Case Name: St. Louis, Iron Mountain & Southern Railway Co. v. Yonley
Court: Arkansas Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Arkansas
Decision Date: 1890-03-08
Citations: 53 Ark. 503
Docket Number: 
Parties: St. Louis, Iron Mountain & Southern Railway Co. v. Yonley.
Judges: 
Reporter: Arkansas Reports
Volume: 53
Pages: 503–509

Head Matter:
St. Louis, Iron Mountain & Southern Railway Co. v. Yonley.
Original opinion delivered March 8, 1890.
Supplemental opinion delivered November 8, 1890.
I. Railway — Independent contractor.
One to whom a railway company has let a contract for the performance of work, without reserving control over those employed in the work, is an independent contractor.
2. “Hireling” defined.
The word “hireling,” as used in section 1959 of Mansfield’s Digest, means servant.
3. Independent contractor — Employer’s liability — General rule.
A railway company may let to an independent contractor the contract to do any work the probable effect of which would not be injurious to another, without incurring any liability for the negligence of the contractor’s employes.
4. Exception — Acts inherently dangerous.
But if the work let to an independent contractor is of such character that its probable effect will be to injure another, a railway company cannot escape liability for its negligent performance by delegating the work to an independent contractor. “
APPEAL from Pitlaski Circuit Court.
J. W. Martin, Judge.
Appellee sued appellant for the negligent burning of his property by persons employed by appellant to clear off its right of way. The facts are stated in the opinion.
The statute cited in the opinion is as follows:
“Sec. 1958. If any person shall willfully set on fire any woods, marshes, or prairies, whether his own or not, so as thereby to occasion any damage to any other person, such person shall make satisfaction in double damages to the person injured, to be recovered by civil action.
“Sec. 1959- When an offense shall be committed against this act by a hireling, with the consent or by the command of his employer, such employer shall be liable in the same manner and to the same extent as if the act had been committed by himself.”
7. M. Moore for appellant.
Campbell was an independent contractor, and the railway company was not liable for his acts or those of his employes. See 6o Ind., 47c; 79 Ind., m; n A. &E. R. R. Cas., 60; 21 Iowa, 575; 23 Iowa, 562; 81 Eng. C. L., 549; 59 Me., 525; 61 N. Y., 178; Story, Agency, sec. 4^4 et seq.
Ratcliffe & Fletcher for appellee.
1. The railway company owed a duty to the public to see that its right of way was kept in proper repair, and if the repair or clearing of same necessarily endangered the property of others unless proper preventive measures were taken and exercised, it could not shield itself from damages by letting the contract to a contractor. 16 Moak, Eng. Rep., 374; Wood on Master and Servant, sec. 316; Mechem on Agency, sec. 747; 1 Sh. & Redf. on Neg., sec. 176; Wharton on Neg., secs. ,184-187; Cooley on Torts, p. 548.
But this question is settled by Mansfield’s Digest, sections 1958, 1959, 6462.
Ratcliffe & Fletcher for appellee on motion for reconsideration.
The company could not shield itself from damages occasioned by reason of • the clearing and burning off the right of way by letting the contract therefor for another. It is true a person is not liable for the negligence of an independent contractor, but this rule does not apply in that class of cases where the work to be done necessarily endangers the property of others, unless proper preventive measures are taken and exercised. 16 Moak (Eng.), 374; Mechem on Agency, sec. 747, p. 596; 24 N. E. Rep., 269; Wood on Nuisances, secs. 116, 118.
The law imposes the duty on them to keep their tracks and contiguous lands free from inflammable matter. 49 Ark., 542; 8 A. & E. Enc. of Law, p. 14.
See also Pollock on Torts, marg. p. 64; Wharton, Negligence, p. 185 ; Wood on Master and Servant, sec. 316; 27 Am. Law Reg. (N. S.), 770.

Opinion:
Per Curiam.
The question in this case is, whether Campbell was the servant of appellant, or whether he was an independent contractor. His employment was by letter of the road-master as follows:
"Little Rock, Ark., Nov. 27, 1887.
JE. A. Campbell, Redfield.
Dear Sir : — I will pay $25 per mile for cutting and clearing right of way from 89 mile post to 101 mile post. Want •all trees, bushes, logs, weeds, grass and all rubbish cleared off the right of way and burned. Yours truly,
C. Russell, R. M."
Campbell, whose testimony is uncontradicted, says: "I accepted the offer and did the work under it. I hired my memand paid them myself. The defendant had nothing to do with them, and did not undertake to order or control my men."
The witness Campbell was an independent contractor, and the railway company was not liable for the negligence of his employes. Mechem on Agency, sec. 747; Story on Agency, sec. 454 et seq.; Cooley on Torts (2d ed.), p. 643; Kellogg v. Payne, 21 Iowa, 575; Callahan v. Railway, 23 Iowa, 562; McCafferty v. Railway, 61 N. Y., 178; Sec. 1959, Mansf. Dig.
The statute does not control the question. The word "hireling" means "servant," and this is clearly demonstrated by reference to the following: Webster's Dictionary, "hire ling;" Worcester's Dictionary, "hireling;" Boniface v. Scott, 3 Serg. & R. (Pa.), 353; Gravat v. State, 25 Ohio St., 168; Heygood v. State, 59 Ala., 51; Williams v. Wadsworth, 49 Barb., 298; Morgan v. Bowman, 22 Mo., 546.