Case Name: In re Charles BLACKSHIRE, Petitioner
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 1996-10-16
Citations: 98 F.3d 1293
Docket Number: No. 96-1191
Parties: In re Charles BLACKSHIRE, Petitioner.
Judges: Before HATCHETT, Chief Judge, and EDMONDSON and COX, Circuit Judges.
Reporter: Federal Reporter 3d Series
Volume: 98
Pages: 1293–1294

Head Matter:
In re Charles BLACKSHIRE, Petitioner.
No. 96-1191.
United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.
Oct. 16, 1996.
Before HATCHETT, Chief Judge, and EDMONDSON and COX, Circuit Judges.

Opinion:
PER CURIAM:
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 and 2244(b)(3)(A), as amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Charles Blackshire applies for an order authorizing the district court to consider a second motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence. Because we find that Blaekshire's second motion does not contain a claim which relies on a new rule of constitutional law, we deny his application.
Under the recently amended statutes, federal prisoners who want to file a second or successive motion to vacate, set aside, or correct a sentence must move the court of appeals for an order authorizing the district court to consider the second or successive motion. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A). A three-judge panel of the court of appeals, § 2244(b)(3)(B), may authorize the filing of a second or successive motion only if it determines that the motion contains claims which rely on either:
(1) newly discovered evidence that, if proven and viewed in the light of the evidence as a whole, would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that no reasonable factfinder would have found the movant guilty of the offense; or
(2) a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable.
28 U.S.C. § 2255.
In his application, Blackshire asserts that Bailey v. United States, - U.S.-, 116 S.Ct. 501, 133 L.Ed.2d 472 (1995), expressed a new rule of constitutional law. His second motion contains a claim which relies on Bailey.
In Bailey, the Supreme Court interpreted 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) which imposes punishment upon a person who "during and in relation to any . drug trafficking crime . uses or carries a firearm." Id. at-, 116 S.Ct. at 503 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)). The Court held that a defendant could not be convicted under the "use" prong unless the government proved that the defendant "actively employed the firearm during and in relation to the predicate crime." Id. at -, 116 S.Ct. at 505. Blackshire's claim appears to be that he was wrongfully convicted under the "use" prong of § 924(e) because the government did not show sufficient evidence that he actively employed a firearm.
We reject Blackshire's assertion that Bailey expressed a new rule of constitutional law. Bailey did not express a new rule of constitutional law; rather, it merely interpreted a substantive criminal statute using rules of statutory construction. See United States v. Andrade, 83 F.3d 729, 730 n. 1 (5th Cir.1996) (stating in effect that Bailey interpreted a substantive criminal statute but did not express a new rule of criminal procedure).
For these reasons, we deny Blackshire's application.
APPLICATION DENIED.