Case Name: Francisco H. REYES, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Jo Anne B. BARNHART, Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant-Appellee
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 2003-07-15
Citations: 70 F. App'x 216
Docket Number: No. 02-51391
Parties: Francisco H. REYES, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Jo Anne B. BARNHART, Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant-Appellee.
Judges: Before BARKSDALE, DEMOSS, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.
Reporter: West's Federal Appendix
Volume: 70
Pages: 216–217

Head Matter:
Francisco H. REYES, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Jo Anne B. BARNHART, Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant-Appellee.
No. 02-51391.
Summary Calendar
United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.
July 15, 2003.
Before BARKSDALE, DEMOSS, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.

Opinion:
PER CURIAM.
Francisco H. Reyes appeals the district court's judgment affirming the Social Security Commissioner's denial of benefits pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The Commissioner determined that Reyes was not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act at the fifth step of the disability determination, after considering the testimony of a vocational expert. Reyes argues that the Commissioner erred in discounting the opinion of a treating physician, Dr. Perez-Rodriguez, and erred in relying on the vocational expert's testimony because the hypothetical question posed to the expert did not account for all of his impairments and there was no finding under Watson v. Barnhart, 288 F.3d 212 (5th Cir.2002), that Reyes would be able to maintain employment.
The administrative record reflects that there was good cause for not according controlling weight to Dr. Perez-Rodriguez's opinion, which was brief, conclusional, and inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in the record. See Greenspan v. Shalala, 38 F.3d 232, 237 (5th Cir.1994). The hypothetical posed to the vocational expert incorporated all of the impairments and restrictions supported by the record, and the Commissioner therefore correctly relied upon the expert's opinion in determining that Reyes was not disabled. See Bowling v. Shalala, 36 F.3d 431, 436 (5th Cir.1994). Reyes identified no impairments that would prevent him from maintaining employment; he thus did not establish the factual predicate required by Watson to necessitate a separate finding on his ability to maintain employment. See Frank v. Barnhart, 326 F.3d 618, 619-20 (5th Cir.2003).
AFFIRMED.
Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.