Case Name: Bessie BROWN v. PARISH OF EAST BATON ROUGE et al.
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1960-12-19
Citations: 126 So. 2d 173
Docket Number: No. 5142
Parties: Bessie BROWN v. PARISH OF EAST BATON ROUGE et al
Judges: Before ELLIS, LOTTINGER, JONES and LANDRY, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 126
Pages: 173–182

Head Matter:
Bessie BROWN v. PARISH OF EAST BATON ROUGE et al
No. 5142.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana. First Circuit.
Dec. 19, 1960.
Rehearing Denied Jan. 30, 1961.
Certiorari Denied March 3, 1961.
Percy & Macmurdo, Edward W. Gray, Baton Rouge, for appellant.
R. Gordon Kean, Jr., John V. Parker, L. C. Parker, Baton Rouge, for appellees.
Before ELLIS, LOTTINGER, JONES and LANDRY, JJ.

Opinion:
JONES, Judge.
This is an action in tort wherein the City of Baton Rouge, the Parish of East Baton Rouge and one Lillian Pruyn are made parties defendant. The petition states that the plaintiff was injured as a result of a fall when the heel of her right shoe became caught in a crack in a sidewalk within the city limits of Baton Rouge and that the cracked condition of the sidewalk causing the fall was patently and obviously dangerous. She alleges actual notice to the parish and city and in the alternative constructive notice and further alleges that the city and parish failed to repair the defect or to post warning devices, although they were under duty to do so. The defendant Pruyn is sought to be held on the allegation that she is the owner of the property abutting the sidewalk where the accident occurred on the ground that she had actual notice of the defective condition of the sidewalk prior to the time of the accident and in the alternative that she had constructive notice thereof and that since she failed to repair said condition or place any device thereon to warn persons of the presence of the defect she is thereby liable under the provisions of Oi'dinance 758 of the pai-ish council for the Parish of East Baton Rouge.
To this petition, all defendants filed exceptions of no right or cause of action. The exceptions filed on behalf of the City of Baton Rouge and the Parish of East Baton Rouge were sustained and the judgment dismissing the suit as to these defendants was read ,and signed in open court on the 18th day of Februai-y, 1960. The plaintiff appealed from that judgment.
The exceptions filed on behalf of the alleged abutting property owner, Lillian-Morrison Pruyn, were also sustained but the judgment sustaining said exceptions and dismissing the suit was signed on the 28th day of April, 1960. The plaintiff did not appeal from this judgment so the abutting property owner is not before the court.
We are of the opinion that the District Court properly sustained the exceptions as to the City of Baton Rouge for the reason that under the plan of government of said parish and city, Section 3.01(b), the functions, powers and duties relating to sidewalks within the City of Baton Rouge were transferred by the city to the Parish. This was so held by this court in Brantley v. City of Baton Rouge, La.App., 98 So.2d 824, and Toppi v. Arbour, La.App., 119 So.2d 621.
Defendant parish is herein contending that Duree v. Maryland Casualty Co., 238 La. 166, 114 So.2d 594 and Stephens v. Natchitoches Parish School Board, 238 La. 388, 115 So.2d 793, overrule the jurisprudence established in Clinton v. City of West Monroe, La.App., 187 So. 561, as well as all subsequent cases recognizing the exception to the- general rule of governmental immunity which holds municipalities liable for damages occasioned by failure to repair or maintain public streets and sidewalks. Counsel for defendant parish further argues the holdings in the Duree and Stephens cases, supra, recognize the judicial error committed in creating and establishing the exception which counsel argues was without foundation in its inception. Next, counsel for defendant Parish earnestly contends our holdings in Carlisle v. Parish of East Baton Rouge, La.App., 114 So.2d 62; Toppi v. Arbour, La.App., 119 So.2d 621, are not decisive of the question herein involved because not only was the issue herein raised not presented in the Cailisle case but also because the Stephens and Duree cases, supra, overrule the Carlisle and Toppi cases, supra.
- In sustaining the contention of counsel' for defendant parish, the trial court in oral reasons assigned and dictated into the record asserted inter alia:
"In the case of Clinton versus City of West Monroe, 187 So. 561, the Court, in passing upon the immunity of the City for liability growing out of such suits, in my opinion, assumed the position of a constitutional convention rather than a court and created a liability by Court decision, whereas, in fact, there was no real basis for such a determination. The fact that the Court said that the City was liable under certain circumstances under a well recognized exception to the general rule of immunity means nothing where there is no basis for such statement other than the statement of the Court to that effect."
There can be no question but that the views expressed by the District Judge are in conflict with those recently enunciated by us in Toppi v. Arbour, supra.
The forcefulness of counsel's argument has compelled us to re-examine the Duree and Stephens cases very closely and our most careful scrutiny thereof leads us to believe there is no foundation or basis to counsel's contention that the Stephens and Duree cases amount to a reversal of Clinton v. City of West Monroe, La.App., 187 So. 561, Carlisle v. Parish of East Baton Rouge, La.App., 114 So.2d 62 and Toppi v. Arbour, La.App., 119 So.2d 621. Our reexamination of the Duree and Stephens cases reveals said authorities hold simply .that there is a difference between the state's .constitutional immunity from suit and its immunity from liability vel non for the torts of its employees, agents or representatives committed in the course of performance of a governmental as distinguished from a proprietary function, the former being subject to waiver by the legislature whereas the latter may not be relinquished or waived.
Conceding both the Stephens and Duree cases, supra, were decided subsequent to our decision in the Carlisle case, we find nothing in either the Duree or Stephens cases indicative of intention to abandon or deviate from the well recognized exception to the general rule of governmental immunity from liability vel non from torts committed in the exercise of a governmental function, which has been established by the jurisprudence of this state and holds that such immunity does not exist with respect to municipalities sued in damages for alleged failure to repair and maintain streets and sidewalks.
Moreover, we pointed out in the Carlisle case, supra, the nature of the City-Parish form of government enjoyed by defendant and that thereunder the authority for street and sidewalks maintenance within the limits of the City was vested in the Parish Council by constitutional authority and such transfer of the powers and duties was held constitutional in State ex rel. Kemp v. City of Baton Rouge, 215 La. 315, 40 So.2d 477. In the course of the Carlisle opinion, we stated as follows [114 So.2d 68]:
"Although for administrative efficiency the city and parish street departments were consolidated and the responsibility for the maintenance of the city streets was vested in the parish council, we do not believe that this circumstance furnishes a sound reason for holding that the historic liability of the governing authorities responsible for maintaining municipal streets in safe condition no longer obtains in the City of Baton Rouge and that this activity is now shielded by governmental immunity. It is apparent that the same reasons ' rendering non-immune the negligent maintenance of municipal streets (see, e. g., Clinton v. City of West Monroe, La.App. 2 Cir., 187 So. 561, at page 564) apply equally whether the maintenance of the city streets is done by a combined city-parish street department or by the city itself. And, in fact, the parish council was held liable for street defects in Brantley v. City of Baton Rouge, La.App. 1 Cir., 98 So.2d 824, certiorari denied."
In addition, the Duree and Stephens cases are not applicable herein for the reason the doctrine of constitutional immunity vel non (available to the state and normally available to parishes) is unavailable to defendant parish herein because of our ruling in the Carlisle and Toppi cases wherein we declared that the transfer from the city to the Parish of liability for failure to maintain streets and sidewalks did not affect the non-immunity from liability to maintain municipal sidewalks. Moreover, in our pet curiam in the Toppi case, we specifically held that the Duree and Stephens cases were not applicable since they merely held the legislature could not, by waiving the state's immunity from suit, create a cause of action where none theretofore existed.
We subscribe to and reassert the following language employed in our per curiam in the Toppi case:
"The defendant Parish most persuasively applies for rehearing, upon the premise, inter alia, that, if the legislature cannot waive governmental immunity from tort liability (Stephens v. Natchitoches Parish School Board, 238 La. 388, 115 So.2d 793; Duree v. Maryland Casualty Co., 238 La. 166, 114 So.2d 594), then neither can the courts.
"(15) However, what able counsel overlooks is that the immunity of a municipal governing authority and of most other governmental units is not based upon any constitutional provision, but is a judicially-created doctrine. Pugh, 'Historical Approach to the Doctrine of Sovereign Immunity', 13 La.L.Rev. 476 (1953); Fordham and Pegues, 'Local Government Responsibility in Tort in Louisiana', 3 La.L.Rev. 720 (1941). Article 3, Section 35, La.Constitution, LSA, simply provides that 'Whenever the Legislature shall authorize suit to be filed against the State', certain procedures shall be followed and that 'the effect of any authorization by the Legislature for a suit against the State shall be nothing more than a waiver of the State's immunity from suit'; it does not provide that municipalities or other governmental units aré immune from tort liability. But cf. Art. 19, Section 26, La.Constitution.
"The tort liability of municipal governing authorities for damages resulting from the failure to keep streets and sidewalks in a reasonably safe condition for travel has traditionally not been subject to the defense of governmental immunity, nor to the prerequisite of legislative consent to suits to recover such damages. Carlisle v. Parish of East Baton Rouge, La.App. 1 Cir., 114 So.2d 62, and authorities therein cited. Thus the holdings of the Duree and Stephens cases, above-cited, have no application "to the present appeal; for they simply held that due to the wording of Article 3, Section 35, the legislature was not empowered by waiving the State's immunity, to create a cause of action when non [sic] theretofore existed." [119 So.2d 631.]
It follows, therefore, the trial court erred in decreeing the principle of constitutional immunity from tort liability applicable to defendant parish herein.
The second point in support of the exceptions which was not passed upon by the District Judge is that even assuming it was the duty of the parish to maintain and keep the city streets in proper repair that said parish has by Ordinance 758 imposed the duty on the abutting property owner to maintain the sidewalks. Under the provisions of LSA-R.S. 13:3712, as amended by Act 316 of 1958, the court shall take judicial cognizance of local ordinances whenever certified copies of such ordinances have been filed with the Clerk of Court. It is stated by counsel for the parish in brief that the ordinances were so filed. It is true that Ordinance 782 was duly certified by the Clerk but Ordinance 758 was not so certified and, consequently, we cannot take judicial cognizance of same.
The third and last ground advanced for sustaining the exception of no cause of action is that the sole proximate cause of the alleged accident was plaintiff's contributory negligence. It is alleged in the petition that about 1:30 P.M., on the 25th day of March, 1959, while the plaintiff was walking in a northerly direction on the sidewalk, just before she reached the point where the sidewalk described in paragraph 3 intersects France Street, the heel of her right shoe became caught in a crack in the sidewalk causing her to fall and that the cracked condition of the sidewalk which caused her to fall, in the manner previously described, was patently and obviously dangerous. The plea of contributory- negligence is an affirmative defense and, while it may be presented through exceptions triable on the face of the petition, the exceptions should not be sustained unless the allegations of the petition exclude every reasonable hypothesis other than the premise upon which the defense is predicated. McCullin v. State, La.App., 94 So.2d 585. In Burmaster v. Texas Pacific-Missouri Pacific Terminal Railroad of New Orleans, La.App., 174 So. 135, 139, it was stated:
"We understand that doctrine to mean that an exception of no cause of action can never be meritoriously pleaded to a petition sounding in damages for personal injury or death on the ground of contributory negligence of the plaintiff, unless its charges are such as to exclude every other reasonable hypothesis other than that the sole and proximate cause of the accident was due to the contributing fault of the plaintiff."
While it is true in the present case the plaintiff has alleged that the defect in the sidewalk was patently and obviously dangerous, her counsel stated in oral argument that he did so because the courts have held that it was a prerequisite for recovery for the plaintiff to prove that the defect was patently and obviously dangerous and the courts of this State have so stated. Parker v. City of New Orleans, La.App., 1 So.2d 123. It could, of course, transpire that in the trial of this case the factual development could be such that the plaintiff would not be guilty of contributory negligence and, at any rate, in every case of this character which counsel for defendant parish has cited in support of the exception we note that the cases have been tried on the merits.
Accordingly, for the above and foregoing reasons, the judgment sustaining the exception of no cause and no right of action and dismissing the plaintiff's suit will be reversed and this cause is remanded to the District Court to be proceeded with in accordance with law. Defendant, being a public body, is relieved of the payment of costs except, of course, stenographic costs for taking testimony. LSA-R.S. 13:4521.
Reversed and remanded.
HERGET, J., recused.