Case Name: TROPICAL PARK, Inc., a Florida corporation, and Maurine J. Hirshstein, Petitioners, v. C. H. RATLIFF, John R. Ring, J. D. Johnson, C. Sweet Smith and Warren H. Toole, Jr., as and constituting the Florida State Racing Commission, Respondents
Court: Florida Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1957-08-14
Citations: 97 So. 2d 169
Docket Number: 
Parties: TROPICAL PARK, Inc., a Florida corporation, and Maurine J. Hirshstein, Petitioners, v. C. H. RATLIFF, John R. Ring, J. D. Johnson, C. Sweet Smith and Warren H. Toole, Jr., as and constituting the Florida State Racing Commission, Respondents.
Judges: TERRELL, C. J., ROBERTS and O’CONNELL, JJ., and ALLEN, District Judge, concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 97
Pages: 169–177

Head Matter:
TROPICAL PARK, Inc., a Florida corporation, and Maurine J. Hirshstein, Petitioners, v. C. H. RATLIFF, John R. Ring, J. D. Johnson, C. Sweet Smith and Warren H. Toole, Jr., as and constituting the Florida State Racing Commission, Respondents.
Supreme Court of Florida.
Aug. 14, 1957.
On Rehearing Oct. 4, 1957.
Walter E. Dence, Miami, for petitioner Maurice J. Hirshstein.
Worley, Gautier & Dawes, Miami, for petitioner Tropical Park, Inc.
Richard W. Ervin, Atty. Gen., George E. Owen, Asst. Atty. Gen., George F. Gille-land, Atty., State Racing Commission, Miami, Richard E. Gerstein, State .Atty., 11th Judicial Circuit, and Leonard R. Mc-Millen, Administrative Assistant, 11th Judicial Circuit, Miami, for respondents.

Opinion:
On Rehearing
PER CURIAM.
Upon reconsideration on rehearing granted, we adhere to the judgment previously entered. The special concurring opinion by Mr. Justice Hobson sets forth the history pf the litigation and the points involved on the appeal. No further discussion is needed as to charges one, two, three, five, six and eight, since it clearly appears from what was said in such opinion that the Commission's order, insofar as it was predicated upon these charges and the evidence submitted, cannot be sustained.
As to charge seven, it-appears that such was predicated upon a violation by Mr. Silberman, president of Tropical Park, Inc., of Rule 386(B) of the Commission, which reads as follows: "The Association is responsible to see that no unauthorized person used their telephones during the period from thirty (30) minutes prior to the first race to fifteen (15) minutes after the last race of the day." Mr. Silberman admitted that he' állowed' employees and bona fide patrons bf the track to use his private telephone at any time, and thus there was a technical violation of the Commission's rule. Section 550.07, Fla.Stat.1955, F.S.A., authorizes the Commission to revoke a racing permit or license only "upon the willful violation of any of the provisions of this chapter, or of any rule or regulation issued by the commission under the provisions of this chapter, by the licensee." (Emphasis added.) The words "or of any rule or regulation issued by the commission under the provisions of this chapter" were added to the statute by Ch. 17276, Acts of 1935. Prior to the amendment, this court held that the word "willful" as used in the statute meant "knowingly and of a stubborn purpose, with evil intent, without justificable (sic) excuse." Six Mile Creek Kennel Club, Inc., v. State Racing Commission, 1935, 119 Fla. 142, 161 So. 58, 59.
. Apparently conceding that there was no direct evidence to show that Mr. Silber-nian's violation of the rule was "willful" as above defined, the Commission contends that "the manner in which the telephone calls were made, the place called, the person called, the person doing the calling, the time of the calls and duration of these calls concerning horse racing has imputed the knowledge as to the illegal use to the petitioner." If by "illegal use" the Commission meant a use for an illegal purpose, the answer to this contention is contained in the opinion by Mr. Justice Hobson in his discussion of charges six and eight. If, on the other hand, by "illegal use" the Commission intended to refer to a use by an unauthorized person or persons, we agree that the evidence was sufficient to show a technical violation of Rule 386(B) by Mr. Silberman.
So the question now before us narrows down to whether or not the technical violation of the above-mentioned rule is sufficient to warrant the revocation of petitioner's license. In this connection the Commission contends that "[t]he writ of certiorari may not be used to determine the weight of the evidence or the sufficiency of the evidence where there is some evidence supporting the judgment complained of, and the Supreme Court will not examine the evidence to determine whether it is of Sufficient probative force to sustain the verdict While administrative agencies are given broad latitude in the performance of their duties, we cannot accept a contention that their decisions in the exercise of a quasi-judicial function are beyond the reach of the judicial process, regardless of how arbitrary or unreasonable they might be. To do so would be tantamount to an abdication of the power and responsibility reposed in the courts by Sec. 4 of the Declaration of Rights of our Constitution, F.S.A., in the following language:
"All courts in this State shall be open, so that every person for any injury done him in his lands, goods, person or reputation shall have remedy, by due course of law, and right and justice shall be administered without sale, denial or delay."
The rule as to judicial review of administrative decisions is well stated, and the statement supported by numerous decisions, in 42 Am.Jur., Public Administrative Law, Sec. 209, p. 610 et scq., as follows:
"In general, in the absence of valid statutory provisions or other factors affecting the scope and extent of judicial review, administrative determinations will not be interfered with by the courts unless, but will be interfered with where, the determination is without or in excess of the statutory powers and jurisdiction of the administrative authority, the determination is an exercise of power so arbitrary or unreasonable as virtually to transcend the authority conferred, or is otherwise an abuse of discretion,
This is the rule in Florida. See State ex rel. Williams v. Whitman, 1934, 116 Fla. 196, 156 So. 705, 95 A.L.R. 1416; Six Mile Creek Kennel Club, Inc., v. State Racing Commission, supra, 161 So. 58; Cohen v. Schott, Fla.1950, 48 So.2d 154, 156; cf. Schott v. Brooks, Fla.1952, 56 So.2d 456.
In Cohen v. Schott, supra, this court reviewed a decision of the State Beverage Director revoking a beverage license of the licensee because of an admitted violation of the Beverage Act prohibiting the sale of intoxicating beverages to minors. In holding that the Beverage Director was not justified, under the facts, in so doing, this court speaking through Mr. Justice Terrell said:
"The law makes the sale of intoxicating beverages a legitimate business, imposes a high tax for the privilege of engaging in it and exacts a high degree of rectitude of those who do so. An inquisition into a charge of violating the conditions of one's license is in no sense criminal but equitable in nature and should be adjudicated on equitable principals. (Emphasis added.)
"In a collection of memorabilia of early Western history there was discovered the record of the trial of a man for stealing a pair of boots. The boots were indicated as exhibit A. The verdict of the jury was not guilty — but with the recommendation that the defendant return the boots. We are convinced that these primitive jurors had a very discriminating sense of justice that is too fast being relegated to the limbo of the law by technical niceties. I am often made to feel that a better brand of Justice would follow if we cultivated it more."
The facts with which we are here concerned are very similar to those in Cohen v. Schott, supra. There was a technical violation of the Commission's Rule 386(B) and undoubtedly some degree of negligence on the part of petitioner's president for which he should be censured and reprimanded. But it must be remembered that the racing industry, like the whiskey industry, is a legitimate business in this state in which millions of dollars have been invested by the petitioner and other owners. Whether or not we approve of pari-mutuel betting at race tracks, we'must accept the fact that the state sovereignty has long since approved it and has laid heavy taxes upon it, which are a substantial part of the tax economy of this state. And to hold that the license of the petitioner could be revoked for this type of dereliction would inculcate into the racing industry an instability of ownership which, in our opinion, would not best serve the public interest. It is of passing interest, although inapplicable in this case, to note that the 1957 Legislature enacted Ch. 57-180, Acts of 1957, F.S.A. § 550.02(4), 550.04, 550.06, 550.07, authorizing the Commission to impose a civil penalty against a licensee for violation of its rules or the statute. This demonstrates that the legislative body recognized that there may be many rule violations where the penalty of revocation would be harsh and oppressive and a civil penalty more in keeping as a penalty for the infraction.
Where, as here, there is no evidence that the negligent supervision of the telephone resulted in any illegal result, it would indeed be harsh and inequitable to impose the extreme penalty of revocation upon petitioner and, in our opinion, would be so arbitrary and unreasonable as virtually to transcend the authority conferred upon the Commission. We hold, therefore, that the order of revocation complained of cannot be predicated upon charge seven; and for this reason, and the reasons stated in the opinion by Mr. Justice Hobson as to the other charges, we adhere to our former judgment. Accordingly, the order here reviewed is quashed, with directions that consideration be given to the imposition of an order of censure or reprimand.
It is so ordered.
TERRELL, C. J., ROBERTS and O'CONNELL, JJ., and ALLEN, District Judge, concur.
HOBSON and DREW, JJ., concur specially.
THOMAS, J., dissents.
. For special concurring opinion by Mr. Justice Hobson see 97 So.2d 172.