Case Name: THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RAY PATTON, Defendant-Appellant
Court: Illinois Appellate Court
Jurisdiction: Illinois
Decision Date: 1978-06-07
Citations: 60 Ill. App. 3d 456
Docket Number: No. 77-65
Parties: THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RAY PATTON, Defendant-Appellant.
Judges: 
Reporter: Illinois Appellate Court Reports, Third Series
Volume: 60
Pages: 456–462

Head Matter:
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RAY PATTON, Defendant-Appellant.
Third District
No. 77-65
Opinion filed June 7, 1978.
STENGEL, P. J., dissenting.
Robert Agostinelli and Michael J. Pelletier, both of State Appellate Defender’s Office, of Ottawa, for appellant.
Michael M. Mihm, State’s Attorney, of Peoria (James E. Hinterlong and John X. Breslin, both of State’s Attorneys Appellate Service Commission, of counsel), for the People.

Opinion:
Mr. JUSTICE STOUDER
delivered the opinion of the court:
The defendant, Ray Patton, was charged with the offenses of robbery and theft. After a jury trial in the circuit court of Peoria County he was found guilty of both offenses, but judgment of conviction and sentence of imprisonment of from 1 to 6 years was imposed only on the robbery offense.
On this appeal the defendant argues the evidence presented is sufficient only to support the conviction of theft and insufficient to support the conviction of robbery.
On June 27, 1976, Rita Alexander and her husband and children were on their way to church about 5:25 p.m. As they were walking toward the church, Mrs. Alexander noticed a man coming the opposite direction on the sidewalk toward her. Just as this man came along side her, he grabbed her purse and ran. Mrs. Alexander had been carrying her purse in her finger tips down at her left side. The man grabbed the purse very quickly and it threw her arm back "a little bit." She did not remember how much her arm was moved. Although the offender was chased he was not caught at the time.
The defendant was identified as the offender although at the trial, the defendant denied the charge and claimed the offender was another person who looked like him and who was with him in the area of the church. On this appeal no questions are raised concerning the sufficiency of the evidence to identify the defendant as the offender.
At the close of the People's case, at the close of all the evidence, and at the conference on jury instructions, defendant insisted that the evidence of force was insufficient to support the charge and conviction of robbery. The trial court rejected the defendant's theory during the course of the proceedings and again denied defendant's motion for a new trial renewing such assertions. According to section 18—1(a) of the Criminal Code of 1961 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 38, par. 18—1(a)):
"(a) A person commits robbery when he takes property from the person or presence of another by the use of force or by threatening the imminent use of force."
The sole question is whether the victim's property was taken with the use of force within the meaning of the statute. More particularly the question is whether the purse snatching incident constitutes such force, it being conceded there is no other evidence of force or intimidation. At this juncture it would be well to note that our statute recognizes theft from the person as a more serious offense than theft and a less serious offense than robbery. A theft not from the person of property valued at less than *150 is a Class A misdemeanor (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 38, par. 16—1(e)(1)). Theft from the person even where the property is of a value of less than *150 is punishable as a Class 3 felony (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 38, par. 1—1(e)(3)). Robbery is of course a Class 2 felony. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 38, par. 18—1(b).) The essential difference between robbery and theft is the absence of use of force or intimidation in the latter. By increasing the penalty for theft of property from the person the statute recognizes that thefts from the person are more serious than ordinary thefts even though the absence of force or intimidation is still a distinguishing characteristic of the offense.
The character of the conduct involved in this case is commonly referred to as a "snatching" offense. Both parties concede that the issue of whether purse snatching is robbery has not been directly passed upon by the courts of review in this State. However, the subject has been mentioned as dicta in several Illinois decisions which suggest Illinois courts favor the majority view and would hold that the force incident to a snatch without more does not include the requisite force required by the statute.
67 Am. Jur. 2d Robbery §28 (1973); Annot., 42 A.L.R.3d 1381, 1383 (1972).
In People v. Ryan, 239 Ill. 410, 88 N.E. 170, the charge was assault with intent to commit robbery, now attempt robbery. The court held the evidence insufficient to support the conviction where the defendant withdrew the victim's stick pin from his tie, but then dropped the pin after the victim grabbed the defendant's hand causing the defendant to flee without the pin. The court held that force incident to the removal of the stick pin was not sufficient to constitute robbery and hence the evidence did not support the conviction of assault to commit robbery. The court in Ryan observed:
"If the taking is by actual violence causing a substantial injury to the person, such as grabbing a hand-bag from a lady's arm with such force that the arm is bruised and lame for several days, it will be robbery." (239 Ill. 410, 412-13, 88 N.E. 170, 171.)
The court in Ryan then goes on to say:
"° ° 0 [I]f there is no resistance by the owner or injury to his person, and the taking is without force or violence, it does not amount to robbery." 239 Ill. 410, 413, 88 N.E. 170, 171.
The People concede that the language and result in People v. Ryan, 239 Ill. 410, 88 N.E. 170, as applied to the facts of this case, is inconsistent with their position that any force no matter how slight or of whatever character is sufficient to constitute the force which is an element of the robbery offense. The People suggest that the language in Ryan being dicta should not be followed or applied to the facts of this case. The Ryan case is the closest case on its facts to those presented in the instant appeal and we believe it should be followed since the opinion finds support in other Illinois decisions. (See People v. Campbell, 234 Ill. 391, 84 N.E. 1035, arid Klein v. People, 113 Ill. 596.) If any force no matter how slight fulfils the requirement contemplated by the robbery statute then even the force necessary to overcome the resistance of friction or gravity which connects property to a person would be sufficient to elevate the offense to that of robbery. Such force would be present even in those cases where the offender does or seeks to exert such force and remove the property without the victim being aware of it. Force or intimidation which is directed at overcoming the will or resistance of the victim is substantially different in quality from that employed in the overcoming of the force which connects the property to the victim. In the usual purse snatching case the only force employed counters the force used to grasp the purse, which is of a different dimension than that contemplated by the robbery statute.
In People v. Williams, 23 Ill. 2d 295, 301, 178 N.E.2d 372, 375, the court observed:
"The gist of that offense is the force and intimidation used in the taking from the person against his will (People v. Cassidy, 394 Ill. 245); and the degree of force necessary to constitute robbery must be such that the power of the owner to retain his property is overcome, either by actual violence physically applied, or by putting him in such fear as to overpower his will. (Hall v. People, 171 Ill. 540; People v. Ryan, 239 Ill. 410; Steward v. People, 224 Ill. 434.) ."
In People v. Chambliss, 69 Ill. App. 2d 459, 217 N.E.2d 422, the court implies that "snatching" does not include sufficient force to constitute robbery. However, the implication is dicta since the circumstances which occurred after the snatch of the wallet involved a violent struggle to regain possession of the wallet and resulted in the victim's leg being broken.
In People v. Williams, 23 Ill. 2d 295, 301, 178 N.E.2d 372, 376, the court declared:
"Where it is doubtful under the facts whether the accused is guilty of robbery or larceny from the person, it is the duty of the court and the jury to resolve that doubt in favor of the lesser offense. Hall v. People, 171 Ill. 540, 49 N.E. 495."
No cases have been called to our attention where a snatching offense was held to be robbery. There are Illinois cases involving snatching offenses where the defendants were convicted of larceny or theft. While such cases do not involve the sufficiency of force issue they are illustrative of how the offense has been viewed. In People v. Jackson, 66 Ill. App. 2d 276, 214 N.E.2d 316, the defendant was charged with robbery and theft from the person, but found guilty only of theft from the person. In People v. Cox, 20 Ill. 2d 458, 170 N.E.2d 531, the defendant was found guilty of larceny from the person and in People v. Morgan, 40 Ill. App. 3d 711, 352 N.E.2d 444, the defendant was charged with robbery, but found guilty only of the lesser included offense of theft.
Based on the foregoing analysis it is our conclusion that the force which is incident to a snatching offense is not in and of itself sufficient to support the charge and conviction of robbery. Of course if force is employed to injure the victim or a struggle ensues to overcome the active resistance of the victim to avoid the loss of his property, the offense is robbery. The facts disclosed by this record, which are substantially uncontradicted, do not show any force or intimidation at overcoming the will of the victim and certainly no resistance on the victim's part.
For the foregoing reasons the judgment and sentence of the circuit court of Peoria County for the offense of robbery are reversed. This cause is remanded with directions that the court enter a judgment of conviction for the offense of theft from the person pursuant to the jury's verdict and that the defendant be resentenced for the offense of theft from the person.
Reversed and remanded with directions.
SCOTT, J., concurs.