Case Name: Goodno vs. The City of Oshkosh
Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Wisconsin
Decision Date: 1872-01
Citations: 31 Wis. 127
Docket Number: 
Parties: Goodno vs. The City of Oshkosh.
Judges: Cole, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion.
Reporter: Wisconsin Reports
Volume: 31
Pages: 127–138

Head Matter:
Goodno vs. The City of Oshkosh.
Statutes, repeal of. — Practice; change of place of trial for prejudice of judge.
1. Where a statute provides that a specified section of a former statute “ shall he amended so as to read as follows,” etc., reciting the section in full as amended, any provision of such section not found in 'the new statute, is repealed. Stater. Ingersoll, 17 Wis., 681.
2. All the provisions of such section which continue to he in force after the passage of the amendatory act, derive their force thereafter, not from the original, hut from the amendatory act.
3. A repeal of the amendatory act does not revive the section as originally enacted. R. S., chap. 5, sec. 25, subd. 3.
4. Chap. 163, Laws of 1868, provides that sec. 9, chap. 123, R. S., “ is hereby amended, and shall read as follows,” etc., reciting the section in full, as amended. Held, that upon the repeal of said act of 1868, by chap. 65, -Laws of 1869, the original provisions of said sec. 9, chap. 123, R. S., as well as the new provisions inserted by the amend-atory act, ceased to be in force.
5. Since chap. 65, Laws of 1869, took effect, there has been no provision of law forbidding more than one change in the place of trial; and an order in this case, refusing an application for a second change of that kind, on account of the alleged prejudice of the judge (such refusal being made upon the ground that the party could not have a second change), is reversed. Smith r. Hoyt (14 Wis., 252), distinguished.
6. Lyon, J., dissents, holding
(1) That the amendment of 1868, in effect, merely excepts certain cases from the general rule established by sec. 9, chap. 123, R. S., forbidding more than one change in the place of trial; and, within the decision in Smith r. Hoyt (14 Wis., 252), the repeal of such a statute merely operates to bring such cases again under the general law.
(2) That if it was the intention and meaning of the act of 1869 to repeal all restrictions upon changes in the place of trial for alleged prejudice of the judge, the act is in conflict with sec. 9, art. I.,. of our state constitution, which declares that “ every person is entitled to a certain remedy in the laws for all injuries or wrongs,” etc., and that “he ought to obtain justice * * completely and without denial, promptly and without delay,” etc.
1. Lyon, J., is also of the opinion that said sec. 9 does not allow a change of venue on the application of the plaintiff, after one has been granted to the defendant, or rice rersa; but absolutely forbids more than oue change in all.
APPEAL from the Circuit Court for Fond du Lac County.
This action was commenced in the circuit court for Winnebago county, but transferred to Fond du Lac county, on petition of the plaintiff on the ground that the judge was prejudiced. Upon the trial in that county a judgment was rendered for the the plaintiff, which was reversed on appeal. The case was never continued on defendant’s application. At the first term after it was remitted from the supreme court, the defendant applied by petition for a change of venue on account of the prejudice of the judge of the circuit court for Fond du Lac county. Such application was denied, solely on the ground that a second change was not authorized by statute, although applied for by the other party.
From the order denying the application defendant appealed.
Gale JSouck, for appellant,
insisted that the proper construction of sec. 9, ch. 123, R. S., is, that the same party is not entitled to more than one change of venue. It does not deprive one party of the benefit of the statute because the other party has already had such change. Heath v. Maihiew, 19 Wis., 114 That section was enacted to prevent delays and secure to each party a fair trial, and such a construction would not be in accordance with that intention.
Jaclcson & Halsey, for respondent,
contended that the statute is specific, and expressly provides that “no more than one change shall be awarded in any action and, even in the absence of express prohibition, but one change could be had, because the statute nowhere provides for more. That the second application is not made by the same party as the first is immaterial, since both had a hearing upon the first application as to where the case should be sent; and its being sent to Fond du Lac county without objection of either party is a decision that the cause which authorized the first change, i. e., the prejudice of the judge, did not exist there. Heath v. Maihiew, 19 Wis., 114; Ewing v. Gray, 12 Ind., 64.

Opinion:
Dixon, C. J.
In the edition of the statutes prepared and arranged by him, Judge Taylor starts the quaere, whether section 9, ch. 123, R. S., providing that no more than one change of the place of trial shall be awarded in any action, has not been repealed. 2 Tay. Stats., 1425, § 11, note. The judge refers to ch. 163, Laws of 1868, and ch. 65, Laws of 1869, as the basis of the suggestion. The former chapter reads as follows : " Section 1. Section nine of chapter one hundred and twenty-three (123) of the revised statutes, is hereby amended, and shall read as follows: ' Section 9. When the place of trial shall be -changed as provided in this chapter, it shall be changed to some county where the causes complained of do not exist, and no more than one change in the place of trial shall be awarded, except upon the written stipulation of the parties or their attorneys, or until one or more trials shall have been had in said county.'" The words in italics indicate the change which was made by the amendment, and those not italicized, the statute as it stood prior to the amendment, with only the words " in any action " omitted, and which should be added at the end. The act of 1869 is in these words: " Section 1. Chapter 163 of the general laws of 1868, entitled 'an act to amend chapter 123 of the revised statutes, entitled of the place of trials of civil actions,' is hereby repealed."
The rule of construction enacted by statute in this state, that no act or part of an act repealed by a subsequent act of the legislature shall be deemed to be revived by the repeal of such repealing act, is well understood. R. S., ch. 5, sec. 25, subd. 3; 1 Tay. Stats., 183, § 25, subd. 3.
In State v. Ingersoll, 17 Wis., 631, this court decided that where a statute provides that a certain section of a former statute shall be "amended'so as to read as follows," ,etc., any provision of such section not found in the new statute is repealed. It follows very clearly from that decision, that, whatever provision of the former statute was in force after the amendment of 1868, it was so in force because of being found in the amendatory act, and that if all or substantially -all of the former section continued to be the law, it was merely by reason of its having been copied into and re-enacted with the amendment. The original section, as an independent and distinct statutory enactment, ceased to have any existence the very moment the amendatory act was passed and went into effect, and whatever provisions of it remained as law were such solely by virtue of being again enacted in the amendment. The original section, as a separate statute, was as effectually repealed and obliterated from the statute book, as if the repeal had been made by direct and express words, and none of its provisions had been re-enacted. Such being the operation of the act of 1868, the conclusion as to the operation of that of 1869 is not difficult. It repealed the whole of the act of 1868, as well that part which re-enacted the provisions of the original section, as the part which was added to those provisions. How such repeal can bo severed, and said to apply only to that portion of the act of 1868 which was new, and not to affect that portion which was old or borrowed from the provisions of the previous statute, is certainly not easy to be perceived. If we areffo look for the intention of the legislature in the language it employs, which is the only criterion where the language is plain, then it is not easy to see that the legislature did not intend to repeal the whole act, both that which was old and that which was new or brought in when the repealed act was passed. Such is the inevitable result by every rule of statutory construction with which we are familiar; and this court is not to go outside of the plain language of a statute to speculate upon what -may have been the possible intention of the legislature, or to consider what may be the inconviences or mischief resulting from its giving effect toa statute according to its obvious import -and meaning. If the legislature has made a mistake, it is for the ¡legislature to correct it. This court has no sufficient evidence that the legislature has done so ; but if it had, it has not the legislative power of correction, or to arrest the opera tion of laws constitutionally passed. It cannot stop tbe force of a repeal when tbe legislature bas plainly and unambiguously so enacted. It would be a migbty undertaking for tbis court, if it bad the power, to correct all tbe mistakes and evils of hasty and ill-considered legislation. But tbe court has no such power, and no disposition to usurp the functions of another coordinate and independent department of tbe government. It is quite enough for tbis court to answer for and rectify its own mistakes and errors, without entering upon forbidden ground to correct tbe supposed mistakes of others.
The case of Smith v. Hoyt, 14 Wis., 252, bas been referred to as possibly furnishing a rule for a decision in tbis that tbe repeal of the act of 1868 did not carry with it tbe provisions of tbe previous section of tbe revised statutes, or that such repeal operated only to revive and restore such previous section. If tbis court were anxious to legislate, as, unfortunately, under the guise of construing statutes, courts have too often done, that decision would seem hardly to furnish a plausible pretext for its so doing. It seems too plainly and clearly distinguishable from the present to afford any ground for such decision. Tbe point there held was, that where a statute merely excepts a particular class of cases from tbe provisions of a previously existing general law which continues to be in force, tbe repeal of tbe excepting statute operates to bring such cases again under the general law. Tbe correctness of this rule is undoubted, and, in the present case, if tbe act of 1868 had been in terms and legal effect only tbe creation or enactment of an exception to tbe provisions of tbe previously exising section of tbe general law, thus leaving that section untouched and to stand of its own force as part of tbe general law, except as to tbe excepted cases, then tbe decision would have been applicable, and tbe repeal of tbe act would have brought all cases again under tbe operation of tbe previous section, which bad all tbe time bad an independent existence as part of tbe law, subject only to tbe exception while that lasted. But we have seen that tbe question here arises under entirely different circumstances, and different rules and principles must govern, tlie rule of that decision being wholly inapplicable.
The court below having refused the application of the de • fendant for a change of the place of trial solely on the ground that no more than one such change could be awarded in the action, it follows that the order appealed from must be reversed, and the cause remanded for further proceedings according to law.
Cole, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion.