Case Name: Roland SPEIGHT, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Bernard WARNER, Respondent-Appellant
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 2017-12-12
Citations: 706 F. App'x 360
Docket Number: No. 16-35137
Parties: Roland SPEIGHT, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Bernard WARNER, Respondent-Appellant.
Judges: Before: HAWKINS, McKEOWN, and CHRISTEN, Circuit Judges.
Reporter: West's Federal Appendix
Volume: 706
Pages: 360–362

Head Matter:
Roland SPEIGHT, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Bernard WARNER, Respondent-Appellant.
No. 16-35137
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
Submitted December 8, 2017 Seattle, Washington
Filed December 12, 2017
Michael Charles Kahrs, Attorney, Kahrs Law Firm, P.S., Seattle, WA, for Petitioner-Appellee
John Joseph Samson, Assistant Attorney General, AGWA—Office of the Washington Attorney General (Olympia), Olympia, WA, for Respondent-Appellant
Before: HAWKINS, McKEOWN, and CHRISTEN, Circuit Judges.
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

Opinion:
MEMORANDUM
Respondent-Appellant Bernard Warner (the State of Washington) appeals the district court's order granting Petitioner-Ap-pellee Roland Speight's 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas petition. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 2258, and we reverse.
In federal district court, Speight asserted he received ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal because his appellate counsel failed to raise the argument that the trial court violated his Sixth Amendment right to a public trial. Because this claim was not raised in his personal restraint petition, it was procedurally defaulted. Speight argued that under Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1, 132 S.Ct. 1309, 182 L.Ed.2d 272 (2012), and this court's decision in Van Nguyen v. Curry, 736 F.3d 1287 (9th Cir. 2013), ineffective assistance of his state postconviction counsel constituted cause for the procedural default of his ineffective-assistance-of-appellate-counsel claim. The district court agreed, granted Speight's habeas petition, and stayed the writ pending the State's appeal to this court.
During the pendency of this appeal, the Supreme Court held that ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel cannot provide cause to excuse the procedural default of an ineffective-assistanee-of-appellate-counsel claim. See Davila v. Davis, — U.S. —, 137 S.Ct. 2058, 2065, 198 L.Ed.2d 603 (2017). As Speight acknowledged in supplemental briefing, Davila squarely foreclosed the argument on which the district court relied to grant his habeas petition. To excuse his procedural default absent application of the Martinez exception, Speight was required to show cause and prejudice under Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750, 111 S.Ct 2546, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991). Because he has not done so, we must REVERSE the district court order granting Speight's habeas petition.
REVERSED.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provid ed by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.