Case Name: CLAYTON McLENDON, INC. v. McCARTHY et al.; THE BONNY CORPORATION v. McCARTHY et al.
Court: Court of Appeals of Georgia
Jurisdiction: Georgia
Decision Date: 1971-11-19
Citations: 125 Ga. App. 76
Docket Number: 46339; 46340
Parties: CLAYTON McLENDON, INC. v. McCARTHY et al. THE BONNY CORPORATION v. McCARTHY et al.
Judges: Pannell, J., concurs. Deen, J., concurs specially.
Reporter: Georgia Appeals Reports
Volume: 125
Pages: 76–81

Head Matter:
46339.
46340.
CLAYTON McLENDON, INC. v. McCARTHY et al. THE BONNY CORPORATION v. McCARTHY et al.

Opinion:
Bell, Chief Judge.
The parties to these appeals entered into a real estate sales contract in which the appellant McLendon was the broker, the appellant The Bonny Corp. was the seller and the appellee McCarthy was the buyer. The appellee deposited $26,250 as earnest money with the broker. The broker brought suit against the purchaser and the seller for its commission alleging an anticipatory breach of the contract by the buyer. A counterclaim was filed by the buyer to recover the earnest money deposited. A cross claim and counterclaim was filed by the seller to recover one-half of the earnest money as liquidated damages. All parties filed motions for summary judgment. The trial court granted the appellee's motion for summary judgment and denied the motions of the two appellants, who appealed to this court from these orders.
The sale contract is attached to the pleadings and its terms are not in dispute. It contains provisions for the payment of a commission to the broker McLendon upon a consummation of the sale, which commission is equivalent to the earnest money deposited at the time of the signing of the contract in the amount of $26,250. The contract provided that if the purchaser refuses or fails to perform, the purchaser shall pay the broker the full commission; with the provision that the broker may apply one-half of the earnest money towards payment of the full commission and may pay the balance thereof to the seller as the seller's liquidated damages if the seller so claims. The contract had a specified closing date of June 21, 1970. The contract also contains several stipulations, one of which is pertinent here. This special condition provided as follows: "It is further understood and agreed that this contract is subject to and contingent upon subject property being served by the necessary storm and sanitary sewers to service the type development referred to in No. 7 above at a cost to purchaser which purchaser considers to be reasonable and economically feasible. If it cannot be then this contract shall be null and void and earnest money shall be refunded to purchaser and purchaser shall have no liability to seller whatsoever." A letter from the appellee to the appellant broker in May, 1970, forms the basis for the claimed anticipatory breach of the sale contract. Held:
1. It was not error for the trial court to consider the affidavit of McCarthy which was served upon the other parties and filed on the day of the hearing of the motions for summary judgment. There is no showing in the record that any objection was made in the trial court on the grounds that it was not served and filed within the time provided by § 6 (d) of the Civil Practice Act (Code Ann. §81A-106 (d)). Wakefield v. A. R. Winter Co., 121 Ga. App. 259 (174 SE2d 178).
2. We need not reach the question as to whether there was any anticipatory breach of the contract, for the contract is unenforceable. By the express terms of the above quoted special condition, the purchaser was only bound to perform if in his uncontrolled judgment the cost of the sewers was "reasonable and economically feasible." This shows that the contract is lacking in mutuality. The condition made the contract contingent upon the event which may or may not happen at the pleasure of the buyer. Until that contingency has occurred there is no obligation on the part of the purchaser to purchase or the seller to sell. F. & C. Investment Co. v. Jones, 210 Ga. 635 (81 SE2d 828); Wehunt v. Pritchett, 208 Ga. 441 (67 SE2d 233); Brady v. Poulos, 121 Ga. App. 35 (172 SE2d 437). Commercial Mortgage &c. Corp. v. Greenwich Savings Bank, 112 Ga. App. 388 (145 SE2d 249) is not in point as that case held that contracts requiring that one party's performance be "satisfactory" to the other in certain respects are not void for lack of mutuality. The situation here does not involve that issue. The performance of the condition in this case was left to the sole determination of McCarthy. The Bonny Corporation has nothing to do by way of any performance in determining the economic feasibility of the storm sewers. The appellee McCarthy was entitled to recover the earnest money.
Submitted June 28, 1971
Decided November 19, 1971.
Alex McLennan, for McLendon.
Scott Hogg, for The Bonny Corporation.
Peek, Whaley & Haldi, Glenville Haldi, for appellees.
3. It is not disputed that the total amount of the earnest money for which the appellee McCarthy obtained judgment in his favor in the lower court is $26,250. The appellee's counterclaim for the earnest money demanded $26,500. We will affirm the grant of his motion for summary judgment and the denial of the appellants' motions for summary judgment on the condition that appellee within 15 days from the date of issuance of this opinion write off so much of the judgment for the earnest money as exceeds $26,250; otherwise we reverse.
Judgment affirmed on condition.
Pannell, J., concurs. Deen, J., concurs specially.