Case Name: Nathaniel Stevens versus Robert Reeves
Court: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
Jurisdiction: Massachusetts
Decision Date: 1829-11
Citations: 9 Pick. 198
Docket Number: 
Parties: Nathaniel Stevens versus Robert Reeves.
Judges: 
Reporter: Massachusetts Reports
Volume: 26
Pages: 201–205

Head Matter:
Nathaniel Stevens versus Robert Reeves.
A person entering into a contract is not bound by the usage of a particular business, unless it is so general as to furnish a presumption of knowledge, or it is proved that he was acquainted with it.
It was a rule in a woollen factory in Andover and some other neighbouring factories, that no person employed should leave their service without giving a fortnight’s notice of his intention to quit. A weaver, who did not know of this rule, worked in the factory without any agreement as to the terms of service, but was paid by the yard for the work which he turned out. He left the factory without giving any previous notice. Held, that the rule was not binding on him, and that he therefore was not liable to an action for damages by the owner of the factory, for thus leaving.
This was assumpsit for a breach of contract of the defendant in quitting the service of the plaintiff, in which he was engaged as a weaver, without giving a fortnight’s previous notice.
In the Common Pleas, where the parties agreed upon a case, a nonsuit was directed ; and the case was brought before this Court by exceptions.
The facts, as agreed by the parties, are as follows.
On the 3d of-July, 1828, Reeves, the defendant, came to the woollen factory of the plaintiff in Andover, and asked the overseer of the weaving room “ if he had a loom idle,” and on being answered in the affirmative, engaged to work on a loom there. On the second week of Reeves’s engagement, he left his work at the factory without notice or leave, and was absent two or three days, and then returned and resumed his work. Reeves was paid for his work by the piece, at the same rate a yard as the other weavers in the same factory. When he had earned about ten dollars, Stevens, at his request, paid him that amount. At the time Stevens made this payment be knew, but not from Reeves himself, that Reeves had engaged a loom in another factory. About the 21st of July, Reeves left the employment of Stevens without his consent, and without having given any previous notice to Stevens.
No agreement was made between the parties as to the price that Reeves should receive for his labor, nor as to the time that he should continue in Stevens’s employment, other than may be implied from the circumstances of the case. It was proved that it was the usage in Stevens’s factory, to give a fortnight’s notice before quitting, and this was generally understood by the workmen. But Reeves had no information given him of this usage, and there was no notice of it posted up ; and it is not usually communicated to those who labor in the factory, at the time of their engagement. It was proved that there was a similar usage in other factories in the vicinity, and that notice of it was commonly posted up with other rules. In every factory there are certain rules for the regulation of the workmen, in respect to their quitting the factory.
Reeves constantly follows the occupation of a weaver, but at the time when he was engaged by the plaintiff he had just arrived in this country.
Stevens sustained an actual damage in consequence ol Reeves’s quitting his service.
The case was argued in writing, by Spaulding, for the plain tiff, and Crosby, for the defendant.
Spaulding contended,
that when the defendant entered1 as a weaver into the service of the plaintiff, as he made no specific contract, he impliedly agreed to serve upon the same terms as the other persons employed in the same factory, and to be bound by the rules of the factory ; and that the defendant, by leaving without notice, broke his contract, and thereby became liable to pay the plaintiff the damages which it is admitted the plaintiff suffered in consequence. It is obvious that the defendant knew of the usage of the factory in this respect, otherwise he would not, when he applied for his pay, have concealed his intention of leaving. But he is bound by the usage, whether he in fact knew it or not. Every factory has rules. If he neglected to ascertain the rules of the factory in which he was going to serve, it was his own fault. The pay which he received was calculated according to the rules of the factory, as he made no special agreement on the subject, and he no doubt could have recovered it according to that rate. If he is entitled to the benefit of the rules, he ought to be bound by them. The usage of an individual is binding on any one dealing with him, who is acquainted with it. But thevpractice of giving notice is not col-fined to the plaintiff’s factory, it is a general usage in the vicinity. It is a reasonable usage, and for the benefit of both parties. Where a person enters into a contract in a particular business, the legal effect of it is regulated by the usages of this business, even where the party is in fact ignorant of them. The present case is somewhat like that of a person dealing with a bank. He is bound by the usage of the bank, even where it changes the legal effect of the contract. The case is also analogous to .hat of landlord and tenant. The right to notice to quit arises from the mere existence of the relation, without any special agreement; and so, in particular places, Loth landlord and tenant are bound by the usages of the place in which the land lies. — He cited Sumner v. Williams, 8 Mass. R. 214 ; Winthrop v. Carleton, 12 Mass. R. 4 ; Edie v. East India Company, 2 Burr. 1221 ; Hodgson v. Davies, 2 Campb. 530 ; Jones v. Fales, 4 Mass. R. 251 ; Widgery v. Munroe, 6 Mass. R. 449 ; Weld v. Gorham, 10 Mass. R. 366 ; Lincoln and Kennebec Bank v. Page, 9 Mass. R. 155 ; Goodenow v. Tyler, 7 Mass. R. 36 ; Floyer v. Edwards, 1 Cowp. 112, cited with approbation by Lord Mansfield in Jestons v. Brooke, 2 Cowp. 795 ; Williams v. Gilman, 2 Greenleaf, 281 ; the proviso in St. 1783, c. 55, § 2 ; Loring v. Gurney, 5 Pick. 15 ; Noble v. Kennoway, 2 Doug. 510 ; 2 Stark. Ev. 453; Robinson v. Hindman, 3 Esp. R. 235; Co. Litt. 11 b, 115 b; Jones on Bailm. 54, 56, 66, 103; 1 Com. Contr. 5 et seq.; Loring v. Bacon, 4 Mass. R. 576 ; Bachelder v. Fiske, 17 Mass. R. 469 ; Powley v. Walker, 5 T. R. 373 ; Pasley v. Freeman, 3 T. R. 63.
Crosby.
The rule of the plaintiff’s factory on the subject °f not’ce> cannot affect the contract of service entered into by the defendant, as it was not a well established, general, and uni form usage. The evidence shows the usage to exist only in the plaintiff’s factory and others in the immediate vicinity. 2 Stark. Ev. 451, 453 ; Wood v. Wood, 1 Carr. & Payne, 59 , Yates v. Pym, 6 Taunt. 446 ; Phil. Ev. 490; Smith v. Wright, 1 Caines’s R. 43 ; Barber v. Brace, 3 Connect. R. 9. The private usages of individuals and corporations, such as of particular carriers, banks, and merchants, are binding on a person who deals with them, only where he is acquainted with those usages. In the present case the defendant, who it is clear did not know the rule of the plaintiff’s factory, could not be bound by it. On this .point he cited,.besides some of the cases referred to by the plaintiff, Blanchard v. Hilliard, 11 Mass. R. 85 ; City Bank v. Cutter, 3 Pick. 414 ; Peirce v. Butler, 14 Mass. R. 303 ; Baxter v. Rodman, 3 Pick. 435 ; Barney v. Coffin, 3 Pick. 115; Haven v. Wentworth, 2 N. Hamp. R. 93 ; Smith v. Horne, 8 Taunt. 144 ; Kerr v. Willan, 2 Stark. R. 53 ; Gouger v. Jolly, 1 Holt’s N. P. R. 317.

Opinion:
Parker C. J.
drew up the opinion of the Court. This ac tion is brought to recover damagés against the defendant, for quitting the plaintiff's service, in violation of an alleged contract, that, having entered into the service, he would not quit it without leave, unless he had given a fortnight's notice of his intention to quit.
It does not appear that the defendant engaged his services for any length of time. He asked leave to work at an unoccupied loom, worked a few days, went away, returned in a short time and worked upon another loom. He was to be paid according to the work turned out, and not by the year, month, or day. There was no stipulation for any particular time ; so that there is no express or implied contract that he would remain for any certain time ; unless such contract is to be implied from what is set up in evidence, as a usage of this and the neighbouring factories, that all who are employed, shall be held to remain until a fortnight after they give notice of their intention to quit. In order to make this a part of the contract, as the usage supposed is a particular one, and not a general custom, it should have appeared, that the defendant knew of the usage when he entered upon the work or before he left it. This is required in order to give effect to a particular usage, so as to operate upon a contract. It is so with the usages of banks, and all other usages not of so general a nature as to furnish a presumption of knowledge. There is no such evidence in this case ; on the contrary, it appears that the defendant was a stranger in the country, that he was not informed of any usage, and that no notice of it was posted up among the rules and orders of the factory.
The cases cited are all either of general usages, or of particular customs, of which the party to be bound was proved or presumed to have notice.
The plaintiff must be nonsuited.
See Wood v. Hickok, 2 Wendell, 501 ; Naylor v. Semmes, 4 Gill & Johns 274; Donnell v. Columbian Ins. Co. 2 Sumner, 366.
See Bank of Washington v. Triplett, 1 Peters, 25; Whitwell v. Johnson, 17 Mass. R. 452; Mills v. Bank of U. States, 1 Wheaton, 431; Bank of Columbia v. M'Gruder, 6 Har. & Johns. 180.