Case Name: Frank Bracelin v. John B. McLaren
Court: Michigan Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1886-01-27
Citations: 59 Mich. 327
Docket Number: 
Parties: Frank Bracelin v. John B. McLaren.
Judges: Morse and Ohamplin, JJ., concurred.
Reporter: Michigan Reports
Volume: 59
Pages: 327–330

Head Matter:
Frank Bracelin v. John B. McLaren.
Dwelling-house, when part of the realty.
Plaintiff brought trover for the value of a dwelling-house erected by him on land purchased under a parol contract, partly performed, which he had occupied for some years and then rented to a tenant, who was ousted by defendant under a claim of title.
Held, that he could not recover. That he could not at the same time treat the building as realty and personalty, and when he rented it he necessarily rented it as a tenement, to stand where it was.
Error to Muskegon. (Bussell, J.)
Argued November 12, 1885.
Decided January 27, 1886.
Trover. Defendant brings error.
Beversed.
The facts are stated in the opinions.
H. B. Carpenter, for appellant:
"Where parties agree that as between themselves a dwelling house shall be considered a personal chattel it takes that character: Smith v. Benson, 1 Hill, 176; and this is undoubtedly a statement of the law as it stands to-day. No such agreement is pretended to have existed in this case. Braeelin built the house on land he had agreed to purchase, for a home, occupied it for years, and when his pecuniary interests are affected by reason of the claim of its annexation to the freehold, asserts it to be a chattel. His acts, as stated, denote an intention to make it a part of the land. It acquired a homestead character, for a homestead is protected where one is in possession under a land contract: McKee v. Wilcox, 11 Mich. 358.
The contract was for a purchase, and under it the plaintiff took possession, built a house upon the land, expended money upon it in other improvements, occupied it more than four years for a home, rented it for more than five years, keeping it through all these years of depreciating values, and insisting upon its possession longer by demanding possession of the premises from one who went in without his permission.
Under such circumstances what rule of damages would be practicable in a suit at law brought by either 1
This Court and the appellate courts of other States in a large number of cases have decided there is none, and a remedy must be sought in equity in a suit for specific performance : Norris v. Showerman, 2 Doug. 16; Weed v. Terry, Ib. 350; Holland v. Hoyt, 14 Mich. 242; Scott v. Bush, 26 Ib. 422 ; Cilley v. Burkholder, 41 Mich. 752 ; Morrison v. Berry, 42 Ib. 389; Kinyon v. Young, 44 Ib. 342; Davis v. Strobridge, Ib. 157; Lamb v. Hinman, 46 Ib. 116 ; Murphy v. Stever, 47 Ib. 522.
Frank Bracelin and Smith, Nims, Hoyt o& Erwin, fo# plaintiff:
The arrangement to purchase the land to be completed in the future, made the house erected thereon personal property. One of the tests to be applied in this case, bearing on this question is, could plaintiff, under the facts shown, have compelled the specific performance of the contract? Clearly not. He could possibly have compelled the execution of a deed, but not the payment by Sanford of the Collin’s mortgage.
Again it was a parol agreement for the sale of land, with no part performance and void under sec. 6181 How. Stat. and Sanford’s only remedy was to eject plaintiff and pay him for the house: Davis v. Strobridge, 44 Mich. 157. Defendant was not a purchaser without notice, under Warren v. Grand Haven, 30 Mich. 24.

Opinion:
Campbell, C. J.
In this case plaintiff himself testifies in effect that he built the house in question upon a parol contract, partly performed, for the purchase of the land, and occupied it for some years, and then rented it to a party who was ousted by McLaren under claim of title. Plaintiff could not at the same time treat the house as realty and personalty ; and when he rented the house to a tenant he necessarily rented it as a tenement, to stand where it was. How the assertion of possession of the land with the house on it, and intended to stay on it, could be treated as a conversion of personal property is beyond my understanding of the rules of law.
I think the plaintiff proved himself out of court, and that defendant should have had judgment.
Morse and Ohamplin, JJ., concurred.