Case Name: MIKOS v. NEW YORK CENT. & H. R. R. CO.
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1907-03-06
Citations: 102 N.Y.S. 995
Docket Number: 
Parties: MIKOS v. NEW YORK CENT. & H. R. R. CO.
Judges: 
Reporter: West's New York Supplement
Volume: 102
Pages: 995–1000

Head Matter:
(118 App. Div. 536)
MIKOS v. NEW YORK CENT. & H. R. R. CO.
(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Fourth Department.
March 6, 1907.)
1. Master and Servant—Injuries to Servant—Fellow Servants—Persons Engaged in Superintendence.
One employed by a railroad, and having charge of the work of cleaning ashes from locomotives in the absence of the regular superintendent or foreman, and who had control of the men and directed them in the work of handling the engines, was acting as a superintendent, within Employer’s Liability Act, Laws 1902, p. 1748, c. 600, making a master liable for injuries to a servant arising from the negligence of any person exercising superintendence.
[Ed. Note.—For cases in point, see Cent. Dig. vol. 34, Master and Servant, «§ 371-373, 427, 428.]
2. Same—Negligence oe Superintendent.
Employer’s Liability Act, Laws 1902, p. 1748, c. 600, makes a master liahie for injuries to a servant arising from the negligence of any one in the employment and exercising superintendence. A hostler, while eating his dinner, at some distance from the ashpit over which locomotives were cleaned, was told by the one who had charge of the cleaning of the locomotives that a locomotive standing over the ashpit had been dumped,-and was ready to be moved and directed him to move it as soon as possible. The hostler moved the locomotive without taking any steps to warn plaintiff's intestate, who was beneath the locomotive, and it was shown that it was almost the invariable practice for an engineer, before taking an engine from the ashpit, to ascertain if the work of cleaning- the engine had been finished, and, if not, to give the cleaner warning. Held, that the hostler had a right to rely on the statement of the superintendent, and the facts warranted a finding of negligence on the part of defendant.
McLennan, P. J., dissenting.
Appeal from Trial Teim, Erie County.
Action by Julia Mikos, as administratrix of the estate of John Mikos, deceased, against the New York Central & Hudson River Railroad Company. From a judgment in favor of plaintiff, and from an order denying a new trial, defendant appeals. Affirmed..
Argued before McLFNNAN/P. J., and SPRING, WILLIAMS, and ROBSON, JJ.
Charles A. Pooley, for appellant.
H. J. Swift and Frank F. Wade, for respondent.

Opinion:
SPRING, J.
The complaint sets out, and the proof tended to establish, a cause of action within the employer's liability act (chapter 600, p. 1748, Laws of 1902). The plaintiff's intestate was in the employ of the defendant, engaged in cleaning the engines from ashes in an ashpit provided for that purpose. This ashpit was connected with the defendant's yards at East Buffalo, was constructed of cement, and adaptable for the purpose intended. It was the practice to run cars, from which the -ashes needed dumping, on tracks over these pits, and men crawled under the engines and scraped out the ashes with a hoe, and plaintiff's intestate had been doing that work for some time. On the 31st day of November, 1905, at about noon, an engineer of the defendant ran on one of these tracks two engines coupled together; the first one a live engine, and the one in the rear a dead crippled engine.
A man named Illman was in charge of this branch of the business on that day, in the absence of the regular superintendent or foreman, and he always acted in that capacity when the superintendent was .not present; Illman had control of the men, directed them in the work of handling these engines, decided whether they should be dumped, when and where to be removed, and within his sphere was in supreme command. He was, therefore, acting as superintendent, within the meaning of the employer's liability act. McHugh v. Man. R. R. Co., 179 N. Y. 379, 72 N. E. 312; Faith v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. R. Co., 109 App. Div. 222, 95 N. Y. Supp. 774, affirmed 185 N. Y. 556, 77 N. E. 1186; McBride v. N. Y. Tun. Co., 101 App. Div. 448, .92 N. Y. Supp. 282. Illman marked these engines to be dumped, and it was expected this work would be done during the noon hour. The plaintiff's intestate was under the rear engine, as was necessary, hoeing out the ashes into the pit provided for then, when the engines were set in motion by Chamberlain, a hostler, without sufficient warning to Mikos, the decedent, and he was run over and killed. The proof does not disclose precisely how the accident occurred. The bell of the engine was rung just as it started, and it is a fair inference from the evidence that he attempted to escape from his perilous situation, when he was crushed with the drive wheels of the engine. Without detailing the facts and inferences permissible, suffice it to say we think the jury had a right to acquit Milcos of any fault which would prevent the plaintiff recovering in this action.
Chamberlain during the noon hour was eating his luncheon in a shanty- 20 or 30 feet from the end of the ashpit, and his business was to move engines from the ashpit when ordered to do so. When he had nearly finished his luncheon, Illman came to the shanty and directed him to remove these two engines. The nub of the litigation is over this direction. Chamberlain was not sworn, and was out of the state at the time of the trial. Brown, a hostler employed by the defendant, was in the shanty with Chamberlain, and testified that Illman came there and "told Chamberlain to take them two engines on that pit over to the coal chute—they were dumped out, and the second engine was disabled; they were both coupled together—take them before they died and get them into the house, so as to make room for the switch engines. Take them. They are ready. The first one was dumped .out, and the second one disabled. Take them as soon as possible, before they die, so as to m?ke room for the switch engines coming in there at the dinner hour." Illman disagreed with this version, and said he simply told Chamberlain:
"When those-engines are ready, keep them coupled together, and take them off."
The court, in submitting the discrepancy in this testimony to the jury, and its effect as the pivotal question in the case, said:
"Now, gentlemen, if it [the injury to plaintiff's intestate! did oeeur solely through the negligence of Chamberlain, then the plaintiff is not entitled to recover. But if Chamberlain was negligent, and Illrnan was also negligent, and the accident would not have happened but for the negligence of Illrnan in respect to the matter to which I have called your attention, then for that act of negligence upon the part of Illrnan in the respect to which I have called your attention the defendant is responsible; for at this time he was exercising acts of superintendence as I view the case, and under the law the defendant is liable for such negligence.
The only rule in any way pertinent to this situation was one providing :
"The engine bell must be rung when the engine is about to move."
That rule is of little significance in this case, for Chamberlain rang the bell as his engine started. The evidence showed that it was almost the invariable practice for the engineer, before taking his engine from the ashpit, to look under the engine and ascertain if the hoer had finished the dumping of the ashes, and, if not, to give him personal warning. It is patent that some warning of this kind must be essential to the safety of the men under the engine, rather than to depend for warning upon the ringing of the bell or by sounding the whistle just before starting the engine; and the necessity is 'more pressing when two engines are coupled together and the workman is under the rear engine.
The crucial question is, therefore, whether Chamberlain was justified in departing from the usual practice because Illrnan told him the engines were dumped and were ready to be taken out. Illrnan was the man who represented the defendant. For the purpose of regulating the movements of Chamberlain in handling and removing these engines, he was the defendant. Chamberlain knew that Illrnan was his superior, and that his special domain was these ashpits and the control of these, engines. Illrnan came directly from the engines. The customary time for dumping them was an hour, and that time had already elapsed. He testified:
"We have strict orders not to delay them any more than we can possibly help; to get them off' as quickly as possible."
With this injunction in mind he gave the direction to" Chamberlain.
We think the hostler had a right to rely on these statements of Illrnan that the engines "had been dumped and were ready." It is the same as if the defendant, coming directly from the engines, advised the engineer that they had been cleaned and were ready to be removed. They were put' in there for the sole purpose of being cleaned under the direction of Illrnan, and, if he told Chamberlain that the work had been done and they were ready to be removed, the jury certainly had a right to find that Chamberlain was excused from investigating on his own account.
He had been instructed by the foreman "to be careful to look around to see it was clear, ring the bell, and also blow the whistle." Illrnan, his immediate superior, in effect told him there was no need of spending the time to look under the engines or malee any personal inspection for they were ready to be taken out. Illrnan assumed to possess knowledge of the cleaning of the engines and their .readiness to be removed.
It certainly would be carrying the rule beyond reason to hold, where the defendant has assumed to say to his servant that every danger has been removed and to do1 certain work in reliance upon that statement, the defendant to be absolved from liability because the servant had no right to accept the statement, but must act precisely as if it had not been made. Illman, the representative of the defendant, imparted the information for the benefit of Chamberlain, and gave instructions, expecting them to be obeyed. Chamberlain had a right to accept the facts stated and obey the directions, and the defendant, who interfered and authorized the departure from the prevailing practice, cannot be heard to say its orders should be disregarded, or its information treated as unreliable. Chamberlain finished his luncheon in about five minutes, ran out the engines without investigating at all, and, as .a result of this omission, the plaintiff's intestate was killed, and the jury were authorized to impute the blame to the defendant.
The judgment and order should be affirmed, with costs.
Judgment and order affirmed, with costs. All concur, except MCLENNAN, P. J., who dissents,