Case Name: Dorothy FOX, Appellant, v. SHANNON & LUCHS COMPANY OF WASHINGTON, Inc., Appellee
Court: District of Columbia Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: District of Columbia
Decision Date: 1967-12-12
Citations: 236 A.2d 60
Docket Number: No. 4058
Parties: Dorothy FOX, Appellant, v. SHANNON & LUCHS COMPANY OF WASHINGTON, Inc., Appellee.
Judges: Before HOOD, Chief Judge, and MYERS and KELLY, Associate Judges.
Reporter: West's Atlantic Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 236
Pages: 60–63

Head Matter:
Dorothy FOX, Appellant, v. SHANNON & LUCHS COMPANY OF WASHINGTON, Inc., Appellee.
No. 4058.
District of Columbia Court of Appeals.
Argued Aug. 1, 1967.
Decided Dec. 12, 1967.
Carl P. Fogel, Washington, D. C., for appellant.
Harry L. Ryan, Jr., Washington, D. C., for appellee.
Before HOOD, Chief Judge, and MYERS and KELLY, Associate Judges.

Opinion:
MYERS, Associate Judge:
The single question presented by this appeal is whether the trial court properly dismissed appellant's case at pretrial because the complaint, which was in four counts, sought damages totaling $23,000.
Appellant does not contest the fact that the complaint claimed damages in excess of the $10,000 jurisdictional limit of the District of Columbia Court of General Sessions, but contends that when the case came on for pretrial, after the statute of limitations had run, the pretrial judge should have allowed her to amend her pleading nunc pro tunc so as to confer jurisdiction upon the court. She makes this argument despite the fact that answer to her complaint set out the court's lack of jurisdiction as a separate defense. Appellant cites no authority to support her contention and refers only to GS Rules 15 and 16 of the trial court which allow liberal amendment of pleadings where the court has jurisdiction over the subject matter. Where the court has no such jurisdiction, the rules are inapplicable.
The instant suit arose out of a contract for the purchase of a house by appellant. The first count of the complaint alleged damages of $6,500 for appellee's breach of contract in conveying a house with a defective roof; the second count demanded an additional $6,500 for breach of warranty respecting the satisfactory condition of the roof; the third count, charging fraud and misrepresentation, carried no ad dam-num clause; and the fourth count asked $10,000 for damages to plumbing and furnishings due to appellee's failure to heat the house during the cold weather.
In Reeves v. Yale Transport Corp., D.C.Mun.App. 128 A.2d 792 (1957), we dismissed a complaint alleging four separate assaults and a slander because the total damages sought exceeded the trial court's jurisdictional limit, although no single count demanded more than the permissible limit. All four counts in the present case arose out of a single contract, and there can be no doubt that the counts were properly included in a single action. Lejohn Mfg. Co. v. Webb, D.C.Mun.App., 91 A.2d 332 (1952). Since the total amount sought exceeded the court's jurisdictional limit, the case was properly dismissed on that ground.
Affirmed.
. § 11-961 D.C.Code (1967 ed.).
. Even if we assume that the first two counts are actually alternative theories of recovery for the same injury, when coupled with the fourth count, the amount claimed is still in excess of ¡>10,-000.
. In the Federal courts it has been held: "The jurisdictional amount is the sum of all the claims which are properly joined." Gray v. Blight, 112 F.2d 696, 700 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 704, 61 S.Ct. 170, 85 L.Ed. 457 (1940). See also Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of the United States v. Wert, 102 F.2d 10 (8th Cir.1939).
.It is regrettable that the effect of our ruling deprives appellant of a hearing on the merits of her claims. However, we note that she had ample time to file a new complaint in a court of proper jurisdiction before the statute of limitations barred a suit. This was not done.