Case Name: KAMBAS v. ST. JOSEPH'S MERCY HOSPITAL OF DETROIT, MICHIGAN
Court: Michigan Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1971-04-26
Citations: 33 Mich. App. 127
Docket Number: Docket No. 10091
Parties: KAMBAS v. ST. JOSEPH’S MERCY HOSPITAL OF DETROIT, MICHIGAN
Judges: Before: Danhof, P. J., and McGregor and Levin, JJ.
Reporter: Michigan appeals reports; cases decided in the Michigan Court of Appeals.
Volume: 33
Pages: 127–140

Head Matter:
KAMBAS v. ST. JOSEPH’S MERCY HOSPITAL OF DETROIT, MICHIGAN
Opinion op the Court
1. Negligence — Malpractice—Statutes op Limitation — Scope op Coverage — Legislative Intent.
The legislative intent in the two-year statute of limitations for malpractice actions is to treat all state-licensed professions in the same manner (MCLA §§ 600.2912, 600.5838.)
2. Negligence — Malpractice—Nurses—Registered Nurses.
A registered nurse is a member of a profession and may be held liable if she deviates from the standards of her profession; since a registered nurse is liable as a professional, a registered nurse is entitled to the benefits of the two-year malpractice statute of limitations (MCLA §§ 338.1152, 600.2912, 600.5838).
References for Points in Headnotes
51 Am Jur 2d, Limitation of Actions § 49.
41 Am Jur, Physicians and Surgeons §§ 122, 123.
41 Am Jur, Physicians and Surgeons §§ 122, 123.
51 Am Jur 2d, Limitation of Actions § 251.
50 Am Jur, Statutes § 275.
50 Am Jur, Statutes § 454.
Resort to constitutional or legislative debates, committee reports, journals, etc., as aid in construction of constitution or statute. 70 ALR 5.
3. Negligence — Malpractice—Statute of Limitations — Principal and Agent.
A statute of limitations that bars a claim against an agent equally protects those in whose behalf he aeted as agent where there are no circumstances of equity to prevent the operation of the statute in the principal’s favor.
4. Negligence — Malpractice—Nurses—Principal and Agent— Statute op Limitations.
A claim against a hospital whose nurses allegedly caused personal injury by their negligent administration of drugs was barred by the statute of limitations governing malpractice actions where the two-year limitation period has run and where the theory upon which the hospital’s liability was based was one of vicarious liability, plaintiff not having alleged any negligence on the part of the hospital itself.
Dissent by Levin, J.
5. Negligence — Nurses—Statute of Limitations — Malpractice
The two-year statute of limitations for malpractice actions applies only to actions charging malpractice by physicians, surgeons, or dentists; the three-year limitation period for tort actions applies to an action claiming that the negligence of nurses employed by a hospital caused plaintiff’s injuries (MCLA § 600.5805).
6. Negligence — Malpractice—Definition—Statute of Limitations.
Malpractice, for the purpose of two-year statute of limitations, means an action charging malpractice against physicians, dentists, and surgeons (MCLA § 600.5805).
7. Statutes — Statutory Revision — Construction—Presumption.
A presumption exists that the sections of a general revision statute have the same meaning as the original sections, notwithstanding an alteration in phraseology.
8. Statutes — General Revision — Construction—Reviser’s Notes.
The notes of the revisers of a general revision of the laws are authoritative guides to legislative intent.
Appeal from Washtenaw, John W. Conlin, J.
Submitted Division 1 March 9, 1971, at Detroit.
(Docket No. 10091.)
Decided April 26, 1971.
Leave to appeal granted, 385 Mich 786.
Complaint by Louis Kambas against St. Joseph’s Mercy Hospital of Detroit for damages for injuries from the negligent administration of drugs by registered nurses employed by the hospital. Accelerated judgment for defendant. Plaintiff appeals.
Affirmed.
Ripple and Chambers, P. C. (by Donnelly W. Had-den), for plaintiff.
Keyes, Creal ■<& Hurbis, for defendant.
Before: Danhof, P. J., and McGregor and Levin, JJ.

Opinion:
Danhof, J.
On January 17, 1969, the plaintiff commenced this action seeking to recover for damages which were allegedly inflicted in April of 1966. The defendant moved for an accelerated judgment under GCR 1963, 116.1(5) on the basis of the two-year statute of limitations governing malpractice actions, MOLA 600.5805(3) (Stat Ann 1962 Rev § 27 A-.5805 [3]).
The plaintiff had suffered a heart attack and had been admitted to the defendant hospital for treatment. Part of the treatment consisted of administering anticoagulants. The plaintiff contends that these drugs were negligently administered by registered nurses who were employed by the defendant.
On appeal the plaintiff raises two issues. First, does the malpractice statute of limitations apply to bar an action charging negligence by a registered nurse in the performance of her duties? Second, even if an action directly against a registered nurse is barred by the two-year statute of limitations, does that statute bar an action against her employer hos pital commenced within three yearsT We conclude that both of these questions must be answered in the affirmative.
MCLA § 600.2912 (Stat Ann 1962 Rev § 27A.2912) provides:
"A civil action for malpractice may he maintained against any person professing or holding himself out to he a member of a state licensed profession. The rules of the common law applicable to actions against members of a state licensed profession, for malpractice, are applicable against any person who holds himself out to be a member of a state licensed profession."
The committee comment to this statute reads:
"The source section pertained only to physicians and surgeons. Note that the broadening of this section does not create a new cause of action. Members of state licensed professions are liable for malpractice at common law, as are unlicensed persons. What this section does is to hold the unlicensed person to the standard of care to which a member of the state licensed profession would be held, instead of to the standard of care of a layman, to which unlicensed persons are held at present."
MCLA § 600.5838 (Stat Ann 1962 Rev § 27A.5838) provides:
"A claim based on the malpractice of a person who is, or holds himself out to be, a member of a state licensed profession accrues at the time that person discontinues treating or otherwise serving the plaintiff in a professional or pseudo-professional capacity as to the matters out of which the claim for malpractice arose."
These statutes certainly indicate that the Legislature has intended to treat all professions in the same manner. If registered nursing is a profession, as that term is used in the Revised Judicature Act, the malpractice statute of limitations must he applied.
The Legislature has defined the duties of a registered nurse, MCLA 1971 Cum Supp § 338.1152 (Stat Ann 1969 Rev § 14.694[2]:
"(c) 'Practice of professional nursing' means the performance for compensation:
(i) Of any act requiring substantial specialized judgment and skill founded on formal education which provides knowledge and application of the principles of nursing based on biological, physical and social sciences, in the care, counsel, treatment or observation of the ill, injured or infirm, or for the maintenance of the health or the prevention of illness of others.
(ii) Of the supervising, directing or teaching of less skilled personnel in the carrying out of delegated nursing activities."
In Prosser, Torts (3d ed), pp 164, 165, the following statement is found:
"Professional men in general, and those who undertake any work calling for special skill, are required not only to exercise reasonable care in what they do, but also to possess a standard minimum of special knowledge and ability. Most of the decided cases have dealt with physicians and surgeons, but the same is undoubtedly true of dentists, pharmacists, psychiatrists, attorneys, architects and engineers, accountants, abstractors of title, and many other professions and even skilled trades."
In the light of all of this it is clear that a registered nurse is a member of a profession and may be held liable if she deviates from the standards of that profession. It would indeed be anomalous to hold that she is not entitled to the benefit of the malpractice statute of limitations.
In dealing with the plaintiff's second contention, the trial court held that the malpractice statute of limitations barred an action against the hospital and quoted the following from 34 Am Jur, Limitation of Actions, § 386 :
" 'A statute that bars a claim against an agent equally protects those in whose behalf he acted as agent, where there are no circumstances of equity to prevent the operation of the statute in their favor.' "
We agree with the trial court. The plaintiff contends that the hospital is vicariously liable for the nurses' malpractice. He does not contend that the hospital is guilty of any negligence of its own. On these facts, the malpractice statute of limitations applies to an action against the hospital. The statute cannot be avoided merely by changing defendants.
Affirmed, costs to the defendant.
McGregor, J., concurred.