Case Name: TRIPLETT v. ST AMOUR
Court: Michigan Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1993-09-28
Citations: 444 Mich. 170
Docket Number: Docket No. 94059
Parties: TRIPLETT v ST AMOUR
Judges: Mallett, J., concurred with Boyle, J.
Reporter: Michigan Reports
Volume: 444
Pages: 170–210

Head Matter:
TRIPLETT v ST AMOUR
Docket No. 94059.
Argued March 31, 1993
(Calendar No. 4 April).
Decided September 28, 1993.
Patricia L. St. Amour and William St. Amour, her husband, brought an action in the Cheboygan Circuit Court against Victor B. Triplett, the driver of an automobile that collided with Patricia St. Amour’s automobile, and Trinity Chemical Company, the owner of the automobile, seeking damages for an injury to Patricia’s shoulder as a result of the accident. Following discovery, the parties settled, and the action was dismissed, Robert C. Livo, J.
Thereafter, during the course of a second suit brought by Patricia St. Amour against her no-fault insurer for benefits arising out of the same accident, it was ascertained that she had been treated less than thirty days before the accident by a physician specialist for a serious shoulder injury. The St. Amours filed a third suit against the doctor for breach of the physician-patient privilege.
Upon learning of the prior treatment, Triplett, Trinity Chemical, and Federated Mutual Insurance Company, the insurer of Trinity’s vehicle, brought an action in the Kalkaska Circuit Court against the St. Amours, alleging fraudulent concealment of Patricia’s preaccident condition, and seeking damages arising out of the execution of the settlement agreement. The court, William A. Porter, J., granted summary disposition for the defendants, concluding that an independent action for fraud could not be maintained because it was barred by the original action under principles of res judicata or collateral estoppel, and that the plaintiffs were limited to seeking relief from the judgment under MCR 2.612(C)(1). The Court of Appeals, Hood, P.J., and Connor and R. C. Kaufman, JJ., reversed and remanded for further proceedings, holding that a judgment entered pursuant to an allegedly fraudulently induced settlement agreement does not bar a separate action for damages resulting from the fraud (Docket No. 129864). The parties appeal.
In opinions by Justice Boyle, joined by Justice Mallett, by Justice Riley, and by Justice Levin, the Supreme Court held:
Because the court rules provide effective remedies and deterrents, an independent cause of action at law to recover dam ages for a fraudulently induced settlement should not be recognized under the circumstances of this case.
Reversed; judgment of the circuit court reinstated.
Justice Boyle, joined by Justice Mallett, stated further that summary disposition was appropriate. The court rules address the balance between deterring fraud, restoring parties to their prefraud positions, and the finality of judgments. Permitting independent actions at law for fraud in inducing settlements would benefit tortfeasors and upset that balance. In addition, it would render inconsequential the period of limitation under the court rules for relief from judgment.
Justice Riley, concurring in part and dissenting in part, further stated that both plaintiffs and defendants may obtain relief from a fraudulently induced settlement only through MCR 2.612(C).
The court rules and accompanying statutory provisions appropriately balance the competing interests of deterring fraud, vindicating the interests of a defrauded party, and maintaining the finality of judgments, and provide the best-reasoned approach for resolution of this case. The failure of Justice Boyle to address whether a similarly situated plaintiff may file an independent action at law for damages leaves intact the common-law right recognized in Kordis v Auto Owners Ins Co, 311 Mich 247 (1945), and creates an artificial distinction between plaintiffs and defendants in such circumstances. Although Kor-dis may have provided an appropriate remedy in the past, the advent of sanctions and MCR 2.612(C), created specifically to address this issue, obviate any need for a separate action at law for either party.
Justice Levin, writing separately, stated that case law provides that an equitable action cannot be maintained to enjoin or set aside a workers’ compensation award or judgment on the award on the ground that it was based on the perjury of the person to whom the award was made. The reasoning set forth in the cases is as applicable in an action at law as an action in equity and does not depend on whether the parties in an earlier action decided to settle the controversy. Before changing the rule, the views of counsel who frequently represent parties in personal injury actions should be sought.
Justice Griffin, joined by Chief Justice Cavanagh and Justice Brickley, dissenting, stated that the plaintiffs are not limited to seeking relief from judgment under MCR 2.612, but alternatively may pursue an action at law for damages based on fraud.
Although MCR 2.612 provides for relief from a judgment obtained by fraud, nothing in the language of the rule supports or requires the conclusion that it provides the exclusive remedy under such circumstances or that it precludes an independent action at law for fraud. Permitting an independent action is supported by the case law of Michigan and other jurisdictions.
Whether the plaintiffs suffered any actionable damage as a result of the defendants’ concealment is the proper subject of this independent action. By interpreting MCR 2.612 in a nonexclusive manner, the common-law election of remedies doctrine expressed in Kordis v Auto Owners remains a viable option for a party allegedly defrauded by an adversary’s misconduct. If the plaintiffs offer sufficient evidence of the elements of fraud, the trier of fact should then determine what would have been the probable amount of the settlement absent the fraud, after considering all known or foreseeable facts and circumstances, and award damages accordingly.
194 Mich App 335; 486 NW2d 146 (1992) reversed.
Fordney, Cady, Mastromarco & Jahn (by Victor J. Mastromarco, Jr., and Jo Ellen O’Con-nor) for the plaintiffs.
Sumpter, Perry & McDonald, P.C. (by Thomas E. McDonald), for the defendants.

Opinion:
Boyle, J.
The plaintiffs, composed of the alleged tortfeasor in a previous action, his employer, and its insurer, have brought an independent action at law for fraud seeking money damages issuing from a fraudulently induced settlement agreement. The circuit court granted summary disposition for the defendant, which the Court of Appeals reversed. We believe the summary disposition was appropriate, and we therefore reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and reinstate the judgment of the circuit court.
i
Following a two-car collision that occurred in February 1986, Patricia St. Amour, the driver of one automobile, and her husband brought a personal injury action in Cheboygan Circuit Court against the driver of the other automobile, Victor Bruce Triplett, and against his employer, Trinity Chemical Company, which owned the other car. Mrs. St. Amour claimed that as a result of the accident she suffered a traumatic shoulder dislocation. As insurer of the vehicle driven by Triplett, Federated Mutual Insurance Company assumed the defense of that action. Following discovery, which included extensive inquiries concerning Mrs. St. Amour's alleged shoulder injury, the parties entered into a settlement agreement pursuant to which Mrs. St. Amour and her husband were paid $20,000, and an order dismissing the action with prejudice was entered by the circuit court on May 3, 1988.
Thereafter, Mrs. St. Amour brought another action against her own no-fault carrier, State Farm Insurance Company, claiming entitlement to benefits relating to the same automobile accident that it had refused to pay. During the course of that lawsuit, it was ascertained that less than thirty days before the accident involving Triplett, Mrs. St. Amour had been treated by Dr. John M. Thiel, a bone and joint specialist, for a serious injury to her shoulder. The St. Amours then filed a third lawsuit against Dr. Thiel alleging a breach of the physician-patient privilege for disclosing a prior treatment of her shoulder condition.
After learning through that litigation of Dr. Thiel's prior treatment, the present action was filed March 17, 1989, in Kalkaska Circuit Court by Triplett, Trinity Chemical Company, and Federated Mutual Insurance Company, as plaintiffs. They allege that during the course of discovery in the original action, the St. Amours fraudulently concealed Mrs. St. Amour's preaccident physical condition. Plaintiffs allege that defendants made misrepresentations via sworn deposition testimony, sworn answers to interrogatories, and counsel's statements and pleadings signed as the. agent of the defendants. In this action, plaintiffs do not request rescission of the settlement agreement or of the order of dismissal entered by the Cheboygan Circuit Court. Rather, the complaint alleges an action at law for fraud and seeks monetary damages resulting from execution of the fraudulently induced settlement agreement, as well as costs associated with defending the original case.
The St. Amours moved for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(8), contending that plaintiffs had failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. They also moved for a change of venue and requested the imposition of sanctions for improper venue.
In an opinion dated April 25, 1990, the Kal-kaska Circuit Court granted defendants' motion for summary disposition. Relying on Rogoski v Muskegon, 107 Mich App 730; 309 NW2d 718 (1981), it concluded that an independent action at law for fraud could not be maintained because the prior action was a bar under either res judicata or collateral estoppel principles. The court indicated that plaintiffs were limited to seeking relief from judgment in accordance with MCR 2.612(C)(1). The court opined that an action in equity for relief would not be available under MCR 2.612(C)(3) because this case does not involve extrinsic fraud. In view of its grant of defendants' motion for summary disposition, the court declined to rule on the issue of venue or the request for costs or sanctions under MCR 2.223.
Plaintiffs appealed the order granting summary disposition in favor of defendants, and defendants appealed from the denial of sanctions for improper venue.
The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded for further proceedings. 194 Mich App 335; 486 NW2d 146 (1992). Citing Courtney v Feldstein, 147 Mich App 70; 382 NW2d 734 (1985), the Court ruled that a judgment entered pursuant to an allegedly fraudulently induced settlement agreement does not bar a separate action for damages resulting from the fraud. It did not address the issue of venue and declined to award sanctions.
Both sides then applied for leave to appeal in this Court, which we granted. 441 Mich 902 (1992).
n
The narrow issue presented in the instant case is whether this Court should recognize an independent action at law to recover damages for a fraudulently induced judgment when the instant plaintiff was the defendant in the original tort action and the instant defendant was the releasor of the previous tort claim. The instant plaintiffs stress that such an independent action is necessary to restore them to their prefraud position. They also advance the goal of deterring fraud. MCR 2.612(C), the court rule allowing relief from judgment, is, according to the plaintiffs, incapable of accomplishing this end. However, because the balance between the worthwhile goals advanced by the plaintiffs and the equally significant concern for the finality of judgments is appropriately addressed by the court rules, we see no need to adopt the new cause of action requested by the plaintiffs.
Although the plaintiffs have failed to direct the Court to any cases that allows a fraud action under the present circumstances, and our independent research has likewise failed to find cases directly on point that might offer guidance, it is not difficult to imagine that under the reasoning of the plaintiff, it would be a rare case in which a tortfeasor in the first action, upon finding that the plaintiff had acted fraudulently during settlement negotiations, would move to rescind the settlement under MCR 2.612(C). The tortfeasor would generally be better off ratifying the settlement and suing for fraud, thereby guaranteeing that the maximum exposure of liability would be the amount previously paid to the plaintiff. Such action by the tortfeasor would completely protect it from a trial in which the jury might award a judgment considerably larger than the settlement figure. This protection would also serve to greatly strengthen the tortfeasor's hand in negotiating a settlement of the second suit. The predictable outcome is that the price of final settlement would be substantially reduced.
The cases involving the releasers of tort claims in the first action are inapposite. While there appears to be a national split of authority regarding whether a "releasor of a tort claim may stand upon a fraudulently induced release and maintain a separate fraud action," DiSabatino v United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co, 635 F Supp 350, 352 (D Del, 1986); see also Kordis v Auto Owners Ins Co, 311 Mich 247; 18 NW2d 811 (1945), or is limited to rescinding the settlement agreement and pursuing the original suit, Shallenberger v Motorists Mutual Ins Co, 5 Ohio Op 2d 173; 150 NE2d 295 (1958), neither the cases from foreign jurisdictions nor Michigan precedent supports what the plaintiff asks this Court to today recog nize — the ability of the tortfeasor in the original action to stand upon the plaintiff's release and sue for fraud. The public policy justifications for recognizing a fraud suit in the above circumstances are not present here.
The balanced approach that MCR 2.612(C) represents to remedy fraudulently induced judgments would be upset if the plaintiff's fraud action was recognized in Michigan. Likewise, the attempt represented by MCR 2.612(C)(2) to enforce the finality of judgments by imposing a one-year period of limitation on the legal remedies available under the rule could also become inconsequential. The plaintiff asserts that such a drastic practical effect is necessary to vindicate the interests of the defrauded party. However, under these circumstances, MCR 2.302(G)(3)(a), (4) provides a remedy to the defrauded tortfeasor that makes him whole without recognizing a new and unique tort action.
Under MCR 2.309(B)(1), (3), a party must sign an interrogatory certifying an answer, which "must include such information as is available to the party served . . . ." MCR 2.302(G)(3)(a), (4) provides sanctions in the discovery context when a certification is not "consistent with these rules . . . ." If it were shown that Mrs. St. Amour fraudulently failed to list a doctor and the trial court granted the defendant in the original action relief under MCR 2.612, the trial court would be empowered to "impose . an appropriate sanction, which may include an order to pay the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred be cause of the violation, including reasonable attorney fees." MCR 2.302(F)(4). Such a sanction would effectively "vindicate the interests of the defrauded party," post at 207, which in the case of the defendant in the original tort action, consist primarily of costs and attorney fees. This remedy provides neither party with a windfall and encourages the use of the court rules rather than the establishment of new tort actions.
Because the court rules provide effective remedies and deterrents in the present case, we decline to recognize a new cause of action for fraud under these circumstances.
Mallett, J., concurred with Boyle, J.
The term "tortfeasor" is simply used to express the alleged role of the present plaintiff in the original action. It does not represent a judgment by this Court that the alleged conduct was actually tortious.
William St. Amour was joined as a plaintiff; however, his claim for loss of consortium was derivative.
(A) Motion; Court's Own Initiative. If the venue of a civil action is improper, the court
(1) shall order a change of venue on timely motion of a defendant, or
(2) may order a change of venue on its own initiative with notice to the parties and opportunity for them to be heard on the venue question.
(B) Costs; Fees.
(1) The court shall order the change at the plaintiff's cost, which shall include the statutory filing fee applicable to the court to which the action is transferred, and which may include reasonable compensation for the defendant's expense, including reasonable attorney fees, in attending in the wrong court.
We recognize that fraud has long been a cognizable claim in Michigan and at common law. However, the question before us is not whether an action for fraud exists, but whether it exists under these circumstances.
(C) Grounds for Relief From Judgment.
(1) On motion and on just terms, the court may relieve a party or the legal representative of a party from a final judgment, order, or proceeding on the following grounds:
(a) Mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.
(b) Newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under MCR 2.611(B).
(c) Fraud (intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party.
(d) The judgment is void.
(e) The judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged; a prior judgment on which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated; or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application.
(f) Any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment.
(2) The motion must be made within a reasonable time, and, for the grounds stated in subrules (C)(1)(a), (b), and (c), within one year after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A motion under this subrule does not affect the finality of a judgment or suspend its operation.
(3) This subrule does not limit the power of a court to entertain an independent action to relieve a party from a judgment, order, or proceeding; to grant relief to a defendant not actually personally notified as provided in subrule (B); or to set aside a judgment for fraud on the court.
The parties have not cited Kordis and we have no occasion to speak to the question of its continued validity.
This Court's recent decision in Bechtold v Morris, 443 Mich 105; 503 NW2d 654 (1993), allows a trial court to assess sanctions for an improperly signed paper even if it is not a pleading. While in this case discovery sanctions would effectively deal with Mrs. St. Amour's conduct, if it is shown to be fraudulent, the sanctions available under MCR 2.114(D), (E) could serve as a remedy to (first-action) defendants in other situations.
Because the trial court had the power to grant summary disposition regardless of the venue, MCL 600.1645; MSA 27A.1645, the venue issue is moot because the trial court's action precluded the requested change,