Case Name: In the Matter of Helisse Palmore et al., Appellants, v. Board of Education of Hempstead Union Free School District et al., Respondents
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 2016-12-30
Citations: 145 A.D.3d 1072
Docket Number: 
Parties: In the Matter of Helisse Palmore et al., Appellants, v Board of Education of Hempstead Union Free School District et al., Respondents.
Judges: Chambers, J.P., Miller and Brathwaite Nelson, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Appellate Division Reports
Volume: 145
Pages: 1072–1081

Head Matter:
In the Matter of Helisse Palmore et al., Appellants, v Board of Education of Hempstead Union Free School District et al., Respondents.
[44 NYS3d 509]

Opinion:
In a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 to review three determinations of the respondent Board of Education of the Hempstead Union Free School District dated June 19, 2014, terminating the petitioners' probationary employment as school principals, the petitioners appeal from so much of an order and judgment (one paper) of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Janowitz, J.), entered April 28, 2015, as granted that branch of the respondents' motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) to dismiss the petition, denied the petition, and dismissed the proceeding.
Ordered that the order and judgment is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.
The petitioners commenced this proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 to review three determinations of the respondent Board of Education of the Hempstead Union Free School District dated June 19, 2014, terminating their probationary employment as principals with the Hempstead Union Free School District. The petitioners appeal from so much of an order and judgment (one paper) of the Supreme Court, entered April 28, 2015, as granted that branch of the respondents' motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) to dismiss the petition, denied the petition, and dismissed the proceeding. We affirm.
On a motion to dismiss a petition pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (1), the movant has the burden of providing documentary evidence that utterly refutes the petitioner's factual allegations, "conclusively establishing a defense as a matter of law" (Matter of Nassau Community Coll. Fedn. of Teachers, Local 3150 v Nassau Community Coll., 127 AD3d 865, 866 [2015] [internal quotation marks omitted]). "On a motion to dismiss a pleading pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the factual allegations in the pleading must be deemed true, and the petitioner must be afforded the benefit of every favorable inference" (Matter of Better World Real Estate Group v New York City Dept. of Fin., 122 AD3d 27, 36 [2014]). "When evidentiary material outside the pleading's four corners is considered, and the motion is not converted into one for summary judgment, the question becomes whether the pleader has a cause of action, not whether the pleader has stated one and, unless it has been shown that a material fact as claimed by the pleader is not a fact at all, and unless it can be said that no significant dispute exists regarding it, dismissal should not eventuate" (Matter of Clavin v Mitchell, 131 AD3d 612, 614 [2015]). "As a general rule, one who objects to the act of an administrative agency must exhaust available administrative remedies before being permitted to litigate in a court of law" (Matter of Sybalski v Delaney, 140 AD3d 776, 777 [2016] [internal quotation marks omitted]).
A board of education has the right to terminate the employment of a probationary teacher or principal at any time and for any reason, unless the teacher or principal "establishes that the termination was for a constitutionally impermissible purpose, violative of a statute, or done in bad faith" (Matter of Frasier v Board of Educ. of City School Dist. of City of N.Y., 71 NY2d 763, 765 [1988]; see Education Law § 2573 [1]; 3012 [1]; Sweeny v Millbrook Cent. Sch. Dist., 130 AD3d 1011, 1012 [2015]; Matter of Johnson v New York City Dept. of Educ., 73 AD3d 927, 927 [2010]). Here, the evidence submitted by the respondents conclusively established that the terminations of the probationary employment of the petitioners were based on "ineffective" ratings that the petitioners had received on their annual professional performance reviews, and were not for a constitutionally impermissible purpose, violative of a statute, or done in bad faith (see Matter of Johnson v Katz, 68 NY2d 649, 650 [1986]; Matter of Zarinfar v Board of Educ. of the City School Dist. of the City of N.Y., 93 AD3d 466, 467 [2012]; Rivers v Board of Educ. of City School Dist. of City of N.Y., 66 AD3d 410, 411 [2009]). To the extent that the petitioners are challenging the ratings they received on their reviews, the evidence conclusively demonstrates that the petitioners have failed to exhaust their administrative remedies, as they failed to avail themselves of an appeals procedure established pursuant to Education Law § 3012-c (5) (a) (see Matter of Sybalski v Delaney, 140 AD3d at 777; SC v Monroe Woodbury Cent. Sch. Dist., 136 AD3d 650, 651 [2016]).
Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly granted that branch of the respondents' motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) to dismiss the petition, denied the petition, and dismissed the proceeding.
The respondents' remaining contention is without merit.
Chambers, J.P., Miller and Brathwaite Nelson, JJ., concur.