Case Name: Amanda B. Hale, Administratrix, and Samuel Merry, Administrator of George Merry, deceased, Appellants, v. Gouverneur M. Sweet, Addison R. Sweet and Byron Benson, Sheriff of Onondaga County, Respondents
Court: New York Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1869-03-18
Citations: 40 N.Y. 97
Docket Number: 
Parties: Amanda B. Hale, Administratrix, and Samuel Merry, Administrator of George Merry, deceased, Appellants, v. Gouverneur M. Sweet, Addison R. Sweet and Byron Benson, Sheriff of Onondaga County, Respondents.
Judges: 
Reporter: New York Reports
Volume: 40
Pages: 97–104

Head Matter:
Amanda B. Hale, Administratrix, and Samuel Merry, Administrator of George Merry, deceased, Appellants, v. Gouverneur M. Sweet, Addison R. Sweet and Byron Benson, Sheriff of Onondaga County, Respondents.
Where, in proceedings to obtain a discharge under the “ Two-Thirds Act,” the affidavit of the insolvent debtor, annexed to his petition and the schedule of his property, under section seven of the act, states, “I have not, at any time, or in any manner whatever, disposed of, or made over, any part of my estate for the future benefit of myself and family,” instead of using the words of the statute, “ for the future benefit of myself or family.” Bald, that it was deficient, the discharge granted upon such proceedings void, and that judgments, previously recovered against the debtor, remained in full force.
tn an action, brought by the mortgagee of a chattel, subsequently acquired *■ by the debtor, against the sheriff and judgment creditors, for its taking f under executions, issued upon then
Where a chattel mortgage is not filed, until after the delivery of an execution to the sheriff, it is void as against the latter, although actually filed before a levy has been made.
(This cause was argued on the 6th, of January, 1869,
and decided on the 18th of March, 1869.)
This was an action, brought by the plaintiff’s testator, George .Merry, to recover the possession of the canal boat “ O. H. Smith,” seized at Syracuse, by the defendant Benson,. sheriff of Onondaga county, under an execution issued upon a judgment in favor of the defendants Sweet against one Jones.
It appeared that -the original plaintiff, George Merry, built the boat, and, ..in .September, 1861, sold one-half of her to Jones for $250. He took property in part payment and the notes of Jones secured .by a chattel mortgage of Jones upon the share of the boat .-sold to him for the balance of the purchase price. This mortgage, by its terms, authorized the mortgagee, if at any time he deemed himself unsafe, to take possession of the property and sell the same at public or private sale, and apply 'the proceeds to the payment of the debt.
The judgment of the defendant, Sweet, against Jones, was recovered on the 5th of Hovember, 1859.' In 1860, Jones took proceedings, under the “ Two-thirds Act,” to obtain his discharge as an insolvent, and on the 13th of October, 1860, he obtained a discharge. In his affidavit, annexed to the petition and schedule, required by the section seven of the statute (2 E. S.,18), he states, that he had not disposed of, or, made over any part of his estate, “ for the future benefit of myself, and family.”
After the mortgage was given to Merry, he, and Jones, ran dhe boat together, each furnishing one-half of the team, and Hones, being master, until the Ith day of October, 1862, when .Merry employed one Hatch, to take charge of the boat, and run it. Jones, however, still often came on board, occasionally attended to the procuring the clearances, which were in. Ms name, as captain, and collected some of the freight earned. x
On the 29th of October, 1862, a transcript of the Sweet judgment was filed in Onondaga county, and an execution upon it, was delivered to the sheriff of Onondaga county; on the 31st of October, the boat came into that county; on. the 1st of November, 1862, the mortgage was, for the first, time, filed; and on the 14th November, 1862, the levy was made.
The judge, who tried the cause, directed a verdict for the defendant, on the ground that, the discharge was void, and. that, even if the exclusive possession taken, by the mortgagee,, before the delivery of the execution, to the sheriff, would give Mm the better title, there was no sufficient evidence, to go to the jury, that such possession had been taken.
The G-eneral Term of the Supreme Court, in the fifth judicial district, ordered judgment for the defendants upon the verdict, and the plaintiff appealed to this court.
Dcmiél Pratt, for the appellants.
Gharles Andrews, for the respondents.

Opinion:
Gboveb, J.
It was necessary for the defendant to show a valid judgment against Jones, upon which the execution, levied upon the boat, was issued. If the discharge of Jones, from his debts, was valid, under the provisions of article 3, title 1, chapter 5, part 2d, E. S., pursuant to which, it was claimed to have been given, the judgment against him was discharged, and the defense failed. The defendants claimed, that the discharge was void, for want of jurisdiction in the officer granting it, for the reason, that the affidavits of some of the petitioning creditors failed to show the consideration of the debts due to them, respectively, and, that the affidavit of Jones, annexed to and delivered with Ms petition, was not in compliance with the 7th section of the' act. It was held, by this court, in Stanton v. Ellis (2 Ker., 575), that the discharge was not conclusive evidence of the facts necessary to give the officer jurisdiction, and that it might be avoided, in a collateral action, by proof of the non-existence of snch facts. In the present case, the affidavit of Jones, annexed to his petition, stated that he had riot, at any time, or in any manner whatsoever, disposed of, or made over, any part of his estate, for the future benefit of himself and his family, while the seventh section requires, that the affidavit should state that he had riot done any of those acts for the future benefit of himself or his family. It is a rule, in the construction of statutes, and other written, instruments, that the word " and,"' may be construed to mean " or," and the latter as ineaning the former, when the sense gathered from the context obviously requires it. But, I do not think that rule can be applied to the affidavit" in question. It is obvious, that a disposition of property, for the joint benefit of the affiant and his family only, is negatived by the affidavit. I think it clear, that Jones could not be convicted of perjury, upon proof that he had disposed of property, for his own future benefit, or that he had made the like disposition for the future benefit of his family only. If right in this, it follows, that the discharge was void, and the judgment remained in full force. The execution was delivered to the sheriff, on the 29th October. It then became a lien upon all the personal property of Jones, liable to a levy, then in the county, and upon all such as should come into the county during the life of the execution, valid and effectual against every one except bona fide purchasers from Jones. (2 R. S., 645, § 13, 17.) The boat in question, came into the county on the 31st of October. The plaintiff's mortgage, at that time, had never been placed on file, as required by the statute. Its subsequent filing was wholly ineffectual, as against the lien acquired by the executiori. It is claimed by the counsel for the plaintiff, that the omission to file the mortgage, was obviated by the plaintiff's taking possession of the boat, before the delivery of the execution to the sheriff, or that the evidence was, at least so conflicting upon this point, that the judge erred, in not submitting the evidence to the jury, to find whether such possession had been taken. It was proved, upon the trial, that the plaintiff built the boat. That he sold one-half to Jones, and took a mortgage thereon, to secure a portion of the purchase money. That it was agreed, between the plaintiff and Jones, that the boat should be run on their joint account, each to furnish half of the .team, and that Jones should act as master. This agreement had not been terminated, at the time of issuing the execution by the plaintiff. The boat was run by Jones pursuant to the agreement, until the 7th October, about three weeks before the issuing of the execution, when, as Hatch testifies, the plaintiff .employed him to .take charge of the boat, and run it. That, upon that day, he went on board, and thereafter run the boat, as captain, and controlled her, until the close of navigation. He further testified, that Jones, collected the freight, earned after .he went on board, discharged hands from the boat, and that the clearances of the boat continued.to be taken in the name of Jones, as cap tain. This evidence, taken as a whole, failed to show that the plaintiff had taken possession of the boat, to the exclusion of Jones, and the Judge, properly, directed a verdict for the defendant. It is not necessary to determine what effect the taking of possession, as claimed by plaintiff, would have had upon the rights of the parties. The judgment appealed from must be affirmed.