Case Name: In re FLORIDA BOARD of BAR EXAMINERS. In re H.H.S.
Court: Florida Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1979-07-12
Citations: 373 So. 2d 890
Docket Number: No. 52909
Parties: In re FLORIDA BOARD of BAR EXAMINERS. In re H.H.S.
Judges: ENGLAND, C. J., and OVERTON, SUNDBERG, HATCHETT and ALDERMAN, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 373
Pages: 890–895

Head Matter:
In re FLORIDA BOARD of BAR EXAMINERS. In re H.H.S.
No. 52909.
Supreme Court of Florida.
July 12, 1979.
Robert M. Ervin, Thomas M. Ervin, Jr. and Dean Bunch of Ervin, Varn, Jacobs, Odom & Kitchen, Tallahassee, for petitioner.
C. Graham Carothers, Tallahassee, for respondent.

Opinion:
PER CURIAM.
We have for consideration the petition of H.H.S. for admission to The Florida Bar.
H.H.S., a member in good standing of the bar of another state and presently residing in Florida, was admitted to and passed the February, 1976, Florida Bar Examination. After an informal hearing the Florida Board of Bar Examiners served specifications upon H.H.S. which were based primarily upon two incidents. H.H.S. entered a plea of nolo contendere in the United States District Court to a charge that he failed to file federal income tax returns for the years 1965, 1966, and 1967. He was adjudged guilty and on July 29, 1971, was imprisoned for a period of thirty days. As a result he was suspended for one year from the practice of law in the state in which he was admitted. H.H.S. was reinstated and is a member of the bar of that state at the present time.
The other incident related to a complicated real estate transaction in 1975. At the request of a realtor, H.H.S. acted as trustee and agent for the realtor, or a syndicate which the realtor sought to form. In the transaction' H.H.S. was under a duty to disclose to the sellers that the identity of the person for whom he was acting as trustee was the realtor, at a time when the realtor or the company with which he was associated had a real estate nonexclusive listing on the subject property. H.H.S. did not make this disclosure.
After a final hearing on the board specifications the board recommended that H.H. S.'s petition for admission to The Florida Bar be denied on the ground that H.H.S. failed to meet the standards of conduct and fitness required under the provisions of article IV, section 19, of the Rules Relating to Admission to The Florida Bar.
Article IV, section 19, of the rules does not set forth definite standards but merely provides that an applicant must be of "good moral character, [and] . . . a fit person to take the oath and perform the obligations and responsibilities of an attorney." The inherent defects of a standard of "good moral character" standing alone, and the saving grace of a history of judicial construction have each been recognized by the United States Supreme Court. In Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 353 U.S. 252, 77 S.Ct. 722, 1 L.Ed.2d 810 (1957), the Court described the term "good moral character" as "unusually ambiguous" and held in pertinent part:
It can be defined in an almost unlimited number of ways for any definition will necessarily reflect the attitudes, experiences, and prejudices of the definer. Such a vague qualification, which is easily adapted to fit personal views and predilections, can be a dangerous instrument for arbitrary and discriminatory denial of the right to practice law.
The decisions of California courts . appear to define "good moral character" in terms of an absence of proven conduct or acts which have been historically considered as manifestations of "moral turpitude."
353 U.S. at 263, 77 S.Ct. at 728 (footnote omitted).
But during the same term of court, the United States Supreme Court also articulated the following sentiments about the standard of "good moral character":
No doubt satisfaction of the requirement of moral character involves an exercise of delicate judgment on the part of those who reach a conclusion, having heard and seen the applicant for admission, a judgment of which it may be said as it was of "many honest and sensible judgments" in a different context that it expresses "an intuition of experience which outruns analysis and sums up many unnamed and tangled impressions; — impressions which may lie beneath consciousness without losing their worth."
Nor is the division of power between this Court and that of the States in such matters altered by the fact that the judgment here challenged involves the application of a conception like that of "moral character," which has shadowy rather than precise bounds. It cannot be that that conception — moral character — has now been found to be so indefinite, because necessarily implicating what are called subjective factors, that the States may no longer exact it from those who are to carry on "the public profession of the law." (See Elihu Root, in 2 A.B.A.J. 736.) To a wide and deep extent, the law depends upon the disciplined standards of the profession and belief in the integrity of the courts. We cannot fail to accord such confidence to the state process, and we must attribute to its courts the exercise of a fair and not a biased judgment in passing upon the applications of those seeking entry into the profession.
Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 248-49, 77 S.Ct. 752, 761, 1 L.Ed.2d 796 (1956) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). .
Assuming, then that "moral turpitude" is the converse of "good moral character" and that this standard as refined by Schware comports with the concept of due process of law, two other concepts applicable to Bar admission proceedings must nonetheless be explored. The first has to do with burden of proof. In the Bar admission process the burden is upon the applicant to demonstrate his or her good moral character. Art. IV, § 19, Rules Relating to Admission to The Florida Bar (1977). Although the burden of coming forward with evidence may shift, the burden of proof never does. Coleman v. Watts, 81 So.2d 650 (Fla.1955). Conversely, in disbarment cases there is no burden on the subject attorney to demonstrate his continuing fitness to practice. In fact the bur den is on The Florida Bar to demonstrate a lack of fitness by clear and convincing evidence. Florida Bar v. Quick, 279 So.2d 4, 7 (Fla.1973).
Secondly, the same standard of fitness and character, or of conduct establishing the lack thereof, does not apply in proceedings wherein one seeks admission to the Bar as applies in disciplinary proceedings. Based upon his assertion that the standard is the same, petitioner develops the following syllogism: (1) denial of admission is equivalent to permanent disbarment, citing Lopez v. Florida Board of Bar Examiners, 231 So.2d 819 (Fla.1970); (2) this Court has consistently refused to disbar permanently an attorney for failure to file income tax returns, citing Florida Bar v. Turner, 344 So.2d 1280 (Fla.1977); Florida Bar v. Solomon, 338 So.2d 818 (Fla.1976); In re Turk, 333 So.2d 16 (Fla.1976); Florida Bar v. Miller, 322 So.2d 502 (Fla.1975); Florida Bar v. Silver, 313 So.2d 688 (Fla.1975); In re Snyder, 313 So.2d 33 (Fla.1975); Florida Bar v. Turk, 202 So.2d 848 (Fla.1967); Florida Bar v. Childs, 195 So.2d 862 (Fla.1967); and, therefore, (3) one may not be denied admission for failure to file income tax returns. There are two flaws in this syllogism. First, denial of admission to the Bar is not the equivalent of permanent disbarment. An applicant may reapply after the expiration of two calendar years. Art. IV, § 20(c), Rules Relating to Admission to The Florida Bar. Second, in Florida Board of Bar Examiners re Eimers, 358 So.2d 7, 9 n.l (Fla.1978), we recognized the differing standards to be met for admission to the Bar as compared to disciplinary or disbarment proceedings.
Furthermore, this Court has recently rejected the restricted view that lack of "good moral character" is limited to acts which reflect moral turpitude. In Florida Board of Bar Examiners re G.W.L., 364 So.2d 454, 458 (Fla.1978), the rule is announced:
In our view, a finding of a lack of "good moral character" should not be restricted to those acts that reflect moral turpitude. A more appropriate definition of the phrase requires an inclusion of acts and conduct which would cause a reasonable man to have substantial doubts about an individual's honesty, fairness, and respect for the rights of others and for the laws of the state and nation. See Konigsberg, supra.
Applying the foregoing burden of proof and standards as to "good moral character," although some of the evidence was in conflict we cannot conclude that there was a lack of competent substantial evidence in the record to support the board's recommendation. Accordingly, the petition for admission to The Florida Bar by H.H.S. is denied.
It is so ordered.
ENGLAND, C. J., and OVERTON, SUNDBERG, HATCHETT and ALDERMAN, JJ., concur.
ADKINS, J., dissents with an opinion, with which BOYD, J., concurs.