Case Name: Jose De Jesus Arias MARINERO, Petitioner, v. Loretta E. LYNCH, Attorney General, Respondent
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 2016-09-19
Citations: 657 F. App'x 717
Docket Number: No. 14-71409
Parties: Jose De Jesus Arias MARINERO, Petitioner, v. Loretta E. LYNCH, Attorney General, Respondent.
Judges: Before: HAWKINS, N.R. SMITH, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.
Reporter: West's Federal Appendix
Volume: 657
Pages: 717–718

Head Matter:
Jose De Jesus Arias MARINERO, Petitioner, v. Loretta E. LYNCH, Attorney General, Respondent.
No. 14-71409
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
Submitted September 13, 2016
Filed September 19, 2016
Jose De Jesus Arias Marinero, Pro Se
Manuel Palau, DOJ—U.S. Department of Justice Civil Division/Office of Immigration Litigation, Washington, DC, for Respondent
Before: HAWKINS, N.R. SMITH, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

Opinion:
MEMORANDUM
Jose De Jesus Arias Marinero, a native and citizen of El Salvador, petitions pro se for review of the immigration judge's ("IJ") determination under 8 C.F.R. § 1208.31(a) that he did not have a reasonable fear of persecution or torture and thus is not entitled to relief from his reinstated removal order. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 12,52. We review for substantial evidence the agency's factual findings, Andrade-Garcia v. Lynch, 828 F.3d 829, 833-34 (9th Cir. 2016), and we review de novo due process claims, Colmenar v. INS, 210 F.3d 967, 971 (9th Cir. 2000). We deny the petition for review.
We reject Arias Marinero's contentions that the IJ's review was deficient and a violation of due process, see Lata v. INS, 204 F.3d 1241, 1246 (9th Cir. 2000) (requiring error to prevail on a due process claim), and his contention that he was stripped of a right to appeal.
Substantial evidence supports the IJ's conclusion that Arias Marinero failed to establish a reasonable possibility of future persecution on account of a protected ground. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.31(c); Parussimova v. Mukasey, 555 F.3d 734, 740 (9th Cir. 2009) (the REAL ID Act "requires that a protected ground represent 'one central reason' for an asylum applicant's persecution"); Molino-Morales v. INS, 237 F.3d 1048, 1051-52 (9th Cir. 2001) (personal retribution is not persecution on account of a protected ground); Zetino v. Holder, 622 F.3d 1007, 1016 (9th Cir. 2010) ("An alien's desire to be free from harassment by criminals motivated by theft or random violence by gang members bears no nexus to a protected ground.").
Substantial evidence also supports the conclusion that Arias Marinero failed to establish a reasonable possibility of future torture by the government of El Salvador or with its consent or acquiescence. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.31(c); Silaya v. Mukasey, 524 F.3d 1066, 1073 (9th Cir. 2008).
PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.