Case Name: PEOPLE v. WHITE
Court: Michigan Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1980-12-02
Citations: 102 Mich. App. 156
Docket Number: Docket No. 43473
Parties: PEOPLE v WHITE
Judges: Before: Danhof, C.J., and M. J. Kelly and G. R. Corsiglia, JJ.
Reporter: Michigan appeals reports; cases decided in the Michigan Court of Appeals.
Volume: 102
Pages: 156–167

Head Matter:
PEOPLE v WHITE
Docket No. 43473.
Submitted June 6, 1980, at Lansing.
Decided December 2, 1980.
Lawrence White was convicted of first-degree criminal sexual conduct, Jackson Circuit Court, Russell E. Noble, J. Defendant appeals, alleging that blood type and secretor evidence which indicated that the defendant could not be excluded from the class of possible assailants was improperly admitted, that a prior statement of a witness was improperly referred to by the prosecutor in closing argument, and that the testimony of two police detectives was improper rebuttal. Held:
1. A ruling of the Court of Appeals since the trial of this case would mandate the exclusion of the blood type evidence because of the low probative value of such evidence when weighed against its ability to confuse, mislead, or otherwise improperly influence the jury. However, because such evidence has had widespread use and acceptance and because retroactive application of the rule against admission may have a significant adverse effect upon the administration of justice, the ruling will not be given retroactive effect.
2. The prior statement of the witness was adopted, at least in part, by the witness when he testified at trial. The prosecutor’s later reference to the statement was not error.
3. The rebuttal testimony of the police detectives was not improper.
Affirmed.
M. J. Kelly, J., concurred, but wrote separately to qualify his prior opinion in People v Sturdivant, 91 Mich App 128; 283 NW2d 669 (1979), regarding the admissibility of blood type evidence. He would suggest that such evidence may be admissible where the evidence would place the defendant within a sufficiently defined population group. In this case the evidence should have been excluded had it been objected to, but its admission was harmless because the case was fully presented with adequate proofs and the jury was informed of the limited value of the evidence. Future cases in which the evidence more accurately points to a particular defendant or a significantly smaller class should be decided on a case by case basis.
References for Points in Headnotes
[1, 2] 20 Am Jur 2d, Courts §§ 233, 236.
Prospective or retroactive application of overruling decision. 65 ALR3d 504.
[2] Blood grouping tests. 46 ALR2d 1000.
[3] 75 Am Jur 2d, Trial § 218.
81 Am Jur 2d, Witnesses § 643.
[4] 29 Am Jur 2d, Evidence § 370.
30 Am Jur 2d, Evidence §§ 1104, 1147.
75 Am Jur 2d, Trial § 166.
Opinion of the Court
1. Criminal Law — New Rule of Law — Retroactive Application of Case Precedent.
The factors to be taken into consideration in determining whether to give a new rule of law retroactive or only prospective application are (1) the purpose to be served by the new rule, (2) the extent of reliance upon the old rule, and (3) its effect on the administration of justice.
2. Criminal Law — Evidence — Blood Type — New Rule of Law.
An opinion of the Court of Appeals which held that testimony regarding blood types used to place a defendant in a population group of possible perpetrators of a crime should be excluded because of its low probative value when weighed against its possible ability to confuse, mislead, or otherwise improperly influence the jury should not be given retroactive application where previously such testimony had been accepted and was in widespread use and where to give the new rule retroactive application may have a significant adverse effect upon the administration of justice.
3. Witnesses — Criminal Law — Prior Statement of Witness.
A prosecutor properly referred, in closing argument, to a statement inculpating the defendant which a witness had made to the police where the witness in his trial testimony adopted the statement; the statement was therefore properly in the record and it was proper for the prosecutor to refer to the statement to the extent that it had been adopted by the witness.
Concurrence by M. J. Kelly, J.
4. Criminal Law — Evidence — Blood Type — Inclusion Within Population Group.
Evidence of blood type which includes a defendant within a population group comprising 20% of all males requires a limit ing instruction to the jury and should be excluded if objected to; the admission of such evidence was harmless error, however, where it was not objected to, the case was fully presented with adequate proofs, and the prosecutor commented in closing argument on the limited value of the evidence.
Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Robert A. Derengoski, Solicitor General, Edward J. Grant, Prosecuting Attorney, and John C. Wildeboer, Chief Appellate Attorney, for the people.
P. E. Bennett, Assistant State Appellate Defender, for defendant on appeal.
Before: Danhof, C.J., and M. J. Kelly and G. R. Corsiglia, JJ.
Circuit judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.

Opinion:
G. R. Corsiglia, J.
Defendant-appellant was convicted on November 2, 1978, of first-degree criminal sexual conduct, contrary to MCL 750.520b(l)(f); MSA 28.788(2)(l)(f), after a four-day trial before a Jackson County Circuit Court jury. He was sentenced to 6 to 15 years imprisonment. Defendant appeals as of right.
At trial, the complaining witness testified that she was followed and verbally harrassed by a number of men in a car while walking home from a bar in Jackson, Michigan, in February of 1978. Terrified when one of the men got out of the car, she ran. Two men pursued her, and eventually she attempted to get into a friend's house. Unfortunately the home was locked, and the complainant was grabbed, physically assaulted and raped by one of the men. Because she was penetrated from behind while on her hands and knees in the snow, she did not get a good look at her attacker's face. However, based upon her recollection of his clothing, size, and certain other characteristics, while riding with police a few blocks from the scené, and shortly after the assault, she identified the defendant. He was then taken into custody. The complainant was taken to the hospital by the police.
At trial, Frank Schehr, of the Michigan State Police Forensic Science Division, Serology Unit, testified that he analyzed the clothing of the complainant and the defendant, specimens taken from the complainant, and blood and saliva samples taken from the defendant. He testified that the complaining witness had type B blood and was a secreter and that the defendant had type A blood and was also a secreter. The specimens taken from the complainant's vagina showed type A secretions, according to his analysis, and such specimens were consistent with the defendant's blood type. In addition, they were also consistent with an AB secreter. Further testimony in a similar vein was given, all indicating that the defendant could not be excluded from the class of possible assailants based upon laboratory analysis.
The defendant did not deny that he was riding in the car that kept pace with the complainant in the early hours of the morning. One of the other occupants of the car, Fred Wheeler, stated that he did not recall telling a detective a few days after the incident that the defendant said that he was going to "fuck that white bitch" when he left the car. Wheeler finally stated that if the detective said that he (Wheeler) made the statement, then he must have said it, that his memory was better at the earlier date, and that he was not sure which of the two men who exited from the car made the statement.
The defendant took the stand to testify on his own behalf. He claimed that after he left the car he did not see the complainant or the other man who got out. According to his testimony, he walked toward his mother's home, but decided to ask an acquaintance named Curtis, whom he met just before arriving at his mother's, for a ride to his sister's house. This person gave defendant the requested ride and left. When defendant found his sister was not home, he walked back six blocks toward his mother's home. He was taken into custody on the porch of a friend's house. Defendant claims he was stopping at the friend's house to ask her a question.
In rebuttal, the prosecution recalled a detective who had interviewed the defendant. The witness testified that the defendant did not mention the Curtis who offered him the ride to his sister's house or other similar details of the story the defendant told on the stand.
Another detective who observed the interview, and who had not been called by the prosecution prior to rebuttal, testified that he had not heard anything about the Curtis who offered the defendant a ride or the other new details regarding the defendant's activities on that day.
The jury apparently did not believe the defendant's version of the events, and he was convicted. He appeals, alleging several errors of law.
The trial in this case predates the decision of People v Sturdivant, 91 Mich App 128; 283 NW2d 669 (1979). Prior to Sturdivant, implicit approval had been given to blood type testimony such as that given in this case. See, e.g., People v Newby, 66 Mich App 400; 239 NW2d 387 (1976), lv den 397 Mich 867 (1976). Hence we are confronted with the issue of whether the rule set forth in Sturdivant ought to be given retroactive effect.
Three factors are generally taken into consideration in determining whether to give a new rule of law retroactive or prospective application. As established in Stovall v Denno, 388 US 293; 87 S Ct 1967; 18 L Ed 2d 1199 (1967), a court should take into consideration: (1) the purpose to be served by the new rule; (2) the extent of reliance upon the old rule; and (3) its effect on the administration of justice. Accord, People v Kamin, 405 Mich 482; 275 NW2d 777 (1979), Stewart v Stewart, 91 Mich App 602; 283 NW2d 809 (1979).
As expounded in Sturdivant, the purpose of excluding blood type testimony relates to its low probative value when weighed against other considerations such as its possible ability to confuse, mislead, or otherwise improperly influence the jury. MRE 401, 403, People v Sturdivant, supra. Such a concern is dissimilar to a focus upon a right such as a defendant's right under the jury system to a properly requested instruction. Compare, People v Kamin, supra, 495.
Indication of the reliance upon the old rule regarding expert testimony on blood types is given by its widespread use and acceptance in similar cases. Indeed, in this case able defense counsel did not even object to its introduction. No prior indication was given to trial counsel of the imminent demise of the established rule. Compare, Placek v Sterling Heights, 405 Mich 638; 275 NW2d 511 (1979).
Further, in this Court's opinion, retroactive application of the rule of Sturdivant, given the lack of prior precedent in similar cases or indication from higher courts to the trial bench, may have a significant adverse effect upon the administration of justice.
Consequently, we decline to give Sturdivant retroactive application. Since we so decide, this holding ought not to be construed as either an ap proval or disapproval of Sturdivant (except for Judge Kelly, the writer of Sturdivant, who still approves of it).
The defendant also argues that reversible error occurred when the trial judge allowed the prosecution to argue that the statement made by Mr. Wheeler was evidence of defendant's guilt. After a review of the record, it is apparent that Mr. Wheeler adopted his prior testimony, at least insofar as one of the two men who exited from the car made the statement. Consequently, the statement was properly of record and properly referred to in closing argument to the extent that it was adopted. People v Couch, 49 Mich App 69; 211 NW2d 250 (1973). We find no reversible error in the prosecution's references to Mr. Wheeler's testimony in his closing argument.
Likewise, the use of the detectives to rebut the story told by the defendant was not improper. Detective Smith had testified during the prosecution's case in chief. Detective Crawford merely supported his further testimony in rebuttal to the contrary testimony offered by the defendant. People v Rosemary Gibson, 71 Mich App 543; 248 NW2d 613 (1976).
Affirmed.
Danhof, C.J., concurred.