Case Name: THE STATE ex rel. JOHN H. POLLOCK v. CHARLES U. BECKER, Secretary of State
Court: Supreme Court of Missouri
Jurisdiction: Missouri
Decision Date: 1921-08-01
Citations: 289 Mo. 660
Docket Number: 
Parties: THE STATE ex rel. JOHN H. POLLOCK v. CHARLES U. BECKER, Secretary of State.
Judges: James T. Blair, C. J., Graves, Walher and Elder, JJ., concur in separate opinions; Higbee and David E. Blair, JJ., dissent in separate opinions.
Reporter: Missouri Reports
Volume: 289
Pages: 660–718

Head Matter:
THE STATE ex rel. JOHN H. POLLOCK v. CHARLES U. BECKER, Secretary of State.
In Banc,
August 1, 1921.
1. LEGISLATIVE ENACTMENT: Referendum: Power of Legislature to Prevent. The General Assembly cannot prevent the reference of a legislative act to the people by referendum petition for their approval or rejection, by inserting in the act a section that the enactment is necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health' and safety, when it is not such in fact, nor by inserting such words in the act inhibit the court from determining whether it is subject to reference. [Per WOODSON, J.; JAMES T. BLAIR, C. J., and WALKER, GRAVES and ELDER, JJ., concurring; HIGBEE AND DAVID E. BLAIR, JJ., dissenting.]
2. CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION: Adopted from Another State: Interpretation Aiso Adopted: Exception. The general rule, general in that it is the frequent expression of the courts, is that where a statute or constitutional provision has been borrowed from another state, which prior to its adoption in the borrowing state had received a construction by the highest court of that state, the presumption is that the borrowing state adopted it in the light of such construction;-hut this is only a rule of constructon, and there are exceptions to it as ancient as the rule itself, one of which is that where the courts of the adoptng state are clearly of the opinion that the construction by the courts of the initial state is erroneous, or that its application would lead to a denial of a substantial right, such foreign construction will not be controlling. [Per GRAVES, J.; BLAIR, C. J., and WALKER, J., concurring.]
3.- REFERENDUM: Ousting Justice of Peace. A legislative act which removes eight justices of the peace in one city, cuts down the number of justices and constables and provides for the appointment of others by the Governor, is not a bill for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health or safety, nor, as is shown by current history, of which the courts take judicial notice, were they enacted for any such purpose. And it is against all reason that the reference of such acts to the people can be prevented by inserting in, them a section declaring that their enactment is,necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health ' and safety. [Per GRAVES, J.; BLAIR, C. J., and WALKER, J„ concurring.]
4. -: Exception: Exercise of Police Power: Judicial Question. The clause of the Constitution which does not require a reference of legislative acts necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health or safety is an exception to the otherwise universal reservation by the people of the power of referendum, and includes only those certain, definite and unquestioned phases of the police power which, in their very nature, may be and usually are emergent; and as the courts exercise jurisdiction to determine whether a legislative act is a valid exercise of the police power, it is also a judicial question whether a certain act, which attempts to cut off its reference to the people, is a valid exercise of the police power. [Per BLAIR, C. J.;‘ WALKER and GRAVES, JJ., concurring.]
5. -: Legislative Finding: Conclusiveness. The Constitution does not say that a legislative act shall be exempt from the referendum if the General Assembly shall declare it to be necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health or safety, but the exemption is made to depend on the fact that the act is so necessary. [Per BLAIR, p. J.; WALKER and GRAVES, JJ., concurring.]
6. -: Exercise of Police Power: Judicial Question: Legislative Finding. The question of fact whether a trade or calling is of such a nature as to render it subject to regulation or to particular regulations under the police power, is strictly a judicial question; and the court will hold invalid any legislative act which it finds does not touch the public good in such a way as to justify regulation of the calling or the particular regulation attempted, and, it will do that in the face of the fact that the regulatory act involves a legislative finding that existing facts justify the attempted regulation. [Per BLAIR, C.- J.; WALKER and GRAVES, JJ., concurring.]
7. -: Widening Police Power: Conclusiveness of Legislative Finding. If a declaration in a legislative act that it is necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety is conclusive upon the courts, then the result is that Section 57 of Article IV of the Constitution empowers the Legislature to widen and extend the police power to include callings and regulations to which it could not have been extended prior to the adoption of said section, and to remove from the realm of judicial inquiry every question of fact pertaining to the scope and extent of a proper exercise of the police power; and, furthermore, it empowered the Legislature to defeat the reference of any and all bills, whether an attempted exercise of the police power or otherwise, by the mere inclusion of such a declaration in the bill, however false in fact it may be. [Per BLAIR, C. J.; WALKER and GRAVES, JJ., concurring.]
8. -: Legislative Error: Corrected by Another Error. That part of said Section 57 pertaining to the reference to the people of laws enacted by the Legislature was designed to correct legislative errors; and if the Legislature errs by passing a bad act, it cannot cure that error by adding thereto another error, false on its face, that the act is necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety. [Per BLAIR, C. J.; WALKER and GRAVES, JJ., concurring.]
9. -: Legislative Finding: Effect -Upon Referendum and Courts. If a legislative declaration inserted in a' law that its enactment is necessary for the immediate preservation^ of the public peace, health and safety is conclusive upon the question of its referendum and prevents its reference to the people, it would likewise be conclusive upon the courts when they are called upon to consider the validity of the act as a proper and’ reasonable exercise of the police power. It is conclusive neither on the referendum nor upon the court. [Per BLAIR, O. J.; WALKER and GRAVES, JJ., concurring.]
10.-: Police Regulation: Question of Fact. Courts have power to pass upon questions of fact in determining whether police regulations are valid or invalid. [Per BLAIR, C. J.; WALKER and GRAVES, JJ., concurring.]
11. -: Adopted from Oregon: Prior Construction. The fact that the referendum provision of our Constitution was borrowed from Oregon, and that the highest court of that state had decided, before it was adopted here, that a declaration inserted by the Legislature in an act declaring that the enactment is necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety is conclusive upon the courts and prevents the reference of the act to the people by petitions sufficiently signed, will not compel the acceptance of such construction by the courts of this State, because it is not in harmony with the spirit and purpose of our Constitution as declared in the initiative and referendum provision, and in such case the rule of foreign construction does not apply. The construction of the borrowed constitutional provision by the courts of the initial state is. not binding, but only persuasive, and will not be followed where the courts of the adopting state are clearly of the opinion, as the Supreme Court is in this case, that such construction was erroneous and if followed will result in the denial of a substantial right. [Per WALKER, J.; BLAIR C. J., and GRAVES, J., concurring.]
12. -: Purpose: Legislative Defeat. The purpose of the referendum'provision, expressed in an adopted constitutional amendment, was to provide an efficient method of checking and regulating legislative power, by providing that all legislative acts, except those necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety, may be referred to the people for their approval or rejection: and to hold that the Legislature may, in spite of. the clear language used, determine, not only the extent to which the reserved- power shall be used, hut whether it may be exercised at all, would be to rule that the Legislature can violate the spirit of the provision and destroy its purpose. [Per WALKER, J.; BLAIR, C. J., and GRAVES, J., concurring.]
13. -: -: -: Justice of Peace: Unlimited Exceptions. If the Legislature may except from the operation of the referendum provisions of the Constitution acts abolishing justices of the peace, clerks and constables' in designated townships and providing for the appointment of their successors, by simply declaring in the acts that their enactment is necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety, then a like exception may be effected by inserting said declaration in any act, regardless of the absurdity of its application, and thus the constitutional power intended to be reserved will be completely destroyed. [Per WALKER, J.; BLAIR, C. J., and GRAVES, J., concurring.]
14.-: Justice of Peace: Public Peace, Health and Safety: Immediate Preservation: Absurdity. Acts which apply to only one city in the State cannot be said to be “public” in the sense'that word is used in the referendum clause of the Constitution; and if their purpose, as is apparent from their face, is to effect a change in the personnel in the offices of justices of the peace, clerks and constables in the townships of said city, and to define their duties and powers, it would be to violate reason, which is the life of the law, and to uphold an absurdity, to say they are necessary for the “immediate preservation” of the public peace, or the public health or the public safety, for those words imply an imminent danger, an impelling necessity, public disorders, and an unwholesome sanitary condition of the community at large. [Per WALKER, J.; BLAIR C. J., and GRAVES, J., concurring.]
15. -: Legislative Acts: Presumption of Right Action: Invasion: Judicial Interference. Every intendment should be made in favor of the propriety of legislative action; but it is firmly fixed in American1 government that it is the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is, and that duty is more imperative under modern constitutions which do not invest exclusive legislature power in the legislature, but divide it between the legislature and the people, and place upon the court, in a proper case, the duty to determine whether the legislature’s'acts constitute an invasion upon the powers which the people in their Constitution have reserved to themselves. If a legislative act purports to be for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety, and its words and subject-matter have no relation to those subjects, and an analysis of it demonstrates that it is a palpable invasion of the powers reserved by the people, the courts will so decide, and preserve the constitutional right of referendum. [Per WALKER, J.; BLAIR, C. J., and GRAVES, J., concurring.]
16. -: Peace and Safety: Legislative Determination. The mandate of the Constitution, coming directly from the people, is superior to the will of the Legislature; and while the Legislature, being invested with law-making power, must, in the first instance, decide whether an act is necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health or safety, its determination that the necessity exists if in fact without substantial basis, is not final or conclusive. But if the act purports to have been adapted to meet an emergency which palpably, from its face, does not exist, it becomes the duty of the courts to take jurisdiction and give effect to the constitutional intent and purpose. [Per ELDER, J.; BLAIR, C. J., and WALKER, and GRAVES, JX, concurring.]
17. • — ——: -: -: Construction by Oregon Court. The ruling of the Supreme Court of Oregon, from which thp initiative and referendum section of our Constitution was borrowed, that .a decía ration placed in a bill by the Legislature that its enactment is necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety is conclusive, is not binding upon the Supreme Court.of ■ this State, although such ruling was made before the constitutional section was adopted in this State. While such foreign construction is persuasive and entitled to respectful consideration, it is not binding, and will not be followed if the courts of the adopting state are of the opinion that it is erroneous. [Per ELDER, J.; BLAIR, C. J., and WALKER and GRAVES, JJ„ concurring.]
18.- — : -: —--: Removal of Justice of Peace. A declaration in a legislative act, abolishing in one township the offices of eight justices of the peace and constables, who from the record are presumed to be properly and efficiently discharging their official duties, and providing for the immediate appointment of other justices and constables, that its enactment is necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety, is not conclusive on the courts, and is not sufficient to prevent the reference of said act to the people for their approval or rejection. [Per ELDER, J.; BLAIR, C. J., and WALKER and GRAVES, JJ., concurring.]
19. -: -: -: Construction by Oregon Court: Binding. When the people of Missouri adopted the referendum amendment from the Constitution of Oregon they adopted the construction which had previously been given it by the Supreme Court of that state just the same as if that construction had been written into the body of the amendment; and that court having ruled, prior to the adoption of the amendment in this State, that a declaraion written into the body of a legislative act that, its enactment is necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety is conclusive and final on the question of necessity, such ruling is binding on the courts of this State and compel a like ruling from them. [Per HIGBEE, J., dissenting.]
20. -: -: -: Legislative Power: Coordinate and Independent Department. The Constitution has solemnly vested the legislative power in the General Assembly, which is an independent and co-ordinate department of the governmeiit, answerable only to the people for the execution of the powers delegated to it, and the remedy for any abuse of that power, by fraud or trickery, is the ballot. Besides, a legislative act, which contains a section declaring that its enactment is necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety, may be submitted to the direct vote of the people by an initiative petition, so that there is no foundation for the suggestion that the Legislature, by inserting such a declaration in an act,- may, by fraud and trickery, destroy the referendum or prevent legislation by the people. [Per HIGBBE, J., dissenting.]
21. -: -: -: Oregon Oonstruction. When one state borrows a constitutional provision from another and the highest court of that state has authoritatively construed the provision prior to its adoption by such other, such provision is to be held as having been adopted with the construction thus previously put upon it. The initiative and referendum amendment to the Missouri Constitution was borrowed from the Constitution of Oregon, and the decision of the Supreme Court of that State, made before its adoption here, that a declaration in an act of the Legislature that its enactment is necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety is final and conclusive on the court, if not absolutely binding on the Supreme Court of Missouri, is persuasive 'authority of the highest character. [Per DAVID E. BLAIR, J., dissenting'.]
22. -: -: -: Weight of Authority: On Principle. The decided weight of authority is to the effect that the existence of the necessity for a legislative act is a matter of legislative determination. But independent of decided cases, and on principle, the courts are and should be bound by the declaration in an act passed by the Legislature that its enactment is necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety. [Per DAVID E. BLAIR, J., dissenting.]
Mandamus.
Writ granted.
John T. Barker and John M. Atkinson for relator.
The Secretary of State refused to accept these referendum petitions for the sole reason that Senate Bills Nos. 4, 5, 6, and 7 contained the “peace, health and safety clause.” Relator contends that this action was arbitrary, and that this court must determine from the entire bills whether the peace, health and safety is involved. State ex rel. v. Sullivan, 224 S. W. 327; State ex rel. v. Roach, 230 Mo. 435; State ex rel. v. Meath, 84 Wash. 302; In Re Hoffman, 155 Cal. 114; McClure v.- Nye, 22 Cal. App. -248; Rigdon v. San Diego, 30 Cal. App. 107; Riley v. Carico, 27 Okla. 33; Beal v. State, 103 Atl. (Mary land), 99; Attorney-General v. Lindsay, 178 Mich. 524; Simpson v. Gage, 195 Mich. 581; Payne v. Graham, 7 A. L. R. 516; Strange v. Levy, 107 Atl. (Maryland), 549; County ’v. Dayton, 92 Ohio St. 215; State ex rel. v. Whisman, 36 S. D. 260, L. R. A. 1917B, 1; Case v. Howell, 85 Wash. 281, 147 Pae. 1162; State ex rel. v. Wright, 251 Mo. 341; Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U. S. 623; O’Neil v. Amusement Co., 8 A. L. R. 1600; In re Jacobs, 98 N. Y. 981, 50 Am. Rep. 636.
Jesse W. Barrett, Attorney-General, Merrill E. Otis and Albert Miller, Assistant Attorneys-General, for respondent.
(1) The initiative and referendum provision in the Constitution, Section 57 of Article IY, was taken bodily from the Constitution of Oregon. State ex rel. v. Carter, 257 Mo. 68, 70; State ex rel. v. Sullivan, 224 S. W. 334. (2) The initiative and referendum amendment was adopted in Missouri at the November election in 1908. More than four years before, to-wit, on January 11, 1904, the Supreme Court of Oregon, in the case of Kadderly v. Portland, 44 Ore. 118, 75 Pac. 222, construed the Oreg'.on provision as authorizing the Legislature finally and conclusively to determine whether a given act is necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety. Missouri, having taken its amendment from Oregon, took it with that interpretation, and that interpretation is now binding upon the Supreme Court of Missouri. State ex rel. v. Sullivan, 224 S. W. 342; State ex rel. v. Sullivan, 224 S. W. 334; State ex rel. v. Carter, 257 Mo. 69; State ex rel. v. Miles, 210 Mo. 146; Skouten v. Wood, 57 Mo. 380; Skrainka v. Allen, 76 Mo. 389; Knight v. Rawlings, 205 Mo. 433. (3) Under a constitutional provision excepting from the referendum laws necessary.to the immediate preservation of the public peace, health or safety, it is for the Legislature to say what laws come within the exception, and its decision is final and conclusive. Kadderly v. Portland, 44 Ore. 118, 75 Pac. '222; State ex rel. v. Bacon, 14 S. D. 394, 85 N. W. 225; Oklahoma City v. Shields, 22 Okla. 265, 100 Pac. 559; In re Menefee, 22 Okla. 365, 97 Pac. 1014; Arkansas Tax Commission v. Moore, 103 Ark. 48, 145 S. W. 199; Hanson v. Hodges, 109 Ark. 479, 160 S. W. 392; Van Kleek v. Ramer, 62 Colo. 4, 156 Pac. 1108; In re Senate Resolution, 54 Colo. 262, 130 Pac. 333; People ex rel. v. Ramer, 61 Colo. 422, 158 Pac. 146. (4) Whether an act is necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety is a question of fact. The finding by the Legislature, as to questions of fact is not subject to judicial review. State ex rel. v. Hackman, 275 Mo. 646; Ex parte Renfrow, 112 Mo. 591, 594. (5) Even if it should be held that the legislative finding is not conclusive, nevertheless it should be conclusive in all cases of doubt. Attorney-General v. Lindsay, 178 Mich. 524; State ex rel. v. Howell, 85 Wash. 281. (6) The phrase “immediate preservation” in the referendum provision refers merely to those laws which will be necessary before the time when the people under the referendum would have time to vote upon them. Hanson v. Hodges, 160 S. W. (Ark.) 392, 396. (7), The laws involved in this case are, as a matter of fact, necessary t'o the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety.
Wilbur F.:Spottswood for amicus curiae.
(1) The Constitution (Secs. 1 and 57, Article IV),in vesting legislative power in'the General Assembly, reserved to the people the right to subject to popular vote all laws, except certain classes of laws, among them the class of laws “necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health or safety.” (2) It is conceded that, to bring the law, now under consideration, within the exception, exempting certain classes of laws from the referendum, it must appear that it belongs to a class of laws which are necessary either for the imme diate preservation of the public peace or for the immediate preservation of the public health, or for the immediate preservation of the public safety. (3) From its very nature the law in question belongs to the class of laws which are necessary for the preservation of all these public blessings. It creates a court of justice having a certain measure both of civil and criminal jurisdiction, including jurisdiction in cases of nuisance; and civilization knows of no scheme by which it can dispense with its courts as instruments for the accomplishment of those ends. Such laws are absolutely necessary. (4) And not only is the law in question necessary for the preservation of the peace, health, and safety of the people, but it is immediately necessary for their preservation, since the menace to the peace, health and safety of the community, against which society, through its courts, raises the shield and unsheaths the sword, is always present, always immediate, always instant. Not for a moment can an efficient judicial system be dispensed with, if the public peace, health and safety are to be preserved. (5) Some have supposed that the court can consider previously existing conditions and previously existing laws, in order to determine whether the act now before the court is necessary; but it is submitted that such a conception is entirely erroneous. Were the court to go into such matters, it would, for the time being, lay aside its judicial character, and become, for the nonce, a legislative body. Its judgment would be forged in the heat of.parliamentary debate, and would rest upon conceptions, not of what the law was, but upon conceptions of what the law ought to be. In short, we would have an exhibition of the exercise by the judicial branch of a function wholly legislative, contrary to the entire scheme of government embodied in the Constitution. (6) What Section 57 of Article IV of the Constitution does, is, not to provide that particular laws, made necessary by particular conditions, shall be excepted from the referendum, but. that certain classes of laws shall be so excepted; and the only function of the court
is, to determine whether the law, from its nature, falls within one of those classes. That this law does fall within the class of laws necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, the public health and the public safety, we have already shown.

Opinion:
WOODSON, J.
This is an original proceeding by mandamus instituted in this court by the relator against the respondent, the Secretary of State, seeking to compel him to accept and file four certain referendum petitions, hereinafter to be more fully described, so that the laws mentioned in the petitions may be placed upon the ballots at the next general election of the State for confirmation or rejection by the voters of the State.
The pleadings in the case fully and clearly present the legal, proposition presented to this court for determination and for that reason I shall here present them in full. They are as follows:
PETITION.
"This action was brought in the name of the State of Missouri at the relation of John H. Pollock against Charles U. Becker, Secretary of State. The petition, which was filed in this court on the 18th day of June, 1921, alleges that the relator is a resident and citizen of Kansas City, Jackson County, Missouri, and a legal voter and qualified elector in said city, county and State, and at the November election in 1918 was elected justice of the peace within and for Kaw Township in said county and State for a term of four years, and that the respondent Becker is now the duly elected and acting Secretary of State of the State of Missouri; tliat the 51st General Assembly convened at Jefferson City, January 1, 1921, and adjourned sine die on March 21, 1921, and passed, among others, Senate Bill No. 4, entitled, 'An Act to amend Section 2688 of the Revised Statutes of Missouri, 1919, relating to Justices of the Peace, abolishing the offices of Justices of the Peace, elected in dis tricts and certain townships and providing for the transfer of business pending before such Justices;' and Senate Bill No. 5, entitled, 'An Act repealing Article 9 including Sections 2923 to 2943 inclusive, Chapter 22 of the Revised Statutes of Missouri, 1919, entitled "Justices and constables in townships of two hundred thousand and less than four hundred thousand" — and making a new article in lieu thereof;' and Senator Bill No. 6 entitled, 'An Act to amend Section 2689 of the Revised Statutes of Missouri, 1919, relating to Justices of the Peace;' and Senate Bill No. 7, entitled, 'An Act amending Section 2143 of the Revised Statutes of Missouri, 1919, relating to constables, abolishing the office of constable in districts, in certain townships, and providing for constables in such townships; ' that all four of said bills have a common interest and pertain to the same subject and affect the same parties, that is, said bills abolish the offices of eight justices of the peace and all constables and clerks in Kaw Township, Jackson County, Missouri; Senate Bill No. 4 provides that on the 1st day of July, 1921, the offices of the justices of the peace elected or appointed in districts in all municipal townships containing a city of one hundred thousand inhabitants and less than three' hundred thousand inhabitants and the office of clerks to such justices shall be abolished and all jurisdiction and powers vested in such justices of the peace are vested in other justices of the peace provided for in said bill; Senate Bill No. 5 provides for the election of five justices of the peace in such township at the general election in 1922, and provides that until such election the Governor shall appoint and confer jurisdiction upon such new justices of the peace to make certain rules, etc.; Senate Bill No. 6 provides for the appointment of other justices of the peace by the County Court of Jackson County; Senate Bill No. 7 abolishes all of the constables holding office after the first day of July, 1921 in said Kaw Township, Jackson County, Missouri, and provides for the election of new constables at the general election in 1922 and authorizes the Governor to appoint until such general election.
"The petition of relator further alleges that all of said hills were approved hy the Governor of Missouri on the 11th day of March, 1921, and that on the 18th day of June, 1921, and within ninety days after the adjournment of the Fifty-first General Assembly, the relator presented to the Secretary of State in the presence of the Governor, 1538 legal referendum petitions containing the total of 65,248 names of legal voters and qualified electors of the State of Missouri, which petitions were legally signed by more than five per cent of the legal voters and qualified electors in mbre than two-thirds of the Congressional districts of the State of Missouri, asking for a referendum on all four of said Senate Bills in order that the people might at the general election in 1922 vote for the appproval or rejection of said measures; that said Secretary of State, wholly disregarding his duties and without any legal right or authority, refused to accept, receive and file said referendum petitions against said bills and assigned as his sole and only reason for such refusal that said bills were not referable, because each of the bills contained among other provisions the following language:
" 'This enactment is hereby declared to be necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety within the meaning of Section 57, Article 4, of the Constitution of Missouri.'
"The petition further alleges that it is not true that said bills, or either of them, are necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health or safety within the meaning of Section 57 of Article 4 of the Constitution of Missouri, but that said bills are purely local in their character and pertain to Jackson County, Missouri, only, and that such statements contained in said bills are false and untrue and that such an attempt on the part of the Legislature to prevent said bills from being referred to the people is unconstitutional and void and in violation of Section 57 of Article 4 of the Constitution of Missouri, and that such action on the part of the Secretary of State was and is arbitrary and*unfair; that by the refusal of the respondent to accept, receive and file such referendum petitions, the relator and all other citizens of Missouri have suffered and will suffer irreparable wrong and injury and the people of the State will be denied their constitutional right to vote for the approval or rejection of said measures and will be entirely without redress of said wrongs, without the interposition and interference of this court oy its writ of mandamus.
"The prayer of the petition prays this court to issue its writ of mandamus, directing and commanding respondent, as Secretary of State, to forthwith accept, receive and file in his office at Jefferson City, Missouri, all of the said referendum petitions pertaining to said Senate Bills Nos. 4, 5, 6, and 7, and to detach the sheet containing the signatures and affidavits and cause them to be attached to one or more printed copies of the measures so proposed, and to deliver such detached copies of such measures to the relator, and that the respondent be compelled to forthwith transmit to the Attorney-General of the State of Missouri a copy thereof in order that said Attorney-General shall provide and return to the Secretary of State a ballot title for said measures, and that said respondent be compelled to furnish to each of the county clerks of the State of Missouri a certified copy of the ballot title and numbers of the several measures to be voted upon at the coming general election, and for such other relief as may be found necessary and expedient to cause the respondent to do that which in justice and right ought to be done.
"After the filing of the petition in this court, re- , lator and respondent entered into a stipulation agreeing that the petition might stand for the alternative writ; that the respondent have until the 28th day. of June, 1921, within which to plead; that the cause be submitted to the court upon briefs filed by both parties; that relator. have until the 5th day of July, 1921, to file his brief and that respondent have five days thereafter to file his answer brief, and that relator have three days thereafter if desired to file reply brief; and that Senate Bills Nos. 4, 5, 6, and 7, be consolidated in one action and all questions as to joinder be waived."
ANSWER.
"On'the 28th day of June, 1921, respondent filed his answer to said petition of mandamus and in said answer says:
"Admits that relator is a resident and assessed taxpaying citizen of Kansas-City, Jackson County, Missouri, and is a legal voter and qualified elector in said city, county and state, and was on the second day of November, 1918, elected a justice of the peace within and for Kaw Township, Jackson County, Missouri, for a term of four years; admits that respondent is and has been the Secretary of State of Missouri since the 10th day of January, 1921; admits that Fifty-first General Assembly of Missouri convened at Jefferson City on January 5, 1921, and adjourned sine die on the 21st day of March, 1921, and passed, among other acts, Senate Bills Nos. 4, 5, 6, and 7, with the titles as pleaded; alleges that copies of said Senate Bills Nos. 4, 5, 6, and 7, are attached and marked 'Exhibits A, B, C and D,' and made a part thereof; admits that all four of said bills have a community of interest, that is, said bills are similar, affect the same parties, pertain to the same subject, are companion bills, and one is useless without all; admits that all of said bills were approved by the Govenor on the 11th day of March, 1921, and that on the 18th day of June, 1921, in the office of the Secretary of State and in the presence of respondent and the Govenor of Missouri, relator presented as against each of said bills 1538 referendum petitions containing a total of 65,248 names of legal voters and qualified electors of the State of Missouri, which said petitions were legally signed by more than five per cent of the legal voters and qualified electors in each of two-thirds of the Congressional districts, of the State of Missouri as set out in detail in relator's petition; admits that said petitions were presented in order that said Senate Bills Nos. 4; 5, 6, and 7, might be referred to the people of Missouri for their approval or rejection; admits that at the time said referendum petitions were presented, relator demanded respondent to accept, receive and file said petitions against each of said bills and to detach the sheets containing the signatures and affidavits as alleged in relator's petition, and demanded that respondent forthwith transmit to the AttorneyGreneral of the State of Missouri a copy thereof in order that he might provide a ballot title for each of said measures, and demanded that respondent furnish to each of the county clerks of the State of Missouri a certified copy of the ballot titles and numbers of the several measures to be voted upon at the coming general election, and demanded that respondent fully comply with Chapter 47 of the Revised Statutes of Missouri 1919, and other laws appertaining to the referendum acts of the Legislature ; and admits that respondent refused to accept, receive and file said referendum petitions against each and all of said bills; denies that in refusing to accept, receive and file said petitions, respondent wholly disregarded his duties as Secretary of State; admits that each of said bills contained among other provisions, the following language:
" 'This enactment is hereby declared necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety, within the meaning of Section 57 of Article 4 of the Constitution of Missouri.'
'Denies that it is not true that said bills, or either of 'them, are necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety within the meaning of Section 57 of Article 4 of the Constitution of Missouri ; denies that said bills, and each of them are purely local in their character and pertain to Jackson County only and do not affect the citizenship of Missouri in any particular; denies that the statement contained in each of said bills is false and untrue, and denies that such statement does not prevent said bills from being referred to the people for their approval or rejection, and.that- the action of. the Legislature in inserting said statements in said bills was unconstitutional and void and in violation of Section 57 of Article 4 of the Constitution of Missouri; and denies that the action of respondent, as Secretary of State, was and is arbitrary, unfair and in violation of Section 57 of Article 4 of the Constitution of Missouri, or with any other provision of the Constitution; denies that by his refusal to accept, receive and file such referendum petitions the relator and other citizens of Missouri have suffered, and will suffer, irreparable wrong and injury and the people of the State be denied any constitutional right whatsoever by reason of his said action; denies each and every allegation contained in relator's petition and alternative writ of mandamus not herein expressly admitted; further answering, respondent states that he refused, and still refuses, to accept, receive and file the referendum petitions tendered by the relator for the following reasons :
"1. Thát said Senate Bills Nos. 4, 5, 6 and 7, and each of them, contain the following language:
" 'This enactment is hereby declared to be necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety, within the meaning of Section 57, of Article 4, of the Constitution of Missouri.'
"Alleges that by reason of said legislative declaration contained in each of said bills and by reason,of the provisions of Section 57 of Article 4 of the Constitution of Missouri, said bills are not subject to, but are excepted from, the referendum.
"2. That said bills, and each of them, are necessary fo.r the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety, and that, therefore, by the provisions of Section 57 of Article 4 of the Constitution of Missouri, said bills are not subject to the referendum; and alleges that, having made return fully to the relator's petition and the alternative writ of mandamus herein, respondent prays the court that the peremptory writ of mandamus prayed for by relator be denied." /
REPLY.
"On the 30th day of June, 1921, relator filed his reply to the answer of the respondent as follows:
"Admits that said Senate Bills Nos. 4, 5, 6 and 7, and each of them, contained the following language:
" 'This enactment is hereby declared to be necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety within the meaning of Section 57 of Article 4 of the Constitution of Missouri.'
"Denies that by reason of said legislative declaration contained in each of said bills and by reason of the provisions of Section 57 of Article 4 of the Constitution of Missouri, said bills are not subject to, but are excepted from, the referendum; denies that said bills, and each of them, are necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety, and therefore, by the provisions of Section 57 of Article 4 of the Constitution of Missouri, said bills are not subject to the referendum; further alleges that said statement in each of said bills is false and untrue and in violation of Section 57 of- Article 4 of the Constitution of Missouri and that said bills are not excepted from the referendum by reason of said statement; and further alleges that it is not true that said bills, or either of them, are necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety and alleges that said bills are purely local in their character and simply provide for legislating out of office eight justices of the peace arid eight constables in one township (Kaw) in the entire State of Missouri, and that the bills are not in any sense necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety.
"We submit, therefore, that there is simply one question for this court to determine and that is whether or not the adoption by the Legislature of the 'peace, health and safety clause' excepts these bills from the referendum. That is; may a Legislature select only one township in the entire State of Missouri and legislate out of office eight justices of the peace and constables who have been elected for a four-year term and authorize the Governor to appoint their successors until the next general election? By stipulation filed and the pleadings, all other questions are eliminated, and the court is called upon to determine the one legal question involved. ' '
There is but a single leg'll proposition presented by this record to this court for determination, and that is, has the Legislature of the State the constitutional authority undér Section 57 of Article .4 of the Constitution to enact a law, and debar the power of the courts of the State from passing upon the question as to whether or not the law is subject to referendum by adding thereto the words: "This enactment is hereby declared to be necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health, and safety, within the meaning of Section 57 of Article 4 of the Constitution of Missouri?" Said section, in so far as here necessary, reads as follows:
" The legislative authority of the State shall be vested in a legislative assembly, consisting of a senate and house of representatives, but the people reserve to themselves power to propose laws and amendments to the Constitution, and to enact or reject the same at the polls, independent of the legislative assembly, and also reserve power at their own option to approve' or reject at the' polls any act of the legislative assembly. The first power reserved by the people is the initiative, and not more than eight per cent of the legal voters in each of at least two-thirds of the Congressional districts in the State shall be required to propose any measure by such petition and every such petition shall include the full text of the measure so proposed. Initiative petitions shall be filed with the Secretary of State not less than four months before the election at which they are to be voted upon. The second power is the referendum, and it may be ordered (except as to laws necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health or safety and laws making appropriations for the current expenses of the State government, for the maintenance of the State institutions and for the support of public schools) either by the petitions signed by five per cent of the legal voters in each of at least two-thirds of the Congressional districts in the State, or by the legislative assembly, as other bills are enacted."
This question has been most elaborately and ably discussed by counsel for the respective parties, and all the authorities bearing upon the question from the various states of the Union have been cited, and after a thorough consideration of the same, I am fully satisfied that the law of the case was, and is, fully and correctly declared bv Craves, J., in the case of State ex rel. v. Sullivan, 283 Mo. 547, 224 S. W. 327, where the same legal proposition was presented to this court for determination that is here presented by this case. I fully concurred in the views as there expressed by Judge Craves, and adopt them as my views of the law of this case. While that opinion was not concurred in by a unanimous opinion of the court, yet there was but one dissent as to the law as there expressed regarding the question here presented; Judges Williamson, Goode, Blair, and Williams concurred as to paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 and the lesult of - the Craves opinion, but they expressed no opinion as to Paragraph 5.
For the reasons stated, I am of the opinion that the writ of mandamus should be made permanent. It is so ordered.
James T. Blair, C. J., Graves, Walher and Elder, JJ., concur in separate opinions; Higbee and David E. Blair, JJ., dissent in separate opinions.