Case Name: DEREK PAOLI, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION OF MENDOCINO COUNTY, Defendant; COUNTY OF MENDOCINO, Real Party in Interest and Respondent; MENDOCINO COUNTY EMPLOYEES' ASSOCIATION, Intervener and Appellant
Court: Court of Appeal of the State of California
Jurisdiction: California
Decision Date: 1993-01-26
Citations: 12 Cal. App. 4th 1073
Docket Number: No. A053816
Parties: DEREK PAOLI, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION OF MENDOCINO COUNTY, Defendant; COUNTY OF MENDOCINO, Real Party in Interest and Respondent; MENDOCINO COUNTY EMPLOYEES’ ASSOCIATION, Intervener and Appellant.
Judges: 
Reporter: California Appellate Reports, Fourth Series
Volume: 12
Pages: 1073–1084

Head Matter:
[No. A053816.
First Dist., Div. Two.
Jan. 26, 1993.]
DEREK PAOLI, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION OF MENDOCINO COUNTY, Defendant; COUNTY OF MENDOCINO, Real Party in Interest and Respondent; MENDOCINO COUNTY EMPLOYEES’ ASSOCIATION, Intervener and Appellant.
Counsel
William L. Williams, Jr., for Plaintiff and Appellant.
H. Peter Klein, County Counsel, and Jeanine B. Bauman, Deputy County Counsel, for Real Party in Interest and Respondent.
Pano Stephens for Intervener and Appellant.

Opinion:
Opinion
KLINE, P. J.
Derek Paoli and the Mendocino County Employees' Association appeal from the denial of a petition for writ of mandate seeking to set aside the Mendocino County Civil Service Commission's order terminating Paoli's employment. They contend the commission exceeded its authority by ordering termination on an appeal from an administrative order of suspension.
Statement of the Case and Facts
On January 7, 1990, cross-appellant Derek Paoli was employed as a Corrections Deputy II in the Mendocino County Sheriff's Office. At approximately 1:30 a.m., while on duty, Paoli assisted in a practical joke involving the discharge of a firecracker inside an office at the county jail. In so doing, Paoli left his post and allowed two doors to remain unsecured. In the ensuing investigation of the incident, Paoli initially made false statements about his participation which he subsequently corrected.
Paoli received written notice of the undersheriffs proposal to suspend him without pay for 30 days as a result of his participation in the firecracker incident and dishonesty during the investigation. He exercised his right to respond to the proposed disciplinary action (Skelly v. State Personnel Bd. (1975) 15 Cal.3d 194 [124 Cal.Rptr. 14, 539 P.2d 774]) and an informal administrative hearing was held on March 14. After this hearing, the sheriff decided not to modify the proposed disciplinary action and ordered Paoli to serve the 30-day suspension. Two other employees who participated in the practical joke were terminated from their positions. All three employees appealed to the civil service commission and the appeals were consolidated. By order dated July 18, 1990, the Commission modified cross-appellant's suspension to termination.
On January 25, 1991, cross-appellant filed a petition for writ of mandate seeking to overturn the commission's decision. On March 15, appellant Mendocino County Employees' Association (Association) applied for and was granted leave to intervene. After a hearing on March 29, the trial court issued a statement of decision denying the petition. Judgment was entered on May 14 and timely notices of appeal and cross-appeal were filed.
Discussion
Under the Mendocino County Civil Service Ordinance (all undesignated section references are to this ordinance), any officer or employee in the classified civil service may be dismissed, suspended or reduced in rank or compensation by the "appointing authority" upon written notice. (§ 3.16.130.) In the present case, the "appointing authority" is the sheriff. (§ 3.16.110.) The appointing authority's disciplinary order is final unless the employee files a reply and requests an appeal to the civil service commission. (§ 3.16.130.) If the employee requests an appeal, the sommission or its referee must hold a hearing and "either affirm, modify or revoke" the disciplinary order. (§ 3.16.140.)
The question presented by this case is whether the commission's authority under section 3.16.140 of the county ordinance to "modify" the order of discipline imposed by the appointing authority includes authority to change an order of suspension to one of termination. The trial court held that it does, viewing the commission as having authority to modify discipline "either up or down within a class or from class to class." This decision was based on Andersen v. Civil Service Com. (1981) 122 Cal.App.3d 577 [176 Cal.Rptr. 66], which held that the Charter of the County of San Diego, permitting the commission to "modify" the order of the appointing authority, authorized the commission to increase as well as decrease the penalty imposed. In Andersen, various employees appealed to the civil service commission after being suspended for participating in a job action. The commission determined that an appropriate penalty would be eight hours' suspension for each day of participation in the job action. This formula resulted in reduction of the penalty imposed by the appointing authority in most cases, but in increased penalties for four employees, from 24 to 40 hours in 2 cases and from 16 to 24 and 24 to 32 hours in the others. The court rejected the suggestion that the charter's authorization to "affirm, modify or revoke" permitted only a decrease in penalty, noting that the term "modify" can include changes in either direction and that the charter's provision for modification of the discipline "provided ample notice to the employees and their counsel that an appeal might result in a change in discipline which they would not like, whether by direct increase or other alteration." (122 Cal.App.3d at p. 580.)
Andersen defined "modify" as meaning " 'to alter; to change an incidental or subordinate feature; enlarge, extend; limit, reduce.' " (Andersen v. Civil Service Com., supra, 122 Cal.App.3d at p. 579, quoting Black's Law Dict. (rev. 4th ed. 1968) p. 1155 [italics added].) "Modification" is defined as " '[a] change; an alteration or amendment which introduces new elements into the details, or cancels some of them, but leaves the general purpose and effect of the subject-matter intact.' " (Fallbrook Sanitary Dist. v. San Diego Local Agency Formation Com. (1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 753, 760 [256 Cal.Rptr. 590], quoting Black's Law Dict. (5th ed. 1979) p. 905 [italics added in Fallbrook]', see Police Protective Ass'n of Casper v. City of Casper (Wyo. 1978) 575 P.2d 1146, 1149 [provision for contract to continue until altered or modified did not contemplate termination of contract].) The commission's action in Andersen clearly constituted a modification under these definitions, as it increased the duration of the employees' suspensions but did not alter the nature of the penalty imposed by the appointing authority.
The present case differs in that the commission here did not simply increase the duration of Paoli's suspension but imposed the entirely different penalty of termination. Termination is the most extreme penalty that can be imposed in the employment context, depriving the employee of the means of livelihood and making it more difficult to find other employment because of the questionable circumstances under which the prior job ended. (See Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill (1985) 470 U.S. 532, 543 [84L.Ed.2d 494, 504-505, 105 S.Ct. 1487].) By contrast, a suspension does not destroy but merely interrupts employment. (Civil Service Assn. v. City and County of San Francisco (1978) 22 Cal.3d 552, 562 [150 Cal.Rptr. 129, 586 P.2d 162].) The change from an order imposing a 30-day suspension to an order terminating employment does not simply change an incidental detail but alters the fundamental nature and effect of the originally imposed punishment. Neither Andersen nor recognized definitions allow a change of this kind to be viewed as a "modification."
Indeed, to view the commission's authority to "modify" disciplinary orders as allowing it to change an order of suspension to one of termination would violate employees' rights to due process. Due process requires that before punitive action is taken an employee must be given notice of the proposed disciplinary action and an opportunity to respond. (Shelly v. State Personnel Bd., supra, 15 Cal.3d 194, 215; Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill, supra, 470 U.S. at p. 546 [84 L.Ed.2d at p. 506].) In the present case, Paoli was given notice of and an opportunity to respond to the proposed 30-day suspension; he was never informed that he faced outright termination of his employment. While the ordinance authorizing the commission to "modify" a disciplinary order may be viewed as providing notice that an initial order might be altered in a manner unfavorable to the employee {Andersen, supra, 122 Cal.App.3d at p. 580), it cannot be seen as giving the employee notice that a manner of punishment totally different from that imposed by the appointing authority might be imposed after an appeal to the commission. Accordingly, the commission exceeded its authority under the Mendocino County Civil Service Ordinance by changing the appointing authority's order of suspension to an order of termination.
The judgment is reversed and the matter remanded to the trial court for further proceedings in accordance with the views expressed herein. Appellant shall recover his costs on appeal.
Smith, J., concurred.
Section 3.16.130 of the Mendocino County Civil Service Ordinance provides: "Any officer or employee in the classified civil service may be dismissed, suspended or reduced in rank or compensation by the appointing authority of the County after employment or promotion is complete by a written order, executed by such appointing authority, stating specifically the reasons for this action. The order shall be filed with the Director of Personnel and a copy thereof shall be furnished to the person affected thereby. Such dismissal, suspension or reduction in rank or compensation shall be final unless such officer or employee files a reply in writing to such order with the Personnel Director and requests an appeal to the Civil Service Commission within ten (10) days after the receipt of the original order; appointing power in a dismissal, demotion, or suspension may make the action effective immediately."
Section 3.16.140 provides in full: "If the employee affected by the order referred to in Section 3.16.130 hereof files a reply and request for appeal to the Civil Service Commission within the specified time, the Director of Personnel shall forthwith transmit the order, reply and request for appeal to the Civil Service Commission for hearing. Within twenty (20) days from the filing of such appeal, the Commission or its referee shall hold a hearing which may be continued from time to time, and at the conclusion thereof either affirm, modify or revoke the order. The appellant may appear personally, produce evidence, be represented by counsel, and have a public hearing if it is desired. If the Commission appoints a referee, a complete transcript shall be made and presented to the Commission."
Respondent urges that a definition of "modify" which precludes changing the character or general purpose and effect of the original disciplinary order would deprive the commission of authority to rescind an order of termination. Section 3.16.140, however, specifically gives the commission such authority by authorizing it to "affirm, modify or revoke" the order. If the term "modify" encompassed rescission of a termination order, it would be unnecessary for the ordinance to also give the commission authority to "revoke" a disciplinary order, and inclusion of the latter term would serve no purpose. Under established principles of statutory construction, " ' "significance should be given to every word, phrase, sentence and part of an act in pursuance of the legislative purpose" ' " and " ' "a construction making some words surplusage is to be avoided." ' " (Fontana Unified School Dist. v. Burman (1988) 45 Cal.3d 208, 218 [246 Cal.Rptr. 733, 753 P.2d 689], quoting Palos Verdes Faculty Assn. v. Palos Verdes Peninsula Unified Sch. Dist. (1978) 21 Cal.3d 650, 658-659 [147 Cal.Rptr. 359, 580 P.2d 1155].) Similarly, section 3.16.150 directs that if a disciplinary order is "reversed or modified" by the commission, the employee must be restored to his previous position with all rights and privileges pertaining thereto except as the decision may affect employment status. Use of both terms in this section of the ordinance indicates it is not necessary to resort to the term "modify" to find authority for reversal of an order of termination.
In view of this conclusion, we need not reach cross-appellant's additional argument that he was denied his right to representation during the investigation of the firecracker incident.