Case Name: WINN-DIXIE STORES, INC., Petitioner, v. Gilbert ROBINSON, Respondent
Court: Florida Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1985-06-27
Citations: 472 So. 2d 722
Docket Number: No. 65360
Parties: WINN-DIXIE STORES, INC., Petitioner, v. Gilbert ROBINSON, Respondent.
Judges: BOYD, C.J., and ADKINS and EHRLICH, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 472
Pages: 722–728

Head Matter:
WINN-DIXIE STORES, INC., Petitioner, v. Gilbert ROBINSON, Respondent.
No. 65360.
Supreme Court of Florida.
June 27, 1985.
Richard N. Blank of Montalto & Blank, Miami, and Larry Klein of Klein & Bera-nek, West Palm Beach, for petitioner.
R. Stuart Huff of the Law Offices of R. Stuart Huff, and Haggard & Kirkland, Coral Gables, for respondent.

Opinion:
ALDERMAN, Justice.
We review the decision of the District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, in Robin son v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 447 So.2d 1003 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984), which expressly and directly conflicts with Baptist Memorial Hospital, Inc. v. Bell, 384 So.2d 145 (Fla.1980), and Castlewood International Corp. v. LaFleur, 322 So.2d 520 (Fla.1975). We hold that the district court properly reversed the trial court's order granting a directed verdict on punitive damages for Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., that the district court erred in reversing the trial court's order granting remittitur or a new trial on the issue of punitive damages, and that the district court erred in disapproving the trial court's entering alternative orders, i.e., a directed verdict, and" in the event of reversal, an order granting new trial or remit-titur. We therefore approve in part and quash in part the decision of the Fourth District.
Robinson operated a store in the Bahamas and purchased merchandise in the United States for resale in the Bahamas. He had purchased goods at a Winn-Dixie store and had left them in his car. The next day, he went again to the Winn-Dixie store. An employee of Winn-Dixie, who assisted Robinson in bringing his newest purchases out to his car, saw the other merchandise in the back of his car and concluded that this merchandise had been shoplifted. When Robinson went back into the store to make additional purchases, he was placed under arrest. The merchandise that was in his car was removed by Winn-Dixie employees and was reshelved. He was charged with petit theft, but this charge was subsequently dropped.
Robinson filed a complaint against Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., alleging false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, and conversion, and claiming damages, among other things, for aggravation of an existent heart condition. At the close of the evidence, the trial court denied Winn-Dixie's renewed motion for directed verdict. Finding Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., guilty of malicious prosecution, false imprisonment, and conversion, the jury, by special interrogatory verdict, assessed compensatory damages in the amount of $200,000. Finding that Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., acted with malice, moral turpitude, wantonness, willfulness or reckless indifference to the rights of others, the jury assessed punitive damages in the amount of $750,000.
The trial court entered judgment for Robinson in the amount of $950,000. Thereafter, Winn-Dixie filed motions for new trial, for judgment in accordance with a motion for directed verdict on the issue of conversion, for judgment in accordance with a motion for directed verdict on the issue of punitive damages, and for remit-titur as to compensatory and punitive damages.' Finding that Robinson neither alleged nor proved fault on the part of Winn-Dixie which foreseeably contributed to Robinson's injury so as to make it vicariously liable for punitive damages, and relying on Mercury Motors Express, Inc. v. Smith, 393 So.2d 545 (Fla.1981), the trial court subsequently granted Winn-Dixie's motion for directed verdict on the issue of punitive damages and amended the judgment accordingly. Alternatively, in the event of an appellate disposition reversing its order granting Winn-Dixie's motion for directed verdict on the issue of punitive damages, the trial court granted the motion for remittitur of the punitive damages award in the amount of $500,000, and, failing the acceptance of the remittitur, granted a new trial on the issue of punitive damages. Specifically, the trial court found that the verdict as to punitive damages was grossly excessive and shocked the conscience of the court, that the verdict was contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence, that the jury considered matters outside the record, that the jury was deceived as to the force and credibility of the evidence, and that the manifest weight of the evidence shows that the amount of punitive damages assessed was out of all reasonable proportion to the malice, outrage, or wantonness of the tortious conduct. Arab Termite and Pest Control v. Jenkins, 409 So.2d 1039 (Fla.1982).
Robinson appealed and Winn-Dixie cross-appealed. The Fourth District relinquished jurisdiction to the trial court with instructions that the matters of record on which the alternative remittitur was based be referred to with specificity as to location in the record. The trial court then detailed with specificity the basis for its alternative order granting remittitur.
The district court reversed the directed verdict because it determined that Mercury Motors did not apply since vicarious liability was not an issue in this case and alternatively because there was the evidence of some "fault" satisfying the requirement of Mercury Motors, thereby justifying punitive damages. The district court reversed the order on motion for remittitur or in the alternative for new trial on the basis that it was "not convinced that the amount of punitive damages assessed by the jury was unreasonable." 447 So.2d at 1005. It finally disapproved the trial court's entering of alternative orders on the basis that it is not the function of the trial court, however well-intentioned, to second-guess the appellate process. The district court reversed the two post-judgment orders and the amended final judgment and remanded with instruction to reinstate the original final judgment.
Relying on Mercury Motors, Winn-Dixie argues that the trial court properly directed a verdict in its favor on the issue of punitive damages because there was no evidence of fault on its part to make it vicariously liable for punitive damages. Robinson, however, counters that this case is not controlled by Mercury Motors because the present case was pled, tried, and submitted to the jury as involving direct corporate activity and vicarious liability was not an issue. Here, Robinson points out, it was alleged and proved that the corporation itself committed the tort and the jury returned a verdict, finding that the corporate defendant acted with "malice, moral turpitude, wantonness, willfulness or reckless indifference to the rights of others."
The Fourth District correctly concluded that because this case was tried on the basis of direct corporate liability, Mercury Motors was not applicable. Most recently in Bankers Multiple Line Insurance Co. v. Farish, 464 So.2d 530 (Fla.1985), we expressly held that Mercury Motors was not intended to apply to situations where the agent primarily causing the imposition of punitive damages was the managing agent or primary owner of the corporation. We also hold that Mercury Motors is not applicable in the present case where the suit was tried on the theory of the direct liability of Winn-Dixie, and the jury, by special verdict, decided that Winn-Dixie should be held directly liable for punitive damages. Cf. Dorsey v. Honda Motor Co., 670 F.2d 21 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 880, 103 S.Ct. 177, 74 L.Ed.2d 145 (1982).
Because the directed verdict was improper, the alternative order for remittitur or new trial must be considered. In this regard, we disagree with the district court's disapproval of the trial court's entry of the alternative orders entered in the present case. We find that it is preferable for the court to rule on a motion for new trial at the same time it grants a defendant's motion for directed verdict in the event that the appellate court reverses the directed verdict. This procedure has been implicitly approved by this Court in Ford Motor Co. v. Kikis, 401 So.2d 1341, 1342 (Fla.1981). See also Reams v. Vaughn, 435 So.2d 879 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983); Navarro v. City of Miami, 402 So.2d 438 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981).
We must now address the propriety of the district court's reversal of the order granting remittitur or new trial. Winn-Dixie argues that the Fourth District did not apply the proper test in reversing the order granting remittitur or new trial, that the district court did not expressly and directly find that the trial court abused its discretion but rather merely stated that it was not convinced that the amount of punitive damages was unreasonable. ' It asserts that the district court just substituted its judgment for that of the trial court. Winn-Dixie contends that the trial court followed the principles announced by this Court for ordering remittitur or new trial and points out that the trial court in the present case expressly found that the manifest weight of the evidence showed that the amount of punitive damages assessed was out of all reasonable proportion to the malice, outrage, or wantonness of the tortious conduct.
In Arab Termite and Pest Control v. Jenkins, we addressed the issue of whether the trial court had the authority to consider the degree of a defendant's misconduct in relation to the amount of punitive damages found by the jury. The trial court in Jenkins had ordered a remittitur of the punitive damages award or a new trial on the basis, among others, that the conduct shown by the evidence was not wanton or malicious enough to justify the amount of punitive damages awarded. Quashing the decision of the district court which had reversed the trial court's order, we held that it is proper for the trial court to issue an order for new trial or remittitur when the manifest weight of the evidence shows that the amount of punitive damages assessed is out of all reasonable proportion to the malice, outrage, or wantonness of the tortious conduct. We further held that this finding must be affirmatively supported by the record or the judge must find that the jury was influenced by matters outside the record. We reiterated in St. Regis Paper Co. v. Watson, 428 So.2d 243, 248 (Fla.1983), that punitive damages must be proportionate to the magnitude of the wrong committed because a defendant does have a right to be free from unreasonable punishment inflicted by an excessive punitive damages award.
The appropriate standard of review of a trial court's order granting, alternatively, remittitur or a new trial where the trial court has given its express reasons for its order in accordance with Wackenhut Corp. v. Canty, 359 So.2d 430 (Fla.1978), and Jenkins is whether there has been a clear showing of abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court. In Baptist Memorial Hospital, Inc. v. Bell, we said:
In reviewing this type of discretionary act of the trial court, the appellate court should apply the reasonableness test to determine whether the trial judge abused his discretion. If reasonable men could differ as to the propriety of the action taken by the trial court, then the action is not unreasonable and there can be no finding of an abuse of discretion. Cana-karis v. Canakaris, 382 So.2d 1197 (Fla. 1980). As we stated in Cloud [v. Fallis, 110 So.2d 669 (Fla.1959)], the ruling should not be disturbed in the absence of a clear showing that it has been abused, and there has been no such showing in the instant case. From this record the action of the trial judge was reasonable although reasonable men may differ.
384 So.2d at 146. See also Castlewood International Corp. v. LaFleur.
In the present case, the district court did not find a clear showing of an abuse of discretion by the trial court. It merely said that it was not convinced that the punitive damages assessed by the jury were unreasonable. Here, reasonable men could differ as to the propriety of the action taken by the trial court, and therefore we find no abuse of discretion.
We find no merit to the other points raised by Winn-Dixie.
Accordingly, we approve that portion of the district court's decision reversing the directed verdict on punitive damages. We disapprove the district court's decision insofar as it reverses the order on motion for remittitur and the alternative order granting new trial. This cause is remanded, and the Fourth District is directed to reinstate the order on motion for remittitur and alternative order granting new trial.
It is so ordered.
BOYD, C.J., and ADKINS and EHRLICH, JJ., concur.
McDONALD, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with an opinion, in which OVERTON, J., concurs.
SHAW, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with an opinion.
In Wackenhut Corp. v. Canty, we held:
Although an order for new trial need not incant language to the effect that the verdict is against the manifest weight of the evidence or was influenced by considerations outside the record, the order must give reasons which will support one of these two conclusions so that it will be susceptible of appellate review. See Thompson v. Williams, 253 So.2d 897 (Fla. 3d DCA 1971). Orders granting motions for new trials should articulate reasons for so doing so that appellate courts may be able to fulfill their duty of review by determining whether judicial discretion has been abused.
359 So.2d at 435.