Case Name: FRANCO-AMERICAN CHAROLAISE, LTD., Mack M. Braly and Claudia M. Braly, Three B Land & Cattle Company, F.E. Bateman, Charles Bateman, W.A. Cannon, Gerald Don Stewart, Hershell Chronister, Jesse Berrie, Mrs. John Prater and Jack Dunn, Appellees, v. The OKLAHOMA WATER RESOURCES BOARD and the City of Ada, Oklahoma, Appellants
Court: Oklahoma Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Oklahoma
Decision Date: 1990-04-24
Citations: 855 P.2d 568
Docket Number: No. 59310
Parties: FRANCO-AMERICAN CHAROLAISE, LTD., Mack M. Braly and Claudia M. Braly, Three B Land & Cattle Company, F.E. Bateman, Charles Bateman, W.A. Cannon, Gerald Don Stewart, Hershell Chronister, Jesse Berrie, Mrs. John Prater and Jack Dunn, Appellees, v. The OKLAHOMA WATER RESOURCES BOARD and the City of Ada, Oklahoma, Appellants.
Judges: HODGES, C.J., and ALMA WILSON, KAUGER and WATT, JJ., concur in the opinion by OPALA, J.
Reporter: Pacific Reporter 2d
Volume: 855
Pages: 568–597

Head Matter:
FRANCO-AMERICAN CHAROLAISE, LTD., Mack M. Braly and Claudia M. Braly, Three B Land & Cattle Company, F.E. Bateman, Charles Bateman, W.A. Cannon, Gerald Don Stewart, Hershell Chronister, Jesse Berrie, Mrs. John Prater and Jack Dunn, Appellees, v. The OKLAHOMA WATER RESOURCES BOARD and the City of Ada, Oklahoma, Appellants.
No. 59310.
Supreme Court of Oklahoma.
April 24, 1990.
Readopted, Reissued and Rehearing Denied April 13, 1993.
Rehearing Denied June 14, 1993.
George W. Braly, Mack M. Braly, Messrs. Braly and Braly, Tulsa, for appel-lees.
Dean A. Couch, R. Thomas Lay, Oklahoma City, for appellant Oklahoma Water Resources Bd.
Joseph Rarick, Messrs. Younger & Files, Ada, for appellant City of Ada.
R. Steven Horn, Tulsa, for amicus curiae Oklahoma Wildlife Federation, Inc.
Diane Pedicord, Sue Ann Nicely, Oklahoma City, for amicus curiae, Oklahoma Mun. League.
Steven E. Moore, Diane Goldschmidt, Oklahoma City, for amicus curiae, Oklahoma Gas and Elec. Co.
Jay M. Galt, Messrs. Looney, Nichols, Johnson & Hayes, Oklahoma City, for ami-cus curiae, Oklahoma Rural Water Ass’n.
Robert D. Allen, Thomas Scott Jones, for amicus curiae, City of Oklahoma City and the Oklahoma City Mun. Improvement Authority.
Robert H. Anderson, Oklahoma City, for amicus curiae, McGee Creek Authority.

Opinion:
OPALA, Justice.
This appeal challenges the constitutionality of the 1963 amendments to Oklahoma's water law insofar as the amendments regulate riparian rights. The case also raises a first-impression question about the interpretation of the requirements for perfecting an appropriative right under 82 O.S. 1981 § 105.12. We affirm the trial court's findings of fact, holding that they are supported by substantial evidence. The questions of law tendered for our resolution are:
1. What is the nature of the riparian right under Oklahoma common law?
2. To what extent did the 1963 amendments abrogate the common-law riparian right?
3. Are the 1963 amendments constitutional when measured by Art. 2, § 24 Okl. Const.?
4. Does 82 O.S.1981 § 105.12(2) require consideration of an applicant's available groundwater in determining its need for stream water?
5. Does 82 O.S.1981 § 105.12(4) require that an out-of-basin appropriation be granted subject to recall by in-basin riparian owners and appropriative users?
We hold that the Oklahoma riparian owner enjoys a vested common-law right to the reasonable use of the stream. This right is a valuable part of the property owner's "bundle of sticks" and may not be taken for public use without compensation. We further hold that, inasmuch as 60 O.S.1981 § 60, as amended in 1963, limits the riparian owner to domestic use and declares that all other water in the stream becomes public water subject to appropriation without any provision for compensating the riparian owner, the statute violates Art. 2 § 24, Okl. Const.
In addition, we declare that the California Doctrine of stream water rights, which recognizes riparian and appropriative rights as coexistent, is the prevailing law in Oklahoma; that the Oklahoma Water Resources Board [OWRB] may, in its discretion, find that an applicant for an appropriation has a need for stream water without regard to any claimed or perfected groundwater sources; that a perfected appropria-tive right is a vested right which may not be permanently divested except for nonuse after notice and hearing but is subject to senior appropriative rights and reasonable riparian uses during shortages; and that in the future a riparian owner seeking an appropriation of stream water must be deemed to have voluntarily relinquished his riparian rights in that stream water except for those preserved under the statute for domestic uses.
A. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Mill Creek is a spring-fed dry weather creek in the.Upper Clear Boggy watershed within the Muddy Boggy River Basin. Byrd's Mill Spring flows directly into Mill Creek which in turn flows into Clear Boggy Creek. Clear Boggy Creek is joined by Buck Creek and flows downstream as Clear Boggy Creek where it joins Muddy Boggy Creek to form the Muddy Boggy River. The latter is a tributary of the Red River. In 1980 the area experienced a severe drought and the stream bed in Clear Boggy Creek went dry. In August of 1980 the City of Ada [City] made application, pursuant to 82 O.S.1981 § 105.9, to increase its appropriation of water from Byrd's Mill Spring from 3,360 acre feet per year to 11,202 acre feet per year to meet a projected annual need of 10,523 acre feet per year by the year 2020. The City straddles two watersheds with approximately 80 percent in the South Canadian Stream Basin and 20 percent in the Clear Boggy Stream Basin. Riparian owners and in-basin appropriators objected to the City's application for additional stream water. The OWRB determined that the average yield of Byrd's Mill Spring is 9,820 acre feet per year. Prior appropriations, including that of the City and some appellee riparian owners, total 3,776 acre feet per year. Allowing 584 acre feet to supply domestic needs down to Buck Creek and 120 acre feet for unavoidable loss, the OWRB found the amount available for appropriation was 5,340 acre feet, 2,502 acre feet less than the 7,842 acre feet requested by the City. The City amended its application to conform to the finding. The OWRB then granted all 5,340 acre feet available for appropriation to the City, requiring the City to release at least 1,120 acre feet of water per year downstream. The OWRB order also required the City to meter and record monthly the amount of water taken from Byrd's Mill Spring. In-basin riparian owners and appropriators appealed from the administrative decision to the District Court, Coal County.
B. COMMON-LAW AND STATUTORY AUTHORITY AFFECTING WATER RIGHTS
The Organic Act of 1890 extended England's common law over Indian Territory. The same year the Territorial Legislature adopted a statute declaring the nature of water rights in the Territory:
"The owner of land owns water standing thereon, or flowing over or under its surface, but not forming a definite stream. Water running in a definite stream, formed by nature over or under the surface may be used by him as long as it remains there; but he may not prevent the natural flow of the stream, or of the natural spring from which it commences its definite course, nor pursue nor pollute the same."
This codification of the common-law riparian doctrine of water rights remained the law in Oklahoma until legislative adoption of the 1963 amendments.
In 1897 the legislature provided for the appropriation of the ordinary flow or underflow of stream water for the irrigation of arid sections of the State. The statute protected the riparian owner from the appropriation of the ordinary flow of the stream without the riparian owner's consent except by condemnation. In 1905 the provision protecting the riparian right was omitted. It was reinstated in 1909, then finally eliminated in 1910. In 1925 the legislature added a provision recognizing the priority of all beneficial uses of water initiated prior to statehood.
Since 1897 both the common law and the statutes have operated in Oklahoma to confer riparian and appropriative rights. Though these rights have coexisted in the State for almost 100 years, they are theoretically irreconcilable. The common-law riparian right extends to the reasonable use of the stream or to its natural flow, depending on the jurisdiction; the appropri-ative right attaches to a fixed amount. The last riparian use asserted has as much priority as the first; the appropriator who takes first has the senior right. In 1963 the legislature attempted to reconcile the two doctrines. The amendments, shown in italics, are as follows:
"The owner of the land owns water standing thereon, or flowing over or under its surface but not forming a definite stream. The use of groundwater shall be governed by the Oklahoma Ground Water Law. Water running in a definite stream, formed by nature over or under the surface, may be used by him for domestic purposes as defined in Section 2(a) of this Act, as long as it remains there, but he may not prevent the natural flow of the stream, or of the natural spring from which it commences its definite course, nor pursue nor pollute the same, as such water then becomes public water and is subject to appropriation for the benefit and welfare of the people of the state, as provided by law; Provided however, that nothing contained herein shall prevent the owner of land from damming up or otherwise using the bed of a stream on his land for the collection or storage of waters in an amount not to exceed that which he owns, by virtue of the first sentence of this section so long as he provides for the continued natural flow of the stream in an amount equal to that which entered his land less the uses allowed in this Act; provided further, that nothing contained herein shall be construed to limit the powers of the Oklahoma Water Resources Board to grant permission to build or alter structures on. a stream pursuant to Title 82 to provide for the storage of additional water the use of which the land owner has or acquires by virtue of this act."
Companion statutes limit riparian domestic use to household purposes, to the watering of domestic animals up to the land's normal grazing capacity, and to the irrigation of land not exceeding a total of three acres. The riparian owner may also store a two-year supply for domestic use. In addition, the 1963 amendments provided a validation mechanism as a method for protecting pre-existing beneficial uses, including those of the riparian owner and preexisting appropriators. All subsequent rights to the use of stream water, except for riparian domestic uses, are to be acquired by appropriation. The stream's natural flow is considered public water and subject to appropriation. Riparian owners may not assert their common-law right to the use of stream water other than for the domestic uses.
C. THE NATURE OF THE COMMON- LAW RIPARIAN RIGHT
Riparian rights arise from land ownership, attaching only to those lands which touch the stream. A riparian interest, though one in real property, is not absolute or exclusive; it is usufructuary in character and subject to the rights of other riparian owners. A riparian right is neither constant nor judicially quantifiable in futu-ro.
Under the natural flow doctrine, the riparian owner is entitled to have the water of the stream flow in its natural channel without diminution or alteration. The riparian owner has the right to the natural benefits of the stream irrespective of his need to put the water to use even if he suffers no tangible harm by a diminution of the stream. The natural flow doctrine, which prevents any consumptive use, was early modified to allow for "natural" or domestic uses such as bathing, drinking, gardening, and stock watering.
Because the natural flow doctrine when "pressed to the limits of its logic enabled one to play dog-in-the-manger" and fostered waste, the majority of American courts have expressly adopted the reasonable use doctrine. An Ohio court first espoused the reasonable use doctrine in 1832. Its adoption was influenced by the rule that the riparian owner's remedy for interference with water rights was trespass on the case, an action requiring material injury. If the plaintiff can show no injury, the riparian owner's use is "reasonable" even though the normal flow of the stream is diminished.
This court first declared its adherence to common-law doctrine of riparian rights in Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry. Co. v. Groves. The issue there was whether the defendant-railroad could obstruct a well-defined channel causing flood waters to back up on the plaintiff's land. The court held that the riparian owner has the right to the stream's continuous flow as it has been accustomed to run and that no one can obstruct its course to the riparian owner's injury without being liable for damages. This court's consistent requirement of injury to the plaintiff is in line with its later express adoption of the reasonable use doctrine in Broady v. Furray. In Furray, a natural obstruction of sediment created a water impoundment on the defendant's property. The plaintiff complained that seepage from the impoundment was ruining his crops. This court affirmed the nisi prius determination that the plaintiff's fishing resort would be damaged more by the removal of the obstruction than the defendant was harmed by its presence. The opinion states that the plaintiff and the defendant, qua riparian owners, had reciprocal rights and each has a right to the reasonable use of the stream. Seven years later in Martin v. British American Oil Producing Co., though using some language consistent with the natural flow doctrine, we held that a riparian owner may use the stream water as long as the use is reasonable and does not tend to injure or damage other riparian owners. The reasonableness of use was deemed a question for the jury.
"Natural flow" language has been used by this court when the plaintiff challenged an obstruction causing too much water in the stream to the plaintiffs injury. But a careful reading of our decisions involving the taking of water from a stream reveals that, even when the natural flow doctrine is mentioned in dicta, the reasonable use doctrine is actually applied. In Smith v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co. we allowed Stanolind, a lessee of a riparian owner, to diminish the flow of the natural stream as long as Stanolind left water sufficient for domestic use and for approximately 45 head of cattle. We quoted with approval from a Vermont decision:
"The fact that such orators [plaintiffs in chancery] were taking the water to their non-riparian lands did not per se make their use unreasonable. But that fact together with the size and character of the stream, the quantity of water appropriated, and all the circumstances and conditions, might make their use unreasonable. The stream might furnish enough to supply this unreasonable use of the defendants and the reasonable demands of the orators [plaintiffs in chancery], in which case the latter could not be heard to complain. The mere fact that the defendants reduce the natural flow of the stream would not be deci-sive_" [Emphasis added.]
We said that the accepted rule allows a riparian owner the right to make any use of water beneficial to himself as long as he does not substantially or materially injure those riparian owners downstream who have a corresponding right. In Baker v. Ellis, a case relied on by the trial court in holding that the natural flow doctrine controls the case at bar, we affirmed a decree granting a permanent injunction against the defendant's construction of a dam which threatened the supply of water to a downstream riparian owner. Though the court noted that the defendant was about to stop the stream "where the water, left alone, would run as it ought to run, and was used to run from time immemorial," we carefully added that the defendant could still properly use the water even impounding some as long as he does not cause substantial damage to the plaintiff.
Mindful of these decisions and of the co-existence of appropriative with riparian rights in this state since 1897, we hold that the modified common-law riparian right to the reasonable use of the stream is the controlling norm of law in Oklahoma. We further hold that, consistently with the California Doctrine, the statutory right to appropriate stream water coexists with, but does not preempt or abrogate, the riparian owner's common-law right.
D. THE CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION
The issue here is whether the legislature can validly abrogate the riparian owner's right to initiate non-domestic reasonable uses in stream water without affording compensation. Art. 2, § 24, Okl. Const. provides in part:
"Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just compensation. Such compensation, irrespective of any benefit from any improvements proposed shall be ascertained by a board of commissioners- of not less than three freeholders, in such a matter as may be prescribed by law."
Private property protected by Art. 2, § 24 includes "easements, personal property, and every valuable interest which can be enjoyed and recognized as property." Further, In Oklahoma Water Resources Board v. Central Oklahoma Master Conservancy District, we held:
"A 'vested right' is the power to do certain actions or possess certain things lawfully, and is substantially a property right. It may be created by common law, by statute or by contract. Once created, it becomes absolute, and is protected from legislative invasion ." [Emphasis added].
Therefore, the common-law riparian right to use stream water, as long as that use is reasonable, has been long recognized in Oklahoma law as a private property right.
The general rule is that the legislature may restrict the use of private property by exercise of its police power for the preservation of the public, health, morals, safety and general welfare without compensating the property owner. In Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Corporation Com'n this court defined the permissible exercise of police power:
"[T]he police power is usually exerted merely to regulate the use and enjoyment of property by the owner, or, if he is deprived of his property outright, it is not taken for public use, but rather destroyed in order to promote the general welfare.... "
Therefore, in C.C. Julian Oil & Royalties Co. v. Capshaw we declared that the legislature could regulate a landowner's use and enjoyment of natural resources to prevent waste and infringement on the rights of others. Thus, a statutory regulation of the methods to be used in extracting hydrocarbons was a constitutional exercise of police power where none of the hydrocarbons was taken for public use. Then, in Frost v. Ponca City we held that in the interest of health and safety, the city could exercise its police power to restrict the plaintiff's right to capture hydrocarbons underlying his property, but the city could not remove the hydrocarbons and sell them without compensating the plaintiff.
We, therefore, hold that the 1963 water law amendments are fraught with a constitutional infirmity in that they abolish the right of riparian owners to assert their vested interest in the prospective reasonable use of the stream. Under the 1963 amendments, riparian owners stand on equal footing with appropriator; ownership of riparian land affords no right to the stream water except for limited domestic use.
This case must be remanded for the trial court to determine whether the appellee-riparian owners' claim to the use of the stream flow for the enhancement of the value of the riparian land for recreation, for the preservation of wildlife, for fighting grass fires, and for lowering the body temperature of their cattle on hot summer days is reasonable.
The OWRB argues the 1963 amendments are a permissible exercise of the police power just as a zoning ordinance would be. That contention is inapposite when, as here, the use of stream water is not just restricted but is taken for public use.
Although the 1963 water law amendments provided a mechanism for a riparian owner to "perfect" all beneficial uses initiated prior to the legislation, that mechanism falls short of protecting the riparian owner's common-law appurtenant right. The mechanism is constitutionally inadequate first of all because the full sweep of the riparian right is much broader than the validation mechanism could ever shield. The heart of the riparian right is the right to assert a use at any time as long as it does not harm another riparian who has a corresponding right. Further, yesterday's reasonable use by one riparian owner may become unreasonable tomorrow when a fellow riparian owner asserts a new or expanded use. After the 1963 amendments, the riparian owner who wants to expand a use or assert a new use may do so only as an appropriator. His use is not judged by its reasonableness but only by its priority in time.
Furthermore, the validation mechanism attempted to forever set in stone the maximum amount of stream water the landowner, as a riparian owner, can use. Any use asserted by tbe landowner, as an appropriator, is either denied because no water is available or is given a lower priority than all other uses, including those of appropriators who are non-riparian to the stream. It matters not that the riparian owner's use is reasonable when compared with prior uses. This result is antithetical to the very nature of the common-law riparian right, which places no stock in the fact of past use, present use, or even non-use.
The 1963 legislation is also constitutionally inadequate because it falls short of an express abrogation of a riparian owner's common-law right. We held in Ricks Exploration Co. v. Oklahoma Water Resources Board that public law will not be interpreted as legally destroying private rights by inference. Until the recent 1988 amendments to our water law, the riparian owner was never given express notice by the legislature that his use would be limited in the future to that validated under the 1963 amendments. By then, the time for "perfection" under the validation mechanism had passed.
In preserving today the riparian right from its infirm legislative abrogation, we do not disestablish the appropriative right. California and Nebraska, which still maintain the dual regime of water rights, protect appropriative rights, prior reasonable uses of the riparian owner and prospective reasonable uses of the riparian owner. In U.S. v. Gerlach Live Stock Co. the United States Supreme Court, interpreting California law, held that the plaintiff's use of even the normal overflow of the stream for irrigation purposes was reasonable, and therefore, compensable.
The asserted riparian use must, of course, be reasonable. Therefore, in a later case, Joslin v. Marin Municipal Water District, the California Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs' use of the normal flow of the stream for the purpose of accumulating rock, sand and gravel for their rock and gravel business was not a reasonable use. The court, which ruled that the plaintiffs had a compensable interest only-in the reasonable use of the flow of the water, balanced the plaintiffs' use against the need to preserve the state's water supply and the constitutional mandate preventing waste and unreasonable use.
Upon remand, should the trial court find that any or all of the riparian owners' asserted uses of the stream for their claimed purposes is unreasonable, such uses do not fall under the mantle of constitutionally protected property rights. On the other hand, should the trial court find that an asserted riparian use of the stream is reasonable, the right to a flow sufficient to supply the riparian owners' reasonable use must be preserved in the owners.
On remand the trial court shall separately determine the reasonableness of each of the riparian owners' asserted uses, applying the factors discussed earlier. One use may be found reasonable while another is not. We make no conclusion as to the reasonableness of any of the riparian owners' asserted uses.
To assure that the state's resources are put to the most reasonable and beneficial use, we adopt the approach of the Supreme Court of Nebraska in Wasserburger v. Coffee. Wasserburger holds that the rights of the riparian owner and the appropriator are to be determined by relative reasonableness. On remand, the trial court shall balance the riparian owners' uses against those of the City, with due consideration to be given all the factors listed earlier in this opinion.
The OWRB shall approve the City's appropriation only if it finds there is surplus water after providing for 1) all prior appropriations; 2) all riparian uses perfected under the 1963 amendments; 3) all riparian domestic uses, 4) all riparian uses approved as reasonable on remand and 5) all anticipated in-basin needs. In its calculation, the OWRB must take into account the last riparian owner and the last appropriator on the stream and maintain the minimum flow necessary to allow for diversion by these users. We affirm the trial court's ruling that all downstream domestic uses below the junction of Buck and Boggy Creeks and above its junction with Muddy-Boggy Creek must be considered to determine the water available for appropriation.
E. GRANTING THE APPROPRIATION
The Consideration of Other Sources of Water
The next issue for review is whether the OWRB must consider the City's claim to groundwater when determining its need to appropriate stream water. Title 82 § 105.12(2) requires the OWRB to determine whether the applicant has a present or future need for the water. The trial court ruled the OWRB must consider the City's claim to groundwater sources in assessing whether the City indeed has a need for the water it seeks to appropriate. The 1988 amendments to our statutory water law address this issue by adding the following clarifying language to 82 O.S.1981 § 105.12:
A. After the hearing on the application the Board shall determine from the evidence presented whether:
1. There is unappropriated water available in the amount applied for;
2. The applicant has a present or future need for the water and the use to which applicant intends to put the water is a beneficial use; and. In making this determination, the Board shall consider the availability of all stream water sources and such other relevant matters as the Board deems appropriate, and may consider the availability of groundwater as an alternative source; [amendments in italics; deletions noted]
The title of the Act that embodies the 1988 amendments expresses a purpose to clarify the language of the statute. We hold that by the language added to 82 O.S.1981 § 105.12(2) the legislature intended to explain the 1963 amendments rather than to amend them. In so doing the legislature expressed its intent to apply the added language in § 105.12 retroactively from the effective daté of the 1963 amendments.
Furthermore, we held in American Ins. Ass'n v. Industrial Com'n that:
"[u]nless there be present on review some property or liberty interest which requires that we apply to the accrued or vested rights in controversy the law in force at a fixed point in time that is anterior to its most recent change, an amendment of controlling statutory law between nisi prius and appellate decisions compels the appellate court to apply the latest version of the pertinent law."
Because the legislature has intervened following our initial consideration of this case and before our final disposition and because the legislature expressed an intent to clarify the 1963 amendments and to apply the language added by 82 O.S.Supp.1988 § 105.12, we are now compelled to retroactively apply the legislature's latest version of the pertinent law. No vested property or liberty interest requires an opposite conclusion.
Conforming to the legislative clarification of § 105.12(2), we reverse the trial court's holding that the OWRB must consider all sources of water claimed by the City in determining the City's need for stream water. Pursuant to the statute, the OWRB must consider the availability of other stream water sources but, in its discretion, may consider the availability of groundwater sources in determining the City's present and future need for stream water. The legislature's interpretation of § 105.12(2) is consistent with the state's policy recognizing groundwater as a limited and dwindling supply which should not be depleted needlessly.
Of course, an initial finding by the OWRB that allowing the appropriation would impair vested appropriative or riparian uses or prejudice future in-basin needs, as revealed by the last five-year study, makes the availability of other sources a moot issue. The OWRB must then deny the application regardless of whether the City has other available water sources. On the other hand, if there is surplus stream water available and if the City will apply it to a beneficial use, granting the appropriation may provide the applicant with the most economic water source and prevent the escape of surplus stream water into an adjacent state.
Some, if not all, appellee-riparian owners have perfected appropriative rights in the same stream in which they are now claiming riparian rights. For almost 100 years, Oklahoma law has permitted riparian owners to "have their cake and eat it too". Under their riparian right riparian owners may assert a reasonable use any time and obtain a priority over pre-existing uses — both riparian and appropriative. Under the rubric of appropriative rights the riparian owners have a priority which can never be disestablished by later appropriations. We, therefore, hold that in the future a riparian owner who applies for an appropriation in stream water must be deemed to have voluntarily relinquished his riparian rights in that stream water, except for those preserved under the statute for domestic uses. Because of its significant constitutional implication, the principle of relinquishment we announce today shall be applied prospectively from the date mandate herein is issued.
F. RECALL OF THE APPROPRIATION
The final issue for our resolution is whether 82 O.S. § 105.12(4) requires the OWRB to grant an out-of-basin appropriation subject to recall (permanent divestment) by in-basin appropriators. This issue implicates both constitutional considerations and statutory interpretation. The maxim "first in time, first in right" is a fundamental feature of the common-law appropriation doctrine codified at 82 O.S. 1981 § 105.2(B). The senior appropriator has priority over the junior appropriator when water supply is insufficient for all. In times of shortage the junior appropriator must stop diverting all or a portion of his appropriated amount until the supply again exceeds that required by senior appropriators. Though the appropriation is considered a vested property right and is not subject to permanent divestment except for nonuse, that right is always subject to the rights of senior appropriators. The junior appropriator takes with notice of those prior rights. This state's appropriation statutes give the appropriator the right to bring suit when his right to use water is wrongfully impaired by another. The OWRB may also institute legal proceedings to enjoin the wrongful diversion and file criminal complaints against the wrongdoers. Under the statute, the only instance when an appropriator is subject to permanent divestment is for failure to beneficially use the water.
In addition to this first-in-time, first-in-right limitation on all appropriations, the out-of-basin appropriator is faced with Oklahoma's statutory preference for in-basin use:
Only excess and surplus water should be utilized outside of the areas of origin and citizens within the areas of origin have a prior right to water originating therein to the extent that it may be required for beneficial use therein;
The OWRB is directed by 82 O.S.1981 § 105.12 to review the needs within the area of origin every five years. Applicants within the stream system shall have all of the water required to supply their beneficial needs revealed by the study. The trial court held that, according to the statute's declared preference for in-basin use, all of the City's appropriation which is to be used outside the basin of origin (80%) is subject to recall by users within the basin of origin. Subsequently, the legislature clarified its declared preference for in-basin use and limited its sweep as follows: the preference applies only 1) when out-of-basin and in-basin applications for an appropriation are pending before the OWRB at the same time and 2) when future in-basin needs are revealed by the last five-year review made prior to the granting of an application. The 1988 clarifying language expressly provides that the five-year review is not to be used to reduce a previously authorized appropriation.
Therefore, in keeping with the most recent text of § 105.12(4) and in keeping with the common-law prior appropriations doctrine, we reverse the ruling of the trial court and hold that any appropriation granted to the City on remand is to be treated as a vested right that is not subject to permanent divestment by subsequent in- basin appropriators. The latter appropriators take subject to temporary divestment by all prior appropriators, even those outside the basin of origin. Likewise, the City's appropriation is subject to temporary divestment by senior appropriators, in or out of the basin of origin, in times of shortage.
Notwithstanding the statutory rule that controls in-stream appropriators, all riparian owners enjoy a vested interest in the prospective reasonable use of the stream, which interest is not subject to prior appropriations. To the extent that § 105.12 fails to preserve that interest, we hold it violative of Art. 2, § 24, Okl. Const. Should a riparian owner assert a vested right to initiate a reasonable use of the stream and should the water in the stream be insufficient to supply that owner's reasonable use, we hold that the appropriator with the last priority must either release water into the stream sufficient to meet the riparian owner's reasonable use or stop diverting an amount sufficient to supply the riparian owner's reasonable use until there is water sufficient to satisfy both interests. This temporary divestment is similar to that required under the appropriation doctrine when a shortage of water impairs a senior appropriation. The described scenario should indeed be a rare occurrence, except perhaps in times of severe drought, if the OWRB conducts a thorough study of future in-basin needs every five years and denies all applications for appropriations which threaten those needs.
Nothing in today's pronouncement precludes the OWRB from granting, as authorized by 82 O.S.1981 § 105.13, seasonable permits allowing increased use and storage of stream water in times of heavy runoff during rainy seasons.
TRIAL COURT'S ORDER ON APPEAL FROM THEvAGENCY IS AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED IN PART; CAUSE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS.
HODGES, C.J., and ALMA WILSON, KAUGER and WATT, JJ., concur in the opinion by OPALA, J.
LAVENDER, V.C.J., concurs in part and dissents in part by opinion.
REIF, Special Justice, sitting by designation in lieu of SIMMS, J., who disqualified, concurs in part and dissents in part by opinion.
HARGRAVE, J., dissents by opinion.
SUMMERS, J., concurs in part and dissents in part.
HODGES, C.J., and OPALA, ALMA WILSON, KAUGER and WATT, JJ., concur in rehearing's denial.
LAVENDER, V.C.J., HARGRAVE and SUMMERS, JJ., and REIF, Special Justice, by designation in lieu of SIMMS, J., who disqualified, dissent from rehearing's denial.
. Laws 1963, ch. 205, § 1. For the text of the statute which includes the 1963 amendments, see this text accompanying infra note 16.
. For the text of the statute, see infra note 57.
. Magnolia Pipe Line Company v. Cowen, Okl., 477 P.2d 848, 850 [1970], Appellant, Oklahoma Water Resources Board, argues that the trial court reweighed the evidence in contravention of the standard for judicial review of administrative determination. 75 O.S.1981 § 322. We disagree. The trial court held the Board's findings were unsupported by evidence and hence arbitrary.
.Our holding today rests on independent and adequate state grounds. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1041, 103 S.Ct. 3469, 3476, 77 L.Ed.2d 1201 [1983].
. See infra note 15.
. The terms of 75 O.S.1981 § 318 provide for district court review of agency decisions.
. The Organic Act of 1890, 26 U.S.Stat. at Large, ch. 182, § 31, provided for the adoption of Chapter 20 of the Mansfield's Digest of the Statutes of Arkansas, which included the common law, as the rule of decision in Indian Territory. As stated in McKennon v. Winn, 1 Okl. 327, 33 P. 582, 585 [1893], the people who settled Indian Territory on April 22, 1889, also brought with them the principles and rules of the common law recognized by the American courts. In 1889 an act of Congress creating a United States District Court for Indian Territory gave the court authority to apply the common law in the adjudication of cases within its jurisdiction. Finally, in 1893 the Territorial Legislature adopted the common law, originally placed at St.1893, § 3874, and now codified at 12 O.S. 1981 § 2. The riparian right was a part of the English and American common law that came to be extended over the State. See infra note 26.
. Terr.Okla.Stat. § 4162 [1890],
. Sess.Laws of Terr., Okl., ch. 19, art. I, § 1-21, pp. 187-195 [1897].
. See supra note 10 at 188.
. Sess.Laws of Terr., Okl., ch. 21, art. I, § 1-56, pp. 274-301 [1905].
. Okla.Comp.Laws § 3918 [1909]. See 1 Okl. Rev.Laws § 3636, note 1 [1910] (provision with reference to "claims initiated prior to the passage of this act" was eliminated as having spent its force).
. Sess.Laws of Okla., ch. 76, § 1 [1925] provides:
"Beneficial use shall be the basis, the measure and the limit of the right to the use of water, and all waters appropriated for irrigation purposes shall be appurtenant to specified lands owned by the person claiming the right to use the water, so long as the water can be beneficially used thereon. Priority in time shall give the better right. Provided, that in all cases of claims to the use of water initiated prior to November 15, 1907, the right shall relate back to the initiation of the claim and beneficial use of such water. All claims to the use of water initiated thereafter shall relate back to the date of receipt of an application therefor in the office of the state engineer, subject to compliance with the provisions of this chapter and the rules and regulations established thereunder."
. This dual system of water rights is known nationally as the "California Doctrine" and at one time was the rule in all West Coast states and the tier of the Great Plains from North Dakota to Texas. Only California and Nebraska retain it. Most dual-system states have since adopted the appropriation doctrine as controlling all rights to stream water. See generally 5 Waters and Water Rights § 421 [R. Clark ed. 1972] and F. Trelease, Water Law infra note 27 at 11-13 (discussing the water law of other states).
. Now codified at 60 O.S.1981 § 60. See Rar-ick, Oklahoma Water Law, Stream and Surface Under the 1963 Amendments, 23 Okla.L.Rev. 19 [1970] (discussing the legislative history and effect of the amendments).
. 82 O.S.1981 § 105.1(B).
. 82 O.S.1981 § 105.2(A).
. See 82 O.S.1981 § 105.2 et seq. See also Talley v. Carley, Okl., 551 P.2d 248, 249 [1975], where we noted that the 1963 amendments set forth a "comprehensive method for establishing water priorities" and applied the amendments to settle a dispute between riparian appropriators.
. 60 O.S.1981 § 60. The 1988 amendments to Oklahoma water law expressly provide that the common law's riparian right is abrogated. Okl. Sess.L.1988, ch. 203, § 1. See text infra notes 59-61 for discussion of the application of the 1988 amendments to the instant case.
. See generally 1 Water and Water Rights § 51 et seq. [R. Clark ed. 1967].
. Smith v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., 197 Okla. 499, 172 P.2d 1002, 1006 [1946].
. The common-law maxim is aqua currit et debet currere, ut currere solebat (water runs, and ought to run, as it has used to run). Black's Law Dictionary, p. 95 [1979]. See also Crawford Co. v. Hathaway, 67 Neb. 325, 93 N.W. 781, 790 [1903] (insofar as it held that the appropriations doctrine had abrogated the common-law riparian right, Hathaway was overruled in Wasserburger v. Coffee, 180 Neb. 149, 141 N.W.2d 738, 743 [1966]).
. United States v. Gerlach Live Stock Co., 339 U.S. 725, 751, 70 S.Ct. 955, 968, 94 L.Ed. 1231, 1249 [1950].
. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 850 Appendix, 22-23 [1982] and 7 Water and Water Rights § 611 at 36-42 [R. Clark, ed. 1976]. Though the natural flow doctrine is espoused in many American cases, Clark insists that no jurisdiction actually applies it. 5 Water and Water Rights § 424 at 285. Appellee riparian owners point to the common law of Arkansas, made applicable to Indian Territory through the Organic Act of 1890, supra note 8, as a source of their vested right to the natural flow of the stream. Yet, Arkansas never adopted the natural flow doctrine and expressly rejected it in 1955 for the reasonable use theory. Harris v. Brooks, 225 Ark. 436, 283 S.W.2d 129, 133 [1955].
. Cooper v. Hall, 5 Ohio 321, 324 [1832]. Weil and Clark argue that the riparian right of the common law was not received in England until 1833. By then, American courts had already adopted both the natural flow doctrine in Tyler v. Wilkinson, 24 Fed.Cas. 472 [C.C.R.I.1827] and the reasonable use doctrine in Cooper v. Hall, supra. Weil, Waters: American Law and French Authority, 33 Harv.L.Rev. 133 [1919] and 7 Waters and Water Rights § 610 et seq. [R. Clark, ed. 1976). See also U.S. v. Gerlach, supra note 24, 339 U.S. at 745, note 24, 70 S.Ct. at 966. But cf. Maass and Zobel, Anglo-American Water Law: Who Appropriated the Riparian Doctrine? 10 Public Policy 109 [1961].
. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 850 [1979].
. 20 Okl. 101, 93 P. 755, 759 [1908].
. Supra note 28. See also Miller v. Marriott, 48 Okl. 179, 149 P. 1164, 1165 [1915] and Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry. Co. v. Morton, 57 Okl. 711, 157 P. 917, 920 [1916].
. 163 Okl. 204, 21 P.2d 770, 771 [1933].
. Broady v. Furray, supra note 30.
. 187 Okl. 193, 102 P.2d 124, 126 [1940],
. See cases in supra note 29.
. 197 Okl. 499, 172 P.2d 1002, 1004 [1946].
. Supra note 34, 172 P.2d at 1005-1006 (quoting Lawrie v. Silsby, 82 Vt. 505, 74 A. 94, 96 [1909]).
. Supra note 34 at 1005.
. Okl., 292 P.2d 1037 [1956].
. Baker v. Ellis, supra note 37, 292 P.2d at 1037-1039.
. See 12 O.S.1981 § 2 which reads in part:
"The common law, as modified by constitutional and statutory law, judicial decisions and the condition and wants of the people, shall remain in force in aid of the general statutes of Oklahoma...."
. Reasonableness is a question of fact to be determined by the court on a case-to-case basis. Factors courts consider in determining reasonableness include the size of the stream, custom, climate, season of the year, size of the diversion, place and method of diversion, type of use and its importance to society (beneficial use), needs of other riparians, location of the diversion on the stream, the suitability of the use to the stream, and the fairness of requiring the user causing the harm to bear the loss. See Restatement (Second) Torts § 850A [1979].
. The adoption of the reasonable use doctrine has been effected without constitutional implications. The United States Supreme Court has stated that the adoption of the English common-law riparian doctrine "is far from meaning that patentees of a ranch on the San Pedro are to have the same rights as owners of an estate on the Thames" and that the adoption of the com mon law is merely the adoption of a general system of law. Boquillas Land & Cattle Co. v. Curtis, 213 U.S. 339, 345, 29 S.Ct. 493, 495, 53 L.Ed. 822 [1909].
. Graham v. City of Duncan, Okl., 354 P.2d 458, 461 [1960].
. Okl., 464 P.2d 748, 755 [1969] (Emphasis added).
. E.g. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. Co. v. Hadley, 168 Okl. 588, 35 P.2d 463, 465 [1934].
. C.C. Julian Oil & Royalties Co. v. Capshaw, 145 Okl. 237, 292 P. 841 [1930] (Syllabus 3).
No one argues here that the taking of stream water by the 1963 amendments is not done for a valid public purpose as required by Art. 2 § 24, Okl. Const. See Delfeld v. City of Tulsa, 191 Okl. 541, 131 P.2d 754 [1943]. The purposes underlying the 1963 amendments are summarized in the statute, 82 O.S.1981 § 1086.1(B), as follows:
"B. The exercise of the powers granted by this act are in all respects for the benefit of the people of the state, for the increase of their commerce and prosperity and for the improvement of their health and living conditions. The primary purpose governing all exercise of powers hereunder shall be to maximize and not to minimize the alternatives available to all citizens, municipalities and other water-user entities in acquiring water for beneficial use."
. Okl., 312 P.2d 916, 921 [1956] (quoting 29 C J.S. § 6); see also Mattoon v. City of Norman, Okl., 617 P.2d 1347, 1349 [1980].
. Supra note 45, 292 P. at 847.
. Okl., 541 P.2d 1321, 1324 [1975].
. Okl., 695 P.2d 498, 504 [1984].
. See supra, note 15.
.Supra note 24, 339 U.S. at 754-755, note 24, 70 S.Ct. at 970.
. 67 Cal.2d 132, 60 Cal.Rptr. 377, 429 P.2d 889, 898 [1967].
. See supra note 40. In determining whether the riparian owners' use of streamwater to preserve wildlife is reasonable, the trial court should consider that uncaptured wildlife is the property of the state under 29 O.S.1981 § 7-204. The trial court should also consider the right of the riparian owner to fish in riparian waters and the right of the landowner to capture wildlife on his property. Other courts have held that a riparian owner's use of stream water for recreational purposes is reasonable. E.g. Taylor v. Tampa Coal Co., 46 So.2d 392 [Fla.1950]; Hoover v. Crane, 362 Mich. 36, 106 N.W.2d 563 [1960]; Bach v. Sarich, 74 Wash.2d 575, 445 P.2d 648 [1968]; Scott v. Slaughter, 237 Ark. 394, 373 S.W.2d 577 [1964]; Sturtevant v. Ford, 280 Mass. 303, 182 N.E. 560 [1932].
. 180 Neb. 149, 141 N.W.2d 738, 743 [1966].
. For a discussion of the appropriation statute's provision for in-basin needs see text infra notes 71-73.
.Since we hold here that the reasonable use doctrine, not the natural flow doctrine, is controlling, the OWRB shall maintain a flow in the stream sufficient to supply the riparian owners' reasonable use which may or may not be the "natural flow." For example, should the trial court find the riparian owners' use of the stream for the preservation of wildlife is a reasonable use, the OWRB shall maintain a flow in the stream sufficient to support wildlife. The OWRB need not allow for a flow in the stream in excess of the amount needed to supply the reasonable use. In holding that the riparian owners' right to the natural flow of the stream must be preserved by the OWRB in granting an appropriation, the trial court did not presume to dictate to the OWRB how much water should be left in the stream. For guidance only, the trial court suggested that the OWRB "consider making minimal provisions for water flows consistent with times of little runoff during normal rainfall seasons, or possibly dryer than normal seasons, but excluding periods of drought." Likewise, we will not presume to tell the OWRB how much water must be left in the stream to supply each reasonable use.
.Before the 1988 amendments [Okl.Sess.L. 1988, ch. 203 § 3], 82 O.S.1981 § 105.12 provided as follows:
"After the hearing on the application the Board shall determine from the evidence presented whether:
1. There is unappropriated water available in the amount applied for;
2. The applicant has a present or future need for the water and the use to which applicant intends to put the water is a beneficial use; and
3. The proposed use does not interfere with domestic or existing appropriative uses.
4. In the granting of water rights for the transportation of water for use outside the stream system wherein water originates, applicants within such stream system shall have a right to all of the water required to adequately supply the beneficial needs of the water users therein. The Board shall review the needs within such area of origin every five (5) years. If so determined, the Board shall approve the application by issuing a permit to appropriate water. The permit shall state the time within which the water shall be applied to beneficial use. In the absence of appeal as provided by this act, the decision of the Board shall be final."
. Okl.Sess.L.1988, ch. 203 § 3.
. See In re Bomgardner, Okl., 711 P.2d 92, 95 [1985] (Presumption that legislature intended statute to be applied only prospectively is rebut-table).
. Okl., 745 P.2d 737, 740 [1987].
. American Ins. Ass'n v. Industrial Com'n, supra note 60, quoting Diffenderfer v. Cent. Baptist Church of Miami, Fla., Inc., 404 U.S. 412, 414-415, 92 S.Ct. 574, 575-576, 30 L.Ed.2d 567 [1972] and Thorpe v. Housing Authority of City of Durham, 393 U.S. 268, 282-283, 89 S.Ct. 518, 526, 21 L.Ed.2d 474 [1969].
. Okl.Sess.L.1988, Ch. 203, § 3 (codified as 82 O.S.Supp.1988 § 105.12A(2)).
. See Oklahoma Water Resources Board v. Texas County Irr. and Water Resources Ass'n., Inc., Okl., 711 P.2d 38, 56 [1984] (Kauger, J., concurring).
. See 82 O.S.1981 § 1086.1 A.(3) which declares Oklahoma's statutory policy that encourages the use of surplus stream water.
. See Harry R. Carlile Trust v. Cotton Petroleum, Okl., 732 P.2d 438, 445-446 [1986].
. Qui prior est tempore, potior est jure. See generally Weil, Waters: American Law and French Authority, supra note 26.
. The Supreme Court of Nebraska held that a statute setting a maximum which could be appropriated for irrigation was unconstitutional insofar as it divested an appropriator of a vested right in a specific amount of water which had been previously applied to beneficial use. Enterprise Irr. Dist. v. Willis, 135 Neb. 827, 284 N.W. 326, 330 [1939].
. 82 O.S.1981 § 105.5.
. 82 O.S.1981 § 105.20.
. 82 O.S.1981 § 105.17. To satisfy the requirements of due process of law, the statute provides for notice and hearing before the divestment can be effective. 82 O.S.1981 § 105.18.
. 82 O.S.1981 § 1086.1.
. Supra note 57.
. Okl.Sess.L.1988, ch. 203 § 3. Pertinent amendments are in italics with deletions noted:
⅝ B. In the granting of water rights for the transportation of water for use outside the stream system wherein water originates, pending applications to use water within such stream system shall first be considered in order to assure that applicants within such stream system shall have a-right-to all of the water required to adequately supply the their beneficial needs — of—the—water-users therein uses. The Board shall review the needs within such area of origin every five (5) years to determine whether the water supply is adequate for municipal, industrial, domestic, and other beneficial uses.
C. The review conducted pursuant to subsection B of this section shall not be used to reduce the quantity of water authorized to be used pursuant to permits issued prior to such review. Such permits, however, remain subject to loss, in whole or in part, due to nonuse, forfeiture or abandonment, pursuant to this title.
-.-rL-if-so-determinedi-the-Board shall-approve the-applicat-ion- by-i6suing-a-permit to - appropriate water. — The permit shall sta-te-the-t-ime within which the water shall be applied to beneficial use. — In the absence of appeal as pr-ovided-hy-this-aetythe-deoision-of -the-Board shall be final."
. See text accompanying supra notes 59-61 (discussing the retroactive application of the 1988 clarifying language to the case at bar).
. Supra note 72 (codified as 82 O.S. § 105.-12(B) and (C)).