Case Name: I. Monroe Taylor, Resp't, v. William H. Arnoux, Appl't
Court: New York Court of Common Pleas
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1888-01-03
Citations: 13 N.Y. St. Rep. 148
Docket Number: 
Parties: I. Monroe Taylor, Resp’t, v. William H. Arnoux, Appl’t.
Judges: 
Reporter: New York State Reporter
Volume: 13
Pages: 148–152

Head Matter:
I. Monroe Taylor, Resp’t, v. William H. Arnoux, Appl’t.
(New York Common Pleas,
Filed January 3, 1888.)
1. Award of damages—Will not be disturbed when.
An appellate court will not disturb the finding of a jury in respect of the matter of damages, they having had proper instructions on the rule of law governing that question, even though the award made by them may be too high.
2. Cause of action—Must be clearly defined.
A bill of charges made against both the plaintiff and defendant which does not enable those against the one to be distinctly separated from the other does not furnish the basis for an action by the plaintiff against the defendant. Daly, J., in dissenting opinion.
3. Complaint—Statement of cause of action in different counts— Election between in discretion of court.
Where a complaint contains different statements of the same claim it is discretionary with the trial court to compel the plaintiff to elect between them. The exercise of this discretion may be reviewed by the general term, but a new trial will not be granted unless it appears that the defendant has been prejudiced. Id.
Appeal from a judgment of the general term of the city court affirming a judgment entered upon the verdict of a jury and an order refusing a new trial.
Sheldon & Brown, for resp’t; Thos. G. Bitch, for app’lt.

Opinion:
Van Hoesen, J.
The judgment of the court below ought to be affirmed. With respect to the first and fourth causes of action, which in reality, are varied statements of the same claim, the controversy in the court below seems to have been respecting the amount that the defendant ought to pay, rather than a question as to whether or not the defendant was ' legally liable to pay anything. This is shown to be the case by the defendant's answer, the first paragraph of which alleges that "defendant after the connection was. made, agreed to pay his reasonable proportion of the expense of the hot water connection made by Bates & Johnson." In his testimony the defendant said: "I told him that I thought it was not just to charge me two-thirds of the bill. I would not make any objection to paying a fair amount of this bill. I asked him what he considered a fair apportionment, I was ready to pay a fair proportion, but it was not right to expect me to pay two-thirds of the bill, and to be liable to be cut off at any moment."
Connected with these statements was the allegation that • the plaintiff had no right to make him liable by contracting bills on his account without express authority, and that he had never given to the plaintiff any authority to pay Bates & Johnson.
Notwithstanding the incompleteness of the plaintiff's testimony, I think that the jury had enough before them to warrant the conclusion that a fair proportion of Bates & Johnson's bill should be borne by the defendant. That left remaining the question as to what that fair proportion amounted to.
There appears to have been no error in the instructions respecting the rule of damages, and the verdict of the jury cannot be disturbed by this court even if the amount awarded were too large.
The judgment should be affirmed, with costs.
Larremore, J., concurs.