Case Name: WASHBURN v. LUCAS
Court: Michigan Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1964-10-06
Citations: 373 Mich. 610
Docket Number: Calendar No. 79, Docket No. 50,219
Parties: WASHBURN v. LUCAS.
Judges: Dethmers, J., concurred with O’Hara, J.
Reporter: Michigan Reports
Volume: 373
Pages: 610–626

Head Matter:
WASHBURN v. LUCAS.
1. Automobiles — Intersections — Contributory Negligence — Evidence.
Evidence presented in action arising from collision between plaintiff’s westbound station wagon and defendant’s southbound station wagon at midafternoon on a rainy, drizzly day early in June at an uncontrolled intersection of city streets held, sufficient to present issue of contributory negligence to jury.
2. Same — Intersection—Instructions.
Instruction given in case arising from collision between plaintiff’s westbound station wagon and defendant’s southbound station wagon in northwest quadrant of uncontrolled intersection of city streets at midafternoon of a rainy, drizzly day early in June which unqualifiedly assumed disputed fact that plaintiff was nearest to, entering, or within intersection as defendant driver rapidly accelerated beyond the speed limit, held, reversibly erroneous.
References for Points in Headnotes
8 Am Jur 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 1005, 1013.
8 Am Jur 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 1034.
20 Am Jur, Evidence §§ 817, 818.
Admissibility of opinion evidence as to the cause of an accident or occurrence. 38 ALB2d 13.
5 Am Jur 2d, Appeal and Error § 553.
4 Am Jur 2d, Appeal and Error § 491 et seq.
3. Evidence — Negligence—Opinion as to Causation.
Opinions of causation in negligence cases whether offered by experts or lay witnesses should be excluded, where the subject matter of the inquiry is of such a character that it may be presumed to lie within the ordinary experience of all men of common education.
4. Appeal and Error — Objections—Opinion Testimony op Police Officer.
Admissibility of opinion testimony of police officer who did not witness collision at intersection but did investigate the accident was not reversible error, where no objection had been made to such testimony.
5. Same — Notice of Error.
The Supreme Court has the power to notice a plain error though it is not assigned or specified.
Dethmers, O’Hara, and Adams, JJ., dissenting.
Appeal from St. Clair; Streeter (Halford I.), J.
Submitted May 8, 1964.
(Calendar No. 79, Docket No. 50,219.)
Decided October 6, 1964.
Rehearing denied November 2, 1964.
Case by Wycliffe Washburn against Hubert V. Lucas, doing business as Lucas Funeral Home, for personal injuries sustained in ■ automobile collision June 1, 1961. Verdict and judgment for plaintiff. Defendant appeals.
Beversed and remanded for new trial.
Davidson, Osborn & Staiger, for plaintiff.
Touma, Watson, Andresen <& Kelly, for defendant.

Opinion:
Adams, J.
{dissenting). This case arose out of an intersection collision. Plaintiff was awarded a jury verdict of $50,000. Defendant appeals from entry of judgment on the verdict and from orders denying his motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and for new trial,
Defendant contends that plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law on the theory that plaintiff entered an uncontrolled intersection without reducing his speed or taking steps to avoid being struck by defendant's vehicle approaching from his right at approximately the same speed. It was not incumbent upon the trial judge to adopt that testimony most favorable to the defendant upon motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict of the jury because all of the witnesses were produced by the plaintiff, but, rather, to view the evidence in a light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Anderson v. Gene Deming Motor Sales, Inc., 371 Mich 223, and cases cited therein at pages 229, 230.
A collision occurred at about 3 p.m., on June 1, 1961, a rainy, drizzly day, at an uncontrolled intersection in Port Huron. Plaintiff, driving a fire-engine-red 1959 Nash Rambler station wagon, was proceeding west on Pine street. Defendant's 1961 Ford station wagon was being driven south on 18th street by Colgan, an employee. The cars collided in the northwest quadrant of the intersection. Plaintiff's car was struck on the right side with the point of greatest damage on the right front door at the pillar post, 51 inches from the front bumper. The car body was pushed in 20-1/2 inches. The motor was ripped free from the left rear motor mount.
Just before the accident, a Mrs. Pochodylo, whose home was located on the southwest corner of the intersection, went into a room on the northeast corner of her house and pulled back the draperies of' a corner window. To the north, she saw defendant's vehicle coming south; and, to the east, she saw plaintiff's automobile proceeding west. Both cars seemed about the same distance from the intersection and were in their own lanes, traveling at about the same rate of speed. She saw the cars crash but was unable to testify as to which one came to the intersection first or which one came into the intersection first. Mrs. Pochodylo continued to watch the cars from the moment she saw them because she knew they were going to crash.
Harold V. Zimmer, residing on the southeast corner of Pine and 18th streets, moving about in his house, saw plaintiff's car about 80 feet from the intersection and defendant's car opposite an alley that intersected 18th street. Both cars/ were about the same distance away from the intersection. He first saw the defendant's car while standing at a fireplace in the living room, then the plaintiff's car through narrow kitchen windows between cupboards, and finally both cars through a window in the dining-area. He did not step over to a window to see if they were going to collide. He did not see the impact.
Immediately after the accident, witnesses Pochodylo and Zimmer were interviewed by Officer Leibler. He testified, under cross-examination, that they could tell him very little about it.
Colgan, the driver of defendant's automobile, left his employer's place of business and shortly turned onto 18th street. He testified he could make the turn at 20 miles per hour. As he proceeded south, somewhere in the middle of the block, sticks were lying in his lane. He turned toward the curb to go around them, slowing down to 20 miles an hour. Afterward he coasted a distance and then stepped on the gas, accelerating to approximately 25 miles an hour. He looked both ways and proceeded into the intersection. The next thing he remembered was sitting- up on a lawn.
As bearing on the extent of any observation Colgan made of what was there to be seen, although he says he looked both ways, not only did he fail to see plaintiff's car coming- from the east but also failed to see a Mrs. McGregor's car coming from the west on Pine street. Mrs. McGregor was about a half a block away from the intersection at the time of the impact.
Plaintiff Washburn, suffering from traumatic amnesia, testified that the last thing he could remember was when he was in his home before the accident occurred.
State Police Trooper Wade, who had served approximately 15 years as a trooper policing some 600 or 700 accidents, and who had gone to school a number of times each year for refresher courses on his work, testified that 70 to 75% of his work is traffic accidents and traffic enforcement. He made a detailed study of the automobiles and the intersection. It was his opinion that, at the time of impact, the front wheels of the Washburn vehicle were just about on a direct line with the west curb of. the north and south street and the front of the car was approximately a foot and a half beyond the curb to the west; that plaintiff's car entered the intersection first by 25 feet; and that the defendant's car had a minimum speed of 30 miles an hour with a range of not to exceed 45 miles per hour. (The legal rate of speed was 25 miles per hour.) Under cross-examination Trooper Wade testified:
"Prom my investigation and where his car was struck I believe he [plaintiff] assumed that he had the right of the intersection inasmuch as he entered it first, possibly assuming that the Lucas car was going to yield the right-of-way to him.
"Q. Well, you are speculating there as to what he saw or did not see, is that it?
"A. Not speculating to what he saw; I am telling you that he went into the intersection and had every right to assume that the intersection was his."
Trooper Wade, in justifying his conclusion stated that the direction of plaintiff's car was changed greatly from its course, to the extent almost of a right angle, which indicated to him the application of a great deal of force.
It was proper in this case for the jury to consider not only the testimony of the eyewitnesses, but the physical facts, the opinion evidence of a properly qualified expert, and the presumption of due care to which plaintiff was entitled, unless rebutted by other evidence, under the circumstances of his loss of memory. Breker v. Rosema, 301 Mich 685 (141 ALR 867). The evidence was sufficient for the jury to conclude that plaintiff was not contributorily negligent. Anderson v. Gene Deming Motor Sales, Inc., supra.
With regard to the claimed error of the judge in his charge to the jury, Justice Souris indicates that the words, "if you find," would have cured the purported error had they been used by the trial judge at the beginning of the last sentence of the second quoted paragraph of the charge. I do not believe it was essential that the judge use these .words at this point since he had already made it abundantly clear that the jury must make a finding of fact before it could reach a given result. The words, "if you find," were used 6 times before the judge gave the sentence that is considered to be objectionable (the last time in the sentence immediately preceding it) and the jury was fully charged as to its responsibility in weighing the evidence. Under the well-known rule that a charge -to the jury must be considered in its entirety, I do not find error.
We are not called upon at this time to pass upon the admissibility of opinion testimony that may be offered by an expert, it being conceded that no objection was made to the testimony of Trooper Wade and that, consequently, there was no reversible error. Justice Souris, in Ms opinion, deals with the propriety of Trooper Wade's testimony. The validity of his advice to the trial courts depends upon agreement that "the subject matter of the inquiry is of such character that it may be presumed to lie within the ordinary experience of all men of common education." The converse of this proposition stated in Detroit T. & I. R. Co. v. Banning (CCA 6), 173 F2d 752, 756, certiorari denied 338 US 815 (70 S Ct 54, 57, 94 L ed 493), is:
"The general rule permits a witness who is experienced in technical matters and qualified to do so, to give his opinion in a matter which is not one of common knowledge, although it involves an ultimate fact to be finally decided by the jury."
To the same effect see Sykes v. Village of Portland, 193 Mich 86; Winchester v. Chabut, 321 Mich 114; Buehler v. Beadia, 343 Mich 692. For a recent discussion of the modern trend toward the admission of opinion evidence, even though it bears on an ultimate issue see 32 CJS, Evidence, § 446(b). It would seem to me that any consideration of this subject might more appropriately be reserved for an occasion when the question is before this Court.
The order of the trial judge denying motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict of the jury should be affirmed. Costs to appellee.
Prom 20 Am Jur, Evidence, § 817, p 687, quoted in Kelso v. Independent Tank Co. (Okla), 348 P2d 855, 857.—Reporter.