Case Name: Louisiana Ice Manufacturing Company vs. City of New Orleans et al.
Court: Louisiana Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1891-02
Citations: 43 La. Ann. 217
Docket Number: NO. 10,720
Parties: Louisiana Ice Manufacturing Company vs. City of New Orleans et al.
Judges: 
Reporter: Louisiana Annual Reports
Volume: 43
Pages: 217–226

Head Matter:
NO. 10,720.
Louisiana Ice Manufacturing Company vs. City of New Orleans et al.
X There are cases, and especially those in which the public interests represented by a municipal corporation are concerned, in which, under Article 906, C. P., the court may remand causes to the District Court in order that additional testimony may be received and considered; but it is a condition precedent to the exercise of such authority that we should be satisfied that “ in the state in which it is” the cause can not be decided according to the requirements of justice.
2. Such an order, when granted, involves the reversal of the judgment appealed from, which can not bo done in advance of hearing and submission.
3. The motion to remand in advance of hearing and submission is premature, and the subject matter thereof is referred to the merits to be considered and determined when the latter shall be tried and submitted.
X From the provisions of Act 883 of 1853, now Section 318, R. S., the riparian owner of any property entitled to the right of accretion can not reduce the batture to private occupation without leaving for public use, without compensation, such portions thereof as may be needed for commerce, public highways and streets.
2. The accretions are enjoyed by the riparian owner subject to the right of the corporationto reserve and use a sufficient portion thereof for public uses, such as levees, highways and streets. To this portion he has no title, and therefore it is unnecessary to expropriate the same.
If more than enough is taken than is required for public uses, the riparian owner can sue for a reduction.
8. The regulation of the dimensions of squares and the width of streets is amatter within municipal discretion, which will not be interfered with without a flagrant abuse of this discretion.
4.When a street is laid out by the city, it is not essential for its continued existence that the city shall immediately grade and improve the street. It is discretionary when further improvement shall be necessary. A failure to improve can not be construed as to abandonment of the street, so as to justify private ownership thereof.
5. The dedication to the public of Water street on the map and plan of the City of Jefferson is sufficient to determine the nature and character of the dedication, and the reservation of that part of the batture for public use. If there were any doubt, the rule is to construe it in favor of the public.
•6. Ho one can acquire by prescription a right against the public to levees, streets and highways over the batture.
7. Where a party in describing his property for the purposes of assessment included a street, and pays for years the taxes assessed against the property, he acquires thereby no title to the street which divides his property.
APPEAL from the Oivil District Coui’t for the Parish of Orleans. King, J. _
Wm. Grant and J. Ward Gurley, Jr., for Plaintiffs and Appellees:
After the levee is advanced toward the river, and the batture brought within the dominion of private property by the extinguishment of the public use, and it is taxed and subjected as to possession and use to the will of the owner, a street can not be opened thereon without compensation being paid to the owner. 7 An. 78.
The Act of 80th April, 1858, Acts of 1883, p. 298, does not require the riparian owner to sue for possession of batture, but gives him the right to sue the municipality if it is withholding from him more of the batture than is necessary for the public use, and to compel the corporation to permit him to enjoy the use and full ownership of such portion-of said batture. 13 An. 350.
Water street never was reserved or withheld by the municipal authority upon plaintiffs’ property, and it can not now be opened upon that property without compensation being paid therefor, and due proceedings taken according to law. Art. 5, Amendments Constitution United States; Arts. 6,155 and 156, Constitution Louisiana, 1879.
Howe & Prentiss and Carleton Hunt, City Attorney, for Intervenor and Defendant, Appellants:
1. Acts of sale between third parties of aecretionary property can not affect public right to what is necessary for public use. Such right can only be limited by suit under batture law. 12 An. 500; 18 An. 349.
2. The plaintiffs could not acquire or prescribe against the public by fencing or building On batture. 4 Martin 2.
8. Assessment of plaintiffs’ property, en bloc, from Tchoupitoulas street to river, could not alienate the public right and confer it on plaintiffs.
4. Map of Surveyor Williams of 1860 important and valid evidence in matter of public concern. Greenleaf 1, Chap. 6,14 Ed.
5. Map of Brown of 1867, made by order of Council and adopted by it, is.plain and conclusive assertion that Water street, as part of batture, had been reserved for public use, and this action was had before plaintiffs bought.
6. The lower judge erred in finding no “public necessity ” for'the ordinance. The Council has decided the question, and as early as 1867, at least* reserved the street, and plaintiffs have never sued to reduce ttíe reservation.
7. No expropriation by the City of Jefferson was necessary, nor is any by New Orleans needful. It is not a question of taking, but of withholding.
8. Jefferson City made compensation for streets laid on in rear of Tchoupitoulas street, but declined to pay for any part of batture.
9. The intervenor made defendant by order of court is entitled to damages in re-convention. Act 50 of 1886.

Opinion:
On Motion to Remand.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
Fenner, J.
The defendant appellants, in advance- of fixing or hearing on the merits, present this motion to remand the cause to the court a qua for the purpose of receiving and considering certain additional evidence which has been discovered since the date of the decision below, and which is alleged to have a material bearing om the issues.
We have maturely considered the points and authorities adduced in support of the motion, but can not avoid the conclusion that the, motion at this time is premature.
Our authority for such action is found in Article 906 of the Code-of Practice, which provides: "But if the court shall think it, not-possible to pronounce definitively on the cause, in the state in which' it is, either because the parties have failed to adduce the necessary testimony, or because the inferior court refused to receive it or otherwise, it may, according to circumstances, remand the cause to-the lower court, with instructions as to the testimony which it shall receive, to the end that it may decide according to law."
We consider it a condition precedent to the exercise of such authority that we should first determine that it is " not possible to pronounce definitively on the cause, in the state in which it is," meaning of course, by " definitively," a judgment according to conscience and the requirements of justice. It is plain that we can not determine this question without first examining into the merits of the cause, a necessity illustrated by the fact that a considerable portion of the argument on this motion was quite inaptly devoted to the merits.
It is not pretended that the evidence now produced raises any new issue or eliminates any existing issue in the cause. It is admitted to be merely additional and cumulative to evidence already submitted.
It might well be that we may conclude, on examining the merits» that the evidence already submitted was sufficient, or that the evidence now suggested, even if admitted, could not affect our conclusion, or that, for some other reason, we could decide the cause to our satisfaction, "in the state in which it is." In such case, of course the remanding would be unnecessary and improper. The. most pertinent precedents cited by movers are the following: Culliver vs. Garric, 13 La. 137; Millaudon vs. Mun., 71 An. 215; Schneider vs. Ins. Co., 30 An. 1198.
In the first two cases the remanding order was made under submission on the merits and after examination thereof. While this, does not so clearly appear in the last case, it is inferable from the facts that the court reviews the merits and reverses the judgment-appealed from before remanding.
It would be necessary for us to pursue the same course, if we should grant the order prayed for, and it would be most irregular for us to reverse a judgment appealed from, on a motion like this, before the case has been set for trial, and when the merits of the judgment have never been submitted for our decision.
It is therefore ordered that the motion be, at the present time, denied, and that the subject matter thereof be referred to the merits of the cause, to be considered and determined when the latter shall foe tried and submitted.