Case Name: In re HART
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1909-04-08
Citations: 116 N.Y.S. 193
Docket Number: 
Parties: In re HART.
Judges: 
Reporter: West's New York Supplement
Volume: 116
Pages: 193–204

Head Matter:
In re HART.
(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department.
April 8, 1909.)
1. Attorney and Client (§ 39 )—Disbarment—Grounds—Professional Misconduct.
Respondent was. employed to bring a civil action against C. for assault upon a girl, and had the girl’s sister appointed guardian ad litem to maintain the action, but did not then attempt to serve a summons, which he had prepared. Several days thereafter respondent procured from the magistrate’s court a summons citing C. to appear to answer a charge of crim inal assault; but the evidence showed that he had no intention of prosecuting C., but the summons was merely served to force a settlement of the civil action contemplated, knowing that C. desired to avoid notoriety. After several consultations with C.’s attorney, a- settlement was effected by which C. paid over $2,500 upon respondent’s agreement that the matter would be dropped. Respondent knowingly permitted thé compromise money to be received by the guardian ad litem without her giving the security required by Code Civ. Proc. § 474, nor was the court’s approval secured to an agreement by which the guardian was to give respondent half the amount recovered for prosecuting the civil action. Held, that as respondent was guilty of blackmail and compounding a crime, and in view of his action in permitting the guardian ad litem to take the compromise money without" giving security, his conduct required that he be disbarred, and the fact that he candidly admitted the culpatory facts did not mitigate his offense.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Attorney and Client, Cent. Dig. § 52; Dec. Dig. § 39. ]
2. Criminal Law (§ 216*)—-Summons—Nature—Magistrate's Summons.
The service of a summons issued out of a magistrate’s court, citing another to appear to answer a criminal charge, is not the commencement of a criminal prosecution, but a mere notice to the person served that a charge is to be made against him.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. § 435; Dec. - Dig. § 216.*]
3. Attorney and Client (§ 53*)—Disbarment Proceedinsg—Evidence—Sufficiency.
In disbarment proceedings for threatening a criminal prosecution in order to compel a compromise of a threatened civil action, evidence held to show that respondent served the proposed defendant in the civil action with a magistrate’s summons merely to force a settlement of the contemplated civil action, without any intention of prosecuting the person served.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Attorney and Client, Cent. Dig. § 75; Dec. Dig. § 53.*]
4. Threats (§ -1*) — Elements of Offense—Threatening Criminal Prosecution. • ■ .
Where an attorney, who was engaged to prosecute a civil action for an. assault upon a girl, had a summons issued out of a magistrate’s court, citing the proposed defendant in the civil action to appear to answer, a charge of criminal assault, merely to force a settlement of the civil action and without any intention of prosecuting him, he was guilty of blackmail, whether the summons operated as the beginning of a prosecution or as . mere notice of intention to do so, and whether the person accused was guilty or not as a claim cannot be collected by threatening to accuse the debtor of crime.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Threats, Cent. Dig. § 1; Dec. Dig. § 1.*]
5. Infants (§ 84*)—Actions—Guardian Ad Litem—Duties.
A guardian ad litem cannot make any contract which would dispose of, or create a lien upon, the infant’s cause of action or the proceeds thereof, without the court’s approval, so that an agreement by a guardian ad litem, without the court’s approval, to pay the attorney prosecuting the action a percentage of the recovery, was illegal.
[Ed. Note.-—For other cases, see Infants, Gent. Dig. §'239; Dec. Dig. § 84.*] ;
6. Attorney and' Client (§ 32*)—Duties—Promotion of Justice.
If.an attorney had knowledge which in his opinion justified a prosecution for criminal assault, it was his duty to notify the prosecuting officer, so that the charge could be investigated.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Attorney and Client, Cent. Dig. § 46; Dec. Dig. § 32.*]
7. Compounding Felony (§ 3 )—Agkeement to Compound.
Under Pen. Code, § 125, making one who takes money upon an agree, ment to compound or conceal a crime, or to discontinue a prosecution thereof, guilty of a felony if the agreement relates to a felony, or of a misdemeanor if it jrelates to a misdemeanor, except where a compromise is allowed by law"; Code Or. Proc. § 663, permitting such compromise only when a defendant is brought before a magistrate or is held to answer for certain misdemeanors, and section 666, forbidding any compromise, except as provided in sections 663 and 664, an attorney who had procured an affidavit from the girl upon whom a criminal assault was alleged to have been committed, and had obtained a summons charging another to appear to answer for the crime, by thereafter agreeing to drop the matter and say nothing more of it upon payment to him of a sum, was guilty of compounding a crime.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Compounding Felony, Cent. Dig. § 2; Dec. Dig. § 3.*]
In the matter of disbarment proceedings against Joseph D. Hart, an attorney.
Judgment of disbarment.
Argued before PATTERSON, P. J., and INGRAHAM, McLAUGHLIN, LAUGHLIN, and SCOTT, JJ.
For other cases see same topic & 5 number in Dec. & Am. Digs. 1907 to date. & Rep'r Indexes
For other cases see same topic & § number in Dec. & Am. Digs. 1907 to date, & Rep’r Indexes
For other cases see same topic & § number in Dec. & Am. Digs. 1907 to date, & Rep’r Indexes

Opinion:
SCOTT, J.
The respondent, an attorney of this court, was charged upon the complaint of a client, with improper and unprofessional conduct. The matter was sent to a referee, who found and reported that these charges were not sustained by the evidence. The referee, however, found, and. so reported, that it had appeared from the evidence taken before him that the respondent, having brought an action for one Evelyn Reed, as guardian ad litem for her sister, Charlotte Reed, effected a settlement of said action without having obtained the permission of the court, and that, having instituted a civil action for damages for an alleged criminal assault, he simultaneously for the same cause commenced a criminal proceeding, which he allowed to lapse upon the opening of negotiations for a settlement upon which he was to receive a contingent fee. As the matter last mentioned was not embraced in the original charges, the Association of the Bar of the City of New York prepared and presented supplementary charges, which have been submitted to the court upon the evidence already taken before the referee; neither the petitioner nor the respondent availing of the opportunity, which was afforded, to submit further evidence. The supplemental charges are:
(a) That on or about the 16th day of April, 1907, in the city and county of New York, the said respondent, knowing the contents of a writing which threatened to accuse one W. N. Crane of a criminal assault, delivered the same to said Crane with intent and by means thereof to extort or gain money.
(b) That on or about April 16, 1907, the respondent took money upon the agreement or .understanding to discontinue the prosecution of a criminal proceeding for assault theretofore instituted in the Jefferson Market magistrate's court against the said W. N. Crane.
There is no dispute as to the facts, which were in large part testified to by the respondent himself. The respondent has been practicing as an attorney in the city of New York for 13 or 14 years. On the 3d or 3d of April, 1907, he was visited in his office by one Evelyn Reed, whom he had not previously known. She informed him that during her absence from her apartment her younger sister, Charlotte, an infant, had been visited by a man who had attempted to outrage her. • Respondent asked for a retainer, which Miss Reed declared herself unable to pay, whereupon it was agreed between them that respondent should receive 50 per cent, of any recovery in a civil action. Respondent does not testify that anything was said, at that time, about á criminal proceeding. Respondent visited the apartment house where the Reeds resided and took the statements in writing of Charlotte Reed and of certain employes of the house. On April 5, 1907, respondent prepared the necessary petition and consent, and obtained from a justice of the Supreme Court an order appointing Evelyn Reed, guardian ad litem for Charlotte Reed, for the purpose of bringing an action against W. N. Crane for assault, and on the same day prepared a summons in the civil action against Crane. No attempt seems to have been made at this time, or for ten days afterwards, to serve the summons on Crane, and thus to commence the civil action. On about April 8th or 9th (the date is left uncertain) the respondent procured from-the Jefferson Market city magistrate's court, and caused to be served on Crane, what is known as a summons, citing Crane to appear on April 11th to answer to a charge of assault on Charlotte Reed. Such a summons is not a legal process which the person summoned is bound to obey, but is in effect nothing more than a notification that .at the time and place mentioned therein a charge will be made. It is-riot the commencement of a criminal..proceeding, does not, apparently, require .that an information or complaint shall be laid before the magistrate before it is issued, and it does not appear in the present case that such an information or complaint was laid before the magistrate. •On the return day mentioned in the summons Crane did not appear, but an attorney named W. J. Bolger, who had been retained by him, did appear, and inquired of the respondent what the charge against Crane was. Respondent told him, whereupon Bolger denounced the proceeding as a blackmailing one, and said that he did not propose to have his client come to court in response to the summons and have the matter made public knowledge; that if respondent wanted Crane in the magistrate's court he would have to arrest him. Thereupon the respondent had the return day of the summons adjourned to April 16th.
Nothing further was done until April 15th, when respondent called Bolger up on the telephone and had a conversation which resulted in Bolger's going to respondent's office. Respondent showed to Bolger the statement of Charlotte Reed, and the order appointing Evelyn Reed her guardian ad litem. Bolger then said that, if it was proposed to bring a civil action, he would accept service for his client, and give a notice .of appearance, as he did not want any more papers served on his client, or any one sent to his house. Thereupon the summons in the civil action was served on Bolger, and he gave notice of appearance' for Crane. A conversation then ensued concerning the payment of a sum of money in settlement, but no conclusion was then arrived at, as the parties were too far apart; Bolger offering $500, and respond ent demanding $25,000. On the following morning there appeared, most opportunely, in a daily newspaper, a long and circumstantial account of the alleged assault on Charlotte Reed, in which the assailant was not named, although the description given tallied well with that of Crane. It does not appear that respondent caused this article to be printed. He says that a reporter called upon him and said that he had heard something about the story, and that he (respondent) refused to say anything about it, but advised the reporter to go to the apartment house in which the Reeds lived to get the rest of the story. It appeared that the publication of this article greatly disturbed and alarmed Crane. On the same day, being the day to which the return of the summons had been adjourned, the respondent and Bolger met in the magistrate's court. Neither the Reeds nor Crane were present. The discussion as to a settlement was renewed, and Bolger said that his client was much wrought up over the newspaper article, and that -if-anything more appeared he should take the matter to the district attorney.
The negotiations for a settlement went on during the day; Bolger protesting all the time that what he wanted was to avoid notoriety, and respondent offering to guarantee that, if a settlement was effected, not another word would appear. Finally on the same day a settlement was effected by the payment by Bolger, on behalf of Crane, of $2,000, on receipt of which Evelyn Reed, as guardian, executed a general release. Eater Bolger paid respondent a counsel fee of $500, and no further action was taken in the magistrate's court. Respondent paid Evelyn Reed $1,250, retaining a like sum for himself. No order permitting the guardian to compromise the action was obtained, and no security was given by the guardian, as required by section 474 of the Code of Civil Procedure and rule 51 of the General Rules of Practice. Respondent admits his familiarity with the statutory requirements in this regard.
It is argued on behalf of respondent that the taking out of a summons in a magistrate's court is not the commencement of a criminal prosecution, and with this contention we are disposed to agree. The issuance and service of such a summons amounts to nothing more than an intimation that a charge of criminality is to be made against the person to whom the summons is directed. There is no evidence that respondent was retained to institute a criminal prosecution. His own-evidence as to his retainer indicated very plainly that he was- employed to demand and collect pecuniary damages (of which he was to have half), and these could not properly or legally be collected by means of a criminal proceeding. The only evidence as to any suggestion to the Reeds of a criminal prosecution is that, when something was said, on the subject to Evelyn Reed, she repudiated the idea, because it would involve the interposition of the Gerry Society. Nor is there anything to show that Hart ever seriously considered the institution of a crim-inal prosecution.
It is urged on his behalf that, having become cognizant of the' com- • mission of a crime by Crane, it was his right, and perhaps his duty, to take steps looking to his prosecution criminally. This may be admit ted, but he never did so. It does not appear that he ever laid before the magistrate or the district attorney the facts upon which such a prosecution could have been based, even when challenged so to do by Crane's attorney. The reason is fairly obvious. If he had actually initiated a criminal prosecution by laying the facts before the proper officer, he would have lost control of the prosecution, and could not have agreed to drop it upon a settlement of the civil action for damages. The whole evidence tends to show that the impelling cause which led Crane to settle was the fear of publicity. He was an old man, accused of a shameful crime, and not unnaturally shrank from notoriety. It is equally evident that respondent appreciated how potent a factor this fear of publicity would be in inducing Crane to settle, and that the settlement was finally made especially with a view to escaping notoriety. Although everything was ready to begin the civil action on April 5th, no attempt was made to do so until the 15th. .When Bolger declared that Crane would not appear in the magistrate's court in response to a summons, the respondent did not apply for a warrant, but adjourned the return day.of the summons. When Crane showed no disposition to move in the matter, it was respondent who called up Bolger and showed him the statement of Charlotte Reed, and, as respondent himself testifies, the criminal proceeding was dropped when Bolger began to show a disposition to make a cash settlement. Finally, as part consideration and inducement for a settlement, respondent undertook to guarantee that the matter should be given no further publicity.
The service of the summons issued out of the magistrate's court, while not the actual commencement of a criminal prosecution, amounted distinctly to a threat of such a prosecution. It was at least as effective, if not more so, than a letter threatening a prosecution would have been, and from the whole evidence we cannot escape the conviction that the service of the summons from the magistrate's court was intended merely as a threat of a criminal prosecution, made in order to force a settlement of the civil action which was contemplated and prepared for before the criminal summons was taken out, and that the respondent never actually intended to prosecute Crane criminally. If this be so,- there can be no doubt that the respondent acted illegally, improperly, and unprofessionally. People v. Eichler, 75 Hun, 26, 26 N. Y. Supp. 998, appeal dismissed 142 N. Y. 642, 37 N. E. 567, was a case much like the present. The defendant, an attorney, had been retained to prosecute a man for damages for assault upon a young girl. He wrote a letter to the accused in which he said:
"Please call at my office, at 7 o'clock this evening in reference to the Mayer matter, without fail; otherwise, I will be obliged to proceed against yon criminally."
He was convicted of an attempt at blackmail, and his conviction was affirmed by the General Term in this Department. In People v. Wickes, 112 App. Div. 39, 98 N. Y. Supp. 163, this court has recently had occasion to review a similar conviction, where the offense consisted in sending, not a threatening letter, but an apparently friendly one, suggesting a possible prosecution for the crime of perjury; the pur pose being to induce the addressee to forego his appeal from a civil judgment against him. Again the conviction was affirmed.
The respondent justifies himself in threatening a criminal prosecution on the ground that he really believed that a crime had been committed. The same plea was interposed by the defendant in People v. Eichler, supra. The court said upon this subject:
"The moral turpitude of threatening, for the purpose of obtaining money, to accuse a guilty person of the crime which has been committed, is as great as to threaten, for a like offense, an innocent person of having committed a crime. The intent is the same in both cases—to acquire money without legal right by threatening a criminal prosecution. But threatening a guilty person for such a purpose is a greater injury to the public than to threaten an innocent one, for the result is more likely to be attained, and the result is the concealment and compounding of felonies to the injury of the state. The fact that the defendant believed in the complainant's guilt is no defense, and is not even a mitigating fact."
These words are quoted with approval in People v. Wickes, supra, and supported by numerous authorities from other jurisdictions. It is true that it was respondent's privilege as an attorney to sue Crane for damages, and it may be that the claim therefor was well founded ; but—
"the law does not authorize the collection of just debts by the malicious threatening to accuse the debtor of a crime." People v. Wickes, supra; People v. Eichler, supra; Commonwealth v. Coolidge, 128 Mass. 55.
If it be considered that the issue and service of the summons issued out of the magistrate's court was in effect the commencement of a criminal prosecution, the respondent is placed in no better light, because then he was guilty, under the second supplementary charge, of taking money upon the agreement and undertaking to discontinue a prosecution for a crime. It may be claimed for the respondent that the frankness with which he admitted all the facts upon which the charge against him is based indicated that he did not understand that he was doing an unlawful thing. If so, not only does it not mitigate his offense, but most clearly demonstrates his unfitness to fill the honorable office of an attorney of this court.
Nor may we pass by in silencé his act in permitting Evelyn Reed to accept a sum of money in settlement of the action without complying with the plain requirements of the law as to giving security. That alone would call for severe censure, if not for disciplinary action. Section 474 of the Code of Civil Procedure explicitly forbids a guardian ad litem, who is not also a general guardian—
"to receive money or property of the infant, other than costs and expenses allowed to the guardian by the court until he has given sufficient security approved by a judge of the court, or a county judge, to account for and apply the same under the direction of the court."
Respondent admits that he knew of this section, and yet he deliberately permitted his client to violate it. Such a plain disobedience of law cannot be overlooked. We are constrained to hold that the respondent has been clearly shown to be an unfit person to remain a member of the bar.
The motion is therefore granted, and the respondent disbarred. All concur.