Case Name: Ex parte FULTON
Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1919-05-14
Citations: 215 S.W. 331
Docket Number: No. 5337
Parties: Ex parte FULTON.
Judges: DAVIDSON, P. J., dissents.
Reporter: South Western Reporter
Volume: 215
Pages: 331–340

Head Matter:
Ex parte FULTON.
(No. 5337.)
(Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
May 14, 1919.)
1. Intoxicating liquoes <&wkey;132 — Acts at SAME SESSION MUST BE CONSTRUED AS A WHOLE.
Provisions of 35th. Leg. 4th Called Sess. 1918, c. 31, relating to transportation and shipment of intoxicating liquors in territory where such liquor has been prohibited under local option law, will prevail in such territory over chapter 24, the state-wide prohibition law, since the acts of same session of Legislature must be taken as a whole and construed as one act; (Per Morrow, J.)
2. Intoxicating liquors <&wkey;17 — Possessing or transporting liquor in local option district.
Allison Shipping Law 1913 as amended by Acts 35th Leg. 4th Called Sess. 1918, c. 31, making it unlawful “to have or keep” intoxicating liquors in a public place in local option territory, or to transport liquor therein, is not unconstitutional under Const, art. 16, § 20, relating to local option legislation to prohibit “sale” of intoxicants, being merely for purpose of making enforcement of local option law more effective in districts in-which it is in force. (Per Morrow, J.)
3. Intoxicating liquors <&wkey;17 — Statute PROHIBITING POSSESSION OR TRANSPORT IN LOCAL option district constitutional.
Allison Shipping Law, as amended by Acts 35th Log. 4th Called Sess. 1918, c. 31, making it unlawful “to have or keep” intoxicating liquors in a public place in local option territory, or to transport liquor therein, does not deny any right guaranteed by the federal Constitution. (Per Morrow, J.)
4. Statutes <&wkey;5- — Scope oe legislation at SPECIAL SESSION UNDER GOVERNOR’S PROCLAMATION.
Acts 35th Leg. 4th Called Sess. 1918, c. 31, amending Allison Shipping Law, so as to make it unlawful to have or keep intoxicants in public place in local option territory or transport liquor therein, held authorized under’ Const, art. 3, § 40, prohibiting legislation at special session upon subjects other than those designated in the Governor’s proclamation or message, by proclamation calling for legislation to restrict liquor traffic and render liquor inaccessible to soldiers.
5. Statutes <&wkey;5 — Scope oe legislation at 'special session under Governor’s proc-lamaron.
Governor’s proclamation or messages, submitting subject of legislation to special session under Const, art. 3, § 40, need not state the details of the legislation to be considered; such matters being within discretion of Legislature.
6. Habeas corpus <&wkey;30(2) — Sufficiency of INDICTMENT FOR UNLAWFUL TRANSPORTATION OE LIQUO*R..
An indictment, charging that liquors were unlawfully transported into prohibited territory, would sufficiently charge an offense to suffice, on application for habeas corpus, unless there was no law on which the prosecution could be founded. (Per Morrow, J.)
Davidson, P. J., dissenting.
Original application for a writ of habeas corpus by A. M. Fulton.
Application dismissed and relator remanded to custody of sheriff.
Puckitt, Mount- & Newberry, of Dallas, for appellant.
E. A. Berry, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.

Opinion:
MORROW, J.
This is an original application for a writ of habeas corpus. The record discloses that at the time of the offense charged, the i sale ,of intoxicating liquors was prohibited throughout Dallas county by the adoption of the local option law. It is charged in separate counts of the indictment that relator "did have and keep" intoxicating liquors in a public road in Dallas county, and that in said county he unlawfully transported such liquors. for other than sacramental, medicinal, mechanical, or scientific purposes. He demands release on the proposition that "to have or keep" intoxicating liquors in a public road in prohibitéd territory, or'to transport such liquor in such territory, is not illegal when not intended for an illegal or unlawful use.
Both counts in the indictment relate to alleged violations of the amended Allison Shipping Law, embodied in chapter 67, Acts 33d Leg. and chapter 31, Acts 35th Leg. 4th Called Session, wherein it is declared unlawful "to have or keep" intoxicating liquors for personal use or otherwise in a public road or other public place in a district in the state in which the local option prohibition law is in force, and also prohibits the transportation of such liquors in such district, each of said provisions containing exceptions, namely, that it is not unlawful "to have or keep" such liquors in the home, nor to personally carry it into such district for personal use..
It affirmatively appears that the offense charged took place in Dallas county in which at the time the sale of intoxicating liquors was prohibited by the adoption of the local option prohibition law by vote of the people in' accord with táe Constitution and Laws of the state. The right and power of the Legislature 'to pass the laws mentioned is challenged. The reason for relator's contention is not made quite clear to the writer. His references to chapter 24, Acts 35th Leg. 4th Called Session, the state-wide prohibition law, occur to the writer as not pertinent, for the reason that the Allison law, supra, was passed at the same session of the Legislature at which the state-wide law was passed, and, the Allison law having special reference to those areas in the state in which the sale of intoxicants was prohibited under the local option law,- its provisions with reference tó the shipment and transportation would prevail in such territory over any provisions in chapter 24, supra, upon the same subject. Such is the effect of the rule that in the construction of acts of the same session of the Legislature the whole must be taken and construed as one act. Cain v. State, 20 Tex. 355; Joliff v. State, 53 Tex. Cr. R. 61, 109 S. W. 176.
In view of the construction given section 20, art. 16, of the Constitution by this court and the Supreme Court in various decisions rendered, we are unable to concur in the suggestion that the limitation upon the legislative power therein contained would have the effect of condemning the law in question. That that section is restrictive of the method of prohibiting sales of such liquors is held in Ex parte Myer. 207 S. W. 100, to which we are referred, but that that restriction is not extended to prevent the Legislature from passing laws in aid of the enforcement of the prohibition against sales, has been so often declared that its reassertion would seem superfluous were it not done in response! to the points urged by fhe learned and able counsel for the relator. The laws in question were, in the opinion of the Legislature, adapted to making the enforcement of the local option prohibition law in districts in which it was in force more effective. With that end ih view the transportation into such territory and the keeping in a public place therein, with the exceptions named, have been denounced as a felony. The principle that would condemn them was involved against the so-called blind tiger law which, to the same end and by similar means, fixed a penalty for the sale of such liquors in prohibited territories by means of a blind tiger, which penalty was in excess of that for making sales under the local option law. The contention was answered by the court in the following terse language by the present presiding judge:
"We think the statute defining and prohibiting the sale of liquor by means of a blind tiger is not violative of a constitutional provision, and it is within the power of the Legislature to prohibit sales of intoxicants in this manner, and prescribe a higher punishment for this character of sale than is provided against other characters of sale." Schwulst v. State, 52 Tex. Cr. R. 427, 108 S. W. 698.
The Supreme Court, in passing upon the power of the Legislature to authorize the use of the writ of injunction by -officials as an auxiliary to the enforcement of the local option law, affirmed the existence of such power. Ex parte Dupree, 101 Tex. 150, 105 S. W. 493. And in Dupree v. State, 102 Tex. 455, 119 S. W. 301, said:
"The proposition that only sales may be prohibited has sometimes been thought to imply the further one that the prohibition can only be enforced by denouncing and punishing as an offense the completed sale. This restricts the power granted within too narrow limits."
• The same -principle was applied in Snearley's Case, 40 Tex. Cr. R. 510, 52 S. W. 547, 53 S. W. 696, in which a license regulation applicable to the sale of intoxicating liquors for the purposes permitted by the local option statute in prohibited territory was upheld ; and in Fitch v. State, 58 Tex. Cr. R. 377, 127 S. W. 1040, the court rejected the contention here made touching the extent of the restriction imposed on the Legislature by section 20, article 16, in giving sanction to the law -which created the offense of pursuing the business of unlawfully selling intoxicating liquors in prohibited territory and fixing a punishment therefor more severe than that imposed under the local option law for making individual sales of such liquors. While at the time they were rendered there was expressed a conflict of views by members of the court in Snearley's Case and in the Fitch Case, these decisions have been uniformly followed (Gearheart v. State, 81 Tex. Cr. R. 540, 197 S. W. 187), and the correctness of the Schwulst Casé, supra, has not been challenged.
We are referred by counsel to Ex parte Hopkins, 75 Tex. Cr. R. 611, 171 S. W. 1163, and to Longmire v. State, 75 Tex. Cr. R. 616, 171 S. W. 1165, Ann. Cas. 1917A, 726. In these cases the original Allison Act (chapter 67, Acts 33(1 Leg.) was construed; arid, while there was lack of harmony among the judges touching its provisions, the conclusion reached by the majority, so far as it bears upon the present question, was that it was within the legislative power to provide that the citizen could not carry intoxicating liquors into districts of the state in which the sale was prohibited, escept for his personal use or for that of members of his family. That the provisions of the law in question, with the limitations named, are not obnoxious to the Constitution of the United States is, we think, demonstrated by the enactment of the so-called Webb-Kenyon Law (Act March 1, 1913, c. 90, 37 Stat. 699 [U. S. Comp. St. § 8739]) by Congress and its enforcement and construction by the United States Supreme Court. An example is found in Clark Distilling Co. v. Western M. & R. Co., 242 U. S. 311, 37 Sup. Ct. 180, 61 L. Ed. 326, L. R. A. 1917B, 1218, Ann. Cas. 1917B, 845. The question arose upon the application of the Webb-Kenyon Law to a statute of West Virginia, which is quite similar to the statute in question, in that it made unlawful the having or keeping of intoxicating liquors in a public place for personal use or otherwise, and also prohibited their transportation. The Supreme Court held that the extreme provisions of the state law in question did not render inoperative, upon shipments of intoxicants to the state of West Virginia, the act of Congress. From the decision we take the following quotation:
"It is only necessary to point out that the considerations which we have stated dispose of all contentions that the Webb-Kenyon Act is repugnant to the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment, since what we have said concerning that clause in the Fourteenth Amendment as applied to state power is decisive.
"Before concluding, we come to consider what wé deem to be arguments of inconvenience which are relied upon, that is, the dread expressed that the power by regulation to allow state prohibitions to attach to the movements of intoxicants lays the basis for subjecting interstate commerce in all articles to state control, and therefore destroys the Constitution. The want of force in tlie suggested inconvenience becomes patent by considering the principle which after all dominates and controls the question here presented; that is, the subject regulated and the extreme power to which that power may be subjected. The fact that regulations of liquor have been upheld in numberless instances which would have been repugnant to the great guaranties of the Constitution but for the enlarged right possessed by government to regulate liquor has never, that we are aware of, been taken as of-fording the basis for the thought that government might exert an enlarged power as to subjects to which under the constitutional guaranties such enlarged power could not be applied. In other words, the exceptional nature of the subject here regulated is that basis upon which the exceptional power exerted must rest and affords no ground for any fear that such power may be constitutionally extended to things which it may not, consistently with the guaranties of the Constitution, embrace."
To the point that the statute in question in the instant case does not deny any right guaranteed by the federal Constitution, we refer to a recent decision of the United States Supreme Court, in which it is said:
"It must now be regarded as settled that, on account of their well-known noxious qualities and the extraordinary evils shown by experience commonly to be consequent upon their use, a state has power absolutely to prohibit manufacture, gift, purchase, sale, or transportation of intoxicating liquors within its borders without violating the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment. Bartemeyer v. Iowa, 18 Wall. 129, 31 L. Ed. 929; Boston Beer Co. v. Massachusetts, 97 U. S. 25, 33, 24 L. Ed. 989, 992; Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U. S. 623, 662, 8 Sup. Ct. 273, 31 L. Ed. 205, 210; Crowley v. Christensen, 137 U. S. 86, 91, 11 Sup. Ct. 13, 34 L. Ed. 620, 623; Purity, Extract & Tonic Co. v. Lynch, 226 U. S. 192, 201, 33 Sup. Ct. 44, 57 L. Ed. 184, 187; Clark Distilling Co. v. Western Maryland R. Co., 242 U. S. 311, 320, 321, 37 Sup. Ct. 180, 61 L. Ed. 326, 335, 336, L. R. A. 1917B, 1218, Ann. Cas. 1917B, 845; Seaboard Air Line R. Co. v. North Carolina, 245 U. S. 298, 38 Sup. Ct. 96, 62 L. Ed. 299.
"As the state has the power above indicated to prohibit, it may adopt such measures as are reasonably appropriate or needful to render exercise of that power effective. Booth v. Illinois, 184 U. S. 425, 22 Sup. Ct. 425, 46 L. Ed. 623; New York ex rel. Silz v. Hesterberg, 211 U. S. 31, 29 Sup. Ct. 10, 53 L. Ed. 75; Murphy v. California, 225 U. S. 623, 32 Sup. Ct. 697, 56 L. Ed. 1229, 41 L. R. A. (N. S.) 153; Rast v. Van Deman & L. Co., 240 U. S. 342, 364, 36 Sup. Ct. 370, 60 L. Ed. 679, 689, L. R. A. 1917A, 421, Ann. Cas. 1917B, 455. And, considering the notorious difficulties always attendant upon efforts to suppress traffic in liquors, we are unable to say that the challenged inhibition of their possession was arbitrary and unreasonable or without proper relation to the legitimate legislative purpose." Crane v. Campbell, 245 U. S. 307, 38 Sup. Ct. 99, 62 L. Ed. 304.
The statute considered was more drastic than that here involved, and in fact was restrictive to a degree which has been held unauthorized under several of the state constitutions. Ex parte Wilson, 6 Okl. Cr. 451, 119 Pac. 596; Commonwealth v. Campbell, 133 Ky. 50, 117 S. W. 383, 24 L. R. A. (N. S.) 172, 19 Ann. Cas. 159; Commonwealth v. Smith, 163 Ky. 227, 173 S. W. 340, L. R. A. 1915D, 172.
We mention the case of Crane v. Campbell for the purpose of illustrating the trend of the decisions of the United States Supreme Court in the interpretation of the federal Constitution, and not as indicating that under the Constitution of this state a law in the terms of the Idaho statute would be valid. That question is not before us. The views we are expressing are limited to the law which we are called upon to construe. Many of the states of the Union, having provisions in their Bill of Rights substantially like ours, have passed laws similar to that in question here; that is, forbidding I the keeping of intoxicating liquors in public places, in localities where the sale of such liquors was prohibited, and limiting the transportation of such liquors into such territory, and in numerous instances the courts have sustained such acts. A notable and recent case is Delaney v. Plunkett, 146 Ga. 547, 91 S. E. 561, L. R. A. 1917D, 926, Ann. Cas. 1917E, 685, in which the Supreme Court of Georgia upheld a statute quite similar to the one in question, and in so doing rendered a decision which in reasoning and citation of precedents is interesting, but too long to quote. Other illustrations will be found in Van Winkle v. State, 4 Boyce (Del.) 578, 91 Atl. 395, Ann. Cas. 1916D, 104; Burt v. State, 14 Ala. App. 125, 72 South. 266; State v. Wignall, 150 Iowa, 650, 128 N. W. 935, 34 L. R. A. (N. S.) 507; Maynes v. State, 6 Okl. Cr. 487, 119 Pac. 644; Atkinson v. So. Ex. Co., 94 S. C. 444, 78 S. E. 516, 48 L. R. A. (N. S.) 349; State v. Seaboard Air Line, 169 N. C. 296, 84 S. E. 283; Glenn v. So. Ex. Co., 170 N. C. 286, 87 S. E. 136, L. R. A. 1918B, 438; Am. Ex. Co. v. Beer, 107 Miss. 528, 65 South. 575, L. R. A. 1918B, 446, Ann. Cas. 1916D, 127; Danciger v. Cooly, 98 Kan. 38, 157 Pac. 455; Commonwealth v. Mixer, 207 Mass. 141, .93 N. E. 249, 31 L. R. A. (N. S.) 467, 20 Ann. Cas. 1152; Adams Ex. Co. v. Commonwealth, 154 Ky. 462, 157 S. W. 908, 48 L. R. A. (N. S.) 342.
Statutes in effect like the one in question have been so generally sustained that in the absence of some provision of our own Constitution, which would render inapplicable the decisions in other jurisdictions, we are not warranted, in the opinion of the writer, in deciding that the Legislature is impotent to pass a valid law, prohibiting the owner of whisky from "having or keeping" it in a public road or place, where its sale is prohibited, or to prohibit his carrying it into such territory except for the use of himself or his family, or for the purposes for which the statute by its terms, permits its transporta-, tion into such territory. Especially is this true in view of the opinion in Longmire v. State, 75 Tex. Cr. R. 616, 171 S. W. 1165, Ann. Cas. 1917A, 726, from which we take the following:
"We hold that the proper construction of this act shows that it was the intention of the Legislature to prohibit, and by its terms they do specifically prohibit, the shipment, transportation, carriage (personal or otherwise), and delivery of intoxicating liquors into prohibition territory for any purpose other than for medicinal, scientific, and sacramental purposes, and the personal use (and members of'his family) of the person receiving same; that a law with such intent and purpose has a place in the system of laws intended to prevent illegal sales of intoxicating liquors in prohibition territory, and that the law as thus construed is valid, and violative of no provision of the Constitution."
The act amending chapter 67, Acts 33d Leg., wás passed at a special session of the Legislature, ánd the süggestion is made that under section 40, art. 3, of the Constitution the amendment was void because not embraced in the subject upon which the Legislature was, under the proclamation and messages of the Governor, permitted to consider. Section 40, art. 3, declares that there shall be no legislation upon' subjects other than those designated in the Governor's proclamation or messages.
In his proclamation calling the special session, the Governor called on the Legislature to pass a law prohibiting the sale of intoxicating liquors within ten miles of any army camp; also to prohibit sale or gift to soldiers throughout the state. Elaborating his objects in subsequent communications, the Governor attached correspondence between himself and the Secretary of War, in which it is made plain that the design was to prevent intoxicants reaching the soldiers who were training at various localities in the state, and the means suggested was to designate zones in which such liquors "shall not be allowed."
We are of the opinion that the Governor, in his proclamation and messages submitted to the Legislature the subject of legislation to restrict the liquor traffic and render such liquor inaccessible to the soldiers. It is not contemplated that the Governor shall state the details of legislation in order to give the Legislature jurisdiction to consider it at a special session. Brown v. State, 32 Tex. Or. R. 132, 22 S. W. 596. He must submit the subjects, but the methods are within the discretion of the Legislature. Long v. State, 58 Tex. Cr. R. 209, 127 S. W. 208, 21 Ann. Cas. 405. It was held that a call "to reduce the taxes, both ad valorem and occupation, as it may be found consistent with the support of efficient state government," embraced the whole subject of taxation, and authorized the levy of taxes on property and occupations not previously taxed. Baldwin v. State, 21 Tex. App. 592, 3 S. W. 109.
The messages, however, having had in contemplation the designation of localities "in which intoxicating liquors shall not be allowed," would seem to embrace the statute in question even under a more narrow construction of the scope of the Governor's messages.
If it were granted, however, that chapter 31, Act 35th Leg., was not valid, it would not follow that the offense charged would not be within the purview of chapter 67, Acts 33d Leg.
One count in tile indictment charged that relator transported whisky into Dallas county for other than sacramental, mechanical, medicinal or scientific purposes. The general purpose and scope of chapter 67, Acts 33d Leg., as it appeared on the statutes before the amendment of 1918 was made, was to prohibit the transportation of intoxicating liquors into parts of the state in which the sale of such liquor was prohibited by law. See Act 33d Leg. 1st Called Session, p. 62, e. 31. Various exceptions were embraced, and we quote section 12 as follows:
"It shall not be necessary in any prosecution under this act to negative the exceptions herein made, but the same shall be available to the defendant as purely defensive matters."
Aside from this clause in the Allison law, under the general rule in habeas corpus cases, the indictment charging that the liquors were unlawfully transported into prohibited territory would sufficiently charge an offense to suffice, on application, for habeas corpus, unless there was no law on which the prosecution could be founded. Ex parte McKay, 199 S. W. 637.
The application is dismissed, and the relator remanded to the custody of the sheriff of Dallas county.
DAVIDSON, P. J., dissents.
(S^jFor other oases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes