Case Name: S.O.U.P., INC., a Corporation, Petitioner, v. The FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, Respondent
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 1971-07-27
Citations: 449 F.2d 1142
Docket Number: No. 24476
Parties: S.O.U.P., INC., a Corporation, Petitioner, v. The FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, Respondent.
Judges: 
Reporter: Federal Reporter 2d Series
Volume: 449
Pages: 1142–1145

Head Matter:
S.O.U.P., INC., a Corporation, Petitioner, v. The FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, Respondent.
No. 24476.
United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit.
Order Filed July 27, 1971.
Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc Denied Nov. 19, 1971.
Before BAZELON, Chief Judge FAHY, Senior Circuit Judge, and WILKEY, Circuit Judge.

Opinion:
ORDER
PER CURIAM.
Petitioner S.O.U.P., Inc., a corporation, has filed a motion to proceed in forma pauperis in the above entitled case. At the request of members of the Court, a financial statement of each of the small number of members of the corporation was filed. In light of the statute governing forma pauperis appeals, 28 U.S.C. Section 1915(a), which we are bound to construe reasonably, assuming arguendo that a corporation may proceed in forma pauperis, we think it would be inconsistent with the congressional intent to hold that this corporation should be allowed to proceed in that manner in view of the financial data submitted since it is likely that the costs of proceeding would not exceed $100.00. We think we would not comply with the statute, properly construed in the situation presented, if we granted the application, although in so deciding we appreciate the good faith of applicants and their public interest motivation. Accordingly, it is
Ordered by the Court that petitioner's aforesaid motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis is denied.
Statement of Senior Circuit Judge FAHY in support of the order of the court, in which Circuit Judge WILKEY concurs.
SOUP is not prevented by our order from proceeding with the litigation. It can easily arrange for the small item of costs by assessment or voluntary contribution of its members. The corporate form is a convenient, organizational vehicle, but its convenience does not justify turning it into a vehicle also for avoiding the costs involved in a lawsuit as if it were a pauper. The public interest motivating SOUP's members, which I join in applauding, does not help make the corporation "a person unable to pay such costs or give security therefor." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). The text of the statute reflects the congressional intent and purpose to enable "person [s]" to obtain exemption, not corporations formed by persons who themselves do not come within the exemption. The statute has the salutary purpose of opening the doors of the courts to poor persons on a basis of equality with the more well-to-do, not to open the doors to "poor" corporations formed by nonpoor members as a convenient form by which to organize and litigate. If the statute is to be enlarged as SOUP contends, I think it should be done by legislation rather than by a strained construction which does not reflect the statute's purposes.
The "time-consuming" responsibility the court has had to assume in this matter, and the "remarkably poor economics" of the court's involvement, referred to by our dissenting colleague, are not the answer to the problem, for the court does not pass over problems which are presented because to decide them consumes judicial resources.