Case Name: LITTLE v. THIRD AVE. R. CO.
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1903-05-08
Citations: 82 N.Y.S. 55
Docket Number: 
Parties: LITTLE v. THIRD AVE. R. CO.
Judges: 
Reporter: West's New York Supplement
Volume: 82
Pages: 55–58

Head Matter:
(88 App. Div. 330.)
LITTLE v. THIRD AVE. R. CO.
(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department.
May 8, 1903.)
1. Street Railways—Injury to Pedestrian—Crossing behind Car—Contributory Negligence—Construction oe Testimony.
A pedestrian, struck by a downtown car immediately after having crossed onto the track behind an uptown car, testified that the car was about 40 feet a,way when he first saw it, and that he was standing on the downtown side, waiting to get across the avenue, and that he waited to let an uptown car pass, which was 40 feet away when he first saw it. He later testified that he looked, and did not see the downtown car, but it did not appear when he looked. Meld, that his testimony disclosed contributory negligence as a matter of law.
Laughlin and Patterson, JJ., dissenting.
Appeal from Trial Term, New York County.
Action by Patrick Little against the Third Avenue Railroad Company. From a judgment dismissing the complaint at the close of plaintiff’s case, he appeals.
Affirmed.
Argued before VAN BRUNT, P. J., and McLAUGHLIN, PATTERSON, O’BRIEN, and LAUGHLIN, JJ.
Jacob Fromme, for appellant.
Bayard H. Ames, for respondent.

Opinion:
McLAUGHLIN, J.
On the 15th of January, 1900, between 2 and 3 o'clock in the afternoon, the plaintiff, then about 39 years of. age, attempted to cross defendant's tracks at the intersection of Thirteenth street and Third avenue, and in doing so was struck by one of its southbound cars, and seriously injured. He brought this action to recover damages therefor upon the ground that the same were caused solely by defendant's negligence. At the trial at the close of plaintiff's testimony, the complaint was dismissed, and he has appealed.
The plaintiff testified, in substance, that as he approached the easterly tracks of the defendant he looked, and saw a northbound car approaching, and that he also then, or shortly thereafter, noticed a southbound car approaching, which was about 40 feet away; that he waited until the northbound car, which stopped at this point to take on or let off passengers, had started and proceeded far enough to allow him to pass in the rear of it, which he did, and just as he stepped upon the southbound tracks he was struck and injured. The witness Cohen testified, and he was corroborated in some respects by the witness Nesi, that the car which struck the plaintiff was in sight when plaintiff passed the southeast corner of Thirteenth street, and that when it struck him it was running at a rapid rate of speed, but was stopped within a few feet after the collision occurred. There was absolutely no evidence to the effect that the plaintiff looked to see whether a southbound car was approaching, or that he took any precautions whatever for his own safety, after he stopped to let the northbound car go by, and before he stepped upon the southbound tracks. Under such circumstances, I do not see how the trial court could do otherwise than dismiss the complaint. It is apparent that, if the plaintiff had exercised any care whatever after the northbound car had passed, and before he attempted to step Upon the southbound tracks, he would have seen the car which struck him, and thus the accident would have been avoided. Cohen could see the car approaching, and, manifestly, the plaintiff could if he had looked, as the accident occurred in the middle of the day, and there was nothing, so far as appears, to obstruct the plaintiff's vision or distract his attention. Of course, he was just as much obligated to look out for his own safety as the defendant was to prevent his being injured. Jackson v. Union Ry. Co., 77 App. Div. 161, 78 N. Y. Supp. 1096; Johnson v. Third Ave. R. R. Co., 69 App. Div. 247, 74 N. Y. Supp. 599. Both parties had an equal right to the use of the street at this place, and, while the law requires the defendant to move its cars with care, to the end that persons crossing the street may not be injured, it also requires such persons to exercise an equal amount of care to prevent being injured. If a person using the street fails to exercise this care, and is injured, he cannot recover from the defendant for the' injuries sustained, inasmuch as his own negligence has contributed to it; and this is precisely what occurred in this case. The plaintiff carelessly and heedlessly stepped upon defendant's tracks, and, taking into consideration all of' the testimony which he offered, it is apparent that, had hé exercised the care referred to, he would not have been injured.
The judgment appealed from, therefore, must be affirmed, with costs.
VAN BRUNT, P. J., concurs.