Case Name: Sidney C. Cross, Trustee, Respondent, v. National Fire Ins. Co. Appellant
Court: New York Supreme Court, General Term
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1889-06-22
Citations: 2 Silv. Sup. 443
Docket Number: 
Parties: Sidney C. Cross, Trustee, Respondent, v. National Fire Ins. Co. Appellant.
Judges: 
Reporter: Silvernail's Supreme Court Reports
Volume: 2
Pages: 443–449

Head Matter:
Sidney C. Cross, Trustee, Respondent, v. National Fire Ins. Co. Appellant.
Supreme Court, Fifth Department, General Term,,
June 22, 1889.
1. Deposition. Affidavit.—An affidavit for an examination of a party before trial should be made by a person who knows the facts, or a reason assigned why it is not so made.
2. Same. Bad faith.—The refusal by an insurance company to receive the proofs of loss furnished by the insured, where all the information sought to be obtained by the examination can be found in such proofs, is an indication that the application was made for purposes of delay and not in good faith.
3. Same. Record. —"Where the information sought by the examination can easily be ascertained by an inspection of the records of the county clerk’s office, the order for the examination will be vacated.
Appeal from an order of the special 'term vacating an order made by a supreme court justice directing the plaintiff to appear before a referee and submit to an examination before answer, for the purpose of enabling the defendant to prepare its answer, as well as for trial.
Ellsworth, Potter & Storrs, for respondent.
I. N. Ames, for appellant.

Opinion:
Macomber, J.
The ground of this motion is stated, in part, to be, that the affidavit on which the original order for examination was granted, was insufficient under section 872 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as supplemented by our rules of practice.
The action is upon a policy of fire insurance. The affidavit, which is made by the attorney of record for the defendant, alleges that one, A. H. Bowen, was the agent and adjuster of the defendant, and had the management of the case in charge, and that he had told the affiant what he could learn about the case. The affidavit is entirely upon information and belief, and concludes as follows: " That deponent's knowledge, information and belief is derived from statements made to deponent by said Bowen as the adjuster of the defendant." This is mere hearsay, evidence. Bowen should have made the affidavit, or some reason should have been assigned why such affidavit could not be forthcoming. Such an allegation is insufficient to support an order of this kind, and the order of the special term was right in vacating it.
Moreover, all the information, with perhaps one or two exceptions adverted to hereafter, which the defendant desired, could have been obtained in the proofs of loss which were furnished by the plaintiff to the defendant and its agents. The defendant, however, by its agent, not only in its correspondence refused to receive the proofs of loss as they were furnished, but gave notice in writing that it would not pay any attention in future to any further proofs, and did not care to have any supposed defects remedied, inasmuch as they should defend a recovery upon the policy. If these proofs of loss conformed to the requirements of the policy, they contained a description and valuation of the property destroyed, and the amount of other insurance thereon, if any, which are two of the principal facts which the affidavit states are desired to be ascertained before the answer can be framed. This circumstance, however, did not appear in the original papers, but was the subject-matter of affirmative affidavits used by the plaintiff upon which the special term has acted in part. It goes far to show that the application for the examination of the plaintiff was not made in good faith, but for purposes of delay, as is contended by counsel for the respondent.
The only remaining fact, of importance, which seems to have been desired by the defendant, relates to the nature and extent of the plaintiff's title to the premises. This, doubtless, could have been easily ascertained by an inspec tion of the records of the county clerk's office of Niagara county, as is also shown by the affidavits used in behalf of the respondent. But, irrespective of the - affirmative facts shown upon the motion to vacate the order, the order for examination could not stand under the defects already pointed out, and appearing in the affidavit upon which it was granted.
The order appealed from should be affirmed, with ten dollars costs and disbursements.
Barker, P. J., concurs.