Case Name: MALCOLM MERCANTILE CO. v. BRITT
Court: Supreme Court of South Carolina
Jurisdiction: South Carolina
Decision Date: 1915-11-24
Citations: 102 S.C. 499
Docket Number: 9241
Parties: MALCOLM MERCANTILE CO. v. BRITT.
Judges: Messrs. Justices Hydricic, Fraser and Gage concur in the opinion announced by Mr. Justice Watts.
Reporter: South Carolina Reports
Volume: 102
Pages: 499–508

Head Matter:
9241
MALCOLM MERCANTILE CO. v. BRITT.
(87 S. E. 143.)
AgBICULTUBE—SHAKE CbOPPEHS—MORTGAGES—CLAIM AND DeLIVEBY.—A mortgagee of a tenant’s interest in a share crop, even after condition broken, is not entitled to the exclusive possession of, nor the owner of any particular part of the crop, until after division made, and cannot maintain an action of claim and delivery for its recovery or its value, but must enforce his lien thereon by an action on the equity side of the Court.
Mr. Chief Justice Gaby dissents.
Before Moore, J., Dillon, February, Í915.
Reversed.
Action by Malcolm Mercantile Company against John D. Britt. From an order refusing to vacate an order of arrest, defendant appeals.
The facts are stated in the Circuit order as follows:
The above entitled matter came on to be heard before me in open Court, at Dillon, upon motion of defendant to vacate an order of arrest issued by the clerk of Court .for the county of Dillon, upon a verified complaint in claim and delivery proceedings and upon affidavits. The motion is based on three grounds:
1. That the suit is not one in which claim and delivery-proceedings can be maintained for the reason that plaintiff seeks to recover an undivided crop, and the proper proceedings would be one on the equity side of the Court for accounting.
2. Upon the ground that the complaint not alleging fraud or such acts as bringing it under subdivision 2 of section 238 of the Code of Procedure, the order must be vacated.
3. Upon the ground that the case as made by the affidavits for plaintiff, and as rebutted by affidavits for defendant is not sufficient to sustain the arrest.
4. The first mentioned objection, if sustained, is sufficient to dispose of the case. The law seems to be well settled that claim and delivery proceedings can only be sustained as a general rule tq recover specific property-to which the plaintiff is entitled solely and exclusively, and this is the rule generally followed by our Court. The modern decisions, however, have made certain exceptions to this rule. Thus, in the case of commingled goods, where they are of the same nature and value, although the particular goods cannot be identified, yet if a division can be made of equal value, then each party may claim his aliquot part and enforce his right in such an'account. 34 Cyc. 1359, and authorities. Again, the rule does not obtain where the property is alike in quality and value and is readily divisible by measure or weight. Another instance is where 'one of the joint or common owners repudiates the interest of the other in property susceptible of division, or takes possession of the common property and converts it to his own use. 34 Cyc. 2394, and authorities. Plaintiff conténds, in the first instance, that the case in question falls under the last mentioned exception. The facts are in brief that the defendant had certain tenants working for shares of the crop upon certain premises in his possession; that in order to secure advances the tenants gave to the plaintiff a chattel mortgage on their interest in the crop, on which mortgage the defendant released his interest. That the defendant, instead of permitting the tenants to turn over to the plaintiff their interest in the crops raised, took possession of all of the crops, and converted them to his own use without in any way or manner accounting to the plaintiff therefor. The action is one in claim and delivery seeking to recover the half of the crop belonging to plaintiff under the said mortgage.
The further contention is made on the part of the plaintiff that the defendant has received his share of the crop, and plaintiff seeks only to recover a number of bales of cotton belonging to it and in which the defendant has no interest. The theory of this contention is that the defendant, having released the interest óf the tenants, and the mortgage being past due, the legal as well as the equitable title to the cotton in question vested in the plaintiff, and it had a right to recover same, and the defendant’s conversion thereof was wrong. In other words, that the plaintiff had a right to a division of the cotton before the same was disposed of by the defendant, and he having removed the property in which he had released any interest that he might have by reason of landlord, he is estopped from making the claim that the suit to recover possession thereof cannot be maintained. After a review of the authorities, I am satisfied that each of the contentions above mentioned is correct, and accepting allegations made in the complaint as true, which must be done for the purpose of the determination of this question, the suit can be maintained. Schulenberg v. Harriman, 21 Wallace 44; Richardson v. Atlantic Coast Lumber Company., 93 S. C. 254, 75 S. E. 371.
The case last cited establishes the proposition that title cannot be created by estoppel, and the defendant in this case, by his acts, having caused the plaintiff to invest his money in defendant’s own place, and having received the benefit thereof, should not now be permitted to defeat the plaintiff’s only remedy for collecting its debt.
As to the second proposition, the defendant conceded that the affidavits state sufficient ground for arrest, but contends that the same should be set aside upon the ground that the complaint does not allege fraud, and, hence, does not come under the provision of the statute permitting arrests in civil actions. This contention'cannot be sustained, as is held in a number of cases, all causes of action covered by the above provisions naturally fall into two classesFirst, those in which fraud is of the essence of the cause of action; second, those in which the arrest is permitted for some act extrinsic to the cause of action. In the latter it is not necessary for the complaint to allege the grounds of arrest. Bank v. Jennings, 38 S. C. 372, 17 S. E. 16, and Bank v. Buryee, 74 New York 491. The case in question falls under the second class above mentioned, and it is not necessary that the complaint should set forth the grounds of arrest. * * *”
Mr. Joe P. Lane, for appellant,
cites: Defendant entitled to exclusive possession of crop until division made: 20 S. C. 1; 20 S. C. 6; 52 S. C. 580; 70 S. C. 392; 40 S. C. 511; 1 Hill, 364. After condition broken tenant’s mortgagee became joint owner with landlord: 56 S. C. 302; 87 S. C. 370. Claim and delivery not applicable: 70 S. C. 547; 30 S. C. 328; 37 E. R. A. (N. S.) 267. Release: Civil Code, sec. 4162. Allegations do not authorise arrest: 10 E. R. A. (N. S.) 362; 38 S. C. 375.
Messrs. Gibson & Muller, for respondent.
November 24, 1915.

Opinion:
The opinion of the Court was delivered by
Mr. Justice Watts.
The principle laid down by the Circuit Judge is not applicable, either to the allegations of the complaint or proof in the case. There is no allegation or proof that the bales of cotton are of same weight or grade, and each bale would sell at the same price, or that they can be divided in kind between the parties according to their respective interest therein; and if these are not of the same weight, grade and kind, the sheriff cannot divide them and take only those that belong to the plaintiff. The action for claim and delivery should not have been brought, but the plaintiff's remedy was an action on the equity side of the Court. He had a plain and ample remedy there, he should have asked for an accounting, and if necessary, for an injunction and receiver. To hold otherwise would overrule Neal v. Suber, 56 S. C. 302, 33 S. E. 463, and Mayfield v. Bessinger, 87 S. C. 370, 69 S. E. 673. Britt was the owner of the entire crop on the premises and he had released not his interest in them, but had released what interest he had in the shares of his croppers only, and the plaintiff had a lien on the part of the cotton which was due the laborers for their hire in making the crop, and Britt was entitled to exclusive possession of the same until division had been made. A mere laborer for a share of the crop has no title to any part of said crop until after division is made. The plaintiff is not entitled to the exclusive possession of property sued for and only in such cases can an action for claim and delivery be maintained. Clerks Benevolent Union v. Knights of Columbus, 70 S. C. 547, 50 S. E. 206. The plaintiff's lien is on the share of the cropper, and a share cropper is not the owner of any particular part of the crop. The landlord owns the whole of the crop and is entitled to the exclusive possession of the same until after a division is' made. While it may prove a hardship in this case, it would be more damaging to affirm the judgment of the Circuit Court, as by so doing it would overrule several well considered cases and the judgment should be reversed.
Judgment reversed.
Messrs. Justices Hydricic, Fraser and Gage concur in the opinion announced by Mr. Justice Watts.
Footnote.—As to title of mortgagee of cropper on shares, see note in 19 L. R. A. 468.