Case Name: Joseph Brown vs. R. Shand
Court: Constitutional Court of South Carolina
Jurisdiction: South Carolina
Decision Date: 1821-05
Citations: 1 McCord 409
Docket Number: 
Parties: Joseph Brown vs. R. Shand.
Judges: Justiéen Bay, Non and Johnson, concurred.
Reporter: South Carolina Law Reports
Volume: 12
Pages: 409–414

Head Matter:
Joseph Brown vs. R. Shand.
There is no precise form of words necessary for a will of personal pro perly, bn whatever form be adopted, it must always be made to ap P'-ar that be intention of the testator vas./ftcetf anti determined.
An appeal from the Ordinary of Charleston district.
In this case, it appeared that, Robert Haig died, leaving-three testamentary papers.
The first was dated in 1810, and was signed and sealed by the testator, and attested by three witnesses. In this will, by which the whole of his property was disposed of. Whitford Smith was left a legacy of $ 500, and was appointed an executor with two others.
Some time after the execution of this will, Haig became dissatisfied with the conduct of Smith, and mentioned to one or two of his ft iends that he would alter his will; and to one that he had altered his will, in consequence of the ill conduct of Smith. He further stated, that he meant to provide for Mary, (his slave,) and her children.. In pur*-suance of this intention, and before April, 1813, he drew tap instructions, from which he said another will should be drawn. These instructions were in his own hand-writing, but were neither signed, sealed,nor dated; and no mention is made of Smith, either as legatee or executor. At the bottom of the page on which the instructions were written, and where the testator’s name is usually signed, after “ my executors,” are written three names, only one of which is found in the will of 1810. By this memorandum, his u real and personal property” were mentioned. A Mr. Brown was requested by Haig to draw a will in conformity to the instructions, which was accordingly done on the 21st of April, 1813. This paper was not signed; the usual words of attestation were added, but not subscribed by any witness.
On the back of this paper, and in the hand-writingof Haig^ 'was commenced another will, in the following words :
“ The last will and testament of Robert Haig, of the city of Charleston, State of South-Carolina, carpenter. I will and bequeath to my beloved niece Mrs. Lackey, 250 shares in the Union Bank.” Nothing more was added.— This legatee got nothing by the first will, and only 200 shares by the memorandum, and the will drawn by Brown,
Evans, one of tbe executors nami d in the memorandum, and in the will drawn by Brown, %vas with Haig when he dud, and for some days before. He (Evans,) represented Haig as very feeble on the day before lie died, but in his senses. When asked on that day to sign the will, drawn by Brown, Haig replied, “ to-morrow.” When interrogated about the distribution of his property, he said, he wished to leave something to charitable societies, naming two. Neither of these societies were mentioned in either of the wills, or in the memorandum. It did not appear that the testator left any real estate.
The Ordinary decided in favor of the second testament tary paper, (the memorandum of instructions.) '
On an appeal to the Circuit Court, his decision was reversed, and the first will established.
A motion was now submitted to reverse the decision of the Circuit Court.

Opinion:
Mr. Justice Huger
delivered the opinion of the court.
There is no precise form established for a will of personal property, but whatever form be adopted, it must always be made to appear that the intention of the testator was fixed and determined. In the language of one of the elementary writers, (1 Swinburne, 12,) referred to, it must be complete and perfect, and not left unfinished, to be completed at another time. The preservation of the will of 1810, the declarations of the testator, that he intended the memorandum as something from which a will was to be drawn, the non-execution of the draft which was always in'the testator's power from 1813 to 1819, when he died, the commencement of another will on the back' of the draft in his own hand writing, nearly as variant from the memorandum as the memorandum was from the will of 1810, Ills declarations even as late as the day before his death, that he intended to leave legacies to two charitable societies not mentioned in his memorandum, are facts that fully authorize the inference, that the intention to establish the memorándum, and to revoke the will of 1810, wars ne* ver fixed and perfect, although the testator may at tíme.; have thougbt'of doing so. The cases from Phillemore, a:-; well as all the other cases referred to by the appellant':; counsel, only shew that from different facts, a different conclusion has been drawn, In most of them, death followed so soon after the issuing of instructions, as not only to have prevented the execution of the wills, but to have excluded the probability, if not the possibility of the testator having changed his mind. He would have signed had he lived, is the irresistable inference in each ; but what becomes of this inference, when six years intervene between the completion of the draft, and the death of the testator ? I think, reversed, he would have executed it, had he approved, is at least an authorized presumption, in the ease of Walker vs. Walker, (1 Merivale, 503,) a testamentary paper formerly drawn, signed and sealed, hut which had words of attestation and no witness, was ruled to be no will; because, from the words of attestation, it appeared that the instrument was intended to have been witnessed, and as it was never witnessed, the intention had never been complete and perfect. This case goes very far; further, Í think, than I should be disposed to go ; hut should a jury so decide, I should not feel myself authorized to say, they were wrong.
The motion is refused.
Justiéen Bay, Non and Johnson, concurred.