Case Name: ALBERT TURNER, Appellant, v. TEVIS MELLON et al., Defendants; WESTERN UNION TELEGRAPH COMPANY (a Corporation), Respondent
Court: Supreme Court of California
Jurisdiction: California
Decision Date: 1953-05-15
Citations: 41 Cal. 2d 45
Docket Number: S. F. No. 18755
Parties: ALBERT TURNER, Appellant, v. TEVIS MELLON et al., Defendants; WESTERN UNION TELEGRAPH COMPANY (a Corporation), Respondent.
Judges: Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., and Spence, J., concurred.
Reporter: California Reports
Volume: 41
Pages: 45–57

Head Matter:
[S. F. No. 18755.
In Bank.
May 15, 1953.]
ALBERT TURNER, Appellant, v. TEVIS MELLON et al., Defendants; WESTERN UNION TELEGRAPH COMPANY (a Corporation), Respondent.
William J. Connolly for Appellant.
Pillsbury, Madison & Sutro, John A. Sutro, Francis N. Marshall and Harry C. Scott for Respondent.

Opinion:
SCHAUER, J.
Plaintiff sued Tevis Mellon and Western Union Telegraph Company, Mellon's employer, for false arrest and false imprisonment. A jury returned its verdict in favor of plaintiff as against both defendants. The motion of defendant Mellon for judgment notwithstanding the verdict was denied and that of defendant Western Union was granted. Plaintiff appeals from the ensuing judgment in favor of Western Union; Mellon has not appealed from the judgment against him. We have concluded that the judgment appealed from should be affirmed.
Although, as will hereinafter appear, the trial court should have granted Mellon's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, Mellon's failure to appeal does not prevent our examining the correctness of the finding that he was liable, for any liability of Western Union would necessarily depend upon whether its agent Mellon committed a tort "in and as a part of the transactions of the business of the agency" (Deevy v. Tassi (1942), 21 Cal.2d 109, 125 [130 P.2d 389]), and Western Union, defending on appeal the judgment in its favor in the action in which the liability of Mellon was first placed in issue, is not precluded from disputing every element of that liability.
Mellon was branch manager of a Western Union office on the street floor of the Sheldon Building in San Francisco. His hours of employment were from 2 p. m. to 10:30 p. m. After 6 p. m. he was the only employe on duty in the office. During the three months prior to April 8, 1949, the date of plaintiff's arrest, Mellon had been robbed of company funds on four occasions, by the same person, at hours varying from 5:20 to 10 -.15 p. m. Mellon had been expressly and repeatedly instructed that his duties included the safeguarding of com pany funds; a company bulletin stated that upon discovery of a theft of such funds a manager should "Notify the local police authorities and secure their co-operation in finding the thief." Mellon or his superintendent reported each of the four robberies to the police. After the fourth robbery the superintendent arranged for installation of an alarm system to summon the police, and plainclothes men were stationed in the building each night after 6 p. m.
On April 8 at about 2:30 p. m. Mellon observed plaintiff walk past the Western Union office, then retrace his steps and, according to Mellon's answer, "evince an unusual interest in the premises." The jury impliedly found, on sufficient evidence, that plaintiff, on legitimate business, was looking for the office of a firm which was in the Sheldon Building. Plaintiff, according to Mellon, "looked very much like the man that had been holding me up." Mellon telephoned the police and reported, "I saw the robber pass the office, or a man that looked like him." Mellon got into the police car with the officer who first arrived, rode along Market Street for about half a block, saw plaintiff, and said, "There is the man I was speaking of." A number of other officers arrived. According to Mellon, "never at any time did I positively identify him [plaintiff], I told them he resembled the man very much." But according to plaintiff, Mellon in responding to an officer's statement, "If he is who you think he is, we will take him," said, "Yes, that is the man."
Plaintiff was arrested, taken to jail, and held until the next day. Mellon then talked with and carefully observed plaintiff and described the ensuing events as follows: "They [the police] told me to sign the complaint, if I was positive of the identification. . . .
"Q. But you got a good close look at him this time ? A. Yes.
"Q. And you were convinced it wasn't the man? A. I wasn't one hundred per cent convinced, because there was such a striking resemblance.
"Q. Did you ask him to say anything? A. Yes.
"Q. To identify his voice? A. That's right.
" Q. Did you ask him to turn in different positions ? A. That is right.
"Q. And after that was done, you weren't sure, is that right? A. That is right.
"Q. And you didn't sign a complaint? A. No, sir. . . . I decided that, as long as there was some doubt in my mind about him being the man, I would rather not make a mistake. ' '
Plaintiff was then released. Two nights later Mellon was again robbed by the same person who had committed the four previous crimes. Shortly thereafter Mellon resigned his position with Western Union because he "couldn't stand the suspense."
It is settled law "that the defendant must have taken some active part in bringing about the unlawful arrest and that he is not liable if, acting in good faith, he merely gives information to the authorities. [Citations.] . [I]t would be unjust to impose liability for an honest mistake in identification even where the identification may have been the principal cause of the wrongful arrest." (Hughes v. Oreb (1951), 36 Cal.2d 854, 859 [228 P.2d 550].) As is pointed out in Miller v. Fano (1901), 134 Cal. 103, 107 [66 P. 183] (and also in the Hughes case, supra), "it would be a hard and unjust law that would hold a party responsible in damages for false imprisonment for an honest mistake as to the identity of a party." All that Mellon did here was to report the commission of the crimes and state to the police officers his honest but mistaken opinion that plaintiff was the robber. This conduct did not in law amount to taking "some active part in bringing about the unlawful arrest," and since Mellon did not participate in the false imprisonment neither he nor his employer, whose only liability would necessarily rest on the doctrine of respondeat superior, is liable therefor.
Plaintiff relies upon Turner v. Elliott (1949), 91 Cal.App.2d 901, 904 [206 P.2d 48], wherein understandable and commendable concern is shown for the victims of mistaken identification and ensuing false arrest. We share this concern but we think that proper concern for the victim in such a case must stop at some point along the line where to support his claims further would contravene the public interest. We think it serves the public interest — and, hence, the line should be drawn here — that citizens who have been criminally wronged may, without fear of civil reprisal for an honest mistake, report to the police or public prosecutor the facts of the crime and in good faith, without malice, identify to the best of their ability to such public officers the perpetrator of the crime. Investigation and action from then on are the responsibility of the public employes who are skilled in that work and who are paid to perform it. The victims of crimes should not be held to the responsibility of guarantors of the accuracy of their identifications.
The Turner case, as indicated above, was a false arrest action and in it judgments for plaintiffs were affirmed upon the stated ground that the defendant actively participated in the arrests because the evidence showed that he "was a victim of the robbery, caused the police to be summoned, pointed out [plaintiffs] Butcher and Moore, stated that they were the men who had robbed him, and when [plaintiff] Turner interceded he directed the officers to arrest Turner also. Without his activities there would have been no identification of the plaintiffs and no arrests." The Turner case purports to distinguish the Miller case (1901), supra, 134 Cal. 103, upon the ground that the facts in Miller "bear no resemblance to the circumstances of the arrests of plaintiffs herein." While there are differences between the facts of the two cases, at least in respect to Turner, there are also implications in the above quoted language of the Turner case which are contrary to the Miller case and also to the Hughes case. Such contrary implications of the Turner case are disapproved. A view contrary to that of the Miller and Hughes cases would, we think, inevitably tend to discourage a private citizen from imparting information of a tentative, honest belief to the police and, hence, would contravene the public interest which must control.
Plaintiff also relies upon Nelson v. Kellogg (1912), 162 Cal. 621, 624 [123 P. 1115, Ann.Cas. 1913D 759], where it is said that ' ' the defense of probable cause is not applicable in actions for false imprisonment." In view of our conclusion that Mellon ⅛ conduct, as a matter of law, did not amount to participation in the arrest, we do not reach the question of probable cause. Our conclusion also obviates the need for discussion of the question whether Mellon was acting in the scope and course of his employment so as to render Western Union liable for his acts.
For the reasons above stated the judgment appealed from is affirmed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., and Spence, J., concurred.