Case Name: Gertrude Wehrheim v. Philetus Smith
Court: Illinois Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Illinois
Decision Date: 1907-02-21
Citations: 226 Ill. 346
Docket Number: 
Parties: Gertrude Wehrheim v. Philetus Smith.
Judges: 
Reporter: Illinois Reports
Volume: 226
Pages: 346–358

Head Matter:
Gertrude Wehrheim v. Philetus Smith.
Opinion filed February 21, 1907
Rehearing denied April 18, 1907.
1. Judgments and decrees—judgment a lien upon subsequently acquired real estate. Where a judgment debtor buys real estate and gives a trust deed for part of the purchase price within seven years after the rendition of a judgment against him, upon which an execution had been duly issued within one year, the judgment becomes a lien upon the difference between the value of the property and the amount necessary to discharge the balance due under the trust deed.
2. Mortgages—when judgment lienholder is a necessary party. One who holds a judgment lien against mortgaged property may be made a party to the proceeding to foreclose the mortgage, and may be compelled to make redemption from the foreclosure sale within the time allowed by law or be forever barred; but if he is nut made a party his rights remain the same as though no foreclosure had taken place.
3. Equity—equity having acquired jurisdiction may enforce legal rights. A court of equity having acquired jurisdiction for one purpose may retain it for all purposes necessary to do complete justice between the parties and determine all their rights in the controversy, even though legal rights are involved which otherwise could be enforced only in a court of law.
4. Same—effect where lien of judgment expires pending suit. Where a bill is filed to determine the rights of a judgment lien-holder who had not been made a party to a previous foreclosure sale, and the lienholder answers claiming the right to redeem under his judgment, which is then a valid lien, the court acquires complete jurisdiction of the controversy, and in case the rendition of a final decree is delayed until after the lien of the judgment has expired, the court should, in its decree, provide for revival of the judgment and permit a redemption to be made according to the rights of the parties at the time the bill was filed.
Hand and Cartwright, JJ., dissenting.
AppEae from the Branch Appellate Court for the First District;—heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Flon. Joseph E. Gary, Judge, presiding.
September n, 1901, appellant sold the premises which are the subject matter of this suit to Otto C. Meinshausen for the sum of $44,750. Meinshausen paid $8000 of the purchase money in cash and received a deed for the premises, and to secure the balance of the purchase money gave appellant his two promissory notes, one for the sum of $8000 due December 10, 1901, and one for $28,750 due September 11, 1906, which were secured by a trust deed in the nature of a mortgage, bearing date September 11, 1901. The $8000 note was paid but default was made in the payment of the interest on the $28,750 note, and on July 1, 1902, the appellant elected to declare the entire debt due, and filed a bill in the circuit court of Cook county to foreclose said trust deed. That suit ripened into a decree, and the premises were sold at master’s sale on December 22, 1902, to satisfy the same. The appellant became the purchaser at the sale, she having bid the amount of the decree, $30,251, and no redemption having taken place, the premises, on March 23, 1904, were conveyed to her by the master. On November 10, 1897, the Euclid Avenue Savings and Banking Company of Cleveland, Ohio, recovered a judgment in the superior court of Cook county against Meinshausen for the sum of $1482.24. Original and alias executions were issued on the said judgment within one year from its rendition, which were returned not satisfied by the sheriff of Cook county, and at the time the bill was filed to foreclose the trust deed, said judgment had been assigned to the appellee and remained unsatisfied. The appellant, however, failed and neglected to make the appellee a party defendant to said foreclosure suit, as a judgment creditor of said Meinshausen or otherwise, and on May 4, 1904, the appellant filed this bill against Meinshausen, the appellee and other lienholders who were not made parties defendant to the foreclosure suit, appellee’s rights alone being here- involved', to settle and determine the rights of said appellee as a judgment creditor in said premises. The prayer of the bill, among other things, was that a decree be entered requiring appellee to redeem by paying the amount due appellant within a time fixed by the court, not exceeding the time allowed by law for redemption. The appellee filed an answer, claiming the right to redeem from the sale under said foreclosure decree, as the assignee of the judgment of the Euclid Avenue Savings and Banking Company. The case was referred to a master, who reported on December 28, 1904, that the appellee had no interest in said premises, and a decree was entered February 17, 1905, barring the right of the appellee to redeem from said foreclosure sale, as the assignee of said judgment or otherwise. The appellee prosecuted an appeal to the Appellate Court for the First District, where the decree of the circuit court was reversed, and the case was remanded, to the circuit court, with directions to enter a decree permitting the appellee to redeem from said foreclosure sale upon the payment by him to the appellant of her debt, taxes, expenses, etc., and the appellant, who was the appellee in the Appellate Court, has prosecuted an appeal to this court.
C. A. Williams, (H. J. Hamlin, of counsel,) for appellant:
A judgment of a court of record is a lien upon land for seven years if execution issues within one year, and ceases to be a lien at the end of seven years unless a levy has been made within seven years, when the lien is continued one year for the purpose of sale by virtue of the statute. Rev. Stat. chap. 77, sec. 1.
The filing of the bill of complaint herein did not and could not extend the life of appellee’s judgment so as to continue the lien of the same between the period of seven years after said judgment was entered and the revivor of the same. Riggin v. Mullin, 4 Gilm. 50; Fitts v. Davis, 42 Ill. 391; Tenney v. Hemenway, 53 id. 97; Harris v. Cornell, 80 id. 55; James v. Wortham, 88 id. 69; Dobbins v. Bank, 112 id. 553.
Where the statutes prescribe the time during which judgments shall have the force of liens on the lands of judgment debtors, one who has neglected to enforce the judgment lien in the proper time will not, in equity, be relieved from the consequences of his neglect. Davidson v. Burke, 143 Ill. 130.
James G. Skinner, (Stephen S: Gregory, C. H. Poppenhusen, and Jos. L. McNab, of counsel,) for appellee:
Section 20 of chapter 77 of our statutes provides for redemption by a creditor, etc., after the year has expired in which the judgment debtor may redeem and within fifteen months after sale. If such redemption is not made, any decree or judgment creditor, or his executors,'administrators or assigns, may redeem. This section also directs the manner in which the creditor may redeem. By express provision of this section the creditor’s assignee may redeem. Herdman v. Cooper, 138 Ill. 583; Sweesey v. Chandler, 11 id. 445.
Redemptions are looked upon with favor, and where no injury is to follow, a liberal construction will be given our redemption laws, to the end that the property of the debtor may pay as many of the debtor’s liabilities as possible. Boynton v. Pierce, 151 Ill. 203; Schuck v. Gerlach, 101 id. 343.
The issue of an execution and delivery thereof to the sheriff, and his endorsement thereon of a levy upon the premises to be redeemed, are not essential to the validity of the redemption, where the decree under which the redemption is had does not provide for any execution. Morava v. Bonner, 205 Ill. 321; Beadle v. Cole, 173 id. 136.
Equity once taking jurisdiction will grant relief to all parties. Pool v. Docker, 92 Ill. 501; Longshore v. Longshore, 200 id. 470.
Any one who has an interest in the mortgaged premises, claiming under the mortgagor, has the right of redemption. And this is the case whether his interest be legal or equitable, an estate or a lien. The only requisite is privity of estate with the mortgagor. Tiedeman on Real Property, sec. 234; Grobe v. Cushman, 45 Ill. 119.

Opinion:
Mr. Justice Wieicin
delivered the opinion of the court:
The judgment of the Euclid Avenue Savings and Banking Company against Otto C. Meinshausen, which was subsequently assigned to the appellee, was, as above stated, rendered November 10, 1897, and execution having been issued thereon within a year, under section 1 of chapter 77 (Hurd's Stat. 1905, p. 1253,) became a lien on the real estate of Meinshausen for a period of seven years from the date of its rendition. Meinshausen purchased the premises involved in this suit on September 11, 1901, and said judgment became a lien thereon subject to the trust deed to appellant, which was given to secure a part of the purchase price. In other words, it became a lien on the difference between the value of the property and the amount necessary to discharge the balance due appellant upon her trust deed. This was the condition of affairs on July 1, 1902, when appellant filed her bill for the foreclosure of the trust deed, and therefore appellee was not only a proper party to that foreclosure proceeding, but was a necessary party, if appellant sought thereby to affect in any way his rights and interest in the premises. (Boynton v. Pierce, 151 Ill. 197; Beadle v. Cole, 173 id. 136; People v. Bowman, 181 id. 421.) If appellee had been made a party defendant in that case he would have had an opportunity to be heard concerning his rights, and those rights could have been determined and fixed by the decree. In that case he might have been compelled, under section 20 of chapter 77, to redeem from the foreclosure sale after the expiration of twelve months and before the expiration of fifteen months from the date thereof, and upon failure to do so his equity of redemption would have been forever foreclosed and the absolute fee simple title vested in the purchaser. The appellant, however, did not see fit to make him a party defendant, and therefore the decree of foreclosure and sale had no force or effect whatever upon his rights, which remained the same as if that proceeding had never been had. (Rodman v. Quick, 211 Ill. 546.) At the expiration of the fifteen months from the date of sale, there having been no redemption, appellant received from the master-a deed to the premises on March 23, 1904. That deed, however, was subject to any outstanding rights of appellee as a judgment creditor. On May 4, 1904, as stated above, appellant filed her bill against appellee to settle and determine his rights to the premises, which is said by her counsel to be in the nature of a supplemental bill to the original foreclosure proceeding. At the time it was filed appellee's judgment was still in full force and effect, and an execution could have been issued upon it on that day and levied upon any property of the judgment debtor which was subject to levy. Between the filing of the bill and rendering the decree, which was on February 17, 1905, some nine months intervened. Appellee's judgment having been rendered on November 10, 1897, and execution duly issued within a year, remained a valid lien until November 10, 1904, or about six months after appellant filed her bill to determine appellee's rights as a judgment creditor. If a decree had been rendered upon her bill within that six months there could have been no doubt but that, the judgment being in full force and effect, the relief sought under appellee's answer would have been granted.
But it is claimed by appellant that on the day the decree was- actually rendered the judgment of appellee had become dormant by lapse of time; that no execution could then be issued upon the same, and therefore there could be no redemption from the foreclosure sale under the provisions of the statute, and therefore he had no interest in the premises and no' right to redeem therefrom. We do not think this contention can be maintained. On the day the bill was filed, and for six months thereafter, the judgment of appellee was in full force and effect. A suit had been commenced in equity by complainant to determine the rights of appellee as a judgment creditor. A summons had been served upon him and he had appeared and set up his right to redeem. A court of equity therefore had jurisdiction of the person of appellee and of the subject matter of the suit. It is a well known rule that when a court of equity acquires jurisdiction for one purpose it acquires jurisdiction for all purposes, and will do full and complete justice between all the parties and determine all their rights. It makes no difference that some of those rights may be in the nature of legal rights which otherwise could not be enforced outside of a court of law. (Morrison v. Morrison, 140 Ill. 560; Pool v. Docker, 92 id. 501; Keith v. Henkleman, 173 id. 137; Longshore v. Longshore, 200 id. 470.) The rights of the parties in this case were fixed and determined upon the date the bill was filed. The decree related back to the filing of the bill, and the rights of the parties should have been fixed as of that date. The mere fact that six months after that date, and before the rendition of the decree, the judgment of appellee had become dormant makes no difference. That judgment could have been revived in a court of law by scire facias, but appellee was hot required, under the circumstances, to go from a court of equity to a court of law for the purpose of reviving the judgment. A court of equity had full power and authority to determine the equities of the parties and make a decree protecting appellee's rights. If the decree for any reason was not rendered until after November 10, 1904, it was the duty of the court to provide in its decree for an extension or- revival of the judgment and not to compel appellee to resort to his action at law for that purpose. The record shows, however, that on January 27, 1905, the judgment was revived by appellee in the superior court of Cook county, and on January 28 this fact was called to the attention of the circuit court. This was twenty days before the rendition of the decree. But notwithstanding all these facts the court entered a decree barring appellee from all right of redemption.
Upon a consideration of all the facts we are convinced that the decree of the circuit court was erroneous, and that the Appellate Court committed no error in reversing said decree and remanding the cause to the circuit court for further proceedings. The judgment of the Appellate Court will therefore be affirmed. We do not,, however, agree with all the views expressed by the Appellate Court, and upon reinstatement of the cause in the circuit court that court is directed to enter a decree against the property in question in favor of appellee for the amount of his judgment, interest and costs, fixing a day within which the same may be paid by appellant and the property thereby relieved from the lien, and providing that in default of such payment said premises be sold to satisfy said judgment, interest and costs, and costs of sale, subject to the right of redemption.
Judgment affirmed.