Case Name: AMERICAN HOME PRODUCTS CORPORATION and Wyeth-Ayerst Laboratories, a division of American Home Products Corporation, Petitioners, v. Fawn C. CLARK, Sylvia Jacobson, Anna Kraus, Sharlet Laws, Nancy Webster, Donna Welch, Delia Zeeh, Carol Bodily, Mary Jo Hall, and Shonna Bush, Respondents
Court: Supreme Court of Texas
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 2000-12-21
Citations: 38 S.W.3d 92
Docket Number: No. 99-1056
Parties: AMERICAN HOME PRODUCTS CORPORATION and Wyeth-Ayerst Laboratories, a division of American Home Products Corporation, Petitioners, v. Fawn C. CLARK, Sylvia Jacobson, Anna Kraus, Sharlet Laws, Nancy Webster, Donna Welch, Delia Zeeh, Carol Bodily, Mary Jo Hall, and Shonna Bush, Respondents.
Judges: in which Chief Justice PHILLIPS, Justice ENOCH, Justice ABBOTT, Justice HANKINSON, Justice O’NEILL, and Justice GONZALES join.
Reporter: South Western Reporter Third Series
Volume: 38
Pages: 92–103

Head Matter:
AMERICAN HOME PRODUCTS CORPORATION and Wyeth-Ayerst Laboratories, a division of American Home Products Corporation, Petitioners, v. Fawn C. CLARK, Sylvia Jacobson, Anna Kraus, Sharlet Laws, Nancy Webster, Donna Welch, Delia Zeeh, Carol Bodily, Mary Jo Hall, and Shonna Bush, Respondents.
No. 99-1056.
Supreme Court of Texas.
Argued Sept. 6, 2000.
Decided Dec. 21, 2000.
David C. Duggins, Marnie Ann McCormick, Burgain G. Hayes, Kenneth J. Ferguson, Clark, Thomas & Winters, Patrick L. DeLaune, Austin, Grant Liser, Brown Herman Dean Wiseman Liser & Hart, Fort Worth, Leslie A. Benitez, Susan Elizabeth Burnett, Clark Thomas & Winters, Austin, Brian P. Leitch, Denver, CO, for petitioners.
Michael Y. Saunders, Helm Pletcher Bowen & Saunders, Sharon S. McCally, Daryl L. Moore, Moore & McCally, J. Donald Bowen, Helm Pletcher Bowen & Saunders, Dan M. Boulware, MacLean & Boulware, J. Scott Nabors, Helm Pletcher Bowen & Saunders, Houston, for respondents.

Opinion:
Justice BAKER
delivers the opinion of the Court
in which Chief Justice PHILLIPS, Justice ENOCH, Justice ABBOTT, Justice HANKINSON, Justice O'NEILL, and Justice GONZALES join.
This case requires us to interpret the interrelation between sections 15.002, 15.003, and 15.064 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code. American Home Products Corporation and its division, Wyeth-Ayerst Laboratories (American Home), challenged the propriety of venue in Johnson County, Texas, of the nonresident plaintiffs under sections 15.002 and 15.003 of the Code. The trial court held that each plaintiff had established venue against all defendants under sections 15.002(a)(2) and 15.005 of the Code. American Home filed an interlocutory appeal from the trial court's order. The court of appeals dismissed American Home's appeal for want of jurisdiction. 999 S.W.2d 908. The primary issue in this case is whether section 15.003(c) grants a court of appeals interlocutory appellate jurisdiction over all venue decisions that relate to intervention or joinder. We hold that the court of appeals correctly held it does not. Accordingly, we affirm its judgment.
I. JURISDICTION
A. The Code Provisions
Under the Legislature's general venue scheme, except as otherwise provided, all lawsuits shall be brought in the county of the defendant's residence at the time the cause of action accrued if the defendant is a natural person. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 15 .002(a)(2). When a plaintiff has established proper venue against a defendant, the court also has venue of all the defendants in all claims or actions arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences. Tex. Civ. PRAC. & Rem.Code § 15.005. In a suit in which more than one plaintiff is joined, each plaintiff must independently establish proper venue. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code § 15.003(a). The Legislature has provided that no interlocutory appeal shall lie from a trial court's determination of a venue question. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code § 15.064(a). But the Legislature has provided the right of limited interlocutory appeal in an intervention or joinder situation:
Any person seeking intervention or join-der, who is unable to independently establish proper venue, or a party opposing intervention or joinder of such a person may contest the decision of the trial court allowing or denying intervention or joinder by taking an interlocutory appeal to the court of appeals' district in which the trial court is located under the procedures established for interlocutory appeals.
Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code § 15.003(c).
B. Procedural History
Here, eleven plaintiffs sued ten defendants in Johnson County, Texas, claiming injuries resulting from taking diet drugs commonly known as Fen-Phen. Nine plaintiffs live outside Texas, one lives in Gregg County, Texas, and only one lives in Johnson County, the county of suit. American Home does not challenge venue as it relates to the Johnson County resident. American Home filed a Motion to Transfer Venue, Objection to Attempted Joinder, and a Motion to Strike or Sever the Plaintiffs. It challenged the propriety of venue of the nonresident plaintiffs in Johnson County under both sections 15.002 and 15.003 of the Code. The plaintiffs responded to these motions by filing affidavits of each plaintiff, an affidavit of one of their attorneys, and affidavits of their experts. The trial court conducted a nonevidentiary hearing and denied all American Home's motions without specifying the grounds for its decision.
American Home filed an interlocutory appeal of the trial court's order. American Home asserted that the plaintiffs could not establish venue under section 15.002(a) and that they had failed to establish join-der under section 15.003(a). The plaintiffs contended that they had established venue under section 15.002(a) because each had individually sued the Johnson County physician who had treated the Johnson County plaintiff.
The court of appeals observed that the trial court's order did not specify on what ground the trial court had denied American Home's Motion to Transfer. Thus, the court could not determine whether it had jurisdiction of American Home's appeal. Accordingly, it abated the appeal and requested the trial court to enter an order specifying the basis for its ruling. 3 S.W.3d 57.
The trial court signed a revised order, which held that (1) the plaintiffs each established venue against the Johnson County physician under section 15.002(a)(2), and (2) because the plaintiffs established venue against the physician, venue was proper against all other defendants under section 15.005. Subsequently, the court of appeals, with one judge dissenting, held that because the trial court's denial of American Home's motions was under section 15.002, it had no interlocutory-appeal jurisdiction. 999 S.W.2d 908. Here, American Home raises two issues: (1) whether the court of appeals abused its discretion by abating the appeal and requiring the trial court to enter a clarifying order; and (2) whether, under section 15 .003(c), a court of appeals has interlocutory appellate jurisdiction over all venue decisions that relate to intervention or joinder.
C. Analysis
American Home recognizes that the law requires a party to wait until a final judgment is entered in a case to appeal an erroneous venue ruling See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code § 15.064(a); Wilson v. Texas Parks & Wildlife Dep't, 886 S.W.2d 259, 262 (Tex.1994). However, American Home asserts that this rule does not apply in multi-plaintiff trials because the Legislature has provided an avenue for speedy pretrial appellate review in section 15.003.
American Home recognizes that a court of appeals may only exercise interlocutory jurisdiction under section 15.003 if the joining party is unable to establish proper venue independently under section 15.002. But American Home also notes that section 15.003 requires a court of appeals to decide the joinder issue based upon an independent determination from the record. Therefore, it contends that when a plaintiff argues venue under both sections 15.002 and 15.003, the court of appeals must independently determine whether the plaintiff can establish venue under section 15.002 to determine whether it has jurisdiction under section 15.003.
American Home further contends that a court of appeals must be able to review a trial court's decision to permit a multi-plaintiff case to proceed in the face of a venue or joinder challenge, regardless of the expressed basis for the trial court's decision, if section 15.003 is to retain any meaning. Thus, American Home argues, to determine its own jurisdiction under section 15.003(c), a court of appeals must decide whether a party is a person unable to independently establish proper venue.
On the other hand, the plaintiffs argue that the Legislature has expressly mandated that venue determinations are not subject to interlocutory appeal. See Tex. Civ. PRAC. & Rem.Code § 15.064(a). They argue that while section 15.003's plain language grants an interlocutory appeal to those opposing the joinder of persons who are unable to independently establish proper venue, that section does not grant an interlocutory appeal to those opposing the join-der of persons who are able to independently establish proper venue. Plaintiffs assert that, here, because the trial court determined that the plaintiffs independently established proper venue under sections 15.002 and 15.005, the trial court never reached the joinder issue under 15.003(a). Thus, the plaintiffs contend that interlocutory appellate jurisdiction does not exist under 15.003(c) to review the trial court's venue determination.
When we construe a statute, our objective is to determine and give effect to the Legislature's intent. Tex. Gov't Code § 312.005; Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Garrison Contractors, Inc., 966 S.W.2d 482, 484 (Tex.1998). We endeavor to discover what the Legislature intended from the actual language that the Legislature used. Mitchell Energy Corp. v. Ashworth, 943 S.W.2d 436, 438 (Tex.1997). We look first to the plain and common meaning of the statute's words. Fitzgerald v. Advanced Spine Fixation Sys., Inc., 996 S.W.2d 864, 865 (Tex.1999).
Section 15.003 is not a venue statute; it is a joinder statute. The statute allows an interlocutory appeal for one specific purpose: to contest the trial court's decision allowing or denying intervention or joinder. See Tex. Civ. PRAC. & Rem.Code § 15.003(c); Surgitek, Inc. v. Adams, 955 S.W.2d 884, 887 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1997, pet. dism'd by agr.). Section 15.003(c) does not provide for an interlocutory appeal from the trial court's determination that a person seeking intervention or joinder has independently established proper venue. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 15.003(c); Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Goldston, 983 S.W.2d 369, 374 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1998, pet. dism'd by agr.); Adams, 955 S.W.2d at 887.
When the trial court's order necessarily determines an intervention or joinder issue under section 15.003(a), section 15.003(c) plainly allows for either party to contest that decision by taking an interlocutory appeal. See Tex. Civ. Prac & Rem.Code § 15.003(c); Surgitek v. Abel, 997 S.W.2d 598, 601 (Tex.1999). Conversely, if the trial court determines that venue is proper under section 15.002, the inquiry is over. This is because section 15.003(a) takes as its starting point a "person who is unable to establish proper venue." Surgitek v. Abel, 997 S.W.2d at 602. Thus, if the trial court, even erroneously, decides that venue is proper under section 15.002, an interlocutory appeal under section 15.003(c) is unavailable. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 15.064(a); Adams, 955 S.W.2d at 887. Neither the court of appeals nor this Court can review the propriety of the trial court's venue decision.
American Home's argument that a court of appeals has interlocutory-appeal jurisdiction over all venue decisions that relate to intervention or joinder is without merit. Such an interpretation would make any trial court venue decision under § 15.002 in a multi-plaintiff case reviewable by interlocutory appeal, which is contrary to the plain language of the statute. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code § 15.064 ("No interlocutory appeal shall lie from the [venue] determination."). The language the Legislature used clearly indicates its intent to limit interlocutory appellate review of a trial court's decision to whether certain plaintiffs may intervene or join in the suit. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code § 15.003(c) ("Any person seeking intervention or join-der, who is unable to independently establish proper venue, or a party opposing intervention or joinder of such a person may contest the decision of the trial court allowing or denying intervention or join-der by taking an interlocutory appeal") (emphasis added). Section 15.003(c) does not permit an interlocutory appeal under the circumstances that exist here. Accordingly, we conclude that the court of appeals correctly dismissed American Home's appeal for want of jurisdiction.
II. THE ABATEMENT ORDER
American Home also contends that the court of appeals violated Rule 29.5 of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure by abating the appeal and asking the trial court to enter an order specifying the basis for its ruling. American Home's position is that the court of appeals' jurisdiction attached when American Home filed its notice of appeal and that the court should have exercised its jurisdiction free from the trial court's interference. Specifically, American Home asserts that the court of appeals' abatement order violated Rule 29.5 by inviting interference with the court of appeals' jurisdiction and instructing the trial court how to make its decision non-reviewable.
Rule 29.5 provides that while an interlocutory appeal is pending, a trial court retains jurisdiction of the case and may make further orders and may even proceed with the trial on the merits. Tex.R.App. P. 29.5. The rule only prohibits a trial court from entering an order that (1) is inconsistent with any appellate court temporary order, or (2) interferes with or impairs the appellate court's jurisdiction or the effectiveness of any relief sought or that may be granted on appeal. Tex. R.App. P. 29.5.
Here, American Home complains only about the court of appeals' abatement order and asserts no complaint about the trial court's order. Accordingly, Rule 29.5 of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure is not the governing rule. Instead, Rule 44 of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure governs the court of appeals' action in this case. Rule 44.4(a) prohibits the court of appeals from affirming or reversing a judgment if a trial court's erroneous action or inaction prevents a proper presentation of a case to the court of appeals and the trial court can correct its action or failure to act. Tex.R.App. P. 44.4(a). If the circumstances in 44.4(a) exist, the court of appeals must direct the trial court to correct the error. Tex.R.App. P. 44.4(b). Here, the court of appeals complied with Rule 44.4 in requiring the trial court to enter a clarifying order to allow a proper presentation of the appeal.
III. CONCLUSION
We conclude that the court of appeals did not abuse its discretion in abating American Home's appeal and requiring the trial court to render a clarifying order. We further conclude that the court of appeals correctly dismissed American Home's appeal for want of jurisdiction. Accordingly, we affirm the court of appeals' judgment.