Case Name: In re MARRIAGE OF HOWARD E. JOHNSTON, Plaintiff, and FRANCES JOHNSTON, Defendant-Appellee (Retirement Board of the Firemen's Annuity and Benefit Fund of Chicago, Defendant-Appellant)
Court: Illinois Appellate Court
Jurisdiction: Illinois
Decision Date: 1990-10-10
Citations: 206 Ill. App. 3d 262
Docket Number: No. 1—89—2167
Parties: In re MARRIAGE OF HOWARD E. JOHNSTON, Plaintiff, and FRANCES JOHNSTON, Defendant-Appellee (Retirement Board of the Firemen’s Annuity and Benefit Fund of Chicago, Defendant-Appellant).
Judges: 
Reporter: Illinois Appellate Court Reports, Third Series
Volume: 206
Pages: 262–271

Head Matter:
In re MARRIAGE OF HOWARD E. JOHNSTON, Plaintiff, and FRANCES JOHNSTON, Defendant-Appellee (Retirement Board of the Firemen’s Annuity and Benefit Fund of Chicago, Defendant-Appellant).
First District (3rd Division)
No. 1—89—2167
Opinion filed October 10, 1990.
Rehearing denied December 27, 1990.
Modified opinion filed January 2, 1991.
RIZZI, J., specially concurring.
Fagel, Haber & Maragos, of Chicago (Maynard B. Russell, Alvin D. Meyers, and Steven J. Teplinsky, of counsel), for appellant.
Doss, Puchalski & Keenan, Ltd., of Chicago (Owen L. Doss, Joseph D. Keenan III, and James M. Forkins, of counsel), for appellee Frances Johnston.
Theodore G. Karavidas, of Williston, McGibbon & Kuehn, of Barrington, for appellee Howard E. Johnston.

Opinion:
PRESIDING JUSTICE CERDA
delivered the opinion of the court:
This is an appeal from an order of the circuit court directing the Retirement Board of the Firemen's Annuity and Benefit Fund (Retirement Board), which was made a party to the action for the dissolution of the marriage of Howard and Frances Johnston, to comply with any qualified domestic relations order that might be entered in the future awarding a portion of Howard's pension to Frances for the remainder of her life. Although a motion to dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction was previously denied by this court, we determine today that the appeal must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
In 1987, Howard and Frances each filed petitions for the dissolution of their, marriage which were consolidated by agreed order. Howard was a retired Chicago firefighter who had been receiving annuity payments since January 18, 1986, from the Firemen's Annuity and Benefit Fund pursuant to the Illinois Pension Code (Code) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 108½, par. 6—101 et seq.). On February 23, 1989, Frances filed a petition alleging that Howard's pension benefits were a marital asset and that she and her husband wanted to enter into a property settlement that would include an equal division of the pension benefits "so as to vest in Frances Johnston her share of the husband's pension for her life, notwithstanding Howard E. Johnston's prior demise." Frances further alleged that the Retirement Board had in the past opposed the division of pension benefits in dissolution proceedings, and she prayed for an order directing the Retirement Board to comply with any future qualified domestic relations order awarding "a portion of the pension benefits of Howard E. Johnston to Frances Johnston for her lifetime." The Retirement Board filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings which asserted that the Code did not provide benefits for a fireman's former spouse for the remainder of her life.
After submission of briefs and a hearing, the trial court denied the motion and held that the Code did not bar a qualified domestic relations order awarding a portion of Howard's pension benefits to Frances for her life. The trial court granted Frances' petition and ordered the Retirement Board to "comply with any QDRO order entered by this Court awarding a portion of the pension of HOWARD E. JOHNSTON to FRANCES JOHNSTON for her lifetime."
The law prohibits appeals from nonfinal orders unless specifically authorized by the supreme court rules. (People ex rel. Scott v. Silverstein (1981), 87 Ill. 2d 167, 171, 429 N.E.2d 483.) The Retirement Board's notice of appeal invoked Supreme Court Rule 307(a)(1) (107 Ill. 2d R. 307(a)(1)), which permits a party to appeal as a matter of right from an interlocutory order "granting, modifying, refusing, dissolving, or refusing to dissolve or modify an injunction." However, as a prerequisite to appellate jurisdiction under Supreme Court Rule 307(a)(1), it must first be determined that the interlocutory order appealed from constitutes an injunction or has the "force and effect" of an injunction. (In re A Minor (1989), 127 Ill. 2d 247, 260, 537 N.E.2d 292.) Because we find that the trial court's order cannot be characterized as injunctive, we must dismiss the appeal.
The purpose of Rule 307(a)(1) is to provide for the interlocutory review of a court's exercise of its equitable power to grant injunctive relief and to prevent abuses of the power that could result in irreparable harm. (Bohomolec v. Gieblewicz (1971), 3 Ill. App. 3d 16, 18, 278 N.E.2d 202.) Whether an interlocutory order can be characterized as injunctive must be determined by examining the substance of the order rather than its form. In re A Minor, 127 Ill. 2d at 260.
In the case at hand, the relief granted in the trial court order is not injunctive in nature but, rather, the order is interlocutory because it merely declares the rights and obligations of the parties with respect to Howard's pension benefits. The trial court's order accomplishes nothing more than to command the Retirement Board to do what it would already have to do if the qualified domestic relations order were issued, i.e., to obey the order unless it is overturned or to stand in defiance of the power of the court. (People ex rel. Scott v. Silverstein (1981), 87 Ill. 2d 167, 173-74, 429 N.E.2d 483.) Moreover, the order is not of the kind that could cause irreparable harm to the Retirement Board if an appeal were not taken until the divorce decree were entered. If an immediate appeal would be more helpful in advancing the proceedings below, appellate jurisdiction may be appropriately secured under Supreme Court Rule 308. (107 Ill. 2d R. 308.) Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
Appeal dismissed.
WHITE, J., concurs.