Case Name: Hogatt v. Bingaman
Court: High Court of Errors and Appeals of Mississippi
Jurisdiction: Mississippi
Decision Date: 1843-01
Citations: 7 Howard 565
Docket Number: 
Parties: Hogatt v. Bingaman.
Judges: Judge Sharkey concurred.
Reporter: Mississippi Reports
Volume: 8
Pages: 565–578

Head Matter:
Hogatt v. Bingaman.
JTotice of demand and protest of negotiable paper cannot be given through the post office, unless the same is to be transmitted by mail.
IN ERROR from the circuit court of the county of Adams.
Montgomery &. Boyd for plaintiff in error.
This was an action of assumpsit on defendant’s indorsement' of a note made by E. Bell for twenty-seven hundred dollars. Pleadings in common form.
On the trial plaintiff read the note sued on, and the deposition of Cook, which proved demand, non-payment and protest of the note, and that notice thereof to defendant was lodged in the post-office at Natchez, where the note was payable, addressed to the. defendant at Natchez. It was admitted that the post office in Natchez was the nearest to the defendant’s residence, and the one at which he usually received his letters and papers, and that he resided without the limits of the city.
The court instructed the jury that jf they believed the defendant resided nearer the post office at Natchez than to any other, and that the notice was not intended to go by mail, then the notice would not be sufficient unless given to him in person, or left' at, his residence or usual place of business; which instruction is assigned for error.
Potter for defendant in error.
Notices to indorsers may be sent by the post, where they are to be sent “through the post office to the post office nearest the party entitled’to notice.” Ireland v. Kip, 11 John. Rep. 232 ; Shed v. Brett, 1 Pickering, 411; Hussy v. Freeman, 10 Mass. 87. That-is, they may be so sent when they are to be transmitted or con veyed from one post office to another by the mail. The general rule is, that where the parties reside in the “same place,” the notice must be personal, or something tantamount; and where the parties do not reside in the same, the notice may be sent by mail. Now this “same place” is not a locality designated by the limits of a town or city; but it is rather a vicinage or neighborhood. It may be in and around a town where a post office is located, or it may be around a post-office located in a rural district. Barker v. Hall, 1 Martin & Yerg. 183.
The term, town, or city, does not convey the meaning of the rule as to the place, in cases of this kind. The word “town,” is used in some parts of the country to designate a locality circumscribed by city limits; in other parts it describes a tract of country in which there may be neither a city, town proper, or even a village; or such “town” may include one or more towns proper or a city, and even both. Thus the “town” of New Haven, Ct. embraces a tract several miles square, within which is the city of that name, and also the villages of Barnesville and Fair Haven. The same kind of towns are found in New York.
There may be two “places” in the same town; and where a notice is sent by mail to a town in which there are two post-offices, it must be sent to the office nearest the indorser; for that is his “place” to receive it. Cuyler v. Nellis, 4 Wend. 398.
So, where there are two post-offices in the same town, the holder residing near the one office may transmit a notice by mail to an indorser residing near the other; for the holder resides at the place where the notice should be mailed, and the indorser resides at the place where it is to be delivered. Ranson v. Ranson. 2 Hill’s N. Y. Rep.
A notice transmitted by mail to the post-office, near which the indorser resides, is sufficient, because the indorser resides at the place, although not within the town. So where the indorser resides near the town where the holder lives, they both reside at the same place.
Where notice is sent by a messenger, to an indorser residing at a different place, it must be left with the indorser, or at his house or place of business. In such a case, the messenger may not deposit the notice in the post office of the place where the indorser resides; because notice by a messenger is in the nature of personal notice. Now suppose the defendant, in this case had sought to notify as an indorser the postmaster at Natchez, could he so contrive to give the notice, that, under the rule for notice where the parties reside at different places, it should be a notice by the post? Or suppose the postmaster has notified the defendant as an indorser by delivering a notice to him from the post-offices, would it be notice by the post, or a personal notice?
It is an universal rule, that a notice to an indorser, sent “by the post,” must be deposited in the post-office in time to “go out” by a particular mail; now when should the notice to this defendant have been deposited in the office, and by what • mail was it to “go out?”
It is said that the holder is only bound to exercise due diligence, and that a deposit in the post-office was, under the circumstances of this case, a compliance with the rule; but it has to some extent become a settled rule of law that a party must give notice in a particular manner, or he will not be permitted to show due diligence. Thus it is well settled, that where the holder and indorser reside in the same place, proof of a notice deposited in the post-office does not show due diligence, although the indorser regularly receives his letters there; because the holder is to be the active party, he is to give the notice, and in such a case to bring it home to the indorser; the latter is not bound to go after it. On this ground the decision in Bank of Columbia v. Lawrence, 1 Peters’ Rep. is erroneous. The reason for that decision is, that it would be inconvenient to the holder to serve personal notice on an indorser residing three miles distant, and it was accordingly imposed as a duty on the indorser to go the same distance and get the notice. In that case, as in this, there was no proof that notice was received in due time.
The conclusion is, that where notice is sent by mail, it must be deposited in one post-office to be forwarded by the post and delivered to the indorser at another office; that, where holder and indorser reside at the same place, the notice may not be there deposited in the post-office; and that this defendant was as much entitled to personal notice as if he had resided within the limits of the city of Natchez.
Other authorities applicable to this case are cited in the opinion delivered by this court in the case of Patrick v. Beazley, 6 How. 609.
Counsel for plaintiff insist on the “presumption” that the defendant did receive this notice; but “notice is of the essence of the contract, and ought not to rest on presumption or inference.” Patterson Bank v. Butler, 7 Hal. 258; Smedes v. Bank of Utica, 20 Johns. Rep. 372; Chitty on Bills, ed. of 1836, p. 511, 643.
Suppose this presumption to be correct, where was the proof, direct or circumstantial, that this notice was received in due time?
Again: it is urged that the authority of Stamps v. Brown, Walker’s Rep. overruled in Patrick v. Beasley, should be confirmed, because it had become a rule of action in this state.
The same argument will sustain the decision in Patrick v. Beazley. On this point there can be but this question: what is the law, and in which of these two cases was the true rule declared? If the case of Stamps v. Brown passed without deliberation, it was properly reviewed; if the decision was founded on a mistake of law, or a misapprehension of the case there quoted and relied on, it was the duty of this court to correct it. Williams v. Germaine, 7 Barn. & Ores. 408, Lord Tenterden. Lord Eldon felt bound to understand the principle of a case before he confirmed it. Aldrich v. Cooper, 8 Tesey, 388. Lord Ellenborough overruled a case “as having been decided against principle.” Purcell v. McNamara, 9 East, 161.
Kent considers that hasty and crude decisions ought to be examined without fear and revised without reluctance. 1 Com. 477. There can be no doubt of the power of courts to review and correct former decisions; the three thousand cases overruled, denied, doubted, or limited in their application, collected by Mr. Greenleaf, show that this power has been not rarely exercised.

Opinion:
Mr. Justice Clayton
delivered the opinion of the court.
The only question in this case is, whether it is sufficient to give notice through the post office of the dishonor o.f a note or bill of exchange, when the parties live in or near the same town, and use the same post office; or, in other words, when the post office is used as a place of deposite, not as a medium of transmission.
This point has heretofore been repeatedly before the courts of this state, and they have, unfortunately, given contradictory decisions. The first case reported is that of Stamps v. Brown, Walker 576, in which it was held that such notice was sufficient. The case of Wilcox & Fearn v. McNutt, 2 How. 784, next came up. It was there held that the notice was insufficient, and that the custom of the notaries at Vicksburg to give notice in that way could not alter the law. The next case in order is that of Patrick v. Beazley, 6 How. 609, in which the same doctrine is held as in 2 How., but by a divided court.
The question is now again presented to us, and a change of the decisions in these two last cases is most earnestly pressed on us, upon the ground that long usage and practice under the first decision had consecrated it, and any departure from it will cause the loss of millions of property. These arguments address themselves with persuasive force to our minds, and had so much weight with the judge who dissented in the case of Patrick v. Beazley that he delivered a very able opinion in their support. A favorite maxim with one of the most powerful modern statesmen was, "ne movete quieta" — do not disturb things that are settled; and this maxim deserves great weight with every judge. It should require very controlling considerations to induce any court to break down a former decision and lay again the foundations of the law.
Yet, in the case before us, little room is left for the influence of reasons like these. The decisions already stand opposed to each other. Six years after the first decision was made, a different rule was adopted. Five years have since elapsed, and this court has already again declared its intention to abide by the rule last adopted. It would certainly not tend to add stability to our decisions, and to give permanence and duration to our recorded opinions, were we now to retrace our former steps and go back to the rule in Walker.
The case of Patrick v. Beazley upon its face shows that it was decided upon mature deliberation. Most of the reported decisions were examined, and the principle established vindicated by showing it to be in accordance with the current of decisions. This conclusion is sustained by a very recent case in 2 Hill's N. Y. Rep. 590, in which this often litigated question was discussed. The supreme court of that state, more conversant with commercial law in all its bearings than any other in the union, without dissent say, "Whether mail service of notice is good or not, does not depend upon the inquiry whether the person to be charged resides within the same legal district; but upon the question whether the notice may be transmitted by mail from the place of presentment or demand to another post office where the drawer or indorser usually receives his letters and papers " See, to same effect, 19 Maine, 447.
Were the question an open one in our state, I should be of opinion that the rule thus laid down is correct; and, as it accords with the two latest decisions of our highest tribunal, I feel bound to give it my concurrence.
The judgment of the court below is affirmed.
Judge Sharkey concurred.