Case Name: Patrick G. TAUBMAN, Appellant, v. PROSPECT DRILLING & SAWING, INC., Respondent
Court: Minnesota Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Minnesota
Decision Date: 1991-04-30
Citations: 469 N.W.2d 335
Docket Number: No. C6-90-2448
Parties: Patrick G. TAUBMAN, Appellant, v. PROSPECT DRILLING & SAWING, INC., Respondent.
Judges: Considered and decided by DAVIES, P.J., LANSING and CRIPPEN, JJ.
Reporter: North Western Reporter 2d
Volume: 469
Pages: 335–341

Head Matter:
Patrick G. TAUBMAN, Appellant, v. PROSPECT DRILLING & SAWING, INC., Respondent.
No. C6-90-2448.
Court of Appeals of Minnesota.
April 30, 1991.
Review Granted July 24, 1991.
Charles W. Faulkner, Brian C. Southwell, Faulkner & Faulkner, Minneapolis, for appellant.
William D. Hull, Timothy R. Duncan, Van Vliet & Hull, Minneapolis, for respondent.
Considered and decided by DAVIES, P.J., LANSING and CRIPPEN, JJ.

Opinion:
OPINION
DAVIES, Judge.
Patrick G. Taubman commenced this action against Prospect Drilling & Sawing, Inc., claiming he was demoted and discharged in retaliation for filing a workers' compensation claim in violation of Minn. Stat. § 176.82. The trial court granted summary judgment to Prospect, finding Taubman's claim barred by his failure to exhaust contractual grievance and arbitration procedures before bringing suit. The trial court also denied Taubman's motion to amend his complaint to add claims for breach of contract, promissory estoppel, and fraud. We affirm.
FACTS
On March 5, 1987, Taubman began working for Prospect as a laborer. Prospect is a company engaged in the business of cutting, removing, and patching concrete. The terms of Taubman's employment were governed by a collective bargaining agreement. Before coming to Prospect, Taub-man had previously been employed as a saw cutter with another concrete cutting company. According to Taubman, he changed jobs and began working for Prospect after being promised he would be moved "into sales and estimating." He stated a manager at Prospect told him the following:
When I started working at Prospect, Tom had said to me at that point in time, "Pat, it is going to take a short period of time before we can get this sales position in line for you. If you can bear with us and hang out in the field for a short period of time, we will get you into that sales position shortly." I said, "Fine, Tom, as long as I know I am going to be moving into a sales and estimating type position I will make the move over from Concrete Sawing."
He also stated the manager told him the following after he had been working at Prospect for some period of time:
Then I talked to Tom at that point in time and Tom assured me of the fact that, "Pat, just hang in there a little bit. We are going to get you into that sales position yet." He knew that is what I wanted to be in.
On April 28, 1987, Taubman injured his thumb and was out of work until June 4, 1987. During that period of time, he received temporary total disability payments from Prospect's workers' compensation insurance carrier. He then returned to work and remained there until December 30, 1987, at which time he was laid off due to lack of available work. Taubman never returned to work for Prospect.
In October 1989, Taubman commenced this action against Prospect, claiming he was demoted and discharged in violation of Minn.Stat. § 176.82 in retaliation for filing a workers' compensation claim. In June 1990, Prospect brought a motion to amend its answer to assert the affirmative defense of failure to exhaust the grievance and arbitration procedures provided in the collective bargaining agreement before bringing suit, and also for summary judgment. In response, Taubman made a motion to amend his complaint to assert claims for breach of contract, promissory estoppel, and fraud. On July 10, 1990, the trial court issued an order granting Prospect's motion to amend its answer, denying Taubman's motion to amend his complaint, and granting summary judgment in favor of Prospect. Taubman then filed a notice of appeal to this court, seeking review of the July 10 order for summary judgment. That appeal was dismissed by order of this court on September 6, 1990, as having been improperly taken from the order instead of judgment. A proper appeal was then taken from the judgment.
ISSUES
1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in allowing Prospect to amend its answer?
2. Was Taubman required to exhaust the grievance procedures provided by the collective bargaining agreement before bringing an action under Minn.Stat. § 176.82 for retaliatory discharge?
3. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in denying Taubman's motion to amend his complaint?
ANALYSIS
The function of this court on appeal from summary judgment is "only to determine (1) whether there are any genuine issues of material fact and (2) whether the trial court erred in its application of the law." Betlach v. Wayzata Condominium, 281 N.W.2d 328, 330 (Minn.1979).
1. Taubman indicates in his brief that the first issue on appeal is whether the trial court abused its discretion in allowing Prospect to amend its answer to assert as an affirmative defense Taubman's failure to exhaust grievance procedures before filing suit. This issue, however, is advanced without discussion or citation to authorities, and, therefore, is deemed waived on appeal. See Minn.R.Civ.App.P. 128.02, subd. (l)(d); see also Schoepke v. Alexander Smith & Sons Carpet Co., 290 Minn. 518, 519-20, 187 N.W.2d 133, 135 (1971).
2. The amendment having been allowed, Taubman argues the trial court erred in ruling that he was required to exhaust the grievance procedures provided in the collective bargaining agreement before bringing an action under Minn.Stat. § 176.82 (1986) for wrongful discharge. Taubman argues the trial court, in reaching this conclusion, erroneously relied on this court's decision in Schuyler v. Metro politan Transit Comm'n, 374 N.W.2d 453 (Minn.App.1985), because Schuyler was overruled by the United States Supreme Court in Lingle v. Norge Division of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 108 S.Ct. 1877, 100 L.Ed.2d 410 (1988). We disagree.
The Supreme Court in Lingle dealt with when state law is applicable to a workplace decision where there is a collective-bargaining agreement. The Court said in a relatia-tory discharge, the questions are purely factual and do not "require[] a court to interpret any term of a collective-bargaining agreement. Thus, the state-law remedy is 'independent' of the collective-bargaining agreement in the sense of 'independent' that matters for § 310 preemption purposes." Id. at 407, 108 S.Ct. at 1882. This is the situation at issue here. Thus, Minnesota law governs.
Minnesota has adopted the Uniform Arbitration Act and Minn.Stat. § 572.08 (1986) provides that:
A written agreement to submit any existing controversy to arbitration or a provision in a written contract to submit to arbitration any controversy thereafter arising between the parties is valid, enforceable, and irrevocable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract. Sections 572.08 to 572.30 also apply to arbitration agreements between employers and employees unless otherwise provided in the agreement.
We conclude the trial court correctly determined that Taubman's claim was barred by his failure, before bringing suit, to exhaust the grievance procedures mandated by contract. See Schuyler, 374 N.W.2d at 456.
3. Taubman also argjies the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion to amend his complaint to add claims for breach of oral contract, promissory estoppel, and fraud, all based on Prospect's alleged offer of a non-union sales and/or management position. We disagree. The decision of the trial court to allow or disallow a motion to amend the pleadings will not be reversed except for clear abuse of discretion. LaSalle Cartage Co. v. Johnson Bros. Wholesale Liquor Co., 302 Minn. 351, 357-58, 225 N.W.2d 233, 238 (1974). A denial of a motion to amend is proper when the movant fails to present evidence to support the claims the movant seeks to assert. Davis v. Midwest Discount Sec., Inc., 439 N.W.2d 383, 388 (Minn.App.1989). A court may consider the stage of the proceedings in deciding whether to allow an amendment. Id.
Here, the trial court denied Taub-man's motion to amend his complaint to add a claim for breach of oral contract because it concluded that any offer or promise made to him by Prospect was only for at-will employment. As an at-will employee he could be terminated at any time; therefore, there was no basis on which to claim damages. See generally Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622, 626-27 (Minn.1983) (if offer and acceptance, there may be unilateral contract; when hiring is for indefinite term, it is "at will"); Rognlien v. Carter, 443 N.W.2d 217, 219-20 (Minn.App.1989) (promise of employment enforceable if requirements met for unilateral contract; absent sufficient facts, employment is presumed to be at-will), pet. for rev. denied (Minn. Sept. 21, 1989). We agree with this analysis and conclude the trial court did not err in denying Taubman's motion to add a claim for breach of oral contract.
We also conclude the trial court did not err in denying Taubman's motion to add claims for promissory estoppel and fraud. Since there was no promise of permanent employment, the claim for promissory estoppel necessarily fails. See Harris v. Mardan Business Sys., 421 N.W.2d 350, 354 (Minn.App.1988), pet. for rev. denied (Minn. May 18, 1988). The fraud claim fails because there is no evidence the offer of employment made by Prospect to Taubman was made in bad faith or without the intent of carrying it out. See Hayes v. Northwood Panelboard Co., 415 N.W.2d 687, 690 (Minn.App.1987) ("When a promise is made in good faith with the expectation of carrying it out, the fact that it is subsequently broken does not give rise to a cause of action for fraud."), pet. for rev. denied (Minn. Jan. 28, 1988).
DECISION
The trial court properly granted Prospect's motion for summary judgment and denied Taubman's motion to amend his complaint. Taubman's objection to the amendment of the answer is deemed waived due to his failure to argue it on appeal.
Affirmed.