Case Name: Valarie Cheek Ledig BURKE v. Conrad LEDIG, Sr.
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1995-05-05
Citations: 655 So. 2d 546
Docket Number: No. CA 94 2044
Parties: Valarie Cheek Ledig BURKE v. Conrad LEDIG, Sr.
Judges: Before FOIL, WHIPPLE and KUHN, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 655
Pages: 546–549

Head Matter:
Valarie Cheek Ledig BURKE v. Conrad LEDIG, Sr.
No. CA 94 2044.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, First Circuit.
May 5, 1995.
Rehearing Denied June 21, 1995.
Helen M. Edgington, Baton Rouge, for appellant plaintiff Valarie Cheek Ledig Burke.
Clinton Hyatt, Jr., Baton Rouge, for appel-lee defendant Conrad Ledig, Sr.
Before FOIL, WHIPPLE and KUHN, JJ.

Opinion:
|2FOIL, Judge.
Plaintiff, Valarie Cheek Ledig Burke, challenges a trial court judgment rendered in favor of defendant, Conrad Ledig, Sr., granting his petition to disavow paternity of two children born during their marriage and dis missing her peremptory exception of prescription. After a review of the record, we affirm.
FACTS
Plaintiff and defendant were married in August, 1981, and during that marriage, two children were born. On May 30, 1990, a judgment of divorce was granted in favor of defendant on the grounds of adultery. In conformity with the parties' stipulation, defendant was ordered to pay $675.00 per month child support to plaintiff. On January 29, 1991, pursuant to a rule to increase child support, the parties stipulated that defendant would pay child support to plaintiff in the amount of $1,000.00 per month.
Thereafter, on May 11, 1993, plaintiff filed another rule to increase child support. On October 14, 1993, while plaintiffs rule was still pending, defendant filed a petition to disavow paternity of the two minor children. He asserted that, under the provisions of 1993 La.Acts No. 32, the first section of which enacted La.R.S. 9:305, he is entitled to said relief because he erroneously believed that he was the father of the children due to misrepresentation, fraud, or deception by plaintiff.
In response, on November 22, 1993, plaintiff filed a peremptory exception of prescription, claiming that the provisions of Act No. 32 of 1993 do not apply to the facts of this case. She denied committing any misrepresentation, fraud or deception which caused defendant to believe that he was the father of the children. Plaintiff urged that the time period for disavowing paternity of the children had prescribed because defendant chose not to seek disavowal, not because of any erroneous belief on his part.
A hearing of the matter took place on February 17 and 18, 1994, after which the trial court took the matter under advisement. The court subsequently rendered judgment in favor of defendant-|petitioner.3 In rendering said judgment, the court overruled plaintiffs exception of prescription; decreed that defendant is not the biological or legal father of the two minor children; ordered that the name "Ledig" be removed from the birth certificates of both children; and vacated the previous order of child support. Plaintiff filed the instant devolutive appeal.
LAW AND ANALYSIS
La.Civ.Code art. 184 provides that "[t]he husband of the mother is presumed to be the father of all children born or conceived during the marriage." This presumption may be rebutted if the father timely institutes an action to disavow paternity under La.Civ.Code art. 189, which provides:
A suit for disavowal of paternity must be filed within one hundred eighty days after the husband learned or should have learned of the birth of the child; but, if the husband for reasons beyond his control is not able to file suit timely, then the time for filing suit shall be suspended during the period of such inability.
In applying this provision, courts routinely rejected a husband's allegations that misrepresentations concerning the paternity of a child constituted "reasons beyond his control," causing him to forego instituting a disavowal action. Rather, the 180-day delay period has been zealously enforced. Mills v. Mills, 626 So.2d 1230, 1231 (La.App. 3d Cir.1993).
During its 1993 regular session, the Louisiana Legislature passed Act No. 32, effective August 15, 1993. Section 1 enacted La.R.S. 9:305, which provides as follows:
Notwithstanding the provisions of Civil Code Art. 189 and for the sole purpose of determining the proper payor in child support cases, if the husband, or legal father who is presumed to be the father of the child, erroneously believed, because of misrepresentation, fraud, or deception by the mother, that he was the father of the child, then the time for filing suit for disavowal of paternity shall be suspended during the period of such erroneous belief or for ten years, whichever ends first.
Section 2 of the Act further declared:
The provisions of this Act shall be applied retrospectively such that a husband or legal father who, because of the mother's misrepresentation, fraud, or deception, Lerroneously believed he was the father of a child, and whose action for disavowal has prescribed, may institute such an action ancillary to any child support proceeding brought within one hundred eighty days of August 15, 1993, and any such suit not instituted within that time and any claims relating thereto shall be forever barred.
In cases such as this one, where the husband's disavowal action has prescribed, the provisions of Act No. 32 retroactively extend the 180-day period to 180 days after its effective date of August 15, 1993. Further, the disavowal action must be brought ancillary to a child support proceeding.
Here, defendant filed a petition to disavow paternity on October 14, 1993, approximately two months after the effective date of Act No. 32 and well within the time limit. The action was filed while a rule to increase child support was pending before the court and was thus an ancillary action. Accordingly, we need only determine whether the trial court erred in finding that defendant proved he erroneously believed he was the father of the children because of misrepresentation, fraud, or deception by plaintiff.
In its written reasons for judgment, the trial court stated:
Mr. Ledig's testimony appears to be more plausible and more believable than the testimony given by Mrs. Ledig. Therefore, after hearing all of the testimony, considering all of the exhibits, considering the witnesses' testimony and their demeanor, the Court believes that Mr. Le-dig thought that he was the father of those children even though he may have had some doubt in his mind at certain times, he believed and wanted to believe that those children were his. He did not conclusively know for an absolute certainty that those children were not his until Mrs. Ledig informed him specifically that he was not the father sometime in the year of 1990.
At that time or shortly thereafter, Mr. Ledig then sought the help of an attorney to disavow those children after he was divorced. At that time his lawyer informed him that it was impossible to bring this action because he had no remedy in law for the relief sought. His saving grace was Act 32 of 1993, passed by the Louisiana Legislature.
It is well settled that a court of appeal may not set aside a trial court's finding of fact in the absence of manifest error or unless it is clearly wrong. Stobart v. State, Department of Transportation and Development, 617 So.2d 880, 882 (La.1993). Reasonable evaluations of credibility should not be disturbed on review where conflict exists in the testimony. Id. Moreover, where two permissible views of the evidence exist, the factfinder's choice between them cannot be manifestly erroneous or clearly wrong. Id. at 883.
After reviewing the record in its entirety, we conclude that the trial court was indeed presented with two permissible views of the evidence. Plaintiff and her witnesses testified that defendant always knew that the children were not his but accepted them as his own nevertheless. On the other hand, defendant and his witnesses testified that he was deceived by plaintiff into believing that he was the father of the children. Under Stobart, the court's decision to credit defendant's version of events cannot be manifestly erroneous.
For the above reasons, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed at appellant's cost.
AFFIRMED.
WHIPPLE, J., concurs with reasons assigned.