Case Name: CARVER v. THE STATE
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia
Jurisdiction: Georgia
Decision Date: 1988-06-23
Citations: 258 Ga. 385
Docket Number: 45339
Parties: CARVER v. THE STATE.
Judges: All the Justices concur, except Marshall, C. J., Smith and Bell, JJ., who dissent.
Reporter: Georgia Reports
Volume: 258
Pages: 385–393

Head Matter:
45339.
CARVER v. THE STATE.
(369 SE2d 471)

Opinion:
Clarke, Presiding Justice.
Carver and several other members of the Ku Klux Klan, all wearing white robes and conical hats, conducted a demonstration in a black neighborhood in Gainesville, Ga. During a verbal confrontation between the demonstrators and neighborhood residents, Carver reached into his robe and said to a resident, "Get back, I'll shoot." Carver was convicted of making a terroristic threat. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, Carver v. State, 185 Ga. App. 436 (364 SE2d 877) (1987), and we granted Carver's petition for certiorari. A more detailed account of the facts appears in the Court of Appeals opinion.
Carver objects to the admission of certain evidence he deems prejudicial. The trial court admitted evidence of Carver's possession of guns at previous Klan rallies, Carver's racist telephone messages recorded to answer inquiries about this demonstration, evidence of an earlier arrest of one of the other demonstrators, and the cost to the public of policing the demonstration and its effect on law enforcement. He also complains that the trial court erred in quashing his subpoenaes for the production of documents in the possession of Southland Publishing Company d/b/a The Times.
1. A person commits the offense of a terroristic threat when he threatens to commit any crime of violence. OCGA § 16-11-37. The crime of terroristic threats is complete when the threat is communicated to the victim and is coupled with the intent to terrorize. Boone v. State, 155 Ga. App. 937 (274 SE2d 49) (1980). Since a deliberate intent to terrorize is an integral part of the crime, evidence showing terroristic intent is not only relevant, but necessary, to proving such a case. The disputed evidence was properly admitted to show Carver's terroristic intent.
2. We find no error in the Court of Appeals holding that Carver failed to show he was denied material exculpatory information from the files of The Times.
3. On direct examination the police chief was asked by the State if police officers were on duty at the scene of the demonstration. The witness responded affirmatively and then volunteered that the cost of this was about $13,000 to the county. At this point, defense counsel objected stating as his grounds that the testimony had no probative value. The district attorney then stated, "We don't insist on it." In response to all this, the court instructed the jury to disregard any testimony as to the cost of officers being present. The record does not indicate a motion for mistrial or a request for any further curative instructions.
The Court of Appeals held the testimony of the police chief to be irrelevant but found that the defense had opened the door to the testimony by its cross-examination of a local law enforcement officer. We find no harmful error, particularly in view of the court's instructions and the failure of the defense to pursue the matter further.
Judgment affirmed.
All the Justices concur, except Marshall, C. J., Smith and Bell, JJ., who dissent.