Case Name: The People of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Johnnie Hendon, Defendant-Appellant
Court: Illinois Appellate Court
Jurisdiction: Illinois
Decision Date: 1975-11-28
Citations: 33 Ill. App. 3d 745
Docket Number: No. 74-76
Parties: The People of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Johnnie Hendon, Defendant-Appellant.
Judges: 
Reporter: Illinois Appellate Court Reports, Third Series
Volume: 33
Pages: 745–756

Head Matter:
The People of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Johnnie Hendon, Defendant-Appellant.
(No. 74-76;
Third District
November 28, 1975.
STOUDER, J., dissenting.
James Geis, of State Appellate Defender’s Office, of Ottawa, for appellant.
Michael M. Mihm, State’s Attorney, of Peoria (James Christy, Assistant State’s Attorney, of counsel), for the People.

Opinion:
Mr. JUSTICE STENGEL
delivered the opinion of the court:
Defendant, Johnnie Hendon, and his brother Raymond Hendon, were indicted for rape. Their cases were consolidated for trial by jury, where Raymond was acquitted and defendant was found guilty. He was sentenced to not less than 4 years nor more than 20 years in the Illinois State Penitentiary. Defendant appeals, contending that the evidence failed to prove that the intercourse was forcible and against the will of the prosecutrix. He also contends that there were improper inferences to a prior criminal record during the trial, and that a mistrial should have been granted due to prejudicial statements made by a prospective juror.
The prosecutrix, who was 18 at the time, testified as follows: On De cember 9, 1972, shortly before 7 p.m., she left her home in order to make a telephone call at a phone booth near her house. She had a date at 7 p.m. and was going to be picked up at her house at that time. She is quite nearsighted and was not wearing her glasses that evening. As she neared the booth she noticed a car was approaching on her side of the street. She saw the car stop outside the booth but could not recognize the occupants, due to her poor eyesight. The driver told her to come over to the car. When she was very near the car, she realized that she did not know the occupants. She identified Johnnie Hendon as the driver, who got out of the car. He told her his name was Willie Jackson and that they were police detectives looking for three or four girls who had been "messing around with black guys."
She stated that she was not one of those girls, told him she was going to call the police and ran into the phone booth. She then decided that she could escape and left the phone booth without calling the police. Defendant grabbed her by the coat and shoved her against the car. She was frightened and defendant told her to "shut up or else." Defendant then forced her into the car and said he was taking her down to where the police was parked. She kept telling defendant she was not one of the girls he was looking for and repeatedly asked to be let out. Defendant drove up to a house, parked and, holding her arm, took her down some steps into the cellar where three couches were pushed together. Before entering the house, she heard some women arguing inside the house.
She removed her clothes at defendant's demand, and defendant removed his. Defendant then forced her to perform several acts of sexual intercourse and oral sex. She tried to cry out at one point, but he told her to "shut up in a loud and vicious way." When defendant finished, another man whom she identified as Raymond Hendon, came into the room and also forced her to commit several acts of intercourse. Following this, she was told to dress, and then defendant took her out of the cellar and drove her to a street close to her house. She stated that throughout this ordeal she was "scared for my life," she was "scared to death" and "in shock," and that "I did what I was told because of my life, afraid of my life."
She testified that she informed her mother of the rape when she arrived home. She was taken to the hospital where she complained of a pain in the neck. She also stated that she had been a virgin prior to this incident. She stated that she was positive about her identification of Johnnie Hendon because she had been so close to him when they were at the phone booth. However, she readily admitted that she had had difficulties in identifying Raymond Hendon, because of the fact that she did not see his face while in the car, and due to the darkness of the cellar room.
Scott Pamham testified that on December 9, 1972, he was to pick up the prosecutrix at 7 p.m. for a date. Apparently the date had been arranged by a third party. She was not at home when he arrived, and he then drove around looking for her. When he returned to her house about an hour and a half later, the prosecutrix was there. She complained that her stomach hurt and asked him to drive her to her sister's house. They were unable to find her sister at home and then drove to a restauraftt where she was supposed to be working. During this half-hour period, the prosecutrix was crying intermittently. After failing to locate her sister, the prosecutrix told Pamham that she had been raped, and he called the police.
A police officer testified that he received a call at about 9:30 p.m. that. evening to proceed to the address where the prosecutrix lived. When he arrived, the prosecutrix was sitting on a bed crying, and he drove her to the hospital. There was testimony by another police officer that, when viewing photographs, the prosecutrix's identification of defendant was absolute and positive, but that she had difficulty identifying Raymond Hendon.
A physician testified that he examined the prosecutrix that evening after she told him she had been raped and complained of neck injury. He stated that the vagina showed signs of recent sexual activity. There was also a small tear in the vagina wall and some blood, which, according to the physician, indicated that this was probably her first sexual experience. An x-ray of her neck showed no bone damage, but the physician said this did not rule out soft tissue damage.
Defendant testified that he had met the prosecutrix two weeks previously at a restaurant and talked with her and another girl for an hour and a half. He then met her around 12:30 p.m. on December 9, 1972, and made arrangements to pick her up that night at the phone booth to go to a movie. Instead of going to the movie, they went to his cellar apartment, listened to records and later had sexual intercourse. He stated that the prosecutrix willingly engaged in intercourse with him. On cross-examination, however, he could not remember the other girl's name at the restaurant or any details of the conversation. He also could not remember what movie they had planned to see. When pressed for further details regarding his testimony on direct examination, he stated "I can't remember, I can't hardly remember nothing."
Raymond Hendon denied any involvement in the incident. He stated on direct examination that on December 9, 1972, he and defendant went to a repair shop at 11 a.m., then proceeded to a pool hall and remained there for about three hours. On cross-examination, however, he recanted his testimony, finally stating that maybe this had happened the day before.
Two of the more significant defense witnesses were relatives of defendant who testified that on the evening in question they were picked up by a car in which only defendant and the prosecutrix were riding. One witness stated that the prosecutrix was smiling and said hello and the other said she was not crying. They dropped the prosecutrix off and went to the house of defendant's sister.
Defendant contends that there is insufficient evidence to show non-consensual intercourse, arguing that the prosecutrix did not resist, did not cry out and did not attempt to escape. He further points out the differences in his testimony from that of the prosecutrix.
The testimony that he gave the prosecutrix an assumed name of "Willie Jackson" and stated that he was a police detective is not consistent with his statement that the prosecutrix had agreed to go out with him and voluntarily engaged in acts of sexual intercourse.
In order to sustain a rape conviction, the prosecution must show that the intercourse was by force and against the will of the victim. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 38, § 11—1.) The uncorroborated testimony of a prosecutrix is sufficient to sustain a conviction for rape if her testimony is clear and convincing. (People v. White, 26 Ill.2d 199, 186 N.E.2d 351 (1962).) If her testimony is not of such character, it must be corroborated by other evidence. (People v. Faulisi, 25 Ill.2d 457, 185 N.E.2d 211 (1962).) There is no definite standards fixing the amount of force required to show nonconsensual intercourse, and each case must be considered on its own merits. Resistance is not necessary under circumstances where resistance would be futile or would endanger the life of the female, nor where she is overcome by superior strength or paralyzed by fear. People v. Smith, 32 Ill.2d 88, 203 N.E.2d 879 (1965).
In the instant case, the testimony of the prosecutrix was clear and convincing. Her testimony on direct examination was straight forward and was unshaken after vigorous cross-examination by the two attorneys representing Johnnie and Raymond Hendon. She readily admitted her difficulty in identifying Raymond Hendon, but was positive in her identification of defendant. Indeed, as we read the record, it is the testimony of defendant, rather than the prosecutrix, which is often vague and uncertain, and is even contradicted by the testimony of his brother.
The prosecutrix's testimony was also corroborated by other evidence. The testimony of Pamham confirmed her statement that she had a date with him for that evening. Furthermore, she told him of the rape and the police were notified within a relatively short time. (People v. Flournoy, 1 Ill.App.3d 918, 275 N.E.2d 289 (1st Dist. 1971).) The fact that she did not complain to Pamham until it became apparent that she could not locate her sister is understandable, considering that Pamham was a relatively new acquaintance. The police officer further testified to the fact that she was crying and was upset when he arrived at her house. (People v. Lee, 96 Ill.App.2d 105, 238 N.E.2d 63 (1st Dist. 1968).) Thus, not only is the prosecutrix's testimony in this case sufficiently clear and convincing, but other evidence in the record serves to corroborate her testimony.
In arguing that there has been an insufficient showing that the intercourse was by force and against her will, defendant cites People v. Qualls, 21 Ill.2d 252, 171 N.E.2d 612 (1961), People v. Keeney, 10 Ill.App.3d 296, 293 N.E.2d 492 (3rd Dist. 1973), and similar cases. He also contends that the circumstances here do not show sufficient resistance on the part of the prosecutrix. Referring to her testimony, he questions why she did not complete her call to the police while in the booth, and argues that she had numerous opportunities to escape or cry out.
The cases cited by defendant are clearly distinguishable. In all those cases, the testimony of the prosecutrix lacked verisimilitude. For example, in Keeney, the alleged victim was living with the defendant, engaging in intercourse with several people, and frequently making .unsubstantiated claims of being raped. In addition to the prosecutrix's testimony in that case being somewhat implausible, there was no corroboration of the material elements of the offense. Similarly in Qualls, the circumstances of the alleged offense, as related by the prosecutrix's own testimony, were too implausible to support a rape conviction.
In the instant case, prosecutrix testified that she was grabbed, shoved against the car, and then forced into a car with two men. She was driven to a strange house and taken to the cellar. She testified that she had been told to "shut up or else," and repeatedly stated that she feared for her life.
We do not find defendant's argument that the prosecutrix could have tried to escape or could have cried out to be very persuasive. While these contentions, which were also advanced before the jury, are indeed relevant to the plausibility of her testimony, that testimony has to be considered in light of all the circumstances. Here we have an inexperienced 18 year old who was physically overpowered, put into a car with two men, and taken to a place unfamiliar to her. There is no requirement that a woman subject herself to possible serious physical harm when an attempt is made to rape her. (People v. Murphy, 124 Ill. App.2d 71, 260 N.E.2d 386 (1st Dist. 1970).) The question is whether her resistance would be futile under the circumstances. (See People v. Parks, 28 Ill.App.3d 327, 328 N.E.2d 603 (5th Dist. 1975); People v. Sims, 5 Ill.App.3d 727, 283 N.E.2d 906 (1st Dist. 1972).) The fact that calm dehberation shows she should have completed the call to the pohce or perhaps jumped out of the moving car, while indicating that she may have acted improvidently, does not ipso facto render the intercourse consensual. Attempting to escape, to struggle or to cry out is not necessary where it would be useless or where the prosecutrix was restrained by fear of violence. People v. Lilly, 9 Ill.App.3d 46, 291 N.E.2d 207 ( 3rd Dist. 1972).
In contrast to defendant's contentions that she had opportunities to cry out or escape, the prosecutrix testified to a forcible abduction, vague threats and her great fear. There were corroborative witnesses for both sides. Under these circumstances, the case essentially became one of credibility.
In People v. Reese, 54 Ill.2d 51, 294 N.E.2d 288 (1973), our Supreme Court stated at page 57:
"Courts of review have a special duty of carefully examining the evidence in rape cases. But in doing so the court may not encroach upon the function of the trier of fact to weigh credibüity and otherwise assess the evidence which was presented. A court of review will not set aside a finding of guüty unless the evidence is so palpably contrary to the finding or so unreasonable, improbable or unsatisfactory as to cause reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused." 54 Ill.2d 51, 57-58.
The determination of the question of whether the defendant or the prosecutrix told the truth is the primary function of the jury. Here it is apparent that the jury, in the discharge of that function, believed the prosecutrix and not the defendant. The jury, acting within the province committed to it, has passed upon the credibility of the witnesses and has determined the weight of the evidence. Unless this court can say, upon review of the entire record, that the verdict is manifestly contrary to the weight of the evidence, the verdict of the jury will not be disturbed. (People v. Polak, 360 Ill. 440, 196 N.E. 513 (1935).) This court has carefully examined the record and considered the testimony. We have found nothing implausible or unbelievable in the prosecutrix's testimony, and we believe her testimony was sufficient to establish that the intercourse was by force and against her wiU.
Defendant next contends that during the trial there were inferences of a prior record which resulted in a denial of a fair trial.
During the examination of Officer Rogers regarding the identification of the house in which the incident occurred, the prosecutor asked him if he knew who resided at that address. The officer replied that he knew that the Hendon family resided there, and, in response to a fúrther quéstion, stated that he was acquainted with Johnnie and Raymond Hendon. Another officer, who testified regarding the photographic identification of the two defendants by the prosecutrix, stated that the photographs were obtained from the records division. Finally, on redirect examination, Detective Pointer, stated that defendant was accompanied by his attorney when he surrendered himself at the police station.
It is fundamental that proof of prior arrests or prior criminal activity, unrelated to the charge in question, cannot be used against an accused. (People v. Smith, 12 Ill.App.3d 1037, 299 N.E.2d 489 (1st Dist. 1973).) This court has condemned the evidentiary use of "mug shots" where it appeared that the use of the picture was of little or no probative value, and the legends of prior arrests on the photos were clearly prejudicial. People v. Hudson, 7 Ill.App.3d 333, 287 N.E.2d 297 (3rd Dist. 1972); People v. Hawkins, 4 Ill.App.3d 471, 281 N.E.2d 72 (3rd Dist. 1972).
In the instant case, testimony that Officer Rogers knew the two Hendon brothers was relevant to the State's case regarding the identification of the Hendons as residents of the house and also tended to corroborate the testimony of the prosecutrix. In addition, we do not see how testimony that the officer knew the Hendon family, knew that it was a large family and was acquainted with the two defendants, was so suggestive of a prior crimina! record as to warrant a new trial. Furthermore, the statement that defendant was accompanied by his attorney was elicited on redirect examination after defendant's attorney had questioned the officer on cross-examination regarding the circumstances of defendant's arrest. This statement does not seem at all suggestive of a prior criminal record.
The statement regarding the source of the photographs was relevant as foundation evidence for the identification made by the prosecutrix. We note from the record that the trial judge exercised great caution in this area. He did not permit the photos to be admitted into evidence and did not aUow the testifying officer to use the photos while on the witness stand lest some of the jurors see that the photos were "mug shots." He also did not allow the prosecution to impeach defendant by prior convictions due to the inherent prejudice that would result in a trial of this nature. Therefore, on the basis of evidence before us, we do not find such prejudicial intimation of a prior criminal record that would, as a matter of law, require a new trial. (People v. Wyatt, 23 Ill.App.3d 587, 319 N.E.2d 575 (3rd Dist. 1974); People v. Ogden, 77 Ill.App.2d 312, 222 N.E.2d 329 (3rd Dist. 1966).
Defendant also contends that a mistrial should have been granted because of certain remarks made by a prospective juror. It appears from the record that, on the first day of jury voir dire, a prospective juror stated that she had previously served on a grand jury. When asked if this would influence her ability to serve here, she stated that from her experience, rape cases were difficult to prove, and therefore, no one would complain of rape unless it was the truth.
The record indicates that the trial judge summarily dismissed this prospective juror. He also thoroughly admonished jurors already selected to disregard the statement and inquired whether anyone else had the same feelings. In his own words, he " * made it quite clear that anyone in that frame of mind was not a qualified juror, almost to the point of holding her in ridicule." The judge also gave the defense attorneys the opportunity to further question the jurors who had already been selected, stating that " I can assure you that if you get any answers that indicate preconceptions or that that comment influenced any of the jurors, I will either reconsider this motion [for a mistrial] or I will strike them as a Court's disqualification The record thus indicates that the trial judge thoroughly considered tins matter, and we do not believe that the court abused its discretion in denying the motion for mistrial. People v. Chaffin, 49 Ill.2d 356, 274 N.E.2d 68 (1971).
Having reviewed the record in this case, we do not believe that prejudicial error was committed nor do we believe that there is a reasonable doubt of the guilt of the defendant. The verdict of the jury, therefore, will not be disturbed. The judgment of the Circuit Court of Peoria County is affirmed.
Affirmed.
BARRY, J., concurs.