Case Name: Brittin & Andrews vs. Crabtree
Court: Arkansas Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Arkansas
Decision Date: 1859-05
Citations: 20 Ark. 309
Docket Number: 
Parties: Brittin & Andrews vs. Crabtree.
Judges: 
Reporter: Arkansas Reports
Volume: 20
Pages: 309–324

Head Matter:
Brittin & Andrews vs. Crabtree.
Although the defendant, in an action at law upon a writing obligatory, might prove that his signature was obtained by fraud, and thus defeat the action, he may, at his election, suffer judgment to go against him, and apply to a court of equity for relief. (1 Eng. 317, etc.)
It is a sufficient ground of relief in equity against a judgment at law upon a writing obligatory, executed by a surety only, that the promissory notes of other persons had been passed to the creditor, and received by him of the principal debtor, as an absolute payment, before such writing obligatory was executed — the obtaining the signature of the obligor, in such case, by deceiving him as to the fact of payment, was a fraud.
Where the charges in a bill are positively denied by the answer, and sustained by one witness only, for corroborating circumstances sufficient to overturn the answer, see opinion of the Court.
Where an objection to the competency of a witness arises from his own examiiyiiiion, he may be further interrogated as to facts tending to remove the objection.
Appeal from Hempstead Circuit Court in Chancery.
Hon. Abner A. Stiti-i, Circuit Judge.
Watkins & Gallagher, for the appellants.
The statements of a defendant in his answer, directly responsive to the bill, or explanatory of matters there charged, relied upon and enquired about, and which are, of necessity, or frora their nature, apparently within the personal knowledge of the defendant, are evidence in his favor. In other words, the rule laid down is that a decree cannot go against such answer, unless overturned by the testimony of two witnesses, or of one witness, with strong corroborating circumstances connected with the transaction. Totten vs. Roberts, 13 Ark. 699; Jordan vs. Fenno, 13 Ark. 593; Graham vs. Dunn et al., 17 Ark. 60; Dodd vs. Spence, id. 166; Williams vs. Cheatham, ib. 278.
It is submitted that a careful examination of the record will demonstrate that the bill is not proved, even if James D. Cobb was a competent witness for the complainant.
It is a rule in the law of evidence, that in a suit between the creditor and a surety, the principal, not a party to the record, and being clearly bound lor the debt, may be a competent witness for the surety to exonerate or discharge him from liability, upon the principle that the principal debtor stands perfectly indifferent, his interest being equally balanced, because, whatever might be the result of that suit, he, being bound for the debt in any event, would have to pay it to one or the other of those contending parties. In this case, not only is there no fixed admitted liability of the principal debtor to the creditor, but the scope and tendency of his testimony is to exonerate himself from all such liability. Moreover, what, as it seems to us, makes the objection stronger in this particular case, is, that if the complainant, Crabtree, should have this debt to pay, a cause of action would thereupon accrue in his favor against the witness. But the creditor would have no recourse against the witness, because, obviously, as between them, the claim, pending this tedious litigation, is barred by limitation — and was so at the time when Captain Cobb testified.
There is also presented upon the record, a question of jurisdiction, which the Court may be called on to decide. All the grounds of relief relied upon in the bill were available to complainant, as defendant in the original suit at law, under the pleas of fraud, payment, and accord and satisfaction. He no where alleges, nor is there any reason to infer that these defences were not as well known to him then as now. There is no allegation of any want or loss of testimony, rendering it necessary to obtain a discovery. And if even that were so, since our statute authorizing either pai’ty to obtain a discovery in a suit at law, without resorting to chancery, mere discovery affords no ground of equity jurisdiction. Williamson vs. King, 1 McMullan Ch. 41; Veeck-vs. Pennybacker, 2 Bibb 326; Cunningham vs. Caldwell, Hardin 123; 1 A. K. Marsh. 479; Thompson vs. Manly, 16 Geo. 440; Taylor vs. Buchan, ib. 541. See, directly in point that the court has no jurisdiction where a discovery may be had in aid of proceedings at law, Woodman vs. Saltonstall, 7 Cush. 181. See, also, Nelson vs. Dunn, 15 Ala. 501; Marsh vs. Edgerton, 1 Chand. (Wis.) 198; Ross vs. Buchanan, 13 111. 55.
Gaulaed for the appellee.
Where a party misrepresents a material part, or produces a false impression, intentionally, or to mislead another so as to take advantage of him, this is positive fraud, and relief will be granted in equity. IStonfs Equity 201; Shackleford vs. Hanly, 1 Marsh. 500; Neville vs. Wilkinson, 1 Bro. Ch 545; 2 Vesey 15; and whether such representations be true or not, {9 Vesey 21-, 13 Ib. 475; 1 Story’s Eq. 202,) if it be a material part which was an inducement, (1 Story’s Eq. 204,) and so much to the party’s injury that he would have declined to contract had he known the true state of the case. Bacon vs. Bronson, 7 Johns. 201; Cummins vs. Boyle, 1 J.J. Marsh, 482; Cates vs. Raleigh, 1 Mon. 168; 1 Green Ch. R. 199; 4 /. J. Marsh. 393; Huguemin vs. Basely, 2 volume, part 2, White <$• Ludor’s (American) Ldg. Cases in Equity 38,et scquens; Earl of Oxford’s Case, lb. 85. Where a party, by design, misrepresents a material fact, or produces a false impression to mislead, cheat, entrap, etc., this is positive fraud in the truest sense of the term, and against such equity will relieve. 1 Story’s Eq. 191, 192, 193. If a party is proceeding at law, or on a bond, or other legal instrument obtained by fraud, or by means of any inequitable transaction, (as they did here on the bond in this case,) equity will interfere by injunction — also, any agreement founded on misrepresentation, or where any bond, promissory note, and the like, is obtained by unfair means; or where one party puts another under a mistake as to the terms of the contract. Drewry on Injunctions 1, 2, 3, 6», 63, noteg.; Eden on Injunctions 20,24; 1 Mad- docks Ch. 134,*' 263;* Hodgson vs. Murray, 2 Simons 515; lb. Plain vs. Agar, 295; Fitzgerald vs. Stuart, lb. 342; Fullagar vs. Clark, 18 Veseij 480.
Although law might keep a party from paying the debt on a bond procured in this way, yet that is no reason why equity should lose its jurisdiction. See Cases from 2 Simons, sufra.
The deposition of James D. Cobb is competent, for he is not interested in the event of the suit, nor can the record be read for him in any other proceedings. Gresley’s Eq. Ev. 241, 249, 250, 251; Ward vs. Wilkinson, 4 Barn, df Aid. 410; Nix vs. -, 4 Taunt. 18. If he has any interest, he should have been made a party. Greslcy’s Eq. Ev. 242. If the record could be used against him, and show his liability hereafter, by force of his deposition, it only adds to his competency. Ib. 222, 249. See, particularly, 6th Paige 76, Wood vs. Skinner et al.

Opinion:
Mr. Justice Compton
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This was a bill in chancery, exhibited by William Crabtree, against Brittin & Andrews, to restrain them from further proceedings upon a judgment, recovered in an action at law, to which Crabtree made no defence, preferring to contest his liability in equity.
The bill charges that the judgment was recovered on a writing obligatory for the sum of $691 41, to which the signature of Crabtree was fraudulently obtained, under the following cir cumstances: The writing obligatory was drawn to cover what
was stated by Brittin & Andrews, to be the indebtedness to them of one James jD. Cobb, with whose daughter Crabtree had previously intermarried. The writing obligatory, which was drawn as a joint and several one, was brought to Crabtree by Brittin & Andrews, who represented that they had loaned Cobb money, and sold him goods, wares and merchandize, to the amount therein specified; and that Cobb being desirous to close his business, and adjust his indebtedness, with the view of leaving the State, had requested them to call upon Crabtree and ask him to sign the writing obligatory, as the security of Cobb. Crabtree not suspecting a design to defraud him, and confiding in the representations of Brittin & Andrews, was thereby induced to execute the writing obligatory, without having a previous interview with Cobb on the subject. Upon seeing Cobb, however, shortly afterwards, he learned, for the first time, that the representations made by Brittin & Andrews were false and fraudulent; and that, at the time his signature was procured to the writing obligatory, the indebtedness of Cobb to Brittin & Andrews had been paid by his transferring to them certain promissory notes which they had accepted in payment.
Upon proceedings regularly had, the cause was heard, and the Court decreed that Brittin & Andrews be perpetually enjoined from further proceedings upon their judgment, and they appealed.
The first question of law presented, is as to the jurisdiction of the Court; and that has been well settled. Fraud is one of the acknowledged subjects of concurrent jurisdiction, and vitiates all contracts which are tainted with it, both in law and equity. And although the appellee could have established, in the action at law, that his signature to the writing obligatory was obtained by fraud, and have thus defeated the action, yet it was competent for him, at his election, to suffer judgment to go against him, and apply to a court of equity for relief. See Hempstead & Conway vs. Watkins admr., etc., 1 Eng. 317, and other decisions of this Court.
So far as regards the merits of the controversy, upon the facts, it may be remarked that the charge in the bill, that the appellants represented to the appellee, that Cobb had requested them to ask the appellee to become his security in the writing obligatory, is not made out by the proof. If, however, the appellants received the promissory notes in payment of the indebtedness of Cobb, and afterwards by deceiving the appellee as to such payment, procured his signature to the writing obligatory for the same indebtedness, it -was a fraud. In view of all the evidence adduced, this proposition, or ground of relief, is established, if it shall satisfactorily appear that the appel lants received the said promissory notes in- absolute payment of Cobb's debt, and not, as is alleged in the answer, for collection merely, with the understanding that if collected, the proceeds should be so applied. Upon this question of fact the bill and answer are in positive conflict. The testimony of James D. Cobb is directly in point, and fully sustains the bill. Bearing in mind ¿the rule of evidence that the answer must pre vail unless overturned by the -'testimony of two witnesses, or of one witness with strong corroborating, circumstances, we need refer to but one transaction, which bears upon the question at issue, and sufficiently corroborates the witness Cobb, and that is this: it is shown by the testimony that the appellants advanced Cobb the sum of $75 to enable him to remove to the City of Washington, for the payment of which the appellee was to become responsible — Cobb being insolvent. This item of $75 was embraced in the joint writing obligatory for $691 41, to wdiich the appellee's signature was obtained, and when Cobb shortly afterwards refused to execute it on his part, alleging that his indebtedness to the appellants had been paid, and that he owed them nothing, they took the obligation of Cobb, with the appellee as his surety, for the same item of $75 alone. Why was this? It could not have been for the better security of the sum advanced, because Cobb was acknowledged to be insolvent, and without credit — the appellee was solvent and already bound for the same item in the writing obligatory previously executed, if that instrument was valid. This is a circumstance from which it may be inferred that the version of the matter given by the witness is the correct one, and that the appellants themselves doubted the successful collection of the writing obligatory.
But it is contended that Cobb is interested in the result of the suit, and therefore incompetent to testify. The ground of objection urged, is, that the appellee was bound as security, for the payment of Cobb's account with the appellants, which was closed by the writing obligatory, out of the execution of which the present litigation arose. If the record showed this to be so, it would be necessary to discuss the question of competency in that view. Such, however, is not the state of case presented. There is no legitimate evidence in the record to this point, except what is contained in the deposition of the witness himself, who was interrogated by the counsel for the appellants, for the purpose of testing his competency; Mr. Greenlcaf, in his work on evidence, vol. 1, sec. 422, states the rule to be, that " where the objection to the competency of the witness arises from his own examination, he may be further interrogated to facts tending to remove the objection, though the testimony might, on other grounds, be inadmissible. When the whole ground of objection comes from himself only, what he says must be taken together, as he says it. Thus, where his interest appears, from his own testimony, to arise from a written instrument, which is not produced, he may also testify to the contents of it; but if he produces the instrument, it must speak for itself. So, where the witness for a chartered company stated that he had been a member, he was permitted also to testify that he had subsequently been disfranchised. So, where a witness called by an administrator, testified that he was one of the heirs at law, he was also permitted to testify that he had released all his interest in the estate, etc.
An application of this rule to the statements of the witness., in the case at bar, shows that the objection to his competency is unfounded. He states in substance, that at the commencement of his dealings with the appellants the appellee was bound by verbal promise for the payment of his account to a limited amount; but that afterwards this responsibility was put an end to and ceased, so that the appellee was not bound for any portion of the account closed up by the writing obligatory.
Seeing no error in the record, the decree of the court below must be affirmed with costs.
In this opinion the Chief Justice concurs.