Case Name: PATRICK DONAHUE v. R. J. GRAHAM, Superintendent, etc.
Court: Supreme Court of California
Jurisdiction: California
Decision Date: 1882-08-23
Citations: 61 Cal. 276
Docket Number: No. 8,363
Parties: PATRICK DONAHUE v. R. J. GRAHAM, Superintendent, ETC.
Judges: 
Reporter: California Reports
Volume: 61
Pages: 276–282

Head Matter:
[No. 8,363.
In Bank.]
Aug. 23, 1882.
PATRICK DONAHUE v. R. J. GRAHAM, Superintendent, ETC.
Municipal Corporation—Street Improvement—Constitutional Law— Street Law of San Francisco.—The provisions of the Act of April 1, 1872, relating to street improvements in San Francisco, which authorize the Superintendent of Streets to execute contracts for such improvements in,, advance of the levy and collection of the assessment, are inconsistent with Section 19 of Article xi. of the Constitution (which is self-executing), and therefore ceased to be operative on the first day of January, 1880.
Id.-Id.—Id.—Id.—(McKinstry J., and Sharpstein, J., dissenting.) The street law of San Francisco, being part of the Charter, was not repealed by the adoption of the present Constitution, but will continue in force so long as the city and county continue under its existing organization.
Application for writ of mandamus to the defendant, as Superintendent of Public Streets, requiring him to sign and enter into a contract for street improvements awarded to the plaintiff.
D. Lake, Wallace, Greathouse & Standing, for Plaintiff.
Is the “ street law” of San Francisco affected by the present Constitution? (Act 1872, p. 804.) This “street law” is an integral portion of the City Charter. (“Consolidation Act,” Art. iv.) In McDonald v. Patterson, 54 Cal. 245, the counsel for McDonald, who sought to uphold the “ street law,” openly conceded that it was so affected. He claimed merely that the law would survive until July 1, 1880, and the single question made was, whether the street law had already ceased upon the adoption of the Constitution, or would continue in force until July 1,1880, at which latter period it was conceded on all hands that it was no longer operative.
In this view it became necessary to contend, and it was contended in support of the “street law,” that the nineteenth section of the eleventh article of the Constitution was a section which required legislation to put it in force. Plainly this position was untenable. It is apparent, therefore, that the position into which the counsel for McDonald allowed himself to be driven, was a virtual surrender of his case; and the decision of the Court in Department Two, in view of this concession by the counsel, was correct—no other conclusion was possible.
But it is our purpose to maintain that the “ street law” was not affected by the present Constitution at all—that it survived the adoption of the Constitution and survived the first day of July, 1880; and that the only operation the Constitution can have in this respect is upon street improvement laws, to be enacted in the future^upon city charters to be framed and adopted hereafter. To maintain this proposition, we have only to cite your Honors to your own decisions rendered in Bank subsequently to the decision in McDonald v. Patterson. (Desmond v. Dunn, 55 Cal. 242; Wood v. Board of Election Commissioners, 58 id. 561.) The import of both these decisions is that the “ Consolidation Act,” in its entirety, is in force in San Francisco.
J. F. Cowdery, for Defendant.
McDonald v. Patterson, 54 Cal. 245, was approved in Hyatt v. Allen, id. 361, and Ewing v. Oroville M. C., 56 Id. 654. Nothing can be found in Desmond v. Dumn, or in Wood v. Board of Election Commissioners, conflicting with McDonald v. Patterson.

Opinion:
Myrick, J.:
For the reasons given by the Court, in McDonald v. Patterson, 54 Cal. 245, the demurrer is sustained.
Morrison, C. J., and Boss, Thornton, and McKee, JJ., concurred.