Case Name: BARNARD v. STATE
Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1920-03-31
Citations: 221 S.W. 293
Docket Number: No. 5490
Parties: BARNARD v. STATE.
Judges: 
Reporter: South Western Reporter
Volume: 221
Pages: 293–296

Head Matter:
BARNARD v. STATE.
(No. 5490.)
(Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
March 31, 1920.
On Motion for Rehearing, May 12, 1920.)
1. Criminal law @=>866 — “Verdict” held notar-rived at “by lot.”
Where jurors, after voting guilty of manslaughter, agreed to add up their preferences as to length of sentence and divide by 12, and quotient amounted to four years and five months, and thereupon it was suggested that the verdict be fixed at four years and there was a unanimous vote in favor of such term, held, there was no violation of Vernon’s Ann. Code Or. Proe. 1916, art. 837, subd. 3, forbidding a verdict to be arrived at by lot.
2. Homicide @=>157(1) — Evidence tending to show former grudge held admissible.
In a prosecution for murder, evidence tending to show enmity or former grudges on the part of accused against deceased is admissible.
3. Criminal IaW @=>680(1) — No abuse of discretion in permitting admission of evidence for . state after defendant closed.
In a prosecution for murder, court did not abuse its discretion in permitting a witness to testify, after defendant had closed his evidence in chief, that deceased was manager of her farm on which accused was a tenant, and that on one occasion when a misunderstanding came up over the division of pecans accused became very angry and insisted that deceased was the one who was causing him the trouble; it not ap pearing that the court refused accused the privilege of introducing evidence upon the matter.
4. Criminal law <@=> 1153(3) — Order of testimony largely confided to discretion of court.
The order of testimony is not fixed by ironclad rules, and is confided largely to the discretion of the trial courts, and their actions regulating the same will ordinarily be upheld unless by some unusual variance from the customary procedure some injury appears probable.
5. Criminal law <@=>729 — Statement of state’s counsel in argument not prejudicial where withdrawn.
A statement of the prosecuting attorney in his argument, to the effect that one of accused’s attorneys went to the scene of the crime and got the parties to make certain tests, was not prejudicial to accused, where one of accused’s attorneys objected for the reason that he was never at the place of the crime and state’s attorney thereupon accepted Ms word and withdrew the statement.
6. Criminal law <@=>723(1) — Argument that children of deceased were entitled to sympathy not reversible error.
In a prosecution for murder, statements to the effect that the children of deceased were entitled to sympathy held not to call for a reversal.
7. Homicide <@=>340(4)— Submission of murder charge not erroneous simply because conviction was for manslaughter.
The fact that one charged with murder is found guilty of manslaughter does not show that the court erred in submitting the law. of murder to the jury.
On Motion for Rehearing.
8. Criminal law <@=>l 156(5) — Findings by court on testimony of jurors upheld in absence of manifest wrong.
Findings made by the trial court upon fact issues raised by testimony of jurors as to manner of arriving at verdict on motion for new trial are always upheld on appeal, unless it appears that the decision is manifestly wrong, under Vernon’s Ann. Code Or. Proc. 1916, art. S37.
Appeal from Criminal District Court, Travis County;' James R. Hamilton, Judge.
Walter Barnard was convicted of manslaughter, and appeals.
Affirmed.
Dickens & Dickens, of Austin, for appellant.
Alvin M. Owsley, Asst. Atty. Gen., for tl).e State.

Opinion:
LATTIMORE, J.
Appellant was indicted
in the criminal district court of Travis county, upon a charge of murder; and upon his trial was convicted of manslaughter, and his punishment fixed at four years in the penitentiary.
Considering the errors urged in the order as presented by appellant's brief, we first notice the contention that the verdict was reached by lot, and that same is therefore illegal. The record discloses that the testimony of the jurors was "heard in support of this motion for a new trial, their testimony substantially being that after they had agreed on a verdict of guilty of manslaughter, finding themselves of various minds upon the question of the penalty, they agreed to add up their several preferences, as to amounts, and divide the result by twelve, which was done; and the quotient amounted to four years and a fraction, or, four years and five months, as testified to by most of them. Thereupon, some one either made a motion, or suggested, that the verdict be fixed at four years, and there was a unanimous vote in favor of this term. This is not such procedure as amounts to a violation of our statute forbidding a verdict arrived at by lot. See section 656, Branch's Ann. Penal Code; Dawson v. State, 72 Tex. Cr. R. 78, 161 S. W. 469; Lamb v. State, 75 Tex. Cr. R. 75, 169 S. W. 1159'; article 837, subd. 3, Vernon's C. C. P. The evidence was practically in accord that, after agreeing to a verdict of manslaughter, a large majority of the jurors were found to favor five years, and two or three for a lesser penalty; and the trial court was warranted in concluding that the addition and division were not to be binding upon them, and it was not so in fact.
Complaint is made of the admission of the testimony of Mrs. Clark. This witness \ testified, 'after the defendant had closed his evidence in chief, that deceased was manager of her farm, on which appellant was a tenant, and that on one occasion, when a misunderstanding came up over the division of some pecans — she accusing appellant of not delivering enough pecans as rental — that appellant became very angry, and said that whoever told her that-was not her share of the pecans had lied. In this connection, she also stated that appellant insisted that deceased was the one who was causing him this trouble. The only persons present at this conversation were appellant, deceased, and the witness. She further said that appellant was more than angry; that his eyes flashed, and he clenched his hands. Appellant was on trial for murder, and evidence tending to show enmity, or former grudges on his part against deceased, was admissible. We think such was evidently the purpose and tendency of said testimony. At the request of appellant, the trial court instructed the jury not to consider any testimony of this witness to the effect that appellant was not giving her the amount of pecans to which she thought herself entitled. If appellant desired to introduce any evidence upon this matter, he had the right so to do; and it does not appear that the trial court refused to permit him this privilege. The: order of testimony is not fixed by ironclad rules under our practice, and is confided largely to tlie discretion of tlie trial courts; and tlieir actions regulating same -will ordinarily t>e upheld, unless by some unusual variance-from the customary procedure- some injury appears probable— which is not the fact in the instant case.
Objection was also made to a statement in his argument, by the prosecuting attorney, to the effect that one of appellant's attorneys went out to the scene of the homicide with certain witnesses, and pointed out various places, and got said parties to mate certain tests. It appears from the qualification affixed to this bill that, as soon as said statement was made, one of appellant's attorneys named therein arose and objected, for the reason that he was never out at such place. At once, the attorney prosecuting promptly retracted said statement, telling the jury that same was based on the fact that the testimony showed that an attorney for the defendant was out at said place, conducting said investigation for the defendant, but that, if this one of defendant's attorneys said he was not there, he accepted his word and withdrew the statement. In this condition of the record, we see no injury possible in this matter.
Nor do we think the argument set out in bill of exceptions No. 7, to the effect that the children of deceased were entitled to sympathy, such argument as would call for a reversal of the case. However, this bill, considered in the light of the court's qualification, presents no objectionable matter. This is also true of his bill of exceptions No. 8. These bills were accepted by appellant, and are before us without objection to the court's qualifications.
Complaint is also made of the fact that the trial court submitted the issue of murder. We do not think any error was thus committed. We are referred to no authority holding that, where one charged with murder is found guilty of manslaughter, the mere fact of the submission of the law of murder operates as any injury to the accused. No incorrect statement of'the law of murder or of manslaughter in the charge is here pointed out, by which we might be led to believe that the charge of the court could have had any evil effect in bringing about a conviction of the lower grade of homicide.
The evidence showed that appellant was armed with a pistol. He testified that deceased threw a rock at him shortly after their meeting, which struck him on the hand, causing pain and bloodshed; that deceased also then cursed him, and said he was going to his house and get his gun and come out and kill him; that when deceased started to the house he (appellant) pulled his pistol and shot. There were three shots fired. Deceased was shot twice in ^the back, and expired almost immediately. We are doubtful if self-defense was in the case. See Lynch v. State, 24 Tex. App. 864, 6 S. W. 190, 5 Am. St. Rep. 888; Bush v. State, 40 Tex. Cr. R. 543, 51 S. W. 238. But if such theory appeared, the court fully charged on same as possibly raised by the testimony of appellant, instructing the jury that said issue was to be determined from the standpoint of appellant alone, and fully applied the law to the facts as made by the testimony, including a charge on the right of one assailed to pursue his assailant.
The only eyewitness to the homicide, beside appellant and deceased, was the wife of deceased, and she testified that, when the last shot was fired, deceased was running away from appellant down the aisle of the cow barn, and that appellant was standing at the door shooting at him as he ran.
We have found no reversible error in this record, and the judgment of the* trial court will be affirmed.
@=>For other eases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes
<§^»For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes