Case Name: Patrick O'Shea, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. James B. Kirker and John G. Shea, Defendants and Appellants
Court: New York Superior Court
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1859-01-29
Citations: 4 Bosw. 120
Docket Number: 
Parties: Patrick O’Shea, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. James B. Kirker and John G. Shea, Defendants and Appellants.
Judges: 
Reporter: Reports of cases argued and determined in the Superior Court of the city of New York
Volume: 17
Pages: 120–139

Head Matter:
Patrick O’Shea, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. James B. Kirker and John G. Shea, Defendants and Appellants.
1. Where the complaint, in an action of tort against two defendants, alleges that the defendants jointly did the wrong complained ofj and the referee to whom the whole issue was referred so finds; but also finds, that one defendant injured the plaintiff to the amount of $150, and the other to the amount of $600; the plaintiff may enter judgment against both defendants, jointly, for the larger sum. (Hoffman, J., dissented.)
2. The judgment may be so entered, notwithstanding the referee decides that the plaintiff recover against the one defendant $150, and against the other $600, damages.
3. When several persons are made defendants in an action of tort, in which it is alleged and proved that they jointly did the wrong complained of, each is as absolutely liable to the plaintiff for the whole damage, as the other.
4. Where, in such a case, the jury or a referee severs the damages, and the plaintiff enters a judgment against all for the larger -amount, the judgment will not be reversed because a remittitur of the lesser amount is not formally entered on the record. The entry of such a judgment, per se, remits all claim to the lesser amount.
(Before Bosworth, Ch. J., and Hoffman and Moncrief, J. J.)
Heard, January 14;
decided, January 29th, 1859.
This is an appeal by the defendants from a judgment entered against them on the report of William Kent, Esq., as referee.
The complaint charges that the defendants, on or about the 24th of June, 1856, and on other days between that day and the commencement of this action, at the city of New York, unlawfully, maliciously, &c., composed and published of and concerning the plaintiff, in a printed circular, certain false and defamatory matter, which is set forth, to the damage of the plaintiff, and prays judgment for $20,000 and the costs of the action.
The defendants answered separately. On the trial the publication was admitted. The libelous circular was composed and written by the defendant Shea, and it bore the printed signature “ Edward Dunigan & Brother,” the name of a firm under which the defendant, Kirker, transacted his business. John Gr. Shea, at the time of writing, issuing and circulating the article complained of, was in the employ of Barker, and was also transacting some "business on Ms own account. Kirker saw the circular, and knew of its being issued and circulated, and the same was issued and circulated from his business establishment.
The action was referred to William Kent, Esq., as referee, who found, among other things, as follows: “ The referee finds that the alleged libelous matter was wantonly and unjustifiably made and published by the defendants.”
As a conclusion of law on the facts of the case, “ the referee finds that the plaintiff is entitled to recover damages against the defendants for an unjustified libel.”
Upon an idea that one defendant was more censurable than the other, the referee severed the damages, and found “ that the plaintiff has sustained damages from the defendant, Kirker, to the amount of $150, and damages from the defendant, John G. Shea, to the amount of $600.” “The referee, therefore, decides and reports that' the plaintiff, Patrick O’Shea, do recover judgment against the defendant, James B. Kirker, for $150, and that he do recover judgment against the defendant, John G. Shea, for $600.”
The judgment (entered on the 14th day of May, 1858), recites that the action was referred to William Kent, as referee, the trial of it before him, and the filing of his report, dated the 14th of September, 1857, “ whereby it is found, decided and declared,” “that the same” (the libel) “was wantonly and unjustifiably made and published by the defendants, and that the plaintiff is entitled to recover damages therefor against the defendants, James B. Kirker and John G. Shea, to the amount of $600, and for Ms costs,” and then adjudges that the said report be “in all respects approved, ratified and confirmed,” and that the plaintiff recover judgment against both defendants for said sum of $600, together with $159.09 costs and disbursements, in all amounting to $759.09, and that he have execution therefor.
Erom this judgment, both defendants appealed to the General Term.
James T. Brady and John D. Burchard, for the defendants and appellants.
The judgment is erroneous, being taken against both defendants for the larger amount.
1st. At common law it was, in actions of tort, error to sever in awarding damages as against various defendants. The Courts, in order to avert the consequences of that error, invented the proceeding of electing de melioribus damnis. It is at least doubtful how far a Court had the power thus to visit upon a defendant a penalty which the tribunal of fact did not intend he should incur. We insist that no such power ever in fact existed, and it was a gross act of usurpation, especially in a case of trial by jury, to deprive a defendant lightly mulcted, of the conclusion which as to him was reached by the tribunal to whose judgment and its effect he had a constitutional right. That right extended as well to the amount of damages, as to the question of liability. The error seems much greater, considering that this power, though deemed the act of the Court, was, in fact, that of the plaintiff.
2d. It will be found, on an examination of the authorities, that the Court of Kings Bench, in the year 1771, Lord Maftsfield presiding, reversed a judgment in a action for a joint tort, because the jury had found the trespass to be joint, and yet had given several damages. (Hill et al. v. Goodchild, 5 Burrow, 2790.)
But neither in that case, nor in any other known to us, has it been determined that it is error for the jury to sever the damages where there are several acts of trespass, as to some of which, certain of the defendants are guilty and others ■not, or where the defendants are charged jointly and severally, or have pleaded separately. In the case just cited, the Court expressly state that they make no decision as to such instances.
3d. We are not aware of any case in which it has been held that where several damages are assessed, the plaintiff may take judgment against any defendant alone or jointly with others, for any amount not awarded against him. The election allowed in such cases is to take judgment against any one defendant for the amount in which he is mulcted, simply because the plaintiff might have sued him alone. (See Tidd’s Practice, 805; Graham’s Practice; Mitchell v. Milbank et al., 6 T. R., 199; 5 Burrow, 2790, and the cases there cited; Sedgwick on Damages, 584; Holley v. Mix, 3 Wend., 350.)
4th. There is, however, a distinction between all the cases heretofore adjudged, and the present, not only in reference to the effect of the Code generally, but because here, the referee, acting in the place of the Gourt, has not only declared that the acts of the defendants were several, and differed in delinquency, hut has also assessed separate damages.
He has found that Shea acted wantonly, and Kirker incautiously.
The plaintiff could not, on this state of facts, enter any judgment other than such as the report authorized. (See Code, § 272.)
5th. But the whole fiction, invention or usurpation thus criticised, has fallen through from the want of any reason to maintain it.
The Code authorizes several judgments against several defendants in all kinds of actions.
And the Court has no power under the Code to award any other damages against a defendant than such as have in the first instance been assessed against him. (Code, §§ 260 to 264 and 274.)
For the preceding reasons this judgment should be reversed, and a new trial ordered.
William Fullerton, for respondent (the plaintiff).
The judgment is properly entered up for the largest amount of damages, against both defendants. (Beal v. Finch, 1 Kern., 128.)

Opinion:
By the Court—Bosworth, Ch. J.
The learned referee, before whom this action was tried and by whom it was decided, found as a fact, "that the alleged libelous matter was wantonly and unjustifiably made and published by the defendants," and held, "as a conclusion of law, on the facts of the case," "that the plaintiff is entitled to recover damages against the defendants, for an unjustified libel."
He father states in his report, that he severed " the damages as the defendant Kirker appears to have taken little part in the libel, and is chiefly censurable for allowing the charges against the plaintiff to go forth attached to a circular under the name of his firm, while the defendant John Gr. Shea wrote and personally caused to be circulated this libelous matter."
He further found that Kirker damaged the plaintiff to the amount of $150, and Shea to the amount of $600, and decided that the plaintiff should have judgment against the former for $150,' and against the latter for $600.
If the two, jointly, did the wrong, and if the amount of resulting damage is correctly found, then that wrong damaged the plaintiff to the amount, at least, of $600.
Each defendant, in judgment of law is liable for the whole of such damage, and one is as absolutely liable to the plaintiff for the whole damage as the other. (Bohun v. Taylor, 6 Cow., 313; Knickerbocker v. Colver, 8 id., 111.)
When several persons are united as defendants, in an action of tort, alleged to be their joint tort, and it is established,- that all jointly did the wrong-complained of, the damages cannot be severed. The plaintiff, in such a case, is entitled to a judgment against all jointly, for the whole amount of damages,- which it is proved that such wrong caused him.
When a jury, or referees, on such a state of facts, attempt' to sever the damages, and find that one sum should be paid by one defendant, and a different sum by another, they constitute them: selves into a quasi Court of Chancery, with no rules to guide them in apportioning damages, except such as seem to them " equitable," in the particular .case, and override the stern rule of the common law, that each defendant is liable for the whole damages. And they seem to forget, for the moment, that a plaintiff can have but one satisfaction, and that settling with one of such wrong-doers, or collecting from one of them the amount assessed against him separately, discharges all. I think it just to say, they seem to forget this rule, because in such cases, it is fair to presume they intend that each defendant shall pay the damages assessed against him. In the case before us, it is quite evident, the referee intended, so far as his action might affect that question, that the plaintiff should recover $750; viz.: $150 of Kirker, and $600 of John Q-. Shea.
On the facts found by the referee, the plaintiff was "entitled to a judgment against both defendants for $600, unless the referee's erroneous severance of the damages, and the -provisions of the Code as to the form and nature of a judgment to be entered on the report of a referee to whom the whole issue has been referred, have deprived him of that right.
If the cause had been tried by a jury, and they had found the facts which the referee has found, and had then severed the damages, assessing them as the referee has done, the plaintiff could take judgment against both defendants for $600.
At all events, we should hardly be justified in holding to the contrary, against the decision of Halsey et al. v. Woodruff, (9 Pick., 555,) and the terms of decided approbation, in which that decision is spoken of in Beal v. Finch, (1 Kern., 135, 136, and 141, 142, id.) (See also Dean v. Thornton & Dutton, 3 Kern., 266, and Blodget v. Morris, 14 N. Y., 482; Bulkley v. Smith et al, 1 Duer, 643.)
In Hill et al. v. Goodchild, (5 Burrow, 2790,) (in an action against two for an assault and battery,) Lord Mansfield observed, that " the present question is, whether, upon a charge of a joint trespass, the jury can assess damages according to different degrees of guilt; though the real justice is, that the damages should be respectively assessed in proportion to the real injury done by each defendant." On delivering subsequently the opinion of the Court, he said, " And the present case is, that the count is of a joint trespass; and the jury have found the defendants guilty of a joint trespass, and yet have severed the damages. We are of opinion that in such case the damages cannot be severed. The consequence is, that the judgment must be reversed." If that decision declares the law correctly, a judgment, entered upon the report of the referee, against each defendant for the amount assessed against him would be erroneous, and for that cause alone, would be reversed.
In Mitchell v. Milbank et al, (6 Term. R., 199,) Lord Kenyon, Ch. J., declared, that to enter several judgments against the defendants, (who were found guilty of a joint trespass,) on separate and several assessments of damages against them, would be erroneous.
We have not been referred to any adjudication by which a contrary rule has been applied. In some cases, when the jury have severed the damages, the plaintiff has entered a nolle proseguí against all the defendants but one, and taken a judgment against that one only, and that was held to be regular, and to have cured the verdict, as in Rodney v. Strode, (in Carth., 19,) and Holley v. Mix & Clute (3 Wend., 350; See 1 Sand., 207, note 2).
The decision in Halsey et al. v. Woodruff, (9 Pick., 555,) seems to us, but an application of the rules, that each is liable for the whole damages, and that there can be but one judgment against those united as defendants in the same action and proved to -be guilty of a joint tort. It follows, logically, that judgment must go against all for the amount of damages established, as the result of such joint tort. In that case, the plaintiff entered a remittitur as to the lesser amount of damages. The same practice was pursued in Bulkley v. Smith & Keteltas. (2 Duer, 267; S. C., 1 Duer, 643.)
As the judgment was reversed upon grounds which did not involve a decision of the question whether such a judgment was regular and free from error, that question was not passed upon. Mr. Justice Duer intimated very distinctly that, " as at present advised, if the conflict of authorities is such as to allow a liberty of choice, we certainly should refuse to follow " the doctrine that a plaintiff in such a case " may enter his judgment against all the defendants for the largest damages that are given." (Id., 271.)
We must concede it to be well settled that a plaintiff in such a case is entitled to a judgment against all for the amount of damage which he proves he has sustained from their joint tort, and that damages cannot be assessed against the defendants severally, according to their different degrees of guilt.
When, under a misapprehension of the rule forbidding a severance of the damages, the jury have in fact severed them, it is the right of a plaintiff to remit the lesser sum or sums, and take judgment against all for the larger sum. The party, by entering such remittitur, does not deprive either defendant of any substantial right. The issues have been tried in the presence of each defendant in an action to which he was a party, and upon such evidence as he chose to offer, and the actual damages caused by the joint tort of himself and his co-defendants, have been correctly found upon the evidence and under an accurate application of the rules of law to the case. The judgment which follows as a necessary consequence, is declared by law; that judgment is a joint one against all for the damage caused by their joint tort.
The entry of a remittitur is a matter of form. The entry of a joint judgment against all for the larger sum (the amount of the. actual damage), and for that only is, per se, an election to take judgment against all and for that sum only, and effectually remits all claim to the lesser sum, in addition to that for which the judgment is entered.
The judgment should not be reversed merely because there is no formal entry on the record of a remittitur of the lesser sum. (2 R. S., 425, § 7, sub. 13 and 14; Code, § 176; Bate v. Graham, 1 Kern., 237.)
We therefore think it quite clear that if this action had been tried by a jury, and they had severed the damages, as the referee has done, and a judgment like the one before us had then been entered, it could not be reversed on the mere ground that it had been entered against all for the larger sum.
Section 274 of the Code has not changed the rule as to the liability of each or either of several defendants, proved to have committed a tort jointly, nor does it introduce any new rule by which to determine when a several judgment against one of several defendants may properly be entered. So far as those questions are concerned, the Code leaves them to be determined by pre-existing law.
We cannot accede to the proposition that this section authorizes a severance of damages and several judgments, when all the defendants are proved, at the trial, to have committed jointly the tort complained of, and charged to be their joint act.
Do the provisions of the Code, as to the trial of actions by referees, and as to the judgment to be entered upon their report, make it necessary that a new trial should be ordered on such a state of facts as this case presents, or preclude the plaintiff from entering a judgment against all for the larger sum ?
Referees are required "to state the facts found and the conclusions of law separately." " The report of the referees upon the whole issue, shall stand as the decision of the Court, and judgment may be entered thereon in the same manner as if the action had been tried by the Court." (Code, § 272.)
" Upon a trial of a question of fact by the Court, its decision shall be given in writing, and filed with the clerk, within twenty days after the Court at which the trial took place. Judgment upon the decision shall- be entered accordingly." (Id., 267.) " Accordingly," in this connection, means, probably, " according to such decision."
The referee found that the defendants jointly committed the tort, charged in the complaint as their joint act, and that the plaintiff had been damaged thereby to the amount of $600. (There is no question made that the damages have been assessed at too large an amount.) Had the report stopped here, there can be no doubt that a single judgment against both for $600 damages would have been a regular, and the appropriate judgment on Such a state of facts, and that no other could have been entered.
That part of the report which severs the damages, is irregular, and is outside Of and beyond the full and correct performance by the referee of his whole duty as such referee." That part of the report which is to the effect that judgment be entered against Kirker for" $150, and against Shea for $600, is in conflict with that part which-finds, ás a fact, "that the alleged libelous matter was wantonly' and unjustifiably made and published by the defendants,and declares, " as a conclusion of law on the facts of the case," "that the plaintiff is entitled to recover damages against the defendants for an unjustified libel," so made and published by-them.
The proper judgment on such a state of facts, and under such a rule of law, is a 'joint and single judgment against the two for the amount of the damage caused by such joint act.
Overruling the decision of the referee, that there shall be a judgment against each for the amount assessed against him, and holding that a singlé judgment against the two for the larger sum should be- affirmed, is but pronouncing a judgment in accordance with the facts as found. When no attempt is made "by either party to question the accuracy of the referee's conclusions of fact, the Court on an appeal from the judgment, by whichever party the appeal may be taken, should direct such a judgment as the law pronounces, upon the facts thus found.
In this case, if a judgment had been entered by the clerk, on the report of the referee being filed, and in the terms of the report, and exceptions- to the decision of the referee had been duly filed, and if the plaintiff had appealed from such judgment, the Court would be required (the accuracy of the decision of the allegations of fact being unquestioned) to order such a- judgment as has been entered.
But the judgment is now regularly before the Court on an appeal from it, and the duty of the appellate Court is the same, whoever may be the party appealing. Such a judgment should be given by the appellate Court, as the facts specially found require.
The severing of the damages, like the severance of damages by a jury, may be regarded as an irregularity, not affecting any substantial right. And all directions based on such irregularity may be corrected, and judgment given according to the justice and law of the case. A correct judgment has been entered. If any irregularity, " error, or defect, in the pleadings or proceedings," has occurred in the progress of the trial, up to, or in entering the judgment, "which shall not affect the substantial rights" of either defendant, the Court is required, by section 176, to disregard it, and is prohibited from reversing the judgment by reason thereof.
The questions presented by this appeal may be briefly stated thus:
These defendants have been sued together, and are charged with having jointly committed a tort. On a trial of the issues, joined in the action, between them and the plaintiff, it has been proved that they jointly did the wrong, and that the plaintiff has been damaged thereby, to the amount of $600. These facts have been established by competent and sufficient evidence. Judgment has been entered against both defendants for $600. This is the proper judgment. Do the facts,'that the referee severed the damages assessing them at $150, against one defendant, and at $600, against the other, and deciding that judgment should be entered accordingly, require a reversal of the judgment that has been entered ? Or shall such severance of damages, and the decision founded on it be disregarded, and the judgment, which is right in itself and according to law, be affirmed ?
We are of opinion that it should be affirmed. We, therefore, order an affirmance, giving liberty to the plaintiff, to modify the form of the judgment, (if so advised,) so as to state that he elected to remit the lesser sum, and take judgment against both for the larger sum, and to enter a judgment, that the judgment appealed from be thus modified, and that, as thus modified, it be in all things affirmed.