Case Name: Lorean S. EVANS; Henry McDermott; Lucille McDermott; and Cheryl Lee Harrison, Appellants, v. George FIRESTONE, as Secretary of State of Florida; and Reason '84: the Committee For Citizens Rights In Civil Actions, a political action committee, Appellees
Court: Florida Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1984-10-11
Citations: 457 So. 2d 1351
Docket Number: No. 65898
Parties: Lorean S. EVANS; Henry McDermott; Lucille McDermott; and Cheryl Lee Harrison, Appellants, v. George FIRESTONE, as Secretary of State of Florida; and Reason ’84: the Committee For Citizens Rights In Civil Actions, a political action committee, Appellees.
Judges: BOYD, C.J., and ADKINS, OVERTON, ALDERMAN, McDONALD, EHRLICH and SHAW, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 457
Pages: 1351–1361

Head Matter:
Lorean S. EVANS; Henry McDermott; Lucille McDermott; and Cheryl Lee Harrison, Appellants, v. George FIRESTONE, as Secretary of State of Florida; and Reason ’84: the Committee For Citizens Rights In Civil Actions, a political action committee, Appellees.
No. 65898.
Supreme Court of Florida.
Opinions Oct. 3 and 11, 1984.
Barry Richard of Roberts, Baggett, La-Face, Richard & Wiser, Tallahassee, and Arthur England of Fine, Jacobson, Block, England, Klein, Colan & Simon, Miami, for appellants.
Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., Mitchell D. Franks, Chief Trial Counsel and Erie J. Taylor, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, Chesterfield Smith, Julian Clarkson and Lynn M. Dannheisser of Holland & Knight, Tallahassee, Robert L. Shevin and James A. Minix of Sparber, Shevin, Shapo & Heil-bronner, Miami, and Donald W. Weidner, Reason ’84: The Committee for Citizen’s Rights, Jacksonville, for appellees.
Karen A. Gievers of Anderson, Moss, Russo & Gievers, Miami, amicus curiae for Florida Consumers Federation, Inc.

Opinion:
PER CURIAM.
The declaratory judgment entered in this cause September 14, 1984 by the Honorable Ben C. Willis, Circuit Judge for the Second Judicial Circuit of Florida is hereby reversed and proposed amendment nine, titled Citizen's Rights in Civil Actions, is stricken from the November ballot. An opinion setting forth our reasons for this decision will issue at a later date.
BOYD, C.J., and ADKINS, OVERTON, ALDERMAN, McDONALD, EHRLICH and SHAW, JJ., concur.
PER CURIAM.
This cause is before the Court for review of a declaratory judgment rendered September 14, 1984, in which the Honorable Ben C. Willis found the proposed amendment to the Florida Constitution, Amendment 9: Citizen's Rights in Civil Actions, and its ballot summary were constitutionally valid. Appellants filed an appeal to the First District Court of Appeal which, upon motion by both parties, certified the question to this Court as being of great public importance, without passing on the merits. We have jurisdiction pursuant to article V, section 3(b)(5), Florida Constitution.
In the circuit court, appellants challenged the validity of appellee Firestone's placing on the November ballot the following amendment:
CITIZEN'S RIGHTS IN CIVIL ACTIONS
In civil actions: a) no party can be found liable for payment of damages, in excess of his/her percentage of liability; b) the Court shall grant a summary judgment on motion of any party, when the Court finds no genuine dispute exists concerning the material facts of the case; c) noneconomic damages such as pain and suffering, mental anguish, loss of consortium, and loss of capacity for the enjoyment of life shall not be awarded in excess of $100,000 against any party,
which would actually appear on the ballot in guise of the following title and summary, pursuant to section 101.161, Florida Statutes (1983):
CITIZEN'S RIGHTS IN CIVIL ACTIONS
Amendment establishes citizen's rights in civil actions: provides a party in a lawsuit shall not be required to pay more damages than the jury found him/her responsible for personally; requires courts to dispose of lawsuits when no dispute exists over the material facts thus avoiding unnecessary costs; and allows full recovery of all actual expenses such as lost wages, accident costs, medical bills, etc., but limits non-economic damages to a maximum of $100,000.
Appellants' challenge alleged that the amendment violates the one subject limitation imposed in article XI, section 3, Florida Constitution and that the title and summary are deceptive and ambiguous, thus failing to give the notice required by section 101.161, Florida Statutes (1983). Additionally, appellants raised a federal constitutional issue, claiming that the amendment's facial invalidity violated the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment of the federal constitution.
Judge Willis held that the amendment embraced only one subject and matter directly connected thereto and that the title and summary were neither ambiguous nor misleading. He declined to reach the due process issue, finding it not to be ripe for adjudication at that point in the amendment process.
After this Court accepted jurisdiction, the cause was fully briefed and orally argued. Our order striking the amendment from the ballot issued October 3, 1984. This opinion follows to explain our earlier decision.
We find the amendment clearly and conclusively defective on both grounds considered by the circuit court: it embraces more than one subject, and the ballot summary fails to satisfy the notice requirements of Florida Statute 101.161 as construed in Askew v. Firestone, 421 So.2d 151 (Fla.1982). As these holdings dispose of the case, we do not reach the due process claims raised in appellants' brief.
I. Single-Subject Requirement.
The power of the citizens of the state of Florida to amend their state constitution by initiative, set forth in article XI, section 3, Florida Constitution, is subject to only one rule of restraint — that the "revision or amendment shall embrace but one subject and matter directly connected therewith." (Emphasis supplied.) Proponents of the amendment have identified the single subject involved as "citizen's right in civil actions" and distinguished this amendment from the multi-subject amendment which was stricken in Fine v. Firestone, 448 So.2d 984 (Fla.1984), by pointing out that amendment 9 is self-contained and would create no conflict with any other existing constitutional provision.
Fine stands for the axiomatic proposition that enfolding disparate subjects within the cloak of a broad generality does not satisfy the single-subject requirement. There we held that the single subject "revenue" encompassed at least three subjects. Similarly "citizen's rights in civil actions" is so broad as to fail to delineate the subject or subjects of this amendment in any mean ingful way. As in Fine, we must look to the functional effect of amendment 9 to determine whether it satisfies the single subject requirement.
In Fine, we receded from earlier language indicating that conflict with multiple sections of the existing constitution has no place in determining multiplicity of subject in initiative amendments, 448 So.2d at 990 (expressly receding from Floridians Against Casino Takeover v. Let's Help Florida, 363 So.2d 337 (Fla.1978)), and found Citizen's Choice defective in part because of its multiple conflicts. We did not, however, establish that as the exclusive test for the single-subject requirement. In Fine we also discussed the primary and fundamental concern of the one-subject restriction — the prevention of logrolling. Where separate provisions of a proposed amendment are an "aggregation of dissimilar provisions [designed] to attract support of diverse groups to assure its passage," 448 So.2d at 988, the defect is not cured by either application of an over-broad subject title or by virtue of being self-contained.
The test, as set forth in Fine, is functional and not locational, and where a proposed amendment changes more than one government function, it is clearly mul-ti-subject. In Fine, we found multiplicity of subject matter because the proposed amendment would have affected several legislative functions. The proposed amendment now before us affects the function of the legislative and the judicial branches of government. Provisions a and c of the amendment, which limit a defendant's liability, are substantive in nature and therefore perform an essentially legislative function. On the other hand, provision b, elevating the summary judgment rule currently contained in Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.510, is procedural and embodies a function of the judiciary. We recognize that all power for each branch of government comes from the people and that the citizens of the state have retained the right to broaden or to restrict that power by initiative amendment. But where such an initiative performs the functions of different branches of government, it clearly fails the functional test for the single-subject limitation the people have incorporated into article XI, section 3, Florida Constitution.
Nor can we hold that the summary judgment provision is "directly connected" to the other two provisions. The general effect of provisions a and c is to limit the amount of damages for which any defendant will be liable. A summary judgment is a procedural mechanism whereby liability and damages may be adjudicated when material facts are undisputed. The existence of this mechanism in no way limits the generalized concepts of liability or damages. Furthermore, the provision would reach far beyond those civil actions in which liability and damages are at issue, e.g. declaratory judgments, mortgage foreclosures, dissolution proceedings. The ballot summary reveals that the purpose for including subsection b is that it would, arguably, lower litigation costs. Those costs, however, are qualitatively different from liability for damages and cannot be held to be "directly connected" for purposes of curing a "single subject" defect.
We hold therefore, that "Citizen's Rights in Civil Actions" does not delineate a single subject such that all three provisions are directly connected therewith. Within the broad generality of the amendment title we find provisions which effect both legislative and judicial functions.
II. Legal Sufficiency of the Ballot Summary
Section 101.161, Florida Statutes (1983) provides, in pertinent part:
Whenever a constitutional amendment or other public measure is submitted to the vote of the people, the substance of such amendment or other public measure shall be printed in clear and unambiguous language on the ballot . The substance of the amendment or other public measure shall be an explanatory statement, not exceeding 75 words in length, of the chief purpose of the measure. The ballot title shall consist of a caption, not exceeding 15 words in length, by which the measure is commonly referred to or spoken of.
In Askew v. Firestone, 421 So.2d 151 (Fla.1982), we construed this provision, holding that "the law required . that the ballot be fair and advise the voter sufficiently to enable him intelligently to east his ballot." Id. at 155 (quoting Hill v. Milander, 72 So.2d 796, 798 (Fla.1954)). In Askew we held clearly and conclusively defective a ballot summary which represented an amendment as granting citizens greater protection against conflicts of interest in government without revealing that it also removed an established constitutional protection. Appellants contend that the ballot summary now before us is similarly misleading. We agree.
The summary states that it "establishes" citizen's rights in civil actions. This is clearly inaccurate as applied to provision b, relating to summary judgment. This provision has long been established in Florida. The effect of the amendment is to elevate this procedural rule to the status of a constitutional right, protected in the same manner and to the same degree as are other constitutional rights. We do not pass on the merits of the effect nor do we question the citizens' right to do exactly this. We do find, however, that the voter must be told clearly and unambiguously that this is what the amendment does.
The summary for that same subsection, after describing the legal effect of summary judgment, ends with the editorial comment, "thus avoiding unnecessary costs." We note in passing that the validity of this statement was hotly contested. But whether it be accurate or not, no logical explanation was given of how a constitutional summary judgment rule would be more effective in avoiding costs than is the existing summary judgment rule. Moreover, the ballot summary is no place for subjective evaluation of special impact. The ballot summary should tell the voter the legal effect of the amendment, and no more. The political motivation behind a given change must be propounded outside the voting booth.
Even more disturbing, and more obviously analogous to Askew, is the material recasting of provision c from language of limitation in the amendment to language of affirmation in the ballot summary. Nothing in the amendment "establishes" the citizen's right to "full recovery of all actual expenses such as lost wages, accident costs, medical bills, etc." These damages are neither enumerated nor alluded to in the language of the amendment. To the extent a citizen's right is established in the amendment, it is the right to have his liability for "noneconomic damages such as pain and suffering, mental anguish, loss of consortium, and loss of capacity for enjoyment of life" capped at $100,000.
This limitation is clearly the chief purpose of provision c within the meaning of section 101.161, Florida Statutes. Just as it is clearly misleading to reveal only one half of a constitutional "trade off" in the ballot summary, Askew, 421 So.2d at 157 (Ehrlich, J., concurring), so is it fatally misleading to imply a constitutional trade-off where none is, in fact, contemplated. The only constitutional protection proposed here is for the benefit of the defendant in civil actions. No constitutional protection is added to the rights of the plaintiff. Again, this is not a criticism of the merits of the amendment nor a diminution of the citizens' right to afford this protection to defendants. We merely stand firm on the fundamental right of the voter to be given fair notice so that he or she may make an informed decision on the merits of the provision.
Because of the ballot summary here was clearly and conclusively defective and because the amendment embraced more than one subject, we have ordered the amendment stricken from the ballot.
NO MOTION FOR REHEARING WILL BE ALLOWED.
BOYD, C.J., and ADKINS and ALDERMAN, JJ., concur.
OVERTON, J., concurs with an opinion.
McDONALD, J., concurs with an opinion in which EHRLICH J., concurs.
EHRLICH and SHAW, JJ., concur specially with an opinion.