Case Name: AUTO-OWNERS INSURANCE COMPANY v. REED et al.
Court: Court of Appeals of Georgia
Jurisdiction: Georgia
Decision Date: 2007-07-16
Citations: 286 Ga. App. 603
Docket Number: A07A0338
Parties: AUTO-OWNERS INSURANCE COMPANY v. REED et al.
Judges: Blackburn, P. J., Phipps, Mikell and Adams, JJ., concur. Johnson, P. J., and Ellington, J., dissent.
Reporter: Georgia Appeals Reports
Volume: 286
Pages: 603–615

Head Matter:
A07A0338.
AUTO-OWNERS INSURANCE COMPANY v. REED et al.
(649 SE2d 843)

Opinion:
Andrews, Presiding Judge.
Auto-Owners Insurance Company filed this declaratory judgment action contending that Lessie Reed's claim of carbon monoxide poisoning against her landlord, C. Melvin Waldrop, is excluded from coverage under Waldrop's commercial general liability ("CGL") policy. The trial court denied Auto-Owners' motion for summary judgment and we granted Auto-Owners' application for interlocutory appeal. For the reasons that follow, we reverse.
Summary judgment is proper when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. OCGA § 9-11-56 (c). We apply a de novo standard of review and view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. Matjoulis v. Integon Gen. Ins. Corp., 226 Ga. App. 459 (1) (486 SE2d 684) (1997).
So viewed, the record shows that Auto-Owners issued a CGL policy to Waldrop with an applicable policy period of January 12,2002 through January 12, 2003. Reed filed a complaint alleging that on December 27, 2002, she suffered carbon monoxide poisoning inside the home she rented from Waldrop as a result of his failure to keep the premises in repair and free from defects. After Waldrop provided notice of the claim to Auto-Owners, the insurer began defending Waldrop under a reservation of rights.
Waldrop's policy provided in pertinent part:
We will pay those sums that the insured becomes legally obligated to pay as damages because of "bodily injury" or "property damage" to which this insurance applies. . . .
2. Exclusions.
This insurance does not apply to: . . .
(1) "Bodily injury" or "property damage" arising out of the actual, alleged or threatened discharge, dispersal, seepage, migration, release or escape of pollutants:
(a) At or from any premises, site or location which is or was at any time owned or occupied by, or rented or loaned to, any insured. . . .
Pollutants means any solid, liquid, gaseous or thermal irritant or contaminant, including smoke, vapor, soot, fumes, acids, alkalis, chemicals and waste. Waste includes materials to be recycled, reconditioned or reclaimed.
Auto-Owners contends that the damages Reed seeks are excluded under the unambiguous terms of Waldrop's policy because Reed's claim satisfies all of the following conditions: (1) she alleges that her damages arose from the discharge, dispersal, or release of carbon monoxide; (2) she alleges that the discharge, dispersal, or release of carbon monoxide occurred at property Waldrop owned; and (3) carbon monoxide is a pollutant as defined in the policy.
Reed and Waldrop conceded that the first two conditions were satisfied. They argued below and now on appeal that the breadth of the definition of "pollutants" renders the pollution exclusion ambiguous.
The trial court, without explanation, denied Auto-Owners' motion for summary judgment. This appeal followed.
The words used in policies of insurance, as in all other contracts, bear their usual and common significance, and policies of insurance are, as in all other contracts, to be construed in their ordinary meaning. An unambiguous policy, as here, requires no construction, and its plain terms must be given full effect even though they are beneficial to an insurer and detrimental to the insured. The natural, obvious meaning of a policy provision is to be preferred over any curious, hidden meaning which nothing but the exigency of a hard case and the ingenuity of a trained and acute mind would discover.
(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Truitt Oil & Gas Co. v. Ranger Ins. Co., 231 Ga. App. 89, 90 (498 SE2d 572) (1998).
The policy in this case excludes coverage for damages resulting from the "discharge, dispersal, seepage, migration, release or escape of pollutants" defined as "any solid, liquid, gaseous or thermal irritant or contaminant," including "fumes." Reed's claim is that she has been injured by the discharge of carbon monoxide at the insured property. There is no dispute that carbon monoxide is a fume and a gaseous irritant or contaminant. Therefore, it falls clearly within the policy exclusion.
Although, as the dissent discusses, there are some states that have found to the contrary, this issue has already been decided in Georgia and therefore other state's case law is not persuasive. In American States Ins. Co. v. Zippro Constr. Co., 216 Ga. App. 499 (455 SE2d 133) (1995), the home became contaminated after asbestos fibers in the kitchen flooring were released into the air. The construction company that sanded the floors, thereby causing the asbestos to be released into the home, was insured by a policy with a "pollution exclusion" provision identical to the one in this case. The court held that "[t]here is little question that asbestos constitutes a pollutant as unambiguously defined in the exclusion." Id. at 501.
The asbestos in the American States case was not an environmental pollutant; it was completely contained inside the house and is indistinguishable from the carbon monoxide in this case. Accordingly, we are bound by that holding. See also Perkins Hardwood Lumber Co. v. Bituminous Cas. Corp., 190 Ga. App. 231, 232 (378 SE2d 407) (1989) (no ambiguity as to scope of pollution exclusion); Truitt Oil & Gas, supra at 90-91 (pollution exclusion in insurance policy is not ambiguous).
Because there is Georgia law on point, we need not look to other state's case law; however, as the dissent points out, there are numerous jurisdictions which agree with the holding in American States. See, e.g., Matcon Diamond, Inc. v. Penn. Nat. Ins. Co., 815 A2d 1109 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003) (carbon monoxide fumes released inside store were pollutant for purposes of pollution exclusion in insurance policy); Deni Assoc. of Florida v. State Farm Fire &c. Ins. Co., 711 S2d 1135 (Fla. 1998) (pollution exclusion is unambiguous and does not apply only to environmental pollutants); Bernhardt v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 648 A2d 1047 (Md. App. 1994) (pollution exclusion applies to claim for injury due to carbon monoxide in building); League of Minn. Cities Ins. Trust v. City of Coon Rapids, 446 NW2d 419 (Minn. App. 1989) (coverage was properly denied under pollution exclusion provision after nitrogen dioxide was released into ice arena from Zamboni); Assicurazioni Generali, S.p.A. v. Neil, 160 F3d 997, 1006 (4th Cir. 1998) (pollution exclusion barred coverage for injury to hotel guests after release of carbon monoxide); Reliance Ins. Co. v. Moessner, 121 F3d 895, 901 (3d Cir. 1997) (carbon monoxide poisoning fell under the pollution exclusion); Longaberger Co. v. U. S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 31 FSupp.2d 595, 603 (S.D. Ohio 1998) (carbon monoxide released into home from furnace was a pollutant and came under pollution exclusion in policy); West American Ins. Co. v. Band & Desenberg, 925 FSupp. 758 (M.D. Fla. 1996) (rejecting argument that pollution exclusion is ambiguous and holding that the pollution exclusion applied to dispersal of contaminant from building's attic into building's airspace); Essex Ins. Co. v. Tri-Town Corp., 863 FSupp. 38 (D. Mass. 1994) (discharge of carbon monoxide from malfunctioning Zamboni falls within pollution exclusion).
Accordingly, for the reasons discussed above, we conclude that American States controls in this case. The trial court erred in denying Auto-Owners' motion for summary judgment.
Judgment reversed.
Blackburn, P. J., Phipps, Mikell and Adams, JJ., concur. Johnson, P. J., and Ellington, J., dissent.
Reed, relies on Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Ga. Cas. & Surety Co., 256 Ga. App. 458 (568 SE2d 484) (2002), as authority for her argument that the pollution exclusion does not apply in this instance. Kerr-McGee is inapposite; but, to the extent that it is contrary to the above-cited cases, that opinion cannot stand as authority because it is a one-judge opinion with two judges joining in the judgment only and therefore has no precedential value.