Case Name: Peter R. GINDL et al., Appellants, v. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION et al., Appellees
Court: Florida Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1979-05-17
Citations: 396 So. 2d 1105
Docket Number: No. 54665
Parties: Peter R. GINDL et al., Appellants, v. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION et al., Appellees.
Judges: ADKINS, BOYD, OVERTON, SUND-BERG, HATCHETT and ALDERMAN, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 396
Pages: 1105–1107

Head Matter:
Peter R. GINDL et al., Appellants, v. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION et al., Appellees.
No. 54665.
Supreme Court of Florida.
May 17, 1979.
As Corrected on Rehearing Feb. 26, 1981.
Larry Levy, of Dickinson, Levy & Taylor, Tallahassee, and Louis F. Ray, Jr., and Robert W. Kievit, of Louis F. Ray, Jr., P. A., Pensacola, for appellants.
James D. Little, Gen. Counsel, State Board of Ed., and David V. Kerns, Gen. Counsel, Dept, of Administration, Tallahassee, for appellees.

Opinion:
PER CURIAM.
We have jurisdiction of this direct appeal from a final judgment of the circuit court of Leon County because the trial court upheld the constitutionality of item 349 of the Appropriations Act, chapter 77-465, Laws of Florida, and section 236.081(3), Florida Statutes (Supp.1976).
By declaratory judgment action, members of the School Board of Escambia County, as the school board and individually as citizens and taxpayers of Escambia County, sought to have item 349 of the Appropriations Act (chapter 77-465), relating to district cost differentials, declared unconstitutionally violative of article III, sections 6 and 12, Florida Constitution, because it purports to amend section 236.081(3), Florida Statutes (Supp.1976), and relates to a subject other than appropriations, and unconstitutionally violative of article II, section 3, in that it constitutes an unlawful delegation of legislative authority and is vague and ambiguous. They also challenged the constitutionality of section 236.081(3) on the basis that it constitutes an unlawful delegation of the legislative authority to appropriate state funds to a state agency and is vague and ambiguous. They attacked the Florida Price Level Index referred to in section 236.081(3) and the district cost differential as being arbitrary, capricious, and discriminatory. They further alleged that school districts are authorized to levy additional millage above the required local effort millage of 6.4 mills set forth in chapter 77-465, but not to exceed a cap of eight mills as provided in section 236.25, Florida Statutes (1975), and that utilization of this "leeway" millage in the Florida Education Finance Program as well as the manner of computing district required local effort constitute a violation of the equal protection clause of the federal and Florida constitutions. They alleged that wide disparities in funds available throughout the state because of disparities in property wealth between districts cause substantial disparities in quality and extent of availability of educational opportunities.
The trial court entered final judgment in favor of appellees and found that appellants had standing; that item 349, chapter 77-465, is not unconstitutionally violative of article III, sections 6 and 12, Florida Constitution, since the one subject embraced by item 349 is appropriations; that, when read in conjunction with section 236.081(3), item 349 is neither vague nor indefinite; that by utilizing common sense and interpreting the plain meaning of these statutes, the administrators arrived at a formula which constitutes the most reasonable interpretation of these provisions; that the Florida Price Level Index, which is a study conducted by the Department of Administration and funded by the legislature, is not void because it does not have to be authorized by statute; that the legislature committed no impropriety when it appropriated funds according to this index, which was the result of a completed study and which was arrived at in a reasonable manner; that, although it did not understand why the legislature chose to use such a complex formula, the district cost differential is not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable and unrelated to the goal of providing substantially equal educational opportunities; and that the Florida education funding formula, in allowing leeway millage, does not violate the equal protection clause, and substantial equality of education is not prevented by the use of leeway millage.
We find that the trial court reached the correct result on each issue presented in this case, and the final judgment of the trial court is hereby affirmed.
It is so ordered.
ADKINS, BOYD, OVERTON, SUND-BERG, HATCHETT and ALDERMAN, JJ., concur.
ENGLAND, C. J., dissents.