Case Name: William W. BUCK, Defendant-Appellant, v. P. J. T., Plaintiff-Appellee
Court: Court of Appeals of Indiana
Jurisdiction: Indiana
Decision Date: 1979-09-10
Citations: 394 N.E.2d 935
Docket Number: No. 3-978A243
Parties: William W. BUCK, Defendant-Appellant, v. P. J. T., Plaintiff-Appellee.
Judges: HOFFMAN, J., concurs.
Reporter: North Eastern Reporter 2d
Volume: 394
Pages: 935–939

Head Matter:
William W. BUCK, Defendant-Appellant, v. P. J. T., Plaintiff-Appellee.
No. 3-978A243.
Court of Appeals of Indiana.
Sept. 10, 1979.
Rehearing Denied Jan. 14, 1980.
Anthony V. Luber, South Bend, for defendant-appellant.
Bruce H. Stewart, Leibowitz & Stewart, South Bend, for plaintiff-appellee.

Opinion:
GARRARD, Presiding Judge.
On February 14,1974 P. J. T. commenced this action against Buck to have him declared the father of her child. A warrant was issued but was cancelled at her request on February 20th. Summons was then issued and served upon Buck by certified mail at a residence address in Illinois. The return receipt signed "Janis Buck" was dated February 22,1974. When no appearance was entered by March 18th a new warrant was ordered issued. Subsequently, on December 13, 1974, judgment by default was entered against Buck. Nearly three years later, on October 28, 1977, Buck filed a motion to set aside the judgment. He brings this appeal from the denial of that motion asserting that the court lacked personal jurisdiction.
It is not disputed that there was a sufficient contact basis for the Indiana courts to exercise jurisdiction in this case. See Neill v. Ridner (1972), 153 Ind.App. 149, 286 N.E.2d 427.
Instead Buck's attack is premised upon the notice requirements necessary to due process. See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co. (1950), 339 U.S. 306, 70 S.Ct. 652, 94 L.Ed. 865.
In examining his assertion we must bear in mind a distinction ignored in his argument. There is a difference between a form of service that is not reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them the opportunity to be heard and a form that, while reasonably calculated to give actual notice, fails to do so in a specific case. In the former, personal jurisdiction is not acquired because the proceeding fails to accord due process. In the latter, personal jurisdiction is present. However, the result of its exercise may be set aside as a matter of fairness and good conscience. See, e. g., Indiana Rules of Procedure, Trial Rule 60(B).
The form of service on non-residents here employed under TR 4.4(B) is precisely the same as that for service upon residents. TR 4.1(A)(1). Service delivered by United States mail, postage prepaid, as certified mail with a return receipt satisfies the method requirement of due process. No contention is made that the information contained was inadequate or that inadequate time to respond was provided. Since actual delivery to the party is not jurisdic-tionally necessary, Buck's argument that the court failed to acquire personal jurisdiction fails.
Moreover, it does not appear the court erred in refusing to grant relief under TR 60(B). At no point does Buck assert that he did not receive timely actual notice. Nor, for that matter, does he assert any reasons explaining the long delay in filing his TR 60 motion. No abuse of discretion appears.
Finally, Buck argues that in accord with Neill v. Ridner, supra, he is entitled to reversal because of the existence of the warrant for his arrest. We disagree.
The statute governing paternity actions authorizes the use of civil process or a warrant. IC 31—4-1-15. However, in Neill the court found upon the facts present that the pendency of the warrant during and following the use of civil process created such an obstacle to Neill's participation in his defense as to constitute a denial of due process. Neill had been represented by counsel who appeared specially shortly after the action was commenced and who "contested jurisdiction at virtually every stage of the proceedings." Despite this representation "on two occasions [during the pendency of the action] the court specifically refused or failed to recall the outstanding warrants after a ruling that service had been made on the defendant." 286 N.E.2d at 431. The court concluded that continuance of the warrants after the determination that service had been successful could only serve the purpose of vindictiveness or harassment and that they substantially interfered with Neill's right to be heard.
The case before us is totally different in the significant particulars. Here, while a warrant was issued, it was recalled when service by summons was attempted. During the twenty-three days following delivery of the summons no warrant was outstanding. That period, of course, equals the time permitted by TR 6(C) and (E). Although a warrant was again issued on March 18th, there had been no judicial determination of the adequacy of service. Not at any point did Buck seek to have the warrant withdrawn. In short, upon the facts now before us it does not appear that his ability to appear and defend himself was in any manner actually impinged upon by the existence of the warrant. Accordingly, there was no denial of due process.
Affirmed.
HOFFMAN, J., concurs.
STATON, J., dissents and files separate opinion.