Case Name: Carl Edward BECKWITH and Stanley Marshall, et al., Executors of the Estate of Helen Beckwith, Deceased, Appellants, v. Nikhil S. SHAH, M.D., Appellee
Court: Mississippi Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Mississippi
Decision Date: 2007-06-05
Citations: 964 So. 2d 552
Docket Number: No. 2003-CA-01624-COA
Parties: Carl Edward BECKWITH and Stanley Marshall, et al., Executors of the Estate of Helen Beckwith, Deceased, Appellants, v. Nikhil S. SHAH, M.D., Appellee.
Judges: Before LEE, P.J., GRIFFIS and ROBERTS, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 964
Pages: 552–564

Head Matter:
Carl Edward BECKWITH and Stanley Marshall, et al., Executors of the Estate of Helen Beckwith, Deceased, Appellants, v. Nikhil S. SHAH, M.D., Appellee.
No. 2003-CA-01624-COA.
Court of Appeals of Mississippi.
June 5, 2007.
Rehearing Denied Sept. 11, 2007.
David L. Merideth, Ridgeland, Philip Mansour, Greenville, Attorneys for Appellants.
Lonnie D. Bailey, Greenwood, Willie L. Bailey, Tommie G. Williams, Attorneys for Appellee.
Before LEE, P.J., GRIFFIS and ROBERTS, JJ.

Opinion:
LEE, P.J., for the Court.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶ 1. On the morning of July 3, 1999, Helen Beckwith entered Delta Regional Medical Center in Greenville, Mississippi, to have a colonoscopy performed by Dr. Nikhil Shah. There were complications during the procedure; specifically, a perforation of Helen's colon. After an unsuccessful surgery to correct the perforation, Helen died later that same day. Other pertinent facts will be discussed as necessary.
¶ 2. On December 21, 1999, Carl Beck-with and Stanley Marshall, executors of Beckwith's estate (hereinafter Beckwith), filed a complaint in the Washington County Circuit Court against Dr. Shah. Beck-with alleged that Dr. Shah was grossly negligent in his treatment of Helen and therefore liable for her death. Beckwith sought actual, compensatory and punitive damages. Dr. Shah then filed an answer in which he denied the allegations. After a one week trial beginning April 16, 2001, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Dr. Shah. After Beckwith's posttrial motions were denied, he appealed to this Court asserting that the jury was not properly instructed on the applicable standard of care in medical malpractice cases.
DISCUSSION
I. WAS THE JURY PROPERLY INSTRUCTED ON THE APPLICABLE STANDARD OF CARE?
¶ 3. In the only issue on appeal, Beckwith argues that the jury was not properly instructed on the applicable standard of care in medical malpractice actions. Specifically, Beckwith claims that instructions C-7 and D-4 were abstract and should not have been given to the jury. Beckwith states that instructions P-8 and P-15, both of which the trial court refused, should have been given instead. Our standard of review for jury instructions is as follows:
The instructions are to be read together as a whole, with no one instruction to be read alone or taken out of context. A defendant is entitled to have jury instructions given which present his theory of the case. However, the trial judge may also properly refuse the instructions if he finds them to incorrectly state the law or to repeat a theory fairly covered in another instruction or to be without proper foundation in the evidence of the case.
Howell v. State, 860 So.2d 704, 761 (¶ 203) (Miss.2003). "If an instruction merely relates a principle of law without relating it to an issue in the case, it is an abstract instruction, and should not be given to the jury." McCarty v. Kellum, 667 So.2d 1277, 1288 (Miss.1995). However, granting an abstract instruction is not always reversible error unless the instruction confuses and misleads the jury. Freeze v. Taylor, 257 So.2d 509, 511 (Miss.1972). In T.K. Stanley, Inc. v. Cason, 614 So.2d 942, 952 (Miss.1992), the supreme court found that an example of an abstract instruction included the definition of "air pollution" but failed to direct the jury to do anything.
¶ 4. Initially, Beckwith agreed to C-7 but withdrew consent a few hours before the trial court submitted the instructions to the jury. Instruction C-7 reads as follows:
In this case the plaintiff has charged Dr. Nikhil S. Shah with medical negligence. A physician, such as Dr. Shah, is required to provide his patients with that same degree of care, skill and diligence which would be provided by a minimally competent, reasonably prudent physician in the same general field of practice, under the same or similar circumstances, and who has available to him the same general facilities, resources and options. Therefore, medical negligence or "malpractice" is defined as a physician's failure to provide a patient with that degree of care, skill and diligence which would be provided by a minimally competent, reasonably prudent physician in the same specialty when faced with the same or similar circumstances.
If you find from a preponderance of the evidence in this case that Dr. Nikhil S. Shah, in the care and treatment of Mrs. Beckwith, complied with the standards of care expected of a reasonably prudent, minimally competent physician under the circumstances, then you shall return your verdict for the defendant, Dr. Nikhil S. Shah.
If you find from a preponderance of the evidence in this case that Dr. Nikhil S. Shah, in the care and treatment of Mrs. Beckwith, failed to comply with the standards of care expected of a reasonably prudent, minimally competent physician under the circumstances, then you shall return your verdict for the Beck-with family.
Instruction D-4 reads as follows:
You are instructed that negligence on the part of a physician such as Dr. Shah may not be presumed to have occurred simply because Mrs. Beckwith died.
Physicians are not the guarantors or insurers of the success of the medical treatment which they provide to their patients, nor is a physician liable to a patient's family simply because a death has occurred. A physician may be held liable for medical negligence only when the treatment which he provides falls below the minimally acceptable level of care as defined in these instructions and when such results in an injury to a patient.
¶ 5. Beckwith argues that these instructions mirror the instructions which the supreme court in McCarty found to be abstract. The instructions are similar, but, in McCarty, the court found that, although inclined to find that the instructions in question were inadequate, the jury instructions when read as a whole adequately instructed the jury. McCarty, 667 So.2d at 1288. However, in McCarty v. Mladineo, 636 So.2d 377, 381 (Miss.1994), the supreme court suggested that lawyers use a jury instruction similar to C-7 when applicable. C-7 correctly states the proper standard of care and instructs the jury to return a verdict for Beckwith or Shah depending upon what the evidence showed. Although D-4 is more abstract than C-7, when read in toto with the other instructions, we find that the jury was provided with appropriate standards and facts.
¶ 6. In reviewing all of the jury instructions, we do not find that instructions C-7 and D-4 are confusing or misleading as to suggest that the jury misunderstood its role or the law. This issue is without merit.
¶ 7. Beckwith also argues that P-8 or P-15 should have been given instead of C-7 and D-4. P-8 was initially proffered but rejected by the trial court. P-15, which was a revamped version of P-8, was proffered a few hours before instructions were given to the jury. Instruction P-8 reads as follows:
The term "proximate cause" or "cause" of an injury or damage are those acts which occur in a natural and continuous sequence that produce injury or damage and, without which, the injury or damage would not have occurred.
If you find from a preponderance of the evidence in this case that Dr. Shah did, or failed to do, any one or more of the following acts, to-wit:
(1) To recognize that Helen Beckwith had acute diverticulitis and did not perform a CAT scan on Helen Beckwith that would have probably disclosed that Helen Beckwith had acute diverticulitis and that the colonoscopy should not have been performed; or
(2) Dr. Shah made a hole in Helen Beckwith's colon and he should not have reinserted the colonoscope into Helen Beckwith's body; or
(3) When Helen Beckwith first got into distress, Dr. Shah should have inserted a needle into her stomach to relieve the air; or
(4) To order an X-ray that probably would have shown the free air in Helen Beckwith's body when she got into distress and before Dr. Sandefur arrived; or
(5) To timely call Dr. John Sandefur after Helen Beckwith's colon was perforated; or
(6) When Helen Beckwith's condition became life-threatening while she was under the exclusive care of Dr. Shah, he did not treat Helen Beckwith for such life-threatening condition, and that such acts by Dr. Shah caused Helen Beck-with's death, but another doctor with Dr. Shah's ability and equipment:
1. Would not have performed the colo-noscopy; or
2. Would not have reinserted the colo-noscope; or
3. Would have inserted a needle into her stomach to relieve the free air; or
4. Would have ordered an X-ray after Helen Beckwith got into distress and before Dr. Sandefur arrived; or
5. Would have treated Helen Beckwith for the life threatening conditions, and that such acts would probably have saved Helen Beckwith's life, then you should return a verdict for the Beckwith family against Dr. Shah.
Instruction P-15 reads as follows:
The term "proximate cause" or "cause" of an injury or damage are those acts which occur in a natural and continuous sequence that produce injury or damage and, without which, the injury or damage would not have occurred.
If you find from a preponderance of the evidence in this ease that the Defendant Shah, at the time he saw and treated Helen Beckwith, a minimally competent physician in the same field of practice who had available the same general facilities, services, equipment and options as the Defendant had and that he did to or failed to do any one or more of the following acts to wit:
(1) Failed to diagnose or recognize that Helen Beckwith had acute diverticulitis and performed colonoscopy; or
(2) Pumped a massive amount of free air into Helen Beckwith's body; or
(3) After Dr. Shah punctured Helen Beckwith's colon he should not have reinserted the scope; or
(4) That Dr. Shah failed to properly and timely react after he punctured Helen Beckwith's colon; or
(5) Failed to timely order an X-ray which would have shown free air in Helen Beckwith's body; or
(6) Failed to timely call a surgeon after Helen Beckwith's colon was perforated; or
(7) When Helen Beckwith's condition became life-threatening while she was under the exclusive care of Dr. Shah, he did not treat Helen Beckwith for such life-threatening condition; and that such acts by Dr. Shah proximately caused and/or contributed to Helen Beckwith's death, then you should return a verdict for the Beckwith family against Defendant Shah.
¶ 8. Both instructions were confusing and peremptory in nature and the trial court found P-15 to be an improper statement of the law. We find no error by the trial court in denying the instructions.
¶ 9. THE JUDGMENT OF THE WASHINGTON COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT IS AFFIRMED. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO THE APPELLANTS.
MYERS, P.J., IRVING, GRIFFIS, ISHEE AND CARLTON, JJ., CONCUR. CHANDLER, J., DISSENTS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION JOINED BY BARNES AND ROBERTS, JJ. KING, C.J., NOT PARTICIPATING.