Case Name: Joseph PAPA and Pete Papa, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. CITY OF SHREVEPORT and Metropolitan Zoning Board of Appeals, Defendants-Appellants
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1995-09-29
Citations: 661 So. 2d 1100
Docket Number: No. 27045-CA
Parties: Joseph PAPA and Pete Papa, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. CITY OF SHREVEPORT and Metropolitan Zoning Board of Appeals, Defendants-Appellants.
Judges: Before SEXTON, NORRIS, BROWN, WILLIAMS and STEWART, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 661
Pages: 1100–1108

Head Matter:
Joseph PAPA and Pete Papa, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. CITY OF SHREVEPORT and Metropolitan Zoning Board of Appeals, Defendants-Appellants.
No. 27045-CA.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Second Circuit.
Sept. 29, 1995.
Jerald N. Jones, City Attorney of Shreveport by Terri Anderson-Scott, Roland Achée, Shreveport, for Appellant.
Michael H. Wainwright, Shreveport, for Appellee.
Before SEXTON, NORRIS, BROWN, WILLIAMS and STEWART, JJ.

Opinion:
h STEWART, Judge.
The City of Shreveport ("city") and the Metropolitan Zoning Board of Appeals ("ZBA") appeal a judgment of the district court in favor of the plaintiffs, Joseph Papa and Pete Papa, granting a "special exception use" to permit the sale of low-alcoholic content beverages for on-premises consumption at the Papas' deli-restaurant located at 545 East Washington Street in Shreveport. For the reasons that follow, we reverse the judgment of the district court and reinstate the decision of the ZBA.
FACTS
Joseph and Pete Papa ("Papas") own and operate a grocery store located at 545 East Washington Street in Shreveport. The establishment was originally operated as a fried chicken outlet before housing a series of three lounges over a period of fifteen years. The present grocery store has been in operation since 1989. Among other grocery items, the store has a deli counter and also sells beer for off-premises consumption. In 1993, the Papas applied to the ZBA for a special exception use to operate a deli-restaurant with on-premises consumption of beer. Prior to this date, the Papas unsuccessfully attempted to obtain a special exception from the ZBA that would have allowed them to reconvert the property to a lounge for on-premises consumption of all kinds of beverages.
A public hearing was held before the ZBA on the plaintiffs current application on October 6, 1993. Without benefit of testimony and evidence presented at the hearing, the ZBA staff determined that the application was consistent with ZBA Liquor Guidelines regarding commercial locations, zoning, residential property, and off-street parking.
At the hearing, six people spoke in opposition to the Papas' application and thirteen others stood to indicate their opposition. The opponents included the | gMontessori School, the Stoner Hill Action Group, the Anderson Island homeowners, and Reverend Ernest L. Woodson, Pastor of the Macedonia Baptist Church. The board voted unanimously to deny the Papas' application.
The Papas filed an administrative appeal to the Shreveport City Council. When the matter came up for consideration on November 9, 1993, the council permitted Reverend Ernest L. Woodson to read aloud a letter previously sent by him to a council member in opposition to the Papas' appeal. That letter later became apart of the record and all council members were given an opportunity to read it. At the request of one of its members, the council voted to suspend its procedural rules in order to allow Reverend Woodson the opportunity to address the body. Neither of the Papas requested or chose to address the council. The council later voted at the meeting to deny the Papas' appeal.
The Papas then filed a petition in district court to overturn the ZBA and city council decisions. The Papas alleged that they were denied their constitutional rights to due process of law and equal protection of the law. First, they contend they were denied due process by the action of the Shreveport City Council in allowing Reverend Woodson to address the Council on November 9, 1993, without allowing the Papas to respond. Next, they allege they were denied equal protection by the action of the ZBA in approving another application for a special exception use filed by Mary Matassa for the on-premises consumption of beer from a deli-restaurant located at 1327 Captain Shreve Drive in Shreveport, while denying their application. The Papas contend that there is no rational basis for denying their application while approving that of Mary Matassa, and hence, they allege the denial of their application is arbitrary and unreasonable.
13After trial on the merits, the district court rendered judgment in favor of the Papas, holding that the ZBA and city council had violated the Papas equal protection and due process rights and ordered that they be issued a special exception use permit to sell low-alcoholic content beverages on the premises. The trial court found that there were no material factors that formed a basis of reasonable distinction between the Papa application and the Matassa application. The court also found that the Papas' due process rights were violated when the city council allowed the Reverend Woodson to read his letter.
The city and ZBA now appeal the judgment of the district court alleging the following eleven assignments of error:
(1) In finding that the plaintiffs were denied due process of law because the city council permitted Reverend Woodson to read a letter that was already in the record of the appeal from the ZBA to the city council.
(2) In holding that the remedy for an alleged denial of due process is to decide the case on the merits in favor of the person allegedly deprived of due process.
(3) In failing to hold that by not objecting at the time and by not asking for equal time the plaintiffs waived any objection to the reading of Reverend Woodson's letter.
(4) In apparently holding that the ZBA was bound by the assessment of its staff to the effect that the plaintiffs' application was consistent with the ZBA's "Liquor Guidelines."
(5) In finding that the only comment made by ZBA members during the deliberative phase of the hearing was one allegedly attributed to Sara Herrington, the substance of the alleged statement having been that the plaintiffs' application should be denied "due to neighborhood opposition."
(6) In finding that Councilman Keith Hightower thought that the plaintiffs' application was for hard liquor.
(7) In finding that the establishments shown by red dots on P-12 are in close proximity to the plaintiffs' property.
(8) In finding that "No material factor exists that would give rise to a basis of a reasonable distinction between the Papas' application and the Matassa application."
14(9) In holding that the plaintiffs were denied equal protection of the laws.
(10) In substituting its own judgment for that of the ZBA, and in reversing the ZBA and the city council.
(11) In granting the plaintiffs a special exception to sell alcoholic beverages for on-premises consumption at 545 E. Washington Street in Shreveport.
It is unnecessary for us to decide the merits of each of appellants' eleven assignments of error inasmuch as the crucial issue in this case is whether the ZBA acted arbitrarily and unreasonably in denying the Papas' application for a special exception use to sell beer for on-premises consumption. All other issues presented by the appellants' assignments of error are subsumed in this issue, except those pertaining to the question of a due process violation, which we will also address.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A prima facie presumption of validity attaches to zoning board actions. A reviewing court cannot substitute its own judgment; it cannot interfere absent a showing that the Board was arbitrary and capricious or abused its discretion. Clark v. City of Shreveport, 26,638 (La.App. 2 Cir. 5/10/95), 655 So.2d 617, citing Cross v. City of New Orleans, 446 So.2d 1253 (La.App. 4 Cir.1984), writ denied 449 So.2d 1359 (La.1984); Christopher Estates, Inc. v. Parish of East Baton Rouge, 413 So.2d 1336 (La.App. 1 Cir.1982). Generally, the action of a governmental body is arbitrary and capricious and unreasonable if it bears no relation to the health, safety, or general welfare of the public. Clark v. City of Shreveport, supra; Christopher Estates, Inc. v. Parish of East Baton Rouge, supra.
The test of whether an action is arbitrary or capricious is whether the action is reasonable under the circumstances. Clark v. City of Shreveport, supra; Castle Investors v. Jefferson Parish Council, 472 So.2d 152 (La.App. 5th Cir.1985), writ denied 474 So.2d 1311 (La.1985).
| gWhere permits are granted in similar situations and refused in others, the refusal to grant a permit may constitute nonuniform application of zoning ordinances that is arbitrary and unreasonable. Clark v. City of Shreveport, supra; See also Kiser v. Parish of Jefferson, 498 So.2d 115 (La.App. 5 Cir.1986), writ denied 500 So.2d 423 (La. 1987).
A challenge to a zoning decision in Louisiana is a de novo proceeding in which the issue is whether the result of the legislation is arbitrary and capricious, and is therefore a taking of property without due process of law. Palermo Land Co. v. Planning Comm'n of Calcasieu Parish, 561 So.2d 482 (La.1990); Hernandez v. City of Lafayette, 399 So.2d 1179 (La.App. 3 Cir.1981); West-side Lumber & Supply v. Parish of Jefferson, 357 So.2d 1384 (La.App. 4 Cir.1978).
A reviewing court does not consider whether the district court manifestly erred in its findings, but whether the zoning board acted arbitrarily, capriciously or with any calculated or prejudicial lack of discretion. Thus, even when there is no manifest error in the findings of the district court, we are bound to reverse the decision of the trial court and reinstate the decision of the board. Gertler v. City of New Orleans, 346 So.2d 228 (La.App. 4 Cir.1977).
Whenever the propriety of a zoning decision is debatable, it will be upheld. Palermo Land Co. v. Planning Comm'n of Cal-casieu Parish, supra; Hunters Grove Homeowners Association v. Calcasieu Parish Police Jury, 422 So.2d 673 (La.App. 3 Cir.1982); Hernandez v. City of Lafayette, supra.
ANALYSIS
Applying the aforementioned legal precepts to the instant case, we find that the trial court substituted its own judgment and incorrectly held that the ZBA andj ethe council acted arbitrarily and capriciously in denying the Papa's application for the special exception use.
Charles Kirkland, the executive director of the Metropolitan Planning Commission, testified that when an individual makes application to the ZBA for a special exception use, the staff makes an assessment based on a land use report, a site visit by staff members, and other information the staff determines is needed by the council to make a decision. However, the ZBA was not compelled to accept the recommendations of the staff, particularly in light of the fact that a hearing on the matter was not conducted until after the staff made its initial findings. Additionally, the report specifically states the following on its face:
"The information stated above is the result of discussion by a staff review team. The staff assessment is made without benefit of information which may be presented at the public hearing, and is therefore subject to change. The Board members use all information available to them in making their decision."
Thus, the staffs recommendations are to be considered by the council in conjunction with the testimony and evidence presented by those who reside in the affected neighborhood.
The record reveals that at the hearing six people spoke in opposition to the plaintiffs application and thirteen others stood to indicate their opposition as well. Opponents of the Papa application presented a letter from the president of the Stoner Hill Neighborhood Action Group and a petition with approximately 30 signatures from area residents.
Several letters from the parents of children at the Montessori School, located across the street from the site, were submitted in opposition, along with a letter from the president of a parent group and a letter from the board of trustees with 11 signatures. Although the school is over 300 feet away from the Papa's site and |7cannot be considered alone as the basis for a refusal to grant a special exception use, the school is within close proximity to the Papas' site and was one of several factors considered by the council. Opponents cited the exposure of school age children to drinking and the increased flow of traffic in the area as their primary concerns.
Next, Reverend Woodson from Macedonia Baptist Church expressed his opposition to the proposal, citing the undesirable behavior occurring at the same location when the property was previously operated as a lounge.
Sam Gregorio, a resident of the area and a representative of the Anderson Island homeowners, the Montessori School, the Stoner Hill Neighborhood Action Group, and the Macedonia Baptist Church, stated that he and his neighbors agreed that on-premises consumption of alcohol "was inappropriate for the neighborhood." Gregorio expressed concerns about the proximity of the site to the school, the devaluation of property, traffic problems, and the incompatibility of on-premises consumption with the residential nature of the neighborhood. A petition was presented with more than one hundred signatures of residents from the neighborhood opposing the re-zoning of the Papas' store to allow the sale of alcohol.
Plaintiffs also presented a petition with 300 signatures. However, many of those who signed did not live in the area.
Additionally, although the Papa's site is zoned B-3, denoting it as a community business district, it is surrounded by a residential neighborhood. There are numerous businesses located in the area, but the only one with on-premises consumption near the Papas' site is Maurice's Restaurant, and it is several thousand | ¿feet away from East Washington Street and is located on the service road near Youree Drive.
The Papas contend that the decision of the ZBA was arbitrary and unreasonable. As the basis for this contention, plaintiffs argue that on the same day their application was denied, the board granted a similar application for on-premises consumption to Mary Matassa, the owner of Zia Maria's Deli-Restaurant located at 1327 Captain Shreve Drive in the Shreve Island subdivision. This court, however, finds that the two cases are factually distinguishable.
In the Matassa case, there was first very little opposition to the proposal to add on-premises consumption at Zia Maria's. Although that establishment is also bordered by a neighborhood, an elementary school, and an apartment complex, there was no opposition present at the initial hearing and only one letter of opposition was presented to the board. At the rehearing on the Matassa application on December 9, 1993, only two individuals spoke in opposition to the application.
Moreover, it was established at the Matas-sa hearing that there is another business with on-premises consumption already in place within close proximity to the Matassa site. Johnny's Pizza is located 285 feet from the northwest comer of the intersection of East Preston and Captain Shreve Drive and is almost due west from Zia Maria's.
Shreve Island Elementary School is also located seven blocks away from Zia Maria's, eliminating concerns about parking, exposure of school-age children to drinking, and increased traffic in the area.
Finally, the decision to permit on-premises consumption at Zia Maria's appears to be far more compatible with the nature of the area than in the Papas' case. Although the Ma-tassa site is bordered by a residential neigh borhood, this 19small area on Captain Shreve Drive has been used commercially since the Shreve Island subdivision was opened and has served as support businesses for the surrounding neighborhoods.
Thus, we find that the actions of the Board and the council bear a significant relationship to the safety and general welfare of the publie. There is sufficient evidence in the record to support the Board's decision to deny the Papas' application. At very least, the decision was a debatable one and as such, the district court was compelled to uphold the decision of the ZBA.
We also conclude that the trial court erred when it held that the Papas' due process rights were violated when Rev. Woodson was allowed to read a letter in opposition to the proposed application on December 9, 1993, after the October 6,1993 hearing. The facts reveal that the members of the council received a copy of the letter, which became a part of the record, and reviewed it before Reverend Woodson spoke. Additionally, the council, in compliance with § 10.1 of its Rules of Procedure, properly voted to suspend its rules in order to allow Reverend Woodson an opportunity to read the same letter to the council. Neither the applicants nor counsel for the applicants, who were present at the meeting, responded to the council's decision or addressed the minister's comments. Although plaintiffs' assert that a number of Reverend Woodson's comments were inaccurate, no one stood in order to demand equal time to correct the alleged errors.
DECREE
For the reasons expressed, we hold that the decision of the council to deny the Papas' application was not arbitrary or capricious. The judgment of the trial court is reversed, and the decision of the ZBA is reinstated.
REVERSED AND RENDERED.
NORRIS and SEXTON, JJ., dissent and assign written reasons.