Case Name: Morris Gordon v. The State
Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1920-11-24
Citations: 89 Tex. Crim. 59
Docket Number: No. 5980
Parties: Morris Gordon v. The State.
Judges: 
Reporter: Texas Criminal Reports
Volume: 89
Pages: 59–62

Head Matter:
Morris Gordon v. The State.
No. 5980.
Decided November 24, 1920.
Rehearing denied March 23, 1921.
1.—Delinquent Child—Juvenile—Information—Motion in Arrest too Late.
Where the information and complaint contained seven counts, and in the first count charged the appellant was under seventeen years of age, which was not alleged in the other six counts, each of which charged a felony, they were not effective under the juvenile Act, but inasmuch as no motion to quash was filed, a motion in arrest of judgment on account of this defect in’ the information comes too late and the presumption is that the court acted correctly in applying the facts to the proper count- under which a conviction could be obtained.
2. —Same—Rehearing—Validity of the Statute—Precedent.
Where upon motion for rehearing appellant attacked the validity of the statute on the ground that the law defining delinquent and incorrigible children is vague, etc., and cannot be understood, such contention cannot be sustained and has many times been decided against appellant. Following Ex parte McLoud, 82 Texas Crim. Rep., 29-9, and other cases
3. —Same—Trial by Jury—Statute Construed—Representation by Counsel.
The contention in appellant’s motion for rehearing that the law with respect to delinquent children is unconstitutional because it deprives the defendant of a trial by jury and representation by counsel is refuted by the law itself, which provides for trial by jury, and also that defendant may be heard by counsel.
4.—Same—Suspended Sentence—Practice in Trial Court—Notice—Presumption.
Where, appellant complained in his motion for rehearing that there was no notice given to his parents or those in legal custody of said defendant, etc.; that he was denied the right of suspension of sentence, etc., it will be presumed, in the absence of bills of exception, to any of the matters now-complained of, that the trial judge did his duty and gave proper notice, etc., and that defendant waived the other matters complained of.
Appeal from the Criminal District Court of Bowie. Tried below before the Honorable P. A. Turner.
Appeal from a conviction of a juvenile; penalty, not less than two nor more than five years in the State Training School at Gatesville.
The opinion states the case.
W. W. Arnold, for appellant.
C. M. Cureton, Attorney General, and Wallace Hawkins, Assistant Attorney General, and Alvin M. Owsley, Assistant Attorney General, for the State.—Cited cases in the opinion.

Opinion:
DAVIDSON, Presiding Judge.
Appellant was convicted as a juvenile and sent to the reformatory at Gatesville.
The record is before us without a statement of facts or bills of exception. The information and complaint contained seven counts. The first count seems to be in proper form, charging appellant with being under seventeen years of age. The other six counts do not show nor allege that he is under seventeen year's of age. Each count charges a felony. They were, therefore ineffective under the juvenile Act in charging felonies in a complaint and information without specifying that the party against whom these charges were filed was under seventeen years of age. There was no motion to quash, and no steps taken in regard to this matter until after the judgment was rendered, when a motion in arrest of judgment was filed. This was overruled. We are of opinion that this comes too late. The court was without jurisdiction to try felonies on a complaint and information, and under the juvenile law the exception to the above statement is found in the fact that the boy was under seventeen years of age, and, therefore, he could be charged and convicted as a juvenile for that reason, otherwise only the District Court would have jurisdiction to try the case as in ordinary felony cases. It seems that each count in the complaint and information charges a separate and distinct offense, so far as the pleadings are concerned, not growing out of the same transaction. Felonies and misdemeanors can not be joined in the same count, but under the decisions a motion in arrest of judgment would some too late, and in passing upon this case, in aid of the presumption that the court was cor rect in his judgment, it will be sustained on the theory that the evidence supported the first count in the information, which charges that appellant was under seventeen years of age, and the presumption would be that the court acted correctly in applying the facts to the proper count under which a conviction could be obtained.
As the record presents the case we are of opinion the judgment should be affirmed, and it is accordingly so ordered.
Affirmed.