Case Name: MARY BAHREY, RESPONDENT, v. PETER PONIATISHIN, APPELLANT
Court: New Jersey Court of Errors and Appeals
Jurisdiction: New Jersey
Decision Date: 1920-11-15
Citations: 95 N.J.L. 128
Docket Number: 
Parties: MARY BAHREY, RESPONDENT, v. PETER PONIATISHIN, APPELLANT.
Judges: For affirmance — Swayze, TreNOHAKD, PaRKEE, BebgeN, Kalisoh, KatzbNBAch-, White, HeepbNtieiMER, WilliaMH, Taylor, GaedNee, ACiíeesoN, JJ. 12.
Reporter: New Jersey Law Reports
Volume: 95
Pages: 128–133

Head Matter:
MARY BAHREY, RESPONDENT, v. PETER PONIATISHIN, APPELLANT.
Submitted July 5, 1920
Decided November 15, 1920.
1. In a suit for slander the plaintiff is entitled to prove the reputation of the defendant for wealth and standing for the purpose of ’ aiding the jury in assessing' compensatory damages. If punitive damages are sought, the evidence in this aspect may be directed to the actual wealth of the defendant.
2. A party is estopped to challenge on appeal erroneous action of a trial court which was taken because of .his own inducement or request.
On appeal from the Supreme Court, in which court the following per curiam was filed:
“This is a slander suit. The trial resulted in a verdict for the plaintiff. The defendant appeals and files eighteen grounds of appeal. The first, fourth, fifth and fifteenth are argued together and refer to evidence admitted showing the reputation for wealth of the defendant. This, we think, is not error. The point is settled by the case of Flaadce v. Stratford, 12 X. J. L. 487; Jones Evid., ¶ 159-160.-
“The second, erroneously, permitting hearsay testimony. This testimony was stricken out by the court, when the court ascertained that it was- hearsay testimony. (Record, page 38, line 30.) Third, and seventh, erroneously permitting witnesses, Daniel Kuchasky and Katie Doroschenko, to say that they had heard reports circulated concerning the statements made by the defendant regarding the plaintiff, that they had heard them on the street and in the houses, they spoke about it. This is admissible on the question of damages showing the extent of the circulation of the slander for which the defendant is responsible. Kidder v. Bacon, 74 Yt. 263; 25 Cyc. 505, 506.
“Eighth and ninth, permitting' a witness,. Mary Maeh-nitzka, to testify on August 28th, 1918, what the defendant said to her regarding the plaintiff, on the occasion that the witness went to the confession and a refusal to strike out this testimony. It is argued that this was professional and confidential advice. We have not been directed to- any statute or decision in New Jersey that excludes this evidence, nor has our own researches revealed any such statute or decision. It is admissible at common law. This was not error.
'“Tenth, permitting the defendant to answer leading questions. viz., that she had heard the statements made' by the defendant. These questions and their form were within the discretion of the trial court.
“Eleventh is not argued and therefore considered as abandoned. Marten v. Brown, 81 X. J. L. 599.
“Twelfth, error 'in the refusal to nonsuit the plaintiff. This requires no discussion. The refusal hv the trial court to nonsuit tlie plaintiff was not error. There was a question of fact for the jury. Freising&r v. Moore, 65 N. J. L. 286.
“Thirteenth and fourteenth are not argued and therefore considered as abandoned. Marten v. Brown, supra.
“Sixteenth, the Ter diet is excessive. We cannot consider this ground on appeal. Smith v. Brunswick Laundry Co., 93 N. J. L. 436.
“Seventeenth, error ini permitting a witness, Sviatoslav Bukak, to answer the following question on rebuttal:
“ ‘Is it a fact that on that day, Eev. Poniatishin mentioned by name Mrs. Dolia, Greely or Surol Bryk, Sosinsko and Wilko and called them devils. And that they were already in hell up to the middle and that he would put them out of the church with the cross? A. Yes, sir.’
“Eighteenth, error in permitting a witness, Alexder Gural, to answer the following question on rebuttal:
“ ‘Is it not a fact that Eev. Poniatshin that day called you and four others a devil ? A. Yes, sir. Q. And that you were already in hell half way? Q. And that he threatened to assault you with the cross?’
“The objection made to these questions was that it was not proper rebuttal. The record shows that the last two questions owing to the objection interposed by the defendant’s counsel were abandoned and not answered. (Becord, page 197, line 20.)
“The incidents involved in the first three questions were first brought in evidence, by the defendant’s attorney on cross-examination of the plaintiff’s witness, Thomas Bryk, referring to the incident of July 21st, 1918, in the church. (Eecord, page 99, line 30 et seq.) This cross-examination was'continued on these lines at page 101, line 10 et seq., where the names in the above question were first mentioned on cross-examination by the defendant’s counsel.
“This was objected to by the plaintiff’s counsel as immaterial and overruled by the court. The defendant cannot now object or protest at the fact, that irrelevant matter had.crept into the ease when he first introduced it; furthermore, the trial court admonished the jury, that these things had absolutely no relation to- the issues in the case and should not be considered by the jury. This, we think, was not reversible error.
“Finding no error in the record, the judgment of the Essex Circuit Court is affirmed, with costs.”
For the respondent. John V., Ladcley.
For the appellant, William J. Kearns and Robert II. McCarter.

Opinion:
Pee Cueiaii.
The judgment, under review herein should be affirmed, for the reasons expressed in the per curiam in the Supreme Court.