Case Name: Borchert and another, Appellants, vs. Skidmore Land Company, imp., Respondent
Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Wisconsin
Decision Date: 1919-03-04
Citations: 168 Wis. 523
Docket Number: 
Parties: Borchert and another, Appellants, vs. Skidmore Land Company, imp., Respondent.
Judges: 
Reporter: Wisconsin Reports
Volume: 168
Pages: 523–534

Head Matter:
Borchert and another, Appellants, vs. Skidmore Land Company, imp., Respondent.
June 7
March 4, 1919.
Vendor and purchaser of land: Assumption of mortgages: When contract and deed cannot he contradicted by parol: Authority of agent. ,
1. By a written contract, unambiguous and complete in itself, a land company agreed to convey to one C. certain land in consideration of his deeding to it certain other land “subject to mortgages amounting to” a certain sum, and the subsequent - deed from C. to the company recited that it was “subject to the following mortgages,” naming them; but neither in the contract nor the deed did the company assume and agree to pay the mortgages. Held, that the terms upon which the company agreed to part with its land and the terms upon which it was to receive the land of C. were contractual terms, and that parol testimony was not admissible to show that the consideration actually agreed upon included the assumption and payment of the mortgages by the company.
2. The provision as to consideration in the contract did not merge in the deed so that, as a mere recital in the deed, it could be contradicted by oral testimony. -
3. A finding by the trial court that an agent of the land company, who acted for it under written instructions in the matter of the execution of the conveyances, and who, it was claimed, at that time orally agreed on behalf of the company to assume and pay the mortgages, had no authority to vary the terms of the original written contract, is held to be supported by the evidence.
Kerwin and Siebecker, JJ., dissent.
Appeal from a judgment of the circuit court for Mari-nette county: W. B. Quinlan, Circuit Judge.
Affirmed.
Action to foreclose a mortgage for $800 upon real estate in which it is sought to' hold the defendant Skidmore Land Company, a corporation, and a grantee of the mortgagor, F. E. Coons, liable for the amount of the mortgage debt. The defendant Land Company purchased the land under a written contract wherein it was agreed that, in consideration of certain real estate of the Land Company being deeded to F. E. Coons, he would deed the mortgaged premises to the Land Company “subject to mortgages amounting to $11,465,” among which was the one foreclosed. The deed from Coons to the Land Company recited that it was “subject to the following mortgagesnaming, among others, the one sued upon in this action. Neither in the written contract of purchase nor in the deed does the Land Company assume and agree to pay the mortgage, but plaintiff maintains that subsequent to' the time the written contract was entered into one Hawkins, the agent of the Land Company, who was sent to Minnesota to' attend to the execution of the transfer of title, orally agreed in behalf of the company to assume and pay the mortgage. It also offered oral testimony tending to show that prior to the execution of the contract of purchase the Land Company assumed and agreed to pay the mortgage, but this testimony was excluded by the court because it contradicted the written contract. At the close of the evidence the court directed a verdict in favor of the Skidmore Land Company on the ground that oral testimony was inadmissible to- vary or contradict the terms of the written contract of purchase and because Hawkins, to the knowledge of Coons, had no authority to vary the terms of the written contract. From a judgment entered accordingly the plaintiffs appealed.
For the appellants there were briefs by L. M. Nelson, attorney, and Eastman & Goldman, of counsel, all of Mari-nette, and oral argument by E. C. Eastman.
For the respondent there was a brief by Martineau, Evert & Martineau of Marinette, and oral argument by P. A. Mar-tineau.

Opinion:
Vinje, J.
The written contract for the exchange of properties was unambiguous and complete in itself. It stated what each party agreed to do in order to secure the conveyance contracted for from the other. The Skidmore Land Company agreed to convey to Coons certain real estate in consideration of his deeding to it, subject to the mortgages in suit and others, the land it was to receive. The terms, therefore, upon which it agreed to part with its land and the terms upon which it would receive the Coons land were contractual terms. They constituted the very essence of the contract. It is a familiar rule that the material contractual terms of a written contract, when complete and unambiguous, cannot be contradicted or varied by parol testimony of prior or contemporaneous conversations or agreements. 4 Wigmore, Ev. § 2425; 10 Ruling Case Law, 1021; 3 Jones, Ev. (3 Horwitz, Comm.) § 434. This rule applies as well to the consideration expressed in a writing when that is contractual as to other terms theréin. 10 Ruling Case Law, 1044. In land contracts such as the one in question the consideration is a contractual part of the writing. Jilek v. Zahl, 162 Wis. 157, 155 N. W. 909.
In deeds and other unilateral contracts where some expressed consideration is essential to give validity to the instrument or to prevent a resulting trust in favor of the grantor and because the instrument does not purport to express the complete contract between parties, a different rule obtains and parol testimony is admissible to show the con sideration actually agreed upon. Brader v. Brader, 110 Wis. 423, 85 N. W. 681; Jost v. Wolf, 130 Wis. 37 (110 N. W. 232) and cases cited on p. 43; Kipp v. Laun, 146 Wis. 591, 600, 131 N. W. 418. But where the written contract is complete and there is nothing in it to suggest that it does not embody the whole agreement between the parties, parol testimony is inadmissible to- vary or contradict it. Cliver v. Heil, 95 Wis. 364, 70 N. W. 346.
That an agreement to- assume and pay a mortgage upon conveyed property is essentially different from an agreement to take title thereto subject to- the mortgage is too obvious to need discussion or explanation. Hence an agreement to take title to land subject to a mortgage is varied by showing that the mortgage debt was assumed by the grantee, because it adds a personal liability not present in the original undertaking.
A suggestion is made that the provision in the written contract as to consideration merged in the deed and therefore, since oral testimony is admissible to contradict the consideration expressed in a deed, the testimony offered was erroneously excluded. That the provision as to consideration in the contract did not merge in the deed is ruled in Butt v. Smith, 121 Wis. 566, 99 N. W. 328. In that case it was held that the terms of an oral agreement as to consideration did not merge in a deed subsequently executed; that they could be shown by parol testimony, and if they were contradictory to- the deed they controlled - as to the amount of consideration to be paid for the conveyance. In the present case the amount of consideration was expressed in a written contract and as there expressed was identical with the recital in the deed. It has also been held that an original contract for the exchange of real estate in which each party assumed a mortgage on the property conveyed to- him did not merge in deeds subsequently executed which contained no provision for the assumption of the mortgages. Stockton v. Gould, 149 Pa. St. 68, 24 Atl. 160. This is on the theory that the deed is but a part performance of the contract and that the contractual terms of the latter, conferring valuable rights and forming the consideration upon which it was entered into, control, and do not merge in the recitals of the deed. To hold that the terms of an express written contract as to consideration in pursuance of which a deed is given merge in the .deed and become subject to the construction given to terms of mere recitals therein would be to destroy the power of parties to make binding written contracts, as to consideration. For example, A. agrees in writing to pay a certain consideration for a deed to a tract of land "subject to a mortgage" and takes a deed subject to a mortgage. Under his contract -and deed he has bought the equity of redemption only. He has incurred no personal liability. But if the consideration expressed in the contract merges in the deed, then he obtains no protection from it, for the recital in the deed may be contradicted by parol testimony and it may be shown that he assumed and agreed to pay the mortgage. This is not the law. A material provision in a written contract is not merged in a later contract, which, as to such provision, does not purport to speak contractually, but merely by way of recital in order that its validity may not be questioned because of the absence thereof. Naturally a different rule usually applies to covenants of title. Since it is the express purpose of a deed to pass title and to define the character thereof, its provisions relative thereto, in the absence of fraud or mistake, control when they purport to cover the field of the previous contract.
The finding of the trial court that the agent, Hawkins, sent by the Land, Company to have the papers executed, had no authority to bind the company by any agreement different from that expressed in the written contract and the written instructions given him, cannot be successfully assailed as against the weight of evidence. It appears that Coons knew that Hawkins had express written instructions to which he frequently referred during their transactions to see that he did not overstep his authority. These instructions were such as would be given any clerk sent to secure the transfer of papers in a land deal whose terms had already been agreed upon. They authorized mere ministerial acts. They gave no power to vary the terms of the written contract. So, too, the claim of ratification by the Land Company of Hawkins's acts fails, as inferentially found by the trial court.
By the Court. — Judgment affirmed.