Case Name: The Selectmen of Boston, Appellants, versus Ward Nicholas Boylston
Court: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
Jurisdiction: Massachusetts
Decision Date: 1807-03
Citations: 1 Tyng 384
Docket Number: 
Parties: The Selectmen of Boston, Appellants, versus Ward Nicholas Boylston.
Judges: 
Reporter: Massachusetts Reports
Volume: 2
Pages: 347–355

Head Matter:
The Selectmen of Boston, Appellants, versus Ward Nicholas Boylston.
An administrator with the will annexed of one domiciled in England, and dying there, comes into this state, files the copy of the will in the probate office pur suant to the statute of June 29, 1785, and takes administration here, cum testar mentó annexa. He is not held to account here for effects received by him in England.
Thomas Boylston, formerly of Boston, went to England, by permission of the government of Massachusetts, during the revolutionary war, and there died in the year 1798, having made his will, by which he bequeathed the greater part of his estate to the town of Boston, for certain charitable uses, and made the selectmen of Boston trustees of the said estate. The executors named in the will having declined to accept the trust, administration of the estate of said deceased, with the will annexed, was committed to Ward N. Boylston, the present respondent, in the Prerogative Court of the archbishop of Canterbury.
Afterwards, the said W. N. Boylston came into this state, *and, in order to enable himself to collect certain [ * 385 ] debts due said estate here, filed a copy of the said will in the probate office in the county of Suffolk, and the judge ot probate granted administration thereof to the said Boylston, pursuant to the statute of this commonwealth, passed June 29, 1785, entitled “ An Act for the filing and recording of wills proved with out this government, and for taking affidavits in writing for the probate of wills in certain cases.”
In December, 1805, upon the application of the said selectmen, the judge of probate cited the said administrator to appear before him, to show cause why he had not settled his administration account, rendered proper inventories of the estate of the testator, and generally to make answer to such questions as might by law be put to him, and to submit himself to such examination as by law he was bound to do. Upon his appearance, in obedience to this citation, a number of interrogatories were put to him, of which it is unnecessary in the present case to state any except the following, viz. : —
“ 10th. What is the amount of the testator’s effects, which came to your hands before you took administration in this county de bonis non, with the will annexed ?
“11th. Did you not receive from the hands of a Mr. Cookson, al whose house the said testator died, certificates for 30,000 dollars of the deferred stock of the United States debt, which belonged to the testator ?
“ 12th. Did you not also receive from said Cookson £4332 10s. 10d. sterling money of Great Britain in cash, being part of the estate of the testator, — and when did you receive it ?
" 13th. Have you received any other effects, estate, or credits, in 'England, oi elsewhere, previous to your taking administration here r ”
To these interrogatories he answered, substantially, that the testator was an inhabitant of Great Britain, and died in ^London; that letters of administration with the will annexed were granted l<> him, as next of kin, by the archbishop of Canterbury; that he became bound to administer the personal estate of the [ *386 ] * testator according to the laws of England; that he is accountable only to the said archbishop for any assets received or to be received by him in England, or elsewhere, as he conceives; and that he hath no necessity to answer the said interrogatories, or either of them, and is not accountable before this Court for any such assets.
The judge of probate below decreed that the said administrator had not in his hands any assets of the estate of said deceased for which he was accountable in that court to said legatees. From this decree the said selectmen appealed to this Court, as the supreme Court of Probate, and the cause came on to be argued at this term.
For the respondent,
it was insisted that, the administration com mitted to him here being only of the testator’s estate “ lying in this government,” he is not accountable in the Probate Court here for any property which came to his hands in England, or elsewhere without this commonwealth, by virtue of the administration granted to him by the archbishop of Canterbury. He had given bonds with sureties to account in the archbishop’s court for all such property and effects, and if he is held to account for and pay it over here, he must be twice charged. The administration taken here was a matter of form, to enable him to recover any demands existing here in favor of the estate, as his appointment in England would not be recognized by our courts. The statute under which his authority is derived authorizes an administration of such patt only of the testator’s estate as lies in this government. This express limitation of the jurisdiction of the judge of probate, and of the power given by him to the executor or administrator, seems of itself to settle the question, and to obviate the necessity of arguments oi authorities.
It will not be denied that, in the distribution of an estate coming under his jurisdiction by force of this statute, the judge of probate must conform to the laws of the place where the testator * had his domicile at the time of his decease, if he will [ * 387 ] undertake the distribution of it. Although, in the case now under consideration, the judge knows the laws of England, yet how shall he know the laws of other foreign countries, as France or Hindostán ? (Sedgwick, J. The same difficulty must arise on every administration of foreigners’ estate originally taken here. The judge must distribute it according to the laws of the intestate’s country.) In such cases, the judge would order the effects trans ferred to such foreign country, there to be distributed; and the pay ment over to the legal representative would discharge the administrator here. And upon this ground it might be contended that Mr. Boylston is held no further to account to the judge here than to show he has obeyed the directions of the archbishop’s court, as to any effects collected here. Had he received moneys here, which were paid voluntarily and without suit, he must account in England for them. Can his being obliged to sue, and for that purpose applying to our courts for authority to maintain his action, make a difference in the rights or duties of any parties interested ?
This case may be resembled to a case of bankruptcy. Suppose a bankrupt in England to have some debts due him in this country. His assignee comes here, and, in order to collect those, debts, he takes out a commission here. Shall he be held to account here, by virtue of this last commission, for all the moneys received by him in England under the first commission ?
The penalty of the bond given on taking out letters of administration is proportioned to the estimated value of the estate to be administered, and sureties are required of sufficient ability to respond for the administrator’s conduct. In this case the principal part of the testator’s estate being in England, bond was taken there in a sum, and with sureties sufficient to cover it. Here a small part of his estate being found, the judge, granting administration on that part only, adapted the bond to its object. But on the construction made by the appellants, the sureties here are made liable, and ought to be of sufficient ability, to respond for the large sums collected in England, — while the sureties there, who were taken for that object, are wholly discharged.
* It is a rule of law, well established, that the rights [ * 388 ] of parties to property are governed by the lex loci ; but the remedy, or form of recovery, by the law of the country where
that remedy is sought, or where process is instituted for its recovery. Mr. Boylston is bound to pay and account for these moneys in England, the place of the testator’s domicile, — and if he should account and pay here, it will not avail him there. He will be told that it was his folly or his misfortune to account in a foreign country for property which was absolutely and exclusively under the jurisdiction of the English courts.
The counsel for the appellants
said, they were not disposed to controvert the greater part of the principles advanced on the other side. But they contended that the appellants, being citizens, having a demand on Mr. Boylston, and finding him here and possessed of assets, have a right to the aid of the laws of the country to enforce their demand. By accounting here, Mr. B. will perform a duty for which he gave bond in England, and such account would be received there in his discharge; so he will not be twice charged for the same debt. It is true, he must account here according to the law of that country where the testator was domiciled at the time of his death. Thus, if there were here creditors by specialty, and by simple contract, our courts, in receiving his account, would recognize the distinction made, in the English law, between those two species of debts, although our law makes no such difference. The demand, however, in this case being for a legacy, the laws of the two countries are in unison upon the subject.
If Mr. B. is not held to account here, he can be held nowhere, for the process of foreign countries cannot pursue him here. While he remains here, out of the reach of process from the English Court of Chancery, the appellants could obtain no remedy there, were they to apply for it. All personal rights and duties are trans- [ * 389 ] itory in their nature, and may be enforced * in every country where the person or property can be found ; excepting only those relating to immovable property, — which the policy of every independent state keeps within its exclusive jurisdiction, —and offences or crimes, in which the sovereign of every country claims to be his own avenger.
When Mr. B. undertook the trust of administering this estate according to the directions of the will, it became his duty to pay over to the appellants the moneys bequeathed to them, as they should be collected. The legatees have a right to require this of him, wherever he may be. All the moneys collected by him, wheresoever collected, or by whatsoever authority, form one fund for the uses appointed in the will. His having taken out letters of administration in different places, and having given collateral securities in each place, cannot affect the rights of the appellants, nor the duties of the appellee. They remain the same, though he take never so many authorities, and give a different security upon each. When he has executed the will, he has done that for which the authorities were conferred, and all his securities are discharged, It is, then, of no consequence to Mr. B. whether he accounts here or in England. Accounting and paying over, according to the will, in either place, would effectually discharge him and his securities in both places.
The words in the statute, “ lying in this government,” can never be construed to mean an administration of part of an estate. The will filed in pursuance of this statute is to have the same force and effect as a will originally proved here. The judge of probate is to settle the estate in the same way and manner as estates of testators whose wills have been duly proved before him. But the property now in question was within these words; for Mr. B. brought this money with him, and had it here when he filed this will. His having previously taken administration in England is a circumstance perfectly immaterial, as it relates to the right of these legatees. This money was as much the estate of the testator without administration as with. This statute alters no former law; it gives an additional remedy only, and cannot be construed so as to take away an existing right.
* Suppose Mr. B. had not filed this will, and clothed [ *390 ] himself with the character of administrator in our court,— if in such case, being found here, he would be liable to a suit here for this legacy, which will not be denied, (for whether a foreign executor or administrator can sue in our courts or not, it has never been doubted that he may be sued here,) all the beneficial consequences to the legatees would follow which they expect upon this process. If they can recover this legacy only in England, Mr, B. has nothing to do but continue in this country, and he may retain the rfioney forever.
The bond given by Mr. B. to the judge of probate, upon receiving this administration here, is conditioned for his returning an inventory of all the goods and credits which have or shall come to his possession or knowledge, and for his accounting and paying over the same, as the judge shall limit and appoint, pursuant to law.
If he is to be held to account, here for moneys collected here, and in England for moneys received there, this absurdity may fol low: A creditor or a legatee, having a demand for a greater sum than was collected in either of the countries by itself, must sever his demand, and sue for a part of it in one country and for the remainder in the other.
If the first administration covers all the property wheresoever collected, the appellants have no case of it. But no authority to this effect has been produced, and the principle goes too far, — for then Mr. B. is not answerable here to our own citizens for the amount of the property which he has received here by the aid of our own laws.
For the respondent, in reply.
The statute which authorizes the filing and recording wills from other countries gives to the judge of probate a-limited jurisdiction, expressly confining it to “estate lying within this government.” These words are superfluous, and must be wholly rejected, if Mr. B. is held, by virtue [ * 391 ] *of this administration, to account for property received in England. This is an extravagant and unnecessary construction. The statute is an act of national courtesy, to enable foreigners, being executors or administrators, to collect dues here, which they were otherwise unable to do. When collected, they are to account for them, in their own country, according to the duties enjoined by the laws thereof. The authority of the Probate Court in this case is merely ministerial, and intended to aid the stranger in procuring his dues. Having done this, it has discharged its office. The administration granted here is intended to go in aid of that granted in England; but upon the construction contended for on the other side, it is made to take from it, and to counteract it.
The appellants do not contend that the Court of Probate here has exclusive jurisdiction. The English courts have still the control of the sureties of Mr. B., or they may repeal the grant of administration to him. The principal transactions having been in that country, the vouchers are properly left there, and could not be produced here in discharge of Mr. B., if he should be decreed to account here. Suppose, what is likely to be a frequent case, that debts are due in a number of these states to the estate of a deceased English merchant. Administration is taken'by the same person in each state. According to the construction contended for on the other side, the administrator must account in each for the whole property received by him in every country.
Where a citizen of this country derives a right under the law of a foreign state or kingdom, there can be no hardship in sending him into that state or kingdom, to secure or obtain it. The accidental and temporary presence of the administrator here cannot alter the rights of a citizen. The process in this case is rather in rem than in personam.
If Mr. B. accounts here for property received here, such account would be his discharge in England. If he does not account here, he must account there. The distribution of the property must follow the first administration ; and accounting here for the moneys received in England by virtue of the administration granted there, would not discharge him there.
* As to severing the demand, it has no connection [ * 392 ] with this process, which is only calling upon him to render his account, and involves in it no adjudication on the demands of the appellants.
Bac. Abr. tit. Executors, E. 11, where is given the form of the bond. — See, also, 4 Burn's Eccl. Law, 485, tit. Wills, Account.
Ambler, 25, Pipon vs. Pipon. — 2 Vesey, 35. Thorn vs. Watkins
Pearsal & Al. vs. Dwight & Al. ante, 84, and the cases cited from N. Y. Term Reports. — See also the case of Burn vs. Cole, cited by counsel in Hunter vs. Potts, 4 Term R. 185.
See the cases of Solomons vs Ross, and the other cases cited in the notes u the case of Folliot vs. Ogden, 1 H. Black. 131.
See Shepherd’s Touchstone, 496.— 6 Rep. 47, Dowdale’s case. — Cro. Jac. 55 Richardson vs. Dowell, S. C. —11 Vin. Abr title Exr. Z. 15 pl. 7, 8, 9.

Opinion:
The Chief Justice, having been of counsel for Mr. Boylston, did not sit in the cause, and the opinion of the rest of the Court was ."elivered by
Sedgwick, J.
This action is brought before the Court by appeal from the Court of Probate in this county.
Thomas Boylston, formerly of Boston, removed from hence to London several years before his death. There he lived, made his will, and died. Administration, after his death, was granted by the archbishop of Canterbury to the respondent, with the will annexed. Since that time he has, conformably to the act of June 29, 1785, for " filing and recording wills, proved without this government," &lc., filed and recorded the will in the probate office of this county. The selectmen, claiming for their town as residuary legatees, have brought the respondent into the Probate Court, to disclose, by answers to interrogatories, the estate of the testator in his hands; and he having declined answering as to effects' which he received in England, and for which he thinks he is bound to answer and account only in the courts of that country, the question for us now to decide is, whether he is bound to make such disclosure.
This question has been argued very much at large, and with great ability. We have very seriously considered the subject, and are all of opinion that the right of the appellants to a disclosure, and the extent to which that disclosure shall go, depend exclusively on the construction of our statute.
The first section of the statute enacts — " That where the copy of any will which has been proved and allowed in any Probate Court in any of the United States, or in any foreign state or kingdom, shall be directed to be filed and recorded fin any Probate Court in this government, pursuant to this act, the filing and recording thereof shall be of the same force and effect as the filing [ *398 ] and recording of an original will proved *and allowed in the same Court of Probate ; and the said judge may thereupon proceed to take bonds of the executor, or grant administration of the said testator's estate lying in this government., with the will annexed, and settle the said estate in the same way and manner as by law he may or can upon the estates of testators whose wills have been duly proved before him."
The judge of probate has in this case proceeded, and in all similar cases must proceed, according to the powers which are delegated to him by this statute. He can exercise no othei powers. He has granted to the respondent administration on,-the estate of Thomas Boylston, lying in this government, with the will annexed. All the authority, then, given to the administrator, is over the estate lying in this government. The judge is to settle the said estate. What estate ? Clearly, I think, the estate lying in this government. And it will neither consist with the intention of the legislature, nor the purposes of justice, because the administrator, with the will annexed, is here, to proceed upon the fiction that, by his relation to the testator in the same capacity in England, we ought to consider all the assets possessed by him there as the estate of the testator-lying in this government; because the estate by the statute subjected to the control of the Court of Probate, and to be settled by it, was that which was lying here before granting the letters of administration. To that, and to that only, do the words, and, as I think, the meaning of the legislature extend.
The argument from the inconveniences of admitting the con struction for which the counsel for the appellants have contended is strong and irresistible. It may reasonably be presumed that the largest part of the testator's estate lies in the country where the original administration is granted ; and that there also is the greatest portion of claims upon it. For what purpose of utility is the property to be transported to a distant region, and those to whom it belongs compelled to follow it, for the satisfaction of their demands ? The expense and trouble of such a procedure, while wholly unnecessary, could not fail to be considerable.
[ * 394 ] * Suppose an English merchant of great property and extensive dealings to have been the testator; suppose this property to be principally in England, but portions of it to be left in several foreign countries, and that the administrator appointed there goes to collect it, and seeks the aid of the foreign governments for that purpose ; and they, under pretence of giving this aid, claim an authority of drawing within their jurisdiction all the personal property of the testator, and all those who have demands apon it, or are interested in it. All these governments are independent of each other; and what is to establish a right of precedence ? The commencement of a prosecution ? How is this to be known Í How are the other authorities to be controlled ? If this is to be the construction, who will become bound for the administrator ? By what means can the liability of the administrator and his sureties be known ? In terms they only guaranty the settlement of the estate lying within the commonwealth; but in effect, if this construction be admitted, estate lying in every part of the globe. It is, in our opinion, impossible that such could have been the intention of the legislature. There are innumerable other inconveniences, which might be, but which it is unnecessary should be, pointed out.
Morton and Dexter for the appellants.
Otis and C. Jackson for the appellee.
Decree affirmed.
Richards vs. Dutch & Al. 8 Mass. Rep. 506. — Dawes vs. Boylston, 9 Mass. Rep. 337. — Selectmen of Boston vs. Boylston, 4 Mass. Rep. 318. — Stevens vs. Gaylord, 11 Mass. Rep. 256. — Dawes vs. Head & Al. 3 Pick. 128. — Harvey vs. Richards, 1 Mass Rep. 381.— Decouche vs. Savetier, 3 Johns. C. C. 190.