Case Name: SOUTH PORTLAND LAND COMPANY v. MUNGER
Court: Oregon Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Oregon
Decision Date: 1900-02-19
Citations: 36 Or. 457
Docket Number: 
Parties: SOUTH PORTLAND LAND COMPANY v. MUNGER.
Judges: 
Reporter: Oregon Reports
Volume: 36
Pages: 457–484

Head Matter:
Decided 19 February, 1900.
SOUTH PORTLAND LAND COMPANY v. MUNGER.
[54 Pac. 815, 60 Pac. 5.]
1. Reeving Notice of Appeal on all Tenants in Common. — A decree against tenants in common rendered on a bill against them all to quiet title may be appealed from by a part of such tenants, without serving notice on the others, though the decree is joint in form, since the interests of the co-tenants are distinct and several, so that the decree may be reversed as to appellants without affecting the decree in so far as it concerns the nonappealing defendants.
2. Waives of Jtjbisdiction by Answebing Ceoss Complaint. — Where, in an action at law to recover possession of land, defendant filed a cross complaint, alleging an equitable defense, and plaintiff, after a motion to strike and demurrer to such cross complaint had been overruled, answered, the right to in. sist that the action be tried at law was waived, since by answering plaintiff voluntarily submitted to the equitable jurisdiction: Scheland v. Brpelding, 6 Or. 258, followed; Dolph v. Barney, 5 Or. 191, distinguished.
3. Equitable Ceoss Complaint — Refoeming Deed fob Mutual Mistake.— An equitable cross complaint in an ejectment action whereby defendant claims title to the land in controversy and alleges that one of the deeds through which he claims is insufficient to convey the legal title owing to certain informalities resulting from a mutual mistake of the parties thereto, and praying for its reformation so that it will accord with the intention of the parties, states ground for equitable relief under Section 381 of Hill’s Ann. Laws.
4. Jueisdiotion Undeb Bquitable Ceoss Bill. — The jurisdiction obtained by a court of equity through a cross bill in an action at law under Section 381 Hill’s Ann. Laws, is the same as the original jurisdiction at common law, the relief afforded under such a cross bill is as broad as that which may be obtained by an original bill, and the remedy may be invoked whenever the law remedy is not as prompt, adequate, and efficient as that in equity.
5. Amending Pleadings to Confoem to Pboofs. — Where in an ejectment action defendant filed an equitable cross complaint alleging title in himself and that there had been a mutual mistake in the description in one of his deeds, the original of which he alleged to have been lost, it was proper to permit the filing of an amended cross complaint to conform the allegations to the proofs, the deed having been found, and it appearing that the mistake was in the record and not in the original deed.
6. Pleading — Cross Complaint for Speoifio Performance. — Where plaintiff claimed land as heir of C, and defendant filed a cross complaint, claiming through a deed executed by C to his wife for a valuable consideration, alleging that she went into possession, and subsequently conveyed the land to plaintiff’s grantor, that the deed from C to the wife was insufficient to pass the legal title, owing to a mutual mistake in writing the description, and praying that plaintiff be adjudged owner, and that the deed to the wife be reformed and corrected, such complaint stated facts sufficient to authorize relief by way of specific performance of the contract to convey, since the deed may be treated as such a contract.
7. Contract to Convey — Evidence of Consideration. — Where a defective deed is sought to be treated as a contract to convey and as a basis of a suit for specific performance, the deed itself, which recites a consideration, is prima facie sufficient evidence that it was based on a consideration.
8. Evidence of Delivery of Deed. — Evidence that a deed was recorded, — that it was in the possession of the grantee, and that she dealt with it and the property as if they were her own; that she placed the property on the market and afterwards sold it, delivering such deed to her grantees at the time she made the conveyance to them, — is sufficient to establish the delivery of the deed: Serles v. Series, 35 Or. 289, cited.
From Multnomah: Alfred F. Sears, Jr., Judge.
This was originally an action by Abbie K. Munger to recover possession of certain real property from the South Portland Land Company. Defendant filed a cross complaint alleging an equitable defense, whereupon the law action was stayed and the disputed questions tried in equity. Various persons having been brought in, a default decree was entered against some defendants and a' final decree on the merits against the others. From this adjudication four defendants appealed but served the notice on the land company only. A motion to dismiss was overruled and the final decree confirmed. The facts are fully stated in the opinions.
Motion Overruled : Affirmed.
Mr. William D. Fenton, for the motion.
Messrs. William W. Thayer and Alex. Bernstein, contra.

Opinion:
Decided 24 October, 1898.
On Motion to Dismiss Appeal.
[54 Pac. 815.]
Mr. Chiep Justice Wolverton
delivered the opinion.
This cause comes here on appeal from a decree on the cross complaint of the South Portland Land Company, filed to enjoin the further prosecution of an action for the possession of real property, instituted by Abbie K. Munger against said land company, to correct an alleged mistake in a certain deed which plaintiff claims constitutes a link in its chain of title, and to quiet its title to the premises in dispute. Abbie K. Munger, in the complaint in said action, alleges that she is the owner in fee of an undivided one-half of such premises, and prays judgment accordingly. The cross complaint against her joins with her, as defendants, her husband and the heirs at law of Mary Austin, deceased, and their respective spouses. All the defendants so joined with her were directed to be brought in by order of the court. Unless plaintiff is entitled to the relief demanded, the pleadings show that Abbie K. Munger is the owner in fee of an undivided one-half, and the heirs of Mary Austin, eight in number, are each the owner of an undivided one-sixteenth of said premises. William Austin, Arthur Austin, Garfield Austin, and Olive Black (nee Austin), four of such defendants, made no appearance in the court below ; whereupon a guardian ad litem was appointed for Garfield Austin, he being a minor, and default entered against the other three. Mary Jackson (nee Austin), the owner of a one-sixteenth interest, filed a disclaimer. The other Austin heirs, three in number, to wit, Prank Austin, George Austin, and Harvey H. Austin, appeared, and with the defendant Abbie K. Munger contested the suit. The four defendants last named attempted to appeal to this court by serving a notice thereof upon the plaintiff only, which filed a motion to dismiss because the defendants William, Arthur, and Garfield Austin, Mary Jackson, and Olive Black were not served with notice, nor made parties to the appeal. This presents the sole question for our disposal. It is contended — First, that all the co-tenants are necessary parties to the proceeding put in motion by the cross complaint to reform the deed and quiet title, and that the suit could not proceed without them ; hence that this court could not acquire jurisdiction to hear and determine the controversy upon the appeal without the presence of all such parties ; and, second, that the decree entered below is joint, and hence that all parties to it must be joined in the appeal or served with notice before appellate jurisdiction could attach.
Mr. Justice Thayer, in Minter v. Durham, 13 Or. 470, 481 (11 Pac. 231), was very much in doubt whether two or more tenants in common had the right to join as complainants in an action of ejectment, and said, in speaking for the court, that "tenants in common hold by unity of possession, but they hold several and distinct freeholds, and, under our statute, the action to recover possession of real property includes a recovery of the estate which the demandant has in it, and which must be a legal estate." The converse of the proposition is undoubtedly true,— that the several and distinct freeholds of each co-tenant may be the subject of a separate action for its recovery. As in law, so in equity ; to quiet title, the party claiming the whole may proceed separately against each person claiming to hold such an interest in the disputed premises ; and, while it may be convenient — perhaps proper— to join all the co-tenants claiming adversely, yet it is not indispensable or necessary that it should be done. And, even when joined, a decree against them must, from the very nature of the case, operate severally upon the distinct freehold interest of each co-tenant, and not jointly upon all. A judgment or decree may be joint in form, yet several in fact; and the rule seems to be that a party showing such a distinct and severable or separate interest may prosecute the appeal without joining co-parties below who are not identified or interdependent in interest; and the appellate tribunal may reverse or modify the judgment or decree without affecting the rights of the parties not before it: 2 Enc. Pl. & Prac. 186-188. Raney, J., in Guarantee Trust Co. v. Buddington, 23 Fla. 514 (2 South. 885), after alluding to the rule which requires the parties to a decree which is in law and in fact joint to unite in an appeal, says : ' 'This rule, however, does not preclude any one party who may be aggrieved by the decree in his separate interest, or several parties who may be aggrieved as to their united interests, from taking, the former his individual appeal, and the latter their joint appeal, although there may be numerous other parties adjudged against by the same decree, but not united in interest with such individual or joint parties in the matter so decreed as to him or them."
This doctrine does not dispense with the requirement that all parties who would be affected adversely, and whose interests would be in conflict with the reversal or modification of the decree appealed from or sought to be reviewed, must have legal notice of the appeal. If the relief sought by the appeal is of such a nature or character that it cannot be granted without adversely affecting parties not before it, either voluntarily as appellants or duly notified as respondents, then the court is without power or jurisdiction to proceed, and the appeal must be dismissed. But, if it appears that the special relief sought can be granted without affecting the interest of any party to the suit not a. party to the appeal, then the appellate jurisdiction is established, and the power to adjudicate concerning it is clear ; and this perhaps affords a reasonable and fair test of the joint or several character of the decree which it is sought to have reviewed. The parties not appearing in the case at bar, if the facts set forth in the cross bill are true, are tenants in common with the defendants appealing, each holding a several and distinct freehold interest in the premises in dispute. The decree of the court below has cut them off, and the plaintiff has obtained effectual relief against them. The other defendants, not being satisfied with the action of the court below, have appealed and served the plaintiff, an adverse party. They seek to have the decree reversed as to them, and this the court may do owing to the distinct and several interests of the appealing defendants, without in the least disturbing the interests of the nonappealing defendants, or affecting the decree below, which determines their adverse claim in favor of the plaintiff. This being so, it is clear the appeal should not be dismissed, and the motion is therefore denied. Motion Overruled.