Case Name: LEWIS v. UPTON et al.
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1904-01-26
Citations: 86 N.Y.S. 397
Docket Number: 
Parties: LEWIS v. UPTON et al.
Judges: 
Reporter: West's New York Supplement
Volume: 86
Pages: 397–410

Head Matter:
(90 App. Div. 453.)
LEWIS v. UPTON et al.
(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Fourth Department.
January 26, 1904.)
1. New Trials—Law oe Case—Second Appeal.
Where the Appellate Division held, on reversing a judgment for plaintiff, that the question of adverse possession was one for the jury, and in a subsequent trial the jury found for plaintiff on substantially the same evidence, the Appellate Division, on appeal from the judgment rendered on such verdict, should adhere to its former decision, and affirm the judgment.
McLennan, P. J., and Stover, J., dissenting.
Appeal from Special Term, Monroe County.
Action by John T. Lewis against Eli M. Upton and others. From a judgment for plaintiff, and from an order denying a new trial, defendants appeal. Affirmed.
Argued before McLENNAN, P. J., and SPRING, WILLIAMS, HISCOCK, and STOVER, JJ.
Charles J. Bissell, for appellants.
John Van Voorhis, for respondent.

Opinion:
WILLIAMS, J.
The judgment and order should be affirmed, with costs.
The action was brought under section 1638 of the Code of Civil Procedure, to compel the determination of a claim to real property. The plaintiff claimed he had a record title to the real property, and that he had also acquired title thereto by adverse possession. Upon a former trial of the action both these questions were submitted to the jury under the instruction of the court that the plaintiff could recover if it was found that he had either a record title or a title acquired by adverse possession. The jury rendered a general verdict for the plaintiff. Upon appeal to this court it was held that there was no evidence to support the verdict if it was based upon the claim of a record title, because the deed under which he claimed did not cover the property in question. The court also held that the question of title acquired by adverse possession was one of fact for the jury. 52 App. Div. 617, 65 N. Y. Supp. 263. Inasmuch as the court could not say upon which claim the jury based its verdict, it was compelled to reverse the judgment and direct a new trial upon the question of adverse possession alone. Thereupon the case was again tried, and the decision of this court followed. The question of a record title was eliminated from the case, and the question of title by adverse possession was submitted to the jury. The plaintiff again had a verdict. Upon- an appeal to this court, it is now claimed there was no question for the jury upon this issue, and that the trial court should have held, as matter of law, that the plaintiff acquired no title to the property by adverse possession. This court having once passed upon that question on practically the same class of evidence, we should adhere to our former decision, and leave the question to be considered by the Court of Appeals, should the defendants desire to take the case to that court. If this court had held upon the former appeal that there was no question for the jury as to adverse possession, the cáse could then have gone directly to the Court of Appeals; but, under the decision then made, a new trial became necessary, and it was had, at considerable expense to the parties, and the result of such trial should not now be nullified by reversing our former decision. Moreover, upon the merits we are of the opinion that the various questions involved in the claim of title by adverse possession, including the occupation and cultivation of the property, and the protecting of the same by substantial inclosure, were properly submitted to the jury, and the evidence was sufficient to support the verdict rendered. No errors in the admission or rejection of evidence or in the charge of the court were committed, calling for a reversal of the judgment.
The judgment and order should therefore be affirmed, with costs. All concur, except McLENNAN, P. J., who dissents in an opinion in which STOVER, J., concurs.
The action was commenced on the 19th day of March, 1895, under section 1638 of the Code of Civil Procedure, to compel the determination of the claim of title made by the defendants to the premises described in the complaint. The answer denied plaintiff's title and possession, and alleged title and possession in the defendants. Plaintiff replied, averring that defendants' title is void under the champerty act, and setting up adverse possession as against the defendants. As appears by the judgment appealed from, three specific questions were submitted to the jury, as follows: First. Was the plaintiff, or were those whose estate he has, in possession of the real property in lot 43, in dispute in this action, for one year before March 19, 1895, the date of the commencement of this action, claiming said premises in fee? Second. At the time of the commencement of this action, had the plaintiff acquired title in fee to the premises in dispute by adverse possession thereof for 20 years or upwards? Third. Are the deeds from the heirs of Oliver Phelps, under which the defendants, except the defendant Hubbell, claim title to the premises in dispute, champertous and void for that reason? The jury answered each of said questions in the affirmative, and thereupon a judgment was entered in favor of the plaintiff, "that the defendants, and every person claiming under them by title accruing after the filing of the notice of the pendency of this action, be, and are hereby, forever barred from all claim to any estate, claim, or interest of any kind or nature in the lands described in the complaint, or any lien thereon or easement therein." The judgment then contained a description of the lands, which is precisely the same as contained in the complaint, and further awarded to the plaintiff the sum of $727.38 for his costs of the action. From such judgment, and from the order denying defendants' motion for a new trial, this appeal is. taken.