Case Name: MICHIGAN COUNCIL NO. 55, AMERICAN FEDERATION OF STATE, COUNTY AND MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES, AFL-CIO v. VILLAGE OF CHESANING
Court: Michigan Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1975-06-11
Citations: 62 Mich. App. 157
Docket Number: Docket No. 21503
Parties: MICHIGAN COUNCIL NO. 55, AMERICAN FEDERATION OF STATE, COUNTY AND MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES, AFL-CIO v VILLAGE OF CHESANING
Judges: Before: R. B. Burns, P. J., and M. J. Kelly and O’Hara, J.J.
Reporter: Michigan appeals reports; cases decided in the Michigan Court of Appeals.
Volume: 62
Pages: 157–160

Head Matter:
MICHIGAN COUNCIL NO. 55, AMERICAN FEDERATION OF STATE, COUNTY AND MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES, AFL-CIO v VILLAGE OF CHESANING
1. Administrative Law — Employment Relations Commission — Appeal and Error — Findings of Fact — Conclusiveness.
The findings of the Michigan Employment Relations Commission with respect to fact questions are conclusive when supported by substantial evidence on the record (MCLA 423.23).
2. Administrative Law — Appeal and Error — Labor Mediation Board — Trial Examiner — Findings of Fact — Specific Consideration.
The findings of a Labor Mediation Board trial examiner will be given specific consideration on appellate review since he has had the opportunity to observe the witnesses.
3. Administrative Law — Employment Relations Commission — Labor Relations — Findings of Fact — Record—Evidence.
A decision of the Michigan Employment Relations Commission finding a defendant municipality guilty of unfair labor practices for refusing to execute a collective bargaining agreement to which its agents had agreed without its attorney’s consent was properly supported by the record where the record reflected that the parties negotiated for six months, proposals and counterproposals were freely made and exchanged, concessions were made by both parties, the municipal council was repeatedly involved in the bargaining, defendant’s representatives signified agreement on a final contract in a variety of ways, and there was no evidence that plaintiff ever agreed that defendant could condition the execution of the agreement upon ratification by defendant’s attorney.
References for Points in Headnotes
2 Am Jur 2d, Administrative Law § 621.
2 Am Jur 2d, Administrative Law §§ 424, 429.
48 Am Jur 2d, Labor and Labor Relations § 546.
Appeal from Employment Relations Commis sion. Submitted Division 2 April 8, 1975, at Detroit.
(Docket No. 21503.)
Decided June 11, 1975.
Michigan Council No. 55, American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO, brought charges against the Village of Chesaning for unfair labor practices. The Employment Relations Commission found for the plaintiff. Defendant appeals. The Employment Relations Commission petitions for enforcement of its order.
Affirmed.
Zwerdling, Maurer, Diggs & Papp, for plaintiff.
Smith Bovill, P. C, for defendant.
Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Robert A. Derengoski, Solicitor General, and Francis W. Edwards, Assistant Attorney General, for the Michigan Employment Relations Commission.
Before: R. B. Burns, P. J., and M. J. Kelly and O’Hara, J.J.
Former Supreme Court Justice, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment pursuant to Const 1963, art 6, § 23 as amended in 1968.

Opinion:
R. B. Burns, P. J.
This is an appeal by defendant Village of Chesaning from a decision of the Michigan Employment Relations Commission (MERC) in which it found a collective-bargaining agreement existed between plaintiff and defendant. It held that defendant had violated § 10 of the Michigan public employment relations act, MCLA 423.210; MSA 17.455(10), by its refusal to execute the agreement. Defendant contends that this finding is not supported by competent, material, and substantial evidence, and that, therefore, the MERC decision based upon it should be reversed.
The Village of Chesaning is a municipal corporation and a public employer within the meaning of the Michigan public employment relations act (PERA), MCLA 423.201 et seq.; MSA 17.455(1) et seq. On April 10, 1973, plaintiff was certified as the collective bargaining agent of all supervisory personnel of the defendant. On April 24, 1973, plaintiff sent a letter to defendant's mayor requesting arrangements be made to commence negotiations upon a collective-bargaining contract. On May 22, 1973, those negotiations began, and they continued until November 5, 1973, when an agreement was allegedly reached. When plaintiff attempted to have the final version of that agreement executed, defendant balked. Plaintiff received a letter from defendant's attorney stating he was going to redraft the proposed contract and submit it to plaintiff for further negotiations. Defendant insisted that its bargaining agents never had authority to bind it to any final agreement with plaintiff and that plaintiff was aware of this from the beginning of the negotiations. Plaintiff denied this and filed unfair labor practice charges with MERC.
Both MERC and the trial examiner found that a valid and binding agreement had been reached by the parties, and they held that defendant had violated MCLA 423.210; MSA 17.455(10) by refusing to execute the agreement. We agree with the finding and holding.
The findings of MERC, with respect to fact questions, are conclusive when supported by substantial evidence on the record. MCLA 423.23(e); MSA 17.454(25)(e), MERC v Detroit Symphony Orchestra, 393 Mich 116; 223 NW2d 283(1974). Similarly, the findings of the trial examiner should also be given specific consideration since he has had the opportunity to observe the witnesses. MERC v Detroit Symphony Orchestra, supra, Universal Camera Corp v NLRB, 340 US 474, 496-497; 71 S Ct 456, 468-469; 95 L Ed 456, 471-472 (1951). In the present case, defendant attempts to justify its refusal to sign the agreement by claiming that all negotiations, even the session on November 5, were conducted with the mutual understanding that no final agreement could be achieved before it had been approved by defendant's attorney. There is substantial credible evidence to the contrary. While the parties negotiated for six months, defendant failed during that entire time to take any action to involve the village attorney in the bargaining. Proposals and counterproposals were freely made and exchanged; concessions were made by both parties; and all of this was done without the presence, aid, or advice of defendant's attorney. The entire village council was repeatedly involved in the bargaining without ever consulting its attorney. There is no evidence that plaintiff ever agreed that defendant could condition the execution of the agreement upon a ratification by defendant's attorney. On November 5, the date when a final agreement was reached, plaintiff's representatives met with a majority of defendant's village council who were attending the meeting in their official capacities. After several hours of negotiations, defendant's representatives signified agreement on a final contract in a variety of ways. There is no evidence in the record that any further meetings were contemplated, at that time, by either party for further negotiations after November 5.
Since the MERC decision is properly supported by the record, we must affirm.