Case Name: COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Nicholas KARABIN, Jr., Appellant
Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
Jurisdiction: Pennsylvania
Decision Date: 1981-11-20
Citations: 292 Pa. Super. 374
Docket Number: No. 92
Parties: COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Nicholas KARABIN, Jr., Appellant.
Judges: Before BRODSKY, HOFFMAN and CIRILLO, J.J.
Reporter: Pennsylvania Superior Court Reports
Volume: 292
Pages: 374–381

Head Matter:
437 A.2d 431
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Nicholas KARABIN, Jr., Appellant.
Superior Court of Pennsylvania.
Argued June 9, 1980.
Filed Nov. 20, 1981.
Todd J. O’Malley, Scranton, for appellant.
Ernest Preate, District Attorney, Scranton, for Commonwealth, appellee.
Before BRODSKY, HOFFMAN and CIRILLO, J.J.
Judge Vincent A. Cirillo of the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County, Pennsylvania is sitting by designation.

Opinion:
BROSKY, Judge:
On January 17, 1979, appellant, Nicholas Karabin, pleaded guilty to a charge of aggravated assault. On March 27, 1979, a hearing was held at which Karabin was sentenced, however, prior to his sentencing, he presented to the court a request to withdraw his plea. Saying that the District Attorney should have an opportunity to review the motion, the trial court postponed ruling on it until a future date. The court did, however, proceed with sentencing imposing upon appellant a sentence of not less than five years nor more than ten years imprisonment. Trial counsel did not object to the lower court's sentencing procedure. Therefore, Karabin has waived any claim that the procedure followed at the hearing was improper. Commonwealth v. Clair, 458 Pa. 418, 326 A.2d 272 (1974). On appeal, however, appellant claims that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to object to the trial court's actions at the sentencing hearing. Appellant is represented by new counsel and the issue is properly before us. We agree that trial counsel was ineffective and therefore reverse the order of the trial court and remand to that court for a hearing on Karabin's motion to withdraw the guilty plea.
On April 6, 1979, Robert Christiano was shot in the back of his neck. Christiano subsequently identified Karabin as the man who shot him. Karabin was also identified as the assailant by a witness to the incident who saw Karabin run across a street very shortly after he heard the sound of a gun shot emanate from that street.
At trial, the testimony given at another trial by Leith Howell, Karabin's paramour, was stipulated by the Commonwealth and by Karabin and incorporated by reference into the trial. She stated that she had lived with Karabin at various times and that he had said to her that he planned to commit a series of slayings including that of taking his own life based upon the theory that such a pattern of action would withdraw him from suspicion as to the murder of his wife. Ms. Howell also stated that on the date of incident involved in the instant case that she had travelled with Karabin in his car to a location a few blocks from the location at which the assault occurred. She claims also that Karabin told her at some later time, after she had left the car and subsequently returned, that he had shot a person.
The standard by which we review ineffectiveness of counsel cases is well established. First, we must determine whether the issue underlying the claim is of arguable merit. Commonwealth v. Sherard, 483 Pa. 183, 394 A.2d 971 (1978); Commonwealth v. Jennings, 285 Pa.Super. 295, 427 A.2d 231 (1981). If the issue is found to have arguable merit then we must determine if the trial counsel's actions had some reasonable basis. If any reasonable basis exists, counsel cannot be found to have been ineffective. Commonwealth v. Evans, 489 Pa. 85, 413 A.2d 1025 (1980); Commonwealth ex rel. Washington v. Maroney, 427 Pa. 599, 235 A.2d 349 (1967).
We find no reason to remand for an evidentiary hearing on this issue because it is quite clear from the record that the claim lost by reason to object to the sentencing procedure was of arguable merit. See Commonwealth v. Hubbard, 472 Pa. 259, 372 A.2d 687 (1977). We are able to reach this conclusion after an independent review of the record. See Commonwealth v. Crawford, 285 Pa.Super. 169, 427 A.2d 166 (1981).
Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 1405 provides:
Rule 1405. Sentencing Proceeding
At the time of sentencing, the judge shall:
(a) .
(b) . .
(c) advise the defendant on the record:
(2) of the right to file motions challenging the propriety of the sentence (and, in the case of a plea of guilty, the validity of the plea or the denial of a motion to withdraw the plea);
We have consistently held that a motion to withdraw a guilty plea presented a trial judge at a sentencing hearing prior to the imposition of a sentence pursuant to Pa.R.Cr.P. 1405 shall be responded to by the trial court prior to the imposition of sentence. Commonwealth v. Waters, 255 Pa. Super. 107, 386 A.2d 159 (1978). Our Supreme Court has stated that requests to withdraw guilty pleas made prior to sentencing shall be granted liberally absent any substantial prejudice to the Commonwealth. Commonwealth v. Forbes, 450 Pa. 185, 299 A.2d 268 (1973). This standard is in stark contrast to that provided for the withdrawal of a guilty plea after the imposition of sentence. A defendant can only withdraw his guilty plea after sentencing where he can demonstrate a showing of substantial prejudice amounting to manifest injustice exists against him. Commonwealth v. Robinson, 253 Pa.Super. 496, 385 A.2d 448 (1978). Thus, the timing of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea is of substantial importance to a defendant.
As a result of this failure to object, appellant lost the chance to demand that the more lenient pre-sentencing standard be applied to his motion. It is clear that the trial court did not apply a pre-sentence standard. In its opinion the court wrote, "We have no doubt that the sentence imposed on defendant is what prompted his immediate request to withdraw his plea."
We find no reasonable basis for trial counsel's failure to object to the deferral of a ruling on the motion until after sentence had been imposed. Entering an objection would not have prejudiced appellant's position at the sentencing hearing. Defense counsel's failure to object did not aid appellant in any way. Furthermore, we see no way in which it was designed to further appellant's interests. A claim of at least arguable merit was waived without reason.
Accordingly, we vacate Karabin's sentence and remand to the trial court for a pre-sentence hearing on Karabin's motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Commonwealth v. Hubbard, supra.
CIRILLO, J., files dissenting opinion.
. We do not agree with Judge Cirillo's statements. We are limited to the facts of record which include no evidence of "judge shopping." Such speculation by our court as to the reasons for litigants' actions is improper. We cannot condone the actions of the trial court herein upon some speculative theory that Karabin was attempting to manipulate our jurisprudential system in a manner so as to assure himself a lenient sentence.
The law is quite clear that a defendant is to be given liberal opportunity to withdraw his guilty plea prior to sentencing. We cannot find any merit in these contentions. The defendant's privilege to withdraw his guilty plea, though not an absolute right, is given great deference in our system of jurisprudence so as to assure that no defendant pleads guilty to an offense to which he believes and desires to assert his innocence. It appears to us that this is the very bedrock of our system of justice. We must permit a defendant to assert his innocence until he has been proven guilty or choses to plead his guilt.