Case Name: CABUNNE vs. LINDELL
Court: Supreme Court of Missouri
Jurisdiction: Missouri
Decision Date: 1848-10
Citations: 12 Mo. 184
Docket Number: 
Parties: CABUNNE vs. LINDELL.
Judges: 
Reporter: Missouri Reports
Volume: 12
Pages: 184–193

Head Matter:
CABUNNE vs. LINDELL.
1. The notice of location to the Surveyor General when the land had been surveyed and the location and plat of survey when a survey was necessary, is sufficient to support an action of ejectment under our statute allowing such actions on New Madrid locations.
2. The statute of limitations does not commence to run against a New Madrid claimant, until the plat and survey of the laud located have been returned to the recorder of land titles-. This return consummates the claimant’s title.
3. If a location and survey of land have been made within the time required by the act of Congress of April 1822; a failure on the part of the Surveyor General to make a return to the recorder will not render the location and survey void; though it might delay an appropriation of the land.
APPEAL FROM ST. LOUIS CIRCUIT COURT!
Polic for appellant.
By the statute law of Missouri, the action of ejectment could' be maintained on a Nevi Madrid location.
Now the return of the survey and plat of the tract of land surveyed for Jos. Hunot or his legal representatives to the recorder of land titles, is either the “ location” of this particular New Madrid claim, or it is not. If it is, the plaintiff could not recover by virtue of it, Because by the act of Congress of 26th April 1822, no such location could be made after the 26th of April 1823. And this “ location” being made after the last named date, it was unauthorized and consequently void.
If it is not, but if on the contrary the certifícate No. 161, the notice of entry of date of 16th June 1818, and the survey No. 2500 of date of June 23 1819, either altogether, or anyone of them singly, constitute the “ location” then the plaintiff might have maintained his action of ejectment for the premises sued for in this action, ever since, at least, the 23d of June 1819, and ever since that time the deirt. could hold the premises adversely to the plaintiff and those under whom he claimed, and consequently ever since that time, the statute of limitations could run against the plaintiff’s claim. And it is no answer to the position, that the statute of limitations could run against the plaintiff'’s claim prior to the 8th January 1833, to say that plaintiff and those under whom he claimed had only an equity in the land up to that time, and that the legal title was is the United States, because that was true as well after the 8th of January 1833, as before. If this position be not true, the statute of limitations could never run until the legal title had passed out of the United States by patent or otherwise.
2d. But the case of Bagnel vs. Broderick (13 Pefers 436) was relied on in the court below and doubtless will be relied on in this court, as showing that the return of the survey to the recorder of land titles was the first appropriation of the land to the claimant and that consequently the statute of limitations could not begin to run until after that time.
To this we answer, that the case of Bagnell vs. Broderick goes further, and expiessly decides, if it decides any thing,te that the location referred to in the act of our General Assembly which defines and enumerates the different kinds of titles upon which ejectment may be maintained, is the plat and certificate of survey returned to the recorder of land titles.” But in this case such return was not made until the 8th January 1833 and of course by the authority of the case of Bagnell vs. Broderick there was not the “location” referred to by our statute until the 8th of January 1833. Now by the act of Congress of 26th April 1822 as already stated (3 Story’s Laws U. S. 1841) it is enacted “ that all warrants issued under the act for relief of the sufferers by earthquakes shall be located within one yeav after the passage of the act, that is before the 26th April 1823, in default whereof the same shall be null and void.” By this act of Congress therefore there could be no location of the warrant No. 161 in this case, after the 26th of April 1823, and of course the “ location” in this case, which was not made until the Sth of January 1833, in the language of the act of Congress must be “null and void” and if so, the plaintiff of course was not entitled to recover upon it.
3d. But it was heard for the first time in this state upon the decision of the case of Bagnell vs. Broderick (13 Peters 436) as far as I have been able to learn, that the return of the plat and certificate of survey to the recorder of land titles alone constitutes the New Madrid location which by our statute is made sufficient to maintain an action of ejectment. On the contrary in the administration of this law by our state courts, all of them even to that of highest authority and last resort, I believe it has been universally considered that when the lands selected by the New Madrid claimant under the warrant issued to him by the recorder of land titles, had been duly surveyed for him, the New Madrid location contemplated by the statute of Missouri ivas perfected, and legal evidence going to such a length has been considered proof a New Madrid location upon which a recovery in ejectment might be had, and if proof fo this extent does not ei-tablish a New Madrid location under our act of Assembly, why then there have been scores of recoveries in ejectment in the courts of this state and not a few perhaps even in this court, upen New Madrid locations when in point of law-no New Madrid location has been shown.
And even in this very cause the plaintiff closed his case in the court below in the first instance without ever offering any evidence of the return of the survey and plat to the recorder of land titles. That is in the opinion of his counsel he had made full proof of the New Madrid location contemplated by our statute, without offering any evidence of the return of the survey and plat to the recorder of land titles.
4th. Again, the instruction given by the court below is based upon the hypothesis, that the statute of limitations cannot begin to run against the plaintiff except from the time at whieh he was first enabled to bring an action of ejectment But that is not the language of our act of limitations. It does not say that hereafter r.o person shall bring an action of ejectment for lands &c., after the expiration of 20 years next after his right to bring an action of ejectment first accrued ; but no person shall make entry into lands &e., after the expiration of 20 years next after his right or title to the same first, accrued. See Ter. Laws vol 1 p. 598.
Now it is contended on the part of the appellant that,
1st. The statute of limitations in this case commenced to run against the appellee from the moment his right of entry first accrued, and,
2d. That his right of entry accrued against this defendant and against ail the world except perhaps the U. S. before the-8th January 1833. That it commenced to run on the 23d June 1819, when the land covered by the New Madrid location was surveyed and set apart for the New Madrid location and his legal representatives.
That from and after that date he had such a right of entry as is contemplated by- our statute of limitations and against which an adverse possession of 20 years would constitute a bar to recovery. It is clear to my mind that it is the right of entry against which the statute provides the bar, and not the right to maintain ejectment, and that aright of mtry existed in the appellee from and after the 23d June 1819.
Gamble for appellee.
The plaintiff asked and the court gave the 'following instruction:
That if the jury find from the evidence that the return of the survey of the tract of land located for Joseph Hunot or his legal representatives was made by the Surveyor General to the recorder of land titles on the 8th day of January 1833, the possession of the land in dispute by the defendant and those under whom Ire entered into possession is no bar to the plaintiffs recovery.
No instruction was asked by the defendant.
There can arise no other point in this case than whether the instruction given was correct and upon that, the decision in 13 Peters, of Bagnell vs. Broderick is conclusive.

Opinion:
Scott, judge,
delivered the opinion of the court.
This was an action of ejectment commenced on the 4th of March 1842 in the St. Louis circuit court by Lindell against Cabunne for a tract of land lying in the county of St. Louis.
Lindell claimed Under a New Madrid certificate granted by the recorder of land titles to Joseph Hunot or his legal representatives dated 12th August 1816. Evidence was also given of a notice of entry by Jos. C. Brown for Rufus Easton. Rufus Easton as the legal representative of Jos. Hunot, entered 480 acres of land by virtue of the above certificate No. 161 describing the land entered. Evidence was then given of the survey of the said entry dated 23d June 1819, afterwards a conveyance was read showing Lindell to be the representative of Hunot. The possession of the premises in controversy by the defendant was proved.
After the rejection of some evidence of a paper title, offered by the defendant, testimony was given tending to show an uninterrupted adverse possession in him for more than twenty years prior to the commencement of this suit.
The plaintiff then showed, that the survey of the location made by Easton was not returned to the recorder of land titles until the 8th January 1833.
The court at the instance of the plaintiff gave the following instruction : That if the jury find from the evidence that the return of the survey of the tract of land located for Jos. Hunot or his legal representatives, was made by the Surveyor General to the recorder of land titles on the 8th January 1833, then the possession of the land in dispute by the defendant and those under whom he entered into possession is no bar to the plaintiff's recovery. This instruction was excepted to—verdict and judgment for the plaintiff.
When this ease was opened a difficulty presented itself as to the propriety of allowing the statute of limitation as a defence, in cases when the fee of the land in dispute had not passed from the government. In the case of Johnston vs. Irwin 3 Ser. & R. 292 a doubt was expressed how far the statute of limitation operates as to private persons, when the legal estate remains in the commonwealth, and the court considering- it a question of great importance declined giving an opinion in relation to it, afterwards however in the case of McKoy vs. the Trustees of Dickinson College 4 Ser. & R. 302 it was held that a title by warrant and survey without a patent is within the act of limitations and is barred by an adverse possession of sufficient duration. So in the case of King et al vs. Martin 5 Martin's Lon. Rep. U. S. 197, it was held that settlers coming within the purview of the act of Congress of the 2d March 1805 for ascertaining and adjusting the titles a-nd claims to land within the territory of Orleans and district of Louisiana, may prescribe from the day that they were embraced by the dispositions of that law. These authoi'ities will warrant us in entering upon the investigation of the question here involved, without any expression of opinion as to the effect of a patent in such cases, issued after twenty years from the beginning of an inchoate title. Duke vs. Thompson et al 16 Ohio Rep. 34.
The doctrine of the cases of Bagnell et al vs. Broderick 13 Pet. 450, and Barry vs. Gamble 3 How 51, that until the plat and survey of the land located are returned to the recorder's office, the land selected is not appropriated to the use of the New Madrid claimant, has been relied on by Lindell in support of the judgment of the court below. On the other hand it is said, that the law of those cases is in diametrical opposition to the views which have always prevailed in this state and that the location and survey have always been regarded as sufficient evidence to maintain an ejectment. I am not aware that under the law for the relief of sufferers by earthquakes in New Madrid the question as to the time when the land becomes appropriated to the claimant has ever been discussed in our .courts. The notice of location to the Surveyor General when the land had been surveyed and the location and plat of survey when a survey was necessary, have always been regarded as sufficient to support an ejectment under our statute allowing such actions on New Madrid locations. Nor has the question been made, when the statute of limitations commenced running against a New Madrid claimant, whether from the date of the survey or fromsthe date of the return to the recorder's office, admitting that by the law of this state the survey was evidence sufficient to maintain an ejectment, yet if by the laws of the United States a party has no title to the land, if it has not been appropriated to his use, could the state impose on him the necessity of bringing suit within a given time under the penalty of losing his land ? The strong probability that the land selected would ultimately become the claimants, might well warrant the legislature in giving him an action of ejectment. There is nothing in the nature of our political institutions, which prohibits the states from passing laws enabling those who have taken incipient steps tojobtain a title to lands from the United States, to protect that land from the depredation of trespasses, although such steps may not be regarded by the general government as conferring a title, such legislation, so restricted as not to interfere with the primary disposition of the soil by the United States is in conflict with no provision of the federal constitution and is a necessary attribute of sovereignty in the states to enable them to protect the rights of all those within their jurisdiction. The remedy offered by the state, the claimant might use or not at his pleasure, but as he claimed under the laws of the United States, and looked to them for the inception and consummation of his grant, he could not be compelled by state legislation to bring suit before there was an actual appropriation of the land for his use in pursuance of the laws of the United States. This view of the matter reconciles the construction given to our statute regulating the action of ejectment with the interpretation! of the act for the relief of the sufferers in New Madrid by those courts whose province it is to expound it and to whose opinions we are compelled to conform.
It was said, that the question as to the time when the land first became appropriated to the use of the claimant did not arise in the case of Bagnel vs. Broderick. It is true that the cause might have been determined without an expression of opinion in relation to this question. But upon examination it will be found that the point was involved and that it was determined. As this is a question arising under the laws of the United States and as the highest tribunal known to the federal constitution has pronounced its judgment in relation to it, that judgment is obligatory on this court whatever opinion might be entertained of its correctness.
I am not impressed with the force of the argument drawn from the act of the 26th April 1822 to perfect certain locations and sales of public lands in Missouri. The second section of the act provides, that hereafter the holders and locators of N. Madrid warrants shall be bound in locating them to conform to the sectional and quarter sectional lines of the public surveys, as nearly as the respective quantities of the warrants will admit and all such warrants shall be located within one year after the passage of this act, in default whereof, the same shall be null and void. It was contended that as the return of the plat and survey to the recorder constitute the location, and as the return in this case was not made until years after the appointed time, the location is therefore null and void. The court in the case of Bagnell vs. Broderick did not intend to define what is a location, but what constituted an appropriation of the land by the claimant. They hold that all the requirements of the act of 1815 must be complied with to make an appropriation. That although the claimant may select and have the lands surveyed, that will not constitute an appropriation without a return of the plat and survey to the recorder. It is obvious, that from the words of the section above cited, that it was only designed to hasten the action of the claimants in selecting and having their lands surveyed, and could never have been intended to affect them injuriously, for the neglect of officers over whom they had no control. If their lands had been located and surveyed within the time required by the act, it could not be contended, that a failure in the officer afterwards to make a return would render the location and survey void, though it might delay an appropriation of the land. Judge McBride concurring, the judgment will be affirmed.