Case Name: John N. Renninger, Respondent, v. The New York Central and Hudson River Railroad Company, Appellant
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1896
Citations: 11 A.D. 565
Docket Number: 
Parties: John N. Renninger, Respondent, v. The New York Central and Hudson River Railroad Company, Appellant.
Judges: 
Reporter: Appellate Division Reports
Volume: 11
Pages: 565–581

Head Matter:
John N. Renninger, Respondent, v. The New York Central and Hudson River Railroad Company, Appellant.
Negligence—-a brakeman injured while coupling a car—■ a coupling pin jammed fast — a risk of the employment—contributory negligence—neglect to me a “coupling stick.” .
Whore a brakeman who is engaged in coupling a car to an engine fails to inspect the drawhead of the car until just as the engine is backing down upon him in response to his signal, and then discovers a pin in the drawhead of the car, which is an obstacle to such coupling, and failing in his attempt to remove the pin steps back to get out and is caught between the car and engine and injured, such brakeman must be deemed to have voluntarily placed himself in a place of danger without having used the caution which a person of reasonable prudence should have exercised, and cannot recover damages for the injury thus sustained.
Such an accident is one of the ordinary risks incident to the business, which" he must be deemed to have, assumed.
The injury in such a case, so far as it resulted from the pin being fastened in the drawhead of the car, was not the result of a defective appliance or instrument, but was rather attributable to the improper selection and use of the pin and link employed. Per Adams, J.
Ward, J., dissented.
The effect, under the circumstances of this case, of a " coupling stick ” having been furnished to the brakeman, and of his having executed to the railroad a release from all liability for am injury happening by reason of his not using it, considered by Adams and Ward, JJ.
Appeal by the defendant, The New York Central and Hudson River Railroad Company, from a judgment of the Supreme Court in favor of the plaintiff, entered in the office of the clerk of the county of Erie on the 18th day of May, 1896, upon the verdict of a jury for $3,000 rendered after a trial at a Trial Term of the Supreme Court held in and for the county of Erie, and also from an order entered in said clerk’s office on the 18th day of May, 1896, denying the defendant’s motion for a new trial made upon a case containing exceptions.
The action was brought to recover because of the alleged negligence of the defendant. The injuries were received by the plaintiff on the 23d of November, 1894, while coupling cars at Corfu, on the defendant’s road. Plaintiff sought to couple a car standing on a branch track to an engine, and in doing so the plaintiff “ rode the car out until she got to the crossing.” He then gave the engineer a signal to stop, and he swung up, and the stake which had been used to move the. dead car fell down, and then the engineer backed up, and when he backed up the plaintiff “ went in between the car and engine and found there was a link and pin there, and got hold of the pin in the head end of the car, next the engine; there was a link and pin in the engine also.” The plaintiff had been in the employ of the defendant as bralceman nearly five years, and he testified he was “ familiar with, disconnecting cars,” and that he was familiar with the manner in which pins -were used. The plaintiff testified that he went to the engineer, signaled him to back up, and that he got off the car after he had got the same on the main track, and he gave the engineer a signal to back up ; “ the engine was about a half a car length away; after signaling him to back up, I got in and got hold of the pin and link, and after I discovered the pin was fast and I couldn’t pull it, and I dropped the link and tried to get out, and before I could get out I was caught. I took hold of the pin with the left hand and the link with the right hand ; I was on the south side of the car, the engineer’s side. I discovered it was driven in with another pin and link on the top ; it was pounded. I shook it, shook the link and tried to pull it out and couldn’t.” When he discovered that it was fast he started to back out and stepped back to get out; “ the engine caught the sill of the car and drove me against the sill of the car.”
The "witness testified, in answer to the question, “ Was it necessary to draw that pin in order to make the coupling % A. Yes, sir. Because you couldn’t make the coupling if you did not raise the pin. If I could have raised the pin, I could have entered the other link in the drawhead. It was in the way ; you cannot connect the car with two links in each end of the car.” The witness says that when he found there was a link in the engine and one in the car, he undertook to take the one out of the car so 'that he could couple the engine on to the car, and that he made the discovery and got injured, and that he started to get out when he discovered that the pin was fastened. “ I couldn’t pull it; I didn’t believe it could be driven out, it was pounded so tight in on the top ; you could see where it was pounded, and I let go and tried to get out.”
In the course of the plaintiff’s cross-examination he said : “ After I gave the signal to back up, I got down and got hold of the pin with my left hand and got hold of the link with my right, and I found the pin was fast; I shook the link up and down; after I found she was fastened, I tried to get it out, but I hadn’t sufficient time to get it out before I was caught; I got in to pull that link out.”
The plaintiff testified that in the ordinary coupling and uncoupling of cars there is difficulty in removing the pin. He adds, however, they are supposed to pull easy.” He further testified that this particular pin “ was driven in there; it was too large for the hole of the drawhead.”
James Fraser Gluck, for the appellant.
George W. Cothran, for the respondent.

Opinion:
Hardin, P. J.:
At the close of the plaintiff's evidence the defendant moved for a nonsuit on several grounds, among them on the ground that if by the plaintiff's testimony it appears that he himself had ample opportunity to observe the defect, if a defect had existed, in any appliances furnishedand, secondly, that it appeared that the injuries were received by reason oí a risk which the plaintiff-assumed ; and on the further ground that no negligence was shown sufficient to charge the defendant. The motion for a nonsuit was denied and an exception was taken. At the close of the whole evidence the defendant moved for a direction of a verdict in its behalf. The motion was denied and an exception was taken.
Before the plaintiff stepped in between the car and the engine he had ample opportunity to inspect the pin and link in the car he was about to attach to the engine. He could lia^e approached the car and made an examination of the pin and link and discovered whether it was readily removed when .applying such force as his hand would bestow upon the pin. He made no such effort. On the contrary, he allowed the opportunity to pass by, and signaled the engineer to. approach and placed himself voluntarily in the place where he received the injuries. As he said, and as the evidence discloses, and as common observation indicates, there is more or less difficulty in removing pins from drawheads caused by the ordinary incidents attending their use. It seems the plaintiff voluntarily ventured to place himself in a point of danger without having used the caution which a person of ordinary care and prudence should have exercised. It is now well settled that an employee takes the ordinary risks incident to the business in which he is employed. (Kaare v. T. S. & I. Co., 139 N. Y. 369 ; Flood v. W. U. Tel. Co., 131 id. 603; Albert v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. R. Co., 80 Hun, 152; Knisley v. Pratt, 148 N. Y. 372; Graves v. Brewer, 4 App. Div. 330.)
In France v. R., W. & O. R. R. Co. (88 Hun, 318) it was said : " As a rule a servant entering into an employment which is hazardous assumes the usual risks and perils of the service — those which are apparent to ordinary observation or which he must know if he exercises ordinary care and observation ; and when he accepts or continues in the service with knowledge of the structures or implements used from which injury may be apprehended he assumes the hazards incident to the situation."
In Crown v. Orr (140 N. Y. 452) O'Brien, J., alludes to the rule and states that if the servant voluntarily enters into, or continues in the service, without objection or complaint, having knowledge " or the means of knowing the dangers involved, he is deemed to assume the risk and to waive any claim for damages against the master in case of personal injury to him. He is bound to take notice of the ordinary operation of familiar laws and to govern himself accordingly, and if he fails to do so the risk is his own. He is bound to use his eyes to see that which is open and apparent to any person so using them, and if he neglects to do so he cannot charge the consequences upon the master."
The trial judge charged the jury, "that one of the dangers to be apprehended by the brakemen in the ordinary operation of the road was the misfit of links and pins, and the possibility that in coupling, or attempting to couple, they might not successfully do so." And he further charged, " That this being so, being one of the dangers to be apprehended, it was one of the risks incident to the business which the plaintiff assumed." When the court had given the instructions just quoted to the jury, the counsel for the defendant asked the court to direct a verdict for the defendant. The court thereupon declined and an exception was taken. Then the defendant excepted to that part of the charge of the court which submitted the question to the jury " whether the plaintiff exercised ordinary prudence in giving the signal for the engine to start before endeavoring to ascertain the condition of the coupling."
The counsel for the defendant then asked the court to charge the jury " that the possibility of not making a successful coupling being one of the risks of the employment, the plaintiff was bound to examine such instruments before attempting to place himself in a position of danger."
The court declined so to instruct the jury, and the defendant took an exception. Then the counsel for the defendant took an exception to that part of the charge of the court " that plaintiff has a right to assume that the link and pin were in order, and that he might operate them as they were ordinarily used."
The court modified its charge by saying to the jury, "You maybe able to say from the testimony that he had a right so to assume," and to that an exception was taken by the defendant.
The evidence fails to show that the plaintiff exercised that care and caution that a person of reasonable prudence, under the circumstances, should have exercised. The verdict in that regard is not satisfactory.
The judgment should be reversed and a new trial ordered, with costs to abide the event.
Follett, Adams and Green, JJ., concurred; Ward,- J., dissented.
Adams, J.:
I vote for reversal for the reasons stated in the foregoing opinion •of Hardin, P. J., and for the further reason that the injury of which the plaintiff complains was not caused by a defective appliance or instrument, but was, rather, attributable to the improper selection and use of the link and pin employed for the purpose of making the coupling in question.
The selection and use of such appliances were, in my opinion, mere details of the business in which the plaintiff was engaged, which, of necessity, must be left to the care and judgment of a bralceman. And for the omission of proper care on his part in making such selection, or in using the same when selected, the defendant cannot be held liable.