Case Name: Henry E. Williams vs. John C. Ten Eyck et al.
Court: Supreme Court of the District of Columbia
Jurisdiction: District of Columbia
Decision Date: 1886-07-13
Citations: 5 Mackey 168
Docket Number: No. 9,855
Parties: Henry E. Williams vs. John C. Ten Eyck et al.
Judges: Justices Haqker, James and Merrick sitting.
Reporter: Reports of cases argued and determined in the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia (District of Columbia - reported by Mackey)
Volume: 16
Pages: 168–171

Head Matter:
Henry E. Williams vs. John C. Ten Eyck et al.
Equity.
No. 9,855.
Decided July 13, 1886.
Justices Haqker, James and Merrick sitting.
Under the law in force in this District, August 16, 1871, it was not necessary that the certificate of some person having official cognizance of the fact, that the notary public was the officer he purported to he, should accompany a deed executed out of this District.
Bill in Equity, to obtain'a confirmatory deed to certain property certified to be beard in the General Term in the first instance.
statement oe the case.
On August 16, 1871, John 0. Ten Eyck and Joseph E. Burr conveyed by deed in fee simple to Plenry H. Dudley certain lots of ground in the city of Washington. Subsequently a portion of the property became vested by mesne conveyances in the- plaintiff, Henry E. Williams, and the balance in the Arlington Eire Insurance Company. When an effort was made to sell a portion of the property, the title of the present holders was reported defective by the title examiner, for the reason that to the deed of John C. Ten Eyck and his wife, which was executed and acknowledged in the State of New Jersey, no certificate of any officer is affixed, to show that the notary public before whom it was acknowledged was the officer he purported to be.
The single question, therefore, in the case was whether, under the law in force in this District on August 16, 1871, it was necessary that the certificates of some person having official cognizance of the fact that the notary public was the officer he puiqjorted to he,- should accompany a deed executed out of the District of Columbia before a notary public. The original statute of April 20,1838 (5 Statutes, 226), authorizes deeds to be acknowledged before two justices of the peace, but that statute contained the following proviso:
“Provided that, when such acknowledgment shall be taken before any justices of the peace beyond the limits o^ the District of Columbia, there shall accompany such certificate of acknowledgment a certificate of the clerk or other public officer having official cognizance of the fact, under his official seal, that such persons were at the date of their said certificate, in fact, justices, as they purport to be.”
The law with relation to acknowledgments was amended by the act of September 16,1850 (9 Stat., 458). This latter statute authorizes the taking of acknowledgments to deeds by notaries public; and further provided that when such acknowledgments aré “ certified under the hand and official seal of such notary, they shall have the same force and effect as if taken or made by or before such justice or justices of the peace.”
James M. Johnston for complainants:
It seems that the act of 1838 required the seal of the justice of the peace to be supported by a certificate of the clerk or other proper public officer under his seal, because the justice of the peace had no seal, and, therefore, had no mode of authenticating his own official acts.
This reason would, of course, not apply to the case of a notary public, for that officer always has a seal; and the certificate of the notary public under his seal was usually accepted before and at the time the act of 1850 was passed.
It will be observed that the act of 1850 does not provide that an acknowledgment before a notary public shall be authenticated in the same manner as an acknowledgment before a justice of the peace. On the contrary, it specifies the manner in which acknowledgments shall be taken before a notary public, and provides that when so taken the acknowledgment shall have the same force and effect as an acknowledgment taken before a justice of the peace.
It would seem, therefore, that no certificate of the clerk or other officer having official cognizance of the fact need be appended to a deed acknowledged before a notary public under the act of 1850.
No one appeared for the defendants.

Opinion:
Mr. Justice Merrick
delivered the opinion of the court.
In the case of Williams vs. Ten Eyck et al., the court signed a decree a few days ago. At the request of counsel, we now announce the reasons for the decree.
A bill was filed by Williams against Ten Eyck and others for the purpose of obtaining a confirmatory deed to certain property in this city, the allegation being that the deed originally executed by them was defective, as had been suggested by certain property title searchers, upon the ground that the Certificate of acknowledgment was taken before a notary public, and there was no certificate of any proper official of the State to the notarial character of the officer taking the acknowledgment. This referred to an acknowledgment taken prior to the act of 18Y1.
The law regulating that subject, while providing for the acknowledgment.of deeds hy notaries public outside of the District of Columbia, did not prescribe any ceremonial after acknowledgment for the purpose of verifying the official character of the notary taking it. There has been a diversity of practice and a diversity of opinion in the District, as the court is informed, as to whether such an acknowledgment was good without a certificate from some other officer to the notarial character of the officer who took the acknowledgment.
Under the general commercial law of the world, the certificate of a notary and his seal prove themselves. He is an officer known to the commercial law, to the admiralty, and to the civil law; and wherever he has executed an iüstrument appropriate to his functions, his seal is recognized and judicially taken notice of by the courts, and proves itself. That was the general and accepted principle of law touching the judicial notice taken of the official character of the notary at the time the act of Congress was passed.
It is presumed, of course, that the framers of that law understood the general principles of the commercial law and the mode in which the courts recognized and gave credit to the official character of a notary when they passed that statute. When they provided for the taking of an acknowledgment of a deed by a notary outside of the District of Columbia, they did not provide that his official act should he certified to by any other person ; and, therefore, as the court think, they left it to be construed according to the general rule of law touching the official character of such a person, to wit, that his seal verified and proved itself.
There is an additional reason in favor of that being the interpretation of the law by Congress, for when it changed the law, in February, 1811, and made a new provision about acknowledgments, it made a specific requirement that the seal of the notary should be authenticated by the proper officer of the State having cognizance of his official characacter and appointment. The absence of the provision in the former law, and the presence of the provision in the second law, confirms the opinion of the court as derived from the general policy of the commercial law to which I have adverted.
For these reasons, the court being of opinion that the deed was good and valid, being acknowledged before a notary public outside of the District, and recorded here, although without any certificate of his official character, the bill is dismissed, because as far as that deed was concerned, it formally conveyed all the estate and title of the party, and the record is a good and complete record, under the statute and the law existing prior to February, 1811,