Case Name: Stowers v. Milledge et al.
Court: Iowa Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Iowa
Decision Date: 1855-06
Citations: 1 Iowa 150
Docket Number: 
Parties: Stowers v. Milledge et al.
Judges: 
Reporter: Iowa Reports
Volume: 1
Pages: 150–154

Head Matter:
Stowers v. Milledge et al.
A judgment of a justice of the peace, which, after reciting the names of the parties, the amount claimed, the cause of action, and that the cause had come before him by change of venue, reads as follows: “ And agreeable with the order, the parties met by their counsel— Goehr an, for plaintiff, and J. R. Richa/rd-son, for defendants. After hearing all the testimony on both sides, it is believed that the plaintiff is entitled to seventy-five dollars debt, and costs of suit, which is taxed as follows," is sufficiently certain and specific, and valid against the defendants.
A party appealing from the judgment of a justice of the peace to the District Court, cannot, in that court, move to dismiss the appeal, or the cause, on the ground that the certificate of the justice to his transcript, is defective.
Appeal from the Lee District Court.
ON tbe 27tb day of January, 1854-, tbe plaintiff sued tbe defendants before a justice of tbe peace, claiming one hundred dollars, for injuries sustained by tbe acts of tbe defendants in assaulting and stabbing the plaintiff. A trial was bad, and tbe justice, as appears from tbe record, after stating tbe names of tbe parties, tbe amount claimed, tbe cause of action, and that the cause bad come before him by change of venue, makes tbe following entry: “ And agreeable with tbe order, tbe parties met by their counsel — Cochran, for tbe plaintiff, and J. R. Richardson, for tbe defendants.- — ■ After bearing all tbe testimony on both sides, it is believed that tbe plaintiff is entitled to seventy-five dollars debt, and cost of suit, which is taxed as follows.” From this judgment, tbe defendants appealed to tbe District Court. At tbe first term thereafter, tbe cause was continued by consent, and at tbe next term, tbe defendants moved to dismiss tbe appeal, as also tbe cause, because there was no judgment rendered from which an appeal could be taken. This motion was overruled, tbe parties went to trial, and tbe judgment was for tbe plaintiff in tbe same amount as before the justice. Tbe defendants appeal to this court, assigning for error tbe overruling their motion to dismiss said cause and tbe appeal.
Samuel F. Miller, for appellants,
contended:
1. Tbe District Court can bave no jurisdiction on appeal from tbe justice of tbe peace, unless there is a judgment rendered by tbe justice, and entered upon bis docket Kimble V. Biggin, 2 G. dreene, 245.
2. There is no certificate or other evidence that tbe paper filed by tbe justice, was a transcript from bis docket, and, of ■course, there was no judgment to be appealed from.
8. The language of tbe justice, in what is supposed to be bis transcript of docket entries, does not amount to a judgment against tbe defendants. 11 Humphrey, 220 ■; 1 Dougl. 500.
John M. Bede, for appellee.
Tbe judgment of tbe j ustice is valid, and of sufficient form to sustain an appeal therefrom. A judgment is tbe sentence of the law, rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction. 1 Bouv. Inst. 264. No form is essential to tbe validity of a judgment. If tbe intention of tbe court can be clearly gathered, without doubt and uncertainty, from, tbe language of tbe judgment, it is all that can be required. This applies with double force to judgments rendered by justices. This ■court has held, in Taylor v. Barber, 2 G. Greene, 352, that technical nicety and legal precision are not required of justices. The judgment rendered by tbe justice would be a bar to other proceedings for tbe same cause of action between tbe .same parties. That being tbe case, we would bave been without remedy, bad tbe District Court dismissed tbe appeal, thereby declaring tbe judgment void. Green v. Beits, 2 Dougl. 99; Hess v. Beehman, 11 Johns. 457 ; Felter v. Mulli-ner, 2 lb. 181. But even if tbe judgment be void, tbe appeal is good, under tbe strong and broad language of section '2343 of tbe Code. Tbe omission of the justice to render bis judgment in proper form, can be nothing more than an error, irregularity or illegality. Under tbe above section, tbe District Court is -to disregard all illegalities. Now there are many, if not all, illegalities, that would make a judgment woid, and therefore, it does not follow, as a matter of course., that because a judgment upon which an appeal is taken, is-void, that the District Court must dismiss the appeal. This case is readily distinguishable from Kimble v.. Riggen.. ' In that case,, the justice made no attempt to render a judgment. Besides, the law which governed that case, is entirely different from the provisions of the Code, governing appeals. The counsel then went on to show that in cases of appeals, it was the duty of the court, under the provisions of the Code, to try the case da novo, and that the appellant could not move to dismiss his own appeal..

Opinion:
"Weight, C. J.
Two questions are presented., First, was this a judgment from which an appeal could be taken to the District Court ? and second, could' the defendants, after treating it as. such, and doing ail those things that showed that they regarded it as a valid judgment, object to it, and the jurisdiction they had sought thus to give? If either of these questions is decided against the defendants, this case must be affirmed..
The language, used by the justice is certainly not in the usual form,, or such as rigid and purely technical rules would require. We would not encourage, on the part of the inferior courts, carelessness in the making of their entries ; nor; on the other hand, would we require too great particularity or specific formula. "We adopt the language used in Taylor v. Barber, 2 G. Greene, 352, that "it is not expected that technical nicety and legal precision can characterize these proceedings ; and hence irregularity and deficiency in form, are viewed with liberality." But when we come to that which is claimed to be the judgment, there must be reasonable certainty and conclusiveness, so that the judicial mind can say it is satisfied that it was a substantial final order.
By our law, " all final adjudications of civil actions are judgments."" Code, § 1814. In the entry thereof, must the justice follow any particular form?' We know of no authority or reason for his so doing. In Ordinary v. McClure, 1 Bailey, 7, it is held, that "beside the time and place, a judgment should exhibit the parties, the matter is. dispute, and tbe result, but tbe form is immaterial." And tbis we bold to be tbe general and correct doctrine. "We must look to tbe substance, and mere form becomes immaterial. Here, there can be no reasonable doubt as to tbe parties, or wbat was in dispute ; and if we bave tbe result witb sufficient certainty, it is all that is required. Mueb would bave to be presumed against tbe legal and ordinary effect of tbe language and tbis record, to say that tbe result or conclusion is not substantially stated. Tbe parties are before tbe justice, one known as tbe plaintiff and tbe others as defendants, in a suit pending; the subject matter in dispute is quite clearly stated; they try that subject matter; and when it is all beard, tbe justice enters on bis docket tbe result — " that plaintiff is entitled to seventy-five dollars." It is said that tbe word " believed," is not sufficiently definite. Tbe usual form is, perhaps, "it is considered." Is there any substantial difference in tbe two terms ? We think not. Who believes or considers? Tbe justice, certainly. For wbat is plaintiff entitled to tbe seventy-five dollars? We answer, for tbe injuries sustained, and which tbe parties there met to adjudicate. From whom is be entitled to bave tbis amount ? Tbe only reasonable and fair construction is, from tbe defendants, of whom be claimed it, and who were there' defending. An unwarranted degree of technicality might claim tbis language to be too indefinite, but we must take tbe whole record together; bear in mind that it was a judicial proceeding; the expression and putting on paper tbe conclusion of tbe mind, acting judicially; and, in this view of it, reasonable certainty is shown, and all reasonable d,oubt and uncertainty excluded.
Defendants, have referred us to 11 Humphrey, 220, and 1 Douglass (Mich.), 502. We cannot see that tbe authority in Humphrey touches the question at bar; or, if it does, tbe record was so entirely dissimilar, that we should not regard it as of weight. In the case in Douglass, a prominent difference, as compared witb the one we are now considering, is, that there, there was no finding in favor of any party, or against either party. That, also, was a suit brought to re-* 'cover upon a judgment, wbieb was beld to be too indefinitely and uncertainly set fortb. Here, there is a clear finding in favor of one. party, and the question arises on a motion by the party appealing to dismiss bis own appeal, because there was no judgment rendered against him from which he could appeal. We are also' referred to the case of Kimble v. Riggin, 2 G. Greene, 245. In that ease, there was no judgment, and no attempt to enter a judgment, but merely the verdict of a jury, appealed Rom. Here, the cause was heard and determined by the justice, without the intervention of a jury, and at least an attempt to enter a judgment.
It is urged, in argument by defendants, that the certificate of the justice to his transcript was not sufficient, and for that reason the motion to dismiss should have been sustained. We shall not inquire, whether the certificate is good in form or not. We are unwilling to recognize the doctrine, that a party can take his appeal from an inferior court, and have his motion sustained to dismiss the same, because he did not do his duty. Suppose there was no certificate to this transcript, could the appellants object ? The other party might, but the party taking the appeal could not.
The above conclusion, as to the first point, will render the consideration of the second unnecessary.
Judgment affirmed.