Case Name: THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. HENRY SWEET, Defendant and Appellant
Court: Court of Appeal of the State of California
Jurisdiction: California
Decision Date: 1967-12-19
Citations: 257 Cal. App. 2d 167
Docket Number: Crim. No. 12284
Parties: THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. HENRY SWEET, Defendant and Appellant.
Judges: 
Reporter: California Appellate Reports, Second Series
Volume: 257
Pages: 167–176

Head Matter:
[Crim. No. 12284.
Second Dist., Div. Two.
Dec. 19, 1967.]
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. HENRY SWEET, Defendant and Appellant.
Alfred V. Contarino, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Thomas C. Lynch, Attorney General, Daniel J. Kremer and Richard L. Hamilton, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

Opinion:
FLEMING, J.
Henry Sweet was convicted of four violations of Health and Safety Code, section 11501 (the sale, furnishing, or gift of narcotics); two violations of section 11531 (the sale, furnishing, or gift of marijuana); and one violation of section 11503 (the sale, furnishing, or gift of a non-narcotic substance after an agreement to sell, furnish, or give away a narcotic). Sweet appeals the judgment, claiming entrapment.
On 9 June 1965 Miss Barbara Etis, a narcotics addict with whom Sweet was acquainted, and a companion came to Sweet's apartment and asked Sweet if he knew where they could buy heroin. Sweet volunteered to go with them to Fifth Street and cop for them in buying heroin. Unknown to Sweet, Miss Etis was a police contact, and her companion was Bernard Parks, an undercover officer in the Narcotic Division, Los Angeles Police Department.
On that occasion, and also on 11 June, 16 June, and 9 July, Sweet directed Officer Parks to various locations at which either Sweet bought narcotics with money given him by Parks and delivered narcotics to Parks and Miss Etis, or Parks bought directly from a seller to whom he was introduced by Sweet.
On 13 July and on 16 July Parks appeared in Sweet's apartment with another informant and asked Sweet to help him buy marijuana. Sweet did so. In all respects these incidents were similar to the heroin purchases.
On 10 June 1965, Parks and Miss Etis went to Sweet's apartment. Miss Etis said "she was sick and she needed some stuff [heroin]. ' ' Parks suggested the seller from whom Sweet had bought the previous day. Sweet said it was too early in the day to tap that source and suggested they try another location. There, Sweet asked an acquaintance if he knew where narcotics were available. The acquaintance got into the ear, directed Parks to an address, obtained money from Parks, left the ear, and returned with a balloon containing a powder which later proved to be a nonnarcotic substance.
Nothing in the record indicates that Sweet profited from any of these transactions. Sweet waived trial by jury and did not testify.
A person who at the instigation of the police com mits a crime he would not otherwise have committed, is said to have been entrapped and may not be punished for that crime. The test for entrapment in California is commonly called the origin-of-intent test. If the person who claims to have been entrapped can establish that the police generated in his mind "the original intent to commit criminal acts which [he] would not have committed . . . but for such inducement" (In re Moore, 70 Cal.App. 483, 488 [233 P. 805]), his defense is good. If, however, the acts of the police merely furnish an occasion on which the defendant chooses to act on a "pre-existing criminal intent," then the defense of entrapment fails (People v. Benford, 53 Cal.2d 1, 10 [345 P.2d 928].) On appeal, a trial court's finding of non-entrapment will be upheld if the record contains substantial evidence to support the finding. (People v. Terry, 44 Cal.2d 371, 372-373 [282 P.2d 19].)
The record in this ease contains sufficient evidence to support an inference of pre-existing criminal intent. Sweet readily and without reluctance accepted the proposals of Parks and Miss Etis, and on 9 June he volunteered to cop for them before he had been asked to do so. The conduct of the police was not tainted by persuasion, deceit, coercion, or unusual enticements. (People v. Estrada, 211 Cal.App.2d 722, 727 [27 Cal.Rptr. 605].) Therefore, it was a justifiable inference that Sweet, given a suitable occasion, was ready and willing to commit the offense.
Sweet argues he acted out of friendship for Miss Etis and with knowledge of her need as an addict for narcotics and was therefore entrapped by an appeal to his sympathy. Yet on only one occasion did Miss Etis suggest that she had a physical need for narcotics, and that suggestion was by use of the ambiguous word sick. The mere fact that a police officer ingratiates himself with a suspect and then asks him to commit an offense does not in itself establish entrapment. (See, e.g. People v. Benford, 53 Cal.2d 1 [345 P.2d 928] ; People v. Cordero, 240 Cal.App.2d 826 [49 Cal.Rptr. 924].) Nor does use by the police of a friend of the suspect to gain the latter's confidence establish entrapment. (People v. Hunter, 218 Cal.App.2d 385 [33 Cal.Rptr. 15].) In the absence of any testimony by Sweet that he was motivated solely by sympathy for Miss Etis, the argument is purely speculative.
The occasion on which Miss Etis said she was sick culminated in the sale of a non-narcotic powder falsely repre sented to be heroin. Section 11503, Health and Safety Code, reads: ' Every person who agrees, consents, or in any manner offers to unlawfully sell, . or give any narcotic to any person, or offers, arranges, or negotiates to have any narcotic unlawfully sold, delivered, . or given to any person and then sells, delivers . or offers, arranges, or negotiates to have sold, delivered . or given to any person any other liquid, substance, or material in lieu of any narcotic shall be punished. ." The offense prohibited by this section is not committed unless a non-narcotic is sold, delivered, etc. "in lieu of" a narcotic. These words imply a substitution by the accused of the non-narcotic for the promised narcotic. Substitution implies conscious replacing of one thing with another. Specific intent to commit this offense must be proved. (People v. Contreras, 226 Cal.App.2d 700, 702 [38 Cal.Rptr. 338] ; People v. Lopez, 213 Cal.App.2d 668, 673-675 [28 Cal.Rptr. 912], Contra, People v. Dalton, 172 Cal. App.2d 15, 21 [341 P.2d 793]. Cf. People v. Hicks, 222 Cal. App.2d 265, 271-272 [35 Cal.Rptr. 149].)
Sweet took no direct part in the sale; rather, he acted as the finder of an apparent intermediary who negotiated the sale. The circumstances of Sweet's finding do not suggest he was acting in concert with the seller in the supplying of the non-narcotic. There was no evidence that Sweet knew of the substitution, and no evidence from which knowledge of the fraud could reasonably be imputed to him, and therefore no evidence of his specific intent to commit the particular offense with which he was charged. Nor under the specific facts of this count was the fraudulent intent of the seller reasonably attributable to Sweet in order to make him an aider and abettor. (Pen. Code, § 31.) " There must be proof that the accused not only aided the actor but at the same time shared the criminal intent." (People v. Butts, 236 Cal.App.2d 817, 836 [46 Cal.Rptr. 362].) While Sweet may have intended to commit a crime on 10 June, his intent was neither to bring about the specific events which took place that day nor to commit the specific crime of which he was accused. Other possible offenses of which he may have been guilty on that occasion, such as conspiracy to sell narcotics, or offer to sell narcotics, or attempt to sell narcotics, were not charged against him. (Cf. People v. Brown, 55 Cal.2d 64, 68 [9 Cal.Rptr. 816, 357 P.2d 1072].)
The judgment is reversed on count IX and affirmed on all other counts.
Roth, P. J., concurred.