Case Name: Michael FLOURNOY, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1987-05-12
Citations: 507 So. 2d 668
Docket Number: No. BI-269
Parties: Michael FLOURNOY, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: MILLS, WENTWORTH, THOMPSON, and WIGGINTON, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 507
Pages: 668–673

Head Matter:
Michael FLOURNOY, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. BI-269.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
May 12, 1987.
Rehearing Denied June 11, 1987.
J. Craig Williams, of Williams and Stapp, P.A., Jacksonville, for appellant.
Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., and Barbara Ann Butler, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, for appellee.

Opinion:
EN BANC OPINION
SHIVERS, Judge.
Flournoy raises nine issues in his appeal of the trial court's judgment and sentence. We affirm the convictions but reverse the sentence. Our discussion relates to Flour-noy's contention that the trial court erred in exceeding the sentencing guidelines.
Appellant Flournoy was charged in a two count information with trafficking in heroin and possession of cocaine. The jury found Flournoy guilty of the lesser included offense of attempted trafficking in heroin and guilty of possession of cocaine. The trial court sentenced Flournoy to 10 years for attempted trafficking in heroin and 5 years for possession of cocaine, the sentences to run concurrently.
The trial court also entered its written statement for departure from the recommended guidelines sentence. The trial court's departure from the guidelines sentence was based on the following three reasons:
(1) The large quantity of heroin involved;
(2)(a) The dangerous nature of the drug, heroin;
(b) A non-state sentence would not be commensurate with the seriousness of the offense and the danger to the community posed by the defendant;
(3) Felony convictions remote in time that were not scored for guidelines purposes.
In the first of its three reaspns given for departure, the trial court found that the amount of heroin involved in the offense was 12.5 grams. It concluded the amount involved constituted a clear and convincing reason for departure from the guidelines. In our consideration of this reason, we believe three of our prior opinions warrant discussion. It is our duty to reconcile these cases, if possible.
In Mitchell v. State, 458 So.2d 10 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984), we permitted departure for possession of "an entire bale" in a marijuana possession case. In Mitchell we affirmed the trial court's departure for a bale since the recommended sentence made no distinction between possession of 21 grams and the possession of 100 pounds. The Legislature did not divide possession of amounts less than 100 pounds into categories. (To be charged and convicted of trafficking in marijuana the amount involved would have to be in excess of 100 pounds.) The amount possessed in Mitchell exceeded multifold the threshold amount necessary for conviction. We concluded the trial judge had clear and convincing reasons for departure and did not abuse his discretion.
In Newton v. State, 490 So.2d 179 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986), the defendant was convicted of trafficking in 170 grams of cocaine. The offense of trafficking in cocaine under section 893.135(l)(b), Florida Statutes requires possession of 28 grams or more of cocaine. For purposes of mandatory sentencing, the Legislature divided the possession of 28 grams or more of cocaine into categories of:
28 grams but less than 200 grams: 3 years mandatory + fine;
200 grams but less than 400 grams: 5 years mandatory + fine;
400 grams or more: 15 years mandatory + fine.
Defendant's scoresheet showed a recommended guidelines range of 7-9 years incarceration. The trial court departed by sentencing Newton to 18 years with 3 years mandatory plus a fine. We concluded the trial court had abused its discretion and reversed. We were unable to say that the 7-9 years recommended by the guidelines should be exceeded when the amount involved was well within the lowest of the statutory categories.
In Atwaters v. State, 495 So.2d 1219 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986) the defendant was convicted of trafficking in 13.1 grams of heroin. The offense of trafficking in heroin under section 893.135(l)(c), Florida Statutes, requires possession of 4 grams or more. For purposes of mandatory sentencing, the Legislature divided the possession of 4 grams or more of heroin into categories of:
4 grams or more but less than 14 grams: 3 years + fine;
14 grams or more but less than 28 grams: 10 years + fine;
28 grams or more: 25 years + fine.
Defendant's scoresheet showed a recommended guidelines range of 472 to 572 years. The trial judge, apparently because 13.1 grams was so close to 14 grams, departed and gave the defendant 8 years. We could not say, under these circumstances, that the trial court abused its discretion and we affirmed the departure.
One of the stated purposes of the sentencing guidelines is to eliminate unwarranted variation in the sentencing process. Rule 3.701, Fla.R.Crim.P., positively provides that the guidelines are not intended to usurp judicial discretion, but departures are to be made only for clear and convincing reasons. Because the amount of heroin involved in the instant case is, like Atwa-ters, near the outer limit of the first statutory category, we conclude that the departure here was within the trial judge's guidelines-restricted discretion for departure.
As to the trial court's second reason for departure, the Florida Supreme Court has ruled that the nature and danger of possession to sell a schedule one substance is factored into the penalty recommended by the guidelines and is therefore an invalid reason to depart from the guidelines sentence. Santiago v. State, 478 So.2d 47 (Fla.1985).
In Scurry v. State, 489 So.2d 25 (Fla.1986), the Florida Supreme Court held invalid a departure from the recommended guidelines sentence based on the trial court's belief that a non-state sentence would not be commensurate with the seriousness of the offense. The reason, "that a lesser sentence is not commensurate with the seriousness of the crime, flies in the face of the rationale for the guidelines. In effect, this reason reflects a trial judge's disagreement with the sentencing guidelines commission and is not a sufficient reason for departure." Scurry, 489 So.2d at 29. Therefore, we hold that both of the trial court's reasons listed under its second basis for departure are invalid.
The trial court's third reason for departure, which is based on defendant's remote felony convictions, is valid. Weems v. State, 469 So.2d 128 (Fla.1985); Hendrix v. State, 475 So.2d 1218 (Fla.1985).
We find that the sentencing court relied on both valid and invalid reasons for departure. The Florida Supreme Court has recently stated that when faced with these circumstances the sentence must be reversed and remanded unless the "reviewing court [is] satisfied that there is no reasonable possibility that the elimination of the invalid reasons would have affected the departure sentence." Casteel v. State, 498 So.2d 1249, 1251 (1986). Based on the record before us, we are not satisfied that the sentencing court's consideration of the invalid factors was harmless and, therefore, we affirm the convictions but reverse the sentence and remand for resentencing.
We certify to the Florida Supreme Court the following question to be of great public importance:
MAY THE QUANTITY OF DRUGS INVOLVED IN A CRIME BE A PROPER REASON TO SUPPORT DEPARTURE FROM THE SENTENCING GUIDELINES?
AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and REMANDED.
MILLS, WENTWORTH, THOMPSON, and WIGGINTON, JJ., concur.
SMITH, J., concurs in result only.
JOANOS, J., concurs specially, with an opinion.
BOOTH, C.J., concurs in Judge JOANOS' specially concurring opinion.
NIMMONS, J., concurs in result only, and concurs in Judge JOANOS' specially concurring opinion.
ZEHMER, J., concurs and dissents, with an opinion.
ERVIN, J., concurs in part, dissents in part, and concurs in Judge ZEHMER'S concurring and dissenting opinion.
BARFIELD, J., concurs and dissents, with an opinion, and concurs in Judge ZEHMER'S concurring and dissenting opinion.