Case Name: Hicks Short vs. The Baltimore City Passenger Railway Company
Court: Court of Appeals of Maryland
Jurisdiction: Maryland
Decision Date: 1878-07-25
Citations: 50 Md. 73
Docket Number: 
Parties: Hicks Short vs. The Baltimore City Passenger Railway Company.
Judges: The cause was argued before Bartol, C. J., Stewart, Brent, Grason, Miller, Alvey and Robinson, J.
Reporter: Maryland Reports
Volume: 50
Pages: 73–89

Head Matter:
Hicks Short vs. The Baltimore City Passenger Railway Company.
Right to remore Snow from its track by Railway Company— No right to throw the snow in the gutter — Ordinary care and prudence to be exercised in Removing the snow and throwing it on the street — True test of Exemption from Liability in actions for Injury to another's property resulting from the exercise of Rights incident to the dominion and ownership of such property.
On the 6th January, 1877, there was a heavy fall of snow, and the Baltimore City Passenger Railway Company, in clearing its track running along the bed of Gay street and across Hoffman street, threw the snow into a mass at the intersection of those streets. Hear by on Hoffman street, was the house of the plaintiff. On the night of the day mentioned, it rained very hard, and the plaintiff’s house was flooded with water. He thereupon brought suit against the Railway Company, alleging that in removing the snow from its track and throwing it into the street, it had obstructed the natural flow oí water, whereby the plaintiff’s house was injured. This was denied by the defendant. The verdict and judgment being for the defendant, the plaintiff appealed. Held :
1st. That the defendant had a right to remove the snow from its track, and in clearing its track and in throwing the snow on the bed of the street adjoining thereto, the defendant did not use the bed of the street in an unusual or unreasonable manner.
2nd. That it had no right to throw the snow in the gutter and thereby obstruct the natural flow of water from the street, because in so doing it would have been guilty of negligence; nor had it a right to bank up. the snow on Gay street, so as necessarily to obstruct the natural flow of water. On the contrary, it was obliged to exercise ordinary care and pirudence, not only in removing the snow from its track but also in throwing it on the street.
The true test of exemption from liability in actions for injury to another’s property resulting from the exercise of rights incident to the dominion and ownership of property, is, whether in the act complained of, the owner has used his property in a reasonable, usual and proper manner, taking care to avoid unnecessary injury to others.
Appeal from the Superior Court of Baltimore City.
The case is stated in the opinion of the Court.
Exception — At the trial the plaintiff offered the following prayer:
If the jury shall believe from the evidence, that the defendant threw the snow from its tract on Gay street, across the mouth of Hoffman street, where it intersects Gay, in such a manner and in such quantities as to obstruct the usual flow of the water from Hoffman street, and that by reason of said obstruction the water on Hoffman street overflowed the gutter and footway, and flooded the premises of the plaintiff, then the jury are instructed that the plaintiff is entitled to recover such damage as he has sustained by reason of such overflow.
And the defendant offered the three prayers following:
1. That if the jury shall find that the defendant exercised ordinary care in the management of its tracks on Gay street, and removal of the snow therefrom, and cleaning out the gutter extending along Gay street, at the side of its track, and that the damage suffered by the plaintiff was attributable either to the conformation of the ground and situation of his premises, or to a storm of such extraordinary severity that the usual drainage provided by the city would not carry the water off, then their verdict should be for the defendant.
2. That if the jury find that the damage suffered by the plaintiff was caused by the condition of the gutter or foot pavement on Hoffman street, at the north side of the house standing between Gay street and the property of the plaintiff, then their verdict should be for the defendant.
3. That the defendant was under no obligation to clean out the gutters on either the north or south sides of Hoffman street, running east and west, and under the ordinances of the city it was the duty of the police officers to cause the snow and ice to be removed from the flagstones at the intersection of Hoffman and Gay streets, to remove the ice and other obstructions to the free passage of the water at the intersection of the said streets, and to cause to be removed any ice and snow on the foot pavement in front of the house at the south-east corner of said streets, which the jury may find that the owner of said house had neglected to have removed; and if the jury shall find that the injury complained of by the plaintiff in this action, was caused by the failure or omission of the police to discharge properly said duty, then their verdict must be for the defendant.
The plaintiff filed special exceptions to defendant’s prayers as follows:
1. Because there is no evidence that the damage to the plaintiff was caused by a storm of extraordinary violence, or by the conformation of the groimd as assumed in defendant’s first prayer.
2. Because there was no evidence from which the jury could infer that the damage was caused by the condition of the footway and gutter of Reaney’s house, on the corner, as assumed in defendant’s second prayer.
3. Because there was no evidence to show that it was the duty of the police to keep the intersections of the streets clear, &c., as stated in defendant’s third prayer, and because there was no evidence of any failure or omission of the police to discharge said duty, or that the plaintiff’s damage was caused thereby, as assumed in said third prayer.
The Court (Dobbin, J.,) granted the plaintiff’s prayer in connection with such qualification as might be found in the defendant’s prayers which it granted. The plaintiff excepted. The verdict and'judgment being for the defendant, the plaintiff appealed.
The cause was argued before Bartol, C. J., Stewart, Brent, Grason, Miller, Alvey and Robinson, J.
J. T. Mason, R., for the appellant.
The foundation of this action is not negligence. Negligence is not the gravamen of the offence. An act may be perfectly lawful in itself, and performed with the utmost care and caution, but if damage thereby accrue to the property of another, from that moment it becomes unlawful.
Moreover, in this case the defendant was making an extraordinary use of a public street for its own private emolument; and if thereby it injured any one else, no am mint of care or diligence could exonerate it. Even if the damage be the necessary and inevitable result of the act, the defendant must answer for it in damages.
The question, in actions of this sort, is not whether the defendant has acted with due care, but whether his acts have occasioned the damage complained of. If the acts complained of were done "by the appellee, or by his agents or servants, in the course of their employment, they were unlawful invasions of the appellant’s rights, and it matters not that they were done without negligence. Lawson vs. Price, 45 Md., 135; Scott vs. Bay, 3 Md., 445; Balto. and Pot. R. R. Co. vs. Reaney, 42 Md., 130, &c.; Chapman vs. Thames Mfg. Co., 13 Conn., 272; Bonomi vs. Backhouse, Ell. Bl. & Ell., 652; Addison on Torts, 5.
The act of the appellee in obstructing the street was unlawful, and as the loss has actually happened whilst its wrongful act was in force, it will not he allowed to apportion or qualify its own wrong.
Conceding, for the argument, that the conformation of the ground or the severity of the storm might have damaged the appellant, this is not sufficient to discharge the appellee. To entitle it to exemption, it must show not only that the same loss might have happened, hut that it must have happened if the act complained of had not been done. Davis vs. Garrett, 6 Bing., 716; Scott vs. Shepherd, 3 Wilson, 403; Vandenburg vs. Truax, 4 Denio, 464; Powell vs. Salisburg, 2 Young & Jervis, 391; Balto. & Pot. R. R. Co. vs. Reaney, 42 Md., 138.
The appellee’s first prayer was vicious, because it left out of view the fact (which was not contradicted) that the servants of the appellee obstructed the mouth of "Hoffman street, and instructs the jury that if the appellee used due diligence in keeping the Gray street gutter open, and that the damage was the result of the conformation of the ground and the severity of the storm, the plaintiff could not recover.
This was, in effect, an instruction that the severity of the storm and the conformation of the ground were the proximate causes of the damage, and the appellee’s act too remote; which was clearly had law. Balto. & Pot. R. R. vs. Reaney, 42 Md., 133.
The appellee’s second and third prayers are obnoxious to the same objection, in that they ignore the wrongful act of the appellee in obstructing the street, and treat the facts mentioned in those prayers as the proximate cause of the damage. Addison on Torts, 5; 3 Parsons on Contracts, 179, 180; 1 Hilliard on Torts, 94, 95; Annapolis & Elk Ridge R. R. vs. Gantt, 39 Md., 143.
There was no evidence to support the hypothesis in the appellee’s first prayer, that the storm was of such extraordinary severity that the usual drainage provided by the city would not carry the water off; nor that the damage was attributable to the conformation of the ground and the situation of the premises.
The evidence on this point was that there was a good grade on Hoffman street, and the water always ran off with ease; and the City Commissioner (one of appellee’s own witnesses,) said if the mouth of Hoffman street had not been obstructed, the water would have passed off.
There was no evidence to support the hypothesis of the second prayer of the appellee.
There was no evidence to support the hypothesis of the appellee’s third prayer, that the condition of the flagstones, &c., at the corner, and the failure of the police to perform their duty, caused the damage. The only evidence as to the flagstones was that they were cleaned off; and such being the case, the jury could not have found otherwise. Balto. & Pot. R. R. Co. vs. Redney, 42 Md., 138.
The evidence also was that the servants of the defendant placed the obstructions at the intersection of the streets, late in the afternoon, and completed their work about dark; and certainly the appellee could not claim exemption because the police did not come in the night and remove them.
The appellant’s prayer correctly stated the law, and should have been granted without qualification. The appellee having been guilty of a wrongful act in obstructing the street, was answerable for any damage which thereby accrued to the appellant, for all the consequences which might have been foreseen; and can only exonerate itself by showing that the loss must necessarily have happened if the act complained of had not been done, of which there was no evidence. And the doctrine of negligence has no application to this case. Lawson vs. Price, 45 Md., 135; Balto. & Pot. R. R. vs. Reaney, 42 Md., 138.
Arthur W. Machen, for the appellee.
The City Code (of 1869,) was in evidence, sec. 157, on page 884.
The plaintiff’s prayer was granted, and it put his case before the jury more favorably than he was entitled to have it. And there was no error in granting either of the defendant’s prayers.
The use of the street by the horse railway company was a lawful use of the highway as a highway, and not the imposition of any new easement. Peddicord vs. Balt., Catonsville and Ellicott’s Mills Passenger Railway Co., 34 Md., 463; Commonwealth vs. Temple, 14 Gray, 69; Elliott vs. Fair Haven R. R. Co., 32 Conn., 579; 1 Redf, on Railways, 318.
In making this use of the bed of the street, in exercise of its franchise, the defendant was hound for ordinary care, hut exercising such care, could not he held to a greater degree of responsibility, any more than a person making use of the highway as a highway, hut in some other mode, is bound to do more than exercise reasonable care. What is sufficient care in any case, depends, of course, upon the circumstances of that case. The removal of the snow from the track being necessary, in order to enable the defendant to use it for the public benefit and convenience, the case is, essentially, not different from that where a person having lawful occasion to cross a street which has been encumbered by a fall of snow, opens a way for his passage through the snow drift. More may he required to he done by the railway company than by the individual traveller, but the nature of the obligation is the same — being to exercise that amount of care which may reasonably be expected from such a person under all the circumstancés of the case.
The class of cases relied on by the appellant’s counsel— cases of injury resulting to a land-owner by an alteration of the natural condition of the adjacent soil, by its owner or occupier, and falling under the maxim, sic utere tuo ut alienum noniaedas, have no application here. This is the case of the lawful use of the surface of a street, as a street, and the defendant was responsible only for the exercise of due care. Mayor & C. C. vs. Marriott, 9 Md., 175, 176; Flynn vs. Canton, 40 Md., 319; Tyson vs. Co. Comm’rs, 28 Md., 510; Ann. & E. Ridge R. R. Co. vs. Gantt, 39 Md., 143 ; P. W. & B. R. R. Co. vs. Constable, 39 Md., 159; Sharp vs. Powell, L. R. 7, C. P., 253; 41 Law Journ., C. P., 95; Rylands vs. Fletcher, L. R., 3 Eng. and Irish Appeals, 339, 340.

Opinion:
Robinson, J.,
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The appellant is the owner of a house in the city of Baltimore, on Hoffman street, near its intersection with Gay; and the appellee is the owner of a horse railway, running along the bed of Gay street, and across Hoffman.
On the 6th January, 1877, there was a heavy fall 'of snow, and in clearing its track, it is alleged the appellee threw the snow off towards the curb, making a ridge or bank on Gay street, and across the mouth of Hoffman, thereby obstructing the natural flow of water at the intersection of the two streets.
On the other hand, the appellee proved that the snow which had been pushed off the track by the snow-plow, lay between the track and the gutter, and did not obstruct nor in any manner interfere with the natural flow of water from Hoffman street.
On the night of the day in question,. it rained very hard, and the appellant's house was flooded with water, and this suit is brought to recover damages for the injuries thereby sustained.
At the trial below, the appellant asked the Court to instruct the jury: that if they should find the appellee obstructed the natural flow of water from Hoffman street, and that by reason of said obstruction the house of the appellant was flooded with water, he was entitled to recover damages for the injuries thereby sustained.
This instruction the Court granted, subject however, to the following modification:
"That if the jury should find the appellee exercised ordinary care in the management of its track on Gray street, and removal of the snow therefrom, and clearing out the gutter extending along Gray street at the side of its track, and that the damage suffered by the plaintiff was attributable either to the conformation of the ground and situation of his premises, or to a storm of such extraordinary severity that the usual drainage provided hy the city would not carry the water off, then their verdict should be for the defendant."
The appellant contends that he was entitled to the instruction as offered by him, and that the Court erred in granting it with the qualification.
Assuming then that the snow thrown on the street by the appellee in clearing off its track, obstructed the natural flow of water from the street; and that in consequence thereof the appellant's house was injured, the broad question is presented, whether he is entitled to recover damages irrespective of the question of negligence on the part of the railway company ?
As a general rule, it is conceded that every one must so use his own property and exercise the rights incident thereto, in such a manner as not to injure the property of another. And it is equally true, that the mere loAofulness of the act is not in itself a test in all cases, of exemption from liability for injuries resulting therefrom to the prop erty of others. But yet, there are certain rights incident to the dominion and ownership of property, in the exercise and enjoyment of which a person will not be liable for damages, although injury may be occasioned thereby to the property of another.
The boohs are full of cases of this kind, and it is unnecessary to cite them here. The question then is, what is the true test in actions' of this kind, by which the exemption from liability is to, be.'.determined? "VVA think it may be safely said, both on principle and on authority, that the true test is, whether in the act complained ofj the owner has used his property in a reasonable, usual and proper manner, taking care to avoid unnecessary injury to others.
This is the rule laid down by the House of Lords, in the recent case of Rylands vs. Fletcher, 3 English and Irish Appeals, 330. There the defendant built a reservoir for the purpose of keeping and storing water, and the weight of the water broke through some old disused mining passages and works, and injured the mine of the plaintiff.
The Court of Exchequer, Bramwell, B., dissenting, were of opinion that the plaintiff was not entitled to recover, but on appeal to the Exchequer Chamber, this judgment was reversed, and on appeal to the House of Lords, the judgment of the Exchequer Chamber was affirmed.
The Lord Chancellor said: " The defendants, treating them as the owners or occupiers of the close in which the reservoir was constructed, might lawfully have used that close for any purpose for which it might in the ordinary course of the enjoyment of land be used; and if in what I may term the natural user of that land, there had been any accumulation of water either on the surface of the ground, or under ground, and if by the operation of the laws of nature that accumulation of water had passed off into the close occupied by the plaintiff, the plaintiff could not have complained that that result had taken place."
" On the other hand, if the defendants not stopping at the natural use of their close, had desired to use it for any purpose which I may term a non-natural use, for the purpose of introducing into the close that which in its natural condition was not in or upon it, for the purpose of introducing water either above or below ground in quantities and in a manner not the result of any work or operation on or under the land, — and if in consequence of their doing so,.or in consequence of any imperfection in the mode of their doing so, the water came to escape and to pass off into the close of the plaintiff, then it appears to me, that which the defendants were doing, they were doing at their own peril."
The right of the plaintiffs to maintain their action, was based entirely upon the ground that the defendants had used their land in an unusual, or in the language of the Lord Chancellor in a " non-natural " manner, but the right to use it for any purpose for which it might, in the ordinary course of the enjoyment of land be used, was distinctly asserted.
Now in this case the appellee was entitled under its charter and the Ordinances of the City of Baltimore, to the use of the bed of the street for the purposes of a horse railway, and if its track was obstructed by snow, it had beyond all question the right to remove it. And the only question is whether in clearing its track and in throwing the snow on the bed of the street adjoining thereto, it can be said, that the appellee was, under the circumstances, using the bed of the street in an unusual or unreasonable manner. We think not. The removal of the snow from its track being necessary in order to enable the company to use it for the public benefit and convenience, it was obliged either to throw it on the bed of the street or to haul it away, and no one will pretend that it was under any obligation to do the latter. It had no right of course to throw the snow in the gutter, and thereby obstruct the natural flow of water from the street, because in so doing the appellee would have been guilty of negligence. Nor are we to be understood as deciding that the Railway Company had the right to bank up the snow on Gay street, so as to necessarily obstruct the natural flow of water. On the contrary, it was obliged to exercise ordinary care and prudence, not only in removing' the snow from its trade, but also in throwing it on the street. And this question was distinctly left to the jury by the modification of the plaintiff's prayer.
(Decided 25th July, 1878.)
Nor do we agree with the appellant, that the evidence-was legally insufficient to prove either that the storm was one of unusual severity, or that the flooding of the plaintiff's house was owing to the peculiar conformation of the ground.
On the contrary, the appellant's own witness, Martinetf says, "it was a dreadful night, slush and snow ankle-deep — one of the worst nights he ever knew."
Then as to the peculiar conformation of the ground, the proof shows, that the first story of the plaintiff's house, is several feet below the level of the street, and there was evidence tending to show that it was liable to be flooded from several directions, namely, through Reaney's house on the west, and then from the rear of the house by the water coming down the hill-side south of Hoffman street, and lastly by the overflow of the front side-walk, caused by the choking up of the Hoffman street gutter.
The several instructions granted by the Court presented, we think, the law of the case fairly to the jury, and the judgment below must therefore be affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.