Case Name: John Carter Brown, Appellant, v. Asher P. Nichols, Administrator, &c., of Albert D. Patchin, deceased, impleaded with others, Respondent
Court: New York Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1870-03-21
Citations: 42 N.Y. 26
Docket Number: 
Parties: John Carter Brown, Appellant, v. Asher P. Nichols, Administrator, &c., of Albert D. Patchin, deceased, impleaded with others, Respondent.
Judges: 
Reporter: New York Reports
Volume: 42
Pages: 26–43

Head Matter:
John Carter Brown, Appellant, v. Asher P. Nichols, Administrator, &c., of Albert D. Patchin, deceased, impleaded with others, Respondent.
A judgment recovered against a defendant who was not served with process and had no knowledge of the suit, but for whom an attorney appeared without authority, cannot be attacked for want of jurisdiction in any collateral proceeding, and is binding upon such defendant. (Grover, J., contra.)
It seems,that defendant may seek relief from such unauthorized appearance by direct application in the action. (Earl, Oh. J. and Ingalls, J.)
The lien upon equitable assets, acquired by commencement of an action in the nature of a creditor’s hill, is not extinguished by the death of defendant before the appointment of a receiver, but survives against such assets in the hands of the administrator. (Ingalls and Smith, JJ., contra.)
(Argued January 7th, 1870 ;
decided March 21st, 1870.)
Appeal from a judgment of the General Term of the Supreme Court, for the eighth district, reversing a judgment entered upon the report of Hon. Joseph G. Hasten, sole referee. The facts, material on the points made on this appeal, are as follows:
The plaintiff recovered a judgment on the 9th Hovenibor, 1861, against Aaron D. Patchin, in an action commenced September 7th, 1861, to foreclose a mortgage given to him by Patchin. The mortgaged premises were sold, by virtue of this judgment, December 5th, 1861, and a judgment for deficiency, being the sum of $10,887.02, was docketed December 12th, 1861. Execution issued to collect such deficiency was returned nulla bona. The summons in said action was never served upon Patchin, and he never knew the action was commenced or that judgment was recovered.
Solomon G-. Haven, a responsible attorney-at-law, appeared for the defendant, Albert D. Patchin, in said action, without Ms authority or knowledge. Plaintiff’s attorney having made inquiries of some members of defendant’s family, for the purpose of serving summons upon him, was informed by them that defendant was then at Clifton Springs, sick, and they did not want Mm annoyed by service of process upon him, and that Mr. Haven would appear for him. Plaintiff’s attorney informed Mr. Haven of these facts, and requested Mm to appear, but he declined, on the ground that he had no directions to do so; but, at a subsequent interview, Mr. Haven stated to plaintiff’s attorney that he had authority, and did thereupon sign and hand to him the notice of appear anee in that action. Mr. Haven died December 24th, 1861. This action was commenced December 9th, 1862, and Aaron D. Patchin was made a party defendant herein, and served with summons December 10th, 1862. By proceedings commenced December 22d, 1862, Aaron D. Patchin was adjudged to be a lunatic, and to have been a lunatic from the 1st day of June, 1862. Commission issued to his committee January 24th, 1863, who, as such committee, was made a party defendant April 27th, 1863, having already been appointed guardian of Patchin in this action.
Aaron D. Patchin died July 27tli, 1864, intestate, and letters of administration of his goods, &c., were duly issued to Asher P. Nichols. This action was revived against Asher P. Nichols, as administrator, June 22d, 1865, by order of the Supreme Court.
At the commencement of this action the- said intestate owned eight second mortgage bonds of the Buffalo, New York and Erie Eailroad Company, which bonds came to the hands of the defendant Nichols, as such administrator, and, with the interest collected by him thereon, now remain in his hands.
The appointment of a receiver was prayed for in the complaint herein, but no receiver has been otherwise applied for, and none has been appointed in,this action.
The referee decided, as matter of law :
That the judgment recovered by plaintiff against defendant’s intestate, was valid and binding.
That plaintiff, by the commencement of this action, obtained a lien upon the said eight bonds in the hands of defendant, the administrator.
That such lien has not been divested, and the said bonds and money are in his hands, subject to such lien.
That judgment must be entered in favor of plaintiff, against such defendant, as administrator, as aforesaid, establishing the plaintiff’s lien upon said bonds and interest money in his hands, and directing that the same be applied toward the-payment of said judgment docketed in the foreclosure suit, and that a receiver be appointed.
The defendant .excepted to such decisions severally.
Befendant also requested the referee to decide that the appearance of Mr. Haven, as attorney in the foreclosure suit, was, under the facts found, void; that the judgment for the deficiency could not, under the facts .found, be enforced in equity against the assets in defendant’s hands; that the right of the plaintiff to reach the assets of Aaron B. Patchin by this action ceased at his death; and that said assets did not come to defendant’s hands subject to any lien by plaintiff’s action, but must be distributed according tó the provi sions of the statute, in due course of administration, without regard to any such claims against him.
These requests were made separately, and the referee refused to so decide as to each of them, and defendant excepted to such refusals severally.
Judgment was entered upon the report of the referee, in favor of the plaintiff. Upon appeal by said defendant to the General Term, this judgment was reversed and a new trial ordered. The plaintiff gave the usual stipulation and appealed to this court.
Albert P. Laning, for the appellant,
on the question as to the validity of the judgment docketed in the foreclosure action, cited Osborn v. Bank (9 Wheat., 738, 830, 831); Henck v. Todhunter (7 Harr. & John., 275); Allen v. Green (1 Baily, 448); Arnold v. Mayor (5 Scott, N. S., 741); Shelton v. Tiffin (6 Howard, U. S., 163); Prince v. Grffin (16 Iowa, 552); Lagerd v. Patterson (1 Blackford, Ind., 427); Hill v. Ross (3 Dall., 331); Herner v. Doe (1 Ind., 130); Masterton v. Le Clear (4 Minn., 163); Hare & Wallace's Notes to Mills v. Duryee (2 Am. Leading Cases); Denton v. Noyes (6 John. R., 296); Am. Ins. Co. v. Oakley (9 Paige, 496); Jackson Ex. Dem. v. Stewart (6 John. R., 34); Republic of Mexico v. De Arangoiz (5 Duer., 643); Hamilton v. Wright (37 N. Y., 502); St. Albans v. Bush (4 Vt., 58); Bates v. Voorhees (20 N. Y., 528.)
That the lien acquired by the commencement of this action, was not discharged by the death of the defendant, he cited Utica Ins. Co. v. Powers (3 Paige, 365); Savage v. Best (3 How., U. S., 111); Watcher v. Bancroft (15 Abb. R., 243); Code, § 121; 2 R. S., 191, §§ 107, 109; Allen v. Walter (10 Abb. R., 382); Penniman v. Norton (1 Barb. Ch. R., 246); Storm v. Waddell (2 Sand. Ch. R., 494, 510); Clark v. Rist (3 McLean R., 494).
Asher P. Nichols, respondent in person (John Ganson with him),
insisted that the judgment for deficiency Avas void, and cited Shelton v. Tiffin & Perry (6 How. U. S., 163, 186); Osborne v. U. S. Bank (9 Wheat., 741, 752); Kerr v. Kerr (2 Hand, 272); Bayley v. Buckland (1 Wels., Hurls. & Gord., 1); Robson v Eaton (1 T. R., 62); Allen v. Stone (10 Barb., 547, 550); Bellinger v. Ford (21 Barb., 311); 14 Am. Law Reg., 385; Meacham v. Dudley (6 Wend., 515); Grazebrooke v. McCredie (9 Wend., 437); Const. of State of New York, art. 1, § 6.
That the lien ceased at Mr. Patchin’s death, no receiver having been appointed, and cited Sylvester v. Reed (3 Edw. Ch. R., 296); Mathews v. Neilson (id., 346); 2 R. S., 87, § 28; Jones v. Smith (1 Walker’s Ch., R., 115, Michigan); Willard on Ex., 289, 274; Anslie v. Radcliff (7 Paige, 439.)

Opinion:
Earl, Ch. J.
1. Aside from .the effect the Eevised Statutes may have upon the subject, it will not be questioned that the lien the judgment creditor gets by virtue of the commencement of his equitable suit would survive the death of the debtor. (Storm v. Waddell, 2 Sand. Chan., 494.) The property then passes to the personal representatives charged with this lien. The assets are subject to this lien, and the debts of the debtor are to be paid out of them after this lien, like any other legal lien, has been first satisfied. It seems to me that the provisions of the Revised Statutes (2 R. S., 88, § 27), as to the order in which debts of a deceased debtor are to be paid, have nothing whatever to do with this question. This provision does not define what are assets, nor how liens upon the assets are to be discharged, but it directs the order in which the net assets, that is, the property of the debtor remaining* after liens have been discharged, shall be applied in payment of his debts.
2. I think the judgment, upon which this action is based, is a valid one. Mr. Haven, a responsible attorney-appeared for A. D. Patchin, the deceased, and in such a case, I think it ought to be regarded as the settled law of this State, that the judgment may stand, and the party must seek his remedy against the attorney,,who without any authority has appeared for Mm, unless there is some good- reason for not doing it, I think a party should always seek relief for an unauthorized appearance in the suit in which it has been put in, where the rights and equities of all parties can be best protected. This rule is based not entirely upon the law of agency, but upon reasons of policy and justice which are discussed in the case of Denton v. Noyes (6 John., 296), and by Judge Woodruff, in Hamilton v. Wright (37 N. Y., 502).
I think the judgment of the General Term should be reversed, and that the costs of both parties upon the appeal to the General Term and to this court, should be paid out of the funds in the hands of the defendant.