Case Name: Mack MIMS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1995-09-15
Citations: 662 So. 2d 962
Docket Number: No. 94-1985
Parties: Mack MIMS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: HARRIS, J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 662
Pages: 962–965

Head Matter:
Mack MIMS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. 94-1985.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
Sept. 15, 1995.
Rehearing Denied Nov. 13, 1995.
James B. Gibson, Public Defender, and Susan A. Fagan, Assistant Public Defender, Daytona Beach, for appellant.
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Wesley Heidt, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for appellee.

Opinion:
GRIFFIN, Judge.
Appellant, Mack Mims, appeals his conviction for attempted armed burglary of a dwelling and resisting an officer without violence. We affirm.
Appellant contends, inter alia, that because the knife he carried was a pocket knife and because there is no evidence that it had been used in a manner likely to cause death or great bodily harm, he cannot be convicted under section 810.02(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1993) for an "armed burglary." Appellant relies for this proposition on Arroyo v. State, 564 So.2d 1153, 1155 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990). Arroyo does not stand for that proposition, however. Anoyo simply concludes that even a "common poeketknife," excluded from the definition of "weapon" in section 790.001(13), Florida Statutes (1993), can be a weapon if used as described in Arroyo. The real question is whether the knife carried by appellant in this case was a "dangerous weapon."
The knife was introduced in evidence at trial and during trial was variously described as a "large brown knife," "large knife" and "large folding poeketknife." The dissent concludes the knife could not be a "dangerous weapon" as a matter of law, apparently deeming it to be a "common pocketknife." Disagreeing with Arroyo, the dissent concludes it cannot be a "dangerous weapon" because of the definition of "weapon" found in section 790.001, which excludes a "common poeketknife." However, the meaning of the term "weapon" in Florida's criminal statutes is ultimately determined by the plain and ordinary meaning of the word. See State v. Houck, 652 So.2d 359, 360 (Fla.1995). Moreover, no fair reading of Chapter 790 could lead to the conclusion that the legislature intended to exclude the possibility that a pocket knife could be a weapon by virtue of the definition of weapon "for purposes of' that chapter. § 790.001, Fla.Stat. (1993). The statute simply intends that a "common poeketknife" is not normally considered a weapon for the multiple salutary purposes of Chapter 790. Arroyo was correct in this respect. 564 So.2d at 1155.
But even if Arroyo were wrong, as the dissent contends, we would still affirm. -The question whether this knife was a "common poeketknife" and, thus, incapable of being a weapon as a matter of law was not raised. Not all knives that fold are "common pocketknives" and not all knives that fit into a pocket are "common poeketknives." The jury was instructed that a dangerous weapon is "any weapon that, taking into account the manner in which it is used, is likely to produce death or great bodily harm." The jury heard testimony about the knife, observed the knife, followed the instructions it was given and found the defendant guilty of the offense of attempted burglary while armed with a dangerous weapon. There is no basis to reverse their decision.
AFFIRMED.
HARRIS, J., concurs.
COBB, J., dissents, with opinion.
. § 810.02(2)(b), Fla.Stat. (1993).
. § 843.02, Fla.Stat. (1993).
.There was some evidence he had used the knife to try to effect entry, however.