Case Name: J. W. Munson et al. v. B. F. Looney, Attorney-General
Court: Supreme Court of Texas
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1915-06-26
Citations: 107 Tex. 263
Docket Number: No. 2665
Parties: J. W. Munson et al. v. B. F. Looney, Attorney-General.
Judges: 
Reporter: Texas Reports
Volume: 107
Pages: 263–280

Head Matter:
J. W. Munson et al. v. B. F. Looney, Attorney-General.
No. 2665.
Decided January 27, 1915, June 26, 1915.
1. —Road and Drainage Districts—¡Creation of Debt—Constitution.
Under article 3, section 52, of the Constitution, districts created in any county for drainage purposes and road districts (Rev. Stats., 1911, art. 2595) may each embrace the whole or a part of the other so created and issue bonds for their respective purposes, but the aggregate indebtedness so created must not exceed one-fourth of the assessed valuation of real property for any portion of the territory embraced in either. Simmons v. Lightfoot, 105 Texas, 212, followed. (P. 268.)
2. —Same—Case Stated.
A road district created in accordance with law in Brazoria County embraced territory lying wholly or in part in two drainage districts theretofore lawfully created and which had issued bonds in the respective amounts of 22 per cent and 21.2 per cent of the assessed value of the real estate within their limits. An issue of bonds by the later created road district was presented for approval which would have resulted in charging an aggregate indebtedness for drainage and for road purposes exceeding one-fourth of the assessed value of their real estate upon portions of the territory embraced in both the road and the drainage districts. Held, that this indebtedness exceeded the limits permitted by the Constitution, and the Attorney-General properly refused to approve the issuance of the bonds. (Pp. 266-268.)
ON MOTION FOB EEHEABING.
3. —Concurring Opinion—Case Criticised.
Concurring in the refusal of writ of mandamus, Mr. Justice Hawkins criticises the opinion and ruling in Simmons v. Lightfoot, 105 Texas, 212, as inconsistent, and as announcing a rule by which indebtedness exceeding one-fourth of the assessed value of real property in a part of a road or drainage district might be and was thereby illegally created (Const., art. 3, sec. 52) or the constitutional requirement of uniformity of taxation (Const., art. 8, sec. 1) disregarded. (Pp. 269-280.)
Original application to the Supreme Court for writ of mandamus requiring Mr. B. F. Loone}*, as Attorney-General, to approve certain bonds of a road district in Brazoria County proposed to be issued by the relators. The action was brought by Munson, County Judge, joined by the county commissioners of Brazoria County and by the road commissioners of Boad District Ho. 5, issuing the proposed bonds.
G. D. Jessup and Hart & Woodward, for relators.
So far as we have been able to ascertain the precise question presented by this record has not been judicially passed upon by any of the -courts of the country except in the case of Simmons v. Lightfoot.
There are countless authorities sustaining the creation of districts of this character. .There are many authorities which support the proposition that such districts may be overlapping, and we respectfully submit that question is no longer open in this State.
The language of most cases as to equality and uniformity of taxation within districts of this character is that such taxes must be equal and uniform throughout the taxing district. Taken abstractly, such language would 'require that as to all property situated within the district taxation must be at the same rate and upon the same proportion of value. If such be in fact the rule, then that portion of the opinion in the Simmons case which authorizes the collection from common territory of bonds less than proportionate to the value of such territory is unsound, and the bonds tendered for approval in this case, having been issued under the authority and upon the same conditions as existed in the Simmons case, can not be lawfully approved for the full amount thereof.
But we submit that in a situation such as is presented by the record in this case, a different standard may be applied. But for the concurrence of two-thirds of the resident taxpaying voters the district would not have been organized. Such a majority has voted to created the district in spite of “conditions as they exist,” and having formed it the matters of its management are committed under the special road law of Brazoria County to trustees chosen by the voters of such district for that purpose. Such trustees are among the relators in this suit.
Under the authority of the Simmons-Lightfoot case, these bonds have been voted and if that decision is sustained it follows that the respondent must be required by order of this court to certify his approval of them. It must be conceded that, unless personal property can be considered for purposes of taxation, in this particular instance three different rates of taxation will be in force within the limits of Road District No. 5 for the purpose of providing interest and sinking fund for this single issue of bonds. No other conclusion can be arrived at and unless such a course is authorized in districts of this character the relief prayed for by relators should be denied.
But it by no means follows that 'the authorization of these bonds to be provided for by taxes distributed as above suggested will result in an absence of equality and uniformity in taxation if it is competent for the court to consider the manner in which the proceeds of such bonds will be managed and disbursed. It is perfectly possible, of course, that the trustees of Road District No. 5, if the bonds in question are authorized and disposed of, will so disburse the proceeds thereof as to return to the taxpayers as nearly as may be the benefits of the contemplated improvement in proportion to their contribution to its cost. Indeed, in view of the purely local character of the control of the entire situation the probabilities are very great that such a course would undoubtedly be followed. If it is, no complaint could be urged by any taxpayer to the burden imposed upon him by virtue of this bond issue.
It is also perfectly possible, of course, that such trustees might so disburse the proceeds of such bonds as to work great hardship and injustice upon the taxpayers in certain portions of the district, but it must be equally evident that such a result might also occur if the bonds were raised by proportionate taxation.
It has been earnestly urged by respondent in this case that the levy of the taxes in the manner above indicated and as authorized by the Simmons case is repugnant to article 8, section 1, of the Constitution of the State of Texas, providing that taxation shall be equal and uniform. In reply we can only say that that provision of the Constitution was in effect when the decision in the Simmons case was announced, and that our very diligent search of all authorities available has failed to disclose any other case authorizing the method of taxation directed and required by the Simmons case.
B. F. Looney, Attorney General, and W. M. Harris and Luther Nickels, Assistants, for respondent.
—The requirements of equality and uniformity of taxation control the tax that must' be levied to take care of the interest and sinking fund of the bonds. Texas Constitution, Bill of Rights, sec. 3; Id., art. 1, sec. 8; Ex Parte Jones, 38 Texas Cr., 482, 43 S. W., 513; Ex Parte Woods, 108 S. W., 1191; Lively v. Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co., 102 Texas, 545; Const. U. S., 14th Amendment, sec. 1; Williams v. Supervisors, 122 U. S., 154; Railway Co. v. Powers, 201 U. S., 245; Railroad Tax Cases, 92 U. S., 575; Railroad Tax Cases, 115 U. S., 321; Railway Co. v. Wright, 151 U. S., 470; Railway Co. v. Backus, 154 U. S., 421; Railway Co. v. Reynolds, 183 U. S., 471; Coulter v. Railway Co., 196 U. S., 599; 37 Cyc., 736, and cases cited in note 17; Norris v. City of Waco, 57 Texas, 635; City of Austin v. Austin Gas Co., 69 Texas, 180.
It has been expressly held by our courts that the taxes levied by drainage districts to take care of the interest and sinking fund on bonds issued under the provisions of section 52 of article 3 of the Constitution and the drainage statute enacted thereunder are not in any sense “special assessments” but are ordinary taxation, to which the restrictions of the Constitution as to equality, etc., apply. Harris Co. Drainage Dist. v. Parker, 148 S. W., 351; Wharton Co. Drainage Dist. v. Higby, 149 S. W., 385.
In order for taxes to be “equal and uniform,” as required, by the Constitution, two things are absolutely necessary: (1) Tax on two similar kinds of property must be equal and uniform. (2) The assessment .and taxation must be equal and uniform throughout the taxing district. Mills County v. Brown County, 85 Texas, 393; Norris v. City of Waco, 57 Texas, 635; M. K. & T. Ry. Co. v. Shannon, 100 Texas, 379; Adair v. Robinson, 6 Texas Civ. App., 277; Cummings v. Natl. Bank, 101 U. S., 158; Fletcher v. Oliver, 35 Ark., 289; Wilson v. Sutter County, 47 Calif., 91; People v. Whyler, 41 Calif., 355; Bright v. McCullough, 27 Ind., 223, reaffirmed and approved in Gilson v. Comrs., 27 N. E., 235; Railroad Co. v. Geiger, 34 Ind., 185; Loftin v. Bank, 85 Ind., 345; Wasson v. Comrs., 49 Ohio St., 622; Fields v. Comrs., 36 Ohio St., 476; Knowlton v. Supervisors, 9 Wis., 410; Hutchinson v. Land Co., 57 Ark., 554, 22 S. W., 173; City of Seattle v. County Comrs., 3 Wash., 154, 38 Pac., 376; Miller v. County Comrs., 69 Atl., 118; French v. Town of Lyme, 86 Atl., 833; People v. Railway Co., 93 N. E., 298; Yamhill v. Foster, 99 Pac., 286; Day v. Roberts, 101 Va., 248, 43 S. E., 362; State v. Meeker, 105 N. E., 906; Merrell v. City of St. Petersburg, 60 So., 349; Dental Mfg. Co. v. Commonwealth, 98 N. E., 1056; King v. Sullivan Co. (Tenn.), 160 S. W., 847.

Opinion:
Mr. Chief Justice BROWN
delivered the opinion of the court.
This is a proceeding by the relators against the Attorney-General to require him to approve an issue of $50,000 of bonds made by the County of Brazoria under the following state of facts:
By a proper proceeding under the law of the State and in accordance with the Constitution of the State, Brazoria County created a road district No. 5, and by a vote of the citizens of said district, provided for the issue of $50,000 of bonds upon the property of the said district. The bonds were issued and presented to the Attorney-General for approval, which was declined.
The road district No. 5 included all or a part of drainage districts Nos. 5 and 8 in the said county. The drainage districts had been previously created and bonds issued to the amount of 33 per cent of the taxable values of the real estate of drainage district No. 5, and of 31.3 per cent of the taxable values of the real estate o:f district No. 8. If the $50,000 in bonds had been approved by the Attorney-General, it would have increased the bonded indebtedness of district No. 5 and district No. 8, each, to an amount greater than 35 per cent of the assessed value of the real estate in each.
As before stated, this is a proceeding in which it is sought to have a mandamus issued to the Attorney-General, requiring him to approve said bonds, and the question that is presented here for examination and determination is: Would the approval of the $50,000 in bonds increase the amount of the bonds on the two drainage districts, or either of them, to an amount greater than the constitutional limitation F
Counsel for both parties have discussed many questions in this case, which, in the opinion of the court, are wholly irrelevant to the real issue, which is, to our minds, very simple. We will first endeavor to strip this case of all of its complications and misleading propositions, so as to make clear and unquestionable the proper course to be pursued in issuing such bonds.
The opinion in the case of Simmons v. Lightfoot, 105 Texas, 212, 146 S. W., 871, seems to be wholly misunderstood and misinterpreted by the attorneys on both sides of this contention. Indeed, from some cause or other, the misunderstanding of that case seems- to have caused the only difficulty in this case.
We will first outline that which might have been done in compliance with the Constitution.
Article 3, section 53, of our Constitution denies to the Legislature the power to authorize any city, town, or county, or any subdivision in the State to lend its credit, etc., "provided, however, that under legislative provisions any county, . . . ; upon a vote of two-thirds majority of the resident taxpayers voting thereon who are qualified electors of such district or territory to be affected thereby, in addition to all other debts, may issue bonds or otherwise lend its credit in any amount not to exceed one-fourth of the assessed valuation of the real property of such district or territory, . . . , and levy and collect such taxes to pay the interest thereon and provide a sinking fund for the redemption thereof, as the Legislature may authorize, and in such manner as it may authorize the same, for the following purposes, to-wit:
"(b) The construction and maintenance of pools, lakes, reservoirs, dams, canals and waterways for the purposes of irrigation, drainage or navigation, or in aid thereof.
"(c) The construction, maintenance and operation of macadamized, graveled or paved roads and turnpikes or in aid thereof.
"(Declared adopted December 39, 1904.)"
In exercise of the authority granted, the Legislature enacted a statute containing these provisions:
"Art. 3595. Drainage bonds; order for issuance; amount.—After the establishment of any such drainage district and after the making and filing of such maps, profiles and estimates as provided for in section 33 of this Act (Article 3593), the Commissioners' Court shall make an order directing the issuance of drainage bonds for such district, sufficient in amount to pay for such proposed improvements together with all necessary actual and incidental expenses connected therewith; provided, however, that said bonds shall not exceed in amount one-fourth of the assessed valuation of the real property in such district, as shown by the last annual assessment thereof made for said drainage district, nor exceeding the amounts specified in said order and notice of election."
Under that law, drainage districts Nos. 5 and 8 in Brazoria County were created. District No. 5 issued bonds to the amount of 33 per cent of the assessed value of the real estate within its limits. District No. 8 was created in said county, and adjoining No. 5, which issued bonds to the amount of 31.3 per cent of the assessed value of all real estate within said district. If the bonds now sought by this procedure were issued by either the fifth or the eighth district, it would result in charging upon such district, a sum greater than one-fourth of the assessed value of the real estate therein, in violation of the Constitution.
If the bonds presented had been approved by the Attorney-General, it would have appropriated to the payment of bonds more than one-fourth of the assessed value of the real estate in each of the districts named, in direct violation of the Constitution of the State. This question was so ably and carefully discussed in Simmons v. Lightfoot, Attorney-General, 105 Texas, 212, 146 S. W., 871, that we deem it unnecessary to repeat conclusions reached and expressed in that case, further than to quote as follows:
"No good reason presents itself to us why the formation of one district for the purpose of promoting one of the five enterprises sanctioned by the Constitution and laws of the State should preclude the formation of another district for a different purpose sanctioned by the same authority, embracing a portion or all of such antecedent district. A defined district in need of drainage might equally be in need of good roads, and the same exigency might be urged in relation to each of the purposes for which such districts may be formed. To hold that the formation of one district for a single purpose would deny the use of any part of such district for any other purpose would deny effectiveness to the Constitution and the legislative acts pursuant thereto.
"One district may embrace a part or the whole of another, or be so formed as to adopt the exact territory with the same metes and bounds and, being for a different purpose, is a distinct unit or entity, with power to exercise the functions of its creation. Allman v. Lumsden et al. Drainage Comrs., 55 Ill. App., 21; People ex rel. Robert T. Miller v. Scott, 132 Ill., 427, 23 N. E., 1119.
"While it is true we have held as herein stated that two or more districts for different purposes may embrace the same territory and remain separate and distinct units or entities, yet from this it does not result that the real property the subject of taxation is distinct in such districts so formed. The taxable property remains the same while administered over by separate and distinct entities, and their joint authority to create a debt against this property is limited by the Constitution to the aggregate amount of one-fourth of the assessed value of such property. This seems to us to be the plain and undoubted language of the section of the Constitution under consideration. To give the section a different construction might lead to injurious results and such as we feel sure were never contemplated by those who proposed the amendment to the Constitution by legislative resolution, or who adopted it by exercise of the ballot's sovereignty."
That clear and forcible statement of the law which confers the power to issue such bonds, and the limitation upon its exercise is so clear, that the writer can not improve upon it, and we adopt it as quoted herein.
The Attorney-General properly refused to approve the bonds. The writ of mandamus is refused.