Case Name: SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Joseph S. AMUNDSEN, Defendant-Appellant
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 2012-03-05
Citations: 470 F. App'x 651
Docket Number: No. 10-17759
Parties: SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Joseph S. AMUNDSEN, Defendant-Appellant.
Judges: 
Reporter: West's Federal Appendix
Volume: 470
Pages: 651–652

Head Matter:
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Joseph S. AMUNDSEN, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 10-17759.
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
Submitted Feb. 21, 2012.
Filed March 5, 2012.
Thomas J. Karr, Assistant General Counsel, Christopher Bruckmann, Senior Counsel, SEC-Securities & Exchange Commission, Washington, DC, Susan Frances Lamarca, Securities & Exchange Commission, San Francisco, CA, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Joseph S. Amundsen, Easton, PA, pro se.
Before: FERNANDEZ, McKEOWN, and BYBEE, Circuit Judges.
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

Opinion:
MEMORANDUM
Joseph S. Amundsen appeals pro se from the district court's order denying his motion to vacate a permanent injunction entered against him in 1983. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review for an abuse of discretion, Casey v. Albertson's Inc., 362 F.3d 1254, 1257 (9th Cir.2004), and we affirm.
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Amundsen's motion under Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(5) because Amundsen failed to demonstrate that any changed circumstances have made his compliance with the injunction "substantially more onerous, unworkable because of unforeseen obstacles, detrimental to the public interest, or legally impermissible." SEC v. Coldicutt, 258 F.3d 939, 942 (9th Cir.2001) (district court did not abuse its discretion by denying the plaintiffs request to terminate a permanent injunction due to changed circumstances).
To the extent that Amundsen's motion falls within Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(3), the district court lacked jurisdiction to consider it because Amundsen filed his motion more than one year after judgment was entered. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(c)(1) (Rule 60(b)(3) motion must be made within one year of entry of judgment); Nevitt v. United States, 886 F.2d 1187, 1188 (9th Cir.1989) (a district court lacks jurisdiction to consider an untimely motion to set aside a judgment).
Amundsen's remaining contentions are unpersuasive.
AFFIRMED.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9 th Cir. R. 36-3.