Case Name: Erin Vontez THOMPSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Court: District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 2018-05-17
Citations: 250 So. 3d 132
Docket Number: No. 1D17–2751
Parties: Erin Vontez THOMPSON, Appellant,
v.
STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: 
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Third Series
Volume: 250
Pages: 132–143

Head Matter:
Erin Vontez THOMPSON, Appellant,
v.
STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. 1D17-2751
District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
May 17, 2018
Rehearing Denied August 21, 2018
Andy Thomas, Public Defender, and Joel Arnold, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Barbara Debelius, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.

Opinion:
Per Curiam.
The trial court revoked Appellant's probation because she paid nothing toward probation costs, court costs, or drug testing for almost two years. Because the record reflects competent, substantial evidence to support the trial court's ruling, and we find no abuse of discretion, we affirm.
Facts
Appellant pleaded guilty to second-degree felony neglect of the younger of her two children, then ages 2 and 5, whom a neighbor found wandering alone outside their apartment while Appellant was gone for half a day in January of 2015. Through counsel, she stipulated to a factual basis for her guilty plea. This felony carried a maximum sentence of up to fifteen years in prison. § 827.03(1)(e), Fla. Stat. (2015) (defining child neglect); § 775.082(3)(d) (establishing permissible sentence).
Based on Appellant's plea of guilty to felony child neglect, the trial court withheld adjudication and sentenced Appellant to two years of probation. She was required to pay $917 in specified court costs/fines and $41.60 a month in costs of supervision, to "work diligently at a lawful occupation . and support any dependents to the best of your ability," comply with her parenting case plan with the Department of Children and Families, obtain a mental health evaluation, and submit to and pay for random drug testing. In her application for indigent status, Appellant indicated that she had no debts or liabilities.
In April 2017, near the end of her two-year probation period, Appellant came before the same trial judge on an affidavit of violation of probation alleging Appellant's complete failure to pay anything toward her $917 in court costs, $960 in costs of supervision, and $30 for drug testing. The Department of Corrections apparently waived the $960 costs of supervision-which the trial court criticized (in no uncertain terms). That left $947 in court costs and drug testing costs toward which Appellant had paid nothing in two years-"not a nickel," as the trial court described it and defense counsel agreed.
The probation officer recommended incarceration, noting among other things Appellant's prior record of failing to pay costs of probation. Appellant had a felony record of grand theft committed in 2011, a third-degree felony. For that prior felony, Appellant was placed on probation, which she violated by failing to make required payments and failing to complete community service hours. For that violation of probation, she was sentenced to 100 days in jail, and did not appeal.
By the time of the hearing, Appellant had a third child, then four months old. She testified that she received some child support from the children's fathers, one of whom was incarcerated; and had "child support orders out on them" for unpaid support. She received food stamps, and paid no rent or utilities because her housing was government subsidized.
Under direct examination by the state, Appellant admitted that she had not paid anything toward her costs. Appellant's counsel brought up the question of employment on cross-examination. Appellant denied having had any jobs until very recently, a week or two before the hearing. On redirect the state followed up on the employment questions, and then Appellant admitted that she had an under-the-table job cleaning the professional football stadium in Jacksonville after home football games. She quit because it was "nasty" and "a lot" of work, and therefore "it wasn't working out." She did not use any of that money to pay anything toward her probation obligations. She testified that she had been looking for work, but did not work while dealing with her dependency case during the first year of probation (presumably as a result of the felony child neglect charge), and was sick for several months of her pregnancy during the second year of probation. She presented no medical argument or evidence that she could not work at all during her pregnancy or at any other time during her probation.
Appellant's probation officer testified that Appellant was required to submit monthly job-search logs. Over the two years of her probation, however, Appellant returned only two logs. Both were blank. It was not until shortly after a Notice to Appear was issued on Appellant's violation of probation that she got a job. She was making $8.50 per hour, and had just received her first paycheck the day before the violation of probation hearing. She did not pay or offer to pay anything toward her probation obligations out of that paycheck.
After Appellant and her probation officer testified, defense counsel rested and offered to present argument. The trial court stated that argument was not necessary. He found that Appellant had willfully and substantially violated her probation, orally announcing his ruling of a willful and substantial violation twice, as follows (emphasis added):
I'm going to find that Ms. Thompson is in substantial and willful violation of her probation for failing to even attempt to get a job. And based on her testimony that she actually did have an under-the-table job, could have paid something, just something, a dollar, $10, something. She paid absolutely nothing. And based on her testimony that she just decided to sit there and do nothing while she was working on her DCF plan, again, I'm going to find that she's in substantial and willful violation of probation.
The trial court revoked Appellant's probation and adjudicated her guilty of felony child neglect pursuant to her earlier guilty plea. Despite the statutory maximum sentence of up to fifteen years in prison for felony child neglect, the trial court sentenced Appellant to only six months in county jail with credit for the three days she was in jail after her arrest before bonding out.
Appellant does not dispute her complete failure to pay or that the trial court found she had the ability to pay and willfully refused to do so. She argues that the revocation for failure to pay monetary obligations was improper because there was evidence that her failure to pay was not willful or substantial; and there was other evidence besides what the trial court relied on, in that she complied with other terms of her probation. We find her argument meritless.
Standards for Willfulness and Revocation
On a violation of probation for nonpayment, the state has the initial burden of showing nonpayment and willfulness, by a preponderance of the evidence. § 948.06(5), Fla. Stat. (2015) ; Brown v. State , 221 So.3d 731, 733 (Fla. 1st DCA 2017). Willfulness arises from a refusal to pay despite an ability to do so. See Aviles v. State , 165 So.3d 841, 843 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015) (citing Del Valle v. State , 80 So.3d 999, 1012 (Fla. 2011) ). Willfulness also arises from a failure to make "all reasonable efforts" or "sufficient bona fide efforts legally to acquire the resources to pay." See Bearden v. Georgia , 461 U.S. 660, 672-73, 103 S.Ct. 2064, 76 L.Ed.2d 221 (1983) ; Del Valle , 80 So.3d at 1005-06 (citing standard set forth in § 948.06(5), Fla. Stat.); see also Haywood v. State , 987 So.2d 1285, 1287 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008).
Once the state has shown nonpayment and willfulness, the burden shifts to the defendant to prove by a preponderance of the evidence "that he or she does not have the present resources available to pay restitution or the cost of supervision despite sufficient bona fide efforts legally to acquire the resources to do so ." § 948.06(5), Fla. Stat. (emphasis added); Del Valle , 80 So.3d at 1002, 1015 (approving shifting of burden to defendant and preponderance standard). The trial court must inquire into the reasons for the defendant's inability to pay. Bearden , 461 U.S. at 672-73, 103 S.Ct. 2064 ; Del Valle , 80 So.3d at 1002. Willfulness does not exist if a probationer makes "all reasonable efforts to pay the fine or restitution, and yet cannot do so through no fault of his own." Del Valle , 80 So.3d at 1005-06 (quoting Bearden , 461 U.S. at 668-69, 103 S.Ct. 2064 ).
If the defendant fails to satisfy the burden of proof, incarceration is "perfectly justified." Bearden , 461 U.S. at 668, 103 S.Ct. 2064. Upon finding a willful and substantial violation, the trial court then has broad discretion to make the ultimate decision of whether to revoke probation. Brown , 221 So.3d at 733 (citing Lawson v. State , 969 So.2d 222, 229 (Fla. 2007) ). If the trial court revokes probation, the court "shall adjudge the probationer or offender guilty of the offense charged and proven or admitted, unless he or she has previously been adjudged guilty, and impose any sentence which it might have originally imposed before placing the probationer or offender on probation or into community control." § 948.06(2)(e), Fla. Stat.
This Court reviews the trial court's findings for competent, substantial evidence. Brown , 221 So.3d at 733-34. We review the trial court's disposition for an abuse of discretion. Del Valle , 80 So.3d at 1009 ; Savage v. State , 120 So.3d 619, 621-24 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013) (separating the CSE standard for willfulness from abuse of discretion as to ultimate revocation).
CSE of Willfulness
Among Appellant's probation obligations was the standard requirement that she "work diligently at a lawful occupation . and support any dependents to the best of your ability." Even though she was not separately charged with a violation of this requirement, Appellant's lack of effort to obtain employment is directly relevant to whether she made reasonable efforts to comply with the financial terms of her probation. Willis v. State , 141 So.3d 611, 612 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014) ("Such evidence may include a showing that the probationer failed to make 'bona fide' efforts to gain employment and/or legally acquire the resources to pay."). While the dissent asserts fundamental error in the trial court's consideration of Appellant's failure to make reasonable efforts to get and keep a job even though Appellant was not separately charged with violating her probation for failure to submit completed job-search logs, the law is clear that Appellant had the burden to prove that she expended "sufficient bona fide efforts legally to acquire the resources " to satisfy her financial obligations. § 948.06(5), Fla. Stat. (emphasis added). This requirement reflects the economic reality of a direct connection between employment and ability to pay, and between good-faith effort and gainful employment.
The trial court had before it competent, substantial evidence that Appellant made no reasonable efforts for nearly two years to comply with the monetary obligations of her probation. Appellant injected the issue when she asserted lack of a job as the reason she could not pay her costs. She submitted only two job-search logs in two years, and both of those were blank. She admitted she did not want to work while her dependency case was going on. She was not pregnant during the majority of her probationary period, and gave no legitimate medical reason why she could not work while on probation. She had an under-the-table job, but chose to leave it. She did not get another job until after a Notice to Appear was issued on her violation of probation, and then was able to get a job very quickly. She did not use or offer to use any money gained from those jobs to pay anything at all toward her probation obligations. This evidence was sufficient to establish willfulness and to support the trial court's discretionary decision to revoke Appellant's probation.
Appellant's sole argument on appeal is that the trial court unfairly revoked probation because Appellant completed other terms of her probation-an argument the dissent adopts and then expands broadly. We reject this argument, because if there is competent substantial evidence to support the trial court's conclusions, it is irrelevant that there may be additional evidence to the contrary. The evidence before the trial court was legally sufficient to support the findings of willfulness.
Although the dissent goes far beyond any argument the Appellant preserved, and among other things attacks the lack of an express written finding of willfulness, Appellant concedes that the finding was necessarily made-as it was, because it was expressed orally twice and was clearly the foundation of the ruling: "I'm going to find that Ms. Thompson is in substantial and willful violation of her probation ." (Emphasis added.) An oral finding suffices. See, e.g., Bittle v. State, 100 So.3d 1194, 1194 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012) (approving an oral finding of willful and substantial violation); Kadyebo v. State, 15 So.3d 928, 928 (Fla. 5th DCA 2009) (recognizing oral pronouncement of willful and substantial violation as supported by competent substantial evidence); Baldwin v. State, 855 So.2d 1180, 1180 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003) (affirming revocation where competent substantial evidence supported an oral pronouncement of willfulness).
Also contrary to the dissent's sua sponte suggestion of a constitutional deprivation, there is not and never has been any requirement that the trial court on a violation of probation obtain anything remotely approaching a financial affidavit or balance sheet before determining ability to pay. The trial court is required to inquire into ability to pay. The trial court did so. Appellant testified that her basic living expenses were government-subsidized (food stamps plus HUD-paid housing and utilities). She received at least some child support from the fathers of her three children and had taken steps to enforce the child support obligations. She had the ability to work but chose not to work, except for a short-term under-the-table job from which she paid nothing toward her probation obligations, and chose to quit. Once the Notice to Appear was issued, however, she very quickly found a job, strongly suggesting that she could have done so earlier if she had felt sufficiently motivated. She was able to come up with the money to post bond of over $500 when she was arrested for felony child neglect, and to pay the $50 application fee for criminal indigent status, on which application she indicated she had zero debts or liabilities.
These facts are materially distinguishable from the cases cited by the dissent, in which there was no evidence of ability to pay or no finding of willfulness. The trial court's inquiry was sufficient, and the record reflects competent, substantial evidence that Appellant had the ability to work and had the ability to pay something toward her obligations, even if not in full. This is not a situation of a probationer trying to pay her obligations, yet through no fault of her own, being unable to do so. See Del Valle , 80 So.3d at 1005-06.
No Abuse of Discretion in Revoking
The willful violation question now resolved, the only question remaining is whether the trial court abused its discretion in revoking probation. This is the core of the dissent's argument, which results from a disagreement as to the trial court's exercise of discretion, coupled with a selective view of the facts. Despite the dissent's protestations to the contrary, we are not unaware of the social dynamics at play here, of which the trial court likewise was well aware. Yet, the evidence showed that Appellant, though able to work, failed to exercise reasonable efforts to maintain employment, simply quit one job, and used none of the little money she did earn to pay toward her obligations, all the while receiving food stamps, rent, and utilities at public expense. She had done it before, on probation from her earlier grand theft felony, and was incarcerated as a result. In this new violation, there was competent, substantial evidence of a willful refusal to comply with monetary obligations. The underlying child neglect felony could have resulted in imprisonment of up to fifteen years, yet the trial court imposed sentence of only six months in county jail. The trial court acted within its broad discretion in the context of the facts before it.
We cannot say the decision to revoke probation was arbitrary or fanciful-one no reasonable jurist could make. See generally Canakaris v. Canakaris , 382 So.2d 1197, 1203 (Fla. 1980) (defining abuse of discretion). Evaluating the evidence and Appellant's credibility and demeanor were the exclusive province of the trial court, and we must give great deference to the trial court's superior vantage point. See Savage , 120 So.3d at 622 ; Riggins v. State , 830 So.2d 920, 921 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002). The dissent's emphasis on the trial court's oral comments at the hearing is misplaced. The trial court heard the evidence, observed and evaluated Appellant, and exercised discretion to determine that revocation was proper in this instance. Within our standards of review-which the dissent would have us ignore-no legitimate basis for reversal exists.
Accordingly, we affirm Appellant's judgment and sentence. We also note that the parties agree that an incorrect statutory reference to section 784.07(2)(b) was added to Appellant's judgment in error upon revocation. The trial court is directed to enter a corrected judgment.
AFFIRMED . REMANDED for correction of scrivener's error in judgment.
Wetherell and Kelsey, JJ., concur; Makar, J., dissents with opinion.