Case Name: TUNE v. BLANEY
Court: Michigan Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1984-03-20
Citations: 132 Mich. App. 759
Docket Number: Docket No. 64481
Parties: TUNE v BLANEY
Judges: Before: M. J. Kelly, P.J., and Shepherd and R. I. Cooper, JJ.
Reporter: Michigan appeals reports; cases decided in the Michigan Court of Appeals.
Volume: 132
Pages: 759–773

Head Matter:
TUNE v BLANEY
Docket No. 64481.
Submitted June 14, 1983, at Lansing.
Decided March 20, 1984.
Martha Tune filed a paternity action against Robert A. Blaney in Saginaw Circuit Court. Prior to the paternity hearing, plaintiff moved for admission of the results of Human Leukocyte Antigen (HLA) blood tests indicating a 91% probability that defendant was the father of plaintiffs child. The trial court, Gary R. McDonald, J., denied the request because, at the time, the admission of blood test results to show inclusion of a defendant in the class of potential fathers was prohibited by statute. The court found that plaintiff failed to meet her burden of proof and entered an order adjudging that defendant was not the father of plaintiffs child. Five days after the trial, the statute was amended to allow the results of such tests if a determination of exclusion of paternity cannot be made. Plaintiff appeals, arguing that under the rules regarding retroactive application of amended statutes, she must be granted a new trial in order to introduce evidence of the HLA blood test results. Held:
1. The rule of retroactivity does not require remand solely because a relevant procedural statute is amended after the conclusion of trial. The trial court did not err in excluding evidence of the defendant’s blood type at trial.
2. The issue of whether defendant’s failure to answer plaintiffs interrogatories precludes him from testifying at trial is moot and therefore was not addressed by the Court of Appeals.
3. The trial court’s findings did not leave the Court of Appeals with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake had been committed.
Affirmed.
References for Points in Headnotes
[1, 2] 73 Am Jur 2d, Statutes § 354.
10 Am Jur 2d, Bastards §§ 32, 118.
Blood grouping tests. 46 ALR2d 1000.
29 Am Jur 2d, Evidence § 123.
10 Am Jur 2d, Bastards § 111.
20 Am Jur 2d, Courts § 84.
Shepherd, J., dissented. He would reverse the trial court’s order adjudging defendant not to be the father of plaintiff’s child and remand for a new trial because of his beliefs (1) that the amendatory statute permitting the admission of the results of the HLA blood test should be applied retroactively, (2) that plaintiff’s counsel did not waive his right to raise on appeal the issue of whether the blood test results could be admitted by stating to the court that he was not introducing the results of the test, and (3) that the trial court erred in ruling that defendant did not have to answer plaintiff’s interrogatories but could testify at trial if he so chose.
Opinion of the Court
1. Statutes — Retroactivity — Procedural Matters.
The rule that statutes pertaining to procedural matters are generally given retroactive effect does not require the Court of Appeals to remand a case solely because a relevant procedural statute is amended after the conclusion of trial.
Dissent by Shepherd, J.
2. Statutes — Retroactivity — Procedural Matters — Remedies — Rules of Evidence.
Statutes, as a general rule, are only to be given prospective effect unless the Legislature indicates a contrary intent; however, a statute may be given retroactive effect if it relates to procedure, changes a remedy, or deals with a rule of evidence.
3. Evidence — Paternity Actions — Blood Tests — Amendment of Statutes — New Trial.
A plaintiff in a paternity action who was not allowed to introduce evidence of the results of blood tests under the then existing statute is entitled to a new trial where the statute was amended to allow the admission of such evidence while the plaintiff’s time for appeal had not yet elapsed (MCL 722.716[d]; MSA 25.496[d]).
4. Evidence — Failure To Introduce Evidence — Waiver.
An attorney cannot be held to have waived the right to introduce evidence by failure to formally do so if, at the time of trial, he or she by statute did not have the right to have the evidence admitted.
5. Evidence — Paternity Actions — Putative Father — Witnesses.
A putative father cannot be compelled to testify in a paternity suit although he is competent to do so (MCL 722.715[a]; MSA 25.495[a]X
6. Statutes — Paternity Act — Court Rules.
The provisions of the Paternity Act prevail where there is a conñict between the act and the General Court Rules (MCL 722.711 et seq.; MSA 25.491 et seq.; GCR 1963, 302.2X
7. Evidence — Paternity Actions — Putative Father — Testimony — Interrogatories — Privilege.
The service of written interrogatories upon a defendant in a paternity action is not prohibited, but such interrogatories may be quashed upon the defendant’s assertion of his privilege not to testify; if the defendant decides to answer the interrogatories and then decides not to testify, the decision must be honored but the interrogatories and the answers could be used by the plaintiff at trial in the same way that a deposition of an unavailable witness can be utilized at trial (MCL 722.715[a]; MSA 25.495[a]; GCR 1963, 302.4, 309.4X
Robert L. Kaczmarek, Prosecuting Attorney, and Ray DeGesero, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for plaintiff.
Klimaszewski & Street (by William T. Street), for defendant.
Before: M. J. Kelly, P.J., and Shepherd and R. I. Cooper, JJ.
Circuit judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.

Opinion:
M. J. Kelly, P.J.
Plaintiff appeals as of right a decision of the trial court holding that plaintiff had failed to establish defendant's paternity by a preponderance of the evidence. Plaintiffs child was born April 4, 1979, and the paternity hearing was conducted on April 15, 1982.
Prior to the hearing, plaintiff moved for the admission of the results of Human Leukocyte Antigen (HLA) blood tests indicating a 91% probability that defendant was the father of plaintiffs child. The trial court denied plaintiff's request under MCL 722.716(d); MSA 25.496(d), which, at the time of the hearing, prohibited the admission of all blood test results to show inclusion of a defendant in the class of potential fathers. See also Klein v Franks, 111 Mich App 316; 314 NW2d 602 (1981); Cardenas v Chavez, 103 Mich App 646; 303 NW2d 3 (1980), lv den 414 Mich 928 (1982).
Effective five days after the hearing, however, on April 20, 1982, MCL 722.716; MSA 25.496 was amended as follows:
"(4) The result of a blood or tissue typing test, and if a determination of exclusion of paternity cannot be made, a calculation of the probability of paternity made by a person the court determines is qualified as an examiner of blood or tissue types based on the result of a blood or tissue typing test shall be admissible in evidence in the trial of the case."
Plaintiff argues on appeal that under the rules regarding retroactive application of amended statutes, she must be granted a new hearing in order to introduce evidence of the HLA blood test results. We disagree.
While we recognize that statutes pertaining to procedural matters are generally given retroactive effect, the rule of retroactivity does not require remand solely because a relevant procedural statute is amended after the conclusion of trial. The cases cited by plaintiff in support of remand can be distinguished on this ground. In Tulkku v Mackworth Rees Div of Avis Industries, Inc (On Remand), 101 Mich App 709; 301 NW2d 46 (1980), lv den 411 Mich 897 (1981), this Court held that a new products liability statute should apply to an action remanded for new trial by the Supreme Court on another, unrelated issue. In McAvoy v HB Sherman Co, 401 Mich 419; 258 NW2d 414 (1977), and in Sherberneau v Metropolitan Life Ins Co, 44 Mich App 339; 205 NW2d 213 (1973), retroactive application of a statute was an issue below. In Denham v Bedford, 407 Mich 517; 287 NW2d 168 (1980), and in Selk v Detroit Plastic Products, 120 Mich App 135; 328 NW2d 15 (1982), one party challenged the retroactive application of a statute which, it was argued, had an effect on some substantive right. The Courts in these cases found that the challenged statute affected only a remedial or procedural right and was therefore to be retroactively applied. None of the above cases stand for the proposition that post-trial amendments to procedural statutes automatically require remand for a new trial.
In this case, neither party challenged the validity of the statute at trial nor did the trial court erroneously construe or apply it. We thus hold that the trial court did not err in excluding evidence of the defendant's blood type at trial and we decline to remand on the basis of the amended statute alone.
Because we find no need to remand for a new hearing, we decline to address the technically moot issue of whether defendant's failure to answer plaintiffs interrogatories precludes him from testifying at trial. GCR 1963, 302.2(1). Defendant did not answer plaintiffs interrogatories but neither did he testify at trial.
Finally, we cannot say that the trial court's findings leave us with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. Tuttle v Dep't of State Highways, 397 Mich 44, 46; 243 NW2d 244 (1976); Precopio v Detroit, 415 Mich 457, 462; 330 NW2d 802 (1982). Defendant's mother testified at the hearing that plaintiff had admitted on at least two occasions that she was uncertain of whether defendant or another man was the father of her son. Matters of witness credibility are best left for the trier of fact. GCR 1963, 517.1.
Affirmed.
R. I. Cooper, J., concurred.