Case Name: Luce & Co., S. en C., Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Rosario Cintrón Sánchez de Capó, Defendant and Appellee
Court: Supreme Court of Puerto Rico
Jurisdiction: Puerto Rico
Decision Date: 1931-12-08
Citations: 42 P.R. 884
Docket Number: No. 5134
Parties: Luce & Co., S. en C., Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Rosario Cintrón Sánchez de Capó, Defendant and Appellee.
Judges: 
Reporter: Puerto Rico Reports
Volume: 42
Pages: 884–886

Head Matter:
Luce & Co., S. en C., Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Rosario Cintrón Sánchez de Capó, Defendant and Appellee.
No. 5134.
Argued May 9, 1930.
Decided December 8, 1931.
Tons Soto ct Zapater for appellant.
José A. Poventud, F. Parra Capó, Eduardo Capó and Alberto S. Poventud for appellee.
Note. — An appeal talcen from this decision to the U. S. Circuit Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, was dismissed for want of jurisdiction. See 73 F. (2d) 481.

Opinion:
Mr. Justice Hutchison
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Plaintiff appeals from an order approving a memorandum of costs, and submits that the district court was without jurisdiction to award costs on denial of a motion for a temporary injunction because the order refusing such relief was an interlocutory order, not a final judgment, and because no amount was involved.
Both questions have been heretofore decided adversely to the contention of appellant. Yabucoa Sugar Co. v. Yabucoa, 34 P.R.R. 280; Dávila v. District Court, 38 P.R.R. 142. Appellant challenges the soundness of the conclusion reached in the first of these two cases, but that is a point which may be passed upon when presented on an appeal from an order awarding costs in some future case. Both of the questions here sought to be raised come too late when presented for the first time on appeal from an order approving a memorandum of costs.
Appellant also questions the soundness of the doctrine laid down in Brac v. Ojeda, 27 P.R.R. 605, and subsequent cases, to the effect that an award of costs will be construed to include attorneys' fees unless the same are expressly excluded. For reasons heretofore stated in other opinions we adhere to the rule already established.
Other contentions are that the amount of ten thousand dollars allowed by the district court as attorneys' fees is excessive, and that only a nominal fee should have been allowed.
There was testimony tending to show that the professional services in question were worth $20,000 or more. The amount claimed in the memorandum was $14,000. We can not agree with appellant that a nominal fee only should have been allowed. The amount fixed by the trial judge was not excessive. There was no abuse of discretion, and there is no satisfactory ground upon which to base a further reduction.
The order appealed from must be affirmed.