Case Name: Jimmy GIBBS, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee
Court: Texas Courts of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1999-07-08
Citations: 7 S.W.3d 175
Docket Number: No. 01-98-00781-CR
Parties: Jimmy GIBBS, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.
Judges: Justices MIRABAL, TAFT, and NUCHIA.
Reporter: South Western Reporter Third Series
Volume: 7
Pages: 175–181

Head Matter:
Jimmy GIBBS, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.
No. 01-98-00781-CR.
Court of Appeals of Texas, Houston (1st Dist.).
July 8, 1999.
Opinion Denying Rehearing En Banc Sept. 23, 1999.
Danny K. Easterling, Houston, for Appellant.
Dan McCrory, John B. Holmes, Houston, for State.
Justices MIRABAL, TAFT, and NUCHIA.

Opinion:
OPINION
TAFT, Justice.
Appellant, Jimmy Gibbs, was charged with delivery of one to four grams of cocaine, enhanced by prior felony convictions for aggravated assault and possession of a controlled substance. A jury found appellant guilty of the charged offense, found the enhancement paragraphs true, and assessed punishment at 25 years in prison. We address: (1) whether the appellate record is complete; (2) whether the trial court erred when it chose a noncapital trial jury from two different venire panels; (3) whether the trial court erred when it sua sponte stopped appellant's cross-examination of a witness, and commented adversely on the relevance of appellant's evidence; and (4) whether appellant was denied his right to effective assistance of counsel. We affirm.
Facts
In July 1997, Pasadena Police Officer T.L. Smith was conducting an undercover narcotics investigation. The investigation targeted drug traffickers who operated in subsidized housing communities. During the course of the investigation, an unidentified female informant introduced Officer Smith to appellant. After meeting appellant, Officer Smith entered appellant's car and asked if he brought the crack cocaine. Appellant pointed to the console where Officer Smith saw a cellophane bag, which contained eight white rocks. Officer Smith picked up the bag, verified the substance in the bag was cocaine, and then paid appellant for the cocaine.
Incomplete Record
In appellant's fourth issue presented, he complains trial exhibits have not been included in the reporter's record, and therefore the appellate record is incomplete. Pursuant to an order issued by this Court, the district clerk has supplemented the record to include the exhibits of which appellant complains. Therefore, appellant's complaint has been rendered moot.
We overrule appellant's fourth issue.
Split Venire
In appellant's first issue presented, he complains the trial court erred when it chose a noncapital trial' jury from two different venire panels. During the first day of jury selection, a 57-member venire panel was chosen. After venire members were stricken based upon cause and peremptory challenges, only seven venire members remained. The trial court told the seven venire members to return at a later date. Before that date, the trial court chose another venire panel, from which the remaining five jurors were selected.
A. Waiver
To preserve a complaint for appellate review, a defendant must make his complaint to the trial court by a timely objection stating the specific grounds of his objection. Tex.R.App.P. 33.1. In the present case, appellant did not object to the trial court's method of choosing the jury. Ordinarily, appellant's failure to object would cause us to conclude appellant waived any complaint for appeal. However, appellant argues his failure to object did not constitute a waiver of his complaint. Appellant relies upon the Court of Criminal Appeals' opinion in Marin v. State, 851 S.W.2d 275 (Tex.Crim.App.1993).
B. Applicability of Marin
In Marin, the court divided a criminal defendant's rights into the following three categories:
(1) absolute requirements and prohibitions;
(2) rights which must be implemented by the system unless expressly waived; and
(3)rights which are implemented only upon request.
Id. at 279. Appellant contends he has a right to have his entire jury selected from one venire panel, and that right fits into either the first or second Marin category. However, before determining which Marin category applies, we must first address whether appellant has a right to have a jury chosen from a single venue.
This Court has previously held that a defendant does not have a right to have his entire jury selected from one venire panel. See Glivens v. State, 918 S.W.2d 30, 32 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, pet ref'd). Therefore, we need not address appellant's argument concerning Marin. Accordingly, appellant's failure to object constituted waiver of his complaint.
We overrule appellant's first issue.
Limiting Cross-Examination & Trial Court's Comment
In appellant's second issue presented, he complains the trial court erred when it sua sponte limited appellant's cross-examination of Officer Smith about the confidential informant, and when it commented on appellant's evidence.
A. Factual Context
During appellant's questioning of Officer Smith as to whether the name "Lisa" meant anything to him, the State objected by stating that evidence about the informant was not relevant. The trial court overruled the objection "at this point." Defense counsel asked several more questions, establishing that someone had aided Officer Smith in his investigation. The prosecutor objected once more, arguing that such evidence was not relevant; however, the trial court again overruled the objection. Defense counsel then asked Officer Smith several questions about the extent to which he trusted the informant. The prosecutor objected, claiming this line of questioning was speculative. The trial court did not rule on this objection, but instead called the attorneys up to the bench. Outside of the jury's hearing, the trial court advised defense counsel that the relevance of the line of inquiry was questionable. The trial court informed defense counsel it would give him "a little leeway," but advised him to be brief; otherwise, the trial court would "cut off' defense counsel's questioning. Through further cross-examination, appellant established the informant was paid, and therefore had a motive for bringing people to Officer Smith. When defense counsel asked how much time Officer Smith and the informant had spent together, the trial court told defense counsel, "I think that's enough . You're getting into irrelevant stuff." Counsel then moved on to other topics without objection.
B. Limiting Cross Examination
Rule 38.1 of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure provides that a prerequisite to an appellant's making of a complaint on appeal is that appellant must have given the trial court an opportunity to rule on the same complaint by making that complaint to the trial court in the form of a specific and timely objection. Tex.R.App.P. 33.1. Further, in the context of a trial court's ruling excluding evidence, the substance of the excluded evidence must have been made known to the trial court in the form of an offer of proof, or the excluded evidence must have been apparent from the context. Tex.R.Evid. 103(a)(2); Romo v. State, 568 S.W.2d 298, 304 (Tex.Crim.App.1977); Fuentes v. State, 832 S.W.2d 635, 638 (Tex.App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, pet. ref'd.) (concluding that without a bill of exception, nothing is preserved for review). In the present case, the record does not reflect that appellant objected to the trial court's sua sponte limiting of appellant's cross examination of Officer Smith. Therefore, we conclude appellant did not preserve this complaint for appeal.
C. Comment on the Evidence
Appellant contends that the trial court's comments, while limiting cross-examination, violated article 38.05 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. Article 38.05 prohibits the trial court from discussing or commenting on the weight of the evidence. Tex.Code Crim.P.Ann. art. 38.05 (Vernon 1979). The record reflects appellant did not object to the trial court's statement. This would ordinarily cause us to conclude appellant waived any complaint for appeal. See Tex.R.App. P. 33.1. However, appellant argues he has a right to a trial free from the trial court's comments on the evidence, and that this right is encompassed by either the first or second Marin category, i.e., it is either an absolute requirement or a right that must be implemented unless expressly waived.
Based upon article 38.05's requirements, we conclude appellant has a right to a trial free from the trial court's comments on the evidence. With regard to whether appellant's complaint is encompassed by either the first or second Marin category, in Green v. State, the Court of Criminal Appeals decided that question adversely to appellant. 912 S.W.2d 189, 192 (Tex.Crim.App.1995) (citing Marin for the proposition that defendant's failure to object resulted in defendant waiving his article 38.05 complaint). Therefore, we conclude appellant's failure to object constituted a waiver of his complaint.
We overrule appellant's second issue.
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
In appellant's third issue presented, he complains he was denied his right to effective assistance of counsel. Appellant contends he was denied effective assistance of counsel by his trial counsel's failure to: (1) object when the trial court indicated the jury would be selected from two different venire panels; (2) object when the trial court cut off his cross-examination of Officer Smith, and made comments on the evidence; (3) object during voir dire when a potential juror, who was a deputy sheriff, stated he had handled appellant at the jail; and (4) file a motion requesting that the confidential informant's identity be disclosed. When reviewing whether an appellant was denied his right to effective assistance of counsel, we apply the usual standard of review. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984).
When the record is silent, an appellate court may not speculate about why counsel acted as he did. Jackson v. State, 877 S.W.2d 768, 771 (Tex.Crim.App.1994); Gamble v. State, 916 S.W.2d 92, 93 (Tex.App. — Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, no pet.). Without testimony from the trial counsel, the court must presume counsel had a plausible reason for his actions. Safari v. State, 961 S.W.2d 437, 445 (Tex.App.— Houston [1st Dist.] 1997, pet. ref'd, untimely filed). Although the record reflects appellant filed a motion for new trial, he did not obtain a hearing on his motion. Therefore, there is no evidence in the record to indicate why appellant's trial counsel engaged in the conduct of which appellant now complains. Accordingly, appellant has not overcome the strong presumption that his trial counsel acted within the range of reasonable professional assistance. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. at 2064.
We overrule appellant's third issue.
Conclusion
We affirm the judgment of the trial court.