Case Name: OGLESBY v. MISSOURI PACIFIC RAILWAY COMPANY, Appellant
Court: Supreme Court of Missouri
Jurisdiction: Missouri
Decision Date: 1903-11-03
Citations: 177 Mo. 272
Docket Number: 
Parties: OGLESBY v. MISSOURI PACIFIC RAILWAY COMPANY, Appellant.
Judges: Marshall, Burgess and Fox, JJ., concur; Brace, Gantt and Valliant, JJ., dissent.
Reporter: Missouri Reports
Volume: 177
Pages: 272–336

Head Matter:
OGLESBY v. MISSOURI PACIFIC RAILWAY COMPANY, Appellant.
In Banc,
November 3, 1903.
1. Practice: demurrer to evidence. Where defendant’s demurrer to the evidence at the close of plaintiff’s case has been overruled, and defendant proceeds to offer its evidence, and a demurrer is again offered and overruled, the appellate court, in passing on the question of whether or not the case should h.ave been submitted to the jury, will consider the ease as a whole, and will dispose of the demurrer in view of all the facts developed, those offered by plaintiff, as well as those shown by defendant.
2. Negligence: defective car: not cause of injury. Where the petition charged that the wreck of a train in which plaintiff (a brakeman) was injured was caused by the breaking down of a certain ear, the court should sustain a demurrer to the evidence if there is a total failure of facts showing that the breaking down of that ear was the proximate cause of the wreck. Although the evidence may show that the sills of that car were doty, worm-eaten and defective, and known by the company to be such, yet that proof does not establish the fact that those defects were the cause of the wreck.
3. -:--: -: facts in case. Plaintiff, a brakeman, testified that he thought the train would be ditched on account-of tlie dangerous and rapid rate of speed at which it was being run down grade with steam on, and the only mother eyewitnesses (both brakemen) testified that the car, the defective condition of which plaintiff alleged caused the wreck, “was whole when it left the track and the damage to it was caused afterwards.” Held, that these facts do not tend to show that the defective condition of this car was the proximate cause of the wreck, but tend to establish the contrary, to-wit, that the wreck was caused by a too rapid running of the train, or the jumping from the track by this car, from that or some other cause. If the car jumped the track in an unbroken condition, while the train was rapidly running down grade, a wreck was inevitable, and hence, the defective condition of the car was not the original primary cause of the wreck.
4. --: irreconcilable physical facts. When a part of the physical facts standing alone go to establish the averments of the petition, and the other physical facts tend to disprove those averments, a verdict based on the physical facts alone can not be permitted, to stand. The physical facts must, just as an eyewitness, tell one uniform, consistent and reconcilable story.
5.---: brakeman. A brakeman on a train does not make out a prima facie case entitling him to recover for injuries received by showing that he was at work at the place assigned him on the train, that^a car in the train was defectively constructed, that the train was wrecked and he was injured. His relation to the company is not that of a passenger. In such case it is necessary for plaintiff' to allege the particular cause of the wreck, and to prove the cause alleged, and if there is a total failure of proof of that cause, a verdict for him must be set aside. Proof of the mere fact that the train was wrecked is not sufficient.
PER VALLTANT, J., DISSENTING, WITH WHOM BRACE AND GANTT, •JJ., CONCUR.
1. negligence: ferlow-servants: inspector and brakeman. The inspector of ears is not a fellow-servant of the brakeman on the train in which such car is placed. The law in such case is that for negligence in the discharge of those personal duties which the master owes to his servants, to supply them with reasonably safe cars, the master is liable whether he acts in person or through his servant, the inspector, and in such case the inspector represents his master.
2. --: DEFECTIVE CAR: CAUSE OF WRECK: FACTS IN EVIDENCE. Plaintiff alleged that the wreck of the train on which be was a brakeman and was injured, was caused by the breaking in two of a defective ear, whose sills were doty and worm-eaten. The 'car had a registered capacity of 60,000 pounds, five days before had hauled a cargo of 31,800 pounds of nails, on the day of the wreck was loaded with 30,000 pounds of barreled flour, at the last station before the wreck was observed by the baggageman to be sagged down, and at the time of the wreck the train of eighteen cars was running twenty or twenty-five miles an hour down grade, around a curve, with steam on. This ear was the one next to the tender, and plaintiff, a brakeman, ivas on the fifth ear behind. There was sufficient evidence to sustain the jury’s verdict that the sills of the car were doty, brash and worm-eaten, and the remaining issue was to show that its breaking in two caused the wreck in which plaintiff was injured. On this issue the, only eyewitnesses were the other two brakemen, one of whom was called by plaintiff, both of whom testified that the car was whole when it left the track, and one of them that after it left the track it rolled over the embankment. Other witnesses testified that when they reached the wreck the ear was broken in two, that about one-third of it remained attached to the tender, and was off the track; that the tender was off the track, but attached to the engine; that the large wheels of the engine were off the track, but close by the rails; that the small fore wheels of the engine were still on the track; that the remaining part of the car was still on the track, some distance behind the engine; that its sills had broken square off, had plowed into the ground, that it had formed a barrier to the cars behind it, and eight or ten other ears had piled up against it, and were broken and wrecked, and that plaintiff was caught under one of them and badly injured. Held, that this evidence was sufficient to submit to the jury the issue of whether or not the defective condition of the car caused the wrecking of the train, and the consequent injury of plaintiff.
3. Evidence: binding effect of one’s own witness. The law does not permit a part/ to impeach the veracity of his own witness, even when he calls one out of his adversary’s ranks, but it does not hold a party bound by everything his witness may say.
i. Negligence: inspector of oars: matter fob jury. The duty of the railroad company to inspect its cars with the view of keeping them in a reasonably safe condition for the use of its employees, is not performed by a mere formal or perfunctory inspection, nor can it shift the responsibility by 'delegating the performance of the duty to a servant; and whether in any case it has exercised the care in this respect which the law imposes on it, is a question of fact for the jury.
5. --: BURDEN OF PROOF: PHYSICAL FACTS: RES IPSA LOQUITUR. The burden is on the plaintiff to show that the injury was the jresult of defendant’s negligence, but the plaintiff does' not have the affirmative of every question of fact that arises out of the evidence in the case. The burden may not be on plaintiff to show how the accident which injured him did occur. The law of res ipsa loquitur i» that when the thing itself has spoken and given demonstrative evidence of negligence, the effect is to make a prima facie case for plaintiff, which calls on defendant to show that notwithstanding the condition of the thing the defendant had in fact exercised the degree of care imposed by law to discover or remedy the defect and had been unable to do so; and this rule is applicable to cases between master and servant, as well as between carrier and passenger, the difference in application being in degree.
6. Evidence: inspection: rebuttal. Where the defendant has assumed the affirmative of showing that the ear which caused the wreck was properly inspected, it is proper to permit plaintiff to introduce in rebuttal evidence as to the character of defendant’s inspection.
7. ---: rebuttal: extent of oross-examination. The defendant can not question plaintiff on a point other than that for which he was recalled in rebuttal.
Appeal from Pettis Circuit' Court. — Now. Geo. N. Longan, Judge.
Reversed.
Martin L. Clardy and R. T. Railey for appellant.
(1) Where an attorney makes improper remarks in his argument to the jury, it is not sufficient for the court to sustain an objection thereto, but it must direct tbe jury to disregard same; and even then, a new trial may be granted. Smith v. Tel. Co., 55 Mo. App. 628; Ensor v. Smith, 57 Mo. App. 596; 1 Thompson on Trials, secs. 264 and 266; Stratton v. Nye, 63 N. W. 928; Andrews v. Railroad, 71 N. W. 377; A. L. & L. S. Co. v. May, 71 N. W. 69; Sutton v. Railroad, 73 N. W. 995; Railroad v. Kellogg, 76 N. W. 464; Rudiger v. Railroad, 77 N. W. 171; Taylor v. Railroad, 79 N. W. 18; Hennies v. Vogel, 87 111. 242; Magoon v. Railroad, 31 Atl. 156; Tucker v. Henniker, 41 N. H. 317; Martin v. State, 63 Miss. 505; Rudolph v. Landwerlen, 92 Ind. 34. (2) It is not charged or claimed in the petition that defendant’s inspectors were incompetent. Hence, if the inspectors were guilty of personal negligence in not properly inspecting the “IT. L.” car, plaintiff is not entitled to recover, as he and said inspectors were fellow-servants. This is true whether considered by departmental rule or the common law. G-raltes v. Railroad, 153 Mo. 385; Schaub v. Railroad, 106 Mo. 88; Railroad v. Miller, 117 Ind. 439; Neutz v. Coal Co., 139 Ind. 411; Thymy v. Railroad, 156 Mass. 13. But even if the master be responsible for the personal negligence of its inspectors, yet the petition must allege the duty, and charge defendant with a violation of the same. Although plaintiff may allege general negligence in petition, yet if it is followed by a specific charge of negligence, as in this case, the plaintiff will be confined in his proof to the specific charge so made. Feary v. Railroad, 62 S. W. 457; Bartley v. Railroad, 148 Mo. 139; Chitty v. Railroad, 148 Mo. 74; McCarty v. Hotel Co., 144 Mo. 402; Huston v. Tyler, 140 Mo. 263; Mc-Manamee v. Railroad, 135 Mo. 447; Hite v. Railroad, 130 Mo. 136; Waldhier v. Railroad, 71 Mo. 518. There is no charge in the petition to the effect that defendant was guilty of negligence in failing to have in its service a sufficient number of inspectors to inspect its cars on the date alleged in petition. If this had been true, it was an independent act of negligence on the part of defendant, in respect to a duty which it owed to plaintiff. Plaintiff having elected in the petition to charge defendant with personal negligence in failing to inspect said “U. L.” car, had no legal right, under the authorities heretofore cited, to introduce evidence in chief, much less rebuttal, for the purpose of convicting defendant of negligence in failing to have a sufficient number of inspectors to inspect said car. (3) Over objections of defendant the court permitted the plaintiff in rebuttal to examine witness Zeigler as follows: “Q. How long would it take, Mr. Zeigler, to make a thorough and proper inspection of a freight car? A. About ten to twenty-five minutes. ’ ’ This question, over objections of defendant, was submitted to witness as an expert. The admission of such testimony authorized the jury to roam at will in the fields of conjecture, and to convict defendant’s inspectors of negligence regardless of any standard in general use among the railroads. It left the witness in his own mind to determine what was a thorough inspection. Bates v. Railroad, 45 N. E. 111. The question and answer having gone to the jury with the sanction of the court, it imposed a duty on defendant not required by either the law or exigencies of trade. Guttridge v. Railroad, 94 Mo. 472; State v. Palmer, 61 S. W. 657; Graney v. Railroad, 157 Mo. 682; Langston v. Railroad, 147 Mo. 465; Boettger v. Iron Co., 136 Mo. 536; Benjamin v. Railroad, 133 Mo. 288; King v. Railroad, 98 Mo. 240; Eu- bank v. City of Edina, 88 Mo. 655; Koons v. Railroad, 65 Mo. 597; Gravisk v. Railroad, 49 Mo. 276; Benjamin v. Railroad, 50 Mo. App. 610; Muff v. Railroad, 22 Mo. App. 584; Railroad v. Smith, 61 S. W. 3; Brown v. Mitchell, 31 S. W. 628; Railroad v. Sheldon, 51 Pac. 808; Jones v. Portland, 50 N. W. 731; Briggs v. Railroad, 53 N. *W. 1019; Lawson on Exp. Ev., 30; Rogers on Exp. Tes., sec. 53, pp. 127-8-9. (4) The charge of negligence, when boiled down, is to the effect that defendant on December 11, 1892, took into its train at Kansas City an unsafe, rotten car, which broke down, wrecked the train and injured plaintiff. The answer was practically a general denial, and put in issue the foregoing. The elementary question to be decided was whether defendant’s inspectors had exercised ordinary care in inspecting said car for safety, before it departed on its journey. Every fact, therefore, which plaintiff relied upon to substantiate this charge, was a part of his ease in chief. Under the rules of pleading, any man who has the testimony at hand,- to prove negligence in three different ways, can not be permitted to introduce Ms testimony tending to establish negligence in one respect, as a part of his case in chief, and then reserve the remainder as rebuttal. R. S. 1899, sec. 592; R. S. 1889, sec. 2039; Pier v. Heinrichoffen, 52 Mo. 335; Christal v. Craig, 80 Mo. 375 ; Feary v. Railroad, 62 S. W. 457. Plaintiff testified, over objection of defendant in rebuttal, in respect to matters which were a part of his case in chief, and defendant moved to strike it out as rebutting testimony. The court overruled said motion, and exceptions were duly saved. Plaintiff on cross-examination said that after leaving Kansas City, on the morning of the accident, and before he got to Independence, some tramps got on his train and on this “IT. L.” car. He said he made them get off at Big Blue bridge. At this stage of the case the court held that plaintiff could not be cross-examined upon any matters not formerly asked about, or which related to the inspection. This court at an ear]y date held that when a witness was put on the stand and examined about any matter, the opposite side had the right to cross-examine him about the whole case. Page v. ICankey, 6 Mo. 433; Brown v. Burrus, 8 Mo. 26; Railroad v. Silver, 56 Mo. 266; State v. Brady, 87 Mo. 145. (5) (a) The plaintiff in his petition did not in any respect attack defendant’s system of inspection in use at either Atchison or Kansas City, (b) He did not in the petition aver that defendant failed to have a sufficient number of inspectors to do the work at either place, (c) He did not aver in the petition that the switchmen ran the cars out of the yard before the inspectors had sufficient time to inspect the same. If any one or more of the three foregoing propositions had been alleged in petition, and the facts had sustained the same, such facts would have constituted negligence upon the part of defendant. The plaintiff in lieu of setting out any of the three propositions, supra, in petition, relied upon the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, and claimed thereby that the car spoke for itself. He saw fit to stand in his petition, on the last proposition. Not only did plaintiff fail to allege any of said three charges in petition, but he failed to offer in chief any evidence in respect to any of said three charges. The defendant, in its answer, tendered no issue as to said three charges. The defendant offered no evidence relating in any particular to any of said three charges. There could, therefore, be nothing for plaintiff to rebut in respect to any. Yet the court, in the face of defendant’s objection, permitted plaintiff’s witnesses, under the guise of rebuttal, to attack, first, defendant’s system of inspection, by attempting to show that it did not allow its men a sufficient length of time to inspect car; second, it permitted plaintiff, under the guise of rebuttal, to offer testimony tending to show that defendant did not have a sufficient number of inspectors to do the work fit Kansas City; third, it permitted plaintiff to in troduce evidence tending to convict defendant of negligence,- in permitting the switchmen in charge of the yards to remove and switch cars as they came in, before the inspectors had time to in: spect same, and that by reason thereof said cars passed without inspection. The admission of this damaging testimony, in respect to the three propositions, supra, which had not been pleaded by either plaintiff or defendant, and which were not referred to in evidence in chief by either plaintiff or defendant, was well calculated to influence the jury to return a verdict for plaintiff. (6) Plaintiff had the right to prove that the facts testified to by witness Iiessler were different, but under the law he vouched for the credit and veracity of said witness when he was put upon the stand. Imhoff & Co. v. McArthur, 146 Mo. 377; Bensberg v. Harris, 46 Mo. App. 406. There is no intimation in the record that he had not testified truthfully nor does the record contain a syllable of evidence which in the least impairs the truthfulness of the testimony of said witness. We understand the rule of law. in this State to be that if the facts are shown by competent evidence on one side, and the evidence is not contradicted on the other, and there is no attempt to impeach the witness, there is no question of fact involved in the case, but simply a question of law is presented. Studybake-r v. Cofield, 159 Mo. 600; Davies v. Railroad, 159 Mo. 7; Carter v. Railroad, 156 Mo. 642; King v. King, 155 Mo. 425; May v. Crawford, 150 Mo. 527; Bartley v. Ráilroad, 148 Mo. 140; Culbertson v. Railroad, 140 Mo. 63; SpiU'ane v. Railroad, 135 Mo. 427; Hite v. Railroad, 130 Mo. 132; Reichenbach v. Ellerbe, 115 Mo. 588; Lynch v. Railroad, 112 Mo. 433. (7) Upon the facts the cause should be reversed without remanding. Under the laws of this State a proceeding to construe a will is an action at law, and as such is just as much triable by a jury as the. case at bar. The rule is well settled in Missouri that in a will contest the burden of proof in the first instance devolves upon the defendants or proponents. When the latter introduces the two attesting witnesses, and proves by them that testator was over twenty-one years of age, was of sound mind, and executed the instrument according to the forms of law, it then becomes the duty of plaintiff to overcome the case made by defendants, and if the plaintiff fails to introduce any evidence, it then becomes the plain duty of the trial court to direct a verdict in favor of defendant, sustaining the will. If, in a will contest, the two attesting witnesses testified to the facts aforesaid, and there was no other evidence in the record tending to show that their testimony was false, would this court for one moment let a verdict stand overturning the will? Would it not reverse the cause with instructions to enter a decree sustaining the will, on the defendant’s evidence alone? Such has been the law in this State for years. Campbell v. Carlisle, 63 S. W. 703; Riggin v. Trustees, 61 S. W. 804; Schierbaum v. Schemme, 157 Mo. 22; Tibbe v. Kamp, 154 Mo. 580; Sehr v. Lindemann, 153 Mo. 288; Fulbright v. Perry Co., 145 Mo. 442; Defoe v. Defoe, 144 Mo. 466; McFadin v. Catron, 138 Mo. 226; Carl v. Grabel, 120 Mo. 295; Maddox v. Maddox, 114 Mo. 46. This court at an early day announced the rule of law that where the evidence is of that character that the trial judg'e would have a plain duty to perform in setting aside the verdict as unsupported by the evidence, it is his duty and his prerogative to interfere before submission to the jury, and direct a verdict for defendant. Riggin v. Trustees, 61 S. W. 805; Davies v. Railroad, 159 Mo. 8; State to use v. O’Neil, 151 Mo. 89; Bartley v. Railroad, 148 Mo. 140; Etlinger v. Kahn, 134 Mo. 497; Hite v. Railroad, 130 Mo. 141; Reichenbach v. Eilerbe, 115 Mo. 588; Powell v. Railroad, 76 Mo. 80. (8) This car may have been unsound; the inspectors may not have seen it at all, and yet it may not have been the cause of the accident. (9) (a) “If the evidence is equally consistent with either view — with the existence or non existence of negligence — it is not competent for the judge to leave the matter to the jury. The party who affirms negligence has altogether failed to establish it.” Cotton v. Wood, 8 C. B. (N. S.) 571; O’Malley v. Railroad, 113 Mo. 325; Perkins v. Railroad, 103 Mo. 52; Click v. Railroad, 57 Mo. App. 105; Peek v. Railroad, 31 Mo. App. 125; Moore v. Railroad, 28 Mo. App. 625; Railroad v. Shertle, 97 Pa. St. 450; Hays v. Railroad, 97 N. Y. 259; Baulec v. Railroad, 59 N. Y. 366; Duncan v. Tel. Co., 58 N. W- 75; Megow v. Railroad, 56 N. W. 1099; Orth v. Railroad, 50 N. W. 364; Wintuska’s Admr. v. Railroad, 20 S. W. 820; Hughes v. Railroad, 16 S. W. 275. (b) The jury had no right to convict defendant of negligence in regard to the inspection upon mere conjecture and without any substantial evidence on which to base their verdict. The jury likewise had no right, upon the evidence in this case, to draw the inference from the defects pointed out that defendant’s inspectors were guilty of negligence in failing to discover same. This brings us to cne of the most important propositions in the ease, to-wit: Whether the car was shown to be unsound and unfit for use, and, if so, whether the defects attempted to be pointed out, were of such character that the jury had the right to draw the inference that the inspectors had failed to perform their duty in regard to this car, as to which see: 3 Elliott on Railroads, sec. 1308; McPadden v. Railroad, 44 N. Y. 480; Shearman and Redfield on Neg. (3 Ed.), sec. 87; Wood’s Law Mast. & Serv. (2 Ed.), p. 819; Pierce on Railroads, p. 383; 2 Rorer on Railroads, pp. 1200-1201; Krampe v. St. L. B. A., 59 Mo. App. 283; Moss v. Railroad, 49 Mo. 170; Murphy v. Railroad, 71 Mo. 202; Roblin v. Railroad, 119 Mo. 484; Sack v. Dolese, 27 N. E. 64; Railroad v. Bates, 45 N. E. 110.
O. L. Houts for respondent.
(1) It was the duty of the defendant to use reasonable care and precaution to furnish and maintain safe cars for plaintiff in the performance of his duties as hrakeman. Under competent evidence and instructions, more favorable to defendant than it was entitled to, the jury found that defendant failed in that duty; that it furnished plaintiff a car that was defective, rotten and decayed; that defendant knew, or by the exercise of ordinary care might have known, of the condition of the car; and that by reason of its defective condition it broke down and injured plaintiff. The verdict of the jury was approved by the trial judge and is conclusive. This case has been twice tried. At the former trial, in another circuit, before another circuit judge, plaintiff obtained a verdict and for the same amount, which that judge approved. Plaintiff respectfully insists that he ought to recover and that this judgment should not be disturbed. Parsons v. Railroad, 94 Mo. 286; Gutridge v. Railroad,' 94 Mo. 468; Gutridge v. Railroad, 105 Mo. 520; Hurlbut v. Railroad, 130 Mo. 657; Bender v. Railroad, 137 Mo. 240; O ’Mellia v. Railroad, 115 Mo. 205; Coontz v. Railroad, 120 Mo. 652; Bowen v. Railroad, 95 Mo. 268; Clowers v. Railroad, 21 Mo. App. 213; Lumber Co. v. Ligas, 172 Ul. 315. (2) Under the authorities cited it was the duty of defendant to plaintiff to make such inspection as was proper and reasonable, the hazard and danger attending the use of its cars considered, regardless of the fact whether other railroads performed such duty or not. Clowers v. Railroad, 21 Mo. App. 213. It was defendant’s duty to protect plaintiff from latent and hidden defects if it could have discovered them by reasonable, ordinary care. Plaintiff had a right to assume that the car was safe; but it was the duty of the defendant to have looked, and to have hunted for defects. Parsons v. Railroad, 94 Mo. 286; Gutridge v. Railroad, 105 Mo. 520; Clowers v.' Railroad, 21 Mo. App. 213. This is the doctrine everywhere and is elementary. Lumber Co. v. Ligas, 172 111. 315; "Wood on Master and Servant, 680. The defects of this car were, to the eye of an inspector, patent and not hidden or latent. It looked old; was sagged three inches, indicating a weakness in the center; and was rotten, worm-eaten and doty. From sneh defects defendant and its inspectors knew that the ear was unfit for service. Under the authorities and the evidence, the fact alone that the car looked old and was sagged, was enough to have required of defendant and its inspectors such an examination as would have shown that the car was. worm-eaten, rotten and unsafe. ■ Gutridge v. Railroad, 105 Mo- 527; Railroad v. Fry, 131 Ind. 327, 28 N. E. 99Í. With all the evidence, facts and circumstances before the jury, ás ,to the defects of this car, the way in which it broke down, the manner in which the wreck occurred, the observations of the eye witnesses and the general character of inspection in the yards of defendant through which the car passed, it was for the jury to say whether the car was unfit for service, and broke down and caused plaintiff’s injury, and whether defendant had exercised reasonable and ordinary care. Plaintiff did not have to prove his case by experts; nor was the jury compelled to accept the opinion of experts if given. Bowen v. Railroad, 95 Mo. 268; Coontz v. Railroad, 121 Mo. 652; Hurlbut v. Railroad, 130 Mo. 657; Gutridge v. Railroad, 94 Mo. 468. If defendant had produced inspectors at the trial, which it did not do, from Atchison and Kansas City, and they had testified that they had inspected the car on the day of the wreck and found no defects, the question of reasonable care, under all the evidence, still would have been one for the jury. Bowen v. Railroad, 95 Mo. 268; Coontz v. Railroad, 121 Mo. 652. The physical fact that this car looked old, was sagged three inches, was worm-eaten, rotten and doty, contradicted all evidence of reasonable care, or of competent inspection, if defendant had introduced such evidence. This fact the jury had a right to consider. Lane v. Railroad, 132 Mo. 4; Huggart v. Railroad, 134 Mo. 680. There was evidence introduced in this case, facts testified to by witnesses showing, conclusively, as plaintiff thinks, but tending to show, undoubtedly, want of reasonable or ordinary care upon the part of defendant. The law does not presume, then, that defendant exercised such care; or that its inspectors were competent; or that they did their duty; or that they inspected this car; or that they found no defects; or that if they did find defects they deemed, them immaterial; or that they were justified in so concluding. All of these were questions of fact for the jury. Defendant, therefore, tried this case, drew its instructions and has presented it to this court on a false theory.- The law will not permit defendant to deprive plaintiff of the benefit of testimony of sworn witnesses, or to presume him out of his rights. No proposition is better settled. Hamm v. Barrett, 28 Mo. 388; G-rover’s Admrs. v. Duhle, 19 Mo. ■360; Moberly v. Railroad, 98 Mo. 183; Meyers v. Kansas City, 108 Mo. 487; Rapp v. Railroad, 106 Mo. 423 Lynch v. Railroad, 112 Mo. 420; Erhart v. Ditrich, 118 Mo-. 430;-.-Bluedorn v. Railroad, 121 Mo. 270; Shepers v. Railroad, 126 Mo. 670; Weller v. Railroad, 152 Mo. 449. Upon the authorities cited, defends ant’s demurrer to the evidence was properly overruled. On the former appeal this court held this was a case for the jury, settling this question. Oglesby v. Railroad, 150 Mo. 137. (3) Plaintiff and defendant’s inspectors were not fellow servants. Long v. Railroad, 65 Mo. 225; Rodney v. Railroad, 127 Mo. 676. (4) Plaintiff’s petition is good and his evidence offered under the petition and in rebuttal of the evidence offered by defendant was competent. Plaintiff has not sued for negligence of a fellow servant; or for negligence on the part of defendant in the employment of a fellow servant; but for negligence on the part of defendant in failing to furnish plaintiff a reasonably safe car, a personal duty it owed him and one it could not delegate. It was perfectly competent, then, for plaintiff, in rebuttal of evidence offered by defendant, to offer evi-' dence tending to show that the defendant’s inspection was imperfect because it did not allow sufficient time, or had not a sufficient number of men for the same, or that they were incompetent and neglected their duty. The petition is in the usual form, often approved by this court. Bender v. Railroad, 137 Mo. 240; Hurlbut v. Railroad, 130 Mo. 657; Condon v. Railroad, 78 Mo. 567; G-utridge v. Railroad, 94 Mo. 468. Plaintiff’s evidence offered in rebuttal tended to disprove “new points first opened by defendant, ’ ’ and was rebuttal in the strictest sense of the term. Christal v. Craig, 80 Mo. 375; Oglesby v. Railroad, 150 Mo. 137; McFarland v. Ins. Co., 124 Mo. 222.

Opinion:
ROBINSON, C. J.
This is an action for damages growing out of injuries received by plaintiff in December, 1892, while in the employ of defendant railway company as brakeman on one of its freight trains running between Kansas City and St. Louis. The contest, between the parties hereto has had quite a long and eventful history. In a former suit between the same parties, growing out of the same occurrence, the case came here then, as now, on defendant's appeal from a judgment in favor of plaintiff, at which time, opinions by four members of this court were written. When the judgment in that suit, Oglesby v. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co., reported in 150 Mo. 137, was reversed and remanded, as the result of the diverse views expressed by the different members of the court, and the cause was returned to the circuit court of Bates county for rehearing, plaintiff dismissed that suit and began anew in his home county of Johnson the present suit, this last action, however, differing from the first in this particular only, that now, no act of negligence is charged to defendant on account of the rapid rate of speed of the train at the time plaintiff received his injuries, as was done in plaintiff's former petition filed; but the absence of that averment from the present petition makes the consid eration of the effect of the existence of that fact, in so far as it has been given as plaintiff's version of the cause of the wreck that resulted in his injury, of no less consequence than it was at the former hearing of the original suit, when that allegation of negligence was contained. In the present action the grounds of negligence charged are :
' ' That defendant negligently furnished and placed and allowed to be placed, operated and used in said train, at said time on said trip a car numbered 7919, with the initials ' U. L. ' thereon, which was at the time unfit for service, unsafe, old, worn, and out of repair, and the timbers of which were decayed and rotten,worm-eaten and doty: That at the time defendant knew, and by the exercise of ordinary care and prudence might have known, of the condition of said car and that'it was unsafe, unfit for service, out of repair, old, worn, rotten, decayed, worm-eaten, and doty. That at said time, on the said 11th day of December, 1892, by reason of the old, worn, decayed, rotten, worm-eaten, doty and unsafe condition of said car and because the same was out of repair as aforesaid, and while said train and cars were being operated by defendant as aforesaid on its said line of railway at a point west of what is called Little Blue Switch in Jackson county, Missouri, the said ca.r broke and the said car and train were wrecked and thrown from the track, and plaintiff by reason thereof and while in the line of his duty as brakeman on said train in the employ of defendant as aforesaid, and without fault on his part, was then and there thrown to the ground and track and the cars thrown upon him, by reason of which his right leg was crushed," etc.
On the appeal in this case, as when the case was here before, the controlling controversy is over the question whether upon all the facts developed the case should have been submitted to the jury. Other minor questions have been presented by the defendant on this appeal, but as none of them in our judgment are suffi eient to effect a reversal of the judgment found, if that judgment is predicated upon facts from which the jury-had the right to make a determination, they need not be mentioned.
What then, are the facts in the case as shown and established by all the witnesses? Though the defendant offered a demurrer to the testimony at the close of plaintiff's case, when that demurrer was overruled, it did not choose to stand thereon, but gave to' the court and the jury its testimony, and we must consider it now along with that of the plaintiff's, as one whole, and if from all the facts shown, the case was one to go to the jury it is not the province of this court, on appeal, to interfere therewith, or to disturb the judgment based thereon.
The testimony on the part of plaintiff tended to •show that this "IT. L." car left Kansas City loaded with 30,000 pounds of flour on the morning of December 11, 1892, in a train of 18 cars bound for St. Louis; that this "U. L." car was the first car of the train and was fastened to the rear end of the tender by means of an iron link and pin; that plaintiff was the forward one -of three brakemen in charge of the train and that his position at the time of the wreck was upon the fifth car from tbe engine that was used to pull the train; that when the train reached a point near what is called Little Blue Switch in Jackson county, about seven miles out from Independence, while running down a steep grade on the road and around a sharp curve, it was wrecked and plaintiff was found under the car upon which he was riding with his right leg broken and crushed, and otherwise bruised and mangled. Plaintiff's testimony tended to- show that this "IT. L." car, as it is called, was old, and that its longitudinal sills were rotten, worm-eaten and doty, and when observed after the wreck they were found to have been broken square in two about ten feet back from the forward end! of the ear. The testimony on part of defendant tended to show that this "U. L." car was sound, in good condition and comparatively new; that it was built to carry 60,000 pounds, while at the time of the wreck it. was carrying only 30,000 pounds of barreled flour; that, it had been inspected at Atchison, Kansas, and Kansas City, Missouri, and that no defects were noticed, and that at the time of the accident the train was not running more than 20 or 25 miles an hour. It was stipulated by the parties that this "U. L." car was received in Atchison, Kansas, December 5, 1892, having come over defendant's road from St. Louis loaded with 31,-000 pounds of nails, and that it remained in Atchison on defendant's premises unloaded until December 10,. 1892.
While in general the testimony in the present case is substantially as it was on the former appeal of the case between the same parties, reported in 150 Mo. 'supra, and the statement of the facts on the former appeal might have been adopted as the statement of the facts of this case in so far as they went, a few new facts Avere brought out at the present hearing, and the testimony of several witnesses called by plaintiff was developed with more distinctness upon the question as to the character and extent of the defects appearing in the broken sills of this "U. L." car, which will be noted below.
Of the new facts brought out in the present case that were not made to appear when the case was here on its first hearing, one was that this "U. L." car was observed to be sagged in the center some two or three inches as it passed Independence station, a distance of six or seven miles from where the train in which it was hauled was Avrecked a few minutes afterwards. Several witnesses, some called by the plaintiff and one called by the defendant, in answer to the question, what this sagging of a car in the center two or three inches would indicate? gave it as their opinion that such a condition would indicate that the car was weak in some of its parts, and that it needed to be repaired.
Two witnesses, fellow brakemen on the train with plaintiff at the time of the accident, and the only eye witnesses to the occurrence of the event who testified at the trial as to the condition of this car immediately preceding and at the time of the wreck, one testifying in behalf of plaintiff, the other called by defendant, said that this "U. L." car was yet whole after it had left or jumped the tracks and was running upon the ties of the roadbed and before it turned over or broke down upon the track. There was also testimony at this, as at the other trial of the case, showing that one or more of the steel or iron rails of this track were discovered to be broken in two, and very badly out of shape and bent when the wreck was viewed, and that the track generally, under the wreck, was badly torn up and out of place. The testimony also disclosed the facts to be that of the 10 or 12 wrecked cars, all were more or less mashed up and broken, and that several of them were more badly broken up than this "IT. L." car, which plaintiff now claims was the cause of the wreck. The engineer and fireman of this train both testified that the first thing they knew of anything going wrong with their train was that the wheels of the tender and engine were off the tracks and running upon the ties and that as they turned to see what had become of the train they discovered it in a heap, piled upon either side of the track back of them a distance of 100 feet or more, except about one-third of the forward end of this "IT. L. " car and the forward trucks under it, which remained fastened to the tender just back of them. That the wheels of the trucks under that part of this "IT. L.", car, that remained fastened to the tender, as well as the wheels of the trucks of the tender and engine (except the small wheels of the forward truck of the engine), were off of the iron rails of the tracks, and that the wooden cross ties over which they had run for a considerable distance back from where the engine and tender had been brought to a stop, were observed to be cut and bruised as if by the flange of the wheels of the engine and tender.
Though the plaintiff omitted from his petition filed in this case, the allegation that this "U. L." car was broken down and caused the wreck on account of the rapid and dangerous rate of speed at which the train was being run at the time of the accident, as he had alleged in his first petition filed, he was made to say on cross-examination in this case, that he had said and thought the train was going too fast, and was being run at a rate of speed that was dangerous when the accident occurred, and that he thought the train in consequence of its speed would go into the ditch. The plaintiff also said that when the train was running down the steep grade upon which it wrecked, the steam from the boiler was not turned off, but was being used on the engine.
While at the former hearing of this case, the writer was inclined to the view (then presented with much earnestness by counsel for defendant) that the plaintiff had not shown as charged in his petition, that the sills of this "U. L. " car that broke in two, were doty or worm-eaten, other than as those defects were made to appear from the breaks in the sills themselves, which ordinary inspection would not have revealed before the break occurred, in the trial of the present case, the testimony upon the question of the defects in the sills, and the extent and character of those defects was gone into more fully than at the first trial of the case, and several witnesses called by plaintiff, who, made an examination of the wreck within a few minutes after its occurrence, testified that the sills of this "U. L." car which they found broken in two upon the track, were decayed, doty and worm-eaten, and that this defective condition of the sills could be readily seen (except on the two' outside sills that were painted), for four or five feet on either side of the break in the sills, as well as at the point of the breaks, and that same could be readily observed by anyone making an examination of the car standing 6 or 8 feet distant from it, 1 am how of the opinion that at the present hearing of the case, the plaintiff offered ample testimony, if believed, to authorize the jury to find for him on the allegation of his petition that the sills of this "IT. L.'' car were defective, and that by the exercise of ordinary care and inspection their defective condition could have been known to defendant, if upon all the testimony in the case, there were facts or circumstances shown, calling for the determination of a jury upon the remaining issue in the case, that this car by reason of its defective condition, broke down upon the tracks and caused the wreck of defendant's train, upon which plaintiff was riding at the time of receiving his injuries.
"What then are the facts of the case upon this last issue to justify its submission to the determination of a jury? That the plaintiff was' badly injured by the wreck that occurred, is sadly too true, but as to the cause of the wreck, as to the averment that this "IT. L." car broke down upon the track and thereby caused the wreck of the train upon which plaintiff was at the time riding, there is a total absence of fact in this entire record, or of facts from which the inference may fairly or reasonably be drawn, that the breaking down of this car upon the tracks was the proximate cause of the wreck that resulted in plaintiff's injury.
In fact, if the testimony from the mouth of plaintiff himself, to the effect that he thought this train would be ditched on account of the dangerous and rapid rate of speed at which it was being run down grade with steam on, at the time of the accident; or if the testimony of the other two eye witnesses to the occurrence, plaintiff's two fellow brakemen (one called by plaintiff and the other called by defendant) to the effect that this "ILL." car "was whole when it left the track and the damage to it was caused afterwards," is given any consideration, we must conclude that the proximate cause of the wreck' of this train was something other than the breaking down upon the track of this "U. L." car on account of its defective sill timbers. If the train upon which plaintiff was working was wrecked on account of the dangerous and rapid' rate of speed at which it was being run by the engineer in charge thereof, then plaintiff has shown himself not entitled to recovery even though the sills of this "U. L." car were confessedly defective, and were found to have broken in two after the car left the iron rails of the track upon which it was designed to run.
If this "U. L." car jumped the track while it was yet in perfect condition, and was pulled over and along the cross ties on the road bed before it turned over, or was broken in two and fell down upon the track, as the brakeman on the train, called by plaintiff, and the one called by defendant, to narrate the facts as seen by them, said it did, and as the bruised condition of the wooden cross ties under and immediately back of this wrecked "IT. L." car clearly indicated the fact to have been, then the proximate cause of the wreck of this train was not that this car broke in two and fell down while being run upon the track, but the cause was that this car had for some reason jumped the track, or that the tracks had spread and let its wheels through upon the cross ties, or had for some other cause unsuggested by witness, left the track on which it was designed to run, and was broken down by being pulled over the rough and uneven surface of the wooden cross ties. All the positive testimony offered by plaintiff upon the question as to the manner of the occurrence that led to the wreck, not only failed to establish the allegation of his petition, but absolutely disproved their existence if believed, and we think the physical manifestations of the wreck itself are no less convincing upon this proposition, than the declarations of the eye-witnesses of the occurrence, however short all these facts may yet be of furnishing the information by which the true cause of the wreck may be determined.
If this "U. L." car did jump from the rails of the track before it broke in two, or if it was let down upon the cross ties of the roadbed, because of a spreading of the iron rails forming the track upon which the ear was. designed to run, then the fact that this car at the time had doty and worm-eaten sills, became a matter of no concern in this case, for the twofold reason: first, because there is nothing in the existence of doty or worm-eaten sills in a car, so long as the car remains whole and unbroken, to cause it to jump a track upon which it is being pulled, or that would cause, or have any tendency to cause, the wheels of such a car to leave more readily a. track that had been spread too wide for its trucks, than if the sills had been absolutely sound and perfect; and in the second place, if this car jumped from the iron rails forming the track, or if for any reason its wheels fell through and down upon the wooden cross ties of the roadbed when the train was being run at the rate of twenty or twenty-five miles an hour down a steep grade and around a sharp curve in the track, a wreck was inevitable, whether the sills of this car were sound or defective, and the condition of the sill timbers of the car and the manner of their breaking in two are to be considered as mere incidental facts of the wreck resulting from some primary original cause to be yet ascertained. Cars are not constructed to withstand the strain and force to which they are subjected under such conditions. Good sill timbers and bad sill timbers, in the cars of a train running at the rate of speed this train was then going, when the train for any reason leaves or jumps the track, are alike broken and smashed into splinters, as the physical condition of most of the cars of this train, as well as the "IT. L." car, clearly demonstrate. If it is once recognized that this "IT. L." car was off of the iron tracks and running upon the wooden cross-ties when it was yet whole, how it was torn up or broken in two when afterwards examined, is to be studied as a mere incidental result of the wreck, and throws no light upon the inquiry as to the cause thereof.
But it is said for respondent that the situation and condition of this "U. L." car upon the track tells its own story of the cause of the wreck, independent of and contrary to what his witness, Hessler, said upon the subject, and contrary to plaintiff's first version of the cause of the wreck as he determined it from the top of the car upon which he was riding at the time of the occurrence. If, then, resort is to be made to the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, to show the existence of this last essential averment of fact of plaintiff's petition, as plaintiff was compelled to do in the present trial after he repudiated and abandoned as untrue not only his own original judgment as to the cause of the wreck (the rapid rate of speed of the train down grade on a curve with steam on), but all the positive testimony regarding the occurrence as given by his eye-witness Hessler, it is certainly not proper that we confine the inquiry to the simple story told by this ' ' U. L. " car itself standing-alone and disassociated with all other features of the wreck, but we should at least view and study the situation and condition as shown by the entire wreck and all the surroundings, and ascertain, if we can, from these, the full story of the wreck and the cause that led thereto if possible. Not only this "U. L." car but all others of the 10 or 12 cars that were found piled upon the tracks hack of this car, broken and piled up, some five or six of which, were as badly or 'more jammed and broken up than this "U. L." car, upon which counsel for plaintiff now seek to fasten the sole cause of the wreck, must be called to bear witness if we may expect even a possible correct disclosure of the cause that led to the wreck. Not only these wrecked and broken ears, but the condition of the broken and bent rails of the track under 'these ears, as seen by the witnesses called to reproduce by verbal photograph the situation to the jury, must be studied; and the fact that the iron rails of the track were found badly disordered and spread apart in places wide enough to permit the wheels of the trucks of the cars to drop down upon the wooden cross-ties of the roadbed, and the fact that the wheels of the tender and engine of this train (except the two front wheels of the engine) were also found off the track a hundred feet or more distant down the road from these wrecked cars, and also the fact that the wooden cross-ties along the track for some distance from where the engine and tender stopped, as also for several feet back from where this "U- L." car was broken down, were found to be cut and bruised as if by some heavy object running over them, and all other conceded and well recognized facts of the situation must be taken into account, if the manner of the occurrence of the wreck and the causes that led thereto, is expected to be determined from the physical facts of the wreck itself, by any kind of a fair conjecture even; and if the story as told by the consideration of the one feature or condition of the wreck, which may now be suggested by plaintiff, as the cause thereof, is out of harmony and irreconcilable with that told or indicated by the consideration of other conditions and features thereof equally as obvious and quite as suggestive of a different or contrary cause, that might have. brought on the wreck, the court should act as upon the irreconcilable story of any single witness who is called to establish the existence of any essential averment of a petition, treat it as if nothing substantial had been shown in the case. Under such circumstances there is nothing for the determination of a jury. To permit a jury to enter the field of conjecture under such circumstances, to say which of these physical conditions they would consider and which they would reject, would be no less unreasonable than to permit a jury to take a case for determination where an eye-witness to the occur rence who had been called by plaintiff to prove the averment of his petition, after first telling what he had seen in line with the averments of the petition, had, when asked by the defendant to repeat what he had seen and the manner of its occurrence, made an exact contrary statement.
Upon the testimony of a witness to antagonistic and irreconcilable statements of. a fact, one tending to sustain the allegations of a petition, the other to disprove it, no one would contend for a moment that the case was one for the determination of a jury. Until a witness can determine for himself just what he saw or did not see, a jury is not warranted in making the determination for him. Under such circumstances the court should dispose of a- case as if the witness had not spoken; as if plaintiff had offered no proof upon that averment of his petition. So here, if the conditions and the appearance of a part of this wreck (to which plaintiff has been driven as his only availing witness, to establish the averments of his petition) might reasonably indicate when standing alone, as plaintiff now contends the appearance and position on the track of this broken "U. L. " car does, that it broke in two and fell down upon the track and thereby caused the wreck which resulted in his injury, there was yet no warrant for the jury taking these facts and from them alone making a finding in accordance with plaintiff's present theory as to the cause of the wreck, when other features and conditions of the wreck disclose a state of facts which as clearly indicate that the wreck must have occurred in a different manner, and could not have occurred, as respondent contends the appearance of this "U. L." car upon the track might and does indicate, if considered alone. The court under such circumstances should act as upon the irreconcilable testimony of any single witness offered to prove the existence of any given act of negligence — tell the jury that plaintiff had failed to make out his case. If the wreck itself, that is, if all the broken and mangled cars of that train, and the condition of the tracks and roadbed under the cars and the fact of the engine being off of the iron track in advance of this "TJ. L." car, is to be relied upon to tell the cause that led to the wreck, there should certainly be exacted of all these features of the wreck so examined, as of any witness called to establish the existence of the same fact, that they tell one uniform and consistent and reconcilable story.
If the conditions and appearances of this "U. L." car when considered alone might indicate, if it might suggest, or if we may use the term, if it might tell one story when considered by itself and independent of the •other features of the wreck, of how the wreck may have been brought about; and if another feature of the wreck when studied alone tells a different story of how the wreck might have taken place, and what was its cause, and still another feature of the wreck would indicate that it must have occurred from an entirely different cause, some of which causes suggested would render defendant liable and others not, what was plaintiff's authority for selecting the one feature of the wreck he did to the exclusion of all others, or why did he not take the condition and appearance of some one of the other 8 or 10 broken and shattered cars of that wreck, or why did he not consider the feature of the disordered condition of the iron rails of the track, under this wreck, or the condition of the bruised and battered wooden cross-ties at that point or any one of a dozen or more features of the wreck, all of which were as open to the view as the condition of this "IT. L." car?
If the truck of the engine used to pull this train, jumped from the iron rails of the track on that occasion (and according to every witness who spoke upon that subject, they did at some time during the progress of the wreck) and if it was due to the rapid rate of speed at which the train was being run down grade and around a sharp curve in the road with steam on (and this was plaintiff's first opinion as to the canse of the wreck, as he was able to observe it, from the top of one of the cars of the train) and if the engine pulled or jerked this "U. L." car off after it upon the wooden cross-ties where the car then broke in two and fell down upon the track, the primary cause of the wreck that injured plaintiff was that the locomotive engine first jumped, or, for some cause, left the iron tracks upon which it was designed to run. The broken condition of the sill timbers of this "U. L." car, as that of the broken condition of the timbers of the other eight or ten wrecked and smashed up ears of the train, under such circumstances, should then also be considered as mere incidents of the wreck, and not looked to as the cause thereof. Or if this "U. L." car itself jumped from the iron rails of the track upon which it was running to' the" rough and uneven surface of the wooden cross-ties of the roadbed, on account of the dangerous rate of speed of the train, before the engine and tender left the track, or if it left the iron rails of the track on account of their disordered and disturbed condition (a feature of the wreck plainly observable to every witness who spoke upon the subject), and was broken in two and fell down upon the tracks on account of the unusual strain to¡ which it must necessarily have been subjected by being-pulled over and across the wooden cross-ties while it was out of line with the engine and tender in front, and the car in the rear, to which it was attached by iron links or fastenings, the fact that the sill timbers were found to be doty, worm-eaten, rotten and broken in two, are to be considered as incidental conditions seen in a catastrophe inevitable from some prior efficient cause. Or if this ' ' IT. L. " car jumped from the iron rails of the track upon which it was designed to run, or fell through the iron tracks to and upon the wooden cross-ties of the roadbed for any cause or causes known or unknown, and was pulled over the rough uneven surface of the wooden cross-ties at the rate of 20 or 25 miles an hour, while it was yet in perfect condition and before it was broken in two and fell down upon the tracks, as plaintiff's only eye-witness to the occurrence says it did, and as the marks on the cross-ties clearly indicate the fact must have been, the plaintiff must fail in his cause of action as at present brought.
Or if the battered and bruised condition of the wooden cross-ties for forty feet or more back of where this ' ' IT. L. " ear was found in the wreck, is studied, a story is told of what must have occurred at the wreck that absolutely disproves respondent's present theory of the cause of the wreck, and is quite in harmony with the story told by plaintiff's witness Hessler, to the effect that this "17. L." car had jumped from or fell through the iron rails of the track to the wooden cross-ties and was running upon them before it broke in two and fell upon the track. It would be a fair and reasonable presumption and one which the law might permit to be indulged from the sight of this wrecked " 7J. L." car, and the bruised and battered condition of the wooden cross-ties, for a distance of 40 feet or more back of where said car was found broken down upon the track, to say, that either this ' ' U. L. " car or the engine and tender in front of it, or all of them, had jumped from the iron rails of the track to and upon the wooden cross-ties, and thus cut and bruised them with the partially sharp flange of their wheels, before the "U. L/' car broke down upon the tracks, for after this car broke in two and the sills under the rear portions thereof fell upon the track, every circumstance in the case points to the fact, and plaintiff claims the facts to be, that this rear portion of the car moved forward only five or six feet upon the track before it was brought to a complete stop (evidenced by the marks upon the roadbed and ties, made by these broken sill timbers plowing over them for that distance after the car broke in two and dropped down upon the track).
As said before, if this "U. L." car or the engine and tender in front of it, did for any canse jump from or leave the iron rails of the track upon which the train was running, before this "U. L." ear broke in two and fell down upon the tracks (as the bruised condition of the wooden cross-ties clearly indicate the fact must have been) the cause of the wreck did not take place as plaintiff asserts, but is to be attributed to that fact rather than to the doty and decayed sill timbers of the "U. L." car that were found broken in two in the wreck. The condition of the sill timbers of this "TJ. L. " car and its position upon the track, as that of all the broken timbers in all other of the wrecked cars, became as mere incidental facts seen in a wreck.
When a physical condition or fact shown is alone relied upon to prove the existence of a certain other fact or facts asserted as the basis for a cause of action (as plaintiff was driven to do in this case, after rejecting and repudiating as untrue the oral statement of his only eye-witness to the occurrence, his fellow brakeman Iiessler, who said that this " U. L. " car broke down after it jumped or left the track, and after discarding his own first impression as to the cause of the wreck, the rapid rate of the train's speed on a sharp down grade curve in the road), the fact asserted and sought to be proven must be one which uniformly, regularly and naturally precedes the existence of the facts shown. It is not enough that we may say, the condition shown has a tendency to prove, or to suggest, the prior existence of the fact asserted and sought to be proven equally with other facts as reasonable and readily suggested to the contrary, and particularly is that so, where some of the conditions shown might indicate the happening of the wreck from a cause or causes for which the defendant would not be liable equally as readily as for a cause or causes for which it would be liable.
But as before said,, when every feature and condition of this "U. L." car and the entire wreck as detailed by all the witnesses, is considered, whether sepa rately or collectively, we have yet nothing that can be said to furnish more than material for conjecture as to what was the primary or proximate cause that led to the wreck, that resulted in plaintiff's injury; and this surmise or conjecture, now made in behalf of plaintiff (for such only can it be characterized) not only fails to coincide with plaintiff's first opinion as to the cause of the wreck, but is in absolute conflict with the view as expressed by the only two' eye-witnesses of the occurrence who testified in the case.
For plaintiff in this case the error has been made throughout of assuming instead of proving the existence of the very fact assigned as his cause of action. Thus it is said: "certain it is if the timbers of this car [the "U.L." car] were rotten they were liable to break from that fact. Therefore given the rotten timbers, the broken car and the wreck, what more is needed to make out a prima facie case for plaintiff?" And again it is said, "If the timbers of this 'U. L.' car were doty and worm-eaten, if they broke in two, dropped down, plowed into the roadbed and formed a barrier against which the rear cars of the train were thrown, the jury needed no expert testimony to assist them in finding the cause of the wreck." Had plaintiff been a passenger upon defendant's train riding in a place assigned to him by defendant's authorized agents, the fact of the. wreck, and the existence of the decayed sill timbers of this broken down "U. L. " car would have been ample to have raised the presumption of negligence on the part of defendant, and properly could have been declared to have made out a prima facie case for plaintiff, but not so when his relation to defendant was shown to have been that of employee to employer, and when he was at the time of receiving his injuries, one of the train crew in the actual management and conduct of this wrecked train. To maintain an action against defendant it was necessary for plaintiff to allege, as he did, the particular cause of the wreck, and it was necessary that he prove the cause as alleged either directly by witnesses who saw the occurrence, or by proof of facts and circumstances from which the existence of the alleged cause might fairly and reasonably be inferred. Granting that the broken sill timbers of this "U. L." car were found to be doty and worm-eaten, as plaintiff's witnesses who examined them immediately after the wreck say they were, they tell no more the cause that brought on the occurrence of the wreck that resulted in plaintiff's injury, than the broken sill timbers, seen by those same-witnesses and many others, under the eight or ten other wrecked and broken cars of that train. Each tells the story that some unusual and violent energy was applied to effect their destruction, but what caused the application of that unusual force to be- exerted as it was, the-one car is alike as silent as the others. The broken, decayed sill timbers of this "U. L." car and the broken sound timbers of the other 8 or 10 cars of the wreck, are alike but incidents found in a wreck, but neither of itself nor all together tell a story that would warrant more than a conjecture to be made therefrom. Plaintiff having failed to establish by adequate proof the existence of the essential averment of his petition, that the wreck of the train upon-which he was injured was caused by the breaking down upon the track of this "U. L." car, the judgment must be reversed, and it is so ordered.
Marshall, Burgess and Fox, JJ., concur; Brace, Gantt and Valliant, JJ., dissent.