Case Name: PEOPLE v. NEWMAN
Court: Michigan Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1981-07-07
Citations: 107 Mich. App. 535
Docket Number: Docket No. 48530
Parties: PEOPLE v NEWMAN
Judges: Before: Bronson, P.J., and M. F. Cavanagh and N. J. Kaufman, JJ.
Reporter: Michigan appeals reports; cases decided in the Michigan Court of Appeals.
Volume: 107
Pages: 535–550

Head Matter:
PEOPLE v NEWMAN
Docket No. 48530.
Submitted February 4, 1981, at Detroit.
Decided July 7, 1981.
Leave to appeal denied, 412 Mich 890.
Donald L. Newman was convicted of voluntary manslaughter, Wayne Circuit Court, Myron H. Wahls, J. He appeals. Held:
The trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury adequately on the defendant’s theory of accident so as to focus the jury’s attention on that central issue. The case is remanded for entry of a judgment of conviction for involuntary manslaughter.
Reversed and remanded.
Bronson, P.J., dissented. He would hold that, absent a showing of manifest injustice, failure of a trial court adequately to instruct the jury on the defendant’s theory of accident does not require reversal where the defendant did not raise an objection to the instruction during trial. He would affirm.
Opinion op the Court
1. Homicide — Jury Instructions — Accident.
Failure of a trial court in a prosecution for first-degree murder to instruct the jury adequately on the defense of accident with regard to all of the lesser-included offenses where the theory of accidental homicide is central to the case, even in the absence of a request by the defendant for such an instruction, constitutes error requiring reversal.
Dissent by Bronson, P.J.
2. Homicide — Jury Instructions — Evidence — Victim’s State of Mind — Rules of Evidence.
Failure of a trial court in a prosecution for ñrst-degree murder to give a limiting instruction to the jury relative to properly admitted evidence reflecting on the state of mind of the victim where the defendant does not request the instruction and other evidence is presented as to the defendant’s guilt constitutes, at most, harmless error (MRE 401, 803[3]).
References for Points in Headnotes
[1, 2, 6] 40 Am Jur 2d, Homicide §§ 483, 486.
75 Am Jur 2d, Trial § 615.
29 Am Jur 2d, Evidence § 771.
29 Am Jur 2d, Evidence § 723.
29 Am Jur 2d, Evidence § 269.
21 Am Jur 2d, Criminal Law § 527.
3. Criminal Law — Demonstrative Evidence — Rules of Evidence.
Demonstrative evidence such as bloodstained clothing is admissible where it aids the Under of fact in reaching a conclusion on a material matter in issue (MRE 401).
4. Criminal Law — Res Gestae Witnesses — Prosecuting Attorneys — Good Faith.
An unendorsed, newly discovered, res gestae witness should be allowed to testify in rebuttal where a proper foundation is laid establishing the prosecutor’s due diligence and good faith in attempting to uncover all potential res gestae witnesses.
5. Evidence — Rebuttal Evidence — Cumulative Evidence.
Technically improper rebuttal testimony which is admitted into evidence does not constitute error requiring reversal where it is cumulative of other, properly admitted evidence.
6. Homicide — Jury Instructions — Appeal — Preserving Question.
Error by a trial court in instructing the jury in a ñrst-degree murder case on the defense theory of accident where the theory is central to the case does not require reversal on appeal where the defendant did not raise an objection during trial and there is no showing that the error resulted in manifest injustice.
7. Criminal Law — Sentencing.
A trial court may consider evidence and testimony presented during trial in determining sentence.
Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Robert A. Derengoski, Solicitor General, William L. Cahalan, Prosecuting Attorney, Edward Reilly Wilson, Principal Attorney, Appeals, and Paul G. Bruno, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for the people.
Chari Grove, Assistant State Appellate Defender, for defendant on appeal.
Before: Bronson, P.J., and M. F. Cavanagh and N. J. Kaufman, JJ.

Opinion:
Per Curiam.
Our brother Bronson has made a very thorough summary of the facts of this case in his dissent.
We find the trial court's error in its failure to adequately instruct the jury on the theory of the defense of accident to be dispositive of this case. As was held by panels of this Court in People v Morris; 99 Mich App 98; 297 NW2d 623 (1980), and People v Stanley Jones, 69 Mich App 459; 245 NW2d 91 (1976), where the theory of accidental homicide is central in the defendant's trial, even where the defendant failed to request an instruction on that defense, it is error requiring reversal for the trial court to fail to adequately instruct the jury on the defense so as to focus the jury's attention on that central issue.
Defendant here advanced the theory of accident throughout his defense. The trial court instructed the jury on the defense of accident as it pertained to first- and second-degree murder but not as it pertained to voluntary manslaughter. Therefore, it was possible that even though the jury was instructed to consider the court's instructions as a whole it could have concluded that the defense of accident applied only to the charges of first- and second-degree murder and not to voluntary manslaughter.
We cannot say with certainty that if the jury had been instructed that accident was a defense to voluntary manslaughter it would have convicted defendant of that crime. We reverse defendant's conviction of voluntary manslaughter and remand for entry of judgment of conviction of involuntary manslaughter. We grant the prosecution the op tion of vacating that conviction and seeking a new trial in this case.
As to the remaining issues raised on appeal by this defendant, we find no merit thereto and concur in the disposition accorded them by Judge Bronson.
Reversed and remanded in accordance with this opinion.