Case Name: MISSISSIPPI REAL ESTATE COMMISSION, James D. Smith and Wife, Jean A. Smith, Glenn R. Cooper and Wife, Colette L. Cooper v. GEICO FINANCIAL SERVICES, INC. and Five Star Associates, Inc.
Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Mississippi
Decision Date: 1992-03-25
Citations: 602 So. 2d 1155
Docket Number: No. 90-CC-0716
Parties: MISSISSIPPI REAL ESTATE COMMISSION, James D. Smith and Wife, Jean A. Smith, Glenn R. Cooper and Wife, Colette L. Cooper v. GEICO FINANCIAL SERVICES, INC. and Five Star Associates, Inc.
Judges: Before ROY NOBLE LEE, C.J. and ROBERTSON and PITTMAN, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 602
Pages: 1155–1159

Head Matter:
MISSISSIPPI REAL ESTATE COMMISSION, James D. Smith and Wife, Jean A. Smith, Glenn R. Cooper and Wife, Colette L. Cooper v. GEICO FINANCIAL SERVICES, INC. and Five Star Associates, Inc.
No. 90-CC-0716.
Supreme Court of Mississippi.
March 25, 1992.
Rehearing Denied July 22, 1992.
Samuel L. Begley, John L. Maxey, II, Maxey Pigott Wann & Begley, Jackson, James F. Thompson, J. Michael McGehee, Gulfport, for appellants.
John Edgar Johnson, Gulfport, Fredrick B. Feeney, II, Franke Rainey & Salloum, Gulfport, for appellees.
Kenneth L. Swarthout, Jr., Ocean Springs, James G. Tucker III, Bay St. Louis, for amicus curiae. .
Before ROY NOBLE LEE, C.J. and ROBERTSON and PITTMAN, JJ.

Opinion:
PITTMAN, Justice,
for the Court:
This is an appeal from a judgment rendered by the Chancery Court of Harrison County finding that time-sharing plan and interval ownership regulations of the Mississippi Real Estate Commission (MREC) are inapplicable to a sale of property interests and memberships in a campground and its amenities. We reverse and remand.
I.
On May 2, 1989, James and Jean Smith (Smith) and Glenn and Colette Cooper (Cooper) instituted proceedings in the Chancery Court of Harrison County for declaratory relief against Five Star Associates, Inc. (Five Star) and Venture Out Resorts, Inc. (Venture Out). Smith and Cooper sought judgment declaring that (a) their purchase of memberships permitted them to use a campground and (b) their purchase of fee simple interests in the campground proper- • ty, were subject to the rules and regulations of MREC pertaining to sale of time-sharing plans and interval ownership of property. MREC moved for and was granted intervention as a plaintiff. Geico Financial Services, Inc. (Geico), who had a financial interest in the campground property, moved for and was granted intervention as a defendant.
Five Star, successor of Venture Out, owns a campground in Harrison County. Fifty-eight (58) sites are available for member recreational vehicle parking. Each site has RV electrical and water hookups. A dump station is provided for vehicular waste removal. Also on the property is a swimming pool, boat dock, canoes, boat houses, and a security station. An A-frame cabin, RV's, and trailers on the property are available for rental by members.
Five Star offered for sale (a) terminable memberships entitling one to. use all Five Star campgrounds wherever located and (b) undivided interests in the Harrison County campground property. Cooper and Smith each purchased memberships and undivided interests in the campground. -
Membership rules restricted use of the campground by a member to fourteen (14) days at any one time. The record reveals a member "could only stay there for a total of fourteen days. After you stayed there fourteen days, you had to leave at least for seven days and then you could come back."
Applicable MREC regulations of "time-sharing plans" and "interval ownership" provide:
Rule 47-1 (F)
"Time-sharing plan" and "interval ownership" means any arrangement, plan, scheme or similar device; whether by membership, agreement, tenancy in .common, sale, lease, deed, rental agreement, license, right to use agreement, or by any other means, whereby a purchaser receives a right to use accommodations for a specific period of time.
RULE 47-1 (A)
"Accommodations" means any structure, service improvement, facility, apartment, condominium or cooperative unit, cabin, lodge, hotel or motel room, or any other private or commercial structure which is situated on real property and designed for occupancy by one or more individuals.
MREC rules further provide that (a) sellers of time-sharing plans shall furnish their purchasers with a copy of the contract which satisfies a list of particulars; (b) the developer of time-sharing units is required to disclose various information in its public offering statement and to submit this document to MREC for approval; (c) a time-sharing unit developer is required to deposit fifty percent of all monies received from purchasers with an escrow agent, or alternatively, post adequate surety; (d) certain restrictions on representations and practices are placed on the advertisements of time-sharing plans; and (e) any seller of a time-sharing plan must be a licensed real estate broker or real estate salesman licensed pursuant and subject to the Mississippi Real Estate Licensure Law.
The Chancery Court, after review of the pleadings, rules, and evidence adduced on trial, found that the MREC rules and regulations do not apply to the Five Star campground sales. The court sustained Five Star's motion for directed verdict, denied the relief sought by Cooper, Smith, and MREC, and rendered judgment for Five Star and Geico. Aggrieved, MREC appeals contending the Chancery Court erred in finding that Five Star was not subject to MREC rules and regulations applicable to time-sharing plans or interval ownership.
II.
Admittedly, MREC enjoys power duly delegated by the legislature to adopt rules and regulations relating to time-sharing plans or interval ownership. It is without dispute that Rules 47-1 (A) and (F) define "time-sharing plan," "interval ownership," and "accommodations" by MREC. After plaintiffs completed presentation of their evidence, Five Star and Geico moved to dismiss on the ground that upon the facts and the law, the plaintiffs showed no right to relief. The standard of review applicable on motion to dismiss under Rule 41(b) has been succinctly stated and distinguished from that applicable on motion for directed verdict. See Mitchell v. Rawls, 493 So.2d at 362-63; Davis v. Clement, 468 So.2d 58, 61-62 (Miss.1985). But where, as here, the facts adduced during the chancery hearing are essentially without dispute, what we are left to decide is basically a question of law.
In attempting to determine the sufficiency and applicability of MREC's rules to Five Star's campground operation, it is proper to accord deference to the agency's construction of its own rules and regulations. Melody Manor Convalescent Center v. Mississippi State Dept. of Health, 546 So.2d 972, 974 (Miss.1989). No Missis sippi cases have explained the meaning of the precise words used by MREC. Similar language is found in real estate commission rules and regulations of other states, but none with the exact expressions used in our statute.
MREC rules and regulations include within the word "accommodations" any "service improvement . designed for occupancy." The word "service" is defined to mean "providing services rather than tangible goods." The word "improvement" is defined as "the enhancement or augmentation of value or quality;" "a permanent addition to or betterment of real property that enhances its capital value and that involves the expenditure of labor or money and is designed to make the property more useful or valuable as distinguished from ordinary repairs." The word "occupancy" means "the act of becoming an occupant or the condition of being an occupant;" "the condition of being occupied;" "the particular use or type of use to which property is put." Webster's Third New International Dictionary, (Unabridged 1976).
The standard dictionary definitions of the terms suffice to show that service improvement designed for occupancy is something less than a building. The RV electrical and water hookups as well as the dump station fall within the meaning of these terms as they are used in the rules and regulations. Simply expressed, the hookups and dump station were service improvements designed to make the property suitable for occupancy by vehicles used for living and sleeping purposes. Moreover, the placement of an A-frame cabin on the property and making it available for membership is a distinguishing convenience which falls clearly within the terms of the MREC definition. The record shows without contradiction that MREC interpreted the rules to apply to the Five Star campground sales.
Five Star contends that its membership rule restricting use of the campground to fourteen days at any one time does not equate with the member receiving a right to "use accommodations for a specific period of time." We disagree. The time a member may use the property is any 14 day period.
III.
We hold that the undisputed facts in this case establish that Five Star's sales of membership and property interests in the campground property were subject to the MREC rules and regulations applicable to time-sharing plans or interval ownership.
This case is reversed and remanded to the trial court to proceed as though the motion for dismissal under Rule 41(b) had been denied. We note that by making the motion, the defendant has not waived the right to offer evidence. We therefore reverse and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion. Reynolds v. Druetta, 417 So.2d 917, 919 (Miss.1982).
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
ROY NOBLE LEE, C.J., HAWKINS and DAN M. LEE, P.JJ., and PRATHER, ROBERTSON, SULLIVAN and McRAE, JJ., concur.
BANKS, J., dissents with separate written opinion.
. Technically and procedurally, the court granted a dismissal on the merits pursuant to Miss. R.Civ.P. 41(b) since this was a non-jury trial. A directed verdict under Miss.R.Civ.P. 50 is limited in use to "cases tried to a jury with a power to return a binding verdict." Comment, Miss. R.Civ.P. 50; Mitchell v. Rawls, 493 So.2d 361, 362 (Miss.1986).
. Cooper and Smith did not appeal the Chancery Court decision.