Case Name: Johnson v. State of Indiana
Court: Supreme Court of Indiana
Jurisdiction: Indiana
Decision Date: 1970-12-03
Citations: 255 Ind. 324
Docket Number: No. 1269S309
Parties: Johnson v. State of Indiana.
Judges: Hunter, C.J., and Givan, J., concur; Jackson, J., • dissents with opinion, in which DeBruler, J., concurs.
Reporter: Indiana Reports
Volume: 255
Pages: 324–336

Head Matter:
Johnson v. State of Indiana.
[No. 1269S309.
Filed December 3, 1970.]
Bob Good, of Shelbyville, for appellant.
Theodore L. Sendak, Attorney General, R. Michael Bruney, Deputy Attorney General, for appellee.

Opinion:
Arterburn, J.
This is an appeal from the Hamilton Superior Court where appellant was found guilty of rape. The appellant was charged by affidavit on July 6, 1966, in the Superior Court of Hancock County with the rape of a fifteen year old girl. On September 8, 1966, appellant was committed to the Division of Maximum Security of the Dr. Norman M. Beatty Memorial Hospital upon the recommendation of two court-appointed psychiatrists, who found that appellant was not competent to stand trial. After nearly three years, the hospital determined that appellant was competent to stand trial.
A motion for a change of venue from Hancock County was granted, and a trial by jury commenced on August 26, 1969, in the Hamilton Superior Court, the jury finding appellant guilty of the crime of rape.
Around 10:00 a.m. on the morning of July 5, 1966, Karen Sue Briles went out of her home in New Palestine, Indiana, to water the sheep for her father. She went into the well-house next to the barn to get water, and, leaving the well-house, she closed the door and walked towards the road. She had just taken a few steps when she was confronted by the appellant, who grabbed her. She was made to walk back to the well-house, where she was forced to open the door and was pushed inside. Although Karen screamed three or four times, she was pushed to the ground by the appellant, hitting her head on the cement foundation of the well-house. When Karen refused to take off her shorts, the appellant tore them off and proceeded to have intercourse with her.
Appellant left the well-house after Karen told him she would not talk and would wait ten minutes before she would leave. A few minutes later, Karen proceeded to go to her father and they contacted the police, who apprehended appellant a short time later near the railroad track close to the Briles' residence.
Appellant contends that the trial court erred in overruling his motion for a mistrial, which pertained to his competency to stand trial, and that the verdict of the jury is contrary to law and is not sustained by sufficient evidence.
Appellant, at the conclusion of the evidence, made an oral motion for a mistrial, stating that the evidence indicated the defendant had a loss of memory which probably re-suited from electric shock therapy at the Dr. Norman M. Beatty Memorial Hospital. The prosecuting attorney opposed the motion, with the contention that shortly prior to the trial the appellant had been released from the Maximum Security Division of the Dr. Norman M. Beatty Memorial Hospital by a certificate of the psychiatric staff, which found that he was competent to stand trial. A staff meeting record was also submitted to the court and, after due consideration, the court found that the defendant had sufficient comprehension to stand trial for the rape charged. Burns' § 9-1706 (a) gives the court discretion in determining whether or not to have additional psychiatrists appointed for that purpose, and under the circumstances in this case, in our judgment, this was a discretionary matter with the trial court, after having heard the evidence relative thereto. We find no error in the court's overruling of such a motion.
Appellant pleaded insanity. The court accordingly appointed three psychiatrists who testified at the trial. Appellant now contends that the evidence is uncontradicted, showing that he was insane at the time of the alleged offense since the State offered no psychiatric or medical testimony directly on the issue of insanity. We cannot agree with appellant's contention that the testimony of the psychiatrists is uncontradicted. It appears to us the testimony of the psychiatrists was equivocal and qualified in character.
Dr. Donahue, a court-appointed psychiatrist, was asked by the court:
"Q. . do you have an opinion as to whether at the time the alleged offense occurred, assuming, in fact, that they did occur, and the defendant did them, do you have an opinion as to whether the defendant, at the time of the act, knew that the act was right or wrong; in other words, could he tell the difference between right or wrong, in your opinion ?
"A. I would have considerable doubt that he was able to tell the difference between right and wrong at that time."
Dr. Hull, to a like question propounded by the court, answered :
"In all probability he did not know the difference between right and wrong."
Dr. Schuster, a court-appointed psychiatrist, in answer to a question by the court, stated that he did not believe the defendant, at the time of the alleged act, could determine the difference between right and wrong. In the next question, however, when the court asked him if in his opinion the defendant had the ability to know and comprehend the consequences of his act, his answer was: "I don't have an opinion about that." At another point, when the court asked this same doctor whether or not in his opinion the defendant had an irresistible impulse to commit the act charged, the doctor answered: "there was not an irresistible impulse, or to my knowledge there was not an irresistible impulse."
In other words, these psychiatrists were not absolute and definite in their opinions. There was room for some equivocation and doubt. This is demonstrated by the fact that on cross examination of Dr. Schuster the following colloquy took place:
"Q. Assuming that this subject had told an indivdual, immediately following the alleged act, not to tell any one, would this affect your opinion on this?
"A. Yes, if it were definite, if I believed that this statement were true, this would indicate that the individual had an awareness of what had taken place.
"Q. And would this, to you, be evidence of his ability to distinguish right from wrong?
"A. That would be an indication, yes, that he assumed that it was wrong."
Thus, there is expert testimony that the appellant knew that his act was wrong. Additionally, when the appellant left the victim in the well-house, he asked her how he would know that she was not going to tell or talk, and she said "Well, I won't" and told him she would give him 10 minutes before she would leave. These are all indicative of the knowledge of his guilt, which evidence the jury had a right to take into consideration, and which evidence, so far as we can find, the psychiatrists did not consider in their expert opinion.
In this case the evidence does show that the defendant had an awareness that his act was wrong and evil. He took the victim to a secluded spot in a well-house, rather than commit the act openly, in plain view of third parties. After it was over, he attempted to conceal the act and fled. In our. opinion these factors may be considered by the jury in determining the sanity of the defendant and his knowledge that the act he was doing was wrong. The jury had the right to accept any one of the statements of the psychiatrists or any part of them, or to reject them all, where there was contradictory evidence, and to weigh all the facts in the case on the issue of sanity. We recognize that once the issue is raised, the burden of proving sanity is on the State. However, until the issue is raised and evidence is introduced to dispute or contradict sanity, the State is not required to introduce evidence to prove sanity. As long as there is evidence to support the issue of sanity, the jury has a right to reach its own conclusion on that issue. We find there is evidence here to support the jury's conclusion. Shipman v. State (1962), 243 Ind. 245, 183 N. E. 2d 823; Freese v. State (1903), 159 Ind. 597, 65 N. E. 915.
Whether the appellant has a disease or defect sufficient to meet the standards of insanity is a question for the triers of the fact, to be determined from all the evidence, including both the lay and the expert testimony. The opinions of the psychiatrists in this case were not absolute in nature, and even if they were, the jury had a right to take into consideration other facts which the psychiatrists did not consider or, which the evidence fails to show, that the psychiatrists did take into consideration in determining the defendant's sanity. Hill v. State (1969), 252 Ind. 601, 251 N. E. 2d 429.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Hunter, C.J., and Givan, J., concur; Jackson, J., • dissents with opinion, in which DeBruler, J., concurs.