Case Name: The People of the State of New York ex rel. George W. Perkins, Respondent, v. Joseph F. Moss et al., Defendants. The People of the State of New York, Appellant
Court: New York Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1907-02-26
Citations: 187 N.Y. 410
Docket Number: 
Parties: The People of the State of New York ex rel. George W. Perkins, Respondent, v. Joseph F. Moss et al., Defendants. The People of the State of New York, Appellant.
Judges: 
Reporter: New York Reports
Volume: 187
Pages: 410–445

Head Matter:
The People of the State of New York ex rel. George W. Perkins, Respondent, v. Joseph F. Moss et al., Defendants. The People of the State of New York, Appellant.
1. Crimes —One Arrested on a Criminal Charge by Information Entitled to Writ of Habeas Corpus Before Examination — War„rant Is a Nullity in the Absence of Any Evidence to Sustain It. One arrested under a warrant issued by a magistrate charging him witli a crime is not obliged to await an examination, but may at once resort for his protection to the writ of habeas corpus. (Code Civ. Pro. §§ 2015- 2019; Code Grim. Pro. §§ 188-197.) The court upon such a proceeding will look back of the warrant and see if the facts stated in the depositions of the prosecutor and his witnesses conferred jurisdiction upon the magistrate to issue it (Code Crim. Pro. § 149); and unless there is some evidence to sustain it, the warrant is a nullity and the defendant is entitled to his discharge.
2. Evidence — When Dependant’s Declaration as to Intent with Which an Alleged Criminal Act Was Committed Is Conclusive. The adoption, in its entirety, by the district attorney, of a letter written by the defendant, containing an explanation of his acts and affirmatively disclaiming any purpose to violate the law and which was used as proof of the facts upon which the prosecution based an application for a warrant of arrest for grand larceny, must be regarded as the use of a prior declaration made by the defendant, it was equivalent to his examination; and as such declaration affirmatively denied the existence of any criminal intent, and there was no inherent improbability therein and no other evidence from which such intent could be inferred, the magistrate5had no jurisdiction to issue the warrant.
8. Grand Larceny — Appropriation by Director of Corporate Funds for Political Purposes—In Absence of Evidence Establishing Felonious Intent, Magistrate Has No Jurisdiction to Issue Warrant of Arrest. An information upon which a warrant of arrest was issued, charging the defendant with the crime of grand larceny in the first degree, contained in substance the following facts: The president of an insurance company, in whom was vested, and who had for years been exercising, the power to make disbursements of the corporate funds upon his sole authority, had agreed that the insurance company would contribute to the presidential campaign fund of the Republican national committee up to the amount of $50,000, and to protect the company against other demands for political purposes he requested the defendant, one of the company’s trustees, to personally carry out the agreement by advancing the money. The defendant acquiesced in the president’s request, advanced the money and, subsequently, the president brought up the subject of his reimbursement, informally, before a full attendance of the members of the finance committee of the company. The president’s purpose was not that the finance committee should take official action in the matter, but that the trustees should be informed of what he had done, and that he might have their opinions upon the matter. It was the general opinion that the president should cause the relator to be reimbursed for his advances out of the corporate funds; what was brought before this body of the company’s trustees was the claim or right of the defendant to be paid the moneys which he had paid out by the procurement of the president, in order that the latter’s agreement on behalf of , the company might be carried out; the president, exercising the executive power, with which he appears to have been clothed, directed the treasurer nf the company'to draw a check for the amount of the defendant's claim, ■which was made payable and delivered to the firm of which defendant was a member; the day before the issuance of the warrant the defendant, at the request of the district attorney, wrote a letter stating in substance that the moneys alleged to have been feloniously appropriated were received by him in satisfaction of his claim; that he had acted in the honest belief that he was benefiting the company, and had derived no personal advantage; this letter was used by the prosecution as proof of the facts upon which the application for the warrant was based. Held, that the defendant might be regarded as having aided and abetted the act of the president of the corporation in contributing corporate funds for the purposes of a political campaign; that such act, at the time in question, was neither a common-law nor a statutory crime, although it was beyond the purposes of the corporation and was wholly unjustifiable and illegal; that when the defendant took part in the appropriation of the moneys in question, unless he did so animo furandi, with the intent to steal it, he was not properly chargeable with the crime of grand larceny, whatever might be the civil consequences of his act; that the case was not onlyebarren of any other evidence calling- for the exercise of the j udicial judgment of the magistrate as to whether there was probable cause to believe that the crime charged had been committed, but there being no inherent improbability in defendant’s statement that he had acted in the honest belief that he was benefiting- the company, in the absence of any evidence contradicting it, the magistrate had no jurisdiction to issue the w-arrant.
People ex rel. Perkins v. Moss, 118 App. Div. 829, affirmed.
(Argued December 10, 1906;
decided February 26, 1907.)
Appeal from an order of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the first judicial department, entered May-25, 1906, winch reversed an order of Special Term dismissing a writ of habeas corpus and directed the discharge of the relator from custody.
Upon a warrant issued by a city magistrate of the city of Hew York, charging him with the crime of grand larceny in the first degree, the relator was arrested by, and taken into the custody of, a police officer. Thereafter, upon a petition to the Supreme Court, setting forth his arrest and averring that the warrant was unlawfully issued and that the petitioner was illegally restrained by virtue thereof, writs of habeas corpus and of certiorari were issued directed to the defendants the police officer and the city magistrate, and commanding the production of the relator and the certification of the cause of his imprisonment. Thereupon, the relator was brought. before a Special Term of the Supreme Court and, upon the return made by the city magistrate to the writ of certiorari and after a hearing had, the writ of habeas corpus was dismissed and the relator was remanded into custody. Upon appeal to the Appellate Division, in the first department, this order was reversed and the discharge of the relator was ordered. The People then appealed to this court.
The information, upon which the warrant of arrest was issued, charging the relator with the crime of grand larceny in the first degree, was contained in certain depositions taken before the magistrate. .One deposition was by Darwin P. Kingsley, a vice-president of the New York Life Insurance Company, which stated that, in December, 1904, when he was secretary of the finance committee of that company, a meeting was had of all of the members of the committee, including McCall, since deceased, who, as president of the company, was ex officio a member. It was stated by the president that, on behalf of the insurance company, he had promised to pay to Cornelius Bliss, as treasurer of the Republican national committee, for use in the presidential campaign of that year, such sums as should not exceed $50,000, and that Perkins, this relator, then a vice-president of the company, at his, the president’s, request and to carry out the agreement with Bliss, had advanced to the latter large sums of money. McCall did not ask the committee to take any official action upon this statement, but desired to inform it of the facts. Conversation was had in regard to the matter and no official action was taken by the committee; but “it was the expressed opinion of those present that McCall should cause Perkins to be reimbursed, for the sums so advanced, out of the funds of the company.” It was stated, also, in the deposition that McCall, “ by virtue of his office, had power to make disbursements, known as disbursements upon executive order.”
Another deposition was by Edmund D. Randolph, a trastee and the treasurer of the insurance company, who was present at the meeting of the finance committee referred to in the deposition of Kingsley, which corroborated Kingsley’s statements as to what liad taken place. Randolph stated that some time after the meeting in December, 1904, he drew a check to reimburse Perkins, the relator, for the moneys he had advanced to Bliss; that the payment was made by the treasurer’s check to the order , of J. P. Morgan & Co, a firm of which Perkins was a member; that this check was drawn by him pursuant to the direction of McCall the president; that, “at that time, large powers were vested in McCall as president to order disbursements to be made from the funds of the company without first submitting for approval to any committee;” that that power had been exercised “upon his sole personal authority ” for many years without having been challenged and that Perkins had had nothing to do with the transaction of the drawing of the check, or of the book entries.
The deposition was taken of Thomas A. Buckner, a vice-president of the company, who identified a letter written by the relator to the district attorney the day before the issuance of the warrant of arrest. The relator’s letter was written in response to the request of the district attorney for a statement of? the former’s connection with the contribution made by the insurance company to the Republican national committee, in 1904. From this letter it appears that Bliss, the treasurer of that committee, had informed the relator of the promise of McCall, the president of the company, that the company would contribute up to the sum of $50,000 towards the campaign; that McCall, upon inquiry, corroborated Bliss’ statement and explained that, as demands had been made upon him for other political contributions by the company, which did not seem to him to be for its interest to make, “ it would make it easier- for him to refuse such demands, if the payment to the Republican Committee was not at that time made directly from the funds of the com.pany; ” that he asked relator to see Bliss and to make the payments personally and that he, McCall, “ would see that the matter was taken care of later on ; ” that, accordingly, the relator advanced to Bliss, from his own resources, various sums amounting to $48,500 ; that in December, 1904, upon the subject of his reimbursement coming up between himself and the president, it was concluded to take the matter up with the members of the finance committee and later, at a meeting of the committee, after McCall had explained, that, at his request, the relator had made the above adirances and that provision should be made for reimbursement, “the conclusion was reached that the President should caúseme to be reimbursed” and that a check to the order of the relator’s firm of J. P. Morgan & Co. was afterwards drawn and delivered by the treasurer of the company. The letter concludes with this clause: “ It never occurred to me that there could be any question as to the propriety of such expenditure, which I believed to be for the benefit of the Company. It has come to me as a total surprise that the legality of such payments should he questioned. While so asserting, it is not my intention to dispute or deny civil liability to account to the Company for these moneys. * * * I derived no personal advantage of any kind from the transaction ; and certainly I had no intent other than to serve the interests of the Company.” The district attorney was authorized to make any use of the statements in the letter and the relator waived any privilege, or immunity, in connection with it.
William Travers Jerome, District Attorney (Wallace Macfarlane and Edward B. Whitney of counsel), for appellant.
If there is any evidence in support of a magistrate’s decision, it cannot be reviewed upon habeas corpus. (Code Crim. Pro. § 150; Burr Case, 25 Fed. Cas. 12; U. S. v. Hughes, 70 Fed. Rep. 972; Horner v. U. S., 143 U. S. 570; Kranskopff v. Tallman, 35 App. Div. 273; Swart v. Rickard, 148 N. Y. 264; Matter of Henry, 13 Misc. Rep. 734; People ex rel, Bungart v. Wells, 57 App. Div. 140; People ex rel. Farley v. Crane, 94 App. Div. 397; Matter of McFarland, 59 Hun, 304; People ex rel. Tweed v. Liscomb, 60 N. Y. 559; People ex rel. Danziger v. P. E. House of Mercy, 128 N. Y. 180.) Pevlcins was an accessory before the fact, and, therefore, a principal under section 29 of the Penal Code. (U. S. v. Gooding, 12 Wheat. 460.) There was sufficient evidence before the magistrate to warrant his inferring that the payment was known or feared to be wrong, both by Perkins and by the treasurer. (People v. Flack, 125 N. Y. 324.) A corporate officer paying out funds of the corporation without consideration moving to it, and without authority of its members or directors, for a purpose foreign to its business (if not also against public policy) and known or feared by him to be wrong, although payments for that specific purpose have not been specifically covered by any provision of the Penal Code, nevertheless commits the crime of larceny. (McKenna v. People, 81 N. Y. 360; People v. Flack, 125 N. Y. 324; U. S. v. Taintor, 28 Fed. Cas. 7; Bissell v. M. S. R. R. Co., 22 N Y. 269; Rex v. Cabbage, R. & R. 292; Rex v. Morfit, R. & R. 307; Regina v. White, 9 C. & P. 344; People v. Woodward, 31 Hun, 57; People v. Sherman, 133 N. Y. 349; People v. Dimick, 107 N. Y. 13.)
Williann N. Cohen, Lewis L. Delafield and Howard S. Gans for respondent.
That the money was paid openly and under a claim of right suffices to defeat the charge of embezzlement ; this would be true even though it should be established that the claim was ill-founded. (1 Bishop on Crim. Law, 297, subds. 1, 2; 1 Whart. on Crim. Law, § 230; 2 Russell on Crimes, 163; Rex v. Hall, 3 C. & P. 409; Regina v. Creed, 1 C. & K 63; Regina v. Norman, 1 C. & M. 501; McCourt v. People, 64 N. Y. 583; People v. Burton, 1 N. Y. Cr. Rep. 297; People v. Grim, 3 N. Y. Cr. Rep. 317; People v. Ouley, 7 N. Y. S. R. 794; Devine v. People, 20 Hun, 98; Abrams v. People, 6 Hun, 491.) The relator having paid out his own money to redeem the promise of the president of the Hew York Life Insurance Company made for the corporation, and having accepted repayment of the funds thus disbursed, there is no evidence of an appropriation of funds to a use other than that of the corporation, and the writ should he sustained by reason of the absence of that element of the crime. (Penal Code, § 528, subd. 2; Koehler v. Reinheimer, 26 App. Div. 5; Leslie v. Lorillard, 110 N. Y. 519; Flynn v. B. C. R. R. Co., 158 N. Y. 493.) There is no evidence that the subscription was ultra vires y but even if it be assumed that it was beyond the corporate powers that circumstance tends neither to an inference that it was not to the corporate use nor to an inference of criminality. (Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168; Hooper v. Cal., 155 U. S. 648; N. Y. L. Ins. Co. v. Cravens, 178 U. S. 389; Nutting v. Mass., 183 U. S. 553; Ingraham, v. Reform, Club, 12 Phil. 264; Hollis v. D. T. Sem., 95 N. Y. 166; People v. Hawkins, 157 N. Y. 1; Matter of Lampson, 161 N. Y. 511; Morawetz on Corp. § 556; Holmes v. Willard, 125 N. Y. 75; Robertson v. Bullions, 9 Barb. 64, 132.) Even if it be assumed that the subscription was an ultra vires act, there is no evidence that the relator had any reason to believe it to be such, and therefore no inference of wrongful intent, or of any criminal intent is to be drawn from the ultra vires act. (Moss v. Cohen, 158 N. Y. 240: Myers v. State, 1 Conn. 502; State v. Nussenholtz, 76 Conn. 93; Goodspeed v. I. St. Ry. Co., 184 N. Y. 351; Knowles v. City of New York, 176 N. Y. 430; Cutter v. State, 36 N. J. L. 125; Oberlander v. Spiess, 45 N. Y. 175; Meyer v. Amidon, 45 N. Y. 169; Taylor v. Com. Bank, 174 N. Y. 181; Rudd v. Robinson, 126 N. Y. 113.) Criminal intent is a fact that must be found before the relator can be held. There is not sufficient evidence in the record upon which the finding can be based, and hence no crime is made out. (People v. Wiman, 148 N. Y. 29; Stokes v. People, 53 N. Y. 164; People v. Powell, 63 N. Y. 88; People v. Plath, 100 N. Y. 592; People v. Flack, 125 N. Y. 324; Hewitt v. Newburger, 141 N. Y. 538; McCourt v. People, 64 N. Y. 583; People v. Baker, 96 N. Y. 341; People v. Burton, 1 N. Y. Cr. Rep. 297; People v. Grimm, 3 N. Y. Cr. Rep. 317.)

Opinion:
Gray, J.
If the information, which was laid before the magistrate furnished no legal evidence of the commission of a crime by the relator, then, he was illegally restrained of his liberty. If the facts shown did not warrant an inference by the magistrate of the existence of probable cause' to believe that the crime charged had been committed, he was without jurisdiction to cause the arrest of the relator and the latter was entitled to resort at once for his protection to the writ of habeas corpus. Section 2015 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that " a person imprisoned or restrained in his liberty, within the State, for any cause, or upon any pretence, is entitled, to a writ of habeas corpus, or a writ of certiorari, as prescribed in this article, for the purpose of inquiring into the cause of the imprisonment or restraint, and, in a case prescribed bylaw, of delivering him therefrom." The petitioner is only required to state, among other things, that he "is imprisoned, or restrained in his liberty; the place where, and the officer or person by whom, he is so imprisoned or restrained." (Sec. 2019, Code Civ. Proc.) The arrest of the relator was an actual restraint of his person, and he was not obliged to await an examination before the magistrate. The provision of the statute, in that respect, was for his benefit; in order that he might be informed of the charge and that he might have the opportunity to examine the witnesses and to make any statement in relation to the charge. (See Code Grim. Proc. secs. 188 to 197.) Tie could waive these proceedings, however, and, immediately, sue out the writs that the legality of his detention under arrest might be inquired into. The statute, which confers the right to the writ of habeas corpus, has always been construed in favor of the liberty of the citizen. The protection afforded by it against arbitrary and illegal arrest is within the guaranties of our Constitution, and the statutes of the state have always been intended to increase the facilities for the issuance of this great and valuable common-law writ and to insure the prompt hearing and disposition of the petitioner's case.
If the. magistrate issued the warrant of arrest without suffi cient evidence in the particular case, the process is a nullity. The question, always, must be whether the magistrate acquired jurisdiction to cause an arrest of the person and the court, upon the habeas corpus proceeding, will look back of his warrant and see if the facts stated in the depositions of the prosecutor and his witnesses support his warrant. (Code Crim. Proc. sec. 149; Church Hab. Corp. sec. 236.) If they did not furnish reasonable and just ground for a conclusion that the crime charged had been committed and that the defendant committed it, then jurisdiction was lacking to hold the prisoner in custody for any time. (Code Crim. Proc. sec. 150.)
The relator had the absolute right to question, in this way, the sufficiency of the facts laid before the magistrate to constitute the crime of larceny. That crime is defined in section 528 of the Penal Code; which reads, so far as material, as follows: " A person who, with the intent to deprive or defraud the true owner of his property, or of the use and benefit thereof, or to appropriate the same to the use of the taker, or of any other person, having in his possession, custody, or control, as a bailee, servant, attorney, agent, clerk, trustee, or officer of any person, association or corporation, -x- ->:• * any money) property, evidence of debt or contract, article of value of any nature, or thing in action or possession, appropriates the same to his own use, or that of any other person other - than the true owner or person entitled to the benefit thereof, steals such property, and is guilty of larceny."
It is apparent that what constitutes the crime of talcing the property of another for the use of the taker, or of that of any other person than the legal owner, is the intention with which the act is committed. Under the statute, the crime of larceny no longer necessitates a trespass; but it does need, as an essential element that the "intent to deprive or defraud" the owner of his property, or of its use, shall exist. The intent, by necessary implication, as from its place in the penal statute, must be felonious; that is to say, an intent without an honest claim of right. It is not now essential, as it was under the Roman and early English law, that the intention of the taker shall be to reap any advantage from the talcing. The statute makes the crime to consist in the intent to despoil the owner of his property. That is necessary to complete the offense and if a man, under the honest impression that he has a right to the property, takes it, it is not larceny, if there be a color-able title. (See Code Crim. Proc. sec. 548; People v. Grim, 3 N. Y. Cr. Rep. 317; Bishop's Crim. Law, secs. 297, 851; Wharton's Grim. Law, secs. 883, 884.) The charge of stealing property is only substantiated by establishing the felonious intent. Without it there is no crime; for it would be a bare trespass. It is the criminal mind and purpose going with the act, which distinguish the criminal trespass from a mere civil injury. (1 Hale's P. C. 509; McCourt v. People, 64 N. Y. 583.) Doubtless, if the particular act was specified in the penal statute, an honest belief that it was right, while it would purge the act from immorality, would not relieve it from indictability. But when there is no statute on the subject and the act is not one which concerns the state directly, because affecting the jieace, order, comfort, or health, of the community, then the wrong done is private in its character and must be redressed by private suit. The act of the president of the insurance company, which the relator may be regarded as abetting, (Sec. 29, Penal Code), that-is the contribution of corporate funds for the purposes of a political campaign, was not malum prohibitum, or a prohibited wrong; for it was not until two years later that it was made a misdemeanor by the law of 1906. (L. 1906, ch. 239.) The legislature may make that criminal, which was not so before; but we may not reason back of the enactment and predicate crime of an act, which was lacking in criminal intent. It is of the very nature of crime that the criminal act shall involve the violation of a public law, or a wrong, which, because grossly immoral and vicious, affects the public injuriously.
If we turn then to a consideration of the facts, upon which the magistrate ordered the relator to be arrested, it is impossible, reasonably speaking, to find that criminal element which the statute makes a necessary one, the intent of the accused to steal.
When summed up, the evidence amounts to this: that the president of the company, in whom was vested, and who had for years been exercising, the power to make disbursements of the corporate funds upon his sole authority, had agreed that the insurance company would contribute to the presidential campaign fund of the Republican national committee up to the amount of $50,000 and that, to protect the company against other demands for political purposes, he requested the relator, one of the company's trustees, to personally carry out the agreement, by advancing the moneys. The relator acquiesced in the president's request, advanced the money and, subsequently, the president brought up the subject of his reimbursement, informally, before a full attendance of the members of the finance committee of the company. The president's purpose was not that the finance committee should take official action in the matter; but that the trustees should be informed of what he had done and that he might have their opinions upon the matter. It was the general opinion that the president should cause the relator to be reimbursed for his advances out of the corporate funds. The facts stated by the witnesses showed that what was brought before this body of the company's trustees was the claim, or right, of Mr: Perkins to be repaid the moneys which he had paid out by the procurement of the president, in order that the latter's agreement on behalf of the company might be carried out, and that the president, exercising the executive power, with which he appears to have been clothed, directed the treasurer of the company to draw the cheek for the amount of the relator's claim. Furthermore, the prosecution in making use before the magistrate of the relator's letter to the district attorney, as an admission of the facts of the transaction complained of, not only made the fact clear that the moneys were paid out to satisfy the relator's claim, but, also, caused it to appear, affirmatively, that the relator had acted in the honest belief that he was benefiting the company and had derived no personal advantage. The 'magistrate was not bound to accept the letter as establishing the innocence of the accused; but, as a part of the evidence used to make out the charge, he had his statements explaining the transaction and stating his honest motives. It was equivalent to his examination.
It is, unquestionably, true that the purpose, for which the moneys of the company were promised, was foreign to the chartered qmrposes of the corporation; but that fact does not make the payment a criminal act. The act not being malum prohibitum, nor malum in se, the innocent motive of indirectly promoting the corporate affairs, through the supposed advantage of the continuance in power of the Republican administration, purged the act of immorality and it lacked the criminal intent. The company had not the right, under the law of its existence to agree to make contributions for political campaigns, any more than to agree to do other things foreign to its charter; but it had capacity to make agreements, if not prohibited, or inherently wicked. Its act would affect the interests of those concerned with the conduct of the corporate business and effect a private wrong ; but it would not be a public offense, or illegal, in the sense of violating any public interest. (Bissell v. M. S. & N. I. R. R. Co., 22 N. Y. 258; Holmes v. Willard, 125 ib. 75; Moss v. Cohen, 158 ib. 240.) If making the agreement to contribute from the corporate funds was an illegal.act, it was because of the limitations upon the corporate powers and not because of considerations of the disadvantage to the company of the act. There are á great many things, which those intrusted with the management of corporate properties are known to do and which they ought not to do, whatever their good motives, not because some statute forbids, but because they are not within the scope of the chartered powers. Their own sense of rectitude and of what is due to those who trust them should admonish them of the wrongful nature of their conduct. It has been well observed that the ultimate welfare of the citizen demands that he shall conform his conduct to the moral law and it concerns him that every one else should conform to it. A moral obligation should be none the less authoritative in the conduct of life that it is binding, only, upon the conscience of the person as a duty and is imperfect in law from the absence of legal sanction. Courts, however, may not sit to judge the conduct of a defendant by any moral code, or rules of ethics. Their sphere is to ascertain if the facts shown establish the crime charged against him. In the facts stated in these depositions I find none, upon which criminality can be predicated. The essential element of the " intent to deprive and defraud " is nowhere to be found and there is no just basis for the inference. There was no concealment about the transaction and knowledge of it was conveyed to the other trustees. That the relator may have made a mistake of law, which will not relieve him from liability in a civil action, may be true, and he expressly disclaimed in his letter any intention to dispute such a liability; but this was a case where the intent, or good faith, was in issue and then knowledge of the law is immaterial. (Knowles v. City of N. Y., 176 N. Y. at p. 439; Goodspeed v. Ithaca St. Ry. Co., 184 ib. at p. 354.) The relator came to the aid of the president of the company, who, as such, had agreed to contribute moneys to the campaign fund, and advanced the moneys, temporarily. Having, done so, for no other reason than for the supposed advantage of the company, his claim to be reimbursed from the treasury of the company is openly presented and it is paid. But .within the spirit, if not the letter, of section 548 of the Penal Code, 'that was not larceny. The section provides that " upon an indictment for larceny it is a sufficient defense that the property was appropriated openly and avowedly, under a claim of title preferred in good faith, even though such claim is untenable." This section is an expression of the emphasis which the statute lays upon the intent with which the property of another is taken. It is a qualification of the provisions of section 528 of the Penal Code, defining what shall constitute the crime of larceny. It is of considerable significance, as illustrating the legislative understanding, that when, in 1906, the legislature dealt with the question, specifically, the offense was declared to be a misdemeanor, not a larceny.
The question in this case was whether the facts evidenced the commission of a crime and that was a question of law, which went to the jurisdiction of the magistrate. They showed that the design to injure, the motive to despoil the company, the wrongful purpose were, all, lacking in the information, which was laid before the magistrate and upon which the warrant issued. This being so, the act of the magistrate was wholly without jurisdiction and the warrant and all proceedings under it were absolutely void. (Hewitt v. Newburger, 141 N. Y. 538, 543.)
For these reasons, I advise the affirmance of the order appealed from.