Case Name: Chemgas v. Tynan, Warden of the Penitentiary
Court: Colorado Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Colorado
Decision Date: 1911-04
Citations: 51 Colo. 35
Docket Number: No. 7272
Parties: Chemgas v. Tynan, Warden of the Penitentiary.
Judges: Chief Justice Campbell, Mr. Justice Bailey and Mr. Justice Gabbert, concur.
Reporter: Colorado Reports
Volume: 51
Pages: 35–52

Head Matter:
[No. 7272.]
Chemgas v. Tynan, Warden of the Penitentiary.
■ Habeas Coepus — Conviction Merely Erroneous — The omission from a criminal information, otherwise above exception, of the concluding phrase “and against the peace and dignity of the same,” goes to matter of form, and in no degree impair® the jurisdiction of the court — (37).
One convicted upon such information will not he discharged on habeas corpus — (33).
Original application for writ of habeas corpus.
Petitioner John Chemgas, alleges that he was unlawfully convicted in the district court' of the city and county of Denver, and sentenced to the penitentiary on the following information:
“State op Colorado, City and County op Denver.
In the District Court, Second Judicial District.
The People op the State op Colorado v. Peter Horons & John Chemgas.
Comes now Willis V. Elliott, district attorney within and for the second judicial district in the state of Colorado and in the name and by the authority of the People of the State of Colorado informs the court and gives the court to understand that Peter Horons & John Chemgas on, to wit, the 10th day of January, A. D. 1909, at the city and county of Denver, and state of Colorado then and there being male persons over the age of fourteen years, in and upon one, Ralph I. Frost, a male person over the age of fourteen years and then and there being, feloniously, did make an assault, and then and there feloniously, wickedly, diabolically, and against the order of nature, had a venereal affair with and carnally knew the said Ralph I. Frost.
WILLIS V. ELLIOTT,
District Attorney.”
That his arrest, trial, conviction and imprisonment are void because the information Is In conflict with section 30, Article VI. of the constitution, in that it does not conclude: “Against the peace and dignity of the same.”
The return of the warden admits that he holds petitioner by virtue of a mittimus based upon said trial, and that the petition contains a true transcript of the record of said trial and conviction.
Petitioner moves to be discharged upon said return.
Section 30. article VI. of the constitution, reads: All process shall run in the name of “The People of the State of Colorado”; all prosecutions shall be carried on in the name, and by the authority of “The People of the State of Colorado,” and conclude, “against the peace and dignity of the same.” .
Section 1956 Rev. Stats, provides: All exceptions which go merely to the form of the information shall be made before trial, and no motion in arrest of judgment or writ of error shall be sustained for any matter not affecting the real merits of the offense charged.
Section 1960 provides: The information shall be sufficient if it can be understood therefrom: 1. That it is presented by the person authorized by law to prosecute the offense. 2. That the defendant is named therein, or described as a person whose name is unknown to the informant. 3. That the offense was committed within the jurisdiction of the court or is triable therein. 4. That the offense charged is set forth with such degree of certainty that the court may pronounce judgment upon a conviction according to the right of the case.
Section 2919, upon habeas corpus, provides: If it appear that the person is in custody by virtue of process from any court legally constituted, he can be discharged only for some of the following causes: First — Where the court has exceeded the limit of its jurisdiction, either as to the matter, place, sum or person.
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Seventh — Where there is no general law, nor any judgment, order or decree of a court to authorize the process, if in a civil suit, nor any conviction, if in a •criminal proceeding.
Messrs. Tapp & DeWeese and Mr. Isham R. Howze, for petitioner.
Hon. John T. Barnett, Attorney General, Hon. Benjamin Griffith, Attorney General, Mr. A. A. Lee, Mr. Elmer L.' Brock, Mr. George H. Thorne and Mr. Eugene A. Moran, for respondent.

Opinion:
Mr. Justice Garrigues
delivered the opinion of the court.
This is a collateral attack upon the judgment of the district court. If the court had jurisdiction to pronounce judgment, it cannot be reviewed on habeas corpus. If the court had no jurisdiction to pronounce the same, it may be disregarded on habeas corpus. After conviction, however illegal or erroneous, if the •court acted within its jurisdiction, the judgment can not be set aside on habeas corpus. This principle of' •collateral attack, runs through both the civil and criminal law.
The contention of the petitioner is, that the complaint charges no offense; hence it is a void proceeding, and the court exceeded the limit of its jurisdiction in pronouncing judgment.
Prosecutions were formerly.conducted in the name of the crown; under our changed conditions they are conducted in the name of the people. This prosecution is in the name of and by the authority of the people of the state. The complaint sufficiently informs the defendant that he is prosecuted by the state. It states fully the nature and character of the offense, and that the transaction occurred in the city and county of Denver, Colorado. The omitted phrase, "against the peace and dignity of the same," is a legal conclusion, not entering into the charging part of the complaint. The court had jurisdiction over the offense charged and over the person of the defendant, and was not robbed of its jurisdiction by the complaint failing to-inform him of the. legal conclusion that buggery is a crime against the peace and dignity of the people of the state of Colorado. The information is faulty because of this omission, but the district court was not without jurisdiction to' pass upon this defect. The facts stated in the information constituted a public offense known to the laws of Colorado sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the district court. What it should have done, had its attention been called to this omission, or because this court would reverse the case on error, cannot avail the defendant in this proceeding. Counsel neglected to avail himself of a motion to quash, or in arrest of judgment, and failed to have the case reviewed here on error. He has waited until petitioner is serving his sentence in the penitentiary, and now seeks in this collateral proceeding to-raise this point for the first time. We do not think that the decisions of this court permit it to be done, unless the information is so drawn as to charge no-offense whatever. — Frisbie v. U. S. 157 U. S. 168; Ex parte Cain, 120 S. W. 999; Caples v. State, 3 Okla. Crim. 72, 104 Pac. 493; State v. Kirkman, 104 N. C. 911, 10 S. E. 312; State v. Peters, 107 N. C. 876, 12 S. E. 74; People v. District Court, 26 Colo. 380; People v. District Court, 33 Colo. 328.
The motion to discharge the petitioner on the return will be denied, and he is remanded to the custody of the warden of the penitentiary. Motion denied.
Decision en banc.
Chief Justice Campbell, Mr. Justice Bailey and Mr. Justice Gabbert, concur.
Mr. Justice White, Mr. Justice Musser and Mr. Justice Hill, dissent.