Case Name: SAM WARE v. SOUTHERN RAILWAY COMPANY
Court: Supreme Court of North Carolina
Jurisdiction: North Carolina
Decision Date: 1918-05-08
Citations: 175 N.C. 501
Docket Number: 
Parties: SAM WARE v. SOUTHERN RAILWAY COMPANY.
Judges: 
Reporter: North Carolina Reports
Volume: 175
Pages: 501–509

Head Matter:
SAM WARE v. SOUTHERN RAILWAY COMPANY.
(Filed 8 May, 1918.)
Railroads — Negligence—Instructions — Evidence — Proximate Cause — Questions for Jury.
Where the evidence tends to show that the plaintiff, an experienced section hand, ordinarily left a moving handcar of the defendant railroad to turn a switch for it to pass and boarded it again as it was running, under orders of his foreman in charge, and that he was injured under such circumstances by attempting to board the car running 7 or 8 miles an hour, driven at the time by gasoline, and that he was clumsy in doing so on this occasion, the mere fact that he attempted to board the car thus running and that he was ordered by his foreman to turn the switch, does not warrant an instruction to the jury to answer the issue of defendant’s negligence in the affirmative, the question of negligence being for the jury to determine under the circumstances, as well as the question of the proximate cause of the injury.
Clark, C. X, dissenting.
Appeal by defendant from Harding, J., at tbe November Term, 1917, of Guilpobd.
Tbis is an action to recover damages for personal injury.
Tbe plaintiff was a section band in tbe employment of tbe defendant, and was engaged in working upon tbe section near Higb Point under Foreman T. W. Pierce. He bad been engaged in tbis work for more tban two years, and on 27 October, 1917, tbe foreman witb four section bands, including tbe plaintiff, was taking two cars from tbe belt-line which runs around a section of tbe city of Higb Point onto tbe main line which leads from Higb Point to Asbeboro. Tbe foremost of tbe two cars was propelled by a gasoline motor; attached to it in tbe rear was what is known as a “band” or “push car,” which is a.flat platform resting upon two trucks and has no motive power, but is ordinarily propelled by tbe men walking upon tbe tracks and pushing tbe car. in front of them. On tbis occasion, it was attached to and propelled by tbe gasoline car. When tbe cars reached a point near tbe junction between tbe main line and tbe belt line, tbe plaintiff jumped off and went forward to tbe switch in order to change tbe switch so that tbe cars might leave tbe belt line and go upon tbe main line.
Tbe evidence of tbe plaintiff is that tbe cars did not stop, and that as they were passing him tbe foreman directed him to jump on, and that be was injured in attempting to do so; that be bad been jumping off and on about two years in changing tbe switch.
According to tbe plaintiff’s testimony, they were running about six or seven miles an hour.
According to tbe defendant’s testimony, they were running from four to five miles an hour.
His Honor charged tbe jury, among other things, as follows: “If tbe plaintiff has satisfied you by tbe greater weight of tbe evidence that tbis car was going at a dangerous rate of speed for him to get off and on tbe car, six or seven miles an hour, tbe court charges you if defendant, through its section master, ordered tbe plaintiff to get on tbis car, that would be negligence on tbe part of tbe defendant, and you should answer tbe issue 'Tes.’ ”
The defendant excepted. There was a motion for judgment of non-suit, which was overruled, and tbe defendant excepted.
Tbe jury returned tbe following verdict :
1. Was tbe plaintiff injured by tbe negligence of tbe defendant, as alleged? Answer: “Yes.”
2. Did tbe plaintiff contribute to bis injury by bis own negligence, as alleged in tbe answer? Answer: “Yes.”
3. What damage, if any, is tbe plaintiff entitled to recover of the defendant? Answer: “$300.”
. Judgment was entered upon tbe verdict in favor of tbe plaintiff, and tbe defendant appealed.
J ohn A. Barringer for plaintiff.
Wilson & Ferguson for defendant.

Opinion:
AlleN, J.
Tbe ease of Myers v. R. R., 166 N. C., 234, decided by a unanimous Court, is a controlling authority on both questions raised by tbe appeal, sustaining tbe exception to tbe charge and overruling tbe exceptions to tbe refusal to nonsuit tbe plaintiff.
In tbe Myers case tbe plaintiff was injured while attempting to get on a freight train running six or eight miles an hour, in obedience to tbe command of bis superior, and upon appeal a refusal to nonsuit was affirmed.
It also appears from an examination of tbe original record that his Honor charged tbe jury that if. they found from tbe evidence that tbe plaintiff was an employee of tbe defendant ;• that be was directed by his superior to get on tbe moving train; that be attempted to do so in obedience to tbe order 'given him; "that -the train was running at a speed of about seven miles an hour, and that a reasonable man could.have seen that it was dangerous for a man to get on a moving train going that fast"; that be used due care and caution in trying to do so, and was injured, and this was tbe proximate cause of.the injury, it would be tbe duty of tbe jury to answer tbe first issue "Yes."
This charge was excepted to, and tbe exception was relied on in tbe brief, and tbe Court, without discussing each exception separately, says: "We have examined with care tbe exceptions set out in tbe record "to tbe reception and rejection of evidence, and also to tbe charge of tbe court, and we think tbe case was substantially tried-under tbe well-settled principles of law obtaining in this State."
It will be observed that in tbe charge, which has been approved, bis Honor did not determine tbe fact that it was dangerous for an employee to get on a freight train moving seven miles an hour, nor did be declare as matter of law that to direct him to do so was negligence, nor did be instruct tbe jury to answer tbe first issue "Yes" without a finding that the negligence of tbe defendant was tbe proximate cause of bis injury. On' tbe contrary, be left tbe question of danger to tbe jury, under tbe rule of tbe reasonable or prudent man, and incorporated tbe principle of proximate cause as secondary before tbe issue could be answered in favor of tbe plaintiff, while in tbe charge now before us bis Honor declared a speed of six or seven miles an hour to be dangerous and eliminated tbe finding of proximate cause altogether, which is an essential fact involved in tbe first issue.
"The authorities fully sustain the position of the plaintiff, that it is negligence to run a train without a headlight at night along a track frequented by the public, but a plaintiff cannot recover upon proof of negligence alone. lie must go further and prove that the negligence complained of was the cause of his injury. Crenshaw v. R. R., 144 N. C., 314; Pritchett v. R. R., 157 N. C., 101; Henderson v. Traction Co., 132 N. C., 784.
"In the first of these cases the Court said: 'The burden is always on the plaintiff to show by a preponderance of evidence that the defendant committed a negligent act, and that it was the proximate cause of the injury. The two facts must coexist and be established by the clear weight of the evidence before a case of actionable negligence is made out. Brewster v. Elizabeth City, 137 N. C., 392'; in the second: 'In all courts where the common law is administered it is held that one cannot recover damages upon proof of negligence alone, and that he must proceed further and show that the negligence of which he complains was the real proximate cause of the injury'; and in the last: 'It is generally held — and this we regard as the doctiine — that the element of proximate cause must be established, and it will not necessarily be presumed from the fact that a city ordinance or statute has been violated. Negligence, no matter in what it may consist, cannot result in a right of action unless it is the proximate cause of the injury complained of by the plaintiff.' " McNeill v. R. R., 167 N. C., 395.
That the question of proximate cause was material and in controversy is shown by the evidence of the defendant that the plaintiff was injured by his own carelessness, which caused him to stumble and fall on the car, and by the answer of the issue of contributory negligence in favor of the defendant.
There was less reason for submitting to the jury the question of the danger of getting on the moving car in the Myers case than in this, because the plaintiff in this action is an employee of experience who had for two years been jumping off and on the car when in motion without injury, while in the Myers case the injured employee was performing different services, some of them not connected with the operation of trains, and he was told to get on a heavy freight train, and in this on a low gasoline car. The danger was more apparent and the experience and skill of the employee less in the one case than in the other.
It is also recognized in Reeves v. R. R., 151 N. C., 318, that the rule which usually prevents a recovery by one injured while getting on a moving train does not apply in strictness to experienced trainmen, and if to do so cannot be declared to be contributory negligence as matter of law, why should a direction to get on under the same conditions be arbitrarily declared to be negligence, instead of leaving the question to the jury to say whether the officer giving the order was acting as a reasonably prudent man, considering the speed of the train, the experience of the employee and other relevant circumstances?
This seems to us to be the better and safer rule, and it leaves to the jury disputed facts instead of permitting the judge to decide them.
New trial.