Case Name: Danny Ray LESTER, a/k/a Steven Stacey, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1984-01-25
Citations: 446 So. 2d 1088
Docket Number: No. 82-1775
Parties: Danny Ray LESTER, a/k/a Steven Stacey, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: SCHEB and LEHAN, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 446
Pages: 1088–1090

Head Matter:
Danny Ray LESTER, a/k/a Steven Stacey, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. 82-1775.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
Jan. 25, 1984.
Rehearing Denied March 14, 1984.
Jerry Hill, Public Defender, Bartow, and Robert F. Moeller, Asst. Public Defender, Tampa, for appellant.
Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and William I. Munsey, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., Tampa, for appellee.

Opinion:
PER CURIAM.
We affirm the trial court's revocation of appellant's probation and appellant's sentence following appellant's admission of a probation violation.
Appellant contends that it was error for a judge who was not the judge who accepted appellant's nolo contendere plea to robbery and aggravated battery charges to revoke the probation which appellant had been given on those charges and to then sentence appellant. Appellant cites Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.700 and Lawley v. State, 377 So.2d 824 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979), for the proposition that it is reversible error for a judge, other than the trial judge, to sentence a defendant where there is no emergency reason for the substitution of judges.
We disagree with appellant's contention. Although the judge who revoked appellant's probation (hereinafter called the first judge) and then sentenced appellant was not the same judge who had accepted appellant's nolo contendere plea to robbery and aggravated battery, the record shows that he was the first judge who dealt with the matters out of which the probation revocation arose. Prior to the pleas on robbery and aggravated battery before another judge (hereinafter called the second judge), appellant had pleaded guilty before the first judge to possession of barbituates and had received three years probation. Three years probation was thereafter imposed by the second judge, to run concurrently with the earlier probation. After that there was no further involvement by the second judge, and the first judge, prior to revoking appellant's probation, received appellant's plea to a charge of DWI and modified appellant's concurrent, three-year probation terms to five-year concurrent probation terms. Under those circumstances the first judge, the judge who revoked appellant's probation and about whose sentencing appellant now complains, was the judge by far the most involved with the subject matter. Also, it does not appear that appellant has raised any contention of error when the first judge modified the three-year probation term fixed by the second judge. It is actually the revocation of that modified probation as to which appellant now complains. As explained above, the first judge was the judge who had both imposed the modified probation and who revoked that probation.
Mobley v. State, 407 So.2d 1037 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981), holds that after a defendant enters a nolo contendere plea to a charge, the sentencing judge need not be the judge who accepted the plea. The Mobley rationale is generally applicable here. The record shows that the first judge familiarized himself with the robbery and aggravated battery matters. We believe that under the circumstances it was necessary and appropriate that the first judge preside over the probation revocation. Judicial administration would have been ill-served otherwise, and defendant has shown no prejudice.
Appellant's other contention is without merit.
AFFIRMED.
SCHEB and LEHAN, JJ., concur.
GRIMES, A.C.J., concurs specially.