Case Name: The People of the State of Illinois v. Charles L. Wilson and Andrew Shuman
Court: Illinois Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Illinois
Decision Date: 1872-09
Citations: 64 Ill. 195
Docket Number: 
Parties: The People of the State of Illinois v. Charles L. Wilson and Andrew Shuman.
Judges: 
Reporter: Illinois Reports
Volume: 64
Pages: 195–238

Head Matter:
NORTHERN GRAND DIVISION.
SEPTEMBER TERM, 1872.
The People of the State of Illinois v. Charles L. Wilson and Andrew Shuman.
1. Contempt—what constitutes—power of the court to punish therefor. Contempts are defined to be, direct, such as are offered in the presence of the court, while sitting judicially, or constructive, such, though not in its presence, as tend to obstruct and embarrass or prevent the due administration of justice.
3. According to the general doctrine, any publication, whether by parties or strangers, which concerns a case pending in court, and has a tendency to prejudice the public concerning its merits, and to corrupt the administration of justice, or which reflects on the tribunal or its proceed ings, or on the parties, the jurors, the witnesses or the counsel, may be visited as a contempt.
3. So where an article was published in a newspaper at a place remote from that at which the court was then being held, in reference to a case then pending, reflecting upon the action of the court therein, impeaching its integrity, and seeking to intimidate the court in respect to its action in the case, by a threat of popular clamor,'it was held: the publication was a contempt of court, and punishable as such by process of attachment.
4 The power to punish for contempts is an incident to all courts of justice, independent of statutory provisions. The statute which declares that the Supreme Court “ shall have power to punish contempts offered by any person to it while sitting,” merely affirms a pre-existent power, and does not attempt to restrict its exercise to contempts in the presence of the court; but leaves them to be determined by the principles of the common law.
5. And if the statute should be regarded as a limitation upon the power of the court to punish for any other contempts than those committed in its presence, yet in this power would necessarily be included all acts calculated to impede, embarrass or obstruct the court in the administration of justice. Such acts would be considered as done in the presence of the court.
6. Nor is it essential to the power to punish for a contempt in the publication of an article concerning the court and its supposed action respecting a pending case, that it should actually have-been impeded, embarrassed or obstructed in the administration of justice in the particular case, but it is enough that it was the object and tendency of the publication to produce such an effect.
7. Same—of the intent—disclaimer. Nor would it be accepted as a reason for discharging a rule to show cause, in such case, that’the respondent disclaimed, in his answer, any intentional disrespect to the court, or any design to embarrass the administration of justice. The meaning and intent of the respondent must be determined by a fair interpretation of the language used by him in the objectionable article.
8. The construction and tendency of a publication, as bearing upon its character asa contempt, are matter of law for the court.
9. Same—of a mere excuse—appearance in person. Where a party is under a rule to show cause why an attachment should not issue against him for a contempt, if he relies upon an excuse only he should appear in his own proper person. Not doing so, no mere excuse can be regarded as a cause for discharging the rule, but only as going to the question of punishment, in the event the court finds the absence of a legal justification in the return.
This was a proceeding in the name of The People, against Charles L. Wilson and Andrew Shuman, the publisher and editor of a newspaper published in the city of Chicago, called the “Chicago Evening Journal,” for an alleged contempt of this court, in the publishing in said newspaper, on the 16th day of October, 1872, during the sitting of said court, at the September term, 1872, thereof, of an article which appeared as an editorial in said newspaper, in reference to the case of Christopher Rafferty against The People, which was then pending, on writ of error, in this court. ,
The article referred to is set forth in the following information, presented to the court by the Attorney General, on the 23d day of October, 1872 :
“And now come the said People, by Washington Bushnell, Attorney General, and represent to the court that on the 16th day of October, A. D. 1872, there was, and still is, pending in this court, a certain cause for the adjudication and determination of this court, wherein one Christopher Rafferty is plaintiff in error and The People of the State of Illinois are defendants in error, and that, on the same day there was published in the city of Chicago, in said State, a certain daily newspaper called the Chicago Evening Journal, of which said paper on said day the said Charles L. Wilson was proprietor and the said Andrew Shuman was editor, and that said Charles L. Wilson and Andrew Shuman, on the said day, caused to be published in said paper, of and concerning said cause so pending in this court, and of and concerning this court and its supposed, action with reference to said cause, a certain article, in the words following, that is to say: ■
“ ‘The Case op Rafferty.’
“ ‘At the time a writ of supersedeas was granted in the case of the murderer Chris. Rafferty, the public was blandly assured that the matter would be examined into by the supreme court and decided at once; that possibly the hanging of this notorious human butcher would not be delayed for a single day. Time speeds away, however, and we hear of nothing definite being done. Rafferty’s counsel seems to be studying the policy of delay, and evidently with success. The riff-raff who contributed fourteen hundred dollars to demonstrate that ‘ hanging is played out,’ may now congratulate themselves on the success of their little game. Their money is operating splendidly. We have no hesitancy in prophesying clear through to the end just what will be done with Rafferty. He will be granted a new trial. He will be tried somewhere, within a year or two. He will be sentenced to imprisonment for life. Eventually, he will be pardoned out. And this in spite of all our public meetings, resolutions, committees, virtuous indignation and whatnot. And why? Because the sum of fourteen hundred dollars is enough nowadays to enable a man to purchase immunity from the consequences of any crime. If next winter’s session of the legislature does not hermetically seal up every chink and loophole through which murderers now escape, it will deserve the bitter censure of every honest man in Illinois. We must simplify our modes of procedure in murder trials. The criminal should be tried at once, and when found guilty, should be hanged at once, and the quicker hanged the better. The courts are now completely in the control of corrupt and mercenary shysters—the jackals of the legal profession—who feast and fatten on human blood spilled by the hands of other men. All this must be remedied. There can be found a remedy, and it must be found.’
“ Wherefore the said Attorney General, for and on behalf of the said People, moves this court for a tule upon the defendants, Charles L. Wilson and Andrew Shuman, to be and appear before this court, on a day to be named, and show cause, if any they or either of them have, why an attachment should not issue against them for a contempt of this court in respect to the publication of said article.
Washington Bushnell,
Attorney General.”
Afterwards, on the 25th day of the same month of October,, a rule was entered of record, requiring the said Charles L. Wilson and Andrew Shuman, on or before the coming in of the court on the first day of November next following, to show cause, if any they should have, why an attachment should not issue against them, for a contempt of this court, in the publishing of the article mentioned.
Accordingly, in obedience to such rule, On the said first day of November, there was filed in behalf of the respondent Wilson, the following answer:
“And now comes Charles L. Wilson, one of the above respondents, in obedience to the rule heretofore, to-wit: On the 25th day of October A. D. 1872, entered in said court, requiring this respondent and Andrew Shuman to show cause why an attachment should not issue against them, for a contempt of said court, on account of the matters and things in a certain information filed in said court, in said rule mentioned ; and in answer to the said rule, this respondent says, that he is the sole proprietor of the said newspaper, mentioned in the said information, called the Chicago Journal, and that the article set forth in said information was published therein on the 16th day of October, 1872, but this respondent says that neither before, nor at the time of the publication, had he any knowledge or information relative to the same. This respondent did not know, before said paper in which the article appeared,, was published, that said article, or any article upon the subject, was written, or to be written, or that any article upon the subject was to be published, and that he neither advised or counseled, nor was he advised or counseled with by any person whatever, relative to the publication of said article, or any article whatever upon the subject.
“ This respondent further says, that the first knowledge or information he had relative to said article, or its publication, was when he read the said article in said paper, after its publication and distribution.
“This respondent further says, that he is informed and believes that no disrespect was intended by said article to said court, or to any judge thereof, and that a fair construction thereof will not warrant an inference to that effect.
“ This respondent is advised and believes that the publication of said article was not designed, and had no tendency to impede, embarrass or obstruct the administration of justice in said court. And this respondent does, and will insist, that he had and still has the right, through his said paper, by himself or his agents, to examine the proceedings of any and every department of the government of this State ; and that he is not responsible for the truth of such publications, nor for' the motives with which they were or are made, by the summary process of an attachment for contempt, save when such publications impede, embarrass or obstruct the administration of justice.
“ This respondent further says, that' such has been the established law of this State for over thirty years past, and that said court has no judicial power to change the same.
“ This respondent takes this occasion to renew his repeated expressions of confidence in the ability and integrity of said court, and of the individual members of the same, and as evidence of the same gives the following article, which was published in said paper, issued on the 26th of September, 1872; that is to say:
‘“The Supreme Court of Illinois, although, perhaps too ready to grant motions for supersedeas, has no sympathy with criminals: The judges are all men infinitely above any such suspicion. It is their business to examine every case appealed to them, without any bias, one way or the other, taking note solely of the facts presented in each case. The question for the higher court to decide is this: Did the accused, from first to last, have a fair trial ? The presumption is that he did, and the rule is to grant a supersedeas only in case it is clear that he did not have a fair trial. While we cordially commend the zeal of the prosecuting attorney and of our courts in their efforts to check the appalling frequency of murders in this city and county, we suggest to them more caution in observing all the forms and technicalities of the law in the conduct of future murder trials. The supreme court will certainly continue to insist upon it, and. every supersedeas granted acts as a premium upon murder.’
“ This respondent further says, that at the time of the publication of said article, first mentioned, there was an intense excitement in the community, and particularly in the city of Chicago, on account of frequent murders, and the escape of the perpetrators thereof; and this respondent is informed and believes that the design of said article ivas to impress upon the community the importance of electing members of the next general assembly of this State, who would remedy the defects in the criminal law of the State, by which criminals are able to escape punishment, and not to' reflect upon the ability or integrity of said court, or any member thereof, nor to impede, embarrass or obstruct the administration of justice. Wherefore, this respondent prays that the said rule, as against him, may be discharged. Charles L. Wilson.”
“ Charles L. Wilson, being duly sworn, says he is one of the respondents named in the foregoing answer, and that the matters stated in said answer are true.
Charles L. Wilson.”
“Subscribed and sworn to before me this 29th day of October, 1872. Henry W; Farrar,
Notary Public.” .
And on the same first day of November, the following answer was filed in behalf of the respondent Shuman:
“ And now comes Andrew Shuman, one of the respondents, in obedience to the rule heretofore, to-wit: On the 25th day of October, 1872, entered in said court, requiring this respondent and Charles L. Wilson, to show cause why an attachment should not issue against them, for a contempt of said court, on account of the matters and things alleged, in a certain information filed in said court, in said rule mentioned, and in answer to the said rule, this respondent says, that he is managing editor of said newspaper, mentioned in the said information, called the Chicago Journal, and that the article set forth in said information, was published therein on the 16th day of October, 1872.
“But this respondent says that said article was not written by him, nor by his procurement or advice, but by an assistant editor of said newspaper. Which said article was submitted to this respondent for his examination, before the same was published, as are all articles prepared for publication in said paper. Upon the submission of said article to this respondent, he read the same, and allowed it to be published without dissent on his part, and without supposing that there was any thing in it disrespectful to, or in contempt of, said court, or of any of its judges or officers. The wording and expressions of said article were, as this respondent then believed and still believes, designed and intended to impress upon the public, and upon the next legislature of this State, the necessity of such a change in the laws regulating and governing the trial of persons accused or convicted of crime, as to ensure a more speedy and certain punishment, and that this was the only aim, purpose or intention of said article.
“This respondent further says, that a fair construction of said article, will not warrant an inference that any disrespect was intended by the same, to the said court, or any judge thereof. This respondent is advised and believes, that the publication of said article had no tendency to impede, embarrass or obstruct the administration of justice in said court; that it was not so designed, and had not that tendency. And this respondent does, and will insist, that he had and still has the right, as managing editor of said paper, to examine the proceedings of any and every department of the government of this State, and that he is not responsible for the truth of such publications, nor for the motives with which they' were or are made, by the summary process of an attachment for contempt, save when such publications impede, embarrass or obstruct the administration of justice.
“This respondent further says, that such has been the established law of this State' for over thirty years past, and that said court has no judicial power to change the same.
“ This respondent takes this occasion to renew his repeated expressions of confidence in the ability and integrity of said court, and. of the individual members of the same, and as evidence thereof, gives the following article, which was published under his supervision, in said paper, issued on the 26th day of September, 1872, that is to say :
‘“The Supreme Court of Illinois, although, perhaps, too ready to grant motions for supersedeas, has no sympathy with criminals. The judges are all men infinitely above such suspicion. It is their business to examine every case appealed to them, without any bias, one way or the other, taking note solely of the facts presented in each case. The question for the higher court to decide is this: Did the accused, from first to last, have a fair trial? The presumption is that he did, and the rule is to grant a supersedeas only in case it is clear that he did not have a fair trial. While we cordially commend the zeal of the prosecuting attorney and of our courts, in their efforts to check the appalling frequency • of murders in this city and county, we suggest to them more caution in observing all the forms and technicalities of the law in the-conduct of future murder trials. The supreme court will certainly continue to insist upon it, and every supersedeas granted acts as a premium upon murder.’
“ This respondent further says, that at the time of the publication of said article, first mentioned, there was an intense excitement in the community, and particularly in the city of Chicago, on account of frequent murders, and the escape of the perpetrators thereof, and this respondent is informed, and believes, and so he understood at the time, that the design of said article was to impress upon the community the importance of electing members to the next general assembly of this State, who would remedy the defects in the criminal laws thereof, by which criminals are able to escape punishment, and not to reflect on the ability or integrity of said court, or any member thereof, nor to impede, embarrass or obstruct the administration of justice.”
“ Wherefore, this respondent prays that said rule, as against him, may be discharged. Andrew Shuman.”
“Andrew Shuman, being duly sworn, says he is one of the respondents named in the foregoing answer, and that the matters stated in said answer are true.
Andrew Shuman.”
“ Subscribed and sworn to before me this 31st day of October, 1872. , Cyrus J. Corse,
Notary Public.”'
Mr. Washington Bushnell, Attorney General, for the people:
I desire in this case respectfully to call the attention of the court to the following authorities, which in my judgment are conclusive upon the question of the power of this court to issue a writ of attachment against the respondents, for the publication of the matters and things contained in the information herein filed.
It is a contempt, punishable by attachment, to publish remarks in a newspaper, which have a tendency to prejudice the public with respect to the merits of a cause depending in court, and to corrupt the administration of justice. 4 Black. Com. 286 ; Ex parte Biggs, 54 North Car. 202; ib. 398; 1 Dall. 319.
A publication pending a suit, reflecting on the court, the parties to the suit, the witnesses, the jurors or the counsel, is a contempt of court. Hollingsworth v. Duane, Wallace, 77, 102; Bronson’s case, 12 Johns. 460; 4 Black. Com. 286.
The publication of a paper to prejudice the public mind in a cause depending, is a contempt, if it manifestly refer to the suit, though it do not expressly appear on the face of the writing. Respublica v. Passmore, 3 Yates, 438.
Denying any criminal or disrespectful design, in publications reflecting on the proceedings before the court, will not justify the party, if they appear to the court to amount to a contempt. People v. Freer, 1 Caines, 485, 518.
The provision in the Constitution of the United States, that the trial of all crimes shall be by jury,does not take away the right of courts to punish contempt in a summary manner. The provision is to be construed to relate only to those crimes ■which by our former laws and customs had been tried by a jury. Hollingsworth v. Duane, Wallace, 77, 106.
The House of Representatives of the United States may punish persons not members thereof for contempt. Anderson v. Dunn, 6 Wheat. 204.
This power is incident to all legislative bodies, and extends to the imprisonment of the party for a period not beyond the adjournment or periodical dissolution of such bodies. Ib.
This power is also incident to courts of law and equity. Mariner v. Dyer, 2 Greenleaf, 165; State v. White, Charlt. 136; Yates v. Lansing, 9 Johns. 395; 6 Johns. 337 ; 4 Johns. 316; Trial of Smith & Ogden, 73; State v. Tipton, 1 Blackf. 166.; 1st Burr’s Trial, 352; Clark v. People, 1 Breese, 266; 8 Conn. 379; United States v. Hudson, 7 Cranch 32; see 1 Kent’s Com. 3d ed. 300 (note B).
See also the case of State v. Matthews, 37 New Ham. 453, and authorities there quoted.
In the celebrated case of The Commonwealth v. John Danbridge, 2 Vir. Cases, 414, the court say: “ They can not but feel it a delicate task to define and decide upon the extent of their own powers, nor be ignorant that the judgment they are called upon to render may expose them, on the one hand, to the imputation of timidity and irresolution, or on the other, to that of usurpation and tyranny. The verity of these suspicions would not be more unworthy of the judges than the fact of their shrinking from this question because of the consequences in which themselves might be involved in it. * * * In this country .we know of no privileges but such as exist for the public good.' Many such privileges we have, from those which appertain to the legislature itself down to such as belong to the lowest executive officer. Those which surround the administration of justice, belong to the same order. Courts, their officers and process, are shielded from invasion and insult, not from any imaginary sanctity in the institutions themselves or th,e persons of those who compose them (as in the political and ecclesiastical establishments of another hemisphere), but solely for the purpose of giving them their due weight and authority, and to enable those who admister them to discharge their functions with impartiality, fidelity and effect.
“This is the true test of every privilege not granted by statute, and is the spirit of every one (not merely private) which is so secured. The political character of the judiciary, and the tendency of the duties which are devolved upon it, have rendered it necessary to invest it with a considerable, share of these privileges. •
' “It is confessedly the weakest branch of all governments, wielding neither wealth, force nor patronage. Its duties consist in adjusting and settling the contested rights of individuals, in controling their turbulence and punishing their crimes. These duties are often of a severe and rigorous character, and they are generally to be discharged in almost immediate contact with those on whom they act. Their exercise will frequently elicit the angry passions, or excite unworthy and sinister attempts to bias or avert their operation, and where there is little real power and no patronage, a certain degree of external dignity may have been considered necessary to supersede a too frequent resort to the actual powers of the courts.”
In 4 Blackstone, 283, that writer says: “ The contempts that are thus punished are either direct, which openly insult or resist the powers of the courts, or the persons of the judges who preside, etc.;” and on page 285, in enumerating the con-tempts which degrade the judicial authority, he refers to one which consists “ in speaking or writing contemptuously of the court or judges acting in their judicial capacity.”
■ If the matters complained of arise at a distance, of which the court can not have so perfect a knowledge, unless by the confession of the party or the testimony of others, it will in its discretion award the proper process to bring the party before it, of which process of attachment is one. 2 Vir. Cases, p. 436.
That to scandalize a court by speaking or writing, either in its presence or absence, is a high contempt. Let the judges of a court be proclaimed in public print as corrupt cowards, when acting in their judicial capacity, and how long will it be before such judges, and the courts held by them will be covered with opprobrium and contempt ? Ib. 436.
It is a high contempt, punishable as aforesaid, to publish, by speaking or writing, anything during the pendency of a particular cause in any such court, by which an imputation is cast upon the judges, or any one of the judges, as to their purity, impartiality or integrity as respects that cause. Commonwealth v. Danbridge, 2 Vir. Cases, 436; 2 Atkyns; Oswold’s case, and the case of The King v. Barler, Strange, 444.
I do not desire to enter upon an extended argument upon the merits of this application for a writ of attachment, and therefore content myself by referring this honorable court to the above authorities.
Messrs. Beckwith, Ayee & Kales, for the respondents.

Opinion:
Me. Chief Justice Laweence
delivered the opinion of the Court:
The respondents, Charles L. Wilson and Andrew Shuman, have been placed under a rule to show cause why an attachment should not issue against them for contempt. The information filed by the Attorney General, upon which the rule was made, sets forth that one of the respondents is the proprietor, and the other the chief editor, of a newspaper published in the city of Chicago, called The Chicago Evening Journal, and presented as a ground for this proceeding, an editorial article published in that paper on the 16th day of October. The article was set out at length in the information. It is entitled " The case of Rafferty." Rafferty had recently been tried for murder, in Cook county, found guilty and sentenced to death. A writ of error, staying the execution of the sentence until the further order of this court, had been granted, and this writ of error was pending and undetermined before us at the date of the publication. The article published is as follows:
"The Case op Raffeety."
" At the time a writ of supersedeas was granted in the case of the murderer Chris. Rafferty, the public was blandly assured that the matter would be examined into by the Supreme Court and decided at once—that possibly the hanging of this notorious human butcher would not be delayed for a single day. Time speeds away, however, and we hear of nothing definite being done. Rafferty's counsel seems to be studying the policy of delay, and evidently with success. The riff-raff who contributed fourteen hundred dollars to demonstrate that ' hanging is played out,' may now congratulate themselves on the success of their little game. Their money is operating splendidly. We have no hesitancy in prophesying clear through to the end just what will be done with Rafferty. He will be granted a new trial. He will be tried somewhere, within a year or two. He will be sentenced to imprisonment for life. Eventually he will be pardoned out. And this, in spite of all our public meetings, resolutions, committees, virtuous indignation, and what not. And why? Because the sum of fourteen hundred dollars is enough nowadays to enable A man to purchase immunity from the consequences of any crime.
" If next winter's session of the legislature does not hermetically seal up every chink and loophole through which murderers now escape, it will deserve the bitter censure of every honest man in Illinois. We must simplify our mode of procedure in murder trials. The criminal should be tried at once, and "when found guilty, should be hanged at once,—and the quicker hanged the better. The courts are now completely in the control of corrupt and mercenary shysters,—the jackals of the legal profession,—who feast and fatten on human blood spilled by the hands of other men. All this must be remedied. There cari be found a remedy, and it must be found."
To the rule granted upon the motion of the Attorney General, the respondents have severally answered under oath. They have declined to argue the case, either orally or in writing, though opportunity has been allowed for that purpose.
The respondent Wilson admits, in his answer, that he is the proprietor of the newspaper, but denies all knowledge of the article prior to its publication. While this fact should influence the degree of the punishment to which he may be liable, it does not exonerate him from responsibility. The respondent Shuman admits he is the editor in chief. He denies the authorship of the article, but says he read it before its publication, and permitted it to be published. Both respondents disavow any intentional disrespect to the court, or any design to embarrass the administration of justice, and insist that they have the right to examine the proceedings of eve^y department of the government of this State, and that they are not responsible, in a proceeding of this character, for the truth of their publications, or for the motives with which they may be made, "save when such publications impede, embarrass or obstruct the administration of justice."
They state, under the solemnities of an oath, as a fact within their personal knowledge, that " such has been the established law of this State fo.r over thirty years past, and that said court has no judicial power to change the same." Such a sworn statement, as to the law of contempt applicable to newspaper publications, is somewhat, remarkable. If we give to the saving clause, in their answers, the interpretation 'which it was possibly designed to bear, the statement may be accepted not merely as a truth, but as a truism. The only ground for pronouncing any act or publication a contempt of court, is, that it tends in its final results to ."impede, embarrass or obstruct the administration of justice." If, on the other hand, the respondents designed to say, or to be understood as saying, that they are privileged to make any publications concerning proceedings in court, however false, to assail the integrity of the court, or to endeavor to inflame popular passion concerning cases pending before it, and not be liable to attachment for contempt, unless it appears that the publication complained of really has the actual and visible effect of impeding, embarrassing or obstructing the administration of justice, in a manner susceptible of proof as an accomplished fact,—if the answers are to be understood in this, sense, it is to be regretted that the respondents were not better advised as to the law, before swearing what the law is.
The revised code of 1845, in speaking of the Supreme Court, contains the following provision : " The said court shall have power to punish contempts offered by any person to it while sitting." This act has never been repealed or modified.
In the case of Stuart v. The People, 3 Scam. 405, decided in 1842, a similar provision in the statute of 1829, in regard to circuit courts, came before this court for construction. The court, after saying that the statute might, with great propriety, be regarded as a limitation upon the power of the court to punish for any other contempts than those committed in its presence, add .the following most significant and important qualification : " In this power would necessarily be included all acts caleulated to impede, embarrass or obstruct the court in the administration of justice. Such acts would be considered as done in the presence of the court."
The respondents evidently had this case before them when their answers were drawn. They use its language, with the exception of a most material word, which changes the meaning of the entire sentence. The respondents say the rule is, that publications are a contempt only when they impede, embarrass or obstruct the administration of justice. The rule laid down by this court was, that they are a contempt when they are calculated to have that effect. The difference is radical, and marks precisely the difference between the guilt or innocence of the respondents in this case. They swear to a rule which would require us to say that we have actually been impeded, embarrassed or obstructed in the administration of justice, before we can hold the respondents guiity of contempt. The true test is, not whether the court has been weak or base enough to be actually influenced by a publication, but whether it was the object and tendency of the publication to produce such an effect.
It need hardly be said that we can not accept, as a reason for discharging the rule, the disclaimer in the answers of any intentional disrespect or any design to embarrass the administration of justice. The meaning and intent of the respondents must be determined by a fair interpretation of the language they have used. They can not now escape responsibility by claiming that their words did not mean what any reader must have understood them as meaning.
No candid man can deny that the article in question was well calculated to make upon the public mind the impression that the court, in a pending case, was influenced by money in its judicial action, and that it could be so influenced in other cases. Neither can it be denied that the article seeks to intimidate the court as to the judgment to be pronounced in a case then pending and involving the life or death of a human being. The article declares that the money raised for Rafferty "is operating splendidly;" predicts that he will be granted a new trial, and avers that " the sum of fourteen hundred dollars is enough nowadays to enable a man to purchase immunity from the consequences of any crime," and that "the courts are now completely in the control of corrupt and mercenary shysters—the jackals of the legal profession." This language will bear but one interpretation.
I shall not stop to cite and discuss the authorities bearing on the law of contempt, as that labor has been performed by another -member of the court. I merely quote the rule as laid down by Bishop, an American writer, in his work on Criminal Law, section 216. He uses the following language: " According to the general doctrine, any publication, whether by parties or strangers, which concerns a case pending in court, and has a tendency to prejudice the public concerning its merits, and to corrupt the administration of justice, or which reflects on the tribunal or its proceedings, or on the parties, the jurors, the witnesses or the counsel, may be visited as a contempt."
Whether tested by this common law definition or by the rule laid down by this court in the case of Stuart, already cited, there is no room for doubt that the article in question must be held a contempt of flagrant character. It related to a case in court involving in its final issues a human life. The answers of the respondents state that at the time of the publication " there was an intense excitement in the community, and particularly in the city of Chicago, on account of frequent murders, and the escape of the perpetrators thereof." This is no doubt true, and this article seems to have been studiously written, with a view to direct popular clamor against this court, and compel it either to affirm the judgment sending Rafferty to execution, or incur the imputation of bribery, and the clamor of an angry city to be echoed throughout the State by a portion of the Chica'go press. The demand was not that we should calmly examine the record of Rafferty's trial to see whether his conviction had been legal, but that we should give him over to execution, because there was such impunity for crime in the- city of Chicago that it was neoessary some man should be immediately hung; We have since examined the record of this man's conviction, and reversed the judgment, all the members of the court holding that a plain provision of the statute had been violated on his trial.
Let us say here, and so plainly that our position can be misrepresented only by malice or gross stupidity, that we do not deprecate, nor should we claim the right to punish, any criticism the press may choose to publish upon our decisions, opinions or official conduct in regard to cases that have passed from our .jurisdiction, so long as our action is correctly stated, and our official integrity is not impeached. The respondents are correct in saying in' their answers that they have a right to .examine the proceedings of any.and every department of the government.
Far be it from us to deny that right. Such freedom of the press is indispensable to the preservation of the freedom of the people. But certainly neither these respondents nor any intelligent person connected with the press, and having a just idea of its. responsibilities as well'as its powers, will claim' that it may seek to control the administration of justice or' influence the decision of pending causes.
A court will, of course, endeavor to remain wholly uninfluenced by publications like that under consideration, but will the community believe that it is able to do so? Can it even be certain in regard to itself? Can men always be sure of their mental poise? A timid man might be influenced to yield, while a combative man would be driven in the opposite direction. Whether the actual influence is on one side or the other, so far as it is felt at all, it becomes dangerous to the administration of justice'. Even if a court is. happily composed of judges of such firm and equal temper that they remain wholly uninfluenced in either direction, nevertheless a disturbing element has been thrown into the council chamber,' which it is the wise policy of the law to exclude.
Begard it in whatever light we may, we can riot but consider the article in question as calculated to embarrass the administration of justice, whether it has in fact done so or not, and, therefore, as falling dmectly within the definition of punishable contempts, announced by this court in the case of Stuart v. The People. It is a contempt, because, in a pending ease of the gravest magnitude, it reflects upon the action of the court, impeaches its integrity, and seeks to intimidate it by the threat of popular clamor.
It may be said that, as long as the court was conscious it had not been frightened from its propriety by the article in question, the wiser course would have been to pass it by in silence.
So far as we are personally concerned, we should' have preferred to do so. We desire no controversy with the press. But a majority of the court were of opinion that, this publication could not be disregarded without infidelity to our duty. By our relations to the bar, to the suitors in our'court, to the entire judiciary of the State, and to the State itself, we felt constrained to call the persons responsible for this publication to account.
It may further be said, that this articlé could do no permanent injury to a court strong in the consciousness of its own integrity, and in the confidence reposed in it by the people, and, therefore, the publication was unworthy of notice. It is quite true that a solitary paragraph, under ordinary circumstances, would have probably been innocuous. It is to be observed, however, that the answers of the respondents speak of the existing excitement in Chicago in regard to unpunished crime, and in that state of the public mind there was great probability that this article would win a ready credence if permitted to go unchallenged. Public meetings had been held, committees had been appointed to aid in the suppression of crime. The papers of Chicago, circulating throughout the State and the north west, had called attention to this subject. It was made a frequent topic of discussion in the public prints, and when, finally, this article appeared, in a paper of noted sobriety and respectability, containing charges and imputations against this court, which were simply infamous, the majority of the court felt that it was necessary for the good name of the State, within and without its borders, and necessary in order to preserve the confidence of the people wholly unshaken in this court, to request the Attorney General to move for a rule against these respondents. The majority of the court still think they have acted wisely. We have been controlled by no feeling of personal malignity, and do not propose to inflict a severe punishment. We wish to eall the attention of the press to the limits which circumscribe their comments on judicial proceedings, and to remind them of the obligations imposed upon them by the great power which they confessedly wield. Especially do we desire to keep the judicial reputation of the State free from the appearance of dishonor, and to prevent the growth of that distrust in the minds of our own people that would certainly follow the circulation of articles like the one under consideration, if permitted to go unrebuked.
The loss of public confidence in our integrity would be a calamity little less than the loss of official integrity itself. The pomp and circumstance which in England aid to clothe the courts and the law with' dignity and power, are not in consonance with our republican form of government. In this country the power of the judiciary rests upon the faith of the people in its integrity and intelligence. Take away this faith and the moral influence of the courts is gone and popular respect for law impaired. Law with us is an abstraction. It is personified in the courts as its ministers, but its efficacy depends upon the moral convictions of the people. When confidence in the courts is gone, respect for the law itself will speedily disappear, and society will become the prey of fraud, violence and crime.
The one element in government and society which the American people desire, above all things else, to keep free from the taint of suspicion, is the administration of justice in the courts. So long as this is kept pure, a community may undergo extreme misgovernment and still prosper. But when these tribunals have become corrupt, and public confidence in them is destroyed, the last calamity has come upon a people, and the object of its social organization has failed. The protection of life, liberty and property is the final aim of all government. This is accomplished by an honest administration of just laws. The people, by their representatives, may be relied upon to pass such laws, but unless they are honestly administered, neither life, liberty nor property enjoys the security which it is the object of government and society to give. If the time shall unhappily ever come when the judiciary of this State has become hopelessly corrupt and justice is bought and sold, the loss of its moral and material well-being will as certainly follow as the night follows the day.
We are glad to say, that for more than half a century the judiciary of this State has not only enjoyed the confidence of the people, but also has received the support of the press. Never before, so far as the members of this court are aware, has the integrity of this tribunal been assailed by a public journal. The respectability of the paper in which the article in question has appeared, and the circumstances surrounding its publication, Have given it a gravity which a casual article of like import would not possess. We have personally felt great reluctance to taking notice of the publication, but our consciousness of the mischief that may be done in embarrassing the administration of justice, and impairing the moral autnority of the judiciary throughout the State, if this article is to stand as an unpunished precedent, has compelled us to issue the rule, and now compels us to order an attachment.
It is the judgment of a majority of the court that an attachment issue against Charles L. Wilson and Andrew Shuman, returnable forthwith.
, Walker, J. I am also of the opinion that a writ of attachment should issue in this case.