Case Name: Paulo FREYESLEBEN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. COUNTY OF FAIRFAX; J. Thomas Manger, Chief of Police, Fairfax County Police Department; Audrey M. Slyman, Captain, Fairfax County Police Department, Defendants-Appellees
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 2001-01-26
Citations: 2 F. App'x 377
Docket Number: No. 00-2025
Parties: Paulo FREYESLEBEN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. COUNTY OF FAIRFAX; J. Thomas Manger, Chief of Police, Fairfax County Police Department; Audrey M. Slyman, Captain, Fairfax County Police Department, Defendants-Appellees.
Judges: 
Reporter: West's Federal Appendix
Volume: 2
Pages: 377–378

Head Matter:
Paulo FREYESLEBEN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. COUNTY OF FAIRFAX; J. Thomas Manger, Chief of Police, Fairfax County Police Department; Audrey M. Slyman, Captain, Fairfax County Police Department, Defendants-Appellees.
No. 00-2025.
United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.
Submitted Jan. 16, 2001.
Decided Jan. 26, 2001.
Richard E. Gardiner, Fairfax, VA, for appellant. David P. Bobzien, County Attorney, Robert Lyndon Howell, Deputy County Attorney, Ann Gouldin Killalea, Assistant County Attorney, Fairfax, VA, for appellees.
Before WIDENER, WILLIAMS, and MOTZ, Circuit Judges.

Opinion:
OPINION
PER CURIAM.
Paulo Freyesleben filed this action under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (West Supp. 2000), asserting that his termination from employment as a police officer for the County of Fairfax, Virginia, violated his First Amendment rights of belief and association. The district court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss or for summary judgment, and Freyesleben appeals.
We agree with the district court that the facts as asserted by Freyesleben do not support the claim that his constitutionally protected right of association was violated. The association in question clearly was not one of an intimate and thus protected nature, see Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 619, 104 S.Ct. 3244, 82 L.Ed.2d 462 (1984); nor was the association for an expressive purpose protected by the First Amendment. Id. at 622. Contrary to Freyesleben's assertion in his reply brief, the Constitution does not recognize a general right of social association. See City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 25, 109 S.Ct. 1591, 104 L.Ed.2d 18 (1989). The freedom of belief Freyesleben asserts is essentially his belief that his conduct was appropriate. This assertion entitles him to no relief.
Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the district court. We grant Freyesleben's motions to file a supplemental appendix and to file additional materials. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED.