Case Name: The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Petitioner, v. Gerald M. ANDREWS, Respondent
Court: Colorado Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Colorado
Decision Date: 1994-04-04
Citations: 871 P.2d 1199
Docket Number: No. 93SC46
Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Petitioner, v. Gerald M. ANDREWS, Respondent.
Judges: VOLLACK, J., dissents, and ROVIRA, C.J., and ERICKSON, J., join in the dissent.
Reporter: Pacific Reporter 2d
Volume: 871
Pages: 1199–1206

Head Matter:
The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Petitioner, v. Gerald M. ANDREWS, Respondent.
No. 93SC46.
Supreme Court of Colorado, En Banc.
April 4, 1994.
Gale A. Norton, Atty. Gen., Timothy M. Tymkovich, Sol. Gen., John Daniel Dailey, Deputy Atty. Gen., Robert Mark Russell, First Asst. Atty. Gen., Amy W. Naes, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., Denver, for petitioner.
David F. Vela, State Public Defender, Samuel Santistevan, Deputy State Public Defender, Denver, for respondent.

Opinion:
Justice SCOTT
delivered the Opinion of the Court.
We granted certiorari to review the decision of the court of appeals in People v. Andrews, 855 P.2d 3 (Colo.App.1992). The court of appeals held that the sentencing enhancement provision in section 18-1-105(9)(a)(V), 8B C.R.S. (1986 and 1992 Supp.) does not apply to the felony of escape, and thus vacated the defendant's enhanced sentence and remanded to the trial court for resentencing. We affirm.
I
In March of 1989, Gerald M. Andrews was committed to the custody of the Department of Corrections to serve concurrent sentences of four and six years for cultivation of marijuana and second-degree burglary, respectively. In May of 1990, Andrews was transferred to a community corrections facility, Alpha Center, Inc. (Alpha). During the morning of July 2,1990, Alpha staff members were unable to locate Andrews and reported him missing. More than two weeks later, on July 19, Arvada police officers apprehended Andrews and placed him in the Jefferson County Jail. The next morning, July 20, 1990, Andrews was taken to the Denver Parole Office for processing. While his parole officer was completing the necessary paperwork, Andrews bolted from the office and again escaped. However, unlike his earlier escape during which he was at large for several days, this time he was immediately apprehended in a nearby parking lot.
For his first escape, Andrews was charged with class 3 felony escape, pursuant to section 18-8-208(2), 8B C.R.S. (1986) (escape while in custody or confinement following conviction of a felony other than a class 1 or class 2 felony). For his second escape, Andrews was charged with class 4 felony escape, under section 18-8-208(3) (escape while in custody and held for but not convicted of a felony).
In October of 1990, Andrews and the People entered into a plea agreement. Under the terms of the agreement, Andrews pleaded guilty to two counts of class 5 felony attempted escape pursuant to section 18-8-208.1(2), 8B C.R.S. (1986) (attempt to escape "while in custody or confinement and held for or charged with but not convicted of a felony"). In exchange for his guilty pleas, the original escape charges were dropped. At sentencing, however, the district attorney argued that pursuant to the sentence enhancement provision in section 18-l-105(9)(a)(V), 8B C.R.S. (1986 and 1992 Supp.) (commission of a felony while "under confinement . as a convicted felon, or an escapee from any correctional institution for another felony"), an aggravated sentence should be imposed for Andrews' second escape because he was still considered an "escapee," due to the first escape, at the time he committed the second escape. The trial court agreed, finding that "the law is such that [case number] 1920 is a mandatorily aggravated circumstance due to the double escape situation.... I don't think by law I can avoid the mandatory aggravator in [case number] 1920." Thus, utilizing this "double escape" rationale, the trial court imposed a sentence of two and one-half years for the second escape to run consecutive to a one-year sentence imposed for the first escape, both sentences to run consecutive to Andrews' prior sentences. After imposing the sentence, the trial court stated that but for the mandatory aggravated sentence it would have sentenced Andrews to less than two and one-half years in the second escape.
On appeal, Andrews contested the trial court's imposition of an aggravated sentence for his second escape. The court of appeals agreed that the aggravated sentence was improper, vacated the sentence, and remanded the case for resentencing. The court of appeals, in an opinion by Judge Tursi, reasoned that "by the plain and ordinary meaning of the term; an 'escapee' is someone who already has escaped from custody or confinement. Thus an escapee cannot escape." Andrews, 855 P.2d at 5. Additionally, relying on People v. Russell, 703 P.2d 620 (Colo.App.1985), the court of appeals found that the enhancement provision "does not apply to the crime of escape, but rather it applies to other felonies committed while under confinement or to other felonies committed after escape from confinement." Andrews, 855 P.2d at 5. We agree and affirm for the reasons set forth below.
II
Before we examine the relevant provisions, we restate those principles of statutory' construction that guide our review.
Legislative intent is the linchpin of statutory construction. Ingram v. Cooper, 698 P.2d 1314 (Colo.1985). To discern legislative intent, a reviewing court should look first to the language of the statute, and the words and phrases used therein should be given effect according to their plain and ordinary meaning. People v. District Court, 713 P.2d 918, 921 (Colo.1986). If the language is clear and the intent appears with reasonable certainty, there is no need to resort to the rules of statutory construction. Id. To reasonably effectuate the legislative intent, a statute must be read and considered as a whole and should be interpreted so as to give consistent, harmonious, and sensible effect to all its parts. Id. In doing so, criminal statutes are to be construed strictly in favor of the accused. People v. Roybal, 618 P.2d 1121 (Colo.1980).
The statute before us is section 18 — 1— 105(9)(a). It provides that if a sentencing court finds the existence of one or more extraordinary aggravating circumstances, that court must sentence the defendant to a term of at least the mid-point in the presumptive range, but the sentence may not be more than twice the maximum term authorized in the presumptive range for the punishment of that class felony. § 18-1-105(9)(a). The extraordinary aggravating circumstance which was held to be present by the trial court is defined in subsection (9)(a)(V) as follows:
(V) The defendant was under confinement, in prison, or in any correctional institution as a convicted felon, or an escapee from any correctional institution as a convicted felon, or an escapee from any correctional institution for another felony at the time of the commission of a felony[.]
§ 18-l-105(9)(a)(V).
The People contend that because the defendant was under confinement as a convicted felon at the time he committed the felony of attempted escape, the sentence enhancement provision applies. In rejecting this contention, the court of appeals relied on its prior decision in People v. Russell, 703 P.2d 620 (Colo.App.1985), which presented a factual scenario similar to this ease, i.e., the defendant was convicted of escape and received an aggravated range sentence from a judge who indicated that he would have imposed a presumptive range sentence in the absence of the mandatory enhancement provisions of subsection (9)(a)(V). The Russell court held that the defendant's conviction for escape did not trigger the operation of the enhanced sentencing provision. Id. at 622. In reaching this conclusion, the court of appeals examined the legislative sentencing scheme and reasoned that if the aggravator were to apply to the crime of escape, conviction of class 3 felony escape would always require imposition of a sentence in excess of the presumptive range for such class of felonies. Id. at 622. The court of appeals held that such a construction would be contrary to legislative intent since it would be tantamount to changing the crime from a class 3 felony to a class 2 felony. Id. Additionally, the court of appeals noted that lawful confinement is an element of the substantive crime of felony escape, and therefore "commission of this element, in and of itself, cannot logically constitute an 'extraordinary aggravating' aspect of the escape." Id. Finally, in concluding that the enhancement provision does not apply to the crime of escape, the court noted that "any other construction of the statute would negate and render mere surplusage the language that 'at the time of the commission of a felony' the perpetrator was an escapee." Id. (citation omitted).
In order to counter the rationale of the court of appeals, the People contend that Russell was legislatively overruled by the 1986 enactment of section 18 — 1—105(9) (f), 8B C.R.S. (1986). Under that provision, a sentencing court "may consider aggravating circumstances such as serious bodily injury caused to the victim or the use of a weapon in the commission of a crime, notwithstanding the fact that such factors constitute elements of the offense." § 18-1-105(9)©. Thus, the People deduce that the principle announced in Russell, i.e., that the enhancement provision shall not apply because lawful confinement is an element of the substantive crime of felony escape, is invalidated by statute.
We do not rely, however, on the "same element" rationale of Russell in reaching our conclusion here. Instead, we focus on the overall statutory scheme and the implications of the two interpretations of the sentence enhancement provision which are now before this court. Under the construction advocated by the People, the enhancement provision, subsection (9)(a)(V), would apply automatically to every individual convicted of class 3 felony escape. This construction would effectively render meaningless the classification of the felony as class 3, since in each and every case an enhanced sentence would be imposed upon the defendant. Such a construction is contrary to the presumption that an entire statute, giving force and effect to all its parts, is intended to be effective. See People v. District Court, 713 P.2d at 921 (a statute should be interpreted "to give consistent, harmonious, and sensible effect to all its parts"); Ingram, 698 P.2d at 1317 (rejecting a construction which would "render meaningless" the penalties adopted by the General Assembly).
We recognize that in other instances we have found that an element of an underlying offense may also provide the basis for an increased sentence, effectively mandating an escalated penalty for that offense. See, e.g., People v. Sanchez, 769 P.2d 1064 (Colo.1989) (holding that "facts which also tend to establish an element" of the crime of vehicular assault could also be used to establish extraordinary aggravating circumstances for purposes of sentencing); People v. Leonard, 755 P.2d 447 (Colo.1988) (applying the "felony while in confinement" aggravator to the crime of first degree possession of contraband); People v. Haymaker, 716 P.2d 110 (Colo.1986) (applying the crime of violence aggravator to first degree sexual assault).
In those instances, however, our rulings were based upon the clear legislative intent that the enhancement provision was meant to apply to the underlying felony. See Haymaker, 716 P.2d at 117 (holding that "the intent of the legislature to authorize cumulative punishment under the statutes at issue is simply unmistakable"); Sanchez, 769 P.2d at 1067 (distinguishing Russell on the grounds that the court of appeals there applied rules of statutory construction to conclude that "the General Assembly had not intended to permit elements of the underlying offenses there involved to be considered extraordinary aggravating circumstances for sentencing purposes"). Here, the legislative intent is not so clear. One reason we question the legislative intent to apply the aggravator is that the General Assembly has provided for enhanced punishment of crimes of escape elsewhere, specifically in section 18-8-208.1, 8B C.R.S. (1986) (escape) and section 18-8-209, 8B C.R.S. (1986) (attempted escape). These statutes provide that any punishment imposed pursuant to a conviction for escape or attempted escape shall run consecutive to any other sentence being served by the offender. The existence of these consecutive sentence provisions cuts against the likelihood that the legislature intended the additional punishment of the application of the sentence enhancement provision at issue in every instance.
Additionally, we note that since it was decided in 1985, this court has addressed the Russell decision on at least four occasions, and while limiting its application to crimes of escape we have not altered its force. Moreover, during that same period of time, the General Assembly has on a number of occasions amended subsection (9)(a)(V), but has never expressly provided that the aggravator should apply to crimes of escape.
In sum, we conclude that the legislature did not intend to punish escape and attempted escape through application of the enhancement provision at issue. First, the language of the escape and attempted escape statutes provides for a specific sentence and additionally provides that punishment imposed pursuant to conviction of such crimes shall run consecutive to the punishment for the underlying felony. Second, the General Assembly has not amended the enhancement provision to make it specifically applicable to crimes of escape. Finally, this court has addressed the Russell decision several times in the past and has continued to assert its validity with regard to crimes of escape.
Ill
We hold, therefore, that the sentence enhancement provision at issue, section 18 — 1— 105(9)(a)(V), is not applicable to the crime of escape or attempted escape. In reaching this conclusion we rely on the plain language of the relevant statutes, giving consistent, harmonious, and sensible effect to all parts of each, as well as the overall statutory scheme.
Accordingly, the judgment of the court of appeals is affirmed.
VOLLACK, J., dissents, and ROVIRA, C.J., and ERICKSON, J., join in the dissent.
. § 18-18-106, 8B C.R.S. (1986).
. § 18-4-203, 8B C.R.S. (1986).
. We note that the two and one-half year sentence falls within the presumptive range, as well as the aggravated range. The record, however, clearly evinces the trial court's intent to impose an aggravated sentence and for purposes of this appeal the sentence will be treated as such.
. The full text of § 18 — 1—105(9)(a.) provides as follows:
(9)(a) The presence of any one or more of the following extraordinary aggravating circumstances shall require the court, if it sentences the defendant to incarceration, to sentence the defendant to a term of at least the mid-point in the presumptive range but not more than twice the maximum term authorized in the presumptive range for the punishment of that class feIony[.]
. At oral argument, the People conceded that the "double escape" rationale utilized by the trial court (see p. 1200, supra) was not correct. We agree. Under the plain meaning of the term "escapee," a defendant ceases to be an "escapee" when he is once again under confinement or placed in custody.
.Under the version of § 18-l-105(9)(a) which was in effect at the time Russell was decided, if an aggravating circumstance was present, the court was required to impose a sentence greater than the presumptive range. The current version requires that the defendant be sentenced to at least the mid-point and no more than twice the maximum term of the presumptive range.
. Andrews was convicted of class 5 felony attempted escape, which unlike class 3 escape does not require that the defendant be convicted of a felony at the time of escape. However, in determining the propriety of the interpretation advocated by the People, we believe it necessary to address the effect that interpretation would have on the entire statutory scheme.
. Though application of the enhancement provision would not necessarily result in a sentence which exceeds the presumptive range for a class 3 felony, it would still change the penalty mandated by the legislature in that no defendant convicted of the felony could be sentenced to a term below the mid-point of the presumptive range.
In practical terms, this would require the sentencing court to sentence a class 3 felon escapee to a minimum of ten years and a maximum of thirty-two years, as opposed to a minimum of four years and a maximum of sixteen years. See § 18-l-105(l)(a)(IV), 8B C.R.S. (1993 Supp.) (defining the presumptive range sentences for each class of felony).
. The full text of subsection (2) of section 18 — 8— 208.1, the statute under which Andrews was convicted, provides as follows:
(2) If a person, while in custody or confinement and held for or charged with but not convicted of a felony, knowingly attempts to escape from said custody or confinement, he commits a class 5 felony. If the person is convicted of the felony or other crime for which he was originally in custody or confinement, the sentence imposed pursuant to this subsection (2) shall run consecutively with any sentences being served by the offender. (Emphasis added).
. See Haymaker, 716 P.2d at 116 (noting that Russell was "consistent" with our holding in that it "did not recognize a blanket constitutional prohibition against basing an aggravated sentence on an element of the crime"); Leonard, 755 P.2d at 451 (distinguishing Russell on the grounds that the extraordinary aggravating circumstance there was "synonymous" with the underlying crime, which was not the situation in the case at bar); People v. Chavez, 764 P.2d 356, 358 (Colo.1988) (limiting Russell to the crime of escape); Sanchez, 769 P.2d at 1067 (distinguishing Russell on the grounds that in Russell the aggravating circumstance was "synonymous" with an element of the offense, and noting that in Russell the court of appeals applied rules of statutory construction to conclude that "the General Assembly had not intended to permit elements of the underlying offenses there involved to. be considered extraordinary aggravating circumstances for sentencing purposes").