Case Name: COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee, v. William E. KLEINICKE, Appellant
Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
Jurisdiction: Pennsylvania
Decision Date: 2006-03-08
Citations: 895 A.2d 562
Docket Number: 
Parties: COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee, v. William E. KLEINICKE, Appellant.
Judges: BEFORE: HUDOCK, FORD ELLIOTT, JOYCE, ORIE MELVIN, KLEIN, BENDER, BOWES, GANTMAN, and PANELLA, JJ.
Reporter: West's Atlantic Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 895
Pages: 562–595

Head Matter:
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee, v. William E. KLEINICKE, Appellant.
Superior Court of Pennsylvania.
Argued March 9, 2005.
Filed March 8, 2006.
Douglas P. France, York, for appellant.
Scott A. McCabe, Asst. Dist. Atty., York, for Com., appellee.
BEFORE: HUDOCK, FORD ELLIOTT, JOYCE, ORIE MELVIN, KLEIN, BENDER, BOWES, GANTMAN, and PANELLA, JJ.

Opinion:
OPINION BY BOWES, J.:
¶ 1 William E. Kleinicke appeals from the judgment of sentence of five years imprisonment and a $50,000 fine that was imposed after he was convicted of possession with intent to manufacture a controlled substance, marijuana, in violation of 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(30). This conviction carried a five-year maximum sentence under 35 P.S. § 780 — 113(f)(2). Due to penalties applicable to possession of various amounts of marijuana imposed pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S. § 7508, Appellant's minimum sentence was increased to be coextensive with his maximum sentence.
¶ 2 In this appeal, we consider whether Appellant's sentence violated the Supreme Court's pronouncements in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), and Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004). After careful review, we conclude that the principles for which these cases stand were not implicated because 18 Pa.C.S. § 7508 merely increased the minimum sentence and not Appellant's maximum term of imprisonment beyond the statutory maximum authorized by the jury's verdict under 35 P.S. § 780-113. Therefore, we affirm.
¶ 3 On August 31, 2001, police executed a search warrant at Appellant's residence at 16651 Round Hill Church Road in Stewartstown, Hopewell Township, York County. The search warrant was based upon an affidavit of probable cause dated August 31, 2001, and prepared by Pennsylvania State Police Officer Craig B. Fenstermacher. The affidavit averred the following: Officer Fenstermacher met with a confidential informant ("Cl") who knew Appellant, was aware that Appellant grew and sold marijuana from his residence, and had observed Appellant sell marijuana on at least fifteen occasions. Police confirmed Appellant's address through his driving record and within three days of August 31, 2001, conducted a controlled buy at that location utilizing the Cl. Officer Fenstermacher also had spoken with Pennsylvania State Trooper Bradley Schriver, who had received information that Appellant was involved with controlled substances. Finally, approximately three years prior to the application for a search warrant, Officer Fenster-macher had been told by another confidential informant that Appellant was distributing marijuana from his residence. In fact, Appellant's criminal history indicated that he had been charged with possession of a controlled substance in 1985 and had been accepted into the accelerated rehabilitative disposition program at that time.
¶ 4 During execution of the warrant, police discovered a sophisticated marijuana-growing operation; they seized 693 marijuana plants from four areas of Appellant's property, including a shed, a room underneath his home, an outside field, and a room specially outfitted to grow marijuana. Appellant was arrested and charged with possession with intent to manufacture a controlled substance, marijuana, in violation of 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(30). Of the 693 plants seized, fifteen plants were tested.
¶ 5 After pretrial hearings disposing of Appellant's request for suppression of the evidence, the case proceeded to trial where Appellant was convicted of violating 35 P.S. § 780 — 113(a)(30). In order to preserve his present sentencing challenge, Appellant asked that the jurors be polled as to the number of live plants he had possessed. Eleven jurors found that Appellant possessed 693 marijuana plants, but one juror concluded that the Commonwealth had only proven that Appellant possessed fifteen live marijuana plants, which was the number that actually had been tested.
¶ 6 Appellant proceeded to sentencing on January 31, 2003, where the sentencing court concluded that Appellant possessed 693 live plants. Based on this finding, Appellant was sentenced to a flat sentence of five years imprisonment and a $50,000 fine. Following the denial of post-sentence motions, Appellant filed a direct appeal to this Court. A three-judge panel, with one judge dissenting, issued a memorandum decision affirming the judgment of sentence. We granted m banc, review. Appellant now raises two issues:
1. Whether the court's sentence of Kleinicke to a sentence of five (5) years incarceration for 51 or more live marijuana plants pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S. § 7508 without unanimity of jurors as to the number of plants violated Kleinicke's sixth amendment right to trial by jury as delineated in Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004)?
2. Whether the [panel] correctly determined Kleinicke waived the challenge to the validity of the affidavit of probable cause premised on the confidential informant's purported statement because the claim was dependent upon material not included in the certified record when it was not included in the certified record pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. § 1921 due to an inadvertent mistake or negligence on the part of the York County Clerk of Courts in the function of their official duty.
Appellant's brief at 3.
¶ 7 We first set forth the facts necessary to review Appellant's sentencing claim. Marijuana is a Schedule I drug but is not classified as a narcotic drug. Therefore, the maximum sentence for Appellant's conviction under 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(30) was five years imprisonment, as outlined by 35 P.S. § 780 — 113(f)(2). Appellant's minimum sentence was impacted by 18 Pa.C.S. § 7508(a)(l)(iii), which provides in relevant part that notwithstanding any other statutory provision, if a person is convicted of 35 P.S. § 780 — 113(a)(30), when the controlled substance is marijuana and "when . the amount of marijuana involved is at least 51 live plants," the minimum sentence shall be five years in prison. Thus, based on application of 18 Pa.C.S. § 7508(a)(l)(iii), Appellant's minimum sentence converged with his maximum sentence, requiring imposition of a flat sentence of five years.
¶ 8 Appellant maintains on appeal that his minimum sentence of five years imprisonment implicates the United States Supreme Court's holdings in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), and Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004). We reject Appellant's challenge because there is a key distinction between an increase in a maximum sentence and an increase in a minimum sentence in United States Supreme Court precedent applicable to the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial.
¶ 9 We begin with an analysis of the seminal holding of Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 69 S.Ct. 1079, 93 L.Ed. 1337 (1949). This case is of vast import in the sentencing area because it creates a fundamental distinction in terms of the application of the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial between the process of conviction and the process of sentencing. Williams, as discussed later, retains its precedential authority with regard to this point and is vital to an analysis of the present constitutional challenge.
¶ 10 In Williams, the defendant was convicted of murder committed in the course of a burglary. Under applicable New York law, the jury's determination of guilt fixed the types of punishment, but the sentencing court had broad discretion to sentence within the permissible range based upon the jury's determination of guilt. In Williams, the sentence for murder could have been either life imprisonment or death, and while the jury recommended life imprisonment, the sentencing court imposed a death sentence. As justification, the court utilized information gleaned from a probation department report, which included accusations that the defendant had committed numerous other burglaries. Though not convicted of those crimes, the defendant had admitted committing some of the burglaries and had been identified as the perpetrator of others. The report also listed other behavior by the defendant that the sentencing court characterized as demonstrating that the defendant had perverse sexual tastes and was a threat to society.
¶ 11 The defendant challenged the use of the information contained in the report on due process grounds, arguing that he had not been able to confront and cross-examine the witnesses who supplied the pertinent data. The United States Supreme Court analyzed whether due process concerns applicable during trial also controlled the manner in which a sentencing court could obtain information to guide it when imposing a sentence within the statutory range fixed by the jury verdict. It noted that under the state scheme it was reviewing, the sentencing court was permitted to consider a variety of evidence regarding the defendant's background, mental health, past conduct, and individual characteristics in fashioning a sentence.
¶ 12 The Williams Court chronicled the evolution of sentencing in the common law of the United States and Britain and observed that under early conventions, many criminal convictions resulted in an automatic sentence of death. Modern sentencing departed from this draconian approach and focused more humanely on individualized sentencing. Thus, under the modern rule, sentencing courts were authorized by the legislature to consider many sources and types of evidence to aid in determining the extent of punishment appropriate as long as the punishment imposed was "within limits fixed by law." Id. at 246, 69 S.Ct. 1079.
¶ 13 In upholding the sentence in Williams, the United States Supreme Court concluded that there was a historical basis for applying different rules to trial proceedings, wherein a defendant was found guilty, as opposed to sentencing proceedings, which involved considerations of an individual's characteristics in assessing the appropriate punishment. The Court ruled that individualized sentencing necessarily entailed weighing the information utilized by the sentencing court in the case before it.
¶ 14 The Williams Court also observed that there were practical reasons to support imposition of divergent rules for trial and for sentencing. At trial, the question is, "Whether a defendant is guilty of having engaged in certain criminal conduct of which he has been specifically accused," while the sentencing judge is not confined to the "issue of guilt;" instead, "[h]is task within fixed statutory or constitutional limits is to determine the type and extent of punishment after the issue of guilt has been determined. Highly relevant — if not essential — to his selection of an appropriate sentence is the possession of the fullest information possible concerning the defendant's life and characteristics." Id. at 247-48, 69 S.Ct. 1079 (footnote omitted).
¶ 15 The Supreme Court declared that the modern paradigm of imposing individualized sentences mandated that the sentencing court rely upon all "pertinent information," which could not be obtained if there was "rigid adherence to restrictive rules of evidence properly applicable to the trial." Id. at 247, 69 S.Ct. 1079. It concluded:
To deprive sentencing judges of this kind of information would undermine modern penological procedural policies that have been cautiously adopted throughout the nation after careful consideration and experimentation. We must recognize that most of the information now relied upon by judges to guide them in the intelligent imposition of sentences would be unavailable if information were restricted to that given in open court by witnesses subject to cross-examination.
Id. at 249-50, 69 S.Ct. 1079.
¶ 16 Williams stands for the proposition that a sentencing court has broad discretion to consider evidence in determining a sentence as long as that sentence is within the ceiling fixed by a jury's finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt at a trial, subject to all the due process guarantees contained in the United States Constitution. A distinction was thereby created between trial and sentencing for purposes of the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial.
¶ 17 Individualized sentencing, however, was not without its inequities. On occasion, there were wide disparities in sentencing based on the individual proclivities of a sentencing judge rather than the more proper considerations to be applied at sentencing such as the severity of the crime or the background of the defendant. Legislatures attempted to redress this concern by placing some limits on judicial discretion. In Pennsylvania, one attempt at such a restriction was the passage of mandatory minimum sentences.
¶ 18 We can find guidance in the mandatory-minimum area with the United States Supreme Court's pronouncement in McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 2411, 91 L.Ed.2d 67 (1986), which is particularly instructive as it dealt with a Pennsylvania mandatory minimum sentencing statute virtually indistinguishable from the current statute under review. Specifically, the McMillan Court examined the constitutionality of 42 Pa.C.S. § 9712 under the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause, importing the Sixth Amendment's jury trial guarantee. Section 9712 requires the imposition of a mandatory minimum sentence of five years upon a defendant's conviction of one of several enumerated crimes if the sentencing court determines the defendant "visibly possessed a firearm" during the commission of the crime. The defendants in McMillan argued that visible possession of a firearm was an element of the crimes for which they had been sentenced and therefore had to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
¶ 19 The Supreme Court rejected that argument on the rationale that the Pennsylvania Legislature chose not to make visible possession of a firearm an element of the offenses listed in section 9712. In so doing, the Court noted that states have considerable latitude in "defining crimes and prescribing remedies." Id. at 86, 106 S.Ct. 2411. Nevertheless, the McMillan Court acknowledged that there are due process concerns that place constitutional limits on state authority in this context. Specifically, the Court observed that state legislatures cannot strip criminal defendants of the presumption of innocence, relieve prosecutors of the burden of proving guilt, or give trial court judges unlimited power to enhance the punishment to be imposed whenever the state obtains a conviction. After weighing these consider ations, the McMillan Court concluded that section 9712 was constitutional because it did not increase the statutory maximum penalty for the offense committed, create a separate crime calling for a separate penalty, or apply until a defendant had been convicted of the particular crime for which he was to be sentenced. Id. at 87-88, 106 S.Ct. 2411.
¶ 20 Significantly, the Supreme Court expressly disapproved of the notion that the state must prove every fact that impacts upon the "severity of punishment" beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 84, 106 S.Ct. 2411. In accordance with this view, the McMillan Court declined to invalidate section 9712 because "it operates solely to limit the sentencing court's discretion in selecting a penalty within the range already available to it . " Id. at 88, 106 S.Ct. 2411. Therefore, although the statute clearly "'ups the ante' for the defendant . by raising to five years the minimum sentence which may be imposed within the statutory plan," the Court concluded that it did not violate the defendant's right to due process of law. Id. See also United States v. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87, 113 S.Ct. 1111, 122 L.Ed.2d 445 (1993) (sentence provision upheld even though it increased minimum sentence if court found that defendant committed perjury). In clarifying its position on the validity of sentencing factors such as visible possession of a firearm, the Court reiterated the maxim that "there is no Sixth Amendment right to jury sentencing, even where the sentence turns on specific findings of fact." McMillan, supra at 93, 106 S.Ct. 2411.
¶ 21 The distinction between minimum and maximum sentences is at the heart of the Apprendi decision. Therein, the defendant was convicted of possession of a firearm, which was classified in New Jersey as a second degree offense punishable by five to ten years imprisonment. Under a separate statute, described as the "hate crime" law, an additional term of imprisonment was imposed if the trial court found by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant committed a crime in order to intimidate an individual or group of individuals due to race, color, gender, handicap, religion, sexual orientation, or ethnicity. The extended term permitted by the hate crime law increased the permissible range of sentences for second-degree offenses to between ten and twenty years. The trial court concluded that the defendant had committed the crime to intimidate the victim and that the offense was racially motivated. The court therefore sentenced the defendant to an increased term of imprisonment by applying the hate crime law.
¶ 22 The Supreme Court concluded that the defendant's due process rights required a jury to determine the existence of racial motivation since his maximum sentence had been increased under the hate crime law. It observed that the hate crime statute, as applied to the defendant, actually doubled the maximum range within which the sentencing judge could exercise his discretion. The Apprendi Court held that "any fact (other than prior conviction) that increases the maximum penalty for a crime must be charged in an indictment, submitted to a jury, and proven beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 476, 120 S.Ct. 2348 (emphasis added) (quoting Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 243 n. 6, 119 S.Ct. 1215, 143 L.Ed.2d 311 (1999) (state law increased maximum sentence based upon degree of harm suffered by victim and that finding was not made by a jury)).
¶ 23 Apprendi did not announce a departure in constitutional analysis. Indeed, Apprendi's outcome was easily predicted by the language in McMillan, which, as noted, disapproved of statutes that increased maximum sentences without a jury's participation. Significantly, the Court in Apprendi reaffirmed the holding in Williams, stating that nothing in the history of the right to a jury trial would suggest that it "is impermissible for judges to exercise discretion — taking into consideration various factors relating both to offense and offender — in imposing a judgment within the range prescribed by statute." Apprendi, supra at 481, 120 S.Ct. 2348 (emphasis in original) (citing Williams, supra).
¶ 24 In Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545, 122 S.Ct. 2406, 153 L.Ed.2d 524 (2002), decided merely three years ago, the Court left no doubt that Apprendi did not erode the holding of McMillan. The statute at issue in Harris provided for an increase in the minimum sentence if the sentencing court determined that the defendant brandished a firearm during the commission of an offense. The Harris Court expressly rejected a challenge to the holding of McMillan based on the Appren-di decision. Four justices reasoned that Apprendi did not apply because the statute under consideration in Harris involved an increase in a minimum sentence rather than an increase in a maximum sentence. One justice decided that Apprendi should not be extended to minimum sentences due to the adverse practical consequences and his conclusion that the Sixth Amendment permitted a judge to apply sentencing factors. The holding of Harris could not be clearer that mandatory minimum sentences that are imposed within the maximum ceiling set by the jury verdict do not violate a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial; Harris cemented the key distinction between increases in minimum sentences and increases in maximum sentences.
¶ 25 The 2004 decision in Blakely did not implicate McMillan or Harris. A clear understanding of Blakely requires an analysis of how the applicable guideline scheme impacted on maximum sentences. The Washington state legislature had enacted a sentencing reform act that delineated presumptive guideline ranges setting forth maximum sentences. Under that act, a judge could impose a sentence in excess of the maximum standard range only if the judge found substantial and compelling reasons to justify an exceptional sentence. An exceptional sentence was sanctioned only when certain factors, different from those used in computing the standard range sentence, were present. The guidelines thus placed strict limitations on the discretion given to the sentencing court to operate within the maximum of a crime's statutory classification. The Supreme Court specifically observed that the sentencing reform act operated to "limit the range of sentences a judge [could] impose." Id. at 299, 124 S.Ct. 2531. Thus, under Washington's sentencing scheme, only when the sentencing guidelines were considered in conjunction with the crime's classification did the "legal maximum" reveal itself.
¶ 26 In Blakely, the defendant pleaded guilty to kidnapping his wife; in Washington, kidnapping was a felony with a maximum authorized sentence of ten years. Under the defendant's plea agreement, the standard maximum range sentence was forty-nine to fifty-three months. At a hearing, the victim testified about the circumstances of the crime. As a result of her testimony, the judge concluded that the defendant had acted with deliberate cruelty, one of the statutorily-allowed grounds for departure in a case involving domestic violence. The judge then imposed a ninety-month maximum, over three years in excess of the maximum under the standard range.
¶ 27 The Supreme Court in Blakely found a violation of the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial because the "statutory maximum" imposed was increased based on the existence of a fact, deliberate cruelty, that was not encompassed within the parameters of the defendant's guilty plea and had not been found by a jury based upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Even though the sentence was within the ceiling of punishment fixed by the crime's classification as a felony, the "statutory maximum" could not be determined solely by reference to the crime's felony classification due to the manner in which the guidelines operated to restrict the range of the maximum sentence.
¶ 28 Blakely expressly distinguished McMillan because McMillan involved an increase in a minimum sentence. The Blakely Court further differentiated both McMillan and Williams on the ground that "neither . involved a sentence greater than what state law authorized on the basis of the verdict alone." Blakely, supra at 305, 124 S.Ct. 2581 (emphasis added). By contrast, in Blakely, the judge's authority to sentence was increased by a fact not included within a jury verdict or guilty plea. Thus, the Supreme Court expressly reaffirmed that McMillan and Williams remain solid authority in the Sixth Amendment right to jury trial arena.
¶ 29 The federal sentencing scheme at issue in Booker was identical to the state scheme addressed in Blakely. The Booker Court considered federal sentencing guidelines enacted by a federal sentencing statute. The guidelines were mandatory and delineated maximum ranges relating to drug possession. That particular sentencing scheme required the court to sentence a defendant to increased time based on the defendant's possession of a greater quantity of drugs than that found by the jury. Applying Jones, Apprendi, and Blakely, the Court in Booker concluded that application of the guidelines violated a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to be tried by a jury under the reasonable doubt standard.
¶ 30 There is nothing inherently contradictory between McMillan/Harris and Blakely/Booker. As noted, the Supreme Court consistently has observed a distinction between increasing a statutory maximum and increasing a sentence within the maximum already authorized by the jury's verdict. In every case to analyze this question, the lodestar of constitutional analysis has been application of the statutory maximum, whether the maximum is simply set forth in a statute or whether the interplay between a statute and mandatory guidelines creates the practical maximum.
¶ 31 Pennsylvania employs an indeterminate sentencing scheme. The sentencing judge announces a range consisting of a minimum and maximum sentence. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9756 (when handing down a prison sentence, the sentencing judge must specify maximum period up to limit authorized by law and must impose minimum sentence, which cannot exceed one-half of the maximum sentence). However, the sentence that a defendant will actually serve is dependent upon whether he is granted parole by the parole board, which has the authority to do so after expiration of the minimum. Thus, the sentence that the defendant will serve cannot be determined at sentencing because while lie will serve the minimum, he may serve up to the maximum or any sentence in between. Under a determinate sentencing scheme, a defendant is sentenced to a set number of years imprisonment, otherwise called a "flat" sentence. In determinate sentencing states, parole has been abolished so that the defendant will serve the sentence handed down by the sentencing judge; thus, the sentence can be determined at that time.
¶ 32 Pennsylvania law makes clear that a minimum sentence serves as a guide to the earliest potential release date. See generally Rogers v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 555 Pa. 285, 289 n. 2, 724 A.2d 319, 321 n. 2 (1999) (stating that punishment imposed for criminal offense is maximum period of confinement, ie., maximum period of incarceration specified by sentencing court; minimum sentence merely sets date prior to which prisoner may not be paroled); Commonwealth v. Butler, 458 Pa. 289, 294, 328 A.2d 851, 854-55 (1974) (holding that significance of minimum sentences arises in connection with eligibility for parole). In other words, under Pennsylvania law, the minimum sentence serves as a baseline for possible early release. Thus, the Pennsylvania legislature establishes the statutory maximum possible punishment for an offense. Statutes that mandate minimum sentences serve only to limit the sentencing court's discretion regarding the manner or method of imposing the minimum sentence.
¶ 33 Whether a sentencing scheme is indeterminate or determinate does not relate to the operation of sentencing guidelines. Sentencing guidelines can be advisory (voluntary) or presumptive (mandatory) or somewhere in between that broad spectrum. Under a presumptive or mandatory guideline scheme, which was at issue in Blakely and Booker, deviation is only permitted under very narrow circumstances. Under fully voluntary or advisory guidelines, the sentencing court is accorded broad discretion as to whether to consider the guidelines.
¶ 34 Pennsylvania's guidelines operate somewhere in the middle. Sentencing courts must consider the Pennsylvania guidelines. 42 Pa.C.S. 9721(b) (when imposing sentence, "court shall . consider any guidelines for sentencing adopted by the Pennsylvania Commission on Sen- tenting."). See also Commonwealth v. Mouzon, 571 Pa. 419, 812 A.2d 617 (2002) (plurality) (quoting Pennsylvania House Journal 8180, September 21, 1978, in stating that guidelines were enacted "to make criminal sentences more rational and consistent, to eliminate unwarranted disparity in sentencing, and to restrict the unfettered discretion we give to sentencing judges."). However, in Commonwealth v. Sessoms, 516 Pa. 365, 532 A.2d 775 (1987), our Supreme Court stated that the guidelines are advisory.
¶ 35 Guideline departure in Pennsylvania is permitted under a much more relaxed standard than the one employed in Washington or the federal system evaluated in Blakely and Booker. Pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 9781(c)(3), deviation is upheld if supported by reasons indicating that the deviation is not unreasonable in light of the factors a sentencing court considers pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 9721(b), which include the protection of the public, the gravity of the offense as it relates to the impact on the life of the victim and on the community, and the rehabilitative needs of the defendant. Commonwealth v. Smith, 543 Pa. 566, 673 A.2d 893 (1996); see, e.g., Commonwealth v. Galletta, 864 A.2d 532 (Pa.Super.2004) (sentencing court is permitted to depart from guidelines if it places on record the factual basis and specific reasons supporting decision under factors set forth in section 9721(b) of Sentencing Code). In fact, the Booker Court ruled that the federal guidelines could operate constitutionally as long as they, like Pennsylvania's guidelines, were voluntary in nature.
¶ 36 Moreover, what sets Pennsylvania's scheme further apart from those under consideration in Blakely/Booker is that Pennsylvania's sentencing guidelines delineate minimum sentencing ranges. Under the Pennsylvania guidelines, the potential maximum sentence is always coextensive with the statutory maximum authorized by the jury verdict or the guilty plea.
¶ 37 At this juncture, we must stress the potential for significant adverse repercussions if any sentencing factor that increased or enhanced sentences had to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. In Pennsylvania, when considering sentencing alternatives and terms, a sentencing court is instructed to "follow the general principle that the sentence imposed should call for confinement that is consistent with the protection of the public, the gravity of the offense as it relates to the impact on the life of the victim and on the community, and the rehabilitative needs of the defendant." 42 Pa.C.S. § 9721(b). This instruction carries a mandate that the sentencing court make relevant findings when imposing sentence. For example, a judge sentences based on whether the defendant is remorseful as well as his background and personal circumstances. A court is permitted to increase a sentence when the facts of the crime are more egregious than a typical crime of its nature and when the offense gravity score does not accurately reflect a defendant's criminal past. Thus, our longstanding precedent allows the sentencing court to consider and weigh a variety of factors when imposing a mitigated to aggravated guideline sentence and when considering whether to sentence beyond the guidelines.
¶ 38 If we held that sentencing enhancements that do not impact the maximum sentence authorized by the jury verdict fell within the ambit of Apprendi, Blakely, and Booker, serious disruption in the sentencing process would result. Each finding by a sentencing judge that "enhanced" a sentence would arguably have to be submitted to an impaneled jury and proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Sentencing proceedings would become second jury trials. Indeed, to date, defendants have continually asserted that the various factors considered by our sentencing courts to enhance a sentence within or in excess of the guidelines must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt under Apprendi and Blakely. Each panel to consider this contention has rejected it. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Moss, 871 A.2d 853 (Pa.Super.2005); Commonwealth v. Druce, 868 A.2d 1232 (Pa.Super.2005); Commonwealth v. Smith, 863 A.2d 1172 (Pa.Super.2004).
¶ 39 The Williams decision is rooted in rational analysis of the realities of the legal system. In Williams, the Supreme Court sensibly recognized that the modern approach to imposing individualized sentences mandates that the sentencing court rely upon all "pertinent information," which could not be obtained if there was "rigid adherence to restrictive rules of evidence properly applicable to the trial." Williams, supra at 247, 69 S.Ct. 1079. Williams concluded that most of the information currently utilized by sentencing judges in the modern penological system would not be available with Sixth Amendment jury trial restrictions in place for every factor used to "enhance" a sentence.
¶ 40 The dissenters simply present an unworkable approach to the sentencing process. Judge Bender's approach creates the potential that a jury would have to be impaneled and the Commonwealth would have to prove beyond a reasonable doubt each factor impacting upon a sentence. Judge Klein suggests that a sentencing enhancement should be submitted to a jury under a beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard if it results in a drastic increase in the sentence. Whether the enhancement represents a drastic increase in sentence is not a workable paradigm. As far as a defendant is concerned, any increase in jail time would be drastic. See Commonwealth v. O'Berg, 584 Pa. 11, 880 A.2d 597 (2005) (discussing "short sentence" exception to holding in Commonwealth v. Grant, 572 Pa. 48, 813 A.2d 726 (2002), and concluding that it was too ambiguous to give the lower courts any guidance as to what sentence would be sufficiently short to apply the exception).
¶ 41 Mindful of all the implications of our holding today, we conclude for the following reasons that the mandatory minimum sentence imposed on Appellant did not offend Apprendi, Blakely, or Booker and did not violate Appellant's Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial. A jury convicted Appellant of manufacturing marijuana' in violation of 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(30) beyond a reasonable doubt and with all constitutional guarantees in place. The jury's verdict authorized the imposition of a maximum sentence of five years imprisonment. 35 P.S. § 780-113(f)(2). A minimum sentence of five years was mandated by 18 Pa.C.S. § 7508(a)(iii), once the sentencing court determined that Appellant possessed at least fifty-one live marijuana plants.
¶ 42 The mandatory provisions set forth in section 7508 do not increase the statutory maximum punishment or change the grade of the crime based upon the number of plants involved. To the contrary, section 7508 regulates only the minimum sentence. Whereas this section serves to limit the court's discretion regarding the manner or method of imposing the sentence, it does not increase the maximum punishment for the conviction.
¶ 43 Since the imposition of the minimum sentence did not exceed the statutory maximum authorized by the jury's verdict, Apprendi, Blakely, and Booker were not offended, and Appellant's position to the contrary must be rejected. The ceiling of the punishment in this case was cemented by the jury's verdict, and Appellant was sentenced within the range that the jury authorized. The statute is constitutional under McMillan and Harris because it did not discard the presumption of innocence, did not create a presumption of the existence of any fact, did not place any burden of proof of the existence of any fact on Appellant, did not relieve the prosecution of its burden of proving guilt, did not alter the maximum penalty for the crime, and did not create a separate offense allowing for a separate penalty. It merely limited the sentencing court's discretion in selecting a penalty within the range already available to it.
¶ 44 Appellant's second contention concerns a suppression issue. On January 14, 2002, Appellant filed a motion to suppress, alleging that there was no probable cause to support issuance of the search warrant. Appellant apparently prepared an amended motion to suppress contending that the affidavit of probable cause contained material misstatements of fact. The amended motion had an attached exhibit consisting of a deposition purportedly óf the confidential informant who supplied some of the information contained in the affidavit of probable cause. The amended motion with attached deposition is not contained in the certified record, and the lower court docket does not reflect the filing of the motion. While Appellant maintains that he filed the motion and that it was not included in the record due to a mistake on the part of the clerk of courts, he does not present this Court with a copy of the timestamped cover sheet of the amended motion.
¶ 45 It is settled that it is Appellant's responsibility to ensure that this Court has the complete record necessary to properly review a claim. See Commonwealth v. Whitaker, 878 A.2d 914 (Pa.Super.2005). The docket entries in this case clearly reflect that the amended motion with attached deposition is not contained in the record, and since that motion is necessary to a review of Appellant's position that the affidavit of probable cause contained material misstatements of fact, we are unable to entertain this issue on appeal.
¶ 46 Judgment of sentence affirmed.
¶ 47 Judge KLEIN files a Dissenting Opinion in which Judge FORD ELLIOTT joins.
¶ 48 Judge BENDER files a Dissenting Opinion.
. Recently, a unanimous panel, which consisted of Judges Lally-Green, Panella, and Kelly, came to the identical conclusion as this en banc panel regarding the impact of Appren-di and Blakely on another of Pennsylvania's mandatory minimum sentencing statutes, 42 Pa.C.S. § 9712. Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 883 A.2d 1096 (Pa.Super.2005).
. The guideline sentencing form in the record indicates that Appellant was sentenced to five to ten years imprisonment. However, this form is incorrect because the maximum statutory sentence in this case, as outlined above, was five years imprisonment. In addition, the sentencing transcript reflects that the court sentenced Appellant to five years imprisonment. N.T. Sentencing, 1/31/03, at 65.
.That section states:
Any person who violates clause (12), (14) or (30) of subsection (a) with respect to . [a]ny other controlled substance or counterfeit substance classified in Schedule I, II, or III, is guilty of a felony and upon conviction thereof shall be sentenced to imprisonment not exceeding five years, or to pay a fine not exceeding fifteen thousand dollars ($15,000), or both.
. Normally, the practice in this Commonwealth is that the minimum sentence cannot exceed one-half of the maximum sentence. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9756(b).
. In his dissent, Judge Bender fails to acknowledge either the Williams decision or the fact that it retains legal authority pursuant to language in Blakely.
. The defendant must be informed of the evidence the sentencing judge is considering so that he has an opportunity to challenge its accuracy and materiality. Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 97 S.Ct. 1197, 51 L.Ed.2d 393 (1976). Williams' precedential value with regard to the application of the death penalty has been significantly eroded by subsequent Supreme Court rulings.
. Judge Bender makes the rather broad statement that this distinction somehow allows the "manner in which the sentence is imposed [to be] beyond constitutional restriction." Dissent at page 585. We consider in this decision only the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial with regard to a factor increasing a minimum sentence and not other constitutional guarantees that may apply to the sentencing process.
. In Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 118 S.Ct. 1219, 140 L.Ed.2d 350 (1998), the Court rejected a constitutional challenge to a statute that increased the maximum sentence that could be imposed for a crime based upon a finding of the number of a defendant's prior convictions by the sentencing court. This holding rests upon the unique role of recidivism in the sentencing arena.
. In the face of this clear pronouncement in Blakely that Williams and McMillan persist as sound precedent, Judge Klein's dissent argues that the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005), overruled Williams and McMillan only one year later and without any direct language to that effect. It defies logic to suggest that the United States Supreme Court would have overruled precedent sub silentio when it had expressly reaffirmed that precedent the previous year. Furthermore, Booker did nothing more than apply Blakely.
. As noted in United States v. Astronomo, 183 F.Supp.2d 158 (D.C.Mass.2001), and confirmed in United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005), drastic changes in the federal sentencing scheme erased Williams's application in the federal context.
. Of course, the imposition of a mandatory minimum sentence is of great importance to the individual defendant and constitutes more than just an administrative guideline. For this reason, the Commonwealth's intent to pursue a mandatory minimum sentence is subject to specific notice requirements, which are not at issue in this case.
. The juiy's decision on application of the sentencing factor was merely advisory. The statute delegates the task of determining the number of plants to the sentencing judge, and thus, the duty rests with the judge and is not subject to jury resolution.