Case Name: J. C. Wilson v. The State
Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1907-12-04
Citations: 52 Tex. Crim. 173
Docket Number: No. 3765
Parties: J. C. Wilson v. The State.
Judges: 
Reporter: Texas Criminal Reports
Volume: 52
Pages: 173–176

Head Matter:
J. C. Wilson v. The State.
No. 3765.
Decided December 4, 1907.
1. —Burglary—Statement of Facts—Twenty-Day-Order.
Where upon appeal from a conviction of burglary the statement of facts was filed on the 30th of July, and the trial court adjourned on the ninth of said month, and there was nothing to indicate that the failure to have the statement filed, arose from any fault of the trial judge, the same could not be considered on appeal. Attention is called to the Act of the Thirtieth Legislature in regard to preparing statement of facts.
2. —Same—Practice- on Appeal—Charge of Court.
Unless the supposed error is of that character and degree which would be detrimental to appellant’s case and not authorized by any state of facts provable under the allegation of the indictment, objections to the court’s charge cannot be considered in the absence of a statement of facts.
3. —Same—Charge of Court—Circumstantial Evidence.
Where upon trial for burglary, the charge of the court on circumstantial evidence was in accordance with the authority laid down by this court there was no error. Following Smith v. State, 35 Texas Grim. Rep., 618.
4. —Same—Argument of Counsel—Withdrawal.
Where upon trial for burglary the argument of counsel was based on the evidence, and besides was not of that serious nature to have been injurious to the rights of defendant, after it was withdrawn by an instruction of the court, there was no error.
5.—Same—Practice on Appeal—Motion For Rehearing.
Where objection to the court’s charge was not raised by bill of exceptions or motion for new trial, but was made for the first time in the motion for rehearing in the appellate court, the same will not be considered, although the charge may have been erroneous.
Appeal from the District Court of Bastrop. Tried below before the Hon. Ed. E. Sinks.
Appeal from a conviction of burglary; penalty, eleven years imprisonment in the penitentiary.
The opinion states the case.
0. Dickens, for appellant.
F. J. McCord, Assistant Attorney-General, for the State.
The law provides that a statement of facts may be filed after the adjournment of the term, provided an order is obtained to that effect, but the statement must be filed within twenty days. This was the law before the Act of the Thirtieth Legislature, approved May 25, 1907, and which took effect ninety days after adjournment. By section 14 of the Act of the Thirtieth Legislature, it is provided that a statement of facts may be filed within thirty days after the adjournment. This law, however, did not go into effect until the 24th day of August, 1907, and this appeal, therefore, is under the old law, and the statement of facts not having been filed within the twenty days, the State contends that the same can not be considered by this court. If we exclude the day of adjournment, then the statement of facts would have to be filed on the 30th, but the statute using the word within twenty days, makes the last day in which the statement of facts can be filed the 29th day of July, 1907. The State, therefore, moves to strike out the statement of facts.
Again, if appellant should attempt to bring himself within the act of the last Legislature giving thirty days within which to file a statement of facts, then said statement of facts cannot be considered, because by section 5 of said act, the law provides that the testimony, as contained in the transcript, shall be in narrative form. The statement of facts that accompanies this record comes here in questions and answers, and therefore can not be considered.
The fourteenth ground of the motion complains that the court charged on circumstantial evidence, because he claims that the charge failed to tell the jury that the circumstantial evidence must exclude to a moral certainty any other reasonable hypothesis other than the guilt of the defendant. How the State insists that the charge given by the court was equivalent to that in this that the court says, “The circumstances taken together, must be of a conclusive nature, leading on the whole to a satisfactory conclusion and producing in effect a reasonable and moral certainty that the accused and no other person committed the offense."

Opinion:
DAVIDSON, Presiding Judge. Judge.—Appellant
Appellant was convicted of burglary. The statement of facts was not filed within the time allowed by law. Court adjourned on the 9th of July, and the statement of facts was not approved by the district judge until the 30th, and there is nothing before the court to indicate that the failure to have the testimony filed in time arose from any fault on his part. We would observe, in passing, that this statement of facts is rather voluminous; is by questions and answers. We call attention to the act of our last Legislature in regard to preparing statement of facts on appeal to this court to avoid complications on such appeals.
There are some matters urged for reversal in regard to the charge of the court, and omissions to charge, etc., which questions cannot be reviewed in the absence of the evidence. Where errors of commission or omission in regard to the court's charge are urged, in the absence of the evidence this court will not review unless the supposed error was of that character and degree which would be detrimental to appellant's case and not authorized by any state of facts provable under the allegations of the indictment. These errors are not of that character, as we view them.
The charge on circumstantial evidence is criticised, but the same we think has been settled adversely to appellant in Smith v. State, 35 Texas Crim. Rep., 618.
The exception reserved to the argument of counsel, as explained by the court, shows no such error as would require a reversal.
In regard to the argument of private prosecuting counsel, Mr. Maynard, the court qualifies this bill by stating that the matters commented on by counsel were introduced in evidence. The bill of exception reserved to the argument of the district attorney is qualified by the court, in which it is stated Mr. Jones withdrew all the comment from the jury and the court instructed them to disregard it. We believe the comments were not of that serious character, in the face of this qualification of the bill, that would require a review.
As the record is presented to us, we find no such matters as require a reversal of the judgment and it is therefore affirmed.
Affirmed.
Henderson, Judge, absent.