Case Name: PEOPLE v. BOURNE
Court: Michigan Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1971-07-07
Citations: 385 Mich. 170
Docket Number: No. 22; Docket No. 52,635
Parties: PEOPLE v. BOURNE
Judges: T. M. Kavanagh, C. J., and Black, T. G. Kavanagh, and Williams, JJ., concurred with Adams.
Reporter: Michigan Reports
Volume: 385
Pages: 170–179

Head Matter:
PEOPLE v. BOURNE
Opinion op the Court
1. Homicide — Manslaughter—Intent.
A killing may be only manslaughter even though there is an intent to kill, as voluntary manslaughter often involves a direct intent to kill, but the law reduces the grade of the offense because, looking at the frailty of human nature, it considers great provocations sufficient to excite the passions beyond the control of reason.
2. Homicide — Murder—Malice—Jury Question.
In a charge of murder, the presence or absence of malice is a question of fact to be determined by the jury.
Concurring Opinion
T. E. Brennan, Swainson, and Williams, JJ.
3. Homicide — Manslaughter—Intent—Instructions—Words and Phrases.
Judge’s instruction to the jury that “in manslaughter it may not he shown that there was any intent’’ on the part of the defendants to hill the victim was a correct statement of the law as the judge was telling the jury that manslaughter need not be an intentional hilling and the word “may” expresses liberty or permission.
References for Points in Headnotes
[1, 3] 40 Am Jur 2d, Homicide §§ 54-70.
40 Am Jur 2d, Homicide § § 45, 50, 51.
40 Am Jur 2d, Homicide §§ 501, 509.
53 Am Jur, Trial § 76.
53 Am Jur, Trial § 648.
4. Homicide — Murder—Use of Deadly Weapon — Malice—Instructions.
Court’s charge “as a matter of law that where one uses a deadly weapon without justification he shows a disregard for life and safety amounting to malice” and “if a man hills another suddenly without any, or where a dangerous or deadly weapon is used without considerable provocation the law implies malice and the hilling is murder” was not erroneous as it was merely setting forth the rule that if the jury be persuaded from all the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt that a deadly weapon was used without justification, they would be obliged to conclude that the use of the weapon was with malice and that a death resulting from use of a deadly weapon without considerable provocation is presumed malicious.
5. Criminal Law — Remarks of Judge.
Judge’s statement to the jury in a criminal case that cases “are easy to appeal nowadays” in denying the jury’s request that the testimony of a witness be read to them was not error as there is no likelihood that the jury might have misconstrued the statement for the judge was talking about an appeal from his ruling, not an appeal from their verdict.
6. Criminal Law — Instructions.
Trial court did not erroneously instruct the jury in a criminal case concerning an incident in another trial where the instructions stated, in defining a “moral certainty” that the jurors should disregard the appearance of a person, and referred to an incident in another ease where a juror improperly considered that a defendant “didn’t look like a boy who would do a thing like that” and stated that a judgment based on appearance is deceiving.
Appeal from Court of Appeals, Division 2, Quinn, P. J., and McGregor and Bronson, JJ., order denying application for leave to appeal from Recorder’s Court of Detroit, Elvin L. Davenport, J.
Submitted February 2, 1971.
(No. 22
January Term 1971,
Docket No. 52,635.)
Decided July 7, 1971.
Samuel Bourne was convicted of second-degree murder. Application for delayed appeal denied by the Court of Appeals. Defendant appeals.
Affirmed.
Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Robert A. Derengoski, Solicitor General, William L. Cahalan, Prosecuting Attorney, Dominick R. Carnovale, Chief, Appellate Department, and Angelo A. Pentolino, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for the people.
Arthur J. Tarnow (Defenders’ Office — Legal Aid and Defender Association of Detroit), for defendant on appeal.

Opinion:
Adams, J.
I concur with Justice T. E. Brennan. With regard to the two major issues raised on this appeal, the law is clear. A killing may be only manslaughter even though there is an intent to kill. The principle is set forth by Justice Campbell in People v. Scott (1859), 6 Mich 287, 295:
"Voluntary manslaughter often involves a direct intent to kill, but the law reduces the grade of the offense because, looking at the frailty of human nature, it considers great provocations sufficient to excite the passions beyond the control of reason."
See also: Nye v. People (1876), 35 Mich 16; People v. Lilley (1880), 43 Mich 521; People v. Holmes (1896), 111 Mich 364; People v. Milhem (1957), 350 Mich 497; 3 Gillespie, Michigan Criminal Law & Procedure (2d ed), § 1664, p 2006.
In a charge of murder, the presence or absence of malice is a question of fact to be determined by the jury. Justice Christiancy in Maher v. People (1862), 10 Mich 212, 218, stated this principle:
"It is for the court to define the legal import of the term, malice aforethought, or, in other words, that state or disposition of mind which constitutes it; but the question whether it existed or not, in the particular instance, would, upon principle, seem to be as clearly a question of fact for the jury, as any other fact in the cause, and that they must give such weight to the various facts and circumstances accompanying the act, or in any way bearing upon the question, as in their judgment, they deserve: and that the court have [sic] no right to withdraw the question from the jury by assuming to draw the proper inferences from the whole, or any part of, the facts proved, as presumption of law. If courts could do this, juries might be required to find the fact of malice where they were satisfied from the whole evidence it did not exist." (Emphasis by Court.)
See also: People v. Potter (1858), 5 Mich 1; Wellar v. People (1874), 30 Mich 16, 19; 2 Gillespie, Michigan Criminal Law & Procedure (2d ed), § 657, p 843.
Judge Davenport's charge to the jury occupies 35-1/2 pages of appellant's appendix in this case. There were no exceptions to the charge. From a review of the record in this case and the charge of the trial judge, I am unable to conclude that any error complained of has resulted in a miscarriage of justice. MCLA § 769.26 (Stat Ann 1954 Rev § 28.1096).
I vote to affirm.
T. M. Kavanagh, C. J., and Black, T. G. Kavanagh, and Williams, JJ., concurred with Adams.