Case Name: The State of Washington, Respondent, v. Clifton Broadnax, Jr., et al, Defendants, Steven Arthur Thompson, Appellant
Court: Washington Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Washington
Decision Date: 1980-03-31
Citations: 25 Wash. App. 704
Docket Number: No. 7353-2-I
Parties: The State of Washington, Respondent, v. Clifton Broadnax, Jr., et al, Defendants, Steven Arthur Thompson, Appellant.
Judges: 
Reporter: Washington Appellate Reports
Volume: 25
Pages: 704–722

Head Matter:
[No. 7353-2-I.
Division One.
March 31, 1980.]
The State of Washington, Respondent, v. Clifton Broadnax, Jr., et al, Defendants, Steven Arthur Thompson, Appellant.
Rebecca M. Baker, for appellant.
Norm Maleng, Prosecuting Attorney, and J. Robin Hunt, Deputy, for respondent.

Opinion:
Williams, J.
Steven Arthur Thompson was charged and convicted of illegal possession of a narcotic drug, heroin. The question presented is whether the trial court was correct in ruling admissible a balloon of heroin taken from Thompson during a warrant search of a house where he was present.
The facts may be summarized as follows: A magistrate issued a warrant for the search of a Seattle residence upon the basis of an affidavit containing information that within the previous 24 hours narcotics had been offered for sale at the house by a person residing there. Four, police officers conducted the search. One of them, Detective Buckland, was posted to guard the back door while the other three entered through the front door. After they had done so, Buckland went in to find Thompson and another mem each standing with his hands on his head. Buckland asked one of the officers whether Thompson had been searched, was told he had not been, and proceeded to frisk Thompson for weapons. While doing so, he felt a small bulge in Thompson's left shirt pocket. Detective Buckland, an experienced narcotics officer, testified concerning the bulge as follows:
Q And based on your patting or feeling this substance in the pocket did you recognize it at that particular time? A I recognized a feeling in a tactile sense as something that has been very familiar in other instances that I have found. Q Can you describe that. A A small bulge that has a — it gives. Q And what have you known this to be on other occasions? A I have found it on other occasions to be balloons of heroin, or some other substance. Q Now, Detective, you previously mentioned that you checked the belt area and other areas for possible weapons. You also mentioned a wallet. . . . Q You didn't have any belief at all it was a weapon? A No, I didn't believe it was a weapon, that's correct. Q You believed it was a balloon of heroin? A That's what I believed it to be, yes.
Buckland then removed a balloon, later found to contain heroin, from Thompson's pocket.
Thompson contends that the heroin should be suppressed as evidence because the search of his person violated his Fourth Amendment rights. Specifically, he argues that the frisk was not justified under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 88 S. Ct. 1868 (1968) and that, in any event, Detective Buckland exceeded the permissible scope of a Terry frisk in reaching into his pocket to remove the balloon. In that case, the United States Supreme Court said at page 24:
When an officer is justified in believing that the individual whose suspicious behavior he is investigating at close range is armed and presently dangerous to the officer or to others, it would appear to be clearly unreasonable to deny the officer the power to take necessary measures to determine whether the person is in fact carrying a weapon and to neutralize the threat of physical harm.
Under the circumstances, nothing could have been more reasonable than for the officer to conduct a pat-down search for weapons while performing this inherently dangerous court-ordered duty. United States v. Peep, 490 F.2d 903, 905 (8th Cir. 1974); State v. Sloughter, 14 Wn. App. 814, 545 P.2d 32, review denied, 87 Wn.2d 1003 (1976); People V. Finn, 73 Misc. 2d 266, 340 N.Y.S.2d 807, 814-16 (1973).
In the recent case of Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 62 L. Ed. 2d 238, 100 S. Ct. 338 (1979) the frisk for weapons was conducted upon customers in a public tavern at a time when the police were executing a search warrant covering the tavern and its bartender. The warrant had been issued upon the advice of an informant that the bartender, while on duty, was selling packets of heroin. The Supreme Court held that the search of Ybarra, a customer, was not justified because
the agents knew nothing in particular about Ybarra, except that he was present, along with several other customers, in a public tavern at a time when the police had reason to believe that the bartender would have heroin for sale.
Ybarra v. Illinois, supra at 91.
The court in deciding that there was not probable cause to believe that any of the customers would be involved said:
a person's mere propinquity to others independently suspected of criminal activity does not, without more, give rise to probable cause to search that person. Sibron v. New York, 392 U. S. 40, 62-63 [20 L. Ed. 2d 917, 88 S. Ct. 1889 (1968)].
Ybarra v. Illinois, supra at 91.
In this case, Thompson was not searched because of mere propinquity to a bartender in a tavern where he was a customer. Rather, he was one of two adults in a house where narcotics had probably been sold within the preceding 24 hours by a person residing therein. It would be unwise to suggest that the police should ignore the individuals present on the assumption that they were unarmed and uninvolved.
Detective Buckland's subsequent seizure of the balloon from Thompson's shirt pocket was justified because he had recognized the bulge as a balloon containing narcotics. Detective Buckland then had probable cause to arrest and seize the balloon as contraband and as evidence of crime. State v. Hammond, 24 Wn. App. 596, 603 P.2d 377 (1979). As was said in State v. Gluck, 83 Wn.2d 424, 426-27, 518 P.2d 703 (1974):
Probable cause [to arrest] exists where the facts and circumstances within the arresting officer's knowledge and of which he has reasonably trustworthy information are sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in a belief that an offense has been or is being committed.
Probable cause may be based upon knowledge gained through any of the senses. State v. Hammond, supra; State v. Huckaby, 15 Wn. App. 280, 291, 549 P.2d 35, review denied, 87 Wn.2d 1006 (1976); State v. Compton, 13 Wn. App. 863, 538 P.2d 861 (1975). Logically, there is no difference in power of recognition between use of the tactile rather than the visual sense. An object may be perceived by touch equally as well as by sight.
It should be noted that this result squares with the principles of the plain view doctrine. That doctrine has three requirements:
a prior justification for intrusion, an inadvertent discovery of incriminating evidence, and immediate knowledge by police that they have evidence before them.
State v. Murray, 84 Wn.2d 527, 534, 527 P.2d 1303 (1974), quoting State v. Dimmer, 7 Wn. App. 31, 33, 497 P.2d 613 (1972).
Those criteria were met in this case.
Affirmed.
Swanson, J., concurs.