Case Name: Linda May COLUCCI and Jane Gentile, Appellants, v. Alan E. GREENFIELD, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1989-07-11
Citations: 547 So. 2d 224
Docket Number: No. 88-903
Parties: Linda May COLUCCI and Jane Gentile, Appellants, v. Alan E. GREENFIELD, Appellee.
Judges: Before SCHWARTZ, C.J., and HUBBART and BASKIN, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 547
Pages: 224–226

Head Matter:
Linda May COLUCCI and Jane Gentile, Appellants, v. Alan E. GREENFIELD, Appellee.
No. 88-903.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
July 11, 1989.
Rehearing Denied Sept. 1, 1989.
Young, Stern & Tannenbaum, North Miami Beach, and Michael H. Wolf, Miami, Jane Gentile, pro se, for appellants.
Evan J. Langbein, Miami, for appellee.
Before SCHWARTZ, C.J., and HUBBART and BASKIN, JJ.

Opinion:
BASKIN, Judge.
Finding that the trial court was divested of jurisdiction by plaintiffs' voluntary dismissal of their cause of action, we reverse the Final Judgment entered subsequent to the voluntary dismissal. Miller v. Fortune Ins. Co., 484 So.2d 1221 (Fla.1986); Randle-Eastern Ambulance Serv., Inc. v. Vasta, 360 So.2d 68 (Fla.1978); Freeman v. Mintz, 523 So.2d 606 (Fla. 3d DCA), cause dismissed, 528 So.2d 1182 (Fla.), review denied sub nom. Coldwell Banker-Klock Co. v. Freeman, 534 So.2d 398 (Fla.), appeal dismissed, 534 So.2d 400 (Fla.1988); Marvella Assoc., Inc. v. Carney, 512 So.2d 1111 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987); Ambory v. Ambory, 442 So.2d 1087 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983); Gonzalez v. Mulreany, 375 So.2d 621 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979).
In addition, we hold that because intervention is "in subordination to, and in recognition of, the propriety of the main proceeding," Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.230, the trial court was precluded from adjudicating the inter-venor's claim. Cf. Coast Cities Coaches, Inc. v. Dade County, 178 So.2d 703 (Fla.1965); Krouse v. Palmer, 131 Fla. 444, 179 So. 762 (Fla.1938).
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
SCHWARTZ, C.J., concurs.
. The law is well-settled that the trial court's subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time. Bohlinger v. Higginbotham, 70 So.2d 911 (Fla.1954); City of Miami v. Cosgrove, 516 So.2d 1125 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987); Jared v. Jackson, 483 So.2d 51 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986); Stel-Den of America, Inc. v. Roof Structures, Inc., 438 So.2d 882 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983), review denied, 450 So.2d 488 (Fla.1984); Swebilius v. Florida Constr. Indus. Licensing Bd., 365 So.2d 1069 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979); Pushkin v. Lombard, 279 So.2d 79 (Fla. 3d DCA), cert. denied, 284 So.2d 396 (Fla.1973); Walton v. Walton, 181 So.2d 715 (Fla. 2d DCA 1966); Hadley v. Hadley, 140 So.2d 326 (Fla. 3d DCA 1962); Mendez v. Ortega, 134 So.2d 247 (Fla. 3d DCA 1961); Pittman v. Roberts, 122 So.2d 333 (Fla. 2d DCA 1960); Florio v. State, 119 So.2d 305 (Fla. 2d DCA 1960); In re Coleman's Estate, 103 So.2d 237 (Fla. 2d DCA 1958); In re Weiss' Estate, 102 So.2d 154 (Fla. 3d DCA), cert. discharged, 106 So.2d 411 (Fla.1958); Fla. R.Civ.P. 1.140(h)(2).
. We note that the "intervenor's" failure to obtain permission to intervene, Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.230, renders the intervention proceeding questionable.