Case Name: John M. DUTTON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MUELLER & DRURY PC; et al., Defendants-Appellees
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 2018-01-23
Citations: 710 F. App'x 315
Docket Number: No. 17-16202
Parties: John M. DUTTON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MUELLER & DRURY PC; et al., Defendants-Appellees.
Judges: Before: WALLACE, SILVERMAN, and BYBEE, Circuit Judges.
Reporter: West's Federal Appendix
Volume: 710
Pages: 315–316

Head Matter:
John M. DUTTON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MUELLER & DRURY PC; et al., Defendants-Appellees.
No. 17-16202
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
Submitted December 18, 2017
Filed January 23, 2018
John M. Dutton, Pro Se
Douglas V. Drury, Esquire, Attorney, Mueller & Drury, P.C., Mesa, AZ, for Defendants-Appellees
Before: WALLACE, SILVERMAN, and BYBEE, Circuit Judges.
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

Opinion:
MEMORANDUM
John M. Dutton appeals pro se from the district court's judgment dismissing his action alleging violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ("FDCPA"). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a district court's dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Cervantes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 656 F.3d 1034, 1040 (9th Cir. 2011). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Dutton's action because Dutton failed to allege facts sufficient to show a qualifying "debt" and that Dutton is a "consumer" under the FDCPA. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(3), (5) (defining "consumer" and "debt" under the FDCPA).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing the complaint without leave to amend because amendment would be futile. See Cervantes, 656 F.3d at 1041 (setting forth standard of review and explaining that dismissal without leave to amend is proper when amendment would be futile); see also Walls v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 276 F.3d 502, 510-11 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that an FDCPA claim based on an alleged violation of the Bankruptcy Code is precluded because the sole remedy "lies in the Bankruptcy Code").
We reject as unsupported by the record Dutton's contention that the district judge was biased.
AFFIRMED.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.