Case Name: City of Hazlehurst v. John B. Mayes
Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Mississippi
Decision Date: 1910-03
Citations: 96 Miss. 656
Docket Number: 
Parties: City of Hazlehurst v. John B. Mayes.
Judges: 
Reporter: Mississippi Reports
Volume: 96
Pages: 656–676

Head Matter:
City of Hazlehurst v. John B. Mayes.
[51 South. 890.]
Municipalities. Powers. Municipal bonds. Code 1906, §§ 3346, 3415. Parks.
Municipalities, operating under the code chapter, Code 1906, ch. 99, entitled “Municipalities:”—
(a) Have no powers except those given them hy the statute; and their
(&) Powers must he construed strongly against an asserted right not clearly given and cannot be extended hy mere implication; and they
(c) Cannot issue bonds for the establishment of parks, such purpose not being an enumerated one for which bonds may be issued, under Code 1906, § 3346, authorizing the issuance of bonds as; provided in Code 1906, § 3415, enumerating the objects for which bonds, in limited amounts, may be issued.
Beom; the chancery court of Copiah county.
IIoN. G-. G-aeiaNd Lyell, Chancellor.
Mayes, appellee, was complainant in the court below; the city of Hazlehurst, appellant, was defendant there. From a decree overruling a motion to dissolve an injunction defendant appealed to the supreme court. The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.
J. 8. 8exion,, for appellant.
Hnder Code 1906, § 3314, the city of Hazlehurst, which is operating under the code chapter, has the power “to purchase and hold real estate, within the corporate limits, for all proper municipal purposes, and for parks.”
Hnder Code 1906, § 3337, the city has the power “to exercise the right of eminent domain in the laying out of streets,, avenues, alleys, and parks.” And under section 3338, the city has power “to exercise full jurisdiction in the matter of streets, sidewalks, sewers, and parks; to open and lay ont and construct the same; to repair, maintain, pave, sprinkle, adorn, and light the same.”
It is conceded, by all concerned, that if the city had eight thousand dollars in its treasury, it could buy the property mentioned in the bill, to be used as a public park, but it is insisted that section 3415 of the code is the full measure of the city’s power to issue bonds, and that the purposes mentioned therein are the only possible purposes for which the city may raise money by the issuance of bonds, and as the word “park” is not used therein, the conclusion is reached that, under m> circumstances, can any city in the state, operating under the code chapter, issue its bonds for the purpose of purchasing a place to be used as a public park. I insist that this construction is too narrow and results in absurdity.
The legislature which enacted the law must be credited with at least ordinary intelligence. It was bound to know that, with our growing civilization, public parks were necessary for the amusement and recreation of our people, and it certainly did know, if it knew anything else, that if our cities were to own them at all, they would have to issue bonds or other negotiable securities therefor, for the reason that the purchase and improvement of a public park involves a considerable outlay and the expenditure of more money than would ever be found lying idle in the treasury.
In the instant case, the property which the city would take over would have cost at least $15,000, though the city was to get the same for $8,000, or really $6,000 under the agreement that the banks would donate $2,000, and it is ridiculous to suppose that the time would ever come when we would have $15,000 lying idle in the treasury. A decent park for the city of Jackson, Vicksburg, or Meridian, would cost from $100,000 to $250,000, and who would suppose that, in all the tide of time these cities would have that amount of idle money in the treasury far tbe purpose of purchasing and improving a place to be used as a public park ?
Tbe result of tbe construction adopted by tbe court below is simply this, that no city or town in Mississippi, wbieb bas not already established a park, will ever establish one in tbe future in this state, because it is absolutely certain that there will never be found'in the treasury of any of our cities or towns enough money to buy and improve a public park. .Of course tbe law could be changed so as to permit it, but I insist that no change' is necessary, and that, under our present statutes, the city of Hazlehurst ha.s the power to issue the bonds sought to be issued.
Under section .3314 each city, town, or village has five different powers.
Under sections 3316 et seq., the mayor and board of aldermen of every city, town, and village have power to do thirty-seven different things.
Under sections .3354 ei seq., the mayor and board of aider-men of cities and towns, but not of villages, have power to do eleven other things; and under section 3366, the mayor and board of aldermen of cities and towns, having more than six thousand inhabitants, have power to do six other things, and under sections of the code chapter on “Municipalities” other powers are enumerated and vested in the city and its officers. An examination of these powers in detail will show that many of the things which the towns and cities and their officers have power to do are quite as necessary as those mentioned in section 3415, for which municipal bonds may be issued, and to hold that section 3415 is the full measure of municipal authority to issue bonds in view of all the powers referred to, is strict construction with a vengeance.
It is elementary learning that “the power of public corporations are either express or implied. ‘The former are those which the legislative act under which they exist confers in express terms; tbe latter are sucb as are necessary to' carry into effect those wbicb are expressly granted and which must therefore be presumed to have been within the intention of the legislative grant.’ ” 1 Smith’s Modem Law of Municipal Corporations, § 678. “Implied power of a municipal corporation is a power necessarily incident to the exercise of those powers expressly granted and directly and immediately appropriate to their exercise.” Id.; Gunclling v. City of Chicago, 176 Ill. 340, 52 N. E. 44; People v. Chicago Gas Trust Co., 130 Ill. 268, 22 N. E. 798; Chicago, etc., E. Co. v. City of Chicago, 148 Ill. 141, 35 N. E. 881; Mather v. City of Ottawa, 114 Ill. 659, 3 N. E. 216.
The question of the power of municipal corporations to issue bonds is ably and exhaustively treated in the case of Williamsport v. Commonwealth, 84 Pa. St. 487, 24 Am. Rep. 208. The question there presented was one of power, .and it was insisted “that a municipal corporation possesses no inherent power to issue bonds, and that in the absence of any such power in its charter, or express legislative authorization, the city is not bound thereby.” In discussing that question, the court used the following language: “We may here observe .that there is a marked distinction in this respect between private and municipal corporations. This distinction has been lost sight of in many of the adjudicated cases, and is perhaps one of the causes of the confusion into which this branch of the law has fallen.” Further on in the opinion, the court, in speaking of the implied power of the municipal corporation in that case, used the following language: “Her implied powers include all such as are necessary to carry out the objects for which her charter was granted.”
“A municipal corporation’s power to issue negotiable securities may be implied from granted powers which could not otherwise be carried out.” Rose’s Notes on IJ. S. Reports, vol. 7, p. 939; Desmond v. Jefferson, 19 Eed. 486; Holmes v. Shreve port, 31 Ned. 119; Commonwealth v. Williamsport, 156 Hass* 72; State v. School District, 13 Neb. 81, 12 N. W. 928; City of Williamsport v. Commonwealth, 84 Pa. St. 496, 24 Am. Rep. 216; Days v. Gallon Gas, etc., Co., 29 Ohio St. 3.39.
The power to purchase, hold, and improve real estate for a public park, which is expressly given by our statute, involves the expenditure of more money than would ever be found in our city treasuries, and the implied power to borrow money for the purpose indicated necessarily follows. Many cases can be found, which, upon a superficial examination, would indicate the contrary view, but when thoroughly examined they do not militate against it.
McNeil & Smylie, for appellee.
Code 1906, § 3415, gives a municipality the power to issue its- bonds for certain purposes therein stated, and these are the only purposes for which a municipality in this state has. power to issue bonds.
Taken in the broad sense, the power to borrow money and issue bonds cannot be said to be among the implied powers of a municipal corporation. * * * The question for our con-
sideration is, whether the power to issue bonds is one of the inherent powers of a municipal corporation in a limited sense; that is to say, for the purpose of providing for such expenditure as is strictly germane to the objects for which such corporations are created.
“Implied power springs from necessity. That which is not necessary cannot be implied.” Is a park a necessity? If it be a necessity in the ease of a large city, is it actually necessary and indispensable that a small town like ITazlehurst should have a park ? It is but a very short distance in any direction to the natural woods, hills, valleys, and streams.
In construing the statute it is necessary to determine, if' possible, the intention of the legislature. We notice that sec tion 3416 of tbe code gives a municipality power to issue bonds for those purposes which are the most indispensable and necessary to its well being. If a municipality has implied power to issue bonds for any purpose whatever, it would certainly have the implied power to issue bonds for the purposes mentioned in this section. Why then give it express power to do that which it has already the implied power to do ? Counsel for appellant says that the legislature is composed of intelligent men who would not do' a foolish or an absurd thing. Does not the maxim “Expressio unius est exclusio■ altering,” apply in this case? Did not the legislature give in this section express power to issue bonds for all purposes, for which they intended a municipality should have power to issue bonds, and thereby actually prohibit a municipality from issuing bonds for any purposes except those actually expressed therein? If it had been the intention of the legislature that a municipality should have the power to issue bonds to purchase land for a park, it would have been easy to have written the word “parks” in section 3415. It seems to us that the only reasonable conclusion to be reached is that the legislature never intended that a municipality should have the power to issue bonds to raise money to buy land for a park.
If we concede for sake of argument that even in this state a municipality has implied power to issue bonds for some purposes, we ask for what purposes does this, power exist ? Who can' determine and answer this question with authority except the court of last resort ? Every time then a municipality attempts to issue bonds under implied power, the question, as to its power, must be passed on by the supreme court, in order to determine the legality of the bonds. A municipality might think that the law*of necessity applies, but the supreme court might take a very different view of the matter. Who then is to draw the line marking off the purposes for which a city may under implied power issue bonds from those which it may not ? The legislature ought to draw the line, and we say that in section 3415 the legislature has drawn the line. Is not this the wiser and safer view to take? If municipalities desire power to issue bonds for other purposes, then let them apply to the legislature to have section 3415 amended so as to include other purposes, such as may have become necessary to meet the needs of “our growing civilization.”
The argument of counsel for appellant, that because it takes a' large sum of money to buy land for a park and that ninety per centvmi of the property within the town of Hazlehurst is owned by those voting for issuance of bonds, is of no force at all. The first question to be determined is, has a town or city in this state implied power to issue bonds for any purpose ? If this question is answered in the negative, that settles the whole matter. If answered in the affirmative, then the question arises, how are we to determine the purposes for which it has the implied power to issue bonds? This power, if it exists at all, springs from necessity. It can be exercised only for purposes which are actually indispensable and necessary for the well-being of the municipality, the benefits flowing therefrom being enjoyed by all of its inhabitants. It is not difficult to see that a school building with proper grounds is a necessity. Waterworks, light plants1, and a sewerage system are all necessities, contributing daily and almost hourly to the actual wants and needs of all those living within the corporate limits. Can we say that a park is in the same sense a necessity ? What purpose would a park serve in the city. of Hazle-hurst? Simply a pleasure resort to be enjoyed by a few. If there is any implied power in any case, which we deny, it is to be decided upon a question of necessity and not upon how much money it takes or how many desire the thing, or how much property those desiring it own.
The fact that the legislature had, in code chapter 99, carefully worked out a scheme of government for municipalities and bas therein expressly granted so many powers, is forceful argument that it has expressly granted all the powers that it intended that a municipality should exercise.
All authorities agree that if there is a doubt as to the power to issue bonds, it must be resolved against the power.
We call special attention to the case of Gause v. City of Clarksville, 5 Dillon, 168.

Opinion:
Taylob, Special Judge,
delivered the opinion of the court.
This is an appeal by the city of Hazlehurst, appellant, from a decree of the chancery court making perpetual an injunction issued at-the suit by Mayes, appellee, restraining the mayor- and board of aldermen of the said city of Hazlehurst from', issuing the bonds of the city in the sum of $8,000 for the purpose of buying and owning certain property, designated as "Lake Hazle and adjoining lands," to be used as a public park.
In this record there is only one question presented for the decision- of this court, and that is whether or not the city of Hazlehurst can issue its bonds for the purpose of raising money with which to purchase the land mentioned to be used as a public park.
This city is a municipal corporation, operating under the Code chapter on municipalities. It is an elementary principle of law that as such it has no powers except those delegated to it by the state. It is equally well established that its powers are to be construed most strongly against a right claimed by it and not clearly given- by the statutes. The officers of a municipality are not the agents of the people. They are merely officers elected to perform certain municipal or local governmental duties defined by the statutes of the state. These duties cannot be extended by mere implication to grave and important acts not authorized by law. Nothing but legislative grant can do this. When there is any doubt as to whether or not a municipality has the power to do or not to do a certain thing, this doubt must be resolved against its charter powers, unless it is plainly manifest that the power is conferred to- the municipality to act. Crittenden v. Booneville, 92 Miss. 277, 45 South. 723. Keeping these elementary facts, which have been announced in decision after decision, time and again, before us, let us look in the case that is now before us.
Counsel for appellant contends that since section 3314 of the Code of 1906 confers upon municipalities the power to purchase and hold real estate for- parks, etc., they therefore have the implied power to issue bonds with which to raise the money necessary to make the purchase. We believe a study of the statutes of this state will show that this ground is not well taken. If the section referred to were the only exj>ression the legislature had given on this matter, there might be some force in the argument. But such is not the case. There are two other sections which deal directly and explicitly with the matter. Section 3346 of the Code of 1906 provides that the mayor and board of aldermen of municipalities have the power "to levy and collect special assessments and to issue bonds as hereinafter provided." We believe that the legislature intended for these words to mean exactly what they say, and we take it that this is a limitation upon the power of a municipality to issue bonds except as provided. If We turn to section 3415 of the C'ode of 1906, we find the provision that the Legislature has made for the issuance of bonds. This section limits the power of municipalities to issue bonds in two ways: (1) By enumerating the objects for which they may be issued; (2) by limiting the amount. The purchase of land to be used as a public ppk is not one of the objects enumerated in the section. In the case of Smith v. City of Vicksburg, 86 Miss. 577, 38 South. 301, the second limitation was directly before the court for construction. In that case Justice Cox says in speaking of this section: "This section is the measure of the city's right to issue bonds. It prescribed the purposes for which they may be issued, and limits the amount." No one would argue that a city could exceed the amount which this section has fixed as the limit. If the limitation is good as to the amount of the issue, it is certainly equally as binding when it comes to the purposes for which they may be issued. If this were not true, what reason can be assigned to the Legislature for enumerating certain objects for which a municipality may issue bonds? The same section that gives a municipality the power to own and hold real estate for a park also gives it the power to hold and own real estate for sehoolhouses, sewers, waterworks, etc. If the Legislature did not intend to enumerate the objects for which bonds may be issued, why did it make any mention of these things at all? They would certainly have the implied power to issue bonds to raise money with which to< purchase real estate for sehoolhouses — an absolute necessity for every community. And it would have been easy, if the legislature had intended for them to have this power as to parks, to have just written the word "parks" in the statute alpng with the other enumerated purposes. To hold that the Legislature meant for a municipality to have the implied power to issue bonds for the purchase of a park would be equivalent to simply adding this word to the section. It is plain and unambiguous as it is. It is not within the province of this court to add to the law as the Legislature has written it.
The Legislature doubtless knew the conditions as they exist in this state at this time — that we have no large cities or crowded centers; that our towns could possibly provide for acquiring these things not yet indispensable to our municipalities in Mississippi in some other manner than burdening the future generation with obligations for their purchase — and for this reason it deemed it proper to limit the objects for which bonds may be issued to those objects which not only necessitated a large outlay of money, but which are absolutely necessary to the life and well-being of the people, daily and hourly, such as. waterworks, sewers, schoolhouses, etc. If the legislature had not limited them in this manner, there would be nothing to-prevent a municipality from issuing its bonds up to the full amount for the purpose of securing the money with which to-purchase a park, for instance. Suppose that this should be-done, and it should then become absolutely necessary to the. lives and the health of the people to own their own waterworks.. The power would have all been used in providing for a luxury to most Mississippi municipalities, and there would be no way by which to provide for the health and lives of the people who live in them.
A close study of the decisions will show that, even in states-where the Legislature has not undertaken to dea.1 with the matter, the implied power of a municipality to issue bonds is-an open question. And keeping in mind the fact that powers-conferred upon them are to be strictly construed, and decided against tire existence of the power if there is any doubt about it, also having before us these sections of the Code in which the Legislature expressly names the purposes for which a-municipality may issue its bonds and limits the amount of the-issues, with this court having already decided, as above mentioned, that the limitation as to the amount is binding, we are forced to arrive at the conclusion that the city of Hazlehurst has not the power to issue its bonds to raise money with which to-purchase land to be used as a park.
Therefore the decree of the chancellor overruling the motion to dissolve the injunction and making it perpetual is affirmed..
Affirmed..
Hayes, J., 'being a brother of appellee, recused himself, and Oscar B. Taylor, Esq., a member of the supreme court bar, was appointed and presided as special judge in this case.