Case Name: PEOPLE v. HANSON
Court: Michigan Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1989-07-17
Citations: 178 Mich. App. 507
Docket Number: Docket No. 109340
Parties: PEOPLE v HANSON
Judges: Before: Doctoroff, P.J., and Maher and Reilly, JJ.
Reporter: Michigan appeals reports; cases decided in the Michigan Court of Appeals.
Volume: 178
Pages: 507–516

Head Matter:
PEOPLE v HANSON
Docket No. 109340.
Submitted April 19, 1989, at Detroit.
Decided July 17, 1989.
Gregory B. Hanson pled guilty in Detroit Recorder’s Court to a charge of probation violation for failing to report to his probation officer on a monthly basis as required by the order of probation imposed upon his conviction of malicious destruction of property worth more than $100. Defendant was sentenced to one to four years imprisonment, Lawrence D. Silverman, J. Defendant appealed, contending that his plea should be vacated and the charge dismissed because the police did not act with due diligence in executing the bench warrant charging him with the violation and because he received notice of the violation only one day before tendering his plea.
The Court of Appeals held:
1. A guilty plea does not operate to waive a defendant’s claims which implicate the very authority of the state to bring him to trial.
2. There is insufficient information in the record upon which to review defendant’s claim that the police did not act with due diligence in executing the bench warrant charging him with the violation. The matter is remanded to the trial court for development of an adequate factual record and for a decision in the first instance on whether the authorities acted with due diligence in executing the warrant charging defendant with probation violation. If the court determines that due diligence was exercised, defendant’s conviction and sentence are to be affirmed. If due diligence was not exercised, the violation will be deemed to have been waived and defendant’s conviction and sentence are to be vacated and the charge dismissed. Jurisdiction will be retained to review the propriety of the trial court’s decision.
3.Defendant’s argument that the conviction must be vacated because he received only one day’s notice of the probation violation charge is without merit.
References
Am Jur 2d, Criminal Law §§ 339, 351, 469, 826.
See the Index to Annotations under Bench Warrant; Estoppel and Waiver; Guilty Plea; Notice and Knowledge; Warrants.
Remanded for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the authorities acted with due diligence in attempting to execute the bench warrant on defendant. Jurisdiction is retained on that issue only.
Reilly, J., concurred in the result but wrote separately to state her rejection of Judge Mahek’s statement in the majority opinion that a twenty-seven-week delay was unreasonable on its face. She would leave the determination of the reasonableness of the delay to the factfinder.
Doctoroff, P.J., dissented. He would hold that defendant waived his right to raise on appeal the issue whether he was entitled to waiver of the charge against him because of the twenty-seven-week delay between the issuance of the warrant and its execution. Furthermore, even if waiver was not an issue, he would not remand this case for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether due diligence was exercised. He agrees with Judge Reilly that a twenty-seven-week delay shQuld not be considered unreasonable on its face. Further, he states that defendant suffered no prejudice due to the delay and that the delay was reasonable considering the workload of the police in dealing with outstanding felony warrants and the desirability of having the police give priority to locating those offenders who have committed violent felonies rather than those who have committed minor probation violations. He would affirm.
1. Criminal Law — Guilty Pleas — Jurisdictional Claims — Waiver.
A guilty plea does not operate to waive a defendant’s claims that police did not act with due diligence in executing a bench warrant charging him with probation violation and that he received notice of the violation only one day before tendering his plea; these claims implicate the very authority of the state to bring him to trial.
2. Criminal Law — Warrants — Delay in Execution — Waiver of Jurisdiction.
Jurisdiction to try a case is not lost because of delay in' executing an arrest warrant where the authorities act with due diligence in attempting to execute the warrant.
3. Criminal Law — Probation Violations — Notice — Guilty Pleas.
Reversal of a defendant’s conviction for probation violation because he was given only one day’s notice of the violation before tendering his guilty plea is not required where he was represented by counsel, the basis of the charge was factually very simple, and the defendant tendered his plea knowingly, understandingly, and voluntarily.
Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Louis J. Caruso, Solicitor General, John D. O'Hair, Prosecuting Attorney, Timothy A. Baughman, Chief of Research, Training and Appeals, and Ernest O. Hornung, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for the people.
State Appellate Defender (by Kim Robert Fawcett), for defendant on appeal.
Before: Doctoroff, P.J., and Maher and Reilly, JJ.

Opinion:
Maher, J.
On February 17, 1988, defendant pled guilty in: the Detroit Recorder's Court to probation violation, MCL 771.4; MSA 28.1134, for failing to report to his probation officer on a monthly basis as required by the order of probation imposed upon his conviction of malicious destruction of property worth over $100. After being sentenced to one to four years imprisonment, he filed this appeal as of right, claiming that his plea should be vacated and the charge dismissed because (i) the police did not act with due diligence in executing the bench warrant charging him with the violation and (ii) he received notice of the violation only one day before tendering his plea.
Before discussing the merits of defendant's claims, it must be noted that he did not raise the objections below. I believe, though, that defendant's claims implicate the very authority of the state to bring him to trial. People v New, 427 Mich 482, 491; 398 NW2d 358 (1986). Much like alleged violations of the "180-day rule" then, a guilty plea should not operate to waive the claims. See People v Sickles, 162 Mich App 344, 350-351; 412 NW2d 734 (1987), lv den 429 Mich 898 (1988); People v Wolak, 153 Mich App 60, 69; 395 NW2d 240 (1986). But see People v Rivera, 164 Mich App 670, 671-673; 417 NW2d 569 (1987).
As to defendant's first claim, I would hold that the twenty-seven-week period between the issuance of the bench warrant (on July 27, 1987) and its execution (on February 16, 1988) was unreasonable on its face. See People v Gunner, 61 Mich App 569, 570; 233 NW2d 87 (1975), lv den 396 Mich 842 (1976); People v Diamond, 59 Mich App 581, 586-587; 229 NW2d 857 (1975), lv den 394 Mich 824 (1975). However, jurisdiction to try the case is not lost if the authorities acted with due diligence in attempting to execute the warrant. People v Miller, 77 Mich App 381, 384; 258 NW2d 235 (1977).
Unfortunately, there is insufficient information in the record, upon which to review this claim. We therefore remand the matter to the trial court for development of an adequate factual record and for a decision in the first instance on whether the authorities acted with due diligence in executing the warrant which charged defendant with the probation violation. If the trial court determines that the warrant was executed with due diligence, defendant's conviction and sentence are to be affirmed. If the authorities did not act with due diligence, they shall be deemed to have waived the violation (Miller, supra) and defendant's conviction and sentence are to be vacated and the instant charge dismissed. Jurisdiction will be retained to review the propriety of the trial court's decision in this regard.
Defendant's next argument (i.e., that the conviction must be vacated because he received only one day's notice of the probation violation charge) is without merit. Not only was defendant represented by counsel, but the basis of the charged violation was factually very simple (thus requiring little time to determine the existence of any viable defense). People v Duncan, 154 Mich App 652; 397 NW2d 857 (1986). Having reviewed the transcript of defendant's pled hearing, we are convinced that he tendered the plea knowingly, understandingly, and voluntarily. Thus, reversal is not required because of the short notice.
Remanded for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the authorities acted with due diligence in attempting to execute the bench warrant on defendant. Jurisdiction is retained on that issue only.