Case Name: BANK ONE, TEXAS, N.A., Formerly Deposit Insurance Bridge Bank, N.A., Petitioner, v. Robert L. MOODY, Jr., Respondent
Court: Supreme Court of Texas
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1992-04-15
Citations: 830 S.W.2d 81
Docket Number: No. D-0722
Parties: BANK ONE, TEXAS, N.A., Formerly Deposit Insurance Bridge Bank, N.A., Petitioner, v. Robert L. MOODY, Jr., Respondent.
Judges: Dissenting opinion by GONZALEZ, J., joined by MAUZY and DOGGETT, JJ.
Reporter: South Western Reporter Second Series
Volume: 830
Pages: 81–87

Head Matter:
BANK ONE, TEXAS, N.A., Formerly Deposit Insurance Bridge Bank, N.A., Petitioner, v. Robert L. MOODY, Jr., Respondent.
No. D-0722.
Supreme Court of Texas.
April 15, 1992.
Rehearing Overruled June 24, 1992.
J. Michael Fieglein, Galveston, for petitioner.
Andrew J. Mytelka, Arnold G. Polanco, for respondent.

Opinion:
OPINION
COOK, Justice.
This case presents a question of the appropriate interpretation and application of the Craddock test for granting a new trial after a default judgment. Craddock v. Sunshine Bus Lines, 134 Tex. 388, 133 S.W.2d 124 (1939).
Robert L. Moody served a writ of garnishment on Bank One. After Bank One failed to file an answer, Moody obtained a default judgment for $82,000, plus $1,000 for attorney's fees, interest and costs. Bank One then filed a motion for new trial that was overruled by operation of law. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court. 800 S.W.2d 280. We hold that the court of appeals improperly treated the Craddock test as having four independent elements, and we hold that a mistake of law is one type of mistake that may satisfy the first element of the three element Craddock test. Therefore, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and remand the cause to the trial court for trial.
In an earlier proceeding, Moody obtained a judgment against Joe Richardson and Apex Natural Resources, Inc. for $79,000 and $3,000 in attorney's fees, costs, and post-judgment interest. Moody then filed an application for writ of garnishment to garnish accounts held by Joe Richardson and Apex Natural Resources, Inc. at Bank One. The writ of garnishment was served on Bank One and was routed to Robin Kane, who was branch president of Bank One. Kane instructed bank personnel to identify and freeze all accounts held by Joe Richardson and Apex Natural Resources, Inc. There were three accounts that contained a total of $27.57. After Kane did not hear anything further from the court or Moody, he instructed bank personnel to call the court to determine what to do with the funds. Subsequently, Bank One submitted a check for $27.57 to the clerk of the court. The record is not clear as to exactly where the check was sent. Moody received the check from the court on the day the court granted default judgment.
At the hearing on the motion for new trial, Kane testified that although the writ required a written answer, he thought Bank One had done what the writ of garnishment required and that Bank One had followed the same procedure when it received writs of garnishment in the past. Kane also testified he did not file an answer because he believed Bank One had complied with the writ of garnishment.
The court of appeals held: (1) that Bank One's failure to answer was intentional; (2) that the failure to answer was due to a mistake; (3) that Bank One had a meritorious defense; and (4) that granting a new trial would not occasion delay or otherwise work an injury to Moody. 800 S.W.2d at 281-82. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court because the first element of the four element Craddock test used by the court of appeals was not met. The court of appeals held Bank One satisfied the other three elements of the four part Craddock test used by the court of appeals.
I.
In Craddock v. Sunshine Bus Lines, this court held that a trial court's discretion in determining whether to grant a new trial after the court renders a default judgment must be referenced to a guiding principle or rule. 133 S.W.2d at 126. The court then announced the guiding rule as follows:
A default judgment should be set aside and a new trial ordered in any case in which the failure of the defendant to answer before judgment was not intentional, or the result of conscious indifference on his part, but was due to a mistake or an accident; provided the motion for a new trial sets up a meritorious defense and is filed at a time when the granting thereof will occasion no delay or otherwise work an injury to the plaintiff.
133 S.W.2d at 126. The court of appeals improperly broke this test down into four elements as follows:
(1) that the failure to answer was not intentional, or the result of conscious indifference, (2) that the failure to answer was due to mistake or an accident, (3). that the defendant has a meritorious defense; and (4) that the defendant's motion was filed at a time when the granting thereof will occasion no delay or otherwise work an injury to the plaintiff.
800 S.W.2d at 281.
The requirement that the failure to answer be due to an accident or mistake should not be treated as a separate element. It is part of the first element of the three element test. Dividing the Craddock test into four elements is contrary to the way this court has consistently interpreted the test and changes the application of the test by improperly reading out the potential for a mistake of law to satisfy the test.
This court has consistently interpreted the Craddock test as having the following three elements: (1) the failure of the defendant to answer before judgment was not intentional, or the result of conscious indifference on his part, but was due to a mistake or an accident; provided (2) the motion for a new trial sets up a meritorious defense; and (3) is filed at a time when the granting thereof will occasion no delay or otherwise work an injury to the plaintiff. A three part test is consistent with the initial purpose of the Craddock test as well as being consistent with subsequent interpretation.
The development of the Craddock test indicates its initial purpose. The Craddock court did not create the standard for guiding discretion on new trial determinations. The court only "reannounce[d], in slightly changed language," the existing rule which was based on Dowell v. Winters, 20 Tex. 793 (1858). Craddock, 133 S.W.2d at 126. Dowell made a mistake of law and as a result failed to file a proper answer to Winter's suit against him. The Dowell court ordered a new trial after a default judgment when the court determined (1) that there was some excuse for not answering on time, (2) that there was a meritorious defense, and (3) that the trial was not delayed. 20 Tex. at 797.
The first element of the Craddock test just refines the excuse requirement of the earlier Dowell standard. The modified standard provides that when considering whether a defendant has a sufficient excuse for not answering on time, the court considers whether the failure to answer was intentional or due to conscious indifference rather than being due to a mistake or accident. Ward v. Nava, 488 S.W.2d 736, 738 (Tex.1973). The court's application of its rule in Craddock to the facts of Crad-dock further clarifies the rule. The Crad-dock court used the presence of a mistake to preclude the presence of an intentional act. 133 S.W.2d at 126.
The court of appeals offers no authority for splitting the Craddock test up into four elements. None of our cases support the proposition that the Craddock standard is a four part test. Nor have we found any court of appeals opinion, other than that of the court of appeals in this case, that supports the proposition that the Craddock test has four parts.
Further, the application and meaning of the Craddock test are changed if the test is treated as having four parts. Under the correct interpretation of Craddock, a mistake or accident may negate any intention not to file an answer. However, if the test is interpreted as having four elements, a mistake or accident cannot negate the intent not to file an answer. This is because, under a four part test, the requirement that the failure to answer not be intentional or due to conscious disregard and the requirement that the failure to answer be due to an accident or mistake must be met independently.
This court was faced with a mistake of law in Angelo v. Champion Restaurant Equipment Co., 713 S.W.2d 96 (Tex.1986). See also Gotcher v. Barnett, 757 S.W.2d 398 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1988, no writ) (mistake of law negated intention not to file). After Champion filed suit against Angelo, Angelo paid the claim in full but did not file an answer to the suit. Angelo mistakenly believed that paying the underlying claim was a sufficient response to the suit and that no answer was required. The trial court granted a default judgment and overruled the motion for new trial. This court and the court of appeals agreed that the "failure to answer was due to an accident or mistake." Angelo, 713 S.W.2d at 97. "Angelo's failure to answer was not caused by conscious indifference but by the belief that payment according to the agreed schedule would cause the suit to be dismissed." Id.
Angelo presents the same conflict as this case. The court in Angelo could have just as easily said that Angelo intended not to file an answer. However, the mistake of law was sufficient to negate the intent not to file an answer. Bank One did not file an answer because it mistakenly believed that freezing the accounts and submitting a check for the balance in the accounts to the court was a sufficient answer. This meets the first element of the Craddock test.
Most applications of the Craddock test focus on whether the failure to answer was intentional or due to conscious indifference. See, e.g., Cliff v. Huggins, 724 S.W.2d 778, 779 (Tex.1987); Strackbein v. Prewitt, 671 S.W.2d 37, 38-39 (Tex.1984). The accident or mistake segment is only considered when, on the facts of a particular case, an accident or mistake may negate intentional or consciously indifferent conduct. See, e.g., Strackbein, 671 S.W.2d at 38-39; State Farm Life Ins. Co. v. Mosharaf, 794 S.W.2d 578, 584 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1990, writ denied); Guardsman Life Ins. Co. v. Andrade, 745 S.W.2d 404, 405 (Tex.App.— Houston [1st Dist.] 1987, writ denied). The requirement of an accident or mistake has not been treated as a separate element. Consistent with this treatment, we hold that the Craddock test has three elements as set out above.
II.
This case also presents the question whether a mistake of law is one of the mistakes that may satisfy the first element of the Craddock test. The Craddock test was a restatement of the standard initially devised in Dowell v. Winters, 20 Tex. 793 (1858). Craddock, 133 S.W.2d at 126. Dowell made a mistake of law and as a result failed to file a proper answer to Winter's suit against him. Dowell, 20 Tex. at 794. The court, enunciating a standard that later became the Craddock test, stated that a mistake of law regarding the appropriate response to a petition is a sufficient excuse to warrant a new trial after a default judgment. Id. at 797-98. Therefore, the first element of the Craddock test is derived from a case where a mistake of law was the reason an answer was not filed.
Subsequent to Craddock, courts have held that a mistake of law satisfies the mistake segment of the first element of the Craddock test. See, e.g., Angelo, 713 S.W.2d at 97 (mistaken belief that paying underlying claim was sufficient answer); Texas State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Martinez, 658 S.W.2d 277, 280-81 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (mistaken belief that exclusive venue rested in county other than the county of suit). Therefore, we hold that a mistake of law may be sufficient to satisfy the first element of the three element Craddock test.
The Craddock test is well established in our jurisprudence. A mistake of law is one of the excuses that are sufficient to meet the requirements of Craddock. This is not to say that every act of a defendant that could be characterized as a mistake of law is a sufficient excuse. See, e.g., Carey Crutcher, Inc. v. Mid-Coast Diesel Services, Inc., 725 S.W.2d 500, 502 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1987, no writ) (attorney did not understand effect of bankruptcy stay); First National Bank of Bryan v. Peterson, 709 S.W.2d 276, 279 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (response to writ of garnishment; froze ac counts but did not submit funds to the court); Butler v. Dal Tex Mach. & Tool Co., Inc., 627 S.W.2d 258, 260 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1982, no writ) (read but did not understand citation; did nothing).
Robin Kane, branch president of Bank One, did not file a written answer to the writ because he thought that it was a sufficient answer to freeze the subject accounts and tender the balance of the accounts to the court issuing the writ. Moody did not controvert this statement of Kane's belief. Looking at the facts most favorable to Moody, Kane read and understood the writ of garnishment. However, that does not change the fact that Kane thought what he did was the answer that the writ required. This satisfies the first element of the Craddock test.
III.
We hold that the Craddock test has three elements as set out above and that a mistake of law may satisfy the first element of the Craddock test. When all three elements of the Craddock test are met, the trial court abuses its discretion by not granting a new trial. See Strackbein, 671 S.W.2d at 38. The court of appeals held that Bank One satisfied the second two elements of the Craddock test and those elements were not an issue in this court. Having held that the first element is satisfied, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and remand to the trial court for a determination of Moody's reasonable costs in obtaining the default judgment and then for trial on the merits. However, Bank One must follow through on its offer to reimburse Moody for his reasonable costs in obtaining the default judgment.
Dissenting opinion by GONZALEZ, J., joined by MAUZY and DOGGETT, JJ.
. Bank One, Texas, N.A. was operating as Deposit Insurance Bridge Bank, N.A., until after the default judgment was rendered. "Bank One" refers to both the current Bank One and its predecessor, Deposit Insurance Bridge Bank.
.See, e.g., Lopez v. Lopez, 757 S.W.2d 721 (Tex. 1988); Cliff v. Huggins, 724 S.W.2d 778 (Tex. 1987); Angelo v. Champion Restaurant Equipment Co., 713 S.W.2d 96 (Tex.1986); Guaranty County Mutual Ins. Co. v. Reyna, 709 S.W.2d 647 (Tex.1986); Grissom v. Watson, 704 S.W.2d 325 (Tex.1986); Strackbein v. Prewitt, 671 S.W.2d 37 (Tex.1984); Guaranty Bank v. Thompson, 632 S.W.2d 338 (Tex. 1982); United Beef Producers, Inc. v. Lookingbill, 532 S.W.2d 958 (Tex.1976); Ward v. Nava, 488 S.W.2d 736 (Tex.1973); Ivy v. Carrell, 407 S.W.2d 212 (Tex.1966).
. This court is not suggesting a return to the broad excuse language of Dowell.
. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
. Dowell had filed a separate suit against Winters claiming that Dowell owed Winters nothing but Winters owed Dowell a large sum of money. In that suit, Dowell requested an injunction preventing Winters from pursuing the suit in which the court granted the default judgment. Dowell thought the injunction requested in his suit against Winters was a sufficient answer to Winters' suit against him even though the court had not ruled on the injunction.
. However, this holding should not be interpreted as condoning the mistake of law made by Bank One or the mistake of law made by any other defendant.
. "While trial courts have some measure of discretion in the matter, as, in truth, they have in all cases governed by equitable principles, it is not an unbridled discretion to decide cases as they might deem proper, without reference to any guiding rule or principle." Craddock, 133 S.W.2d at 126. The three elements of the Crad-dock test define the bounds of a trial court's discretion.