Case Name: Sloan, Special Administratrix, Appellant, vs. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway Company, Respondent
Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Wisconsin
Decision Date: 1913-01-07
Citations: 151 Wis. 645
Docket Number: 
Parties: Sloan, Special Administratrix, Appellant, vs. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway Company, Respondent.
Judges: I am authorized to say Mr. Justice KerwiN concurs in this dissent.
Reporter: Wisconsin Reports
Volume: 151
Pages: 645–663

Head Matter:
Sloan, Special Administratrix, Appellant, vs. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway Company, Respondent.
December 12, 1912
January 7, 1913.
Appeal: Questions of fact: Weight given to decision of trial fudge: Special verdict: Changing answers: Evidence: Sufficiency: Railroads: Negligence: Death of switchman.
1. Because of the superior opportunity of the trial judge for reach- » ing a right conclusion, his decision as to whether there is a jury question for solution will not he disturbed on appeal unless manifestly wrong.
2. Plaintiff’s intestate, while in charge of a switching crew in defendant’s yards, was run down and hilled by cars which ran upon the wrong trach because of the failure to turn a switch. Upon evidence showing that it was the duty of the deceased on this occasion to turn the switch and to give the signals for the movements of the cars, and that up to the time he stepped into the region of danger and was killed the movements of the cars were under his personal direction, it is held that the trial court was warranted in changing findings in the special verdict to the effect that negligence of other members of the crew directly contributed to the death, and in dismissing the action.
3. The special verdict having been thus changed so as to negative the existence of negligence on the part of any one except the deceased, it is immaterial that the trial court did not formally set aside or change other findings by the jury to the effect that it was the duty of one of the other men to turn the switch (which finding was contrary to all the evidence), and that the negligence of the deceased was slighter as a contributing cause to the injury than that of the other switchmen.
4. In such a case judgment might have been given in favor of defendant notwithstanding the verdict, without changing any of the findings therein; but the usual and better practice is to shape the verdict so that on its face it forms a basis for the judgment.
Timlin and Keewin, JJ„ dissent.
Appeal from a judgment of the circuit court for La Crosse county: E. 0. Higbee, Circuit Judge.
Affirmed.
Action to recover compensation for damages caused to the widow of Eranit Sloan, hy his death, alleged to have been pro duced by negligence of defendant’s servants. Issues were duly joined. All conditions precedent to tbe right to maintain the action were alleged and admitted or proved.
The evidence established as facts, the following: In the nighttime of September 9, 1909, while the intestate was on duty in defendant’s yards at La Crosse, Wisconsin, in charge of a switching crew he was run down and killed by cars which were being moved under his direction. Resides the engineer and fireman there were two men associated with Sloan, Mr. Kessler, as head brakeman, and Mr. Hawkins, as rear brakeman. It was a dark, foggy night. Because of such condition Kessler 'was stationed rather nearer the engine than usual so he could readily receive signals from Sloan and repeat them to the engineer. It was Hawkins’s duty to ride the rear cars and as they were, from time to time, spotted to set the brakes. Because of fog and darkness Sloan assumed the duty of throwing the switch for the movements leading up to the accident. The engine was operating “head on” with a string of cars and a caboose. There were several sidetracks, substantially parallel with a main track, and connected therewith, directly or indirectly. Just prior to the particular movement the engineer executed orders to set a caboose in on what was known as track 1. Failing to do so efficiently by the first effort, there was a return and the caboose was “kicked” on to a satisfactory clearance. Hawkins rode the caboose to its position and set the brakes. Sloan was in front of the caboose or between it and the particular switch. Kessler was on the moving cars, toward the engine, where he could receive and transmit signals as before indicated. The movement next to be executed, according to Sloan’s orders was to recede to a clearance of the switch to track 1 and that to track 4, and then return and push the cars in on the latter, the switches being properly turned for that purpose. By inadvertence they were not turned so as to direct the cars in on track 4 but were left so as to give direction back in on track 1. Sloan gave tbe signals for tbe return movement. Tbej were received by Kessler and repeated to tbe engineer. Hawkins about tbis time descended from tbe caboose and, after having some altercation with a trespasser near by, passed over toward track 4, — tbe one on wbicb tbe cars were expected to come. Sloan was near tbe particular switch just before tbe return movement of tbe cars. Kessler was some distance away on the moving cars and some six car lengths from tbe rear. On account of tbe conditions, be could not see Sloan’s person but could see bis lantern. He could not see definitely, what track tbe cars were on. His attention was directed to receiving tbe signals from Sloan and repeating them to tbe engineer. Tbe initial signal for tbe return movement was given by a person standing near tbe particular switch. There was no other person at that point except Sloan. After such initial signal, others were given for a continuance of tbe return movement, tbe person giving them, at tbe same "time going in tbe direction tbe cars were moving and on or near track 1. Soon after tbe last signal was given, be disappeared and soon thereafter Hawkins, who bad observed him step into tbe pathway of tbe coming cars, a short distance therefrom and endeavored, but too late, to arouse bis attention to tbe peril, succeeded in efficiently signaling for tbe movement of ears to stop. Sloan was found dead about where Kessler bad seen bis lantern disappear after tbe last signal to come on was given. About tbe time Sloan was seen at tbe switch be bad some altercation with a trespasser on tbe track, presumably tbe same one who bad attracted tbe attention of Hawkins.
Upon tbe theory that tbe evidence tended to show that Sloan came to bis death'by reason of bis own carelessness and that, if there was any efficient negligence on tbe part of bis associates it was either in tbe conduct of Kessler or Hawkins, and with tbe firm conviction, as stated by tbe judge, that there was no warrant in tbe evidence for a finding of such negli gence, tbe cause was submitted to tbe jury for answers to special questions, resulting in substantially these findings, among others, in tbe whole, if warranted by tbe evidence, entitling plaintiff to recover: Kessler was guilty of want of ordinary care proximately causing tbe death of Sloan. Hawkins was also guilty of such want of care. Sloan was guilty of efficient contributory fault. His want of care was of lesser degree than that of tbe trainmen. It was Hawkins’s duty to turn tbe switch.
Upon motion tbe trial court changed tbe finding as to negligence of Kessler and also as to negligence of Hawkins, characterizing tbe reversal by a decision to tbe effect that there was no warrant for tbe finding that it was tbe latter’s duty to turn tbe switch, and ordered judgment dismissing tbe action with costs, which was accordingly rendered.
Eor tbe appellant there were briefs by A. E. Bleehman and Frarilc Winter, and oral argument by Mr. Winter.
For tbe respondent there was a brief by G. H. Van Alstine, H. J. Killilea, and Paul W. Mahoney, and oral argument by Mr. Killilea.

Opinion:
Marshall, J.
It does not seem best to review tbe evidence here, in detail, to demonstrate tbe correctness of tbe conclusion to which we have arrived. Tbe statement of facts sufficiently justifies that. It indicates that tbe opinion which tbe trial judge bad at tbe close of tbe evidence was well grounded. On tbe motion to correct tbe verdict and for judgment in respondent's favor, be carefully reviewed tbe evidence ; showing that it was tbe duty of Sloan, and of no one else on tbe particular occasion, to turn tbe switch; that it was bis duty, and that of no one else, to give tbe signals for tbe movement of cars; that be, and no one else, gave tbe signals, and that tbe movements, up to' tbe time be stepped into tbe region of danger and was killed, were under bis personal direction.
From tbe nature of tbe case, tbe rule applies, very strongly, that in determining wbetber there is a jury question for solution tbe trial judge has such superior opportunity for reaching a right conclusion as to tbe matter of fact involved,— that is as to wbetber there is room in tbe evidence for a determination to a reasonable certainty in either of two ways, that bis decision is entitled to such weight on appeal as not to be legitimately disturbable without a manifest showing of its being wrong. Tbe mere fact, looking at tbe printed record alone, that we would incline to a different view, is not sufficient. Tbe weight of superior opportunity below to discover tbe right of tbe matter, would still bear down tbe scales in favor of tbe decision complained of. All reasonable doubts arising from tbe record itself, and those arising from appreciably contemplating the peculiarly advantageous position of tbe trial judge, must be overcome, in such a case as this, in order to successfully challenge tbe initial decision. As has been said, over and over again, that dignity is due to tbe decisions of trial judges on matters of fact. Tbe letter and spirit of our system of jurisprudence demands and commands it. Justice, in general, will be most certainly effectuated by this court firmly adhering to such rule. Such a course will give courage and stimulus to trial judges to perform the whole duty of their high office and shape litigation speedily, directly, economically, and certainly as practicable, to a finality. Any other course would strongly tend to weaken trial jurisdictions where there is most need of executive strength and judicial courage.
Testing tbe record before us by the rule indicated, we fail to discover any fair ground for disturbing the judgment appealed from. We come far short of being able to say the court below was wrong in deciding that there was no evidence of negligence on the part of either Kessler or Hawkins. The fact that the finding as to Hawkins's duty to turn the switch was not formally changed or set aside, is immaterial. The erroneous notion entertained by tbe jury, if they intelligently considered tbe matter at all, tbat Hawkins was negligent must bare been grounded on tbe theory, wbicb is not only without support in tbe record but contrary to all tbe evidence on tbe subject, — that it was bis duty to turn tbe switch. Therefore tbe change of one in effect changed tbe other; and, in any event, tbe court might have granted judgment in defendant's favor, notwithstanding tbe verdict, without changing any of tbe answers; though to first shape tbe verdict' so as, on its face, to form a basis for the judgment, is tbe usual practice and is the formal, if not the best, though not essential way. What is said on this subject applies to the fact that the finding as to the negligence of Sloan being slighter than that of the trainmen was not changed. The change so as to negative there having been negligence of any one but Sloan, carried with it the comparative found feature of his negligence. Moreover, his fault, in the judgment of the trial court, appeared conclusively from the evidence, leaving the jury finding in the case, really immaterial.
By the Court. — Judgment affirmed.
The following opinion was filed January 28, 1913: