Case Name: The State of Texas v. John Horan et al.
Court: Supreme Court of Texas
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1860-10
Citations: 25 Supp. Tex. 271
Docket Number: 
Parties: The State of Texas v. John Horan et al.
Judges: 
Reporter: Texas Reports
Volume: 25 Supp.
Pages: 271–275

Head Matter:
The State of Texas v. John Horan et al.
The act of the 2d February, 1856, (Paschal’s Dig., Arts. 2161 to 2163,) provides for obtaining license for selling spirituous liquors in quantities less than a quart. The amendment to the Penal Code of the 12th February, 1858, reads as follows:
"If any person or firm shall sell, or be in any way concerned in selling, spirituous, vinous, or other intoxicating liquors, in quantities less than one quart, without first having obtained license therefor, in the manner prescribed by 1 An act to authorize the county courts of this State to grant license for the retail of spirituous, vinous, and other intoxicating liquors, in quantities less than one quart, and imposing a license tax for such privilege,’ approved 2d February, 1856, or in violation of any other law hereafter passed, regulating licenses for the sale of liquor, or shall violate any other provision of said act of 2d February, 1856, such person or firm shall be punished by fine not less than $50 nor more than $250.” (Paschal’s Dig., Art. 2075, Note 654.)
The indictment should aver the offense to have been “without first having obtained a license therefor.”
Without such averment, the indictment was insufficient on constitutional grounds, as ruled in Hewitt v. The State, 25 Tex., 722. (The learned reader is referred to Hewitt v. The State for a full discussion.)
Appeal from Travis. The case was tried before Hon. A. "W. Terrell, one of the district judges.
The indictment charged that Horan-' and Robinson, on the 10th day of March, 1858, did sell intoxicating liquors in quantities less than a quart, contrary, &e.
The defendants specially objected on the grounds of uncertainty, as required by the constitution, the failure to describe the place where the liquors were sold, and because it was not in accordance with the constitutions of Texas and the Hnited States. The exceptions were sustained, from which the State appealed. .
M. D. G-raham, Attorney General, for the State.
—The indictment comes fully up to all the requisites of article 395, Code of Crim. Pro. By the 5th sub-division of that article, it will be seen that all that is required to be averred in relation to the place where the offense was committed is, that it was “within the jurisdiction of the court.” It is not necessary to state in the indictment anything not necessary to be proved. (Art. 396, Code Crim. Pro.)
The 7th section of the act of the legislature, already referred to, under which this indictment was found, declares what is necessary to be averred and proved by the State.
As to the certainty required in alleging the particular place, see Prior v. The State, 4 Tex., 383; Sublett v. The State, 9 Tex., 53.
[Mr. Justice Roberts filed some queries, which called forth the following points:]
Geo. Flournoy, for M. D. Graham, Attorney General, for the State.
—The Attorney General submits the following additional brief in this cause, upon some suggestions made at the last term by a member of the court.
"We think it clear that “our statute is founded on the idea of entire prohibition of sale” in quantities less than a quart, “with certain allowed exceptions,” as distinguished from “ recognizing the general right to sell, and seeking to regulate the mode of selling.”
The constitutional right' of the legislature to entirely prohibit the sale of intoxicating drinks, from reasons of “ public policy,” or for the protection of “public morals,” was settled in the case of Perdue v. Ellis, 18 Ga. R., 586.
It is sustainable for the same reasons that sustain the various Sabbath laws of the different States, which I believe have uniformly been held no infringement of common right, and consistent with the freedom of conscience.
A law prohibiting entirely the sale of intoxicating drinks on the Sabbath day is equally as unconstitutional as one prohibiting the sale altogether; they are both for the protection of “public morals,” and neither can be sustained on the ground that it is an exercise of the “taxing” or revenue-raising power.
The law in question is only an absolute prohibition of sale in certain quantities, with certain allowed exceptions.
“There is no need to allege in an indictment” on a statute, that the defendant is not “within any of the provisos,” notwithstanding the court expressly takes “notice of them” as special cases, “as are expressed in the act.” (Bac. Abridg., Indictment H., 4.)
There are but two questions to determine:
1. Does the legislature possess the constitutional right to prohibit, not the sale altogether, but the sale in certain quantities ?
We have shown that they might prohibit the sale altogether. If this be true, they can prohibit the sale of intoxicating liquors in certain quantities, and to this general prohibition of sale in such quantities they may allow certain specified exceptions.
The legislature certainly recognizes the general right to sell intoxicating liquors, but have enacted a general prohibition of the sale in certain quantities, to wit, less than a quart, as they might well have enacted a general prohibition of sale in a certain form, to wit, whiskey. To this, however, there are allowed exceptions, which are substantial provisos to the enacting clause.
The statute certainly has general prohibitory words. The intention of the legislature was clearly to prohibit all persons from selling in quantities less than a quart, but provided a mode by which, in exceptional cases, a person might acquire the right to sell—not the privilege of exercising an already existing right, whose exercise had been regulcded by law. It provides how the right to sell shall be acquired, and such right is as independent of “common right” as a distinct “franchise.” It is not a suspension or regulation, but a general prohibition; not as to manner of selling, but of the right to sell at all. It does not matter hoto a person may sell in quantities less than a quart, so that he first purchase the right to sell.
Taking it for granted, then, that this is a general prohibition of right as to persons, the indictment having alleged “in quantities less than one quart,” we think it sufficiently charges the statutory inhibition. The case of The State v. John Miller, 24 Conn., 526, clearly affirms the modern doctrine upon the question above discussed. It was decided mainly upon the authority in Hart v. Cleis, 8 Johns., 41, and Rex v. Pemberton, 2 Burr, 1036. They are all three cases directly in point.
Hamilton ¿- Sublett, for appellees.
—1. The indictment is not sufficiently certain to enable the defendants to make their defense.
2. The indictment does not state the place at which the retailing occurred, or any other fact identifying the transaction.
3. The indictment has not the certainty guaranteed by the Constitution of the United States, and the constitution of the State of Texas.
4. The indictment is in contravention of the Constitution of the United States, as well as the constitution of Texas.
The want of that certainty in the indictment, to make it a good common law indictment, is too apparent to require any comment or argument to prove.

Opinion:
Boberts, J.
—This indictment leaves out the allegation that the liquors were retailed "without first having obtained a license therefor."
This question was directly before us at Tyler, at the last term, and we held the indictment insufficient on constitutional grounds. (See case of Hewitt v. The State, 25 Tex., 722.) Following that case, the judgment in this must be
Affirmed.