Case Name: Tommy MALBROUGH, Individually and on Behalf of His Minor Children, Tamala Malbrough and Tiffany Malbrough, and Tammy Malbrough v. Jane S. WALLACE, et al.
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1991-12-27
Citations: 594 So. 2d 428
Docket Number: No. 90 CA 1109
Parties: Tommy MALBROUGH, Individually and on Behalf of His Minor Children, Tamala Malbrough and Tiffany Malbrough, and Tammy Malbrough v. Jane S. WALLACE, et al.
Judges: Before SHORTESS, LANIER, and CRAIN, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 594
Pages: 428–449

Head Matter:
Tommy MALBROUGH, Individually and on Behalf of His Minor Children, Tamala Malbrough and Tiffany Malbrough, and Tammy Malbrough v. Jane S. WALLACE, et al.
No. 90 CA 1109.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, First Circuit.
Dec. 27, 1991.
Writ Denied Feb. 28, 1992.
Michael J. Samanie, Houma, for plaintiffs and appellees Tommy Malbrough et al.
Frederick A. Miller, Metairie, Vincent P. Fornais, Baton Rouge, for defendant and appellant Hartford Cas. Ins. Co.
Before SHORTESS, LANIER, and CRAIN, JJ.

Opinion:
SHORTESS, Judge.
Tammy Malbrough (plaintiff) was injured in an automobile accident which occurred on July 26, 1985, in Houma, Louisiana. She sued the owner and driver of the other vehicle and their insurers, as well as her own uninsured motorist carrier, Hartford Casualty Insurance Company (Hartford). Her husband, Tommy Malbrough (Malb-rough), joined in the suit claiming property damage and loss of consortium. (The Malbroughs are referred to herein collectively as plaintiffs.)
Liability of the adverse driver was stipulated. Plaintiffs settled with the tort-fea-sor's insurer before trial and received its policy limits of $10,000.00. Plaintiffs accepted a tender from Hartford of $2,500.00, plus payment of medical bills totaling $1,457.00.
The case was originally tried August 25-27, 1987. The jury was unable to agree on whether plaintiff's injuries resulted from the accident. A mistrial was declared.
The case was retried beginning October 30, 1989. The jury returned a special verdict in favor of plaintiffs, awarding plaintiff a total of $568,256.54 and Malbrough $25,000.00. The jury also found Hartford arbitrary and capricious in tendering plaintiffs only $2,500.00 before trial and awarded attorney's fees of "⅛."
The parties stipulated before trial that Hartford's policy limits were $100,000.00. The trial court entered judgment in favor of plaintiff in the sum of $93,210.00, together with legal interest on the sum of $556,306.54 from date of judicial demand, a statutory penalty of $55,630.65, attorney fees of $189,051.08, and legal interest on the penalty and attorney fees from date of judicial demand. The trial court entered judgment in favor of Malbrough in the sum of $4,290.00, together with legal interest on the sum of $24,450.00 from date of judicial demand, a statutory penalty of $2,445.00, attorney fees of $8,701.10, and legal interest on the penalty and attorney fees from date of judicial demand. From this judgment Hartford appeals.
Hartford's assignments of error on appeal include several evidentiary issues, as well as the amount of damages awarded, the finding that it was arbitrary and capricious, and the date from which the trial court held interest began to run on the excess judgment, penalties, and attorney fees. We will first address the evidentiary issues.
I. EVIDENTIARY ISSUES
A. Admission of Videotape
Hartford contends the trial court erred in permitting the jury to view a 55-minute videotape of the plaintiff's microlaminecto-my. After viewing the entire videotape, we agree.
The admissibility of a videotape is largely within the discretion of the trial judge. LaFleur v. John Deere Co., 491 So.2d 624, 632 (La.1986); United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Hi-Tower Concrete Pumping Service, 574 So.2d 424, 438 (La.App.2d Cir.), writs denied, 578 So.2d 136, 137 (La. 1991); Ashley v. Nissan Motor Corp., 321 So.2d 868, 872-873 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 323 So.2d 478 (La.1975). Determination of the admissibility into evidence of videotapes must be done on a case-by-case basis depending on the individual facts and circumstances of each case. Douglas v. G.H.R. Energy Corp., 463 So.2d 5, 7 (La.App. 5th Cir. 1984). The trial court must consider whether the videotape accurately depicts what it purports to represent, whether it tends to establish a fact of the proponent's case, and whether it will aid the jury's understanding. Against those factors, the 'trial court must consider whether the videotape will unfairly prejudice or mislead the jury, confuse the issues, or cause undue delay. The trial court may exclude the evidence if the factors favoring admission are substantially outweighed by the factors against admission. Louisiana Code of Evidence articles 401-403; Hi-Tower, 574 So.2d at 438; Burk v. Illinois Central Gulf Railroad Co., 529 So.2d 515 (La.App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 532 So.2d 179 (La. 1988).
Plaintiff's neurosurgeon, Dr. Donald Judice, used an operating microscope in performing the surgery on plaintiff's back. A camera attached to the microscope filmed the surgery as seen through the microscope. The resulting videotape is an extreme close-up of this bloody surgery. Plaintiffs contend this videotape proved plaintiff had "gigantic ruptured disks." However, a viewer without a medical education cannot ascertain that plaintiff's disks were abnormal by seeing this videotape; no normal disks are shown with which to compare the disks shown on video tape.
Much of the material shown on this videotape, such as the cutting of plaintiff's fat, the smoke rising from her muscles as they were cauterized, and the removal of gory packing material from the wound, served no purpose other than to inflame and prejudice the jury. Had the videotape been restricted to only the portion showing the abnormal disks, our opinion might be different. However, this lengthy videotape was repetitive of Judice's testimony and had very little probative value to a viewer not trained in medicine. For these reasons we find the trial court committed legal error in admitting the videotape of plaintiffs surgery.
B. Exclusion of Trial Transcript and Testimony of Nancy Burgess Regarding First Trial
Hartford contends the trial court erred in excluding the testimony of Nancy Burgess, its claims supervisor who handled plaintiffs' claim, regarding the first trial and the impact of the mistrial on her decision not to make an additional tender to plaintiffs. Hartford contends the trial court also erred in excluding the transcript of the first trial.
Burgess' proffered testimony shows she attended the first trial and heard the foreman announce the jury could not reach a decision on the first interrogatory, whether plaintiff's injuries were caused by the accident. She had also reviewed the portion of the trial transcript regarding the jury foreman's statements. She testified this knowledge confirmed her original opinion that reasonable minds could differ as to the amount Hartford owed.
The jury was asked to determine at the second trial whether Hartford, through Burgess, was arbitrary and capricious in tendering only $2,500.00 to plaintiffs. The facts on which Burgess based her decision not to make a further tender were relevant and should have been placed before the jury. We find the trial court committed legal error in excluding this testimony.
It is unclear from the record whether Hartford wanted to introduce the entire transcript of the first trial or only the portion of the transcript regarding the jury's inability to reach a decision on the issue of causation. In either case, we find the trial court did not err in excluding this evidence. The transcript of the jury foreman's unsworn colloquy with the trial court adds little to Burgess's testimony and would have been confusing to the jury. The transcript of the entire first trial, including the testimony of many of the same witnesses who testified at the second trial, would have been even more confusing to the jury. Hartford contends it could have been introduced with limiting instructions to make it clear to the jury that it was being introduced only insofar as it was relevant to the issue of Hartford's good faith evaluation of plaintiffs' claims. We find, however, that the confusion to the jury would have outweighed the probative value of the transcript. C.E. art. 403.
II. DAMAGES
Hartford complains the general damages awarded by the jury to plaintiff and the damages for loss of consortium awarded to Malbrough were excessive. Hartford also contends the trial court erred in adopting the jury's verdict awarding damages to plaintiff for past lost earnings and loss of future earning capacity. The evidentiary errors made by the trial court were decidedly prejudicial to Hartford's case and so tainted the jury's findings that they are entitled to be given no weight by this court on appeal. We thus must conduct a de novo review of the record, disregarding the prejudicial videotape and considering the improperly excluded testimony of Burgess, and render judgment on the merits. Buck-bee v. United Gas Pipe Line Co., 561 So.2d 76, 85-87 (La.1990). We now summarize the facts relevant to the damages issues.
A. Facts
Plaintiff Malbrough graduated from high school in 1977. Plaintiff married Malb-rough in 1978. Their daughters Tamala and Tiffany were born in 1980 and 1981, respectively.
Plaintiff began working as a skin therapist at her mother's business, Derma Culture Clinic, when she graduated from high school. The work involved constant leaning over tables and put a great deal of pressure on her back, causing occasional backaches.
Plaintiffs pre-accident medical history included the following:
(1) Treatment by a family doctor for two weeks for a "run-of-the mill backache" after she hurt her back picking up a heavy water jug in 1977.
(2) Treatment by a family doctor for back pain which began suddenly while bending over her baby's bed in May 1983.
(3) Four visits to Dr. Richard Whitney, a chiropractor, for the May 1983 backache, which was diagnosed, based on a positive straight leg raising test, as an acute lumbar intervertebral disk lesion.
(4) A finding in May 1983 by Whitney, based on x-rays, that plaintiff had spina bifida occulta, a malformation of the neural tube in the first sacral segment.
(5) One visit to a chiropractor in May 1984 for a backache, diagnosed as muscle strain, which she thought may have been caused by picking up her baby.
(6) A call to her family doctor inquiring whether a back brace would help support her back, although there was no indication in the doctor's records that a back brace was ever prescribed.
(7) A statement to a state vocational rehabilitation counselor in April 1985 that her back had been giving her a great deal of trouble, she felt she would not be able to work as a skin therapist much longer, and she could "no longer work at this because of bending."
(8) An orthopedic evaluation for purposes of vocational rehabilitation in April 1985 in which plaintiff told the orthopedist she had had back pain for three years. The orthopedist diagnosed spondylolysis of the L-5 lumbar vertebra and chronic {i.e., lasting more than six months) back sprain secondary to spondylolysis.
This accident occurred July 27, 1985. Plaintiff did not notice any pain immediately after the accident. She testified she was more concerned about her daughters, who were in the car with her at the time of the accident, than she was about herself. After having the girls examined and learning they were uninjured, she started to relax. She then realized her neck and shoulder hurt very badly.
Plaintiff saw Dr. Jules Dupont, a family doctor, about an hour after the accident. She had no back pain at that time. Dupont prescribed muscle relaxers and told her to go home and relax. While lying in bed at home, she noticed pain in her ribs and hips and a burning sensation from the top of her neck down her spine. She called Du-pont within a week after the accident and told him her neck pain was not improving and that her ribs and hips hurt. She asked Dupont to refer her to Judice, a neurosurgeon recommended by her aunt. She took the first available appointment with Judice, which was August 13, 1985.
Plaintiff gave a history to Judice in which she denied any significant spinal trauma or neck injury before the accident. She did not mention any past medical or physical problems. She testified she did not tell Judice about the spondylolysis or the spina bifida occulta on the first visit because she was not seeking treatment for those conditions. She did not tell Judice about the chiropractic visits or the rehabilitation evaluation by Rhymes for two reasons: (1) in her opinion, the problems for which she saw those doctors was unrelated to her complaints after the accident; and (2) the birth defect Whitney advised her of was "unconfirmed in my mind."
Plaintiff complained initially of pain in her neck and between her shoulder blades and a burning sensation down her back. Judice diagnosed cervical sprain and ordered conservative treatment. Those complaints resolved in a matter of months.
However, on September 23, 1985, two months after the accident, plaintiff complained of leg and back pain. Judice found no numbness or weakness in her legs; his initial diagnosis was lumbar strain. A CT scan of her lumbar spine done on September 27, 1985, however, showed a broad-based disk bulge at the L-4 level.
Judice recommended conservative treatment. In March or April 1986 plaintiff learned she was pregnant. Judice did not want to do any tests or prescribe any medication while she was pregnant; he did not see her again until after the baby, Tommy, Jr., was born in January 1987.
Plaintiff's back pain worsened while she was pregnant. She worked full-time after the accident until a month before Tommy, Jr., was born, despite the pain, because of her family's financial situation. She testified she took early maternity leave because she was too uncomfortable to work any longer.
On March 27, 1987, Judice performed a CT scan of plaintiff's lumbar spine. This test showed a disk herniation at the L-3 and L-4 levels. Judice testified the L-3 bulge was not shown on the earlier CT scan, but that area of her back was not adequately scanned the first time.
Dr. Robert Applebaum, a neurosurgeon, examined plaintiff at the request of Hartford in August 1987. He reviewed her tests and medical records and conducted a neurological examination which lasted approximately twenty minutes. He testified he found minimal bulging on both the 1985 and 1987 CT scans at the L-3/4 and L-4/5 levels but no evidence of a herniated or ruptured disk. The straight leg raising test was negative. He felt no further testing or surgical treatment was necessary and she could return to any work for which she was otherwise qualified. In Apple-baum's opinion, the only injuries plaintiff sustained as a result of the accident were a possible mild concussion and a cervical strain.
Plaintiff testified her pain worsened despite conservative treatment. In May 1988 Judice admitted her to the hospital, where he placed her in traction and gave her intravenous pain medication. A lumbar MRI taken while she was hospitalized confirmed the bulges at L-3 and L-4 shown on the CT scan. Finally, in June 1988 Judice performed a microlaminectomy on plaintiff's disks at the L-3 and L-4 levels. Judi-ce testified plaintiff got good relief from the surgery but continued to have occasional back and leg pain. Plaintiff testified she could walk again after the surgery, but she had little feeling in the lower part of her leg for four to five months after surgery.
Judice performed an MRI on plaintiff about a month before the 1987 trial because of her continued complaints. The test showed "a bit of a problem" because the L-3 disk is now beginning to bulge or prolapse into the spinal canal. If she continues to have symptoms, Judice will have to fuse the L-3 and L-4 vertebrae to correct the instability, which will cost from $15,000 to $18,000. He could not estimate how long he would have to treat her if she required a fusion.
Because of the prolapsed disk, Judice placed the following restrictions on plaintiff: (1) do not lift more than 15 pounds; (2) do not carry more than 10 pounds; (3) do not work on anything that vibrates heavily, such as a truck or boat; (4) avoid stair climbing, never climb ladders, and never work in a job with slippery or rough surfaces. He assigned her a 20%-25% disability of the body as a whole.
Before the surgery, it was Judice's opinion that the September 1985 back pain could have been caused by a combination of her spondylolysis and the disk. At trial, however, he testified that after seeing the size of the herniation during surgery, he was convinced the pain was all caused by the disks.
Judice opined that, based on the history given him by plaintiff, the herniated disks at L-3 and L-4 were caused by the July 1985 automobile accident because of the progression of her symptoms; that there was no way to tell the age of a disk bulge from a CT scan; that the bulge he found in September 1985 could have pre-existed the automobile accident and may have been caused by pre-July 1985 traumas; that in his opinion, however, plaintiff would have had consistent symptoms from 1988 to 1985 if she had had a disk; and that she would have needed to see a neurosurgeon (as opposed to a chiropractor) for relief.
Pregnancy can aggravate or even cause a disk bulge. Plaintiff did not complain of radicular pain until after Tommy, Jr., was born. However, Judice found it significant that plaintiff had two other pregnancies without back pain. In his opinion, her pregnancy did not cause the ruptured disk at L-3, although it aggravated her problems.
Since the surgery plaintiff has also seen a urologist, Dr. Frank Graffagnino, because of difficulty controlling her urine. All of the tests done by Graffagnino were normal except that her bladder does not empty completely. The only thing he could attribute this to is pain, i.e., that if she has pain while voiding her urethra closes prematurely. In Graffagnino's opinion, the voiding problem will probably remain as long as plaintiff has back pain.
At the time of trial, plaintiff relied on Malbrough for help around the house. She was working at Derma Culture two days a week for four to five hours per day. The week before trial she filled in at Derma Culture for her sister, Penny, who had the flu. After working a full day, she was very tired and in pain. She was trying to gradually build up her ability to work.
Plaintiff testified that before the accident she took the girls to the mall shopping and played with them outside. Now she shops by catalog, and her sisters take the kids shopping. She no longer has as much patience with the children as she did before the accident. The only thing they do together as a family now is go walking at night so the children can ride their bicycles.
Plaintiff has not worked full time since taking maternity leave in December 1986. She introduced evidence which showed she earned approximately $1,000.00 per month in 1985 and 1986.
B. General Damages
We find the preponderance of the evidence shows plaintiff suffered herniated disks at L-3 and L-4 as a result of the accident. In our opinion, the testimony of Judice, the board-certified neurosurgeon who treated plaintiff from a month after the accident until trial, is entitled to greater weight and is more credible than that of Whitney, the chiropractor who diagnosed a disk lesion in 1983, and Applebaum, who saw plaintiff for only twenty minutes. While her disk problems may have been aggravated by her pregnancy, this is a foreseeable consequence of a back injury to a woman of child-bearing age.
Considering plaintiff suffered from back pain for three years before surgery, underwent a two-level microlaminectomy which left her with a 20-25% disability of the body as a whole, and will probably need a subsequent surgery to fuse her L-3 and L-4 vertebrae, we find she is entitled to an award of general damages of $150,000.00. This sum includes her damages for past and future mental and physical pain and suffering and permanent disability.
C. Special Damages
The jury's verdicts of $23,256.54 for past medical expenses and $27,000.00 for future medical expenses were not appealed and are now final. Based on the evidence in the record, we find the sum of $83,000.00 will adequately compensate plaintiff for lost earnings and loss of future earning capacity.
D. Malbrough's Loss of Consortium Claim
Plaintiff's general and special damages total $283,256.54, well in excess of Hartford's policy limits of $100,000.00 per accident. Malbrough proved a loss of consortium at trial. However, his loss of consortium claim is only derivative, arising out of plaintiff's injuries. His claim is there fore restricted to the monetary limits of the policy. Those limits have been exhausted by plaintiffs claim. Malbrough's claim for loss of consortium has thus been extinguished. Shepard v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 545 So.2d 624, 630 (La.App. 4th Cir.) writs denied, 550 So.2d 627, 628 (La.1989); Carroll v. State Farm Insurance Co., 519 So.2d 265, 267-268 (La.App. 5th Cir.), writ denied, 520 So.2d 756 (La.1988); Albin v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 498 So.2d 171 (La.App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 498 So.2d 1088 (La.1986). The trial court's judgment in favor of Malbrough is thus clearly wrong and must be reversed.
III. APPLICABILITY OF LSA-R.S. 22:658
A. Was Hartford Arbitrary and Capricious?
Hartford contends the trial court erred in finding it was arbitrary and capricious in tendering only $2,500.00 to plaintiffs.
Plaintiffs who seek penalties and attorney fees under LSA-R.S. 22:658 have the burden of proving the insurer was arbitrary and capricious in failing to unconditionally tender the reasonable amount of damages due, i.e., the amount over which reasonable minds could not differ, within 60 days after receipt of satisfactory proof of loss. A satisfactory proof of loss within the meaning of R.S. 22:658 is that which is sufficient to fully apprise the insurer of the insured's claim. McDill v. Utica Mutual Insurance Co., 475 So.2d 1085, 1089 (La. 1985); Barnes v. Thames, 578 So.2d 1155 (La.App. 1st Cir.1991, writ denied, 577 So.2d 1009 (La.1991). Thus, in order for plaintiff to prevail on her claim for penalties and attorney fees, she must show that Hartford received satisfactory proof of loss, that Hartford failed to tender within 60 days the amount over which reasonable minds could not differ, and that Hartford was arbitrary and capricious in so doing.
On February 10, 1987, Hartford was provided with copies of all of plaintiff's medical records, including a report of Judice dated October 4, 1985, which refers to the bulging disk at L-4, a radiologist's report reporting the bulging disk, and reports from Judice showing a ten- to twelve-month cervical sprain and continuing complaints of low back pain. Based on these records, Hartford concluded plaintiff had only cervical and lumbar sprains as a result of the accident and tendered $2,500.00 on April 10, 1987. It was Hartford's position at that time that reasonable minds could not differ that plaintiff's damages were at least $12,500.00.
Nancy Burgess, Hartford's adjuster, testified she had no information at the time the tender was made that the bulging disk was related to the accident. However, she had no information that it was not. In June 1987 plaintiff's counsel provided Hartford with a copy of the CT scan and MRI showing the disk bulges at L-3 and L-4. In July 1987 Hartford deposed Judice and learned that in his opinion the disk bulges were caused by the accident. However, Burgess testified she did not give a great deal of credibility to any information received from Judice after mid-1987 because "he generally leans towards the injured party."
In August 1987 Applebaum examined plaintiff at Hartford's request and rendered his opinion that the only injuries she received as a result of the accident were the cervical strain and a possible concussion. He noted the bulging disks but did not find them significant. Later that same month the jury could not reach a verdict on the issue of whether plaintiff had any injuries caused by the accident. Burgess testified she took these factors into account in deciding not to make an additional tender. However, we note the weight Burgess gave the mistrial should have been minimal since she herself admitted plaintiff sustained cervical and lumbar strains in the accident.
We would have had difficulty finding Hartford arbitrary and capricious at this point in view of the conflicting medical testimony. See Thomas v. Hanover Insurance Co., 477 So.2d 1171, 1174 (La.App. 1st Cir.1985), affd., 488 So.2d 181 (La.1986). An insurer should not be cast for penalties and attorney fees simply for exercising its right to litigate a disputed claim.
However, by April 21, 1989, Hartford had received the records of Judice and Ter-rebonne General Medical Center showing plaintiff had undergone a two-level micro-laminectomy to relieve her pain from the bulging disks. At this point Hartford could no longer rely on Applebaum's opinion that plaintiffs bulging disks were "insignificant." Even considering Whitney's 1984 diagnosis of a lumbar disk lesion, Hartford was aware at this point that it owed damages, at a minimum, for aggravation to the extent surgery was required for a pre-existing disk problem. Despite receiving this additional medical information, Hartford made no further tender within 60 days of April 21, 1989.
An assessment that plaintiff's damages were only $12,500.00 at this point was clearly unreasonable. We find that Hartford acted arbitrarily and capriciously in failing to make a further tender to plaintiff within 60 days of April 21, 1989. They are thus liable for penalties and attorney fees under LSA-R.S. 22:658.
B. Penalties
LSA-R.S. 22:658 has been amended numerous times, and the amount of the statutory penalty has varied during the course of this litigation. The applicable statutory penalty is determined by the time the right to that penalty came into existence, which in this case was June 20, 1989. Gulf Wide Towing v. F.E. Wright (U.K.), 554 So.2d 1347, 1354 (La.App. 1st Cir.1989). At that time, the penalty was "ten percent of the difference between the amount paid or tendered and the amount found to be due and all reasonable attorney fees for the prosecution and collection of such amount." The penalty is calculated on the loss alone and does not include any legal interest that may become due. Shepard v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 545 So.2d 624, 631 (La.App. 4th Cir.), writs denied, 550 So.2d 627, 628 (La. 1989).
Hartford is entitled to a credit for the portion of the damages within the liability limits of Champion, the tortfeasor's insurer. Niemann v. Travelers Insurance Co., 368 So.2d 1003 (La.1979). Thus, the "amount found to be due" is plaintiff's total damages of $283,256.54 less Champion's policy limits of $10,000.00, or $273,-256.54. The difference between that figure and the amount tendered of $2,500.00 is $270,756.54. Hartford is thus liable to plaintiff for a penalty of $27,075.65.
C. Attorney Fees
Hartford contends the attorney fees awarded plaintiff of $189,051.08 are excessive and an abuse of the trial court's discretion. The jury awarded plaintiff attorney fees of "⅛." The trial court properly converted this to a dollar figure in the judgment.
An award of attorney fees in a case such as this should be based on the services needed to effect recovery, the degree of the professional skill and ability exercised, the volume of work performed, the time devoted to the case, the result obtained, the amount in controversy, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and the percentage fixed for attorney fees in the plaintiff's contract with his attorney, if based on a contingency. Shepard v. State Farm, 545 So.2d at 631; Louisiana Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.5. The trial court has much discretion in fixing an award of attorney fees, and its award will not be modified on appeal absent a showing of an abuse of discretion. Gulf Wide Towing, 554 So.2d at 1355 (La. App. 1st Cir.1989).
This case was tried twice, each jury trial lasting four days. This litigation also involved numerous depositions, motions, and pleadings. Liability was stipulated, and there were no novel questions of law involved at the trial court level. Plaintiffs' counsel testified his firm does not keep time records, but he estimated the firm spent 225 to 250 hours on the suit. He testified he has never worked for an hourly rate but always charges a ½ contingency fee. He obviously achieved a good result for his client.
In light of our reduction of the award to plaintiff and the reversal of the award to Malbrough, the trial court's award of $189,-051.08, or approximately % of the award to plaintiff, is clearly excessive and an abuse of discretion. In our opinion an award of $90,252.18 (⅛ of $270,756.54) for attorney fees is more appropriate and reasonable under the facts of this case.
IV. INTEREST
Hartford contends the trial court erred in awarding interest on the excess judgment and on the penalties and attorney fees from date of judicial demand. Hartford also contends the trial court erred in admitting evidence of plaintiffs' settlement with the primary insurer after trial and in ordering Hartford to pay interest on the portion of plaintiffs' damages paid by the primary insurer.
The trial court erred in awarding damages on the portion of the judgment in excess of Hartford's limits from date of judicial demand. The Hartford policy contains a supplementary payments clause which provides in pertinent part: "In addition to our limit of liability, we will pay on behalf of a covered person: . 3. Interest accruing after a judgment is entered in any suit we defend." In Barnes v. Thames, 578 So.2d 1155, 1170 (La.App. 1st Cir.1991), this court, sitting en banc, held that insurers intend by this clause to provide supplementary protection to their insureds for interest accruing after entry of judgment. The uninsured motorist insurer in Barnes was held liable for legal interest on the excess portion of the judgment only from date of judgment until paid. See also Remedies v. Lopez, 560 So.2d 118, 120 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 563 So.2d 1155 (La.1990); Pugh v. Gondrella, 522 So.2d 1257, 1258 (La.App. 4th Cir.1988); Doty v. Central Mutual Insurance Co., 186 So.2d 328, 333-336 (La.App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 187 So.2d 451 (La.1966).
The trial court also erred in awarding interest on the penalties and attorney fees from date of judicial demand. The law is well settled that because penalties and attorney fees are not ascertainable until awarded by the court, interest will run on those awards only from the date awarded. Alexander v. Burroughs Corp., 359 So.2d 607, 613-614 (La.1978); Francis v. Travelers Insurance Co., 581 So.2d 1036, 1045 (La.App. 1st Cir.1991); Hampton v. Rubicon Chemicals, 579 So.2d 458, 470 (La.App. 1st Cir.1991); Gulf Wide Towing, 554 So.2d at 1355.
Hartford contends the plaintiffs waived any right to interest from Hartford on amounts other than Hartford's $100,-000.00 limits by failing to reserve the right to interest when it settled with Champion. Hartford bases this contention on a misreading of Pugh v. Gondrella. In Pugh, the plaintiff settled with the tort-feasor's liability carrier for its policy limits and entered into a "limited release." The release did not contain a specific reservation of the right to proceed against the uninsured motorist carrier for interest on the primary carrier's policy limits. The court relied on La.C.C. art. 2925 to hold that plaintiffs had waived their right to any interest on the amount paid by the primary insurer. Article 2925 provides:
The release of the principal, without any reserve as to interest, raises the presumption that it also has been paid, and operates a release of it.
Thus, in this case, if the plaintiffs failed to specifically reserve their right to proceed against Hartford for the interest on Champion's $10,000.00 policy limits, they waived their right to interest on that $10,000.00, not the- excess judgment as contended by Hartford.
Plaintiffs failed to introduce the release during the trial. However, the trial court permitted the plaintiffs to introduce the release during a hearing on Hartford's mo tion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict approximately one month after the completion of the trial. Hartford contends the trial court erred in permitting the introduction of the release at that time.
The trial court's decision to reopen a case for additional evidence is discretionary and will not be disturbed absent a clear abuse of discretion. La.C.C.P. arts. 1631, 1632; American Bank & Trust v. McDowell, 545 So.2d 1211, 1214 (La.App.2d Cir.1989). Even if the settlement document was improperly admitted, however, the error was harmless. The release contains no specific language reserving plaintiffs' right to proceed against Hartford for the interest on Champion's limits. It simply states plaintiffs are "reserving all rights to proceed against the uninsured motorist carrier." This language is insufficient to reserve plaintiffs' right to recover from Hartford interest on the sum paid by Champion to the plaintiffs in 1987.
V. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment in favor of Tommy Malbrough and against Hartford Casualty Insurance Company is reversed. The judgment in favor of plaintiff and against Hartford Casualty Insurance Company is amended to read as follows:
IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that there be judgment herein in favor of plaintiff, Tammy Malbrough, and against defendant, Hartford Casualty Insurance Company, in the full and true sum of ninety-seven thousand, five hundred and no/100 ($97,500.00) dollars, together with legal interest thereon from date of judicial demand until paid.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that there be judgment in favor of plaintiff, Tammy Malbrough, and against defendant, Hartford Casualty Insurance Company, for legal interest on the sum of $173,256.54 from the date of the trial court judgment, November 6, 1989, until paid.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that there be judgment in favor of plaintiff, Tammy Malbrough, and against defendant, Hartford Casualty Insurance Company, for a penalty pursuant to LSA-R.S. 22:658 of $27,075.65, together with legal interest thereon from the date of the trial court judgment, November 6, 1989, until paid.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that there be judgment in favor of plaintiff, Tammy Malbrough, and against defendant, Hartford Casualty Insurance Company, for attorney fees of $90,252.18, together with legal interest thereon from the date of the trial court judgment, November 6, 1989, until paid."
The remainder of the judgment of the trial court regarding expert fees was not appealed and is final. Costs of this appeal are assessed against Hartford.
REVERSED IN PART, AMENDED IN PART, AND, AS AMENDED, AFFIRMED.
LANIER, J., concurs in part and dissents in part and assigns reasons.
. Named as defendants in addition to Hartford were Jane S. Wallace, the owner of the other vehicle; Jane's insurer, American Insurance Company; Connye B. Wallace, the adverse driver; and Champion Insurance Company, Con-nye's insurer. Hartford filed a cross claim against these defendants, which was later voluntarily dismissed.
. Tommy Malbrough also claimed damages on behalf of his minor children, Tamala and Tiffany Malbrough, who were passengers in the vehicle operated by their mother at the time of the accident. His claims for their medical expenses and personal injuries were apparently dropped; there was no mention of those claims at trial.
. The verdict form asked the jury to express the amount of attorney fees in dollars, but this instruction was ignored.
. This sum represents the jury verdict of $568,-258.54 less $1,952.00.
.This sum represents the sum of $25,000.00 awarded by the jury for loss of consortium less $550.00.
. This is illustrated by plaintiffs' counsel's question to Judice during the showing of the film: "Obviously it's Greek to us, but at this point what you're seeing there is abnormal to you as a surgeon?"
. We note, however, that plaintiff testified she took maternity leave three to four weeks before each of her other two pregnancies.
. Plaintiffs had already settled with Champion for $10,000.00.
. The plaintiffs did not answer the appeal and ask for additional attorney fees for the appeal, so ws cannot consider the time spent by plaintiffs' counsel defending this appeal.