Case Name: TERRITORY OF ARIZONA, Respondent, v. MILTON B. DUFFIELD, Appellant
Court: Arizona Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Arizona
Decision Date: 1872-01
Citations: 1 Ariz. 58
Docket Number: 
Parties: TERRITORY OF ARIZONA, Respondent, v. MILTON B. DUFFIELD, Appellant.
Judges: 
Reporter: Arizona Reports
Volume: 1
Pages: 58–74

Head Matter:
TERRITORY OF ARIZONA, Respondent, v. MILTON B. DUFFIELD, Appellant.
Indictment should Charge One Oeeense Only, and therefore an indictment which in one count charges the offense of resisting an officer in the execution of process, and in another count charges the offense of assault with a deadly weapon upon the person of the same officer, v/ith intent to put him in fear and to compel him to obey an unlawful command of the defendant, is bad.
In All Criminal Cases Court must Charge Jury in Writing, unless the defendant expressly waive his right to have the charge so given. The judge must commit his instructions to writing and read them to the jury from the original manuscript; and where this is not done, the error is not cured by subsequently reducing them to writing.
Appeal from the district court of Pima county. The facts are stated in the opinion.
G. W. G. Boivell, for the appellant.
The first count in the indictment charges an offense. See Howell’s Code, p. 64, sec. 94.
The second count in the indictment charges another offense. See Howell’s Code, p. 55, sec. 50.
Two separate and distinct offenses are charged in the indictment, which is error. See Howell’s Code, p. 96, secs. 215, 217.
The defendant liad, the constitutional right to have arms. See Const.; Howell’s Code, page 453, art. 2, amendments; argumentatively, Howell’s Code, page 97, sec. 224.
If the indictment be for felony, the defendant must be present at the rendition of the verdict. And the record should so show. Howell’s Code, page 112, sec. 384.
Indictment should charge but one offense. See People v. Garnett, 29 Cal. 622.
Courts in their charges to the jury should not, either directly or indirectly, assume the guilt of the accused, nor use equivocal phrases which may leave such an impression. People v. Williams, 17 Cal. 142. Nor should the court assume a conclusive effect to circumstances, or assume that such circumstances were proven. People v. Levison, 16 Cal. 98; People v. Dick, 32 Id. 213.
Eefusing a proper instruction is not cured by the fact that it was given in substance. People v. Ramirez, 13 Cal. 172.
What purports to be a judgment in this case is no judgment at all. See Howell’s Code, p. 118, sec. 421; also, In re Edward Ring, 28 Cal. 247.
Law is that the charge of the court must be in writing when delivered unless waived. See act of 1867, page 53, sec. 368.
G. E. Oury, for the respondent.
The two counts in the indictment are properly joined. Howell’s Code, chap, xi., sec. 217. Kane v. People, 8 Wend. 211.
Judgment may be rendered on any one good count. Id. 213, 214.
The difference in punishment of the two counts in the indictment is not so great as in grand larceny and receiving stolen goods. Howell’s Code, chap, x., sec. 60, 63.
It has been held that counts for stealing and receiving stolen goods may be joined in the same indictment, and the court will neither quash the indictment nor compel the prosecutor to elect upon which count he will proceed. A receiver may be indicted as an accessary in one count, and for a substantive felony in another count; and although in his discretion the judge may put the prosecutor to his elec tion, he will not do so whenever it is clear that there is only one offense, and the joinder of the counts can not prejudice the defendant. Train and Heard’s Precedent of Indictments, pp. 447, 448.
When the defendant was indicted in several counts for stabbing with intent to murder, with intent to maim and disable, and with intent to do grievous bodily harm, it was held that the prosecutor was not bound to elect on which count he would proceed, notwithstanding the judgment is different: in the first count capital, and in the other transportation. Roscoe’s Crim. Ev., pp. 189, 190.
It can not be objected in error that two or more offenses of the same nature, on which the same or a similar judgment may be given, are contained in different counts in the same indictment; nor can such objection be maintained either on demurrer or arrest. 1 Wharton’s Criminal Law, sec. 415.
In New Tort, in cases of felony where two or more repugnant offenses are contained in the same indictment, it may be quashed, or the prosecutor compelled to elect on which charge he will proceed; but such election will not be required to be made when several counts are inserted in an indictment solely for the purpose of meeting the evidence as it may transpire on the trial, the charges being substantially for the same offense. Id., sec. 423.
The two counts charge substantially the same offense, and not two separate and distinct offenses. The date, the place, and the names of the magistrate and of the person on whom the assault is charged to have been made, being identical in each count, show that the same act is charged, in each count, as the offense. People v. Thompson, 28 Cal. 215.
Under our practice, where two offenses charged to have been committed by the same act are both stated in the same indictment, the objection must betaken by demurrer, or it will be deemed waived, and a verdict of guilty of either offense will not be disturbed on that groud. People v. Garnett, 29 Cal. 626.
The demurrer in this case does not state any ground for which a demurrer will lie. Howell’s Code, chap, si., secs. 211, 265.
The proceedings of the court are presumed to be regular and legal until the contrary is shown, and it must be affirmatively shown that error has been committed. People v. Connor, 17 Cal. 361, 362.
If the instruction may be correct under any supposed state of facts, as the appellant must show affirmative error, we presume in favor of the judgment below, and will not reverse the judgment when no statement appears. People v. Levison, 16 Cal. 100; People v. King, 27 Id. 514.
Judges must still, as formerly, state what facts are in evidence, and what are not; or in other words, they may state the evidence pro and con, in view of which the existence of certain facts is affirmed or denied, which includes the right to state to the jury that there is no evidence as to the particular facts or issues, when such is the case. People v. King, 27 Id., 513.
The court may charge the jury as to the credibility of a witness. People v. Cronin, 34 Id. 204.
The less abstract, the more useful the charge. Jurors find but little assistance in the charge of a judge who deals only in general and abstract propositions which he supposes to be involved in the case, and leaves the jury to apply them as best they may. Id. 204, 205.
When it does not appear that the law has been misrepresented, or the jury misled to the prejudice of the defendant, the judgment will be affirmed. Id., p. 204.
The court did not err in not charging the jury in writing, for the charge is in writing, filed with the papers in the case, and is referred to on the motion for a new trial. See record of the case.
The court did not err in charging the jury as requested by the prosecution, as the charges asked for and given were strictly in accordance with the statutory definition of the offense charged. Howell’s Code, chap, x., secs. 50, 94.
The court did not err in charging the jury in regard to the first count.
The act of 1790 punishes the obstruction of every species of process, legal and judicial, whether issued by the court in session, or by a judge or magistrate acting in that capacity, in the execution of the laws of the United States. 1 Brightly’s Federal Digest, p. 221, sec. 556, title Criminal Law.
The law referred to is almost identical with the law under which the indictment was found. See 1 Stat. at Large, p. 117, sec. 22, and Howell’s Code, chap, x., sec. 91.
To complete the offense, it is not necessary that the person resisting should use or threaten violence. 1 Brightly’s Federal Digest, p. 221, sec. 551, title Criminal Law.
The offense of obstructing process consists in the opposing or obstructing the execution of the writ, by threats or violence, which is in the power of the person to enforce. Id., sec. 558.
The officer is not obliged to risk or expose his person, or to proceed to a personal conflict with the defendant. Id., sec. 559.
Ho indictment shall be deemed insufficient, nor shall the trial, judgment, or other proceedings thereon be affected by reason of any defect or imperfection in matters of form which shall not tend to the prejudice of the defendants. Howell’s Code, chap, xi., sec. 223.
After hearing the appeal, the court shall give judgment without regard to technical error or defect which does not affect the substantial rights of the parties. Id. sec.. 168.

Opinion:
By Court,
Reavis, J.:
This cause was brought into this court on appeal from the district court of Pima county. There are numerous errors complained of on behalf appellant;but we do not feel called upon, nor do we deem it necessary, to examine more than the two following points, urged by counsel for appellant, a proper solution of which, in our judgment, will dispose of this whole matter:
First, it is claimed that the indictment in this cause in the court below contains two separate and distinct charges; and second, that the court erred in delivering an oral charge to a jury when the same should have been in writing, the defendant not having waived his right to have it so given.
There are two counts in the indictment, and the record shows that the jury returned a verdict of guilty as charged in both.
The first charges the defendant with an offense against public justice, to wit, in resisting the sheriff of Pima county in attempting to execute a lawful order of the judge of the district court for said county, issued while sitting in the capacity of a committing magistrate, and directed to such sheriff for execution. Sec. 94, Criminal Code.
The second charges an offense against the person of an individual, that is to say, with an assault with a deadly weapon upon the person of said sheriff, with intent to put him in fear, and by fear to compel such sheriff to obey an unlawful command of said defendant. Sec. 50, Criminal Code.
We have no doubt of the erroneous joinder of those two offenses in the same indictment. Section 217 of our criminal code provides that "the indictment shall charge but one offense, but it may set forth that offense in different forms under different counts. " In the case before us, it can not be claimed, as we think, with any kind of propriety, that the same offense has been set forth in different forms in the several counts therein contained. The offenses are wholly dissimilar, and can have no possible connection. The first is a crime against the public justice of the country, without reference to the person of the officer; while the second is a crime against the person of an individual, without reference to his official character. The other point to which our attention is directed is one of the gravest importance, and demands careful and serious consideration. The criminal code, sec. 368 of the compiled laws, requires the judge in all criminal cases to give his instruction to the jury in writing, unless its being so given shall be expressly waived by the defendant in each particular case in open court. How does the fact stand in this case ? The record shows that the presiding judge below charged the jury orally, and that on the day following the return of the verdict, he filed with the clerk a manuscript purporting to be the charge he had given the jury the day before. Was this a substantial compliance with the statute ? We think not. In the case of the People v. Ah Fong, 12 Cal. 345, the supreme court held, that "the fact that the judge told the counsel he would put the instruction in writing if desired does not help the error." This was after the charge was given. The mischief intended to be prevented by the act might have been partly done. The court further remarked in that case: "In such trials the exact ^language used is ofjj^^orgotten or differently un derstood by different persons; and in the press of business, •with his attention diverted to various matters, it is next to impossible for a judge to remember days after the trial precisely what occurred during its progress." The same principle was decided in People v. O'Hara, by that court during the same term. It is true that the language of the statute under which the decisions referred to were made, is not identical with that o£ the statute of this territory on the same subject; yet we are of the opinion that the spirit and intent of the two acts are for all the purposes of justice substantially the same in effect. When the charge of the court to the jury in a criminal case is required to be given in writing, the presiding judge must first reduce it to writing and deliver its contents to the jury by reading in their hearing from the original manuscript. And it is no answer that the charge of tb£© court was in writing at the time of its delivery to the jury when the judge gives orally from his recollection what purports to be the contents of the written charge. The jury in that case would be left wholly dependent upon the memory of the judge for the accuracy of his statements, however widely they might differ from those he had reduced to writing, and which, when filed, the law makes a part of the record.
The true point of inquiry is, What did the judge charge ?
The defendant in a criminal case has an undoubted right to hear every word uttered by the judge to the jury, written at large in the record, and a failure to do so when required, touching the charge to the jury, as the law directs, is error.
The substantial requirements of the law in the particulars mentioned, not having been complied with, on the trial of this cause in the court below, the judgment must be reversed; and as we are of opinion that no valid conviction can be had upon the indictment herein, no new trial will be ordered.
It is therefore directed that the bail of appellant herein be and it is hereby exonerated, and the cause remanded for such further proceedings as shall be necessary and proper according to law.
Tweed, J., concurred.