Case Name: STATE of Louisiana v. Roger Dale DOUCET
Court: Louisiana Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1977-12-19
Citations: 359 So. 2d 1239
Docket Number: No. 59784
Parties: STATE of Louisiana v. Roger Dale DOUCET.
Judges: SANDERS, C. J., and MARCUS, J., dissent.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 359
Pages: 1239–1256

Head Matter:
STATE of Louisiana v. Roger Dale DOUCET.
No. 59784.
Supreme Court of Louisiana.
Dec. 19, 1977.
On Rehearing June 9, 1978.
Raymond D. Fuljenz, Lake Charles, for defendant-appellant.
William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Barbara Rutledge, Asst. Atty. Gen., Frank T. Salter, Jr., Dist. Atty., Adam L. Ortego, Jr., Asst. Dist. Atty., for plaintiff-appellee.

Opinion:
DENNIS, Justice.
The defendant in this case was convicted of an armed robbery, La. R.S. 14:64, which occurred at the Parkside Grocery in Calcasieu Parish on May 31, 1976. The State's case was based primarily on the testimony of a store attendant who selected defendant's picture after being shown two photographic line-ups by law enforcement officers investigating the crime. The testimony of the store attendant was corroborated by a revolver obtained through a warrant-less search of defendant's automobile. Of the several arguments raised on appeal, the primary contention of the defendant is that the weapon should not have been admitted as evidence in the case.
The same revolver was also involved in a prior case, in which defendant was charged with an armed robbery at a 7-11 Food Store in Calcasieu Parish on June 24, 1976. In that case the defendant filed a pretrial motion to suppress. Following a hearing, the trial court on November 12, 1976 ordered the evidence suppressed after finding that it had been seized during an unlawful warrantless search of defendant's vehicle. The State on that date orally informed the court of its intention to seek supervisory writs to review its ruling. Approximately five months later, on April 4, 1977, the State filed an application in this Court for a writ of certiorari, which we initially refused to consider because it appeared to be untimely. On April 18,1977, this Court granted the State's motion to reconsider the application and upon so doing vacated its previous ruling and decided to consider the application on its merits. After further study this Court on May 13,1977, issued the following order: "Writ denied. We find no error in the trial court's ruling." 345 So.2d 505 (La.1977).
In the instant case, Doucet did not file a pretrial motion to suppress, but during trial he did seek to prevent the introduction of the revolver into evidence by attempting to file a motion to suppress and by objecting on the grounds that a different judge of the same district court had previously decided that the evidence was inadmissible in another prosecution involving the defendant. The trial court overruled the objection, denied defendant the right to file a motion to suppress, and admitted the weapon into evidence.
Defendant contends that the State was collaterally estopped to offer the evidence over a defense objection because the court's ruling thereon would amount to the reliti-gation of the unreasonable search and seizure issue which had been decided previously in another case. The contention of the State is that the court's order suppressing the evidence in the prior litigation was not a final judgment; therefore, the doctrine of collateral estoppel should not apply.
In Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 90 S.Ct. 1189, 25 L.Ed.2d 469 (1970), the Supreme Court held that the federal rule of collateral estoppel is embodied in the Fifth Amendment guarantee against double jeopardy which is applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. Collateral es-toppel "means simply that when an issue of ultimate fact has once been determined by a valid and final judgment, that issue cannot again be litigated between the same parties in any future lawsuit." Ashe v. Swenson, supra, 397 U.S. at 443, 90 S.Ct. at 1194. Although first developed in civil litigation, it stands for an extremely important principle in our adversary system of justice. As Mr. Justice Holmes said in United States v. Oppenheimer, 242 U.S. 85, 37 S.Ct. 68, 61 L.Ed. 161 (1916), "[i]t cannot be that the safeguards of the person, so often and so rightly mentioned with solemn reverence, aré less than those that protect from a liability in debt." 242 U.S. at 87, 37 S.Ct. at 69. (quoted approvingly in Ashe, supra, at 397 U.S. 443, 90 S.Ct. 1189).
Moreover, the decisions have made it clear that the rule of collateral estoppel in criminal cases is "not to be applied with the hypertechnical and archaic approach of a 19th century pleading book, but with realism and rationality." Ashe v. Swenson, supra, 397 U.S. at 444, 90 S.Ct. at 1194. The inquiry must be "set in a practical frame and viewed with an eye to all the circumstances of the proceedings." Sealfon v. United States, 332 U.S. 575, 579, 68 S.Ct. 237, 240, 92 L.Ed. 180 (1948) (quoted approvingly in Ashe, supra, 397 U.S. at 444, 90 S.Ct. 1189).
Guided by these judicial principles we turn to the issue presented in this case: Is the State, under the doctrine of collateral estoppel, precluded from introducing into evidence in another trial evidence which has been declared inadmissible at a motion to suppress hearing held in connection with another charge?
This Court has recognized that the doctrine of collateral estoppel is fully applica ble to a former judgment in a criminal case, State v. Jackson, 332 So.2d 755 (La.1976), and has been "elevated to the dignity of a constitutional right." State v. Cain, 324 So.2d 830 (La.1975). However, this is the first time we have been called upon to invoke it to bar the relitigation of an order to suppress evidence. Since Ashe v. Swenson, which applied the doctrine to preclude a second trial on the merits did not expressly address the issue presented here, we will consider the jurisprudence of other state and lower federal courts in deciding the res nova question.
A survey of the decisions reveals that a satisfactory answer to the question is not readily available. A number of courts have concluded that the doctrine of collateral estoppel does not require the prosecutor to abide by a former court decree suppressing evidence because it is not a "final judgment on the merits." E. g., State v. Greenwood, 565 P.2d 701 (Okl.Cr.App.1977); Cook v. State, 35 Md.App. 430, 371 A.2d 433 (1977). If these decisions attempt to follow Ashe v. Swenson, they represent a strict and mechanical interpretation of the language of that case which, in our opinion, disregards the reasons for the concept of collateral estoppel and how its formulation there by the Supreme Court was influenced by the facts of the case.
In one of the cases upon which the Supreme Court in Ashe relied in stating why the doctrine should be available in criminal cases, United States v. Kramer, 289 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1961), the court of appeals discussed at some length the rule's underlying policy. In part, the Court stated:
"The very nub of collateral estoppel is to extend res judicata beyond these cases where the prior judgment is a complete bar. The Government . . . may not prove the new charge by asserting facts necessarily determined against it on the first trial, no matter how unreasonable the Government may consider that determination to be." Id. at 916.
Another work which the Ashe court cited and quoted from extensively, Mayers & Yarbrough, Bis Vexari: New Trials and Successive Prosecutions, 74 Harv.L.Rev. 1 (1960), sets forth the basic policy considerations for applying collateral estoppel in criminal cases as follows:
"Collateral estoppel in civil cases is grounded upon the belief that the burden of relitigation upon parties and upon the judicial system outweighs the possibility of injustice in perpetuating an erroneous determination in an earlier suit. Continued relitigation acts as a drain upon the finances, time, and energy of the individual party. Further, absent the finality provided by collateral estoppel, a successful litigant would not be able to rely upon a prior determination as assurance that he may continue his conduct or that he may plan his economic life free of the possibility of being forced to pay a judgment. Finally, relitigation results in waste of public funds and the valuable time of courts with already crowded dockets, and delays the opportunity of other citizens to gain initial adjudication of their claims. While the need to reach just results in legal matters is certainly a primary consideration, these results can be adequately achieved by allowing a plaintiff one full and fair hearing plus an opportunity for impartial review through appeal. A miscarriage of justice resulting from inability of counsel must in the nature of our judicial system be borne by the losing litigant; erroneous decisions uncorrected on appeal are not common enough to support a different principle.
"In the criminal law the possible waste of judicial resources seems somewhat diminished in effect. Criminal matters are less numerous than civil, prosecutors are less liekly to attempt relitigation than private persons, and the issues of fact in criminal litigations are likely to be less complex and time-consuming. However, a single criminal suit is likely to involve a greater expenditure of public funds since it involves the additional expense of prosecution. A policy forbidding reexamination of issues encourages care in the prep aration and presentation of the prosecution's initial case.
"The weight of the harassment factor is considerably increased in the criminal law. Initially one recognizes the increased disparity in the resources of the parties; the government has available relatively large amounts of funds and legal manpower to utilize in successive actions. Further, a new action is a more serious matter for the defendant than in the civil context, since he may be incarcerated pending the new trial if bail cannot be obtained. Even without imprisonment awaiting trial, the strain of potential reprosecution is greatly magnified. Furthermore, one who faces a second prosecution based on a different statutory offense will certainly be deterred more easily from engaging in conduct which the court in the first prosecution has found to be lawful than one who fears only further civil litigation.
"While thé harassment argument favoring a broad application of the concept of collateral estoppel thus increases in criminal law, the opposing consideration — that erroneous resolutions of litigated matters not be allowed to stand — is similarly buttressed. The state has a more urgent interest in securing the punishment of criminals and protecting the public from criminal acts that it has an individual compensation for a breach of contract or deterrence of such contractual infidelity. And as long as the prosecution is not permitted to appeal determinations against it, not only is the possibility of good-faith error enhanced, but the realization by the trial judge that rulings against the government are not reviewable may prejudice the administration of the criminal law. However, despite the possible detriment to the state, the retention of collateral estoppel seems necessary to safeguard the rights of defendants. The most satisfactory solution, one which would permit a compromise between the competing interests, would be to allow the state to correct erroneous acquittals on appeal." (footnotes omitted)
A careful analysis of the reasons underlying the doctrine of collateral estoppel and the Ashe decision leads to the conclusion that the doctrine forbids relitigation by the government of adverse suppression orders. In United States ex rel. DiGiangiemo v. Regan, 528 F.2d 1262 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 950, 96 S.Ct. 3172, 49 L.Ed.2d 1187 (1976), the court in making such an examination first defined the term "final judgment" as follows:
"For purposes of issue preclusion, 'final judgment' includes any prior adjudication of an issue in another action between the parties that is determined to be sufficiently firm to be accorded conclusive effect,' ALI, Restatement of Judgments 2d, Tent. Draft No. 1, § 41 (1973); Lummus Co. v. Commonwealth Oil Refining Co., 297 F.2d 80, 87-90 (2 Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 986, 82 S.Ct. 601, 7 L.Ed.2d 524 (1962); Zdanok v. Glidden Co., 327 F.2d 944, 955 (2 Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 934, 84 S.Ct. 1338, 12 L.Ed.2d 298 (1964). Factors supporting a conclusion that a decision is final for this purpose are 'that the parties were fully heard, that the court supported its decision with a reasoned opinion, [and] that the decision was subject to appeal or was in fact reviewed on appeal.' Restatement, supra, § 41 at 7."
The Court next noted the due process overtones in Mr. Justice Holmes' statement on collateral estoppel in United States v. Oppenheimer, supra, mentioned the harassment factor, the disparity of resources between the state and the defendant and the strain of relitigation upon the latter discussed in Mayers & Yarbrough, Bis Vexari: New Trials and Successive Prosecutions, supra. After considering all of these factors, the Court in DiGiangiemo reasoned that the collateral effect of a judgment suppressing illegal evidence cannot reasonably depend upon whether the ruling came in the course of trial or through the more orderly proce dure of a pretrial motion to suppress hearing; therefore, the Court concluded, if the elements of a final decision are present in a judgment suppressing evidence, due process would forbid relitigation of the issue by the State.
In United States ex rel. DiGiangiemo, the Court assumed without discussion that a ruling resulting from a motion to suppress hearing is a ruling upon an issue of "ultimate fact." While there are contrary opinions on this subject, the better view appears to be that a district judge's finding that evidence seized is the product of an unreasonable warrantless search constitutes a finding of "ultimate fact."
We agree with the DiGiangiemo analysis. In many of our criminal cases the admissibility of evidence obtained through a search and seizure is the only seriously contested issue. It does not appear reasonable or just that the ruling on such an important question should have less dignity than factual determinations made during trial. Normally, a ruling prior to trial on the merits, upon a motion to suppress, is binding at the trial in search and seizure cases. La. C.Cr.P. art. 703. It is primarily for the sake of procedural convenience and efficiency that the defendant is required to file and try his motion to suppress before the trial. See, La. C.Cr.P. art. 703; State v. Wallace, 254 La. 477, 224 So.2d 461 (1969). For these reasons we reach a conclusion similar to the second circuit federal court of appeals. Assuming that the State has had an opportunity for a full hearing on suppression and an adequate opportunity for review, due process would forbid relitigation of the issue determined adversely to it. We note also, that according to an eminent federal procedure scholar, in litigation under former Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(e), the source of our own suppression statute, La. C.Cr.P. art. 703, "[i]f the motion [to suppress] is granted, the tainted evidence is not admissible at the trial of the case, nor in any subsequent trial or hearing." Moore's Federal Practice, § 41.10 (1977).
Applying these principles to the instant case we conclude that the ruling by the trial court on November 12, 1976 finding that the revolver had been seized in an unlawful warrantless search and suppressing it as evidence was a valid and final judgment for the purpose of precluding relitigation of the identical issue between the same parties. The State was afforded an adequate oppor tunity to be heard at the hearing and to seek review by this Court, and the State took full advantage of these rights. Accordingly, the doctrine of collateral estoppel was properly invoked by the defendant, and the district court should not have admitted the evidence at trial. Since the defendant was denied a right vouchsafed by both federal and state constitutions we are required to reverse the conviction and sentence, Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure Article 921, and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings. It is so ordered.
SANDERS, C. J., and MARCUS, J., dissent.
. Laughlin v. United States, 120 U.S.App.D.C. 93, 344 F.2d 187 (1965) defined ultimate facts as "those which the law makes the occasion for imposing its sanctions." Id., 120 U.S.App.D.C. at 97, 344 F.2d at 191. (quoting from The Evergreens v. Nunan, 141 F.2d 927, 928 (2d Cir. 1944), cert. denied 323 U.S. 720, 65 S.Ct. 49, 89 L.Ed. 579 (1944). See, Note, 80 Yale L.J. 1229, 1241 et seq. (1971); F. James, Civil Procedure, § 11.18-21, pp. 575-84 (1965). Contra, People v. Price, 69 Mich.App. 363, 244 N.W.2d 363 (1976); People v. Kernanen, 178 Colo. 234, 497 P.2d 8 (1972). For a discussion of ultimate facts as opposed to evidentiary or mediate facts, see, The Evergreens v. Nunan, supra; United States v. Kramer, 289 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1961); Comment, Recent Developments — Constitutional Law — Double Jeopardy, 69 Mich.L.Rev. 762, 772-4 (1971); Note, 21 Rutgers L.Rev. 274, 278-81 (1967).
. See, McRae v. United States, 137 U.S.App.D.C. 80, 420 F.2d 1283 (1969).
. According to a majority of this Court in State v. James, 329 So.2d 713 (La.1976), the Louisiana Constitution of 1974 prohibits the legislature from providing the State with an appeal of right in criminal cases, except those in which a law or ordinance has been declared unconstitutional. Therefore, where the State desires review of a final preconviction adverse judgment or ruling in a criminal case, application to this Court for a writ of review under our supervisory jurisdiction is now the proper procedure to follow. This applies to judgments or rulings on motions to quash, pleas of time limitations, pleas of double jeopardy, motions in arrest of judgment, motions to change venue and motions to recuse formerly appealable under La. C.Cr.P. art. 912(B). Even before the James case, the legislature considered that our supervisory jurisdiction offered an adequate opportunity for review of suppression rulings adverse to the state. See, La. C.Cr.P. art. 703, Official Comment (g).
.The State contends that the November 12, 1976 ruling was rendered "impermanent" by its notice to the trial court that it intended to apply for writs. This argument is without merit. Mere notice to the district judge of a liti gant's intention to apply for writs does not operate as a stay of the proceedings. Roumain v. Moody, 225 La. 187, 72 So.2d 473 (1954); McMahon, Work of the Supreme Court: Civil Procedure, 15 La.L.Rev. 376, 394-8 (1955). Moreover, in the absence of a timely application for supervisory review staying such ruling, it would have become final as of the date of its rendition insofar as the State is concerned. See, e. g., State v. Bullock, 263 La. 946, 269 So.2d 824 (1972); cf. State v. Mallet, 284 So.2d 761 (La.1973). Moreover, in the case before us it would be most inequitable to allow the State to stay the effect of the prior adjudication for several months by its inordinate and unexplained delay (five months) in perfecting its writ application.