Case Name: Nevin SHEWBROOKS, et ux. v. A.C. AND S., INC., et al.
Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Mississippi
Decision Date: 1988-05-11
Citations: 529 So. 2d 557
Docket Number: No. 56014
Parties: Nevin SHEWBROOKS, et ux. v. A.C. AND S., INC., et al.
Judges: PRATHER and ANDERSON, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 529
Pages: 557–577

Head Matter:
Nevin SHEWBROOKS, et ux. v. A.C. AND S., INC., et al.
No. 56014.
Supreme Court of Mississippi.
May 11, 1988.
Rehearing Denied July 13, 1988.
Michael B. Wallace and Julie L. Sneed, Phelps, Dunbar, Marks, Claverie & Sims, Jackson, for appellants.
Richard L. Forman and Walter G. Watkins, Jr., Butler, Snow, O’Mara, Stevens & Cannada, Natie P. Caraway and John D. Price, Wise, Carter, Child & Caraway, Michael S. Allred and Thomas L. Kirkland, Jr., Satterfield & Allred, Curtis E. Coker and Gary K. Jones, Daniel, Coker, Horton & Bell, Edward J. Currie, Jr., Steen, Reynolds, Dalehite & Currie, Jackson, James 0. Dukes, Bryant, Stennis & Colingo, Gulf- port, P.N. Harkins, III, William F. Goodman, III, and Douglas J. Gunn, Watkins & Eager, Thomas W. Tardy, III, Thomas, Price, Alston, Jones & Davis, and Don Moore, Jackson, for appellees.

Opinion:
ON PETITION FOR REHEARING
En Banc.
HAWKINS, Presiding Justice,
for the Court:
The Petition for Rehearing is granted and the following substituted for the opinion of the Court.
Nevin and Anna Mae Shewbrooks have appealed from a judgment of the circuit court dismissing their action against A.C. and S., Inc., and numerous other corporate co-defendants because of lack of personal jurisdiction over the defendants and forum non conveniens. Finding the circuit court in error, we reverse and remand for trial upon the merits.
FACTS
Nevin and Anna Mae Shewbrooks, Delaware residents, filed suit in the circuit court of the 1st Judicial District of Hinds County against 18 corporate defendants, none of which had its principal office or was domiciled in Mississippi. The suit was for asbestos poisoning received by Shew-brooks in Delaware, New Jersey and Pennsylvania as a result of mining, manufacturing and distribution of asbestos by the various defendants. The defendants are engaged in business in this state and are subject to process in this state.
The complaint charges the defendants with knowingly mining, manufacturing and marketing asbestos years after discovery of its dangers, and concealing its hazards from their employees and the public. It also charges a conspiracy between them to conceal such dangers.
The circuit court sustained motions to dismiss on two grounds: lack of personal jurisdiction over the defendants and forum non conveniens. The circuit court clearly erred in dismissing for lack of jurisdiction.
LAW
There is no serious contention on appeal that the circuit court lacked personal jurisdiction of the defendants, all of which do business in Mississippi and are subject to process in this state. This ground of dismissal needs little discussion.
The fact that a plaintiff and a defendant are non-residents of a state in a transitory cause of action which accrued in another state does not, in and of itself, deprive a court of lawful authority (i.e., "jurisdiction") to hear the case, and this is universally recognized by all courts.
This familiar principle of law was settled in this state long ago in Pullman Palace Car Co. v. Lawrence, 74 Miss. 782, 22 So. 53 (1897). In that case the plaintiff lived in Illinois, the defendant corporation was domiciled in Illinois, and the assault on the plaintiff by an employee of the defendant occurred in Illinois. Suit, however, was brought in the circuit court of Claiborne County. We then held that there was:
[I]n our own state, no ground left for dispute that in transitory actions, whether in tort or on contract, our courts were wide open to any suitor, resident or nonresident, against his adversary, whether resident or nonresident, whether a natural person or an artificial one, regardless of where the right of action occurred, if only the courts had jurisdiction of the subject-matter, and could obtain jurisdiction of the party, either by a voluntary appearance, or by service of process. [Emphasis added]
Id. 74 Miss. at 796, 22 So. at 55. See: Read v. Sonat Offshore Drilling, Inc., 515 So.2d 1229 (Miss.1987); Slater v. Mexican Nat'l R.R. Co., 194 U.S. 120, 48 L.Ed. 900, 24 S.Ct. 581 (1904); 30 A.L.R. 255.
We turn then to the other ground for dismissal.
I.
WHAT COURTS ARE ALL ABOUT
Courts of this nation are the passive branch of government. We have no lawful authority to decide any issue or pronounce any law not required from the facts squarely presented in an actual case before us. The converse of this is also true. When we have a case before us which we have the lawful authority to decide, we have no authority not to decide it. We can neither ask for nor invite lawsuits, but at the same time — and just as important— we cannot refuse to hear a case, either. That is, we cannot refuse in conformity with our solemn responsibility as a court.
In Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat) 264, 404, 5 L.Ed. 257, 291 (1821), the United States Supreme Court speaking through Chief Justice Marshall, stated:
It is most true, that this court, will not take jurisdiction if it should not: but it is equally true, that it must take jurisdiction, if it should. The judiciary cannot, as the legislature may, avoid a measure, because it approaches the confines of the constitution. We cannot pass it by, because it is doubtful. With whatever doubt, with whatever difficulties a case may be attended, we must decide it, if it be brought before us. We have no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is not given. The one or the other would be treason to the constitution. Questions may occur, which we would gladly avoid; but we cannot avoid them. All we can do is, to exercise our best judgment, and conscientiously perform our duty.... We find no exception to this grant, and we cannot insert one.
[Emphasis added]
That Court in Knox County v. Aspinwall, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 376, 16 L.Ed. 735 (1861), stated:
[B]ut no court, having proper jurisdiction and process to compel the satisfaction of its own judgments, can be justified in turning its suitors over to another tribunal to obtain justice.
65 U.S. at 385.
In Willcox v. Consolidated Gas Co., 212 U.S. 19, 40, 29 S.Ct. 192, 195, 53 L.Ed. 382, 394, 48 LRA NS 1134 (1909), that Court stated: "When a Federal court is properly appealed to in a case over which it has by law jurisdiction, it is its duty to take such jurisdiction." 212 U.S. at 40, 29 S.Ct. at 195, 53 L.Ed. at 394-395.
This holding was repeated by the United States Supreme Court in England v. Louisiana Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 415, 84 S.Ct. 461, 464, 11 L.Ed.2d 440, 445 (1964).
In State v. Killigrew, 202 Ind. 397, 174 N.E. 808 (1931), the Indiana Supreme Court held:
[W]hen a court has jurisdiction over a class of cases and one seeking relief invokes the jurisdiction of the court in the manner prescribed by law, the particular cause is, ipso facto, under the jurisdiction of the court and the court cannot refuse jurisdiction.
Id. at 809.
The Indiana Supreme Court again in Rosenbarger v. Marion Circuit Court, 239 Ind. 132, 155 N.E.2d 125 (1959), held:
[T]he power to hear and decide carries with it the duty to do so. Mandate will lie to require an inferior court to hear the merits of a cause where it was improperly dismissed.
Id. at 127.
In Kruidenier v. McCulloch, 257 Iowa 1315, 136 N.W.2d 546 (1965), the Iowa Supreme Court held:
[S]tate courts of original jurisdiction have the duty to hear and determine cases properly before them. Such courts may not deny relief to persons properly before them to the extent to which they are entitled and the courts have power to afford under the circumstances.
Id. at 547.
In Lansverk v. Studebaker-Packard Corp., 54 Wash.2d 124, 338 P.2d 747 (1959), the Washington Supreme Court held:
[W]e find nothing in our constitution, our statutes, our rules, or our decisions that recognizes the existence of any discretion in the superior court of any county to decline to exercise the jurisdiction with which it is vested by the constitution and our statutes because of forum non con-veniens.
Id. at 748. See also: Vickers v. Kansas City, 216 Kan. 84, 531 P.2d 113, 121 (1975); Buckman v. United Mine Workers of America, 80 Wyo. 199, 339 P.2d 398, 400 (1959).
Neither can state courts make a distinction in access to its courts between in- and out-of-state citizens. Article 4, § 2, Paragraph 1 of the United States Constitution provides: "The Citizens of each state shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States." In Chambers v. Baltimore & O.R. Co., 207 U.S. 142, 28 S.Ct. 34, 52 L.Ed. 143 (1907), the United States Supreme Court held:
[Different states may have different policies, and the same state may have different policies at different times. But any policy the state may choose to adopt must operate in the same way on its own citizens and those of other states. The privileges which it affords to one class it must afford to the other. Any law by which privileges to begin actions in the court are given to its own citizens and withheld from the citizens of other states is void, because it is in conflict with the supreme law of the land.
207 U.S. at 149, 28 S.Ct. at 35.
Likewise, a court of this state may not decline jurisdiction because it is based on the law of another state. See: First Nat'l Bank v. United Airlines, Inc., 342 U.S. 396, 72 S.Ct. 421, 96 L.Ed. 441 (1952); Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609, 71 S.Ct. 980, 95 L.Ed. 1212 (1951).
II.
FORUM NON CONVENIENS
There is one important qualification to this principle, and that is the doctrine of forum non conveniens. As stated in 20 Am.Jur.2d, Courts, § 172:
[T]he doctrine of forum non conveniens is a most important qualification of the general theory that a court which has jurisdiction of a case has not only the right, but also the duty to exercise it, .
Section 84 of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws (1971), embraces this proposition:
§ 84. Forum Non Conveniens
A state will not exercise jurisdiction if it is a seriously inconvenient forum for the trial of the action provided that a more appropriate forum is available to the plaintiff.
*
(a) Rationale . The rule has been developed that a court, even though it has jurisdiction, will not entertain the suit if it believes itself to be a seriously inconvenient forum provided that a more appropriate forum is available to the plaintiff.
Of key importance is a recognition of a clear-cut type of case in which this doctrine has never been applied. In a suit between United States citizens, no court has ever applied the doctrine of forum non conve-niens to dismiss a case when there was no other forum available to the plaintiff.
As was stated by the Supreme Court of Tennessee in Zurich v. Inman, 221 Tenn. 393, 426 S.W.2d 767, 771 (1968):
The doctrine of forum non conveniens presupposes the court has jurisdiction of both the parties and the subject matter. The doctrine also presupposes there is at least one forum other than the forum chosen where the plaintiff may bring his cause of action, and it is necessary the trial court determine such other forum is available.
In Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 506-07, 67 S.Ct. 839, 842, 91 L.Ed. 1055 (1947), the United States Supreme Court stated:
In all cases in which the doctrine of forum non conveniens comes into play, it presupposes at least two forums in which the defendant is amenable to process; the doctrine furnishes criteria for choice between them.
See also: Koster v. Lumbermen's Mutual Casualty Co., 330 U.S. 518, 67 S.Ct. 828, 91 L.Ed. 1067 (1947); Menendez-Rodriquez v. Pan American Life Ins. Co., 311 F.2d 429, 432 (5th Cir.1962); Bewers v. American Homes Products Corp., 117 Misc.2d 991, 459 N.Y.S.2d 666, 670 (1982); MacLeod v. MacLeod, 383 A.2d 39, 42 (Me.1978); Holmes v. Cyntex Laboratories, Inc., 156 Cal.App.3d 372, 202 Cal.Rptr. 773, 780 (1984).
And, there is one classic instance when the doctrine of forum non conveniens will never be applied, and that is to dismiss a case if it is barred elsewhere by a statute of limitations, unless or until the defendant is willing to stipulate that he will waive the statute of limitation defense.
Thus, in the comment under § 84 of the Restatement, supra, we find the following:
c. Factors to be considered. The two most important factors look to the court's retention of the case. They are (1) that since it is for the plaintiff to choose the place of suit, his choice of a forum should not be disturbed except for weighty reasons, and (2) that the action will not be dismissed unless a suitable alternative forum is available to the plaintiff. Because of the second factor, the suit will be entertained, no matter how inappropriate the forum may be, if the defendant cannot be subjected to jurisdiction in other states. The same will be true if the plaintiffs cause of action would elsewhere be barred by the statute of limitations, unless the court is willing to accept the defendant's stipulation that he will not raise this defense in the second state.
To insure an alternative forum is available, the overwhelming authority in this country requires a defendant to waive the statute of limitations before the court will grant a forum non conveniens transfer. See:
California
Holmes v. Cyntex Laboratories, 156 Cal.App.3d 372, 202 Cal.Rptr. 773, 780 (1984).
Colorado
Kelce v. Touche Ross Co., 37 Colo.App. 352, 549 P.2d 415, 418 (1976).
Connecticut
Miller v. United Technologies Corp., 40 Conn.Supp. 457, 515 A.2d 390, 393 (1986).
District of Columbia
Mills v. Aetna Fire Underwriters Ins. Co., 511 A.2d 8, 13-14, (App.D.C.1986).
Illinois
Ellis v. Outboard Marine Corp., 132 Ill.App.3d 532, 87 Ill.Dec. 875, 478 N.E. 2d 14, 16 (1985).
Torrijas v. Midwest Steel Erection Co., 130 Ill.App.3d 788, 86 Ill.Dec. 53, 474 N.E.2d 1250, 1255 (1984).
Wieser v. Missouri Pacific R.R., 98 Ill.2d 359, 74 Ill.Dec. 596, 456 N.E.2d 98, 105 (1983).
Kansas
Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co. v. Herren, 207 Kan. 400, 485 P.2d 156, 157 (1971).
Maine
MacLeod v. MacLeod, 383 A.2d 39, 44 (Me.1978).
Michigan
Beilin v. Johns-Mansville Sales Corp., 141 Mich.App. 128, 366 N.W.2d 20, 23 (1984).
Missouri
Besse v. Missouri Pacific R.R., 721 S.W.2d 740, 743 n. 3 (Mo.1986).
New Hampshire
Smith v. Smith, 125 N.H. 336, 480 A.2d 158, 159-60 (1984).
New Mexico
State ex rel. Southern Pacific Transp. Co. v. Frost, 102 N.M. 369, 695 P.2d 1318, 1320 (1985).
New York
McLeod v. Lovelace, 117 A.D.2d 989, 499 N.Y.S.2d 290, 291 (N.Y.App.Div.1986).
Tetra Finance (HK), Ltd. v. Patry, 115 A.D.2d 408, 496 N.Y.S.2d 37, 38 (1985).
North Carolina
Motor Inn Management v. Irvin-Fuller Development Co., 46 N.C.App. 707, 266 S.E.2d 368, 371 (1980).
Pennsylvania
Daugherty v. Inland Tugs Co., 240 Pa.Super. 527, 359 A.2d 465, 467 (1976).
Norman v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 228 Pa.Super. 319, 323 A.2d 850, 855 (1974).
Thus in Torrijas v. Midwest Steel Erection Co., supra, we find the following illustrative statement:
Since the time limitations involved in certain of these cases may have run, this disposition is conditioned on the defendant's waiver of the statute of limitations, or similar defense, when the particular cause is transferred to another forum. (Foster v. Chicago & North Western Transportation Co., (1984), 102 Ill.2d 378, 385, 80 Ill.Dec. 746, 466 N.E.2d 198.) This disposition with the foregoing condition is applicable individually and severally to each case herein. If the defendant or defendants in any case involved herein refuses to waive the limitations defense, then in such instance plaintiff shall be given leave to reinstate the particular cause in the circuit court of Cook County.
86 Ill.Dec. at 58, 474 N.E.2d at 1255.
Federal district courts of this state, as a condition precedent to sustaining a forum non conveniens transfer motion, require the defendant to waive any statute of limitation defense. Tisdale v. Stone & Webster Corp., 595 F.Supp. 1016, 1020 (S.D.Miss.1984).
The only authority which may cursorily appear to suggest otherwise is Islamic Republic of Iran v. Pahlavi, 62 N.Y.2d 474, 467 N.E.2d 245, 478 N.Y.S.2d 597 (1984). That case, however, remains markedly different from this case. It involved a suit filed by Ayatollah Khomeini's government of the Islamic Republic of Iran against the former Shah and his wife charging a breach of fiduciary duty to the people of Iran and asking for a judgment against the defendants for $35 billion actual and $20 billion punitive damages. The only argument made by the plaintiff to the motion to dismiss on the ground of forum non conve-niens was the unavailability of an alternate forum. The Court of Appeals responded that there would be a question whether the judgment of a New York court would be effective in any event, that the defendants could not defend the claim in any meaningful way because all the records and witnesses were in Iran, and finally if the plaintiff could not proceed to a valid judgment in its own courts, it was its own fault. Thus, the Court of Appeals found all these factors overwhelmingly arrayed against the contention that there was not an alternative forum. The court stated:
Arrayed against this [unavailability of alternate forum] is the substantial burden upon the courts of this State and the possibility that its judgment may be ineffectual because of its inability to impose a constructive trust on defendant's assets if they are not in New York. Moreover, defendant probably cannot defend this claim in any realistic way because the witnesses and evidence are located in Iran under plaintiff's control and are not subject to the mandate of New York's courts. Indeed, plaintiff's counsel conceded on oral argument that ideally the action should be maintained in Iran but contended that New York was the better forum. If the action cannot be maintained in Iran, however, under laws which result in judgments cognizable in the United States or other foreign jurisdictions where the Shah's assets may be found, then that failure must be charged to plaintiff. It is, after all, the government in power, not a hapless national victimized by its country's policies. Any infirmity in plaintiff's legal system should weigh against its claim of venue, not impose disadvantage on defendant or the judicial system of this State.
478 N.Y.S.2d at 601-02, 467 N.E.2d at 249-50.
We note the following differences in that case and this:
(1) That case involved foreigners exclusively. The privileges and immunities clause of the United States Constitution was not affected.
(2) The court of New York doubted if it had the power to afford complete relief, of which there is no doubt in this case.
(3) If the plaintiff could not get complete relief under the judicial system of Iran, it was the plaintiff's own fault.
(4) There was no statute of limitations involved in that case.
That the courts of New York would not apply Islamic Republic to the facts of this case is made clear in McLeod v. Lovelace, 117 A.D.2d 989, 499 N.Y.S.2d 290 (1986), a suit by a Canadian citizen against another Canadian citizen following a one-car accident in New York. The trial court dismissed the case on the ground of forum non conveniens, and the New York Supreme Court affirmed, because it found the New York forum inconvenient, and "another forum is available which best serves the ends of justice and the convenience of the parties." This case, while citing Islamic Republic, concludes:
[T]o assure the availability of such forum the dismissal is affirmed on condition that defendant stipulates to accept service of process in Canada, to appear in an action commenced there for the same relief demanded in the complaint here and to waive any defense of the Statute of Limitations therein. If defendant fails to do so stipulate within 30 days after service of the order entered herein with notice of entry, the order is reversed, with costs to plaintiff. [Citations omitted; Emphasis added]
499 N.Y.S.2d at 291.
III.
STATUTE OF LIMITATION BAR
Appellees also contend on appeal that the judgment of dismissal was correct as a matter of law, even though the circuit judge may have assigned the wrong reasons in granting it. It is true that an appellate court has the obligation to affirm a trial court judgment correct as a matter of law, even though the trial court may have been mistaken in its reason for granting the judgment. Hickox v. Holleman, 502 So.2d 626 (Miss.1987); Allgood v. Bradford, 473 So.2d 401 (Miss.1985); Tedford v. Dempsey, 437 So.2d 410 (Miss.1983); Huffman v. Griffin, 337 So.2d 715 (Miss.1976).
Limitations on the time within which an action must be brought are created by statute only. They are legislative, not judicial acts. Thus, in State Board of Adjustment v. State, 231 Ala. 520, 165 So. 761, 762 (Ala.1936), the Alabama Supreme Court held:
[T]here was no such thing as a limitation of action at common law. The right is wholly statutory, and there are no exceptions to the statute except those made in and by the statute itself.
In Butler v. Craig, 27 Miss. 628, 61 Am.Dec. 527 (1854), this Court, in answer to a particular argument of the inequity in applying a limitation statute, held:
[B]ut it has long been the settled doctrine of this court, that no equitable exceptions are to be engrafted upon the statutes of limitation, and that where there is not an express exception the court will not engraft one.
In Matson v. Matson, 50 N.M. 155, 173 P.2d 484, 489 (1946), the New Mexico Supreme Court held:
[T]he general principle recognized to-day for the construction of statutes of limitations is that unless some good ground can be found in the statute for restraining or enlarging the meaning of its general words, they must receive a general construction, and that the courts cannot arbitrarily subtract from or add thereto, and cannot create an exception where none exists, even when the exception would be an equitable one.

As a general rule the courts are without power to read into these statutes exceptions which have not been embodied therein, however reasonable they may seem. It is not for judicial tribunals to extend the law to all cases coming within the reason of it, so long as they are not within the letter.
#
The Legislature having made no exception, the courts of justice can make none, as this would be legislating.
See also: Fontana Land Co. v. Laughlin, 199 Cal. 625, 250 P. 669 (1926); Baldwin v. City of San Diego, 195 Cal.App.2d 236, 15 Cal.Rptr. 576 (1961); Oberst v. Mays, 365 P.2d 902 (Colo.1961); Doughty v. Maine Central Transp. Co., 141 Me. 124, 39 A.2d 758 (1944); Gilliam v. Admiral Corp., 111 N.J.Super. 370, 268 A.2d 338 (1970); Woods v. Phillips Petroleum, 207 Okl. 490, 251 P.2d 505 (1952); Evans v. Finley, 166 Or. 227, 111 P.2d 833 (1941).
The United States Supreme Court has consistently sustained the power of a forum's Legislature to prescribe times in which suits may be brought. Nothing in the Constitution limits this power. M'Cluny v. Silliman, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 270, 7 L.Ed. 676 (1830); M'Elmoyle v. Cohen, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 312, 10 L.Ed. 177 (1839); Campbell v. Holt, 115 U.S. 620, 6 S.Ct. 209, 29 L.Ed. 483 (1885); The Michigan Ins. Bank v. Eldred, 130 U.S. 693, 9 S.Ct. 690, 32 L.Ed. 1080 (1889); Burnet v. Alvarez, 226 U.S. 145, 33 S.Ct. 63, 57 L.Ed. 159 (1912); Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 61 S.Ct. 1020, 85 L.Ed. 1477 (1941); Chase Securities Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 65 S.Ct. 1137, 89 L.Ed. 1628 (1945); Wells v. Simonds Abrasive Co., 345 U.S. 514, 73 S.Ct. 856, 97 L.Ed. 211 (1953).
The only restriction placed on states in hearing out-of-state claims is the Constitutional limit placed on our long-arm statute. So long as an out-of-state litigant has enough minimum contacts in Mississippi so that the maintenance of a suit "does not offend the traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice," our courts have the power to hear a suit. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 105 S.Ct. 2174, 85 L.Ed.2d 528 (1985); Administrators of Tulane Educational Fund v. Cooley, 462 So.2d 696 (Miss.1984). So long as the case falls within the prescribed period of when a suit can be brought, our courts must hear the action.
The Legislature of this State over time has enacted a comprehensive series of acts setting time limits on various types of action, set out in Title 15 Chapter 1 of our 1972 Code. It has also by other statutes provided an extension of one year in case of death, Miss.Code Ann. § 15-1-55. It has provided for tolling in case of:
(1) legal disability (§ 15-1-57, —61);
(2) disability of age or mentality (§ 15-1-59);
(3) absence from state (§ 15-1-63);
(4) fraudulent concealment (§ 15-1-67).
It has passed other statutes making special provisions as to the application of such statutes: Miss.Code Ann. § 15-1-73 to -75.
Also, the Legislature has passed a statute making provision for nonresidents bringing suit on causes accruing in another state. Miss.Code Ann. § 15-1-65, which has been on the books since 1880, provides:
[W]hen a cause of action has accrued in some other state or in a foreign country, and by the law of such state or country, or of some other state and country where the defendant has resided before he resided in this state, an action thereon cannot be maintained by reason of lapse of time, then no action thereon shall be maintained in this state.
We have consistently held that this statute applies only to a nonresident who moves to this State after the statute has run on the cause in the other state. It does not apply to the factual situation presented here, and in cases such as this our Mississippi statute of limitations applies. See: White v. Malone Properties, Inc., 494 So.2d 576 (Miss.1986); Cowan v. Ford Motor Co., 437 So. 2d 46 (Miss.1983); Montgomery v. Yarbrough, 192 Miss. 656, 6 So.2d 305, sugg. of error overruled, 6 So.2d 925 (1942); Louisiana & Mississippi R. Transfer Co. v. Long, 159 Miss. 654, 131 So. 84 (1930); Fisher v. Burk, 123 Miss. 781, 86 So. 300 (1920); New Orleans Great Northern R. Co. v. Fortinberry, 107 Miss. 79, 64 So. 966 (1914); Robinson v. Moore, 76 Miss. 89, 23 So. 631 (1898); Kershaw v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 415 F.2d 1009 (5th Cir.1969); Sheets v. Burman, 322 F.2d 277 (5th Cir.1963). The Legislature, in re-enacting this statute over the years is presumed to have known the construction put on it by this Court and never saw fit to change it. This conclusively demonstrates we have given this statute the precise interpretation the Legislature intended. White v. Williams, 159 Miss. 732, 132 So. 573, 75 A.L.R. 757 (1931).
IV.
COMMON LAW APPLICATION OF STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
The overwhelming body of common law holds that in applying statutes of limitations, the law of the forum controls. That is, the statute of limitations of the state where suit is filed applies, not the state where the cause accrued.
The rule has been consistently applied by this Court without problem in Hamilton v. Cooper, 1 Miss. (Walker) 542 (1832); Wright v. Morduant, 77 Miss. 537, 27 So. 640 (1899); Louisiana & Mississippi R. Transfer Co. v. Long, supra; Montgomery v. Yarbrough, supra; New Orleans Great Northern R. Co. v. Fortinberry, supra; Gutherie v. Merchants Nat'l Bank of Mobile, 254 Miss. 532, 180 So.2d 309 (1965); and Cowan v. Ford Motor Co., supra.
In Vick v. Cochran, 316 So.2d 242, 246 (Miss.1975), we stated: "(2) the period of limitations, by ancient precedent, is governed by the law of the forum."
Also, as noted, application of Mississippi law to suits brought in this state has been consistently respected by the federal courts. See: Davis v. Nat'l Gypsum Co., 743 F.2d 1132 (5th Cir.1984); Kershaw v. Sterling Drug, supra; Sheets v. Burman, supra; Fieldman v. Roper Corp., 586 F.Supp. 936 (S.D.Miss.1984); Price v. Litton Systems, Inc., 607 F.Supp. 30 (S.D.Miss.1984); Schreiber v. Allis-Chalmers, 448 F.Supp. 1079 (D.Kan.1978); Steele v. G.D. Searle & Co., 422 F.Supp. 560 (S.D.Miss.1976); Cummings v. Cowan, 390 F.Supp. 1251 (N.D.Miss.1975).
While not involving Mississippi cases, the rule is respected and adhered to in decisions of the United States Supreme Court. See Watkins v. Conway, 385 U.S. 188, 87 S.Ct. 357, 17 L.Ed.2d 286 (1966); Wells v. Simonds Abrasive Co., supra; Davis v. Mills, 194 U.S. 451, 24 S.Ct. 692, 48 L.Ed. 1067 (1904).
53 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions, states the general rule. Section 27, pp. 970-72:
[T]he general rule is that in respect of the limitation of actions the law of the forum governs, regardless of where the cause of action arose, or of whether or not the action would be barred in the state in which it arose, and irrespective of the residence of the parties at the time the cause of action accrued.
*
The general rule applies wherever foreign statutes bar merely the remedy as distinguished from the right, and has been said to have no exceptions other than those which may be found in the law of the forum.
Section 30, p. 975, gives the one general exception:
Where by statute a right of action is given which did not exist by the common law, and the statute giving the right fix the time within which the right may be enforced, the time so fixed becomes a limitation or condition on such right, and will control, no matter in what forum the action is brought .
See also: 51 Am.Jur.2d Limitations of Actions, § 66, 68.
In addition the following states hold that the forum applies its own statute of limitations:
Alabama
Dodd v. Lovett, 287 Ala. 131, 248 So.2d 724 (1971).
Alaska
Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 430 F.Supp. 134 (D.Alaska 1977).
Colorado
Casselman v. Denver Tramway Corp., 39 Colo.App. 306, 568 P.2d 84, 86 (1977).
Connecticut
Raymond-Dravo-Langenfelder v. Microdot, Inc., 425 F.Supp. 614, 619 (D.Del.1976).
Thomas Iron Co. v. Ensign-Bickford Co., 42 A.2d 145, 146 (1945).
Florida
Aviation Credit Corp. v. Batchelor, 190 So.2d 8, 10 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1966), cert. dismissed, sub nom. Batchelor v. Aviation Credit Corp., 198 So.2d 24 (Fla.1967).
Georgia
Crites v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 177 Ga. App. 723, 341 S.E.2d 264, 265-266 (1986).
Indiana
Lee v. Estate of Cain, 476 N.E.2d 922, 924 (Ind.Ct.App.1985).
Iowa
Sedco Intern'l, S.A. v. Cory, 522 F.Supp. 254, 315 (S.D.Iowa 1981). Clark v. Figge, 181 N.W.2d 211, 215 (Iowa 1970).
Maine
Hossler v. Barry, 403 A.2d 762, 766 (Me.1979).
Maryland
Sokolowski v. Flanzer, 769 F.2d 975, 978 (4th Cir.1985).
Billingsley v. Lincoln Nat'l Bank, 271 Md. 683, 320 A.2d 34 (1974).
Michigan
Fries v. Holland Hitch Co., 12 Mich. App. 178, 162 N.W.2d 672, 674 (1968).
Nevada
Seely v. Illinois-California Express, 541 F.Supp. 1307 (D.Nev.1982).
Ohio
Loughan v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 624 F.2d 726, 729 (5th Cir.1980). Lee v. Wright Tool & Forge Co., 48 Ohio App.2d 148, 356 N.E.2d 303, 306 (1975).
Oklahoma
Mitchell v. Cloyes, 620 P.2d 398, 403 (Okla.1980).
Pennsylvania
Bulkin v. Western Kraft East, Inc., 422 F.Supp. 437, 441 (E.D.Pa.1976).
Freeman v. Lawton, 353 Pa. 613, 46 A.2d 205 (Pa.1946).
Texas
Los Angeles Airways, Inc. v. Lummis, 603 S.W.2d 246 (Tex.Civ.App.1980).
Washington
Sobo v. Sobo, 28 Wash.App. 766, 626 P.2d 520 (1981).
Texas has carried the rule of applying her own statute of limitations to the extent that even though a summary judgment was granted in a foreign state because that state's statute barred the action, nevertheless this did not bar the plaintiff suing in a Texas court. Los Angeles Airways, Inc. v. Lummis, supra. State courts are, and should be chary of relinquishing their right to offer their own state's statute of limitations to causes pending in their courts.
This Court is not unmindful that the application of this rule has received respectable academic criticism. See: Leflar, The New Conflicts-Limitations Act, 35 Mercer L.Rev. 461 (1984); Lorenzen, The Statute of Limitations and the Conflict of Laws, 28 Yale L.J. 492 (1919); Martin, Statutes of Limitations and Rationality in the Conflict of Laws, 19 Wash.L.J. 403; and Grossman, Statutes of Limitations and the Conflict of Laws: Modern Analysis, 1980 Ariz.St.L.J. 1. Even they are not unanimous, however. See: Ailes, Limitation of Actions and the Conflict of Laws, 31 Mich.L.Rev. 474 (1933).
Also, the comments under Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws (1971), § 142 (amended 1987) recommend a contrary holding. As the Restatement acknowledges, however, this question can be easily addressed by a legislature, and cites the Uniform Conflict of Laws-Limitations Act, which was approved by the National Con ference of Commissioners on Uniform Laws in 1982. This, of course, is where the question should be addressed, not through any back-handed legislation from this Court.
What time limitations should be imposed on litigants filing suit in courts of this state embraces broad matters of public policy, which clearly are matters for the Legislature to decide, as indeed they have throughout history.
We have clearly established, sound principles of law which we are not inclined to overrule. White v. Malone Properties, supra, and Cowan v. Ford Motor Co., supra.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
. The corporate defendants are: A.C. and S. Inc., a/k/a Acands, Inc., and formerly known as Armstrong Contracting and Supply Corporation; Amoco Chemicals Corporation; Armstrong World Industries, Inc., formerly known as Armstrong Cork Company; Atlas Turner, Ltd; Bell Asbestos Mines, Ltd.; The Celotex Corporation, successor-in-interest to The Philip Carey Manufacturing Company, Philip Carey Corporation, Briggs Manufacturing, and Panacon Corporation; Eagle-Picher Industries, Inc.; E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Company, Inc.; Fibreboard Corporation; Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc.; Gale Corporation; Keene Corporation; Pittsburgh Corning Corporation; GAF Corporation, successor-in-interest to Ruberoid Corporation; Southern Textile Corporation, formerly known as Southern Asbestos, a wholly-owned subsidiary of H.K. Porter Company, Inc.; Nicolet, Inc.; and Owens-Illinois, Inc.
. Indeed it is ancient, in this country as well as England. See: Campbell v. Stein, 6 Dow. 116 at 134, 3 Eng.Rpr. 1417 (1818); M'Elmoyle v. Coken, 13 Pet. (38 U.S.) 312, 10 L.Ed. 177 (1839).
. This Uniform Act has been enacted by four states, Arkansas, Colorado, North Dakota and Washington. A copy is made an appendix to this opinion.