Case Name: Hudson v. Simonson
Court: Arkansas Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Arkansas
Decision Date: 1926-02-01
Citations: 170 Ark. 243
Docket Number: 
Parties: Hudson v. Simonson.
Judges: 
Reporter: Arkansas Reports
Volume: 170
Pages: 243–247

Head Matter:
Hudson v. Simonson.
Opinion delivered February 1, 1926.
Gladish & Tnylor, for appellant.
J. T. Coston, for appellee.

Opinion:
Hart, J.,
(after, stating the facts). The Legislature has provided for the assessment of benefits upon the land in drainage districts, and the power of determining these benefits is vested in the commissioners. The statute also provides the remedy for the landowners in cases of unequal, irregular or illegal assessments.
Under § 3613 of Crawford & Moses' Digest the commissioners are made the assessors of benefits and damages. Under § 3615 it is their duty to deposit the assessment with the county clerk, where it shall be kept and preserved as a public record. The section provides that the county clerk shall give notice of the filing of the assessment by publication two weeks in some weekly newspaper in the county or counties in which the lands of the district may lie. The section further gives the landowners a remedy to complain to the county court and the right to an appeal from the order of the county court in the premises.
Under § 3625 the commissioners are given the power to alter the plans of the ditches and drains. It also provided that if, by reason of such change of plans, any property owner deems that the assessment on any property has become inequitable, he may petition the county court for a reassessment in the manner provided in the section. The section also gives the property owners the same right of appeal that is provided for in the case of the original assessment.
It is well settled in this State that an injunction will not lie to restrain proceedings in the assessment of benefits where there is an adequate remedy provided by the statute. In such case the statutory remedy must be followed. Chapman & Dewey L. Co. v. Road Imp. Dist. 127 Ark. 318; McCord v. Welch, 147 Ark. 362; House v. Road Imp. Dist. No. 2, 158 Ark. 330; Road Imp. Dists. 1, 2 and 3 v. Crary, 151 Ark. 484; and Wimberly v. Road Imp. Dist. No. 7, 161 Ark. 79.
Thus it will be seen that the plaintiffs had an adequate remedy under the statute to correct any inequalities or illegalities in the assessment under the change of plans, and under the authorities cited the statutory remedy is exclusive, unless some well-known ground of equitable interference is alleged. In this connection it may be stated that there is no allegation in the bill of facts which shows that the plaintiffs, by reason of fraud, un avoidable casualty, or any other ground calling for equitable interference, were prevented from pursuing the remedy provided by the statute in case of illegal or unequal assessments.
It is contended, however, that the chancery court has jurisdiction under the allegation that the plaintiffs are informed and ibelieve that the defendants do not intend to let any contract for the construction of said laterals in compliance with the judgment of the circuit court.
This court will not inquire whether or not the commissioners will fail to discharge their duties upon such a vague and indefinite allegation. No facts are set up upon which they base their belief that the commissioners will not discharge their duty. Their pleadings is a mere conclusion on their part, which is not a ground of demurrer. A demurrer admits only those facts which are well pleaded. House v. Road Imp. Dist. No. 2, 158 Ark. 330. So long as the commissioners keep within the limits of the powers conferred upon them by the statute under which they act, and they are guilty of no corrupt or fraudulent conduct in the discharge of their official duties, the courts have no power to control their action by mandatory injunction. If courts of equity could interfere upon such a vague and indefinite allegation as the one in question, it is difficult to perceive at what point they would stop, or what would prevent their taking upon themselves the whole administrative power of the commissioners. Such a practice would open the door to much useless litigation.
We are of the opinion that the plaintiffs were not entitled to the relief sought under the allegations of their complaint, and that the chancery court committed no error in sustaining a demurrer to it.
The decree will therefore be affirmed.