Case Name: Marion LUBELL, Petitioner, v. ROMAN SPA, INC., et al., Respondents
Court: Florida Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1978-06-30
Citations: 362 So. 2d 922
Docket Number: No. 50083
Parties: Marion LUBELL, Petitioner, v. ROMAN SPA, INC., et al., Respondents.
Judges: ADKINS and SUNDBERG, JJ., and MASON, Circuit Judge (Retired), concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 362
Pages: 922–924

Head Matter:
Marion LUBELL, Petitioner, v. ROMAN SPA, INC., et al., Respondents.
No. 50083.
Supreme Court of Florida.
June 30, 1978.
Rehearing Denied Oct. 16, 1978.
David R. Lewis of Lewis, Paul, Isaac & Castillo, Jacksonville, for petitioner.
Marion R. Shepard of Mathews, Osborne, Ehrlich, McNatt, Gobelman & Cobb, and Carle A. Felton, Jr., of Boyd, Jenerett, Leemis & Staas, Jacksonville, for respondents.

Opinion:
BOYD, Justice.
In this case the District Court of Appeal, First District, applied an earlier decision as controlling precedent. The decision should not have served as precedent because this case contains materially different facts. Such a "misapplication of law" generates conflict between the two decisions and gives us jurisdiction.
The facts of the case appear in the opinion of the District Court. The case proceeded in this way. Marion Lubell, a patron in the Roman Spa, was injured when a "false" ceiling, constructed by Connors Construction Company, collapsed. She brought suit against the Spa and, in turn, the Spa filed a third party complaint against Connors for indemnification. In the main action, the jury found the Spa liable for negligence and returned a verdict for Lubell of $25,000 in damages. In the indemnity action, the jury returned a verdict for Connors. A consolidated final judgment in keeping with the jury determinations was rendered and the Spa appealed, attacking the verdicts on both liability and indemnification.
The District Court held that the trial court erred in failing to grant the Spa's motion for a directed verdict at the close of the evidence. In so holding the court relied on Slavin v. Kay, 108 So.2d 462 (Fla.1959). In the course of the Slavin opinion, this Court had stated that the rule freeing contractors from liability for injuries resulting from their defective work, when the work had been turned over to the owner, did not apply "where the dangerous condition is not discoverable by [the owner's] inspection." Slavin, at 466. The district court used the Slavin language to free the Spa from liability because the cause of the ceiling's collapse was that Connors, instead of strapping metal laths to two-by-fours in the ceiling had improperly attached them with smooth shank nails, a defect not discoverable by the Spa's inspection.
To the contrary, there was evidence in the record which indicated that the defect may have been discoverable by inspection. This evidence: approval of the plan for the ceiling by the Spa's maintenance supervisor, the supervisor's observance of some of the construction, and his acceptance of the completed work following inspection; is mentioned in the court's opinion. There is other evidence in the record which indicated that the Spa may have breached the duty of care it owed Lubell and that the breach proximately caused her injuries. There was no rule of law to compel the district court to disturb the jury's evaluation of the evidence as to the Spa's liability and it was incorrect to do so.
The decision that the Spa was not liable made it unnecessary for the Court to consider the challenge to the indemnity verdict. That issue has not been properly briefed or argued here. The cause is remanded with directions for the district court to consider the points on appeal originally raised against the indemnity verdict and to reinstate the liability judgment against the Spa.
It is so ordered.
ADKINS and SUNDBERG, JJ., and MASON, Circuit Judge (Retired), concur.
ENGLAND, J., dissents with an opinion.
OVERTON, C. J., and ALDERMAN, J., dissent.
. Wale v. Barnes, 278 So.2d 601, 604 (Fla. 1973).
. Art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla.Const.
. Roman Spa, Inc. v. Lubell, 334 So.2d 298 (Fla.App.1976).
. For example, that the Spa didn't take sufficient precaution to protect its patrons when it should have known the collapse might occur due to pile driving in the vicinity.