Case Name: Alexander LOWRY, Appellant, v. Elizabeth R. LOWRY, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1987-09-24
Citations: 512 So. 2d 1142
Docket Number: Nos. 86-1637, 86-1850
Parties: Alexander LOWRY, Appellant, v. Elizabeth R. LOWRY, Appellee.
Judges: UPCHURCH, C.J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 512
Pages: 1142–1144

Head Matter:
Alexander LOWRY, Appellant, v. Elizabeth R. LOWRY, Appellee.
Nos. 86-1637, 86-1850.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
Sept. 24, 1987.
Peter Cushing, Orlando, for appellant.
Sally D.M. Kest, Orlando, for appellee.

Opinion:
COBB, Judge.
Alexander Lowry petitioned for modification of his permanent alimony payments, which were predicated upon a settlement agreement. Prior to entering into the prejudgment agreement, Lowry was aware that his then wife was living with another man. The trial court denied the petition, and we affirm that ruling on the basis of estoppel — and also because the evidence adduced at the modification hearing failed to establish a de facto marriage between Elizabeth Lowry and her boyfriend.
On appeal the wife relies, quite naturally, upon the prior opinion of this court in Schneider v. Schneider, 467 So.2d 465 (Fla 5th DCA 1985). If the element of estoppel were not present and the evidence sufficient, the present majority in this case would seek an en banc reconsideration of Schneider for the reason that we do not believe it represents sound law in regard to the issue of termination of permanent alimony where a subsequent de facto marriage of a former spouse is established at a modification hearing. As observed by the dissent in Schneider:
[W]e expect too much when we require a person to support an ex-spouse who has "married" another, legally or illegally.... Once cohabitation with a new partner is established, an ex-spouse may be legally compelled to continue paying support, but few will accept it even stoically as their duty.
467 So.2d at 468.
It is invidious and illogical for the law to discriminate against those who enter into de jure marriages and favor those who enter into de facto marriages instead. There may be a problem of proof in establishing a de facto marriage, but once such a "marriage" is established, it should have the same legal consequences in support matters as would a de jure marriage.
The appellant also challenges the trial court's award of attorney's fees to Elizabeth for the modification proceedings. We reverse this excessive award. We have repeatedly held that attorney fees should not be awarded where both parties are equally able to pay a reasonable fee. Bloodwell v. Bloodwell, 508 So.2d 771 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987); Mauldin v. Mauldin, 493 So.2d 1103 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986); Sizemore v. Sizemore, 487 So.2d 1080 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986); Ariko v. Ariko, 475 So.2d 1352 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985); Zulywitz v. Zulywitz, 473 So.2d 275 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985).
The former wife in this case did not have "meager resources" from which to pay her attorney for one modification hearing: She owned the former marital home valued at $67,000; a savings account of $47,000; a 1984 Buick and a 34-foot boat; and had a monthly income of approximately $1,000 from various sources. She is well able to pay a fee of $2,875, (which is some three times greater than the former husband's attorney received for the same hearing).
AFFIRMED in part; REVERSED in part; and REMANDED.
UPCHURCH, C.J., concurs.
SHARP, J., concurs specially with opinion.
. Bentzoni v. Bentzoni, 442 So.2d 235 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983), concerned rehabilitative alimony and is therefore distinguishable from Schneider and the instant case, which deal with permanent alimony.