Case Name: THE PEOPLE of the State of California, ex relatione S. R. HARRIS, Appellants, v. CHARLES D. BRENHAM, Mayor of San Francisco, Respondent
Court: Supreme Court of California
Jurisdiction: California
Decision Date: 1853-10
Citations: 3 Cal. 477
Docket Number: 
Parties: THE PEOPLE of the State of California, ex relatione S. R. HARRIS, Appellants, v. CHARLES D. BRENHAM, Mayor of San Francisco, Respondent.
Judges: 
Reporter: California Reports
Volume: 3
Pages: 477–501

Head Matter:
THE PEOPLE of the State of California, ex relatione S. R. HARRIS, Appellants, v. CHARLES D. BRENHAM, Mayor of San Francisco, Respondent.
The act to re-incorporate the City of San Francisco, passed the 15th April, 1851, provides, that the first election for city officers should be held on the fourth Monday of April, 1851; and thereafter annually at the general election for State officers. The general election was appointed by law to be held on the first Monday in September of each year. At the first election for city officers, held on the fourth Monday of April, as above directed, the respondent was elected mayor of the city, was qualified, and was in the exercise of the functions of his office. At the general election held on the first Monday of September following, the relator received 1101 votes for mayor (the whole number given), was qualified, and claimed the office of the respondent on the 24th of the same month. No notice of the latter election was given, or other measure pursued, by the city council, under the 4th section of the 2d article of the charter. The respondent refused to surrender the office, and the relator filed this bill asserting his right to it, &c.
Held, that the election of the relator was valid, and that the means of bringing about the election and the irregularities therein should be disregarded.
It is not important to interpret the literal meaning of the word annually or the word or, as used in the city charter of 1851, respecting the election of municipal officers ; the actual and substantial intention of the legislature is to be sought after.
The best rule of interpretation of the statute in question, is to follow the established policy of the government from its origin, which is, to make elective all officers of the state, counties, and cities, at the shortest period which the convenience of the public will permit.
Official terms should not be extended beyond the time clearly defined, but rather shortened by implication, if necessary.
Appeal from the Fourth Judicial District.
This action was brought by the plaintiff, by their attorney-general, upon the complaint of Stephen R. Harris, against the defendant, and avers that defendant is now, and has been since the 3d September, 1851, unlawfully holding and exercising the office of mayor of the City of San Francisco. That said Harris was, on the 3d September aforesaid, duly elected to fill the said office, and is now entitled to hold and occupy the same, and had qualified as required by law; and had demanded of defendant the said office, with the books, papers, &c., who had refused to yield the same, &c., to the great injury and prejudice of the people of the State and of said Harris, and prays that said Brenham may be ousted from said office, and that said Harris may be declared the lawful incumbent, and invested with the authority and duties thereof, &e.
The defendant denied all the allegations of the complaint, and prayed to be dismissed; and for his costs, &c.
- The case exhibits the following facts :—
The City of San Francisco, was first incorporated by law on the 15th April, 1850. The act of incorporation provided that the municipal officers should be elected on the fourth Monday of April in each year.
On the 15th day of April, 1851, an act was passed which repealed the above act, and re-incorporated the city. By the last act it is provided that the first election for officers of the city should be held on the fourth Monday of April, 1851, and thereafter annually at the general election for state officers.
The election for state officers is appointed by law to be held on the first Monday in September of each year.
At the charter election held on the fourth Monday of April, 1851, the defendant was elected mayor, was duly qualified, and went into the possession of the office, and the discharge of his duties.
At the general election for state officers held on the first Monday in September following, a portion of the qualified voters of the said city claimed the right to vote, and did vote for the municipal officers provided for in the act of 15th April, 1851, rechartering the said city.
The entire number of votes so cast for mayor was 1101, all of which were given to the relator.
On the 20th of September, 1851, the Clerk of the County of San Francisco issued his certificate to the relator, certifying his election, who, on the 22d September, took the oath of office as required by law.
On the 24th September, 1851, the relator demanded of defendant the said office, books, papers, &c., who claimed the same in virtue of his election and qualification, as above stated, and still claims the same, and holds and exercises the functions thereof, and who refused to accede to the demand of the relator, and still refuses.
It was admitted that defendant was duly elected at the said charter election, held on the fourth Monday of April, and was duly qualified.
And it was also admitted that no election had been called by the common council of the city in September, 1851, nor any notice given of such election by the said common council, as required by the city charter in relation to charter elections.
The words of the Act of 1851, bearing upon the question in dispute, are as follows :—
Sect. 1 of Art. II.—“ For the government of said city there shall be elected annually, by general ticket, the following officers: a mayor,” &c.
Sect. 5 of the same article.—“ The first general election for officers under this charter shall be held on the fourth Monday of April, 1851, and thereafter annually, at the general election for state officers.”
Sect. 16, Art. IV.—“ The officers elected under this charter shall continue in office for one year, or until their successors are qualified.”
After hearing the case, the District Judge decided as follows:—
The complaint in this case alleges in substance that the defendant is now, and since the third day of September last has been, unlawfully holding the office of Mayor of the City of San Francisco, to which office the relator, Stephen R. Harris, was on that day duly elected, and prays that the defendant may be ousted from said office, and that the relator may be declared the lawful incumbent, and invested with the authority and duties appertaining thereto.
The agreed case upon which the cause is presented, states:—
1. That at the general election, on the third day of September, 1851, the polls were regularly opened in all the wards of the City of San Francisco, under the general election law.
2. That a portion of the qualified voters of the city claimed the right to vote for the municipal officers, provided for in the charter.
3. That the entire number of votes, so cast for the office of Mayor, was eleven hundred and one, all of which were cast for Stephen R. Harris, the relator.
4. That on the 20th of September, the Clerk of the County of San Francisco counted the votes, and issued a certificate to the said Harris, certifying his election to the office of mayor, and that, on the 22d day of September, said Harris qualified, by taking the oath of office.
The facts then being thus admitted, the questions to be considered arise upon the construction of the act, re-incorporating the City of San Francisco, passed on the 15th day of April, 1851.
It was conceded in the argument, that the omission by the common council to order the election, and to give public notice thereof, would not of itself vitiate the election.
I have no doubt of the correctness of this proposition. The popular will cannot be defeated by such a neglect, whether wilful or accidental, on the part of the common council; especially when the time and place of holding the election have been already fixed by law.
But it is by no means clear, that such order and notice are required at all.
The fifth section of the second article of the charter provides, that “ the first general election for officers, under this charter, shall be held on the fourth Monday in April, 1851, and thereafter annually, at the general election of state officers.”
The third section of the same article provides, that “all vacancies, except as hereinafter provided, shall be filled by election, in such manner as may be prescribed by ordinance,” and by the fourth section it is made “the duty of the Common Council, to call all city elections, to designate the place of holding the same, giving at least ten days’ notice thereof, to appoint inspectors of election, to examine the returns, and declare the results, and to determine contested elections.”
I am inclined to the opinion, that the duty of the Common Council, as prescribed in section four, was only intended to apply to such special elections as are prescribed by section three, and to the first general election, which took place on the fourth day of April last. Because the law has fixed the time and place for the election of city officers in future, to be at the general election of state officers; and it seems to me, that the legislature, in thus fixing the time and place, ¿learly intended to incorporate the state, county, and city elections, into one general election, with one board of judges, who should be authorized to receive the votes for all officers, to be chosen at such election.
If, therefore, under the Charter, there should have been an election for the office of mayor at the last general election, then the relator is legally elected to that office.
Much of the embarrassment in this case has arisen from its having been assumed, by both parties, that the term of office of the mayor elected in April last, would, in any event, be a fraction of a year, the relator insisting that such term continued only till the general election, which took place in September last, whilst the defendant contends, that he is lawfully entitled to hold the office for the full term of the year, from the time of his election.
Such, indeed, is the conclusion at which I have arrived. It will be observed that there is no precise time fixed by the Charter for the commencement or termination of the official year; but from the provision for holding the first election in April last, already referred to, taken in connection with section 16, of article 4, which provides, “ that the officers elected under this Charter shall continue in office for one year, or until their successors are qualified,” it may be fairly inferred, that the official year hereafter, under this Charter, should terminate on the fourth Monday of April, and that the officers to be elected at each general election in September should enter upon the duties of their offices on the fourth Monday of April, and that the officers to be elected at each general election in September should enter upon the duties of their offices on the fourth Monday of April following.
The language used in section 2, of art. 3, “ that both boards shall assemble on the first Monday after their election,” taken in connection with the several other provisions already referred to, can only be interpreted to mean, that they are to meet on the first Monday after the term for which they shall have been elected shall commence.
It is only by such a construction that complete effect can be given to the whole Charter; and it produces less conflict than any other construction that can be given it.
It follows, therefore, that the defendant is legally entitled to hold the office of mayor until the fourth Monday of April, 1852, at which time the relator’s term of office will commence.
In accordance with this opinion the District Court ordered judgment to be entered for the defendant, from which plaintiffs appealed.
-, for appellants.
The Charter provided for an election of municipal officers at the general election in September last.
Section 5, art. 2, of the Charter of 1851, provides, that the first general election for officers shall be held on the 4th Monday of April, 1851, and thereafter annually, at the general election for state officers.
Here are two distinct provisions, the first for an immediate election, the other for a series of annual elections. The term “ annually” does not relate to the first provision for an election in April; but thereafter, the election shall be had at the general election for state officers annually. In ascertaining the first term, therefore, “ annually” may be omitted in the section, which would then read, “ the first election, &c., shall be held on the fourth Monday of April, 1851, and thereafter at the general election for state officers.”
The provision, sect. 16, art. 4, that the officers elected, &c., shall continue in office one year, or until their successors are qualified, shows the understanding of the legislature, that the first term was not for a year.
The journals of the House and Senate show, that a bill passed the House, and was lost in the Senate, where the bill originated, to extend the term from September, 1851, to September, 1852. If the meaning of the section be doubtful, this “ cotemporary exposition” ascertains it, and shows that it was well understood, that the term ended in September, and also, that the Senate refused to extend it. 3 How. 564, 565; 1 Black. 60.
No order of the Council was necessary. The election was provided for by law; the time, place, and inspectors of the general elections were provided for, and after the first election, the municipal officers were directed to be elected at the general election, that is, at the same time, place, &c., and by the same machinery. The Council, therefore, could not supply time, place, or inspectors, and so much of section fourth of the Charter as provides for the appointment of time, place, &c., in relation to elections by the Council, must be held to apply to such special city elections as may occur under other sections of the Charter, filling vacancies, &c. See Charter, art. 2.
But if the 4th sect., art. 2, should be held to apply in these respects, it is merely directory. Bex v. Locksdale, 1 Burr. 447, per Mansfield, Justice. “ There is a known distinction between things which are of the essence of the act to be done, and things which are not.” See Smith’s Stats., 679, 680, 681, 673; 7 Hill, 9; 12 Wend. 486 ; 11 lb. 605 ; Smith, 671; 2 Watts, 9 ; 8 Vera. 280, 390.
If these provisions are not advisory, then the Governor may defeat any state election—the County Judge may defeat any county election. Either may secure a continuation of office, and defeat the popular will.
The election determines the rights of the person elected. Rex v. Vice-Chancellor of Cambridge, 3 Burr, 1647-9 ; Ex-parte Hiatt et ah, 3 Hill, 43, 47.
The term commences on the first Monday after the election. See art. 3, p. 1, of the Charter.
M’Lean and Norton, for respondent.
By the Charter, the general elections are to be annual, and the one for 1851, was fixed for the fourth Monday of April. Charter, 1851, art. 2, sect. 15 ; art. 4, sect. 16.
This is in conformity to the policy of this state, and of all others in relation to municipal elections. Smith’s Com. 740, sect. 622; Char. 1850, p. 224, sect. 4; p. 226, sect. 19.
See also the general laws for incorporating cities and towns, and other special incorporations. Laws of 1850, 91, sect. 32, p. 128; sect. 2, p. 73; sect. 21, p. 121; sect. 8, p. 124; sect. 21, p. 127; sect. 21, p. 134; sect. 31.
Departure from this general policy was not intended. 6 Barbour, 60.
The construction which would give two elections in the year 1851, would occasion great collision between the various provisions of the Charter. Char, of 1851, art. 2, sect. 1; art. 4, sect. 16.
The word “or,” in sect. 16, art. 4, is synonymous with the word, and, and is so used in the legislation of this state. Laws of 1850, p. 124; sect. 21, p. 127; sect. 21, p. 134; sect. 2, p. 85; sect. 1, p. 163; sect. 3, p. 226; sect. 19. Smith’s Com. 751, sect. 637.
The Constitution giving one election in 1851, renders all the provisions of the Charter harmonious, and gives effect to every word in its natural meaning, and in the order and place in which it occurs. Smith’s Com. 588, sect. 419; lb. 672, and 651, sect. 508; lb. 619, sect. 465-6; lb. 603, sect. 442.
The ordinary meaning of the word “annually” in statutes, is not a measure of time, but successive calendar years. Const. California, art. 4, sect. 3; Laws of 1850, 64, sect. 13; Laws of United States, vol. 1, 73, sect. 1;'Revised Stats, of Mass., part 1, ch. 15, sects. 17, 18, 20-36; ch. 11, sect. 5; ch. 13, sect. 40.
The word “annually,” in sect. 5, is, by the word “thereafter,” connected with, and refers to, the election of April, 1851. Revised Stats, of Mass. 101, sect. 3; lb. 127, sect. 20; Smith’s Com. 711, sect. 576; Sacramento City, Laws of 1850, p. 73, sect. 21, p. 79; sect. 2.
The word “first,” in sect. 5, establishes the election of April, 1850, as one of the annual elections. See provisions of other statutes; Charter of 1851, art. 2, sect. 128 ; Laws of 1850, 206, sect. 15, p. 81; sect. 123; Law Concerning Offices, 1851, sect. 14.
The absence of any express or incidental provision, indicating a contrary understanding by the legislature, is controlling in favor of defendant’s construction. Laws of 1850, 91, sect. 31, 32, p. 128; sect. 2, p. 123-4; sect. 20 and 21, p. 124; sect. 21, p. 134; sect. 20, 21, p. 97; sect. 2, p. 73; sect. 21.
No election was held in September, 1851. The Common Council did not call or notify an election : Char. 1851, sect. 4, art. 2; 5 Burr, 2681; 1 Adol. and Ellis, 878; Revised Stats, of Mass. 8, 1 ch. 15, sects. 8, 17, 18; 6 Mit. 340; Laws of 1850;-91, sect. 32.
The day being fixed by the statute does not affect the case. 2 Kent’s Com. 295; Cowper, 538 ; Election Law of 1850, 101, sect. 5 and 8.
The argument ex necessitate, has no application, as there is an effectual remedy by mandamus. 1 Barn, and Cress. 310; 4 Burr, 2011; 8 East, 270; 6 T. R. 301; Prac. Act, 1851, title 12, ch. 2.
If the action of the Common Council could be dispensed with, still what transpired was not an election. Charter, 1851, sect. 4, 57; Election Laws of 1850, p. 102, sect. 17; General City Incorporation Law, 1850, p. 91, sect. 32.
If the relator was elected in September, he did not qualify within the time required by law. Charter of 1851, art. 4, sect. 15; 20 Wend. 12; 1 Revised Stats, of New York, 122, sect. 34; 9 New Hamp. 524.
If relator was duly elected, and duly qualified, his term of office does not commence until the fourth Monday of April next. Law Concerning Offices, 1851.

Opinion:
Chief Justice Hastings
delivered the opinion of the court. Murray, Justice, concurred with the Chief Justice in his conclusion, but for different reasons, and delivered his opinion in conformity to his views. Lyons, Justice, dissented.
Hastings, Chief Justice. Three propositions are suggested relating to the construction of the Charter of the City of San Francisco, regulating the election and terms of the officers of the city.
1. That the election should have been holden in September, 1851, and the terms of the officers to commence in April, 1852.
2. That the first election having been holden on the first Monday of April, A. D. 1851, the second election should be postponed until the September general election, 1852.
3. That the term of the respondent should cease at the state election of September, A. D. 1851, and that the election of the relator, as his successor, was legally holden at that time.
One of these propositions must be adopted, and we shall adopt that which would naturally produce the least injury, and best harmonize with the intention of the legislature, and the general policy of the State Government, relating to the terms and tenure of office.
The first proposition violates section 2, article 4, of the Charter, which provides that both boards (of aldermen) shall assemble on the first Monday after their election, and would operate an injury to the public in this, that they would be deprived of the services of officers, who would usually be elected for causes influencing the minds of the electors at the time, which might not exist months after, and a wrong upon the officers elect, by postponing the commencement of their terms, until the first Monday of April, of each year.
The second proposition is obnoxious to the 16th section of article 4, which provides that the officers elective under this Charter shall continue in office for one year, or until their successors are qualified, as it gives the respondent a term of seventeen months, a greater term than any of his successors could be elected to. This is no't usual in the incipient organization of any city government, and such a term is not contemplated and prescribed by the Charter.
By adopting the third proposition, it is difficult to perceive how the public can suffer further injury, than a change of officers may produce, during the prosperous administration of the affairs of the city; and this could be of no great moment, provided competent successors are elected. It is true that this construction seems to conflict with the 16th sect, referred to, and the general policy of the Charter, which contemplates a term of one year, and but one general election for each year, and curtails the term of the respondent to a half year ; but the term of one year is not absolute. It may he limited by an event which may happen, viz.: the election and qualification of a successor, prior to the termination of the term. It is not of much importance to interpret the literal meaning of the word annually, or of the. word or ; the actual and substantial meaning and intention of the legislature is to be sought after, and we know of no better rule than to follow the established policy of the State Government, from its origin, which evidently is to make elective all offices of the state, counties, and cities, at the shortest periods which the convenience of the public will permit.
Governed by this policy, we should not extend official terms beyond the time clearly defined, but rather by implication, if necessary, shorten the duration of a term, than prolong it.
Adopting the third proposition, the first official year in the government of the City of San Francisco should have closed at the September general election, for 1851, and the second official year should have thereupon commenced.
This would give the respondent a fraction of a year for his term, and not one full term and a fraction of a second.
" As to the validity of the election of the relator, we are of the opinion that the decision of the court below is correct. He received a majority of all the votes cast, at an election ordered by law; and the means of bringing about the election, and irregularities therein, should be disregarded, as it is to be presumed that all of the electors knew the law, and were not prevented from voting by any fraud or misconduct on the part of those who conducted and managed the election. The time and place of the election being fixed by law, it may have been the duty of the Common Council to give notice thereof; and should they fail to do so, or to perform any other duty required, prior to the election, a writ of mandamus might issue from the courts commanding them to discharge their duty; but this would not afford immediate relief; and it ought not to he in the power of incumbents in office to prevent the election of their successors, at the time and place prescribed by law, by neglect on their part. Unless the election of the relator is a nullity, he acquired a right to the office, which should be protected. So much, therefore, of the judgment of the court below declaring the election of the relator to be valid is affirmed, and that part of the decision of the court postponing the commencement of the term until the first Monday of April, 1852, is reversed, and the District Court is ordered to enter judgment in this case accordingly.