Case Name: Charles J. Glover and wife v. John Lott, executor of Sarah Lott, deceased
Court: South Carolina Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: South Carolina
Decision Date: 1846-09
Citations: 1 Strob. Eq. 79
Docket Number: 
Parties: Charles J. Glover and wife v. John Lott, executor of Sarah Lott, deceased.
Judges: 
Reporter: South Carolina Equity Reports
Volume: 20
Pages: 79–81

Head Matter:
Charles J. Glover and wife v. John Lott, executor of Sarah Lott, deceased.
The defendant, as executor, in discharge of his trust, paid over to an unmarried' infant, seventeen years of age, who was a residuary legatee of his testator; her distributive share of the estate, and took the joint receipt of herself and her father for the same. The court held, that twelve years after making his final return, he was entitled to the protection of the statute of limitations, against a suit for the amount brought by the legatee and her husband.
Before Dunkin, Ch. at Edgefield, September, 1846.
The case is sufficiently elucidate^ by the following circuit decree.
Dunkin, Ch. Sarah Lott died in September, 1831. The com'plainant, Mrs. Glover, then Martha Frazier, was a granddaughter of testatrix, and entitled, under her will, to a share of her residuary estate. This share, it is- admitted, amounted to one hundred and seventy-five dollars, twelve and a half cents. '
Miss Frazier was the daughter of the late Benjamin Frazier, and was then residing with her father, who was a man of opulence, in Edgefield village. On the 15th day of February, 1833, the complainant being then about seventeen years of age, the defendant paid to her the said sum of one hundred and seventy-five dollars, twelve and a half cents, as witnessed by the following receipt, signed by herself and her father, to wit: — “Rec’d of John Lott, executor, one hundred and seventy-five dollars, twelve and a half cents, in full of my distributive proportion of the personal estate of Sarah Lott, deceased. February 15th 1833. (Signed) Martha Frazier, Benjamin Frazier.” In June, following, Miss Frazier intermarried with the complainant, Charles J. Glover.
On the 20th December, 1833, the defendant made his final return as executor of Sarah Lott, deceased, and passed his accounts with the Ordinary, in which account the payment of the 15th February, 1833, is regularly entered.
For some years afterwards, Benjamin Frazier, as well as the complainants and defendant, resided in Edgefield district. In 1836, Benjamin Frazier removed to the West, and died about the year 1844, leaving an estate worth seventy thousand dollars, which was soon afterwards distributed among his children, the complainants taking their share.
On the 1st. April, 1845, this bill was filed, praying for an account and payment of Mrs. Glover’s proportion of the residuary estate of Sarah Lott, deceased. As has been stated, it appeared on the reference that her proportion amounted to the sum stated in her receipt of the 15th February, 1833.
The principle seems to be well settled, that when a trustee does an act purporting to be a discharge of his trust, the statute commences to run from that time. Starke v. Starke, Car. L. Journ. 509. Moore v. Porcher, Bail Eq. R. 198.
This bill is preferred in the joint names of C. J. Glover and' Ms wife. Some three or four months prior to her marriage, •she received this legacy of $175, with the sanction and approbation of her father. If this act purported to be a discharge of the defendant’s trust, it is said, and perhaps truly said, that the payment should have been made only to a guardian, duly appointed. If this course had been- ádopted, it would have been unnecessary for the defendant to resort to the protection of the statute. But the complainant was of an age fully to comprehend the meaning of the transaction. She was married in June, and in December the account of the defendant was passed and recorded 'in the Ordinary’s office.
In June, 1833, the husband was entitled to demand and receive the legacy, as was held in Starke v. Starke. Considering the situation of the parties, and the record in the Ordinary’s office, it is no violent presumption to say that both the complainants knew, in 1833, that the defendant had done an act purporting to be a discharge of his trust. If it was effectual he was discharged. If it was ineffectual, the complainants were put on the assertion of their rights. Chancellor Harper says, in Moore v. Porcher, that, after a general distribution, four years is time enough for a residuary legatee to discover errors, or suggest mistakes. If Mrs. Lott had made a bequest of one hundred and seventy-five dollars to Charles J. Glover, which was paid to him by the executor, when he was seventeen years of age, and no suit had been instituted, for twelve years afterwards, it is difficult to perceive on what principle the executor should be debarred from the protection of the statute.
It is ordered and decreed, that the bill be dismissed with •costs.
The complainants appealed, and moved the Court of Appeals to reverse the decree in this case, on the following grounds.
.1. Because the defendant’s return to the Ordinary in December, 1833, shows that the money was paid to Benjamin Frazier, and not to his infant daughter, and because this return was not such an act as indicated to the complainants a termination of the trust of the executor; and the complainants having had no notice of that return, the statute of limitations cannot, therefore, be applied to defeat their claim.
2. Because, upon the pleadings and proof, and the report of the Commissioner, to which no exceptions were taken, the complainants were entitled to a decree confirming said report.
Griffin, for motion.
Bauskett, contra.

Opinion:
Per Curiam.
This court concur in the decree of the Circuit Court. The appeal is dismissed.
Appeal dismissed.