Case Name: LAMB v. STATE
Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1914-06-26
Citations: 169 S.W. 1158
Docket Number: No. 3204
Parties: LAMB v. STATE.
Judges: 
Reporter: South Western Reporter
Volume: 169
Pages: 1158–1164

Head Matter:
LAMB v. STATE.
(No. 3204.)
(Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
June 26, 1914.
On Motion for Rehearing, Oct. 28, 1914.)
1. Criminal Law (§ 1091 ) — Appeal—Bill of Exceptions — Rulings on Evidence.
A bill of exceptions in a murder case alleged that, the widow of deceased was called by the state and asked if, before defendant killed deceased, during her husband’s entire lifetime, she ever heard him make any threat against defendant, and answered that she had not, to which defendant objected as an attempt to prove deceased’s character, because it related to a purported statement by deceased long prior to the killing, and because defendant did not rely on threats as a provocation. The court overruled the objection, and defendant then and there excepted and tendered his bill, which was approved, signed, and ordered filed. Held., that the bill was too meager and insufficient to require review.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 2803, 2815, 2816, 2818, 2819, 2823, 2824, 2828-2833, 2843, 2931-2933, 2943; Dec. Dig. § 1091. ]
2. Homicide (§ 158 ) — Evidence—Threats.
Where, in a prosecution for homicide, accused on cross-examination of a state’s witness sought to show intense hostility by deceased against him which had continued for a considerable time, the state, was properly permitted to ask deceased’s widow if she ever heard her husband, during his entire lifetime, make a threat of any kind against defendant.
TEd. Note. — For other cases, see Homicide, Cent. Dig. §§ 293-296; Dec. Dig. § 158. ]
3. Criminal Law (§ 363 ) — Res Gestae.
In a prosecution for homicide, evidence as to what was said and done by defendant and deceased from the time they first came in view of each other at the time of the killing, that defendant when leaving the scene immediately thereafter had six-shooters in each hand, and when the constable attempted to arrest him resisted arrest and shot the constable, was admissible as res gestae.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. § 804; Dec. Dig. § 363. ]
4. Criminal Law (§ 396 ) — Reception of Evidence — Rebuttal.
Where accused, on cross-examination of a state’s witness, sought to show intense hostility by decedent toward him, and various acts of un kindness, the state was properly permitted to Show that deceased had no ill will toward defendant, and that the alleged acts of hostility never occurred. ,
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent Dig. §§ 861, 862; Dec. Dig. §396. ]
5. Homicide (§ 309 ) — “Manslaughter” — Adequate Cause.
Where in a prosecution for homicide there was no evidence suggesting adequate cause, manslaughter was not in the case.
[Ed. Note. — For other eases, see Homicide, Cent. Dig. §§ 649, 650, 652-655; Dec. Dig. § 309. ]
6. Homicide (§ 295 ) — Provoking Difficulty — Evidence.
In a prosecution for homicide, evidence held to justify an instruction on provoking difficulty by defendant to kill deceased.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Homicide, Cent. Dig. §§ 606-609; Dec. Dig. § 295. ]
On Motion for Rehearing.
7. Criminal Law (§ 866 ) — Triai>-Quotient Verdict.
In a prosecution for homicide, evidence held to require a finding that the jury, though having arrived at the term of punishment by the quotient method, had not agreed to be bound thereby, and hence that the verdict was not void for that reason.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. § 2063; Dec. Dig. § 866. ]
8. Homicide (§ 43 ) — “Manslaughter”—Elements.
“Manslaughter” necessarily involves adequate cause and- existing passion, and if they do not coexist such offense is not shown.
• [Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Homicide, Cent. Dig. § 67; Dec. Dig. § 43.
For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, Manslaughter.]
9. Homicide (§ 43 ) — Manslaughter—“Influence of Sudden Passion.”
“Influence of sudden passion” means that the provocation must arise at the time of the commission of the offense, that the passion Is not the result of a former provocation, and that the act must be directly caused by the passion arising out of the- provocation.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Homicide, Cent. Dig. § 67; Dec. Dig. § 43.
For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, Second Series, Immediate Influence.)
10. Homicide (§ 43 ) — Manslaughter—“Adequate Cause.”
By “adequate cause” is meant such as would commonly produce a degree of such passion or emotion in a person of ordinary temper as would be, sufficient to render the mind incapable of cool reflection.
' [Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Homicide, Cent. Dig. § 67; Dec. Dig. § 43.
For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, Adequate Cause.]
11. Homicide (§ 250 ) — Degree of Offense —Manslaughter—Adequate Cause.
In a prosecution for homicide, evidence held to show that deceased did nothing at the time of the killing except to try to protect himself from his assailant, and was therefore insufficient to produce adequate cause so as to reduce the killing to manslaughter.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Homicide, Cent. Dig. §§ 515-517; Dec. Dig. § 250. ]
Appeal from District Court, Tarrant County; James W. Swayne, Judge.
John Lamb was convicted of murder, and he appeals.
Affirmed.
Mays & Mays and Lattimore,' Cummings, Doyle & Bouldin, all of Ft. Worth, for appellant. C. E. Lane, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.
For other cases see same topic and section NUMBER in Dec. Dig. & Am. Dig. Key-No. Series & Rep’r Indexes
For other cases'see same topic and section NUMBER in Dec. Dig. & Am. Dig. Key-No. Series &-Rep’r Indexes

Opinion:
PRENDERGAST, P. J.
Appellant was convicted of murder and his punishment assessed at 30 years in the penitentiary. This is a companion case of the same appellant, recently decided. 168 S. W. 534.
Appellant complains that a new trial should have been granted because, in effect, the jury arrived at its verdict by lot; that is, a quotient verdict. The court heard evidence on this issue which is shown by one of appellant's bills. Mr. Branch, in his Criminal Law (section 844, subd. 2) says:
"If jurors take the average as a means of securing an expression as to their views in respect to the punishment (making an experiment), and with no agreement in advance to be bound by the result, 'or if agreement is broken, the court's finding of no error will not be disturbed on appeal. Leverett, 3 Tex. App. 217; Cravens, 55 Tex. Cr. R. 521, 117 S. W. 156 [16 Ann. Cas. 907]; Goodman, 49 Tex. Cr. R. 191, 91 S. W. 795; Keith, 56 S. W. 629; Pruitt, 30 Tex. App. 159, 16 S. W. 773; Barton, 34 Tex. Cr. R. 613, 31 S. W. 671; Hill, 43 Tex. Cr. R. 586, 67 S. W. 506."
The trial judge was justified in holding, as he did, that the verdict in this case was not an illegal one under this line of authorities.
Appellant has several bills of exceptions to the admission of certain testimony. We will give it first on this subject in full. Omitting the number, style of the case, and the court below, it is:
"Be it remembered that upon the trial of the above styled and numbered cause Mrs. John Guest, widow of deceased, was called to the stand by the state and was asked if, prior to the time that defendant killed John Guest, during her husband's entire lifetime, she ever heard him make any threat of any kind or of any character whatever against John Lamb, and answered that she did riot. To this the defendant objected as an attempt to prove the character of the deceased; because it relates to a purported statement by deceased long prior to the killing, and because defendant does not rely upon any threats as a provocation for the killing. The court overruled the objection, and defendant then and there excepted, and now tenders this his bill of exception and asks that same be approved, ordered filed, and made a part of the record herein; which is accordingly' done.
"Approved Apr. 1st A. D. 1914.
"Jas. W. Swayne, Judge 17th District Court, "Tarrant County, Texas."
Clearly, under the rules established by the Supreme Court when it had criminal jurisdiction and by this court upon its organization, in accordance with the statute, this bill is so meager and insufficient as to neither require nor authorize this court to consider the question sought to be raised. James v. State, 63 Tex. Cr. R. 75, 138 S. W. 612; Conger v. State, 63 Tex. Cr. R. 326, 140 S. W. 1112; sections 857 and 1123, White's Ann. C. C. P.; Best v. State, 164 S. W. 996.
However, we have considered the admissibility of the evidence attempted to be raised by all of his bills, and in our opinion the evidence was properly admitted.
The evidence objected to by these various bills is along these lines:
First. As to what was said and done by appellant and by deceased from the time they first came in view of each other at which time the killing occurred, and that the appellant when leaving the scene of the killing immediately after it had two six-shooters, one in each hand, and when the constable attempted to arrest him for killing deceased he resisted arrest and shot the constable. All this testimony, we think, was clearly admissible as res gestas. Girtman v. State, 164 S. W. 1010, and cases cited; Washington v. State, 19 Tex. App. 521, 53 Am. Rep. 387; Wiseman v. State, 32 Tex. Cr. R. 454, 24 S. W. 413; Koller v. State, 36 Tex. Cr. R. 496, 38 S. W. 44; Means v. State, 10 Tex. App. 16, 38 Am. Rep. 640; Cox v. State, 8 Tex. App. 254, 34 Am. Rep. 746; Johnson v. State, 30 Tex. App. 420, 17 S. W. 1070, 28 Am. St. Rep. 930; Tooney v. State, 8 Tex. App. 452; Elmore v. State, 78 S. W. 520; Stanley v. State, 44 S. W. 519; Ency. of Ev. p. 615; Renn v. State, 64 Tex. Cr. R. 639, 143 S. W. 168.
Second. Appellant by his cross-examination of the state's witnesses — he introduced none — attempted to show an intense hostility by deceased against him which had continued for quite a length of time, .so much so as to estrange his mother and sister with whom he lived from him, and they sought protection by leaving his home and going to deceased's and that deceased in effect denied him access to his mother and sister; that deceased carried arms — guns—for the purpose of killing him and deceased was seeking to kill him and have others to do so, all growing out of what he claimed was the deceased's attempt to control the property and prevent his mother from dividing hers with him and turning it over to him. We do not attempt to give the particulars of these matters, nor any of them in detail. The state undertook to meet appellant's contentions and the evidence brought out by him along this line by having various witnesses testify of their own knowledge that the deceased had no ill will against appellant and, in effect, denying all of appellant's claimed acts of hostility and claimed intentions and plans to kill him. When he raised these questions, and by his examination of the witnesses on cross-examination introduced evidence tending to support his contentions, the state had a right to meet it by the proof it introduced to show the contrary.
Manslaughter was not in the case. There is no evidence whatever even suggesting adequate cause. • . I
Appellant objected to the court submitting provoking a difficulty, at all, and made many objections to the charge itself. From a careful study of the evidence we believe provoking a-difficulty by appellant for the purpose of killing the deceased was raised by the evidence and the court correctly submitted it. None of appellant's objections to the court's charge in this respect show any reversible error.
The court did not err in overruling appellant's motion to quash the indictment.' The grounds of the attack of the indictment in this case we regard as more than ordinarily hypercritical. One objection is wherein in the indictment it is alleged that appellant killed the deceased with malice "aforethought" the "t" at the end of the word was omitted. Taking the indictment as a whole, there can be no question but that the leaving off of the "t" in the spelling of said word could in no possible way have misled appellant nor be fatal to the indictment.
We have given this case careful investigation and study, and in our ppinion no reversible error is pointed out.
The judgment is affirmed.