Case Name: Toni D. LEVINGSTON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND REHABILITATION; et al., Defendants-Appellees
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 2012-07-12
Citations: 474 F. App'x 610
Docket Number: No. 11-15566
Parties: Toni D. LEVINGSTON, Plaintiff—Appellant, v. CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND REHABILITATION; et al., Defendants—Appellees.
Judges: Before: SCHROEDER, HAWKINS, and GOULD, Circuit Judges.
Reporter: West's Federal Appendix
Volume: 474
Pages: 610–611

Head Matter:
Toni D. LEVINGSTON, Plaintiff—Appellant, v. CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND REHABILITATION; et al., Defendants—Appellees.
No. 11-15566.
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
Submitted June 26, 2012.
Filed July 12, 2012.
Toni D. Levingston, Stockton, CA, pro se.
Kathleen Jane Williams, Matthew Ross Wilson, Esquire, Williams & Associates, Sacramento, CA, for Defendants-Appel-lees.
Before: SCHROEDER, HAWKINS, and GOULD, Circuit Judges.
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

Opinion:
MEMORANDUM
Toni D. Levingston, a former California state prisoner, appeals pro se from the district court's judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action for failure to exhaust administrative remedies as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 1117 (9th Cir.2003). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Levingston's action because Levingston did not properly exhaust administrative remedies before filing his complaint, and failed to show that administrative remedies were effectively unavailable to him. See Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 90, 126 S.Ct. 2378, 165 L.Ed.2d 368 (2006) (explaining that "proper exhaustion" requires adherence to administrative procedural rules); Sapp v. Kimbrell, 623 F.3d 813, 826 (9th Cir.2010) (administrative remedies are "available" where administrative appeals are screened for proper reasons). We construe the dismissal of these claims to be without prejudice. See Wyatt, 315 F.3d at 1120.
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Levingston's motions for reconsideration because Levingston provided no basis for reconsideration. See Sch. Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah Cnty., Or. v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1262-63 (9th Cir.1993) (setting forth standard of review and requirements for reconsideration).
Levingston's remaining contentions are unpersuasive.
AFFIRMED.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.