Case Name: Juan Raul CUERVO, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 2006-05-12
Citations: 929 So. 2d 640
Docket Number: No. 5D04-3879
Parties: Juan Raul CUERVO, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: ORFINGER, J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 929
Pages: 640–645

Head Matter:
Juan Raul CUERVO, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. 5D04-3879.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
May 12, 2006.
James S. Purdy, Public Defender, and Leonard R. Ross, Assistant Public Defender, Daytona Beach, for Appellant.
Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Allison Leigh Morris, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellee.

Opinion:
GRIFFIN, J.
Juan Raul Cuervo ["Cuervo"] appeals his conviction of attempted first-degree murder with a weapon and burglary of a conveyance with an assault or battery with a weapon. He argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress his confession because it was involuntarily made without a free and intelligent waiver of his right to remain silent. We affirm.
The victim lived in her sister's house; Cuervo lived in the garage. On the evening of the attack, Cuervo hid in the victim's vehicle and emerged from the rear seat while she was driving. He held a knife to her throat and said that her day had come — and she was going to die. He continuously stabbed her until she escaped the vehicle. He then exited the vehicle and continued to stab her. She finally was able to flag down a passing vehicle, and law enforcement was called.
Law enforcement apprehended Cuervo the next day and read him his Miranda rights. Deputy Garcia translated for Detective Palmieri because Cuervo could not speak English. Garcia asked Cuervo, "Do you wish to talk about the matter and make a statement, yes or no?" Cuervo responded, "No, I do not want to declare anything. I just — I do not want to declare anything." Detective Palmieri noticed that the Miranda form had not been initialed or signed, and she asked Officer Garcia to review the rights again and to have Cuervo do so. The following exchange then occurred:
Officer Garcia: (Explains Miranda rights in Spanish.)
Detective Palmieri: Please explain to him that at this time if he does wish to speak with us that he can give us his side of the story. If he doesn't wish to, that's his right. He does not have to. Just let him know that.
Officer Garcia: He is saying that he does — he does not wish to speak because he doesn't know if the victim already said anything or the victim's mother, because he's afraid that they've been here for 30 years or more and that they can use anything against him to (indiscernible).
Detective Palmieri: Okay. Does he have an attorney that we can speak with?
Officer Garcia: He doesn't know anybody in this country, and he does not have an attorney. He's by himself in this country. He doesn't have any family (inaudible).
Detective Palmieri: Okay. So at this time, he's refusing to talk to us?
Officer Garcia: He says he — if you ask him a — questions, he will answer them although if he feels like he doesn't want to answer that one, then he won't answer that one.
Detective Palmieri: Tell him that's fine. He doesn't have to answer any question that I ask.
In response to the ensuing questions, Cuervo then related information largely consistent with the victim's account of the events. Cuervo said that the victim had been driving him crazy, he was lying in the rear seat of her vehicle when she left for work, a twelve-inch knife was in the ear, and he only intended to talk to her, but he got angry and began to stab her.
During the suppression hearing, Palmi-eri explained why she did not cease communicating with Cuervo:
Well, . there was the communication barrier.... Originally, I told Deputy Garcia to have him — read him the rights, and to have him initial to make sure he understands. And, I guess, at that point Deputy Garcia told me he does not want to talk. But when I looked down at the paperwork, it showed that he did not sign it. So I told him please go back, have him initial it, and make sure he understands. And I said make sure he understands this is his opportunity to speak. But I just wanted to make sure that was clear, . I wanted to make sure he knew his rights, and I wanted it initialed.
The State's position was that Cuervo made equivocal responses. The State pointed out that in the leading Florida case, Owen v. State, 862 So.2d 687 (Fla. 2003), the statements "I don't want to talk about it," and, "I'd rather not talk about it," were deemed equivocal. The State argued that Cuervo merely made "cryptic statements" and, even if Cuervo had made an unambiguous statement, the police were only prevented from asking substantive questions.
The trial court found that Cuervo's statements were ambiguous and that the exchange that followed was only for clarification, and did not amount to a violation of Cuervo's constitutional rights. We agree that Cuervo's statements were not subject to suppression.
At the very least, the brief exchange between Palmieri and Cuervo, with Garcia translating, was sufficiently uncertain to allow clarifying questions. The entire dialogue took only about five minutes and arose in the context of a translation. Cuervo began by responding that he did not want to "declare anything." The follow-up question elicited from him an odd narrative about his family that was the opposite of "not speaking" and which compounded the ambiguity about whether he wished "to speak" or not. In response to the question about whether he had counsel the police could talk to, he responded by volunteering to answer questions put to him — or not — as he chose. In the entire exchange, there was manifestly no coercion of any sort, no effort to overcome a settled decision to invoke his right to remain silent, no interrogation.
Police can certainly clarify an ambiguous exchange with a suspect, although they are under no obligation to do so. See Owen, 862 So.2d at 697-698. They may also give multiple Miranda warnings, to ascertain a defendant's intent. Sotolongo v. State, 787 So.2d 915 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001). They are also permitted to continue to communicate with a defendant even after he has invoked his right to remain silent. Everett v. State, 893 So.2d 1278 (Fla.2004) (law enforcement officer's request for a consent to search from a defendant in custody who has invoked the right to counsel does not violate the Fifth Amendment). What is prohibited following the invocation of rights is custodial interrogation or its functional equivalent. See Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 64 L.Ed.2d 297 (1980), "[T]he definition of interrogation can extend only to words or actions on the part of police officers that they should have known were reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response." Id. at 302, 100 S.Ct. 1682. Also prohibited are persistent efforts to wear down a suspect's resistance and make him change his mind about invoking his rights. Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 105, 96 S.Ct. 321, 46 L.Ed.2d 313 (1975). However, neither circumstance was present in this case.
Bright lines are valuable tools in this area of the law, but there is nothing in this brief exchange, as it is communicated back and forth in two languages for which the protection of Miranda is required. When asked point blank if he was refusing to speak, Cuervo could simply have said, "yes." He chose, instead, to hear the investigator's questions and to respond — or not, as he chose.
AFFIRMED.
ORFINGER, J., concurs.
THOMPSON, J., dissents, with opinion.
. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).