Case Name: David L. Guptill versus Noah Damon
Court: Maine Supreme Judicial Court
Jurisdiction: Maine
Decision Date: 1856
Citations: 42 Me. 271
Docket Number: 
Parties: David L. Guptill versus Noah Damon.
Judges: Rice, Appleton and May, J. J., concurred.
Reporter: Maine Reports
Volume: 42
Pages: 271–275

Head Matter:
David L. Guptill versus Noah Damon.
The construction of a -written contract is a question of law, to be decided by the Court.
But in an unwritten contract, circumstances in proof may essentially vary the literal import of the language used; and it is not the province of the presiding Judge to give a construction to the language, as an imperative rule of law.
It is for the jury alone to determine from all the evidence, what was said and done by the parties to a verbal contract, and therefrom to find their intention.
On Exceptions from Nisi Prius, Cutting, J., presiding.
This was assumpsit on an alleged contract of warranty of the soundness of a horse sold by the defendant to the plaintiff, and for breach thereof.
There was evidence tending to show on the part of the plaintiff, that the horse was unsound immediately after the sale, and on the part of the defendant, that the horse was sound up to the time of the sale.
The only evidence of the warranty was derived from the admissions of the parties subsequently made.
One witness, on the part of the plaintiff, testified that the plaintiff, in his hearing, asked the defendant “ if he did not sell him the horse for a sound horse,” and that defendant replied that he did.
A witness called by defendant, testified that he asked the plaintiff if “ defendant warranted the horse to him,” and that plaintiff replied that “he did not; that he would not warrant any horse.”
The Judge, among other things, instructed the jury, that if they found that the defendant did, at the time of the sale, say to the plaintiff, “ I sell you the horse for a sound horse, but I will not warrant him,” then, as matter of law, there was no warranty.
The jury returned a verdict for the defendant.
To the foregoing ruling and instruction, the plaintiff excepted.
Paine and Glazier, for plaintiff.
The plaintiff should not have been required to prove the horse unsound.
Rule 9 of this Court. — “ All matters set forth in the writ and declaration which are not specifically denied, shall be regarded as admitted.”
The declaration alleges a promise and a breach, and the specification does not deny the breach.
The Judge erred in giving the instruction he did.
Any distinct assertion by the vendor during the negotiation, intended to bring about a sale and having that effect, will be treated as a warranty. Hastings v. Lovering, 2 Pick. 214; Hillman v. Wilcox, 30 Maine, 170; Osgood v. Lewis, Har. & Gil. 495.
In Wood v. Smith, 4 C. & P. 45, the buyer said, “ she is sound, of course.” The seller replied “yes, to the best of my knowledge.” On being asked if he would warrant, he said, “ I never warrant — I would not warrant even myself.” Held to be a qualified warranty.
Assumpsit on breach of warranty will lie, when defendant knew what he affirmed to be false. Hillman v. Wilcox, 30 Maine, 170.
Morrill and Mills, for defendant.

Opinion:
Tenney, C. J.
This action is assumpsit upon the alleged warranty of the soundness of a horse, purchased by the plaintiff of the defendant. At the trial, it was a question whether the allegation was satisfactorily proved or not. The evidence consisted of confessions represented by witnesses to have been made by each party after the sale.
The Judge instructed the jury, that if they found the defendant did, at the time of the sale, say to the plaintiff, " I sell you the horse for a sound horse, but I will not warrant him," then, as matter of law, there was no warranty.
It was for the jury alone to determine, from the evidence, what was said and done by the parties, and therefrom, under all the circumstances attending the transaction and connected therewith, exhibited in evidence, if any such there were, to find their intention.
The meaning of the parties to a written contract, is a question of law to be decided by the Court. But when the contract alleged is not attempted to be shown by any written instrument, circumstances in proof may essentially vary the literal import of the language employed; and it is not the province of the Judge to give a construction to the language represented to have been used by the parties, as an imperative rule of law. Homans v. Lombard, 21 Maine, 308; Copeland v. Hall, 29 Maine, 93; Houghton v. Houghton, 37 Maine, 72.
The instruction given restricted the jury, in their consideration of the evidence, to limits not fully authorized by law.
Exceptions sustained, verdict set aside, and new trial granted.
Rice, Appleton and May, J. J., concurred.