Case Name: PURCELL v. LAURER et al.
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1897-02-09
Citations: 43 N.Y.S. 988
Docket Number: 
Parties: PURCELL v. LAURER et al.
Judges: 
Reporter: West's New York Supplement
Volume: 43
Pages: 988–1003

Head Matter:
PURCELL v. LAURER et al.
(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Fourth Department.
February 9, 1897.)
1. Damages—Efficient Cause—Question for Jury.
It is a question for the jury whether an injury to decedent’s knee and back was the cause of her death, where plaintiff gave evidence that the injuries caused an abscess, from which blood poison resulted, and that the blood poison caused gastritis, from which death ensued; while defendant adduced evidence that the cause of gastritis was malaria, which is taken into the system either through the lungs or stomach, and cannot result from a physical injury. Green, J., dissenting.
2. Same—Death after a Tear and a Day—Presumption.
The common-law presumption in criminal cases that an injury was not the proximate cause of the death because it did not occur within a year and a day after the injury, does not apply to civil cases.
8. Same—Excessive Judgment—Death by Wrongful Act.
A verdict for $3,000 for the death of plaintiffs daughter is not excessive where plaintiff was 82 years old at the time of the death, was entirely dependent on decedent for support, and was in good health, likely to live for a long time.
The action was to recover damages for the negligence of the defendants in causing the death of Mary G. Wooster, deceased, a resident of the city of Rochester, which occurred March 11, 1895. The injury complained of she received on the 23d day of October, 1893, while she was going along a sidewalk in that city, in the evening, by tripping over a cable wire drawn across the walk, which was used as a guard to support the defendants’ derrick while they were constructing a bridge. The cable was about two inches above the sidewalk. The deceased was a large, heavy woman, weighing about 180 pounds, and was carrying a number of bundles in her arms. She fell to the sidewalk, greatly injuring her right knee, and, to some extent, her left one, and the evidence tended to show that in the fall, or in the wrench given by it to her body, she seriously injured her spine. She was taken to her home, and there was evidence tending to show that the knee-cap of the left limb was injured; that swelling and inflammation resulted from the injury; that the accident caused a great shock to her nervous system; that she was compelled to employ a physician and a nurse, and received treatment almost continuously for the injury, until the time of her death; that an abscess was formed, and a suppuration created under her knee; that evidence of blood poisoning occurred; that she gradually grew weaker and thinner from the time of her injury until her death; that at times she had symptoms of fever, which appeared to be recurrent or intermittent, and the physician in charge, who seemed to have been an experienced and capable one, attributed her death to the original injury and shock caused by the accident. The deceased was a remarkably vigorous and healthy woman before the injury, about 60 years of age, and with great powers of resistance as against disease. She was a widow. Her husband had been killed in the war for the Union, and she was drawing a pension of about $200 per year, and, in addition thereto, earned considerable as a music teacher. Her next of kin was her father, a gentleman who at the time of the trial was about 82 years of age, but a man of vigor and good health, and to all appearances likely to live for some time, and almost entirely dependent upon her for his support. She was his housekeeper, took charge of his business and household so far as it pertained to their home, turned her pension in for his support, and seemed indispensable to his comfort and support. The defendants concede that the deceased was not at fault as to the injury, and that there was evidence upon which she might have recovered against the defendants for the injury which she sustained, if she had brought the action herself. Nor do they question but what the defendants were negligent in the matter; indeed, it appears they were grossly negligent. But the defendants do claim that as a matter of law it did not appear that the injury and her, death were so connected as to render the defendants liable to her executor after her death; and the defendants upon this appeal made four points: First, that upon the whole evidence the injury was not the proximate cause of the death, nor -was the death the natural or probable result of the defendants’ wrongful act; second, that there is a conclusive presumption that the injury was not the proximate cause of the death, because it did not occur within a year and a day after the injury; third, that it was shown upon the trial that the origin of the fever that the deceased had was malarial, which comes from matter in the atmosphere, and is an intervening cause of death, and that the court had erred in its charge upon that subject; and, fpurth, that the damages awarded by the jury, of $3,000, are excessive. The defendants’ evidence was principally from physicians testifying as experts, only one of whom had examined the deceased after her injury, and he not the attending physician; and they, upon their direct examinations, advanced the opinion that the fever of which the deceased at times suffered was of a malarial character, indicating the presence of germs of disease, which was an intervening cause, and consequently the death was not attributable to the injury, but to such intervening cause. Their conclusions were much shaken upon their cross-examinations, and it was fairly a question for the jury whether the fever was malarial in its character or coming from pus or impure matter and dead tissue passing into the system, creating local inflammation and what was known as “blood poisoning”; all as a result of the injury to the knee and the other injuries. The immediate cause of the death seems to have been gastritis, being either an acute or chronic inflammation of the stomach.' The plaintiff’s evidence tended to show that this condition was created by causes the direct result of the injury to the knee, the spine, and the shock of the accident; while the defendants’ evidence tended to dispute this proposition.
Appeal from trial term, Monroe county.
Action by James Purcell, as executor oí Mary Gr. Wooster, deceased, against Frederick C. Laurer and others, for death by wrongful act. From a judgment in favor of plaintiff entered on a verdict, and from an order denying a motion for a new trial, defendants appeal. Affirmed.
Argued before HARDIN, P. J., and FOLLETT, ADAMS, GREEN, and WARD, JJ.
George F. Yeoman, for appellants.
George Raines, for respondent.

Opinion:
WARD, J.
The question of fact upon which arises the principal contention of the defendants upon this appeal—as to whether the injury to Mrs. Wooster which resulted from "the defendants' negligence was the proximate cause of her death—was clearly a question for the jury, and was fairly submitted to them by the learned trial court. The plaintiff having established the injury which might be productive of the result claimed, and shown a state of facts that would naturally produce it, if an intervening cause were established, sufficient, as a matter of law, to show another cause of the death, the burden of doing so devolved upon the defendants. A careful examination of the whole evidence in the case satisfies us that this was not done; at least so far accomplished as to justify the trial court in taking the question from the jury.
The fact that the deceased survived the accident a year and four or five months is greatly relied upon by the defendants to justify their position that a presumption has obtained from the lapse of time that some intervening cause, not connected with the accident, caused the death of Mrs. Wooster; and they refer to the common-law "presumption that the injury was not the proximate cause of the death because it did not occur within a year and a day after the injury. This was a rule of the common law in relation to homicide, and does not prevail in this state in criminal cases, and has no application to civil cases. Schlichting's Admix v. Wintgen, 25 Hun, 626. That was an action to recover damages for the negligent killing of a person who died a year and seventeen days after the injury. And see, also, Sias v. Railway Co., 92 Hun, 140, 36 N. Y. Supp. 378. But this lapse of time was a circumstance to be submitted to the jury in connection with the other evidence in the case.
The appellants' counsel relies principally upon Scheffer v. Railroad Co., 105 U. S., 249, which was a railway collision case, where •a passenger was injured, and afterwards became disordered in mind and body, and some eight months after the accident committed suicide. In an action by his representatives to recover damages for his death it was held that the proximate cause of his death was the suicide, and not the injury received by the deceased. It did not seem susceptible of clear proof that the injury caused the suicide. Whether it did or not was necessarily a matter of conjecture. Could it have been fairly shown that the suicide would not have occurred but for the injury, a different case would have been presented. But the court in that case recognized the rule to be that ordinarily in such cases the liability of the defendant is a question for the jury, and cite with approval Railway Co. v. Kellogg, 94 U. S. 469, which was a fire case, where the sparks from a" steam ferryboat had, through the negligence of its owner (the defendants), set fire to an •elevator. The sparks from the elevator had set fire to the plaintiff's sawmill and lumber yards, which were three or four hundred feet from the elevator. The court was requested to charge the jury that the injuries sustained by the plaintiff were too remote from the negligence to afford a ground for a recovery. This the court refused, but submitted to the jury to find whether the burning of the mill and lumber was the result reasonably to be expected from the burning of the elevator; whether it was the result which, under the circumstances, would not naturally follow from the burning of the elevator; and whether it was the result of the continued effect of the sparks from the steamboat, without the aid of other causes not reasonably to be expected.
In Ehrgott v. Mayor, etc., 96 N. Y. 264, where the plaintiff drove into a ditch in the street, his horses jumped, the axle of his carriage was broken, and he was dragged partly over the dashboard. He procured another carriage. The matter was reported to the police, and the plaintiff drove several miles to his home, which took several hours, and during which time he was exposed to the cold rain, and his clothes became saturated with water. The plaintiff's evidence tended to show that the injuries which resulted were caused by the strain and shock of the accident, and the defendant gave evidence tending to show that the diseases were the result of the subsequent exposure to the cold rain. The trial court charged that, whether his injuries resulted from the strain and shock or from the exposure after the accident, the defendant was still responsible for the injuries from which the plaintiff was suffering. Upon appeal the court of •appeals sustained this charge, and the opinion of Judge Earl in the case tends to sustain the conclusions here reached.
Reference may also profitably be had to Pollett v. Long, 56 N. Y. 200; Sauter v. Railroad Co., 66 N. Y. 50; Mitchell v. Railroad Co., 4 Misc. Rep. 575, 25 N. Y. Supp. 744; Leonard v. Telegraph Co., 41 N. Y. 544; Perley v. Railroad Co., 98 Mass. 414; Jucker v. Railroad Co., 52 Wis. 150, 8 N. W. 862; Delie v. Railroad Co., 51 Wis. 400, 8 N. W. 265; Railroad Co. v. Kemp, 61 Md. 74; Williams v. Vanderbilt, 28 N. Y. 217.
The appellants complain of the charge of the court to the effect •that if the injuries caused the abscess, and the abscess blood poison, and the blood poison caused the gastritis from' which Mrs. Wooster died, the plaintiff might recover. The whole charge must be taken together. The court did charge that unless the death was the probable and natural result of the injury, there could be no recovery. Also that unless the gastritis was the natural and probable result of the fall, there could be no recovery. - Also that they could- not find for the plaintiff unless they could say as a matter of reason, and not conjecture, that the fall was the proximate cause of death; and the court added: "There must not be a link missing. You must find the chain complete. For instance, the injury which she received caused the abscess, the abscess the blood poison, and the blood poison the gastritis with which she died." The matter excepted to was rather by way of illtistration. The trend of the cases, both civil and criminal, is in the direction that, so long and so far as the ultimate result can be traced directly to the first great cause, though through successive stages, the responsibility rests with the one who put in operation the chain of events which wronged or injured the plaintiff. Particularly is this so in cases of this character. We find no reversible error in the charge, or in the exceptions taken thereto, oiHo the refusals to charge.
• The jury awarded a verdict to the plaintiff of $3,000. The plaintiff, the next of kin, was before them. They could judge from his appearance something as to the years that should be allotted to him in the future. They found a penniless and dependent old man, whose span of life might be stretched out a decade. The only child upon whom he could depend for his support in his old age, and who was comfortably supporting him at the time she was injured, had been taken away from him by the negligence of the defendants, as the jury found. We cannot say from this evidence that this verdict was so excessive as to justify us in reversing it for that reason.
The judgment and order should be affirmed, with costs. All concur, except GREEN, J., dissenting.