Case Name: J. MONROE TAYLOR, Respondent, v. JOSEPH H. RISLEY, Appellant
Court: New York Supreme Court, General Term
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1882-10
Citations: 35 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 141
Docket Number: 
Parties: J. MONROE TAYLOR, Respondent, v. JOSEPH H. RISLEY, Appellant.
Judges: Brady, P. J., concurred.
Reporter: Supreme Court Reports (Hun)
Volume: 35
Pages: 141–150

Head Matter:
J. MONROE TAYLOR, Respondent, v. JOSEPH H. RISLEY, Appellant.
Contract — one who prevents the performance of it cannot sue for the bi'each caused by his own act — Stipulated damages — when a sum named in the contract asa forfeit for its breach is to be treated as.
The defendant agreed to deliver to the plaintiff at Brooklyn a certain quantity of yellow pine timber to be obtained from Fernandina, Florida, or other suitable port. In an action brought by the plaintiff to recover damages for a failure to deliver the lumber the defendant alleged in his answer that being unable to obtain the lumber from Fernandina, by reason of the prevalence of yellow fever there, he entered into negotiations with one Bacon, of Savannah, Georgia, for the purchase of the requisite lumber, and would have succeeded in purchasing and delivering it so as to have made a profit of $500 on his contact but for the interference of the plaintiff! That the plaintiff learning that the defendant was negotiating with Bacon for the lumber, for the purpose of preventing the defendant from purchasing it induced Bacon to decline and refuse to sell it to the defendant, whereby the latter was rendered unable to deliver any portion of the lumber to the plaintiff as he had agreed to do.
Held, that the facts stated in the answer would, if proved, have defeated the action, and that the court erred in refusing to allow the defendant to prove them. (Barker, J., dissenting.)
When a sum of money provided by a contract to be paid as a forfeit upon the breach thereof is to be considered as a penalty and when as liquidated damages, considered by Barker, J.
Appeal from a judgment in favor of the plaintiff entered on the verdict of a jury, and from an order denying a motion for a new trial made upon the minutes of the justice before whom the action was tried.
The action was brought upon a written contract for the sale and delivery, by the defendant to the plaintiff, at Brooklyn, of a large quantity of yellow pine timber; the pieces* to be in accordance with the schedule attached to the. contract, to be used by the plaintiff in the construction of a building for manufacturing purposes. The purpose for which the timber was to be used being clearly indicated in the contract and schedules. The plaintiff’s recovery was for the sum of $300 and interest thereon as stipulated damages. The clause in the contract relating to damages was as follows: “The party of the second part .agrees to deliver óne-half of the required amount of timber on or before the aforesaid twenty-fifth of October, and the balance as soon thereafter as practicable so as not to delay the progress of the work of the building. for which the timber is intended; and it is hereby agreed by both parties aforesaid that should the party of the second part not deliver as before called for, that he is to forfeit unto the party of the first part the sum of three hundred dollars as damages unto the party of the first part.”
The defendant did not deliver any part of the lumber which he undertook to supply. The exact quantity of timber is not mentioned in the agreement or disclosed by the proofs, but by an inspection of the contract and the schedules it appears that the quantity was between 250,000 and 300,000 feet. The plaintiff gave proof tending to show that he jiad suffered damages from the non-delivery of the lumber, in an amount largely beyond the sum claimed as stipulated damages. Upon the trial the defendant offered to prove the facts set forth in his third defense, which is set forth in the opinion of Daniels, J.; this evidence was excluded by the court as immaterial, and the defendant excepted.
John E. Risley, for the appellant.
Re Witt O. Brown, for the respondent.

Opinion:
Daniels, J.:
By the judgment from which the appeal has been taken the defendant has been held liable for stipulated damages fixed by a contract entered into between himself and the plaintiff. . By the terms of this contract he became obligated to deliver to the plaintiff a eer tain quantity of yellow pine timber to be obtained from Fernandina, Florida, or other suitable port. He was unable to obtain it from Fernandina, because of the prevalence of yellow fever at that place, and to excuse himself from liability upon the contract, which he did not in fact perform, he proposed upon the trial to prove all the allegations contained in the third defense stated in the answer. This was objected to as incompetent, and as ^instituting no defense. The objection was sustained, and to that ruling an exception was taken on behalf of the defendant. This third answer was in the following terms:
That upon the stoppage of the mills at Fernandina, as hereinbefore set forth, he entered into negotiations with one Bacon, of Savannah, Georgia, for the purchase and delivery in Brooklyn to the order of the defendant of certain quantities and descriptions of timber and lumber, which he, the said Bacon then had, and that he would have succeeded in purchasing the same from said Bacon, but 'for the interference and acts of the plaintiff as hereinafter set forth, and that thereupon and thereby the defendant would have been enabled td deliver, and would have delivered to the plaintiff the timber and lumber in said agreement mentioned within the time therein specified, and would thereby have made a profit out of said transaction of at least $500.
That the plaintiff learning that the said Bacon had said timber and lumber on hand, and that the defendant was negotiating for the purchase of the same, to enable him, the defendant, to comply with the terms of the said agreement between plaintiff and defendant, for the purpose of preventing the defendant from suoeeeding in said negotiation, he, the plaintiff, opened negotiations with said Ba-vn, and so wrought, upon said Baoon as to induce him to decline and refuse to sell said timber and lumber to defendant.
That by said acts of the plaintiff, defendant was unable to deliver any portion of said timber or lumber to the plaintiff, on or before the 25th day of October, 1877, and was thereby prevented from making a profit out of said transaction of at least $5Q0, to his damages in the sum of $500, which said sum was due to jjhe defendant at and before the commencement of this action, and which is still unpaid.
By this answer it was alleged, and the defendant proposed to prove the truth of the allegation, that the plaintiff, for the purpose of preventing him from obtaining the timber at Savannah, entered into negotiations for the purchase of it himself from the person having it, and induced him to decline and refuse to sell such timber and lumber to the defendant. By this interference of the plaintiff he prevented the defendant from performing his contract, and his acts, attended with that result, were stated to have been actuated with the intention of preventing such performance. Under the settled principle of law, which is no more than the principle of fair dealing, this excused the defendant from delivering the timber as he had agreed to by the terms of the contract in the case. The law will not permit a party who has become entitled to the performance of an agreement by another so to intervene as to prevent such performance being made, and then on the basis of such failure to claim damages against the party prevented, because of his omission to perform his agreement. (Fleming v. Gilbert, 3 Johns., 528, 531; Stewart v. Keteltas, 36 N. Y, 388, 390; Dexter v. Norton, 47 N. Y., 62; Borden v. Borden, 5 Mass., 67; Marshall v. Craig, 1 Bibb., 379,; Shaw v. Hind, 3 id., 371.)
If the proof offered to be made under this'division of the defendant's answer had been received, it would have constituted a legal defense against the plaintifE's claim, for it would have entitled the defendant to the full benefit of this well settled, legal principle. The judgment and order denying the motion for a new trial should, therefore, be reversed and the verdict set aside, and a new trial ordered, with costs to the defendant to abide the event.
Brady, P. J., concurred.