Case Name: UNITED STATES FIDELITY & GUARANTY CO. v. DOWDLE
Court: Texas Courts of Civil Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1924-10-11
Citations: 269 S.W. 119
Docket Number: No. 9332
Parties: UNITED STATES FIDELITY & GUARANTY CO. v. DOWDLE.
Judges: 
Reporter: South Western Reporter
Volume: 269
Pages: 119–130

Head Matter:
UNITED STATES FIDELITY & GUARANTY CO. v. DOWDLE.
(No. 9332.)
(Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. Dallas.
Oct. 11, 1924.
Rehearing Denied Jan. 31, 1925.)
1. Appeal and error <&wkey;930(l) — Evidence viewed in light of sustaining verdict of jury.
On appeal, evidence will be viewed in light of sustaining verdict of jury.
On Motion for Rehearing.
2. Appeal and error &wkey;>218(2) — Statute providing that special verdict shall be conclusive as between parties, construed.
Rev. St. art. 1986, providing that a special verdict shall, as between parties, be conclusive as to facts found, means that parties to a proceeding in which verdict is rendered on, special issues, being dissatisfied therewith, must properly question its validity in court below, and, failing to do this, jury’s finding on special issues submitted becomes conclusive as toi facts found between parties.
3. Judgment <&wkey; 198 — Court not authorized in rendering judgment on special verdict to disregard jury’s finding on a material issue.
Trial court is not authorized in rendering judgment on a special verdict to disregard jury’s finding on a material issue, even though such finding has no support in testimony.
4. New trial <&wkey;l64 — Court may set aside jury’s findings on special issues as a whole.
Court may, on motion, set aside jury’s findings on special issues as a whole and grant a new trial, but cannot set aside part of them and substitute his own for those set aside and thereon render judgment.
5. Trial <&wkey;350( I) — Statute held only to require trial court to limit submission of a cause to issues raised by pleadings and evidence.
Vernon’s Sayles’ Ann. Civ. St. 1914, art. 1984a, only requires trial court to submit and limit submission of a cause on special issues to issues raised by pleadings and evidence.
6. Trial <&wkey;355(l) — Statute held to require evidence to sustain any finding of jury on special issues.
Rev. St. art. 1985, providing that special verdict must find facts established by evidence and that issue not submitted and not requested shall be demanded as found by court to support judgment, if there is any evidence to sustain such finding, requires that there shall be evidence to sustain any finding of jury on special issues.
7. Appeal and error @=51175(2) — Power conferred on Courts of Civil Appeals to render judgment which court below should have rendered applies to all judgments.
Power conferred on Courts of Civil Appeals by Rev. St. art. 1626, to render such judgment as court below should have rendered, applies without limitation to all judgments, whether based on general verdict or jury’s findings on special issues, or rendered by court without a jury trial.
8. Appeal and error <&wkey; 1175(2) — Where jury’s verdict is unsupported and case has been fully developed, Court of Civil Appeals will render such judgment as court below should have rendered.
Where there is no evidence to support jury’s verdict and case has been fully developed, on reversal, Court of Civil Appeals has authority to render such judgment as court below should have rendered, whether judgment is based on jury’s findings as a verdict, or a verdict on general submission.
9. Marriage <&wkey;50(5) — Valid common-law marriage not shown to exist where no change of relationship after removal of legal inhibition.
Valid common-law marriage was not shown to exist by cohabitation and repute, where, at time of entering into same, one of parties was lawfully married, notwithstanding removal of inhibition by divorce, where their relations were thereafter continued without change and without agreement to take each other for husband and wife.
10. Marriage @=>22 — Cohabitation and repute do not constitute marriage.
Cohabitation and repute do not constitute a marriage, but are only evidence, when relationship is not meretricious, tending to raise a presumption of more or less strength according to circumstances.
(I. Marriage @=>40(4) — Marriage cannot be presumed from an illicit cohabitation.
Marriage cannot be presumed from an illicit cohabitation.
12. Marriage @=>40(1) — Courts cannot marry parties by mere presumption without their consent.
Courts cannot marry parties by mere presumption without their consent, since law compels no one to assume matrimonial status.
13. Marriage <&wkey;l8 —When marriage status arises, stated.
Marriage status only arises where parties are not only capable of so contracting, but voluntarily consent to assume, and'by mutual contract do assume, such relation.
14. Marriage &wkey;>50(5) — Marriage may be shown by circumstantial evidence.
Marriage may be shown by circumstantial as well as by direct evidence, and may be inferred from continuous cohabitation and repute when nothing appears, to prevent raising of presumption created by proof of such facts. •
15. Marriage <&wkey;4fi(4) — Illicit cohabitation presumed to continue, in absence of proof of change of relation.
If cohabitation in its inception is illicit, it will be presumed that such relation continues, in absence of proof of change of relation.
16. Contracts <©=> 10(1)— Contract not mutually binding is void for want of mutuality.
A contract not mutually binding is void for want .of mutuality.
Looney, J., dissenting on motion for rehearing.
Appeal from District Court, Dallas County; Douis -Wilson, Judge.
Proceeding by Mary Dowdle against the United States Fidelity & Guaranty Company before tbe Industrial Accident Board for an award. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals.
Reversed and rendered.
See, also, 242 S. W. 771; 255 S. W. 388.
Seay, Seay, Malone & BipSeomb, of Dallas, for appellant.
J. *W. Craig and John White, both of Dallas, for appellee.

Opinion:
VAUGHAN, J.
This is the second appeal of this case. The former appeal was from a judgment in favor of appellant, which was affirmed. See Dowdle v. U. S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co. (Tex. Civ. App.) 242 S. W. 771. Appellant, in said appeal, obtained writ of error, and, on hearing, said judgment of affirmance was reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings. See Dowdle v. U. S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co. (Tex. Com. App.) 255 S. W. 388. For statement of the case on the pleadings we refer to and adopt statement made on former appeal. Id., 242 S. W. 771.
The case on the trial from which this appeal is prosecuted was submitted to the jury on one special issue, to wit:
"Do you find and believe from the evidence that there was a common-law marriage between the deceased, Bueius Dowdle, and the plaintiff herein, Mary Dowdle?"
To which the jury answered, "Yes," and on which verdict the trial court rendered judgment in favor of appellee.
The controlling issue presented by this appeal is whether or not appellee was the common-law wife of one Bueius Dowdle at the time of his demise. Therefore, we will only consider the assignments of error and propositions thereunder relating or pertinent thereto, all of which, we think, are comprehended by the following propositions advanced by appellant:
(a) Where a person has a living spouse, such person is incapable of performing a valid common-law marriage.
(b) Where a marriage is once shown to exist, it is presumed to continue until the contrary is shown.
(c) To constitute a valid common-law marriage requires the same good faith as a statutory marriage.
(d) The evidence in this cause shows that appellee did not contract a "valid common-law marriage with deceased.
The issue embraced in the first proposition was submitted to the jury by the following portion of the explanatory charge, by which they were to be guided in reaching an answer to the one special issue submitted:
"To constitute such a marriage it requires "only the agreement of callable contracting parties to become then and thenceforth husband and wife; that such agreement to become husband and wife must be in good faith and of a permanent nature to the extent of that made where marriage is performed in statutory manner. When these elements exist, such a marriage is complete."
In passing upon the questions presented by said propositions, it is necessary to do so in the light of the strongest feature of the evidence sustaining the verdict of the jury. Therefore we have culled from the mass of the evidence and given effect to all portions thereof bearing upon the issue resolved in favor of the appellee by the findings of the jury.
In reference to the contract of marriage alleged to have been made by and between appellee and the deceased, Bueius Dowdle, whereby appellee claims she became and was the common-law wife of said decedent at the time of his demise, appellee testified as follows;
"I knew Bueius Dowdle in his lifetime. I first met him in Queen City, on Battimer street, where I was living on Joe Greer's place. Queen City is in South Dallas. That was my first acquaintance with him. I had not known him previous to the time he came to my house. I allege in my petition that some time along about that time Bueius Dowdle and myself married. We had been living together at the time he was lulled about a year or better. He was there with me, off and on, worked out, going picking cotton; he said he liked me and I liked him all right, and he says he would take care of me and treat me all right, and says, 'Bet's me and you marry.' I says, 'All right,' and we just went' on like married people. I lived in the same house with him and he supported me, and I worked for him and kept house for him. I waited on him when he was sick. When lie-mentioned the subject of marriage to me, he just said, 'Bets get married,' and went right ahead. He had been boarding with me before he proposed to marry me about a year.- After he proposed to marry me, I accepted him and 'went to keeping house as husband and wife. During the time I lived with him as his wife, I was loyal and true to him as his wife andi attended to all the duties of the wife'in the home. I was living that way with him at the time of his death. At the time I entered into this marriage I was a single woman; I had been single about 18 years. During the two or three years-prior to his death I lived and cohabited with him as his wife, slept with him, worked for him, and washed for him. After he had stayed about a year, he says: 'Mrs. Griffin, if you will be married I will help you and be good to you and treat you nice and take care of you, and you won't have to work,' and I told him, 'All right.' "
In reference to the date of the making of this alleged marriage contract and as to her knowledge that deceased, Bueius Dowdle, at that time was legally married to one Callie Dowdle, who was then living, appellee testified:
"I 'aint saying I know that Bueius had a wife named Callie Dowdle; I just heard him talk ing about it. I beard he had a wife and a preacher took her away from him; that was all I knew about it; that was after we began living together. He told me before we went to living together, and all during the time we did live together, that he had a wife named Oallie Dowdle, and that a preacher took her away from him, and he said about the time we started living together that he believed he would go to San Antonio and clean up on this preacher, and I talked him out of it. He told me about his wife in San Antonio close to where he came from; that he had a wife in San Antonio. I cannot tell you exactly how soon it was after he came there before he commenced to stay in my room. I didn't set any date as to the time he commenced sleeping with me. My judgment about it was the fall of the year some time; it was after Christmas in December, and we just began to go together. That was before Christmas, 1915; I have got my mind on that. It was in the spring or summer of the next year that I learned from him he had another wife; 1916, I think is right. He told me then he had & wife. He got a letter, I don't know* what time it was, but in the spring along after Christmas. The letter stated, 'Just want a divorce.' Never paid any attention to it. He said he had a letter from his wife and she wanted a divorce. I think it was after the time he showed me this letter that we agreed to live together. I had never discussed his wife with him up to the time he got the letter. I didn't know that he had a living wife until he got the letter. I think we had made the agreement to marry at that time, as near as I can remember. We went ahead as soon as he showed me the letter and made the contract. I didn't set any time, but it was after he got the letter, I think. I don't know anything about whether he had gotten a divorce from his wife or not when we made this contract. I don't know whether he got a divorce before his death. I didn't try to find out. I did testify that I had been sleeping with Lucius long before I started playing husband and wife; I don't know whether it was before we agreed to become husband and wife; we just went right on after he signed for the divorce. We went right on living together after he signed for the divorce; it was after that we commenced sleeping together as near as I can remember now."
In our opinion the evidence of appellee, as a whole, is within its own terms so inconsistent and in such diametrical conflict as not to be worthy of being accepted as a guide to the truth of the matters in reference to which appellee testified. This, we think, can apply with almost equal force to the above extracts made from her entire testimony as revealed by the record before us. However, for the purpose of disposing of this appeal, we will assume that the evidence of appellee, the sole witness who testified anent the making of the common-law marriage contract, is sufficient to support the making of such contract in so far as the parties were under the law in position to so contract. The evidence if it reveals with certainty any one thing, establishes that only one marriage contract was made and entered into between appellee and the deceased, Lucius Dowdle. Aided by circumstances, appellee fixed the date of the contract at or about the time that deceased, Lucius Dowdle, received the letter in reference to the suit for divorce that had beeh filed against him by Callie Dowdle. The nunc pro tunc entry of the judgment rendered in said suit establishes the fact that said suit was filed on the 13th day of October, 1915; that acceptance of service of citation in said cause was made by Lucius Dowdle, the defendant therein, prior to November 22, 1915, for on that date his acceptance of service was filed in the court in which said suit for divorce was pending.
The only marriage contract entered into by appellee with deceased, Lucius Dowdle, was between the dates of October 13 and November 22, 1915, and prior to November 22, 1915; that at the time of the making of same, decedent was the lawful husband of one Callie Dowdle, of which status appellee at that time had notice; that by said nunc pro tunc judgment entry it is shown that on the 22d day of November, 1915, the bonds of matrimony theretofore existing between decedent and Oallie Dowdle were dissolved, and from that date to the death of Lucius Dowdle appellee and decedent lived together without contracting to become then and thenceforth husband and wife; that at the time said parties attempted to enter into the marriage state, decedent Dowdle, one of the contracting parties, was under such legal inhibition, to wit, his existing marriage with Oallie Dowdle, that he was prevented from contracting a legal marriage with appellee. The fact that said parties continued living together, cohabiting as husband and wife, after the granting of said divorce, is not sufficient to show a marriage in fact after the removal of such impediment; no subsequent contract to enter into said state having been shown to have been made by said parties. Further, the evidence shows that at the time of the commencement of the cohabitation and conduct from which it is sought to establish the fact of the marriage of appellee to deceased Dowdle, there was in fact no marriage because of the inhibition existing to said Dowdle making the contract. Therefore the continuance of such relations after the removal of such inhibition, without an agreement to then and there become husband and wife, would not be sufficient to show a marriage in fact subsequent to the removal of such inhibition, as a continuation thereafter of such relationship, without something more to indicate that there had been a change in the relation of the parties to each other, would not be sufficient to es.-tablish the marriage as contended for by appellee. Cuneo v. De Cuneo, 24 Tex. Civ. App. 436, 59 S. W. 284.
No valid agreement creating the relation of husband and wife between appellee and de ceased, Dowdle, having been shown to have been made after the removal of the impediment existing to deceased, Dowdle, the cohabitation by said parties thereafter was not as man and wife in continuance of a marriage contract, as "it can of itself be no part of the marriage contract except it taire place after and not before the agreement."
We therefore hold that the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury to return a verdict in favor of appellant as per its request for peremptory instruction.
As shown by the record, the case has been fully developed, and to remand the cause for further proceedings would serve no useful purpose. Therefore the judgment of the court below is reversed and here rendered in favor of appellant that appellee tafee nothing by her suit.
Reversed and rendered.
©soFor other cases see same topic and KEY-NTJMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes