Case Name: PRAIRIE PIPE LINE COMPANY, Appellant, v. BENJAMIN SHIPP et al.
Court: Supreme Court of Missouri
Jurisdiction: Missouri
Decision Date: 1924-12-18
Citations: 305 Mo. 663
Docket Number: 
Parties: PRAIRIE PIPE LINE COMPANY, Appellant, v. BENJAMIN SHIPP et al.
Judges: All concur, except James T. Blair, J., not sitting, and David E. Blair, J., who dissents and adopts as his dissent the opinion of Higbee, C., filed in Division Two.
Reporter: Missouri Reports
Volume: 305
Pages: 663–685

Head Matter:
PRAIRIE PIPE LINE COMPANY, Appellant, v. BENJAMIN SHIPP et al.
In Banc,
December 18, 1924.
1. APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Condemnation. A judgment for the condemnation of a right of way for a pipe line across and under defendants’ lands and awarding them damages, involves title to real estate, and the appeal therefrom is to the Supreme Court.
2. CONDEMNATION: Validity of Statute Conceded: Constitutional' Question Eliminated. A concession by the parties that the statute upon which is based a proceeding to condemn a right of way for a pipe line over and across private land is valid, in so far as it authorizes private corporations to condemn land for the laying oí its pipe line and the transportation therein Of crude petroleum through this State, eliminates from consideration what might otherwise present a serious question under the limitations of the Constitution.
3. -: Pipe Line: Measure of Damages: General Rule. No general rule as to the measure of damages to the landowner caused by the laying of a pipe line for carrying crude oil, applicable to all cases, can be framed, because of variant facts not subject to classification. A general rule, announced in text-books and treatises, that the damages should be direct and certain and such as may be known or may be reasonably expected to result from the invasion of private premises and the consequent disturbance of the dominion of the owner and the construction by the condemnor .upon the premises invaded of the facilities to be employed, lends little aid in estimating the damages in a concrete case, except to mark the boundaries of consideration.
4. --: -: -: Difference in Value of Land. The determinative tests in ascertaining the damages in railroad condemnation cases are: first, the damage done by the absolute taking of the right of way; and, second, the difference between the value of the land before the taking and thereafter; and this rule is applicable to the condemnation of a right of way for an oil pipe line, except that the damages assessed for the taking of the right of way itself must be minimized by the fact that the landowner is not wholly deprived of the use of the surface of the right of way. The true rule is that when a part only of the land, is taken the measure of damages is the difference between what was the fair market value of the entire tract before and after the appropriation, in view of the use to which the part condemned should thereafter be applied.
Held, by DAVID E. BLAIR, J., dissenting, that the measure of damages is not the difference in the market value of the whole farm, but only of the forty-acre tract through which the pipe line runs, since there is no actual severance of one part of the farm from the rest by the construction of an under-surface pipe line, where the strip taken is required to be left open and uninclosed so as not to interfere with the cultivation of either farm as an entire tract.
5. -: -: Evidence of Damages: Inadequate as to Particular Injury: Adequate as to Difference in Market Value. The appellate court will not disturb a judgment awarding damages supported by substantial evidence. Notwithstanding the damages occasioned by the installation of the pipe line are negligible, and there is no substantial evidence as to the extent of the damages occasioned by the increased difficulty to be encountered in cultivating the land by reason of ridges raised on the right of way by laying the pipe line, or occasioned by deterioration of the fertility of the' soil on the right of way by the leaving thereon of non-arable clay, or occasioned by the frequent patrolling of the land by the condemnor’s employeees, if the evidence is substantial that the effect upon the land as a whole, other than that occupied by the right of way, is to decrease its market value, in the amount found by the jury, not only should the case be submitted to the jury, but its verdict will not be disturbed on appeal.
Held, by DAVID E. BLAIR, J., dissenting, that the opinions of the difference in the market value of the farm caused by the laying of the pipe line were based on the possible or probable leaking of oil from the pipes, which might not happen, which was therefore purely speculative damages, and an allowance of $1000 to one defendant for an appropriation of an eight-foot strip 1277 feet long and of $1400 to another for an eight-foot strip 2221 feet long was grossly and unreasonably excessive.
6. -: -: Speculative: Irrelevant Evidence: Proper Instructions. Where the instructions properly and clearly directed the jury that the damages to be found must be limited by the injury caused by the laying of the pipe line and the depreciation resulting therefrom in the market value of the residue of the land, and the verdict itself bears evidence that it was based on these authorized concerning speculative damages which the appropriator has obligated ifself to pay upon their infliction will not work a reversal.
Held, by DAVID E. BLAIR, J., dissenting, that the admission of evidence that in laying the pipe line the condemnor’s employees did not confine themselves within the eight-foot strip taken but trespassed upon the adjoining lands, and that oil sometimes leaked from the pipe and “killed” the soil, was error.
Citations Pertaining to Subjects of Headnotes: 1, Courts, 15 C. J. par. 513; 2, Constitutional Law, 12 C. J. par. 188; 3, Eminent Domain, 20 C. J. par. 186; 4, Eminent Domain, 20 C. J. par. 189; 5, Appeal and Error, 4 C. J. -pars. 2846, 2858; Eminent Domain, 20 C. J. par. 40Y; 6, Appeal and Error, 4 C. J. pars. 29Y0, 29Y4.
Appeal from Randolph Circuit Court. — Hon, Allen W., Walicer, Judge. .
Appirmbd.
T. J. Flannelly, Major J. Lilly and 8. J. & G. G. Jones for appellant.
(1) The verdict and finding of the jury is grossly excessive, unreasonable, unfair and unjust. Defendants’ land is not taken, the possession, use and enjoyment are still retained by defendants. Bray v. Land Const. Co., 203 Mo. App. 644; Met. St. Ry. Co. v. Walsh, 197 Mo. 392; Calor Oil Co. v. Franzell, 36 L. R. A. (N. S.) 456; Postal Telegraph Co. v. Peyton, 3 L. R. A. (N, S.) 333. (2) It was error to admit over plaintiff’s objections evidence to the effect that oil might escape from the pipe line. Such evidence was purely speculative. To say that oil might or might not escape from the lines is purely speculation and nothing else, especially so when there is no evidence showing that such is the general tendency. Met. St. Ry. Co. v. Walsh, 197 Mo. 329; Railroad v. Mendonsa, 193 Mo. 518; Railroad v. McG-rew, 104 Mo. 282; Mathews v. Railroad, 121 Mo. 298; Chicago & I. C. Railroad Co. v. Hunter, 128 Ind. 213; Elliott on Railroads* secs. 991, 991a, 991b. (3) It was error to overrule plaintiff’s objections to testimony offered by defendants relating to the depreciation in the market value of defendants’ land on account of the condemnation sought. Said witnesses did not show sufficient knowledge and qualifications to express an opinion in that respect, and the hypothetical questions, if such they may be called, did not embrace and take into consideration all of the elements embraced in the pleadings and in the case. Union Elevator Co. v. Surburban Ry. Co., 135 Mo. 375; Railroad v. Mendonsa, 193 Mo. 523. (4) The instructions broadened the issues and permitted the jury to take into consideration inconveniences and matters of a temporary nature which did not permanently depreciate the market value of defendants’ farms. Redding v. Railroad, 165 Mo. App.-130; Craton v. Hunt-zinger, 163 Mo. App. 718; Maynard v. Railroad, 155 Mo. App. 354; Christian v. Ins. Co., 143 Mo. 469; Bray v. Land Const. Co., 203 Mo. App. 644; Calor Oil Co. v. Franzell, 36 L. R. A. (N. S.) 456. (5) The court erred in. ref using,instructions requested by the plaintiff properly limiting the inquiry of damages to that part of defendants’ farms which were actually affected by the condemnation. Elliott on Railroads, secs. 990, 992; Lexington v. Long, 31 Mo. 369.
Hunter <& Chamier and Jerry M. Jeffries for respondents.
(1) The verdict is not excessive. Gibson’s farm consists of one hundred forty acres and very valuable land worth, before the easement was taken, at least $150 per acre. The easement passes entirely across same, between his residence and the public road. Shipp’s farm consists of one hundred, eighty acres and is very valuable land, worth, before the easement was taken, at least $125 per acre. The easement passes across the farm near the improvements. Shipp’s damage was fixed at $1000 or $5.55 an acre. 'Gibson’s, damage was fixed at $1400 or ten dollars per acre. Defendants are entitled to recover not only for the value of the land taken, but also for damages to the remainder of their farms. Pratt v. Ry. Co., 130 Mo. App. 175; Railroad v. McGrew, 104 Mo. 282. (a) It is with great reluctance that appellate courts undertake to .interfere with verdicts of juries on the grounds of excessiveness in condemnation proceedings. Met. St. Ry. Co. v. Walsh, 197 Mo. 421; Railroad v. Brick Co., 198 Mo. 712. (b) The extent of the easement and use to be made of it and how used is the very essence of the cause for damage. The limitation that plaintiff would pay for any damages to adjacent land by reason of oil escaping, lessened the damages. While the jury were hearing and considering these things it had a right to know all about the use to which the easement was to be put. Mathews v. Railroad, 121 Mo. 298; Railroad v. McGrew, 104 Mo. 282; Railroad V. Donovan, 149 Mo. 93; Railroad v. Shoemaker, 160 Mo. 425. (2) The objections to the hypothetical questions were not sufficient and many of the witnesses testified as to value without any objections being made. Our courts have recognized this manner of proving the damages in condemnation proceedings. Railroad v. Brick Co., 198-Mo. 709; Met. St. Ry. Co. v. Walsh, 197 Mo. 392; Railroad v. Vleiez, 234 Mo. 471. (3) The evidence was that the taking damaged each farm in its entirety, and the measure of damages is the value of the land taken and damage to the remainder of the farm. Ry. Co. v. Carton R. E. Co., 204 Mo. 565; Railroad v. McGrew, 104 Mo. 282. The instructions recited the various items to be considered in assessing the damages and were proper. Railroad v. Brick Co., 198 Mo. 712.

Opinion:
WALKER, J.
In February 1921, the plaintiff filed a petition in the Circuit Court of Randolph County, under Section 1791, Revised Statutes 1919, for the con-' demnation of a right of way for a pipe line across and under certain tracts of land in that county, one of which was owned by Benjamin Shipp and wife and the other by L. B. Gribson and wife, who are the defendants herein and own their respective lands by the entirety.
Commissioners were appointed in conformity with the prescribed statutory procedure who assessed nominal damages in favor of the owners of the land. The plaintiff proceeded under this judgment to lay its pipe line. The defendants excepted to the report of the commissioners, and it was set aside, and upon a trial before a jury a verdict was returned in favor of Shipp' and wife for $1000; and in favor of Gribson and wife for $1400. Prom this judgment an appeal was perfected by the plaintiff to the Kansas City Court of Appeals. Under our ruling in Springfield S. W. Ry. Co. v. Schweitzer, 246 Mo. 122, and Moberly v. Lotter, 266 Mo. 457, this case was transferred to the Supreme Court on the ground that the title to real estate was involved (240 S. W. 473).
The petition is in the conventional form employed in cases of this nature. It asks, inter alia, that a strip of land eight feet in width may be condemned across the lands of the defendants for the purpose of permitting the plaintiff — a Kansas corporation engaged in the transportation of oil through this State — to lay a pipe line underneath the surface of the lands for plaintiff's use in its business. The pipe line to be laid in such a manner as to not interfere with defendants' access to or cultivation of the soil or the drainage of the lands or of tracts adjacent thereto, except during such times as the plaintiff may necessarily be engaged in laying, removing or repairing the line. The plaintiff, by its pleading, obligates itself in the event of the condemnation, to afford the defendants access at all times to the lands and their right to the use of the same as parts of their respective farms, in the same manner and' to the same extent as if said line had not been laid subject to the right of entry for the purposes stated. Plaintiff further obligates itself to pay defendants any damages to the lands by reason of the installing or the repairing of said line by plaintiff; or for any damages that may subsequently be done to growing crops on the right of way from time to time, or by the laying of additional pipe lines or the repairing of those laid, or by the escape of oil upon the right of way or upon adjacent lands.
The pipe line laid across the Shipp farm is 1277 feet long, eight feet wide and .embraces an area of .235 acres; the line across the Gibson farm is 2221 feet long, eight feet wide and embraces an area of .408 acres. The estimated value of the Shipp land, which consists of one hundred eighty acres, before the installation of the pipe line, was from $110 to $115 per acre. After the installation of the pipe line the land was estimated to be worth from $75 to $80 per acre. The estimated value of the Gibson land, which consists of one hundred forty acres, prior to the installation of the pipe line was from $140 to $150 per acre. After the installation of the pipe line the land was estimated to be worth $125 per acre.
There was testimony that the laying of the pipe line caused ridges in the land, rendering the cultivation of same difficult; that where disturbed the land is "killed" or rendered unproductive for a year or two thereafter; that the cultivation of the land would be subject to further interference if leaks in the pipe occurred; that such an occurrence happened in another line laid earlier under these tracts and not only prevented cultivation while the repairs were in progress', but that the escaped oil destroyed the productive character of the soil with which it came in contact and rendered its cultivation useless. Furthermore it was shown that where a pipe line of the character at bar is laid during wet weather damage is done to the cultivable character of the soil; also that the frequent patrolling of the line by plaintiff shown to have been necessary, and the making of repairs thereon when required, interfere with the unobstructed use of same by the owners, to their detriment.
I. By their conduct the parties concede the validity of the statute (Art. 11, chap. 13, R. S. 1919) upon which this proceeding is based in so far as it authorizes private corporations to condemn land for the laying of pipe lines and the transportation therein of crude petroleum through this State. [Smith v. Glynn, 177 S. W. (Mo.) 850 and cases; State ex rel. v. McQuillin, 246 Mo. 1. c. 592; Burns v. Ins. Co., 295 Mo. 1. c. 694; State ex rel. Home Savings Ins. Co. v. Lee, 288 Mo. 1. c. 707.] This concession eliminates from consideration in this case what might have presented a serious question under the limitations of the Constitution.
II. Texts and treatises attempt to state general rules from which the measure of damages may be determined in cases of the character at bar. The difficulty in relying upon such rules as forming a basis for a conclusion in a particular case, is that when traced to the adjudicated cases upon which they must rest, they are not infrequently found to be general deductions drawn from cases compositely considered, which, upon analysis, are, from their variant facts, not subject to such classification. In short, it is sought to frame a general rule from a combination of dissimilar facts. Neither in law nor in logic can a consistent conclusion be drawn from inharmonious premises. Nor do general statements as to the limitations upon such rules afford material aid in estimating the damages in a particular case. To declare, therefore, that damages should be direct and certain and such as may be known or may be reasonably expected to result from the invasion of premises by the condemnor and the consequent disturbance of the dominion of the owner and the construction by the former upon the premises invaded of the improvement or facility to be employed, lends little light in estimating the damages in a concrete case, except to mark the boundaries of consideration. Especially is this true where, as at bar, the damages sustained must be determined from opinion evidence upon which the market value of property of necessity has its foundation. [St. L., Memphis, Railroad Co. v. Cont. Brick Co., 198 Mo. 1. c. 709.] Conceding the application, therefore, of the general rules referred to and that the testimony must be of the. character mentioned, aside from these limitations, precedents, parallel in their facts, disélose certain well-defined standards to be observed in condemnation cases. While many of the cases cited have reference to condemnations of rights of way for railroads and involve the absolute and continued use of the right of way by the condemnor, the difference between that class of cases and the instant case is only one of degree in estimating the damages and does not involve a difference in the basis or principle upon which the estimation is made. To illustrate: the determinative tests in ascertaining the damages in railroad condemnation cases are, first, the damage done to the absolute taking of the right of way, and, second, the difference between the value of the land before the taking and thereafter. In cases as at bar a like standard is applicable in estimating the damages except that those assessed for the taking of the right of way itself must be minimized by the fact that the owner is not wholly deprived of the use of the surface of the right of way itself as in railroad cases. The rule adverted to furnishes the safest and most reliable standard from which such injuries may be estimated. A long line of authorities in this State sustain the application of the rule in railroad condemnation cases, and with the difference stated its application'in the instant case accords with reason and affords a just basis for the determination of the damages. The rule, as most explicitly stated in these cases, is that when a part only of land is taken under condemnation proceedings the measure of damages is the difference between what was the fair market value of the entire tract before and after the appropriation in view of the use to which the portion condemned should thereafter be applied. [St. L. Belt Term. Ry. Co. v. Cartan R. E. Co., 204 Mo. 565 and cases; Mo. Pac. Railroad Co. v. Porter, 112 Mo. 1. c. 368; Wyandotte, K. C. & N. W. Ry. Co. v. Waldo, 70 Mo. 629; Quincy, Mo. & Pac. Railroad Co. v. Ridge, 57 Mo. 1. c. 601.]
The rule as applicable to the case at bar is comprehensively considered in St. Louis v. Hill, 116 Mo. 527, 21 L. R. A. 226, in which it is said, in effect, that anything which destroys or subverts the exclusive right of any person to freely use, enjoy and dispose of any determinate object, real or personal, constitutes a taking or destruction pro tanto of property, notwithstanding the possession and disposal thereof is not disturbed and there is no actual or physical invasion of the locus in quo.
III. Aside from the increased difficulty encountered in cultivating the land by reason of the ridges raised thereon after the. laying of the pipes, the deterioration of the fertility of the soil on the right of way by leaving thereon non-arable clay, and the frequent patrolling of the land by plaintiff's employees, the evidence is negligible concerning the damages occasioned by the installation of the pipe line. Even as to these injurious incidents there is no substantial evidence as to the extent of the damages. However, when we come to consider the second element of damages or, concretely stated, the effect upon the value of the land other than that occupied by the right of way, there is no lack of evidence to sustain the conclusion that the laying of the pipe line across these lands materially depreciate their market value. The cogency of this evidence is ample, not only as to the number of the witnesses but the amount per acre of the depreciation, to render it unnecessary to enter into particulars in the presentation and discussion of the same. In the face of these facts no question can arise as to their sufficiency to authorize the submission of the case to the jury. Thus submitted, a proper element of damages as we have stated, is the depreciation or diminution in value of the market price of the land by reason of the laying of the pipe line. [Met. St Ry. Co. v. Walsh, 197 Mo. 1. c. 419; C. R. I. & P. Ry. Co. v. George, 145 Mo. 1. c. 46; Mo. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Porter, 112 Mo. 361; Mo. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Chrystal, 25 Mo. 544; Palmer v. Harris Co., 69 S. W. 229.] The finding of the jury is amply supported therefore, if based upon no other element of damages. There is a well-recognized rule of appellate procedure which had its origin in the uniform integrity accorded to judgments of courts of competent jurisdiction, including those in condemnation proceedings, that an appellate court will not disturb a judgment awarding damages in the presence of substantial evidence in support of same. [Mallette v. St. Louis, 236 S. W. (Mo.) 63; St. Louis v. Railroad, 272 Mo. 80; St. Louis v. Semple; 199 S. W. (Mo.) 967; Railroad v. Brick Co., 198 Mo. 1. c. 712; Zehner v. Milner, 172 Ind. 493, 24 L. R. A. (N. S.) 383; Boyne City v. Anderson, 146 Mich. 328, 8 L. R. A. (N. S.) 306; Henderson v. Lexington, 132 Ky. 390.] The finding being on a question of fact will not be disturbed, although the'evidence may be conflicting. [In re Thompson, 127 N. Y. 463, 14 L. R. A. 52.]
IY. The instructions asked by the plaintiff and given by the court, supplemented by those given by the court on its own motion, clearly, fully and fairly submitted the issues under the facts and are all that the plaintiff was entitled to. Those asked by the plaintiff, and given, present in logical order the issues raised by the pleadings and leave no ground for conjecture as to the limit of the jury's duty. Those given by the court on its own motion correctly define the questions for the jury's determination in such a manner that the measure of their finding as to the damages and the limitations upon the same could not reasonably have been misinterpreted. It may be conceded that there was immaterial and irrelevant testimony admitted concerning speculative damages and others akin thereto which plaintiff had obligated itself to pay upon their infliction. This testimony, however, was not of such a nature as to influence the verdict in view of the court's unmistakable limitations as to the basis of the jury's finding. No one reading these instructions can fail to understand that the damages authorized to be found must be limited to the injury inflicted by the laying of the pipe line and the depreciation caused thereby to the residue of the land. The verdict itself, so far as inferences in regard thereto can be drawn from its words, bears evidence of the fact that it was based upon the authorized limitation. Instructions 9 and 10 asked for by the- plaintiff were properly refused. Technically considered they did not include all of the land of either of the defendants. Waiving this defect, their subject-matter was covered by instructions given.
No other errors assigned are of such magnitude .as to require consideration.
The judgment of the trial court is therefore affirmed.
PER CURIAM: — The foregoing opinion of Walker, J., filed in Division Two, is adopted as the opinion of Court in Banc.
All concur, except James T. Blair, J., not sitting, and David E. Blair, J., who dissents and adopts as his dissent the opinion of Higbee, C., filed in Division Two.