Case Name: W. S. Walls v. The State
Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1903-10-14
Citations: 45 Tex. Crim. 329
Docket Number: No. 2787
Parties: W. S. Walls v. The State.
Judges: 
Reporter: Texas Criminal Reports
Volume: 45
Pages: 329–334

Head Matter:
W. S. Walls v. The State.
No. 2787.
Decided October 14, 1903.
1. —Statement of Facts.
A statement o£ facts which does not show the approval of the judge who tried the case can not be considered. .
2. —Swindling—Indictment—Requisite of Statute Construed.
While other articles of the statute in the same chapter, viz., articles 943 and 944, defining- the offense of swindling, require that “the property must be acquired, in the first instance, by some fraudulent or deceitful pretense, no authority is known inhibiting the Legislature, in article 498, from creating or making conversion of funds of ward by guardian, swindling and punishing same independent of the preceding articles defining same, notwithstanding the said article fails to embrace an essential ingredient contained in the preceding definition of swindling. Held, the court did not err in failing to quash the indictment.
ON REHEARING.
Decided November 25, 1903.
3.—Statement of Facts—Burden of Proof.
Where the statement of facts does not show the approval of the trial judge, the burden is on appellant to show that want of diligence was not his but that of the judge. Held, where such showing is not made, the statement of facts can not be considered.
Appeal from the District Court of Red River. Tried -below Hon. Ben H. Denton.
Appeal from a conviction of swindling; penalty, two years imprisonment in the penitentiary.
Appellant was tried on indictment presented in the» District Court of Red River County, charging him with swindling one Sylvy Watson, a minor, he the said (W. S. Walls) appellant being then and there the guardian of the said Sylvy Watson. The indictment, omitting formal portions, is as follows. “That W. S. Walls, on or about the 20th day of January, one thousand nine hundred and two (1902), and anterior to the presentation of this indictment in the county of Red River and State of Texas, was then and there guardian of the person and estate of Sylvy Watson, a minor, and as such guardian, the said W. S. Walls, did then and there have charge of the estate, real, personal and mixed, of the said Sylvy Watson, said minor aforesaid, and the said W. S. Walls did then and there with intent to defraud the said minor and ward, Sylvy Watson, who was then and there interested in said estate as aforesaid stated, unlawfully and fraudulently convert to his own use the property of said estate and of said minor Sylvy Watson, to wit, twelve hundred and fifty dollars ($1250) lawful current money of the United State of America and of the value of twelve hundred and fifty dollars ($1250) which said money had then and there come into and was then then and there in possession of the said W. S. Walls, by virtue of his said guardianship, he having theretofore been duly and legally appointed the said guardian of the said minor Silvy Watson, as aforesaid stated, against the peace and dignity of the State.
Motion was made in the court below to quash this indictment, for the following reasons, viz:
First. Said indictment was intended to charge the defendant with the offense of swindling, as'.shown by the records of said court as well as by indorsement on the back of said indictment.
Second. Said indictment fails to charge the defendant in plain and intelligible words with any act or omission which is by law declared to be an offense.
Third. Said indictment charges that defendant, as the duly and legally appointed guardian of Silvy Watson, did convert to his own use certain moneys the property of said minor, which had come into the possession of defendant by virtue of his said guardianship, thereby in substance charging the defendant with the offense of embezzlement as the same is defined by the penal statutes of the State of Texas. Which definition does not include any person acting in the capacity of guardian of the estate of a minor.
Fourth. Said indictment fails to charge the elements comprehended in the definition of swindling, in that it fails to charge the defendant with acquiring the possession of the property alleged in the indictment by means of some false or deceitful pretense or device or fraudulent representations with intent to appropriate the same to his, defendant’s, own use, or destroying or impairing the rights of the party justly entitled to the same. Said indictment also fails to allege acts the doing of which are included within the meaning of the term of swindling.
Fifth. Because there is no statute now in force in the State of Texas under which a guardian can be prosecuted and legally convicted for appropriating money to his own use which he has in his possession as guardian of a minor.
This motion was overruled and appellant excepted.
Ho further statement necessary.
Hodges & Hunt, for appellant.
There is no statute now in force in the State of Texas .under which a guardian can be prosecuted and legally convicted for appropriating money to his own use which he has in his possession as guardian of a minor, in that article 948 of the Penal Code, page 674, providing that if any executor, administrator or guardian having charge of any estate, real, personal or mixed, shall unlawfully and with intent to defraud any creditor, heir, legatee, ward or distributee interested in such estate convert the same or any part thereof to his own use, he shall be deemed guilty of the offense of swindling, is wholly inoperative and in direct conflict with articles 943 and 944 defining and constituting swindling.
J. G. 'Hodges also filed a written argument for appellant on the motion for rehearing.
Howard Martin, Assistant Attorney-General, for the State.
There is but one question to be considered by this court; that it, is the indictment sufficient? The State submits that it is in accord with the form laid down by Judge White. See White’s Ann. P. C., sec. 1647.
The purported statement of facts found in the record can not be considered, for the reason that the trial judge did not sign or approve the same. Without the facts there is no other question presented which is necessary to be noticed.

Opinion:
HEHDERSOH, Judge.
Appellant was convicted of swindling, and his punishment assessed at confinement in the penitentiary for a term of two years; hence this appeal.
What purports to be a statement of facts found in the record does not appear to have been approved by the judge who tried the case; consequently we can not consider it.
Appellant made a motion to quash the indictment on the ground that it failed to charge the offense of swindling. He contends that article 948, Penal Code, under which the indictment is drawn, makes the conversion of property merely the offense, when articles 943 and 944 in the same chapter, which define the offense of swindling, require that the property must be acquired in the first instance by some fraudulent pretense. We quote said article 948 as follows: "If any executor, administrator, or guardian having charge of any estate, real, personal or mixed, shall unlawfully, and with intent to defraud any creditor, heir, legatee, ward or distributee, interested in such estate, convert the same, or any part thereof, to his own use, he shall be deemed guilty of the offense of swindling." It must be conceded that this article eliminates an essential element of the offense of swindling, as defined in the preceding-articles of said chapter. That is, all of the authorities hold that, in order to constitute the offense of swindling, as defined in said articles, the property must be acquired in the first instance by some fraudulent or deceitful pretense or representation, and that the indictment must set out the false pretenses or representations. White's Ann. P. C., sec. 1639, sub. 4; French v. State, 14 Texas Crim. App., 76; Blum v. State, 20 Texas Crim. App., 578.
Furthermore, appellant contends, in this connection, that article 34, Penal Code, requires "that every offense must be defined, and that the definition of the offense, as constituted under article 948, contravenes the definition of swindling, as found in the preceding articles, in that no false pretenses need be resorted to to acquire the property; but that, if one of the enumerated trustees shall convert the property of the heir, etc., he shall be guilty—making the guilt of such person depend solely on conversion of property that may have come to.his hands.
The act as to swindling appears to have been passed in 1858, and article 948 was a part of the original act, and was embodied along with the other articles in the several epdes that have been passed since that time. So that it does not occur to us that it is a matter that can be considered under the caption of the original bill; and is simply a question as to whether or not the Legislature was authorized to make conversion by a guardian of the trust funds of his ward the offense of swindling—having previously defined what constituted swindling and given it an essential element not contained in said article 948. We know of but one case decided under said article, and that is Moody v. State, 24 Texas Crim. App., 458. But the question here presented was not raised in that case.
We are now asked for the first time to pass on the legality of the article with reference to the preceding definition. Undoubtedly, under the definition of 'swindling, as given in articles 943 and 944, the mere conversion of funds by a guardian would not constitute the offense of swindling, but rather, under our view, be embezzlement; yet we know oh no authority which would inhibit the Legislature from creating or making the conversion by a guardian of the funds of his ward swindling, and punish it as such, independent of the preceding subdivisions defining swindling, and notwithstanding said article does not embrace an essential ingredient contained in the preceding definition. It appears that they did make it an offense, and it is so written in plain terms. We hold that the indictment is correctly framed under said article, and charges the offense of swindling named therein. Accordingly, the court did not err in refusing to quash the indictment. In the absence of the statement of facts, we can not review the charge of the court. There being no errors pointed out by the assignments requiring a reversal, the judgment is affirmed.
Affirmed.