Case Name: Andrew Kolchins, Respondent, v. Evolution Markets, Inc., Appellant
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 2015-04-02
Citations: 128 A.D.3d 47
Docket Number: 
Parties: Andrew Kolchins, Respondent, v Evolution Markets, Inc., Appellant.
Judges: 
Reporter: Appellate Division Reports
Volume: 128
Pages: 47–77

Head Matter:
[8 NYS3d 1]
Andrew Kolchins, Respondent, v Evolution Markets, Inc., Appellant.
First Department,
April 2, 2015
APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL
Wechsler & Cohen, LLP, New York City (David B. Wechsler and Todd Gutfleisch of counsel), for appellant.
Debevoise & Plimpton LLP, New York City (Jyotin Hamid and Olga Kaplan of counsel), for respondent.

Opinion:
OPINION OF THE COURT
Renwick, J.
This breach of contract action stems from plaintiff Andrew Kolchins's employment with defendant Evolutions Markets, Inc. The most recent employment agreement commenced on September 1, 2009 and ended on August 31, 2012. Before its expiration, the parties engaged in correspondence with regard to an extension of the agreement. The question for our determination is whether the parties' emails and other correspondence can be viewed as constituting a binding offer and acceptance of an extension of the 2009 employment agreement, such that in the absence of a formal contract they created a legally enforceable contract. Because we find that the documentary evidence does not utterly refute plaintiffs factual allegations that the parties reached an agreement on the material terms of a contract renewal, we conclude that Supreme Court properly denied defendant's motion, pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (1), to dismiss the first cause of action for breach of contract.
Factual Background
The international finance firm of Evolutions Markets, Inc. structures transactions and provides brokerage and advisory services in the global environmental and energy commodities marketplace. Plaintiff joined defendant in 2005. In 2006, the parties entered into a three-year employment agreement dated September 1, 2006. Over the course of his tenure with defendant, plaintiff came to manage defendant's renewable energy market group.
On August 31, 2009, the parties executed the 2009 employment agreement covering the three-year period ending on August 31, 2012. The 2009 agreement provided for plaintiff to receive a base salary of $200,000 per year, and for plaintiff to receive a number of bonuses. Among these was a "Sign On Bonus" of $750,000, payable in three installments, with $300,000 due within 10 days of the employment agreement start date and equal installments of $225,000 due on the first and second anniversaries of the start date. The 2009 agreement also provided for plaintiff to participate in a production bonus of at least 55% of net earnings received by plaintiffs group, paid on a trimester basis, payable "within two months of the close of a given trimester."
The third significant provision in the 2009 employment agreement was the special noncompete payment. This payment provision was triggered if plaintiff were terminated by defendant "without cause" or quit his employment for "Good Reason" at any time prior to termination of the three-year period of employment. In such event, plaintiff was entitled to receive, along with his base salary and bonuses, a special noncompete payment in exchange for agreeing not to work "for a Competitor" for a period of six months after his termination or resignation. The special noncompete payment was to be made "on the firm-wide bonus payment dates following receipt of funds by [defendant]," with any such payments "calculated consistent with the calculation of [plaintiffs] bonus compensation during the last trimester [he was] an employee of [defendant]." The "Special Non-Compete Payment" was defined as "bonus compensation in respect of transactions: (i) that [plaintiff] brokered during the period of [his] employment and (ii) for which any contingency associated with [defendant's] right to receive payment is satisfied during the Non-Compete Period."
The fourth significant provision of the 2009 employment agreement was the guarantee payment. As the label indicates, this provision guaranteed that plaintiff would receive a minimum combined base salary and bonus for each year of the contract of no less than $750,000. If such combined bonus and salary did not reach the $750,000 threshold for a specific year, the difference would constitute a "Make Whole Payment" due to plaintiff at the end of each year. The guarantee calculation, however, did not include the "Sign On Bonus." In addition, the provision contained a "For the avoidance of doubt" clause, which provided that, unlike the other bonuses, the bonus that plaintiff would earn during the second trimester of the 2009 employment agreement would not count toward the computation of the guarantee payment. On the other hand, any amounts payable to plaintiff under the special noncompete payment would count toward the computation of the guarantee compensation for the last year of the contract ending on August 31, 2012.
Finally, the 2009 agreement stated that, "[e]xcept as provided above with respect to the Sign On Bonus and Special Non-Compete Payment, in order to be eligible to receive any Production Bonus . or Guaranteed Compensation, [plaintiff] must be actively employed by [defendant] at the time of [its] firm-wide bonus payment dates." Likewise, the agreement stated, plaintiff "will not be eligible to receive any such bonus or Guaranteed Compensation if [he had] already given notice of [his] intention to resign."
On June 15, 2012, towards the end of the 2009 agreement, defendant's CEO, Andrew Ertel, sent plaintiff an email captioned "In writing," which stated:
"The terms of our offer are the same terms of your existing contract (other than a clarification around the issue of departed members of the team), and include:
"3 year term
"$200,000 base salary
"$750,000 sign on bonus ($300,000 payable upfront, $225,000 payable on 1st and 2nd anniversaries)
"$750,000 per year minimum cash compensation
"production bonus pool of 55% of net earnings of [renewable energy] desk.
"Any further questions, let me know but u do have your existing contract."
On July 16, 2002, plaintiff replied to Ertel's June 15 email, stating, in full, "I accept, pl[ease] send contract." Ertel immediately replied, stating, in full, "Mazel. Looking forward to another great run."
On July 20, 2012, defendant's general counsel Benjamin Zeliger emailed plaintiff a "clean and marked draft of [his] new employment agreement." Zeliger stated that "[m]ost of the changes are simply updates to dates and your role as [director] of the [renewable energy] business." Zeliger noted two "substantive changes," however. The first of these proposed changes was that plaintiff repay any year's installment of the sign on bonus if he quit "without Good Reason or [were] terminated for Cause" in that year. Zeliger asserted that this "clawback" provision was now standard company policy in order to "protect the company from paying a sign on bonus and then having the employee quit after receiving it." The second change related to "clarifying language regarding the retention of desk employee bonuses if the employees are no longer with [defendant]."
A few minutes later, plaintiff responded, "I will review and provide my initial feedback before sending to counsel. I will just want reciprocal language pertaining to clawback prob [sic]. If you fire me [without] cause I get the full sign-on bonus." Zeliger replied, "[T]hat protection is already in there for you."
On July 24, 2012, Zeliger emailed plaintiff a "revised" "draft." Zeliger stated that he had "agreed to make several changes that [plaintiff] requested," including "[specifying that [plaintiff] shall be a member of the management committee," reducing the number of people to whom plaintiff had to report on certain issues, and "[specifying" plaintiffs power to effect a "management override" relating to bonuses for departed employees. Zeliger declined to make certain changes, explaining:
"We did not change the clawback to reflect a pro rata repayment. The repayment amount remains the amount of the last sign on bonus paid.
"We did not reinsert the 'For the avoidance of doubt . . .' sentence in the guarantee paragraph. That provision was unique to 2009 when your current contract was signed, and was meant to not include the [second trimester] bonus from 2009 as part of your guarantee for the first year of your current contract because your bonus structure had changed. Your new contract, however, roles [sic] the guarantee from your current contract, and the guarantee for the next three years should continue to be calculated in the same way as the guarantee from the previous 2 years — i.e., calculated by measuring total cash compensation received during each one year period beginning on Sept 1st."
"We did not change the terms of the Special Non-Compete Payment, which remain the same as your current contract."
Zeliger closed, "I am happy to discuss further, and I understand that you are going to show the agreement to your attorney for review." Within a few minutes, plaintiff responded:
"We can discuss tomorrow. But not including the avoidance of doubt sentence makes no sense. Why would any money that I earned for the company in [the second trimester] and paid in a new contract go against my minimum [?] It defie[s] logic and common sense. This provision will actually benefit [defendant] as say in any one year I may have a large bonus due to me [o]n Oct 31 that could be used against my minimum, rather than be forced to pay me."
Zeliger replied, "Let's discuss tomorrow. As I understand it, the calculation is meant to be total cash paid to you between Sept 1st through August 31st." Plaintiff responded, again a short time later,
"The statement that that was meant for 2009 only is BS [sic] and is not what the intended [language] was created for. It was created for just this. No way should this revenue go against my minimum in a new contract year. It is a bad faith statement and I don't understand [defendant's] logic."
Plaintiff then added, "This contract was presented to me as a mirror image of my last one. This doesn't reflect that."
On August 3, 2012, Zeliger emailed plaintiff:
"We have discussed your request regarding the calculation of your guarantee and, in an effort to finalize your contract, we've agreed to make that change. Please note that we're agreeing to this change subject to you not having any additional substantive changes to your contract, as we hope the agreement is now substantially final. Attached is a marked draft of your contract compared against the last draft I sent. You'll see that we extended your term by two months and now have the guarantee calculated from each Nov 1 - Oct 31 period during the term."
On August 13, 2012, plaintiff responded with "limited comments" from his "attorney." Zeliger replied two days later, stating that defendant had "accepted some of [plaintiffs] lawyer's changes and tweaked some others," and "hope[d] to be able to sign this soon."
In an email to Zeliger dated August 15, 2012, plaintiff suggested that they "discuss in person," stating:
"It seems to me to be over reaching to not allow me to communicate with clients or solicit [defendant's] employees for a period of time after my non compete. Understanding we are negotiating a worst case scenario, how can you expect to prevent me from working or doing a job WITHOUT paying me, If you want to prevent me from doing these things th[e]n pay me.
"In regards to the special non compete, why would any monies paid to me after the contract period go against a previous years guaranteed comp [sic]? [Doesn't] that go against common sense? If you want that term, th[e]n protect me with the special non compete payment if and when my contract expires and you hold me out. These are all reasonable requests.
"You have to understand that my base salary is a mere portion of my compensation and if you hold me out of the market (in a worst case scenario) than [sic] you are really not paying me to sit out as my comp [sic] is mainly determined thr[ough] my bonus. In otherwords, you already have a VERY RESTRICTIVE non compete, which [I] am fine with . . . but you have to pay me to enforce it."
In an email dated August 17, 2012, Zeliger offered to set up a call to discuss the contract, stating:
"At this time, we are not willing to make the additional requested changes to your agreement other than the changes that we accepted in the last draft. Also, we have two changes that we want to make: (1) extending the employee non-solicit from 9 months to 18 months following the non-compete period; and (2) revising the production bonus language to clarify that while your payout from the bonus pool is 55% of your net income, the payout for others on the desk is less depending on seniority."
Within minutes, plaintiff responded, stating, "We are headed the wrong way. I cannot accept non compete language that prevents me from doing my [job] or a job without getting paid." In an email to Zeliger dated August 23, 2012, plaintiff followed up, stating, "I am not willing to consider your two proposed changes. Let me know what the next steps are if any." Zeliger responded, "[J]ust so I understand, do you otherwise accept the last draft of your agreement that we sent to you?" Plaintiff replied:
"For the most part my comments are not meant to be commercial but to tinker with language that was written 3 yrs ago to reflect today's scenario.
"[Defendant's] approach was to counter my comments with terms that did not do anything to improve the contract language!;] rather it was to be confrontational.
"I just don't understand why common sense refuses to be used on some of this language.
"I haven't had a chance to review this language for over a week and don't think your 2 unreasonable terms were going to have me change my opinion on some of th[is] language.
"Is that how you were negotiating!?] Actually I don't want to negotiate. I think we agreed to terms. It is clarifying some old language."
While on vacation, plaintiff informed defendant that he wished to continue discussing the contractual "documentation issues" when he returned to the office on Tuesday, September 4, 2012. This did not happen.
Instead, by letter dated September 1, 2012, defendant advised plaintiff that his employment had "ceased":
"On June 22, 2012, you notified us that you do not wish to extend (i.e., renew) your Employment Agreement with [defendant]. Since then, despite our efforts, you have not entered into a new written employment agreement with us. That is unfortunate, but your decision. However, as a result of your decisions, the Ending Date under your Employment Agreement was yesterday, August 31, 2012. As a result, your employment with [defendant] has ceased effective today. That said, we remind you of, and expect you to abide by, your ongoing obligations under your Employment Agreement, including without limitation those set forth in Section 6 [restrictive covenants], which [defendant] will enforce. . . .
"While we believe the cessation of your employment is not a termination by [defendant], and instead a non-extension of your Employment Agreement at your choice, without prejudice to [defendant's] positions, in an effort to avoid any dispute, and fully reserving all of its rights and claims, [defendant] will nonetheless pay you: (i) thirty days base salary and benefits in lieu of notice; and (ii) your base salary during the Non-Compete Period so long as you execute and return to [defendant] the enclosed General Release (the form of which was annexed to your Employment Agreement as Exhibit B . . . )."
Following the notification from defendant that his employment had "ceased," plaintiff commenced this action in October 2012. The first cause of action alleges breach of contract and seeks damages for "benefits to which [plaintiff] is entitled under the 2009 Employment Agreement as extended by the Extension Agreement." The second cause of action alleges unjust enrichment, by virtue of defendant's "retaining" his production bonus for the second trimester of 2012, as well as further monies allegedly owed him as a special noncompete payment.
In November 2012, defendant moved pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (1) to dismiss the first and second causes of action of the complaint for failure to state a claim based on documentary evidence. In support of its motion, defendant submitted, among other things, copies of the correspondence between the parties summarized above. As to plaintiffs claim that defendant had breached the 2009 agreement, defendant argued that, because his employment ended before the contractual due date of the production bonus and special noncompete payment, plaintiff had "forfeited his right to the monies." Defendant argued that plaintiffs second cause of action, for unjust enrichment, was "precluded by the existence of a written contract," namely, the 2009 agreement.
The motion court partially granted defendant's motion to dismiss to the extent of dismissing the second cause of action for unjust enrichment as duplicative of the breach of contract claim. The court, however, denied dismissal of the breach of contract claim on two grounds. First, the court found that the "emails submitted are not 'documentary evidence' under [CPLR 3211 (a) (1)]." (2013 NY Slip Op 31978[U], *6 [Sup Ct, NY County 2013].) Secondly, the court found that even if deemed documentary evidence, the emails do not "conclusively refute Plaintiffs contention that the parties had entered into a binding agreement as of July 16, 2012." (Id. at *7.)
Discussion
On a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (1), a court is obliged "to accept the complaint's factual allegations as true, according to plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determining only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory" (Weil, Gotshal & Manges, LLP v Fashion Boutique of Short Hills, Inc., 10 AD3d 267, 270-271 [1st Dept 2004] [internal quotation marks omit ted]). Moreover, dismissal pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (1) is warranted only if the documentary evidence submitted "utterly refutes plaintiffs factual allegations" (Goshen v Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N.Y., 98 NY2d 314, 326 [2002]; see Greenapple v Capital One, N.A., 92 AD3d 548, 550 [1st Dept 2012]), and "conclusively establishes a defense to the asserted claims as a matter of law" (Weil, Gotshal & Manges, LLP, 10 AD3d at 270-271 [internal quotation marks omitted]). If the documentary proof disproves an essential allegation of the complaint, dismissal pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (1) is warranted even if the allegations, standing alone, could withstand a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action (see McGuire v Sterling Doubleday Enters., L.P., 19 AD3d 660, 661-662 [1st Dept 2005]).
In this case, defendant's defense to the breach of contract claim, premised upon documentary evidence, boils down to the contention that the exchange of emails and other correspondence described above establishes as a matter of law that the parties did not enter into an extension of the 2009 employment agreement. Since the employment agreement had not been renewed, defendant argues, it had no duty to pay a sign on bonus for any new contract. Likewise, it had no duty to pay any production bonus for the second trimester of 2012 (which ended on Aug. 31, 2012), since, under the 2009 agreement, plaintiff was only entitled to receive that bonus if he remained employed two months after it had accrued. Similarly, since plaintiffs contract had simply expired, and he had not been terminated, it had no duty to give plaintiff any special noncompete payment.
Preliminarily, we reject Supreme Court's conclusion that correspondence such as the emails here do not suffice as documentary evidence for purposes of CPLR 3211 (a) (1). This Court has consistently held otherwise. For example, in Schutty v Speiser Krause P.C. (86 AD3d 484, 484-485 [1st Dept 2011]), this Court found drafts of an agreement and correspondence sufficient for purposes of establishing a defense under the statute. Similarly, in Langer v Dadabhoy (44 AD3d 425, 426 [1st Dept 2007], lv denied 10 NY3d 712 [2008]), this Court found "documentary evidence in the form of e-mails" to be sufficient to carry the day for a defendant on a CPLR 3211 (a) (1) motion. Likewise, in WFB Telecom. v NYNEX Corp. (188 AD2d 257, 259 [1st Dept 1992], lv denied 81 NY2d 709 [1993]), this Court granted a CPLR 3211 (a) (1) motion on the basis of a letter from the plaintiffs counsel that contradicted the complaint. Therefore, there is no blanket rule by which email is to be excluded from consideration as documentary evidence under the statute.
Nevertheless, we agree with Supreme Court that the disputed emails and other correspondence do not utterly refute plaintiffs allegations that the parties reached an agreement on the material terms of the contract renewal. "To establish the existence of an enforceable agreement, a plaintiff must establish an offer, acceptance of the offer, consideration, mutual assent, and an intent to be bound (22 NY Jur 2d, Contracts § 9). That meeting of the minds must include agreement on all essential terms (id. § 31)" (Kowalchuk v Stroup, 61 AD3d 118, 121 [1st Dept 2009]).
In determining the existence of a valid contract, we begin with the examination of the communications between the parties. We find that the June 15, 2012 email sent by defendant's CEO, Ertel, was not merely an incident in "preliminary negotiations," but an actual offer for the renewal of the 2009 employment agreement. Not only did Ertel characterize it as an offer that was made under "the same terms [as the] existing contract," but he specified the material terms of the employment contract: the period of employment, the yearly base salary, the sign on bonus, the minimum yearly compensation, and the production bonus.
When viewed in light of contract law principles that "[a]n offer is the manifestation of willingness to enter into a bargain, so made as to justify another person in understanding that his assent to that bargain is invited and will conclude it," (Restatement [Second] of Contracts § 24), Ertel's June 15, 2012 email can hardly be construed otherwise than extending to plaintiff the power to accept. Regarded in this context, plaintiffs subsequent purported acceptance by his July 16, 2012 email to Ertel, "I accept [please] send [the] contract," in reply to the June 15, 2012 email, must be interpreted as an acceptance of the offer, to which Ertel immediately replied, stating in full, "Mazel, looking forward to another great run."
"As a general rule, in order for an acceptance to be effective, it must comply with the terms of the offer and be clear, unambiguous and unequivocal" (King v King, 208 AD2d 1143, 1143-1144 [3d Dept 1994], citing 21 NY Jur 2d, Contracts § 53 at 470 [1982], and 2 Richard A. Lord, Williston on Contracts § 6:10 at 68 [4th ed 1990]). Inasmuch as there was nothing unclear, ambiguous or equivocal about plaintiffs July 16, 2012 email in response to Ertel's June 15, 2012 email, it appears to constitute an effective acceptance. Hence, according plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference, as we must do on a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (1) (Weil, Gotshal & Manges, LLP, 10 AD3d at 270), and viewed in the context of the parties' prior dealings, one may reasonably find that by the June 15-to-July 16, 2012 email exchange, the parties had entered into an agreement to renew plaintiffs employment for a new three-year term, carrying forward the existing compensation plan under the 2009 employment agreement.
The inquiry, however, does not end there. In order to argue for treating the contract formation process employed here as ineffective to bind it, defendant points out that, after the July 16, 2012 exchange, the parties entered into a long train of correspondence aimed at formalizing the contract, which never took place. However, to overcome the reasonable inference we draw from the language of the correspondence ending in the July 16, 2012 exchange — that the parties did indeed intend thereby to create a binding contract — defendant must do more than merely point to the circumstance that a formal document was contemplated: defendant must show either that both parties understood that their correspondence was to be of no legal effect or that plaintiff had reason to know that defendant contemplated that no obligations should arise until a formal contract was executed.
But defendant has referred to no documentary evidence conclusively establishing either of these possibilities. On the contrary, upon this record, no evidence has been shown that either party expressly reserved the right not to be bound prior to the execution of a formal writing. Nor does the language in their correspondence indicate an unambiguous intent not to be bound until a formal writing was executed by the parties. The mere fact that defendant often referred to the writing in progress as a "draft" is not dispositive here where other correspondence indicates that the parties may have had a different understanding. Indeed, on several occasions plaintiff expressed the view that he was not seeking to "negotiate" but that he was seeking either to clarify language or bring the language to conform with the parties' actual performance under the 2009 employment agreement.
Defendant, however, argues that even if we find evidence supporting a contractual intent, a binding contract never came into being because too many important terms were left unsettled by the exchange of letters. In support of this contention defendant points to the subsequent difficulties the parties encountered in reaching agreement on certain terms. The law is clear that although the parties may intend to enter into a contract, if essential terms are omitted from their agreement, or if some of the terms included are too indefinite, no legally enforceable contract will result (Cobble Hill Nursing Home v Henry & Warren Corp., 74 NY2d 475, 482 [1989], cert denied 498 US 816 [1990]; Joseph Martin, Jr., Delicatessen v Schumacher, 52 NY2d 105, 109 [1981]; see also Restatement [Second] of Contracts § 33 [2]). But it is also plain that all the terms contemplated by the agreement need not be fixed with complete and perfect certainty for a contract to have legal efficacy (Cobble Hill Nursing Home at 483; see also 21 NY Jur 2d, Contracts § 20; 1 Corbin on Contracts § 95 [1950]).
In this case, as indicated, it appears that all of the terms essential to the agreement were specified in the June 15, 2012 email intended to be an offer, and which plaintiff accepted (see Geller v Reuben Gittelman Hebrew Day School, 34 AD3d 730, 731 [2d Dept 2006] [material terms of employment agreement include "salary and the amount of services required"]). This militates toward plaintiffs contention that the parties initially did reach an agreement on all material terms, even though there might not have been a meeting of the minds on all details of the agreement (see Aiello v Burns Intl. Sec. Servs. Corp., 110 AD3d 234, 242-243 [1st Dept 2013]).
Indeed, the initial proposed changes appeared to be simple clarifications and modifications that would not necessarily indicate a lack of meeting of the minds on the essential terms. For instance, in the first draft defendant inserted a clawback clause intended to modify the "Sign On Bonus" provision. The clawback clause, however, did not alter the amounts of the periodic "Sign On Bonus." Instead, the clawback clause simply provided that each periodic bonus was contingent upon the employee remaining employed until the end of each "Sign On Bonus" period. Initially, plaintiff did not find the modification objectionable. Plaintiff only sought clarification that the claw-back did not apply if he was terminated without cause or he resigned for good reason. Defendant accepted this clarification even though the employer found it unnecessary because "that protection [was] already in there for you."
In the first draft, defendant also included a modification of the 2009 guarantee payment provision. As the language indicates, such provision guaranteed that plaintiff would receive a minimum combined payment of salary and bonuses totaling $750,000. If the combined salary and bonuses paid to plaintiff for a specific year did not reach the $750,000 threshold, the difference would constitute a "Make Whole Payment" due to plaintiff at the end of the year. The 2009 agreement, however, contained a "For the avoidance of doubt" clause. The clause inured to plaintiffs benefit since it provided that the production bonus that he earned during the second trimester of 2009 would not be included in the "guaranteed compensation" calculation. Defendant did not seek to significantly alter the 2009 guarantee provision; it simply sought to remove the "For the avoidance of doubt" clause from the provision because the clause was "unique" to the 2009 agreement. It had been inserted to the 2009 employment agreement to compensate for the fact that plaintiffs "bonus structure had changed" when such contract was signed. Since the "avoidance of doubt" modification involved a single trimester of production bonus, which, as defendant acknowledged, was unique to the 2009 employment agreement, it cannot be viewed as a significant change to the guaranteed compensation scheme.
Plaintiff also complained about defendant's purported insertion of a second modification to the guaranteed compensation scheme. Specifically, plaintiff complained about the inclusion of the noncompete payment — which would have been triggered if he was terminated without cause or he quit with a good reason — as an amount to be factored, along with base salary and bonuses, in the computation of the "Make Whole Payment" due to plaintiff. However, plaintiff was under the misimpression that this was a modification of the guaranteed compensation provision of the 2009 agreement. The 2009 agreement explicitly provided that any amount due to plaintiff as a special noncompete payment would count toward the guaranteed compensation calculation during the last year of the contract.
In retrospect, it appears that the only significant change upon which the parties faltered was defendant's attempt to increase the period of the non-solicit restrictive covenant from 9 to 18 months following the noncompete period. On its face, such modification clearly appears to be a material change of the terms of the non-solicit restrictive covenant. However, plaintiff contends that such last minute modification was an attempt by defendant to renege on the contract by introducing a drastic change that it knew plaintiff was never going to accept, presumably as financially onerous.
If plaintiffs contention is the correct characterization of the parties' negotiations, such impasse on a drastic new change does not necessarily defeat the original agreement of the parties. An agreement is still binding if a party has a change of heart between the time of agreeing to the terms of the agreement and the time those terms are reduced to writing (see Kowalchuk v Stroup, 61 AD3d at 122-123). Once the renewal agreement is reached, however, it may not be repudiated by either party. Rather, such agreement must be enforced.
Contrary to the dissent's mischaraterization, we do not hold "that the terms on which the parties failed to agree simply don't matter." Rather, we simply hold that defendant has not established, as a matter of law, that by their emails and other' correspondence, that the parties never entered into a valid employment renewal contract and that, instead, their aborted negotiation efforts were intended to reach a new agreement. On the contrary, if we accord to plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference, as we must do on a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (1) (Weil, Gotshal & Manges, LLP, 10 AD3d at 270), we find that the emails and other correspondence support an inference that the parties were engaged in attempts to formalize the binding extension agreement in a more formal instrument (see Kowalchuk, 61 AD3d at 123 ["binding agreement that is nevertheless to be further documented . is enforceable with or without the formal documentation" (internal quotation marks omitted)]).
Even if we were to agree with the dissent that the parties never entered into an extension of the 2009 employment agreement, we would still find that defendant's documentary evidence does not establish, as a matter of law, that plaintiff was not entitled to a production bonus for work done prior to termination of the 2009 employment agreement. Defendant claims that plaintiff was not entitled to the production bonus because payment of the bonus was contingent upon plaintiff being "actively employed by [defendant] at the time of [defendant's] firm-wide bonus payment," which took place after the 2009 employment agreement expired. Plaintiff, however, claims that the production bonus was "incentive compensation." Plaintiffs contention is supported by contractual language stating that the production bonus was "based on [plaintiffs] performance" and calculated as "no less than 55% of the Net Earnings of the Desk" that plaintiff managed. Thus, if plaintiffs contention is correct that the production bonus was actually earned through his own performance, plaintiff would be entitled to such bonus as wages, which are not subject to forfeiture (see Ryan v Kellogg Partners Inst. Servs., 19 NY3d 1, 16 [2012] [Court held that "bonus (that) was expressly link(ed) to (employee's) labor or services personally rendered . . . had been earned and was vested before he left his job . . . (and) its payment was guaranteed and non-discretionary as a term and condition of his employment" (internal quotation marks omitted)]; Weiner v Diebold Group, 173 AD2d 166, 167 [1st Dept 1991] ["the long standing policy (in the state) against the forfeiture of earned wages . . . applies to earned, uncollected commissions as well"]; see also Labor Law § 190 [1]). Thus, given the conflicting language concerning the nature of the bonus payment, this issue presents a question of fact.
We find, however, that defendant met its burden of establishing that plaintiff does not have a claim under the 2009 employment agreement for a special noncompete payment. The 2009 employment agreement provided for this payment to be made "[i]n the event" that plaintiff was "terminated by [defendant] prior to the Ending Date without cause." It is undisputed that plaintiffs employment terminated on September 1, 2012, after the 2009 agreement's "Ending Date" of August 31, 2012. Thus, in accordance with the agreement's plain language, plaintiff is not entitled to any special noncompete payment under the 2009 employment agreement.
Accordingly, the order of the Supreme Court, New York County (Eileen Bransten, J.), entered August 22, 2013, which, insofar as appealed from, denied defendant's motion to dismiss the first cause of action for breach of contract, should be modified, on the law, to dismiss so much of the cause of action as seeks to recover a special noncompete payment under plaintiffs 2009 employment agreement, and otherwise affirmed, without costs.
. Plaintiff also avers a third cause of action seeking a declaration that section 6.3 (b) of the 2009 agreement, which "purports to prohibit [plaintiff] from having any business dealings or communications with a client of [defendant] for a period of nine months following the termination of his employment," is "not enforceable to prohibit [plaintiff] from entering into a consulting arrangement with a client (not a competitor) that would not involve any activity competitive with the business of [defendant], any solicitation on behalf of a competitive business, or any use or disclosure of any confidential information of [defendant]."
. Mazel is an obvious reference to "Mazel tov" or "mazal tov," a Hebrew or Yiddish phrase used to express congratulations for a happy and significant occasion or event.
. The cases cited by the dissent to support its position are easily distinguishable on the facts. For instance, in Spier v Southgate Owners Corp. (39 AD3d 277, 278 [1st Dept 2007]), this Court found that the defendant's letter was not a contract; it simply referred to " 'possible' sale of air rights and the advice that it 'will not consider a sale' of less than a certain square footage did not manifest a present intent to be bound." In Galesi v Galesi (37 AD3d 249, 249 [1st Dept 2007]), this Court found that while the "plaintiffs presented evidence that the negotiating parties had agreed as to price and quantity, the exchange of drafts, further discussion, and the totality of the circumstances clearly showed that there was never a meeting of the minds on all essential terms." In Yenom Corp. v 155 Wooster St. Inc. (23 AD3d 259, 259-260 [1st Dept 2005], lv denied 6 NY3d 708 [2006]), this Court found that "even if there were no intent to be bound only upon execution of a formal contract, the many substantial changes to [the] draft that were prepared by plaintiffs counsel and the parties' subsequent correspondence establish that there was never a meeting of the minds on material terms, including price." In Yenom Corp., this Court also found it significant that "one section of the draft that plaintiffs counsel did not alter was that requiring execution and delivery of a formal contract" (id. at 260). Finally, in Dratfield v Gibson Greetings (269 AD2d 294, 295 [1st Dept 2000]), this Court found that "[t]he parties' correspondence and the surrounding circumstances establish that they did not intend to be bound until their agreement was reduced to writing and formally executed." This Court found it significant that "[although neither party expressly reserved the right not to be bound prior to the execution of the signed contract, the language used in both of defendant's March letters establishes an intention to be bound only after a formal signing"; thus summary dismissal was properly granted (id.).