Case Name: DANIEL H. TOWLE v. J. J. STARZ
Court: Minnesota Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Minnesota
Decision Date: 1897-02-02
Citations: 67 Minn. 370
Docket Number: Nos. 10,299—(225)
Parties: DANIEL H. TOWLE v. J. J. STARZ.
Judges: 
Reporter: Minnesota Reports
Volume: 67
Pages: 370–374

Head Matter:
DANIEL H. TOWLE v. J. J. STARZ.
February 2, 1897.
Nos. 10,299—(225).
Certificate of Deposit — Construction — Demand of Payment — Liability of Indorser.
The defendant was sued as indorser on tbe following certificate of deposit: “Tbe Bank of Zumbrota.
“Zumbrota, Minn., July 27, 1893.
“J. J. Starz has deposited in this bank two thousand dollars, payable to the order of himself on the return of this certificate properly indorsed, with interest at four per cent. To be left six months. No interest after ma turity. Not subject to check.
“[Signed] E. V. Canfield, Cashier.”
Eeld, that this was a “time,” and not a “demand,” certificate; that payment was demandable at the expiration of six months, and, as between the holder and the indorser, it matured at that date; that, to hold the indorser, it should have been presented for payment on the last day of grace, January 30, 1894.
Appeal by plaintiff from an order of the district court for Good-hue county, Williston, J., denying a motion for a new trial, after a verdict in favor of defendant directed by the court.
Affirmed.
Wilson ds Foot, for appellant.
The certificate in issue, omitting that part of the certificate beginning with the words “To be left,” is substantially the same as that in the case of Mitchell v. Easton, 37 Minn. 335, 33 N. W. 910. In construing the words “To be left six months. No interest after maturity. Not subject to check” the court will take judicial notice that the country was undergoing a severe panic, and the banks of the country, to prevent presentment at any time of its paper, placed words of restriction in .their certificates so as to prevent a depositor from making a demand until after the lapse of a certain time. A prorpise to pay on demand after a certain number of days or months is the legal effect of this certificate. Heywood v. Perrin, 10 Pick. 228; Franklin Sav. Inst. v. Reed, 125 Mass. 365; Tiedeman, C. P. §41; 1 Randolph, C. P. § 120; 1 Daniel, Neg. Inst. § 150; 2 Parsons, N. & B. 540; Edwards. B. & P. N. 146. The words “Not subject to check” are simply superfluous. The relation between the bank and its depositor is simply that of a debtor and creditor. 1 Morse, Bank. § 289.
J. C. MoOlure, for respondent.
Certificates of deposit are the same as promissory notes. Cassidy v. First Nat. Bank, 30 Minn. 86, 14 N. W. 363; Mitchell v. Easton, 37 Minn. 335, 33 N. W. 910. In the construction of written instruments words are to be given their usual meaning. A business man would construe this certificate to mean that the money was deposited for six months, and that interest would be paid for that period, but thereafter interest would cease because the debt had matured.
Reported in 09 N. W. 1098.

Opinion:
MITCHELL, J.
The defendant was sued as indorser of the following instrument:
"The Bank of Zumbrota,
"Zumbrota, Minn., July 27, 1893.
"J. J. Starz has deposited in this bank two thousand dollars, payable to the order of himself on the return of this certificate properly indorsed, with interest at four per cent. To be left six months. No interest after maturity. Not subject to check.
"E. V. Canfield, Cashier."
The certificate was presented at the bank for payment on January 31, 1894, and notice of dishonor given to the defendant on the same day. The only question is whether the demand was seasonably made, so as to hold the indorser.
The court below held that it should have been made on January 30, and hence was one day too late. According to Mitchell v. Easton, 37 Minn. 335, 33 N. W. 910, if it had been a demand certificate (no time of payment being specified), it would fall within the 60-day limitation fixed by G-. S. 1894, § 2231, and would have been seasonably presented any time within 60 days after its date. But this was a "time," and not a "demand," certificate, and the section cited has no application. The provision that the money was "to be left six months," emphasized by the word "maturity" in the subsequent provision, which refers to the expiration of six months, clearly means that the certificate was not payable until the expiration of that time. It must, therefore, be construed as if it read payable "six months after date." Whether a special demand, accompanied by a return or tender of the certificate, would be necessary before an action could be brought against the bank, is entirely foreign to the question before us. Payment was demandable at the expiration of six months, and, as between the holder and indorser, the certificate matured at that date. Demand should have been made on the last day of grace, which was January 30th.
Order affirmed.