Case Name: RAINES v. STATE
Court: Florida Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1953-03-31
Citations: 65 So. 2d 558
Docket Number: 
Parties: RAINES v. STATE.
Judges: ROBERTS, ’ C. J., and HOBSON and DREW, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 65
Pages: 558–564

Head Matter:
RAINES v. STATE.
Supreme Court of Florida, en Banc.
March 31, 1953.
Rehearing Denied June 2, 1953.
William C. Pierce and Manuel M. Garcia, Tampa, for appellant.
Richard W. Ervin, Atty. Gen., and Leonard Pepper, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

Opinion:
TERRELL, Justice.
Appellant and V. R. Selph were tried for bribery on an information in three counts. The first count charged appellant with exacting a bribe of $500 from Tracy Phillip to issue him a license to practice barbering in Florida. The second count charged that appellant accepted the bribe. The third count charged appellant and Selph jointly with exacting and accepting the bribe. Appellant was convicted on counts one and two and Selph was acquitted. Appellant was sentenced to a term of five years in the state penitentiary. We are confronted with an appeal from that judgment. .
It is first contended that the trial court committed error in recessing the Court, sending the jury home for the night about 6:30 P.M., and ordering it to reassemble the next morning at 9:30 A.M. to continue its deliberations.
The record discloses that the case had been fully submitted to the jury and that it had been deliberating for more than one and one-half hours without reaching a verdict when the recess was taken. It was taken without consent of or objection on the part of counsel and the jury went home for the night without any instructions or the protection of a bailiff. They were out for fifteen hours, resumed deliberations, found defendant guilty, and acquitted his co-defendant.
Section 919.01(1), F.S.A., provides in effect that after the jury is sworn it shall sit together, hear the proofs against the accused and that it shall be kept together in some convenient place till it agrees on a verdict or is discharged. Section 919.02, F.S.A., provides for separation of the jury for a definite -period. Section 920.05, F.S. A., details grounds for new trial, and Section 924.33, F.S.A., provides that no judgment shall be reversed for error unless it is shown to have injuriously affected the substantial rights of the appellant. It further provides that error affecting substantial rights shall not be presumed.
The state contends that when read together these statutes permit separation of the jury and that when done a new trial will not be granted unless substantial rights of defendant have been affected and that defendant having failed to object when the jury was recessed for the night, waived his right to object at this time. The following cases are relied on to support this contention. Lucas v. United States, 8 Cir., 275 F. 405; State v. Dugan, 52 Kan. 23, 34 P. 409; State v. McNeil, 59 Kan. 599, 53 P. 876; Farris v. State, 74 Tex.Cr.R. 607, 170 S.W. 310; Fowler v. Commonwealth, 260 Ky. 433, 86 S.W.2d 148.
The record does not show that appellant raised any objection whatever to the order of the Court permitting the jury to separate and go to their homes for the night. In the last cited case the Kentucky Court held that no objection having been made at the time, appellant waived his right to object and could not raise it the first time on motion for new trial. The following cases support this view: Sharp v. People, 90 Colo. 356, 9 P.2d 483; Williams v. State, 27 Ala.App. 293, 171 So. 386; Martin v. State, 92 Okl.Cr. 182, 222 P.2d 534.
Whether or not separation of the jury for the night without instruction as to communicating with others and without the protection of bailiff was error, turns on the interpretation of the governing statutes cited in the forepart of this opinion. There was no objection raised when the jury was dispersed, nor were counsel consulted. There is no showing: in the way of evidence that defendant's rights were prejudiced but trials should not be conducted in a way that defendant has ' good reason for the belief that he was deprived of fundamental rights. The opportunity was open for tampering with the jury and the temptation to do so was such that we are not convinced that'the appellant's trial was conducted with that degree of fairness and security that the hill of rights contemplates. A fifteen hours absence under no restraint whatever leaves too much room to question the bona fides of everything that took place during that time, particularly when one defendant was acquitted and the other was convicted on the same charge and evidence. It imposes too great a burden on defendant to produce evidence of prejudice to his rights under such circumstances. We think this error calls for reversal.
It is next contended that appellant, being a member of the State Barber Board, with two others, was without authority to issue a license to practice the business of a barber,1 and being so, he could not legally be convicted of a charge that he was powerless to commit.
The rule seems to be well settled that an officer cannot be charged and convicted of an act that is entirely outside the scope of his legal duties. This court is committed to the doctrine that any one who corruptly offers, gives, or receives anything of value to influence the receiver's official action, is guilty of bribery. Richards v. State, 144 Fla. 177, 197 So. 772; State v. Potts, 78 Iowa 656, 43 N.W. 534, 5 L.R.A. 814; Peo ple v. Jackson, 191 N.Y. 293, 84 N.E. 65, 15 L.R.A.,N.S., 1173; State v. Ellis, 33 N.N.L. 102, 97 Am.Dec. 707; Rembrandt v. United States, 6 Cir., 281 F. 122, certiorari denied 260 U.S. 731, 43 S.Ct. 93, 67 L.Ed. 486; People v. McGarry, 136 Mich. 316, 99 N.W. 147, and many others.
The last cited cases are in harmony with the rule approved in this state with reference to giving or receiving anything of value to influence one's official conduct, so there is no merit to appellant's contention in support of that point.
The judgment appealed from is therefore reversed and a new trial awarded.
Reversed.
ROBERTS, ' C. J., and HOBSON and DREW, JJ., concur.
THOMAS and SEBRING/JJ;, dissent.,
MATHEWS, J., not.participating.