Case Name: Vann v. Vernon General Insurance Company
Court: Appellate Court of Indiana
Jurisdiction: Indiana
Decision Date: 1956-03-20
Citations: 126 Ind. App. 503
Docket Number: No. 18,678
Parties: Vann v. Vernon General Insurance Company
Judges: 
Reporter: Indiana Court of Appeals Reports
Volume: 126
Pages: 503–515

Head Matter:
Vann v. Vernon General Insurance Company
[No. 18,678.
Filed March 20, 1956.
Rehearing denied May 24, 1956.]
Anderson, Hicks & Anderson, F. L. Anderson, Sr., F. L. Anderson, Jr., of Gary, Snyder & Jacobs and Karl M. Jacobs, of Fowler, for appellant.
Draper & Eichhorn, of Gary, and Fraser & Isham, of Fowler, for appellee.

Opinion:
Kelley, J.
In this action the appellant sought to recover of the appellee insurer, on a collision policy issued to the former by the latter, an amount claimed to be the entire value of the insured's automobile. Appellee put the complaint at issue and filed an amended third paragraph of answer averring that it had made an election to repair under the policy, had repaired the automobile, and thereby satisfied the policy agreement. The reply denies said answer and alleges that the automobile had not been repaired in accordance with the provisions of the policy.
The issues thus made were submitted to a jury for trial. At the close of appellant's evidence the court directed a verdict for the appellee. Consistent judgment followed and appellant appeals therefrom, charging that the direction of said verdict was erroneous.
The court directed the verdict apparently upon the theory, as urged by appellee, that there was no evidence that the accident resulted in the total loss of the automobile.
There was evidence tending to establish the following material and pertinent facts: On or about August 19, 1950, while appellant's automobile was properly parked on the highway, another automobile collided therewith, knocking the parked automobile back some 300 feet and turning it around. The police department removed it to the Fifth Avenue Ford, Inc., referred to as the Ford agency and garage. The automobile was a 1948 Packard which appellant had purchased new from the Tri-City Motors, Inc., a Packard agency. Later appellant went to the Ford garage and told them he wanted the automobile taken to the Packard garage. He was advised by the Ford agency that the "insurance people wanted them to do the work." Later appellant went to the Ford garage and inquired concerning what they were going to do and he was informed that they were taking the frame of the automobile to a frame shop and have it fixed. Appellant objected on the ground that the frame couldn't be fixed without replacing it, to which it was rejoined that to replace the frame would "cost more than the car 'is worth." Upon being advised that the car was ready, appellant and others took it out upon the highway but after proceeding a block or so it failed to function and was towed back to the garage.
Appellant conversed with appellee's adjuster on several occasions, insisting that the automobile would not be as it was without a new frame, but the adjuster advised that "The Insurance Company said they will not put in a new frame, that a new frame would run about $2,200.00 and that was more than the car was worth;" and that "This $279.81 estimate is as far as the company will go, they will not put in a new frame." Appellee did not put in a new frame.
The automobile would not be in a safe operating condition without a new frame. Its value prior to the collision was $2,100.00 and after the collision it had a salvage value of $350.00 to $400.00. Since the collision appellant has not had possession of the automobile and, at the time of his testimony on October 1, 1954, he did not know where it was.
It is a familiar rule that in considering the appropriateness of a directed verdict, the court must accept as true all facts which the evidence tends to prove and draw, against the party requesting such instruction, all inferences which the jury might reasonably draw, Whitaker, Admr. v. Borntrager (1954), 233 Ind. 678, 122 N. E. 2d 734, and the court is not authorized to weigh conflicting evidence even though the conflict may appear between the direct examination of the witness and his cross-examination. Tarnowski v. Lake Shore and Michigan Southern Railway Company (1914), 181 Ind. 202, 209, 104 N. E. 16; Moslander v. Moslander's Estate (1941), 110 Ind. App. 122, 126, point 1, 38 N. E. 2d 268.
A fair consideration of the evidence, surveyed in the light and within the boundaries of the stated applicable legal principles, convinces us that there is evidence tending to support the material averments of the complaint. There is evidence, also, we think, bearing directly upon the issues raised by appellee's amended third paragraph of answer and the reply thereto from which the jury might have found that appellant's- automobile had not been repaired and the policy agreement fulfilled, as claimed by appellee in its said answer.
One of the cherished constitutional rights of the American citizen is that of trial by jury. Our courts are charged with the duty of preserving that right. Thus it has been decreed that in a civil case where the issue rests upon inferences and deductions to be drawn from facts proved, if there be any evidence, upon the essential issues, in favor of the party against whom a directed verdict is moved, such motion will be denied.
Judgment reversed, with instructions to sustain appellant's motion for a new trial.