Case Name: Frederick A. SCHOTT, Jr., Appellant, v. William E. FORNOFF et al., Appellees
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 1975-04-09
Citations: 515 F.2d 344
Docket Number: No. 74-1337
Parties: Frederick A. SCHOTT, Jr., Appellant, v. William E. FORNOFF et al., Appellees.
Judges: Before WINTER, CRAVEN and RUSSELL, Circuit Judges.
Reporter: Federal Reporter 2d Series
Volume: 515
Pages: 344–346

Head Matter:
Frederick A. SCHOTT, Jr., Appellant, v. William E. FORNOFF et al., Appellees.
No. 74-1337.
United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.
Argued Dec. 5, 1974.
Decided April 9, 1975.
William Harris Zinman, Baltimore, Md., for appellant.
Maurice W. Baldwin, Jr., Asst. County Sol. of Baltimore County (R. Bruce Alderman, County Sol., Harry S. Shapiro, Chief Asst. County Sol., and Thomas J. Aversa, Jr., Asst. County Sol. of Baltimore County, Md., on brief), for appel-lees.
Before WINTER, CRAVEN and RUSSELL, Circuit Judges.

Opinion:
PER CURIAM:
This is an appeal by Frederick S. Schott, Jr., a former Baltimore County policeman, from the granting of defendant's motion for summary judgment. Schott had sought damages and injunc-tive relief because of his discharge for failure to conform his haircut to a police department regulation that required, inter alia, a one-quarter-inch clearance between the hair on the side of the head and the ear (sometimes referred to as the white sidewall rule). We have examined the hair regulation the violation of which resulted in Schott's discharge, and we have no hesitation in holding that it is so extreme in respect to hair appearance and cut that it cannot be said to bear a rational relationship to the constitutionally permissible objective of an efficient police department, and in short, is arbitrary and capricious.
We reverse the granting of summary judgment and remand to the district court for determination of the relief to which Schott may be entitled. With respect to damages we note that the Supreme Court has quite recently held that a school board member has a qualified immunity from damages under § 1983 if his actions can reasonably bé characterized as having been taken in good faith. Wood v. Strickland, - U.S. -, 95 S.Ct. 992, 43 L.Ed.2d 214 (1975). The Court had this to say on what constituted absence of good faith:
[W]e hold that a school board member is not immune from liability for damages under § 1983 if he knew or reasonably should have known that the action he took within his sphere of official responsibility would violate the constitutional rights of the student affected, or if he took the action with the malicious intention to cause a deprivation of constitutional rights or other injury to the student. Id. at -, 95 S.Ct. at 1001.
Reversed.