Case Name: UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. John Herbert EADES, Appellant
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 1980-10-09
Citations: 633 F.2d 1075
Docket Number: No. 78-5216
Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. John Herbert EADES, Appellant.
Judges: 
Reporter: Federal Reporter 2d Series
Volume: 633
Pages: 1075–1079

Head Matter:
UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. John Herbert EADES, Appellant.
No. 78-5216.
United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.
Argued June 3, 1980.
Decided Oct. 9, 1980.
Stanley J. Reed, Asst. Federal Public Defender (Charles G. Bernstein, Federal Public Defender, Peter D. Ward, Asst. Federal Public Defender, Susan Preston, Law Clerk, Baltimore, Md., on brief), for appellant.
Richard D. Bennett, Asst. U. S. Atty., Baltimore, Md. (Russell T. Baker, Jr., U. S. Atty., Lynne A. Battaglia, Asst. U. S. Atty., Baltimore, Md., on brief), for appellee.
Before HAYNSWORTH, Chief Judge, and WINTER, BUTZNER, RUSSELL, WIDENER, HALL, PHILLIPS, MURNA-GHAN, SPROUSE and ERVIN, Circuit Judges, sitting en banc.

Opinion:
HAYNSWORTH, Chief Judge:
A divided panel of this court reversed the defendant's conviction on two counts under the Assimilative Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C.A. § 13, of third degree sexual offenses in violation of Article 27, § 464B(a)(l)(iii) of the Annotated Code of Maryland. The government filed a petition for rehearing en banc, which was granted. Now, after oral argument before the en banc court, a majority of the judges in regular active service holds that the defendant's conviction on Counts 2 and 6 of the third degree sexual offenses was not precluded by 18 U.S.C.A. § 113. The reasons for the majority's conclusion are adequately stated in the opinion of the dissenting judge. United States v. Eades, 615 F.2d 617, 624 (4th Cir. 1980) (Haynsworth, C. J., dissenting).
The suggestion in the dissenting opinion after the en banc rehearing of inconsistency requires a further word.
The problem is one of preemption by a comprehensive federal assault statute, 18 U.S.C.A. § 113, of a comprehensive Maryland sexual offense statute, Article 27, § 461, et seq., Annotated Code of Maryland. The key to the answer is our perception of congressional intention. That perception is enlightened by a consideration of the apparent purpose of the Congress in the enactment of § 113.
The Congress had been concerned with some sexual offenses committed within the special territorial and maritime jurisdiction of the United States. Rape is a serious offense made unlawful by 18 U.S.C. § 2031, while carnal knowledge of a female under the age of sixteen years and not married to the defendant is proscribed by 18 U.S.C. § 2032. Section 113, however, deals entirely with assaults. In it there is only one reference to a sexual offense. Assault with the intent to commit murder or rape is made unlawful by § 113(a), but that does not suggest that in the enactment of § 113 Congress intended to deal comprehensively, or even generally, with sexual offenses. That it did not have such an intention is strongly suggested by its enactment of separate statutes dealing with carnal knowledge of a female without her consent or under the age of sixteen years.
Under common law concepts, Wilson's conduct was appropriately catalogued as assault with intent to commit rape. He touched the victim's sex organ without her consent and told her that he intended to have intercourse with her, provoking her reaction to effect her escape. It was conduct specifically proscribed by § 113(a). It was conduct which also falls within the more generalized language of Maryland's § 464B(a)(l)(iii), but surely Congress could not have intended that conduct specifically proscribed by § 113(a) be again punishable under the Assimilative Crimes Act.
To that extent, there is an overlap of the federal assault statute with Maryland's sexual offense statute, but we are unaware of any rule that any such slight touching of federal and state statutes, generally having different purposes, means that the state statute cannot be assimilated in other contexts in which there is no relevant federal statute proscribing the specific conduct in which the defendant has engaged.
There is also a slight touching of the two statutes in the sense that the great majority of the offenses proscribed by Maryland's sexual offense statutes may be said to encompass simple assault as a lesser included offense. The fact that simple assault is made unlawful by § 113(e), however, does not convert the federal assault statute into a general sexual offense statute. One asked to catalogue the conduct of Eades in forcefully fondling the genitals of his second victim and banging her head on the floor, would hardly entitle it "simple assault." There is simply no indication that Congress, in the enactment of § 113, intended to deal with that kind of offense.
We conclude that federal preemption of a state statute in one context when the defendant's conduct is clearly proscribed by a federal statute does not necessarily preempt the state statute in other contexts when the defendant's conduct is no where addressed by any federal statute. It is a matter of congressional intention. We find no congressional intention to preempt the prosecution under the Assimilative Crimes Act and Maryland § 464B(a)(l)(iii) of Eades for the sexual conduct in which he engaged, which is not proscribed by § 113 or any other federal statute, unless it is treated as only a simple assault.
Part III of the opinion for the panel majority has not been reconsidered and remains in effect.
Accordingly, the defendant's conviction of the third degree sexual offenses charged in Counts 2 and 6, as well as his convictions upon charges in Counts 3, 7 and 9, are all affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
. The pertinent portions of the text of § 464B follow:
§ 464B. Third Degree Sexual Offense.
(a} What constitutes. A person is guilty of a sexual offense in the third degree if the person engages in sexual contact:
(1) With another person against the will and without the consent of the other person, and: *
(ill) Threatens or places the victim in fear that the victim . . . will be imminently subjected to death, suffocation, strangulation, disfigurement, serious physical injury, or kidnapping
*
(b) Penalty. A person violating the provisions of this section is guilty of a felony and upon conviction is subject to imprisonment for a period of not more than 10 years.
. The problem arises most frequently when the federal statute is a comprehensive one covering a wide range of criminal activity, as § 113 does. It is perhaps exacerbated if the state statute is a comprehensive one. Maryland's sexual offense statutes are certainly comprehensive. Even if attention is focused upon 464B(a)(l)(iii) its general terms reach varied conduct, including Wilson's assault with intent to commit rape, since there was sexual contact, and the kind of offensive touching committed by Eades, though there was no apparent intention of committing rape.