Case Name: Wiggins and others, commissioners of highways of the town of Malta, vs. Tallmadge
Court: New York Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1851-07-07
Citations: 11 Barb. 457
Docket Number: 
Parties: Wiggins and others, commissioners of highways of the town of Malta, vs. Tallmadge.
Judges: 
Reporter: Barbour's Supreme Court Reports
Volume: 11
Pages: 457–470

Head Matter:
Wiggins and others, commissioners of highways of the town of Malta, vs. Tallmadge.
If a highway is laid out in the mode pointed out by statute, that may be done at once. But if user is relied upon to prove a dedication to the public, the authorities differ as to the time requisite. Yet there is no doubt user is sufficient. Per Hand, J.
A dedication to the public must be with intent to dedicate. But when that intention is ascertained, whether by the express declarations and acts of a party, or by user, it is sufficient.
Forty years before suit, the grantor of the defendant, and his neighbor, opened a lane or road upon their boundary lines, to accommodate the adjoining lands, taking ton feet from each side. The road thus opened was used uninterruptedly by the public, thenceforth, until shut up by the defendant, the year before the trial. In 1848 the commissioners of highways ascertained, described and entered such road upon record. In 1826 they surveyed, laid out and recorded, and made to connect with the road or lane in question, the road beyond, on which inhabitants resided who had no other egress. Held, that there was sufficient evidence of a dedican tiou to the public, upon which the public and individuals had relied; and of an adoption of such road by the proper authorities. And the defendant having purchased a farm adjoining the road, many years after the dedication, and having acquiesced in the use of the road by the public for 22 years, and then obstructed the same, by building a fence through the center thereof; Held further, that he was liable for such obstruction, in an action at the suit of the commissioners of highways. Cady, J. dissented.
This suit was originally commenced before a justice of the peace, and dismissed by him on a plea of title, &c. The action was commenced in this court, May 25th, 1849, and tried before Mr. Justice Cady, at the Saratoga circuit in February, 1850, when a verdict was given for the defendant. The complaint alledged that the plaintiffs were commissioners of highways of Malta, in the county of Saratoga, and that a road ncu,r to, or adjoining the land of the defendant, had been a highway for more than thirty years, and that the defendant obstructed it by building a fence through the center, which was removed by their order, and the defendant again obstructed it by building fences across and fencing up 80 or 100 rods of it. Whereupon this suit was brought to recover the penalties and damages imposed by statute. The answer denied that there was any such public highway; - or that it was or had been for more than 20 years last past, or was ever a highway ; but on the contrary, alledged that it was a private lane and used for private purposes alone ; and that neither the public nor the commissioners had any right or legal claim, or jurisdiction or authority over the same ; and denied that the defendant had injured or obstructed any public highway in the town of Malta, as stated in the complaint. One Waterbury testified that he had known the road about thirty-six years; that the part that had been obstructed had been used by the public ever since he knew it. That the north part of the road, being about one mile in length, had not been opened for some-13 or 14 years. There had been some obstruction, as bars or a gate. There was testimony to show that there had been some occasional travel on the whole length of a road or lane, about a mile and a half long, extending north and south between two other roads. About a mile of the northern part of this road had been cultivated many years, perhaps 13 or 14 years, and at most but a small part of that portion had ever been fenced as a road. There was a gate at the south end of this part. But the southern portion, which was the part in question, had been fepced out as a road or lane. A second witness stated that he had known this road or lane thirty-six years, a third between 30 and 40, and a fourth between 40 and 50, and another 40, and all of them testified to its use by the public during the time, except one, who stated that he and seven others, whom he named, had used it. The testimony further tended to show that formerly there was a factory off westerly, from which a lane or road, two rods wide, commenced, and ran easterly about 30 rods to a place where three families resided. Thence it continued about 60 rods, li rods wide, where it intersected with the north end of the lane or road particularly in question in this suit. From thence the latter ran south about half a mile to an east and west road, and was about 20 feet wide. There was no house upon the disputed piece, but the families living on the above roads, westerly, had no outlet but this. One Parks owned the land on the west side, and the defendant on the east side of this road. One Olmstead formerly owned the farm now owned by the defendant, and sold it to the defendant in 1826. One Parks, called by the defendant, testified that he remembered when the road was laid out between his father, who owned on the west side, and Olmstead, who owned on the east. That the witness acted for his father in laying out the road. That was 40 years before the trial, and there was at that time only one family in north. That Parks and Olmstead laid open the road so that Olmstead would not go through his father’s land, and so that it could be used as a lane to accommodate the fields east and west. That it was a mere verbal agreement between two neighbors. That he had been pathmaster a number of years, and this road was not attached to any beat, to his knowledge. That every body passed through it that had occasion, but he did not know as the public, by their officers, recognized it as a road until 1848. That he had known the public to use it as a highway for about 40 years ; that it had never been closed up until the defendant closed it up in the spring of 1849. That the soil was sandy and did not need repairs like hard land. That the fence on the east side of the road was where it had been for 40 years. A brother of this witness, called by the plaintiffs, testified 'that he understood his father and the other owner gave each ten feet. There was a road through before, further west, but it was opened where it is now when the 20 feet was given. He had used it 40 or 50 years, and it had always been used by the public. That he did not know when it was opened, but thought it had been opened 60 years. That he had worked it for his own accommodation, and there was a bridge on it. That he had used it to draw lumber to Stillwater 50 years before.
The plaintiffs proved by the records of the town of Malta, that this road was ascertained, described and entered of record in the town clerk’s office by the commissioners of highways of Malta, in April, 1848.
The defendant gave in evidence, under objection, the following, which was recorded in the town clerk’s office, March 4,1829. “A survey of a road laid out by the commissioners of highways, on the 9th day of October, 1826, beginning sixty-five links northward of the north limit of Lewis Waterbury’s house, and on the line with the west end thereof, and running thence S. 66 deg. E. 13 chains and 46 links to the middle of the lane running' E". and S. between Coleman Olmstead’s lane and Patrick Parks, land, the point of intersection being H. 63 deg. E. 33 links from the middle of a pitch pine tree in the W. E. corner of Patrick Parks’ field. Thence IN". 22 deg. 45 E. 3 chains 73 links to a point in the said line of David Bidwell’s land, 43 links II. E. of an apple tree in Coleman Olmstead’s field and 47 links S. W. of a certain pitch pine stump, the lines above traced being intended for the middle of the road, and the road 37-| links wide.
Joseph -Simpson,
Signed the day and date Zadocic Dunning,
within, in presence of Com’rs of Highways.
Sam’l Hunter, Surveyor.
The judge charged the jury, among other things, that the highway must have been adopted by the officers of the town, in order to make it a public highway, as contemplated by statute; and the plaintiffs were bound to show that it was so far a public highway, that the public had adopted it, which they had not done. That merely traveling on the road did not give them a right to it at all. Individuals merely traveling a road, or using it as a right of way, did not make it a public highway, within the meaning of 1 R. & 521, § 100. It was necessary that the officer representing the public should secure it, or do some act to signify their adoption of it, and in this case there was no proof of such acts prior to 1848. That the act of the plaintiffs in 1848 only showed one year’s possession, and therefore could have no effect in this cause. The plaintiffs excepted, and the jury found for the defendant. A hill of exceptions was sealed and the plaintiffs appealed.
J. B. McKean, for the plaintiffs.
E. F. Bullard, for the defendant.

Opinion:
Hand, J.
The revised statutes declare that " all public highways now in use, heretofore laid out and allowed by any law of this state, of which a record shall have been made in the office of the clerk of the county or town, and all roads not recorded, which have been, or shall have been used as public highways for twenty years or more, shall be deemed public highways, but may be altered in conformity to the provisions of this title." (1 R. S. 521, § 100.) The next section requires the commissioners of highways to order the overseers of highways to open all roads to the width of at least two rods, " which they shall judge to have been used as highways for twenty years." (§ 101.) Another section requires the commissioners " to cause such of the roads used as highways as shall have been laid out but not sufficiently described, and such as shall have been used for twenty years, but not recorded, to be ascertained, described and entered of record in the town clerk's office." (1. R. S. 501, § 1, sub. 3.) And by section 102 a penalty of five dollars is imposed upon " whoever shall obstruct any highway," &c. It perhaps is not important to define what was deemed a highway at common law, as the statute declares that all roads used as public highways for twenty years, may be deemed highways. It seems to me this clause of the statute has great influence upon this case, though I do not think it necessary to put the case upon twenty years' user. " Highway" is the genus of all public ways, whether ca.rt, horse or foot ways. (Queen v. Saintliff, 6 Mod. 255. Holt, C. J. 4 Vin. 502.) And whether a road shall be deemed a highway from mere user, depends upon the nature of the user. It is doubted in some of the books whether a road can be a highway unless it be a thoroughfare. (Hoodyer v. Hadden, 5 Taunt. 126. Hood v. Veal, 5 B. & Ald. 454. King v. Marquis of Downshire, 4 Ad & El. 698.) The judges have been divided in opinion, but there is now, perhaps, a leaning to the opinion that it may be. (British Museum v. Finnis, 5 C. & P. 460. Roscoe on Cri Evi. 564. Woolr. on Ways, 3.) " A thoroughfare," Mr. Webster says, "is a passage through; a passage from one street or opening to another ;" and a highway has been said to be infinite, having no termini ; no terminus a quo, nor terminus ad quern. (King v. Hammond, 10 Mod. 383.) But a cul de sac may be a good highway, in this state, if laid out by the proper authorities. In our new country are many public roads not connected with any other, at one end. And the same judge who gave the opinion in King v. Hammond, decided that if a vill be erected and a way laid out to it, if there be no other way but that to the vill, it is not material quo animo it was laid; it shall be deemed a public way. (Parker C. J. in Queen v. Inh. of Hornsby 10 Mod. 150.) If a highway is laid out in the mode pointed out by statute, that may be done at once. But if user is relied upon to prove dedication, the authorities differ as to the requisite time ; but there is no doubt user is sufficient. In some cases six, and in another seven years, were required. In Colden v. Thurbur, twelve years' use was held prima facie evidence that the road had been properly laid out. (2 John. 424.) Lord Kenyon, in Rugby Charity v. Merriweather, mentioned a case of six years. (11 East, 375, n.) That case has been doubted; and perhaps more now depends upon the intent than upon the time of sufferance. ( Woolr. on Ways, 12.) A dedication must be with intent to dedicate. (Ld. Denman in Barraclough v. Johnson, 8 Ad. & El. 99.) There must be animus dedicandi, and when that is ascertained, whether by the express declarations and the acts of a party, or by user, it is sufficient. The books are full of such cases. (Ladi v. Shepherd, 2 Stra. 1004. Post v. Pearsal, 22 Wend. 425. S. C. 20 Id. 116. 3 Kent, 451. Jarvis v. Dean, 3 Bing. 447. Surrey Canal v. Hall, 1 M. & Gr. 392. Parker v. Van Houten, 7 Wend. 145. Galatian v. Gardner, 7 John. 106. City of Cincinnati v. Lessee of White, 6 Peters, 435. N. Orleans v. U. S. 10 Peters, 662. State v. Wilkin son, 2 Vt. R. 480. 4 Paige, 510. Hunter v. Trustees of Sandy Hill, 6 Hill, 407. 2 Smith's Lead. Cas. 180, and Am. Notes.)
Again; the commissioners are to ascertain and enlarge those roads which have been used twenty years. (1 R. S. 501, § 1: 521, § 101.) Perhaps the roads can not be enlarged, without compensation. But the commissioners can ascertain what are roads in the town, and when that is done, the road so ascertained becomes a public highway so far as such public act can confirm it; in cases where confirmation is necessary. (Parker v. Van Houten, 7 Wend. 145.) Though I do not see how such confirmation can be necessary in this case. As a general rule the parish is to repair all highways, no matter how they became such. (King v. lnh. of Leake, 5 B. & Ald. 469. Woolr. on Ways, 76. King v. Inh. of Wornsey, Holt, 338. 4 Vin. 504, 5.) And a bridge used by the public, prima facie, is to be repaired by them, it seems, though built by an individual; and to escape that obligation, it lies with the public to show that the duty rests with another. (23 Wend. 450.)
These principles, applied to the road in question, require a new trial. Here was a former road opened perhaps sixty years ago; and forty years before suit the grantor of the defendant, and his neighbor, nearly upon the same site, opened a lane or road upon their boundary lines, taking ten feet from each for the distance of half a mile, from whence it continued on another course into a small neighborhood; and which ever since has been used uninterruptedly by the public, until shut up by the defendant the year before the trial. It is true the factory has been abandoned for years, and but few families have resided beyond the part in question. And it has been decided there can not be a dedication to a limited part of the public. (Pool v. Huskisson, 11 M. & W. 827.) And it is testified that the twenty feet was opened to accommodate the adjoining lands. But the uninterrupted use by the public alone, I think sufficient evidence of dedication.
But again ; in 1826, as I understand the testimony, the road commissioners surveyed, laid out and recorded, and made to connect with the road or lane in question, the road beyond, on which inhabitants then resided, who had no other egress. And the public were undisturbed in the use for twenty-two years after. Denominating the road in question the " lane" of A. in that survey could make no difference. If it was a public road before, an admission to the contrary, by a public officer, in a document upon another subject, would not affect the rights of the public. But I think it is rather a declaration that the other part was also a public way, for it would be futile to lay out a road sixty or seventy rods in length, having no connection with any other road. And this takes away the objection that the particular piece in question was a cul de sac, if that would make any difference. Possibly from the last course of the survey made in 1826, some other outlet was intended; but if so, it seems no such route has been completed. Nor, under the circumstances, could that alter the case. But there is another circumstance that should not be overlooked. In 1848, the proper officers ascertained, described and entered this road upon record. If any adoption was necessary this was sufficient, and made the public liable to repair. Upon the whole, here was sufficient evidence of a dedication, upon which the public and individuals had relied; in addition to which, the proper authorities had taken legal steps to declare it a public highway. The defendant purchased the adjoining farm many years after the dedication and subsequently acquiesced in the use by the public 22 years longer, and then obstructed the road and shut in his neighbors.
I think the case is clearly against him; at all events the question of dedication should have been passed upon by the jury.
Judgment reversed, with costs to abide the event.
Willard, P. J. concurred.