Case Name: STATE v. JOHN WILLIAM KILBURN
Court: Minnesota Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Minnesota
Decision Date: 1975-05-23
Citations: 304 Minn. 217
Docket Number: No. 44136
Parties: STATE v. JOHN WILLIAM KILBURN.
Judges: Mr. Justice Knutson took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
Reporter: Minnesota Reports
Volume: 304
Pages: 217–236

Head Matter:
STATE v. JOHN WILLIAM KILBURN.
231 N. W. 2d 61.
May 23,1975
No. 44136.
C. Paul Jones, State Public Defender, and Jack S. Nordby, Assistant State Public Defender, for appellant.
Warren Spannaus, Attorney General, Robert W. Johnson, County Attorney, and Edward W. Bearse, Assistant County Attorney, for respondent.

Opinion:
Scott, Justice.
Defendant was found guilty by a district court jury of first-degree murder, Minn. St. 609.185(1), and sentenced by the presiding judge to a term of life imprisonment as provided by law. Defendant contends, on this appeal from the judgment of conviction, that the trial court erred in refusing to permit him to waive his right to trial by jury. We affirm.
Around midnight on April 27, 1972, Mrs. Shirley Harrison of Blaine informed the police that her 15-year-old daughter, Connie, for the first time had not returned home when expected. On April 28, Blaine police detective Jack Sunnarborg, after learning that defendant was the last person with whom Connie had been seen, contacted defendant at his place of employment, a sod field in Blaine. Defendant stated that he had met Connie at a party at the Raygor residence the previous evening and that he had given her a ride home at 10:30 p. m., dropping her off a short distance from her home because she did not want her parents to know that she had been out with defendant.
On the afternoon of April 80 Connie's nude body was discovered in a water-filled ditch on a little-used road in Ham Lake Township. A pathological examination revealed the cause of death as a compound fracture of the skull with deep cerebral lacerations resulting from multiple blows to the head with a straight instrument. Additionally, the examination, revealed bruising of the opening of the vagina and some sign of squeezing of the neck. Tests to determine the presence of sperm were inconclusive.
On May 1,1972, following the discovery of the body, Detective Thomas J. Anderson of the Anoka County sheriff's office, in the company of defendant's friend, Detective Melde of Coon Rapids, interrogated defendant at the Coon Rapids Police Department, defendant -voluntarily submitting to questioning. At the start of the session defendant stated that after dropping Connie off he had driven to a secluded spot, fallen asleep, and awakened to find Connie's nude body in his trunk. He stated that he transported her body to where it was found rather than to the police because he did not want to be blamed for her death.
Having obtained this story from defendant but no confession that he actually killed Connie, Detective Anderson, thinking that Melde's presence was inhibiting defendant, asked Melde to leave the room. A short time later defendant confessed to the killing. At first defendant was vague about what had happened but later, after more interrogation, gave a more detailed statement.
Detective Anderson summarized this statement in his testimony at the trial. In substance, he said that defendant had picked the victim up that night at the Raygor residence and asked her if she wanted to go out and see the place where he worked in the sod field. He said they then drove out to the end of the sod field to a spot where he had previously told the detective that he had hit her with the tire jack. He said that he had kissed her, and that the conversation got around to sex. He said that the victim told him she was a virgin, and he said, "Maybe now is the time to change this." He said that he had talked her into having intercourse with him, and inserted his penis inside her vagina. He said when she told him that it hurt and to stop it, that he did. He said that he stood outside the car pulling his pants up, then, he said, "I grabbed her by the neck, I shook her, pushed her up against the car and threw her on the ground." According to Detective Anderson's testimony, defendant said, "At this time she was moaning. I told her to get up. You're not hurt. Get up, you're not hurt." He then told Detective Anderson that he "got scared" that she was going to go home and tell her folks or the police that he had tried to rape her, and at this time he decided to kill her. He went back to the trunk of the car, unlocked it, got the jack out, came to where she was lying, and started to strike her on the head with the jack. He said after this he decided that he would have to get rid of her, and he loaded her into the trunk of the car and drove to the spot where the body was found.
A large number of exhibits were introduced by the prosecution. Among the more significant were two pieces of Miss Harrison's torn brassiere and other blood-stained clothing; a bloodstained toolbox belonging to defendant; a piece of blue rubber molding shown to be from defendant's car; and defendant's boots, which were of the type which could have made the two prints found near the body. A criminologist testified that the blood stains on the car and on the various other items were of Miss Harrison's blood type, and not defendant's.
Defendant did not testify, but produced four witnesses, former employers and neighbors, who knew defendant and gave their opinion that he was not a violent person.
Defendant, before trial, moved the court for a waiver of a jury trial or, in the alternative, a demand for a change of venue:
"Our basis for a waiver of a jury trial, I think, is readily apparent to the Court. We feel that under the facts and circumstances of this case that it is to the Defendant's best interest to have this case heard by the Court itself and that a determination be made with regard to the facts and evidence presented by the Court as to the charge against the Defendant, which, of course, is First-Degree Murder, or any lesser included charges that may be available to the Defendant. We have discussed this matter, the waiver of a jury, and we understand the law that in the event we should waive a jury, it would have to be in open court and signed by the Defendant after inquiry by the Court; but we have discussed it with the Defendant and with his parents in confidence and feel that it is in his best interest to waive a jury, request a waiver of a jury at this time.
"In the alternative, and we. do not have at this time, Your Honor, any clippings or evidence to show that the Defendant's case is prejudiced by having the trial in Anoka County, but we would, of course, call to the Court's attention that John Kilburn is Black, that our chances of having persons of his same ethnic background as members of a jury are practically nil in Anoka County. I know of only two Black couples in Anoka County, three, perhaps. We think this is of paramount importance to him. There was considerable publicity and I think that the newspapers and the television programs carried this story. We do not indicate to the Court that there was reference made to the fact that the victim was White and Mr. Kilburn was Black. We're not making reference to that, but we are saying there was considerable news coverage. We are concerned primarily with the fact that Mr. Kilburn cannot at this time, we think, have a fair trial in the absence of having people of his own ethnic background representing his particular people on the jury. We feel that's not possible in Anoka County. We think it would, perhaps, be possible in the City of Duluth, where there are people that are Black and having at least an opportunity to inquire of persons that are Black, we would have an opportunity to provide him with the type of justice or having his own peers hear his case, which is not given to him in Anoka County."
After hearing arguments on both sides, the court responded as follows:
"In line with State versus Boyce I'm inclined to agree with the County Attorney that in this situation I think the interest of the Defendant would best be served by a jury trial. The Court will deny the Motion to waive a jury.
"As far as the Motion for change of venue, I believe it was one of the cases that I handled in Pine County where the claim was made in regard to a Defendant of Indian origin, that there were no Indians impaneled on the jury, and I believe that case went to the State Supreme Court, and there is no requirement constitutionally either on the state or federal constitution or under any statute that the ethnic group of a defendant must be represented according to population. It could well be that were we to transfer this case to Duluth, Minnesota that not one member of the panel would be of the Defendant's ethnic background. So if that is the purpose of the move we could well be thwarted having transí ered this case all the way across the State, and if there were no members of the Defendant's ethnic group, that would not be a basis to set aside that jury panel and impanel another or call in another jury panel. I believe it's incumbent on the party moving for a change of venue to prove to the Court by exhibits and by evidence that the defendant could not have a fair trial, an impartial trial in this County. Up to this point there has been nothing presented in evidence, no exhibits, no tapes, nothing that would indicate that the Defendant cannot obtain a fair trial here in Anoka County, and unless that should appear on the impaneling of jurors, then, the Court is of the opinion that the Defendant can, and to the Court's utmost ability, and will receive a fair and impartial trial right here in Anoka County."
The following exchange between defendant's counsel and the court then occurred:
"Mr. Gibbs: May it please, the Court, I'm assuming, then, from the Court's comments that should it come to the Court's attention during the impaneling of a jury that there is prejudice, that we would be allowed to renew our motion with regard to a change of venue?
"The Court: Certainly, if it's impossible to impanel a fair and impartial jury and it's proved to be a fact at the time of jury selection, then, certainly, the motion could be renewed.
"Mr. Gibbs : Which would include statements from prospective jurors that they had heard about the case and that pre-trial publicity was such that they could not in fairness hear the Defendant's case, that the Court would then reconsider our motion?
"The Court : The pre-trial publicity would have to be of such a nature that it caused them to develop attitudes toward the case which would prevent them from being impartial in the matter. As far as I have been able to glean from the arguments here, the news reporting of this incident would be ideal, and in line with the comments on the Shepard case, that the news media restricted itself, it did not make editorial comments to my knowledge, did not identify the Defendant here as being a colored boy or man, and didn't recite any of the details of the alleged crime itself. The reporting wasn't of such a nature that it would prejudice the Defendant, unless it appears on voir dire that it may have,,and if it does, at that time you may renew your Motion.
"Me. Gibbs : Fine. That's basically what we're asking, then, Your Honor."
After a finding of guilty, and before sentencing, the defense counsel stated as follows:
"Your Honor, as Defense Counsel for John Kilburn, we feel very strongly that justice was done. We have no objection to the Jury's findings. We feel that throughout this trial and throughout the whole incident that John has been treated well by the Sheriff's Office and by the County Attorney's Office. We know the consequences of a conviction of Murder in the First Degree and it doesn't, then, do us any good to talk about another chance for John. We really believe that this was a two or three minutes of incomprehensible madness, if that's the right way to put it."
The only issue raised in this appeal is, under all the circumstances, did the trial court err in refusing to allow the defendant to waive a, jury trial and have the case tried by the court.
The leading United States Supreme Court case dealing with waiver of trial by jury is Singer v. United States, 380 U. S. 24, 85 S. Ct. 783, 13 L. ed. 2d 630 (1965). In that case, the Court held that restrictions on waiver of a jury trial in Rule 23(a), Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure — which permits a defendant to waive a jury trial "with the approval of the court and the consent of the government" — , did not violate the United States Constitution.
Rule 26.01, subd. 1, of the new Minnesota Rules of Criminal Procedure, to be effective July 1, 1975, provides, in part as follows:
"(2) Waiver of Trial by Jury.
"(a) Waiver Generally. The defendant, with the approval of the court may waive jury trial provided he does so personally in writing or orally upon the record in open court, after being advised by the court of his right to trial by jury and after having had an opportunity to consult with counsel.
"(b) Waiver When Prejudicial Publicity. The defendant shall be permitted to waive jury trial whenever it is determined that (a) the waiver has been knowingly and voluntarily made, and (b) there is reason to believe that, as the result of the dissemination of potentially prejudicial material, the waiver is required to assure the likelihood of a fair trial."
The comment accompanying Rule 26 states in part:
"Rule 26.01, subd. 1(2) (a) (Waiver of Trial by Jury Generally) is based upon Fed. R. Cr. P. 23(a), ABA Standards, Trial by Jury, 1.2(b) (Approved Draft, 1968) and continues substantially present Minnesota law (Minn. Stat. § 631.01 (1971)) except that waiver of jury trial by the defendant requires the approval of the court."
It is clear that the procedures provided in Rule 23(a) are not binding upon the states. Further, the Minnesota Rules of Criminal Procedure will not take effect until July 1, 1975. However, we are inclined to agree with the foregoing comment made by the advisory committee and feel ample study was given to protect the constitutional rights of an accused.
We therefore reject defendant's suggestion that we construe Minn. St. 631.01 as creating an absolute right to waive a jury trial. We previously expressed these views in State v. Hoskins, 292 Minn. 111, 118, 193 N. W. 2d 802, 808 (1972), by stating:
" [T]his court undertook to resolve the question [in Gaulke v. State, 289 Minn. 354, 184 N. W. 2d 599 (1971)] of 'whether Minn. Const, art. 1, § 4, and Minn. St. 631.01 grant a defendant in a criminal case the unconditional right to waive a jury.' We said:
' Considering the historical antecedents of our constitution, it is doubtful that the legislature intended to grant the accused an absolute right of waiver. Although we perceive no intent that the waiver be subject to the consent of the prosecution, it has long been considered to be subject to the approval of the trial court.' 289 Minn. 359, 184 N. W. 2d 602.
In short, the matter of whether a defendant may waive a jury trial was left to the sound discretion of the trial court."
The point was raised, which is tangential in effect, that an impartial trial by jury was unlikely or impossible. It has already been indicated above that no evidence was produced that passions were aroused or that any prejudice would result to deny the availability of impartial jurors. The trial court was apprised only of defendant's statement that there would be prejudice because of the facts and circumstances of the case and the racial characteristics of defendant and the victim. There was no showing of pretrial publicity or prejudice, and, as indicated by defense counsel, no showing of prejudice during the trial or by the jury's actions. The court was not trying to avoid a disagreeable case, as indicated above by his denial of the motion. The jury was questioned thoroughly on these matters, and the defense was satisfied as indicated.
We addressed this problem in Gaulke v. State, 289 Minn. 354, 360, 184 N. W. 2d 599, 602 (1971), when we said:
"A trial court would .undoubtedly exercise a sound discretion in declining an application to waive a jury if the court was not satisfied that the application was defendant's informed and intelligent act. However, the instant case suggests situations in which the withholding of such approval might constitute an abuse of judicial discretion. First, defendant asserted that the crime had been attended with extensive pretrial publicity, impairing selection of an impartial jury, a situation reserved for consideration in Singer v. United States, supra. But there was no evidence of such prejudicial publicity and the trial court's findings were adverse to a claim on such a ground."
As in Gaulke, we hold that the trial court did not err or abuse its discretion, and that defendant has not been prejudiced.
Affirmed.
The advisory committee was appointed by the Minnesota Supreme Court pursuant to Minn. St. 480.059, subd. 2, on July 1, 1971.