Case Name: John Martin HIGDON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1985-03-14
Citations: 465 So. 2d 1309
Docket Number: No. 83-1128
Parties: John Martin HIGDON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: “COBB, C.J., UPCHURCH, F., J., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 465
Pages: 1309–1314

Head Matter:
John Martin HIGDON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. 83-1128.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
March 14, 1985.
Craig Stephen Boda, of Tanner, Lambert & Boda, Daytona Beach, for appellant.
Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and W. Brian Bayly, Asst. Atty. Gen., Daytona Beach, for appellee.

Opinion:
ON MOTION FOR REHEARING
COBB, Chief Judge.
We herewith vacate our opinion filed in this cause on February 14, 1985. We have jurisdiction to do so inasmuch as no mandate has issued, the same having been ordered stayed within fifteen days from the date of said decision. See Fla.R.App.P. 9.340. Even had the mandate issued, we would have jurisdiction to vacate it during this term of court, which does not end until the second Tuesday in July, 1985. See § 35.10, Fla.Stat. (1983); State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co. v. Judges of the District Court of Appeal, Fifth District, 405 So.2d 980 (Fla.1981). See also Orange Federal Savings & Loan Assn. v. Dykes, 444 So.2d 1152 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984); Westberry v. Copeland Sausage Co., 397 So.2d 1018 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981).
This cause concerns a substantial issue of law bearing upon the proper administration of justice in the trial courts and has caused a division of opinion between other appellate courts of this state. We herewith deny the appellant's motion for rehearing and reinstate our original opinion, issued under date of November 23, 1984, which affirmed the appellant's convictions for vehicular homicide and certified a question to the Florida Supreme Court. The original opinion and dissent herewith are set forth in haec verba:
"PER CURIAM.
"The defendant, John Martin Higdon, was charged by information with two counts (two victims) of manslaughter by driving while intoxicated pursuant to section 860.01, Florida Statutes (1981).1 Such a charge is commonly referred to as 'D.W.I. manslaughter.' At trial, he objected to the jury being instructed on, and allowed to consider a verdict of, vehicular homicide2 as a lesser included offense of D.W.I. manslaughter. The objection was overruled by the trial judge for the reason that vehicular homicide is included as a Category 1 lesser included offense of D.W.I. manslaughter in the schedule of lesser offenses in the Matter of Use by Trial Courts Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases, 431 So.2d 594 (Fla.1981). Higdon was convicted of vehicular homicide on each count and appeals, arguing that he was convicted of a crime with which he was not charged.
"The issue on appeal3 is whether or not vehicular homicide is a necessarily lesser included offense (Category 1) of D.W.I. manslaughter. If it is not, then the appellant must prevail and be discharged from any homicide conviction, in spite of the overwhelming evidence that he drunkenly killed two boys on a bicycle. The reason is that the factual allegations of the informa-tions filed in the trial court are not broad enough to encompass the statutory elements of the crime of vehicular homicide so as to classify it as a Category 2 (possibly included) lesser offense.
"Vehicular homicide requires that the defendant operate a motor vehicle in a reckless manner (likely to cause the death of, or great bodily harm to, another), and that there be a causal relationship between that recklessness and the- victim's death. See J.A.C. v. State, 374 So.2d 606 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979), review denied, 383 So.2d 1203 (Fla.1980). Neither reckless operation nor proximate cause is an element of the crime of D.W.I. manslaughter under section 860.-01(2), as that section has been construed by the Florida Supreme Court in Baker v. State, 377 So.2d 17 (Fla.1979). Therein, the Florida Supreme Court held the statute to be one creating strict criminal liability. Therefore, based upon a strict Blockburger4 analysis of the statutory elements of the two offenses, it would seem that vehicular homicide cannot be a necessarily lesser included offense (Category 1) of D.W.I. manslaughter. Two district courts of appeal in Florida agree with this conclusion. See Houser v. State, 456 So.2d 1265 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984); Mastro v. State, 448 So.2d 626 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984).
"Nevertheless, the Florida Supreme Court, in its schedule of lesser included offenses, has specifically included vehicular homicide as a necessarily lesser included offense of D.W.I. manslaughter, and promulgated that schedule subsequent to its Baker opinion. The schedule is presumptively correct. See Ray v. State, 403 So.2d 956 (Fla.1981); Torrence v. State, 440 So.2d 392 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983). We decline to reverse the trial court for following that schedule in the instant case. This result facilitates review, and correction if necessary, by the Florida Supreme Court of the apparent incongruity between its schedule and its majority opinion in Baker. Frankly, we cannot perceive how that majority opinion ignored the causation language in section 860.01(2) to arrive at its interpretation of strict liability. Hopefully, the schedule portends an adoption of Justice Boyd's persuasive dissent in Baker.
"Pursuant to Article V, Section 3(b)(4) of the Florida Constitution, and Rule 9.030(a)(2)(A)(v) and (vi), we hereby certify that our decision herein is in direct conflict with the decisions of the First and Second District Courts of Appeal in Houser and Mastro, and we certify the following question to be one of great public importance:
"IS THE SCHEDULE OF LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES PROMULGATED BY THE FLORIDA SUPREME COURT IN 1981 IN ERROR IN CLASSIFYING VEHICULAR HOMICIDE (§ 782.071) AS A NECESSARILY LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE OF D.W.I. MANSLAUGHTER (§ 860.01)?
"AFFIRMED.
"COBB, C.J., UPCHURCH, F., J., concur.
"DAUKSCH, J., dissents with opinion.
"1 Section 860.01(1) and (2), Florida Statutes (1981), provides:
Driving an automobile while intoxicated; Punishment. — (1) It is unlawful for any person, while in an intoxicated condition or under the influence of intoxicating liquor, model glue, as defined in Section 877.11, or any substance controlled under Chapter 893 to such extent as to deprive him of full possession of his normal facilities, to drive or operate over the highways, streets, or thoroughfares of Florida any automobile, truck, motorcycle, or other vehicle. Any person convicted of a violation of this section shall be punished as provided in Section 316.193.
(2) If, however, damage to property or person of another, other than damage resulting in death of any person, is done by said intoxicated person under the influence of intoxicating liquor to such extent as to deprive him of full possession of his normal facilities, by reason of the operation of any of said vehicles mentioned herein, he shall be guilty of a misdemeanor of the first degree, punishable as provided in Section 775.082 or Section 775.083, and if the death of any human being be caused by the operation of a motor vehicle by any person while intoxicated, such person shall be deemed guilty of manslaughter, and on conviction be punished as provided by existing law related to manslaughter.
"2 Section 782.071, Florida Statutes (1981), provides:
Vehicular homicide. — 'Vehicular homicide' is the killing of a human being by the operation of a motor vehicle by another in a reckless manner likely to cause the death of, or great bodily harm to, another. Vehicular homicide is a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in Section 775.082, Section 775.083, or Section 775.084.
"3 Higdon's second issue relating to the admissibility of testimony from family members of the victims is without merit, and therefore not addressed herein.
"4 Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 52 S.Ct. 180, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932). See also Borges v. State, 415 So.2d 1265 (Fla.1982).
. Unpublished order directed to clerk of this court.
. See Spillane v. State, 458 So.2d 838 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984); Mastro v. State, 448 So.2d 626 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984).