Case Name: THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. SANDY WILLIAMS, Defendant-Appellant
Court: Illinois Appellate Court
Jurisdiction: Illinois
Decision Date: 2008-08-27
Citations: 385 Ill. App. 3d 359
Docket Number: No. 1—06—3463
Parties: THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. SANDY WILLIAMS, Defendant-Appellant.
Judges: 
Reporter: Illinois Appellate Court Reports, Third Series
Volume: 385
Pages: 359–378

Head Matter:
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. SANDY WILLIAMS, Defendant-Appellant.
First District (3rd Division)
No. 1—06—3463
Opinion filed August 27, 2008.
Rehearing denied October 14, 2008.
Patricia Unsinn and Brian Carroll, both of State Appellate Defender’s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.
Richard A. Devine, State’s Attorney, of Chicago (James E. Fitzgerald, Ashley Romito, Veronica Calderon Malavia, and Amy Watroba Kern, Assistant State’s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.

Opinion:
JUSTICE GREIMAN
delivered the opinion of the court:
Following a bench trial that included inculpatory deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) evidence, defendant, Sandy Williams, was convicted of two counts of aggravated criminal sexual assault, aggravated kidnaping and aggravated robbery. He was subsequently sentenced to two concurrent terms of natural life imprisonment for the aggravated criminal sexual assault counts; a consecutive term of 60 years' imprisonment for the aggravated kidnaping count; and a concurrent term of 15 years' imprisonment for the aggravated robbery count. On appeal, defendant contends that the trial court erred in admitting the inculpatory DNA evidence because sufficient foundation was not established for the forensic scientist's opinion testimony on the matter. Defendant ad ditionally contends that admission of the forensic scientist's opinion testimony violated defendant's confrontation rights according to Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 158 L. Ed. 2d 177, 124 S. Ct. 1354 (2004). Defendant finally contends that the trial court erroneously ordered that his aggravated kidnaping sentence run consecutive to his sentence of natural life imprisonment for aggravated criminal sexual assault.
The evidence adduced at trial demonstrated that, on February 10, 2000, defendant grabbed the 22-year-old victim, L.J., as she was walked home from work, forced her into a car and repeatedly sexually assaulted her. Once finished, defendant took the victim's money and some of her personal belongings and fled. The victim immediately ran home and reported the incident.
The victim later went to the hospital, where she provided a blood sample and a vaginal swab for a sexual assault kit (kit). Doctor Nancy Schubert sealed the samples in the kit and placed it in a secured lock box in the emergency room. Early the next morning, Detective Michael Baker obtained the kit from the emergency room and inventoried it prior to sending the kit to the Illinois State Police crime lab (Crime Lab) for testing and analysis.
Prior to going to the hospital, the victim spoke to the police and described defendant as a black male, standing 5 feet 8 inches tall, wearing a black skullcap, black jacket and jeans and driving a beige station wagon. The police subsequently issued a "flash" message including that description. Pursuant to the "flash" message, two officers stopped an individual matching the perpetrator's description. The suspect, James McChristine, agreed to accompany the officers to the hospital where the victim was being treated. The victim first viewed McChristine's driver's license and stated that there was potential that he was her attacker; however, she asked to view him in person. As a result, the victim viewed McChristine in the hospital parking lot and there was conflicting evidence presented as to whether the victim positively identified McChristine at that time. Notwithstanding, the victim again viewed McChristine at a police station thereafter and confirmed that McChristine was not her offender.
Defendant was arrested on August 3, 2000, on an unrelated offense. While in custody, defendant was required to provide a blood sample for the police DNA database. John Duffy, an investigator for the State's Attorney's office, placed defendant's blood sample into a sealed envelope. Duffy then inventoried the sample and sent it to the Crime Lab for testing and analysis. In March 2001, a DNA "hit" was generated in the database linking defendant to the underlying offenses. As a result, on April 16, 2001, L.J. viewed a lineup and positively identified defendant as her attacker. Defendant was subsequently charged with the instant offenses.
Karen Kooi, a forensic scientist at the Crime Lab, testified that she received defendant's sealed blood sample on August 24, 2000, and performed a short tandem repeat (STR) analysis on a portion of the sample. Kooi obtained a DNA profile from the sample and entered it into the Crime Lab database, which is used to compare DNA profiles to blood samples from unsolved crimes. While extracting defendant's DNA profile from his blood sample, Kooi acted in accordance with the nationwide standards for DNA analysis.
Brian Hapack, a forensic scientist at the Crime Lab, testified that he received the victim's sealed kit on February 15, 2000, and performed two tests on the vaginal swabs in order to detect the presence of semen. First, Hapack conducted an acid phosphatase test and received the highest indication for semen, four plus positive. Next, Ha-pack conducted an Abacard test and again received a positive result for the presence of semen with two pink lines. Hapack guaranteed the accuracy of his results by working in a clean environment free from contamination and by ensuring that the tests functioned properly. Ha-pack did not perform any tests on the victim's blood sample. Thereafter, Hapack sealed both the vaginal swabs and the blood sample in envelopes and placed them in a secure freezer in order to secure the evidence for future testing, as was a common practice in the scientific community.
Sandra Lambatos, a forensic scientist at the Crime Lab, testified, as an expert in forensic biology and forensic DNA analysis, that a procedure known as polymerase chain reaction (PCR) enables forensic examiners to extract a male DNA profile from semen, which could then be compared to the DNA from a suspect's blood in order to garner a statistical probability that the DNA matched.
In particular to the instant case, Lambatos testified that the victim's kit was sent, in a sealed condition, to Cellmark Diagnostic Laboratory (Cellmark), an accredited crime lab in Maryland, for further analysis. According to Lambatos, at the time, the Crime Lab commonly sent evidence samples to Cellmark to expedite analysis. The samples were sent via Federal Express, which was a generally accepted manner of transporting DNA evidence in the scientific community. A Crime Lab shipping manifest indicated that the victim's kit was shipped to Cellmark on November 28, 2000, in a sealed condition; was received by Cellmark on November 29, 2000; and was returned to the Crime Lab on April 3, 2001. According to Lambatos, the Crime Lab shipping manifest was generated in the ordinary course of business and was kept in a secure area of the lab.
Lambatos further testified that she used the comparison method described earlier to conclude that the semen obtained from the victim's vaginal swabs, as identified by Hapack, and the male DNA profile produced from defendant's blood sample, as identified by Kooi, were a match. The probability, of the match was 1 in 8.7 quadrillion unrelated black individuals, 1 in 390 quadrillion unrelated white individuals and 1 in 109 quadrillion unrelated Hispanic individuals.
On cross-examination, Lambatos admitted that she was unaware of what happened to the Federal Express package containing the victim's kit when it arrived at Cellmark. Lambatos further admitted that she did not examine or perform any physical testing of the samples herself; rather, she based her opinion, in part, on the results generated by Cellmark. In particular, Cellmark provided a DNA profile for the semen recovered from the victim's vaginal swabs using electropherograms and allele charts. Although she did not personally observe Cellmark perform the tests on the evidence at issue, Lambatos averred that, because Cellmark was an accredited laboratory, it was required to meet "certain guidelines to perform DNA analysis for the Illinois State Police and so all those calibrations and internal proficiencies and controls [of the equipment used] would have had to have been in place for them to perform the DNA analysis." Lambatos, however, admitted that Cellmark had different procedures and standards for results than the Crime Lab. Nevertheless, Lambatos maintained that Cellmark analysts generally performed proficiency tests that she personally developed.
According to Lambatos, Cellmark's electropherogram tests revealed a mixture of DNA profiles; therefore, Lambatos opined that Cellmark subtracted the victim's profile, as generated from the vaginal swab, from the sample in order to deduce the male's DNA profile, namely, defendant's. Lambatos admitted that Cellmark's results demonstrated a minor presence for unaccounted genetic material, which she described as "white noise." Lambatos then entered the retrieved male DNA profile into the Crime Lab database to search for a match. Lambatos admitted that it was possible to have a degraded evidence sample; however, she did not observe any evidence degradation in the instant case. According to Lambatos, she reviewed Cell-mark's results; made her own interpretations; and formed her own opinion of the evidence.
On redirect examination, Lambatos clarified that the results demonstrating a mixture only produced DNA profiles for the victim and defendant. In her expert opinion, Lambatos stated that Cellmark's testing and analysis methods were generally accepted in the scientific community. Lambatos further testified that she routinely relied on
results from Cellmark and she did not observe any problems with the chain of custody or contamination of the evidence at issue.
At the conclusion of Lambatos' testimony, defense counsel moved to exclude that portion of her testimony related to Cellmark's testing based upon Crawford and a lack of established foundation. In particular, defense counsel argued that the evidence presented lacked a suitable foundation in terms of the chain of custody; who handled the evidence; how the equipment was calibrated; how the tests were run; and what procedures were followed. Following the parties' arguments, the trial court concluded that Crawford was inapplicable. In so ruling, the court stated:
"I've read a lot of memorandums of law about Crawford. The premier memorandum is written by Appellate [C]ourt [JJustice Quinn. I've read his memorandum, his updated memorandum which he updates every year. I don't think this is a Crawford scenario, and I agree with the State that the evidence is — the issue is, you know, what weight do you give the test, not do you exclude it and accordingly your motion to exclude or strike the testimony of the last witness or opinions based on her own independent testing of the data received from CeltHmark will be denied."
The trial court ultimately found defendant guilty as previously described. The court subsequently denied defendant's motion for a new trial and proceeded to sentencing. In aggravation, the State presented the testimony of G.M., an individual whom defendant kidnaped, repeatedly raped and robbed in 1984. Defendant's criminal record further demonstrated that he was paroled for those offenses, including aggravated criminal sexual assault, in February 1997 and was discharged from parole on February 4, 2000, less than a week before the instant offense. Following additional evidence in aggravation and mitigation, the court sentenced defendant to two concurrent terms of natural life imprisonment for the aggravated criminal sexual assault counts; a consecutive term of 60 years' imprisonment for the aggravated kidnaping count; and a concurrent term of 15 years' imprisonment for the aggravated robbery count. Thereafter, the court denied defendant's motion to reconsider that sentence. This timely appeal followed.
Defendant first contends that the trial court erred in admitting the DNA evidence produced by Cellmark where a sufficient foundation was not established to demonstrate that the equipment used was adequately calibrated and properly functioning, and where the State failed to establish a sufficient chain of evidence based upon Cellmark's handling of the evidence.
At the outset, we note that neither argument was waived for purposes of our review. Despite the State's insistence that defendant expressly waived review of his chain of custody argument, our review of the record reveals that defense counsel included the issue in his oral motion to exclude Lambatos' testimony and in his posttrial motion as well. See People v. Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d 176, 186 (1988). Accordingly, we review defendant's arguments.
The admission of Lambatos' expert testimony was within the trial court's sound discretion; therefore, we will not overturn that decision absent an abuse of discretion. People v. Eyler, 133 Ill. 2d 173, 211 (1989).
In Wilson v. Clark, 84 Ill. 2d 186 (1981), our supreme court adopted Rule 703 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, holding that an expert may offer an opinion based upon facts not in evidence if those facts are "of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field." People v. Raney, 324 Ill. App. 3d 703, 706 (2001), citing Wilson, 84 Ill. 2d at 193. Moreover, where expert testimony is based upon an electronic or mechanical device, the expert must provide some foundational proof that the device was functioning properly at the time it was used. Raney, 324 Ill. App. 3d at 710-11; People v. Bynum, 257 Ill. App. 3d 502, 514 (1994). Notwithstanding, in a post -Bynum and post -Raney decision, this court approvingly cited People v. Hill, 169 Ill. App. 3d 901 (1988), for the proposition that a chemical analyst need not personally determine the reliability of the instrument being used to perform the evaluation at issue. People v. Rucker, 346 Ill. App. 3d 873, 890 (2003), citing Hill, 169 Ill. App. 3d at 911. Thereafter, it is the defendant's responsibility to challenge the sufficiency or reliability of the basis for the expert's opinion during cross-examination, and the determination of the weight to be given that expert's opinion is left to the finder of fact. Adams v. Family Planning Associates Medical Group, Inc., 315 Ill. App. 3d 533, 550 (2000), citing People v. Lipscomb, 215 Ill. App. 3d 413, 435 (1991).
In the case at bar, Lambatos was qualified, without objection, as an expert in forensic biology and forensic DNA analysis and concluded, based upon her expertise, Kooi's analysis of defendant's blood, Hapack's analysis of the semen found on the victim's vaginal swabs and Cellmark's report detailing the DNA profile generated from the semen on the victim's vaginal swabs, that the semen belonged to defendant. Although she admittedly did not perform the actual tests on the evidence, Lambatos familiarly testified regarding the PCR procedure, which was used to extract the male DNA profile from the semen found on the vaginal swabs. Moreover, Lambatos repeatedly averred that Cellmark was an accredited laboratory and therefore was required to follow specified guidelines in order to perform DNA analysis. Lambatos additionally provided that Cellmark's testing and analysis methods were generally accepted in the scientific community, so much so that she routinely relied on Cellmark's facility. Accordingly, despite Lambatos' inability to speak to the precise conditions of Cellmark's equipment and testing of the instant samples, we find that she provided a sufficient foundation upon which to partially base her assessment and conclusion. See People v. Sutherland, 223 Ill. 2d 187, (2006) (where the supreme court dismissed the same argument because the defendant did not mount a challenge against the facts relied upon by the expert as not typically relied upon in the relevant field).
Defendant relies heavily on Raney to support his argument that the foundation was inadequate because Lambatos could not testify that Cellmark's equipment was calibrated and working properly. Raney, 324 Ill. App. 3d at 710-11. The Raney court, however, recognized that it may not be feasible to require that an expert personally test the instrument relied upon for making the relevant determination. Raney, 324 Ill. App. 3d at 710. Moreover, the instant case is distinguishable from Raney in that Lambatos provided "some foundation[al] proof as to the fact that the instrument was functioning properly at the time it was used" (Raney, 324 Ill. App. 3d at 710), where she maintained that Cellmark's testing necessarily met the threshold of proper DNA analysis. In comparison, the expert in Raney did not provide any testimony that the machine used was calibrated and working properly or how she knew its results were accurate. Raney, 324 Ill. App. 3d at 710. Consequently, defendant's argument is based upon pure speculation that the equipment may not have been working properly, and such speculation is best tested during crossexamination. See Adams, 315 Ill. App. 3d at 550. The record reveals that defense counsel thoroughly cross-examined Lambatos on the basis of her opinion. Accordingly, the issue of Lambatos' reliance on Cellmark's report went to the weight of her opinion and not its admissibility. The trial court assessed the weight of Lambatos' testimony and clearly found it convincing.
We next turn to defendant's argument regarding the chain of custody of the victim's kit. Specifically, defendant argues that the State failed to demonstrate a sufficient chain of evidence because it did not offer any evidence regarding whether Cellmark "employed protective measures to guard against contamination of the samples."
Where physical evidence is not readily identifiable or may be susceptible to tampering, contamination or exchange, the State is required to establish a chain of custody "that is sufficiently complete to make it improbable that the evidence has been subject to tampering or accidental substitution." People v. Woods, 214 Ill. 2d 455, 467 (2005). Our supreme court further instructed:
"Unless the defendant produces evidence of actual tampering, substitution or contamination, a sufficiently complete chain of custody does not require that every person in the chain testify, nor must the State exclude every possibility of tampering or contamination; the State must demonstrate, however, that reasonable measures were employed to protect the evidence from the time that it was seized and that it was unlikely that the evidence has been altered." Woods, 214 Ill. 2d at 467.
In those circumstances, any deficiencies in the chain of custody are considered against the weight of the evidence and not its admissibility. Woods, 214 Ill. 2d at 467.
In the case at bar, defendant does not take issue with the chain of custody of the victim's kit prior to its transport to Cellmark; therefore, we focus only on that portion of the chain. Lambatos testified that the Crime Lab kept a shipping manifest in the ordinary course of business in a secure area which detailed the arrival and departure of specified evidence samples. In regard to the relevant evidence here, the shipping manifest reflected that the victim's kit was sent to Cellmark on November 28, 2000, in a sealed condition via Federal Express, a generally accepted manner of transporting DNA evidence within the scientific community; was received by Cellmark the next day; and was returned to the Crime Lab on April 3, 2001. Lambatos was unaware of the express condition of the samples when they arrived at Cellmark; however, based on her expertise, Lambatos testified that the sample did not show any signs of degradation. We are not persuaded by defendant's argument that the chain of custody was inadequate because no Cellmark analyst testified regarding the condition and handling of the samples, where Lambatos testified regarding the reasonable measures employed to safeguard the evidence. See Woods, 214 Ill. 2d at 467 (every person in the chain of custody need not testify). Accordingly, the State established a prima facie demonstration that the chain of custody was sufficient.
Defendant briefly argues that the State could not establish a chain of custody based upon the shipping manifests because they were inadmissible business records produced for purposes of litigation in violation of section 115 — 5(c)(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Code) (725 ILCS 5/115 — 5(c)(2) (West 2006)). Defendant, however, has waived review of this argument where he barely mentioned it and did not cite to any relevant authority outside the statute, in violation of Supreme Court Rule 341(h)(7) (210 Ill. 2d R. 341(h)(7)). "A reviewing court is entitled to have issues clearly defined with pertinent authority cited and cohesive arguments presented [citation], and it is not a repository into which an appellant may foist the burden of argument and research [citation]; it is neither the function nor the obligation of this court to act as an advocate or search the record for error." Obert v. Saville, 253 Ill. App. 3d 677, 682 (1993).
Defendant further argues that he sufficiently rebutted the State's prima facie case because he presented evidence of contamination visa-vis Cellmark's reported mixture of DNA profiles and presence of unaccountable genetic material. We disagree. Lambatos clearly testified that the mixture at issue was a combination of only defendant's and the victim's DNA profiles. Moreover, in regard to the unaccounted-for genetic material, Lambatos categorically designated it "white noise." Consequently, we do not find that defendant presented sufficient evidence to suggest that the samples were tampered with or contaminated. Accordingly, Lambatos' testimony regarding Cellmark's testing and analysis was properly admitted on the basis of the State's sufficient chain of custody.
Defendant next contends that the results of Cellmark's testing and analysis were testimonial in nature and therefore Lambatos' expert testimony in reference thereto violated defendant's constitutional right to confrontation, where no Cellmark representative was presented for cross-examination. The State responds that Lambatos' testimony regarding Cellmark's analysis was not testimonial hearsay, and thus, defendant's confrontation rights were neither implicated nor violated.
In People v. Spicer, 379 Ill. App. 3d 441 (2007), this court recently provided that, where a defendant claims that a trial court admitted a hearsay statement in violation of the confrontation clause, we defer on review to the trial court's evidentiary ruling unless that discretion has been frustrated by an erroneous ruling of law. Spicer, 379 Ill. App. 3d at 451.
Pursuant to Crawford, "[w]here testimonial statements are at issue, the only indicum of reliability sufficient to satisfy constitutional demands is the one the Constitution actually proscribes: confrontation." Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68-69, 158 L. Ed. 2d at 203, 124 S. Ct. at 1374. Hence, since no Cellmark representative was available for cross-examination, the purported question before us is whether Cellmark's report constituted improper testimonial evidence. Crawford, however, reiterated that "[t]he [Confrontation] Clause also does not bar the use of testimonial statements for purposes other than establishing the truth of the matter asserted. See Tennessee v. Street, 471 U.S. 409, 414[, 85 L. Ed. 2d 425, 431, 105 S. Ct. 2078, 2081-82] (1985)." Crawford, 541 U.S. at 59 n.9, 158 L. Ed. 2d at 197 n.9, 124 S. Ct. at 1369 n.9. As a result, we must initially determine whether Lambatos' reliance on the Cellmark results was hearsay. See Spicer, 379 Ill. App. 3d at 449 ("hearsay analysis and sixth amendment analysis are completely different").
Hearsay generally prohibits the introduction of an out-of-court statement offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted therein. Spicer, 379 Ill. App. 3d at 449. However, underlying facts and data may be disclosed by an expert, not for the truth of the matter asserted, but for the purpose of explaining the basis of his opinion. People v. Nieves, 193 Ill. 2d 513, 528 (2000), citing People v. Pasch, 152 Ill. 2d 133, 176 (1992); People v. Almighty Four Hundred, 287 Ill. App. 3d 123, 132 (1997). Moreover, "[i]t is well established that an expert may testify about the findings and conclusions of a nontestifying expert that he used in forming his opinions." People v. Jones, 374 Ill. App. 3d 566, 579-80 (2007).
Defendant argues that Cellmark's report was inadmissible hearsay because it was necessarily offered for the truth of the matter asserted where Lambatos could not conclude that defendant's semen was present on the victim's vaginal swabs absent the DNA profile generated by Cellmark. We disagree. Cellmark's report was not offered for the truth of the matter asserted; rather, it was offered to provide a basis for Lambatos' opinion. Lambatos clearly testified that she performed her own evaluation of the data, which included Kooi's findings, Hapack's findings and Cellmark's report, prior to forming her opinion.
In Almighty Four Hundred, this court provided:
"[A]n expert witness may base his or her opinion on information that has not been admitted into evidence so long as that information is reliable and is of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in that field. Rule 703 did not, however, create an exception to the hearsay rule [citation]. The underlying facts or data upon which an expert in a particular field is found to have reasonably relied are not admitted for their truth. [Citation]. Rather, these facts are admitted for the limited purpose of explaining the basis for the expert witness' opinion. [Citation]. Furthermore, it is for the circuit court, in the exercise of its discretion, to determine whether the underlying facts or data upon which an expert bases an opinion are of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field." Almighty Four Hundred, 287 Ill. App. 3d at 132.
Similar to the facts of Lipscomb, Lambatos relied on Cellmark's report, which included data of the type generally relied upon by experts in the field. Lipscomb, 215 Ill. App. 3d at 435 (the expert's opinion was properly admitted even though it was based on a final report which included data generated by individuals that did not testify).
Moreover, defense counsel vigorously cross-examined Lambatos regarding her opinion and was free to call another expert to dispute that opinion. It was, therefore, the trial court's duty to determine the weight of Lambatos' testimony. Adams, 315 Ill. App. 3d at 550. Furthermore, the record does not affirmatively show that the instant trial judge considered anything but competent evidence. People v. Schmitt, 131 Ill. 2d 128, 138-39 (1989) (a trial judge is presumed to consider only competent evidence unless the record affirmatively demonstrates otherwise). On the contrary, defendant objected to Lambatos' testimony and the Honorable Kenneth Wadas entertained arguments on the matter, yet determined that the opinion based on Cell-mark's reports was admissible. Simply put, the report was not introduced to prove the truth of Cellmark's results consequently the confrontation clause was not violated. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 59 n.9, 158 L. Ed. 2d at 197 n.9, 124 S. Ct. at 1370 n.9. Further, because we have already determined that it was reasonable for Lambatos to rely on Cellmark's report, we find that Lambatos' testimony regarding the Cellmark report was properly admitted to assist in explaining the basis of her ultimate opinion. See Nieves, 193 Ill. 2d at 528.
Overall, defendant essentially requests that we require each and every individual involved in the testing and analysis of DNA to testify at trial. For obvious reasons in the abstract and for those provided in the case at bar, we decline to issue such a ruling.
Defendant finally contends that the trial court erred in sentencing him to a term of imprisonment consecutive to his term of natural life. The State responds that the plain language of section 5 — 8—4 of the Unified Code of Corrections (Code of Corrections) (730 ILCS 5/5— 8 — 4 (West 2006)) and section 12 — 14 of the Criminal Code of 1961 (Criminal Code) (720 ILCS 5/12 — 14 (West 2006)) require that defendant's prison term for aggravated kidnaping run consecutive to his term of natural life for aggravated criminal sexual assault.
Although the imposition of a sentence is within a trial court's discretion, we review the propriety of defendant's sentence de novo because it involves a question of law. People v. Chaney, 379 Ill. App. 3d 524, 527 (2008).
Section 5 — 8—4 of the Code of Corrections provides that a "court shall impose a consecutive sentence" if a defendant was convicted of a violation of section 12 — 14 of the Criminal Code. 730 ILCS 5/5 — 8— 4(a)(ii) (West 2006). Moreover, pursuant to section 12 — 14(d)(2) of the Criminal Code, an individual, like the instant defendant, who has been convicted of aggravated criminal sexual assault after having been previously convicted of aggravated criminal sexual assault "shall be sentenced to a term of natural life imprisonment." 720 ILCS 5/12— 14(d)(2) (West 2006).
In People v. Dixon, 366 Ill. App. 3d 848 (2006), this court resolved the question before us, and in People v. Spears, 371 Ill. App. 3d 1000 (2007), this third division approvingly cited and relied on Dixon to resolve the same issue. Following the supreme court's logic in People v. Palmer, 218 Ill. 2d 148 (2006), that, under the principles of natural law and within the plain meaning of the consecutive sentencing statute, only one natural life sentence may be served, we concluded that a term of years could not be served consecutive to a term of natural life because a defendant is only capable of serving one natural life sentence. Spears, 371 Ill. App. 3d at 1008; Dixon, 366 Ill. App. 3d at 856, citing Palmer, 218 Ill. 2d at 164. "His natural life sentence without parole means that he will remain in prison for the remainder of his life and at the conclusion of this sentence, his life is over." Spears, 371 Ill. App. 3d at 1008. Consequently, the instant defendant, like that in Spears, cannot serve a 60-year term at the conclusion of his term of natural life. Accordingly, pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 615(b)(4) (134 Ill. 2d R. 615(b)(4)), we vacate that portion of the trial court's order sentencing defendant to consecutive terms of natural life and 60 years' imprisonment and modify his sentence to reflect concurrent terms.
Based on the foregoing, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County in relation to defendant's convictions. We vacate that portion of the circuit court's order imposing consecutive sentences for aggravated criminal sexual assault and aggravated kidnaping, and instead modify defendant's sentence to impose concurrent sentences for those convictions.
Affirmed in part and vacated in part; sentence modified.
QUINN, EJ., concurs.
According to the parties, the transcript reflects an improper spelling of the laboratory.
We note that neither party provided the proper standard of review for this issue.