Case Name: STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA v. THE UNITED STATES
Court: United States Court of Claims
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 1901-10-28
Citations: 36 Ct. Cl. 507
Docket Number: Departmental 55
Parties: STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA v. THE UNITED STATES.
Judges: 
Reporter: United States Court of Claims Reports
Volume: 36
Pages: 507–531

Head Matter:
STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA v. THE UNITED STATES.
[Departmental 55.
Decided October 28, 1901.]
On the Auditor's Report.
On the outbreak of the civil war, the President calls out troops and requests the governors of the loyal States to arm and equip themr-The States are reimbursed under the Act- of Indemnity, 27th July, 1861 (12 Stat. L., p. 276;lb., 615), for all moneys expended except interest on loans. The accounting officers and the Attorney-General having decided that interest so expended can not be allowed under the statute, the State of Pennsylvania does not present a claim for interest. But the State of New York brings an action, and in 1891 recovers (26 0. 01s., 467; 160 D. S. R., 621). The' State of Pennsylvania then presents a claim for interest, and the Secretary of the Treasury transmits it to this court under the Bowman Act.
I.The accounting officers have jurisdiction of a claim for interest expended by a State in procuring money to arm and equip troops called out by the President'in 1861, the claim resting upon the Act of Indemnity, 27th July, 1861 (12 Stat. L., p. 276; lb., 615).
II.The act directs the Secretary to- refund the moneys so' expended, and mere delay in presenting a claim is not necessarily fatal.
III. The statute of limitations, which will bar an .action in this court, does not deter the action of the Secretary of the Treasury..
IV. Laches is not like limitation, a mere matter of time, but a question of the inequity of presenting a demand. This inequity must be founded upon some change in the conditions or relations of the parties.
V.Where the evidence to sustain a claim presented to the accounting officers is wholly documentary and the details of the transactions are as accessible now as ever, and the accounting officers practically prevented the presentation of such claims by deciding in a similar case that they would not be allowed, and their action was approved by the Secretary of the Treasury and the Attorney-General, and the Government lost no right and the claimants gained no advantage, there is no reason why the Treasury Department should not act upon the claims.
VI.Estoppel for failure to present a claim can not be set up by the party whose officers decided that presentation would be a useless procedure.
VII.In 1861 the loyal States were at liberty to aid the General Government in arming and equipping troops by issuing interest-bearing bonds wherewith to obtain funds.
VIII. Where the interest on such bonds was, by their terms, payable in gold, premiums paid by the State in purchasing gold wherewith to pay interest was a disbursement made for the uses and purposes of the General Government, and is recoverable under the statute.
IX. The direct tax, under the Act 5th August, 1861 (12 Stat. L., 295), assumed by the State of Pennsylvania, should be treated as a payment on the indebtedness of the General Government to the State. Interest on that amount is not recoverable after the 30th June, 1862; and interest should not be allowed against the United States from the time when any repayment was made to the State.
The Reporters' statement of the case:
The evidence in this case being wholly documentary and involving an examination of the Treasury accounts, both of the General Government and the State of Pennsylvania, it was referred to an auditor to make and state an account, and came to a hearing upon his report. The material facts involving questions of law fully appear in the opinion of the court.
Mr. Ilenry M. Foote for the claimant:
The legal right of the State to recover having been determined, the next question relates to a limitation upon such right.
In the case referred to the court, in construing the language of the acts of Congress, it is said, among other things, that the State of New York was the agent of the Government in making the loan. “It is (says the court, p. 622) as if the United States had itself borrowed the. money through the agency of the State.”
The first thing to determine, therefore, is, Did the State of Pennsylvania, acting as an agent of the Government in making this loan, exceed its authority ?
Upon this subject the decisions are clear:
“That whether the authority be expressed or implied it necessarily carries with it, or includes in it, as an incident, all the powers which are necessary, or proper, or usual, as means to effectuate the purposes for which the agency was created.” (Story on Agency, par. 97; WilUams v. Getty, 31 Pa. St.,461; Andrews v. Eneeland, 6'Low. (N Y.), 354; Anderson v. Coon-ley, 21 Wend. (N. Y.), 279; Sanford v. Ihandy, 23 id., 260; Reck v. Harriott, 6 S. & ft. (I*a.), 146; Benjamme v. Ben-jamine, 15 Conn., 347; Shackman v. Little, 87 Ind., 181; Earnest v. Stoller, 2 McCreary (U. S.), 380.)
So also the act of an agent will bind the principal if done within the apparent scope of the agent’s authority. (Continental Bank v. National Bank, 50 N. Y., 575; Bank v. State' National Bank, 52 N Y., 961.)
And it is a rule of general application that “ \n agent is required to use only reasonable skill and diligence — that is to say, the same diligence as is ordinarily exercised by persons in the same trade or business; or, that is used by the agent about his own business affairs.” (Story on Agency, par. 183.)
Will it be urged that the State should have borrowed this money upon any better terms than the Government itself could have obtained it? It is shown that in 1861 $18,000,000 of the 6 per cent bonds of the United States, issued under the act of February 8, 1861, were' sold at a discount of from 10 to 15 per cent. And that in August and October of that year $100,000,000 of its 7.30 bonds, payable in three years, were issued; while in November following it boiTowed at par for 7 per cent on its twenty-year 6 per cent bonds reduced to the equivalent of sevens, including interest, nearly $46,000,000. If the United States had borrowed the $3,000,000 in question, it would have paid $1,000,000 more in interest and discount than the State is now claiming. Did the State then make an unreasonable contract in behalf of the Government, seeing that it has accepted reimbursement on account of the money borrowed, at the option of the Government itself?
At the time the State assumed this indebtedness for the United States its funded debt was $38,000,000, and it was paying an annual interest charge of nearly $2,000,000 more, and there was only money enough in its treasury to pay the ordinary expenses of the State government for that year. Under these circumstances is it not remarkable that the State was able to make this loan on far more advantageous terms than the Government itself could? In the light of such facts as these, will it be said that the State exceeded its authority?
Will the court nullify the act of the legislature by declaring that the loan of $3,000,000 should have been on one or two years’ time instead' of ten ? Which authority is to prevail upon this subject — that of the court, or that of the people of the State? Was not the Government bound to know that the State, in assuming the responsibility of agenc.y, must needs regulate its action by the stress of its own financial condition? And is not the defendant now estopped from asserting- that the loan should have been made for any shorter period than it took the Government to refund the money to the State?
The only other question connected with this branch of the •case is the one which relates to'the payment of the interest on this loan in specie at a premium for two years, and the payment of the necessary expenses in floating said loan.
Under the provisions of the act of the legislature of the State, approved June 12, 1840, the interest on the indebtedness of the State was always to be paid in specie or its equivalent. And the auditor has found that the State paid a premium for gold to pay interest on its funded debt. It is a part of the history of the times from 1862 to 1864, of which the court will take notice, that specie commanded a • premium, and that interest on the public debt was paid in coin. Under.these circumstances we can not see how it can be said that the payment of interest in specie at a premium by the State was not a proper cost, charge, and expense under the acts of Congress referred to, and the incidental expenses in connection with said loan, the payment of which .was authorized by the act of legislature approved May 15, 1861, were as much a proper and necessary cost, charge, and expense as the payment of interest on the loan itself.
The next question to consider is that which relates to the splitting up of the cause of action, which, in view of the long-prevailing practice of the Treasury Department, and a recent decision of the court upon that subject, will require only a brief consideration.
The auditor has found that beginning with March 1,, 1862, and ending December 5, 1892, the State presented for settlement to the Treasury Department sixteen distinct and separate claims under the acts of Congress mentioned, all of which accrued during the years 1861,1862, and 1863. These claims were allowed and paid in twenty-two payments, extending through a series of years beginning. May 1, 1867, and ending March 12,1895. For over thirty years, therefore, the Department recognized and allowed the splitting up of the claim of the State without raising any objection.
If the long-followed precedents of the Department are to prevail, then this objection has no force, even though it were not fully answered by the decision of the court in the case of Yoes (31 C. Cls. R., 296), which case, in the light of the testimony of Mr. Wells, and the decisions of the Department itself, is a complete answer to this objection.
The very reasons which the court say relieved Yoes from neglect in not presenting his claim for settlement with the balance of his account exist in this case. The accounting officers of the Treasury Department were not allowing claims like this prior to the decision of the case of the State of New York (supra), and for that reason the attornej^ for the State chose not to do a useless and exceedingly improper thing by presenting it.
The only other question which requires consideration is that which relates to the subject of laches. Under the facts disclosed, was this a stale claim when presented for settlement December 11, 1896?
The court will observe the auditor has found that the State paid interest on this loan from June, 1861, to May 15, 1871. The claim, therefore, in its entirety did not accrue until the latter date. As such, it was presented only twenty-five and a half years after it accrued, while the claim of the State last to this one was not filed for at least thirty years after it accrued.
As we have seen, the State was laboring under the disability that claims like this were not being allowed and paid in the Treasury Department prior to January 6, 1896, when the decision in the case of the State of New York was rendered. And the court has decided in the case of Yoes that delay in presenting a claim under such circumstances is entirely excusable. As this claim was filed within a year aftér the New York State case was decided (which is admitted to have been within 'a reasonable time), and the Treasury Department has already taken jurisdiction of claims much more stale than this, we can not believe the court will instruct the Secretary of the Treasury to refuse payment of it upon the ground of laches.
If it could be made to appear that the relative position of the parties had changed during this lapse of time (a thing which can not be done), then there might be some ground for complaint. But we feel that it would be an unjust and inequi table rule to hold that we hayo slept upon our rights after the Treasury Department has prevented us from asserting them until January, 1896.
The rule of laches is an equitable defense, controlled by equitable considerations, and varies with the peculiar circumstances of each case. Unless it is shown that owing to the neglect of the claimant some right or advantage has been lost to the defendant, lapse of time is of very little consequence. Adamson L. It. 8, ch. Div. 807-817; Daggers y. Van Dyke, 37 N. J. Eq,,130; RFuddY. Powers, 136 Mass., 273; Platt v. Platt, 58 N. Y., 661; Wollaston v. Tribe, L. R. 9, Eq., 11.)
There are a great number of cases which have been decided by the Supreme Court of the United States affirming the rule above laid down, and many of them are referred to in the well-considered opinion in the case of the Penn Mutual Life Insu/rance Co. v. Austin (Í68 U. S. R., 699), Townsend v. Van-derwerker (160 U. S. R., 5), citing Qundon v. Carroll (101 U. S. R., 125); Alsop v. Riker (155 U. S. R., 161), Ilcdstead v. Grinnan (152 U. S. R., 112, 116).
This subject has been frequently before this court, and in the case of Bal/mer (26 C. Cls. R., 91) Justice Nott has.so admirably stated the doctrine that a further reference to authorities seems unnecessary. W e will, however, refer to a few other cases where the subject of laches occasioned by the act of the defendant is discussed. (Qunton et al., Trustees, v. Anna C. Carroll et al., Executrices, 101 U. S. R., 126; Eroy on Specific Perf., sec. 740; Ridgway v. Wharton, 6 H. L., 292; Callender v. Colegrove, 17 Conn., 1; DickermanY. Burgess, 20 Ill., 266; Berry v. Lovi, 107 Ill., 612; Glenn v. Ilebb, 17 Md., 260.)
Since this claim was transmitted to court, the Comptroller, of the Treasury has rendered a very pertinent decision in the claim of the State of Indiana, vol. 6, Part I, p. 236, Decisions of Comptroller of the Treasury from July 1 to September 30, 1899.
It appears that the State of Indiana on the 8th day of June, 1868, presented a claim to the Treasury Department for interest and other expenses paid on account of money which it had borrowed to equip troops to aid in suppressing the rebellion, which claim was finally considered by Comptroller Maynard October 11, 1886, and disallowed.' After the decision of the Supreme Court was rendered in the New York State case, an application was made for a rehearing in the Indiana claim, which was refused, and the Comptroller, in giving’ his reasons, among other things, said:
“In view of the decision of the Court of Claims and of the Supreme Court in the New York case, I do not think there can be any doubt that the decision of the Second Comptroller Maynard, supra, in disallowing the claim of Indiana was erroneous, and that instead of disallowing it he should have allowed it if established by satisfactory proof;, but his decision, whether correct or erroneous, was an adjudication of said claim over which he had jurisdiction, and is the law of the case so far as the accounting officers are concerned. ”
With the presentation of these authorities we do not feel called upon to further discuss the legal and equitable aspects of this case. The dictum of the Comptroller of the Treasury Department makes it clear that that Department is not now averse to the allowance of this claim on legal grounds, and the equities of the case are all in favor of the claimant.
Mr. Assistant Attorney-General Pradt for the defendants:’
The first question presented to the court upon these references is—
“Have the accounting officers jurisdiction to entertain, adjust, and settle this claim on its merits, under the decision in the case of the United States v. New York (160 U. S. It., 598)?”
The answer to this question seems to be found in the decision referred to, being New York v. United States (31 C. Cls. K., 276), as affirmed by the Supreme Court in 160 U. S. E.., 598. So far as it is not therein answered, this question will be discussed farther on.
“Is this claim for interest on money borrowed and expended in equipping troops so intimately connected with the principal claims already allowed that the interest claim can be held to have been settled in the settlement of the principal claims, on the doctrine that a claimant can not be allowed to split up his cause of action?”
Here it should be premised that—
“When a claim is transmitted by the head of an Executive Department, under the second section of the Bowman Act, 'the court is to determine the law applicable to the case in such Department, and not necessarily what the law would be upon the same claim if commenced by voluntary petition filed under the statutes conferring jurisdiction upon the court to enter judgment.” (Wilson v. United, States, 25 C. Cls. R., p. 342.)
With this rule in view, the decision of the Comptroller of the Treasury in the case of Captain Wadleigh (4th Comp. Dec., p. 328) is here peculiarly pertinent. The following is the syllabus of that decision:
1 “Where claimant has heretofore presented and has been allowed a claim for a part of an entire demand arising out of the same service and in the same right, such partial allowance is a settlement of the whole demand, and a subsequent application for the remainder will be disallowed.”
. The Comptroller relied in that case upon the well-known legal principle that a plaintiff in court can not split up a single and entire cause of action and make it the subject of different suits — quoting Baird v. United States (96 U. S. R., 430) — • and applied this rule of law to the claim before him in the following language:
“Whetherthe rule against dividing entire claims and presenting them piecemeal be considered as based upon the ground of res adjudicata, or upon grounds of public policy, in preventing multiplicity of • suits, there is no reason why it should not be applied in the settlement of claims against the Government when presented to the accounting officers, as well as in the settlement of controversies between individuals in courts of law.”
This seems to be a clear and unmistakable enunciation of the principles of law by which the action of the accounting officers of the Treasury Department is to be governed in cases of this kind, and to be, for that reason, a complete answer to the above question. Surely the accounting officers of the Treasury Department may pr'operly be guided by this opinion in the exercise of their discretion as to whether these claims should be entertained. And no rule of law seems to be better founded. As said by this court, “ As a matter of pleading, plaintiff may not be allowed to split up. his demand.” (.Hughes v. United States, 25 C. Cls. R., 481.) •
The rule is founded upon two well-known maxims of law: That it is for the public good that there be an end of litiga tion, and that no one should be twice vexed upon one and the same cause of action.
“No maxims of the law are more firmly established or more valuable in the administration of justice.” ( United States v. Throckmorton, 98 U. S. R., 65.)
“It is not a technical rule, but a rule of justice.” (Dutton v. Shrno, 35 Mich., 431.)
“Each contract affords only one cause of action.” (Secorv. Stwrgess, 16 N. Y., 558.)
See also Bamgesser v. Harrison (12 Wis., 544); Brans v. GoTbier (79 Ga., 319); Buck v. Wilson (113 Pa. State, 430).
The case of Toes v. United States (30 C. Cls. R., 370), upon which the claimants so strenuously rely in this connection, goes no farther than to hold that there may be circumstances under which this court will decline to apply the above rule, and I shall endeavor to point out later on that the circumstances of that case and of those now under consideration are essentially different.
In view of the long delay in presenting this claim, is it “a stale claim,” which the accounting officers should not entertain, adjust, or settle on its merits?
This may be regarded as the crucial question in these cases, since it involves the discussion of no technicalities and brings up the real merits of the claims.
The claimants with great confidence rely upon the decision in the New York case, and beyond question the legal principle announced in that case — that interest paid in procuring money to be expended for the purposes expressed in the act of July 7, 1861, may be regarded as a part of the expense contemplated by that act — is directly applicable to these claims; but the facts concerning such claim in the New York case are so dissimilar from those in the present case that it is difficult to make the recovery in the New York case a criterion for recovery on the present claims. In the New York case the State, by statute passed by its legislature early in 1861, providing for expenditures for arming and equipping its troops in aid of the United States* appropriated the sum of $3,000,000 for the purpose, and also provided for the levy of a State tax during the ensuing fiscal year to meet the expenses so authorized. Not having the money for immediate use, and as the proceeds of the tax authorized would not be available until 1862, the State had to borrow money in anticipation of the collection of these taxes. This monejr was obtained on short loans and was repaid, principal and interest, during the following- year, from the proceeds of the tax levied for the purpose. The claim of the State for these expenditures ivas filed in the Treasury Department in May, 1862, and included the items of interest. Upon this state of facts the court held that the acts of July 27, 1861, and March 8, 1862, created, on the part of the United States, an obligation to indemnify the States for any cost, charges, and expenses properly incurred for the purposes expressed in the act of 1861, and that the interest thus paid by the State of New York was a proper item of expense, as so defined.
In each of the present cases the money expended by the State for the purposes of the National Government was raised upon long-time bonds. Various claims for reimbursement were thereafter presented to the United States by the State, and on each occasion payments of interest on these bonds had previously been made by the State, but at no time when the different claims for reimbursement were presented by the State was any item of interest included in the claim, nor amr notification given the United States that any such claim existed, nor even that any expenditure of interest had been incurred; and it was not until more than thirty years after the claims for reimbursement had been presented by the State and substantially adjusted and paid that the present claim for interest paid was presented. During all the time there was no action of any sort taken by the State which in any way indi- ■ cated or gave to the United States any intimation that the claim of the State for reimbursement included any item other than those already presented, and the claim for such reimbursement reached a final adjustment and complete payment without a hint of the existence of any such additional items now presented.
It is this state of facts, more especially as contradistinguished from the facts concerning the presentation of the claim for the expense of interest nfade by the State of New T ork, that gives to these claims every essential element of staleness. Certainly, as regards the lapse of time before the presentation of the claim it should be considered stale. A generation of silence is surely enough to give it that status. And this fact alone may be fairly taken as proof of staleness, unless the delajr is satisfactorily explained, and I contend that it is not.
“Every person is bound to take care of his own rights and to vindicate them fully in due season and in proper order.” (Amer. and Eng. Enc. of Law, vol. 12, p. 535), quoting Peguero v. Gouvernor, 1st Johnson’s cases, 436-502.
“Equity is no more bound to take care of those who can take care of themselves and will not than is a court of law. ” (Sharp v. IGing, 3 Ired. Ch.; N. Cor., 402-405.)
“Mere lapse of time may act as a positive bar, even in cases of purely equitable jurisdiction.” (12 Amer. and Eng. Enc., 540.)
“ The doctrine of laches is based upon grounds of public policy, which require, for the peace of society, the discouragement of stale demands. ” (Me Call v. Casilear, 137 U. S. R., 566.)
“An unreasonable delay in asserting rights is a bar to relief.” (Martin v. Gray, 142 U. S. it., 239.)
“They had originally an easy and simple remedy in their own hands, to be used, or not, at their own pleasure, and if they have suffered it to be lost bjr lapse of time, their own negligence can give them no right to call into action the powers of a court of. chancery.” (McKnight v. Taylor, 1 How., 169.)
“An equitable bar arises from lapse of time in cases not strictly within any statute limitations, but within the rule which requires reasonable diligence to entitle a party to relief.” (Bowmanx. Wathen, 1 How., 189.)
“There must be an end of litigation, says a maxim of the law, and there must be at some time or other an end of accounting.” (Patterson v. United States, 28 C. Cls. R., 325.)
But there are not wanting other elements going to show the staleness of these claims. To begin with, during all this period of silence as to the existence of the claim, the claimant was tacitly acquiescing in the^ruling of the accounting officers of the United States, that any such claim was invalid; and acquiescence coupled with lapse of time is alone sufficient to establish staleness.
“ Courts of equity often act upon their own inherent doc-ti'ine of discouraging, for the peace of society, antiquated demands, by refusing to interfere where there has been gross laches in prosecuting a claim, or long acquiescence in the assertion of adverse rights.” (2d Story Equity, sec. 1520; Goddenv. Ki/mmell, 99 H. S. R., 210.)
‘4 It is an established rule with courts of equity, independent of any statute limiting the time in which suits can be brought, that they will not entertain stale demands. * * * Story, referring to the rule imposing diligence upon parties seeking relief, says: ‘Hence, if there be a clear breach of trust by a trustee; yet, if the cest/id que trust or beneficiary has for a long time acquiesced in the misconduct of the trustee, with full knowledge of it, a court of equity will not relieve him, but leave him to bear the fruits of his own negligence or infirmity of purpose.’” (Ilume v. Beale, 17 Wall., 348.)
“The rule is aptly expressed by 2 Pomeroy’s Eq. Jur.,-sec. 816, as follows: ‘Acquiescence is an important factor in determining equitable rights and remedies in obedience to the maxims: He who seeks equity must do equity, and he who comes into equity must come with clean hands. Even when it does not work a true estoppel upon right of property or of contract, it may operate in analogjr to estoppel — may produce a qu,asi estoppel — upon the rights of remedy. ’ ” (Simmons v. Railway Company, 159 U. S. R., 291.)
“A court of equity, said Lord Camden, has always refused its aid to stale demands where the party slept upon his rights and acquiesced for a great length of time. Nothing can call forth this court into activity but conscience, good faith, and reasonable diligence. Where these are wanting, the court is passive and does nothing. Laches and neglect are always discountenanced, and therefore from the beginning of this jurisdiction there was always a limitation to suits in this court.” (Smith v. Olay¿ 3 Bro. Ch.) “This doctrine has been repeatedly recognized and acted on here.” (Speidel v. Ilenrici, 120 U. S. R., 387.)
But the claimants urge that their acquiescence in the adverse ruling of the accounting officers upon these claims is apparent only, and is really excusable on the ground that it would have been a vain thing to have presented their claims to the accounting officers only to have them rejected; and they rely upon the decision in the Joes Oase (supra) in support of this contention. But the decision in the Toes Oase is not broad enough to cover the present claims. In that case the claimant had refrained from presenting certain items of mileage in his accounts to the accounting officers, for the reason that claims for such services were not then being allowed by the accounting officers. Subsequently, and before the statute of limitations had run against his claim, in the light of certain decisions in the Supreme Court, he brought his action in this court upon his claim without having previously presented it to the accounting’ officers; and this court held that, under the circumstances, the claimant was not estopped from pursuing his action by reason of the fact that he had not included the items sued upon here in his former accounts presented to the accounting officers. Applying that decision to these cases, it is clear that the claimants have failed to pursue the course which is therein approved. Granting, what is undoubtedly true, that if they had presented their claims to the accounting officers they would have been rejected, there was nothing to prevent their bringing action upon'these claims in this court, as was done in the Toes Case. The situation is admirably defined by Assistant Comptroller of the Treasury Bowers, in 1th Dec. Comp., 331, as follows:
“It is no sufficient excuse to say that at the time of the allowance of the former claim this claim, if presented, would have been disallowed by the accounting officers under the rule then prevailing. It is not to be presumed that the Comptroller would have determined a question erroneously, if properly presented, but whether he would have done so or not, that was the time and forum for settling the entire matter, and it affords no legal excuse for dividing his claim and presenting it in piecemeal. Nor can it be said that he was compelled to accept this interpretation of the law. The courts were open to him to assert his rights, if he felt himself aggrieved by the action of the accounting officers. He did not avail himself of this privilege, and his long acquiescence, if nothing else, ought to estop him from recovering anything beyond the payments he has received.
So in these cases: There was nothing to prevent the claimants, if they desired to assert these claims against the United States, from bringing suit upon the same in this court without what may be conceded to be the useless formality of presenting the same to the accounting officers. If such action had been taken by them, they would have recovered judgment for such amount of interest paid by them as was justly allowable, precisely as was done in the New Yorh Case, and their claims would have been thus determined years ago. The fact that they neglected to pursue this obvious course should now work an absolute estoppel upon the present belated assertion of the claims.
It is further urged that the defense of staleness, or laches, can not be applied to those claims on the ground that laches can not be imputed to a sovereign. It is difficult to believe that this contention is seriously made in this connection. The rule invoked applies to dealings between the sovereign and those subject to the sovereign, and can have no possible application to the claim of a suitor or claimant asking relief from a sovereign power. Indeed, it is sometimes modified even as to the United States (Patterson v. United States, 28 C. Cls. R., 824, 325; United States v. Sanborn, 135 U. S. R., 281). There is no possible reason in logic or justice why the States by whom these claims are presented against the United States should not stand, either before the accounting officers or in this court, in which they are allowed to appear only by the grace of the United States, upon exactly the same footing as any other suitor. In every one of the cases referred to by the counsel for the State of , Maine, in which this rule was upheld in the case of a State of the Union, the action was between the State and an official subject to the sovereignty of the State.
But the burden of the argument of counsel on this question of staleness is that it must be shown that the delay and laches of the claimant have resulted in detriment to the party against which the claim is made; otherwise it will be no bar to the claim. This argument leaves out the important elements of acquiescence and of neglect not” satisfactorily explained, which, as shown above, are alone sufficient to stamp a claim with staleness; yet even on their own ground I contend that it does not appear that no detriment has accrued to the United States by reason of the silence and long delay of the claimants. Here again we may look to the Nexo Yorh Case for' light. That was the only instance in which a State, in pressing its claims for reimbursement for expenditures on behalf of the United States in aiding to suppress the rebellion, had included in its claim, as a part of-such expense, the cost, by way of interest, of procuring the money expended. That claim was presented promptly without the slightest delay, and was continuously urged until finally referred to this court for adjudication. Meanwhile these claimants kept absolute silence for more than thirty years, and while it is true that all of the evidence which existed at the time that these claims might have been presented still exists, and that in that regard no detriment has accrued to the United States, yet it is fair to argue that the silence and delay of the claimants have in other respects resulted to the prejudice of the United States in relation to these claims. For example, the payments made by the United States were scattered along during various years, and the adjustment of the indebtedness of the various States to the United States upon their assessment of direct tax, which assessment was due and payable on or before the 30th •day of June, 1862, was postponed to March 2, 1867} a period ■of nearly five years. This item in the case of the State of Maine was §357,702.10, and in the case of the State of Pennsylvania §1,304,711.43. Now, it is most reasonable to assume that if the United States had had knowledge that the States had borrowed money on bonds running for a period of years, upon which large amounts of interest were piling up yearly, this knowledge would have tended to speedier payment on its part,"or, at any rate, to the enforcement of prompt payment • ■of the direct tax due from the various States. But no such-•claims for interest being presented, and there being no notification to the United States of the existence of any such claim, these matters were regarded by it with indifference. In the matter of this direct-tax assessment alone the difference to the United States is very great, being in the case of the State of Pennsylvania the interest on over §1,300,000 for about five years, at 6 per cent, and in the case of the State of Maine the interest upon §358,000, in round numbers, for about the same length of time at the same rate of interest.
In conclusion, I insist that these claims are wholly without equity. The inference seems almost irresistible that the claimants had for years no thought of asserting any claim of this character, or in any event were content to abide by the decision of the Treasury Department that such claims were not valid. This appears from the manner in which the loans were made, from the utter failure of the States to include any claim for reimbursement of expenses of interest in their ' claims for reimbursement against the United States, from the apparent acquiescence of the States in the adverse ruling of the accounting officers of the Government against claims of this character, from the neglect to seek to enforce the claims before the statute of limitations had run against them, and from the great lapse of time before they were presented at all. Certainly if a similar claim, surrounded by, like circumstances, were to be brought in a court of equity between private parties, it would not be difficult for the court to decide that it was wanting in equity, or at least that relief should be denied upon the ground of gross laches and neglect of the claimant.
The liability of the United States, as stated in the Now Yorle, Case, is for expenses properly incurred, the transaction being considered as if the United States had itself borrowed the money through the agency of the State. In the case of the State of New York the money was raised on loans made for a sufficient length of time only that the money might be forthcoming for immediate use, pending the raising of the same by a special tax levy. This, it seems to me, was the only reasonable, businesslike method of procedure. And this liability of principal to agent for expenditures in his behalf “proceeds upon the ground that the advances, expenses, and disbursements have been properly incurred and reasonably and in good faith paid, without any default on the part of the / agent.” (Story on Agency, sec. 336.)
How can it be considered reasonable that the State, acting as the agent of the General Government, in a supreme exigency, wherein the interests of its own citizens were vitally concerned, should involve the United States, as its principal, in indebtedness for expenses by way of interest, which might amount to as much as the original sum disbursed, and might even exceed the same? There has been shown no necessity for any different mode of procedure on the part of these States than that adopted by the State of New York. The argument of counsel for claimants upon this point seems to me too' refined for sturdy use. There is no room for fine-spun distinctions between the United States and the people of the various States, who together constitute the United States. The interests of the United States were the interests of every loyal citizen of the United States, and the patriotic duty of each citizen was no less than that of his General Government. It must be conceded that the General Government had the right and the power to have levied upon each of the States a direct tax amounting to all that was expended by each for the purposes of these claims. What greater burden would have been involved in the levy of this amount by each of the States through its own government, for the same purpose, just as was done by the State of New York?

Opinion:
Howry, J.,
delivered the opinion of the court:
The findings establish payment by plaintiff of certain necessary incidental expenses and large sums by way of interest on account of certain temporary and extended loans made on obligations of the State of Pennsylvania (for which as to the long time loans registered and coupon bonds were duly authorized and issued) for money borrowed and used by the State in enrolling, subsisting, clothing, supplying, arming, equipping, paying, and transporting its troops under the act of Congress approved July 27,1861 (12 Stat. L., 276), and the joint resolution of March 8, 1862 (12 Stat. L., 615).
But the State did not present any claim on account of these expenditures until December 14, 1896, alleging as an excuse therefor that prior to the time when the claim accrued the accounting officers of the Treasury, as well as the Attorney-General of the United States, had decided that the act of 1861 (supra) did not give the Secretary of the Treasury jurisdiction to adjust and settle claims for expenditures on account of interest, in consequence of which the State deferred presentation of its claim until the Supreme Court of the United. States determined in the case of the State of New York against The United States (160 U. S. R., 598) that similar expenditures for interest were recoverable. Thereupon the claim was presented to the Treasury, but the Secretary, deeming that controverted questions of law and fact had arisen in considering the matter of any payment at all, or if payable that uncertainty existed as to the method of adjustment, transmitted the record pertaining to the matter to this court, under the provisions of section 2 of the Act of March 3,1883 (22 Stat. L., 485), with certain inquiries now to be considered.
No doubt exists as to the justice of this demand for interest expended. Such expenditures when actually disbursed became a part of the aggregate principal properly paid by the State for the General Government, according to the decision in United States v. New York-(160 U. S. R., 621). So, by this decision no question arises as to the propriety of the expenditures for interest.
But it is argued for defendants that Pennsylvania did not claim anything for interest on money borrowed for a period of more than thirty years after all her other claims had been presented and substantially adjusted and paid, which must be taken as proof that the present claim is stale; that the effect of its being withheld, together with claimant's acquiescence in the rulings of the Treasury Department, establishes staleness, which necessarily excludes any payment whatever now. And further, that as claimant did not bring suit in this court within the statutory period of limitation, the Secretary should be advised that such failure works an estoppel upon the belated assertion of the demand; that the claim is too intimately connected with the principal claims already allowed to. admit of further consideration, because the State can not be allowed to so divide its original cause of action as to be entitled to further payments.
Claims against the United States, cognizable by this court, are barred unless filed within six years from the time the claim first accrued. Section 1069 of the Revised Statutes is jurisdictional as well as a statute of limitation limiting the cases of which the court can take cognizance. (Wardwell v. United States, 172 U. S. R., 51; Finn v. Same, 123 U. S. R., 123.) As this claim accrued more than six years before it was filed in the Treasury, no request has been made in this court for judgment, or can now avail for that result. The duty of the court is to declare such rules as shall guide the Secretary of the Treasury in his action. Its jurisdiction to do more not being asserted, but its power to do that much not being denied, the first question to be considered is the right of the Secretary to adjust the claim.
The act conferring jurisdiction upon the Secretary to pay claims for interest on money borrowed by the States did not impose a time limit upon their presentation. While it is true that the failure of the Secretary to pay opened the doors of this court for the enforcement of disbursements properly made under the act of 1861 by any State, and the remedy continued here at any time within six years after such claim first accrued, it does not necessarily follow that the Secretary lost jurisdiction because such claims were not presented to him within six years. The act of 1861 not only conferred jurisdiction upon the Secretary of the Treasury to pay the costs, charges, and expenses properly incurred by any State for the purposes indicated in the act, but directed him to pay. Mere delay in presenting it is not necessarily fatal.
For the reason that the Secretary of the Treasury was the proper officer to adjust the expenditures of the States under the act of 1861, the statute of limitations, which could be interposed to the demand if presented to the courts after six years, did not necessarily operate to determine the action of the Secretary.
In explaining some of the intricacies of the law affecting our jurisdiction, the present chief justice, in the case of Balmer, surviving partner, v. United States (26 C. Cls. R., 82), said:
"There are claims which are barred in one place, but not in another; claims upon which an action can not be maintained upon the merits in a court, but which, nevertheless, can be settled at the Treasury. These are the great class of claims whereof the accounting officers have jurisdiction."
Thus, it will be seen, that there is precedent for the anomaly that the statute of limitations may apply to a right of action in this court and not apply to a demand for an accounting at the Treasury.
The door for settlement at the Treasury may not always be open, however, by reason of the laches of the claimant so operating upon the rights of the Government as to cause prejudice to its interests, or the conduct of the claimant be such as to estop the further assertion of the demand.
The reason for the application of the law of laches as well as the principle of limitation is found in the lapse of time which carries with it the life and memory of witnesses, the muniments of evidence, and other means of-proof. (Brown v. Buena Vista, 95 U. S. R., 161.) Length of time is not always a test of staleness. (Paschell v. Hindever, 28 Ohio St., 568, 580.) Laches does not depend upon the number of years which have elapsed upon the accruing of rights and the assertion of them, but also upon the nature and evidence of those rights, the changes in value, and other circumstances occurring during the lapse of years. (Penn Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Austin, 168 U. S. R., 658.)
Laches is not, like limitation, a mere matter of time, but principally a question of the inequhy of presenting the claim to be enforced, an inequity founded upon some change in the condition or relation of the property of the parties. ( Galliher v. Cadwell, 145 U. S. R., 368.) The doctrine is based upon grounds of public policy, which requires for the peace of society the discouragement of stale demands. It is most applicable where the difficulty of doing entire justice arises through the death of the principal participants in the transaction complained of, or of the witnesses, or by reason of the original transaction having become so obscured by time as to render the ascertainment of the exact facts impossible. (Hammond v. Hopkins, 143 U. S. R., 224.)
While there must at some time or another be an end of accounting, and creditors of the Government must not unreasonably delay presenting their demands, and while it is true an equitable bar may sometimes arise from lapse of time in cases not strictly within any statute of limitation, it is also true that circumstances may relieve the failure to present if it does not appear that the relative position of the parties has changed. Here, it appears, the legislature of the State of Pennsylvania authorized its obligations with interest for the purposes stated in the act of 1861; the State records contain the numbers of the obligations and the amounts for which they were respectively issued, and the archives disclose possession of these evidences of debt, together with the data necessary to determine the precise sums expended. The details of the transactions are as accessible now as ever. The accounting officers of the Treasury erroneously declared, very early after similar demands were presented, that reimbursements for interest expenditures were not páyable to any State. Their action was accepted as correct by the Secretary, and his course was approved by the chief law officer of the Government. The United States lost no right and .the State gained no advantage by the nonpresentation of the claim. Under these circumstances it would be a harsh application of the rule respecting diligence to now say that the Secretary had lost jurisdiction because of his erroneous decision and the inaction of the State because of that mistaken view of his authority.
Especially would such a declaration appear to be unjust and wholly technical in view of the continued presentation of claims and payment under the statute of other war claims of the State of Pennsylvania. Beginning March 1, 1862, and ending December 5, 1892, sixteen separate claims were presented by the Commonwealth, and during the time extending to March 12, 1895, the Treasury made as many as twenty-five separate payments. The intervening time from the presentation of the last allowed claim of. the State to the presentation of its final demand was something under five years. Large items in the claims already adjusted were presented twenty years or more after such items had accrued. If the unpaid claim now being considered can not be settled for want of a place of adjustment, or for staleness, or because of the bar of the period of limitation in case of suit, then some of the claims heretofore settled would seem to have been unlawfully paid.
Such a distinction in the practice of the Treasury Department in dealing with proper expenditures of plaintiff should not operate as an estoppel even though it appears the State paid its last installment of interest on its bonds in 1872. The doctrine of estoppel for failure to present — a doctrine not favored in the law — can not be invoked by the party whose officers erroneously decided presentation to be a useless proceeding. Estoppel might arise against a party where his own conduct has caused another to act differently from a course which otherwise such person might pursue without reference to a statute of limitation. It can not rest by mere silence upon a departmental ruling adverse to jurisdiction, with no additional rights acquired by a claim and no injury done to the debtor in the meantime.
The respective payments of interest were disassociated from the payments of other lawful expenditures of plaintiff. These payments were made at separate times and from funds raised by taxation. In dividing its accounts the State was excused from presenting all the claims together by the practice of the Treasury in dealing with the various expenditures.
Other questions relate to the time interest ought to be allowed- — that is, treating the interest payments as principal under the decision in the New York Case, whether interest shall be allowed to maturity on the ten-year bonds of the State or to the time they were redeemed.
The method of raising money by Pennsylvania was not in the main different from that adopted bjT the State of New York,' except as to the length of time the bonds had to run. The loan on the ten-year bonds in 1861 covered a shorter period than any loan made to the State prior to 1860. Loans had been generally obtained before that time payable in from twenty-five to thirty years. The act of 1861 and the supplemental joint resolution to that act did not restrict the State in the means it should adopt to raise'the money. The United States agreed to reimburse all costs, charges, and expenses properly incurred. If long-time bonds were needlessly issued a different question' would arise, but it has not been made to appear that the credit of the State was uselessly or improvidently put forth, or that it was not the quickest sr&y of raising- money for the purposes it was immediately wanted. It does not appear that the ready cash was in the State treasury at the time.
It. is true the State might have raised the large amounts needed by direct taxation upon its citizens. In the stress of the times that may have been proper, but certainly not most expedient. It was deemed best, in the exercise of the sovereign power of the State, to raise revenue for some of its public purposes by authorizing and issuing bonds. The emergency was great, and the good faith of the State in the premises has never been, nor can ever be, questioned. Under these circumstances it can not be said that the interest expended was improper.
Besides the items of expenditure by way of interest, expenses were incurred by the State in negotiating a loan on $3,000,000 of its obligations under an act of the legislature of May 15, 1861, which authorized the State to issue bonds for the purposes named in the act of Congress. There was also expended for premiums on gold in the payment of interest on these bonds the amount shown by the report of the auditor. The expenses incurred in negotiating the loan amounted to $9,713.71 and the premiums on gold aggregated $58,303.98.
The court will take judicial notice of the history of the times', of the financial conditions prevailing throughout the country, and other circumstances affecting the public credit in the efforts of the State to float its bonds. That difficulty existed in the attempt to use the credit of the State to the best advantage appears certain, and in securing the services of a fiscal agent to facilitate the negotiation of its bonds without loss and paying the sum proven to have been paid, we think the expenditure was proper. The disbursements on this account have the additional merit of being entirely reasonable.
The payment of premiums on gold were a necessity at the time. The terms of the State's contract required specie payments. Gold was at a premium, and with the advancing storm of war continued to rise in value. The authorities of the State were fortunate in not having (by mere delay) to pay more of a premium on the gold necessary to meet'the interest on the bonds of the' State as that interest fell due.
The amount of direct tax chargeable against the.State under the Act of August 5, 1861 (12 Stat. L., 295), was formerly credited in the Treasury Department some time after it became due and chargeable. Under an apportionment of this direct tax to the several States, the quota of Pennsylvania was fixed at §1,946,719.33. The balance due by the State, after deducting the 15 per cent provided by the act imposing the tax, was §1,654,711.44. There was sufficient recognition on June 30, 1862, by the United States of its liability to reimburse the State for its expenditures as to justify credit to the State of the amount of the direct tax as of the date above given. The fact that difficulties subsequently arose in the adjustment of the State's accounts as presented in June, 1862, and that various items may have been rejected, does not prove that the United States denied its liability to the State for what was properly due to it. The controversy over the accounts related to the correctness and propriety of the disbursements and to the details of the claim as presented by the State, and not to any denial of liability for whatever was shown to be proper. For this and the reasons sot forth in the contemporaneous opinion in the case of the State of Maine, the amount of direct tax should be credited as of the date stated, namely, June 30, 1862.
Summarizing- the considerations stated and directly answering the inquiries propounded by the Secretary, we hold:
1. That the accounting officers have jurisdiction to entertain, adjust, and settle this claim on its merits under the decision in the case of the United States v. New York (160 U. S. R., 598).
2. That interest paid by the State of Pennsylvania lie allowed.
3. Interest should be allowed beyond the time necessary for the State to levy a tax and collect the money required for the principal expenditure.
4. This claim for interest paid out by the State on money borrowed and expended in equipping troops under the act of 1861 is not so intimately connected with the principal claims already allowed that the present claim can be held to have been settled in the adjustment of the principal claims.
5. Settlement of the claim in the Treasury is not barred by any statute of limitations, nor is it a stale claim which the accounting officers should not entertain, adjust, or settle on its merits.
6. The accounting officers having jurisdiction, the claim should be adjusted b}r allowing the State interest from the dates of the several loans made by it to raise money necessary to organize and equip troops, for which the United States promised indemnity by the act of 1861, up to the date or dates when the Government recognized the claims for the money so advanced, deducting therefrom the amount of direct tax chargeable against said State as of the date when due and chargeable to wit, June 30, 1862.
7. Under the rule stated, and by the direction of the court, the auditor to whom this case was referred to take and state the account has filed an amended report. By it the amount shown to be due is $689,442.13. This sum includes the expenses incurred in negotiating the loan and the premiums on gold, as well as the claim for interest expended. The amended report, which the court adopts as its findings of fact, is based upon the charge to the State of its quota of the direct tax and the credit of the amount of this tax as of June 30, 1862, and not upon the amount claimed in the petition and credited to the State under its- contention and the auditor's original report, at a later date.