Case Name: MOBIL OIL CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. Jeremy BRANSFORD, Respondent
Court: Florida Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1995-01-05
Citations: 648 So. 2d 119
Docket Number: No. 80310
Parties: MOBIL OIL CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. Jeremy BRANSFORD, Respondent.
Judges: GRIMES, C.J., OVERTON, KOGAN and HARDING, JJ., and MeDONALD, Senior Justice, concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 648
Pages: 119–124

Head Matter:
MOBIL OIL CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. Jeremy BRANSFORD, Respondent.
No. 80310.
Supreme Court of Florida.
Jan. 5, 1995.
Rehearing Denied Feb. 17, 1995.
Roger S. Robert of Mark A. Cohen & Associates, P.A., Miami, for petitioner.
Mark R. McCollem of McCollem and D’Espies, P.A., Ft. Lauderdale, for respondent.
C. Rufus Pennington, III of Margol & Pennington, P.A., Jacksonville, amicus curiae for Academy of Florida Trial Lawyers.
Mark Hicks of Hicks, Anderson & Blum, P.A., Miami, amicus curiae for American Petroleum Institute.
S.William Fuller, Jr. and Michael W. Ke-hoe of Fuller, Johnson & Farrell, P.A., Tallahassee, amicus curiae for Amoco Corp.

Opinion:
PER CURIAM.
We have for review Bransford v. Berman, 601 So.2d 1306 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992), based on apparent conflict with the opinion in Orlando Executive Park, Inc. v. Robbins, 433 So.2d 491 (Fla.1983). We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const.
In 1990, Jeremy Bransford entered a Mobil Mini Mart gas station in Broward County owned by Mobil Oil Corporation but leased to Alan Berman. While on the premises, Bransford was attacked and beaten by one of Berman's employees, who allegedly had a history of assaulting customers. Bransford later sued Mobil on the theory that it had effectively established an apparent agency relationship with the leaseholder, Berman.
As grounds, Bransford noted the facts that Mobil owned the property, that Mobil products were sold in the station, that Mobil trademarks and logos were used throughout the premises, and that the franchise agreement with Mobil required the use of Mobil symbols and the selling of Mobil products. Moreover, Mobil allegedly sent its representatives to the station to provide various routine franchise support services. The trial court ordered summary judgment in favor of Mobil, but the district court reversed the relevant portions of that order.
We find Bransford's allegations legally insufficient to plead a case against Mobil. In today's world, it is well understood that the mere use of franchise logos and related advertisements does not necessarily indicate that the franchisor has actual or apparent control over any substantial aspect of the franchisee's business or employment decisions. Nor does the provision of routine contractual support services refute this conclusion. Here, the contract itself expressly stated that Berman "is an independent businessman, and nothing in this contract shall be deemed as creating any right in [Mobil] to exercise any control over, or to direct in any respect, the conduct or management of [the] business.".
Franchisors may well enter into an agency relationship with a franchisee if, by contract or action or representation, the franchisor has directly or apparently participated in some substantial way in directing or managing acts of the franchisee, beyond the mere fact of providing contractual franchise support activities. However, nothing in the present record sufficiently establishes that the parties to the instant contract ceased to honor the. contract's own terms, actually or apparently. There thus is no remaining issue of material fact to support the district court's decision as to Mobil.
In cases of alleged apparent agency, something must have happened to communicate to the plaintiff the idea that the franchisor is exercising substantial control. Our law is well settled that an apparent agency exists only if each of three elements are present: (a) a representation by the purported principal; (b) a reliance on that representation by a third party; and (c) a change in position by the third party in reliance on the representation. Sapp v. City of Tallahassee, 348 So.2d 363, 367 (Fla. 1st DCA), cert. denied, 354 So.2d 985 (Fla.1977); Cawthon v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 124 So.2d 517 (Fla. 2d DCA 1960).
It is the first of these elements that is primarily relevant here. The factual allegations in the complaint below clearly fail to allege even the minimum level of a "representation" necessary to create an apparent agency relationship. The plaintiff below alleged no genuine factual representation by Mobil, but merely assumed that such a representation is implicit in the prominent use of Mobil symbols and products throughout the station and in the provision of support activities. As noted above, such an assumption is not sustainable in today's world. Unless properly amended, the complaint below clearly fails to state a cause of action against Mobil.
While the Orlando Executive Park case appears to create some distinction between "oil company cases" and others, we find any such distinction irrelevant to the holding of that case. The only relevant fact in Orlando Executive Park was that the franchisor's direct participation was substantial despite the fact it did not own the property: The franchisor actually operated several components within the complex in question. Orlando Executive Park, 433 So.2d at 494. That fact alone obviously and directly "represented" to the public that the franchisor was in substantial control of the business, even though the franchisor did not own the premises.
Indeed, actual ownership of the premises is relevant only to the extent it may indicate some degree of actual or apparent control over the business. Mobil's ownership here is irrelevant because the record indicates that Mobil had leased the property to another who possessed actual and superseding control over the premises; and there was nothing beyond trademark symbols, Mobil products, and franchise support to indicate any apparent control by Mobil as to this plaintiff.
We recognize that Orlando Executive Park suggested that oil company cases somehow are different from other franchising cases and that logos or other trademark symbols alone can create an apparent agency. Because we believe these to be erroneous impressions, we recede from Orlando Executive Park to the extent it is inconsistent with this opinion. The briefs in this case as well as the district court's opinion indicate the unnecessary confusion caused by the misleading language in Orlando Executive Park, which requires us to clarify the relevant law as set forth in this opinion above.
we address one further as-asof the district court's opinion. At one point the opinion apparently reinstates only the claim of negligent retention against Ber-Ber-Yet, the district court seems to hold that Mobil still might have some vicarious liability as to the claim of failure to provide adequate security — even though dismissdismissal of the same claim against apparappar-ently is left intact. The opinion below and the record are not entirely clear on this point and, in any event, we need not determine what the court actually held. We merely note for the instruction of the courts below that the dismissal of any claim against an apparent agent also requires dismissal of the same claim against the apparent principal. This is based on the simple fact apparappar-ent agency is a theory of vicarious liability imputing the acts of the agent to principrinci-pal. Thus, if the agent cannot be held liable, neither can the principal, because there is nothing to impute.
This proceeding is remanded for proceedings consistent with our views here, and with instructions that the trial court's order of summary judgment in favor of Mobil be rein stated. The decision of the district court is quashed.
It is so ordered.
GRIMES, C.J., OVERTON, KOGAN and HARDING, JJ., and MeDONALD, Senior Justice, concur.
SHAW, J., dissents with an opinion.