Case Name: COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee, v. Hugh Gerard HERRON, Appellant
Court: Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
Jurisdiction: Pennsylvania
Decision Date: 1977-12-24
Citations: 475 Pa. 461
Docket Number: No. 67
Parties: COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee, v. Hugh Gerard HERRON, Appellant.
Judges: Before EAGEN, C. J., and O’BRIEN, ROBERTS, POMEROY, NIX, MANDERINO and PACKEL, JJ.
Reporter: Pennsylvania State Reports
Volume: 475
Pages: 461–475

Head Matter:
380 A.2d 1228
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee, v. Hugh Gerard HERRON, Appellant.
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
Submitted Sept. 24, 1976.
Decided Dec. 24, 1977.
Leonard G. Ambrose, III, Erie, for appellant.
Robert H. Chase, Dist. Atty., Bernard L. Siegel, 1st Asst. Dist. Atty., Erie, for appellee.
Before EAGEN, C. J., and O’BRIEN, ROBERTS, POMEROY, NIX, MANDERINO and PACKEL, JJ.

Opinion:
OPINION
EAGEN, Chief Justice.
Appellant, Hugh Gerard Herron, was tried before a jury and found guilty of selling approximately one pound of marijuana to an undercover state police officer. Post-verdict motions were denied and Herron was sentenced to imprisonment for two and one-half to five years. The Superior Court affirmed the judgment of sentence. Commonwealth v. Herron, 235 Pa.Super. 740, 346 A.2d 64 (1975). Herron's petition for allowance of appeal was granted and this appeal followed.
Only one issue is presented by the appeal: whether the trial judge committed reversible error in sustaining the prosecution's objection to defense counsel's question to a state police officer requesting the name of the officer's informant.
On direct examination, the state police officer testified that he went to the "Light House Cafe" with an individual (Mr. X) who upon their arrival introduced him to Herron. While at the "Light House Cafe" the officer and Herron engaged in a private conversation (no one else including Mr. X was present), and in the course of that conversation the officer mentioned that he had heard Herron "had a lb. for sale for a hundred and sixty dollars." According to the officer, Herron said, "Yes," and when the officer said he would buy, Herron called to a person named "Frankie," gave him the keys to an automobile, and told him to "get the stuff."
On cross-examination, the officer said he was introduced to Mr. X by another state police officer who was also engaged in undercover narcotics investigation. He was then asked, "Was Mr. X introduced to you for the purpose of trying to secure a buy from Mr. Herron?" The officer replied "Yes." In answer to further questions, the officer admitted that he met Mr. X on the day involved for the specific purpose of trying to purchase marijuana from Herron, and that both he and Mr. X agreed to use fictitious names to identify themselves. He also testified that it was Mr. X who told him Herron had a pound of marijuana for sale for $160, and that Mr. X was paid $10 for his services on this day.
Defense counsel then asked the officer to identify Mr. X. At sidebar, counsel told the court that the defense was "one of entrapment" and that he wanted to call Mr. X "to test the credibility as to what happened on this occurrence as to this officer's testimony, and furthermore to show there was an inducement by the Commonwealth in this manner, and he was part of it."
The trial judge then asked defense counsel, "What evidence precisely in terms of entrapment could this informant present or do you believe he could present, that would in any way exculpate the defendant?" Counsel responded:
"I believe he might offer evidence that the entire plan and format as to how this entire purchase was to be set up was made between the informant and this Police Officer in advance; that the conversations between Mr. Herron and Mr. X may have been much more by predesign; that Mr. X may have well been told by this Officer that he was to tell Mr. Herron certain things to induce the sale, that is, as to where he worked, who he was, who he knew, that sort of thing."
The judge ruled the officer did not have to disclose the informer's identity under these circumstances. We cannot conclude that, in the circumstances of this case, the trial court erred in refusing to order the police-officer witness to disclose the identity of the informer who aided him in arranging for the marijuana purchase which was the basis of this prosecution. In our view, therefore, a new trial is not warranted.
In Commonwealth v. Carter, 427 Pa. 53, 55-56, 233 A.2d 284, 285 (1967), we assumed that the Commonwealth has a qualified privilege "to refrain from disclosing the identity of an informer" which "limits the prosecution's duty to make available to the defense the names and whereabouts of all material eyewitnesses." We then went on to quote with approval the following formulation of the disclosure issue by the Supreme Court of the United States in Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 77 S.Ct. 623,1 L.Ed.2d 639 (1957):
" 'A further limitation on the applicability of the privilege arises from the fundamental requirements of fairness. Where the disclosure of an informer's identity, or of the contents of his communication, is relevant and helpful to the defense of an accused, or is essential to a fair determination of a cause, the privilege must give way. In these situations the trial court may require disclosure and, if the Government withholds the information, dismiss the action.
" 'We believe that no fixed rule with respect to disclosure is justifiable. The problem is one that calls for balancing the public interest in protecting the flow of information against the individual's right to prepare his defense. Whether a proper balance renders non-disclosure erroneous must depend on the particular circumstances of each case, taking into consideration the crime charged, the possible defenses, the possible significance of the informer's testimony, and other relevant factors.' (Footnotes omitted.) 353 U.S. at 60-62, 77 S.Ct. at 628-29."
427 Pa. at 59, 233 A.2d at 287. After examining the circumstances presented in Carter, we concluded that, since the defendant disputed the identification by the police of him as the seller and since the informer was the only "disinterested" eyewitness to the disputed transaction, disclosure of the informer's identity should have been ordered to aid Carter in preparing his defense.
Subsequently, in Commonwealth v. Washington, 463 Pa. 206, 344 A.2d 496 (1975), we applied the standards established by Carter to circumstances in which the defendant had asserted the identity of an informer was relevant and helpful to his defense of entrapment. We once again quoted the language from Roviaro indicating that no fixed rule with respect to disclosure is justifiable and that the public interest in non-disclosure of an informer's identity must be balanced in the particular circumstances of a given case against the individual's right to prepare his defense. In Washington, the defendant had testified that he had twice refused to accede to the requests of one Gisondi that he participate in a burglary, that he had finally agreed to participate after Gisondi had urged him a third time, and that, when he broke into the house designated by Gisondi as the site of the burglary, the police were waiting to arrest him; there was also evidence that an informer had notified a Beaver County detective of the planned burglary the day before it was to take place, that two weeks previously the detective had told the informer that his co-operation would be made known to the court if and when he should be brought before the court, and that this detective had known Gisondi for many years. In this context, the defendant sought to ascertain whether Gisondi was the informer. We concluded, in the words of Mr. Justice Manderino:
"Asserting the defense of entrapment, appellant was attempting to establish that the informant was an agent of the police who had actually conceived, planned, urged the commission of the crime in the face of refusals by appellant, and then, participated in its occurrence. It appears unquestionably clear that testimony, naming Gisondi as the informant, were it forthcoming, would have had obvious relevancy to appellant's defense. An admission by the prosecution that Gisondi was the informant could have influenced the jury's thinking on the entrapment defense and could also have served to corroborate appellant's testimony that Gisondi conceived, planned and urged the perpetration of the crime." [Emphasis added.]
463 Pa. at 209-10, 344 A.2d at 497.
Carter and Washington clearly indicate that, before disclosure of an informer's identity is required in the face of the Commonwealth's assertion of privilege, more is necessary than a mere assertion by the defendant that such disclosure might be helpful in establishing a particular de fense. To hold otherwise would be to disregard the Roviaro balancing test announced and applied in those decisions. See also Commonwealth v. Garvin, 448 Pa. 258, 293 A.2d 33 (1972). Although the defendant plainly cannot be expected to show that such information will actually be helpful to his defense, the record should at least suggest a reasonable possibility that the information might be helpful, so that it would be unfair to withhold it. Thus, in Carter it was unfair to deny the defendant access to a relatively disinterested eyewitness who might have lent support to his defense of mistaken identity, and in Washington it was unfair to prevent the defendant from establishing a fact which, together with other evidence on the record, might have convinced the jury that he had been induced by improper police conduct into committing a crime he would not otherwise have been inclined to commit.
In the instant case, as in Washington, the defendant in asserting entrapment was admitting for the purposes of this defense that he had committed the offense with which he was charged but was seeking by way of affirmative defense to establish that the police had used improper methods to induce him to commit it. Herron did not testify in his own behalf, and the Commonwealth's evidence, not contradicted during cross-examination, did not suggest he needed to be urged or was reluctant to participate in the illegal transaction for which he was paid $160. Since there was no evidence of improper police conduct or of reluctance on the part of Herron on the record, and since Herron was in a position to know what took place between himself and both the police officer and the police informer with regard to the transaction, we conclude that at a minimum Herron through his counsel should have informed the court in an offer of proof of facts indicative of entrapment which would have suggested the possibility that disclosure of the informer's identity might indeed have been relevant and helpful to the defense. In Commonwealth v. Pritchett, 225 Pa.Super. 401, 407-8, 312 A.2d 434, 438 (1973), the Superior Court, speaking through Judge Spaeth, stated the standard applicable to this case:
"A mere allegation that the informant's testimony might be helpful will not suffice. See, e. g., State v. Dotson, 260 La. 471, 256 So.2d 594 (1972); Lannom v. United States, 381 F.2d 858 (9th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1041, 88 S.Ct. 784, 19 L.Ed.2d 833 (1968). However, the defendant cannot be expected to predict exactly what the informant would say on the stand. Rather, in keeping with Roviaro and Carter, 'all the defendant must show [or offer] is a reasonable possibility that the anonymous informer could give evidence that would exonerate him.' Price v. Superior Court, 1 Cal.3d 836, 463 P.2d 721, 83 Cal.Rptr. 369 (1970). This means that where the defendant asserts the possibility of entrapment, he should present, in support of his contention that the informant may exculpate him, facts relating directly to the two elements of the entrapment defense, i. e., '(1) a defendant not disposed to commit the crime, and also (2) conduct likely to entrap the innocently disposed.' Commonwealth v. Conway, 196 Pa.Super. 97, 104, 173 A.2d 776 (1961). See United States v. Waters, 288 F.Supp. 952 (D.Mass.1968)." [Emphasis added.]
With this standard in mind, it is apparent that Herron failed to include in his offer a sufficient factual foundation to enable the trial judge to conclude that knowing the informer's identity might be helpful in establishing an entrapment defense. When the trial judge properly asked defense counsel what helpful evidence the informer might supply, counsel's reply was not only speculative but completely lacking in specificity as to what if any improper inducement or persuasion had been used and was totally devoid of any indication that Herron had not been disposed to commit the crime. The record plainly indicates that the informer was not an eyewitness to the criminal transaction itself. His testimony might only have been relevant and helpful to an entrapment defense if it might have provided support for the conclusion that Herron had not been disposed to commit the crime and had been improperly induced or persuaded to commit the crime. Since there was no basis in either the evidence or the offer for such a conclusion, we cannot conclude the trial judge erred in determining that disclosure would be neither relevant nor helpful and that it was thus not unfair to withhold it. See and compare United States v. Hodges, 493 F.2d 11 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v. Brenneman, 455 F.2d 809 (3rd Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 923, 92 S.Ct. 2492, 33 L.Ed.2d 334 (1972); United States v. Mehciz, 437 F.2d 145 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 974, 91 S.Ct. 1663, 29 L.Ed.2d 139 (1971). See also Rugendorf v. United States, 376 U.S. 528, 84 S.Ct. 825, 11 L.Ed.2d 887 (1964).
Order affirmed.
MANDERINO, J., filed a dissenting opinion.
. Commonwealth v. Walak, 471 Pa. 457, 370 A.2d 695 (1977), in which we recently held that a defendant was entitled to information requested concerning the whereabouts of an informer eyewitness, is not to the contrary. In Walak, the informer's identity was known to the defense, and no privilege as to his identity was asserted by the Commonwealth.
. Since the crime in the instant case was alleged to have taken place on November 1, 1972, that is before the effective date of the Pennsylvania Crimes Code on June 6, 1973, the Pritchett standard is applicable. Compare 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 313.
. Although the Supreme Court of the United States in Roviaro observed that the informer whose identity should have been disclosed in that case wight have provided evidence of an entrapment, the evidence indicated that the informer had actually participated in the criminal transaction itself; there was also evidence that he subsequently denied knowing Roviaro. The informer's involvement here was more peripheral, and there was no issue of misidentification. Compare Lopez — Hernandez v. United States, 394 F.2d 820 (9th Cir. 1968), with United States v. Russ, 362 F.2d 843 (2nd Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 923, 87 S.Ct. 236, 17 L.Ed.2d 146 (1966).
. "Since defendant . . knew whatever, if anything, the informer had said or done to entrap him, he cannot plead ignorance or inability to supply the missing substantiation. We see no infirmity, constitutional or otherwise, in requiring him to do so. Indeed, it would seem, as a broad proposition, that to hold that need for an informer as a witness can be met purely by speculations of counsel would be to defenestrate Roviaro."
United States v. Hodges, supra, 493 F.2d at 12-13.