Case Name: Kenneth JENKINS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 2004-10-11
Citations: 884 So. 2d 1014
Docket Number: No. 1D03-1066
Parties: Kenneth JENKINS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: LEWIS, J., concurs; ERVIN, J., concurs and dissents with opinion.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 884
Pages: 1014–1020

Head Matter:
Kenneth JENKINS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. 1D03-1066.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
Oct. 11, 2004.
Rehearing Denied in Part and Granted in Part Oct. 11, 2004.
Nancy A. Daniels, Public Defender, and John R. Alfino, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General, and Giselle Lylen Rivera, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.

Opinion:
BENTON, J.
On consideration of appellant's motion for rehearing, we withdraw our prior opinion and substitute the following.
Kenneth Jenkins appeals three of four sentences imposed in consequence of convictions arising out of two separate criminal episodes. He contends that the trial court erred by imposing ten-year sentences for convictions on Counts I, battery of a law enforcement officer, and IV, resisting an officer with violence, because the sentences exceed the statutory maximum for third-degree felonies; by imposing a consecutive sentence for the conviction on Count III, fleeing or attempting to elude arrest, because, he alleges, all four convictions arose from what was really a single criminal episode; and, finally, by imposing a sentence under the Prison Releasee Reoffender Punishment Act for the conviction on Count I, because battery of a law enforcement officer is not, he contends, a qualifying offense. We affirm the sentence for Count III, but reverse the sentences for Counts I and IV.
On Jenkins's motion to correct sentence pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(b), the trial court struck the habitual felony offender designation for the sentences earlier imposed on the Count I and IV convictions, but did not reduce the ten-year habitual felony offender sentences to the five-year statutory máximums that apply, absent habitualization. Because both resisting an officer under section 843.01, Florida Statutes (2002), and battery of a law enforcement officer under section 784.07(2)(b), Florida Statutes (2002), are third-degree felonies subject to maximum sentences of five years under section 775.082(9)(a)(3)(d), Florida Statutes (2002), we reverse the ten-year sentences imposed for those offenses and remand for resentencing.
We affirm the consecutive habitual felony offender sentence for Count III, because Jenkins's act of fleeing or attempting to elude two officers who were in their patrol vehicles with sirens and lights activated, in violation of section 316.1935(2), Florida Statutes (2002), occurred in a different location and at a different time than the other three offenses, which arose from Jenkins's earlier conduct toward an officer who was on bicycle patrol. See Hale v. State, 630 So.2d 521, 524 (Fla.1993); Murray v. State, 491 So.2d 1120, 1124 (Fla.1986); Parker v. State, 633 So.2d 72, 74 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994).
Finally, we reject appellant's contention that the Prison Releasee Reoffen-der Punishment Act does not apply to the battery of a law enforcement officer which was proven in this case. See Branch v. State, 790 So.2d 437, 439 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000) ("The appellant meets the criteria for classification as a prison releasee reof-fender, for within three years of his 1996 release from a D.O.C. state correctional facility, he committed battery on a law enforcement officer, a qualifying offense that falls within the ambit of statutory subsection (8)(a)(l)(o), which includes '[a]ny felony that involves the use or threat of physical force or violence against an individual.' "). Although acquitted of using an automobile as a deadly weapon on Count I, Mr. Jenkins was convicted on that count of "intentionally touching or striking Victor Pacheco against his will," and he was also found guilty, on another count tried simultaneously, of "driv[ing] his vehicle directly toward Officer Pacheco which created a well-founded fear in Victor Pacheco that violence was imminent." See generally Lane v. State, 867 So.2d 539, 541 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004) (considering simultaneous verdict on related count in upholding conviction). In the present case, whatever the rule when the jury fails to find even threatened violence, appellant's "battery on a law enforcement officer is a qualifying offense for prison releasee reof-fender sentencing. See Spann v. State, 772 So.2d 38 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000)." Brown v. State, 789 So.2d 366, 367 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001).
In sum, we affirm the sentence imposed for fleeing or attempting to elude arrest, but reverse the sentences imposed for battery of a law enforcement officer and for resisting an officer with violence, and remand for resentencing.
LEWIS, J., concurs; ERVIN, J., concurs and dissents with opinion.