Case Name: JOSEPH EDWIN SOLI et al., Petitioners, v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF MENDOCINO COUNTY, Respondent; THE PEOPLE, Real Party in Interest
Court: Court of Appeal of the State of California
Jurisdiction: California
Decision Date: 1980-03-05
Citations: 103 Cal. App. 3d 72
Docket Number: Civ. No. 47416
Parties: JOSEPH EDWIN SOLI et al., Petitioners, v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF MENDOCINO COUNTY, Respondent; THE PEOPLE, Real Party in Interest.
Judges: 
Reporter: California Appellate Reports, Third Series
Volume: 103
Pages: 72–88

Head Matter:
[Civ. No. 47416.
First Dist., Div. One.
Mar. 5, 1980.]
JOSEPH EDWIN SOLI et al., Petitioners, v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF MENDOCINO COUNTY, Respondent; THE PEOPLE, Real Party in Interest.
Counsel
Scott LeStrange, Public Defender, Thomas S. Brigham and Rawles, Hinkle, Finnegan, Carter & Brigham for Petitioners.
No appearance for Respondent.
George Deukmejian, Attorney General, Robert H. Philibosian, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Edward P. O'Brien, Assistant Attorney General, Clifford K. Thompson, Jr., and Morris Lenk, Deputy Attorneys General, for Real Party in Interest.

Opinion:
Opinion
ELKINGTON, Acting P. J.
Petitioners Joseph Soli and Raymond Soli stand charged in the superior court with grand theft of a bovine animal (Pen. Code, § 487, subd. 3), and with the misdemeanor offense of violating Penal Code section 597a. On their petition for a writ of prohibition, we inquire into the legal sufficiency of an order denying their motion to suppress certain evidence essential to their prosecution. (See Pen. Code, § 1538.5.)
(We shall for convenience hereafter refer to the two petitioners, without distinction, simply as petitioners, and as they themselves do in their briefs.)
In our ensuing discussion, we follow the well-settled rule stated by the high court in People v. Lawler (1973) 9 Cal.3d 156, 160 [107 Cal.Rptr. 13, 507 P.2d 621], in this manner: "'"A proceeding under section 1538.5 to suppress evidence is one in which a full hearing is held on the issues before the [trial] court sitting as a finder of fact"...' . . .In such a proceeding the power to judge the credibility of the witnesses, resolve any conflicts in the testimony, weigh the evidence and draw factual inferences, is vested in the trial court. On appeal all presumptions favor the exercise of that power, and the trial court's findings on such matters, whether express or implied, must be upheld if they are supported by substantial evidence."
The relevant evidence before the superior court as it fairly and reasonably might have been, and presumably was, accepted and believed, follows.
A Mendocino County resident had observed, adjacent to a highway, the head and skin of a recently killed Black Angus cow. He reported his find to the county sheriff's office. Deputy Sheriff Frank Rakes (hereafter for convenience, the sheriff) responded to the scene. An examination disclosed two bullets in the animal's head which were, respectively, "consistent with having been fired from a Winchester caliber .30 W.C.F. rifle," and from a "Charter Arms .357 magnum revolver,..." The skin bore a brand mark which was registered to Charles Sizemore, a Mendocino County cattle rancher.
The sheriff communicated the information to Sizemore who had been unaware of his loss. Sizemore was engaged in unrelated pressing business at the time, but said that "he was going to look around when he could get up to his ranch;..." The sheriff told him "he should get up there and look around,..." In the meantime the sheriff, who was assigned as county "livestock investigator," searched the completely fenced 1,200-acre Sizemore ranch 4 or 5 times. Finally, while with Sizemore, he found a place in the fence where "the wire had been cut."
A day or two later Sizemore returned to the hole in the fence. He observed "some tracks on the other side of the fence.. . " Beyond the fence were several large unfenced parcels of property under different ownerships. Two or three parcels away was unfenced land owned by petitioners. The several parcels were traversed by a rough dirt road leading from an unlocked gate in Sizemore's fence. (The magistrate of the preliminary hearing, the transcript of which constituted the greater part of the superior court evidence, found the gate "clearly a common gate used by both Solis and Sizemore.")
Sizemore started to follow the tracks he had observed. With his dog he traced them with some difficulty for a mile or more without passing a fence, or gate, or other barrier. The tracks then went "up the hill" and "into some timber." In the timber or at its edge Sizemore "found the stomach contents," i.e., a large "pile" of animal entrails which he identified as removed from a cow. The entrails were on petitioners' land and from that point could be seen a small wooden shack and house trailer 30 or more feet away. Sizemore promptly reported his observations to the sheriff who, contacting a deputy district attorney, was instructed to go with Sizemore "to determine if they were, could be cow guts from my case."
The sheriff and Sizemore did so, traveling by automobile through the unlocked gate on Sizemore's fence and, unlike Sizemore earlier, along the dirt road—"It's all open country. There are no fencelines"—until they came to a low-lying wire stretched across the road on petitioners' property, which otherwise was also unfenced. He and Sizemore stepped over the wire. The two then went into the timber where the cow's entrails were again observed.
The deputy district attorney thereafter prepared, and the sheriff swore to the truth of, affidavits for a search of the homes of petitioners, respectively, in Ukiah in Mendocino County and San Bruno in San Mateo County. All of the above-related matters, including the details of both entries and searches upon petitioners' land were fully and fairly reported in the affidavits. (Petitioners make no contrary contention.) Upon the affidavits' presentation to a magistrate search warrants were issued. Upon their execution, boots covered with cow's blood and guns of the caliber of the bullets found in the cow's head, were found in petitioners' possession. And the crime's perpetration was thereafter admitted by petitioners, or one of them.
Petitioners' contentions on their motion to suppress evidence in the superior court may reasonably be reduced to the following:
(1) Both of the searches violated petitioners' "reasonable expectation of privacy " (italics added), and were accordingly proscribed by the Fourth Amendment.
(2) The second search "was an illegal 'confirmation search' under the recent Supreme Court holding in People v. Cook (1978) 22 Cal.3d 67 [148 Cal.Rptr. 605, 583 P.2d 130]... ."
At the conclusion of the hearing the superior court found no reasonable "expectation of privacy in this situation," and that there was "nothing unreasonable" about the search and "there is thus no [confirmatory] search as was prohibited in People v. Cook, 22 [Cal.3d] 67." The motion to suppress the "fruits" of the searches was denied, and these proceedings in prohibition followed.
We treat petitioners' superior court contentions, as we must, as a statement of the issues of our review. Points here raised for the first time will not be considered. (See People v. Gallegos (1971) 4 Cal.3d 242, 249-250 [93 Cal.Rptr. 229, 481 P.2d 237]; People v. Brawley (1969) 1 Cal.3d 277, 294-295 [82 Cal.Rptr. 161, 461 P.2d 361].)
We consider now the first contention of petitioners, i.e., that both of the searches violated their reasonable expectation of privacy.
It is, of course, a truism of our law that "the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places." (Katz v. United States (1967) 389 U.S. 347, 351 [19 L.Ed.2d 576, 582, 88 S.Ct. 507].)
But people will have a constitutionally protected expectation of privacy according to the nature of the place in which they claim it.
"The pattern of prior decisions suggests that one of the most crucial determinants of the validity of warrantless searches is the nature of the place subjected to search. This pattern has been created by the interweaving of constitutional concepts with fundamental human needs and expectations. The courts have implicitly recognized that man requires some sanctuary in which his freedom to escape the intrusions of society is all but absolute.... Certain other places carry with them an expectation of privacy which, although considerable, is less intense and insistent. These places may be searched upon probable cause alone under circumstances of less demanding urgency. Still other sites are regarded as so public in nature that searches are justifiable without any particular showing of cause or exigency. This hierarchy of protection arises not from the application of differing constitutional standards to various locales, but rather from an application of a single standard of reasonableness to all places in accordance with a fundamental understanding that a particular intrusion into one domain of human existence seriously threatens personal security, while the same intrusion into another domain does not." (People v. Dumas (1973) 9 Cal.3d 871, 881-883 [109 Cal.Rptr. 304, 512 P.2d 1208]; fns. omitted.)
The highest of Fourth Amendment protection extended to people is in their "houses." "[Warrantless searches of a private dwelling are unreasonable per se in the absence of one of a small number of carefully circumscribed exceptions...." (People v. Ramey (1976) 16 Cal.3d 263, 270 [127 Cal.Rptr. 629, 545 P.2d 1333].) Such dwellings are "ordinarily afforded the most stringent Fourth Amendment protection." (United States v. Martinez-Fuerte (1976) 428 U.S. 543, 561 [49 L.Ed.2d 1116, 1130, 96 S.Ct. 3074].) "Freedom from intrusion into the home or dwelling is the archetype of the privacy protection secured by the Fourth Amendment." (Dorman v. United States (D.C.Cir. 1970) 435 F.2d 385, 389.)
A lesser degree of constitutional concern is shown in respect of such places as a person's automobile. There, "one's expectation of privacy [is] significantly different from the traditional expectation of privacy and freedom in one's residence." (United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, supra, 428 U.S. 543, 561 [49 L.Ed.2d 1116, 1130].) And "business premises may...reasonably be [searched] in many more situations than private homes,..." (See v. City of Seattle (1967) 387 U.S. 541, 545-546 [18 L.Ed.2d 943, 947-948, 87 S.Ct. 1737].)
Near the bottom of this descending scale will be found places such as "open fields."
"[T]he special protection accorded by the Fourth Amendment to the people in their 'persons, houses, papers, and effects,' is not extended to the open fields. The distinction between the latter and the house is as old as the common law." (Hester v. United States (1924) 265 U.S. 57, 59 [68 L.Ed. 898, 900, 44 S.Ct. 445].) "Open fields" are among the places "regarded as so public in nature that searches are justifiable without any particular showing of cause or exigency." (People v. Dumas, supra, 9 Cal.3d 871, 882, and fn. 10.) "The Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable searches and seizures does not extend to open fields." (United States v. Basile (9th Cir. 1978) 569 F.2d 1053, 1056; to the same effect see wide authority collected in U.S.C.A., Const., Amend. 4, Note 123, and supps. thereto.)
Nevertheless, and despite what appears to be the great weight of authority, some courts appear to reject the absolutism of Hester v. United States, supra, 265 U.S. 57, and to apply, in the case of "open fields," the basic Fourth Amendment principle restated in People v. Ingle (1960) 53 Cal.2d 407, 412 [2 Cal.Rptr. 14, 348 P.2d 577]: "There is no exact formula for the determination of reasonableness. Each case must be decided on its own facts and circumstances... and on the total atmosphere of the case."
The general purport of such cases is well summarized by United States v. Freie (9th Cir. 1976) 545 F.2d 1217, 1223, as follows: "It now appears that Hester no longer has any independent meaning but merely indicates that open fields are not areas in which one traditionally might reasonably expect privacy." (Italics added.)
People v. Edwards (1969) 71 Cal.2d 1096 [80 Cal.Rptr. 633, 458 P.2d 713] may reasonably be deemed one of these authorities. There the court concluded (p. 1100) that "open fields or grounds around a house" may in rare situations, and depending upon facts and circumstances, be the subject of a reasonable expectation of privacy. Among the circumstances to be considered are the open space's "'proximity or annexation to the dwelling, its inclusion within the general enclosure surrounding the dwelling, and its use and enjoyment as an adjunct to the domestic economy of the family.'" (Id., p. 1101, fn. 2.)
It is notable also that: "The fact that a search may or may not involve a trespass or other invasion of defendant's property interests is not conclusive, for 'The prohibition in the [Fourth] amendment is against unreasonable searches and seizures, not trespasses'" (Italics added; People v. Krivda (1971) 5 Cal.3d 357, 365 [96 Cal.Rptr. 62, 486 P.2d 1262] [overruled on other grounds in Madril v. Superior Court (1975) 15 Cal.3d 73, 77 [123 Cal.Rptr. 465, 539 P.2d 33]), and People v. Kaanehe (1977) 19 Cal.3d 1, 10, fn. 6 (136 Cal.Rptr. 409, 559 P.2d 1028)].) The "search of open fields without a search warrant is not constitutionally 'unreasonable.' . This is true even though entrance to the area searched was gained by trespass." (Italics added; McDowell v. United States (8th Cir. 1967) 383 F.2d 599, 603.) The rule that "a technical trespass on the part of the officer" does not necessarily create a Fourth Amendment violation seems to be universally followed. (See Hester v. United States, supra, 265 U.S. 57, 58 [68 L.Ed. 898, 899]; United States v. Johnson (D.C.Cir. 1977) 561 F.2d 832, 841; United States v. Cain (7th Cir. 1972) 454 F.2d 1285, 1286; United States v. Hanahan (7th Cir. 1971) 442 F.2d 649, 654; Atwell v. United States (5th Cir. 1969) 414 F.2d 136, 138.)
Under the authority we have cited and the evidence produced on the motion to suppress there was, in our opinion, controlling law and substantial evidence (see People v. Lawler, supra, 9 Cal.3d 156, 160) supportive of the superior court's determination that petitioners had no reasonable expectation of privacy in respect of the bovine entrails they had discarded, or the place where they were found. The questioned entries, although perhaps technically trespasses, were over open fields and not reasonably subject to the rare exception of People v. Edwards, supra, 71 Cal.2d 1096, 1100, 1101, footnote 2. The area where Sizemore's cow's entrails were found had little proximity and no annexation to any dwelling, and it was neither within a "general enclosure surrounding [a] dwelling" nor was "its use and enjoyment... an adjunct to the domestic economy of [a] family."
Nothing is found in our recent opinion of Burkholder v. Superior Court (1979) 96 Cal.App.3d 421 [158 Cal.Rptr. 86], tending to impugn the conclusion we have reached. There, sheriff's officers had probable cause for obtaining a search warrant but wilfully, or negligently, sought none. The officers in Burkholder traveled past many "no trespassing signs," and through locked gates, using master keys. At one of the gates the entry was made in spite of Burkholder's personal and express opposition, and what must reasonably be deemed his bodily interposition. And the area searched was a closely knit complex of Burkholder's residential travel trailer, a completely enclosed growing field, a fully equipped water system, and an electric generator and power supply. It fitted precisely the above mentioned criteria of People v. Edwards, and could not reasonably be deemed an "open field." Under all the "facts and circumstances... and on the total atmosphere of the case," we concluded that Burkholder had a reasonable expectation of privacy against a warrantless search.
Indeed, in our opinion, we recognized sub silentio in Burkholder the controlling California law as expressed in People v. Dumas, supra, 9 Cal.3d 871, 882, and footnote 10, that open fields are among the places "regarded as so public in nature that searches are justifiable without any particular showing of cause or exigency." (Italics added.)
We advert now to the petitioners' second contention, i.e., that the second search, by Sizemore and the sheriff, "was an illegal 'confirmation search' under... People v. Cook (1978) 22 Cal.3d 67 [148 Cal.Rptr. 605, 583 P.2d 130]...."
We first observe that the subject of Cook was two or more illegal, warrantless, and extensive, searches of a private dwelling by a deputy district attorney and a police officer before any application for a search warrant. Thereafter, and without mention of those searches, the deputy district attorney prepared, and the officer signed and swore to the truth of, an affidavit for a search warrant. Evidence indicated that the essential and material allegations of the affidavit were "intentionally" and "absolutely false." Upon Cook's motion to suppress, the prosecution had assumed, "'for the "sake of argument,'" that the "charges of perjury [and subornation of perjury] were all true...." (Id., p. 77.) And the superior court refused to allow the parties to the false affidavit to be examined on the issue. In the case at bench, and as noted, the questioned searches were upon open fields under circumstances unproscribed by the Fourth Amendment, and were honestly reported to the magistrate.
And patently Cook does not hold a "confirmation search" to be invalid per se, even though not violative of constitutional standards.
Moreover, we note that Cook's rationale, and holding, were that an intentionally, or negligently, false search warrant affidavit may not be cured by excising its untrue, and retaining its legitimate, recitals. In its entirety the affidavit will be rejected under the rule of "'falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus,...'" (Id., p. 86.) The holding has no application whatever to the case at bench.
Another of Cook's comments seems relevant here. The court carefully noted that the exclusionary rule is designed only to discourage intentional and negligent misconduct of law enforcement officers. Reasonable, but mistaken acts, done in good faith at the time, will not be penalized by suppression of evidence. For the rule "does not require police officers to know or even anticipate complex constitutional doctrines." (Id., pp. 87-88.) Were we to assume, which we do not, that under the complex rules and divergent views and interpretations of the law of "search and seizure," the deputy district attorney and sheriff of this case erred, it cannot reasonably be said that they were negligent. For on a subject where judges and scholars disagree among themselves, a prosecutor's and officer's good faith decision may not logically be faulted.
For yet another reason the search warrants of this case must be upheld.
We have in our preceding discussion treated Sizemore's initial search upon adjacent lands, arguendo only, as state action reasonably to be equated with the second search by the sheriff. But we are also impelled to a conclusion that Sizemore's was not such state action. The sheriff's above mentioned admonition to him that "he should get up there [to his ranch] and look around," may not reasonably be deemed to have been a direction to search upon other persons' land. And even were the admonition deemed ambiguous, that ambiguity was resolved by the superior court in favor of the validity of Sizemore's search. (See People v. Lawler, supra, 9 Cal.3d 156, 160.)
"'The conduct of a person not acting under the authority of a state is not proscribed by the Fourth or Fourteenth Amendments of the federal Constitution.'" (People v. McKinnon (1972) 7 Cal.3d 899, 911-912 [103 Cal.Rptr. 897, 500 P.2d 1097].)
And information from one reasonably believed to be the victim of a reported crime will be deemed reliable, thus furnishing Fourth Amend ment probable cause for a search warrant. (Krauss v. Superior Court (1971) 5 Cal.3d 418, 421-422 [96 Cal.Rptr. 455, 487 P.2d 1023] [overruled on other grounds in People v. Cook, supra, 22 Cal.3d 67, 99]; People v. Schulle (1975) 51 Cal.App.3d 809, 814-815 [124 Cal.Rptr. 585].) In the case at bench the deputy district attorney, the sheriff, and apparently the magistrate and superior court, were under the not uncommon, but erroneous, impression that the crime's victim, Sizemore, was not "reliable" under Fourth Amendment standards, since he had not previously so established himself.
As noted, the affidavit proffered by the sheriff for the search warrants fully and fairly reported all of the relevant incidents, including Sizemore's detailed report of his earlier search for evidence relating to his stolen animal upon the land of petitioners. Of itself that information furnished probable cause for a search warrant.
Our high court's recent case of People v. Cook, supra, 22 Cal.3d 67, teaches that where a search warrant affidavit contains constitutionally offensive matter (here, arguendo, the report of the sheriffs search), that matter will be excised. As said by the court: "'We require only that such information be deleted and the warrant's validity be tested by the remaining accurate information.'" (P. 83.) "[T]he remainder of the allegations are untouched... and... the reviewing court should accept them as true." (Pp. 84-85.)
The deleted material of Cook's above described discussion concerned good faith, but erroneous, allegations. But by logical analogy and extension, the holding will necessarily here apply. And it will further be noted that the sheriff's search exploited no previous constitutional violation, for such a violation does not appear.
Treating the information of the sheriff's search as deleted, our consideration of the affidavit at issue discloses probable cause for issuance of the search warrants.
For these several reasons the order denying petitioners' motion to suppress evidence was without error or abuse of discretion.
The peremptory writ of prohibition is denied and the extant alternative writ is discharged.
There was evidence at the superior court hearing which we find irrelevant to the conclusion we reach. It was "a fairly common thing among cattle ranchers that when your cow is missing or there is some suspicion of rustling, that you get together and search the area of the victim's property." And the superior court judge seemed obliquely to confirm this practice, and more, by saying: "I don't suppose the court can take judicial knowledge of long-standing customs in this county and how people travel around it."