Case Name: Lois D. Jackson and husband, John D. Jackson, Appellants, v. General Motors Corporation, Oldsmobile Division, and Pryor Oldsmobile Company, Appellees
Court: Tennessee Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Tennessee
Decision Date: 1969-01-31
Citations: 223 Tenn. 12
Docket Number: 
Parties: Lois D. Jackson and husband, John D. Jackson, Appellants, v. General Motors Corporation, Oldsmobile Division, and Pryor Oldsmobile Company, Appellees.
Judges: Burnett, Chief Justice, and Dyer, Chattin and Obeson, Justices, concur.
Reporter: Tennessee Reports
Volume: 223
Pages: 12–19

Head Matter:
Lois D. Jackson and husband, John D. Jackson, Appellants, v. General Motors Corporation, Oldsmobile Division, and Pryor Oldsmobile Company, Appellees.
441 S.W.2d 482.
(Jackson,
April Term, 1968.)
Opinion filed January 31, 1969.
Petition for Rehearing Denied March 26, 1969.
Second Petition for Rehearing Disallowed June 13, 1969.
Eulyse M. Smith, and Erich W. Merrill, Memphis, for appellants.
EugeNe Gbeeneb, Je., and Louis M. Rutstein, Memphis, of counsel; BuchigNANi & GbeeNer, Memphis, for appellees.

Opinion:
Me. Justice Humpheeys
delivered the opinion of the Court.
In May, 1963, Plaintiff John D. Jackson bought an Oldsmobile automobile from Pryor Oldsmobile Company, placing the title thereto in the name of his wife, Lois I). Jackson. In November, 1965, approximately tAVo-and-a-half years later, Mrs. Jackson parked this automobile in her slightly sloping home driveway, and, according to the allegation of the declaration, placed the gear in park position and set the hand-brake. After alighting from the ear, and leaving it, according to the allegation of the declaration, the automobile suddenly rolled backwards doAvn the driveway, striking Mrs. Jackson and injuring her.
Mr. and Mrs. Jackson sued Pryor Oldsmobile Company and G-eneral Motors Corporation, Oldsmobile Division, for the usual damages, personal injuries, loss of services, consortium, and medical expenses. As summarized in the assignments of error, the action was based on Defendants' common law negligence; breach of warranty; and misrepresentations of fact.
Pryor Oldsmobile Company pleaded to the declaration, but the action against this Defendant need be noticed no further as suit against it was dismissed, and it is not involved in this appeal.
General Motors Corporation, Oldsmobile Division, demurred to the declaration, because it showed on its face that the automobile had been bought on May 16, 1963, but that suit had not been commenced until November 21,1966.
When the demurrer was heard, the Trial Judge held that the suit was barred by the one year statute of limitations which commenced to run at the time of the sale, in May, 1963. The assignments of error in this Court challenge this holding.
The Court is satisfied, after a thorough consideration of the Plaintiffs-in-error's contention, that this case is ruled by Chief Justice Green's holding in Albert v. Sherman, 167 Tenn. 133, 67 S.W.2d 140. In that case it was said:
"In State, to Use of Cardin v. McClellan, 113 Tenn. 616, 85 S.W. 267, 269, 3 Ann.Cas. 992, the court said the following statement of the general rule was the law in Tennessee:
'As a general rule, the cause of action for a wrongful act, whether negligent or willful, or for the breach of a contract or duty, accrues immediately upon the happening of the wrongful act or the breach, even though the actual damage resulting therefrom may not occur until some time afterwards. The statute therefore begins to run upon the occurrence of the act or breach complained of, and not from the time of the damage resulting therefrom.'
In State v. McClellan, supra, the court noted an except tion to the general rule to the effect that, when a cause of action was based on consequential, as distinguished from direct, damages, involving an act or omission which might have proved harmless, the cause of action might be taken as accruing only upon the actual occurrence of the damage. It is said that there were many respectable authorities sustaining the exception noted, but this court carefully avoided application of the rule embodied in the exception, although such application would have disposed of the case. The decision in State v. McClellan was rested on another ground. If this opinion does not indicate a repudiation of the rule of the exception, it certainly indicates an unwillingness on the part of this court to follow that rule.
Undoubtedly the weight of authority is to the effect that the statute of limitations begins to run against an action of this kind from the date of the wrongful act rather than from the date of the damage caused."
Chief Justice Green concludes his reasoning on this proposition with this observation:
"While hardships may arise in particular cases by reason of this ruling, a contrary ruling would be inimical to the repose of society and promote litigation of a character too uncertain and too speculative to he encouraged,"
While this observation was in reference to a malpractice action, it is peculiarly and particularly applicable in this case where after operating an automobile for some two-and-a-half years an action is brought for damages against the manufacturer for a defect alleged to have been present in the automobile during the whole of that time.
The assignments of error are overruled and the judgment of the Trial Court is affirmed.
Burnett, Chief Justice, and Dyer, Chattin and Obeson, Justices, concur.