Case Name: Johnnie Mae ROBINSON, Appellant, v. WASHINGTON INTERNAL MEDICINE ASSOCIATES, P.C., et al., Appellees
Court: District of Columbia Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: District of Columbia
Decision Date: 1994-09-19
Citations: 647 A.2d 1140
Docket Number: No. 92-CV-1461
Parties: Johnnie Mae ROBINSON, Appellant, v. WASHINGTON INTERNAL MEDICINE ASSOCIATES, P.C., et al., Appellees.
Judges: Before FARRELL and KING, Associate Judges, and MACK, Senior Judge.
Reporter: West's Atlantic Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 647
Pages: 1140–1159

Head Matter:
Johnnie Mae ROBINSON, Appellant, v. WASHINGTON INTERNAL MEDICINE ASSOCIATES, P.C., et al., Appellees.
No. 92-CV-1461.
District of Columbia Court of Appeals.
Argued Nov. 10, 1993.
Decided Sept. 19, 1994.
Dominique D. Michel, with whom William E. Artz, Arlington, VA, was on the brief, for appellant.
Alfred F. Belcuore, Washington, DC, with whom Stephen L. Altman and Vicki J. Hunt, Fairfax, VA, were on the brief, for appellees.
Before FARRELL and KING, Associate Judges, and MACK, Senior Judge.

Opinion:
WARREN R. KING, Associate Judge:
In this medical malpractice action, trial court plaintiff Johnnie Mae Robinson ("Robinson"), daughter and administratrix of the estate of Lela Jones ("Jones"), seeks reversal of a judgment in favor of appellees Washington Internal Medicine Associates, P.C. and Dr. Merril Stock (collectively "Dr. Stock"). Robinson contends the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on contributory negligence, maintaining there was insufficient evidence to support that defense. Further, Robinson contends the trial judge, in giving the instruction, erred in not also instructing that the only acts of the decedent which could be considered contributorily negligent were those acts contemporaneous to the alleged negligent acts attributed to Dr. Stock.
Among his other arguments in support of the judgment, Dr. Stock contends that appellant was obligated to request a special verdict in order to preserve the issues presented in this appeal. In short, Dr. Stock contends that because no special verdict was sought, Robinson cannot demonstrate that the verdict rested on the assertedly erroneous contributory negligence instructions. For the reasons stated in Part II.A. and Part III. of this opinion, and in the concurring opinion of Judge Farrell, we hold that there is no basis for reversal in this case.
I.
Robinson brought survival and wrongful death actions, alleging negligent follow-up care by Dr. Stock, after he performed a lower endoscopic examination of the colon of 82-year-old Lela Jones. On the morning of January 24, 1991, Dr. Stock performed the endoscopy to determine whether Mrs. Jones was suffering from gastrointestinal bleeding. Shortly after recovering from the procedure, some two hours later, Jones was given written instructions by Dr. Stock to "promptly" report to him any "unusual bleeding, vomiting, pain, fever or other reactions" to the examination. In addition, Dr. Stock told Jones that she would probably experience some gas discomfort. Dr. Stock instructed Jones to call him the following morning to report how she was feeling. Thereafter, Jones was discharged and she returned home.
Later that day, Jones telephoned Robinson, her daughter, complaining that she was not feeling well. In response, Robinson directed Jones's great-granddaughter, who was approximately 23 years old at the time, to attend to Jones until Robinson could do so herself later in the day. When the great-granddaughter arrived, Jones told her that she was suffering from abdominal cramps. Thereafter, Robinson and Jones's granddaughter arrived, finding that Jones was still experiencing stomach cramps, which persisted throughout the evening and night. At no time that day or evening, or during the night, or early morning hours of the next day, did Jones, or anyone on her behalf, inform Dr. Stock, or any other medical personnel, of Jones's condition.
At approximately 9:00 a.m. the following morning, Robinson telephoned Dr. Stock as he had directed. Dr. Stock testified that Robinson reported only that Jones was experiencing gas discomfort and he recommended that decedent take some over-the-counter remedies to provide relief. On the other hand, Robinson testified that she informed Dr. Stock that her mother had been experiencing abdominal pain and had been "spitting up."
At approximately 3:00 p.m., Robinson again called Dr. Stock and informed him that Jones had a fever, had been vomiting and experiencing severe abdominal cramps, and had not urinated that day. Dr. Stock directed that Jones be immediately taken to an emergency room. Robinson then began to assist Jones in getting dressed, during the course of which Jones experienced a heart attack; she was pronounced dead at approximately 5:00 p.m. The cause of death was later determined to have been acute peritonitis as a result of a perforation of Jones's large bowel that occurred during the endoscopy.
At trial, Robinson's expert witnesses conceded that the perforation itself was not the result of negligent treatment, but was a known risk of the examination. The only negligence attributed to Dr. Stock was his asserted failure to properly respond during the course of the 9:00 a.m. telephone call. In his defense, Dr. Stock contended that Jones herself was negligent in not following the post-endoscopy instructions. Specifically, he argued that Jones failed to inform him of the severity of her symptoms. Dr. Stock's expert also testified that even if the decedent has been immediately treated as a result of the 9:00 a.m. conversation, she could not have been saved. On the other hand, Robinson's experts testified that at that stage Jones's condition was reversible with corrective surgery.
Over appellant's objection, the trial judge instructed the jury on contributory negligence. Robinson contended that such an instruction was improper because there was no evidence that Jones, as opposed to Robinson who placed the call, had been negligent during the course of the 9:00 a.m. telephone call. Further, Robinson, although preserving her objection to the giving of the contributory negligence instruction, requested that the trial judge instruct the jury that the only conduct that could be considered as being contributorily negligent was the asserted failure to inform Dr. Stock, during the 9:00 a.m. telephone call, of the true nature of Jones's condition — not any antecedent failure of Jones to follow instructions. The trial judge denied that request but advised that Robinson was free to make the point during closing argument.
During deliberations, the jury sent two separate notes to the court, the second of which stated: "[s]ome of our concern is equal negligence by majority vote. Where do we go from here?" In response, the trial judge reinstructed the jury on the theories of negligence, contributory negligence, and causation, directing the jury to resume deliberation. Soon thereafter, the jury returned a general verdict in favor of Dr. Stock. This appeal followed.
II.
This appeal raises a question that has never been expressly decided by this court: whether a plaintiff who failed to request a special verdict (or a general verdict accompanied by interrogatories) in a negligence action, where the defense denies negligence and also asserts the affirmative defense of contributory negligence, is estopped from challenging an adverse verdict on the ground that there was error in the giving of the affirmative defense instruction. In resolving that question, we look for guidance in our cases considering analogous issues.
A.
In District of Columbia v. White, 442 A.2d 159, 164-66 (D.C.1982), we reversed a judgment entered after a plaintiffs verdict in a negligence action where the jury was instructed on alternative theories of liability, and one of the theories was held by the court to be based on insufficient evidence. We reasoned that it was impossible to determine whether the verdict was based on a permissible or impermissible theory because the jury did not specify which theory or theories formed the basis for its verdict. Id. at 165. We concluded under those circumstances there was a possibility that the jury may have relied on the impermissible theory in reaching its verdict. Id. at 165-66 (citations omitted); see also District of Columbia v. Jackson, 451 A.2d 867, 873-75 (D.C.1982) (remanding for new trial on damages).
Nine years later, this court narrowed the White rule in Nimetz v. Cappadona, 596 A.2d 603 (D.C.1991). In Nimetz, as in White, there were several possible theories of negligence that the jury considered, at least one of which was hotly contested on sufficiency of evidence grounds. Id. 596 A.2d at 605-06. To guard against the problem presented in White, plaintiff requested that the jury be given a special verdict form that would require it to specify which theory or theories formed the basis for any verdict reached. Id., 596 A.2d at 604. The defendant objected, the trial judge denied the request, and the jury thereafter returned a general verdict in favor of the plaintiff. Id.
On appeal, defendant conceded that there was sufficient evidence to support the verdict with respect to five of the six theories of liability; however, we held that the trial court erred in its instructions with respect to the sixth theory. Id, at 605-06. Under White, that determination would seemingly have called for a reversal of the judgment. Declining to reverse, however, we "adopt[ed] the rule that a defendant who fails to request a special verdict form in a civil case will be barred on appeal from complaining that the jury may have relied on a factual theory unsupported by the evidence when there was sufficient evidence to support another theory properly before the jury." Id. at 608. The court reasoned that "[f]rom the perspective of the most efficient use of the judicial system, it would clearly have been preferable for [defendant's] counsel to have acquiesced in (and the trial judge to have granted even over objection) [plaintiffs] counsel's request for a special verdict form.... Our courts are overburdened, and a plaintiff should not have to endure a second trial when the rules of procedure provide a remedy.... [T]he litigants bear the responsibility to request or submit special verdict forms." Id, at 607-08 (emphasis added; citations and internal quo tation omitted). Also holding that the rule announced would apply to that case, we affirmed the judgment that had been entered in favor of the plaintiff. Id. at 608-10.
White and Nimetz involved multiple theories of liability with general verdicts in cases where it was determined that at least one of the theories could not be sustained. This case, however, involves a single theory of liability with two separate defenses: either there was no negligence (or no proximate causation) or, if there was negligence, the plaintiff was contributorily negligent. Because the jury returned a general verdict in favor of the defendants, we do not know whether the jury found that the defendants were not negligent (or that proximate causation was not proven) or that the plaintiff was contributorily negligent. The identical circumstances were present in Sinai v. Polinger Co., 498 A.2d 520, 523 (D.C.1985), where the plaintiffs contended that the trial judge erred, inter alia, by instructing the jury on affirmative defenses of assumption of risk and contributory negligence. In Sinai, we observed that because a general verdict was returned, "we do not know whether [the jury] even reached the question of contributory negligence or assumption of risk." Id. at 523 n. 1. Nevertheless, the court reached the merits but warned that:
[w]e do not rule out the possibility, in future cases, of requiring that a plaintiff make some showing of special prejudice before he [or she] will be permitted to challenge the verdict based on issues the jury may well never have reached, where the plaintiff, as in this case, failed to request that special interrogatories be submitted to the jury.
Id.
Judge Nebeker, concurring separately, declined to reach the merits, urging that the court adopt the rule that a plaintiff who wishes to challenge an adverse verdict because of asserted defects with respect to an affirmative defense must demonstrate, either through a special verdict form or interrogatories, that the verdict rested on that defense. Id. at 533-34 (Nebeker, J., concurring in result). He reasoned that because a general verdict was returned, appellants could not establish prejudice requiring a new trial: "The general verdict shrouded the decision of the jury in darkness. Appellants might have dissipated that darkness by asking pursuant to Super.Ct.Civ.R. 49(b), for a general verdict accompanied by the jury's answers to interrogatories." Id. at 533 (Nebeker, J., concurring in result) (citation, internal quotation, and alteration omitted). Further, he noted that such a requirement is necessary "where, as here, there was a genuine question regarding primary negligence, [because] it is entirely possible that the jury never even reached the issues presented by the instructions." Id. Finally, remarking that every appellant bears the burden of persuading the court that the trial judge committed error, Judge Nebeker observed that had interrogatories been requested by trial counsel, "we would know specifically what the jury found and whether they even considered the defenses asserted by appellees." Id. (citation omitted).
As foreshadowed by Sinai, we now hold that a plaintiff who objects to the giving of affirmative defense instructions, but who does not request either a special verdict or a general verdict with interrogatories, is es-topped from raising any claim of error with respect to the affirmative defense on appeal. In so holding, we reiterate that it is well established that a party challenging an adverse judgment bears the heavy burden of persuading this court that the trial judge committed error. Cobb v. Standard Drug Co., 453 A.2d 110, 111-12 (D.C.1982); see also Sinai, supra, 498 A.2d at 533 (Nebeker, J., concurring in result) (citation omitted); D.C.Code § ll-721(e) (1989). An appellant satisfies that burden by presenting the court with a record sufficiently demonstrating entitlement to the relief sought. See Cobb, supra, 453 A.2d at 111-12. Requiring a special verdict in these circumstances is entirely reasonable "where, as here, there was a genuine question regarding primary negligence, [because] it is entirely possible that the jury never even reached the issues presented by the instructions. Instead, the jury may simply have found that the defendants were not negligent." Sinai, supra, 498 A.2d at 533 (Nebeker, J., concurring in result). Further, "[w]hile it is true that the trial court might have rejected counsel's proposed queries, appellants would have been able to preserve an objection to the failure to direct answer[s] to specific questions." Id. (citation omitted). Thus, a plaintiff who challenges an affirmative defense instruction, but fails to take steps to preserve the point raised before the trial court, cannot demonstrate prejudice attributable to the assertedly erroneous instruction.
We are satisfied that White does not compel a contrary result, and we are persuaded that the holding in that case should be limited to its facts. White is very much a minority rule, and most state courts follow the so-called general verdict rule, which provides that if a jury renders a general verdict, and no party requests a special verdict or interrogatories, the appellate court will affirm the judgment based on that verdict if substantial evidence supports any one of the other theories upon which the jury was instructed. In sum, we extend the estoppel rule we announced in Nimetz to the circumstances presented here and, therefore, hold that a plaintiff who fads to request either a special verdict or a general verdict with interrogatories, in a negligence action where the defense both denies negligence (or, relat-edly, proximate causation) and asserts an affirmative defense, is estopped from contending on appeal that the jury may have relied on an impermissible affirmative defense theory if the evidence supports an alternative rejection of primary negligence by the jury.
B.
Ordinarily we would next determine, as we did in Nimetz, whether to apply the new estoppel rule to the litigants actually before the court. As noted in his concurring opinion, however, Judge Farrell would not reach that issue, but would affirm on other grounds. For the reasons stated below, I am of the view that the estoppel rule we have announced in Part II.A. should apply in this case.
In Nimetz, we held that, although retroactive application was not automatic, the estop-pel rule announced should apply in that case, based on the factors set forth by the Su preme Court in Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 106-07, 92 S.Ct. 349, 355-56, 30 L.Ed.2d 296 (1971). The continued vitality of Chevron Oil has been placed in doubt, however, by two recent decisions of the Supreme Court. Specifically, in James B. Beam Distillery Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 111 S.Ct. 2439, 115 L.Ed.2d 481 (1991), and more recently in Harper v. Virginia Dep't of Taxation, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 2510, 125 L.Ed.2d 74 (1993), the Court held that, where it had applied a new rule of federal law in a civil case, the new rule "must be given full retroactive effect in all cases still open on direct review." Harper, supra, — U.S. at -, 113 S.Ct. at 2517. In both James B. Beam and Harper, however, the Court was implementing federal law and neither case purports to apply to the circumstances presented here. It is not necessary to decide, however, whether the automatic retroactivity rule of James B. Beam and Harper or the more flexible principles set forth in Chevron Oil should govern because, as pointed out below, application of the Chevron Oil factors nonetheless compels the conclusion that the estoppel rule announced today should apply to the litigants in this case.
In Nimetz, the court resolved the question of the applicability of a new rule there announced to the litigants in the case before it by applying the factors set forth in Chevron Oil, supra. Chevron Oil, however, dealt with the retroactivity of a new rule, which had been announced in a completely different case, to cases that were pending when the new rule was announced. In short, Nimetz dealt with same-ease retroactivity, while Chevron Oil dealt with the retroactivity of another case previously decided, i.e., other-case retroactivity. Analysis under Chevron Oil requires an examination of the previous rule, the reliance upon that rule by litigants, and the potential hardship, if any, that would result from retroactive application of the new rule. See Chevron Oil, supra, 404 U.S. at 106-07, 92 S.Ct. at 355-56.
More closely on point on same-case retro-activity is this court's decision in Mendes v. Johnson, 389 A.2d 781 (D.C.1978) (en banc), where we analyzed the factors to be considered in determining whether to apply a new rule of law to the litigants in the case in which the new rule was announced. Most of the Mendes factors are essentially the same as those applicable in other-case retroactivity analysis, i.e., considerations relating to the significance of the litigant's reliance on the old rule. The court recognized, however, that there is a distinction between same-case retroactivity and other-case retroactivity when the majority held that the new rule announced in Mendes would apply in that case, but it would not otherwise operate retroactively. See id. at 789 (same-case retro-activity, but other-case non-retroactivity). In reaching that result, the court acknowledged that rewarding a party who seeks to change the law, by applying the new rule to that party, a consideration not included within the Chevron Oil analysis, is a significant factor in determining same-case retroactivity. See id. at 791. Giving similar weight to that factor in this case provides further support for the conclusion below, applying the Chevron Oil factors, that the new rule should be applied in this case.
In Nimetz, in deciding whether to impose a rule retroactively, we looked to factors set forth in Chevron Oil:
First, the decision to be applied nonretro-actively must establish a new principle of law, either by overruling clear past precedent on which litigants may have relied, or by deciding an issue of first impression whose resolution was not clearly foreshadowed. Second, it has been stressed that we must . weigh the merits and demerits in each case by looking to the prior history of the rule in question, its purpose and effect, and whether retrospective operation will further or retard its operation. Finally, we have weighed the inequity imposed by retroactive application, for [w]here a decision of this Court could produce substantial inequitable results if applied retroactively, there is ample basis in our cases for avoiding the injustice and hardship by a holding of nonretroactivity.
Nimetz, supra, 596 A.2d at 608 (citing Chevron Oil, supra, 404 U.S. at 106-07, 92 S.Ct. at 355) (alterations in original) (quotations omitted).
In Nimetz we held that the estoppel rule announced there did not overrule past precedent, id., and I conclude we should reach the same result with respect to the rule we announce today which does no more than extend the Nimetz estoppel rule to those eases where a defendant has denied the validity of the claim and has also raised an affirmative defense. Further, in Nimetz we relied in part on the fact that the estoppel rule announced had been forecast by previous decisions of the court. Id. at 608-09 (discussing District of Columbia v. Bethel, 567 A.2d 1331, 1334 (D.C.1990); Sinai, supra, 498 A.2d at 523 n. 1; and Jackson, supra, 451 A.2d at 873-74). The same is true with the rule set forth above, which was clearly foreshadowed in Sinai:
We do not rule out the possibility, in future cases, of requiring that a plaintiff make some showing of special prejudice before he [or she] will be permitted to challenge the verdict based on issues the jury may well never have reached, where the plaintiff, as in this case, failed to request that special interrogatories be submitted to the jury-
Sinai, supra, 498 A.2d at 523 n. 1. Moreover, the holding in Nimetz — which itself preceded the trial in this case by almost exactly a year — also made clear that the rule set forth in White would be narrowly construed. Nimetz, supra, 596 A.2d at 608-09. Indeed, counsel for Robinson acknowledged at oral argument that if, in resolving the jury note issue discussed infra, the court concluded that it could not be certain that the jury rested its verdict on a finding of contributory negligence, then the judgment must be affirmed.
Additionally, retroactive application of this rule will further its operation. Since White was decided in 1982, we have commented on at least four separate occasions about the advisability of a party requesting a special verdict in order to preserve its point when appealing an adverse verdict. See, e.g., Nimetz, 596 A.2d at 608 (holding that defendant who objects to a request for a special verdict may not later avail him or herself of the rule of White on appeal); Bethel, supra, 567 A.2d at 1334 (observing that it was an open question whether a defendant who fails to request a special verdict or interrogatories is es-topped from challenging jury verdict); Sinai, supra, 498 A.2d at 523 n. 1 (observing, without deciding, that a plaintiff who failed to request a special verdict may be required to make a showing of special prejudice in order to challenge verdict); Jackson, supra, 451 A.2d at 873 (observing that defendant should have met its burden by requesting a special verdict or special findings). I agree with Judge Farrell's observation in his concurring opinion in Nimetz: "White's demise, for all practical purposes, was forecast — hence putting prudent attorneys on notice not to oppose a special verdict in these circumstances — by our decisions beginning with District of Columbia v. Jackson, 451 A.2d 867 (D.C.1982)." Nimetz, supra, 596 A.2d at 611 (Farrell, J., concurring). I am confident that retroactive application of the rule announced today will serve to further the application of the well-established principle set forth in Cobb, that appellants must demonstrate that they were harmed by an asserted trial court error by taking the necessary steps to preserve the issues they may wish to later raise on appeal. Thus, where, as here, a party failed to preserve an issue for appeal, he or she should not be "permitted to challenge the verdict based on issues the jury may well never have reached." Sinai, supra, 498 A.2d at 523 n. 1.
Finally, a balance of the equities favors the retroactive application of the rule announced today. As noted in Nimetz, "[a] party has it within his or her means — by requesting a special verdict — to insure that a finding of negligence rests upon a theory supported by the evidence, and absent such a request there is no unfairness in assuming that juries rest their conclusions on theories founded in the evidence." Nimetz, supra, 596 A.2d at 611 (Farrell, J., concurring). Indeed, failure to apply the Nimetz rule to plaintiffs as well as defendants would be an unprincipled distinction inconsistent with notions of equal justice. Plaintiff had every opportunity to request a special verdict, and Dr. Stock should not be subjected to a second trial simply because Robinson faded to adequately preserve the issue. Moreover, I cannot say that retroactive application of the rule would result in "injustice to a party because of reliance on the continued validity of the prior legal rule" when this court has clearly forecast its intention to limit that rule. Mendes v. Johnson, supra, 389 A.2d at 789. In sum, I would apply the special verdict rule announced today to the instant appeal.
III.
In support of her argument that she was prejudiced by the contributory negli gence instruction, Robinson asks this court to infer from the "equal negligence" note that the jury must have concluded that Jones was contributorily negligent when it found for the defendants. It is not this court's function to second-guess jury verdicts. See Arnold v. United States, 511 A.2d 399, 417 (D.C.1986) (trial judge did not abuse discretion in denying defendant's request for individual poll of each juror on each count of an indictment where trial judge received note from a juror the day before the jury returned its verdict stating that the juror did not agree with fellow jurors); cf. Luck v. Baltimore & Ohio B.R. Co., 166 U.S.App.D.C. 283, 288, 510 F.2d 663, 668 (1974) (observing that jury misconduct must be proved by "legally competent evidence"). As Robinson conceded at argument, it is just as plausible that the jury — reinstructed on all three theories— found either that Dr. Stock complied with the applicable standard of care or that his conduct was not the proximate cause of death, as it is that the jury found Jones was contribu-torily negligent. Appellant, moreover, does not contend, nor could she, that sufficient evidence does not support such findings of no negligence on either basis noted. We decline to speculate as to the significance of the jury note, which on its face is ambiguous, and we, consequently, conclude that the jury note casts no light on the question of whether the verdict rested on the claim of negligence or the affirmative defense.
Affirmed.
. The opportunity was not accepted since no such argument was made by counsel for Robinson.
. As we stated in Nimetz, supra, 596 A.2d at 608, "[i]n [White ], the court was not presented with a question involving the effect of failing to request a special verdict...."
. For state court cases applying a rule similar to the one announced in White, see, e.g., Alabama Farm Bureau Mut. Casualty Ins. Co. v. Smith, 406 So.2d 913, 916 (Ala.Civ.App.1981); Hazen v. Municipality of Anchorage, 718 P.2d 456, 461-62 (Alaska 1986); Oban v. Bossard, 201 Neb. 243, 267 N.W.2d 507, 510 (1978); and Circus Circus Hotels, Inc. v. Witherspoon, 99 Nev. 56, 61-63, 657 P.2d 101, 105-06 (1983). See also 89 CJ.S. Trial § 505, 177 (1955) ("it is more commonly held that, in the absence of a request for an instruction that the jury bring in a separate verdict on each count, or motion for a directed verdict on each count, where several counts, issues, or theories are tried and submitted to the jury, the general verdict will stand if the evidence on one count, issue, or theory is sufficient to sustain the verdict").
. See, e.g., Continental Dairy Equip. Co. v. Lawrence, 17 Cal.App.3d 378, 94 Cal.Rptr. 887, 890 (1971) (where jury returned general verdict against plaintiff on his complaint and in favor of defendant on its cross-complaint, general verdict rule applies because substantial evidence supports the verdict, and judgment must be sustained); Giardini v. Supermarkets Gen. Corp., 24 Conn.App. 9, 585 A.2d 110, 111-12 (1991) (where jury was instructed on defenses of no negligence and contributory negligence, plaintiff not entitled to challenge instruction with respect to defendant's negligence); E.F. Hutton v. Sussman, 504 So.2d 1372, 1373 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1987) (where jury awarded punitive damages and defendant failed to request special findings as to whether defendant acted recklessly, willfully, or wantonly, award would be sustained); Goad v. Evans, 191 Ill.App.3d 283, 138 Ill.Dec. 523, 529, 547 N.E.2d 690, 696-97 (1989) (where jury returned general verdict in favor of plaintiff in wrongful death action, defendant not entitled to contest negligent entrustment instruction since he failed to request special interrogatories and jury was instructed on multiple theories of liability); Radtke v. Yokose, 87 A.D.2d 220, 453 N.Y.S.2d 43, 44—45 (1982) (where jury returned general verdict in favor of defendant and neither party requested special verdict or interrogatories, trial judge did not eir in refusing to inquire of jury degree of negligence attributable to each party); and Teague v. United Truck Serv., 499 P.2d 380, 383-84 (Okla.1972) (where jury returned general verdict in favor of defendants, judgment would be affirmed because there was evidence from which jury could conclude plaintiff was contributorily negligent or that defendants' negligence was not probable cause of injury).
. In Chevron Oil, a Gulf of Mexico oil rig employee (Huson) brought an action in the federal district court for damages caused by an injury suffered by him on the rig. Chevron Oil, supra, 404 U.S. at 98, 92 S.Ct. at 351. While that case was pending, the Supreme Court decided Rodrigue v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 395 U.S. 352, 89 S.Ct. 1835, 23 L.Ed.2d 360 (1969), which held, with respect to a statute of limitations claim, that Rodrigue's claim was time barred. If that ruling retroactively applied to Huson's claim against Chevron Oil, that claim would also be time barred. The Supreme Court held, however, applying the factors discussed infra, that the Ro-drigue rule would not apply retroactively. See Chevron Oil, supra, 404 U.S. at 105-09, 92 S.Ct. at 354-56.
. Six judges supported that result, while four judges would have applied the new rule only to future cases.
. Research has revealed no civil case decided by this court that did not apply a new principle of law to the litigants in the case deciding the issue.
. In Mendes, supra, where we applied the new rule to the litigants before the court, we reached that decision even though we were also expressly overruling binding precedent. Thus, the level of reliance on prior law by the Mendes litigants was at its highest. Here, as noted above, the effect of the reliance factor is just the opposite since there was ample forewarning of the rule we announce today. If the new rule announced in Mendes applied to the litigants before the court where the reliance factor weighed so heavily against retroactivity, it would follow that the same would be the case where, as here, the reliance factor clearly points in the direction of applicability of the new rule to the litigants before the court.
. As Judge Farrell noted in Nimetz, "[h]enceforth White will apply only where the parties have urged a special verdict instruction but the trial judge, for reasons of his [or her] own, refuses to give it. I have difficulty imagining that ever happening, but the prospect is so slight in any event that I think we have today repudiated White. Indeed, many of the decisions the court cites in support of the estoppel rule we adopt explicitly reject the rule of White. " Id., 442 A.2d at 610 (Farrell, J., concurring).
. Unlike my dissenting colleague, I am not convinced that this court's recent opinion in Howard Univ. v. Baten, 632 A.2d 389 (D.C.1993), requires a different result. In that case we held that the trial court erred, in a breach of an employment contract action, in instructing the jury that it could award damages to the employee for mental anguish in addition to ordinary monetary losses due to the termination. The employee- argued that since there was no way of determining whether the verdict included any damages for mental anguish, the employer should be estopped from challenging the damages award because he did not request a special verdict which would have clarified what portion, if any, of the damages awarded was attributable to mental anguish. Id. at 393. We concluded that since the employee was as responsible as the employer for the absence of separate verdicts on the two elements of damages, it would be unfair to permit the employee to now benefit from the employer's failure to ensure there were separate verdicts, i.e., under the circumstances the employee must share at least equal responsibility with the employer for the court's failure to secure separate verdicts. Id. at 394.
The dissent reasons that since each party in this case was free to request a special verdict then, as in Baten, Dr. Stock must share equal responsibility with the patient's representative for the failure to secure a special verdict. That conclusion misapprehends what occurred in Ba-ten.
In Baten, the trial judge made it unmistakably clear that she would not separate the two types of damages (one valid and, the other, as this court ultimately ruled, invalid). Id. Moreover, counsel for the employee, in further colloquy with the court, reinforced that view by adopting the position that the mental anguish damages component was so intertwined with the legitimate damage component that separating the two would not be feasible. Id. Thus, any request by the employer for a special verdict would have been met by staunch opposition by both opposing counsel and the court. It is little consequence that this court concluded, under those circumstances, that the employee shared at least equal responsibility for the failure to obtain separate verdicts. Indeed, that characterization likely understated the employee's role. Similarly, in Ni-metz, where several grounds of negligence were propounded to the jury, we held that a defendant who actively opposed the plaintiff's request for a special verdict could not claim on appeal that an impermissible ground formed the basis for the jury's verdict.
In short, the litigants in both Baten and Nimetz were not permitted to avail themselves of the benefits that might ordinarily have been accorded them due to the absence of a special verdict, because they actively helped to bring about that result by some affirmative action of their own in the trial court.
That is not the case here. Appellant is obligated under Cobb to present to this court a record demonstrating entitlement to the relief it seeks. See Cobb, supra, 453 A.2d at 111-12. That could have been accomplished by a request for a special verdict. Dr. Stock took no action whatsoever to prevent such inquiry and there is nothing in Baten that suggests, in the absence of some affirmative conduct on the part of the appellee which frustrated appellant's ability to obtain the information necessary for successful appellate review, that the appellant can avoid the consequence of its failure to make a proper record for this court's review.
. Based upon our review of the record, we conclude that there was sufficient evidence before the jury to establish either that Dr. Stock was not negligent or that any negligence attributed to Dr. Stock was not the proximate cause of death.