Case Name: GENERAL AGENTS INSURANCE COMPANY OF AMERICA v. PEOPLE'S BANK & TRUST COMPANY, Administrator of the Estate of Jerry Gray, Deceased; Bob Dimango; and Dynamic Enterprises, Inc., d/b/a Car Mart
Court: Arkansas Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Arkansas
Decision Date: 1993-06-02
Citations: 42 Ark. App. 95
Docket Number: CA 92-565
Parties: GENERAL AGENTS INSURANCE COMPANY OF AMERICA v. PEOPLE’S BANK & TRUST COMPANY, Administrator of the Estate of Jerry Gray, Deceased; Bob Dimango; and Dynamic Enterprises, Inc., d/b/a Car Mart
Judges: Cooper and Robbins, JJ., agree.
Reporter: Arkansas Appellate Reports
Volume: 42
Pages: 95–96

Head Matter:
GENERAL AGENTS INSURANCE COMPANY OF AMERICA v. PEOPLE’S BANK & TRUST COMPANY, Administrator of the Estate of Jerry Gray, Deceased; Bob Dimango; and Dynamic Enterprises, Inc., d/b/a Car Mart
CA 92-565
854 S.W.2d 368
Court of Appeals of Arkansas Division II
Opinion delivered June 2, 1993
Laser, Sharp, Mayes, Wilson, Bufford & Watts, P.A., by: Jacob Sharp, Jr., and Brian Allen Brown, for appellant.
Blair & Stroud, by: H. David Blair, for appellees.

Opinion:
John E. Jennings, Chief Judge.
Dynamic Enterprises, Inc., owns and operates a chain of used car sales lots which do business under the name of Car Mart. Bob Dimango was the manager of the Car Mart location in Batesville. Appellant, General Agents Insurance Company of America, was the garage liability insurance carrier for Car Mart.
On October 3,1986, Dimango left work in a car he selected from those on the lot. There is no dispute that Dimango was allowed to drive whatever vehicle he wanted that was on the lot and that he drove different vehicles from time to time. He and a friend, Jerry Gray, went to a bar that night and while returning home they had a wreck and Mr. Gray was killed.
In denying coverage the appellant relied on a provision of the policy excluding "those automobiles . . . furnished for the regular use of. . . employees[.]" While appellant concedes that the particular automobile Dimango was driving at the time of the accident was not regularly used by him, it argues, in effect, that all of the cars on the lot were furnished for Dimango's regular use because of Car Mart's policy permitting him to drive any one he chose. The trial court held to the contrary and we find no error.
We certainly agree with the general principles appellant states: when the contract is clear, it must be interpreted in accordance with the plain meaning of its words; a word should be given its obvious meaning; and insurance coverage should not be extended to cover a risk for which a premium has not been collected. On the other hand, we think the trial court was entirely correct in holding that the automobile involved in the accident was not one "furnished for the regular use of' Mr. Dimango. It has been held that "regular use" means "principal use as distinguished from a casual or incidental use." See Tillotson v. Farmers Ins. Co., 276 Ark. 450, 637 S.W.2d 541 (1982).
In the case at bar, Mr. Dimango regularly used vehicles off the lot for his nonbusiness purposes. He did not, however, as even the appellant concedes, use the vehicle involved in the accident on a regular basis. Nor was it furnished to him for his regular use. Given the undisputed facts in this case, we agree with the trial court's conclusion.
Affirmed.
Cooper and Robbins, JJ., agree.