Case Name: BOUSSNEUR v. CITY OF DETROIT
Court: Michigan Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1908-07-13
Citations: 153 Mich. 585
Docket Number: Docket No. 109
Parties: BOUSSNEUR v. CITY OF DETROIT.
Judges: Montgomery, Ostrander, Hooker, and Moore, JJ., concurred with Carpenter, J. McAlvay, J., concurred in the result.
Reporter: Michigan Reports
Volume: 153
Pages: 585–593

Head Matter:
BOUSSNEUR v. CITY OF DETROIT.
1. Municipal Corporations — Opening Streets — Condemnation Proceedings — Irregularities—Effect—Special Assessments.
Where such proceedings to open a street were taken under chapter 90, 1 Comp. Laws, as resulted in a determination of ■ the necessity of the improvement by one jury, and an assessment of the value of the property and of the benefits by another, and the award of the second jury was accepted by the owners of the property and paid by the city, there was a waiver by the only parties directly interested of the irregularity of submitting the questions to two juries, and persons whose only relation to the proceedings was their liability for benefits could not enjoin the collection of the special assessments because of the irregularity complained of. Grant, C. J., and Blair, J., dissenting.
2. Same — Award—Acceptance—Time.
That the award was not accepted by the landowners, nor the money paid by the city, until after the bill was filed in this case, did not affect the right of the parties to waive the irregularities, nor to show such acceptance as evidence of waiver, since if the parties had a right to waive the irregularities, complainants could not deprive them of it by filing a bill.
3. Same — Assessments—Omission of Property — Relief.
Whether property within a special assessment district belonging to a church, and omitted from the assessment on the theory that it was exempt, should have been included, cannot be decided on a bill to enjoin the collection of the special assessment, since if the property should have been included the only relief available to complainants would be a reduction of their assessments, and to entitle them to that they should tender their proportionate share of the taxes and point out the extent of their reduction.
Appeal from Wayne; Mandell, J.
Submitted April 16, 1908,
(Docket No. 109.)
Reargued June 2, 1908.
Decided July 13, 1908.
Bill by John N. Boussneur against the city of Detroit and Thomas M. Lucking, receiver of taxes, to enjoin the collection of an assessment. Horace H. Dickinson and others intervened as parties complainant praying the same relief. From a decree for complainants, defendants appeal.
Reversed, and bill dismissed.
Keena, Lightner & Oxtoby, for complainants.
Denton Guinness (Timothy E. Tarsney, of counsel), for defendants.
In 1902 proceedings were instituted in the recorder’s court for the city of Detroit for the opening of Hancock avenue from Fourteenth avenue to Grand River avenue. The jury duly impaneled in that case determined that it was necessary to have this avenue opened and valued the property to be taken at $18,356.05. The judge of the recorder’s court before whom the proceedings were had confirmed that portion of the verdict finding the necessity and set aside that portion of the verdict valuing the property. Subsequently, in 1906, a second jury was called for the purpose of assessing the value of said property. They assessed the value at $13,150. These proceedings were confirmed by the common council of the city of Detroit, and that body, acting in pursuance of the authority given it by the charter, directed a portion of the amount found by said jury — two-thirds—to be assessed against property in the locality of the proposed improvement specially benefited. A certain piece of land belonging to St. Leo’s parish, which would otherwise have been included, was omitted from the assessment district because it was used for church purposes. Complainant and the intervening complainants are the owners whose property, is made subject to said local assessment. They seek an injunction prohibiting the enforcement of said assessment upon two grounds:
(1) That the recorder’s court lost jurisdiction by having one jury determine the question of necessity and another assess the value of the property taken.
(2) That the common council had no right to leave out of the assessment district the property of the Catholic church above mentioned.
Defendants answered and the case was heard in the lower court on pleadings and testimony taken in open court. It appeared by this testimony that the owners whose property was taken for the proposed improvement accepted the compensation awarded them by the second jury. The learned trial judge gave complainant and the intervening complainants a decree. Defendants appeal.

Opinion:
Carpenter, J.
(after stating the facts). The first question for our consideration is that raised by the contention of complainants that the recorder's court had no jurisdiction because the questions of necessity and valuation of property were determined by two different juries. It is by no means clear that either the Constitution or statutes of this State forbid the practice com plained of. In City of Detroit v. Beecher, 75 Mich. 454 (4 L. R. A. 813), in an appeal from proceedings instituted for the purpose of opening a street, this court affirmed the judgment with the exception of the valuation of three parcels of land owned by appellant. As to this, it directed an appraisement by another jury. Thus the questions of necessity and the valuation of the property were in that case, by the judgment of this court, determined by two different juries. Assuming, however, but not deciding, that such practice is forbidden, it by no means follows that complainant and the intervening complainants can raise the objection. The parties to the condemnation proceedings, viz., the city on the one hand and those whose property is taken on the other, do not raise it. On the contrary they acquiesced in the proceeding.
They treated the judgment as a valid and binding judgment. The city paid the award and the property holders accepted it. This affords conclusive evidence that any departure from proper practice was consented to by the parties directly interested in the proceedings. They had a right to consent to this departure and the judgment rendered under these circumstances would be just as binding upon them as if the proceedings had been regular in every particular. The property was therefore taken for street purposes just as effectually as it possibly could be taken under any condemnation proceedings that might be instituted.
Complainant and the intervening complainants are specially benefited by the taking of this property and they are therefore taxed to pay a portion of its cost. They are not affected by any irregularities in the taking of that property which did not affect those whose property was taken. As the proceedings were sufficiently regular to take the property, they are sufficiently regular to be the basis of proceedings to raise a tax to be used in paying for it. Complainant and the intervening complainants cannot escape taxation by reason of the non-prejudicial irregularities of which they complain.- This is settled by our decision in Borgman v. City of Detroit, 103 Mich. 361. There, in a street opening case, by consent of all parties to the proceedings, a jury of 11 instead of 13 determined the question of necessity and assessed the value of the property taken. This was clearly a departure from the method provided by the Constitution and statutes. We held that, as this irregularity was waived by the parties to the proceeding, it was not open to objection by those whose property was assessed for the improvement, and a bill filed by them to restrain the enforcement of such an assessment was dismissed. See, also, Scotten v. City of Detroit, 106 Mich. 564; Brown v. City of Saginaw, 10? Mich. 643. I am therefore of the opinion that complainants' right to relief cannot be based upon the ground that the proceedings in the recorder's court were fatally defective.
On the reargument of this case — which took place after the preparation of this opinion — the point was made by complainants' counsel that the payment and acceptance of the award cannot be considered, since that took place after the institution of this suit. There might be force in this contention if this opinion proceeded upon the ground that the payment of the award was what passed the title to the condemned property. But the opinion does not proceed upon that ground. It proceeds upon the ground that the condemnation proceedings were valid and effectual because any departure from proper practice was consented to by all the parties interested therein. The payment and acceptance of the award is used merely as evidence of that consent, and I think it might be said it only corroborates other evidence contained in the record. If, however, we assume the payment and acceptance of the award to be the only evidence of consent found in this record, we affirm our right to use it as such evidence, and to hold it conclusive in this case. Under this assumption, at the time this suit was instituted — for it was instituted before the lapse of the time given the city to pay the award — the parties to the proceeding had a right either to raise objec tions or to waive all irregularities occurring therein. Surely complainants By commencing this suit could not deprive these parties of their right to waive said irregularities. They had just as much right to waive them after this suit was commenced as before, and such waiver cured all irregularities in the proceedings, and, under the reasoning of this opinion, made them valid and effectual for all purposes.
The effect of exempting the property of St. Leo's church property. The city authorities exempted this property because they thought they were required to do so by section 3825 and subd. 5 of section 3830, 1 Comp. Laws. Whether or not they were right in this, we are not called upon to determine. If they were wrong it would not entitle complainant and the intervening complainants to relief in this case. For in that case their property should still be assessed for a smaller amount, and, therefore, all they could claim would be a reduction in the amount of their taxes. They make no such claim. To entitle them to equitable relief in such a case, they should have tendered their proportionate share of the taxes and pointed out the extent of their reduction. This they did'not do. They claim relief upon no such ground, and we cannot give it to them. See Grand Rapids, etc., R. Co. v. City of Grand Rapids, 137 Mich. 596, 597.
If I am right in the foregoing views, the decree of the circuit court should be reversed and a decree entered in this court dismissing complainants' bill, with costs of both courts.
Montgomery, Ostrander, Hooker, and Moore, JJ., concurred with Carpenter, J. McAlvay, J., concurred in the result.