Case Name: Nathan Sonneberg, Respondent, v. Meyer Levy, Appellant
Court: New York Court of Common Pleas
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1895-04
Citations: 12 Misc. 154
Docket Number: 
Parties: Nathan Sonneberg, Respondent, v. Meyer Levy, Appellant.
Judges: 
Reporter: New York Miscellaneous Reports
Volume: 12
Pages: 154–156

Head Matter:
Nathan Sonneberg, Respondent, v. Meyer Levy, Appellant.
(New York Common Pleas
—Additional General Term,
April, 1895.)
The Court of Common Pleas has power to review the evidence given upon an inquest taken in a District Court, and to reverse the judgment should such evidence he insufficient to establish a prima facie case in support of the recovery.
In an action for conversion, where the property is not shown to he in nature fluctuating as to market value and no element of malice appears, the recovery should he limited to the value of the chattels at the date of the conversion, with interest.
Proof solely of théir value at the time of the trial is not sufficient to support a recovery.
Appeal from a judgment of the District Court in the city of ¡New York for the fourth judicial district, rendered in favor of the plaintiff upop defendant’s default and after inquest.
A. II. Berrick, for respondent.
Abraham I. JElkus, for appellant.

Opinion:
Bischofe, J.
It is the province of this court to review the evidence given upon an inquest taken in a District Court and to reverse the judgment should such evidence be insufficient to establish a prima facie case in support of the respondent's recovery. Jones v. Pridham, 3 E. D. Smith, 155 ; Howard v. Brown, 2 id. 247; Vorzimer v. Shapiro, 6 Misc. Rep. 143 ; Jacobs v. Zeltner, 9 id. 455.
In this case plaintiff, the assignee of the cause of action,, recovered a judgment for seventy-five dollars, apparently the supposed value of certain chattels alleged to have been converted by defendant, but no proper proof of this value appears from the record, and the judgment, therefore, is not to be sustained.
The cause of action for conversion, upon which plaintiff undoubtedly could sue as assignee (Baumamn v. Jefferson, 4 Misc. Rep. 147), was predicated of defendant's failure to return, upon demand, certain household furniture belonging to plaintiff's assignor, the original possession of which- by defendant was in no way tortious. Dpon the question of damages the only proof adduced was the testimony of plaintiff's witness, given in answer to the question as to the value of the chattels, " What is their value to-day ? " The proof thus received fails to afford a basis for the recovery below.
The property was not shown to be in nature fluctuating as to market value, and no element of malice appeared in the case; thus, there was nothing to justify a departure from the well-established rule that the recovery should be limited to-the value of the chattel at the date of the conversion, with interest. Wehle v. Haviland, 69 N. Y. 448; 5 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, 40, and cases cited.
We are not to assume, in the absence of proof, that the value at the date of the trial, as given,, was not greater than at the date of plaintiff's demand, which, by reason of various conceivable causes, it might actually have become.
Judgment reversed and new trial ordered, with costs to the appellant to abide the event. Restitution ordered of the amount paid by the appellant in satisfaction of the iudgment here reversed.
Giegebich, J., concurs.
Judgment reversed and new trial ordered, with costs to appellant to abide event, and restitution ordered.