Case Name: PEOPLE v. THOMAS; PEOPLE v. GRANT
Court: Michigan Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1971-05-21
Citations: 33 Mich. App. 664
Docket Number: Docket Nos. 5760, 8126
Parties: PEOPLE v. THOMAS PEOPLE v. GRANT
Judges: Before: Lesinski, C. J., and R. B. Burns and Levin, JJ.
Reporter: Michigan appeals reports; cases decided in the Michigan Court of Appeals.
Volume: 33
Pages: 664–677

Head Matter:
PEOPLE v. THOMAS PEOPLE v. GRANT
Opinion op the Court
1. Criminal Law — Arrest—Probable Cause.
Probable cause existed to stop the automobile defendant was driving and to arrest the defendant where the car matched the description given of the getaway vehicle used in an armed robbery and the first three digits of the license number of the defendant’s car corresponded to the digits of the getaway car’s license.
2. Search and Seizure — Automobiles—Search at Station — Probable Cause — Loss of Evidence.
Police officers’ taking defendant’s automobile to the station house after defendant’s arrest in the car and making a search of the ear without a warrant at the station were reasonable where the police had probable cause to stop the car, to arrest the defendant, and to search the car at the time of the arrest, because the mobility of the car threatened potential loss of evidence.
3. Criminal Law — Lineups—Participants’ Dissimilarities — Prejudice.
The defendants’ participation in lineups (each defendant participating in one lineup) did not prejudice either defendant where the victim testified that the two men who had robbed her were between 5'9" and 5'10" tall, the defendants were 6'4" and 6'5", and the other men in each lineup were between 5'4" and 6'4" tall, because the others resembled the victim’s description of the robbers more than the defendants did.
References for Points in Headnotes
5 Am Jur 2d, Arrest § 46.
47 Am Jur, Searches and Seizures §§ 18, 19.
Validity, under Federal Constitution, of warrantless search of automobile — Supreme Court Cases. 26 L Ed 2d 893.
21 Am Jur 2d, Criminal Law § 368. 29 Am Jur 2d, Evidence § 371.
Admissibility of evidence of lineup identification, as affected by allegedly suggestive lineup procedures. 39 ALR3d 487.
29 Am Jur 2d, Evidence § 610 et seq.
58 Am Jur 2d, New Trial § 164 et seq.
21 Am Jur 2d, Criminal Law § 315.
Incompetency of counsel chosen by accused as affecting validity of conviction. 74 ALR2d 1390.
4. Criminal Law — Eight of Confrontation — Nontestifying Code-pendant’s Statement — Common Alibi Defense.
Admitting into defendant’s and his nontestifying codefendant’s joint trial a statement of the codefendant in support of his and the defendant’s joint alibi did not violate defendant’s right to confrontation where both the defendant and codefendant affirmatively relied upon the statement, and the defendant did not attempt to controvert the statement or to limit its use to the eodefendant, because the use of the statement did not present a serious risk that the defendant’s guilt or innocence may not have been reliably determined.
5. New Trial — Evidence — Newly-Discovered Evidence — Elements.
Newly-discovered evidence must be newly discovered, not merely cumulative, such as to render a different result probable on retrial, and of such a character that it could not have been produced at trial with the exercise of due diligence.
Concurrence by Levin, J.
6. Criminal Law — Eight of Confrontation — Nontestifying Codefendant’s Statement — Appeal and Error — Standard of Eeview.
State courts must retroactively apply the rule requiring the reversal of a defendant’s conviction when the defendant’s right of confrontation has been violated by the use of a nontestifying codefendant’s statements in a joint trial; courts may not decide on a case by case basis whether the rule will be given retroactive application based on the court’s evaluation of the seriousness of the rislc that the particular defendant’s guilt or innocence was not reliably determined.
7. Criminal Law — Eight of Confrontation — Nontestifying Codefendant’s Statement — Appeal and Error — Harmless Error.
Allowing into evidence, in a defendant’s and his nontestifying codefendant’s joint trial, the codefendant’s statement that he and the defendant were together at a funeral at the time the crime charged occurred was harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt where the defendant claimed the same alibi as the codefendant.
8. Criminal Law — Ineffective Counsel — Burden of Proof.
A convicted person who claims he received the ineffective assistance of trial counsel must make a testimonial record at the trial level in connection with a motion for a new trial which supports his claim by proof and which excludes reasonable hypotheses consistent with the view that his lawyer represented him adequately.
9. Criminal Law — Ineffective Counsel — Interrogating Counsel — ■ Attorney-Client Privilege.
A defendant who attacks the adequacy of the representation he received at his trial waives the attorney-client privilege to the extent necessary to permit an inquiry concerning the adequacy of the representation.
10. Criminal Law — Ineffective Counsel — Court’s Interrogating Attorney — Attorney-Client Privilege.
Trial judge’s stating, when denying defendant’s motion for a new trial, that he was precluded by the attorney-client privilege from asking defendant’s attorney why he had not called an alibi witness, who had been present during trial, was erroneous; to hold the attorney-client privilege as tlms applicable is to shield inadequate representation.
11. Criminal Law — Effective Counsel — ’Failure to Call Witness.
Defendants have not established that they were ineffectively represented by counsel even though trial counsel failed to call an alibi witness who was known to them and present in court during the trial where counsel relied upon the testimony of another alibi witness, which contradicted the testimony that the uncalled witness would have given.
Appeal from Recorder’s Court of Detroit, Robert J. Colombo, J.
Submitted Division 1 February 2, 1971, at Detroit.
(Docket Nos. 5760, 8126.)
Decided May 21, 1971.
George Leon Thomas and Thomas Grant were convicted of armed robbery. Defendants appeal.
Affirmed.
Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Robert A. Derengoski, Solicitor General, Willimn L. Cabalan, Prosecuting Attorney, Dominick R. Carnovale, Chief, Appellate Department, and Thomas P. Smith, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for the people.
Joseph A. Golden, for defendant Thomas on appeal.
Sol Plafkin, for defendant Grant on appeal.
Before: Lesinski, C. J., and R. B. Burns and Levin, JJ.

Opinion:
Lesinski, C. J.
Defendants, George Thomas and Thomas Grant, were tried jointly and convicted by a jury of armed robbery. MCLA § 750.259 (Stat Ann 1971 Cum Supp § 28.797). They appeal as of right from a denial of their motions for new trial.
On November 15, 1966, two men robbed the clerk of City Wide Cleaners at gunpoint. They were seen leaving the store by an 11-year-old boy who provided police with a description of the car in which they escaped and the first three digits of the license plate number. Eight hours later police officers observed a car matching that description with the same first three digits on the license plates. They arrested the driver, defendant Thomas, and drove the car to the precinct station where a warrantless search revealed a pistol concealed under the dashboard.
Defendant Grant was arrested on a warrant issued after Thomas, while denying participation in the robbery, told police he spent the day with Grant. Both defendants were subsequently identified at separate showups by the victim of the robbery.
Defendants' first assignment of error concerns the propriety of the search of the car and the ad mission into evidence of the seized pistol. While the search at the police station cannot properly be said to be incident to the arrest, Preston v. United States (1964), 376 US 364 (84 S Ct 881, 11 L Ed 2d 777), we affirm the trial court's ruling that the police had probable cause to stop a car matching the description of the wanted vehicle and arrest the driver. Immediate search of the automobile at the scene would have been permissible. Carroll v. United States (1925), 267 US 132 (45 S Ct 280, 69 L Ed 543, 39 ALR 790); People v. Miller (1970), 26 Mich App 665. It was not unreasonable to take the car to the police station to perform the search where the probable cause factor still obtained and the mobility of the car threatened potential loss of evidence. Chambers v. Maroney (1970), 399 US 42 (90 S Ct 1975, 26 L Ed 2d 419). We find no error.
Defendants next claim that the conduct of the showups was so suggestive and conducive to mistaken identification as to violate due process of law. Stovall v. Denno (1967), 388 US 293 (87 S Ct 1967, 18 L Ed 2d 1199).
The victim testified that she told police that the men who robbed her were between 5'9" and 5'10" tall. Defendant Grant, who is 6'5" tall, was identified by this witness in a lineup of other men whose heights were 5'4", 6T", 5'9-l/2", and 5'5" respectively. Defendant Thomas, who is 6'4" tall, was similarly identified from a lineup of four other men who were between 5'7" and 5T1" tall. Since both defendants were considerably taller than the description of the wanted men, whereas the others in the lineup more closely resembled the descriptions, it is difficult to see how defendants could have been prejudiced by the showups. We note that no objection was made below to the introduction of the identification testimony and that both defense counsel elected to utilize the disparity of height between the descriptions given and defendants' actual height to their advantage in arguments to the jury. We find no error.
During the course of the trial, a police officer investigating the robbery testified that:
"A. I had Mrs. Mans come into the station and I made a warrant request and I took Mrs. Mans and myself to police headquarters, to request a warrant for George Thomas. Mrs. Mans and I, we stopped at the Robbery — B and E Bureau and I showed her some pictures and she—
"Mr. Harris: Just a minute, I would ask that the jury be excused, if the court please.
"The Court: All right, the jury will step out."
Defense counsel's objection was that if testimony showed the witness identified defendants from "mug shots" it would show defendants had prior criminal records. The objection was sustained. The record does not indicate that any pictures of either of the defendants were shown to the witness, or that identification was made as a result of such procedure. Contrary to defendants' claim, there was no mention of prior criminal convictions before the jury. We find no prejudice resulted.
The defense advanced by both defendants at trial was alibi. Upon arrest, defendant Thomas told police he and Grant were attending to details of the funeral for Thomas' recently deceased uncle during the time of the robbery. The use of this exculpatory statement at trial forms the basis of defendant Grant's claim that his rights to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him were violated within the meaning of Bruton v. United States (1968), 391 US 123 (88 S Ct 1620, 20 L Ed 2d 476).
In Bruton, the Supreme Court held that incriminating extra-judicial statements of a nontestifying codefendant are constitutionally inadmissible in evidence at a joint trial, irrespective of any instructions limiting their use to only the codefendant. In Roberts v. Russell (1968), 392 US 293 (88 S Ct 1921, 20 L Ed 2d 1100), the Supreme Court declared Bruton retroactive and applicable to the states.
In the instant case, defendant Thomas' statement placed him with Grant at the time of the robbery, but was intended as an alibi. Bruton and Roberts both dealt with confessions and accusations of guilt. Defendant Grant neither attempted to controvert the statement nor sought an instruction limiting its use to Thomas. Instead, they both affirmatively relied on the statement, and the testimony of others, to prove their alibi defense. Under the circumstances, we hold that the use of the statement at trial did not "present a serious risk that the issue of guilt or innocence may not have been reliably determined". Roberts, supra, 295; People v. Cartwright (1970), 26 Mich App 687.
As a basis for their motions for new trial, defendants claimed they had new evidence in support of their alibi defense in the form of a witness whose testimony would place defendants at a funeral home at the time of the robbery. When it was shown that this witness was known to defense counsel at the time of trial and was present in the courtroom during trial, the trial judge ruled that her testimony did not meet the test of newly discovered evidence.
New evidence must be newly discovered, not merely cumulative, such as to render a different result probable on retrial, and of such kind and character that it could not have been produced at trial with the exercise of reasonable diligence. People v. Keiswetter (1967), 7 Mich App 334. The trial judge did not abuse his discretion in ruling that the testimony of a witness known to defense counsel and present at trial was not new evidence.
Defendants' remaining assignments of error concern jury instructions given by the trial judge. Since no objections were raised on the issues below, defendants are precluded from claiming error on appeal. People v. Dexter (1967), 6 Mich App 247; People v. Bradshaw (1969), 16 Mich App 348.
Affirmed.
R. B. Burns, J., concurred.