Case Name: Union Passenger Railway Company's Appeal
Court: Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
Jurisdiction: Pennsylvania
Decision Date: 1872-11-14
Citations: 81 1/2 Pa. 91
Docket Number: 
Parties: Union Passenger Railway Company’s Appeal.
Judges: At Pittsburgh. Before Thompson, C. J., Read, Agnew, Sharswood, and Williams, JJ.
Reporter: Pennsylvania State Reports
Volume: 81 1/2
Pages: 91–95

Head Matter:
Union Passenger Railway Company’s Appeal.
1. The act of incorporation of a passenger railway company authorized them to lay their tracks in a number of streets designated. Another act was passed, entitled “ A supplement (to the first act) authorizing the company to declare dividends quarterly, and to lay additional tracks of railway.” Held, that under the clause in the constitution prohibiting laws “containing more than one subject, which shall be clearly expressed in the title,” a provision authorizing them to lay tracks in streets not authorized by the original act was unconstitutional.
2. The last clause in the title did not clearly express the intent to confer a power or extend the railway into new territory.
3. By the charter the road was a single-track railway, the apparent meaning of the title was to give the company power to lay additional tracks on the original route.
4. A title to a bill which tends to mislead, stands on a different footing from, one merely general in its terms.
5. A title conveying a belief that one subject is the purpose of the bill while a different one is its subject, tends to mislead.
6. The language of this title is not the extension of a line into new places, but an addition to that which was already had.
7. That the legislature might have intended the power authorized, is not a clear expression; the purpose of the constitutional clause was not an inquiry into an uncertain thing.
8. Dorsey’s Appeal, 22 P. F. Smith, 192, followed.
October 30th, 1872.
At Pittsburgh. Before Thompson, C. J., Read, Agnew, Sharswood, and Williams, JJ.
Appeal from the decree of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia, No. 144, of July Term, 1872.
■On the 13th of April, 1872, the West Philadelphia Passenger Railway Company filed a bill against The Union Passenger Railway Company; the bill alleged:
1, 2. Plaintiffs were a corporation of Pennsylvania by act of May 14th, 1857. The defendants were a like corporation under act of May 14th, 1864.
3, By virtue of their charter, the plaintiffs had built a line of railway for passenger use extending over various portions of Philadelphia, west of the Schuylkill, crossing the Market Street bridge, extending eastwardly by double track along Market Street to Front Street.
4. The defendants, under their charter, built a line of passenger railway, beginning near Wharton and Front streets, “ with a single track and such turnouts as may be necessary,” along Wharton to Ninth Street, thence along the same, and
3 by various streets set but in the bill, northwardly, crossing Market Street, and returning southwardly to Race Street, along Race to Seventh Street, thence southwardly along Seventh Street, and various streets set out in the bill,and crossing Market Street to the placaof beginning.. Market Street was not one of the streets along which this road was to be built.
5. On the 13th of March, 1872, an act entitled “A further supplement to an act entitled, ‘ An act to incorporate the Union Passenger Railway Company of Philadelphia,’ approved April 8th, 1861, authorizing the said company to declare dividends quarterly and to lay additional tracks of railway,” was passed.
6. The defendants threatened, etc., “ to construct two lines of additional railway tracks upon Market Street, between Ninth and Er.ont streets, under the authority of the act referred to, . . . to the great inconvenience and detriment of the public in their enjoyment of Market Street, .... which two additional lines of railway tracks, besides greatly impairing and inconveniencing the plaintiffs’ franchise, are intended, etc., to cross their lines at several points.”
>k * * * *
8. .The constitution of Pennsylvania provides that “no bill shall be passed by the legislature containing more than one subject, which shall be clearly expressed in the title.” Plaintiffs insisted that the act of March 13th, 1872, contravenes both the requirements of the said article of the constitution, in containing more than one subject, and in not clearly expressing in its titfe the proposed extension of its tracks upon Market Street. There were other paragraphs in the bill not necessary to be referred to, the decision of the Supreme Court being on the 5th and 8th paragraphs.
Tfie prayer for relief was, that the defendants might, by special injunction, and after hearing, by a perpetual injunction, be resti-ained from constructing their extended line of railway on Market Street between Ninth and Front streets.
The Court of Common Pleas, April 13th, 1872, awarded a preliminary injunction, and, after argument, on the 15th of June, 1872, continued the preliminary injunction. From, this decree the defendant appealed to the Supreme Court.
This róas the error assigned :
F. G. Brewster, H. M. Phillips, and E. Olmsted, for appellants.
Acts of incorporation have no more expressed in their titles than that they are to incoi’porate individuals and name the corporation ; the act may incorporate the company to do almost anything. They do not indicate the powers granted. An act, therefore, which enlarges or modifies the powers of a corporation, is not required to express more in its title than that it is a supplement to the original act. This act indicates its contents with even more particularity than the constitution required. The constitution requires, not that the title should be a full index to the contents of the law, but prevents the passage of bills on many different subjects under the title of the enactment in the first section, “ and for other purposes:" Yeager v. Weaver, 14 P. F. Smith, 427 ; Blood v. Mercelliott, 3 Id., 391 ; “ Church Street,” 4 Id., 353.
T Cuyler and G. W. Biddle, for appellees.
Under Section 8, Article II of the constitution, a corporation is prevented from obtaining by legislation, a bill containing, in different matters, powers which they could not openly obtain. The act under consideration, Pamph. L., 339, Section 1, authorizes the declaration of quarterly dividends. Section 2, authorizes the corporation to extend their track along Jefferson Street, from Seventh to Thirty-third Street, and along Seventh from Oxford Street, etc., and also to lay a double track on Market Street from Ninth Street to Front Street, etc. The title, “to lay additional tracks,” does not cover laying a double track on Market Street: Dwarris on Statutes, by Potter, p. 103; Blood v. Mercelliott, “ Church Street;” Yerger v. Weaver, supra ; Commonwealth v. Green, 8 P. F. Smith, 234; Pennsylvania Railroad v. Riblet, 16 Id., 165. Even had the title been good, if simply a “supplement” to the first act, adding “ to declare quarterly dividends and lay additional tracks ” concealed the meaning, and instead of “ clearly expressing ” was a fraud on the legislature: People v. Commissioners of Palatine, 53 Barbour, 70.

Opinion:
Mr. Justice Agnew
delivered the opinion of the court, November 14th, 1872.
We depart, in this case, from our usual rule not to deliver an opinion in deciding upon an appeal from a preliminary injunction. The ground upon which we determine the case is decisive upon a final hearing, and therefore it may be stated now. We are of opinion that so much of the supplement to the charter of the Union Passeuger Railway Company of Philadelphia, passed the 13th of March, 1872, as gives the company authority to extend their railway into streets not authorized by their charter to b'e used by them, is unconstitutional, on the ground that this purpose is not clearly expressed in the title of the supplement. The titlé reads as follows: " A further supplement to an act entitled ' An act to incorporate the Union Passenger Railway of Phila del phi a, approved April 8th, A.D. 1864,' authorizing said company to declare dividends quarterly, and to lay additional tracks of railway." The last clause of this title does not clearly express the intent to confer a power, or to extend the railway into new territory. Its apparent meaning is only to authorize the laying down of additional tracks upon the authorized route of its railway, it being by its charter'a single-track railway.
The words of the second amendment to the constitution adopted in 1864,are quite plain: "No bill shall be passed by the legislature containing more than one subject, which shall be clearly expressed in the title, except appropriation bills." In Dorsey's, McMakin's, and Donnelly & Co.'s Appeals, decided at this term (22 P. F. Smith, 192), we have discussed the purpose of this amendment, and shall not repeat .what was then said, except to state that a title to a bill which tends to mislead, stands upon a different footing from one which is merely general in its terms. When the title conveys the belief that one subject is the purpose pf the bill, while another and different one is its'real subject, it is evident that it tends to mislead by diverting the attention from the true object of the legislation. Confiding in the title as applicable to a purpose unobjectionable to the reader, he is led away from the examination 6f the body of the bill. In such a case the subject is not clearly expressed in the title. Indeed it is not expressed at all. It may have something colorable in it, but this is merely hinting at the subject, not expressing it. To lay additional tracks on an existing, railway is a different thing from extending the railway itself into new territory not before authorized to be used. The difference in purpose is so palpable, and the difference in consequences so grave, the mind cannot hesitate a moment in the conclusion that the language which authorizes the former only cannot mean to sanction the latter. To confound these two is to open the door to fraud, and to enable men, expert in the use of phrases, to steal'away the rights of the people; and this it was a purpose of the amendment to prevent. Then, clearly, a -reader of this title alone would be led to conclude that the purpose of the supplement was to enable a single-track railway company, as this company was, merely to lay down additional tracks along its line of railway. The language is not that of extension of its line into new places, but of addition to that which it had already. The reader would scarcely surmise that the title covered an intent to allow the railway to run upon new streets, and beside other railways. There is no better test of the meaning of* the language in this title than to transfer the words into the body of the law. Let us suppose a general law in these words: "Be it enacted, etc., that the several railroad companies of this Commonwealth are hereby authorized to lay additional tracks of railway." What would be the manifest meaning of this language ? Would it be supposed for a moment that a railroad company, under such an act, could extend its road at pleasure into new territory ? Under such a law, could the Philadelphia and Beading Railroad be extended from Pottsville to Pittsburgh, or the Connellsville Railroad from Somerset to Philadelphia'? How, then, will the same language in this title be held to " clearly express " a purpose to extend this railway into new streets and along other lines of railway Í If it be said the legislature m:ght have meant this, the obvious answer is, that this is a mere possibility, a conjecture ; not a clear expression of the intent. Nothing ambiguous can be said to be clear, and this is a decisive answer to the argument that the title is sufficient to lead to inquiry. An inquiry into a dubious or uncertain thing is not the purpose of the amendment. Its requirement is that the subjeot shall be clearly expressed. This word clearly is not in the constitutions of some of the States whose judicial decisions have been cited. Its bearing on the clause cannot be ignored. It is impossible, if the language of the title must be clear as well as express, to say, that to " lay additional tracks of railway " means to extend the railway into new parts.
It was argued by the counsel that the part of the title of the act of 1872, which declares it to be a supplement, is itself sufficient to support the enactment; and reference was made to the titles of numerous acts stating that they are supplements, without more. We do not intend to enter into a discussion of the constitutionality of such law. If constitutional, another question might also arise, whether such a title could constitutionally extend the original act to new objects. Putting aside these questions as unnecessary to determine this case, it is sufficient to say that this title .is not that it is a supplement to the charter merely, but it distinctly expresses the particular purpose of the supplement, to wit, " to enable the company to declare dividends quarterly, and to lay additional tracks of railway." It therefore falls within the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius. The very expression of these purposes would itself tend to mislead, if others' could be added in the enactment ad libitum, for the title purports to confine the enactment to these alone.
The decree of the Common Pleas awarding a preliminary injunction is therefore affirmed, and the injunction continued, and the costs of these appeals are ordered to be paid by the appellants.