Case Name: Elizabeth E. Lundy, App'lt, v. The Second Avenue Railroad Co., Resp't
Court: New York Court of Common Pleas
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1892-11-07
Citations: 48 N.Y. St. Rep. 676
Docket Number: 
Parties: Elizabeth E. Lundy, App’lt, v. The Second Avenue Railroad Co., Resp't.
Judges: 
Reporter: New York State Reporter
Volume: 48
Pages: 676–679

Head Matter:
Elizabeth E. Lundy, App’lt, v. The Second Avenue Railroad Co., Resp't.
(New York Common Pleas, General Term,
Filed November 7, 1892.)
Negligence—Railroads. .
Plaintiff endeavored to cross the avenue about a foot behind one of defendant’s cars which had stopped on an incline to allow a passenger to alight. As she did so, the driver released the brake in order to start, when the car hacked and struck the plaintiff twice, knocking her down and injuring her. Neld, "that upon these facts the jury would have been warranted in finding that the driver might have so started the car as to arrest the retrograde movement, or, if that was impossible, ordinary care required him to give notice to persons in the way of probable injury, and that a nonsuit was error.
(Bischoff, J., dissents.)
Appeal from judgment and order denying new trial. Action for negligent injury, upon this state of facts: Defendant’s car having stopped three or four feet below the crossing, plaintiff undertook-to pass about a foot in its rear, when it suddenly moved backward, causing the injury in controversy.
The complaint was dismissed.
Payson Merrill, for resp’t; George W. Wilson, for app’lt.

Opinion:
Pryor, J.
If upon any construction of the evidence it be sufficient to authorize a verdict for the plaintiff, the dismissal of the complaint was error. Stackus v. R. R. Co., 79 N. Y., 464; Clemence v. City, 66 id., 834, 338. Hence, if the inferences from the evidence be not certain and incontrovertible, the question of negligence is for determination by the jury. Hart v. Bridge Co., 80 N. Y., 622.
Upon the evidence before us the jury would have been warranted in the conclusion that the driver might have so started the car as to arrest its retrograde movement; or, if this were impossible, that ordinary care required him to give notice to persons in the way of probable injury.
" To justify a non-suit on the ground of contributory negligence, the undisputed facts must show the omission or commission of some act which the law adjudges negligence." Stackus v. R. R. Co., supra. Clearly no act of the plaintiff can be held to be negligence as matter of law. Conlin v. Rodgers, 39 St. Rep., 51, is authority only for the proposition that in the absence of any evidence as to the occasion of the injury, in other words, in the absence of evidence on the issue of negligence, a non-suit is inevitable. Dobbins v. Brown, 119 N. Y., 188; 28 St. Rep., 957. Here, the cause of the injury was demonstrated, and we are unable to affirm that it is equally consistent with inferences fatal and unfavorable to the plaintiff's case.
The conclusion is, that the judgment be reversed and a new trial ordered, costs to abide the event.
Daly, Oh. J., concurs.