Case Name: Edward Charles GESFORD, Jr., Appellant, v. Mary GESFORD, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1976-09-17
Citations: 337 So. 2d 1017
Docket Number: No. 76-212
Parties: Edward Charles GESFORD, Jr., Appellant, v. Mary GESFORD, Appellee.
Judges: DOWNEY, J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 337
Pages: 1017–1021

Head Matter:
Edward Charles GESFORD, Jr., Appellant, v. Mary GESFORD, Appellee.
No. 76-212.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
Sept. 17, 1976.
Rehearing Denied Oct. 26, 1976.
S. Robert Zimmerman, Pompano Beach, for appellant.
Evan I. Fetterman, North Palm Beach, for appellee.

Opinion:
ALDERMAN, Judge.
Husband in a divorce action appeals an award of lump sum and periodic alimony to his former wife.
The trial court in its final judgment found husband and wife to be 49 and 45 years of age. They were married to each other in 1949. At the time of trial the husband had an equity of about $1,500 in an automobile and owned an airplane in which he had little or no equity. He also had an equity of about $25,000 in a business that was in the process of being dissolved. In addition, he had formed a new business corporation which had a net worth of $13,-000. Prior to trial, the parties had equally divided a joint savings account of about $30,000. The parties owned jointly their former marital home in which they had an equity of $70,000. In 1974, the wife's income was $8,200, while the husband's was $17,000. However husband's income in 1975 was considerably lower because of a depressed real estate market and the fact he was terminating his former business arrangement and embarking upon a new real estate business. The wife's income as a beautician remained the same.
The trial court found that wife had no special equity in either of husband's businesses and that she had no special equity in the former marital home. However the court did find that the wife was entitled to lump sum and periodic alimony. She was awarded the husband's interest in the former marital home as lump sum alimony and husband was ordered to convey all of his right, title and interest in said residence to wife. Husband was further ordered to pay to wife, commencing six (6) months from the date of the final judgment, $200.00 per month as permanent alimony. The court also provided that in the event the parties were unable to agree, they could set a hearing to determine the question of the wife's attorney's fees and costs.
LUMP SUM ALIMONY
It is fundamental that the marital home formerly owned by husband and wife as a tenancy by the entireties, after dissolution of the marriage, became a tenancy in common. Section 689.15, Florida Statutes (1975). The court specifically found that wife had no special equity in husband's undivided one-half interest. Therefore before the wife can be awarded the husband's interest as a form of lump sum alimony there must be a positive showing of necessity on the part of the wife as well as the pecuniary ability of the husband to support that necessity. Cummings v. Cummings, 330 So.2d 134 (Fla.1976); Gordon v. Gordon, 192 So.2d 514 (Fla.1st DCA 1966).
In the present case there has not been a clear showing of necessity. Wife is employed with a present income of $8,200. In addition her half interest in the marital home is worth $35,000. Se also received $15,000 as her half of the joint savings account. The fact that one spouse upon dissolution of marriage may have more money or property than the other does not, ipso facto, allow the court in the form of lump sum alimony to equalize the relative economic positions of the parties. In the absence of a clear showing of necessity on the part of the wife in this case, the portion of the final judgment awarding lump sum alimony is reversed.
PERIODIC ALIMONY
In reference to the award of periodic alimony, the trial judge in the final judgment observed:
" . . . the most difficult aspect of this case has been the disparity between the Husband's previous earnings and his earnings this year. This is not an anomalous situation, especially in cases involving self-employed business and professional persons, most of whom do experience fluctuations in income. In determining the Husband's 'ability', should the court consider his earnings for the last week, the last month, the last year, or the last decade? It appears to the court that both the recent past and the extended past have to be considered and compared in order for a judgment to be made. This the court has attempted to do in this case."
The award of $200.00 per month alimony beginning six months from the date of the final judgment apparently was based upon the trial court's judgment that considering the husband's past earning ability, within six months he would financially be able to began payments. We believe, if at the time of trial the present pecuniary ability of the husband does not justify an award of periodic alimony, the better practice would be for the trial judge to reserve jurisdiction, rather than awarding alimony to begin some time in the future. Steinhauer v. Steinhauer, 252 So.2d 825, 832 (Fla.4th DCA 1971). In six months the situation of the parties may be entirely changed. The needs of the wife and the pecuniary ability of the husband may then justify an award of more than $200.00, or perhaps none at all. We therefore reverse that portion of the final judgment allowing the wife $200.00 a month periodic alimony beginning six months after trial. However jurisdiction is reserved in the trial court, upon proper motion, to award alimony in the future should there be sufficient change in circumstances of the parties to justify such an award.
ATTORNEY'S FEES
The parties in their briefs have argued the question of whether in the case below the wife was entitled to an award for her attorney's fees and costs. The trial court in its final judgment indicated that in the event the parties were unable to agree the court would set a hearing to determine the question of wife's attorney's fees and costs. From the record it appears that no such hearing was ever held. Since the trial judge has not yet ruled on the question of attorney's fees and costs in the suit below that issue is not properly before this court.
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
DOWNEY, J., concurs.
MAGER, C. J., dissents, with opinion.