Case Name: Fanny Rogers v. E. T. Blake
Court: Supreme Court of Texas
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1951-06-13
Citations: 150 Tex. 373
Docket Number: No. A-2931
Parties: Fanny Rogers v. E. T. Blake.
Judges: 
Reporter: Texas Reports
Volume: 150
Pages: 373–387

Head Matter:
Fanny Rogers v. E. T. Blake.
No. A-2931.
Decided June 13, 1951.
Rehearing overruled July 25, 1951.
(240 S. W., 2d Series, 1001.)
Andress, Lipscomb & Peticolas and Theodore Andress, all of El Paso, for petitioner, Mrs. Fanny Rogers.
It was error for the Court of Civil Appeals to hold that there was no evidence of gross negligence as found by the jury and in reversing the judgment of the trial court. Glassman v. Feldman, 106 S. W. 2d 721; Pfeiffer v. Green, 102 S.W. 2d 1077; Bowman v. Puckett, 144 Texas 123, 188 S.W. 2d 571.
R. A. D. Morton and H. E. Brockmoller, both of El Paso, for respondent, E. T. Blake.
The Court of Civil Appeals erred in remanding this case, because in holding that there was no evidence there was nothing to be ascertained by another trial and the judgment should have been rendered. Munves v. Buckly, 70 S.W. 2d 605; Linn v. Nored, 133 S.W. 2d 234; Pfiffer v. Green, 102 S.W. 2d 1077.

Opinion:
Mr. Justice Griffin
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This suit arose out of a collision between a car driven by respondent, Blake, and an automobile driven by one Sammons. Mrs. Rogers, petitioner, and her husband, and Mrs. Blake were all in the Blake car. Mr. Rogers was killed, and Mrs. Rogers seriously injured as a result of the collision. Blake failed to stop at a "stop" sign prior to entering Alabama Street from Richmond Street in the City of El Paso, Texas. Mrs. Rogers sued Blake for gross negligence in his operation of his car at and immediately prior to the collision. On a jury's answer to the special issues submitted, the trial court rendered a judgment for Mrs. Rogers against Blake. On appeal the Court of Civil Appeals at El Paso reversed and remanded the judgment for the reasons stated in the court's opinion reported in 237 S.W. 2d 457. That opinion contains a full discussion of the pertinent facts, and we will set out only such facts as may be necessary for an understanding of our opinion.
The facts of this case disclose that two families, who were friends and members of the same church, had spent the day together driving to and from (in another friend's car) and attending a service of their church. After returning to El Paso, Mr. and Mrs. Blake took Mr. and Mrs. Rogers in their car, and were on their way to the Rogers' home when this unfortunate accident occurred wherein Mr. Rogers lost his life, and Mrs. Rogers suffered serious injuries. There is no question but that this action is governed by Art. 6701b, Vernon's Annotated Civil Statutes, and which statute is commonly called the "guest statute". It provides in part:
"Section 1. No person transported over the public highways of this State by the owner or operator of a motor vehicle as his guest without payment for such transportation, shall have a cause of action for damages against such owner or operator for injuries, death or loss, in case of accident, unless such accident shall have been intentional on the part of said owner or operator, or caused by his heedlessness or his reckless disregard of the rights of others."' (Emphasis added).
The purpose of this statute is to exempt operators of vehicles from liability for "negligence". Napier v. Mooneyham, Tex. Civ. App., 94 S.W. 2d 564, writ dismissed, W.O.J., 1936, 126 Texas 654.
The language of the statute "or caused by his (the driver's) heedlessness or his reckless disregard of the rights of others", has been held to mean the same as the term "gross negligence". Rowan v. Allen, 134 Texas 215, 134 S.W. 2d 1022 (5) ; Bowman v. Puckett, 144 Texas 125, 188 S.W. 2d 571 (2) ; Ten Year Supplement, Tex. Jur., Vol. 2, p. 266, Secs. 311 et seq., and authorities cited therein.
There was no allegation that the injury for which redress is sought in the present suit resulted from the intentional action of E. T. Blake, the driver of the car in which Mr. and Mrs. Rogers were riding. Therefore, the question for discussion is: Does the evidence raise an issue of fact that petitioner's injuries and her damages were caused by respondent's "heedlessness or his reckless disregard of the rights of others"; or, was respondent guilty of "gross negligence"?
Petitioner relies upon three grounds of recovery; namely, that the respondent "with gross negligence and heedless and reckless disregard of the rights of others" (1) failed to stop at a stop sign at the entrance of Richmond Street into Alabama Street, a through street or thoroughfare in the City of El Paso, Texas, (2) failed to yield the right of way at the intersection of Alabama and Richmond Streets to vehicles traveling on a through street or thoroughfare, being Alabama street, and (3) failed to keep a proper lookout for other vehicles approaching such intersection. All these allegations rely upon the failure of respondent, Blake, to stop at the stop sign as he entered Alabama Street from Richmond Street, and to his driving out into Alabama Street. Had Blake stopped the accident would not have happened. The evidence is uncontroverted to show that Blake knew of the stop sign and that he did not stop. There is evidence to show he slowed down, but none to show that he stopped. Unless his failure to stop at this stop sign constituted gross negligence, then the trial court should have sustained Blake's motions for an instructed verdict, or his motion for judgment non obstante veredicto. There is no evidence of fast driving, or that Blake was driving otherwise than carefully at all times until he ran the stop sign. Petitioner made no claim otherwise. Petitioner, or no one in the Blake car, saw the approach of the car with which they collided until immediately prior to the actual contact. Blake testified that he slowed down upon coming to the intersection (and the driver of the other car also testified to the same effect), and that he looked both up and down the street and did not see any cars approaching and drove out into the intersection. The actual collision occurred after Blake had cleared the center of the intersection. The evidence showed that there were only two other cars on Alabama Street near the point of impact — one a city bus which had passed on by shortly prior to the collision, and the other car following the car on Alabama Street with which Blake collided. The evidence showed this accident took place around 9:00 P. M., and the streets were nearly empty of vehicles at the time, and occurred in the residential portion of the city.
In discussing the meaning of "gross negligence" this Court has said:
"It is to be observed that the definition quoted uses the words 'conscious indifference', thus stressing the mental attitude of the person charged to have been grossly negligent. Gross negligence is positive or affirmative, rather than merely passive or negative as ordinary negligence often, and perhaps usually, is. As said in the discussion in Ruling Case Law of the right to recover exemplary damages for gross negligence: 'The rule is that re covery is permitted, in, and confined to, cases where the negligence is wilful, or where it is so gross as to indicate wantonness or malice.' 8 R. C. L., p. 590. Mere indifference is not enough. The indifference must be conscious. The indifference is to the rights or welfare of the person or persons who may be affected by the act or omission. Thus the doctrine of foreseeableness becomes important." (Emphasis added) Texas Pac. Coal & Oil Co. v. Robertson, et al, 125 Texas 4, 79 S.W. 2d 830; 98 A. L. R. 262.
See Bennett v. Howard, 141 Texas 101, 170 S.W. 2d 709, where this Court after a thorough discussion of the cases involving liability for exemplary damages for gross negligence, says:
"This question was again before this court in the case of Rowan v. Allen, 134 Texas 215, 134 S. W. 2d 1022, and in an opinion written by Judge Hickman the rule announced in the Shuford and Robertson cases were reiterated. We adhere to the rule announced in the cases above mentioned and any rule to the contrary announced in other cases in conflict therewith, is hereby overruled."
See also 65 C. J. S., p. 371, Sec. 8d, et seq.; 5 Am. Jur., p. 636, Sec. 242; 38 Am. Jur., p. 690, Sec. 47.
The case of Hamilton v. Perry, Tex. Civ. App., 109 S.W. 2d 1142, no writ history, was one of the first cases construing our present "guest statute". It has been cited with approval by this Court in cases involving this statute, and according to Shepard's Southwestern Citations, it has never been questioned. That case says:
"Our Texas statute was first construed by the Tennessee Court of Appeals in Fly v. Swink, 17 Tenn. App. 627, 69 S. W. (2d) 902, in a very exhaustive opinion which adopted the intrepretation that the Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut placed on an identical statute prior to its enactment in Texas. The construction placed upon this statute by the Tennessee court and the Connecticut courts has been adopted and approved by the court of Texas in Napier v. Mooneyham (Tex. Civ. App.) 94 S. W. (2d) 564; Aycock v. Green (Tex. Civ. App.) 94 S. W. (2d) 894; Crosby v. Strain (Tex. Civ. App.) 99 S. W. (2d) 659; Pfeiffer v. Green (Tex. Civ. App.) 102 S. W. 2d) 1077; Glassman v. Feldman (Tex. Civ. App.) 106 S. W. (2d) 721. From this unbroken line of decisions, it is now the settled law of this state that momentary thoughtlessness, inadvertence, or error of judgment do not constitute 'heedlessness or reckless disregard of the rights of others' within the meaning of this statute; there must be something in the nature of a continued or persistent course of action; such acts as to constitute wanton misconduct or gross negligence." (Emphasis added).
That such is the law is recognized by the petitioner, Fanny Rogers, in her briefs in the Court of Civil Appeals, and in her application for writ of error and supporting briefs where she says:
"The Court of Civil Appeals was correct in holding, as was held in Linn v. Nored, 133 S.W. 2d 234, and approved in Bowman v. Puckett, supra, and McCarty v. Moss, 225 S.W. 2d 883, that 'there must be something of a continued or persistent course of action in order to constitute heedlessness and reckless disregard of the rights of others or gross negligence'.
"Petitioner was familiar with this rule of decision before this cause was filed and has no quarrel with it."
We think the fallacy of petitioner's reasoning is that she contends a conscious failure to stop at the stop sign; i. e., a conscious violation of the law requiring one to stop at the stop sign, constitutes gross negligence on the part of the respondent, whereas the law is that there must be a "heedlessness and reckless disregard of the rights of others", which a conscious failure to stop, standing alone, does not show.
The case of Bowman v. Puckett, 144 Texas 125, 188 S.W. 2d 571, requires that there must be a continued and persistent course of action in order for the driver to be liable. In that case the driver had been driving recklessly and unlawfully for many miles, and knew his brakes were defective. He continued this course into the thickly populated and busy part of the town of Weslaco where the accident occurred. It was held such evidence raised a fact issue for the jury's determination. In our opinion, the evidence in the case at bar raises no more than a "momentary thoughtlessness, inadvertence, or error of judgment" and does not meet the requirements of the law so as to constitute "gross negligence" and a "heedlessness or reckless disregard of the rights of others".
We think the following language of this Court in the case of Rowan v. Allen, 134 Texas 215, 134 S.W. 2d 1022, controls this cause:
"Bearing in mind the relationship existing between the parties and all other surrounding circumstances, this evidence does not raise the issue that the defendant drove in reckless disregard of the rights of plaintiff or was consciously indifferent to her welfare. Hamilton v. Perry, supra. To permit findings of gross negligence to stand under these facts would be to permit a jury to treat the language of our guest statute as dead words.
"This case as a whole will permit of no inference other than that these parties, as friends, attended the races together for their mutual enjoyment, the plaintiff as defendant's guest, and that the defendant on his way to the races committed acts of ordinary negligence, that is, he failed to exercise ordinary care in the manner of operating his automobile. No facts or circumstances are shown which would justify the inference that defendant's conduct was grossly negligent, and, therefore, within the terms of our guest statute, supra."
This case has been fully developed and there is nothing to be gained by a further trial of the same, London Terrace, Inc. v. McAlister, 142 Texas 608, 180 S.W. 2d 619.
The judgments of the trial court and the Court of Civil Appeals are hereby reversed and judgment rendered that the plaintiffff take nothing.
Opinion delivered June 13, 1951.