Case Name: H. W. CURREY, Respondent, v. TRINITY ZINC, LEAD & SMELTING COMPANY, Appellant
Court: Springfield Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Missouri
Decision Date: 1911-05-08
Citations: 157 Mo. App. 423
Docket Number: 
Parties: H. W. CURREY, Respondent, v. TRINITY ZINC, LEAD & SMELTING COMPANY, Appellant.
Judges: All concur.
Reporter: Missouri Appeal Reports
Volume: 157
Pages: 423–439

Head Matter:
H. W. CURREY, Respondent, v. TRINITY ZINC, LEAD & SMELTING COMPANY, Appellant.
Springfield Court of Appeals,
May 8, 1911.
Motion for Rehearing Filed July 20, 1911.
1. ATTACHMENT: Appearance: Giving Bond. Where the defendant in an attachment suit gives bond provided for under section 2341, Revised Statutes 1909, for the purpose of dissolving the attachment, it is a condition precedent that he appear and plead to the action. But a redelivery bond may he given under section 2317 without the necessity-of defendant entering his appearance in said cause.
2. JUDGMENTS: Setting Aside Default Judgment: Appearance. In an attachment suit where no service had been had upon defendant, the defendant’s attorney, believing it necessary to get the court’s order, filed an application to give a redelivery bond, appearing only for that purpose, and this application was later withdrawn by order of the court, because defendant’s attorney feared that it might be taken as an appearance.’ At the same term of court plaintiff obtained judgment by default against the defendant on the theory that the filing of the application to give the redelivery bond was equivalent to an appearance, and the defendant within two days after said judg ment was rendered filed its’motion to set the same aside and showed to the court that its attorney had no authority to enter its appearance at that term, and further, that it had a meritorious defense to plaintiff’s action. Held, that the court should have set aside the default judgment.
3. APPEARANCE: Jurisdiction: Appearing to Set Aside Default Judgment. Where the defendant files a motion to have a default judgment set aside on the ground that no process has been served on defendant in the cause and alleges that it had a meritorious defense to plaintiff’s action, this amounts to such an appearance by the defendant as will give the court jurisdiction. over the person of the defendant for all purposes in the action, and it is not thereafter necessary to have defendant served with process in said cause.
On Rehearing.
4. JUDGMENTS: Setting Aside Judgment at Same Term. The right to set aside a judgment on motion made at the term at which the same was rendered, exists independent of any-statute. It is the inherent power of every court of general jurisdiction and exists in all cases and upon the application of either party or upon the court’s own motion.
5. -: -: Parol Evidence Contradicting Record. There is a difference between the weight to be. given to the recitals of a judgment when their correctness is made an issue in a direct proceeding at the term at which the judgment was rendered, and when the attack is made at a subsequent term. During the term the record remains in the breast of the court and is alterable by it during that term, and parol testimony is admissible at the same term in a proceeding to get the court to change its judgment, even though such parol evidence may contradict the judgment as written; but after the term has expired, parol evidence is not admissible to contradict the record.
6. -: Appearances: Withdrawing Appearance. The defendant in an attachment suit, upon whom no service had been had, filed an application asking the court to permit it to give a bond to have its property released from the attachment, and defendant appeared only for that motion; and the bond contemplated was a re-delivery bond, provided for by section 2317, Revised Statutes 1909. Fearing that the filing of this motion would be taken as an appearance the attorney for the defendant, a few days later, requested leave to withdraw the application and the court by order of record permitted the defendant to withdraw the appearance and the application. Held, that the order was a judgment of the court until reversed or set aside, and left the court without jurisdiction to render a judgment against the defendant.
7. -: Setting Aside Default Judgment. In a proceeding to set aside judgment by default, the general rule is that where the application discloses a good defense on the merits and a reasonable excuse is shown why the defendant did not appear and defend the case, and no substantial injury will result from allowing a trial on the merits, the court should exercise its discretion in favor of a trial on the merits.
Appeal from Jasper Circuit Court. — Eon. David E. Blair, Judge.
Reversed and remanded (with directions).
A. G-. Young for appellant.
(1) The withdrawal of au appearance is within the discretion of the court. As a general rule it should he allowed when the appearance is unauthorized. 3 Cyc. 529; Graham v. Spencer, 14 Fed. 603; 2 Amer. & Eng. Ency. PI. and Pr. 696. (2) If a party makes a motion in a cause, limiting his appearance to a particular purpose, this does not constitute a general appearance. 2 Ency. PI. and Pr. 637; 3 Cyc. 509; Godley v. New Haven, 156 U. S. 518; Hawkins v. Pier.ce, 79 Fed. 452; Kime v. Lant, 68 Fed. 436. (3) To authorize a judgment against a party without service of process upon him, some acts of his clearly indicating his intention to voluntarily appear in this action must he shown by the record. Ferguson v. Ross, 5 Ark.'- 517; Lutes v. Perkins, 6 Mo. 58. (4), In several late, well reasoned cases it has been held that the giving of a redelivery bond is not such an appearance as will give the court jurisdiction of the person. If giving a bond is not an appearance, then certainly the offer to give a bond is not appearance. Hilton & Allen v. Can. Co., 48 S. E. (Ya.) 899; Winter, v. Packing Co., 93 Pac. 930. (5) The trial court will be more often reversed for refusing to set aside a default judgment than for doing so. Hall v. McConey, 132 S. W. 618.
George V. Farris and W. J. Owen for respondent.
(1) When an attorney is directed by his client to enter special appearance, yet in doing so he pleads matters operating as a general appearance, the client is bound thereby. McNeal v. Gossard, 74 Pac. 629, 68 Kan. 113; Kramer v. Gerlach, 59 N. Y. S. 855; Maher v. Railroad, 146 Fed. 921. (2) By an appearance for any other purpose than to object to the jurisdiction of the court over his person a defendant voluntarily submits himself to the jurisdiction of the court. Berham v. Lewis, 76 Pac. 337; Long v. Newhouse, 49 N. E. 79 ; Andrews v. Sheely, 51 So. 122; McCullough v. Railway, 73 Atl. 1667. (3) Where the defendant appears specially to question the jurisdiction of the court over his person, if he includes therein some other grounds recognizing the jurisdiction of the court, it amounts to a general appearance. West Grain Co. v. Bartley, 74 Atl. 736; Dudley v. White, 31 So. 836; Ray v. Trice, 37 So. 582; Nicholas & Sheppard v. Baker, 73 Pac. 362; McCoy v. Stockman, 46 N. E. 21; Gorham v. Tanquery, 48 Pac. 916; Teeter v. King, 76 Pac. 688; Summitt Lbr. Co. v. Cornell-Yale Co., 123 N. W. 444. (4) There are two ways of relieving property from the effect of an attachment by giving bond. One is by giving bond and security to the satisfaction of the officers executing the writ, payable to the sheriff, his successors or assigns, in double the value of the property attached, conditioned that the same shall be forthcoming when and where the court shall direct and shall abide the judgment of the court, and this bond is authorized by section 2317, Revised Statutes 1969, and the other is a bond given to the plaintiff with good and sufficient security to be approved by the court, conditioned that defendant shall pay to plaintiff the amount which shall be adjudged in favor of the plaintiff, etc., and this bond is authorized by section 2341, R. S. 1969. The former does not discharge the lien of an attachment but the latter dissolves the attachment and discharges property of lien. The former may not, the latter does render the defendant liable to be proceeded against, as in case of personal service. Winter v. Packing Co. 93 Pac. 930; New Albany v. Sulzer, 63 N. E..873; Ferguson v. Glidwell, 48 Ark. 195; Whiting & Williams v. Budd, 5 Mo. 443; Evans v. King, 7 Mo. 412; Drake on Attachment, sec. 322. (5) Whether an appearance is general or special does not depend upon the form of the pleading, but upon the substance. If the defendant invokes the judgment of the court in any manner upon any question except that of the power of'the court to hear and determine the controversy, his appearance is general. Bankers Ins. Co. v. Bobbins, 80 N. W. 484;-Frank v. Zeigel, 33 S. E. 761. (6) If the defendant intends to rely on a want of jurisdiction he must appear for the sole purpose to object to the jurisdiction; if he appears for any other purpose his appearance is general. Lorton v. Heye, 95 N. W. 1040; Thomason v. Ins. Co. 114 Mo. App. 109. (7) If a defendant has entered his appearance the subsequent withdrawal of his appearance dose not withdraw his appearance so as to deprive the court of the jurisdiction of his person. Harrison v. Bank, 69 N. E. 871. (8) There is an appearance for all purposes where defendant moves to vacate the judgment alleging an illegal service of. the writ, and that he has a just defense to the claim which he set out. Jeannette v. Eoheme, 47 Átl. 283; Henry v. Henry, 87 N. W. 522; Crawford v. Foster, 84 Fed. 939; Daley v. Iselin, 61 Atl. 919.

Opinion:
GRAY, J.
— The plaintiff brought this suit, in the circuit court of Jasper County, on the 2d day of July, 1910, to recover from the defendant $1620', and to impound certain funds belonging to the defendant in the hands of A. F. Carmean, clerk of the circuit court of said county. In aid of the suit, an attachment was issued and the funds of the defendant owing by tenants on its mining lands in said county, were garnisheed. Summons was issued to the sheriff returnable to the Octo ber term of the court. There was no service on the defendant, but on the 5th day of October, (the third day of the term) the following- motion (omitting caption) was filed by the defendant: "Comes now the defendant and appearing for the purpose of this application only, and represents to the court that the plaintiff has attached the property and effects of defendant and asks the court to make an order permitting defendant to give bond in a sum to be fixed by the court and have the property and effects of defendant released from said attachment."
On the 13th day of October, the defendant appeared by its attorney and asked permission to withdraw the application above set forth, and the following order was duly entered of record: "By leave of court application for an order permitting the defendant to give a redelivery bond withdrawn."
On the 15th of October, judgment was rendered against the defendant in favor of the plaintiff. The judgment of the court recites, "it appearing to the court that the defendant has filed a motion herein praying the court for an order allowing it to file a redelivery bond, and asking the court for* an order releasing the attached property herein," etc.
On the 18th day of October, the defendant filed a motion to set aside the default judgment, for the following reasons: "1st. That said judgment was rendered without proper service of process upon this defendant. And defendant states that he has a good and meritorious defense to the said cause of action stated in plaintiff's petition, to-wit: That plaintiff has been fully paid for all services rendered defendant as general manager or attorney or in any other capacity, and that defendant is not indebted to him in any sum for said services."
The motion was supported by the affidavit of appellant's attorney, but was overruled by the court, after the parties had offered testimony relating to the same.
It was shown by the testimony that the defendant is a foreign corporation, with its chief office out of this state; that for sometime previous to the institution of this suit, the plaintiff had been its general manager and attorney in Missouri; that he was superseded by a Mr. Ewell, and this suit was instituted by plaintiff to recover the amounts he claimed the defendant owed him for services rendered. The defendant had appointed Mr. Ewell its agent, upon whom process might be served in this state. The certificate had been filed with the Secretary of State. Mr. Ewell was located in Webb City, but had no sign at his place of business indicating that it was an office of the defendant.
The evidence further shows, however, that the plaintiff had transacted business with Mr. Ewell as the general manager of the defendant, and that plaintiff had this knowledge in plenty time to have served the summons upon Mr. Ewell, had he so desired.
The evidence further shows that it was understood between Mr. Young, the attorney for defendant, and Mr. Ewell, its manager, that nothing should be done to enter the appearance of the defendant at the October term, for the reason that defendant was not ready for trial on the merits. The plaintiff was suing on an account as general manager and attorney, and the defendant wanted to ascertain what services had been rendered, as the defense was that plaintiff had been paid in full for the value of of the services rendered. Parties were mining on the defendant's lands, and its funds were tied up by the attachment proceedings. After talking the matter over, Mr. Young and Mr. Ewell agreed that they could give a redelivery bond to the sheriff under section 2317, Revised Statutes 1909. On reading the statute, the defendant's attorney was of the opinion that the words found therein, to-wit, "under the order of the court," required him to obtain an order from the court to authorize the sheriff to take the bond, and he appeared in court for the sole purpose of getting the order under that section of the statute; that when he afterwards learned that his appearance for that purpose might be construed as an appearance in the case, and that it was not necessary to apply to the court for an order under that section, he immediately asked permission to withdraw his application, and the same was granted. The order of the court and its judgment show that the court so understood the application of the defendant. It may be stated that there is no conflict as to the facts, and they are substantially as herein stated.
It is the claim of the respondent that appellant's application was made under section 2341. This section provides how an attachment may be dissolved. First. When the affidavit is insufficient. Second. When the defendant shall appear and plead to the action and give bond to the plaintiff, conditioned that the property .attached shall be forthcoming when and where the court shall direct. And third. When the defendant shall appear and plead to the action and give like bond, conditioned that the defendant shall pay to plaintiff the amount which may be adjudged in favor of the plaintiff, including interest and costs of suit.
It will be noticed that the authority to dissolve attachment by giving bond, is conditioned on the appearance of defendant and plea filed to the action.- The defendant did not appear and plead to the action, and there is no testimony tending to prove that it was proceeding under section 2341. The undisputed testimony corroborated by the order and judgment of the court, shows that defendant was proceeding under ' section 2317.
Counsel for the respondent claim that the decision is controlled by the case of Whitings & Williams v. Budd, 5 Mo. 443. In that case a motion was filed to quash the attachment, and the parties were intentionally proceeding under what is now section 2341, and the court rightfully held that they were in court for all purposes. And if the evidence showed, in this case, that defendant was proceeding under the provisions of that section, we would hold that notwithstanding it attempted to limit its appearance, that it was in court for all purposes.
But it is shown beyond question by all the evidence, that the defendant's attorney was proceeding under the other section of the statute, and not only with no intention of entering the appearance of his client, but at the time there was an understanding between him and his client that nothing should be done to enter the appearance of the defendant in the case at that term.
It is further shown that when the attorney learned that his actions might be construed by the plaintiff as an appearance, that he at once applied to and was granted permission by the court to withdraw the application.
This court has taken an advanced step toward the trial of cases upon the merits. We have adopted a most liberal set of rules in regard to the sufficiency of abstracts of the record filed in this .court. These rules were adopted with a view of avoiding the necessity of dismissing'so many appeals on account of mere technicality. In the recent case of Hall v. McConey, 132 S. W. 618, we declared: "Courts should and do favor the trial of causes upon their merits, and, if failure to secure such trial is not due to the negligence óf the party in default, he should, upon a proper showing of merits, be given an opportunity to be heard. And it is well settled that the appellate court is less apt to interfere when the judgment was set aside, than when it was not. This is upon the theory that, when the judgment is set aside, the cause is reopened and justice will yet be done on the merits between the parties." We further said: "The general rule is that, where the application discloses a. good defense on the merits, and a resonhble excuse for delay is shown, and no substantial injury has resulted from such temporary delay, the court should exercise its discretion in favor of the trial on the merits."
In the present case, the suit was not for trial at the October term. The action of the defendant's attorney in applying to the court, under a mistaken view of the law, for an order to permit the sheriff to take a redelivery bond, in no wise delayed the prosecution of plaintiff's suit. The case is not similar to one where the party has been served with process, but failed to appear and the plaintiff appeared in proper time and took his judgment. In such a case, to set aside the judgment is to punish the plaintiff for the negligence of the defendant.
The premises considered, we are of the opinion that when the defendant made it appear to the court that its counsel was not authorized to enter its appearance for the October term, and that in making the application for a bond, the attorney was under the impression that it was necessary to obtain an order of the court before the sheriff was authorized to accept a redelivery bond, and that the attorney appeared for no other purpose, and subsequently, when he learned that plaintiff was construing his conduct as an appearance, immediately withdrew his application, and that defendant was- claiming that it had a meritorious defense to plaintiff's demand, and that it had paid plaintiff all sums due him for services rendered defendant, the court should have set aside the default judgment.
The appearance of the defendant for the purpose .of asking to have the default judgment set aside, and alleging that it had a meritorious defense to plaintiff's cause of action, was such an appearance by defendant that it was in court for all purposes at the time the court overruled the motion to set aside the judgment, and it will not be necessary for the plaintiff to take further steps to secure jurisdiction over the person of the •defendant.
The judgment will be .reversed and the cause remanded, with directions to the trial court to set aside the default judgment and give the defendant an opportunity to plead to the merits.
All concur.