Case Name: CORA GOODRICH, Administratrix, v. PAUL H. MAY et al.
Court: Oregon Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Oregon
Decision Date: 1927-04-29
Citations: 121 Or. 418
Docket Number: 
Parties: CORA GOODRICH, Administratrix, v. PAUL H. MAY et al.
Judges: Burnett, C. J., and Bean and Brown, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Oregon Reports
Volume: 121
Pages: 418–422

Head Matter:
Argued April 13,
affirmed April 29, 1927.
CORA GOODRICH, Administratrix, v. PAUL H. MAY et al.
(255 Pac. 464.)
For appellants there was a brief over the name of Messrs. Ridgway, Johnson & Montgomery, with an oral argument by Mr. Hugh S. Montgomery.
For respondent there was a brief over the name of Messrs. Semi S Recken, with an oral argument by Mr. Frank 8. Sewn.

Opinion:
BELT, J.
The sole question for consideration is whether the court erred in sustaining an objection to the following hypothetical question asked of Captain Lewis of the Portland Police Department:
"Q. Now, Captain, it appears from the evidence introduced upon the trial of this case that a car op erated by tbe defendant Paul H. May had the right rear wheel damaged to tbe extent of a scratch on one spoke, a splintering of tbe spoke to tbe left of tbe one first scratched and a scratching of tbe spoke to tbe left of tbe one splintered, both of wbicb scratches are close to tbe rim where tbe spoke enters tbe rim. Based on that evidence and on your experience in tbe investigation of automobile accidents, I will ask you whether or not, in your opinion, tbe injury wbicb I have described to the said wheel could have been caused by that wheel being turned in a right-hand direction from tbe direction in wbicb it was traveling against another car or wheel traveling in tbe same direction?"
Prior to tbe above question, evidence was offered to show that tbe witness, as an officer in tbe traffic department of tbe City of Portland, bad many years of experience in investigating tbe cause of automobile collisions; that he bad examined tbe wheel in question and that it was in tbe same condition as at tbe time of tbe accident. Evidence bad been introduced on behalf of tbe plaintiff tending to establish negligence as averred in tbe complaint. To refute tbe same and to show that defendants' automobile did not strike tbe Goodrich car, counsel for appellants asserts tbe above question was asked.
We are of opinion that this was not a proper subject for expert testimony. Tbe wheel in question was introduced in evidence and tbe jurors bad tbe opportunity of observing tbe scratches upon its spokes and any other way in wbicb it was damaged. They were in a position to draw a reasonable inference therefrom as to wbicb car struck tbe other. It was a matter not beyond tbe range of their common experience and there was no occasion to resort to expert testimony. Such evidence should be received only where the subject matter is complicated and embraces matters not of common knowledge. No question of science, art or technical learning' was involved. It was simply a matter of applying well-known natural laws of which the jurors had more or less knowledge. As stated in Commonwealth v. Sturtivant, 117 Mass. 122 (19 Am. Rep. 401):
"Suppose the panel of a carriage door is broken in by a collision; different appearances would follow from a horizontal blow delivered at right angles, than from a blow from the front or rear, from above or below. Such appearances the common observer can detect, some more accurately and clearly than others, but it is presumed to be within the power of all; and the opinion of an expert who has experimented by blows on similar surfaces, and is learned in the law of forces, is not necessary or required. If the panel itself is introduced to the jury, they are competent and able to decide the question."
The fact that the witness may have been more skilled and experienced than the jurors does not of itself justify expert testimony. In 11 R. C. L. 593 it is said:
"It is not sufficient to warrant the introduction of expert evidence that the witness may know more of the subject of inquiry, and may better comprehend and appreciate it than the jury. The jurors may have less skill and experience than the witnesses and yet have enough to draw their own conclusions and do justice between the parties."
Also see Fisher v. Oregon S. L. etc. Ry. Co., 22 Or. 533 (30 Pac. 422, 16 L. R. A. 519), wherein Chief Justice Shaw, in Northeastern Glass Co. v. Lovell, 7 Cush. (Mass.) 319, is thus quoted:
"It is not because a man has a reputation of superior sagacity and judgment and power of reason ing, that his testimony is admissible; if so, snch men might be called in all cases and advise the jury, and it would change the mode of trial; but it is because a man's professional pursuits require peculiar skill and knowledge in some department of science not common to men in general, which enables him to draw an inference, when men of common experience, after all the facts proved, would be left in the dark."
No error was committed by the trial court. It follows that the judgment is affirmed. Affirmed.
Burnett, C. J., and Bean and Brown, JJ., concur.