Case Name: PEOPLE v. GARY HUGHES
Court: Michigan Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1978-09-20
Citations: 85 Mich. App. 674
Docket Number: Docket No. 77-2649
Parties: PEOPLE v GARY HUGHES
Judges: Before: R. B. Burns, P. J., and Bronson and D. F. Walsh, JJ.
Reporter: Michigan appeals reports; cases decided in the Michigan Court of Appeals.
Volume: 85
Pages: 674–696

Head Matter:
PEOPLE v GARY HUGHES
Docket No. 77-2649.
Submitted February 9, 1978, at Detroit.
Decided September 20, 1978.
Gary R. Hughes, on his plea of guilty, was convicted of armed robbery and possession of a firearm during commission of a felony in the Recorder’s Court for the City of Detroit, Joseph E. Maher, J. Defendant appeals claiming that the felony-firearm conviction violates the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy. Held:
The Legislature is free under the double jeopardy clause to define crimes and fix punishments. Once the Legislature has acted, courts may not impose more than one punishment for the same offense and prosecutors ordinarily may not attempt to secure that punishment in more than one trial. Separate statutory crimes may be the "same offense” under the double jeopardy clause, even though they are not identical in either constituent elements or actual proof. Each case ultimately turns upon whether the Legislature intended a particular act to be punished by only one or more statutes. Resort to the tests to determine whether separate statutory crimes are the "same offense” under the double jeopardy clause need not be done where the legislative intent is apparent regarding whether the Legislature intended a particular act to be punished by only one or more statutes. The felony-firearm statute applies to the felony of armed robbery since armed robbery is not one of the felonies explicitly excluded in the statute. The double jeopardy clause does not prohibit a Legislature from amending an armed robbery statute, to add as a proviso that there be a minimal punishment where the dangerous weapon is a firearm, in order to make certainty of minimal punishment the standard where firearms are involved in the commission of felonies, and there is no double jeopardy impediment to the Legislature’s attainment of this same goal by a separate statute making it a felony to possess a firearm at the time of the commission of any felony not explicitly excluded by the statute.
References for Points in Headnotes
[1, 6, 17] 16 Am Jur 2d, Constitutional Law § 332.
21 Am Jur 2d, Criminal Law §§165, 166.
[2, 3, 7, 12] 21 Am Jur 2d, Criminal Law §§ 183, 184, 189.
[4, 5] 21 Am Jur 2d, Criminal Law § 20.
67 Am Jur 2d, Robbery §§ 4, 48.
[8] 21 Am Jur 2d, Criminal Law §§ 187, 189.
[9, 13] 21 Am Jur 2d, Criminal Law § 547.
67 Am Jur 2d, Robbery § 4.
[10] 21 Am Jur 2d, Criminal Law § 577.
[11] 21 Am Jur 2d, Criminal Law §§ 183, 184, 189.
67 Am Jur 2d, Robbery §§ 4, 48.
[14] 21 Am Jur 2d, Criminal Law § 187.
[15] 21 Am Jur 2d, Criminal Law § 166.
[16] 16 Am Jur 2d, Constitutional Law §§ 111-114.
[18] 21 Am Jur 2d, Criminal Law §§ 187, 547.
Affirmed.
Bronson, J., concurred but wrote separately to state his reasoning that armed robbery and felony-firearm are not the same offense under Federal constitutional law, since each requires proof of a fact not required to convict of the other. The Legislature often provides for different statutory offenses which could apply to the same act, however, the prohibition on multiple punishment prevents a court from cumulating punishment where it appears that the Legislature did not intend that the defendant be cumulatively punished. In ascertaining such legislative intent, it is presumed that the Legislature did not intend to punish cumulatively a greater and necessarily included offense. A rule of lenity prevents multiple punishment where the legislative intent is unclear or doubtful; however, where the legislative intent regarding punishment is clear there is no multiple punishment problem in punishing a defendant under separate statutes. The legislative intent here is clear that there be two convictions and a minimum two-year sentence where a person commits a felony, not excluded in the statute, while in possession of a firearm.
D. F. Walsh, J., dissented and would hold that application of the felony-firearm statute in this case violates the double jeopardy clauses of the United States and Michigan Constitutions. By definition, the felony necessary in order to convict a defendant of the felony-firearm violation is a lesser included offense of the felony-firearm violation itself since it is impossible to commit the latter without committing the former. The double jeopardy clause prohibits cumulative punishment and conviction for both offenses where a defendant is convicted of two offenses, one of which is included in the other. The constitutionally guaranteed protection against double jeopardy does not ultimately turn upon whether the Legislature intended a particular act to be punished by only one or more statutes. Legislative intent is considered in order to avoid a constitutional issue, if possible, not to resolve it. The felony-firearm conviction is cumulative punishment for the same offense since the felony-firearm violation and the armed robbery, upon which it was premised, do not constitute separate offenses because conviction for armed robbery does not require proofs of any facts unnecessary to the felony-firearm conviction, since every element of armed robbery must also be proved to establish violation of the felony-firearm statute. The Michigan Supreme Court has adopted more protective standards regarding the application of the double jeopardy clause than those compelled by the Federal constitution.
Opinion op R. B. Burns, P. J.
1. Constitutional Law — Double Jeopardy — Legislature—Courts —Prosecutors.
The double jeopardy clause provides that no person shall be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy; the Legislature is free under the clause to deñne crimes and fix punishments; however, once the Legislature has acted, courts may not impose more than one punishment for the same offense and prosecutors ordinarily may not attempt to secure that punishment in more than one trial. (US Const Am V; Const 1963, art 1, § 16.)
2. Constitutional Law — Criminal Law — Separate Statutory Crimes — Same Offense — Double Jeopardy — Elements— Proof — Legislature’s Intent.
Separate statutory crimes may be the "same offense” under the double jeopardy clause, even though they are not identical in either constituent elements or actual proof; each case ultimately turns upon whether the Legislature intended a particular act to be punished by only one or more statutes.
3. Constitutional Law — Double Jeopardy — Test—Same Offense —Separate Statutory Crimes — Legislative Intent.
The courts have developed tests to determine whether separate statutory crimes are the "same offense” under the double jeopardy clause; however, resort need not be had to the tests where the legislative intent is apparent regarding whether the Legislature intended a particular act to be punished by only one or more statutes.
4. Criminal Law — Felony-Firearm—Excluded Felonies — Included Felonies — Armed Robbery — Statutes.
The felony-ñrearm statute applies by its terms to all felonies except those explicitly excluded; therefore, the statute applies to the felony of armed robbery, since it is not explicitly excluded by the statute. (MCL 750.227b; MSA 28.424[2].)
5. Constitutional Law — Criminal Law — Double Jeopardy— Armed Robbery — Legislature—Firearms—Minimal Punishment — Felonies—Separate Statutes — Statutes.
The double jeopardy clause does not prohibit a Legislature from amending an armed robbery statute, to add as a proviso that there be a minimal punishment where the dangerous weapon is a ñrearm, in order to make certainty of minimal punishment the standard where ñrearms are involved in the commission of felonies; and there is no double jeopardy impediment to the Legislature’s attainment of this same goal by a separate statute making it a felony to possess a ñrearm at the time of the commission of any felony not explicitly excluded by the statute. (MCL 750.227b; MSA 28.424[2j.)
Concurrence by Bronson, J.
6. Constitutional Law — Double Jeopardy — Courts—Prosecutors.
The double jeopardy protection against multiple punishment is a restraint on courts and prosecutors.
7. Constitutional Law — Separation of Powers — Legislature— Define Offenses — Fix Punishments — Multiple Punishment —Legislative Intent.
The Legislature is the proper institution to deñne offenses and provide for their punishment; in so doing, the Legislature often provides for different statutory offenses which could apply to the same act; however, the prohibition on multiple punishment prevents a court from cumulating punishment where it appears that the Legislature did not intend that the defendant be cumulatively punished.
8. Constitutional Law — Double Jeopardy — Courts—Construction — Legislative Intent — Criminal Law — Punishment— Presumptions — Necessarily Included Offenses — Lenity Rule.
The courts have applied certain rules of construction as an aid to ascertaining the Legislature’s intent regarding whether a particular act is to be punished by only one or more statutes; it is presumed that the Legislature did not intend to punish cumula tively a greater and necessarily included offense; a rule of lenity prohibits multiple punishment where the legislative intent is unclear or doubtful; however, where the legislative intent regarding punishment is clear there is no multiple punishment problem.
9. Criminal Law — Felonies—Felony-Firearm—Legislative Intent —Two Convictions — Multiple Punishment — Statutes.
The Legislature has clearly provided for two convictions and a minimum two-year sentence where a person commits or attempts to commit a felony, not expressly excluded in the felony-ñrearm statute, while in possession of a ñrearm; since the legislative intent is clear, there can be no multiple punishment problem, or possibility of the court cumulating punishment where a defendant is convicted of armed robbery and possession of a ñrearm during the commission of the robbery. (MCL 750.227b; MSA 28.424[2].)
10. Constitutional Law — Multiple Punishment — Legislative Intent — Separate Statutes.
The constitutional protection against multiple punishment only prevents the courts and prosecutors from multiplying punishment, absent a clear legislative directive prescribing punishment; there is no multiple punishment problem where the statutory scheme evidences a clear legislative intent that the defendant be punished under separate statutes.
11. Constitutional Law — Double Jeopardy — -Test—Separate Statutes — Same Offenses — Facts—Criminal Law — -Armed Robbery — Felony-Firearm.
The test to determine whether separate statutory crimes are the "same offense" under the double jeopardy clause, provides that two statutory provisions deñne different offenses if each statute requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not; therefore, armed robbery and felony-ñrearm are not the same offense under Federal constitutional law since felony-ñrearm requires proof of a fact not required to convict of armed robbery, and armed robbery requires proof of facts not required for conviction of felony-ñrearm.
Dissent by D. F. Walsh, J.
12. Constitutional Law — Double Jeopardy — Same Offenses — Test —Facts—Cumulative Punishment.
The test for determining whether two separately deñned crimes constitute the "same offense" for purposes of the double jeop ardy clause, provides that where the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only one, is whether each provision requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not; unless the statutes involved satisfy that test the double jeopardy clause of the United States Constitution forbids cumulative punishment. (US Const, Am V.)
13. Constitutional Law — Double Jeopardy — Cumulative Punishment — Felony-Firearm—Armed Robbery — Facts—Elements —Statutes.
Cumulative punishment imposed by the felony-firearm statute upon a defendant convicted of the felony of armed robbery violates the Federal constitutional prohibition against cumulative punishment for the "same offense” since a conviction for armed robbery does not require proof of any facts unnecessary to the felony-firearm conviction because every element of the crime of armed robbery must also be proven to establish violation of the felony-firearm statute. (MCL 750.227b, 750.529; MSA 28.424[2], 28.797.)
14. Criminal Law — Armed Robbery — Felony-Firearm—Lesser Included Offenses — Double Jeopardy — Constitutional Law.
The felony of armed robbery by use of a firearm is, by definition, a lesser included offense of a felony-firearm violation incidental to that robbery because it is impossible to commit the latter without committing the former; therefore, conviction and sentencing for both a felony-firearm violation and for the underlying felony of armed robbery by use of a firearm is precluded by the double jeopardy provisions of the Federal and Michigan constitutions. (US Const, Am V; Const 1963, art 1, § 15.)
15. Constitutional Law — Double Jeopardy — Legislative Intent— Multiple Punishment.
The constitutionally guaranteed protection against double jeopardy does not ultimately turn upon whether the Legislature intended a particular act to be punished by only one or more statutes; one of the most fundamental principles of constitutional government is that the Constitution limits the power of the Legislature and not vice versa.
16. Constitutional Law — Legislative Intent — Avoidance of Issues —Resolving Issues.
Legislative intent is considered by the courts in order to avoid, if possible, a constitutional issue, not to resolve it.
17. Constitutional Law — Double Jeopardy — Application—Michigan’s Standards.
The Michigan Supreme Court has adopted more protective standards regarding the application of the double jeopardy clause, than those compelled by the Federal constitution.
18. Constitutional Law — Double Jeopardy — Cumulative Punishment — Included Offenses.
The double jeopardy clause prohibits not only cumulative punishment but also conviction for both offenses where a defendant is convicted of two offenses, one of which is included in the other; conviction for both a greater offense and one legally necessarily included is precluded.
Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Robert A. Derengoski, Solicitor General, William L. Cabalan, Prosecuting Attorney, Edward Reilly Wilson, Principal Attorney, Appeals, and Timothy A. Baughman, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for the people.
Bruce R. Saperstein, for defendant.
Before: R. B. Burns, P. J., and Bronson and D. F. Walsh, JJ.

Opinion:
R. B. Burns, P. J.
Defendant pled guilty to robbery armed, MCL 750.529; MSA 28.797, and possession of a firearm during commission of a felony, MCL 750.227b; MSA 28.424(2), and appeals. We affirm.
Although defendant argues that he did not knowingly and understanding^ waive various constitutional rights before pleading guilty, the trial court complied with GCR 1963, 785.7. A knowing and understanding waiver was implicit in the plea procedure.
Defendant's argument that the felony-firearm statute, MCL 750.227b; MSA 28.424(2), is unconstitutional because it amended a large number of statutes without re-enactment and publication, contrary to Const 1963, art 4, § 25, is without merit, since amendment by implication is. not the evil sought to be avoided by the constitutional provision. Advisory Opinion re Constitutionality of 1972 PA 294, 389 Mich 441, 471-474; 208 NW2d 469, 476-478 (1973).
Defendant also argues that his felony-firearm conviction must be set aside because it violates constitutional prohibitions against double jeopardy. US Const, Am V, Const 1963, art 1, § 15.
The double jeopardy clause provides that no person shall "be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy".
"[The clause] serves principally as a restraint on courts and prosecutors. The legislature remains free under the [d]ouble [j]eopardy [c]lause to define crimes and fix punishments; but once the legislature has acted courts may not impose more than one punishment for the same offense and prosecutors ordinarily may not attempt to secure that punishment in more than one trial." Brown v Ohio, 432 US 161, 165; 97 S Ct 2221, 2225; 53 L Ed 2d 187, 193-194 (1977).
Because many statutory crimes are duplicative, it is well established that separate statutory crimes may be the "same offense" under the double jeopardy clause, even though they are not identical in either constituent elements or actual proof. Brown v Ohio, supra, at 164; 97 S Ct at 2224; 53 L Ed 2d at 193. Each case ultimately turns upon whether the Legislature intended a particular act to be punished by only one or more statutes. See Gore v United States, 357 US 386; 78 S Ct 1280; 2 L Ed 2d 1405 (1958). Unfortunately, it is rarely possible to divine legislative intent in this area, as the multiple punishment issue rarely receives explicit legislative consideration. Gore v United States, supra, at 394; 78 S Ct at 1285; 2 L Ed 2d at 1411 (Warren, C. J., dissenting). As a consequence the courts have developed tests to determine whether separate statutory crimes are the "same offense". See, e.g., Harris v Oklahoma, 433 US 682; 97 S Ct 2912; 53 L Ed 2d 1054 (1977), Brown v Ohio, supra, Blockburger v United States, 284 US 299; 52 S Ct 180; 76 L Ed 306 (1932), People v Stewart (On Rehearing), 400 Mich 540; 256 NW2d 31 (1977), People v Martin, 398 Mich 303; 247 NW2d 303 (1976).
Although it may be argued with some force that application of the above tests to the instant case would indicate the presence of a double jeopardy problem, but see, e.g., Kowalski v Parratt, 533 F2d 1071 (CA 8, 1976), cert den 429 US 844; 97 S Ct 125; 50 L Ed 2d 115 (1976), resort need not be had to the tests where the legislative intent is, as here, apparent.
The statute applies by its terms to all felonies except those explicitly excluded.
"A person who carries or has in his possession a firearm at the time he commits or attempts to commit a felony, except the violation of section 227 [MCLA 750.227; MSA 28.424 — carrying a concealed weapon] or section 227a [MCLA 750.227a; MSA 28.424 (1) — unlawful possession of a pistol by a licensee], is guilty of a felony, and shall be imprisoned for 2 years." MCL 750.227b; MSA 28.424(2).
Expressio unius est exclusio alterius. "Felony" includes robbery armed. MCL 750.529; MSA 28.797. By this statute the Legislature has attempted to make certainty of minimal punishment the standard where firearms are involved in the commission of felonies. The minimal punishment purpose applies with equal force to robbery armed crimes as to other crimes. As it cannot be doubted that the Legislature could have amended the robbery armed statute to add as a proviso that there be a minimal punishment where the dangerous weapon is a firearm, without offending the double jeopardy clause, see Gore v United States, supra, there is no double jeopardy impediment to its attainment of the same goal by separate statute.
Since the Legislature intended the type of result obtained in the instant case, the convictions do not violate double jeopardy protection.
Affirmed.
For purpose of analysis we assume the double jeopardy protection under state and Federal constitutions is equivalent.