Case Name: JOINER et al. v. GLENN
Court: Court of Appeals of Georgia
Jurisdiction: Georgia
Decision Date: 2010-11-08
Citations: 288 Ga. 208
Docket Number: S10A1267
Parties: JOINER et al. v. GLENN.
Judges: All the Justices concur, except Hunstein, C. J., Carley, P. J., and Melton, J., who dissent.
Reporter: Georgia Reports
Volume: 288
Pages: 208–213

Head Matter:
S10A1267.
JOINER et al. v. GLENN.
(702 SE2d 194)

Opinion:
THOMPSON, Justice.
Glenn filed suit against Joiner, the Mayor of Jefferson, Georgia, the members of the city council, and the city manager, alleging defendants violated his liberty interests because they denied him a name-clearing hearing after he was terminated as chief of police. Glenn sought damages under OCGA § 36-33-4 and the due process clause of the Georgia Constitution, asserting the refusal to afford a name-clearing hearing was "without authority of law." Defendants moved for judgment on the pleadings, pointing out that a procedural remedy — the writ of mandamus — was available to plaintiff to cure the refusal to hold a name-clearing hearing. The motion was denied, but certified for immediate review. Thereupon, defendants sought, and we granted, this interlocutory appeal.
In Camden County v. Haddock, 271 Ga. 664 (523 SE2d 291) (1999), this Court stated:
We interpret the due process clause under our State Constitution as providing the same procedural rights in public employment cases as the federal due process clause. Under both clauses, the state must give notice and an opportunity to be heard to a person deprived of a property interest. This Court has found that a public employee has a property interest in continued employment for due process purposes when a personnel manual provides that an employee can only be terminated for cause. Due process entitles the employee to a pre-termination hearing, but the employer's failure to provide one is not a constitutional violation under the due process clause if the state provides a later procedural remedy. The "focus of the procedural due process analysis is whether the state makes adequate procedures available — not whether the plaintiff takes advantage of those procedures and achieves a successful outcome."
Id. at 665 (citations and footnotes omitted). Camden County dealt with a property interest due process claim. The question posed by this case is whether the adequate state remedy analysis applies equally to a liberty interest due process claim.
In Cotton v. Jackson, 216 F3d 1328, 1330-1331, n. 1 (11th Cir. 2000), the Eleventh Circuit ruled that it does. In that case, following an investigation showing that plaintiff employee violated sexual harassment policies, defendant, the president of a state college, terminated plaintiffs employment. Plaintiff requested a hearing which was denied, and plaintiff brought a claim under 42 USC § 1983 for reputational damage sustained in connection with the termination of his employment. The court held that the failure to hold a name-clearing hearing was cured by the availability of a procedural remedy, i.e., mandamus. It reasoned that plaintiff could have used a mandamus action to ensure that he was not deprived of his due process rights. Based on that reasoning, the appellate court concluded that defendant was entitled to summary judgment on plaintiffs claim that his liberty interest was violated.
Like the Eleventh Circuit, we see no reason to differentiate between a property interest and a liberty interest in this context. See generally Brewer v. Schacht, supra at 235 Ga. App. 313; Rogers v. Georgia Ports Authority, 183 Ga. App. 325 (358 SE2d 855) (1987). Accordingly, we hold that a writ of mandamus is a procedural remedy which cures defendants' failure to provide plaintiff with a name-clearing hearing. It follows that the superior court erred in denying defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings.
The dissent's attempt to characterize this case as something other than a procedural due process claim rings hollow. The complaint makes it abundantly clear that Glenn sought damages (and punitive damages) for defendants' decision to deny him a name-clearing hearing in violation of his due process rights. Thus, Glenn's claim springs only from defendants' refusal to afford Glenn his right to due process under the federal and state Constitutions — and nothing more.
Judgment reversed.
All the Justices concur, except Hunstein, C. J., Carley, P. J., and Melton, J., who dissent.
See generally Brewer v. Schacht, 235 Ga. App. 313, 316 (3) (509 SE2d 378) (1998) ("a plaintiff can recover for a deprivation of reputational liberty upon proof of the following elements: (1) a false statement (2) of a stigmatizing nature (3) attending a governmental employee's discharge (4) made public (5) by the governmental employer (6) without a meaningful opportunity for employee name clearing").
This Code section provides that municipal officers can be held liable for official acts "if done oppressively, maliciously, corruptly, or without authority of law."
The complaint does not mention the violation of a "ministerial duty" and even if it did, that duty is the duty to provide a name-clearing hearing.