Case Name: The ESTATE OF Stacey Kay KLAUS by Alta KLAUS, Administratrix and Alta Klaus as Personal Representative of the Wrongful Death Beneficiaries of Stacey Kay Klaus. v. VICKSBURG HEALTHCARE, LLC d/b/a River Region Health Systems, River Region Medical Corporation, Triad Hospitals, Inc., Stephanie Vanderford, R.N., and Eugene Ferris, III, M.D.
Court: Mississippi Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Mississippi
Decision Date: 2007-11-29
Citations: 972 So. 2d 555
Docket Number: No. 2006-IA-00675-SCT
Parties: The ESTATE OF Stacey Kay KLAUS by Alta KLAUS, Administratrix and Alta Klaus as Personal Representative of the Wrongful Death Beneficiaries of Stacey Kay Klaus. v. VICKSBURG HEALTHCARE, LLC d/b/a River Region Health Systems, River Region Medical Corporation, Triad Hospitals, Inc., Stephanie Van-derford, R.N., and Eugene Ferris, III, M.D.
Judges: SMITH, C.J., WALLER, P.J., EASLEY, CARLSON, DICKINSON, AND LAMAR, JJ., CONCUR. DIAZ, P.J., DISSENTS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION JOINED BY GRAVES, J.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 972
Pages: 555–564

Head Matter:
The ESTATE OF Stacey Kay KLAUS by Alta KLAUS, Administratrix and Alta Klaus as Personal Representative of the Wrongful Death Beneficiaries of Stacey Kay Klaus. v. VICKSBURG HEALTHCARE, LLC d/b/a River Region Health Systems, River Region Medical Corporation, Triad Hospitals, Inc., Stephanie Van-derford, R.N., and Eugene Ferris, III, M.D.
No. 2006-IA-00675-SCT.
Supreme Court of Mississippi.
Nov. 29, 2007.
Rehearing Denied Jan. 31, 2008.
Jerry Campbell, Vicksburg, Attorney for Appellants.
Kristopher Alan Graham, Stuart Bragg Harmon, Jackson, R.E. Parker, Sr., Clifford C. Whitney, III, Vicksburg, Attorneys for Appellees.

Opinion:
RANDOLPH, Justice,
for the Court.
¶ 1. In this interlocutory appeal, the Court is asked to address the legislatively-instituted cap on non-economic damages found in Mississippi Code Annotated Section ll-l-60(2)(a) (Supp.2007) and its effect, vel non, on the wrongful-death statute, i.e., Mississippi Code Annotated Section 11-7-13 (Rev.2004).
FACTS
¶2. Stacey Kay Klaus ("Stacey") died following surgery at River Region Hospital. On July 18, 2005, Stacey's mother, Alta, filed a medical malpractice complaint against the Appellees in the Circuit Court of Warren County, Mississippi, as Admin-istratrix of Stacey's estate and "as personal representative of the wrongfuLdeath beneficiaries of [Stacey].... " Stacey's wrongful-death beneficiaries ("Klauses") are Alta; her father, Sylvain; and her half-sister, Marian.
¶ 3. Subsequently, the Klauses filed a "Motion for Declaratory Judgment" in the trial court, stating:
2. Under Miss.Code Ann. § 11-1-60, non-economic damages are limited to $500,000.00 for "the plaintiff."
3. This wrongful death claim actually has three plaintiffs being the mother, father and half-sister. Although by statute each plaintiff must share equally in any award, each plaintiff has a separate claim for damages incurred for the death of [Stacey] because each plaintiff has a different relationship with [her].
4. The rights of each beneficiary plaintiff is affected by Miss.Code Ann. § 11— 1-60. [The Klauses] pursuant to Rule 57 M.R.C.P. seeks a declaration from this Court, deciding whether each plaintiff's non-economic damages are limited to $500,000.00 or the suit's total non-economic damages are limited to $500,-000.00.
(Emphasis added). Dr. Eugene Ferris filed his Response to that motion, arguing that "the noneconomic damages of all of the wrongful death beneficiaries of [Stacey], in the aggregate, are capped at the statutory maximum of $500,000 under Miss.Code Ann. § 11-1-60." Following hearing, the circuit court entered a "Declaratory Judgment" finding that "the limitation on non-economic damages in 11 — 1— 60(2)(a) to $500,000.00 applies to this cause of action regardless of the number of beneficiaries." This Court granted the Klaus-es' timely petition for interlocutory appeal. See M.R.A.P. 5.
ISSUE
¶ 4. This Court will consider:
(1) Does Mississippi Code Annotated Section ll-l-60(2)(a) limit non-economic damages to $500,000 for all wrongful death beneficiaries and the estate in an action for medical malpractice?
ANALYSIS
¶ 5. As this interlocutory appeal involves "a question of law and interpretation of a statute[,] . the standard of review is de novo." Miss. Dep't of Transp. v. Allred, 928 So.2d 152, 154 (Miss.2006) (citing Cooper v. Crabb, 587 So.2d 236, 239 (Miss.1991)). This Court has stated that:
[i]n considering a statute passed by the legislature, . the first question a court should decide is whether the statute is ambiguous. If it is not ambiguous, the court should simply apply the statute according to its plain meaning and should not use principles of statutory construction. Whether the statute is ambiguous or not, the ultimate goal of this Court is to discern and give effect to the legislative intent.
City of Natchez v. Sullivan, 612 So.2d 1087, 1089 (Miss.1992) (citations omitted).
¶ 6. Mississippi Code Annotated Section 11 — 1—60(2)(a) provides that:
[i]n any cause of action filed on or after September 1, 2004, for injury based on malpractice or breach of standard of care against a provider of health care, including institutions for the aged or infirm, in the event the trier of fact finds the defendant liable, they shall not award the plaintiff more than Five Hundred Thousand Dollars ($500,000.00) for noneconomic damages.
Miss.Code Ann. § ll-l-60(2)(a) (Supp. 2007) (emphasis added). In pertinent part, the wrongful-death statute authorizes that:
[t]he action for such damages may be brought in the name of the personal representative of the deceased person . for the benefit of all persons entitled under the law to recover, . or by the parent for the death of a child, . or by a sister for the death of a sister, . or all parties interested may join in the suit, and there shall be but one (1) suit for the same death which shall ensue for the benefit of all parties concerned, but the determination of such suit shall not bar another action unless it be decided on the merits. Except as otherwise provided in Section 11-1-69, in such action the party or parties suing shall recover such damages allowable by law as the jury may determine to be just, taking into consideration all the damages of every kind to the decedent and all damages of every kind to any and all parties interested in the suit.
Miss.Code Ann. § 11-7-18 (Rev.2004) (emphasis added).
¶ 7. The Klauses argue that these two statutes, read together, create an ambiguity. Specifically, they maintain that the "shall not award the plaintiff more than Five Hundred Thousand ($500,000.00) for noneconomic damages" language of Mississippi Code Annotated Section 11 — 1— 60(2)(a) is incongruent with the fact that, under the wrongful-death statute of Mississippi Code Annotated Section 11-7-13, multiple plaintiffs may have standing to file suit. The Appellees respond that "[wjrongful death actions are, inherently, derivative" and, therefore, "any defense which would have been available against the deceased, is available against the wrongful death beneficiaries." See Lee v. Thompson, 859 So.2d 981, 987 (Miss.2003). Therefore, the Appellees argue that "the plain language of § 11-1-60 establishes that the cap applies to the total amount of recoverable damages and that it is not multiplied by the number of parties involved." Furthermore, the Appellees assert that following this Court's decision in Allred, Mississippi Code Annotated Section 11-1-60, "when read in pari materia with § 1-3-1 and 1-3-33, applies regardless of the number of plaintiffs."
¶ 8. In Allred, this Court addressed the question of:
when multiple governmental defendants have been sued in "single occurrence" jurisdictions, such as Mississippi, does the limitation of liability [in Mississippi Code Annotated Section 11^46 — 15(l)(a) ] provide for one maximum dollar amount of liability for a single tortious act, regardless of the number of governmental entities sued, or does the maximum dollar amount of liability apply separately to each governmental entity defendant?
Allred, 928 So.2d at 154. In response to Allred's argument that the $50,000 limit in Mississippi Code Annotated Section 11-46-15(1) is to be applied per person, see id. at 153, this Court found:
Miss.Code Ann. Section 1-3-1, states, "this chapter is applicable to every statute unless its general object, or the context of the language construed, or other provisions of law indicate that a different meaning or application was intended from that required by this chapter." Specifically pertinent in this case is Miss.Code Ann. Section 1-3-33 which states, "words used in the singular number only, either as descriptive of persons or things, shall extend to and embrace the plural number; and words used in the plural number shall extend to and embrace the singular number, except where a contrary intention is manifest."
The common maxim is that statutes in pari materia are to be construed together, When a statute is in pari materia with a later one, it is simply part of its context to be considered by the Court in deciding whether the meaning of a provision in the later statute is plain. See Rupert Cross, Statutory Interpretation 128 (1976). Applying Miss.Code Ann. Section 1-3-33 to an analysis of the Mississippi Tort Claims Act, it is abundantly clear that the Act fails to manifestly express a contrary intention, as required by Miss.Code Ann. Section 1-3-33. The Legislature had the opportunity to declare that the statute at issue was to be read only in the singular, but did not. Additionally, the Legislature did not manifestly express a contrary intention not to include plural language in its Declaration of Legislative Intent. Miss.Code Ann. § 11-16-3. The Legislature had the opportunity to manifest an intent that the statute should be read only in the singular; however, it is clear the Legislature did not do so. There being no ambiguity, the Court is bound to simply apply the statutes according to their plain meaning.
Allred, 928 So.2d at 155-56 (emphasis added). Therefore, this Court concluded that Mississippi Code Annotated Section 11-46-15(1) "shall be interpreted by using singular or plural language." Id. at 156 (emphasis added).
¶ 9. The learned circuit judge did not have the benefit of Allred when he entered "Declaratory Judgment" in favor of the Appellees. Nonetheless, he correctly observed that the Klauses' "argument that the use of the singular form of 'plaintiff in § 11-1-60 MCA would apply to each beneficiary, individually, is not persuasive.... " Just as in Allred, "[t]he Legislature had the opportunity to declare that the statute at issue was to be read only in the singular, but did not. Additionally, the Legislature did not manifestly express a contrary intention not to include plural language in its Declaration of Legislative Intent." Id. Accordingly, the statute is to be applied according to its plain meaning and "the plaintiff' in Mississippi Code Annotated Section ll-l-60(2)(a) "shall be interpreted by using the singular or plural language" when considered in pari materia with Mississippi Code Annotated Section 1-3-33 (Rev.2005).
¶ 10. While acknowledging the rectitude of the majority view, stating it "is consistent with the legislative purpose behind Section ll-rl-60" (Dissenting Opinion at ¶ 21), the dissent then mulls over the potential unintended consequences of the legislative act and concludes that these potential unjust results were "not fully taken into consideration by the Legislature." (Dissenting Opinion at ¶ 23). ' If perchance the Legislature should subscribe to these assumptions, it may amend Mississippi Code Annotated Section 11 — 1— 60 and expressly manifest a contrary intention to the plain language of Mississippi Code Annotated Section 1-3-38. See Miss. Ethics Comm'n v. Grisham, 957 So.2d 997, 1003 (Miss.2007) ("[t]he power to change this result lies with the legislature to amend the statute."). However, the dissent's suggestion that this Court should redress the perceived legislative error by judicial fíat requires an act of judicial activism. To properly preserve the separation of powers mandated by the Mississippi Constitution, see Miss. Const, art. I, § 1-2, this Court should act with restraint. See Grisham, 957 So.2d at 1003 ("[t]he privilege to amend a statute, not constitutionally infirm, does not rest with this Court.").
CONCLUSION
¶ 11. By enacting Mississippi Code Annotated Section ll-l-60(2)(a), the Legislature expressly instituted a cap on non-economic damages recoverable by "the plaintiff." Mississippi Code Annotated Section 1-3-33 provides that words written in the singular are to be read in the plural. In light of Mississippi Code Annotated Section 1-3-33 and this Court's decision in Allred, the cap on noneconomic damages applies to plaintiff or plaintiffs. Therefore, the cap on noneconomic damages in Mississippi Code Annotated Section 11 — 1— 60(2)(a) applies to all plaintiffs who bring a wrongful-death action pursuant to Mississippi Code Annotated Section 11-7-13. Accordingly, the judgment of the Circuit Court of Warren County is affirmed, and this case is remanded to that court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
¶ 12. AFFIRMED AND REMANDED.
SMITH, C.J., WALLER, P.J., EASLEY, CARLSON, DICKINSON, AND LAMAR, JJ., CONCUR. DIAZ, P.J., DISSENTS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION JOINED BY GRAVES, J.
. Subsequently joined by the other Appellees.
. Mississippi Code Annotated Section 11-46-15(l)(a) states, in pertinent part, that:
(1) In any claim or suit for damages against a governmental entity or its employee brought under the provisions of this chapter, the liability shall not exceed the following for all claims arising out of a single occurrence for all damages permitted under this chapter:
(a) For claims or causes of action arising from acts or omissions occurring on or after July 1, 1993, the sum of Fifty Thousand Dollars ($50,000.00). Miss.Code Ann. § 11 — 46—15(l)(a) (Rev.2002) (emphasis added).