Case Name: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Titus Mark BRYANT, Defendant-Appellant
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 2016-06-22
Citations: 653 F. App'x 503
Docket Number: No. 15-30179
Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Titus Mark BRYANT, Defendant-Appellant.
Judges: Before: BEA, WATFORD, and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges.
Reporter: West's Federal Appendix
Volume: 653
Pages: 503–504

Head Matter:
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Titus Mark BRYANT, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 15-30179
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
Submitted June 14, 2016
FILED June 22, 2016
Lori Anne Harper Suek, Leif Johnson, Assistant U.S. Attorneys, Office of the US Attorney, Billings, MT, for Plaintiff-Appel-lee.
Steven C. Babcock, Assistant Federal Public Defender, FDMT — Federal Defenders of Montana (Billings), Billings, MT, for Defendant-Appellant.
Before: BEA, WATFORD, and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges.
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2),

Opinion:
MEMORANDUM
Titus Mark Bryant appeals from the district court's judgment and challenges the 60-month sentence and a special condition of supervised release imposed following his guilty-plea conviction for three counts of assault resulting in serious bodily injury, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 113(a)(6). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We affirm the sentence, vacate the special condition of supervised release, and remand for further proceedings.
Bryant contends that the sentence is substantively unreasonable in light of his post-offense rehabilitation. The district court did not abuse its discretion. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51, 128 S.Ct. 586, 169 L.Ed.2d 445 (2007). The above-Guidelines sentence is substantively reasonable in light of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors and the totality of the circumstances, including Bryant's criminal history, the need to protect the public, and the seriousness of the offense. See Gall, 552 U.S. at 51,128 S.Ct. 586.
Bryant also contends, and the government concedes, that remand is required because the district court failed to provide advance notice of its intent to impose a special condition of supervised release requiring Bryant to comply with the violent offender registration requirements of any state in which he resides. We agree. See United States v. Wise, 391 F.3d 1027, 1033 (9th Cir. 2004) ("Where a condition of supervised release is not on the list of mandatory or discretionary conditions in the sentencing guidelines, notice is required before it is imposed."). Accordingly, we vacate the condition and remand to permit the district court to determine whether to reimpose the condition. If the court ehoos-es to reimpose the condition, it shall provide adequate notice to the parties so that an objection can be made. We express no view as to whether the challenged condition is appropriate in this case.
AFFIRMED in part; VACATED in part; and REMANDED.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.