Case Name: PEOPLE ex rel. CANTON BRIDGE CO. v. BOARD OF TOWN AUDITORS OF TOWN OF HORICON, WARREN COUNTY
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1909-12-30
Citations: 120 N.Y.S. 696
Docket Number: 
Parties: PEOPLE ex rel. CANTON BRIDGE CO. v. BOARD OF TOWN AUDITORS OF TOWN OF HORICON, WARREN COUNTY.
Judges: 
Reporter: West's New York Supplement
Volume: 120
Pages: 696–712

Head Matter:
PEOPLE ex rel. CANTON BRIDGE CO. v. BOARD OF TOWN AUDITORS OF TOWN OF HORICON, WARREN COUNTY.
(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Department.
December 30, 1909.)
1. Bridges (§ 10 )—Establishment by Public Authorities^Oontribution to Expenses—“Jointly Liable.”
Under Highway Law (Laws 1890, p. 1201, e. 568) § 130, as amended by Laws 1895, p. 265, c. 416, providing that, when public free bridges are constructed over streams forming the boundary lines of towns, such towns shall be “jointly liable” to pay the expenses of construction, the expense must be divided equally between the towns.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Bridges, Cent. Dig. § 22; Dec. Dig. § 10.
For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, vol. 4, p. 3819; vol. 8, p. 7695.]
2. Bridges (§ 8 )—Establishment by Public Authorities—Contribution to Expenses—Certiorari to Review Action.
Highway Law (Laws 1890, p. 1179, -e. 568) § 10, as amended by Laws 1895, p. 408, c. 606, provides that, if any bridge shall become unsafe, the commissioner of highways may, with the consent of the town board, causthe same to be immediately rebuilt. Section 130 (page 1201), as amended by Laws 1895, p. 265, c. 416, provides that, when public free bridges are constructed over streams forming the boundary lines of towns, such towns shall be jointly liable to pay the expenses of zsueh construction. Section 134 (page 1202) provides that, whenever two of more towns shall be liable to make or maintain any bridge, the same shall be built and maintained at the expense of such towns, without reference to the town lines, and that the commissioners of highways of all the towns, or one or more of such towns, the others, refusing to act, may enter into a joint contract for making and repairing such bridge. Section 136 (page 1202) provides that if .the commissioners of highways of either of such towns, after a noticin writing from the commissioner of highways of any other of such towns, shall not within 20 days consent in writing to build or repair any such bridge, the commissioners giving such notice may make or repair such bridge, and maintain an action against the town whose commissioners, neglect or refuse to join in such making or repairing. The commissioner of highways of a town jointly liable with another town for the maintenance of a bridge gave notice under section 136 to the commissioner of the other town that the bridge was out of repair, and after examination of the bridge the town boards of both towns voted to rebuild the bridge, and the commissioners of the two towns let the contract, and the bridge was constructed and accepted by the commissioners; and was opened to-public travel in 1899 and continuously used thereafter. Held, that one of the towns was liable for one-half of the expense of building the bridge, though only a majority of its town board agreed to its construction, and, no steps having been taken to review the action of the town boards or their power to act, their action is not subject to review in certiorari proceedings to compel the allowance of the claim for one-half the expense of building the bridge.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Bridges, Gent. Dig. §§ 11, 15; Dec. Dig. § 8 ]
3. Bridges (§ 5 )—Statutory Provisions—Repeal by Implication.
Highway Law (Laws 1890, p. 1202, c. 568) § 134, provides that, whenever two or more towns, shall be liable to construct any bridge, the same shall be built at the expense of such towns without reference to the town line, and that the commissioners of highways of all the towns, or of one or more of such towns, the others refusing to act, may enter into a joint contract for making such bridge. Section 135 (page 1202) provides that if the com missioners of highways of either of such towns, after notice in writing from the commissioner of highways of any other of such towns, shall not within 20 flays give their consent in writing to build any such bridge, the commissioners giving such notice may make such bridge, and then maintain an action against the town whose commissioners neglected or refused to make such bridge, and recover from such town as much as it would be liable to contribute to the making of such bridge. County Law (Laws 1892, p. 1761, c. 686) § 68, entitled “Bridges over 'County Lines,” was a re-enactment of Laws 1875, p. 557, c. 482, § 1, subd. 4, which provided that the board may apportion the expense of the construction of a public bridge over a stream forming the boundary lines of counties between the towns at such point. Other sections of the county law, in which said section 68 is found, relate more particularly to bridges intersecting county lines, and the building of a bridge between two towns in the same county is fully provided for in the highway law. Held, that County Law, § 68, did not repeal or destroy the effect of Highway Law, §§ 134, 135.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Bridges, Cent. Dig. § 5; Dec. Dig. § 5. ]
Cochrane, J., dissenting.
Certiorari by the People of the State of New York, on relation of the Canton Bridge Company, to compel the Board of Town Auditors of the Town of Horicon, Warren County, to reverse its decision not to allow relator’s claim. The action of defendants reversed, and the matter remanded to them, with direction to audit and allow relator’s claim.
Certiorari issued out of the Supreme Court, and attested on the 5th day of October, 1905, directed to the board of town auditors of the town of Horicon, Warren county, and to the several persons and officers composing said board, commanding them to certify and return to the clerk of the county of Warren all and singular the proceedings of the said board in relation to the disallowance and rejection of the claim of the relator. The claim of the relator, rejected by the defendants, is for one-half the contract price of a new iron bridge constructed by the relator over the Schroon river, connecting the towns of Chester and Horicon, amounting to the sum of $2,115.21, and the interest thereon. No question has been made as to the amount of the claim. For 25 years and upwards prior to October, 1898, there had existed a public free wooden bridge crossing Schroon river at the outlet of Schroon lake, which bridge connected a public highway leading up to the same in the town of Chester with a like public highway leading up to it in the town of Horicon. The bridge had been kept up and maintained at the joint expense of both towns. The bridge rested upon six or seven piers, the superstructure of which was supported by needle beams at about 12 feet distance from each other. In that month one of the needle beams, of the bridge suddenly fell, precipitating into the river one William O’Neill and his team of horses while they were crossing the bridge, and he sustained injury and damage, for which he presented a claim to these two towns, which was settled by each town paying one-half of the same. On the 31st day of October, 1898, Atwood Carpenter, who was then the sole commissioner of highways of the town of Chester, made an examination of the bridge, and served upon Seth H. Nichols, the sole commissioner of highways of the town of Horicon, a notice that the bridge had partly fallen down, that the whole thereof was in a decayed, dangerous, and defective condition, and wholly unsafe for public travel, and it was absolutely necessary that a new bridge be built in place thereof, and requested the latter to join in the construction of such bridge at the joint expense of the two towns, and in case of his failure to consent thereto he, as commissioner of highways of the town of Chester, would proceed to construct such bridge pursuant to law. After the service of this notice, and on the 1st day of November, 1898, the commissioner of highways and town board of each town made an examination of the bridge in question. The town board of the town of Horicon voted three to two, and the town board of the town of Chester voted unanimously, that the bridge should be rebuilt by an iron bridge. The town board of the town of Horicon, by a vote of three to two, passed a resolution reciting that the bridge had become damaged so that it was in an unsafe and dangerous condition, and consenting that its commissioner of highways, in conjunction with the commissioner of highways of the town of Chester, should cause the said bridge to be immediately rebuilt according to law. The town board of the town of Chester voted unanimously, authorizing its commissioner of highways, in conjunction with the Commissioner of highways of the town of Horicon, to “immediately build a new iron bridge to take the place of the said wooden bridge, which has lately fallen down and become defective and unsafe for public travel.’’ The commissioner of highways of the town of Horicon, after his town board had authorized the building of said new bridge, served his written consent on the commissioner of highways of the town of Chester to join with said town in the building thereof. Thereafter the commissioners of highways of the two towns, acting together, advertised for and received sealed bids for the building of said bridge, and received several different bids from different bridge companies therefor. The bid of the relator was the lowest received by them, and on the 28th day of November, 1898, the two commissioners entered into a written contract with the relator to furnish and erect the iron bridge and superstructure for said bridge at the agreed price of $4,200. The relator proceeded to build and complete the bridge pursuant to the terms of such contract, and the same was completed and accepted by the commissioners of highways of both towns, and was opened to public travel in March, 1899, and thereafter the old bridge was taken.down and carried away, and the new bridge has ever since been used by the citizens of both towns as a portion of the public highway connecting the highways in the respective towns and leading thereto'. The highway commissioners of both towns in that month had a settlement of their account of expenses and disbursements incurred by them in the building of the new bridge, together with the substructure and abutments thereof, and agreed upon the amount to be paid by each town, and furnished and filed verified statements thereof with each town, showing the expenses thereof, and the amount to be paid by each town. The town board of the town of Chester thereupon audited, and the town paid, one-half of the total cost; but the town of Horicon never paid any part thereof. The town board of the town of Horicon, on the relator’s claim being presented to it for audit, rejected the same upon the merits, because the same was not a legal claim against the town. The relator thereupon sued out this writ.
Argued before SMITH, P. J., and CHESTER, COCHRANE, KELLOGG, and SEWELL, JJ.
John H. Cunningham, for relator.
Kellogg & Barker, for defendants.
For other cases see same topic & § number in Dec. & Am. Digs. 1907 to date, & Rep'r Indexes.
For other cases see same topic & § number in Dec. & Am. Digs. 1907 to date, & Rep’r Indexes

Opinion:
CHESTER, J.
The defendants seek to justify their rejection of the relator's claim .upon the ground that the construction of the new bridge was not authorized by law. Section 10 of the old highway law (Laws 1890, p. 1179, c. 568), as amended by Laws 1895, p. 408, c. 606, which was in force at the time of the construction of this bridge, related to extraordinary repairs of highways or bridges and provided as follows: •
"If any highway or bridge shall at any time be damaged or destroyed by the elements or otherwise, or become unsafe, the commissioner of highways of the town in which such highway or bridge may be situated, may, with the consent of the town board, cause the same to be immediately repaired or rebuilt, although the expenditure of money required may exceed the sum raised for such purposes as hereinbefore provided; and the commissioders of highways shall present the proper vouchers for the expense thereof to the town board, at their next annual meeting, and the same shall be audited by them and collected in the same manner as amounts voted at town meetings."
Section 130 of said highway law (page 1201), as amended by Laws 1895, p. 265, c. 416, provided that, when public free bridges are constructed over streams forming the boundary line of towns, such towns "shall be jointly liable" to pay the expenses of such construction. This means at the equal expense of the towns. Lapham v. Rice, 55 N. Y. 472. Section 134 (page 1202) of said highway law, which relates to joint liabilities of towns, and their joint contracts, provided that:
"Whenever any two or more towns shall be liable to make or maintain any bridge or bridges, the same shall be built and maintained at the joint expense of such towns, without reference to the town lines. The commissioners of highways of all the towns or of one or more of such towns, the others refusing to act, may enter into a joint contract for making and repairing such bridge."
Section 135 (page 1202) of said highway law, with respect to refusal to repair, provided that:
"If the commissioners of highways of either of such towns, after notice in writing from the commissioner of highways of any other of such town, shall not within twenty days give their consent in writing to build or repair any such bridge, and shall not within a reasonable time thereafter do the same, the commissioners of highways giving such notice may make or repair such bridge, and then maintain an action in the name of the town, against the town whose commissioners neglect or refuse to join in such making or repairing, and in such action the plaintiffs shall be entitled to recover so much from the defendant, as the town would be liable to contribute to the same, together with costs and interest."
The defendants seek the benefit of the rule laid down by us in a number of recent cases, where we have held that said section 10 of the highway law does not authorize the rebuilding of a bridge which has become defective by ordinary wear and tear or the natural decay of the materials of which it was constructed, at a cost exceeding the moneys appropriated for highway purposes, and that it only authorizes such construction where the bridge has become destroyed by some emergency or by some extraordinary cause. Livingston v. Stafford, 99 App. Div. 108, 91 N. Y. Supp. 172; People ex rel. Fellows v. Early, 106 App. Div. 269, 94 N. Y. Supp. 640; People ex rel. United Construction Co. v. Voorhies, 114 App. Div. 351, 99 N. Y. Supp. 918.
The Livingston Case, above cited, was a taxpayer's action brought to restrain the construction of a bridge which the highway commissioner determined had become unsafe from natural wear and decay, and thereupon had obtained the consent of the town board to its construction, and had entered into a written contract therefor; the Eel-, lows Case was one where the relator sought to compel the town board and its highway commissioner by mandamus to build a bridge that had been destroyed; and the United Construction Company Case was a writ of certiorari to review the action of a town board in rejecting the relator's claim for damages for not accepting six bridges contracted for by the commissioner of highways with the consent of the town board. The material for one bridge had been shipped when the relator received a letter from the supervisor, sent by direction of the town board, refusing to accept the bridges and canceling the contract. In the first two cases mentioned the question of liability was raised before any money had been expended. In the last case, while the contract had been entered upon, it was promptly canceled before exe cution. Besides this, there was an element of bad faith on the part of the relator, as it went ahead chargeable with knowledge that the officials of the town with whom it had acted had no lawful' authority tO' bind the town.
These cases, therefore, are not controlling in support of the defendant's contention, even if it be conceded that authority for the construction of the bridge in question is to be found in said section 10. These cases, moreover, all related to bridges wholly within a town, and not to bridges crossing town lines, and it is more than doubtful if section 10 has any relation to, or was intended to apply to, a bridge or its approaches partly in two towns.
The town of Chester was evidently proceeding under sections 134 and 135 of the highway law, above referred to,' and was putting itself in a position to charge one-half of the expense of its building the bridge upon the town of Horicon, in case that town refused to join therein. These sections seem to make the town upon which the notice provided for in section 135 is served liable for its part of the expense of such a bridge, whether the town has funds or not properly applicable for that purpose, and may make it liable therefor even against its protest.
In the case under review there is nothing'impugning the good faith either of the relator, the commissioner of highways, or the town boards of either town. So far as appears, the contract in question was entered into in entire good faith by all parties. The bridge was constructed in accordance with the terms of the contract, it was accepted by the commissioners pf highwáys of both towns, and ever since its acceptance has been in constant use by the citizens of both towns and by the public generally, and forms a part of one continuous highway partly in each town. It was a part of a much traveled highway in a much patronized summer resort. It was over a river from 200 to 250 feet wide, which could not be crossed by teams or pedestrians at that point without a bridge.
The members of the town board of each town, after the span had fallen, met at the bridge and inspected it, and each passed a resolution reciting, after inspection, that it was in an unsafe and dangerous condition, and directed its commissioner of highways, in conjunction with the commissioner of the other town, to cause a new bridge to be built immediately. These officers evidently acted under the belief that the law devolved the obligation upon the two towns, jointly to repair or rebuild the bridge. They determined that it should be rebuilt. The statute (section 134) gave the commissioners of highways power to enter into a joint contract for building the new bridge, and they having done so, and having acted in good faith, and no steps having been taken to review or question their action, or their power to act, we think, under the circumstances presented here, and under the authorities, their action is not now subject to review or question in this proceeding. People ex rel. Graham v. Studwell, 91 App. Div. 469, 474, 86 N. Y. Supp. 967; Govers v. Board of Supervisors, 55 App. Div. 40, 43, 67 N. Y. Supp. 27; Hines v. City of Lockport, 50 N. Y. 236; People ex rel. McCabe v. Matthies, 179 N. Y. 242, 72 N. E. 103.
It may be, in view of the fact that the old bridge was sufficiently repaired at small cost to permit of its being used during the construction of the new bridge on a slightly changed location at one end, that the town authorities erred in their judgment as to the necessity of the new bridge; but, if they did, that error cannot now be corrected. The defendants, I think, are not now in a position to test that question, or to deny the validity of the contract under which the bridge was built, or the lawfulness of the relator's claim. The town board of the town of Horicon, after inspecting the old bridge in its damaged condition, gave their consent to their commissioner of highways to_ join with the commissioner of highways of the town of Chester in building the new bridge at the joint expense of the two towns. Pursuant to this authority the contract was made and the bridge built. The new hridge was then open to public use, and the old bridge removed. During all that time, and down to the time the relator tried to enforce collection of its claim, no proceeding or action was brought to test the necessity for the new bridge, the legality of the acts of the town officers in réspect to the matter or of the contract under which it was built, or to restrain the relator and these commissioners from constructing the bridge. It is now too late to raise these questions. People ex rel. Groton Company v. Town Board, 92 Hun, 585, 36 N. Y. Supp. 1062.
The defendants further urge that no part of the bridge in question is in the town of Horicon; their claim being that the east bank of the Schroon river, rather than its center, is the town line. We think it is unnecessary to determine this question, as it appears clearly that -one of its approaches is in each town. It also" appears that there are two other bridges crossing the Schroon river between these towns, both of which, as well as the bridge in question, have long been maintained at the joint expense of both towns. Under section 134 of the highway law I think it is unimportant, on the question of joint liability, whether the town line was in the center of the stream or upon its east bank. It has even been held, under a statute (Laws 1865, p. 302, c. 180, and Laws 1866, p. 196, c. 106) providing that a bridge between two towns should be kept in repair at an equal expense to each town, that the approaches to the bridge were a part thereof, and that both towns wére liable for the maintenance thereof. Edwards v. Ford, 22 App. Div. 277, 47 N. Y. Supp. 995. The town of Horicon has even paid one-half of the expense of repairing one of the approaches to the bridge in question, incurred the following year after it was open for public travel.
I think, under the facts presented here, the town of Horicon is liable for its half of the expense of the bridge under the contract made by its commissioner of highways by authority of the majority vote of its town board, and that it cannot permit its officers to have the bridge constructed and completed pursuant thereto, and reap the benefits, past and prospective, of the structure, without paying the amount it contracted to pay therefor. I have not come to this conclusion without having in mind section 68 of the county law (Laws 1892, p. 1761, c. 686), which section is entitled "Bridges over County Lines." That was a re-enactment, with some change in verbiage, of subdivision 4, § 1, c. 482, p. 557, of the Laws of 1875, which provided that the board may apportion the expense of the construction of a public bridge over a stream, forming the boundary lines of counties, between the towns at such point. From this fact, and the fact that the building of a bridge between two towns in the same county is fully provided for in the highway law, and that the other sections of article 4 of the county law, in which said section 68 is found, relate more particularly to bridges intersecting the county line, we may fairly infer that those provisions were not intended to repeal or destroy the effect of sections 134 and 135 of the highway law, which provide the manner in which bridges shall be built across the dividing lines of towns situated in the same county.
The determination of the defendants should therefore be reversed, with $50 costs and disbursements to the relator, and the matter remitted to the town board, with direction to audit and allow the relator's claim at the amount properly due thereon.