Case Name: W. R. Todd v. The State
Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1921-02-16
Citations: 89 Tex. Crim. 99
Docket Number: No. 5917
Parties: W. R. Todd v. The State.
Judges: 
Reporter: Texas Criminal Reports
Volume: 89
Pages: 99–105

Head Matter:
W. R. Todd v. The State.
No. 5917.
Decided February 16, 1921.
Rehearing denied March 30, 1921.
1. —Intoxicating Liquors—Indictment—Duplicitous Pleading.
Where, upon a trial of a violation of the Dean Liquor Law, the indictment alleged that the defendant did receive, transport, export and deliver and solicit and take orders for and did furnish spirituous, vinous, and intoxicating liquors, etc., a motion to quash on the ground that the indictment was vague and indefinite and failed to particularize the offense charged, and combined in the same count a number of separate and distinct felonies, naming them, should have been sustained, and the prosecution is dismissed.
2. —Same—Rule Stated—Different Offenses—Pleading.
Where offenses are of a distinct nature, neither of them capable of being resolved into the other, it is error to join them in the same count in the indictment, and where in the instant case this was done, the motion to quash should have been sustained. Following Brown v. State, 38 Texas
3. —Same—Rehearing—Pleading—Statutory Offenses.
When the definition of one offense in the statute embraces several ways in which same may be committed, all punishable alike, these several ways may be charged conjunctively in the same count in the indictment, but where, as in the instant case, three separate and distinct felonies are set out in one count in the indictment, the same is duplicitous, and is bad on moton to quash. Following Ferguson v. State, 80 Texas Crim. Rep., 383, and other cases.
4. —Same—Rule Stated.—Duplicitous Pleading—Practice in Trial Court.
While it is decided that an objection to an indictment for duplicity comes too late after conviction, yet none of these decisions have application to the principle involved in the instant case, where the pleader in one count joins three separate and distinct felonies. Overruling Johnson v. State, 75 Texas Crim. Rep., 177.
5. —Same—Statutory Offenses—Indictment.
The contention that to charge in the language of the statutes in the indictment is sufficient, is not always the rule and has no application to the instant case, wherein the pleader attempts to join three separate and distinct offenses in one count.
Appeal from the District Court of McLennan. Tried below before the Honorable Richard I. Munroe.
Appeal from a conviction of a violation of the Dean Liquor Law; penalty, one year imprisonment in the penitentiary.
The opinion states the case.
Herbert Scharff, and John McNamara, and Williams & Williams, for appellant.
Cited Ferguson v. State, 189 S. W. Rep., 271, and cases cited in opinion.
Frank B. Tirey, County Attorney, Frank Fitzpatrick, Assistant County Attorney, and C. M. Cureton, Attorney General, and Alvin M. Owsley and C. L. Stone, Assistant Attorneys General, for the State.
On question of sufficiency of the indictment: Stevens v. State, 150 S. W. Rep., 944; Johnson v. State, 171 id., 211; Smith v. State, 197 id., 589; Morris v. State, 121 id., 1112; Mooneyham v. State, 181 S. W., 456; Armendariz v. State, 194 id., 826.

Opinion:
LATTIMORE, Judge.
Appellant was convicted in the District Court of McLennan County of a violation of the Dean Liquor Law, and his punishment fixed at one year in the penitentiary.
The conviction was had under the second count in the indictment, the charging part of which was as follows: "W. R. Todd did receive, transport, export and deliver and solicit and take orders for and did furnish spirituous, vinous and intoxicating liquors, etc." A motion to quash this count in the indictment upon the ground that it was vague and indefinite, failed to particularize the offense charged and combined in the same count a number of separate and distinct felonies, naming them, was overruled. We are of opinion that said motion was meritorrious. The authorities are not quite clear as to those cases in which offenses of different nature may be charged in the same count, but all of them seem to agree that offenses not involving each other may not be so charged. 2 Wharton Precedent of Indictment and Pleas, page 834, says: "Where offenses are of a distinct nature, neither of them capable of being resolved into the other, it is error to join them in the same count." In the instant case it must be admitted that each of the things mentioned in the said count, to-wit: transporting, exporting, delivering, soliciting, taking orders for, possessing, furnishing,—are separate felonies, and while some of them may involve some of the others, this is not true of all of them. For instance, possession is involved in most of the others, but clearly, transporting and exporting do not involve soliciting; taking orders for, does not involve exporting; receiving does not involve delivering. In Beaumont v. State, 1 Texas Crim. App., 537, it is held that an indictment which produces confusion and uncertainty as to what offense was really intended to be charged, and in one count of which two distinct offenses are charged, is bad. In Brown v. State, 38 Texas Crim. Rep., 597, this court said, "duplicity consists of alleging in one count separate and distinct felonies." In Ferguson v. State, 80 Texas Crim. Rep., 383, 189 S. W. Rep., 271, Judge Prendergast for this court held an indictment bad in which three separate and distinct felonies were set out in one count. In Vernon's C. C. P., Section 17, under Article 481 occurs this statement, supported by many citations. "Duplicity is the joinder of two or more distinct offenses in one count, and if it be such as to produce confusion and uncertainty as to what was intended to be charged it, would vitiate the indictment." Substantially the same rule is announced in Branch's Anno. Penal Code, Section 506. Applying what has been said to the instant indictment it would appear that transporting is a separate and distinct act as well as felony from soliciting; that exporting is likewise separate and distinct from taking orders for; that receiving intoxicating liquors is a separate and distinct act and felony from delivering same; and that charging one with each and all of these acts in one count would necessarily lead to confusion and uncertainty. One accused of crime is presumed innocent, and one office of an indictment is to apprise him of that which he must meet in court as the charge against him. We do not think he could be so informed by the indictment in the instant case.
Believing the indictment fatally defective, we forego discussion of the other questions raised and for said defect the cause will be reversed and dismissed.
Dismissed.