Case Name: PEOPLE v. McCOLOR
Court: Michigan Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1971-10-19
Citations: 36 Mich. App. 455
Docket Number: Docket No. 10329
Parties: PEOPLE v. McCOLOR
Judges: Before: Levin, P. J., and Quinn and V. J. Brennan, JJ.
Reporter: Michigan appeals reports; cases decided in the Michigan Court of Appeals.
Volume: 36
Pages: 455–465

Head Matter:
PEOPLE v. McCOLOR
Opinion of the Court
1. Criminal Law — Appeal and Error — Preserving Question.
Failure to object at trial to the prosecuting attorney’s alleged improper cross-examination, to the prosecutor’s alleged prejudicial argument in summation to the jury, and to alleged error in jury instructions precluded the defendant from appellate relief where no clear injustice was shown.
Dissent by Levin, P. J.
2. Criminal Law — Privilege Against Self-Incrimination — Silence —Defendant Testifying.
A defendant who takes the stand may not he asked on cross-examination why he did not tell the police at the time of his arrest the story he related at trial.
3. Criminal Law — Privilege Against Self-Incrimination — Silence at Arrest — Prosecutor’s Comment — Appeal and Error — Preserving Question.
Defense counsel’s failure to object to the prosecutor’s asking the defendant at trial why he did not tell the police at the time of his arrest the same story he told at trial does not necessarily preclude defendant from raising that issue on appeal.
4. Criminal Law — Privilege Against Self-Incrimination — Silence at Arrest — Prosecutor’s Comment — Reversible Error.
Prosecutor’s asking the defendant why he had not told the police when he was arrested the version of the facts which defendant gave on direct examination was not harmless error where the issue of guilt depended on the jury’s assessment of the credibility of the defendant and the complainant.
References for Points in Headnotes
1] 5 Am Jur 2d, Evidence § 553.
'2-4] 29 Am Jur 2d, Evidence § 640.
5 — 7] 53 Am Jur, Trial § 486.
8] 53 Am Jur, Trial § 506.
9] 53 Am Jur, Trial § 485.
10] 53 Am Jur, Trial § 480 et seq.
'll] 53 Am Jur, Trial § 803.
5. Criminal Law — Defendant’s Guilt — Prosecutor’s Belief.
Proseeutor’s statement in closing argument that from the evidence, he believed defendant was properly charged and that defendant was guilty violated the rule which precludes a prosecutor from expressing a personal opinion concerning the guilt of the accused.
6. Criminal Law — Prosecutor’s Comments — Improper Argument.
Prosecutor’s suggesting, during closing argument, that the jury should show its “sincerity” by convicting the defendant was improper.
7. Criminal Law — Prosecutor’s Comment.
Prosecutor’s suggestion in summation to the jury that defendant was a member of the criminal class was improper.
8. Trial — Trial Court’s Duty — Intemperate Language.
A trial court has the duty to check and control any intemperance of zeal or language that is not warranted by the facts and circumstances shown by the proofs.
9. Criminal Law — Prosecutor’s Misconduct — Irrelevant Issues— Innuendo.
A prosecutor should stick to the pertinent facts and should not try to convict a defendant through innuendo and character assassination by the introduction of extraneous side issues.
10. Criminal Law — Prosecutor’s Comment — Cross-Examination.
Prosecutor’s asking the defendant’s father and the defendant’s wife, who were not present when the defendant shot complainant and who had no personal knowledge of the facts surrounding the shooting, whether they would shoot the prosecutor in the back and whether they believed it to be wrong to shoot anyone in the back was improper, because the issue in defendant’s trial was whether the defendant acted properly at the scene of the assault: whether the defendant assaulted the complainant or whether the complainant assaulted the defendant, and whether the defendant acted feloniously or criminally in the matter.
11. Criminal Law^ — Instructions to Jury — Punishment—Emphasis.
A supplemental instruction to the jury, in a trial for assault with intent to do great bodily harm less than murder, in which the judge listed the various grades of assault in descending order, said that he could not mention punishment, and twice stated that assault and battery is a misdemeanor, gimen in response to a question about the difference between assault and battery and felonious assault, emphasised unduly that felonious assault is a lower grade of felony than the crime charged and that assault and battery is a misdemeanor, and thus improperly stressed the difference in possible punishment.
Appeal from Recorder’s Court of Detroit, Elvin L. Davenport, J.
Submitted Division 1 June 10, 1971, at Detroit.
(Docket No. 10329.)
Decided October 19, 1971.
Glenn Ray McColor was convicted of assault with intent to do great bodily harm less than murder. Defendant appeals.
Affirmed.
Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Robert A. Derengoski, Solicitor General, William L. Cahcdan, Prosecuting Attorney, Dommick R. Garnovale, Chief, Appellate Department, and Robert A. Reuther, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for the people.
Carl Ziemba, for defendant on appeal.
Before: Levin, P. J., and Quinn and V. J. Brennan, JJ.

Opinion:
Quinn, J.
The errors relied on by defendant for appellate relief relate to prejudicial argument by the prosecuting attorney in summation to the jury, two instances of improper cross-examination by the prosecuting attorney and error in the jury instructions. None of the errors was preserved by objection at trial, and we are unable to find the "clear in justice" required by People v. Qualls (1968), 9 Mich App 689, to overcome the "no objection — no error" rule.
Affirmed.
V. J. Brennan, J., concurred.