Case Name: Ronald L. WILLIAMS v. GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, et al.
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1994-02-11
Citations: 639 So. 2d 275
Docket Number: No. 93-CA-0287
Parties: Ronald L. WILLIAMS v. GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, et al.
Judges: Before BYRNES, LOBRANO, WARD, PLOTKIN and WALTZER, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 639
Pages: 275–299

Head Matter:
Ronald L. WILLIAMS v. GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, et al.
No. 93-CA-0287.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fourth Circuit.
Feb. 11, 1994.
Opinion on Grant of Rehearing June 15, 1994.
Michael A. McGlone, Kent B. Ryan, Lemle & Kelleher, New Orleans, for intervenor-appellant.
Stephen P. Bruno, Natasha Zimmerman, Bruno and Bruno, New Orleans, Laurence E. Larmann, Kurt D. Engelhardt, Hailey, McNamara, Hall, Larmann & Papale, Me-tairie, for appellees.
B. Frank Davis, Howard B. Kaplan, Karen Wells Roby, Bernard, Cassisa, Saporito & Elliott, Metairie, for appellant.
Before BYRNES, LOBRANO, WARD, PLOTKIN and WALTZER, JJ.

Opinion:
jiBYRNES, Judge.
At approximately 10:00 p.m. on the evening of March 17, 1987, Ronald L. Williams, a safety and training specialist with Ocean Drilling and Exploration Company (ODECO) for eight (8) years was driving a 1985 Buick Century manufactured by General Motors. Mr. Williams alleged that a steering failure caused the vehicle to veer sharply to the left on I — 10, striking the left guardrail and then veer to the right striking the right guard rail, resulting in serious injuries and damages. As a result of those injuries and damages, Mr. Williams brought this products liability suit against the manufacturer of the vehicle, General Motors, as well as Crown Buick Inc., Prudential Property and Casualty Insurance Company, Sears and Roebuck, and his wife Betty Williams. All defendants with the exception of General Motors were dismissed. No one has appealed those dismissals.
In the trial court, the jury found in favor of Mr. Williams awarding him general damages in the sum of $750,000; past medical expenses in the sum of $197,000; past lost wages in the sum of $150,000 and future lost wages in the sum of $100,000, together with interest and costs.
The Judgment also ordered that:
I2I. Murphy Exploration and Production Company [as successor to ODECO] be reimbursed by preference the sum of $106,-588.56 for medical expenses, but reduced by $30,000 as attorney fees to the plaintiffs attorney Stephen Bruno, Esq., together with interest and costs.
2. Murphy Exploration and Production Company [as successor to ODECO] be reimbursed by preference the sum of $34,-594.07 paid in indemnity benefits from the $150,000 awarded for past lost wages but reduced by $10,000 attorney fees in favor of plaintiffs attorney, Stephen Bruno, Esq., together with interest and costs.
3. The Motion for Directed Verdict in favor of Crown Buick be granted, dismissing it as a party defendant.
4. The Motion for Directed Verdict in favor of Prudential Property and Casualty Insurance Company be granted, dismissing it as a party defendant on the main demand.
5. General Motors Corporation pay to Prudential Property and Casualty Company the sum of $5,925.00 on the third party demand, together with interest and costs.
I. THERE WAS NO MANIFEST ERROR IN THE JURY'S FINDINGS ON LIABILITY
The crux of this case was succinctly expressed by the questions contained in the following two interrogatories which were propounded to the Jury:
1. Did the 1985 Buick Century have a defect at the time it was manufactured?
2. Did the defect cause or contribute to any injuries sustained by Ronald Williams?
The jury answered "yes" to both of these questions. Only if we find that the jury was manifestly erroneous/clearly wrong in answering these two questions can we reverse the judgment of the trial court on the core issue of liability.
This is a classic case of conflicting witnesses and conflicting experts. As this Court said in Brewhouse v. New Orleans Public Service, 614 So.2d 118 (La.App. 4 Cir.1993).
Our standard of review is set forth in Rosell v. ESCO, 549 So.2d 840 (La.1989); Virgil v. American Guarantee and Liability Ins. Co., 507 So.2d 825 (La.1987); and Miller v. Miller, 602 So.2d 330 (La.App. 4 Cir.1992) which stand for the following: When findings are based on determinations regarding the credibility of witnesses, the manifest-error clearly wrong standard demands great deference to the trier of fact's hfindings both express and implicit even though the appellate court may feel that its own evaluations and inferences are as reasonable; for only the fact finder can be aware of the variations in demeanor and tone of voice that bear so heavily on the listener's understanding and belief in what is said.
In reviewing contrasting expert testimony, the trier of fact has the responsibility to determine which evidence is the most credible.
The reason for this well-settled principle of review is based not only upon the trial court's better capacity to evaluate live witnesses (as compared with the appellate court's access only to a cold record) but also upon the proper allocation of trial and appellate functions between the respective courts. Appellate courts must constantly have in mind that their initial review function is not to decide factual issues de novo.
Thus, where there is conflict in the testimony, reasonable inferences of fact should not be disturbed upon review, even though the appellate court is convinced that had it been sitting as the trier of fact, it would have weighed the evidence differently. Rosell v. ESCO, 549 So.2d at 844. Where there are two permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder's choice between them cannot be manifestly erroneous or clearly wrong. Rosell v. ESCO, 549 So.2d at 844. General Motors' expert testified that the accident could not have been caused by a defect in the vehicle. Plaintiffs experts testified to the contrary. The jury apparently believed plaintiffs experts.
General Motors argued that the accident was caused by driver error with intoxication as a contributing factor. The jury apparently found plaintiffs testimony that he was not intoxicated and that the steering failed credible. This was corroborated by his brother's testimony. The policeman who investigated the accident made no note of any evidence of intoxication.
Reviewing the record of conflicting testimony of experts and witnesses in light of the foregoing, we cannot say that the jury's findings were manifestly erroneous/clearly wrong.
II. GENERAL MOTORS WAS NOT PREJUDICED
General Motors was not materially prejudiced when plaintiffs expert testified for the first time at trial that in addition to his theory that a crack in the spring of the rack and upinion assembly caused plaintiffs accident, it was also possible that the rack and pinion could have beconie temporarily disengaged. This second possibility had never been mentioned before the trial, in spite of the fact that the expert had been twice deposed.
One major purpose of discovery is .to prevent trial by ambush. This court will not allow a party to be prejudiced by last minute, surprise evidence to which that party is given no adequate opportunity to respond. In this case it does not appear that an ambush was intended. Additionally, General Motors was given an adequate opportunity to respond to the new theory. The trial court allowed General Motors three (3) days to prepare its cross-examination of plaintiffs expert, Mr. Mizen, with respect to the new theory. During this time, General Motors conducted tests using the already prepared exemplar vehicle in order to refute the testimony. General Motors already had an expert, Peter Rogousky, who was fully conversant with the technical workings of the rack and pinion steering gear. He demonstrated his opinion to the jury using a cut away of a rack and pinion steering gear. General Motors, as the manufacturer of the mechanism was certainly familiar with its mechanical structure and operation.
In denying General Motor's motion for a new trial the trial court found that "... defense counsel [General Motors] handled the trial skillfully and was not prejudiced by the second theory of Plaintiffs expert."
This is a close case, but the record is adequate to support this conclusion.
III. THE ADVERSE PRESUMPTION RULE DOES NOT APPLY
The Williams' damaged vehicle was taken to Jackie Rowan's Automotive Repair. An employee of the repair shop discarded the rack and pinion steering assembly. Mr. Williams, therefore, could not produce those parts at the trial in support of his claim that they were defective. General Motors asserts that Mr. Williams' failure to produce those parts in court creates a presumption that the evidence would have been unfavorable to Ms cause.
I ¡Where a litigant fails to produce evidence available to him and gives no reasonable explanation, the presumption is that the evidence would have been unfavorable to him. Boh Brothers Construction v. Luber-Finer, Inc., 612 So.2d 270 (La.App. 4 Cir.1992), and Wilson v. U.S. Fire and Casualty Company, 593 So.2d 695 (La.App. 4 Cir.1991).
The record supports Mr. Williams' contention that the part was inadvertently discarded when it was mistaken for scrap metal by an employee of Jackie Rowan's Automotive Repair Shop.
Therefore, Mr. Williams provided a reasonable explanation for his failure to produce the evidence in court and no such unfavorable presumption applied. Bourgeois v. Bill Watson's Investments, Inc., 458 So.2d 167 (La.App. 5 Cir.1984); Babineaux v. Black, 396 So.2d 584 (La.App. 3 Cir.1981).
It should be noted that the Boh Brothers case cited by General Motors followed and relied on the Bourgeois and Babineaux cases. The facts in Bourgeois are remarkably similar to the instant case, with the exception that in Bourgeois the plaintiff had to account for the disappearance of the entire automobile, not just a damaged part. The plaintiff explained that she had been required to sell her car to her insurance company in order to recover property damages. This was found to be an adequate explanation.
On the other hand in Boh Brothers the party litigant had custody of the item when it disappeared, no compelling reason to discard it, and knew of its importance. Contrariwise, in this case, the part in question was not in the custody of the plaintiff. Nothing in the record indicates that the part was lost due to the negligence or deliberate act of the plaintiff. It was in the custody of a third party repair shop which admitted responsibility for mistaking the rack and pinion steering gear for scrap metal and discarding it.
Moreover, in Boh Brothers the actual ruling of this Court was to set aside the jury verdict because the trial court failed to instruct the jury that the litigant could explain its failure to produce the missing item which is the reverse of the situation in the instant case. Boh Brothers does not support General Motors' position.
The case of Wilson v. U.S. Fire and Cas. Co., 593 So.2d 695 (La.App. 4 Cir.1991), also fails to support General Motors' position. In the Wilson case where a party failed to call a witness on his witness list, this Court found that:
1. As no jury instruction was requested on the issue, it could not be considered on appeal.
2. As both parties could have called the witness no presumption was created in favor of or against either party.
3. "The adverse presumption rule suggested by plaintiff must be tempered by the proposition that a party to a lawsuit need only to prove his case. If he does so by calling one or more witnesses to testify concerning an issue, he should not be penalized because he fails to call still another witness on the subject." Wilson, 593 So.2d 695, 700.
The record cannot support a finding that the missing part was in plaintiffs custody. Nor can it support a finding that the part was lost through any negligent or intentional act on the part of the plaintiff. Had the jury concluded otherwise it would have been manifestly erroneous/clearly wrong.
In view of the foregoing, if the failure of the trial judge to instruct the jury on the adverse presumption rule was error, it was harmless error.
IV. THE RECORD SUPPORTS THE AWARD FOR LOSS OF FUTURE EARNINGS
Plaintiff asserts that the testimony of his expert economist, Mr. Wolfson, that plaintiff had a loss of future earnings in the sum of $385,000 was uncontroverted. Therefore, the jury was clearly wrong in awarding the plaintiff only $100,000 for loss of future earnings. This Court does not agree.
It is well settled that an award of damages may not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion by the trier of fact. Coco v. Winston Industries, Inc., 341 So.2d 332 (La.1976); Reck v. Stevens, 373 So.2d 498 (La.1979). Furthermore, uncontradicted expert testimony regarding lost future income is not binding on the court. Matthias v. Brown, 551 So.2d 821 (La.App. 3 Cir.1989); Morvant v. Smith, 463 So.2d 75 (La.App. 3rd Cir.1985).
|7At the time of the accident at issue, Mr. Williams was employed as a safety specialist on oil rigs with ODECO. Thomas Round-tree, Personnel Specialist with ODECO, testified that ODECO, like other oil companies in Louisiana, suffered severe cutbacks in the late 1970's and 1980's causing ODECO to lay off numerous employees. Ultimately, ODE-CO ceased to exist as a separate entity in Louisiana and is now part of Diamond M in Houston, Texas.
Based on the testimony of Mr. Roundtree and the general knowledge of the deterioration of the Oil industry in Louisiana, the jury had a factual basis to discount the testimony of Mr. Wolfson. The plaintiffs compensation had been consistently declining in the years prior to the accident. The jury had ample factual evidence to conclude that Mr. Wolf-son's assumption regarding work life advancement and raises would not occur.
V. IT WAS ERROR TO AWARD FEES TO PLAINTIFF'S ATTORNEY OUT OF MURPHY'S RECOVERY
The jury returned a verdict in plaintiffs favor on October 22, 1992 in the amount of $1,197,000.00. By Amended Judgment, the Court awarded Murphy Oil $106,588.56 as reimbursement for medical expenses paid on behalf of or to plaintiff which funds were to be paid in preference from plaintiffs recovery of $197,000.00 for past medical expenses. The Court ordered Murphy Oil to pay $30,-000.00 in attorney's fees to plaintiffs counsel from its award for medical expenses paid. Additionally, the Court awarded $34,594.07 to Murphy Oil as reimbursement for the compensation payments paid to. plaintiff to be paid in preference from the $150,000.00 for past lost wages awarded to plaintiff. However, the Court awarded plaintiffs counsel $10,-000.00 as attorney's fees from Murphy's $34,-594.07 award. The trial court provided reasons for judgment concerning the awards of attorney's fees to be deducted from Murphy's awards on November 11, 1992.
It was error for the trial court to order Murphy Oil to pay attorney's fees to plaintiffs attorney. Murphy Oil was represented by its own attorney, not by plaintiffs counsel. The trial court's reliance on Moody v. Arabic, 498 So.2d 1081 (La.1986) is misplaced. In Moody the Supreme Court held that when an injured worker sues a third party in tort and that igworker's employer or his workers' compensation carrier intervenes for recoupment of workers' compensation paid to the worker, the employer or carrier is obliged to pay a portion of the attorney's fees of the worker if the worker succeeds in recovering funds from which the employer or carrier realize recoupment. The Supreme Court based this holding on its conclusion that under the Louisiana Worker's Compensation Act, La.R.S. 23:1021 et seq., the employer or compensation carrier is a co-owner with the injured worker "of a property right consisting of a right to recover damages from the third person." It is only this right of co-ownership which entitles the injured worker to recover attorney's fees from' the employer/eompensation carrier if the attorney for the worker is determined to have been responsible for securing the award from which the employer/compensation carrier recoups compensation payments.
Plaintiff in his brief acknowledges that Murphy's right of recovery is based on sub-rogation, not co-ownership. The recent effort of this Court to resist the expansion of Moody as expressed in Wiedemann & Fransen v. Highlands Ins., 617 So.2d 105 (La. App. 4 Cir.1993), writ denied 619 So.2d 552 (La.1993), is equally applicable to this Case:
"We agree with McLain v. Caddo Parish School Bd., 599 So.2d 878 (La.App. 2 Cir. 1992), writ denied, 605 So.2d 1123 (La.1992) where the court took the position that efforts to expand the scope of Moody v. Arabie, should be resisted.
It is clear that the lynehpin of Moody v. Arabie is co-ownership of a single property right.
Efforts to extend the rationale of Moody v. Arabie, to cases beyond recovery from a third party tort feasor by the employee or employer in a worker's compensation setting have been resisted." Id., 617 So.2d at 106.
This is consistent with the opinion of this Court in Charity Hosp. of Louisiana v. Band, 593 So.2d 1392 (La.App. 4 Cir.1992). In Charity Hosp. the attorney sought to apply his 40% contingent fee contract to funds recovered on behalf of his client, but which were subject to a privilege in favor of and owed to Charity Hospital. This Court made the following pronouncement:
loin Moody v. Arabie, supra, the issue was whether an employer (or its compensation insurer) was obligated to pay a portion of the employee's attorney fees in a third party tort suit. The Supreme Court concluded that since the employer had a preference up to the amount of the compensation paid, on the settlement and/or judgment proceeds in the employee's third party claim, each party (employer and employee) were co-owners in the litigious right. As co-owners each were responsible for their pro-rata share of the litigation costs, including attorney fees. Broussard v. Olin, supra [546 So.2d 1301], used the same rationale and reached the same conclusion.
We find Moody distinguishable from the instant case. Where an employee is injured by the tortious acts of a third party, either the employer who pays compensation or the employee, or both can file suit. La.R.S. 23:1102(A)(B). Thus by specific statute, the employer is granted a property right in the claim of the injured employee. In the instant case, Charity is the creditor of McCrimmons. Absent a legal or conventional subrogation by McCrimmons, Charity has no independent right to seek from the tortfeasor the medical expenses incurred by McCrimmons. The law (R.S. 9:4751, et seq.) only provides that Charity have a privilege on any funds received by McCrimmons from another person on account of the injuries. Charity Hosp. of Louisiana v. Band, 593 So.2d 1392 (La.App. 4 Cir.1992). (Emphasis added).
Thus, in Charity Hosp. this Court pointed to the aggregation of the following factors which the Supreme Court considered in arriving at its conclusion in the Moody ease:
1. Either the employer/compensation carrier or the injured employee, or both can file suit.
2. The employer/compensation carrier had a preference up to the amount of compensation paid, on the settlement and/or judgment proceeds in the employee's third party claim.
3. The existence of a specific statute, LSA-R.S. 23:1102(A)(B), which establishes the first two rights.
4. The parties have co-ownership of a litigious right.
Such an aggregation of factors does not exist in the instant case.
Miguez and Leckband v. Holston's Ambulance, 614 So.2d 150 (La.App. 3 Cir.1993), is inapposite. In Miguez there was no issue of co-ownership. In Miguez the attorneys for the injured worker obtained judgment proceeds in the amount of $11,970. Holston's Ambulance, a health care provider, claimed the entire proceeds of the judgment leaving nothing for the attorneys who obtained the proceeds. The court simply held that the privilege for attorneys fees provided by LSA-R.S. 9:5001 "primes the privilege set forth in | mLSA-R.S. 9:4752 for medical providers." This only becomes an issue where the proceeds of the judgment are inadequate to reimburse the health care provider and pay the attorney's contractual contingent fee. That is not a problem in the instant case. Mr. Bruno does not argue that the balance of the proceeds from this judgment after reimbursement is made to Murphy will be inadequate to pay his fee. In effect, Miguez is nothing more than a "ranking of liens" case.
Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. v. Sonnier, 406 So.2d 178 (La.1981), is also distinguishable. There was no issue of attorney's fees. In Southern Farm Bureau the parents of the decedent obtained a judgment of $103,-160 against the railroad tort-feasor. (See the appellate opinion, 396 So.2d 996, 997.) After obtaining the judgment for $103,160, the parents of the decedent agreed to settle with the tort-feasor for $90,000. Seven days after the settlement Southern Farm Bureau Casualty Insurance sued the decedent's parents for the $2758.40 it had paid them for their son's funeral expenses, "alleging the settlement destroyed its conventional subrogation under the policy against the railroad in violation of the policy provisions."
The Supreme Court held that the insurance company had only a right of partial subrogation to its insured's claim against the tort-feasor to the extent of the $2758.40 it had payed for funeral expenses. Because the $90,000 obtained in settlement was only part of what the parents were entitled to under the judgment, i.e., $103,160, they were entitled to preference for the balance of their claim against the tort-feasor:
Nevertheless, subrogation cannot injure the creditor, since, if he has been paid but in part, he may exercise his right for what remains due, in preference to him from whom he has received only a partial payment. La.C.C. art. 2162. Thus, when the creditor has received from the subrogee a partial payment only, the credit is divided between them; the original creditor remains creditor for the unpaid portion and the subrogee becomes creditor to the extent of the payment he had made. Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. v. Sonnier, 406 So.2d at 180.
I iiWhat the Supreme Court meant in Southern Farm Bureau was that the decedent's parents were entitled to a preference over the insurance company on all sums recovered from the tort-feasor until they were paid $100,401.60, i.e., the $103,160.00 amount they were awarded in the judgment less the $2,758.40 to which the insurance company was subrogated. Therefore, when the decedent's parents settled for $90,000 they ended up with $10,401.60 less from the tort-feasor than the amount to which they were entitled to recover in preference to the insurance company.
Plaintiff argues that Southern Farm stands for the proposition that Murphy's recovery as subrogee must be reduced by the amount of the attorney's fees plaintiffs attorney charges him on the portion awarded to Murphy based on the Supreme Court's pronouncement that "... the subrogee can only claim that which remains after the subrogor has been paid." Southern Farm, Bureau Cas. Ins. v. Sonnier, 406 So.2d 178, 180.
If plaintiffs subrogation argument were carried to its logical conclusion, Mr. Williams would be entitled to a dollar for dollar reduction of what he owed to Murphy for every dollar he owed to his attorneys, leaving nothing to Murphy. This is clearly not what was intended by the Supreme Court in Southern Farm Bureau. That case stands only for the proposition that the recovery of a partial subrogee of the injured party (Murphy in the instant case) may be reduced by an amount equal to the difference between what the injured party actually collécts from the tori-feasor and what the injured party was entitled to collect from the tort-feasor. It is the amount recovered from the tort-feasor that determines what the partial subrogee is entitled to, not the amount the injured party nets after various ¡^expenses, such as attorney's fees. Plaintiff acknowledges in his brief that "he recovered the full amount of his past wages and medical expenses from the Judgment."
Plaintiff has failed to cite any authority that would support his contention that he is entitled to deduct attorney's fees from the portion paid to Murphy based on a theory of quantum meruit. The cases cited by plaintiff, Succession of Butler, 294 So.2d 512 (La.1974), and Oppenheim v. Bouterie, 505 So.2d 100 (La.App. 4 Cir.1987), have no bearing on this case.
In Succession of Butler an attorney was seeking to enforce a contingency fee contract for approximately $72,000 against his own client. In that case the court held that the contingency fee contract was contra bonos mores and, therefore, unenforceable. However, the court allowed the attorney to recover fees from his client on a quantum meruit basis in the much lesser sum of $25,000, recognizing that a true attorney-client relationship existed.
In Oppenheim v. Bouterie, 505 So.2d 100 (La.App. 4 Cir.1987) this Court quoted the case of Guillory v. Guillory, 339 So.2d 529, 581 (La.App. 4 Cir.1976) to the effect that "... attorney's fees incurred by the wife in prosecuting a suit for separation from bed and board or divorce is an obligation of the community which . must be paid out of community assets on a quantum meruit basis.... " The application of community property law to a claim for attorney's fees is irrelevant to Mr. Williams' claim for attorney's fees from an unrelated third party. If there is any analogy to be drawn, it would be to the language of this Court from Guillory that was omitted by the ellipsis at the end of the quotation above where this Court went on to finish that sentence by stating that:
"... but if there are no community assets, there is no liability on the part of the husband separately for such fees." [Emphasis added]. Guillory, 339 So.2d at 531.
In Moody v. Arabie, 498 So.2d 1081 (La.1986) the Supreme Court stated:
"The trial court held that the worker's attorney was entitled under his contingency fee contract with the worker to collect one third of the gross recovery because La.R.S. 9:5001 grants an attorney a first privilege on a judgment obtained by him and on property recovered thereby. The Court of Appeal reversed, holding that because the employer was not a party to or a debtor under the contingent fee contract the accessory right of privilege established by La.R.S. 9:5001 h%could not affect proceeds due to the employer under the judgment. j.85 So.2d 660. We agree %vith and affirm that part of the CouH of Appeal judgment." (Emphasis added) Id. at p. 1083.
Our holding in this case is consistent with Moody. The trial court erroneously awarded attorney's fees out of Murphy's recovery for reimbursement for plaintiffs medical expenses and lost past wages.
VI. PRUDENTIAL IS ENTITLED TO BE REIMBURSED FOR PROPERTY DAMAGE PAYMENTS
Donald Williams, plaintiffs brother, was a passenger in the'Vehicle at the time of the accident. Donald Williams filed suit against Prudential Property & Casualty Insurance Company as the liability insurer of Betty Williams, plaintiffs wife, in whose name the defective Buick was registered. Prior to trial Prudential settled Donald Williams' bodily injury claim for $5,925.00. Prudential filed a cross-claim against General Motors seeking reimbursement of the $5,925.00 it paid to Donald Williams as well as $5,278.73 it paid to Ronald and Betty Williams under the collision portion of the policy it had issued to Betty Williams.
In support of its cross-claim for reimbursement for property damage Prudential introduced a copy of the damage estimate and the testimony of Gill Chisholm, an ex-Prudential employee who testified regarding the estimate and amount of property damages paid to Ronald and Billy Williams.
Prudential was dismissed as a party defendant by way of directed verdict. That decision is not challenged on this appeal. In its judgment in favor of Ronald Williams and against General Motors Corporation the court also awarded Prudential $5,000 on its third party demand/cross claim against General Motors. Prudential filed a Motion to Amend the Judgment, and the trial court amended the judgment, increasing the award in favor of | ^Prudential to $5,925.00, the exact amount Prudential paid to Donald Williams in settlement of his bodily injury claim.
Prudential contends that in spite of having introduced sufficient uncontroverted evidence at the trial to support its additional claim of $5,278.73 for property damage reimbursement, the trial court judgment is silent on the matter. The record supports this contention. This Court accepts Prudential's explanation that there was an inadvertent oversight on the part of the trial court.
DECREE
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial court is amended to award the sum of $5,278.73 in favor of Prudential Property & Casualty Insurance Company and against General Motors Corporation, said $5,278.73 to be in addition to the sum of $5,925.00 already awarded to Prudential by the judgment of the trial court.
The deduction by the trial court of $40,000 in attorney's fees in favor of plaintiffs attorney, Stephen Bruno, Esq. from the sums awarded to Murphy Exploration and Production Company as reimbursement is reversed.
The balance of the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
AFFIRMED IN PART;
AMENDED IN PART;
AND REVERSED IN PART.
LOBRANO, J., concurs.
WARD and PLOTKIN, JJ., dissent.
. In the instant case the subrogee, Murphy, intervened in the tort suit to protect its claim. In Southern Farm the subrogee insurance company failed to intervene. It did not file suit until after the entire tort litigation had been disposed of.
. The effect of partial subrogation is more easily understood if round numbers are used. Assume that it has been determined that an injured worker has a right to recover $100,000 from a tortfea-sor. Assume that a third party has advanced $10,000 to the injured worker which should be applied to the $100,000 claim entitling that third party to a right of subrogation against the tort-feasor. As the amount advanced by the third' party is less than the full amount of the claim, i.e., there is still a $90,000 balance due the plaintiff, the third party has a right of partial subrogation only. This means that the injured worker is entitled to recover the full $90,000 balance still due him from the tortfeasor in preference to the partial subrogee before the partial subrogee may assert his subrogation against the tortfeasor. In other words, in this hypothetical case the partial subrogee's subrogation claim is deferred to the last $10,000 to be collected from the tortfeasor, not the first.