Case Name: Tom SANCHEZ, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. L.D.S. SOCIAL SERVICES, Defendant and Respondent
Court: Utah Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Utah
Decision Date: 1984-04-12
Citations: 680 P.2d 753
Docket Number: No. 17698
Parties: Tom SANCHEZ, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. L.D.S. SOCIAL SERVICES, Defendant and Respondent.
Judges: HALL, C.J., and HOWE, J., concur.
Reporter: Pacific Reporter 2d
Volume: 680
Pages: 753–757

Head Matter:
Tom SANCHEZ, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. L.D.S. SOCIAL SERVICES, Defendant and Respondent.
No. 17698.
Supreme Court of Utah.
April 12, 1984.
Paul Gotay, Ogden, for plaintiff and appellant.
Allen M. Swan, Salt Lake City, for defendant and respondent.

Opinion:
STEWART, Justice:
The plaintiff, Tom Sanchez, appeals a dismissal of his petition for a writ of habe-as corpus to obtain custody of the child he fathered who, born out of wedlock, is now over three years old. The mother had given the child up to defendant L.D.S. Social Services to be placed for adoption. The district court dismissed Sanchez's petition on the ground that he had abandoned the child pursuant to the terms of U.C.A., 1953, § 78-30-4(3). That provision reads as follows:
(a) A person who is the father or claims to be the father of an illegitimate child may claim rights pertaining to his paternity of the child by registering with the bureau of vital statistics of the division of health, Utah department of social services, a notice of his claim of paternity of an illegitimate child and of his willingness and intent to support the child to the best of his ability....
(b) The notice may be registered prior to the birth of the child but must be registered prior to the date the illegitimate child is relinquished or placed with an agency licensed to provide adoption services .
(c) Any father of such child who fails to file and register his notice of claim to paternity and his agreement to support the child shall be barred from thereafter bringing or maintaining any action to establish his paternity of the child. Such failure shall further constitute an abandonment of said child and a waiver and surrender of any right to notice of or to a hearing in any judicial proceeding for the adoption of said child, and the consent of such father to the adoption of such child shall not be required.
C.S.M., the child's natural mother, began dating Sanchez in the fall of 1979. From December, 1979, until March, 1980, she lived much of the time at Sanchez's apartment, during which time she became pregnant by him. On several occasions, before, during, and after the pregnancy, Sanchez proposed marriage, but she refused. Sanchez also expressed his desire to have her and the baby live with him after the birth. Prior to the child's birth, the mother told Sanchez that she might give the baby up for adoption. Both she and Sanchez discussed the problems presented by the expected child with a counselor at L.D.S. Social Services. The counselor did not inform Sanchez of the statutory right that he could assert by complying with the statutory filing requirement.
The baby was born on October 24, 1980. The mother signed papers relinquishing the child on the morning of October 27. Sanchez had earlier visited her and the baby in the hospital. At trial, he asserted that he assumed the three of them would eventually live together even though he and the mother had not discussed any plans to that effect and even though she told Sanchez that she would not live with him or marry him. C.S.M. called Sanchez on the morning of the 27th and told him to come to the hospital if he wanted to see the baby one last time. When Sanchez went to the hospital on the 27th, he did not protest the mother's decision to place the child for adoption. However, he did try to sign the birth certificate, but was not allowed to do so. He then attempted to register with the Bureau of Vital Statistics the afternoon of the 27th, but was not allowed to do so until the 28th. The baby had been relinquished by the mother to L.D.S. Social Services before Sanchez registered or attempted to register his status as natural father. L.D.S. Social Services placed the child in an adoptive home, and the child has now lived in that home over three years.
Sanchez contends that because § 78-30-4 does not provide for actual notice of the statutory procedure for establishing his parental rights, it denies him a liberty without due process of law. For reasons expressed in Wells v. Children's Aid Society, Utah, 681 P.2d 199, (1984), there is no constitutional requirement that § 78-30-4 give actual notice of the statutory requirements for establishing paternal rights.
The dissent concedes the facial constitutionality of § 78-30-4, but contends that the statute is unconstitutional as applied in this case. The concession of the facial constitutionality of the statute and the assertion that the statute is unconstitutional as applied in this case are hard to reconcile. Sanchez lived in this state throughout the pregnancy, knew of the time and place of the birth of the child, and was presumed to know the law. In Wells we expressly held that a father who tried to register in a timely fashion, but did not do so, was not entitled to notice. Wells controls the issue here. It is of no constitutional importance that Sanchez came close to complying with the statute. Because of the nature of subject matter dealt with by the statute, a firm cutoff date is reasonable, if not essential.
The consequence of the position asserted by the dissent would be to promote litigation in a number of adoption cases, thereby holding the rights of putative adoptive parents, and the rights of the natural mother, whatever they may be, in limbo while the courts undertake to make a decision based on criteria nowhere articulated by the dissent, but which would, no doubt, involve the degree of the father's diligence and sincerity in trying to establish his parental rights, factors which are foreign to the statutory provisions. The damage done by the actual and potential disruption of the adoption system by protracted litigation of such cases would be especially incalculable as to the children involved. The harm caused to infants, who need stable relationships with adults for the psychological bonding necessary for their well-being and character development, could be incurable.
Marriage is the institution established by society for the procreation and rearing of children. Those who conceive children outside the bonds of marriage may be loving parents, but experience teaches that the number of illegitimate children born each year contribute disproportionately to many of the serious social problems with which society must cope. It is not too harsh to require that those responsible for bringing children into the world outside the established institution of marriage should be required either to comply with those statutes that accord them the opportunity to assert their parental rights or to yield to the method established by society to raise children in a manner best suited to promote their welfare.
Affirmed. Costs to respondent.
HALL, C.J., and HOWE, J., concur.
. On these facts, Ellis v. Social Services Department of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, Utah, 615 P.2d 1250 (1980), is clearly distinguishable. In Wells, supra, we declined to expand the holding in Ellis beyond the type of factual situation involved in that case.
. The dissent claims that the child's mother and L.D.S. Social Services deprived the father of the opportunity to claim his parental rights. That is not accurate and is irrelevant. They simply did not inform him of the statutory procedure. Furthermore, C.S.M. probably did not know about the procedure. Whether L.D.S. Social Services had some duty to inform is not established by this record. But if it did and breached that duty, that does not constitute state action or result in a violation of due process.