Case Name: Roosevelt THOMAS, As Next Friend and on Behalf of All Wrongful Death Beneficiaries of Ada Mae Thomas, Deceased, Appellant v. GREENWOOD LEFLORE HOSPITAL and William B. Harper, D.O., Appellees
Court: Mississippi Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Mississippi
Decision Date: 2007-12-11
Citations: 970 So. 2d 273
Docket Number: No. 2006-CA-00377-COA
Parties: Roosevelt THOMAS, As Next Friend and on Behalf of All Wrongful Death Beneficiaries of Ada Mae Thomas, Deceased, Appellant v. GREENWOOD LEFLORE HOSPITAL and William B. Harper, D.O., Appellees.
Judges: LEE AND MYERS, P.JJ., CHANDLER, GRIFFIS, ISHEE, ROBERTS AND CARLTON, JJ., CONCUR. IRVING, J., DISSENTS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION. BARNES, J., NOT PARTICIPATING.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 970
Pages: 273–284

Head Matter:
Roosevelt THOMAS, As Next Friend and on Behalf of All Wrongful Death Beneficiaries of Ada Mae Thomas, Deceased, Appellant v. GREENWOOD LEFLORE HOSPITAL and William B. Harper, D.O., Appellees.
No. 2006-CA-00377-COA.
Court of Appeals of Mississippi.
Dec. 11, 2007.
Dennis C. Sweet, III, Jackson, Warren Louis Martin, Jr., attorneys for appellant.
Gaye Nell Currie, L. Carl Hagwood, Jackson, Jason E. Dare, Greenville, attorneys for appellees.

Opinion:
KING, C.J.,
for the Court.
¶ 1. Roosevelt Thomas, as next friend and on behalf of the wrongful death beneficiaries of Ada Mae Thomas, deceased, appeals the trial court's order granting summary judgment to Greenwood Leflore Hospital and William B. Harper, D.O. He alleges that there were genuine issues of material fact before the trial court that should have precluded summary judgment. We find no error and affirm.
FACTS
¶ 2. On August 15, 2001, at approximately 2:25 p.m., Ada Mae Thomas arrived at Greenwood Leflore Hospital complaining of left side pain, burning upon urination, and vomiting. Dr. William Harper was the on-duty emergency room physician at the time. Dr. Harper met with Mrs. Thomas and discussed her symptoms. He then ordered a number of different tests to determine the cause of her illness.
¶ 3. Included in the array of tests ordered were an amylase, complete blood count, and a urinalysis. After the return of these tests, Dr. Harper determined that Mrs. Thomas needed further testing and ordered an intravenous pyelogram (IVP). Prior to the return of the IVP, Dr. Harper went off-duty as his twelve-hour shift in the emergency room ended at 5:00 p.m.
¶ 4. Prior to going off-duty, Dr. Harper turned Mrs. Thomas's care over to Dr. Michael Stokes, the oncoming emergency room physician. After the IVP had been completed, Dr. Stokes discharged Mrs. Thomas in stable condition around 6:50 p.m. with a prescription for 800 mg of Ibuprofen and instructions to follow up with her primary care physician for renal stones.
¶ 5. On August 17, 2001, Nurse Barbara Nevels telephoned Mrs. Thomas to remind her to follow-up with her primary care physician. Mrs. Thomas told Nurse Nev-els that she had an appointment scheduled for August 20, 2001, with Dr. Hardin, but that she was not feeling well and might return to the emergency room. Nurse Nevels told Mrs. Thomas to return to the emergency room if needed, but to keep her appointment with Dr. Hardin.
¶ 6. On August 19, 2001, Mrs. Thomas returned to the Greenwood Leflore Hospital emergency room in a very ill state. She was admitted to the Intensive Care Unit by Dr. Mark Byrd where she died on August 20, 2001.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶7. Roosevelt Thomas filed his complaint on August 8, 2002, alleging a wrongful death action against Dr. Harper, Nurse Nevels, Greenwood Leflore Hospital, and a number of John Does. The defendants filed their answer on August 21, 2002, along with their first discovery requests.
¶ 8. Included in the discovery requests were requests regarding expert witnesses. Thomas objected to these specific requests. Dr. Harper filed a motion to compel on April 1, 2003, which was granted by order dated April 23, 2003. On April 24, 2003, Thomas filed his expert designation, designating Dr. William Truly as his expert. The designation included, among other things, the nature of Dr. Truly's proposed testimony.
¶ 9. On August 13, 2003, in the midst of discovery, a stay was entered for six months due to the insolvency of Greenwood Leflore Hospital's insurance provider. After the stay had been lifted, on November 11, 2004, the defendants each filed separate motions for summary judgment. The trial court denied them as premature on March 14, 2005, and ordered that the depositions of Dr. Harper and Nurse Nevels should be taken. Dr. Harper gave his deposition on May 11, 2005, while Nurse Nevels's deposition was rescheduled numerous times without being completed.
¶ 10. On July 11, 2005, the defendants again filed separate motions for summary judgment. Thomas responded to Dr. Harper's motion and attached an unsigned affidavit to the response. No written response to Greenwood Leflore Hospital's motion for summary judgment can be found in the record.
¶ 11. A hearing on the motion was held on December 5, 2005. Then, by order dated January 31, 2006, the trial court granted defendants' motions for summary judgment. Aggrieved, Thomas appealed.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶ 12. Under Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), summary judgment may be granted to a party when "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admission on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." This Court reviews a trial court's granting of summary judgment de novo. Maxwell v. Baptist Mem'l Hosp.Desoto, Inc., 958 So.2d 284, 287(¶ 14) (Miss.Ct.App.2007). "The burden is on the moving party to establish that there is no material issue of fact, and the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party." Id. However, the non-moving party must be diligent in opposition to a motion for summary judgment and "may not rely upon the mere unsworn allegation in his pleadings." Magee v. Transcon. Gas Pipe Line Corp., 551 So.2d 182, 186 (Miss.1989). Specifically, the non-moving party may . not create an issue of genuine fact through briefs and argument alone. Id.
ANALYSIS
¶ 13. Thomas alleges that there were three genuine issues of material fact that should have prevented the trial court's grant of summary judgment. Thomas's issues include the following: (1) Dr. Harper breached the standard of care by failing to properly communicate Mrs. Thomas's condition to the incoming physician; (2) Dr. Harper breached the standard of care by failing to ensure that Mrs. Thomas was admitted to the hospital; and (3) Nurse Nevels breached the standard of care by failing to admonish Mrs. Thomas to return to the hospital upon hearing of her condition. We now address each allegation of material fact in turn.
I. Whether Dr. Harper breached the standard of care by failing to properly communicate Mrs. Thomas's condition to the incoming physician.
¶ 14. Thomas argues that Dr. Harper breached his standard of care by fading to communicate Mrs. Thomas's condition to Dr. Stokes, the oncoming emergency room physician. Also, Thomas claims that had Dr. Harper explained the severity of the condition to Dr. Stokes, Dr. Stokes would have had Mrs. Thomas admitted to the hospital.
¶ 15. Generally in a medical malpractice case, the plaintiff must present expert medical testimony as to the standard of care, whether that standard was breached, whether the breach caused the plaintiffs injury, and the extent of the damages.. Phillips ex rel. Phillips v. Hull, 516 So.2d 488, 491 (Miss.1987). There is an exception when the elements would be within the knowledge of a layperson. Id. Thomas alleges in his brief that his expert, Dr. Truly, was prepared to testify to the standard of care that should have been followed and that Dr. Harper breached the standard of care. However, this information was not presented to the trial court in the form of an affidavit or even in the expert designation. Thomas can not create a material issue of fact through arguments and assertions in briefs. Id. Therefore, we must look elsewhere in the record to determine if the standard of care was defined and whether there is a question as to whether Dr. Harper breached that standard.
¶ 16. The only other place in the record where the standard of care as to Dr. Harper's communication to Dr. Stokes is found in Dr. Harper's sworn deposition. When asked what the standard of care was, he stated that it was "to get the charts together, get the records up to date, discuss the patient's history, physical findings and condition and concerns with the oncoming physician." He then stated that he did comply with the standard of care. Even viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Thomas, the only evidence in the record as to this issue is that Dr. Harper met the standard of care when he turned Mrs. Thomas's care over to Dr. Stokes.
¶ 17. Therefore, this allegation of material fact is without merit.
II. Whether Dr. Harper breached the standard of care by failing to ensure that Mrs. Thomas was admitted to the hospital.
¶ 18. The trial court stated in its order that "based on the fact that Dr. Harper was not present at the time Mrs. Thomas's final test results were returned or at the time of her discharge and given the fact that Dr. Harper does not have admitting privileges, [the court] finds that Dr. Harper is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Thomas alleges that Dr. Harper should have hospitalized Mrs. Thomas prior to going off-duty. He points to an unsworn affidavit that was attached to his response to the motion for summary judgment for support. The affidavit stated, "Even if Mrs. Thomas was under Dr. Harper's care for three hours, he still had sufficient medical facts and data before him to conclude that Mrs. Thomas would have a serious negative outcome without appropriate and immediate medical intervention including hospitalization." Dr. Harper counters by stating that the affidavit was not and should not have been relied upon by the trial court. We agree with Dr. Harper.
¶ 19. The supreme court has held that "the only unsworn matters available to a party opposing the motion [for summary judgment] are undenied allegations in his pleadings and admissions secured under Rule 36, Miss.R.Civ.P." Magee, 551 So.2d at 186. The opinion goes on to say that for a document to have the power to create a genuine issue of material fact, it "must, first, be sworn; second, be made upon personal knowledge; and third, show that the party giving them is competent to testify." Id. The affidavit that Thomas relies upon was never even signed by Dr. Truly, much less sworn to by him. An affidavit is "a voluntary declaration of facts written down and sworn to by the declar-ant before an officer authorized to administer oaths." Blacks Law Dictionary 58 (7th Edition 1999). The affidavit appears to be a standard form affidavit, but without being sworn it cannot create an issue of material fact. For our purposes it is merely a piece of paper with the word "affidavit" as its title.
¶ 20. Therefore, we must look to the rest of the record to determine if an issue of material fact was created by the defendant. The only other place in the record which stated that Dr. Harper should have hospitalized Mrs. Thomas came from Thomas's expert designation. It stated that after the tests including the IVP came back, the "emergency room physician could have, at the very least, hospitalized this patient." After further discovery, it became uncontested that Dr. Harper was not on-duty when Mrs. Thomas was taken to have an IVP, much less when the results were returned. According to Thomas's expert designation, no duty to hospitalize Mrs. Thomas had arisen before all the test results had been returned. Hence, Dr. Harper had no duty to hospitalize Mrs. Thomas since he was off-duty at that time.
¶ 21. Since the affidavit that Thomas attached to his response to the motion for summary judgment was not even attested, it cannot be said to create an issue of material fact. Also, the remainder of the record fails to create a genuine issue of material fact as to this allegation. Therefore, this allegation of material fact is without merit.
III. Whether Nurse Nevels breached the standard of care by failing to admonish Mrs. Thomas to return to the hospital upon hearing of her condition.
¶22. Thomas's final allegation of material fact is that Nurse Nevels should have "admonished" Mrs. Thomas to return to the emergency room. Further, he claims that had she admonished Mrs. Thomas to return to the emergency room, Mrs. Thomas would have returned immediately and receive^ the proper medical care. He alleges that Nurse Nevels had the knowledge and information to recognize Mrs. Thomas's condition and its severity. Thomas recognizes that expert testimony would be needed to testify to the appropriate standard of care and alleges that his expert, Dr. Truly, would be able to testify to the standard and its breach.
¶ 23. After a thorough review of the record, this Court cannot find any affidavit or pleading that stated Nurse Nevels breached a standard of care. Neither can we find anything in the record as to the standard of care that Nurse Nevels should have followed. The primary discussion of Nurse Nevels's conduct comes from the brief and pleadings of Greenwood Leflore Hospital. The Hospital's pleadings at trial discuss an affidavit from Dr. Truly that spoke of Nurse Nevels's conduct, but this affidavit is not found anywhere within the record. "The burden rested upon [Thomas] to see to it that the record contained all data essential .to an understanding and presentation of matters relied upon for reversal on appeal." Dew v. Langford, 666 So.2d 739, 746 (Miss.1995) (quoting Shelton v. Kindred, 279 So.2d 642, 644 (Miss.1973)). Since this did not occur, we find this referenced affidavit of no consequence.
¶ 24. The only other reference to Nurse Nevels's conduct can be found in Thomas's expert designation. There, Thomas acknowledged that Nurse Nevels told Mrs. Thomas "to return to the hospital if need be, but that she needed to keep her appointment with Dr. Hardin on Monday."
¶ 25. Since Thomas cannot merely rest on his allegations and assertions in his brief, there must be something in the record that would constitute a material fact in regard to Nurse Nevels. Here, the only thing in the record is a reference that she did tell Mrs. Thomas to return to the emergency room if need be. Since the standard of care of what a nurse should do in that situation is beyond the knowledge of a layman, expert testimony would be needed. Phillips, 516 So.2d at 491. The record does not contain any such affidavit by Thomas's expert as to the standard of care, much less a breach of such a standard.
¶ 26. Therefore, this allegation of material fact is without merit.
CONCLUSION
¶ 27. Each of Thomas's allegations of genuine issue of material fact is unsupported by the record and without merit. Therefore, the trial court properly granted summary judgment to both Dr. Harper and Greenwood Leflore Hospital.
¶ 28. THE JUDGMENT OF THE LE-FLORE COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT IS AFFIRMED. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO THE APPELLANT.
LEE AND MYERS, P.JJ., CHANDLER, GRIFFIS, ISHEE, ROBERTS AND CARLTON, JJ., CONCUR. IRVING, J., DISSENTS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION. BARNES, J., NOT PARTICIPATING.