Case Name: PEOPLE v. SARGEANT
Court: Michigan Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1975-11-24
Citations: 65 Mich. App. 691
Docket Number: Docket No. 21038
Parties: PEOPLE v SARGEANT
Judges: Before: Lesinski, C. J., and D. E. Holbrook, Jr. and O’Hara, JJ.
Reporter: Michigan appeals reports; cases decided in the Michigan Court of Appeals.
Volume: 65
Pages: 691–708

Head Matter:
PEOPLE v SARGEANT
Opinion D. E. Holbrook, Jr., J.
1. Criminal Law — Trial—Evidence—Presumption of Sanity — Defense of Insanity — Notice.
A defendant is presumed to be sane from the beginning of a criminal trial until some evidence is introduced to the contrary and this presumption attaches to the defendant no matter what notice the prosecution has that the defendant will present an insanity defense.
2. Criminal Law — Prosecution—Sanity—Evidence—Presumption of Sanity — Burden of Proof.
The prosecution is always required to prove the defendant sane beyond a reasonable doubt but, until some evidence is introduced to show that the defendant is insane, the presumption of sanity satisñes the prosecution’s burden of proof.
3. Criminal Law — Prosecution—Evidence—Sanity.
The prosecution has a duty at a criminal trial not to introduce evidence on the issue of the defendant’s sanity until after the defendant has introduced the issue.
4. Criminal Law — Police Officers — Opinion Testimony — Sanity— Confessions — Inferences.
Statements at trial by police officers that a defendant appeared "normal” at the time of his arrest should not be considered as lay opinion testimony of sanity where the statements were necessary to establish the voluntariness of the defendant’s confession which was to be subsequently offered, a fair reading of the objectionable questions asked of the officers in the context of their testimony shows that the questions did not imply any opinions as to the defendant’s sanity, and the trial court took pains to insure that the jury would not draw the wrong inferences from the officers’ testimonies following the defendant’s objection.
References for Points in Headnotes
[1, 2] 21 Am Jur 2d, Criminal Law § 70.
[3] 21 Am Jur 2d, Criminal Law §§ 64, 65.
Investigation of present sanity to determine whether accused should be put, or continue, on trial. 142 ALR 961.
[4, 6, 7, 9-11, 14, 15] 31 Am Jur 2d, Expert and Opinion Evidence §§ 88, 92-94.
[5] 75 Am Jur 2d, Trial §.192 etseq.
[6] 5 Am Jur 2d, Appeal and Error § 545 et seq.
[8, 12, 13] 5 Am Jur 2d, Appeal and Error §§ 901, 902.
5. Trial — Courts—Attorneys—Officer of the Court — Presumptions — Improper Questions.
The Court of Appeals will not presume that an attorney as an officer of the court will deliberately ask improper questions after he has been corrected by the trial court.
6. Criminal Law — Prosecutor’s Statement — Sanity—Expert Witnesses — Failure to Object.
The issue of the appropriateness of a prosecutor’s statement that the jury should match up the testimony of the defendant’s expert witnesses against the testimony of police officers who stated that defendant was "normal” was not properly before the Court of Appeals where the defendant failed to object to the statement at trial.
Concurrence by O’Hara, J.
7. Witnesses — Criminal Law — Opinion Testimony — Sanity.
A statement by a non-expert witness that the defendant in a criminal trial appeared "normal” to him at the time of his arrest falls far short of an impermissible expression of opinion testimony as to the defendant’s sanity; the mere appearance of "normalcy” is not coextensive with the legal standard of sanity or insanity.
8. Courts — Appellate Courts — Supreme Court — Opinions—Precedential Value.
A Supreme Court decision for which five separate opinions were written, which opinions agree on nothing except that the conviction involved should be reversed for a variety of reasons, has no binding precedential value.
Dissent by Lesinski, C. J.
9. Criminal Law — Police Officers — Evidence—Lay Opinion Evidence — Mental Condition — New Trial — Foundation.
An adequate foundation is a prerequisite for the admission of lay opinion evidence, and where police officers testified that a defendant appeared "normal” at the time of his arrest and the defendant objected to these conclusions because this testimony constituted lay opinion evidence of his mental condition and as such was inadmissible for lack of the required foundation reversal for a new trial is required.
10. Evidence — Opinion Evidence — Foundation.
There is no authority in Michigan for the proposition that lack of an adequate foundation goes only to the weight and not to the admissibility of opinion evidence.
11. Criminal Law — Evidence—Police Officers — Sanity—Prosecutors.
The testimony of police officers that defendant appeared "normal” at the time of his arrest was introduced as evidence of the defendant’s sanity where the prosecutor himself treated it as such in the course of the trial and where he treated the testimony as proof of sanity in his closing argument.
12. Courts — Precedent—Evidence—Opinion Testimony — Sanity.
A Supreme Court opinion establishing that an adequate foundation is a prerequisite for the admission of lay opinion evidence of mental condition should not be rejected as precedent where although five opinions were written the majority of the justices agreed on that principle.
13. Appeal and Error — Divided Opinions — Precedent.
A case decided by an evenly divided appellate court has no precedential value.
14. Witnesses — Lay Witness Testimony — Mental Condition — Evidence — Foundation—Admissibility.
As a necessary foundation for lay witness opinion testimony of mental condition it must be shown that the witness had ample means to observe his subject; it is not, and never has been, the rule that the existence of a foundation goes only to weight and not admissibility.
15. Criminal Law — Evidence—Lay Opinion Testimony — Sanity— Foundation.
A trial court erred in admitting lay opinion testimony of a defendant’s sanity where the periods of observation by the witnesses did not provide an adequate foundation for the admission.
Appeal from Oakland, Arthur E. Moore, J.
Sub mitted February 14, 1975, at Detroit.
(Docket No. 21038.)
Decided November 24, 1975.
James L. Sargeant was convicted of breaking and entering with the intent to commit a larceny. Defendant appeals by leave granted.
Affirmed.
Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Robert A. Derengoski, Solicitor General, L. Brooks Patterson, Prosecuting Attorney, and Thomas S. Richards, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for the people.
John M. Leh, for defendant.
Before: Lesinski, C. J., and D. E. Holbrook, Jr. and O’Hara, JJ.
Former Supreme Court Justice, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment pursuant to Const 1963, art 6, § 23 as amended in 1968.

Opinion:
D. E. Holbrook, Jr., J.
The defendant was charged with breaking and entering with the intent to commit a larceny, MCLA 750.110; MSA 28.305. The defendant filed an insanity defense. However, on February 22, 1974, a jury rejected it and he was convicted. Defendant was sentenced to from 6 years 8 months to 10 years in prison. Defendant appeals by leave granted on a motion for a delayed appeal.
The defendant does not dispute the basic facts of the case. During the early morning hours of June 1, 1973, the police were called to a tool and die shop. When they arrived at the scene they discovered a broken window and found the defendant inside the building attempting to leave by the front door. He was carrying a can of beer and a briefcase at the time. In his confession he admitted that he intended to take the briefcase, and a television set and radio that were found nearby, from the building.
On direct examination the prosecutor questioned the police officers who were at the scene how the defendant acted or appeared at the time of his arrest. The first officer testified that the defendant appeared "normal". Defendant objected to this conclusion. In response, the trial court limited the officer to testifying as to what he observed. When the question was asked of the second police officer defendant again objected for the same reason that the prosecutor was trying to introduce lay opinion testimony concerning defendant's sanity. At this point the prosecutor countered by arguing that he was attempting to lay the foundation for the introduction of defendant's confession. It was the prosecutor's contention that this was necessary, since there had been an indication that the defendant had been drinking, to show that he had the faculties to make a voluntary confession.
To establish the defendant's insanity, four expert witnesses were called. The first two witnesses testified that they had examined the defendant in 1952 when he was nine years old. They stated that at that time the defendant had shown signs of severe emotional disturbance and that he lived in a fantasy world. Defendant's third witness was the chief psychologist in the reception diagnostic center at Jackson prison. He stated that he interviewed the defendant in 1968 and that although the defendant knew right from wrong he could not resist the impulse to commit a crime. Defendant's fourth expert witness was a psychiatrist who briefly examined the defendant before trial six months after the crime had been committed. This doctor testified that in his opinion this breaking and entering was related to defendant's mental illness and that the defendant could not resist behaving as he did. Each of these witnesses was thoroughly cross-examined by the prosecution. Defendant also introduced, by stipulation of the prosecutor, a list of 52 crimes that the defendant had committed in the past 25 years.
Defendant's only meritorious issue on appeal concerns the characterization made by the police officers that he was "normal". He claims that these characterizations were lay opinion testimony on the issue of his sanity without a proper foundation as required by People v Cole, 382 Mich 695; 172 NW2d 354 (1969). However, we do not need to enter the dispute between the various panels of this Court as to the precedential value of People v Cole, supra, since we conclude that the officer's testimony was not lay opinion testimony concerning the defendant's sanity. Compare People v Alsteens, 49 Mich App 467; 212 NW2d 243 (1973), with People v Thompson, 30 Mich App 142; 186 NW2d 4 (1971).
From the beginning of the trial and until some evidence is introduced to the contrary, the defendant is presumed to be sane. People v Woody, 380 Mich 332, 338; 157 NW2d 201 (1968), People v Garbutt, 17 Mich 9, 22; 97 Am Dec 162 (1868), People v Livingston, 57 Mich App 726, 732; 226 NW2d 704 (1975). This presumption attaches to the defendant no matter what notice the prosecution has that the defendant will present an insanity defense. Although the prosecution is always required to prove the defendant sane beyond a reasonable doubt, until some evidence is introduced to show that the defendant is insane, the presumption of sanity satisfies the prosecution's burden of proof. People v Krugman, 377 Mich 559, 563; 141 NW2d 33 (1966), People v Livingston, supra. In fact, the prosecution has a duty not to introduce evidence on the issue of the defendant's sanity until after the defendant has. People v Williams, 218 Mich 697, 700; 188 NW 413 (1922), People v Plummer, 37 Mich App 657, 659; 195 NW2d 328 (1972).
Since no evidence was introduced during the prosecution's case-in-chief tending to show that the defendant was insane, the prosecution had no reason to introduce the policemen's testimony as evidence that the defendant was sane. This is true even though the prosecutor mistakenly argued that since the issue of insanity had been raised, he needed to rebut it. The trial court properly corrected him that the issue was not raised until there was evidence introduced on the subject. Although this mistaken belief might show the intent of the prosecution to use these statements by the police officers as lay opinion testimony, several factors militate against such a reading.
First, the trial court corrected the prosecutor's mistaken belief during the testimony of the first police officer and the prosecutor continued to ask similar questions. We will not presume that an attorney as an officer of the court will deliberately ask improper questions after he has been corrected by the trial court. Second, when the defendant objected during the questioning of the second police officer, the prosecutor stated that the questions were necessary to establish the voluntariness of the defendant's confession since there was testimony that the defendant had been drinking.
Furthermore, a fair reading of the objectionable questions asked both officers in the context of their testimony convinces us that the questions did not imply any opinion of the police officers as to the defendant's sanity. In addition the trial court took pains to insure that the jury would not draw the wrong inferences from the officers' testimonies following the defendant's objections. It made the first officer clarify that he was talking about the defendant's physical appearance when he mentioned the word "normal". It also made sure that the second officer was referring to the defendant's sobriety, not sanity.
However, the defendant argues that even if the police officer's testimony was not an expression of lay opinion concerning the defendant's sanity, it acquired that character when the prosecutor referred to it as such to "rebut" the testimony of the defendant's experts. There he said,
"Now match that [the testimony of the defendant's experts] up against the testimony of police officers who actually observed the defendant on the night and during the commission of the crime. Now these are people that you can see when they testified as to how he acted, you can see for yourself because as I stated earlier, opinion evidence is worth nothing more or nothing less than any other witness who takes the stand."
We note, however, that no objection was made at that time. Hence, the issue of the statement's appropriateness is not properly before us. Any error appearing in the statement clearly could have been rectified by the trial court if a timely objection had been made and a curative instruction requested. People v McLendon, 51 Mich App 543; 215 NW2d 742 (1974). Although we do not intimate that it could, this comment by the prose cutor certainly does not make the police officer's testimony into lay opinion testimony of the defendant's sanity. It is not necessary to strain to do it either since the prosecution discharged its burden of proving defendant's sanity beyond a reasonable doubt by its cross-examination of the defendant's expert witnesses. People v Fisk, 62 Mich App 638; 233 NW2d 684 (1975), cf. People v Finley, 38 Mich 482, 485-486 (1878).
We find no error. Affirmed.
A Walker hearing (People v Walker [On Rehearing], 374 Mich 331; 132 NW2d 87 [1965]) was held at this point. After the hearing the trial court admitted the confession into evidence during the testimony of the officer who secured the confession.
Among these were 36 cases of breaking and entering, 12 escapes from custody, and 4 cases of destruction of property.