Case Name: Cyrus French WICKER, Appellant, v. The BOARD OF PUBLIC INSTRUCTION OF DADE COUNTY, Florida, a body corporate and politic under the laws of the State of Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1958-01-08
Citations: 106 So. 2d 550
Docket Number: 
Parties: Cyrus French WICKER, Appellant, v. The BOARD OF PUBLIC INSTRUCTION OF DADE COUNTY, Florida, a body corporate and politic under the laws of the State of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: TERRELL, C. J., ROBERTS and DREW, JJ., and HARRIS, Circuit Judge, concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 106
Pages: 550–558

Head Matter:
Cyrus French WICKER, Appellant, v. The BOARD OF PUBLIC INSTRUCTION OF DADE COUNTY, Florida, a body corporate and politic under the laws of the State of Florida, Appellee.
Supreme Court of Florida.
Jan. 8, 1958.
On Rehearing Nov. 12, 1958.
Rehearing Denied Dec. 8, 1958.
Julian R. Benjamin, Miami, and Irving Peskoe, Homestead, for appellant.
Boardman, Bolles, Davant & Lloyd, Miami, for appellee.

Opinion:
THOMAS, Justice.
This litigation had its origin in two actions, one in the circuit court and one in the federal district court, instituted by the appellant to recover money from the ap-pellee. After the appellee's motion, in the state court, to dismiss had been denied and it had answered in compliance with the court's order, the parties entered into negotiations for settlement of the controversy. Eventually it was agreed that the appellee would give to the appellant a quitclaim deed to certain land involved and disclaim any interest in the land in exchange for a dismissal, with prejudice, of appellant's actions, at appellant's cost.
Pursuant to a resolution unanimously adopted by the appellee-board 18 January 1956 the disclaimer was executed 12 days later and it was recorded the sixth of the following month. The action in the circuit court was dismissed 7 February 1956, and the one in the federal court February thirteenth. In each order of dismissal the compromise agreement was identified. On February twentieth appellant contracted to sell the land in question to Jack Fleischer, and later Jack Fleischer agreed to sell it to Don R. Solomon. In accordance with the terms of the compromise appellee executed the quitclaim deed March 22 and it was delivered to appellant's attorney, Irving Kal-back.
Then, 27 March 1956, the appellee brought the present suit against appellant and against Irving Kalback, custodian of the quitclaim deed, seeking a decree rescinding and cancelling the disclaimer, enjoining the transfer of the quitclaim deed, requiring surrender of this deed to appel-lee, and holding "for naught" the interest of the appellant or anyone claiming under him.
We continue our digest of the complaint to ascertain the allegations upon which the prayer for relief was based. It was averred that the disclaimer was executed because of a mistake of fact and that prior to the date of execution, the appellee had been owner of the fee simple title to the property described in the disclaimer and quitclaim deed. This was followed by an allegation that the appellee had paid $19,000 for the property. There appeared the remarkable statements that the mistake of fact consisted of failure of the appellee to know that it owned the property in fee simple and that had the appellee "been aware of the fact it would not have executed the Disclaimer"; also that the instrument was "executed in error and through oversight and inadvertence."
It was charged that the appellee had not received any sum of money "whatsoever" as consideration for the disclaimer and deed.
The chancellor granted the relief in a summary decree.
Two questions of law stand out in bold relief against a background of fact which is not in serious dispute: Was there a mistake of fact justifying relief in equity and was there want of consideration for the instruments? Allied with these is the matter of appellee's failure to offer to put the appellant in statu quo.
The allegations of the complaint may be fairly interpreted as presenting the position that the appellee after its experience with the two actions involving the very land described in the deed and disclaimer and after participating in negotiations to settle the suits during which abundant opportunity was present to- get all relevant information it did not already have, decided it had made a bad bargain. But the appellant was not responsible for this fault. In this record there is not an inkling that the appellant withheld from the appellee any knowledge, or possessed any, that was not available to the appellee. And certainly appellee's assertion that it did not know it held its own land in fee simple is no basis for the relief. No one was better positioned than appellee to know what it owned.
It should be recorded here that when the matter of compromise came before the ap-pellee-board 18 January 1956 and the board's attorney reported the conditions of the proposed settlement, one of the members of the board requested a summary of the transaction so she could vote more intelligently on the question, and that in deference to her, action was delayed until the end of the meeting to give the legal department time to prepare this summary for the board's information. Later in the minutes appeared the notation that the board had "received from the Legal Department a resume of the case of Cyrus French Wicker vs. Board of Public Instruction," after which, upon recommendation of the Superintendent and the Legal Department, the compromise was approved without a dissent.
The appellee frankly pleaded that the instruments were the result of its own "oversight" and of "inadvertence," but the oversight and inadvertence, or, more accurately, carelessness, are not chargeable to the appellant. By the examination of the public records, or its own records, the appellee could have avoided the dilemma in which it seems to have landed through its own inattention.
We think our decision in Willis v. Hillsborough County, 117 Fla. 1, 157 So. 29, is ample authority for reversal of the decree. Actually the present case is a stronger one for support of appellant's position because the parties were brought into contact as adversaries in two actions. Surely, in their effort to effect a compromise they were dealing at arm's length. During the negotiations towards a settlement, parties on both sides were put on guard. Nothing prevented the appellee from fully informing itself so its best judgment could be used to put an end to troublesome litigation.
It cannot now put the blame on someone who may have got the better of the bargain.
As for the consideration, there was a benefit to appellee from the settlement and appellee must have thought so. It was relieved of defending in the law suits without any responsibility for costs.
Even had a situation of unilateral mistake been shown, warranting the relief the appellee asked, it would have been necessary to restore the appellant to his former status, yet this prerequisite was ignored in the complaint.
It has been intimated that the ap-pellee should be granted relief because of the financial loss it sustained, but we think that the appellee despite its responsibilities as a board directly charged with proper administration of public schools, a function as important as exists under our government, is nevertheless bound in litigation like this, by the same rules that apply to individuals. Willis v. Hillsborough County, supra. Reversed with directions to dismiss the bill.
Reversed.
TERRELL, C. J., ROBERTS and DREW, JJ., and HARRIS, Circuit Judge, concur.