Case Name: Jon Flemming, Individually and as the Administrator of the Estate of Elizabeth Lagai, Deceased, on Behalf of Himself and All Others Similarly Situated, Respondent, v. Barnwell Nursing Home and Health Facilities, Inc., Defendant. Caroline Ahlfors Mouris, Appellant; Paul Macari, Respondent
Court: New York Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 2010-10-21
Citations: 15 N.Y.3d 375
Docket Number: 
Parties: Jon Flemming, Individually and as the Administrator of the Estate of Elizabeth Lagai, Deceased, on Behalf of Himself and All Others Similarly Situated, Respondent, v Barnwell Nursing Home and Health Facilities, Inc., Defendant. Caroline Ahlfors Mouris, Appellant; Paul Macari, Respondent.
Judges: 
Reporter: New York Reports
Volume: 15
Pages: 375–383

Head Matter:
[938 NE2d 937, 912 NYS2d 504]
Jon Flemming, Individually and as the Administrator of the Estate of Elizabeth Lagai, Deceased, on Behalf of Himself and All Others Similarly Situated, Respondent, v Barnwell Nursing Home and Health Facilities, Inc., Defendant. Caroline Ahlfors Mouris, Appellant; Paul Macari, Respondent.
Argued September 13, 2010;
decided October 21, 2010
POINTS OF COUNSEL
Michael S. Gruen, New York City, for appellant.
I. Fees are awardable to objectant’s counsel for services resulting in actual benefit to the class. (Frankenstein v McCrory Corp., 425 F Supp 762; In re Horizon/CMS Healthcare Corp. Sec. Litig., 3 F Supp 2d 1208; Matter of Attorney-General v Northern Am. Life Ins. Co., 91 NY 57; Klein v Robert’s Am. Gourmet Food, Inc., 28 AD3d 63; White v Auerbach, 500 F2d 822; Winkelman v General Motors Corp., 44 F Supp 960, 48 F Supp 504, affd sub nom. Singer v General Motors Corp., 136 F2d 905; In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. Sales Practices Litig., 962 F Supp 450, 148 F3d 283, cert denied sub nom. Krell v Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 525 US 1114; Bowling v Pfizer, Inc., 927 F Supp 1036, 103 F3d 128, cert denied sub nom. Ridgeway v Pfizer, Inc., 522 US 906; Duhaime v John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 2 F Supp 2d 175; In re General Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55 F3d 768.) II. The same guidelines that govern fees to class counsel should govern fees to counsel for objectant. (Wininger v SI Mgt. L.P., 301 F3d 1115; Frankenstein v McCrory Corp., 425 F Supp 762; Gottlieb v Barry, 43 F3d 474; In re Horizon/CMS Healthcare Corp. Sec. Litig., 3 F Supp 2d 1208; Hensley v Eckerhart, 461 US 424; Matter of Rahmey v Blum, 95 AD2d 294; Washington Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn. v Village Mall Townhouses, 90 Misc 2d 227; Sternberg v Citicorp Credit Servs., 110 Misc 2d 804; Duhaime v John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 2 F Supp 2d 175; Roberts v Texaco, Inc., 979 F Supp 185.)
DeGraff, Foy & Kunz, LLP, Albany (George J. Szary, David F. Kunz and Aaron F. Carbone of counsel), for respondent.
I. The clear and unambiguous language of CPLR article 9 does not provide for fees to an objectant’s counsel. (Matter of Raritan Dev. Corp. v Silva, 91 NY2d 98; Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v Wilderness Society, 421 US 240; #1 Funding Ctr., Inc. v H & G Operating Corp., 48 AD3d 908; Moore v Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 75 Misc 2d 168, 41 AD2d 601, 33 NY2d 304; People v Finnegan, 85 NY2d 53; Patrolmen’s Benevolent Assn. of City of N.Y. v City of New York, 41 NY2d 205; Eaton v New York City Conciliation & Appeals Bd., 56 NY2d 340; Matter of Attorney-General v Northern Am. Life Ins. Co., 91 NY 57; Gerzof v Sweeney, 22 NY2d 297; Matter of Loomis, 273 NY 76.) II. An objectant’s counsel is entitled only to an award of fees where counsel’s actions conferred an actual benefit on the class. (White v Auerbach, 500 F2d 822.)

Opinion:
OPINION OF THE COURT
Pigott, J.
On this appeal, we are asked to consider whether New York law permits an award of counsel fees and expenses to an object-ant in a class action. We hold that it does not.
This class action lawsuit was brought on behalf of 242 individuals, who were residents at defendant Barnwell Nursing Home and Health Facilities, Inc. at any time from January 1, 1999 through January 31, 2000. The class claim, brought pursuant to Public Health Law § 2801-d, alleged that the nursing home failed to comply with state-imposed standards of patient care.
After nearly six years of litigation, the parties reached a compromise and a motion for approval pursuant to CPLR 908 was made to Supreme Court. Caroline Ahlfors Mouris, on behalf of her mother's estate, filed objections to the proposed award of fees to class counsel, the compensation established for the settlement administrator, and the incentive award to the class representative. She did not object to the overall settlement amount. Mouris also cross-moved for an award of counsel fees she incurred in preparing and presenting her objections.
Supreme Court approved the proposed settlement, and directed that certain monies be awarded to class counsel for fees and expenses, to the originator of the claim as an incentive award, and to the administrator for past and future services— the remainder to be distributed among the class members in accordance with the approved distribution formula. The court denied Mouris's objections, as well as her cross motion for counsel fees, noting that her objections had neither assisted the court nor benefitted the class.
The Appellate Division modified by reducing or eliminating each category of Supreme Court's award (56 AD3d 162 [2008]). As relevant to this appeal, the court held that Mouris was not entitled to an award of counsel fees because CPLR 909 "does not provide for the payment of counsel fees to any . . . party or individual" other than class counsel (id. at 168). The court remitted the matter to Supreme Court to determine the administrator's fees and expenses. Thereafter, Supreme Court issued a judgment determining such fees and expenses.
This Court granted Mouris leave to appeal from the judgment of Supreme Court to bring up for review the prior nonfinal Appellate Division order. We now affirm.
Under the general rule in New York, attorneys' fees are deemed incidental to litigation and may not be recovered unless supported by statute, court rule or written agreement of the parties (Hooper Assoc. v AGS Computers, 74 NY2d 487, 491 [1989]). An attorney is not entitled to legal fees from persons other than his or her client merely because such other persons were benefitted by his or her services (Matter of Loomis, 273 NY 76 [1937]). There are certain exceptions to the general rule, including an award of counsel fees for class actions brought on behalf of all members of a class.
Such an award is embodied in CPLR 909, which provides:
"If a judgment in an action maintained as a class action is rendered in favor of the class, the court in its discretion may award attorneys' fees to the representatives of the class based on the reasonable value of legal services rendered and if justice requires, allow recovery of the amount awarded from the opponent of the class" (emphasis added).
Enacted in 1975, this provision was part of a comprehensive reform of the laws relating to class actions in New York:
"The bill codifies the usual rule that the attorneys for a class that has been successful (through judgment or settlement) are awarded a reasonable attorney's fee; historically, the prospect of obtaining substantial counsel fees has been an important factor in encouraging the private bar to undertake the class action representation of persons with moderate or modest resources" (Mem to Counsel to Governor from State Consumer Protection Bd, Bill Jacket, L 1975, ch 207 [emphasis added]).
The statute codifies the common-law rule that attorneys' fees may be paid out of a fund created for the benefit of the class by the litigation. It further empowers the court to order the fees to be paid by the class opponent "if justice requires."
The language of CPLR 909 permits attorney fee awards only to "the representatives of the class," and does not authorize an award of counsel fees to any party, individual or counsel, other than class counsel. Had the Legislature intended any party to recover attorney fees it could have expressly said so, as it has in other contexts (see e.g. SCPA 2302 [6] ["In a proceeding to construe a will or after appeal in such a proceeding, pursuant to the direction of the appellate court the court may award to a fi duciary or any party to the proceeding such sum as it deems reasonable for his, her or its counsel fees and other expenses necessarily incurred in the proceeding or on the appeal" (emphasis added)]). Although federal courts have awarded counsel fees to objectors in certain situations under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure rule 23 (h), New York's statute is only in part modeled on that federal provision (Matter of Colt Indus. Shareholder Litig., 77 NY2d 185, 194 [1991] [noting that CPLR 901-909 have "much in common" with Federal rule 23]).
Mouris argues, and the dissent agrees, that a basis for an award of fees may be recognized under the "common fund" doctrine. However, no modern New York court has applied such rule to authorize an objector's counsel fee award in a class action lawsuit. The dissent cogently argues that section 909, being in derogation of our common law, should not be read so broadly as to totally eliminate the "common fund" doctrine. However, the Legislature having comprehensively revised CPLR article 9, it is not for this Court to assume a provision it could have easily provided and recognize a doctrine that has not been invoked in the last century. Simply put, although a class may at times benefit from an objectant's actions, the Legislature did not provide recompense for those efforts.
Accordingly, the judgment of Supreme Court appealed from and the order of the Appellate Division brought up for review should be affirmed, with costs.