Case Name: Henry Freeman, plaintiff in error, vs. Thomas B. Norwell, defendant in error
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia
Jurisdiction: Georgia
Decision Date: 1858-05
Citations: 25 Ga. 359
Docket Number: 
Parties: Henry Freeman, plaintiff in error, vs. Thomas B. Norwell, defendant in error.
Judges: Lumpkin, J. concurred.
Reporter: Georgia Reports
Volume: 25
Pages: 359–367

Head Matter:
Henry Freeman, plaintiff in error, vs. Thomas B. Norwell, defendant in error.
It; in trover and bail under the Act of 1821, the defendant proves unable to give the bond, and the plaintiff gives it, and receives possession of the negroes, and then dismisses his action, and fails to restore the negroes to the defenct■ant, such dismissal and failure amount to a breach of his bond, — Benhing J.
Trover, from Lincoln county. Decided by Judge Thomas, April Term, 1858.
An action ivas brought in the Court below by Thomas B„ Norwell, against Henry Freeman, to recover the penalty un•der a bond, on account of the breach of the condition of the .said bond.
The condition of the bond was as follows:
“ The condition of the above obligation is such, that where as, the said Yancey G. Freeman, committee as aforesaid, did commence his action of trover against the said Thomas B. Norwell, returnable to the March Term of the Superior Court of said county, 1857, for three certain slaves, to-witi Jane, a woman about thirty-eight years of age, of dark complexion, and Orese, a woman about twenty-eight years old, and her boy child (name not known,) about five years old, of’ the value of $1,600; and the said Thomas B. Norwell having failed and refused to give bond and security for the forthcoming of said negroes, according to law. Now, should the-said Yancy G. Freeman, well and truly produce said negroes to answer such judgment, execution or decree, as maybe issued or rendered in the case, and well and truly pay the eventual condemnation money recovered in said case, then this obligation to be void, else to remain in full force and. virtue.”
The plaintiff in his declaration, after setting out the above-condition, stated that the condition of the bond had beera violated; the said Yancy G. Freeman, for whom, and with whom the said Henry Freeman became jointly and severally-bound, having dismissed his action of trover, and had judgment of dismissal entered on the minutes of the said Court,,, and a judgment for the costs of said suit rendered against him, on the 24th day of March, 1858 ; and that on the 2d day of April, 1858, he (the plaintiff,) demanded the said negroes, and the said Henry Freeman refused to deliver the same, having previously removed them to the State of South Carolina, the residence of the principal, in order to prevent the plaintiff from recovering the same, according to his undertaking.
To this declaration, the defendant demurred, on the ground that the same was not sufficient in law to enable the plaintiff to maintain his action.
After argument, the Court overruled the demurrer, and the defendant excepted, and filed his bill of exceptions, assigning the same as error.
Stephens, for plaintiff in error,
Reese, contra.

Opinion:
By the Court.
Benning, J.
delivering the opinion.
Norwell, the defendant in the original action, having failed to give the bond required to be given by the Act, (of 1821,) Yancy G. Freeman, the plaintiff in that action, gave it, and thereupon, received the possession of the negroes for which the action was brought, Yancy G. Freeman then dismissed his action, (a judgment of dismissal being entered,) and, instead of restoring the negroes to Norwell, held on to them.
Was this a breach of that condition of his bond, which required, that he should " produce said negroes, to answer such judgment, execution, or decree, as" might " be issued or rendered in the case ?"
I think that it was. I think, that the judgment of dismissal by itself, gave to Norwell the right to an immediate restitution of the negroes, and rendered it the duty of Freeman,, to make the restitution. This, I think, was the legal effect of the judgment.
Such, I understand to be the effect of the reversal of a judgment under which money has been paid. " If judgment be reversed, the party shall be restored to all that he has lost by occasion of the judgment; and a writ of restitution shall be awarded. When the plaintiff has execution, and the money is levied and paid, and the judgment is afterwards reversed, there, because it appears on the record, that the money is paid, the party, we have seen, shall have restitution without a scire facias ; for there is a certainty of what was lost: otherwise where it was levied but not paid; for there must then be a scire facias, suggesting the matter of fact, viz: the sum levied, &c." 2 Tidd's Pr. 1186.
Here, it seems, that the right to have restitution on the one part, and the duty to make it on the other, is the direct result of the mere judgment of reversal, per se.
Indeed, I believe, that we are all agreed, that the judgment of dismissal did have the effect, to confer on Norwell the right to an immediate restoration of the negroes, and to impose on Freeman the duty of making that restoration.
Freeman failed to restore them, was not that a failure to " produce" them "to answer" the "judgment" "rendered in the case?" I think it was. The judgment of dismissal in legal effect, said to Freeman, restore the negroes. He failed to restore them. This was failing to produce the negroes, to answer the judgment.
I think, then, that the judgment of dismissal, followed by the failure to restore, was a breach of the condition of the bond: and therefore, that the demurrer to the declaration, was well overruled by the Court below.
I admit, that Norwell might have entered up a judgment for restitution against Freeman, or have had a writ of restitution against him without entering up such a judgment; "but, I think, that there was no necessity for Norwell's doing either, in order to make it his right to have, and Freeman's duty to render restitution; this right and this duty, having already, as I conceive, resulted from the judgment of dismissal. Indeed, if they had not, Norwell could not be entitled to enter up judgment of restitution, or entitled to causei to be issued, the writ of restitution without entering up such a judgment; the title to do either, depending entirely upon such right as he derived from the judgment of dismissal.
Judge McDonald thinks, if I understand him aright, that a judgment of restitution, or, at least, a writ of restitution, was necessary, before there could be a breach of the condition.
I have given my reasons for thinking neither necessary. I think, that requiring either, in cases of this kind, would also be inexpedient. If either were required^ it would also be necessary to require, that it should be founded on notice to the party in possession; otherwise requiring it, would be worthless to him; and in many cases, as in this, (according to the declaration which is admitted by the demurrer,) he would be out of the State, beyond the reach of notice. In. such cases therefore, requiring a notice, would be denying redress; and that would, practically, be taking part with one who, armed with his wealth alone, has abused the very law itself, to wrench from the hand of poverty, what is, perhaps, its all. ,
I'think the judgment ought to be affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
Lumpkin, J. concurred.