Case Name: Sherman HUNTER, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1987-11-12
Citations: 518 So. 2d 304
Docket Number: No. 4-86-1312
Parties: Sherman HUNTER, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: GOLDMAN, MURRAY, Associate Judges, concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 518
Pages: 304–309

Head Matter:
Sherman HUNTER, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. 4-86-1312.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
Nov. 12, 1987.
On Petition for Rehearing Jan. 20, 1988.
Rehearing Denied Feb. 12, 1988.
Kayo E. Morgan and Fred Haddad of Sandstrom & Haddad, Fort Lauderdale, for appellant.
Robert A. Butterworth, Jr., Atty.Gen., Tallahassee, and Deborah Guller, Asst. Atty. Gen., West Palm Beach, for appellee.

Opinion:
ANSTEAD, Judge.
This is an appeal challenging the trial court's order denying a motion to suppress evidence seized from the appellant while he was a passenger on an interstate bus temporarily stopped at a bus station in Bro-ward County. We affirm because we find clear and convincing evidence to sustain the trial court's finding that appellant's consent to search was freely and voluntarily given.
This case presents only a slight factual variation of State v. Carroll, 510 So.2d 1133 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987), in which this court approved a trial court's order suppressing the results of an alleged consent search. The trial court there, unlike the court here, found that the alleged consent was not freely and voluntarily given, but rather was the result of the inherently coercive nature of the confrontation of the passenger by the police. Here, the law enforcement officers boarded a bus that was ready to depart, and went through the bus, asking each passenger if he or she would consent to a search of their baggage. A critical distinction in the evidence here was appellant's testimony that he had observed other passengers refuse to consent to a search before he was approached. That evidence supports the trial court's holding.
Factually, there is nothing in United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 64 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980), the sole case upon which the state relies, to support this inquiry of every passenger who has boarded a bus or airplane, train or boat— none of which have actually departed their gate, station or berth. In Mendenhall the events took place on a public concourse. The Supreme Court there took great pains to point out that the respondent could terminate the conversation and go about her business. That, to us, is a far cry from leaving the bus, airplane, train or boat. We find the confrontation of each passenger on a bus in transit more appropriate to totalitarian countries than to our own. See State v. Kerwick, 512 So.2d 347 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987).
Nevertheless, the law is clear that, notwithstanding the above apparently common practice of the law enforcement officers, if there were clear and convincing proof of an unequivocal break in the chain of illegality sufficient to dissipate the taint, consent to the subsequent search of his baggage will be held voluntary and the evidence not to have been illegally seized. See Norman v. State, 379 So.2d 643 (Fla.1980). In conclusion we emphasize the responsibility of the trial court to determine that any alleged consent search was given freely and voluntarily and not just in response to apparent police authority. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973); State v. Kerwick, supra.
We find no error as to appellant's remaining point, and accordingly affirm.
GOLDMAN, MURRAY, Associate Judges, concur.
GLICKSTEIN, J., concurs specially with opinion.