Case Name: Paul T. NEWELL, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent
Court: Florida Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1998-06-11
Citations: 714 So. 2d 434
Docket Number: No. 91135
Parties: Paul T. NEWELL, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
Judges: KOGAN, C.J., and OVERTON, SHAW, ANSTEAD and PARIENTE, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 714
Pages: 434–436

Head Matter:
Paul T. NEWELL, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
No. 91135.
Supreme Court of Florida.
June 11, 1998.
Paul T. Newell, pro se, Daytona Beach, Petitioner.
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, and Belle B. Turner, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Respondent.

Opinion:
HARDING, Justice.
We have for review Newell v. State, 696 So.2d 892 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997). The basis for our jurisdiction lies in the fact that the Fifth District Court of Appeal rendered a per curiam decision with citation to Moody v. State, 696 So.2d 797 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997). This Court subsequently accepted Moody for review and quashed the decision below. Moody v. State, 699 So.2d 1009 (Fla.1997). Thus, we have jurisdiction based on article V, section 3(b)(3) of the Florida Constitution. See also Jollie v. State, 405 So.2d 418 (Fla.1981).
In State v. Hudson, 698 So.2d 831, 833 (Fla.1997), this Court concluded that a trial court's "sentencing discretion [under the habitual offender statute] extends to determining whether to impose a mandatory minimum term." We quashed-the decision in Moody because the district court concluded otherwise. We also remanded that case for proceedings consistent with our opinion in Hudson. Moody, 699 So.2d at 1009.
In the instant case, the State concedes that the reason given by the trial court for summarily denying Paul Newell's motion for postconviction relief — that mandatory minimum sentencing provisions of the habitual offender statute are required to be imposed — was incorrect. However, the State contends that summary denial was proper for a different reason. The State asserts that it has been clear since 1992 when this Court issued its opinion in Burdick v. State, 594 So.2d 267 (Fla.1992), that a trial court is not required to impose a mandatory minimum sentence upon habitual offenders. Thus, the State reasons, Newell should have raised this issue in his direct appeal, which concluded in February 1995, and he is not entitled to postconvietion relief.
We find several flaws in the State's argument. First, this Court accepted jurisdiction in Hudson because of a conflict between the district courts of appeal on this very issue. See Hudson, 698 So.2d at 832 (citing conflict between the Third and Fourth District Courts of Appeal, which held that sentencing to mandatory minimum term was permissive, and the First, Second, and Fifth District Courts of Appeal, which held that mandatory minimum term must be imposed); see also State v. Hudson, 689 So.2d 1072 (Fla.1997) (granting review of the district court decision on the basis of express and direct conflict). Thus, Florida law was not clear on this issue as late as 1997. Second, the petitioner in Moody raised this issue in a postconviction motion filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. This Court quashed the district court decision affirming the trial court's denial of relief and remanded for further proceedings. Thus, this Court has at least implicitly acknowledged that this issue can be raised in a motion for postcon-viction relief.
Accordingly, we quash the decision below that cited Moody as authority. We remand for further proceedings consistent with our opinion in Hudson.
It is so ordered.
KOGAN, C.J., and OVERTON, SHAW, ANSTEAD and PARIENTE, JJ., concur.
WELLS, J., dissents with an opinion.