Case Name: JOHAN JOST BECKER and Others, Respondents, v. WALTER S. CHURCH, Appellant
Court: New York Supreme Court, General Term
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1886-11
Citations: 49 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 258
Docket Number: 
Parties: JOHAN JOST BECKER and Others, Respondents, v. WALTER S. CHURCH, Appellant.
Judges: 
Reporter: Supreme Court Reports (Hun)
Volume: 49
Pages: 258–264

Head Matter:
JOHAN JOST BECKER and Others, Respondents, v. WALTER S. CHURCH, Appellant.
Summary proceedings io recover possession o" land — when the validity of a lease may be attached in such proceedings, by the defendant, for fraud — when an equitable action to cancel the lease will lie.
This action was brought by the plaintiff to have a paper executed by the parties to this action, which purported to change the relation existing between thorn from a tenancy from year to year to a tenancy at will, set aside on the ground that it was procured by fraud, and to restrain the defendant from further proceeding, in certain summary proceedings instituted by him, to remove the plaintiff from the possession of the demised prei&ises. .Upon the trial it appeared that on or before July 5, 1882, the plaintiff Becker was a tenant of the defendant Church; that on that day the plaintiff was induced by fraud to execute a paper purporting to change such tenancy to a tenancy at will; that in May, 1883, Church, after serving a notice to quit, pursuant to the statute to terminate a tenancy at will, instituted summary proceedings to dicpossess Becker, whereupon the latter brought this ' action and recovered therein a judgment, from which this appeal was taken.
Held, that the judgment should be affirmed. (Landon, J., dissenting.)
It seems, that the question as to whether or not the alleged lease was procured by fraud could have been tried in the summary proceedings. (Per Bookes and Landon, JJ.; Learned, P. J., contra.)
Appeal from a judgment, entered in Albany county, upon tbe report of a referee granting an injunction restraining the defendant from proceeding, in summary proceedings instituted by him, to remove the plaintiffs from certain premises in the town of Berne, by reason of the alleged expiration of the term of their tenancy, and canceling and setting aside an alleged lease on the ground that it was procured by fraud.
S. W. Bosendale, for the appellant.
W. efe G. W. Youmans, for the respondent.

Opinion:
Learned, P. J.:
I assume for the present that on and before July 5, 1882, Becker was tenant from year to year of Church; that on that day a paper was executed between the parties which purported to change such tenancy to a tenancy at will; that such paper was, as the referee finds, obtained from Becker by fraud. Thereupon, in May, 1883, Church served a notice to quit upon Becker, pursuant to the statute to terminate a tenancy at will, and proceeded to take summary proceedings thereunder to dispossess Becker.
Now upon those proceedings, that paper would have been proof against Becker that he was such tenant at will. Could he in those proceedings have shown that that paper was obtained by fraud ? Is he, therefore, forbidden to maintain this action, which is brought both to set aside and cancel that paper, and also to restrain the summary proceedings? Now I suppose that an action in equity will be maintained for the purpose of setting aside and canceling an instrument affecting title to land and obtained by fraud. (Pomeroy's Eq., § 110, 399; Story's Eq, § 691, 700; Potter's Willard's Eq , m. p., 301.)
As part of the remedy, actions or proceedings on the fraudulent instrument will be enjoined. But could the county judge try the question of fraud in the obtaining of the instrument ? He has jurist diction to pass on the legal title only, and not on an equitable title. (Terrett v. Cowenhoven, 11 Hun, 320; People ex rel. Ainslee v. Howlett, 13 id., 138.) This latter case was affirmed (76 N. Y., 576), and the decision there, made by only four out of seven judges, goes to -the point that the defendant, by alleging facts, showing that the so-called lease was void for usury, set up a defense that denied the conventional relation of landlord and tenant, and that such an issue should have been tried by a jury.
Now, if we look at the Code (sec. 2244) it will be seen that the person against whom summary proceedings are taken may put in an answer denying generally the allegations, or specifically, any material allegation. He is, therefore, limited to denials. And there is no provision for affirmative allegations. Suppose, then, that the petitioner alleged a tenancy at will, and the respondent denied it. On the trial of that issue could the respondent have been permitted to show that the alleged lease was obtained by fraud, and was, therefore, voidable, not void, as in a case of usury ? I find no case where it has been held that any question, such as here arises, can be tried in summary proceedings.
It seems to me then that if the alleged instrument was obtained by fraud, as it affected Becker's title to land, he might maintain an equitable action for its cancellation, and as a part of the relief therein, might restrain proceeding upon it. Nor do I think that fraud in obtaining an alleged lease is an issue to be tried in summary proceedings.
As my brother Bookes concurs with me in the former of these two propositions, the judgment is affirmed, with costs.