Case Name: M & E LAND COMPANY, a corporation, d/b/a Fox Drive-In Theatre, H. B. Meiselman, and Pine Drive-In Theatres, Inc., a corporation, Appellants, v. David SIEGEL, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1965-08-10
Citations: 177 So. 2d 769
Docket Number: No. G-104
Parties: M & E LAND COMPANY, a corporation, d/b/a Fox Drive-In Theatre, H. B. Meiselman, and Pine Drive-In Theatres, Inc., a corporation, Appellants, v. David SIEGEL, Appellee.
Judges: STURGIS, J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 177
Pages: 769–775

Head Matter:
M & E LAND COMPANY, a corporation, d/b/a Fox Drive-In Theatre, H. B. Meiselman, and Pine Drive-In Theatres, Inc., a corporation, Appellants, v. David SIEGEL, Appellee.
No. G-104.
District Court of Appeal of Florida. First District.
Aug. 10, 1965.
Kurz, Toole, Maness & Martin, Jacksonville, for appellants.
Floyd G. Yeager, Jacksonville, for appel-lee.

Opinion:
RAWLS, Chief Judge.
Appellee David Siegel, Plaintiff in the trial court, by his amended complaint in chancery seeking a declaratory decree against appellants M & E Land Company, et al., alleged in substance that: He had leased to defendants M & E Land Company and H. B. Meiselman certain personal property described as a fifty foot by one hundred twenty foot screen tower for a total rental of $27,000.00, pa)^able by an advance rental of $5,000.00 at the time of execution and delivery of the lease agreement and thereafter a rental of $500.00 per month, and by the terms of the lease he granted to defendants the option to purchase, in the event of no default on their part, at the end of 36 months for the purchase price of $4,000.00; defendants M & E Land Company and H. B. Meiselman had not paid the $5,000.00 nor any of the monthly rentals of $500.00 as of the date of the filing of the amended complaint (March 23, 1964) ; plaintiff cancelled the said lease agreement by reason of the default of the defendants and made demand upon them to allow him to enter upon the property pursuant to the provisions of paragraph 4 of said lease agreement; and defendants have refused to allow plaintiff and his employees to enter upon the real property described for the purpose of removing the said screen tower. The crux of plaintiff's allegations are contained in paragraph 6 of his amended complaint, the same being:
"6. That, by reason of the acts of the Defendants and the Lease Agreement made a part hereof, Plaintiff is in doubt as to whether or not he and his employees can enter the property of the defendants, M & E LAND COMPANY, a corporation, d/b/a Fox Drive-In Theatre, and PINE DRIVE-IN THEATRES, INC., a corporation, and remove the said screen tower, as described in the said Lease Agreement, without being guilty of trespass or any criminal act, or the incurring of any obligation on the Plaintiff's part for the removal of said screen tower."
The chancellor, after denying defendants' motion to dismiss, and after considering further pleadings, tried the cause upon the merits and entered a final decree in which he found that the court had jurisdiction of the parties and the subject matter and that Siegel had the right to enter the described property and retake possession of the screen tower without interference from any of the defendants.
By this appeal appellants present their primary point: Where the lease agreement provides in clear and unambiguous language that in the event of default the lessor shall at all times have the right to enter and retake possession of the leased property without interference from the lessee, is the allegation of a default and a refusal of the lessee to permit the lessor to enter and retake possession a sufficient showing of "doubt" as to lessor's rights to state a cause of action for declaratory decree under Chapter 87 of the Florida Statutes, F.S.A.?
We are of the opinion that the amended complaint failed to allege a cause of action for declaratory decree under Chapter 87 of the Florida Statutes, F.S.A.
Much has been written by the appellate courts in construing Chapter 87, and it is noted at the outset that the courts, with legislative prodding, have been increasingly generous in sustaining complaints predicated upon this Chapter. Mr. Justice Terrell, speaking for the Supreme Court in the landmark case of Ready v. Safeway Rock Co., cleared the ground for utilizing this new tool when he stated: "Viewed in its proper perspective, the Declaratory Judgments Act is nothing more than a legislative attempt to extend procedural remedies to comprehend relief in cases where technical or social advances have tended to obscure or place in doubt one's rights, immunities, status or privileges" and that the statute " should be construed to aid those who have a meritorious cause rather than to provide a way of escape for those who would be adversely affected." However, in the subsequent case of Deen v. Weaver, Mr. Justice Terrell in affirming the dismissal of a declaratory decree suit involving a claim of a realtor's commission by plaintiff, stated:
"The rule is settled that the Declaratory Judgments Statute cannot be employed to point out the procedure for an attorney to follow to litigate a case like this. Bagwell v. Woodward Iron Company, 236 Ala. 668, 184 So. 692; Pennsylvania Casualty Co. v. Thornton, D.C., 61 F.Supp. 753, 1 C.J.S., Actions, § 18, p. 120 (1950 Cum. Pocket Part). Even if the method of procedure could be indicated, the merits of petitioner's claim involve purely common law considerations that could not be reached in a declaratory judgments proceeding."
Siegel does not allege any doubt as to the provisions of his contract. The net effect of his complaint is that appellants owe him a stated sum of money, which they refuse to pay and due to this default, he is entitled to go upon their land and retake his personal property. There is no doubt in his mind that he is entitled to possession of his movie screen; his only doubt is how to get possession of same. By resorting to a declaratory relief action he ignores the traditional routes of judicial relief that might be available to him, such as, the law action of replevin or a bill for injunctive relief in equity. And by so doing he escapes the posting of bond which is requisite in such cases.
The appellate courts of this state have settled the question that such a suit will not lie. In the landmark case of Columbia Casualty Co. v. Zimmerman, our Supreme Court in affirming the dismissal of a suit brought pursuant to Chapter 87 held that:
"The complaint in this case shows on its face that there is no doubt as to the meaning of the contract. The only doubt which is shown to exist is whether or not the automobile was being driven with, or without, the knowledge and consent of the insured. This is not a doubt as to the meaning of the contract or as to the proper interpretation of the contract."
The Third District Court of Appeal, speaking through Carroll, J., in reversing the chancellor for entertaining a suit upon substantially the same facts as appeared in Columbia Casualty, quoted with approval the following statement from the Columbia Casualty opinion:
"The complaint in this case shows on its fact that there is no doubt as to the meaning of the contract. The only-doubt which is shown to exist is whether or not the automobile was being driven with, or without, the knowledge and consent of the insured. This is not a doubt as to the meaning of the contract or as to the proper interpretation of the contract. It is simply a doubt as to what will be the ultimate outcome of a consideration of the facts bearing on the question of whether or not the automobile was being driven with the knowledge and consent of the insured."
We are not here concerned with a complaint presenting a bona fide question as to the proper construction of a contract "with respect to any act not yet done or any event which has not yet happened" as contemplated by Section 87.05, as was the situation in Platt v. General Development Corporation and Jackson Tom, Inc. v. Carlton. Justice Roberts stated the rule applicable here in Florida Hotel & Restaurant Commission v. Marseilles Hotel Co., when he stated:
"To be entitled to such relief, the moving party must show a doubt as to the existence or nonexistence of some right, status, immunity, power or privilege. Bryant v. Gray, Fla., 1954, 70 So.2d 581. No such doubt is alleged, and it is clear that the real and only purpose of the suit was to enjoin the hearing on the Rule to Show Cause. This court 'cannot permit an unauthorized extension of the Declaratory Decree Statute to a point where it might be substituted for another normally appropriate action in the absence of a bona fide foundation for a declaratory decree as contemplated by Sec. 87, Florida Statutes, 1941, F.S.A.' Bowden v. Seaboard Air Line R. Co., Fla.1950, 47 So.2d 786, 787."
And to like effect was the statement of Justice O'Connell in Barrett v. Pickard, viz.:
"This Court has said before that doubt, because of disputed questions of fact alone, is not sufficient to make available to litigants the provisions of the Declaratory Judgments Act, F.S.A. § 87.01 et seq. Halpert v. Oleksy (Fla.), 65 So.2d 762, and cases cited therein."
The Supreme Court reiterated this principal in Florida National Bank v. Pugh. There a complaint for declaratory decree filed by Pugh sought construction of two wills of a decedent and a promissory note payable to said decedent. Pugh was one of the makers of the note. The chancellor denied a motion to dismiss, holding the complaint susceptible of stating a cause of action based upon Pugh's claim that no consideration existed for the execution of the note. The Supreme Court in directing the chancellor to dismiss the complaint held that since the promissory note was in conventional form, no reason was apparent for the existence of any doubt, and in the event suit was brought on it, Pugh would have available to him any defenses he might see fit to proffer. In so holding, the court again quoted from Columbia Casualty that "The complaint in this case shows on its face that there is no doubt as to the meaning of the contract."
Finally, Siegel argues the elements of a declaratory judgment action as set out in 9 Fla.Jur., Declaratory Actions, Sec. 8, page 552, from which he copies the six elements stated therein necessary for stating a cause of action in a proceeding seeking declaratory relief. We need be concerned only with the first element so cited, viz.: "(1) That there is a bona fide, actual, present practical need for the declaration."
Risking redundancy, we repeat that the instant complaint alleges in substance: He owes me money and will not pay. My contract says I can go get my property. How can I do it ? As stated by Sturgis, J., of this court in Mayes Printing Co. v. Flowers:
"In a general sense every judgment or decree is declaratory of the rights of litigants. The special objectives of Chapter 87 should not be perverted by permitting it to be used as a catch-all for any type of proceeding at law or in equity." (Emphasis supplied.)
And as stated by Justice Sebring in Stark v. Marshall:
" 'Although our Declaratory Decree Act is broad in its scope and should be liberally construed in order to effectuate its purpose, it was never intended that it should supplant all other types of civil procedure known to our jurisprudence/ " (Emphasis supplied.)
The decree is reversed and the cause is remanded with directions to dismiss the complaint without prejudice.
STURGIS, J., concurs.
WIGGINTON, J., dissents.
. Ready v. Safeway Rock Co., 167 Fla. 27, 24 So.2d 808 (1946).
. Deen v. Weaver, 47 So.2d 539, 540 (Fla.1950).
. Columbia Casualty Co. v. Zimmerman, 62 So.2d 338, 340 (Fla.1952).
. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. v. Couch, 167 So.2d 786 (Fla.App.3d, 1964). See also Johnson v. Atlantic Ins. Co., 155 So.2d 886 (Fla.App.3d, 1963) wherein it is stated: "It is apparent from the quoted portions of the complaint in this cause that not only did the plaintiff fail to allege a doubt or the need for the construction of the insurance policy or for the determination of its validity; but quite the contrary, it alleges facts precedent to a claimed injunction to prohibit the appellant, Johnson, from proceeding with the lawsuit. The complaint should have been dismissed upon the motion of the defendant."
. Platt v. General Development Corporation, 122 So.2d 48 (Fla.App.2d, 1960).
. Jackson Tom, Inc. v. Carlton, 133 So.2d 752 (Fla.App.1st, 1961).
. Florida Hotel and Restaurant Commission v. Marseilles Hotel Co., 84 So.2d 567 (Fla.1956).
. Barrett v. Pickard, 85 So.2d 630 (Fla.1956).
. Florida National Bank v. Pugh, 88 So.2d 284 (Fla.1956).
. Mayes Printing Co. v. Flowers, 154 So.2d 859, 862 (Fla.App.1st, 1963).
. Stark v. Marshall, 67 So.2d 235 (Fla.1953).