Case Name: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Marcell D. DEAN, Defendant-Appellant
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 2004-11-03
Citations: 111 F. App'x 762
Docket Number: No. 03-51432
Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Marcell D. DEAN, Defendant-Appellant.
Judges: 
Reporter: West's Federal Appendix
Volume: 111
Pages: 762–763

Head Matter:
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Marcell D. DEAN, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 03-51432.
Summary Calendar.
United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.
Decided Nov. 3, 2004.
Joseph H. Gay, Jr., Assistant U.S. Attorney, San Antonio, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
H.W. Leverett, Jr., Midland, TX, for Defendant-Appellant.
Before WIENER, BENAVIDES AND STEWART, Circuit Judges.

Opinion:
PER CURIAM:
Marcell D. Dean was convicted by a jury of threatening to murder a federal judge with the intent to retaliate against the judge on account of the performance of his official duties, a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 115. The district court determined that Dean was a career criminal for purposes of U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1 and 4B1.2. Dean was sentenced to a 100-month imprisonment term and a three-year term of supervised release.
Dean has filed a motion seeking to relieve the counsel appointed to represent him on appeal so that he can raise claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel on direct appeal. He has also filed a motion seeking the appointment of substitute counsel so that he can file a petition for a writ of habeas corpus challenging his state conviction for murder. Those motions are DENIED.
Dean appeals his sentence on the ground that the district court erred in finding him to be a career offender. Specifically, he argues that, because he was incarcerated in a Texas state prison at the time he made the threat, it was not a credible threat that posed a serious potential risk of physical harm to the judge.
Section 4B1.2 of the sentencing guidelines offers two disjunctive definitions of a "crime of violence." The district court did not err in finding that Dean's instant offense is a "crime of violence" for the pur poses of determining career offender status. See 18 U.S.C. § 115; U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1 and 4B1.2(a)(l). Thus, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.