Case Name: WILLIAM ARRINGTON v. CHARLES LISCOM et al.
Court: Supreme Court of California
Jurisdiction: California
Decision Date: 1868
Citations: 34 Cal. 365
Docket Number: 
Parties: WILLIAM ARRINGTON v. CHARLES LISCOM et. al.
Judges: 
Reporter: California Reports
Volume: 34
Pages: 365–390

Head Matter:
WILLIAM ARRINGTON v. CHARLES LISCOM et. al.
Statute op Limitations—Right op Redemption, when Barred.—The right of the mortgagee to maintain an action on the debt, and to enforce the lien of the mortgage given to secure it, and the right of the mortgagor to maintain an action for the redemption of the property from the lien of the mortgage, are reciprocal; and when one is barred by the Statute of Limitations the other is also barred.
Idem—Title Under.—An adverse possession of land for the period of time prescribed by the Statute of Limitations, not only bars the remedy, but practically extinguishes the right of the party having the true paper title, and vests a perfect title in the adverse holder.
Statute op Limitations as a Source op Title to Lands—A party who has been in the exclusive adverse possession of lands for a period of time which, under the Statute of Limitations, vests him with a title thereto, may maintain an action against a party claiming under a record title, to have said adverse claim determined and adjudged null and void as against him.
Idem.—(t Title to land is the means whereby the owner of lands has the just possession of his property.” A party, under the Statute of Limitations, may acquire an absolute right of possession in lands as against all the world; such a right as, when ousted, will restore him to and effectually protect him in his just possession thereof, even against one having the written title. , An adverse possession, therefore, confers a substantial title, and it is such a title as entitles the holder to all the remedies to quiet his possession that are incident to possessions under written titles.
Action to remove Cloud upon Title.—An apparently good record title to land constitutes a cloud upon a title thereto which has been subsequently acquired by adverse possession under the Statute of Limitations, which the holder by adverse possession is entitled to have removed. This statute would have performed but half its mission as a statute of repose, if the party relying upon it, as to a party claiming under a written title, must wait till he is attacked before he can reduce the evidence of his title, which otherwise rests only in parol, to the form of a permanent record.
Idem.—Arrington had been in the exclusive adverse possession of lands for twelve years, under a deed from one Harris, whole sole title was derived through a sale under a judgment foreclosing a mortgage executed by one Light. The title of Harris was defective, because one Liscom, a subsequent grantee of the mortgagor, Light, held the legal title at the time when said foreclosure suit was instituted, and not having been made a party to the action, his title was unaffected by the foreclosure and sale. After said twelve years adverse possession, Arrington brought an action against Liscom, alleging his title acquired under the proceedings of foreclosure and through his said adverse possession ; that Liscom claimed title adverse to him under his conveyance from Light; that said title had ceased to have any validity as against said plaintiff, but being an apparently good title of record, it cast a cloud upon his title, which diminished the value of his estate ; and upon the case stated, asked that Liscom's adverse claim be determined, adjudged to be void, and that the said cloud be removed. Liscom, in his answer, admitted the facts alleged, but claimed title in himself, subject only to the mortgage, denying that it was a cloud on plaintiff's title, and as a ground for affirmative relief restated the facts, set up his record title, and asked to be allowed to redeem from the mortgage, and that Arrington be required to account for the rents and profits of the land. Meld, first, that Liscom's right to redeem is barred by the Statute of Limitations ; second, that the action, upon the facts averred in the complaint, is not an action in substance or form for a strict foreclosure of the mortgage as against Liscom, and that there was no recognition by the plaintiff of a present subsisting mortgage, nor any waiver of the bar of the statute ; third, that Arrington had become vested with a perfect title to the land through his adverse possession during the period prescribed by the Statute of Limitations •, and fourth, that Liscom's title, as against Arrington, had become extinct, but being an apparent title from a common source, regular upon its face, it casts a cloud upon Arrington's title, and that Arrington is entitled to have the adverse claim of Liscom determined and adjudged invalid, and the cloud removed.
Appeal from the District Court, Fourth Judicial District, City and County of San Francisco.
The defendants appealed.
The other facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Nathaniel Bennett, for Appellants.
The sole object of this suit seems to be to foreclose and cut off the rights of Liscom. It is, in fact, a reforeclosure of the mortgage; although the complaint charges that the claim of Liscom is a cloud upon the plaintiff’s title. It is a cloud in the same way, and in no other, that the equity of redemption may be styled a cloud upon the rights of every mortgagee. The gist of the answer is, that Liscom still has a subsisting claim and title in the premises as the owner of the equity of redemption—that this equity of redemption has never been foreclosed—and that, as the plaintiff brings his action to foreclose such equity, Liscom, the owner of it, is entitled to come in and redeem with the same rights which the owner of any other equity of redemption possesses, and irrespective of the time which may have elapsed. The demurrer rests solely upon the ground of the Statute of Limitations; for, if there be no ground for the interposition of this statute, no question can arise upon the owner’s setting up a good and sufficient defense.
The whole substance of the case, then, is that the mortgagee, or holder of the mortgage, brings a suit against the owner of the equity of redemption, to foreclose such equity, and the owner of the equity asks to redeem upon the same terms upon which holders of equities of redemption are always permitted and entitled to redeem. The plaintiff, Arrington, is the holder of the mortgage, and the defendant, Liscom, the holder of the equity of redemption. It would seem to be a plain proposition, that when the former institutes his foreclosure proceedings, the latter becomes, of course, entitled to the universal rights pertaining to the owner of an equity of redemption. The equity of redemption in favor of Liscom must subsist until it is foreclosed. Even though it should happen from lapse of time that Liscom himself could not institute proceedings to redeem, as plaintiff in an action, it by no means follows that he cannot insist on his right of redemption, when the machinery of the law is set in motion against him by the mortgagee. It may, perhaps, well be, that Liscom would have been remediless in the premises if the adverse party had remained quiet— if he had not treated the mortgage as still subsisting; and yet, when he, by commencing suit, acts upon the hypothesis of the mortgage still existing, the correlative rights of Liscom must also exist. The correct rule is laid down in Angeli on Limitations, Sec. 458. (See, also, 2 Hilliard on Mort., p. 1, See. 2, p. 22, Secs. 40-42, p. 23, Secs. 48, 49; Culkins v. Calkins, 3 Barb. S. C. R. 305, and cases there cited; 20 N. Y. 147.)
Quint Hardy, for Respondent.
[All the points and authorities contained in respondent’s brief are fully discussed in the opinions of the Court.—Rep.]

Opinion:
By the Court, Sawyer, J.:
The plaintiff in his complaint substantially avers, that, one Light, in 1849, being then the owner of the premises described, conveyed them to one Harris, by deed- absolute in terms, hut coupled with a defeasance and a covenant that the same should be void on payment to said Harris of a certain sum of money according to conditions specified; that on nonpayment of the money, in accordance with said terms, said Harris, in a suit against said Light, in 1850, foreclosed said mortgage, and in March, 1851, purchased in the premises under the judgment of foreclosure; that subsequently, on the 9th of November, 1854, through sundry' conveyances, the plaintiff acquired the interest of said Harris in said premises, and entered into possession, and made large and valuable improvements thereon, and that ever since, down to the present time, he has been in undisturbed and adverse possession of the same; that subsequent to the execution of said deed and defeasance, and before the commencement of the said suit for foreclosure in 1850, said Light conveyed his interest in said mortgaged premises, but in express terms subject to said mortgage to defendant, Liscom; that said deed to said Liscom is a cloud upon plaintiff's title; and said Liscom has no valid claim to' said premises. He then asks that said Liscom be adjudged to quitclaim said premises to said plaintiff; that said cloud be removed and said deed declared null and void as against plaintiff's title thus acquired, and for such other relief as may be just and equitable.
The defendant, Liscom, answers, and, without denying any of the material allegations of fact in the complaint stated, sets them up affirmatively, and insists that inasmuch as he was not a party to the foreclosure suit, the mortgage was never foreclosed as to him; and that the legal title is in him by virtue of the said conveyance from Light, subject to said mortgage. As affirmative relief he seeks an account of the rents and profits, offering to pay any balance that may be found due, and asks for an affirmative judgment allowing him to redeem. The plaintiff demurs on the ground, among others, that the right to redeem is barred by .the Statute of Limitations. The demurrer to the answer was sustained, and the defendant declining to amend, judgment was entered for plaintiff in pursuance of the prayer of the complaint. There can be no doubt that an action to redeem was long since barred. This point was determined in Cunningham v. Hawkins, 24 Cal. 409, 410, and Grattan v. Wiggins, 23 Cal. 35. As to the affirmative relief sought, the appellant is the actor, and he is as clearly affected by the bar as if he had brought an independent action to redeem. But he insists that the plaintiff's action is, upon the facts averred in the complaint, whatever he may choose to call it, a suit for a strict foreclosure, and as he has chosen to waive the statute and treat the mortgage as still subsisting, and the rights of the parties are mutual, the defendant is entitled to treat it as a live mortgage also, and the right to redeem is still a live equity. Calkins v. Isbell, 20 N. Y. 147, and Calkins v. Calkins, 3 Barb. 305, are relied on to sustain this view. In our judgment, however, upon the facts averred in the complaint, the action can in no sense be regarded as a proceeding to foreclose the mortgage. The plaintiff never owned the mortgage, or the debt secured by it. He is simply a purchaser of the mortgaged premises from the purchaser under a judgment of foreclosure. The foreclosure, it may be conceded for the purposes of this case, was defective, because Liscom was not made a party and his title was not cut off. But the plaintiff was the purchaser of the land, not of the debt and mortgage. He simply got whatever title to the land passed by the Sheriff's sale, be it good or bad, much or little. He avers no assignment of the debt, or mortgage, or the judgment. The complaint sets out many matters unnecessary to be stated, but no objection was made in the' Court below in any form to the mode of statement, or its sufficiency. The cause of action averred, when stripped of unnecessary matter, seems to us to be this : that the plaintiff in 1854 entered into possession of the premises in question, under a conveyance, and that he has ever since, for a period of some twelve years, been in the undisturbed adverse possession of the premises under said conveyance, thereby acquiring a good title under the Statute of Limitations; that the defendant, Liscom, holds a deed from the same source of title antedating his own, which might, .at the time, have conveyed some interest to defendant, but which by the long adverse possession has ceased to have any vitality; that being of record, although no longer available to the defendant, it has become a cloud upon the title of plaintiff thus perfected as against the defendant by the Statute of Limitations. And the prayer is in accordance with this theory. The cause of action might have been averred in a better form, but this is the substance of it. And there is nothing in the answer to take the case out of the Statute of Limitations, or to avoid the title made under it, for adverse possession for the time specified in the statute in effect confers title. (Grattan v. Wiggins, 23 Cal. 36.) We know of no reason why a party who has been in adverse possession for a period of time, which, under the Statute of Limitations, vests him with a title against all the world, may not bring his suit against a party claiming under a record title, to have the claim determined and adjudged null and void as against him. An apparently good record title would certainly be a cloud upon the title, acquired by adverse possession under the Statute of Limitations. It is of record, and when produced makes out a prima facie case, which can only be defeated by evidence of adverse possession, which is not of record, unless established in a judicial proceeding, but rests in parol, and is liable to be lost and established with difficulty. Such an apparent record title could not fail to be a cloud that would greatly decrease the value of the title acquired by adverse possession. The Statute of Limitations, as against a party claiming under a written title, would have performed but half its mission, as a statute of repose, if the party relying upon it must wait till he is attacked before he can reduce the evidence of his title to the form of a permanent record. We think a party in possession whose right is perfected by an adverse possession during the period prescribed by the Statute of Limitations, as well as others., is entitled to bring his action, under section two hundred and fifty-four of the Practice Act, to determine an adverse claim or remove a cloud which would thenceforth diminish the value of his property. In this - case the cause of action set up is an adverse possession of some twelve years under- a conveyance which gives a title under the Statute of Limitations, and an outstanding conveyance from the same source of title, which, under the circumstances alleged, became a cloud, and which the plaintiff asks to have adjudged to be a cloud, and to have removed. The plaintiff in no part of his complaint recognizes directly or by implication the existence of any valid or subsisting mortgage.' On the contrary, he denies that defendants have any valid claim or right, and insists that the conveyance from the original mortgagor is a cloud upon his own title. They even claim that the foreclosure is valid as against defendant, Liscom, and that he acquired a good title on grounds other than the Statute of Limitations. The action is in no sense an action to foreclose the mortgage as against Liscom. We think the demurrer to the answer properly sustained.
Judgment affirmed.
[Note.—The foregoing opinion was delivered at the October Term, 186V. Subsequently, and before the delivery of the following opinion on petition for rehearing, Justices Sprague and Crockett succeeded Chief Justice Currey and Justice Shatter as members of the Court, and Justice Sawyer become Chief Justice.]