Case Name: WARD v. DETROIT BOARD OF EDUCATION
Court: Michigan Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1976-12-02
Citations: 72 Mich. App. 568
Docket Number: Docket No. 26405
Parties: WARD v DETROIT BOARD OF EDUCATION
Judges: Before: V. J. Brennan, P. J., and Bronson and Bashara, JJ.
Reporter: Michigan appeals reports; cases decided in the Michigan Court of Appeals.
Volume: 72
Pages: 568–579

Head Matter:
WARD v DETROIT BOARD OF EDUCATION
Opinion of the Court
1. Workmen’s Compensation — Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board — Findings of Fact — Conclusions of Law.
The Court of Appeals must recognize findings of fact made by the Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board in the absence of fraud, but will review the decision of the board to determine whether the legal conclusions drawn from those facts were justified.
2. Workmen’s Compensation — Disability—Impairment of Wage-Earning Capacity.
The test used to determine disability in workmen’s compensation depends not upon industrial injury and consequent disability alone, but upon proof of impairment to wage-earning capacity.
3. Workmen’s Compensation — Wage-Earning Capacity — Question of Fact.
Determination of an injured worker’s subsequent wage-earning capacity is an issue of fact to be resolved by the workmen’s compensation department.
4. Workmen’s Compensation — Statutes—Wage-Earning Capacity.
"Wage-earning capacity” as used in the Workmen’s Compensation Act is the capacity of an injured workman to earn sufficient wages in the same or another occupation, whether or not he works (MCLA 418.371; MSA 17.237[371]).
References for Points in Headnotes .
2 Am Jur 2d, Administrative Law § 610 et seq.
82 Am Jur 2d, Workmen’s Compensation § 347 et seq.
82 Am Jur 2d, Workmen’s Compensation § 565.
Necessity, form, and contents of findings of fact to support administrative determinations relating to workmen’s compensation. 146 ALR 123.
Workmen’s compensation: right to compensation as affected by fact that injured employee earns, or is offered, as much as, or more than, before the injury. 149 ALR 413.
5. Workmen’s Compensation — Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board — Evidence—Support for Determination.
Sufficient evidence was presented to the Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board to support a determination that an injured employee’s wage-earning capacity was not impaired at the time he terminated employment and that he had not proved continuing disability from the injury where there was conflicting medical testimony, and where the employee was concurrently employed at two full-time positions for eight months after the injury.
Dissent by Bronson, J.
6. Workmen’s Compensation — Compensable Disability — Wage-Earning Capacity — Remand.
A determination by the Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board that a claimant was not entitled to compensation is erroneous where it appears that the board found no compensable disability because the claimant suffered no apparent wage loss; the relevant inquiry is whether the claimant suffered a loss of wage-earning capacity as a result of the injury, and where the board made no speciñc ñnding as to the effect of the claimant’s injury on his earning capacity, the case should be remanded for further ñndings on the issue.
Appeal from Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board.
Submitted October 6, 1976, at Detroit.
(Docket No. 26405.)
Decided December 2, 1976.
In lieu of grant of leave to appeal, remanded to Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board.
Claim by William O. Ward against the Detroit Board of Education for workmen’s compensation. Benefits denied. The Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board affirmed with modification. Plaintiff appeals.
Affirmed.
Marston, Sachs, Nunn, Kates, Kadushin & O’Hare, P. C, for plaintiff.
LeVasseur, Werner, Mitsoff & Brown.(by Lawrence D. Egan), for defendant.
Before: V. J. Brennan, P. J., and Bronson and Bashara, JJ.

Opinion:
V. J. Brennan, P. J.
Plaintiff William Ward appeals a ruling by the Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board denying him benefits. This ruling affirmed the corrected findings of Administrative Law Judge Frank Condino that "in spite of sustaining an injury plaintiff did not suffer any wage loss as a result thereof and [so] has failed to sustain the burden of proof that he is still disabled as a result of the said injuries". The appeal board did modify Judge Condino's ruling to the extent that they ordered defendant Detroit Board of Education to pay for medical expenses incurred as a result of plaintiff's injury.
The facts in this case are not particularly complicated. Plaintiff began part-time work with defendant as an emergency food service helper in February, 1970. His duties included washing pots and pans, sweeping and mopping. He was concurrently employed full time with Parke-Davis Company, a position he had held since March, 1969. On April 6, 1970, the injury upon which the claim is based occurred when a rack of frozen food fell on plaintiff. He was taken to Harper Hospital emergency room but lost no work time as a result of the injury. In November, 1970, plaintiff began full-time employment with defendant as an assistant custodian while maintaining his full-time employment with Parke-Davis. He testified that his continuing back problems prompted him to seek the custodial position which he felt required less bending.
In late November, 1970, plaintiff was called in by his supervisor, Robert Johnson, because he was not arriving at and leaving the job on time. In early December, a second such conference occurred for the same reason. Finally, on December 29, 1970, a formal personnel meeting was held, at which time plaintiff was given the choice of resigning or being fired. He resigned. Plaintiff believed his refusal to shovel snow because of his back problem was responsible for the termination, though the need to attempt such work never arose.
Plaintiff continued to work full time with ParkeDavis. On April 5, 1971, plaintiff filed a petition for hearing with the Workmen's Compensation Bureau. Later that month, plaintiff was hospitalized for two weeks because of his back problems and hypertension. In September, 1971, plaintiff was laid off from Parke-Davis, but returned to work in November, 1971. He worked for a month at the Parke-Davis distribution center in Allen Park, operating lift equipment and doing "whatever they had for me to do". Subsequently, he was employed as a "granulator finisher", blending medicines, before being reassigned shortly afterward to a position filling drug orders. In March, 1972, plaintiff entered Boulevard General Hospital for diagnosis and treatment. A myelogram taken at that time was negative.
On appeal, the only question we find necessary to discuss at length is whether any legal error appears in the Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board ruling that plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning of the Workmen's Compensation Act.
In the absence of fraud, this Court is bound to recognize findings of fact made by the Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board. Const 1963, art 6, § 28. See MCLA 418.861; MSA 17.237(861). See also Moore v Gundelfinger, 56 Mich App 73, 77; 223 NW2d 643 (1974). However, we do review the decision below to determine whether the legal conclusions drawn from these facts were justified. Deziel v Difco Laboratories, Inc, 394 Mich 466, 475; 232 NW2d 146 (1975). On review of the appeal board ruling in this case, we believe no legal error occurred in finding that plaintiff failed to sustain the burden of showing a work related disability.
The test used to determine disability in Michigan depends not upon industrial injury and consequent disability alone, but upon proof of impairment to wage-earning capacity. MCLA 418.371; MSA 17.237(371). See Hansel v Chrysler Corp, 58 Mich App 173, 176; 227 NW2d 276 (1975), Miller v Midwest Foundry Corp, 57 Mich App 761, 768; 226 NW2d 721 (1975), Medacco v Campbell, Wyant & Cannon Foundry Co, 48 Mich App 217, 221; 210 NW2d 360 (1973), Sims v R D Brooks, Inc, 389 Mich 91, 93; 204 NW2d 139 (1973).
The Michigan Supreme Court has characterized the determination of what a worker is "able" to earn subsequent to an industrial injury and disability — that is, his wage earning capacity, as an issue of fact. Pulley v Detroit Engineering & Machine Co, 378 Mich 418, 423; 145 NW2d 40 (1966):
"Thus, the method of determining the employee's earning capacity, as that term is used in the act, is a complex of fact issues which are concerned with the nature of the work performed and the continuing availability of work of that kind, and the nature and extent of the disability and the wages earned. This determination by legislative enactment is reposed in the workmen's compensation department.
On the other hand, what wage-earning capacity means under the Workmen's Compensation Act is a legal matter left to the courts. The Supreme Court has interpreted the statute in the following terms:
"This leads us to the construction of the words 'wage-earning capacity' in the proviso. The proviso was adopted to relieve the employer of the payment of compensation pro tanto, if and while the employee has capacity to earn sufficient wages in the same or another occupation, MacDonald v Great Lakes Steel Corp, 268 Mich 591 [256 NW 558 (1934)], whether or not he works, Hood v Wyandotte Oil & Fat Co, [272 Mich 190; 261 NW 295 (1935)]." Markey v SS Peter & Paul's Parish, 281 Mich 292, 298; 274 NW 797 (1937).
The appeal board found that plaintiffs wage-earning capacity was unimpaired at the point his employment with defendant terminated and held that no continuing disability from the original injury on April 6, 1970, was established by the proofs submitted. We feel these findings employ the proper legal standard. Our only function, then, is to determine whether "any evidence" to support these conclusions existed on the record. Gilbert v Reynolds Metals Co, 59 Mich App 62, 65; 228 NW2d 542 (1975).
On October 25, 1971, an examination including X-Rays was undertaken by James J. Horvath, M. D. His testimony, presented at the hearing, indicated no basis to find disability at that time:
"Q. What did you conclude on the basis of your examination with respect to any disability?
"A. I found no evidence of deformity or disability on the objective point of view or from his work history that would be disabling.

"Q. Do you have any explanation, from a medical point of view, why one doctor might find a frank muscle spasm on one examination and might not be present at the second examination?
"A. Yes.
"Q. What would that be, Doctor?
"A. Muscle spasm in the chronic phase of a problem is usually intermittent, comes and goes; whereas in the acute phase of a problem, it is there all the time."
Raymond F. Lipton, M. D., also testified concerning plaintiff's hospitalization in April 1971, as the appeal board majority opinion indicates:
"In April 1971 he was hospitalized for thirteen days at the Kirwood Hospital for hypertension condition for being overweight, and because of back symptoms. He was treated with physical therapy and medications. While in the hospital, X-rays of the spine were taken. Apparently, his care was under the supervision of Dr. W. Kyle. At this time he lost seven weeks from his other job at the Parke-Davis Company. While in the hospital a back support was prescribed for him, but he had no other treatment except as indicated. Prior to going to the hospital, he stated that he had palpitation of the heart, much sweating and nausea."
Though Dr. Lipton's later testimony concluded that plaintiff was unable to perform work requiring heavy lifting, we do not believe this evaluation establishes any more readily than Dr. Horvath's contrary evaluation a cause to find disability affecting wage-earning capacity. The appeal board could have chosen to believe either viewpoint. Apparently they believed Dr. Horvath. We will not question their decision now. Consequently, on the basis of the testimony presented and the undisputed fact that plaintiff was employed at two full-time unskilled positions of labor for some eight months after the injury, we believe evidence does appear to sustain the appeal board's conclusion.
We feel plaintiffs other allegations depend directly on whether the appeal board ruled properly on the presence of a disability. As we feel they did, no need exists to discuss them at length. We believe the appeal board made reference to the circumstances of plaintiffs discharge only to support their opinion that his wage-earning capacity was not impaired through disability. We also feel the concurrent employment doctrine is inapplicable where no disability is found. See Bowles v James Lumber Co, 345 Mich 292; 75 NW2d 822 (1956).
Affirmed.
Bashara, J., concurred.
"We find that the unrebutted testimony of plaintiff establishes an injury date of April 6, 1970. However, after considering that plaintiff worked at two jobs full time prior to December 29, 1970, and his reason for leaving on that date was, by the majority of lay testimony, because he was not keeping proper work hours with defendant, not because of back pain, we do not find he suffered an injury on that last day worked. Plaintiff did not meet his burden of proof in establishing disability as a result of the April 6, 1970, injury."