Case Name: Richard CLOW and Nickie Clow, husband and wife, Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF PAYETTE COUNTY, Defendant-Appellant
Court: Idaho Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Idaho
Decision Date: 1983-10-05
Citations: 105 Idaho 714
Docket Number: No. 13962
Parties: Richard CLOW and Nickie Clow, husband and wife, Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF PAYETTE COUNTY, Defendant-Appellant.
Judges: SHEPARD, BAKES and HUNTLEY, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Idaho Reports
Volume: 105
Pages: 714–719

Head Matter:
672 P.2d 1044
Richard CLOW and Nickie Clow, husband and wife, Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF PAYETTE COUNTY, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 13962.
Supreme Court of Idaho.
Oct. 5, 1983.
Rehearing Denied Dec. 5, 1983.
Bert L. Osborn, Deputy Pros. Atty., Payette, for defendant-appellant.
Richard H. Greener of Clemons, Cosho & Humphrey, Boise, for plaintiffs-respondents.

Opinion:
DONALDSON, Chief Justice.
Richard Clow, the respondent, purchased 10.98 acres of land in Payette County located about 7/8ths of a mile west of New Plymouth. On December 14,1978, Mr. Clow met with the Payette County Planning and Zoning Commission and requested that they approve his plan to subdivide the property into one-acre parcels. No action was taken at this time. On December 18, 1978, he filed a document entitled "Preliminary Subdivision Map" with the Court Clerk. Earlier that day the Commission adopted an emergency zoning ordinance and moratorium rezoning the land from residential to agricultural.
On February 26, 1979, the Payette County Commissioners declined to review the application on the basis that it first had to be submitted to the city of New Plymouth because the proposed subdivision was within the city's impact area. Mr. Clow then met with the New Plymouth Mayor and the Planning and Zoning Commission and they issued a letter of approval, but on March 19, 1979, the Payette County Commissioners informed Mr. Clow that the city of New Plymouth had revoked its letter of approval, and therefore, the Board could not go ahead and approve the preliminary plat. In a written denial of the request the Commission stated that "[t]he Board feels that there is some question whether the application was properly filed and some question whether the application together with the drawings comply with the Payette County Subdivision Ordinance (Ordinance 19). However, to expedite this matter, the Board does not feel that it is necessary to reach a decision in those issues." The Board then went on to refuse the request because Mr. Clow did not have the approval of New Plymouth and after the moratorium it was also necessary to file an application to rezone the property from agricultural to residential.
Mr. Clow then filed suit in the district court, seeking a declaratory judgment. The parties later agreed that it would be heard as an appeal from an administrative agency and an order by the district court was en-
tered accordingly. The parties also stipulated that the issues would be:
"(1) Whether or not the order was valid and legal, which was dated March 19, 1979, and in which the Commissioner's [sic] denied approval of the Plaintiff's application, upon the grounds that the City of New Plymouth had not first given it's [sic] approval after legal notice and required public hearings.
"(2) Whether or not the Plaintiff properly filed his application and preliminary plat in compliance with the Payette County Subdivision Ordinance."
The district judge stated at the beginning of the hearing that "the case was to continue as an administrative appeal from the county agency" and reiterated the issues that the parties would be confined to on appeal. The judge then admitted into evidence exhibits and testimony, and then set forth findings of fact and concluded that "Ordinances 19 and 20 of Payette County[,] Idaho, were from their inception and now null and void and are now of no force and effect." The Board of County Commissioners appealed this decision.
A review of the record indicates that the district judge apparently relied on I.C. § 67-5215(f) for authority to hear additional evidence. I.C. § 67-5215(f) states:
"The review shall be conducted by the court without a jury and shall be confined to the record. In cases of alleged irregularities in procedure before the agency, not shown in the record, proof thereon may be taken in the court. The court, upon request, shall hear oral argument and receive written briefs."
Generally, as seen by the language set forth in I.C. § 67-5215(f), a review is confined to the record unless there are alleged procedural irregularities before the agency and under those circumstances the statute states that proof may be taken in the court. In this case, however, the issues were limited and no procedural iiregularities before the agency were alleged by the parties before or during the appeal hearing. Because of this, the trial court erred in relying on I.C. § 67-5215(f) to admit additional evidence, and enter findings of fact and conclusions of law. In situations where no procedural irregularities before the agency are alleged and the case is heard as an administrative appeal, the hearing must be confined to the record. See Hill v. Board of County Commissioners, 101 Idaho 850, 623 P.2d 462 (1981); Walker-Schmidt Ranch v. Blaine County, 101 Idaho 420, 614 P.2d 960 (1980); Cooper v. Board of County Commissioners, 101 Idaho 407, 614 P.2d 947 (1980). Admitting additional evidence when procedural irregularities are not alleged in essence results in a trial de novo and this Court has stated that on an appeal from an administrative agency "a trial de novo is-not a possible course of action." Hill v. Board of County Commissioners, 101 Idaho 850, 852, 623 P.2d 462, 464 (1981). Therefore, we reverse the judgment of the district court and remand with directions for further proceedings in accordance with I.C. § 67-5215(b) through (g). Hill, supra; Walker-Schmidt Ranch, supra; Cooper, supra.
Costs to appellant.
No attorney fees on appeal.
SHEPARD, BAKES and HUNTLEY, JJ., concur.
. The only procedural error found by the district court concerned the ordinances' publication and it had no bearing on procedural irregularities that take place before the agency.