Case Name: Harold Toney BATES, Petitioner, v. The Honorable Richard B. KEATING, as Circuit Judge, in and for the Ninth Judicial Circuit of the State of Florida, Orange County, Florida, Respondent
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1981-04-15
Citations: 396 So. 2d 1172
Docket Number: No. 81-60
Parties: Harold Toney BATES, Petitioner, v. The Honorable Richard B. KEATING, as Circuit Judge, in and for the Ninth Judicial Circuit of the State of Florida, Orange County, Florida, Respondent.
Judges: DAUKSCH, C. J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 396
Pages: 1172–1174

Head Matter:
Harold Toney BATES, Petitioner, v. The Honorable Richard B. KEATING, as Circuit Judge, in and for the Ninth Judicial Circuit of the State of Florida, Orange County, Florida, Respondent.
No. 81-60.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
April 15, 1981.
Harry W. Carls, III, Public Defender, and Glenn Klausman, Asst. Public Defender, Orlando, for petitioner.
Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Evelyn D. Golden, Asst. Atty. Gen., Dayto-na Beach, for respondent.

Opinion:
COBB, Judge.
Petitioner seeks a writ of prohibition based on the expiration of his speedy trial time.
Petitioner was arrested for drug trafficking and moved for a continuance to prepare a challenge to the drug trafficking statute. The motion was granted and the speedy trial time was "waived for the period of this continuance." On October 17, 1979, petitioner filed a motion attacking the drug trafficking statute as unconstitutional.
The following day, October 18,1979, petitioner filed a demand for speedy trial, and his trial was set for December 17, 1979. Due to a conflict with the trial court's trial schedule, the petitioner's trial was reset for December 19, 1979. No order granting an extension of the speedy trial time for exceptional circumstances was rendered.
On December 19, 1979, petitioner moved for discharge on the ground that more than sixty days had run from the date of his demand for a speedy trial. Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.191(a)(2). The trial court denied the motion. Petitioner seeks to have the trial court prohibited from further exercising jurisdiction over him.
While we understand the rationale of Judge Cowart's dissent that prohibition is not a proper remedy, the Florida Supreme Court has already decided that prohibition is a proper remedy when a trial court improperly fails to discharge a defendant whose speedy trial time has expired. Dick-off v. Dewell, 152 Fla. 240, 9 So.2d 804 (1942); Feger v. Fish, 106 Fla. 564, 143 So. 605 (1932). We are obliged to follow that precedent. Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So.2d 431 (Fla. 1973). Indeed, we have done so in previous cases. Gordon v. Savage, 383 So.2d 646 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980); Deiches v. Kaney, 375 So.2d 584 (Fla. 5th DCA 1979).
In the case at hand, the sixty-day period had expired, and no order of extension had been rendered. Therefore, petitioner is entitled to be discharged. State v. Acurse, 347 So.2d 828 (Fla.3d DCA 1977). Accordingly, the writ of prohibition is granted and the case remanded to the trial court with orders to discharge the defendant.
Prohibition GRANTED; REMANDED with directions.
DAUKSCH, C. J., concurs.
COWART, J., dissents with opinion.