Case Name: SARAH J. BURKE and MARY F. BURKE, Respondents, v. WILLIAM H. JACKSON, Appellant
Court: New York Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1890-07
Citations: 64 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 320
Docket Number: 
Parties: SARAH J. BURKE and MARY F. BURKE, Respondents, v. WILLIAM H. JACKSON, Appellant.
Judges: Landon, J., concurred.
Reporter: Supreme Court Reports (Hun)
Volume: 64
Pages: 320–326

Head Matter:
SARAH J. BURKE and MARY F. BURKE, Respondents, v. WILLIAM H. JACKSON, Appellant.
Purchase-money mortgage — description therein of the la/nd — not competent in evidence in an ejectment suit as being part of the transaction of purchase, or as a declamation of the purchaser while in possession.
A piece of land was conveyed, bounded entirely by adjoining streets and premises, the purchaser gave back a purchase-money mortgage, which contained a similar description, and also stated the width of the premises covered thereby.
In an action of ejectment, involving the question of the width of the premises, the purchaser offered in evidence the mortgage which had been given by him, which it was claimed was competent evidence, first, as being a part of the same transaction with the deed; and, second, as a declaration by the party in possession as to the extent and claim of his possession.
Held, that the mortgage was not competent upon either ground. (Mayham, J., dissenting.)
Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, entered in the office of the clerk of the county of Montgomery on the 3d day of July, 1889, with notice of an intention to bring up for review, upon such appeal, an order, entered in said office on the 27th day of June, 1889, denying a motion, made by the defendant upon the minutes of the court before which the action was tried, to' set aside the verdict of the jury and for a new trial.
The action was brought to trial before the court and a jury at a Montgomery Circuit on the lltli day of June, 1889, and involved the question as to the line of division between the lands of the plaintiffs and of the defendant.
P. J. Lewis, for the appellant.
Z. 8. Westbrook, for the respondents.

Opinion:
Learned, P. J.:
This is an action of ejectment to recover a strip of land about one foot wide and about ninety-six feet long. The question is how wide the lot of plaintiffs really is. The plaintiffs claim under a deed from French to their ancestor, which describes the lot as bounded: " Northerly by Grove street; easterly by Daniel Leffert's lot; southerly by Waterman Sweet's lot, and westerly by a lane," giving no other description and no dimensions.
Burke, the grantee, the same day gave a mortgage to French, described as a purchase-money mortgage, describing the land mortgaged as bounded: "Northerly by Grove street; easterly by Daniel Lefferts' lot; southerly by Waterman Sweet's lot, and westerly by a lot of the party of the second part " (viz., French), and further stating that the lot thereby conveyed was " fifty-one feet wide on Grove street."
This mortgage the plaintiffs gave in evidence on the trial, against defendant's objection, in order to sustain the plaintiffs' claim that their lot was fifty-one feet wide on Grove street. The defendant's lot lies on the easterly side of plaintiffs' lot. The plaintiffs claim that this mortgage, executed by their ancestor to French, is competent. 1st. As being part of the transaction with the deed. 2d. As a declaration by a party in possession as to the extent and claim of his possession.
It does not appear that defendant derived title either from French or from Burke. Therefore, the transaction between them was not binding on him. The giving back a purchase-money mortgage by Burke could not increase the title which he had received from French, especially as against a stranger.
The deed bounded the land easterly by Lefferts, westerly by a lane. The mortgage described the western boundary differently, yet it might mean the same, thing. The doctrine that a deed and the purchase-money mortgage are to be construed together as one act does not apply. That doctrine only indicates the simultaneous character of the transactions, showing that no outside rights can come between. Bat the doctrine does not mean that the mortgage can in any way increase or diminish, as against a third party, the amount of land conveyed by the deed. A mortgagor may be very willing to mortgage land twice as large as that described in the deed to Mm, but the mortgagee on foreclosure would get no more than the deed had conveyed.
Declarations of former owners have been admitted to show the nature of their claim, or to show its extent, or to show where boundaries were. But it does not seem to us that this mortgage comes within the rule. At the best this is only an assertion by Burke that the description in a deed to him embraced fifty-one feet. How that can be evidence against the defendant we do not see. Burke might as well have said that the lot mortgaged was 100 feet on Grove street, which would have taken all of defendant's lot, and would have been an easy way of getting title to another's property.
"We have examined-the cases cited by the plaintiffs to sustain the admission of the mortgage. They seem to us clearly distinguishable from the present case. The doctrine here asserted is that one, by executing a mortgage on another's land to a third party, can acquire title thereto, or at least can show, as against such owner, a possession thereof. If authority is needed to the contrary, it may be found in Armstrong v. Du Bois (90 N. Y., 95, at 104).
The judgment should be reversed, new trial granted, costs to abide event.
Landon, J., concurred.