Case Name: Tingley against Cutler
Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Connecticut
Decision Date: 1828-07
Citations: 7 Conn. 291
Docket Number: 
Parties: Tingley against Cutler.
Judges: Lanman and Daggett, Js. were of the same opinion.
Reporter: Connecticut Reports
Volume: 7
Pages: 291–301

Head Matter:
Tingley against Cutler.
In an action of debt to recover a certain sum, as liquidated damage*, for the non-performance of an agreement to purchase and pay for real estate an unrecorded deed to the plaintiff from his immediate grantor, accompanied by possession of the estate, is prima facie evidence o title ; and it is unnecessary for the plaintiff, in the first instance, to trace his title farther back.
In an action founded on a written agreement, it is not necessary, that the con. sideration should be expressed in the writing; but it maybe eollected from circumstances, and the evidence submitted to the jury.
Where the defendant agreed to purchase of the plaintiff an estate, and to make payment therefor, by taking up certain outstanding notes of his, and by paying the residue of the purchase money in two and three months, with good security ; and before the expiration of one month, the defendant refused to accept a deed of the estate from the plaintiff, or to take up the plaintiff’s notes, or to give security to perform his agreement; it was held, that such agreement was thereby broken.
Where the defendant agreed to purchase of the plaintiff an estate, and to make payment therefor, in a particular manner ; and further agreed, that if he should fail to perform these stipulations, he would pay the plaintiff the sum ef 150 dollars ; it was held, that this was liquidated damages.
This was an action of debt,'to recover the sum of 150 dollars, commenced in January, 1826.
The cause was tried, on the plea of nil debel, at Brooklyn. September term, 1827, before Brainard, J.
The declaration consisted of two counts. In the first, the plaintiff stated, That on the 13th of December, 1825, and for a long time previous, he was, and ever since has been, the owner of certain real estate in the town of KHlingly, [describing it] being the same which the plaintiff bought of George B. Hutch-ins, by deed bearing date October 29th, 1825 ; that on said 13th of December, there were outstanding against the plaintiff two promissory notes in favour of Jonathan Cutler, one for 350 dollars, and the other for 550 dollars, both secured by mortgage on said real estate; that in consideration that the plaintiff, at the special instance and request of the defendant, had promised, by his note or memorandum in writing, of that date, by him signed, to sell to the defendant said real estate for the sum of 1975 dollars, the defendant, by his note or memorandum of that date by him signed, promised to and agreed with the plaintiff, to purchase of him said real estate, for said sum of 1975 dollars, and to make payment therefor, by taking up and cancelling said promissory notes against the plaintiff, and whatever was then due thereon should constitute part payment of’ said 1975 dollars, 300 dollars to be paid in sixty days, and the remainder by the 1st of April then next — with good security ; that the defendant, on the same day, by his note in writing of that date, by him signed, on the back of said first-mentioned note or memorandum, agreed with the plaintiff, that if he, the defendant, did not fulfil his agreement therein contained, he would pay the plaintiff the sum of 150 dollars ; that on the 2nd of January, 1826, the plaintiff tendered to the defendant a good warranty deed of said real estate, and demanded of him a fulfilment of said agreement to purchase on his part, but the defendant utterly refused to receive said deed, or to make payment to the plaintiff, as in his said note or memorandum he had agreed to do.
The second count recited the agreement referred to in the first. The face of the note or memorandum was as follows : “ KHlingly, December, 13th, 1825. This may certify, that I, Elisha Cutler,have bought of Elisha Tingley the house and barn which he now occupies, and the store now occupied by Isaac T. Hutchins and 73. D. Tarhox, for the sum of 1975 dollars : payment to be made as follows : — Turn Tingleifs notes payable to Jonathan Cutler ; the remainder, 300 dollars, in sixty days; the rest, by the 1st day of April — with good security. Elisha Cutler.” The writing on the back of the paper, was as follows: “ Willingly, December 13th, 1825. The consideration of the within is such, that if Elisha Cutler does not perform, according to the within instrument, he shall pay the sum of 150 dollars'. Elisha Cutler.” In this count no consideration was stated, except what was implied in the agreement recited.
The defendant objected to a recovery by the plaintiff, on the following grounds. 1. That the plaintiff traced his title to the estate no further back than a deed from.his own immediate grantor, and that unrecorded. 2. That the plaintiff had proved no consideration ; and the writing did not import a consideration. 3. That there was a variance between the declaration and the proof; for in the description of the notes, no mention is made of their being on interest. 4. That the action was premature ; as the defendant, if he was bound at all, had until the 1st of April, 1826, to perform the contract. 5. That the damages, from the terms of the contract, are open and unliqui-dated ; and as the plaintiff has proved no special or actual damage, he is not entitled to recover any.
On the first point, the judge instructed the jury, that a deed, although unrecorded, is good as between the parties; and if such deed be in the hands of the grantee, and he in possession of the property, this is prima facie evidence of title, especially where no objection is made to the fulfilment of the contract, on that account.
In relation to the second point, the judge submitted to the jury the question of fact, whether the consideration stated in the first count was proved, instructing them, that although there was no direct testimony to that point, they might infer a consideration, if the whole circumstances of the case would, in their opinion, warrant it. He also instructed them, that the agreement recited in the second count, implied a consideration.
On the third point the judge instructed the jury, that there was no material variance between the declaration and the proof, the dates and amounts of the notes being truly given.
On the fourth point the judge instructed the jury, that if they should find, that within a reasonable time after the making of the agreement, the plaintiff offered and tendered to the defend ant a proper deed of the premises, and demanded of him performance an(] jf the\ should find, that he did not then comply; and that thereafter, before the commencement of the suit, he a reasonable time to comply, and did not; they might infer a refusal and a breach of his contract.
On the fifth point, the judge instructed the jury, that the damages were fixed and liquidated by the contract.
The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff, with 150 dollars damages. The defendant thereupon moved for a new trial.
Strong, in support of the motion,
contended, 1. That the plaintiff did not shew such a title to the estate in question, as entitled him to recover; but on the contrary, his title was shewn to be imperfect.
2. That the question as to the existence of the consideration alleged, was submitted to the jury without any proof. The contract in the first and second counts is the same ; and the judge erroneously charged the jury, that such a contract implied a consideration.
3. That the variance between the notes set forth and those proved, was material.
4. That there was no breach, and, of course, no right of action, at the time this suit was commenced.
5. That the damages should have been left to the jury. Astley v. Weldon, 2 Bos. A Pull. 346. 353.
Goddard and Backus, contra,
resisted the claims of the defendant’s counsel on the several points in the case. In relation to the proof of title, they cited 1 Swifts Dig, 507.; to the consideration, 1 Swifts Dig. 204. 766.; to a variance, 3 Stark. Ev. 1533. 1548. Cunningham v. Kimball, 7 Mass. Rep. 65. ; to liquidated damages, Lowe v. Peers, 4 Burr. 2225. Astley v. Weldon, 2 Bos. <jr Pull. 346. 1 Swifts Dig. 680, 1.

Opinion:
Peters, J.
Upon the trial, the defendants resisted the plaintiff's claim, on five grounds, viz.
1. That the plaintiff showed no other title than an unrecorded deed from his immediate grantor.
2. That the plaintiff proved no consideration for the defendant's promise.
3. That there was a material variance between the declaration and the testimony in the description of the notes to be taken up by the defendant.
4. That the action was premature, as the defendant was not bound to fulfil said contract, until the 1 si day of April, 1826.
5. That the damages were unliquidated, and as none were proved, none could be recovered.
The court charged the jury in favour of the plaintiff, and they returned a verdict accordingly
1. An unrecorded deed from the plaintiff's grantor is good between the parties, and would be sufficient for the plaintiff in an action of ejectment against a wrong-doer; as a valid deed, accompanied by possession, is prima facie evidence of title ; and it is unnecessary for the plaintiff, in the first instance, to trace back his title to the origin of titles. 1 Sw. Dig. 507.
2. A sufficient consideration for the defendant's promise is alleged in the first count. The contract is mutual and promise for promise. 1 Pow. on Contr. 357. There seems not to have been any direct proof of an express consideration. But one is strongly implied. In the first count, the plaintiff avers, that at the request of the defendant, he agreed to sell, and in consideration thereof, the defendant agreed to buy and pay-In the second count, the plaintiff avers, that the defendant agreed to buy and the plaintiff to sell, and recites the written evidence of their agreement; and the evidence on this point was submitted to the jury. But, says Powell, it is not necessary that in contracts or agreements, the consideration should be expressed, it being sufficient if it can be collected out of them from circumstances. Pow. on Contr. 368
3. The suggestion of a variance between the declaration and proof, respecting the notes to be taken up by the defendant, is unfounded, as it no where appears that said notes were on interest.
4. The defendant's contract was broken, when he refused to accept the deed, take up and deliver to the plaintiff his notes to Jonathan Cutler, and give security to fulfil his contract.
5. This objection presents the principal question in this case. Is the debt demanded a p nalty, or liquidated damages ? Where it is agreed, that if a party do or omit something, which may be injurious to another, a sum shall be paid, this sum may be considered liquidated damages, in all cases where the d mages are uncertain and depend on the discretion of the jury. In such cases, the parties may stipulate for the consequences of the breach of contract. 1 Sw. Dig. 680. 1 H. Bla. 232. As where a man agreed with a woman not to marry any other, and if he did, to pay her £1000 ; this was holden to be liquidated damages. Lowe v. Peers, 4 Burr. 2225. So where two persons agreed to perform certain work in a limited time, or pay £10 a week, for such time as it should remain unfinished, Butter, J. said : " This is as strong a case of liquidated damages, as can possibly exist and the court decided accordingly. Fletcher v. Dyche, 2 Term Rep. 32.
The decision below was correct; and I do not advise a new trial.
Lanman and Daggett, Js. were of the same opinion.