Case Name: Mark Manning against Zachariah Norwood
Court: Constitutional Court of South Carolina
Jurisdiction: South Carolina
Decision Date: 1818-05
Citations: 2 Mill 374
Docket Number: 
Parties: Mark Manning against Zachariah Norwood.
Judges: Grimké, Bay, JYott, and Johnson, J. concurred.
Reporter: South Carolina Law Reports
Volume: 9
Pages: 374–381

Head Matter:
Mark Manning against Zachariah Norwood.
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This was an action of assumpsit for a breach of warranty in not returning a negro, (Ned,) hired ky defendant of plaintiff, and for damages sustained by loss of labour, &c. J The facts proven that defendant hired the negro of Mrs. Manning, upon condition that her husband, the ° A plaintiff, agreed to the bargain. The plaintiff did agree to it, and defendant took the negro to Chester, but never returned him. The price agreed on was five dollars for the trip to Charles-A t°n- The five dollars were paid by the defendwjtness who proved the demand of the negro, after the defendant returned from Charleston, in 1806, also proved that the defendant said, “ what a damn fool he must be, who would not take such a negro to Chester for half his value.” It also appeared in evidence, that the plaintiff had possession of the negro for sixteen years. The witness understood the negro was to be returned on the return of the defendant from Charleston, and that he was worth about 500 dollars. The action was brought in 1814. The defendant then offered to prove that the person who was Mrs. Manning was not the plaintiff’s wife, but the wife of one William Heron, and that the negro was the property of Mark Williams, of North Carolina. But this -was not permitted by the presiding Judge, on the ground that the evi denee was irrelevant to the point in issue. The Jury found a verdict for the plaintiff for seven hundred and seventy-four dollars and seventy cents. The defendant now moves for a new trial, on the following grounds:
1st. That the Judge mistook the law in rejecting the testimony, which went to show that the woman with whom the defendant contracted was not the wife of the plaintiff
2d. In rejecting the testimony which went to prove that the negro was the property of Mark Williams.
3d. In stating to the Jury that although they could not give the plaintiff a verdict for the wages of the negro, but in this form of action they could give damages over and above the value of the negro, commensurate to the injury sustained by the plaintiff by the loss of labour. And,
4th. That he mistook the evidence, in saying that the contract was proven to have been made before the action brought.
It was contended on the part of the defendant, that if he had been permitted to prove that the woman, with whom the contract was made, was not the wife of the plaintiff, that that would have destroyed all privity of contract between the plaintiff and defendant, and, of course, have defeated the action; and that by proving that the property of the negro was in Mark Williams, the contract would have enured to his benefit; that damages ought not to be recovered in this action for the loss of labour, for the defendant might again be liable for the wages of the negr© in another action brought to recover them, to wjjich action this verdict could not be pleaded a bar.

Opinion:
The opinion of the Court was delivered by
Mr. Justice Colcock.
On the first ground, I held it immaterial whether the person with whom the contract was made was the wife of the plaintiff or not; because the contract was afterwards confirmed by the plaintiff himself, and the money actually paid to him. It then became his contract: and there is such a privity between the plaintiff and defendant as will support the action.
On the second ground, I am of opinion that defendant having hired the negro of the plaintiff, he thereby acknowledged his right of property, and that he cannot now be permitted to question it. There is a strong analogy between this case and the case of a landlord and tenant: it is a universal rule, that a tenant shall not be permitted to set up an objection to the title of his landlord under whom he holds, This is not a mere technical rule, hut one founded in public convenience and policy, Strange, 818; 1 Modern, 411; Lord Raymond, 1550: and in my mind, the principle of policy and convenience applies ae strongly, (if not more so,) to personal as to real property; possession is prima fads evidence of a right. In this case, the long possession war* more than prima facie evidence; for, except as to minors, it was such as would have established a complete title in the plaintiff. Possession being so important, such an artifice cannot be ted to divest one of it. Again, as a rule of public convenience and policy, it should apply; for otherwise no degree of human prudence or foresight would be sufficient to protect the rights of our citizens. In fact, to permit the defendant to question the right of the plaintiff, would be to permit him to take advantage of his own wrong, in the fullest extent; but I conceive it might be admitted, without prejudice to the case, that the negro was not the plaintiff's, for the action is for a breach of warranty in not returning him. The negro, however, was the plaintiff's. On the third ground, I am of opinion that the charge of the Judge was correct; the Jury were bound to take into consideration the loss of the labour of the negro. It constituted as just and legal a ground for damages as the value of the negro, and is inseparably connected with it. The action is assumpsit for a breach of warranty, and the immediate injury resulting from this breach was to be compensated; for the loss of the negro involved the loss of labour. I take it for granted,* that the Jury were satisfied with the testimony of the witness, who said, he understood the negro was to be returned; but if that evidence had not been given, I, am of opinion that the hiring for a particular purpose, implied a warranty to return the negro, when the purpose was answered, or in a reasonable time, rj-^ ¿jeman(j was made after the defendant returned from town, and no reason assigned why the return was not made. On the last ground, I think the testimony conclusive. The demand was proven to have been made in 1806. The hiring was then acknowledged, and the money paid; the action was not brought until 1814. It is, therefore, clear that the cause of action did exist before the action brought. Upon the whole, I think the plaintiff entitled to recover. It is obvious, that the defendant had entered into a combination with the pretended owner of the negro, to gain the possession of him: he resorts to a most dishonourable mean of accomplishing his object; and his own expression, " That he would be a d — n fool, who would not carry a negro to Chester for half his worth," leaves no room to doubt that he was remunerated for the fraud. I am, therefore, against the motion.
Grimké, Bay, JYott, and Johnson, J. concurred.