Case Name: John W. IRELAND, Appellant, v. Blake Allen DAVIS, Appellee
Court: Kentucky Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Kentucky
Decision Date: 1997-12-12
Citations: 957 S.W.2d 310
Docket Number: No. 96-CA-0367-DG
Parties: John W. IRELAND, Appellant, v. Blake Allen DAVIS, Appellee.
Judges: Before BUCKINGHAM, HUDDLESTON and JOHNSON, JJ.
Reporter: South Western Reporter Second Series
Volume: 957
Pages: 310–314

Head Matter:
John W. IRELAND, Appellant, v. Blake Allen DAVIS, Appellee.
No. 96-CA-0367-DG.
Court of Appeals of Kentucky.
Dec. 12, 1997.
Ernesto Scorsone, Michelle M. Ciccarelli, Susan C. Sears, Lexington, for Appellant.
No Brief for Appellee.
Before BUCKINGHAM, HUDDLESTON and JOHNSON, JJ.

Opinion:
OPINION
BUCKINGHAM, Judge.
John Ireland (Ireland) appeals from an order of the Fayette Circuit Court affirming an order of the Fayette District Court which dismissed a domestic violence order (DVO) that had been entered against Blake Allen Davis (Davis). For the reasons set forth hereinafter, we reverse and remand.
Ireland and Davis are homosexual males who were living together in an intimate relationship. Difficulties in the relationship arose which prompted Ireland to file a domestic violence petition in the Fayette District Court alleging that he had been abused by Davis. Following a hearing, a DVO was entered which ordered Davis to refrain from having any contact with Ireland. Several months later, Ireland filed an affidavit alleging that Davis had violated the terms of the DVO. Pursuant to the affidavit, a show cause warrant for Davis was signed by a Fayette District Court judge. Another district judge, however, set aside the arrest warrant and dismissed the entire domestic violence proceeding on the stated grounds that he lacked jurisdiction under the domestic violence statutes (KRS 403.715 -.785) because Ireland and Davis are of the same gender.
Ireland appealed the order dismissing the proceedings, but the Fayette Circuit Court entered an order affirming the dismissal order of the Fayette District Court. The matter is now before this court on discretionary review.
KRS 403.725(1) states in part that "[a]ny family member or member of an unmarried couple who is a resident of this state or has fled to this state to escape domestic violence and abuse may file a verified petition in the District Court of the county in which he resides." KRS 403.725(3) states that "[a] petition filed pursuant to subsection (1) of this section may be filed by the family member or member of an unmarried couple seeking relief or by an adult family member or member of an unmarried couple on behalf of a minor family member." Since Ireland and Davis are not family members as that term is defined under KRS 403.720(2), then they must meet the definition of "members of an unmarried couple" in order to fall within the protection of KRS 403.725. KRS 403.720(3) states that " '[m]ember of an unmarried couple' means each member of an unmarried couple which allegedly has a child in common, any children of that couple, or a member of an unmarried cowple who are living together or have formerly lived together." (Emphasis added.)
The Fayette Circuit Court determined that the definition of "member of an unmarried couple" was ambiguous in that it defined the term using the same term. Citing City of Owensboro v. Noffsinger, Ky., 280 S.W.2d 517 (1955), it then looked to the prior version of the domestic violence statutes (which required an unmarried couple to have a child in common in order to be afforded domestic violence protection) and determined that since same-sex couples cannot have a child in common, the new statute did not extend protection to such couples.
When the domestic violence statutes were amended in 1992, the General Assembly extended protection from domestic violence to a new class of individuals—those members of an unmarried couple who either are living together or have lived together but who do not have a child in common. The language of the statute is unambiguous, even though it is gender-neutral and does not specifically include or specifically exclude same-sex couples from its scope.
It would be illogical to apply the Noffsinger ease and interpret the newly enacted portion of the statute by relying on the prior version which did not contain the provision in question. It would be even more illogical to do so when Such an interpretation leads to the conclusion that the General Assembly did not intend to change the effect of the statute, despite enacting extensive revisions to it. The ruling of the Fayette Circuit Court, carried to its logical conclusion, would deprive unmarried heterosexual couples of the protection of the domestic violence statutes if the couple did not have a child in common. Such a result would be clearly contrary to the statute's purpose and would render the amended portion of the statute completely ineffective.
The Fayette Circuit Court also held that since the domestic violence statutes are found in KRS Chapter 403 which is entitled "Dissolution of Marriage—Child Custody," then the statute may not extend protection to same-sex couples since they cannot be married and cannot have a child in common. This line of reasoning is flawed,- however, since the domestic violence statutes afford protection not only to persons who are married but also to the others listed in the statutes, including unmarried couples.
The Fayette Circuit Court also reasoned that if domestic violence protection is afforded to more than married couples and couples with a child in common, then such protection would have to be afforded to roommates. Although the word "couple" is not defined in the statutes, we believe that it refers to two people engaged in an intimate relationship and would not include roommates. The reasoning of the Fayette Circuit Court that courts would be required to make inquiries into the intimate relationships of all roommates to determine whether they may be afforded protection by the domestic violence statutes is true. However, such an inquiry is already necessary for members of couples of the opposite sex who are roommates and who seek domestic violence protection.
The Fayette Circuit Court also states that same-sex couples have other avenues, such as the criminal complaint and arrest in a criminal proceeding and a restraining order in a civil proceeding, by which to seek protection from domestic violence. This begs the question and also overlooks the fact that to exclude same-sex couples on this basis would be to deny them the same protection that other couples are afforded.
In short, we hold that the domestic violence statutes (KRS 403.715—.785) afford protection to same-sex couples just as they do to the others enumerated therein. The General Assembly has not given preferential treatment to same-sex couples or homosexuals; rather, it has provided for equal treatment under the law for same-sex or homosexual victims of domestic violence.
The orders of the Fayette Circuit Court and the Fayette District Court are reversed, and the case is remanded to the Fayette District Court for the reinstatement of the domestic violence proceedings that were dismissed.
HUDDLESTON, J., concurs.
JOHNSON, J., dissents and files a separate opinion.
. The Fayette Circuit Court noted in its opinion that the courts of the Commonwealth are in need of guidance from the appellate courts or from the legislature on the issue involved in this appeal.
. That statute defines a family member as "a spouse, including a former spouse, a parent, a child, a stepchild, or any other person related by consanguinity or affinity within the second degree[.]"
.The Court of Appeals held in this case that when "construing a statute which is ambiguous, or when the meaning is not clear, a court may look to a prior act from which it was taken Noffsinger, supra, at 519.
. One of the puiposes of the domestic violence statutes is "[t]o allow persons who are victims of domestic violence and abuse to obtain effective, short-term protection against further violence and abuse in order that their lives will be as secure and as uninterrupted as possible!.]" KRS 403.715(1).
. We will not address the equal protection of the law constitutional argument since we can decide the case on a basis other than constitutional grounds. See 5 Am.Jur.2d Appellate Review § 703 (1995).