Case Name: McCUE v. STATE
Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1913-12-03
Citations: 170 S.W. 280
Docket Number: No. 2495
Parties: McCUE v. STATE.
Judges: 
Reporter: South Western Reporter
Volume: 170
Pages: 280–301

Head Matter:
McCUE v. STATE.
(No. 2495.)
(Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
Dec. 3, 1913.
On Motion for Rehearing, Feb. 25, 1914.
Dissenting Opinion, Nov. 4, 1914.)
1. Criminal Law (§ 511 )— Evidence — Corroboration oe Accomplice.
Testimony that a knife found by the body of deceased, who had been stabbed and beaten to death, belonged to accused, was sufficient corroboration of the testimony of a self-confessed accomplice to justify a conviction upon the accomplice’s testimony.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 1128-1137; Dec. Dig. § 511. ]
2. Criminal Law (§ 742 ) — Trial — Jury Question — Credibility oe Witnesses.
The credibility of witnesses is a question for the jury.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 1098, 1138,1719-1721; Dec. Dig. § 742. ]
3. Criminal Law (§ 739 ) — Trial — Jury Question — Alibi.
In a prosecution for homicide, where the ividence on alibi was conflicting, the question was for the jury.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 1708-1711; Dec. Dig. 739. ]
4. Homicide (§ 154 ) — Evidence — Corpus Delicti.
In a prosecution for homicide, where the body was not clearly identified by any witness, letters, memoranda, etc., found in a grip near the body and in the clothes, were admissible to prove identity.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Homicide, Cent. Dig. § 285; Dec. Dig. § 154. ]
5. Homicide (§ 166*) — Evidence—Admissibility.
But such memoranda, etc., are not admissible to show that deceased had in his possession a considerable sum of money.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Homicide, Cent. Dig. §§ 320-331; Dec. Dig. § 166. ]
6.'Criminal Law (§ 1171 ) — Appeai>-Harmless Error.
Where there was abundant other evidence to show that deceased had in his possession a considerable sum of money, the act of the prosecutor in stating to the jury that memoranda found with the body of deceased showed that he was hard-working- and had money in his possession was harmless.
[Ed. Note. — For other eases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 3126, 3127; Dec. Dig. §• 1171. ]
7. Criminal Law (§ 358 ) — Evidence — Admissibility-Alibi.
Where the defense of alibi was that accused spent the entire day and night of the killing in his father’s home, testimony that a witness heard accused on tlie night of the crime while he was in another room of an immoral resort was admissible.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. § 763; Dec. Dig. § 358. ]
8. Criminal Law (§ 358 ) — Evidence — Admissibility — Alibi.
Where accused offered evidence to show that he was at home on the day and night of the killing, testimony that accused was seen drinking with deceased on the evening of the murder was admissible.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. § 763; Dec. Dig. § 358. ]
9. Criminal Law (§ 358 ) — Evidence — Ad- . missibility — Alibi.
Testimony that a witness saw accused down town on the afternoon of the' murder and saw him later that evening is also admissible.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. § 763; Dee. Dig. § 358. ]
10. Witnesses (§ 395 ) — Corroboration — Right to Corroborate.
Where accused attacked the credibility of a witness offered to contradict his defense of alibi by testimony that the witness had stated to others that he knew nothing about the case, but was going to testify nevertheless, etc., the witness might be corroborated by evidence that, shortly after the killing, he made statements identical with those given at trial.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Witnesses, Cent. Dig. § 1260; Dec. Dig. § 395. ]
11. Criminal Law (§ 358 ) — Evidence—Admissibility — Alibi.
Where accused claimed to have been in his father’s house on the day and evening of the homicide, testimony that a witness saw him on the afternoon of the killing in a saloon drinking with another person was admissible.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. § 763; Dec. Dig. § 358. ]
12. Criminal Law (§ 358 ) — Evidence—Admissibility — Alibi.
Testimony that the companion of a former -witness saw two men drinking as detailed by such witness, though he did not know and could not recognize accused, as the other witness had, is admissible in corroboration.
[Ed. Note. — Eor other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. § 763; Dec. Dig. § 358. ]
13. Witnesses (§ 410 ) — Corroboration — Reputation.
Where witnesses offered by accused to prove his' alibi were contradicted by the state’s witnesses as to the fact of the alibi, but were not in any other way attacked, their testimony could not be corroborated by proof of their general reputation for veracity, notwithstanding the trial was held in a county where accused’s witnesses were not known.
[Ed. Note. — Eor other cases, see Witnesses, Cent. Dig. § 1284; Dec. Dig. § 410. ]
14. Homicide (§ 166 ) — Evidence—Admissibility.
Where it was shown that immediately before the killing accused had been short of money and pawned his watch, evidence that after the killing accused was freely spending money in saloons and immoral resorts was admissible, where it appeared that deceased, when killed, had in his possession a considerable sum of money.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Homicide, Cent. Dig. §§ 320-331; Dec. Dig. § 166. ]
15. Criminal Law (§ 358 ) — Evidence—Admissibility — Alibi.
Where accused claimed that he spent the entire day and night of the killing in his father’s home, testimony in support of an accomplice, who claimed to have met accused in an immoral resort, that on the night of the killing the accomplice and accused visited the resort, where they removed their blood-stained clothing and spent the rest of the night smoking hop, was admissible.
[Ed. Note. — Eor other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. § 763; Dec. Dig. § 353. ]
16. Criminal Law (§ 680 ) — Tbial—Order op Proof.
Where, upon the record as a whole, evidence was admissible, the order of its introduction was immaterial.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 1609, 1610, 1613; Dec. Dig. § 680. ]
17. Criminal Law (§ 358 ) — Evidence—Admissibility — Alibi.
Where accused claimed that on the day of the killing he had remained in his father’s house, and there was evidence tending to show that he had spent that night in an immoral resort, testimony that, some days after, he w.as arrested when leaving such resort, was admissible.
[Ed. Note. — Eor other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. § 763; Dee. Dig. § 358. ]
18. Criminal Law (§ 1169 )— Appeal — Harmless Error.
Where accused did not take the stand himself, and the jury assessed the lightest possible penalty for murder in the first degree, though the offense could have been nothing else, the erroneous admission of evidence showing accused to have been a frequenter of low saloons and dives was harmless.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 754, 3088, 3130, 3137-3143; Dee. Dig. § 1169. ]
19. Criminal Law (§ 823 ) — Trial—Instructions.
Where accused’s defense was alibi, the error in a charge on principals, which did not require the jury to find that accused was personally present at the killing, must be disregarded, where other paragraphs of the charge directed acquittal in case of a reasonable doubt as to whether accused was present at the killing.
[Ed. Note. — Eor other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 1992-1995, 3158; Dee. Dig. § 82¿. ]
On Motion for Rehearing.
20. Criminal Law (§ 1134 ) — Appeal—Matters Review able on Appeal.
As the state cannot appeal in criminal cases, the only matter which the Court of Criminal Appeals can review is whether error was committed against accused; and, if so, was the error prejudicial.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 2587, 2653, 2986-2998, 3056, 3067-3071; Dec. Dig. § 1134. ]
21. Criminal Law (§ 939 ) — New Trial — Newly Discovered Evidence — Diligence.
Accused is not entitled to a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence tending to support his claim of alibi, where some of the evidence must have been within the knowledge of accused, and the other could have been discovered by diligence during the five years preceding trial.
[Ed. Note. — Eor other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 2318-2323; Dec. Dig. § 939. ]
22. Criminal Law (§ 941 ) — New Trial — Newly Discovered Evidence.
Where several persons besides members of accused’s own family testified in support of his defense of alibi, newly discovered testimony of other outside witnesses tending to support the defense is cumulative, and affords no ground for new trial.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 2328-2330; Dec. Dig. § 941. ]
23. Criminal Law (§ 941 ) — New Trial — Newly Discovered Evidence.
Where there have been several trials and continuances, a new trial will not be granted on the ground of newly discovered testimony which is only cumulative.
[Ed. Note. — Eor other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 2328-2330; Dec.' Dig. § 941. ]
24. Homicide (§§ 143, 264 ) — Evidence—Corpus Delicti.
Under Pen. Code 1895, art. 654, requiring the identification of the body of deceased as that of the person charged to have been killed, the state is bound to prove the corpus delicti, and the amount of proof of identification cannot be complained of.
[Ed. Note. — Eor other cases, see Homicide, Cent. Dig. §§ 260, 558; Dec. Dig.' §§ 143, 264. ]
25. Homicide (§ 154 ) — Evidence—Admissibility.
Under this statute, circumstantial evidence is admissible to prove identity.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Homicide, Cent. Dig. § 285; Dec. Dig. § 154. ]
26. Witnesses (§ 376 ) — Corroboration.
Where accused attacked a witness by evidence of statements that he was going to volunteer to testify, though he knew nothing of the case, the witness might be corroborated by evidence that his name was furnished to the another.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Witnesses, Cent. Dig. §§ 1204^-1206; Dec. Dig. § 376. ]
27. Witnesses (§ 410 ) — Corroboration — Reputation.
Where a witness is a stranger, and discrediting facts have been developed in his cross-examination, he may be corroborated by proof tliat his general reputation for truth and veracity is good.
[Ed. Note.—Eor other cases, see Witnesses, Oent. Dig. § 12S4; Dec. Dig. § 410.*]
28. Criminal Law (§ 376 )—Evidence—Ad-missibility.
In a prosecution for homicide, the fact ■that evidence of accused’s visits to saloons and the lowest of dives might necessarily have a prejudicial effect does not render such testimony inadmissible, where it was vitally connected with the evidence to show accused’s guilt.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 836-839, ¿41, 843; Dec. Dig. § 376. ]
29. Criminal Law (§ 507 )—“Accomplice”— Evidence—Admissibility.
A witness, who testified that, after accused struck deceased with an iron bar, he himself stabbed him, was an accomplice.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 1082-1096; Dee. Dig. § 507.
For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, Accomplice.]
30. 'Criminal Law (§ 1172 )—Review—Harm-less Error—Instructions.
Verbal inaccuracies in a charge, where it correctly and fairly presents the law as a whole, are not ground for reversal.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 3128, 3154r-3157, 3159-3163, 3169; Dee. Dig. § 1172. ]
31. Criminal Law (§ 542 )—Evidence—Tes-timony at Former Trial.
Where a witness who testified at a former trial has since died, his testimony may be reproduced upon proof of death.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 1232, 1236; Dec. Dig. § 542. ]
. Davidson, J., dissenting.
Appeal from District Court, Collin County; J. M. Pearson, Judge.
Frank McCue, alias Mud McCue, was convicted of murder in the first degree, and he appeals. Affirmed.
Walker & Williams, of Dallas, Clarence Merritt and W. R. Abernathy, both of McKinney, and G. F. Greenwood, of Dallas, for appellant.. C. E. Lane, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.
For otlier oases see same topic and section NUMBER in Dec. Dig. & Am. Dig. Key-No. Series & Rep’r Indexes
For other oases see same topic and section NUMBER in Dec. Dig. & Am. Dig. Key-No. Series & Rep’r Indexes

Opinion:
HARPER, J.
Appellant was prosecuted and convicted of the crime of murder in the first degree, and his punishment assessed at imprisonment in the penitentiary for life.
That the person who killed Earl Mabry on the night in question was guilty of murder in the first degree there can be no question. The question presented by this record is: Was appellant one of the participants in the crime? Roy Pringle on this trial says that appellant struck deceased in the back of the head with an iron pin, and then cut his throat with a poeketknife. Deceased had been knocked in the head, and his throat had been cut, and some 17 other wounds had been inflicted on him. Roy Pringle was an accomplice, admitting that he stabbed deceased several times, and the court'so instructed the jury. The contention that there is no testimony corroborating the accomplice, tending to connect appellant with the crime, cannot be sustained. A knife was found near the dead body. Sis Hamp positively identifies this knife as the knife of appellant. This tended very strongly to connect the appellant with the crime, and is sufficient corroboration of the accomplice in and of itself to sustain the conviction.
However, it may be stated that there are many other circumstances in the record, corroborative of the accomplice, tending to connect the appellant with the offense. The contention that some one other than the accomplice must have seen appellant at or near the scene of the crime, and must have seen him strike the blows, to be sufficient as corroborative testimony, is not the law. If the state had such testimony, it would not need the testimony of the accomplice. When the deceased was found dead near the railroad dump, his throat cut from ear to ear, and a knife found by his side that is identified as the knife of appellant, the corroboration is sufficient. It is true that appellant assails the testimony of Roy Pringle and Sis Hamp. Witnesses swear that their reputation for truth and veracity is bad, and it is sought to impeach them by proving^, contradictory statements, yet all this was for the jury, and we suppose it was as ably argued in the trial of the case as it is here presented, yet the jury finds appellant guilty.
Appellant presents a strong alibi. The witnesses tie their memory to circumstances that would seem to render the defense indisputable, yet the state introduces an equal or greater number of witnesses who testify as positively to facts that would render the alibi untrue. This was a question for the determination of the jury, and the court's charge on alibi is not subject to the criticisms contained in appellant's motion for new trial, for it is drawn in language frequently approved by this court. Hines v. State, 40 Tex. Cr. R. 26, 48 S. W. 171; Caldwell v. State, 28 Tex. App. 566, 14 S. W. 122; Harris v. State, 31 Tex. Cr. R. 416, 20 S. W. 916; Stevens v. State, 42 Tex. Cr. R. 175, 59 S. W. 545.
On Sunday morning, the 21st day of September, 1907, the body of a young man was found on the south side of the railroad dump on west of the Texas & Pacific Railway bridge, on the road from Dallas to the cement plant, dragged into some high weeds. The skull was crushed in the back of the head; there were 16 or 17 knife wounds in the body, and the head had been nearly severed from the body. Witnesses say only about two inches of skin at the back of the neck connected the head with the body. An iron coupling pin, bloody, was found near the body. A knife was also found, with the big blade open; the point being broken. A red leather grip was also found, and in this grip were certain letters, a time book, etc. To prove that the body was that of Earl Mabry, the sister, who never saw the dead body, was permitted to testify that the letters found in the grip were written by herself and her mother to her brother Earl; that the writing in the time book was in her brother's handwriting; that the hat found near the dead body was her brother's hat; that the watch found on the body was her brother's watch. The defendant objected to the introduction of the letters and the time book in evidence on various grounds, but as the identity of the deceased was an issue in the ease, and the state was required to prove that the dead body was that of Earl Mabry, the letters and time book and other articles mentioned were admissible on the issue of identity of deceased. This question was specifically passed on in the case of Campbell v. State, 8 Tex. App. 90, and the valise and contents held admissible on the question of identity of deceased. See, also, Wharton's Crim. Law, § 941, and cases there cited.
However, it was improper for the prosecuting officer to-state in his argument that the time book and certain items therein showed that the deceased was a hard-working boy, and that said book showed the deceased had worked all the month of August and up to the 18th day of September, and that the book showed he had $40 in his possession. The time book was not admissible to show these facts, if it did so show, but was admissible only on the question of the identity of the deceased, and the objection to that portion of the argument of state's counsel should have been sustained.
But is the error such an error as will call for a reversal of the case? The fact that deceased had on Saturday evening some $50 or $60 is amply proven by other witnesses, and there is no testimony that he did not have money on his person, so the amount of money he had was not) an issue in the case. That he had, just before being killed, been at work near Mineóla, was amply proven by other witnesses, and that he came to Dallas Friday night was proven by defendant, by Charles Moore, and by Mrs. Wilky. Then, too, the issue in the case, as made by the testimony offered in behalf of appellant, was not whether the deceased had been murdered for the purpose of robbery, but that appellant was not the person who did the killing — that he was at home at his father's Saturday and Saturday night, and could not have been the person who killed the deceased. That deceased had been foully murdered in a brutal way was shown by all the testimony adduced on the trial, and as the remarks of the prosecuting officer complained of above were not such as could or would cause the jury to find that appellant was the person who did the killing, nor had any influence in regard to that issue, the remarks do not present reversible error.
Gertrude Wilson was the twenty-sixth witness introduced by the state, and she testified:
"In, 1907, I remember about hearing of the dead body of a man being found over west of the Trinity river, and I heard about it Sunday evening after the killing, and the way I heard about it was by hearing them talk about it. I knew Frank McCue at that time. Oh, I hadn't known Frank McCue very long. I saw him at Beasley's several times, and had heard him talk there, and heard him talk at Risa Beasley's and several, others, and heard him talk at Risa Beasley's on the Saturday night before I heard of this killing the next Sunday evening. I am acquainted with Frank McCue's voice. I heard some parties talking that Saturday night upstairs in Risa Beasley's rooin. and I took one of the voices to be Frank McCue's."
It will be recalled that the defense of the defendant'was an alibi — that he was at home all Saturday night. When this witness was offered, the defendant objected to her testimony on the following grounds:
"(1) Because the evidence that would be put before the jury, and by and through the answer of said questions by said witness, would be immaterial, inadmissible, irrelevant, and incompetent, in that it would not establish nor tend to establish any allegation in the indictment, nor any material issue in the case.
"(2) Because the testimony that would go' to the jury through the medium of said witness' answers to said questions would have only the effect to prejudice the jury against the defendant."
The court did not err in overruling the objections made, for it is manifest by the testimony of this witness, if true, that appellant was not at home on Saturday night, but instead was at Risa Beasley's. This evidence was on a most material issue in the ease — to prove that his alibi was not true.
The testimony of Ike Owens was reproduced. He had testified that in 1907 he worked for T. H. Moore as a bartender, and that at 6:30 on Saturday evening (the evening of the killing) he saw appellant, Pringle, and Mabry in' Moore's saloon; that the three drank together in the saloon, and appellant (McCue) said that Mabry was a stranger in the town and they were showing him around; that Mabry paid for the last round of drinks, and had $50 or $60 in his purse; that he (Owens) changed a $5 bill for him. Mr. Pe Berry testified that Owens was dead; that he saw his dead body, and attended the funeral. The court did not err in overruling the objections made. Robertson v. State, 63 Tex. Cr. R. 216, 142 S. W. 533, Ann. Gas. 19130, 440.
When the defendant had offered his testimony to prove an alibi — that he was at his father's home in Oak Cliff all day Saturday and Saturday night — among other witnesses the state introduced Amos Clem, who testified, among other things, that on that Saturday he was in Dallas, and saw appellant on Main street in Dallas; that—
"at the time I was passing him, a young fellow passing by said, 'Hello, McCue, where are you going?' and the one called McCue said, 'Going over to the cement plant after a while.' The cement plant is close to Dallas and west of Dallas, and is near the Texas & Pacific Railroad, and I guess it is two or three miles from Dal- Jas. I guess it must have been betwixt 2 o'clock and 3 o'clock when I saw the young man called McCue on Main street, but I couldn't say positively. After that I saw him that night— that evening, 10 minutes before 7 o'clock, when he stepped off the sidewalk and went into a saloon, him and two other boys. At the time I saw him, lO minutes before 7 o'clock, it was right north of where I first seen him, across straight right north, and I seen two other boys with him, and one was carrying a suit case or a grip.1 The man sitting there (indicating defendant) was the one with the two boys when I saw them."
This testimony was clearly admissible on the issue of appellant's alibi, and when the state had introduced this testimony, and appellant had then introduced J. C. Clem, who testified that Amos Clem had not been in Dallas that Saturday evening, it was permissible for the state to prove by other witnesses that Amos Clem was in Dallas. And when the defendant introduced J. C. Clem, and proved by him that Amos Clem had told him he knew nothing about the case, but was going to testify anyway, it was permissible for the state to show by Mr. Samuels that Amos Clem had made the same statement to him one week after the homicide as that he testified to on this trial. When the defendant undertook to impeach the witness Amos Clem by evidence that he was not in Dallas on that Saturday evening, and had made statements that he knew nothing about the case, but was going to testify anyway, then Amos Clem could be supported. Branch's Crim. Law, § 874, and cases there cited.
Fawn Simpson testified for the state:
"The day before the killing I saw Frank Mc-Cue some time after 1 o'clock on the corner of Elm and Crowdus street in East Dallas, and east of the Union Depot, and about 400 yards east of the Union Depot. He was sitting in Joe Plarbretche's saloon at a table drinking-some beer, and some fellow was with him; but I did not pay any attention to him. I did not notice how he was' dressed. The fellow that was with Frank McCue had a grip setting down by his side. It was a suit case. I didn't pay any attention to it. It was similar to that grip you show me, I think. -McCue and the young man were sitting at the table on my left as I went in at the front door of the saloon. They were drinking beer; that is, I took it to be beer. I just spoke to Frank as I went in. Just, said, 'Hello, Frank,' and he said, 'Good evening.' No words passed between us. It was after 1 o'clock. The man that went in there with me was W. B. Fortune."
This testimony was admissible, for it tended to show that appellant was not at his father's home in Oak Cliff all day Saturday, as contended by him. The state then introduced W. B. Fortune, who testified that he did go in the saloon with Simpson; that two men were sitting at the table, one of whom Simpson addressed as "Frank"; that he did not know appellant, and could not and would not identity appellant as one of the persons sitting at the table. It was permissible for Mr. Fortune to testify that he went in this saloon, and saw two men sitting at the table, although he did not know appellant, and could not identify him, when Simpson testified that he did know appellant, and appellant was one of the men he and Fortune saw sitting there. Fortune was testifying to facts within his knowledge, and not to anything some one else had told him.
By his twelfth bill of exception appellant would show the following facts:
"The defense of the defendant herein, and his sole defense, it might he said, was an alibi. This alibi for the most part was made by the immediate members of the defendant's family, to wit, his father and mother, his brothers and sisters. The substance of defendant's alibi was that during all of the day and all of the night of_ the day on which and in which the offense laid in the indictment was committed that defendant was at his home in the Oak Cliff part of the city of Dallas, Tex., and that defendant was at no time, during all of said day and all of said night, away from his said home or outside of his father's home. Only two witnesses besides the members of the defendant's family testified for defendant that he was at his home on the evening of the day and immediately preceding the night on which and in which the offense laid in the indictment was committed. These two witnesses were W. A. Brown and Sam Anderson, and both of them swore that as they were passing the home of defendant, at or about the hour of 4 o'clock on the evening immediately before the offense herein, as is disclosed by the testimony in this record, was committed, at about 8 o'clock that night, they saw defendant at his said home and in a hammock on the porch of said home. Said members of defendant's family swore positively that defendant was at his home, and at no time absent from or away from his said home, during all of the day and all of the night of the day when the evidence shows deceased, named in the indictment, was killed. All of the testimony of all of the witnesses in this ease, who testified as to the matter at all, shows positively that defendant's home, where defendant lived at that time with his father, was fully three miles from the place where the dead body of deceased, named in the indictment, was found, and from the place where deceased was killed; that said home was west of the Trinity river, and fully three miles from the courthouse just east of the Trinity river, in the city of Dallas proper; and that said home was fully four miles from the Union Depot in the city of Dallas proper.
"It was the contention of the state herein, stoutly argued by the state, both in the state's testimony and in the argument by counsel for the state, that defendant's defense of an alibi was false. The theory of the state in this case was that defendant was a principal in the commission of the offense laid in the indictment, and that he was actually present at the time and place of the commission of the offense, three miles distant from his home, and that he, together with the state's accomplice witness, Roy Pringle, actually participated in the commission of the offense. The names of defendant's family, who testified in his behalf, and who swore to a complete alibi for defendant, were J. M. McCue, father of defendant, Mrs. J. M. McGue, mother of defendant, Howard McCue, brother of defendant. Miss Willie McCue, sister of defendant, John McCue, brother of defendant, and Miss Ida McCue, sister of defendant. After all of said members had testified and established by their testimony, and so far as their testimony was concerned, a complete and positive alibi, the state introduced a great number of witnesses for the purpose of contradicting said members of defendant's family, and for the purpose of destroying defendant's alibi, and for the purpose of showing that it was false."
In thei bill are named J. F. Stanley, Ashley Ewing, Will Irby, Ed Irby, Amos Olom, T. N. Briggs, A. B. McDougal, G. T. Hare, J. A. Burgess, Gertrude Wilson, Alice Mea-dors, Sis Hamp, B. D. James, M. Samuels, Koy Pringle, Fawn Simpson, W. B. Fortune, Ike Owens, and Callie Flowers, as witnesses who testify to facts which would show that the alibi is not true; and it then recites:
"And be it remembered that L. J. Truett, county attorney of Collin county, who conducted the trial of this case, in his cross-examination of each and all of the hereinbefore named members of defendant's family, subjected each and all of them to as thorough cross-examination as he could possibly give."
After reciting all these facts appellant insists that the court erred in refusing to permit him to introduce witnesses to prove that the reputation of the father and mother of appellant and his sisters and brothers for truth and veracity was good. It is true that appellant's father and mother and other members of his family lived in Dallas county, while this ease was tried in Collin county, and that the witnesses offered by appellant to prove his alibi had perhaps no acquaintance in Collin county; but as to that the record discloses that all the witnesses for the state on this issue also lived in Dallas county, and Mr. Branch in his work on Criminal Law correctly states the rule to be:
"Proof of general reputation of defendant or any other witness for truth is not admissible, where no attach has 'been made on the mtness, but there is a mere contradiction between witnesses, or'confusion in the statements of the witness" — citing Hill v. State, 52 Tex. Cr. R. 246, 106 S. W. 145, and many other eases in section 877 of his work.
In this case, in the cross-examination of the witnesses who testified to facts tending to prove an alibi for appellant, no questions were asked that would reflect upon the witnesses. Only a legitimate cross-examination was made, testing their memory, etc., and under such circumstances the court did not err in excluding the testimony as to general reputation for truth.
The most serious question in the case is the one presented by bills of exception Nos. 14, 13, 11, and 3. We will not take them up in the order numbered, but rather as they occurred on the trial. In bill No. 14 it is made to appear that, while the accomplice Roy Pringle was testifying, the state proved by him that the first time he ever met appellant was at Fannie Howard's; that he had met him there several times; that Fannie Howard ran a saloon and negro house of prostitution. In bills Nos. 11 and 13 it is shown that Officers Briggs and McDougal testified that on Tuesday after the homicide on Saturday night they saw appellant drive up to Fannie Howard's saloon and house of prostitution with two negro women in his buggy; that they all got out, and appellant went in Jew Jake's saloon and invited all present to drink with him; that he rattled money in his pocket and threw a dollar down on the counter; that from the noise made he judged appellant had some $12 or $15, and appellant remarked that everybody who refused to drink with him was a piker. In bill No. 3 it is shown by Deputy Sheriff Chick, when he arrested appellant on Thursday, that he saw him come out of an alley between Fannie Howard's saloon and her house of prostitution, and he arrested him in front of Fannie Howard's door. All this testimony was objected to on various grounds, it being unnecessary to state them all, for, if the testimony was inadmissible, sufficient objection was made to it.
As to the testimony of Officers Briggs and McDougal, we think it clearly admissible. The record discloses that, just prior to the killing of young Mabry, appellant pawned his watch to Ed Goldstein, who was in the pawn-brokerage business; that appellant was, in common parlance, broke; that Mabry had on his person some $50 or $00, and Pringle says Mabry was killed to get his money. Under such circumstances any testimony which would tend to show that appellant had money after Mabry's death would be admissible. It would be a circumstance tending to show his guilt under the facts in this case, in the absence of any explanation of where he got this money. It is perhaps unfortunate for appellant, wherever he got the money, that he was spending it taking negro prostitutes driving in a buggy, and spending it in Jew Jake's saloon, treating the crowd, yet this would not render the testimony inadmissible. The fact Mabry on the day of his death had money, and appellant saw it, is shown by the testimony of Mrs. Meadors, Ike Owens, and others. That he did not have it when his body was found is shown by all the testimony. Then the fact that appellant had no money prior to Mabry's death, and the further fact that he was well supplied with money after Mabry's death, would tend strongly to corroborate Pringle,, who testfied that appellant killed Mabry for his money.
As to the testimony of Pringle that the first time he met McCue was at Fannie' Howard's house, and that he had seen him there frequently, under the evidence in this-case, was admissible. Gertrude Wilson testified that at 11 o'clock on the night of the homicide, while she did not see appellant, yet she heard him talking there at Fannie Howard's place. Sis Hamp testified that appellant and Pringle came to that house that Saturday night and that they were bloody; that they washed their hands and changed their clothing in this house of prostitution, and spent the remainder of the night in the saloon, "smoking hop." etc. That appellant had been seen at these places and was a frequent visitor of them would be material in passing upon whether or not Gertrude Wilson and Sis Hamp had testified to the truth, and would be admissible as supporting their tes timony. The order of its introduction would be immaterial, if upon the record as a whole it was admissible. Appellant appreciated the strength and force of Sis I-Iamp's testimony, and sought to break it down by a most rigid cross-examination, by evidence that her reputation for truth and veracity was bad, and by proving contradictory statements.
The other bill, that appellant, when arrested on Thursday, after the homicide on Saturday night, was coming from these places and was arrested in front of the saloon, would be admissible in our opinion for the same reason. But if we should be wrong in these conclusions (which we do not think we are), would the fact that appellant was a frequent visitor and often found in Fannie Howard's saloon or her house of prostitution influence the jury in passing on his alibi? Appellant did not testify, so it cannot be said that this testimony caused the jury to fail to give due weight to his testimony. His defense as hereinbefore shown was an alibi, and it is not shown nor asserted that any of the persons who testified to his alibi were ever in Fannie Howard's saloon, nor her house of prostitution, so this testimony could not affect their credit as witnesses. It cannot be said this testimony influenced or aroused the passion of the jury, because they gave appellant the minimum punishment for the offense submitted to them. As the testimony all showed that deceased was murdered to obtain his money, only murder in the first degree was submitted, and if the jury had given him the death penalty, then it might be said that this testimony inflamed their minds against appellant; but they do not assess that punishment, but give him the least punishment the law authorized for the crime submitted to them, so evidently this testimony created no prejudice in the minds of the jury, and as it would not and could not affect his defensive theory and testimony, and if it did tend to support the state's evidence and theory it would be admissible, for that purpose, if error there be in admitting the testimony it would not call for a reversal of the case.
These are all the bills of exception in the record. The remainder of the motion for a new trial complains of the charge of the court. As before stated, the court only submitted murder in the first degree, and in so doing appellant concedes there was no error, as the elements of murder in the second degree or manslaughter are not presented by the testimony. Many complaints are urged to the charge on accomplice testimony, but these matters have been so frequently before the court we do not deem it necessary to discuss each of them. The charge on this issue as given is a virtual copy of the form prescribed in Campbell v. State, 57 Tex. Cr. R. 302, 123 S. W. 583, and approved in King v. State, 57 Tex. Cr. R. 363, 123 S. W. 135, and other cases handed down since the rendition of these two opinions. The criticisms of ' the charge .on alibi have heretofore herein been passed upon, and the cases cited, showing there was no error in that portion of the charge.
The charge on who are principals in the commission of an offense is severely criti-cised, and taken by itself it might be subjected to some criticism; but, when we read the charge as a whole, no jury could have been misled thereby. The criticism that, defendant's defense being an alibi, the charge' on principals was erroneous, in that it did not require the jury to find that defendant was personally present at the time of the commission of the offense, might be said to be true by a strained construction of the language used in that paragraph alone, yet we find that in paragraph 18 of the charge the coprt instructs the jury:
"Now, if the evidence raises in your minds a reasonable doubt as to the presence of the defendant at the place where the offense was committed, at the time of the commission thereof, you will find the defendant not guilty."
So by no construction of the charge could it be said that the jury was authorized to convict appellant, though he was not present at the time of the commission of the offense.
This ease was submitted the latter part of last June. The record is a voluminous one, and we have read and re-read it, so as to arrive at the true issues in the case, and the testimony legitimately bearing on these issues. A lifetime imprisonment is assessed against appellant. The testimony supporting his plea of alibi is strong, and yet the testimony offered by the state on that issue is as equally convincing. The court in his charge was fair to appellant, and the cmly error in the record, as we view it, was the remarks of the county attorney in commenting on the testimony which was legitimate to prove identity, yet used by him on other issues. But, as hereinbefore stated, this could not and would not affect this plea of alibi, nor support the state's theory that appellant was the person who cut Earl Mabry's throat and murdered him for his money. That it did not arouse the passion nor inflame the minds of the jury is evidenced by the verdict inflicting the minimum penalty, and we are constrained to believe that the judgment should be affirmed; and it is so ordered.