Case Name: Manchester v. Van Brunt
Court: New York Court of Common Pleas
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1893-02
Citations: 2 Misc. 228
Docket Number: 
Parties: Manchester v. Van Brunt.
Judges: 
Reporter: New York Miscellaneous Reports
Volume: 2
Pages: 228–234

Head Matter:
Manchester v. Van Brunt.
(New York Common Pleas
General Term,
February, 1893.)
In a proper case, a deposit in the post-office of a notice of- dishonor, though accompanied with a direction to return if not delivered in ten days, is sufficient notice to charge an indorser.
Appeal from a judgment of the General Term of the City Court of New York, which affirmed a judgment for plaintiffs, entered upon a verdict and affirmed also an order denying defendant’s motion for a new trial.
Action by holders against indorser to recover upon a promissory note payable in the city of New York, where the indorserhad his place of business and also resided. The defenses were-that the indorser was discharged by reason of the omission to-give him due notice of nonpayment of the note at maturity, and also by a subsequent agreement between the holders and. maker whereby the time for payment was extended.
Sackett dc Lang, for plaintiff (respondent).
Alfred B. Gruikshank for defendant (appellant).

Opinion:
Pryor, J.
To an action by the holder of a note against the indorser, the defendant pleads a discharge for default in notice of dishonor. The note being payable and the indorser resident in the city of Eew York, the plaintiff availed himself of the method of notice provided by statute, namely, by deposit in the post-office; but, by indorsement on the envelope containing the protest, the postmaster was requested to return it to the plaintiff if not delivered within ten days, and the argument is that this direction defeated the effect oE the deposit as a notice. We are of opinion that the contention is untenable.
The law never required actual notice to the indorser, but due diligence sufficed to charge him. Gawtry v. Doane, 51 N. Y. 84; Libby v. Adams, 32 Barb. 542. Proceeding on the presumption that a communication duly addressed and deposited in the post-office will regularly reach its destination (Oregon Steamshing Co. v. Otis, 100 N. Y. 446; Price v. McGoldrick, 2 Abb. N. C. 69), the statute prescribes that a notice of protest " may he served " by being so addressed and deposited. Hence such deposit is the legal equivalent of notice. Ellis v. Bank, 40 Am. Dec. 63; Montgomery v. Marsh, 7 N. Y. 481.
Yet, notwithstanding the literal terms of the statute, it may be assumed that were the deposit so conditioned and incumbered as to repel the presumption of delivery, it would not amount to notice. But such is not the present case. From the facilities and securities for the prompt delivery of mail matter in the city of Eew York, the inference is inevitable that ten days was ample time for the receipt of the notice by the defendant.
By the Hnited States Bevised Statutes, it is provided that a letter not called for within a given period shall be sent to the "dead-letter" department, and by section 3939 that, after thirty days, if the name and address of the writer he indorsed On the letter, it shall he returned to him. The state statute making a deposit in the post-office equivalent to notice, must have contemplated these provisions of federal law, and hence the inference that an absolute and unrestricted deposit is not a necessary condition of such notice.
By the Code, under certain circumstances, service of pleadings may be made by mail; and the service is complete upon deposit in the post-office, although, in fact, the paper miscarry in the delivery. Jacobs v. Hooker, 1 Barb. 71; Crittenden v. Adams, 5 How. 310. In Gafney v. Bigelow, 2 Abb. N. C. 311, the defendant deposited his answer in the post-office, but with a direction to return it, " if not called for in five days." An objection that this qualification of the deposit destroyed its effect as a legal service, was overruled by a court consisting of Mullen, P. J., E. Darwin Smith and Gilbert, JJ. The authority is in point, and would control our decision even were it supported by less satisfactory reasons.
Appellant assails the judgment again on the ground that the defendant was discharged by an extension of time to the maker; but it appearing beyond doubt that the indulgence was gratuitous, the liability of the indorser is unaffected. Hpon this point, nothing need be added to the argument of the City Court, General Term.
So far as the appeal invites a consideration of questions of fact, they are concluded before us by the determination of the court below. In other exceptions, we observe no feature of gravity.
Judgment affirmed, with costs.
Daly, Ch. J., concurs.