Case Name: DEPARTMENT OF CIVIL RIGHTS v. BEZNOS CORPORATION
Court: Michigan Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1983-05-04
Citations: 125 Mich. App. 500
Docket Number: Docket No. 62753
Parties: DEPARTMENT OF CIVIL RIGHTS v BEZNOS CORPORATION
Judges: Before: Bronson, P.J., and Mackenzie and K. N. Sanborn, JJ.
Reporter: Michigan appeals reports; cases decided in the Michigan Court of Appeals.
Volume: 125
Pages: 500–510

Head Matter:
DEPARTMENT OF CIVIL RIGHTS v BEZNOS CORPORATION
Docket No. 62753.
Submitted August 19, 1982, at Detroit.
Decided May 4, 1983.
Leave to appeal applied for.
The Beznos Corporation owns two multi-unit apartment complexes in Farmington Hills, Michigan. The Michigan Department of Civil Rights charged Beznos with unlawful age discrimination in setting aside certain apartment buildings for families while restricting the remaining buildings to individuals without children. The Michigan Civil Rights Commission ordered Beznos to cease the policies and awarded damages and attorney fees to various complainants. The Oakland Circuit Court, Francis X. O’Brien, J., reversed the order of the commission. The Department of Civil Rights appealed. Held:
The order of the circuit court should be affirmed. The Court of Appeals declined to infer a broad legislative intent to require that all apartments be made available to children. The construction of the Civil Rights Act that the Department of Civil Rights advocates would force landlords to bear increased economic burdens and would force other tenants to live near children against their wishes.
Affirmed.
Mackenzie, J., dissented. She believed that the segregation which Beznos accorded to families with children constituted discrimination against a person on the basis of the age of the persons residing with that person in the terms, conditions, and privileges of a real estate transaction and in the furnishing of facilities or services in connection with that transaction. To the extent that Beznos restricted families with children to certain designated buildings, Beznos refused to engage in real estate transactions concerning apartments in other buildings with members of the family on the basis of the age of persons residing with them, even though Beznos might have' been willing to engage in other real estate transactions with such persons concerning apartments in the designated buildings. She would reverse.
References for Points in Headnotes
73 Am Jur 2d, Statutes §§ 145,146,194.
[2, 6, 7] 15 Am Jur 2d, Civil Rights § 255.
73 Am Jur 2d, Statutes §§ 281, 283.
73 Am Jur 2d, Statutes §§ 213-216.
73 Am Jur 2d, Statutes § 194.
73 Am Jur 2d, Statutes § 268.
15 Am Jur 2d, Civil Rights § 249 et seq.
Opinion of the Court
1. Statutes — Judicial Construction.
A statute must be enforced as written where the statutory language is clear and unambiguous on its face; however, if the language contains an ambiguity, or is susceptible to two or more constructions, the Court of Appeals should ascertain and effectuate the intent of the Legislature.
2. Civil Rights — Landlords — Restrictions Regarding Children.
The Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act should not be construed so as to prohibit a landlord from restricting families with children to certain apartment buildings within an apartment complex because such a construction would force landlords to bear increased economic burdens and would force other tenants to live near children against their wishes (MCL 37.2101 et seq.; MSA 3.548[101] et seq.).
Dissent by Mackenzie, J.
3. Statutes — Judicial Construction.
A court, in construing a statute, may compare related provisions of the statute to reach an understanding of what the drafters actually intended by their use or omission of terms and when a statute contains words grouped in a list, the words should be given related meaning.
4. Courts — Statutes.
It is the duty of a court to enforce a statute as it is written if the statute is clear and unambiguous.
5. Courts — Statutes.
It is not the role of the Court of Appeals to pass on the wisdom of a statute.
6. Civil Rights — Landlords — Restrictions Regarding Children.
A landlord’s restricting families with children to certain apartment buildings within an apartment complex is plainly discrimination against a person on the basis of the age of the persons residing with that person in the terms, conditions, and privileges of a real estate transaction and in the furnishing of facilities or services in connection with that transaction.
7. Civil Rights — Landlords — Family Restrictions.
An apartment complex landlord may exclude or segregate families for legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons which are not mere pretexts for discrimination.
Evans & Luptak (by Gordon S. Gold), for respondent.
Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Louis J. Caruso, Solicitor General, and Michael A. Lock-man and Howard E. Goldberg, Assistants Attorney General, for claimant.
Before: Bronson, P.J., and Mackenzie and K. N. Sanborn, JJ.
Circuit judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.

Opinion:
Per Curiam.
Beznos Corporation owns two apartment complexes in Farmington Hills. The Department of Civil Rights found that certain policies of Beznos violated the Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act, MCL 37.2101 et seq.; MSA 3.548(101) et seq. The policies in question restricted use of complex swimming pools by children and restricted families with children to certain apartment buildings. The department issued an order which required Beznos to give up its policies and to pay damages and attorney fees to various complainants. Beznos petitioned for review of the department's decision in circuit court and, after a trial de novo pursuant to MCL 37.2606; MSA 3.548(606), the department's decision was reversed. The department appeals by right.
At issue here is MCL 37.2502; MSA 3.548(502), which provides in part:
"(1) A person engaging in a real estate transaction, or a real estate broker or salesman, shall not on the basis of religion, race, color, national origin, age, sex, or marital status of a person or a person residing with that person:
"(a) Refuse to engage in a real estate transaction with a person.
"(b) Discriminate against a person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of a real estate transaction or in the furnishing of facilities or services in connection therewith."
MCL 37.2103(a); MSA 3.548(103)(a) contains the following definition:
" 'Age' means chronological age except as otherwise provided by law."
If the language used in a statute is clear and unambiguous, we must enforce it as written, but, if the language is ambiguous, we must ascertain and effectuate the intent of the Legislature. Davis v River Rouge Bd of Ed, 73 Mich App 358, 363; 251 NW2d 585 (1977). The statute at issue here prohibits discrimination on the basis of chronological age in real estate transactions but makes no mention of disparate treatment of families with children. Relationships between parents and their children are more than simply relationships between persons of different ages.
An exhaustive study of the problem of discriminatory treatment of families with children is: Note, Why Johnny Can't Rent — An Examination of Laws Prohibiting Discrimination Against Families in Rental Housing, 94 Harv L Rev 1829 (1981). Disparate treatment is common and becoming increasingly more common. Id., pp 1833-1835. The problem of disparate treatment may be the result of economic pressures in the housing market. Id., pp 1835-1836:
. "The social and economic forces fueling this growth in child-exclusion policies are not fully understood. Landlords might exclude families because of children's 'mischievousness, boisterousness and rowdyism.' In fact, 73% of the landlords surveyed in the 1980 HUD [R. Marans, M. Colten et al., Measuring Restrictive Rental Practices . Affecting Families With Children: A National Survey 8 (1980) (prepared for the Office of Policy Development and Research, Department of Housing and Urban Development, by the Survey Research Center, Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan)] study considered unsupervised children to be a problem. Although the desire to avoid these inconveniences might partially explain the growth of exclusionary practices, it is unlikely that landlords would severely restrict their market for this reason alone.
"A more persuasive explanation for child-exclusion policies lies in the financial advantages accruing to a landlord who restricts tenancy to adults. It has been suggested that landlords can avoid unnecessary costs by refusing to rent to families. Eighty-one percent of the landlords surveyed in the 1980 HUD study indicated that the maintenance costs associated with renting to families were either 'a big problem' or 'somewhat a problem.' Higher insurance costs were also seen as troublesome, although to a lesser extent. If landlords are unable to pass on these higher costs because of rent control or weak demand, exclusionary practices might be their only way of making ends meet. But there is a more lucrative aspect to child exclusion. The evidence suggests that some landlords are able to command a premium for excluding children. The 1980 HUD study indicated that rent in buildings that restrict children tends to be higher than in those that admit them freely. A detailed 1980 study of the Atlanta rental housing market corroborated this finding. Vacancy rates were lower, rents higher, and waiting lists longer for adults-only units than for those that accepted children." (Footnotes omitted.)
While the department's goal may be laudable, the construction of the statute it advocates would force landlords to bear increased economic burdens and would force other tenants to live near children against their wishes. While the discriminatory treatment of families with children is the subject of considerable national controversy, we cannot conclude that the Legislature intended such a major innovation in the law to be affected by implication. Absent clear language as to this specific question, we decline to infer a broad legislative intention to require that all apartments be made available to children.
Affirmed. No costs, a public question being involved.