Case Name: GLORIA J. WHYTE et al, Petitioners-Appellees, v. ESTATE OF JOHN E. WHYTE, Deceased, Julie Whyte Jefferson, Adm'r, Respondent-Appellant
Court: Illinois Appellate Court
Jurisdiction: Illinois
Decision Date: 1993-03-31
Citations: 244 Ill. App. 3d 746
Docket Number: No. 1—90—1655
Parties: GLORIA J. WHYTE et al, Petitioners-Appellees, v. ESTATE OF JOHN E. WHYTE, Deceased, Julie Whyte Jefferson, Adm’r, Respondent-Appellant.
Judges: 
Reporter: Illinois Appellate Court Reports, Third Series
Volume: 244
Pages: 746–753

Head Matter:
GLORIA J. WHYTE et al, Petitioners-Appellees, v. ESTATE OF JOHN E. WHYTE, Deceased, Julie Whyte Jefferson, Adm’r, Respondent-Appellant.
First District (3rd Division)
No. 1—90—1655
Opinion filed March 31,1993.
GREIMAN, J., specially concurring.
Betty Burns Paden, of Evanston, for appellant.
O’Brien, O’Rourke, Hogan & McNulty, of Chicago (Michael Gilman, of counsel), for appellees.

Opinion:
PRESIDING JUSTICE TULLY
delivered the opinion of the court:
This case involves a dispute about the validity of decedent John E. Whyte's marriage to his third wife, petitioner Gloria J. Whyte. John was legally divorced from his first two wives, Barbara and Helen, at the time of his marriage to Gloria in Cook County, Illinois. Gloria was first married to William E. McCune in Cook County in December 1961. Gloria and William separated in 1963. In March 1970, Gloria received notice that William had filed for di vorce from her in Bell County, Texas. In a letter from William's attorneys, Gloria was asked to sign and return various documents to them in order to bring about the divorce. Gloria, unrepresented by counsel, executed these documents (an appearance, waiver of notice, and consent to decree) on March 24, 1970, and mailed them to William's lawyers. At this time, Gloria erroneously believed that her execution of these papers alone was all that was necessary to effectuate a divorce from William. However, it was not until November 6, 1970, that the Texas court entered its divorce decree ending the marriage. In the meantime, Gloria, believing herself to be divorced from William, married John in Cook County on August 17, 1970. Gloria and John lived together in Evanston, Illinois, until December 1979, when they separated for four months. They then resumed living with one another until John died on February 24, 1986, without a will, but leaving an estate valued in excess of $120,000. John and Gloria had no children together.
On May 29, 1987, a petition for letters of administration of the estate was filed by John's daughter, respondent Julie Whyte Jefferson, and listed as heirs herself, her brother Steven Whyte, and her half-brother Anye Whyte. On that date, the trial court entered orders appointing Julie the estate's administrator and declaring Julie, Steven, and Anye to be John's sole heirs. However, an amended order was entered on July 1, 1987, declaring Gloria an additional heir as a surviving spouse. On July 27, 1987, the trial court appointed, without objection, Gloria as the independent administrator of the estate.
On November 12, 1987, Gloria petitioned the trial court to vacate the July 27, 1987, order appointing her independent administrator of the estate. In this petition Gloria explained that she had only recently discovered that the Texas divorce decree was not entered until November 6, 1970. Accordingly, she asked the trial court to redetermine the matter. At the same time, Julie repetitioned the trial court to be appointed the estate's administrator. In its orders of that day, the trial court relieved Gloria as independent administrator, deleted her name from the list of heirs as a surviving spouse, and appointed Julie as the estate's independent administrator.
After a two-year series of motions unrelated to the issues presented in this appeal, Gloria petitioned the court on March 10, 1989, to declare her John's surviving spouse and to amend the list of heirs to include her name. After an exhaustive and contested hearing on the matter, the probate court granted Gloria's motion on May 18, 1990. It is from this order that Julie now appeals to this court pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 301 (134 Ill. 2d R. 301).
Gloria's claim of heirship is premised upon section 212(b) of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (the Act) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 40, par. 212(b)) whereby her marriage to decedent allegedly became valid as of the date of her divorce from William.
Section 212 provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
Ҥ212. Prohibited Marriages, (a) The following marriages are prohibited:
(1) a marriage entered into prior to the dissolution of an earlier marriage of one of the parties[.]
(b) Parties to a marriage prohibited under subsection (a) of this Section who cohabit after removal of the impediment are lawfully married as of the date of the removal of the impediment." (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 40, par. 212(b).)
Thus, the trial court ruled that Gloria and John's previously void marriage became lawful under section 212(b) because the impediment of Gloria's previous marriage to William was removed and the couple subsequently cohabitated with each other.
On appeal, Julie first urges that the trial court erred in concluding that there was a marriage between John and Gloria. Specifically, Julie cites error in the trial court's finding that: a marriage ceremony took place between the couple; the marriage license was properly executed; and Gloria's testimony was credible. We disagree.
While a trial court's decision in a case is always subject to review, a court of review may not reweigh the evidence or substitute its judgment for that of the trier of fact simply because it does not agree with the lower court or because it might have reached a different result had it been the trier of fact. A trial judge, as the trier of fact, is in a superior position to that of a reviewing court to observe the demeanor of witnesses while they testify, to judge their credibility, and to measure the weight their testimony should receive. As a result, a court of review will not disturb a trial court's finding absent a conclusion that such finding was against the manifest weight of the evidence. In re Application of County Treasurer (1989), 131 Ill. 2d 541, 546 N.E.2d 506; Zaderaka v. Illinois Human Rights Comm'n (1989), 131 Bl. 2d 172, 545 N.E.2d 684; In re Estate ofSchisler (1980), 81 Ill. App. 3d 280, 401 N.E.2d 301.
After a careful review of the record, we cannot conclude that the trial court's judgment was contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. We perceive no error in the trial court's conclusion that a valid wedding ceremony had occurred and that such ceremony was duly recorded on the marriage license. Although it is true that Gloria's testimony is not free from flaws, we are not of the opinion that it is so incredible or inconsistent that it warrants reversal of this cause. Rather, we believe there was sufficient evidence from which the trial judge could find a factual basis for concluding that a marriage ceremony occurred, the impediment of Gloria's previous marriage to William was removed, and that the couple cohabitated subsequent to Gloria's divorce such that the requisites of section 212(b) were met. Schisler, 81 Ill. App. 3d 280, 401 N.E.2d 301.
Still to be considered is Julie's contention that the estate's heirs were denied due process of law. We feel obliged to point out that the estate's heirs are not parties to this litigation. Rather, this dispute is between the estate, represented by Julie as its independent administrator, and petitioner Gloria. Thus, it logically follows that the heirs could not be denied due process in a proceeding in which they played no part. Consequently, we find this contention is without merit.
In light of the foregoing, the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County is affirmed.
Affirmed.
CERDA, J., concurs.
We note that while the effective date of the Act was October 1, 1977, our review of its legislative history confirms that the General Assembly intended for the Act to have retroactive effect and that there not be a separate body of law governing marriages occurring before its enactment.