Case Name: Joseph Napiwocki v. State of Indiana
Court: Supreme Court of Indiana
Jurisdiction: Indiana
Decision Date: 1971-08-06
Citations: 257 Ind. 32
Docket Number: No. 1070S250
Parties: Joseph Napiwocki v. State of Indiana.
Judges: 
Reporter: Indiana Reports
Volume: 257
Pages: 32–38

Head Matter:
Joseph Napiwocki v. State of Indiana.
[No. 1070S250.
Filed August 6, 1971.
Rehearing denied October 19, 1971.]
Charles W. Symmes, of Indianapolis, for appellant.
Theodore L. Sendak, Attorney General, Robert F. Hassett, Deputy Attorney General, for appellee.

Opinion:
Givan, J.
Appellant was charged by affidavit with the crime of robbery. Trial by court without a jury resulted in a finding of guilty. Appellant was sentenced to the Indiana State Prison for a term of not less than ten nor more than twenty-five years.
Appellant's sole contention is that the trial court erred in overruling his motion for discharge, which reads in pertinent part as follows:
"1. That on or about the 21st day of March, 1969, a warrant was read to the defendant, Joseph Donald Napiwocki, charging him with the crime of robbery, and subsequently, the capias issued, binding the defendant over to this Court.
"2. That on or about the said day of March 21, 1969, the defendant, Joseph Napiwocki, was arrested and incarcerated in the Marion County jail, subsequently transferred to the Indiana Reformatory on or about the 4th day of April, 1969, without being adjudicated a parole violator, and has been continuously restrained of his liberty since said date of March 21, 1969, without having been brought to trial.
"3. That on May 19, 1969, an affidavit charging the crime of robbery was filed in this Court, but the defendant has not, since said date, been brought to trial; and on the 7th day of January, 1970, the defendant, Joseph Napiwocki, was arraigned in this Court and entered his plea of 'not guilty'.
"4. That a continuous period in excess of 6 months has elapsed since the defendant's arrest and incarceration, and that a continuous period in excess of 6 months has elapsed since the filing of this charge in this Court, all during which time, the defendant has been continuously confined in the Marion County jail, and there has been no delay caused by the defendant."
The record in this case discloses the following facts:
Appellant had previously been convicted of the crime of robbery and had been sentenced to the Indiana State Reformatory. On February 28, 1969, he was released from the Reformatory on parole.
On March 19, 1969, appellant's parole officer, Vaughn Over-street, responded to a complaint of the manager of the home where appellant was residing that the appellant was intoxicated and causing a disturbance.
The parole officer upon finding the appellant intoxicated arrested him for parole violation and took him to the Marion County jail. Upon arriving at the jail it was discovered that appellant had over $200 on his person. Further investigation of this fact led to the charge of robbery, of which appellant now stands convicted.
The appellant was removed from the Marion County jail to the Reformatory as a parole violator.
After his removal to the Indiana Reformatory the affidavit under which he now stands convicted was filed by the Prosecuting Attorney of Marion County. Upon the filing of the affidavit a capias was issued to the Sheriff of Marion County on May 19, 1969.
On October 14, 1969, the trial judge determined that the capias previously issued was still unserved upon the appellant.
On the 23rd day of December, 1969, the trial judge entered an order ordering the Superintendent of the Indiana Reformatory to deliver the appellant to the court for arraignment on the 6th day of January, 1970.
It is appellant's contention that under the Rules of this Court CR. 4 he is entitled to discharge in that more than six months had expired since the charging affidavit had been filed on May 19, 1969.
Under the facts as above recited we cannot agree with the appellant's contention. This Court has previously held that the above Rule is applicable only when the appellant is incarcerated or under recognizance on the charge in question. Finton v. State (1963), 244 Ind. 396, 193 N. E. 2d 134, 2 Ind. Dec. 214.
In the instant case the appellant's arrest and incarceration in the Reformatory related solely to a conviction for a prior crime having no connection with the prosecution at bar. Appellant was not in jail or on recognizance awaiting trial in the instant case. The record here indicates the appellant was tried well within six months of the time the trial court ordered his return from the Indiana Reformatory to be arraigned in this cause. We, therefore, hold the facts in this case do not bring the appellant within the Rule CR. 4. Bewley v. State (1966), 247 Ind. 652, 220 N. E. 2d 612, 9 Ind. Dec. 286.
In reaching the decision in this case we are not unmindfull of the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of Smith v. Hooey (1969), 393 U. S. 374, 21 L. Ed. 2d 607, 89 S. Ct. 575. In that case the Supreme Court held that it is the duty of a state to afford an accused a speedy trial as guaranteed by the Constitution. We also recognize that our Rule CR. 4 was adopted to implement the right to a speedy trial as guaranteed under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, § 12 of the Indiana Constitution. However, as above pointed out, the Rule does not cover the factual situation of the case at bar. The absence of the applicability of the Rule, of course, does not deny the appellant the right to the protection of the Constitution of the United States or the Constitution of this state. In the Hooey case the accused had made repeated efforts to asssert his right to a speedy trial. In the case at bar appellant had made no request for trial. However, even in the absence of a request on the part of the appellant for an early trial, the trial court did in fact within the year of the filing of the charge issue an order to the Superintendent of the Reformatory to return the appellant to court for trial. We hold the action of the trial court in this case afforded the appellant a speedy trial as guaranteed by the Federal and State Constitutions and in keeping with the principles set out in Smith v. Hooey, supra.
The trial court is, therefore, affirmed.
Arterburn, C.J., and Hunter, J., concur; DeBruler, J., dissents with opinion in which Prentice, J., concurs.