Case Name: DETROIT MOTION PICTURE PROJECTIONISTS UNION, LOCAL 199, IATSE, AFL-CIO v. EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS COMMISSION
Court: Michigan Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1978-11-20
Citations: 403 Mich. 491
Docket Number: Docket No. 58394
Parties: DETROIT MOTION PICTURE PROJECTIONISTS UNION, LOCAL 199, IATSE, AFL-CIO v EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS COMMISSION
Judges: Kavanagh, C.J., and Levin, Fitzgerald, and Ryan, JJ., concurred with Coleman, J.
Reporter: Michigan Reports
Volume: 403
Pages: 491–506

Head Matter:
DETROIT MOTION PICTURE PROJECTIONISTS UNION, LOCAL 199, IATSE, AFL-CIO v EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS COMMISSION
Docket No. 58394.
Argued November 3, 1977
(Calendar No. 4).
Decided November 20, 1978.
Detroit Motion Picture Projectionists Union, Local 199, IATSE, AFL-CIO, filed an unfair labor practice charge with the Employment Relations Commission against the Ninety-Six Grand Corporation, and others doing business as Krim Enterprises, on behalf of two projectionists who were discharged from their employment at the Farmington IV theater under a temporary day-to-day work arrangement when a contract could not be reached. After the employment ended, the theater owners themselves acted as projectionists. The employer argued that its actions were motivated solely by economic considerations and not by anti-union bias. The Employment Relations Commission agreed with the employer and dismissed the charges. The Court of Appeals, J. H. Gillis, P.J., and Quinn, J. (R. E. Noble, J., dissenting), affirmed (Docket No. 23702). Plaintiffs appeal. Held:
The decision of the Employment Relations Commission is supported by competent, material and substantial evidence on the whole record. The theater was a new enterprise and the defendants voluntarily sought out the union to fill the jobs available. The negotiations failed to result in an employment contract satisfactory to the parties and they reverted to the positions they had been in before the defendants gave the union the first opportunity to fill the new jobs. The only interest of the two members of the union was a temporary day-to-day work arrangement contingent upon the successful outcome of the contract negotiations. The formal letter of termination requested by the union does not transform the arrangement into a permanent hiring and a discharge from employment. The reasons proffered by the employer for expiration of the temporary arrangement supported the decision of the Employment Relations Commission.
Affirmed.
Reference for Points in Headnotes
[1-3] 48 Am Jur 2d, Labor and Labor Relations §§ 1163-1171.
Justice Blair Moody, Jr., joined by Justice Williams, dissenting, concluded that once an employer recognizes a union as representing the bargaining unit for newly hired employees and the parties attempt to negotiate a permanent relationship, the employer cannot resolve its bargaining problems by eliminating the unit. The motive underlying an employer’s conduct is not an element of the unfair labor practice of interfering with employees in the exercise of their rights to bargain collectively. The employer’s action here, even if motivated by economic reasons and even if in good faith, was inherently destructive of the employee’s important right to bargain collectively. The discharge of the very employees who were actively engaged in negotiating a labor agreement cannot be categorized as an inherent management prerogative providing immunity from challenge. Even in considering allegations of discriminatory action, when an employer’s practice is inherently destructive of employees’ rights and not otherwise justified, no specific evidence of intent to discourage union membership is necessary to establish a violation. Moreover, the employer’s conduct in this case carried with it its own indicia of improper intent. The only reasonable inference that could be drawn from it was that the employer fired the projectionists because of their insistence upon union representation at the bargaining table. This conduct amounts to discriminatory action and a violation of the prohibition against using hiring practices to discourage union membership. The employer had no justifiable reason for taking such drastic measures. Alternative measures were available, such as a temporary "lockout” of the employees, or a temporary layoff or replacement of them, or paying the employees at the last rate offered by management.
68 Mich App 458; 242 NW2d 806 (1976) affirmed.
Opinion of the Court
1. Labor Relations — Unfair Labor Practices — Economic Reasons.
A decision of the Employment Relations Commission that employers had discharged a two-person bargaining unit for economic reasons and not as an anti-union measure and therefore were not guilty of an unfair labor practice is supported by competent, material, and substantial evidence on the whole record and is affirmed where the employers voluntarily sought out the employees’ union to fill the jobs available in a new enterprise, negotiations with the union failed to result in an employment contract satisfactory to the parties, and after the employees were discharged the parties reverted to the positions they had occupied before; the discharge was not inherently destructive of employee interests where the only interest of the two union members was a temporary day-to-day work arrangement contingent upon the successful outcome of the contract negotiations; a formal letter of termination requested by the union does not transform the arrangement into a permanent hiring and discharge from employment (Const 1963, art 6, § 28; MCL 423.16; MSA 17.454[17]).
Dissenting Opinion by Blair Moody, Jr., J.
2. Labor Relations — Unfair Labor Practices — Inherently Destructive Conduct.
Once an employer recognizes a union as representing the bargaining unit for newly hired employees and the parties attempt to negotiate a permanent relationship, the employer cannot resolve its bargaining problems by permanently dismissing all of the bargaining unit’s members; the employer’s action, even if motivated by economic reasons and even if in good faith, is inherently destructive of the employee’s important right to bargain collectively (MCL 423.16; MSA 17.454[17]).
3. Labor Relations — Unfair Labor Practices — Improper Motives.
The only reasonable inference that the Employment Relations Commission could have drawn from discharge of two movie projectionists, who were the entire bargaining unit of employees, from their jobs because their union demanded the union wage rate for them was that the employer bred the projectionists because of their union membership and because of their insistence upon union representation at the bargaining table; this conduct in a case where less drastic measures were available amounted to discriminatory action and a violation of the statutory prohibition against using hiring practices to discourage union membership (MCL 423.16; MSA 17.454[17]).
Miller, Klimist, Cohen, Martens & Sugarman, P.C. (by Sheldon L. Klimist and Thomas L. Gravelle), for plaintiff.
Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Robert A. Derengoski, Solicitor General, and Francis W. Edwards, Assistant Attorney General, for defendant Employment Relations Commission.
Honigman, Miller, Schwartz & Cohn (by John Sklar and Charles H. Tobias) for defendants Ninety-Six Grand Corporation; and Sol Krim, Leonard Krim, Harry Krim and Mac Krim, doing business as Krim Enterprises.

Opinion:
Coleman, J.
The temporary employment of both members of a two-person bargaining unit ended when a first contract agreement could not be reached. The question is whether an unfair labor practice under § 16 of the labor relations and mediation act (MCLA 423.16; MSA 17.454[17]) was committed. We affirm the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the Michigan Employment Relations Commission's finding that there was no unfair labor practice on this record.
The defendants own the Farmington IV Theatre. During late November of 1972, while the theatre was still under construction, they sought out the plaintiff union hoping to hire a union projectionist and relief projectionist. The defendants had in the past enjoyed a satisfactory relationship with the union, employing a number of its members at other theatres which they owned.
The defendants and the union met together several times over the course of the next few weeks to discuss a possible contract. However, no agreement was reached. During this initial discussion period, Robert Holmes, a union projectionist, was hired lay Ringold Equipment Company to install the projection equipment in the theatre. Holmes installed the equipment and was paid by Ringold for his work. On the day the theatre was scheduled to open, the union agreed to let two of its members, Holmes and a relief projectionist, work as projectionists for two weeks, during which time further discussions were to take place regarding a possible contract. The defendants agreed to pay the two members full union scale while the discussions continued. It was understood that this was only a temporary arrangement.
The defendants and the union met together several more times during the next two weeks but they still could not reach an agreement on an initial contract. They did agree, however, to extend the temporary work arrangement on a day-today basis and to continue the contract discussions. On this basis, the members continued to work and the defendants continued to pay them full union scale.
Nearly one month later, after several more meetings, the defendants and the union still had not been able to agree on an initial contract. Based upon the theatre's first month earnings, the defendants told the union that they could not pay full union scale and also meet their other expenses. They made an offer of one-half union scale. The union rejected this offer and said that nothing less than full union scale would be acceptable. The union then told the defendants that it was pulling its members off the job and the defendants said that the members' services were no longer needed. Contract discussions ended. Thereafter, the defendants themselves acted as projectionists.
The union later asked the defendants to send the two members a formal letter of termination. After receipt of this letter, the union filed unfair labor practice charges against the defendants.
The administrative law judge ruled that the defendants had been guilty of unfair labor practices. The Michigan Employment Relations Commission reversed in a split decision and dismissed the charges. The majority concluded inter alia that the defendants "were sincere in their economic protestations" and were motivated solely by economic considerations. On rehearing the majority affirmed its original decision and stated that "the evidence persuades that the officers of the employer were, if anything, pro-union and not anti-union in their opinions and attitudes". In addition, the majority found that "[t]he evidence establishes that both employees were furnished by the union under a hiring hall situation, and that the employment was for a temporary period while bargaining continued". The majority concluded by emphasizing the unique factual circumstances of this case.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the MERC majority in a split decision. 68 Mich App 458; 242 NW2d 806 (1976).
We also affirm. The MERC decisions are supported by competent, material and substantial evidence on the whole record. See Const 1963, art 6, § 28.
The theatre was a new business enterprise. The defendants did not have to hire union members to fill the job openings. They could have hired nonunion projectionists or performed the work themselves. (They finally performed the work themselves.) Instead, they voluntarily sought out the union to fill the jobs weeks before the theatre was scheduled to open.
When many meetings failed to result in an initial contract satisfactory to both the defendants and the union, the parties went their separate ways. They reverted to the same positions they had occupied prior to the defendants' solicitation of the union. Neither side was in any better or any worse position than it had been in before. The only interest the two union members (the only members of the unit) had was a temporary day-to-day work arrangement contingent upon the successful outcome of the initial contract discussions. When those discussions ended unsuccessfully, their interests expired. No interests were destroyed. The formal letter of termination requested by the union does not transform the temporary consensual work arrangement and its expiration into a permanent hiring and a discharge.
In these unique circumstances, the case of National Labor Relations Board v Great Dane Trailers, Inc, 388 US 26; 87 S Ct 1792; 18 L Ed 2d 1027 (1967), does not apply and the reasons proffered by the employer for expiration of the temporary arrangement supported the MERC decisions.
Affirmed. No costs, a public question.
Kavanagh, C.J., and Levin, Fitzgerald, and Ryan, JJ., concurred with Coleman, J.
The union's business representative, Archie Shelley, testified as follows about his dealings with one of the defendants, Sol Krim, on the day the theatre was scheduled to open:
"A. I took the agreement out to the theatre — the two-week agreement we were supposed to have, and he told me he was going to take it, I assume, to you — you are his attorney — and have you check it over. That was the way it was left. Subsequently, I never got the agreement.
"Q. But the idea when you spoke to him was that we are on a temporary basis and will be negotiating during this two-week period?
"A. That is correct.
"Q. On December 22nd, that was not a permanent agreement?
"A. No, that was not a permanent agreement.
"Q. To the best of your knowledge, did the Krims during that two-week period honor all of the terms of the temporary arrangement?
"A. Yes, he did."
Mr. Holmes, the projectionist, understood that there was no permanent contract. He testified:
"Q. So when you went to work you knew you were not under contract?
"A. Correct.
"Q. Did Mr. Shelly tell you that 'during this period you are not under contract so be prepared at any time to be pulled off the job', or words to that effect?
"A. Maybe something to that effect."
MERC majority opinion, p 8.
MERC majority opinion on rehearing, p 4.
Id., p 2.