Case Name: Dan PADILLA v. STATE of Arkansas
Court: Arkansas Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Arkansas
Decision Date: 1983-04-18
Citations: 279 Ark. 100
Docket Number: CR 83-46
Parties: Dan PADILLA v. STATE of Arkansas
Judges: Smith, J., concurs.
Reporter: Arkansas Reports
Volume: 279
Pages: 100–107

Head Matter:
Dan PADILLA v. STATE of Arkansas
CR 83-46
648 S.W.2d 797
Supreme Court of Arkansas
Opinion delivered April 18, 1983
Donald R. Huffman, Public Defender, for appellant.
Steve Clark, Atty. Gen., by: Victra L. Fewell, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

Opinion:
Robert A. Dudley, Justice.
The issue in this case is whether the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act, Ark. Stat. Ann. § 43-3201 (Repl. 1977), is applicable to a detainer based on a petition for revocation of probation which does not allege the commission of a subsequent offense. In 1980, appellant entered a plea of guilty to two felonies in Benton County and was placed on three years probation. Two months later a petition for revocation of his probation was filed alleging that appellant had not reported to his probation officer and had absconded. When appellant failed to appear at the hearing, a warrant was issued for his arrest. Subsequently, appellant was convicted on an unrelated charge in California and sentenced to two years in the California Department of Correction. A detainer, based on the outstanding Arkansas warrant, was then placed on appellant in California. Appellant requested that a final disposition of the alleged probation violation promptly be made under the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act [hereinafter referred to as Agreement]. The prosecuting attorney refused to honor appellant's request for extradition and trial. Eight months later appellant was returned to Arkansas for a hearing. He moved to dismiss the petition alleging that the Agreement requires the State to dispose of the complaint against him within 180 days of his request for final disposition. The trial court found that appellant had already been tried on the basic charge and that a hearing to revoke probation does not constitute trial of an "untried indictment, information or complaint" within the purview of the Agreement. We affirm. This case was certified to the Supreme Court by the Court of Appeals since it involves the construction of an Arkansas statute. Rule 29 (1) (c).
The Interstate Agreement on Detainers is an interstate compact to which both Arkansas and California are signatories. Article III provides that where a detainer is lodged against a prisoner based upon an untried indictment, information or complaint of another state, the prisoner, upon request, must be brought to trial on the untried charges within 180 days. Ark. Stat. Ann. § 43-3201 Art. Ill (a). Failure to accord a timely trial may mandate dismissal of the underlying charge. Art. III (d); but see Young v. Mabry, 471 F. Supp. 553 (E.D. Ark. 1978), aff'd, 596 F.2d 339 (8th Cir.), cert, denied, 444 U.S. 853 (1979). The compact is designed to standardize interstate rendition procedures in order to protect the inmate's right to speedy trial and reduce any uncertainties which might obstruct programs of prisoner treatment and rehabilitiation. Ark. Stat. Ann. § 43-3201 Art. I; United States v. Mauro, 436 U.S. 340 (1978); Capalongo v. Howard, 453 N.Y.S.2d 45 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982); Camp v. United States, 587 F.2d 397 (8th Cir. 1978).
Appellant contends that the State's petition to revoke his probation is an untried complaint within the scope and meaning of the Agreement. This is a case of first impression in Arkansas. Although some courts have held otherwise, see Gaddy v. Turner, 376 So.2d 1225 (Fla. App. 1979), we are persuaded by the reasoning of the courts that have held a probation revocation proceeding not to involve "untried" matters within the purview of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act. See e.g., Capalongo v. Howard, supra; People v. Jackson, 626 P.2d 723 (Colo. Ct. App. 1981).
The Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act, Ark. Stat. Ann. §43-3201 (Repl. 1977) by its express terms applies only to a detainer based on an untried indictment, information or complaint. Under the principle of noscitur a sociis, we interpret the terms "untried" and "complaint" as used in the Agreement as being synonymous with, or at least in the nature of, an untried "indictment" or "information."Altus Cooperative Winery v. Morley, 218 Ark. 492, 237 S.W.2d 481 (1951). A charge against a defendant does not remain "untried" after a defendant has pleaded guilty. A plea of guilty is itself a conviction; nothing remains but to give judgment and determine punishment. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969). As stated by the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals:
The term "untried" refers to matters which can be brought to full trial. In a probation revocation proceeding, the trial has already been held, and the defendant convicted. In such a hearing, the defendant comes before the court in a completely different posture than he does at his trial before conviction.
Blackwell v. State, 546 S.W.2d 828 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1976); see also Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972); Lockett v. State, 271 Ark. 860, 611 S.W.2d 500 (1981).
The petition to revoke appellant's probation did not charge him with committing a crime prior to completion of his sentence. Since appellant had entered a plea of guilty on the charges underlying the original sentence of probation, there was nothing "untried" within the meaning of the statute. In our opinion, a charge of violation of probation, absent an allegation of the commission of an indictable offense, is not an "untried indictment, information, or complaint" within the scope and meaning of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act. The trial court was correct in refusing to dismiss the petition.
Affirmed.
Smith, J., concurs.
Purtle, J., dissents.