Case Name: The People v. William Tyler
Court: Michigan Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1859-10-14
Citations: 7 Mich. 161
Docket Number: 
Parties: The People v. William Tyler.
Judges: 
Reporter: Michigan Reports
Volume: 7
Pages: 161–291

Head Matter:
The People v. William Tyler.
Upon the high seas every vessel, public and private, is, for jurisdictional purposes, a part of tho territory of tho nation where it belongs ; and an offence committed on board of it is an offence against the sovereignty of that nation. But, where a private ship enters a foreign jurisdiction, it becomes, with all on board, in the absence of treaty stipulations to the contrary, subject to the municipal laws and control of the country it visits.
"When a Legislature, out of abundant caution, enumerates a great number of possible places, and punishes crimes committed in any of them, there is no rule of construction which requires tho law to be regarded as an assertion that there are such places within tho jurisdiction. It does not, therefore, necessarily follow, because Congress in the Crimes Act of 1857 provided for the punishment of offences upon bays, creeks, havens and rivers, not within states nor forming a part of the high seas that the existence of such -within the admiralty jurisdiction must be assumed.
The said act of 1857 being amendatory and supplementary to other acts of identical extent, commencing in 1790, it is not to be supposed that it was intended to use these terms in different senses at tho different periods. And, as there wore at the' date of the first act navigable waters open from the ocean, not admitted to have been within tho exclusive jurisdiction of any particular state, and as, upon the Pacific coast, we have still some waters of this description, there is no necessity to go beyond our own territory to satisfy the terms of tho act. And tho jurisdiction referred to by the language used being a local one, referring to a fixed natural locality, and not satisfied by a vessel, the claim of jurisdiction should not be extended into foreign parts, unless such an intention is clearly expressed in the act.
As the states lying upon the lakes and their connecting waters extend to tho national boundary, and their jurisdiction is co- extensive with their territory and legislative power, the said Crimes Act of 1857, if it applies at all to these waters, can only take effect without the United States, and within British waters.
As a general principle, the criminal laws of no nation can operate beyond its territorial limits, and to give any government or its judicial tribunals the right to punish any act or transaction as a crime, it must have occurred within those limite- The exceptions to this rule relate to crimes which are peculiarly injurious to the rights or interests of the nation or of its subjects, and which, if committed by its citizens or subjects, may bo punished wherever committed. As in tho case of treason committed abroad, or criminal acts on the part of the crews or passengers of its ships in a foreign port, whereby its commerce or its pacific relations with other powers would be endangered. But theso exceptions to the general rule of the locality of crimes are never understood to be included in the general provisions of criminal statutes, but require to be specifically mentioned and defined.
The territory of a state or nation includes, as a part of its domaiu, the lakes and rivers which lie within its limits. And these waters being thus susceptible of appropriation as territory in the same way as the land, are in like manner capable of division, by which a part may be appropriated by one adjoining nation and a part by another; and when so divided, the part belonging to each nation is as completely a part of its territory as the whole lake or river if wholly within its limits.
The United States and Great Britain having in this manner, by the treaty of 1783, divided and appropriated the lakes and their connecting waters, the courts of neither, while this treaty remains in force, can for jurisdictional purposes, and especially for criminal jurisdiction, consider that portion of these waters within the limits of the other, as differing in any respect from the lauds. The treaty of 1842, conceding to the vessels, &c., of both nations a right of passage through the channels and passages thus appropriated, does not deprive either of that complete and exclusive jui'isdiction over that part of the lakes and rivers on its side the line which any nation may exercise upon land within its acknowledged limits.
The said Crimes Act of 1857 was not understood or intended by Congress to extend to any waters not essentially maritime; much less to a river in the interior of the continent, not navigable from the ocean; and least of all to a portion of that river within the territory and exclusive jurisdiction of a foreign sovereignty.
Nor was the said Crimes Act of 1857 intended to go beyond the class of assaults made manslaughter under the former statutes to which it was amendatory and supplementary; or, to do more than provide for the case of death on land, resulting from assaults which were already made punishable when death resulted at the place where the fatal blow was given.
And, therefore, manslaughter committed by a mortal blow given on the River St. Clair, beyond the boundary line between the United States and the Province of Canada, and -within a county in said province, from which blow death ensued on land, is not within the intent and meaning of the said act, though the blow was given on an American vessel.
The subject of admiralty jurisdiction over the lakes and navigable waters connecting them considered, and the case of the Genesee Chief (12 How. 443) commented on, per Clwistnei/ncy J.
The admiralty jurisdiction over the said lakes and navigable waters connecting them, and the constitutional validity of the act of Congress of February 25th, 1845, relating to the same, considered and denied, per Memwing </.
Heard June 1st, 2d, 3d & 4th.
Decided October 14th.
Case reserved from St. Clair Circuit.
On the fourth day of February, 1859, defendant was indicted in the Circuit Court for the county of St. Clair for murder. The indictment charged that Tyler, on the twen ty-ninth] day of November, 1858, “with force and arms, on navigable waters without the limits of the state, in and on board the brig Concord then and there being in the river St. Clair, without the limits of the state of Michigan, in and upon one Henry Jones in the peace of God then and there being, feloniously, willfully, and of his malice aforethought, did make an assault, and that the said William Tyler a certain pistol of the value of two dollars then and there charged with gunpowder and one leaden bullet, which said pistol he, right hand then and there feloniously, wilfully, and of the said William Tyler; in his iad aucl held, then and there his malice aforethought, did discharge and shoot off, to, against, and upon the said Henry Jones, and that the said "William Tyler, with the leaden bullet aforesaid, out of the pistol aforesaid, then and there, by force of the gunpowder aforesaid, by the said William Tyler discharged and shot off as aforesaid, then and there feloniously, wilfully, and of his malice aforethought, did strike, penetrate and wound him, the said Henry Jones, in and upon the left side of the head of Mm, the said Henry Jones, giving to Mm, the said Henry Jones, then and there, with the leaden bullet aforesaid so as aforesaid discharged and shot out of the pistol aforesaid, by the said William Tyler, in and upon the left side of the head of him, the said Henry Jones, one mortal wound, of the depth of four inches, and of the breadth of half an inch, of which said mortal wound the said Henry Jones, from the said twenth-ninth day of November, in the year aforesaid, until the thirtieth day of November, as well on the navigable waters aforesaid, as in the city of Port Huron, in the county of St. Clair, in the state of Michigan, did languish, and languishing did live, on which said thirtieth day of November, in the year aforesaid, the said Henry Jones, in the said city of Port Huron, in the said county of St. Clair, in the state of Michigan aforesaid, of the Ld mortal wound died: and so tbe jurors aforesaid, upon their oaths aforesaid, do say that the said William Tyler, the said Henry Jones, in manner and by the means aforesaid, feloniously, willfully, and of his malice aforethought, did kill and murder, contrary to the form of the statute in such case made and provided, and against the peace and dignity of the People of the state of Michigan.”
A second count charged the murder as committed at Port Huron in the county of St. Clair.
On the fourth day of May, 1859, Tyler was arraigned on said indictment, and pleaded thereto as follows:
“ State op1 Michigan, Gounty of St. Glair,
7 j
In the Circuit Court for the County of St, Clair.
The People of the State of Michigan vs. William Tyler.
“And the said William Tyler, in his own proper person cometh into court here, and having heard the said indictment read, saith that the People of the state of Michigan ought not further to prosecute the said indictment against the said William Tyler, in respect of the offense in the said indictment mentioned, because he saith that heretofore, to wit, at a special term of the Circuit Court of the United States of America for the District of Michigan, began and held at the city of Detroit, within and for the district aforesaid, on the fourth Tuesday of March, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and fifty - nine, it was presented by the Grand Jurors of the United States of America within and for the District aforesaid upon their oath,
“That William H. Tyler, late of Detroit, in said district, not having the fear of God before his eyes, but being moved and seduced by the instigation of the devil, on the twenty-ninth day of November, in the year of • our Lord one thousand eight hundred and fifty - eight, with force and arms, in the river St. Clair, within the admiralty and maritime jiuisdiction of the United States, within the jurisdiction of said court, and out of the jurisdiction of any particular state of the United States, in and on board of a certain vessel, being a brig called the “ Concord,” owned by a certain person or persons whose names were to the jurors unknown, being a citizen or citizens of the United States of America, in and upon one Henry L. Jones, in the peace of God and the said United States then and there being, on board said brig called the Concord, in the river St. Clair, within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States, within the jurisdiction of said Circuit Court of the United States, and out of the jurisdiction of any particular state of the United States of America, unlawfully, feloniously, Avillfully, but without malice aforethought, did make an assault, and that the said William H. Tyler, a certain pistol, of the value of two dollars, then and there charged with gunpowder and one leaden bullet, which said pistol he, the said William H. Tyler, in his right hand then and there had and held, then and there unlawfully, feloniously, willfully, but without malice aforethought, did discharge and shoot off, at, and [’against, and upon the said Henry L. Jones, and the said William H. Tyler, with the leaden bullet aforesaid, out of the pistol aforesaid, then and there by force of the gunpowder aforesaid, by the said William H, Tyler' discharged and shot off as aforesaid, then and there unlawfully, feloniously, and Avillfully, but Avithout malice aforethought, did strike, penetrate and Avound him, the’ said Henry L. Jones, in and upon the left side of the head of Mm, the said Henry L. Jones, giving to him, the said Henry L. Jones, then and there, with the leaden bullet aforesaid* so as aforesaid discharged and shot out of the pistol aforesaid by the said William H. Tyler, in and upon the left side of the head of him,' the said Henry L. Jones, and near the left temple of Mm, the said Henry L. Jones, one mortal wound of the depth of four inches, and of the breadth of half an inch, of which said mortal wound he, the said Henry L. Jones, afterwards, that is to say, on the twenty-ninth day of November aforesaid, upon the land and within the the United States of America, to Avit: at Port Huron, in the county of St. Clair, and within the district aforesaid, died. And so the jurors aforesaid, upon their Oaths aforesaid, did say, that the said William H. Tyler, him, the said Henry L. Jones, in the manner and by the means aforesaid, feloniously, willfully and unlawfully did kill, against tbe peace of tbe said United States and their dignity, and against the form of the statute of the said United States in such case made and provided. And the jurors aforesaid, upon their oath aforesaid, did further present, that William H. Tyler, late of Detroit, in said district, on the twenty-ninth day of November, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and fifty - eight, with force and arms, in the river St. Clair, within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States, within the jurisdiction of said court, and out of the jurisdiction of any particular state of the said United States, in and upon one Henry L. Jones, in the peace of Cod and the said United States, then and there being, in the river St. Clair, within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States, within the jurisdiction of said circuit court, and out of the jurisdiction of any particular state of the said United States of America, feloniously, unlawfully and willfully did make an assault, and that the said William H. Tyler, a certain pistol, then and there charged with gunpowder and one leaden bullet, which said pistol he, the said William H. Tyler, in Ms right hand then and there had and held, then and there feloniously, unlawfully and willfully, but without malice aforethought, did discharge and shoot off, at and against him, the said Henry L. Jones, and that the said William H. Tyler, with the leaden bullet aforesaid, out of the pistol aforesaid, then and there, by force of the gunpowder aforesaid, by the said William H. Tyler discharged and shot off as aforesaid, then and there feloniously, unlawfully and willfully, but without malice aforethought, did strike, penetrate and wound him,, the said Henry L. Jones, in and upon the left side of the head of him, the said Henry L. Jones, giving to him, the said Henry L. Jones, then and there, with the leaden bullet aforesaid, so as aforesaid discharged and shot out of the pistol aforesaid, by the said William H. Tyler, in and upon the left side of the head of him, the said Henry L. Jones, one mortal wound, of which mortal wound caused by said shooting, he, the said Henry L. Jones, afterwards, • that is to say, on the twenty-ninth day of November aforesaid, upon the land, and within the United States of America, to wit: at Port Huron, in the county of St. Clair, and within the district aforesaid, died. And so the jurors aforesaid, upon their oaths aforesaid, did say, that the said William H. Tyler, him, the said Henry L. Jones, in the manner and by the means aforesaid, unlawfully, feloniously and willfully, but without malice aforethought, did kill, against the peace of the United States of America and their dignity, and against the form of the statute of the said United States, in such case made and provided. And the jurors aforesaid, upon their oaths aforesaid, did further present; that after-wards, on the said twenty-ninth day of November, in the year one thousand eight hundred and fifty-eight, the said William H. Tyler, the offender aforesaid, was first apprehended for said offense in the district of Michigan, and within the jurisdiction of this court.
“To which said indictment the said William H. Tyler having been duly arraigned, pleaded not guilty, and put himself upon the country for trial.
“And afterwards came as well the said United States of America by attorney, as the said William H. Tyler, and the twelve jurors of the jury aforesaid, who being duly chosen, empannelled, tried and sworn, heard the evidence as well for said United States as said William H. Tyler, and said upon their oath that the said William H. Tyler was guilty in manner and form as charged in said indictment.
“Whereupon it was considered by said court that said William H. Tyler be imprisoned for thirty days in the county jail of Wayne county, and pay a fine of one dollar to the- United States, which said fine has been paid, and said imprisonment fully served out, as by the record thereof in the said court remaining (a copy of - which, duly attested, the said William H. Tyler here in court produces) more fully and at large appears; which said judgment and conviction still remain in full force and effect,”” and not in the least reversed or made void.
“And the said William H. Tyler further saith that the said Circuit Court of the United States for the district of Michigan, had full power, authority and jurisdiction to try Mm, the said William H. Tyler, for the said offense for which the said William II. Tyler was tried, and of which he was convicted and sentenced as aforesaid, and that the said authority and jurisdiction were conferred by section first of the act of Congress of the United States, approved the third day of March in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and fifty-seven, entitled “An Act in addition to an Act more effectually to provide for the Punishment of Certain Crimes against the United States, and for other purposes.”
“And the said William H. Tyler further saith that the said shooting at said Henry L. Jones by said William H. Tyler, as alleged in the said former indictment, was in the river St. Clair, within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States, and out of the jurisdiction of any particular state of the United States, and that said Henry L. Jones afterwards died of said shooting on land within the United States, to wit: at said Port Huron, and that said brig Concord was an American bottom, owned wholly by citizens of the said United States, and that both said William H. Tyler and Henry L. Jones were citizens of the said United States, as alleged in said former indictment.
“And the said William Tyler further saith, that the said William Tyler, and the said William H. Tyler so indicted and convicted, are one and the same person, and ■ not other and different.
“And the said William Tyler further saith, that the -said act, felony, homicide, shooting, killing and manslaugh ter of the said Henry L. Jones, of which the said William H. Tyler was so indicted and convicted as aforesaid, and the said act, felony, homicide, shooting, killing', and murder of Henry Jones, for which he is now indicted, are. one and the same act, shooting and killing', and not other or different felonies or offenses; and this the said William Tyler is ready to verify; wherefore he prays judgment if the People of the state of Michigan ought further to prosecute the said indictment against the said William Tyler, in respect of the said offense in the said indictment mentioned, and that the said William Tyler may be dismissed and discharged from the same.
William H. Tylee.
Walker & Russell, Counsel for Tyler”
The prosecuting attorney replied to this plea as follows: “State oe Michigan: The Circuit Court for the County of St. Clair.
The People of the state of Michigan vs. William Tyler, “And now the said People of the state of Michigan, by Harvey MeAlpine, Esq., Prosecuting Attorney for said county of St. Clair, who, for the said People, prosecutes in this behalf, says, that the said People ought not to be barred from prosecuting this present indictment presented by the grand jurors of the People of the state of Michigan, inquiring in and for the body of the county of St. Clair aforesaid, because, they say, that the said William Tyler was not heretofore convicted of the premises charged in and upon him by this present indictment; for, although true it is that the said William H. Tyler was convicted upon the said indictment in said plea mentioned, and received and suffered judgment thereon, as in and by-said plea set forth: and although true it is that the assault, shooting and discharging of a pistol, and striking, penetrating and wounding the said Henry L. Jones with a leaden bullet shot off and discharged from said pistol by said William H. Tyler, whereof the said Henry L. Jones died, m the said county of St. Clair, as set forth in the said plea of the said William Tyler, is and are the same felonious assaulting, shooting, striking, penetrating and -wounding of the said Henry Jones, by said William Tyler, and the same identical, felonious killing and wounding of said Henry Jones by said William Tyler, of the malice aforethought of said William Tyler, as in the said present indictment mentioned, and not other or different: and although true it is that the said Henry L. Jones mentioned in the said indictment in said plea set forth, and the said Henry Jones in the present indictment mentioned, are one and the same person, and not other and different: and although true it is that the said William H. Tyler, so indicted and convicted as set forth in said plea, and the said William Tyler, the defendant in the present indictment, are one ■and the same person, and not other and different: and •although true it is that the said brig Concord, in said plea and indictment mentioned, was an American bottom, owned Wholly by citizens of the Hnited States, and that both said William H. Tyler, and Henry L. Jones, were citizens of the Hnited States:
“Yet the said People of the state of Michigan, for replication in this behalf, say that the said assaulting, shooting off and discharging of said pistol, and the striking, penetrating, and wounding of said Henry Jones with said leaden bullet, so dischai’ged from said pistol] by said William Tyler, were all done by said William Tyler on board of said vessel called the “ Concord,” at the time mentioned in said plea, and upon the said river St. Clair, but the said People aver that the same were done beyond the boundary line between the Hnited States and the province of Canada, and within the geographical boundaries of said province, and of the county of Lambton, in •said province, without the limits of the Hnited States, •and without the boundaries of the state of Michigan, and of the county of St. Clair, and without the admiralty jurisdiction of the United States. And this the said People of the state of Michigan are ready to verify.
Wherefore, they pray judgment, and that the said William Tyler may answer to the said indictment pending in this court.
Harvey McAlpine, H. D. Terry, Prosecuting Attorney. Of Counsel for People.”
To this rejilication defendant demurred, and the prosecution joined in demurrer.
And thereupon the circuit judge reserved for the opinion of this court the following questions:
First: Had the Hnited States, at the time of the said conviction and judgment, admiralty jurisdiction over that part of the waters of the river St. Clair, which is without the boundaries of the Hnited States, and within the boundaries of the county of Lambton, in the province of Canada, within the intent and meaning of the act of Congress entitled “An Act in addition to an Act more effectually to provide for the Punishment of Crimes against the Hnited States,, and for other purposes,” approved March 3d, 1857?
Second: Was the shooting of Henry Jones, by the defendant, in the manner, and under the. circumstances set forth in the said plea and replication, and in the place set forth, in the said replication, within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the Hnited States, for the seventh circuit and district of Michigan, under the said first section of the act of Congress aforesaid?
A. Bussell, in support of the demurrer:
I. In regard to the first question, which we submit must be answered in the affirmative:
1. The act intends, and means, within the civil admiralty jurisdiction of the United States, when it fixes the necessary locality of the shooting- as “in a river within the admiralty jurisdiction of the United States.”
a. The United States have no criminal admiralty jurisdiction. The extension of judicial powers, by the Constitution, to cases in admiralty, refers to civil cases belonging to commerce. There was a separate grant of power to define and punish maritime felonies, and when Congress legislated about cases in admiralty, in order to prevent any doubt, it conferred on the admiralty court (the district) jurisdiction over civil cases only, and it gave cognizance of crimes in admiralty neither to that court nor any other, as over crimes in admiralty, but gave cognizance of several specified offences to the district courts, and some offences to the circuit courts.— U. S. Const. art. 3, §2; Ibid. art. 1, §8, subd. 11; lud. Act 1789, §§ 9, 11, 1 Stat. 76, 78; New Bedford Bridge Case, 1 Woodb. & M. 401, 471, 472, and passim; Taylor v. Carryl, 20 How. 616, per Taney Ch. J.
The judgment of Woodbury J. in the Bridge case, is an elaborative and exhaustive treatise on the whole subject. The doctrine is that when a power is conferred, no court can exercise it save under some act of Congress locating the power in the court. No criminal admiralty jurisdic. tion, as such, has been conferred by any act of Congress, and the United States courts have steadily refused to take cognizance of any admiralty crime as such.
It may be further said, that for two centuries prior to the Constitution, the admiralty in England had exercised no jurisdiction over felonies on the high seas, but these had been exclusively tried by a commission. And it is not certain that mere misdemeanors were ever tried there. This, taken in connection with the grant in the Constitution, of power to define and punish felonies on the high seas, in the enumeration of the powers of Congress, although the judicial power was made to extend to all admiralty cases, strongly supports our position. — See 1 W. & M. 470, 465, citing Stat. Ric.; Corfield v. Coryell, 4 W. C. C. 383.
It is also apparent, from the mode of tried of criminal cases in the United States courts, that these cases are not tried “in admiralty.” The procedure is by indictment of a grand jury, and by petit jury, under the Constitution.— Const. Art. 3, §2, subd. 3; Amendments V. and VI.
So, also, the common law, and not the admiralty, system of proofs is used.
b. The replication and the question both go upon the idea that some portion of the St. Clair river is within the admiralty jurisdiction.
That the great navigable rivers of the country, the lakes, and the waters connecting them, are, by reason of their navigability, within the original grant of admiralty jurisdiction, and of like character with the sea in respect to maritime legislation and jurisdiction, is fully settled.— The Genesee Chief 12 How. 443; Jackson v. Steamboat Magnolia, 20 How. 296; 1 Conkl. Adm. 1 to 33.
This court has adopted and approved the above doctrine, and held such waters not included in the term “inland navigation.” — Amer. Trans. Co. v. Moore, 5 Mich. 368.
Compare Rossiter v. Chester (1 Doug. Mich. 169) where the court yields to the then weight of authority, contrary to their expressed views of what ought to be the law.
It remains, then, to inquire whether the civil jurisdiction of the admiralty is ousted if the locality of the tort or service be within the body of a foreign county.
Our position is, that it is not ousted when such is the fact. That, although in England the locality of the marine tort must be out of a domestic county, the rule never was that it should be out of a foreign county; and that in this country it need not be out of a domestic county.
All the expressions in the statutes of Richard, which originated the infra corpus comitatus rule, are to be construed with reference to the territory over which the statutes extend. The legislators knew nothing of the political divisions of the continent. — See the statutes cited, 1 W. & M. 465.
The Supreme Court has settled the doctrine that the locality of a tort need not be out of a domestic county.— Waring v. Clarke, 5 How. 441; Jackson v. Steamboat Magnolia, 20 How.; Towboat Co. v. R. R. Co. 5 Am. Law Reg. 280; Brig James Gray v. John Fraser, 21 How. 184.
It is also held expressly that it need not be out of a foreign county. — Thomas v. Lane, 2 Sumn. 1, 9; Waring v. Clarke, 5 How. 486, per Woodbury J.; Steele v. Thacher, Ware, 92; The Appollon, 9 Wheat. 868. This was a libel for a marine tort, commencing on the Spanish side of Belle River, and terminating in a county of Georgia, analogous to the present case as far as the locality is concerned.
II. But if by the words “ admiralty jurisdiction ” in the act, criminal admiralty jurisdiction be intended, we say:
1. Admitting fully that it depends upon locality, the rule in respect to where that locality rnust^ be, is the same as that of the civil jurisdiction in the case of torts — which rule, we have shown, was, in England, that the place must be out of a domestic, but not out of a foreign county; and is here, that it need not be out of either; then, as a corollary:
2. the place of the crime need not be out of a foreign county, nor out of a domestic county, unless the statute had carefully so directed.
1, As to the first position, — That the rule of place is the same as to civil admiralty, torts and admiralty crimes:— Waring v. Clarke, 5 How. 469; Bridge Case, 1 W. & M. 482.
The rule as to both was fixed by the statutes of Rich ard, viz.: That the place must be out of a county (1 W. & M. 465); and upon the same ground; that there was a local tribunal.
2. As to the second position, — That the place need not be out of a foreign jurisdiction:
The statutes of Richard never extended to this country. — Waring v. Clarke, 4 How. 453, 461; Rossiter v. Chester, 1 Doug. Mich. 165.
The act of 1857 was passed subsequent to these decisions, and as it is held that the English rule does not apply to torts, on principle and analogy it can not apply to crimes. — (Woodbury J) 1 W. & M. 486.
The fact that Congress has been scrupulous in requiring all crimes punishable in the courts of the United States, to have been committed in places “out of the jurisdiction of any particular state,” adds great force to this view.
Under such statutes, the place of the offense may be within the jurisdictional limits of a foreign State, and still upon the “high seas,” etc. — Griffin & Brailsford's Case, 5 Wheat. 184; U. S. v. Ross, 1 Gall. 624; U. S. v. Wiltberger, 5 Wheat. 76 (Marshall Ch. J.); 1 Bish. Cr. Law, §§21, 609, 610, 611, 653. Compare U. S. v. Keefe, 3 Mason, 475; U. S. v. Davis, 2 Sumn. 482; Story on Const. §1673.
In WiltbergeTs case, the Ch. J. does not refer to the locality within a foreign territory as the difficulty, but to the impossibility of applying section eight to section twelve (Act of ’90).
Congress knew that all vessels navigating the lakes and connecting waters from one state to another, or to Canada, are always within “the boundaries” of United States or Canadian counties, and that those waters are common to both nations, for maritime purposes, both by the law of nations and by treaty. — 8 Stat. 575, 576; The Appollon, 9 Wheat. 362; The Atlantic, Ware 121; Campbell J. diss, Magnolia Case, 20 How.
Whether or not the place was within the jurisdiction, is a fact to be found by the jury wider the charge; and this the verdict settled. (See III. below.) — Griffins Case, 5 Wheat. 184; Kessler’s Case, 1 Baldwin, 15.
The argument may be stated, then, as a reductio ad ahswdum. Either there is admiralty jurisdiction in the county of Lambton, or none the other side of the national boundary line; for the eastern half of the river is all within foreign counties; then, if none in foreign counties, none in domestic, for the rule is the’ same, it is said; therefore, no admiralty crime can be committed on the river anywhere. But the rule in relation to crimes, and torts is the same as to place, on principle and authority; therefore, the United States court can not take cognizance of a collision on this river anywhere; in cases of contract, although the jurisdiction results primarily from the subject-matter, yet the locality is one of the essential elements of an admiralty contract, and jurisdiction to that extent depends upon the place, which must be the same as in torts.' — 1 Conkl. Adm. 38. It further follows, then, that in towage, affreightment, &c., upon this river, there is no jurisdiction.
IU. We come, now, to consider the second question reserved.
- The replication admits the former trial upon a good indictment showing jurisdiction, and then sets up a fact alleged to be inconsistent with that jurisdiction. The demurrer says: “You admit the trial upon a good indictment, &c. No matter, then, if the alleged fact be true, it can not now be averred or proved.”
We say, then,—
1. Where jurisdiction appears upon the face of the record, the court and jury before which the proceeding was had, have the sole determination of the jurisdiction, and the judgment on the verdict can not be collaterally impeached.
The courts of the United States, although of limited jurisdiction, are not inferior courts, and their judgments, although the record does not show jurisdiction, are binding everywhere, until reversed; are merely voidable, not void.
When, therefore, the St. Clair court inquires whether the United States court had jurisdiction, in order to make answer it is necessary only to examine the record pleaded in bar, and to reply that no court can look behind it save by appellate power; that it was for that court and jury to decide upon the existence of facts which give jurisdiction, and that the exercise of it warrants the presumption that the facts necessary to be proved were proved; that the record imports absolute verity, not to be impugned by averment or proof to the contrary. — Ex parte Watkins, 3 Pet. 193; Grignon's Lessee v. Astor, 2 How. 319; Huff v. Hutchinson, 14 How. 586; Voorhies v. U. S. Bank, 10 Pet. 477; Curt. Dig. 301, cases cited; Kemp's Lessee v. Kennedy, 5 Cranch, 185; Kennedy v. Ga. State Bank, 8 How. 611; Palmer v. Oakley, 2 Doug. Mich. 475; Erwin v. Lowry, 7 How. 172; Griswold v. Sedgwick, 1 Wend. 131. See, also, Brittain v. Kinnaird, 1 Brod. & Bing. 432 (The Bum-Boat Case); Betts v. Bagley, 12 Pick. 572, et seq.; 2 Phil. Ev. 4th Am. Ed. 161, 162, and cases cited.
The locality of the crime was a fact for the jury, under proper averments.
Here the record shows jurisdiction of the parties and the subject matter, so that it fully appears affirmatively; and the judgment would not be reversable on error.— Curt. Pig. 302, cases cited; Conkl. Treat. 3d Ed. 142.
2. The phraseology of the second question is also open to some criticism. The act refers to the place, and not to the shooting, as within the admiralty jurisdiction, and the circuit court has no original civil admiralty jurisdiction; and whether it can, with any propriety, be said to be sitting in admiralty when sitting to try an offense unknown to the English admiralty, created by the statute, as properly under the power to regulate commerce as under the admiralty grant, is very questionable. — 1 W & M. 450, 454, 455, 492; 5 How. 487. Indeed, the entire jurisdiction in civil cases in admiralty seems, by the latest decisions, to be referred to the power to regulate commerce. — Allen v. Newberry, 21 How. 244; Maguire v, Card, 21 How. 248; (Betts, I) Poag v. S. B. McDonald, So. Dist. N. Y. April 5; McLean J. Magnolia Case, 20 How. 304;— and so, probably, in maritime criminal cases. Under the power to establish post offices, Congress has provided for crimes committed by the agents of the department. Why may it not, under the commercial power, provide for offences on navigable waters ?
We proceed to say a few words in respect to the origin of the act of 185Y, its relation to previous acts, and the judicial decisions construing the words of similar acts.
1. An examination of the legislation of Congress, and the decisions of the Federal courts, will show that the act was passed to amend secs. Y, 8, and 12 of the act of 1Y90, and secs. 4 and 5 of the act of 1825, commonly called the “ Crimes Act,” and because of the common law doctrine that the crime is committed where the death occurs, and not where • the injury is inflicted, and the application of that doctrine in the interpretation of the statutes.— U. S. v. McGill, 4 Dall. 426; Id. v. Id. 1 Wash. C. C. 463; U. S. v. Armstrong, 2 Curt. C. C. 451; U. S. v. Davis, 2 Sumn. 482; 1 Russ on Cr. 554, cases cited; but see 1 Bish. Cr.Law, §554.
It was drafted, and its passage procured, by Judge Curtis, — a name of deserved eminence among admiralty and constitutional lawyers — and in consequence of Armstrong’s case.
Sec. 12 of the act of 1Y90 did not define manslaughter; the act of 185Y does, or rather creates a new species of it.
The existing evil was that, by the common law, the offender escaped all punishment; the remedy applied was ;the abrogation of the rule that death must ensue at the place of injury. Congress made the cause of the death, — the shooting — the offense, and provided that if that offense — i. e. the shooting — occurred at a given place, no matter where the death occurred, the proper United States court might proceed to punish the offender.
2. Sec. 5, of the act of 1825, relative to offenses committed by any of the passengers or crew on American vessels “ lying in a port or place ” within a foreign jurisdiction, deserves comment here.
The replication does not bring the case within this section, because it does not allege that the vessel was lying in a harbor or stopping place, moored or at anchor, and not in motion, &c.
But if it be said that this section limits, or construes, the act of 1857, and that the plea does not allege the defendant and deceased to have been passengers or mariners, and that the replication does properly describe the place defined in the section, we say,—
a. This section, and all other sections, of the acts of 1825 and 1790, can limit and construe the act of 1857 only by the “inconsistency ” of the former with the plain and explicit terms of the latter — inconsistency, especially in adding the further restriction “ and out of the jurisdiction of any state or sovereign,” and interpreting the words “any person or persons,” to mean “ any person belonging to the company of, or being a passenger upon, the ship, if the shooting shall be on a ship,” &e.
But “ all acts and parts of acts inconsistent with the provisions” of the act of 1857, are expressly repealed by sec. 4 of the act.
b. This section of the act of 1825 was cumulative, so to speak, and not restrictive. It was passed in consequence of decisions limiting these same general words “ any person or persons,” which occurred in all the- previous acts, to citizens of the United States or employe.es of American vessels.— Kessler's Case, Bald. C. C. 28, 30; Palmer's Case, 3 Wheat. 610, 31, 2; Beebe's Case, 3 Wash. C. C. 340; Holmes' Case, 5 Wheat. 412; Klentock’s Case, Ibid. 144; Pirates' Case, Ibid. 184; U. S. v. Gilbert, 2 Sumn. 22.
The act gives jurisdiction to punish any offender, whether a citizen of the United States or not, who sustains a relation to the vessel.
The. section was intended to meet Wiltberger's Case, the Land-locked Bay Case (.Robinson’s Case, 4 Mason, 307), and the Bock Case (.Hamilton's Case, 1 Mason, 152), and simply recognizes the ancient rule that the high seas are without any foreign or domestic port, and defines that term — and is totally inapplicable to any other waters, especially the waters of the St. Clair, and to a vessel in transit on the British side.
c. By the law of nations, the laws of a country extend over the persons of its citizens,-and over vessels carrying its flag — everywhere. An American bottom is American soil. Wheat. Int. Law, 175; 1 Kent, 26, 187; Vat. B. 2, ch. 8 §§107, 111; B. 1 ch. 19, §216; B. 2 ch. 9, §123; Palmer's Case ubi supra; Holmes' Case, Ibid; Pirates' Case, Ibid; Bish. Cr. Law, §§579, 581; (Story I) The Appollon, 9 Wheat.; Story Confl. I. § 540. Compare Rex. v. Sawyer, Russ. &. Ry. 294; Reg. v. Azzopardi, 2 Moody, 366.
It is this principle of the law of nations to which we are to look in the application of the statute of 1857 to the facts of this case. The entire argument in favor of the People must be based on a denial of this doctrine, and this law can not'be said to be abrogated by sec. 5.
This latter is an affirmative statute, and such statutes never repeal the prior law unless expressly contradictory and totally irreconcilable with it. Here there is no direct or implied contradiction. See Bish. Cr. Law, §§91, 100; Sedgw. Stat. & Const. Law, 124 seq.
And it is the character of the vessel which gives jurisdiction under the fifth sec. of the act of 1825. U. S. v. Imbert, 4 Wash. C. C. 702; Kessler's Case, Baldwin, 29.
8. There is no clashing of state and national jurisdiction in the case. Secs. 5 and 26 of the act of 1825, and sec. 3 of the act of 1820, expressly refer to concurrency of jurisdiction. See U. S. v. Marigold, 9 How. 560; Peters' Case, 12 Metc. 387; Bevan’s Case, 3 Wheat. 886; Coombs’ Case, 12 Pet. 72. Of course when such a concurrency would involve a liability to a double prosecution, in cases affecting life or limb, it can not exist. — Art. V. Amendments U. S. Const.
But where Congress has regulated the subject-matter of concurrent jurisdiction, existing state legislation is superseded, and future legislation prevented; and the jurisdiction of the United States is exclusive.— Caldwell v. Ins. Co. 1 La. An. 85; Jack v. Martin, 12 Wend. 311, 817 ; Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 1 Wheat. 304; Houston v. Moore, 5 Wheat. 1; U. S. v. Lothrop, 17 Johns. 9; Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat.— Ableman v. Booth, 21 How. 515; Rossiter v. Chester, 1 Doug. Mich. 168. The citizen loses no right of trial by jury, as we have shown, in the Federal tribunals; and would not aside from the constitutional provisions; for before the statute of Henry, as well as by that statute, crimes were tried in admiralty by jury. — 1 Kent, 364, 365; The Ruckers, 4 C. Rob. 74, note 4.
But we think we have shown that crimes are not tried in admiralty in the United States Courts.
Both questions reserved, we submit, with entire confidence, should be answered in the affirmative.
J. M. Howard, Attorney General, for the People:
The replication in this case shows that the mortal wound was given within the British boundary, and in the British county of Lambton; and the main question arising in this case is, whether that part of the St. Clair river is “ within the admiralty jurisdiction of the United States ?”
We hold that it is not; and that, therefore, the Federal court had no jurisdiction of the crime committed by the prisoner.
Of course, the language of the act of 1857, “ within the admiralty jurisdiction of the United States,” must be held to be merely descriptive of the place where the criminal act is done; and the phrase is clearly susceptible of no other meaning. The admiralty jurisdiction of the United States must then be held to embrace such places, and such only, as are referred to in the 2d section of art. 3, of the Federal Constitution, which declares that the judicial power “ shall extend to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction.” In whatever place, then, Congress may, under the Constitution,’ exert its admiralty power; that is, wherever it may authorize its own courts or functionaries to exercise the admiralty jurisdiction, in a case of admiralty there arising, it may punish the crimes defined by this act. But the place must be one within which Congress is authorized actually to exercise and use the admiralty power; for otherwise the act to be punished is not a case within the admiralty jurisdiction. The United States must, at the time and place of committing the act, have authority under the Constitution and laws of nations, to seize the offender, and try, and punish him. The place is of the essence of their right to do this, and if it be not within the geographical limits, within which the'admiralty jurisdiction is restrained by the Constitution or the laws of nations, then the crime is not punishable by the Federal authority.
No such power has ever been granted to the United States over that part of the River St. Clair where this crime was committed. The north-western lakes and their connecting waters have never, for criminal purposes, been treated by the two countries as a part of the “high seas,” or as subject to the admiralty jurisdiction; and no jurisdiction can be claimed upon them as such by either party. The high seas are the common highway of all nations; this is their distinctive attribute; and no one can claim or exercise any authority over them, or take cognizance of any criminal cases arising upon them, except upon its own vessels, which, while on the high seas, are held by the law of nations, to be within the jurisdiction of the goverment to which they belong.
Now the north-western lakes have never, like the high seas, been open and free to the travel of all nations. History does not show that France, who first discovered them, and held them for a century and a half, ever considered them otherwise than as an integral part of her dominions, over which she exercised all her sovereign powers, as fully as she did within her European possessions.
By the 2d article of the preliminary treaty of peace, dated the third of November, 1162, between Great Britain, France and Spain, the King of France “renounces all pretensions which he has heretofore formed or might have formed, to Nova Scotia or Acadia, in all its parts, and guaranties the whole of it, with all its dependencies, to the King of Great Britain; moreover, his Most Christian Majesty cedes and guaranties to his said Britanic Majesty, in full right Canada, with all its dependencies, as well as the Island of Cape Breton, and all the islands in the Gulf and River St. Lawrence, without restriction, and without any liberty to depart from this cession and guaranty under any pretence, or to trouble Great Britain in the possessions above mentioned.” And by the 4th article of the Definitive Treaty, (Paris, Feb. 10,1163), “His Most Christian Majesty renounces all pretensions which he has heretofore formed or might form to Nova Scotia or Acadia, in all its parts, and guaranties the whole of it, and with its dependencies, to the King of Great Britain; moreover, his Most Christian Majesty cedes and guaranties to his said Britanic Majesty, in full right, Canada, with all its dependencies, as well as the island of Cape Breton, and all the other islands and coasts in the Gulf of the River St. Lawrence, and in general, everything that depends on said countries, islands, lands, places, coasts, and their inhabitants, so that the Most Christian King cedes and makes over the whole to the said King and to the Crown of Great Britain, and that in the most ample manner and form, without restriction, and without any liberty to depart from the said cession and guaranty, under any pretence, or to disturb Great Britain in the posses-, sions above mentioned.” — Entick's late War, Vol. 5, pp. 439 453, London, 1764; See also 16 American St. Papers, p. 268
There is nothing in these treaties indicating that the con tractirig parties considered these lakes as a part of the high seas for any purpose whatever. By right of prior discovery and exploration they were doubtless the property of France until the cession of 1762; and that by the treaty they became the property of Great Britain, and so remained until the treaty of 1783, is indisputable. And this long possession by those parties, without claim by any other nation to treat them as the common highway of nations, must be held conclusive that they were never such.— Vattel B. 1. chap. 22, § 266.
By the Royal proclamation of October 7, 1763, the laws of England were extended over the whole of the newly conquered territory; (16 Am. State Papers,p. 36), and the conquered country governed by the King alone until Parliament had acted on the subject.' — Campbell v. Hall, Cowp. 204; Mitchel v. United States, 9 Pet. 748.
No provision is found in any'subsequent treaty going to show any release or modification of the absolute sovereignty of the owners of those waters over them, except as to the right to navigate them.
By the second article of the Treaty of Peace between Great Britain and the United States, of September 3, 1783, (8 Stat. at Large, 81), the boundary between the two countries passed “through the middle of the said lake (Erie) until it arrives at the water communication between that lake and lake- Huron, thence along the middle of said water communication into lake Hnron, thence through the middle of said lake to the water communication between that lake and lake Superior, thence through lake Superior northward to the Isles Royal and Phellipeaux to Long Lake,” &o. This treaty gave neither of the parties to it a right of way by water over the territory of the other, save that it made the Mississippi “free and open” to the subjects of both, from its source to the ocean. — Art. 8.
By the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation of the 19th of Nov., 1794, art. 3, (Ib. p. 117), the two nations stipulate “that it shall at all times be free to His Majesty’s subjects and to the citizens of the United States, and also for the Indians, dwelling on either side of 'the boundary line, freely to pass and repass, by land or inland navigation, into the respective territories and countries of the tw.o parties, on the continent of America (the country within the limits of the Hudson Bay Company excepted), and to navigate all the lalces, rivers, and' waters thereof and freely to carry on trade and commerce with each other.
These were the only provisions respecting the boundaries and the use of the waters until the treaty of "Washington in 1842 (Zb. p. 515). The latter treaty made no changes in the-boundary, which had been previously agreed upon, through the chain of lakes, except in the St. Mary’s River, and in the part of it which lies in the northern portion of lake Superiornor does it alter the rights of the parties to navigate all the rivers and waters, and to carry on trade and commerce; simply declaring (art. 1), that the various channels formed by the islands in the St. Lawrence, in the Detroit by Bois Blanc, and the several channels at the mouth of the St. Clair “shall be equal-ly free and open to the ships and boats of both parties.”
Thus the three countries have, by their treaties, concurred in regarding the lakes as proper territory for the exercise of their sovreignty, and Great Britain and the United States have bounded their territorial possessions and powers by a line drawn through their centre. It would be absurd to sup-, pose that in thus establishing their boundaries, each party did not believe and intend that it was entirely at liberty to exeiv cise, on its own portion of the watery domain, all and every of the powers of sovereignty which it possessed, in such man-, ner, on such subjects, and at such times as it should see fit, subject only to the privilege stipulated to be conferred on the other party, of a right to navigate the same portion. — Wheat. Intern. L. 252, 253; 1 Bish. Cr. L. § 575.
It did not enter their thoughts' (that their sovereign and exclusive legislative power — the power to preserve the peace, and to punish crimes committed within their own dominions 1 — was in any way afftcted by the nationality of the offender, or by the ownership of the craft on which he should commit the crime; circumstances which can be considered only in criminal cases arising upon the- high seas, where no nation •can claim any jurisdiction except on its own vessels. Indeed the treaty of USB, defining the boundaries, is, in its nature, an absolute relinquishinent of all claim of sovereignty by each of the parties beyond the line of demarkation, and a .guaranty that she shall abstain from exercising her powers within the limits of the other. It made each nation sovereign and independent within its new limits, and excluded all powers of the other.— Wheat. Intern. L. 115, 121; The Exchange v. McFaddon, 1 Cranch. 116.
The place, then, where the wound was inflicted, was not 'within the limits of the United States, nor, consequently, within their jurisdiction.
The Constitution contemplates no such absurdity as the .granting of power to the Federal courts, to try criminal causes arising within the territorial limits of another sovereignty ; and whether admiralty powers over the American part of those waters has been granted to Congress (as held in the Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 12 How. 450), or not, the federal courts can take no cognizance of crimes perpetrated on the British portion. England has never, by treaty or legislation, impressed upon these lakes and rivers that character of high seas which enables the nation own ing the vessel to punish crime committed upon it while ■on the high seas. To say that the United States may punish] such a crime, is to assert that they may establish a court of justice on such a vessel, and authorize it to issue process, make the arrest, try the offender, and punish him on board the same vessel, while afloat in British waters; in short, to enforce the whole criminal code on British waters, and within the British limits. For, if the United States have cognizance of the crime committed in such a locality, they certainly can arrest and try the offender there.
One legal attribute of the high seas is that no nation can appropriate to itself any exclusive dominion over them. Vattel B. 1 Ch. 23, §281; Wheat. Int. L., 6 ed. 247, 248, et seq.; 1 Kent. Com. 26, 27 ; The Twee Gebroeders, 3 Rob. Adm. 336, 339, etc.; 1 Bishop Cr. § 679: while lakes and rivers belong to the sovereign within whose territorial limits they fall.— Vattel, B. 1 Ch. 22; Wheat. Int. L. 252.
In accordance with this principle, the United States, in admitting Michigan into the Union, bounded her on the east by the same divisional line, and declared that she should have jurisdiction within it.
Under the territorial government the counties of Wayne,, Monroe, Macomb, St. Clair, and Sanilac, were all bounded on the east by the national boundary line, Huron county, Cheboygan, Alpena, Iosco, Alcona and Presque Isle are all hounded by the same national boundary line. Chippeway county (Code of 1827, p. 692) embraced the whole of the Upper Peninsula, and was bounded on the north and east by the same line.
And it is worthy of note, that by the proclamation of Governor St. Clair, of August 15th, 1796, the original county of Wayne was bounded on the east and north by the national boundary line, commencing on that line in the-middle of Lake Erie, and terminating at a point in said line north of the “north-west part” of Lake Michigan Chase's Laws of Ohio vol. 3, p. 2096.
In October, 1818, the county of Michillimackinac was. also bounded on the east by the same line, so that every square inch of the American part of these waters was included in the several counties bordering on them.
By the R. S. of 1838, the counties of Monroe and1 Wayne had civil and criminal jurisdiction in common on that part of Lake Erie lying within the boundaries of the State;Wayne, Macomb and St. Clair on Lake St. Clair; Saginaw, Michilimackinae and St. Clair, (which three counties formed' •the western border of Lake Huron),, on La-ke Huron; and; Chippeway on Lake Superior; and each county could issue civil and criminal processes upon them; though no such common jurisdiction prevailed upon the American part of the rivers. The same state of things continues. The state of New York, by her laws, extends her counties bordering on lakes Ontario and Erie, and the rivers St. Lawrence and Niagara, to ,the same national boundary line (Manly v. People, 3 Seld. 299); and it is presumed the same is true of the state of Ohio.
Such are the treaties and such the American legislation respecting these waters. They have been treated by us as a portion of the territorial dominions of the United States, and not as high seas. And there is no pretence that England has ever regarded her portion of them in any other light than as a part of her territorial domains; none that her own courts have ever regarded them as at all subject to her admiralty powers. Her courts have steadily held that the admiralty jurisdiction of the kingdom applies only to the high seas, including the mouths of rivers as high up as the tide ebbs and flows. — See 1 Kent. Com. 365, 366, 367, (note a); The Thomas Jefferson, 10 Wheat. 428, approved in the Steamer Orleans v. Phœbus, 11 Pet. 175; Waring v. Clark, 5 How. 463; U. S. v. New Bedford Bridge, 1 Woodb. & M. 420; Lord Hale, (cited 6 How. 397), 1 Bishop Cr. L. §609.
No argument to sustain the jurisdiction of the Federal court can be drawn from the fact that the [treaty of 1794 allows to the citizens and subjects of each of the parties the right “to navigate the lakes, rivers and waters of the other.” This clause confers no jurisdiction, no legislative power over the alien waters, but only a right of passage, which in the absence of such a stipulation would probably have been held to be secured by the laws of nations.
■ There is no analogy between this simple right of way across peaceful territory and the exercise of any part of the sovereign power over it. The former proceeds from the latter, not the latter from the former. Besides, such an argument destroys itself by proving too much; for if the jurisdiction in question can be deduced from the right of passage on the British side of the line, the same right of passage on the rivers on “either side of the boundary line,” would carry the same jurisdiction into all the navigable streams on each side, and would subject the inland rivers and. other waters of each party to the exercise of the same jurisdiction; a consequence which all will reject.
The admiralty jurisdiction of Congress is only such as belonged originally to the states, and such as the states have granted to Congress by the Constitution; and can be neither enlarged nor diminished. Congress can not extend it into regions where it did not before exist, any more than it can expand its other powers so as to encroach upon other nations and diminish their sovereignty. It might as well assume to try ejectments, or other real actions, or actions in rem, where the subject matter is within a foreign country, in contempt of the lex rei sitae ; or establish a .blockade without ships of war on the coast to enforce it.
Under what grant of power in the Constitution can Congress claim the right to punish such an offense? Not that to punish piracy and felony committed on high seas; because, as we have seen, the place was in no sense part of the common highway of nations. Not that to punish offenses against the law of nations, because neither the law of nations nor the common law holds such an offense (i, e. the mortal assault) to be punishable out of the territorial jurisdiction where it is committed. Vattel JB. 2 §101, remarks that “ even in countries which every foreigner may freely enter, the sovereign is supposed to allow him access only upon this tacit condition, that he shall be subject to the laws. I mean the general laws, made to maintain good order, and which have no relation to the title of citizens or of subjects to the state, &c.”
Our courts can not punish offenses against a foreign government nor take cognizance of such, offenses.— 1 JBish, Or. L. §595 ; Story’s Oonfl. of Laws §§Y and 8; §§619 to 625 inclusive.
Not that granting the admiralty power, because that would be to stretch that power not only over all tide waters, (which, so far as England is concerned, is its proper and exclusive theatre), and all navigable waters within the United -States, (as settled in 12 Howard), but over a region which lies confessedly within the limits of a foreign sovereignty, where it is not pretended the United States have any power, to define or punish crimes. No such power, (except perhaps in cases of treason or mutiny), has been delegated to Congress by the Constitution, nor, it is submitted, ever attempted to be exercised by them. Wheaton, in his International Law, (p. 1Y2), although conceding that as a '-general principle a nation may punish its subjects for crimes committed in a foreign country, yet remarks that England and the United States form exceptions to the rule, In the case of the United States the reason is plain. No power is granted by the Constitution, that would authorize Congress to declare an act criminal, committed in a foreign country which was made such solely by the laws of that country, but which should not of itself violate any law which the Constitution authorized to he passed. To make an act, done in such foreign country by an American citizen, criminal, it must appear that it -was done in derogation of some granted power; and nothing of the kind appears in the present case. See The Exchange v. McFaddon, 7 Cranch, 116.
The Supreme Court have never intimated that an act done on the British_side of these waters is within the American admiralty. The farthest they have gone was to declare, in the case of the Genesee Chief (12 How. 453), that a collision on the American side 'in Lake Erie, was a case within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States; but not that it would have been such had it occurred in British waters.
Nor is the power in question derived from the grant in the Constitution “to regulate commerce with foreign nations, among the several states, and with the Indian tribes.” The act of IBS'! was obviously not passed in pursuance of that grant. It does not require that the criminal act should be committed with a view to obstruct commerce, or while the offender is engaged, directly or indirectly, in the business of commerce, with any foreign nation, any other state of the Union, or Avith the Indian tribes; nor does it require that he should be engaged in navigation (which falls within the commercial power,— Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1), either to foreign countries 'or to other states of the Union. It does not require the act to be done on board of an American ship, or any ship unless by mere implication; establishing in British waters two codes, one American, the other British, incompatible with each other. But under the act of 1845 (5 U. S. Stat. at Large, p. 726), in order to bring an American vessel within this jurisdiction on the lakes, it must be enrolled and licensed for the coasting trade, be of twenty tons burden and upward, and be at the time employed in the business of commerce and navigation between forts and places in different states and territories. None of these facts are averred in the indictment, as to the Concord, and in omitting .them the pleader has obviously failed, upon the face of the indictment, to present a case which by implication falls within the admiralty jurisdiction, even had it occurred on the American side of the line.
Nor was the act of lSS^ passed to punish American citizens, as such, for crimes committed in a foreign country, if Congress have such a power; for it does not even require that the offender shall be an American citizen, and the indictment in the federal court does not aver that either Tyler or Jones was such, — though this is admitted in the replication.
The question arising upon this record is not, however, whether the United States have power, under the Constitution, to punish American citizens for crimes they may commit in foreign countries (which I insist can be done, if at ail, only under the treaty-making power, as in the case of the treaty with China,' — 8 U. S. Stat. at Large, p. 592, § 21); but really whether they may extend their admiralty and maritime jurisdiction into the interior of a neighboring independent nation, which does not recognize the existence there of any such jurisdiction, and whose laws wisely repel it.
If Congress can not assert a power to punish crime, under the admiralty clause, committed within the boundaries of a state of the Union above high water mark (United States v. Coombs, 12 Pet. 78), it would seem they are at least under as clear a disability in respect to a foreign country.
In Commonwealth v. Peters, 12 Metc. 387, the prisoner had been indicted in the federal court, under the twenty-second section of the act of 1825 (4 Stat. at Large, p. 121), for an assault with intent to kill, committed on board an American vessel lying in the. sea, but within the limits of the county of Suffolk, and was acquitted. He was then indicted in the municipal court for the same offense, and pleaded his former acquittal. The court, in overruling the plea, held, that the offense was exclusively within the cognizance of the state courts, for the reason that, although there may be a concurrent power in the Federal and state courts to punish crimes committed in the harbors, rivers, etc., within the body of a county, yet that the phrase in that section, “ within the admiralty and maritme jurisdiction of the United States, and out of the jurisdiction of any particular state,” excluded the Federal court. To the same effect is United States v. Beavans, 3 Wheat. 336.
In The United States v. Grush, 5 Mason, 290, 299, where the indictment was under the same section, for a like offense, Judge Story held the same thing, though he admitted that
the “arms of the sea,” and rivers, harbors, creeks, basins, and bays, where the tide ebbs and íIoavs, although within the body of a county, are Avithin the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction.
In United States v. Wiltberger, 5 Wheat. 76, the prisoner was indicted under the twelfth section of the act of 1790, for manslaughter committed on the river Tigris, some thirty-five miles from its mouth, but Avithin the ebb and floAV of the tide. The court held the place not to be on the high seas; and as the section required that the act should be done on the high seas, the court had no jurisdiction of the offense. But the court do not intimate that, had the language been “within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United. States,” they would have had jurisdiction of the offense. But it is quite clear that this section, so far as it punishes manslaughter committed on the high seas, derives its force from that clause of the Constitution which enables Congress to define and punish piracies and felonies on the high seas, and not from that granting the admiralty power; Avhile the power claimed in the present case must, if it exist, spring exclusively from the latter.
Although the jiresent case does not involve the question of the poAver of Congress to punish crime committed on the navigable waters of a state, within her acknoAvledged limits, under the admiralty poAver, yet a state court may, in view of the consequences to the states, well pause before establishing the precedent asked for by this demurrer. For it invites the court to declare that Congress has power under that clause of the Constitution, to extend the admiralty jurisdiction into every inland navigable river in the world, and to try and determine all cases, civil and criminal, arising upon them on board of American vessels. If this may be done, Congress may surely repeal the present limitation in the acts of 1825 and 1857, prohibiting the exercise of the power in the states, and direct that all crimes committed upon their navigable waters, whether arms of the sea, har bors, bays, or rivers, shall be tried exclusively in the federal courts, by juries selected by the marshals from the whole district. The doctrine laid down in the ease of the Genesee Chief, in 12 Soto., extending this unwelcome and ambitious jurisdiction, in civil eases, not only to the head of tide waters in the states, but to the highest point where the stream is navigable, is but the tocsin for assumption by the Federal power of the trial of all crimes committed on those waters; and, finally, should a Congress be found sufficiently pliant to yield to the imperial claim, to exclude the state courts from making any effort to preserve the peace, and enforce their criminal codes upon, them. The possibility of such an attempt has become the ground of just alarm.
And for myself, I seize the occasion here to utter my remonstrance against a construction of the Constitution, which, although it has not yet been actually done, may yet absorb within the Federal power a large and very important portion of the power of the state over crimes committed within her limits, and expose an accused person to be tried in a federal court by a jury exclusively selected by a Federal. officer, and called from remote parts of the state, far out of the limits of his county, and having no acquaintance or sympathy with him; and cordially adopt the language of Justice Manning, in his dissenting opinion in the American Trans. Co. v. Moore, 5 Mich., that “rather than acknowledge such an encroachment on her sovereignty, it would be better for the state to define anew her territorial limits, excluding therefrom that portion of her territory which can no longer be retained without constantly reminding her of her political degradation, and the loss of her sovereignty over her own watersP
JET. JE>. Terry on same side:
Admitting the language of the act of the 3d of March, 1857 — “within the admiralty jurisdiction of the United States” — to mean, the admiralty jurisdiction as it existed in England and her American colonies at the close of the Re" volution, yet we insist that admiralty jurisdiction was never recognized as existing over,any waters or seas where there was a local jurisdiction of the common law courts. The jurisdiction of the English courts of admiralty in criminal cases was limited to offenses committed on the high seas, or bays, havens, rivers or creeks beyond and outside the borders of counties, and where the jurisdiction of common law courts did not exist. This is the rule laid down in all the books that treat of criminal jurisdiction in admiralty. Even if the place where the shot was fired by the defendant had been within tide waters, still a court of admiralty would have no jurisdiction over the offense, because it was clearly within the borders of a county, and within the jurisdiction of the common law courts of Canada. No English or American case can be found where jurisdiction has been enforced in the admiralty courts, or any other courts, for offenses committed within the jurisdiction of the local courts of a foreign government, and upon any principle of the common or admiralty law; and only one case can be found under the statute of 33 Hen. VIII. Rex v. Sawyer, Russ. & Ry. 294; 1 Hawh. P. C. 93. Wherever waters lie within the body of a county, or any local, civil or municipal division for judicial purposes, they are not within the jurisdiction of the admi. ralty for criminal purposes, and never were; and there is, and can be, no such thing as concurrent jurisdiction over criminal offenses by the admiralty courts and courts of common law.
There are a few cases, both English and American, where criminal jurisdiction has been sustained by the admiralty courts, or courts taking jurisdiction as such, when the offenses have been committed within a marine league of the coast, and below low water mark, although the local foreign jurisdiction was there exercised; but in all those cases the jurisdiction was maintained on the ground that the locus was on the high seas. The statute of Richard created no new offense, nor did it extend or diminish any territorial jurisdiction. And before the statute the admiral had jurisdiction only upon the high seas and outside of any local jurisdiction. — 1 Com. Dig., N. Y. Ed. 1824, pp. 507 to 516, 517 and 518; 1 Hawk, P. C. 254, § 11 — 15; 2 East C. L. 803; 1 Kent Com. 364; Regina v. Serva, 2 C. & K. 53; 2 Bac. Abr. (Bouvier's Ed.) 734, 735; 1 Russ, on Cr. 101.
In connection with the proposition that the admiralty criminal jurisdiction did not extend to places where there was a local jurisdiction, we say that the same doctrine has been held in this country, and that, too, whether the local jurisdiction was foreign or domestic, even if the places were on the “high seas.” — 1 Bishop Cr. L. §611, and cases there cited; 2 N. Y. Regal Observer 35.
The act of Congress under which the prisoner was indicted makes no mention of .'any vessel as the place or scene of the offense, nor does it in terms refer to the nationality of any person or persons who may commit it, nor the relations they may bear to any vessel, or the crew or passengers of any vessel. A statute could not be more general. Compare it with the act 3d March, 1825, §5. What necessity was there to pass this latter act if all the precedent acts, and the present act can be held to include places within the local jurisdiction of foreign sovereigns and independent States? — See U. S. v. Wiltberger, as cited in 7th Ed. 1 Kent, 362 and 363, and the remarks on §5. The maxim, “ Pxpressio unius exclusio alterius,” applies in this connection with peculiar fitness. But, if it be said that the words “within the admiralty jurisdiction,” in the act of 1857, define not only the locus of the offense, but include, ¿necessarily, the fact that it must be committed upon an American vessel, by or upon. American citizens, then we say that there are no words in the record showing that the Concord is one of the vessels included in the act of 1845. (See §3 of act 1845; Palmer's case, 3 Wheat. 610; 1 Baldw. 29, where it is said the character of the vessel determines the jurisdiction). The admiralty court would have no jurisdiction of a tort committed on such a vessel as the Concord, as she is described in the record.
Again, the Federal court could not have jurisdiction over an offense committed in a place where the process could not be served. It would be absurd to say that the process of a court could not be executed in a particular locality, and yet not the same court could have full jurisdiction over an offence committed in that locality. That process could not be served where this offence was committed- — See The Appollon, 9 Wheat 362. See case Booth, just decided in Sup. Ct. of U. S., sentence of Judge Wilkins.
Again, we say that the words of Sec. 1 of the act of 1857, (upon which the indictment in the Federal court was framed), to wit: “Any arm of the sea, or in any river, haven, creek, basin, or bay,” must have the same meaning, and refer to the same places, as when used in the crimes act of 1790, and in the subsequent acts. That is, that the bodies of water referred to must open into and be navigable from the “high seas.”- — -See §8 of the act of April 30, 1790, Laws U. S., p. 93 ; Brightly's Dig., p. 207, § 28.
Congress never dreamed of including the American lakes and the straits connecting them, when they passed this section. They simply meant to make the territorial jurisdiction over the offence defined by this section as broad as the then American doctrines in regard to the extent of admiralty jurisdiction. We must look to the circumstances surrounding them to get their intention. — 1 Kent, 366 et seq. These same words were used by English statutes and writers, hence their adoption in early legislation. — 2 Bac. Air. 735 and 741. Section 4 of the act of 3d of March, 1825, uses the same language precisely, and includes the offenses of murder by “shooting, &c., maliciously,” when the party dies on shore. So sections 6, 7, and 22 of the act use the same language. Then came the act in question, using pre cisely the same language. It can not be said that these words, when used in the act of 1857, must have a different meaning from what they were understood to have in the previous act. It was passed after the extension of the admiralty jurisdiction to the “lakes” and rivers, in 1845. But if it had been the intention so to have extended the criminal jurisdiction, would not the word “lakes” have been used ? They had become well known; for, year after year1, applications had been made to Congress for appropriations; light houses had been erected, and harbors constructed; and the opening of the mineral regions had attracted the attention of the world. It is a little strange that, if Congress designed to extend criminal admiralty jurisdiction over them, more express and appropriate language had not been used.
Again, if Jones had died on the spot where he was shot, upon the brig, the offense must have gone without punishment, if the ground assumed by the other side be tenable; because there would be no power under any existing act of Congress to punish such an offense.
Besides, the water communication between Lakes Huron, St. Clair, and Erie was never understood as, or called, rivers, until long after the act of 1790; nor do they come within any definition of that word as understood in admiralty law, or by national treaties. — 2d Bouv. L. D., Tit. River; Art. 2 of Preliminary Treaty between U. S. and Great Britain, Laws U. S., Vol. 1, 196; so on p. 203, in Definitive Treaty
What was the object of enacting the law of 1857? What evil was to be remedied, or omission to be supplied by it? Section 4 of the act of 1825 makes certain acts (if resulting in death) murder, if the acts are done “with malice,” but not providing for the punishment of like acts with like result, but done without malice. The of 1857 Supplies this defect. And it is to be remarked that the language of the two sections is identical, except in the first case the word “maliciously” is inserted, and in the latter the words “without maliceP There is no difference in the language defining the territorial jurisdiction. Is it not clear that no broader construction can be given to the latter statute than to the former? — We think so.
But what seems to us must settle the question that no other construction can be given to the words “river, haven, creek, basin or bay,” as used in the act of 1857, than that they mean navigable water communications from the “ high seas,” is the want uof power in Congress to punish maritime crimes except upon the “high seas.” This court will hesitate before they pronounce an act of Congress unconstitutional; but if, by giving a construction to an. act which it will fairly and reasonably bear, they thereby bring it within the Constitution, they will do so. Now, it is insisted on the other side, very strongly, that the provision of the Constitution extending the judicial power to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, does not include the power to define and punish marine offenses, but that this pówer is found only in the provision authorizing Congress to define and punish felonies committed on the high seas.— Art. 1, § 8, SuMiv. 9. For the purposes of this branch of the argument this is conceded. Look at the language of this provision: “ To define and punish piracies, and felonies committed on the high seas, and offenses against the law of nations.” Can there be any doubt how the words “high seas” were understood by the framers of the Constitution? Were not the words understood precisely as they were understood at that time in England? — 1 Story on Const., p. 56, §1159; 1 Bish. Cr. L. §611. So, precisely, has the term been understood as used in the act of 1790, passed in the following year. — U. S. v. Ross, 1 Gall. 624; U. S. v. Furlong, 5 Wheat. 184; U. S. v. Wiltberger, 5 Wheat. 76.
But we say, what we think must be conclusive of this ease, the Circuit Court of the United States had no jurisdiction of the offense charged in the indictment in that court, because the killing of Jones was within the state of Michigan, and therefore the offense was not committed “ out of the jurisdiction of any particular state,” within the intent of the act of 1857, but was within the jurisdiction of the state of Michigan. If a state court had jurisdiction, then it is clear the Federal court had none. The jurisdiction of the state of Michigan is co- extensive with her legislative power.— U. S. v. Bevans, 3 Wheat. 336; 1 Hawk. P. C. 254, §16; Beach. Cro. Ca. 432; Coombs’ Case; 1 Shaw, 339; Rex v. Alsop, 1 Russ, on Cr. 101; Ibid. 554; U. S. v. Davis, 2 Sum. 482; U. S. v. Grush, 5 Mason, 290; 12 Metc. (Peters’ case) 387; 3 Park. Cr. Cas. 199.
A want of jurisdiction in. the court pronouncing a judgment or decree may always be set up when it is soirght to be enforced, or when any benefit is claimed under it; and the principle which ordinarily forbids the impeachment or contradiction of a record has no sort of application to the case. — Cow. & Hill’s Note’s, 801, 825 and 6; 2 Doug. Mich. 476; 19 Johns. 33; 15 Johns. 141; 1 Pet. 340; 3 How. 750; 1 Day, 168; 5 Wend. 148; 12 Metc. 387.
The main propositions may be summed up as follows: That the statute of 1857 does not and can not apply, either in its spirit or its letter, to the lakes and rivers of the northwest, whether lying within the geographical boundaries of Canada or the United States, because the local jurisdiction-of the several states and Canada excludes it. The act of 1857 is confined to the “high seas,” and “rivers, basins, creeks, havens, and bays” which are a part of the “high seas,” and which are also beyond and outside of any local jurisdiction.
If the act of 1857, by its letter and terms, included the offense charged as having been committed at the place specified, it would clearly be utterly null and void, as contrary to and beyond the provisions of sub-division 11, section 3, article 1st of the Constitution: “ Congress shall have power to define and punish piracies, and felonies committed on the high seas.”
Now the government of the United States can not define or punish any offenses when committed beyond the boundaries thereof, except only under this provision, and where they are committed on the high seas, which, Judge Story says, “ may be taken to mean that ,part of the ocean which washes the sea coast, and is without the body of any county according to the common law,” and, of course, where no local jurisdiction exists. This provision of the Constitution is the one under which all the acts defining felonies and piracies on the high seas have been passed, including the acts of 1790, 1825, 1835, and 1857; and Congress could not, under this provision, if they desired so to do, extend the power to the lakes and rivers of the north-west, because they are not “ high seas,” and because they are all either within the local jurisdiction of the several states bounded thereon, on the one side, or the jurisdiction of Canada, on the other; and if Congress intended, as in section 5 of the act of 1825, to punish felonies when committed within a foreign jurisdiction on the high seas, they would have expressly provided therefor. But the offense described in the indictment was clearly within the jurisdiction of the state of Michigan, and, therefore, expressly excluded from the Federal courts by the very act of 1857.
Mussell in reply:
If, as is said by the Attorney General, the court will take notice, from the former indictment, that the place was in Canada, why did he not demur, instead of replying the locality, as new matter, in the nature of a confession and avoidance?
The first argument for the People is, that in order that the place mentioned in the act of 1858 and required to be “within the admiralty jurisdiction” may be so, it must be a place where Congress may ‘■'■exert its admiralty power f “ may actually exercise and use it;” “ the United States must at the time and place of the act, have authority to seize and try, and punish.” And again it is said, “To say that the United States may punish such a crime, is to assert that they may establish a court of justice in British waters, arrest, try, and punish there, and enforce the whole criminal code within British limits“ cognizance of the case at all, involves this power to arrest and try the offender at the place of the crime.” Here is a fallacy — a non sequitur, of the most extraordinary kind. What is jurisdiction? It is “to have the power to inquire into, the facts, to apply the law, and to declare the punishment, in a regular course of judicial proceedings.” (Shaw Ch. J. 3 Metc. 462; 2 How. 319, 338; 6 Pet. 691, 709). This power in a court depends upon the subject matter and the parties; and may be said to be dormant until the regular course of judicial proceedings is instituted. That can be instituted only within the territorial jurisdiction of the court and where its process may run. Take the case of a collision on Detroit river — the District Court of Northern Ohio or that of Michigan has jurisdiction. But only that court can exercise it within whose territorial limits the vessel shall be brought. Take the case of the Echo or the Wanderer. Any circuit court of the United States has jurisdiction to try the offense against the slave trade acts, but the offender must be apprehended within the district. Persona] process to the marshal directs arrest “if found within the district.” See Ex parte Graham, 3 Wash. C. C. R.
But, again; waters within the admiralty jurisdiction are - waters which may be the locality of a tort or service cognizable by the admiralty court, if that court ever gets hold of the vessel. The argument of the Attorney General is twofold- — first, he says this place is not within the civil admiralty jurisdiction- — -then, if it be, the act of 1851! giving power to punish a crime committed there, is unconstitutional. Why is not this place within the civil admiralty jurisdiction ? Because, says he, that jurisdiction cannot exist except on waters accessible to all the powers of the earth. In what text book or judicial decision do we find this criterion? Was not the Baltic the cradle of admiralty law, and yet a mare clausum, where to this clay Denmark exacts a toll for passage? If the two greatest commercial nations of the globe have access to the lakes, is there not a theatre for this jurisdiction? Did not Clay claim the St. Lawrence td be a strait? But it is said that' by the treaty of Paris of 1763, and by the treaty of 1783, no provision was made for admiralty jurisdiction. Population and commerce exists where there is such jurisdiction. Neither existed on the lakes then; they were as unknown as the Niger. The high contracting parties did not know whether they were fresh or salt. During this century England has furnished an armed vessel on Lake Ontario -mih fresh water tanks. Now the internal commerce of the lakes exceeds in value the entire foreign commerce of the United States.
The Attorney General then says that England restrains admiralty jurisdiction to the tide, and never exercised admiralty jurisdiction anywhere else, or on the lakes, or that part of this river, in” Canada; and cites the case of the Thomas Jefferson, and N. O. v. Phœbus, and 2 Haggard. Hrgo, this court is asked to hold that the English rule prevails here, and to overrule the United States Supreme Court decisions since 1845. The whole argument against civil admiralty jurisdiction on the other side of the line proves too much; it sweeps away the jurisdiction on this side equally See 20 How., Magnolia Case.
But, says the Attorney General, this statute is unconstitutional. Congress has no power, he says, to enact that a crime, committed by one of our citizens in a foreign country, may be punished here. Under what clause, he asks, can the power to pass this statute be found? The power to regulate commerce, we answer. The admiralty power is really the same thing, as McLean J. says in his opinion in the Magnolia Case, 20 How.-, and, as before said, by the law of nations.
But if it be, says the Attorney General, under this power, then the tonnage and employment of the vessel should have been averred. By no means. The act of 1845 relates solely to civil cases of tort and contract, and confers jurisdiction on the district courts.
The tonnage and employment upon certain waters give jurisdiction in civil cases over the vessel, and the waters where such vessels <we employed become admiralty waters. Any crime committed on an American vessel on these waters, we say, is punishable.
The ownership gives jurisdiction, provided the vessel is on admiralty waters. Take the case of the Fashion, 21 Sow. 244. Suppose a crime committed on that vessel, or any other .vessel although plying between ports of the same state; she would be on waters within the admiralty jurisdiction.
Does the act of 1845 say employed on the American side of the lakes and connecting waters ? The question did not arise in 12 Sow. As a matter of fact the collision theré was on this side. But in Scott v. Young America, 1 Newb., and many other cases, and in the great collision case of the Atlantic and Ogdensburg, 1 Newb. and 21 How., the collisions were in Canada. So in the Appollon case the tort was begun in a foreign country. In the Wiltberger casé it is clearly manifest that if the words of the 8th section could have been engrafted on the 12th, the court would have sustained the jurisdiction.
But if the doctrine of the Attorney General is true, the act is an absurdity. Where are the “rivers, creeks, havens, basins, and bays,” outside of any state, which are not in foreign countries?
The place of the shooting is to be without the jurisdiction of the state; not the offense. If the United States has no jurisdiction, because the state has, then the United States can not punish counterfeiting because the state can. — 1 Cond. 278; Ch. J. in Bevans’ case.
How surprising the assertion that if we can legislate for the punishment of citizens returned here for crimes committed abroad, it follows, as a consequence, that we can enact that they shall not be amenable to local laws abroad, and that foreign authorities shall not provide their own criminal code, and that we may set up our own courts abroad!
The law of nations, as interpreted by Yattel, Bishop, Story, Wheaton, English and Federal legislation and decisions, Marshall, Johnson, Baldwin, and Hopkinson — the admiralty decisions of the Supreme Court — the very precedents in the form books — recognize the doctrines for which we contend. Wheaton, page 175, is enough to settle the whole matter. The common law is no part of Federal law; but the law of nations is.
If there was no power to punish maritime felonies, to regulate commerce, or try admiralty cases, yet by the law of nations as laid down by Wheaton, the United States may punish offences of its own citizens everywhere.— Wheat. 175; Story Confl. L. § 540 ; Vattel cited above ; JBish. Or. L. § 601; 1 Taunt. 26; Reg. v. Sawyer, 2 C. & K. 101; Whart. Prec. 93.
Negative answers to the questions of the court below involve the holding the acts of 1825, § 5, 1845, and 1857, unconstitutional, and a disregard of the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States since 1845.
On the cause being announced as ready for decision, Martin On. J., made an oral statement of the case, and then proceeded to say, that he had not -written out his opinion, but that he held the following views:
Jurisdiction is co-extensive with the territorial limits of the government exorcising it. Admiralty jurisdiction is that which a nation exercises beyond its territorial limits, and upon the high seas. This is exercised because those seas are the peculiar proporty of no nation, but a common Highway for all; and is properly exclusively confined to cases of civil jurisprudence. The United States has never conferred upon its admiralty courts criminal jurisdiction. It is true that criminal jurisdiction over certain specified offenses is conferred by Congress upon the courts exercising admiralty jurisdiction, but such jurisdiction is never administered under the admiralty code, but after the course of the common law.
In England, at the time of our revolution, and for a long time prior, no power existed in the courts of admiralty to try and punish for crime. This power was conferred upon a commission which proceeded under the common law. Thus the right of trial by jury, and of being confronted by witnesses, was secured to persons charged with the commission of offenses upon the high seas, as well as to those charged with thoir commission upon land. This common law was brought to this country by our ancestors, and at the time of the revolution, and the formation of our federal government, was the law of every colony. The objections which had prevailed in England to the trial of those charged with crime, under the admiralty code — whereby the right of trial by jury was refused — and which ultimately led to the withdrawal of this jurisdiction from the admiralty courts, equally prevailed here; and, when the framers of the constitution inserted in it the clause conferring admiralty and maritime jurisdiction upon the Federal judiciary, they conferred such only as existed in the mother country at the time of the separation. This is manifest from the fact that provision is made in a separate clause of the constitution for the power to define and punish piracies and felonies committed on the high soas, and offenses against the law of nations, and in also providing that the trial of all crimes shall be by jury. Had crimes been considered as embraced 'within the admiralty jurisdicton, this power would be unnecessary, if not inconsistent with the provision conferring judicial power ; and certainly the provision for trial by jury would be wholly inconsistent with the power and practice of admiralty courts.
If the admiralty courts had no jurisdiction over crimes committed on the high seas, what court has, and what is the extent of that jurisdiction? Congress, by various acts from 1T89 to the present day, has conferred that jurisdiction upon the Circuit and District Courts of the United States.
Such jurisdiction is confined to the high seas, or other waters out of the jurisdiction of any particular state.
"When, therefore, Congress provides for the punishment of felonies, if committed within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States, such jurisdiction must be regarded as confined to the high seas, or, probably, tide-waters in certain instances — as such only are within the dominion of Congress for such purpose. The constitutional limitation must bo considered as incorporated into and as controlling tlie act. And Congress, in every or nearly every instance, has accordingly respected this limitation of power by enacting that tlie offences shall have been committed on waters out of the jurisdiction of any state.
Tho words “admiralty and maritime jurisdiction,” as used in the criminal code, must then be interpreted by tlie grant of power to Congress in the Constitution, and construed as signifying the high seas. "Whether there be a civil admiralty jurisdiction extending elsewhere, and on other waters, it is immaterial to inquire.
This leads us to the inquiry, are the waters of the St, Clair River which are without tkeboundaries of the "United States and within those of Canada, within the admiralty jurisdiction of the United States, and without the jurisdiction of any particular state, within the meaning of the Crimes act ? When the Constitution was framed, it cannot — except by the most violent presumption — be presumed that the lakes and their connecting waters were intended to be embraced within the admiralty jurisdiction of the United States. The term was employed in tho sense it had been for centuries used in the mother country, and, from, their first settlement, in the colonies, to designate jurisdiction upon the ocean — that space without the territorial limits of any government — the common highway of all nations. Tho lakes, and rivers or straits connecting them, were not presumed to be of such a character. They were, before the revolution, within the exclusive dominion of Great Britain, and, by the treaty of peace, dominion over them was divided. No waste of waters beyond any territorial jurisdiction — no common highway of nations, ever existed upon them. By the treaty of 1788, the boundary line between Great Britain and the United States ran through the centre. They can, tliercrefore, in no sense, be denominated “high seas” within the meaning of the constitution.
Nor are their waters which are within the boundaries of tho United States without the jurisdiction of any particular state. Each state lying upon their borders is bounded by the national boundary liae. Beyond such line, the waters are within an acknowledged foreign jurisdiction, and, so far as I can ascertain, (at least in this case, as admitted by the pleadings,) within the body of foreign counties. Under no known rule of admiralty law, then, can they be regarded as within admiralty and maritime jurisdiction.
Nor were they ever regarded as being witbin such by Congress, nor by tbe courts of the United States, until the decision of the case of the Genesee Ghief 'O. JTiizlmqh (12 Howard, 448). — If they had been within this jurisdiction, there was no occasion for the passage of the act of 1845, extending what Judge Conklin very properly calls a quasi admiralty jurisdiction over them.
This act does not extend full admiralty jurisdiction over them, nor include them within such jurisdiction. It only"extends tlie jurisdiction of the District Court over cases of contract and tort arising in, upon, or concerning certain classes of "boats and vessels navigating them, to "be exercised in tlie same manner as jurisdiction was exercised over contracts and torts upon like vessels navigating tlie high seas or tidewaters, witlwn the adrrwi'altAj and maritime jw)'isdiction of the United States, and secures to parties a concurrent remedy at common law, and "by tlie state laws, wlien competent.
As I understand it, this act distinctly recognizes the distinction between these waters and the high seas, and regards them as being without tho admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States. Its language will not admit of a construction which will embrace them within such jurisdiction. The jurisdiction conferred is likened to the admiralty, but it is not tho full and exclusive admiralty jurisdiction which it extended over them. As it did not exist over tho lakes before the act, Congress had no power to extend it over them. I am aware that the Supreme Court of tho United States, in the case of the Genesee Chief, regard this as being an extension of the admiralty jurisdiction; or rather, as I understand the opinion of Chief Justice Taney, as a recognition of the existence of such jurisdiction under the constitution. To my mind it is certain that it exists as admiralty jurisdiction by virtue of the Constitution, or not at all. Congress cannot extend such jurisdiction over waters not recognized by the law of nations as tlie proper subjects of it. That law was in the eye of the framers of the Constitution when the provision conferring admiralty and maritime jurisdiction upon the Federal courts was incorporated into it, and this includes only the high seas or tidewaters.
If Congress had the power to pass the act at all, it was under the power to regulate commerce between the several states. This seems to have been the aim of Congress, for the act confers jurisdiction only in cases of contract or tort arising upon vessels “employed in business of commerce and navigation between ports and places in different States cmd TerritoriesAnd this appears to be the later view of that court. {See Allen n. The Fashion, 21 How.) It was said, in the argument of the prisoner’s counsel, that this court in Amer. Trasporiation Co. v. Ü/borehad recognized these waters as within the original grant of admiralty jurisdiction, and of like character with the sea in respect to maritime legislation and jurisdiction. In this the counsel is mistaken. No such question was before us, nor did we undertake to determine under what grant such jurisdiction was exercised. As an exercise of the power to regulate commerce between the different states, I am still of the opinion that the civil jurisdiction of the District Court might have been extended in the manner and with the limitation that it was. If these views are correct, the Crimes acts of of1825 and 185T do not embrace the offense for which. Tyler stands charged, as the of fense was not committed on tlie liigli seas, or in any arm of the sea, or within any river, haven, creek, basin or bay within the admiralty jurisdiction of the United States.
The act of 1857 was additional to that of 1825, and the section under which Tyler was indicted in tlie Federal court was passed to supply a casus omdssus. The act of 1825, which defined and punished certain crimes committed on “ the high seas, or in any arm of tlie sea, or in any river, &c., within tlie admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States, and out of the jurisdiction of any particular State,” was so passed before any jurisdiction of the Federal courts was extended over the lakes or their connecting waters. This act, then, could not have embraced offences committed upon these waters; 1st: Because they are nothigh seas; and, 2d: Because Federal jurisdiction had not been extended by Congress over them. The act of 1845, extending the jurisdiction of the District Court over them in certain cases, is confined to civil cases alone, and does not confer full admiralty jurisdiction. Had Congress intended to extend the Crimes act over them, it is natural to suppose that such intention would have been declared. But it did not so intend, for it had not the power. The act of 1857 defined and provided for the punishment of another felony, but did not enlarge, or undertake to enlarge, the jurisdiction of the courts, or to confer jurisdiction over waters not within the act of 1825.
It is to my mind an utter impossibility to extend the provisions of these acts over the lakes and their connecting waters. They aro operative only within the admiralty jurisdiction of the courts of the United States. Now, such jurisdiction can exist only on the high seas, as has already been shown, although a quasi admiralty jurisdiction, for purpose of regulating and protecting commerce, may exist elsewhere. But the Crimes acts do not confer jurisdiction on the Federal courts co-extensively with that they have or may have in civil cases. The offense must be committed “out of the jurisdiction of any particular state.”
The Federal courts have no jurisdiction over crimes committed in foreign waters with a single exception, viz.: when an inhabitant of an American ship commits a crime against the person or property of another inhabitant; and then only when the foreign government disclaims or declines to exercise jurisdiction. This is not such a case.
Nor have they criminal jurisdiction over the waters of any “ particular state.”
Now, there are no common, no unappropriated waters on the line of the lakes. The boundary line runs through their centre, and every crime committed upon them is committed within the jurisdiction of some state or that of Great Britian. Where, then, can a crime be committed on these waters, within the admiralty jurisdiction of the United States, and without that of any particular state ?
I think both questions should be answered in the negative.
The following is the statutory provision under which this indictment was found: «if any * * mortal wound shall be given, or other violence or injury shall be inflicted, or poison administered, on the high seas, or on any other navigable waters, or on land, either within or without the limits of this state, by means whereof death shall ensue in any county thereof, such offence may be prosecuted and punished in the county where such death may happen.” Compiled Laws, §5944.
The first section of this act is in the folfowing words: “Be it enacted,” &c., “that if any person or persons upon the high seas, or any arm of the sea, or in any river, haven, creek, "basin or bay, within the admiralty jurisdiction of the United. States and out of the jurisdiction of any particular state shall, unlawfully and wilfully, but Without malice aforethought, strike, stab, wound or shoot, at any other person, of which striking, stabbing, wounding oy shooting such person shall afterwards die upon land within or without the United States, every person so offending, his oy her counsellors, aiders and abettors, shall be deemed guilty of the crime of manr. slaughter, and upon conviction thereof shall be punished as hereinafter provided.^

Opinion:
Campbell J.:
The facts, as set up in the pleadings, show that Tyler shot Jones on an American vessel on the St. Clair river, within the limits of Canada, and that he died of the wound at Port Huron, on land, within the county of St. Clair, in this state. The question presented for our consideration is, whether Tyler's offense came within the United States laws, and within the jurisdiction of the United States Circuit Court.
It is much to be regretted that this question was not presented to the consideration of the Circuit Court of the United States, where the trial was had. It is fairly raised here upon the issue of a former conviction, and the very able arguments we have listened to have exhausted the subject.
Homicide has always been treated as an offence depending on locality, and it is so regarded by the act of Con gress under which Tyler was indicted. Where death does not immediately follow the mortal blow, and happens in another jurisdiction within the realm, the place of death was generally, under the views taken by the common law authorities, the proper place of jurisdiction; inasmuch as the crime was not complete without it. There is some doubt whether, at the common law, originally such offenses were provided for at all. But, as the blow itself may be made a punishable assault, there is no very good reason for not allowing it to be punished as an assault, qualified by its natural and legitimate consequences/ — 1 Bish. Cr. L. §554, 555. This is the plain design of the act of Congress, which punishes an assault upon the water, when death ensues upon land either within or without the United States. There are very few places in the United States where a crime of violence would come within the Federal jurisdiction. In this case, the place of death being within the state jurisdiction, the authority of Congress to punish the assault could only be deduced from a jurisdiction existing where the assault was committed. And, inasmuch as under our treaties with Great Britain the place was under the exclusive territorial jurisdiction of that country, the case presents the question whether, under this act of Congress, a person who commits the offence charged within a foreign jurisdiction, is made punishable here.
Upon the high seas, every vessel, public or private, is, for jurisdictional purposes, a part of the territory of the nation of its owners. An offense committed on board of such vessel, is an offense against the sovereignty of that nation. But, when a private ship enters a foreign jurisdiction, it becomes at once, with all on board (in the absence of treaty stipulations to the contrary), subject to the municipal laws and control of the country it visits. — The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 7 Cranch, 116. Any crime committed there may be punished by the local laws. The right to- enter upon and navigate the waters of any country, is subject in all cases to the condition of tern porary obedience to its laws. And, if the laws of Canada made provision for the punishment of such an assault as the one under consideration, no doubt Tyler, if found there, would have been properly amenable to those laws — whether amenable to our laws or not.
The matter to be investigated resolves itself into the inquiry whether the act of Congress, under which the trial was had in the United States court, is, upon fair rules of construction, intended to cover just such a case as this. If the case falls within it, an inquiry may then arise into its constitutional validity.
By the words of the statute, if taken literally, and without qualification, every person, of whatever nationality, who, upon the waters mentioned in the act, whether in a vessel or not, commits an assault without malice upon any other person, of whatever nationality, and whether in or out of a vessel, of which the assaulted person dies on land, within or without the United States, is guilty of manslaughter, and punishable in the Federal courts.
• No one would contend for a moment that the act should be so broadly construed. It would occur at once that there are several classes of objections to such a construction. It is obvious that Congress could by no possibility have power in all these cases. It is also plain that, if any of these places are off the high seas, some provisions which might be valid on the high seas, would not be so elsewhere. And it is further manifest that, whether on or off the seas, the citizenship of the parties might become an important element in the inquiry. Other difficulties might arise, which it is unnecessary to refer to more particularly.
It is undoubtedly true that every word which goes to the description of an offense, or the circumstances under which it is punishable, must be regarded; or, in other words, that no one can be held liable unless he comes within all the particulars of the offense described. But there is no rule of construction which requires, when a legislature, out of abundant caution, enumerates a great variety of possible places, and punishes crimes committed in any of them, that the law must be regarded as an assertion that there are such places within the jurisdiction. And it does not, therefore, necessarily follow, because Congress has provided for the punishment of offenses upon bays, creeks, havens, and rivers not within states, nor forming a part of the high seas, that we must assume the existence of such within the admiralty jurisdiction — much less that Congress intended to include within that list all navigable waters on the globe without the United States. And there is no principle which would include Canadian waters that would not require this unlimited construction.
The phrases describing the waters named in this act of Congress, are substantially'borrowed from English statutes relating to the admiralty. Under those statutes, the havens, bays, &c., named, were all understood to be within the realm, and opening from the- sea, although, by the prevailing authority, their enumeration was nugatory; for, according to many cases, none were in fact within the admiralty jurisdiction. The decisions on this point were not uniform. In the conflict of opinion on the extent of admiralty jurisdiction, it was wise to include such places in any general act; and yet their inclusion, as qualified, could not be regarded as corroborating the admiralty claim. In borrowing phrases from old statutes, it is usually deemed proper to take them as construed. If this be done, the statute before us is satisfied without departing from the republic. If there are such waters as are there described within the republic, and not within states, they are included. If there are no such waters in the country, still the act is not impaired, but is only applicable, as in England, to the high seas.
This act was passed in 185Y, but it is amendatory and supplementary to other acts, of identical extent, as old as 1Y90. And it is not to be supposed that it was meant to use language in any different senses at the different periods; A reference to the condition of things existing when the Constitution was adopted, as well as subsequently, will show that, whatever may have been the real state of the case, there were, in more than one locality, navigable waters open from the ocean, and not admitted to have been within the exclusive jurisdiction of any particular state. Such seems to have been the case with Delaware bay (see 1 Kent Com. 29), and even the Delaware river was held in Pennsylvania, in Montgomery v. Henry, 1 Dall. 50, not to be within the body of any county. The same difficulties existed in New York bay and the lower part of Hudson river, which, in 1808, were the source of serious controversies between New York and New Jersey. — N. Y. Rev. L. of 1813, vol. 1, p. 238. It was not until 1834 that the controversy was settled; and now each state has the right to serve process over all of the lower waters, while the jurisdiction and property are parceled out in a very different manner from that usually adopted by neighboring states. — 3 N. Y. Rev. Stat. p. 175. There were also waters opening into the Gulf of Mexico which were within territories; and the subsequent acquisition of Louisiana and Florida continued this state of things up to the admission of Florida into the Union. Upon the Pacific coast, we have still some waters of this description. There is, therefore, no necessity to go beyond our own territory to satisfy the act. And the jurisdiction referred to, by the language used, being a local one, referring (as was held in United States v. Bevans, 3 Wheat. 336) to a fixed natural locality, and not satisfied by a vessel, even although that vessel was a public man-of-war, we ought not to extend a claim of criminal jurisdiction into foreign parts, unless such an intention is very clearly expressed.
Whether, apart from the jurisdiction over commerce, any such prerogative exists over citizens as to authorize us, as is done in England, to take cognizance of their offenses wheresoever committed, or whether, if possessed, it is vested in the individual states, which have exclusive supervision of all ordinary transactions at home, or in, the Federal government, which at home has no concern with such acts, is an interesting inquiry, but entirely unnecessary for the purposes of this case. No case is reported in which jurisdiction over' the delinquencies of absent citizens has been exercised by the United States courts on any such ground. And I have discovered no act of Congress which purports to provide for such cases. The offenses committed out, of the country, which are made punishable (except military delinquencies, and correspondence with foreign powers, and possibly treasons) are all confined to the waters.
The power to define and punish piracies, and felonies upon the high seas, and offenses against the law of nations, is given by the Constitution in the,broadest terms. The Crimes act of 1790 uses as broad language as the act before us, namely: "If any person or persons shall commit, upon the high seas, or in any river, haven, basin, or bay, out of the jurisdiction of any particular state," t&c.. 1 L. U. S. p. 113. And the language thus used was not qualified by the phrase which is found in the acts of 1825 and 1857, "within the admiralty jurisdiction of the United States." The act literally reached "any person" who might commit the offenses charged in any navigable waters. Murder and robbery committed there were declared -to be piracy, as murder and robbery on the sea were piracy at common law. In the case of the United States v. Palmer, 3 Wheat. 610, it was expressly held that robbery committed on the high seas by American citzens, upon a foreign ship, did not come within the intent of the act, although the language of the act was broad enough to cover such a case, and if was also within the power of Congress. This ruling was based upon the doctrine that the - law was only intended to punish crimes against the United States; and a crime committed on board of a foreign ship on the high seas, or upon a foreigner, not on an. American ship, was no offense against the United States, because not committed within her jurisdiction. In United States v. Holmes, 5 Wheat. 412, the same doctrine was recognized as to vessels having a lawful -national character. In United States v. Klintock, 5 Wheat. 144, where the offense charged was alleged to have been committed on a piratical vessel which had no nationality, it was held to come within the act, because it was an offense against all nations, and of universal jurisdiction. But Fthe doctrine as to foreign vessels is reiterated in this language : " Those general terms ought not to be applied to offenses committed against the particular sovereignty of a foreign power; but we think they ought to be applied to offenses committed against all nations, including the United States, by persons who, by common consent, are equally amenable to the laws of all nations." In the case of the United States v. Certain Pirates, 5 Wheat 184, Johnson J., intimates a doubt whether, in cases of robbery, which he deems general piracy, the fact that it was committed on a foreign ship should exempt it from our jurisdiction. He, however, lays it down very clearly that murder on a foreign ship is no offense against the United States, and in no sense within her jurisdiction; but he also intimates a doubt whether, if committed by an American, it may not be reached by reason of his allegiance. The court, however, has never departed from the doctrine in Palmer's case. It was held in the Pirates' case that a piratical offense, committed on a piratical vessel, was punishable, although committed within a marine league of the shore of a foreign country, provided it was upon the high seas; because the neutral rights allowed in favor of nations over that space of the ocean, render it neutral to war only, and not to crimes. And it is well settled that the - maritime jurisdiction accorded to nations over their contiguous waters, is not an absolute and exclusive one, but is subject to the peaceable use of all parts of the open ocean as a common highway of nations, but liable to any regulations necessary for the safety and protection of commercial rights and the fisheries, as well as the preservation of neutrality. A foreign vessel, upon any part of the high seas, has been regarded as foreign territory.
In the United States v. Kessler, Baldw. 15, the question came up directly, whether an offense committed on a French vessel, within a marine league of our coast, was punishable in the Federal courts; and it was held that such a vessel was foreign territory, and for that reason a crime committed on her was not punishable by our laws. In the United States v. Davis, 2 Sumn. 482, an American officer of a vessel, who, while on his own vessel on the high sea, but within a short distance of the shore of the Society Islands, shot a person on a vessel belonging to those islands, was held not punishable under the acts of Congress; and the court regarded the offense as exclusively punishable by the local authorities. The decision was given by Judge Story, who drew the Crimes act of 1825, and whose inclination was generally in favor of giving a liberal extension to the Federal jurisdiction. This decision is in accordance with Palmer's case.
Every principle which takes out of the operation of the acts of Congress crimes committed by Americans on foreign vessels on the high seas, applies with greater force to offenses committed within the acknowledged and fixed territorial limits of a foreign nation, because it is dependent entirely on the national character of the place of the offense, and can not, by any sound reasoning, reach that which is territory by implication only, and yet be excluded from that which is actual territory.
. This view of the courts is strengthened by the fact, that those statutory marine offenses which are not confined to place, are all mutinous offenses, committed on board of American vessels by their crews. The only case expressly provided for in foreign waters, is where offenses are committed by persons belonging, as passengers or crew, on board of Ameri can vessels, on othe: s occupying similar relations to the same ship, and committed on the ship (see §5 of aet of 1825)# And, even in that case, which is plainly within the power to regulate foreign commerce, it is expressly provided that, if the offense be punished by the local authorities, such punishment shall be a bar to further proceedings in this country. This act shows that it could never have been intended to regard offenses committed abroad, as offenses against the United States, merely because committed by American citizens, or on American vessels, unless some other element entered into the account.
It is further worthy of consideration whether the mischief of the old law is not to be regarded, as in great measure, the occasion of the new. The act of 1790 punished manslaughter only when committed on the high seas. In the case of the United States v. Wiltberger, 5 Wheat. 76, it was decided that, under that act, manslaughter committed on an American ship near Whampoa, in a river navigable from the ocean, was not punishable. That decision was made in 1820. A revision of the Crimes acts was made in 1825, and yet it was not considered necessary to make any new law on the subject. As Whampoa was then without the jurisdiction of any country which had recognized the general law of nations, there was certainly strong occasion for a change, unless the policy of this country had been regarded as fairly expressed in Palmer's case. And, if the British portion of St. Clair river is within the purview of the act of 1857, we shall have presented the singular anomaly, of an assault which constitutes a crime if followed by death on land, either within or without the United States, and yet is no crime or offense whatever if followed by death on the spot. The act of 1S57 was occasioned by the result of a trial before Judge Curtis for a fatal assault committed on the high seas, and which would have amounted to manslaughter, under the old statute, if the wounded man had not survived long enough to be landed. United States v Armstrong 2 Curt. C. C. 451. The' bill was introduced by Mr. Fessenden, who made this statement on its introduction ; and it passed without any examination or debate. There is no reason to suppose its intention was to go beyond the class of assaults made manslaughter under the former statute, or to do more than provide for the cases of death on land resulting from attacks which already were punishable where death occurred at the place where the fatal blow was given. If designed to go further, it creates a' new easum omissum by no means less formidable than the one it was meant to supply. I am very strongly inclined to the opinion that, even if the other statutes had received no construction, the effect of this, as an amendatory act, should be confined to the high seas. But, be this as it may, I have no doubt whatever that it can not be extended to cover an assault made in a foreign country, imless made by one of a ship's company or passengers upon another of the inhabitants of the ship.
These considerations would, to my mind, be sufficient to dispose of the case before us, without regard to the views which have been presented to us as applicable to these particular waters. Although they are navigable, and actually used for commerce of a maritime nature, which, when foreign, or between different states, may, perhaps, be open, under the legislation of Congress, to the forms of admiralty remedies, where the option of a jury trial is allowed, yet every portion of the lakes and their connecting waters is the exclusive property of Great Britain, or of some American state. And the Supreme Court of the United States has recently decided that upon these waters, as upon the internal tide-waters of the states, the jurisdiction of the admiralty is not local and territorial, but is transitory, and attaches only to such commerce as has been, by the Constitution of the United States, submitted to the control of Congress (Allen v. Newberry 21 How. 244; and Maguire v. Card, Id. 248). There is no construction of the act of 1857 .which, under any theory of jurisdiction, could extend it to offenses committed on the lakes, for they come within none of the terms used; and it would be a very forced construction which should apply the statute to their connecting waters.
Without expressing any opinion upon the power of Congress to punish such an offense as Tyler's, I am entirely satisfied that no act of Congress now in force can be fairly construed1 to embrace it. I am therefore of opinion that the case was not within, the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court of the United States for this district, and was not within the intent of the act of 1857.
Both questions reserved should be answered in the negative.