Case Name: The FREDERICKSBURG CARE COMPANY, L.P., Petitioner, v. Brenda LIRA, as Representative of the Estate of Guadalupe Quesada, Deceased, Respondent
Court: Supreme Court of Texas
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 2015-03-06
Citations: 461 S.W.3d 529
Docket Number: No. 13-0577
Parties: The FREDERICKSBURG CARE COMPANY, L.P., Petitioner, v. Brenda LIRA, as Representative of the Estate of Guadalupe Quesada, Deceased, Respondent
Judges: 
Reporter: South Western Reporter Third Series
Volume: 461
Pages: 529–530

Head Matter:
The FREDERICKSBURG CARE COMPANY, L.P., Petitioner, v. Brenda LIRA, as Representative of the Estate of Guadalupe Quesada, Deceased, Respondent
No. 13-0577
Supreme Court of Texas.
OPINION DELIVERED: March 6, 2015
Rehearing Denied June 26, 2015
Gavin Joe Gadberry, Underwood Law Firm, P.C., Amarillo, for Amicus Curiae American Health Care Association and Texas Health Care Association.
Roy R. Barrera III, Shawn Christopher Golden, Golden & Barrera, P.C., San Antonio, for Petitioner The Fredricksburg Care Company, L.P.
Byron Miller, Gavin Mclnnis, Marynell Baker Maloney, Marynell Maloney Law, San Antonio, for Respondent Brenda Lira, as representative of the Estate of Guadalupe Quesada, Deceased.

Opinion:
PER CURIAM
The outcome of this case is controlled by our opinion in Fredericksburg Care Co. v. Perez, 461 S.W.3d 513, 2015 WL 1035343 (Tex.2015). Both cases, along with a third case styled Williamsburg Care Co. v. Acosta, 461 S.W.3d 530, 2015 WL 1029779 (Tex.2015) (per curiam), involve the question of whether a federal law, the McCar-ran-Ferguson Act (MFA), 15 U.S.C. § 1011-1015, exempts Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 74.451 from being preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 1-16. The court of appeals consolidated this case with Perez and Acosta for oral argument, and issued identical opinions (except for changing the identities of the parties) holding that the MFA exemption from preemption applied to section 74.451. 407 S.W.3d 810, 822 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2013). We hold today in Perez that section 74.451 was not a law enacted for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance and thus does not qualify for the MFA exemption from preemption. Perez, 461 S.W.3d at 528. The trial court should have granted the motion to compel arbitration. Id.
Accordingly, we grant the- petition for review in this case, and without hearing oral argument, Tex. R. App. P.' 59.1, we • reverse the court of appeals' judgment and remand this case to the trial court to proceed in a manner consistent with our opinion in Perez, 461 S.W.3d 513.