Case Name: Lewis Buffett, Respondent, v. The Troy and Boston Railroad Company, Appellants
Court: New York Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1869-03-20
Citations: 40 N.Y. 168
Docket Number: 
Parties: Lewis Buffett, Respondent, v. The Troy and Boston Railroad Company, Appellants.
Judges: 
Reporter: New York Reports
Volume: 40
Pages: 168–180

Head Matter:
Lewis Buffett, Respondent, v. The Troy and Boston Railroad Company, Appellants.
A railroad company, authorized by its charter, to construct and operate a railroad between T and the State line at P, had constructed and was operating such road. On the line of the road, was a station S, distant about a mile from the village of S. The railroad company hired one D, for a daily compensation, to run stages between the village and the station, carrying passengers to and from the railroad. D was supplied by the company with, and sold railroad tickets from S station to the various points on the railroad, generally when passengers arrived at the station, though, sometimes, while they were on the stage. The plaintiff, intending to proceed to T,by the railroad, got onboardD’s stage, atS village, and, by his direction, took his seat on the outside, the inside being' full. On its way to the station, the stage was negligently overturned and the plaintiff seriously injured. He had, at the time, bought no railroad ticket. In an action against the railroad company, to recover for these injuries—Held (James, J., dissenting), that, from these facts, a jury were authorized to find, that the plaintiff had, at the time of the accident, become a passenger for transportation, by the railroad company, to T, and was entitled to the protection and care from them due to a passenger.
Held further (James, J., dissenting), that whether the contract by the railroad company, to transport passengers by stage, outside of then line, was ultra mres or not, they were liable for the consequences of their negligence, in executing such contract.
Bissell v. Michigan Southern and Mortim'n Indiana Railroad Company (33 K Y., 258), followed.
(This cause was argued on the 15th day of January, 1869,
and decided on the 20th day of March, 1869.)
This action was brought to recover damages for injuries .sustained by the plaintiff, by the overturning of a stage sleigh employed by the defendant, for the purpose of conveying passengers to and fro between the village of Schaghtiuoke Point, and the Schaghticoke Station, on defendant’s railroad, distant about a mile from the village.
The defendant was an incorporated company, authorized to construct, and operate a railroad from the city of Troy, to the State line of Vermont, at or near Pownal. Such raifroad passes about a mile from the village of Schaghticoke Point, at what is called Schaghticoke Station. Passengers on defendant’s railroad, going to or from the village of Schaghticoke Point had, ever since the opening of the road, been conveyed in omnibnsses, stage wagons, or sleighs, which, in going to the trains, ordinarily started from the upper end of the village, and passed down through the main street, stopping along for passengers. The conveyances used for this purpose were furnished by John Downs, who was, together with his conveyances, horses, and servants, hired by the defendant, at a daily compensation, to carry passengers between the village and the station, and was in the defendant’s employment for that purpose, at the time of the occurrence, out of which this action arose.
On the day of the occurrence (March 11th, 185Y), the plaintiff took passage at the lower end of the village of Schaghticoke Point, on the stage sleigh, then driven by one of Downs’ men, for the purpose of coming to Troy by defendant’s railroad. As the sleigh stopped, the driver told the plaintiff that it was full inside, and he (plaintiff) got on the outside.
The defendant had no ticket office at the village of Schaghticoke Point; but Downs sold tickets. Passengers generally purchased their tickets of Downs after reaching the depot, but, sometimes, at the village. The plaintiff had not purchased one on that occasion. Between the village and the depot, the sleigh was overturned, and the plaintiff received the injuries, for which this action was brought. Ho question is now made, but that the driver was guilty of negligence, which was the immediate cause of the overturning of the sleigh, nor that the plaintiff thereby sustained severe injuries.
When the plaintiff had rested, the defendant moved for a • nonsuit, on the following grounds:
1. That there was no proof of a contract to carry plaintiff as a passenger.
2. Ho money having been paid by plaintiff nor information given by him, that he designed to be a passenger, he did not become such, and defendants were not bound to him by contract or duty, and are not liable for the injuries in question.
3. Defendants are common carriers only by railroad, and had not power, under their, charter, to.contract to carry plaintiff from Schaghticoke Point, by stage, to Schaghticoke -Station ; and such, contract, if -made, is illegal and void.
4. Defendants are not estopped .from denying the obligation of a contract, which-they had no power to make.
The nonsuit .was .denied, .and the defendants excepted. The motion was renewed at the close of the evidence, on the same grounds, again-denied, and the defendant again excepted.
The court, among other things, charged the jury:
1. That the defendanthad a right to. employ Downs, and his .vehicles, to -transport passengers from Schaghticoke Point to the Station, and from the. Station to the Point, and that this .was legitimately connected with their business of railroad transportation. The defendants excepted.
2. That the defendant might lawfully contract -to carry railroad passengers from Schaghticoke village to the Station, and might lawfully employ stages for . such purpose. The defendants excepted.
3. That it was a question-of fact for the jury, whether the ■plaintiff became a passenger with .the defendants, and the burthen of proof was -with the plaintiff.
The jury rendered a verdict for $450, damages, upon which judgment was .perfected on the 22d of June, 1860.
This judgment was affirmed .by the G-eneral Term of-the third district, and the defendant now appeals to ftbia court.
John JET. Reynolds, for the appellant.
William A. Beach, for the respondent.

Opinion:
Hunt, Ch. J.
The objections, in their .various forms, ' resolve themselves into two inquiries: 1st. Was there evidence, sufficient to be submitted to the jury, that the plaintiff had •become a passenger with the defendants, under an agreement, express -or implied, for his transportation ? -2d. Could the defendants lawfully enter .into such an agreement, under -the circumstances .stated;?
On the first question, the facts are as follows: That the defendants rnn this stage sleigh to carry passengers, between the station at Schaghticoke and the village of the same name, about one mile distant; that it was the practice to start the stage at the upper end of the village, picking up passengers as it proceeded down the street; that the driver was furnished with railroad tickets, by the company, and sold them to passengers, usually, after their arrival at the station, but sometimes at the village; that the plaintiff, on this occasion, rode on the sleigh towards the station, for the purpose of taking a passage to the city of Troy, but was injured before reaching the station.
This stage was a part of the transporting arrangements of the defendants, in connection with their railroad. That was its sole purpose. It was one link in the chain of passenger carriage, between the village of Schaghticoke and the other towns on the line of the defendants' road. It is, no doubt, the law, that one taking his seat in a railroad car, for transportation, becomes a passenger, entitled to full protection in his rights as such, from the starting of the car, although he has not purchased a ticket or paid his fare. He is bound to pay whenever called upon by the collector, and taking his seat, thus to be transported, is evidence of an agreement, on his part, to be thus transported, and of a promise to pay the legal demand therefor. (22 N. Y. R., 307; 15 N. Y. R., 444.) It is no answer to this to say, that he has not formally announced to the company that he wished to become such passenger, or that he has not stated to what point he wished to be carried. This information may be communicated to the company when the call is made by the collector for the fare; and his continuance in the conveyance, is evidence that he certainly wishes to go farther than he has gone when he is thus called upon. It is also evidence of his promise to pay for such further transportation. The plaintiff's position was the same, as if he had been in the railroad car of the defendants. He was in the conveyance provided by the defendants, in connection with their cars, and, by which, a journey from the village of Schaghticoke to the city of Troy might be completed. This was the purpose for which he started, as he testified without objection. I think these facts justified a submission to the jmy of the question, whether the plaintiff had become a passenger with the defendants under an agreement for transportation, and that the verdict of the jury on that question cannot be assailed.
The next question is, was it within the power of the defendants to make such an agreement ? The objection is made, ' that the defendants, being incorporated to carry passengers between Troy and Pownal, have no power, or authority, to enter into contracts for transportation on, or over, any territory not included between those points, and that their authority is to transport by railroad, and not by stage. • These objections have been fully .considered in the cases already decided in this court. Hart v. The Rensselaer and Saratoga, R. R. Co. (4 Seld., 37), decided, that where a company made a contract for transportation of persons and property, beyond its own line, and over the line of another company, it was responsible for a failure to perform such contract. Quimby v. Vanderbilt (17 N. Y., 306), is to the same effect. The action, however, was against an individual, and not against a, corporation. In Bissell v. The Michigan Southern and N. I. R. R. Co. (22 N. Y.. R., 258), where a passenger was injured, upon being transported beyond the authorized lines of the defendants, the same result was reached. Elaborate opinions were delivered by Comstock, Ch. J., who held that the defendants were liable upon the contract specifically, as a contract; and by Selden, J., who held the contract to be vlt/ra vines and void, but that the defendants were liable for their negligence, independent of any existing contract. With out settling upon which ground the liability should be placed, the court had no difficulty in determining that they were-liable. The case, therefore, is a clear authority in favor of' the plain tiff here. (See, also, Cary v. Cleveland, and Toledo R. R. Co., 29 Barb., 35; Weed v. S. and S. R. R. Co., 19 Wend., 534.)
There can be no room for doubt on these eases, that where .
a corporation undertakes a transportation beyond its chartered line of railroad, and an injury to the person occurs, through the negligence of their agents, that the corporation is liable in damages. Whether this injury occurred upon another railroad track, or upon a common road used by them in the same business, would seem to be quite unimportant. The principle being established, that they are liable for injuries occurring at the point in question, all else follows. A break or loss of a bridge, often compels a railroad company to transport its passengers a short distance, by stage or boat, around the obstruction. It could not be successfully contended, that they were not bound to care in this transportation, or that they were not responsible for the want of it.
Judgment should be affirmed with costs.