Case Name: CATTERSON v. BROOKLYN HEIGHTS R. CO.
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1909-05-07
Citations: 116 N.Y.S. 760
Docket Number: 
Parties: CATTERSON v. BROOKLYN HEIGHTS R. CO.
Judges: 
Reporter: West's New York Supplement
Volume: 116
Pages: 760–765

Head Matter:
CATTERSON v. BROOKLYN HEIGHTS R. CO.
(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department.
May 7, 1909.)
1. Pleading (§ 34 )—Construction op Complaint on Motion to Dismiss.
Code Civ. Proc. § 519, requires that a complaint on motion to dismiss be liberally construed, and its construction, so far as matters of form are concerned, must be in favor of the pleading.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Pleading, Cent. Dig. § 66; Dec. Dig. § 34.*]
2. Carriers (§ 314*)—Carriage of Passengers—Personal Injuries—Setting Down Passengers—Actions—Complaint.
In' an action for injuries to plaintiff’s wife, a complaint is sufficient, on motion to dismiss, where under it plaintiff could prove that defendant was a iytreet railroad operating its cars on a specified avenue; that on a date named the pavement on such avenue within two feet of its tracks was being repaired; that plaintiff’s wife, having an infant in her cafe, was a passenger on a car, which) came to a full stop on the avenue named; that plaintiff’s wife alighted, and while taking her child from the car, without any fault on her part, her foot slipped into a hole, causing her to fall, and that she thereby sustained injuries; and that defendant knew the condition of the street, and omitted to give any warning of such repairs.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Carriers, Cent. Dig. § 1273; Dec. Dig. § 314. ]
S. Carriers (§ 303*)—Carriage of Passengers—Personal Injuries—Setting Down Passengers.
A carrier must provide a reasonably safe place at which its passengers can alight, or warn them of known dangers at the place where they alight; and the duty of the carrier to a woman accompanied by an infant does not terminate at the moment when she alights from the car, but continues until she has a reasonable opportunity to take her child from ,the hands of a fellow passenger, who was handing it to her.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Carriers, Cent. Dig. § 1224; Dec. Dig. § 303.*]
Gaynor, J., dissenting.
Appeal from Special Term, Kings County.
Action by Patrick Catterson against the Brooklyn Heights Railroad Company. Prom an order dismissing the corñplaint, and denying plaintiff’s motion for a new trial, plaintiff appeals.
Reversed.
Argued before HIRSCHBERG, P. J., and GAYNOR, BURR, RICH, and MILLER, JJ.
Adolph L. Pincoffs, for appellant.
George D. Yeomans, for respondent.
For other cases see same topic & § number In Dec. & Am. Digs. 1907 to date, & Rep’r Indexes
For other cases see same topic & § number in Dec. & Am. Digs. 1907 to date, & Rep’r Indexes

Opinion:
BURR, J.
Upon the trial of this action, after a jury had been impaneled, but before any evidence had been introduced by the plaintiff, the court dismissed the complaint upon the ground that it did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. Upon such a motion, not only must the complaint be liberally construed (Code Civ. Proc. § 519), but such construction, so far as matters of form are concerned, must be in favor of, and not against, the pleading. Coatsworth v. Lehigh Valley R. Co., 156 N. Y. 451, 51 N. E. 301; Rochester R. Co. v. Robinson, 133 N. Y. 242, 30 N. E. 1008; Howe v. Hagan, 110 App. Div. 392, 97 N. Y. Supp. 86; Naylor v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. R. Co., 119 App. Div. 24, 103 N. Y. Supp. 966. In the Coatsworth Case, supra, the court said:
"Under the more recent authorities pleadings are not to .be construed strictly against the pleader, but averments which sufficiently/point out the nature of the pleader's claim are sufficient if under the e would be entitled to give the necessary evidence to establish his cause action."
In the Howe Case, supra, and the Naylor Case, supra, this court has followed this rule, making use of the same language, under the complaint in this action the plaintiff could prove that' the defendant was a street railroad corporation operating its cars through Graham avenue, in the borough of Brooklyn; that on the 7th day of August, 1906, the pavement on Graham avenue within two feet of the tracks of the rail road company was being repaired; that some of the paving blocks had been taken out, leaving large holes in .the pavement; that on the date mentioned plaintiff's wife, having an infant child in her care, was a passenger on a car of the defendant, which came to a full stop at the corner of Graham avenue and Driggs street; that plaintiff's wife alighted, and while in the act of taking her infant child from the car, without any fault on her part, her foot' slipped into one of the above-mentioned large holes in the pavement, causing her to fall; and that she thereby sustained injuries. He could also prove that the defendant knew that the pavement was being repaired, and the condition of the street in consequence thereof, and omitted to give the alighting passenger any notice or warning that such pavement was being repaired, and that there were large holes in such pavement as a consequence thereof. Upon such proof being made it would be for the jury to say whether the defendant exercised due care to give the plaintiff's wife a reasonably safe place to alight.X This it was the duty of the defendant to do, or t'o warn her of existing danger known to it. Wells v. Steinway R. Co., 18 App. Div. 180, 45 N. Y. Supp. 864; Wolf v. Third Avenue R. R. Co., 67 App. Div. 605, 74 N. Y. Supp. 336; Flack v. Nassau Electric R. R. Co., 41 App. Div. 399, 58 N. Y. Supp. 839; Onderdonk v. N. Y. & Sea Beach R. R. Co., 74 Hun, 42, 26 N. Y. Supp. 310; West Chicago St. Ry. Co. v. Cahill, 64 Ill. App. 539; Bass v. Concord Street Ry. Co., 70 N. H. 170, 46 Atl. 1056.
The duties and obligations of a common carrier to exercise reasonable care to secure the safety of the plaintiff's wife did not terminate at the moment when she had alighted from the car, but continued until she had a reasonable opportunity to take her infant child from the hands of a fellow passenger, who was handing it t'o her. McKone v. Mich. Central R. R. Co., 51 Mich. 601, 17 N. W. 74, 47 Am. Rep. 596; Jeffersonville, etc., R. R. Co. v. Riley, 39 Ind. 568; Tobin v. Portland, etc., R. R. Co., 59 Me. 183, 8 Am. Rep. 415. It was not necessary to allege in the complaint the exact size of the hole nor the exact distance from the track. These were evidentiary facts. It' was enough to allege that it was less than two feet from the track, and that it was sufficiently large to cause the passenger to fall, when without fault on her part she. stepped into it. It was not necessary to allege that it was dangerous. That could be inferred from the fact of the fall as a consequence of stepping into it. The allegations of the complaint respecting the conduct of the defendant in bringing the car to a stop in close proximity to this, large hole in the pavement, and in omitting to warn the plaintiff's wife of its existence, is followed by the allegation that "the accident was caused by the negligence of the defendant." This is equivalent to saying that the act and the omission above referred to was a negligent act and omission.
The judgment and order appealed from should be reversed, and a new trial granted, costs t'o abide the event. All concur, except GAY-NOR, J., who dissents.