Case Name: MARIETTA v. CLIFFS RIDGE, INC.
Court: Michigan Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1971-08-27
Citations: 385 Mich. 364
Docket Number: No. 13; Docket No. 52,690
Parties: MARIETTA v. CLIFFS RIDGE, INC.
Judges: T. M. Kavanagh, C. J., and Adams, T. E. Brennan, T. G. Kavanagh, and Swainson, JJ., concurred with Williams, J.
Reporter: Michigan Reports
Volume: 385
Pages: 364–391

Head Matter:
MARIETTA v. CLIFFS RIDGE, INC.
Opinion op the Court
1. Negligence — Standard op Care — Reasonably Prudent Man— Customary Usage op Industry — Evidence.
The standard by which the negligent or non-negligent character of a defendant’s conduct is to be determined is that of a reasonably prudent man under the same or similar circumstances and the customary usage and practice of the industry in which the defendant was engaged is relevant evidence to be used in determining whether or not this standard has been met; however, such usage cannot be solely determinative of the standard as this would permit the industry to set its own standard of care.
References por Points in Headnotes
[1] 38 Am Jur, Negligence §§ 29, 30, 34.
Custom as a standard of care. 68 ALR 1400.
2] 38 Am Jur, Negligence § 344 et seq.
3] 38 Am Jur, Negligence §§ 96,131.
4] 46 Am Jur 2d, Judgments § 117.
5] 47 Am Jur 2d, Jury § 14.
6,11,14] 38 Am Jur, Negligence § 332 et seq.
Liability of operator of skiing, tobogganing, and bobsledding facilities for injury to patron or participant. 94 ALR2d 1431.
7] 47 Am Jur 2d, Jury § 3.
8] 5 Am Jur 2d, Appeal and Error § 602.
9,17,18] 5 Am Jur 2d, Appeal and Error § 987.
53 Am Jur, Trial § 357 et seq.
5 Am Jur 2d, Appeal and Error § 546.
53 Am Jur, Trial § § 8-11.
38 Am Jur, Negligence §§171,174.
4 Am Jur 2d, Amusements and Exhibition § 98.
2. Negligence — Standard of Reasonable Prudence — Jury Question — Question of Law.
The question of whether a defendant in fact met the standard of reasonable prudence required of him is ordinarily one for the jury and it is only where the facts are such that all reasonable men must draw the same conclusion from them, that the question of negligence is ever considered one of law for the court.
3. Negligence — Occupier of Land — Business Invitee — Dangers— Duty.
The duty of an owner or occupier of land to a business invitee is to remedy or warn of dangers which are known to him or which, in the exercise of reasonable care, he should have discovered.
4. Judgment — Judgment Notwithstanding Verdict — -Evidence— Inferences — Burden of Proof.
A court must view all of the evidence and all legitimate inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the plaintiff in determining, on defendant’s motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, whether the plaintiff has met his burden of producing enough evidence from which a jury could reasonably find in his favor.
5. Jury — Question of Pact — Jury Question — Courts.
A factual question, when raised, must be decided by the jury, not by the court.
6. Negligence — Evidence—Reasonable Prudence — Skiing—Jury Question.
Evidence produced by plaintiffs and all legitimate inferences therefrom raised a question for the jury, where there was testimony that bamboo poles are safer than sapling poles for use on a slalom ski course, that a thinner sapling pole is safer than a thicker one and that defendant’s employees knew that sapling poles were being used on defendant’s slalom course as, viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, it cannot be said they did not produce enough evidence from which a jury could reasonably find that the use of a sapling pole 1-1/2 inch in diameter, upon which one of the plaintiffs was impaled in skiing on the slalom course, failed to meet a standard of reasonable prudence.
7. Jury — Verdict—Damages.
A cherished tenet of our legal philosophy is that a jury comprised of man’s peers, properly instructed in the law by the court, will render an honest finding of fact based on the truth, and a fair and just verdict as to the damages suffered.
8. Appeal and Error —■ Evidence — Admissibility — Failure to Object.
Objections to admissibility of evidence not properly raised at trial cannot be later asserted on appeal.
Dissenting Opinion
Black, J.
9. Appeal and Error — Pleading—Evidence—Theory of Case— Issues.
Law actions on appeal to the Michigan Supreme Court are reviewed and disposed of only upon the legal points and theories which the respective parties have presented by their pleadings and evidence, precisely as the latter stood when the judgment reviewed was entered and appeal taken; im, other words, no party to a legal action may on appeal abandon his presented and tried theory, whether it be of prosecution or defense, and substitute therefor another not brought to issue im, the trial court.
10. Negligence — Evidence—Burden of Proof — Directed Verdict.
In an action for tortious injury where one party or the other moves for an instructed verdict of liability or non-liability there is, in every case, a preliminary question, which is one of law, viz., whether there is any evidence on which the jury could properly find the verdict for the party on which the burden of proof lies; if there is not, the judge ought to withdraw the question from the jury and direct a nonsuit if the burden is on the plaintiff or direct a verdict for the plaintiff if the burden is on the defendant.
11. Negligence — Evidence—Skiing.
Plaintiffs failed utterly on fully granted favorable view to make out a submissible case on their exclusively pleaded and tried theory of recovery that the defendant, operator of a ski area, was guilty of actionable negligence for having permitted high school students to cut and install maple saplings, as slalom gate poles or markers, on a “practice” slalom slope.
12. Appeal and Error — Pleading—Evidence—Motions.
Plaintiffs by their motion for new stance on appeal have conceded tacitly that the case made by their complaint and submitted evidence is deficient as a matter of law.
13. Trial — Pretrial Summary — Action—Court Bule.
The pretrial summary supposedly controlled the subsequent course of the action where no modification of it was ever proposed or made (GCR 1963, 301.3).
14. Negligence — Skiing—Poles.
The charge, that an operator of a ski area was negligent for having permitted installation of wooden slalom gate poles that would not splinter, failed legally and should fail now, there being no proof or inference that defendant would not have been charged as quick or quicker with negligence had it installed bamboo poles which would splinter and cause multiple piercing of plaintiff’s body rather than once by the larger diametered sapling into which plaintiff projected himself while skiing.
15. Negligence — Contributory Negligence — Assumption op Risk — Consent to Injury.
Defenses of contributory negligence and assumption of risk are available, if at all, when and only when a submissible case of actionable negligence has been made out and no such case was made out where the action is controlled by an old legal maxim that he who consents cannot receive an injury.
16. Negligence — Sport—Consent to Injury.
The voluntary participant in a perilous sport has consented to receive his injury, should it occur, and may not hold another responsible for the consequences solely on the basis of a home-made-theory made not of proof but of pure conjecture.
17. Negligence — Theory op Recovery — Appeal and Error — Judgment Notwithstanding Verdict — Pleading—Trial—Reasonable Men.
Plaintiffs’ “independent” theory of recovery in a negligence action which entered the case after plaintiffs’ appeal to the Michigan Court of Appeals had been taken and pursued should be cast out in favor of a straight-forward test of the right or wrong of defendant’s motion for judgment and of the trial judge’s determination thereof upon the issue and record then before that judge as that motion brought to test but one legal question; whether, upon the circuit court record of pleadings and trial and the favorable-to-plaintiff assay of “all reasonable men”, plaintiffs did or did not make out a submissible case.
18. Negligence — Judgment Notwithstanding Verdict — Theory op Recovery- — Jury Question — Appeal and Error.
Trial court’s judgment granting defendant’s motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict for plaintiffs should be upheld where the jury never had submitted to it plaintiffs’ “independent” theory of negligence and hence cannot be deemed as having decided it as this theory entered the case after plaintiffs’ appeal to the Michigan Court of Appeals had been taken and pursued.
Appeal from Court of Appeals, Division 3, R. B. Burns, P. J., and Holbrook and Levin, JJ., reversing and remanding Marquette, Bernard H. Davidson, J.
Submitted January 7, 1971.
(No. 13
January Term 1971,
Docket No. 52,690.)
Decided August 27, 1971.
20 Mich App 449 affirmed.
Complaint by Neil J. Marietta and James Marietta against Cliffs Ridge, Inc., for damages resulting from an injury sustained while slalom skiing at defendant’s ski area. Judgment for defendant notwithstanding a verdict for plaintiffs. Plaintiffs appealed to the Court of Appeals. Reversed and remanded. Defendant appeals.
Affirmed.
Wisti & Jaaskelainen (by John M. McCarthy), for plaintiffs.
Baldwin, Kendricks & Bordeau, for defendant.

Opinion:
Williams, J.
The prime issue in this negligence case is whether the plaintiff on a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict produced enough evidence to go to the jury.
On December 31, 1964, plaintiff Neil Marietta, then a minor, was injured while skiing through a slalom course at defendant's ski area. While turning through the last gate of the slalom course, plaintiff's body struck a 1-1/2 inch thick maple sapling pole being used as a slalom gate marker. The pole flipped over, its top becoming imbedded in the snow, and plaintiff was impaled through his groin and abdominal region on the pole's other end. Plaintiffs alleged that defendant was negligent in using a wooden pole of such diameter to mark the slalom course, rather than a bamboo or fiberglass pole which would have broken when struck.
After all proofs had been presented, the defendant moved for a directed verdict. The court denied the motion and submitted the case to the jury. The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff, and the defendant then moved for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict claiming there was no factual issue to be submitted to the jury. The trial court granted defendant's motion stating that the defendant complied with a degree of care equal to the average in the trade or industry in which it was engaged and therefore there was no negligence on its part as a matter of law.
The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded for entry of the jury verdict. We affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.
The standard by which the negligent or nonnegligent character of the defendant's conduct is to be determined is that of a reasonably prudent man under the same or similar circumstances. McKinney v. Yelavich (1958), 352 Mich 687. The customary usage and practice of the industry is relevant evidence to be used in determining whether or not this standard has been met. Such usage cannot, however, be determinative of the standard. As stated by Justice Holmes:
"What usually is done may be evidence of what ought to be done, but what ought to be done is fixed by a standard of reasonable prudence, whether it usually is complied with or not." Texas and Pacific R. Co. v. Behymer (1903), 189 US 468, 470 (23 S Ct 622, 47 L Ed 905).
The danger inherent in allowing an "industry" standard to be the sole criteria for determining whether or not the defendant exercised due care was recognized in Witt v. Chrysler Corporation (1969), 15 Mich App 576, 583:
"To adopt this view would permit the industry to set its own standard of care."
Similarly, Judge Learned Hand also enumerated the dangers of allowing an industry standard to be determinative of negligence:
"Indeed, in most cases reasonable prudence is in fact common prudence; but strictly it is never its measure; a whole calling may have unduly lagged in the adoption of new and available devices. It may never set its own tests, however persuasive be its usages." The T. J. Hooper (CA2, 1932), 60 F2d 737, 740.
The question of whether the defendant in fact met the standard of reasonable prudence required of him is ordinarily one for the jury:
" 'It is only where the facts are such that all reasonable men must draw the same conclusion from them, that the question of negligence is ever considered one of law for the court.' " Ackerberg v. Muskegon Osteopathic Hospital (1962), 366 Mich 596, 600 quoting Grand Trunk R. Co. v. Ives (1892), 144 US 408, 417 (12 S Ct 679, 36 L Ed 485).
Applying the standard of reasonable prudence to an owner or occupier of land, the duty of such an owner or occupier to a business invitee, the stipulated status of the plaintiff, is to remedy or warn of dangers which are known to him or which, in the exercise of reasonable care, he should have discovered. Kroll v. Katz (1965), 374 Mich 364.
The question for this Court is whether the plaintiffs produced enough evidence from which a jury could have reasonably found that the permitted use of sapling poles 1-1/2 inches in diameter was a danger which the defendant, in the exercise of reasonable care, discovered or should have discovered, and, in the exercise of reasonable care, should have either remedied or warned of its existence.
In determining, on defendant's motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, whether the plaintiff has met his burden of producing enough evidence from which a jury could reasonably find in his favor, the court must view all the evidence and all legitimate inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Weisenburg v. Village of Beulah (1958), 352 Mich 172, 184. This Court has said:
" a directed verdict against a litigant is proper only if the evidence and permissible inferences therefrom, viewed most favorably to that litigant leave no room for disagreement thereon among reasonable men." In re Wood Estate (1965), 374 Mich 278, 291.
When a factual question is raised, it must be decided by the jury, not by the court. As this Court stated in Davis v. Belmont Creamery Co. (1937), 281 Mich 165, 169:
"The determination of factual questions is purely within the province of the jury. The judgment non obstante veredicto was based upon the court's decision on a reserved motion for a directed verdict, and in determining said motion the same considerations are applicable as are pertinent to the determination of a motion for a directed verdict. A verdict cannot properly be directed for one party when an issue of fact, as in the instant case, is presented for the jury's determination."
The evidence produced by the plaintiffs consisted of:
A. The 1-1/2 inch in diameter sapling pole on which the plaintiff was impaled.
B. The demonstration in court of the relative breaking qualities of bamboo and sapling poles, i.e., the particular sapling pole on which the plaintiff was impaled.
C. The testimony of the plaintiff concerning:
1. the propensity of slalom skiers to strike slalom gates;
2. the plaintiff as an experienced skier who had never skied on á slalom course on which sapling poles were used;
3. the use of bamboo poles on other slalom courses on which the plaintiff had skied;
4. the normal practice of skiers on a slalom course not to examine the poles on the course before skiing on it;
5. the ski run on which he was injured as the first time the plaintiff had skied on defendant's slalom course;
6. no signs being posted on the hill restricting its use;
7. the plaintiff's lack of knowledge that sapling poles were being used on the defendant's slalom course;
8. the plaintiff's impression that bamboo poles were being used on the defendant's slalom course;
9. the plaintiff's refusal to use the slalom course had he known that sapling poles were being used on the course.
D. The testimony of William Hart, the Athletic Director of the local high school that skiers on slalom courses will knock down slalom gates.
E. The testimony of Bruce C. Makinen, an employee of the defendant on ski patrol, that:
1. he and the other employees of the defendant knew that sapling poles were being used on the defendant's slalom courses;
2. in the month prior to the accident bamhoo poles were stored on the defendant's premises.
F. The testimony of John J. Racine, a ski instructor, that a thin, flexible sapling pole was safer than a thick sapling pole.
G. The testimony of Robert J. Rieholdt who was skiing on the hill at the time of the accident that he never examined the poles on a slalom course before he went down it.
H. Six ski magazines subscribed to by the defendant containing pictures showing the use of bamboo poles on other slalom courses.
Viewing the. evidence produced by the plaintiffs and all legitimate inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, we cannot say that they did not produce enough evidence from which a jury could reasonably find that the use of a sapling pole 1-1/2 inch in diameter on a slalom course failed to meet a standard of reasonable prudence. There was testimony that bamboo poles are. safer than sapling poles for use on a slalom course, that a thinner sapling pole is safer than a thicker one, and that defendant's employees knew that sapling poles were being used on the defendant's slalom course. This evidence raised a question for the jury. It is a cherished tenet of our legal philosophy that a jury comprised of a man's peers, properly instructed in the law by the court, will render an honest finding of fact based on the truth, and a fair and just verdict as to damages suffered. Indeed, this jury acted with the fairness and reality with which a jury in theory is supposed to work. It returned a verdict in the amount of $10,000 though plaintiff had prayed for a much larger sum. This case does not contain those very special circumstances under which a judge may substitute his trained intelligence for the common sense of the jury.
The defendant also asserts that the ski magazines introduced by the plaintiff for the purpose of showing notice or knowledge of the defendant of the use of bamboo poles on other slalom courses were hearsay, not authenticated, and irrelevant, and that their admission was reversible error. The record shows that there was no specific objection made at the trial on the grounds now asserted on appeal. Objections to admissibility not properly raised at trial cannot be later asserted on appeal, e.g., Kocks v. Collins (1951) 330 Mich 423, 428.
The decision of the Court of Appeals reversing the judgment notwithstanding the verdict and remanding for entry of the jury verdict is affirmed.
T. M. Kavanagh, C. J., and Adams, T. E. Brennan, T. G. Kavanagh, and Swainson, JJ., concurred with Williams, J.
Defendant's objection to the admission of the magazines at trial was as follows:
"I object to them because the standard of care here is not governed by what is used in Vermont or in Europe or on Olympic sld meets. We're dealing with a local course in this community and this was not competitive skiing in the first place and I think the evidence is here that there is a vast difference between competitive skiing and when these young skiers go out here from the high school and set up a practice course."