Case Name: PEOPLE ex rel. KENNY v. FOLKS, Com'r of Public Charities
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1903-12-30
Citations: 85 N.Y.S. 1100
Docket Number: 
Parties: PEOPLE ex rel. KENNY v. FOLKS, Com’r of Public Charities.
Judges: 
Reporter: West's New York Supplement
Volume: 85
Pages: 1100–1108

Head Matter:
(89 App. Div. 171.)
PEOPLE ex rel. KENNY v. FOLKS, Com’r of Public Charities.
(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department.
December 30, 1903.)
1. Motion for Judgment—Specifying Grounds.
Defendant, having at the close of the evidence moved for judgment without specifying that relator’s evidence was insufficient to show he was a veteran volunteer fireman, may not afterwards claim such insufficiency.
8. Civil Service Law—Veteran Volunteer Fireman.
A member of an incorporated fire company, which is not officially connected with a municipality, but the object of which is to render public service in the extinguishment of fires, is within Civil Service Law (Laws 1899, p. 809, c. 370, as amended by Laws 1902, p. 805, c. 270) § 21, providing that no person holding a municipal position or employment who shall have served the term required by law in the volunteer fire department of a city, town, or village shall be removed, except for cause, after a hearing.
8. Same—Equal Protection of Laws.
Civil Service Law (Laws 1899, p. 809, c. 370, as amended by Laws-1902, p. 805, c. 270) § 21, in providing for removal from a position of one who is a veteran volunteer fireman only after a hearing, which is not necessary in the case of one not a veteran, does not contravene Const. U. S. Amend. 14, prohibiting the denial of the equal protection of the- - laws.
Appeal from Special Term, Kings County.
Mandamus, on the relation of Thomas Kenny, Sr., against Homer-Folks, commissioner of public charities of the city of New York. From a final order granting a-peremptory writ after trial of issues-raised by the return to an alternative writ, defendant appeals.
Affirmed.
Argued before GOODRICH, P. J., and JENKS, WOODWARD,. HIRSCHBERG, and HOOKER, JJ.
James McKeen (Walter S. Brewster, on the brief), for appellant.
Warren C. Van Slyke, for respondent.

Opinion:
GOODRICH, P. J.
The findings of fact are supported by evidence, and, briefly stated, are as follows: The relator, Kenny, is-a veteran volunteer fireman, having served more than the time required by law, viz., from January, 1872, to December, 1881, in the Cataract Engine Company, No. 2, of the North Shore Fire Department of the County of Richmond, which was a volunteer fire com- party in said county. Kenny was appointed superintendent of outdoor poor for the borough of Richmond in 1898, and held that office and fulfilled its duties continuously from that date until March 31, 1902, when he was summarily removed by Mr. Folks, commissioner of public charities of the city of New York, without a hearing upon notice or charges, and without being served with or receiving any charges of incompetence or misconduct. No charges of any kind were ever preferred against him. On April 11, 1902, he served on the commissioner formal notice protesting against his removal, but he has not been reinstated. The office or position held by Kenny was not that of a private secretary, cashier, or deputy of any official department, and Kenny did not occupy a position involving a strictly confidential relationship between the commissioner and himself. The office has never been abolished, and still exists. At the time Kenny was removed there was a vacancy in the department which he was qualified to fill, viz., the position of deputy superintendent of outdoor poor for the borough of Richmond, which on April 1, 1902, was filled by the appointment of one Seehusen. The office of superintendent remained vacant till May-10, 1902, when the office of deputy was abolished, and Seehusen was appointed superintendent of outdoor poor for the borough of Richmond. The duties performed by Seehusen from April 1st to May 10th as deputy, and since May 10th as superintendent, are similar in kind and character to, and substantially the same as, those performed by Kenny as superintendent prior to his removal. The court granted a peremptory writ of mandamus, commanding the commissioner to reinstate and re-employ Kenny in the office of superintendent of outdoor poor in the borough of Richmond at his former salary. From this order the commissioner appeals.
The appellant contends that the finding that Kenny was a veteran volunteer fireman was not warranted by the evidence. We think otherwise. In the second paragraph of the petition it is alleged that Kenny was a veteran volunteer fireman, and, while the return denied the allegation of the second paragraph, such denial was coupled with the allegation that no notice of such claim was made by Kenny until after his removal. At the trial, Kenny was asked, "Were you a member of the Cataract Engine' Company, No. 2?" A simple objection was made, without specifying any grounds; and afterwards the act of the Legislature incorporating the Cataract Company was offered and received in evidence without objection, and Kenny testified, also without objection, that he joined the company as an active member in 1871, and served as such until 1882, and thereafter continued to serve as a privileged member, and that he was foreman in 1874. It seems, from the course of the hearing, -to have been assumed that Kenny was a veteran volunteer fireman. The commissioner's counsel, at the conclusion of the relator's evidence, moved for a decision in his favor upon the issues raised by the return, and at the close' of the whole evidence moved for judgment and a finding that the issues of fact were as stated by the commissioner in his return to the alternative writ. It is now too late to contend that there is a failure of proof in this respect, inasmuch as the motion did not specify the point now raised as one of the grounds of the motion. It was said in Gerding v. Haskin, 141 N. Y. 514, 520, 36 N. E. 601, 603:
"A motion to direct a verdict for the defendant is in substance a motion for a nonsuit, and must be governed by the same rules. It is undoubtedly the general rule that a motion for a nonsuit is ineffectual unless the grounds upon which it is based are specified. The defect in the plaintiff's case should be pointed out, so that he may supply it if he can. [Citing cases.] So much is required by good faith and fair practice, and so much is due to the orderly administration of justice."
It may be assumed that the relator could have given other evidence, if it had been necessary (which is not at all certain), in view of his testimony that he was a member of an incorporated fire company for the time required by law.
Neither is it necessary that the veteran should be a member of a fire department officially connected with a municipality. It is sufficient if he was a member of an incorporated fire company, the object of which was to render the public service in the extinguishment of fires. That is the public service to which the statute has relation. In other statutes the distinction is recognized, without making a difference by reason thereof—notably, in section 1030, subd. 13, ofvthe Code of Civil Procedure, which exempts from jury duty in the several counties of the state, other than the counties of New York and Kings, "a member of a fire company, or fire department, duly organized according to the laws of the state, who, after faithfully serving five successive }rears in such a fire company, or fire department,, has been honorably discharged therefrom." Similar language is used in section 1081 in relation to jurors' in the county of New York, and in section 1127 in relation to jurors in the county of Kings.
This seems to be decisive of the question whether Kenny is a veteran volunteer fireman, within the meaning of section 21 of the civil service law (chapter 370, p. 809, Laws 1899, as amended by chapter 270, p. 805, Laws 1902), which provides that no person holding a position by appointment or employment in the cities, counties, towns, or villages of the state, "who shall have served the term required by law in the volunteer fire department of any city, town or village in the state, shall be removed from such position or employment except for incompetency or misconduct shown after a hearing upon due notice, upon stated charges and with the right to such employé or appointee to review by a writ of certiorari."
We hold that Kenny was a veteran volunteer fireman, having served the time required by law in a "volunteer fire department" of a town or village in this state, and, being such, could be removed from his position only for incompetency or misconduct, after a hearing upon notice and stated charges.
The commissioner also contends that the relator was a deputy, and so ¡not entitled, within the provision of section 21 of the state civil service law, to notice and hearing. The court has found, upon sufficient evidence, that he was not a deputy, within the meaning of section 21 of chapter 370, p. 809, of the Laws of 1899, as amended by chapter 270, p. 805, Laws 1902, which provides that the veteran ex emption clause does not apply, among others, to a "deputy of any official or department." With this finding we fully concur.
The learned corporation counsel earnestly urges that section 21 is unconstitutional and void because it violates the fourteenth amendment of the Constitution of the United States, which provides that "no state shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." His argument is that where two men occupy exactly similar positions in the same department of the municipal service, and are accused of the same offense, one, if a veteran volunteer fireman, can be discharged only after a trial, in which the burden of proof is on his accuser, and he can have the decision reviewed on certiorari, while the other, if not a veteran, can be discharged without trial, and in such a case cannot have the decision against him reviewed. This, he contends, is not "equal protection of the laws."
The first veteran law was passed in 1884 (chapter 312, p. 377, Laws 1884). That act has been amended in various respects, and its substance incorporated in other statutes—among them, the Greater New York charter. For nearly 20 years its underlying principle has stood practically unchallenged. The constitution of 1894 adopts the principle so far as it relates to appointment and promotion of veterans, but is silent as to removals. We may assume that the constitutional convention adopted this provision of the Constitution with reference to the existing law as to removals, which the Legislature had plenary power to pass, unless restricted by constitutional limitation. The learned corporation counsel admitted on the argument that he had been unable to find any authority exactly in point. Neither has any member of this court. It may be observed that the main purpose of the fourteenth amendment was the protection of negroes against invidious distinctions as to their legal rights. While it has not such a restricted sense as matter of law, it would be a long stretch of interpretation to extend it to the protection of persons in holding state offices. It cannot be affirmed that any person has a right to be appointed to a nonelective municipal office. If the municipality confers such an office upon an individual, he cannot be said to have a property right therein until a definite term of tenure has been affixed thereto. At the most, it is only a privilege; and as to privileges of citizens we have the definite utterance of the Supreme Court of the United States in Presser v. Illinois, 116 U. S. 252, 266, 6 Sup. Ct. 580, 585, 29 L. Ed. 615, where it was held that "A state may pass laws to regulate the privileges and immunities of its own citizens, provided that in so doing it does not abridge their privileges and immunities as citizens of the United States." We cannot see why the veteran sections of the Constitution and of the civil service law are not precisely and completely within the language and spirit of this opinion of the United States Supreme Court. It follows that the order should be affirmed.
Final order affirmed, with costs. Ail concur.