Case Name: THE BUILDING AND LOAN SOCIETY OF ABSECOM v. ROBERT LEEDS, WILLIAM T. CARTER, JOSEPH NOTE AND MORRIS POWDERMAKER
Court: New Jersey Court of Errors and Appeals
Jurisdiction: New Jersey
Decision Date: 1888-03
Citations: 50 N.J.L. 399
Docket Number: 
Parties: THE BUILDING AND LOAN SOCIETY OF ABSECOM v. ROBERT LEEDS, WILLIAM T. CARTER, JOSEPH NOTE AND MORRIS POWDERMAKER.
Judges: For affirmance — The Chancellor, Chief Justice, Depue, Knapp, Magie, Scudder, Van Syckel, Brown, Cole, McGregor. 10.
Reporter: New Jersey Law Reports
Volume: 50
Pages: 399–409

Head Matter:
THE BUILDING AND LOAN SOCIETY OF ABSECOM v. ROBERT LEEDS, WILLIAM T. CARTER, JOSEPH NOTE AND MORRIS POWDERMAKER.
1. The signing of a non-negotiable note by a third party while such note is in the hands of the maker of it, does not, when passed to the payee, import, per se, any contract on which a suit will lie.
2. The production of such a note, without proof other than itself, will not sustain an action against such endorser; in such case the plaintiff, with respect to such endorser, must be non-suited.
Error to Atlantic Circuit Court.
Suit on promissory note drawn by Leeds as maker, payable to the plaintiff. The note was not, by its terms, negotiable.-
It appeared while the maker of the note held it, it was signed on the back by Note, Carter and Powdermaker; there was no evidence showing in what capacity they did such act. So far as related to these three last-named defendants, the plaintiff was non-suited at the trial.
For the plaintiff in error, Peter L. Voorhees.
For the defendants in error, H. L. Slape.

Opinion:
The opinion of the court was delivered by
Beasley, Chief Justice.
The only question in this case is whether a note, not negotiable, signed on its back by three persons, prior to its passing to the payee, is evidence, per se, of a contract by such endorsers. At the trial it was held that the note, standing alone, did not evidence what the agreement between these parties was, and consequently, with respect to these three endorsers, the plaintiff was non-suited.
Over sixteen years ago this court, in the case of Chaddock v. Van Ness, 6 Vroom 517, decided that the signature of a third person on the back of a negotiable note, before it was put in circulation by the maker, neither expressed nor implied, by its own intrinsic signification, any contract whatever on the part of such endorsers. The endorsement in that case was treated as a signature in blank, over which could be written the real engagement of the party endorsing, which was to be proved by parol evidence. Parol evidence was held to be admissible to show what the agreement between the parties was, a result which could not have been sanctioned except on the ground that the writing itself did not manifest an agreement. If the note and the endorsement proved an agreement it followed as a matter of course that parol evidence to show the mind of the parties would have been inadmissible.
Nor was this decision a novelty in the jurisprudence of this state, for as far back as 1856 the Supreme Court had promulged a similar adjudication in the case of Watkins v. Kirkpatrick, 2 Dutcher 84, the same principle haviug been previousl}r asserted in the case of Crozier & Moore v. Chambers, Spencer 256. And it was this long prevalence of the doctrine that had a considerable and perhaps a decisive effect when the question finally arose in this court in the case referred to. Speaking as a member of this court on that occasion, I can say that it did, not then seem to me that the prin ciple established was either politic, or the logical deduction! from the facts in proof. It seemed to me then, as now, that, when a third person signs a note before it has been put in' circulation by the maker, whether such signature be on its back or face, the writing should be construed as exhibiting his contract, which would have the effect of placing him as. one of the makers of the instrument. This is the view taken by the courts of Massachusetts, and it- has the signal advantage of reducing the transaction to the stable form of a definite-written contract, instead of, as in the present case, compelling-the person who has taken the paper and loaned his money upon it, to prove the real character of the affair by oral testimony, and generally by means of interested and hostile witnesses. But on the occasion referred to it seemed to me that the usage in question, and which had grown up under the-sanction of the courts, was so firmly established that it could not properly be abrogated by judicial authority. That doctrine was then approved of by this court, and since then it lias, not seemed to me that the matter thus far was open to further-discussion.
Taking, then, this as an established premise, the only inquiry is whether the endorsement made in the present instance, being on a note not negotiable, affords a ground for discrimination. Such a differentiation has been made in some instances by various courts, but upon reflection I am satisfied that the distinction thus drawn is too subtle to be safely acted upon. At best it would take out of the rule a very limited, class of cases, and would, consequently, have but a scant effect.. Legal regulations affecting contracts and property should be-plain and well defined, and it is obvious that exceptive cases have inevitably a marked tendency to perplex and confuse the-rule.
On the doctrine of stare decisis, I think this judgment, should be affirmed.