Case Name: Gerald Wayne FORD, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee
Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1972-12-13
Citations: 488 S.W.2d 793
Docket Number: No. 45783
Parties: Gerald Wayne FORD, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.
Judges: 
Reporter: South Western Reporter Second Series
Volume: 488
Pages: 793–798

Head Matter:
Gerald Wayne FORD, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.
No. 45783.
Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
Dec. 13, 1972.
Grady Hight, Fort Worth, for appellant.
Doug Crouch, Dist. Atty., Roger Cramp-ton and Charles E. Webb, Asst. Dist. Attys., Fort Worth, Jim D. Vollers, State’s Atty., and Robert A. Huttash, Asst. State’s Atty., Austin, for the State.

Opinion:
OPINION
DOUGLAS, Judge.
This is.an appeal from an order revoking probation.
On May 21, 1969, the appellant was found guilty of burglary with intent to commit theft. His punishment was assessed at a term of five years, probated. A condition of probation was that he commit no offense against the laws of this State or any other state. The appellant was given permission by the trial court to go to the State of Oklahoma. On July 12, 1971, an amended motion to revoke probation was filed. It alleged, among other things, that the appellant had violated the terms of his probation by committing the offense of theft in the State of Oklahoma. On November 5, 1971, the hearing on the motion to revoke was held.
In determining whether the trial court abused its discretion in revoking probation, we have considered only the condition that he committed theft in the State of Oklahoma, because the court based his revocation upon such a violation.
Buddy Bates testified that on July 6, 1971, the appellant asked to use his automobile for a short time to go across town (Oklahoma City). He testified that the appellant was to be back within an hour or so and that the appellant never returned the car. Bates recovered his automobile some three weeks later in Minneapolis, Minnesota.
Curt Sharp testified that he was probation control officer for. Oklahoma City and was assigned to supervise the appellant. He testified that the appellant did not report to him after July 6, 1971, and that he made an investigation and determined that the appellant had gone to Minneapolis, Minnesota which was contrary to his instructions. At the hearing on the motion to revoke probation, the trial court found that the appellant had violated the laws of the State of Oklahoma by "converting" the automobile of Buddy Bates.
The question is, does the allegation support the finding of theft? We assume that the laws of the State of Texas and Oklahoma are the same in the absence of a showing to the contrary.
Article 1410, Vernon's Ann.P.C., defines theft as follows:
" 'Theft' is the fraudulent taking of corporeal personal property belonging to another from his possession, or from the possession of some person holding the same for him, without his consent, with intent to deprive the owner of the value of the same, and to appropriate it to the use or benefit of the person taking."
The other statute involved is Article 1429, V.A.P.C., "Conversion by bailee." It provides, in part:
"Section 1. Any person having possession of a motor vehicle, trailer, equipment, or tool, or any other personal property of another by virtue of a contract of hiring or borrowing, or other bailment, who shall without the consent of the owner, fraudulently convert such property to his own use with intent to deprive the owner of the value of the same shall be guilty of theft, and shall be punished as for the theft of like property."
This Court held in Callahan v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 192 S.W.2d 562, that an indictment alleging ordinary theft will not support a conviction for theft by bailee.
In the present case we have an allegation of theft in the motion to revoke probation. The proof does not show theft of the automobile. There was no showing that the appellant intended to convert the automobile at the time he took it. Even if the proof showed theft by bailee or conversion of the automobile, it does not support the allegation of theft.
Before entering the order revoking probation for the offense of theft, the court found that the appellant was the person who was previously convicted and "I am going to find that on July the 6th, 1971, that you converted the automobile of Buddy, and that in doing so, that you violated the law — that you committed an offense against the laws of this State and the State of Oklahoma. And it will be upon this ground that I am going to revoke your probated sentence." After the court made his finding, it was not necessary for the appellant to request additional findings to have the matter reviewed on appeal.
In Foote v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 463 S.W.2d 445, cited in the dissent, the allegation in the motion to revoke probation was for theft of property over the value of $50.00. At the hearing on the motion to revoke, the proof showed theft of the property but its value was under $50.00. There was enough proof to show misdemeanor theft, a lesser included offense. The allegation in the motion to revoke alleged over $50.00. This allegation included $50.00 and anything under that value. The proof was sufficient in the Foote case to show a misdemeanor theft and was sufficient as a basis to revoke probation. Branch v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 465 S.W.2d 160, held misdemeanor theft to be a lesser included offense. A lesser included offense means that a major as well as the lesser offense was alleged in the pleadings.
Wilcox v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 477 S.W. 2d 900, is cited by the dissent as authority that this Court approved a revocation of probation upon a condition not alleged in the motion to revoke. The motion to revoke alleged that Wilcox possessed narcotics paraphernalia. The proof did not show the accused to have the paraphernalia in his hand, or on his person, but the circumstances showed him to be a principal in its possession.
Article 65, V.A.P.C., provides that all persons are principals who are guilty of acting together in the commission of the offense. In that case the accused was guilty of the offense as alleged in the motion because he was a principal and the judgment was affirmed.
This Court has suggested for many years that a trial judge should enter his findings on the grounds he relies upon to revoke probation. E. g. McBee v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 316 S.W.2d 748 (1958). When this is done, a probationer has an opportunity to show an abuse of discretion in the revocation if the proof is not sufficient to revoke upon the grounds specified.
Failure to comply with a request to make findings in support of an order revoking probation may call for a reversal. Tate v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 365 S.W.2d 789. When the trial judge makes findings on violation of a condition to revoke probation, whether by request or on his own motion, we will not substitute the opinion of this appellate court for his judgment.
We hold that the trial court abused its discretion under the facts of this case in that it revoked appellant's probation on a ground not supported by the evidence.
The order of revocation is reversed and the cause is remanded.