Case Name: JOHN W. HILL AND ERONA J. HILL, HIS WIFE, PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS, v. BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT OF THE BOROUGH OF EATONTOWN, A MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY, AND JERRY CERAN AND EDITH V. CERAN, HIS WIFE, DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS
Court: New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New Jersey
Decision Date: 1972-12-07
Citations: 122 N.J. Super. 156
Docket Number: 
Parties: JOHN W. HILL AND ERONA J. HILL, HIS WIFE, PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS, v. BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT OF THE BOROUGH OF EATONTOWN, A MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY, AND JERRY CERAN AND EDITH V. CERAN, HIS WIFE, DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS.
Judges: 
Reporter: New Jersey Superior Court Reports
Volume: 122
Pages: 156–170

Head Matter:
JOHN W. HILL AND ERONA J. HILL, HIS WIFE, PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS, v. BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT OF THE BOROUGH OF EATONTOWN, A MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY, AND JERRY CERAN AND EDITH V. CERAN, HIS WIFE, DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS.
Superior Court of New Jersey Appellate Division
Submitted October 24, 1972
Decided December 7, 1972.
Before Judges Fritz, Lynch and Trautwein.
Mr. Albert T. Berich, attorney for appellants (Mr. Daniel M. Waldman, on the brief).
Messrs. Campbell, Mangini, Foley, Lee & Murphy, attorneys for respondents Board of Adjustment of the Borough of Eatontown (Mr. Michael J. Cernigliaro, on the brief).
Messrs. Cerrato & O’Connor, attorneys for respondents Jerry and Edith Ceran (Mr. William J. Mehr, on the brief).

Opinion:
The opinion of the court was delivered by
Lynch, J. A. D.
Plaintiffs John W. Hill and Erona J. Hill (Hills), next door neighbors of defendants Jerry Ceran and Edith Y. Ceran (Cerans), in the Borough of Eatontown, appeal from a judgment of the Law Division which affirmed the granting of a variance to the Cerans to permit certain additions to their residence. The additions would result in violation of the side yard requirement of seven feet as set forth in the applicable zoning ordinance. The proposed improvements would create a side yard of four feet.
On October 31, 1970, the Cerans applied for and received from the building inspector a permit to add a single car garage, laundry room, bath and foyer to their premises. The plans and specifications indicated that the side yard would be only four feet but the Cerans did not know of the seven foot requirement. There is no showing of fraud or lack of good faith on the part of the building inspector in issuing the permit. The court below held that the building inspector "made a mistake."
Construction began on November 4, 1970, and continued until March 10, 1971. At that time, the building inspector, alerted by the Hills, discovered that a mistake had been made in the issuance of the permit, and revoked it because it had been issued in violation of the ordinance. He told the Cerans that he had forgotten to let them know that they needed a variance when he issued the permit.
As the trial court found, substantial work had been completed between November and March. The foundation had been laid and inspected and approved by the building inspector. The rough framing of the rooms and garage area had been completed, the roof had been completely rough-sheathed with plyseore and partially shingled, the side of the garage and the rear of the addition had been rough-sheathed with plyseore. Of an overall estimated cost of $6,000, the Cerans had actually spent $3,500.
When the building inspector advised the Cerans of the revocation of ihe permit, they promptly applied for a variance and, after hearing, it was granted by the Board of Adjustment.
The trial court also found that if the Cerans were compelled to comply with the seven foot yard requirement the removal of the three feet of the garage would not only be at an additional cost of $1,500, but would also effectively deprive them of the use of the remaining structure (11 feet) for garage purposes. In recommending the variance, the Board of Adjustment found that many of the homes in the immediate area involved had side yards of less than seven feet. The trial court found that there were 40 homes with side yards less than seven feet on both sides and 38 homes where the side yards were less than seven feet on one side. Three of these incursions into the required side yard area were made pursuant to variances granted by the Board of Adjustment, two in 1967 and one in 1970.
Appellants argue that the building inspector "erroneously represented" that the minimum side yard requirement was four feet when in fact it was seven feet but, says appellant's brief, " in so making this good faith representation, no interpretation of the ordinance was necessary " and therefore estoppel may not be applied, citing Jantausch v. Borough of Verona, 41 N. J. Super. 89 (Law Div. 1956), aff'd 24 N. J. 326 (1957), and Bonsall v. Township of Mendham, 116 N. J. Super. 337 (App. Div. 1971), certif. denied 59 N. J. 529 (1971).
What must be decided here, with all semantic obfuscations aside, is simply this — when a building inspector, in good faith, but with mistaken judgment, issues a permit in violation of a zoning ordinance, may estoppel or laches operate in favor of one relying in good faith on the permit?
In our view, appellants misinterpret Jantausch. There, by way of dictum, the court alluded to three categories of cases wherein the issue of estoppel against a municipality may arise with respect to the issuance of permits. The court did not subscribe to any one of the categories, but merely described them: (1) where a permit is regularly issued in accordance with the ordinance, it may not be revoked after reliance by the permittee unless there be fraud; (2) where there is no semblance of compliance wtih or authorization in the ordinance, the deficiency is deemed jurisdictional and estoppel cannot be asserted (hereafter called the "void" class); and (3) the "intermediate situation" where the administrative official " in good faith and within the ambit of his duty makes an erroneous and debatable interpretation of the ordinance and the property owner in like good faith relies thereon ." Id. at 94. [Emphasis added] (hereafter called the "voidable" class). In the latter instance, said the court in Jantausch, the cases permit estoppel to operate.
Plaintiff argues that since the building inspector herein had no authority under the ordinance to issue the permit and therefore erroneously issued it to defendants, the action comes within category (2); i. e., the issuance of the permit was totally void ab initio and estoppel may not spring therefrom even though there was reliance thereon by the permittee.
We do not agree. A reading of the cases cited by the court in Jantausch as being examples of the "void" class demonstrates what is meant by that characterization. Thus in V. F. Zahodiakin &c., Corp. v. Bd. of Adjustment, Summit, 8 N. J. 386 (1952), it was said of the "void" action under review that it was "not professed to be an exercise of the statutory power" (Id. at 393); there was "no pretense of adherence to the statutory principle" (Id. at 394); it was "not within the province of the local authority" (Id. at 395); and it was "not a mere irregular exercise of the quasi-judicial function residing in the local authority." (Id.). In Zahodiakin, Justice Holier cited, among other cases, Bauer v. City of Newark, 7 N. J. 426 (1951), as illustrative of what he meant by an act so ultra vires as to be coram non judice and "utterly void," and thus beyond the power of resuscitation by reason of estoppel. In Bauer, Justice Heher described the distinction between an act which a municipality is "utterly without capacity to make under any and all circumstances" and an act "merely voidable for want of authority or for an irregularity in the exercise of the contractual power." Id. at 434.
In Summer Cottagers' Ass'n of Cape May v. City of Cape May, 19 N. J. 493 (1955), the Supreme Court, again through Justice Heher, said:
There is a distinction between an act utterly beyond the jurisdiction of a municipal corporation and tile irregular exercise of a basic power under the legislative grant in matters not in themselves jurisdictional. The former are ultra vires in the primary sense and void; the latter, ultra vires only in a secondary sense which does not preclude ratification or the application of the doctrine of estoppel in the interest of equity and essential justice. [Id. at 004],
Further, in Jantausch, Judge Weintraub adverted to Marini v. Borough of Wanaque, 37 N. J. Super. 32 at 40 (App. Div. 1955), wherein the court, speaking of what it assumed to be an unauthorized issuance of a building permit, said "If anything, it was a mistaken or irregular exercise of a ministerial function," rather than an action which is ut terly void as in V. F. Zahodiakin &c., Corp., supra, and, as it was characterized in Donovan v. Gabriel and Gruber, 57 N. J. Super. 542, 547 (App. Div. 1959): " a mistaken action on the part of the building inspector " and therefore not "void."
Thus the essential intent of Jantausch was that, if a permit was "irregularly" issued, but in good faith and within the ambit of the building inspector's duty, it is not "utterly void" and estoppel is permissible with proper good faith reliance thereon. And so Jantausch was interpreted in Schultze v. Wilson, 54 N. J. Super. 309 (App. Div.), certif. denied 29 N. J. 511 (1959), where the court said at 323-324:
Although Judge Weintraub was concerned with an ordinance situation and not a building permit case, a reasonable interpretation of his "intermediate" category applies to the instant situation where the officer issues a permit "within the ambit of his duty" in the utmost good faith (there is no proof to the contrary herein) and the property owner accepts it in good faith and relies thereon. As the permit was within the jurisdiction of the inspector to issue even if it was issued irregularly, it was not utterly void. [Emphasis added].
So here, the issuance of the building permit to the Cerans was within the province of the general duties of the building inspector. It was not an act which he was "without capacity to make under any and all circumstances." (Emphasis added). Rather it was a "mistaken or irregular exercise of a ministerial function" (Marini at 40) and "within the purview of his jurisdiction." (Donovan at 547). Therefore it came within the "intermediate situation" referred to in Jantausch and estoppel is not precluded.
B3r way of analogy, in the area of municipal contracts, a contract which a municipality is "utterly without capacity to make under any and all circumstances" is void. One in which there is no lack of power in the municipality but in which there has been a mere "irregular exercise" of the power, is voidable. In the former category there can be no recovery on the contract. In the latter class there can be recovery upon the theory that one contracting with a public body, under such circumstances, is not obliged to scrutinize, at Ms peril, the corporate proceedings. Bauer v. City of Newark, supra; Campbell v. City of Hackensack, 115 N. J. L, 209 (E. & A. 1935), and cases cited therein. And here Cerans had a right to rely on the validity of the permit issued to them by the building inspector who had the ostensible power to issue it. Realistically, and in practical recognition of what an ordinary citizen would do in this circumstance, is that not so?
Plaintiffs5 contention that it is only when a permit is validly issued that estoppel applies is not well taken. In Jantausch, Judge Weintraub cited as an example of the "intermediate55 class the case of Kurowski v. Bd. of Adjustment of Bayonne, 11 N. J. Super. 433 (App Div. 1951). There the building department had no authority to issue a permit for the erection of a storage building in an "A55 residence zone. Yet the Appellate Division, adopting verbatim an opinion of then Judge Brennan, affirmed the grant of a variance for the prohibited use. And in Marini v. Borough of Wanaque, supra, also cited in Jantausch as in the "intermediate55 class, the court, without passing upon the validity of the building permit involved, dismissed the complaint of Marini, next door neighbor of defendant Gordon and holder of the permit, on the grounds of limitations and laches. The court said:
Finally, we think laches additionally bars plaintiff's way. We are satisfied that he knew what was going on in respect to this structure and withheld his legal fire during a period in which he knew or had every reason to know that a substantial sum of money was being invested in the improvement of this property, [citing cases]. We are aware of the policy that laches should be invoked with hesitation against a taxpayer and citizen vindicating a public right, Garrou v. Teaneck Tryon Co., supra (11 N. J. at pages 306, 307, 94 A. 2d, at pages 338, 339), but we deem the application of laches plainly indicated in the present case. [Id. at 41],
The same principle of laches applies against the Hills here. Cf. N. J. S. A. 40:55-43.
Finally we conceive that the additional equitable doctrine of "relative hardship" applies here. Cf. Gilpin v. Jacob Ellis Realties, Inc., 47 N. J. Super. 26 (App. Div. 1957); Sautto v. Edenboro Apartments, Inc., 84 N. J. Super. 461 (App. Div.), eertif. denied 43 N. J. 353 (1964). If plaintiffs were to succeed, defendants would be compelled to destroy the improvements they had made before plaintiffs warned them of the possible violation. Id. at 476. That would be a severe hardship to defendants. Over and above the $3,500 already expended, it would cost defendants an additional $1,500, and would leave the new garage too small for its intended use. On the other hand, plaintiffs have suffered no discernible damage by the proposed construction and in fact the Board of Adjustment found that the side yard violation is consistent with many properties in the neighborhood. The resulting "gross inequity" warrants operation of estoppel against plaintiffs. Bonsall v. Township of Mendham, supra, 116 N. J. Super. at 346. While plaintiffs attempt to distinguish Bonsall from the instant situation, we read it as being distinguishable without a difference under the equitable principles here appropriate. Bonsall at 346.
Plaintiffs would have us ignore the " strong recent trend towards the application of equitable principles of estoppel against public bodies where the interests of justice, morality and common fairness clearly dictate that course." Gruber v. Mayor and Tp. Comm. of Raritan Tp., 39 N. J. 1, 13 (1962). The latter statement of our Supreme Court in Gruber was a reference to the Appellate Division opinion in the same case, appearing at 73 N. J. Super. 120. There Judge Gaulkin, for the Appellate Division, had pointed out that, even though the action of the municipality was truly void, equitable principles "akin to estoppel" had been applied in Hilton Acres v. Klein, 35 N. J. 570 (1961), and Tremarco Corporation v. Garzio, 32 N. J. 448 (1960). Gruber, supra, 73 N. J. Super. at 126-128. The Supreme Court, in affirming the Appellate Division decision in Gruber, adopted this philosophy. In simple language, estoppel will be applied against a municipality in the interest of equity and essential justice. Morality and common fairness clearly dictate that course. Gruber, supra, 39 N. J. at 12-17; see also Palisades Properties, Inc. v. Brunetti, 44 N. J. 117, 131 (1965); 405 Monroe Co. v. Asbury Park, 40 N. J. 457 (1963).
All of those concepts mandate judgment in favor of defendants. If estoppel and laches apply against the municipality so much the more so against plaintiffs, even though they be deemed to be acting vicariously for the municipality.
The judgment in favor of defendants is affirmed.