Case Name: Rachel A. Tise, by her next friend, George Tise, and others vs. Zachariah Shaw, Guardian of Mary D. Parker, and others
Court: Court of Appeals of Maryland
Jurisdiction: Maryland
Decision Date: 1887-11-18
Citations: 68 Md. 1
Docket Number: 
Parties: Rachel A. Tise, by her next friend, George Tise, and others vs. Zachariah Shaw, Guardian of Mary D. Parker, and others.
Judges: 
Reporter: Maryland Reports
Volume: 68
Pages: 1–11

Head Matter:
Rachel A. Tise, by her next friend, George Tise, and others vs. Zachariah Shaw, Guardian of Mary D. Parker, and others.
Statutory construction—Sec. 1 of Art. 2, and Sec. 40, of Art. 75 of the Code—Ejectment—Continuance of Action until Infant arrives at Full age.
Section 1 of Article 3 of the Code provides that “ no action of ejectment, waste, partition,” &c., “ shall abate by the death of either or any of the parties to such action.” Section 40 of Article 75, provides that, “where a party in any action brought to recover lands, or in which the title thereof is involved, shall die, and the proper person to be made a party in the place of the person so dying, shall be an infant, such action shall not be tried during such infancy unless the guardian or next friend of such infant satisfy the Court that it will be for the benefit, of the infant to have the action tried during his infancy; but the action may be continued till the infant arrives at age.” Held :
That section I of Article 3, and section 40 of Article 75, of the Code, having both been taken from the Act of 1785, ch. 80—-the first from section one, and the second from section two of that Act—and having been re-enacted at the same time in 1860, when the Code was adopted, neither has superiority over the other, and they must be construed together, and both madQ,to stand as they did in the Act of 1785, the second section as an exception to the first.
Section 40 of Article 75 of the Code, which authorizes the suspension of the prosecution of actions until the infant defendants, however young, attain full age, is contrary to the fundamental principles of right and justice, and is therefore unconstitutional and void. Per Alvey, O. J.
Appeal from the Circuit Court for Prince George’s-County.
The case is stated in the opinion of the Court.
The cause was argued before Alvby, C. J., Yellott,. Miller, Irving, and Bryan, J.
C. C. Magruder, for the appellants.
The section of the Code under which the defendants-expect to postpone a trial of this case until they all arrive at age, is the common law doctrine of “ parol demurrer.”' This worked an abatement of the action for some cause but, when any one of these pleas was filed, it had to be done with the greatest accuracy, &c. The fact that the exact ages, respectively, of the infant defendants in this case are not stated in the plea, is fatal to their success. While it is true that infancy is a matter that has always appealed to the Courts, yet when a guardian ad litem has been appointed by the Court to defend for them, it is his duty to be prompt and adopt a valid defence, and make it at the proper time.
In Maryland our Courts of equity have authority to decree the sale of infants’ land, and to bind them in almost every respect. Our Courts of law do not go as far, and the case at bar involves a question which for the first time comes to the Court of Appeals in this shape. The-statute under which the defence is made for these infants, is found in the Act of 1785, chap. 80, sec. 2, incorporated in Article 64, Revised Code, sec. 102; yet the Act of 1801, chap. 74, 1 Dorsey’s Laws, 463, in effect repeals by implication the prior statute, because it says expressly that no action of ejectment shall abate by the death of either of the parties, &c. The repeal of a statute by implication is often done. Montel & Co. vs. Consolidated Coal Co., 39 Md., 171; Kennerly’s Exec’x vs. Wilson, 1 Md., 102 ; Webb, &c. vs. Ridgely, et al., 38 Md., 370-71; Swann vs. State, 64 Md., 419-23.
There is a conflict between the section of the Code under which these defendants make defence, and sections 32, &c., page 593 of Bevised Code, the action abating as claimed by the infants, page 612, sec. 102, and no abatement to an action of ejectment, as settled by the former section.
After plea pleaded by the guardian ad litem, the infant is as much hound as any other person. Ejectment lies against an infant. McCoon vs. Smith, 3 Hill, N. Y., 147; Marshall vs. Wing, 50 Maine, 62.
An infant pleading, is as much bound and is as little privileged as a plaintiff of full age. ’ Darvin vs. Hatfield, 4 Sandf., (N. Y.,) 468.
The fact is, that while infants unprotected, are always under the care of the Court, yet once represented by guardian ad litem, as these were, they are to he held as strictly to an assertion of their defences at the proper time, the same' as if they were adults. James, &c. vs. Boyd, 1 H. & G., 1-3 ; Jenkins, &c. vs. Simms, Adm’r, 45 Md., 532-9 ;. Alexander’s Brit. Stats., 122 ; Tessier vs. Wyse, 3 Bland, 51.
Charles H. Stanley, for the appellees.
The Act of 1785, chap. 80, sec. 1, which provides that no action of ejectment, &c., shall abate, is the same chapter which contains this section (sec. 2) now before this Court, and both sections are to be construed together as contemporaneous legislation—and are entirely consistent— for by the death of the ancestor, this suit did not end or abate, but new parties .were made, and the case is tried, if the Court decides it is to the benefit of the infants, other wise it is not abated, but continued, and sec. 1, of Art. 2, of the Code, which is a codification of the Act of 1785, chap. 80, sec. 1, the Act of 1801, chap. 74, sec. 28, and other Acts, is no broader in its terms than the original Act of 1785, and both the first and second sections of the Act <jf 1785 being codified, are re-enacted, have both the force of law, and are to he construed together. Act of 1785, chap. 80, secs. 1 and 2; sec. 1 of Art. 2, and sec. 40 of Art. 75 of the Code.
This section is in entire conformity with the practice at common law.
“ The heir, if an infant, may also pray that the parol may demur till he is of full age.” Tidd’s Practice, 645.
The parol demurred at common law, and was so recognized in this State. Alexander British Statutes, 122; Watkins vs. Worthington, 2 Bland, 509-519; Hammond vs. Hammond, 2 Bland, 306, 330; Tessier vs. Wyse, 3 Bland, 28-29.
It is not, therefore, a casé where the Legislature made a radical change in the principles of pleading, or took away from the plaintiff prior existing rights.'
The distinction is this—at common law the action abated —under the Act of 1785, secs. 1 and 2, the action is suspended.
In the case of James vs. Boyd, 1 Harr. & G., 1, this Court construed this section so far as to say that the judgment against the infant was good because it did not affirmatively appear that the defendant was an infant at the time of trial. The argument from this decision seems to he that if the defendant had been an infant at the time of trial, and it was so shown, no trial could have been had, unless the Court had- been satisfied that a trial of the case was to her benefit.
The question was properly raised by plea in abatement. Tidd’s Practice, 635; Poe’s Pleading, p. 673, sec. 595.
There is no rule of Court which requires a plea in abatement to be filed by rule day. The only plea required to be filed by rule day, under the rules of the Court below, is the plea of limitations.
The rule is clear that a plea in abatement must be pleaded before general imparlance, before pleas in bar and issue joined, unless the matter in abatement has arisen since che filing of the plea in bar. Chapman vs. Davis, 4 Gill, 167; Eschbach vs. Bayley, 28 Md., 496; Young vs. Citizens’ Bank, 31 Md., 68; Webster vs. Byrnes, 32 Md., 69; Cruzen vs. McKaig, 57 Md., 457.
There could be no appeal from the action of the Court striking out the judgment, nor from the action of the Court in overruling the demurrer in this case. If the appeal is to be considered as taken from this, it should be dismissed. Craig vs. Wroth, 47 Md., 282.

Opinion:
Irving, J.,
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This action of ejectment was instituted against one Charles Parker, who died, and on motion of the plaintiffs his infant children, (all of whom, by the agreed statement of facts, were under the age of sixteen years) were made parties defendants, and Zachariah Shaw was appointed guardian ad litem to defend for them. He appeared by attorney and pleaded their infancy by way of plea in abatement, and insisted that it was not for the benefit of the infants to have the action tried during their infancy. This plea in abatement was duly verified by the affidavit of the guardian ad litem. It seems to have been pleaded at the imparlance term; and the Court overruled a motion of ne reeipiatur based on the contention that it should have been filed by the rule day. The rules of the Court are not in the record, and we must assume the Court in its action properly interpreted the requirement of its own rules. It also appears by the record that a demurrer was filed to this plea in abatement, which demurrer was first sustained by the Court, but afterwards this ruling was stricken out and the demurrer was overruled, and judgment was given thereo.n for the defendants; and then the Court ordered "that this case shall not be tried until all the infants arrive at full age." Appeal was at once taken to this Court. There having been no final judgment in the cause, but only an order for a continuance till the infants reach full age, we do not .see how an appeal can be sustained. But as the appeal was designed to test the validity and operative character of the statute under which the order of the Court continuing the cause was passed, we will con-' sider the question, which is one of great importance.
The 40th section of Article 75 of the Code of Public General Laws is in this language: "Where a party in any action brought to recover lands, or in which the title thereof is involved, shall die, and the proper person to be made a party in the place of the person so djúng, shall be an infant, such action shall not be tried during such infancy, unless the guardian or next friend of such infant satisfy the Court that it will be for the benefit of the infant to have the action tried during his infancy; but the action may be continued till the infant arrives at age."
The. order of the Court continuing the cause rests for its authority on the imperative language of this statute which says that in a case of infancy the case shall not he tried, but, instead of abating it and putting an end to it entirely, also provides the suit may be continued until the infant shall attain majority.
At the common law the "parol demurred" in such case. Tidd's Practice, 635; Alex. Brit. Stat., 122; and this statute was, in effect, but making the common law a statutory provision.
It is contended that this provision is no longer operative, and is so far inconsistent with the provisions of Art. 2', sec. 1, of the Code, which are so general, that it cannot be enforced. Sec. 1 of Art. 2, and sec. 40, Art. 75, both came from the same Act, the Act of 1785, chap. 80. The first is sec. 1 and the second is sec. 2 of that Act. After making the general provision that suits should not abate by reason of death, an exception was made in the event named in the second section. The two sections of this Act of 1785 having been both re-enacted in 1860, when the Code was adopted, neither can have superiority over the other, and they must be construed together and both made to stand, as they did in the Act of 1785, the second section as an exception to the first. For convenience sake they have been separated in the Code and no longer stand in juxtaposition as in the original, but having been re-enacted at one and the same time, they must be construed as if they had continued side by side. We find no instances in our reports where the statute has been enforced, but it has several times been recognized as the law. In Hammond vs. Hammond, 2 Bland, 336, Chancellor Bland says, formerly the parol demurred both in law and equity, but there had been a change by statute as to equity ; and that the statute allowing sales of decedents' real estate for the payment of debts was passed to give the Chancellor power to decree sale after the infaut heir had been summoned and answered. He quotes the language of this section under consideration as being the law enforceable at law in the cases provided for. He so recognizes it in Watkins vs. Worthington, 2 Bland, 509-519, and in Tessier vs. Wyse, 3 Bland, 28-29. In James vs. Boyd, 1 H. & G., 1, the judgment below was sustained because it did not affirmatively appear at the trial that the heir was not then of full age. The law was evidently not thought a wise one; but inferentially the Court recognized its binding authority, if the condition of things justified or required its application, and the Court assigned a reason why that case did not require a reversal of the judgment appealed from because of its provisions, viz., that it did not appear the party was a minor when, the case was tried.
It was contended in argument, that its enforcement will operate harshly, and that because of its apparently long disuse it should be treated as obsolete. In the days of feudal tenures and the rights of primogeniture, it may have served a useful purpose, but in the changed condition of things in the present day, it seems to us to operate as an obstruction of justice rather than as a protection of rights, and in our opinion it should no longer have place on the statute book. But the statute is plain, imperative and unambiguous, and was re-enacted as part of the written law of the State as late as 1860, when the Code was adopted; and it cannot be disregarded. It is not our province to repeal it. Having been so long the law, and unchallenged as void because it is in derogation of common right, we cannot so declare it. The Legislature must deal with it, if it is hurtful.
(Decided 18th November, 1887.)
Appeal dismissed.