Case Name: R. F. Montgomery, Mrs. C. Gullifer, Subrogee, vs. G. H. Koester
Court: Louisiana Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1883-11
Citations: 35 La. Ann. 1091
Docket Number: No. 8048
Parties: R. F. Montgomery, Mrs. C. Gullifer, Subrogee, vs. G. H. Koester.
Judges: 
Reporter: Louisiana Annual Reports
Volume: 35
Pages: 1091–1094

Head Matter:
No. 8048.
R. F. Montgomery, Mrs. C. Gullifer, Subrogee, vs. G. H. Koester.
The rule of our law, aa well as of the common law, is, that he, who owns and keeps a dangerous animal knowing it to be such, is bound, at his peril, to keep him up safe from hurting innocent persons, and if, for want of sufficient oare, the animal escape and do injury, the owner is liable.
The scienter may be established by attendant circumstances withoutnecessity, in all cases, of proving prior cases of injury.
APPEAL from the Eourfch District Court for the Parish of Orleans. Houston, J.
Z>. £7. <& 1j. L. Lcibatt and A. Smith for Plaintiff and Appellee:
1.The owner of a dog which inflicts a wound upon a person walking upon the public highway is responsible in damages for such injury (C. C. 2321); and this holds whether the injury resulted from the negligence of the owner himself or from, that of his agent or servant. O. C. 2316, 2317.
. 2. Knowledge on the part of the owner of the dangerous character of the dogs is to be presumed from the fact that he kept the dogs chained in the day time and loosed fcheni at night; and from the fact that the dogs were kept to guard and protect his promises and property. Buckley vs. Leonard, 4 Denio,50Q; Sherman aud BedfieUL on Negligence, Section 191.
3.The owner of an animal is bound so to keep him that he shall not commit injury. When, therefore, such an animal does damages the owner is liable, though it be shown that it never before evinced any fierceness. Besazzio vs. Harris, 1st Foster aud T. nisipirius, p. 92; 1 Com. (N.X.) 515; SBarb. (N. X.) 630; 38 Barb. (N. X.) 14; 14 Cal. 138; Addison on Torts, old ed., p. 135.
4.In the assessment of damages not only the mental aud bodily suffering are to betaken into consideration, but also tho trouble and expense to which plaintiff has been subjected by the wrongful act of defendant It is proper to take iuto account, as part of the expenses, the reasonable fees of attorneys. 29 An. 218; 5 An. 5,21,22; Greenleaf Evidence, Yol. 2, p. 280. Sec. 267. '
5.Defendant having gone into the trial of a cause on the merits, without having pleaded his exception, notwithstanding the fact that he had ample time subsequent to the notice of subrogation, the exception comes too late; and not having demanded a decision on tho exception, it is considered as waived and abandoned. 6 An. 533; 11 An. 689, etc.
H. P. Dari for Defendant and Appellant:
Exception.
1. Defendant’s right to raise exceptions to the capacity, etc., of a subrogee who becomes such after issue joined with original plaintiff is not affected by that fact,
2.An exception to tho want of authorization and right of a married woman to stand in judgment is peremptory, because it shows “a total want of legal right or authority to sue,” and it may be urged at any stage of the cause. 4 B. 174; 17 L. 236; 4 N. S. 437.
3.The husband’s authorization to sue must be filed before proceeding to trial ou the merits,* or he must appear with her. 22 An. 204; 21 An. 576: 25 An. 193. It is sufficient that she be capable of standing in judgment when judgment is rendered. 2 B. 13; 4 L. 259 ; 10 An. 505; 26 An. 590,809; C. P. 320,£321. The statute is prohibitory and such an authoriza tion filed subsequent to judgment is not sufficient. 15 An. 182, 303; 12 An. 147; 1 An. 260; C. C. 121, 124.
4. Tbe wife (ber'busband living) cannot prosecute community claims. C. C. 2402; 10 An. 310 j 15 An. 119; 20 An. 532 ; 24 An. 521, 295.
5. Personal actions of tbe wife are under the sole control of the husband. C. P. 107; 9 L. 350; 12 An. 333 • 29 An. 215.
C. This Court will not permit litigants to question here titles whose validity they have maintained in the court a quo,.
7. A judgment rendered in favor of a married woman unauthorised or incapacitated must bo reversed and the case remanded.
Merits.
1. Burden of proof is upon plaintiff in actions ex delicto and he must make his case certain ; a probable case will not satisfy the exigency of the law. 16 An. 121.
2. Bogs are property under the laws of this State, and it is lawful to keep same, (Act 148 of 1858; R. S. 1201,) provided they be not public nuisances. City Ordinance, p. 142.
3. Statements or conversations by or witb tbe wife should not be received foror against bim in an action against the husband.
4. It being lawful to keep dogs, if tbe same are so kept witb extreme care, and, through no fault or negligence of defendant, they get out in the night timo and do injury, such inj ury is an acoidont, from which no liability results. Wait’s Actions and Defenses, 1, 160, and authorities there cited; Sbawban vs. Clarke, 24 An. 390.
5. A dog is 'inmisuetce naturce, and tbe owner is responsible for injuries by it committed only when it is shown to be accustomed to injure persons or property to tbe knowledge of tbe owner. 1 Wait, Actions and Defenses, and authorities ; 1 Addison on Torts, 229; 2 Hilliard on Torts, 81, 82; 7 Ala. 171; 22 Ala. 571; 22 HI. 143; 21 Yfc. 378 ; 4 Denio, 127,177, 500 ; 13 Johnson, 339 ; 3 Keyes, (K. Y.) 269-70; 4 H. 363; 4 Carr. & Payne, 297; 19 Penn. 359. The same principle controlled Rome and Israel. Exodus SKI, 29-36“' Cooper’s Inst., Lib. IY, -Tit. IS. Yredonburg vs. Behan, 33 An. 634.

Opinion:
On the Exception.
The opinion of the Court was delivered by
Eenner, J.
This is a personal action brought by Montgomery, in his own name and right,"against the defendant.
The latter had filed answer and the cause was at issue.
Thereafter a motion was filed, suggesting a transfer by Montgomery to. Mrs. G-ullifer, and an order was entered recognizing her as subrogee.
The-case was taken up for trial on 25th May, testimony taken on that and various subsequent days, to which the cause was continued, until 15th June, when defendant filed an exception to the effect that "Mrs. G-ullifer, subrogated, is a married woman and hath averred and proved no facts which warrant the Court in rendering judgment in her favor, and she is absolutely without capacity to stand in judgment. Wherefore, he prays that this exception be sustained, and plaintiff's suit be dismissed with costs."
' Manifestly, this exception does not go to the dismissal of the suit, which was properly brought and at issue before the subrogation took place. The exception simply attacks the subrogation and the rights of the-subrogee thereunder. In absence of any interest proved, or even asserted in the defendant, the validity and effect of the subrogation seem to be matters between plaintiff and his subrogee, and not concerning the defendant. The suit proceeded in the name of the original plaintiff; the judgment, by its terms, is 'in favor of plaintiff, Robt. E. Montgomery, Mrs Catherine G-ullifer, subrogated;" satis-' faction of the judgment will securely discharge the defendant, and he has no other interest in the matter.
The authorities quoted as to suits improperly brought in the name of the wife do not apply to such a case.