Case Name: Sidney Hirschfeld, Director, Mental Hygiene Legal Service, Second Judicial Department, Appellant, v. Mitchell Teller, as Administrator of Woodmere Rehabilitation and Health Care Center, Inc., et al., Respondents
Court: New York Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 2010-03-30
Citations: 14 N.Y.3d 344
Docket Number: 
Parties: Sidney Hirschfeld, Director, Mental Hygiene Legal Service, Second Judicial Department, Appellant, v Mitchell Teller, as Administrator of Woodmere Rehabilitation and Health Care Center, Inc., et al., Respondents.
Judges: 
Reporter: New York Reports
Volume: 14
Pages: 344–357

Head Matter:
[927 NE2d 1042, 901 NYS2d 558]
Sidney Hirschfeld, Director, Mental Hygiene Legal Service, Second Judicial Department, Appellant, v Mitchell Teller, as Administrator of Woodmere Rehabilitation and Health Care Center, Inc., et al., Respondents.
Argued February 9, 2010;
decided March 30, 2010
POINTS OF COUNSEL
Mental Hygiene Legal Service, Second Judicial Department, Mineola (Lisa Volpe, Sidney Hirschfeld and Dennis B. Feld of counsel), for appellant.
I. Mental Hygiene Legal Service’s statutory mandate to provide legal representation and advocacy for individuals with mental illness extends to such individuals residing in places or facilities that may not possess operating certificates issued by the State Office of Mental Health, but nevertheless fall under the Mental Hygiene Law licensing statute and its corresponding regulations. (Cohen v Lord, Day & Lord, 75 NY2d 95; Leader v Maroney, Ponzini & Spencer, 97 NY2d 95; Brad H. v City of New York, 185 Misc 2d 420, 276 AD2d 440.) II. The lower courts incorrectly defined Mental Hygiene Legal Service’s mandate within the context of the State Office of Mental Heath’s decision-making function. (Besunder v Coughlin, 102 Misc 2d 41; Brown v Lavine, 78 Misc 2d 1085; Matter of Mental Hygiene Legal Serv. v Maul, 36 AD3d 1133; Matter of Myerson v Schechter, 25 Misc 2d 291; Matter of Board of Educ. of Glen Cove City School Dist. v O’Shea, 304 AD2d 662; Matter of Over hill Bldg. Co. v Delany, 28 NY2d 449; Flaherty v McCall, 262 AD2d 890; Gilberg v Barbieri, 53 NY2d 285; Comi v Breslin & Breslin, 257 AD2d 754; Flacke v Onondaga Landfill Sys., 69 NY2d 355; Brad H. v City of New York, 185 Misc 2d 420, 276 AD2d 440.) III. Respondent nursing homes fall within the licensing statute of Mental Hygiene Law article 31 and its corresponding regulations, based on the characteristics of the facilities themselves, the residents with primary diagnoses of mental illness whom they serve, and the services they provide to those residents. IV Public policy considerations support the conclusion that Mental Hygiene Legal Service must be permitted to provide the same independent oversight and advocacy to individuals with primary diagnoses of mental illness currently residing in respondent nursing homes as the agency provides to others with mental illness residing in Office of Mental Health-operated or licensed facilities. (Matter of Julio R., 16 AD3d 423; Matter of Francine T., 302 AD2d 533; Matter of Seltzer v Hogue, 187 AD2d 230.)
Abrams, Fensterman, Fensterman, Eisman, Greenberg, Formato & Einiger, LLP, Lake Success (Sarah C. Lichtenstein of counsel), for respondents.
I. Mental Hygiene Legal Service jurisdiction is limited by statute to places required to have an Office of Mental Health operating certificate. (Joseph S. v Hogan, 561 F Supp 2d 280.) II. The responsible state agencies have determined that the nursing homes are not required to obtain Office of Mental Health operating certificates, and those decisions are dispositive. (Matter of Natural Resources Defense Council v New York City Dept. of Sanitation, 83 NY2d 215; Matter of Albert F. v Stone, 169 Misc 2d 838; Brad H. v City of New York, 185 Misc 2d 420, 276 AD2d 440; Flacke v Onondaga Landfill Sys., 69 NY2d 355; Flaherty v McCall, 262 AD2d 890; Matter of Ferrelli v Long Is. Coll. Hosp. School of Nursing, 204 AD2d 544; Keith v New York State Teachers ’ Retirement Sys., 46 AD2d 938; Lade v Levitt, 33 AD2d 956; Staatsburg Water Co. v Staatsburg Fire Dist., 72 NY2d 147; United States v Western Pacific R. Co., 352 US 59.) III. The larger statutory scheme confirms that the nursing homes are not required to obtain Office of Mental Health operating certificates. (Pajak v Pajak, 56 NY2d 394; Matter of Town of Riverhead v New York State Bd. of Real Prop. Servs., 5 NY3d 36; Matter of Union Indem. Ins. Co. of N.Y., 89 NY2d 94; Festinger v Edrich, 32 AD3d 412; Matter of Subpoena Duces Tecum to Jane Doe, 293 AD2d 231, 99 NY2d 434.) IV The federally mandated regulatory process for discharging persons from psychiatric facilities to nursing homes confirms that residents in the nursing homes are not being treated for mental disability. V Policy considerations concerning the rights of nursing home residents confirm that Mental Hygiene Legal Service should not be given unfettered access to certain residents and their medical records.

Opinion:
OPINION OF THE COURT
Pigott, J.
Beginning as early as 1996, defendants, certain nursing homes in New York State, began accepting as residents patients discharged from facilities licensed by the Office of Mental Health (OMH). The patients were primarily from New York State psychiatric hospitals with diagnoses of mental illness. All but one of defendant nursing homes placed the patients in discrete units of the residence, referred to as "neurobiological units" (NBUs), where the residents received psychiatric and psychosocial rehabilitative services. Defendant nursing homes operate under licensing by the Department of Health but have never sought, nor obtained, licenses from OMH.
In October 2002, a series of related articles began appearing in the New York Times focusing on the NBUs and claiming that NBU residents were being deprived of legal protections afforded to patients committed to psychiatric wards, including the right to a lawyer. Upon learning of the articles, Mental Hygiene Legal Service (MHLS) conducted an investigation and thereafter sought access to NBU residents and their records in order to provide advocacy and legal representation to those who might be in need of such services. Defendant nursing homes denied MHLS such access.
Thereafter, in June 2003, plaintiff Sidney Hirschfeld, Director of MHLS (hereinafter MHLS), commenced this action against defendant nursing homes alleging that because the nursing homes are providing services for mentally disabled residents, MHLS has a right of access to such residents. MHLS sought judgment declaring that it has the right of access at any and all times to the residents and their records and also sought an injunction enjoining defendant nursing homes from denying MHLS such access.
Defendant nursing homes answered arguing, among other things, that because MHLS has jurisdiction only over facilities required to obtain operating certificates and OMH has determined that the nursing homes are not required to have one, MHLS was without authority to access the residents.
At some point during the litigation, defendant nursing homes shut down the NBUs. Thus, defendant nursing homes no longer maintain discrete units in which the NBU patients reside.
After motion practice not relevant here and significant discovery, both parties moved for summary judgment. Supreme Court granted defendant nursing homes' motion and dismissed the complaint (2006 NY Slip Op 30608[U]). The Appellate Division modified Supreme Court's order by remitting the matter to Supreme Court for, among other things, entry of a judgment declaring that MHLS does not have the right of access to the mentally ill residents of NBUs of defendant nursing homes (Hirschfeld v Teller, 50 AD3d 855 [2008]).
This Court granted MHLS leave to appeal (12 NY3d 707 [2009]). We now affirm.
MHLS is statutorily mandated to provide legal services and assistance to individuals with mental disabilities. Such mandate is delineated in Mental Hygiene Law § 47.01 (a), which provides, in relevant part:
"There shall be a mental hygiene legal service of the state in each judicial department. The service shall provide legal assistance to patients or residents of a facility as defined in section 1.03 of this chapter, or any other place or facility which is required to have an operating certificate pursuant to article sixteen or thirty-one of this chapter, and to persons alleged to be in need of care and treatment in such facilities or places, and to persons entitled to such legal assistance as provided by article ten of this chapter."
Thus, by statute, MHLS's jurisdiction is limited to two categories of facilities: (1) facilities defined in Mental Hygiene Law § 1.03 and (2) other places that are required to have an OMH operating certificate. MHLS claims that defendant nursing homes fall within the designation "any other place or facility which is required to have an operating certificate pursuant to . . . [article 31 of the Mental Hygiene Law]." Article 31 of the Mental Hygiene Law vests OMH with the exclusive authority to issue operating certificates to facilities providing services to the mentally disabled. But not every facility that treats the mentally disabled requires an operating certificate from OMH. 14 NYCRR part 70 "establish[es] an all-inclusive set of categories, named classes, to which all providers of services to the mentally disabled subject to the requirement to obtain an operating certificate" will be assigned (14 NYCRR 70.1 [a]). The Commissioner determines if a provider is subject to OMH licensure on the basis of three factors: "characteristics of the persons served, characteristics of the services provided, and the auspices of the provider of services" (14 NYCRR 70.1 [b]).
In support of their motion to dismiss the complaint, defendant nursing homes submit the deposition testimony of OMH's Director of Inspection and Certification that OMH did not have jurisdiction over defendant nursing homes and, as a result, OMH did not exercise any licensing jurisdiction. This decision was based, in part, on a site report prepared by OMH's field office.
In opposition, MHLS does not challenge OMH's authority to make a licensing determination, nor does it challenge OMH's decision not to license defendant nursing homes. MHLS claims OMH's decision not to require an operating certificate is of no import. Rather, MHLS argues that the dispositive issue is whether the facilities themselves are subject to licensing because they provide residential services to the mentally disabled.
But precisely which facilities are, in fact, subject to OMH licensure is a matter committed, in the first instance, to the Commissioner's discretion and expertise. Here, OMH decided that licensure was not required. Because only OMH is authorized to determine whether a facility is required to have an operating certificate and MHLS's jurisdiction is expressly limited to licensed facilities, MHLS has failed to raise an issue of fact. Thus, defendant nursing homes are entitled to summary judgment dismissing the complaint.
Finally, we express no opinion as to the correctness of OMH's decision underlying this case. The proper way to challenge any OMH licensure determination, however, is via a CPLR article 78 proceeding. At that time, OMH would be a party to the proceedings, allowing courts to review its determination on the full administrative record.
Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should be affirmed, without costs.
Defendant nursing homes maintain that the last date any resident was accepted into an NBU was April 30, 2004, and the date the last resident was discharged from the program by any one of defendant nursing homes was August 16, 2004.