Case Name: STEPHENS v. ELY et al.
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1897-02-05
Citations: 43 N.Y.S. 762
Docket Number: 
Parties: STEPHENS v. ELY et al.
Judges: 
Reporter: West's New York Supplement
Volume: 43
Pages: 762–771

Head Matter:
STEPHENS v. ELY et al.
(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department.
February 5, 1897.)
Fixtures—Landlord and Tenant—Agreement before a Lease.
Defendants entered into possession of premises under a written lease for a certain term. During the term articles in the nature of fixtures were put in and attached to the property by defendants. A new lease was made for an additional term, and defendants continued in possession during the specified time. After the term they vacated the premises, and removed the articles, claiming that they had made an agreement with the landlord, before the articles were put in the hoqse, that they should have the right to remove them. They also claimed that before the renewal of the lease a further agreement was made that they might remove the articles at the expiration of the renewal term. The landlord brought an action to recover the value of the alleged fixtures. Held, that a judgment for defendants should be affirmed,—Ingraham and O’Brien, JJ., holding that the agreement was controlling, and that the articles never became fixtures; Patterson, J., holding (Van Brunt, P. J., and Williams, J., dissenting) that the question of whether the parol agreement could he resorted to for the purpose of varying the terms of the lease was not properly raised by the record.
Appeal from trial term, New York county.
Action by Benjamin F. Stephens against Sarah M. Ely and others, for the value of fixtures. From a judgment entered on a verdict in favor of defendants, and from an order denying a motion for a new trial, plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.
Argued before VAN BRUNT, P. J., and WILLIAMS, PATTERSON, O’BRIEN, and INGRAHAM, JJ.
Charles N. Morgan, for appellant.
Justus A. B. Cowles, for respondents.

Opinion:
PATTERSON, J.
This action was brought to recover the value of certain fixtures attached to premises in the city of Brooklyn, of which the plaintiff was the owner and landlord, and the defendants were the tenants. Those fixtures were removed by the tenants when they left the premises. They had been put in by the defendants, who claimed the right to remove them, by agreement with their landlord. The defendants entered into possession of the demised premises under a written lease for the term of one year and eight months from the 1st day of September, 1888, and it was while they were in possession under this first term that the fixtures were put in the property by them. A new lease was made for an additional year, with a stipulation for two renewals of a year each, and the defendants continued in possession until May 1, 1892; and when they left they removed the articles, being those specified in the bill of particulars appearing in the record. It is the settled law of this state that where a tenant has the right to take away fixtures put by him on the premises demised, if he takes a new lease of the premises, without any claim or mention of that right, it is gone. Loughran v. Ross, 45 N. Y. 792, where it is said: "Elementary writers are very well agreed that when the tenant continues in possession under a new lease or agreement, his right to remove fixtures is determined, and he is in the same situation as if the landlord, being seised of the land with the fixtures, had demised both to him,"—citing authorities. The ruling in.the case referred to is commented upon in Lewis v. Pier Co., 125 N. Y. 350, 26 N. E. 301, where it is remarked that that ruling was placed upon quite technical reasoning, supported, it is true, by some authorities, but that it was made in one of those cases "whose principles should not be extended." Still it is recognized that where there is a new lease, and not a mere holding over without a new agreement, what was decided in Loughran v. Ross remains authoritative. The rule laid down in that case would therefore control here, were it not that the record before us discloses the existence of an outside agreement, which authorized the defendants to remove these fixtures at the expiration of their term' on the 1st of May, 1892. That agreement was by parol, and it is claimed by the appellant that it cannot be resorted to to vary the terms or stipulations of the renewal lease made in 1889. That question is not properly raised by this record. In the defendants' answer it is alleged that after the execution of the first lease certain verbal arrangements were entered into between the lessor and the lessees by which the lessor agreed to allow the lessees to remove the fixtures involved in this action; and upon the trial, by the consent of the plaintiff's counsel, the answer was amended by allowing the insertion of an allegation that at the time of the making of the lease in 1889 there was an agreement made and entered into between the parties, and that as part of that agreement the defendants were to have the right to remove such fixtures as they had placed on the premises, and that that right was preserved in spite of the renewals. That is the substance of the amendment allowed; the court saying that it permitted the amendment in the terms the plaintiff's, counsel was willing to concede, and that the answer should stand amended, as stated by the court, and consented to by the plaintiff's counsel. Evidence of this agreement, independent of the renewal lease, came into the case without objection. Mary B. Ely, one of the defendants, testified that they took a lease of the premises in the spring of 1889, which continued until they left; that prior to the making of that lease she had personal communication with the plaintiff, Mr. Stephens; that certain conditions were required if the lease was to be renewed; that they related to a reduction of the rent, and to certain repairs; that certain fixtures should be put in the basement, and that the defendants should have the privilege of removing the fixtures they had previously put in. The question was then asked: "Was it agreed between you that the right to remove those fixtures should continue until you quit the premises?" That was objected to, no ground of objection being stated; but it is plain that the objection was only as to the form of the question, involving as it did the conclusion of the witness. That is evident from what the court said, which was, "Let her state what took place." There was no objection as to the competency of the evidence, nor as to the right of the defendants to give testimony as to the parol contract made as the condition of the written lease, but evidently the objection and the exception applied only to the form of the question, the evidence being offered manifestly to sustain the allegation of the amendment to the answer.consented to by the plaintiff's.counsel. The witness then testified that Mr. Stephens stated that he was willing to have the fixtures removed, and thereupon the renewal lease seems to have been executed. All this testimony came in without objection, and that that was so also appears in a subsequent part of the record. The court asked of this same witness the question, "How many conversations did you have with the plaintiff with reference to the removal' of fixtures?" Then the counsel for the plaintiff for the first time stated that in his judgment it was immaterial and improper, in view of the fact that all the agreement appeared to be in writing. The court then referred to the record to ascertain whether or not questions that had been previously put to the witness respecting conversations with the plaintiff regarding the right to remove fixtures were allowed without objection; and the record then recites that the stenographer read the testimony referred to, and, there having been no objection to this line of testimony, the objection is overruled. Thus it appears distinctly that the evidence of this parol' contract was admitted without objection. There was no motion made to strike out the testimony, the plaintiff's counsel contenting himself with taking an exception to further examination of the witness upon that subject. We must take up the case, therefore, as we find it on this testimony, and as the plaintiff's counsel evidently considered its situation to be at a later stage of the trial. The court charged the jury that it was for them to decide what fixtures were removed by the defendants, and, after they had determined that, to decide whether or not there was an oral agreement between the parties litigant, as claimed by the defendants, viz. that the fixtures might be removed by them after the expiration of their term in the demised premises. No exception was taken. On the contrary, the plaintiff's counsel requested the court to charge that the fixtures admitted to have been removed by the defendants were of such a character as to be affixed to the premises, and such as could not have been removed without an express agreement to that effect, and the court so charged. He also requested that the jury be instructed that, unless they should find that at the time of the malting of the second lease of March, 1889, there was also an agreement made by which the defendants were to be permitted to remove the fixtures in question, then they should find for the plaintiff for the amount which they determined the fixtures removed, together with the cost of replacing the same, were reasonably worth under the evidence. That the court also charged. So that the case was treated as if the evidence were properly before the jury with respect to the parol arrangement, recognizing the right of the defendants to remove the fixtures. These requests would not have prevented the plaintiff's insisting upon the validity of an objection to the competency of the testimony with respect to the parol arrangement, had such objection been made in time; but as it appears that it was not so made, and that substantially all that was necessary to establish that parol agreement was in the case before any objection was made, and was thus before the jury, the plaintiff cannot now avail himself of the contention that there was error in allowing the case to go to the jury upon that evidence as to the parol agreement.
There are no errors in the charge or in the rulings during the trial that call for a reversal of the judgment, and it must be affirmed, with costs.