Case Name: Walter CORBIN v. STATE of Mississippi
Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Mississippi
Decision Date: 1991-08-21
Citations: 585 So. 2d 713
Docket Number: No. 89-KA-1204
Parties: Walter CORBIN v. STATE of Mississippi.
Judges: Hawkins, P.J., filed dissenting opinion in which Roy Noble Lee, C.J., and McRae, J., joined.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 585
Pages: 713–723

Head Matter:
Walter CORBIN v. STATE of Mississippi.
No. 89-KA-1204.
Supreme Court of Mississippi.
Aug. 21, 1991.
Hawkins, P.J., filed dissenting opinion in which Roy Noble Lee, C.J., and McRae, J., joined.
Irene Mikell Buckley, Boyd Buckley & Bateman, Greenville, for appellant.
Mike C. Moore, Atty. Gen., Deirdre McCrory, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., Jackson, for appellee.

Opinion:
PITTMAN, Justice,
for the Court:
Walter Corbin was convicted in the Circuit Court of Washington County for the burglary of M & M Grocery in Greenville, Mississippi. He was sentenced to a term of seven (7) years in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections. Aggrieved by his conviction, Corbin appeals to this Court. Finding error in the lower court, we reverse and render.
I.
During the evening hours of September 9, 1988, M & M Grocery in Greenville, Mississippi, was burglarized. The crime was discovered at approximately 5:40 a.m. on September 10, 1988, by Sgt. Lon Pepper of the Greenville Police Department. Entry into the local business had been forced.
Before discovering the M & M Grocery burglary, Officer T.C. Meyers of the Green-ville Police Department was on patrol when he noticed a black male walking along Hughes Street. As Officer Meyers approached this person, the man dropped the various items that he was carrying and ran away from the approaching officer. This person was never identified. The items thrown down by this person, however, were identified as the goods that had been stolen from M & M Grocery that same night. These items included several cartons of cigarettes, a coin box, a bag of quarters and a glove. Upon recovery of the above goods, they were immediately processed for fingerprints by detectives from the Greenville Police Department. The stolen merchandise was found within two blocks of M & M Grocery.
Although the suspect was observed by two police officers, no witness was able to identify the person that dropped the stolen goods and ran.
The proprietor of M & M Grocery, Mr. Major Norman of Greenville, testified that he had indeed been burglarized on September 10, 1988. He stated that entry had been gained through the back door of his building by prying open both an iron door and an inner wooden door. Mr. Norman testified that he was able to determine that several items of merchandise had been stolen from his store, including several cartons of cigarettes, change from the video machine and a small change box. The stolen items, according to Norman, totalled around $150.00 in merchandise and cash.
Officer Ken Winter of the Greenville Police Department, a certified fingerprint examiner, testified that on October 7, 1988, he matched four latent fingerprints taken from the cartons of cigarettes stolen from M & M Grocery with the known fingerprints of Walter L. Corbin. At trial, Captain Winter testified that Walter Corbin, "at some point in time", touched the three cigarette cartons from which the fingerprints were lifted.
Based upon the evidence above, Walter Corbin was convicted in the Circuit Court of Washington County for the burglary of M & M Grocery. Aggrieved by that conviction, he appeals to this Court.
II.
Walter Corbin argues on appeal that the lower court was in error when it did not sustain his motions for Directed Verdict and Judgment of Acquittal Notwithstanding the Verdict. These motions, according to appellant, challenged the sufficiency of the State's proof concerning the elements of the crime of burglary. Those elements, under Miss.Code Ann. § 97-17-33 (Supp. 1989), are the unlawful breaking and entering of any structure with the intent to steal or commit a felony therein. Appellant argues that the State wholly failed to prove these elements in the case sub judice. We agree.
When one argues on appeal concerning the legal sufficiency of the evidence supporting a conviction, the standard is as follows:
This Court has often stated the standard of review to be used on motions for a directed verdict:
In passing upon a motion for a directed verdict, all evidence introduced by the State is accepted as true, together with any reasonable inferences that may be drawn from that evidence, and, if there is sufficient evidence to support a verdict of guilty, the motion for directed verdict must be overruled.
Guilbeau v. State, 502 So.2d 639, 641 (Miss.1987).
A motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, after the jury verdict is returned, essentially tests the legal sufficiency of the evidence that supports a guilty verdict. The standard of review for such a claim is familiar:
Where a defendant has moved for jnov, the trial court must consider all of the evidence which supports the State's case — in a light most favorable to the State. The State must be given the benefit of all favorable inferences that may reasonably be drawn from the evidence. Glass v. State, 278 So.2d 384, 386 (Miss.1973). If the facts and inferences 'so considered' point in favor of the defendant with sufficient force that reasonable men could not have found 'beyond a reasonable doubt' that the defendant was guilty, granting the motion is required. On the other hand, if there is substantial evidence opposed to the motion— that is, evidence of such quality and weight that having in mind the beyond a reasonable doubt burden of proof standard, reasonable fairminded men in the exercise of impartial judgment might reach different conclusions — the motion should be denied.
Parker v. State, 484 So.2d 1033, 1036 (Miss.1986). Butler v. State, 544 So.2d 816, 819 (Miss.1989). Walter Corbin maintains that under the facts of this case, and the standards enumerated above, that his conviction cannot stand.
The facts of the case at bar reveal the following: (1) that M & M Grocery was burglarized sometime between closing hours September 9, 1988, and 4:50 a.m. September 10, 1988; (2) that an unidentified black male was seen dropping the items stolen from M & M Grocery and running from a police officer at 4:50 a.m. on September 10, 1988; (3) that the fingerprints of Walter Corbin were found on three of the six cartons of cigarettes recovered by the Greenville Police Department; and (4) that these cartons were generally inaccessible to the public during business hours at M & M Grocery.
These facts, standing alone, do not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Walter Corbin was the person who unlawfully entered M & M Grocery with the intent to steal merchandise in that business. No fingerprints were recovered at M & M Grocery to place him at the scene of the crime. In fact, the State did not present any evidence placing Walter Corbin at the business at any time. The State will not be required to disprove every hypothesis in a criminal trial. The State here, however, did nothing to focus the possibilities of the fingerprints being concurrent with the robbery.
A decision similar to the case sub judice is McLain v. State, 198 Miss. 831, 24 So.2d 15 (1945). In McLain, the defendant was charged and convicted of the larceny of an automobile on the sole basis of his thumbprint being found on the rear-view mirror of the car. This Court, in ruling that appellant's fingerprint, without more, was not sufficient to uphold the conviction, stated:
In the case before us here the sole and only proof against the appellant consists of a thumb-print on the rear-view mirror, which is conclusive evidence of his identity, and that he had been in the car for some purpose; but evidence of identity and of presence alone is not equivalent to evidence of guilt of a particular crime, especially where several crimes could have been committed as to this car, but as to which a certain charge was made. The thumb-print here was not declaratory, as stated supra, of the nature of the crime, since it was not aided by other evidence identifying the particular crime, and did not exclude other crimes.
No witness testified to having seen appellant in Clarksdale on the night the car was stolen, or on the day it was recovered; and, as stated, there is no evidence in the record of any kind as to when, or under what circumstances, this print was made on the rear-view mirror.
McLain, 198 Miss, at 836-37, 24 So.2d at 16 (emphasis added).
In affirming our earlier decision in McLain, we again announce that a fingerprint as the sole and only proof of guilt is insufficient. Fingerprint evidence must be coupled with some other evidence, especially so when the fingerprint was not found at the crime scene but on some object away from the scene. The State must corroborate this physical evidence with other proof of guilt. Here the State failed in this regard. Therefore, the judgment of the trial court will be reversed, and appellant discharged.
REVERSED AND RENDERED
PRATHER and ROBERTSON, JJ., concur.
SULLIVAN, J., concurs in result only.
BANKS, J., concurs by separate written opinion, joined by DAN M. LEE, P.J., and PRATHER and SULLIVAN, JJ.
HAWKINS, P.J., dissents by separate written opinion joined by ROY NOBLE LEE, C.J., and McRAE, J.