Case Name: Charles Richard MARTIN, Appellant/Cross-Appellee, v. Judith Kay MARTIN, Appellee/Cross-Appellant
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1985-12-26
Citations: 480 So. 2d 683
Docket Number: No. 84-920
Parties: Charles Richard MARTIN, Appellant/Cross-Appellee, v. Judith Kay MARTIN, Appellee/Cross-Appellant.
Judges: THOMPSON, E.R., Associate Judge, concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 480
Pages: 683–688

Head Matter:
Charles Richard MARTIN, Appellant/Cross-Appellee, v. Judith Kay MARTIN, Appellee/Cross-Appellant.
No. 84-920.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
Dec. 26, 1985.
Isham W. Adams and Garrett L. Briggs of Adams & Briggs, Daytona Beach, for appellant/cross-appellee.
Charles Tindell of Charles Tindell, P.A., Daytona Beach, for appellee/cross-appel-lant.

Opinion:
DAUKSCH, Judge.
The former husband appeals from an order modifying the child support provisions of a final judgment of dissolution of marriage. We reverse because the evidence adduced below does not support an increase of appellant's obligation from $300 per month to $1,200 per month.
In her financial affidavit, the former wife listed the amounts she is required to spend on a regular basis for the benefit of the parties' child. Each month, the former wife spends $120 for the child's clothes, $100 for his recreation, $186 for his transportation, and $100 on incidentals; a total amount of $506 per month. Additionally, the court found in the final order that the parties' child should contribute $400 per month as his share of the mortgage payments on the house he occupies with his mother and stepfather. We know of no case law or logic which would require a child to pay a share of his mother's and stepparent's mortgage payments. Would the child build an equity of some sort in the property? Would the father, who really pays the "share," gain an equity? Would either of them enjoy a deductible mortgage interest expense?
The duty to support children of a dissolved marriage does not rest exclusively with the noncustodial parent. § 61.13(1), Fla.Stat. (1983); Condon v. Condon, 295 So.2d 681 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974). Both natural parents share this duty. Id. When providing for the support of minor children in dissolution proceedings, trial courts should impose support obligations in accordance with the circumstances of the parties and the equitable aspects of the case. § 61.13(1), Fla.Stat. (1983). The factors listed in Peak v. Peak, 411 So.2d 325 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982) are illustrative of this determination.
Although the evidence shows that the parties' child requires at most $506 per month, the court ordered appellant to pay $1,200 per month. The final order of modification indicates that the court arrived at this amount based upon its determination that such amount equals approximately 20% of appellant's "spendable" income. In Rook v. Rook, 469 So.2d 172 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985) (en banc), this court receded from any indication in Menendez v. Menendez, 435 So.2d 287 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983), review denied, 441 So.2d 632 (Fla.1983) that we have adopted certain percentage guidelines which trial courts must follow when providing for child support in domestic relations cases. The income percentages referred to in Menendez should be considered only as another of the enumerated factors set out in Peak. In reversing, we note that our decision in Rook was not available to the trial court at the time it entered the order under review. We remand the case to the trial, court for further proceedings and consideration in accordance with this opinion. Upon reconsideration the trial judge may reconsider the bases upon which the award was made, including the rental share. In addition, the court should closely examine the evidence in support , of the $120 per month clothing expense, $100 per month "incidentals" and the transportation expense.
REVERSED and REMANDED.
THOMPSON, E.R., Associate Judge, concurs.
SHARP, J., dissents with opinion.
. The former wife's cross appeal is therefore moot.