Case Name: Hopkins and another vs. Langton and another
Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Wisconsin
Decision Date: 1872-06
Citations: 30 Wis. 379
Docket Number: 
Parties: Hopkins and another vs. Langton and another.
Judges: 
Reporter: Wisconsin Reports
Volume: 30
Pages: 379–389

Head Matter:
Hopkins and another vs. Langton and another.
Fraudulent Sale: (1.) Vendor's fraudulent intent and vendee's knowledge thereof must he shown.
Evidence: (2.) Error to reject evidence of vendor's fraudulent intent. (3.) Evidence necea sary to charge vendee with duty of inquiry. (4.) Improper instruction as to degree of evidence.
Exceptions : (5.) Exceptions taken hy one party cannot he considered on appeal hy the other. (6, 7.) Modifications of the rule.
Attachment: (8,9.) Sei'vice of summons in attachment, evidence of. (10,11.) Defect in appraisement of property attached, how remedied.
1. To impeach a sale for fraud as against the vendor’s creditors, both the . vendor’s fraudulent intent and the vendee’s knowledge of it (or of circumstances which charge him with the duty of inquiry) must be shown.
2. .It was error to reject evidence of the vendor’s fraudulent intent, though not accompanied at the time by evidence of the vendee’s knowledge. If the latter kind of evidence were not substantially introduced, the vendee would not be prejudiced by the admission of the former, as a verdict could not be found against him on that alone.
8. It was error to instruct the jury that the vendee was not chargeable with notice of the vendor’s fraudulent intent so as to avoid the sale, unless he had before him at the time of his purchase “ good and substantial evidence of it, such as sends conviction home to the mind and establishes a well founded belief.” A less degree of evidence than this will charge the vendee with the duty of inquiry.
4. Where such an instruction is given after numerous others, some of which state the rule correctly, it must be regarded as so modifying the whole as to require a reversal of the judgment in favor of the vendee.
5. The general rule, in the absenee of any contrary statute, is, that exceptions taken by one party cannot be considered on appeal by the opposite party.
6. But when the appellant is compelled to establish his title or defense through certain documentary or record evidence offered by him, and it appears therefrom that his title or defense is fatally and incurably defective, and the respondent excepted to the admission of the evidence, it seems that the judgment should not be reversed even though there were errors committed against the appellant.
7. Thus, where the action was for the seizure and sale, by the appellants, of certain chattels, and they justified under writs of attachment in suits against plaintiffs’ vendors, and alleged that the sale to plaintiffs was fraudulent and void, if the records in the attachment suits, admitted against plaintiffs’ objection, were fatally and incurably defective in respect to showing jurisdiction, the judgment should not he reversed for errors against the appellants.. Otherwise if the defects in the evidence may he cured before a new trial.
8. Whether and how far a recital in the judgment of a court of general jurisdiction, in an attachment suit, that the summons was served upon all the defendants, is evidence of such seiyice upon non-resident defendants, as to whom service was required to be made by publication; and whether appellants, justifying under the attachment, were bound to show the service by other proof — is not here decided. See. Ballmer v. Guild, (10 Wis., 572,) and Whitney v. Brunette, (15 Wis., 68).
9. The omission of the appellants to introduce in evidence other parts of the records in the attachment suits, showing the fact of service, being a remediable defect (if any), furnishes no reason for refusing to reverse the judgment for errors against them.
10. Where property seized under a writ of attachment was in fact duly appraised, but the appraisers omitted by mistake to sign the appraisement, although the statute requiring such signature (R. S., ch. 180, § 9) is mandatory, and the defect cannot be disregarded in this action, yet such defect may be remedied by amendment, on application to the court in which the attachment proceedings were had.
11. Such defect, therefore, in this case, constitutes no ground for refusing to reverse the judgment for errors against the appellants.
APPEAL from the Circuit Court for Fond du Lac County.
Action of trespass for the recovery of the value of a stock of goods seized by defendant, Langton, as sheriff, under certain writs of attachment, the defendant, Van Dyhe, being plaintiff in one of the attachment suits. Defendants in their answers justified under the writs of attachment, and alleged that at the time the goods were attached they were the property of the Red River Lumber Company, defendants in attachment, and that plaintiffs claimed them by virtue of a pretended sale from the Red River Company, which was fraudulent and void.
Plaintiffs established in evidence their purchase and possession of the goods on the 22d day of November, 1867, the seizure by defendants being on the 27th day of the same month. Defend ants offered, among other evidence, the depositions of J. B. Bradford and Thomas K. Erwin, tending to show fraudulent intent upon the part of the vendors, to the admission of which plaintiffs objected, and the objection was sustained. At the close of the instructions, which were exceedingly voluminous, the court, at the request of plaintiff’s counsel, charged as follows : “I mean that you should not charge the plaintiffs with notice of the fraudulent intent of the Eed Eiver Company, so as to avoid this sale, unless they had before them at the time these goods were purchased, good and substantial evidence of it, such as sends conviction home to the mind and establishes a well founded belief.- Nothing short of this would be sufficient to charge them with knowledge so as to deffeat their recovery in this action, and any notice-or knowledge of fraud they may have had after this sale was made, would certainly not avoid the sale or in any way affect it.” Verdict for plaintiffs, and a mo tion for a new trial being overruled, defendants appealed.
Hastings & Gi'eene, for appellants, L. B. Caswell, contra.

Opinion:
DixoN, C. J.
The court erred in excluding the depositions of the witnesses Bradford and Erwin, offered by the defendants. In cases of this nature, beside the relation of debtor and creditor, two facts are to be shown in order to establish the defense, first, fraud on the part of the vendor of the property in making the sale, and, second, knowledge of such fraud on the part of the vendee or purchaser at the time of purchasing, or knowledge of such other facts and circumstances by the vendee as ought to have put him upon inquiry and would have led to an ascertainment of the truth, or as will afford reasonable ground for the inference that he purposely or negligently omitted to make those inquiries which an ordinarily cautious and prudent man in the same situation would have made. Knowledge by the vendee of the fraudulent intent, or the existence within his knowledge of other facts and circumstances naturally and justly calculated to awaken suspicion of it in the mind of a man of ordinary care and prudence, thus making it bis duty to pause and inquire, and a wrong on bis part not to do so, before consummating tbe purchase, is essential in order to charge tbe vendee in every such case with a knowledge of facts so calculated to arouse suspicion, that tbe vendee cannot shut bis eyes, but must look about him and inquire. Tbe depositions offered and rejected bad no ten dency to prove tbe guilty knowledge or participation of tbe ven-dees in this case, but they did tend very strongly to prove tbe fraudulent intent of tbe vendors which was tbe first fact to be established by tbe defense. Eor that purpose they are admissible and should have been received, and then, if there was no evidence to connect tbe plaintiffs with such fraudulent intent of their vendors, or to show that they knew or ought to have known it, or to have inquired into it, which was tbe other distinct fact also to be shown by the defense, tbe jury would have so found and returned by their verdict and tbe plaintiffs could not have been prejudiced.
Another error, which in tbe judgment of this court is clear and unquestionable, and which follows from what has already been said, was in the final instruction of the court to the jury, given at the request of the plaintiffs where the judge said : " I mean you should not charge the plaintiffs with notice of the fraudulent intent of the Red River Company so as to avoid this sale, unless they had "before them at the time these goods were purchased, good and substantial evidence of it, such as sends conviction home to the mind and establishes a well-founded belief — nothing short of this would be sufficient to charge them with Icnowledge, so as to defeat their recovery in this action," etc. This instruction, or rather small part of one, given after all the others, and at the close of a charge made up almost entirely of the written requests prepared and presented by counsel on both sides, and all of which were given, and which together amounted to over forty folios, must be regarded as a modification of all the others, and was in substance informing the jury that to charge the plaintiffs with notice of the fraudulent intent of their vendors, or to put them upon inquiry which, if omitted, was equivalent to notice, the plaintiffs must Rave Rad at tRe time of tRe pnrcRase actual knowledge of tRe fraudulent intent or sucR evidence of it Refore tRem as would Rave Reen sufficient to estaRlisR tRe fact in a court of justice. A proposition so wide from tRe true rule of law governing in sucR case requires no argument to elucidate its error. TRe court Rad more tkan once in tRe course of tRe ckarge stated tRe correct rule as indicated, Rut as already observed, tRe last instruction must Re regarded as Raving so far qualified it, and substituted anotker and most erroneous one, tkat notking skort of a reversal of tRe judgment and tRe granting of a new trial can Re looked upon as an adequate means of correction.
Sometking ougkt to Re said in tkis opinion in animadversion of tRe practice of counsel wko prepare and present so many and suck voluminous and repetitious requests to ckarge, as was done in this case, wkere tkree or four requests skortly drawn would have covered all the points of law involved and served a far better purpose. With suck a wordy cloud of instructions, as that by which the jury were showered, we might say deluged, in this case, twenty-three long ones from one side and seventeen from the other, the marvel is that the jury should Rave known anything about the law. TRe strong probability is they did not When the learned judges of the circuit courts shall take the responsibility of rejecting instructions thus long drawn out and repeated to the point-of obscurity on account of their length and verbosity and tendency to bewilder the jury, and shall substitute some brief and appropriate instructions of their own, it will be time enough, no doubt, for this court to consider and determine the propriety of such action. We may, however, at this time, with safety predict that any like action on their part which shall, consistently with the ends .of justice, operate to check this evil and repress the spirit of verbosity, which too often prevails in these matters to the detriment of law and jus tice, will undoubtedly receive tbe favorable consideration of tbis court.
By the Court.— Judgment reversed and a venire de novo awarded.