Case Name: Juan Luis GARCIA, Sr., Appellant, v. Cristobal REYES and The City of Fort Lauderdale, Appellees
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1997-07-09
Citations: 697 So. 2d 549
Docket Number: No. 96-2924
Parties: Juan Luis GARCIA, Sr., Appellant, v. Cristobal REYES and The City of Fort Lauderdale, Appellees.
Judges: GLICKSTEIN, KLEIN and PARIENTE, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 697
Pages: 549–552

Head Matter:
Juan Luis GARCIA, Sr., Appellant, v. Cristobal REYES and The City of Fort Lauderdale, Appellees.
No. 96-2924.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
July 9, 1997.
Certification of Questions Denied Aug. 19, 1997.
Steven Wisotsky, Miami, for appellant.
Raoul G. Cantero, III and Jonathan D. Colan of Adorno & Zeder, P.A., Miami, for appellees.

Opinion:
PER CURIAM.
Juan Luis Garcia, Sr. (Garcia) appeals from the dismissal with prejudice of his third amended complaint in which he sought a declaratory judgment and damages for thirty months of wrongful imprisonment resulting from police misconduct. We affirm, finding that there is no cause of action for money damages against the state, its agencies or employees acting in their official capacities for police misconduct arising directly under the due process clause, article I section 9, of the Florida Constitution. We further find that if any such action existed, a lawsuit against the City of Fort Lauderdale and its police officer, Cristobal Reyes, would be barred by sovereign immunity. See generally § 768.28, Fla. Stat. (1995).
In his third amended complaint, Garcia does not allege violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, nor does he assert any causes of action for traditional common law torts such as false arrest. Instead, Garcia claims that our holding in Garcia v. State, 582 So.2d 88 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991), where this court reversed his conviction for attempted armed trafficking and conspiracy on due process grounds, carries with it presumptive liability for civil damages. Our holding in Garcia was based on our finding in Londono v. State, 565 So.2d 1365 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990), that Garcia's co-defendant was "objectively" entrapped as a matter of law in a reverse-sting operation by the police.
Garcia argues that police misconduct violated his state due process rights constituting a wrongful act within the meaning of section 768.28. However, our supreme court has announced that " § 768.28, when viewed alone, was intended to render the state and its agencies liable for damages for traditional torts under state law, but to exclude such liability for 'constitutional torts.' " Hill v. Department of Corrections, 513 So.2d 129, 133 (Fla.1987) (citation omitted) (emphasis supplied). The United States Supreme Court later overruled Hill's prohibition against bringing federal civil rights actions arising under § 1983 in Florida courts. See Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 110 S.Ct. 2430, 110 L.Ed.2d 332 (1990). It did not, however, disturb Hill's broader statement that the waiver of sovereign immunity pursuant to section 768.28 extended to traditional torts but not to "constitutional torts."
"[T]he creation of section 768.28, waiving sovereign immunity in certain circumstances, created no new causes of action against a governmental entity which did not previously exist." Huff v. Goldcoast Jet Ski Rentals, Inc., 515 So.2d 1349, 1350 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987) (citation omitted); see also Trianon Park Condominium Ass'n v. City of Hialeah, 468 So.2d 912 (Fla.1985). As our supreme court explained in Trianon:
[I]t is important to recognize that the enactment of the statute waiving sovereign immunity did not establish any new duty of care for governmental entities. The statute's sole purpose was to waive that immunity which prevented recovery for breaches of existing common law duties of care. Section 768.28 provides that governmental entities "shall be liable for tort claims in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances." This effectively means that the identical existing duties for private persons apply to governmental entities.
468 So.2d at 917-18.
To allow Garcia to bring a cause of action based on a violation of our state's constitution, where no concomitant duty arises for private citizens, would extend the waiver of sovereign immunity beyond the stated intent of the statute. It would also create a duty of care arising from the state constitution where none has previously existed.
It is only "when a duty of care exists does the essential inquiry turn to the question of sovereign immunity." George v. Hitek Community Control Corp., 639 So.2d 661, 663 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994). There has never been a common law duty of care with regard to:
[h]ow a governmental entity, through its officials and employees, exercises its discretionary power to enforce compliance with the laws duly enacted by a governmental body- This discretionary power to enforce compliance with the law, as well as the authority to protect the public safety, is most notably reflected in the discretionary power given to judges, prosecutors, arresting officers, and other law enforcement officials .
Trianon, 468 So.2d at 919 (emphasis supplied) (citations omitted). This reasoning extends to the type of police conduct that is the subject of this lawsuit — the decision to insti tute a reverse-sting operation as a means of enforcing compliance with the laws. See also DeMarco v. Publix Super Mkts., Inc., 360 So.2d 134, 136 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978) (no civil cause of action for interference with exercise of one's right under article I, section 21 of Florida Constitution ), aff'd, 384 So.2d 1253 (Fla.1980). But see Shuttleworth v. Broward County, 639 F.Supp. 654 (S.D.Fla.1986) (plaintiff may bring claim directly under article I, section 2 of the Florida Constitution ).
Although Garcia asserts that Florida courts have recognized due process causes of action in related contexts, the cases he relies on — Metropolitan Dade County v. Sokolowski, 439 So.2d 932 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983), and City of Riviera Beach v. Fitzgerald, 492 So.2d 1382 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986) — involve federal civil rights actions brought' in state court. As the eleventh circuit recognized in an action to recover just compensation through inverse condemnation for injuries sustained as the result of an unreasonable zoning ordinance, there is "no support for the availability of an action for money damages, based either on .trespass or violation of the right of due process, as guaranteed by the Florida Constitution." Corn v. City of Lauderdale Lakes, 816 F.2d 1514, 1518 (11th Cir.1987) (emphasis supplied), rejected on other grounds, Greenbriar, Ltd. v. City of Alabaster, 881 F.2d 1570, 1574 (11th Cir.1989).
Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the trial court.
GLICKSTEIN, KLEIN and PARIENTE, JJ., concur.
PARIENTE, J., concurs specially with opinion.
. Article I, section 21 of the Florida Constitution provides:
Access to courts. — The courts shall be open to every person for redress of any injury, and justice shall be administered without sale, denial or delay.
. Article I, section 2 provides:
Basic rights. — All natural persons are equal before the law and have inalienable rights. among which are the right to enjoy and defend life and liberty, to pursue happiness, to be rewarded for industry, and to acquire, possess and protect property; except that the ownership, inheritance, disposition and possession of real property by aliens ineligible for citizenship may be regulated or prohibited by law. No person shall he deprived of any right because of race, religion or physical handicap.