Case Name: TOWNSEND v. KREIGH
Court: Michigan Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1903-05-12
Citations: 133 Mich. 243
Docket Number: docket No. 49; docket No. 68
Parties: TOWNSEND v. KREIGH.
Judges: The other Justices concurred.
Reporter: Michigan Reports
Volume: 133
Pages: 243–249

Head Matter:
TOWNSEND v. KREIGH.
1. Yendor and Purchaser — Purchase-Money Mortgage — Estoppel.
A grantee of land who has given back a purchase-money mortgage, and entered into possession.under his deed, is estopped from disputing his grantor’s title for the purpose of defeating the payment of the mortgage.
2. Ejectment — Codefendants—Title—Common Source — Judgment.
3 Comp. Laws, § 10973, provides that if any of the defendants . in an action of ejectment, at the commencement of the suit, occupied or claimed distinct parcels in severalty or jointly, and other defendants possessed or claimed other parcels in severalty or jointly, all of which titles were derived from the same source, the jury shall state particularly in their verdict, if in favor of plaintiff, the description of the parcel claimed by each defendant, but, if the titles are from different, sources, plaintiff shall elect against which he will proceed. T. conveyed certain land to M., taking back a mortgage. M. deeded one-half of the land to W., and W. sold one-half of his interest to K., who entered into possession without receiving a deed. Plaintiff purchased the land at foreclosure sale, and brought ejectment against M. and K. In the meantime K. had purchased certain alleged outstanding titles to the entire premises, and quitclaimed to M. the parcel occupied by him. Held, that the titles of defendants were derived from the same source, and a recovery might be had against both.
3. Same — Verdict.
But in such case the verdict should particularly describe the-parcel claimed by each.
4. Same — Appeal—Correction.
Where the verdict was defective iriHhis respect, but the proof® were clear, and there was no dispute as to the descriptions, plaintiff was permitted to avoid a reversal by consenting to a, correction.
Error to Mason; McAlvay, J.
Submitted January 15, 1903
(docket No. 49);
opinion filed, for reversal, May 12, 1903.
Rehearing granted June 23, 1903;
reargued October 23, 1903
(docket No. 68);
former decision reversed November 9, 1903.
Second application for rehearing denied February 16, 1904.
Ejectment by Gertrude Townsend against Joseph Kreigh, Eliza Kreigh, Jacob Mahler, and Ellen Mahler. From a judgment for plaintiff on verdict directed by the court, defendants bring error.
Affirmed conditionally.
JWitch & Meek, for appellants.
M. B. Danaher and Morse & Locke, for appellee.

Opinion:
Carpenter, J.
This is an ejectment suit to recover •possession of the northeast quarter of the southwest quarter of section 27, township 18 north, of range 16 west. Plaintiff obtained her title February 15, 1899, by purchasing at a statutory foreclosure of a purchase-money mortgage executed November 25, 1882, given by defendant Jacob Mahler to Larmon- B. Townsend, plaintiff's husband. On said 25th of November, 1882, said Larmon B. Townsend and Gertrude, his wife (plaintiff in this suit), conveyed the lands in suit by warranty deed'to said •defendant, Jacob Mahler. Jacob Mahler at once took possession of the land, and conveyed the east half of the .same to William Kreigh, the son of defendant Joseph Kreigh, who soon thereafter conveyed to his father oneLalf of his interest. The son, William, after living on •the property for about seven years, moved away, and .subsequently died. Defendant Mahler, with his wife, continued in occupancy of the west half, and defendant Kreigh and his wife of the east half, until the commencement of this suit.
To defeat this suit defendants undertook to prove that •said Larmon B. Townsend did not own the land in question at the time he deeded the same to defendant Mahler; that, soon after defendants took possession, some Indians •came to them, and claimed"to own the land; that in 1888 they tried to borrow money upon this land, to pay off the mortgage under which plaintiff now claims title, but could not borrow the money, because the title was defective; that on the 17th of January, 1899, defendant Joseph Kreigh purchased said outstanding title, and thereafter conveyed the west half of the property in controversy to defendant Jacob Mahler. It is to be noted that no claim is made, nor does the evidence prove, that the proceedings to foreclose the mortgage in question were not commenced within the time specified in 3 Comp. Laws, § 9725. The trial court made a ruling which, in effect, excluded defendants' testimony, and then directed a verdict in plaintiff's favor.
The ruling excluding this testimony was clearly correct. Defendants, while in possession of this land under the-deed from Larmon B. Townsend, were estopped from disputing his title for the purpose of escaping the payment of the agreed purchase price. Robertson v. Pickrell, 109 U. S., at page 615 (3 Sup. Ct. 407); Peters v. Bowman, 98 U. S. 56; McConihe v. Fales, 107 N. Y. 404 (14 N. E. 285). It follows that they are estopped from disputing their grantor's title for the purpose of defeating a purchase-money mortgage. This application of the principle of estoppel is most equitable. The title purchased by defendants was barred by the statute of limitations before their purchase was made. Defendants' possession, under the deed from plaintiff's husband, destroyed the title which they now assert. They acquired, therefore, no additional rights to possession by their purchase of said title. Their entire right to possession, then, comes from their deed from plaintiff's husband, unless, while holding under said deed, they have acquired a right adversely thereto. It would be useless to refute the proposition that a grantee, who has given back a purchase-money mortgage, holds adversely to his grantor and to said mortgage, merely because the title of his grantor is defective.
Inasmuch as the testimony in the case proved that the holding of defendants was hot joint, but several, the court erred in directing a verdict, under the declaration, which charged a joint holding. See Murphy v. Campau, 33 Mich. 71. While this precise objection was not made in the court below, it can, nevertheless, under the authority of Haldeman v. Berry, 74 Mich., at page 436 (42 N. W. 57), be raised by assignment of error to the charge.
For the error pointed out, the judgment must be-reversed.
The other Justices concurred.