Case Name: John R. ALFINO, Appellant, v. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND REHABILITATIVE SERVICES, etc., et al., Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1996-05-17
Citations: 676 So. 2d 447
Docket Number: No. 95-0623
Parties: John R. ALFINO, Appellant, v. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND REHABILITATIVE SERVICES, etc., et al., Appellee.
Judges: HARRIS, J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 676
Pages: 447–451

Head Matter:
John R. ALFINO, Appellant, v. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND REHABILITATIVE SERVICES, etc., et al., Appellee.
No. 95-0623.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
May 17, 1996.
Rehearings Denied July 17, 1996.
John R. Alfino, Howey-in-the-Hills, pro se.
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, and Laura Rush, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Belle B. Turner, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appel-lees.

Opinion:
ANTOON, Judge.
John R. Alfino appeals the trial court's final order dismissing with prejudice his defamation suit against the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS), and two of its employees, Ester Tibbs and Robert Froeman. We affirm.
Mr. Alfino's complaint explains that he was employed by HRS as a Child Protective Investigator from March 1989 until August 1992. During that same time Ester Tibbs and Robert Froeman were also employed by HRS. Ms. Tibbs was the Deputy District Administrator for HRS, and Mr. Froeman was an Operational Program Administrator. The complaint alleges that "with knowledge of falsity, reckless disregard for the truth, and negligence, defendants caused to be published and widely distributed statements which were false and defamatory." The complaint continues that "in committing the acts alleged . [Tibbs and Froeman] were at all times acting under the color of office, but were also acting contrary to the duties of their respective offices." The statements to which the complaint refers were attached as exhibits to the complaint and included:
(1) A letter written by Ms. Tibbs, on HRS letterhead, to the union representing Mr. Alfino regarding a grievance proceeding initiated by Mr. Alfino. The letter contained the statement that "... it is alleged that [Alfino] engaged in criminal conduct which could have resulted in criminal felony charges
(2) Two HRS Performance Appraisals which were signed by Mr. Froeman as "reviewer"; and,
(3) Two interoffice memoranda on HRS letterhead signed by HRS employee, Thomas R. McKay, which contain written reprimands concerning Mr. Alfino's alleged falsification of records and negligent use of the "unit sign-out log".
Upon review of motions to dismiss filed by the defendants, the trial court dismissed Mr. Alfino's complaint, ruling that the defendants were entitled to immunity from suit because the alleged defamatory statements were made in connection with the performance of their duties as government employees.
On appeal, Mr. Alfino contends that the trial court erred in two respects. First, he argues that HRS and its employees are not entitled to immunity from suit for defamatory communications made in the scope of the employee's duties. Second, he argues that the trial court erred in ruling on the defendant's dismissal motions before discovery was completed. We conclude that both arguments lack merit.
In McNayr v. Kelly, 184 So.2d 428 (Fla.1966), our supreme court ruled that executive officials of the government possess an absolute privilege from liability with regard to defamatory statements made in connection with the performance of their duties. This principle was based upon the rationale that high-ranking government officials should be able to perform the duties of office unfettered by the fear of lawsuits. It was not immediately clear just how far down the chain of command this privilege extended, but in City of Miami v. Wardlow, 403 So.2d 414 (Fla.1981), the court adopted the view set forth in Cripe v. Board of Regents, 358 So.2d 244, 245 (Fla. 1st DCA), cert. denied, 365 So.2d 710 (Fla.1978), that the controlling factor in deciding whether a public employee is absolutely immune from actions for defamation is whether the communication was made within the scope of the officer's duties. Accordingly, in order for our courts to determine whether immunity applies in any given lawsuit, it is necessary to determine whether the alleged defamatory communication was made within the scope of the government employee's employment.
Conduct is within the scope of one's employment if it is the type of conduct which the employee is hired to perform, the conduct occurs substantially within the time and space limits authorized or required by the work to be performed, and the conduct is activated at least in part by a purpose to serve the employer. Craft v. John Sirounis and Sons, Inc., 575 So.2d 795 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991). Applying these standards to the allegations set forth in Mr. Alfino's complaint, it was obvious to the trial court that the privilege applied to the defendants in this case. In this regard, the exhibits attached to the complaint enabled the trial court to ascertain the context in which the communications were made, to whom the communications were made, and why the communications were made. By Mr. Alfino's own allegations, the defamatory statements were made by the defendants within the scope of their government employment.
There was also no error in the trial court's decision to dismiss Mr. Alfino's complaint prior to the conclusion of discovery. The purpose of filing a motion to dismiss is to ask the trial court to determine whether a complaint fails to state a cause of action. In making this determination the trial court is permitted only to consider the allegations set forth in the complaint. Odham v. Foremost Dairies, Inc., 128 So.2d 586 (Fla.1961). Thus, it is not relevant whether discovery has been completed at the time the motion is heard.
AFFIRMED.
HARRIS, J., concurs.
W. SHARP, J., concurs specially, with opinion.