Case Name: Curtis MITCHELL v. CONNECTICUT INDEMNITY COMPANY
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1963-07-01
Citations: 161 So. 2d 460
Docket Number: No. 5929
Parties: Curtis MITCHELL v. CONNECTICUT INDEMNITY COMPANY.
Judges: Before ELLIS, LOTTINGER, PIER-GET, LANDRY and REID, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 161
Pages: 460–467

Head Matter:
Curtis MITCHELL v. CONNECTICUT INDEMNITY COMPANY.
No. 5929.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana. First Circuit.
July 1, 1963.
Certiorari Refused Nov. 12, 1963.
On Rehearing March 2, 1964.
Badeaux & Gisevius, by Reginald T. Badeaux, Jr., Robert R. Gisevius (On Rehearing), New Orleans, for appellant.
Bienvenu & Culver, by P. A. Bienvenu, New Orleans, Timothy J. McNamara (On Rehearing), for appellee.
Before ELLIS, LOTTINGER, PIER-GET, LANDRY and REID, JJ.

Opinion:
LOTTINGER, Judge.
This is a suit in workmen's compensation by Curtis Mitchell, the petitioner, against his employer's compensation insurer, Connecticut Indemnity Company of New Haven, Connecticut, the defendant. The Lower Court awarded judgment in favor of petitioner and against defendant for specific injuries. The petitioner has taken this appeal seeking to have himself declared permanently and totally disabled, and for benefits accordingly.
The evidence discloses that petitioner is a painter by trade and on June 25, 1959 while employed as such by Howard Creel he suffered an accident resulting in injury for which he now seeks benefits under the Workmen's Compensation Act. At the time of the accident he was performing work as a painter on a school job in the Parish of Washington, Louisiana.
The petitioner was examined and treated by Dr. L. L. Lancaster, a general practition er who eventually discharged him as having recovered from his injury and able to return to work on December 17, 1959. Petitioner was also examined by Dr. H. R. Soboloff,. an orthopedic surgeon, and Dr. Vernon R. Kroll, a general surgeon.
The evidence reflects that the petitioner received compensation for a period of 26 weeks at the rate of $35.00 per week or a total sum of $910.00 during the period from the date of his injury, June 25, 1959, to December 23, 1959, which was one week subsequent to the date of his discharge by Dr. Lancaster. In his petition, the petitioner seeks compensation benefits at the maximum amount for total and permanent disability. There is no question but that if found to be totally and permanently disabled petitioner would be entitled to the maximum weekly benefits as provided in the act.
The defendant filed answer denying that the petitioner is totally or permanently disabled in setting forth his discharge by Dr. Lancaster. Defendant also alleges that subsequent to his discharge by the said doctor an agreement was reached for compromise and settlement with petitioner for an additional sum of $200.00 and that, although the settlement pleadings were prepared, and defendant was willing to settle for said amount, the petitioner withdrew from his agreement after consulting Counsel. Simultaneously with the filing of its answer, the defendant deposited the sum of $200.00 in the Registry of the Court in compromise of the matter and as evidence of its good intentions.
The Lower Court held that the petitioner sustained a specific injury to his foot resulting in a five to ten per cent disability thereof, and concluded that the benefits already paid, plus the sum of $200.00 deposited in the Registry of the Court would fully and adequately cover the compensation due petitioner. The petitioner has taken this appeal asking that the judgment of the Lower Court be reversed so as to declare him totally and permanently disabled, and that he be awarded benefits accordingly. There is also at issue herein a bill of exception taken by the defendant based upon the refusal of the Lower Court to allow defendant to introduce and show the Court certain moving pictures of the petitioner while at work subsequent to the accident. The purpose for this introduction was to discredit the credibility of petitioner in his testimony, that he was unable to do any work of a reasonable character. The Lower Court refused to allow these moving pictures to be introduced for such purposes because of the fact that the defendant had not disclosed its intention of so doing at a pretrial conference held between the parties, to this suit.
The only question upon which there was any serious dispute in the Lower Court, and upon which there is any serious dispute before this Court is as to the disability of petitioner. We feel that there is no question but that there is a five to ten per cent disability to the left foot of petitioner as was found by the Lower Court. This amount of disability was testified to both by Dr. Lancaster and Dr. Soboloff. The question as to permanent and total disability, however, is an entirely different matter.
Dr. Lancaster, who was the first to examine petitioner and who treated him for the injuries, testified that, as a result of the accident, petitioner received contusions and abrasions of the left elbow on the medial aspect, a sprained ankle and a fracture of the oscalsis of his left foot. The injury upon which petitioner bases his claim of total and permanent disability was the fracture of the oscalsis of his left foot.
Subsequent to the accident and the resulting injuries,, the petitioner suffered another injury to the ankle of his left foot, however this second injury is of no concern to this present suit as all the medical testimony is to the effect that the second injury has totally healed and that it is easily distinguished from the first injury as it was to a different portion of the foot.
After analyzing all of the medical testimony introduced in this matter, we have come to the conclusion that the petitioner has recovered, and his left foot is substantially in as good a condition as it was prior to the accident. The only residual was a twenty to twenty-five per cent loss of plantar flexation of the foot. Both Dr. Lancaster and Dr. Soboloff testified that this loss of flexation resulted in a five to ten per cent loss of the use of his foot. With regard to the question of temporary and total disability, the doctors were in substantial agreement. There is no question but that the petitioner could return to his work, however the question was raised as to whether or not he could perform the same duties which he performed prior to the accident without any pain. We believe that Dr. Soboloff gave the best résumé of petitioner's condition, in this regard, as follows:
"The reason would be that toward the end of an eight hour day, this man is going to have aching and soreness in the feet in climbing up and down ladders all day long, working, as counsel points out, on girders, constantly working on ladders for maybe several hours at a time, working in a squatting position, all of these things would give him aching and soreness toward the end of an eight hour day and if he was required to do this and this only, then it would be no different than what I originally stated, that I don't think the man can do that on a full unrestricted basis. He can do it with some modification, some restrictions, he could do it if he had some period of rest or if he could work at a level surface or on a scaffolding for an hour or two at a time to rest in between standing on a ladder or something." Italics supplied.
The Workmen's Compensation Act provides for maximum unemployment benefits when a worker receives an accidental injury resulting in his total and permanent disability to do work of a reasonable character. In applying this doctrine, the Courts have held an injured workman to be totally and permanently disabled when, although he is physically able to do the same work, he does it under pain or with danger to his safety. In Loflin v. Erectors and Riggers, Inc., La.App., 68 So.2d 694, the Court allowed recovery on the basis of a permanent partial disability to an iron worker who had suffered a ten per cent loss of the use of his left forearm. In discussing the question of total disability and partial disability, the Court said:
"It does not necessarily mean that an injured employee has to be able to do and perform all of the identical duties he is called upon to do during the course of his employment. If he can do substantially all of them, he is not totally disabled within the provisions of the statute, and the total disability provisions are not to apply. Distinction has been made occasionally in applying that section of the statute when the employee is a common laborer and when he is a skilled laborer. This distinction has grown out of the jurisprudence and not because of any statutory provision. Whether the employee is a common laborer or whether he is a skilled employee, the true test is whether or not the injury suffered by him prevents him from doing work of a reasonable character.
"It is not a fair test to say that a skilled employee cannot do work of a reasonable character because he cannot do every identical thing he was capable of doing prior to the accident any more than it is to say that a common laborer can do the same thing he was doing at the time of the accident. The test to be applied on the question of whether or not the total disability is to be applied is whether the injured workman can do and perform the same or similar work to that he was performing at the time of the accident. We believe that the best criterion to follow in determining this question is whether or not, subsequent to the accident and in jury, the workman did perform, and do the same type and character of work as that which he did at the time of the injury. If the workman only suffers a partial impairment of an arm or a leg, and it does not produce disability to do work of a reasonable character, then the specific injury provisions of the statute should be applied based on the percentage of the disability, but if the accident produces partial disability to do work of a reasonable character, then that section of the statute should be applied."
As was stated by the Court in the Loflin case, the best criterion to follow in order to determine the question of whether or not a workman is totally disabled, is whether the injured workman can do and perform the same or similar work which he was performing at the time of the accident. We believe that the evidence discloses that petitioner is able to perform the same or similar work which he was doing prior to his accident without pain and without danger to his safety. The portion of the testimony of Dr. Soboloff which we have quoted above, we believe, sets forth unusual condition rather than the usual one. We do not believe that a painter in his occupation is required to stand on a ladder for an eight hour period of time without rest. In his occupation he may stand on a ladder for an hour or so then climb down to mix paint or perform other tasks, then stand on a flat surface for a period of time, under which circumstances Dr. Soboloff indicated that petitioner did receive no pain.
Furthermore, there is evidence in the record to the effect that the petitioner did return to his prior occupation subsequent to the accident. We find that the Lower Court was correct in holding that petitioner was not totally and permanently disabled.
In view of our holding regarding the lack of total and permanent disability, the question as to the admissibility of the moving pictures into evidence to test the credibility of petitioner becomes moot.
With regard to benefits for loss of use or function of a specific member, LSA~ R.S. 23:1221 provides for sixty-five per cent of wages during a period of 125 weeks for the loss of a foot. To compute the compensation payable for a partial loss of use of a member we multiply the per cent of partial loss times sixty-five per cent of wages and allow the amount thus obtained, per week, for the number of weeks permitted for the total loss of the member. Any compensation based on this formula is regulated by LSA-R.S. 23:1202 setting out that the minimum compensation that can be paid per week is $10.00. Lethermon v. American Insurance Co., La.App., 129 So. 2d 507.
The evidence shows that total weekly benefits were paid by the defendant from the date of the injuries until petitioner was discharged by Dr. Lancaster. During this period of time, petitioner was totally disabled to do his work, and for this period he was entitled to the maximum benefits of $35.00 per week. Subsequent to his discharge, however we find that the petitioner still suffers a five to ten per cent disability of his left foot.
The record in this matter is silent as to the amount of wages the petitioner was earning at the time of the accident. It was stipulated at the pre-trial conference, however, that the petitioner's compensation benefits, if any, would be at the rate of $35.00 per week. Under the act, the minimum weekly benefits are fixed at $10.00 per week. The act further provides that for loss of a foot, when such loss does not result in permanent and total disability, the employee is entitled to sixty-five per cent of his wages for a period of 125 weeks, however, due consideration must be given to the maximum and minimum benefits allowable under the act. Under the circumstances, we feel that for the five to ten per cent loss of the use of his foot petitioner is entitled to benefits at the rate of $10.00 per week for a period of 125 weeks. In accordance with the provisions of LSA-R.S. 23 :1223, however, the defendant is entitled to a credit of $910.00, same being the sum of the benefits already paid on a dollar for dollar basis. Miller v. General Chemical Division, La.App., 128 So.2d 39.
Petitioner claims that he is entitled to statutory penalties and reasonable attorney fees in accordance with the provisions of LSA-R.S. 22:658. This statute provides for same when it is found that the failure of an insurer to pay any claim is arbitrary, capricious and without probable cause. Now there is no question but that the petitioner is entitled to benefits for partial loss of the use of his left foot and that su'ch benefits are in excess of the amounts paid and tendered. Although defendant may have been justified in stopping payments of $35.00 per week when it received the report of Dr. Lancaster dismissing the petitioner as able to return to work, the record affirmatively discloses that the reports of Dr. Kroll and Dr. Soboloff furnished to the insurance company showed that the petitioner sustained a five to ten per cent loss of use or function to his left foot and was then compensable under LSA-R.S. 23 : 1221(c) and payments of compensation in such amounts should have been resumed by defendant. Such would have been in line with the holding in Seal v. Lionel F. Favret Company, 238 La. 60, 113 So.2d 468, where the Court held the defendant without probable cause when it received a physician's report indicating that the petitioner should return to work but ignored subsequent reports from the doctors giving unquestionable notice of petitioner's total and permanent disability.
In determining the amount of penalties, the law provides for a credit of the amounts paid or tendered. We feel that the failure of the defendants to pay benefits in accordance with the schedule for partial loss of use or function of the foot was without probable cause. The penalty is computed at the rate of 12% of the difference between the amount due and the amount paid and tendered. The amount of compensation already paid is in the sum of $910.00. The amount tendered, and which is on deposit in the Registry of the Court, is the sum of $200.00. The penalty will therefore b.e computed by .subtracting the total amount paid and tendered, in the sum of $1,110.00 from the total amount due for the specific loss, in the amount of $1,250.00, and multiplying the figure thus reached, in the sum of $140.00, by .twelve per cent, the latter being the rate of penalty. The penalty will, therefore, be twelve per cent of $140.00, or the sum of $16.80. Reasonable attorney fees will be assessed at $750.00.
For the reasons hereinabove assigned, the judgment of the Lower Court will be amended so as to increase the award to petitioner to the sum of $10.00 per week for a period of 125 weeks subject, however, to a credit of $910.00, being the' amount already paid, and providing for penalties in the sum of $16.80, and attorney fees in the sum of $750.00. All costs shall be paid by defendant. As so amended, the judgment of the Lower Court will be affirmed.
Judgment amended and affirmed.