Case Name: Edith L. HOUGH, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 1959-09-14
Citations: 271 F.2d 458
Docket Number: Nos. 14923, 14924
Parties: Edith L. HOUGH, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee.
Judges: 
Reporter: Federal Reporter 2d Series
Volume: 271
Pages: 458–469

Head Matter:
Edith L. HOUGH, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee.
Nos. 14923, 14924.
United States Court of Appeals District of Columbia Circuit.
Argued April 8, 1959.
Decided Sept. 14, 1959.
Wilbur K. Miller, Circuit Judge, dissented in part.
Mr. Frank J. Whalen, Jr., Washington, D. C., with whom Messrs. Samuel Spencer and Donald K. Graham, Washington, D. C., were on the brief, for appellant.
Mr. Carl W. Belcher, Asst. U. S. A tty., with whom Mr. Oliver Gasch, U. S. Atty., was on the brief, for appellee.
Before Wilbur K. Miller, Bazelon and Fahy, Circuit Judges.

Opinion:
BAZELON, Circuit Judge.
These appeals involve construction of those provisions of the D.C.Code requiring persons acquitted of crimes by reason of insanity to be confined in a mental hospital and prescribing the conditions and procedure for their release.
Appellant was indicted on June 17, 1957, for a murder committed in circumstances strongly suggesting that she was mentally ill. The next day she was ordered to St. Elizabeths Hospital for determination of her competency to stand trial. After a two-month period she was found incompetent and was committed to the hospital until restoration of her competency. On May 23, 1958, she was found competent to stand trial but was ordered to remain in the hospital until the trial. The trial, held on July 10, 1958, culminated in a judgment of acquittal by reason of insanity and appellant was committed to St. Elizabeths Hospital as required by D.C.Code § 24-301(d) (Supp. VII, 1959). She had then been under treatment at the hospital for more than a year.
On October 20, 1958, when appellant had been under treatment for about sixteen months, the Superintendent of St. Elizabeths Hospital filed in the District Court a certificate stating in pertinent part:
"Miss Hough has now recovered sufficiently to be granted her conditional release from Saint Elizabeths Hospital pursuant to section 927 (e) of Public Law 313.
"The plan under which we recommend that the conditional release be granted is that in accordance with the continuation of a total plan of rehabilitation Miss Hough be permitted to leave Saint Elizabeths Hospital to go to the city of Wash-_ ington, D. C., unaccompanied in an effort to obtain employment. It is recommended that this plan be carried out under very close hospital supervision and that she be subject at all times during the period of her conditional release to the supervision of the Social Service Department of Saint Elizabeths Hospital and that she report to Saint Eliza-beths Hospital for examinations at such times as are designated by the authorities of Saint Elizabeths Hospital."
Release of persons who have been committed to a mental hospital after acquittal by reason of insanity is governed by D.C.Code § 24-301 (e) (Supp. VII, 1959). Unconditional release is authorized fifteen days after certification by the hospital superintendent "(1) that such person has recovered his sanity, (2) that, in the opinion of the superintendent, such person will not in the reasonable future be dangerous to himself or others, and (3) in the opinion of the superintendent, the person is entitled to his unconditional release from the hospital But upon objection by the prosecutor's office, the court is required to — or, upon its own initiative, may — hold a hearing and determine from evidence presented therein whether "such person has recovered his sanity and will not in the reasonable future be dangerous to himself or others ."
Conditional release is authorized upon the certificate of the superintendent that the individual "is not in such condition as to warrant his unconditional release, but is in a condition to be conditionally released under supervision (Emphasis supplied.) For "such certificate" the procedural hearing provisions for unconditional release are applicable: " and, if, after a hearing and weighing the evidence, the court shall find that the condition of such person warrants his conditional release, the court shall order his release under such conditions as the court shall see fit, or, if the court does not so find, the court shall order such person returned to such hospital." (Emphasis supplied.)
The release here proposed for appellant was a conditional release. The United States Attorney objected to it and the District Court held a hearing. Testifying at the hearing in support of his proposal to release appellant conditionally, Dr. Overholser, the Superintendent of St. Elizabeths Hospital, stated that he would require appellant to report to the hospital once a week under a plan of close supervision and treatment. To show that she had demonstrated her readiness for release under such conditions without danger to the community, the doctor cited the hospital's successful experience with appellant in a treatment and rehabilitation program under which appellant had been allowed to leave the hospital grounds for several hours a day, accompanied only by her seventy-five-year old mother, returning every evening ; that as appellant improved this was allowed with increasing frequency until after October 15, 1958, appellant was away from the hospital grounds under similar circumstances almost every day; that, in the opinion of the hospital authorities, she had progressed sufficiently to do this without danger to the community.
The District Court denied conditional release by order of December 12, 1958. The court also invited the United States Attorney to seek modification of the commitment order to require that appellant be restricted to the hospital grounds, or, if outside the hospital grounds, in the custody or company of a hospital attendant until such time as the court orders the conditional release of appellant. Subsequently, upon motion of the United States Attorney, these restrictions were imposed by the court's order of December 23, 1958.
In appeal No. 14923, which we discuss first, appellant seeks review of the order of December 12, 1958, denying conditional release. Her points are (1) that the order is contrary to the weight of the evidence and (2) that the court below erred in its interpretation of the statute with respect to the standard to be applied for conditional release.
This is the first appeal involving construction of the conditional release provisions of § 24-301 (e). Overholser v. Leach, 1958, 103 U.S.App.D.C. 289, 257 F.2d 667, 669, a habeas corpus proceeding, involved construction of the finding required for unconditional release: "that such person has recovered his sanity and will not in the reasonable future be dangerous to himself or others There we rejected the contention that recovery of sanity was sufficient for release. We construed the statute to require "freedom from such abnormal mental conditions as would make the individual dangerous to himself or the community in the reasonably foreseeable future."
But for conditional release the statute is less specific: It requires the court to "find that the condition of such person warrants his conditional release, •>:- » whereupon he shall order his release "under such conditions as the court shall see fit [to impose] ." We must construe this provision in light of the basic policy underlying the statute. That policy, as we read the legislative history, is to provide treatment and cure for the individual in a manner which affords reasonable assurance for the public safety. Accordingly, we think that to order conditional release upon a challenged certification the court must conclude that the individual has recovered sufficiently so that under the proposed conditions — or under conditions which the statute empowers the court to impose "as [it] shall see fit," — "such person will not in the reasonable future be dangerous to himself or others." This gives effect to the legislative distinction between conditional and unconditional release without diluting the statute's grant of judicial power to protect the public safety.
In an oral opinion denying conditional release in this case, the District Court cited the agreement of the psychiatrists that appellant was still suffering from schizophrenia of the paranoid type, the seriousness of her offense, the doctors' testimony that she lacked insight concerning the seriousness of the offense, the short period which had elapsed since her trial, and the need of punishment for crime. The court also filed formal findings of fact and conclusions of law. It found that appellant had not recovered her sanity and that "it has not been shown that [she] will not in the reasonable future be dangerous to herself or others." The conclusions of law stated that "it has not been shown by a preponderance of the evidence that [appellant] should be released conditionally ; that the Government has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that [she] should not "
We cannot discern from either the court's oral opinion or its findings of fact and conclusions of law what distinction, if any, it drew between the statutory requirements for conditional release and those for unconditional release. The District Court did not have the benefit of our present construction of the statute, made now for the first time. Sound judicial administration dictates that we refrain from review of the evidence and allow the trial court to evaluate it in the first instance in light of the principles we now hold applicable. Accordingly we reverse the appealed order in No. 14923 and remand the case to the District Court with directions to afford the parties an opportunity to re consider the case in the light of this opinion, with leave to supplement the record if the court or the parties are so advised.
Appeal No. 14924 is from the District Court's order of December 23, 1958, and presents the question whether an individual who has been committed to a mental hospital after acquittal of a crime by reason of insanity may, without judicial approval, be permitted by the hospital authorities to leave the hospital grounds without a guard or attendant.
Dr. Overholser, the Superintendent of St. Elizabeths Hospital, testified that a course of periodic absences from the hospital without a guard or attendant is a necessary step in the process of rehabilitating the patient so that he can be restored to his place in the community without danger to himself or others. The District Court, on the other hand, suggested that an individual under such a commitment is supposed to be "a prisoner."
The statute under which appellant was committed is silent as to the conditions of confinement or treatment. It provides no specific test whereby one can determine whether rehabilitative therapy, which is clearly the province of the hospital alone, amounts to conditional release, which is the province of the court as well. So here, as with the criteria for conditional release, we must interpret the general language used in light of the legislative purpose.
In the light of that purpose, we must reject the District Court's suggestion that appellant is a "prisoner." Nothing in the history of the statute — and nothing in its language — indicates that an individual committed to a mental hospital after acquittal of a crime by reason of insanity is other than a patient. The individual is confined in the hospital for the purpose of treatment, not punishment; and the length of confinement is governed solely by considerations of his condition and the public safety. Any preoccupation by the District Court with the need of punishment for crime is out of place in dealing with an individual who has been acquitted of the crime charged.
It does not follow, however, that the hospital authorities are free to allow such a patient to leave the hospital without supervision. We readily grant that periodic freedom may be valuable therapy. So, we suppose, may outright release sometimes be. But the statute makes one in appellant's situation a member of "an exceptional class of people." Overholser v. Leach, supra, 103 U.S.App.D.C. at page 291, 257 F.2d at page 669. It provides, generally, that the District Court have a voice in any termination of her confinement, whether unconditional or conditional.
Although the statute does not speak of temporary leaves from the hospital, its purpose, as we read it, is to assure that members of the "exceptional class" to which appellant belongs be kept under hospital restraint until the District Court, in the exercise of a discretion, reviewable by this Court, approves a relaxation of that restraint. We read "conditional release" as used in the present statute to include the kind of temporary freedom which has been given this appellant. We do not, of course, lose sight of the hospital's view that such temporary freedom is often an essential part of the therapeutic process and, therefore, must not be prevented. But calling it a conditional release does not prevent it. It simply requires the hospital authorities, when they decide that a patient has reached the stage where such freedom is necessary and proper, to certify that fact to the District Court and obtain an appropriate order, reviewable by this Court. It should not be anticipated that the District Court would arbitrarily prevent the hospital authorities from utilizing temporary leaves for therapy in proper cases. The court would simply fulfill its statutory role by deciding whether or not the evidence supports the hospital's determination that in all reasonable likelihood the patient's temporary absence from the hospital under specified conditions will not endanger others.
The order of December 23, 1958, appealed from in No. 14924 is accordingly-affirmed.
No. 14923 is reversed and remanded for further proceedings as directed in this opinion.
No. 14924 is affirmed.
. D.C.Code § 24-301 (c) (Supp. VII, 1959).
. Clearly the court is not bound to an all-or-nothing acceptance or rejection of the conditions recommended by the hospital superintendent.