Case Name: Moses E. Ragan, administrator, plaintiff in error, vs. Louisa Ragan, defendant in error
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia
Jurisdiction: Georgia
Decision Date: 1864-03
Citations: 33 Ga. Supp. 106
Docket Number: 
Parties: Moses E. Ragan, administrator, plaintiff in error, vs. Louisa Ragan, defendant in error.
Judges: 
Reporter: Georgia Reports
Volume: 33 Suppl.
Pages: 106–122

Head Matter:
Moses E. Ragan, administrator, plaintiff in error, vs. Louisa Ragan, defendant in error.
Where a will is signed by another for the testator, and by his direction, how and by whom must the authority to sign be proved ?
After the execution and attestation of a codicil to a will, it was suggested that it did not express the wishes of the testator. By questioning him on the subject, it was ascertained that the codicil, as executed and attested, did not conform to testator’s wishes in two material particulars. By ezvsure and interlineation, the codicil was changed in these particulars, and a note thereof made below the signature of the testator, which note was signed by the witnesses to the codicil, but not by the testator, either in person or by another by his direction :
Held, That the codicil was not executed according to law.
The testator must be mentally, as well as bodily pi'esent, at (he attestation of his will, and the onus of establishing this fact is on the propounder.
To malte a valid will the testator must be capable of bringing in mental review, with proximate accuracy, the property subject to his testamen tary disposition, as well as liis family relations, and of comprehending the claims and obligations naturally suggested by such review.
£5.] This case distinguished from that of Hall vs. Hall, 18 Georgia, 40.
Issue of devisavit vel non, decided by the Hon. Richard H. Clark, at Chambers, in the city of Albany, on the. 27th of January, 1864.
Such portion of the facts of this case as is necessary to a proper understanding of the questions made and decided therein, are as follows:
On the 21st of April, 1858, James H. Ragan executed his will, which was attested in due form, by which he bequeathed the whole of his estate, after paying his debts, to his only child and daughter, Missouri Antoinette Ragan, with directions that the estate should be kept together by his executor until his daughter should marry, she to be supported and educated out of the income, the property to be the sole and separate estate of the said Missouri Antoinette, free from the debts or liabilities of any husband she might marry, to be held for her during her life, remainder to such children as she may then leave, or to such persons as she may, by will, direct and appoint. Moses E. Ragan was nominated executor of this will. At the time of executing the will, Hr. Ragan, the testator, was a widower without children, except his said daughter. His will was written by Colonel David A. Yason, who after its execution was, by the testator, made the custodian of the will. Some time in October, 1860, Dr. Ragan intermarried with the caveator, who was then a widow, by which marriage he acquired considerable property. Dr. Ragan had been told by Colonel Yason that this marriage revoked the will he had made. In April, 1862, testator was taken sick and became anxious upon the subject of disposing of his property. Colonel Yason was sent for to visit him and to bring with him the will which had been confided to bis keeping. When Yason arrived at testator’s house he found there Dr. Love, Dr. Hillsman, Dr. Walker and Mr. Webb. Dr. Gilbert went witli Colonel Yason. When Yason arrived, testator was laying on bis left side, with his eyes partly closed, and being aroused, recognized Yason and shook bands with .him. Yason then told him that in obedience to his summons, he had come and had brought the will with him. Vason referred to a conversation in which he told testator that his marriage revoked liis will, when testator expressed an intention to change it. Vason then asked him if he desired to have this will changed? And he answered, “Yes.” Upon being asked what change he desired to make in it, he replied, “I want to provide for my wife.” Vason then asked him what provision he wished to make for his wife? To which he replied, “I want her to have one-half of my personal estate during her life or widowhood.” Tlie last two words were uttered in a low tone of voice whilst testator’s eyes were partially closed. Vason, suspecting that his power of connecting ideas was defective, and thinking that he did not intend to use those words, and being a little astonished at them, used the same words in a high tone of voice, and with an emphasis that aroused him, “or widowhood?” And testator replied, “Yes, or widowhood,” with some emphasis. Vason then asked him what he meant by half of his personal estate? To which he replied, “Everything except my land.” He was then asked “Who is to have your land?” And he replied, “Nettie.” Vason then explained to him that his wife would be entitled to a life estate in one-third of his land as dower, unless he gave her something in lieu of it. He replied, “I want all the property kept together, as provided in the will, and my wife to have one-half of the net proceeds.” Vason then asked him if that was to be in lieu of dower? And he answered, “Yes.” Vason then took the will, and on one of the blank leaves thereof wrote a codicil, of which the following is a copy, to-wit:
“GEORGIA — Lee county.
“Having intermarried since the above will was made, I, James Ragan, do make this codicil. I give to my wife the one-half of my personal property during her life or widowhood, and at her death or marriage, the same to vest in my said daughter as the other property bequeathed to her. My said wife to have one-half the net proceeds of the plantation whilst it is kept up, as before provided for, and this legacy is given her in in lieu of dower.”
Nason then asked testator who he wanted for witnesses? And he answered, “Any of them.” Doctors Walker and Gilbert both excused themselves from being witnesses to the codicil. Nason read it over to the testator but did not notice whether or not he kept his eyes open all the time, and after finishing the reading, he asked testator if it was right? A.nd he replied, “Yes.” Testator then made an effort to rise, but his left arm failing, he did not rise up. Nason then told him that it was not necessary for him to sign the codicil, that he could get any other person to sign for him, and he said, “You do it,” seeming tobe much exhausted. Nason then put the paper on a writing desk immediately in front of, and close up to the testator, and told him that he would sign for him, and he said, “ Well,” and Nason signed his name to the codicil. The desk was then turned round for the witnesses to sign it, they standing close by the bedside. Nason called out clearly the name of each witness as each in his turn signed it. Jeremiah Hillsman, Richard Webb and William Abram Love were the witnesses. No witness could say that testator actually saw the witnesses subscribe their names, but he could easily have witnessed the signatures and must have done so, if his eyes were open at the time.
Immediately after the codicil was thus executed, Dr. Walker called Nason out of the room, and in an excited manner told Nason that great injustice was done Mrs. Ragan by the paper, and asked him if the property that she brought into the coverture would pass under the will, and Nason told him it would, unless there v’as a marriage contract between the parties. Dr. Walker said there was not, so far as he knew, and both he and Nason thought it quite probable that testator did not intend such a disposition of the property, and Dr. Walker desired Nason to converse with testator on the subject. Dr. Walker, also believing that it was not the testator’s wish to cut his wife off with a widowhood estate, wished Nason to converse with him on that subject likewise. Nason, Dr. Walker and Dr. Love then went up to testator’s bedside and Dr. Love aroused him. Nason, then, with the will and codicil in his hand, presented the same to testator and said to him, that as it was written it disposed of the property which his wife brought into the marriage, and asked him if that was as he wanted it. Testator replied, “No, I want her to have that over and above.” Nason said, “absolutely ¶” And testator replied, “absolutely.” Nason then assured him that he should have it the way he wished it, and if it suited him to say so, and if not, to tell him no, aud he would change it. He then explained to the testator that the property given to his wife, in case of her marriage or death would go to Nettie, and asked him if he wished her to have it during life or during widowhood only? Testator replied, “or widowhood” — “that is the point,” knitting his brow as though in deep reflection, and after looking at Nason a moment, said, “it is safest,” or, “it is best,” “to say during life.” Nason then explained to him the balance of the codicil' and asked him if he desired to make any other change? And he said, “No.”' Nason immediately made the changes in the codicil by interlining the words, “ all the property 1 received by her absolutely, also” between the words “ wife” and “the,” where they first occur in the codicil, as first written,, and by erasing the words, “or widowhood,”' and the words “or marriage,” thus making the codicil to read as follows, to-wit:
“GEORGIA — Lee county.
“Having intermarried since the above will was made, I,, James Ragan, do make this codicil. I give to my wife all the property I received by her, absolutely, also, the one-half of my personal property during her life, and at her death, the same to vest in my said daughter as the other property bequeathed to her, my said wife to have the one-half proceeds of the plantation whilst it is kept up, as before provided for, and' this legacy is given to her in lieu of dower.”
Colonel Nason then wrote below the codicil the following note or memorandum, to-wit:
“ The words ‘ all the property I received by her, absolutely, also," were interlined and the words ‘or widowhood’ and the words ‘or marriage’ were erased; these changes were made to carry out the explained wishes of testator, as made after it was signed, on the same day.”
This note or memorandum was presented to the witnesses to the codicil, read over to them, and they each signed it. This was done at the foot of the bed, in the same room. Yason then took the will and read it over to testator, as changed. Just before concluding, and as Yason was turning over the page, he noticed that testator’s eyes were partially closed. He aroused him and told him to listen and let him know whether it was all right, and Yason then read it, keeping his eye on testator, and felt certain that he then engaged testator’s attention until it was completed. Testator then said, “all right,” and closed his eyes again, having remained aroused during this interview longer than any that Yason had with him. After the expiration of ten or fifteen minutes, Yason aroused testator again whilst he and Hr. Hillsman, Mr. Webb, Dr. Walker, Dr. Love and Moses Ragan were standing around the bed, and others were in the room, more remote, and.asked testator to whom he should give his will, presenting it in his hand, to which he replied, (looking at Dr. Hillsman) “Doctor.” Mr. Webb asked what Doctor? Testator replied, looking at Yason, “Yason.” Mr. Webb then said Dr. Yason is not here, he is in the war in Yirginia, and testator said, “I mean Ellick Yason, lawyer Yason.” All of the bystanders were pointed out to testator and he asked who they each were, and he called the name of each one correctly, except Dr. Hillsman, whom he called Dr. Yason. The original will was not read over to testator at the time the codicil was made.
Moses E. Ragan, the nominated executor, propounded the will and codicil for probate, and the widow of the testator, Mrs. Louisa Ragan, entered a caveat to the same. Pending the case in Lee Superior Court, on appeal from the Court of Ordinary, Missouri Antoinette Long, formerly Missouri Antoinette Ragan, a minor, was made a party by due notice, and William E. Collier was appointed guardian ad litem for her.
The parties desiring to terminate the litigation with as little expense and delay as possible, entered into a written agreement to submit all the matters in said case to the arbitrament and award of his Honor Richard H. Clark, the Judge of the Superior Courts of the Southwestern Circuit, with authority to pre side in said case as sole arbitrator, and that he should try the case at Albany on the 27th January, 1864, and that he be considered also as Judge of the Superior Court of Lee county, with power to try all questions of both law and fact involved in said, case, either party having the right to except to his judgment and carry the same to the Supreme Court for review, and that the Supreme Court should pass upon the entire case, and. that the award of said Judge should be returned to and be the judgment of Lee Superior Court in said case.
Upon the trial of the case before Judge Clark, the original will was produced and its execution was proved by the witnesses thereto, and the codicil was also produced and the facts herein-before stated were proven by Colonel Nason.
It was also shown by the witnesses to the codicil, that in their opinion and judgment, the testator did not have mind enough, at the time the codicil was executed, to make a will, that he was incapable of concentrating his mind on any one subject, or of pursuing a line of continuous thought. Two persons present declined to be witnesses to the codicil, and testified that they thus declined because they did not believe the testator capable of making a will. Two of the witnesses to the codicil do not remember that testator requested Nason to sign his name thereto. Two of the witnesses to the codicil characterize the whole scene of making the paper as a wicked and solemn farce. One of them testified that the testator was in articulo mortis at the time, and the proof was that he lived not exceeding an hour after the execution of the codicil. One of the witnesses thought that if testator had lived and recovered entirely, he would not have remembered making the codicil at all. The testimony showed that testator was in what is termed a comatose state' when Nason arrived at his house; that he was in a state of stupor from which, when aroused, he seemed to have some mind, but that when let aloue he would immediately relapse into stupor again; that when in this state of stupor he could have no knowledge of what was going on around him, that he could not possibly hold his mind together long enough to hear the codicil read, and that it was impossible for him to summon his mind to an understanding of the nature and extent of his property, and of his family relations, and of those who had claims upon his bounty. Several of the witnesses who were with testator testified that he began to sink about ten o’clock the night before the codicil was made, and continued thus to sink until about twenty minutes before twelve o’clock the next day, when he breathed his last j that when Vason was sent for, at daylight, testator was rational, but when he arrived testator had grown so much worse as not to have a disposing mind.
There was some testimony going to show that some of the witnesses had stated that testator died in his right mind, which statement was at variance with their testimony before the Judge. There was also some conflict in the recollection of the witnesses as to minor events and circumstances, but the foregoing statement is a fair presentation of the testimony on the material issues of the case.
After the testimony and argument had closed the presiding Judge rendered the following decision and judgment, to-wit:
“My-opinion is, the will lacks legal execution, and the statute of frauds is not ^ satisfied :’
“1st. Because the authority given to Mr. Vason to sign the will for testator is not sustained by the three subscribing witnesses. A superscription of the will by testator himself, though the subscribing witnesses may be deficient in memory as to their signing in his presence, may be supplied by other witnesses, as so much is to be inferred in favor of testator’s genuine signature, but when the signing is by another under testator’s ‘ express direction,’ the authority for signing ought to be proven by the subscribing witnesses, otherwise the statute of frauds would be rendered nugatory, for if the proof of the ‘ express direction’ is to come from the agent or other outsiders, the necessity of the three subscribing witnesses imposed by the statute, is virtually dispensed with in such cases.
“ 2d. The signing of the witnesses to a will, whether signed by testator, or by another under his ‘ express direction,’ must be 1 in the testator’s presence.’ There is no evidence to show that at the time the codicil was signed by Mr. Vason and the three witnesses, more especially at the latter’s signing, after it had .undergone changes, that the testator was in a condition where he did or, could see, but the weight of evidence is, that at that particular time he must have been in a stupor, or state of insensibility. The signing by the witnesses ‘ in testator’s presence’ must be so clearly proven as not to admit of a reasonable doubt. Upon this point I consider the maxim, ita lex saripta est, as applicable. There is no conflict of evidence as to the point, that when not aroused, the testator was in a state of stupor, or insensibility; therefore the propounder should show, by legal evidence, that when the witnesses signed testator did see or might have seen — if, at the time, he was in a state of stupor, he neither did or could see. Chancellor Kent states that a constructive presence is an invention of the English Courts to save their prejudices in favor of wills. From his dicta I infer that the current of legislation and authority in this country is adverse to that policy. Nevertheless it seems that in a case similar to this, Wright vs. Price, Douglas, 241, an English Court refused to set up a will, when at the time of signing by the witnesses, the testator was in a state of insensibility: 4 Kent’s Commentaries, 505 to 610. The same dictum is to be found in 2 Bouvier’s Institutes, 452, where it is said to be also the doctrine of the civil law. There are three important differences between this and the Hall case reported in 18 Georgia Reports. 1st. Hall did actually subscribe his will. 2d. The scrivener was also one of the subscribing witnesses, and his attending physician. 3d. He testified to a state of facts, to establish testator’s testamentary capacity, much stronger than that given by Mr. Nason in this case.”
Propounder excepts to this decision, and by his writ of error seeks a reversal of the judgment.
Hall & Nason; Davis & Company, for plaintiffs in error.
Stkozieb & Smith, for defendant in error.

Opinion:
By the Court
Jenkins, J.,
delivering the opinion.
Whilst this case was pending in the Superior Court of Lee county, on appeal from the Court of Ordinary, by consent of parties it was referred to the arbitrament of the Honorable Richard H. Clark, Judge of the Superior Court, with full power to hear the case in vacation, and determine all questions of law and of fact arising in it, but with a reservation to the unsuccessful party of the right of appeal from his decision, which was to stand as the judgment of the Court, to this Court. It was further provided in the consent that the appeal, if taken, should bring before this Court, entire, the merits of the case. The grounds of caveat do not appear in the record, but the questions made in the argument, which was very fairly conducted, sufficiently indicate them. I state these in the order which I propose to consider them, as follows: 1st. Was the will, according to the evidence, signed as required by the statute, (29 Charles II., of force in Georgia,) or rather has the signing been proved according to the true intent and meaning of the statute? 2d. Was the attestation in conformity with the statute? 3d. Had the testator testamentary capacity ? It appears that the testator had, several years before, whilst a widower with one child, made a will. Having subsequently married, that fact, by the laws of Georgia, worked a revocation. Some time after his second marriage, the testator had a severe illness, which reduced him to a state of extreme debility, which resulted in his death. On the last morning of his life his scrivener, David A. Vason, was sent for, who repaired to him immediately, with the revoked will, which had remained in his custody, and after a brief conversation with testator, wrote on a blank leaf of it, an instrument which purported to be a codicil, and which was intended to express the then intention of testator respecting the disposition of his property. The questions to be considered relate to the time and circumstances of the execution of this codicil, all conceding that unless it can be established as a testamentaiy paper, James H. Ragan died intestate. The facts in relation to the signing, as proved by one of the subscribing witnesses and two other persons present, were, that when the paper was read to and approved by him, he attempted to rise, for the purpose of signing it, but failed in the effort from weakness. It was then suggested to him that he might authorize some one present to sign his name for him, and he said, addressing Vason, the scrivener, "do you do so." Vason immediately subscribed the paper with testator's name, and told him he had done so. Upon this evidence the Court below held that the proof of signing by the testator did not meet the requirement of the statute; his opinion being that although the testator might delegate to another authority to sign for him, that delegation of authority must be proved by the attesting witnesses, no others being competent.
1st. We are not prepared, to affirm this opinion. It might, perhaps, be well enough to require evidence that the authority to sign was given in the presence of the subscribing witnesses? but it would be going very far to say' they are the only competent witnesses to prove the fact, and that they must all concur in it. In many cases, where such authority is given and acted upon, it may very well happen that some of the subscribing witnesses would remember it and others not. Such seems to be the fact in this case. One of the subscribing witnesses testifies to the delegation of the authority; the other two do not remember it. Two others present, however, testify to it positively, and all the evidence on this subject clearly establishes to our satisfaction both the fact of authority given, and that it was done in presence of the subscribing witnesses. The interval between the reading of the codicil, as writtén, to the testator, and the signing by the witnesses was very short; in that interval, according to the evidence, the authority was given. Each of the subscribing witnesses testifies to things occurring, both before and after that, and as neither is proven to have left the room during that short interval, the presumption is, that the authority was given in presence of them all, and that two of them have forgotten it. Since, however, in the view we take of this case, our judgment may be placed on other grounds, we decide nothing on this point. It would seem, however, that the evidence as to signing is adverse to the establishment of the codicil as offered for probate. After the formal execution and attestation of the codicil, a doubt seems to have arisen whether or not it expressed his wishes in two respects, and it was determined to question him further. The result was, that the codicil as executed expressed his wishes and intentions in neither of the two points, which were both material. The intelligent and faithful scrivener deemed it necessary to reform the codicil. This was done by erasure accom plishing one important change, and an interlineation effecting another still important and quite independent of the other. The instrument thus altered was again read and approved by the testator, and a memorandum of the alterations, reciting that they were " made to carry out the explained wishes of the testator as made after it (the codicil) was signed on the same day " was written below and signed by the subscribing witnesses. But the codicil as reformed does not appear to have been signed, either by the testator himself or by any other person for him. So far then as regards the testamentary dispositions introduced denovo by these changes, there was no signature at all. These circumstances may also be found to have an important bearing upon another part of the case.
2d. The next question arising is, whether or not the evidence of attestation satisfies the requirements of the statute? It was made by three credible witnesses, and in the corporeal presence of the testator. The doubt is, whether or not he was mentally present, or in other words, cognizant of the attestation. There can scarcely be said to be any conflict in the evidence as to the facts showing his condition, though there is some contrariety of opinion deduced by the witnesses from those facts. All agree that he was greatly debilitated, and when not disturbed lay in a stupor; wholly insensible to what passed immediately around his bed, his ejms being closed; that from this state he could be aroused by effort, when he would open his eyes, usually recognize his acquaintances seen by him, and answer questions asked intelligently, but that there was at every instant a tendency to relapse into this stupor, attended with a gradual closing of the eyes. There is no evidence of a disposition to continue conversation, or to prolong attention to persons or to subjects, or to thought, but the contrary. When those who aroused him ceased conversation stupor instantly resumed its sway. It was a barrier to his cognizance of what was transpiring in his corporeal presence, capable of removal, but always immediately recurring when the means used to remove it were withdrawn. This being the testator's established status, it was incumbent on the propounders to prove that the barrier of his cognizance of the act was removed when the attesting witnesses were making their subscriptions. The proposition that the testator must be mentally as well as bodily present at the attestation, will scarcely be denied. The authorities to this point are concurrent: 2 Bouvier's Institutes, 449; Wright vs. Price, Douglass, 241; 4 Kent's Com., 516; 2 Greenleaf on Evidence, 678. What is the evidence on this point? After Mr. "Vason had told deceased he would sign the paper for deceased, he replied, " Well." This being done the witnesses proceeded to sign. "Vason called out the name of each witness clearly before he signed it, to call testator's attention to it, but the response, " well," above quoted, was the latest evidence of attention on his part; 'he took no notice of the calling of their names. There is no evidence that he attended to it, none that his eyes continued open, (the usual indication that the stupor was resumed) whilst the attestation was in progress. The strong presumption is, that he had relapsed into insensibility before it had been half completed. All that passed only shows that the scrivener endeavored to keep his attention aroused. There is no evidence that the attempt was successful. Under the circumstances, we repeat, the onus wTas upon the propounder to prove it.
3d. This prevailing stupor, which seems to have rested so heavily upon the testator as to raise a presumption that he was not cognizant of the attestation of the will, demands serious attention in the discussion of testamentary capacity, to which we now come. It is well established that a less degree of mental force than is necessary to the skillful and profitable management of property, and the general conduct of business affairs, will suffice for the making of a will. But the testator must be capable of bringing in mental review, with proximate accuracy ^ the property subject to his testamentary disposition, as well as his family relations, and of comprehending the claims and obligations naturally suggested by such review. He must have, to some extent, the power of concentrating thought and controlling the operations of his mind. Otherwise ideas cannot be connected, and without this there can be no conception of a dispository scheme. True, it may be said that in this, as in many other cases, there is a strong probability that this whole operation had been performed whilst the testator was in health, and that nothing more was requisite than the ability to communicate prearranged details. But the history of this case clearly illustrates the danger of adopting this hypothesis. The deceased was an intelligent and worthy man, and had,' undoubtedly, a fixed purpose to die testate. He had, years before, made a will. He had, months before, been informed that a subsequent marriage operated in law as a revocation of that will, yet neither in health nor in the earlier stages of a serious illness, had he a second time come up to the execution of that purpose. What transpired in the last interview with his scrivener, which resulted in this testamentary effort, shows conclusively that upon two points at least, (and very important ones) he either had not reached previously a satisfactory conclusion, or had forgotten it. Upon these points he first gives one direction, in accordance with which the codicil is prepared and carried through the forms of execution. Upon being subsequently aroused, at the suggestion of a bystander, and having his attention called to them, he uses an expression, as to one, indicating embarrassment and irresolution, and ends by giving directions upon both exactly opposite to the first, which necessitated the changes made. It is said that such changes are often made within a few minutes, by men in full health, and in the undoubted possession of all their faculties, when about to make their wills. 'Very true, but in such cases the evidence precludes the idea of a want of mental capacity, but establishes the contrary, and raises the presumption that the change of purpose resulted from a vigorous exercise of that capacity. But the condition in which we find this testator will scarcely justify such a reason in his case. Our object in this connection is to show that he either had not predetermined what he was then directing, or that he had forgotten his predetermination.
Again, supposing a testamentary scheme fully adjusted when he was in full health, it must be conceded that the proper action of the faculty of memory was necessary to communicate it to the scrivener, and to just criticism of his draft when read. The concurrent testimony of witnesses, of the continuous depression exerted upon him by the stupor, renders it extremely improbable that by an act of volition he could bring his memory into effective action. Even iu the best physical and mental condition that faculty does not act well under the interruption of questions or of continuing discourse. We are informed that invariably, so sotfn as conversation ceased, the decease relapsed into stupor. There was then no moment of time in which the facts testified to, transpired, favorable to the exercise of the faculty of memory. The three subscribing witnesses agree in the opinion that the deceased had not mind enough to make a will. One of these was the physician in charge of the case, another was a consulting physician long acquainted with deceased, the third was also an acquaintance of long standing, and a clergyman. Two other physicians present at the time, concur in this opinion. The facts developed impress our minds with a belief that his powers of thought, of memory and of volition, were too much in subjection to heavy stupor, the immediate precursor of death, to leave him testamentary capacity.
There is a difficulty in setting up this will, which, it seems to us^ cannot be gotten over. We have already said that it cannot be established as propounded, because it contains provisions not in it when signed by his direction, that, for instance, which gives to his wife absolutely, the property which she brought into the coverture. Shall it then be admitted to probate as it was when signed, and before the attempted alterations ? We think not; because what transpired immediately afterwards shows that in the prior instructions given to the scrivener, and which were promptly written out and read to him, he had failed to express his wishes regarding the property brought to him by his wife, or else all the while talking at random.' This evidence connects itself closely with the question of testamentary capacity. It indicates that in the first effort at testamentary disposition he did not recognize the relation he bore to that property as a marital acquisition, nor the relation between it and his wife, nor the peculiar claim regarding it, which these circumstances gave her. When his attention was called to it, and it was pressed upon his consideration, he promptly recognized it, but too late for incorporation in his will as signed. Who shall say there are no other claims resulting from family and property relations recognized by him when in the full possession of his faculties, but entirely forgotten, steeped as they were in stupor. We view this one instance, casually developed, in two aspects: first, as conclusive evidence that the codicil as signed, (in which state alone it could be admitted to probate) does not express his will and intention respecting a provision for his wife; secondly, as a forcible indication that his waning intellect had reached the stage of testamentary incapacity. The case of Hall vs. Hall, (18 Georgia, 40,) is relied upon as controlling authority on that question. A careful comparison of the cases will bring to light material differences. They resemble each other in these particulars, there were two common grounds of caveat, want of testamentary capacity, and that the testator, though corporeally present, was mentally absent from the attestation; in each case the testator was in a state of great exhaustion, and proneness to mental stupor. But as regards the first ground of caveat, capacity, the evidence establishes a marked difference. Hall, at first, when questioned, spoke only of the disposition of his estate, which, unexplained, would seem to argue forgetfulness of his personalty. But the principal subscribing witness, who was the attending physician and scrivener, " doubted whether in his palmiest days he knew the meaning of real estate." When this was explained to him, and he was asked whether he meant to give his wife half of all his estate, he answered, " yes, that is what I mean." From this expression of intention he never deviated. Still, owing to his apparent indifference to the whole subject, and his relapsing after each answer into stupor, had the evidence gone no further, I would have been strongly inclined, had the question come before me, to pronounce against his capacity. But he was prompted to perform this act at the suggestion of a sister, one of the legatees present all the while, who, had he died intestate, would not have inherited from him. She, in the absence of his wife, made two efforts to procure from him a disposition more favorable to herself, and less so to the wife. Both of these were resisted with no other support than his own will at hand, and he adhered inflexibly to his purpose, giving for his refusal to comply a reason both sensible and just. His wife, he said, had helped him to make the property'and save it, and "I want her to-have one-half."
Here is evidence of memory, reason, comprehension of family and property relations and strong volition, all combined. In the case at bar such evidence is wanting. Ragan knew the difference between real and personal estate, but his instructions were that his wife should have a half interest in his property, including what she brought to him, only during life or widowhood, and so the will was written and executed. Afterwards, when his attention was called to the limitation of her interest to her widowhood, he abandoned that, showing either lack of understanding or of independent volition. Again, when reminded of the property he had acquired by his marriage with her, he said he wished her to have that absolutely, proving when he dictated the will, which (if any) must go to probate, the claims growing out of the relations to family and property were not in his mind. And this can be imputed to nothing but its shadowed condition.
Regarding the other point, the testator's cognizance of the fact of attestation, two remarks may be made upon the ruling in Hall's case, which distinguishes it from this: First, that question was really not in the record, and we might dispose of the ruling by saying that it was obiter diotum. But, secondly, it was exclusively a question of fact, and had been submitted to and passed upon by a jury. They found that he was mentally and corporeally present, and, with such a finding, under proper direction from the bench, and sustained, on a motion for a new trial, by the presiding Judge, this Court never interferes, unless it be in flagrant violation of the evidence. In this case jury trial was dispensed with, and this was an original question before the Judge in the Court below, who with fuller evidence on the point than was adduced in Hall's case, reached the conclusion that, in contemplation of the statute, the attestation was not in the testator's presence, and on this point wo concur with him.
Let the judgment be affirmed.