Case Name: A. P. Aldrich, Comm'r. vs. William Kirkland
Court: South Carolina Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: South Carolina
Decision Date: 1854-12
Citations: 8 Rich. 349
Docket Number: 
Parties: A. P. Aldrich, Comm’r. vs. William Kirkland.
Judges: DuneiN, Da:rgaN, and Wardlaw, CC., and WhitNer, Glover, and Mumto, JJ., concurred.
Reporter: South Carolina Law Reports
Volume: 42
Pages: 349–376

Head Matter:
A. P. Aldrich, Comm’r. vs. William Kirkland.
A special injunction ordering security for the forthcoming of property in litigation, is within the powers of the Court of Equity, and may he granted hy a Master or Commissioner, under the 8th section of the Act of 1840.
But an injunction to compel a party to find sureties to perform any other decree, such as the payment of money, is contrary to the rules and practice of the Court.
An injunction bond, conditioned that if the defendant shall cause certain property (specifying it) “to he forthcoming, to he subject to the final order of the Court,” &c., and “shall abide hy and perform such orders and decrees as the said Court shall make in the said cause,” &c., construed, ut res magia valeat quam pereat, to require the defendant to abide by and perform such orders and decrees as the Court shall make, touching the property specified, which was to be forthcoming, &c.; and not to require the performance of any decree which the Court might make.
Failure to perform a mere money decree, held to be no breach of the bond.
BEFOSE O’NEALL, J., AT BA.BNWELL. FALL TERM, 1858.
A full and clear statement of the facts of this case will be found in tbe dissenting opinion of his Honor, Chancellor Johnston, and in the report of his Honor, the presiding Judge, which is as follows:
“ This was an action of debt on a bond, conditioned, that Lewis Kirkland ‘ shall, and do, well and truly cause certain property, to wit.: twenty head of cattle and two slaves, Nimrod and Comba, to be forthcoming, to be subject to the final order of the Court of Equity in a certain cause of Matthew J. Cave, trustee, vs. Lewis Kirkland and others, bill filed 5th May, 1849, and if the above bound Lewis shall abide by and perform such orders and decrees as the said Court shall make in the said cause, without fraud or further delay,’ &c. This bond was taken in pursuance of an order made by the commissioner, and pursues its terms, except that in the last clause it is broader than the order, which is, that he, the said Lewis Kirkland, shall abide by and perform ‘ such orders and decrees as the Court may make in the premises.’
“ The Court of Equity made no decree for the property; it simply made a money decree based upon an account for money and property delivered to the said trustee long before the filing of the bill; nothing is said about Comba. The value of Nimrod is charged, but that was admitted to have been erroneously done, inasmuch as the money, which bought him, had been previously charged in the account at February term, 1853. The value of Nimrod was struck from the account; the cattle had been delivered and sold. Nimrod’s value was shown to be four hundred dollars; he was killed b,y Lewis Kirkland, 1st October, 1849. The Court, February, ’51, ordered that the bond should be put in suit unless Lewis Kirkland fulfilled the orders by the 5th of March then ensuing. Lewis Kirkland confessed a judgment 7th May, 1849, for thirteen hundred dollars to the defendant, to indemnify him as surety in the bond under the Ji. fa. The slave Comba was sold to, and bought by the defendant, for one hundred and five dollars. The defendant in the equity case, (Lewis Kirkland,) was shown to be insolvent. I thought, and so charged, that no breach of the bond was shown.
“ The plaintiff chose to withdraw the case from the jury, and submit to a nonsuit.”
“ Tbe plaintiff appealed and moved tbe Law Court of Appeals to set aside tbe nonsuit, on tbe ground, that, in tbe case made, tbe defendant was liable for tbe value of tbe two negroes, Nimrod and Comba, by reason that tbe said negroes were not forthcoming to meet tbe decretal order directing suit by a certain day. On tbe contrary Nimrod was killed by Lewis Kirkland, and the defendant appropriated Comba, under a confession of judgment, to secure himself.
After argument in the Law Court of Appeals, the case was ordered to this Court, where it was now beard.
Bellinger, for appellant,
cited Aldrich vs. Kirkland, 6 Rich. 334, and contended : 1. That tbe validity neither of tbe interlocutory order, nor of tbe bond, could now be inquired into. Tbe parties are concluded by the order. They could question it only on appeal. They did not appeal and they cannot now question tbe validity of tbe order or tbe bond taken under it; Meek vs. Richardson, 4 Rich. Eq. 88. 2. That the order and bond were valid. 11-Stat. 110, § 7, 8; Bryan vs. Roberts, 2 Rich. Eq. This'question concluded by decision on first appeal. Attorney General vs. Jolly, 2 Strob. Eq. 393. 3. That there has been a breach of tbe bond; Vose vs. Hannahan, 6 Rich. 225; Gadsden vs. Bank, 5 Rich. 336; Gray vs. Gidiere, 7 Rich. 168.
Owens, contra.
The decree is for money — not for the value of the negroes. If an order, has been made for tbe forthcoming of tbe negroes, and the decree bad been for their value, the bond might have been broken. But here the decree is not for the value, but for other matters.
The condition to perform the decree of the Court can only be broken by failing to surrender his body, or by failing to deliver specific property claimed and decreed to be delivered. It does not require that a money decree shall be paid. Tbe Court cannot require that a party shall give bond and security to pay any decree. It can require bail, or bond, as in trover, for the production of specific chattels; 5 Gill & Johns. 463; 1 Smith, Ch. Pr. 484, note.

Opinion:
The opinion of the Court was delivered by
O'Neall, J.
When this case was before the Law Court of Appeals, on a former occasion, 6 Rich. 334, it would seem from the words of the Judge delivering the opinion, (p. 342,) that the Court inclined to construe the condition, as not imposing " an absolute liability to pay a money decreeand the case went back to ascertain whether Lewis Kirkland had failed " to fulfil the conditions of the bond so as to implicate the defendant, his surety, until it appeared that he was in default, in that Nimrod and Comba were not forthcoming?"
This question came before me, and I thought, that inasmuch as the Court of Equity had rendered a mere money decree, and had made no order touching the slaves, that a breach of the bond was not shown: and, on expressing that opinion, the plaintiff asked for leave to submit to a non-suit, which was granted.
The appeal brought up no other question than the correctness of this ruling, and none other was needed to have been considered.
But it has been supposed by some of the Court that the liability of the defendant to the money decree was still, notwithstanding the former opinion, open for the plaintiff to rely upon, and the defendant (as he had a right to do to sustain the nonsuit,) has denied the power of the Commissioner to grant such an order as that made in this case, and has therefore strongly urged -the unlawfulness of the bond.
This question raised by the defendant is first to be considered. The power of granting, by a Chancellor, special injunctions to restrain the party defendant from doing some act which would or might be irreparably injurious to the complaniant, is undoubted. This was, as is said by Chancellor Harper in Ramsay vs. Joyce, McM. Eq. 252, irregularly exercised against the removal of property from this State, or to compel it to be forthcoming to abide the order of the Court, by requiring security to obey the provisions of such an injunction. In the case of Ellis vs. Commander, 1 Strob. Eq. 188, such writs and such practice had the sanction of the Court.. In that case, Chancellor Dunkin says, " Many cases may be found in the books of reports in which the defendant has been required to give security to abide the order of injunction for the- forthcoming of the property." After that case it may be considered as settled, that an injunction ordering. security for the forthcoming of property in litigation is within the power of the Court of Equity, and may be granted by a Master or Commissioner under the 8th section of the Act of 1840, 11 Stat. 110, which says, that "Masters and Commissioners in Equity shall, in their respective districts, have the further power to grant injunctions, both special and common, conformably to the rules and practice of the Court." If, therefore, the order for the injunction is merely for the forthcoming of the property, Nimrod and Comba, to abide the decree of the Court in relation to them, it would be according to the practice of the Court as settled in Ellis vs. Commander. But if it be further to compel the party to find sureties to perform any other decree, such as the payment of money, it is beyond all doubt contrary to the rules and practice of the Court of Equity. No Chancellor in England or this country ever granted such an injunction or made such an order. If it were to receive the sanction of any Court, I know no greater usurpation than it would be. For it would be literally binding the defendant hand and foot for the sacrifice.
But I take it, the true construction of this order and of thé bond, is, that the defendant shall abide by and perform such orders and decrees as the Court shall make touching the slaves Nimrod and Comba, who were to be forthcoming according to the words of the order and bond. It is true, the words used might extend to any order or decree made in the cause, but that would render the whole void as an illegal requisition and condition, and hence, therefore, the narrower construction is preferred; "mí res magis valeat quam pereat"
Thus construing the bond, the inquiry arises, has there been any breach of the condition ? It is clear there has been none. For the bill alleged that Nimrod and Comba were the acquisitions by the defendant from the trust funds, and therefore it claimed in one aspect that they should be delivered: and, in another, that the defendant account for the funds received.
In the report, the account is entirely for the alleged trust fund: the value of Nimrod, which was once included in the report, was afterwards struck out, inasmuch as the defendant had been already charged with the money which bought him. This report was confirmed, and the defendant ordered to pay the amount, $660.19. There is not one word said touching Nimrod and Comba: they are not ordered to be forthcoming, or ordered to be delivered up. How can it be pretended there is any breach shown ? It is plain there is none, unless it be in that part of the decree which directs, "unless Lewis Kirkland do, by the 5th March next, fulfil the conditions of the bond given by him in this cause, and dated the 7th May, 1849, the Commissioner do put the said bond in suit." This, as was said by one of the Chancellors at the hearing, is the order of the complainant's solicitor: it is no judgment of the Court of' Equity on the matters in controversy; it is a mere license to the complainant to sue the bond at law.
The motion to set aside the nonsuit is dismissed.
DuneiN, Da:rgaN, and Wardlaw, CC., and WhitNer, Glover, and Mumto, JJ., concurred.