Case Name: PEOPLE v. MASS
Court: Michigan Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 2001-07-05
Citations: 464 Mich. 615
Docket Number: Docket No. 115820
Parties: PEOPLE v MASS
Judges: Cavanagh, Kelly, and Young, JJ., concurred with Taylor, J.
Reporter: Michigan Reports
Volume: 464
Pages: 615–671

Head Matter:
PEOPLE v MASS
Docket No. 115820.
Argued November 15, 2000
(Calendar No. 6).
Decided July 5, 2001.
Jimmy Mass was convicted by a jury in the Monroe Circuit Court, Daniel L. Sullivan, J., of delivery of 225 grams or more, but less than 650 grams, of a mixture containing cocaine and with conspiracy to commit that offense. The Court of Appeals, O’Connell and Danhof, JJ. (Hoekstra, P.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), affirmed. 238 Mich App 333 (1999) (Docket No. 208384). The defendant appeals.
In an opinion by Justice Taylor, joined by Justices Cavanagh, Kelly, and Young, the Supreme Court held:
A defendant properly may be convicted of delivery of 225 grams or more, but less than 650 grams, of cocaine on an aiding and abetting theory, even if he does not know the amount of drugs to be delivered, as long as the jury finds that at least 225 grams of cocaine were delivered. Pursuant to People v Justice (After Remand), 454 Mich 334 (1997), and Apprendi v New Jersey, 530 US 466 (2000), a defendant charged with conspiracy to deliver 225 grams or more, but less than 650 grams, of cocaine is entitled to have the jury instructed that he is guilty only if the prosecution has proved beyond a reasonable doubt that he conspired to deliver not just some amount of cocaine, but at least 225 grams of cocaine.
1. To be convicted of conspiracy to possess with intent to deliver a controlled substance, the people must prove that the defendant possessed the specific intent to deliver the statutory minimum as charged, coconspirators possessed the specific intent to deliver the statutory minimum as charged, and the defendant and the coconspirators possessed the specific intent to combine to deliver the statutory minimum as charged to a third person. Delivery of a controlled substance is a general intent crime. Knowledge of the amount of a controlled substance is not an element of a delivery charge.
2. The requisite intent for conviction of a crime as an aider and abettor is that necessary to be convicted of the crime as a principal. Accordingly, it was enough for the prosecution to show that the defendant, as with the principal offender, knowingly delivered or aided in the delivery of some amount of cocaine, as long as the jury later determined that at least 225 grams of cocaine were in fact delivered. Conviction of a crime as an aider and abettor does not require a higher level of intent with regard to the commission of the crime than that required for conviction as a principal.
3. Under Apprendi, drug quantity is an element of a controlled substances offense, and that element must be submitted to the jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt if the quantity increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum. In this case, the delivery instruction did not violate Apprendi because it charged the jury not to find the defendant guilty of the delivery charge unless the prosecution proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the substance delivered weighed 225 grams or more. The jury necessarily found that at least 225 grams of cocaine were delivered when it convicted the defendant of the delivery charge. Hence, the defendant’s delivery conviction was proper.
4. A different conclusion is required regarding the conspiracy instructions. Because of Justice and Apprendi, the jury should have been instructed that it could not find defendant guilty of conspiracy to deliver 225 grams or more, but less than 650 grams, of cocaine unless it found that the defendant conspired to deliver not just any amount of cocaine, but at least 225 grams. This element was notably absent from the conspiracy instructions. Because the defendant did not object to them, the error was forfeited; but, because the trial court omitted an element from its conspiracy instruction, the error seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the defendant’s trial. Given the instructions, it is clear that the jury effectively, and only, determined that the defendant had conspired to deliver less than 50 grams of cocaine. Thus, it would seriously affect the fairness and integrity of the defendant’s trial to allow a conviction of a more serious offense than the one determined by the jury to stand. Therefore, reversal of the defendant’s conspiracy to deliver 225 grams or more, but less than 650 grams, of cocaine is required, and the case must be remanded for entry of a conviction consistent with the jury’s verdict of guilty of conspiracy to deliver less than 50 grams of cocaine.
Justice Markman, joined by Chief Justice Corrigan and Justice Weaver, concurring, stated that while the amount of a controlled substance is a necessary element in a conspiracy to deliver charge, knowledge of the amount is not. First, there is nothing in the plain text of either the delivery statute or conspiracy statute that would compel a finding that a defendant must have knowledge of the amount of the controlled substance. Where there is an agreement to commit the unlawful act of delivery of a controlled substance and some act in furtherance of that agreement, it is impermissible to require an element of a crime that goes beyond this language. Second, the United States Supreme Court decision in United States v Feola, 420 US 671 (1975), held that in a conspiracy to commit a federal substantive offense, a defendant need not have knowledge of the attendant circumstances. In Michigan, the amount of a controlled substance is similarly an attendant circumstance for which a defendant need not be aware. Third, the United States Supreme Court decision in Apprendi does not provide support for imposition of the knowledge requirement. Instead, the Apprendi holding establishes that the amount of a controlled substance is an element of the offense if the amount operates to increase the penalty for the crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum for the lowest level delivery offense.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
Jennifer M. Granholm, Attorney General, Thomas L. Casey, Solicitor General, Edward F. Swinkey, Prosecuting Attorney, and Cheryl E. Werner, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for the people.
State Appellate Defender (by C. Joseph Booker and Valerie Newman) for the defendant.
Amicus Curiae:
Jeffrey L. Sauter, President, PAAM, David G. Gorcyca, Prosecuting Attorney, Joyce F. Todd, Chief, Appellate Division, and John S. Pallas, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for the people.

Opinion:
Taylor, J.
Defendant was convicted, on an aider and abettor theory, of (1) delivery of 225 grams or more, but less than 650 grams, of a mixture containing cocaine and with (2) conspiracy to commit that offense.
We granted leave to determine
whether knowledge of the amount of the controlled substance was a necessary element of the delivery and conspiracy charges, and, if so, whether the prosecution's evidence was insufficient to prove this element and whether the omission of it from the jury instructions deprived defendant of a fair trial.
As explained below, we conclude that the amount of a controlled substance is an element of a delivery offense, but that knowledge of the amount is not an element of a delivery charge. However, consistent with People v Justice (After Remand), 454 Mich 334; 562 NW2d 652 (1997), and Apprendi v New Jersey, 530 US 466; 120 S Ct 2348; 147 L Ed 2d 435 (2000), we also hold that knowledge of the amount of a controlled substance is an element of a conspiracy to deliver charge.
I. EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT TRIAL
An undercover state police officer testified that in early 1996 he purchased crack cocaine six times from Monolito Blackstone. As detailed below, the officer told the jury that defendant assisted Blackstone in completing a seventh sale.
On March 19, 1996, the officer visited Blackstone's apartment and advised that he wished to purchase ten ounces of cocaine. Blackstone began making phone calls. Jimmy Mass, who lived across the hall, then arrived. Blackstone told Mass he needed "ten ounces" and asked if he knew anyone who they "could get ten ounces from." Mass said "you should have told me earlier" and began making telephone calls from Blackstone's bedroom. He then returned and advised Blackstone that "his man was not there."
On March 25, 1996, the officer again phoned Blackstone and indicated that he still wanted to purchase ten ounces of cocaine. Blackstone told the officer to meet him the next morning at his apartment. At that meeting, Blackstone made a phone call and advised he would have to travel to Detroit to get the cocaine. Before the meeting ended the officer gave Blackstone $3,700, one half of the agreed upon price as a down payment, and they agreed to meet in the afternoon. At 2:00 that afternoon the officer was told by Mass that Blackstone was not coming back, but that he would direct the officer to a meeting place with Blackstone. The officer responded by expressing some hesitation about that arrangement, and indicated he wanted to speak with Blackstone. To facilitate this, Mass took the officer to his own apartment where he telephoned Blackstone and handed the phone to the officer. In that conversation, Blackstone told the officer that the police had followed him to Detroit and that defendant would bring him to a place where the sale could be completed. Mass and the officer then got into the officer's car, and, under Mass' direction, they drove to a house in Monroe. As they proceeded, Mass gave the directive to the officer to pull over because he believed a car had been following them. Moreover, when the officer for his part indicated that things did not seem right, Mass reassured him that Blackstone had the officer's "stuff" and that "that part of it was straight." Mass also confided to the officer that if Blackstone had taken him with him to Detroit that he would have made sure the police did not follow.
Upon arrival at the house, Mass got out of the car and began looking up and down the street in the manner of a lookout. Meanwhile Blackstone came out from behind the house, got in the car, and handed the officer a package and said "here is your ten ounces." The officer then paid Blackstone the balance of the purchase price, and drove off alone leaving Mass and Blackstone together in front of the residence.
At the close of the prosecution's case, defense counsel moved for a directed verdict with regard to the delivery and conspiracy charges. The trial court denied the motion stating that a question of fact existed for the jury. Defendant did not testify or present any evidence. In his closing argument defense counsel argued that Mass was a "sad sack, who should pick better friends" but that he had only been present [when Blackstone had delivered the drugs] and was not part of any conspiracy. Following jury instructions, the jury convicted Mass as charged on both counts.
n. THE COURT OF APPEALS OPINION RESOLVING DEFENDANT'S APPEAL
The Court of Appeals affirmed defendant's convictions in a divided opinion. The majority rejected defendant's claim that the evidence was insufficient because the prosecution had presented no evidence that he had knowledge of the quantity of cocaine to be delivered. It concluded that knowledge of the amount of cocaine was not an element of either the delivery charge or the conspiracy charge. The Court also rejected defendant's assertion that People v Justice, supra, required proof of knowledge of the quantity of controlled substances for a conspiracy conviction. Alternatively, the majority said that, even if Justice required the prosecutor to prove that defendant knew the quantity of cocaine involved to support the conspiracy conviction, the evidence was sufficient to show that Mass knew the quantity of cocaine to be delivered.
The Court also indicated there was no flaw in the jury instructions, even though the instructions did not apprise the jury that the prosecution had to prove that defendant knew the quantity of cocaine involved in the transaction. It concluded that, because knowledge of the quantity of drugs is not an element of the crimes charged, the jury instructions did not constitute error. Alternatively, the majority indicated that if knowledge was an element, any error had been forfeited where there had been no objection to the instructions and the alleged error was not outcome determinative.
MCL 333.7401(2)(a)(ii).
MCL 750.157a
462 Mich 877 (2000).
Ten ounces is roughly 280 grams.
Later testing showed the cocaine weighed 246.4 grains.
Defense counsel's sole jury instruction objection concerned the giving of a circumstantial evidence instruction.
The trial court found substantial and compelling reasons to depart from the presumptive twenty- to thirty-year sentences and imposed a tentó twenty-year sentence for each conviction. The prosecutor appealed the sentences and the Court of Appeals reversed and remanded for resentencing. Unpublished opinion per curiam, issued April 14, 1998 (Docket No. 203651). The Court of Appeals held that the trial court had failed to specifically articulate reasons why the factors it identified provided "substantial and compelling" reasons to except the sentences from the presumptive sentences. It also held the trial court had failed to articulate additional justification for the extent of the departure. The Court indicated that it was conceivable that a departure sentence would be appropriate at resentencing. The trial court postponed resentencing defendant until further order of the Court. It appears the trial court is awaiting resolution of defendant's appeal in this Court before going forward with the resentencing.
238 Mich App 333; 605 NW2d 322 (1999).