Case Name: LAMBERT v. CALHOUN
Court: Michigan Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1973-07-25
Citations: 48 Mich. App. 506
Docket Number: Docket No. 14640
Parties: LAMBERT v CALHOUN
Judges: Before: J. H. Gillis, P. J., and Holbrook and Bashara, JJ.
Reporter: Michigan appeals reports; cases decided in the Michigan Court of Appeals.
Volume: 48
Pages: 506–515

Head Matter:
LAMBERT v CALHOUN
Opinion op the Court
1. Limitation op Actions — Saving Provisions — Specific Time Limitation.
A specific legislative time limitation on bringing suit contained in a statute creating a cause of action excludes the operation of saving provisions contained in the general statute of limitations.
2. Limitation of Actions — Motor Vehicle Accident Claims Fund.
The limitation contained in the Motor Vehicle Accident Claims Act requiring suit against the Accident Claims Fund to be brought within three years is a limitation on the right to seek recovery from a previously immune source and both the right and the remedy created are exclusively controlled by the limitations contained in the act (MCLA 257.1118, 257.1128).
3. Limitation of Actions — Automobiles—Motor Vehicle Accident Claims Act — Minors.
A suit must be brought against the Motor Vehicle Accident Claims Fund within three years from the time the cause of action accrued and a minor’s cause of action against the fund is not affected by the saving provision of the general statute of limitations that a minor entitled to bring any action shall have one year after his disability is removed to bring the action although the limitations period ■ has run (MCLA 257.1118, 257.1128, 600.5851).
4. Limitation of Actions — Automobiles—Motor Vehicle Accident Claims Act — Tolling of Statute.
The institution of proceedings by an automobile insurance carrier pursuant to subrogation rights against an uninsured motorist involved in an automobile accident did not toll the three-year statute of limitations period of the Motor’ Vehicle Accident Claims Act, because the insurer cannot recover from the fund since the act prohibits indemnification by the fund in such a situation (MCLA 257.1118, 257.1122, 257.1128).
References for Points in Headnotes
[1] 51 Am Jur 2d, Limitations of Actions §§ 138-199.
[2, 3, 5, 6] 51 Am Jur 2d, Limitations of Actions § 103.
51 Am Jur 2d, Limitations of Actions §§ 138,182-185.
Dissent by Holbrook, J.
5. Limitation of Actions — Automobiles—Motor Vehicle Accident Claims Act — Minors.
The Motor Vehicle Accident Claims Act, which provides that in all actions in which any person seeks to recover from the Motor Vehicle Accident Claims Fund the action must be commenced within three years from the date of the accident, did not create a new cause of action; therefore, the saving proviso embodied in the general statute of limitations, allowing a minor who is entitled to bring any action to have one year after his disability is removed to bring the action although the limitations period has run, applies to it (MCLA 257.1118, 257.1128, 600.5851[1]).
6. Limitation of Actions — Automobiles—Motor Vehicle Accident Claims Act — Legislative Intent — Saving Provision.
The Legislature’s intent in passing the Motor Vehicle Accident Claims Act was to provide for recovery from the fund for those accident victims who normally would receive no compensation for their injuries because of uncollectibility from a guilty tortfeasor; excluding infants, incompetents and others disabled from bringing suit under the act by denying them the protection of the saving provision of the general statute of limitations which allows suit to be brought within one year after the disability was removed is directly counter to that legislative intent (MCLA 257.1101 etseq., 600.5851[1]).
Appeal from Wayne, Victor J. Baum, J.
Submitted Division 1 May 10, 1973, at Detroit.
(Docket No. 14640.)
Decided July 25, 1973.
Leave to appeal applied for.
Complaint by Beverly Lambert, a minor, by her next friend, Carmie E. Lambert, against Esker Calhoun for damages for personal injuries received in an automobile accident. The Secretary of State, as Director of the Motor Vehicle Accident Claims Fund, intervened as a defendant. Accelerated judgment for the Secretary of State. Plaintiff appeals.
Affirmed.
Sommers, Schwartz, Silver, Schwartz, Tyler & Gordon (by Stanley S. Schwartz and Richard D. Toth), for plaintiff.
Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Robert A. Derengoski, Solicitor General, and Joseph B. Bilitzke and Carl K. Carlsen, Assistants Attorney General, for the Secretary of State.
Before: J. H. Gillis, P. J., and Holbrook and Bashara, JJ.

Opinion:
J. H. Gillis, P. J.
Plaintiff, Beverly Lambert, was injured in an automobile accident on October 6, 1968. She was 14 years old at the time, and was a passenger in a car driven by James W. Holland. The negligence of Esker Calhoun, an uninsured motorist, was alleged to be the proximate cause of the accident. Plaintiff received an award from Holland's insurance company, which then sued Calhoun in Detroit Common Pleas Court pursuant to subrogation rights.
On November 27, 1971, plaintiff, through her next friend, brought suit against defendant Calhoun in Wayne County Circuit Court. The Secretary of State intervened in the action pursuant to MCLA 257.1105; MSA 9.2805, and moved for accelerated judgment alleging plaintiff's claim against the Motor Vehicle Accident Claims Fund was barred by the three-year statute of limitations set out in MCLA 257.1118; MSA 9.2818, and MCLA 257.1128; MSA 9.2828.
Plaintiff argued below that her minority saved her cause of action under the Motor Vehicle Accident Claims Act, by virtue of a provision in the general statute of limitations.
The trial court granted the Secretary's motion. Plaintiff appeals raising three issues which we will consider seriatim.
It is well-settled that a specific legislative time limitation on bringing suit contained in a statute creating a cause of action excludes the operation of savings provisions contained in the general statute of limitations. Holland v Eaton, 373 Mich 34, 39-40; 127 NW2d 892, 895 (1964); Genesee Merchants Bank v Bourrie, 375 Mich 383, 390; 134 NW2d 713, 716 (1965); Troy W Maschmeyer Co v Haas, 376 Mich 289, 296; 136 NW2d 902, 904 (1965).
The entire concept of establishing a fund for the payment of judgments obtained against uninsured motorists, though remedial in nature, is new and did not exist at common law. Steele v Wilson, 29 Mich App 388, 392; 185 NW2d 417, 418-419 (1971). Like the dramshop act, the limitation contained in the Motor Vehicle Accident Claims Act is on the right to seek recovery from a previously immune source and both the right and the remedy created are exclusively controlled by the limitations contained therein. See Holland v Eaton, supra. We hold the trial court properly ruled on that issue.
We do not consider that such a holding denies due process or violates equal protection of law. Any claim of ambiguity or inconsistency engendered by the disparate wording of MCLA 257.1118, supra, and MCLA 257.1128, supra, has been overcome by the judicial interpretation in Lisee v Secretary of State, 388 Mich 32, 41, 42; 199 NW2d 188, 191, 192 (1972), which delineates the different legislative intendments of the two sections. Further, it is only recovery from the Motor Vehicle Accident Claims Fund that is barred by the limitation period, not the action against the uninsured motorist. All persons, whether infants or adults, seeking recovery from the fund must do so within the prescribed period, and such "nondiscrimination" is justified by the practical consideration that stale claims by anyone can prejudice an insurer's opportunity to investigate and preserve evidence, be they private companies or "funds" created by the government. See, e.g., Oakland Motor Co v American Fidelity Co, 190 Mich 74; 155 NW 729 (1916); Wehner v Foster, 331 Mich 113; 49 NW2d 87 (1951).
We cannot hold that the institution of proceedings by Holland's insurance carrier against Calhoun tolled the limitation period here in question. That suit did not, and could not, seek recovery from the Motor Vehicle Accident Claims Fund for this incident. Defendant denies it received notice of the claim against the fund* within the prescribed time limit and there is nothing in the record to refute this claim. Cf. Lisee v Secretary of State, supra.
Affirmed. Costs to appellee.
Bashara, J., concurred.
Approximately 3 years and 2 months after the accident.
MCLA 257.1118; MSA 9.2818, provides: "In all actions in which recovery is to be sought against the fund, said action must be commenced within 3 years from the time the cause of action accrues".
MCLA 257.1128; MSA 9.2828, provides: "All claims or actions under which any person seeks to recover from the fund shall be filed or commenced within 3 years from the date of the accident".
MCLA 600.5851(1); MSA 27A.5851(1), provides: "If the person first entitled to bring any action is under 21 years of age he or those claiming under him shall have 1 year after his disability is removed to bring the action although the period of limitations has run".
MCLA 436.22; MSA 18.993.
MCLA 257.1122; MSA 9.2822, prohibits indemnification by the fund of any insurer in such situations.