Case Name: Kenneth L. ROBERTS v. STEVENS CLINIC HOSPITAL, INC. and Vernon J. Magnus, M.D.
Court: Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia
Jurisdiction: West Virginia
Decision Date: 1986-04-02
Citations: 176 W. Va. 492
Docket Number: Nos. 16598, 16599
Parties: Kenneth L. ROBERTS v. STEVENS CLINIC HOSPITAL, INC. and Vernon J. Magnus, M.D.
Judges: 
Reporter: West Virginia Supreme Court
Volume: 176
Pages: 492–514

Head Matter:
345 S.E.2d 791
Kenneth L. ROBERTS v. STEVENS CLINIC HOSPITAL, INC. and Vernon J. Magnus, M.D.
Nos. 16598, 16599.
Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.
April 2, 1986.
Dissenting Opinions June 12, 1986.
G. David Brumfield, Ballard & Brum-field, Welch, for appellee.
Lawrence E. Morhous, David M. Kersey, Hudgins, Coulling, Brewster, Morhous & Cameron, Bluefield, George Sharp, Kay, Casto & Chaney, Charleston, for Stevens Clinic.
David L. Shuman, Stephen D. Annand, Shuman, Annand & Poe, Edward T. Eard-ley, Steptoe & Johnson, Charleston, Rudolph J. Murensky, Laearia & Murensky, Welch, for Vernon J. Magnus, M.D.

Opinion:
NEELY, Justice:
In this appeal we decide whether we should sustain a McDowell County Circuit Court $10,000,000 jury award in favor of the parents and two siblings of Michael Joseph Roberts, a 2V2-year-old child who died as the result of medical malpractice. We find no reversible error in the conduct of the trial, but we find it appropriate to enter a remittitur of $7,000,000.
Kenneth and Joyce Roberts are a young couple who were married in 1976. Joyce had two children, Pepper and Ritchie, before she and Kenneth were married. And even though Ken adopted Pepper and Rit-chie after the marriage, Ken and Joyce wanted to have a child of their own. After three years, Joyce gave birth to Michael Joseph Roberts on 22 December 1979. Because of a hysterectomy after Michael's birth, Joyce is no longer able to have children.
The evidence at trial indicated that Michael was the darling of the whole family. He was both an intelligent and happy little boy who was particularly close to his mother. The jury had before it substantial evidence that since Michael's death Joyce has been overwhelmed by grief and that the Roberts' family is no longer a happy household. Dr. Kenneth J. Manges, clinical psychologist, testified that each member of the Roberts' family suffered psychological injury because of the death of Michael. Rit-chie is now withdrawn, and no longer sleeps in the bedroom he and Michael formerly shared. The impact, however, has been greatest on Joyce. Dr. Manges testified that Joyce had difficulty sleeping, eating, concentrating, organizing herself and her thoughts, and that she had become overly protective of her other children. At the time of trial Joyce had spent many nights crying and writing poems to Mi chael, and there was evidence that she continues to suffer from chronic diarrhea and vomiting. Furthermore, Dr. Manges testified that the manner in which the child died, and the parents' involvement with the child at the hospital immediately before his death increased their suffering, guilt, and anger.
The events leading to Michael's death began on the evening of 12 June 1982 when Michael had an episode of rectal bleeding following a bowel movement. Joyce was concerned, but was unable to reach Michael's pediatrician, Allen B. Carr, M.D. Joyce called Vernon J. Magnus, M.D., who attended the same church as the Roberts. Dr. Magnus checked Michael, and although the bleeding stopped after his bowel movement, Dr. Magnus recommended that Michael return for a barium x-ray. The x-ray was normal, but Dr. Magnus suggested that he do a sigmoidoscopy — a procedure by which a doctor examines a patient's rectum and lower colon.
On 21 June 1982, Dr. Magnus attempted a sigmoidoscopy in his office at the Stevens Clinic Hospital, but it hurt Michael and he stopped. Dr. Magnus then recommended a sigmoidoscopy under general anesthesia. He believed Michael might have a polyp or a small hemorrhoid in the lower part of his rectum that had caused the bleeding. Dr. Magnus told the Roberts that if Michael had a polyp, it could be snipped off in a simple procedure that might not even require a stitch.
The Roberts family then went on a two-week vacation during which there were two occasions when mild bleeding recurred.
On 13 July Dr. Magnus performed a sig-moidoscopy on Michael. In addition to the sigmoidoscopy, however, Dr. Magnus performed a biopsy without the parents' permission, and in doing so perforated Michael's colon. Fecal material spewed into the child's abdominal cavity and, as a result, Michael developed peritonitis, a severe infection. The sigmoidoscopy and biopsy were performed at approximately 8:30 a.m. and Michael was returned to his room at approximately 9:50 a.m. following the procedure. At that time Mrs. Roberts noticed that Michael's stomach was swollen. She asked nurse Sandy Alderman and Dr. Mag-nus who came into the room what was wrong with Michael. Dr. Magnus said it was just gas. The jury was entitled to infer that at that point Dr. Magnus had still not informed the Roberts that he had performed an unauthorized biopsy.
Dr. Magnus left immediately after talking with Joyce and Ken. Later in the morning, however, Joyce noticed Michael's throat quivering. She called for a nurse; the nurse checked Michael and determined that he had labored breathing. The nurse informed Joyce that Dr. Magnus had been called, and later the hospital staff inserted a rectal tube in Michael and Joyce was asked to watch to see if Michael expelled gas through the tube. Michael's breathing was still labored, his stomach was swollen, and he began vomiting and complaining of pain in his stomach.
At 2:45 p.m. the nurses pumped Michael's stomach. After visiting Michael at 3 p.m., Nurse Alderman told Joyce and Ken that she did not believe that Michael was getting any better, and advised them to insist that something be done. Up until that time, whenever Ken or Joyce asked what Michael's problem was, they were told that he had gas and was going to be fine. At this point, however, Ken went to the desk and demanded that greater attention be given to Michael. About an hour later, at 4 p.m., Dr. Magnus finally arrived, followed shortly thereafter by Dr. Johnston, another hospital staff surgeon. Then Michael's pediatrician, Dr. Carr, checked Michael. Dr. Carr said that he feared that Michael had a perforated bowel. Michael was later x-rayed, and after his return from x-ray, Dr. Magnus returned to Michael's room and told Joyce he had perforated Michael's colon when he did the biopsy that morning.
Dr. Magnus returned Michael to surgery, placed him under a general anesthetic, and attempted to repair the ruptured bowel. Michael never awakened from the anesthetic.
From the time Michael returned from the biopsy in the morning until he reentered the operating room that evening, he received no antibiotics to treat his infection. After the biopsy, the hospital staff had attempted to administer some antibiotics and fluids thorugh an I.V., but because the I.V. needle infused into Michael's tissue rather than his vein, Nurse Alderman removed the I.V. During the day, there were no other attempts to administer either fluids or an antibiotic. Michael finally received fluids through an I.V. in the operating room at 5:35 p.m., and he received his first antibiotic for his severe infection at 5:43 p.m. The operation to repair the hole in Michael's colon was begun at 5:50 p.m., seven minutes after the antibiotic was administered.
On 3 November 1982 Kenneth L. Roberts, as administrator of Michael's estate, sued the Stevens Clinic Hospital and Dr. Magnus for Michael's wrongful death. The complaint alleged simple negligence and enumerated $4,281.55 in medical expenses and $2,591.00 in funeral and burial expenses. The complaint did not ask for punitive damages, but did ask for $20,000,-000 in compensatory damages. After two-weeks of trial and two hours of jury deliberations, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff in the amount of $10,-000,000 compensatory damages. Both Dr. Magnus and the Stevens Clinic Hospital appealed to this Court.
I
Most of the errors that the defendants assert on appeal were waived at trial because no timely objection was made. From our review of the briefs and the four volumes of proceedings below, we conclude that both sides in this case believed that they were going to win before the jury. Apparently the defendants believed that a local, McDowell County jury would be reluctant to award large damages for the death of an infant against the community's only full service hospital and one of its local practicing physicians. Consequently, it was obviously the defendants' trial strategy to minimize the number of technical objections.
History, of course, has vindicated the plaintiff's estimation of the value of the case, but the defendants believed that they would have a sympathetic jury on the issue of damages, if not liability. Their trial strategy of not asserting frivolous objections was reasonable, and although defense counsel's failure to object makes it easy for us to write this opinion without its assuming the dimensions of Averroes' Commentaries on Aristotle, we can say from a review of the record that the result in this case would not be otherwise had objections been made with the regularity of a pendulum. On appeal, Dr. Magnus does not assert that the jury's finding of liability is unsupported by the evidence. Both the doctor's negligent treatment and his failure to warn the Roberts of the possible dan-' gers of a biopsy were firmly established.
II
At trial the plaintiff introduced into evidence a professionally prepared, twenty minute, videotape that combined "home movie" video recordings of Michael taken by a neighbor with a series of still, colored, photographs of Michael and the family. The audio background for this video presentation consisted of tape recordings of the child's voice as well as Joyces' voice singing and talking to the child. It is the defendant's contention that this film was a "theatrical" presentation that artistically highlighted certain aspects of Michael's life and Joyce's relationship to Michael in an inaccurate way.
We have reviewed the tape in its entirety and we find nothing inflammatory or prejudicial about it. W. Va. Code, 55-7-6 [1982], our wrongful death statute, provides in section (c)(1):
"The verdict of the jury shall include, but may not be limited to, damages for the following: (A) Sorrow, mental anguish, and solace which may include society, companionship, comfort, guidance, kindly offices and advice of the decedent;
The purpose of the videotape was to demonstrate that Michael was a healthy, intelligent, enthusiastic, and well loved child. So as a preliminary matter, the videotape was relevant. W. Va.R.Evid. 401, 402. In our review of the tape, we find no artistic highlighting that emphasizes some scenes or photographs more than others, and we find no merit in the defendant's assertion that because the mother's voice went on several seconds after the screen turned black, an unduly sentimental atmosphere was evoked that would have prejudiced the jury.
This Court has not previously addressed the admissibility of videotape "Day-in-the-Life" films. The same evidentiary rules that govern the admissibility of recordings and photographs govern the admissibility of videotape evidence. W.Va. R.Evid. 1001(2). The general rule is that pictures or photographs that are relevant to any issue in a case are admissible. Furthermore, the trial judge is afforded wide discretion in determining the admissibility of videotapes and motion pictures. Szeliga v. General Motors Corp., 728 F.2d 566, 567 (1st Cir.1984); Ilosky v. Michelin Tire Corp., 172 W.Va. 435, 307 S.E.2d 603, 618 (1983).
We are not unmindful of the potential dangers inherent in such presentations. As one court has explained:
Almost always an edited tape necessarily raises issues as to every sequence portrayed of whether the event shown is fairly representative of fact, after the editing process, and whether it is unduly prejudicial because of the manner of presentation.
Bolstridge v. Central Maine Power Co., 621 F.Supp. 1202 (D.C.Me.1985) (Plaintiff's "Day-in-the-Life" videotape excluded when open court testimony could demonstrate similar evidence, and admission of videotape would create risk of distracting jury and unfairly prejudicing defendant). A videotape's tone and editing, as well as the availability of similar evidence through in-court testimony, are all factors a trial court should consider in deciding whether to admit a videotape. But, we shall not reverse a trial court's decision in these matters unless the record shows a clear abuse of discretion. See Gough v. Lopez, 172 W.Va. 288, 304 S.E.2d 875 (1983) (Evaluation of remoteness of evidence left to trial court's discretion).
Ill
A
The defendants assert that four of the plaintiff's instructions were erroneous and that the court erred in failing to give one instruction of Defendant Magnus and two instruction of Defendant Stevens Clinic. This Court will presume that a trial court acted correctly in giving or refusing instructions, unless the instructions given were prejudicial or the instructions refused were correct and should have been given. Syl. Pt. 1, State v. Turner, 137 W.Va. 122, 70 S.E.2d 249 (1952). In making this determination, the Court will review the instructions as a whole. McAlister v. Weirton v. Hosp. Co., 173 W.Va. 75, 312 S.E.2d 738 (1983), quoting, Syl. Pt. 3, Lambert v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Company, 155 W.Va. 397, 184 S.E.2d 118 (1971).
We have reviewed the plaintiff's instructions and find that they might have been worded more precisely, but that they accurately stated the law. The defen dant's jury instructions that were refused simply advised the jury that they should decide the case in accordance with the evidence and the instructions and that bias, sentiment or feelings of sympathy had no proper, legal weight. These instructions stated the obvious and were simply repetitive of other instructions given by the court. As we have stated:
"It is not error to refuse to give an instruction to the jury, though it states a correct and applicable principle of law, if the principle stated in the instruction refused is adequately covered by another instruction or other instructions given."
Syl. Pt. 3, Morgan v. Price, 151 W.Va. 158, 150 S.E.2d 897 (1966).
B
The defendants next assert that it was error to allow jurors serving for circuit court "B" to be impaneled for this case because Mildred Ellen Altizer, the grandmother of the plaintiff's decedent, was serving on the panel. However, at the time of voir dire both sides knew of Mrs. Altizer's service on the circuit court "B" panel (or with reasonable diligence should have known) and no objection was made. Furthermore, the circuit court allowed extensive, individual voir dire and no member of the jury indicated any friendship with members of the plaintiff's family.
C
Defendants assert that it was an error to allow the plaintiff to inquire of a hospital employee about previous complaints by the nursing staff against Dr. Magnus. Again, however, no objection to this line of questioning was made by defendant Magnus at trial, and when an objection was raised by the hospital, the trial judge sustained the objection at the time; no request either for a mistrial or for a curative instruction was made by either defendant. Furthermore, because one of the grounds for the hospital's liability was its possible negligence in allowing Dr. Mag-nus to practice there, that line of questioning was proper. Whether the hospital allowed a known incompetent to continue to enjoy hospital privileges was a major point to be decided in determining the hospital's negligence.
D
The defendants assert that it was error for the trial court to refuse to recall the jury or otherwise determine the validity of a rumored, initial vote by the jury panel to award $250,000,000 to the plaintiff. We find no error. The internal operations of a jury panel are presumed to be fair. Voir dire allows litigants to discover juror prejudice before a trial. We will not allow a post-trial, collateral attack upon a jury's integrity in the absence of a showing of corruption or bias. Because the ultimate jury award was for $10,000,-000 and not $250,000,000, the fact that the higher number was discussed or even voted upon is entirely irrelevant. Defendant Magnus' contention that the jury should be recalled is nothing more than a restatement of his contention that the jury's award is excessive. We shall discuss this contention in an extensive and straightforward manner below.
IV
The jury's verdict found the defendant doctor 82 percent negligent and the defendant hospital 18 percent negligent. The hospital asserts that the trial court erred in failing to direct a verdict in its favor and, indeed, there is substantial evidence in the record before us that the nursing staff of the hospital did everything in their power to overcome the defective treatment that Michael had received from Dr. Magnus. Nonetheless, there is expert testimony in the record that the hospital did not have the type of pediatric care facilities required by West Virginia State Department of Health regulations and that Michael was not monitored in a way appropriate for a child in his condition.
There was also evidence that the hospital did not comply with State Department of Health regulations concerning supervision of its medical and nursing staffs, and that the hospital did not provide annual evaluations of its staff doctor, Dr. Magnus. Dr. Magnus, himself, testified that the hospital's nurses were regularly used by staff doctors to obtain consents for surgery from hospital patients, although the joint commission on accreditation of hospitals (of which defendant hospital is a member) has regulations that require hospitals to have doctors obtain appropriate consents. It is alleged that this practice contributed to Dr. Magnus' doing a procedure he had absolutely no permission to do — the biopsy.
The plaintiff also introduced evidence that the hospital was negligent in granting Dr. Magnus full surgical privileges in light of the fact that before coming to Stevens Clinic Hospital he had been primarily a family practitioner and had never previously been granted full surgical privileges. A motion for a directed verdict may properly be granted only when it appears from all the evidence presented that the party against whom the verdict is sought would not be entitled to a verdict under any view of the evidence. Syl. Pt. 2, Cox v. Galigher Motor Sales Co., 158 W.Va. 685, 213 S.E.2d 475 (1975); Hinkle v. Martin, 163 W.Va. 482, 486, 256 S.E.2d 768, 770 (1979). Thus, we conclude that the defendant hospital's negligence vel non was properly a jury question and that the court did not err by failing to direct a verdict for the defendant hospital.
V
We now come to the most serious problem in this case, namely the closing argument of plaintiff's counsel. In a nutshell, the reason that we are compelled to reduce the jury's award from $10,000,000 to $3,000,000 is that plaintiff's counsel implied, in his closing argument, that the duty of the jury was to place a value on Michael's life. No objection along those lines, however, was made during the closing argument, and for that reason we are undisposed to reverse the entire trial because, technically, the error was waived. Yet we find that counsel's closing argument was not entirely consistent with either W.Va. Code, 55-7-6 [1982], our wrongful death statute, or the court's instructions.
Plaintiff's counsel made a number of analogies during closing argument that could lead a juror only to believe that the juror's job was to evaluate Michael's life in terms of money. Counsel argued that if a $10,000,000 racehorse had been killed through the negligence of a veterinary hospital, the measure of damages would be exactly $10,000,000. At another point in the argument counsel asked what would have happened if someone had approached Michael's parents with an envelope containing ten, $1,000,000 winning lottery tickets and. asked the parents if they would trade Michael's life for the tickets. Finally, counsel made reference to the American space program where billions of dollars are spent to avoid the loss of a single life. Representative excerpts from counsel's closing argument are as follows:
"When I was growing up, the kids used to say 'Boy, that's valuable. That must be worth a million bucks.' Well, as you know, in light of inflation, that same item might be worth ten million dollars today. Really, a million dollars isn't all that much anymore .
If the race horse is worth $10,000,000, that's what the Roberts would be entitled to. It wouldn't be fair for us to come in and ask for $11,000,000 and it wouldn't be right, for the defense to say, 'We only want to pay $9,000,000' and that case would be easy. Justice would require a verdict of $10,000,000 .
Now if Michael were a race horse and the Stevens Clinic Hospital operated a veterinarian hospital and a race horse named Michael died as a result of the negligence of a veterinary doctor, you wouldn't have any trouble in returning a verdict for millions of dollars because you know that that's what race horses are worth. You tell me, you tell the family, are horses entitled to better care than children? And are children less valuable than horses? .
Another guide tells you what, in modern day life, how high the value is placed on society is in the military. Millions and billions of dollars are spent on preventive measures. Why? To protect the life of the soldiers. If a military plane costing millions of dollars gets in trouble, what's the call? Get the pilot out. Let the plane crash....
And what about our space program? I'm proud of our country. 225,000,000 people, but when we made the decision to go into space, a decision was made that not one single life would be sacrificed as a guinea pig. The decision was made that we would bring our astronauts back. And billions have been spent for all the safety devices to insure that they come back."
Our wrongful death statute, W. Va. Code, 55-7-6 [1982] (the statute in effect at the time of Michael's death) specifically sets forth in subsections (c)(1) and (2) the losses for which damages can be recovered. Obviously, if the measure of damages were the value of a human life then, arguably, no jury verdict could be excessive. The death of a family member, particularly a child, involves inconsolable grief for which no amount of money can compensate. Counsel's suggestion that the Roberts would not have traded Michael's life for $10,000,000 is entirely accurate — but they would also not have traded Michael's life for $100,000,000 or even a $1,000,000,000.
VI
In West Virginia, an appellate court will not set aside a jury verdict upon the claims that it is excessive, "unless the verdict is monstrous and enormous, at first blush beyond all measure, unreasonable and outrageous, and such as manifestly shows jury passion, partiality, prejudice, or corruption." Syl. Pt., Addair v. Majestic Petroleum Co., Inc., 160 W.Va. 105, 232 S.E.2d 821 (1977). Obviously, applying that standard entails a largely subjective exercise on the part of appellate judges.
The proceedings below took two full weeks of trial, prodigious amounts of lawyer and witness time, and substantial litigant and state expense. In West Virginia the remedy of remittitur is unusual when the damages in a case do not admit to an exact calculation, but in other jurisdictions we find ample authority for the procedure we now invoke. Al McCullough Transfer Co. v. Pizzulo, 7 Ohio Op. 319, 53 Ohio App. 470, 5 N.E.2d 796, 800 (1936) (Appeal court entered remittitur of $5,000 after excessive verdict of $10,000 in part created by plaintiff's counsel's closing argument inviting jurors to "trade places" with injured plaintiff); Yerrick v. East Ohio Gas Co., 27 Ohio Op.2d 67, 119 Ohio App. 220, 198 N.E.2d 472 (1964). (Plaintiff's closing argument held improper, and even though no objection to argument was made at time the argument was delivered, and no request was made that jury be told to disregard argument, judgment of $115,-000 was held excessive. Remittitur of $25,-000 ordered).
In the past, this Court has held the minority rule that when there are no data by which the amount of the excess is definitely ascertainable, a remittitur is impermissible. Our rule has been that no part of an erroneous verdict can be saved by a remit-titur and that the whole verdict must be set aside. Earl T. Browder, Inc. v. Webster County Court, 145 W.Va. 696, 116 S.E.2d 867 (1960). The present case demonstrates the unreasonable nature of this rule. The verdict of the jury and judgment of the trial court are plainly right on the issue of liability. But the amount of the verdict is excessive even though the Roberts' damages are substantial. The majority rule about remittitur allows us to give the Roberts their choice of a set amount of damages or, if they believe our estimation of their case to be too niggardly, a new trial. See Smithey v. Sinclair Refining Co., 203 Va. 142, 122 S.E.2d 872 (1961).
Thus, we have decided to dispose of the one meritorious assignment of error, namely the excessiveness of the verdict, simply by asking ourselves: "What is the highest jury award under the facts of this case that would not be monstrous and enormous, at first blush beyond all measure, unreasonable and outrageous, and such as manifestly shows jury passion, partiality, prejudice, or corruption?" Our answer, after substantial collegial discussion, is $3,000,000 and that is the amount that we will allow to stand. We believe that our conclusion in this regard is grounded in sound public policy, which we now proceed to discuss.
VII
In deciding this case, we recognize that over 94 percent of all civil actions in which pleadings have been filed are settled voluntarily by the parties, and some incalculable number more potential cases are voluntarily settled after lawyers have been contacted but before any formal court action has been taken. Consequently, because less than 6 percent of all serious lawsuits are tried, the most important thing that courts do is to cast a shadow of legal rules within which litigants can craft their own custom-made settlements. The defendants in the case before us are here complaining about the excessiveness of the jury's verdict; however, they do not discuss the enormous investment of plaintiff's counsel in the development of expert testimony, the cost of preparing exhibits, or the cost of legal research in order to go to trial.
When defendants wish to fight plaintiffs tooth and nail, both the complexity of preparing for trial and the glacial pace of the judicial process guarantee at least a four year delay between the filing of a legit imate complaint and the chancey receipt of the first dollar in damages. In the present case, the plaintiff has shown the defendant's liability in a clear-cut manner. To send the plaintiff back to square one, because the verdict is excessive would be more than unfair; it would also be a waste of litigant resources and send the wrong signal to other prospective litigants.
In this latter regard our decision is instructed by the fact that both the design of a law firm and the corresponding corporate structure of a client may create counterproductive approaches to litigation. Specifically, insurance company officials are fiduciaries who feel most comfortable when they pay their lawyers by the hour. Big defense law firms respond to their clients' accounting requirements by adopting case management systems that allow them to "build a file" that creates a paper trial to justify their bills. In the case before us, the fact that the only offer of settlement on the defendant's side came on the eve of trial, after the plaintiff had sustained enormous expenses in preparing the case, is circumstantial evidence of the accuracy of this observation.
Without months or years of depositions, interrogatories, and pretrial motions, defense law firms cannot build a file to justify fees, and large fees are necessary to sustain the overhead of large firms. Insurance clients and other defendants, then, can find themselves engaged in potentially disastrous, all-or-nothing litigation simply because their lawyers are in the litigation business and not the cheap settlement business. Without the occasional jury award that is at least ten times greater than what the parties would have settled for immediately after the tragedy, there would be no incentive on the part of clients to temper the file building, anti-settlement proclivities of their lawyers by urging quick payment of just claims. Sometimes, of course, it is the clients who insist on litigation against the advice of their lawyers, and this too is more likely to be avoided when appellate courts restrain themselves in the supervision of jury awards.
Ideally, in a case such as the one before us where the negligence of the defendants is palpable, some just compensation for Michael's death would have been forthcoming within thirty days. Yet Michael died in July, 1982 and it is now April, 1986 without the Roberts' having received any compensation whatsoever for Michael's loss.
When the defendants moved for leave to file an appeal in this Court, the Court asked the parties to describe the settlement negotiations that preceded the trial. Such information is generally inadmissible and incompetent to show liability or set the measure of damages. Shaeffer v. Burton, 151 W.Va. 761, 155 S.E.2d 884 (1967); McMillen v. Dettore, 161 W.Va. 346, 242 S.E.2d 459 (1978). But we believe that settlement discussions have some bearing on the necessarily subjective criteria that appellate courts use to determine a proper remittitur, because such a determination affects future settlement negotiations.
We used this case's settlement history not as an indicia of liability or lack thereof, but as a barometer of each party's conduct in trying to settle the case. Obviously, there are some cases that need to go to a full trial, but most cases, including the one before us, that do not present questions of broad societal interest that require public hearings are simple questions of "how much" and little more. Settlement has become too large a part of our civil liability system to remain entirely in the unillúminated background. Our exception to the venerable and hoary evidentiary rule excluding all mention of settlement at any stage of in-court proceeding is necessary if a jurisprudence of settlement is to be cre ated. Accordingly, we asked the litigants to brief the subject, and the appellee included a section in his brief outlining the offers and counteroffers made.
About two months before trial plaintiff's counsel made a written offer to both defendants to settle for $5,000,000, which was approximately half of the total available insurance coverage of $10,250,000. No response was received from the defendants until the Friday afternoon before the Monday morning trial date! At that time defendant Magnus offered $100,000 and the offer was rejected. The next day the offer was increased to $125,000, and after one week of trial, when most of the plaintiffs evidence was in, and both defendants had reason to expect a substantial verdict, defendant Magnus increased the offer to $220,000.
VIII
In light of the statistically demonstrable fact that settlement rather than litigation is the true cynosure of the whole judicial process, in this case, then, we not only ask ourselves how much money the Roberts family should receive to compensate them for the losses enumerated under the Wrongful Death Statute; we also ask ourselves what jury award in a case of this type will establish the proper climate for out-of-court settlements. Certainly these considerations were in the background of our court's reasoning when the extremely liberal Addair, supra, criteria for reviewing jury awards were formulated.
IX
Our law emerges from an 800-year-old tradition, and thus most of the materials we have to work with are dictated by the happenstances of history rather than by any intelligently calculated design. The jury system is a given, as are both "the law's delay [and] the insolence of office." But in the constraints under which our materials place us we differ little from other architects, builders, and engineers. If, for example, an architect or engineer with sensitive measuring devices were to stand in the nave of the Great Cathedral in Salisbury, England, he would discover that the tip of the cathedral's spire is exactly 3.2 feet off dead center in the direction of the southwestern prevailing winds. Someone unfamiliar with the prevailing winds and the flexibility of structures built from stone and medieval mortar might conclude that Salisbury's builders were sloppy craftsmen; yet it is the deviation from theoretical perfection, a concession to reality, that has permitted the spire to survive in all its splendor hundreds of years of punishment by the elements.
Medieval cathedrals like Salisbury do not sustain our attention and draw us back time and time again because they achieved spectacular heights or supported incredible stresses. Any modern architect can design and execute a cathedral with the proportions of New York's World Trade Center supporting a load several hundred times the weight of all parts of Salisbury combined. What is amazing in Gothic architecture is the effect, in terms of upward thrust and exhilarating proportions, achieved with primitive materials. The flying buttress is not itself beautiful; it is a beautiful concession to nature's physical laws of outward force.
Greatness in architecture is not achieved by creating a good structure from superb materials; it is achieved by creating a superb structure from' mediocre materials. The same general criterion of judgment applies to government. To say that our judicial system is imperfect is to engage in a triumph of understatement. A plaintiff with a just claim has both a long and hard march to recover damages. Courts understand that juries operate on largely emotive principles and that jury awards can be substantially in excess of what judges, educated in law as a science, would award in similar circumstances.
Yet close to unbridled discretion is reposed in a jury in this jurisdiction to award such damages as it feels proper exactly because of the in terrorem effect on defendants that potentially large jury awards have as a counterweight to the in terro-rem effect on plaintiffs that outrageous expense, incalculable inconvenience, and inordinate delay have. The similarities between the legal system and Salisbury, then, become apparent: Judges understand the imperfections in the materials with which they must work and attempt to achieve some structural balance by offsetting one imperfection against another.
If, however, these are some of the considerations that guide our decision to allow $3,000,000 of the $10,000,000 judgment to stand, it is logical to ask why we do not sustain the entire verdict. The answer to that question involves modern tort law's mechanism for spreading risk throughout society through universal insurance coverage.
The object of tort law is to provide reasonable compensation for losses in an expeditious fashion. Thus some penalty for unreasonable delay is appropriate. Tort law, however, is not designed to be a Las Vegas game of chance; it serves no useful purpose to turn the tort system into a lottery where everyone pays high insurance premiums so that enormous windfalls can be allocated randomly. As one judge explained:
Courts are reluctant to undertake the speculative task of setting a figure beyond which an award is excessive. It is a responsibility which must be assumed at some time however. Otherwise, as awards get higher, the proponents of each will justify its reasonableness on the precedent of the approval of the highest previous award.
Baird v. Chicago, Burlington and Quincy Railroad Company, 32 Ill.App.3d 1, 334 N.E.2d 920 (1975) (Green, J., dissenting). The sky is not the limit with regard to jury awards, and at some point premium payers — who are somewhat like taxpayers— must be protected from paying excessive premiums.
Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above the judgment of the Circuit Court of McDowell County is reversed and the case is remanded to the circuit court with directions to enter a remittitur of $7,000,000 and enter judgment on the verdict for $3,000,000 or, in the alternative, at the option of the plaintiff, to award a new trial.
Reversed and remanded with directions.
. This Court adopted the West Virginia Rules of Evidence on 1 February 1985. Accordingly, the rules were not effect at the time of the proceedings below. But our position on this point is the same under the rules or the common law. Because the rules will govern all future cases, we have stated our holding in the phraseology of the rules rather than the common law.
. W. Va.R.Evid. 1001(2) reads:
Rule 1001. Definitions. For purposes of this article the following definitions are applicable:
(2) Photographs. — "Photographs include still photographs, x-ray films, videotapes, and motion pictures."
.The instructions in question are: Plaintiffs Instruction Nos. 5, 6, 8, and 17; Defendant Magnus' Instruction No. 4; and, Defendant Stevens Clinic's Instruction Nos. 12 and 15. To discuss them individually in the opinion would serve little purpose because they are clearly not prejudicial.
. What the jury's discussion of a possible $250 million judgment probably implies is "innumeracy," a phenomenon with regard to numbers akin to illiteracy. Innumeracy, however, does not demonstrate "bias" or "prejudice" anymore than illiteracy. Whether, however, jurors have some understanding of what numbers like 10 million or 250 million mean is a fit subject for exploration on voir dire, in the same way that determining literacy is fit' subject for exploration on voir dire. For an extensive discussion of "innumeracy" See Douglas R. Hofstadter, "Metamagical Themas: Number Numbness, or Why Innumeracy May Be Just as Dangerous as Illiteracy," Scientific American, pp. 20-34 (May, 1982).
. We point out that there was no objection to the argument, but can anyone seriously contend that a timely objection and a "curative" instruction would have changed the outcome in this case? In the roughly seven seconds available to counsel to make the strategic decision whether to object, it probably dawned on counsel that an objection and "curative" instruction would serve only to reinforce plaintiffs counsel's point.
. Code, 55-7-6 [1982] provides:
The verdict of the jury shall include, but may not be limited to, damages for the following: (A) Sorrow, mental anguish, and solace which may include society, companionship, comfort, guidance, kindly offices and advice of the decedent; (B) compensation for reasonably expected loss of (i) income of the decedent, and (ii) services, protection, care and assistance provided by the decedent; (C) expenses for the care, treatment and hospitalization of the decedent incident to the injury resulting in death; and (D) reasonable funeral expenses.
(2) In its verdict the jury shall set forth separately the amount of damages, if any, awarded by it for reasonable funeral, hospital, medical and said other expenses incurred as a result of the wrongful act, neglect or default of the defendant or defendants which resulted in death, and any such amount recovered for such expenses shall be so expended by the personal representative.
. Yet in conceding that there are policy reasons for imposing some ceiling on wrongful death recoveries we wish to imply no sentiment to return to the days before Lord Campbell's Act, when under the common law the death of a person could not be a wrong, nor to any other parsimonious theory that allows but nominal recovery to family survivors for the non-economic losses associated with the death of a loved one.
. Discussed, in: Earl T. Browder, Inc. v. Webster County Court, 145 W.Va. 696, 700, 116 S.E.2d 867, 872 (1960); Fortner v. Napier, 153 W.Va. 143, 151, 168 S.E.2d 737, 742 (1969). See also 58 Am.Jur.2d, New Trial § 226, n. 19.
. While the plaintiffs furnished us with a number of cases where jury verdicts of this magnitude have been approved, the plaintiffs in those cases had suffered severe personal injuries that necessitated enormous future medical care costs and also loss of earning capacity. These elements are absent in this case. See, e.g., Firestone v. Crown Center Redevelopment Corp., 693 S.W.2d 99 (Mo. 1985) (en banc); Reilly v. Southeastern Pa. Transportation Authority, 507 Pa. 204, 489 A.2d 1291 (1985); Hasson v. Ford Motor Company, 32 Cal.3d 388, 185 Cal.Rptr. 654, 650 P.2d 1171 (1982), cert. dismissed, 459 U.S. 1190, 103 S.Ct. 1167, 75 L.Ed.2d 422 (1983); Niles v. City of San Rafael, 42 Cal.App.2d 230, 116 Cal.Rptr. 733 (1st Dist.1974).
.See Council on the Role of Courts, The Role of Courts in American Society, West Publishing Co., 1984, pp. 28-34. Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What. We Know and Don't Know (And Think We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L.Rev. 4 (1983).
. Counsel for defendant Magnus conceded in oral argument in this court that $300,000 would have been the outer limit of an appropriate jury award. Certainly it would have been an appropriate settlement figure if offered within 60 days of Michael's tragic death. .
. See Owen Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 Yale L.J. 1073 (1984). An example of such would be Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 74 S.Ct. 686, 98 L.Ed. 873 (1954); 349 U.S. 294, 75 S.Ct. 753, 99 L.Ed. 1083 (1955).
. The common law rule Is codified in W.Va. R.Evid. 408 which reads:
Evidence of (1) furnishing or offering or promising to furnish, or (2) accepting or offering or promising to accept a valuable consideration in compromising or attempting to compromise a claim which was disputed as to either validity or amount is not admissible to prove liability for or invalidity of the claim or its amount. Evidence of conduct or statements made in compromise negotiations is likewise not admissible. This rule does not require the exclusion of any evidence otherwise discoverable merely because it is presented in the course of compromise negotiations. This rule also does not require exclusion when the evidence is offered for another purpose, such as proving bias or prejudice of a witness, negativing a contention of undue delay, or proving an effort to obstruct a criminal investigation or prosecution.
. Supra, Note 9.
. Hamlet
. Caldarera v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 705 F.2d 778, 784 (5th Cir.1983).