Case Name: PEOPLE v. WILLIAMS
Court: Michigan Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1978-06-05
Citations: 83 Mich. App. 642
Docket Number: Docket No. 29301
Parties: PEOPLE v WILLIAMS
Judges: Before: Danhof, C. J., and Allen and H. L. Heading, JJ.
Reporter: Michigan appeals reports; cases decided in the Michigan Court of Appeals.
Volume: 83
Pages: 642–653

Head Matter:
PEOPLE v WILLIAMS
Docket No. 29301.
Submitted October 12, 1977, at Lansing.
Decided June 5, 1978.
Jimmie L. Williams was convicted of armed robbery, Ingham Circuit Court, Donald L. Reisig, J. Prior to trial the defendant appeared at a parole revocation proceeding without counsel. The defendant appeals, arguing that the in-court identification of the defendant was tainted because of an impermissibly suggestive pretrial identification procedure which occurred during the parole revocation hearing and that witnesses were improperly questioned about the defendant’s employment. Held:
The in-court identification of the defendant was proper, even assuming that the parole revocation hearing constituted an impermissibly suggestive identification procedure, because the record discloses clear and convincing evidence that the complaining witness had a prior independent basis for the in-court identification. There was no showing of manifest injustice regarding the prosecution’s questioning of the defendant’s alibi witnesses as to whether the defendant was employed; therefore, although such questioning was improper, there was no reversible error on that issue.
Affirmed.
H. L. Heading, J., dissented. He would hold (1) that the trial court’s finding that the in-court identification of the defendant rested on an independent basis was clearly erroneous, and (2) that the prosecution’s questioning of the alibi witnesses about the defendant’s employment at the time of the robbery were so prejudicial that a curative instruction could not have overcome the error and that the defendant should not be precluded from raising the issue on appeal. He would reverse the defendant’s conviction and remand for a new trial.
References for Points in Headnotes
81 Am Jur 2d, Witnesses § 492.
5 Am Jur 2d, Appeal and Error §§ 562, 778.
21 Am Jur 2d, Criminal Law § 568.
59 Am Jur 2d, Pardon and Parole § 97.
Right to assistance of counsel to revoke probation. 44 ALR3d 306.
29 Am Jur 2d, Evidence § 372.
29 Am Jur 2d, Evidence §§ 371-373, 1143.
Extrajudicial or pretrial identification of accused, admissibility of evidence as to. 71 ALR2d 449.
30 Am Jur 2d, Evidence §§ 1085-1086.
81 Am Jur 2d, Witnesses § 661.
75 Am Jur 2d, Trial § 708.
Opinion of the Court
1. Witnesses—Criminal Law—Identification—Improper Procedure—Independent Basis.
Factors to be considered in determining whether an in-court identification of a defendant had a basis independent from a pretrial identification procedure include consideration of the witness’s opportunity for observation during the crime, accuracy of description, any discrepancy between a pre-lineup description and actual appearance of the defendant, identification of any other person prior to the lineup, failure to identify the defendant on a prior occasion, the lapse of time between the crime and the lineup identification, and any idiosyncratic or special features of the defendant.
2. Criminal Law—Appeal and Error—Prosecutor’s Questions— Witnesses—Alibi Witnesses—Failure to Object—Manifest Injustice.
A prosecutor’s improper questioning of a defendant’s alibi witness regarding the defendant’s employment was not reversible error where there was no objection at trial and no showing of manifest injustice.
Dissent by H. L. Heading, J.
3. Criminal Law—Constitutional Law—Right to Counsel—Probation Revocation Hearing—Identification—Case Precedent.
A criminal defendant is entitled to representation of counsel at a parole revocation hearing where the hearing is a pretrial identification procedure within the meaning of precedent case law.
4. Criminal Law—Identification—Parole Revocation Hearing— Suggestive Identification Procedure.
A confrontation of a complaining witness with a defendant, who was without counsel, in custody, and obviously the accused at a parole violation proceeding, was an unduly suggestive pretrial identification procedure.
5. Criminal Law—Identification—Hearing—Attorney and Client —Discretion.
The holding of an evidentiary hearing out of the presence of the jury, at which the people must show by clear and convincing evidence that an in-court identification had a basis independent of the prior identification procedure, is not discretionary with the trial judge if there was no counsel at the pretrial identification procedure, or if the procedure was unnecessarily suggestive or conducive to irreparable misidentification.
6. Criminal Law—Identification—Independent Basis—Suggestive Identification Procedure—Findings.
A trial judge’s finding that a complaining witness’s in-court identification had a basis independent of an improper pretrial identification procedure should not be disturbed unless it is clearly erroneous.
7. Criminal Law—Identification—Suggestive Identification Procedure—Parole Violation Hearing—Independent Basis—In-Court Identification.
A trial court’s finding that a complaining witness’s in-court identification of a defendant had a basis independent of an impermissibly suggestive pretrial identification procedure at the defendant’s parole violation hearing was clearly erroneous where there is no doubt that the showup at the parole hearing aided the complainant in positively identifying the defendant and where, if the complainant had not seen the defendant at the parole hearing, the complainant would not have identified the defendant as the perpetrator of the offense.
8. Criminal Law—Evidence—Alibi Witnesses—Prosecutor’s Questions—Employment Status of Defendant.
Questioning by the prosecution of a defendant’s alibi witnesses to determine if the defendant was employed at the time of a robbery was improper because the prejudicial value outweighed the probative value.
9. Criminal Law—Appeal and Error—Failure to Object—Prosecutor’s Questions—Alibi Witnesses.
The failure of a defendant to object to questions by a prosecutor of alibi witnesses should not preclude the defendant from raising the issue on appeal where the questions brought forth answers which were so prejudicial that even if an objection had been raised a curative instruction would not have overcome the error.
Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Robert A. Derengoski, Solicitor General, Peter D. Houk, Prosecuting Attorney, Lee Wm. Atkinson, Chief Appellate Attorney, and Lawrence P. Schneider, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for the people.
Reid & Reid, P. C. (by Joseph D. Reid and Lawrence J. Emery), for defendant on appeal.
Before: Danhof, C. J., and Allen and H. L. Heading, JJ.
Detroit Recorder’s Court judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.

Opinion:
Danhof, C. J.
Defendant was jury convicted of armed robbery in violation of MCL 750.529; MSA 28.797, and was subsequently sentenced to a term of 7-1/2 to 20 years in prison. Defendant appeals as of right raising four issues.
Defendant argues that the absence of counsel at his parole revocation hearing, which took place after his arrest but before his trial on the robbery charge, required the per se exclusion of any testimony concerning that parole revocation proceeding or its result at the robbery trial. The prosecution did not present any such testimony at defendant's trial however.
Defendant further argues that the in-court identification of the defendant by the complaining witness was tainted by the impermissibly suggestive pretrial identification procedure which occurred during the parole revocation hearing. Defendant made a pretrial motion to suppress the in-court identification. Assuming that the defendant is correct that the parole revocation hearing con stituted an impermissibly suggestive identification procedure, the record discloses clear and convincing evidence that the witness had a prior independent basis for his in-court identification. That basis was his observation of the robber at the scene of the crime both shortly before and during the robbery. Applying the test set out in People v Kachar, 400 Mich 78; 252 NW2d 807 (1977), reveals that the factors favoring a finding of an independent basis include the witness's opportunity to observe the robber before and during the crime under good lighting conditions with no distractions; the fairly short time between the crime and the trial; the previous proper identification of defendant's photograph in a nonsuggestive identification situation; the accuracy of the witness's description of the defendant given shortly after the crime occurred; and the fact that the witness identified no one other than the defendant as the robber. Some factors do undercut the identification including the witness's excited state during the robbery; his failure to identify defendant's picture shortly after the robbery; and the witness's own testimony which appears confused at points. Defendant places great emphasis on a small part of this testimony which appears to contain an unequivocal admission by the witness that he could not have identified the defendant had he not seen him at the parole revocation hearing. A fair reading of the record shows, however, that the witness misunderstood the question asked of him. The witness subsequently explained that he had not' finished his answer and that the parole hearing had no effect on his ability to identify the defendant whom he could have identified as the robber even if he had not seen him at the parole hearing. Our own reading of the question posed to the witness reveals that it contains three negatives and could easily have confused the witness. The record supports a finding of an independent basis and therefore it was not error to allow the witness to make an in-court identification of the defendant.
Defendant also contends that the prosecutor's unobjected to statement in closing argument that the evidence was "uncontradicted and unrebutted" was an improper comment on the defendant's failure to testify. There is no merit to this contention. People v Jacoboni, 34 Mich App 84, 86; 190 NW2d 720 (1971), People v Franklin, 70 Mich App 343, 348; 245 NW2d 746 (1976).
Defendant also argues that the prosecutor's questioning of his alibi witnesses to determine if defendant was employed at the time of the robbery was improper. We agree. However, we do not find reversible error here because there was no objection at the trial, the questions were few, the subject was not mentioned in closing argument, and there has been no showing of manifest injustice. See People v Martin, 75 Mich App 6, 13-14; 254 NW2d 628 (1977), and People v Kincade, 61 Mich App 498, 506-507; 233 NW2d 54 (1975).
Affirmed.
Allen, J., concurred.