Case Name: W. M. Hall v. T. M. Keese; Dougherty v. Cartwright
Court: Supreme Court of Texas
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1868-10
Citations: 31 Tex. 504
Docket Number: 
Parties: W. M. Hall v. T. M. Keese. Dougherty v. Cartwright.
Judges: 
Reporter: Texas Reports
Volume: 31
Pages: 504–556

Head Matter:
W. M. Hall v. T. M. Keese. Dougherty v. Cartwright.
Mobbill, C. J. — The constitution of the" United States provides that “no person shall be deprived of * * property without due process of law;” that “congress shall have power to declare war, grant letters of marque and reprisal, and make rules concerning captures on land and water;” "to raise and support armies;” and “make rules for the government of the land and naval forces.” So that if the people of Texas were citizens of the United States during the rebellion they could not be deprived of their property without due process of law. If they were a part of another state or a de facto government, and they and their property were captured by the forces of the United States, it belonged to congress and not the commander-in-chief of the army to make rules concerning those captures. In either case the proclamations, military orders, or whatever else they may he called, can have no force or effect upon any other than the men subject to the commander, unless such proclamations and orders are based upon an act of congress.
The powers of government are distributed into three co-ordinate branches. There is no majesty except the majesty of the law.
The right to condemn or confiscate the property of enemies rests not upon the declaration of war or upon modern usage, but legislative will, to be found in acts of congress; and if there be no such legislation, the power of condemnation does not exist. (Livingston v. Moon, 7 Pet., 546; Brown v. The United States, 8 Cranch, 110.)
The power to declare war includes the exercise of all the ordinary rights of belligerents, and congress may therefore pass suitable laws to embrace them. But until laws of condemnation have been passed, no private citizen can enforce any such rights, and the judiciary is incapable of giving them any legitimate operation.
But the congress of the United States have declared their will as to the disposition of slaves. As early as the 6th of August, 1861, and the 17th day of July, 1862, the congress of the United States passed “An act to confiscate property used for insurrectionary purposes,” and “An act entitled an act to suppress insurrection, to punish treason and rebellion, to seize and confiscate the property of rebels, and for other purposes." (11 Stats., 589.) The 9th section of this last act provided, that “All slaves of persons who shall hereafter be engaged in rebellion against the government of the United States, &c., escaping from such persons and taking refuge within the lines of the army, and all slaves captured from such persons or deserted by them and coming under the control of the government of the United States, shall be deemed captives of war, and shall be forever free of their servitude, and not again held as slaves.” This, as well as all the other sections of the act, was prospective, and the fourteen different sections of the act contain full and ample “rules concerning captures on land and water.” The congress, by this act, virtually negatives the power of any other branch of the government to do what the constitution authorizes that body alone to do. The act specially declares the slaves captives of war, and bases their freedom on the fact that their owners “were engaged in rebellion against the government of the United States,” and it does not free any others. This same act, in the 7th and 8th sections, contemplated “due course of law” against the owners of the property, and of course the freedom of the slave was dependent upon the disloyalty of the owner, as found by the court.
As the proposed Xlllth amendment to the constitution was passed by congress on the 1st day of February, 1865, and as it is to be presumed that the congress supposed that the requisite number of states would ratify it, which was really done previous to the 18th December, 1865, hence there was no necessity to convict their owners of treason to free the slaves. By this amendment not only the slaves of the disloyal, but of the loyal also, were free, and on the 18th of December, 1865, slavery ceased to exist, and freedom was established coextensive with the United States.
This proclamation was a war measure, and did not operate presently upon the slaves. It was not founded in the constitution, and it was duly claimed for the commander-in-chief of the armies.
In the case before the court, the vendor, in January, 1865, sold and delivered a slave to the vendee, who in consideration thereof executed a promissory note for the payment. In the other case, a slave at the same time was hired for a year, and a promissory note given in consideration of the hire. As there was nothing illegal in the transaction, the notes were not void for illegality. "The consideration is represented as having failed. It is not pretended that at the time of the contract there was no consideration. Each party had the same means of knowing the future condition of the slave, and acted upon his own ideas as to the result of the war. That the cause which proved mortal to slavery would soon sweep over the land, was apparent to some and disbelieved by others. There was, however, no breach in the contract on the part of the vendor at the time of the sale. And though the vendor guarantied the subject of sale, a slave for life, and the slave in the same year was made free by the superior power, inasmuch as at the time the sale was made he was a slave for life, yet, if his freedom was occasioned afterwards, not by the vendor, but by the sovereign power of the nation, the vendor did not violate his contract.
The question is, who was the owner at the time the slave became free? “Bes pent suo domino.”
The pecuniary loss must be borne by those who were the owners of such slaves at the time of their emancipation; for the emancipation of the slaves during the year was the artificial death of the slaves, and operated as would their natural death; therefore the defendant is liable for the hire during the whole year. The loss in the other ease was a vis major, and it fell upon the vendee, who was in possession, and not upon the vendor, to whom the note for the price was due.
Lindsay, J., concurred. — Slavery did exist in fact and in law until its overthrow by the actual force of the national arms. It originated in force; it was destroyed by force.
The effect of the President’s proclamation was to liberate the slaves under the national control, and to pledge the faith of the government as to the remainder. The liberation was the "effect of capture.
The proclamation could not, proprio vigore, manumit the slaves. It required the power of the conquering forces. The liberation in Texas took effect from the date of the surrender of the insurgent forces, and the proclamation of that fact by the commanding general, dated 19th June, 1865. By general understanding, that was the day of jubilee of the freedom of the slaves in Texas. Until this final surrender in Texas, the traffic in slaves was lawful.
The destruction of slavery was a vis major, and those in possession at the final application of the power had to sustain the loss.
It is not conceded that the XHIth amendment was necessary to destroy slavery in the revolted states. This was settled by the surrender. This amendment finished the work throughout the entire nation.
The notes being given after the proclamation in 1863, but before the 19th June, 1865, were recoverable.
Latimeb, J., concurred. — [The clerk informs the Reporter that Latimer’s opinion had unfortunately been lost.]
Hamilton, J., dissented. — The real question is, Was a sale of negroes in Texas after the 1st of January, 1863, opposed to the solemnly declared will and policy of the United States government, and had they the right, under existing circumstances, to declare such policy? If these questions are to be answered in the affirmative, then it is unnecessary to do more than add, that they should receive no aid from loyal courts to carry them into execution. '
By the terms pf President Lincoln’s proclamation of January 1, 1863, the high purpose of the government was, in solemn form, made known to the citizens of the government and to the nations of the earth, that slavery should cease in the states and districts which it embraced, provided effect could be given to it by force of arms; and that this declaration of purpose was authoritative and warranted by the constitution as a measure of war, and was carried into full effect by the success of the national arms.
Prom the fact of a civil war and a defacto government here in Texas, I deduce the right of the national government to declare and effect the emancipation of the slaves.
War is that state in which a nation prosecutes its right by force Civil war includes every war between one and the same political society. In such a war, the parties are forced to accord to each other the rights of belliger eats; and to such wars the public laws of nations are in many respects applicable.
After the recognition of the Confederate States by the proclamation of the Queen of England, of the 13th May, 1861, as belligerents, a citizen of a foreign power is estopped to deny the existence of a war, with all its consequences, as regards neutrals. They cannot ask a court to affect a technical ignorance of the existence of a war which all the world acknowledges to be the greatest civil war known in the history of the human race, and thus cripple the arm of the government and paralyze its power by subtle definitions and ingenious sophisms. (The Prize Cases, 2 Black, 669.)
After quoting largely from the Prize Cases, the judge says: From these authorities, which I have so freely quoted, and from my knowledge of the character, magnitude, and duration of the war, the manner in which it was conducted by the parties engaged in the contest, with all the prominent incidents connected with it to its close — of which, as a matter of public history, I must take judicial knowledge — I am at no trouble to determine that it was a “civil war” of vast proportions, in which the contesting parties respectively were entitled to and were accorded all the rights of belligerents, according to the established public law of nations; and, as resulting from this necessarily, that the successful belligerent may rightfully claim and exercise all the powers accorded to a conqueror under the laws of war.
A government in fact was erected, complete in the organization of all its parts, with sufficient resources of men and money to carry on a civil war of unexampled dimensions. * * The so-called Confederate States were in the possession of many of the highest attributes of government.
The revolting states did practically, not legally, withdraw from the Union by severing their political connection with it; they did expel from their limits the flag of the United States, her courts and officers, civil and military, and erected a new government in its stead, with a constitution, a president, a congress, a judiciary, and officers, state and confederate; organized vast armies, equipped and put them in the field, and for four years contested the palm of final victory with the United States on more than three hundred bloody fields, in a war which is admitted to have been the most gigantic of modern times. It is too late for those who were engaged on the Confederate side to insist now that they have always been in the Union, and that, therefore, the condition of the revolting states has not been changed.
It is too late for the United States to dispute the fact of secession, or a partial disruption of the government in the revolting states during the period of the war.
In the meantime it must be remembered that the United States government lost none of her rights, authority, or jurisdiction over the territory and people of the insurgent states by reason of their withdrawal; she was only prevented by force for a time from exercising them.
The rebellion was carried on in the interest of slavery. It was in fact a contest between freedom and slavery, and which demanded every energy and resource which the executive possessed or could command to sustain even the existence of the government; and after long deliberation and advice it was determined to make war upon slavery.
After reciting the preliminary proclamation of the 22d of September, the proclamation of the 1st of January, 1863, he proceeds: “Now, therefore, I, Abraham Lincoln, President of the United States, by virtue of the power in me vested, as commander-in-chief of the army and navy of the United States, in time of actual armed rebellion against the authority and government of the United States, and as a fit and necessary war measure for suppressing said rebellion, do, on this 1st day of January, 1863, and in accordance with my purpose so to do, publicly proclaimed for the full period of one hundred days from the day first above mentioned, order and designate, as the states and parts of states wherein the people thereof respectively are this day in rebellion against the United States, the following, to wit,” (then mentioning the states and parts of states, including Texas,) proceeds: “And by virtue of the power and for the purpose aforesaid I do order and declare, that all persons held as slaves within said designated states-and parts of states are, and henceforward shall be, free;” and then this noblest paper since the declaration of independence by our forefathers, and which, like that, was to be sustained and enforced at the cost of blood and treasure, concludes with this solemn assertion and invocation, “ and upon this act, sincerely believed to be an act of justice, warranted by the constitution upon military necessity, I invoke the considerate judgment of mankind and the gracious favor of Almighty God.”
The war powers in the constitution cited.
It is a well-established rule of the public law of nations that “from the moment one state is at war with another it has, on general principles, a right to seize on all the enemy’s properly, of whatever kind and wheresoever found, and to appropriate the property thus taken to its own use or to that of the captors.” (Lawrence’s Wheaton’s Int. Law.)
This proclamation of emancipation, thus warranted by the laws of war, fully expressed the will of the United States government, as a belligerent, upon the subject embraced in it. It was, that from and after that date the former slaves in the insurrectionary states and districts (including Texas) should thenceforth be forever free.
The proclamation depended upon the success of the arms of the United States. But they did succeed, and that gave it effect from its date.
After the proclamation, to engage in the traffic of slaves was to violate the public policy of the United States. It was an illegal dealing, about which neither party will receive relief.
The question here is, not as to the moment of time when the former slaves in Texas actually obtained their freedom by the events of the war, but it is whether now the courts will aid in carrying out and enforcing contracts against the public policy of the government, pronounced in the most solemn form, as both sovereign and belligerent, in a great civil war.
The XHIth amendment applied to those states and parts of states not embraced in the president’s proclamation.
Caldwell, J., concurred in the dissent of Hamilton, J.
Appeal from Caldwell. The case was tried before Hon. J. J. Thornton, one of the district judges.
These cases, like several others found in the volumes of this Reporter, in coming ages, will be referred to as a chapter in the history of great events. Bead in connection with Bishop v. Jones & Petty, 28 Tex., 294; the Sequestration Cases, 30 Tex., 688; the Stay-Law Cases, Jones v. McMahan & Gilbert, 30 Tex., 719; the great case of Texas v. White & Chiles, 25 Tex. Supp., 465, (Texas Bond case;) and others of like character, they will convince the antiquarian of future years that some generations make history so rapidly that they do not understand it themselves.
The secession movement was one avowedly in the interest of slavery. Deeper down and below this there were motives in the minds of many to establish an absolute and arbitrary government. But the great masses had- been educated up to the belief that the people in the nineteen states where African slavery did not exist were faithless to their obligations to the constitution, and that at some time or other they would manumit all the slaves of the land. Ho one could foresee the mode, but the sentiments constantly avowed against the institution were received as proof of the desire and purpose. The election of President Lincoln was seized upon as the occasion to “fire the-southern heart” and to dissolve the Union. The possession of the state governments by the extremists made the forms of dissolution very simple. The governors convened the legislatures; the legislatures authorized the election of conventions, which passed secession ordinances and elected delegates to a convention at Montgomery; these men agreed upon a new union, which they called the Oonfed erate States of America; they organized a national government and put the new machine in motion. The delay in Texas, owing to the opposition of Governor Sam Houston, was exceedingly irritating. He delayed calling the legislature in special session, although severely pressed by newspapers, town meetings, and even many of the unionists, who elected him, to do so. One member of the legislature actually issued a proclamation, inviting the legislature to assemble without waiting the call of the governor. Sixty-one gentlemen, who “ chanced to be at Austin,” issued a proclamation for the election of delegates to a convention. Yielding to the threatening circumstances, the governor convened the legislature in “ extra session,” and that body legalized the call of the convention. The convention, as was its purpose, passed a secession ordinance, which was submitted to the people amidst an incipient war, during which all the United States forces “ surrendered,” or were captured, and it was carried by an overwhelming majority. (Paschal’s Dig., pp. 78-81, 86 et seq., and note 216.)
During the discussions of that day and for thirty years previous, the southern press, the pulpit, the stump orators, the family circle, and every instrument of public sentiment had taught the blacks as well as the whites that a contest was coming which would either destroy slavery or render it perpetual. Restrictions had been imposed upon manumission. The free persons of color had been driven from several states. In others, including Texas, laws had been provided for the re-enslavement of those who had become free. Yet, in the face of all this, the influences of kindred ties, or other causes of conscience, induced some slave-owner occasionally to manumit his slaves by last will and testament. The secession convention sought to put a perpetual stop to this by the following amendments to the constitution, article YIH:
“ Seo. 1. The legislature shall have no power to pass laws for the emancipation of slaves.
“ Sec. 2. No citizen or other person residing in this state shall have power, by deed or will, to take effect in this state or out of it, in any manner whatsoever, directly or indirectly, to emancipate his slave or slaves.
“ Seo. 3. The legislature shall have no power to pass any law to prevent immigrants to this state from bringing with them such persons of the negro race as are deemed, slaves by the laws of any of the Confederate States of America: Provided, that slaves who have committed any felony may be excluded from this state.” (Paschal’s Dig., Art. VIII, pp. 69, 70.)
But “Man proposes and God disposes.” The war came, and it ended; the stone which had been laid as the chief of the corner was dashed to pieces; the fabric fell, and slavery was destroyed. The strong man, who had bowed at the pillars of the temple, had so shattered the edifice and so deeply buried the princes, who had feasted in the belief that all was well until the last hour, that those who survived to mourn the fall were as much confused as to the time of the real catastrophe, as were the four million servitors, who emerged from the funeral pile, to find no masters to command them.
In the confusion little was thought of except to hurry to the provost marshals and other officials, and to take the amnesty oath proclaimed by President Johnson, in which oath all swore that they would respect the laws and proclamations which had destroyed slavery, and never more assert the right of property in man.
Those who had been loudest to proclaim their purpose to perish in the defense of slavery were the first to reach the provost marshal’s and the loudest in their responses to the manumission oath. Then they hurried back to contrive some plan to retain the services of those whom they had owned. The negroes stood aghast, not knowing whether most to trust their old masters or their liberators. On the 1st of January, 1863, President Lincoln had proclaimed the universal emancipation of the slaves of the insurgents. This proclamation was necessarily partial. When General Granger entered Texas, in 1865, he proclaimed the negroes free. The proclamation of Provisional Governor Hamil ton was to the same effect. The amnesty oaths, already referred to, seemed to seal it. The people of Texas had seen the final downfall of the “southern confederacy” on the 25th of May, 1865. The simultaneous revolt of all the Confederate soldiers against their officers; the division of the vast property of that defunct corporation among the disbanded; the return of those from the conscription worse than the slavery in which the African descendants were held; and the surrender and flight of Smith, Magruder, many of their subalterns, and the heads of the civil government, to Mexico and other foreign lands, had marked the downfall of the resisting power. There was a forced consent that the negroes had become free. But when had they obtained their freedom ? What was the effect of that freedom upon thousands of existing contracts for their sale and hiring ? Here were grave questions for the lawyers. And no sooner were the courts organized than the records were filled with these questions. The freedmen had little interest in their solution. Four millions of people, without property, money, education, or self-confidence, had gone forth amidst those who had greatly transferred their resentment from their conquerors to this race.
The questions were presented in different cases, but some of them without argument. The immediate points in this case were, did the manumission of the slaves terminate the contract for hiring? and, if so, from what date? There were also suits which involved the validity of sales made after the 1st January, 1863.
The court invited arguments. The cases were argued by Geo. W Paschal and Charles 8. West in favor of the validity of the contracts for hiring and for sales previous to the actual downfall of slavery.
Argument of Geo. W. Paschal.
—I. We are invited to discuss the very question, what was the effect of President Lin- coin’s proclamation of the 1st day of January, 1863, upon negro slavery in Texas ?
On the 22d of September, 1862, President Lincoln issued a proclamation, notifying his intention, on the 1st day of January thereafter, to designate the states, in which the people should then be in rebellion, where freedom should be declared to the slaves. (Sayles’ Treat., § 844.)
This proclamation recited the acts of the 13th of. March and the 17th of July, 1862, against the return of fugitive slaves. (Sayles’ Treat., § 844.) It is thus shown that the proclamation stood upon no other act of congress. On the 1st of January, 1863, the President issued'his proclamation of that date, in which he declared, among other things, that, as to Texas, 44 All persons bred as slaves are and henceforward shall be free; and that the executive government of the United States, including the military and naval authorities thereof, shall recognize and maintain the freedom of such persons.” (Sayles’ Treat., p. 526, § 844.)
It is historically known that all semblance of authority of the United States was withdrawn from Texas, with the mails, in June, 1861, and that this condition of things, except as to a margin of some counties along the coast, remained, until General Gordon Granger’s order of the 19th of June, 1865. (Sayles’ Treat., § 847.) In this General Granger says: 4 4 The people of Texas are informed that, in accordance with a proclamation from the executive of the United States, all slaves are free.”
President Johnson’s amnesty oath of the 29th of May, 1865, contained this clause: 44 And that I will, in like manner, abide by and support all laws and proclamations which have been made during the existing rebellion with reference to the emancipation of slaves.” (Sayles’ Treat., § 846.)
And in the proclamation appointing the Hon. Andrew J. Hamilton governor, he limits the right of suffrage to those who have taken this oath. (Paschal’s Dig., p. 930, Note 1174.) And the special pardons contain this clause: “The said pardon to he void if the said A. B. shall hereafter at any time acquire any property whatever in slaves or make use of slave labor.”
And in a dispatch to Governor Marvin, of Florida, the President says that no state will be considered as restored to the Union until it shall have adopted the Xtilth constitutional amendment.
The X 11 Tth constitutional amendment was proclaimed on 18th of December, 1865. (Paschal’s Annot. Const., p. 271, Note 274; Paschal’s Dig., note 120, p. 24.)
Breads thus: “Heither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime, whereof the parly shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States or any place subject to their jurisdiction.”
. The question is as to the effect of each. Did the proclamation of President Lincoln operate, if so facto, in Texas, so as to liberate the slaves instanter, and to deprive the masters of the ability to sell or hire them after that time, and to recover the notes given for their sale or hire ?
We think not. Practically we all know that slavery in fact continued undisturbed until General Granger’s order. Generally it ceased after that time, though there were exceptional cases until the proclamation of the constitutional amendment.
But it is insisted that although freedom did not exist de facto, it did become the rule de jure, on the 1st day of Jan-, nary, 1863.
Buch seems not to he the understanding of the courts, whose peculiar province it is to interpret the federal constitution.
Mr. Justice Swayne says: “B trenches upon the power of the states and of the people of the states. B is the first and only instance of this character in the organic law.” (Paschal’s Annot. Const., p. 273.)
Chief Justice Chase says: “It establishes freedom as the constitutional right of all persons in the United States.” (Id.)
Mr. Justice Swayne says: “What the several states under the original constitution only could have done, the nation has done by the XlLlth amendment.” (Id., 276.)
And again: “ The amendment reversed and annulled the original constitution, which left to each state to decide exclusively for itself whether slavery should or should not exist as a local institution, and what disabilities should attach to those of the servile race within its limits.” (Paschal’s Annot. Const., p. 277.)
The quotation from Chief Justice-Chase is taken from his opinion in the matter of Elizabeth in Maryland, and the quotations from Mr. Justice Swayne are taken from his opinion in the United States v. Rhodes, in Kentucky. It did not seem to either of these great men that slavery was abolished in any state by any thing connected with the war, but only by the Xlllth amendment or the voluntary action of the states.
Judge Duval, in Connett v. Williams, Austin term, 1866, held that the proclamation was a war measure; that it did not operate presently any where, but only as the arms of the United States advanced, and that notes given for negroes in Texas in 1863 could be recovered. (Paschal’s Annot. Const., p. 278.)
In South Carolina it has been held that “ Slaves did not become free, either de jure or de facto,hj the emancipation proclamation in 1862.” (Pickett v. Wilkins, 13 Rich. Eq., 336.)
And so in Arkansas. (Dorris v. Grace, 24 Ark., 326.) This was doubtless a suit for wages by a former slave. (Amer. Law Rev., vol. 2, So. 4, p. 715.)
And so it has been held in Georgia. (Cobb v. Battle, 34 Ga.,458; and see also the cases collected in Amer. Law Rev., vol. 3, No. 1, p. 134.)
We refer also to the case of Mittelhózezer v. Fullerton, 6 Adolph & Ellis, 989, quoted also in Paschal’s Annotated Constitution, p. 277; and we maintain that the analogy holds good, and the whole question is, “Who shall bear the losses occasioned by a vis major f And that.depends upon the question, who was the proprietor when that loss was occasioned?”
We believe with Judge Duval, that the President’s proclamations were war measures; that they were not intended to operate as law; but were in fact designed to invite the the slaves to join in the war for their freedom.
II. If we look at the subject without any reference to precedents and the dicta of judges, as a mere constitutional question, the position that slavery continued in Texas until the adoption of the X 11 Ith constitutional amendment is impregnable.
Slavery, although not mentioned in fact in the original constitution, is recognized in the “three-fifths of all other personsin the “migration or importation of such persons;” in the inhibition upon “ capitation or other direct tax, unless in proportion to the census or enumeration hereinbefore directed to be taken,” all in article I; and in the “Ho person held to service or labor in one state,” &c., in article IV. (See the authorities collected in Paschal’s Annot. Const., notes 6, 16, 17, 24, 46, 93, 169, 220.)
It had always been admitted that the rights thus guaranteed, particularly in relation to the rendition of fugitives, were in the nature of compacts, and could not be abrogated by the national government. (See the cases collected in the same work, notes 226, 227, pp. 232, 233.)
HE. The extent of the power “to declare war” need not be critically considered. Whatever may be the incidental power growing out of this express grant of power belonged to congress, and not to the President, “ To make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by this constitution in the government of the United States, or in any department or officer thereof.” (See the authorities collected in Paschal’s Annot. Const., note 138, pp. 138, 139.) And the same principle, more strongly expressed, is found in the 2d section of the X11 Ifb and the 5th section of the XTVth amendments: “Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.” (This “ appropriate legislation ” has been interpreted to mean that which is “necessary and proper” legislation. (Paschal’s Annot. Const., notes 274, p. 276.) The incidental power belonged to congress, and it is not to be presumed that the President intended to transcend his authority, which made him commander-in-chief of the army and navy under the law, and act absolutely according to his own will.
PV". "We do not see the application of the principle that a contract founded on illegal dealing or a consideration of turpitude is void. If the negroes remained slaves, that principle had no application. But even in the application of this principle there must be great discrimination. A contract is not void because it tends to promote illegal or immoral purposes. (Hillard on Sales, 376; Armstrong v. Toler, 11 Wheat., 258; Story’s Conflict of Laws, 6th ed., §§ 257, 258; Armfield v. Tate, 7 Ired., 259.)
Bor is a sale of goods void although the seller knows that they are bought for illegal purposes, unless he has a part in the illegal purpose. (Hodgson v. Temple, 5 Taunt., 181; Dater v. Earl, 3 Gray, 482; Coolige v. Inglee, 13 Mass., 26; Phillips v. Hooker, 1 N. C. Eq., 205.)
Bor will the mere fact that the negroes were not slaves when sold render the note void. To support this, read Ban-don v. Toby, 11 How., 493, which was a Texas case. We may admit the maxim, that ex dolo malo non oritur ctctio. It is upon this maxim that all the courts, except perhaps North Carolina, have held, that contracts founded upon Confederate treasury notes were void, because they were issued to aid the rebellion — looked expressly to' dissolving the Union; and, therefore, their vicious character adhered to every contract which it touched, not because of the illegal dealing of' the parties, but because the thing dealt in could not be permitted to have any value. (Petty v. Long, 40 Mo., 536; Schmidt v. Barker, 17 La. Ann., 264; Stillman v. Looney, 3 Cold., 20; Thornburg v. Harris, Id., 157; Gill v. Creed, Id., 205; Shiner v. Green, Id., 419; Potts v. Gray, Id., 468; Henry v. Franklin, Id., 472; Linder v. Barbee and Smith v. Smith, at the last term here, [30 Tex., 754;] and McGehee v. Goodman at this term, [31 Tex., 252].)

Opinion:
Morrill, O. J.
—In a country, nation, or state, where "what pleases the prince is law," it is only necessary to know the actions or even the wishes or whims of the prince to adjudicate upon the rights of person and property. In a state or nation where, in times of war, what pleases the commander-in-chief of the victorious party is law to the conquered, a proclamation of the commander, setting forth his will, would be decisive of the status of the conquered. There are but few nations, even among the civilized of modern times, who in times of peace are governed by a "rule of action prescribed by the supreme power in a state;" and still less is this number in times of war. Even in that nation which we denominate our parent country, and which is, par excellence, a country of laws in peace, the happiness or misery of the conquered in times of war depends in a great degree upon the wishes, will, whim, or caprice of the victorious commander. "Whether the conquered shall retain their lives, liberty, or property, or whether their property shall be confiscated and they themselves blown from the cannon's mouth, depends in a great measure upon the humanity, avarice, or bloodthirstiness of the gen eral in command. The history of the world is a detail of wars, "and woe to the conquered" blackens every page. But there is a nation whose theory of government is based upon law, both in peace and war; where the organic law provides that "no person shall be deprived of property without due course of law;" and where in times of war not the commander-in-chief of the army and navy, but the " congress shall have power to declare war, grant letters of marque and reprisal, and make rules concerning captures on land and water," "to raise and support armies," "to make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces."
We are so accustomed to look at the precedents furnished us by those nations who either have no constitutions, or whose organic laws do not • contain provisions similar to those of the constitution of the United States, that we base our actions and principles and thoughtless declarations more upon those precedents than our own laws.
In England the king is the sovereign power, and as such sovereign has the power to declare war and exercise such other rights of sovereignty as are specially delegated to the congress. In the United States the congress is vested with the sovereign power.
It is evident that if, during the rebellion, the citizens of Texas were citizens of and subject to the constitution of the United States, then they could not "be deprived of property," in slaves, money, stocks, or agricultural products, without due course of law. If they were a part of another state or de facto government, and they and their property were captured by the forces of the United States, in that case not the commander-in-chief of the army and navy of the United States, but congress, and congress alone, had and has "power to make rules concerning those captures." In either case the proclamations, military orders, or whatever else they may be called, can have no effect or force upon any other than the men subject to the commander, unless they are based upon an act of congress. The powers of the government of the United States are separate and distinct. The powers which belong to one department are exercised by the officers belonging to that department, and exercised independently of any of the others. Each department is separate, co-ordinate, and equal. No majesty is recognized but the majesty of the law; and no man can exercise any power but such as has been delegated to him merely as the servant of the people.
" The power existing in every body politic is an absolute despotism. In constituting a government it distributes that power as it pleases, and in the quantity it pleases, and imposes what checks it pleases upon its public functionaries." (Livingston v. Moore, 7 Pet., 546.)
In tlie case of Brown v. United States, 8 Cranch, 110, the question before the court was, whether certain property, then in the United States, but belonging to a British subject, with whose nation the United States were at war, was subject to confiscation, Chief Justice Marshall, in delivering the opinion of the court, said:
"The questions to be decided by the court are:
" 1st. May enemy's property, found on land at the commencement of hostilities, be seized and condemned as a necessary consequence of the declaration of war?
• " 2d. Is there any legislative act which authorizes such seizure and condemnation ?
" Since, in this country, from the structure of our government, proceedings to condemn the property of an enemy found within our territory at the declaration of war can be sustained only upon the principle that they are instituted in execution of some existing law, we are led to ask, is there such a law ? "
The chief justice, after having shown that the declaration of war was not such a law, proceeds:
" There being no other act of Congress which bears upon the subject, it is considered as proved that the legislature has not confiscated enemy's properly which was within the United States at the declaration of war, and that the sentence of condemnation cannot be sustained.
" One view, however, has been taken of this subject which deserves to be further considered :
"It is urged that, in executing the laws of war, the executive may seize and the courts condemn all property which, according- to the modern law of nations, is subject to confiscation, although it might require an act of the legislature to justify the condemnation of that property which, according to modern usage, ought not to be confiscated."
" The argument must assume for its basis the position that modern usage constitutes a rule which acts directly upon the thing itself by its own force, and not through the sovereign power. This position is not allowed.
It is not an immutable rule of law, but depends on political considerations, which may continually vary. It is proper for the consideration of the legislature, not of the executive or judiciary."
Judge Story, in his Commentaries on the Constitution, § 1197, after citing the power of Congress "to make rules for the government and regulation of 6 the land and naval forces,' " proceeds: " This is a natural incident to the preceding powers to make war, to raise armies, and to provide and maintain a navy.
"In G-reat Britain the king, in his capacity of generalissimo of the whole kingdom, has the sole power of regulating fleets and armies. The whole power is far more safe in the hands of congress than of the executive, since, otherwise, the most summary and severe punishments might be inflicted at the mere will of the executive."
In § 1177, in commenting upon the power of congress "to declare war," &c., this same author says: "The power to declare war is exclusive in congress. It includes the ex ercise of all the ordinary rights of belligerents; and congress may, therefore, pass suitable laws to embrace them. They may authorize the seizure and condemnation of the property of the enemy, within or without the territory of the United States, and the confiscation of debts due to the enemy. But until laws have been passed upon these subjects, no private citizen can enforce any such rights, and the judiciary is incapable of giving them any legitimate operation."
This same author, in commenting on the powers of the executive, in § 1512, says: " In England the power to make treaties is exclusively vested in the crown." But however proper it may be in a monarchy, there is no American statesman but must feel that such a prerogative in an American president would be inexpedient and dangerous. It would be inconsistent with that wholesome jealousy which all republics .ought to cherish of all depositaries of power.
§ 1515: " A man raised from a private station to the rank of chief magistrate, for a short period, having but a slender or moderate fortune, and no very deep stake in the society, might sometimes be under temptations to sacrifice duty to interest, which it would require great virtue to withstand. If ambitious, he might be tempted to risk his own aggrandizement. If avaricious, he might make his treachery to his constituents a vendible article at an enormous price.
" Although such occurrences are not ordinarily to be expected, yet the history of human conduct does not warrant that exalted opinion of human nature, which would make it wise in a nation to commit its most delicate interests and momentous concerns to the unrestrained disposal of a single magistrate. It is far more wise to interpose checks upon the actual exercise of the power, than remedies to redress or punish an abuse of it."
But the congress of the United States have declared their will as to the disposition of slaves. As early as the 6th of August, 1861, and the 17th day of July, 1862, the congress of the United States passed "An act to confiscate property used for insurrectionary purposes," and "An act entitled an act to suppress insurrection, to punish treason and rebellion, to seize and confiscate the property of rebels, and for other purposes." (11 Stats., 589.)
The 9th section of this last act provided, "that all slaves of persons who shall hereafter be engaged in rebellion against the government of the United States, &c., escaping from such persons and taking refuge.within the lines of the army, and all slaves captured from such persons, or deserted by them and coming under the control of the government of the United States, shall be deemed captives of war, and shall be forever free of their servitude and not again held as slaves."
This, as well as all the other sections of the act, was prospective, and the fourteen different sections of the act contained full and ample " rules concerning captures on land and water."
The congress by this act virtually negatives the power of any other branch of the government to do what the constitution authorizes that body alone to do. The act specially declares the slaves captives of war, and bases their freedom on the fact that their owners " were engaged in rebellion against the government of the United States," and it does not free any others.
This same act, in the 7th and 8th sections, contemplated " due course of law" against the owners of the property, and of course the freedom of the slave was dependent upon the disloyalty of the owner, as found by the court.
If, as contended, the proclamation of the President, ipso facto, made all slaves free, it would be in utter disregard of the acts of congress, thus pointing out the manner and conditions of their freedom, and virtually nullify them. And if the judiciaryprove subservient to the executive, our boasted republican government is really, quoad hoe, an absolute monarchy in times of war.
As the proposed XUIth amendment to the constitution was passed by congress on the 1st day of February, 1865,- and as it is to be presumed that the congress supposed that the requisite number of states would ratify it, which was really done previous to the 18th December, 1865, hence there was no necessity to convict their owners of treason to free the slaves. By this amendment, not only the slaves of the disloyal, but of the loyal also, were free, and on the 18th of December, 1865, slavery ceased to exist, and freedom was established co-extensive with the United States.
It is insisted that the proclamation of the President, wherein, as a war measure, he declared the slaves in Texas free from and after the 1st of January, 1868, even if it did not actually make them free, at least it showed the policy of the United States, and that a court, bound to observe the constitution and laws of the United States, ought not to give its aid to enforce a contract for a sale of a slave after that time, and previous to their actual emancipation, because the contract was contrary to the policy of the United States. That the emancipation proclamation was issued as a war measure appears on its face; that it proved to be one of the greatest of war measures is universally admitted. But its effects were hot upon the parties apparently most interested only. That it was designed to counteract the efforts made by the Confederates in their attempts to enlist the sympathies and material aid in the western European nations, then and there equally balanced, or perhaps slightly preponderating to the cause of the rebels, and that it faithfully performed its mission, will be shown by the historian. During the first years of the war, the acts of congress and the military orders of the President, as commander-in-chief of the army and navy, amply attest that the policy of the United States was the integrity of the Union, .without any change of the peculiar southern institution. As late as the 11th of February, 1861, the House of Representatives in congress passed a resolution, yeas 161, nays none, "that neither congress nor the people or government of the nonslaveholding states have a constitutional right to legislate upon or interfere with slavery in any slaveholding state of the "Union." The President, in all messages and orders, inculcated the same ideas. But, after the war had progressed so far as to be evident that a complete subjugation of the rebellious states was the only preliminary to the integrity of the nation, the policy of the President was changed. As the Confederates disclaimed the protection guaranteed by the constitution and laws of the United States, the President took them at their word. Cutting himself loose from the constitution and laws, and appealing to and invoking the considerate judgment of mankind and the gracious favor of Almighty God, he launched out in the open sea of war, and, as a fit and necessary war measure for suppressing the rebellion, declared that all the slaves in a certain designated portion of the United States are, and henceforward shall be, free; and that the executive government of the United States, including the military and naval authorities therof, will recognize and maintain the freedom of said persons. Two of the first-class nations of Europe had long before abolished slavery in their territories and dependencies, and the autocrat of the Russias had recently followed their example, and not only was the considerate judgment of the people of the western hemisphere, but of all mankind, invoked on this measure.
These nations were estopped by their own actions from giving further countenance and encouragement to the "Confederate States in their attempt to erect a government whose corner-stone was slavery. It is to be remarked that the President did not base this proclamation upon the constitution or laws of the United States, but solely on his power as commander-in-chief of the army and navy. He clid not intimate that any other power of the government would assist him, but simply that the executive government of the United States, including the military or naval authorities thereof, would recognize and maintain the freedom of Said power.
Congress took a different course, and acted agreeably to their often-repeated declaration, that universal emancipation could not legally take place except by an amendment to all the state constitutions or of the national constitution, which the people, through the States, adopted. Until slavery was abolished no feature of it was destroyed. Owners of slaves had all the rights of property therein, and the one not the least in importance is its vendible quality.
The known and indisputable effects of the President's proclamation are sufficient to pronounce it unparalleled as a war measure and military strategy. The announcement to the slaves that they were free caused them to desert their masters by thousands,1 and, by thus depriving the confederacy of their assistance, and transferring it to the army of the United States, doubly assisted the latter, and in the same ratio injured the former. The invocations of the considerate judgment of mankind and the gracious favor of Almighty God were responded to by the passage of the XHIth amendment to' the constitution, and had the same potency and effect on the ruling powers of Europe that the command of an ancient Jewish hero had on the sun and moon when he ordered them to " stand still."
We now pass to another and different subject, having reference to the effect of the freedom of slaves upon contracts executory in part for their sale. In the case before the court the vendor, in January, 1865, sold and delivered a slave to the vendee, who in consideration thereof executed a promissory note for the payment.
In the other case, a slave, at the same time, was hired, for a year, and a promissory note given in consideration of the hire.
As there was nothing illegal in the transaction, the notes were not void for illegality. The consideration is represented as having failed. It is not pretended that at the time of the contract there was no consideration. Each party had the same means of knowing the future condition of the slave, and acted upon his own ideas as to the result of the war. That the cause which proved mortal to slavery would soon sweep over the land was apparent to some, and disbelieved by others. There was, however, no breach in the contract on the part of the vendor at the time, of the sale.- And though the vendor guaranteed the subject of sale, a slave for life, and the slave in the same year was made free by the superior power, inasmuch as at the time the sale was made he was a slave for life, yet, if his freedom was occasioned afterwards, not by the vendor, but by the sovereign power of the nation, the vendor did not violate his contract.
The question is, "Who was the owner at the time the slave became free ? " lies peril suo domino ."
The vendor could not legally guaranty that the supreme power in the state or nation would not exercise their legitimate functions. All governments are based upon the theory that the sovereign power therein is omnipotent in what respects property.
In Graves v. Heaton, 3 Cold., 13, the supreme court of Tennessee said:
" The pecuniary loss consequent upon the emancipation of slaves by the amendment of the constitution of the state adopted on the 22d of February, 1865, must be borne by those who were the owners of such slaves at the time of their emancipation."
In Woodfin v. Sluder, 1 Phill., 202, the court said:
"If A give a slave to B for a year, B, during the year, is the owner of the slave. If the slave die during the year, A loses his general property, and B loses the special property and the hire. The emancipation of slaves during the year was then artificial death on slaves, and operated as would their natural death; therefore the defendant is liable for the hire during the whole of. the year."
After the parliament of Great Britain passed the act (3 and 4 W., c. 4,73) entitled "An act for the abolition of slavery throughout the British colonies, for promoting the industry of the manumitted slaves," &c., the purport of which act was, that slaves in the colonies should be free from slavery, but should be apprenticed until the 1st August, 1840, and afterwards entirely free, one M, being the owner of one hundred and fifty-three former slaves, then apprentices, conveyed them to F, in consideration of £7,800, to be paid in six annual installments, on the 12th day of January each successive year. In July, 1868, the governor of the island wherein the parties resided decreed, that from and after the 1st of August, 1838, all and every of the former, held as apprentices, should be free from their apprenticeship, thereby lessening the term two years. On the refusal of F to pay the two- last annual installments, falling due after the apprentices became free, M brought suit on the contract, and F set up the defense as above stated in all its changes and varieties.
In delivering the opinion of the court, the judges said:
" The whole question is, who shall bear the loss occasioned by a vis major. And that depends on the question who was the proprietor when that loss was occasioned. The properly in the service of these laborers had been transferred to the defendant. The question is analogous to those which arise by fire, as, whether the goods destroyed were in transitu or the transit was ended. If the property here had passed and the residue of it was destroyed by a vis major, the loss must fall upon the proprietor of the thing, namely, of the services during the unexpired term. And . in my opinion that was the case." (51 Eng. Com. Law, 1019.)
" This was a contract of sale, an engagement on one side to transfer all right to the services, and on the other to pay the stipulated sum. The act of the colonial legislature in 1838 made no alteration in that contract."
This case is decisive of the two principal points arising in the case before the court.
It certainly will not be contended that the policy of the British government, at the time the contract for the sale of the apprentices was made, Had not become as notoriously opposed to slavery as that of the United States during the war. Yet the British courts did not conceive that the sale of these former slaves, under the name of apprentices, was contrary to public policy, or that the contract was illegal or void for want of consideration.