Case Name: Viele et al. v. The Troy and Boston Railroad Company
Court: New York Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1859
Citations: 20 N.Y. 184
Docket Number: 
Parties: Viele et al. v. The Troy and Boston Railroad Company.
Judges: 
Reporter: New York Reports
Volume: 20
Pages: 184–191

Head Matter:
Viele et al. v. The Troy and Boston Railroad Company.
Where a trial by the court comes up for review without any finding of facts, nothing can be intended or presumed against the correctness of the judge's decision, hut in support of the judgment the party obtaining it is entitled to that inference from the facts proved which is most favorable to him.
A railroad corporation took possession of land required for its track under an agreement to pay the value, to be appraised by arbitrators, in ten days after notice of their award, and upon the tender of a deed conveying an unincumbered title: Held, that after the tender of a deed and a failure to specify the objection, that the title was subject to an incumbrance —which was removed eight days afterwards — the corporation continuing in the possession of the land, could not resist a specific performance on the ground that the plaintiff had not strictly performed the condition precedent on his part.
Nor can it impeach the award, because the arbitrators took improper items into consideration, in fixing the damages, the corporation having kept possession of the land with knowledge of that fact.
Appeal from the Supreme Court. Action for a specific performance of a contract. The trial was before Mr. Justice W. F. Allen, without jury, and these facts were proved: The defendant" located its road upon the plaintiff’s land, and its workmen having entered thereon, and being warned by the plaintiffs to keep off until they got their pay for the land, desisted from their . operations. Immediately thereafter the parties entered into an agreement that the damages from the appropriation of the land to use for a railroad should be determined by three appraisers named in the agreement: that within ten days after notice of the appraisal, the plaintiffs should execute and deliver a good and valid deed which should convey a title free from incumbrances, and thereupon the defendant should pay the amount appraised as compensation to the plaintiffs. The appraisers made an award, after hearing evidence and viewing the premises in presence of both parties, and deli vered copies to each. The plaintiffs were delayed a few days in consequence of an inability, from the absence of the officers of the defendant, to obtain the form of the deed required by the corporation, and an accurate survey and description of the land. Within ten days after the award, the plaintiffs tendered a deed to the defendant’s treasurer, which he declined to accept on the score of his want of authority to act in the premises, and the absence of the president. Upon the return of that officer, two or three days afterwards, the deed was handed to him and he referred it to counsel for examination. The counsel reported that the land was incumbered. It was in fact incumbered by a mortgage for $350, which was satisfied by the plaintiffs eight days after the first tender of their deed to the defendant’s treasurer. The defendant’s workmen resumed ope- . rations upon the land immediately after the award, and the defendant continued in possession down to the time of the trial. This action was commenced about five months after the award.
The defendant set- up in its answer, and offered to prove on the trial, that the arbitrators received evidence of expenses incurred by one of the plaintiffs in attending the Legislature to lobby against an amendment of the general railroad law, which the defendant was seeking to procure in, order to facilitate the obtaining title to lands required for its road, and that the arbitrators allowed some $80 on that account in their award; and also allowed the further sum of $500 to indemnify the plaintiffs against the chance, that at some future day the life of a child might be lost by injury from the defendant’s engines. The evidence was excluded and the defendant took an exception.
The judge directed judgment for a specific performance of the contract, in case the plaintiffs could then make a perfect title to the premises, to ascertain which he directed a reference at the defendant’s option (it was waived by stipulation). He refused costs to either party; to the plaintiffs for want of proof of a tender of deed, and demand of money after the satisfaction of the mortgage; to the defendant for the reason that the refusal to accept the conveyances and pay the award, and the defence of this action, were not placed distinctly upon the ground that the title was defective, but upon other and distinct grounds. The judgment having been affirmed at general term in the third district, the defendant appealed to this court. The case contained no statement of the conclusions of fact, either by the judge at circuit or the court at general term.
John X. Porter, for the appellant.
John 3. Reynolds, for the respondent.

Opinion:
Comstock, J.
Some of the points which have been urged on the part of the defendants might be worthy of a serious consideration, if they had not taken possession of the land in question for the purposes of their road, and continued in theoccupation, so far as we know, to the present time. It was suggested on the argument that the company took .possession as wrongdoers; that their continued occupation was but a continuance of the wrong; and on this ground that the question whether the award ought to be specifically enforced must be determined wholly by other considerations. To this it must be answered that the facts are not so found in the case made for reviewing the trial. There is indeed no statement of the conclusions of fact found by the judge who tried the cause, and therefore nothing can be intended or presumed against the correctness of his final decision. On looking into the evidence it appears that shortly before the award was made, the plaintiffs forbid the workmen of the company from going on to the land until it was paid for: that this prohibition was complied with until after the award was published, when the company resumed their operations, and from that time continuously occupied the premises. A reasonable interpretation of this conduct is, that the defendants on their part intended and expected to perform the award by paying to the plaintiffs the sum therein specified on receiving a conveyance of the land. The inference which the judge derived from these circumstances is not stated, and the plaintiffs therefore, in support of the judgment, are entitled to the one which is most favorable to them. I think they have a right now to say that the railroad company took and continued the possession of this land with a direct reference to the submission and award by which the price and damages were determined. That conclusion may have been, and probably was, the controlling one which influenced the course of the trial and the final decision.
Viewing the case from this point there was no error in the rulings at the trial, or in pronouncing the judgment. The defendants were not entitled to a nonsuit, as they claimed, on the ground that an incumbrance existed against the land at the time the deed was tendered to them. The title, it is true, was to be clear of incumbrance, and if the defendants had not themselves acted upon the award by taking possession of the premises, it may be that they could resist a specific performance on the ground that the condition precedent was not strictly performed on the part of the plaintiffs. Such a question need not be examined. The incumbrance was satisfied eight days after the deed was tendered, and although this was after the time when a clear title was to have been made, according to the terms of the sub- . mission, yet the defendants by their own conduct lost the right of insisting upon such a ground of defence. If they "were not content with the title offered to them, they should have specified the objection and given up the possession of the land.
And a similar answer must be given to another objection prominently urged on the argument before us. The defendants offered to show that the arbitrators allowed to be proved, and took into consideration, one or more items not embraced in the submission, and which could not legally form any part of the sum to be paid to the plaintiffs as a compensation for their land. It appears that both parties attended and were heard before the arbitrators; and the fact is not found, nor is it pretended, that the defendants took and retained possession of the land in ignorance of the irregularities which they offered to prove. In such circumstances they cannot reject the award, even if it could be otherwise impeached for misconduct or excess of power. If they intended to deny the validity of the decision, they should have kept away from the premises or proceeded in some other manner to acquire the' title. They did neither of these things; and having taken and appropriated the land with no other right to it than such as they took under the submission and award, they are, on the plainest principles, estopped from interposing a defence of this nature.
I think the judgment should be affirmed.
Johnson,- Ch. J., Denio, Allen and Gray, Js., concurred.