Case Name: PEOPLE v. ABRAMCZYK
Court: Michigan Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1987-10-06
Citations: 163 Mich. App. 473
Docket Number: Docket No. 82592
Parties: PEOPLE v ABRAMCZYK
Judges: Before: Shepherd, P.J., and M. J. Kelly and R. L. Tahvonen, JJ.
Reporter: Michigan appeals reports; cases decided in the Michigan Court of Appeals.
Volume: 163
Pages: 473–483

Head Matter:
PEOPLE v ABRAMCZYK
Docket No. 82592.
Submitted March 5, 1986, at Lansing.
Decided October 6, 1987.
Niels P. Abramczyk was convicted of negligent homicide following a jury trial in Ingham Circuit Court, Jack W. Warren, J. Defendant was sentenced to two years probation, with the first sixty days to be served in jail, fined costs, and prohibited from driving a motor vehicle during the term of his probation unless he filed a petition with the trial court demonstrating that he required driving privileges to maintain employment. Defendant appealed, claiming that the trial court should have granted his motion for a directed verdict because the prosecution failed to present direct proof of negligence, that the trial court should have granted his motion to set aside the verdict or motion for a new trial for the same reason, and that the trial court abused its discretion by imposing the sentence it did.
The Court of Appeals held:
1. Sufficient evidence was introduced to support defendant’s conviction, and the negligent homicide statute is not unconstitutional.
2. The trial court properly considered the perceived efficacy of licensing sanctions in fashioning the terms of defendant’s probation.
Affirmed.
Shepherd, P.J., concurred in part and dissented in part. Judge Shepherd stated that defendant’s conviction of negligent homicide based upon a noncriminal act of ordinary negligence, i.e., failing to look into his automobile’s rearview mirror before executing the lane change which resulted in the collision with the victim’s automobile, was not violative of due process of law. Judge Shepherd noted that, had the victim survived the accident, defendant could at most be held responsible for the civil infraction of careless driving, but concluded that the provision by the Legislature of criminal sanctions in cases where death results from the negligent operation of a motor vehicle is nonetheless a proper exercise of legislative power. With regard to the sentence imposed in this case, Judge Shepherd concluded that it was based upon improper reasons and not specifically tailored to the particular circumstances of defendant and this case, and he would therefore remand for resentencing.
References
Am Jur 2d, Criminal Law §§ 525 et seq.
Am Jur 2d, Homicide §§ 91 et seq.
What amounts to negligence within meaning of statutes penalizing negligent homicide by operation of motor vehicle. 20 ALR3d 473.
1. Homicide — Negligent Homicide.
An act of ordinary negligence, which by itself is not criminal, may serve as a basis for a conviction of negligent homicide (MCL 750.324; MSA 28.556).
2. Homicide — Negligent Homicide — Contributory Negligence.
Contributory negligence is not a defense to negligent homicide, although it may be a factor to consider in determining proximate cause.
3. Criminal Law — Sentencing.
A sentencing court must specifically tailor its sentence to the particular circumstances of each defendant and his case and may not impose a particular sentence on one defendant based on well-known violations by others.
Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Louis J. Caruso, Solicitor General, Peter D, Houk, Prosecuting Attorney, Robert B. Ebersole, Chief Appellate Attorney, and M. Ann Conlan, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for the people.
Mary E. Bennett, for defendant on appeal.
Before: Shepherd, P.J., and M. J. Kelly and R. L. Tahvonen, JJ.
Circuit judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.

Opinion:
Per Curiam.
We agree with Judge Shepherd's conclusions that the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction and that the negligent homicide statute is constitutional.
However, we hold that Judge Warren properly considered the perceived efficacy of licensing sanc tions in fashioning the terms of the defendant's probation.
Affirmed.