Case Name: In the Matter of Paul Smith et al., Appellants, v. Town of Mendon et al., Respondents
Court: New York Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 2004-12-21
Citations: 4 N.Y.3d 1
Docket Number: 
Parties: In the Matter of Paul Smith et al., Appellants, v Town of Mendon et al., Respondents.
Judges: 
Reporter: New York Reports
Volume: 4
Pages: 1–29

Head Matter:
[822 NE2d 1214, 789 NYS2d 696]
In the Matter of Paul Smith et al., Appellants, v Town of Mendon et al., Respondents.
Argued November 17, 2004;
decided December 21, 2004
POINTS OF COUNSEL
Galvin and Morgan, Delmar (James Morgan and Madeline Sheila Galvin of counsel), for appellants.
I. The Supreme Court’s decision in Dolan v City of Tigard (512 US 374 [1994]) applies to this case. (Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd. v City of Monterey, 95 F3d 1422, 526 US 687.) II. The conservation restriction required by the Town of Mendon is a conservation easement, carrying with it all of the resulting legal sequelae. (Matter of Necker Pottick, Fox Run Woods Bldrs. Corp. v Duncan, 251 AD2d 333; Matter of Morrone v Bennett, 164 AD2d 887; Leibring v Planning Bd. of Town of Newfane, 144 AD2d 903; Human Dev. Servs. of Port Chester v Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Vil. of Port Chester, 110 AD2d 135, 67 NY2d 702; Soon Duck Kim v City of New York, 90 NY2d 1; Matter of Doyle v Amster, 79 NY2d 592; Matter of Fuhst v Foley, 45 NY2d 441; Conley v Town of Brookhaven Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 40 NY2d 309.) III. The Appellate Division incorrectly effectively reversed the State Supreme Court’s holding that a conservation “restriction” of the type sought by the Planning Board of the Town of Mendon legally constitutes an easement. IV Application of facially un constitutional provisions of the Mendon Town Code to Paul and Janet Smith results in violation of the Smiths’ constitutionally guaranteed rights. (Forsyth County, Ga. v Nationalist Movement, 505 US 123; Freedman v Maryland, 380 US 51; United States v Grace, 461 US 171; Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v Conrad, 420 US 546; Ward v Rock Against Racism, 491 US 781; City of Lakewood v Plain Dealer Publ. Co., 486 US 750; Regan v Time, Inc., 468 US 641; Simon & Schuster, Inc. v Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 US 105; Arkansas Writers’ Project, Inc. v Ragland, 481 US 221.) V. Town of Mendon Comprehensive Plan-2015 created a layering of requirements which is inherently discriminatory when applied to owners of property and in particular to owners of property whose ownership and rights flowing therefrom predate the creation of the Plan and which contains an unconstitutionally vague provision relating to “conservation restrictions” (easements). (McMinn v Town of Oyster Bay, 66 NY2d 544; City of Cleburne, Tex. v Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 US 432; Group House of Port Washington v Board of Zoning & Appeals, 45 NY2d 266; City of White Plains v Ferraioli, 34 NY2d 300; Huntington Branch, N.A.A.C.P. v Town of Huntington, 844 F2d 926, 488 US 15.) VI. The Town of Mention’s use of “conservation restrictions” as á condition of final approval of Paul and Janet Smith’s application is invalid and unenforceable. (Nollan v California Coastal Commn., 483 US 825; Dolan v City of Tigard, 512 US 374; Reed v Planning Bd. of Town of Chester, 120 AD2d 510; Matter of Brucia v Planning Bd. of Town of Huntington, 157 AD2d 657; Matter of Massiello v Town Bd. of Town of Lake George, 257 AD2d 962; Reed v Planning Bd. of Town of Chester, 120 AD2d 510; Matter of Ronsvalle v Blumenthal, 144 AD2d 766; Matter of Buckley v Amityville Vil. Clerk, 264 AD2d 732; Schneider v State of N.J., Town of Irvington, 308 US 147; Metromedia, Inc. v City of San Diego, 453 US 490.) VII. The Planning Board of the Town of Mendon proceeded improperly to create a condition precedent to approval of Paul and Janet Smith’s application and in so doing effected an impermissible, uncompensated taking of the Smiths’ property. (Matter of Chrysler Realty Corp. v Orneck, 196 AD2d 631; Matter of Exxon Corp. v Board of Stds. & Appeals, 128 AD2d 289; Matter of Mandel v Nusbaum, 138 AD2d 597; Matter of Black v Summers, 151 AD2d 863; Matter of Stockdale v Hughes, 189 AD2d 1065; Matter of Brous v Planning Bd. of Vil. of Southampton, 191 AD2d 553; Matter of McDonald’s Corp. v Kern, 260 AD2d 578; Matter of Swan v Depew, 167 AD2d 835; Matter of Greene v Johnson, 121 AD2d 632; Matter of Ka dish v Simpson, 55 AD2d 911.) VIII. As a direct result of and inextricably linked to the actions of Town of Hendon, Paul and Janet Smith were denied their constitutionally protected right of equal protection. (Pitchell v Callan, 13 F3d 545; Zahra v Town of Southold, 48 F3d 674; LaTrieste Rest. & Cabaret, Inc. v Village of Port Chester, 40 F3d 587; Riley v Town of Bethlehem, 44 F Supp 2d 451; RR Vil. Assn., Inc. v Denver Sewer Corp., 826 F2d 1197; Soon Duck Kim v City of New York, 90 NY2d 1.)
Chamberlain D’Amanda Oppenheimer & Greenfield, LLP, Rochester (George D. Marron and Sheldon W Boyce of counsel), for respondents.
I. This appeal should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because appellants have failed to state a cause of action for a regulatory taking and, therefore, have failed to raise a substantial constitutional issue as required by CPLR 5601 (b) (1). (PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v Robins, 447 US 74; Spears v Berle, 48 NY2d 254.) II. The proposed conservation restriction is a conservation easement and a negative easement; but it is not an exaction or dedication for public use of appellants’ property. (Rahabi v Morrison, 81 AD2d 434; Huggins v Castle Estates, 36 NY2d 427; Nature Conservancy v Congel, 253 AD2d 248.) III. Appellants’ third cause of action was properly denied and dismissed because the Planning Board of the Town of Hendon’s grant of conditional final site plan approval is not a regulatory taking. (Agins v City of Tiburon, 447 US 255; Eastern Enters, v Apfel, 524 US 498; City of Monterey v Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 US 687; Lucas v South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 US 1003; Dolan v City of Tigard, 512 US 374; Nollan v California Coastal Commn., 483 US 825; Bonnie Briar Syndicate v Town of Mamaroneck, 94 NY2d 96, 529 US 1094; Twin Lakes Dev. Corp. v Town of Monroe, 1 NY3d 98; Loretto v Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 US 419; de St. Aubin v Flacke, 68 NY2d 66.) IV Appellants’ second cause of action was properly denied and dismissed because the Planning Board of the Town of Hendon’s grant of conditional final approval of Paul and Janet Smith’s site plan is not illegal, or arbitrary and capricious as a matter of law. (Thomas v Brookins, 175 AD2d 619; Matter of Green v Planning Bd. of Town of New Castle, 220 AD2d 415; Matter of Grogan v Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Town of E. Hampton, 221 AD2d 441; Twin Lakes Dev. Corp. v Town of Monroe, 1 NY3d 98.) V Appellants’ claim for costs and disbursements of this proceeding pursuant to Town Law § 282 was properly dismissed because the claim is without merit. VI. The remainder of appellants’ arguments are irrelevant, groundless and lack any merit whatsoever.
Eliot Spitzer, Attorney General, Albany (Caitlin J. Halligan, Daniel Smirlock, Peter H. Lehner, John J. Sipos and Susan L. Taylor of counsel), for State of New York, amicus curiae. I. There is no physical taking of Paul and Janet Smith’s property. (Tahoe-Sierra Preserv. Council, Inc. o Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 535 US 302; Loretto o Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 US 419; Southview Assoc., Ltd. v Bongartz, 980 F2d 84, 507 US 987.) II. The conservation restriction is not an exaction triggering heightened scrutiny under the Takings Clause. (City of Monterey v Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 US 687; Dolan v City of Tigard, 512 US 374; Nollan v California Coastal Commn., 483 US 825; Agins v City of Tiburon, 447 US 255; Bonnie Briar Syndicate v Town of Mamaroneck, 94 NY2d 96, 529 US 1094; New Port Largo, Inc. v Monroe County, 95 F3d 1084, 521 US 1121; Clajon Prod. Corp. v Petera, 70 F3d 1566; Villager Pond, Inc. v Town of Darien, 56 F3d 375, 519 US 808; Walz v Town of Smithtown, 46 F3d 162, 515 US 1131; Matter of Grogan v Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Town of E. Hampton, 221 AD2d 441, 88 NY2d 919.) III. The proposed conservation restriction is a negative easement. (Witter v Taggart, 78 NY2d 234; Huggins v Castle Estates, 36 NY2d 427; Seawall Assoc. v City of New York, 74 NY2d 92, 493 US 976; Dolan v City of Tigard, 512 US 374; Southview Assoc., Ltd. v Bongartz, 980 F2d 84; Loretto v Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 US 419; Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v City of New York, 438 US 104.) IV There is no regulatory taking. (Bonnie Briar Syndicate v Town of Mamaroneck, 94 NY2d 96; Agins v City of Tiburon, 447 US 255; Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v City of New York, 438 US 104; Village of Euclid, Ohio v Ambler Realty Co., 272 US 365; Dittmer v County of Suffolk, 188 F Supp 2d 286; Wambat Realty Corp. v State of New York, 41 NY2d 490; Spears v Berle, 48 NY2d 254; French Inv. Co. v City of New York, 39 NY2d 587, 429 US 990; de St. Aubin v Flacke, 68 NY2d 66; Lubelle v Rochester Preserv. Bd., 158 AD2d 975, 75 NY2d 710.)
Community Rights Counsel, Washington, D.C. (Jason C. Rylander of counsel), for Association of Towns of the State of New York and others, amici curiae. I. The heightened scrutiny tests of Nollan v California Coastal Commn. (483 US 825 [1987]) and Dolan v City of Tigard (512 US 374 [1994]) do not apply to development restrictions that do not infringe the landowners’ right to exclude others from the property. (Loretto v Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 US 419; Kaiser Aetna v United States, 444 US 164; Lucas v South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 US 1003; Yee v City of Escondido, 503 US 519; Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v City of New York, 438 US 104; Pennsylvania Coal Co. v Mahon, 260 US 393; City of Monterey v Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 US 687; Bonnie Briar Syndicate v Town of Mamaroneck, 94 NY2d 96; Tahoe-Sierra Preserv. Council, Inc. v Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 535 US 302.) II. The Nolan v California Coastal Commn. (483 US 825 [1987]) and Dolan v City of Tigard (512 US 374 [1994]) tests Eire rooted in the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions and are inapplicable to workaday planning conditions. (Yee v City of Escondido, 503 US 519; Garneau v City of Seattle, 147 F3d 802; San Remo Hotel, L.P. v San Francisco City & County, 364 F3d 1088; Agins v City of Tiburon, 447 US 255; Bonnie Briar Syndicate v Town of Mamaroneck, 94 NY2d 96.)

Opinion:
OPINION OF THE COURT
Rosenblatt, J.
This appeal calls on us to determine whether a municipality commits an unconstitutional taking when it conditions site plan approval on the landowner's acceptance of a development restriction consistent with the municipality's preexisting conservation policy. We hold that it does not.
L
Paul and Janet Smith own a 9.7 acre lot in the Town of Hen-don. Situated along Honeyoe Creek, a protected waterway, the lot includes several environmentally sensitive parcels, falls within the creek's 100-year floodplain boundary and is located within 500 feet of a protected agricultural district. It also contains a woodlot and steep sloping areas susceptible to erosion. Several portions of the property sit within areas classified as environmental protection overlay districts (EPODs), pursuant to section 200-23 of the Hendon Town Code.
Four separate EPODs limit the Smiths' use of their property. The first, a "Steep Slope" EPOD, bars the construction of new buildings or structures, the clearing of any land area, the installation of sewage disposEd systems, the discharge of stormwater and the placement of stormwater runoff systems, and filling, cutting or excavation operations within the designated district. Property owners may acquire development permits for projects within a Steep Slope EPOD if they can show that their proposed activities will not destabilize the soil, cause erosion or unnecessarily destroy ground cover. They must further demonstrate that there is no reasonable alternative for the proposed activity.
The other three EPODs apply to sensitive lands bordering a major creek, an established wooded area and a floodplain. All contain comprehensive use restrictions similar to the Steep Slope EPOD. As a prerequisite for issuance of a development permit, all require specific showings that the proposed activity will not result in injuries to the covered, environmentally sensitive districts.
In December 2001, the Smiths applied to the Town Planning Board for site plan approval to construct a single-family home on the non-EPOD portion of their property. Following various proceedings, the Planning Board issued a final site plan approval in July 2002. The Board concluded that the Smiths' proposal was not likely to result in any adverse environmental impacts as long as no development occurred within the EPOD portions of the site. It conditioned final site plan approval on the Smiths' filing a conservation restriction on any development within the mapped EPODs and amending the final site plan map accordingly. Such action, the Planning Board stated, would "put subsequent buyers on notice that the property contains constraints which may limit development within these environmentally sensitive areas." The Board also determined that the restriction would provide the most meaningful and responsible means of protecting the EPODs.
The conservation restriction sought by the Town closely tracked the limitations set by the EPOD regulations. Under the restriction, which would run with the land and bind subsequent owners, the Smiths would be prohibited in the EPODs from ' [c]onstruction, including, but not limited to structures, roads, bridges, drainage facilities, barns, sheds for animals and livestock and fences," the "[cjlear-cutting of trees or removal of vegetation or other ground cover," changing the "natural flow of a stream" or disturbing the stream bed, installing septic or other sewage treatment systems, and using motorized vehicles.
The restriction also required the Smiths to maintain the "Restricted Area" in accordance with the terms of their grant and permitted the Town, upon 30 days' written notice, to enter the property to safeguard the environmentally sensitive parcels. The Smiths, their successors and their assigns, however, retained their rights to "full use and quiet enjoyment" of the EPODs. Critically, they retained the right to exclude others from the entirety of their 10-acre parcel.
The terms of the proposed "Grant of Conservation Restriction" mirrored the preexisting EPOD regulations, differing in only a few respects. First, the conservation restriction encumbered the servient property in perpetuity, whereas the Town could amend its EPOD ordinance. Under both the EPOD system and the conservation restriction, however, the Smiths could seek permission from the Town to conduct a proscribed activity in the environmentally sensitive parcels. Second, the conservation restriction afforded the Town greater enforcement power. Under the EPOD regime, the Town could only issue citations for violations, whereas with the conservation restriction, it could seek injunctive relief.
Rejecting the proposed conservation restriction, the Smiths commenced this hybrid declaratory judgment/CPLR article 78 proceeding, asserting that the restriction worked an unconstitutional taking. The Town moved for an order dismissing or granting summary judgment against the Smiths' claims. Applying Dolan v City of Tigard (512 US 374 [1994]), Supreme Court concluded that, although the conservation restriction was an "exaction," it did not effect an unconstitutional taking. The Smiths appealed.
The Appellate Division determined that Supreme Court erred in characterizing the conservation restriction as an exaction. It affirmed, however, holding that, because the proposed conservation restriction bore a reasonable relationship to the Town's objective of preserving the environmentally sensitive EPODs, there was no taking entitling the Smiths to compensation (see 4 AD3d 859 [4th Dept 2004]). The Smiths appeal as of right from the Appellate Division order, and we now affirm.
IL
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides "nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation." Historically, takings jurisprudence involved instances in which the government encroached upon or occupied real property for public use. Beginning with Pennsylvania Coal Co. v Mahon (260 US 393 [1922]), the Supreme Court recognized that, even if the government does not seize or occupy a property, a governmental regulation can work a taking if it "goes too far" (id. at 415).
In the years following Mahon, the Supreme Court offered "some, but not too specific, guidance to courts confronted with deciding whether a particular government action goes too far and effects a regulatory taking" (Palazzolo, 533 US at 617). The first and perhaps most critical factor in the Court's takings analyses became whether the regulation deprived landowners of "all economically viable use" of their property.
If the contested regulation falls short of eliminating all economically viable uses of the encumbered property, the Court looks to several factors to determine whether a taking occurred, including "the regulation's economic effect on the landowner, the extent to which the regulation interferes with reasonable investment-backed expectations, and the character of the government action." In a different formulation of this third factor, the Supreme Court held in Agins v City of Tiburón (447 US 255, 260 [1980]) that the "application of a general zoning law to particular property effects a taking if the ordinance does not substantially advance legitimate state interests" (see also Bonnie Briar Syndicate v Town of Mamaroneck, 94 NY2d 96 [1999]).®
Styling the conservation restriction an exaction, the Smiths argue that we should not review the Town's action under the Penn Central/Agins standard. We disagree. Exactions are defined as "land-use decisions conditioning approval of development on the dedication of property to public use" (City of Monterey v Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 US 687, 702 [1999] [emphasis added]). In a narrow, readily distinguishable class of cases, the Court has held such conditions unconstitutional.
In Nollan v California Coastal Commn. (483 US 825 [1987]), the Court considered whether conditioning a development permit on the property owners' transfer to the public of an easement across their beachfront violated the Takings Clause. The Court deemed the condition unconstitutional because it lacked an "essential nexus" (id. at 837) with the stated purpose of the underlying land-use restriction—"protecting the public's ability to see the beach, assisting the public in overcoming the 'psychological barrier' to using the beach created by a developed shorefront, and preventing congestion on the public beaches" (id. at 835). Nevertheless, the Court noted that the government could have conditioned the grant of a development permit on restrictions that promoted the public's ability to see and psychologically access the beach, such as height limitations, width restrictions, and the like (id. at 836).
In Dolan v City of Tigard (512 US 374 [1994]), the Supreme Court added a second layer to the "essential nexus" test— "rough proportionality." In Dolan, the municipality conditioned approval of a building permit on the landowner's dedication of, first, a portion of her property lying within a 100-year floodplain for improvements to a storm drainage system and, second, a strip of land adjacent to the floodplain for use as a pedestrian and bicycle path. The Court concluded that an essential nexus existed between these development conditions and a legitimate governmental purpose, but nevertheless determined that the municipality's proposed exactions were impermissible under a "rough proportionality" standard (id. at 391).
A showing of rough proportionality, the Court ruled, requires a municipality to "make some sort of individualized determination that the required dedication is related both in nature and extent to the impact of the proposed development" (id.). A "precise mathematical calculation" is not required (id.). The exactions at issue were not roughly proportional, the Dolan court reasoned, because the municipality had failed to meet its burden of showing the impact of the proposed construction on its flood and traffic abatement efforts. The Court stressed, however, that the municipality could, for instance, have conditioned the grant of a development permit on the transfer of a pedestrian/bicycle pathway easement if it had made "some effort to quantify its findings" that the construction would generate more traffic {id. at 395). In other words, a municipality could place otherwise unconstitutional conditions on the issuance of a regulatory permit if the condition furthered the purpose of the underlying development restriction and there was a rough proportionality between the condition and the impact of the proposed development.
With City of Monterey v Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd. (526 US 687, 702 [1999]), the Court placed a key limitation on Dolan, indicating that the "rough proportionality" test did not apply beyond the special context of exactions. The Court added that the test was not "designed to address, and is not readily applicable to" a case in which the landowner's challenge is based on denial of development, as opposed to excessive exactions {id. at 703).
¡IL
The Attorney General has submitted an amicus brief arguing for affirmance, cogently pointing out that the present case involves efforts by the Town of Mendon to protect environmentally sensitive lands by means of a "do-no-harm" restriction that involves no property dedication of the type encountered in Nollan and Dolan. We agree. Under the Supreme Court's doctrinal framework, the Appellate Division correctly determined that the Town's conservation restriction was not an "exaction" subject to the closer scrutiny of the Dolan test. In City of Monterey (526 US at 702), the Court observed that an exaction involves the conditioning of a land-use decision on the "dedication of property to public use" (emphasis added).
There is no such dedication of "property" here. In practice, the Court has identified exactions in only two real property cases, Nollan and Dolan, both of which involved the transfer of the most important "stick" in the proverbial bundle of property rights, the right to exclude others. In Twin Lakes Dev. Corp. v Town of Monroe (1 NY3d 98 [2003]), we also characterized a fee imposed in lieu of the physical dedication of property to public use as an exaction. Outside of these two narrow contexts, neither the Supreme Court nor this Court has classified more modest conditions on development permits as exactions. Thus, we decline the Smiths' invitation to extend the concept of exaction where there is no dedication of property to public use and the restriction merely places conditions on development.
The Smiths argue that by its conservation restriction the Town is requiring them to surrender the right to seek a variance under the particular procedures of the EPOD regime. On the record before us, we are not persuaded that this can properly be characterized as the relinquishment of a property right. If it is a property right, however, it is trifling compared to the rights to exclude or alienate. Under the "Grant of Conservation Restriction," the Smiths could still apply to the Town for permission to conduct prohibited activities within the "Restricted Area."
Under the circumstances of this case, the difference between the Smiths' rights under the EPOD ordinance and the conservation restriction is subtle: section 200-23 of the Hendon Town Code affords the Planning Board wide discretion in granting development permits within EPODs; by contrast, under the proposed conservation restriction, the Board would have essentially unfettered discretion to grant or deny such permits. The right to seek a variance from a planning board that enjoys broad, as opposed to unmitigated, discretion may be among the more modest and fragile twigs in the bundle of property rights, if it is a property right at all. To be sure, conditioning a development permit on its surrender should not trigger the same constitutional scrutiny as the regulatory extortion of sticks far more integral to the bundle, such as the right to exclude third persons (a right the Smiths fully retain).
IV
Because the Town's development condition is not an exaction, we review it according to the standard enunciated by the Court in Agins v City of Tiburon (447 US 255 [1980]; see also Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v City of New York, 438 US 104 [1978]), as opposed to Dolan's rough proportionality test. Examined in this light, the conservation restriction does not effect an unconstitutional taking.
First, the restriction would not appreciably diminish the value of the Smiths' property, let alone deny them economically viable use of it—as demanded by Agins (447 US at 260).* In exchange for their acceptance of the restriction, the Smiths would garner a permit to construct a single-family home on their property. A single dwelling on a protected, 10-acre parcel is a valuable, mar ketable asset. Indeed, it is not clear that the conservation restriction would have any effect whatsoever on the market value of the Smiths' property. Given the development bar created by the preexisting EPOD ordinance, the legitimacy of which the Smiths do not challenge, the encumbered parts of the property had almost no developmental value before the Town announced the conservation restriction. Second, the conservation restriction substantially advances a legitimate government purpose— environmental preservation. As we indicated in Bonnie Briar Syndicate, Inc. v Town of Mamaroneck (94 NY2d 96,108 [1999]), a regulatory action need only be reasonably related to a legitimate governmental purpose to satisfy the "substantially advance" standard. Such a relationship undeniably exists here. The conservation restriction will advance the Town's aim of preserving environmentally sensitive areas in perpetuity, place future buyers on notice of the development limitations on the Smiths' property and furnish the Town with a more effective means of ensuring compliance with its regulatory objectives. In all, and in keeping with preexisting conservation policies, the restriction merely gives the Town the power to interdict harmful activities within the EPODs on the Smiths' parcel.
In dissent, Judge Graffeo argues that the conservation restriction effects a taking under Agins because, in her view, it advances the Town's interests only marginally, if at all. We disagree. Ensuring perpetual protection for open spaces—along with the resources and habitats they shelter—from the vicissitudes of workaday land-use battles is hardly an inconsequential governmental interest. At the very least, the permanent character of the conservation restriction will spare the Town the administrative cost of continually being forced to maintain its conservation policies. More importantly, as the Attorney General observes, the conservation restriction imposed by the Town, as a species of negative easement (see Huggins v Castle Estates, Inc., 36 NY2d 427, 430 [1975]), is a "well established land use tool" that is "consistent with the State's longstanding commitment to protecting . . . critical natural resources" (Attorney General's brief at 2). Further, even assuming that the marginal benefit to the Town from the conservation restriction were, as Judge Graffeo suggests, modest, it would nonetheless be legitimate. Under the holdings of Agins, Penn Central and their progeny, a modest environmental advancement at a negligible cost to the landowner does not amount to a regulatory taking. The Smiths' other claims are without merit.
Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should be affirmed, with costs.
. In addition, the Smiths also sought a judgment declaring that the conservation restriction was, as a matter of law, a conservation easement under ECL 49-0303 (1). They also alleged that the Board's decision to condition final site plan approval on their acceptance of the conservation restriction was arbitrary and capricious, and sought attorneys' fees pursuant to Town Law § 282. That section permits a court to award costs to a person or persons aggrieved by a planning board decision if it "shall appear to the court" that the board "acted with gross negligence or in bad faith or with malice in making the decision appealed from."
. The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment is applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment (see Chicago, B. & Q.R. Co. v City of Chicago, 166 US 226 [1897]).
. (See Palazzolo v Rhode Island, 533 US 606, 617 [2001] [discussing the evolution of takings jurisprudence]; see also Loretto v Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 US 419 [1982].)
. (City of Monterey v Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 US 687, 720 [1999]; see also Palazzolo, 533 US at 617; Lucas v South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 US 1003, 1019 [1992] ["when the owner of real property has been called upon to sacrifice all economically beneficial uses in the name of the common good, that is, to leave his property economically idle, he has suffered a taking"].)
. (Palazzolo, 533 US at 617; see also Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v City of New York, 438 US 104 [1978].)
. In spite of their differing language, the Supreme Court has employed the Agins test and Penn Central standard, which the Court invoked in Palazzolo, interchangeably (see e.g. Lucas v South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 US 1003, 1024 [1992]; Keystone Bituminous Coal Assn, v DeBenedictis, 480 US 470, 485 [1987]).
. Because the Town's conservation restriction cannot be classified as an exaction, we need not address the question whether it was roughly proportional to the impact of the development proposed by the Smiths.
. Judge Read suggests that the conservation restriction here somehow encumbers the right to exclude because it permits town inspectors to enter the property on 30 days' written notice or in the event of an emergency threatening the public's health, safety or welfare (see Read, J., dissenting op at 23). On the facts of this case, we fail to see how the Town's right to enter the Smiths' land under a sharply circumscribed set of circumstances to enforce a set of valid regulations impairs the right to exclude or represents a departure from the Town's ordinary exercise of its police powers.
. Although the conservation restriction may, as Judge Read suggests, require the dedication of a possessory interest (see Read, J., dissenting op at 19-20), "property" is constituted by many possessory interests, some of which (e.g., the rights to exclude and alienate) are more central to commonly held understandings of property than others. The Supreme Court's exactions jurisprudence tracks this conception of property. In Nollan and Dolan, the Supreme Court applied the idea of "exaction" only to the required dedications of a core possessory interest, the right to exclude. As the Attorney General observes, "[b]oth cases hinged on the owners' loss of perhaps the most important 'stick' from the ownership bundle: the ability to restrict access" (Attorney General's brief at 12-13). Notably, the Supreme Court has never extended its exactions analysis to the dedication of less substantial possessory interests, like those at issue here. Thus, the Appellate Division correctly determined that the conservation restriction is not an exaction within Nollan and Dolan, and we are unwilling to expand the holdings of those decisions to the case before us.
. Judge Read mistakenly argues that there is something extraordinary or improper about the Town's exercise of its police powers here. We disagree. The case before us today concerns only a marginal use restriction superimposed over a wholly legitimate, preexisting EPOD ordinance. There is nothing here that implicates the Fifth Amendment's concern with "forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole" (Armstrong v United States, 364 US 40, 49 [1960]).
. (See also Lucas v South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 US 1003 [1992] [holding that a deprivation of "all" economically viable uses of a property works a taking].)
. We note that the Supreme Court has been reluctant to engage in spatial "conceptual severance" in determining whether a regulation or government action deprives a property owner of all economically viable uses of the property (District Intown Props. Ltd. Partnership v District of Columbia, 198 F3d 874, 887 [DC Cir 1999]). Hence, we look to the effect of the government action on the value of the property as a whole, rather than to its effect on discrete segments of the property (see Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v City of New York, 438 US 104, 130-131 [1978] [" 'Taking' jurisprudence does not divide a single parcel into discrete segments and attempt to determine whether rights in a particular segment have been entirely abrogated. In deciding whether a particular governmental action has effected a taking, this Court focuses rather both on the character of the action and on the nature and extent of the interference with rights in the parcel as a whole"]; see also Keystone Bituminous Coal Assn, v DeBenedictis, 480 US 470, 497 [1987]). Here, the conservation restriction, while reinforcing the preexisting devaluation of a portion of the Smiths' property, does not begin to deny them all economically viable uses of the entire parcel.
. (See also City of Monterey v Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 US 687, 701, 721 [1999] [observing that the trial court correctly instructed the jury that "substantially advances" was equivalent to "reasonable relationship"]; Hotel & Motel Assn. of Oakland v City of Oakland, 344 F3d 959, 968 [9th Cir 2003] ["A reasonable relationship exists between this regulatory action and the public purpose it is meant to serve. Thus, the ordinance substantially advances a legitimate government interest."].)