Case Name: Philip O. THEVENET et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. W. O. CLAUSE, et al., Defendants-Appellees
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1974-10-24
Citations: 302 So. 2d 649
Docket Number: No. 4673
Parties: Philip O. THEVENET et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. W. O. CLAUSE, et al., Defendants-Appellees.
Judges: Before CULPEPPER, MILLER and WATSON, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 302
Pages: 649–655

Head Matter:
Philip O. THEVENET et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. W. O. CLAUSE, et al., Defendants-Appellees.
No. 4673.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Third Circuit.
Oct. 24, 1974.
Rehearing Denied Nov. 20, 1974.
Willis & Hardy, Paul J. Hardy, St. Mar-tinville, for plaintiffs-appellants.
Champagne & Colomb by George J, Champagne, Jr., Lafayette, for defendants-appellees.
Before CULPEPPER, MILLER and WATSON, JJ.

Opinion:
MILLER, Judge.
Plaintiffs Philip O. Thevenet and James Thevenet appeal the judgment rejecting their possessory action against defendants W. O. Clause and Thomas J. Periou. The trial court held that plaintiffs failed to prove the requisite possession as owner. We affirm.
Defendants claim the 30 by 4,886 foot tract in dispute is part of a larger tract owned by them. The strip is located in Breaux Bridge and was used as a road in the year 1900. The road led to a tract (hereinafter called the "east tract") then owned by Ursin Broussard, plaintiff's ancestor in title. Ursin's son testified that his father acquired the 30 foot strip from the St. Martin Parish Police Jury in about 1900 to provide access from the east tract to the public road, now Louisiana Highway 328. There is no showing that the Police Jury acquired or conveyed title to the disputed tract, other than this testimony.
In 1907 Ursin conveyed the east tract to a son, and in that instrument conveyed to the named vendee and to two other parties, the use of the 30 foot strip for the purpose of passage to the public road.
In 1908 Ursin's son conveyed a portion of the east tract to plaintiffs' father Andre Thevenet, and referred to the strip in the following manner:
It is expressly understood — that together with said (east tract) land — all rights of ways, passage and drainage — belonging to said land — is hereby transferred & sold to the present buyer. (Parenthetical note added.)
Plaintiffs' father died in 1943 and the judgment of possession placed his children in possession of the strip in this way:
Together with all the rights of way, passage and drainage referred to as belonging to said property in that Act of Conveyance recorded under . . '
In 1954 plaintiffs purchased from their brothers and sisters all their interests in the east tract, and the 30 foot strip was "conveyed" in this way:
Together with all the rights of way, passage and drainage referred to as belonging to said property in that Act of Conveyance recorded under Entry No. 33812 of the Conveyance Records of St. Martin Parish, Louisiana, and more particularly, an undivided one-half interest in and to that certain road, being 30 feet wide by a depth of 4,886 feet and extending from the property herein conveyed in a Southwesterly direction to the Public Paved Road (L.D.H. # 328) in Breaux Bridge, Louisiana.
The description also refers to a plat by Fred Colomb, a licensed surveyor, and concludes by stating this is the same property acquired by the heirs from their parents' succession.
We find the acts of possession exercised by plaintiffs and their ancestors in title to be consistent with their recorded title to a servitude of passage.
The evidence established that the 30 foot strip was fenced about the year 1900. Gates were installed at the east and west ends. The strip was used by the Brous-sard family and others for access from the east tract to what is now Highway 328. When Andre Thevenet acquired the east tract in 1908, his family and others continued to use the 30 foot strip as a passageway. Another road provided access to the east tract in about 1920, but the strip continued to be known as "Andre Thevenet's Lane", and about 1925 was used as a race track for horses. In 1938, the strip was used by the Thevenets to haul sugarcane from the east tract to the mill. One plaintiff testified that his father used the strip as a pasture, and that they repaired the fences from time to time.
Several persons familiar with the strip testified the Thevenets claimed it as owners. But every one of these witnesses admitted under cross-examination that all they knew about the tract was that Theve-net Lane was an old road which they assumed the Thevenet's owned. Their testimony was consistent with the Thevenet's having a right of passage. These witnesses admitted that they were not concerned with ownership claims until the year 1970 when plaintiffs contacted them to appear as witnesses.
Chester Degeyter, Sr. farmed the land presently owned by defendants. He testified that he obtained permission from the Thevenets to cut hay on the strip for the year 1949. The consideration given by De-geyter for this permit was his obligation to keep the strip clean. This is in keeping with the needs of the servitude of passage owned by the Thevenets.
In 1954, the strip was surveyed by Fred Colomb at the request of one plaintiff. The only stakes found were those marking the northeast and northwest corners, the admitted north boundary of property belonging to others to the north. Colomb had been employed to survey the east tract in preparation for a proposed partition between the Thevenet heirs. Colomb testified that although there was no title shown to him to indicate that the strip was owned by the Thevenets, he was specifically requested by one of the Thevenet heirs to survey the strip and show it on his plat. He noted this fact in his field notes. It is relevant to note that the partition based on this survey described the strip as a right of. way. Colomb's inclusion of the strip on his plat of survey does not establish that the Thevenets possessed as owners.
During the year 1956 the Soil Conservation Service secured Philip Thevenet's permission to construct a ditch along the north side of the disputed tract. Permission was obtained to place the spoil bank on the strip. This usage is consistent with the maintenance of the strip as a passageway. Soil Conservation's witness admitted that no check was made to determine record ownership.
It was also established that plaintiffs.granted oil, gas, and mineral leases on the strip during the 1956-1968 period. Defendant's ancestors in title granted similar leases affecting the same tract. Execution of mineral leases does not establish the requisite civil possession under LSA-C.C.P. art. 3660 unless lessor or his ancestors in title had some corporeal possession. Ree Corporation v. Shaffer, 261 La. 502, 260 So.2d 307 (1972).
Plaintiffs claim that their possession of the strip was disturbed by the 1970 recor-dation of defendant Clause's deed to defendant Periou of a one-half interest in a tract which included the strip. That instrument conveyed property bounded on the north by property owned by the parties who owned the property to plaintiffs' north. If that constituted disturbance, then plaintiffs possession was also disturbed by recordation of the 1970 deed to plaintiff Clause (Tr. 175), the recordation of the 1970 judgment of possession in the Succession of Alexis F. Broussard (Tr. 173), and the recordation of seven other deeds during the years 1917 through 1921 (Tr. 156-170).
Another earlier disturbance was established. One plaintiff admitted at Tr. 364 that an attorney advised him that a thorough search of the records revealed that the Thevenets did not have record title.
Plaintiffs have failed to establish manifest error in the trial court's conclusion that plaintiffs failed to prove possession of the strip "in the manner and for the period required by law. . . . " The cited authorities are applicable. LSA-C.C.P. art. 3658; Hill v. Richey et ah, 221 La. 402, 59 So.2d 434 (1952); Kilchrist v. Conrad, 191 So.2d 705 (La. App. 3 Cir. 1966) ; Moise et al. v. LeBlanc, 280 So.2d 618 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1973).
The trial court judgment is affirmed at appellants' costs.
Affirmed.
CULPEPPER, J., dissents and assigns written reasons.