Case Name: FISER v. CITY OF ANN ARBOR
Court: Michigan Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1981-03-19
Citations: 107 Mich. App. 367
Docket Number: Docket No. 46426
Parties: FISER v CITY OF ANN ARBOR
Judges: Before: M. J. Kelly, P.J., and D. F. Walsh and Beasley, JJ.
Reporter: Michigan appeals reports; cases decided in the Michigan Court of Appeals.
Volume: 107
Pages: 367–376

Head Matter:
FISER v CITY OF ANN ARBOR
Docket No. 46426.
Submitted March 6, 1980, at Lansing.
Decided March 19, 1981.
Ronald Fiser broúght an action against the City of Ann Arbor, David L. Miller, Donald Terry, and Walter Lunsford, Ann Arbor police officers, Esther Rupas and Nicholas Rupas, owners of a motor vehicle, and Michael L. Lehman, the driver of the vehicle, for damages for injuries arising out of a motor vehicle accident involving his vehicle and that driven by defendant Lehman which was being pursued by the police officers. Defendants police officers and the city moved for summary judgment, which motion was granted, Washtenaw Circuit Court, Edward D. Deake, J. Plaintiff appeals. Held:
1. The trial court properly granted summary judgment relative to the officers’ decisions to continue their pursuit of Lehman. The decisions were discretionary and were immune from tort liability.
2. The trial court properly granted summary judgment relative to the officers’ operation of their vehicles. Officers Miller and Terry were not in pursuit of Lehman at the time of the accident and Officer Lunsford’s operation of his vehicle, even if negligent, was not a proximate cause of plaintiff’s injuries.
3. The officers not being liable, the city also is not liable, and the court properly entered summary judgment.
Affirmed.
M. J. Kelly, P.J., dissented. He would hold that since the record reveals that the actions of Officer Lunsford do not exhibit as a matter of law due care for the safety of innocent third persons the determination of whether his actions constituted a proximate cause of plaintiffs injuries was for the trier of fact. He would reverse the trial court’s grant of summary judgment as to defendants Lunsford and the City of Ann Arbor.
References for Points in Headnotes
57 Am Jur 2d, Municipal, School, and State Tort Liability §§ 243, 244.
57 Am Jur 2d, Municipal, School, and State Tort Liability §§ 263, 264.
Liability of governmental unit or its officers for injury to innocent occupant of moving vehicle, or for damage to such vehicle, as a result of police chase. 4 ALR4th 865.
73 Am Jur 2d, Summary Judgment §§ 26, 27.
75 Am Jur 2d, Trial §§ 319-321, 378-380.
Opinion op the Court
1. Municipal Corporations — Police Departments — Torts — Governmental Immunity — Statutes.
The management, operation, and control of a police department is a governmental function, and police officers are protected from liability for tortious acts committed in the scope of their employment where the acts are discretionary and not ministerial (MCL 691.1407; MSA 3.996[107]).
2. Municipal Corporations — Police Departments — Discretionary Acts — Automobiles — Governmental Immunity — Statutes.
A decision by a police officer to pursue and to continue to pursue a fleeing motorist may be a discretionary act, in light of surrounding circumstances, which is immune from tort liability (MCL 691.1407; MSA 3.996[107]).
3. Municipal Corporations — Police Departments — Negligence — Torts — Automobiles — Proximate Cause — Statutes.
The negligent operation of a police vehicle by a police officer in pursuing a fleeing motorist will not give rise to statutory tort liability where such operation is not the proximate cause of an injury even though the officer’s decision to pursue is a contributing cause (MCL 691.1405, 691.1407; MSA 3.996[105], 3.996[107]).
Dissent by M. J. Kelly, P.J.
4. Judgments — Summary Judgment — Court Rules.
A trial court, before granting a motion for summary judgment, on ' the ground that except for the amount of damages there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is therefore entitled to judgment as a matter of law, must be satisñed that it is impossible for the claim asserted to be supported by evidence at trial (GCR 1963, 117.2[3j).
5. Municipal Corporations — Police Departments — Torts — Proximate Cause — Automobiles — Questions op Fact — Statutes.
The actions of a police officer in pursuing a Seeing motorist may constitute a proximate cause of injuries sustained as a result of the pursuit and give rise to statutory tort liability, and, where the facts of a case do not indicate as a matter of law that the officer acted with due care for the safety of innocent third persons, the determination whether the acts were a proximate cause of any injuries is for the trier of fact (MCL 691.1405; MSA 3.996[105]X
Erwin A. Salisbury, for plaintiff.
John K. Van Loon, Chief Assistant City Attorney, for defendants City of Ann Arbor, Miller, Terry, and Lunsford.
Before: M. J. Kelly, P.J., and D. F. Walsh and Beasley, JJ.

Opinion:
Per Curiam.
Plaintiff, Ronald Fiser, appeals the entry of summary judgment for defendants City of Ann Arbor and Ann Arbor police officers David L. Miller, Donald Terry, and Walter Lunsford. In his complaint against these defendants, plaintiff sought damages for injuries sustained in an automobile accident involving plaintiff's car and a car driven by Michael Lehman, who was being chased by an Ann Arbor police car driven by defendant Lunsford at the time of the accident.
In the early morning hours of October 19, 1975, plaintiff was driving his automobile south on South Main Street in Ann Arbor. At the same time an automobile driven by Michael Lehman was proceeding east on Madison Street toward the intersection of Madison and South Main. Lehman was being pursued by a fully marked Ann Arbor police car with activated emergency sirens and overhead oscillating lights. Traveling at a high rate of speed, Lehman disregarded the flashing red light at the intersection, entered the intersection without stopping, and struck plaintiff's car, causing personal injury to plaintiff.
All three of the defendant police officers had been involved in the chase of the vehicle driven by Lehman. Lehman had first been seen by defendants Miller and Terry when he failed to stop for a flashing stoplight. Lehman ignored the officers' signal to stop. Officer Miller, the driver of the police car, activated the overhead emergency lights and began to pursue Lehman. Lehman increased his speed. At some point in the pursuit Lehman lost control of his vehicle. After being struck by the police car, Lehman's car came to a stop. As Officer Terry left the police car, Lehman sped away again, nearly running down Officer Terry.
Officer Miller continued to pursue Lehman's vehicle. After following him the wrong way on a one-way street, Miller lost track of the Lehman car. Officer Lunsford, who was also operating a fully marked Ann Arbor police car and who had received a radio report of the high-speed chase, the collision with Officer Terry, and a description of the Lehman vehicle spotted Lehman's car and began pursuit with his emergency light and siren activated. Lunsford pursued Lehman for approximately six blocks at a maximum speed of about 55 miles per hour. Lunsford saw Lehman ignore a stop sign, make an improper turn, disregard the flashing red light at Madison and South Main, and strike the car driven by plaintiff. According to Lunsford, Lehman's car had been going faster than 55 miles per hour.
Plaintiff alleged that his injuries were caused by the negligence of defendant police officers. Defendants moved for summary judgment. In ruling on the motion, the trial court reviewed the affidavits of the police officers, the allegations of plaintiff's amended complaint, and testimony given by Offi cer Lunsford at the hearing on the motion for summary judgment. The court identified two theories of negligence advanced by plaintiff: (1) defendant officers' negligent decisions to continue their pursuit of Lehman, and (2) defendant officers' negligent operation of their police cars. Summary judgment was entered for all defendants on both theories.
With respect to plaintiff's first theory, we affirm entry of summary judgment for defendants. Defendant City of Ann Arbor is statutorily immune from liability under this theory since the operation of a police department is a governmental function. MCL 691.1407; MSA 3.996(107). Walkowski v Macomb County Sheriff, 64 Mich App 460; 236 NW2d 516 (1975), Berger v City of Berkley, 87 Mich App 361; 275 NW2d 2 (1978), lv den 406 Mich 969 (1979).
The defendant police officers are protected from liability for tortious acts committed in the scope of their employment if their acts are "discretionary" and not "ministerial". Antkiewicz v Motorists Mutual Ins Co, 91 Mich App 389, 397; 283 NW2d 749 (1979), Bush v Oscoda Area Schools, 405 Mich 716, 734; 275 NW2d 268 (1979) (opinions of Moody, J., and Coleman, C.J.). In our judgment, the decision of a police office to pursue and to contine to pursue a fleeing motorist, under circumstances like those in this case, is a discretionary act which is protected by immunity from tort liability. See Bratt v City and County of San Francisco, 50 Cal App 3d 550, 553; 123 Cal Rptr 774 (1975), Sparks v City of Compton, 64 Cal App 3d 592, 596; 134 Cal Rptr 684 (1976).
Under his second theory of liability for negligence, plaintiff sought to avoid governmental immunity through the motor vehicle exception:
"Governmental agencies shall be liable for bodily injury and property damage resulting from the negligent operation by any officer, agent, or employee of the governmental agency, of a motor vehicle of which the governmental agency is owner, as defined in Act No. 300 of the Public Acts of 1949, as amended, being sections 257.1 to 257.923 of the Compiled Laws of 1948." MCL 691.1405; MSA 3.996(105).
With respect to defendants Officers Miller and Terry, we affirm entry of summary judgment under plaintiff's second theory. It is undisputed that these officers did not operate or even occupy the police car which was pursuing the Lehman car at the time of the accident with plaintiff's car. Their sole participation, if any, at the time of the accident was in making the decision to chase. As noted above, they are protected from liability for any negligence in making that decision.
We next address the question concerning the liability of Officer Lunsford and the City of Ann Arbor with respect to Lunsford's allegedly negligent operation of the police vehicle.
We are of the view that plaintiff's injury was not caused by any "negligent operation of a motor vehicle" by an employee of the City of Ann Arbor within the meaning of MCL 691.1405; MSA 3.996(105).
Certainly, an officer responding in an emergency situation must act in a reasonable manner. Officer Lunsford was required to pursue Lehman with due regard for the safety of the public in mind. But even if Officer Lunsford was operating his police vehicle negligently during the course of his pursuit of Lehman, that negligence was not a proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries since Officer Lunsford's vehicle was not involved in the accident in which plaintiff was injured. The accident was directly caused by the negligent driving of Lehman, who was attempting to flee from an officer performing his duties. Whereas Lunsford's decision to chase may have been a contributing cause of the injuries suffered by plaintiff, the manner in which Luns-ford drove the police vehicle was not. Since both the city and the officers are immune from liability for the making of the decision to pursue, summary judgment was properly granted.
The decision of the circuit court is affirmed.