Case Name: STATE of Florida ex rel. Marcia A. McGUIRK, Relator, v. Honorable Edward D. COWART, as Judge of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit in and for Dade County, Florida, Respondent
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1977-04-12
Citations: 344 So. 2d 624
Docket Number: No. 77-90
Parties: STATE of Florida ex rel. Marcia A. McGUIRK, Relator, v. Honorable Edward D. COWART, as Judge of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit in and for Dade County, Florida, Respondent.
Judges: Before HAVERFIELD and HUBBART, JJ., and CHARLES CARROLL (Ret.), Associate Judge.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 344
Pages: 624–628

Head Matter:
STATE of Florida ex rel. Marcia A. McGUIRK, Relator, v. Honorable Edward D. COWART, as Judge of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit in and for Dade County, Florida, Respondent.
No. 77-90.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
April 12, 1977.
Simons & Schlesinger, Fort Lauderdale, for relator.
No appearance of counsel for respondent.
Before HAVERFIELD and HUBBART, JJ., and CHARLES CARROLL (Ret.), Associate Judge.

Opinion:
HUBBART, Judge.
This is an original petition for a writ of prohibition seeking to prohibit medical malpractice mediation proceedings on the ground that the time within which such proceedings must be held has expired under Section 768.44(3), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1976). We issued a rule nisi directing the respondent to show cause in writing why the writ prayed for should not issue. The respondent has not filed a return. Subsequent thereto, this court in State of Florida ex rel. Mercy Hospital v. Vann, 342 So.2d 1073 (Fla.3d DCA 1977), has resolved the issues raised by the petition. Accordingly, the petition is dismissed and the writ discharged.
The issue presented for review is whether a circuit judge sitting as a judicial referee has authority to alter the ten month time period allowed for medical mediation proceedings under Section 768.44(3), Florida Statutes (Supp.1976). If not, a second issue is presented as to whether an unauthorized altering of the said ten month time limit at the request of the malpractice claimant can deprive the malpractice defendant of his right to mediation under Section 768.44, Florida Statutes (Supp.1976).
On September 24,1975, the relator filed a request for medical mediation on a malpractice claim against several doctors and a hospital under Section 768.133, Florida Statutes (1975) [now 768.44, Florida Statutes (Supp.1976)]. The respondent circuit judge is the judicial referee of the three person medical mediation panel before whom the relator's claim fell. The relator thereupon challenged the constitutionality of the aforesaid statute and sought to have the claim transferred to the circuit court.
On December 22, 1975, the circuit judge granted the relator's motion, dismissed the claim on the ground that the statute in question was unconstitutional and transferred the cause to the circuit court. Later he took under advisement a motion by the relator to reinstate and abate the claim as a medical mediation matter pending a decision on the constitutionality of the aforesaid statute in a case presently pending before the Supreme Court of Florida. Thereafter, the respondent entered an order on motion of the relator reinstating the medical mediation claim when the Supreme Court of Florida upheld the constitutionality of the aforesaid medical mediation statute. Carter v. Sparkman, 335 So.2d 802 (Fla.1976).
Although requesting all the orders transferring and reinstating her medical mediation claim which delayed the progress of the mediation proceedings, the relator now claims that the ten month time limit for a final hearing on the claims established by Section 768.44(3), Florida Statutes (Supp.1976), has expired and the respondent has lost jurisdiction to proceed. We disagree.
Section 768.44 et seq. Florida Statutes (Supp.1976), sets up a statutory mediation proceeding for all medical malpractice claims as a prerequisite to the filing of a medical malpractice suit in the courts of this state. The Supreme Court of Florida has upheld the constitutionality of this legislative scheme "[e]ven though the pre-litigation burden cast upon the claimant reaches the outer limits of constitutional tolerance . . . ." Carter v. Sparkman, 335 So.2d 802, 806 (Fla.1976).
In an effort to mitigate the plaintiffs pre-litigation burden, the statute specifically limits the time within which the medical mediation panel may hold a hearing on the claim. Section 768.44(3), Florida Statutes (Supp.1976), requires that such a hearing "shall be held within 120 days of the date the [malpractice] claim was filed with the clerk . . . ." The judicial referee is given the authority to extend the hearing date upon good cause, but such extension "shall not exceed 6 months from the date the claim is filed." Finally, "[i]f no hearing on the merits is held within 10 months of the date the claim is filed, the jurisdiction of the mediation panel on the subject matter shall terminate, and the parties may proceed in accordance with law."
This court in State of Florida ex rel. Mercy Hospital v. Vann, 342 So.2d 1073 (Fla.3d DCA 1977), held that a circuit judge sitting as a judicial referee on a medical mediation panel has no authority to stay or alter the ten month time limit allowed for medical mediation under Section 768.44(3), Florida Statutes (Supp.1976). The time limits of the statute are.binding on the circuit judge and must be rigorously enforced. Nevertheless, the court went on to hold that since the circuit judge entered the unauthorized order staying the proceedings at the request of the medical claimant until the Supreme Court of Florida ruled on the constitutionality of the aforementioned medical mediation act and the statutory time thereafter expired, the medical defendant could not be deprived of his right to medical mediation. Consequently, under those circumstances there still adhered to the mediation panel the period of time which remained on the ten month period at the time the unauthorized order was entered.
We have extremely similar facts in the case at bar. The circuit judge at the request of the medical claimant has declared the Medical Malpractice Reform Act unconstitutional, dismissed the medical claim and transferred the cause to the circuit court. Thereafter, the circuit judge took under advisement a motion by the claimant to reinstate the medical claim and abate the mediation proceedings pending the Supreme Court's ruling on the constitutionality of the aforementioned medical mediation act. After the Supreme Court of Florida had upheld the constitutionality of the Act, the circuit judge at the request of the medical claimant reinstated the claim before the mediation panel.
We hold that the circuit judge's order dismissing the medical malpractice claim and transferring the cause to the circuit court was unauthorized and void. The Medical Malpractice Reform Act was in fact constitutional and proceedings thereunder should have gone forward. But since the claimant asked for such an unauthorized order which resulted in the subsequent expiration of the statutory ten month period, we believe that the medical defendants should not thereby be deprived of their right to mediation. We therefore hold that there still adheres to the mediation panel the time which remained on the ten month statutory period at the time the unauthorized order was entered.
Since the circuit judge in this case and in the Mercy Hospital case entered their stay or transfer orders under the peculiar circumstances of awaiting a Florida Supreme Court decision on the constitutionality of the Medical Malpractice Reform Act, it is clear that these or similar circumstances will never again occur. The ten month statutory limit for holding medical malpractice mediation hearings is clear and unequivocal. It should be rigidly enforced so as to mitigate the plaintiff's pre-litigation burden imposed by the Act.
The petition for a writ of prohibition is dismissed and the writ discharged.