Case Name: Jeremiah Murphy, v. The Executors of Isaac Guion, dec.
Court: Supreme Court of North Carolina
Jurisdiction: North Carolina
Decision Date: 1813-01
Citations: 2 Mur. 238
Docket Number: 
Parties: Jeremiah Murphy, v. The Executors of Isaac Guion, dec.
Judges: 
Reporter: North Carolina Reports
Volume: 6
Pages: 238–240

Head Matter:
Jeremiah Murphy, v. The Executors of Isaac Guion, dec.
From Craven.
In an action of trespass for mesne profits, the Defendant pleaded the statute of limitations. The action was brought two years after the decision of tine action of ejectment, in which the demise had expired before the decision. Held, that the Plaintiff was entitled to recover for the whole term, from the commencement of the demise to the taking of possession, it being eleven years.
The action for mesne profits does not accrue until possession is given after judgment in the action of ejectment, and from that time only, the statute of limitations begins to run.
This was an action of trespass for mesne profits. The Defendants pleaded “ the general issue, and statute of limitations.” The Plaintiff replied, and issue being joined, the case came on to be tried, when the jury found the issue for the Plaintiff, subject to the opinion of the Court upon the following points, to wit: Whether the Plaintiff in tills action, brought two years after the deci sion of an ejectment in his favour, in which the demise laid had expired before the decision, ought to recover for the whole sum, from the commencement of the demise to the taking of possession, being eleven years. No formal judgment was entered in the ejectment.
The case, was argued by Gaston for the Plaintiff and Harris for the defendant, and

Opinion:
Haii, Judge,
delivered the opinion of the Court:
It has been alleged for the Defendants, that the Plaintiff ought to be barred, because he had it in his power at any time he pleased to make an entry on the land in question; by virtue of which entry, and his having a better title than the Defendant, the law would have adjudged him in possession ; and being so in possession, he might have had the same redress by action that he now seeks. Admitting that he might have taken this step, yet the law allowed him to choose the course he has taken of bringing an ejectment, and by that means possessing himself of the premises. And this mode of redress ought not to be discouraged, because thereby, he is put in possession of the land under the sanction of the judgment of the Court. Until such possession, the action fop mesne profits does not accrue, and from that time only, the statute of limitations begins to run. It seems to be a very wrong construction of the act to say, that a recovery can be had for the profits of the land for the last three years only, next before the commencement of the action, when the action of ejectment may have been pending ten or more years, and the Defendant lias been in the receipt of the profits during all that time; and when an action could not be commenced for them, until after possession gained by the action of ejectment. It is true, there is a dictum in Buller's NisiPrius, 88, which seems to be sanctioned by some' other books; but no adjudged onsc is found on which it rests.
It is said, however, that no judgment has been formally entered up in the action of ejectment. We ail Jtnow that too little form is observed in our judicial pro-ceC(\¡ngS • but if the judgment has been entered in that action, as is usual in other similar cases, it must be deemed sufficient. As to the expiration of the demise, it ought not now to be an objection, after the Plaintiff has obtained judgment in the action of ejectment, and been put in possession of the lands. Let judgment be entered for the Plaintiff, for the mesne-profits for clevcu years, as assessed by the Jury.