Case Name: Davis v. Harness
Court: Supreme Court of Ohio
Jurisdiction: Ohio
Decision Date: 1882-01
Citations: 38 Ohio St. 397
Docket Number: 
Parties: Davis v. Harness.
Judges: 
Reporter: Ohio State Reports, New Service
Volume: 38
Pages: 397–401

Head Matter:
Davis v. Harness.
1. A party entering into a contract in Ms own name may sue or be sued upon it, whether he be, in fact, agent or principal.
2. Where a landlord, with the consent of his tenants, sold their share of a crop of corn with Ms own, and afterward brought an action against the purchaser for not accepting the corn, the fact that the landlord did not own all the corn, neither constitutes a defense nor operates to diminish the damages. If the acceptance ot the corn by the purchaser would have invested him with a good title, it is not material whether the landlord owned all the corn or not.
Error to the District Court of Róss county.
Charles E. Harness, defendant in error, brought an action in the court of common picas of Ross county against George Davis, Stephen Morrow and S. Morris, partners as George Davis & Co., plaintiffs in error to recover damages for the breach of a contract. The petition was as follows :
“ The plaintiff says: On the fourth day of September, A. d. 1875, he made a verbal contract with the defendants, acting through their agent, S. N. Iligby, whereby plaintiff bound himself to deliver to defendants the corn crops of the year 1874, then belonging to plaintiff and his tenants, being then on hand, and to deliver said corn to defendants, on board their boats on the Ohio canal, at a point where plaintiff was accustomed to deliver corn from his farm, about half a mile above the mouth of Stony creek, at such reasonable time thereafter as the defendants should furnish boats for the purpose of receiving said corn; and defendants bound themselves, by said contract, to receive said corn at said point within a reasonable time after the making of said contract, and to furnish boats sufficient for the purpose, and to pay the plaintiff for said corn, at the time of delivery, at the price of seventy cents per bushel of sixty-eight pounds. At the time said contract \yas made, the number of bushels of corn thereby bought and sold was not ascertained, but the quantity has since been ascertained, and that the number of bushels was eight thousand nine hundred and fifty-seven and fifty-one pounds.
“ Plaintiff says he duly performed all the conditions of sayl contract on his part; that he was ready and willing to deliver said corn during the whole of said reasonable time; that he tendered to the defendants performance of said contract and offered to deliver said corn ; but defendants failed and refused to furnish boats to receive said corn or any part thereof, within such reasonable time and at all times, and failed and refused to pay the price, or any part of the price, agreed to be paid for the same. After the making of said contract and before the expiration of said reasonable time, the market price of corn fell, and plaintiff was damaged by. the aforesaid failure and refusal of defendants in the sum of nineteen hundred dollars. Wherefore plaintiff asks judgment against defendants for said sum of nineteen hundred dollars.”
To this petition the following answer was filed:
“Now come the said defendants, and as a first defense to said petition say : They deny that the said S. N. Higby was, at the time mentioned in said petition, or at any other time, the agent of the defendants, authorized to purchase the quantity of corn averred by said plaintiff to have been contracted to these defendants, through the agency of said Higby. They say that the said S. N. Higby was, at the time, authorized to purchase for them a limited quantity of corn, such quantity not to exceed four thousand bushels; and the said Higby, in contractingjvitli the plaintiff on behalf of the defendants for sixteen thousand bushels of corn, exceeded his authority as such agent of the defendants.
■ “ And as a second defense to said petition they say: They deny that said plaintiff duly performed all the conditions of said contract on his part; they deny that the plaintiff was ready and willing to deliver said corn during the whole of said reasonable time. They aver that the plaintiff was not the owner of said 8,957 51 68 bushels of corn at the making of said contract, and that at no period within said reasonable time was he the owner of 8,957 51-68 bushels of corn, and ready to be delivered to the defendants. They deny that the plaintiff, within a reasonable time, offered to deliver the whole or any part of said corn. They deny that after making of said alleged contract and before the expiration of a reasonable time for the delivery, the market price of corn fell. -And they deny that the plaintiff has suffered any damage whatever.”
On the trial, the plaintiff, to maintain the issue on his part, introduced as a witness S.N. Higby, who testified, that George Davis, one of the defendants, being at his house on August 31, 1875, told him, “if he did not hear from him by letter the first mail, directing him not to purchase, to pitch in, and buy corn for the said Davis & Co., at seventy cents per bushel.” That, not hearing from said Davis by first mail, he bought the plaintiffs’ corn, at seventy cents per bushel.
The defendants then introduced George Davis as a witness in their behalf, who denied that he had authorized Higby, to purchase corn, but testified, that he did say to Higby, “ that they had purchased about all the corn they wanted, but they might want a little more, and that, upon reaching home, he would write him by the first mail, and let him know, should they want any more.”
The bill of exceptions also shows, that “ it was proved, that the plaintiff, at the time of making said contract, had in his cribs, belonging to himself and tenants, on his farm and under his control, for the purposes of sale, the number of bushels alleged in the petition, raised on said farm.”
The defendants asked the court to charge the jury, among other things, as follows: — “ 4th. Plaintiff in this action, if entitled to recover at all, is not entitled to recover for corn that, at the time of the making of the contract, did not belong to him, but didjoelong to tenants living on his farm. 6th. If, at the making of the alleged contract, nothing was said about including any com belonging to other parties, but it was the agreement, that the plaintiff sold his crop of corn, or his corn in his cribs, the same to be afterwards weighed and the quantity ascertained, then the plaintiff cannot recover for any other corn than his own,” which the court refused, but did charge, among other things, as follows:
“That it did not matter, whether the plaintiff was the owner of all the corn for which he sues at the time the contract was made or not. If part of it belonged to him and part to tenants living on his farm, the plaintiff had a right to recover damages for the whole amount, if plaintiff had such right to sell the corn as would enable him to confer upon the purchaser a good title to the corn by delivering it to him.”
An exception was taken to the refusal to charge as asked, and to the charge as given.
Yerdict for the plaintiff, and judgment on the verdict.
On error the district court affirmed the judgment.
W. A. Hutchins, for plaintiff in error.
Harrison, Olds & Ma/rsh, for defendant in error.

Opinion:
"White, J".
The contract sued on being entered into by Harness, in his own name, he was authorized to sue, and was liable to be sued upon it. The fact that part of the corn embraced in the contract was the property of his tenants did not affect his right to sue for its breach, provided he was able, ready and willing to comply with it on his part.
The only issue raised by the first defense is the denial that ITigby was authorized to make the contract described in the petition on behalf of the defendants. The jury found that he had such authority. The authority was not limited to the purchase of corn owned by Harness, or by any particular person, but extended to the purchase of corn generally. The averment, therefore, in the second defense, that the plaintiff did not own all the corn sold, is immaterial, if the defendants, by accepting it, would have acquired a good title. The bill of exceptions shows that "it was proved that the plaintiff, at the time of making said contract, had in his cribs, belonging to himself and tenants on his farm, and under his control, for the purposes of sale, the number of bushels alleged in the petition, raised on said farm." This being so, the fact that part of the corn was owned by the - tenants constituted neither a defense, nor did it operate to diminish the damages. Nixon v. Nixon, 21 Ohio St. 114; Bell v. Offutt, 10 Bush, 632.
The sixth charge asked, as applied to the case, was calculated to mislead the jury. It is a plain proposition, that if the agreement had been for the sale of corn owned by the plaintiff, Harness, the defendants would have been bound to take no other corn than was thus owned. But such was not the intent of the agreement. The agreement contemplated the sale of the corn owned by Harness, as well as that of the tenants, and of which he had control and was authorized to sell. There was, therefore, no error in the charge as given.
Other points are made in the case which the court deem it unnecessary to notice, further than to say that there was no error in the ruling of the courts below.
Judgment affirmed.