Case Name: Antonio Guliano, Resp't, v. John H. Whitenack, App'lt
Court: New York Court of Common Pleas
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1894-06-04
Citations: 59 N.Y. St. Rep. 738
Docket Number: 
Parties: Antonio Guliano, Resp’t, v. John H. Whitenack, App’lt.
Judges: 
Reporter: New York State Reporter
Volume: 59
Pages: 738–741

Head Matter:
Antonio Guliano, Resp’t, v. John H. Whitenack, App’lt.
(New York Common Pleas, General Term,
Filed June 4, 1894.)
Negligence—Question eor jury.
In an action for negligence, if there is any doubt as to the facts established by the evidence, or as to the inferences from the facts, the case must go to the jury.
Appeal from judgment on verdict and order denying new trial. The opinion gives the case.
J. Hampdon Dougherty, for app’lt; Joseph Wamsley, for resp’t.

Opinion:
Pryor, J.
In connection with a building he was erecting, the defendant constructed an oven, intp which, when it was about completed, he directed the plaintiff to enter for the purpose of cleaning out the sand. It collapsed and crushed the plaintiff; and for the injury so sustained he prosecutes the action. With seeming confidence the defendant imputes error to the court in refusing to dismiss the complaint. But, upon what ground ? Surely not because the proof of his negligence was insufficient to carry the case to the jury. Not such was counsel's opinion on the development of the evidence at the trial. For, he then said: "It would be a question for the jury whether it was a negligent construction or not, connecting the oven with the post that caused this oscillation." And, indeed, defendant's own testimony left no alternative but to submit the issue to the jury. He disclosed the agency by which the oven collapsed, saying, " The cause of the break, to the best of my knowledge, was the post of the elevated railroad standing against the corner of the oven and shaking it; all the stones shook on to it." And again, "Its giving way I could only attribute to two things; one was the cement and plaster was no good, and the other was that hammering of the post." The defendant had been working there before the oven was built; and he confessed that "During that time I felt the vibration; the vibration of the elevated railroad; but did not think there was enough to do any harm. I subsequently found that it did." And yet with this knowledge of the vibration of the pillar, he so placed the oven that it was " hammered ' to pieces. Obvious and easy was the escape from the peril of which plaintiff was the victim. When the oven was rebuilt "it was rebuilt so that it did not touch the post, with a short interval between." Thus, that the caving-in of the oven was the effect of its ill construction, the defendant concedes. And that its bad construction was the result of negligence, is equally apparent on his testimony. For, what man of ordinary prudence, aware of the vibration of the pillar under the incessant movement of the trains, would have so placed the oven as to subject it to the impact of the disintegrating agency? That the consequence was within the range of reasonable apprehension, and might have been averted by the slightest effort, it is idle to gainsay.
Beyond, all question the evidence required the submission of the issue upon defendant's negligency, to the jury, and is sufficient to sustain their verdict. " If there is any doubt, however slight, either as to what facts of negligence are established by the evidence, or as to the conclusion in respect to the fact of negligence that may be drawn legitimately from the circumstances proved by the average of men of common sense, ordinary experience, and fair intentions, the case should not be taken from the jury." Bills v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. R. Co., 84 N. Y. 5, 10. Nor, may we, upon our estimate of the probative force of the evidence, so encroach on the function of the jury as to nullify a verdict not manifestly destitute of support Nelson v. E. & A. R. R. Co., 7 Misc. 656; 58 St. Rep. 384. Equally untenable is the position that no proof was given of plaintiff's freedom from contributory negligence. He was a common laborer, not a mason or a brick-layer, and he had done no work on the oven. Thus ignorant of its insecurity, he was ordered into it by the defendant; and obedience to the command of his master absolved him from the imputation of negligence, Kranz v. L. 1. R. R. Co., 123 N. Y. 1, 5; 38 St. Rep 46; Doyle v. Baird, 15 Daly, 287, 289; 25 St. Rep. 749; Stuber v. McEntee, 58 St. Rep. 455, 457; Connolly v. Poillon, 41 Barb. 366. The record discloses no error, and the judgment should stand.
Judgment and order affirmed, with costs. Bischoff, J., concurs.