Case Name: STATE of Florida, Petitioner, v. Douglas Paul FRAZEE, Respondent
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1993-04-14
Citations: 617 So. 2d 350
Docket Number: No. 91-2765
Parties: STATE of Florida, Petitioner, v. Douglas Paul FRAZEE, Respondent.
Judges: GLICKSTEIN, C.J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 617
Pages: 350–355

Head Matter:
STATE of Florida, Petitioner, v. Douglas Paul FRAZEE, Respondent.
No. 91-2765.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
April 14, 1993.
Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and James J. Carney, Asst. Atty. Gen., West Palm Beach, for petitioner.
C. Edward McGee, Jr., Dykema Gossett, Fort Lauderdale, for respondent.

Opinion:
DOWNEY, JAMES C., Senior Judge.
The State of Florida has perfected this appeal to review the issuance of a writ of prohibition by the circuit court directed to the county court wherein that court had denied Douglas Paul Frazee's motion for discharge under the speedy trial rule. We believe this matter is properly reviewed by this court under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.030(b)(2)(B) and thus we treat it as a petition for writ of certiorari.
Frazee was charged in the county court with driving while under the influence and his trial was ultimately set for April 28, 1987, which was two days before the speedy trial time expired. On the trial date Frazee's counsel appeared before the county judge and advised him that he was ready for trial but that he could not appear for trial because he was involved in a trial before another judge and would not conclude in time to commence trial in the present case. The trial judge then announced that he would continue the case until a later date and charge the continuance to Frazee. Counsel advised he was not requesting a continuance and did not want it charged to his client because he was precluded from being present by the judge in his other case. Nevertheless, this case was continued past the speedy trial date. Fra-zee then moved for discharge and upon denial thereof he appealed to the circuit court. That court treated the appeal as a petition for writ of prohibition, granted the writ and ordered Frazee discharged. From that decision the state has filed a plenary appeal in this court which we now consider as a petition for writ of certiorari.
We look to rule 3.191(d)(3), Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, for instruction as to when a motion for discharge should be granted for violation of the speedy trial rule. The rule provides that a pending motion for discharge shall be granted unless it is shown that "(ii) the failure to hold trial is attributable to the accused, a co-defendant in the same trial, or their counsel, or (iii) the accused was unavailable for trial under section (e)_" Section (e) provides that a person is considered unavailable for trial when "the person or his counsel is not ready for trial on the date trial is scheduled."
Frazee contends that neither he nor his counsel ever requested any type of delay. Technically, that is true. But the facts of this case show that defense counsel left the trial court with no other alternative other than to order a continuance. The trial had been set for more than two weeks to start on April 28. That morning, defense counsel appeared and announced, for the first time, that he could not try the case because he was scheduled for trial before another judge. Counsel refused, however, to request a continuance on behalf of his client. He placed the responsibility for his unavailability on the State, because it was another judge who prevented him from being present for trial. He rejected a suggestion that the case be tried later that night because he would be fairly well exhausted by that time.
This rule has been construed to mean that any defense request to postpone a case is a motion for a continuance waiving speedy trial rights regardless of its characterization. Blackstock v. Newman, 461 So.2d 1021 (Fla. 3d DCA), rev. denied, 467 So.2d 999 (Fla.1985); accord State v. (Buster) Brown, 412 So.2d 448 (Fla. 6th DCA 1982); State v. (Michael) Brown, 394 So.2d 218 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981). But more in point are State v. McCoy, 369 So.2d 1027 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979), and State v. Belcher, 372 So.2d 546 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979). In each case the defendant's counsel advised the court that he was ready for trial but could not be present because he was trying another case before another judge. The holding in each case was that the defendant could not be considered available for trial during the pertinent period and thus waived the right to speedy trial. Thus, without belaboring the point further, we believe the trial judge's ruling denying Fra-zee's motion for discharge was correct. Regardless of his counsel's refusal to expressly request a continuance and his statement that he was ready for trial, his in volvement in the trial of another case at that time precluded the defendant from being ready for trial within the meaning of the rule.
We therefore conclude that the trial court correctly denied Frazee's motion for discharge and the circuit court committed error in granting prohibition and ordering Frazee's discharge.
Turning now to the more difficult question, we must decide if this court can or should reach the issue presented in view of the limited review granted in certiorari. While acknowledging that the question is debatable, we believe that certiorari should be granted and the matter reviewed.
In Combs v. State, 436 So.2d 93 (Fla.1983), the supreme court pointed out that the parameters of district court of appeal review in the present case "should not be narrowly construed so as to apply only to violations which effectively deny appellate review or which pertain to the regularity of procedure." Rather, the court held that the district court "should not be as concerned with the mere existence of legal error as much as with the seriousness of the error." The error should constitute a departure from the essential requirements of law and, as the court put it in Combs, the district courts should exercise their discretion only where there has been a violation of a clearly established principle of law resulting in a miscarriage of justice.
In the present case we are dealing with a ruling discharging a defendant charged with a crime; a ruling which departs from the precedential constructions of the speedy trial rule. It therefore seems to us that in this posture, we are dealing with the violation of a clearly established principle of law resulting in a miscarriage of justice. Combs teaches that the district court should exercise its discretion in favor of granting certiorari in this instance.
Accordingly, we grant the petition for writ of certiorari filed by the State of Florida and quash the writ of prohibition issued by the circuit court.
GLICKSTEIN, C.J., concurs.
FARMER, J., dissents with opinion.