Case Name: Jesse Turnipseed vs. John Freeman
Court: Constitutional Court of South Carolina
Jurisdiction: South Carolina
Decision Date: 1822-11
Citations: 2 McCord 269
Docket Number: 
Parties: Jesse Turnipseed vs. John Freeman.
Judges: Justices Johnson and Colcock, concurred.
Reporter: South Carolina Law Reports
Volume: 13
Pages: 269–271

Head Matter:
Jesse Turnipseed vs. John Freeman.
'To substitute an office copy of a grant, in a case of trespass to try title? under the act of 1803, it is not necessaiy that the affidavit of tjie loss, of the original deed should be made just before going to trial. But where the affidavit is sworn to subsequent to docketing the cas?. for the purpose ofbeingused in that case, and no circumstance indo, pendentoftlie lapse oftime, appeals to invalidate it, it should be received. The afiidavit must be regarded as efficient from the time it is offered.
THIS was an action of trespass to try titles to land, called for trial at Columbia, in the Spring Court of 1822. To enable the plaintiff to substitute an office copy of the grant and plat, for the original, under the act of 1803, he offered an affidavit of the loss of the original, sworn to on the 9th August, 1820, when the case was first ready for trial. The defendant objected to the admissibility of the affidavit, as it had been sworn to some time anterior to the meeting of the court. This objection was sustained, and the plaintiff not being present to make another affidavit, 'was non-suited.
A motion was now submitted to reverse the decision of the Circuit Court.

Opinion:
Mr. Justice Huger
delivered the opinion of the court:
The act of 1803, requires that the person applying to produce an office copy of a grant in evidence, shall swear that the original grant is lost, destroyed, or out of his power to produce, and that he has not destroyed, mislaid, or In any way willingly, previous to that time, put it out of his power to produce the same, with an intention to produce an office copy of the same in evidence, &c. The act no where prescribes the manner or time of swearing. The practice has been uniform to receive as evidence an affidavit of the loss, &c. If an affidavit be received at all, there appears to be no reason for requiring its execution at one period, rather than another, provided it be satisfactory as to the loss of the grant. It is true that what has been lost may be recovered ; but if the bare possibility of a recovery of the original be sufficient to invalidate an affidavit, one made a day, an hour, or minute before it is produced, would not be good. If such a possibility be regarded as too remote, at what point of remoteness is the mind to stop ? As we travel back, so will the possibility of reco very increase, until it be lost in the invisible boundaries, which divide what is highly possible, from what is remotely probable. The difficulty of deciding; in casos of this kind, has led to the establishment of arbitrary boundaries : Hence our statute of limitations, and that rule of law, which presumes a bond paid, after 18 or SO years.
DeSaussure, for the motion.
Gregg, contra."
In the case of Creagh & Delane, (1 Nott & McCord, 189,) a case arising under the attachment act, it was ruled that although the act declares that the plaintiff on filing hip. declaration, shall make oath to the debt; yet, that an oath taken some time prior to the filing of the declaration was Sufficient. It is as possible that the plaintiff in attachment, should have received payment subsequent to the execution of his affidavit, and before the declaration is filed, as it is that the plaintiff in trespass should have recovered the original grant, between the execution of his affidavit and the trial of the case. In both cases, the affidavit must be regarded as efficient, at the time they are offered, although sworn to before.
I am satisfied that where the affidavit is sworn to subsequent to docketing of the case, for'the purpose of being used in that case, and no circumstance independent of the lapse of time, appears to invalidate it, that it ought to he received.
The motion for a new trial is therefore granted.
Justices Johnson and Colcock, concurred.