Case Name: PRUEY v. NEW YORK CENT. & H. R. R. CO.
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1899-05-24
Citations: 58 N.Y.S. 797
Docket Number: 
Parties: PRUEY v. NEW YORK CENT. & H. R. R. CO.
Judges: 
Reporter: West's New York Supplement
Volume: 58
Pages: 797–806

Head Matter:
(41 App. Div. 158.)
PRUEY v. NEW YORK CENT. & H. R. R. CO.
(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Fourth Department.
May 24, 1899.)
Railroads—Accident at Crossing—Contributory Negligence.
On a dark morning, plaintiff’s intestate, on his way to work, approached defendant’s eight parallel tracks where they crossed a street, and where he was daily accustomed to cross. The gates were down, as they usually were, at that time in the morning, whether trains were passing or not. He waited for a freight train to pass on the first track, and then started to cross, when he was struck by a locomotive backing against him on the second track from the direction which the freight was going. The street lights had gone out, and the engine, running at 20 miles per hour, carried no light on the rear of its tender, and gave no warning of its approach. No one saw the accident, and there was no direct proof that he looked and listened for the engine. Held to warrant a finding that deceased was free from contributory negligence.
Adams, J., dissenting.
Appeal from trial term, Oneida county.
Action by Annie Pruey, as administratrix of the estate of Leonard Pruey, deceased, against the New York Central & Hudson River Railroad Company for the death of her intestate. Prom a judgment for plaintiff, and from an order denying a new trial, defendant appeals.
Affirmed.
The plaintiff’s intestate was hit by a backing locomotive and tender, in Genesee street, in the city of Utica, on the morning of the 8th of February, 1894. The general direction of Genesee street is northeast and southwest. It is crossed by eight parallel tracks of the defendant. The Mohawk river is immediately north of these tracks, and the bridge across this stream forms a part of the street. Between the bridge and the nearest track the defendant maintains gates, which were down at the time of the injuries to the decedent. He came across the bridge, waited for a passing freight train going westerly-on the first track, and then started to cross the street diagonally, going northwesterly, when he was hit by the engine backing on the second track from the- ' bridge. The morning was intensely dark, but this engine carried no light on the rear of the tender, and no warning of its approach was given. No one saw the accident, although the witness Creighton, with his milk wagon, had crossed the bridge, alighted from his wagon, stood awaiting the passing freight train, and saw Pruey, the decedent, immediately after he was injured. The intestate survived the accident only a few hours:
Argued before HAEDIN, P. J., and ADAMS, McLENNAN, and SPRING-,. JJ.
C. D. Prescott, for appellant.
P. C. J. De Angelis, for respondent.

Opinion:
SPRING, J.
The negligence of the defendant is proved by the-undisputed testimony in the case. The morning was dark; the only street light that could be of any service was usually out at this time in the morning; the street crossing was an important one, with eight parallel tracks over it; the defendant's gates were usually down at this time; and yet the locomotive which crashed into Pruey was scudding along backward, at 20 miles an hour, without giving any signal of its approach, and without any light. Crass carelessness of this kind must be weighed in the balance-when we are seeking to enforce the stringent rule imposed upon a wayfarer to be vigilant as he approaches a railroad crossing. While the rule obtains, and freedom from scrupulous watchfulness cannot be baldly inferred, yét the personal representative of a man familiar with the surroundings, accustomed to observe and give heed to signals indicating an oncoming train, cannot be held to the-strictest accountability, where those in charge of the train are confessedly derelict in their duty, and where there is no observer of the conduct of the decedent. Pruey had passed over this crossing to-his work daily for three years, at about this time each morning. He was therefore familiar with the danger at this point, he knew from long experience the almost invariable habit of defendant's servants to give the customary signals of an approaching train, and he was aware that a light was present upon it. This very familiarity with these facts and with t'he surroundings would unconsciously lessen somewhat, the circumspection he would otherwise observe. He must still be watchful) but, in determining whether he fairly met the duty devolving upon him, we must necessarily take into consideration the negligence of defendant's-agents and his own obvious wont tb rely upon these warnings. On the morning in question, as Pruey came over the bridge, the-gates were down. This was of no significance, as the evidence, without uncontradiction, shows the gate tender, at this time in the-morning, was ordinarily unmindful of his duties, as the gates were-then generally down. Again, a freight train was passing, and. Pruey undoubtedly waited for that to go over the highway, and then endeavored to cross diagonally, in his customary manner, when he was hit by the backing locomotive, which was hauling a caboose on the second track. These facts are mainly inferential, but are confirmed by his daily mode of going to his work and the fact, Creighton testified, he was in the street when he was hit. There is no proof that he looked and listened as he neared this track; and the contention of defendant's counsel is that we must depend upon conjecture entirely to reach a finding that the plaintiff's intestate fulfilled the duty of looking and listening as he approached this crossing. In a case where death ensues as a result of a collision of this kind, and where there is no eyewitness of the occurrence, there is a relaxation of the rule requiring strict proof that the decedent was vigilant and observant as he advanced towards the track. The regulation exists -in its integrity; but the proofs presented may be inferential, may be dependent upon circumstances, and still be adequate to satisfy the court of the absence of contributory negligence. As was said in Noble v. Railroad Co., 20 App. Div. 42, 46 N. Y. Supp. 647:
"In actions to recover damages for negligence resulting in death, where there are no eyewitnesses of the accident, the freedom of the deceased from contributory ngiigence may be established by proof of facts and circumstances from which it may fairly be inferred that the deceased was not at fault." Wieland v. Canal Co., 30 App. Div. 85, 51 N. Y. Supp. 776; Chisholm v. State, 141 N. Y. 246, 36 N. E. 345.
But in this case there are other facts which relieved the plaintiff's intestate from the duty of looking and listening for this engine. The morning was dark, foggy, misty, and, according to some of the witnesses, Cimmerian in its density,—a darkness quite common in this latitude on a muggy, foggy morning, at 6 o'clock, in the early part of February. John Praey, the son, testified:
"I remember the kind of day it was on the morning of my father's death. It was very dark and misty, and warm. It had been raining through the night. The snow was about all thawed away. I observed the tracks of the Central road. The snow was about all gone. What little there was there was all black with smoke and dirt and one thing and another."
The witness Sultenfuss described the condition as follows:
"That morning about 6 o'clock it was foggy, with the wind blowing from the east. It was very dark, so dark you could not distinguish an object very well at a distance of twenty feet. It was foggy. The snow was melting. There was ice on the sidewalk. It was rainy and foggy like."
The witness Decker in this manner:
"I got up about half past 6. It was a very dark morning,—very cloudy. There had been a thaw. There was snow enough for sleighing; but there had been quite a thaw, and the snow was dark and dirty on top,—muddy. On the .railroad and on the bridge there was no snow. The snow in the immediate neighborhood of the crossing was slush more than® anything else. It was dark from the dirt that was on it."
It is therefore a legitimate deduction from the evidence that the morning was very dark; and there is much force in the contention that to look for this engine would have been useless, as it could not have been seen. It is urged, however, that Creighton's testimony shows he observed this approaching train. That testimony simply made a contradiction in the evidence, and the crédibility of these witnesses was for the jury to pass upon. McNamara v. Railroad Co., 136 N. Y. 650, 32 N. E. 765. And Creighton was viewing the approaching engine, not from the rear, but by a side view, which may have enabled him to catch a glimmer of the headlight. The philosophy of the rule requiring a traveler approaching a railroad crossing to look and listen for a train, before venturing upon the tracks, rests upon a common-sense foundation. These were regarded as the most efficient acts in demonstrating the vigilance of such traveler and most likely to apprise him of danger. If to look would be futile, then the person is absolved from an obligation which would be wholly mechanical. If the view is obstructed, so a person could not see a coming train, unless he possessed the strength of vision described by the imperturbable Weller, then the failure to look is not carelessness. The same principle applies where to listen would be of no practical moment. Smedis v. Railroad Co., 88 N. Y. 13; Wieland v. Canal Co., 30 App. Div. 85, 51 N. Y. Supp. 776. As was said in the Smedis Case, at page 19:
"While it is true that a traveler, on approaching a railroad crossing, is bound to look and listen for an approaching train, before undertaking to cross, it is only where it appears from the evidence that he might have seen, had he looked, or might have heard, had he listened, that a jury is authorized to find that he did not look and did not listen."
The freight train had just passed the crossing as Pruey was struck. The rumbling noise and the clatter of that large train quite probably drowned the lesser noise of the locomotive which ran down upon decedent. The darkness of the night, the absence of artificial light, the direction and force of the wind, and the din of the passing freight train, in connection with the obvious negligence of the defendant, were sufficient to warrant a submission of this case to the jury. In addition to the authorities already cited, the following tend to sustain the proposition that there was a question of fact in this case: Davis v. Railroad Co., 47 N. Y. 400; Fejdowski v. Canal Co., 12 App. Div. 589, 43 N. Y. Supp. 84; Harper v. Railroad Co., 22 App. Div. 273, 47 N. Y. Supp. 933; Judson v. Railroad Co., 158 N. Y. 604, 53 N. E. 514. In the Daniels Case, 125 N. Y. 407, 26 N. E. 466, upon which some stress is laid, the flagman warned the intestate of the approach of the train. It could be distinctly seen a long distince from the crossing. There was nothing to interfere with the' view. The slightest observation, the slightest caution, would have apprised the traveler of its coming. While his deafness prevented him hearing, his eyesight was apparently unimpaired; but he went in front of the train without any care or vigilante. I think there is a wide variance between the facts of the two cases.
The learned trial judge instructed the jury clearly as to the caution required of a person approaching a railroad crossing. He then stated the rule which I have invoked, discussing it as bearing upon the subject of the intestate's contributory negligence, stating "that, if he had listened, he could not have heard the approaching train, or, if he had looked, he could .not have seen the approaching train," then the jury were permitted to find that Pruey was not chargeable with negligence. The trial judge kept very fairly within the facts upon which this contention was based, and did not overstep the rule of law applicable to this case.
The judgment and order are affirmed, with costs to the respondent. All concur, except ADÁMS, J., dissents.