Case Name: Raymond JARVIS and Theresa Mary Jarvis, Appellants/Cross-Appellees, v. TENET HEALTH SYSTEMS HOSPITAL, INC., d/b/a Delray Community Hospital, Appellee/Cross-Appellant
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1999-11-17
Citations: 743 So. 2d 1218
Docket Number: No. 98-2312
Parties: Raymond JARVIS and Theresa Mary Jarvis, Appellants/Cross-Appellees, v. TENET HEALTH SYSTEMS HOSPITAL, INC., d/b/a Delray Community Hospital, Appellee/Cross-Appellant.
Judges: FARMER, J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 743
Pages: 1218–1221

Head Matter:
Raymond JARVIS and Theresa Mary Jarvis, Appellants/Cross-Appellees, v. TENET HEALTH SYSTEMS HOSPITAL, INC., d/b/a Delray Community Hospital, Appellee/Cross-Appellant.
No. 98-2312.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
Nov. 17, 1999.
Julie H. Littky-Rubin of Lytal, Reiter, Clark, Fountain & Williams, LLP, West Palm Beach, for appellants/cross-appellees.
James C. Sawran of McIntosh, Sawran, Peltz & Cartaya, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, for appellee/cross-appellant.

Opinion:
SHAHOOD, J.
Following a three-week trial in this medical malpractice action, the jury found in favor of the plaintiffs/appellants, Raymond Jarvis and Theresa Mary Jarvis. Based on a determination that the defendant/ap-pellee, Tenet Health Systems Hospital, Inc., d/b/a/ Delray Community Hospital ("Delray") was 1% negligent and the Fa-bre defendant, Bethesda Ambulance Service ("Bethesda") was 99% negligent, the jury awarded past medical expenses in the amount of $10,446.65, future medical expenses in the amount of $474,114, and damages for past and future pain and suffering in the amount of $10,000,000.00. The trial court granted an additur of $1,011,868.31 as to the past medical expenses and a remittitur of $5,000,000 as to the loss of consortium damages, and ruled that the failure to accept the additur or remittitur by either party would result in a new trial on both liability and damages.
The central issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred in granting a new trial on both liability and damages once the additur was rejected. We conclude that the court did err in this regard, and reverse and remand for a new trial on damages only.
Section 768.74(4), Florida Statutes addresses the procedure to be followed for remittitur and additur, and states that "[i]f the court finds that the amount awarded is excessive or inadequate, it shall order an additur or remittitur, as the case may be." § 768.74(2), Fla. Stat. (1997). The statute further provides that "[i]f the party adversely affected by such remittitur or addi-tur does not agree, the court shall order a •new trial in the cause on the issue of damages only." § 768.74(4), Fla. Stat. (1997) (emphasis added). In Broward County School Board v. Dombrosky, 579 So.2d 748 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991), this court carved a limited exception in these cases holding that where the issue of liability is hotly contested and there is some suggestion that the jury may have compromised on the verdict, a new trial on both damages and liability is appropriate.
In this case, the trial court denied appellants' motion to limit the new trial to only damages indicating that it was bound to follow the Dombrosky exception since liability was hotly contested. While there is no dispute that liability was hotly contested, there was no concurrent finding that the verdict was the result of a compromise, as Dombrosky requires. In fact, in denying Delray's motion for new trial, the trial court had previously found just the opposite, stating that this was a "well-thought-out verdict." Thus, absent a finding that the jury compromised on the verdict, the trial court was not bound to follow Dom-brosky. In fact, in light of the court's earlier decision to deny Delray's motion for new trial, the subsequent grant of a new trial on both liability and damages following rejection of the additur was inconsistent. Instead, the trial court should have granted a new trial on damages only in accordance with the statute.
Delray argues that the verdict was, indeed, a compromise because the award for past medical expenses appears to be approximately one percent of the damages proven, and is consistent with the jury's assessment of liability. We have not overlooked the fact that there was some confusion at trial concerning the jury instructions, but note that the trial court addressed this issue and concluded that the jury was not unduly influenced by passion or prejudice. The trial court has broad discretionary authority in this area; we find that there has been no abuse of discretion. See generally Brown v. Estate of Stuckey, 24 Fla. L. Weekly S397, — So.2d -, 1999 WL 669205 (Fla. Aug. 26, 1999) (in reviewing a trial judge's ruling on whether a verdict is inadequate, exces sive, or contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence, an appellate court must employ the reasonableness test to determine whether the trial judge abused his or her discretion).
Accordingly, we reverse the order granting a new trial on both liability and dam-agés and remand for a new trial on damages only. We affirm as to all other issues raised.
FARMER, J., concurs.
HAZOURI, J., concurs specially with opinion.
. Fabre v. Marin, 623 So.2d 1182 (Fla.1993), receded from by Wells v. Tallahassee Mem'l Reg'l Med. Ctr., 659 So.2d 249 (Fla.1995).