Case Name: GILMER v. ANDERSON
Court: Michigan Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1971-05-21
Citations: 34 Mich. App. 6
Docket Number: Docket No. 10127
Parties: GILMER v. ANDERSON
Judges: Before: Danhof, P. J., and McGregor and Levin, JJ.
Reporter: Michigan appeals reports; cases decided in the Michigan Court of Appeals.
Volume: 34
Pages: 6–19

Head Matter:
GILMER v. ANDERSON
Opinion of the Court
1. Appeal and Error — Equity.
An equitable judgment is viewed de novo on review; however, the findings of fact of the trial court are given considerable weight.
2. Deeds — Delivery—Intent.
Whether there has been a delivery of a deed is a matter of the intention of the grantor as manifested by the circumstances surrounding the questioned acts.
3. Deeds — Delivery—Agent—Instructions.
Delivery of a deed by the grantor to one acting exclusively as his agent without instructions, either expressed or implied, to deliver the deed to the grantee is insufficient to pass title.
4. Deeds — Delivery—Agent—Instructions.
A grantor’s handing to his attorney instruments conveying his title to certain real property to third parties was not a delivery sufficient to pass title where the attorney had drawn up the instruments, the attorney was later called to the hospital which the grantor was in to make changes to the instruments, and the instruments were then executed, the attorney retained the instruments, the grantor gave no specific instructions concerning the instruments but did say that he and the attorney should not be hasty, and where the grantor was familiar with real estate transactions.
References for Points in Headnotes
[1] 5 Am Jur 2d, Appeal and Error §§ 703, 822.
[2] 23 Am Jur 2d, Deeds §§ 81, 82.
[3,4] 23 Am Jur 2d, Deeds §§ 95, 96.
[5-10] 23 Am Jur 2d, Deeds § 101 et seq.
Dissent by Levin, J.
5. Deeds — Passage of Title — Delivery.
A grantor’s depositing a deed with a third party who is to deliver the deed to the grantee after the grantor’s death constitutes a complete delivery to the grantee and vests an immediate estate in the grantee where the grantor has not reserved any further control over the instrument, even though the third party is the grantor’s agent and even though delivery to the grantee is not expected to occur and, in fact, does not occur until after the grantor’s death.
6. Deeds — Passage of Title — Delivery.
The grantor’s intent that a deed he delivers to a third party shall he delivered to the grantee upon the grantor’s death can he inferred from an examination of the facts and circumstances surrounding the transaction of delivery to the third party.
7. Deeds — Delivery—Third Party.
The willingness of a third party to return to the grantor deeds given him hy the grantor to he delivered to the grantee upon the grantor’s death, which the grantor Tcnows is imminent, is of no importance in determining whether the grantor’s depositing the deeds with the third party showed the requisite intent to pass title, absent a showing that the grantor reserved the right to recall the deeds.
8. Property — Real Property — Gifts—Contemplation of Death.
Just as an express reservation of a right to revohe a gift causa mortis of personal property does not affect the validity of the gift, so a gift of real property made in contemplation of death with such a reservation should play no part in determining the gift’s validity.
9. Deeds — Delivery—Contemplation op Death.
The inference that the grantor intended to pass title to real property after his death to the grantee when he delivered deeds to his attorney is the most reasonable inference even though the grantor gave no express instructions where the grantor, who died shortly after executing the deeds, realized he was dying, the grantor, not acting upon the spur of the moment, consulted with his attorney and a week later executed the deeds and delivered them to the attorney while in the hospital, the deeds stated that they were “signed, sealed, and delivered”, and the grantor told the grantee and vendees of land contracts that everything had been taken care of and that they were to consult the attorney in regard to the property; the fact that the grantor told his attorney after delivering the deeds, “Let’s not be too hasty,” does not indicate the grantor’s intent to reserve the power of revocation but could indicate the grantor’s desire that delivery of the deed should be deferred until his death and is, thus, consistent with the inference that he meant that delivery to the grantees was to be made only after his death.
10. Deeds — Delivery—Necessity—Instructions.
Words of instruction to deliver a deed to the grantee are unnecessary when it is handed to a third person if the intention that it is to be delivered to the grantee is clearly indicated otherwise.
Appeal from Oakland, Philip Pratt, J.
Submitted Division 1 March 9, 1971, at Detroit.
(Docket No. 10127.)
Decided May 21, 1971.
Leave to appeal denied August 12, 1971. 385 Mich 780.
Complaint by Barbara H. Gilmer, Thomas J. Gilmer, and Kathryn Lee Gilmer, by Barbara H. Gilmer, her next friend, against Robert C. Anderson to determine title to certain parcels of real estate. The administrator of the Estate of Charles Humphries intervened as a defendant. Judgment for defendants. Plaintiffs appeal.
Affirmed.
Milton F. Cooney, for plaintiffs.
Robert C. Anderson, in propria persona.
John K. Irwin, Jr., for defendant administrator of the Estate of Charles Humphries.
Before: Danhof, P. J., and McGregor and Levin, JJ.

Opinion:
Danhof, P. J.
This is an action brought by-plaintiffs to determine title to certain parcels of real estate. The defendant, Robert C. Anderson, is an attorney who has in his possession certain instruments purporting to convey to plaintiffs the right, title, and interest of the late Charles N. Humphries, in certain properties he owned. The intervening defendant is the administrator of the estate of deceased and disputes the effect of the instruments, claiming they were never delivered.
On August 1, 1967, attorney Anderson was summoned by the deceased to draw up certain instruments relating to the property he owned. On August 2, 1967, the deceased again summoned Anderson and indicated that he wanted several changes made. On August 8, 1967, Anderson visited the deceased in the hospital at which time the instruments were executed. Anderson retained the instruments. The deceased gave Anderson no specific instructions concerning the instruments. However, the deceased did state "Let's not be hasty". The plaintiffs contend that the delivery of the instruments to the attorney was sufficient delivery to pass title.
In a detailed and scholarly opinion the trial court held that there had not been delivery. This case is equitable in nature and we review de novo; however, we give considerable weight to the findings of the trial court. Biske v. City of Troy (1969), 381 Mich 611.
Delivery is a matter of the intention of the grant- or as manifested by the circumstances surrounding the acts. McMahon v. Dorsey (1958), 353 Mich 623. In Hooker v. Tucker (1953), 335 Mich 429, 436, the Court stated:
" 'A delivery to a third person does not authorize a presumption that it is done with the intention of passing the title. The facts and circumstances attending the transaction must be such as to show that the grantor intended that the deed should be delivered by the custodian to the grantee. Every such case must be determined by the intention of the grantor.' Trask v. Trask [1894], 90 Iowa 318 (57 NW 841, 48 Am St Rep 446), as quoted with approval in Thomas v. Sullivan (1904), 138 Mich 265.
" 'As a general rule, the delivery of a deed to a third person must be for, and on behalf of, the grantee in order to constitute a delivery to the latter, and a delivery to one acting exclusively as the grantor's agent is ineffectual to transfer title to the grantee.
" 'It follows that to constitute a delivery to the grantee, there must be either expressed or implied instructions authorizing the depositary to make such delivery.' 26 CJS, p 242."
On the record before us we are not disposed to overturn the trial court's finding that there had not been delivery. The deceased, who was not unfamiliar with real estate transactions, entrusted the instruments to his agent and did not give him instructions to deliver them. The trial court did not err when it determined that the decedent did not intend a completed legal act.
Affirmed, costs to the defendant.
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McGregor, J., concurred.