Case Name: Braddee against Brownfield; Same against Same
Court: Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
Jurisdiction: Pennsylvania
Decision Date: 1841-09
Citations: 2 Watts & Serg. 271
Docket Number: 
Parties: Braddee against Brownfield. Same against Same.
Judges: 
Reporter: Reports of cases adjudged in the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania (Watts & Sergeant)
Volume: 2
Pages: 271–293

Head Matter:
Braddee against Brownfield. Same against Same.
An Act of Assembly directing a judgment to be opened and the defendant let into a defence upon the plea of payment, is the exercise of a jurisdiction of a remedial character, partly legislative and partly judicial, and not in violation of the constitution.
Legislative and judicial powers sometimes so commingle, that the exercise of a certain hind of judicial authority in the passage of a law is in accordance with precedents, and not contrary to received constitutional principles, nor such as a court could annul.
The acknowledgment of a sheriff’s deed is not such a res adjudicóla as precludes an inquiry into the legality of the proceedings by which the sale was made.
A writ of error does not lie to the Court of Common Pleas upon its refusal to open a judgment, or in its receiving the acknowledgment of a sheriff’s deed.
ERROR to the Special Court of Fayette county.
John F. Braddee against Bazil Brownfield.
The facts of this case, and the principles of law raised by them, are fully stated by the court below, in their charge to the jury, which was the subject of exception.
Greer, President.' — The case before us originated in a proceed- . ing before two justices of the peace, under the “ Act (of 6th April 1802) to enable purchasers at sheriff’s and coroner’s sales to obtain possession.”
Dr Braddee, the plaintiff, had purchased the land in dispute at sheriff’s sale, as the property of Joseph Collins; Bazil Brownfield, the defendant, being in possession of a part of the premises, (about 200 acres). The plaintiff instituted these proceeedings against him to obtain the possession. The jury having found the facts necessary to entitle the plaintiff to possession, the defendant “ made oath,” according to the provisions of the Act of Assembly, that he claimed the property by a purchase from Joseph Collins, previous to the time of the plaintiff’s judgment, and the proceed ings were removed to the Court of Common Pleas; and this is the issue now to be tried; whether Dr Braddee is entitled to the possession of the premises in dispute.
On a former trial of this case before this court, the defendant offered in evidence his sheriff’s deed for the plaintiff’s interest in this property, obtained since his appeal; and it was rejected, on the authority of the case of Hale v. Henrie, (2 Watts 147), and the defendant was confined in his defence to the claim set forth in his affidavit. The plaintiff recovered a verdict, and the defendant took a writ of error to the Supreme Court. From the decision of that court reversing the cause, it appears that this court erred in relying upon the case of Hale v. Henrie. We have, therefore, on this occasion, admitted the deed we then rejected, and in consequence thereof, we have to try an entirely different issue from that which was presented at the former trial, as the defendant has wholly abandoned the defence and title set up as the .ground of his appeal. By so doing, he admits the plaintiff had a right to recover when he instituted the proceedings, and therefore has a right to a judgment for costs and damages up to the time his title was devested by the sheriff’s sale. The only question, then, to be decided at this time, is the validity of this sheriff’s sale of plaintiff’s title to the defendant.
The foundation on which this sale rests, were four certain judgments entered to June Term 1834, in the Common Pleas of this county, Nos. 47, 48, 49, and 50, on bonds with warrants of attorney, given by John F. Braddee to Bazil Brownfield. The almost interminable litigation between these parties, originating in the entry of these judgments, which has nearly monopolized the attention of both the civil and criminal tribunals of the county from that day to this, is a portion of the history of your county, known to all its citizens, and unnecessary to be adverted to by the court. But in order to understand the nature of the objections to the validity of this deed, it will be necessary to state some of the judicial and legislative history of the case, so far as they are in evidence before us; and without at all wishing to reflect upon the conduct or proceedings of any tribunal which has had, or assumed to have jurisdiction on this subject, I may say, that the case presents a most anomalous and unprecedented course both of judicial and legislative action.
It appears that soon after these judgments were entered, an application was made by Braddee to the court, to open the judgments and let him in to a defence, on the ground that the bonds had been fully paid and satisfied. Why the court refused to grant this application, which was urged, continued and renewed from time to time for two or three years, especially when several witnesses swore positively to the payment of money and the signing of a receipt, it is unnecessary to inquire; suffice to say, the application was refused by the court, and the defendant, Braddee, had recourse to the legislature. Producing his receipt in full for the money, proved by two subscribing witnesses, and complaining that the court had refused him his constitutional right of a trial by jury, he prevailed on the legislature to pass the Act which you. have heard read, (Act of 1st of April 1837, Pamphlet Laws 128). By this Act, the Court of Common Pleas of this county are enjoined “ to order said judgments to be opened and direct an issue to try the alleged fact of payment before a jury of said county, in the same manner that causes are at law triable,” &c.
It further directs, “ That all orders or precepts of the court shall be stayed until the question of payment be determined by a jury, and all sales, should any be made on the said judgments of the real or personal estate of the said defendant, shall be void until the facts alleged in the said petition of said defendant shall be tried by a jury as aforesaid,” &c. It was also further enacted that “ should the judges of the Court of Common Pleas of Fayette county decline or refuse to try the issue aforesaid, the District Judge of the city of Pittsburgh, in the county of Allegheny, be and he hereby is authorized and empowered to hold a special court at Uniontown, in the county aforesaid, at such time as said judge may order and appoint,” &c.
After the passage of this Act, Braddee again applied to the Court of Common Pleas of this county “ to order the judgments to be opened and direct an issue,” as required by the Act of the legislature. That court “ declined and refused,” not only “ to try the issue,” but refused obedience to the Act as far as “to open the judgments or direct an issue.” On a certificate of this refusal, the president judge of the District Court of Allegheny county, assuming himself to be the person intended by the description of District Judge of the city of Pittsburgh, &c., appointed a special court at this place on the second Monday of August 1837. Presuming also that the legislature meant something, notwithstanding their costiveness of diction, and perplexed obscurity of expression, that special court when constituted, assumed jurisdiction of these cases, and although there was no issue as yet directed, they assumed the power to direct one and try it; and after an impartial investigation and a full and fair hearing of the parties, the jury found that the judgments had not been paid.
It must be recollected, also, that previous to the passage of this Act of Assembly, the property of Braddee had been levied on and condemned, and an alias venditioni exponas to June Term 1837, had been issued some two weeks before the passage of the Act. Notwithstanding notice of the passage of this Act was given to. the plaintiff and his counsel, and the sheriff, the property was exposed to sale at the June court and knocked down to the plaintiffin the judgments, Brownfield (or his agent). On the 5th of July following, the counsel of Braddee “ moved the court for a rule to show cause why the sale should not be set aside, on the ground that the legislature had ordered the proceedings to be stayed. The court refused to entertain the motion, for the reasons before stated,” when they refused to open the judgment, to wit: that the Act of the legislature was unconstitutional, and the case removed to another tribunal if it was not. On the 25th of August 1837, Braddee’s counsel moved in the Special Court then in session trying the issue, “ to set aside the sale on the ground that it was made since the passage of the law, and in violation of it.” To this motion the court answered, that the motion could not be entertained, as they had no power except to try the issue of payment. On the 12th of September 1837, before the acknowledgment of the sheriff’s deed, John F. Braddee again petitioned the Court of Common Pleas, setting forth “ the Act of Assembly, the executions and sale, the trial of the issue by the special court, and their refusal to entertain jurisdiction of the question about the sale, &c., and therefore praying the court to set aside the sale as made contrary to the Act of Assembly, and for a sum less than one-sixth of the value of the land.” On this petition is the following endorsement: “ Sept. 12, refused.” On the 16th of September the sheriff’s deed to Brownfield was regularly acknowledged.
The only question then before us is the validity of this deed— and this is a question of law for the court, depending upon records and Acts of Assembly.
The plaintiff’s counsel have requested us to instruct the jury:
1. That the law passed the 1st day of April 1837, is a constitutional law.
2. That from and after the passage of the Act of the 1st of April 1837, the judgments were opened by the operation of that law, and therefore an execution and sale predicated on these judgments, were void and conveyed no title.
3. That by the law aforesaid, all orders and precepts (executions) of the Court of Common Pleas were stayed until the question of payment should be determined by a jury; and inasmuch as a sale was made after the passage of the law and before there was a trial by jury, the sale was absolutely void, and the purchaser, Bazil Brownfield, took no title by the sheriff’s deed.
4. That ejectment, or the form of suit adopted by the plaintiff in this case, under all the circumstances of the case, and from the facts disclosed and evidence given, is the proper and legitimate mode of inquiry into the legality and fairness of the sale, and the validity of the sheriff’s deed to Bazil Brownfield. And this court and jury are not precluded from that inquiry, by the fact that the deed was acknowledged in a court, after the rule to show cause why the sale should not be set aside.
5th. That if the jury believe that Bazil Brownfield was made acquainted with the law of 1st of April 1837, and in violation of it, on a levy subject to the claim which the plaintiff has in the same, which the plaintiff alleges is 200 acres, and whilst this very suit was pending, proceeded to sale, sold the property at a great sacrifice, and became the purchaser, it is a legal fraud, and inquirable into in ejectment.
Without giving a particular answer to each of these points, in the order in which they stand, the court will briefly state their reasons for coming to a contrary conclusion on the whole facts of the case, and refusing to charge the jury as therein requested.
In the decision of this case, I do not think it material to decide whether the Act of Assembly referred to is constitutional or not. The constitutionality of Acts of the legislature is a question for the Supreme Court alone, and we shall take it for granted in this case (whatever our private opinions may be) that the Act is constitutional; nor shall we inquire into the construction of the eleventh section; or endeavour to elaborate the meaning of the legislature, out of the profound obscurity in which their diction has involved it, or pretend to decide what construction will render it least liable to the charge of absurdity.
The Court of Common Pleas had jurisdiction of the subject matter; they had rendered a regular judgment, and awarded an execution; the land in dispute was levied on and condemned; a venditioni exponas was in the sheriff’s hand, ordering him to sell this property when this Act of Assembly passed. Whether the legislature have power to open a judgment, or to order a court to do a judicial act; or whether the special court which opened the judgment had any power so to do, or only assumed it, are questions not necessarily arising in this case. The parties in this case are the same as in the judgments and executions. The Court of Common Pleas, when they acknowledged the deed, had full jurisdiction of the case. That was the proper suit and the proper tribunal to judge of the regularity of the process and sale, and to construe the force and effect of the dark sayings of this 11th section. In this state, the reception of an acknowledgment of a sheriff’s deed, is a judicial act, in the nature of a judgment of confirmation of all the acts preceding the sale, curing all defects in process or its execution, which the court has power to act upon. When the acknowledgment is once taken, everything which has been done, is considered as done by the previous order or subsequent sanction of the court, and cannot be afterwards disaffirmed collaterally. See Thompson v. Phillips, (1 Baldwin 272). The court which directs a sale, can alone judge of the legality of acts done under its authority. It follows that all questions arising on judicial sales, when their validity is questioned in an ejectment, must be those of authority (or fraud practised by the purchaser), not of irregularity or error in awarding executions, or confirming process or acts in pursuance of it. If the power of the court is once brought into action, no tribunal can declare their proceedings nullities. These principles, laid down by Mr Justice Baldwin in the above case, are the settled law of Pennsylvania, at least since the case of M’Pherson v. Cunliff, (11 Serg. Sp Rawle 424). It is useless to accumulate cases: the books are full of them. Nor does it make any difference where the plaintiff is the purchaser. Arnold v. Gorr, (1 Rawle 223); Hale v. Henrie, (2 Watts 147); Tarbox v. Hays, (6 Watts 400). The only exception to be found in late cases to this rule, is where the court has no jurisdiction, or where the purchaser at sheriff’s sale has been guilty of “ actual fraud.” Gilbert v. Hoffman, (2 Watts 66); M’Kennan v. Pry, (6 Waits 137); Hoffman v. Stroliecker, (7 Watts 86); Gibbs v. Neely, (7 Watts 306). The case of Burd v. Dansdale, (2 Binn. 80), would hardly be considered law at the present day.
But in this case, this very question as to the regularity of this sale was raised between these parties, and decided by the court, and is therefore “ res judicata and it matters not, that no writ of error would lie to the decision of the court on the subject. It may be a hardship in some cases, but the legislature only can remedy it. The question, therefore, raised by plaintiff’s counsel as to the confirmation of the sale by taking credit for the amount of it, does not necessarily arise, nor does the evidence show such an actual confirmation as would validate the sale, if it could be declared void for other reasons. Whether, therefore, the Court of Common Pleas did right in confirming this sale, under all the circumstances, (considering the effect of the wording of the levy “ subject to the claim of Brownfield to 200 acres,” and, besides the shade then cast on the title offered for sale, the uncertainty created by this Act of Assembly,) is not a question open for the decision of this court.
The jury are therefore instructed to find for the plaintiff, costs and damages only, and that the title of plaintiff became vested in defendant by the sheriff’s deed of the 16th of September 1837. The plaintiff has given no evidence of the amount of damages: I presume, therefore, that question is reserved, that the parties may enjoy the luxury of another lawsuit.
To this charge the plaintiff excepted.
Austin, for plaintiff in error,
argued, that the Act of Assembly, authorizing the opening of the judgment, was constitutional; and on this point cited 3 Dali. 386; Pamp. Laws 1832 — 1833, page 107; 2 Peters 380; 2 Penn. Rep. 503; 4 Serg. Sp Rawle 356; 7 Peters 516, 546; 14 Serg. Sp Rawle 435; 1 Rawle 323; 7 Watts 300; 7 Peters 469; 1 Reg. of Debates 479,481, 515; 9 Watts 149; 14 Serg. Sp Rawle 127; Plowd. 205. The acknowledgment of a sheriff’s deed is not conclusive, but the regularity of the sale may be inquired into. 4 Serg. Sp Rawle 82; 4 Yeates 341; 2 Binn. 80.
Howell and Dunlop, contra.
The venditioni exponas was issued before the law passed: and the effect of its passage was, not to take away the jurisdiction of the Common Pleas, but to create a tribunal to try the issue. The jurisdiction of the Common Pleas remained; and the 11th section of the Act contemplates that it shall continue to be exercised. Assuming the law to be constitutional, the proceedings of the court are conclusive. 1 Bald. 271; 2 Peters 169; 10 Peters 473; 4 Cran. 333; 6 Watts 401, 492; 1 Rawle 226; 2 Watts 147; 1 Serg. Rawle 101 ; 1 Yeates 40; 6 Binn. 255; 10 Watts 23, 472; 2 Whart. 469; 8 Watts 194; 1 Conn. 1; 17 Serg. Sp Rawle 320.

Opinion:
The opinion of the Court was delivered by
Sekgeant, J.
The gi'eat object of the plaintiff in error, Braddee, in his applications to the Court of Common Pleas of Fayette county, and to the legislature after his failure in those applications, was to have the fact of payment of the bonds, on which the judgments against him had been entered, tried by a jury. This he eventually obtained by means of the Act of Assembly of the 1st of April 1837, and when the trial was had, the verdict of the jury decided that the bonds had not been paid. In the meanwhile, the defendant in error, Brownfield, proceeded with his executions on his judgments — sold the tract of land now in question at sheriff's sale, as the property of Braddee, becoming himself the purchaser. The plaintiff in error contends, that the trial of the issue of payment was not the sole purpose of the Act of Assembly: that it went further, and in effect prohibited any proceedings before the trial to sell his property by execution on the judgments, and therefore the sale which took place, and under which Brownfield now claims title, was absolutely null and void to all intents and purposes whatsoever. This is a brief epitome of the matter in contest, and suffices to present the question raised between these parties on which the case turns, what is the true intent and meaning and operation of the Act for the relief of the plaintiff in error, passed on the 1st of April 1837?
The defendant in error contends, that this Act of Assembly, in interfering with the duties of a tribunal of justice, and dictating to them that they should open judgments confessed by bonds and warrants, and allow the plaintiff in error a trial by jury of the fact of payment, prescribing new conditions as to sales under the judgments, after the court had heard the parties, and decided that the judgments ought not to be opened, was in contravention of the constitution of Pennsylvania, and in no way affected his proceedings. It is certainly true that this species of legislation, for particular cases pending in courts of justice, by granting extraordinary privileges to one party or the other, out of the ordinary course of justice, is susceptible of abuse, and may lead to great injustice, and ought to be warily employed by a wise legislature. But for us to hold a law unconstitutional, it must be a plain violation of some provision contained in the constitution. It must be an ex post facto law, or a law impairing the obligation of contracts, or manifestly in collision with some constitutional provision. The exercise of a certain sort of superior equity jurisdiction of a remedial character, a kind of mixed power, partly legislative, partly ¡judicial, seems to have been practised by our legislature from time to time, in the shape of special laws like that before us. They have been looked at with jealousy by some, while others have considered them as necessary, under our frame of government, to prevent a total failure of justice in certain cases not falling within the control of ihe judicial branches. There is, at any rate, no clause in our constitution which prohibits them; and when a motion to that effect was introduced in the late convention which formed our present constitution, though the subject was much and ably canvassed, and the law now in question commented upon, no alteration was made on the subject. See Debates in Convention of 1837, p. 479, 544, &c.
Under these circumstances, it would be difficult to say that a law, granting a remedy to a party by referring the cause to another decision, or enabling him to sustain an action where he could not before sustain one, or removing an impediment in his way to obtaining a hearing and decision, or conferring powers, or ratifying imperfect acts and doings of officers, by which the rights of a party would otherwise be lost, is a violation of the constitution. Every case of the kind must be judged of by itself, according to its own peculiar circumstances. That there is a usurpation on the judiciary, which it would be unconstitutional in the legislature to assume, may, I think, be safely asserted. That, on the other hand, there are cases where the legislative and judicial powers so commingle, that the exercise of a certain kind of judicial authority in the passage of a law is in accordance with precedents, and not contrary to received constitutional principles, nor such as a court could annul, is perhaps equally clear. In the passage of the present law, the legislature have acted rather in the character of an appellate tribunal of justice, ordering, by way of mandamus, that to be done which they considered ought to be done, and which no existing appellate tribunal could relieve against, by interposing in a special case then depending in court before a competent tribunal, which had already heard and decided between the parties, and giving a remedy in that particular cause alone, without prescribing a general rule for the conduct of all the citizens of the commonwealth.
It is unnecessary, however, to pursue this subject further; because we are of opinion that, according to the proper construction of this obscure and ambiguous Act of Assembly, the sale of the lands by executions on the judgments after the passage of the Act, was not absolutely prohibited by the Act, but, on the contrary, was permitted under certain terms and conditions; or, in other words, that its enactment is, that if sales should take place, they should, in a certain event, be voidable, but not absolutely null and void to all intents and purposes whatsoever.
If the Act had contained only the provisions of the 10th section and the first part of the 11th section, down to the proviso, the conclusion might well be drawn, that all sales by execution were to be postponed until after the hearing and determination of the issue ordered by the Act, notwithstanding, in the preamble, the gravamen of Braddee's complaint is recited to be, that he ha'd paid and satisfied the judgments in full, and the court had refused to open them; and that the facts set forth by the defendant, were such as could only be determined by a jury. But then comes the last clause of the 11th section, which provides, that if the jury find otherwise, (that is to say, that the bonds were not paid,) " the said sales to remain in full force and effect." What sales, are here referred to? By the settled principles in relation to Statutes, unless some other period be prescribed by the Statute from which it is to operate, it speaks from the time of its passage; its enactments are to operate in futuro, and are not to have a retrospect beyond the time of its commencement. The rule and law of Parliament is, that nova constitutio futuris formam debet imponere, non prceteritis. And this is not only the doctrine of the English law, but is also founded in the principles of general jurisprudence. Dwarr. on Stat. 680; 6 Bac. Mr. 370. The sales referred to, therefore, cannot, as is argued for the plaintiff in error, refer to such as might have happened to take place before the passage of the Act. For although the alias venditioni exponas had then issued, yet there is no pretence that any sale was had; nor is there an allusion in the preamble or Act, to a sale being in contemplation. The sales must necessarily be considered as those whieh should happen after the 1st of April 1837, and not before.
Taking into view, then, the whole tenor and scope of the Act, the legislature orders that the judgments be opened, that the plaintiff's allegation of payment of the bonds shall be tried by a jury, and the rights of the parties be settled according to the event. If the plaintiff should choose to go on and sell, it was to be at the risk of having the whole sale set aside, in case he failed on the trial. On the other hand, the defendant was indulged with another trial, on the merits, before a jury, which was the main object of his complaint and application — with the power, if he succeeded, of treating any sales that might, in the meanwhile, take place, as a nullity. In opening a judgment, the legislature, like a court, may prescribe such terms and conditions as it sees fit. Opening a judgment, is not setting it aside, annulling, or reversing it. It is but a mode of allowing to the defendant a hearing on the merits, and a court may impose such terms as it deems propel'. The legislature, acting as a high and responsible tribunal, in a delicate matter, where they were about to interfere in a particular suit, a measure which is looked on with distrust in a community of laws, might choose to go to a certain extent, and no further. They might choose to say, we will provide you a hearing, but we will do nothing further to delay or hinder the security of the creditor. We will not take away his lien — we will not arrest his executions, if he chooses to go on and sell, and take the risk of the ultimate result. We think we do as much for you, as in justice and reason you can ask, when we allow you to go before a jury to prove your payment, and when we guarantee you from loss of your property, in case you establish your assertion of payment. But we will not tie the hands of your creditor in the meanwhile, when perhaps your assertion is unfounded, and when the fluctuations in the value of property, or the casualties of human aifairs, may operate to impair his security, if we do. Such appears to us to be the proper construction of the Act of Assembly, 1st of April 1837, considering all its different provisions, and the existing state of things apparent from the evidence. And it may be further observed, that, where a Statute of this kind is dark in its meaning, and ambiguous in its expressions, it ought not, in our opinion, to be strained farther, in derogation of the ordinary rights of a party to a suit, than is plainly warranted by its enactments. It is rather in the nature of a private Act of Assembly, conferring new and unusual privileges on a particular individual, and should receive a strict interpretation. Dwarr. Stat. 750; Cowp. 26; 4 Bing. 450 ; 2 Chitt. 610, 650. As to the word void used in the Act, in this as in many other cases that have occurred in the construction of statutes, when the language and meaning of the whole Act necessarily require it, it means voidable only. Prigg v. Adams, (Salk. 678); Winchcombe v. Winchester, (Hob. 166); Dwarr. Stat. 741.
Although, therefore, the court below, agreeably to the principles settled in Cash v. Tozer, (1 Watts & Serg. 519), erred in holding that the acknowledgment of the sheriiPs deed to the defendant Brownfield was conclusive and prevented an inquiry in this suit into the validity of the process and sale, yet the verdict and judgment were, for the reasons above given, correct, the sale not being prohibited by the Act of Assembly in the events that have taken place. Nor are the other circumstances referred to in the charge, of the manner in which the levy was made, (subject to the claim of Brownfield to 200 acres,) or the shade cast on the title, sufficient grounds for invalidating the sheriff's deed.
Judgment affirmed.
The other case is also affirmed, being of opinion that no writ of error lies to this court from the Court of Common Pleas, on its refusal to open a judgment, or in receiving the acknowledgment of a sheriff's deed.
Judgment affirmed.