Case Name: MANN v. BROWN et al.
Court: Texas Courts of Civil Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1918-01-30
Citations: 201 S.W. 438
Docket Number: No. 7616
Parties: MANN v. BROWN et al.
Judges: 
Reporter: South Western Reporter
Volume: 201
Pages: 438–442

Head Matter:
MANN v. BROWN et al.
(No. 7616.)
(Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. Galveston.
Jan. 30, 1918.
On Motion for Rehearing, Feb. 21, 1918.)
On Motion for Rehearing.
1. Judgment ⅞=^>17(11) — Process to Support —Nonresidents—Attachment.
Attaching a nonresident’s property and serving process on him under Vernon’s Sayles’ Ann. Civ. St. 1914_, art. 1869, confers jurisdiction to satisfy plaintiff’s demand by selling the attached property, but not to enter a personal judgment.
2. Execution <®=j7 — Nonresident Defendants.
Where a nonresident’s property has been attached and process served under Vernon’s Sayles’ Ann. Civ. St. 1914, art. 1869, the resulting lien and sale is unaffected by the fact that judgment was rendered by default.
3. Judgment ®=>17(11) — Process to Support —Nonresidents—Validity.
A judgment against a nonresident secured by attaching property within the state and serving process under Vernon’s Sayles’ Ann. Civ-St. 1914, art. 1869, is not invalid because the notice or citation did not show that defendant’s, property had been attached.
4. Courts <⅞⅝=>480(3) — Injunction — Justice Court — Selling Exempt Property.
A district court has no jurisdiction to enjoin the sale of a nonresident’s property pursuant to a valid justice court judgment upon the ground that such property was exempt from execution.
5. Justices op the Peace <§=»130 — Judgments— OONCLUSIVENESS.
Justice’s courts have a special and exclusive jurisdiction under the Constitution, and' other courts cannot review trials therein except upon appeal, and, where no appeal is allowed, judgments rendered therein are conclusive.
Appieal from District Court, Anderson County; John S. Prince, Judge.
Petition for injunction by G. E. Mann against A. D. Brown and others. From an order dissolving a temporary writ of injunction, the petitioner appeals.
Appeal dismissed.
W. R. Petty, of Palestine, for appellant. J. O. Hughes, of Palestine, for appellees.

Opinion:
LANE, J.
This is an appeal from an order of the regular judge of the Third judicial district of Texas, dissolving a temporary writ of injunction, restraining A. D. Brown and R. D. Bryan from selling certain property of appellant, theretofore issued-by the lion. A. G. Greenwood, special judge of the district court of Anderson county, within said Third judicial district.
The petition for injunction, among other things, alleges that on the 10th day of July, 1017, appellee R. D. Bryan filed suit in the justice court of precinct No. 1 of Anderson county against appellant, G. B. Mann, praying for judgment for the sum of $64 due by appellant to R. D. Bryan for rent of certain premises and for a foreclosure of his landlord's lien, without naming any property upon which said foreclosure was sought; that at the time said suit was filed Bryan, upon affidavit, procured the issuance of a writ of attachment and placed the same in the hands of A. D. Brown, constable, to be levied upon certain household and kitchen furniture belonging to appellant, which included one piano and three sets of bedroom .furniture; that said levy was made by said Brown and that said furniture was by said Brown seized and taken into his possession under said writ; that at the time said suit was filed and at the time of the issuance and levy of said attachment, and at all times since, appellant G. E. Mann was and is still. a nonresident of the state of Texas; that he was at all such times a married man and the head of a family, consisting of a wife and children, and that said furniture was at the time of such levy and seizure exempt under the law from forced sale for the payment of his debts; that on the 30th day of July, 1917, a personal judgment was rendered in said justice court in favor of appellee Bryan against appellant for the sum of §64 and for a foreclosure, and ordering the issuance of an order of sale of said furniture for the payment of said judgment; that thereafter an order of sale was issued and placed in the hands of Constable A. D. Brown, who is threatening to sell said property thereunder; that said property is of value far in excess of the amount of said judgment, but will not sell for more than one-fourth of its value; and that unless the injunction prayed for be issued he will suffer irreparable injury. He further alleged that he had no notice or knowledge that any writ of attachment had been issued and levied upon his property until the expiration of the time in which he could have appealed from the judgment rendered against him.
On the 18th day of August, 1917, Special Judge A. G. Greenwood granted a temporary injunction, restraining the sale of said property until final disposition of the cause, unless sooner modified or dissolved by the court. On the 5th day of September, 1917, appellees Brown and Bryan presented their motion to the Hon. J. S. Prince, the regular judge of said court, praying for a dissolution of said temporary injunction. On the 18th day of September, 1917, the regular judge granted said motion and dissolved the temporary injunction theretofore issued. From this action oí the court in dissolving said injunction G. E. Mann has appealed.
The only description of the property involved in the suit is found in appellant's petition for injunction, and is that it is three suites of bedroom furniture and one piano. Tire only reference to its value is to be found in said petition, and is to the effect that it is "of value far in excess of the amount of the judgment of §64 and costs of suit."
By article 1705, Vernon's Sayles' Civil Statutes 1914, the district court is given jurisdiction of all suits, complaints, or pleas whatever, without regard to any distinction between law and equity, when the matter in controversy shall be valued at or amounts to §500, exclusive of interest, and by article 1706 it is given jurisdiction of all causes of action whatever for which a remedy or jurisdiction is not provided by law or the Constitution. It has no jurisdiction, however, of causes of action of which exclusive jurisdiction has been conferred by law upon the county court. By article 1763 the county court is given exclusive jurisdiction over civ-, il cases when the matter in controversy shall exceed in value §200 and shall not exceed §500, exclusive of interest.
As before stated, the value of the property involved in the present case is not shown by the pleadings of either party. The record sent to this court does not affirmatively or otherwise show the value of such property so as to show that the district court, from which this appeal is taken, had jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the suit. In the absence of such showing this court will not entertain jurisdiction of the appeal.
In a suit brought for the sole purpose of preventing the sale of specific property, the value of the property determines the amount in controversy in determining the jurisdiction of the court, and such value should be alleged. Smith Drug Co. v. Rochelle, 135 S. W. 258.
Stating the proposition more broadly: In suits to foreclose a lien when the debt sued for is less than the minimum prescribed to give jurisdiction, and the value of the property upon which the lien is sought to be foreclosed is not alleged, the petition fails to show that the court has jurisdiction. It is essential to tlie validity of tlie judgment in such cases that the pleadings affirmatively show that the trial court had jurisdiction of the suhject-matter, and the Court of Appeals must notice the want of jurisdiction of the trial court whether the objection is' raised by the parties or not. Smith Drug Co. v. Rochelle, supra; Walker Mercantile Co. v. Raney Co., 154 S. W. 317; Marshall v. Stowers Furniture Co., 167 S. W. 230; De Witt County v. Wischkemper, 95 Tex. 435, 67 S. W. 882.
In the case last cited the court said:
"By section 16, art. 5, of the Constitution of this state, the jurisdiction of county courts is thus defined: 'They shall have exclusive jurisdiction in all civil cases when the matter in controversy shall exceed in value $200 and not exceed $500, exclusive of interest, and concurrent jurisdiction with the district court when the matter in controversy shall exceed $500 and not exceed $1,000, exclusive of interest; and the county court or judge thereof shall have power to issue writs of injunction, mandamus, and all writs necessary to the enforcement of the jurisdiction of said court.' In the cases of Dean v. State, 88 Tex. 296 [30 S. W. 1047, 31 S. W. 185], and Johnson v. Hanscom, 90 Tex. 321 [37 S. W. 601, 38 S. W. 761], this court held that the power of the county court to issue writs of mandamus under the section of the Constitution above quoted was limited to cases exceeding $200 and not exceeding $1,000. The same rule is applicable to writs of injunction, which can only bo issued by the county courts where the matter in controversy exceeds $200 and does not exceed $1,000 in value. In this case, no value of the subject of the suit is alleged; therefore the application for the writ of injunction does not bring -the case within the terms of the Constitution, and the county court had no jurisdiction to issue the writ of injunction upon the facts stated."
We conclude that the petition for injunction does not show a cause over which the trial court had jurisdiction and therefore this court has no jurisdiction to determine this appeal.
The appeal is dismissed.
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