Case Name: BEREA COLLEGE v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
Court: Supreme Court of the United States
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 1908-11-09
Citations: 211 U.S. 45
Docket Number: No. 12
Parties: BEREA COLLEGE v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY.
Judges: Mr. Justice Holmes and Mr. Justice Moody concur in the judgment.
Reporter: United States Reports
Volume: 211
Pages: 45–70

Head Matter:
BEREA COLLEGE v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY.
ERROR TO THE COURT OP APPEALS OP THE STATE OP KENTUCKY.
No. 12.
Argued April 10, 13, 1908.
Decided November 9, 1908.
This court will not disturb the judgment of a state court resting on Federal and non-Federal grounds if the latter are sufficient to sustain the decision.
The state court determines the extent and limitations of powers conferred by the State on its corporations.
A corporation is not en titled to all the immunities to which individuals are entitled, and a State may withhold from its corporations privileges and powers of which it cannot constitutionally deprive individuals.
A state statute limiting the powers of corporations and individuals may be constitutional as to the, former although unconstitutional as to the latter; and, if separable, it will not beheld unconstitutional at the instance of a corporátion unless it clearly appears that the legislature would not have enacted it as to corporations separately..
The same rule that permits separable sections óf a statute to be declared unconstitutional without rendering the entire statute void, applies to separable provisions of a section of a. statute.
The prohibition in § 1 of the Kentucky statute of 1904, against persons and corporations maintaining schools for both white persons and negroes is separable, and even if an unconstitutional restraint as to individuals it is not unconstitutional as to corporations, it being within the power óf the State to determine the powers conferred upon its corporations.
While the reserved power to alter or amend charters is subject to reasonable limitations, it includes any alteration or amendment which does not defeat or substantially impair the object of the grant or vested rights.
A general statute which in effect alters or amends a Charter is to be construed as an amendment thereof even if not in terms so designated.
A state statute which permits education of both white persons and negroes by ^ the same corporation in different localities, although prohibiting their attendance in the same place, does not defeat the object of a grant to maintain a college for all pérsons, and is not vio- lative of the contract clause of the Federal Constitution, the state law having reserved the right to repeal, alter and amend charters.
123 Kentucky, 209, affirmed.
On October 8, 1904, the grand jury of Madison County, Kentucky, presented in the Circuit Court of that county an indictment, charging:
“The said Berea College, being a corporation duly incorporated under the laws of the State of Kentucky, and owning, maintaining and operating a college, school and institution of learning, known as ' Berea College,’ located in the town of Berea, Madison County, Kentucky, did, unlawfully and willfully permit and receive both the white and negro races as •pupils for instruction in said college, school and institution of learning.”
This indictment was found under an act of March 22, 1904 (acts Kentucky, 1904, chap. 85, p. 181), whose first section reads:
. “Sec. 1. That it shall be unlawful for any person, corporation or association of persons to maintain or. operate any college, schopl or institution where persons of the white and negro ' races are both receivéc^as pupils for instruction, and any person or corporation who shall operate or maintain any such college, school or institution sháll be fined $1,000, and any person or corporation who may be bonvicted of violating the provisions of this act shall be fined $100 for each day they may operate said school, college or institution after such conviction.”
On a trial the defendant was found guilty and sentenced to pay a fine of one thousand dollars. This judgment was on June 12, 1906, affirmed by the Court of Appeals of the State (123 Kentucky, 2Q9), and from that \court brought here on writ of error.
Mr. John G. Carlisle and Mr. Guy Ward Mallon for plaintiff in error:
A legislative enactment depriving a person of the right to ' pursue his 'usual occupation or depriving a person of the right to attend a school or institution of learning of his own choice is not due process of law, and-if the person is a citizen of the United States such an enactment abridges his privileges and immunities as such.
The act is not separable; it relates to but one subject and has only one purpose — to prohibit the same person, corporation or association from receiving pupils of the two races for instruction; in order to accomplish this, penalties are imposed, not only upon the offending person, association, or corporation, but also upon all persons who teach for the institution, although they may teach the two races separately, and upon all pupils who attend such schools, although the two races may be taught separately by different teachers and in different rooms.' It follows that if any provision is unconstitutional, the entire act is invalid.
A party has a right to rely upon the unconstitutionality of a statute where his rights are injuriously affected by the unconstitutional provision contained in the statute; and, where the unconstitutional provision would not of itself directly affect his rights, but is, so connected with the constitutional provisions which do affect them that it invalidates the entire act. Field v. Clark, 143 U. S. 649; Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 158 U. S. 601.
The rule that a part of a statute may be unconstitutional, and other parts may be valid, only applies where the parts are clearly separable and may well stand alone. This rule does nót apply to cases where the enforcement of the unconstitutional parts affects the. complaining party just as much as the enforcement of the constitutional parts. The constitutional part of an act will not be enforced when other parts are unconstitutional, unless the court can assume that the legislature would have passed tbe, act if the void part had been omitted. *
The difference between the extent of legislative power over schools and other institutions established and maintained by. the State and its power over private schools and institutions is obvious. In the case of public schools the legislature may reguláte the hours of teaching, prescribe the text-books, the qualifications of teachers, the ages at which pupils shall be admitted, classify the students who shall be instructed together, and in fact do almost anything which does not make unjust or unconstitutional discriminations among the people who contribute by taxation to the funds used in defraying the expenses of the system. But a private school- stands upon exactly the same footing as any other private business, and the power of the State to prohibit it, or to interfere with the right to teach in it, or to attend it, is no greater than its power to prohibit any other ordinary occupation of the people. The statute is unnecessary and unreasonable, and therefore an arbitrary interference with the rights of the people in the conduct of their private business and in the pursuit of their ordinary occupations. The right to maintain a private school is no more subject'to legislative control than the right to conduct a store, or a farm, or any other one of the various occupations in which the people are engaged. The right of the citizen to choose and follow an innocent occupation is both a personal and,a property right. Cummings v. Missouri, 4 Wall. 321; Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U. S. 591; Schnair v. Navarro Hotel Imp. Co., 182 N. Y. 83; Butchers’ Union Co. v. Crescent City Co., Ill U. S. 746; Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356; SlaughterHouse Cases, 16 Wall. 36; Colon v. Lisk, 153 N.’Y. 188; People v. Gibson, 101 N. Y. 389; People v. Marx, 99 N. Y. 377; In re Jacobs, 98 N. Y. 98; Lochner v. State of New York, 198 TJ. S. 45; Corfield, v. Coryell, 4 Washington C. C. 371; Maxwell v. Dow, 176 TJ. S. 588, 589.
The nature or extent of legislative power cannot be affected by calling it the “police power.” Absolute arbitrary power over the lives, liberties and property of the people cannot exist in this country, under any name or in any form, and it is always the duty of the courts to disregard mere names and forms in determining whether the legislature has or has not exceeded its authority. It is for the court to decide, not only whether the subject to which legislation relates is within the scope of the power attempted to be exercised, but also whether the legislation itself is in violation of the personal or property rights of the citizen. The subject to which the legislation relates may be clearly within the scope of the police power, and yet the enactment may be so unreasonable, unnecessary or inappropriate for the accomplishment of the purpose ostensibly designed, that the courts, in the discharge of their duty to protect personal and property rights, will be bound to hold it null and void. Ritchie v. People, 155 Illinois, 98, 110; Eden v. People, 165 Illinois, 296, 318.
Thé Constitution makes no distinction between the different races or different classes’of the people, and if a distinction is to be made, it must be done by the legislature in the exercise of the police power. All such legislation is necessarily injurious to the peace and prosperity of the people and its validity ought to be clearly established before it receives the sanction of the courts. The manufacture and sale of ardent spirits, gambling, the maintenance of nuisances, the keeping of disorderly houses, and many other vocations which are subject to regulation and control in the exercise of the police power, are in themselves injurious to the health, morals, and safety of the public; but even over these subjects the legislative authority is limited to the enactment of reasonable and necessary laws. Lawton v. Steele, 152 U. S. 133; In re Jacobs, 98 N. Y. 115; Bertholf v. O’Reilly, 74 N. Y. 515; Butchers’ Union v. Crescent City Co., Ill U. S. 756; Lochner v. People of New York, 198 U. S. 45, and cases cited.
While the Fourteenth Amendment may not limit the subjects upon which the police power of a State,may be exercised, so long as there is no discrimination on account of race or color, yet- in the exercise of that power the State cannot disregard the limitations which the Amendment imposes. Ex. parte Virginia, 100 U. S. 339; Bashier v. Connolly, 113 U. S. 27-31.
The Thirteenth, Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States were adopted, for the protection of the colored race, and their primary purpose was to establish absolute civil equality — that is, to place the colored race, in respect to civil rights, upon the same basis as the white race. The Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. 36; Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U. S. 303; Virginia v. Rives, 100 U. S. 313; Bush v. Kentucky, 107 U. S. 110.
But the effect of the Fourteenth Amendment is not only to secure equal civil rights to the colored race, but to protect the white race ialso in the -unmolested enjoyment of all its rights of person and property.
In order to avail himself of the protection guaranteed by that Amendment, it is not necessary for a party to show that the legislation complained of makes a discrimination against the white race, as such, or against the colored race, as such. It is sufficient if it can be shown that an attempt has been made to abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States, or to deprive persons of life, liberty or property without due process of law, or to deny to any person within the jurisdiction of the State the equal protection of the law; and if the legislation attempts to do any of these things, and the complaining party is, or will be, injured by its enforcement, he has a right to contest its validity. It is well settled that the word “person” in the Amendment includes corporations as well as individuals.
Social equality between persons of the white and colored races, or between persons of the same race, cannot be enforced by legislation, nor can the voluntary association of persons of different races, or persons of the same race, be constitutionally prohibited by legislation unless it is shown to be immoral, disorderly, or for some other reason so palpably injurious to the public welfare as to justify a direct interference with the personal liberty of the citizen; and even in such a case the restriction should go no further than is absolutely necessary.
The validity of this act cannot be sustained on the ground that it was an amendment or repeal of the charter of the college. Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U. S. 578, distinguished.
Mr. N. B. Hays, with whom Mr. James Breathitt, Attorney General of the State of Kentucky, Mr. Thos. B. McGregor and Mr. Charles H. Morris were on the brief, for defendant in error:
The statute is a reasonable' exercise of the police power. Legislative power is the power and authority vested in the general assembly to make laws. This power, within constitutional limitations, is absolute and complete. The object and purpose of every government is to foster and promote the happiness and general welfare of its people. The welfare of the State and community is paramount to any right or privilege of the individual citizen.' The rights of the citizen are guaranteed, subject to the welfare of the State. Hence, the State has not surrendered its sovereign power of legislation for the general welfare, by constitutional guaranties of individual liberty. Cooley’s Const. Lim. (6th ed.), 704; Lake View v. Rose Hill Cemetery Co., 70 Illinois, 192; Hare’s American Constitutional Laws, 766; Tiedeman’s Limitations of Police Power, 212; 111 U. S. 746, Justice Bradley; 165 U. S. 580, Justice Peck-ham; State v. Holden, 14 Utah, 718; Commonwealth v. Alger, 7 Cush. 85; Power v. Pennsylvania, 127 U. S. 678; 22 Am. and Eng. Ency. Law (2d ed.), 937.
This statute, the constitutional provision and the statutes of Kentucky providing for separate public schools for the two races; the statute» prohibiting the intermarriage of the two races; the statute incapacitating the issue of such marriages from inheriting; and the statute requiring common carriers to provide separate coaches for the two races, are in pari materia; and the Commonwealth, in the enactment and passage of all these laws, had but one common purpose and end — to preserve race identity, the purity of blood, and prevent an amalgamation, and such is the settled public policy of the State. Kentucky Statutes, §§ 795, 2097, 2098, 2111, 2114, 4428.
Several other States, as well as Kentucky, prohibit the two races from attending the same public school, and provide separate public schools for the two races. These laws have been held to be a reasonable and valid exercise of the police power of such States, and not to abridge any right or privilege granted by the Fourteenth Amendment to either of the races. Lehew v. Brummell, 103 Missouri, 551, 552; Cary v. Carter, 48 Indiana, 362; Martin v. Board of Education, 42 W. Va. 515; State of Ohio v. McCann, 21 Ohio St. 210; Cisco v. School-Board, 161 N. Y. 598; Bertonneau v. Board of Directors, 3 Woods, 180.
The laws of several States, including Kentucky, require common carriers to provide separate cars or coaches for the white and colored persons who travel over their lines. These laws have been upheld by the Supreme Court of the United States as a reasonable and valid exercise of the police power; and not to abridge any immunity or privilege secured by the Fourteenth Amendment to either of the races. West Chester & Philadelphia R. R. Co. v. Miles, 93 Am. Dec. 747, 748.
The legislature of Kentucky is vested with a large discretion and is at liberty to act for the preservation of the public peace and general welfare. The political rights of the. two races may be equal without being identical. The conditions of this statute apply equally to both races. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U. S. 678; L. & N. R. R. Co. v. Kentucky, 161 U. S. 677.
This statute neither denies the equal protection of the law, nor does it deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due process of law. Social equality is not guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, nor is voluntary association guaranteed to the races.
The State by this statute prohibits the voluntary co-education of the two racefe, nothing more. Unless white pupils are guaranteed the right to voluntarily associate with the pupils of the colored race, and vice versa, the act is not in conflict with, nor repugnant to, the Fourteenth Amendment. Cary v. Carter, 17 Am. Rep. 757.
All property in the Commonwealth and every property right is held subject, to those general regulations which are necessary to prornot.e. the common good and general welfare..
The; following authorities will illustrate the different phases in which this question has been presénted to the courts: Cooley's Constitutional Limitations (7th ed.), 830; Powérs v. Commonwealth, 101 Kentucky, 287; Dunn v. The Commonwealth, 88 Am. Rep. 344; N. Y., N. H. & H. R. R. Co. v. New York, 165 U. S. 628; Gladine v. Minnesota, 166 U: S. 427; Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U. S. 578; Nor. Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U. S. 196; Otis v. Parker, 187 U. S. 66; Holden v. Hardy, 169 U. S. 366.
The right to do business within a State may be regulated and sometimes prohibited when the contracts or business conflict with the policy of the State as contained in its statutes. Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U. S. 578.

Opinion:
Mr. Justice Brewer,
after making the foregoing statement, delivered the opinion of the court.
There is no dispute as to the facts. That the act does not violate the constitution of Kentucky is settled by the decision of its highest court, and the single question for our consideration is whether it conflicts with the Federal Constitution.- The Court of Appeals discussed at some length the general power of the State in respect to the separation of the two races. It also ruled that "the right to teach white,and negro children in a private school at the same time and place is not a property right. Besides, appellant as a corporation created by this State has no natural right to teach at all. Its right to teach is such as the State sees fit to give to it. The .State may withhold it altogether, or qualify it. Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165. U. S. 578."
Upon this we remark that when a state court decides a case upon two grounds, one Federal and the other non-Federal, this court will not disturb the .judgment if'the non-Federal ground, fairly construed, sustains the decision. Murdock v. City of Memphis, 20 Wall. 590, 636; Eustis v. Bolles, 150 U. S. 361; Giles v. Teasley, 193 U. S. 146, 160; Allen v. Arguimbau, 198 U. S. 149.
Again, the decision by a state court of the extent and limitation of the powers conferred by the State upon one of its own corporations is of a purely local nature. In creating a corporation a State may withhold powers which may be exercised- by and cannot be- denied to an individual. It is under no obligation to'treat both alike. In granting corporate powers the legislature may deem that the best interests of the State would be subserved by some restriction, and the corporation may not plead that in spite of the restriction it has more or greater powers because the citizen has. "The granting of such right or privilege [the right or privilege to be a corporation] rests entirely in the discretion of the State, and, of course, when granted, may be accompanied with such conditions as its legislature .may judge most befitting to its interests and policy." Home Ins. Co. v. New York, 134 U. S. 594, 600; Perrine v. Chesapeake & Delaware Canal Co., 9 How. 172, 184; Horn Silver Mining Co. v. New York, 143 U. S. 305-312. The act of 1904 forbids "any person, corporation or association of persons to maintain or operate any college," etc. Such a statute may conflict with the Federal Constitution in denying to individuals powers which they may rightfully exercise, and yet, at the same time, be valid as to a corporation created by the State.
It may be said that the. Court of Appeals sustained the validity of this section of the statute, both against individuals and corporations. It ruled that the legislation was within the power of the State, and that the State might rightfully thus restrain all individuals, corporations and associations. But it is unnecessary for us to consider anything more than the .question of its validity as applied to corporations.
The statute is clearly separable and may be valid as to one class while invalid as to another. Even if it were conceded that- its assertion of power over individuals cannot be sustained, still it must be upheld so far. as it restrains corporations.
There is no force in the suggestion that the statute, although clearly separable, must stand or fall as an entirety on the ground the legislature would not have enacted one part unless it could reach all. That the legislature of Kentucky desired to separate the teaching of white and colored children may be conceded, but it by no means follows that it would not have enforced the separation so far as it could do so, even though it could not make.it effective under all circumstances. In- other words, it is not at all unreasonable to believe that the legislature, although advised befofehand of the constitutional question, might have prohibited all organizations and corporations under its control from teaching white and colored children together, and thus made at least uniform official action. The rule of construction in questions of this nature is stated by Chief Justice Shaw in Warren v. Mayor of Charlestown, 2 Gray, 84, quoted approvingly by this court in Allen v. Louisiana, 103 U. S. 80-84.
"But if they are so mútually connected with and dependent on each other, as conditions, considerations or compensations for each other' as to warrant a belief that the legislature intended them as a whole, and that if all could not be carried into effect, the legislature would not pass the residue independently, and some parts are unconstitutional, all the provisions which are thus dependent, conditional or connected, must fall with them."
See also Loeb v. Township Trustees, 179 U. S. 472, 490, in which this court said:
" As one section of a statute may be repugnant to the Constitution without rendering the whole act void, so, one provision of a section may be invalid by reason of its not conforming to the Constitution, while all the other provisions may subject to no constitutional infirmity. One part may stand, while another will fall, unless the two are so connected or dependent on each other in subject-matter, meaning or purpose, that the good cannot remain without the bad. The point is, not whether the parts are contained in the same section, for, the distribution into sections is purely artificial; but whether they are essentially and inseparably connected in substance— whether the provisions are so interdependent that one- cannot operate without the other."
Further, inasmuch as the Court of Appeals considered the act separable, and while sustaining it as an- entirety gave án independent reason which applies only to corporations, it is obvious that it recognized the force of the suggestions we have made. And when a state statute is so interpreted this court should hesitate before it holds that, the Supreme Court of the State did not know what was the thought of the legislature in its enactment. Missouri, Kansas & Texas Railway v. McCann, 174 U. S. 580, 586; Tullís v. Lake Erie & Western Railroad, 175 U. S. 348, 353.
While the terms of the present charter are not given in the record, yet it was admitted on the trial that the defendant was a corporation organized and incorporated under the general statutes of the State of Kentucky, and of course the state courts, as well as this court on appeal, take judicial notice of those statutes. Further, in the brief of counsel for the defendant is given a history of the incorporation proceedings, together with the charters. From that it appears that Berea College was organized under the authority of an act for the incorporation of voluntary associations, approved March 9, 1854 (2 Stanton Rev. Stat. Ky. 553), which act was amended by an act of March 10, 1856 (2 Stanton, 555), and which in terms reserved to the General Assembly "the right to alter or repeal the charter of any associations formed under the provisions of this act, and the act to which this act is an amendment, at any time hereafter." After the constitution of 1891 was adopted by the State of Kéntucky, and on June 10, 1899, the college was reincorporated under the provisions of chap. 32, art. 8, Ky. Stat. (Carroll's Ky. Stat. 1903, p. 459), the charter defining its business in these words: "Its object is the education- of all persons who. may attend its institution of learning at Berea, and, in the language of the original articles, ' to promote the cause of Christ.' " The constitution of 1891 provided in § 3 of the bill of rights that "Every grant of a franchise, privilege or exemption shall remain, subject to revocation, alteration or amendment." Carroll's Ky. Stat. 1903, p. 86. So that the full power of amendment' was reserved to the legislature.
It is undoubtedly true that the reserved power to alter or amend is .subject to some limitations, and that under the guise of an amendment a new contract may not always be enforcible' upon the corporation or the stockholders; but it is settléd "that a power reserved to the,legislature to alter, amend or repeal a charter authorizes it to make any alteration or amendment of a charter granted subject to it, which will not .defeat or substantially impair the object of the grant, or any rights vested under it, and which the legislature may deem necessary to secure either that object or any public right. Commissioners on Inland Fisheries v. Holyoke Water Power Co., 104 Massachusetts, 446, 451; Holyoke Co. v. Lyman, 15 Wall. 500, 522;" Close v. Glenwood Cemetery, 107 U. S. 466, 476.
Construing the statute, the Court of Appeals held that "if the same school taught the different races at different times, though at the same place or at different places at the same time it would not be un)awful." Now, an amendment to the original charter, which does not destroy the power of the college to furnish education to all persons, but which simply separates them by time or place of instruction, cannot be said to "defeat or substantially impair the object of the grant." The language of the statute is not in terms an amendment, yet its effect is an amendment, and it would be resting too much on mere form to hold that a statute which in effect works a change in the terms of the charter is not to be considered as an amendment, because not so designated. The act itself, being separable, is to be read as though it in one section prohibited any person, in another section any corporation, and in a third any association of peráons to do the acts named. Reading the statute as containing a separate oro-hibition on all corporations, at least, all state corporations, it substantially declares that any authority given by previous charters to instruct the two races at the same time and in the same place is forbidden, and that prohibition being a departure from the terms of the original charter in this case may properly be adjudged an amendment.
Again, it is insisted that the Court of Appeals did not regard the legislation as making an amendment, because another prosecution instituted against the same corporation under the fourth section of the act, which makes it a misdemeanor to teach pupils of the two races in the same institution, even although one race is taught in one branch and another in another branch, provided the two branches are within twenty-five miles of each other, was held could not be sustained, the court saying: "This last section, we think, violates the limitations upon the police power: it is unreasonable and oppressive." But while so ruling it also held that this section could be ignored and that the remainder of the act was complete notwithstanding. Whether the reasoning of the court concerning the fourth section be satisfactory or not is immaterial, for no question of its validity is presented, and the Court of Appeals, while striking it down, sustained the balance of the act. We need concern ourselves only with the inquiry whether the first section can be upheld as coming within the power of a State over its own corporate creatures.
We are of opinion, for reasons stated, that it does come within that power, and on this ground the judgment of the Court of Appeals of Kentucky is
Affirmed.
Mr. Justice Holmes and Mr. Justice Moody concur in the judgment.