Case Name: Percival W. Copeland, Respondent, v. Francis M. Hugo, Appellant, Impleaded with Interstate Mortgage Corporation, Defendant
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1925-01-15
Citations: 212 A.D. 229
Docket Number: 
Parties: Percival W. Copeland, Respondent, v. Francis M. Hugo, Appellant, Impleaded with Interstate Mortgage Corporation, Defendant.
Judges: 
Reporter: Appellate Division Reports
Volume: 212
Pages: 229–231

Head Matter:
Percival W. Copeland, Respondent, v. Francis M. Hugo, Appellant, Impleaded with Interstate Mortgage Corporation, Defendant.
Fourth Department,
January 15, 1925.
Pleadings — complaint — amendment may be made at trial under Civil Practice Act, § 106, and Rules of Civil Practice, rule 166, in discretion of court on such conditions as court may impose — definite scope of amendment must be stated — notwithstanding plaintiff failed to state amendment desired, order permitting service of amended complaint is affirmed under circumstances in this case.
A judge presiding at a trial has the same power, under section 105 of the Civil Practice Act, and rule 166 of the Rules of Civil Practice, to grant amendments to a complaint as a judge at Special Term, and in his discretion he may permit the complaint to be so amended as to change the cause of action, subject, likewise, in his discretion, to such terms and conditions as he may see fit to impose for the protection of the defendant.
However, when an amendment is sought to a complaint, the attorney for the plaintiff should point out definitely the seqpe of the proposed amendment in order that both the judge and the opposing counsel may be informed of the intentions of the plaintiff.
Notwithstanding the plaintiff’s attorney did not follow the required practice and did not state the scope of the-desired amendment, the order by the Trial Term, authorizing the plaintiff to serve an amended complaint, is affirmed, since it appears that the order was granted after a long conference between the judge and the attorneys for the parties and that the record includes the amended pleading actually served.
Davis, J., dissents, with memorandum.
Appeal by the defendant, Francis M. Hugo, from an order of the Supreme Court, made at the Oneida Trial Term and entered in the office of the clerk of the county of Oneida on the 10th day of October, 1924, granting plaintiff’s motion to withdraw a juror, permitting plaintiff to serve an amended complaint in such form and setting up such cause of action as he might desire or be advised, and permitting such cause of action set up in such amended complaint to be brought either in law or equity.
Moses G. Hubbard, Jr., for the appellant.
C. R. Dewey [H. T. Dorr anee of counsel], for the respondent.

Opinion:
Per Curiam:
Under the provisions of the Civil Practice Act and the Rules of Civil Practice, the judge presiding at the trial has the same power to grant amendments to pleadings as has the judge at Special Term. (Civ. Prac. Act, § 105; Rules Civ. Prac. rule 166; Feizi v. Second Russian Ins. Co., 199 App. Div. 775.) This includes the power to allow amendments changing the cause of action. (Feizi v. Second Russian Ins. Co., supra; Deyo v. Morss, 144 N. Y. 216.) The exercise of the power is safeguarded by giving the judge authority to " adjourn the trial or direct a new trial, and impose terms and conditions in his discretion."
When such an amendment is sought, counsel should point out definitely the scope of the amendment intended. Unless this is done opposing counsel may be deprived of the full opportunity of voicing his objections and the judge may lack the necessary knowledge upon which his determination of terms and conditions must be based. (Gordon v. Anderson, 200 App. Div. 616.)
In the present case, so far as appears upon the record, the proper practice in this respect was not followed. The scope of the amendment desired was not stated nor did the order allowing the amendment impose any limitations in respect to its nature.
However, counsel for both appellant and respondent stated on the argument that the motion followed a long conference with the trial justice and the record includes the amended pleading actually served.
We think it would be futile under these circumstances to reverse, the order because the proper practice was not followed and we prefer bo consider the order as limited to the granting of leave to serve the amended complaint which has in fact been interposed.
When so viewed we find no abuse of discretion.
We, therefore, affirm the order, without costs.
Present — Hubbs, P. J., Davis, Sears, Crouch and Taylor, JJ. All concur; except Davis, J., who dissents in a memorandum.