Case Name: Kimberly DAVIS, Appellant, v. BERWIND CORPORATION, Bepex Corporation, and Boldt Industries, Inc., Appellees
Court: Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
Jurisdiction: Pennsylvania
Decision Date: 1997-02-24
Citations: 690 A.2d 186
Docket Number: No. 1 E.D. Appeal Docket 1995
Parties: Kimberly DAVIS, Appellant, v. BERWIND CORPORATION, Bepex Corporation, and Boldt Industries, Inc., Appellees.
Judges: Before NIX, C.J., and FLAHERTY, ZAPPALA, CAPPY, CASTILLE and NEWMAN, JJ.
Reporter: West's Atlantic Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 690
Pages: 186–195

Head Matter:
Kimberly DAVIS, Appellant, v. BERWIND CORPORATION, Bepex Corporation, and Boldt Industries, Inc., Appellees.
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
Reargued Jan. 25, 1996.
Decided Feb. 24, 1997.
Bruce Baron, Donald E. Matusow, Philadelphia, for Kimberly Davis.
Gerald A. McHugh, Jr., Philadelphia, for Amicus - Pa. Trial Lawyers Assoc.
Gary B. Cutler, Philadelphia, for Berwind Corp.
Angelo L. Scaricamazza, for Boldt Indus.
James M. Beck, for Amicus - Pa. Liability Advisory Council.
Before NIX, C.J., and FLAHERTY, ZAPPALA, CAPPY, CASTILLE and NEWMAN, JJ.

Opinion:
OPINION OF THE COURT
ZAPPALA, Justice.
In this product liability action, the Superi- or Court vacated the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County and granted a judgment notwithstanding the verdict (j.n.o.v) in favor of Appellees, Berwind Corporation and Bepex Corporation. We affirm the judgment of the Superior Court and conclude that as a matter of law, Appellant failed to state a cause of action in strict liability based upon an inadequate warning.
The record establishes that Kimberly Davis, Appellant, was employed as a quality control inspector for Keystone Equity Meats (Equity), a company which supplies hamburger patties to McDonald's restaurants. One of Appellant's duties was to operate a blender in a meat formulation system Equity had purchased from Boldt. The Boldt sys-tern incorporated blenders manufactured by Bepex.
Appellees' blenders were sold with interlocking eleetropneumatic safety devices. A dual valve system required the simultaneous use of both of the operator's hands, thus keeping the hands away from the rotating blades. Also, the blender was equipped with an interlocking door which was designed to act as a guard, automatically blocking access to the area where meat was being ground if either of the operator's hands was removed from its place on the control panel. The blender, however, could operate without the safety devices, and the safety devices were shipped separately from the blender.
Appellees included on the blender a visible warning reading "DANGER, KEEP FINGERS OUT OF DOOR OPENINGS." The operating manual provided to Equity also warned against removing the interlocking safety device:
Do not operate unless guards and safety devices are in place and are working. The electropneumatic control is considered an integral part of blender and should not be removed or modified to preclude the safety to the interlock feature....
R. 927a.
Shortly after Equity installed the meat formulation equipment, it removed the interlocking safety devices from the blenders. With the safety devices removed, employees could operate two blenders at one time and therefore increase production without increasing labor costs.
On the day of the accident, Appellant shut off the power to one of the blenders she was operating. Approximately ten seconds later, she used her right hand to clear the blender's discharge chute of meat which had accumulated in the blender's hopper. Even though the blender's power had been turned off, the blades continued to turn. Appellant's right hand came into contact with the rotating blades, and three of her fingers were severed. Appellant testified at trial that had she known that the blades would continue to rotate alter the machine had been turned off, she never would have put her hand near the doors. Appellant also conceded at trial that had the electropneumatic safety devices been in place, the accident would not have occurred.
Appellant's sole claim against Appellees was that they were strictly liable under § 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts for failing to warn users of the propensity of the mixing blades to rotate after the blender had been turned off. Appellant contended that this warning was necessary to make the blender safe because the alterations made to the product by Appellant's employer were foreseeable.
The jury determined that Boldt was not liable for Appellant's injuries, and that Ap-pellees were liable. The jury awarded damages in the amount of $400,000.00. Both parties filed post-trial motions. The trial court granted Appellant's request for delay damages in the amount of $218,725.92, and denied Appellees' posttrial motions. It concluded that there was substantial evidence for the jury to conclude that the alteration to the product, i.e., the removal of the safety device, was foreseeable.
The Superior Court reversed and entered j.n.o.v. on the basis that the case should not have been submitted to the jury as a matter of law. It held that Appellees did what was required of a responsible manufacturer by providing a safety device, affixing warnings on the discharge doors and providing additional warnings cautioning against the removal of the safety device in the product manual. The Superior Court further held that where the product endures substantial post-sale alteration contrary to the warnings of the manufacturer, the alteration rises to the level of an intervening or superseding cause of the injury, breaking the chain of causation and relieving the manufacturer of liability. Davis, 433 Pa.Super. at 363, 640 A.2d at 1300.
Appellant filed a petition for allowance of appeal with our Court, and we granted allocatur. In reviewing an entry of a judgment n.o.v., we note that
[tjhere are two bases upon which a judgment n.o.v. can be entered: one, the mov-ant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and/or two, the evidence was such that no two reasonable minds could disagree that the outcome should have been rendered in favor of the movant. With the first, a court reviews the record and concludes that even with all factual inferences decided adverse to the movant the law nonetheless requires a verdict in his favor, whereas with the second, the court reviews the evidentiary record and concludes that the evidence was such that a verdict for the movant was beyond peradventure.
Moure v. Raeuchle, 529 Pa. 394, 402-403, 604 A.2d 1003, 1007 (1992) (citations omitted).
In their appeal to the Superior Court, Appellees successfully premised their claim to j.n.o.v. on the basis that they were entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In examining this determination, our scope of review is plenary, as it is with any review of questions of law. Phillips v. A-Best Products Co., 542 Pa. 124, 130, 665 A.2d 1167, 1170 (1995).
We begin our analysis of whether Appellees are entitled to judgment as a matter of law with a discussion of § 402A, which was adopted by our Court in Webb v. Zern, 422 Pa. 424, 220 A.2d 853 (1966). Section 402A reflects the social policy that a seller or manufacturer is best able to shoulder the costs and to administer the risks involved when a product is released into the stream of commerce. Having derived a benefit from engaging in business, manufacturers and sellers are particularly able to allocate the losses incurred through cost increases and insurance. Walton v. Avco Corporation, 530 Pa. 568, 575, 610 A.2d 454, 458 (1992).
Nevertheless, it is not the purpose of § 402A to impose absolute liability. A manufacturer is a guarantor of its product, not an insurer. See Azzarello v. Black Brothers Co., Inc., 480 Pa. 547, 553, 391 A.2d 1020, 1023-1024 (1978). To recover under § 402A, a plaintiff must establish that the product was defective, that the defect was a proximate cause of the plaintiffs injuries, and that the defect causing the injury existed at the time the product left the seller's hands. Berkebile v. Brantly Helicopter Corporation, 462 Pa. 83, 93-94, 337 A.2d 893, 899 (1975). The seller is not liable if a safe product is made unsafe by subsequent changes. Id. Where the product has reached the user or consumer with substantial change, the question becomes whether the manufacturer could have reasonably expected or foreseen such' an alteration of its product. Eck v. Powermatic Houdaille, 364 Pa.Super. 178, 527 A.2d 1012 (1987).
A dangerous product can be considered "defective" for strict liability purposes if it is distributed without sufficient warnings to notify the ultimate user of the dangers inherent in the product. Mackowick v. Westinghouse Electric Corporation, 525 Pa. 52, 575 A.2d 100 (1990). The determination of whether a warning is adequate and whether a product is "defective" due to inadequate warnings are questions of law to be answered by the trial judge. Id. at 56, 575 A.2d at 102.
Appellant's theory of liability, inadequate warnings, is premised on the argument that Appellees should have anticipated the removal of the safety device and, therefore, should have provided additional warnings. Appellant contends that the warning on the blender, which stated, "DANGER, KEEP FINGERS OUT OF DOOR OPENINGS," was inadequate to warn the user that the blades would continue to rotate after the power was terminated.
Appellant's initial error lies in the characterization of the "danger" as being the continued rotation of the blades of the meat blender after the power had been turned off. Instead, the danger to be cautioned against is the placement of the operator's hands at any position near the blades. An instruction concerning the continued rotation of the blades becomes necessary only if the operator blatantly ignores the specific warning to keep fingers away from the door openings. Appellant is in effect suggesting that we require a manufacturer to warn against dangers that may arise if the stated warnings are not heeded. Such requirement is unreasonable and unwarranted since the law presumes that warnings will be obeyed. See Baldino v. Castagna, 505 Pa. 239, 478 A.2d 807 (1984) (where a warning is given, the seller may reasonably assume that it will be read and heeded); Comment j of Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.
In a similar argument, Appellant maintains that the Superior Court erred in finding that the removal of the safety device by Appellant's employer constituted a superseding cause of Appellant's injury. This claim is likewise meritless. Disregarding the warnings stated in the owner's manual and affixed to the machine itself, Appellant's employer removed the safety devices so that a single employee could operate more than one machine at a time. This clearly constitutes a substantial change in the condition in which the product was sold that relieves the manufacturer of liability for Appellant's injury.
Appellant attempts to avoid this result, however, by contending that it was foreseeable that the meat blender could be operated without the interlocking safety device. As evidence of foreseeability, Appellant asserts the following: the instruction manual accompanying the blender cautioned against removing the safety device; the hand controls were shipped separately from the blender; the safety device was incompatible with Equity's procedure of two machines being operated by one person; and, the warnings placed on the blender were cogent only if the safety device was removed. We find untenable the proposition that a manufacturer must anticipate that a specific warning not to operate a product without a safety device indicates to a user that the product could, in fact, be operated without the safety feature. Such conclusion defies common sense. It also renders warnings of any nature meaningless since the manufacturer must anticipate that the user will engage in the precise conduct which the warning cautions against.
In summary, notwithstanding the removal of the safety device, the warning on the blender itself clearly instructed the operator to "KEEP FINGERS OUT OF DOOR OPENINGS." This warning addressed the danger and was sufficient to caution the operator. Moreover, an integral part of the product was an interlocking electropneumatic safety device and the product's manual cautioned against its removal. The fact that Appellant's employer chose to disregard such warning does not render the product defective. Accordingly, the Superior Court properly concluded that Appellees were entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
NIGRO, J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this ease.
NIX, former C.J., did not participate in the decision of this case.
CAPPY, J.,
files a dissenting opinion in which NEWMAN, J., joins.
NEWMAN, J., files a dissenting opinion.
. Boldt Industries, Inc. was not party to the appeal to the Superior Court, and is not a party in the instant proceeding.
. At the time of the sale of the blender, Bepex was owned by Berwind. Both companies shall hereinafter be referred to as "Appellees."
. Section 402A. Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical Harm to User or Consumer.
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and a sale of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any contractual relation with the seller.
. Appellant's remaining assertions also do not lead to the conclusion that Appellees should have foreseen the product alteration. The fact that Equity had a procedure of having one person operate two machines prior to purchasing Appel-lee's blender does not give Equity reason to ignore the warning cautioning against such procedure when using Appellee's machine. It also has nothing to do with Appellee's ability to foresee the product alteration. Further, the fact that the safety device was shipped separately from other components of the blender is not dispositive of the issue.
. Appellant also argues that the social policy underlying product liability requires that the risk of loss of injury be borne by Appellees as they are in a better position to protect themselves against the loss. We disagree. The imposition of strict liability on Appellees in the instant case would be a futile attempt to promote the distribution of safe products when it is not the manufacturer but the purchaser who rendered the product dangerous. The manufacturer should not be responsible for the employer's intentional removal of the safety device merely because the purchaser/employer is limited in liability to that recoverable in a workers' compensation proceeding.