Case Name: BANKHEAD v. MAYOR OF RIVER ROUGE
Court: Michigan Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1971-06-30
Citations: 35 Mich. App. 7
Docket Number: Docket No. 8948
Parties: BANKHEAD v. MAYOR OF RIVER ROUGE
Judges: Before: Lesinski, C. J., and Levin and O’Hara, JJ.
Reporter: Michigan appeals reports; cases decided in the Michigan Court of Appeals.
Volume: 35
Pages: 7–39

Head Matter:
BANKHEAD v. MAYOR OF RIVER ROUGE
Opinion of the Court
1. Statutes — One Object — Expressed-in-title Rule — Purpose— Constitutional Law.
The purpose of the constitutional provision requiring that a statute have only one object which shall be expressed in its title is to make certain that the title gives notice to legislators and other interested parties of the statute’s object so as to assure them that only matters germane to the object expressed in the title will be enacted (Const 1963, art 4, § 24).
References for Points in Headnotes
1] 50 Am Jur, Statutes §§ 190, 193.
2] 50 Am Jur, Statutes § 165 et seq.
3] 50 Am Jur, Statutes § 194.
4] 50 Am Jur, Statutes §§ 165-179.
5‘ 50 Am Jur, Statutes §§ 159, 183.
6] 50 Am Jur, Statutes § 183.
7] 16 Am Jur 2d, Constitutional Law §§ 496-501.
8, 12-14] 50 Am Jur, Statutes §§ 13, 201, 202.
9, 15, 16, 18, 21-23] 50 Am Jur, Statutes §§ 8-13, 200-202.
10] 16 Am Jur 2d, Constitutional Law § 146.
11] 50 Am Jur, Statutes § 190 et seq.
17] 50 Am Jur, Statutes §§ 170, 171, 195, 200-202.
19] 50 Am Jur, Statutes §§ 8-12.
20] 40 Am Jur 2d, Housing Laws and Urban Redevelopment §§2, 10.
2. Statutes — Object-in-title Rule — Constitutional Law.
The title of an act must be broad enough to permit the enactment of the provisions in its body; the body of the act must be reasonably harmonious with its title (Const 1963, art 4, § 24).
3. Statutes — One Object — Expressed-in-title Rule — Test—Constitutional Law.
The test to be applied to determine whether an act complies with the constitutional requirement that no law shall embrace more than one object which shall be expressed in its title is to ask whether the title of the act fairly indicates the purpose of the legislation, does the title fairly inform legislators and the public of the act’s purposes as a whole, and is the title a fair index of the act (Const 1963, art 4, § 24).
4. Statutes — Object-in-title Rule — Municipal Corporations — > Constitutional Law.
A statute may not be applied to local governments not indicated in the statute’s title where the title relates to designated municipal corporations (Const 1963, art 4, § 24).
5. Statutes — Conflict Between Title and Body — Construction.
A statute’s title shall prevail over conflicting portions of its body where the body is broader in scope than the limitations in its title.
6. Statutes — Municipal Corporations — Housins Facilities Act— Conflict Between Title and Body.
A board of tenant affairs need not be established for cities with public housing projects where the city has a population less than 1,000,000, because even though the body of the municipal housing facilities act mandates the creation of a board without limitation as to population, the title of the act specifies that boards are to exist only for cities with populations of 1,000,000 or more (Const 1963, art 4, §24; MCLA § 125.651 et seq.).
7. Constitutional Law — Equal Protection — Statutes—Classification by Population — Reasonable Relationship.
Legislative classification by population will be upheld where there is a reasonable relationship between the restriction and population; equal protection of the laws does not prevent reasonable classification by legislation and the ultimate decision of the wisdom of that reasonable classification rests with the Legislature (US Const, Am 14; Const 1963, art 1, § 2).
8. Statutes — Municipal Corporations — Population Classification — 1,000,000 Population Classification.
Legislation which contains a population classification which limits the present application of the statute to municipalities with populations over 1,000,000 is not necessarily local or special legislation.
9. Statutes — Municipal Corporations — Housing Facilities Act— Classification by Population — Equal Protection — Constitutional Law.
The municipal housing facilities act which gives tenants in a public housing project a board of tenant affairs only in those projects in cities with populations of 1,000,000 or more does not violate equal protection and does not cause the statute to be an unnecessary local or special act, because the Legislature could reasonably have determined that tenants of public housing projects in large cities face considerably different problems than those in smaller cities (US Const, Am 14; Const 1963, art 1, § 2, art 4, § 29; MCLA § 125.651 et seq.).
Concurrence in Part and Dissent in Part by Levin, J.
10. Statutes — Preservation of Constitutionality — Construction.
A court has the duty to construe the language of a statute, subject to constitutional infirmity, in such a way, if possible, as to preserve the statute’s constitutionality.
11. Statutes — Municipal Corporations — Housing Facilities Act— Construction.
The municipal housing facilities act is not violative of the constitutional requirement that no law shall embrace more than one object which shall be expressed in its title, even though the title of the act limits the power to create boards of tenant affairs to localities of population of 1,000,000 or over and the body of the act has no population limit to the power, because a court, in order to preserve the act’s constitutionality, will read the population limitation into the act’s body (Const 1963, art 4, § 24; MCLA § 125.651 et seq.).
12. Statutes — Local or Special Act — Prohibition—-Purpose.
The purpose of the constitutional requirement that the Legislature shall pass no local or special act where a general act can be made applicable is to prevent unwarranted interference by the Legislature in purely local matters and to insure that all legislation will receive grave attention by all legislators by preventing those from areas unaffected by the act from eomplaisantly accepting its enactment (Const 1963, art 4, §29).
13. Statutes — Population Classification — Local or Special Act.
Classification by population is not inevitably consistent with the constitutional requirement that no special or local act be passed where a general act can be made applicable (Const 1963, art 4, § 29).
14. Statutes — Local or Special Acts — Population Classification.
A statute whose applicability is based on population differences will be upheld as not being an unnecessary local or special act where the existence or nonexistence of the problem sought to be solved can accurately be stated in terms of population; however, because there are always distinguishing features between the problems faced in a small city and a large city, the difference in population itself cannot be the basis for the act’s limited application.
15. Statutes — Local or Special Act — Applicability of General Law.
The Legislature is given some leeway in its determination whether the problem focused upon by a statute exists in only one community; however, the question whether a general act can be made applicable to the problem is a judicial Question and the courts must carefully scrutinize the determination made by the Legislature (Const 1963, art 4, § 29).
16. Statutes — Municipal Corporations — Housing Facilities Act— Constitutional Law.
The municipal housing facilities act which confers significant individual rights upon tenants in public housing projects but limits the applicability of those rights to tenants in localities with populations of 1,000,000 or over is violative of the constitutional prohibition of a local or special aet where a general act could have been made applicable where not even a scintilla of evidence has been introduced to show a real difference justifying the population classification; the contention that small city housing project tenants have less problems or significantly different problems from large city housing project tenants is merely an unproven hypothesis (Const 1963, art 4, §29; MCLA §125.651 et seq.).
17. Statutes — Local or Special Act — 1,000,000 Population Classification — Presumption of Validity.
The presumption of validity that generally attaches to legisla tion does not attach to a statute which confers significant legal rights, and which on its face, by reason of a population classification of 1,000,000 or more, does not apply and is not Mlcely to apply in the foreseeable future to more than one city in this state, where the statute is being attacked! as a local act and it is argued that a general act could have been made applicable.
18. Statutes — Population Classification — Constitutional Law.
A statute containing a population classification which has a reasonable relation to the purpose of the statute is nevertheless invalid as a local act if a general act can be made applicable (Const 1963, art 4, § 29).
19. Statutes — Population Classification.
Legislation containing a population classification can be classed functionally as (1) legislation concerning governmental operations and functions, (2) legislation providing for economic regulation of business, and (3) legislation establishing or concerning individual rights or prerogatives; because individual rights and the needs of citizens are less likely to vary significantly from one community to another, legislation in the third category is less likely to be justified (Const 1963, art 4,
20. Statutes — Municipal Corporations — Housing Facilities Act.
The housing facilities act amendments requiring housing commissions to adopt certain rules, creating a board of tenant affairs, and providing for hearings in certain cases were adopted to enlarge and create new rights m public housing tenants, not to facilitate management or to regulate the business of public housing (MCLA §§ 125.694b, 125.699 et seq., 125.703, 125.704).
21. Statutes — Population Classification — General Act — Constitutional Law.
An act classifying by population, and thus applicable in less than the entire state, is sustainable as a general act if the act could not have been made more generally applicable (Const, 1963, art 4, § 29).
22. Statutes — Population Classification — General Act — Constitutional Law.
A statute which confers advantages on citizens in a favored locale and denies them to citizens residing elsewhere by means of a population classification and which could have been made totally general should not ordinarily he declared totally invalid hut should have the unconstitutional population classification eliminated (Const 1963, art 4,$ 89).
23. Statutes — Housing Facilities Act — Population Classification — Constitutional Law.
The title of the municipal housing facilities act limiting the law’s application to cities with a population of 1,000,000 or more should he stricken because the restriction creates a special or local act where a general act could have heen passed (Const 1963, art 4, § 09; MCLA § 105.651 et seg.).
Appeal from Wayne, Thomas Roumell, J.
Submitted Division 1 December 7, 1970, at Detroit.
(Docket No. 8948.)
Decided June 30, 1971.
Affirmed by Supreme Court, 387 Mich 610.
Complaint for mandamus by Francis Bankhead and others to compel John McEwan, Mayor of River Rouge, to establish a board of tenant affairs in a River Rouge housing project. Judgment for plaintiffs. Defendant appeals.
Reversed.
Craig P. Colby, for plaintiffs.
Logan & Huchla, River Rouge City Attorneys, for defendant.
Before: Lesinski, C. J., and Levin and O’Hara, JJ.
Former Supreme Court Justiee, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment pursuant to Const 1963, art 6, § 23 as amended in 1968.

Opinion:
Lesinski, C. J.
Plaintiffs, tenants of a housing project in the city of River Rouge, sought a writ of mandamus below to compel defendant as mayor of that city to establish a board of tenant affairs pursuant to section 49 of the municipal housing facilities act, MCLA § 125.651, et seq. (Stat Ann 1969 Rev § 5.3011, et seq.). Section 49 of the act, MCLA 1971 Cum Supp § 125.699 (Stat Ann 1969 Rev § 5.3056 [3]), is a recent amendment (to the act) which, together with other recently added sections, creates boards of tenant affairs for cities with housing commissions and housing projects with the cooperation of the chief executives of the municipalities. From the trial court's granting of the writ, defendant appeals as of right.
The title to the act, as amended by PA 1968, No 344, § 1, reads:
"An act to authorize any city, village or township to purchase, acquire, construct, maintain, operate, improve, extend and repair housing facilities; to eliminate housing conditions which are detrimental to the public peace, health, safety, morals or welfare; and for any such purposes to authorize any such city, village or township to create by a commission with power to effectuate said purposes, and to prescribe the powers and duties of such commission and of such city, village or township; and for any such purposes to authorize any such city, village or township to issue notes and revenue bonds; to require the issuance, sale, retirement and refunding of such notes and bonds; to regulate the rentals of such projects and the use of the revenues of the projects; to prescribe the manner of selecting tenants for such projects; to provide for condemnation of private property for such projects; to confer certain powers upon such cities, villages and townships in relation to such projects, including the power to receive aid and cooperation of the federal government; to provide for a referendum thereon; to create a board of tenant affairs in any city of 1,000,000 or over having a housing commission and operating 1 or more housing projects; to define the powers and duties of such board; to provide for the right of appeal from its determinations; and for other purposes." (Emphasis supplied.)
Section 49 of the act, also added by PA 1968, No 344, provides:
"There is created a board of tenant affairs for each city, village or township having a housing commission and operating 1 or more housing projects as provided by this act."
On appeal, defendant challenges the constitutional validity of § 49 in that the body of the act mandates the creation of a board of tenant affairs for housing project cities, villages, and townships without limitation as to population whereas the title of the act, as amended, indicates that such boards are to exist only for cities with populations of 1,000,000 or more. Const 1963, art 4, § 24 establishes:
"No law shall embrace more than one object which shall be expressed in its title."
It is axiomatic that the body of an act must be reasonably harmonious with its title. McKellar v. Detroit (1885), 57 Mich 158. The purpose of the constitutional requirement is to make certain that the title of a legislative act must give notice to legislators, and others interested, of the object of the law, thereby assuring* them that only matters germane to the object expressed in the title will be enacted into law. Continental Motors Corporation v. Township of Muskegon (1965), 376 Mich 170, 179. See, also, Leininger v. Secretary of State (1947), 316 Mich 644; Regents of University of Michigan v. Pray (1933), 264 Mich 693; People v. Carroll (1936), 274 Mich 451; People v. Wohlford (1924), 226 Mich 166. The title of the act must be sufficiently broad to permit the enactment of the provisions found in the body of the legislation. People v. Wohlford, supra, p 168. The constitutional test to be applied is in Vernor v. Secretary of State (1914), 179 Mich 157, 160:
"What is the constitutional test? We think it is that a title must embrace the object of the act, and the body of the act must not be inconsistent with the title. The pertinent questions should be: Does the title of the act fairly indicate the purpose of the legislation? Is the title a fair index of the act? Does the title of the act fairly inform the legislators and the public of its purposes, as a whole?"
Undeniably, the title of the act, as amended, requiring the creation of boards in housing project cities of 1,000,000 or more, is more restrictive in scope than the body of the act which establishes a board for each city, village and township with a housing project. When the title of an act relates to designated municipal corporations and the body of the statute affects municipal corporations not specified by the title, the legislation may not be constitutionally applied to the local governments not indicated by the title. Wilcox v. Paddock (1887), 65 Mich 23; Hume v. Village of Fruitport (1928), 242 Mich 698.
We hold that where, as here, the body of the act is broader in scope than the limitations of the title of the act, the title shall prevail over the conflicting portion of the body of the act. See Arnold v. Ogle Construction Company (1952), 333 Mich. 652. As such we hold that defendant may not be required by virtue of § 49 to establish a board of tenant affairs.
A word is now due on plaintiffs' contention that the above holding deprives plaintiffs of equal protection of law. US Const, Am 14; Mich Const 1963, art 1, § 2. The statute gives boards of tenant affairs broad powers to veto housing commission rules and to review denials of admissions to public housing, evictions, and rental increases. MCLA 1971 Cum Supp § 125.702 (Stat Ann 1969 Rev § 5.3056[6]). Plaintiffs maintain that a construction of the act limiting § 49 of the act to cities with public housing commissions and public housing projects having populations of 1,000,000 or more unconstitutionally deprives them of the right to elect a board which could check arbitrary housing commission action.
Legislative classification by population will be upheld where there is a reasonable relationship between the restriction and population. Hayes v. Auditor General (1915), 184 Mich 39; Kates v. Reading (1931), 254 Mich 158; Chamski v. Wayne County Board of Auditors (1939), 288 Mich 238; Sullivan v. Graham (1953), 336 Mich 65. It has been held that the fact that legislation contains a population classification which limits the present application of the act to municipalities over 1,000,000 does not necessarily make the act local or special. Airport Community Schools v. State Board of Education (1969), 17 Mich App 574. Equal protection of the laws does not prevent a reasonable classification by legislative enactment and the ultimate decision as to the wisdom of such laws rests with the Legislature. Tribbett v. Village of Marcellus (1940), 294 Mich 607, 614.
We are unable to say that restriction of the act as expressed in the' title of the legislation is arbitrary. The Legislature could reasonably determine that tenants of public housing projects in large cities face considerably different problems than do tenants in smaller cities, such as to warrant classification. For example, tenants in large city public housing projects must compete with a greater number of tenants for individual attention. Tenants of such projects — because they live in the midst of huge urban areas — must cope with not only living in public housing but also living in large cities. Many such distinguishing features exist.
Nor do we think that Wayne Circuit Judges v. Wayne County (1969), 383 Mich 10, requires a different result. There, legislation established a statewide compensation distribution program for county probation departments, but excepted existing departments in counties with populations of over 500,000. This exception was struck down by the Court as local legislation, principally because the distinction drawn was unreasonable. The Court noted that the function of probation officers is to rehabilitate criminals and since there is a greater need for such work in heavily populated areas, the legislative classification defied logic. Further, the act excepted departments "heretofore established" in counties of 500,000 which narrowed the exception, in effect, to Wayne County.
In the case before us, we see an act limited to large cities and we are of the opinion that many valid reasons may be advanced to justify that limitation. We do not read Wayne Circuit Judges as precedent for elevating the rights of small city public housing project tenants on an equal protection basis.
Reversed. No costs, a public question being involved.
O'Hara, J., concurred.
MCLA 1971 Cum Supp § 125.700 (Stat Ann § 5.3056[4]); MCLA 1971 Cum Supp § 125.701 (Stat Ann 1969 Rev § 5.3056[5]).
The city of Biver Bouge has a population of approximately 20,000.
The Legislature itself has apparently recognized the defect in the title. HB 3721, introduced April 15, 1969, attempted to cure the imperfection by making title and body consistent by broadening the title. The bill was defeated.
See, also, Midi Const 1963, art 4, § 29, as to the constitutional prohibition against special and local acts where a general act can be made applicable. Analyses of special and local legislation and legislation which is violative of the equal protection clause are substantially similar. See Walters v. Binder (Ky, 1968), 435 SW2d 464, 466.