Case Name: Bruce RIDDLE et al., Plaintiffs in Error, v. Cecil D. JAY, Defendant in Error
Court: Oklahoma Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Oklahoma
Decision Date: 1960-10-25
Citations: 356 P.2d 1074
Docket Number: No. 38997
Parties: Bruce RIDDLE et al., Plaintiffs in Error, v. Cecil D. JAY, Defendant in Error.
Judges: DAVISON, C. J., WILLIAMS, V. C. J., .and HALLEY, BLACKBIRD and IRWIN, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Pacific Reporter 2d
Volume: 356
Pages: 1074–1079

Head Matter:
Bruce RIDDLE et al., Plaintiffs in Error, v. Cecil D. JAY, Defendant in Error.
No. 38997.
Supreme Court of Oklahoma.
Oct. 25, 1960.
Rehearing Denied Nov. 22, 1960.
Emerson R. Phillips, Pawnee, for plaintiffs in error.
Marvin T. Johnson, Tulsa, for defendant in error.

Opinion:
JACKSON, Justice.
This is a quiet title and partition action involving certain real property, to-wit:
The East one-half (E}4) of Lot seven (7) in Block Twenty-one (21) of the City of Pawnee, Pawnee County, State of Oklahoma.
Plaintiffs deraign their alleged title from the probate proceedings in the matter of the estate of George W. Hughes, deceased, who died testate in the year 1913.
The pertinent provisions of the last will and testament of George W. Hughes, deceased, are, as follows :
"I hereby give, devise, and bequeath to my beloved wife Sarah E.' Hughes a life estate in all the rest, residue and remainder of my estate, real, personal or mixed wheresoever situated, whereof, I may be seized or possessed, or to which I may be in any manner entitled, or in which I may be interested, at the time of my death to have and to hold for and during her life time, and to have and use all the profits, interests and income from the same for her own use and benefits; and upon her death, or upon my own death if I shall survive my wife I hereby will and direct that my entire estate shall be equally divided into as many portions or shares as there may be children of mine living, or deceased leaving issue, one of said portions or shares of my estate shall be set over, conveyed and assigned to each of my said children, and one of such shares or portions to be lawful issue of any of said children who shall be dead at such time, such issue to have the share or portion that their parent would have been entitled to if living."
The pertinent provisions of the decree of distribution in the County Court of Pawnee County, Oklahoma, are, as follows:
"All the rest, residue and remainder of said property real and personal and mixed wheresoever located to the said Sadie E. Hughes, to have and to hold to her own use and benefit for and during the rest of her natural life, and upon her death to Relia Z. Riddle, Grace O. Jay, Owen R. Hughes and Emily M. Hughes, each an undivided one-fourth interest, to have and to hold the same together with all and singular the hereditaments and appurtenanc es thereunto appertaining of the above named persons, their heirs and assigns forever.
"Witness my hand and seal of said Court, this 1 day of October, 1925."
Sadie E. Hughes was the wife of the testator. Relia Z. Riddle, Grace O. Jay, Owen R. Hughes and Emily M. Hughes were the children of the testator. All were living at the time of the death of the testator.
On December 14, 1915, Relia Z. Riddle executed and delivered a warranty deed covering the property in question to defendant, Cecil D. Jay. Relia Z. Riddle died in 1957, prior to the death of Sadie E. Hughes (adjudged in the Final Decree to be one and the same person as Sarah E. Hughes) in 1958.
Plaintiffs are the children and grandchildren of Sadie E. Hughes. Their contention is that under provisions of the decree of distribution, the vesting of the fee-simple title to the property in question was withheld until the death of the life tenant, Sadie E. Hughes; that inasmuch as Relia Z. Riddle died prior to the death of the life tenant, she never acquired any interest in the said property, and her deed to defendant Cecil D. Jay was a nullity; that upon the death of the life tenant plaintiffs became owners of an undivided one-fourth interest in and to said property, not as heirs of Relia Z. Riddle, but as beneficiaries in the final decree and will in the estate of George W. Hughes, deceased.
We agree with plaintiffs' statement in their brief that "this whole law suit hinges squarely upon the interpretation this Court gives the Final Decree
It is well settled that a County Court has jurisdiction in probate cases to construe a will and determine the beneficiaries and the interest and proportion of the estate to which each is entitled. Matthewson v. Hilton, Old., 321 P.2d 396; In re Everhart's Estate, 208 Okl. 101, 253 P.2d 174; Porter v. Hansen et al., 190 Old. 429, 124 P.2d 391; Gassin v. McJunkin, 173 Okl. 210, 48 P.2d 320; National Exploration v. Robins, 140 Okl. 260, 283 P. 236.
The decisive question for our determination, then, is whether under provisions of the final decree Relia Z. Riddle acquired a vested one-fourth interest in the property in question subject to the life estate of Sadie E. Hughes, or whether the vesting of the fee-simple title was withheld or postponed until the death of the life tenant.
In Baldwin v. Chappell, 105 Okl. 38, 231 P. 496, 498, the final decree of distribution contained a clause, as follows:
" 'To Emma Baldwin, a life estate in the southeast quarter of section 3, in township 11 N., of range 21 W., I. M., remainder in fee to Melvin R. Baldwin, his heirs and assigns.' 'And in case of his death before said remainder vests, then to his heirs and assigns.' "
After this decree became final a controversy arose as to the legal effect of thei final decree.
Plaintiff therein contended that under the quoted provisions of the final decree, Melvin R. Baldwin was given only a contingent remainder, dependent upon his outliving his mother, Emma Baldwin, the life,tenant, and that unless he outlived her the remainder would never be vested in him. At pages 498 and 499 of 231 P. this court said:
"The law fixes when the remainder created by the will, as was created here in favor of Melvin R. Baldwin, shall vest. There is no doubt but that it vests when the will takes effect. The will passed the remainder in fee to Melvin R. Baldwin, to vest upon the death of the testator. The only contingency suggested by the language of the will is the possibility that Melvin R. Baldwin might die before the estate would vest, that is, he might die in the lifetime of the testator. But he survived the testator, and the will went into effect, and the remainder in fee vested in Melvin R. Baldwin and •destroyed any possibility of the children of Melvin R. Baldwin taking under the will. The right to convey a life estate, such as was given to Emma Baldwin, and to convey a vested remainder, such as passed to Melvin R. Baldwin, is unquestioned. Such conveyance is authorized by all the authorities."
We conclude that the final decree of distribution in the instant case vested a life estate in Sadie E. Hughes and the fee-simple remainder in the property in question in equal shares to the four named children •of the testator. It follows that the deed from Relia Z. Riddle, one of the children, •to defendant Cecil D. Jay was a valid conveyance of a one-fourth interest in the fee-simple title, subject only to the life estate, •of Sadie E. Hughes, which terminated with her death in 1958.
In view of our conclusion that Relia Z. Riddle had a vested interest under provisions of the final decree, the authorities •cited by plaintiffs, Whitten et al. v. Whit-ten, 203 Okl. 196, 219 P.2d 228, and 33 Am. Jur. Life Estates, Remainders, Etc., § 150, pertaining to contingent remainders, are not controlling.
The judgment is affirmed.
DAVISON, C. J., WILLIAMS, V. C. J., .and HALLEY, BLACKBIRD and IRWIN, JJ., concur.
WELCH, JOHNSON and BERRY, JJ., •dissent.