Case Name: Frances E. Williams, Respondent, v. The United States Mutual Accident Association of the City of New York, Appellant
Court: New York Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1894-12
Citations: 89 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 268
Docket Number: 
Parties: Frances E. Williams, Respondent, v. The United States Mutual Accident Association of the City of New York, Appellant.
Judges: MayhaM, P. J., concurred.
Reporter: Supreme Court Reports (Hun)
Volume: 89
Pages: 268–281

Head Matter:
Frances E. Williams, Respondent, v. The United States Mutual Accident Association of the City of New York, Appellant.
Accident insurance — defense of voluntary exposure to danger- — -negligence as a matter of law — exposure to save life — amendment to an answer on the second trial of an action.
Upon tlie trial of an action brought against an insurance company to recover on a policy of accident insurance, which contained the provision that the insurance “ shall not extend to or cover * * * suicide, felonious or otherwise, sane or insane, * * * voluntary exposure to unnecessary danger, i:' * * or walking on the roadbed or bridge of any railway,” it is for the defendant to establish the defense that the assured, at the time he was killed by being run down by a train on a steam railroad; went upon the tracks in front of the approaching train with a suicidal intent, or that he voluntarily exposed himself to unnecessary danger, and that his death resulted therefrom. The plaintiff is not compelled to show as part of her affirmative case that the deceased did not commit suicide or did not voluntarily expose himself to unnecessary danger.
Voluntary is defined to mean “ done by design or intention; purposely; intentional; not accidental,” and to show a voluntary exposure on the part of the deceased the evidence must disclose a design or intention on his part to expose his life, or a high degree of negligence; something more than ordinary negligence is necessary.
Where a person had time, or had reason to believe ho had time, to cross a railroad track in front of an approaching train, and in crossing fell and was run over by such train, negligence will not be imputed to him as a matter of law.
The law hesitates to impute negligence to a person who has exposed himself to danger for the purpose of saving life.
It is within the discretion of a trial court to allow ail amendment to an answer on the second trial of an action.
Herrick, J., dissenting.
Appeal by the defendant, The United States Mutual Accident Association' of the City of New York, from a judgment of the Supreme Court in favor of the plaintiff, entered in the office of the clerk of the county of Saratoga on the 19th day of April, 1894, upon the verdict of a jury, rendered after a trial at the Saratoga Circuit, and also from an order made at the Saratoga Circuit on the 19th day of. April, 1894, and entered in said clerk’s office, denying the defendant’s motion for a new trial made upon the minutes, with notice of an intention to bring up for review upon such appeal said judgment and order and the exceptions taken upon the trial of the action.
Winsor B. French and Biehcurd L. Fcmd, for the appellant.
Theodore F. Hmnilton and Edgw T. Brachett, for the respondent.

Opinion:
PUTNAM, J.:
This action was brought on a contract of accident insurance by which defendant insured the life of Alonzo C. Williams for the sum . of $5,000 against death through external, violent and accidental means.
On the evening of November 22, 1889, said Alonzo was struck by a locomotive on the crossing of the Adirondack railway track, at Church street, Saratoga Springs, N. Y., and killed. Due proofs of death having been furnished defendant, it became liable to the plaintiff under the insurance contract, unless tlie defenses set up in the answer were established by tlie evidence on tlie trial.
Tlie contract, among other tilings, provided that the insurance " shall not extend to or cover suicide, felonious or otherwise, sane or insane, voluntary exposure to unnecessary danger or walking on the roadbed or bridge of any railway."
Defendant claims that "Williams, at the time he was injured, in going on the railroad track in front of an approaching engine in plain view, and which he saw, acted with a suicidal intent, or, at least, voluntarily exposed himself to unnecessary danger ; that ^ his death resulted from gross negligence, and hence plaintiff was not entitled to recover.
On the first trial plaintiff obtained a judgment, which was reversed by the Court of Appeals (133 N. Y. 366). It is important, therefore, to determine to what'extent, if at all, the facts established on the last trial differ from those appearing on the first.
At the place where Williams was killed the street runs east and west, and the railroad track north and south. Immediately before the accident deceased was coming easterly from some point west of the railroad track. From the opinion of Judge Guay (133 N. Y. 369) it appears that on the first trial the following facts appeared : Williams met two Germans 100 feet east of the railroad track, walking in an opposite direction, and said to them : " Boys, look out for the engine ; maybe he will catch you." One of them replied, " I'm not afraid, my life is insured." The deceased must have turned and retraced his steps, as the engineer on the locomotive, immediately afterwards, saw him standing ten or fifteen feet from the track; 'the train was then going at the rate of four miles an hour ; when the locomotive was about twenty-five feet from the crossing deceased walked- on to the track in front of the approaching cars, and, in the language of the witness, " squatted down " and received the injuries which caused his death; there was no evidence showing that the two Germans were intoxicated; they had gotten off the track when the engine came by, and deceased was not called upon to incur danger in their behalf.
' In his gpinion Judge Geay remarks: " When seen just before the train struck him, he was, at first, standing away from the track •crossing, witli tbe train about twenty-five feet off, and tlien deliberately going upon tbe track, stopping and lowering bis body in front of tbe engine. Tbe men whom be bad met and addressed bad crossed and were away from tbe track. There was no evidence of tbeir coming back upon it, nor of any circumstance requiring tbe assured to change tbe position of safety in which be was, as tbe train was approaching tbe crossing." It being urged by counsel for plaintiff that, as tbe evidence in tlie case was such as to negative tbe idea of any motive on tbe part of Williams to destroy bis life, and as, from tbe facts appearing, another motive might be inferred to account for bis actions at tbe time, the case was not one where tbe court could presume a suicidal intent, or impute negligence on tbe part of deceased, Judge Geay further says: " Tbe argument would be unanswerable in a case where tbe facts were disputed and any at all existed from which an inference was possible that there was a reasonable or excusable cause for tbe occurrence. In tbe present case there is no dispute as to liow tbe accident occurred, nor as to tbe conduct of tbe deceased which permitted it."
On tbe last trial a different state of facts was established — a state of facts which plaintiff claims justly entitled her to the judgment she obtained, under tbe opinion of Judge Geay above referred to.
Tbe witness Powers testified that be was eighty or ninety feet from tbe crossing at tbe time of tbe accident and saw deceased when be met tlie Germans. Instead of such meeting beiyg at a point 100 feet east of tbe track, it was at or a few feet from it. Tbe men were intoxicated, noisy and staggering from side to side of tbe street. As deceased met them at tbe track they all stopped a moment while Williams made some remark which tbe witness did not understand. Williams turned around, apparently motioned to the men to leave tbe track, and then seemingly endeavored to. escape himself, but slipped, and falling was struck by tbe engine. In tbe language of tbe witness, " He saw tbe locomotive and started to get out of tbe way and fell. He slipped; be started to take a step, slipped down and fell." Tbe witness' account of tbe meeting of Williams and tbe two men, on bis cross-examination, which I quote from appellant's points, was as follows: " Mr. Williams, when they were within a foot of tbe railroad, was just across on tbe west side. He came across tbe railroad and met them as they were on tbe east side of tbe railroad track; be met them wben they were about a, foot from the railroad t/radc or on the trade. Tbe cars were tlien probably 30 or 40 feet below. Electric lights were burning and tbe headlight shining and tbe bell ringing, but tbe Dutchmen and Mr. Williams stopped and talked with each other, and tbe cars kept coming. Williams didn't go any further. The Dutchmen went on tbe track. They went on, but they didn't go across. • Williams looked back and motioned them to get off. After the Dutchmen stepped off the track he turned to go off the track, turned southward and he saw the cars, and he whirled and started to run and get out of the way northwestward. He was on the track and turned to get out of the way, turned kind of southward, and it looked to me that he saw that the cars were so close to him that he could not get out of the way and turned northwest to go across. He was about half way across when he turned to go southward."
As the evidence disclosed the fact that Williams was killed in consequence of being struck by a locomotive engine, under the contract of insurance plaintiff was entitled to recover unless defendant made it appear, or the evidence showed, that it was a case of suicide or voluntary exposure to unnecessary danger. It was for the defendant to establish this defense. Plaintiff was not compelled to show, as part of her affirmative case, that Williams did not commit suicide or did not voluntarily expose himself to unnecessary danger. (Van Valkenburgh v. Amer. Popular Life Ins. Co., 70 N. Y. 605; Jones v. The Brooklyn Life Ins. Co., 61 id. 79.)
I am of the opinion that the testimony of Powers and the other evidence in the case presented a question of fact on the issues raised by the pleadings for the jury to pass upon. The jury could have properly found from Powers' testimony that deceased, meeting two drunken men on the railroad track, and in their condition exposed to the danger of being killed by the approaching locomotive, in the attempt to hasten them over the track, unconsciously stepped or remained on it, slipped down and was himself killed. It may be gathered from the evidence that had he not fallen he would not have been run over. He was trying to escape, as Powers testified, and the witness Myers said if he had continued to walk and had not sunk down on the track he could probably have escaped. The jury could well bave found that the death of Williams was the result of a mere accr dent, being occasioned by his slipping down in front of the approach' ing engine. Powers, in one part of his testimony, said deceased met the Germans from one to three feet east of the track; if so, while speaking to the two men and endeavoring to hasten them on their way, he might naturally and unconsciously take a step or two towards them. But the witness is not clear as to the exact location where they met. He said " he met them when they were about a foot from the railroad track, or on the track" In any view of the case I cannot believe that it should be held as matter of law that deceased moved in front of the cars with a suicidal intent or in consequence of a voluntary exposure to unnecessary danger. Yoluntary is defined to mean " done by design or intention; purposely; intentional; not accidental." To show a voluntary exposure on the part of deceased, the evidence must have disclosed a design or intention on his part to expose his life, or a high degree of negligence; something more than mere ordinary negligence. As we have seen, the evidence of Powers allowed the jury to find that seeing two drunken men exposed to danger of being killed by the approaching engine, in the humane desire to save them he unconsciously remained or stepped on the track, slipped, fell and was run over.
It has been held in an action for damages against a railroad corporation, that where one had time, or had reason to believe he had, to cross a railroad track in front of an approaching train, and in crossing fell and was.injured, negligence would not be imputed to him as matter of law. (See Baxter v. Second Ave. R. R. Co., 30 How. 219; Belton v. Baxter et al., 58 N. Y. 411; Bernhard v. Rens. & Saratoga R. R. Co., 1 Abb. Ct. App. Dec. 131.)
So, Williams, as the jury could have found, had he not fallen,, would have had time to leave the track before the engine struck him, and hence, could not, as matter of law, be deemed to have been even negligent. Certainly, under the circumstances, the jury could properly determine that he should not be held to have been guilty of that degree of negligence which was equivalent to a voluntary exposure of his life to danger.
The law hesitates to impute negligence'to one who has exposed himself to danger for the purpose of saving life. (Tucker v. Mut. Ben. Life Co., 50 Hun, 50; 121 N. Y. 718; Eckert v. R. R. Co., 43 id. 502.) Deceased, if the witness Powers is to be credited, at tbe time of tlie accident, was engaged in a humane effort to save two drunken men from injury oir death. There is no reason to doubt that the men were in peril, or that Williams thought so. When the latter met them, the locomotive, going four miles an hour, or five feet per second (according to appellant's computation), was thirty feet distant (as Powers testified), and required only six seconds to reach them. Men under the influence of liquor, staggering from side to side of the street, and on or quite near the track, with an engine only six seconds distant, could properly be deemed in a dangerous position. It should also be remembered that from the time Williams met the Germans until he was struck -was also only six seconds. He was compelled to act hastily and without time for reflection. These facts have an important bearing on the questions involved in the case. I think under the testimony the jury were justified in determining that the death of Williams was caused by accidental means; that. there was no evidence sufficient to establish the fact that he died in. consequence of a voluntary exposure to unnecessary danger. The evidence rather shows that his death was the result of the accident of his slipping down on the track when he was endeavoring to escape from the engine; that he had inadvertently stepped or remained on the track while endeavoring to save the two men from injury.
The jury was authorized to credit the evidence given by the witness Powers. lie was not impeached. Nothing in his testimony rendered his statement incredible; nor was the preponderance of contradictory evidence so great as to authorize the trial judge to withdraw his testimony from the consideration of the jury. His statement of the transaction was the more probable one, and the jury was justified in believing it. First. As to the two Germans being intoxicated. They admitted having come from a liquor saloon where they each drank three glasses of beer and had passed a jDortion of the afternoon before meeting Williams. The remark of Williams — " Boys, look out for the engine; maybe he will catch you " — to them, is not one that lie would probably have made to two sober men, strangers to him, but a natural' remark to men under the influence of liquor and exposed to danger from an approaching engine. Again, it was shown by two witnesses that when struck Williams gave a long, loud and shrill scream. Yolger, who was much nearer than these witnesses, did not hear the scream, and the other German testified to hearing a noise, but does not mention the cry of Williams when struck by the locomotive. If these men were sober, and within twenty or twenty-five feet of deceased when he was struck, it was strange that one or both should not have noticed a sound that attracted the attention of Galusha and Yan Doren, who were much further away. On the whole, it is extremely probable that Powers told the truth when he testified that the two men were intoxicated.
Again, the whole account of the transaction given by Powérs, in connection with other evidence in the case, was the more probable and reasonable one. Prom such account, and the other testimony, the following state of facts appeared: Williams was a man over sixty years of age, religious, of exemplary habits, of good character and cheerful disposition, and not in seriously embarrassed circumstances. ITe had left his home a short time before to make a business call west of the railroad track, and was returning when the accident occurred. In coming east he crossed the track, a locomotive was approaching, and he met two intoxicated Germans, staggering and noisy, and he made the remark to them above cpioted. The cars were almost upon them. Tie turned and motioned to them to cross and in so doing, doubtless, stepped on to the track. Turning to escape he slipped, and falling, was run over.
On the other hand, the theory of defendant, founded on the testimony of the two Germans and Myers, is that Williams, a man, as above described — religious, cheerful, of good character and exemplary habits — coming across the railroad track and meeting the two men, who were sober and presumably acting like sober men, 100 feet east of the track, said: "Boys,- look out for the engine; maybe he will catch you." After he passed the two sober men he turned, followed them back to the railroad track, and then, in the language of Myers, " squatted down " on the track in front of the approaching locomotive. It seems to me that the jury was fully justified in believing the probable story of the transaction as related by Powers and in not believing the improbable and almost incredible statement of the two Germans.
I have not overlooked tbe testimony of the witness Myers, that the first he saw of Williams the latter was ten or fifteen feet from the track, and from that point walked directly in front of the locomotive. It was for the jury to determine whicli of the two witnesses, Powers or Myei-s, gave a correct statement of the transaction. If, however, Williams did, in his desire to hasten the two intoxicated men from a position which he thought dangerous, went back a few steps on to the track, that fact would not compel a reversal of the judgment. It did not show a voluntary exposure to unnecessary danger. As above suggested, the evidence indicates that when he went, or was on the track, he probably would have had time to move out of the way of the engine had he not slipped and fallen, and that his death was Caused by the accident of his fall.
It will not be doubted that in fact deceased accidentally fell, as Powers testified, instead of " squatting down " on the track, according to Myers' statement.
The learned counsel for the appellant is not correct in his statement that four witnesses swore positively that Powers was not present at the time of the accident. The witnesses referred to simply testified that they did not see him there. It was shown that there was " quite a crowd " of people who gathered immediately after the accident, and the attention of the witnesses was not called to who were present.
It was clearly within the discretion of the court below whether or not to allow an amendment to the answer on the second trial of the case. Other questions were raised which I do not think necessary to discuss.
I conclude that the learned trial judge was justified in submitting the questions of fact involved in the case to the jury, and that the verdict was sustained by the evidence.
The judgment should be affirmed, with costs.
MayhaM, P. J., concurred.