Case Name: A.C. WHATLEY, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Bonnie Friday WHATLEY, Defendant-Appellant
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1983-06-06
Citations: 439 So. 2d 444
Docket Number: No. 15476-CA
Parties: A.C. WHATLEY, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Bonnie Friday WHATLEY, Defendant-Appellant.
Judges: Before HALL, JASPER E. JONES and NORRIS, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 439
Pages: 444–450

Head Matter:
A.C. WHATLEY, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Bonnie Friday WHATLEY, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 15476-CA.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Second Circuit.
June 6, 1983.
On Rehearing Sept. 20, 1983.
Whitehead & McCoy by C.R. Whitehead, Jr., Natchitoches, for defendant-appellant.
Horton & Jones by William R. Jones, Coushatta, for plaintiff-appellee.
Before HALL, JASPER E. JONES and NORRIS, JJ.

Opinion:
HALL, Judge.
After obtaining a separation from bed and board from her husband, Mrs. Whatley petitioned for a partition and accounting of community property. Mr. Whatley answered, alleging that Mrs. Whatley's separate estate was indebted to the community and to his separate estate in an amount in excess of the value of her interest in the community, and accordingly her interest in the community had a negative value.
The principal item in dispute on trial of the matter was the status of $31,928 received shortly before the community was terminated for a five-year paid-up oil, gas, and mineral lease of Mr. Whatley's separate property. The trial court held that the amount received should be prorated over the five-year primary term of the.lease, with the community getting credit for the part of the payment attributable to the period between execution of the lease and termination of the community and Mr. Whatley's separate estate getting credit for that part of the payment attributable to the period between termination of the community and the end of the five-year term. Taking into account other debts and assets, the trial court then concluded that Mrs. Whatley owed Mr. Whatley more than the value of her interest in the community. Judgment was rendered rejecting her demands for a partition and an accounting, and she appealed.
While the partition proceeding was pending, Mr. Whatley petitioned for a final divorce and Mrs. Whatley reconvened for alimony. After trial, judgment was rendered granting the divorce and rejecting Mrs. Whatley's claim to alimony, and she appealed from that part of the judgment denying alimony.
The appeals have been consolidated in this court and both appeals are considered and decided in this opinion.
Partition and Accounting
After about eight months of marriage, Mr. and Mrs. Whatley separated in November 1981. He filed suit for separation on December 3 and Mrs. Whatley filed a recon-ventional demand for separation on December 16, 1981. By judgment signed on March 4,1982, Mr. Whatley's demands were denied and Mrs. Whatley was awarded a judgment of separation. The parties agree that the community was terminated as of the date Mrs. Whatley filed her reconven-tional demand, December 16, 1981. LSA-C.C. Art. 155.
On October 28,1981 Mr. Whatley granted an oil, gas, and mineral lease on 307 acres of land which is his separate property. The lease is for a five-year primary term and is a "paid-up" lease, that is, it does not provide for delay rentals. A draft for $31,928 was given to Mr. Whatley on October 30, but was not paid until December 15, 1981, one day prior to dissolution of the community.
The trial court found it illogical for Mrs. Whatley to receive one-half of the lease payment which covered a five-year period simply because she happened to be the wife of the lessor at the time of execution of the lease and payment of the total amount applicable to the entire lease period. The court felt "bound in law and equity" to apportion the consideration commensurate with the period the community existed from the inception of the lease to the dissolution of the community. Finding that the community existed for 49 days subsequent to execution of the lease, which is 2.68 percent of the total term of the lease, the court held that $857.24 was attributable to the community.
Appellant Mrs. Whatley contends that the consideration for the oil, gas, and mineral lease, whether considered as bonus or rental or both, is community property under the express provisions of LSA-C.C. Art. 2339 which provides:
"The natural and civil fruits of the separate property of a spouse, minerals produced from or attributable to a separate asset, and bonuses, delay rentals, royalties, and shut-in payments arising from mineral leases are community property. Nevertheless, a spouse may reserve them as his separate property by a declaration made in authentic act or in an act under private signature duly acknowledged.
"As to the fruits and revenues of im-movables, the declaration is effective when filed for registry in the conveyance records of the parish in which the immovable property is located. As to fruits of movables, the declaration is effective when filed for registry in the conveyance records of the parish in which the declar-ant is domiciled."
The equitable appeal of appellee's argument and the trial court's decision must yield to the positive expression of law contained in LSA-C.C. Art. 2339. Bonuses, delay rentals, royalties, and shut-in payments arising from mineral leases "are community property." The express provision of Article 2339, enacted by Act 709 of 1979, effective January 1, 1980 as part of the comprehensive revision of matrimonial regime laws, codifies and continues the rule of Milling v. Collector of Revenue, 220 La. 773, 57 So.2d 679 (1952) and McElwee v. McElwee, 255 So.2d 883 (La.App. 2d Cir. 1971), which held that mineral lease payments are civil fruits which fall into the community.
The status of property as community or separate is fixed at the time of its acquisition. Vining v. Beatty, 161 So.2d 298 (La.App. 2d Cir.1964). Property is either separate or community, not mixed. Curtis v. Curtis, 403 So.2d 56 (La.1981). There is no authority for reclassifying community property after dissolution of the community, or for apportioning a part thereof to the separate estate of one of the spouses.
Under LSA-C.C. Art. 2344 personal injury damages are given special treatment, but no such special treatment is provided for mineral lease payments. The pension and retirement plan cases, such as T.L. James Co., Inc. v. Montgomery, 332 So.2d 834 (La. 1975), are not analogous because they deal with payments received or to be received after dissolution of the community. The same is true of West v. Ortego, 325 So.2d 242 (La.1975), dealing with workers' compensation benefits, and Broussard v. Broussard, 340 So.2d 1309 (La.1976), dealing with interest on savings certificates, both involve ing payments made after dissolution of the community.
The mineral lease payment received during the existence of the community is community property, and Mr. Whatley is required to account to Mrs. Whatley for her one-half community interest in the amount of the payment.
Neither party disputes the findings of the trial court as to other items of assets and debts involved in the partition and accounting. Taking the trial court's finding on these other items, and considering the lease payment for which Mr. Whatley must account, it appears that the net result is that Mr. Whatley owes Mrs. Whatley $15,-451.85 in settlement of the community and the respective claims of the parties' separate estates. The judgment in the partition action will be reversed and set aside and the partition action will be remanded for further proceedings to complete the partition and accounting in accordance with the views expressed in this opinion.
Alimony
Prior to her marriage to Mr. What-ley in April 1981, Mrs. Whatley worked as a postmaster earning about $24,000 annually. She left her job when she married and began drawing disability retirement benefits of $770 per month, out of which about $100 is deducted for life and hospitalization insurance. She cares for an eight-year-old grandson whose father pays her $200 per month and other expenses of the child. She has about $50,000 equity in her home. Her monthly expenses total about $800. She has no significant debts.
Mr. Whatley is 61 years old and a painting contractor by trade. His income from painting has been minimal the past year or so. He lives on and runs cattle on his 307-acre farm, which he estimated to be worth about $500,000 and which is paid for. His farm operation showed a loss for 1981.
We find no abuse of discretion by the trial court in denying alimony. Mrs. What-ley's income, means, and assets are sufficient for her support. LSA-C.C. Art. 160. The trial court's decision is bolstered by the fact that under the decision of this court, Mrs. Whatley will receive a substantial payment in settlement of the community, adding to her means.
Decree
The judgment of the district court signed January 20, 1983 denying Mrs. Whatley's claims against the community is reversed and set aside. The action for partition and accounting of the community is remanded to the district court for further proceedings in accordance with the views expressed in this opinion.
The judgment of the district court signed December 9, 1982 granting a divorce and denying Mrs. Whatley's claim for alimony is affirmed.
Costs of the appeals are assessed one-half to Mr. Whatley and one-half to Mrs. What-ley.