Case Name: Jason C. DOYLE and Cheryl C. Doyle v. Oscar L. McKINNEY, City of New Orleans, Paul H. Jones and Allstate Insurance Co.
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1999-04-07
Citations: 732 So. 2d 128
Docket Number: No. 98-CA-1102
Parties: Jason C. DOYLE and Cheryl C. Doyle v. Oscar L. McKINNEY, City of New Orleans, Paul H. Jones and Allstate Insurance Co.
Judges: Court composed of Judge STEVEN R. PLOTKIN, Judge JAMES F. McKAY, III, and Judge DENNIS R. BAGNERIS, Sr.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 732
Pages: 128–134

Head Matter:
Jason C. DOYLE and Cheryl C. Doyle v. Oscar L. McKINNEY, City of New Orleans, Paul H. Jones and Allstate Insurance Co.
No. 98-CA-1102.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fourth Circuit.
April 7, 1999.
Benjamin J. Birdsall, Jr., New Orleans, Louisiana, Attorney for Plaintiffs/Appel-lees.
Avis Marie Russell, City Attorney, Nolan P. Lambert, Chief Deputy City Attorney, Darren G. Wells, Assistant City Attorney, New Orleans, Louisiana, Attorneys for Defendants/Appellees.
Joseph B. Morton, III Kathleen C. Marksbury, Duplass, Zwain & Bourgeois, Metairie, Louisiana, Attorneys for Paul H. Jones and Allstate Insurance Co., Defendants/Appellants.
Court composed of Judge STEVEN R. PLOTKIN, Judge JAMES F. McKAY, III, and Judge DENNIS R. BAGNERIS, Sr.

Opinion:
I,McKAY, Judge.
The defendants in this case are appealing a trial court's award of damages and apportionment of fault between the defendants. We affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On Monday, April 11, 1994, at approximately 8:15 P.M., Jason Doyle was traveling west in the extreme right hand lane of 1-610. Mr. Doyle was driving a 1989 Nissan owned by his mother, Cheryl Doyle. At a point somewhere between the Franklin Avenue on-ramp and the Elysian Fields exit, he noticed an abandoned 1974 Ford pick-up truck in the extreme right hand lane of the interstate. Paul Jones had left the truck at this location at least an hour and a half earlier after the truck's battery had apparently gone dead. Mr. Jones contends that he left the truck in order to go to his friend's house to seek assistance. The hazard lights on the truck did not work and Mr. Jones made no attempt to warn other motorists of the stalled vehicle. However, Mr. Doyle was able to stop his vehicle some fifteen to twenty feet behind the truck.
| ¡Mr. Doyle was waiting for a chance to move into the adjacent lane when he was struck from behind by a 1992 Ford Taurus driven by Oscar McKinney and owned by the City of New Orleans. At the time of the accident, Mr. McKinney was in the course and scope of his employment with the New Orleans Recreation Department. Mr. McKinney maintains that a red Mustang suddenly changed lanes and caused him to veer into the extreme right hand lane and strike Mr. Doyle's car. Mr. Doyle also recalled seeing a red Mustang in his rear-view mirror before the accident. Some controversy also exists as to whether Mr. McKinney was talking on a portable phone at the time of the accident.
On June 28, 1994, Jason Doyle and Cheryl Doyle filed suit against Oscar McKinney, the City of New Orleans, Paul Jones, and Allstate Insurance Company (Jones' liability insurer). The Doyles later amended their suit to add United Services Automobile Association, their uninsured and/or underinsured motorist carrier. Trial was held on September 23, 1997, and the trial court issued its judgment along with Reasons for Judgment on January 12, 1998. The trial court found in favor of the plaintiffs and awarded Jason Doyle: $42,500.00 for pain and suffering, $6,460.17 for special damages, and $1000.00 for expert witnesses. Cheryl Doyle was awarded: $9,465.00 for the actual cash value of the vehicle, $75.00 for towing, $298.00 for storage, and $852.00 for license and transfer fees. The court apportioned seventy-five percent (75%) of the fault to Paul Jones and twenty-five percent (25%) of the fault to Oscar McKinney. The defendants appeal this judgment.
LISSUES
The two principal issues are: 1) whether the trial court erred in finding defendants, Paul Jones and Oscar McKinney, liable for the collision and apportioning 75% of the fault to Paul Jones and 25% of the fault to Oscar McKinney, and 2) whether the trial court erred in awarding $49,960.17 to plaintiff Jason Doyle.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
In reviewing the factual findings of a trial court, an appellate court is limited to a determination of manifest error. Hill v. Morehouse Parish Police Jury, 95-1100 (La.1/16/96), 666 So.2d 612, 614; Ferrell v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 94-1252 (La.2/20/95), 650 So.2d 742, 745; Stobart v. State through Dept. of Transp. and Development, 617 So.2d 880 (La.1993); Arceneaux v. Domingue, 365 So.2d 1330 (La.1978).
Before a trier of fact's judgment may be reversed, we must find from the record that a reasonable factual basis does not exist for its conclusions, and they must be manifestly wrong. Lewis v. State through Dept. of Transp. and Development, 94-2370 (La.4/21/95), 654 So.2d 311, 314; Stobart, supra. Furthermore, a reviewing court may not disturb reasonable evaluations of credibility and reasonable inferences of fact when viewed in the light of the record in its entirety even though it feels its evaluations are more reasonable. Id. at 882.
ALLOCATION OF FAULT
In our review of the trial court's allocation of fault between the defendant's, we are guided by Clement v. Frey, 95-1119, 95-1163 (La.1/16/96), 666 So.2d 607, 610-611. In that case, the Louisiana Supreme Court requires intermediate courts of appeal to consider the trial court's allocation of fault under the same standard of 14review applied to awards of general damages. Accordingly, trial courts have a great deal of discretion when allocating fault. This Court has opined that the allocation of fault is not an exact science, or the search for one precise ratio. Rather, it is an acceptable range and any allocation within that range cannot be "clearly wrong." Riley v. Reliance Ins. Co., 97-0445 (La.App. 4 Cir. 11/19/97), 703 So.2d 158. In Clement, the Supreme Court held that any allocation of fault falling between a ratio of 6% and 75/25 would be reasonable. This is illustrative of the great discretion a trial court has when allocating fault.
NEGLIGENCE OF JONES
According to La. R.S. 32:141(B): "the driver of any vehicle which is disabled while on the main traveled portion of a highway so that it is impossible to avoid stopping and temporarily leaving the vehicle in that position . shall remove the vehicle as soon as possible, and until it is removed it his responsibility to protect traffic." When Mr. Jones' pick-up truck broke down, he left it in the right hand lane of 1-610 for at least an hour and a half while he went to look for help. Mr. Jones made no attempt to warn other motorists of the peril on the road ahead of them. These are not the actions of the reasonably prudent person in this situation. Mr. Jones could have called a tow truck as soon as he was able to get to a phone. He did not do this. Mr. Jones could have taken one of his vehicle's floor mats and flagged oncoming vehicles away from the broken down pick-up. He did not do this either.
Mr. Jones' assertion that he did not violate La. R.S. 32:141 is simply not correct. In Thibodeaux v. Lock Clinic, 303 So.2d 570 (La.App. 4 Cir.1974), this Court affirmed the finding of negligence on the part of the driver of a broken down truck. That driver's vehicle lost a wheel while descending a bridge at dusk. His | staillights were on and he made some attempt to alert other motorists by waving a handkerchief close behind the van. Nevertheless, it was found that he violated La. R.S. 32:141 because the precautions he took were not adequate. In the case sub judice, Mr. Jones took no precautions. Accordingly, logic dictates that Mr. Jones was negligent.
The accident in the instant case would not have occurred but for the negligence of Mr. Jones. When this is considered with the fact that the trial court has such wide discretion in apportioning fault, it is implausible that the trial court erred in finding Mr. Jones negligent and assigning him the greater portion of fault.
NEGLIGENCE OF McKINNEY
If a rear end collision occurs, the following motorist is presumed negligent. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co. v. Hoerner, 426 So.2d 205, 208 (La.App. 4 Cir.1982), unit denied, 483 So.2d 154 (La. 1988). Further, a motorist is required to maintain reasonable vigilance or "to see that which he should have seen" and to exercise reasonable care. Id. However, a person who is caught in a sudden emergency, not of his own making, is not expected to exercise the same degree of care and caution as a person who has ample opportunity for the full exercise of judgment or reason. Clement v. Griffin, 91-1664 (La.App. 4 Cir. 3/3/94) 634 So.2d 412, writ denied, 94-0717 (La.5/20/94) 637 So.2d 478.
In the instant case, Mr. McKinney collided with the rear end of Mr. Doyle's car which was stopped because of the presence of Mr. Jones' broken down pick-up truck. Mr. McKinney's failure to keep a proper lookout and maintain control of his vehicle was a cause in fact of the accident. However, it was not the principal cause. The principal cause of the accident was the obstruction of the road created by Mr. Jones' broken down pick-up truck. This does not excuse Mr. McKinney | fifrom the consequences of his negligence but does lessen the severity. Mr. McKinney contends that a sudden lane change by a red mustang forced him to take evasive action which resulted in his rear ending plaintiffs vehicle. However, the trial court gave no weight to this contention and apportioned 25% of the fault for the accident to him. We find no error in the trial court's finding Mr. McKinney negligent and apportioning 25% fault for the accident to him.
DAMAGES
The defendants contend that the damages awarded to plaintiff, Jason Doyle, are excessive. Our Court has stated:
Assessment of damages is within the province of the fact-finder and should not be disturbed in the absence of manifest error, and the appellate court should not consider whether a different award might have been more appropriate but, rather, only whether the award made by the trial court is reasonably supported by the record; Appellate courts must review the trial court's records and render judgments in quantum based on the merits of the case by considering whether the fact-finder abused its much discretion in setting the damage award. Id.
Jason Doyle was seventeen years old at the time of the accident. He had never had back problems and had participated in athletics his entire life. The trial court found that as a result of the accident Mr. Doyle now has narrowing of the interver-tebral spaces of his lumbar spine, as well as bulging lumbar discs. Additionally, the court found that Mr. Doyle sustained a five (5%) to ten (10%) percent anatomical disability of his back and a functional disability that requires him to refrain from strenuous activities for the rest of his life. The damages awarded to Mr. Doyle totaled $49,960.17. The trial court based this award on the uncontroverted testimony of Mr. Doyle's treating physicians, Dr. Lax-man Kewalramani and Dr. Bruce Razza. Accordingly, there is no evidence that the trial court abused its discretion in making this award.
| CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we find that the trial court neither erred nor abused its discretion when it awarded $49,960.17 in damages to plaintiff, Jason Doyle. We also find that the trial court did not err or abuse its discretion when it allocated 75% of the fault to Paul Jones and 25% of the fault to Oscar McKinney. Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the trial court in its entirety.
AFFIRMED.
PLOTKIN, J., DISSENTS WITH WRITTEN-REASONS