Case Name: William Fell vs. The State of Maryland
Court: Court of Appeals of Maryland
Jurisdiction: Maryland
Decision Date: 1875-03-11
Citations: 42 Md. 71
Docket Number: 
Parties: William Fell vs. The State of Maryland.
Judges: The cause was argued before Bartol, C. J., Bowie, Stewart, Miller and Alvey, J.
Reporter: Maryland Reports
Volume: 42
Pages: 71–117

Head Matter:
William Fell vs. The State of Maryland.
Constitutionality of Local Option Laws : Act of 1874, ch. 453— Acts of Assembly to be declared Invalid only for the most conclusive reasons — Legislative power — Nature of a Incense to sell liquor.
Section one of the Act of 1874, ch. 453, provided for an election to be held on • the second Tuesday in July, 1874, at -which the voters of the several election districts in the counties named, should cast ballots “for the sale of spirituous or fermented liquors” or “against the sale of spirituous or fermented liquors;” and directed the judges of election should make return of the votes to the Judg-es of the Circuit Court, who should make proclamation of the result. Section two, enacted that, if it should be found by the returns of the judges of election, and proclamation of the Judges of the Circuit Court, that a majority of the votes, in any district of either of the said counties '* ® * * had been cast against the sale of spirituous or fermented liquors, that then it should not be lawful for any person or persons, or body corporate to sell spirituous or fermented liquors, in any district of either of said counties, voting by a majority against selling the same. Section three prescribed the penalty for a violation of the Act; and section four provided that the Act should take effect, immediately after it should have been determined by a majority of the people in any one or more election districts of the counties named, whether or not spirituous or fermented liquors should not be sold, as before provided for. Held :
That this Act was constitutional and valid ; its going into effect and becoming operative, being made to depend upon the result of a popular vote, was not a delegation of legislative power to the people.
Every intendment should be made in support of a legislative enactment; and it should not be declared invalid except for the plainest and most conclusive reasons.
The Legislature has the undoubted power to prohibit the sale of spirituous or fermented liquors in any part of the State, notwithstanding a party to be affected by tlie law, may have procured a license, under the general license laws of the State, which has not yet expired. Such a license is in no sense a contract made by the State with the party holding the license. It is a mere permit, subject to be modified or annulled at the pleasure of the Legislature, who have the power to change or repeal the law under which the license was granted.
Appeal from the Circuit Court for Caroline County.
The case is stated in the opinion of the Court.
The cause was argued before Bartol, C. J., Bowie, Stewart, Miller and Alvey, J.
Phil. H. Tuck, J. W. Bryant, John B. Brown and Will. H. Tuck, for the appellant.
The Act of 1874, ch. 453, is null and void, being in violation of the Constitution.
1. Laws of this kind have been passed npon in several of the States, and although in some instances they have been sustained, the Courts have concurred in the following principles, to wit: that legislation cannot be exercised directly by the people; that legislative power cannot be delegated, but must be exercised by the functionaries and in the mode designated by the Constitution ; and that a law enacted in any other manner is void. Hence, the inquiry has been, whether, according to the terms in which the sense of the people was proposed to be taken, there was a delegation of legislative power to them; in other words, whether the Act as it emanated from the Legislature was a perfect and effective law, or required for efficacy the sanction of the people. If of the latter character they have been, without exception, declared to be void. Rice vs. Foster, 4 Harr., 479; Parker vs. Commonwealth, 6 Penna., 507; Thorne vs. Cramer, 15 Barb., 112 ; Bradley vs. Baxter, 15 Barb., 122; Barto vs. Himrod, 4 Selden, 490; Sauto vs. State, 2 Iowa, 165; Geebrick vs. State, 5 Iowa, 491; State vs. Beneke, 9 Iowa, 203; State vs. Weir, 33 Iowa, 134; Maize vs. State, 4 Ind., 342; Meshmeier vs. State, 11 Ind., 482; State vs. Swisher, 17 Texas, 441; City of Patterson, &c., 4 Zabiskie, 392; State vs. Copeland, 3 Rhode Island, 33; Railroad Co. vs. Clinton County, 1 Ohio S. R., 77 to 90; People vs. Collins, 3 Mich., 343; State vs. Parker, 26 Vermont, 356; Ex parte Wall, 48 Cal., 279; Sedgwick’s Const. Law, 164; Cooley on Const. Lim., 116, 117.
2. By our Constitution legislative power is conferred upon the General Assembly, composed of a Senate and a House of Delegates. This is the only law-making department known to the Constitution, subject to the veto power, and the provisions on the subject are imperative both as to the authority and the manner of its exercise in passing laws. Constitution of Marylamd, Art. III., Secs. 1, 14, 28, 29, 30, 31.
Limitations upon this power are declared in certain cases where the people, speaking through the convention, reserved to themselves a participation in the legislative function. Art. 11, Sec. 7 ; Art. 13 ; Art. 14.
3. This Act is a delegatiotfof legislative power to portions of the people'of the counties named. Every act to have the force of law should express the judgment and will of the Legislature, and be a perfect operative law when duly passed by the two Houses, and approved hy the Governor. This Act was not a complete declaration of the mind and will of the law-makers ; it had no validity when recorded in the Oourt of Appeals, except as authority for holding elections. It was to take effect, not immediately after its passage, or on the 1st June, according to the Constitution, but “immediately after it shall have been determined by a majority of the people, whether or not liquor should not be sold as before provided for.” The people were to determine whether or not any person should sell, and if it appeared that a majority in any district was cast against selling, then it loas to he unlawful to sell. (Sec. 2.)
The members of the Legislature did not will that the Act should have the force of law; it was left by them to the people to determine for themselves whether it should ever have any effect. The only thing determined by the Legislature was, that there might be an election, and that persons should be punished or not, according to the judgment of the people as shewn by the result of the election. If there had-been no election, or if a majority had been the other way, there would have been no effective law, because there would have been no determination of the question as to the right to sell, and no punishment for selling, for there could have been no offenders. Bradley vs. Baxter, 15 Barb., 122; Thorne vs. Cramer, 15 Barb., 112, 114; Barto vs. Himrod, 4 Selden, 486; 489, 496; Rice vs. Foster; 4 Harr., 479; Parker vs. Commonwealth, 6 Penna., 507.
This Act does not, as in some of the cases quoted, establish a license system for the State with penalties for selling without license, and making the issue of a license depend on a vote of the people, (even supposing that such a law would be valid,) but without any repeal by the Legislature of the existing license Jaws, it declares that the people shall determine in effect whether there shall be any licenses issued, and also whether anjr person — including, of course, those who hold licenses —shall sell, and according to their determination, the seller is or is not to be punished.
The revenue laws, prescribing how licenses might be obtained, were in force in that county on the second Tuesday of July^ — the day of election. On that day the appellant was selling without violating any law of the State. The next day it became unlawful for him to sell, not by reason of any determination or will that the Legislature had expressed, but because the people of his district had voted that no one should sell. This was nothing less than a repeal by a vote of a small portion of the people, of the license system, whicli the representatives of all the people liad established, and under which the appellant had purchased a privilege which those who conferred it, alone ought to have power to take away. Railroad Co. vs. Clinton County, 1 Ohio S. R., 90; Geebrick vs. State, 5 Iowa, 491; Rice vs. Foster, 4 Harr., 491.
It is not denied that statutes may be conditional; that their taking effect is sometimes made to depend on a subsequent event. But the event must be one that will produce such a change of circumstances, affecting the expediency of passing the law, that the Legislature can, in advance, see and be able to declare, as matter for their own judgment, that it will be expedient and proper that the Act shall take effect on the occurrence of the event. Here the expediency of passing the law is to be determined in another manner, and the event on which it is to have effect, is nothing less than a determination by others of the identical matter which it was the province of the Legislature to have decided. It was a mere shifting of duty and responsibility, for it is impossible to say that the Legislature would have passed a law prohibiting the sale of liquor-in any one district of Caroline, or of any other county. Bradley vs. Baxter, 15 Barb., 123; Mayor, &c. of Balt. vs. Clunet, 23 Md., 468, 470; N. C. R. R. vs. Mayor, &c., 21 Md., 93; Mayor, &c. vs. Kirkley, 29 Md., 85; Barto vs. Himrod, 4 Selden, 490, 495; Ex parte Wall, 48 Cal., 279; Cooley on Const’l Lim., 121; Sauto vs. State, 2 Iowa, 203; People vs. Collins, 3 Mich., 378; Parker vs. Commonwealth, 6 Penn., 525.
4. There is a class of cases in the books in which Acts have been submitted to the action of towns or townships, or municipal corporations, and held to be valid ; but this Act does not belong to that class.
County affairs in this State are managed by Commissioners, who bear no resemblance to the local authorities in some of the other States, and, if, a parallel could be drawn between towns and townships and oiir counties, surely election districts are not entitled to the same consideration. One of the anomalies of this law is, that while the people in four districts of Caroline County are expected to live abstemiously, the inhabitants of the other are under no such restraint.
The right of the people in towns and townships to vote on such questions, is based, in some of the cases, on the idea that they are quasi corporations, and may be well authorized to regulate their police affairs ; but our election districts are in no sense corporations. Commonwealth vs. Bennett, 108 Mass., 27; Commonwealth vs. Dean, 110 Mass., 359; Bancroft vs. Dumas, 21 Vert., 464. In this last case, the law was sustained as being perfect and operative without the vote of the town.
5. In some of the cases such laws have been sustained in part, and condemned in part, because of the clause submitting them to a vote of the people, if it appeared that the laws were perfect and operative without popular approval. Sauto vs. State, 2 Iowa, 165; Maize vs. State, 4 Ind., 342. But this distinction cannot apply here, for there would have been nothing for the law to operate upon if the election had not been held, or if the vote had been the other way. The provisions are so dependent, one on the other, that the Act is not divisible, hut good or had in loto. State vs. Swisher, 17 Texas, 441; Geebrick vs. State, 5 Iowa, 498; Sauto vs. State, 2 Iowa, 165; Cooley on Const. Lim., 177, 178, 179.
6. Does this Act shew that the Legislature intended to interfere with licenses issued and in force at the time the election took place ?
The people did not vote on the question whether licenses should he granted. The first section declares that the question “ whether or not any person may he licensed, by whom spirituous or fermented liquors may he sold, shall he submitted, &c., &c.,” and then the same section provides for taking a vote for or against selling. Thus while the Act appears to have intended that one question should he submitted to the people, they actually voted upon another. If there is any donht as to the intent of the Legislature; if the supposed intent is not clearly expressed, or cannot be plainly gathered from the whole Act, the Court will not wrest the meaning of words so as to take away the rights of the citizen vested at the time the Act was passed or took effect.
If the Legislature intended that the people should vote upon the question of granting licenses after the ascertainment of the popular will, so as to prevent selling thereafter under such licenses ; or that a majority vote against selling should have the effect of preventing any from being issued after that time, the existing licenses could not be interfered with, and the judgment was wrong. This interpretation seems to be in accordance with the reason and justice of the case, for the Legislature must be presumed to have known that licenses would expire and others issued on the 1st May, and that prohibiting the sale of liquors after the second Tuesday in July, would take away the privilege conferred by the licenses issued between 1st May and the day of election. Legislative expression should be very plain and explicit to perpetrate such a wrong'upon the citizen, while pursuing a business protected by the then existing general laws of the State. An examination of the authorities will show that the subject has been fully considered by the Courts of several of the States, and that the preponderance in number and force of reasoning is against the validity of such laws as that now under review.
Attorney General Syester, William Daniel and George M. Russum, for the appellee.
It is said that the Act of 1814, ch. 453, was not a perfect law when it emanated from the Legislature, but that it delegated to the people legislative functions, and is therefore unconstitutional and void. . Courts will not pronounce a statute unconstitutional, unless it is plainly and undoubtedly a violation of the Constitution. All presumptions are in favor of the law, and to doubt at all, is to resolve the case in favor of the statute.
The Act of 1864, ch. 348, presented to the Court in Hammond vs. Haines, 25 Md., 541, the same .questions that arise here; the validity of that statute was sustained. And a comparison of the two statutes will show that there is no essential difference, no substantial distinction between them. The Act of 1864, submitted to the vote of the people, the single question, “ whether any license to sell spirituous or fermented liquors shall be granted?”
Under the Act of 1814, there is but one thing submitted to the vote of the people. Like the Act of 1864, the first section of the Act of 1814 submits the question, whether there may be a license to any person or persons, or any house, by whom or wherein spirituous or fermented liquors are sold. ££ Whether any person or persons, or house,” “ by whom or in which liquor is sold may be licensed” is the language. Nothing else is before them. They determine the question submitted, at a special election by voting ballots, with the words ££for the sale of spirituous or fermented liquors,” or against such sale, on them. If a majority of the ballots are against the sale, then there is a majority against the license. And in that event, on that contingency here, as in 1864, the law steps In and declares all the consequences without regard to whether the people approve or disapprove of these consequences.
It is true that these consequences may determine one way or the other the judgment of the people. But the people do not, in any sense, pass upon the consequences. The fitness of the results that follow the vote, and the expediency of the rules of conduct that become binding and operative, are subjects with which the people have no more to do here than under the Act of 1864.
The most that can be said of this Act, in the way of delegation of power, is, that the Legislature has delegated a power to the people, to ascertain a fact, or determine the existence of a state of things, (public sentiment, if you please,) upon which the law makes its own action to depend. And this is not a legislative function. The existence of this fact or state of sentiment, is by the Act itself ££ declared to he effeetive, to put the law in operation” in the designated districts, just as the Court understood the provisions of the Act of 1864.
The people have nothing, to say or do with the punishment inflicted for violation of the law. They are not allowed to say whether a fine shall be imposed, or if imposed, how much. They pass no judgment, and have no discretion whatever as to the character or extent of the punishment; prescribe no rules for the government of themselves or others; decree no results; ordain no consequences ; sanction nothing; accept nothing; reject nothing. Nothing of this character is referred to them.
It is true they vote whether “license may issue” or not. But for what purpose ? Not to determine how the trade in liquors shall be carried on ; neither to say whether a man shall be punished for trafficking in them ; but simply to ascertain whether a proper occasion exists for the law to go into operation. This the people may lawfully do. Legislatures can, and constantly do delegate a discretion to some other body or instrumentality, to determine the expediency of a law. They frequently delegate to the people of a particular locality, the discretion to say whether a proper occasion exists for the operation of a law ; or an appropriate event occurs for the enforcement of it. But these are, in no sense, legislative powers. Moses vs. Reading, 9 Harris, (Penn.,) 188; Locke’s Appeal, 72 Penn., 491; Parker vs. State, 26 Vermt., 357; Bancroft vs. Dumas, 21 Vermt., 456.
It seems to be clear, also, that here the people do not ratify what the Legislature has done. The qualities of command and prohibition are in no sense with them, but in the Act itself — not subject to approval by the people. The law becomes operative on a contingency, it is true ; but that contingency is not whether the people ratify anything contained in the Act, or reject anything there. It is something wholly different from that. A state of public sentiment is manifested by this vote, and thereupon, the legislative will becomes operative; but not because the vote says it shall so operate.
A statute, made to go into effect, upon a future uncertain contingency, is not for that reason void ; many illustrations might be given, of which the school law of 1825, ch. 162, is an example. The law in that case went into effect only in such counties as voted for the “ establishment of primary schools.” In those voting against them, the Act was declared to be void, secs. 29 and 30. This to be sure, has been justified on the ground that it was a mere question of taxation referred to the people. But there were many things besides taxes provided, for in that law. There is in it, a complete system, which went into operation or not according as the people voted in the counties.
But the general proposition that statutes may be passed, to take effect on a future contingency, would seem to be unquestioned. Parker vs. State, 26 Vermont, 364; Brig Aurora vs. United States, 7 Cranch, 382.
Does it invalidate the law, that the contingency, on which this Act is to become operative and effective, is a vote of the people, on the question, whether a license to sell liquors shall issue or not? Does the nature of the contingency affect the question at all ? Parker vs. State, 26 Verm., 364; See also Bull, et al. vs. Read, et al., 13 Oral., 89; People vs. Reynolds, 5 Gilman, 18, 19; Smith vs. The City of Janesville, 26 Wisconsin, 291; Cooley’s Const, Lim., 120, note 1, 123; People vs. Salomon, 51 Ill., 55; Erlinger vs. Boneau, 51 Ill., 97 ; State vs. O’ Neill, 24 Wisconsin, 153, 154.
It was perfectly competent for the Legislature to make the right to sell liquor dependent on the popular choice. It is nothing more than a regulation of the traffic in conformity with the wishes of those interested ; a power which the State may exercise, a condition which it may impose under the police power.
The power to regulate this traffic, to make the sale dependent on just such conditions as it sees fit, or utterly to prohibit, with a view to prevent intemperance, crime and pauperism, and the suppression of disorders in society, is by an overwhelming mass of authority sustained everywhere, as a valid and appropriate exercise of the police power of the State. Cooley on Const. Lim., 583, and authorities cited.
Hor can it affect the true nature of this discretion or power, as a condition precedent, because of the manner and the time when it is allowed to declare itself. It is the same thing, whether it expresses itself hy consenting or refusing to sign petitions, as in Indiana (See Groesch vs. The State, 42 Indiana, 547); the recommendation or refusal of “respectable citizens,” as in Lancaster’s case (mentioned in 25 Md., 561); or the consent or refusal expressed hy the people through their ballots, as in this case. The condition jirecedent may be anything the Legislature may see fit to declare, only so it he fair, reasonable and have relation to the subject-matter. And the approval of the people is certainly as fair, reasonable and as clearly related to such subjects, as the payment of so much money into the treasury, or the recommendations of certain citizens. People vs. Reynolds, 5 Gillman, 1; Ball vs. Read, 13 Grattan, 18; Smith vs. The City of Janesville, 26 Wisconsin, 291; State vs. Court of Common Pleas of Morris, 36 New Jersey, 42.
Does it affect the constitutionality of the law, that the Legislature sees fit to interdict the sale of liquor in the third district of Caroline County, after actual demonstration that a majority of the people there not only acquiesce in, but desire it ?
If, whilst in session, the Legislature had ordered a vote on this subject, and upon being satisfied that a majority were unfavorable to a sale of liquor, it had passed a law prohibiting it, no one would question the perfect regularity and validity of the statute.
Is there any essential difference between that case and the one where the law is passed, perfect in all its commands and prohibition, to become operative, when it is knowm to be in accordance with public sentiment ? It is not exactly understood how a law made in conformity with public will, is thereby unconstitutional, as being a delegation of lawmaking power to the people. And where, as in this case, it is clear that the thing submitted to the people is not whether they approve or reject the provisions of a statute as enacted, but simply whether a state of public sentiment exists ; on which it is expedient the enactment should operate ; this, clearly is not a delegation of legislative authority to the people. All the cases maintain, and some draw this distinction. Haines vs. Hammond, 25 Md., 561; Bancroft vs. Dumas, 21 Vermont, 456; State vs. Parker, 26 Vermont, 357; Locke’s Appeal, 72 Penn., 491; Bull vs. Read, 13 Grattan, 78; People vs. Reynolds, 5 Gillman, 1.

Opinion:
Bartol, C. J.,
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The appellant was indicted for selling spirituous liquors on the 5th day of October, 1874, within the third election district of Caroline County, in violation of the provisions of the Act of 1874, ch. 453.
The case was submitted to the Circuit Court upon an agreed statement of facts, set out in the record, and the judgment being against the defendant, he has prosecuted this appeal.
It is admitted that an election was held as provided by the Act, on the second Tuesday of July, 1874, and that the returns thereof were duly made by the proper officers, that in the third, election district, a majority of the votes cast were against the sale of spirituous or fermented liquors; and on the 4th day of August, 1874, proclamation of the resuLt was made by the Judges of the Circuit Court, as provided by the Act. It was also admitted that the sales were made by the defendant as charged in the indictment.
If tbs Act of Assembly be valid, tbe offeree eomes eleaxly within the second and, third sections. But it is contended on the part of the appellant, that the Act is unconstitutional and void, because it is alleged to be an attempt by the Legislature to delegate to the legal voters of the district, the power of making the law. By the Constitution, the legislative power is delegated to the General Assembly exclusively, and that the power thus delegated, cannot constitutionally be exercised by any other body or authority is universally conceded.
Mr. Cooley, in his work on " Constitutional Limitations," page 117, says, " One of the settled maxims of constitutional law is that the power conferred on the Legislature to make laws, cannot he delegated hy that department to any other body or authority."
This principle rests upon the established rule " delegatus non potest deleg ari," and the application of this rule to the several dejjartments of the government created hy the Constitution, and clothed with the exercise of political power, is sanctioned both by reason and authority. The .tnm question, therefore, is whether the Act of Assembly now under consideration is a delegation of the legislative power to the voters, and to determine this question it is important to examine the provisions of the Act.
Section 1 Provides for an election to he held on the second Tuesday of July, 1874, at which the voters of the several election districts, in the counties named, shall cast ballots "for the sale of spirituous or fermented liquors" or " against the sale of spirituous or fermented liquors;" and directs that the judges of the election shall make return of the votes to the Judges of the Circuit Court, who shall make proclamation of the result.
Section 2nd, Enacts that if it shall be found by the returns of the judges of election, and proclamation of the Judges of the Circuit Court, that a majority of the votes, in any district of either of said counties has been cast against the sale of spirituous or fermented liquors, that then it shall not be lawful for any person, or persons, or body corporate to sell spirituous or fermented liquors, in any district of either of said counties voting by a majority against selling the same.
Section 3rd, Prescribes the penalty for a violation of the Act.
Section ith, Provides that the Act shall take effect, immediately after it shall have been determined by a majority of the people in any one or more election districts of the counties named, whether or not spirituous or fermented liquors shall not be sold, as before provided for.
Now what has been delegated to the voters by this Act of Assembly? Certainly not the power to make the law, or to'repeal existing laws. They are called on by the first section simply to express, by their ballots, their opinion or sentiment as to the subject-matter to which the law relates. They declare no consequences, prescribe no penalties and .exercise no legislative functions. The consequences are declared in the law, and are exclusively the result of the legislative will. The Act of Assembly is "a perfect and complete law as it left the halls of legislation and was approved by the Governor;" but by its terms, it was made to go into operation in any district, upon the contingency of a majority of the legal voters within the district, being ascertained to be in favor of the prohibition contained in the second section. The question before us therefore resolves itself simply into this. May the Legislature constitutionally enact a law, and make its operation depend upon the contingency of the popular vote ? It has never been denied that " the Legislature may provide that an Act shall not take effect until a future day, or until the happening of some particular event, or in some contingency thereafter to arise, or upon the performance of some specified condition." A familiar example of such legislation may be found in the Acts of Congress, which came under review before the Supreme Court in the case of the Brig Aurora vs. United States, 7 Cranch, 382.
It was decided by this Court that " a valid law may be passed, to take effect upon the happening of a future contingent event, even where that event involves the assent to its provisions by other parties." Mayor, &c. of Balt, vs. Clunet, et al., 23 Md., 469; in support of this proposition many cases might be cited.
It. has been well remarked by a learned Judge : " If the Legislature may make the operation of its Act depend on some contingency thereafter to happen, or may prescribe' conditions, it must be for them to judge in what contingency, or upon what condition the Act shall take effect. They must have the power to prescribe any they may think proper; and if the condition be that a vote of approval shall first be given by the people affected by the proposed measure, it is difficult to see why it may not be as good and valid as any other condition whatever. There can be no inherent vice in the nature of such a condition, which shall serve to defeat the Act, when it would be legal and effectual, if made to depend upon some other event. To say in such a case, that the Act is made by the voters and not by the Legislature, is to disregard all proper distinctions, and involves an utter confusion of ideas upon this subject."
" Wherever the contingency upon which a law is to take effect, depends upon the action of third persons, it might be said with equal truth, that the law was enacted by those persons instead of the Legislature." Bull vs. Read, 13 Grattan, 90, 91.
In the same case Judge Lee uses the following argument which seems to us to present the question in a very clear and forcible manner:
" It will not be questioned, that it is entirely competent for the Legislature to provide for taking a vote of the people or any portion of them, upon a measure directly affecting them, and if a given number be in favor of its adoption, to enact a law thereupon, carrying it into effect. And there would seem to be but little difference in substance, in a reversal of the process, by first enacting the law in all its parts ; but providing that its operation is to be suspended until it be ascertained that the requisite number of the people to be affected by it were in favor of its adoption." 13 Grattan, 88.
We refer also to the opinion of Redfield, C. J., in The State vs. Parker, 26 Vermont, 365, where the same views are expressed.
It must be borne in mind that the question with which we are dealing, is one of constitutional power. As to the wisdom or expediency of such legislation we are not authorized to judge. These are questions which under our system of government, are exclusively confided to the Legislature, and so long as that department acts within the constitutional limits of its authority, this Court has no power to sit in judgment on the wisdom, or expediency of its action.
The constitutional question here involved is not a new one in this State. In our judgment it has been distinctly passed upon by our predecessors in this Court.
By the Act of 1825, cli. 162, a general system of primary schools was established. The 29th and 30th sections of that Act were as follows:
i£29th. Be it enacted, That at the next election of delegates to the General Assembly, every voter when he offers to vote, shall be required by the judges of election, to state whether he is for or against the establishment of primary schools, and the said judges shall record the number of votes for and against primary schools, and make return thereof to the Legislature, during the first week of the session, and if a majority of the said votes in any County shall be in favor of the establishment of primary schools as is therein provided for, then and in that case the said Act shall be valid for such County or Counties, otherwise of no effect whatever."
"Sec. 30th. And he it enacted, That if a majority of the votes of any County in this State, shall be against the establishment of primary schools, as established by this Act, then and in that case the said Act shall be void as to that County."
This law came before the Court of Appeals in Burgess vs. Pue, 2 Gill, 11, (decided in 1844.) Its validity was assailed, on the same ground as is now urged against the Act of 1874. That is, that its operation in any County was made to depend upon the result of a popular vote. It was urged there as here, that the effect of the 29th and 30th sections, was to delegate the law-making power to the voters, which the Legislature could not constitutionally do. After a most full and able argument, the Court decided that the law was valid, and that there was no validity in the constitutional objection.
The same question again arose in a case between the same parties, 2 Gill, 254, and again the constitutionality of the law was maintained. It would he difficult to find a more solemn and authoritative decision upon any question than is presented by those cases ; and if would be equally difficult to distinguish the principle then decided, from, that involved in the present case ; so far as it concerns the question of the supposed delegation of legislative power, by a submission to the popular vote to determine the contingency upon which a law is to go into operation. Again in Hammond vs. Haines, 25 Md., 541, this Court by a unanimous decision held the Act of 1864, ch. 348, to be valid, and constitutional. That Act submitted to the qualified voters of,the borough of North East, to decide by ballot whether any license should he granted to sell spirituous or fermented liquors within the borough.
The position of the appellant finds no support in the decided cases in Maryland. In other States there has been much conflict in the decisions. In some of them, the Courts have held laws to be invalid, because their operation was made to depend upon the contingency of a popular vote. Among the earliest of these cases are Parker vs. Commonwealth, 6 Barr, (Penn.,) 507, (decided in 1847 ;) Rice vs. Foster, 4 Harr., (Del.,) 479, (decided about the same time ;) and Barto vs. Himrod, 4 Selden, (N. Y.,) 483. These were followed by the Courts of Indiana, Iowa, Michigan and some others. We do not consider it necessary to refer to these cases more particularly. In many of the States, decisions have been rendered by the Courts of last resort, in accordance with the ruling of this Court in Burgess vs. Pue, and Hammond vs. Haines. In Pennsylvania the leading case of Parker vs. The Commonwealth, which furnished the basis of many of the decisions in other States, cited by the appellant, has recently been overruled and reversed by the Supreme Court of the same State in Locke's Appeal, 72 Penn., 491. This last decision by that able Court was made after full argument, and an examination of the course of judicial decision upon the question, and is in accordance with the conclusions we have expressed.
In the examination of the question before us, we have kept in view the cardinal principle, which must always govern the Courts, when called on to pass upon the constitutionality of the acts of a co-ordinate department of the government.
Every intendment ought to be made in support of the legislative enactment, and it is not to be declared invalid, except for the plainest and most conclusive reasons. In this case, we have failed to discover any sufficient grounds to justify us in declaring the Act of 1874, ch. 453, unconstitutional or inoperative. So to pronounce would in our judgment be contrary to sound reason, as well as at variance with the previous decisions of this Court.
There can be no question of the power of the Legislature to fix the time when a law shall go into effect; nor can it be doubted that the Legislature has power to prohibit the sale of spirituous or fermented liquors, in any part of the State ; notwithstanding a party to be affected by the law, may have procured a license, under the general license laws of the State, which has not yet expired. Such a license is in no sense a contract made by the State with the party holding the license. It is a mere permit, subject to be modified or annulled at the pleasure of the Legislature, who have the power to change or repeal the law under which the license was granted. Parkinson vs. State, 14 Md., 185.
(Decided 11th March, 1875.)
Being of opinion that none of the objections to the validity of the law, urged by the appellant are valid ; the judgment of the Circuit Court has been affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.