Case Name: Frank M. MILLER, Jr., Appellant, v. Peter J. FENTON, Superintendent, Rahway State Prison, Irwin I. Kimmelman, Attorney General, State of New Jersey, Appellees
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 1984-08-17
Citations: 741 F.2d 1456
Docket Number: No. 83-5530
Parties: Frank M. MILLER, Jr., Appellant, v. Peter J. FENTON, Superintendent, Rah-way State Prison, Irwin I. Kimmelman, Attorney General, State of New Jersey, Appellees.
Judges: 
Reporter: Federal Reporter 2d Series
Volume: 741
Pages: 1456–1486

Head Matter:
Frank M. MILLER, Jr., Appellant, v. Peter J. FENTON, Superintendent, Rah-way State Prison, Irwin I. Kimmelman, Attorney General, State of New Jersey, Appellees.
No. 83-5530.
United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.
Argued Jan. 24, 1984.
Decided Aug. 17, 1984.
Rehearing and Rehearing In Banc Denied Sept. 28, 1984.
Joseph H. Rodriquez, Public Defender, Claudia Van Wyk (Argued), Paul M. Klein, Asst. Deputy Public Defenders, East Orange, N.J., for appellant.
Irwin I. Kimmelman, Atty. Gen. Arlene R. Weiss (Argued), Deputy Atty. Gen., Division of Criminal Justice, Trenton, N.J., for appellees.
Before GIBBONS and BECKER, Circuit Judges, and ATKINS, District Judge.
Honorable C. Clyde Atkins, United States District Judge for the Southern District of Florida, sitting by designation.

Opinion:
OPINION OF THE COURT
BECKER, Circuit Judge.
This is a habeas corpus case brought by Frank M. Miller, Jr., who was convicted in New Jersey state court of the murder of Deborah Margolin. In his habeas corpus petition, Miller alleges that his confession to the murder was involuntary, because the police detective's mode of questioning created psychological pressure that induced him to confess against his will. The New Jersey Supreme Court held that the record supported the trial court's conclusion that Miller's confession was "voluntary," and thus admissible under the controlling precedents. We have carefully reviewed the record and conclude that the factual findings of the state court are supported by the record. We therefore conclude that we must accord these findings the presumption of correctness provided for in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). See Patterson v. Cuyler, 729 F.2d 925 (3d Cir.1984). Given the findings and the presumption, we cannot say as a matter of law that the mode of interrogation used by the detective who questioned Miller rendered the confession involuntary, and accordingly we will affirm the judgment of the district court denying Miller's application for the writ of habeas corpus.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On August 13, 1973, at about 11:30 a.m., while Deborah Margolin was sunbathing on the porch of her home in rural East Amwell Township, a stranger approached in an automobile and informed her that he had seen a heifer loose at the bottom of the driveway. The stranger offered to help her retrieve the cow. Ms. Margolin declined the offer of help, and then proceeded alone in her brother's automobile to retrieve the heifer. Her brother found the automobile about half an hour later; the keys had been left in the ignition.
When Ms. Margolin failed to return by late afternoon, her family commenced searching for her. Her father eventually found her dead, face down in a creek, with her throat and breast cut. The New Jersey State Police were then called. A number of troopers and detectives arrived on the scene at about 7:30 P.M., and took a description of the car and the stranger from the victim's brothers, who had seen him drive up. Miller, who lived nearby and was known to the troopers, had been convicted in 1969 of carnal abuse and arrested in 1973 for statutory rape. One of the officers, Trooper Scott, recalled that Miller drove a car that matched the one described by the victim's brothers — an old white car with the trunk tied shut and two dents in the side. Detective Boyce of the State Police confirmed the descriptions of the car and also concluded that the description of the stranger given by the victim's brothers matched Miller's general physical characteristics.
The police located Miller at his place of employment, P.F.D. Plastics in Trenton, at about 10:50 P.M. on the evening of the murder, and questioned him there. Miller agreed to accompany the officers to the police barracks for further questioning, and, without being searched, turned his penknife over to the officers. After spending about seventy-five minutes in the barracks kitchen with Trooper Scott, during which he was not questioned, Miller was taken into an interrogation room by Detective Boyce and read his Miranda rights. Miller signed the Miranda card, and specifically asked Boyce for a clarification of his right to terminate questioning, which Boyce gave him.
The state police made a tape recording of Miller's statement. Boyce spoke in a soft and friendly — even sympathetic — voice. He thus presented himself as a "nice guy," friendly to the suspect and interested in solving his problems. In response to Boyce's questions, Miller first described his activities on the morning of August 13. Boyce then pointed out various discrepancies in Miller's story about how he passed the time during which the murder occurred, the similarity between the description of the car given by the victim's brothers and Miller's car, and other incriminating evidence. At that point, Miller weakened:
BOYCE: Now, what would your conclusion be under those circumstances, if someone told you that?
MILLER: I'd probably, uh, have the same conclusion you got.
BOYCE: Which is what?
MILLER: That I'm the guy that, that did this.
BOYCE: That did what?
MILLER: Committed this crime.
After this, Boyce shifted gears. Boyce stated that in his opinion, Miller wasn't a "criminal," and that he didn't have a "criminal mind." Rather, Boyce asserted that Miller had a "problem," for which he needed help, not punishment. Boyce then led Miller to talk about his need for help, the psychiatric treatment he received as a condition of his parole from a prior conviction, and his recent statutory rape arrest.
With this background out on the table, Boyce began appealing to Miller's conscience:
B. Okay, listen Frank, If I promise to, you know, do all I can with the psychiatrist and everything, and we get the proper help for you, and get the proper help for you, will you talk to me about it?
M. I can't talk to you about something I'm not .
B. Alright, listen Frank, alright, honest. I know, I know what's going on inside you, Frank. I want to help you, you know, between us right now. I know what [sic] going on inside you. Frank, you've got to come forward and tell me that you want to help yourself. You've got to talk to me about it. This is the only way we'll be able to work it out. I mean, you know, listen, I want to help you, because you are in my mind, you are not responsible. You are not responsible, Frank, Frank, Frank, what's the matter?
M. I feel bad.
B. Frank, listen to me, honest to God, I'm, I'm telling you, Frank, (inaudible). I know, it's going to bother you, Frank, it's going to bother you. It's there, it's not going to go away, it's there. It's right in front of you, Frank. Am I right or wrong?
M. Yeah.
Miller then began, step by step, to make damaging admissions concerning his participation in the murder. At first, he insisted that, although he was with the victim when she was killed, some unknown stranger had actually committed the crime while they were searching for the heifer. Miller insisted that he had tried to get help, but that, when he realized the victim was dead, he had panicked and dropped the body off. Boyce allowed this much to come out, but then challenged Miller, saying "[y]ou killed this girl, didn't you." Miller again denied having committed the crime, after which Boyce changed gears again, telling Miller— again in soft, pleading tones — that he could only be helped if he "told the truth" — admitted the crime. The following exchange then took place.
B. Honest, Frank? It's got to come out. You can't leave it in. It's hard for you, I realize that, how hard it is, how difficult it is, I realize that, but you've got to help yourself before anybody else can help you. And we're going to see to it that you get the proper help. This is our job, Frank. This is our job. This is what I want to do.
M. By sending me back down there.
B. Wait a second now, don't talk about going back down there. First thing we have to do is let it all come out. Don't fight it because it's worse, Frank, it's worse. It's hurting me because I feel it. I feel it wanting to come out, but it's hurting me, Frank. You're my brother, I mean we're brothers. All men on this, all men on the face of this earth are brothers, Frank, but you got to be completely honest with me.
M. I'm trying to be, but you don't want to believe me.
B. I want to believe you, Frank, but I want you to tell me the truth, Frank, and you know what I'm talking about and I know what you're talking about. You've got to tell me the truth. I can't help you without the truth.
M. I'm telling you the truth. Sure, that's her blood in the car because when I seen the way she was cut I wanted to help her, and then when she fell over I got scared to even be involved in something like this, being on parole and .
B. I realize this, Frank, it may have been an accident. Isn't that possible, Frank? Isn't that possible?
M. Sure, it's possible.
B. Well, this is what I'm trying to bring out, Frank. It may be something that, that you did that you can't be held accountable for. This is, I can help you, I can help you once you tell me the truth. You know what I'm talking about. I want to help you, Frank. I like you. You've been honest with me. You've been sincere and I've been the same way with you. Now this is the kind of relationship we have, but I can't help you unless you tell me the complete truth. I'll listen to you. I understand, Frank. You have to believe that, I understand. I understand how you feel. I understand how much it must hurt you inside. I know how you feel because I feel it too. Because some day I may be in the same situation Frank, but you've got to help yourself. Tell me exactly what happened, tell me the truth, Frank, please.
M. I'm trying to tell you the truth.
B. Let me help you. It could have been an accident. You, you've got to tell me the truth, Frank. You know what I'm talking about. I can't help without the truth. Now you know and I know that's, that's, that's all that counts, Frank. You know and I know that's what counts, that's what it's all about. We can't hide it from each other because we both know, but you've got to be willing to help yourself. You know, I don't think you're a criminal. You have this problem like we talked about before, right?
M. Yeah, you, you say this now, but this thing goes to court and everything and you .
B. No, listen to me, Frank, please listen to me. The issue now is what happened. The issue now is truth. Truth is the issue now. You've got to believe this, and the truth prevails in the end, Frank. You have to believe that and I'm sincere when I'm saying it to you. You've got to be truthful with yourself.
Miller then began disgressing, talking about how he was "framed" by a detective in connection with his prior conviction and put in prison, and how "this is going to kill my father." Boyce continued to redirect Miller toward the murder, and finally the confession came out. The entire interrogation lasted about fifty-eight minutes. There were no threats or explicit promises made, and no physical coercion. Miller, who was coherent throughout the questioning, passed out at the end.
The state trial court refused to suppress the confession, and Miller was convicted after a four-day trial. A three-judge panel of the Appellate Division of the New Jersey Superior Court reversed unanimously, stating "we deplore the techniques and tactics which extracted this confession and which, in our judgment, denied defendant due process of law." The court's opinion, which is principally composed of quotes from the interrogation transcript, characterizes Boyce's method of interrogation as "psychological pressure," and in a short conclusion invoked the "the fair winds of due process" which "blow on the guilty as well as the innocent."
The New Jersey Supreme Court, in a 4-3 decision, reversed the Appellate Division and reinstated the conviction. State v. Miller, 76 N.J. 392, 388 A.2d 218 (1978). The court stated the appropriate legal standard:
Every case must turn on its particular facts. In determining the issue of volun-tariness, and whether a suspect's will has been overborne, a court should assess the totality of all the surrounding circumstances. It should consider the char-. acteristics of the suspect and the details of the interrogation. Some of the relevant factors include the suspect's age, education and intelligence, advice as to constitutional rights, length of detention, whether the questioning was repeated and prolonged in nature and whether physical punishment or mental exhaustion was involved. Schneckloth v. Bus-tamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 2047, 36 L.Ed.2d 854, 862 (1973). A suspect's previous encounters with the law has been mentioned as an additional relevant factor. State v. Puchalski, 45 N.J. 97, 101, 211 A.2d 370 (1965).
76 N.J. at 402, 388 A.2d at 223. The court then proceeded to make subsidiary findings on the relevant factors, and applying the "totality of the circumstances" standard, held that the use of the "friendly cop" approach by Boyce did not overbear Miller's will. The court relied primarily on the following facts: the interrogation was not excessively long, Boyce at no time misled Miller into thinking he was anything but an interrogating police officer, and Miller understood the significance and probable outcome of confessing to the killing of Deborah Margolin. Id. at 403-04, 388 A.2d at 224. The court held that "the interrogation in this case did not exceed the proper bounds and that the voluntariness of der fendant's confession could properly have been determined by the trial court to be established beyond a reasonable doubt." Id.
Miller petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey. The petition was referred to a magistrate, who recommended that the writ be denied. The district court agreed, rejecting Miller's contention that the psychological pressure created by the questioning made the confession involuntary in the constitutional sense. The district court held that, based on its independent review of the evidence, including the tape of the confession, Miller's will was not "overborne" by Boyce's questioning. The court adopted the magistrate's recommendation denying the writ of habe-as corpus and granting a certificate of probable cause. This appeal followed.
II. SCOPE OF REVIEW
Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), a state court factual finding is entitled to a "presumption of correctness" in a federal habeas corpus proceeding unless one of eight enumerated exceptions apply. The first seven exceptions, which go to the procedural adequacy of the state proceedings, are not applicable to this case. The eighth exception, which we address below, applies where a factual conclusion is not adequately supported by the record as a whole.
The controlling case on the application of the eighth exception in this context is Pat terson v. Cuyler, 729 F.2d 925 (3d Cir. 1984). Patterson's principal holding is that a decision of a state court concerning the voluntariness of a waiver of Miranda rights is entitled to the "presumption of correctness." Writing for the court, Judge Sloviter analyzed four recent Supreme Court decisions emphasizing the great deference due to state court factual findings in habeas corpus proceedings. See Rushen v. Spain, — U.S.-, 104 S.Ct. 453, 78 L.Ed.2d 267 (1983) (biased nature of jury deliberations is a finding of fact; presumption of correctness applies); Maggio v. Fulford, 462 U.S. 111, 103 S.Ct. 2261, 76 L.Ed.2d 794 (1983) (presumption applies to competence to stand trial); Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422, 103 S.Ct. 843, 74 L.Ed.2d 646 (1983) (presumption applies to voluntariness of a guilty plea); Sumner v. Mata, 455 U.S. 591, 102 S.Ct. 1303, 71 L.Ed.2d 480 (1982) (presumption applies to state of mind of witness in pre-trial photographic identification). On the basis of these cases, Judge Sloviter concluded that, contrary to our prior holdings, "mixed questions of law and fact" such as whether a confession is voluntary or not are subject to the presumption of correctness contained in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
Neither Patterson nor the recent Supreme Court decisions hold that we have lost our plenary power to review questions of federal law. Instead, the Court has mandated that we treat state-court factual findings dealing with a defendant's state of mind as such, and apply the presumption of correctness, even where that finding may be dispositive as a matter of law of the defendant's claim. Section 2254(d), of course, contains exceptions, the most important of which is that the presumption does not apply unless the factual findings are fairly supported by the record. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Thus, as we read Patterson and the recent Supreme Court cases which it interprets, our review is limited to determining whether the state court applied the proper legal test, and whether the factual conclusions reached by the state court are supported on the record as a whole; to the extent that our prior holdings gave us plenary review over state court findings as to state of mind, they are no longer valid.
The dissent complains bitterly that our opinion, which is, of course, informed by Patterson, reads recent decisions of the Supreme Court as effectively overruling, sub silento, fifty years of caselaw of that Court holding that the question whether a defendant's state of mind renders his confession involuntary is a question of law, over which we have plenary review in a habeas corpus case. The dissent may be correct on this point. Patterson is binding precedent, however, and we must apply it unless we find it distinguishable, which we do not. We note that Patterson's reading of the trend of the recent Supreme Court decisions has since been reinforced by the Court in Patton v. Yount, — U.S. -, -, 104 S.Ct. 2885, 2892 n. 12, 81 L.Ed.2d 847 (1984). At all events, we believe that Patterson was correctly decided and that its principles are applicable to voluntary confession cases.
The concept of voluntariness is not one that lends itself to easy description. In determining whether a confession is voluntary, a court must make three determinations. First, the court must find the subsidiary facts on which the ultimate conclusion must be based — the circumstances surrounding the defendant's confession. Second, the court must draw an inference as to the effect that those surrounding circumstances had on the defendant's mental processes. Third, the court must determine whether the mental processes which led the defendant to confess were such that the confession was "voluntary" within the constitutional standard. See Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 603, 81 S.Ct. 1860, 1879, 6 L.Ed.2d 1037 (1961). The dissent does not dispute that, in reviewing a finding of voluntariness, we must defer as to the state court's findings of the subsidiary facts, such as the circumstances of the questioning and the defendant's mental capacities, as long as they are supported by the evidence. There is also no dispute that we are free to review, on a plenary basis, the legal standard applied to the "state of mind" inference drawn by the state court. The disputed question in this case is whether the inference as to the defendant's state of mind should be treated as a separate factual conclusion, to which we must also defer, or whether it is so inextricably bound up with the legal standard that the two steps are really one, over which we have plenary review.
In the long series of cases cited by the dissent, the Supreme Court confronted confessions made under varying circumstances. These cases generally presented undisputed facts, including unrecorded interrogation of the defendant by police officers, long periods of questioning during which the defendant was denied sleep, access to counsel, or any other form of outside support, and often included disputes over whether physical force was used. The Court was consistently dubious that a confession given under these circumstances could be considered "voluntary"; yet state judges and juries were finding, on the basis of these facts, that confessions were voluntary. A precise legal definition of volun-tariness, however, remained elusive. As a result, the Court engaged in an independent, case-by-case review of the state courts' conclusions concerning voluntariness, on the basis of the subsidiary facts as found by the state court, and substituted its conclusion for that of the state courts.
The case which perhaps best highlights the Court's approach to this problem is one stressed by the dissent: Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 81 S.Ct. 1860, 6 L.Ed.2d 1037 (1961). In Culombe, the Court utilized the same three-stage analysis as we do here, but did not treat state court findings concerning the defendant's state of mind as binding. The court did not, however, base its holding on an unconstrained review of the state-of-mind finding. This is clear from a passage from Justice Frankfurter's opinion in Culombe which immediately follows the segments quoted by the dissent:
Great weight, of course, is to be accorded to the inferences which are drawn by the state courts. In a dubious case, it is appropriate with due regard to federal-state relations, that the state court's determination should control. But where on the uncontested external happenings, coercive forces set in motion by state law enforcement officials are unmistakably in action; where these forces, under all the prevailing states of stress, are powerful enough to draw forth a confession; where, in fact, the confession does come forth and is claimed by the defendant to have been extorted from him; and where he has acted as a man would act who is subjected to such an extracting process — where this is all that appears in the record — a State's judgment that the confession was voluntary cannot stand.
367 U.S. at 605, 81 S.Ct. at 1880-1881. Fairly speaking, the "inference" concerning the defendant's state of mind, therefore, was never considered a purely "legal" question; rather, it was viewed as a hybrid question, on which the state court's conclusion was entitled to some deference.
In recent years, the Supreme Court has shown considerable concern for segregating "factual" and "legal" issues for purposes of appellate review. See Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 287-88, 102 S.Ct. 1781, 1789-90, 72 L.Ed.2d 66 (1982) ("ultimate" findings of fact, which are dispositive of the legal issues involved, are entitled to deference under the "clearly erroneous" standard of Fed.R.Civ.P. 52(a)). The eases relied on by this court in Patterson extend that concern to habeas corpus review of state court criminal convictions. See also Patton v. Yount, — U.S. -, 104 S.Ct. 2885, 81 L.Ed.2d 847 (1984). Patterson found this trend generally applicable to constitutional questions that turn on a determination about a defendant's state of mind, and held that such determinations were ultimate questions of fact, rather than questions of law. We read the recent decisions of the Supreme Court, as interpreted by Patterson, as holding that the second stage of the Cu-lombe inquiry — that concerning the inference as to the defendant's state of mind— should no longer be considered a "legal" or "hybrid" question as it was in Culombe, but rather a question of "ultimate fact" in the sense of Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 102 S.Ct. 1781, 72 L.Ed.2d 66 (1982).
This increased concern with limiting the scope of review reflects a change of emphasis on the part of the Supreme Court. Before the Supreme Court's decision in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), the Court had used the "voluntariness" inquiry as a way to check outrageous interrogation practices by law enforcement agencies. Since Miranda, however, voluntariness inquiries have played a far less important role in court supervision of police practices. Before Miranda, the courts were frequently presented with confessions extracted by means of the "third degree." Since Miranda, however, voluntary confession cases turn more often on factors such as the individual defendant's intelligence and understanding of the proceedings. In these latter cases, state court determiná tion of state of mind will frequently be dispositive, if given deference by the federal courts in habeas corpus proceedings. The Supreme Court, clearly understood this in its recent decisions. These cases, therefore, appear to involve a policy decision by the Court to limit the scope of federal supervision of the interrogation process, as long as the police have complied with the prophylactic rules of Miranda.
Notwithstanding the dissent's hyperbole, the case before us today does not present the type of gross abuses of fundamental fairness that characterized many of the voluntariness cases which came before the Court in the years before its decision in Miranda; instead, it is typical of voluntary confession cases in the post-Miranda era. There was no secret interrogation in this case; indeed, the entire encounter was tape-recorded. The questioning was not pressed for a long period of time, and Miller was aware of his right to terminate it upon request. He was not denied food or other necessities, nor was he physically abused or threatened. We cannot say, and we doubt that the dissent would assert, that no confession made under the circumstances presented in this case could ever be "voluntary." Instead, we are asked to judge the effect of a particular set of circumstances on a particular defendant. This type of inquiry is one which seems to us to be peculiarly within the proper realm of the trier of fact.
We recognize that, in circumstances where the ultimate question of fact is one involving state of mind, it may be difficult to pinpoint the "factual" conclusion as to state of mind, and to state the "legal standard" in such a way as to make its application mechanistic. Under such circumstances, federal courts in habeas corpus cases must either review underlying conclusions about the defendant's state of mind as legal questions, or allow the fact-finding courts some leeway in applying legal standards to the facts of specific cases. Our reading of the recent Supreme Court decisions relied on in Patterson is that the Court has chosen to require strict adherence to the limited scope of review over facts, even where it would result in giving state trial courts some leeway in applying the constitutional standard.
Our decision does not leave the federal courts devoid of power to redress state court decisions which violate fundamental constitutional rights. The legal standard to be applied is a federal question. State courts must apply the federal constitution as it is interpreted by the federal courts, and they may not draw inferences as to a defendant's state of mind that are not supported by objective facts. But where, as here, the objective facts support a factual inference that the defendant's "state of mind" was such that the confession was voluntary within the meaning of the Constitution, it is not the role of the federal courts to second-guess the inference drawn by the state courts.
III. THE VOLUNTARINESS OF THE CONFESSION
The constitutional test for voluntariness involves a determination, on the totality of the circumstances, whether the confession was a product of the defendant's free will, or whether it was the product of interrogation, which resulted in the overbearing of the defendant's will. Sckneck-loth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973). In most instances, the controlling question is the defendant's state of mind — a question of fact. In this case, the New Jersey Supreme Court stated a number of subsidiary factual conclusions: that Miller was a man of reasonable intelligence who had experience with and understood the workings of the criminal justice system; that Miller's distress during the interview was a product of his realization of what he had done, not of coercive pressure by Boyce; that Miller was not deceived into believing that Boyce was anything other than a police officer investigating a serious crime for which Miller was the prime suspect; and, that Miller was well aware that, if he confessed, he would be handled through the criminal justice system. The court then concluded, on the basis of these findings, that Miller's confession was the product of his free will, rather than psychological coercion. 76 N.J. at 404, 388 A.2d at 224. Under § 2254(d), these conclusions are presumed to be correct, and we must accept them as long as they are fairly supported by the record ás a whole. We find that they are.
The most relevant part of the record in this case is the tape of Miller's interrogation and confession, and we must therefore analyze the confession tape to determine whether it supports the conclusion of the New Jersey Supreme Court. No objection is made to Boyce's confronting Miller with discrepancies in his explanation of where he was at the time of the murder, or with the statements of the victim's brothers describing the car that approached their home that morning and its driver. During the questioning, Boyce did lie in telling Miller that the victim had died only a few minutes beforehand, but this lie does not render the confession legally involuntary unless it undermined the "volun-tariness" of the confession under the totality of the circumstances. See Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 739, 89 S.Ct. 1420, 1424, 22 L.Ed.2d 684 (1969). Since the colloquy about the time of the victim's death did not seem to affect Miller at all, it cannot be said to have undermined the vol-untariness of the confession. Obviously, the fact that the interrogation was "sympathetic" rather than confrontational does not render it coercive. Similarly, to the extent that Boyce confronted Miller with the enormity of his crime, attempting to appeal to his conscience, the questioning is not objectionable, even though Boyce referred to the incident as a "problem" rather than a crime.
Miller's principal contention is that Boyce's repeated assertions that Miller did not have "a criminal mind," and that he needed help, rather than punishment, amounted to deception or psychological coercion which undermined the voluntariness of the confession. It is axiomatic that coercion need not be physical to render the confession involuntary; any coercion which denies the defendant the freedom to remain silent may be enough. See Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 496, 87 S.Ct. 616, 618, 17 L.Ed.2d 562 (1967). Psychological coercion is enough if, under the totality of the circumstances, it results in the overbearing of the defendant's will. All police practices that encourage defendants to confess, however, do not amount to psychological coercion. Our role is to review the nature of the questioning involved, accepting as true those findings of the state court that involve the defendant's state of mind, to determine whether the tactics used by Detective Boyce in this ease were unconstitutionally coercive.
The most substantial potential problem with the confession is that Boyce's questioning arguably implied that Miller would receive "help," not punishment, if he confessed. The use of promises by an interrogating officer can be sufficient to invalidate a confession. See Robinson v. Smith, 451 F.Supp. 1278, 1290 (W.D.N.Y. 1978), and cases cited therein. In general, however, promises by interrogators will not invalidate a confession unless they are sufficient to "overbear the defendant's will"— the general standard of voluntariness. See Fernandez-Delgado v. United States, 368 F.2d 34 (9th Cir.1966) (where defendant was told that any assistance to investigators would be brought to the attention of prosecutors, confession was not rendered inadmissible as a result); United States v. Ferrara, 377 F.2d 16 (2d Cir.), cert, denied, 389 U.S. 908, 88 S.Ct. 225, 19 L.Ed.2d 225 (1967) (where interrogator told defendant that if he cooperated with the government, he would be released on a reduced bail, the confession was not rendered involuntary); United States v. Glasgow, 451 F.2d 557 (9th Cir.1971) (per curiam) (where interrogator told defendant he would inform prosecutor if defendant cooperated, the confession was not necessarily rendered involuntary).
In this case, Miller showed a continuing recognition of the depth of the trouble that he was in and the consequences of telling Boyce the truth. Although Boyce stated that he felt Miller needed help, not imprisonment, this was only part of his approach. He also spoke to Miller about the need to tell the truth to purge his conscience, and continually intermixed his statements about Miller's "problem" with his appeals to conscience. The state court found that this questioning did not overbear Miller's will, and thus did not render the confession involuntary. As we have noted above, we conclude that the state court's determination as to the effect on Miller's state of mind was supported on the record as a whole.
IV. CONCLUSION
Under the caselaw on the question of voluntariness, the inquiry before us is whether the confession was "a product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice by its maker." Judging by this standard, in light of our restricted scope of review, we have concluded that Miller's confession was voluntary and hence admissible. The judgment of the district court will be affirmed.
. The adequacy of the Miranda warnings and waiver are not contested on appeal.
. We have listened to that tape, and have read the transcript as well (both are part of the record); hence, we are in a position to describe Detective Boyce's and Miller's mood and their relationship during the interrogation.
. In declining to suppress the confession, the trial court relied on the absence of an inducement.
. Miller was sentenced to life imprisonment.
. The quotes in this paragraph are taken from the unpublished opinion of the appellate division, State v. Miller, No. A-1275-73 (N.J.App. October 27, 1975).
. A certificate of probable cause is required to appeal from a decision of the district court denying a writ of habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2253.
. Subsection (d) reads as follows:
(d) In any proceeding instituted in a Federal court by an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court, a determination after a hearing on the merits of a factual issue, made by a State court of competent jurisdiction in a proceeding to which the applicant for the writ and the State or an officer or agent thereof were parties, evidenced by a written finding, written opinion, or other reliable and adequate written indicia, shall be presumed to be correct, unless the applicant shall establish or it shall otherwise appear, or the respondent shall admit—
(1) that the merits of the factual dispute were not resolved in the State court hearing;
(2) that the factfinding procedure employed by the State court was not adequate to afford a full and fair hearing;
(3) that the material facts were not adequately developed at the State court hearing;
(4) that the State court lacked jurisdiction of the subject matter or over the person of the applicant in the State court proceeding;
(5) that the applicant was an indigent and the State court, in deprivation of his constitutional right, failed to appoint counsel to represent him in the State court proceeding;
ip) that the applicant did not receive a full, fair, and adequate hearing in the State court proceeding; or
(7) that the applicant was otherwise denied due process of law in the State court proceeding;
(8) or unless that part of the record of the State court proceeding in which the determination of such factual issue was made, pertinent to a determination of the sufficiency of the evidence to support such factual determination, is produced as provided for hereinafter, and the Federal court on a consideration of such part of the record as a whole concludes that such factual determination is not fairly supported by the record:
And in an evidentiary hearing in the proceeding in the Federal court, when due proof of such factual determination has been made, unless the existence of one or more of the circumstances respectively set forth in paragraphs numbered (1) to (7) inclusive, is shown by the applicant, otherwise appears, or is admitted by the respondent, or unless the court concludes pursuant to the provisions of paragraph numbered (8) that the record in the State court proceeding, considered as a whole, . does not fairly support such factual determination, the burden shall rest upon the applicant to establish by convincing evidence that the factual determination by the State court was erroneous.
. See United States ex. rel. Hayward v. Johnson, 508 F.2d 322 (3d Cir.), cert, denied, 422 U.S. 1011, 95 S.Ct. 2637, 45 L.Ed.2d 675 (1975); United States ex rel. Rush v. Ziegele, 474 F.2d 1356, 1358-59 (3d Cir. 1973).
. As noted above, the first seven exceptions of § 2254(d), which go to the procedural adequacy of the state proceedings, are not at issue in this case.
. The dissent points to several "distinctions" between the voluntariness of Miranda waivers, the subject matter of Patterson, and the volun-tariness of confessions, but they are distinctions without a significant difference. Although a Miranda waiver itself is not exculpatory, any subsequent confession is likely to be, as is evidenced by this case, and the problems of ascertaining the defendant's state of mind are likely to be identical whether the "voluntariness" challenge is to the Miranda waiver or to the confession itself. It is doubtless for this reason that the Patterson panel encompassed confessions within its holding.
To the extent that the dissent is arguing that Patterson was incorrectly decided, it is arguing an issue that is not before us, but that may only be decided by this Court in banc or by the Supreme Court. See Third Circuit Internal Operating Procedures Ch. VIII(c).
. The dissent argues that Patton supports its position, relying on the fact that the Court in Patton listed a number of factors which favor deference to the trial court on the issue involved in that case: juror bias. The question before us, however, is not the wisdom of section 2254(d); it is, instead, whether the question of a defendant's state of mind at the time of his confession is a question of fact, or a "mixed question of law and fact." In Patton, which also required the application of a legal standard to an individual's state of mind, the Court held that the question of the juror's "state of mind" was a question of fact, on which the state court was entitled to deference. A similar inquiry is present in a voluntary confession case, and section 2254(d) is similarly applicable to the inference drawn by the state court concerning the defendant's state of mind.
. The extended discussion that follows is respective to the dissent. Patterson was a unanimous decision and there was no occasion for such comment.
. The question of the degree of deference to be given by a federal court to state-court determinations of subsidiary facts in a habeas case is not at issue in this case. The issue, rather, is what is a "fact" for purposes of review. The distinction raised by the dissent between direct-appeal cases and habeas corpus cases is therefore irrelevant to this case, since the issue of which determinations are "legal" and which are "factual" is the same in both contexts.
. As pointed out in footnote 6 of the dissent, statements in some of the Supreme Court confession cases that the Court would not be bound by factual findings dispositive of the federal issues are "overstatements." If any of the earlier cases were dependent on such reconsidera-tions of factual conclusions, those cases have been overruled. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 83 S.Ct. 745, 9 L.Ed.2d 770 (1963). Cf. Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 287-88, 102 S.Ct. 1781, 1789-90, 72 L.Ed.2d 66 (1982).
. The Court has made at least one exception, on policy grounds, to the limitation on appellate review inherent in the Pullman-Standard rule. See Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union, — U.S. -, 104 S.Ct. 1949, 80 L.Ed.2d 502 (1984). Judge Gibbons believes that a similar exception to § 2254(d) is implicit in the Supreme Court's treatment of the voluntary confession cases. See typescript at 17. We disagree. We believe that the "policies" cited by the dissent can be dealt with within the framework of the ordinary scope of review.
. In addition, the Court's decision in Miranda also served to increase the awareness of constitutional rights on the part of local police officers and state court judges, thereby reducing the number of outrageous cases and the need for federal review.
The dissent misrepresents our position when it says that we hold that Miranda compliance affects the scope of review in a habeas case over a state-court determination about a defendant's state of mind.' Our Miranda reference should rather be understood as an effort to explain the shift in the law. We add to this historical comment the assertion that, at the same time as Miranda was taking care of the worst abuses of police authority, the Court was becoming increasingly concerned with the explosion in the workload of the federal courts, particularly the appellate courts, and with the proper allocation of functions between the state and federal courts. E.g., Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 101 S.Ct. 1908, 68 L.Ed.2d 420 (1981). Given these developments, the Court has sought to limit the federal role to defining constitutional standards, and dictated that we defer to state courts in applying those standards where these applications are reasonable.
. The fact that the facts found in this case are taken from the opinion .of the New Jersey Supreme Court, rather than from a statement of findings by the trial court, does not vitiate the presumption of correctness. See Time, Inc. v. Firestone, .424 U.S. 448, 461, 96 S.Ct. 958, 968, 47 L-.Ed.2d 154 (1976); Hance v. Zant, 696 F.2d 940, 946 (11th Cir.), cert, denied, -U.S.-, 103 S.Ct. 3544, 77 L.Ed.2d 1393 (1983); United States ex rel. Heral v. Franzen, 667 F.2d 633 (7th Cir.1981).
. Boyce never explicitly promised to do anything other than "do all I can with the psychiatrist and everything ." In context, this statement apparently refers to a discussion, moments earlier, of the lack of proper psychiatric treatment under Miller's parole for a prior crime.
. Appellant relies on the venerable case of Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 542-43, 18 S.Ct. 183, 186-87, 42 L.Ed. 568 (1897), in which the court stated that a confession is involuntary if "obtained by any direct or implied promise, however slight." As the Second Circuit has stated, "[t]hat language has never been applied with the wooden literalness urged upon us by appellant." United States v. Ferrara, 377 F.2d 16, 17 (2d Cir.1967).
. For instance, at page 12 of the typescript, Boyce said:
B: Frank, listen to me, honest to God, I'm, I'm telling you, Frank, (inaudible). I know, it's going to bother you, Frank, it's going to bother you. It's there, it's not going to go away, it's there. It's right in front of you, Frank.
Am I right or wrong?
M: Yeah.
. Even if our review on this question was plenary, we would reach the same result. We essentially agree with the conclusions of the New Jersey Supreme Court concerning the effect of Boyce's questioning of Miller. See supra typescript at 9-10. We also agree that Boyce's questioning technique could, under different circumstances, create risks of deception. The same questioning coming from, for example, a psychiatrist employed by the police but not clearly identified as a detective, might well create a situation in which the confession would not be voluntary. See Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556, 74 S.Ct. 716, 98 L.Ed. 948 (1954) (confession made to a psychiatrist, following three days of prior questioning by police, where psychiatrist was not identified as a police interrogator, was not voluntary). Similarly, if Boyce's questioning had in fact induced Miller to confess in the belief that he would receive psychological "help" rather than punishment, the confession would not be "voluntary."