Case Name: METROPOLITAN DADE COUNTY FAIR HOUSING AND EMPLOYMENT APPEALS BOARD, Petitioner, v. SUNRISE VILLAGE MOBILE HOME PARK, INC., Respondent
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1986-03-25
Citations: 485 So. 2d 865
Docket Number: No. 85-1057
Parties: METROPOLITAN DADE COUNTY FAIR HOUSING AND EMPLOYMENT APPEALS BOARD, Petitioner, v. SUNRISE VILLAGE MOBILE HOME PARK, INC., Respondent.
Judges: Before SCHWARTZ, C.J., and BARK-DULL, HENDRY, HUBBART, NESBITT, BASKIN and FERGUSON, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 485
Pages: 865–871

Head Matter:
METROPOLITAN DADE COUNTY FAIR HOUSING AND EMPLOYMENT APPEALS BOARD, Petitioner, v. SUNRISE VILLAGE MOBILE HOME PARK, INC., Respondent.
No. 85-1057.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
March 25, 1986.
Robert A. Ginsburg, County Atty., and John Mclnnis, Asst. County Atty., for petitioner.
Schild & Lucas and Elliott Heywood Lucas, for respondent.
Before SCHWARTZ, C.J., and BARK-DULL, HENDRY, HUBBART, NESBITT, BASKIN and FERGUSON, JJ.
Daniel S. Pearson and Jorgenson, JJ. are recused from consideration of this case.

Opinion:
BASKIN, Judge.
ON REHEARING EN BANC
On June 18, 1985, this court denied a Petition for Writ of Certiorari in which the Metropolitan Dade County Fair Housing and Employment Appeals Board [Board] sought to overturn a circuit court appellate opinion reversing the Board's finding that Sunrise Village Mobile Home Park, Inc. [Sunrise Village] engaged in age discrimination. The circuit court declared chapter 11A, section 11A, of the Metropolitan Dade County Code [Code] unconstitutional insofar as it prohibits reasonable age restrictions in housing. In response to the Board's Motion for Rehearing En Banc, this court heard oral argument. Fla.R. App.P. 9.331. Having afforded the litigants en banc consideration, we deny the relief sought.
The impetus for this action was the refusal of Sunrise Village to allow James Reid, Jr., a twenty-nine year old employed individual, to occupy the mobile home he purchased. The home was situated on a lot owned by Sunrise Village and located in its mobile home park. Reid was informed before he purchased the home that he would have to obtain the approval of Sunrise Village before becoming a resident. When he spoke to the manager, Reid was told that he was too young to live in the park which was being developed as a retirement community. Reid then filed a complaint with the Board charging that Sunrise Village engaged in age discrimination in housing, in violation of chapter 11A, section 11A-3 of the Code. Despite his failure to gain the approval of Sunrise Village, Reid purchased the mobile home.
Following an investigation, the Executive Director of the Board issued a report based on Reid's complaint; she concluded that Sunrise Village had engaged in age discrimination. The Director recommended that the Board order Sunrise Village to compensate Reid in the amount of $7,000 for humiliation, embarrassment, and mental distress, and to permit Reid to move into the park. Sunrise Village appealed the Director's findings to the Board, which conducted a hearing and adopted the Director's findings. Sunrise Village appealed to the appellate division of the eleventh judicial circuit, pursuant to section 11A-9 of the Code. The circuit court, relying on White Egret Condominium, Inc. v. Franklin, 379 So.2d 346 (Fla.1979), reversed the Board's decision, stating:
We reverse the Board's decision upon a holding that it results in an unconstitutional restraint on the right of the mobile home park owner to use its property for a legitimate purpose, namely, the creation of a retirement community. To the extent that Chapter 11 A, Section 11A of the Dade County Code requires the Board's finding, it is deemed unconstitutional.
Since the Dade County ordinance does not allow for [a] judicially determined reasonable age restriction, and there is no evidence in the record that the restriction was arbitrarily applied to Reid or that the particular restriction is unreasonable, the category of age must be deleted from the anti-discrimination ordinance. (emphasis in original)
The Board challenged the circuit court's decision by filing a Petition for Writ of Certiorari with this court. When the Petition was denied, the Board requested, and was afforded, rehearing en banc.
District court review of an order entered by a circuit court sitting in its appellate capacity is limited to a determina tion of whether the circuit court afforded petitioner procedural due process and observed essential requirements of law. City of Deerfield Beach v. Vaillant, 419 So.2d 624 (Fla.1982); Tomeu v. Palm Beach County, 430 So.2d 601 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983). The district court may not reweigh the evidence. Metropolitan Dade County v. Mingo, 339 So.2d 302 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976). Only when the circuit court departs from required procedures may the district court exercise its discretion and grant review by certiorari. "The district courts should use this discretion cautiously so as to avert the possibility of common-law certiorari being used as a vehicle to obtain a second appeal." Henshaw v. Kelly, 440 So.2d 2, 7 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983) (quoting Combs v. State, 436 So.2d 93, 96 (Fla.1983)), review denied, 450 So.2d 486 (Fla.1984). An examination of the record before us indicates that the circuit court afforded petitioner a full appeal in compliance with due process requirements, and that it observed essential legal principles in rendering its decision. Thus, no basis exists for the exercise of this court's discretionary review.
According to article I, section 2 of the Florida Constitution, all persons have the right to possess property and to use that property in any legitimate manner not in conflict with the public welfare. Palm Beach Mobile Homes, Inc. v. Strong, 300 So.2d 881 (Fla.1974); Miller v. MacGill, 297 So.2d 573 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974), cert. denied, 307 So.2d 183 (Fla.1975). A statute or regulation which limits or restrains a property owner's use of his property may infringe on the property owner's constitutional rights. See Palm Beach Mobile Homes; Miller. Although the legislature or county commission may, in the exercise of its police powers, promulgate statutes and ordinances regulating property use, Palm Beach Mobile Homes; Moviematic Industries Corp. v. Board of County Commissioners, 349 So.2d 667, 671 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977); Miller, the regulation must bear a substantial relationship to the public health, safety, morals, and general welfare. Coca Cola Co., Food Division v. State, Department of Citrus, 406 So.2d 1079, 1084-85 (Fla.1981), dismissed sub nom. Kraft, Inc. v. Florida, Department of Citrus, 456 U.S. 1002, 102 S.Ct. 2288, 73 L.Ed.2d 1297 (1982); Palm Beach Mobile Homes. If the means employed do not have a real and substantial relationship to the avowed or ostensible purpose, the lawmaking body has exceeded the legitimate bounds of its police power. Palm Beach Mobile Homes, 300 So.2d at 885 (quoting Atlantic Coastline Railroad v. City of Goldsboro, 232 U.S. 548, 34 S.Ct. 364, 58 L.Ed. 721 (1914)).
The ordinance in question states that its goal is to assure equal opportunity to all persons to live in decent housing facilities. Ch. 11 A, § 11A-1, Metropolitan Dade County Code. Although the commission, in promulgating the ordinance, adopts a laudatory policy, it utilizes extreme methods to implement its goal. The effect of the ordinance is to eliminate all adult and retirement housing in its jurisdiction, a drastic means of fulfilling its purpose of assuring decent housing.
We reject the Board's assertions that the circuit court's application of the policy set forth by the Florida supreme court in White Egret was inappropriate in this case. In White Egret, the court stated that "age limitations or restrictions are reasonable means to accomplish the lawful purpose of providing appropriate facilities for the differing housing needs and desires of varying age groups.... Age restrictions are a reasonable means to identify and categorize the varying desires of our population." White Egret, 379 So.2d at 351; see Star Lake North Commodore Assoc. v. Parker, 423 So.2d 509 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982); Taxpayers Association v. Weymouth Township, 80 N.J. 6, 364 A.2d 1016 (1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 977, 97 S.Ct. 1672, 52 L.Ed.2d 373 (1977). Elderly individuals may require housing designed to provide a quiet atmosphere and to satisfy other needs peculiar to the elderly. White Egret. Cogent policy reasons for permitting the establishment of retirement communities are set forth in Weymouth.
The rapid increase of the elderly population has brought increasing public recognition of the special problems confronting this age group.... Among these problems are the special housing needs of the elderly. The lack of housing specially designed to meet the needs and desires of the elderly is a matter that has generated increasing public concern....
In part the need of the elderly for specialized housing results from the fixed and limited incomes upon which many older persons are dependent....
In part, though, the need for specialized housing transcends economic status and results from the particular physical and social problems of the elderly....
. The elderly are apt to be less mobile than younger persons. They may have lost friends and relatives of comparable age and background. As a result, readily accessible companionship becomes increasingly important to them. In addition, the fact that children may have moved away sometimes causes elderly persons to seek an age-homogeneous environment to replace broken family ties.... Such an environment also helps older citizens to adjust to the social and psychological effects of retirement....
In addition, age-homogeneous communities afford a sense of security to their residents and thereby reduce the fear of criminal victimization.... Finally, these communities facilitate social relations and increase opportunities for the peer contact which many older persons need and desire, (citations omitted)
Weymouth, 80 N.J. at 24-29, 364 A.2d at 1026-28.
The White Egret court recognized that reasonably applied and fairly enforced age restrictions are constitutional. Utilizing White Egret principles, the circuit court determined that the challenged ordinance fails to permit the reasonable age discrimination authorized by White Egret, and that no evidence indicated the age restriction was arbitrarily or selectively applied to Reid.
Finding that the circuit court observed essential requirements of law, we deny the relief sought. We certify as a question of great public importance, Fla.R.App.P. 9.0S0(a)(2)(v):
"Under the principles enunciated in White Egret Condominium, Inc. v. Franklin, 379 So.2d 346 (Fla.1979), is chapter 11 A, section 11A-3 of the Metropolitan Dade County Code an unconstitutional exercise of the county commission's police powers insofar as the ordinance prohibits reasonable age discrimination in housing?"
HENDRY and NESBITT, JJ., concur.
BARKDULL, J., concurs in conclusion to deny certiorari.
. Section 11A-3 provides:
In connection with any of the transactions set forth in this section which affects any housing accommodation or in connection with any sale, purchase, rental or lease of any housing accommodation, it shall be unlawful within the incorporated or unincorporated areas of Dade County for a person, owner, financial institution, real estate broker or real estate salesman, or any representative of the above, to:
(1) Refuse to sell, purchase, rent or lease, or otherwise deny to or withhold any housing
accommodation or to evict a person because of his race, color, religion, ancestry, natural origin, age, sex, physical handicap, marital status or place of birth_ (emphasis supplied)
"Age" is defined in section 11A-2(14) of the ordinance as "the chronological age of an individual who is eighteen (18) years old or older."
. In the interim, the circuit court entered a temporary injunction requiring Sunrise Village to permit Reid to move into the park.
. The United States Congress has adopted several programs designed to provide housing for the elderly. See generally, 12 U.S.C. § 1701-1750g, 42 U.S.C. § 1485. "These sections represent an implicit legislative finding that not only do older adults need inexpensive housing, but also that their housing interests and needs differ from families with children." Riley v. Stoves, 22 Ariz.App. 223, 229, 526 P.2d 747, 753 (1974).