Case Name: Odilia DANK, Member of the Oklahoma House of Representatives, Petitioner, v. The Honorable Loyd BENSON, Speaker of the Oklahoma House of Representatives, Respondent
Court: Oklahoma Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Oklahoma
Decision Date: 2000-05-23
Citations: 5 P.3d 1088
Docket Number: No. 94,166
Parties: Odilia DANK, Member of the Oklahoma House of Representatives, Petitioner, v. The Honorable Loyd BENSON, Speaker of the Oklahoma House of Representatives, Respondent.
Judges: 14 SUMMERS, C.J., HARGRAVE, v.C.J., OPALA, KAUGER, WATT, BOUDREAU, and WINCHESTER, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Pacific Reporter 3d
Volume: 5
Pages: 1088–1096

Head Matter:
2000 OK 40
Odilia DANK, Member of the Oklahoma House of Representatives, Petitioner, v. The Honorable Loyd BENSON, Speaker of the Oklahoma House of Representatives, Respondent.
No. 94,166.
Supreme Court of Oklahoma.
May 23, 2000.
Gary W. Gardenhire, Norman, OK, for the petitioner.
W.A. Drew Edmondson, Attorney General of Oklahoma; Andrew Tevington, Asst. Atty. Gen.; and Neal Leader, Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen., Oklahoma City, OK, for the respondent.
Lee Slater, Oklahoma City, for amicus.

Opinion:
LAVENDER, J.
{1 Dank [petitioner] asks this Court to decide whether the custom and practice employed in the House of Representatives when proposed legislation is brought up for final vote offends the provisions of Okla. Const. art. 5, § 34. She also asks that, if current legislative procedure is found to be constitutionally deficient, the Court mandate what procedure the House should follow. Before the merits of Dank's petition can be reached, the Court must decide if her claim is "justiciable," i.e., whether it is susceptible of judicial resolution. We conclude that her claim-presented, as it is, in the context of an intra-House dispute-is nonjusticiable.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
12 Petitioner Odilia Dank, a member of the Oklahoma House of Representatives [House] since 1994, today asks the Court to review how the House procedurally conducts itself when pressing for the final passage of a bill. She asserts that the House has "never" caused proposed legislation to be "read at length" before a final vote is taken on it-a process which, according to her, is constitutionally mandated. Dank contends the constitutionally-deficient legislative procedure persists in spite of several efforts on her part to change it. On past occasions petitioner has sought to have the House change its rules to comport with her understanding of the "read at length" requirement and she has raised (with limited success) points of order contesting the leadership's failure to comply with Okla. Const. art. 5, § 34's provisions. Dank has also secured an Oklahoma Attorney General's opinion on the meaning of the pertinent constitutional provision in an attempt to heighten the House's understanding of and compliance with the "read at length" provision.
T3 Petitioner would have the Court (1) construe Okla. Const. art. 5, § 34's phrase "read at length" to mean "reading each and every word of the bill proposed to be finally passed from beginning to end, without omis sion and not in summary form" and (2) to condemn the House's internal custom and practice currently used to bring measures to a final vote (when these procedures do not require proposed legislation to be "read at length"). Petitioner's application does not challenge any specific, enrolled legislation as being constitutionally flawed. Rather the sole focus of her quest is reformation of the legislative process used to inform House members of a bill's content before a final vote is taken on the same. Lastly, petitioner's paperwork does not draw the Court's attention to any specific procedural infractions of a constitutional dimension in the current legislative session but rather predicts that the same will occur since they have in the past.
114 Loyd Benson [respondent], the House Speaker, asserts absolute immunity to the petitioner's suit premised upon the protection afforded by the Speech and Debate clause to his conduct while presiding over the House. Since we find that the petitioner's application does not present a justiciable cause and hence decline to assume original jurisdiction over the same, it is not necessary to reach the merits of the respondent's claim of immunity.
II
DANS APPLICATION PRESENTS A NONJUSTICIABLE CLAIM
A
115 As we begin our analysis today, we are mindful of the Court's holding in City of Sapulpa v. Land, 101 Okla. 22, 223 P. 640, 644 (1924), that:
"The judiciary system of this state is the creature of the Constitution and the statute laws of the state. The Supreme sovereign power of this state rests in the people of the state."
The enunciated legal principle rightly demands great respect for the people's will as expressed in the state's organic law. Though the resolution of causes often turn upon the law's minutiae, there are indeed conflicts-such as the one now before the Court-which find much of their resolution in broader constitutional principles.
16 Because Dank takes issue with the House procedure used to bring proposed legislation to a final vote, her action necessarily implicates the constitutionally-committed authority of each House to adopt its own rules of internal procedure. The requested relief asks the Court to interject itself into the legislative process constitutionally committed to the House of Representatives and render an opinion concerning how this body should conduct its business. While Oklahoma's Constitution gives the Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction to review and assess the lawfulness of legislative enactments and original jurisdiction over prescribed entities, only under the most exi gent circumstances are we to intercede in the internal affairs of a coordinate branch of government when it exercises a function-i.e., legislative or executive-committed to it by the Constitution. The framers clearly intended a separation of power between the executive, legislative and judicial branch es of government. General constitutional order is offended when one department of government usurps power expressly delegat ed to another. Henee, it is with heightened consideration that the Court assays Dank's application for the relief (a declaratory judgment and writ of mandamus) which she asks the Court to grant.
B
17 Petitioner claims there is a likelihood that the House (through its elected leadership, ie., the Speaker) will engage in future procedural conduct which will be vio-lative of Okla. Const. art. 5, § 34. In essence her claim-which is not based on actual, reported procedural acts of the current Legislature and does not assert constitutional flaws in enacted legislation-asks the Court to address a hypothetical situation which may or may not arise. It is not the business of the Court to give advisory opinions on hypothetical questions. [Were it different legislators could pose questions to the Court about proposed legislation-a process which today lies without the seope of the Court's jurisdiction.]
T8 To be justiciable Dank's claim must be suitable for judicial inquiry. This requires determining whether the controversy (a) is definite and concrete, (b) concerns legal relations among parties with adverse interests and (c) is real and substantial so as to be capable of a decision granting or denying specific relief of a conclusive nature. Petitioner's claim fails to satisfy the enunciated test in two regards.
19 First, the petitioner's claim fails to satisfy the test's initial criterium, ie., is the claim fixed and substantive and not of a hypothetical character. For the Court to assume original jurisdiction and to grant the requested form of relief the cause must be of sufficient immediacy and reality as to warrant the pronouncement of judgment. The asserted claim implicates neither (a) enrolled legislation carrying the force of law nor (b) an imminent constitutional crisis which threatens governmental operation. When in Ethics Com'n v. Cullison, 1993 OK 37, 850 P.2d 1069, the Court assumed original jurisdiction, the case clearly satisfied the justicia-bility criterium of "immediacy and reality" since it raised the specter of an "intolerable conflict" between co-ordinate branches of government which possessed the potential for governmental gridlock. Because no such immediacy or reality exists in the present cause, the test for justiciability remains unmet and original jurisdiction cannot be assumed.
110 Secondly, because Dank's claim comes solely in the guise of an intra-House dispute, its justiciability must also be assessed in conjunction with the separation-of-powers doctrine. Dank's "application to assume original jurisdiction" asks the Court to issue mandamus to force the Legislature's compliance with the "read at length" provision. This the Court cannot do. Oklahoma's extant jurisprudence clearly delimits the Court's power over the Legislature. In Jones v. Freeman, 193 Okla. 554, 146 P.2d 564 (1944), it was held:
"The Legislature, being a co-ordinate branch of the government, may not be compelled by the courts to perform a legislative duty, even though the performance of that duty be required by the Constitution."
Generally speaking, the separation-of-powers doctrine prevents the Court's intrusion by writ of mandamus into the House's exercise of its constitutionally-assigned legislative function. Because of the context in which the petitioner brings her application-an in-tra-House dispute-her cause is not susceptible of resolution through specific relief of a conclusive nature. Because there is no adequate relief which can be crafted to resolve Dank's claim [at least in the context in which it comes to the Court], petitioner's claim is not justiciable, ie., suitable for judicial ingqui-ry. It fails to satisfy the third element of the enunciated test for justiciability.
III
CONCLUSION
{11 By her application petitioner would have the Court assume original jurisdiction over an intra-House dispute, construe the "read at length" provision of Okla. Const. art. 5, § 34, and mandate rules of procedure to be used in the House to implement the Court's construction of the constitutional provision.
112 The declaratory relief which Dank seeks is not available under the facts of her application because it does not present circumstances imbued with the immediacy and reality required under Oklahoma's extant jurisprudence to grant a declaratory judgment. Further, the Court is without authority to interject itself into the legislative process [assigned by the constitution to the House] by directing how that body shall conduct its business. While not giving the petitioner the judicial solution she seeks, the Court's pronouncement does give efficacy to the limitations on governmental function posited with each governmental branch by the people of Oklahoma under the separation-of-powers doctrine.
{13 Petitioner's application presents a nonjusticiable controversy. Hence, her "application to assume original jurisdiction" is denied.
14 SUMMERS, C.J., HARGRAVE, v.C.J., OPALA, KAUGER, WATT, BOUDREAU, and WINCHESTER, JJ., concur.
{ 15 HODGES, J., dissents.
. The terms of Okla. Const. art. 5, § 34 provide:
"Every bill shall be read on three different days in each House, and no bill shall become law unless, on its final passage, it be read at length, and no law shall be passed unless upon a vote of a majority of all the members elected to each House in favor of such law; and the question, upon final passage, shall be taken upon its last reading, and the yeas and nays shall be entered upon the journal." [Emphasis added.]
. The relief which the petitioner seeks in her application is at variance with the position she advanced during oral argument where she indicated that a declaratory judgment would suffice. Nonetheless, she has not amended her paperwork filed in this cause where a writ of mandamus directed to the House is sought.
. For the terms of Okla. Const. art. 5, § 34 see supra note 1.
. Attorney General's Opinion No. 98-38.
. Petitioner offers that while it is the House's custom and practice to furnish Members with a printed form of the bill before the final vote is taken, bills are often lengthy and time constraints prevent her from reading the same at length before she is required to vote. Petitioner's counsel also acknowledged during oral argument that it would be physically impossible for the House to "read at length" [as Dank has defined the phrase] the volume of legislation pending before the House in the current legislative session.
. Counsel for respondent in oral argument before the Court offered-and the petitioner did not controvert-that the House's journal reflects that during the 1999 legislative session the Members were not asked to vote on proposed legislation solely on the basis of bill summaries and were in fact provided with full copies of all bills before voles were taken upon the same. Respondent did acknowledge that the complained of procedures were used in earlier legislative sessions.
. See Okla. Const. art. 5, § 22.
. See Okla. Const. art. 5, § 30, which provides in pertinent part:
"Each House may determine the rules of its proceedings...."
. See Okla. Const. art. 5, § 1, whose pertinent terms provide:
The Legislative authority of the State shall be vested in a Legislature, consisting of a Senate and a House of Representatives...."
. See Okla. Const. art. 7, § 4, whose pertinent terms provide:
'The appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court shall . extend to all cases at law and in equity.... The original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court shall extend to a general superintending control over all inferior courts and all Agencies, Commissions and Boards created by law."
. For examples of circumstances presenting crises of a constitutional dimension warranting the assumption of original jurisdiction, see Bellmon v. Barker, 1988 OK 79, 760 P.2d 813, and Ethics Com'n v. Cullison, 1993 OK 37, 850 P.2d 1069. Both cases involved "intolerable conflict" between co-ordinate branches of government which possessed the potential for gridlock. Id. at 1073.
. The separation-of-powers doctrine is most appreciated when viewed in the context of governmental checks and balances. Mr. Justice Brandeis assessed the value of the separation-of-powers doctrine (as it relates to the federal government) when he observed:
'The doctrine of the separation of powers was adopted by the convention of 1787 not to promote efficiency but to preclude the exercise of arbitrary power. The purpose was not to avoid friction, but, by means of the inevitable friction incident to the distribution of the governmental powers among the three departments, to save the people from autocracy." Myers v. U.S., 272 U.S. 52, 47 S.Ct. 21, 85, 71 L.Ed. 160.
. The terms of Okla. Const. art 4, § 1 provide:
'The powers of the government of the State of Oklahoma shall be divided into three separate departments: The Legislative, Executive, and Judicial; and except as provided in this Constitution, the Legislative, Executive, and Judicial departments of government shall be separate and distinct, and neither shall exercise the powers properly belonging to either of the others." {Emphasis added.]
. Tweedy v. Oklahoma Bar Ass'n, 1981 OK 12, 624 P.2d 1049, 1054.
. Application of Fun Country Development Authority, 1977 OK 138, 566 P.2d 1167.
. State of Okla. ex rel. Dept. of Transp., 1982 OK 36, 646 P.2d 605, 608-609.
. Cullison, supra note 11 at 1703.
. Petitioner asks that the sought declaratory relief be given "prospective" application. See Dank's Brief in Support of Application to Assume Original Jurisdiction, p. 14. Her request necessarily implicates the immediacy criterium enunciated in Keating v. Johnson, 1996 OK 61, 918 P.2d 51, 55. There the Court held:
"[The present posture of the case as delivered to us by petitioners, particularly in light of their own request that we make any decision prospective to a future date to afford the Governor and Legislature time to enact curative legislation should we decide one or more of the challenged provisions are unconstitutional . appears to counsel against a determination there is any need for our immediate attention. In our view, although the question(s) presented are important, petitioners have failed to show there is some immediacy involved in this controversy that would call for this Court to exercise its discretion to hear the matter at the present time." [Emphasis added.]
. Puckett v. Cook, 1978 OK 108, 586 P.2d 721, 723.
. Romang v. Cordell, 1952 OK 139, 206 Okla. 369, 243 P.2d 677, 680; City of Bethany v. District Court of Oklahoma County, 200 Okla. 49, 191 P.2d 187, 189.
. See Okla. Const. art. 4, § 1 supra note 13.