Case Name: NORTH COUNTY PARENTS ORGANIZATION FOR CHILDREN WITH SPECIAL NEEDS, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, Defendant and Respondent
Court: Court of Appeal of the State of California
Jurisdiction: California
Decision Date: 1994-03-10
Citations: 23 Cal. App. 4th 144
Docket Number: No. D016698
Parties: NORTH COUNTY PARENTS ORGANIZATION FOR CHILDREN WITH SPECIAL NEEDS, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, Defendant and Respondent.
Judges: 
Reporter: California Appellate Reports, Fourth Series
Volume: 23
Pages: 144–154

Head Matter:
[No. D016698.
Fourth Dist., Div. One.
Mar. 10, 1994.]
NORTH COUNTY PARENTS ORGANIZATION FOR CHILDREN WITH SPECIAL NEEDS, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, Defendant and Respondent.
Counsel
Charles Wolfinger for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Joseph R. Symkowick, Roger D. Wolfertz and Carolyn Pirillo for Defendant and Respondent.

Opinion:
Opinion
FROEHLICH, J.
The issue in this case is whether the California Department of Education (Department) is entitled to charge its full cost of providing copies of public documents which are requested in accordance with the California Public Records Act. (Gov. Code, § 6250 et seq.)
North County Parents Organization for Children With Special Needs (appellant) is a nonprofit tax-exempt corporation which provides advisory services to parents of children with disabilities. Appellant assists such parents in enforcing their rights to special educational services provided by state and federal laws. Parents seeking review of local school district action respecting such services may take advantage of an appellate hearing process. The decisions resulting from this process are public records maintained by the Department.
Appellant requested copies of all decisions rendered in the last two years. Department charged $.25 per page for furnishing the copies, rendering a total bill of $126.50. This charge not only covered the cost of duplication of the documents, but also reimbursed Department for staff time involved in searching the records, reviewing records for information exempt from disclosure under law, and deleting such exempt information. Department refused to reduce this charge, and also refused to waive the charge upon the ground that "there is no legal authority to waive such charges." Appellant paid the charge and then brought this action seeking miscellaneous relief.
The trial court ruled for the Department, finding that section 6257 permits the Department to charge "the full direct costs of duplication," and that the Department's charge of $.25 per copy "was not in contravention of section 6257." The court made a second ruling pertaining to the potential of waiver of fees. It ruled that the Department had discretion to waive fees pursuant to section 6253.1, but that it was not required to waive fees and did not err in this case by refusing to consider waiver. Appellant contends both rulings are in error.
We agree with appellant. Section 6257 provides that one who requests copies of public documents must pay the statutory fee for same, if there is one. The parties agree there is none prescribed in this case. Lacking a statutory fee the cost chargeable is a "fee[] covering direct costs of duplication." There seems to be little dispute as to what "duplicate" means. It means just what we thought it did, before looking it up: to make a copy. (See Black's Law Dict. (4th ed. 1968) p. 593 ["to . . . reproduce exactly"]; Webster's Third New Internal, Diet. (1981) p. 702 ["to be or make a duplicate, copy or transcript . . ."].) Since words of a statute are to be interpreted "according to the usual, ordinary import of the language employed in framing them" (In re Alpine (1928) 203 Cal. 731, 737 [265 P. 947, 58 A.L.R. 1500]), we conclude that the cost chargeable by the Department for furnishing these copies is the cost of copying them.
There is no disagreement with the proposition that the Department was put to a great amount of trouble responding to appellant's request, much of which had nothing to do with copying. Records were searched, documents were read for any material to be excised, such material was removed, files were refiled, etc.
We sometimes presume too much of the Legislature, but this is assuredly not the case when we presume that the statute writers, themselves bureaucrats of a sort, knew the ancillary costs of everything government does. They specified, however, that the sole charge should be that for duplication. In order to clarify this limitation the Legislature added that the fee should be the "direct cost" of duplication. Obviously to be excluded from this definition would be "indirect" costs of duplication, which presumably would cover the types of costs the Department would like to fold into the charge.
The parties to this appeal argue earnestly about the policy considerations which should go into this momentous decision (whether to charge $.10 or $.25 per copy). We do not reach these arguments. Clearly the Legislature could have provided a different charge for copying. It simply did not, and the reason it did not is of no moment to the Court of Appeal, a body which simply interprets statutes and does not ordinarily seek their rationale.
However, if our quick conclusion needs any bolstering it is easy to find in the statutory history of this fee-setting provision. The originad wording, adopted in 1968 (Stats. 1968, ch. 1473, § 39, p. 2948), was that "a reasonable fee" could be charged. In 1975 an amendment limited the "reasonable fee" to not more than $.10 per page. (Stats. 1975, ch. 1246, § 8, p. 3212.) An amendment in 1976 deleted "reasonable fee" and inserted instead "the actual cost of providing the copy." (Stats. 1976, ch. 822, § 1, p. 1890.) Finally, the present version of the statute was adopted in 1981 limiting the fee to the "direct costs of duplication." (§ 6257.) Thus it can be seen that the trend has been to limit, rather than to broaden, the base upon which the fee may be calculated. A "reasonable fee" or the "actual cost of providing the copy" could be interpreted to include the cost of all the various tasks associated with locating and pulling the file, excising material, etc. When these phrases are replaced by the more restrictive phrase "direct costs of duplication," only one conclusion seems possible. The direct cost of duplication is the cost of running the copy machine, and conceivably also the expense of the person operating it. "Direct cost" does not include the ancillary tasks necessarily associated with the retrieval, inspection and handling of the file from which the copy is extracted.
We apprehend that the court's second ruling was also in error. It may be thought that the error was either inadvertent or insignificant. However, being called upon herein to right wrongs which might seem inconsequential to most, we complete our task by identifying this one. As stipulated by the parties, the Department refused to waive fees because it determined there was no legal authority to do so. The trial court, to the contrary, concluded that the Department did have the power to. waive fees, citing section 6253.1. This section gives an agency power to "adopt requirements for itself which allow greater access to records than prescribed by the minimum standards set forth in this chapter." The trial court apparently concluded that this provision permits an agency to waive or reduce its fees. We agree. A reduction in copy fee permits "greater access" to records.
The trial court then, however, found no obligation to reduce the fee and hence no actionable wrong by the Department. Our difficulty with this ruling is that it ignores the fact that the Department declined to exercise discretion, contending it had none. Had the Department been aware that it was vested with discretion to reduce the fee, it might have done so. We believe, therefore, that the case should be returned to the Department with instructions to consider (but not necessarily to grant) the request for fee waiver.
Section 6258 provides: "Any person may institute proceedings for injunctive or declarative relief or writ of mandate . to enforce his or her right to inspect or to receive a copy of any public record . . . ." This lawsuit clearly comes within this provision, and hence appellant's requests for writs, orders and declarations are proper. We decline, however, to grant such specific relief. As indicated by the general counsel, the Department will surely follow the law once it is advised of it. Appellant is entitled to a declaration of its right to obtain copies at a cost of only the expense of copying, and it is also entitled to our advice that the Department could waive this fee if it chose to do so. By this opinion we have granted these declarations. Appellant is also entitled to a refund of some portion of the fee it has already paid, and also to costs both at trial and appellate level. The statute (§ 6259, subd. (d)) contains authority for an award of attorney fees to appellant. All these matters are best determined by the trial court, assuming (which we would expect is a false assumption) that the parties cannot now resolve their dispute by stipulation.
Disposition
We reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the case for further proceedings in accord with this opinion.
Work, Acting P. J., concurred.
All statutory references are to the Government Code unless otherwise specified.