Case Name: Stuart B. Clawson, Appellant, v. Pierce-Arrow Motor Car Company, Respondent
Court: New York Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1921-05-31
Citations: 231 N.Y. 273
Docket Number: 
Parties: Stuart B. Clawson, Appellant, v. Pierce-Arrow Motor Car Company, Respondent.
Judges: 
Reporter: New York Reports
Volume: 231
Pages: 273–277

Head Matter:
Stuart B. Clawson, Appellant, v. Pierce-Arrow Motor Car Company, Respondent.
Negligence — automobiles — driver does not abandon business of owner merely by carrying a passenger without deviating from direct route to place where car was to be stored for night. '
A driver of an automobile belonging to defendant who was directed by a manager of one of its departments, whom he had driven home, to take the car to defendant’s repair shop and at the same time take a seamstress in his employ to her home a little beyond the shop, is engaged in the defendant’s business in taking the automobile to a place of storage for the night and does not abandon the business merely because at the same time that he was attending to it he served some other purpose, and, where an accident occurred before the shop was reached, at a point where the ear must have passed, though the seamstress had not been there, and plaintiff is injured through the negligence of the driver, the defendant is liable.
Clawson v. Pierce-Arrow Motor Car Co., 182 App. Div. 172, reversed.
(Argued May 3, 1921;
decided May 31, 1921.)
Appeal from a judgment, entered March 18, 1918, upon an order of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the fourth judicial department, reversing a judgment in favor of plaintiff entered upon a verdict and directing a dismissal of the complaint.
Ralph S. Kent and Allan N. Lynch for appellant.
There was evidence which required the question of what errand the car was on to be submitted to the jury. (Ferris v. Sterling, 214 N. Y. 249; Morris v. Kohler, 41 N. Y. 42; Rose v. Balfe, 223 N. Y. 481; Ellwood v. Western Union Tel. Co., 45 N. Y. 549; Volkmar v. Manhattan Ry. Co., 134 N. Y. 418; Schuster v. Erie R. R. Co., 145 App. Div. 71; 205 N. Y. 569; Quick v. Am. Can Co., 205 N. Y. 330; Rider v. Miller, 86 N. Y. 507; Schwier v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. R. Co., 90 N. Y. 558.) The trial court, in submitting the question of whether or not Guenther was acting in the defendant’s employ at the time of the accident, followed the well-established rules of law in this state. (Cowell v. Saperston, 149 App. Div. 373; 208 N. Y. 610; Reilly v. Connable, 214 N. Y. 586; O’Brien v. Stern Bros., 223 N. Y. 290; Quinn v. Power, 87 N. Y. 535; Williams v. Koehler, 41 App. Div. 426; Jones v. Wiegand, 134 App. Div. 644; Gerraty v. National Ice Co., 16 App. Div. 174; 160 N. Y. 658; Mott v. Consumers Ice Co., 73 N. Y. 543; Rounds v. D., L. & W. Ry., 64 N. Y. 129; Sterns v. Windsor Motor Car Co., 220 N. Y. 284; Ferris v. Sterling, 214 N. Y. 249.)
Evan Hollister and Maurice C. Spratt for respondent.
The use of defendant’s automobile at the time of the accident for a purpose outside the scope of its business and without its knowledge or authority, exempts the defendant from liability for the accident as a matter of law. (Potts v. Pardee, 220 N. Y. 431; Maher v. Benedict, 123 App. Div. 579; Reilly v. Connable, 214 N. Y. 586; Fallon v. Swackhamer, 226 N. Y. 444; Perlmutter v. Byrne, 193 App. Div. 769; Ostrander v. Armour & Co., 176 App. Div. 152; Power v. Arnold Engineering Co., 142 App. Div. 401; Clark v. Buckmobile Co., 107 App. Div. 120; Be Smet v. Niles, 175 App. Div. 822; Riley v. Standard Oil Co., 191 App. Div. 490.)

Opinion:
Cardozo, J.
The plaintiff was run down in the streets of Buffalo by the defendant's automobile in charge of the defendant's servant. The question is whether the servant was engaged in the employer's business.
The defendant is a manufacturer of motor cars. One Pratt, the manager of the sales department, was an invalid, and used one of the cars to travel between his office and his home. He did this with the defendant's knowledge. Sometimes the car, after leaving Pratt at home, was driven west to the defendant's factory. Sometimes, it was driven south to the defendant's repair shop or garage. This time it was going south. A seamstress in Pratt's service lived near the repair shop, but a little farther away. Pratt told the chauffeur to take the car to the shop and the seamstress to her home. The accident occurred before the shop was reached, at a point where the car must have passed though the seamstress had not been there. The plaintiff had a verdict which was reversed upon appeal. (In the judgment of the Appellate Division, the car on its path to the garage was withdrawn from the defendant's service by the dual purpose of the errand.
We reach a different conclusion. The driver of the car was engaged in the defendant's business in taking it after the day's work to a place of storage for the night. He did not abandon the business merely because at the same time that he was attending to it he served some other purpose. How the case would stand if the collision had occurred in the course of deviation from the route, we need not now inquire. Deviation there never ivas. The unfulfilled intention of passing the repair shop and returning did not transform the trip in its entirety, and vitiate that parí oí tne service which was legitimate and useful. For this conclusion, we think, the authorities are ample (v. Koehler & Co., 41 App. Div. 426; Riley v. Standard Oil Co., 231 N. Y. 301).
The defendant makes the point that the factory, and not the repair shop, was the only proper place of storage. The practice of the business permits another inference.
The judgment of the Appellate Division should be reversed, and that of the Trial Term affirmed, with costs in the Appellate Division and in this court.