Case Name: In re Christina I. CONNORS
Court: Florida Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1976-05-05
Citations: 332 So. 2d 336
Docket Number: No. 46799
Parties: In re Christina I. CONNORS.
Judges: OVERTON, C. J., and ADKINS, BOYD and SUNDBERG, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 332
Pages: 336–347

Head Matter:
In re Christina I. CONNORS.
No. 46799.
Supreme Court of Florida.
May 5, 1976.
Eric Haugdahl, Jacksonville, and James G. Mahorner, Tallahassee, for appellant.
James T. Russell, State’s Atty., and George E. Tragos, Asst. State’s Atty., for appellee.

Opinion:
ROBERTS, Justice.
This cause is before us on direct appeal from a final order of the Circuit Court, Sixth Judicial Circuit, which passes upon the constitutional validity of Section 394.-467(3) (b), Florida Statutes. We have ju risdiction pursuant to Article V, Section 3(b)(1), Constitution of Florida.
Pertinent to the determination of this cause are the following facts. Dr. Stuart Cahoon, Director of the Division of Mental Health, refused to admit Christina I. Connors to the State of Florida mental health facilities after her acquittal by reason of insanity and the subsequent Order of Commitment issued on December 2, 1974, by Circuit Judge Lawrence E. Keough of the Sixth Judicial Circuit pursuant to Criminal Rule 3.460. In the Order of Commitment, Judge Keough explained that the discharge of the defendant would be manifestly dangerous to the peace and safety of the people with whom defendant might come in contact with. On December 6, 1974, Judge Keough entered an Order to Show Cause directed to the Director of the Division of Mental Health to show why he should not be held in contempt of court for failure to comply with the judgment of acquittal by reason of insanity and Order of Commitment. In a Supplemental Commitment entered December 20, 1974, Judge Keough stated:
"This cause coming on to be heard upon the Order to Show Cause heretofore entered by this Court on December 6, 1974, and upon the Motion to Dismiss Order to Show Cause filed by Dr. Stuart Cahoon and it having been made to appear that Dr. Stuart Cahoon as Director of the Division of Mental Health, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services is willing and anxious to carry out and fulfill his official obligations as Director and that because of the language contained in Florida Statute 394.467(3) (b), as amended, he believes that, notwithstanding Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.-460, the defendant, Christina I. Connors, is not commitable to the Division of Mental Health of the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services unless she is also civilly committed pursuant to Part I of Chapter 394 of the Florida Statutes; that this Court, pursuant to Rule 3.460 and as evidenced by this Court's Judgment of December 2, 1974, has found that the discharge of the defendant would be manifestly dangerous to the peace and safety of the people with whom defendant might come in contact and intended that the defendant be forthwith committed to the Division of Mental Health for hospitalization and treatment in accordance with Rule 3.460 and that she not undergo further civil commitment procedures as set forth in Part I of Chapter 394; it further having been made to- appear that the refusal of the Division of Mental Health of the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services to admit the defendant subsequent to December 2, 1974, although believed by the director to be justified, has caused the defendant unintended and additional incarceration in the Pasco County Detention Center where she has been a nuisance and dan ger to herself and others and that continuation of the status quo cannot be further tolerated by the Court."
proceeded to find:
"1. That the, provisions of Florida Statute 394.467(3) (b) relating to Part I, Chapter 394 are unconstitutional or otherwise ineffective as applied to this defendant and others who are committed to the Division of Mental Health of the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services by Court Order pursuant to Rule 3.460 after having been acquitted by reason of insanity and a finding made by the Court that defendant's discharge or going at large would be manifestly dangerous to the peace and safety of the people.
"2. That under these circumstances, the above finding appears to be more appropriate at this time than a continuation of contempt proceedings against Dr. Stuart Cahoon."
and ordered that:
"1. That Florida Statute 394.467(3) (b) is unconstitutional or otherwise ineffective and inoperative as applied to the defendant, Christina I. Connors, and all other defendants in like circumstances.
"2. That Dr. Stuart Cahoon, as Director of the Division of Mental Health of the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, admit the defendant, Christina I. Connors, for hospitalization and treatment within ten (10) days from the date hereof and that other defendants likewise be admitted in the future forthwith and without the occurrence of civil commitment proceedings who by Court Order are committed to the Division of Mental Health pursuant to Rule 3.460 upon Court findings that such person's discharge or going at large shall be manifestly dangerous to the peace and safety of the people."
Sub judice, Judge Keough's determination of the present mental state of Connors as posing a dangerous threat to the peace and safety of the people was made separately from the judgment of not guilty by reason of insanity.
We agree with the reasoning and conclusions of the trial court under review and find that Judge Keough acted properly pursuant to Rule 3.460, Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, in ordering that Christina I. Connors be committed after a determination of her mental state at the time of his Order of Commitment. Rule 3.460, Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, provides :
"When a person tried for an offense shall be acquitted by the jury for the cause of insanity, the jury, in giving their verdict of not guilty, shall state that it was given for such cause. If the discharge or going at large of such insane person shall be considered by the court manifestly dangerous to the peace and safety of the people, the court shall order him to be committed to jail or otherwise to be cared for as an insane person and such person shall be held in custody until released by order of the committing court, or may give him into the care of his friends, on their giving satisfactory security for the proper care and protection of such person; otherwise he shall be discharged."
A determination by the trial judge that one found not guilty by reason of insanity is manifestly dangerous to the community presupposes that the trial judge means that the defendant is manifestly dangerous at the time of commitment, because the jury verdict or adjudication by the trial judge of not guilty of the crime charged by reason of insanity relates to his mental condition at the time of commission of the crime which could have occurred many months or even years before the adjudication.
Section 394.467(3)(b), Florida Statutes, does not purport to veto or repeal Rule 3.460, F.Cr.R.P., as contemplated by Arti- ele V, Section 2, Constitution of Florida. Cf. In Re Clarification of Florida Rules of Practice and Procedure, 281 So.2d 204 (Fla.1973). Relative to appellant's argument that the statute supersedes the rule because of the substantive nature of the matter dealt with therein, this Court stated in Powell v. Genung, 306 So.2d 113 (Fla.1974), at 115-116:
"This rule is substantially identical to Section 919.11, Florida Statutes, the statutory precursor of Rule 3.460, which statutory provision was repealed by the Legislature by Chapter 70-339, Laws of Florida, as having been superceded by the Rules of Criminal Procedure. Section 919.11, F.S., had been interpreted by the courts of this state to allow continuing jurisdiction over petitioner in the trial court to determine by subsequent hearing and order whether defendant was still manifestly dangerous to the public. State v. Eaton, 161 So.2d 549 (Fla.App.1964), Oksten v. State, 173 So.2d 489 (Fla.App.1965), cert. den. 177 So.2d 11 (Fla.1965), U.S. cert. den. 382 U.S. 867, 86 S.Ct. 138, 15 L.Ed.2d 105."
The instant cause is controlled by our decision in Powell v. Genung, supra. The material questions of law argued, sub ju-dice, were discussed and disposed of in that decision and it would serve no useful purpose to repeat that discussion here.
In support of her position that Rule 3.-460 does not provide the proper constitutional safeguards, appellant cites Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107, 86 S.Ct. 760, 15 L.Ed.2d 620 (1966), Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605, 87 S.Ct. 1209, 18 L.Ed.2d 326 (1967), Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504, 92 S.Ct. 1048, 31 L.Ed.2d 394 (1972), and Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 92 S.Ct. 1845, 32 L.Ed.2d 435 (1972). This Court in response to the same assertions by petitioner in Powell v. Genung, supra, opined:
"The committing court granted this full hearing whereat petitioner was represented by counsel, and at the conclusion of which the trial judge properly determined that petitioner continues at the present time to pose a danger to others. See Oksten v. State, supra, and State v. Eaton, supra.
Sub judice, defendant was given a hearing immediately following her adjudication of not guilty by reason of insanity to determine her mental condition and the danger posed thereby to the community at this time. At this hearing, defense counsel was present and both sides stipulated to the doctors' reports.
The procedure set out by Rule 3.460, F.Cr.R.P., and that followed by the trial court below accord with the above-cited cases from the Supreme Court of the United States. Accord also: O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 95 S.Ct. 2486, 45 L.Ed.2d 396 decided June 26, 1975.
We are not unmindful that these decisions hold that such patients are not subject to the same periodic re-examinations as are those committed who have not been charged with criminal offense. Cf. Section 394.467(3) (a), Florida Statutes (1973), Ch. 75-305, Laws of Florida, 1975. However, we have no reason to believe that the trial judges of this State would not respond to a request for a current reexamination and redetermination of the defendant-patient's mental condition at least within a period not to exceed six months; and, if further hospitalization is found to be necessary, thereafter, requests may be made for re-examination at reasonably separated periodic intervals or on the suggestion of the custodial official. Powell v. Genung, supra, Ch. 75-305, Laws of Florida, 1975. However, should such an unexpected denial occur, appropriate remedies are available under the law of this State. The Court now has under consideration an amendment to the present rule which would facilitate such periodic re-examinations.
Appellee argues and we agree that Connors has been accorded all necessary due process rights by the trial court including a hearing and determination by the trial court that she is presently manifestly dangerous to the peace and safety of the people. . • '
Accordingly, the trial court acted in accordance with Rule 3.460, F.Cr.R.P., in requiring that Connors be committed because she is manifestly dangerous to the peace and safety of the people at the present time. To the extent that Section 394.-467(3) (b), Florida Statutes, attempts to derogate the authority of the committing judge set out in Rule 3.460, F.Cr.R.P., such statutory provision is superseded thereby.
For the aforestated reasons, the judgment of the trial judge is affirmed.
It is so ordered.
OVERTON, C. J., and ADKINS, BOYD and SUNDBERG, JJ., concur.
HATCHETT, J., dissents with opinion.
ENGLAND, J., dissents.
. Section 394.467(3) (b) [Chapter 74-233], provides:
"(b) In the event a person is ordered into a treatment facility under the provisions of the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure or chapter 801 or chapter 917, the order shall adequately document the nature and extent of a patient's mental illness. Any person adjudi cated not guilty by reason of insanity pursuant to Rule 3.460 of the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure shall be committed to the division for hospitalization and treatment in accordance with the provisions of this part. No person charged with a misdemeanor shall be committed to the division solely by Rule 3.210 of the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, but shall be admitted for hospitalization and treatment in accordance with the provisions of this part. The treatment facility may accept and retain a patient so admitted for a period not to exceed six months whenever the patient is accompanied by a court order and adequate documentation of the patient's mental illness. Such documentation shall include a psychiatric evaluation and any psychological and social work evaluations of the patient and document the results of any criminal investigation on the patient. If a patient is considered to be suffering from an emotional illness to the extent that he cannot participate in his own defense, such documentation should include details regarding the evaluation which led to that conclusion. If further hospitalization is necessary at the end of his authorized treatment period, the administrator shall apply to the hearing examiner for an order authorizing continued hospitalization."
. In 1975, the Legislature of the State of Florida adopted Ch. 75-305 which added paragraph (h) to Section 394.467(4), Florida Statutes, to accord with Powell v. Genung, supra.
. We are not unmindful of the decisions of the Supreme Court in Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107, 86 S.Ct. 760, 15 L.Ed.2d 620 (1966), Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605, 87 S.Ct. 1209, 18 L.Ed.2d 326 (1967), Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504, 92 S.Ct. 1048, 31 L.Ed.2d 394 (1972), and Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 92 S.Ct. 1845, 32 L.Ed.2d 435 (1972), with which the instant decision is clearly consistent. Those decisions deal with the right to a hearing before commitment to a mental hospital."