Case Name: The State Finance Committee, Petitioner, v. Robert S. O'Brien, as Treasurer, Respondent
Court: Washington Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Washington
Decision Date: 1986-01-09
Citations: 105 Wash. 2d 78
Docket Number: No. 51945-5
Parties: The State Finance Committee, Petitioner, v. Robert S. O'Brien, as Treasurer, Respondent.
Judges: Utter, Dore, Pearson, and Andersen, JJ., and Hamilton, J. Pro Tern., concur.
Reporter: Washington Reports
Volume: 105
Pages: 78–92

Head Matter:
[No. 51945-5.
En Banc.
January 9, 1986.]
The State Finance Committee, Petitioner, v. Robert S. O'Brien, as Treasurer, Respondent.
Kenneth O. Eikenberry, Attorney General, and Eluin J. Vandeberg and Clifford D. Foster, Jr. (of Kane, Vande-berg, Hartinger & Walker), Special Assistants, for petitioner.
Kenneth O. Eikenberry, Attorney General, and David E. Walsh, Deputy, for respondent.
Edward L. Fleisher and Martin H. Brown on behalf of the Legislature, amici curiae for petitioner.

Opinion:
Brachtenbach, J.
This is an original action seeking a writ of mandamus ordering the state treasurer to sign resolutions authorizing the sale of state bonds.
The petitioner correctly and precisely states the issues:
Whether chapter 4, Laws of 1985, 1st ex. sess., which authorizes the state to issue bonds for a number of capital projects, violates Const. Art. 2, § 19 because it embraces more than one subject or is not properly titled?
The writ shall issue.
The issues arise from Const, art. 2, § 19: "No bill shall embrace more than one subject, and that shall be expressed in the title."
The title to the bill at issue provides that it is "an act relating to capital projects ." Lines 6 and 7 of the first section of the bill authorize the State Finance Committee to issue general obligation bonds of the State in the amount of $285,851,000 to finance projects therein described.
The two issues are title and subject matter. Our decision is made with two long-established premises in mind. First, the statute is presumed to be constitutional and the challenger bears a heavy burden to overcome that presumption. Second, article 2, section 19 is to be liberally construed in favor of the validity of the legislation. State Higher Educ. Assistance Auth. v. Graham, 84 Wn.2d 813, 529 P.2d 1051 (1974); State v. Grisby, 97 Wn.2d 493, 647 P.2d 6 (1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1211, 75 L. Ed. 2d 446, 103 S. Ct. 1205 (1983).
Examining the title it admittedly is broad in scope, but so be it. In a comprehensive opinion, 90 pages including the dissent, this court dealt with the title issue. Gruen v. State Tax Comm'n, 35 Wn.2d 1, 22, 211 P.2d 651 (1949), overruled on other grounds in State ex rel. State Fin. Comm. v. Martin, 62 Wn.2d 645, 384 P.2d 833 (1963). We there said, and it is still good law:
Titles to statutes may be general or restrictive; or, in other words, broad or narrow, since the legislature in each case has the right to determine for itself how comprehensive shall be the object of the statute. And it also has a wide discretion in the particularity of the title selected to express it, provided that, by a fair construction, such title complies with the constitutional provision in question.
Gruen, at 22.
This title gave fair notice to legislators and the public that the Legislature was considering capital projects. That, in fact, is what it was considering. Turning to the subject matter issue, the Attorney General argues that the act authorizes a wide range of capital projects with separate and distinct purposes. It is correct that the authorized capital projects range from fisheries to educational facilities. However, it is equally true that the overall subject is singular — capital expenditures to carry out legitimate govern mental purposes.
In a landmark decision by Justice Hamilton, this court established the fundamental rules about subject matter. Kueckelhan v. Federal Old Line Ins. Co. (Mut.), 69 Wn.2d 392, 403, 418 P.2d 443 (1966). We said:
The basic purposes of the constitutional mandate regarding the title to legislation is to enlighten the legislature and the general public as to what matters are being considered for legislation and to prevent logrolling in the legislative process. Young Men's Christian Ass'n v. State, 62 Wn.2d 504, 383 P.2d 497 (1963). However, this constitutional requirement is to be liberally construed so as not to impose awkward and hampering restrictions upon the legislature. DeCano v. State, 7 Wn.2d 613, 110 P.2d 627 (1941). Consequently, the legislature is deemed the judge of the scope which it will give to the word "subject." Marston v. Humes, 3 Wash. 267, 28 Pac. 520 (1891), overruled on other grounds, In re Shilshole Ave., 101 Wash. 136, 172 Pac. 338 (1918). So long as the title embraces a general subject, it is not violative of the constitution even though the general subject contains several incidental subjects or subdivisions. Robison v. Dwyer, 58 Wn.2d 576, 364 P.2d 521 (1961); Washington Toll Bridge Authority v. State, 49 Wn.2d 520, 304 P.2d 676 (1956). All that is required is that there be some "rational unity" between the general subject and the incidental subdivisions. If this nexus can be found, the act will survive the light of constitutional inspection. State ex rel. Toll Bridge Authority v. Yelle, 61 Wn.2d 28, 377 P.2d 466 (1962).
A branch of government which is independent and coequal, which the judiciary is, must respect the decisions of an also independent and coequal branch, which the Legislature is. Absent a clear violation of the constitution, which we do not perceive here, the Legislature is entitled to determine what is within the "subject" of a bill. It did so and we should not inquire further.
The writ shall issue.
Utter, Dore, Pearson, and Andersen, JJ., and Hamilton, J. Pro Tern., concur.