Case Name: SIERRA CLUB, et al. v. LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF WILDLIFE AND FISHERIES
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1990-04-26
Citations: 560 So. 2d 976
Docket Number: No. 89-CA-1562
Parties: SIERRA CLUB, et al. v. LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF WILDLIFE AND FISHERIES.
Judges: Before KLEES, BYRNES and PLOTKIN, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 560
Pages: 976–981

Head Matter:
SIERRA CLUB, et al. v. LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF WILDLIFE AND FISHERIES.
No. 89-CA-1562.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fourth Circuit.
April 26, 1990.
Michael Osborne, Christopher Gobert, Osborne & McComiskey, New Orleans, for plaintiffs-appellants Sierra Club, et al.
Donald E. Puckett, Baton Rouge, for defendant-appellee Dept, of Wildlife and Fisheries.
James A. Burton, Susan F. Clade, J. Thomas Hamrick, Jr., Simon, Peragine, Smith & Redfearn, New Orleans, for Inter-venor and appellee Dravo Basic Materials Co., Inc.
Before KLEES, BYRNES and PLOTKIN, JJ.

Opinion:
KLEES, Judge.
Plaintiffs appeal from the trial judge's denial of their claim for attorneys' fees. We affirm.
Two years ago, plaintiffs obtained a declaratory judgment in the district court holding that three shell dredging leases executed previously by the Louisiana Department of Wildlife and Fisheries were invalid because they had been privately negotiated in violation of the public bid law. That judgment was affirmed by this court in Sierra Club v. Louisiana Department of Wildlife and Fisheries, 519 So.2d 836 (La.App. 4th Cir.1988), writs denied, 521 So.2d 1151, 1152 (La.1988). After the judgment became final, plaintiffs filed an amended petition seeking attorneys fees for their efforts in obtaining the declaratory judgment. The trial judge summarily denied this relief, entering judgment on the pleadings with the notation "Denied. Not entitled to as a matter of law." After reviewing the issue, we agree with the trial judge that plaintiffs are not entitled to attorneys fees in this instance.
Plaintiffs assert that they are entitled to attorneys fees by virtue of the "common fund" exception to the general rule that each party in litigation bears its own costs. Conversely, defendants assert that the trial judge was correct in denying plantiffs' claim for two reasons: (1) An amended petition cannot properly be filed in a case which has been fully disposed of by means of a final judgment; and (2) The facts of this case do not fall under the "common fund" exception for awarding attorneys fees.
In general, defendants are correct in asserting that once a final judgment has been rendered, there can be no amended petition because there is no longer a petition before the court to amend. Templet v. Johns, 417 So.2d 433 (La.App. 1st Cir.1982). Nevertheless, where a declaratory judgment has been sought and rendered, as here, article 1878 of the Code of Civil Procedure allows the court to grant further relief based upon that judgment whenever "necessary or proper." Although technically such relief is to be sought by means of a petition rather than an amended petition, this article has been used to authorize a petition seeking attorneys fees from a declaratory judgment action. Blaise Parking and Enterprises Corp. v. Project Square 221, 409 So.2d 691 (La.App. 4th Cir.1982). Therefore, plaintiffs at least arguably had the right to file the amended petition.
We need not decide this issue, however, because we are convinced that as a matter of law, plaintiffs are not entitled to attorneys fees in this situation. It is well established that attorneys fees are not recoverable except where expressly provided by law, statute or contract. Huddleston v. Bossier Bank & Trust Co., 475 So.2d 1082 (La.1985). The only authority cited by plaintiffs as support for their claim are cases construing the so-called "common fund" doctrine, which allows a court, in its discretion, to award attorneys fees and court costs to a party who at his own expense has "maintained a successful suit for the preservation, protection, or increase of a common fund, or of common property, or who has created at his own expense or brought into court, a fund in which others may share_" In re Interstate Trust & Banking Company, 235 La. 825, 106 So.2d 276, 280 (1958).
Plaintiffs theorize that their efforts have created such a common fund because, following the court's declaration invalidating the leases, the Department of Wildlife and Fisheries rebid the leases according to the public bid law and received substantially more for them, thus creating a "fund" of increased royalties to benefit the citizens of Louisiana. This argument is flawed in several respects, and is more than a little ironic under the circumstances.
First, plaintiffs never sought to create any such fund; rather their public objective for initiating the lawsuit was and still is to eliminate all shell dredging leases in Louisiana. To this end, plaintiffs are currently in court challenging the newly issued leases as being invalid on various grounds. Secondly, the "fund" in question was not created solely through the efforts of plaintiffs in obtaining the declaratory judgment, but came about primarily because the defendant Department of Wildlife and Fisheries put the leases up for rebid after they were declared invalid and received more money for them.
Plaintiffs cite several cases applying the common fund doctrine as support for their claim, none of which are factually similar to the instant situation. In Louisiana State Mineral Board v. Abadie, 164 So.2d 159, 168 (La.App. 1st Cir.1964), one of the cases relied upon by plaintiffs, the court stated that the test to be applied to determine the applicability of the common fund doctrine is whether "the attorney alone and unaided performed the legal services necessary to create, preserve, protect or increase the fund." In this case, the test is obviously not met because the so-called "fund" could not have come about without the efforts of the defendant in putting the leases up for rebid. This is not a case in which plaintiffs sought to create or preserve a fund on behalf of others; the so-called "fund" was unwittingly created as a byproduct of both plaintiffs' action and the reaction of the State of Louisiana to its initial defeat in court. Under the circumstances, we do not find the common fund doctrine to be applicable to the instant situation. The trial judge did not abuse his discretion in denying plaintiffs' petition for attorneys fees, as these fees are not recoverable as a matter of law.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court.
AFFIRMED.