Case Name: STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Steven MARES, Defendant-Appellant
Court: Court of Appeals of New Mexico
Jurisdiction: New Mexico
Decision Date: 1971-05-28
Citations: 82 N.M. 682
Docket Number: No. 561
Parties: STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Steven MARES, Defendant-Appellant.
Judges: SPIESS, C. J., concurs.
Reporter: New Mexico Reports
Volume: 82
Pages: 682–688

Head Matter:
486 P.2d 618
STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Steven MARES, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 561.
Court of Appeals of New Mexico.
May 28, 1971.
Writ of Certiorari Issued June 25, 1971.
Stanley F. Frost, Tucumcari, David W. Bonem, Clovis, for defendant-appellant.
David L. Norvell, Atty. Gen., Santa Fe, C. Emery Cuddy, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., for plaintiff-appellee.

Opinion:
OPINIOÑ
HENDEEY, Judge.
Convicted of the unauthorized entry of a dwelling with intent to commit a felony while armed with a deadly weapon contrary, to-§ 40A-16-4(A), N.M.S.A.1953 (Repl.1964) defendant appeals.
We affirm.
' Mrs. C. returned home on the evening of October 14, 1969, after a ten day trip. Before retiring that evening she checked and locked all doors and windows. During the early morning hours of October 15, 1969 a forced entry was made into her house. Mrs. C. was awakened and saw a man, wearing no clothes, but with a white towel around his neck, standing near her bed. The man held a long knife. Due to poor lighting Mrs. C. could not see the man's facial characteristics. Mrs. C. persuaded the man to leave and then called the police.
The police arrived and discovered the top window in the utility room broken and the bottom window opened. Shortly, thereafter, the police dusted the area around the window and the formica top and sink which was directly under the broken window. Palm prints were lifted from around the formica sink top and sink molding.
Subsequently on December 29, 1969 palm prints of defendant were made and forwarded to the F.B.I. laboratory along with the lifted prints found October 15, 1969. The testimony of the F.B.I. finger print examiner was to the effect that no two palm prints are the same and that a comparison of the lifted prints showed that they were identical with the right palm print of the defendant.
Mrs. C. testified that defendant and his employer had installed a hot water heater in her home on August 11, 1968 but to her knowledge defendant had not been in her house since that time. Mrs. C. further testified she used the utility room sink " from' a few times a week to several times a week", that she used it the day before her trip, that she kept " a sponge by the sink at all times and T always use the sponge to, of course, wipe away any water," and that she wiped the sink " with a sponge, cleaned it, all particles of water." Also, " it's scrubbed from time to time with scouring powder." At the close of the State's case and after defendant rested, defendant moved for a directed verdict on the grounds that:
" the State has not • introduced evidence to the extent necessary to support a conviction based on the circumstantial nature of the evidence. » . .
Defendant contends the trial court erred in overruling the motions. , ,
Defendant frames the issue as " whether proof that palm prints found in the place where a crime was committed which prints correspond to those of the 'accused and which prints are found under circumstances that indicate they might have been impressed at a time other than when the crime was committed is sufficient proof of identity standing alone to sustain a conviction. " ' '
It is defendant's contention that when circumstantial evidence is relied upon it must exclude every reasonable hypothesis other than the guilt of the defendant; State v. Easterwood, 68 N.M. 464, 362 P.2d 997 (1961). With this proposition we agree.
Defendant has referred us to several fingerprint cases [Townsley v. United States, 236 A.2d 63 (D.C.App.1967); Gray v. State, 4 Md.App. 155, 241 A.2d 725 (1968); Anthony v. State, 85 Ga.App. 119, 68 S.E.2d 150 (1951); McClain v. State, 198 Miss. 831, 24 So.2d 15 (1945)]. Those cases are distinguishable on their facts. They deal with areas where the public had access or where there was no showing .that the public did not have access or .in which. the mere presence of defendant would .not..establish the offense charged..
Here we have undisputed proof of a lapse of 14 months since defendant was legally on the premises — repeated wiping and "time to time" scrubbing of the area from which the prints were lifted.
"Evidence of fingerprint identification, that is proof of fingerprints corresponding to those of the accused, found in a place where the crime was committed under such circumstances that they could only have been impressed at the time when the crime was committed, may be sufficient to support a conviction in a criminal prosecution. " State v. Helms, 218 N.C. 592, 12 S.E.2d 243 (1940). See also Hack v. Commonwealth, 433 S.W.2d 877 (Ky.Ct.App.1968) wherein the court stated:
"In this case, Hack had been in and around the cocktail lounge prior to the date of the crime and could possibly have left his fingerprints on the door at that time. But the owner testified the door had been washed the day before and following the last time Hack had been present. The jury had every right to believe that testimony. It would necessarily follow then that Hack's fingerprints were not impressed innocently, and the evidence was sufficient to sustain the verdict."
In view of the foregoing, we conclude that there was substantial evidence to sustain the conviction of defendant and that such evidence excluded every other reasonable hypothesis inconsistent with defendant's guilt.
Defendant next contends that the presence of a juror in Mrs. C.'s home during the time when the police were investigating the crime 'and taking fingerprints denied defendant "a trial by an impartial jury and the right to confrontation and cross-examination."
After trial, defendant learned of Juror Sefcik's presence in Mrs. C.'s home during a part of the police investigation. Defendant filed a motion for a new trial on the ground that Juror Sefcik's involvement precluded a fair trial. A hearing was held and testimony taken.
No record of the voir dire jury examination was made but at the motion for a new trial it was stipulated that defendant's voir dire examination disclosed the fact that Juror Sefcik was a good friend of Mrs. C. for about 22 years, that he had visited and had eaten in her home, that Juror Sefcik did not think this relationship would affect his opinion. It was also stipulated that when the jurors were asked if they had talked to any witnesses or knew of any reason they could not serve on the jury or knew of any reason why they could not render a fair and impartial verdict, Juror Sefcik did not indicate any answer. The record at the motion for a new trial hearing further showed defendant was not limited in his voir dire of the prospective jurors nor did he exercise all of his peremptory challenges.
We fail to see, as a matter of law, how the trial court erred in refusing to grant a new trial. The granting of a new trial, or denial of request therefor, is within the sound discretion of the trial court and the reviewing court will not disturb the decision unless there has been a manifest abuse of discretion. State v. Pope, 78 N.M. 282, 430 P.2d 779 (Ct.App.1967).
The trial court conducted a lengthy hearing on the motion. Both the defendant and the State called witnesses. No evidence was adduced beyond the fact of a 22 year long friendship and visits in the house of Mrs. C., that the juror did not discuss the case with Mrs. C. or the police officers, nor was any evidence discovered at the time in question used at trial. Further, Mrs. C. testified, at trial and at the hearing, that she never could identify the intruder.
We fail to see an abuse of discretion by the trial court. Further, the evidence was not such as to show Juror Sefcik had any special knowledge of the case beyond that brought out on voir dire. There is no factual basis for defendant's contention. State V. Maes, 81 N.M. 550, 469 P.2d 529 (Ct.App.1970).
Affirmed.
It is so ordered.
SPIESS, C. J., concurs.
SUTIN, J., dissents.