Case Name: The People of the State of New York ex rel. Edward M. Goring, Respondent, v. The President and Board of Trustees of the Village of Wappingers Falls, Appellants
Court: New York Supreme Court, General Term
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1894-12
Citations: 90 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 130
Docket Number: 
Parties: The People of the State of New York ex rel. Edward M. Goring, Respondent, v. The President and Board of Trustees of the Village of Wappingers Falls, Appellants.
Judges: 
Reporter: Supreme Court Reports (Hun)
Volume: 90
Pages: 130–138

Head Matter:
The People of the State of New York ex rel. Edward M. Goring, Respondent, v. The President and Board of Trustees of the Village of Wappingers Falls, Appellants.
Chapter 680 of 1892 — •right of a voter to vote for a person for an office not named on the official ballot — unconstitutionality of laws prohibiting it — police justice of the village of Wappingers Falls — the Supreme Court has no power to direct the trustees of such village to allow an annual salary to him.
Section 104 of the Election Law (Chap. 680 of the Laws of 1892) must he construed to give a voter the- right not only to vote for any person for an office named on the official ballot, but also for an office which ought to have been named thereon, but which has been omitted therefrom by the neglect of the official charged with the duty of its preparation. (Dykman, J., dissenting.)
The right to vote at an election is derived from the Constitution; the manner of voting is regulated by statute; the constitutional provision that “ Every male citizen of the age of twenty-one years * * * shall be entitled to vote ” at all elections confers the right to vote for a person for every office required by law to be filled at the election at which the voter desires to vote, and any law which prohibits him from so voting is unconstitutional. (Dykman, J., dissenting.)
The right of a voter to vote for a candidate at any election is not dependent upon the performance or non-performance of the duty of the officer charged hy chapter 680 of the Laws of 1893 with the preparation of the official ballot.
(Dykman, J., dissenting.)
The fees of the police justice of the village of Wappingers Falls are a charge upon the village, and must he audited and allowed in the same manner as other village charges, unless such police justice shall he allowed an annual salary fixed hy the hoard of trustees of the village which is empowered to fix and establish an annual salary to he paid to the police justice hy resolution to he entered in its minutes, which salary when so fixed is in lieu of fees to which the justice might otherwise he entitled. The discretion is vested in the hoard of trustees of the village to determine between the two modes of compensation, and it is beyond the province of the Supreme Court to determine the 'exercise of such election hy such hoard of trustees.
Appeal by tbe defendants, Tbe President and Board of Trustees of tbe Tillage of "Wappingers Falls, from an order of tbe Supreme Court, made at tbe Dutcbess Special Term and entered in tbe office of tbe cleric of tbe county of Dutcbess on tbe 30tb day of June, 1894, granting tbe relator’s motion for a peremptory writ of mandamus, directed to tbe president and board of trustees of tbe village of Wappingers Falls requiring tbem to forthwith provide tbe relator as police justice of said village tbe necessary blanks and stationery for tbe business of bis office, that they provide and designate a suitable place for tbe bolding of tbe sessions of court in connection with tbe office of such police justice, and that they fix and determine an annual salary for the services of tbe relator as such police justice commensurate with tbe duties of such office.
Joseph F. Barna/rd, for the appellants.
Bernard J. Tirmey, for tbe respondent.

Opinion:
Brown, P. J.:
* Tbe facts out of which this case arose are correctly stated in'tbe opinion of Justice .Dykman, and need not be here repeated. Tbe question presented is whether a duly qualified voter may vote for a person for an office which is not named on tbe official ballot, but which exists by statute, and is required to be filled at an election at which the voter desires to vote. Section 104 of tbe Election Law (Chap. 680, Laws of 1892) provides that within tbe voting booth " tbe name of any person for whom tbe voter desires to vote for any office named, on the official ballot may be written on the official bal-' lot which the voter proposes to vote; or a paster containing one or more such names or offices may be pasted thereon." The Ballot Reform Law of 1890 (Chap. 262, § 25) provided that "The voter' may write or paste upon his ballot the name of any person for whom he desires to vote for any office." But under section 104 of the present law, it will be observed that the right to write or paste upon the ballot the name of any person for whom the voter desires to vote, is apparently limited to the offices named on the official ballot. In the case before us the office of police justice was not named on the official ballot. The office had, however, been created by law, and it was required to be filled at the village election. There had, however, been no incumbent of the office for the greater part of the expiring term, and no nominations had been made for it, and the fact that it was to be filled was probably overlooked by the officers and the great majority of electors of the village. It was, nevertheless, by section 82 of the Election Law, made the duty of the clerk of the village to furnish official ballots containing the names of all the offices to be filled at the election, and the name of the office of police justice should have been upon the ballot. We are of the opinion that section 104 must be construed to give to the voter the right, not only to vote for any ¡Derson for an office named on the ballot, but also for an office which ought to have been named thereon, but which had been omitted therefrom by the neglect of the officer charged with the duty of its preparation. The right to vote at an election is derived from the Constitution ; the manner of voting is regulated by statute. The constitutional provision is that " Every male citizen of the age of twenty-one years shall be entitled to vote" at all elections. This provision confers the right to vote for a person for every office required by law to be filled at the election at which the voter desires to vote. The Constitution contains no restriction upon this right, and the only express power given to the Legislature in reference to it is to enact laws " for ascertaining by proper proofs the citizens who shall be entitled to the right of suffrage." There is, of course, an implied po'wer to regulate the manner of voting, but any law which prohibits the right to vote is unconstitutional. The present Election Law has provided for the preparation of an official ballot by certain desig nated officers, and it makes it tlieir duty to print tlie names of all offices to be filled upon the face of each and all of the official ballots. This duty is in no wise made dependent upon the making of nominations, it being further provided by section 82 that if the full number of candidates for the offices specified on any one kind of ballot shall not have been nominated " blank spaces shall be left on each ballot of such kind where the names of candidates would appear, except for such failure to nominate."
The intention of the Legislature is plain. It is that there shall be printed upon the official ballot the name of every office to be filled at the election, and if this duty is performed by the officer charged with it, the voter, under section 104, is enabled to exercise his constitutional right to vote for any person he chooses for any office to be filled at the election. It is equally plain that the Legislature did not intend that this right should depend upon the performance or non-performance of the duty of the officer charged with the preparation of the official ballot. Yet that is what fhe argument of the appellants comes to. The voter, it is said, may vote for any person for any office named on the ballot, but if, through inadvertence, neglect of duty or other cause, the name of the office is omitted from the ballot, no vote can be cast for any person for that office, and no election for that office can be held. Such a construction, if it could be adopted, would disfranchise the voter and deprive the people of the right of the proper administration of their laws. But it cannot prevail, as it would make the law unconstitutional. The original Ballot Reform Law, when introduced in the Legislature in 1888, contained a provision which permitted the voter to vote only for a candidate duly nominated and certified, but that provision was rejected, and, in the discussion that then and since has been had upon the question, it has been the almost unanimous opinion of the lawyers of the State that any law prescribing an official ballot which did not permit the voter to write or paste upon his ballot the name of any person for whom he desires to vote for any office to be filled at the election, whether named on the official ballot or not, would be in violation of the provision of the Constitution hereinbefore quoted.
Our conclusion, therefore, is that the votes cast for the relator were valid, and tha-t he was duly elected to the office of police justice of the village. We agree with Justice Dykman that the Special Term had no power to direct the trustees of the village to fix the salary of the office. "We have the power to modify the order, however (People ex rel. Hasbrouck v. The Supervisors, 135 N. Y. 535), and that part of it should be stricken out, and, so modified, it should be affirmed, without costs of appeal.
Cullen, J.:
I agree with the opinion of the- presiding justice that an interpretation of section 104 of the Election Law which would limit the right of voters to vote only for offices which may be named on the official ballot, or only for candidates who may have been put in nomination by the modes prescribed by that law, would render this provision of the section unconstitutional and void. The section is general and applicable to election for all offices. As to two classes of public offices it seems to me too clear for debate that the Legislature cannot deny the voter the right to vote nor can it make the qualifications pi,-escribed for candidates dependent on the action of election officials or nominating conventions.
By the Federal Constitution (§ 2, art. 1) :
"2. No person shall be a representative who shall not have attained to the age of twenty-five years, and been seven years a citizen of the United States, and who shall not, when elected, be an inhabitant of that State in which he shall be chosen."
By section 4 of the same article:
• " 1. The times, places and manner of holding elections for senators and representatives shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time, by law, make or alter such regulations, except as to the places of choosing senators."
Congress has acted under this authority and prescribed the time of holding elections for representatives. How can the State deny the right of any qualified voter to vote at the time prescribed ? As to the qualifications of representatives though the constitutional provisions are wholly in the negative, still they are plainly meant to prescribe the only conditions of eligibility, and are exclusive. How can the State prescribe that the candidates must have been nominated by a certain number of voters for an appointed period before the election ? Such provisions would not relate merely to the man ner of holding the election but would plainly be limitations on the eligibility of the candidate. He may not have moved into the State and become an inhabitant thereof until the day before election, and yet he would be constitutionally eligible for the office.
These considerations also apply to those officers which the Constitution of the State ordains shall be filled by election. At an early period under our present Constitution the question arose whether the election of a justice of the Supreme Court to fill a vacancy occurring after the notice given by the Secretary of State of the offices to be filled at the approaching election was valid. It was held that the election was valid, notwithstanding that no notice thereof had been given by the Secretary of State. (People ex rel. Davies v. Cowles, 13 N. Y. 350.) The authority of this case has never been questioned. In the Constitutional Convention of 1861 it was acknowledged as a correct exposition of the law, and to avoid any difficulty from lack of sufficient notice to the voters, the Constitution was amended so that vacancies in the judicial offices created by it are directed to be filled only at elections happening three months after the occurrence of the vacancy. But as to other elective offices of the Constitution the old rule' remains in force.
As to offices not constitutional, but created by the Legislature, the Legislature may prescribe qualifications for the incumbents of such offices. (People v. Platt, 117 N. Y. 159.) "We assume, however, that as to such offices the qualifications must bear some relation to the duties of the office, and be not merely arbitrary. The office here in dispute is a local office. By the Constitution it must be filled by election or appointment as the Legislature shall direct. Hnder this authority the Legislature determined that the office should be elective, and on that determination the office " fell within the scope and terms of the constitutional provisions applicable to elections by the people." (Matter of Gage, 141 N. Y. 112.) A scheme that would permit the town election officers or nominating conventions to determine whether the office should be filled or not would be neither providing for an election nor for an appointment, and it is only one of these two methods that the Legislature can adopt.
The order appealed from should be affirmed, with ten dollars costs.