Case Name: Ludwin Israel LOPEZ-AGUILAR, Petitioner, v. William P. BARR, Attorney General of the United States, Respondent.
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 2019-04-23
Citations: 921 F.3d 898
Docket Number: No. 17-73153
Parties: Ludwin Israel LOPEZ-AGUILAR, Petitioner,
v.
William P. BARR, Attorney General of the United States, Respondent.
Judges: 
Reporter: Federal Reporter 3d Series
Volume: 921
Pages: 898–911

Head Matter:
Ludwin Israel LOPEZ-AGUILAR, Petitioner,
v.
William P. BARR, Attorney General of the United States, Respondent.
No. 17-73153
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
Argued and Submitted March 5, 2019 Portland, Oregon
Filed April 23, 2019

Opinion:
TUNHEIM, Chief District Judge:
Petitioner Ludwin Israel Lopez-Aguilar, a native and citizen of Guatemala, petitions for review of a final order of the Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA") finding him removable pursuant to section 237(a)(2)(A)(iii) of the Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA") because of his conviction under Oregon Revised Statutes section 164.395 and denying his application for protection under the Convention Against Torture ("CAT"). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We deny Lopez-Aguilar's petition because we conclude that: (1) section 164.395 is a categorical theft offense and, therefore, an aggravated felony under section 101(a)(43)(G) of the INA; and (2) the record supports the BIA's denial of CAT relief.
BACKGROUND
Lopez-Aguilar is a native and citizen of Guatemala. He entered the United States in 1989, when he was three years old, and became a legal permanent resident on March 12, 2001, when his application for suspension of deportation was granted.
In Guatemala, Lopez-Aguilar's father abused his mother physically, sexually, and verbally. Lopez-Aguilar's father also abused him, starting when he was less than a year old, and threatened to kill him. Since Lopez-Aguilar entered the United States, he has never returned to Guatemala, but his mother has returned twice, once for three months and once for three weeks. Lopez-Aguilar's father did not contact her or bother her on those trips, and he has not tried to contact Lopez-Aguilar since 1995. Nevertheless, Lopez-Aguilar fears that, if he is returned to Guatemala, his father will follow through on the threat to kill him.
Lopez-Aguilar was formerly a member of the Norteño gang. He became affiliated with the Norteños at age 16 and was initiated at age 18. He has numerous visible tattoos that he believes make him identifiable as a Norteño. His role as a Norteño involved fighting with members of rival gangs, including Mara Salvatrucha and Barrio 18, both of which operate throughout Guatemala.
Lopez-Aguilar left the gang in 2009. He has not been targeted by any gangs in the United States, and no one has harmed or looked for him. However, he fears that he will be targeted by police or by rival gangs, if returned to Guatemala, because he will be recognizable as a Norteño and seen as suspicious and a foreigner.
I. Lopez-Aguilar's Conviction
In 2014, Lopez-Aguilar was convicted of third-degree robbery in violation of Oregon Revised Statutes section 164.395 and sentenced to 13 months in prison. Section 164.395 provides:
(1) A person commits the crime of robbery in the third degree if in the course of committing or attempting to commit theft or unauthorized use of a vehicle as defined in ORS 164.135 the person uses or threatens the immediate use of physical force upon another person with the intent of:
(a) Preventing or overcoming resistance to the taking of the property or to retention thereof immediately after the taking; or
(b) Compelling the owner of such property or another person to deliver the property or to engage in other conduct which might aid in the commission of the theft or unauthorized use of a vehicle.
(2) Robbery in the third degree is a Class C felony.
Section 164.395 incorporates Oregon's theft definition, which includes "theft by deception." Or. Rev. Stat. § 164.015(4). It also incorporates Oregon's Unauthorized Use of a Vehicle statute, which criminalizes, in relevant part:
(b) Having custody of a vehicle, boat or aircraft pursuant to an agreement between the person or another and the owner thereof whereby the person or another is to perform for compensation a specific service for the owner involving the maintenance, repair or use of such vehicle, boat or aircraft, the person intentionally uses or operates it, without consent of the owner, for the person's own purpose in a manner constituting a gross deviation from the agreed purpose; or
(c) Having custody of a vehicle, boat or aircraft pursuant to an agreement with the owner thereof whereby such vehicle, boat or aircraft is to be returned to the owner at a specified time, the person knowingly retains or withholds possession thereof without consent of the owner for so lengthy a period beyond the specified time as to render such retention or possession a gross deviation from the agreement.
Or. Rev. Stat. § 164.135(1)(b)-(c).
II. Immigration Court Proceedings
Because of Lopez-Aguilar's robbery conviction, an immigration judge ("IJ") found him removable as an alien convicted of an aggravated felony as defined in two sections of the INA: (1) section 101(a)(43)(F), which defines crimes of violence, and (2) section 101(a)(43)(G), which defines theft offenses for which the term of imprisonment is at least one year. The IJ also denied Lopez-Aguilar's petition for deferral of removal under the CAT. The IJ ordered Lopez-Aguilar removed to Guatemala.
III. BIA Appeal
The BIA dismissed Lopez-Aguilar's appeal. It disagreed with the IJ's conclusion that Lopez-Aguilar's conviction under Oregon Revised Statutes section 164.395 was for a crime of violence under section 101(a)(43)(F) of the INA but agreed that the conviction was for a theft offense under section 101(a)(43)(G).
The BIA rejected Lopez-Aguilar's argument that section 164.395 is overbroad because it covers consensual takings by incorporating theft by deception. The BIA concluded that the statute also requires taking of property by force, which negates the consensual nature of theft by deception. Accordingly, the BIA found that Lopez-Aguilar had not demonstrated a realistic probability that an individual could be convicted under section 164.395 for a consensual taking.
The BIA also rejected Lopez-Aguilar's argument that section 164.395 is overbroad because it covers unauthorized use of a vehicle, which does not require an intent to deprive the owner of the rights and benefits of ownership. The BIA concluded that the remainder of the statute required an intent to prevent or overcome resistance to the taking, to retain the property immediately after the taking, or to compel another to deliver the property. Accordingly, the BIA found that Lopez-Aguilar had not demonstrated a realistic probability that an individual could be convicted under section 164.395 for unauthorized use of a vehicle without the requisite intent.
Finally, the BIA agreed with the IJ's conclusion that Lopez-Aguilar had not established that he would more likely than not face a particularized risk of torture with the acquiescence of a public official in Guatemala.
This timely petition for review followed.
JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
We have jurisdiction to review final orders of removal based on a petitioner's commission of an aggravated felony to the extent that the petition "raises . questions of law." Ngaeth v. Mukasey , 545 F.3d 796, 800 (9th Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (quoting Vizcarra-Ayala v. Mukasey, 514 F.3d 870, 872 (9th Cir. 2008) ). Whether a particular offense is an "aggravated felony" under the INA is a question of law that we review de novo. Id.
We also have jurisdiction to review the BIA's denial of CAT relief where, as here, "the IJ did not rely on [the petitioner's] conviction . but instead denied relief on the merits." Alphonsus v. Holder , 705 F.3d 1031, 1036-37 (9th Cir. 2013), abrogated on other grounds as recognized in Guerrero v. Whitaker , 908 F.3d 541 (9th Cir. 2018). We review denial of CAT relief for substantial evidence. Owino v. Holder , 771 F.3d 527, 531 (9th Cir. 2014) (per curiam). The substantial evidence standard is "extremely deferential," and we must uphold the BIA's findings "unless the evidence presented would compel a reasonable finder of fact to reach a contrary result." Gebhart v. SEC , 595 F.3d 1034, 1043 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Monjaraz-Munoz v. INS , 327 F.3d 892, 895 (9th Cir.), amended by 339 F.3d 1012 (9th Cir. 2003) (order) ).
DISCUSSION
I. Section 164.395 and Generic Theft Offenses
Under the INA, a conviction for a generic theft offense that results in a prison term of at least one year is an aggravated felony. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(G). To determine whether a particular conviction is for a theft offense, we use the categorical and modified categorical approaches of Taylor v. United States , 495 U.S. 575, 110 S.Ct. 2143, 109 L.Ed.2d 607 (1990), and Shepard v. United States , 544 U.S. 13, 125 S.Ct. 1254, 161 L.Ed.2d 205 (2005). Under those approaches, we compare Lopez-Aguilar's statute of conviction ( Or. Rev. Stat. § 164.395 ) with the generic crime of theft to determine whether the latter encompasses the former. See Hernandez-Cruz v. Holder , 651 F.3d 1094, 1100 (9th Cir. 2011). In the context of an aggravated felony theft offense under section 101(a)(43)(G) of the INA, the generic crime of theft is defined as "[1] a taking of property or an exercise of control over property [2] without consent [3] with the criminal intent to deprive the owner of rights and benefits of ownership, even if such deprivation is less than total or permanent." Id. at 1100-01 (quoting Carrillo-Jaime v. Holder , 572 F.3d 747, 750 (9th Cir. 2009) ).
Lopez-Aguilar contends that section 164.395 is not categorically a generic theft offense because: (1) it incorporates theft by deception, which covers consensual takings, and (2) it incorporates unauthorized use of a vehicle, which does not require an intent to deprive the owner of the rights and benefits of ownership.
A. Theft by Deception
We conclude that, although section 164.395 theoretically could cover a consensual taking due to its incorporation of theft by deception, there is no realistic probability that Oregon would prosecute such conduct under the statute. To find that a statute of conviction is broader than a generic removable offense definition, there must be "a realistic probability, not a theoretical possibility, that the State would apply its statute to conduct that falls outside the generic definition." Gonzales v. Duenas-Alvarez , 549 U.S. 183, 193, 127 S.Ct. 815, 166 L.Ed.2d 683 (2007).
To be convicted under section 164.395, a defendant must:
use[ ] or threaten[ ] the immediate use of physical force upon another person with the intent of: (a) Preventing or overcoming resistance to the taking of the property or to retention thereof immediately after the taking; or (b) Compelling the owner of such property or another person to deliver the property or to engage in other conduct which might aid in the commission of the theft or unauthorized use of a vehicle.
Or. Rev. Stat. § 164.395(1) (emphasis added). Because the statute does not require that force be used or threatened against the owner of the property, the text of the statute could theoretically cover situations involving consensual takings. For example, under subsection (a), a defendant could be convicted if he entered a residential building, obtained property from a resident through deception, and used force against a security guard on his way out of the building in order to retain the property. Under subsection (b), a defendant could be convicted if she convinced an owner, by deception, to give her property but used force against a third party to compel that third party to deliver the consensually obtained property to her. In either scenario, the property would have been taken by consent of the owner, and the force used would not negate the owner's consent because the force was used against a third party without the owner's knowledge.
However, these two scenarios represent merely theoretical-not realistic-possibilities. Indeed, under subsection (a), the threat or force must be used "immediately after the taking." Therefore, it is unlikely that a defendant would be convicted for using or threatening force against a third party unless the force occurred in the presence of the owner, which would negate consent.
Moreover, Lopez-Aguilar has not presented, and we are unable to find, any Oregon case in which a defendant was prosecuted for conduct falling outside the generic definition of theft. Accordingly, we find that section 164.395 is not overbroad, qualifies as a categorical theft offense and, therefore, constitutes an aggravated felony under section 101(a)(43)(G) of the INA.
B. Unauthorized Use of a Vehicle
We also conclude that the incorporation of unauthorized use of a vehicle in section 164.395 does not make it overbroad. Lopez-Aguilar argues that subsections (b) and (c) of Oregon's Unauthorized Use of a Vehicle statute criminalize use of a vehicle without the intent to deprive the owner of the rights and benefits of ownership because they apply when the vehicle has been temporarily and consensually placed in the defendant's care. See Or. Rev. Stat. § 164.135(1)(b)-(c). However, in the context of aggravated felonies, a generic theft offense is defined as "[1] a taking of property or an exercise of control over property [2] without consent [3] with the criminal intent to deprive the owner of rights and benefits of ownership, even if such deprivation is less than total or permanent ." Hernandez-Cruz, 651 F.3d at 1100-01 (emphasis added) (quoting Carrillo-Jaime , 572 F.3d at 750 ). None of the conduct covered by Oregon's Unauthorized Use of a Vehicle statute falls outside this definition. Accordingly, we hold that section 164.395 qualifies as a categorical theft offense and, therefore, as an aggravated felony under section 101(a)(43)(G) of the INA.
II. CAT Relief
To establish eligibility for CAT relief, Lopez-Aguilar must establish that, if removed to Guatemala, he will more likely than not be tortured. See 8 C.F.R. 1208.16(c)(2). Torture is defined as the intentional infliction of severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, for purposes such as intimidation, punishment, coercion, or discrimination, if "inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity." 8 C.F.R. 1208.18(a)(1). In determining the likelihood that an applicant will be tortured, courts must consider "all evidence relevant to the possibility of future torture," including evidence that the applicant was tortured in the past. 8 C.F.R. 1208.16(c)(3).
The BIA agreed with the IJ that Lopez-Aguilar did not show past torture and noted that Lopez-Aguilar did not challenge that finding on appeal. It found that Lopez-Aguilar had not shown that he would more likely than not face a particularized risk of torture in Guatemala at the hands of his father or rival gangs. The BIA noted that Lopez-Aguilar's father had not tried to contact him since 1995, neither Lopez-Aguilar nor his mother knew where his father was or even if his father was alive, and his mother had returned to Guatemala twice without incident. The BIA also noted that Lopez-Aguilar had faced no serious problems with rival gangs since leaving his gang, Lopez-Aguilar testified that rival gangs in the United States had left him alone because he told them he was no longer an active gang member, and Lopez-Aguilar had not shown that gangs abide by different rules of conduct depending on their geographical location. Finally, the BIA reviewed country conditions evidence and expert testimony and found that Lopez-Aguilar did not establish that he would more likely than not be tortured by the government or that a public official would acquiesce to harm he might endure at the hands of private actors. The BIA's conclusions are supported by substantial evidence.
Even considering evidence that Lopez-Aguilar was tortured by his father in the past, the record does not compel a finding that his father will more likely than not torture him upon his return. While Lopez-Aguilar suffered horrific abuse at the hands of his father, the abuse happened when Lopez-Aguilar was a small child. Lopez-Aguilar is now an adult, and his father has not tried to contact him in more than twenty years. Lopez-Aguilar's mother, who likewise was subjected to horrific abuse at the hands of his father, was not contacted by his father on either of her return trips to Guatemala. Furthermore, Lopez-Aguilar points to no evidence in the record that any future mistreatment by his father would be inflicted with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or a person acting in an official capacity.
The record does not compel a finding that gang members will more likely than not torture Lopez-Aguilar or that police will more likely than not consent to such torture. Lopez-Aguilar notes that his expert witness, Dr. Kirkland, testified that he would be "caught up in violence" because of his tattoos and that police decline to intervene in gang conflicts. But while Dr. Kirkland concluded that Lopez-Aguilar would likely be "harassed" by gang members, which "could rise to the level of torture," he did not go so far as to say that Lopez-Aguilar was likely to be tortured by gang members.
The record also does not compel a finding that police will more likely than not torture Lopez-Aguilar. Dr. Kirkland testified that police were likely to monitor, stop, and interrogate him, but these actions may not rise to the level of torture.
Finally, the record does not compel a finding that police or the government would consent to Lopez-Aguilar's torture. While there is evidence that the Guatemalan police are struggling to address violence, there is also evidence that the Guatemalan government is taking active steps to combat illegal activities. The BIA correctly noted that "a government does not 'acquiesce' to torture where the government actively, albeit not entirely successfully, combats the illegal activities." Del Cid Marroquin v. Lynch , 823 F.3d 933, 937 (9th Cir. 2016) (per curiam).
Ultimately, "[w]e are not free to look anew at the testimony and then measure the soundness of the [BIA's] decision by what we would have found." Donchev v. Mukasey , 553 F.3d 1206, 1213 (9th Cir. 2009) (footnote omitted). Evidence does not "compel the opposite conclusion just because it would also support a different result." Id. Because the BIA's denial of CAT relief is supported by substantial evidence, we deny Lopez-Aguilar's petition on this ground.
CONCLUSION
We deny Lopez-Aguilar's petition for review. Lopez-Aguilar is removable for having committed an aggravated felony, and the BIA permissibly concluded that Lopez-Aguilar failed to show that he was likely to be tortured if returned to Guatemala.
Petition DENIED.
The dissent disagrees, citing State v. Tolbert for the proposition that Oregon courts prosecute robbery in "situations involving the use of force during flight." 295 Or.App. 6, 433 P.3d 501, 505 (2018). But the Tolbert court also noted that "[a]bsent evidence of 'close pursuit,' . intervening time, distance, and events may well break the link between the theft and the subsequent use of force." Id. at 506. In fact, the Tolbert court reversed the defendant's conviction because "[a]bout 10 to 15 minutes had passed" between the theft and the use of force. Id. This case does not convince us that there is a realistic possibility that Oregon courts would prosecute conduct falling outside the generic definition of theft.
The dissent also cites two cases in which Oregon courts prosecuted defendants for using force against security guards as examples of takings followed by threats or use of force against third parties. But neither case involved a consensual taking. See Pereida-Alba v. Coursey , 356 Or. 654, 342 P.3d 70, 71 (2015) ; State v. Tolson , 24 Or.App. 657, 546 P.2d 1115, 1116 (1976). Furthermore, Oregon treats security guards as authorized agents of the owner. See Or. Rev. Stat. § 131.655 ; see also, e.g. , AFSCME v. City of Lebanon , 360 Or. 809, 388 P.3d 1028, 1038 (2017) (holding that employers can be liable for their employees' conduct); Hoke v. May Dep't Stores Co. , 133 Or.App. 410, 891 P.2d 686 (1995) (holding that a department store is liable for the wrongful acts of its security guard); Gibson v. Safeway Stores, Inc. , 307 Or. 120, 764 P.2d 548 (1988) (holding that the grocery store to which a security-guard service company assigned the guard was his joint employer). Thus, even a conviction for a consensual taking followed by force against a security guard would not fall outside the generic theft definition because security guards are not third parties under Oregon law.