Case Name: In the Matter of Adolpho Soto et al., Respondents. Nathan Goldman, as President of Local 122, National Jewelry Workers Union, AFL-CIO, Appellant. [In the Matter of the Arbitration between Lenscrapt Optical Corp. (Rayex), Petitioner, and Nathan Goldman, as President of Local 122, National Jewelry Workers Union, AFL-CIO, Respondent.]
Court: New York Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1960-03-03
Citations: 7 N.Y.2d 397
Docket Number: 
Parties: In the Matter of Adolpho Soto et al., Respondents. Nathan Goldman, as President of Local 122, National Jewelry Workers Union, AFL-CIO, Appellant. [In the Matter of the Arbitration between Lenscrapt Optical Corp. (Rayex), Petitioner, and Nathan Goldman, as President of Local 122, National Jewelry Workers Union, AFL-CIO, Respondent.]
Judges: 
Reporter: New York Reports
Volume: 7
Pages: 397–403

Head Matter:
In the Matter of Adolpho Soto et al., Respondents. Nathan Goldman, as President of Local 122, National Jewelry Workers Union, AFL-CIO, Appellant. [In the Matter of the Arbitration between Lenscrapt Optical Corp. (Rayex), Petitioner, and Nathan Goldman, as President of Local 122, National Jewelry Workers Union, AFL-CIO, Respondent.]
Argued January 6, 1960;
decided March 3, 1960.
Murray A. Frank for appellant.
I. Respondents did not comply with the requirements of section 1462 of the Civil Practice Act and it was, therefore, error to affirm the vacatur of the arbitrator’s award. (Matter of Weiner Co. [Freund Co.], 2 A D 2d 341, 3 N Y 2d 806; Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co., 350 U. S. 198; Matter of Dembitser [Gutchen], 3 A D 2d 211, 3 N Y 2d 851; Matter of Wheat Export Co., 185 App. Div. 723, 227 N. Y. 595.) II. The decision of this court in Parker v. Borock requires the reversal of the decision of the court below. (Parker v. Borock, 5 N Y 2d 156; Matter of Cox [Macy & Co.], 14 Misc 2d 294; Matter of Brettner [Canada Dry Ginger Ale], 9 Misc 2d 725; United States v. Voges, 124 F. Supp. 543; Rotnofsky v. Capitol Distrs. Corp., 262 App. Div. 521.)
Martin H. Schneider and Harry J. Halperin for respondents.
I. Respondents had the right to intervene and be represented by their own counsel in an arbitration involving their discharge where the evidence disclosed that the attorney representing their union could or would not fairly represent them. (Donato v. American Locomotive Co., 283 App. Div. 410, 306 N. Y. 966; Parker v. Borock, 5 N Y 2d 156; Jenkins v. Schluderberg-Kurdle Co., 217 Md. 556; Pattenge v. Wagner Iron Works, 275 Wis. 495; Newburger v. American Sur. Co., 242 N. Y. 134.) II. Respondents had standing under the provisions of subdivision 3 of section 1462 of the Civil Practice Act to move to vacate the arbitration award. (Busch Jewelry Co. v. United Retail Employees’ Union, 170 Misc. 482; Matter of Petroleum Research Fund, 3 A D 2d 1; Clark v. Sandusky, 205 F. 2d 915.)

Opinion:
Dye, J.
In this proceeding commenced by an order to show
cause, the respondent-appellant union appeals by permission from an order vacating an award of the New York State Board of Mediation, rendered in an arbitration between the respondent Lenscraft Optical Corp. (Bayex), as employer, and appellant union, as collective bargaining agent, under an agreement then in full force and effect, the validity of which had previously been upheld (cf. Rayex Corp. v. Sanchez, 6 A D 2d 902, motion for reargument denied 6 A D 2d 1044, motion for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals dismissed 5 N Y 2d 915). The award permitted the employer to discharge the petitioners-respondents for conduct violative of the contract conditions, a deliberate slowdown.
The basic issue is whether the petitioners-respondents have status, within the meaning of subdivision 3 of section 1462 of the Civil Practice Act, to initiate the proceeding.
The court below accepted the petitioners' contention that they had been prejudiced by the mediator's refusal to allow them to be independently represented at the arbitration by counsel of their own choosing. In so deciding, the Appellate Division deemed the petitioners had status as parties since — because their jobs were at stake — they were either third-party beneficiaries of the collective contract or in the position of beneficiaries of a trust. This was a wrong approach. The award, having been rendered in a controversy between the parties to a valid collective agreement, could be vacated only at the initiation of a party to the arbitration in the manner and for the reasons provided by section 1462 of the Civil Practice Act. The misconduct of an arbitrator, contemplated by the statute, and warranting the setting aside of an award, is that '1 by which the rights of any party have been prejudiced" (§ 1462, subd. 3; emphasis supplied). The petitioners, not being parties to the agreement, may not avail themselves of rights which under the Civil Practice Act are limited to parties; an exception to such limitation may not be created by judicial application of equitable principles, nor may a basis for vacatur be supplied by implication. Such a result can be accomplished only by appropriate legislative action. Furthermore, the ruling complained of was well within the reach and scope of our recent decision in Parker v. Borock (5 N Y 2d 156). There we made it clear that an employee could not avail himself of the arbitration procedure provided in the collective bargaining agreement since there, as here, the contract granted such right only to the union and to the employer (cf. Hudak v. Hornell Ind., 304 N. Y. 207). This was in the interest of maintaining orderly procedure under accepted principles of substantive law. At the same time, an employee is not foreclosed, in an appropriate case, from pursuing any remedy at law that might be available for breach of fiduciary duty owing by the union.
The order of the Appellate Division should be reversed and the arbitrator's award reinstated.