Case Name: Simons, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. De Bare, Respondent
Court: New York Superior Court
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1859-05-07
Citations: 4 Bosw. 547
Docket Number: 
Parties: Simons, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. De Bare, Respondent.
Judges: 
Reporter: Reports of cases argued and determined in the Superior Court of the city of New York
Volume: 17
Pages: 547–563

Head Matter:
Simons, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. De Bare, Respondent.
1. The record of an inferior court to be competent evidence of a due judicial determination of the facts which it declares such Court to have decided, must show on its face that the Court had jurisdiction both of the action, and of the persons of the parties.
2. As the statute which establishes “ The City Court of Brooklyn ” and defines its jurisdiction, declares that “its jurisdiction shall extend,” (1st), to certain actions which it enumerates, “when the cause of action shall have arisen, or the subject of the action shall be situated within the said city; (2d), to all other actions where all the defendants shall reside or be personally served with the summons within said city;” such Court' is an inferior court, within the meaning of the rule first above stated.
3. To constitute a court a superior court as to any class of actions, within the common law meaning of that term, its jurisdiction of such actions must be unconditional, so that the only thing requisite to enable the Court to take cognizance of them, is the acquisition of jurisdiction of the persons of the parties.
4. Although section 4 of the statute establishing “ The City Court of Brooklyn ” enacts that, “ the said City Court shall possess the powers and authority in relation to actions in said Court, and the process and proceedings therein as are possessed by the Supreme Court in relation to actions pending in the said Supreme Court And all laws regulating the practice of the Supreme Court, and the course of procedure therein, shall, as far as practicable, apply to and be binding upon the said City Court, and the said City Court shall have power to review all of its decisions, and to- grant new trials;" such section cannot be so construed as to make a part of such statute, a subsequent act in relation to courts named in it, and not including said City Court, to the effect, that “ a voluntary appearance of a defendant is equivalent to personal service of the summons upon him.”
5. The said 4th section prescribes generally the practice in actions, pending in the City Court of Brooklyn and its power over the process and proceedings in such actions, and cannot operate prospectively so as to apply to said Court subsequent statutory amendments of the Code of Procedure . which, in terms, in no way refer to said Court, in such sense as to enlarge its jurisdiction, and make it extend to actions of which, by the statute establishing and defining its powers, it has no jurisdiction.
6. A judgment of said Court which purports to have been rendered “ on hearing Mr. Samuel Brown, for the defendant," does not, by such a recital alone, show that the defendant caused his appearance to be entered in the action, nor that he personally appeared therein, nor that any attorney of said Court served “ notice of an appearance, or retainer generally " for the defendant in such action; and is not, of itself, sufficient to show that such Court acquired jurisdiction of the person of the defendant.
(Before Bosworth, Ch. J., and Hoffman, Woodruff, Pierrepont and Moncrief, J. J.)
Heard, April 9th;
decided, May 7th, 1859.
This is an appeal by the plaintiff from an order made by Mr. Justice Piebbepont, granting a new trial. The action, was tried before the said Justice and a jury, February 19th, 1858, when the plaintiff recovered a verdict for $2,500 damages. The action is assault and battery, and is brought by Henry Simons against Reuben B. De Bare.
On the trial, the plaintiff called as a witness Fanny Behrman, who had been married to the defendant on the 17th of August, 1856. (The assault and battery were committed on the 16th of said August.)
“ The defendant’s counsel objected to her being sworn, on the ground that she was incompetent as a witness against her husband. The plaintiff then offered to prove by parol that a divorce had been .granted, to which evidence defendant objected, and the objection was sustained. The plaintiff then offered in evidence a certified copy decree, of which the following is a copy:
“ At-a.Special Term of the City Court of Brooklyn, held at the City Hall in the city of Brooklyn, on the '10th day of March, A. D., 1857,
“ Present—Hon. E. D. Culveb, City Judge.
“ Fanny De Babe, by Zion Bebnstein, her next friend, &c., against
“ Reuben B. De Babe.
“ This action having -been brought on to be heard upon the complaint herein, and upon report of Wm. T. B. Milliken, Esq., a referee duly appointed in this action, from which it appears that all the material facts' charged in the said complaint are true, and that said defendant was, at the time of said marriage, physically ■incapable of entering into the marriage state, and that said incapacity still exists and is incurable.
“ Now, on motion of O’Brien & Higinbotham, attorneys for the plaintiff, and on hearing Mr. Samuel Brown, for the defendant, it is ordered, adjudged and declared that the said marriage between the said plaintiff and the said defendant mentioned in the complaint was null and void, and the same is hereby declared a nullity, and the said parties are, and each of them is, freed from the obligations thereof.
“ And it is further adjudged and decreed, on the stipulation and consent of the parties, that the said plaintiff, Fanny De Bare, do recover and receive from the defendant, and that said defendant do pay to her the sum of twelve hundred dollars in full for all claim of dower, and right of dower, and thirds, in the estate and property of the defendant, and in full for the costs and disbursements in this action, and that said plaintiff, by the said Zion Bernstein, as her guardian and next friend, do execute to said defendant a full and satisfactory release thereof for the consideration aforesaid.
“Endorsed.’ Filed March 10, 1857, 3:30 p. M.
“ Kings Countt, Citt of Brooklyn, i “ In the Clerk's Office of the City Court of Brooklyn, j lss-J
“ I do hereby certify that I have compared the foregoing copy of an original decree of divorce with the original now recorded in my office, and that the same is a correct transcript thereof and of the whole of said 'original.
“ In witness whereof, I have hereunto signed my name and [l. s.] affixed the seal of the said The City Court of Brooklyn, this 23d day of November, 1857.
“ Sam. L. Harris,
“ Clerk of the City Court of Brooklyn.
“Defendant objected to the admissibility of said decree as evidence of the facts therein cited, because it did not appear from said decree that the City Court of Brooklyn had jurisdiction to declare the marriage contract a nullity, or had acquired jurisdiction of the person of the defendant, or jurisdiction of the cause of action or subject matter of the proceeding. The Court overruled said objections severally, and decided that said copy decree was admissible in evidence, to which several rulings the counsel for defendant did then and there except. Said certified copy decree was then read in evidence, to which reading defendant objected. The court overruled the objection and the defendant excepted. The plaintiff again offered said Fanny Behrman as a witness in the action against the defendant. The defendant objected to the admissibility of said witness. The Court decided that said person was a competent witness as to matters which occurred prior to the marriage, to which decision defendant excepted. Said witness was then sworn in the cause, and testified to matters which occurred prior to the marriage material to the issues in behalf of the plaintiff and against defendant.”
A verdict having been rendered in favor of the plaintiff, and a motion made for a new trial having been granted, the plaintiff appealed from the order granting a new trial to the General Term.
P. Y. Cutler, for appellant (the plaintiff).
I. The mere fact that a decree was made, the res ipsa, may be proved by a production of the decree without the pleadings. (1 Greenl., § 511.)
II. A record of a court having a seal and clerk proves itself, because it is a record of a court of record, and imports absolute verity, (Greenl., § 503;) and it is conclusive between the same parties upon the matter adjudicated, because it is presumed to have jurisdiction. (1 Phill. Ev., 385, and notes; note 714, p. 1061; as to foreign Courts of Admiralty, see Story’s Confl. L., 643 ; Coke Litt., 352 a.)
III. The City Court of Brooklyn is as much a court of record as the Superior Court is a court of record, and its records under seal are entitled to equal respect.
1. That the Court had jurisdiction of the parties is proved by the record.
(a.) It was not necessary to prove that they were residents of Brooklyn, any more than it would be necessary to prove that the defendants in the Superior Court were served in the city.
(6.) If the defendants had not been served at all, they would be bound, because they appeared by attorney, and that appearance is noted in the record. (Cow. & Hill’s Notes, 799, 800; Starbuck v. Murray, 5 Wend., 148.)
(c.) Besides, consent confers jurisdiction over the parties where the Court has jurisdiction of the subject matter. When parties voluntarily come before a Court having jurisdiction of the subject matter, and submit to its jurisdiction, they are concluded.
2. A court of limited jurisdiction is not necessarily an inferior court. No court of record is an inferior court, and the Brooklyn Court is a court of record.
IV. The error, has been in deeming the Brooklyn Court an inferior court. It is an inferior court in one sense, because its judgments may be reviewed; but every court in the United States, except the Supreme Court of the United States, is an inferior court in the same sense. In the legal acceptation of the term, it is not an inferior court, although a court of limited jurisdiction. Every court in the United States is of limited jurisdiction. (Barber v. Winslow, 12 Wend., 102; Notes to Phill. Ev., C. & H., 1016; Selin v. Snyder, 7 Serg. & Rawle, 166; S. C., 11 id., 436; Raborg v. Hammond, 2 Harris, 42, 50; Brittain v. Kinnaird, 2 Brod. & Bing., 432.)
V. Even the proceedings of inferior courts are prima fade evidence of jurisdiction, when the jurisdictional facts are recited in those proceedings; and, although in England the cases have “fluctuated from absolute verity to mere nullity,” yet, in America, the rule is that they are evidence until the contrary be shown. (See the whole subject discussed, in 2d vol. Notes to Phill. Ev., 1014.)
On page 1016 the note proceeds:
“In New York we may safely consider these jurisdictional recitals as prima fade evidence.”
Citing Barber v. Winslow, (12 Wend., 102;) and that case, and the cases therein cited, fully sustains the position.
VI. The record was rightly received in evidence, and was of itself full proof, whether viewed as the proceeding of a superior or inferior court, that the Court had jurisdiction of the parties and subject matter, and the judgment should not have been reversed for that reason.
G. Dean, for respondent.
I. The City Court of Brooklyn is a court of inferior and limited jurisdiction. (Const, art. vi, §§ 3 and 14.)
1. The Supreme Court only has general jurisdiction in law and equity.
2. The power of the Legislature is limited to the establishment of “ inferior local courts.” And if the act had purported to make the City Court of Brooklyn a court of “ general ” jurisdiction, it would have transcended the powers of the Legislature.
3. The acts establishing the court, (Laws of 1849, p. 170, and Laws of 1850, p. 148,) expressly limit its jurisdiction. (§ 2, act of 1849.)
II. The fact having been established that the decree offered was that of an inferior court, the authorities are clear' that enough was not shown to make the copy decree which was introduced in evidence admissible. (Bloom v. Burdick, 1 Hill, 130; Yates v. Lansing, 9 Johns. R., 437; Hart et al. v. Seixas, 21 Wend., 40.)
1. There should always appear sufficient on the face of the proceedings in an inferior court to show that it has jurisdiction of the cause of which it takes cognizance. (Powers v. The People, 4 Johns., 292; Bloom v. Burdick, 1 Hill, 130; Noyes v. Butler, 6 Barb., 613; Foot v. Stevens, 17 Wend., 483; Peacock v. Bell, 1 Saund., 73; Kundolf v. Thalheimer, 2 Kern., 593; Frees v. Ford, 2 Seld., 176: Turner, Adm’r, v. Bank of North America, 4 Dall., 8.)
HI. The decree not setting out facts showing jurisdiction, the divorce is not proved, and Fanny Behrman was an incompetent witness in the cause.

Opinion:
By the Court—Bosworth, Ch. J.
If the City Court of Brooklyn is an inferior court, within the meaning of the rule— that the jurisdiction of an inferior court will not be presumed in support of the validity of its proceedings, but, on the contrary, enough must appear upon its records, or be otherwise proved, to show that it had jurisdiction of the subject matter of the action and of the parties, in order to make its records evidence in another court—the present appeal may be briefly disposed of.
That Court has no jurisdiction of any transitory action, unless one of two facts exists: All of the defendants in it must either " reside or be personally served with the summons within said city." (Laws of 1849, p. 170, §2, sub. 2.)
The judgment or decree given in evidence does not even recite that De Bare resided within that city when that action was, or may be claimed to have been, commenced, or when the judgment in it was rendered; nor that he was ever personally served with the summons in that action, within that city or elsewhere.
The act organizing that Court was passed the 24th' of March, 1849.
Section 8 of the Code does not, in terms, apply to that Court any provisions of the Code, except sections 69 to 126, both inclusive. That Court is not named in section 9. It is by no means clear, therefore, that the concluding sentence of section 139 applies to that "Court. That sentence was incorporated into the Code by the amendments enacted in 1851. (Laws of 1851, p. 887, § 139;, p. 904, §470, [§2;] id., appendix, p. 51, § 139; Laws of 1849, p. 644, § 139.) If it does not apply to that Court, then the voluntary appearance, in any transitory action, of a defendant not residing within that city, would not give to that Court jurisdiction of such action. Consent cannot confer upon any court jurisdiction of an action, when 'jurisdiction of it is not conferred by law.
To constitute a court, a superior court, (within the meaning of the rule we are considering,) as to any class of actions, its •jurisdiction of such actions must be unconditional, so that the only thing essential, to enable the Court to take cognizance of them, is the acquisition of jurisdiction of the persons of the parties.
In Kemp's Lessee v. Kennedy et al., (5 Cranch, 173,) Chief Justice Mabshall, in speaking of the Court of Common Pleas for the county of Hunterdon, New Jersey, (the judgment of which, and the proceedings upon it, being relied on as a" defense,) said, that, "In considering this question, therefore, the constitution and powers of the court in which this judgment was rendered must be inspected.
"It is understood to be a court of record,- possessing, in civil cases, a general jurisdiction to any amount, with the exception of suits for real property.
"In treason, its jurisdiction is over all who commit the offense" : "with respect to treason, then, it is a court of general jurisdiction, so far as respects the property of the accused." The action was ejectment, and the defendant made title under a judgment of such Court of Common Pleas, confiscating the real estate in question by reason of the treason of the person who was the common source of title.
The New York Common Pleas has been decided not to be. an inferior court, within the meaning of the rule under consideration, because, by 2d Revised Statutes, 135, 2d edition, 1, it had power to hear, try and determine " all transitory actions, wherever the cause may arise," and was also a court of record, proceeding according to the general course of the common law. (Foot v. Stevens, 17 Wend., 483; Hart v. Seixas, 21 Wend., 40.)
In Frees v. Ford, (2 Seld., 176,) the present County Courts of this State were held to be inferior courts, and that it was essential to the validity of their judgment's that " all the facts necessary to give the court jurisdiction, as well over the subject matter of the suit, as of the parties, must appear in the record."
By the 30th section of the judiciary act, (Laws of. 1847, p. 328, § 30,) their jurisdiction extends to the transitory actions named in it, " when all of the defendants, at the time of commencing the action, reside in the county in which said court is held," and " when the debt or damages claimed" do not exceed the sums specified.
They had not, therefore, a general and unconditional jurisdiction of any transitory action, and were also, in respect to the cases in which jurisdiction of the actions enumerated existed, so far as it depended on the residence of the defendants, limited to those in which the debt or damages claimed did not exceed a specified amount.
Without entering into a more detailed statement of the facts of the various adjudged cases, or of the reasons on which they were decided, we think it may be stated, as a settled rule, that when the judgment of a local court, in a transitory action, is offered as evidence that a particular fact has been judicially determined by competent judicial authority, the record of the judgment will be no evidence of that fact, unless 'it affirmatively appears, by the record itself, that all the facts necessary to give the court, jurisdiction, both of the subject matter of the suit and of the parties to it, existed: if the court, by the law creating it, has no jurisdiction of that particular action, nor of any transitory action, unless all the defendants resided, or were personally served with the summons, within the city within which such court is required by law to be held.
Such a court is not only one of limited jurisdiction; but its jurisdiction of every action—of the action itself—being made to depend either upon the place where the defendants reside, or the fact that'they are "personally served with the summons" within a designated locality smaller than a county, it is an inferior court within the common law meaning of that term.
If the court had a general jurisdiction of an enumerated class of actions, without reference to the place where they arose or the parties to them resided, or to the amount sought to be recovered, being a court of record and proceeding according to the general course of the common law, it might be, quo ad hoc, a superior court, within the meaning of the rule under consideration.
Having jurisdiction in the action, jurisdiction of the persons of the parties in it might be acquired by their voluntary appearance.
But the difficulty in the present case is, that the court had no jurisdiction of the subject matter of the suit; of the action itself, unless the defendant resided within the city of Brooklyn or was personally served with the summons within that city.
Such a court is an inferior court, within the common law meaning of that phrase. Its judgment must show on its face, that the defendant resided or was personally served with the summons within that city, to be per se evidence in another court of a valid judicial determination of any fact which it purports to decide.
This is not shown by the decree or judgment which was received as evidence, that the defendant and his wife had been divorced by that court, in an action between them instituted for that purpose.
But, it is insisted that the 4th section of the act creating the court, and the amendment made to section 139 of the Code, in 1851, have, together, the effect to enlarge the jurisdiction of that court, and make it more extensive than it was by the statute alone, by which the court was created.
That 4th section reads thus: "The said City Court shall possess the powers and authority in relation to actions in said court, and the process and proceedings therein as are possessed by the Supreme Court in relation to actions pending in the said Supreme Court. And all laws regulating the practice of the Supreme Court, and the course of procedure therein shall, as far as practicable, apply to and be binding upon the said City Court, and the said City Court shall have power to review all of its decisions and to grant'new trials." (S. L. of 1849, p. 171, §'4.)
We think this section must be construed as prescribing the practice in actions in the City Court of Brooklyn, and its power over the process and proceedings in such actions; and that it cannot be so construed that subsequent amendments of the Code, not referring to that court, shall be held to enlarge, and as having been intended to enlarge its jurisdiction.
If the Legislature had intended, by the amendment made in 1851 to section 139 of the Code, to extend the jurisdiction of that court by force of such amendment, to all transitory actions against persons not residing within the city of Brooklyn, on their voluntary appearance therein; it would seem that section 8 would have been so amended as to designate it as one of the courts to which that section was applicable, and that section 9 would have been so amended that such court would have been named in it.
It is quite clear, as we think, that section 4 of the act creating that court, does not apply to it, the provisions of section 135 of the Code, so as to enable a person to commence an action in it, against a sole defendant not residing within the city of Brooklyn, by the publication of a summons. The concluding sentence of section 139, as it was amended in 1851, does not, in our opinion, affect the question of the jurisdictional capacity of the court, nor change it from an inferior to a superior court.
This view renders it unnecessary to decide the question, whether a copy of the judgment of a superior court, in an action of divorce, without a copy of the pleadings, would be competent and sufficient evidence that the parties had been and were divorced by a regular and valid judicial determination, provided the judgment recites the nature of the action, and the appearance of the ¡parties in court, and that they were heard on the application for judgment. Being an inferior court, it was necessary to produce a judgment roll which showed on its face that the court had jurisdiction both of the action and of the persons of the parties. This not Raving been done, the judgment was erroneously-received as evidence, and the order granting a new trial on account of that error, must be affirmed with costs.
It may also be observed, that if "a voluntary appearance" of R. B. De Bare would as effectually give that court jurisdiction of that action, as the personal service of a summons upon him within the city of Brooklyn; the judgment does not recite that he caused his appearance to be entered; nor that he personally appeared therein; nor that any attorney of the court served " notice of an appearance or retainer generally " (Rule 11) for him in that action; nor that "Mr. Samuel Brown" who was heard for him, was an attorney; or had served notice of appearance for him; or that he had been retained for him in that action.