Case Name: Dennis R. Alward v. Emily B. Alward
Court: New York Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1888-06
Citations: 17 N.Y. St. Rep. 864
Docket Number: 
Parties: Dennis R. Alward v. Emily B. Alward.
Judges: 
Reporter: New York State Reporter
Volume: 17
Pages: 864–870

Head Matter:
Dennis R. Alward v. Emily B. Alward.
(Supreme Court, Equity Term, Cayuga County,
Filed June, 1888.)
1. Husband and wipe—When action between maintainable—Code Civ. Peo. § 450.
In an action between husband and wife in which the plaintiff sought to recover certain moneys paid out and advanced by him, at the defendant's request in and about the management of her separate estate, and to have the amount thereof declared a lien upon said estate, Held, that husband and wife cannot maintain a legal action against each other. That Code Civ. Pro. § 450 does not confer such right. The common law unity of husband and wife has not been so far abrogated as to confer upon them the privilege of bringing their quarrels into a court of law.
3. Same—Court of equity will entertain suit between.
Courts of equity will, in furtherance of the manifest intentions and objects of the parties, carry into effect a contract entered into between hus band and wife although it would be void at law and in order to accomplish this will entertain a suit at the instance of either against the other.
:3. Same—Sepabate estate of wife—Action to becoveb advancements BY HUSBAND.
A husband can maintain an equitable action against his wife for money advanced for the benefit of her separate estate and have such advances declared a lien thereon.
This is an action between husband and wife in which, the plaintiff seeks to recover certain moneys paid out and .advanced by him, at the defendant’s request, in and about the management of her separate estate, and asks to have the amount thereof declared a lien upon said estate.
Upon the trial and before any evidence was given, defendant’s counsel moved for a dismissal of the complaint -upon the ground that this is an equitable action which will not lie upon the facts stated in the complaint and claimed that the action if tried at all, must be before a jury. The court reserved its decision upon this motion until the case was finally submitted and thereupon the parties proceeded to trial upon the merits, and evidence was given in support as well as in defence of the claim litigated.
Charles M. Baker, for pl’ff; Rogers, Locke & Milburn, for def’t.

Opinion:
Adams, J.
A careful examination of the evidence in this case tends to confirm the impression produced at the trial that the plaintiff's claim is one which is well founded and one which the defendant's testimony strengthens rather than weakens; so that the only questions which demand .serious consideration are those raised by the defendant's motion hereinbefore referred to.
So far as the first branch of that motion is concerned, a decision adverse to the defendant's claim and theory may be reached without much hesitation, inasmuch as our present system of procedure has expressly done away with former distinctintion between legal and equitable remedies. Code Civ. Pro., 3339.
Distinction in the application of principles still exists, it is true, but if sufficient facts are set forth in the complaint to entitle the plaintiff to the relief sought, it matters very little whether the form of the action be legal or equitable. In either case it is the duty of the court to award the relief to which the facts stated and established entitle the plaintiff. Wright v. Wright, 54 N. Y., 437; Hale v. Omaha Bank, 49 id., 626; Stevens v. Mayor, etc., 84 id., 296.
The rule thus stated is subject, however, to one qualification, and that is that where the action is what may be termed "legal" in its nature, and the defendant demands a jury trial, the court must direct the cause to be so tried. Wheelock v. Lee, 74 N. Y., 495.
This is a constitutional right, and one of which a party cannot be deprived unless he expressly waives it, which certainly was not done here, for, before any evidence was given, counsel demanded that the case be tried by a jury.
That the action is one which, if it were between strangers, would come within the term " legal" as distinguished from " equitable " is quite obvious, and there is' therefore no alternative but to accede to this demand, and send the case to-the circuit, notwithstanding the evidence discloses no substantial defense upon the merits, provided the court is satisfied that a legal action can be maintained by this plaintiff against the defendant who, as has been stated, is his wife..
The question thus presented for consideration is by no-means free from difficulty, which is made all the more embarrassing by reason of the contrariety of opinion in the-different courts of this state. The decisions bearing upon this subject being in direct conflict with each other, have led to great confusion, and, until the precise question, unhampered by other complications, is fairly passed upon by the court of last resort, it will require considerable temerity upon the part of a subordinate tribunal to record its own-conclusion; for, whatever it may be, it is open to the criticism of' antagonism to that of some other and higher-authority.
To illustrate: in the case of Wright v. Wright (supra), the commission of appeals held that a wife might maintain an action against her husband upon a promissory note and that it mattered not in what form she brought her action.
In Wood v. Wood, (83 N. Y., 575), it was held that a wife-might maintain ejectment against her husband. In Howland v. Howland (20 Hun, 472), it was held that she might, likewise maintain replevin; in Berdell v. Parkhurst (19 Hun, 358), that the husband might sue his wife for conversion; while in a very recent case decided by the general term of this department (Granger v. Granger, 2 N. Y. State Rep., 211), it was held that a husband and wife might contract with each other, and that an action at law could be maintained upon a promissory note given by the latter to the former. At first blush, these citations would seem conclusive upon the question under consideration.
A careful examination convinces me, however, that so-far as it relates to this precise question, what is said in the first two cases is obiter, while the remainder are overruled in principle at least, by some more recent decisions of the court of appeals.
The general term in the first department in the case of Schultz v. Schultz (27 Hun, 26), held that a married woman might sue her husband in a civil action for assault and battery. This decision, which is in direct conflict with those of Freethy v. Freethy (42 Barb., 641), and Longendyke v. Longendyke (44 Barb., 366), was placed upon the ground that the acts of 1848, 1849, 1860 and 1862, had not only destroyed the unity of husband and wife, but had expressly conferred upon them the right to sue each other in any form of action. On appeal to the court of appeals the case was reversed (89 N. Y,, 644), and, although no opinion was written, the ground upon which the reversal was granted is made quite obvious by the reference thereto which occurs-in the celebrated case of Bertles v. Nunan (92 N. Y., 160), in which the court says. 'Although section 7 of the act of 1860 authorizes a married woman to maintain an action against any person for an injury to her person or character, yet we have held that she cannot maintain an action against her husband for such an injury." Certainly no distinction is made in the section referred to between an action for a personal injury and any other of a strictly legal nature, and if a wife may not bring suit for assault and battery, it is difficult to see upon what principle she may bring one for either conversion, replevin, ejectment or to recover the amount due upon a promissory note.
Indeed, the language of the court which precedes that already quoted, is utterly inconsistent with the idea of any such right being conferred by the acts in question. That the general term of this department is thus impressed by the decision in the Butts' case, is apparent in reading the opinion of Haight, J., in the case of Kaufman v. Schoeffel (37 Hun, 140), in which after commenting upon, and quoting from that decision, he concludes that the statutes of this State do not empower a married woman to carry on business as a co-partner of her husband, tor the simple reason that the unity of husband and wife still exists as under the common law, and so far as transactions between them are concerned. The doctrines of the Buttes' case was subsequently reiterated by the court of appeals. Zornttlein v. Bram, et al. (100 N. Y., 13), so that the present weight of authority, I think, may be fairly considered as adverse to the principle contended for by the defendant.
If, however, I were compelled to consider the proposition as an original one, unaided by the light thrown upon it by these latter decisions, it would seem that the same conclusion must inevitably be reached.
The statutes hereinbefore referred to, being in derogation of the common law are to be construed strictly and, as is stated by Dwarris, "it is not to be presumed that the legislature intended to make any innovation upon the common law further than the case absolutely requires."
The application of this canon of construction makes it necessary, therefore, to find some enactment which in ex press terms and not inferentially confers upon husband and wife the right to maintain against each other, an action at law. With this end in view, let us consider very briefly, recent legislation upon this subject.
Neither the act of 1848 nor that of 1849, contains any provision relating to the bringing of suit by married women. Obviously the extent to which the legislature designed to invade the common law rule by those acts was simply to confer upon married women the right to take, hold and convey their separate estate in the same manner as though unmarried.
By -the act of 1860 as thereafter amended by section 7 of -chapter 172 of the laws of 1862, the additional right and liability to "sue and be sued in all matters having relation to her sole' and separate property in the same manner as if she were sole," was conferred upon her.
It is noticeable that the language of this section is substantially the same as that of section 3 of the act of 1849, which permits a married woman to bargain, sell and convey her real estate in the same manner and with like effect as if she were unmarried, and yet the court of appeals held in White v. Wager (25th N. Y., 328), that this language did not enable her to convey directly to her husband, and this decision has been acquiesced in down to within a year past, when it was abrogated by express enactment. (Laws 1887, chap. 537.) It would seem, therefore, that if it required specific action on the part of the legislature to enable husband and wife to convey directly to each other, it would require similar action to authorize them to sue each other. Careful investigation, however, discloses no such intention •on the part of the law making power, on the contrary, the amendment of 1862, which has given rise to the conflicting 'decisions hereinbefore referred to, was repealed by chapter 245 of the Laws of 1880, and in lieu thereof we now have only section four hundred and fifty of the Code of Civil Procedure, which provides that "in an action or special proceeding, a married woman appears, prosecutes or defends, alone or joined with other parties, as if she was single. Certainly, there is nothing in this language which can be construed to confer upon husband and wife the right to maintain a legal action against each other.
If we were seeking for information as to the intention of the legislature as disclosed by these various enabling acts, the act of 1884 (chap. 381) might be of some assistance to us. By reference to that it will be seen that while conferring upon married women the right to make contracts in the same manner as if single, it expressly excepts from its operation contracts between husband and wife.
It must be conceded, I think, that there is nothing in the acts thus far adverted to which destroys the common, law unity of husband and wife to the extent contended for by the learned counsel who submitted this case on behalf of the defendant unless we follow the reasoning of the cases heretofore adverted to, one of which has as already suggested, been expressly reversed and all of them inferentially overruled by the court of appeals.
There is yet another complete answer, in my judgment, to the defendant's contention. The several acts to which attention has been directed were designed for the protection of the wife and to confer upon her certain rights and privileges and the earlier ones were entitled acts "for the more effectual protection of the property of married women'"
It would be an unwarranted perversion of their design to hold, as would be necessary in this case, that the acts in question conferred upon the husband a privilege which was not afforded him by the common law. This was the view taken by Mr. Justice Potter in Perkins v. Perkins (7 Lans., 19), as well as by Judge Dentó in White v. Wager (supra), and is one which possesses great force, although I prefer to place my decision upon the broad principle that the sound and sensible rule which obtained at common law relating to the unity of husband and wife has not yet been so far abrogated as to confer upon them the much coveted privilege of bringing their quarrels into a court of law.
1 am not unmindful of the contention frequently heard that the innovations which our modern civilization has made upon the conservatism of remoter generations respecting the marital relations are so radical in their character as to render it improper, if not impossible, to stop short of complete revolution, and such does, indeed, appear to be the tendency of recent legislation.
I think, however, that I can perceive, upon the part of the court of last resort, a disposition to throw the responsibility for the new order of things solely upon the law-making power, arid at the same time to place a check upon this tendency by adopting and adhering to rigid rules of construction.
The views to which I have given expression necessarily lead to a denial of the defendant's motion. It does not follow, however, that the plaintiff may not maintain his action. He has invoked the aid of a court of equity to grant him the relief which he could not obtain in a court of law In the forms thus selected by him, although the principles of the common law are fully recognized, yet they are not exclusively considered. On the contrary, courts of equity will, in furtherance of the manifest intentions and objects of the parties, carry into effect a contract entered into between husband and wife, although it would be void at law and in order to accomplish this, will entertain a suit at the instance of either against the other. Story's Eq. Juris., § 1368, et seq.; Shepard v. Shepard, 7 Johns. Ch. Rep., 57; Hunt v. Johnson, 44 N. Y., 27.
The plaintiff's demand, which, as already intimated, is . virtually undisputed, is one which calls for the interposition of equitable principles for its enforcement inasmuch as it 'does not appear that he has any legal remedy.
Judgment is, therefore, directed in his favor, but, inasmuch as the question passed upon is a somewhat novel one, and one concerning which it was conceded at the time that the practice was unsettled, a proper case presents itself for the exercise of the discretionary power of the court in the matter of costs, and none are awarded to either party.