Case Name: FOULKE v. THALMESSINGER
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1896-02-21
Citations: 37 N.Y.S. 563
Docket Number: 
Parties: FOULKE v. THALMESSINGER.
Judges: 
Reporter: West's New York Supplement
Volume: 37
Pages: 563–567

Head Matter:
(1 App. Div. 598.)
FOULKE v. THALMESSINGER.
(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department.
February 21, 1896.)
1. Pleading and Proof—Judgment.
A judgment need not be pleaded, in order to make it competent evidence of a fact which was thereby determined.
3. Res Judicata—Statute of Frauds—Failure to Plead.
A judgment in favor of plaintiff in an action on a contract which, by its terms, was not to be performed within a year, is conclusive between the parties as to the validity of the contract, though the statute of frauds was not pleaded. Van Brunt, P. J., dissenting.
The complaint alleged that on or about the 25th day of April, 1890, the defendant employed the plaintiff; that said employment was to commence June 16, 1890, and ivas to continue for one year, at the agreed compensation of $2,000 per year; that the plaintiff continued to act under such employment until January 1, 1891, at which time the defendant terminated the contract of employment, without fault or negligence on the part of the plaintiff, by discharging him from such employment; and that plaintiff had sustained damage by reason of such breach of contract in the sum of $916.67, for which amount he sought to recover damages. The answer contained a general denial, and then set up as a defense that the agreement alleged in the complaint, by its terms, was not to be performed within one year of the making thereof, and that neither the contract, nor any note or memorandum thereof, was ever in wri t-. ing, or subscribed by the defendant, who was sought to be charged therewith. It was agreed at the opening of the trial that if a judgment recovered by the plaintiff against the defendant in a prior action between them was not res judicata upon the question of the statute of frauds, alleged in this case, then the statute of frauds was a perfect defense to this action. Thereupon the plaintiff offered in evidence such prior judgment roll. The evidence was objected to on the ground that it was immaterial, irrelevant, and incompetent, and, it was urged that, if it was in any way binding in this case, it should have been pleaded affirmatively by the plaintiff. The court overruled the objection, and' the defendant excepted. It appeared from this judgment roll that the prior action was brought to recover for services rendered by the plaintiff under the employment of defendant. The complaint alleged that about April 25, 1890, the defendant employed the plaintiff; that said employment commenced on the 6th day of June, 1890, and continued until the 1st day of January, 1891, and was at the agreed compensation or rate of $2,000 per year; that he had been paid on account of such employment $500, leaving a balance due him of 583.33, which was owing, and for which judgment was demanded. The answer admitted that $500 had been paid by the defendant to the plaintiff, and denied all the other allegations of the complaint. Upon the trial before the court and a jury, a verdict was rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant for the amount claimed, and judgment entered thereon. This judgment roll having been admitted in evidence, the parties conceded that the plaintiff and defendant entered into an agreement of employment April 25, 1890,—the employment to commence on the 16th day of June, 1890, and to terminate on the 16th day of June, 1891,—at a salary of $2,000 per year, and that about January 1, 1891, the plaintiff was discharged, without any fault or negligence on his part, and that plaintiff had been paid for his services to January 1, 1891, in cash, and by the judgment in evidence, and that there ivas never more than one contract of employment between the parties. The parties consented that all the evidence taken on the trial of the former case should he regarded as evidence upon this trial. The plaintiff rested, and the defendant’s attorney testified that the question of the statute of frauds was in no way raised upon the trial of the former case. Upon this evidence the court ordered judgment for the plaintiff, on the ground, among other things, that the statute of frauds had been avoided by showing that this question might have been litigated in the prior action, and that the validity of the contract was passed upon favorably to the plaintiff in such former action. There was no exception taken to this decision.
Action by Theodore B. Foulke against Eugene Thalmessinger to recover damages for the violation of a contract by defendant, in having discharged plaintiff from his employ before the expiration of his term. From a judgment in favor of plaintiff, defendant appeals. Affirmed.
Argued before VAN BRUNT, P. J., and BARRETT, RUMSEY, WILLIAMS, and PATTERSON, JJ.
I. M. Dittenhoefer, for appellant.
Charles A. Decker, for respondent

Opinion:
WILLIAMS, J.
In the absence of an exception, we cannot review the correctness of the decision of the court ordering judgment for the plaintiff. Code Civ. Proc. § 994, 1022; Millar v. Larmer, 85 Hun, 313, 32 N. Y. Supp. 1146; Smith v. Moulson, 88 Hun, 147, 34 N. Y. Supp. 607. We can only review the exceptions taken on the trial, and the only one taken was to the reception in evidence of the judgment roll in the former case. If that evidence was improperly received, the exception requires a reversal of the judgment, because the judgment was based upon this evidence,—resulted solely from it. It was not necessary to plead the judgment, in order to make it competent evidence. It might properly be given as evidence in this case of any fact which was, or might have been, determined in the former case; and such evidence would be conclusive, and could not be contradicted. Krekeler v. Ritter, 62 N. Y. '372. The question which the judgment roll was offered as evidence of was the validity of the contract which was conceded in this case to have been made, to wit, a contract of employment on April 25, 1890, to commence June 16, 1890, and to terminate June 16, 1891, at a salary of $2,000 per year, and as to which there was no writing or memorandum signed by the defendant. It is conceded that there was but a single contract made between the parties. Upon this contract both actions were therefore brought. The validity of this contract was necessarily determined in the first action, because upon no other theory could that action have been maintained. It is true that an action might have been brought for the services rendered, as alleged in the first action, though the contract was void under the statute of frauds, and could have been maintained, if the recovery had been sought upon the theory of a quantum meruit; but no such allegation was made in the complaint in that action, and the recovery was not had upon any such theory. The action was based upon the contract alone, and the judgment recovered therein necessarily involved and established the validity of that contract. The statute of frauds might have been pleaded in that action, and the contract attacked upon that ground, and then upon the real contract being proved or conceded, as it has been in the present action, the cause of action there alleged would have been defeated on the ground of the invalidity of such contract. By failing to allege the invalidity of that contract under the statute of frauds, or to insist upon it, in that action, the defendant waived such validity or claim, and conceded the validity of that contract. We are unable to escape the conclusion, therefore, that the validity of the contract in question was determined in the former action, and that the judgment roll, when offered in evidence in this action, conclusively established such validity, and that it could not be again litigated here. Our conclusion is that the evidence in question was properly received, and that the case was properly decided by the trial court.
The judgment should be affirmed, with costs.
BARRETT, RUMSEY, and PATTERSON, JJ., concur.