Case Name: BRAND INVESTMENT COMPANY (FORMERLY KNOWN AS A. W. KUTSCHE & COMPANY) v. THE UNITED STATES
Court: United States Court of Claims
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 1944-06-05
Citations: 102 Ct. Cl. 40
Docket Number: No. 44617
Parties: BRAND INVESTMENT COMPANY (FORMERLY KNOWN AS A. W. KUTSCHE & COMPANY) v. THE UNITED STATES
Judges: Whitaker, Judge; and Whaley, Chief Justice, concur.
Reporter: United States Court of Claims Reports
Volume: 102
Pages: 40–63

Head Matter:
BRAND INVESTMENT COMPANY (FORMERLY KNOWN AS A. W. KUTSCHE & COMPANY) v. THE UNITED STATES
[No. 44617.
Decided June 5, 1944.
Defendant’s motion for new trial overruled October 2, 1944]
Mr. Milton Roberts for the plaintiff. Mr. Max N. Freeman Avas on the briefs.
Mr. W. A. Stern, II, with whom was Mr. Assistant Attorney General Francis M. Shea, for the defendant. Miss Mary K. Fagan and Mr. Milton Kramer were on the briefs.
Defendant’s petition for writ of certiorari denied February 26, 1945.

Opinion:
Madden, Judge,
delivered the opinion of the court:
The plaintiff made a contract with the Government for the construction of a Post Office building at New Castle, Pennsylvania. While the work was under way, the Government issued a telegraphic stop order, which is quoted in finding 5. This stop order was not lifted for 113 days, and the plaintiff was actually stopped in its work for 109 days. It claims that the stop order with its consequent delay was a breach of the contract and seeks damages. The Government undertook, at the hearing before the commissioner of this court, the burden of justifying the stop order and its duration, but presented no evidence at all to sustain that burden. It therefore properly concedes that the stop order was, so far as the evidence shows, unjustified, and we have so found. Being unjustified, it was a breach of the contract.
The remaining questions in the case have to do with some items of alleged damages. The plaintiff asks for a part of the cost of maintaining its main office during the period of the delay, proportionate to the relation which this contract bore to the total amount of all of its then current contracts, plus a large additional amount to compensate for the fact that its executives devoted more than a proportionate part of their time to attempts to get the New Castle job under way again during the period of the stop order. The Government urges that nothing should be allowed for main office expense, since it goes on regardless of what is happening on any or all of the contractor's jobs.
We are allowing the plaintiff a proportionate part of its main office overhead. While such an element of damage can never be proved with mathematical precision, it is standard accounting practice to attribute main office expense to various company operations on some fair basis, and we follow that practice. While it is probable that the plaintiff's executives did devote more than a proportionate part 'of their time to the New Castle job during the period of the stoppage, the amount of that excess has not been proved with measurable definiteness.
The other disputed element of damage is the rental value of machines and equipment which the plaintiff had on the job, and which were necessarily kept idle during the period of the stop order. The plaintiff proved that machines of this type had a certain rental value. The Government urges that the plaintiff was not in the business of renting machines to others; that it would, probably, not have rented them even if they had not been tied up on this job by the indefiniteness of the duration of the stop order; that it has not shown that it had any other job on which it could have used them itself if they had not been tied to this job.
We think that the plaintiff is entitled to recover on this item of its claim. We do not allow the full amount of the rental value, since we recognize that, if rented, the machines would have suffered wear and tear which they did not suffer while idle on this job. But when the Government, in breach of its contract, in effect condemns a contractor's valuable and useful machines to a period of idleness and uselessness, we think that it should make compensation comparable to what would be required if it took the machines for use for a temporary period, but did not in fact use them. As a jury verdict, we allow the proved rental value, discounted by one-half because of the absence of actual use with its resulting wear and tear. We think that the contrary view expressed by the court in Phoenix Bridge Company v. United States, 85 C. Cls. 603, 631, should not be followed.
The plaintiff may recover $6,215.62.
It is so ordered.
Whitaker, Judge; and Whaley, Chief Justice, concur.