Case Name: Decker and Brown, Respondents, v. Furniss, impleaded Appellant
Court: New York Superior Court
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1854-05-06
Citations: 3 Duer 291
Docket Number: 
Parties: Decker and Brown, Respondents, v. Furniss, impleaded Appellant.
Judges: 
Reporter: Reports of cases argued and determined in the Superior Court of the city of New York
Volume: 10
Pages: 291–318

Head Matter:
Decker and Brown, Respondents, v. Furniss, impleaded Appellant.
In an action to recover for materials furnished and labor done in the repair of a vessel, in the absence of any proof of an express contract, those who were, at the time, in possession of the vessel, acting as owners, and directing as to the repairs, are primd facie owners, and liable as such.
This presumption will not be overcome by proof that one of the two defendants, thus acting and directing, was sole owner before the repairing was commenced, and that before that time, he, by written contract between the two, “sells” one half of the vessel, “ as she is now completely fitted for sea,” to the other for a fixed sum to be paid in his notes, payable in fifteen months, to be dated of the time said vessel is out of the carpenter’s hands—fit and ready for sen; the contract also providing that the vendor of the half part should fit her for an ocean steamer at a cost of not over $10,000, one half of which cost the vendee was also to pay in notes to bear the same date as those to be given for the contract pi-ice of half of the vessel, as she was, when sold. Whether by the true construction of such a contract, as between the parties to it, title to the one half vested in the purchaser, from the time the contract was executed, or whether the sale was conditional and the conversion of her into an ocean steamer at an additional cost to the purchaser of not over $5000, was a condition precedent, the performance of which was essential to the vesting of title to the half bought, and fixing the purchaser’s liability to pay the contract price, is immaterial, as to third persons, who furnish materials and expend labor upon the vessel, on her credit and that of her owners, without notice of there being such a contract, or that those in possession, acting and directing as owners, are not, in fact, owners. Semble—The contract, by its terms, passes a present title to one half, as she now is, for a sum named. .
The conversion of her into an ocean steamer, at a cost of not more than a stipulated sum, is a matter independent of the contract of sale. The purchaser is to have a credit of fifteen months from the time the conversion should be completed. The vendor having made the conversion, within a time not objected to, as unreasonable or otherwise, and the vessel having been registered in the joint names of the two, as owners, on the ■ affidavit of the purchaser, while the repairs sued for were being made, the purchaser cannot successfully object, in such an action, that, as between him and such plaintiffs, he and his vendor were not joint owners of the vessel.
Dueb, J., dissenting.
(Before Duer, Bosworth, and Slobson, J.J.)
April 12;
May 6, 1854.
. This action came "before the court on appeal from a judgment of the Special Term. It was tried on the 15th of June, 1853, "before Justice Bosworth and a jury. The plaintiffs, William J. Decker and Charles Brown, in their complaint, alleged that the defendants, William P. Furniss and William H. Brown, were indebted to the plaintiffs, who are copartners in business as ship-joiners, in the sum of $1,333 T272„, with interest from the 26th of January, 1850, for the work and labor, care and diligence of the plaintiffs, béfore that time, done, performed, and bestowed, in and for the defendants, and at their special instance and request, and for materials found, provided, and used' in, and about, and upon the steamer Rhode Island, of which steamer the defendants, during the said time, &e., were joint owners, and prayed judgment for that sum.
The defendant, Brown, put in no answer. The defendant Furniss, by his answer, denied—
First, that at the several times mentioned in the complaint, or at any or either of them, the defendants were owners of the steamboat Rhode Island.
Second. Any knowledge or information of the other matters stated in the complaint, sufficient to form a belief as to the truth thereof.
Third. Any indebtedness to the plaintiffs, by reason of the matters stated in the complaint, or otherwise.
On. the trial defendant, Furniss, admitted that the plaintiffs performed labor upon, and furnished materials used upon, the steamer Rhode Island, from December 8, 1849, to January 26, 1850, inclusive, of the value of $1,333 22. He also admitted the execution of a written agreement, which the plaintiff read in evidence, as follows:
“The present agreement between William H. Brown, shipbuilder, on the first part, and William P. Furniss, merchant, on the other part, witnesseth:
“ William H. Brown sells to William P. Furniss the one-half of the steamboat6 Rhode Island,’ burden 1,000 tons, or thereabouts, with all her tackle, appurtenances, boats, and furniture, as she is now completely fitted and furnished, for the transportation of passengers on the Sound, at the rate of fifty thousand dollars for the whole boat, payable in fifteen months, in William P. Furniss’ notes, favor of said Wm. H. Brown; notes to be dated from the date said steamboat ‘ Rhode Island’ is out of the carpenter’s hands, fit and ready for sea, coals and provisions excepted.
“ Said William H. Brown is to proceed and fit up said steamboat1 Rhode Island,’ in a suitable manner for her to proceed from New York to the Pacific, via the Straits of Magellan, and to trade along the west coast of America, or in the rivers of the same, as may be thought most advantageous by said William P. Furniss, after her arrival there; the outfits for said boat, for carpenter, smith, sails and rigging, and steam machinery, is not to exceed ten thousand dollars, and as much less as possible—William P. Furniss’ half of which is also payable in his notes favor of William H. Brown, at fifteen months from date said steamboat is done, completed, and out of the workmen’s hands, and fit for sea. The boat is to have two or more boats, and a launch at least thirty-five feet long by ten wide, and coppered, suitable to land cargo in, from on board the steamer in the Pacific.
“ William P. Furniss is to be the sole agent for this steamer in the port of New York, and "to have the appointing Of all other agents in all other ports, both on the Atlantic and Pacific coasts; he is to be allowed a commission of five per cent, on all receipts for freight and passengers carried by the boat, and received by him, as well as on all amounts which may be remitted to him, for account of the boat from the Pacific, from time to time; also on account of all disbursements made by him for the boat ‘ Rhode Island.’
“ William P. Furniss is to account, from time to time, for moneys he may receive into his hands, to William H. Brown, or other owners of the boat; first paying himself all and any advance he may have made for the steamer ‘ Rhode Island.’
“ It is further understood, that each owner is to insure his own interest in said boat, but that William P. Furniss is at liberty to insure a sum sufficient to cover any advances he may be under at any time for said steamboat ‘ Rhode Island.’
“ A policy of insurance to be kept open to cover all shipments of specie from the Pacific to New York; premium to be charged to the boat, as well as one-half per cent.—Wm. P. Furniss’ commission for effecting the same.
“ Dated New York, 1st Novémber, 1849.
“ W. H. Brown, [l. s.]
“ William P. Furniss. [l. s.]
“ Signed in presence of
William Chalmers.”
And then the counsel for the plaintiffs called as a witness on their part-—
Edmund Elass, who, being duly sworn, testified that he was a ship-joiner, and that he worked upon the steamboat Rhode Island when she was lying at the foot of Twelfth street. That he knew the defendant Furniss, and saw him on the steamboat, about the first of November, 1849. That he saw the defendant, William P. Furniss, there three or four times a week, while the steamboat was lying there at the dock. That the steamboat left the dock, about the last of January, 1850-On one occasion the defendant, Furniss, came to witness. He was at work putting in some coal bunkers, down in the cabin. Hr. Furniss said they were not strong enough, and proposed putting stanchions all along the side of the coal bunkers, from the cabin deck, along under the beams, to support the cabin below. This was in the latter part of December. Witness told him that witness would send down for Hr. Decker: witness was at work there for Hr. Decker. Hr. Decker came up there, and the work was done according to Hr. Furniss’ directions. That was the only circumstance that Mr. Furniss told witness anything about. When he was there, he would'walk around and look at the work, the same way that any superintendent generally does.
On cross-examination, he testified: That he never saw the defendant, William P. Furniss, before he came there. That he never had any business transactions with him: That witness was at work on the steamboat, from about the first of December ; and during the period that he was there, he should think Hr. Furniss was there three or four times a week. He was never introduced to him by anybody, and never had any conversation with him except at that one time. There were men about witness when that conversation occurred—(they called him William P. Furniss)—but he could not say whether they heard the conversation or not. William J. Decker told him what Mr. Furniss’ name was. John Englis also mentioned it. He did not recollect the particular day when Hr. Decker told him Hr. Furniss’ name. Mr. Englis told him some time during the two months that witness was at work there. Witness was induced to ask, because he was employed by Mr. Decker. That after Mr. Furniss made the suggestions respecting the stanchions for the coal bunkers, witness did the work as Hr.- Decker di rected him; that Mr. Brown, one of the plaintiffs, is a brother of William H. Brown, one of the defendants.
The counsel for the plaintiffs next called as witness on their part,
James C. Perry, who, having been sworn, testified that he was a ship-joiner, and about the first of November, 1849, was in the employ of Decker & Brown, and continued until 1850. That he worked on the steamboat Rhode Island within the time. That she was lying at the foot of Twelfth street. Mr. Plass worked there during the same time with witness. That he knew the person who was there, and who was represented as Mr. Furniss. He was there three or four times a week, and generally came there about the middle of the day. He was walking about there with the defendant, Mr. Brown, superintending and seeing what was going on. He once gave directions to witness about work. Mr. William H. Brown had told witness to fix one of the shutters in the fire-room. As witness was fixing it, Mr. Furniss came to the fire-room door and asked witness what he was doing, and witness told him that he was going to make the shutter so as to slide. He said, “ I won’t have it so. It won’t b¿ strong enough.” He would have it cut in two, and swung in two parts on the outside. While witness was at work at it, William H. Brown came in and says, “ Perry, what are you doing ?” and witness said, Mr. Furniss won’t have it slide. He wants the shutters to open outside. Mr. Brown said nothing, and witness finished the shutters according to the orders of Mr. Furniss. Witness was there when the steamboat started away from the foot of Twelfth street. Witness never had any conversation with Mr. Furniss except on that one occasion. Did not know at that time what Mr. Furniss’ first name was. Don’t know whether it is William or William P.
The counsel for the plaintiffs then read in evidence a certified copy of the enrolment of the steamboat Rhode Island, in the district of New York, dated January 21, 1850, viz.: “ That William P. Furniss, of the city, county, and state of New York, swore that he and William H. Brown, of same city, county, and state, were the owners of the vessel called the 6 Rhode Island,’ whereof John Colby was master, built at New York in 1836, enlarged 1845, as per enrolment (182), in November 20, 1849, now cancelled, property changed in part, certifying said vessel to have one deck, two hundred and eighty six feet length, twenty-eight feet breadth, ten feet ten inches depth, eight hundred and eighteen 75-95 tons, square stern, and no head; said Furniss having agreed to all the requisitions of the act of Congress, and said steamer duly registered at the port of New York.”
The counsel for the plaintiffs then rested their case.
Whereupon the counsel for the defendant, William P. Furniss, moved to dismiss the complaint as against the defendant Furniss, upon the ground that the evidence so given, as aforesaid, did not show any liability on the part of the defendant Furniss, for the bill sought to be recovered in this action, nor entitle the plaintiffs to have the question of such liability submitted to the jury.
His honor the judge overruled the motion, and to his decision thereupon the counsel for the defendant Furniss then and there excepted.
The evidence having been concluded, his honor the judge then charged the jury, that there was no dispute as to the amount of the demand of plaintiffs, and that the only question in the case was, whether upon the evidence the plaintiffs were entitled to recover against the defendant Furniss, as well as against the defendant Brown.
The judge then instructed the jury, that the plaintiffs were entitled to a verdict against both defendants, for the amount due to the plaintiffs on the bill in question, to which charge the counsel for the defendant Furniss then and there excepted.
The jury, under the charge aforesaid, rendered a verdict for the plaintiffs, for sixteen hundred and forty-six dollars and eighty-eight cents.
A judgment having been entered on the verdict, the defendant Furniss appealed from the judgment to the General Term.
E. Sandford, Esq., for defendant Furniss, made the following points.
- I. The defendant, William P. Furniss, was not a joint owner of the steamboat Rhode Island at the time the repairs in question were made, nor is he liable therefor to the plaintiffs. 1. On the first of November, 1849, the defendant, William H. Brown, was the sole owner of the boat, and was in the sole and unqualified possession of her. That possession was not changed in any manner until the twenty-first of January, 1850. 2. The agreement given in evidence was wholly an executory contract. Although, in the introductory part, the words used are, “ William H. Brown sells to William P. Furniss,” from the context, and the other provisions in the agreement, it is manifest that they were intended to express that he “agrees to sell,” upon the terms therein stated being complied with on his part: then, and at such time, and in that event only, Hr. Furniss agreed to pay the price in his notes in favor of Brown, “ notes to be dated from the date said steamboat Rhode Island is out of the carpenter’s hands, fit and ready for sea, coals and provisions excepted.” Until Hr. Brown completed the part of the contract which was to be executed by them, Hr. Furniss could not be called upon to give any notes, nor did he incur any liability to Brown to pay for one-half of the vessel (McDonald v. Hewitt, 15 J. R. 351; Hias v. Bates, 18 Vermont, 579; 4 Rawle, 261; Laidlaw v. Swift, 2 Mees. & Welsby, 602; Ward v. Shaw, 7 Wend. 404). 3. The seller had “ to proceed and fit up said steamboat Rhode Island in a suitable manner for her to proceed from New York to the Pacific.” He had to furnish for her two or more boats, and a launch, and to provide the necessary carpenter’s work, smith work, sales, rigging, and steam machinery to fit the vessel for the Pacific trade, at an expense not to exceed ten thousand dollars. What is termed in the agreement “ Hr. Furniss’ half of which,” is a part of the purchase price, to be paid by him, for one-half of the whole steamboat, as thus fitted up, in a suitable manner to proceed from New York to the Pacific, the amount of which was to be ascertained, not by the actual cost to Brown of the alterations and additions undertaken to be made by him, but by Brown’s charges therefor, up to the limit of ten thousand dollars ; if a larger expenditure had proved to be necessary to thus fit up the boat, Hr. Furniss could not have been charged with any part of the excess; if Mr. Brown did not thus fit up the boat, Mr. Furniss was not bound to accept any part of her, nor to take any interest in her. The vessel was to remain in the hands of the vendor until he should bring it into the condition in which it was agreed to be purchased and received. The law is so well settled, that where anything remains to be done, as between the seller and the buyer, before the goods are to be delivered, a present right of property does not attach in the buyer, although present terms of sale are used, that a citation of the authorities is deemed to be unnecessary (2 Kent’s Com. 495). 4. The fitting up the steamboat in such a manner as would be sufficient to change her from a boat for the transportation of passengers on the Sound to a suitable boat to proceed from Hew York to the Pacific, and to trade along the west coast of America, constituted the whole inducement to Mr. Furniss to agree to make the purchase when she was so changed. The agreement shows that, when thus prepared, the entire possession of the whole boat was to be delivered by Brown to Mr. Furniss. He was to be the sole agent of the steamer in Hew York, and to have the appointing of all other agents. The “ coals and provisions” were to be provided by him, when the vessel should be delivered by Brown, and accepted by Furniss; he was to make advances, and to have a commission on all disbursements made by him, and the boat was to be run under his exclusive possession and control on joint account. The understanding declared relative to insurance, relates to insurances after the fitting up, delivery, and acceptance of the boat, and the commencement of the agency of Mr. Furniss. He was not to be charged with the duty, nor bound to advance, nor to become liable for the insurance upon Brown’s interest in the boat; and he had authority to insure, at the joint expense, “ a sum sufficient to cover any advances he might be under, at any time, for said steamboat Rhode Island.” Hnder this contract, if the boat had been destroyed by fire before Brown had made the changes which he agreed to effect, the loss would have been wholly his, and Mr. Furniss would not have been liable for any part of the price. The boat was subject to the claims of the creditors of Brown, and he might-have sold and delivered the whole vessel to another, who would have acquired a complete title. The object of the stipulation, that Brown should thus fit up the boat, shows the intention of the parties to have been to make it a condition precedent, and no property passed to Mr. Furniss until it was complied with (Crookshank v. Bussell, 18 J. R. 58; Sewall v. Fitch, 8 Cow. 215; Mixco v. Howarth, 21 Pick. 205; Hight v. Ripley, 19 Maine 137; Spencer v. Cone, 1 Met. 283). 5. The agreement shows, also, that the delivery of the vessel, and the payment of the purchase money, were to be concurrent acts. The time fixed for the mutual performance was the period when “ said steamboat is done, completed, and out of the workmen’s hands, and fit for sea.” If, at that time, Brown had refused to deliver, upon an offer of payment, or Furniss had refused to accept and pay, upon an offer by Brown to deliver, the contract would have become void (2 Kent’s Com. 496). 6. The bill of sale is the true and proper muniment of title to a ship or vessel, and the evidence shows that Mr. Furniss acquired such title to one-half of the Rhode Island, on the 21st January, 1850. Where no such bill of sale is produced, a sale and delivery must be proved. The evidence requisite to prove such sale, is the same as that required upon the sale of any other property (Norton v. Penniman, 1 Mason, 306, 317; La Jeune Eugenie, 2 Id. 407, 435; Ohl v. The Eagle Insurance Company, 4 Id. 390, 392; Badger v. Bank of Cumberland, 26 Maine R. 428, 434, 35; Wendover v. Hogedorne, 7 J. R. 308, 310; Bixby v. Franklin Insurance Company, 8 Pick. 86, 88; McDonald v. Hewitt, 15 J. K. 349, 51; Heckett v. Stearns, 7 Barb. 488 ; Cox v. Reid, 1 C. & P. 602; Shinelleo v. Hueston, 1 Coms. 261). 7. Brown, out of his own materials, or by materials and labor which he undertook to procure, agreed to construct upon the foundation of the old Long Island Sound steamboat, a steamer fitted for ocean navigation. Upon general principles, the property remained in him until the completion and delivery of a boat adapted to that employment (Merritt v. Johnson, 7 John’s Rep. 473; Gregory v. Striker, 2 Denio, 628, 29; Muchlow v. Mangles, 1 Jamet 318; Laidlaw v. Burlinson, 2 M. & W. 602, 14, 15; Johnson v. Hunt, 11 Ward, 137, 39). 8. If Furniss acquired any title under the executory agreement, still the exclusive possession continued in Brown, to make the alterations which he undertook to make. Furniss was out of possession, and is not liable, except upon his express contract to Brown ( Leonard v. Huntington, 15 J. R. 298; Thore v. Hicks, 7 Cow. 697, 99; Hussey v. Allen, 6 Mass. R. 163, 165). 9. If Mr. Furniss had been the sole owner of the steamboat, and had employed Brown to make the alterations in question, and in the execution of that employment, he had engaged the plaintiffs, as he did in this case, to do a portion of the work for him, the plaintiffs could not have maintained this personal action against the defendants, and if they had notice of the contract, could not have acquired any lien upon the vessel. The title to a vessel may furnish evidence that repairs are done under the authority and upon the credit of the legal owner, but it does no more; and if it appear that they were made under the authority and upon the credit of another, the legal owner will not be answerable. In this case the plaintiffs prove that Brown contracted with Furniss to do the work, which, in part, was performed by them; and the only inference the Court can draw, or which the jury were authorized to draw, from the evidence is, that the plaintiffs made a sub-contract with Brown to do this part of his undertaking, and Brown did not act as an agent for Furniss (Abbott on Shipping, 32, 33, and cases cited; Reeve v. Davis, 1 Al. & Ellis, 312, 15, 19; Frazer v. Marsh, 13 East, 238; Briggs v. Wilkinson, 7 B. & C. 30; Young v. Brander, 8 East. 10; Hollingsworth v. Dow, 19 Pick. 228, 29, 30; Jennings v. Griffiths, Ryan & Mov. 42). 10. To hold that the title was intended to pass, or did pass to Mr. Furniss upon the execution of the agreement, without regard to the change of the vessel to fit her for the purpose for which Mr. Furniss agreed to become the purchaser, is to lose sight of the situation of these parties, the business in which they proposed to engage, and its necessities (Clark v. The Merchants’ Bank, 2 Comst. 380, 84).
II. The judge erred in his instruction to the jury. The judgment should be reversed, and a new trial granted.
Albert Mathews, for plaintiffs.
This action is brought to recover $1,333 22, and interest from January 26, 1850, for work done and materials furnished by direction of defendants on the steamer Rhode Island from December 8, 1849, to January 26,1850. The only question in ' the case is, whether at this time the defendant, Eurniss, was owner so far as to render him liable to third persons furnishing materials for the steamer.
Eirst. November 1st, 1849, defendant, Eurniss, buys by bill of sale of that date, of defendant Brown, one-half of the steamer Rhode Island, “as she is now completely fitted and furnished for the transportation of passengers on the Sound, at the rate of fifty thousand dollars for the whole boat, payable in fifteen months in Eurniss’ notes, favor of Vm. H Brown.”
The boat was to be fitted up for sea as provided by the terms of the bill of sale, “ the outfits for said boat for carpenter, &e., not to exceed ten thousand dollars,” Eurniss to pay one-half and Brown one-half. Eurniss was to be her sole agent in New York, and to have allowed him a commission of five per cent, on account of all disbursements made by him for the boat, and each owner was to insure his own interest in the boat.
Second. January 21, 1850, Eurniss made oath at Custom House he was owner with Brown, and the vessel was registered in their joint names.
Third. Eurniss was on the boat from day to day while the work was going on, directing the men (jointly with Brown) as to the work done.
I. By virtue of the bill of sale of November 1st, Eurniss became joint owner, with Brown, of the vessel. The words are, Brown sells, in the present tense. (Furniss v. Brown, 8 How. S. H. R. 64.)
II. Eurniss by his own acts confirms this interpretation of his contract: In the Supreme Court suit above cited he claimed this construction, and succeeded.
HI. Being joint owner, acting as such, and in possession, he was liable in that capacity, and also as one of a copartnership as to third persons, jointly with Brown, for the work done according to his directions and for his benefit upon his property. (Miln v. Spinola, 4 Hill, 177; 6 Hill, 218; Flanders v. Merritt, 3 Barb. S. C. R. 201; (as to partnership) Durham v. Jarvis, 8 Barb. S. C. R. 94.)

Opinion:
By the Court. Bosworth, J.
No evidence was given or offered by the defendants. There was no conflict in the evidence given by the plaintiffs. It either established, or was insufficient prima facie to establish, that the defendants were joint owners of the steamboat Rhode Island during the time the labor was performed, and the materials were furnished, to recover the value of which the action is brought. Whether they were such joint owners was the only question controverted at the trial.
The instrument of the first of Hovember, 1849, declares that defendant Brown " hereby sells" one-half of the steamer " as she now is," at the rate of $50,000 for the whole. So far, the language and legal effect of the instrument are clear and unequivocal. They pass a present interest.
The only doubt arises out of the provision in relation to the payment of the purchase money. That was to be paid in the notes of Furniss, on time, and to be dated on a day then uncertain. Although the time when this day should arrive could not then be known, and possibly might not occur, yet the half of $50,000 was to be paid for a definite subject, in its then condition.
The sale by Brown, and purchase by Furniss, were made with the intent to convert the steamer into an ocean steamer at their joint expense, to be employed on their joint account.
Brown covenanted, construing the covenant most unfavorably to him, to convert her into an ocean steamer at an expense not exceeding $10,000, and Furniss agreed to pay half of the actual expense, within that limit. This covenant I regard as a distinct and independent covenant, and not as a conditional covenant, the full performance of which was essential to vesting title in Furniss to half of the steamer as she then was. Full performance fixed the day for the date of the notes to be given, for the half of the vessel sold on the 1st of Hovember, 1849, as she then was, as well as the date of the notes to be given for half of the cost of the alterations. Full performance of the covenant on the part of Brown was made; the vessel left her wharf completed on the last of January, 1850, and she was registered in the names of Brown and Furniss, as joint owners, on Furniss' affidavit of such joint ownership. This affidavit was made two or three days before the alteration was fully completed, and before title vested in Furniss, if it did not vest on the execution and delivery of the instrument of November, or if it was not " out of the carpenter's hands, fit and ready for sea." If out prior to making the affidavit, there is nothing to show when title vested, if it did not vest on the execution of the agreement.
This is not a controversy between Brown and Furniss, but is one between them and third persons. The acts of Furniss during the progress of the work, and with reference to it, in such a controversy, are to be considered, and their proper weight is to be given to them, and they may, of themselves, in a controversy like this, be conclusive. Furniss was almost daily inspecting the work and superintending it. He did not content himself with mere observation, which would have been proper if his purchase was only conditional, and dependent on the fact of her being converted into a steamer fit for ocean navigation. Such inspection would have been proper in case of a conditional purchase, to enable him to judge whether the conditions were fully performed—the performance of which would make it obligatory on him to pay the contract price.
But his directions were those of an owner, exercising the right of control, and in some instances they actually superseded those given by the defendant Brown. In such cases, the directions of Furniss were obeyed by the plaintiffs, and those of Brown disregarded. All such work was done literally by his personal order. Such acts are a practical construction by Furniss of the instrument of Uov. 1,1849, and treat it as passing at its date, a title to one-half of the steamer as she then was, and making them tenants in common from that date. They exhibit him acting as an actual joint owner with Brown in reference to the matter of converting her into an ocean steamer, and in fact exercising a paramount control with reference to the manner of doing the work. It was a control over these plaintiffs, who were neither parties to nor cognizant of the instrument of ÍTov. 1,1849, but who were third persons furnishing materials to the steamer, and expending labor upon her, on account of her owners. Who actually employed them was not shown nor attempted to be. In the absence of any express contract, credit is presumptively given to the persons in posses Bion acting as owners. Those so in possession and so acting, hold themselves out to third persons as owners, and aré liable to them as such.
The instrument of Nov." 1,1849, contained apt and effective terms to then pass title to half of the vessel. Nothing remained to be done by the vendor, with respect to the subject matter for which $25,000 was to -be paid. That was to be paid for half of the steamer as she then was. The only thing contingent was the term of credit. That was to be fifteen months at all events, and as much longer as the period that might elapse between that date and the time of converting her'into an ocean steamer. Instead of contracting, in the first instance, with a third person to make the alterations, as between themselves, it was agreed that Brown should do it, at a cost not exceeding $10,000, and for less if practicable—and Furniss was to pay the $25,000 fifteen months from the time the change was completed. It was completed, and it is not suggested that this did not occur within the shortest period contemplated by the parties. Furniss undoubtedly had a right, under the other clauses of the contract, to appoint officers, employ a crew, engage passengers and freight, while the work was progressing, so as to commence loading her for a voyage to the Pacific the moment the repairs should be completed. Whether he did so, does not appear. The clause in respect to each defendant's insuring his own interest, under what I regard as a fair construction of the whole instrument, was in force from its date. That clause, however, if the sale was clearly conditional, would only be effective from the time the sale became absolute and the title vested, and cannot have any controlling force given to it, in construing the contract.
A bill of sale reciting the registry is not essential to transfer the title. In the case of registered vessels, a bill of sale reciting the registry is requisite, not for the purpose of transferring the title, but for the purpose of securing her American character. The possession of one of two joint owners, is the possession of both. So far as there is any evidence of actual possession while the work was progressing, she was as much .controlled by Furniss as by Brown. That the delivery of a bill of sale of an interest in a ship will pass title, and that the subsequent pdssession of the part owner so selling will be the possession of both, no one, it is presumed, will deny.
We think the evidence given at the trial made out a clear • primó facie, case of the joint ownership of the defendants, as between them and the plaintiffs, during the time the materials were furnished and .the work, was done.
If the instrument of Hovember 1, 1849, had been still more express, and had positively declared that the one-half so bought by Furniss was from that time to be at his exclusive risk, as his absolute property, and had contained the same provisions, that it now does as- to the date of the notes, it would have been possible for events to occur making the right of Brown to recover the purchase money doubtful. The time of fixing the date of the notes, in the contemplation of the parties, was certain to arrive, and within a brief period. The agreement provides that Furniss might in the meantime contract liabilities on joint account, as if its arrival was certain and definite. That time did arrive, as the defendants anticipated. The title not only passed on the execution and delivery of the instrument of sale, but the time of payment arrived, and whatever doubts there might have been on the face of the instrument alone, as to the rights and liabilities of the defendants, as between themselves, while the repairs were being made, if Furniss had not interfered with them; yet on the whole case, as between the defendants and the plaintiffs, who do not appear to have ever - heard of the agreement of the 1st of Hovember, 1849, and who were working on account of the owners, and following the di-. rections of the defendants, who were in possession and acting as such, Furniss in fact exercising the paramount authority and control, a primó fade case' of joint ownership was established, and the judgment must be affirmed.