Case Name: In Re Estate Of Edward Keyes Davis
Court: Vermont Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Vermont
Decision Date: 1966-03-11
Citations: 125 Vt. 446
Docket Number: 
Parties: In Re Estate Of Edward Keyes Davis
Judges: Present: Holden, C. J., Shangraw, Barney and Keyser, JJ.
Reporter: Vermont Reports
Volume: 125
Pages: 446–452

Head Matter:
In Re Estate Of Edward Keyes Davis
[218 A.2d 390]
February Term, 1966
Present: Holden, C. J., Shangraw, Barney and Keyser, JJ.
Opinion Filed March 11, 1966
Frank L. Bunting for Appellent.
Ryan, Smith & Carbine for Appellee.

Opinion:
Holden C. J.
Joan Davis Steindler, the daughter of the testator, seeks review of the questions of law in the decree of distribution ordered by the probate court for the district of Manchester. The notice of appeal, filed pursuant to 12 V.S.A. §2382, names the Supreme Court as the tribunal to which the appeal is taken. The appeal is challenged at the threshold by a motion to dismiss filed by the executor and co-residuary legatee, Evelyn Woods Davis.
The motion to dismiss presents the single question of the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to review the decree on the direct appeal from the probate court. The appellee contends the right to obtain review of an appealable order of the probate court by direct appeal to this Court was revoked by the repeal of 12 V.S.A. §2552 (V.S. '47 §3086) contained in the final section of No. 261 of the Acts of 1959.
Prior to 1917 the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in probate matters was restricted to causes passed here from the county courts, sitting as higher courts of probate. Holmes v. Estate of Holmes, 21 Vt. 536, 540. The controlling statute was R.S. 44 §27: "The supreme court shall have jurisdiction of all questions of law arising in the course of proceedings of the county court in probate matters as in other cases."
This provision was carried forward through subsequent revisions and was in effect at the time of the enactment of No. 89 of 1917, - An Act to Give the Right of Appeal from Probate Courts to the Supreme Court in Certain Causes. This statute provided: "A person interested in an order, sentence, decree or denial of a probate court involving only a question of law may take an appeal therefrom directly to the supreme court in the manner provided in cases of appeal from the court of chancery."
This enactment performed - two functions. It gave the Supreme Court the power to review and revise decisions of the probate court on questions of law, where previously it could entertain only causes heard by the county court in probate matters. Secondly, it provided the manner in which the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court could attach in such cases, namely, the method provided for appeals in chancery. The jurisdictional and procedural aspects of the statute were integrated in the General Laws in two separate sections.
G.L. §3454, now 12 V.S.A. §2551, was constituted to read: The supreme court shall have jurisdiction of questions of law arising in the course of proceedings of the county and probate courts in probate matters as in other causes. The procedural provisions were made the subject of a new section, G.L. §3451, later 12 V.S.A. §2552, adapting direct appeals from probate court to the manner provided in chancery appeals.
12 V.S.A. §2551 has remained unchanged since 1917 and is in effect today. 12 V.S.A. §2552 was amended in 1941 when the special method of appeal from chancery causes was abolished and the standard procedure for passing causes to the Supreme Court from county court was made applicable. 1941, No. 34; 12 V.S.A. §2433. Abel's Inc. v. Newton, 116 Vt. 272, 273, 74 A.2d 481. Accordingly, 12 V.S.A. §2552 was amended to refer to Section 2433 of the same title.
From 1941 until 1959 a bill of exceptions was the common vehicle for transferring all causes for review by this Court. In 1959 the legislature undertook to simplify outmoded rules of practice and procedure by resort to an adaption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Notice of appeal, substantially as provided in Federal Rule 73, was the method adopted for passing causes for review wherever a right of appeal prevailed. As with its federal antecedent, our statutory rules eliminated the need for exceptions to the rulings of the court of first instance and abolished bills of exception as a means for transferring cases on appeal. 12 V.S.A. §2381-2383. As with its federal counterpart, the intention of rule makers was to expedite appeals and guard against dilatory tactics. The changes produced are entitled to a construction consistent with the accomplishment of this purpose. 3A Barron and Holtzoff, Federal Practice and Procedure, §1551 (Rules Ed.).
The requirement of exceptions and the use of bills of exceptions resulted in numerous cross references to these devices in numerous sections of our statutory law. The abolition of this procedure carried with it varying provisions in some twenty-four sections embraced within Title 12, rendering these provisions outmoded or pure surplus-age. 12 V.S.A. §2433, referred to in §2552, was in this category and became obsolete.
Accordingly, the rule makers concluded the 1959 enactment with a repealing section which removed the inconsistent provisions in conformity with the new enactment. 1959, No. 261, §68. Of the twenty-four sections repealed by this provision, twenty related to exceptions and the transfer of causes under the old procedure of appellate review. Since 12 V.S.A. §2552 was specifically geared to Section 2433 these provisions were excised along with 12 V.S.A. §2421-2424 relating to appeals from county court.
The companion section, 12 V.S.A. §2551, relating to the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in probate matters, was left undisturbed. It remains in its .full context as amended in 1917.
This pattern is in accord with the expressed direction of the legislation which established the commission to formulate rules of practice and procedure for all courts of the state for consideration by the General Assembly of 1959. This enactment provided: "Such rules should be consistent with the constitution of this state, shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right or the jurisdiction of any court;...." 1957, No. 216 §2; 12 V.S.A. §1N. Complying with this directive the commission, which included the presiding officers and chairmen of the judiciary committees of both House and Senate, formulated and proposed rules which neither enlarged nor restricted the jurisdictional power of any court. Recommendations of Commission of Court Rules of Pleading and Practice. January 15, 1959.
That this legislative purpose, first expressed in 1957, attended the 1959 enactment, is further indicated by the fact that other statutes, concerned with direct appeals from probate court, remain intact. 12 V.S.A. §2357; 32 V.S.A. §6892.
Our statutes, like the federal rules from which they were derived, are not to be construed to extent or limit either original or appellate jurisdiction. Neither was designed to affect jurisdiction. They were adopted to prescribe methods by which the jurisdiction of the courts should be exercised. 3A Barron and Holtzoff, Federal Practice and Procedure, supra, §1701 (Rules Ed.).
From these considerations, we conclude the repeal of 12 V.S.A. §2552 was not done with the legislative purpose of depriving an interested litigant in probate court of his right of direct appeal to the Supreme Court on questions of law. Only the method for transferring the question has been changed. Although notice of appeal has replaced the bill of exceptions, the jurisdiction of the Court to review the question, once they have reached us, continues by force of 12 V.S.A. §2551.
This construction is consistent with the manifest object of the new statutory rules. It is in conformity with the construction given the 1959 enactment by the legal profession and the Court since the rules were first adopted. In re Estate of Mattison, 122 Vt. 486, 487, 177 A.2d 230; In re Estate of Valiquette, 122 Vt. 350, 173 A.2d 832; In re Estate of Sharon, 121 Vt. 322, 157 A.2d 475. In the absence of a statutory directive to such effect, we do not interpret the repeal of 12 V.S.A. §2552 as erecting a barrier to a right of appellate review contrary to the established understanding and the objective of the 1959 statutory rules. In re Estate of Gaskell, 123 Vt. 57, 59, 181 A.2d 67; St. Johnsbury v. Topsham, 122 Vt. 268, 271, 169 A. 2d 352. Indeed a repealing clause will be restrained, where necessary, to avoid such a result. Arnett v. State, 168 Ind. 180, 80 N.E. 153, 156; 50 Am.Jur. Statutes. §519. Repealing clauses, like any other statutory provisions, are subject to rules of construction, and legislative intent will prevail over the literal import of the words. Arnett v. State, supra, 80 N.E. at 156.
Accordingly, we hold the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to hear the appeal is conferred by 12 V.S.A. §2551. The cause was pro perly transferred here by notice of appeal as provided in 12 V.S.A. §2382.
The appellee's motion to dismiss the appeal is denied.
Note: The appellee's motion to dismiss the appeal was originally heard at the October Term, 1965. The opinion of the Court which followed was recalled and the entry stricken at the December Term 1965. At the same term the Court, on its own motion, ordered the case brought forward for reargument at the February Term 1966, at which time other appellants, with direct appeals from probate court pending in the Supreme Court, were permitted to file written briefs and present oral arguments. This revised opinion was filed after reargument.