Case Name: James C. WILLIAMS v. STATE of Louisiana, Through the DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1977-10-17
Citations: 351 So. 2d 1273
Docket Number: No. 11521
Parties: James C. WILLIAMS v. STATE of Louisiana, Through the DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS.
Judges: Before BLANCHE, COVINGTON and CHIASSON, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 351
Pages: 1273–1275

Head Matter:
James C. WILLIAMS v. STATE of Louisiana, Through the DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS.
No. 11521.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, First Circuit.
Oct. 17, 1977.
Rehearing Denied Nov. 21, 1977.
D. Michael Mooney, Lake Charles, of counsel for plaintiff-appellant James C. Williams.
Michael C. Barron, Staff Atty., Baton Rouge, of counsel for defendant-appellee State of La. through Dept, of Corrections.
Before BLANCHE, COVINGTON and CHIASSON, JJ.

Opinion:
COVINGTON, Judge:
Plaintiff, James C. Williams, an inmate of Louisiana State Penitentiary (Angola), who sustained chest injuries in a stabbing incident by Andrew Harding, a fellow inmate, appeals from the judgment of the lower court dismissing his claim for damages. We affirm.
The applicable rule of law has been stated by the Louisiana Supreme Court in the case of Parker v. State, 282 So.2d 483, 486 (La., 1973), as follows:
"A penal institution is not an insurer of an inmate against attacks by other inmates. The standard is that of reasonable or ordinary care. The majority rule is that in order to hold the penal authorities liable for an injury inflicted upon an inmate by another inmate, the authorities must know or have reason to anticipate that harm will ensue and fail to use reasonable care in preventing the harm. St. Julian v. State, La.App., 98 So.2d 284 (1957); 60 Am.Jur.2d, Penal and Correctional Institutions, § 17, p. 821 (1972); 72 C.J.S. Prisons section 13, p. 866; Annot., Prison-Assault by Prisoner, 41 A.L.R.3rd 1021, 1028-1029 (1972)."
Under the Parker rule, the lower court found no negligence on the part of defendant, State of Louisiana through the Department of Corrections, or the prison employees.
We have carefully reviewed the record, and find that the evidence amply supports the lower court's finding. The record clearly establishes that the prison officials had no forewarning of any danger to the plaintiff, no one anticipated or foresaw any difficulty between the plaintiff and Harding. The officials had no reasonable cause to anticipate an attack on Williams. Prior to the stabbing incident, he had not been threatened in any way by Harding. Indeed, Williams testified that he had never had an altercation or "bad words" with Harding and that he had no reason to fear Harding.
The facts are not in serious dispute. They can be stated briefly. On the date of the stabbing, November 14, 1972, both inmates were assigned a four-dormitory unit in the Big Stripes area designated "Hickory Three." Harding and another inmate, Albert Dixon, engaged in "horseplaying and tussling," which got out of hand, so that Harding separated himself from the tussle and came over to Williams' bed in the dormitory where the plaintiff and another inmate, Hayes Williams, were talking.
The plaintiff described the incident as follows:
"And he told Hayes something and he started arguing with Hayes. Well, then he looked at me, and he told me, that you, T been wanting to do you something.' And he went down in his boot and got a knife. When he came up with the knife, I tried to move and that's when I was hit. He knifed me over my chest, right side of my chest, punctured my lung and I went to the hospital."
The attack appears to have been sudden, unprovoked, and without warning to the plaintiff. At the time of the stabbing, the prison guard was at his proper station, a booth outside of the dormitory. The prison officials arrived promptly on the scene and stopped the altercation. Soon thereafter they removed the plaintiff to the Angola hospital and later to Earl K. Long Hospital in Baton Rouge. These facts clearly show that the penal institution measured up to its standard of "reasonable or ordinary care."
The appellant primarily argues that the proper officials did not use ordinary care in providing the plaintiff with a safe environment while incarcerated at Angola. In support of his contention, the appellant argues that the Louisiana Supreme Court in Breaux v. State, 326 So.2d 481 (La., 1976) tacitly upheld the broader view of the First Circuit of Appeal in Breaux v. State, 314 So.2d 449 (La.App. 1 Cir. 1975), by not rejecting the view expressed therein.
We had occasion to consider this same argument in our recent decision of Jones v. State of Louisiana, Through the Department of Institutions, 346 So.2d 807 (La.App. 1 Cir. 1977), and we concluded that the Supreme Court has not extended the Parker rule, and that the Parker rule of "reasonable or ordinary care" is the standard applicable to a prison-assault by another inmate, such as we have here.
We adhere to the Jones decision. We find that the penal authorities had no reason to anticipate that harm would come to Williams and that they used all reasonable or ordinary care to prevent harm to him.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the lower court, dismissing the plaintiff's claim, and cast the appellant for costs.
AFFIRMED.