Case Name: Re WLBT, INC., d/b/a WLBT-TV
Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Mississippi
Decision Date: 2005-01-20
Citations: 905 So. 2d 1196
Docket Number: No. 2004-M-02239-SCT
Parties: Re WLBT, INC., d/b/a WLBT-TV.
Judges: SMITH, C.J., CARLSON, GRAVES AND DICKINSON, JJ„ CONCUR. RANDOLPH, J., CONCURS IN PART. DICKINSON, J., CONCURS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION JOINED BY SMITH, C.J., AND WALLER, P.J.; COBB, P.J., AND RANDOLPH, J., JOIN IN PART. COBB, P.J., DISSENTS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION JOINED IN PART BY EASLEY AND RANDOLPH, JJ. EASLEY, J., DISSENTS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION JOINED IN PART BY COBB, P.J. AND RANDOLPH, J. DIAZ, J., NOT PARTICIPATING. ,
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 905
Pages: 1196–1205

Head Matter:
Re WLBT, INC., d/b/a WLBT-TV.
No. 2004-M-02239-SCT.
Supreme Court of Mississippi.
Jan. 20, 2005.
. Leonard D. Van Slyke, Jr., Jackson, attorney for appellant.

Opinion:
WALLER, Presiding Justice,
for the Court.
¶ 1. This matter comes to us from the Circuit Court of Madison County on the circuit court's denial of a request to allow television coverage of trial proceedings. Effective April 17, 2003, this Court adopted the Mississippi Rules for Electronic and Photographic Coverage of Judicial Proceedings "MREPC", bringing Mississippi in accord with those states which have elected to allow coverage of court proceedings by the use of still cameras, television, and other electronic technology.
¶ 2. David H, Richardson entered a guilty plea to the charge of conspiracy, and a sentencing hearing was scheduled for December 1,. 2004. The petitioner here, WLBT-TV,- timely notified the circuit court of its intention to cover the.sentencing proceedings with television cameras as provided for in MREPC 5, and was notified by the court administrator that the request was denied. WLBT then sought relief in this Court, and the matter was remanded with directions to the circuit court, Special Judge Marcus Gordon presiding, to enter an order regarding the request and, if it was denied, to state his reasons for doing so. Thereafter, the request was formally denied by opinion and order of the circuit court. WLBT then filed its petition for an emergency writ of mandamus to compel the circuit court to allow such televised coverage. This Court finds that the circuit court erred in denying WLBT's request, and, due to time constraints, we, on November 29, 2004, issued an order to this effect with opinions to follow.
¶ 3. After the first petition was remanded, a hearing was held at which WLBT, the district attorney, and attorneys for Richardson and Don A. McGraw, a co-defendant, were heard. In giving his reason for denying the coverage, the circuit judge stated his denial was based solely on his concern for the impact that television coverage of the sentencing proceedings may have on the right to a fair trial of James Butler, a defendant in a companion case, also charged with conspiracy. He found that Butler's right to a fair trial might be negatively affected by television coverage of statements made in the sentencing hearing regarding that defendant's guilt and details associating him with the conspiracy. The judge stated expressly that he had no concern that the coverage would adversely impact the dignity of the proceedings or offend decorum.
¶ 4. The paramount concern must, of course, be assuring fair trials for the parties. Nevertheless, the right of openness in judicial proceedings is also a fundamental right shared by the accused and the public. Gannett River States Publ'g Co. v. Hand, 571 So.2d 941, 942 (Miss.1990) (citing Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court (Press-Enterprise II), 478 U.S. 1, 7, 106 S.Ct. 2735, 2739, 92 L.Ed.2d 1 (1986)). Most often, that concern is raised, as it was here, on motion of press representatives, who have standing to contest court orders restricting public access to legal proceedings. Hand, 571 So.2d at 944 (holding that "representatives of the news media have the standing to contest a court order restricting public access to legal proceedings.")
¶ 5. In Hand, we addressed circumstances under which a court may close proceedings to protect the rights of the accused, holding that prior to closure, a hearing must be held, and that: at such a hearing a party seeking closure of the proceedings must "advance an overriding interest that is likely to be prejudiced; the closure order must be no broader than necessary to protect that interest; the trial court must consider reasonable alternatives to closing the proceedings, and it must make findings adequate to support the closure." Id. at 945.
¶ 6. In the present ease, we do not face an order closing the proceedings, but rather one which restricts the methods and technology used, i.e. television cameras. There is neither a constitutional prohibition against nor a constitutional presumption in favor of allowing cameras in the courtroom. Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. 560, 580-81, 101 S.Ct. 802, 812-13, 66 L.Ed.2d 740 (1981); In re WMUR Cahnnel 9, 148 N.H. 644, 813 A.2d 455, 458 (2002); see generally Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc. 435 U.S. 589, 610, 98 S.Ct. 1306, 1318, 55 L.Ed.2d 570 (1978). Still, prohibiting cameras does restrict the ability of the public to access the proceedings, and, as we said in Hand regarding the closing of proceedings, the complete exclusion of cameras should be resorted to only after less restrictive measures have been considered and found to be inadequate. Such is the dominate note of our rules.
¶ 7. MREPC 3 declares that electronic media coverage of judicial proceedings "shall be allowed in the appellate and trial courts of record in this state, subject to the conditions [of this rule.]" Having established the policy that electronic media coverage is favored, the rules put limits on the presiding judge's management of the use of the technology:
All electronic coverage is subject at all time to the authority of the presiding justice or judge to (i) control the conduct of the proceedings, (ii) ensure decorum and prevent distraction, and (iii) ensure fair administration of justice in the pending case. The rights of the parties to a fair adjudication are recognized as paramount. It is the responsibility of the media to so arrange and operate equipment in order to comply with these rules.
MREPC 3(a). MREPC 4 also places limitations on the use of the technology to prevent disruption, to protect jurors, and to avoid audio recording of off-the-record conversations and coverage of in-chambers proceedings. It is within these limits that the presiding judge's discretion and courtroom management must be exercised. It is generally better for the courts to limit or terminate coverage as needed than to exclude camera and television coverage altogether. MREPC 3 speaks of ensuring fair administration of justice and protecting the rights of parties and witnesses. These words envision real and substantial rights that are at risk. The learned circuit judge, while expressing concern that things covered in the sentencing hearing "may" impact the companion case — not that there was a probability that such would be the case — -stated no specific prejudice. The proper standard for restricting press coverage is that there is a "substantial probability" that the accused will be deprived of a fair trial. In Press-Enterprise II, the Supreme Court rejected the lesser standard of "reasonable likelihood" applied by the California Supreme Court and went on to point out that "[t]he First Amendment right of access cannot be overcome by the conclusory assertion that publicity might deprive the defendant of that right." Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 14, 106 S.Ct. at 2743. The decision to restrict press access, whether by closing proceedings or by eliminating the use of the tools of the trade must be supported by specific, on the record findings of fact which show in what manner, the coverage will cause a party to lose the right to a fair trial. See Hand, 571 So.2d at 944. Butler, the defendant in the related case, is not, in the words of MREPC 3, a party "in the pending case." The judge did not indicate that Butler's trial is imminent, a circumstance which could be a factor in limiting or restricting coverage if the trial of that case was to take place shortly after the sentencing hearing. Butler sought no opportunity to intervene and raised no objection to having cameras in the courtroom.
¶ 8. Although each case must be' judged on its own merits and the privilege of using electronic technology in the courts is not absolute, in the present case the circuit judge failed to articulate sufficient reasons to deny television coverage by WLBT-TV. The petition of WLBT-TV is granted to the extent that the circuit court's order denying television coverage is set aside. WLBT shall be allowed to provide television coverage of the proceedings in accordance with the Mississippi Rules for Electronic and Photographic Coverage of Judicial Proceedings.
¶ 9. PETITION GRANTED AND CASE REMANDED.
SMITH, C.J., CARLSON, GRAVES AND DICKINSON, JJ" CONCUR. RANDOLPH, J., CONCURS IN PART. DICKINSON, J., CONCURS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION JOINED BY SMITH, C.J., AND WALLER, P.J.; COBB, P.J., AND RANDOLPH, J., JOIN IN PART. COBB, P.J., DISSENTS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION JOINED IN PART BY EASLEY AND RANDOLPH, JJ. EASLEY, J., DISSENTS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION JOINED IN PART BY COBB, P.J. AND RANDOLPH, J. DIAZ, J., NOT PARTICIPATING. ,
. In the hearing on media coverage, there was discussion of the difference between MREPC 5, requiring that media representatives notify the clerk and court administrator of their intention to- use electronic coverage forty-eight hours prior-to trial, and.MREPC 7 which .requires parties to file objections to such coverage up to fifteen days prior to trial. In this discussion, there was apparent confusion as to the purpose of the two rules. MREPC 7 requires parties to formally object to all use of camera and television coverage. Should parties believe media coverage would be prejudicial or otherwise objectionable, their objection is to be filed sufficiently in advance of the proceedings to allow a response and hearing. MREPC 5 requires notice of the media's intention to record or broadcast forty-eight hours before the proceedings begin, so that administrative coordination may be had prior to the proceedings. The "media notice" is not for leave or permission to record or broadcast because that right is presumed unless there are objections or order to the contrary.