Case Name: CRAIG v. PARISH
Court: Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia
Jurisdiction: District of Columbia
Decision Date: 1915-04-19
Citations: 43 App. D.C. 447
Docket Number: No. 2706
Parties: CRAIG v. PARISH.
Judges: 
Reporter: Reports of Cases Adjudged in the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia
Volume: 43
Pages: 447–457

Head Matter:
CRAIG v. PARISH.
Pleading; Bins of Paktictjlak; Assumpsit.
1. In complying with an order requiring the plaintiff to furnish a bill of particulars in an action based upon a contract by the defendant’s testator to pay the plaintiff’s intestate a specified percentage of his recovery on a government claim, “in return for pecuniary and other aid rendered to me,” it is sufficient for the plaintiff to show that services were rendered and money advanced which formed a, part of the consideration named in the contract, irrespective of the value of the services and the amount of the advances, as the contract was contingent and the parties fixed Hie value of the services, including the pecuniary aid rendered, at the percentage mentioned. (Mr. Chief Justice Sliepard dissenting.)
2. The plaintiff is not required to state or • disclose his evidence, such as letters and memoranda, in his bill of particulars.
3. Where the defense to an action based upon a contract by the defendant’s testator to pay to tbe plaintiff’s intestate a percentage of the recovery on a government claim, in return for pecuniary and other aid rendered, is that the services were rendered and the advances made to aid in the prosecution of the claim by the plaintiff’s intestate at a time when he was in government employ, the plaintiff cannot be required to set out in his bill of particulars facts negativing such defense.
4. The action of assumpsit is equitable in its character, furnishing a. ■remedy highly favored by the courts, and a liberal rule will be applied in the matter of requiring particulars of demand, especially where both parties to the promise sued on are dead.
o In general, a bill of particulars is sufficient if information of the nature of the plaintiff’s claim is given with sufficient certainty so that the defendant will not be misled or deceived on the trial.
6. Qucere, whether defects in a bill of particulars can be urged by the defendant after he has pleaded to the merits, or after the cause has been remanded by the appellate court for retrial, and not for dismissal, for failure to file an additional bill of particulars.
No. 2706.
Submitted December 10, 1014.
Decided April 19, 1915.
Hearing on an appeal by the plaintiff from a judgment of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia in favor of the defendant, entered after the failure of the plaintiff to comply with two orders requiring an amended bill of particulars to be filed.
Reversed.
The Court in the opinion stated the facts as follows:
Annie F. Craig, administratrix of the estate of Samuel Ramsey, brought this action against Emily E. Parish, executrix of the will of J. W. Parish, to recover an amount equal to 5 per cent of a certain claim allowed by the United States government to J. W. Parish for ice furnished in the year 1863.
It is alleged that Parish, on October 9, 1900, agreed to pay Ramsey, in consideration of pecuniary and other aid rendered to Parish, an amount equal to 5 per cent of the gross sum that should r.ltimately be awarded on said ice claim. In May, 1909, the government awarded Parish the sum of $181,358.95, and the amount, claimed is 5 per cent of the award, or $9,0,67.94-. The declaration also contains the usual common counts for work dono and materials furnished and for money had and received. For particulars of demand, plaintiff stated the sum equal to 5 per cent of the Parish award, $9,067.94, with interest from June 15, 1909, and by amendment of the particulars of demand, among other things, set up the following contract:
October 9th, 1900.
To Whom It May Concern:—
In return for pecuniary and other aid rendered to me, I promise to pay to Samuel Ramsey, of Washington city, 'District of Columbia, his heirs and assigns, an amount equal to 5 per cent of the gross amount ultimately allowed by the United States on my claim now pending in Congress, which is based upon a contract for furnishing ice to the army in the year eighteen hundred and sixty-three (1863).
J. W. Parish.
Witnesses:
J. EL McGowan,
Arthur N. Marr.
Defendant pleaded non assumpsit, statute of limitations, and usury. The case went to trial, resulting in a verdict for plaintiff in the full amount claimed. On motion, the court vacated the verdict, and ordered a new trial. A second trial was had, which resulted in another verdict for the full amount. From the judgment thereon, defendant appealed to this court, where the judgment was reversed. Parish v. Craig, 40 App. D. C. 138.
When the cause was remanded for a third trial, the court, in response to a motion of the defendant, ordered plaintiff to file an additional bill of particulars. Plaintiff complied with the order, but was confronted shortly by a similar motion and order, to which he responded by filing the following:
“N ow comes the plaintiff and presents this bill of particulars in compliance with the order of court made herein, and asks that the same be taken as the amended bill of particulars in this cause, and be attached to the declaration as such in place of the particulars of demand and additional bill of particulars hitherto filed.
“The plaintiff’s bill of particulars is as follows:
“(1) The sum claimed by the plaintiff is as follows:
“1909.
“June 15. To a sum equivalent to 5 per cent of $181,358.95, being the gross amount allowed upon the J. W. Parish claim against the United States, due according to the agreement of October 9, 1900, hereinbefore set forth........$9,067.91
“Interest, from June 15, 1909.
“(2) A true and exact copy of the contract in writing, referred to in plaintiff’s declaration and attached to her declaration, as follows:
“October 9th, 1900.
’ "To Whom It May Concern:—
“In return for pecuniary and other aid rendered to me, I promise to pay Samuel Pamsey, of Washington city, District of Columbia, his heirs and assigns, an amount equal to 5 per cent of the gross amount ultimately allowed by the United States on my claim now pending in Congress, which is based upon a contract for furnishing ice to the army in the year eighteen hundred and'sixty-three (1863).
“J. W. Parish.
“Witnesses:
“J. II. McGowan,
“Arthur N. Marr.
“(3) That the promise in writing set forth in the preceding paragraph hereof was made by said J. W. Parish in consideration of $1,080 in cash advanced to Parish by Pamsey in the year 1900, on-or about the following dates:
“September 29, 1900, $180.-
“October 26, 1900, $900.
“And as a further consideration plaintiff says that Pamsey performed for Parish certain estimates of the amoxint due to Parish from the United States under the Parish -ice contract, said estimates being performed late in tbe year 1899 or early in the year 1900; said Ramsey being competent to make such estimates, which said Parish lacked aptitude to make.
“And as a further consideration said Ramsey, being a friend of said Parish, who was impecunious and without means and sometimes unable to pay for food, did from time to time during the years 1897, 1898, 1899, and 1900 perform kindly services for said Parish and advance to him various sums for that purpose, of which no itemized record in writing is at present in the hands of the plaintiff:
“And that plaintiff further says that no payment by Parish was ever made of the $1,080, nor of the other sums, nor for the estimates aforesaid.
“(4) The plaintiff has evidence in writing of the consideration stated, as follows:
“An admission in writing signed by Parish that advances or moneys advanced by way of loan were made by Ramsey bearing date October 9th, 1900.
“Memoranda in writing of the advance of the several sums stated in paragraph 3 hereof.”
Counsel for defendant then filed a motion to von pros or dismiss plaintiff’s suit, on the ground that she had not set forth a sufficient legal consideration for the promise or contract declared upon in the declaration; that plaintiff failed to file the original, or true and exact copies, of all memoranda in writing of the advance of the several sums of money stated in the bill of particulars, and that she failed to set forth with sufficient clearness the nature, character, and extent of the alleged estimate, which wTas furnished by Ramsey to Parish as a part of the consideration for said contract. The consideration of the objections above stated will sufficiently dispose of the other matters contained in the motion. On hearing, the court granted the motion, and from the judgment plaintiff has appealed.
Mr. Chauncey Hackett for the appellant.
Mr. Holmes Conrad and Mr. Leigh Robinson for the appellee.

Opinion:
Mr. Justice Van Orsdel
delivered the opinion of the Court:
The contract of October 9, 1900, was a contingent agreement to pay a fixed sum upon the happening of a certain event, — the allowance of the ice claim. The consideration therein named was twofold, — "pecuniary and other aid." The consideration is so indefinite that we held on the former appeal that it would not support the presumption of legality, but must be proved. We think the declaration, however, in the light of the foregoing bill of particulars, is sufficient to justify us in directing a trial. The issues are comparatively free from difficulty. Plaintiff has set forth, though' in a general way, the pecuniary«aid furnished with sufficient particularity, we' think, in the light of the proof disclosed in two former trials, to advise defendant of the claims asserted.
As to the services rendered, sufficient is stated in the bill of particulars to apprise defendant of what they consisted. All that is required is proof that the alleged estimates were furnished, and that the services thus rendered formed part of the consideration named in the contract. The contract is contingent, and the parties have fixed the value of the services, including the pecuniary aid rendered, at an amount equal to 5 per cent of whatever sum should be awarded in the. ice claim. Tho court, therefore, is not concerned with any comparison between the amount of money advanced by Ramsey and the value of the services rendered to the sum here involved. A small sum of money advanced to Parish in his extremity might furnish a valid consideration for a security of such problematical value as the one Ramsey received. Hence, this is not a cas.e where the itemized particulars of demand must aggregate to a nicety in dollars and cents the total amount claimed.
The documents, letters, and memoranda called for in the motion of defendant for the amended bill of particulars arc matters of evidence within the control of plaintiff to produce or withhold at will. Plaintiff is not required to state or disclose her evidence in the bill of particulars. Garfield v. Paris, 96 U. S. 557, 24 L. ed. 821. Neither does mere suspicion that Ramsey furnished information to Parish in aid of the proper and effective presentation of the ice claim against the government at the time Ramsey was in the government service, or within two years thereafter, have any bearing upon the proper disclosure of particulars of demand. The contract on its 'face purports to have been made long after Ramsey left the government service. The services alleged to have been rendered on the ice claim are stated at a time when Ramsey could legitimately perform such services. Some of the loans mentioned in prior bills of particulars from the dates appear to have been made when Ramsey was in the government service, but there is nothing to prevent a government employee from loaning money to a claimant against the government, so long as it is not furnished to assist the claimant in prosecuting his claim. But whether or not Ramsey violated the statute in this particular is a matter of defense. Plaintiff is not required either to set out in the bill of particulars or prove a negative. Ramsey is presumed to have acted honestly, and it rests with the defense to prove the contrary. Of course, if it could be shown that Ramsey violated the law as to one item, it would so taint the whole contract as to prevent any recovery. Hazelton v. Sheckells, 202 U. S. 71, 78, 50 L. ed. 939, 941, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 567, 6 Ann. Cas. 217.
The action in assumpsit is equitable in character. It is therefore liberal in form and furnishes a remedy highly favored by the courts. In the present case, both of the parties to the original agreement are dead, and, of necessity, the transactions will have to be adduced from evidence more or less indirect in character, consisting largely of documents and memoranda. The inquiry, therefore, partakes much of the character of a disclosure in equity. A liberal rule should be applied in such eases in the matter of requiring particulars of demand. In general, it may be said that a bill of particulars is sufficient if information of the nature of a plaintiff's claim is given with sufficient certainty that the defendant may not be misled or deceived. Wright v. Dickinson, 67 Mich. 580, 11 Am. St. Rep. 602, 35 N. W. 164; Hess v. Fox, 10 Wend. 437. It is hardly possible that defendant, after two trials on issues joined, is in danger either of being misled or deceived as to the nature of plaintiff's claim. Besides, the case on the former appeal was remanded for trial, not for dismissal, for failure to file an additional bill of particulars. Indeed, there is reputable authority to the effect that defects in a bill of particulars cannot be urged after pleading to the merits. Southern Bldg. & L. Asso. v. Price, 88 Md. 155, 42 L.R.A. 206, 41 Atl. 53. The reason is less apparent for such a proceeding in the face of a mandate directing a new trial.
The judgment is reversed with costs, and the cause is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. Reversed and remanded.