Case Name: THOMAS M. TYNG, Plaintiff, v. LEMUEL B. CLARKE, Defendant
Court: New York Supreme Court, General Term
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1876-12
Citations: 16 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 269
Docket Number: 
Parties: THOMAS M. TYNG, Plaintiff, v. LEMUEL B. CLARKE, Defendant.
Judges: 
Reporter: Supreme Court Reports (Hun)
Volume: 16
Pages: 269–277

Head Matter:
THOMAS M. TYNG, Plaintiff, v. LEMUEL B. CLARKE, Defendant.
Judgment in favor of corporation — operates as an estoppel, in action against its trustees because of failure to file annual report.
This action, was brought to charge the defendant, as a trustee of a corporation, for a debt due therefrom, on the ground that no report had been filed as required by law. Upon the trial the defendant gave in evidence against plaintiff’s objection and exception, a judgment roll in an action by the plaintiff against the corporation to recover the same debt, in which a judgment was rendered for the corporation upon the merits. Held, that the judgment roll was properly received, and that it was conclusive against the plaintiff’s right to recover in this action, (Daniels, J., dissenting.)
MotioN for a new trial, on exceptions ordered to be beard in the first instance at the General Term, after an order dismissing the complaint herein.
This action was brought to charge the defendant, as a trustee of the United States Submarine and Torpedo Boat Company, with individual responsibility for a debt of that company, on the ground that said company did not, within twenty days from the 1st day of January, 1870 and 1871, make, file and publish the report required to be so made, filed and published by section 12 of the general manufacturing act of 1848, under which the said company was organized.
The answer concedes all the facts except the existence of the indebtedness of the company.
On the trial of the action at Circuit, after the counsel for the plaintiff had opened to the jury, and before he could introduce any evidence to prove his case, the counsel for the defendant offered in evidence, on the part of the defendant, a judgment roll in an action in which this plaintiff sued the said company for the. same debt as is involved in this suit, and in which the complaint was dismissed with costs.
Counsel for the plaintiff objected to the admission in evidence of the judgment roll on the following grounds:
First. That it was not an adjudication between the same parties, and therefore incompetent as an estoppel against the plaintiff in the present action.
Second. That it was not offered at the proper time, it being an affirmative defense set up in the answer; and that the plaintiff was entitled to proceed with his evidence and develop his entire case, before the defendant was at liberty to offer any evidence.
Third. That it was not such a judgment upon the merits of the issues involved, as would be a bar to another action for the same debt between the same parties.
Counsel for the defendant then moved upon the judgment roll, thus -admitted, to dismiss the complaint, which motion was granted, and the plaintiff duly excepted.
The exceptions were ordered to be heard at the General Term in the first instance, and the entry of judgment was in the mean time suspended.
Thomas M. Tyng, plaintiff, in person.
The judgment roll was not admissible as evidence in this action, in favor of the defendant Clarke, because it was not an adjudication between the same parties or their privies. {Goddcvrd v. Benson, 15 Abb., 191; Atlcmtio Dock Go. v. The Ma/yor, 53 N. Y., 61; Booth v. Powers, 56 id., 22; Stowell v. Ghamberlavn, 60 id., 272; Kent v. Kent, 62 id., 560, 566; Miller v. White, 50 id., 132.) In all actions at law the party holding the affirmative of the issue has the absolute vested -right to open and close the action. "While it is somewhat within the discretion of the court to control the order of proof, it is not within its discretion to tolerate such an irruption upon the plaintiff’s rights as was here permitted. (Millwrd v. Thorn, 56 N. Y., 402; Lmdsley v. Petroleum Go., 10 Abb. [N.- S.], 107.) The former adjudication was simply a dismissal of the complaint, and therefore would not have been an estoppel in a subsequent suit against the company for the same cause of action. ( Wheeler v. Buckman, 51 N. Y., 391.)
Fithicm <& Clark, for the defendant.
The judgment is final and a bar to this suit. (Dexter v. Broat, 16 Barb., 337; Embury v. Gonnor, 3 Comst., 512; Burr v. Bigler, 16 Abb., 177; Bruce v. Howes, 2 Barb., 586, 596, 597.) It is conclusive in this suit on the plaintiff as to all the facts adjudged. (Graig v. Ward, 3 Abb. [N. S.], 235; Doty v. Brown, 4 Comst., 71; Oastle v. Noyes, 14 N. Y., 329, 331; Dema/rest v. Darg, 32 id., 281; Bouchaud v. Dias, 3 Den., 238; O'Brien v. Browning, 49 How., 109 ; Bush v. Knox, 2 Hun, 576.) The cause of action in this suit is different from the .cause of action in the suit against the company, but the determination in that suit is conclusive because the same question was determined there on which this suit depends. (Doty v. Brown, 4 Comst., 75; Goddard v. Benson, 15 Abb., 193.) The matter which the plaintiff now attempts to agitate is res adjudicata. (The People v. Stephens, Gale et al., N. Y. Weekly Digest, July 20,1876, p. 518; Lawrence v. Hunt, 10 Wend., 81; Bates v. Stanton, 1 Duer, 79 ; Green v. Glarke, 12 N. Y., 343; Thomas v. Hubbell, 18 Barb., 9 ; Banjmond v. Howla/nd, 12 Wend., 176; Boynton v. Willard, 10 Pick., 166, 168; Dexter v. Broat, 16 Barb:, 337.)

Opinion:
Beady, J.:
The plaintiff failed in bis action against the company, and the judgment establishes, until reversed, that he has no claim against it arising out of the transactions litigated. The judgment is therefore conclusive against him. Assuming the liability of the defendant as a trustee, he is responsible only for the debts of the company. The plaintiff sues to recover from the defendant his claim against the company, and the answer is: "You have none; the tribunal to which you appealed 1ms so declared." If the opposite of this proposition be adopted, then the plaintiff has two chances of success on different actions, for the same claims, and in which the results might be conflicting.
It may well be, as shown by Justice Daniels, that the plaintiff was not bound to commence his action against the company before prosecuting his claim against the defendant; but having done so, he cannot iguore the proceeding. The remedy he sought has been denied by a court having jurisdiction to pass upon the claim presented, and the judgment pronounced is conclusive against him as long as it remained.
The judgment should be affirmed.