Case Name: Leonard W. PENKOSKI, Appellant, v. Linda A. PATTERSON, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1983-11-09
Citations: 440 So. 2d 45
Docket Number: No. AQ-427
Parties: Leonard W. PENKOSKI, Appellant, v. Linda A. PATTERSON, Appellee.
Judges: LARRY G. SMITH and WENTWORTH, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 440
Pages: 45–47

Head Matter:
Leonard W. PENKOSKI, Appellant, v. Linda A. PATTERSON, Appellee.
No. AQ-427.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
Nov. 9, 1983.
Donald R. Colpitts and George E. Day, Fort Walton Beach, for appellant:
Ferrin C. Campbell, Sr., Crestview, for appellee.

Opinion:
PER CURIAM.
Appellant seeks review of a dissolution decree which also effected a division of marital property, awarded child custody, and imposed a support obligation. We find that the court erred as to the support obligation imposed, and we otherwise affirm the order appealed.
Pursuant to the dissolution decree, appellant is required to pay child support in the amount of $300 per month until the child attains the age of five; $400 per month thereafter until the child attains the age of ten; and $500 per month thereafter. Judgments providing for automatic changes in support payments are generally disfavored, as there is no evidentiary basis for the determination of future events, and there exists an adequate procedure for modification when changes in the circumstances of the parties do occur. See Kangas v. Kangas, 420 So.2d 115 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982). Unlike Spotts v. Spotts, 355 So.2d 228 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978), in the present instance the automatic increases are not conditioned upon specifically articulated future occurrences warranting a presumption that appellant will necessarily have a greater ability to pay. Instead, the support increases occur regardless of any external circumstances. Such an award is contrary to the principle that support should be based upon need and ability to pay; the lower court erred in mandating unconditioned automatic increases in support payments.
We conclude that any standard which could force a party to accept a decree based on clairveyance of the trial judge would be clearly less desirable than one which enables the judge to make a decision based on present conditions, leaving the parties to make their own decisions when monetary ability and needs change. The latter course has a tendency immediately to impress upon both parents the need for cooperation, not just with respect to monetary matters but as to all other conditions that may later affect the child. This rule places the burden of providing for future support needs of the child, and changing obligations of the parents, precisely where that burden belongs — upon the parents themselves. They may formalize a change by a two-line modification of support agreement. If either parent lacks the maturity and judgment to make those adjustments, a return to court is probably inevitable regardless of anticipatory provisions of the final judgment. If there is a prospect of added expense and emotional turmoil from the necessity for future judicial modification, that burden should be recognized as the result of lack of parental cooperation and recognition of changed circumstances, rather than a lack of judicial intervention in future affairs which are presently impossible to evaluate in context.
The order appealed is affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the cause remanded for redetermination of appellant's support obligation.
LARRY G. SMITH and WENTWORTH, JJ., concur.
JOANOS, J., dissents in part with opinion.