Case Name: In re ESTATE of Adrian Clyde HUMPHREYS, Jr., Deceased
Court: Florida Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1974-06-26
Citations: 299 So. 2d 595
Docket Number: No. 44675
Parties: In re ESTATE of Adrian Clyde HUMPHREYS, Jr., Deceased.
Judges: ADKINS, C. J„ and BOYD and DE-KLE, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 299
Pages: 595–600

Head Matter:
In re ESTATE of Adrian Clyde HUMPHREYS, Jr., Deceased.
No. 44675.
Supreme Court of Florida.
June 26, 1974.
Rehearing Denied Sept. 24, 1974.
Ervin, J., dissented and filed opinion in which Roberts and Overton, JJ., concurred.
Curtin R. Coleman of Coleman, Leonard, Morrison & Riddle, Fort Lauderdale, for appellants.
Harry'G. Carratt of Morgan, Carratt & O’Connor, Fort Lauderdale, for Harry G. Carratt.
Elizabeth Athanasakos, Fort Lauderdale, for Ellen M. Coxeter Humphreys.

Opinion:
McCAIN, Justice.
This case is before the Court on direct appeal from an Order entered in the Circuit Court in Broward County, Florida, upholding the constitutionality of the Florida Dower Statutes in force in 1972, to-wit: Florida Statutes § 731.34 — 731.36 and 733.-09-733.14 (1971), F.S.A. We have jurisdiction pursuant to Article V, Section 3(b)(1), Florida Constitution, F.S.A.
The question raised for our review is whether an ex-wife may challenge the constitutional validity of the dower statutes alleging that they invidiously discriminated against males. And, if so, then whether the statutes which were in effect at the time of the decedent's death, do in fact discriminate against males.
The facts of this case are that the deceased married his first wife in 1942, and two children were born of the marriage. Some time in 1967, irreconcilable differences arose between the co-partners and they obtained a divorce; pursuant to which a separation agreement was entered into which provided for monthly payments and other financial benefits payable to the first wife.
The first wife obtained a Final Money Judgment on January 31, 1972 which judgment also dissolved the marriage on the Counterclaim of the now deceased husband. Thereafter the deceased remarried and later executed a will to. the exclusion of his first wife, but including his second wife, his children from the prior marriage and his mother.
The decedent died on September 25, 1972, leaving his second wife as the surviving widow, and his first wife as a judgment creditor.
The decedent's will, dated July 25, 1972, was duly admitted to probate on September 27, 1972. The first wife filed her Statement of Claim in January, 1973. When it became clear that very little would be left in the estate after the satisfaction of the first wife's claim, the second wife filed her Election to Take Dower.
The first wife then filed her Objections to the Election to Take Dower and alleged inter alia that:
"B. The Florida dower statutes under which the instant election to take dower was made are unconstitutional, being in violation of the Constitutions of both the United States and the State of Florida, including the failure to provide equal protection uñder the law and allowing for invidious discrimination against members of the male sex."
In his Order dated October 25, 1973, the Circuit Judge ruled that:
"2. That the petitioners have the right and are the proper parties to question the constitutionality of the dower statutes.
"3. That the dower statutes do not clearly violate organic law; therefore, the statutes are declared to be constitutional." .
From this Order, timely Notice of Appeal was filed.
Interesting logic is raised by this appeal. The appellant asserts that the operation of the dower statutes discriminates against males. Yet to so find in this case would defeat the intent of the male testator. He seeks, by virtue of his will, to have his estate divided between his second wife and the remainder of his family. He is succored in his intent by the operation of the dower statutes which have the effect of protecting his widow in the event there are insufficient funds available after the judgment and other creditors are satisfied. The first wife, who then stands in the position of a judgment creditor, attempts to destroy the dower rights alleging that they are discriminatory against males.
In order to properly review a constitutional challenge the party raising the issue must have the requisite interest. While the first wife, as a judgment creditor, may' suffer from the operation of the dower statutes as they existed, their alleged discrimination is in no way directed against her. It is a well settled principle of constitutional litigation that a person challenging the discrimination must be adversely affected by the statute's operation.
" . . . [I]n all instances when the constitutionality of a law is attacked, such an issue will not be ruled on except at the suit of a person affected adversely by the alleged invalid aspect of the law. [Citations]."
Therefore, the proper party to raise the issue of discriminatory operation of the dower statutes must of necessity have been a male widower who elected to take dower in his deceased wife's estate and was denied that right by the very operation of the statutes, as they at one time existed.
Since the first wife is not discriminated against adversely, she does not have standing to raise the constitutional challenge. All of the cases cited by the appellant deal with fact situations where, by operation of statutes, females are deprived of equal protection and the female raises the issue of discrimination, and are thus clearly distinguishable.
Therefore since the appellant does not have the requisite standing, the Circuit Judge erred in considering and passing upon the constitutionality of the statutes, and we do not, by this Opinion, in any way deal with their constitutionality.
This cause is hereby remanded with directions to the Court below to vacate its Order entered October 25, 1973, and to proceed consistently with the view expressed herein.
It is so ordered.
ADKINS, C. J" and BOYD and DE-KLE, JJ., concur.
ERVIN, J., dissents with opinion.
ROBERTS and OVERTON, JJ., dissent and concur with ERVIN, J.
. A widow's right to elect dower is controlled by the dower statutes as they existed at the time of the death of the husband. In re: Rogers Estate, 171 So.2d 428 (Fla.App.1965). Although the Florida Dower Statutes were amended by subsequent action of the Legislature, Chapter 73-107, Laws of Florida (1973), to allow a widower as well as a widow to elect to take dower, the parties before the courts in this action are governed by the existing law in effect prior to the legislative change.
. State v. Turner, 224 So.2d 290 (Fla.1969.)
. Cooper v. Sinclair, 66 So.2d 702, 703 (Fla. 1953). See also: State ex rel. McClure v. Sullivan, 43 So.2d 438 (Fla.1949); Henderson v. Antonacci, 62 So.2d 5 (Fla.1952); Acme Moving & Storage Co. of Jacksonville v. Mason, 167 So.2d 555 (Fla.1964); and City of Cape Canaveral v. Chesnick, 227 So.2d 502 (Fla.App.1969).