Case Name: O'HERON et al. v. BLANEY et al.
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia
Jurisdiction: Georgia
Decision Date: 2003-06-30
Citations: 276 Ga. 871
Docket Number: S02G1784
Parties: O’HERON et al. v. BLANEY et al.
Judges: All the Justices concur, except Sears, P. J, Benham and Carley, JJ., who dissent.
Reporter: Georgia Reports
Volume: 276
Pages: 871–877

Head Matter:
S02G1784.
O’HERON et al. v. BLANEY et al.
(583 SE2d 834)

Opinion:
Fletcher, Chief Justice.
We granted certiorari in this case to address the scope of the immunity defense for doctors who report suspected child abuse. Dr. Thomas Blaney and Jean Blaney sued Dr. Sara O'Heron and her employer, The Emory Clinic, after O'Heron made a report regarding suspected abuse by Thomas Blaney of his granddaughters. The trial court granted O'Heron summary judgment based on the immunity provided in OCGA § 19-7-5 (f). The Court of Appeals reversed. Because the Court of Appeals failed to recognize that the statute provides immunity for those who have reasonable cause to make a report and for those who make a report in good faith, we reverse.
The Blaneys' daughter-in-law had first raised questions about possible abuse of her two small daughters after the children had spent the weekend with the Blaneys, their paternal grandparents, in Fayette County. The children's mother contacted a doctor, a social worker, and the Department of Family and Children Services in Columbia County, where she, her husband, and the children resided, regarding her observations and suspicions. Columbia County DFACS reported the allegations of abuse to the Fayette County DFACS. The mother also directly contacted the Fayette County Sheriff's department, which advised her to take the children to O'Heron for an examination. O'Heron examined the children and discussed the situation with the mother. A detective with Fayette County was also present for the examination. Following her examination, O'Heron made a verbal report of suspected abuse to the detective, which she supplemented with a written report four days later. The Blaneys were arrested and indicted for various offenses including child molestation, sodomy, incest, and contributing to the deprivation of a minor. Sometime later, a new assistant district attorney was assigned to the case and presented it to a second grand jury, which issued a "no bill." The Fayette County District Attorney's office subsequently nolle prossed the charges under the initial indictment. Then the Blaneys sued O'Heron and Emory for malicious prosecution, professional malpractice and ordinary negligence.
1. Nearly 40 years ago, the legislature enacted Georgia's first law requiring the mandatory reporting of child abuse by physicians. That first law contained an immunity provision providing that physicians who in good faith make a report of child abuse shall be immune from civil liability. In numerous amendments to this law, the legislature has consistently expanded the reporting required and the immunity granted. The legislature has imposed the obligation to report on a wider variety of persons, made reports easier to make and prove, expanded the definition of abuse, expanded immunity, and imposed criminal penalties for the willful failure to make a report. The legislature's conclusion that reporting is essential to protecting innocent children from abuse is abundantly clear. Furthermore, the legislature has specified that this law "shall be liberally construed so as to carry out the purposes thereof." It is within this context that we must construe the requirements of OCGA § 19-7-5.
Subsection (c) (1) provides that specified persons, including physicians, "having reasonable cause to believe that a child has been abused shall report or cause reports of that abuse to be made as provided in this Code section." The report must include any information that "might be helpful in establishing the cause of the injuries and the identity of the perpetrator." Under OCGA § 19-7-5 (f) any person who participates in the making of a report is immune from civil or criminal liability that would otherwise be incurred, "provided such participation . is made in good faith." This immunity also extends to the reporter's participation in any judicial or other proceeding resulting from the report.
Reading these provisions together, we conclude that immunity may attach in two ways, either by showing that "reasonable cause" exists or by showing "good faith." Once a reporter has reasonable cause to suspect child abuse has occurred, she must report it or face criminal penalties. The trigger for the duty to report is "reasonable cause to believe," which requires an objective analysis. The relevant question is whether the information available at the time would lead a reasonable person in the position of the reporter to suspect abuse. Once reasonable cause has been established under this standard, a reporter complying with the statutory mandate to make a report is, by definition, operating in good faith. Therefore, if the objective analysis supports the reporter's conclusion that child abuse has occurred, then immunity attaches and there is no need to further examine the reporter's good faith.
On the other hand, if under an objective analysis, the information would not lead a reasonable person to suspect child abuse, the reporter may still have immunity if she made the report in good faith. Although we have not previously examined the meaning of good faith under this immunity provision, we held in Anderson v. Little & Davenport Funeral Home that good faith under another immunity statute is a subjective standard: " 'a state of mind indicating honesty and lawfulness of purpose; belief that one's conduct is not unconscionable or that known circumstances do not require further investigation.' " In Anderson, we were construing the predecessor to OCGA § 31-11-8, which protects licensed ambulance services from civil liability arising out of the provision of emergency care. A subjective standard is even more appropriate under the child abuse reporting statute because it, unlike OCGA § 31-11-8, imposes criminal penalties. Thus, the relevant question is whether the reporter honestly believed she had a duty to report. A reporter acting in good faith will be immune even if she is negligent or exercises bad judgment.
2. Having determined the proper legal analysis, we examine the summary judgment record de novo and in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. O'Heron's affidavit in support of the motion for summary judgment details her examination and interviews with each child, in which the children used anatomically descriptive dolls to demonstrate how Thomas Blaney touched their vaginal and anal areas using his hands, mouth, tongue, and penis. No evidence contradicts the testimony of O'Heron and the Fayette County detective that the children made specific allegations of sexual contact by their grandfather. Furthermore, the medical director of the Child Protection Program at Egleston Children's Hospital, with whom the Fayette County district attorney consulted, concluded that the sexually explicit nature of these allegations by such young children raised a concern about the possibility of abuse. We conclude that, as a matter of law, the children's allegations are sufficient to cause a reasonable person to suspect that child abuse has occurred. Therefore, the trial court correctly entered summary judgment for O'Heron and Emory.
3. The court of appeals confused the two separate aspects of immunity under the statute, superimposing a requirement of reasonableness on the good faith standard. Under the court of appeals standard, even if a reporter has reasonable cause to believe that child abuse has occurred, a jury question could still exist on the issue of bad faith. This interpretation chills the reporting requirement and fails to honor the legislative goal of protecting children by encouraging the reporting of suspected child abuse. It furthermore would require a mandatory reporter to make a detailed investigation before making a report. Such an investigation is contrary to the statutory scheme that places the job of investigation on child welfare authorities and the criminal justice system.
Judgment reversed.
All the Justices concur, except Sears, P. J, Benham and Carley, JJ., who dissent.
Blaney v. O'Heron, 256 Ga. App. 612 (568 SE2d 774) (2002).
1965 Ga. Laws 588, originally codified as Ga. Code Ann. § 74-111 (Harrison). The enactment of child abuse reporting statutes was a response to a 1962 article in the Journal of the American Medical Association that first identified child abuse as a medical condition and to a model statute proposed by the Children's Bureau of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare. See Caroline T. Trost, Chilling Child Abuse Reporting: Rethinking the CAPTA Amendments, 51 Vand. L. Rev. 183, 192 (1998).
1965 Ga. Laws 588.
See 1968 Ga. Laws 1196, 1973 Ga. Laws 309, 1974 Ga. Laws 438, 1977 Ga. Laws 242.
See 1974 Ga. Laws 438 (eliminating requirement of medical exam being made prior to report); 1980 Ga. Laws 921 (allowing photographs to be taken).
See, e.g., 1981 Ga. Laws 1034.
1974 Ga. Laws 438 (providing immunity for voluntary reporters).
1977 Ga. Laws 242.
OCGA § 19-7-5 (a).
OCGA § 19-7-5 (f).
OCGA § 19-7-5 (c) (1).
1976 Op. Att'y Gen. 76-131 (V).
See Warner v. Mitts, 536 NW2d 564, 566 (Mich. App. 1995).
242 Ga. 751, 753 (251 SE2d 250) (1978).
See also Rite Aid Corp. v. Hagley, 824 A2d 107 (Md. 2003) (good faith is subjective under immunity provisions of child abuse reporting statutes); S.G. v. City of Monroe, 843 So2d 657, 664 (La. App. 2d Cir. 2003) (same); Purdy v. Fleming, 655 NW2d 424, 432-433 (S.D. 2002); Garvis v. Scholten, 492 NW2d 402, 403 (Iowa 1992) (same).
Michaels v. Gordon, 211 Ga. App. 470, 473 (439 SE2d 722) (1993).
Youngblood v. Gwinnett Rockdale Newton Community Service Bd., 273 Ga. 715, 717-718 (4) (545 SE2d 875) (2001).
OCGA § 19-7-5 (a), (e).