Case Name: THE CITY OF BROOKLYN, RESPONDENT, v. FREDERICK J. NODINE, APPELLANT
Court: New York Supreme Court, General Term
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1882-02
Citations: 33 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 512
Docket Number: 
Parties: THE CITY OF BROOKLYN, RESPONDENT, v. FREDERICK J. NODINE, APPELLANT.
Judges: Gilbert, J., concurred, except as to exclusion of aliens.
Reporter: Supreme Court Reports (Hun)
Volume: 33
Pages: 512–517

Head Matter:
THE CITY OF BROOKLYN, RESPONDENT, v. FREDERICK J. NODINE, APPELLANT.
Common council — power of, to regulate- and license business —it cannot pass a revenue measure under disguise of a regulation.
The charter of the city of Brooklyn authorizes the common council “to regulate and license * * * vehicles of every description used on the public streets in the conduct and carrying on of any business, except that of physicians, established and transacted in said city, provided that the license fee charged for any one vehicle shall not exceed three dollars per year.” An ordinance was passed providing that licenses should be granted by the mayor, to such persons as he might deem proper, to carry on the business or trade, or to act in the capacity of “coachmen, porters, owners and drivers of hacks, * * * and all other vehicles used upon the public streets in the conduct of any business (except that of physicians), * * * provided the licenses shall be granted to no person other than citizens of the United States.” It provided that on issuing licenses specified sums should be charged and paid, among others: “For each vehicle drawn by two horses, three dollars; to each vehicle drawn by one horse, one dollar.”
In an action against the defendant, a livery stable keeper, to recover license fees alleged to be due upon vehicles owned and used by him in his business:
Held, that the ordinance was too broad as it included as'well vehicles used for pleasure as for business.
That it was objectionable because it authorized the mayor to license, a power which should have been exercised by the common council.
That it was not an attempt to “regulate and license,” but an attempt to raise a revenue by taxation.
That it was void. (Dykman, J., dissenting.)
Qutm'e, as to the validity of the clause prohibiting the issue of licenses to aliens.
Appeal from a judgment, entered upon an order overruling a demurrer, interposed on tbe ground that the complaint did not state facts sufficient, to constitute a cause of action.
The action was brought by the City of Brooklyn to recover license fees alleged to be due from the defendant upon twenty vehicles owned and used by him in his business of keeping a livery stable, and which on demand he refused to pay.
On the 16th day of June, 1880, the legislature so amended the city charter as to permit the common council “to regulate and license common carriers, carriers of passengers, criers, hawkers, peddlers, pawnbrokers, junk dealers, public cartmen, truckmen, hackmen, cabmen, expressmen, dealers in coal, fire-wood, hay and straw, meat shops, fishmongers, auctioneers, undertakers, intelligence offices, exhibitions, menageries, circuses, common shows and dogs, real estate, steamboat, railroad, insurance and ticket agents, billiard saloons, bowling alleys and shooting galleries; also vehicles of every description used on the public streets in the conduct and carrying on of any business, except that of physicians, established and transacted in said city, provided that the license fee charged for any one vehicle shall not exceed three dollars per year. The common council- shall also fix an annual license fee, not exceeding the sum of twenty dollars, for each street or horse car daily operated and used in said city.” (Laws of 1880, chap. 564.) Thereupon the common council passed an ordinance which contained among others the following provisions:
SeotioN 1. Licenses shall be granted by the mayor from time to time, to such persons as he may deem proper, to carry on the business or trade, or to act in the capacity of coachmen, porters, owners .and drivers of hacks, trucks, cabs, omnibuses, stages, railroad cars^ and all other vehiclés used upon the public streets in the conduct of any business (except that of physicians), * * * provided that licenses shall be granted to no person other than citizens of the United States, x * * x *
Sec. 3. There shall be charged and paid to the city clerk (except in the case of railroad cars, whose payment shall be made to the city treasurer) for the use of the city, on issuing the said licenses by the parties to whom they may be granted, the following sums: * * * * 1 * .
For each driver of a hackney coach, cab or omnibus, other than the person licensed to keep the same, one dollar.
For each vehicle drawn by two horses, three dollars.
For each vehicle drawn by one horse, one dollar.
William Q. Cooke, for the appellant.
William C. De Witt, for the respondent.

Opinion:
Barnard, P. J.:
The ordinances in question are not warranted by the power granted by the legislature. The power given is " to regulate and license " vehicles of every description used on the public
streets in the conduct and carrying on of any business except that of physicians, established and transacted in said city." The defendant is a livery stable keeper and his business is not required to be licensed. The ordinance authorizes the mayor to grant licenses for certain classes of business providing that no license shall be granted to " other than citizens of the United States."
The ordinance then proceeds to establish a fee for the license in certain specified cases, among them, "For each vehicle drawn by two horses, three dollars. For each vehicle drawn by one horse, one dollar." It is not against vehicles owned by any person doing business in Brooklyn, but against the owners of such vehicles simply as owners. It covers as well vehicles used for pleasure as for business, and this was beyond the legislative grant of power. Proof cannot be given to show that the defendant conducted a business which might be licensed. If the ordinance does not point out the defendant, of necessity, it is defective. The ordinance is also objectionable because it leaves a discretion to the mayor to license or not. It was for the common council to license or refuse.
The gravest objection to the ordinance is that it is not within the power granted, inasmuch as no attempt is made to " regulate and license," but to pass an extensive revenue measure under these words. There is no selection; certain businesses should be carefully guarded. In this ordinance all classes of business mentioned in it may be carried on by those who pay the tax or license therefor. Must a person be a citizen of the United States to be taxed for liis vehicle ? Can a license to use a vehicle be granted to one not a citizen ? Is the defendant a citizen ?' If he is not a citizen must he pay a tax on vehicles which he is not permitted to use and cannot be licensed to use ? Where is the legislative warrant for city legislation against those who are not citizens in so many forms of human labor ?
These are questions which might be considered, but it is not necessary to discuss them. The power to.regiilate and license does not carry the power to tax, which is the only end of. this ordinance. It is competent for the legislature to give the city of Brooklyn power to tax vehicles or other personal property. The' law under which this ordinance was passed, does not give such power.
The judgment overruling the demurrer should, therefore, be reversed, and an order be granted that the demurrer be sustained, with leave to plaintiff to amend in twenty days on payment of costs.
Gilbert, J., concurred, except as to exclusion of aliens.