Case Name: In re the Marriage of Sue Ann HAMM, Petitioner/Appellant, v. Harold HAMM, Respondent/Appellee
Court: Oklahoma Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Oklahoma
Decision Date: 2015-04-28
Citations: 350 P.3d 124
Docket Number: No. 113,451
Parties: In re the Marriage of Sue Ann HAMM, Petitioner/Appellant, v. Harold HAMM, Respondent/Appellee.
Judges: Concur: REIF, C.J., and KAUGER, WINCHESTER, TAYLOR, and COLBERT, JJ.
Reporter: Pacific Reporter 3d
Volume: 350
Pages: 124–130

Head Matter:
2015 OK 27
In re the Marriage of Sue Ann HAMM, Petitioner/Appellant, v. Harold HAMM, Respondent/Appellee.
No. 113,451.
Supreme Court of Oklahoma.
April 28, 2015.

Opinion:
MEMORANDUM OPINION
PER CURIAM: |
T1 Sue Ann Hamm (Petitioner) filed for divorce from her husband, Harold Hamm (Respondent), on May 18, 2012, in Oklahoma County District Court. On November 10, 2014, the district court entered its divorce decree, awarding Petitioner three pieces of real property and the properties' contents; Petitioner's Continental Resources, Inc. 401K; certain bank accounts; a note from Olan Arnall; and property-division alimony in the amount of $995,481,842.00, minus the $22,750,000.00 from interim distributions while the divorcee was pending. The district court ordered Respondent to convey all property within five days of the order and pay a designated portion of the property-division alimony by the last day of 2014, then $7,000,000.00 per month, plus accrued interest, until Petitioner received the entire awarded sum. Instead, by January 5, 2015, Respondent had conveyed all court-ordered marital assets to Petitioner, including a check for the entire sum of the property-division alimony. Petitioner deposited the check and took possession of the marital property awarded to her soon after.
T2 Petitioner appealed the district court's order on December 5, 2014. Respondent counter-appealed, filing his amended counter-petition in error on December 16, 2014. Nearly one month later, Respondent filed a motion to dismiss (mere days after Petitioner deposited the check and took possession of the court-ordered marital property). We now turn to Respondent's motion to dismiss before us. |
13 Our analysis must begin with the general black-letter rule of law applicable here: "A party to an action who voluntarily accepts from [her] adversary the benefits accruing to [her] under a judgment cannot question the validity of such [Jludgment in this court on appeal, and thus deny the rights flowing to such adversary under said judgment." Ingram v. Groves, 1921 OK 380, ¶ 0, 84 Okla. 159, 202 P. 1019, 1019 (Syllabus by the Court 1); see Bras v. Gibson, 1974 OK 148, ¶ 5, 529 P.2d 982, 983. The record before us compels us to conclude that Petitioner voluntarily accepted the benefits of the judgment. Despite Petitioner's argument to the contrary, she chose not to proceed with the district court's hearing on alimony pen-dente lite, instead depositing the check and taking possession of the court-ordered marital property. While an evidentiary hearing for alimony pendente lite may be intrusive, such a hearing does not rise to the level of coercion necessary for Petitioner's argument that her decision to accept the benefits of the judgment was involuntary. Petitioner could have refused to accept the judgment and proceeded with the hearing, thereby maintaining her right to appeal.
14 Petitioner relies on two exceptions to the general rule that accepting the benefits of the judgment waives a party's right to appeal. The first, identified in Stokes v. Stokes, 1987 OK 56, 738 P.2d 1346, allows an appeal to proceed despite a party accepting the benefits of the judgment when the judgment accepted "is necessary for the support and maintenance of the receiving spouse and minor children." Id. 13, 788 P.2d at 1347. Petitioner is correct that the Stokes exception must flow from enlightened public policy, but fails to recognize the exception is a narrow one; it applies to situations when a spouse "must choose between food and the right to appeal." Id. We are not presented with that factual scenario here, and the exception does not apply.
15 The second exception identified by the Court applies if the judgment-accepting party's appeal may result in a more favorable judgment but has no risk of a less favorable one. United Engines, Inc. v. McConnell Constr., Inc., 1980 OK 139, ¶ 14, 641 P.2d 1101, 1104. If the reversal of the judgment appealed from "cannot possibly affect the appellant's rights to the benefits secured or vested under the part of the judgment which was allowed to become final," a party has not waived his or her right to appeal by accepting the benefits of the judgment. Id. 115, 641 P.2d at 1105 (quoting Marshall v. Marshall, 1961 OK 86, ¶ 23, 364 P.2d 891, 895). Petitioner admits that there is a risk, albeit small, that her award may be reduced on appeal,. The no-risk exception means no risk, not negligible risk. The second exception does not apply.
T6 Respondent conveyed to Petitioner all court-ordered marital property. Petitioner took possession or title of the real property and deposited the check for property-division alimony. The parties acceded to the district court judgment and now have the benefits flowing from that judgment. The judgment is now satisfied. Respondent's motion to dismiss Petitioner's appeal is hereby granted.
Concur: REIF, C.J., and KAUGER, WINCHESTER, TAYLOR, and COLBERT, JJ.
Concur Specially: COMBS, V.C.J. (by separate writing with whom WINCHESTER, J. joins), and WATT, J. (by separate writing).
Dissent: EDMONDSON, J., and GURICH, J. (by separate writing with whom EDMONDSON, J. joins).
. Appellant Sue Ann Hamm's name was restored to her maiden name, Sue Ann Arnell, by the district court in its November 10, 2014 Decree of Divorce and Dissolution of Marriage. We will refer to the Petitioner by the name used in her filings before this Court.
. Intrusiveness is the basis for Petitioner's argument that she had no other option but to take the sum tendered by Respondent on January 5, 2015.