Case Name: UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Tylan LUCAS, Appellant
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 2007-08-23
Citations: 499 F.3d 769
Docket Number: No. 05-2165
Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Tylan LUCAS, Appellant.
Judges: Before LOKEN, Chief Judge, WOLLMAN, BEAM, ARNOLD, MURPHY, BYE, RILEY, MELLOY, SMITH, COLLOTON, GRUENDER, BENTON, and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges.
Reporter: Federal Reporter 3d Series
Volume: 499
Pages: 769–802

Head Matter:
UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Tylan LUCAS, Appellant.
No. 05-2165.
United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.
Submitted: Jan. 9, 2007.
Filed: Aug. 23, 2007.
Adam J. Sipple, argued, Johnson & Mock, Omaha, NE, for appellant.
Robert Francis Cryne, U.S. Attorney’s Office, argued, on the brief, William W. Mickle, II, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Omaha, NE, for appellee.
Before LOKEN, Chief Judge, WOLLMAN, BEAM, ARNOLD, MURPHY, BYE, RILEY, MELLOY, SMITH, COLLOTON, GRUENDER, BENTON, and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges.

Opinion:
MURPHY, Circuit Judge, with whom LOKEN, Chief Judge, and MELLOY, SMITH, and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges, join.
Tylan Lucas, an escapee from the Nebraska prison system returned to custody pursuant to an administrative arrest warrant, was convicted of drug and firearm offenses, attempted obstruction of justice, and one forfeiture count and was sentenced to 25 years in prison. Lucas appeals, arguing that his motions to suppress evidence should have been granted, that there was insufficient evidence to uphold his convictions for conspiracy and attempted obstruction of justice, and that the district court erred by not dismissing the case under the Speedy Trial Act and by several trial rulings. A panel of this court reversed, holding that the district court should have granted his motion to suppress the evidence found when the warrant was executed. United States v. Lucas, 451 F.3d 492 (8th Cir.2006). The government's petition for rehearing en banc was granted and the panel opinion vacated. We now affirm.
I.
In October 2003 Lucas escaped from the custody of the Nebraska Department of Correctional Services (Department) while serving a sentence for possession of a controlled substance and for felonious assault with a firearm. He absconded after he was placed on work release, and Harold Clarke, Director of the Department, issued a 'Warrant of Arrest (for Escaped Prisoner)" on October 22. Clarke had statutory authority as director to issue warrants for the arrest of escapees from the Department's custody, see Neb.Rev.Stat. § 83-173(11), and he stated in the warrant that he had "reasonable cause to believe" that Lucas had escaped from custody.
On January 4, 2004, Timothy Carmody, a sergeant of the Omaha Police Department and member of its fugitive task force, received a report from Crime Stoppers that Tylan Lucas was staying at 2316 Ogden Street apartment 1 in North Omaha. That address was for a unit on the first floor of a house converted into apartments. Carmody referred the tip to Deputy Gerald Kellogg of the county sheriffs department, and Kellogg met the tipster and they drove by the residence where Lucas had been sighted. At the suppression hearing Kellogg testified that the tipster had reported seeing Lucas at the residence in the preceding 48 hours.
Later that day officers from the fugitive task force went to the residence. They had learned that the tenant in apartment 1 was Theresa Scaife, and on their arrival a man and woman were heard speaking inside. The officers knocked on the front door, and a woman's voice responded that she needed to get dressed. Scaife opened the door a few minutes later, and the police asked whether Lucas was in the apartment. She denied that he was. The officers told her they believed he was inside and wanted to look for him. Scaife asked whether they had a search warrant. The officers said they did not but that they did have an arrest warrant for Lucas and information that he was living at that address. On that authority they intended to enter the premises and search for him. Scaife then admitted that Lucas was in the apartment, and the officers placed her in their squad car before looking for him.
The officers announced their presence and asked Lucas to come out of the apartment. When he did not, they went inside and found him in the basement dressed in boxer shorts. He was arrested and taken upstairs to the living room. Department policy required that he be dressed because of the winter weather. Deputy Kellogg saw a pair of men's warm up pants in the bedroom adjacent to the living room, picked them up, and asked Lucas if they were his. Lucas replied that they were but he wanted to wear a different pair. After picking up the pants, Kellogg discovered they contained about $2,900 in cash, two bags of crack cocaine, and a bag of marijuana. The officers finished dressing Lucas, and he was taken away for booking.
Scaife was then able to return to the apartment. Sergeant Carmody explained that the officers suspected Lucas had a weapon and other contraband there and asked for her permission to search. Scaife verbally consented to a search and also signed a consent form. In the subsequent search of the apartment the officers found a stolen Ruger revolver and a bag of marijuana.
Lucas was initially charged on January 23, 2004 with four counts — possession with intent to distribute 5 or more grams of crack, possession of a Ruger revolver in furtherance of possessing with intent to distribute 5 or more grams of crack, possession of a Ruger revolver after having been convicted of assault in the first degree, and a forfeiture count. Lucas moved to suppress the evidence from the search, on the ground that his Fourth Amendment rights had been violated by the officers' illegal entry into Seaife's apartment. The magistrate judge issued a report recommending the motion be denied on the basis that the officers had entered pursuant to a valid arrest warrant and that Scaife had consented to their entry. The district court did not adopt the finding that Scaife had consented to the initial entry, but it denied the motion to suppress on the ground that the officers had authority to enter the apartment since they had an arrest warrant issued by a neutral and detached magistrate. Although Director Clarke was not a judicial officer, the court noted that the warrant was authorized by a Nebraska statute, that Clarke was not directly involved in "ferreting out crimes," and that he was well positioned to determine probable cause for the arrest of an escaped prisoner.
During the pretrial period Lucas continued serving the remainder of his state sentence at the Douglas County Corrections Center where his telephone calls were recorded as part of routine policy. The Omaha police obtained a subpoena for copies of the recordings of these calls, and Lucas moved to exclude evidence of the calls. At a suppression hearing an officer who was familiar with Lucas testified that it was his voice on the recordings. In the recorded conversations the speaker was heard asking several different individuals to claim they owned the Ruger revolver found at Scaife's apartment and offering to pay for their assistance. Lucas's motion to exclude this evidence was denied.
Based on these recordings and letters written by Lucas, the government filed a superseding indictment on March 17, 2004 which charged him with additional counts of attempted obstruction of justice and of conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of crack. A second superceding indictment on October 19, 2004 added two more firearm counts: possession of a semiautomatic handgun in furtherance of the conspiracy to distribute 50 grams or more of crack and possession of a semiautomatic handgun after having been convicted of assault in the first degree.
Before trial Lucas filed several other motions. He moved to dismiss the counts charging conspiracy and possession of a semiautomatic handgun. In addition he moved in limine to exclude Fed.R.Evid. 404(b) evidence and moved pro se to dismiss all charges for violation of the Speedy Trial Act. The motions were denied, and the case proceeded to trial. At the close of the government's case and again at the end of trial, Lucas moved to dismiss the charges for possessing a revolver in furtherance of a drug crime and for possessing a semiautomatic handgun in furtherance of the conspiracy to distribute crack. The motions were denied.
After a four day trial the jury found Lucas guilty of attempted obstruction of justice, possession of at least 5 grams of crack with intent to distribute, conspiracy to distribute between 50 and 150 grams of crack, possession of a Ruger revolver in furtherance of the conspiracy, and being a felon in possession of a weapon. He was found not guilty of possessing a semiautomatic handgun in furtherance of the conspiracy and not guilty of being a felon in possession of a semiautomatic handgun. Lucas appeals.
Lucas contends that the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress evidence because the officers' entry into Scaife's apartment was illegal since the arrest warrant had not been issued by a neutral and detached magistrate, but by an executive officer answering to the governor and without judicial authority, citing Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980). He contends further that the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule should not be extended to uphold the entry. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984). The government responds that the requirement for a neutral and detached magistrate has no application here because Clarke's statutorily authorized arrest warrant permitted the police to enter Scaife's home in order to retake Lucas and return him to custody. We review the district court's factual findings for clear error and its legal determinations de novo. United States v. Kelly, 329 F.3d 624, 628 (8th Cir.2003).
II.
Lucas contends that under the Fourth Amendment officers cannot enter "a suspect's home in order to make a routine felony arrest" without a warrant or consent, Payton, 445 U.S. at 576, 100 S.Ct. 1371, and that the warrant must have been issued by a neutral and detached magistrate who has found "probable cause" and "sufficient evidence . that his arrest [was] justified." Id. at 602, 100 S.Ct. 1371. The government responds that the Payton rule applies only to routine felony arrests, not to the recapture of a person already convicted of a crime and placed in state custody.
The Constitution generally requires that "someone independent of the police and prosecution," Shadwick v. City of Tampa, 407 U.S. 345, 348, 92 S.Ct. 2119, 32 L.Ed.2d 783 (1972), review a warrant application to determine whether there is "probable cause to believe a citizen guilty" of a crime and to issue an arrest warrant. Id. at 351, 92 S.Ct. 2119; see also Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 449-50, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971) (similar requirement for search warrant). As the Court has explained, "[t]he Fourth Amendment does not contemplate the executive officers of the Government as neutral and disinterested magistrates. Their duty and responsibility are to enforce the laws, to investigate, and to prosecute." United States v. U.S. Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 317, 92 S.Ct. 2125, 32 L.Ed.2d 752 (1972).
The panel opinion concluded that Clarke as an executive officer was unable 'to issue a valid warrant, just like the jailer in United States v. Parker, 373 F.3d 770 (6th Cir.2004). In Parker, the Sixth Circuit suppressed evidence seized pursuant to search warrants issued by a deputy jailer in her alternate capacity as a county trial commissioner. Since she had been ap pointed as jailer by an executive branch official, she was employed in a law enforcement agency, and the jail had a financial interest in the outcome of the warrant proceedings, she was not neutral and detached. Id. at 773.
Although Director Clarke's role in issuing the arrest warrant for Lucas was quite different from the jailer's issuance of search warrants in Parker, Clarke was not a neutral and detached magistrate in the sense of a judicial officer. He was appointed by the governor, who set his salary and had power to remove him at will. Neb.Rev.Stat. § 81-102, -103. Clarke headed a corrections agency, and his duties closely involved him with prisons and prisoners. By law he was responsible "for the custody, control, safety, correction, and rehabilitation of persons committed to the department." Id. § 83-173(3).
The fact that Clarke was not a neutral judicial officer does not end the Fourth Amendment inquiry, however. This case is quite different from the cases on which Lucas relies in which a neutral magistrate was needed to determine probable cause. Here the administrative official responsible for the custody of prisoners issued a warrant to retake an inmate who had already been convicted of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt and had fled from his lawful custody. The standard for issuance of a valid administrative warrant under the Fourth Amendment is different from the probable cause showing necessary for a warrant to arrest someone suspected of a crime.
The Supreme Court has upheld administrative warrants and has never held that administrative warrants must be issued by a neutral and detached magistrate in the sense of Shadwiclc or Coolidge. An administrative arrest warrant issued by a district director of the Immigration and Naturalization Service pursuant to a deportation statute led to a valid arrest in Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 234, 80 S.Ct. 683, 4 L.Ed.2d 668 (1960). There, the Court recognized the "long-sanctioned practice" and "overwhelming . legislative recognition" favoring "the propriety of administrative arrest" in such circumstances. Id. at 230, 233, 80 S.Ct. 683. The Court has required that administrative warrants be obtained before inspectors enforcing housing code compliance may lawfully enter and inspect residential units. See Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 87 S.Ct. 1727, 18 L.Ed.2d 930 (1967). And in the course of striking down a federal statute as unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment for authorizing Occupational Health and Safety Administration agents to make warrantless safety inspections, the Court indicated that the requirements for issuance of an administrative warrant are not identical to those for judicial warrants. Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 320, 98 S.Ct. 1816, 56 L.Ed.2d 305 (1978).
The requirements for valid administrative warrants were also examined in Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 107 S.Ct. 3164, 97 L.Ed.2d 709 (1987), a case upholding a Wisconsin law authorizing probation officers to make warrantless searches if there were reasonable grounds to believe a probationer's home contained contraband. The dissent argued that the Constitution required a warrant issued by a neutral member of the judiciary, but the majority explained that administrative search warrants need not be issued by judicial officers, in contrast to "constitutionally mandated judicial warrants." Id. at 877-78, 107 S.Ct. 3164. The "neutral magistrate or neutral officer envisioned by our administrative search cases is not necessarily the 'neutral judge' envisioned by the dissent." Id. at 877 n. 5, 107 S.Ct. 3164 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Like the probation officer in Griffin, Director Clarke was "not an impartial magistrate, [but] neither [was] he the police officer who normally conducts searches against the ordinary citizen," for he was charged with retaking an escapee while protecting both "the public interest" and "the welfare of the [escapee]." Id. at 876, 107 S.Ct. 3164. Just as the Griffin probation officer had specialized knowledge, Clarke was well positioned to know if a convicted inmate in his custody had escaped. As Director of the Department of Correctional Services, he had access to information about such an escapee and the statutory duty to issue a warrant. See Neb.Rev.Stat. § 83-173 (director "shall" issue warrant for escapee).
Our conclusion that a warrant issued by a neutral and detached magistrate was not required for a lawful entry into Scaife's apartment is consistent with decisions of other circuit courts. A Maryland statute authorizing prison wardens to issue retake warrants for parolees was found by the Fourth Circuit not to violate the Fourth Amendment in Henderson v. Simms, 223 F.3d 267 (4th Cir.2000). Like the retake warrants in Henderson, Clarke's administrative arrest warrant for escapee Lucas was authorized under a state statute. According to a ruling of the First Circuit, a parole violation warrant issued by the New York parole board and supported by "reasonable cause" permitted a valid arrest consistent with the Fourth Amendment. See United States v. Cardona, 903 F.2d 60 (1st Cir.1990). Like that parole violation warrant, Clarke's arrest warrant for Lucas was issued by an executive official with legislative authority for the subject matter and was supported by reasonable cause.
Probable cause "in the criminal law sense" is not required for issuance of an administrative warrant, Marshall, 436 U.S. at 320, 98 S.Ct. 1816, for in the administrative context probable cause "refer[s] not to a quantum of evidence, but merely to a requirement of reasonableness." Griffin, 483 U.S. at 877 n. 4, 107 S.Ct. 3164. The reasonableness of the officers' entry into Scaife's apartment must be judged by balancing the government's "need to [arrest Lucas] against the invasion which the [arrest] entails." Camara, 387 U.S. at 537, 87 S.Ct. 1727. Whatever expectation of privacy an escaped convict might have must be weighed against the strong interest the government has in bringing him back into custody.
Like the prison escapee in United States v. Roy, 734 F.2d 108, 112 n. 5 (2d Cir.1984), Lucas "lost his presumption of innocence when he was convicted and incarcerated," and his escape could not expand the very restricted expectation of privacy he had while in the custody of prison officials. Id. at 111-12. Since Roy's presence outside of custody was wrongful, id. at 111, the Second Circuit found he lacked "a legitimate expectation of privacy against the government's intrusion." Id. at 110. Evidence seized without a warrant from his locked trunk was therefore admissible. Id. at 112. Lucas similarly had no right to be in Scaife's apartment, and Nebraska's interest in the present case was even stronger than the state's in Roy because the officers here were acting pursuant to a valid administrative warrant.
As an escapee Lucas had only a minimal expectation of privacy in Scaife's apartment. See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 n. 12, 99 S.Ct. 421, 58 L.Ed.2d 387 (1978). Prisoners like Lucas who are on work release are subject to special restrictions just like probationers. Their liberty is legitimately constrained because "[p]ro- bation, like incarceration, is a form of criminal sanction imposed by a court upon an offender after verdict, finding, or plea of guilty." Griffin, 483 U.S. at 874, 107 S.Ct. 3164 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The state has a duty to protect the community from harm when a probationer or escaped prisoner is "at large." Id. at 875, 107 S.Ct. 3164. For these reasons a warrantless search of a probationer's home without probable cause is permissible if it is based on the reasonable suspicion of the probation officer. United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 121-22, 122 S.Ct. 587, 151 L.Ed.2d 497 (2001). The officers' entry into Scaife's apartment did not violate the Fourth Amendment since Lucas was a convicted escapee whom they were seeking under the authority of a valid administrative warrant issued by the responsible state official who had reasonable cause to believe that Lucas had escaped.
Lucas as an escapee from lawful custody had an even more circumscribed expectation of privacy than the probationer in Knights or the parolee in Samson v. California, -U.S.-, 126 S.Ct. 2193, 2200, 165 L.Ed.2d 250 (2006) (state's "overwhelming interest in supervising parolees" justified a warrantless search). Lucas had to sign a personalized plan agreeing to the terms of his work release program before he could participate in it, and these terms required him to return to the community corrections center after work. See Neb. Dep't of Correctional Servs. Reg. 201.06 & app., available at http://www.correetions. state.ne.us/policies/files/201.06.pdf; see also Trial Tr. at 259 (stipulation that Lucas was obligated to return to Omaha Community Corrections Center after work). That Lucas expected to be recaptured wherever discovered is evidenced by his comment to the arresting officers, "Damn, I knew I was going to get caught eventually."
Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 101 S.Ct. 1642, 68 L.Ed.2d 38 (1981), is also instructive. In that case the police entered Steagald's home with an arrest warrant for Ricky Lyons, a fugitive who was not present, but the officers discovered evidence incriminating Steagald. The Supreme Court concluded that the search violated Steagald's personal Fourth Amendment rights but that those of Lyons were not affected. Id. at 216, 101 S.Ct. 1642. The Supreme Court distinguished the rights of Steagald from those of Lyons, just as we must analyze the respective rights in this case. The Court pointed out that "two distinct interests were implicated by the search at issue here — Ricky Lyons' interest in being free from an unreasonable seizure and petitioner's interest in being free from an unreasonable search of his home." Id. While the arrest warrant would have supported the search for and the seizure of Lyons if he had been there, it did not justify the search that turned up evidence against Steagald. In our case it is Scaife rather than Lucas who was in a position like Steagald's. Clarke's arrest warrant authorized entry into Scaife's home for the purpose of arresting Lucas.
"Reasonableness" is the standard for issuance of an administrative arrest warrant seeking to return a prison escapee to custody, see Camara, 387 U.S. at 539, 87 S.Ct. 1727, rather than the probable cause requirement for a warrant to arrest a person suspected of crime. Shadwick, 407 U.S. at 351, 92 S.Ct. 2119. Clarke's administrative warrant met that standard. We conclude that the entry into Scaife's apartment was reasonable because the Omaha police were acting under the authority of a valid administrative warrant and they had reason to believe Lucas was there. Cf. Payton, 445 U.S. at 602, 100 S.Ct. 1371. They had received and sufficiently corroborated a tip that Lucas would be found at Scaife's apartment. Their source had reported seeing Lucas at Scaife's home within the prior 48 hours, and one of the officers had driven by the residence with the tipster to verify as much of the information as possible. The balance of interests here tips in favor of the state since Nebraska's interest in recapturing a convicted criminal who had absconded from its custody is a strong one, and Lucas had no legitimate expectation of privacy while hiding out in Scaife's residence.
The dissent errs by overlooking Lucas's status as an escapee and focusing solely on the fact that the officers entered a residence. Its statement that "expectation of privacy tests . concern places rather than persons" is contrary to the teaching of the Supreme Court, for "the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places." Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1968). As the Fifth Circuit explained in United States v. Taylor, 482 F.3d 315, 318-19 (5th Cir.2007), another case involving a war-rantless search of a girlfriend's residence in which the defendant was hiding, the defendant had no greater Fourth Amendment rights in her place than he would have had in his own, citing Katz and Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 110 S.Ct. 1684, 109 L.Ed.2d 85 (1990). The Taylor court applied the totality of circumstances approach taken in Knights to conclude that the search had not violated the Fourth Amendment since Taylor had no special protection in his girlfriend's residence, the officers had a misdemeanor arrest warrant for him and reason to believe he was present in her residence, and Taylor's rights were limited by his supervised release status.
Because Lucas's reasonable expectation of privacy was limited by his status as an escapee and the officers possessed both a valid administrative warrant and reasonable cause to believe Lucas was in Scaife's apartment, we conclude that his Fourth Amendment rights were not violated by the entry of the officers into the apartment and his subsequent arrest. Nor were they violated by the search incident to his arrest and the subsequent search of Scaife's apartment with her consent. Since Lucas does not have standing to assert Scaife's Fourth Amendment rights, any issue of hers is not before us. See Pierson, 219 F.3d at 806 (Fourth Amendment rights are personal and cannot be vicariously asserted); see also Raleas, 439 U.S. at 133-38, 99 S.Ct. 421; Taylor, 482 F.3d at 319.
III.
Lucas also appeals several issues related to his trial. First, he argues that the district court erred by not dismissing the conspiracy charge for lack of particularity. He objects that the indictment only referred to coconspirators "known and unknown to the grand jury." Lucas contends there can be no assurance that he was convicted of the offense charged by the grand jury because the government introduced evidence of several possible conspiracies. The government responds that it offered sufficient evidence that Lucas, Nathaniel Grant, James Edwards, and others joined in a single crack distribution conspiracy.
To prove a single conspiracy the government relied in part on the testimony of Grant and Edwards, two gang members who had previously pled to narcotics offenses. Grant testified that he sold crack to Lucas on numerous occasions during October 2003 and saw him carrying a semiautomatic handgun during these dealings. Edwards testified that between December 2003 and early January 2004 Lucas sold him crack and that Lucas owned a semiautomatic handgun. The possibility that there were other unknown individuals involved in the drug dealing does not mean there was more than one conspiracy. The law recognizes that "[a] single conspiracy may exist even if the participants and their activities change over time, and even if many participants are unaware of, and uninvolved in, some of the transactions." United States v. Benford, 360 F.3d 913, 914 (8th Cir.2004) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). We conclude that the indictment was constitutionally sufficient, that the district court did not clearly err in concluding there was sufficient evidence of one conspiracy, and that it did not abuse its discretion in refusing to give a multiple conspiracy instruction.
Lucas makes two objections relating to his conviction for attempted obstruction of justice. He argues first that the phone recordings on which the charge was based should have been excluded from evidence. Telephone calls may be intercepted without a warrant if one of the parties to the call gives "prior consent." 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(c). There was uncontra-dicted evidence at the suppression hearing that the Douglas County Corrections Center gave each inmate a handbook stating that all outgoing telephone calls were monitored except those to attorneys. The Center affixed placards to the inmate telephones warning that the calls were recorded, and an audio message repeated the warning before each call. In a similar situation in United States v. Horr, 963 F.2d 1124, 1126 (8th Cir.1992), we concluded that medical center inmates had impliedly consented to the recording of their phone calls. The district court was entitled to find from the notice given to inmates that any reasonable person in Lucas's position should have known of the policy. We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the recordings into evidence.
Lucas next contends that there was insufficient evidence to convict him of attempted obstruction of justice. He argues that the statute under which he was convicted, 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(2), applies only to direct conduct obstructing an official proceeding, not to an attempt to influence others to obstruct. Because Lucas failed to make this argument below, we review for plain error and find none. The only appellate decision we have found construing this statute, United States v. Reich, 479 F.3d 179, 185 (2d Cir.2007), does not support his argument. See Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 468, 117 S.Ct. 1544, 137 L.Ed.2d 718 (1997) (plain error is one "clearly contrary" to estab lished law at time of appeal). After viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government and giving it the benefit of every reasonable inference, we can only reverse if no reasonable jury could have found Lucas guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Carlisle, 118 F.3d 1271, 1273 (8th Cir.1997). An attempt requires "(1) an intent to engage in criminal conduct, and (2) conduct constituting a 'substantial step' toward the commission of the substantive offense which strongly corroborates the actor's criminal intent." United States v. Joyce, 693 F.2d 838, 841 (8th Cir.1982). There was sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that Lucas asked both Shawn-na Hilmer and Jaime Bonnett to claim ownership of the firearm found in Scaife's apartment and that each understood his request to be in earnest. This was enough to prove that Lucas took a "substantial step" toward obstruction of justice. See United States v. Mims, 812 F.2d 1068, 1077-78 (8th Cir.1987).
Lucas also objects to the admission of evidence of his past drug dealing and gun possession under Fed.R.Evid. 404(b). The government filed a pretrial notice of intent to introduce such evidence in order to establish motive, intent, plan and design in relation to the drug and firearm charges. Police reports of Lucas's prior arrests were introduced and there was testimony by people who dealt drugs with him before he was incarcerated in November 2000. Lucas contends that the evidence was not similar in kind or close in time to the charged offenses and that any probative value of the evidence was outweighed by its prejudicial effect.
We review the admission of Rule 404(b) evidence for abuse of discretion and will "reverse only when such evidence clearly had no bearing on the case and was introduced solely to prove the defendant's propensity to commit criminal acts." United States v. Thomas, 398 F.3d 1058, 1062 (8th Cir.2005), quoting United States v. Howard, 235 F.3d 366, 372 (8th Cir.2000). When a defendant has denied ownership of seized drugs or the intent to distribute them, evidence of past drug related activity is admissible to prove both knowledge and intent. United States v. Love, 419 F.3d 825, 828 (8th Cir.2005). Since Lucas put his knowledge and intent at issue, and the government had the burden of proof on these elements, admission of the 404(b) evidence was proper. See United States v. Foster, 344 F.3d 799, 801 (8th Cir.2003). Furthermore, his drug related activities were not so remote in time to be irrelevant. See Love, 419 F.3d at 828; Thomas, 398 F.3d at 1063; Foster, 344 F.3d at 802.
Lucas asserts that his Sixth Amendment right to compulsory process was violated when the district court did not allow all of the testimony he wanted to present about John Ezell. Ezell had been living with Theresa Scaife before Christmas 2003. One theory of Lucas's defense was that it was Ezell who had left the Ruger revolver and crack in Scaife's apartment either accidentally, or purposely because he was angry that Lucas was staying there and wanted to incriminate him. Lucas hoped to introduce evidence that Ezell had four arrests related to crack and handguns, but the government contended that the evidence was inadmissible. A criminal defendant's right to compulsory process is violated if relevant evidence is excluded without sufficient justification. United States v. Bernhardt, 642 F.2d 251, 253 (8th Cir.1981); see also Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 410, 108 S.Ct. 646, 98 L.Ed.2d 798 (1988). We review the court's eviden-tiary decision for abuse of discretion. United States v. LeGrand, 468 F.3d 1077, 1080 (8th Cir.2006).
The district court allowed evidence to support Lucas's theory of defense. He was permitted to question Scaife about her relationship with Ezell and about whether the revolver and drugs belonged to him. See United States v. Becht, 267 F.3d 767, 773 n. 7 (8th Cir.2001), quoting Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 182-83, 117 S.Ct. 644, 136 L.Ed.2d 574 (1997). Evidence that is cumulative or "remote and speculative" may be excluded under Fed.R.Evid. 403 to avoid confusing or misleading the jury, see United States v. DeNoyer, 811 F.2d 436, 440 (8th Cir.1987), and we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by not permitting Lucas to solicit all the evidence he wished to present. See United States v. Yarns, 811 F.2d 454, 456 (8th Cir.1987).
Finally, Lucas argues that the district court violated the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161-3174. The Act requires that trial begin within 70 days after a defendant is charged or makes an initial appearance unless the running of the time is stopped for reasons set out in the statute. One authorized period of delay is triggered if a district court expressly finds that the ends of justice served by granting a continuance outweigh the interests of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial. See id. § 3161(h)(8). Shortly before Lucas's trial was scheduled to begin, the government moved for a continuance because the prosecutor was scheduled to start a different trial the day before the Lucas case. The magistrate judge denied the motion on the grounds that it was untimely and did not comply with the local rules. The government appealed to the district court, explaining that the other trial involved numerous witnesses from outside the district and one from another country.
The district court issued an order on September 27, continuing the trial date from September 28 to November 9, 2004 for the following reasons:
[Considering all of the relevant circumstances, the Court concludes that the motion should be granted in the interest of justice. The Court finds that, under the circumstances presented, the ends of justice outweigh the interest of the public and of the Defendant in a speedy trial and failing to grant a continuance would result in a miscarriage of justice. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(8)(A) & (h)(8)(B).
A superseding indictment with additional charges was later filed, and on October 25 another order was entered continuing Lucas's trial to January 4, 2005 on the ground that a "failure to grant additional time might result in a miscarriage of justice." On December 17 Lucas filed a pro se motion to dismiss all the charges under the Speedy Trial Act. The motion was denied on December 20, and trial began as planned on January 4.
Lucas argues that Zedner v. United States, — U.S. -, 126 S.Ct. 1976, 164 L.Ed.2d 749 (2006), requires a district court to detail its reasons for granting an ends of justice continuance, that the court failed to do so in its September continuance order, and that that violation is not susceptible to harmless error analysis. In the context of Speedy Trial Act rulings, we review a district court's legal conclusions de novo, its factual findings for clear error, and its ultimate determination for an abuse of discretion. See United States v. Duranseau, 26 F.3d 804, 808 (8th Cir.1994).
The district court made explicit findings to support its ends of justice continuance on September 27, finding that "failure to grant [a continuance would] result in a miscarriage of justice." That factor is one of the permissible reasons for a continuance, 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(8)(B)(i), and the court also balanced the ends of justice and the interests of the parties and public. While there could have been more detailed findings, its order was sufficient to show compliance with the Act, particularly in the context of the government's stated reasons for requesting the continuance. This record is unlike the situation in Zedner where the district court "made no mention of the Act and did not make any findings to support exclusion." 126 S.Ct. at 1982. We conclude that Lucas has not shown that the district court abused its discretion in granting the September 27 continuance or that the district court erred by not dismissing the case for violating the Speedy Trial Act.
IV.
In sum, we conclude that the Speedy Trial Act was not violated, that the district court did not err by denying Lucas's suppression motions or his motions to dismiss the conspiracy and obstruction of justice charges for insufficient evidence, and that the district court did not abuse its discretion in other trial rulings or in its jury instructions. For these reasons we affirm the judgment of the district court.
. The Honorable Laurie Smith Camp, United States District Judge for the District of Nebraska.
. The Honorable F.A. Gossett, United States Magistrate Judge for the District of Nebraska.
. This gun was not the revolver found in Scaife's apartment, but a different weapon Lucas was charged with possessing in connection with the conspiracy.
. The arrest warrant here was issued to retake Lucas into custody. It was issued by his custodian rather than by a prosecuting authority, and our conclusion that Lucas's arrest was lawful is independent of any "semantic legerdemain" put forward by the dissent.
. Lucas and the dissent claim that the government waived its right to argue that he lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy. The waiver doctrine is most appropriately applied when the government has taken inconsistent positions during the course of the litigation and such inconsistency has affected the factual record. See United States v. Hansen, 652 F.2d 1374, 1381-83 (10th Cir.1981); cf. Steagald, 451 U.S. at 210-11, 101 S.Ct. 1642; United States v. Morales, 737 F.2d 761, 763 (8th Cir.1984). In this case the government has never claimed that Lucas had a reasonable expectation of privacy in Scaife's apartment, and our conclusion that he lacked such an expectation is based solely on facts which the parties do not dispute. We are merely applying the "well-settled principle" that a district court may be affirmed on any ground supported by the record. United States v. Pierson, 219 F.3d 803, 807 (8th Cir.2000) (Beam, L).
. In light of this conclusion we need not address the government's argument based on United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984).
. 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(2) provides: "Whoever corruptly . obstructs, influences, or impedes any official proceeding, or attempts to do so, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both."