Case Name: MILES et al. v. ASHLAND CHEMICAL COMPANY et al.
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia
Jurisdiction: Georgia
Decision Date: 1991-11-15
Citations: 261 Ga. 726
Docket Number: S91Q0739
Parties: MILES et al. v. ASHLAND CHEMICAL COMPANY et al.
Judges: All the Justices concur, except Smith, P. J., and Benham, J., who dissent.
Reporter: Georgia Reports
Volume: 261
Pages: 726–734

Head Matter:
S91Q0739.
MILES et al. v. ASHLAND CHEMICAL COMPANY et al.
(410 SE2d 290)

Opinion:
Hunt, Justice.
In this certified question from the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, we are asked: "Do the Georgia courts follow the discovery rule in applying the statute of limitations to a wrongful death action alleging a failure to warn?"
The facts are set out by the Eleventh Circuit:
The plaintiffs in these cases are relatives of three decedents, Carol Williams, Harmon M. Gaines, and John T. McKenna. The decedents were all employed by Great Dane Trailers, Inc. Each of the decedents died from cancer. Carol Williams died from renal cell carcinoma in April, 1984; Harmon Gaines died from carcinoma of the colon in August, 1979; and John McKenna died from adenolymphoma in October, 1984. The defendants, Ashland Chemical Company and Swift Adhesive, Inc., are manufacturers of Fome Bond, a product containing Methylene Chloride that is used by Great Dane Trailers, Inc.
The plaintiffs contend that it was not until September 3, 1987, that they first learned of the relationship between exposure to Methylene Chloride and cancer. On May 26, 1989, each plaintiff filed a wrongful death action against one or both of the defendants in the Superior Court of Chatham County, Georgia. The plaintiffs allege that defendants failed to provide adequate warnings of the dangers of exposure to Methylene Chloride. The defendants removed these cases from state court to the district court for the Southern District of Georgia. Thereafter the defendants moved the court for judgment on the pleadings, contending that the plaintiffs' actions were barred by Georgia's two-year statute of limitations for wrongful death claims. The district court granted the defendant's motion, ruling that the two-year statute of limitations began to run on the date of death.
The applicable statuté of limitation, OCGA § 9-3-33, provides "[a]ctions for injuries to the person shall be brought within two years after the right of action accrues. . . ." Taylor v. Murray, 231 Ga. 852, 854 (204 SE2d 747) (1974). In the case before us, the plaintiffs seek to extend the commencement of the statute of limitation for wrongful death to September 3, 1987, when they discovered the cause of death, even though this was over two years after the decedents died.
Under the "discovery rule," the right of action does not "accrue" until the injured person discovers the cause of his or her injury. Everhart v. Rich's, Inc., 229 Ga. 798, 802 (194 SE2d 425) (1972). Similarly, the failure to warn of a hazard capable of producing an injury due to continued exposure constitutes a continuing tort, which "accrues" when the failure to warn is discovered by the injured plaintiff. Id. If the cause of the injuries in the cases before us had been discovered during their lifetimes, the decedents would have had personal causes of action in continuing tort, and the benefit of the discovery rule. King v. Seitzingers, Inc., 160 Ga. App. 318 (287 SE2d 252) (1981). However, an action for wrongful death "accrues" to the heirs at death, not at the time the cause of the injury is discovered. Lovett v. Garvin, 232 Ga. 747, 748 (208 SE2d 838) (1974); Burns v. Brickie, 106 Ga. App. 150, 153 (126 SE2d 633) (1962).
The plaintiffs urge us to follow other jurisdictions which apply the discovery rule to wrongful death cases. E.g., Frederick v. Calbio Pharmaceuticals, 89 CalApp.3d 49, 152 Cal. Rptr. 292 (2nd District 1979); Gosnell v. Ashland Chemical, Inc., 674 SW2d 737 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1984). These jurisdictions havé either historically applied the discovery rule to wrongful death, or have broadly interpreted their wrongful death statutes. Georgia however, has construed the wrongful death statute narrowly:
We have consistently held since our statutes give a right of action not had at common law, they must be strictly construed or limited strictly to the meaning of the language employed and not extended beyond plain and explicit terms.
Ford Motor Co. v. Carter, 239 Ga. 657, 658 (238 SE2d 361) (1977); Taylor v. Murray, supra, 231 Ga. at 854.
Under OCGA § 9-3-33, the defendants' liability extended two years from the date of death. To prolong the running of this period would be to subject the defendants to potentially infinite liability and is counter to the policy underlying statutes of limitation. We decline to extend the statute of limitation by adopting the discovery rule in wrongful death cases.
The answer to the certified question is no.
Certified question answered in the negative.
All the Justices concur, except Smith, P. J., and Benham, J., who dissent.
"[I]t has none of the attributes of a mere survival of the cause of action had by the deceased, but has only those of a new and distinct right or cause of action, based merely upon the same tort which gave cause to the right of action in the deceased." Thompson v. Watson, 186 Ga. 396, 405 (197 SE 774) (1938). We thus reject amici's argument that medical malpractice, wrongful death and continuing tort cases must be treated alike.
Thus, the cause of action for wrongful death might still be viable where the personal injury action may have already lapsed. Burns v. Brickie, 106 Ga. App. 150, 153 (126 SE2d 633) (1962).
As has Florida, in Walker v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 320 S2d 418 (Fla. App. 1975) and Pennsylvania, in Pastierik v. Duquesne Light Co., 526 A2d 323, 325 (Pa. 1987).
As was said in Pastierik v. Duquesne Light Co., 526 A2d 323, 326 (Pa. 1987):
survivors . . . have the opportunity to proceed with scientific examinations aimed at determining the exact cause of death so that a wrongful death action, if warranted, can be filed without additional delay.
It is utterly repugnant to the genius of our laws for a person to be forever liable for a wrong done, whether that wrong arises out of contract or out of tort. . . .
"In a country where not even treason can be prosecuted after a lapse of three years, it can scarcely be supposed that an individual would remain forever liable to a pecuniary forfeiture." Atlantic, Valdosta & Western R. Co. v. McDilda, 125 Ga. 468 (54 SE 140) (1906), quoting Adams v. Woods, 5 U. S. 194 (2 Cranch) (1804).
Compare OCGA § 9-3-71 (a) which fails to grant such flexibility to the courts. "[A]n action for medical malpractice shall be brought within two years after the date on which an injury or death arising from a negligent or wrongful act or omission occurred." Compare OCGA § 9-3-29 in which the General Assembly defined when a cause of action "accrues." The statute provides in pertinent part: "For the purpose of this Code section, the right of action shall accrue immediately upon the violation of the covenant. . . ." Id.