Case Name: HANCOCK ADVERTISING, INC., Appellant, v. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1989-09-26
Citations: 549 So. 2d 1086
Docket Number: No. 88-480
Parties: HANCOCK ADVERTISING, INC., Appellant, v. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, Appellee.
Judges: Before SCHWARTZ, C.J., and NESBITT and BASKIN, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 549
Pages: 1086–1093

Head Matter:
HANCOCK ADVERTISING, INC., Appellant, v. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, Appellee.
No. 88-480.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
Sept. 26, 1989.
Papy, Weissenborn & Papy and James McMaster, Miami, for appellant.
Gregory G. Costas and Thomas H. Bate-man, III, Orlando, for appellee.
Before SCHWARTZ, C.J., and NESBITT and BASKIN, JJ.

Opinion:
SCHWARTZ, Chief Judge.
Hancock Advertising, Inc. appeals from a final order of the Department of Transportation (DOT) requiring the removal of an outdoor advertising sign Hancock had erected near the intersection of Interstate 95 (1-95) and State Road 836 (Dolphin Expressway) in the City of Miami. Since the DOT has authority over the sign only if it is located "on" 1-95 within the meaning of section 479.07(1), Florida Statutes (1987), see § 479.07(9)(a)l., the dispositive issue is whether that is in fact the case. Contrary to the DOT's position, we hold that it is "on" the expressway rather than the interstate and therefore reverse the decision below.
The sign in dispute is the easterly section of a two part billboard which lies slightly to the west of and parallel to 1-95 and to the north and perpendicular to State Road 836. We are concerned with the easterly-facing half of the sign, that is, the one which motorists traveling west on 836 face head on. While it is visible from 1-95, those going either north or south would have to turn their heads to view the message. The following diagram, oversimplified but sufficient for the purpose, illustrates the situation:
After a complicated process in which a representative of the DOT initially indicated that no permit was required, Hancock erected the sign in reliance on that representation, and a hearing examiner subsequently determined that the sign was un authorized, the secretary of the DOT held in the order on review that:
[Bjecause the subject sign is immediately adjacent to Interstate 95, visible from the main-traveled way of Interstate 95 and erected without a permit, the subject sign should be removed pursuant to Section 479.105(1), Fla.Stat. (1985).
We do not agree.
Contrary to the DOT's apparent conclusion that the issue turns on whether the billboard is "adjacent to" or "visible from" 1-95, the statutory authority to regulate the sign, since it is inside the limits of the City of Miami, depends entirely on whether it is "on" 1-95 as opposed, it follows, to being on SR-836. § 479.07(1), Fla. Stat. (1987). Since there is no statutory definition of the word "on," we must exercise our judicial responsibility to resolve the issue ourselves. L.B. Price Mercantile Co. v. Gay, 44 So.2d 87, 90 (Fla.1950). In doing so by holding that the sign is not on 1-95, we primarily apply one of the most basic rules of statutory construction, which is peculiarly applicable here: that a legisla-five word, including a deceptively simple one like "on," must be given its ordinary and commonly accepted meaning, 49 Fla. Jur.2d Statutes § 123 (1984), as it is used in the particular statutory context. See 49 Fla.Jur.2d Statutes § 123; 73 Am.Jur.2d Statutes § 213 (1974).
In the present setting of a street location, it seems clear that when one speaks in ordinary usage of a structure being "on" a particular street, he means the roadway to which it fronts; that is, the one which has direct physical access to the structure in question. He does not mean a merely intersecting street or boulevard even if the building runs parallel to that roadway a short distance away and is peripherally visible to those upon it. Thus, if the issue were whether the building indicated on the following map is "on," in the sense of having an address "on," 1st St. or 3rd Ave., no one would question that the structure is "on" the street.
See The American Heritage Dictionary (2d College ed. 1982) ("on . 1. Used to indicate: . c. Location at or along: a house on the beach, d. Proximity: a town on the border"). The present issue requires the same conclusion.
Our view is supported by the practical construction which has in fact been adopted by the industry which we are entitled to consider in our resolution of the statutory interpretation problem before us. 49 Fla.Jur.2d Statutes § 116; see Calio v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 169 So.2d 502 (Fla. 3d DCA 1964). The record shows that, consistent with the common practice in the business, the particular sign involved here was treated indeed as being located "on" State Road 836, and not Interstate 95. Specifically, the traffic count and the charges made for advertising on the billboard were computed according to the number of vehicles directly facing the sign driving on State Road 836, without regard to those who could see the sign only out of the corner of their eyes while traveling on Interstate 95. There is no reason why our view of § 479.07(1) should differ from those in the day-to-day business of dealing with its subject matter.
In sum, we hold that no matter what its proximity to or visibility from the Interstate, the advertising sign in question can be said only to be "on" State Road 836, and not "on" 1-95.
The final order under review is therefore
Reversed.
NESBITT, J., concurs.
. 479.07 Sign permits.—
(1) Except as provided in s. 479.16, a person may not erect, operate use, or maintain, or cause to be erected, operated, used, or maintained, any sign on the State Highway System outside an incorporated area or on any portion of the interstate or federal-aid primary highway system without first obtaining a permit for the sign from the department and paying the annual fee as provided in this section, [e.s.]
. (9)(a) A permit shall not be granted for any sign for which a permit had not been granted by the effective date of this act unless such sign is located at least:
1. One thousand five hundred feet from any other permitted sign on the same side of the highway, if on ah interstate highway.
. Among other reasons, this clear and unjustified deviation from the terms of the statute renders inapplicable the rule that a contemporaneous administrative statutory construction is entitled to substantial judicial deference. See Green v. Wisner, 119 So.2d 814, 815 (Fla. 2d DCA 1960) ("Administrative custom cannot prevail, where, in a particular case, it is found to be in clear conflict with the law judicially construed in relation to established facts."); see also Daniel v. Florida State Turnpike Auth., 213 So.2d 585, 587 (Fla.1968); Green v. Hood, 120 So.2d 223, 226 (Fla. 2d DCA 1960).
Furthermore, since the DOT's decision below results in, we think, an unauthorized arrogation of power to itself, the issue is governed by the contrary rule that:
We are always reluctant to disagree with an administrative body in its interpretation of the statute which it has the duty to administer; and, of course, the orders of the Florida Commission come to this court with a presumption of regularity, Sec. 364.20, Fla.Stat., F.S.A. But we cannot apply such presumption to support the exercise of jurisdiction where none has been granted by the Legislature. If there is a reasonable doubt as to the lawful existence of a particular power that is being exercised, the further exercise of the power should be arrested. Edgerton v. International Company, Fla. 1956, 89 So.2d 488. See also State v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 1928, 96 Fla. 392, 118 So. 478. [e.s.]
Radio Tel. Communications, Inc. v. Southeastern Tel. Co., 170 So.2d 577, 582 (Fla.1965).
Finally, it is our ultimate determination that the DOT's finding that its statutory authorization applies to this billboard is "clearly erroneous" and thus, under any formulation of the doctrine, may not be followed. See Daniel v. Florida State Turnpike Auth., 213 So.2d at 587; State v. Florida Dev. Comm'n, 211 So.2d 8, 12 (Fla.1968); 49 Fla.Jur.2d Statutes § 163, at 196 n. 25 (1984).
. In the case of a word like "on," resort to dictionary definitions, which may be appropriate or even determinative in other areas, see Florida Dep't of Revenue v. DeMaria, 338 So.2d 838, 840 (Fla.1976), is, to say the least, not very helpful here. The Oxford English Dictionary (1933) gives no fewer than forty-three definitions of the word. Its most common use seems to be the one in the sense of "the book is on the table." Obviously, however, the billboard need not be located "on" 1-95 in this respect to come within section 479.07(1), Florida Statutes (1987). Similarly, the only previous Florida judicial construction of "on," in Jerome H. Sheip Co. v. Amos, 100 Fla. 863, 874-876, 130 So. 699, 704 (1930), concerned the phrase "tax on petroleum products" which was held to mean "with respect or pertaining to." Again, the irrelevance of this holding to our question serves to emphasize the significance of the particular milieu in which the legislature employs a given word or expression. Compare Smith v. Powell, 293 N.C. 342, 238 S.E.2d 137 (1977) (driver who operated car on land beneath bridge was not driving "on highway" under statute providing for breathalyzer test); State v. Jarvis, 145 Vt. 8, 482 A.2d 65 (1984) (defendant who drove into parking lot along public highway was operating a motor vehicle "on a highway" under statute prohibiting driving while intoxicated); Chatham v. Brain-erd, 11 Conn. 60 (1835) (description of land as bounded "easterly on highway" gives title to center of highway), as cited in Annot., Boundary — Title to Center of Highway, 2 A.L.R. 6, at 27 (1919).