Case Name: David LEWIS v. STATE of Arkansas
Court: Arkansas Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Arkansas
Decision Date: 2008-01-23
Citations: 101 Ark. App. 176
Docket Number: CA CR 06-1455
Parties: David LEWIS v. STATE of Arkansas
Judges: Glover, Marshall, and Vaught, JJ., agree.
Reporter: Arkansas Appellate Reports
Volume: 101
Pages: 176–190

Head Matter:
David LEWIS v. STATE of Arkansas
CA CR 06-1455
272 S.W.3d 113
Court of Appeals of Arkansas
Opinion delivered January 23, 2008
Charles D. Hancock, for appellant.
Dustin McDaniel, Att’y Gen., by: Brad Newman, Ass’t Att’y Gen., for appellee.

Opinion:
Brian S. Miller, Judge.
Appellant David Lewis entered a negotiated plea of guilty to six felony charges in exchange for a sentence recommendation of 360 months. Lewis, however,failed to appear at his sentencing hearing. After Lewis was eventually apprehended, the trial court denied Lewis's motion to withdraw his plea, and sentenced Lewis to a prison sentence of 864 months. On appeal, Lewis argues that the trial court erred when it denied his motion to withdraw his guilty plea before the court entered a sentence that deviated from the sentence contemplated by the plea negotiations. Lewis also argues that the sentences imposed by the trial court for possession of marijuana with intent to deliver and possession of cocaine with intent to deliver were illegal because they exceed the maximum punishment permitted by Arkansas law. We agree that the trial court erred when it denied Lewis's motion to withdraw his guilty plea, and for this reason, we reverse and remand.
Lewis was charged with the following criminal acts in the Arkansas County Circuit Court: (1) possession of a controlled substance with the intent to deliver, specifically marijuana, a class "C" felony, carrying a penalty of four to twenty years; (2) possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver, specifically crack cocaine, two counts, a class "Y" felony, carrying a penalty of ten to eighty years; (3) possession of a controlled substance, specifically hydrocodone, a class "B" felony, carrying a penalty of five to forty years; (4) possession of marijuana, a class "D" felony, carrying a penalty of zero to six years; (5) possession of hydrocodone with intent to deliver, a class "Y" felony, carrying penalty of ten to eighty years or life; (6) battery in the second degree, two counts, class "D" felonies, carrying penalties of zero to six years; (7) possession of drug paraphernalia, a class "C" felony, carrying a penalty of three to ten years; (8) fleeing on foot, a class "A" misdemeanor, carrying a penalty of up to one year in jail; and (9) resisting arrest, a class "A" misdemeanor, carrying a penalty of up to one year in jail. Negotiations with the State concluded with Lewis agreeing to plead guilty to three counts of possession of cocaine with intent to deliver, one count of possession of marijuana with intent to deliver, and two counts of battery in the second degree. In exchange for the plea, the State agreed to recommend to the court that Lewis receive a total of 360 months in prison.
The trial court was informed of the terms of the plea agreement and agreed to sentence Lewis according to the plea agreement. The court accepted Lewis's guilty plea on December 7, 2005. Before releasing Lewis until the date of the sentencing hearing, the court told Lewis:
Now, I am sure that Mr. Barrett [defense counsel] has explained to you that if for any reason you do not show up for sentencing as scheduled . . . , and if you do not have a very very good reason for not showing up, having already accepted your pleas of guilty to charges, I will consider myself to be free to sentence you to any term of years that I could sentence you to if you had simply entered pleas of guilty with no recommended sentence. Do you understand that?
Lewis acknowledged that he understood and was released until February 6,2006. Lewis, however, failed to appear for sentencing and a warrant was issued for his arrest.
Lewis was arrested on June 27, 2006, and his sentencing hearing was finally held on August 28, 2006. At the hearing, the trial court informed Lewis that the court was no longer bound by the sentencing recommendation because Lewis had failed to appear at the original sentencing hearing. Counsel for Lewis objected and verbally moved the court to permit Lewis to withdraw his guilty plea. The State did not object to defense counsel's motion and announced that it was prepared for trial. The trial court denied Lewis's motion to withdraw his guilty plea and sentenced Lewis to a prison term of 864 months. Lewis filed a timely appeal.
Lewis relies on Rules 25.3 and 26.1 of the Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure in support of his argument that the trial court abused its discretion when it failed to permit him to withdraw his guilty plea. We hold that the court erred pursuant to both rules and therefore we reverse and remand.
The trial court erred by failing to call upon Lewis to either affirm or withdraw his plea at the sentencing hearing. Rule 25.3 permits the parties to a criminal action to inform the court of the terms of plea negotiations before a plea is taken. Ark. R. Crim. P. 25.3(b). The court may then indicate whether it will concur in the proposed disposition. Id. The rule further provides that:
If, after the judge has indicated his concurrence with a plea agreement and the defendant has entered a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, but before sentencing, the judge decides that the disposition should not include the charge or sentence concessions contemplated by the agreement, he shall so advise the parties and then in open court call upon the defendant to either affirm or withdraw his plea.
Id. The trial court was informed that the plea agreement required Lewis to enter a plea of guilty in exchange for 360 months in prison. Once the court indicated to the parties that he would concur in the proposed disposition, and Lewis entered a guilty plea based on the agreement, the court was required by Rule 25.3(b) to either sentence Lewis according to the agreement or permit Lewis to withdraw his plea. The court erred in failing to do so.
The trial court also erred pursuant to Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure Rule 26.1, when it denied Lewis's request to withdraw his plea. That rule provides that a criminal defendant has an absolute right to withdraw a plea of guilty or nolo contendere before the plea is accepted by the court. Ark. R. Crim. P. 26.1(a). A plea of guilty or nolo contendere may not be withdrawn after the judgment is entered. Id. During the time between the entry of the plea and the entry of the judgment, the trial court has discretion to permit a defendant to withdraw a plea of guilty or nolo conten-dere. Id. In deciding whether to permit a defendant to withdraw his plea, the court must determine whether the plea withdrawal is required to correct a manifest injustice. Id. The rule further provides, in pertinent part:
(b) Withdrawal of a plea of guilty or nolo contendere shall be deemed to be necessary to correct a manifest injustice if the defendant proves to the satisfaction of the court that:
(v) he or she did not receive the charge or sentence concessions contemplated by a plea agreement in which the trial court had indicated its concurrence and the defendant did not affirm the plea after receiving advice that the court had withdrawn its indicated concurrence and after an opportunity to either affirm or withdraw the plea.
Ark. R. Crim. P. 26.1(b)(v).
In Williams v. State, 272 Ark. 207, 613 S.W. 2d 94 (1981), the Arkansas Supreme Court reversed the trial court for refusing to permit a defendant to withdraw his guilty plea under conditions similar to the conditions in this case. In that case, the defendant was charged as an habitual offender with felony theft of property. Id. Plea negotiations concluded with the defendant agreeing to plead guilty in exchange for a suspended sentence. Id. The court was informed of the agreement before the defendant entered his plea of guilty. Id. After taking the plea, the court scheduled a sentencing hearing, at which the defendant failed to appear. Id. The defendant was later arrested and the State withdrew its sentence recommendation. Id. The defendant moved the court to hold the State to its bargain or allow him to withdraw his plea. Id. The court denied the motion and sentenced the defendant to twenty years' imprisonment. Id. The supreme court reversed, holding that:
[t]he defendant is entitled to be assured that a plea withdrawal will be mandatory where the prosecutor fails to follow through with his end of the bargain. It would be inherently unfair for the judge to only bind one of the parties to the bargain.
Rule 26.1(b)(iv) contemplates that the trial judge will hold both parties to the plea agreement or release both.
Id. at 209, 613 S.W.2d at 95-96.
Williams and this case are distinguished only by the fact that the State withdrew the sentence recommendation in Williams, while here the trial court, sua sponte, deviated from the terms of the plea agreement entered by Lewis. This distinction is important only because it required the court in Williams to apply Rule 26.1(b)(iv), while we are required to apply Rule 26.1(b)(v). The analysis to be applied in both cases, however, is indistinguishable. When the Williams analysis is applied to this case, it is clear that the trial court erred by failing to permit Lewis to either affirm or withdraw his guilty plea. Therefore we reverse on this point.
Because we are reversing, we do not address Lewis's argument that his sentences were illegal.
Reversed and remanded.
Glover, Marshall, and Vaught, JJ., agree.
Heffley and Baker, JJ., dissent.