Case Name: JUNGER UTILITY & PAVING CO., INC. and Melford Gene Oglesby, Appellants, v. M. Scott MYERS and Susan Myers and Metropolitan Property & Liability Insurance Company, Appellees
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1989-11-15
Citations: 578 So. 2d 1117
Docket Number: No. 88-1674
Parties: JUNGER UTILITY & PAVING CO., INC. and Melford Gene Oglesby, Appellants, v. M. Scott MYERS and Susan Myers and Metropolitan Property & Liability Insurance Company, Appellees.
Judges: BOOTH, JOANOS and BARFIELD, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 578
Pages: 1117–1127

Head Matter:
JUNGER UTILITY & PAVING CO., INC. and Melford Gene Oglesby, Appellants, v. M. Scott MYERS and Susan Myers and Metropolitan Property & Liability Insurance Company, Appellees.
No. 88-1674.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
Nov. 15, 1989.
On Motion for Rehearing May 8, 1991.
Thomas J. Maida of Karl, McConnaugh-hay, Roland & Maida, and George N. Me-ros, Jr., of Rumberger, Kirk, Caldwell, Ca-baniss, Burke & Wechsler, Tallahassee, for appellants.
,W. Dennis Brannon of Dewrell & Bran-non, Ft. Walton Beach, for appellees M. Scott and Susan Myers.
Robert C. Palmer, III, of Harrell, Wilt-shire, Swearingen, Wilson & Harrell, Pensacola, for appellee Metropolitan Ins.

Opinion:
PER CURIAM.
Appellants seek reversal of a final judgment against them in a negligence action based upon a vehicular accident. They claim reversible error in the trial judge's ruling that their expert accident recon-structionist could not rely upon section 316.237, Florida Statutes, for an assumption that the headlights of the vehicle in which the plaintiff was a passenger illuminated at least 150 feet, the minimum standard set by the statute. They also claim that the final judgment should be reversed because the predecessor judge erred in denying their motion to disqualify plaintiff's counsel (the Dewrell firm) on the grounds of conflict of interest. We affirm the final judgment, but conclude that both issues warrant discussion.
We affirm on the issue of the evi-dentiary ruling because appellants have not demonstrated that the trial court's ruling deprived them of the ability to present the expert witness' opinion that the driver of the vehicle in which the plaintiff was riding had sufficient time in which to brake or take other evasive action that would have avoided the rear-end accident. Sufficient evidence was presented upon which the expert could have based his opinion, without relying upon the statute.
As to the denial of the motion to disqualify plaintiff's counsel, the uncontroverted evidence indicates that the Dewrell firm represented Junger Utility & Paving Company, Inc. (Junger) on other matters at the time of the accident, that Junger sought and obtained the advice of his attorney at the Dewrell firm the day after the accident regarding how to handle investigators attempting to view the company truck involved in the accident, and that an attorney-client relationship therefore existed between Junger and the Dewrell firm with respect to the accident.
The plaintiff's motion to resolve the allegations of a conflict of interest states: "Immediately following the accident that is the basis for this suit, Plaintiffs retained the firm of Dewrell, Blue & Brannon to represent them against any persons or parties responsible for the injuries or damages they sustained." The uncontroverted evidence indicates that the Dewrell firm thereafter continued to represent Junger in an unrelated matter, and only later indicated to Junger its desire to represent the plaintiffs, which he resisted. Later, Junger dismissed the firm when it was discovered that the firm was in fact representing the plaintiffs. The Dewrell firm then filed the complaint against Junger and its driver.
We find that under the code of ethics applicable to members of The Florida Bar, this demonstrated conflict of interest required the disqualification of the Dewrell firm. In his order denying the motion to disqualify plaintiffs counsel, the predecessor judge found that Junger had not proved "that the matter embraced in the pending suit is substantially related to any matters or cause of action wherein plaintiffs' counsel previously represented JUN-GER UTILITY & PAVING CO., INC." and had not proved "that by reason of the prior representation of defendant by plaintiffs' counsel that plaintiffs have gained unfair advantage in the pending litigation."
To disqualify a private law firm from representing a party whose interests are adverse, the former client need show only that an attorney-client relationship existed, thereby giving rise to the irrefutable presumption that confidences were disclosed during the course of that relationship, and that the matter in which the law firm subsequently represented the interest adverse to the former client is the same matter or substantially similar to the matter in which it represented the former client. Junger was not required to demonstrate specific prejudice to his case in order to justify disqualification. The judge should have disqualified the Dewrell firm from representing the plaintiffs in this action.
We reject appellees' contentions that appellants waived their right to raise the issue of disqualification, either before the trial court or on appeal. However, we find that under the particular circumstances of this case, appellants have not demonstrated that the final judgment should be reversed. While, for purposes of interlocutory review by certiorari, it is unnecessary to demonstrate actual prejudice to justify disqualification of opposing counsel, once the parties have proceeded through trial, most courts require a showing of prejudice in order to reverse the final judgment. Appellants did not seek review by certiorari of the denial of their motion to disqualify plaintiff's counsel. Because the record does not demonstrate that appellants' case was actually prejudiced by confidences disclosed to the Dew-rell firm, justification for reversal of the final judgment at this stage of the proceedings has not been demonstrated.
The final judgment is AFFIRMED.
BOOTH, JOANOS and BARFIELD, JJ., concur.
. Specifically, the Code of Professional Responsibility, Canon 4 ("A Lawyer Should Preserve the Confidences and Secrets of a Client"), Canon 5 ("A Lawyer Should Exercise Independent Professional Judgment on Behalf of a Client") and Canon 9 ("A Lawyer Should Avoid Even the Appearance of Professional Impropriety"), and the attendant ethical considerations and disciplinary rules. The Code of Professional Responsibility was superceded in 1987 by the Rules Regulating the Florida Bar. The ethical considerations addressed in Canons 4 and 5 are now embodied in Rules 4-1.7 and 4-1.9 (set out below). Although the new Rules do not contain the express language of Canon 9 and its explanatory ethical considerations regarding the avoidance of even the appearance of impropriety, this fact does not persuade us that they are no longer pertinent. See Bammac, Inc. v. Grady, 500 So.2d 274, 280 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986).
Rule 4-1.7(a) A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that client will be directly adverse to the interests of another client, unless:
(1) The lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not adversely affect the lawyer's responsibilities to and relationship with the other client; and
(2) Each client consents after consultation. Rule 4-1.9 Conflict of Interest; Former Client
A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not thereafter:
(a) Represent another person in the same or a substantially related matter in which that person's interests are materially adverse to the interests of the former client unless the former client consents after consultation; or
(b) Use information relating to the representation to the disadvantage of the former client except as rule 4-1.6 would permit with respect to a client or when the information has become generally known.
.Judge Wells granted Junger's motion for recu-sal which was based upon allegations that Judge Wells had given investigators information regarding Dean Junger's co-defendant in a federal fraud case. On appeal, appellants contend that Judge Wells violated their due process rights by ruling on the motion to disqualify plaintiffs' counsel at a time when he suffered from a disqualifying prejudice against Junger. However, appellants failed to preserve this issue for appeal by refiling the motion with the successor judge or otherwise seeking vacation of the ruling based upon the judge's alleged prejudice.
. Ford v. Piper Aircraft Corporation, 436 So.2d 305 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983), rev. den., 444 So.2d 417 (Fla.1984); Sears, Roebuck & Company v. Stansbury, 374 So.2d 1051 (Fla. 5th DCA 1979). See also State v. Cote, 538 So.2d 1356 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989); Brent v. Smathers, 529 So.2d 1267 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988); Lackow v. Walter E. Heller & Co. Southeast, Inc., 466 So.2d 1120 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985); Trautman v. General Motors Corporation, 426 So.2d 1183 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983).
. Annotation, Propriety and effect of attorney representing interest adverse to that of a former client, 52 A.L.R.2d 1243, 1286; 7 Am.Jur.2d Attorneys at Law, § 189.