Case Name: COLE-COLLISTER FIRE PROTECTION DISTRICT, a Corporation, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. CITY OF BOISE, a Municipal Corporation, Defendant-Appellant
Court: Idaho Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Idaho
Decision Date: 1970-03-10
Citations: 93 Idaho 558
Docket Number: No. 10320
Parties: COLE-COLLISTER FIRE PROTECTION DISTRICT, a Corporation, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. CITY OF BOISE, a Municipal Corporation, Defendant-Appellant.
Judges: McFADDEN, C. J., and SHEPARD and SPEAR, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Idaho Reports
Volume: 93
Pages: 558–569

Head Matter:
468 P.2d 290
COLE-COLLISTER FIRE PROTECTION DISTRICT, a Corporation, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. CITY OF BOISE, a Municipal Corporation, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 10320.
Supreme Court of Idaho.
March 10, 1970.
Rehearing Denied May 1, 1970.
Clemons, Skiles & Green, Boise, for defendant-appellant.
Millar, Callister & Carter, Boise, for plaintif f-respondent.

Opinion:
DONALDSON, Justice.
The plaintiff-respondent, ColeCollister Fire Protection District, owns a vacant parcel of real property located on the Northwest corner of the intersection of Cole and Ustick Roads in the City of Boise. Pursuant to I.C. § 50-1201 et seq., Boise City zoned the property in question "L-O" or "Limited Office District." This designation precludes the erection of a gasoline station on property situated within the "L-O" zone. The respondent orig inally purchased the property in question for use as a fire station. However the need for a fire station in this area became obviated and at present respondent wishes to dispose of the property. Respondent received an offer from Standard Oil of California to purchase the parcel for $27,-000.00 conditioned on the right of Standard Oil to construct a gasoline filling station thereon. As heretofore stated, a gas station is not a "permissible use" in a zone designated "L-O." At the trial testimony was presented which indicated that respondent advertised the property for sale, but received no offers to purchase except the one from Standard Oil. There is no testimony of record that indicates respondent's property is useless or of no economic value if it is not used as a gasoline station; however there is testimony that respondent's land is worth only $12,000.00 to $15,000.00 so long as the restrictions of a "L-O" zone apply while it is worth $27,000.00 to $30,000.00 if a gasoline station could be erected upon it. The record reveals that although Boise City has zoned the respondent's land in question and adjoining parcels "L-O," thus prohibiting the use of land so zoned for commercial purposes, it has in fact permitted commercial establishments (gas station, drive-in restaurant, health and beauty salon, animal hospital) to exist in proximity to the property in question under the doctrine of nonconforming use. In fact all of the "L-O" district except for the lot in question is made up of non-conforming establishments having life expectancies in excess of fifteen to twenty years. The record further reveals that both streets bordering the corner parcel in question are major traffic arterials and furthermore that the parcel would he unsuited and undesirable as residential property or as an office location.
The gravamen of the complaint was that because of the location of the property in question which is surrounded by commercial establishments (permitted to exist under the doctrine of non-conforming use) and roadways carrying heavy traffic, such property is not desirable as "L-O" zone property, i. e., offices, accessory uses related to offices, mortuary, nor for any of the authorized conditional uses, assuming that a conditional use permit was applied for and approved. Thus the property has a limited value as long as it is classified "L-O." However the property does have considerably greater value as the location for a gasoline filling station. For this reason the "L-O" zoning classification imposed on respondent's property was alleged to be unreasonable, arbitrary, and capricious, depriving him of his property without due process of law in violation of rights afforded under both the United States and Idaho Constitutions.
The trial court sitting without a jury found merit in respondent's claim and made conclusions of law which stated that the zoning ordinance in question was confiscatory, arbitrary and unreasonable and void as to the property of the respondent and that the respondent or any subsequent owner of the property is entitled to erect and maintain on said property a service station selling petroleum products. Furthermore the trial court enjoined the appellant from bringing any civil or criminal action against the respondent or its successors arising out of the use of the subject property,
It is beyond dispute that a local legislative body has the right to enact zoning ordinances. Village of Euclid, Ohio v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 47 S.Ct. 114, 71 L.Ed. 303 (1926). However such an ordinance must bear a reasonable relationship to the goal or ends sought to be attained. The Court of Appeals of New York clearly stated the principle in holding invalid a zoning ordinance when it stated:
" 'The governmental -power to interfere by zoning regulations with the general rights of the land owner by restricting the character of his use, is not unlimited, and other questions aside, such restriction cannot be imposed if it does not bear a substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare.' (Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 188, 48 S.Ct. 447, 448, 72 L.Ed. 842.)" Matter of Concordia Collegiate Institute v. Miller, 301 N.Y. 189 at 196, 93 N.E.2d 632 at 636, 21 A.L.R.2d 544 (1950).
Furthermore, zoning ordinances cannot be arbitrary since they interfere with the free use of property and thus the validity of a zoning ordinance depends on a reasonable relation to the police power. Continental Oil Co. v. City of Twin Falls, 49 Idaho 89 at 106, 286 P. 353 at 358 (1930) ; Appeal of Sawdey, 369 Pa. 19, 85 A.2d 28 (1951). In determining the question of reasonableness or unreasonableness of an ordinance, all the existing circumstances or contemporaneous conditions, the objects sought to be obtained, and the necessity or lack thereof for its adoption, will be considered by the court. White v. City of Twin Falls, 81 Idaho 176, 338 P.2d 778 (1959); Continental Oil Co. v. City of Twin Falls, supra.
The New York Court of Appeals in Vernon Park Realty v. City of Mount Vernon, 307 N.Y. 493, 121 N.E.2d 517 (1954) considered a problem almost identical to the one presented by the case at bar where a parcel of land was placed in a zoning classification which precluded its use for purposes to which it was most readily adopted.
"On this record, the plaintiff, having asserted an invasion of his property rights, cf. Rodgers v. Village of Tarrytown, 302 N.Y. 115, 96 N.E.2d 731, has met the burden of proof by establishing that the property is so situated that it has no possibilities for residential use and that the use added by the 1952 amendment does not improve the situation but, in fact, will operate to destroy the greater part of the value of the property since, in authorizing its use for parking and incidental services, it necessarily permanently precludes the use for which is most readily adapted, i. e., a business use such as permitted and actually carried on by the owners of all the surrounding property. Under such circumstances, the 1927 zoning ordinance and zoning map and the 1952 amendment, as they pertain to the plaintiff's property, are so unreasonable and arbitrary as to constitute an invasion of property fights, contrary to constitutional due process and, as such, are invalid, illegal and void enactments. U.S.Const. 5th and 14th Amends.; N.Y.Const, art. I, § 6, 7; Rockdale Construction Corporation v. Incorporated Village of Cedarhurst, Nassau County, 301 N.Y. 519, 93 N.E.2d 76; Arverne Bay Construction Co. v. Thatcher, supra [278 N.Y. 222, 15 N.E.2d 587, 117 A.L.R. 1110]; Dowsey v. Village of Kensington, supra [257 N.Y. 221, 177 N.E. 427, 86 A.L.R. 642]; Eaton v. Sweeny, supra [257 N.Y. 176, 177 N.E. 412] ; Village of Euclid, Ohio v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 47 S.Ct. 114, 71 L.Ed. 303; Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 43 S.Ct. 158, 67 L.Ed. 322; Town of Islip v. F. E. Summers Coal & Lumber Co., 257 N.Y. 167, 177 N.E. 409." Vernon Park Realty v. City of Mount Vernon, 307 N.Y. 493 at 499, 121 N.E.2d 517 at 519, 520 (1954).
It is a firmly established principle of law that a presumption of validity must be accorded to the decisions of the municipal zoning board.
"Ordinances and resolutions of a municipal corporation are presumed valid until the contrary is shown. The burden is on the party who attacks such an act to show the illegality thereof. City of Idaho Falls v. Grimmett, supra [63 Idaho 90, 117 P.2d 461] ; Taos County Board of Education v. Sedillo, 44 N.M. 300, 101 P.2d 1027; Baxley v. City of Frederick, 133 Okl. 84, 271 P. 257; City of Spokane v. Coon, 3 Wash.2d 243, 100 P.2d 36; Hughes v. City of Carlsbad, 53 N.M. 150, 203 P.2d 995; Seifert v. City of Poplar Bluff, Mo.App., 112 S.W.2d 93; McQuillin, 3rd Ed., § 22.34, 24.31." Boise City v. Better Homes, Inc., 72 Idaho 441 at 447, 243 P.2d 303 at 306 (1952).
See also, City of Idaho Falls v. Grimmett, 63 Idaho 90, 91, 117 P.2d 461 (1941); 3 Anderson, American Law of Zoning, p. 584, § 21.16 (1968). However a presumption of law is merely a rule which requires that the court draw a particular inference from a fact unless and until the truth of such inference is disproved. Black's Law Dictionary, Rev. 4 ed. (1968); Lane v. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co., 132 Mo. 4, 33 S.W. 645 (1895) ; 1 Greenleaf on Evidence, § 14, 33.
This court carefully considered the concept of "presumption" in the case of Haman v. Prudential Insurance Co. of America, 91 Idaho 19, 415 P.2d 305 (1966) and stated:
"In Madron v. McCoy, 63 Idaho 703, 126 P.2d 566 (1942), it was held that if insufficient evidence is presented by the party against whom the presumption operates, the presumption will entitle the party relying on it to judgment. In Brown v. Graham, 62 Idaho 388, 112 P.2d 485 (1941), this court considered the other side of the evidentiary value to be attributed to such presumption and by a divided opinion held that clear, convincing and uncontradicted evidence in opposition to the presumption will prevail as a matter of law over the presumption, and that it was incorrect to instruct the jury, that in order to overcome the presumption the evidence must be clear, convincing and uncontradicted. In Department of Finance v. Union Pacific R. R. Co., 61 Idaho 484, 104 P.2d 1110 (1940), it was held that if reasonable minds might differ as to the conclusions to be drawn from the evidence opposing the presumption, the matter should be submitted to the jury, and the jury informed as to the presumption, quoting from Geist v. Moore, supra [58 Idaho 149, 70 P.2d 403], as follows:
' and in the following cases this court had definitely committed itself to the doctrine that where there is a conflict between the presumption and contrary evidence, from which reasonable minds might draw different conclusions, it is proper to instruct the jury as to the presumptions, (citing cases.)' "
91 Idaho 19 at 25, 415 P.2d 305 at 311 (1966).
We emphasize that the burden of proof devolved upon the plaintiff-respondent, at the district court level, to show that the zoning ordinance as applied to the property in question was confiscatory, arbitrary, unreasonable and void. Boise City v. Better Homes, Inc., supra. This burden respondent has sustained as demonstrated by the ample evidence contained in the record to support the legal conclusion that the zoning ordinance was unlawful as applied to the respondent's property.
Once the respondent overcame the presumption of validity by introducing evidence tending to show that the ordinance in question had been unreasonably applied to his property, the burden was then shifted to Boise City to come forward with evidence to rebut the respondent's evidence and to show that the ordinance was valid. Hendricks v. City of Nampa, 93 Idaho 95, 456 P.2d 262 (1969). In order to sustain the validity of its ordinance, Boise City then bore the burden of introducing evidence which would tend to show that the erection of a gasoline filling station on the property in question would be disruptive of the neighborhood, produce noise, or in some way be injurious to public health, safety or morals. However Boise City produced not one iota of evidence probative of the legal conclusion that the erection of the filling station would interfere with the goals articulated by the statute which prescribes the ends sought to be attained via the aid of zoning regulations. The presumption of validity originally attached to the Boise City ordinance disappeared from the case and it behooved Boise City to produce legally competent evidence which tended to prove that the ordinance restricting the use of respondent's property was at least reasonably related to the intended purposes of I.C. § 50-1201 et seq. By our holding today we have not thwarted Boise City's plan to control its future. Planning is indeed an admirable and necessary element for the proper growth of cities. However a municipal body cannot disrupt individual freedoms which are guaranteed by both the Idaho and United States Constitutions under the guise of planning. Since Boise City produced no evidence to support the legal conclusion that the erection of a gasoline filling station on the property in question would be injurious to the public health, safety, and morals of the community, it is clear from the record that the evidence 'preponderated in favor of the respondent.
If the evidence were in a state of equilibrium, then under the presumption of validity attached to the ordinance, the party attacking its validity would lose. Graves et al. v. Colwell, 90 Ill. 612 (1878). This result is correct since the party attacking the validity of the ordinance bears the risk of the non-persuasion of the trier of the fact; he will lose if he fails to convince the jury or court of the justice of his position.
"Where the parties to a civil action are in dispute over a material issue of fact, then that party who will lose if the trier's mind is in equipoise may be said to bear the risk that the trier will not be affirmatively persuaded or the risk of non persuasion upon that issue."
The ultimate burden of persuasion is on the party attacking the validity of an ordinance. Hendricks v. City of Nampa, supra.
In accord with the aforementioned principles, if the validity of the ordinance as applied to the property in question can be said to be fairly debatable (evidence in equipoise) its validity must be upheld. Huneke v. Glaspy, 155 Colo. 593, 396 P.2d 453 (1964) ; Metropolitan Dade County v. Greenlee, Fla.App., 224 So.2d 781 (1969).
However in the instant case, the record discloses that there was substantial and competent evidence to support the trial court's finding and such finding will not be disturbed by the Supreme Court on appeal. Thompson v. Wise Boy Min. & Mill. Co., 9 Idaho 363, 74 P. 958 (1903) ; Boise Payette Lumber Co. v. Bales, 52 Idaho 762, 20 P.2d 214 (1933). Furthermore where plaintiff has made out a prima facie case and the defendant introduces no evidence; the judgment will not be disturbed. Foster v. Anschustigui, 37 Idaho 136, 215 P. 463 (1923). There is ample evidence probative of the conclusion that the ordinance was unreasonable as applied to the respondent's property, viz., that the property in question is located at the intersection of two heavily traveled thoroughfares where the traffic load has been rapidly increasing for the past two years; that property adjacent to and in close proximity to the property in question although zoned "L-O" on paper is in fact used for commercial purposes and is for all practical purposes commercial property; that the value of the property in question would have a substantially greater value if used for commercial purposes. Thus respondent has sustained the burden of producing evidence to overcome the presumption of validity accorded the Boise City Ordinance. Since Boise City failed to come forward with evidence to rebut when the burden shifted to it, it must bear the risk of non-produc-. tion of evidence and its attendant consequences.
This Court in Herzog v. City of Pocatello, 83 Idaho 365, 363 P.2d 188 (1961), in considering a problem analogous to the one presented by the case at bar, phrased the issue to be decided in the following manner :
"The issue here presented is whether the evidence sustains a finding that appellant's action in denying respondents' requests was arbitrary, capricious and discriminatory. After careful consideration of the entire record, we feel that the evidence of discrimination in the various aspects as presented to the trial court sustains the findings of said court." 83 Idaho 365 at 373, 363 P.2d 188 at 192 (1961).
In the case at bar the record reveals substantial evidence supporting the findings of the district court. Furthermore, loss to a property owner caused by restrictions on the use of his property is to be considered in determining whether an ordinance is invalid in its application to a landowner's property. White v. City of Twin Falls, supra.
Even conceding that the zoning ordinance in question was a valid exercise of the police power of Boise City at the time of its enactment, and hence was not unreasonable at that time, a police regulation, valid when made may become arbitrary and confiscatory in operation by reason of later events. Abie State Bank v. Weaver, 282 U.S. 765, 51 S.Ct. 252, 75 L.Ed. 690 (1931). Since the record indicates that the property in question is situated at the intersection of two increasingly heavily traveled thoroughfares and that a traffic signal was installed because of the increase in traffic flow, that no residences have been built on either arterial, Cole or Ustick, in the vicinity of the intersection within the past two years, this is sufficient to show that the ordinance is arbitrary and confiscatory since these events (increase in traffic volume and commercial character of the area) have definite bearing on the validity of the ordinance.
Judgment affirmed. Costs to respondent.
McFADDEN, C. J., and SHEPARD and SPEAR, JJ., concur.
. Boise City Code.
"SECTION 11-2-7: REGULATIONS FOR LIMITED- -OFFICE — L-O DISTRICT
11-2-7.1: Purpose — A Limited Office District is created to accommodate a demonstrated need for the development of office space together with necessary off-street parking facilities in locations served by primary access, yet inappropriate for commercial development because of close proximity to residential uses. It is intended that administrative, professional and limited business office uses permitted in this district shall be located and designed so as to be in harmony with adjacent residential uses. The following regulations shall apply, in addition to the general regulations of this ordinance, to property in any L-O District.
•11-2-7.2: Uses • Allowed
(a)Professional and administrative office;
(b) Accessory uses relating to professional and administrative office;
(c) Mortuary."
. Pursuant to Boise City Code, § 11-2-7.3 certain enumerated uses other than those designated by § 11-2-7.2 are permitted.
"11-2-7.3 : Conditional Uses Permitted —The following uses shall be permitted only when authorized by a Conditional Use Permit obtained as provided in Section 11-1-9:
(a) Single-family, two-family, multiple-family and multiple-family high rise dwelling ; (b) Bank ; (c) Boarding and rooming house; (d) Convalescent home, nursing home; (e) Home for ambulatory aged, rest home, elderly housing; (f) Hospital; (g) Laboratoi'y, research, dental and medical (nonindustrial) ; (h) Motel; .(i)-Nursery school; (j) Parking lot; (k). Prescription optician shop; (l) Prescription pharmacy; (m) Public building; (n) Public utility facility (non industrial) ; (o) School, public, private or parochial
Those uses not enumerated under § 11-2-7.1 or § 11-2-7.3 are prohibited.
"11-2-7.4: Prohibited Uses — Uses not specified above are prohibited unless determined by the Planning Director, in accordance with Section 11-1-5.1 (g), to be similar in nature to those specified."
. Non-conforming uses — Uses permitted by zoning statute or ordinances to continue notwithstanding the fact that similar uses are not permitted in the area in which they are located. Black's Law Dictionary, Revised 4 ed. (1968) ; Beyer v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 182 Md. 444, 34 A.2d 765 (1943). The continuation of non-conforming uses is permitted because not to allow them to continue would be a violation of the due process clauses, cf., O'Connor v. City of Moscow, 69 Idaho 37, 202 P.2d 401, 9 A.L.R.2d 1031 (1949). However the continuation of non-conforming uses is designed to avoid the imposition of hardship on the owner of property 6ut eventually the non-eonforming use is to he eliminated. Seo 8A McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, § 25.183, pp. 16-1S.
. "50-1203. Regulations — Purposes in view.- — Such regulations shall be made in accordance with a comprehensive plan, and shall be designed to lessen congestion in the streets, to safeguard from fire, panic and other damages, to promote public health, safety, morals and the general welfare, to provide adequate light and air, to prevent the overcrowding of land, to avoid undue concentration of population, to facilitate the adequate provision of transportation, water, sewerage, schools, parks and other public requirements. Such regulations shall be made with reasonable consideration, among other things, as to the character of the district and its peculiar suitability for particular uses, and with a view to conserving the value of buildings and encouraging the most appropriate use of land throughout such city."
. James, Civil Procedure, § 7.6 (1965).