Case Name: Larry B. McCULLOUGH v. STATE of Mississippi
Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Mississippi
Decision Date: 1999-10-21
Citations: 750 So. 2d 1212
Docket Number: No. 98-KA-00364-SCT
Parties: Larry B. McCULLOUGH v. STATE of Mississippi.
Judges: BEFORE PRATHER, C.J., MILLS AND COBB, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 750
Pages: 1212–1225

Head Matter:
Larry B. McCULLOUGH v. STATE of Mississippi.
No. 98-KA-00364-SCT.
Supreme Court of Mississippi.
Oct. 21, 1999.
J.B. Goodsell, Clinton, Attorney for Appellant.
Office of the Attorney General by W. Glenn Watts, Attorney for Appellee.
BEFORE PRATHER, C.J., MILLS AND COBB, JJ.

Opinion:
MILLS, Justice,
for the Court:
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
¶ 1. Larry B. McCullough appeals from his conviction in the Yazoo County Circuit Court for aggravated assault and from his sentence of ten (10) years in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections. On appeal, he assigns as error the following issues, which are taken verbatim from his brief:
I. DID THE TRIAL COURT COMMIT REVERSIBLE ERROR IN ALLOWING EVIDENCE THAT THE DEFENDANT HAD SHOT SOMEONE IN AN UNRELATED PAST INCIDENT WHICH OCCURRED WHEN THE DEFENDANT WAS A JUVENILE?
II. DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN NOT GRANTING A CONTINUANCE WHEN THE STATE INFORMED THE DEFENSE THAT IT INTENDED TO IMPEACH THE DEFENDANT'S TESTIMONY WITH A PRIOR ACT THAT WAS NOT DISCLOSED TO THE DEFENSE UNTIL THE DAY OF TRIAL?
III. DID THE COURT ERR IN ALLOWING THE STATE TO USE A PRIOR FELONY CONVICTION OF POSSESSION OF COCAINE TO CHALLENGE THE CREDIBILITY OF DEFENSE WITNESS DEVON REESE?
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
¶ 2. On April 3, 1997, outside the Red Barn Store in Yazoo City, Mississippi, Larry B. McCullough shot Darrell Waller in the leg with a .38 caliber revolver. The store was located across the street from McCullough's home. Darrell Waller and Ted Sibley testified that when McCullough saw them at the store across the street, he crossed the street with Devon Reese and asked Waller, "What's up?" and "Why did you jump on me last night?" According to McCullough, "in the streets, the words, What's up?" are fighting words." McCullough was referring to an altercation which took place between McCullough and Sibley the night before at Lisa's Lounge in which Waller alleges he took no part. After those words were exchanged, according to Waller and Sibley, McCullough fired two shots at Waller as Waller sat down in the car in which they were driving.
¶ 3. McCullough's recollection of the events differs from that of Waller and Sibley. According to McCullough, he and Reese were crossing the street when they saw Sibley. They did not acknowledge Sibley, as there had been an altercation the previous evening and they did not want any trouble. They walked up onto the porch of the Red Barn Store, and Darrell Waller opened the door and came outside onto the porch. According to McCullough, he and Reese stepped to the side to let Waller pass, again trying to avoid any trouble, and Waller said to McCullough, "What's up?" thereby initiating the altercation. McCullough claims that he ran away because he was afraid, and he shot behind him as he ran. He testified that he did not even know anyone had been shot until later when someone told him. However, McCullough also testified that he shot Waller in self-defense as he saw Waller reach for a weapon concealed behind his back. Waller argued that he did not have a weapon, nor did he reach into his back pocket for anything, as alleged by McCullough.
¶4. After a trial in the Yazoo County Circuit Court, McCullough was convicted of aggravated assault and sentenced to serve ten years in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections. It is from that conviction and sentence that he appeals to this Court.
¶ 5. McCullough first submitted an incomplete brief to this Court which listed issues which he apparently intended to discuss but did not At the direction of this Court, he then submitted his amended brief. We will discuss only the issues presented in the amended brief, as the original brief was not supported by argument or law.
I. DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN ADMITTING EVIDENCE OF McCullough's prior bad ACT?
¶ 6. McCullough claims that the trial court committed reversible error when it allowed evidence of a prior bad act in violation of M.R.E. 404(b). The evidence elicited from McCullough was evidence of a prior shooting that occurred when he was fourteen. Prior to admission of the testimony, the defense made a motion in limine to exclude the testimony from trial as it was extremely prejudicial and in violation of M.R.E. 404(b). The trial court denied the motion and ruled that it would allow the testimony. Before calling McCullough, the defense again objected to the admission of the evidence of the prior bad act. The court overruled the objection. Prior to presenting the evidence of the prior shooting, McCullough's attorney made clear upon the record first, that he objected to the admission of the evidence and, second, that he would introduce the evidence himself for the purpose of minimizing the damage that the testimony promised his client. The defense then elicited the evidence of the prior shooting on direct examination. The testimony was as follows:
Q. Have you ever shot anybody before?
A. Yes.
Q. How old were you?
A. Around 14 or 15.
Q. Were you prosecuted?
A. No, I didn't go to court or nothing for it, no.
¶ 7. The prior shooting was also briefly mentioned by the prosecution on cross-examination. That testimony was as follows:
Q. When do you not carry your gun?
A. I never did carry a gun.
Q. You carried it when you shot the guy when you were 15.
A. It wasn't my gun.
¶ 8. M.R.E. 404(b) states as follows:
(b) Other Crimes, Wrongs, or Acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowl edge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.
¶ 9. The admission of the prior shooting was clearly inadmissible character evidence in violation of M.R.E. 404(b). However, the general rule is that a defendant may not, himself, introduce evidence at trial and then assert on appeal that the admission of the evidence constituted reversible error. Hobson v. State, 730 So.2d 20, 24-25 (Miss.1998). Hobson involved the typical situation wherein the defendant elicits testimony that is otherwise inadmissible and then objects to subsequent allusion to or inquiry into that testimony by the prosecution. Id. Hobson elicited inad-missable hearsay testimony on cross-examination. Id. Subsequently, on re-direct the prosecution addressed that testimony. Idl Hobson then complained on appeal that the testimony should not have been allowed. Id. In finding that no error had been committed, the Court correctly stated the general rule as noted above and went on to state: "If the defendant goes fishing in the state's waters, he must take such fish as he catches." Id. (citing Fleming v. State, 604 So.2d 280, 289 (Miss.1992). However, the facts surrounding the admission of the testimony in the case sub judice are unique. In Hobson, there was no motion in limine to exclude the evidence that was eventually brought out by Hobson himself. Hobson had no reason to believe that the prosecution was even going to attempt to introduce the hearsay testimony that Hobson ultimately elicited from the witness; therefore, Hobson had no excuse for his introducing testimony that would otherwise have been inadmissible. In the present case, McCullough made a motion in limine to have the evidence excluded. Once the trial court denied McCullough's motion, McCullough had to proceed according to the court's ruling; that is, McCullough and his attorney based their strategy on the knowledge that the prosecution was going to be allowed to introduce the evidence of the prior shooting. This strategy dictated that McCullough introduce the evidence himself to limit its effect. Therefore, the admissibility of the testimony in Hobson is distinct from the admissibility of the evidence in the case sub judice.
¶ 10. The evidence was obviously in direct violation of M.R.E. 404(b) as he argued in his motion hearing. However, the trial judge ruled that the evidence of the prior shooting, which took place when McCullough was fourteen or fifteen and which would have been prohibited by M.R.E. 609(d) as well had it been prosecuted to a conclusion, would be admissible to impeach because the defendant was "going to take the witness stand to testify. And if the State wants to put his character into evidence at that point by asking him about it, I can't see how you can get around — uh—the admissibility under 404(b)." McCullough's attorney replied, "Your Honor, under 404(b), evidence of other crimes, wrong -", but was interrupted by the court as follows: "Okay, I understand all of that, but that's what— if you put him on the witness stand to testify and the State asks him about his character, under 404(b) then it becomes admissible."
¶ 11. There was obviously a great deal of confusion concerning M.R.E. 404(b) and when evidence of prior crimes is admissible. The dialogue continued as follows:
MR. GOODSELL [attorney for McCullough]: Okay, is it proof of the motive, opportunity, intent? I mean what -
MR. HOLMES [assistant district attorney]: Certainly proof of motive, Your Honor. That's exactly over and over and over again Mr. Goodsell has put in front of this jury, "What's the motive? Why? Why did he do it? Why did he do it?" This would be proof of motive.
MR. GOODSELL: Well, Your Honor, how does, if he has been involved in a shooting when he was 14 years old and was not prosecuted, how does this make him any more or any less likely to have used self-defense than the shooting now?
THE COURT: If we get to that point, the Court will give a cautionary instruction on what the jury is to use that evidence, how they are to consider that evidence. But once you put him on the witness stand, you open the door for 404(b).
MR. GOODSELL: Okay. One other thing, Your Honor, in addition, we would ask for a continuance, because we'd like to find the victim of this first one, or alleged victim, it was not prosecuted, so we could call him to testify. Because what I understand from the facts, the guy pulled a knife on Larry, and Larry did shoot him.
THE COURT: Objection is overruled. Anything further? (Pause) Bring in the jury-
¶ 12. Although the evidence was eventually admitted by McCullough, Goodsell, McCullough's attorney, made clear upon the record that his intent in entering the evidence himself was a strategic move exercised only due to the ruling of the court that the evidence would be admitted over objection. The strategy was to minimize the certain prejudice that would befall his client by the introduction of the prior shooting. Goodsell's explanation to the court was as follows:
MR. GOODSELL: Your Honor, it is my understanding, like in the previous witness, that the State intends for, I suppose, impeachment purposes, to ask the defendant has he ever been involved in shooting someone before, which I believe he's going to answer in the affirmative. I am going to ask that on direct examination and, but for the ruling of the Court, I would not ask that. So I just want to make that clear, and I still object to the question being or that the evidence being put before the jury is not probative as to this guilt or innocence.
¶ 13. As previously stated a defendant generally cannot use as grounds for appeal the improper introduction of evidence which he, himself, introduced. Hobson v. State, 730 So.2d at 24-25. However, according to the Mississippi Rules of Professional Conduct 1.3, it is an attorney's duty to zealously defend his or her client. Once the trial court put the defense counsel in that posture, this Court should not, by procedurally barring the issue, penalize the defense for attempting to minimize the damage done by the improper evidence. Therefore, we address the issue on the merits.
¶ 14. The trial court ruled that evidence of an identical prior bad act was admissible in direct violation of M.R.E. 404(b). In the case sub judice, McCullough was tried for shooting a man, and he alleged the shots were fired in self defense. The prior bad act introduced into evidence over objection in the trial court was a shooting that took place when McCullough was fourteen or fifteen years old. In that shooting McCullough also claimed the shots were fired in self defense. The evidence of the prior shooting plainly does not fit within an exception to the M.R.E. 404(b) bar on introduction of such evidence.
¶ 15. In addition to the fact that the evidence should have been excluded under Rule 404(b), it is also readily apparent that the trial court committed error by not subjecting the evidence to scrutiny under Rule 403. Rule 403 states that:
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury....
The Court has stated:
Evidence admissible under Rule 404(b) is subject to the prejudice test of Rule 403, and a trial court is required to consider whether the probative value of the questionable evidence is outweighed by undue prejudice. Rule 4Ó3 is an ultimate filter through which all otherwise admissible evidence must pass.
Jenkins v. State, 507 So.2d 89, 93 (Miss.1987) (emphasis added).
¶ 16. In the case sub judice, the record does not disclose that the trial court judge considered whether the probative value of the prior shooting was substantially outweighed by the undue prejudice that might result if it were introduced. Therefore, we can only assume that the evidence was not filtered through Rule 403 before being ruled admissible. Since the evidence should not have been allowed under Rule 404(b) in the first place, it is an elementary conclusion that the evidence would not have been permitted under Rule 403. Therefore, the introduction of the evidence was reversible error.
II. DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN NOT GRANTING A CONTINUANCE WHEN THE STATE INFORMED THE DEFENSE THAT IT INTENDED TO IMPEACH THE DEFENDANT'S TESTIMONY WITH A PRIOR ACT THAT WAS NOT DISCLOSED TO THE DEFENSE UNTIL THE DAY OF TRIAL?
¶ 17. On the day of the trial, the prosecution informed McCullough that it intended to impeach McCullough's testimony using evidence of the prior shooting discussed in issue one. As stated above, the prior shooting was a youth court matter that was never prosecuted. McCullough objected to the use of the evidence and requested a continuance. The State claimed that it had learned of the prior shooting only that morning from Detective Wallace, and the evidence was not discoverable anyway.
¶ 18. McCullough objected to the introduction of this evidence on the basis of unfair surprise pursuant to UCCCR 9.04, in addition to his initial objection to the substance of the evidence.
In Duplantis v. State, 644 So.2d 1235 (Miss.1994), this Court stated:
Box v. State, 437 So.2d 19 (Miss.1983) (Robertson, J., specially concurring), first set forth the procedure trial courts should follow when confronted with a discovery violation. Miss. Unif.Crim. R. Cir. Ct. Prac. 4.06 [now Uniform Circuit and County Court Rule 9.04] now reflects the Box procedure. This procedure is equally applicable in capital cases.
When faced with previously undisclosed evidence to which the defendant has objected, the trial court should give the defendant a reasonable opportunity to familiarize himself with the evidence. If the defendant thereafter believes he may be prejudiced by admission of the evidence because of his lack of opportunity to prepare to meet it, he must request a continuance. Should the defendant fail to request a continuance, he has waived the issue. If he indeed requests a continuance, the state may opt to proceed without the undisclosed evidence, else the trial court must grant the continuance. Failure to follow'the Box guidelines is prejudicial error, requiring reversal and remand.
Snelson v. State, 704 So.2d 452, 458 (Miss.1997) (citations omitted).
¶ 19. Since the defense was not presented with the evidence until the morning of trial, and McCullough requested a continuance which was denied, this Court finds prejudicial error.
III. DID THE COURT ERR IN ALLOWING THE STATE TO USE A PRIOR FELONY CONVICTION OF POSSESSION OF COCAINE TO CHALLENGE THE CREDIBILITY OF DEFENSE WITNESS DEVON REESE?
¶ 20. McCullough asserts that the attack upon defense witness, Devon Reese, by use of a
prior conviction was improper and in violation of M.R.E. 609(a). The testimony elicited from Reese was as follows:
Q. Have you ever been convicted of a crime?
A. Yeah.
Q. And what was that?
A. Uh—possession of cocaine.
¶ 21. Although McCullough did not preserve the issue for appeal due to his failure to make a contemporaneous objection, this Court will discuss the issue anyway. Johnson v. State, 477 So.2d 196 (Miss.1985).
¶ 22. M.R.E. 609(a) states as follows:
(a) General Rule. For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence that he has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted if elicited from him or established by public record during cross-examination but only if the crime (1) was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year under the law under which he was convicted, and the court determines that the probative value of admitting this evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect on a party or (2) involved dishonesty or false statement, regardless of the punishment.
¶ 23. The official comment to M.R.E. 608 discusses the situation at bar as follows:
Subsection [608](b) prohibits the impeachment of a witness by specific acts of conduct, but it provides two important exceptions. First, a witness may be impeached by a criminal conviction. Rule 609 governs the kinds of criminal convictions which may be used to attack a witness. Mississippi has traditionally allowed a witness to be impeached by evidence of a criminal conviction but not by other specific acts. See Vick v. Cockran[Cochran], 316 So.2d 242 (Miss.1975); Allison v. State, 274 So.2d 678 (Miss.1973). Details of the crime may not be elicited.
¶ 24. McCullough asserts that Peterson v. State, 518 So.2d 632 (Miss.1987) requires more than a simple statement that the probative value of the evidence outweighs the prejudicial value. Peterson laid out the factors that a trial judge should consider before admitting M.R.E. 609 evidence. Peterson, 518 So.2d at 636. This Court specifically stated that the trial judge "must specifically weigh, on-the-record, those factors which make the conviction probative against those factors which make the evidence of the conviction prejudicial." However, the case sub judice may be distinguished from Peterson in several respects. In Peterson, the Court found that the impeachment evidence was so similar to the crime for which Peterson was being tried that the prejudicial effect outweighed the value of the conviction for impeachment purposes. McCullough's witness, Devon Reese, was impeached with a prior conviction for possession of cocaine. McCullough was on trial for aggravated assault. Certainly, these two crimes are not even remotely similar. Furthermore, to compare a defense witness's prior convictions to the crime or crimes for which the defendant is being tried is to confuse the issue. It is the proverbial mixing of apples and oranges. Indeed, this point leads to the second distinction. In Peterson, it was the defendant's own prior convictions which were admitted. In this case, it was a witness for the defense whose testimony was impeached by the evidence of a prior conviction of that witness, not by prior convictions of the defendant. Finally, and most importantly, although the trial judge did not specifically state that she was considering the Peterson factors, all of the factors set out in Peterson, with the exclusion of those that would pertain to admission of evidence impeaching a defendant's testimony, were discussed at length before the judge by counsel for both parties. We find that the probative value of the evidence sufficiently outweighed the prejudicial value, and the trial judge was correct in so finding. Therefore, we hold that this issue is without merit.
CONCLUSION
¶ 25. Because of the trial court's admission of evidence in direct violation of M.R.E. 404(b), and failure to grant a continuance, the judgment below and McCullough's conviction and sentence are reversed and this ease is remanded to the Yazoo County Circuit Court for a new trial.
¶ 26. REVERSED AND REMANDED.
PRATHER, C.J., SULLIVAN AND PITTMAN, P.JJ., BANKS, McRAE AND WALLER, JJ., CONCUR. SMITH, J., CONCURS IN PART AND DISSENTS IN PART WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION JOINED BY COBB, J.