Case Name: PEOPLE v. KRETCHMER
Court: Michigan Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1978-12-26
Citations: 404 Mich. 59
Docket Number: Docket No. 57997
Parties: PEOPLE v KRETCHMER
Judges: Kavanagh, C.J., and Williams, Levin, and Ryan, JJ., concurred.
Reporter: Michigan Reports
Volume: 404
Pages: 59–69

Head Matter:
PEOPLE v KRETCHMER
Docket No. 57997.
Argued January 5, 1978
(Calendar No. 15).
Decided December 26, 1978.
Clarence L. Kretchmer was charged with public intoxication under a Niles Township ordinance and with resisting a police officer in the discharge of his duty; both charges arose out of the defendant’s actions while police officers were quieting a disturbance in a tavern. He was acquitted in the Fifth District Court, John Iwaniuk, J., of the charge of public intoxication. The Berrien Circuit Court, Julian Hughes, J., granted the defendant’s motion to quash the information charging resisting a police officer on the ground of the defendant’s right to be free from second jeopardy under the "same-transaction” test. The Court of Appeals, N. J. Kaufman, P.J., and R. B. Burns and Deneweth, JJ., affirmed (Docket No. 22609). The people appeal. Held:
1. Where one or more of the offenses charged does not involve criminal intent, the "same transaction” test defining "same transaction” as those crimes committed in a continuous time sequence which display a single intent or goal is inappropriate in examining a claim of double jeopardy. Instead, the criterion is whether the offenses are part of the same criminal episode, and whether the offenses involve laws intended to prevent the same or similar harm or evil, not a substantially different, or a very different kind of, harm or evil.
References for Points in Headnotes
[1, 2, 5, 6] 5 Am Jur 2d, Arrest § 94
21 Am Jur 2d, Criminal Law §§ 107,108,182-193. 75 Am Jur 2d, Trial §§ 367, 426.
What constitutes obstructing or resisting an officer, in the absence of actual force. 44 ALR3d 1018.
Modern status of the rules as to voluntary intoxication as defense to criminal charge. 8 ALR3d 1236.
Effect of voluntary drug intoxication upon criminal responsibility. 73 ALR3d 98.
Location of offense as "public” within requirement of enactments against drunkenness. 8 ALR3d 930.
When intoxication deemed in voluntary so as to constitute a defense to criminal charge. 73 ALR3d 195.
[3, 4] 21 Am Jur 2d, Criminal Law §§ 107,108.
75 Am Jur 2d, Trial §§ 367, 426.
Modern status of the rules as to voluntary intoxication as defense to criminal charge. 8 ALR3d 1236.
Effect of voluntary drug intoxication upon criminal responsibility. 73 ALR3d 98.
When intoxication deemed involuntary so as to constitute a defense to criminal charge. 73 ALR3d 195.
2. Public intoxication does not involve an element of criminal intent. Whether or not public intoxication and resisting arrest can be part of the same criminal episode, the two laws are intended to prevent substantially different harm or evil. The purpose of the public intoxication ordinance was to protect the public, as it went about its business, from persons not in control of themselves. The purpose of the resisting arrest statute is to protect persons (the officers) from physical harm and violence. The enactment of 1977 PA 109 and 1977 PA 110 reflects the legislative judgment that public intoxication is so substantially different from conduct generally covered by the criminal law that it should not be a criminal offense at all. Therefore, prosecution of a charge of resisting arrest arising out of events which led to the charge of public intoxication is not barred by double jeopardy.
Justice Moody, joined by Justices Coleman and Fitzgerald, concurred in the result and agreed that this case may be distinguished from the one which announced the "same-transaction” rule because the case here entailed both criminal intent and non-criminal intent offenses which were meant to address different evils. However, he would find this case a clear exception to the same-transaction rule on another ground. The Legislature vested jurisdiction over ordinance violations in the district courts and jurisdiction over offenses such as resisting arrest in the circuit courts. In this case, where neither district nor circuit court had subject-matter jurisdiction to try all the criminal charges arising out of this incident, it would be anomalous and unjust to preclude prosecution by separate trial on those charges necessarily triable only in different courts. Therefore, a claim of double jeopardy may not bar the prosecution of the defendant for resisting arrest. The same-transaction rule was simply not conceived or intended to apply to this type of case.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed and the case is remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings.
66 Mich App 548; 239 NW2d 658 (1976) reversed.
Opinion of the Court
1. Criminal Law — Double Jeopardy — Same Transaction — Resisting Arrest — Public Intoxication.
The offense of resisting arrest and that of public intoxication, which does not include an element of criminal intent, involve laws intended to prevent substantially different harm or evil and do not, therefore, require a single prosecution in a case arising out of one episode (US Const, Am V; Const 1963, art 1, § 15; MCL 750.479; MSA 28.747).
2. Criminal Law — Double Jeopardy — Joinder.
Multiple criminal charges against a defendant in which not all the offenses involve criminal intent need not be joined at one trial where they are part of the same criminal episode but violate laws intended to prevent the same or similar harm or evil, but a substantially different kind of harm or evil (US Const, Am V; Const 1963, art 1, § 15).
3. Criminal Law — Public Intoxication — Intent.
Public intoxication does not involve an element of criminal intent.
4. Criminal Law — Public Intoxication.
The enactment of a statute barring local ordinances imposing a civil or criminal penalty for public intoxication, being a common drunkard, or being incapacitated, except as provided by the statute defining a disorderly person, reflects the legislative judgment that public intoxication is so substantially different from conduct generally covered by criminal law that it should not be a criminal offense at all (1977 PA 109, 1977 PA 110).
Concurring Opinion by Blair Moody, Jr., J.
5. Criminal Law — Double Jeopardy — Same Transaction — Resisting Arrest — Public Intoxication — Jurisdiction.
A claim of double jeopardy on the ground that the defendant was previously acquitted in district court of public intoxication may not bar the prosecution of a defendant in circuit court for resisting arrest which arose out of his arrest for public intoxication because neither district nor circuit court had subject-matter jurisdiction to try all the criminal charges arising out of the incident (US Const, Am V; Const 1963, art 1, § 15; MCL 600.601, 600.8311[b], 750.479; MSA 27A.601, 27A.8311[b], 28.747).
6. Criminal Law — Double Jeopardy — Jurisdiction — Same Transaction.
It would be anomalous and unjust to preclude prosecution by-separate trial on those charges necessarily triable only in different courts through the application of the "same-transaction” rule, which was not conceived or intended to apply to that kind of case (US Const, Am V; Const 1963, art 1, § 15; MCL 600.601, 600.8311[b]; MSA 27A.601, 27A.8311[b]).
Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Robert A. Derengoski, Solicitor General, John A. Smietanka, Prosecuting Attorney, and John Jeffrey Long, Chief Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for the people.
James K Jesse for defendant.

Opinion:
Per Curiam.
The issue is whether defendant's acquittal of a charge of public intoxication bars, under the "same transaction" rule we adopted in People v White, 390 Mich 245, 258; 212 NW2d 222 (1973), a charge of resisting arrest arising out of the events which led to the charge of public intoxication.
We hold that prosecution is not barred because the two offenses involve laws intended to prevent substantially different harm or evil.
I
The police arrived at a tavern on March 31, 1974 after receiving a report of a disturbance from the owner. They saw a number of persons causing trouble and asked them to leave. As these persons were complying with the officers' request, they received information that the defendant and a companion were causing a disturbance. The officers asked the companion to leave. The defendant intervened.
An officer testified at the preliminary examination that after an exchange of words, defendant was arrested, that he resisted the arrest and was subdued. Defendant was charged with an ordinance violation (public intoxication), and with a circuit-court misdemeanor (resisting a police officer in the discharge of his duty).
On August 13, 1974 the defendant was acquitted in the district court of the public intoxication charge. The circuit court concluded that the trial in district court barred prosecution for resisting arrest. The Court of Appeals affirmed. 66 Mich App 548; 239 NW2d 658 (1976).
II
The offenses in White all involved an element of criminal intent. In Crampton v 54-A District Judge, 397 Mich 489, 499, 502; 245 NW2d 28 (1976), we held that the criterion applied in White was inappropriate to a determination of whether a series of offenses arose out of the same transaction where at least one of those offenses did not involve an element of criminal intent. We developed the following criterion for such a situation:
"Where one or more of the offenses does not involve criminal intent, the criterion is whether the offenses are part of the same criminal episode, and whether the offenses involve laws intended to prevent the same or similar harm or evil, not a substantially different, or a very different kind of, harm or evil."
Public intoxication does not involve an element of criminal intent.
The people argue that the offenses were not "part of the same criminal episode" because the defendant's public intoxication existed before the police arrived at the scene. Whether or not public intoxication and resisting arrest can be part of the same criminal episode, we are persuaded that the two laws are intended to prevent substantially different harm or evil.
The purpose of the public intoxication ordinance, as is the purpose of the law proscribing the driving under the influence of liquor offense involved in Crampton, was to protect the public, as it went about its business, from persons not in control of themselves. The purpose of the resisting arrest statute is to protect persons (the officers) from physical violence and harm.
The enactment of 1977 PA 110; MCL' 325.763; MSA 18.1031(63) barring, after January 15, 1978, local ordinances imposing "a civil or criminal penalty for public intoxication, being a common drunkard, or being incapacitated" except as provided by MCL 750.167; MSA 28.364, as amended by 1977 PA 109, defining as "a disorderly person", among others, "[a] person who is intoxicated in a public place and who is either endangering directly the safety of another person or of property or is acting in a manner that causes a public disturbance", reflects the legislative judgment that public intoxication is so substantially different from conduct generally covered by the criminal law that it should not be a criminal offense at all.
We reverse the judgment of the Court of Ap peals and remand the matter to the circuit court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Kavanagh, C.J., and Williams, Levin, and Ryan, JJ., concurred.
MCL 750.479; MSA 28.747.
We found that the three crimes committed by the defendant were all part of a single criminal transaction because they "were committed in a continuous time sequence and display a single intent and goal". People v White, 390 Mich 245, 259; 212 NW2d 222 (1973).
It may also have an aesthetic purpose. See Morris & Hawkins, The Honest Politician's Guide to Crime Control (University of Chicago Press, 1970), p 7.