Case Name: EDITH ENGELBRETSON, PETITIONER-RESPONDENT, v. AMERICAN STORES, RESPONDENT-APPELLANT
Court: New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New Jersey
Decision Date: 1957-08-13
Citations: 49 N.J. Super. 19
Docket Number: 
Parties: EDITH ENGELBRETSON, PETITIONER-RESPONDENT, v. AMERICAN STORES, RESPONDENT-APPELLANT.
Judges: 
Reporter: New Jersey Superior Court Reports
Volume: 49
Pages: 19–34

Head Matter:
EDITH ENGELBRETSON, PETITIONER-RESPONDENT, v. AMERICAN STORES, RESPONDENT-APPELLANT.
Superior Court of New Jersey Appellate Division
Argued July 8, 1957
Decided August 13, 1957.
Waugh, J. S. C. (temporarily assigned), dissented.
Before Judges Francis, Waugh and Smith.
Mr. M. Marvin Soperstein argued the cause for the respondent (Messrs. Margolis <& Margolis, attorneys; Mr. Louis 0. Jacobson, of counsel).
Mr. John IV. Taylor argued the cause for the appellant.

Opinion:
The opinion of the court was delivered by
FEANcrs, S. J. A. D.
Petitioner, Edith Engelbretson (apparently should be Engebretsen), suffered a compensable accident while in the employ of American Stores, for which she received an award based upon total and permanent disability. The appeal presents onfy one issue, that is, the legal propriety of the weekly rate at which the compensation is to be paid. Both the Division of Workmen's Compensation and the County Court fixed it at $30 weekly; the employer maintains it should be $15.33.
Mrs. Engelbretson, who was 70 years of age at the time of the hearing, entered the employ of American Stores in 1942 or 1943. At the time it was difficult to get help on account of the war and she was engaged to work whenever she was needed. No arrangement was made as to the number of hours or days per week to be worked; she was to be subject to call and "supposed to work as long as [she] was needed." The daily and weekly details were left to the discretion of the employer. The rate of pay was $.80 an hour, although at the time of the accident in 1954, it had been increased to $1.15. Her husband was the manager of the meat department in the store at 462 Central Avenue, East Orange, New Jersey, and she was to assist, and thereafter did assist, in that department. Her labors were performed behind the butcher counter, cutting meat and waiting on customers. She was so occupied continuously under the same arrangement until June 3, 1954, the date of her accident.
The meat department operated six days a week, although the regular work week of the employees was five nine-hour days.
In the beginning Mrs. Engelbretson worked four and, apparently, occasionally five da3»s a week. She put in the number of hours requested by her superior; sometimes it was the whole day, nine hours; other times it was less. On reporting for duty, usually she and the employer's representative signed a card which set forth the days and hours of the employment. A sample thereof appearing in the appendix shows, among other things, the dates: "6/2, 6/3," and
"Will work with you from 2 o'clock Wed. and Thurs. until closing time 6 p. m."
The employer produced the work records for 1951, 1953 and 1954. No explanation was given as to the reason for the absence of those relating to the years previous to 1951 or for 1952. However, the company does not dispute that she regularly put in longer days in and prior to 1953.
In 1954, although engaged almost every week (20 weeks between January and the week ending June 5), most of the time (15 weeks) she worked on Wednesday and Thursday for four hours each day. During the other five weeks the work period was two hours each on Wednesday and Thursday in two of them and four or five hours on Thursdays in the remaining three.
On this record, the employer contends that a part time customary work pattern of two four-hour days weekly was established and therefore under N. J. S. A. 34:15-37 the compensation rate should be computed by using the formula: 4 hours per day x $1.15 per hour times 5 days a week or $23 weekly. This would produce a compensation rate of $15.33 ($23 x 2/3). The Deputy Director felt that the statute required a different equation, namely, nine hours per day at $1.15 per hour times a five-day week, or weekly wage of $51.75, and a compensation rate of $30 weekly ($51.75 x 2/3 limited to the maximum of $30. L. 1951, c. 105). The County Court did not set out a specific formula but agreed that a work week of five days of at least eight hours daily was in order, and called for payment of the maximum rate of $30.
The statute, N. J. S. A. 34:15-37, around which the controversy centers, provides inter alia:
" 'Wages' shall be construed to mean the money rate at which the service rendered is recompensed under the contract of hiring in force at the time of the accident. 15 Where the rate of wages is fixed by the hour, the daily wage shall be found by multiplying the hourly rate by the customary number of working hours constituting an ordinary day in the character of the work involved. In any case the weekly wage shall be found by multiplying the daily wage by five, or if the employee worked a greater proportion of the week regularly, then by five and one-half, six, six and one-half or seven, according to the customary number of working days constituting an ordinary week in the character of work involved. Five days shall constitute a minimum work week. i; * (Emphasis supplied)
As indicated, the employer maintains that the legislative language requires the daily wage to he ascertained by multiplying petitioner's hourly rate of pay by the number of hours she customarily worked at the time of the accident, i. e., $1.15 x 4 which results in a weekly wage of $23 and a compensation rate of $15.33. The argument is that the direction to use as the multiplier the "customary number of working hours constituting an ordinary day in the character of the work involved" means the number of hours usually worked by the particular employee involved, and not the number of hours customarily or normally worked by employees generally in the type operation in which the employer is engaged. More specifically, the claim is that in the administration of this portion of the Work men's Compensation Act, the rate of payment is not arrived at by using the number of hours constituting the normal or regular work day as fixed by the employer's custom or practice in the kind of operation involved but on the basis of the customary experience of the particular employee (who is seeking compensation) with respect to hours of employment.
Some support for the employer's position is found in Langheld v. Federal Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Co., 25 N. J. Misc. 159 (Com. Pl. 1947), where the proof showed that the employee was hired as a part-time canteen worker for four hours daily at $.65% per hour. The court held that the customary number of hours constituting an ordinary day in the character of the work involved was four hours. It was said among other things that the petitioner had contracted and started her initial period of hiring on the basis of a customary and ordinary working day of four hours and the view was taken that
" tbe statute contemplates compensation on tlie basis of the earnings of the employee herself, rather than upon that of herself and other employees combined. If this be true then the issue resolves itself into a question of fact, to wit, what was the customary number of working hours constituting an ordinary day in the petitioner's experience during the period of her employment with respondent?"
This decision was not reviewed by an appellate tribunal. However, it was used as a precedent by the employer in Mahoney v. Nitroform Co., 20 N. J. 499 (1956). In that case it appeared that the decedent Mahoney, who had a full-time occupation elsewhere, worked in his spare time nights, week-ends and holidays, an average of 20 hours a week for a corporation which he and others had organized. Citing the Langheld case, the employer claimed compensation should be predicated on five four-hour days and the rate fixed on the basis of 40% (the pertinent death case allowance) of 20 x the hourly rate. The Supreme Court neither approved nor disapproved the Langheld doctrine in its own factual setting but sustained an award resting on a full eight-hour, five-day week, saying that to ignore the contemporaneous full-time employment would "obviously frustrate the objective of wage calculation sought to be attained by the statute." 20 N. J. at page 510. Favorable reference was made to Bennett v. Fertig, 10 N. J. Misc. 1021 (Sup. Ct. 1932), affirmed per curiam 110 N. J. L. 510 (F. & A. 1933), where the employee worked two days a week at $1.50 per day and was granted compensation based upon five days or $7.50 a week.
The effect of the case is that although Mahoney was hired to work in the employer's business such hours as he could or would evenings, week-ends and holidays, the character of the work involved was not determined by the hours devoted to the part-time endeavor but rather by the hours in the ordinary day in his usual occupation, which was of the same type or character.
In seeking the intent of the lawmakers in promulgating N. J. S. A. 34:15-37, we must be mindful that it is remedial social legislation we are interpreting and that all the precedents call for liberal construction in order that its beneficent purposes may be accomplished. Biglioli v. Durotest Corp., 44 N. J. Super. 93, 99 (App. Div. 1957). Nor can we ignore the fact that the ordinary part-time worker today may have full-time employment tomorrow or that a part-time worker (such as a daily houseworker) may have four or five such jobs each week. And an accident suffered in one employment by such person causes pecuniary loss as the result of the consequent physical disability in all the employments or prevents or interferes with later full-time employment. For example, despite the fact that Mrs. Engelbretson was 68 years of age when her mishap occurred, there is no evidence that she was in poor health or unable to work a full week or for additional days for another employer. Her 12 years of experience in the meat department might well have influenced another employer to make use of her skill. It seems obvious from the structure of the act that these facts were in the contemplation of the Legislature and that the thinking was in terms of an ordi nary work week of five eight-hour days. Nowhere in the act is part-time employment mentioned, although provision is made for cases of casual employment.
Under the circumstances, we hold the view, contrary to the Langlield case, that in establishing the basis for computing the daily wages for an employee hired at an hourly rate of pay, the allusion to the "customary number of working hours constituting an ordinary day in the character of the worlc involved" has reference to the regular or normal working day followed by the employer in the line or type of work in which the particular employee is engaged. Cf. Ostatnik v. Hamilton, 43 N. J. Super. 469 (Cty. Ct. 1957). Conversely, in our opinion the reference is not to the number of hours in a day the employee is called upon to work under his contract — unless the type of occupation is such that a lesser number of hours than eight are customary or perhaps necessary because of its nature. To illustrate, if under the conditions of work an employee is exposed to noxious fumes which are dangerous after four hours and so the customary day is limited to such period, the ordinary day for compensation purposes may be that number of hours because of the "character of work involved." Cf. Fear v. Ebony Paint Mfg. Co., 238 Mo. App. 560, 181 S. W. 2d 559 (Ct. App. 1944).
The connotation now adopted by us is in accord with that announced by the Supreme Court of Kansas in construing the statute of that state which contains precisely the same terminology as our own. Baker v. Western Power & Light Co., 147 Kan. 571, 78 P. 2d 36 (1938), and compare Franklin v. J. P. Floria & Co., 158 So. 591 (La. Ct. App. 1935); Morrison-Merrill & Co. v. Industrial Commission, 81 Utah 363, 18 P. 2d 295 (Sup. Ct. 1933).
In the instance before us the undisputed proof shows the character of the work involved to be such that the customary number of hours in the ordinary work day is nine and the customary number of days in the work week is five. Accordingly, petitioner's compensation rate must be reached on the basis of that work day.
The fact that the weekly rate of $30 will give the petitioner more as compensation than she was ever paid as wages by the American Stores cannot be regarded as significant in the exercise of our judicial function. Our task is to construe and give effect to the intention and mandate of the Legislature. Carter v. Ocean Accident & Guarantee Corp., 190 Ga. 857, 11 S. E. 2d 16 (Sup. Ct. 1940); Morrison-Merrill & Co. v. Industrial Commission, supra. It is perfectly obvious that if she was engaged to work one eight-hour day doing the very same work, the compensation rate would be $30 weekly (9 hours x $1.15 per hour x 5 days x 2/3, but reduced to the statutory maximum of $30). Having in mind the character of the work involved, it would not be consistent with the spirit and purpose of the legislation to reduce the compensation to approximately one-half of that sum, because the duties of the employment were performed over two four-hour days rather than one day of eight hours duration.
The judgment is affirmed.