Case Name: SMITH v. WINN
Court: Supreme Court of South Carolina
Jurisdiction: South Carolina
Decision Date: 1893-04-24
Citations: 38 S.C. 188
Docket Number: 
Parties: SMITH v. WINN.
Judges: 
Reporter: South Carolina Reports
Volume: 38
Pages: 188–199

Head Matter:
SMITH v. WINN.
1. Purchaser — .Mistake—Belief.—A party to an action, who purchases at a full price a tract of land sold under a decree in the cause, advised and believing that he is buying a fee simple title, cannot be relieved of his completed contract of purchase, nor require contingent remaindermen to be afterwards made parties in order that his title may be perfected.
2. Ibid. — Ibid.—Bes Judioata. — Moreover, the purchaser is barred of the relief he seeks by an order in the cause, made subsequent to his purchase, and unexeepted to, whereby the proceeds of his purchase were directed to be distributed among the parties to the cause.
3. Findings of Fact — Commissions.—A refusal to allow an executor commissions, approved, where such refusal was based upon findings of fact by referee and Circuit Judge, and where it appeared in the “Case’’ that the charge for commissions had been waived.
4. Petition fob Reueaking refused.
Mr. Justice Pope dissenting as to Nos. 1 and 2.
Before Hudson, J., Union, October, 1891.
This action is thus correctly stated by Mr. Justice Pope in his dissenting opinion:
In 1865, William Long, senior, by his will directed that the whole of his estate, real and personal, should be divided into nine shares — one of which he gave to each of his eight children and one to be equally divided between his grand-son and granddaughter, who were the children of a pre-deceased son; that the share of such devisees should be enjoyed by them during life respectively, “not subject to the debts, contracts, or disposition of the males, or the debts or contracts of any future husband of the females among them;” that a trustee was appointed for each of the daughters; that a life estate in one-half the real and personal estate of testator was carved out for his widow; that one of the devisees, William Long, the younger, died intestate, unmarried and childless, after testator; that Mary Long alone qualified as executrix of the will;' that the life tenant divided amongst her children much of the personal estate she had received under the will; that by the terms of the will an appraisement by three disinterested persons of the property, real and personal, had to be made; that by the consent of all the children and widow the actual division was postponed until 1868, though an appraisement of the property was made in 1866; that the executrix, Mary Loug, manned one Upton W. Winn; that, the testamentary, trustee of Jane E. Smith, who was Jane E. Loug, having declined to accept the office, Asa Smith became her trustee; that a disagreement as to the division when made arose amongst the children, and, as a result, Asa Smith, as trustee, his cestui que trust, Jane E. Smith, and her husband, William Smith, filed their complaint against the widow, the remaining children, and the two grandchildren wbo were named in the will as legatees and devisees, alleging that such settlement and division should be set aside, and for other relief; that pending such litigation the widow (and life tenant of half the property) died; that the.special referee recommended that the share of the lauds allotted for life to the widow should be sold by the master for Union County; that such recommendation of the special referee was by au order in the cause adopted by the Circuit Judge, no party to the cause objecting thereto; that so much of the contention as arose between the parties relating to the settlement and division of the estate before the life estate fell in was settled by the decision of this court on appeal, as found in 29 S. 0., 591; that the terms of the sale of the land allotted to the life tenant-, when sold by the master, was one-third in cash and the balance on a credit of one and two years, to be secured by the bond of the purchaser, with a mortgage of the premises; that the defendant, Charles R>. Long, became the purchaser at the price of $4,590.44, of which sum he paid one-third in cash and gave his bond for the other two-thirds, secured by a mortgage of the premises; that the proceeds of this sale being about to be divided amongst the devisees hereinbefore named under the will of William Long, senior, and the purchaser having-learned that, under the law as it applied to the parties before the court, his purchase could only be construed as a purchase by him of the estate of the parties to the action (a life estate), became alarmed, and applied to the Circuit Court for leave to file a supplemental answer, wherein he could set up that the . parties to this action only had a life estate in the lands he had purchased; that $4,590.44 was full market value of fee simple title of said lands, and that all parties to the sale considered that full title passed; that he had been so informed by a reputable lawyer before the sale, and that there were a number of contingent remaindermen in esse whose presence here as parties to this action might cure the defect of his title, or, if that could not be done, that the sale might be rescinded, paying back to him the money he had already' paid, and cancelling his bond and mortgage for the credit portion; that the defendant was allowed to file his supplemental answer by which he alleged these facts, bub was denied by the special referee and the Circuit Judge any relief thereunder, it being denied to him to have these contingent remaindermen made parties. He now appeals to this court.
Messrs. D. A. Townsend and T. S. Moorman, for appellant.
Mr. William Munro, contra.
April 24, 1893.

Opinion:
The opinion of the court was delivered by
Mr. Chief Justice McIver.
After a most careful consideration of this case, stimulated by an anxious desire to relieve the appellant, Charles E. Long, from what seems likely to prove a most improvident purchase, I must confess that I am unable to perceive how such relief can be afforded consistently with well settled principles of law. The appellant was a party to the action under which the sale was made, from which he is now seeking to be relieved. He knew, or ought to have known, that, by his purchase, he could only acquire the title of those who were parties to the action; and if it was necessary that other parties should have been brought in, for the purpose of obtaining a good title for the land which he, with other parties to the action, had induced the court to order the sale of, he could have had such additional parties brought in, and if he failed to do so, he must be regarded as having offered the amount of his bid for the interests of those who were parties to the action. This case must, therefore, be regarded as another instance of the many in which persons have bought property unadvisedly, without taking the necessary steps to inquire into the title of the property which they buy, and, after the contract of purchase has been fully executed, find that they have not obtained what they thought they were buying.
It is earnestly urged, however, that the appellant bought under a mistake of law, caused by the advice of eminent counsel, and is, therefore, entitled to relief. As was said in the case of Munro v. Long, 35 S. C., 354, when this same question was before this court in a different form: "Without undertaking to go into any discussion of what is called in one of the cases (Norman v. Norman, 26 S. C., 48,) the nice and shadowy distinction between a mistake of law and ignorance of law, it is sufficient for us to say, that there was no such mistake of law, even under the cases which have gone to the extreme in that direction, as would relieve the defendant. The mistake claimed to have been made was either in the construction of the will, or in supposing that the rights of the contingent remaindermen would be barred by the order of sale made in a cause to which they were not made parties. If the former, it is very obvious, from the cases of Keitt v. Andrews, 4 Rich. Eq., 349, and Ouningham v. Ouningham, 20 S. C., 317, that such a so-called 'mistake' would not be sufficient; for, as said by Dargan, Oh., in his Circuit decree in Keitt v. Andrews, supra, adopted by the Court of Appeals, a misconstruction of a will 'is rather an error of the judgment than a mistake either of the law or fact.' If, however, the mistake really relied upon (as seems to be the fact from appellant's argument here) was in supposing that the contingent remaindermen were not necessary parties, that, upon the same principle, would not be sufficient."
This language is not cited as decisive of this appeal, inasmuch as the court, in Munro v. Long, expressly declined to decide the question as to the right of appellant to relief in the case in which the order of sale was made; but it is cited for the purpose of showing that the appellant is not eutitled to relief upon the ground of a mistake of law. But I am unable to perceive upon what principle of law the appellant can obtain relief, even under the case in which the order of sale was made. Even a third person, who becomes a purchaser at a judicial sale, is bound to inquire whether all necessary parties were before the court when the order of sale is made. (Trapier v. Waldo, 16 S. C., 282); and if so, much more is it the duty of a purchaser who was originally a party to the proceedings. This being so, the appellant must be regarded as having bought only the interests of the parties who were before the court; and he cannot now, after his contract of purchase has been fully executed, require that other parties [be brought in], who, in a con tin gency which has not yet occurred, may at some future day have an interest in the property.
But in addition to this default on the part of the appellant, in failing to have the proper parties brought before the court, it appears from the proceedings set out in the "Case" that the appellant has been guilty of another default. When the referee made his report of the 11th of March, 1889, ascertaining the amounts due to each of the parties to this cause, it was excepted to, and his honor, Judge Fraser, made an order recommiting the cause to the referee, and directing him to restate the accounts, "and that he take an account of the entire estate of William Long, including the share set apart to Miriam Long, the life tenant; that in taking said account he include, also, the lands sold by the master after the death of said Miriam Long, so as to show the true amount due to each legatee and devisee under the will of William Long, deceased." To this order there was no exception and from it there was no appeal, and hence it must stand as the law of this case; In other words, it was an adjudication, not accepted to and not appealed from, that the proceeds of the sale from which the appellant now seeks relief, should be distributed amongst those who were then parties to the action. In view of these repeated defaults on the part of the appellant, Charles B. Long, I am unable to perceive how he can obtain the relief he seeks, without utterly disregarding well settled principles of law.
In reference to the exception as to the commissions of the executor, I concur iu the views presented in the opinion of Mr. Justice Pope, and do not deem it necessary to add anything to what he has said.
It seems to me, therefore, that the judgment of the Circuit Court should be affirmed; and this being the opinion of the majority of this court, the judgment of this court is that the judgment of the Circuit Court be affirmed.