Case Name: CAP'S-ON-THE-WATER, INC., et al., Appellants, v. ST. JOHNS COUNTY, et al., Appellees
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 2003-02-21
Citations: 841 So. 2d 507
Docket Number: No. 5D02-988
Parties: CAP’S-ON-THE-WATER, INC., et al., Appellants, v. ST. JOHNS COUNTY, et al., Appellees.
Judges: PALMER, J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 841
Pages: 507–510

Head Matter:
CAP’S-ON-THE-WATER, INC., et al., Appellants, v. ST. JOHNS COUNTY, et al., Appellees.
No. 5D02-988.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
Feb. 21, 2003.
Rehearing Denied April 7, 2003.
Frank D. Upchurch, III, of Upchurch, Bailey and Upchurch, P.A., St. Augustine, for Appellants.
Isabelle Christine Lopez, ' Assistant County Attorney, St. Johns County, St. Augustine, for Appellee, St. Johns County.
Robert L. McLeod, II, St. Augustine, for Appellees, Morsch, et al.

Opinion:
PLEUS, J.
The appellants own a restaurant/bar on the Intracoastal Waterway ("the owners"). The sole issue on appeal is the facial constitutionality of a portion of the St. Johns County Land Development Code (the "Code"). Because we find the ordinance, on its face, does provide for "adequate" standards to be applied by the zoning authorities in making zoning decisions, we affirm the trial court's order upholding the constitutionality of the ordinance.
The portion of the ordinance in question pertains to the conditional grant ing of Special Uses under the Code. Specifically, section 2.03.01-A, entitled "Limitations on Special Uses," provides:
The Planning and Zoning Agency may adopt conditions on any Special Use approval; any such conditions shall be stated in the final order of the Planning and Zoning Agency granting the Special Use.
The ordinance places no limits on the discretion of the Planning and Zoning Agency (the "PZA") to adopt conditions for the special use approval. Read alone, this provision would not pass constitutional muster because the PZA could arbitrarily impose on any applicant any condition that it chose to impose.
In ABC Liquors, Inc. v. City of Ocala, 366 So.2d 146 (Fla. 1st DCA), cert. denied, 376 So.2d 69 (Fla.1979), an ordinance simply allowing a mayor and city council to decide on a case-by-case basis those locations at which the sale of alcoholic beverages would be permitted, and which would not be permitted, was held to be unconstitutional based on the total absence of standards or procedures for guidance in the decision-making process.
Although the ordinance in the instant case does not provide for standards in the decision-making process, it, like any code provision, must be read in the context of the entire document. The County points to the definition of a special use found in Part 12.01.01 of the Code which provides guidance as to when a conditional special use may be found to be appropriate. This code section provides:
Part 12.01.01
Special Use: Means a Use that would not be appropriate generally or without restriction throughout a zoning division or district but which if controlled as to number, area, location, or in relation to the neighborhood, would promote the public health, safety, welfare, morals, order, comfort, convenience, appearance, prosperity, or the general welfare. Such Uses may be permissible in a zoning classification or district upon the granting of a Special Use and meeting the requirements of this Code.
(Emphasis added).
The trial court concluded that section 2.03.01-A is constitutional because the discretion to place conditions on a special use is curtailed by the Code's definition of a special use in Part 12. The court noted that similar terminology limiting a zoning entity's discretion was deemed constitutional in Life Concepts, Inc. v. Harden, 562 So.2d 726 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990).
In Life Concepts, neighbors of a proposed group house challenged the constitutionality of a city ordinance allowing group or foster homes as special exceptions. This court found that the ordinance in question which required group homes to be "compatible with the neighborhood or area in terms of size of facility and number of persons," to not be "subject to whimsical or capricious application or unbridled discretion." Life Concepts, 562 So.2d 726, 727-28.
The language in the definition of a special use in the instant case that the use should be controlled "in relation to the neighborhood," is quite similar to the language held sufficient in Life Concepts. We thus conclude that the language "in relation to the neighborhood" provides a sufficient constitutional standard on the PZA's discretion to impose conditions on a special use in any particular application.
We note, however, that in the application of this provision, the conditions imposed must bear a relationship to the goal of compatibility between the special use and the surrounding area. Should the owners decide to challenge the conditions as unreasonable restrictions, the court can consider whether the conditions are whimsical or capricious. Conditions on a use, just like exceptions to a rule, can swallow or drown the use which was intended to be approved in the first place. Owners are entitled to fair play; their properties, which may represent their life fortunes, should not be subjected to whimsical or capricious conditions.
AFFIRMED.
PALMER, J., concurs.
PETERSON, J., dissents with opinion.