Case Name: THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. KENDRIC L. HAYES, a/k/a James D. Vance, Defendant-Appellant
Court: Illinois Appellate Court
Jurisdiction: Illinois
Decision Date: 2004-11-18
Citations: 353 Ill. App. 3d 578
Docket Number: No. 3—02—0390
Parties: THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. KENDRIC L. HAYES, a/k/a James D. Vance, Defendant-Appellant.
Judges: 
Reporter: Illinois Appellate Court Reports, Third Series
Volume: 353
Pages: 578–592

Head Matter:
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. KENDRIC L. HAYES, a/k/a James D. Vance, Defendant-Appellant.
Third District
No. 3—02—0390
Opinion filed November 18, 2004.
McDADE, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.
Kenneth D. Brown, of State Appellate Defender’s Office, of Ottawa, for appellant.
Edward D. Smith, State’s Attorney, of Kankakee (Lawrence M. Bauer and Richard T. Leonard, both of State’s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor’s Office, of counsel), for the People.

Opinion:
JUSTICE SCHMIDT
delivered the opinion of the court:
A Kankakee County jury found defendant Kendric L. Hayes, also known as James D. Vance, guilty of two counts each of attempted first degree murder and aggravated battery with a firearm (720 ILCS 5/8 — 4, 9 — 1(a)(1); 12 — 3, 12 — 4.2(a)(1) (West 2000)). Defendant appeals. He contends that (1) the State's evidence was insufficient to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of one count each of the charged offenses; (2) the trial court denied him his right to present a defense; and (3) the prosecutors' closing arguments deprived him of a fair trial. We affirm.
FACTS
The State's evidence established that on the afternoon of October 13, 1999, defendant visited the brothers Elisha and Elijah Dabney and their friend, Darryl Jordan, at the Dabney residence in Hopkins Park. Defendant invited the Dabneys and Jordan to party with him at defendant's girlfriend's home in Kankakee. Defendant's girlfriend, Lola Brown, was the mother of Eric Tatum, a friend of the Dabneys and Jordan. The invitees, all under age 21, promptly accepted the invitation and got into defendant's vehicle. En route to Brown's house, defendant first stopped at a dog kennel, where defendant reported that his children's rottweiler puppies had been missing from his home since the night before. Defendant next drove to a liquor store to purchase alcohol and cigars.
At Brown's house, defendant offered the young men drinks and "swisher" cigars laced with marijuana. At some point, Tatum and another Mend stopped by and joined the party for a short while. After they left, defendant retrieved a shotgun which Elisha described as a black, 12-gauge sawed-off with the handle cut and black tape on the end. Defendant ordered the Dabneys and Jordan to get down on the floor. He aimed the gun at them and asked who had broken into his house. Defendant kicked both of the Dabney brothers in the head and then fired once at Jordan, hitting him in the left shoulder. Defendant then left the house with the shotgun. Jordan yelled at Elisha to run for help, and then he passed out by the front door. Elisha ran out the back door and proceeded to the liquor store to telephone the police.
On cross-examination, Elisha said he sold a Cutlass Supreme to defendant two months before the shooting incident. He denied that he sold anything other than the car. He also denied that anyone else was present at the time of the sale. He said he never had a weapon or saw the shotgun used in the shooting incident before defendant pulled it out and aimed it at them. On redirect, Elisha testified that he did not own the shotgun; he did not pull it out on the date of the incident; he did not struggle with defendant for control of the gun; and it did not discharge accidentally.
Elijah testified that buckshot hit him under his left eye. He said he ran across the street after defendant left. There, he encountered Brown and Kankakee police officer Avery Ivey, Jr. Elijah told the officer that he had been shot. Ivey observed that Elijah's face was bleeding from a round gunshot wound. He radioed for an ambulance and assistance.
Patrolman Jose Lema arrived on the scene and approached the front of the house, where he found Jordan's body blocking the door. He entered the house through the rear door and determined that Jordan had suffered a large gunshot wound to the back. Detective Earl Cote, who also responded to the scene, testified that he observed a gunshot wound to Elijah's left cheek as he and Jordan were being loaded into the ambulance. Cote said the shape and size of the wound were consistent with buckshot recovered from inside the house.
Elijah was transported from St. Mary's Hospital to Loyola by helicopter. He testified that he was "in bad shape" and never saw what, if anything, was removed from his face. Jordan testified that he was treated for a punctured lung and three broken ribs. Buckshot removed from Jordan's body at the hospital was turned over to Cote and admitted into evidence at trial.
Following the State's case in chief, defendant called his live-in girlfriend, Kathy Black, as his first witness. Black testified that she knew Elisha Dabney as "Pee Wee." She said that he came to her home in mid-August 1999, seeking to sell his 1989 gray Cutlass to defendant. Black said she was interested in the car and looked inside. At that point, the prosecutor objected to the relevancy of Black's testimony.
In an offer of proof, Black stated that on the front passenger seat of the Cutlass she observed a long gun with gray duct tape on the thick end where the handle had been cut. She said that Pee Wee offered to sell the gun to defendant, but he declined. She said Pee Wee then removed the gun from the car. Black paid for the car, and defendant drove him home. On cross-examination, the prosecutor asked if the gun was a rifle. Black responded, "That's what I would say, some type of gun."
Following arguments of counsel, the court sustained the prosecutor's objection. The court ruled that Black's testimony regarding the gun was not relevant, because the gun she described was not the same one used in the offense. Further, the testimony could not be admitted for impeachment purposes because no foundation was laid during defense counsel's cross-examination of Elisha Dabney. Based on the court's ruling, defense counsel released Black, and the court instructed the jurors that they were not to concern themselves as to why she would not be testifying further.
Defendant then testified on his own behalf. He initially admitted that he had a 1997 conviction for simple robbery. He said that Elisha brought the sawed-off shotgun with him when defendant picked up the three men on the date of the offense. Defendant said that after Tatum left the party, defendant asked Elisha about the puppies. Defendant told him that he had heard that Elisha had been at his house the night before. Defendant said that a big argument ensued, and Elisha became very defensive. He said Elisha reached over and grabbed the shotgun. Defendant then dashed across the room and grabbed the gun. During a struggle over the gun, it discharged and Jordan fell to the floor. Defendant said he then poked Elijah under his left eye with the barrel of the gun. He checked Jordan's wound and presumed he was dead. Defendant said he then "panicked, freaked out" and left. Defendant denied that he intended to kill Elisha or Jordan.
On cross-examination, defendant explained that he fled the scene and checked into a motel in East Hazelcrest under the name of James Vance. He left his car with the shotgun on the backseat at the motel and went to Mississippi. Defendant denied that he ever owned a gun, but he admitted that the police had found him in possession of a .380-caliber handgun approximately two weeks before the shooting incident.
In rebuttal, the State impeached defendant's denial of gun ownership with evidence that he gave a written statement to the police on January 24, 2001, in which he said, "I had my gun taken by another agency (police)." Defendant also said during the January 2001 interview that he struck Elijah under the right eye with the shotgun.
Following closing arguments, the jury found defendant guilty as charged. The court subsequently denied posttrial motions and imposed consecutive prison sentences of 18 and 6 years for the attempted murders of Darryl Jordan and Elijah Dabney, respectively.
ISSUES AND ANALYSIS
1. Reasonable Doubt
On appeal, defendant first contends that the State failed to prove attempted murder and aggravated battery of Elijah Dabney, because the evidence was insufficient to show that the wound on Elijah's face was caused by a shotgun projectile. Defendant suggests that, in the absence of physical evidence or medical testimony proving that a projectile was removed from Elijah's face, the wound could have been caused by a pebble on defendant's shoe.
When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we must consider all evidence introduced at trial in the light most favorable to the State and determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Wittenmyer, 151 Ill. 2d 175, 601 N.E.2d 735 (1992). This court will not overturn a criminal conviction unless the evidence is so improbable or unsatisfactory that it creates reasonable doubt as to the defendant's guilt. People v. Collins, 106 Ill. 2d 237, 478 N.E.2d 267 (1985).
Defendant cites to no authority that would require the State to produce medical or forensic evidence to prove the offenses charged. The State's theory of guilt with respect to Elijah's wound was one of transferred intent — i.e., Elijah was injured as a result of defendant's attempted murder of Jordan. See People v. Ephraim, 323 Ill. App. 3d 1097, 753 N.E.2d 486 (2001). This theory was amply supported by the State's evidence. At trial, it was undisputed that the sawed-off shotgun wielded by defendant on October 13, 1999, was fired only once. Testimonial evidence by police officers responding to the scene within minutes of the shooting corroborated Elijah's testimony that he was struck in the face by buckshot from the same blast that tore into Jordan's shoulder. The hole in Elijah's face was consistent with pellets recovered from the scene. Based on the evidence, the jury was justified in rejecting defendant's theory at trial that the hole was caused by poking Elijah with the barrel of the shotgun, and we will not speculate in this appeal that the hole was caused by debris on defendant's shoe. The evidence was not so improbable or unsatisfactory as to leave a reasonable doubt as to defendant's guilt of the offenses committed against Elijah Dabney on a transferred intent theory. Accordingly, defendant is not entitled to a reversal of his convictions. See Ephraim, 323 Ill. App. 3d 1097, 753 N.E.2d 486.
2. Admissibility of Kathy Black's Testimony
Next, defendant claims that he was deprived of his right to present a defense when the court sustained the State's objection to Kathy Black's testimony. He argues that the court erroneously ruled that the testimony was neither relevant nor admissible to impeach Elisha Dabney.
While it is true that a defendant has the right to present a defense (People v. Manion, 67 Ill. 2d 564, 367 N.E.2d 1313 (1977)), it is also true that the trial court is vested with broad discretion in ruling on the admissibility of evidence sought to be excluded as irrelevant. People v. Ward, 101 Ill. 2d 443, 463 N.E.2d 696 (1984). In assessing the trial court's exercise of discretion, we must determine whether the proffered testimony would have made the question of the defendant's guilt of the charged offenses more or less probable. Ward, 101 Ill. 2d 443, 463 N.E.2d 696. A court may properly refuse evidence as irrelevant if it is uncertain or remote in time. Ward, 101 Ill. 2d 443, 463 N.E.2d 696.
Kathy Black's proffered testimony related to a gun that Elisha allegedly wanted to sell to defendant two months before the shooting incident in this case. She said the gun was long and had a cut handle and gray duct tape; it could have been a rifle. Defendant sought to introduce the testimony in support of his theory that Elisha brought the same weapon to Brown's house on October 13, 1999, and drew it on defendant immediately before defendant grabbed the weapon and it fired.
The problem with defendant's offer of proof was that Black's testimony was both uncertain and remote. It was undisputed that the weapon used in the offenses on October 13, 1999, was a sawed-off shotgun (not a long gun like a rifle) with the handle cut off and black tape (not gray duct tape) on the handle end. Even assuming that Black was trying to describe the same weapon, her testimony about what happened in August 1999 was too remote to shed light on who brought the gun to Brown's house on the date of the offenses. Accordingly, we cannot say that the trial judge abused her discretion in sustaining the State's relevancy objection.
Defendant argues in the alternative that the court should have admitted the testimony as impeachment of Elisha Dabney's testimony that he had never seen the shotgun or possessed it before October 13, 1999. Again, we find no abuse of the court's discretion. Generally, a cross-examiner may impeach a witness if a proper foundation for the impeachment is laid; however, he may not impeach a witness on collateral matters. People v. Collins, 106 Ill. 2d 237, 478 N.E.2d 267 (1985). A matter is collateral if it cannot be introduced for any purpose other than to contradict. People v. Hutson, 223 Ill. App. 3d 50, 584 N.E.2d 975 (1991).
In this case, defendant failed to lay a foundation for Black's testimony during cross-examination of Elisha Dabney. He never asked Elisha whether there was a gun in the car he sold to Black in August 1999. Moreover, whether Elisha had a weapon in his possession in August was clearly collateral to the question of whether he had possession of the sawed-off shotgun used in the shooting of October 13. Accordingly, we find no abuse of the court's discretion in denying admission of Black's testimony solely for impeachment purposes.
As another alternative, defendant claims that his attorney provided ineffective assistance of counsel when she failed to lay a foundation to impeach Elisha. This argument is not well taken. To establish ineffective assistance of trial counsel, the defendant must show both prejudice and deficient representation. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674,104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984). Prejudice is shown if there is a reasonable probability that the result of the trial would have been different had counsel not committed the errors complained of. Strickland, 466 U.S. 668, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 104 S. Ct. 2052.
The evidence of defendant's guilt as presented in the State's case here was overwhelming. Even if Black's testimony had been admitted, there is no reasonable probability that the jury would have found defendant not guilty of the charged offenses. Accordingly, defendant is not entitled to a new trial on this ground.
3. Closing Arguments
Last, defendant argues that he is entitled to a new trial because of numerous prejudicial comments made during the prosecutors' closing arguments. He argues that the prosecutors improperly (1) placed the integrity of the office of the State's Attorney behind the credibility of its witnesses, (2) misstated the evidence, (3) accused defense counsel of attempting to manufacture reasonable doubt by confusing the jury, (4) appealed to the jury's passions and prejudices by repeatedly dubbing defendant a liar and imploring the jury to send him a message that his conduct would not be tolerated, and (5) commented on his criminal background. Defendant contends that the comments, both individually and cumulatively, constituted plain error.
To preserve errors made in closing arguments, the defendant must raise an objection both at trial and in his posttrial motion. People v. Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d 176, 522 N.E.2d 1124 (1988). Where he fails to do so, the error is waived and will not be considered on review unless it rises to plain error (134 Ill. 2d R. 615(a)). Plain error may be found where the evidence of guilt is closely balanced or where the alleged error was seriously prejudicial and prevented the defendant from receiving a fair trial. People v. Hudson, 157 Ill. 2d 401, 626 N.E.2d 161 (1993).
Defense counsel in this case filed a motion in limine seeking to bar the State from making remarks that were found objectionable in various reported decisions in other cases; however, she failed to make contemporary objections during the State's closing arguments. Without contemporaneous objections, the trial court had no opportunity to give cautionary instructions. Therefore, the contentions of error based on the prosecutor's comments are deemed waived and will not be reviewed unless piar. error resulted. See Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d 176, 522 N.E.2d 1124.
As aforesaid, the evidence of defendant's guilt was not closely balanced. We have reviewed defendant's arguments solely to determine whether the comments were so egregious as to have deprived defendant of a fair trial. Having considered all of the allegedly improper comments individually and cumulatively, we cannot say that the prosecutor's remarks could have affected the jury's verdict. Accordingly, the closing arguments will not be reviewed under the plain error doctrine.
Although plain error did not result in this case, we nevertheless take this opportunity to caution prosecutors to refrain from making comments such as, "Send the defendant back to jail" and "Send him a message." References to a defendant's residency at the county jail improperly imply that the defendant is a bad man deserving of punishment; and sending messages, whether to the defendant, to the police or to society, is not the jury's job. It is wrong to imply that the guilty verdict form may be used for any purpose other than a finding that all elements of the offense were proved beyond a reasonable doubt. We anticipate that savvy prosecutors will refrain henceforth from including "back to jail" and "message sending" comments in their closing arguments.
CONCLUSION
The judgment of the circuit court of Kankakee County is affirmed.
Affirmed.
HOLDRIDGE, EJ., concurs.