Case Name: DUNN v. STATE
Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1922-04-12
Citations: 242 S.W. 1049
Docket Number: No. 6353
Parties: DUNN v. STATE.
Judges: 
Reporter: South Western Reporter
Volume: 242
Pages: 1049–1055

Head Matter:
DUNN v. STATE.
(No. 6353.)
(Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
April 12, 1922.
Rehearing Denied June 23, 1922.)
1. Criminal law ¡§=>296 — Plea of jeopardy where sufficient in law raises an issue of fact for jury.
A plea of jeopardy where sufficient in law raises an issue of fact which should be submitted to the jury.
2. Criminal law ¡@=304(16)— Courts take ju- ' dicial notice of facts shown by its records.
The trial court may take judicial knowledge of facts shown by the records of such court.
3. Criminal law ¡@=>304(16) — Plea of jeopiardy held insufficient in view of record of former trial.
Plea of jeopardy, alleging that the defendant was tried in a former proceeding in which one of the jurors was excused and the trial proceeded with 11 jurors, held insufficient, in view of the record in such preceding trial showing that defendant was convicted therein, and that the judgment was reversed and the cause remanded for new trial; the court having the right to take judicial knowledge of facts shown by such record.
4. Criminal law <@=>262 — Plea of jeopardy may be waived.
A plea of jeopardy is a personal privilege, and can be waived by the accused, which waiver need not be direct, but may be implied.
5. Criminal law <@=>262 — Defendant by proceeding at trial waived right to interpose plea of jeopardy at subsequent trial.
Defendant by agreeing to proceed with the trial before 11 jurors after one of the jurors had been excused waived the right to interpose plea of jeopardy at subsequent trial.
6. Criminal law ¡@=>296 — Refusal to submit issue raised by plea of privilege to jury held harmless.
Refusal to submit issue raised by plea of jeopardy to jury held not error where court had taken judicial notice of its records, and knew that the defendant had been convicted in the preceding trial, and judgment had been reversed and cause remanded, since, if the issue had been submitted, the court would have been authorized to give a peremptory instruction against the defendant on the plea.
7. Criminal law <@=1091 (4) — Bill of exceptions held insufficient for failure to designate tha particular testimony complained of.
Bill of exceptions complaining of cross-examination, setting out m question and answer form five pages thereof, without pointing out the particular cross-examination complained of, held insufficient.
8. Criminal law <@=1091 (11) — Bill of exceptions in question and answer form held defective.
Bill of exceptions complaining of improper cross-examination setting out the cross-examination in question and answer form, held defective.
9. Homicide <@=295 (3) — Requested instruction as to provoking the killing held erroneous.
In a prosecution for murder, requested instruction as to provoking the killing held erroneous, in that it did not take into account the condition of defendant’s mind at the time of the killing, nor restrict it to the first meeting after having been informed of insults.
10. Homicide ¡@=295(2) — Refusal of requested instruction as to effect of threats on defendant’s mind not error in view of absence of claim that such threats were made.
In a homicide prosecution, in which it was not claimed by defendant that threats were made by deceased at the time of the homicide, the refusal of requested instruction as to the effect of such threats on defendant’s mind held not error.
11. Homicide ¡@=>158(2) — Testimony as to threats held not too remote.
In a prosecution for murder of son-in-law, testimony as to threats against deceased made by defendant prior to tlie marriage of his daughter to the deceased held admissible as against contention that the testimony was too remote, the objection thereto going to its weight, and not its admissibility.
12. Homicide <©==>190(10) — Evidence as to general reputation of deceased as a peaceable and law-abiding citizen held admissible.
In murder prosecution, in which the defendant introduced evidence of communicated threats against him and members of his family by the deceased, and by his evidence raised the issue of self-defense, making it necessary for the court to charge thereon, evidence as to the general reputation of deceased as a peaceable and law-abiding citizen held admissible.
13. Criminal law <S=m763, 764(1) — Special charge on weight of evidence properly refused.
Special charge on the weight of the evidence was properly refused.
14. Homicide <§=m 187 — Evidence as to relative size, weight, and age of defendant and deceased held admissible.
In murder prosecution, involving self-defense issue, evidence as to relative size, weight, and age of defendant and deceased held admissible.
On Motion for Rehearing.
15. Criminal law <s=>292(3) — Plea of jeopardy not stating result of the former trial held insufficient.
Plea of jeopardy, alleging that defendant was tried in a prior proceeding for the same offense, that one of the jurors was excused, and that the trial proceeded before the ,11 remaining jurors without stating the result of the trial, held insufficient, since to be legally sufficient the plea should have further alleged that a conviction or an acquittal was had, or that the result of the trial was in some way a mistrial.
16. Jury <®c=o32(2) — Verdict of guilty by II jurors is void.
A verdict of guilty in a felony ease by 11 jurors is void, and a judgment based thereon may be set aside at the request of the accused.
17. Criminal law <S=»I68 — Plea of jeopardy cannot be founded on illegal judgment based on verdict rendered by 11 jurors.
The accused cannot interpose a plea of jeopardy based on illegal judgment rendered on verdict of guilty by 11 jurors, under Vernon’s Code Or. Proc. 1916, arts. 9, 20, and Bill of Rights, § 14.
Appeal from District Court, Coryell County; J. B. Keith, Judge.
Tom Dunn was convicted of murder, and he appeals.
Affirmed.
Clay McClellan, of Gatesville, and A. R. Eidson, of Hamilton, for appellant.
R. G. Storey, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.

Opinion:
HAWKINS, J.
Conviction was for murder, punishment being assessed at 65 years' confinement in the penitentiary. This case has been before the court on two former occasions; opinions will be found reported in 85 Tex. Cr. R. 299, 212 S. W. 511, and 88 Tex. Cr. R. 21, 224 S. W. 893.
When the case was called for the instant trial appellant interposed a plea of former jeopardy, in which he substantially avers that he was put upon trial in this case on the 26th of January, 1920. He alleges that a jury was impaneled and sworn, after which his plea proceeds as follows:
"Thereupon the court announced that it stood adjourned until 1:30 o'clock p. m., and directed all of the parties to be in court at that time. That, before the jury left the courtroom, one of the jurors, viz. Paul Cross, stated to the court that he did not want to serve on the jury; that he had an excuse. The court asked him what his excuse was, and he said he had a sick child,' and the court told him that he should have interposed his excuse at the time the court called for excuses from the jurors, and that it was too late now for the court to entertain his excuse, and the court declined to hear the excuse of the juror or to entertain the same, and directed the sheriff to take charge of the jury and have them back in court at 1:30 p. m. When the court reconvened at 1:30 p. m. a deputy sheriff who was in charge of the jury announced to the court that he had received a telephone message informing him that the juror Cross had a sick child, and the juror wanted to be excused. The court asked the attorneys what they wanted to do about the matter, and the attorneys, for the defendant said that they were willing to excuse the juror. The defendant did not say anything, and was not asked if he consented for the juror to be excused or not. The court conducted no investigation and made no inquiry in reference to the seriousness of the illness of the child except to hear what the deputy sheriff had to say about the matter, and excused the juror Cross, and the trial proceeded before the 11 remaining jurors. The juror Cross was himself neither sick nor otherwise incapacitated, but was able to proceed with the trial of the case. That after the juror Cross was excused the district attorney and the lawyers for the defendant tried to agree on another juror, but were unable to do so, and then the parties agreed to try the ease before the 11 remaining jurors, and the case was tried before said 11 remaining jurors."
All averments were made necessary to show the trial in the instant case was upon the same indictment and for the same offense as that for which he was tried in January, 1920. No answer was filed by the state joining issue with appellant on the facts set up in his plea but a general demurrer thereto was filed, and the trial judge refused to entertain the plea of jeopardy, evidently justifying his action from a knowledge of the records in the case, for he explains the bill by certifying that the case was tried, appellant convicted, that the case was' appealed and reversed, and then stood again for trial.
Under the authority of Hipple v. State, 80 Tex. Cr. R. 531, 191 S. W. 1150, L. R. A. 1917D, 1141, it may be conceded that the plea of jeopardy was good as against a general exception. It is the general rule in this state, well supported by authority, that a plea of jeopardy, being sufficient in law, raises an issue of fact which should be submitted to the jury for its determination. Appellant contends that he has brought himself within that rule, and that the court should have submitted his plea of jeopardy in the instant trial. His contention should be sustained unless the record shows this as an exception to the rule. If facts exist disclosed from the record of the court trying this case which, if shown by the state in answer to the plea of jeopardy, would ha,ve authorized the court to instruct the jury that the plea should not be considered by them, then would the trial judge have a right to take judicial knowledge of those matters so disclosed by the records of his own court which would have that effect? We are not without authority on the proposition that, even relative to a plea of jeopardy, the trial court may take judicial knowledge of those things disclosed by the record of his own court. Miller v. State (No. 6287) 242 S. W. 1040 (opinion delivered February 22, 1922, and not yet [officially] reported) is authority for that proposition, and Johnson v. State, 29 Ark. 31, 21 Am. Rep. 154; State v. Bowen, 16 Kan. 475, and the other authorities cited in the Miller opinion also support it. See, also, State v. White, 71 Kan. 356, 80 Pac. 589, also reported in 6 Ann. Oas. 132, and authorities collated under notes in last citation. In Woodward v. State, 42 Tex, Or. R. 188, 58 S. W. 135, the question was raised that the plea of former jeopardy interposed was not sufficient because it failed to set out the indictment, verdict and judgment in full. In passing upon that question this court used the following language:
"It is not necessary in this case that the plea set up the indictment, verdict, and judgment in full, as the court must take judicial knowledge of the orders and decrees entered in its own court; and especially is this true when those orders and decrees were made in the case then on trial."
Assuming this to be a correct proposition of law, and that the court in the instant case could look to its own records, of what facts could the court take judicial knowledge? Appellant's plea asserts that after the juror in question was excused, "the parties" agreed to continue the trial with 11 jurors. The trial judge knew from the records of his court that such trial proceeded and resulted in the conviction of appellant; that an appeal had been taken from such judgment of conviction; that the judgment had been reversed and the cause remanded for a new trial, and was then upon call in obedience to the order of this court. We have a right to look to the records of our own court to fix the identity of the cases, and we find from an inspection of the record in the case of Dunn v. State, reported in 88 Tex. Cr. R., at page 21, 224 S. W. 893, that the numbers are the same, and that it is the identical case now -before us, and was reversed and remanded because the same appeared to have been tried before 11 jurors. The opinion recites that "one of the jurors was excused with the consent of appellant." When we look to the bill of exceptions in that record we find the error assigned based upon the excuse of the identical juror named in appellant's plea of former jeopardy. There is no question about the correctness of the opinion reversing the case upon that trial, because, even with defendant's consent, a trial cannot be had in a felony ease with less than 12 jurors, but we may look to the record in. that case in connection with the instant bill of exception in order to determine the action of the trial judge in not submitting the plea of jeopardy.
That the plea of jeopardy is a personal privilege, and can be waived by accused, is well established. See 16 Corpus Juris, § 489, and notes under decisions in 6 Ann. Cas. 132. This rule has been recognized many times in this state where juries have, been discharged by agreement of accused on trial, and it is not necessary to cite further authority upon this proposition. Jeopardy attached in the instant case when the jury was impaneled and appellant pleaded to the indictment. Jeopardy was as complete at the time the juror Cross was excused as when the plea was interposed by appellant upon the call of the case for the instant trial. After the juror was excused it appears from the plea itself that an effort was made to agree upon another juror, and, having failed "in this, that "the parties" agreed to proceed with the trial before 11 jurors. Appellant was present and cognizant of these proceedings, and was evidently taking his chances upon an acquittal at the hands of the eleven jurors, relying, doubtless, upon article 20, C. C. P., that a verdict of acquittal, though irregular, would protect him, or that the state, having agreed to proceed with the trial with 11 jurors, would not disregard the agreement, whatever might be the result. Being disappointed at the verdict of the jury he appealed from the judgment of conviction, secured a reversal, and now for the first time seeks to interpose his plea of jeopardy, having remained silent when objection could have been urged to proceeding with the trial after the excuse of the juror Cross. The waiver of jeopardy does not have to be direct, but may be implied, which is more frequently the case than otherwise. 16 Corpus Juris, § ,489; 17 Cyc. 605. We are of opinion that the subsequent proceedings after the juror was excused were a waiver of the question of jeopardy. We cannot escape the conclusion that, if the state had joined issue with appellant on his plea, and the matters recited had been introduced in evidence, it would have been the duty of the court to have instructed the jury to find against appellant. Believing the trial court had a right to take judicial knowledge of the matters disclosed by the- records of his own court which would have authorized a peremptory instruction against appellant on his plea of jeopardy, we have been unable to conclude that failure to entertain the plea has in any way resulted harmfully to accused, because the same result would have been reached by either procedure.
In his bill of exception No. 2 appellant sets out in narrative form the testimony of his wife, and at the conclusion of such narrative statement says she was "cross-examined, without objection being urged, as follows." There then appeared five pages of questions and answers embracing the cross-examination. The bill nowhere undertakes to point out in what particular the cross-examination infringed upon the rule relative to the cross-examination of the wife of accused, and nowhere does the bill pertinently direct our attention to any particular question that was objectionable.
"A bill of exceptions is too general to be considered if it includes a number of statements some of which are clearly admissible, and there is nothing in the objection to directly challenge or single out the supposed objectionable evidence;" Section 211, p. 1S5, Branch's Anno. P. C., and authorities there collated.
The bill is further objectionable for being in question and answer form, which has been frequently held by us as not in compliance with the rules relative to bills of exceptions. See Carter v. State, 234 S. W. 535; Jetty v. State, 235 S. W. 589; Rylee v. State, 236 S. W. 744; McDaniel v. State, 237 S. W. 292; Watson v. State, 237 S. W. 298.
Appellant requested the following special charge:
"The jury shall be at liberty to determine in every case whether under all of the circumstances the insulting words or gestures were the real cause which provoked the killing. Therefore you are charged in this case that, if you believe, or have a reasonable doubt thereof, that the defendant was provoked, that is, caused, to kill the deceased by reason of and on account of the insulting words that defendant was informed the deceased used in reference to defendant's daughter, if you convict the defendant you cannot convict him of a higher grade of offense than manslaughter."
An examination of the court's charge discloses a full, fair, and complete submission of the issue of manslaughter, of which there could be no just ground of complaint, in connection with which he told the jury that they were at liberty to determine under all the facts and circumstances in the ease whether or not appellant was informed of insulting words or conduct of deceased towards appellant's daughter, and whether such information was the real cause which provoked the killing. The requested charge was erroneous in that it did not take into account the condition of appellant's mind at the time of the killing, nor does it restrict it to the first meeting after having been informed of insults. The charge given by the court covers all these issues in an admirable manner, and safeguarded the rights of appellant at every point.
Appellant requested the court to charge, in substance, that if, prior to the time of the killing, appellant had been informed of threats which deceased had made against his (appellant's) daughter or against appellant himself, or against any other member of the family, and that such information produced in appellant's mind such a degree of anger as rendered it incapable of cool reflection, and that he killed deceased while under such condition of mind, he would be guilty of no greater offense than manslaughter. There is no claim that any such threats were made by deceased at the time of the homicide. The charge substantially asserts as a proposition of law that information to that effect conveyed to appellant which enraged him, and he killed while in such state of mind, would be adequate cause to reduce the offense to manslaughter, regardless of when the killing took place. Such is not the law, and the court committed no error in refusing to give the charge in question. If deceased had said or done anything at the time of the killing which, taken in connection with any previous threats uttered by him, might have been adequate cause, it would have been proper to have instructed the jury with reference to such threats, but no such issue is raised by the evidence.
The court committed no error in permitting the state to introduce proof by Mr. and Mrs. Wingfield that, prior to the marriage of deceased to appellant's daughter, they had heard appellant make threats that if they married appellant would kill deceased. The objection that the testimony is too remote is not tenable. Taken in connection with all the other facts disclosed by the record, the evidence was pertinent, and the objection went to the weight of the testimony rather than to its admissibility.
The court properly admitted evidence that the general reputation of deceased as a peaceable and law-abiding citizen was good. Appellant, while declaring that he was not relying upon self-defense, introduced evidence of communicated threats against appellant, and members of his family, and by the evi dence of his witnesses raised the issue of self-defense, which made it necessary for the court to charge thereon, and rendered testimony as to the general reputation of deceased admissible. Section 2095, p. 1176, Branch's Ann. P. 0., for authorities.
Special charge No. 3 requested by appellant was upon the weight of the testimony, and properly refused by the court.
We have been unable to discover any error committed by the court as complained of in appellant's bill of exceptions No. 9. Under the facts of the ease the státe had a right to prove the relative size, weight and age of appellant and deceased, and the objection thereto is not tenable.
The evidence in the record is not set out, nor reviewed at any length. Reference is made to the opinion in the same case reported in 85 Tex. Or. R. at page 299, 212 S. W. 511, for a recital of sufficient facts to make clear the matters discussed in this opinion.
Rinding no errors in the record, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
<@=For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes
^=>For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes