Case Name: In re Edward J. SHOEN; In re James P. Shoen; In re Aubrey Johnson; In re John Dodds; In re William Carty, Debtors. Edward J. Shoen; James Shoen; Aubrey Johnson; John M. Dodds; William Carty; AMERCO, Appellants, v. Samuel W. Shoen; Cecilia M. Hanlon, a/k/a Cecilia M. Shoen-Hanlon; Katrina Carlson, a/k/a Katrina Shoen-Carlson; Samwill, Inc.; Kattydid, Inc.; Mickl, Inc., Appellees. In re Edward J. Shoen; James P. Shoen; Aubrey Johnson; John Dodds; William Carty, Debtors. Samuel W. Shoen; Cecilia M. Hanson, a/k/a Cecilia M. Shoen-Hanson; Katrina Carlson, a/k/a Katrina Shoen-Carlson; Samwill, Inc., now called Katabasis International, Inc.; Cemar, Inc.; Kattydid, Inc.; Mickl, Inc., Appellants, v. Edward J. Shoen; James Shoen; Aubrey Johnson; John M. Dodds; William Carty; AMERCO, Appellees
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 1999-05-06
Citations: 176 F.3d 1150
Docket Number: Nos. 97-17369, 98-15455
Parties: In re Edward J. SHOEN; In re James P. Shoen; In re Aubrey Johnson; In re John Dodds; In re William Carty, Debtors. Edward J. Shoen; James Shoen; Aubrey Johnson; John M. Dodds; William Carty; AMERCO, Appellants, v. Samuel W. Shoen; Cecilia M. Hanlon, a/k/a Cecilia M. Shoen-Hanlon; Katrina Carlson, a/k/a Katrina Shoen-Carlson; Samwill, Inc.; Kattydid, Inc.; Mickl, Inc., Appellees. In re Edward J. Shoen; James P. Shoen; Aubrey Johnson; John Dodds; William Carty, Debtors. Samuel W. Shoen; Cecilia M. Hanson, a/k/a Cecilia M. Shoen-Hanson; Katrina Carlson, a/k/a Katrina Shoen-Carlson; Samwill, Inc., now called Katabasis International, Inc.; Cemar, Inc.; Kattydid, Inc.; Mickl, Inc., Appellants, v. Edward J. Shoen; James Shoen; Aubrey Johnson; John M. Dodds; William Carty; AMERCO, Appellees.
Judges: Before: FERNANDEZ and McKEOWN, Circuit Judges, and WEINER, District Judge.
Reporter: Federal Reporter 3d Series
Volume: 176
Pages: 1150–1167

Head Matter:
In re Edward J. SHOEN; In re James P. Shoen; In re Aubrey Johnson; In re John Dodds; In re William Carty, Debtors. Edward J. Shoen; James Shoen; Aubrey Johnson; John M. Dodds; William Carty; AMERCO, Appellants, v. Samuel W. Shoen; Cecilia M. Hanlon, a/k/a Cecilia M. Shoen-Hanlon; Katrina Carlson, a/k/a Katrina Shoen-Carlson; Samwill, Inc.; Kattydid, Inc.; Mickl, Inc., Appellees. In re Edward J. Shoen; James P. Shoen; Aubrey Johnson; John Dodds; William Carty, Debtors. Samuel W. Shoen; Cecilia M. Hanson, a/k/a Cecilia M. Shoen-Hanson; Katrina Carlson, a/k/a Katrina Shoen-Carlson; Samwill, Inc., now called Katabasis International, Inc.; Cemar, Inc.; Kattydid, Inc.; Mickl, Inc., Appellants, v. Edward J. Shoen; James Shoen; Aubrey Johnson; John M. Dodds; William Carty; AMERCO, Appellees.
Nos. 97-17369, 98-15455.
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
Argued and Submitted March 9, 1999.
Decided May 6, 1999.
Shirley M. Hufstedler, Morrison & Foerster, Los Angeles, California, for the appellants.
C. Taylor Ashworth, Andrew D. Hur-witz, Osborn Maledon, Phoenix, Arizona, for the appellees.
Before: FERNANDEZ and McKEOWN, Circuit Judges, and WEINER, District Judge.
. Honorable Charles R. Weiner, Senior United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation.

Opinion:
PER CURIAM Opinion; Dissent by Judge McKEOWN.
PER CURIAM:
Edward J. Shoen, James P. Shoen, Aubrey K. Johnson, John M. Dodds, William E. Carty, and AMERCO (collectively the Edward Shoen Interests) appeal the bankruptcy court's order which awarded post-petition interest to Samuel W. Shoen, Ka-tabasis International, Inc., Michael Shoen, Mickl, Inc., Katrina Shoen-Carlson, Katty-did, Inc., Cemar, Inc., and Cecilia M. Shoen-Hanlon (collectively the Samuel Shoen Interests). The Samuel Shoen Interests appeal the bankruptcy court's order which determined that the post-petition interest at the Arizona judgment rate stopped running once the Edward Shoen Interests deposited the then accrued interest in an interest bearing Escrow Account under the auspices of the bankruptcy court. We affirm.
1. The post-petition interest problem arose because of a rather unusual judgment issued by the Arizona Superior Court in which the Samuel Shoen Interests were required to transfer all of their shares of AMERCO common stock to the Edward Shoen Interests once the latter paid $461,838,000 together with accrued interest at 10 percent per annum plus costs to the former. The Edward Shoen Interests promptly filed bankruptcy and sought to use the protections afforded by those proceedings in order to pay something other than the amount decreed by the Arizona Superior Court, and also obtain transfer of the stock. In other words, they would have liked it if they could keep much of their money and still get the stock. We agree with the bankruptcy court and the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel that the Edward Shoen Interests are not entitled to that Panglossian a result. We do so for the reasons articulated by the BAP which we adopt. See Shoen v. Shoen (In re Edward J. Shoen), BAP No. AZ-96-1884-KJRy pages 11-16 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. Oct. 22, 1997) (unpublished disposition). We add only a few reflections. It is necessary to analytically place the Arizona judgment into one category or another, although it does not comfortably fit in any standard ones. In our opinion, the BAP chose the best fit when it dubbed the judgment "a judicially prescribed sale of stock." Id. at 14. The Arizona Superior Court told the Samuel Shoen Interests that if they wanted their damages they had to turn over their stock to the Edward Shoen Interests, and gave the Edward Shoen Interests the consolation of knowing that once they paid all that was owed they could have the stock. Call it what you like, but the Edward Shoen Interests had no right whatever to obtain the property of the Samuel Shoen Interests until they complied with the terms of the Arizona judgment. That the bankruptcy court required them to do just that violates neither the policies, the purposes, nor the letter of the bankruptcy law. In short, the Edward Shoen Interests could not obtain transfer of the stock of the Samuel Shoen Interests without paying the full price, which included all of the interest.
2. Not to be outdone in the have-your-cake-and-eat-it sphere, the Samuel Shoen Interests seek to mulct the Edward Shoen Interests for even more interest than the $55,000,000 deposited in the Escrow Account plus interest which has been accruing on that deposited amount. They find a wedge for their argument in the somewhat uncertain state of the paper record when the rest of the case was resolved by the bankruptcy court. That court was well aware of what had gone on throughout the proceedings and at the time when the rest of the issues were settled. It was also aware of what the parties and the court really intended at that time. We cannot say that it erred in construing what it was doing at the time of plan approval, and, again, we are satisfied that the BAP has articulated the reasoning and result quite satisfactorily. See id. at 16-22.
Even if that were not so, we are equally satisfied that the interest stopped as a matter of law when the $55,000,000 was deposited into the Escrow Account. This was no mere escrow account controlled by a debtor while liability was being litigated on appeal. Cf. International Telemeter Corp. v. Hamlin Int'l Corp., 754 F.2d 1492, 1495-96 (9th Cir.1985). It was, rather, more in the nature of an unconditional tender of the money. Cf. Homes & Son Constr. Co., Inc. v. Bolo Corp., 22 Ariz.App. 308, 306, 526 P.2d 1258, 1261 (1974); Bartlett v. Heersche, 209 Kan. 369, 374, 496 P.2d 1314, 1317-18 (1972). Of course, the tender was not entirely unconditional, but it was very close to that. The only condition was that the bankruptcy court determine that the post-petition interest amount was owed. And if the Samuel Shoen Interests could not access the money immediately, neither could the Edward Shoen Interests enjoy its fruits in the meantime. Notably, the use of the Escrow Account in this case was part of a deal that also freed up the principal amount — $461,838,000—for the Samuel Shoen Interests' use right away. That was a not inconsiderable benefit, and went far beyond what one would obtain from a mere supersedeas bond.
AFFIRMED.
. We attach this decision as Appendix A to this opinion.