Case Name: SCHOREN v. SCHOREN
Court: Oregon Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Oregon
Decision Date: 1924-04-24
Citations: 110 Or. 272
Docket Number: 
Parties: SCHOREN v. SCHOREN.
Judges: McBride, C. J., and Bean and McCourt, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Oregon Reports
Volume: 110
Pages: 272–299

Head Matter:
Motion for suit money and to dismiss denied September 20, 1921,
argued March 7,
reversed and remanded April 24,
argued on rehearing November 27, 1923,
affirmed on rehearing February 13,
costs taxed March 4, 1924.
SCHOREN v. SCHOREN.
(214 Pac. 885; 222 Pac. 1096.)
Appeal and Error — Trial Anew on Appeal from Whole Decree.
1. Under Section 556, Or. L., the appeal being from the whole of the decree, suit is to be tried anew on the transcript and evidence accompanying it.
Divorce — “Desertion” Established by Refusal of Intercourse.
2. Desertion is established by refusal of intercourse.
Divorce — Desertion for Pull Year Necessary.
3. Divorce deeree for desertion is unauthorized under Section 507, subdivision 5, Or. L., a full year from the commencement of the desertion not having elapsed prior to filing of suit or entry of deeree.
2. Refusal of marital intercourse as grounds for divorce, see notes in 12 Ann. Cas. 547; L. R. A. 1915B, 770.
Divorce — Refusal of Intercourse not “Cruelty” — “Personal Indignities.”
4. Refusal of intercourse is not within Section 507, subdivision 6, Or. It., giving as ground of divoree cruel and inhuman treatment or personal indignities rendering life burdensome.
Divorce — Partitioning Real Estate must be Based on Issues in Pleadings.
5. A divorce decree partitioning and determining title to real estate must be based on and in conformity with issues raised by the pleadings and facts alleged, and supported by the findings.
Divorce — Husband and Wife — Deeree Partitioning Real Estate Unauthorized by Pleadings.
6. Neither the wife in her complaint for support under Sections 9749-9752, Or. L., nor the husband in his answer or counterclaim for divoree, describing or seeking relief concerning the real estate partitioned by the deeree, but the answer and counterclaim merely alleging defendant’s ownership and maintenance of a home, at a certain number on a certain street, which the wife left, the decree so far as attempting to transfer title to real estate is invalid.
Divorce — On Reversal Wife Decreed Lien Till Repaid Sums Paid on Mortgage.
7. On reversal of decree of divorce partitioning real estate, the wife, who, relying on stipulation, took possession of the real estate and made payments on mortgage thereon in accordance with understanding with husband, is entitled to repayment, and will be awarded a lien till paid.
ON REHEARING.
Appeal and Error — One Requesting Decree cannot Appeal Therefrom.
8. One on whose request a judgment or deeree is entered, granting him the relief designated in his request, cannot appeal from the judgment or decree granting such relief.
Divorce — Husband Could not Appeal from Decree Awarding Him Divorce as Prayed for.
9. Defendant, who obtained a divoree on his counterclaim in a suit by his wife for support, could not appeal from that part of the deeree awarding him divoree; no fraud appearing.
Appeal and Error — Judgment—Decree Rendered on Oral Stipulations is Consent Decree, and not Appealable.
10. Decree rendered on an oral stipulation of the parties, made during the eoursc of the proceedings and entered in the court journal or embodied in the decree, is deemed one of consent, and is equivalent to a decree by confession, and, having consented thereto, the parties cannot appeal therefrom, under Section 549, Or. L.
8. Direct attack on divoree decree by party obtaining it or consenting thereto, see notes in 60 L. R. A. 294; 51 L. R. A. (N. S.) 534.
Collateral attack on divorce deeree, see notes in Ann. Cas. 1915B, 430; 3 A. L. R. 540.
See 3 C. J., p. 671; 19 C. J., p. 188.
Divorce — Consent Decree, Awarding Division of Property, Though not Within Scope of Pleadings, Held not Appealable.
11. In a suit by the wife for support, in which the husband counterclaim,ed for divorce, a decree as to a division of the property rendered on the oral stipulations of the parties, dictated to court stenographer and made in open court, held a decree by consent, not appealable by the husband, independently of the question whether the pleadings sufficiently raised issues on which to base such a decree, if the matter had been contested.
Divorce — Facts Held to Show Stipulation on Which Consent Decree was Based Expressed Final Agreement of Parties.
12. In a suit by the wife for support, in whieh the husband counterclaimed for divorce, facts held to show that an oral stipulation of the parties, dictated to- the court stenographer and on which consent decree was based, was made in open court, as declared in the findings and as recited in the deeree, and that it expressed the final completed agreement of the parties.
From Wasco: Feed W. Wilson, Judge.
Department 2.
This is an appeal from a decree annulling the marriage status of the parties hereto and determining their rights to certain real property.
Christena Schoren and Mathias Schoren have been twice married to each other. They were first married September 2, 1893, and, after living together for about nineteen years, were divorced. About three years thereafter they were remarried and, after five years, they again appear in court. Three children were born to them during their first marriage, two of whom had attained their majority and the youngest having reached the age of seventeen years prior to the institution of this litigation on October 15, 1920. On that date, Christena Schoren commenced a suit against Mathias Schoren, as defendant, by filing her petition in the Circuit Court of the State of Oregon for Wasco County, whereby she undertook to secure relief through the court, in requiring defendant to support her and their minor daughter. Mathias Schoren answered, denying the alleged delinquencies charged against him by his wife’s complaint, and asserted that he maintained a comfortable home in The Dalles, in which he and his family were residing; that the plaintiff, without fault on his part and without his consent, “left the defendant’s bed and board and moved to rooms on the second floor of their home, taking the minor daughter with her, and since then has eaten and slept there, and has refused to consort with defendant and has abandoned the conjugal relation.”
Defendant then counterclaims and avers:
“That the defendant owns and maintains at 302 Bast 2d Street, Dalles City, Oregon, a home of size, equipment and comfort in keeping with his financial worth * * ;
“That on or about May 1, 1920, the plaintiff, without cause or fault from or of the defendant, and without his consent or desire, left the defendant’s bed and board and moved to rooms on the second floor of their home, taking the minor daughter, Geneva with her, and since that date and occurrence has continued to eat and sleep and live there, separate and apart from the defendant and their older daughter, Helen, and has refused to consort with defendant and has abandoned the conjugal relation.
“ * * That the defendant is a blacksmith and operates a blacksmith and machine shop in The Dalles, and must necessarily be about his said business during working hours; that the plaintiff, since about May 1, 1920, has made no attempt, but has failed and neglected to do any housework in and about that portion of the home occupied by the defendant and daughter Helen, and thus the work of cooking meals and cleaning and caring for the home has fallen heavily upon the defendant and daughter Helen.”
Schoren avers that he returned home one day in October, 1920, to find that his wife had taken from the kitchen all groceries and stocks of food, and that he was obliged to go out and purchase a new supply before he and his daughter Helen could cook their supper; that a few days afterwards, the same thing happened again. He further alleges that his wife had repeatedly stated that she would never live with him again. He avers that she was possessed of an ugly and nagging disposition; that, in fact, she practiced “nagging,” as defendant believed, for the purpose of inducing him to leave home that she might acquire it. He further avers that she also accused him of the commission of adultery “with others not named.” He says, in his pleading, that her charg’e of adultery is untrue.
On February 8, 1921, the case, being at issue, came on regularly for trial. The plaintiff, Christena Schoren, and Geneva Schoren, her daughter, gave testimony in behalf of the complaint for support. A recess was then taken, and the trial judge invited the attorneys for the respective parties into his chambers and suggested that the litigants adjust their financial differences and make a settlement of their property rights. This suggestion arose from the fact that the parties were engaged in making a public record that might prove embarrassing to their daughters.
Thereafter, a stipulation was entered into by and between Christena Schoren and Mathias Schoren, which is set forth in the findings of fact, and which forms the basis of the decree wherein certain real property was awarded to Christena Schoren. According to the findings of fact, the stipulation was dictated to the court reporter in open court and was thereafter transcribed and filed. No further evidence was taken in behalf of, or against, the cause of suit set out in the complaint of Christena Schoren. The cause of suit alleged in the counterclaim of Mathias Schoren then came on for hearing. The testimony in support of his cause is brief. It consists of evidence of ■Mathias Schoren alone, who testified, in substance, that he was of the age of fifty-two years and the husband of Christena Schoren; that they were last married on August 21, 1915; that they were, at the time of the suit, husband and wife, residing at The Dalles, and had been inhabitants of Oregon continuously since March 3, 1888; that they lived in the same house, but did not cohabit as husband and wife and had not “since May, * * 1920.”
“Q. And you have not cohabited with her since?
“A. No, sir.
“Q. Was that because of your desire, or her refusal?
“A. Her refusal.
“Q. Was there any cause for her refusing to cohabit with you?
“A. None to my knowledge.
“Q. So far as you know, there wasn’t?
“A. Yes, sir.
“Q. Did you give her any cause for that?
“A. Not that I know of.
“Q. You live in the same house, but do not live as husband and wife?
“A. Yes, sir, that’s right.”
Upon that record the court granted Mathias Schoren a divorce. The decree provided that—
“The real estate mentioned and referred to in the pleadings in this cause and situated at No. 320 3d Street, Dalles City, Oregon, and described as Lot 5 in Block 6 in Bogelow’s Bluff Addition to Dalles City, Oregon, be, and the same is hereby, partitioned and divided between the parties hereto, and that the plaintiff have the East half of said property, and the defendant the West half thereof, and that the plaintiff execute and deliver to the defendant a quit-claim deed for the West half of said real estate and that the defendant execute and deliver to the plaintiff and Geneva Schoren, daughter of plaintiff and defendant, a quit-claim deed for the East half of said property * * .
“That in the event of the failure of either party to execute and deliver a deed to the other party in accordance with the provisions of this decree, then and in that event this decree shall be deemed and taken to be equivalent thereto and may be recorded in accordance with the provisions of Section 9895, Or. L., 1920 * * .
This decree is given, made and entered on the 22d day of April, 1921, as of, on, and for the 9th day of February, 1921.”
Prior to the settling and signing of the findings of fact, conclusions of law and decree in this cause, Mathias Schoren appeared by his counsel and moved—
“That the decision of this court, announced on April 18, 1921, * * sustaining the motion of the plaintiff for the approval and signing of certain findings of fact, conclusions of law and decree * * be reversed * * , and that a rehearing on said * * motion be granted,” which motion was overruled.
Whereupon, the defendant asked leave to submit and offer proof, which request was denied.
The appellant says the court erred in decreeing that specific real property belonging to Mathias Schoren should be conveyed to Christena Schoren, “because real property * * had not been mentioned or described in the pleadings, nor in the purported stipulation, nor admitted in, nor proved by, the evi dence,” and “in ordering, over defendant’s objections, tbe alleged written stipulation to become a part of tbe record of tbe trial, and in overruling the defendant’s motion to strike the same from the record * * .” Error is further assigned upon the ground that the court refused “defendant’s application to introduce evidence to establish that the alleged stipulation was never agreed upon, nor entered into, nor executed.”
Reversed and Remanded.
For appellant there was a brief and oral argument by Mr. George B. Wilbur.
For respondent there was a brief over the name of Messrs. Wilson & Bradshaw, with an oral argument by Mr. W. E. Wilson.

Opinion:
BROWN, J.
The appeal in this case having been taken from the whole of the decree, we are required to try this suit anew, "upon the transcript and evidence accompanying it." Or. L., § 556. Also see Or. L., § 405. Hence, a number of matters discussed in the appellant's brief may not be referred to in this opinion.
Entering upon the trial of this canse de novo, we are confronted with the question as to the sufficiency of the proof to warrant the court in granting a divorce.
In this state, a divorce may be granted for a number of causes:
"5. Willful desertion for the period of one year;
"6. Cruel and inhuman treatment or personal indignities rendering life burdensome." Or. L., § 507.
From the allegations contained in the counterclaim, facts are averred that tend to show desertion. Likewise, other acts are alleged to have been committed by the wife that point to cruelty. However, the evidence offered in the trial of the cause supports the charge of desertion only.
In this jurisdiction, it has been held by judicial decision that desertion is established by proof that the defendant has refused to have marital intercourse with the plaintiff: Sisemore v. Sisemore, 17 Or. 542 (21 Pac. 820); Baker v. Baker, 99 Or. 213 (195 Pac. 347).
There is a division in the decisions upon this question in other jurisdictions. Under what is perhaps the majority thereof, the refusal of intercourse by one of the parties to a marriage contract does not constitute desertion.
This court has followed the doctrine enunciated by Bishop, where that author wrote:
"Nothing injurious to the health can be required of either party in marriage. But if, from no consideration of health, and from no other good reason, either the husband or the wife permanently, totally, and irrevocably puts an end to what is lawful in marriage and unlawful in every other relation, — to what distinguishes marriage from every other relation, — this, by the better opinion, constitutes matrimonial desertion, though the deserting party consents still to live in the same house with the other, in the capacity of servant, of master, of brother, of sister, of parent, of child, or a friend, either for pay or as a gratuity." 1 Bishop, Marriage, Divorce and Separation, § 1676.
We concede, for the purpose of this case, that the evidence constitutes desertion. But, even so, Mathias Schoren is not entitled to a decree annulling the marriage status in this proceeding on the ground sought to be established by the evidence, because the statute requires allegation and proof of willful deser tion for the period of one year. It appears from his complaint and from his testimony that the desertion commenced on May 1, 1920, and the decree of divorce was made and entered on the twenty-second day of April, 1921, "as of, on, and for the ninth day of February, 1921." A' full year had not expired prior to the time of the filing of the suit or the entry of the decree.
Plaintiff does not claim that the acts testified to constitute cruel and inhuman treatment, and, by the weight of authority, the refusal of one of the parties to a marriage contract to cohabit with the other is not legal cruelty. It has often been held that desertion does not constitute cruelty: Smith v. Smith, 62 Cal. 466; Ruby v. Ruby, 29 Ind. 174; Stewart v. Stewart, 78 Me. 548 (7 Atl. 473, 57 Am. Rep. 822); Southwick v. Southwick, 97 Mass. 327 (93 Am. Dec. 95). Plaintiff's testimony tended to prove desertion, and nothing more.
"The general rule is that in the absence of proof that the health of the complaining spouse is either injured or threatened, the refusal of the other to cohabit is not legal cruelty." 19 C. J. 56.
In Pinnebad v. Pinnebad, 134 G-a. 496 (68 S. E. 73), it was held that a wife's refusal to have sexual intercourse with her husband is not legal cruelty and is not a ground for divorce. See, also, Platt v. Platt, 38 Pa. Super. Ct. 551.
However, there are cases to the contrary. See Campbell v. Campbell, 149 Mich. 147 (112 N. W. 481, 119 Am. St. Rep. 660), wherein the court held that a wife's refusal to have sexual intercourse with her husband for a period of three years constitutes such extreme cruelty as warrants the granting of a divorce. This opinion is based upon former Michigan cases: Menzer v. Menzer, 83 Mich. 319 (47 N. W. 219, 21 Am. St. Rep. 605); Whitaker v. Whitaker, 111 Mich. 202 (69 N. W. 1151).
In the case of Sevens v. Sevens, 107 Ill. App. 141, it was held that the refusal upon the part of the wife to cohabit with her husband except for a period of about six weeks after their marriage did not constitute extreme and repeated cruelty. See, also, Hexamer v. Hexamer, 42 Pa. Super. Ct. 226.
In Schoessow v. Schoessow, 83 Wis. 553 (53 N. W. 856), the court held that the refusal of a husband to have intercourse with his wife did not constitute "cruel and inhuman treatment," particularly in the absence of any testimony tending to show mental or bodily injury resulting to the wife from the husband's refusal. See Varner v. Varner, 35 Tex. Civ. App. 381 (80 S. W. 386).
A wife's refusal of sexual intercourse does not constitute cruelty which will justify granting him a divorce: Holyoke v. Holyoke, 3 New Eng. Rep. 169, 78 Me. 404 (6 Atl. 827); Cowles v. Cowles, 112 Mass. 298; Gordon v. Gordon, 48 Pa. 226; Eshbach v. Eshbach, 23 Pa. 343.
Giving to the terms, "cruel," "inhuman," and "personal indignities, " their true significance, as used in the statute cited above, we adopt the following as expressing our views:
"In what respect the refusal by the wife to allow the husband access to her bed can be termed crael I cannot conceive; nor, having a reference to the proper meaning of terms, can I see how such treatment will render his life burdensome ." McGill v. McGill, 3 Pittsb. R. (Pa.) 25.
A decree, granting a divorce, and partitioning and directing title to real property, must be based upon and in conformity -with issues raised by tbe pleadings: 19 C. J. 161; Bender v. Bender, 14 Or. 353 (12 Pac. 713); Weber v. Weber, 16 Or. 163 (17 Pac. 866); Senkler v. Berry, 52 Or. 212 (96 Pac. 1070); Sutton v. Sutton, 78 Or. 9 (150 Pac. 1025, 152 Pac. 271).
" 'Tbe maxim that tbe decree must be secundum allegata, as well as secundum probata,' says Chief Justice Marshall, in Schooner Hoppett v. The United States, 7 Cranch, 389 (3 L. Ed. 389), 'is essential to the due administration of justice in all courts.' This rule requires that a party must obtain his decree on the grounds stated in his pleading. # * " Bender v. Bender, supra.
Again, the decree must be based upon, and be in accordance with, the facts alleged in the pleadings, and should be supported by the findings of fact: 14 Oyc. 713.
In the case of Senkler v. Berry, supra, it was said:
"It is now the settled law of this state, that in divorce proceedings the title to real property authorized to be awarded to the successful party by Section 511, B. & 0: Comp., is not transferred by force of the statute, but by force of the decree; that to enable the court to act judicially on the subject of property in such cases, and to make a decree that shall have the effect of divesting the title to real property out of one of the parties to the suit and transferring it to another, it must appear in the pleadings, not only that such party from whom it is proposed that the title shall be taken is the owner of the property, but also of what the property consists; and that, as the decree has the effect of transferring the title, it must be one of the muniments of the title and should identify the parcel or parcels intended to be transferred or affected thereby with as great certainty as is required in ordinary conveyances: Bamford v. Bamford, 4 Or. 30; Wetmore v. Wetmore, 5 Or. 469; Hall v. Hall, 9 Or. 452; Ross v. Ross, 21 Or. 9 (26 Pac. 1007)."
Neither party to this litigation describes the real property nor seeks relief by averment in any pleading on file herein, concerning the parcel of land partitioned by the decree. Christena Schoren does say, in her complaint for support, that—
"The parties and their daughters live together in Dalles City, Wasco County, Oregon, at No. 320 East Second Street, in said city."
Answering his wife's charge of nonsupport, Mathias Schoren says, in effect, that his wife left his home "that he owns and maintains at 320 East Second Street, Dalles City, Oregon." In his counterclaim for a divorce he again avers that he owns and maintains a home at 320 East Second Street, Dalles City, and that his wife, without cause, "left the defendant's bed and board and moved to rooms on the second floor of their home." The only purpose of the wife's suit was to obtain support under the provisions of the act of the legislative assembly of 1889, entitled, "An Act to provide for the support of maried women," and codified as Sections 9749-9752, inclusive, Or. L. Mathias Schoren's intention, in referring to their home, was to show that she had abandoned him and the home he had provided for her. Neither party intended to, nor did either, bring the parcel of real property described in the decree into the case for judicial determination by any pleading, as measured by the rule announced by the authorities hereinbefore quoted. The- absence of necessary allegations to empower the court to decree a transfer of title is not supplied by the stipulation hereinbefore referred to, nor does the stipulation aid the description. It follows that the decree of the court below is invalid in so far as it attempts to transfer the title to real property: Perkins v. Perkins, 72 Or. 302 (143 Pac. 995); Gustin v. Gustin, 79 Or. 387 (155 Pac. 370).
As hereinbefore stated, the decree granting the divorce is likewise invalid.
For the reason that a dismissal of this proceeding would leave the controversy unsettled, the cause is remanded to the Circuit Court for such further action as the parties deem fit, not inconsistent with this opinion.
It appearing that Christena Schoren, relying upon the stipulation on file herein, entered into possession of the property hereinbefore referred to and made payments on the mortgage lien in accordance with her understanding with Mathias Schoren, for that reason she is entitled to a repayment of all sums she has advanced, together with legal interest thereon, and she is awarded a lien on that real property and entitled to the possession thereof until such sum is repaid to her.
Neither party shall recover costs and disbursements in this court. Reversed and Remanded.
McBride, C. J., and Bean and McCourt, JJ., concur.
Affirmed. Costs Taxed.
For appellant there was a brief and oral argument by Mr. George B. Wilbur
For respondent there was a brief over the name of Messrs. Wilson & Bradshaw, with an oral argument by Mr. W. H. Wilson.