Case Name: In the Matter of the Judicial Settlement of the Accounts of Thomas Watson and Others, as Executors, etc., of Joseph Corbit, Deceased, Appellants. Ellen Patterson and Others, Respondents
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1906-11-05
Citations: 115 A.D. 310
Docket Number: 
Parties: In the Matter of the Judicial Settlement of the Accounts of Thomas Watson and Others, as Executors, etc., of Joseph Corbit, Deceased, Appellants. Ellen Patterson and Others, Respondents.
Judges: 
Reporter: Appellate Division Reports
Volume: 115
Pages: 310–322

Head Matter:
In the Matter of the Judicial Settlement of the Accounts of Thomas Watson and Others, as Executors, etc., of Joseph Corbit, Deceased, Appellants. Ellen Patterson and Others, Respondents.
First Department,
November 5, 1906.
Executors and administrators — when executors not protected in paying judgment against estate—failure of executors to defend — widow’s' claim against husband’s estate.
Executors who, after rejecting a claim, and having knowledge of- facts which might constitute a defense, make no defense when the case is tried before a referee, hut give evidence supporting the claim and suppress other facts, and do not raise objections to testimony under section 829 of the Code of Civil Procedure, are not protected by a judgment so obtained.- Under such circumstances the right of the executors to pay the claim will be determined as if the payment were voluntary.
A widow’s claim against her husband’s estate was for cash and the proceeds of a farm given to her husband to invest for her. The claimant purchased real estate, .paying therefor by assuming a mortgage thereon, transferring other . lands owned by. her and by giving back a purchase-money mortgage. A balance due in cash was paid by claimant’s husband, who also subsequently paid the mortgage. The title was taken in the. name of both. Subsequently the property was exchanged for two houses., the testator taking title to one and his wife the other. Though both houses were subject to mortgages, the husband paid part of the mortgage on his wife’s house, so that it was the less incumbered of the two. The net. result of the transactions,' which were known to the husband’s executors, was that on the joint investment the husband had paid §4,750 more than his wife had contributed, while the lands acquired by the 'wife were worth §2,000 more than those held by the husband.
Held, that the wife had no valid claim against her husband’s estate and that the executors who paid her claim with knowledge of the facts were properly . charged with the amount.
"vBrien, P. J., arid Ingraham, J., dissented, with opinions.
Appeal by Thomas Watson and' others, as executors, etc., from so much of! a decree of the Surrogate’s Court of the county of New York, entered in said Surrogate’s Court on tlie 11th day of April, 1906, judicially settling the accounts of said executors, as surcharges their account in certain respects and reduces tlieir commissions.
The principal item surcharged is a, judgment for $10,423.55’ recovered by the widow of the testator. The executors, appellants, were charged with this judgment on the ground that they were guilty of negligence or collusion in defrauding the estate against it.
The claim of the widow was for moneys which she alleged were intrusted to testator during his lifetime to the amount of $9,000, with interest, being the proceeds of a farm at Plainfield, N. J., known as Oak Tree farm, and $3,000 cash, -less $1,5.00, which was the proceeds of the sale of a house at 172 East Ninetieth street after payment of a mortgage'thereon, which house came into the possession of the wid >w during the lifetime of the testator. The transactions upon which" this claim is based were found by the referee to be as follows: When claimant and testator were married in June, 1895, claimant owned a farm in New Jersey, known as Oak Tree farm. On the 18th of January, 1896, claimant made a contract with one Ritzmann to purchase the leasehold of 106 Eighth avenue for $27,250, this sum to be paid by assuming a mortgage of $12,500; by the transfer of tlie Oak Tree farm at a valuation of $6,000, the giving of a purchase-money mortgage on said leasehold for $3,000, and balance to be paid in cash in February, 1896. On February 11, 1896, claimant directed that the assignment of the lu-'se of No. 106 Eighth avenue be made toiler husband and herself anu it was so made. Testator, however, made the cash payments upon the above contract and also paid the $3,000 mortgage. In June, T897, the testator and wife transferred the leasehold back to Ritzmann and received therefor on even terms Nos. 170 and 172 East Ninetieth street, No. 170 being taken in the name of the testator and No. 172 being taken in the name of the wife. The houses were apparently similar and were subject to mortgages, the mortgage upon No. 172 exceeding that upon No. 170 by $500. Subsequently, however, testator paid off $2,500 upon No. 172. No. ■ 172 remained the property of claimant until after the death of the testator, and it was for this house that she gave a credit of $1,500, although the referee found that after the payment. of commissions, back interest and taxes she received from the sale only $171.21, $1,500 being the difference between the face of the mortgages and the price' received. It was also found that claimant had delivered $3,000 in cas'h to testator shortly before the first of these transactions.
By his will testator gave claimant his farm in Railway, N. J., together with all the buildings and improvements thereon, and all the stocks, crops, farming implements and household furniture thereat; the house No. 132 West Fifteenth street; $3,000 in cash ; .the furniture in their New York home, and all the articles bought by the claimant. The will then recites : “ The above devises and legacies are given to my said wife and to be accepted by her in lieu and stead of all her dower'and.right of dower and rights and interests in and to my real and personal estate.”
Upon the presentation of the claim by the widow it was rejected by the executors and thereafter referred to a referee. Upon the the hearing one of the executors, Watson,' and the widow gave evidence in support of the claim. No objection to the testimony of' the widow under section 829 of the Code of Civil Procedure was made, and no real defense to her cause of action was interposed, many of the facts recited above not being brought out upon that hearing. The referee in this proceeding found that contest to have been merely 11 pro forma ” and made for the purpose of protecting them (the executors) in the ultimate payment by them of the alleged claim. It was upon this negligence or collusion on the part of the executors that the decision surcharging them for the .payment is based.
Henry A. Forster, for the appellants.
Richard S. Martin, for the respondents Bunnell and others.
Ellen T. Bennett, for the respondents Patterson and others.
William E. Carnochan, for the respondents Boards of Home and Foreign Missions.

Opinion:
Scott, J.:
It is very obvious that the executors cannot justify their payment of $10,423.55 to Mrs. Corbit, merely by proof of the judgment in her favor rendered upon the reference of her claim. Hot only did they make no real defense to the claim, but the executor Watson, who was a witness upon the reference, and who confessedly knew all about the transactions between Mr. Corbit and his wife, did not lay all the facts before the referee. It is made very plain from the evidence and the circumstances that the executors desired to pay Mrs. Corbit's claim (doubtless honestly deeming it an equitable one), but so far doubted its legal validity as to be unwilling to pay it unless protected by a judgment. If such a judgment had been fairly obtained by the claimant after all the facts had been laid before the 'court, it would have been a sufficient answer to the effort now made to surcharge the executors' accounts with the amount paid. But under the circumstances disclosed by the record, we must agree with the referee that the judgment affords no defense to the executors. It follows that the judgment should -be left out of view and the liability of the executors tested as" if the payment had been a voluntary one, with full knowledge of the facts. Mrs. Corbit's claim, as submitted to the executors, states that she " intrusted to the said Joseph Corbit for investment and to - be dealt with by him for the benefit of this claimant " the sum of $3,000 in cash and a farm of the value of $6,000. Her precise . claim, therefore, is that this money and the proceeds of the farm were to be invested for her. It is not claimed or suggested that the money was loaned or paid for any other purpose than that of investment. The first investment was in the Eighth avenue leasehold, the title' to which was taken in the joint name of Mr, and Mrs. Corbit. This was paid for partly by mortgage and partly by the transfer of Mrs. Corbit's farm and partly in cash. Mrs. Corbit's contribution was her farm, valued at $6,000. Mr. Corbit paid in cash in closing the transaction $5,750,_ and subsequently paid off a mortgage of $3,000 upon the property, making his cash contribution towards the purchase $8,750. Thus it appears that Joseph Corbit contributed to the joint investment .in the Eighth avenue property $2,750 more than; was contributed by his wife. When the two joint.investments were transformed into two separate investments by the exchange of the Eighth avenue leasehold for two houses in ¡Ninetieth street of identical character and value, the house taken by Mrs. Corbit was more heavily mortgaged by $500 than was that taken by her husband. He, however, more than equalized this discrepancy by paying off a mortgage of $2,500 on Mrs. Gorbit's house, thus leaving it less heavily mortgaged than was his own by $2,000. The net result was that Joseph Corbit, after paying out for the joint property $2,750 - more than his wife had contributed, had caused to be conveyed to her, in exchange for her one-half of the venture, a house equal .in every way to the one he took himself, upon which -he had so reduced the mortgage load that it was less by $2,000 than the amount for which his house was mortgaged. In other words, by the cash expenditure of $4,750 more than his wife had contributed, he had given her the better of the transaction by $2,000. • It is true that, as the referee has found, Corbit also received from his wife, at some time,'the sum of $3,000 in cash, but even charging him with this, the exact investment of which is not traced, the fact remains that he expended $1,750 more than his wife contributed or paid to him. There is certainly nothing in these facts to indicate that Mr. Corbit treated his wife unfairly, or took any advantage of the trust and confidence which she reposed in him. On the contrary, he seems to have treated her not only fairly blit even generously. It is true that the investment turned.out unfortunately, but there is nothing to indicate that this resulted from anything more than an error of judgment; from the consequences of which Mr. Corbit, suffered as well as his wife.. Under these circumstances we are unable to see that Mrs. Corbit' had any just or valid claim against her husband's estate for the amount intrusted to him for investment. It remains to consider whether the executors were liable for the amount they paid upon this unfounded claim. It is the.general rule that if an executor or administrator assumes to pay a demand which has no legal foundation, and could not have been recovered, the claim may properly be disallowed upon his accounting (Dye v. Kerr, 15 Barb. 444), and if he negligently allows, an invalid claim to go to judgment without making an honest contest, the judgment will afford him no shield, and he may properly be charged with this amount. ' (Matter of Saunders' Estate, 4 Misc. Rep. 28.) Of course, an executor is not to be charged as an insurer of the validity of every claim which.he pays even without the protection of a judgment, but if there be no judgment effective for his protection, he must at least show that in paying the claim, as in other acts of administration, he employed such prudence and such diligence in the care and management of the estate or property as, in genera], prudent men of discretion and intelligence employ in their own like affairs. (King v. Talbot, 40 N. Y. 76.)' Do the executors show that they exercised such diligence and prudence in paying Mrs. Corbit's claim, or rather in consenting that «lie have a judgment for it ? We think not. They knew, or at least one of them knew, and the others are chargeable with knowledge, the exact facts respecting the investment which Mr. Corbit had made; they had at least so much, doubt asto the validity of the claim as to be unwilling to pay it without a judgment, and yet, when the claim had been rejected and referred, they not only made no defense, but actually refrained from laying the true facts concerning the transaction before the referee, finder these circumstances, we are unable to see that they used any degree of prudence or diligence whatever in defending the estate, certainly not such as any prudent man would exercise if such a claim were made against him personally, finder the facts, as they now appear, which differ materially from those which were shown upon the former appeal (101 App. Div. 550), we are of opinion that the referee was right in surcharging the executors' accounts with the amount paid to Mrs. Corbit in satisfaction of her judgment. With respect to the other items called into question, viz., the interest paid on mortgages and the commission charged by the executors, we also agree with the learned referee.
The decree is, therefore, affirmed, with costs to the respondents.
Clarke and Houghton, JJ., concurred; O'Brien. P. J., and Ingraham, J., dissented.