Case Name: E. Janette Louthood v. Town of Cambridge
Court: Vermont Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Vermont
Decision Date: 1921-11-01
Citations: 95 Vt. 425
Docket Number: 
Parties: E. Janette Louthood v. Town of Cambridge.
Judges: Present: Watson, C. J., Powers, Taylor, Miles, ancl Slack, JJ.
Reporter: Vermont Reports
Volume: 95
Pages: 425–430

Head Matter:
E. Janette Louthood v. Town of Cambridge.
February Term, 1921.
Present: Watson, C. J., Powers, Taylor, Miles, ancl Slack, JJ.
Opinion filed November 1, 1921.
Highways — Notice to Selectmen of Injuries Not Stating Year Insufficient — Complaint Need Not Allege Notice to Selectmen — Unnecessary Allegation Not Surplusage When It Shows That Plaintiff Has No Cause of Action.
1. A notice to the selectmen of a town of injuries caused by an allege! defective bridge, which was dated July 3, 1919, and stated tha the injuries were received on Sunday, June 15th, without stating the year, was insufficient to comply with the requirement of G. L. 4617, that the time he stated.
2. A complaint against a town for injuries caused by an alleged). defective bridge need not allege the giving of notice of such injuries to the selectmen.
3. The allegation of such a notice in the complaint cannot be rejected as surplusage, where the notice as alleged was so defective that the plaintiff had no cause of action.
Action op Tort to recover for injuries received 'through the alleged insufficiency of a bridge. Heard on defendant’s demurrer to plaintiff’s complaint at the September Term, 1920, Orleans County, Fish, J., presiding. Judgment overruling the demurrer and adjudging the complaint to be sufficient. The defendant excepted. The opinion states the case.
F. G. Fleettuood for the defendant.
J. W. Redmond for the plaintiff.

Opinion:
Watson, C. J.
The plaintiff seeks to recover for alleged injuries caused by the insufficiency or want of repair of a bridge which the defendant town is liable to keep in repair. The amended complaint is challenged by demurrer, specifying as the reason that the notice given to the selectmen of the town, as set forth in the complaint, does not state the time of the occurrence of such injuries. The demurrer was overruled and the complaint adjudged sufficient. To this ruling an exception was allowed, and the cause passed to this Court before final judgment.
The complaint alleges that on July 3, 1919, the plaintiff caused to be delivered to the selectmen of defendant town, a notice in writing, signed by her, in the words and figures following, and that no other notice was ever delivered to said selectmen or either of them. The notice, then set forth in full, dated July 3, 1919, states the time when the injuries were received, as ' ' at about ten o 'clock on Sunday night, June 15th ' ' — no year being stated.
Plaintiff argues, in effect, that since the notice is dated July 3, 1919, one would understand the phrase therein, "at about ten o'clock on Sunday night, June 15th," to mean June 15, 1919, for one ' ' would have to go back six years to find another June 15th on Sunday"; and consequently that the notice is sufficient. But selectmen to whom a notice of this character is given, are not supposed to enter upon such calendarial reckoning to ascertain the time the injury was received, — the statute requires the time to be stated in the notice (G. L. 4617), and if not so stated it cannot be otherwise supplied. Underhill v. Washington, 46 Vt. 767. There was no reason why the year could not be specifically stated, and without it the notice showed no definite time of the occurrence. In this respect the notice in question is not materially different from the one involved in White v. Stowe, 54 Vt. 510, which for this reason (as well as others) was held to be insufficient. The only difference between the two, in stating the time the injury was received, is that the notice in the instant case states the day of the week, while that in the other ease mentioned did not; but this difference has no reference to the year. We see no reason for departing from the holding there had.
• [2, 3] Allegations of the notice given were unnecessary to the complaint (Kent v. Lincoln, 32 Vt. 591; Herrick v. Holland, 83 Vt. 502, 77 Atl. 6); yet, since such allegations, though surplusage, show the notice to have been so defective that the plaintiff had no cause of action, the complaint is bad on demurrer. Com. Dig. Pleader, c. 29. Mr. Tidd, speaking of the rules of pleading governing the statement of the cause of action, says ' ' surplusage will not vitiate, except where it defeats the action. ' 1 Tidd's Pr. *451. And Mr. Chitty says: "It is a material part of the rule respecting surplus allegations, that if the party introducing them show, on the face of his own pleading, that he has no cause of action, his pleading will be defective." 1 Chit. PI. *231. In such case "the superfluous matter cannot be rejected as immaterial; since it shows that the pleader has, according to his own statement, no cause of action, or no defence." Gould's Pl. Ch. Ill, § 171.
Since the failure to give a notice answering the requirements of the statute, is fatal to the plaintiff's right of recovery, final judgment wall follow.
Judgment reversed, demurrer sustained, complaint adjudged insufficient, and judgment for defendant to recover its costs.