Case Name: ALL ABOUT CRUISES, INC., and Sheryl Myman a/k/a Sheryl Myman-Miller, Petitioners, v. CRUISE OPTIONS, INC., Respondent
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 2004-12-08
Citations: 889 So. 2d 905
Docket Number: No. 4D04-3107
Parties: ALL ABOUT CRUISES, INC., and Sheryl Myman a/k/a Sheryl Myman-Miller, Petitioners, v. CRUISE OPTIONS, INC., Respondent.
Judges: GROSS and HAZOURI, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 889
Pages: 905–910

Head Matter:
ALL ABOUT CRUISES, INC., and Sheryl Myman a/k/a Sheryl Myman-Miller, Petitioners, v. CRUISE OPTIONS, INC., Respondent.
No. 4D04-3107.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
Dec. 8, 2004.
Rehearing Denied Jan. 10, 2005.
Michael W. Moskowitz and Ari J. Glazer of Moskowitz, Mandell, Salim & Simowitz, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, for petitioners.
Richard A. Asselta and Nanci S. Landy of Landy & Asselta, P.A., N. Miami Beach, for respondent.

Opinion:
PER CURIAM.
Petitioners, All About Cruises, Inc. ("AAC") and Sheryl Myman-Miller, seek certiorari review of an order compelling discovery. We deny the petition.
Cruise Options, Inc. is a travel agency. It sued petitioners in connection with a contract whereby AAC would work as an independent contractor booking cruises. In return, Cruise Options would receive a percentage of the commissions AAC was paid by the cruise lines.
Cruise Options alleged that AAC failed to pay its contractual commissions. Petitioner Sheryl Myman-Miller is the owner of AAC.
Cruise Options alleged that throughout the time period of the contract, Myman disregarded the corporate entity of AAC by failing to hold shareholder's meetings, failing to hold board of director's meetings, failing to maintain the corporate books and records, using corporate funds to pay personal expenses, and "intermingling" her personal funds with that of the corporation.
Cruise Options alleged that instead of paying it the commissions owed, AAC and its "alter ego" Myman, fraudulently converted the money from the corporate account and used that money to pay personal expenses such as her divorce lawyer, her jewelry expenses, as well as her liposuction surgery.
The complaint details causes of action for breach of contract, an equitable accounting, and to "pierce the corporate veil."
The petition challenges three discovery requests. The trial court granted Cruise Options' motion to compel with certain restrictions.
Certiorari review lies to review a challenge to production as protected by privilege or work product. The reasoning is that such is the kind of information that "may reasonably cause material injury of an irreparable nature." Allstate Ins. Co. v. Langston, 655 So.2d 91, 94 (Fla.1995) (quoting Martin-Johnson, Inc. v. Savage, 509 So.2d 1097, 1100 (Fla.1987)); Bared & Co. v. McGuire, 670 So.2d 158 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996). Nonetheless, and applicable to request #7, this court generally will not exercise its certiorari review where the objection is that the requested production is vague, overbroad, and irrelevant. Eberhardt v. Eberhardt, 666 So.2d 1024, 1025 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996) (dismissing petition seeking to quash order requiring production of income tax returns in case involving claims for accounting, fraud, breach of contract, constructive trusts, and rescission of a deed); cf. Woodward v. Berkery, 714 So.2d 1027 (Fla. 4th DCA), rev. denied, 717 So.2d 528 (Fla.1998) (broad financial discovery order quashed where discovery was sought to embarrass and bring undue pressure on litigant through unwarranted publicity of sensitive personal information).
Request # 6 involves Myman's billing statements and invoices from her divorce lawyer. Though this claim potentially implicates Myman's attorney-client privilege with her divorce lawyer, Myman is permitted to redact any descriptions of "legal services rendered which would reveal the mental impressions and opinions of coim-sel."
The remaining point concerns Cruise Options' request seeking all personal checking account information of Myman, including all cancelled checks from 1997 to the present. The trial court limited this production to a specific time frame. As set forth above, the complaint alleges a count seeking to pierce the corporate veil.
This point is controlled by the cases of Friedman v. Heart Institute of Port St. Lucie, Inc., 863 So.2d 189, 194 (Fla.2003), and In re Estate of Sauey, 869 So.2d 664 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004). Sauey involved probate litigation. The decedent's surviving spouse petitioned for the removal of the co-personal representatives, claiming that they had financial interests that conflicted with their obligations as personal representatives.
An order was issued compelling production to the surviving spouse of financial information from the personal representatives. Sauey, 869 So.2d at 665. Citing the supreme court's decision in Friedman, 863 So.2d at 194, we stated: "[W]here materials sought by a party 'would appear to be relevant to the subject matter of the pending action,' the information is fully discoverable." Sauey, 869 So.2d at 665. Further, we commented that "[t]he order compelling production of relevant financial information cannot be the object of a writ of certiorari because there is no irreparable harm." Id. (citing Eberhardt, 666 So.2d at 1025) (emphasis added).
In Friedman, the claims involved breach of an employment agreement and a violation of the Florida Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (FUFTA). The allegation was that Dr. Friedman fraudulently transferred the proceeds from the sale of his home to his fiancée, .also a party, to divest himself of assets. Friedman, 863 So.2d at 191.
' Resolving conflict on this point, the supreme court held that the FUFTA claim was not premature. Id. at 193. Turning to the related discovery issue, concerning the disclosure of personal financial information, Friedman acknowledged that the disclosure of personal financial information may cause irreparable harm to a person forced to disclose it in a case in which the information is not relevant. Id. at 194 (citing Straub v. Matte, 805 So.2d 99, 100 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002)).
Nonetheless, this was a matter of discretion for the trial court. Friedman. To facilitate its exercise of discretion, the trial court "may" conduct an in camera inspection or may require the proponent of the claim to post bond. Friedman, 863 So.2d at 194.
Neither is required though, and we note that the supreme court commented that it saw no "need to limit this discretion with specific rules or formulas...." Id. at 195. Having reviewed Cruise Options' allegations and the above outlined authority, we find that the trial court's order does not depart from the essential requirements of law warranting extraordinary review. Bared & Co. v. McGuire, 670 So.2d 153 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996).
GROSS and HAZOURI, JJ., concur.
FARMER, C.J., concurs specially with opinion.
. Request #7 concerns various corporate financial records, such as accounts receivable and payable.
. Friedman quoted Epstein v. Epstein, 519 So.2d 1042, 1043 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988).