Case Name: PEOPLE v. WILLIAMS
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1906-12-07
Citations: 101 N.Y.S. 562
Docket Number: 
Parties: PEOPLE v. WILLIAMS.
Judges: 
Reporter: West's New York Supplement
Volume: 101
Pages: 562–566

Head Matter:
PEOPLE v. WILLIAMS.
(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department.
December 7, 1906.)
Constitutional Law—Labob Laws—Police Poweb.
The clause of section 77 of the labor law (Laws 1903, p. 439, c. 184), forbidding the employment of minors under the age of 18 years and females in factories between 9 o’clock p. m. and 6 o’clock a. m., is not a valid exercise of police power, but an infringement of the constitutional right to contract.
Houghton and Ingraham, JJ., dissenting.
Appeal from Court of Special Sessions of City of New York.
David D. Williams was convicted of permitting a female to be employed in a factory under his charge after 9 o’clock p. m. From an order of the Court of Special Sessions (100 N. Y. Supp. 337) arresting judgment and discharging him, the people appeal. Affirmed.
Argued before McLAUGHLIN, INGRAHAM, HOUGHTON, CLARKE and SCOTT, JJ.
Julius M. Mayer, for the People.
Frederick B. House, for respondent.

Opinion:
SCOTT, J.
The opinion delivered by the learned justice who wrote for the Court of Special Sessions discusses the constitutional infirmity of the clause of the statute upon which the prosecution is based so satisfactorily that we adopt it as the opinion of this court. It would be necessary to add nothing to it, were it not for the fact that, in the discussion which has been had, a confusion seems to have arisen as to precisely what is the offense charged. The statute (section 77, Labor Law, Laws 1903, p. 439, c. 184) contains two inhibitions. It forbids the employment of any minor under the age of 18 years, or any female of any age in any factory before 6 o'clock in the morning or after 9 o'clock in the evening. It is this clause which the defendant is charged with violating. The other prohibition is quite distinct and forbids the employment of any such minor or woman for more than 10 hours a day, or for more than 60 hours in the week. The two inhibitions are quite distinct and unrelated. The first, which is the only one in question now, has nothing to do with the length of time a woman or minor shall work; for permitting such work for an hour, or even less time, within the .prohibited hours, is a violation of the clause. We may all be prepared to agree that for physical reasons a woman cannot, speaking generally, work as long or as hard as a man, and, if we had to consider a statute limiting the number of hours, per day or per week, during which a woman might work, the arguments now put forth to sustain the clause under consideration would be apposite and persuasive. But that question is not. before us, and its discussion serves rather to cloud than to clarify the question which is before us.
The provision under examination is aimed solely against work at night, without regard to the length of time during which work is performed, or the conditions under which it is carried on, and in order to sustain the reasonableness of the provision we must find that, owing to some physical or nervous difference, it is more harmful for a woman to work at night than for a man to do so, for concededly the clause in question would be unconstitutional if it applied to men as well as to women. We are not aware of any such difference, and in all the discussions that have taken place none such have been pointed out.
The order appealed from is therefore affirmed.
MCLAUGHLIN and CLARKE, JJ., concur.