Case Name: DOSSETT v. STATE
Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1923-04-04
Citations: 249 S.W. 1048
Docket Number: No. 7479
Parties: DOSSETT v. STATE.
Judges: 
Reporter: South Western Reporter
Volume: 249
Pages: 1048–1049

Head Matter:
DOSSETT v. STATE.
(No. 7479.)
(Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
April 4, 1923.)
1. Witnesses <&wkey;337(6) — Proof of previous conviction of crime held admissible to affect credibility of accused.
Where, in a prosecution for unlawfully selling intoxicating liquor, accused was a witness in her own behalf, held, that proof that she bad been convicted of the offense of unlawfully possessing intoxicating liquors, a felony, was admissible for the purpose of affecting her credibility as a witness and was provable on cross-examination by her oral testimony, as was also proof that she had befen convicted of conducting a bawdyhouse; that being a misdemeanor and imputing moral turpitude.
2. Criminal law <&wkey;>729 — Argument of prosecuting attorney withdrawn by court could not injure accused.
Argument of prosecuting attorney, if improper, held not to injure accused, where it was withdrawn.
Appeal from District Court, Milam County; John Watson, Judge.
Lena Wells Dossett was convicted of unlawfully selling intoxicating liquors, and appeals.
Judgment affirmed.
B. P. Matocha, of Cameron, for appellant.
R. G. Storey, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.

Opinion:
MORROW, P. J.
The offense is the unlawful selling of intoxicating liquor; punishment fixed at confinement in the penitentiary for one year.
The testimony of the witness Camp is definite to the effect that he went to the house occupied by appellant and purchased from her several drinks of whisky, for each of which he paid one dollar; also, that he also purchased from her a half-pint bottle of whisky, which he delivered to the sheriff. This bottle of whisky was identified upon the trial by both the sheriff and the witness. The appellant and the witnesses introduced by her, who were present at the time of the alleged transaction, denied the sale of the whisky and declared that the prosecuting witness Camp was drunk and that the purchases made by him were of Coco-Cola.
The issues of fact as presented were submitted to the jury under instructions of which there is no complaint made.
The appellant being a witness in her own behalf, there was no inpropriety in allowing the state to prove by her that she had been convicted of the offense of the unlawful possession of intoxicating liquor. This being a felony, proof of it for the purpose of affecting the credibility of the witness was allowable and for that purpose was provable on cross-examination by her oral testimony. Numerous authorities to this effect are found in Branch's Ann. Tex. Penal Code, § 167, to which we refer.
It was also permissible to prove by her on cross-examination that she had been convicted of the offense of conducting a bawdy-house; that being a misdemeanor and imputing moral turpitude. See Branch's Ann. Tex. P. C. § 169; Bogue v. State, 69 Tex. Cr. R. 656, 155 S. W. 943; Bird v. State, 66 Tex. Cr. R. 611, 148 S. W. 738; Wood v. State, 84 Tex. Cr. R. 187, 206 S. W. 349; Morrison v. State, 85 Tex. Cr. R. 20, 209 S. W. 742, 6 A. L. R. 1607.
The jurymen in the panel were asked by the appellant if they belonged to the Ku Klux Klan. Three of them made no reply to this question. The appellant requested the court privately to excuse the jurors for cause. The parties had not stated that they belonged to the organization mentioned, nor had the court been called upon to require them to do so. They were excused by appellant upon peremptory challenge. No objectionable juror was shown to have been taken or to have been forced upon the appellant. The bill revealing these facts shows no error.
The argument of counsel for the state is complained of. The court prepared his own bill, from which it appears that such remarks as were made by the counsel were proper replies to the argument of appellant's counsel and were withdrawn from the consideration of the jury by the court. Whether the argument was such aS would have required the withdrawal under the circumstances is questionable, but, manifestly having been withdrawn, no injury was done to the appellant.
The judgment is affirmed.
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