Case Name: McGILLIS et al. v. McGILLIS et al.
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1896-12-02
Citations: 42 N.Y.S. 921
Docket Number: 
Parties: McGILLIS et al. v. McGILLIS et al.
Judges: 
Reporter: West's New York Supplement
Volume: 42
Pages: 921–929

Head Matter:
McGILLIS et al. v. McGILLIS et al.
(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Department.
December 2, 1896.)
1. Remainders—Alien Devisee—Statute Removing Disability.
A devise oí a life estate to a woman, with remainder in fee to her issue surviving her, gives the remainder to such of her issue as are at her death able to take by the devise: and therefore Laws 1889, c. 42, enacted during the life of the woman, and removing the disability oí such of her issue as were aliens, admits them to take the remainder equally with other issue who had from their birth capacity to take by the devise. Putnam, J., dissenting.
2. Same—Contract by Remainder-Man to Reel.
A devise of a life estate, with remainder in fee to the issue of the life tenant surviving her, gives to such issue an estate defeasible by their failure to survive the life tenant; and therefore a contract to convey, executed by one of the children of the life tenant, is void as against the issue of such child, where she died before the life tenant.
This action was brought for the partition of certain real estate in the counties of Albany and Warren, and for the enforcement of an alleged lien on other real estate, known as the “Mansion-House Property,” at Caldwell, N. Y., in favor of the defendant Henry W. Hayden, on the interest of the defendant Morrison M. E. Jarvis therein; the complaint asking that the property sought to be partitioned he divided equally between the six surviving children of Eliza McGillis, deceased, and the defendant Morrison M. E. Jarvis, the only child of Margaret Louisa Jarvis, a deceased daughter of Eliza McGillis, and that the defendant Morrison M. E. Jarvis may be directed to convey his interest in said mansion-house property to the defendant Henry W. Hayden. William Caldwell died in the year 1848, devising property in Albany and Warren counties to his daughter Eliza McGillis for life, to her husband for life, and after their deaths to her issue her surviving, in the following language: “Prom and after the decease of both my said daughter and her said husband, I give, devise, and bequeath the remainder or fee simple in said property to the lawful issue of my said daughter then living, in such relative proportions as they would, by the laws of the state of New York, tlien have inherited or taken the same from her in case she and they were then native-born citizens of said state, and she had died intestate, lawfully seised of said property in fee simple.” Eliza McGillis died in the year 1893, and subsequent to the death of her husband. She had married, on or about May 17, 1836, one John McGillis, an alien, and after such marriage resided with her husband in Canada, where all her children were born. At the time of the death of the testator, she had four children, who were aliens, viz. Mary Charlotte, William H., John, and Elizabeth. The latter died without issue in 1890. After the death of William Caldwell, said Eliza Mc-Gillis had four children,—Ewen, Margaret Louisa, who married John H. Jarvis, and died, intestate, on May 1, 1891, leaving the defendant Morrison M. E. Jarvis her only heir; Robert A. McGillis, and Mary Sophia, who married, on March 8, 1887, Alexander A. R. McDonell. Thus, Eliza left as her issue six children, three born before the death of the testator, and three after, and one grandchild, the son of a daughter, also horn subsequent to the decease of William Caldwell.
In the year 1850 an action was brought by the executor named in the will of William Caldwell, deceased, to obtain a judicial construction of its provisions. Eliza McGillis, her husband, and her four children then living were made parties defendants. It was held in that action that the devise to Eliza McGillis for life was valid, she not being an alien, but the devise to her husband and to her issue, they all being aliens at Caldwell’s death, urns void and inoperative, under 2 Rev. St. p. 57, § 4, which provides that “a devise to a person who at the time of the death of the testator shall be an alien is void.” See Beck v. McGillis, 9 Barb. 35. Soon after, an action rvas brought by the devisees of the other two-thirds share in the Warren county property to partition it. Eliza McGillis was made a party, but her children were not. In that action the property was divided. A life estate in one-third thereof was set off to Eliza McGillis, and the fee therein to.the heirs at law of the testator. No order confirming the report of the commissioners in partition was made or filed. This action was known as the suit of “Van Cortlandt vs. Laidley.” In the year 1887, four other children than those living at the death of the testator having been born to Eliza McGillis, proceedings were commenced by the defendant Henry W. Hayden to establish the title of such children to the fee in the Warren county property, which had been set off in the said action to Eliza McGillis for life, and to the heirs at law of the testator in fee. Mrs. McGillis was then living, and had eight children, the four named as defendants in the action of Beck v. McGillis, and the four others born since the death of William Caldwell. Mr. Hayden secured the passage of chapter 310 of the Laws of 1887, by which the state released any right of eschdat which it might possess over the property in question on account of the alienage of the children of Eliza McGillis. The first-born four, on the 20th day of June, 1887, conveyed to the after-born four their interest, if any, in the property in question, on the agreement that the after-born four would share equally with them in case their title thereto should be established. The entire eight also executed a deed to Henry W. Hayden, their attorney, of a portion of the property known as the “Mansion-House Property,” and said Hayden, in consideration thereof, contracted to conduct the proceedings for them. In July, 1888, the four children born after Caldwell’s death were permitted to intervene in the aforesaid action of Van Cortlandt against Laidley, as the plaintiffs in a cross action against the heirs at law of William Caldwell, deceased. The rights of the children of Eliza McGillis to the remainder in the property set off in that suit to her for life, as against the heirs at law of William Caldwell, were the only issue in the cross action. It was there decided that the children of Eliza McGillis, born after Caldwell’s death, not being aliens at that time, were not within the provisions of 2 Rev. St. p. 57, § 4, making devises to persons at that time aliens void; that, not being parties to the action of Beck v. McGillis, they were not bound by the judgment therein; that they and all subsequent born issue who should survive Eliza McGillis were entitled to the remainder. Van Cortlandt v. Laidley, 59 Hun, 161, 11 N. Y. Supp. 148. The defendant Morrison M. E, Jarvis was born on July 1, 1888. His mother, Margaret Louisa Jarvis, died on August 1, 1891. The act of the legislature providing that foreign-born children of a woman born in the United States may hold real estate was passed on the 2d day of March, 1889.
Action by Robert A. McGillis and another against Ewen McGillis and others, to partition certain real estate in Warren and . Albany counties, and to enforce an alleged lien in favor of defendant Henry W. Hayden on the interest of defendant Morrison M. E. Jarvis in certain other real estate. There was an interlocutory judgment for plaintiffs on the report of a referee, and defendant Morrison M. E. Jarvis moves for a new trial on exceptions ordered heard in the first instance at general term.
Judgment modified.
The facts are stated by Mr. Justice PUTNAM as follows:
Two questions were presented on the trial: Eirst, whether the defendant Morrison M. E. Jarvis was entitled to a one-seventh interest or to a one-fourth interest, as he claimed, in the real estate in question; second, whether, as against him, the agreement made by all the other parties in interest, and by his mother, by which, in consideration of services to be rendered by the defendant Henry W. Hayden, the mansion-house property, at Caldwell, was to be given to him, can be . enforced. The learned referee found in favor of the contention of the plaintiffs on both questions, and the defendant Morrison M. E. Jarvis appeals.
Argued before PARKER, P. J., and LANDON, PUTNAM, and MERWIN, JJ.
Henry W. Hayden, for plaintiffs.
Hun & Johnston, for defendants.
Henry T. Kellogg, guardian ad litem of Morrison M. E. Jarvis.

Opinion:
LANDON, J.
In the action of Beck v. McGillis, 9 Barb. 35, the heirs of the testator obtained a decision which, as between them and the first-born four children of Mrs. McGillis, gave to the heirs the remainder upon the death of Mrs. McGillis. That is of no consequence here, since no party to this action claims under the heirs of the testator. The judgment in the case of Van Cortlandt v. Laidley, 59 Hun, 161, 11 N. Y. Supp. 148, excluded the heirs of the testator from any title to the remainder, because the title to the same was vested in the four after-born children of Mrs. McGillis. But this case decided nothing in respect to the share of the infant, Morrison Janús, because he was not a party to the action. Whether his share is one-fourtii or one-seventh is a question unprejudiced by the judgments in either of the actions mentioned. I think his share is one-* seventh. The "remainder" to the "lawful issue of my daughter then living"—that is, at the daughter's death—was a contingent remainder. When the testator died, there were no persons' in being who could take the remainder under the will. This was not any objection to its validity. 1 Rev. St. p. 725, § 28; Purdy v. Hayt, 92 N. Y. 446. The existing issue of Mrs. McG-illis were then incompetent to, taire, because of their alienage. But the disability of their alienage might be removed. Other children not subject to such disability might be born to her. Thus, the persons to whom the remainder was limited were uncertain, and thus a contingent remainder, as defined by the statute, was created. 1 Rev. St. p. 723, § 13; Moore v. Littel, 41 N. Y. 66; Hennessy v. Patterson, 85 N. Y. 91, 104. This situation was contemplated by the testator; for, by apt words, he postponed until his daughter's death the determination of the persons who should take the remainder, though he defined the class of persons who should take it. This the section of the statute above cited permitted the testator to do. Upon the birth of a child to Mrs. McG-illis, after the death of the testator, the remainder ceased to be contingent, and became vested in that child; that is, as our courts have been constrained to use the term "vested," under the thirteenth section of the statute. ' Although vested, it was liable to be divested by the child's death in the lifetime of the mother, and also the interest of such child while living was liable to open and be diminished by the birth of after-born issue, and also by letting in the prior-born children, the moment their disability, through alienage,'should be removed. Campbell v. Stokes, 142 N. Y. 23, 36 N. E. 811. In like manner it may be said that upon the testator's death, since there was then no person in existence who could take the remainder under the will in case Mrs. McG-illis had died before giving birth to another child, and before the disability of her first-born was removed,' the remainder vested in the heirs of tire testator as in case of intestacy; but, if so, it was liable to be divested, and was, in fact, divested, by the coming into existence of her after-born child, or by the acquisition in her lifetime of the capacity by the prior-born to take under the devise. The term "vested," as used in the thirteenth section of the statute, must be considered with reference to the subject-matter vested. We must distinguish, says Mr. Washburn, quoted in Hennessy v. Patterson, 85 N. Y. 103, "between the vesting of a right to a-future estate of freehold, the vesting- of a freehold estate in interest, and the vesting of the same in possession." Sow, upon the birth of the first child of the after-born children of Mrs. McG-illis, the thirteenth section authorizes us to say that the remainder was solely vested in that child, because, if Mrs. McGillis had then died, that child would have been the only person answering to the testator's designation of his ultimate devisee. But of what estate in the remainder was he vested? Of a present right to its future possession, —a right liable to be diminished or defeated by possible future events, inherent in the nature of his right,' and entirely beyond his control. Thus, the term "vested" is not here the exact opposite of "contingent,'' but is in a measure confused with it. It has the quality of opening and sharing, of ending and shifting, in such way that he who yesterday was the only person vested to-day has others sharing with him, and to-morrow may be wholly divested, and this, too, against his consent. There, probably, is some lack of accuracy in using the term in this sense; some confusion of the common-law distinction between vested and contingent estates. Judge Grover pointed it out in his dissenting opinion in Moore v. Littel, supra, and it has not escaped other criticism (6 Alb. Law J. 361; Gray, Perp. § 107); but the shifting sense has the support of authority.
The argument against the power of the legislature to qualify the four first-born children of Mrs. McGillis to take under the devise of the testator rests upon the assumption that title to the ultimate possession of the remainder absolutely vested either in the heirs of the testator or in the after-born children of Mrs. McGillis. It wholly fails when we see that such vesting was not of the absolute right to the ultimate possession of the remainder, but of a contingent right to it; the contingencies inhering in the right as created by the testator, and only absolutely to be put at rest by the death of Mrs. McGillis. Then those who were within the class designated by the testator became vested of the remainder in possession, and until then all the issue of Mrs. McGillis were eligible to enter the class,—the after-born by birth within it, the prior-born by the enabling qualification of the statute. Thus, the statute affected the right of the first-born to come within the class to be benefited by the devise, and this was plainly within the intention of the testator; and thus the statute aided his purpose, instead of defeating it. His heirs never acquired any title, because lie w'as not intestate, and thus the statute did not affect them. The after-born held their title during Mrs. McGillis' life, subject to such laws as to the admission of the first-born as might be enacted. Such is the meaning of the will, and such was the nature of their interests. In re Baer, 147 N. Y. 348, 41 N. E. 702. When Mrs. McGillis died, her lawful issue, capable of taking both under our statutes and under the terms of the will, consisted of all her lawful issue then living,—her six children, and the infant, Jarvis, her grandchild: and each took one-seventh of the remainder in fee. I agree with Mr. Justice PUTNAM that the share of the infant, Jarvis, is not bound by the contract made with Mr; Hayden.
I advise that so much of the interlocutory judgment as charges the share of the infant, Jarvis, wiili a lien in favor of Mr. Hayden, be reversed; in other respects, that the judgment be affirmed; costs of both parties to be paid out of the fund.
PARKER, P. J., and MERWIN, J., concur.