Case Name: THOMPSON v. THOMPSON
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1902-03-11
Citations: 75 N.Y.S. 401
Docket Number: 
Parties: THOMPSON v. THOMPSON.
Judges: 
Reporter: West's New York Supplement
Volume: 75
Pages: 401–404

Head Matter:
(70 App. Div. 242.)
THOMPSON v. THOMPSON.
(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Department.
March 11, 1902.)
Administrators—Settlement—Discharge—Release—Remaining Assets.
Where an administrator deducted a certain sum from the assets before distribution as a possible necessary expenditure to pay an income tax on the estate, and struck a balance for distribution from the remainder, and the distributees executed a release and receipt of their full distributive shares and of all moneys due or to become due from the estate, stipulating that the same might be filed in the surrogate court, and a decree entered without further account, judicially settling the administrator’s account, and such decree was entered, a distributee could not maintain an action for her share of the sum retained against the administrator individually, but his liability to account was as an administrator only.
Fursman and Kellogg, JJ., dissenting.
Appeal from trial term.
Action by May A. Thompson against J. R. Thompson. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals.
Reversed.
The defendant was the administrator of the estate of John Thompson, deceased. The plaintiff, as one of his next of kin, was entitled, upon distribution, to a one-tenth share thereof. In May, 1893, the parties interested got together, and mutually agreed upon the total sum which was in the defendant’s hands as administrator to be distributed. Bach of such parties thereupon executed to the defendant a written release under seal, acknowledging the receipt of the full distributive share due to each, respectively, and of all moneys due or to become due from said estate, and in full payment and satisfaction of all claims held against such estate or the administrator thereof, and releasing and discharging him and the estate from any further liability. Such release also contained an agreement that the same might be filed in the surrogate’s court, and that upon it a decree might be entered, without citation, and without filing any further account, judicially settling the defendant’s accounts as such administrator, and discharging him from all further liability as such. It also contained a covenant to save the said defendant harmless, and to indemnify him from all dost, trouble, and expense on account of the payment therein acknowledged. Such releases were duly acknowledged, and filed with the surrogate, and a decree was thereupon entered declaring his accounts settled, and discharging him from further liability as such administrator. The plaintiff was present at such settlement, and executed one of such releases. Subsequently, in November, 1899, she brought this action to recover from the defendant the further sum of $60, which she claims the defendant on the occasion of the settlement promised to pay to her in the event that no collateral inheritance tax was thereafter assessed against it. The defendant’s promise then made was a personal one, and the release then executed by her runs to him as administrator, only, and therefore does not at all affect this claim. The trial court so held, and the jury rendered a verdict in her favor for such amount and interest. From the judgment entered thereon, and from the order denying a new trial upon the minutes, this appeal is taken.
Argued before PARKER, P. J., and SMITH, KELLOGG, CHASE, and FURSMAN, JJ.
Davie & Stoddart (Charles L. Andrus, of counsel), for appellant.
Andrew J. McNaught, Jr. (John P. Grant, of counsel), for respondent.

Opinion:
PARKER, P. J.
If the balance which at the time of the settlement was found to be due from the defendant as administrator included the $6oo which the complaint claims was then "intrusted" by the next of kin to the defendant to meet a possible demand for an inheritance tax against the estate, then it might perhaps be argued that a retention of the same by the defendant, and a release therefor, was equivalent to a receipt by him of their money, advanced by them to protect him personally against such a claim; and his promise to repay the plaintiff $6o thereof as the amount so deposited by her, in the event that he did not have to use the same, might be considered a promise made by the defendant, in his individual character, under' an arrangement made subsequent to the transaction to which the release referred. It might then be considered that she had received the $6o, and receipted for it, and had thereafter returned it to the defendant for the purpose aforesaid. ' Such a subsequent arrangement would not be affected by the release. But the fact, as it appears from the evidence introduced in her behalf, is that the defendant deducted the sum of $6oó from the assets before the balance for distribution was agreed upon. The share then agreed to be due her, and upon the payment of which to her she executed the release, was ascertained upon the theory that it did not include any part of the $600. He deducted that as a possible necessary-expenditure before he struck the balance for distribution, and so such $600 was no more nor less than assets of the estate left in his hands for subsequent distribution. He retained it solely as administrator, and I am at a loss to understand why he does not still hold it as such. He received it from the estate as part of its assets. According to her claim, as it appears upon the trial, he has never yet distributed it, and therefore his liability to account for and pay it over is that of an. administrator only.
From this view of the transaction—-and which is the one stated by the respondent in her points—it is manifest that the plaintiff is not entitled to maintain this action. Her claim is squarely in conflict with the release which she then executed. Such release and the surrogate's decree subsequently entered are a flat bar to her recovery here, and on the evidence before it the jury was not warranted in rendering the verdict which it did render. All objections and exceptions necessary to raise this question were taken by the defendant upon the trial. The judgment and order therefore must be reversed, and a new trial granted.
Judgment and order reversed, and new trial granted, with costs to appellant All concur, except FURSMAN and KELLOGG, JJ., who dissent.