Case Name: John McIntyre and others, Appellants, v. Benjamin Clapp, Respondent
Court: New York Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1865-03
Citations: 31 N.Y. 569
Docket Number: 
Parties: John McIntyre and others, Appellants, v. Benjamin Clapp, Respondent.
Judges: 
Reporter: New York Reports
Volume: 31
Pages: 569–573

Head Matter:
John McIntyre and others, Appellants, v. Benjamin Clapp, Respondent.
To exclude evidence offered by the defendant tending to maintain one of the issues tendered by him, upon the hypothesis that, if the jury should believe certain evidence offered by the plaintiff to be true, then the defendant would be estopped from setting up and maintaining such issue, is erroneous.
It is erroneous for the court to assume as true what belongs to the jury to ascertain, and then make that assumption the basis of excluding testimony otherwise legitimate and proper.
This action was brought by the plaintiffs as copartners, to recover an account against the defendant for storing potatoes as warehousemen for him, and services in and about the same. The defendant sets up four defenses, the last of which is, that the potatoes were stored under a special contract, by which they were to be safely kept and stored for a certain reasonable reward and compensation, to be paid to the plaintiffs ; that the plaintiffs promised safely to keep them in good condition, and deliver them on request. He then alleges the plaintiffs’ carelessness and negligence in respect thereto; thau the defendant’s potatoes were thereby injured by frost or otherwise, and that he had sustained loss or damage thereby to the amount of one hundred and fifty dollars. On the trial, a witness for the plaintiffs, a son of the plaintiff Smith, was-called, and proved a conversation between the defendant and the father of the witness, in the spring of 1855, showing a liquidation and settlement of the account for storage, and a promise to pay the sum agreed upon. The defendant called various witnesses for the purpose, among others to impeach the witness Smith, and then called a witness to contradict, and who did contradict this witness as to the quantity of potatoes that had been stored, and then offered to show, by the same witness, that these potatoes were stored under a special agreement between the parties at four cents per bushel, through the winter, and the plaintiffs were to insure the defendant against damage by frost to the potatoes; and that the potatoes thus stored were damaged by frost during the winter, to an amount exceeding in value the price agreed on for storage. This was objected to by the plaintiffs’ counsel, and the offer was overruled by the court, the evidence excluded and the defendant’s counsel excepted. The judge, in his charge to the jury, stated that he had ruled out the defendant’s offer as to the special agreement to insure against damage by frost, inasmuch as the defendant would be estopped from setting it up by his subsequent agreement, if they believed the witness by whom the subsequent agreement was sought to be proved.
To this portion of the charge the defendant excepted. The jury found a verdict for the plaintiffs, upon which judgment was entered. The General Term ordered a new trial, and the plaintiffs appealed from that order, and stipulated that if the same should be affirmed, judgment absolute might be entered against them.
The cause was submitted on printed points by
Wait and Reynolds, for the appellants.
James Gibson, for the respondent.

Opinion:
Davies, J.
The only question presented for consideration in this appeal is, as to the correctness of the ruling of the judge at the trial excluding the evidence offered by the defendant. The reason given by the judge for such exclusion, in his charge, is, that if the jury believed the testimony of Smith, then that evidence was improper, inasmuch as the defendant was estopped by the agreement testified to by Smith, from setting up the agreement offered to be given in evidence by him. But this was begging the very question which the jury had to decide; and if the proposition stated was a legal and correct one, it furnished no ground for the exclusion of the evidence offered. If sound, it was eminently proper to have so said to the jury, in commenting upon the effect of that evidence, but it furnished no ground for its exclusion. Smith's testimony had been seriously impeached, and in one particular contradicted. The evidence offered by the defendant tended to weaken if not wholly to discredit it, and if it would not have had that effect, then it was admissible, as setting up a distinct and substantive cause of defense, and which it is conceded would have been available to the defendant, unless he had done something to preclude him from availing himself of it. This it is not pretended he had done, unless he was estopped from setting it up, and whether so estopped or not, depended entirely on the testimony of Smith. If he was not credited, then the foundation of the estoppel was gone, and the relevancy of the excluded testimony is conceded. The exclusion of the testimony, therefore, necessarily assumed the credibility of the testimony of Smith; thus drawing from the jury the consideration of that question, and deciding it by the court. This is in substance conceded by the judge in his charge to the jury. Without intimating any opinion as to the effect of the evidence, and whether or not the defendant would have been estopped, by the agreement testified to by Smith, if the jury should have found that such an agreement had in fact been made, I am clearly of the opinion that the testimony offered was improperly excluded, and that the order of the General Term granting a new trial should be affirmed.