Case Name: Mark PAZ, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. LONG ISLAND RAILROAD COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 1997-11-05
Citations: 128 F.3d 121
Docket Number: No. 459, Docket 97-7376
Parties: Mark PAZ, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. LONG ISLAND RAILROAD COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee.
Judges: Before: WINTER, Chief Judge, CARDAMONE, Circuit Judge, and POLLACK, District Judge.
Reporter: Federal Reporter 3d Series
Volume: 128
Pages: 121–122

Head Matter:
Mark PAZ, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. LONG ISLAND RAILROAD COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee.
No. 459, Docket 97-7376.
United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
Argued Oct. 24, 1997.
Decided Nov. 5, 1997.
David M. Lira, Law Office of David M. Lira, Garden City, NY, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
Richard J. Berka, Long Island Railroad Company, Office of General Counsel, Jamaica, NY (Roberta Bender, of counsel), for Defendant-Appellee.
Before: WINTER, Chief Judge, CARDAMONE, Circuit Judge, and POLLACK, District Judge.
The Honorable -Milton Pollack, of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, sitting by designation.

Opinion:
PER CURIAM:
Mark Paz appeals from Judge Raggi's dismissal of Paz's complaint pursuant to Fed. R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). In February 1996, Paz filed suit under Section 706(k) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k), for the sole purpose of recovering attorney's fees incurred in successfully pursuing state-law discrimination claims commenced between 1987 and 1991. Those discrimination claims did not allege a violation of Title VII. Paz's claim for attorney's fees did not, therefore, arise from an "action or proceeding under this subehapter," as required by Section 706(k). Accordingly, we affirm for substantially the reasons set forth in Judge Raggi's opinion. Paz v. Long Island R.R. Co., 954 F.Supp. 62 (E.D.N.Y. 1997).