Case Name: BARTOLAS, Admr. v. COLEMAN
Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Ohio
Decision Date: 1927-07-26
Citations: 6 Ohio Law Abs. 339
Docket Number: 
Parties: BARTOLAS, Admr. v. COLEMAN.
Judges: (Shields, J., and Démert, J., concur.)
Reporter: The Ohio Law Abstract
Volume: 6
Pages: 339–340

Head Matter:
BARTOLAS, Admr. v. COLEMAN.
Ohio Appeals, 5th Dist., Tuscarawas Co.
Decided July 26, 1927.
Stafford & O’Donnell, New Philadelphia, for Bartolas.
Bowers & Bowers, New Philadelphia, for Coleman.

Opinion:
HOUCK, J.
"The errors relied upon for a reversal of the judgment in the Common Pleas Court are as follows:
(a) Refusal to permit plaintiff to examine the defendant and other witnesses, before the jury was called, to ascertain whether the defendant or some insurance company was the actual party in interest.
(b) Error in the admission of testimony on behalf of defendant.
(c) Refusal to give, in charge before argument, special request No. 1 which was in writing.
(d) Error in the general charge.
(1) The first claimed error does not appeal to us as sound in reason or law.
It must be remembered that courts are inclined to, and do, give much latitude in determining the qualifications of jurors as to their interest as stockholders, policyholders or otherwise, in liability insurance companies. Yet, such in no wise extends the rule to the degree as insisted on by the plaintiff here.
We do not agree with plaintiff in error that any prejudicial error intervened in the impaneling of the jury; or in the refusal of the court to permit counsel to examine defendant prior to the impaneling of the jury as requested by them.
(2) We have very carefully read the testimony, on behalf of defendant, which is insisted as being erroneously admitted. This testimony is in support of the claim of the defendant that he did not abandon his patient and that he was not guilty of any actionable negligence on his part. This evidence was clearly pertinent to the issues raised by the pleadings and was properly submitted to the jury for its consideration.
(3) Did the court err in refusing to give the following request before argument:
"Ladies and Gentlemen of the Jury, I charge you as a matter of law, that a physician has the right to leave, temporarily, hisi practice, if he makes provision for the attendance of a Competent Physician upon his patients. If he notifies a patient that he is going away and indicates who will attend him in his stead, no neglect can be imputed to him, but a physician who leaves a patient in a critical stage of the disease without reason or sufficient notice to enable the party to procure another medical attendant, is guilty of culpable dereliction of duty, and is liable to respond in damages."
It needs little or no comment from the court because it is so well known by judge and lawyer that a written request of law must be given by the trial judge, before argument, if it contains the law pertinent to the issuable facts and the proof. The charge under consideration was properly refused for the following reasons:
a. While sound as to a particular state of facts, yet an examination of the proven facts clearly indicate that in several respects it is foreign to them.
b. Several of the facts stated in the charge were not set' forth in the pleadings and no proof offered to establish same.
c. The law as contained therein is not applicable to the case made in the record.
d. The charge is not responsive either to the facts or law of the instant case.
(4) Did the court below, in its general charge, err?
It is urged that error has intervened with respect to the charge as to "proximate cause," "negligence" and "measure of damages."
As we view it, the general charge fully and completely covers each and every issue raised by the pleadings and the evidence adduced. The issues were stated in a clear and plain language.
This court finds that under the facts, as contained in the bill of exceptions, the jury reached the proper conclusion.
Gillette v. Tucker, 67 OS. 106; Palmer v. Humiston, 87 OS. 401; Hier v. Stites, 90 OS. 127; Bowers v. Santee, 99 OS. 361; Manley v. Coleman, 19 O. A. R. 284; McAllister v. Harzell, 60 OS. 69; and Ochsner v. Traction Co., 107 OS. 33.
The court if bound, under the facts and the law, to affirm the judgment of the lower court."
(Shields, J., and Démert, J., concur.)