judges: Before BARKDULL, HENDRY and BASKIN, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 536
Pages: 1023–1037

Head Matter:
Charles KING, Appellant, v. EASTERN AIRLINES, INC., Appellee.
No. 86-938.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
Dec. 15, 1987.
Amended on Denial of Rehearing Oct. 25, 1988.
On Rehearing En Banc Oct. 25, 1988.
Podhurst, Orseck, Parks, Josefsberg, Eaton, Meadow & Olin and Joel Eaton, for appellant.
Thornton, David & Murray and Kathleen M. O’Connor, for appellee.
Before BARKDULL, HENDRY and BASKIN, JJ.
Judge Ferguson participated in the decision on rehearing, but not in the original decision.

Opinion:
BASKIN, Judge.
On May 5, 1983, Eastern Airlines' Flight #855 departed from Miami International Airport, bound for Nassau, in the Bahamas. En route to Nassau, one of the airplane's three jet engines failed. Shortly after the flight crew turned the plane around and headed back to Miami, the second and third engines failed. The airplane/ began losing altitude, and the passengers were told that the crew would ditch the airplane in the Atlantic Ocean. After an extended period, during which the airplane descended without power, the flight crew restarted an engine and landed the airplane safely at Miami International Airport.
Appellant Charles King, and other pas- " sengers not parties to this appeal, sued Eastern Airlines for damages allegedly incurred as a result of the airline's intentional or reckless infliction of mental distress, and for damages arising under the Warsaw Convention. The lawsuit was removed to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida, but was remanded to the Circuit Court. After remand, King filed an amended complaint alleging, among other matters, that Eastern's maintenance personnel had failed to install the required oil seals or "O-rings" necessary to prevent oil leaks; that Eastern's records reveal that its aircraft had experienced a dozen prior engine failures stemming from the absence of O-rings; that Eastern knowingly failed to institute "appropriate" procedures to correct the problem; and that Eastern's "entire want of care or attention to duty and great indifference to persons, property and rights of the plaintiff implies such wantonness, willfulness, and malice as would justify punitive damages." Because related cases were pending in the United States District Court, the state trial judge stayed King's action.
The related federal actions culminated in the entry of judgments on the pleadings in Eastern's favor based on a determination that the complaints, identical or similar to the one filed by King in the case before us, failed to state a cause of action against Eastern. In Re Eastern Airlines, Inc. Engine Failure, Miami Int'l Airport on May 5, 1983, 629 F.Supp. 307 (S.D.Fla.1986). Citing the federal court ruling, Eastern filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings in King's state court action. The trial court granted the motion, and entered a final judgment in favor of Eastern. King instituted this appeal, in which he contends that Count III of the amended complaint, predicated on intentional infliction of mental distress resulting in severe and permanent mental pain and anguish, medical expenses, and lost earnings, and Count IV, arising under the Warsaw Convention, allege causes of action justifying the recovery of damages. We agree that Count III states a cause of action but hold that Count IV does not. We address the counts in turn.
COUNT III — EASTERN'S ENTIRE WANT OF CARE
In Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. McCar-son, 467 So.2d 277 (Fla.1985), the supreme court recognized the availability of an independent cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress unaccompanied by physical injury or impact. The court adopted the Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 46 (1965):
§ 46. Outrageous Conduct Causing Severe Emotional Distress
(1) One who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or reck lessly causes severe emotional distress to another is subject to liability for such emotional distress, and if bodily harm to the other results from it, for such bodily harm. (Emphasis supplied.)
According to section 46, the tort may result from intentional or reckless conduct. The court defined intentional infliction of emotional distress in accordance with the comments to the text:
d. Extreme and outrageous conduct . It has not been enough that the defendant has acted with an intent which is tortious or even criminal, or that he has intended to inflict emotional distress, or even that his conduct has been characterized by "malice," or a degree of aggravation which would entitle the plaintiff to punitive damages for another tort. Liability has been found only where the conduct has been so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community. Generally, the case is one in which the recitation of the facts to an average member of the community would arouse his resentment against the actor, and lead him to exclaim, "Outrageous!"
McCarson, 467 So.2d at 278-79.
King posits that Eastern's conduct was "outrageous." Although he acknowledges that the failure to install an o-ring may constitute merely negligent conduct, in his brief he maintains that the airline's failure to correct its maintenance procedures after it experienced twelve engine failures can be characterized only as "behavior so reckless and outrageous, given the life-threatening nature of the risk involved, that it is the equivalent of an intentional disregard of the safety of the airline's passengers." Whether conduct is so extreme as to permit recovery is initially a question for the court. See note 7. We agree with King that the allegations state a cause of action.
King persuades us that Eastern's knowledge of the enormous risk to the many passengers for whom it was responsible under its special relationship as common carrier renders its failure to take appropriate, easily accomplished corrective action so "outrageous" that it constitutes a cause of action under the law. See Dorsey v. Honda Motor Co. Ltd., 655 F.2d 650 (car manufacturer's knowing refusal to accept recommendations for eliminating risks, constituted wantonness, willfulness or reckless indifference to the rights of others), modified, 670 F.2d 21 (5th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 880, 103 S.Ct. 177, 74 L.Ed. 2d 145 (1982); Piper Aircraft Corp. v. Coulter, 426 So.2d 1108 (Fla. 4th DCA) (failure to act in face of known substantial danger to lives of aircraft passengers sufficient to justify punitive damages), review denied, 436 So.2d 100 (Fla.1983); American Motors Corp. v. Ellis, 403 So.2d 459 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981) (manufacturer who is aware of defect but chooses not to seek safer alternative may be awarded punitive damages), review denied, 415 So.2d 1359 (Fla.1982); see also Ciamar Marcy, Inc. v. Monteiro Da Costa, 508 So.2d 1282 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987) (repossession of property without inquiry as to whether payments were made justifies punitive damage award).
King has directed our attention to Florida cases which recognize an action for intentional infliction of emotional distress based on facts far less egregious than those in this case. See, e.g., Smith v. Telophase Nat'l. Cremation Soc'y, 471 So.2d 163 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985) (intentional emotional distress recognized where cremation society failed to dispose of decedent's ashes in accordance with specific instructions); Dominguez v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 438 So.2d 58 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983) (damages for mental distress held recoverable where insurance company falsely accused injured insured of fabricating claim); Kirkpatrick v. Zitz, 401 So.2d 850 (Fla. 1st DCA) (recovery allowed skunk-bite victim for intentional infliction of emotional distress where pet-store owner withheld information that he sold skunk and that animal was unavailable for rabies test), dismissed, 411 So.2d 385 (Fla.1981); Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Sheehan, 373 So.2d 956 (Fla. 1st DCA) (debtor has cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress where credit company falsely told debtor's mother that grandchildren were in serious auto accident), cert, dismissed, 379 So.2d 204 (Fla.1979) [based on authority of Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 46]; Knowles Animal Hosp., Inc. v. Wills, 360 So.2d 37 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978) (recovery for dog owner's mental suffering allowed where veterinarian left dog on heating pad and dog was severely burned), cert. denied, 368 So.2d 1369 (Fla.1979); Korbin v. Berlin, 177 So.2d 551 (Fla. 3d DCA 1965) (six-year old child may bring action for intentional infliction of emotional distress where adult made allegedly false statements indicating that the child's mother committed adultery) (based on authority of Kirksey v. Jernigan, 45 So.2d 188 (Fla.1950)). These cases allow recovery under circumstances less extreme than the frightening exposure to an imminent crash at sea and the actual risk of death to which King and other passengers were subjected by Eastern's allegedly reckless conduct.
Of course, Eastern Airlines cites other authorities in support of affirmance. Chrysler Corp. v. Wolmer, 499 So.2d 823 (Fla.1986); Fisher v. Shenandoah Gen. Constr. Co., 498 So.2d 882 (Fla.1986); and White Constr. Co., Inc. v. Dupont, 455 So.2d 1026 (Fla.1984), do not persuade us. In Dupont, the supreme court compared intentional misconduct and recklessness. The court held that a driver's knowing operation of a loading truck with malfunctioning brakes did not amount to sufficient recklessness to justify punitive damages. Unlike Eastern Airlines, whose twelve previous engine failures foretold with substantial certainty the risk of injury or death, the truck driver in Dupont had no reason to "realize that there [was] a strong probability that harm [would] result." Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 500, Comment f (1965). Wolmer is inapposite; it turns on lack of actual knowledge. Fisher lends no support. It deals with an employer's intentional tort in ordering an employee to work inside a pipe which the employer knew was filled with dangerous gas; the court did not consider whether the conduct constituted recklessness. See note 4. Here, Eastern's alleged history of indifference to its maintenance procedures could, if proved, demonstrate that Eastern's conduct was outrageous.
In its final argument directed to this point, Eastern cautions us that even if we decide that Count III of the amended complaint states a cause of action, King's remedy is limited by the Warsaw Convention. We disagree. Although the general provisions of the Warsaw Convention set forth the criteria for liability of international air carriers along with certain limitations of liability, Article 25 of the Warsaw Convention specifically provides that a carrier may not avail itself of the provisions of the Convention which exclude or limit liability if the carrier engages in "willful misconduct" or its equivalent. Butler v. Aero-Mexico, 774 F.2d 429 (11th Cir.1985). Courts have construed "willful miscon duct" as "the intentional performance of an act with knowledge that the . act will probably result in injury or damage"; or as "reckless disregard of the consequences"; or as "a deliberate purpose not to discharge some duty necessary to safety." Butler, 774 F.2d at 430, quoting Koninklijke Luchtvaart Maatschappij N.V. v. Tuller, 292 F.2d 775, 778-79, cert. denied, 368 U.S. 921, 82 S.Ct. 243, 7 L.Ed.2d 136 (1961). Because the conduct King alleges is exempt from Article 25 liability limitations, the Warsaw Convention does not preclude his claim. We therefore conclude that Count III alleges a cause of action for conduct which "may reasonably be regarded as so extreme and outrageous as to permit recovery." Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 46, Comment h (1965). We reverse the judgment as to Count III and reinstate King's cause of action for infliction of emotional distress.
COUNT IV — WARSAW CONVENTION CLAIM
King contends that Count IV of the amended complaint states a cause of action under Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention for the recovery of damages resulting from mental distress. The relevant portion of Article 17 provides that "[t]he carrier shall be liable for damage sustained in the event of the death or wounding of a passenger or any other bodily injury suffered by a pas-senger_" In Re Eastern, 629 F.Supp. at 313. The original French text states: "Le transporteur est responsable du dom-mage survenu en cas de mort, de blessure ou de toute autre lesion corporelle subie par un voyageur_" In Re Eastern, 629 F.Supp. at 313, quoting Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 397 n.2, 105 S.Ct. 1338, 1341 n.2, 84 L.Ed.2d 289, 295 n.2 (1985) (emphasis omitted). The crux of the issue is whether the phrase "ou de toute autre lesion corporelle" includes mental distress unaccompanied by bodily injury. Although courts have arrived at different conclusions, compare Burnett v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 368 F.Supp. 1152 (D.N.M.1973); In Re Eastern (excluding recovery for emotional distress in the absence of physical injury); with Krystal v. British Overseas Airways Corp., 403 F.Supp. 1322 (C.D.Cal.1975); Husserl v. Swiss Air Transport Co., Ltd., 388 F.Supp. 1238 (S.D.N.Y.1975); Palagonia v. Trans World Airlines, 110 Misc.2d 478, 442 N.Y.S.2d 670 (N.Y.Sup.1978) (authorizing recovery for mental distress), the court's reasoning in In Re Eastern convinces us that mental distress suffered without accompanying physical injury is not compensable under the Warsaw Convention.
In Saks, the Supreme Court held that because French is the official language of the Warsaw Convention, the French legal meaning of Convention terms governs. The Burnett court employed the French legal meaning of the terms of the Convention and concluded that "the Convention intended to narrow the otherwise broad scope of liability . and preclude recovery for mental anguish alone." Burnett, 368 F.Supp. at 1157. The court explained:
[t]he controlling phrase for the purpose of interpretation would seem to be "ou de toute autre lesion corporelle" (or any other bodily injury) for both the terms mort (death) and blessure (wound) are by necessity incorporated within it. As is done in American law, French law distinguishes sharply between bodily injury (lesion corporelle) and mental injury (lesion mentale). Lesion corporelle has been defined in a leading work to mean "an infringement of physical integrity (l'atteinte a 1'integrite physique)." The definition gives not the slightest indication that mental injuries are to be included within its domain. An examination of the meaning of the words lesion and mentale (as defined in Cassell's New French-English, English-French Dic tionary, 1962) reveals the meaning of the phrase "lesion mentale" to be mental wrong or injury. The two phrases appear to be mutually exclusive and therefore, sound construction compels the court to attribute to "lesion corporelle" its normal import only, excluding mental injury. (Footnote omitted.)
Burnett, 368 F.Supp. at 1156. The In Re Eastern court was skeptical of those cases which do not use the French interpretation of the treaty. In Re Eastern, 629 F.Supp. at 313. We follow its example. Although we are aware that Patagonia views the French legal meaning of the phrase "lesion corporelle" as including a separate cause of action for emotional distress, we are reluctant to assign great weight to its decision for two reasons. First, the Patagonia opinion reveals that the experts were not in agreement; second, unlike the Burnett court, the Patagonia court failed to examine records of the Convention's drafts and negotiations. See Saks, 470 U.S. at 400, 105 S.Ct. at 1343, 84 L.Ed. at 297; In Re Eastern, 629 F.Supp. at 314. We therefore conclude that emotional distress alone is not compensable under the Warsaw Convention.
Affirmed in part; reversed in part; remanded.
HENDRY, J., concurs.
. We note that Count III was drafted before the supreme court adopted § 46 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts and its definition of the tort of intentional or reckless infliction of mental distress. Count III therefore tracks the language of Kirksey v. Jernigan, 45 So.2d 188 (Fla.1950), in which the supreme court allowed the recovery of damages for emotional distress if the defendant committed a separate tort. Consequently, Count III is framed in terms of "entire want of care," "willfulness," and "wantonness," rather than the language of the Restatement. We do not perceive any obstacle to our consideration of the issue; on remand appellant may amend the complaint.
. The trial court dismissed Count I, a breach of contract claim, and Count II, a negligence claim. Those rulings are not included in this appeal.
. Many of the cases cited by both appellant and appellee are cases in which the court considers the propriety of awarding punitive damages. We cite these cases as analogs to the case before us. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46, Comment d.
.Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 500, Comment f provides:
Intentional misconduct and recklessness contrasted. Reckless misconduct differs from intentional wrongdoing in a very important particular. While an act to be reckless must be intended by the actor, the actor does not intend to cause the harm which results from it. It is enough that he realizes or, from facts which he knows, should realize that there is a strong probability that harm may result, even though he hopes or even expects that his conduct will prove harmless. However, a strong probability is a different thing from the substantial certainty without which he cannot be said to intend the harm in which his act results.
. Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Transportation by Air, Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, T.S. No. 876 (1934), note following 49 U.S.C.A. App. § 1502.
. Article 25 provides in pertinent part:
(1) The carrier shall not be entitled to avail himself of the provisions of this convention which exclude or limit his liability, if the damage is caused by his wilful misconduct or by such default on his part as, in accordance with the law of the court to which the case is submitted, is considered to be equivalent to wilful misconduct.
. Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 46, Comment h provides:
Court and jury. It is for the court to determine, in the first instance, whether the defendant's conduct may reasonably be regarded as so extreme and outrageous as to permit recovery, or whether it is necessarily so. Where reasonable men may differ, it is for the jury, subject to the control of the court, to determine whether, in the particular case, the conduct has been sufficiently extreme and outrageous to result in liability.
. See, e.g., Krystal v. British Overseas Airways Corp., 403 F.Supp. 1322 (C.D.Cal.1975); Husserl v. Swiss Air Transport Co., Ltd., 388 F.Supp. 1238 (S.D.N.Y.1975).