Case Name: Jose Rodolfo MAGANAPENA, Petitioner, v. Loretta E. LYNCH, Attorney General, Respondent
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 2016-01-12
Citations: 628 F. App'x 547
Docket Number: No. 13-70117
Parties: Jose Rodolfo MAGANAPENA, Petitioner, v. Loretta E. LYNCH, Attorney General, Respondent.
Judges: Before: W. FLETCHER, RAWLINSON, and PARKER, Circuit Judges.
Reporter: West's Federal Appendix
Volume: 628
Pages: 547–548

Head Matter:
Jose Rodolfo MAGANAPENA, Petitioner, v. Loretta E. LYNCH, Attorney General, Respondent.
No. 13-70117.
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
Submitted Nov. 20, 2015.
Filed Jan. 12, 2016.
John Martin Pope, Pope & Associates, PC, Phoenix, AZ, for Petitioner.
Chief Counsel Ice, Office of the Chief Counsel Department of Homeland Security, San Francisco, CA, Oil, Jane Tracey Schaffner, DOJ-U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for Respondent.
Before: W. FLETCHER, RAWLINSON, and PARKER, Circuit Judges.
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).
The Honorable Barrington D. Parker, Jr., Senior Circuit Judge for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, sitting by designation.

Opinion:
MEMORANDUM
Petitioner Jose Rodolfo Maganar-Pena (Magana-Pena) petitions for review of a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) that determined MaganaPena's conviction for residential burglary under Arizona Revised Statute § 131507 was an aggravated felony within the meaning of 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F). Specifically, the BIA determined that Maganar Pena's burglary offense constituted a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 16(b).
As a preliminary matter, we conclude that res judicata did not bar the Department of Homeland Security from raising a new ground of removability on remand from this court because there was never a final judgment on the merits. See Valen-ciar-Alvarez v. Gonzales, 469 F.3d 1319, 1324 (9th Cir.2006),
However, we conclude that our recent decision in Dimaya v. Lynch, 803 F.3d 1110 (9th Cir.2015), controls the outcome of this case. In Dimaya, we adhered to the rationale articulated in Johnson v. United States, — U.S. -, 135 S.Ct. 2551, 2558, 192 L.Ed.2d 569 (2015), where the Court held that the residual clause defining a violent felony under the Armed Career Criminal Act of 1984 was unconstitutionally vague. We held that the similar "residual clause definition of a violent felony [under 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) ] is unconstitutionally vague____" Dimaya, 803 F.3d at 1111 (internal quotation marks omitted). We are bound by this precedent, which does not support the BIA's determination.
The petition for review is GRANTED and we REMAND to the BIA for further proceedings consistent with this disposition.
xhiS disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
. 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) defines a crime of violence as a felony offense "that, by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of another may be used in the course of committing the offense."