Case Name: Canal Insurance Company v. Bush and King, d. b. a. Bush and King Trucking Company
Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Mississippi
Decision Date: 1963-06-03
Citations: 247 Miss. 87
Docket Number: No. 42635
Parties: Canal Insurance Company v. Bush and King, d. b. a. Bush and King Trucking Company
Judges: McGehee, G. J., and Arrington, McElroy, Rodgers and Jones, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Mississippi Reports
Volume: 247
Pages: 87–123

Head Matter:
Canal Insurance Company v. Bush and King, d. b. a. Bush and King Trucking Company
No. 42635
June 3, 1963
154 So. 2d 111
Satterfield, Shell, Williams & Buford, K. Hayes Callicutt, Jackson, for appellant.
0. B. Triplett, Forest; McFarland & McFarland,, Bay Springs, for appellees.

Opinion:
Lee, P. J.
James Bush and Eras King, partners, doing business as Bush and King Trucking Company, by their bill of complaint against Canal Insurance Company, a South Carolina corporation, doing business in this state, and Multiple Peril Underwriters, Inc., a Mississippi corporation, alléged that they obtained, about April 10, 1959, a liability insurance policy on motor vehicles from the defendants, and shortly thereafter and prior to May 14, 1959, the defendants agreed to extend the coverage of bodily injury, property damage, and automobile medical payments to include hired automobiles, the exact premium charge being then undetermined, but to be subsequently made known upon the audit; that the complainants entered upon their contract, and, on November 10, 1959, one of their hired motor vehicles collided with another truck, driven by Joe Smith, Jr. in which vehicle Hugh Hillary Odom was a passenger; that complainants made prompt report thereof to the defendants; that the defendants engaged adjusters who investigated the accident and conducted negotiations toward a compromise, at no time giving the complainants any hint that they were not fully protected under their coverage; and that, after suits were filed on April 29, 1960, and the defendants were requested to defend, they refused to do so. As a result, complainants were required to employ their own attorney at a fee of $1,000 to defend said suits, which said attorney did successfully. The prayer of the bill was that their rights, under the contract should be established and that the defendants should be required to carry out the terms thereof. They also prayed for general relief. At the close of the evidence, they asked to amend their bill so as to extend specific relief to them by a decree in the amount of $1,000 to extinguish their obligation to the attorney whom they had employed, as heretofore stated.
The defendants filed a motion to dismiss, and special and general demurrers, setting up numerous grounds, all of which were overruled. After having obtained leave of the court, they then filed an answer, denying all of the material allegations of the bill and setting up therein certain legal defenses.
It appeared that James Bush and Bras King were partners, doing business under the trade name of Bush & King Trucking Company. They secured a contract job in Hancock County on account of which it was necessary to have protection against accidents. -James Bush testified that he applied verbally to Paul T. Whit-sett Insurance Agency in Jackson for a policy of in surance. One was written, numbered 349250, of date of April 10, 1959, running for a period of twelve months, with Canal Insurance Company and was received by mail from Whitsett, but not until either the last day of April or the first day of May. It was countersigned by Paul Whitsett as Authorized Representative of Multiple-Peril Underwriters, Inc. Five endorsements ' ' Countersigned and issued at Jackson, Miss., this 10th day of April 1959 by W. Gr. Thames, Authorized Agent, Multiple-Peril Underwriters, Inc." were attached to the body of the policy.- Upon an inspection of the policy, Bush noticed that one of the endorsements was a fifty mile limit from the base of operations and another excluded hired car coverage. On May 2, 1959, he wrote Whitsett asking for (1) the correction of an erroneously included vehicle, (2) on account of his office being at Taylorsville and the work in Hancock County, the radius would have to be extended accordingly, and (3) "about the protection we have for the trucks we hire at different times or the comprehensive liability that we had on one of the old policies. Please check this and let me know." After the receipt of this letter, Whitsett talked to Bush over the telephone and agreed to extend the radius of operation and write the hired car insurance. The estimated cost of the premium was agreed upon. He accepted the rate and told Whitsett it was satisfactory. After this agreement that they were covered for hired cars Bush said there was no further agreement. Confirming this telephone conversation and agreement, Bush received a letter from Whitsett, dated May 14, 1959, in which he said: "In quoting to you the rate of $1.50 per $100 for the hired automobile endorsement, I quoted the rate on base limits rather than the increased limits effective in your policy. Because of this error, the premium I gave you is obviously low but in an effort to keep the additional premium as low as possible, I am reporting to the company an estimated hired car cost of some $17,000 rather than the $20,000 yon and I had agreed upon. As stated to yon over the phone, if yonr cost runs above this figure, the adjustment can be made on audit. As soon as we have heard from the company as to the exact premium charge for this amendment, I will let you know. Enclosed herewith is a current statement which does not include the additional premium to be charged on the hired car amendment (Emphasis supplied.) The bill, referred to, was promptly paid. All endorsements came to the partnership from Paul T. Whitsett Insurance Agency and all premiums were paid to him as soon as bills were received. Subsequently the radius of operation was extended to one hundred and fifty miles by endorsement for the life of the policy "Countersigned and issued at Jackson, Miss., this 29th day of July 1959 By W. G. Thames, Authorized Agent, Multiple-Peril Underwriters, Inc."
About November 10, 1959, a truck, owned by Mrs. Fleming, and hired by the partners, was in collision with another vehicle, driven by Joe Smith, Jr., in which Hugh Hillary Odom was a passenger. Bush reported the accident to Whitsett. Without question, adjusters in the employ of Canal Insurance Company began investigating the case. Sometime in December 1959, he received from Canal Insurance Company a hired car endorsement, dated December 10, 1959, to be annexed to the policy, running for the term of the policy. It was not until May 23, 1960, that notice was received from the Insurance Company of denial of liability on its part. After the suits were filed, when the defendants refused to defend the suits, the partners necessarily were required to employ an attorney. They therefore employed Hon. O. B. Triplett, Jr. of Forest, Mississippi, to represent them in the suits for an agreed fee of $1,000. He was successful in having the cases dismissed.
Paul B. Whitsett testified that he operated a business known as Whitsett Insurance Agency in Jackson, Mis sissippi, handling all lines of insurance. James Bush requested insurance to protect the partners on a contract that they had secured in Hancock County. As he did not have a company of his own through which this insurance could be handled, he contacted Multiple Peril Underwriters, Inc. to secure the insurance on an agreed basis that he was to get a ten percent commission. His discussions were largely with W. U. Thames, President of the corporation. Multiple sent the policy of insurance to him for delivery. The coverage was written by Canal Insurance Company. He complied with the instructions, made delivery, sent a bill to Bush & King, and collected the premium later. Immediately after examining the policy, Bush, by letter, raised the question that it did not provide certain needed coverage, namely, at lease a one hundred and fifty mile radius of operation and hired car coverage. Following this conversation, the witness contacted W. G. Thames and told him that Bush had pointed out that the policy had the limited radius of fifty miles, and did not cover hired cars, and that he needed this protection. Thames agreed to extend the radius and gave him the $1.50 per $100 on a basis of $17,000. He then called Bush and told him that the radius would be extended and what the rate would be and Bush said "We will have to have it and we want it." Whitsett then wrote the letter of confirmation of May 14th to Bush, of Bush & King. He did not receive a billing from Multiple-Peril on an invoice to cover a premium of $262.20 on this hired car coverage until December 20, 1959. When he submitted it to Bush & King, the same was promptly paid, as usual. The witness said that the endorsement, in effect, showed that the premium was based on a twelve month estimate; that rates for such insurance are based on the hired car cost, and not merely the time to run; and that the premium of $262.20 could be no part of a multiple, based on time, of a rate of $5.61 per $100 on $17,000, as attempted to be claimed by tbe insurance company. When he was notified about tbe accident, be reported it through Multiple. When be first beard that a question bad arisen as to hired car coverage, be talked to Thames, who appeared to be uncertain. Tbe witness reminded him of their conversation and tbe fact that be first quoted an erroneous premium and subsequently corrected tbe rates and tbe coverage was corrected and supposed to be there. Thames then stated that be recalled tbe situation and be was sure that tbe endorsement bad been forwarded from bis home office and that someone bad evidently slipped up on it. He stated positively that be bad ordered it from tbe home office and that someone there bad slipped up on it. He said that be would attend to it immediately and would issue an endorsement giving tbe hired car coverage. When tbe witness asked if tbe endorsement would be retroactive, Thames replied that it would be because it was supposed to have been there originally, and tbe endorsement would provide coverage for that period of time. He testified that tbe hired car endorsement was to have been issued in May 1959 and that the rate of $1.50 per $100, if found too low, would be revised later. According to their practice, Multiple sent billings for tbe premiums, be made remittances to them and transmitted tbe billing to tbe customer and tbe customer sent tbe check to him, and in turn, be remitted to Multiple, less bis ten percent.
On being recalled for further examination, Whitsett was asked why be signed bis name on tbe original policy above tbe typewritten signature of Multiple Peril Underwriters, Inc., and be replied that, when be wrote bis name, be assumed that, since tbe space bad been left blank, it was tbe intention of Multiple Peril for him to sign bis name as their representative on tbe policy, and that is what be did.
Grayson B. Keaton, an attorney representing Joe Smith, Jr. in his claim against Bnsh & King Trucking Company, testified that an adjusting .agency corresponded with him about the claim and requested certain information which he furnished. Finally, after some negotiations, the Insurance Company denied liability and the adjuster, with whom he had been trying to negotiate a compromise settlement, advised that the defendants were not covered by insurance. The witness knew Hon. O. B. Triplett, Jr. who represented Bush & King in the Smith case and also in the Odom case against the same defendants, and in his opinion, a reasonable fee for services such as were rendered by Mr. Triplett, was $1,500 to $2,000 and that $1,000 would be very reasonable indeed.
William G. Thames testified as a witness for the defendants. He had begun working for Multiple in December 1958 and had continued in their employ until February 1960. He identified the policy which was involved in this controversy. He confirmed Whitsett's statement about how he came to acquire this business. He said, however, that the premium for it was received, he sent it to Canal, and that the Company wrote the policy and sent it to him for delivery; that all of the endorsements, dated April 10, 1959, were attached to the policy at the time of delivery; and that other endorsements, shown as exhibits to the policy, were requested and obtained on the date shown by them. He admitted that Whitsett contacted him in May with reference to the extension of the radius of operation to one hundred and fifty miles and inquired about obtaining an endorsement for hired trucks. He obtained the information as to rates from Canal by telephone and quoted this rate to Thames, but he said that nothing happened until after the accident, and this was the first or second week in December. He said that the rate for such insurance was $5.61 per $100, and no money was tendered for the time intervening between May and December. He said that his company was a mere soliciting agent. While he had a typewritten contract with the company on behalf of Multiple, it was not then in his possession. On cross-examination, he admitted that when Whitsett talked to him about the insurance, the agreement was that Whitsett was to get ten percent of the premium. While he was working with Canal, he collected over $200,000 worth of premiums. The Company supplied him with forms and these were kept in Multiple's office. Then he stated that Canal wrote the policies and endorsements in the home office; but sometime about June 1, 1959, Multiple began doing its own work. While saying in one instance that he collected premiums before he asked the Company to write the policies, he admitted that in some cases the Company allowed him to prepare and send out an endorsement if he had enough money to get the return premium out of it. He admitted that this was an oral application and that Whitsett had told him that the applicants needed the insurance. While maintaining that Canal filled out the policies and sent them to Multiple with the name typewritten at the bottom, he finally equivocated by saying "I don't know whether it was written by them or not. They wrote the policy." He denied that he agreed to see that the endorsement was issued and made retroactive, and replied that "I told him that I would talk to the Company about it to see if they -would. ' ' In other words, the version of this witness was in all substantial particulars in dispute with the statements of Whitsett.
After the defendants rested, Paul Whitsett was recalled in rebuttal and he stated that he had no recollection whatever of Thames having said that he quoted a rate of $5.60 per $100 for the hired car coverage. He reiterated that the partnership did not have the coverage and that they needed it. On the other hand, Thames said that the rate -would be $1.50 per $100 for this cost, and Bush, when he reported to him, said "We will have to have it and we want it." The basic figure given to Bush was $1.50 per $100 with the possibility that the new premium might be hig*her when the exact rate should be obtained.
The motion of Multiple Peril to dismiss as to it was sustained. The chancellor also made a detailed finding of the facts in writing and awarded the relief as prayed for in the bill of complaint. Prom a decree in accordance with the findings, Canal Insurance Company appealed. .
The burden of the argument of the appellant, under its assignments, is that Multiple Peril was a mere soliciting agent, and as such, it could not, by parol endorsement, extend coverage to hired trucks and thereby waive or change the written provisions of the policy; and that the doctrine of waiver and estoppel cannot be used to extend the coverage of an insurance policy or create a prime liability. Counsel cite an abundance of authorities to support the general principles by which they contend that this cause is governed.
On the contrary, the appellees contend that Multiple Peril was a general agent of the appellant, and they cite cases to show the authority and powers of such an agent.
In the early case of Rivara v. Queen's Insurance Co., 62 Miss. 720 (1885), in holding that one of the disputed issues, namely, whether the agent who issued the policy sued on had authority to take risks and issue policies without forwarding applications to his company, the Court announced the following principles: 1 ' The powurs of insurance agents to bind their companies are varied- by the character of the functions they are employed to perform. Their powers in this respect may be limited by the companies, but parties dealing with them as to matters within the real or apparent scope of their agency are not affected by such limitations unless they had notice of the same. An insurance agent clothed with authority to make contracts of insurance or to issue policies stands in the steacl of the company to the assured. His acts and declarations in reference to such business are the acts and declarations of the company. The company is 'bound, not only by notice to such agent, but by anything said or done by him in relation to the contract or risk, either before or after the contract is made", citing authorities. (Emphasis supplied.)
In the case of Liverpool & London & Globe Ins. Company v. Hinton, 116 Miss. 754, 77 So. 652 (1917), the complainant, on January 21, 1913, reminded the insurance agent that his fire policy on the house for $1,500 had expired and he wanted it renewed. The agent assured him that it would be renewed, and later told him that it had been. The house was burned June 18, 1914 —• nearly seventeen months later — and the premium had not been paid, and the policy had not been delivered, although he would have paid for it, if he had been billed. The opinion held that the chancellor was justified, on the conflicting evidence, in believing that the contract of renewal became complete when the agent, who had authority to issue and renew the same, orally agreed to do so, and reaffirmed the principle which was laid down in Rdvara v. Queen's Ins. Co., supra, as set out in the above excerpt from the opinion in that case.
In Liverpool & London & Globe Ins. Company v. Delaney, 190 Miss. 404, 200 So. 440 (1941), á local agent of the appellant, to whom it supplied blank policies to be filled up, countersigned and issued by him, without referring applications to it, had issued to Mrs. Delaney, on a verbal application, the fire policy on which this suit was brought. Mrs. Delaney's husband made the application and told the local agent there was an out standing policy covering the house. This was disputed by the evidence for the insurance company. The opinion said: "If Delaney advised Stewart of the existence of this other insurance policy on the house here insured, which was for the determination of the jury, the stipulation in the policy that it would be void if the house covered by it was or would become covered by another insurance policy was waived, by his issuing the policy notwithstanding stipulations to the contrary therein. This Court has many times held in accord with the weight of authority elsewhere, — that a local agent of an insurmice company who is furnished by it with blanJc policies to be filled, up, countersigned and issued by him has all the powers of a general agent of a company when issuing such policies and may waive any of their provisions. Saucier v. Life & Casualty Ins. Co., 189 Miss. 693, 198 So. 625, relied on by counsel for the appellant, deals, in this connection, only with the effect of Section 5196, Code of 1930, on the authority of special agents of an insurance company, and has no application here." (Emphasis supplied.)
In Buffalo Ins. Co. of New York v. Borden, 211 Miss. 47, 50 So. 2d 895 (1951),' the evidence for the appellee was to the effect that she told the local agent of the appellant, when he solicited her insurance, that she already had with another agency a $1,000 policy, which was just enough to pay her indebtedness to the bank; that after the agent advised her that she did not have enough insurance, she told him that, as soon as she could, she would take out a policy with him; that he said "fine"; that six or eight months later she called the agent on the telephone, told him she was ready for another policy, and ascertained the amount of the premium on $2,000; and that later she sent her father with the premium money to pick up the policy, and he brought it to her. The agent denied the telephone conversation, but did not deny the alleged conversation with her six or eight months before. The alleged conversation between the appellee's father and the agent at the time of the issuance of the policy concerning other insurance was in sharp dispute. In response to the appellant's contention that it was entitled to a peremptory instruction on the ground that the provisions of the policy were violated in that there was other insurance on the house, the Court said: ' ' The evidence in this case shows that Smith, as the general agent for appellant, issued this policy on a verbal application therefor, and under the law he could waive any of the. provisions of the policy. The only question presented here for decision is whether or not the appellee told Smith that she had another policy on her home in the amount of $1,000. We are of the opinion that this presented a question for the jury." The opinion cited Liverpool and London & Globe Ins. Company v. Delaney, supra, and quoted an excerpt from the opinion. The following is a part of that excerpt: "This Court has many times held in accord with the weight of authority elsewhere, — that a local agent of an insurance company who is furnished by it with blank policies to be filled up, countersigned and issued by him has all the powers of a general agent of a company when issuing such policies and may waive any of their provisions."
In Camden Fire Ins. Ass'n v. Koch, 216 Miss. 576, 63 So. 2d 103 (1953), after Koch purchased the property, which was insured, he went to the insurance agent, reported his purchase and asked for a notation of the change in ownership. The agent said that he would attend to it. Later, Koch's representative went to the insurance office and was told that the papers had been sent off. These two witnesses testified accordingly. The insurance agent denied these conversations and said that he had never heard of the change. The opinion stated that recovery would necessarily have to be based on the conversations which appellee claimed that he had with the general agent prior to the loss, as working an estoppel against the appellant to deny that the purchaser of the property was protected at the time of the loss. It cited Liverpool & London & Globe Ins. Company v. Delaney, supra, and Lititz Mutual Ins. Company v. Miller, 210 Miss. 548. 50 So. 2d 221, on that question. The opinion also quoted Sec. 5706, Code of 1942, and explained that it means substantially that the agent of a foreign insurance company, who is the sole medium through whom his principal deals and who has authority to fill out, sign and deliver a policy, has all the powers of a genéral agent of the company while so doing, and may waive any of the policy provisions. While conceding that, under appellant's argument, the statute might not be applicable as between the insurer and insured as to consummated contracts, yet, in the case there under consideration, the appellee was in the status of an original applicant, who was assured that the insurance, which he sought, would protect him, and that there was therefore an agreement between the parties for the existing policies to be changed in order to conform to the change in ownership.
Other authorities of like force and effect might be cited.
The Court must determine, from the authorities, the nature and extent of. Multiple Peril's ag-ency for the appellant.
It must be remembered that (1) Multiple Peril handled a large amount of business for Canal; that Thames admitted that (2) Canal supplied the forms for this business and that they were kept in Multiple's office, "That is true-in this case", although he had earlier claimed that the policy and all of the endorsements had been filled out at the home office of the company; that yet (3) "Sometime after June 1st" they did all of their work and policy writing; that (4) the policy itself was countersigned by Multiple Peril's agent; that (5) the five endorsements, which were attached to the body of the policy, were all "countersigned and issued at Jackson, Miss, this 10th day of April, 1959 by W. Gr. Thames, Authorized Agent, Multiple-Peril Underwriters, Inc."; that (6) the increased radius of operation endorsement, which the agents of Multiple Peril agreed to issue in May 1959 was "Countersigned and issued at Jackson, Miss, this 29th day of July, 1959, by W. Gr. Thames, Authorized Agent, Multiple-Peril Underwriters, Inc."; that (7) several other subsequent endorsements, using like verbiage of issuance, and signed by Multiple Peril by its agent, as above, were attached to this policy; that (8) the application for the insurance was oral; that (9) the agents of Multiple Peril were the only representatives through, whom appellees were required to deal; that (10) the contract of insurance had not been fully consummated at the time when the agents of the insurance company agreed to provide hired car coverage — and when these potent factors are remembered and all of the facts are viewed in the light of the foregoing applicable authorities, it is clear that Multiple Peril Underwriters, Inc. was fully authorized to enter into a valid contract for this coverage.
The validity of oral contracts with an insurance company is challenged. However, as early as 1876, this Court had occasion to pass upon that question. Franklin Fire Ins. Company v. Taylor, 52 Miss. 441, was a suit to compel the delivery of an insurance policy against loss by fire and for the. payment of the amount due, the house having been burned. The evidence was in dispute as to whether the contract for this purpose had been completed before the loss. The chancellor determined the question in behalf of the insured. The opinion said: "It is well settled that a court of equity will compel the issuance and delivery of an insurance policy after a loss, where there has been a valid agreement for one before the loss, and will enforce payment of it, as if made in advance. This will he done where the contract was by parol, and even where the charter of the insurance company requires all policies to be in writing," citing authorities.
Moreover, in Liverpool & London & Globe Ins. Company v. Hinton, 116 Miss. 754, 77 So. 652, the appellee sought to require the insurance company to issue him a policy renewing the contract which he had until January 21, 1913, and that the policy be issued, if necessary, as of that date for the term of three years, and that the insurance company he held liable for the loss under the contract. The decree ordered the issuance of the policy, as prayed for, determined the amount due the complainant under the policy to be $1,200, and credited the insurance company with the premium of $36. That decree was affirmed by this Court. The opinion said "That there can be an oral contract to renew insurance is unquestioned."
In New England Ins. Company v. Cummings, 164 F. Supp. 553 (1958), a Mississippi case, Cummings testified that he telephoned the local general agent of the insurance company and told him he wanted $9,000 insurance on the contents of his restaurant, and that the agent informed him that he would issue a policy. His deposition was also in these words: "Let's put it this way. He told me I was covered for $9,000." The agent's statement was: "I told him I was going to provide him coverage." No policy was actually issued although the agent had signed, but not delivered, a Memorandum of Insurance underneath which was typed "Insurance Binder" for an unspecified amount of insurance in appellant company on a building of Mr. Cummings on Highway 49 W; Yazoo City, Mississippi. No rate was given nor premium paid. The issue was submitted to the jury and it found for the appellee. Under a motion to set aside the verdict and grant a judgment notwithstanding, Judge Mize held that the company was under a valid .agreement and obligated to bear the loss unless it was voided by some subsequent act of the insured. He came to this conclusion for the following reasons: Under Section 5706, Code of 1942, and Camden Fire Ins. Ass'n v. Koch, 216 Miss. 576, 63 So. 2d 103, an agent with the authority to write and deliver policies is a general agent and may waive any provisions of the policy; it was not necessary either that the premium be paid or the policy be actually delivered to the insured before the contract became effective, citing Scottish Union & National Ins. Company v. Warren Gee Lumber Co., 118 Miss. 740, 80 So. 9; and although the so-called binder had not been delivered, this fact did not prevent it from becoming effective, citing Connecticut Fire Ins. Company v. Harrison, 173 Miss. 84, 161 So. 459. However, because of an increase in hazard, as the judge thought, he granted the motion. On appeal to the Circuit Court of Appeals, styled Cummings v. New England Ins. Company, 266 F. 2d 888, that Court concurred with the trial judge, in all of his conclusions, as stated above, and mentioned besides Rivara v. Queen's Ins. Co., 62 Miss. 720. However, the appellate court held that the trial judge was in error in entering judgment for the insurance company notwithstanding the verdict of the jury. It therefore reversed the judgment and remanded the case to the trial court for the entry of the judgment on the verdict of the jury.
Consequently the Court is of the opinion that the oral contract in this case, if made, is enforceable.
The Court is next concerned with the relationship between Whitsett and Multiple Peril.
Multiple Peril Underwriters, Inc. was the authorized agent and representative of Canal Insurance Company. W. G-. Thames was its President. When. Paul Whitsett received Bush and King Trucking Company's request for insurance, and he did not have a suitable line of his own, he engaged Multiple Peril to obtain the insurance with the agreement that he and Multiple Peril would divide the commission accordingly between them. He conducted all negotiations with Bush and was the agent of Multiple Peril, the agent of Canal, the insurer in this transaction. This principle has been fully settled and determined in Bankers Fire & Marine Ins. Company v. Dungan, 240 Miss. 691, 128 So. 2d 544. See the authorities there cited.
In regard to the oral contract, the trier of fact, on the disputed issue, had ample evidence to warrant a finding that such contracts for hired car coverage had been entered into between the appellees and the appellant's agents in May 1959, and that it remained in effect until December 10, 1959, when a written endorsement, embodying the terms of the agreement, except for the effective date, was issued as a part of the policy. This was the situation: Bush orally applied to Whitsett for the insurance because of the hauling contract of the partnership with the Highway Department. Whitsett, not having a suitable line of insurance himself, procured the policy through Multiple Peril. But, as soon as Bush received the policy, he found that it was not what he was trying to buy. With its limited radius of operation, he actually would have no protection whatever in the performance of the contract, and, even though the radius were extended, he would be without hired car coverage. He would have been foolish indeed to purchase such an insurance policy under the circumstances in this case. By letter, he immediately called these matters and an error to Whitsett's attention, and the letter shows that he did not send his check to cover the bill which had been enclosed with the policy. Unknown to Bush, Whitsett and Thames of Multiple Peril, who had become associates in writing this insurance, colloborated about the matter, with the result that Whit-sett 'called Bush over the telephone, told him that the radius would be extended, and that the hired car cov erage would be written. He also advised the approximate cost. Bush in turn told Whitsett that he needed the insurance and would have to have it. Following this conversation, Whitsett sent his letter of confirmation of May 14th, in which he said expressly that, as soon as he received the exact premium from the company for the hired car amendment, he would let Bush know. This, of course, meant so that Biish could pay for it. Besides, Whitsett, in that letter, advised that he was sending a current statement "which does not include the additional premium to be charged on the hired car amendment." Bush evidently felt that his partnership was protected. One of the hired trucks later had a wreck. He reported, in a reasonable time, the facts fully to Whitsett, and the insurance company had the matter elaborately investigated over a long period of time; and it was without any clue whatever to him when the insurance company unexpectedly signified its determination to topple him from his citadel of safety. Sometime in December 1959, the company had sent him an endorsement for hired car coverage, effective from December 10, 1959, for the balance of the twelve-month period. The amount which he paid was $262.20, which, the evidence justified the chancellor in finding, was the cost for such insurance to be effective in May for the balance of the life of the policy. The oral contract was fully established by the evidence of Bush, Whitsett and the several written communications.
On its contention that Multiple Peril had no authority to agree to provide the coverage here in question, the appellant, from the many authorities cited, seems to place great reliance on Mutual Liability Ins. Company of New York v. Hebron, 166 Miss. 145, 146 So. 445; Travelers' Fire Ins. Company v. Price, 169 Miss. 531, 152 So. 889; Aetna Ins. Company v. Singleton, 174 Miss. 556, 164 So. 13; Saucier v. Life and Casualty Insurance of Tennessee, 189 Miss. 693, 198 So. 625; and American National Insurance Company v. Walters, 230 Miss. 616, 93 So. 2d 616. In each of the first four cases, the Court said that the alleged representatives of the companies were mere soliciting agents. In the Walters case, Judge Kyle, writing the opinion for the Court, said that "A general agent ordinarily has authority to waive a ground for avoidance of forfeiture of an insurance policy. But it was not shown that Waller was a general agent of the company. A mere collecting agent has no power to' modify a contract of insurance) or to waive a forfeiture." Besides, the opinion showed that there was no evidence that Waller, the alleged agent, had any authority to issue policies, or make any contract of insurance, or change or modify them, or that there was any such custom.
Neither can the principle, found in such cases as Maryland Casualty Company v. Adams, 159 Miss. 88, 131 So. 544, or Hartford Accident & Indemnity Company v. Lockard, 239 Miss. 644, 124 So. 2d 849, apply. Although in the Adams case, the agent had represented that a policy would be issued to cover the risk as desired, the policy, when issued and accepted, did not do so. There was no complaint about it until four months later, after the accident had occurred; and under such circumstances, coverage could not be extended. In the Lockard case, the situation was very similar, as to representations. But the policy, when issued and delivered, contained an express exclusion against liability on account of the trailer, and nothing had been done about changing this provision after the policy had been delivered and accepted. There could be no extension of coverage by implication.
The opinion will not be prolonged for the purpose of distinguishing each and every case. Factual situations determine the application of general principles; and when those situations differ in material points, obviously the general principles to be applied are different.
From -which it follows that the decree of the trial court must be affirmed.
Affirmed.
McGehee, G. J., and Arrington, McElroy, Rodgers and Jones, JJ., concur.