Case Name: Joseph B. BROWN v. Douglas WHITE, et al.
Court: Louisiana Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1982-09-07
Citations: 430 So. 2d 16
Docket Number: No. 81-C-3251
Parties: Joseph B. BROWN v. Douglas WHITE, et al.
Judges: DIXON, C.J., concurs in the result.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 430
Pages: 16–31

Head Matter:
Joseph B. BROWN v. Douglas WHITE, et al.
No. 81-C-3251.
Supreme Court of Louisiana.
Sept. 7, 1982.
On Rehearing April 4, 1983.
Rehearing Denied May 13, 1983.
Lawrence D. Wiedemann, Wiedemann & Fransen, New Orleans, for applicant.
A.R. Christovich, Jr., Christovich & Kear-ney, New Orleans, Roland J. St. Martin, LaPlace, Clarence A. Frost, Faris, Ellis, Cu-trone, Gilmore & Lautenschlaeger, M. Truman Woodward, Jr., James K. Irvin, Milling, Benson, Woodward, Hillyer, Pierson & Miller, Gerald M. Dillon, Michael R. Daigle, Dillon & Cambre, New Orleans, for respondents.

Opinion:
CALOGERO, Justice.
Plaintiff Joseph B. Brown, a mechanic employed by E.L. duPont deNemours Company at their Laplace, Louisiana plant, was injured on August 28, 1975 while working on an industrial fan.
In tort, he sued eleven so called executive officers of his employer duPont in their individual capacities and National Machinery Drying, Inc., the manufacturer of the fan. After an eleven day trial, the civil jury hearing the case returned a verdict in favor of all the defendants and against plaintiff. The Court of Appeal affirmed the lower court judgment. We granted writs on application of plaintiff.
The events leading up to the accident are essentially as follows. Plaintiff had been employed for duPont for eleven years prior to the accident. He had worked himself up to a step six mechanic, the top grade in his trade at duPont. His work assignment for eight months preceding the accident had been in the Neoprene Finishing Area. On the morning of August 8, 1975, plaintiff arrived at work at approximately 7:30 a.m. He and other mechanics met with their supervisor who gave out the work assignments for the day. That morning, plaintiff, Larry Robertson, and Sam Lavigne were assigned by their supervisor, Jack Evans, to work on the number two blower in the Neoprene Finishing area. Brown had no previous experience working on the blowers, but his co-workers on the assigned task had, especially Robertson. The men went to the locker room to put on their hard hats and special work shoes. At this time, La-vigne informed plaintiff that they were to change a defective pulley on the number two blower. He also informed plaintiff that both he (Lavigne) and Robertson were scheduled for some medical tests and that they would return shortly.
While Robertson and Lavigne were gone Brown began making the necessary preparations for performing the assigned job. He first went to Production personnel to have the No. 2 blower de-energized and tagged out. He then went to the second floor and observed that the No. 2 blower was still turning at what appeared to him to be the same velocity as that of an energized blower. Brown then went down to the maintenance shop to procure the tools with which to do the job. While there, he saw two other of his co-workers, Larry Bou-dreaux and Ira Marcel, mechanics who Brown knew had a great deal of experience. Brown asked these men what tools he would need for the job. Plaintiff testified that they told him he would need a wheel puller and a pipe wrench, the latter for stopping the de-energized but turning fan. He further testified that they did not explain to him how the pipe wrench should be used to stop the blower. When plaintiff said to these men that this method of stopping the turning fan seemed dangerous, he testified that they responded that that was the way everyone did it.
However, Brown's testimony in this regard was not corroborated by Boudreaux and Marcel. To the contrary, they testified that they told the plaintiff that he should use a pry bar to stop the fan. Both men testified that they had either done the job or seen it done only by use of a pry bar, and that they did not tell plaintiff he should use a pipe wrench.
Brown took both a wheel puller and a pipe wrench up to the second floor and placed them by the blower. He then waited for one of his assigned co-workers to return. When Lavigne returned he and Brown went to work on the No. 2 blower. First Brown and Lavigne removed the safety guard covering the motor, the two fly wheels and the belts. Brown indicated to Lavigne that he was going to try to stop the fan's turning by applying pressure to the fan belt with the pipe wrench. While trying this, the pipe wrench slipped off the belt several times. Plaintiff remarked that this was a "hell of a way to do a job," but nonetheless proceeded to try once more to stop the fan by this method.
Defendant Evans (plaintiff's immediate supervisor) testified that there were safety regulations in effect at the time of the accident prohibiting the removal of safety guards from equipment unless the equipment was inoperative. Workers were also instructed that if a job looked dangerous or if a worker did not know how to perform an assigned task they were to consult with their supervisor. This testimony was corroborated by some of plaintiff's co-workers. Plaintiff did not consult with his supervisor prior to removing the safety guard and proceeded to attempt to stop the fan from turning notwithstanding that he had remarked twice that the job seemed dangerous.
On his third or fourth try to stop the fan from turning, the teeth of the pipe wrench apparently got caught on the belt or between the belt and the fly wheel, and the wrench was projected upward striking plaintiff under the chin.
After an eleven day trial, the jury, responding to written interrogatories submitted to them by the trial judge, concluded that National Drying Machinery, Inc., was guilty of negligence, but that its negligence was not a proximate cause of the accident. They also concluded that one of the executive officers, Jack Evans, was guilty of negligence and that his negligence was a proximate cause of the accident. Finally, they found that plaintiff was contributorily negligent and that he had assumed the risk of his injury. Accordingly, the trial judge entered judgment in favor of all defendants.
The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court judgment upon finding that the jury determinations were amply supported by the record, or at least 'not clearly wrong. Brown v. White, 405 So.2d 555, (La.App. 4th Cir.1981).
In application for writs in this Court plaintiff contended that the jury returned a verdict in favor of National, the manufacturer, because the trial judge had, in effect, charged the jury that contributory negligence was a defense to a strict liability claim based upon a defective product, a legal proposition with which plaintiff took issue. This assignment of error prompted our granting writs. While, as argued by plaintiff, Langlois v. Allied Chemical Corp., 258 La. 1067, 249 So.2d 133 (La. 1971) seems to support the argument that contributory, negligence is not a defense to a strict liability cause of action, some doubt as to this proposition has been cast by the recent plurality decision of this Court in Dorry v. Lafleur, 399 So.2d 559 (La.1981).
After studying the record, however, we conclude that this principle issue, which prompted our writ grant, is not before us in this case. The written interrogatories which the judge presented to the jury did not specifically instruct them not to return a verdict against National in the event that they found plaintiff to be guilty of contributory negligence. Furthermore, even if the interrogatories may be construed as having effectively so instructed the jury, that is not what prompted the jury verdict in National's favor. Prior to reaching the interrogatory concerning plaintiffs contributory negligence, the jury had already absolved National of liability by finding that its negligence was not a proximate cause of the accident. Had the jury found National negligent and its negligence a proximate cause of the accident, and then barred plaintiffs recovery because of a finding that plaintiff was contributorily negligent, plaintiffs argument would be ripe for consideration.
Secondly, the trial judge did not instruct the jury that contributory negligence is a defense to a strict liability claim. He merely charged them that if the accident was solely caused by the improper use of the product, the manufacturer would not be liable. Thus, although it is true that the trial judge refused to charge the jury that contributory negligence was not a bar to a strict liability claim, it cannot be said that what he did charge was equivalent to a charge that contributory negligence was a bar.
In any event, as stated above, the result reached in this case in favor of National was unaffected by any charges the judge gave on contributory negligence, because the jury did not reach that issue as relates to National, having previously decided that National's negligence was not a proximate cause of the accident.
However, since we granted writs and have the entire case before us, we shall consider plaintiff's other assignments of error even though they did not prompt the granting of writs in this case. For the reasons which follow, we find no merit in plaintiff's other assignments and affirm both lower court judgments.
As a preliminary matter, plaintiff argues that the trial judge erred in refusing to excuse a juror, a Mr. Vaughn, upon plaintiff's request for him to do so. It appears that Vaughn overheard that a settlement offer had been made to plaintiff. He immediately reported what he had heard to the trial judge. The trial judge notified all the attorneys in the case, and questioned Vaughn out of the presence of the other jurors. Vaughn, who was himself an attorney, assured the trial judge that he could decide the case impartially based on the evidence presented at trial without being affected by what he had overheard. He also swore that he would not repeat to the other jurors what he had heard. Vaughn was told that the remark he heard was not true and that no settlement offer had been made. At this point, Vaughn was allowed to remain on the jury and plaintiff did not protest.
At the close of trial, however, plaintiff's counsel moved that Vaughn, as well as another juror, be excused from the jury. The trial judge granted his motion as to the other juror but denied it as to Vaughn, being satisfied that the juror would be impartial.
Trial judges are vested with a wide range of discretion in determining the capabilities of jurors. Unless it is shown that there was an abuse of that discretion, the trial judge's ruling should not be upset. In the present case, the judge did not abuse his' discretion in refusing to excuse Vaughn. Vaughn swore that the remark he had overheard would not affect his judgment and that he could be impartial. He also stated that he would not repeat what he had heard to the other jurors, and there is no contention that he did so. This argument is without merit.
Next plaintiff argues that the charges to the jury concerning the plaintiff's contributory negligence were erroneous and caused the jury to come to the wrong conclusion that the plaintiff was in fact contributorily negligent.
Plaintiffs complaints about the jury charge in this regard are twofold. First he complains about the trial judge's refusal to give the second half of plaintiff's proposed charge No. 3. Secondly, he complains of the trial judge's decision to give defendant's proposed charge No. 14.
With respect to plaintiff's first argument, concerning his proposed charge No. 3, the trial judge gave the first half of it. He instructed the jury that the negligence aspect of the case involved a comparison of duties, that identical conduct of the parties should not necessarily be demanded, and that varying factors affect what conduct should be required of a reasonable man under the circumstances. It was only the second half of the charge which he refused to give, a portion of the charge focusing upon a higher degree of care by supervisory employees than by subordinate employees.
He did, however, give the following charge:
In determining whether an employee had been contributorily negligent, you should consider the following factors:
1. Relative knowledge of the danger by the supervising employee and the injured employee;
2. Relative control over the employee's situation;
3. The degree to which the employee's conduct is voluntary on his part;
4. Alternatives available to the employee;
5. Obviousness of the danger; and
6. Relative ability to eliminate the danger.
We do not find any error in this ruling. Rather than tell the jury that they were entitled to exact a higher degree of care from supervisory employees than from subordinates, the trial judge opted to give the jury the above factors to consider, factors which they could well have employed had they found the facts warranted same, to exact a higher degree of care from supervisory employees.
Under the circumstances there was no error by the trial judge in refusing to give the second half of the proposed charge No. 3.
With respect to plaintiff's second argument, concerning defendant's proposed charge No. 14, there is nothing inherently wrong with the charge. Indeed an employee cannot be supervised every moment. And, generally speaking, his responsibility for his own safety is equal to that of his supervisory co-employees. The charge is based upon principles established in Miller v. Employers Mutual Liability Insurance Co., 349 So.2d 1353 (La.App.2d Cir.1977).
However, the charge, applicable in a general sense, must be considered in context with other charges given by the trial judge. In this respect we note that he gave a number of charges, the effect of which was to accentuate the responsibility of supervisory employees for the safety of subordi nate employees. He instructed the jury, in effect, that: if an employee is required to perform a task without the equipment necessary for its safe performance then it should be concluded that the employee did not voluntarily expose himself to the risk involved; the supervisory employee cannot escape responsibility because an employee used an unsafe method of performing his duties if he was forced to do so because of a lack of safe and adequate equipment; an employee is not contributorily negligent in failing to anticipate that his employer and the engineering supervisors would subject him to an unreasonable risk of injury; and the respective duties of the employee and the supervisory employer should be determined by objective factors, considering the circumstances surrounding the accident.
Therefore, considering the charges overall, the inclusion of defendant's proposed charge No. 14 was not improper.
Furthermore, the evidence presented at trial establishes that plaintiff was contribu-torily negligent. With one co-employee who was also inexperienced at the assigned job, plaintiff attempted to stop the fan from turning by using a method which he devised, and which he himself remarked was dangerous. Despite the rules in force at the plant, that if any job appears dangerous the workman is to consult with his supervisor, Brown nevertheless proceeded several times to stop the fan in a manner he knew to be dangerous, without ever consulting his supervisor. Furthermore, the jury must have concluded that it was plaintiff's decision to use the pipe wrench notwithstanding advice given him by the two more experienced co-workers that he use a pry bar. Finally, after making several unsuccessful attempts to stop the fan by pressing the pipe wrench on the fan belt, and each time having the pipe wrench slide from the belt, plaintiff continued to pursue this course until finally he caused the accident. Plaintiff gave as a reason for not seeking advice from his supervisor that although it was the stated policy of the company that a worker should consult with a supervisor when confronted with a dangerous or uncertain situation, those workers who frequently solicited such assistance placed their jobs in jeopardy. Plaintiff's co-workers testified that they often went to their supervisors for instructions or when something looked dangerous without any fear of being fired and that the supervisors were helpful.
The jury made the finding that plaintiff was negligent and that his own negligence was a proximate cause of the accident, barring his recovery against his supervisor, Jack Evans, whom the jury also found to be negligent. Based on our review of the record, we simply cannot conclude that the jury was clearly wrong in that determination.
Next plaintiff argues that the jury erred in finding that the plaintiff assumed the risk he encountered. Like the Court of Appeal, because of our finding that there was no error in the jury determination that plaintiff was contributorily negligent we need not consider the jury's finding regarding assumption of risk since plaintiff's recovery is barred, irrespective of the jury's finding on that issue.
Decree
For the foregoing reasons the judgments of the trial court and the Court of Appeal are affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
DIXON, C.J., concurs in the result.
LEMMON, J., dissents.
WATSON, J., dissents and assigns reasons.
. The Neoprene Finishing area is a section of the plant where Neoprene film, a type of plastic substance, is subjected to a drying process. That process requires movement of air around the Neoprene film while it moves through a large room on a conveyor belt. The air is circulated by ten fans, each measuring approximately five feet in diameter, which operate in pairs.
. There were five pairs of fans in the area. The electrically driven fans were housed within the interior of the Neoprene Finishing System. The fan blade assembly and its shaft were turned by a fan belt which was attached to the wheel on the end of the shaft and to the motor. The fan belt section of the equipment was accessible, for mechanical repairs, by the removal of the back safety guard. In addition, the fan shaft was accessible by the removal of a side plate, without exposing the belt, wheels and motor.
. Safety procedures in effect required that equipment not be worked on unless and until it was de-energized and rendered inoperable. A part of the de-energizing procedure was for the mechanic and someone from the production department to find the appropriate electric switch and turn it off. The switch was then tagged with the mechanic's name and locked with the mechanic's lock. This would prevent the equipment's being accidentally turned on while the mechanical work was in progress. Plaintiff de-energized the No. 2 blower, then tagged and locked the electric switch.
. The arrangement of the fans, in facing pairs, was such that if one fan in a pair was turned off, the air being moved by the other paired fan would cause the de-energized fan to rotate backwards, a sort of "windmill effect".
. Boudreaux and Marcel testified that they did not explain to plaintiff how to stop the fan from turning, but only told him to use a pry bar. However, Jack Evans had devised a method by which one took off the side panel and pressed the pry bar against the fan shaft, using the bottom metal side of the equipment as a fulcrum. This method did not require the removal of the safety guard covering the fan belt.
. The jury was charged on this point as follows:
Should you conclude that the employee was using the product in an improper manner and that this was the sole proximate cause of his injury, rather than any manufacturing defect being the total proximate cause of his injury, then the plaintiff would not be entitled to recover from the manufacturer.
. Plaintiffs proposed charge No. 3 was as follows, with the part not given by the trial judge in brackets:
The negligence aspect of this case involves a comparison of duties. In considering negligence and contributory negligence in a given situation, the jury should not necessarily demand identical conduct of the plaintiff and the defendants, and varying factors affect what conduct the standard of a reasonable man requires. [In the present case you are entitled to exact a higher degree of care from the supervisory employees who had the responsibility for the safety of the subordinate employees and the responsibility of furnishing the subordinate employees with safe and adequate equipment to perform expected tasks.]
. Defendant's proposed charge No. 14 provided:
A workman cannot be supervised at every moment. His responsibility to exercise reasonable care for his own safety and protection is at least equal to that of his supervisory co-employees.
. Plaintiff testified that he was told to use a pipe wrench by his co-workers. Yet, the coworkers, Boudreaux and Marcel, testified that they told plaintiff to use a pry bar, not a pipe wrench.