Case Name: Jaime ZUBIA, Jr., Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas
Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1999-06-09
Citations: 998 S.W.2d 226
Docket Number: No. 926-98
Parties: Jaime ZUBIA, Jr., Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas.
Judges: MEYERS, J., has a dissenting opinion.
Reporter: South Western Reporter Second Series
Volume: 998
Pages: 226–230

Head Matter:
Jaime ZUBIA, Jr., Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas.
No. 926-98.
Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, En Banc.
June 9, 1999.
Lauren K.S. Murdock, El Paso, for appellant.
Karen L. Landinger, Assist. DA, El Paso, Matthew Paul, State’s Atty., Austin, for the State.

Opinion:
OPINION
PER CURIAM.
The issue in this case is whether, in the offense of injury to a child, the culpable mental state applies to the age of the victim. We hold that it does not.
The appellant, a member of a "gang," believed that a rival gang had driven by his house and fired a gunshot at it. He and other gang members drove within range of a rival gang member's house. The appellant fired a gun at people standing in the yard of the house. He hit one of the people, a four-year old child, causing serious bodily injury.
The appellant asked the court of appeals to find that the evidence was insufficient to prove his guilt. The court of appeals overruled this point, and all the appellant's points of error.
One of the appellant's arguments was that, if he intended to shoot the child's adult uncle (as he claimed in his statement to police), under the doctrine of transferred intent the evidence would not prove that he intended to injure a child. The court of appeals held that the injury-to-a-child statute did not require proof of intent to injure a child. Zubia v. State, No. 08-96-00096-CR, slip op. at 6-7 (Tex.App.— El Paso March 19, 1998) (not designated for publication):
One sister comet has said that the statute does not specifically require scienter with respect to the victim's age, and held that the State need not prove knowledge or intent. Huff v. State, 660 S.W.2d 635, 638 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1983, pet. refd). Likewise, other criminal statutes focusing on child victims tend not to require scienter as to age. Knowledge or intent with respect to the complainant's age is not an element of indecency with a child. Tex. Pen.Code Ann. § 21.11(a) (Vernon 1994); Roof v. State, 665 S.W.2d 490, 491 (Tex.Crim.App.1984). Where sexual assaults or aggravated sexual assaults ordinarily require the complainant's lack of consent, but if the complainant is a child, consent is not required. Tex.Pen.Code Ann. § 22.011(a)(1) (sexual assault); 22.021(a)(1)(A) (aggravated sexual assault); compare to. § 22.011(a)(2) (sexual assault); 22.021(a)(1)(B) (aggravated sexual assault). Mistake of fact with respect to the complainant's age is likewise not a defense. See Vasquez v. State, 622 S.W.2d 864, 865 (Tex.Crim.App.1981). Although murder can become capital murder if the actor kills an individual under the age of six, TexPen. Code Ann. § 19.03(a)(8), we have found no case addressing knowledge or intent as to the victim's age.
In contrast, where the Legislature has acted to protect other classes of victims, i.e. public servants, it acted differently. Punishment for simple assault or an aggravated assault can be enhanced if the actor knows the victim is a public servant. Tex.Pen.Code Ann. § 22.01 (assault); Tex.Pen.Code- Ann. § 22.02 (aggravated assault). The capital murder statute also requires knowledge where the victim is a police officer or fireman. Section 19.03(a)(1).
We, thus, conclude that the statute does not require the State to prove Zu-bia had intent or knowledge in connection with the victim's age. The State can prove its case relying on transferred intent.
We agree.
We also granted review of another ground, but in light of the court of appeals' alternative holding on the question, our grant of review was improvident.
The judgment of the court of appeals, which affirmed the conviction, is affirmed.
MEYERS, J., has a dissenting opinion.
. " (a) A person commits an offense if he intentionally, knowingly, recklessly, or with criminal negligence, by act or intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly by omission, causes to a child, elderly individual, or disabled individual:
(1)serious bodily injury,
(2) serious mental deficiency, impairment, or injury, or
(3) bodily injury.
"(c) In this section:
(1) 'Child' means a person 14 years of age or younger." Tex. Penal Code § 22.04.
. "Does this court's opinion in Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234 (Tex.Cr.App.1997), extend to the State's legal or factual grounds that were not submitted to the jury?"
The court of appeals held, alternatively, that the evidence was sufficient to support the verdict that the appellant intended to cause serious bodily injury to a child victim.