Case Name: John DIXON, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1994-02-01
Citations: 630 So. 2d 1242
Docket Number: No. 92-1875
Parties: John DIXON, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: Before HUBBART, COPE and GODERICH, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 630
Pages: 1242–1244

Head Matter:
John DIXON, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. 92-1875.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
Feb. 1, 1994.
Bennett H. Brummer, Public Defender, and Richard D. Tannenbaum, Palm Beach, Sp. Asst. Public Defender, for appellant.
Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., and Avi J. Litwin, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.
Before HUBBART, COPE and GODERICH, JJ.
. Judge Hubbart did not hear oral argument.

Opinion:
PER CURIAM.
John Dixon appeals his conviction for trafficking in four or more grams of heroin and resisting an officer without violence. We affirm.
The question before us is whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying the defendant's motion for mistrial. "[A] mistrial is appropriate only when the error committed was so prejudicial as to vitiate the entire trial." Duest v. State, 462 So.2d 446, 448 (Fla.1985) (citation omitted). Whether a mistrial must be granted depends upon the circumstances of the particular case. Mabery v. State, 803 So.2d 369, 370 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974), cert. denied, 312 So.2d 756 (Fla. 1975).
In the present case the police officer testified that he conducted drug surveillance at a housing project. He saw the defendant and another person conduct a drug transaction, but because the officer was due to be in court, he left the area and did not make an arrest at that time.
Later in the same day, the officer again observed the defendant at the same location. He observed another drug transaction, at which time the defendant was arrested. The officer testified that after the arrest, he said to the defendant, "Mr. Dixon, you're at it again." The defendant moved for a mistrial, which the trial court denied.
We find no error in the trial court's ruling. The trial court could reasonably conclude that "you're at it again" would be interpreted by the jury to refer to the morning drug transaction which the police officer had just testified about. Given those facts, there was no abuse of discretion in the denial of the motion for mistrial.
The defendant argues that the officer's statement violated the trial court's order in limine issued at the outset of trial. Obviously, the trial court did not agree. The order in limine prohibited reference to prior arrests. It specifically allowed testimony about the officer's prior contact with defendant. It was for the trial court to interpret its own order in limine, and the court plainly concluded that the order in limine had not been violated.
Finally, in view of the physical evidence and the incriminating statements by defendant which were in evidence, any arguable error was entirely harmless.
As to the second point on appeal, we find no error with regard to the determination of the weight of the contraband. See Ross v. State, 528 So.2d 1237, 1240 (Fla. 3d DCA), review denied, 537 So.2d 569 (Fla.1988).
Affirmed.
HUBBART and COPE, JJ., concur.
. In addition, the defendant elected to testify in the case. Given the overwhelming evidence against him, that choice was quite understandable. During his testimony, he conceded that he had five prior felony convictions. Assuming ar-guendo that the officer's statement was susceptible of being interpreted as a reference to defendant's prior record — and viewed in context, we do not think it was susceptible of that interpretation — it was insignificant in view of the defendant's own specific testimony regarding his prior record.