Case Name: In re MICAH S., a Minor. SANTA CLARA COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES, Petitioner and Respondent, v. GLORIA S. et al, Objectors and Appellants; In re MICAH S., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. ROBERT WEIGLE, as Chief Probation Officer, etc., Plaintiff and Respondent, v. GLORIA S. et al., Defendants and Appellants
Court: Court of Appeal of the State of California
Jurisdiction: California
Decision Date: 1988-02-10
Citations: 198 Cal. App. 3d 557
Docket Number: No. H002148; No. H001790
Parties: In re MICAH S., a Minor. SANTA CLARA COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES, Petitioner and Respondent, v. GLORIA S. et al, Objectors and Appellants. In re MICAH S., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. ROBERT WEIGLE, as Chief Probation Officer, etc., Plaintiff and Respondent, v. GLORIA S. et al., Defendants and Appellants.
Judges: 
Reporter: California Appellate Reports, Third Series
Volume: 198
Pages: 557–568

Head Matter:
[No. H002148.
Sixth Dist.
Feb. 10, 1988.]
In re MICAH S., a Minor. SANTA CLARA COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES, Petitioner and Respondent, v. GLORIA S. et al, Objectors and Appellants. In re MICAH S., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. ROBERT WEIGLE, as Chief Probation Officer, etc., Plaintiff and Respondent, v. GLORIA S. et al., Defendants and Appellants.
[No. H001790.
Sixth Dist.,
Feb. 10, 1988.]
Counsel
Gary V. Crooks and Judy D. Goldman, under appointments by the Court of Appeal, Susan Myers and Goldman & Goldman, for Objectors and Appellants and Defendants and Appellants.
Donald L. Clark, County Counsel, and Diane L. Bennett, Deputy County Counsel, for Petitioner and Respondent and Plaintiff and Respondent.

Opinion:
Opinion
AGLIANO, P. J.
Gloria and Michael S. appeal a juvenile court order continuing their son, Micah, as a dependent child and an order and judgment terminating their parental rights. We consolidated the two appeals for review and disposition. Appellants contend that the court failed to make a finding that termination was the least detrimental available alternative and that the reunification services offered them were inadequate. They also challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting termination and, last, allege that delays in the termination proceedings deprived them of due process. We find no error and affirm.
Micah was placed in protective custody at the age of seven weeks, on January 4, 1984, when appellants had no suitable place to live. On January 6 he was placed with foster parents who wish to adopt him. What appears to have been a combined jurisdictional and dispositional hearing was held on January 23, 1984, at which Micah was adjudged a dependent child under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (a) and continued in foster care. On March 27 appellants signed a reunification plan which called for them to visit Micah regularly, to complete a parenting program and to maintain suitable housing for six months, to participate in counseling and to complete a psychiatric evaluation.
A combined six-month review and permanency planning hearing was held on June 28, 1984. At this hearing, the juvenile court ordered county counsel to file a petition under Civil Code section 232 to terminate appellants' parental rights. Further review hearings were held on December 11, 1984, March 27, 1985, August 30, 1985, and February 7, 1986. Appellants appealed the order made at the latter hearing.
On October 18, 1984, respondent filed a petition alleging that grounds existed for termination of parental rights under Civil Code section 232, subdivisions (a)(6) and (a)(7). A Civil Code section 233 report was filed on November 27, 1984, and a supplemental report was filed on December 10. Hearings were held on the petition on February 15, 1985, April 18 and 19, 1985, August 1 and 26, 1985, and January 23, 1986. An order and judgment terminating appellants' parental rights on the basis of Civil Code section 232, subdivision (a)(6) was filed on March 28, 1986. Appellants appealed this judgment.
Appellants first argue that the juvenile court failed to make a finding that terminating their parental rights to Micah was the least detrimental alternative. (In re Carmaleta B. (1978) 21 Cal.3d 482, 489 [146 Cal.Rptr. 623, 579 P.2d 514].) This argument is specious. The termination judgment states: "The court has considered less drastic alternatives than the termination of parental rights and finds that granting the Petition is the least detrimental alternative." This finding is clear, specific and adequate.
This finding is also supported by substantial evidence in the record. (In re Angelia P. (1981) 28 Cal.3d 908 [171 Cal.Rptr. 637, 623 P.2d 198].) Testimony by the case worker established that she had explored the possibility of placing Micah with his maternal grandparents, with Gloria's sister, and with his paternal grandfather. She also requested information from Michael's grandmother in Colorado about relatives there who would be willing to accept Micah's custody, although both appellants opposed placing Micah outside the area. It is hard to imagine what else could have been done to find a familial placement for Micah.
Next, appellants have a variety of complaints concerning the provision of reunification services. They argue that the reunification plan should have been developed more promptly, that no good faith effort was made to allow appellants to comply with the plan and that the court should have ordered further reunification services. A review of the facts belies these contentions.
The social report submitted for the jurisdictional and dispositional hearing revealed that Gloria S. had a history of psychiatric hospitalizations dating back to 1966, that Michael S. had a history of psychiatric hospitalizations dating back to 1976, drug and alcohol abuse problems, and six arrests since 1979. Micah's half-brother, born in 1971, was freed for adoption in 1978. A sister born in 1981 was made a dependent of the court that same year when Gloria was hospitalized in a psychiatric facility. This child was freed for adoption in 1983. Two psychiatric evaluations had been submitted in the latter case. One indicated that both appellants were psychotic and that the illness was severe. It concluded "The [S.'s] cannot even take care of themselves for more than a few weeks at a time. To place a child with them would not only endanger the child's welfare but seriously compromise their marginal ability to cope." The other evaluation concluded that both parents had "serious chronic continuing evidence of psychological impediments" and that "individually and conjointly, [they] are incapable of providing a safe and secure environment for their biological child" as a direct consequence of their illness.
The report also noted that the parents' chronic mental illnesses were the underlying cause of Micah's and his siblings' dependencies, and indicated that termination might be appropriate. It also contained a reunification plan in narrative form which was identical in its scope to the document signed by appellants on March 27. This is sufficient to comply with California Rules of Court, rule 1376(b). This reunification plan was specific and concrete, unlike the plan criticized in In re Bernadette C. (1982) 127 Cal.App.3d 618 [179 Cal.Rptr. 688]. Appellants were advised of these prerequisites to reunification by January 23, 1985, the date of the dispositional order, which reiterated the reunification requirements as conditions of Micah's dependency, and which was signed by both appellants.
The social report filed for the six-month review hearing established that appellants had made no progress towards reunification. Their housing remained unstable, they had attended only one parenting class, and they had refused to accept counseling or psychiatric treatment. On May 29, 1984, Gloria had been hospitalized in a psychiatric facility on a 72-hour hold. Even though Gloria received financial assistance through a payee representative program, appellants had trouble budgeting, frequently ran out of money by midmonth and were unable to pay their bills. Supervised visits with Micah had consistently shown appellants' lack of understanding of how to care for a small child. Appellants had established no relationship with their son as a result of these visits.
It is apparent from this record that appellants' unfortunate chronic mental illnesses were preventing them from adequately caring for Micah, and that the juvenile court had no choice but to recommend that the case proceed toward termination of appellants' parental rights, so that Micah could be freed for adoption.
Appellants also contend that the court should have ordered additional reunification services in light of the evidence presented at the termination hearings that in 1985, Gloria had shown improvement in her mental health. Where there is a failure to order reunification services in the course of a child's dependency they may be offered, in the court's discretion, during a termination proceeding. (In re Clarence I. (1986) 180 Cal.App.3d 279, 283 [225 Cal.Rptr. 466]; In re Susan M. (1975) 53 Cal.App.3d 300, 311 [125 Cal.Rptr. 707]; In re David B. (1979) 91 Cal.App.3d 184, 198 [154 Cal.Rptr. 63].) But appellants cite no authority for the proposition that a court has discretion to order further reunification services prior to termination where those services were already provided during the child's dependency. Even were a court to have this discretion, we would not find it abused on the record before us.
Two psychiatrists testified at the termination hearings concerning appellants' mental disability. Dr. White testified that Gloria S. had been hospitalized over 20 times during her more than 20-year mental illness and that she had better than an 80 to 90 percent chance of future hospitalizations. He believed Michael S. to be permanently disabled by his mental illness. Dr. Harper testified that he had had contact with Gloria S. since 1976, that he believed her to be chronically mentally disordered and that it was "beyond my comprehension how she could maintain a degree of stability that is required for parenting a child." He believed Michael S. to be suffering from paranoid schizophrenia, and had seen him deteriorate since the doctor's first contact with him a year and a half before. In his opinion, neither Michael nor Gloria was likely to improve in the future and "it would take a miracle" for mental illness of the duration of appellants' to be successfully resolved. Not only would it be detrimental for Micah to be in appellants' care, but it would also put a terrible strain on appellants' already minimal ability to care for themselves.
This testimony corroborated the psychiatric evaluations of appellants performed by these practitioners in August 1984. In light of this evidence, it was reasonable for the court to treat Gloria's improvements as likely to be short-lived and not to reopen any realistic possibility for reunification. We find no abuse of discretion on this record.
We would merely create excess verbiage were we to reiterate this evidence in order to conclude that substantial evidence supports termination. The evidence was not only substantial, it was overwhelming. It is unfortunate that appellants, who love Micah and are concerned for his welfare, are unable, because of their chronic mental illnesses, to care for him. Nonetheless, it would have been impossible, on this record, for the trial court not to have concluded that appellants suffered from a mental disorder which rendered them unable to adequately care for and control Micah, as required by Civil Code section 232, subdivision (a)(6), and not to have sustained the termination petition on this basis.
Last, appellants contend their due process rights were violated by the fact the hearings on the termination petition, which took place on five separate days, lasted for a ten-month period. While such delay is lamentable, appellants have not demonstrated that they were in any way prejudiced. Our review of the record substantiates respondent's contention that several of these delays were for the convenience of appellants or their witnesses. The statutory preference for termination proceedings over civil matters expressed in Civil Code section 232.3 was not violated, since the case was heard before a juvenile court referee sitting, by stipulation of the parties, as a judge pro tempore. If anything, the delay worked to appellants' advantage since it gave them an opportunity to document the improvement in their situation during 1985. We find no violation, either of due process or of the statute, on this record.
The judgment and orders are affirmed.
Brauer, J., and Capaccioli, J., concurred.
In both the briefs and the record, the child is referred to as both Micah and Michah. We have used the former spelling.
Under subsequently amended Welfare and Institutions Code section 361.5 (Stats. 1986, ch. 1122, § 13) reunification services need not be provided under certain circumstances, including, under subdivision (b)(2), where the court finds that a parent is suffering from "a mental disability that is described in paragraph (5) or (6) of subdivision (a) of Section 232 of the Civil Code and that renders him or her incapable of utilizing those services." The evidence in this case would have amply supported such a finding.