Case Name: William STONE, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1986-12-03
Citations: 500 So. 2d 572
Docket Number: No. 85-2750
Parties: William STONE, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: GRIMES, A.C.J., and HALL, J., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 500
Pages: 572–577

Head Matter:
William STONE, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. 85-2750.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
Dec. 3, 1986.
Rehearing Denied Jan. 13, 1987.
James Marion Moorman, Public Defender and William H. Pasch, Asst. Public Defender, Bartow, for appellant.
Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee and Joseph R. Bryant, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tampa, for appellee.

Opinion:
PER CURIAM.
William Stone was convicted of aggravated battery with a firearm. He appeals his sentence and the imposition of costs. We affirm his conviction but find merit in two of his points on appeal. Accordingly, we reverse in part and remand for a hearing on costs.
Stone's first point on appeal is that notations at the bottom of a scoresheet are insufficient to meet the requirements of Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.701(d)(ll). We find no merit in this point. The sentencing judge signed the scoresheet in question, and the reasons for departure were legibly handwritten under the heading "Reasons for Departure." The purpose of a writing is to allow effective appellate review. State v. Jackson, 478 So.2d 1054 (Fla.1985). The notations in the case at hand are sufficient.
Stone's second point on appeal is that the sentencing court imposed costs pursuant to sections 943.25(4) and (8) and 960.20, Florida Statutes (1985), without notice or a hearing. Stone was declared indigent four months prior to the imposition of the sentence. As an indigent, he should have been afforded a hearing before costs were imposed. Jenkins v. State, 444 So.2d 947 (Fla.1984); Burrow v. State, 487 So.2d 77 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986). We reverse the trial court's imposition of costs pursuant to these sections and remand for a hearing in accordance with Jenkins.
Stone's third point on appeal is that section 27.3455, Florida Statutes (1985), as applied to him violates ex post facto provisions of the United States Constitution and the Florida Constitution. The crime of which Stone was convicted occurred on June 15, 1985. Section 27.3455, Florida Statutes became effective July 1, 1985. Stone argues that the imposition of $200.00 court costs constitutes an additional penalty and, as such, cannot constitutionally be applied to him. This issue has been raised repeatedly in this district and in other districts. The first case to decide this issue was Yost v. State, 489 So.2d 131 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986). Under similar facts, the fifth district held that the statute violated ex post facto restrictions, and certified the following question to the Florida Supreme Court:
DOES THE APPLICATION OF SECTION 27.3455, FLORIDA STATUTES (1985), TO CRIMES COMMITTED PRIOR TO THE EFFECTIVE DATE OF THE STATUTE VIOLATE THE EX POST FACTO PROVISIONS OF THE CONSTITUTIONS OF THE UNITED STATES AND OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA, OR DOES THE STATUTE MERELY EFFECT A PROCEDURAL CHANGE AS IS PERMITTED UNDER STATE V. JACKSON, 478 S0.2D 1054 (FLA.1985)?
The certified question in Yost is currently pending before the Florida Supreme Court. State v. Yost, No. 68,949 (Fla. June 19, 1986). Recently, this court certified an identical question concerning this issue. Bowman v. State, 495 So.2d 868 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986). We follow the Bowman decision and reverse that portion of the judgment in this case imposing court costs of $200.00. We also certify the above question to the Florida Supreme Court as a question of great public importance.
Stone's fourth point on appeal also concerns section 27.3455. He claims that the trial court erred in imposing costs rather than community service because Stone is indigent. Because we have held that the statute is unconstitutional in this case as applied to Stone, we do not reach this point on appeal. The case is remanded for a hearing on costs pursuant to sections 943 and 960, Florida Statutes (1985), and for correction of the sentence by deleting the imposition of costs pursuant to section 27.-3455, Florida Statutes (1985).
Affirmed in part; reversed in part ant remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
GRIMES, A.C.J., and HALL, J., concur.
RYDER, J., specially concurs.
. Davis v. State, 495 So.2d 928 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986); Ivie v. State, 497 So.2d 931 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986); Bowman v. State, 495 So.2d 868 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986); Bennett v. State, 495 So.2d 239 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986); Slaughter v. State, 493 So.2d 1109 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986) [consolidating sixteen cases]; Miller v. State, 492 So.2d 1191 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986); Gordon v. State, 497 So.2d 661 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986); Williams v. State, 492 So.2d 784 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986); Signorelli v. State, 491 So.2d 349 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986); Moseley v. State, 491 So.2d 336 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986); McDowell v. State, 491 So.2d 594 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986); Freeney v. State, 493 So.2d 9 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986); Williams v. State, 492 So.2d 1098 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986); Robinson v. State, 488 So.2d 925 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986); Yost v. State, 489 So.2d 131 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986).