Case Name: Jacqueline M. ALSTON, Appellant, v. Ann C. ALSTON, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 2007-07-18
Citations: 960 So. 2d 879
Docket Number: No. 4D06-286
Parties: Jacqueline M. ALSTON, Appellant, v. Ann C. ALSTON, Appellee.
Judges: MAY, J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 960
Pages: 879–885

Head Matter:
Jacqueline M. ALSTON, Appellant, v. Ann C. ALSTON, Appellee.
No. 4D06-286.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
July 18, 2007.
Stan L. Riskin of Stan L. Riskin, P.A., Plantation, for appellant.
Steven A. Mason of Law Offices of Steven A. Mason, P.A., Hollywood, for appel-lee.

Opinion:
STONE, J.
Jacqueline Alston (Second Wife) appeals a summary final judgment in favor of the plaintiff, Ann Alston (Former Wife). We reverse.
Former Wife brought suit after she was denied military survivor benefits by the Army Board for Correction of Military Records. The marital settlement agreement (MSA), incorporated into the judgment of dissolution of her marriage to Colonel Alston, provided that she would be entitled to maximum military survivorship benefits upon his death.
The military survivor benefit plan allowed payment to a former spouse after certain conditions were met. In this case, it required submission of military form DD 2656-1 within one year of the Alston's divorce in 1999. Unaware of this condition, Colonel Alston submitted the correct form in 2004, nearly four years after the Army's deadline. Colonel Alston had remarried in 2000. Second Wife was one of the witnesses to his ill-timed execution of form DD 2656-1. The colonel died a month after he submitted the form.
Former Wife's application for survivor benefits was denied by the Department of the Army due to the colonel's untimely filing of the form. A subsequent appeal of this decision was denied on the same grounds; the "Discussion and Conclusions" section of the military's order ends with the following paragraph:
4. The [former service member] had remarried in June 2000. After his first anniversary, his [second] wife became the legal beneficiary of the [service benefit plan]. Absent consent of the widow to correct to FSM's records to provide for former spouse coverage in lieu of spouse coverage, to grant the applicant's request at this date would constitute an unconstitutional taking from his widow.
(Emphasis added)
In this suit, Former Wife alleges that Second Wife was unjustly enriched by receipt of the military benefits. She seeks a mandatory injunction directing Second Wife to execute a consent to transfer of the survivorship benefit to Former Wife in accordance with the judgment of dissolution. Neither party argues that the military board ruled on any basis other than timeliness. Although the military board recognized the Second Wife could consent to Former Wife's claim, there is no indication that the military tribunal considered the issue decided and relied upon by the trial court in granting summary judgment, that by the act of witnessing the form, Second Wife, by inference, consented to a transfer to Former Wife.
We reverse the summary judgment because we conclude a waiver of Second Wife's right to the benefits cannot be inferred, without more, simply from the act of witnessing her husband's signature on the form. The only evidence supporting Second Wife's waiver acquiescence appearing in the record on appeal is the act of witnessing. This was the sole basis for the trial court's summary judgment. There is no indication or claim that there is evidence of additional circumstances regarding whether Second Wife's act of witnessing was a waiver of her rights.
As a matter of law, waiver requires knowledge of facts and intentional conduct. See Estate of Ballett, 426 So.2d 1196, 1199 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983). There is no evidence in the record that Second Wife even knew what the form was, what its implications or effect were or could be, or that she intended anything whatsoever by her witnessing other than attesting to her husband's signature. Neither is this a case where it can be said that Second Wife should have known that her signing as a witness would constitute acquiescence.
We reject, however, Second Wife's arguments that the military board decision must control the outcome of this case and that the trial court usurped the jurisdiction of the military board. The military board decision did not address the relief claimed in this case by Former Wife. The board ruled solely on the basis of timeliness. Whether the military would recognize a judgment of the trial court mandating Second Wife's consent is not for us to resolve in this appeal.
Therefore, we reverse and remand for consideration of First Wife's claim on the merits.
MAY, J., concurs.
FARMER, J., concurs specially with opinion.