Case Name: Billy Joe WILSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Mississippi, Appellee
Court: Mississippi Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Mississippi
Decision Date: 2002-04-16
Citations: 815 So. 2d 439
Docket Number: No. 2000-KA-01922-COA
Parties: Billy Joe WILSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Mississippi, Appellee.
Judges: McMILLIN, C.J., KING, P.J., THOMAS AND IRVING, JJ„ JOIN THIS SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 815
Pages: 439–447

Head Matter:
Billy Joe WILSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Mississippi, Appellee.
No. 2000-KA-01922-COA.
Court of Appeals of Mississippi.
April 16, 2002.
Thomas H. Pearson, Clarksdale, Attorney for Appellant.
Office of the Attorney General by Scott Stuart, Attorney For Appellee.

Opinion:
LEE, J., for the court.
¶ 1. In August 2000 in the Coahoma County Circuit Court, a jury convicted Billy Joe Wilson of arson in the third degree. He was sentenced to serve three years in prison, with one year suspended and two years to serve.
¶ 2. The incident leading to the arrest and conviction occurred in July 1999 when Wilson went to the home of Kesha Brown, his girlfriend. Upon arrival, Wilson found Eddie Henderson at the house. Wilson accused Kesha of having an affair with Henderson, then Kesha told Wilson to leave and she called the police. Later, Wilson found a rag and saturated it in gasoline and then stuck it into a bottle. He then went back to Kesha's house and lit the rag on fire and threw it under Henderson's vehicle, which set the vehicle on fire. Kesha called the police and fire departments and the fire was extinguished.
DISCUSSION OF THE ISSUES
I. DID THE TRIAL JUDGE COMMIT ERROR IN FAILING TO REQUIRE THAT THE PROSECUTION PROVE ALL ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF THE CRIME OF ARSON?
¶ 3. Wilson argues that all the elements of the offense of arson in the third degree were not proven to the jury. The definition of arson in the third degree states:
Any person who wilfully and maliciously sets fire to or burns or causes to be burned, or who aids, counsels or procures the burning of any personal property of whatsoever class or character; (such property being of the value of twenty-five dollars and the property of another person), shall be guilty of arson in the third degree and upon conviction thereof, be sentenced to the penitentiary for not less that one or more than three years.
Miss.Code Ann. § 97-17-7 (Rev.2000). Specifically, Wilson argues that the prosecution failed to put on any evidence with regard to the value of the property that was burned.
¶ 4. "Our standard for review is de novo in passing on questions of law." Snapp v. Harrison, 699 So.2d 567(¶ 7) (Miss.1997). As described in the statute, the elements necessary to prove arson in the third degree include a wilful and malicious act of setting fire to or aiding another in such act to property whose value exceeds twenty-five dollars. Here, evidence was presented to show that the rag was indeed ignited and tossed under the vehicle, which caused the gas tank on the vehicle to ignite, but no evidence was presented to show that the value of the burned property exceeded twenty-five dollars. Although we do agree that no such evidence was produced, we find it clear that the burned property was a 1991 Ford Explorer whose value obviously exceeded the statutory minimum, reasoning that any reasonable hypothetical juror could deduce that an operating eight-year old vehicle (as it was at the time of the burning) would be worth more than twenty-five dollars. As described herein, we find no merit to this argument.
¶ 5. We do find the need to address the supreme court case of Peterson v. State, 671 So.2d 647 (Miss.1996), upon which Wilson relies. In Peterson, the defendant was charged with sexual battery, but the indictment failed to explain that such crime must have taken place without the victim's consent. Peterson, 671 So.2d at 651. Peterson argued that this omission rendered his indictment faulty under Rule 2.05 of the Uniform Criminal Rules of Circuit Court Practice, since an indictment must contain the essential elements of the crime charged. Id. at 652-53. In Peterson's, 5-4 decision, Justice Banks, writing for the court, recognized that an indictment need not use the precise words of the statute, but the right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him is essential to the preparation of his defense. Id. at 655. The majority then concluded that the failure in the indictment to specifically include language concerning the victim's lack of consent was fatal to Peterson's indictment. Id. Justice Pittman wrote a dissent noting that the majority relied on cases prior to 1979, the year in which the Uniform Criminal Rules of Circuit Court Practice were enacted. Justice Pittman pointed out that cases subsequent to enactment of these rules declared that actual notice of the crime and enumeration of the requirements in Rule 2.06 (now UCCCR 7.06) are all that is required in an indictment. Id. at 661-62. See Hines v. State, 472 So.2d 386 (Miss.1985); Harden v. State, 465 So.2d 321 (Miss.1985); Henderson v. State, 445 So.2d 1364 (Miss.1984).
¶ 6. Wilson's case is distinguishable from Peterson. In Peterson, the charge was sexual battery, and at that time the statute concerning sexual battery listed three different subsections which could be the basis of proof: (l)(a) without consent, (l)(b) with a mentally or physically handicapped person, or (l)(c) with a child under age fourteen. See Miss.Code Ann. § 97-3-95 (Rev.2000). Since Peterson's indictment failed to include language that he was being charged under (l)(a) "without consent," he could not have been informed and could not have prepared a defense. In the present case, though, the section under which Wilson was charged did not contain subsections, as occurred in Peterson. Hence, there was no question but that Wilson was given clear indication concerning the law he had violated. Also, we note that the indictment contains each of the seven requirements listed in Rule 7.06, acting to adequately inform him.
¶ 7. We look to this Court's previous examination of Peterson in Williams v. State, 772 So.2d 406 (Miss.Ct.App.2000), in further reconciling Peterson to the case sub judice. In Williams, the defendant was charged with carjacking; citing to Peterson, he argued that his motion to dismiss his indictment should have been granted since the indictment failed to contain essential statutory language. Williams, 772 So.2d at (¶ 13).
[Although the technical language of the statute for the crime of carjacking may not have been recited in the indictment, the statute was enumerated, and the facts that were stated were sufficient to notify Williams of the crime he was being charged with, therefore, allowing him the opportunity to prepare a defense. As aforementioned, the indictment stated that he was being charged with the crime of carjacking because he "did recklessly and knowingly by force or violence, by the exhibition of a knife, take a motor vehicle from Farrah Goodman." "[T]ake a motor vehicle from Farrah Goodman" is equivalent to the words "from a person's immediate actual possession."
Id. at (¶ 13) (citations omitted). In comparing the Williams findings to the facts of the present case, we find that the words in Wilson's indictment, "set fire to and/or burn a 1991 Ford Explorer," have a sufficient relation to the language in the stat ute requiring "such property being of the value of twentyfive dollars and the property of another person," to apprize Wilson of the exact crime with which he was charged, allowing him to prepare a defense. Both the defendant and any reasonable juror could gather that the value of this property, a 1991 Ford Explorer, exceeded the statutory amount of twenty-five dollars. Thus, we find no error with Wilson's indictment.
¶ 8. We finally look to Wilson's argument that the jury was not properly instructed as to the elements of the crime, specifically the value of the property. The instruction to which he objects reads in part:
If you find from the evidence in this case beyond a reasonable doubt that on or about July 17, 1999, Billy Joe Wilson, wilfully and maliciously set fire to and/or burned a 1991 Ford Explorer, being the property of Eddie Henderson, then you shall find the defendant guilty of arson in the third degree.
¶ 9. Wilson argues that this instruction did not accurately reflect the elements of the crime, since it did not include the statutory minimum value of twenty-five dollars. Wilson did not object to any failure of the State to produce specific evidence concerning the value of the vehicle, including Wilson's failure to object to the giving of this instruction; therefore, he is procedurally barred from now objecting on appeal. Berry v. State, 703 So.2d 269(¶ 13) (Miss.1997).
II. WAS THE INDICTMENT FATALLY DEFECTIVE?
¶ 10. Wilson finally argues that the indictment was defective because it failed to set forth the specific elements of the offense. Again, he refers to the value of the property as having been omitted from the indictment.
Formal or technical words are not necessary in an indictment, if the offense can be substantially described without them . Certainly, the indictment need not (though it may) charge in the exact language of the statute said to have been offended. If from a reading of the indictment as a whole the accused is in fact given fair notice of that with which he has been charged, the indictment is legally sufficient.
Harbin v. State, 478 So.2d 796, 799 (Miss.1985). 'Whether an indictment is fatally defective is 'an issue of law and deserves a relatively broad standard of review by this Court.' " Porter v. State, 749 So.2d 250 (¶ 34) (Miss.Ct.App.1999). Here, the indictment included the date of the incident, the location and nature of the crime, a description of the subject property and the name of the owner of the property, and a description of the crime with which he was charged. We find that Wilson was certainly given fair notice of the crime with which he was charged, and the wording meets the prerequisites of Rule 7.06 of the Uniform Circuit and County Court Rules, which explains what information must be included in an indictment. The fact that the indictment did not explain that the burned vehicle was valued at more than twenty-five dollars is not a fatal defect.
¶ 11. "This Court has made it 'clear that the ultimate test, when considering the validity of an indictment on appeal, is whether the defendant was prejudiced in the preparation of his defense.' " Gray v. State, 728 So.2d 36 (¶ 171) (Miss.1998). Wilson has not demonstrated how he was prejudiced in the preparation of his defense, and we find no merit to this argument.
¶ 12. THE JUDGMENT OF THE COAHOMA COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT OF CONVICTION OF ARSON IN THE THIRD DEGREE AND SENTENCE TO SERVE THREE YEARS IN THE CUSTODY OF THE MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS WITH ONE YEAR SUSPENDED IS AFFIRMED. SENTENCE IMPOSED IN THIS CAUSE SHALL RUN CONSECUTIVELY TO ANY AND ALL SENTENCES PREVIOUSLY IMPOSED. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE TAXED TO COAHOMA COUNTY.
BRIDGES, MYERS, CHANDLER AND BRANTLEY, JJ., CONCUR. SOUTHWICK, P.J., DISSENTS WITH A SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION JOINED BY MCMILLIN, C.J., KING, P.J., THOMAS AND IRVING, JJ.
. The rule is now Rule 7.06 of the Uniform Circuit and County Court Rules.
.Rule 7.06 of the Uniform Circuit and County Court Rules states that the following shall be included in an indictment:
1. The name of the accused;
2. The date on which the indictment was filed in court;
3. A statement that the prosecution is brought in the name and by the authority of the State of Mississippi;
4. The county and judicial district in which the indictment is brought;
5. The date and, if applicable, the time at which the offense was alleged to have been committed. Failure to state the correct date shall not render the indictment insufficient;
6. The signature of the foreman of the grand jury issuing it; and
7. The words "against the peace and dignity of the state."
UCCCR 7.06 (2001).
. This code section was amendment in 1998. Paragraph (l)(c) was replaced with a new paragraph (c) and an additional paragraph (d); these two paragraphs allowed a distinction with regard to the age of the victim with relation to the perpetrator.
. See footnote 2.