Case Name: STATE of Louisiana v. Chance CEASER
Court: Louisiana Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 2003-10-21
Citations: 859 So. 2d 639
Docket Number: No. 2002-K-3021
Parties: STATE of Louisiana v. Chance CEASER.
Judges: KNOLL, J., dissents and assigns reasons.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 859
Pages: 639–649

Head Matter:
STATE of Louisiana v. Chance CEASER.
No. 2002-K-3021.
Supreme Court of Louisiana.
Oct. 21, 2003.
Rehearing Denied Dee. 12, 2003.
Richard P. Ieyoub, Attorney General, Earl B. Taylor, District Attorney, Alisa A. Gothreaux, Counsel for Applicant.
G. Paul Marx, Lafayette, R. Neal Walker, New Orleans, Counsel for Respondent.

Opinion:
| TRAYLOR, J.
Defendant, Chance Ceaser, was charged by Bill of Information with two counts of battery of a police officer in violation of La.Rev.Stat. 14:34.2(B). The jury returned a guilty verdict on both counts, but found that the second count produced no injury requiring medical attention. The trial court sentenced defendant to two years at hard labor on the first count and gave him a concurrent sentence of six months on the second. The Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, reversed the conviction and ordered the acquittal of the defendant upon a finding that the police had no probable cause to arrest the defendant for resisting an officer and, therefore, the defendant had the right to resist the unlawful arrest. 2002-374 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/2/02), 828 So.2d 680. Upon the state's application, we granted certiorari to review the correctness of that decision. For the reasons that follow, we reverse the court of appeal and reinstate defendant's conviction and sentence.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On April 9, 2001, at approximately 2:30 p.m., the Eunice City Police received a telephone call from the home of Ms. Millie Ceaser, reporting a domestic disturbance involving the homeowner's adult son, Chance. Officer Kevin Noel and Sergeant Baxton Troy Stagg of the Eunice City Police responded to the report and heard defendant arguing with his mother and brother, Shaun, as they approached. Upon arriving at Ms. Ceaser's home, Officer Noel and Sgt. Stagg observed defendant | ¡.arguing with his mother and brother in the kitchen. Ms. Ceaser insisted that the police remove defendant from her home. The officers were familiar with defendant due to a history of disturbances which had caused his mother to request his removal from her home in the past. The officers entered the home and asked defendant to leave peacefully so that he could cool off and avoid an escalation of events. On this occasion, however, defendant refused to leave voluntarily, loudly saying he was not "f — ing leaving."
In an attempt to defuse the situation, Sgt. Stagg took hold of defendant's arm to escort him out of the home. In response, the defendant jerked his arm away from the officer. At this point, the officers informed defendant that he was under arrest and both officers attempted to grab hold of defendant to secure and handcuff him. Defendant began grabbing at various items on Sgt. Stagg's duty belt: pepper spray, handcuffs, radio, and gun. As the struggle progressed, defendant scratched Sgt. Stagg's face with his fingernails, bit him, and grabbed and tore Sgt. Stagg's flashlight from his duty belt and struck Sgt. Stagg on his head, behind the left ear. Sergeant Stagg withdrew and expanded his collapsible baton and struck defendant several times. Sgt. Stagg later testified that the blows, which are intended to temporarily paralyze the thigh muscle of assailants, "didn't have any effect upon him."
Meanwhile, Officer Noel attempted to restrain defendant in what he termed "a violent struggle," only to receive a blow to his own head with the flashlight defendant wielded. Officer Noel sustained a two-inch laceration to the top of his head which required five or six stitches. Defendant retreated to his bedroom and was apprehended outside the home. Thereafter, defendant was charged with two counts of battery of a police officer in violation of La.Rev.Stat. 14:34.2(B).
At trial, Sgt. Stagg testified regarding the procedure the police follow when they receive a complaint of a disturbance at a residence. He stated that two officers will respond to the call to "find out what's going on, just investigate to the best of our ability with the attitudes of the people when we get there. Normally, separate them to try to defuse the situation. It depends on how bad the arguing is or if any batteries may have been committed." Regarding the instant call, Sgt. Stagg testified that the ^defendant was placed under arrest when he refused to be escorted out of the house. Sgt. Stagg stated that after defendant refused to leave the home voluntarily, they attempted to escort him out "by the arm" which is a common procedure.
Officer Noel testified that after Ms. Ceaser asked that defendant be removed from her house, the officers "went to escort him out by his arms and he started struggling" and hit Sgt. Stagg on the left side of his head with a flashlight. Defendant then struck Officer Noel over his head with the flashlight, causing the laceration. Officer Noel stated that the defendant was placed under arrest for resisting the officers and "very violently" refusing to leave the home. Officer Noel testified that the defendant had not struck anyone before he was arrested.
The jury found the defendant guilty on both counts, but determined that only the battery of Officer Noel required medical attention and merited an increased sentence. The trial court accordingly sentenced defendant to two years at hard labor on the first count and gave him a concurrent sentence of six months on the second.
The Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, reversed the conviction and acquitted the defendant upon a finding that the police had no probable cause to arrest the defendant for resisting an officer and, therefore, the defendant had the right to resist the unlawful arrest. 02-374 (La.App. 3 Cir.10/2/02), 828 So.2d 680.
DISCUSSION
In order for the State to obtain a conviction for battery of a police officer, it must prove the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Battery of a police officer has three elements: the intentional use of force upon a police officer, without the consent of the officer, when the offender knows or should reasonably know that the victim is a police officer acting within the performance of his duty. LSA-R.S. 14:34.2. The sufficiency of evidence of the crime is viewed the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); State ex rel. Graffagnino v. King, 436 So.2d 559 (La.1983).
The testimony adduced at trial indicates that the uniformed officers responded to a call to remove defendant from the home and that they instructed the defendant to leave the home in accordance with him mother's wishes. The officers had previously |4removed the defendant from the home for similar disturbances. The jury also heard testimony that defendant was instructed that he was under arrest. Given the circumstances of this case, we find that the jury could have properly found, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, that defendant intentionally used force upon the police officers, without the consent of the officers, when he knew or should reasonably have known that the victim is a police officer acting within the performance of his duty.
Once the elements of La.Rev.Stat. 14:34.2 are satisfied, a defendant can defeat his conviction only by showing that the battery was justified and in defense of an unlawful arrest. Thus, the issue is whether the police had lawful grounds, or probable cause, to arrest the defendant. An individual in Louisiana has a time-honored right to resist an illegal arrest. City of Monroe v. Goldston, 95-0315 (La.9/29/96), 661 So.2d 428; White v. Morris, 345 So.2d 461, 465 (La.1977). However, that right is only available where the arrest is illegal and is tempered by the requirement that in preventing such illegal restraint of his liberty, he may use only "such force as may be necessary." City of Monroe v. Ducas, 203 La. 971, 14 So.2d 781, 784 (1943).
Here, the appellate court incorrectly reasoned that the police had no valid grounds to arrest defendant, which resulted in the further erroneous conclusion that defendant was justified in resisting an unlawful arrest. Nevertheless, the court of appeal considered if "probable cause for arresting him might have been supportable on some other ground." The court of appeal then examined La.Code Crim. Proc. art. 213 and concluded that the officers had "no reason to believe that the defendant had committed an offense, nor did he commit an offense in their presence after they arrived at the house."
The Third Circuit purportedly canvassed the Criminal Code to determine whether the police had probable cause to arrest defendant for any offense, but neglected to properly consider a valid rehearing ar gument made by the state in its prehearing application: that the police had probable cause for the arrest under La. Rev.Stat. 14:63.3(A), which provides the owner of any immovable property with the authority to order anyone from the premises. The court of appeal neglected to address this applicable and determinative statute.
As this court has noted on several occasions, La.Rev.Stat. 14:63.3 prohibits entering or remaining in places or on land after being forbidden to do so, either orally or in writing. State in the Interest of J.A.V., 558 So.2d 214 (La.1990); State v. Johnson, 381 So.2d 498 (La.1980). The statute "requires a reasonably contemporaneous or written request to leave as an indispensable element of the offense." Id. In the instant case, both of these elements are unquestionably satisfied.
Further, the record clearly establishes that both Ms. Ceaser and the police officers made contemporaneous requests, and in fact made several such requests, for the defendant to leave the premises. When the defendant refused to do so, the officers had probable cause to arrest him on the basis of his violation of La.Rev.Stat. 14:63.3(A) and did so by verbally informing him that he was under arrest and attempting to secure him with handcuffs.
We further note that what the officers subjectively believed or testified that they believed when they placed the defendant under arrest is not necessarily relevant to the outcome of this case, as the lone dissenter would have this court find. Both State and Federal Constitutions require that "seizure" of person by law enforcement official be founded upon objective justification; when seizure takes the form of an arrest, the police officer must have probable cause to believe the person arrested has committed an offense. La. Const. Art. 1, § 5; U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 4; La.Code Crim. Proc. art. 213; Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 85 S.Ct. 223, 13 L.Ed.2d 142 (1964); State ex rel. Bailey v. City of West Monroe, 418 So.2d 570 (La.1982); State v. Hathaway, 411 So.2d 1074 (La.1982). As this court has previously explained:
| (¡Probable cause to arrest exists when the facts and circumstances within an officer's knowledge, and of which he has reasonable and trustworthy information, are sufficient to justify a man of average caution in the belief that the accused has committed an offense. Probable cause to arrest is not absolute cause, and to determine its existence, courts must examine facts and circumstances within the arresting officer's knowledge in light of the experience of reasonable people, not legal technicians. (Citations omitted)
State v. Scales, 655 So.2d 1326 (La.1995). Furthermore, probable cause, and not absolute certainty, is the test to be applied in judging the validity of an arrest, and all possible lawful explanations of a situation need not be negated before making an arrest. State v. Winfrey, 359 So.2d 73 (La.1978); State v. Phillips, 347 So.2d 206 (La.1977).
In applying these principles to the case at hand, we find there was probable cause to arrest the defendant. Prior to placing the defendant under arrest, both officers were informed by Ms. Ceaser that she wanted the defendant out of her home because he was causing a disturbance and fighting with Ms. Ceaser and his brother. On several occasions during the instant incident, the defendant did not comply with this mandate and finally refused to leave the home. The fact that the defendant remained on the premises after being ordered to leave and where he was forbidden to remain constituted an offense in progress. See Lewis at 1084. From the totality of these facts and circumstances the officers clearly had probable cause to arrest the defendant for several violations, including La.Rev.Stat. 14:68.3.
The evidence provides that Officer Noel and Sgt. Stagg had responded to previous reports from the home and had successfully defused the situations without any violence or cause for arrest. The officers were, therefore, familiar with the household and the problems caused by defendant within the household. On this occasion, the officers had used entirely reasonable measures involving the minimal force of grasping defendant's arm to escort him outside. The defendant resisted by wrenching his aim from the officer's grasp and announcing his resolve to remain on the premises against the wishes of the homeowner. In the process of attempting to make a lawful arrest by placing defendant in handcuffs to lead him outside, the officers l7sustained the blows inflicted by their own equipment wielded in defendant's hands in an unjustified use of force to resist the lawful arrest. Defendant was thus not justified in his use of violence to oppose the officers' performance of their official duties and the court of appeal erred in concluding otherwise. We further note that even if the arrest were not legal, the amount of force the defendant used exceeded that which was reasonably necessary to prevent the arrest. Therefore, the verdict of the trial court was correct.
CONCLUSION
The Third Circuit erred by reversing defendant's convictions for battery on a police officer. In this domestic dispute, which escalated into violence directed at the police, the police had probable cause to arrest defendant for remaining on the premises after being asked to leave. La. Rev.Stat. 14:63.3. The Third Circuit mistakenly reasoned that defendant was justified in resisting an arrest that was not grounded in probable cause. For the forgoing reasons, we find that the evidence clearly supports that the police officers had lawful grounds upon which to arrest the defendant. The evidence substantiates the defendant's conviction for two counts of battery of a police officer in violation of La.Rev.Stat. 14:34.2. Accordingly, we reinstate the jury's verdict against defendant, as well as the sentence imposed by the trial court.
KNOLL, J., dissents and assigns reasons.
. Defendant signed his name "Chanse Ceaser" on several documents in this record. His surname is also alternatively spelled "Ceasar" in the record.
. While we do not find error in the court of appeal's summary rejection of the applicability of La.Rev.Stat. 14:103, relative to disturbing the peace, to the instant intra-family argument, we do not necessarily agree with remainder of the court's determinations but pretermit discussion of the applicability of the Protection from Family Violence Act, La. Rev.Stat. 46:2140, as we find the state succeeds on other grounds.
. La.Rev.Stat. 14:63.3(A), provides, in pertinent part:
No person shall without authority go into or upon or remain in or upon or attempt to go into or upon or remain in or upon any structure, . or immovable property, which belongs to another . after having been forbidden to do so, either orally or in writing . by any owner, lessee, or custodian of the property or by any other authorized person.