Case Name: Earl Franklin TRAVIS v. HARTFORD ACCIDENT AND INDEMNITY COMPANY
Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Mississippi
Decision Date: 1993-12-09
Citations: 630 So. 2d 337
Docket Number: Nos. 90-CC-1222, 90-M-0727
Parties: Earl Franklin TRAVIS v. HARTFORD ACCIDENT AND INDEMNITY COMPANY.
Judges: Before DAN M. LEE, P.J., and SULLIVAN and BANKS, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 630
Pages: 337–342

Head Matter:
Earl Franklin TRAVIS v. HARTFORD ACCIDENT AND INDEMNITY COMPANY.
Nos. 90-CC-1222, 90-M-0727.
Supreme Court of Mississippi.
Dec. 9, 1993.
Rehearing Denied Feb. 10, 1994.
Paul Snow, Paul Snow & Associates, Thomas J. Lowe, Jr., Jackson, for appellant.
Robert S. Addison, Randolph C. Wood, Daniel Coker Horton & Bell, Jackson, for appellee.
Before DAN M. LEE, P.J., and SULLIVAN and BANKS, JJ.

Opinion:
DAN M. LEE, Presiding Justice,
for the Court:
On November 22, 1985, appellant Earl Franklin Travis (hereinafter "Travis") sustained an injury while employed with Mississippi Steel, a division of Magna Corporation. Hartford Accident and Indemnity Company (hereinafter "Hartford"), Mississippi Steel's workers' compensation carrier, initially refused Travis' claim arguing that Travis' injury was not compensable as it did not occur within the course and scope of his employment. However, on January 6, 1987, an Administrative Law Judge found that the injury was, in fact, compensable and awarded Travis disability benefits of $59,850.00. This decision was appealed by Hartford. While the appeal was pending, counsel for Travis wrote a letter to Hartford. The letter, dated April 17, 1987, was in response to a letter written by an employee of Hartford to Travis' doctor, in which the doctor was informed that Travis' bills were not being paid because Travis refused to settle his claim.
In his letter, counsel for Travis threatened Hartford with a bad faith action due to Hartford's alleged unjustified refusal to pay medical bills incurred in connection with Travis' injury. Subsequent to this letter, counsel for the respective parties entered into settlement negotiations. These negotiations resulted in the alleged oral agreement which is the subject of Hartford's cross-appeal. In this alleged oral agreement, counsel for Hartford allegedly accepted counsel for Travis' settlement offer of $55,000.00 plus medical payment by Hartford as a complete settlement of any and all claims Travis had against Hartford relative to Travis' claim for workers' compensation benefits. According to counsel for Hartford, this settlement included any bad faith claims that Travis might have had. However, counsel for Travis maintained by letters to counsel for Hartford and through testimony at trial that the offer of settlement applied only to the claims relative to Travis' workers' compensation claim and did not include any bad faith actions.
The Administrative Law Judge's award was affirmed by the Commission on November 5, 1987, the circuit court on July 5, 1988, and this Court on April 11, 1990. Mississip pi Steel, Division of Magna Corporation v. Travis, 559 So.2d 1052 (Miss.1990). Accordingly, Hartford paid to Travis the amount owed, $59,850.00, plus all accrued penalties and interest.
As a result of these failed negotiations, Hartford filed a complaint for declaratory judgment and specific performance on February 22, 1988, in the Chancery Court of the First Judicial District of Hinds County, Mississippi, to enforce the parties' alleged settlement agreement. Travis answered, denying that the settlement included his bad faith claims, and filing a counterclaim in which he alleged bad faith based on Hartford's failure to pay Travis workers' compensation benefits without a legitimate or arguable reason.
During the discovery process, Chancellor James Arden Barnett recused himself, and, by agreement of the parties, the Honorable Billy G. Bridges was appointed special chancellor to hear the action. The lower court bifurcated the proceedings and, on January 16-18, 1990, conducted a trial on the merits limited to the issue of the enforceability and validity of the alleged oral agreement. On March 12, 1990, the trial court entered its Opinion denying Hartford's complaint.
Hartford's motion for new trial was denied on April 23, 1990. Subsequently, Hartford filed a motion for interlocutory appeal to stay proceedings. This motion was denied by the lower court on June 28, 1990. Thereafter, Hartford filed a petition for interlocutory appeal by permission with this Court which was denied on or about August 18, 1990.
The parties next agreed that Chancellor Bridges would hear the issue of Travis' claim of bad faith, and on September 24-26,1990, a trial was conducted. After the close of all the evidence, the lower court, in an opinion entered on November 9, 1990, granted Hartford's motion to dismiss and held that Hartford did not act in bad faith. The lower court then entered its final judgment on November 9,1990, finally dismissing both Hartford's complaint for declaratory judgment and specific performance and Travis' counterclaim for bad faith. The parties' respective motions for new trial were denied by the lower court. Travis and Hartford then filed their notices of appeal and cross-appeal, respectively. Travis assigned as error the following:
I. Whether there exists an arguable or legitimate reason for withholding Workers' Compensation payments when the carrier is reasonably sure that it will not prevail on the issue of compensability.
II. Whether Hartford at all times it was withholding payment for disability and medical benefits had an arguable reason for failure to pay.
Hartford assigned as error the following:
I. Whether the lower court erred in (a) failing to find that an enforceable oral settlement contract was entered into between the parties which would have settled both appellant/eross-appellee's claim for workers compensation benefits and his claim of bad faith and, consequently, (b) dismissing appellee/cross-appellant's Complaint for Declaratory Judgment and Specific Performance.
LAW
Our decision in the case at bar is controlled by our holding in Collins by Smith v. McMurry, 539 So.2d 127 (Miss.1989), wherein we stated:
The standard of review used by this Court when examining findings of fact as made by the chancellor has been stated many times. In Richardson v. Riley, 355 So.2d 667 (Miss.1978), it was stated thusly:
The principle of law with which we are concerned has been repeated by this Court many times. It is that where the chancellor was the trier of facts, his findings of fact on conflicting evidence cannot be disturbed by this Court on appeal unless we can say with reasonable certainty that these findings were manifestly wrong and against the overwhelming weight of the evidence. Even if this Court disagreed with the lower court on the finding of fact and might have arrived at a different conclusion, we are still bound by the chancellor's findings unless manifestly wrong, as stated above.
Id. at 668. See also Matter of Estate of Varvaris, 528 So.2d 800, 802-803 (Miss. 1988). (Involving the interpretation of a will).
More specifically, this Court has also addressed the proper scope of review for judging the credibility of witnesses. In Pellegrin v. Pellegrin, 478 So.2d 306 (Miss.1985) the Court wrote:
The credibility of the witnesses and the weight of their testimony, as well as the interpretation of evidence where it is capable of more than one reasonable interpretation, are primarily for the chancellor as the trier of facts. The issue here was a factual one and the chancellor's decision will not be dis-. turbed since it was not manifestly wrong.
Id. at 308. See also Johnson v. Brewer, 427 So.2d 118, 126-127 (Miss.1983); McKay v. McKay, 312 So.2d 12, 13-14 (Miss.1975).
These eases make clear that this Court gives great deference to the decisions of the chancellor concerning findings of fact and especially to the credibility of witnesses. Therefore, it has generally been held by this Court that unless we are of the firm opinion that the chancellor's decision was incorrect or "manifestly in error," the decision of the chancery court will not be overturned.
McMurry, 539 So.2d at 129-130.
The chancellor held that based upon the facts of the case, the parties to the suit had not reached an oral settlement of Travis' worker's compensation claim. Accordingly, the chancellor reached the merits of Travis' bad faith claim. The chancellor found that the actions of Hartford Indemnity did not rise to the level of "bad faith." Based on the record before us, we cannot say that the chancellor was manifestly in error in so holding.
AFFIRMED ON DIRECT AND CROSS APPEALS.
HAWKINS, C.J., PRATHER, P.J., and SULLIVAN, PITTMAN, BANKS, JAMES L. ROBERTS, Jr. and SMITH, JJ., concur.
MeRAE, J., dissents with separate written opinion.