Case Name: The State ex rel. Camaco, L.L.C., Appellant, v. Albu et al., Appellees
Court: Supreme Court of Ohio
Jurisdiction: Ohio
Decision Date: 2017-09-14
Citations: 151 Ohio St. 3d 330
Docket Number: No. 2015-0036
Parties: The State ex rel. Camaco, L.L.C., Appellant, v. Albu et al., Appellees.
Judges: O’Connor, C.J., and French and Fischer, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Ohio State Reports, Third Service
Volume: 151
Pages: 330–344

Head Matter:
The State ex rel. Camaco, L.L.C., Appellant, v. Albu et al., Appellees.
2017-Ohio-7569.]
(No. 2015-0036
Submitted January 10, 2017
Decided September 14, 2017.)

Opinion:
DeWine, J.
{¶ 1} This is an appeal from the denial of a writ of mandamus in a workers' compensation matter. Robert Albu suffered a head injury while working for Camaco, L.L.C. Separate from its award of workers' compensation benefits, the Industrial Commission granted an additional award to Albu based upon its finding that Camaco had violated a "specific safety requirement" in failing to provide Albu with protective headgear.
{¶ 2} Camaco challenged the additional award by way of a mandamus action filed in the Tenth District Court of Appeals. The Tenth District denied the writ, finding that Camaco had waived a central issue it raised in its mandamus action— that Albu's injury had resulted from a latent defect in the manufacturing equipment involved in his injury—by not raising it during proceedings before the commission. We conclude that waiver does not apply in this case. The latent-defect theory was not raised by the parties below; rather, it was raised by the commission's staff hearing officer on rehearing. Thus, the mandamus action was Camaco's first opportunity to respond to this new theory.
{¶ 3} We further hold that an employer does not face liability for the violation of a specific safety requirement ("VSSR") when it lacked knowledge of a specific danger requiring a safety device. We reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and issue a limited writ of mandamus ordering the commission to determine whether Camaco knew or should have known about the latent defect at the time that Albu was injured.
Albu's Claim
{¶ 4} Albu was injured in 2006 while working for Camaco as a "weld tech trainee." Some machinery had become jammed, and Albu was called to troubleshoot the problem. After Albu went inside a fenced enclosure containing the equipment, it suddenly restarted and struck Albu in the head. A workers' compensation claim was allowed for numerous head injuries. At issue in this case is Albu's application for an additional award for a violation of a specific safety requirement based upon his allegation that Camaco failed to provide him suitable protective headgear pursuant to Ohio Adm.Code 4123:l-5-17(G).
{¶ 5} Under Ohio's workers' compensation system, a claimant may be entitled to separate, additional compensation when the claimant's workplace injury results from an employer's violation of a specific safety requirement. Such an award is specifically authorized in Article II, Section 35 of the Ohio Constitution. "To establish entitlement to a VSSR award, a claimant must show that a specific safety requirement is applicable to the employer, that the employer violated that [specific safety requirement], and that the violation proximately caused the injury." State ex rel. Richmond v. Indus. Comm., 139 Ohio St.3d 157, 2014-Ohio-1604, 10 N.E.3d 683, ¶ 17. A "specific safety requirement" is "one of the 'specific and definite requirements or standards of conduct as are prescribed by statute or by orders of the Industrial Commission.' " Id. at ¶ 19, quoting State ex rel. Trydle v. Indus. Comm., 32 Ohio St.2d 257, 291 N.E.2d 748 (1972), paragraph one of the syllabus. "[Bjecause a VSSR award is a penalty, the commission must resolve all reasonable doubts in favor of the employer." State ex rel. Penwell v. Indus. Comm., 142 Ohio St.3d 114, 2015-Ohio-976, 28 N.E.3d 101, ¶ 17.
{¶ 6} The calculation of the amount of a VSSR award is tied to the workers' compensation award for the underlying workplace injury; Article II, Section 35 provides that when an injury is found to have resulted from an employer's failure to comply with a specific safety requirement, an "amount as shall be found to be just, not greater than fifty nor less than fifteen per centum of the maximum award established by law, shall be added to the amount of the compensation that may be awarded on account of such injury." Although based on the same incident as the underlying workers' compensation award, a VSSR award "is not a modification of a previous award, but is a new, separate and distinct award." (Emphasis sic.) State ex rel. Curry v. Indus. Comm., 58 Ohio St.2d 268, 269, 389 N.E.2d 1126 (1979).
{¶ 7} Albu applied for a VSSR award based on Ohio Adm.Code 4123:1-5-17(G)(l)(a)(i), which requires employers to provide suitable protective headgear whenever employees are required to be in places where their heads are exposed to potential hazards from physical contact with rigid objects. The central issue in this case is whether that requirement was applicable to Camaco in regard to Albu.
Factual and Procedural Background
Albu Suffers a Workplace Injury While Troubleshooting Malfunctioning Machinery
{¶ 8} The machine involved in Albu's injury was a "seatback manufacturing system" designed and installed by Wayne Trail Technologies, Inc. Generally referred to as the "Wayne Trail," the machine was used to bend metal tubing to form frames for automobile seats. Included in the manufacturing system was a Motoman robot, which worked in conjunction with the Wayne Trail, moving the bent frames through the manufacturing process. The robot could be reprogrammed using a handheld device, known as a "teach pendant," that was intended to "teach" the robot to incorporate adjustments while it operated at a slow speed.
{¶ 9} The Wayne Trail and the Motoman robot were fully automated and were surrounded by a wire-mesh fence in an area sometimes referred to as the "cell." An operator monitored the machines from a control station outside the cell. Two doors allowed employees to enter the cell; each door was connected to a safety-interlock system that shut off the power to both machines when either door was opened. Metal tubing entered and exited the cell area through two separate, smaller openings in the fence. Signs posted on the fence warned, "DANGER. THIS MACHINE STARTS AND STOPS AUTOMATICALLY." (Capitalization sic.)
{¶ 10} On the day Albu was injured, Ollie Higgins was operating the Wayne Trail. The machine stopped moving, and Albu was summoned to investigate. Albu could not see the problem from outside the fence, so he decided to enter the cell. Rather than use one of the personnel doors, Albu crawled through the opening where the materials exited the cell area. Because Albu entered the cell through the material-exit chute rather than through a safety-interlocked door, the Wayne Trail remained powered with Albu inside. According to Higgins, once Albu was inside the fence, Albu said that he saw the problem and, while trying to fix it, tripped a sensor that activated the machine, causing the transfer arm of the Wayne Trail to move. The arm hit the back of Albu's head, driving his head forward into another part of the machine. Albu does not remember most of the details of the accident.
{¶ 11} The Safety Violations Investigation Unit ("SVIU") of the Bureau of Workers' Compensation investigated the incident and prepared a report. Cama-co's human-resources manager, Karen Mayfield, told investigators that Camaco did not require its employees to wear hardhats to work on the Wayne Trail or the Motoman robot but they were available upon request. The SVIU's report also noted that there were conflicting statements about why Albu had entered the fenced-in area through the material-exit opening. Albu claimed that he had been trained to do so, but Camaco officials said that Albu had improperly bypassed the safety-interlocked doors and had not properly used the teach pendant.
Albu's Application for an Additional Award for a VSSR Is Initially Denied, but the Commission Grants His Motion for Rehearing
{¶ 12} A staff hearing officer initially denied Albu's VSSR application, concluding that "[t]he question of whether or not head protection was required or whether or not there was a violation of [Ohio Adm.Code] 4123:l-5-17(G) is not pertinent" because "there would have been no potential for a head injury to occur had the personnel doors been used by Mr. Albu"; entry through the personnel doors would have "de-energized" the cell and thus prevented any movement by the transfer arm while he was inside.
{¶ 13} Albu moved for rehearing, arguing that the hearing officer misunderstood what Albu was required to do to troubleshoot problems with the equipment. Albu cited evidence supporting his position that he had to be inside the cell in order to see the robot and that he needed power to the area to diagnose the problem. According to Albu, he was in danger of being struck regardless of hów he entered the cell, because the power had to be on to both the Wayne Trail and the Motoman robot for him to assess the problem. He argued that Camaco knew of the danger, because it posted warning signs at both entrance doors and at the openings where material entered and exited the cell.
{¶ 14} Camaco opposed rehearing, arguing that Albu could have troubleshot from outside the cell without putting himself in danger and that he was injured because he had improperly entered the cell through the material-exit chute. Camaco noted that expert witnesses in related intentional-tort and product-liability litigation had determined that Albu had circumvented safety features when he crawled through the material-exit chute. The commission granted Albu's request for rehearing.
On Rehearing, the Staff Hearing Officer Grants a VSSR Award to Albu on a Theory Not Raised by Either Party
{¶ 15} On rehearing, the parties set forth their familiar arguments before a different staff hearing officer. Camaco continued to argue that it was not necessary for Albu to be inside the cell with the power on to both machines to troubleshoot. It further argued that if he had entered through one of the personnel doors—which would have shut down power to the cell—he could have used the teach pendant while only the robot (in teach mode), and not the Wayne Trail, was powered. Albu, on the other hand, argued that he had to be inside the cell to perform his job and that the entire manufacturing system had to be powered for him to activate the robot.
{¶ 16} The hearing officer did not accept either party's view but rather decided the case on a completely different theory altogether. The hearing officer acknowledged that Albu had "bypassed a safety device" when he entered the cell through the material-exit chute but concluded that the injury would have occurred even had he gone through one of the personnel doors. The hearing officer relied on a report from Vernon Mangold Jr. that had been submitted in Albu's related intentional tort and product-liability civil action. The hearing officer stated:
The file contains a report from Vernon Mangold, an expert in the design and operation of robotic systems. Mr. Mangold indicated that it was not possible for [Albu] to enter the enclosure and then turn on power only to the robot by means of the teach pendant. Mr. Mangold states that the transfer arm of the bending machine was capable of moving at full speed when the robot was in teach mode. He indicated that even the employees of Wayne Trail who trained the employees of [Camaco] were not aware of this.
The Hearing Officer finds that [Camaco] did present a potential hazard of head contact with rigid objects as the system did not permit power to be turned off to the bending machine when power to the robot was activated. [Camaco], therefore, should have provided head protection to [Albu].
It is therefore ordered that an additional award of compensation be granted to [Albu].
(Emphasis added.)
{¶ 17} In other words, the hearing officer determined that a defect in the manufacturing system—a defect that even the designer/installer of the system was unaware of when it trained Camaco's employees—created a condition that required Camaco to provide head protection to its employees.
{¶ 18} The hearing officer's decision granting Albu's application for a VSSR award—"in the amount of thirty-five percent of the maximum weekly rate"—was a final order. See Ohio Adm.Code 4121-3-20(E)(4). The commission summarily denied Camaco's motion for rehearing (treating it as a "request for reconsideration") and likewise summarily denied Camaco's motion to vacate the denial of its motion for rehearing.
The Tenth District Finds that Camaco Waived the Latent-Defect Issue
{¶ 19} Camaco filed a complaint for a writ of mandamus in the Tenth District Court of Appeals, alleging that the commission had abused its discretion because the VSSR award was
based solely upon the affidavit of a non-testifying expert who opined, in the context of a separate products liability case against the manufacturer of the machine which Albu was repairing, that there were design flaws in the machine that could have rendered the machine's safety interlock devices ineffective to protect users against injury from moving machinery.
{¶ 20} Camaco also alleged that there was no evidence that Camaco knew or should have known of the design flaws.
{If 21} A magistrate appointed to hear the case refused to consider Camaco's defense of lack of knowledge of the design defect because Camaco had not raised the issue of a hidden, latent defect in the Wayne Trail system during proceedings before the commission. The magistrate noted that Mangold's report constituted some evidence that even if Albu had entered through the safety-personnel doors, the transfer arm of the Wayne Trail would have been capable of moving at full speed with the robot in teach mode. Thus, the magistrate concluded that the commission did not abuse its discretion when it awarded compensation for a violation of a specific safety requirement.
{¶ 22} Camaco filed objections to the magistrate's report. The court of appeals overruled the objections and denied the writ. This matter is before the court on Camaco's appeal as of right.
Analysis
Camaco Did Not Waive the Latent-Defect Issue
{¶ 23} Camaco argues that it cannot be found liable for a violation of a specific safety requirement when the injury to its employee resulted from a hidden, latent design or manufacturing defect in the equipment that the employee was operating and the employee bypassed existing safety devices. Camaco maintains that because the hearing officer sua sponte introduced the latent-defect issue in the commission's final decision, it had no opportunity to challenge the finding at the administrative level. Thus, Camaco argues, the doctrine of appellate waiver should not prevent it from seeking mandamus relief.
{¶ 24} We agree.
{¶ 25} On rehearing, the commission's staff hearing officer premised the VSSR award on a theory that had not been raised by Albu—that there was a latent defect in the manufacturing equipment involved in his injury. The hearing officer then determined that because of this defect, Camaco should have provided protective headgear to Albu, but the hearing officer cited no evidence in the record that Camaco knew of the purported defect and the concomitant need for protective headgear. To the contrary, the hearing officer found that the manufacturer/installer of the Wayne Trail was unaware of the defect when it was training Camaco's employees on the machinery.
{¶ 26} The sole evidence of a design defect came from Mangold's report. Although the report had been submitted by Camaco at the original hearing along with other reports to demonstrate that Albu's own experts had confirmed that Albu had circumvented the safety-door feature, it was never relied on by Albu during the proceedings on rehearing. Indeed, Mangold never testified as an expert in the VSSR litigation, and neither party argued that Albu's injury resulted from a design defect in the equipment.
{¶ 27} Camaco should not be expected to have anticipated that the hearing officer would rely upon a theory not advanced by either party. An award for the failure of a safety measure "cannot be sustained without evidence of prior malfunction and employer awareness thereof." State ex rel. Taylor v. Indus. Comm., 70 Ohio St.3d 445, 447, 639 N.E.2d 101 (1994); see also State ex rel. Pressware Internatl., Inc. v. Indus. Comm., 85 Ohio St.3d 284, 290, 707 N.E.2d 935 (1999). And just as an employer cannot be held liable for the first-time failure of a safety device, State ex rel. M.T.D. Prods., Inc. v. Stebbins, 43 Ohio St.2d 114, 118, 330 N.E.2d 904 (1975), so too must an employer be free from liability for not providing a safety device when it lacked knowledge of the existence of a specific danger requiring such a device.
{¶ 28} The court of appeals held that Camaco waived any opportunity to raise its lack of knowledge of the defect that could have caused Albu's injury by failing to raise the issue in its motion for rehearing at the commission level. See State ex rel. Quarto Mining Co. v. Foreman, 79 Ohio St.3d 78, 81-83, 679 N.E.2d 706 (1997) (the rule that a reviewing court will not consider an issue that was not presented to the court below also applies in a mandamus action in which an administrative determination is challenged). However, Camaco's motion for rehearing was essentially a nullity: Ohio Adm.Code 4121-3-20(E)(4) states that in VSSR proceedings, "[i]n no case shall a rehearing be granted from an order adjudicating a rehearing." Thus, Camaco's mandamus action was its first meaningful opportunity to challenge the hearing officer's award. Therefore, we hold that Camaco did not waive its ability to argue in this mandamus case that the commission abused its discretion by basing its award on a condition that Camaco did not know existed.
The Commission Must Resolve the Factual Question Whether Camaco Knew of the Design Defect at the Time of Injury
{¶29} The determination of the extent of Camaco's knowledge was left unaddressed by the commission. The staff hearing officer on rehearing found that the company that designed and installed the industrial system was unaware of the defect that caused Albu's accident when it trained Camaco's employees. The hearing officer did not, however, make a specific finding that Camaco remained unaware of the defect at the time of Albu's accident. We should not make the factual determination of the extent of Camaco's knowledge here; "[fjactual questions relevant to proof of a VSSR rest exclusively within the discretion of the commission." State ex rel. Scott v. Indus. Comm., 136 Ohio St.3d 92, 2013-Ohio-2445, 990 N.E.2d 598, ¶ 12, citing State ex rel. Haines v. Indus. Comm., 29 Ohio St.2d 15, 278 N.E.2d 24 (1972).
Conclusion
{¶ 30} Therefore, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and issue a limited writ of mandamus ordering the commission to vacate its order granting the VSSR award and to determine whether Camaco, at the time of the injury, knew or should have known about the specific defect that gave rise to the need for protective headgear. If Camaco lacked the requisite knowledge of the defect at the time of the injury, it cannot have violated a specific safety requirement.
Judgment reversed and limited writ granted.
O'Connor, C.J., and French and Fischer, JJ., concur.
Kennedy, J., concurs in part and dissents in part, with an opinion joined by O'Donnell, J.
O'Neill, J., dissents, with an opinion.