Case Name: In the Matter of The Petition for REINSTATEMENT To The Practice of Law OF Thomas Eddy PARSONS
Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Mississippi
Decision Date: 2003-08-21
Citations: 890 So. 2d 40
Docket Number: No. 2001-BR-01533-SCT
Parties: In the Matter of The Petition for REINSTATEMENT To The Practice of Law OF Thomas Eddy PARSONS.
Judges: PITTMAN, C.J., SMITH, P.J., COBB AND CARLSON, JJ., CONCUR. EASLEY AND GRAVES, JJ., DISSENT WITHOUT SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION. McRAE, P.J., DISSENTS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION JOINED IN PART BY EASLEY, J. DIAZ, J., NOT PARTICIPATING.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 890
Pages: 40–56

Head Matter:
In the Matter of The Petition for REINSTATEMENT To The Practice of Law OF Thomas Eddy PARSONS.
No. 2001-BR-01533-SCT.
Supreme Court of Mississippi.
Aug. 21, 2003.
Albert Necaise, Tadd Parsons, Wiggins, for appellant.
Michael B. Martz, attorney for appellee.

Opinion:
WALLER, Justice, for the Court.
¶ 1. The petition of Thomas Eddy Parsons to be reinstated to the practice of law is again before us for consideration after we referred the petition to a special master pursuant to Rule 3 of the Rules of Discipline for the Mississippi State Bar. In re Petition for Reinstatement of Parsons, 849 So.2d 852 (Miss.2002) ("Eddy Parsons I "). While appreciative of the conclusions and recommendation of the able special master, we nonetheless deny Parsons's petition for reinstatement given the testimony adduced at the hearing that Parsons engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶ 2. The following is the factual background from Eddy Parsons I:
Parsons was disbarred by agreed order of disbarment on June 13, 1996, after he was convicted of two felonies in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi. Miss. Bar v. Parsons, 677 So.2d 192 (Miss.1996). The first conviction was based on one count of conspiring to possess with intent to distribute cocaine and five counts of possession with intent to distribute cocaine. Parsons was sentenced to 98 months imprisonment on each count with all sentences running concurrently. The second conviction was based on a guilty plea entered for enticing an individual to travel in interstate commerce for the purposes of prostitution in violation of the Mann Act. Parsons was sentenced to 60 months running concurrently with the 98-month drug convictions and fined $5,000. The overall sentence was later reduced to 80 months. After serving nearly six years (59/6 months) in prison, he was released and placed on five years supervised and reporting probation and ordered to serve 200 hours of community service. Parsons's probation was originally scheduled to end on June 5, 2005, but it has since been terminated thirty-seven months early on April '30, 2002, by the federal court.
849 So.2d at 853.
¶ 3. Parsons filed his petition for reinstatement after the termination of his probation. Noting the divergence and seeming inconsistency in the case law regarding the reinstatement of attorneys disbarred for drug convictions, we referred Parsons's petition to a special master to assess the extent of his rehabilitation. Id. at 855. We appointed the Honorable Norman L. Gillespie, now a retired chancellor, to serve as special master.
¶ 4. Prior to the hearing, general counsel for the Bar, Michael B. Martz, wrote Jack Parsons and Tadd Parsons, Eddy Parsons's father and brother, respectively, and both members of the Bar, that it had come to the Bar's attention that Eddy Parsons may have been employed in their law office.
¶ 5. It was undisputed that Eddy Parsons maintained an office in the same building as the law office occupied by his father and brother. Out of this same building, Eddy Parsons owned and operated E-Z Disposal, a waste disposal company that provided dumpsters for contractors at construction sites.
¶ 6. The November 8, 2002, hearing for the most part concentrated on determining whether Eddy Parsons engaged in the unauthorized practice of law while disbarred rather than on whether he was worthy of reinstatement from a moral and character standpoint. The Bar presented three witnesses, former secretaries of the Parsons Law Firm, who testified as to Eddy Parsons's involvement in his father's and brother's law practices.
¶ 7. Rhona Saucier was employed by the Parsons Law Firm as a secretary for approximately seven months in 2002. She performed general secretarial work and stated that Eddy Parsons dictated tapes for cases being handled by the firm and would indicate whose signature, be it his father's or brother's, should go on the document. Saucier also noted that Eddy Parsons was in the office "|j]ust about every day" and that Eddy Parsons signed his brother's name to pleadings and discovery on a couple of occasions. Also, she testified that clients' telephone calls would be sent to Eddy Parsons and that he would request law firm files so that he could discuss their cases with them.
¶ 8. Victoria Herrington was employed by the Parsons Law Firm as a secretary as well for approximately eight months. Her testimony was consistent with that of Saucier. Herrington testified that she transcribed tapes from Eddy Parsons for active client files and that he would indicate whose signature belonged on a particular document. She would also transfer client telephone calls to Eddy Parsons. Herrington also noted that Eddy Parsons moved into an office closer to those occupied by his family's law firm where he met with clients.
¶ 9. The Bar's final witness was Stephanie Evans, another former secretary of the Parsons Law Firm. She also transcribed tapes dictated by Eddy Parsons and noted that he had met with clients.
¶ 10. At the close of the Bar's case, Judge Gillespie recessed the hearing until November 22, 2002, to allow Eddy Parsons to present witnesses in rebuttal to the Bar's assertion that he had engaged in the unauthorized practice of law. Sandy Scarborough, a client of the Parsons Law Firm, testified that in her dealings with the firm and to her knowledge, Eddy Parsons never gave her legal advice or worked on her case. Jimmy Scott, another client, testified to the same effect. Buster Shaw, a long-time client, frequently used the firm for work in conjunction with his real estate development business and also testified that, in his extensive dealings with the firm, Eddy Parsons never prepared a title opinion or performed any legal services for him. Eddy Parsons himself also testified that, among other things, he never signed his brother's name to any pleadings or other legal documents.
¶ 11. In his final report and recommendation, Judge Gillespie ably discussed the circumstances leading to Eddy Parsons's disbarment and the extent of Eddy Parsons's rehabilitation since his release from prison. He concluded that Eddy Parsons had sufficiently demonstrated his rehabilitation in conduct and moral character and recommended that Eddy Parsons be reinstated to the practice of law.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶ 12. We retain exclusive jurisdiction over matters of attorney discipline and reinstatement. Rules of Discipline for the Miss. State Bar Rule 1(a). Attorneys' petitions for reinstatement are reviewed under the de novo standard. In re Baker, 649 So.2d 850, 852 (Miss.1995). We likewise sit as the trier of fact and are not bound by any substantial evidence or manifest error rule. Id.
DISCUSSION
¶ 13. Judge Gillespie ultimately recommended that Eddy Parsons be reinstated to the practice of law upon his passage of the Mississippi Bar Examination. On the issue of unauthorized practice of law, he noted that we reinstated Michael Holleman who, at the time of his petition and reinstatement, was employed as a paralegal in Louisiana. In re Holleman, 826 So.2d 1243 (Miss.2002).
¶ 14. He also noted our resolution of a petitioner's potential unauthorized practice with respect to Ethics Opinion No. 96 in Williams v. Miss. State Bar Ass'n, 492 So.2d 578 (Miss.1986). In Williams, the petitioner was disbarred after pleading guilty to two drug charges. 492 So.2d at 578. In 1981, a Meridian attorney sponsored Williams's work release and employed Williams in his firm as a paralegal, law clerk, and secretary. Id. After filing his petition, Williams became aware of Ethics Opinion No. 96 but was not working for another attorney at the time. 492 So.2d at 579. He never accepted employment with an attorney subsequent thereto. Id.
¶ 15. With respect to Ethics Opinion No. 96, we held:
[Retired] Justice Sugg [, the special master,] did not express an opinion on this issue, but recommended that this Court should write with reference to Ethics Opinion No. 96, which held that an attorney should not employ a disbarred or suspended attorney to work in his office. The issue is not properly before the Court at this time, since neither Williams nor his former employer, Roy Pitts, were disciplined for failure to abide by this Opinion. Therefore, we will reserve judgment on the matter until properly presented to the Court.
492 So.2d at 581.
¶ 16. Judge Gillespie likewise opined that the issue of Parsons's unauthorized practice may not be properly before this Court. Relying on Williams alone, such a conclusion is technically correct but discounts Ethics Opinion No. 171 which was rendered subsequent to Williams on June 22, 1990, and provides: "It is not proper for a disbarred attorney, whose license to practice law has been reinstated conditioned on passing the bar examination and multi-state professional responsibility examination, to be employed as a clerk or paralegal until all requirements for reinstatement are met." We find that the issue of a disbarred or suspended attorney's unauthorized practice of law is a matter to be inquired into in reinstatement proceedings since such activity evidences a disregard of and contempt for the order of disbarment or suspension.
¶ 17. Judge Gillespie noted the inconsistency of Ethics Opinion Nos. 96 and 171 with In re Holleman, 826 So.2d 1243 (Miss.2002). Michael Holleman was disbarred after being convicted of felony possession of child pornography. Id. at 1244. Subsequent to his release from custody, Holleman obtained employment with a Baton Rouge, Louisiana, law firm as a paralegal earning $60,000 per year. Id. at 1245. In assessing Holleman's worthiness to be reinstated, we cited his employment as a paralegal as a mitigating factor. Id. at 1247. We ultimately reinstated Holleman unanimously. Id. at 1249.
¶ 18. While Holleman was ostensibly in violation of Ethics Opinion No. 171, the facts of that case are nonetheless distinguishable from those in the instant case. Holleman obtained employment in Louisiana, and there was no indication that he ever maintained ties with his former practice in Mississippi. On the other hand, Eddy Parsons maintained an office with his father, with whom he practiced until his disbarment, and his brother who was subsequently admitted to the Bar. Maintaining an office with a former partner could lead to the temptation to assist in legal work although Eddy Parsons contends he only used his office to run his disposal business and participate in the family corporations. See David Rand, Jr., Annotation, Nature of Legal Services or Law-Related Services Which May Be Performed for Others by Disbarred or Suspended Attorney, 87 A.L.R.3d 279, 1978 WL 43146 (1978 & Supp.2002) (outlining disbarred attorney's permitted and proscribed activities from research and investigation to appearing in judicial proceedings). The Bar presented credible evidence, as outlined above, that Eddy Parsons did in fact perform proscribed wdrk such as dictating letters and pleadings, signing his brother's name to documents, and meeting with clients. While this certainly is work paralegals do on a customary basis, Parsons was less than forthcoming about the extent of his "legal work," and within the setting of his old law firm there is, at a minimum, the appearance of the practice of law in contravention of our order of disbarment.
¶ 19. These close ties with a former practice were addressed by the Supreme Court of Oregon in the case of In re Kraus, 295 Or. 743, 670 P.2d 1012 (1983). Kraus had been suspended from the practice of law for one year and had applied for reinstatement. Id. at 1012. The Oregon State Bar opposed Kraus's reinstatement, alleging he had engaged in the unlawful practice of law by continuing to meet with and advise clients, negotiate with adverse parties on behalf of former clients, by arranging appointments and keeping regular office hours, and failing to remove his office sign. Id. at 1013. In denying Kraus's petition for reinstatement, the court held:
We recognize Mr. Kraus's difficulty in disassociating himself from the office when his wife remained an employee and she continued to have contact with his former clients. And the geographical proximity of his home to the office made it more difficult to break old habits. However, we find from the evidence that petitioner deliberately placed himself in a position where he was likely to come in contact with his former clients and the clients of Mr. Boland [an attorney renting space].
Id. at 1015 (emphasis' added). Kraus, like Eddy Parsons, testified that he used one of the offices. On this point, the court held:
Continued occupancy in one's law office after being suspended from practicing law can well give 'the appearance of practicing law. We are not prepared to say that a suspended attorney may never use his office, for this, standing alone, does not indicate the continued practice of law. If all other precautions we have set out above are taken and if the suspended attorney consciously avoids contact with former clients or clients of other attorneys in the office there may be no harm in using the office for other purposes. That does not appear, however, to have been the case here.
Id. at 10Í7 (emphasis added).
¶ 20. In the instant case, Eddy Parsons testified that he met with his father's and brother's clients while they were waiting for their attorney but contends he never rendered legal advice. Three former secretaries of the Parsons Law Firm testified that they transcribed tapes dictated by Eddy Parsons for active firm clients. Saucier and Herrington testified that Eddy Parsons took phone calls from active clients. Herrington further testified that during her tenure as secretary, Eddy Parsons moved into an office closer to those of his father and brother.
¶ 21. At the very least, Eddy Parsons should have kept his office separate and distinct from the offices of his father and brother and from their law practice. Continuing to do what is at the very least the appearance of law practice in his old office with current and former clients makes a mockery of the disbarment. There was evidence that Eddy Parsons maintained numerous commercial properties such as a hotel and shopping center, so he easily could have maintained an office elsewhere. Eddy Parsons's actions reflected a disregard of the consequences that come with disbarment.
¶ 22. The Mississippi Bar Ethics Committee quoted In re Kuta, 86 Ill.2d 154, 56 Ill.Dec. 56, 427 N.E.2d 136 (1981), in Ethics Opinion No. 96 to support the austere proposition that under no circumstances can a suspended or disbarred attorney serve as a law clerk or paralegal. We find that the rule in Kuta is the minority position and that the standard expressed by the Supreme Court of Kansas to be the more prudent approach. In re Wilkinson, 251 Kan. 546, 834 P.2d 1356, 1362 (1992), allows disbarred or suspended lawyers to be employed as law clerks and paralegals under certain stringent guidelines:
The consensus is that an attorney suspended from the practice of law may obtain employment as a law clerk, providing there are certain limitations upon the suspended attorney's activities. Regarding limitations, toe are persuaded the better rule is that an attorney toho has been disbarred or suspended from the practice of law is permitted to toork as a lato clerk, investigator, paralegal, or in any capacity as a lay person for a licensed attorney-employer if the suspended lawyer's functions are limited exclusively to work of a preparatory nature under the supervision of a licensed attorney-employer and does not involve client contact. Any contact with a client is prohibited. Although not an inclusive list, the following restrictions apply: a suspended or disbarred lawyer may not be present during conferences with clients, talk to clients either directly or on the telephone, sign correspondence to them, or contact them either directly or indirectly.
(emphasis added). See also In re Mitchell, 901 F.2d 1179 (3d Cir.1990) (allowing attorney suspended from court of appeals to be employed as a law clerk); In re Mekler, 672 A.2d 23 (Del.1995); State ex rel. Oregon State Bar v. Lenske, 284 Or. 23, 584 P.2d 759 (1978). We find this to be the better standard given the requirement for reinstatement that the disbarred attorney have the "requisite . legal learning to be reinstated to the privilege of practicing law." Rules of Discipline for the Miss. State Bar Rule 12.7. We adopt this standard here, for such carefully restricted employment would undoubtedly contribute to the disbarred attorney's rehabilitation. We further find no circumstances where it would be appropriate for a disbarred lawyer to work in his former office, for his former firm, with his former partners and associates or on files of former clients. We likewise believe public service is preferred, such as working in a legal services office. Under these restrictions we find that the public will be protected since the disbarred attorney must be under the supervision of an attorney in good standing, will have no contact, whether directly or indirectly, with clients and will be totally separated from his prior law practice.
¶ 23. Presiding Justice McRae, in his dissent, accuses us of retracting a long line of cases supposedly condoning the type of conduct upon which our denial of Parsons's petition is based. There is no long line of cases, and the issue of a disbarred lawyer working in a law office has never been directly addressed. In this opinion we modify the blanket prohibition, but proscribe disbarred attorneys from meeting with clients and maintaining an office where he maintained his former practice. In Holleman, Williams, and In re Nixon, 618 So.2d 1283 (Miss.1993), the disbarred attorneys obtained employment separate and apart from their former practices. The dissent finally asserts that we placed "much emphasis" on the number of drug convictions as a basis for our denying readmission of Parsons. First, neither this opinion nor Parsons I places an emphasis on the number of drug offenses other than to give a factual background, and second, Parsons only pled guilty to the Mann Act charge; a jury found him guilty of the drug charges.
CONCLUSION
¶ 24. We find that the unauthorized practice of law is a proper matter to be raised in opposition to a disbarred attorney's reinstatement efforts. We deny the petition for reinstatement to the practice of law of Thomas Eddy Parsons. Thomas Eddy Parsons will be ineligible to file another petition for reinstatement until one year from the date of this opinion. Rules of Discipline for the Miss. State Bar Rule 12.6.
¶ 25. PETITION FOR REINSTATEMENT DENIED.
PITTMAN, C.J., SMITH, P.J., COBB AND CARLSON, JJ., CONCUR. EASLEY AND GRAVES, JJ., DISSENT WITHOUT SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION. McRAE, P.J., DISSENTS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION JOINED IN PART BY EASLEY, J. DIAZ, J., NOT PARTICIPATING.
. Ethics Opinion No. 96, rendered June 7, 1984, provides: "It is not proper for an attorney to allow a disbarred or suspended attorney to work as a paralegal or legal assistant in the attorney's law office."
. It is worth noting that the Bar supported Holleman's petition for reinstatement, and the opinion reinstating him never mentioned Ethics Opinion Nos. 96 and 171.
. There was also testimony that Eddy Parsons was consulted regarding business and legal strategies to be taken by the corporations of which he was a shareholder and drafted deeds in conjunction therewith. Such activities are not problematical because the unauthorized practice of law statute, Miss.Code Ann. § 73-3-55 (2000 & Supp.2002), excepts from the definition work performed for one's self or "in which he may own an interest."
. For example, Herrington testified that Eddy Parsons instructed her in the presence of the client to make a change to a warranty deed. The client, Buster Shaw, contradicted the tone of the exchange but not the fact that Eddy Parsons met and discussed firm business with an active client.
. The Bar could have also sought to have Parsons found in contempt of the disbarment order. Rules of Discipline for the Miss. State Bar Rule 11(e).