Case Name: The STATE, Respondent, v. Timothy MILLS, Appellant
Court: Supreme Court of South Carolina
Jurisdiction: South Carolina
Decision Date: 2004-09-07
Citations: 360 S.C. 621
Docket Number: No. 25864
Parties: The STATE, Respondent, v. Timothy MILLS, Appellant.
Judges: TOAL, C.J., WALLER and BURNETT, JJ„ concur.
Reporter: South Carolina Reports
Volume: 360
Pages: 621–626

Head Matter:
602 S.E.2d 750
The STATE, Respondent, v. Timothy MILLS, Appellant.
No. 25864.
Supreme Court of South Carolina.
Heard April 21, 2004.
Decided Sept. 7, 2004.
Chief Attorney Daniel T. Stacey and Assistant Appellate Defender Eleanor Duffy Cleary, of South Carolina, Office of Appellate Defense, of Columbia, for appellant.
Deputy Director Teresa A. Knox, Tommy Evans, Jr., and J. Benjamin Aplin, all of South Carolina, Department of Probation, Parole & Pardon Services, of Columbia, for respondent.

Opinion:
Justice MOORE:
This is a statutory construction case. The sole issue before us is the application of S.C.Code Ann. § 24-21-560(D) (Supp. 2003) which determines the sentence for successive revocations of a prisoner's community supervision. We affirm the trial judge's reading of the statute and the sentence imposed.
FACTS
Appellant pled guilty to distribution of crack cocaine, second offense, and was sentenced to six months imprisonment. He was given credit for two days served. After serving five months and two days, he entered a Community Supervision Program (CSP) which was to continue for two years.
This case was commenced when appellant's supervising agent swore out a warrant alleging numerous violations of CSP including failure to report, use of controlled substances, failure to maintain employment, and failure to pay supervision fees. The trial judge revoked appellant's CSP and sentenced him to five months and seven days. Because this was the second time appellant's CSP was revoked, his sentence was determined under § 24-21-560(D).
Appellant claims § 24-21-560(D) limits his sentence for revocation to the remaining time left on his original sentence for the substantive crime. His original sentence was six months, of which he served five months and two days, and he served three weeks on the prior revocation. Appellant contends his revocation sentence therefore should not exceed five days. He complains the trial judge erroneously interpreted § 24-21-560(D) to allow a revocation sentence that was "almost double" his original sentence.
DISCUSSION
Under § 24-21-560(A), participation in CSP is a mandatory condition of release for most no-parole offenses. Section 24-21-560 further provides in pertinent part:
(C) If the department determines that a prisoner has violated a term of the community supervision program and the community supervision should be revoked, a probation agent must initiate a proceeding in General Sessions Court.
If the court determines that a prisoner has wilfully violated a term or condition of the community supervision program, the court may impose any other terms or conditions considered appropriate and may continue the prisoner on community supervision, or the court may revoke the prisoner's community supervision and impose a sentence of up to one year for violation of the community supervision program .
(D) If a prisoner's community supervision is revoked by the court and the court imposes a period of incarceration for the revocation, the prisoner also must complete a community supervision program of up to two years as determined by the department pursuant to subsection (B) when he is released from incarceration.
A prisoner who is sentenced for successive revocations of the community supervision program may be required to serve terms of incarceration for successive revocations, as provided in Section 24-21-560(0), and may be required to serve additional periods of community supervision for successive revocations, as provided in Section 24-21-560(D). The maximum aggregate amount of time the prisoner may be required to serve when sentenced for successive revocations may not exceed an amount of time equal to the length of incarceration imposed for the original "no parole offense". The original term of incarceration does not include any portion of a suspended sentence.
(emphasis added). Appellant contends the underscored language means his sentence for revocation can equal only the amount of unserved time remaining on his original sentence. This construction of § 24-21-560(D) is not supported by a plain reading of the statute.
Although a penal statute must be strictly construed against the State, when the terms of the statute are clear and unambiguous, we are constrained to give them their literal meaning. State v. Blackmon, 304 S.C. 270, 403 S.E.2d 660 (1991). The words of the statute must be given their plain and ordinary meaning without resort to subtle or forced construction to limit or expand the statute's operation. Brown v. State, 343 S.C. 342, 540 S.E.2d 846 (2001).
Subsection (C) of § 24-21-560 provides that "the court may revoke the prisoner's community supervision and impose a sentence of up to one year for a violation of the community supervision program." Subsection (D) then provides that for a successive revocation, the prisoner may be sentenced "as provided in [subsection] (C)" i.e., for up to one year, with the limitation that the total time imposed "for successive revocations" i.e., all revocations, cannot exceed the length of time of the prisoner's original sentence. Subsection (D) does not provide, as appellant contends, that the sentence for any successive revocation is limited to the amount of time remaining on the prisoner's original sentence, nor does this statute inevitably result in the "doubling" of a prisoner's sentence. Further, we emphasize that the only issue before us is the construction of this particular statute and not the wisdom of the CSP statutory scheme as a whole.
Since appellant served three weeks on his prior revocation, and his time for all revocations cannot exceed six months, the trial judge properly sentenced appellant to five months and seven days.
AFFIRMED.
TOAL, C.J., WALLER and BURNETT, JJ" concur.
PLEICONES, J., dissenting in a separate opinion.
. Distribution of crack cocaine, second offense, is a "no parole offense." S.C.Code Ann. § 24-13-100 (Supp.2003).
. See State v. Dawkins, 352 S.C. 162, 167, 573 S.E.2d 783, 785 (2002) (construing CSP statutes and noting that "all parties agree the statutory scheme is convoluted.")