Case Name: L. Rupert WILLS, Appellant, v. Violet E. WILLS, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1981-06-24
Citations: 399 So. 2d 1130
Docket Number: No. 80-1782
Parties: L. Rupert WILLS, Appellant, v. Violet E. WILLS, Appellee.
Judges: HERSEY, J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 399
Pages: 1130–1132

Head Matter:
L. Rupert WILLS, Appellant, v. Violet E. WILLS, Appellee.
No. 80-1782.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
June 24, 1981.
Myron B. Berman, North Miami Beach, for appellant.
Jeffrey P. Swayman of Kaplan & Jaffe, P. A., Hollywood, for appellee.

Opinion:
DOWNEY, Judge.
This appeal involves an interlocutory order awarding visitation rights with Beverly Ann Wills, the twelve year old adopted daughter of the appellant. Beverly was adopted by appellant and his first wife in 1972 when she was three and one-half years old. Her adoptive mother died in April of the following year and in November of that same year the appellant married the appel-lee. Beverly, although never adopted by the appellee, was raised by and knew this woman to be her mother. In March of 1980 the husband filed a petition for dissolution of the marriage.
In these dissolution proceedings the General Master recommended that appellee be granted visitation privileges with Beverly. It is significant that the Master found ap-pellee was Beverly's "psychological mother." The trial court adopted the Master's recommendation and granted appellee visitation privileges while the dissolution proceeding was pending. That order is the subject of this appeal.
We have not been afforded the benefit of a transcript of the proceedings before the Master. Nevertheless, we would assume the evidence was substantial because of the General Master's rather unique finding that appellee was the "psychological mother" of the child.
This is not a case of the court's finding that a non-parent should have custody of children as against their parents, although that, too, can be done in appropriate circumstances. Cone v. Cone, 62 So.2d 907 (Fla.1953), modified 68 So.2d 886 (Fla.1953); Johnson v. Johnson, 114 So.2d 338 (Fla. 1st DCA 1959). Rather, under the peculiar circumstances of this case the court obviously felt that the best interests of the child, and that is the polestar to be followed, required that the erstwhile stepmother visit the child, at least for the time being.
Several jurisdictions have awarded visitation privileges to a non-parent where the evidence demonstrates it is in the best interest of the child involved. See: Collins v. Gilbreath, 403 N.E.2d 921 (Ind.App.1980); Simpson v. Simpson, 586 S.W.2d 33 (Ky.1979).
There are several cases in Florida which hold that an order granting visitation rights to a non-parent of a child whose custody has been awarded to a fit parent is unjustified and unenforceable. Tamargo v. Tamargo, 348 So.2d 1163 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977); Sheehy v. Sheehy, 325 So.2d 12 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975); Rodriguez v. Rodriguez, 295 So.2d 328 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974). Furthermore, the Supreme Court of Florida held years ago in Parker v. Gates, 89 Fla. 76, 103 So. 126 (1925) that an award of visitation to a non-parent who had cared for the child over an extended period was "not warranted by the evidence." A similar result was arrived at by the Third District Court of Appeal in Lee v. Kepler, 197 So.2d 570 (Fla. 3d DCA 1967) based upon evidence that such visitation was. not in the child's best interest.
It seems to us that if an adequate record can be made demonstrating that it is in the child's best interest that such visitation be authorized the trial judge's discretion in the matter is sufficiently broad to allow him to authorize visitation with a non-parent. Certainly this type of visitation, contrary to the wishes of the custodial parent, should be awarded with great circumspection. But if the welfare of the child is promoted by such visitation and there is no other substantial interest adversely affected the trial judge should be allowed that latitude.
In any event, the order under review is an interlocutory order entered during the pendency of the dissolution proceeding. We have no transcript of the evidence adduced before the Master and considered by the trial judge. Under those circumstances it would appear improvident of this court to interfere in that temporary action of the trial court.
HERSEY, J., concurs.
MOORE, J., dissents with opinion.