Case Name: In re ANDREW C.
Court: Arizona Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Arizona
Decision Date: 2007-06-21
Citations: 215 Ariz. 366
Docket Number: No. 1 CA-JV 06-0079
Parties: In re ANDREW C.
Judges: CONCURRING: G. MURRAY SNOW, Presiding Judge.
Reporter: Arizona Reports
Volume: 215
Pages: 366–374

Head Matter:
160 P.3d 687
In re ANDREW C.
No. 1 CA-JV 06-0079.
Court of Appeals of Arizona, Division 1, Department A.
June 21, 2007.
Jeffery M. Zurbriggen, P.C. By Jeff Zur-briggen, Tempe, Attorney for Appellant.
Andrew P. Thomas, Maricopa County Attorney By Andrea L. Kever, Deputy County Attorney, Phoenix, Attorneys for Appellee.

Opinion:
OPINION
BARKER, Judge.
¶ 1 The issue in this case is whether prepaid educational fees are economic losses for purposes of restitution. We hold that they are and affirm.
I.
¶2 Juvenile Andrew C. ("Andrew") appeals a restitution award ordered by the juvenile court. Andrew was adjudicated delinquent after he entered a plea agreement admitting to misdemeanor assault. As part of the plea agreement, Andrew agreed to pay restitution to the victim, not to exceed $500. The court later conducted a restitution and disposition hearing at which the juvenile court ordered $186 in restitution to be paid for the victim's pre-paid educational fees on the basis that it was an economic loss arising from the incident.
¶ 3 At the restitution and disposition hearing, the victim testified that the assault caused him to miss the session of a culinary class he was to attend that day. The victim paid $2,800 for a six-week culinary class that consisted of fifteen class sessions. He therefore requested reimbursement for the value of the missed class, $186 ($2800 divided by fifteen equals $186). The victim indicated that his tuition, including that for the missed class, had been paid at the beginning of the semester. He further testified that he would not be reimbursed for the class, he was not able to make the class up, and that each class session was unique: "every day is a different . thing that we learn in class."
¶ 4 The juvenile court held that the educational fees were an economic loss that resulted from the assault and entered an order of restitution for the value of the missed class. Andrew timely appealed the restitution order. See Ariz. R.P. Juv. Ct. 89. This court has jurisdiction pursuant to Arizona Revised Statutes ("A.R.S.") section 8-235 (Supp.2005).
II.
¶ 5 Andrew contends that the educational fees were not an "economic loss" because they were pre-paid and the victim did not incur any additional costs for missing the class session. Andrew argues that the prepayment was a "sunk cost at the time of enrollment" and that the only loss "was that of the educational process itself, which," Andrew contends, "is not economic." The dissent accepts Andrew's argument and asserts that the loss is one of enjoyment, for which a civil remedy may apply, but not economic, for which restitution in a criminal case is appropriate. The State asserts, and the trial court found, that the losses at issue are economic and restitution is appropriate. We agree.
¶ 6 We review a juvenile court's restitution order for an abuse of discretion. In Re Erika V., 194 Ariz. 399, 400, ¶ 2, 983 P.2d 768, 769 (App.1999); Maricopa County Juv. Action No. JV-128676, 177 Ariz. 352, 353, 868 P.2d 365, 366 (App.1994). We consider the facts in the light most favorable to upholding the decision. See In re Julio L., 197 Ariz. 1, 2-3, 6, 3 P.3d 383, 384-85 (2000). We review issues of statutory and constitutional construction on a de novo basis. Univ. Med. Ctr. Corp. v. Dep't of Revenue, 201 Ariz. 447, 450, ¶ 14, 36 P.3d 1217, 1220 (App.2001).
¶ 7 To properly consider Andrew's claims we must set forth the constitutional and stat utory parameters of restitution and those pertinent cases construing those provisions. We then turn to the specific provisions and analysis of the term "economic."
III.
¶ 8 The juvenile court's authority to order restitution stems both from the Arizona Constitution and statutes. The Arizona Constitution provides that it is a victim's right "[t]o receive prompt restitution from the person or persons convicted of the criminal conduct that caused the victim's loss or injury." Ariz. Const, art. 2, § 2.1(A)(8). When "a juvenile is adjudicated delinquent, the court, after considering the nature of the offense . shall order the juvenile to make full or partial restitution to the victim of the offense for which the juvenile was adjudicated delinquent. ." A.R.S. § 8-344 (Supp.2006).
¶ 9 In applying the statutory and constitutional scheme, the Arizona Supreme Court has provided a three-part test. State v. Wilkinson, 202 Ariz. 27, 29, ¶ 7, 39 P.3d 1131, 1133 (2002). Restitution is appropriate for those losses that (1) are economic, (2) would not have occurred but for the juvenile's delinquent conduct, and (3) are directly caused by the delinquent conduct (e.g. not consequential damages). Id.
¶ 10 "Arizona's statutory scheme requiring restitution in criminal cases is based on the principle that the offender should make reparations to the victim by restoring the victim to his economic status quo that existed before the crime occurred." In re William L., 211 Ariz. 236, 239, ¶ 11, 119 P.3d 1039, 1042 (App.2005). As we have noted, "[t]his concept is commonly referred to as making the victim 'whole.' " Id. at ¶ 12, 119 P.3d 1039. "[T]he trial court has discretion to set the restitution amount according to the facts of the case in order to make the victim whole." In re Ryan A., 202 Ariz. 19, 24, ¶ 20, 39 P.3d 543, 548 (App.2002) (emphasis added); see also State v. Reynolds, 171 Ariz. 678, 681, 832 P.2d 695, 698 (App.1992) ("[A] trial court is required to determine the full amount of the victim's loss to make the victim whole."); Pima County Juv. Action No. 45363-3, 151 Ariz. 541, 541, 729 P.2d 345, 345 (App.1986) ("[Tjhe court also must consider the victim's loss in fashioning an order appropriate to a particular case.").
¶ 11 Frequently, a victim's loss can be measured by fair market value. See State v. Ellis, 172 Ariz. 549, 550, 838 P.2d 1310, 1311 (App.1992) ("in assessing restitution for a loss of personal property, the measure of the victim's full economic loss is the fair market value of the property at the time of the loss"). Other times, however, fair market value is not an appropriate measure for economic loss. See William L., 211 Ariz. at 240, ¶ 14-17, 119 P.3d at 1043 (approving measures other than fair market value when necessary to establish restitution). The guiding principle is to "make the victim whole," to the extent permitted by the statutory and constitutional scheme. Ryan A., 202 Ariz. at 24, ¶ 20, 39 P.3d at 548. That is the purpose of the three-part test from Wilkinson, to which we now turn.
IV.
¶ 12 As noted, Wilkinson requires that the loss (1) "be economic," (2) "be one that the victim would not have incurred but for the defendant's criminal offense" and (3) be "directly cause[d]" by the delinquent conduct. 202 Ariz. at 29, ¶ 7, 39 P.3d at 1133.
¶ 13 Beginning with the second prong of the test, that prong is clearly satisfied because "but for" the delinquent conduct the victim would have been able to attend the class and there would have been no loss. As to the third prong of the test, there is likewise no question that the loss of the class session was directly caused by the delinquent conduct. The assault took place the same day as the class and prohibited the victim from attending the class.
¶ 14 Thus, under the Wilkinson test, the only factor that remains is whether the loss was "economic."
V.
¶ 15 The legislature has provided a statutory definition of "economic loss" applicable to restitution matters. A.R.S. § 13-105(14) (Supp.2006). When the legislature has defined a term we apply that definition. Sakrison v. Pierce, 66 Ariz. 162, 170, 185 P.2d 528, 534 (1947) ("[I]t is a firmly established rule that definitions of terms given within the framework of a statute itself control and dictate the meaning of those terms as used in the statute."). If a definition still leaves unresolved questions, we turn to standard principles of statutory analysis to resolve them. • Hughes v. Jorgenson, 203 Ariz. 71, 73, ¶ 11, 50 P.3d 821, 823 (2002). The legislative definition of "economic loss" is as follows:
"Economic loss" means any loss incurred by a person as a result of the commission of an offense. Economic loss includes lost interest, lost earnings and other losses which would not have been incurred but for the offense. Economic loss does not include losses incurred by the convicted person, damages for pain and suffering, punitive damages or consequential damages.
A.R.S. § 13-105(14). We note that the legislature has defined some specific items that are economic ("lost interest, lost earnings"), some that are not economic ("losses incurred by [a] convicted person," "pain and suffering", "consequential damages"), and then simply defined an "economic loss" to be "any loss" not otherwise referenced. Thus, we consider that the phrase "any loss" means "any loss that is economic" and that the reference to "any loss" means that the legislature intends the term "economic" to be construed as broadly as that term permits.
¶ 16 Although a number of our cases apply the statutory definition of economic loss, none deal with the issue posed by equating "any loss" with "economic loss." See, e.g., William L., 211 Ariz. at 239, ¶ 11-13, 119 P.3d at 1042; State v. Guilliams, 208 Ariz. 48, 51-52, ¶ 9-12, 90 P.3d 785, 788-89 (App.2004); In re Stephanie B., 204 Ariz. 466, 469, ¶ 10-13, 65 P.3d 114, 117 (App.2003). Neither does Wilkinson shed further light on how we should construe the term "economic loss" when described as "any loss." The primary focus of Wilkinson was on prong two and three of the test. Neither does the legislative history for § 13-105(14) provide further guidance.
¶ 17 In circumstances such as these, it is appropriate to turn to established dictionaries to give meaning to terms used. Sierra Tucson, Inc. v. Pima County, 178 Ariz. 215, 220, 871 P.2d 762, 767 (App.1994) ("reference to established, respected dictionaries is appropriate in determining the commonly accepted meaning of words in a statute"). A common definition of "economic" is the following: "Of, relating to, or based on the production, distribution, and consumption of goods and services." Merriam Webster Collegiate Dictionary (10th Ed.2005). We hold that the breadth of this definition encompasses the breadth of the definition that the legislature intended when it determined that "economic loss" meant "any loss," except as otherwise defined. We adopt it and apply it here.
¶ 18 Using this definition of "economic," the pre-paid educational fees at issue clearly qualify. The inability to attend the culinary class certainly is one "relating to . consumption of goods and services." In the language of the definition, the victim was unable to "consume" the "services" for which he had paid: the culinary class. In this ease the "service" that the victim was precluded from consuming was the culinary class that he had purchased. The loss here was "economic," satisfying that prong of the Wilkinson test and the statutory definition. Thus, the trial court did not err when it ordered restitution in the amount of $186, which is the economic loss represented by missing one of fifteen class sessions when the overall cost of the course was $2800. Once the three- part test from Wilkinson was satisfied, the trial court had the responsibility to "make the victim whole," whether or not there was a fair market value that could be assigned to the loss. William L., 211 Ariz. at 289, ¶ 12, 14-17, 119 P.3d at 1042; Ryan A., 202 Ariz. at 24, ¶ 20, 39 P.3d at 548.
VI.
¶ 19 Andrew and the dissent assert, however, that because the educational costs were "prepaid" they do not qualify as economic. The principle asserted by Andrew and the dissent is that a "fixed cost, paid prior to the assault" does not qualify for restitution as "the loss occurred prior to the assault. . The only loss to the victim occurring after and resulting from the assault was a loss of enjoyment . [which] is not compensable as restitution." Infra at ¶34. This logic is flawed.
¶ 20 We first note that whether goods or services are paid for in advance is not a factor under the statutory definition of "economic loss." The question is whether the loss is "economic" — not when it was paid for. What matters, in determining whether a loss is economic, is whether it is one "relating to, or based on the production, distribution, and consumption of goods and services." Supra at ¶ 17.
¶ 21 Frequently, hypothetical examples shed light on the viability, or lack thereof, of an asserted legal principle. Such is the case here. Assume you pre-paid $10,000, nonrefundable, for a ten-day cruise on the Mexican Riviera. You are assaulted the day before the cruise, and your injuries are such that you are unable to sail. Is there an economic loss of $10,000 or simply a non-economic loss of enjoyment? Assume someone steals your tickets to the ASU-USC football game for which you previously paid $1000. You can now no longer attend the game. If the thief is caught, should restitution be considered for a $1000 economic loss or was there merely a non-economic loss of enjoyment?
¶22 We think the answer to each hypothetical is obvious. The losses pertain to the "consumption of . services" for which the victim has paid in advance. Applying the definition derived from § 13-105(14), the losses are "economic." Prongs two and three from Wilkinson must still be met, but the fact that the payment was made prior to the criminal act does not make the loss "non-economic." Prong one of the test is satisfied. Although the dissent asserts that "[enjoyment in and of itself is non-economic in nature," that is of no consequence when the event or services one seeks to enjoy were paid for in advance.
VII.
¶23 The dissent also suggests that there are constitutional reasons that would impede the trial court from entering this award. This is not so.
¶ 24 First, we note that this argument was not raised on appeal or asserted in the trial court. Generally, such an issue may not be considered on appeal. Childress Buick Co. v. O'Connell, 198 Ariz. 454, 459, ¶29, 11 P.3d 413, 418 (App.2000). We agree with the dissent, however, that in some circumstances it may be appropriate to address foundational legal issues that are either (1) dispositive of the case, or (2) necessary to accurately apply the law even though those issues have not been asserted or briefed. See Stokes v. Stokes, 143 Ariz. 590, 592, 694 P.2d 1204, 1206 (App.1984) ("The exceptions to the general rule operate only where the facts of a particular case so warrant and the question is one of substantive law presenting no dispute as to the facts.") Having said that, the constitutional argument that the dissent makes here holds no sway.
¶25 The Arizona Constitution expressly provides that a victim has a right "[t]o receive prompt restitution from the person or persons convicted of the criminal conduct that caused the victim's loss or injury." Ariz. Const, art. 2, § 2.1(A)(8). As stated in Wilkinson, "[o]ur conclusion that the restitution statutes encompass only damages directly caused by the criminal conduct involved not only remains faithful to the statutory language, but also prevents the restitution statutes from conflicting with the right to a civil jury trial preserved by Arizona Constitution Article 2, Section 23." Wilkinson, 202 Ariz. at 29, ¶ 11, 39 P.3d at 1133 (emphasis added). The restitution award here was only for those losses "directly caused by the criminal conduct involved." Id. Thus, there is no constitutional impediment.
VIII.
¶ 26 For the reasons set forth above, we affirm the restitution order entered in this case.
CONCURRING: G. MURRAY SNOW, Presiding Judge.
. The court also ordered other restitution which is not at issue on appeal.
. Subsection 14 of A.R.S. § 13-105, defining "economic loss," was added by Senate Bill 1232 of the 1986 legislative session. The bill was originally proposed by the Senate as establishing a Juvenile Probation Services Fund. The House of Representatives amended the bill to include various additions to Chapter 13, including the definition of "economic loss" in A.R.S. § 13-105(14). The judiciary committee recommended that the bill pass without comment. The legislative history, therefore, does not suggest a particular intent for the definition of "economic loss" beyond the express statutory language.
. Just as it does not matter if only a portion of a car was damaged for the purposes of restitution, as contrasted with the vehicle being totaled, it does not matter here that only a portion of the course was missed rather than the entire course. If the statutory scheme is complied with and the Wilkinson test is met, the victim is entitled to restitution for "the victim's loss or injury." Ariz. Const, art. 2, § 2.1(A)(8). There is no requirement that the loss be total or complete.
. The dissent also asserts that three cases dealing with damaged vehicles support its proposition that monies paid "prior to the assault" cannot be an economic loss. Infra at ¶ 37-39, citing William L., 211 Ariz. at 239-40, ¶ 9-14, 119 P.3d at 1042-43; State v. Barrett, 177 Ariz. 46, 864 P.2d 1078 (App.1993); State v. Morris, 173 Ariz. 14, 839 P.2d 434 (App.1992). We disagree. The cases are completely consistent with, and support, our holding. On their facts they simply do not address the situation here, where monies were paid prior to the crime and the crime directly caused the loss of the goods and services those funds purchased. Two of them, William L. and Morris, deal with whether monies paid or sought after the crime had occurred qualify as restitution. William L., 211 Ariz. at 239, ¶ 9, 119 P.3d at 1042; Morris, 173 Ariz. at 18-19, 839 P.2d at 438-39. The third, Barrett, addresses whether there was sufficient evidence for asserted lost profits to qualify as restitution. 177 Ariz. at 46-47, 864 P.2d at 1078-79.