Case Name: STATE of Louisiana, Respondent, v. Rex DRIEVER, Relator
Court: Louisiana Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1977-07-01
Citations: 347 So. 2d 1132
Docket Number: No. 59109
Parties: STATE of Louisiana, Respondent, v. Rex DRIEVER, Relator.
Judges: SUMMERS, J., dissents and assigns reasons.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 347
Pages: 1132–1139

Head Matter:
STATE of Louisiana, Respondent, v. Rex DRIEVER, Relator.
No. 59109.
Supreme Court of Louisiana.
July 1, 1977.
George T. Anderson, Jr., Shreveport, for defendant-relator.
William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Barbara Rutledge, Asst. Atty. Gen., Henry N. Brown, Jr., Dist. Atty., Roland V. McKneely, Asst. Dist. Atty., for plaintiff-respondent.

Opinion:
TATE, Justice.
We granted certiorari, 341 So.2d 414 (La.1977), to review the denial of the defendant's motion to quash this prosecution as prescribed. La.C.Cr.P. art. 578(2).
The chief issue is whether the state's inability to locate a material state witness for a portion of the prescriptive period constitutes an interruption of the prescribed time within which the state must try the accused. See La.C.Cr.P. art. 579(2). The trial court held the prescription was interrupted. We reverse.
Context Facts
The defendant is charged with a non-capital felony. La.C.Cr.P. art. 578(2) provides that "no trial shall be commenced" in a non-capital felony "after two years from the date of institution of the prosecution." (Other code articles provide, however, that in limited circumstances this delay may be suspended or interrupted, La.C.Cr.P. arts. 580, 581, one of which the state claims here applies.)
In the present instance, the accused was charged by bill of information on September 10, 1974. On the present occasion, by motion of August 24, 1976, the state fixed the prosecution for trial on September 13, 1976, (i. e., three days past the date upon which the continued prosecution was prescribed). On that date, the accused filed a motion to quash the prosecution as prescribed.
After a hearing, the district court overruled the motion. It essentially held that the absence of a material state witness, allegedly the only eye-witness to the crime, excused the state's delay in not trying the accused within the mandatory statutory time allowed for trial of the charge.
We have concluded that the state has not met its heavy burden of showing that it is excused from trying an accused on a charge later than the period mandated by Article 578. The prosecution must therefore be dismissed.
(1)
In the first place, the evidence shows that the missing witness was available for trial before expiration of the two-year period.
We need at this point to recapitulate the evidence and showing at the hearing. Aside from minute entries and stipulations as to records and procedures, the state relies solely upon the testimony of its investigator to show that it could not try the case earlier.
The record shows that, on September 10, 1974, the accused was formally charged with a killing five days earlier in a nightclub fight. He was arraigned and pleaded not guilty on September 18, eight days after he was charged.
The state set the case for trial on four earlier occasions: November 25,1974, January 27, 1975, March 10, 1975, and May 5, 1975.
The defendant never moved for continuance. On each occasion, he appeared for trial and subpoenaed some five or six defense witnesses, who were present. Likewise, on each occasion, the state subpoenaed some 16 state witnesses (7 of them police officers and a coroner).
The state did not ever move for a continuance. The trial date in each instance was passed on the court's own motion. Since no formal motion was made at the time, we have to rely upon the reason suggested by an investigator's testimony, which was taken after the two-year prescriptive period had expired:
Starting about February, 1975, the state was unable to locate the whereabouts of Sherri Lawrence, a material state witness. We will accept for the moment (but see (2) below) the investigator's testimony as showing that diligent efforts were made to locate Miss Lawrence, which were not successful until August, 1976.
Thereafter, by motion of August 24, the state fixed the charge for trial on September 13, 1976, which the district court in its post-hearing per curiam states was "the first available trial date on the fall term."
In summary, the missing state witness was located in August, 1976, before expiration of the two years. By motion of August 24, the district attorney fixed the accused's trial for September 13, after expiration of the mandatory two-year delay, instead of before.
We know of no prohibition which prevented the trial court from fixing the trial before the expiration of the delay, instead of after it, even though this might have required a special jury week (see footnote 1). The court system cannot excuse itself from affording an accused a trial within the delay required by law, simply by relying upon internal operating procedures which result in noncompliance with the statutory mandate.
To protect persons accused of crime against indefinite delay in state prosecutions against them, our legislature has provided that "no trial shall be commenced . after two years" from the date of institution of the present prosecution. La. C.Cr.P. art. 578(2). The constitutional right to a speedy trial was intended to be at least partially effectuated thereby.
The present record does not support a finding that the state's duty to try the case within the prescribed time is excused by the only reason advanced in support of the delay: That the statutorily limited period for trial of the defendant was interrupted because, during the period, the accused "cannot be tried" for a "cause beyond the control of the state," La.C.Cr.P. art. 579(2).
(2)
In the second place, assuming that inability to locate an essential state witness may under some circumstances be a valid cause interrupting prescription, the state has not here met the heavy burden of proving that the absence of this material witness excused indefinite delay in trying an accused within the statutorily mandated period.
Miss Lawrence was held as a material witness for some two months or so after the charge was filed against the accused, until she was released on her own recognizance. Apparently it was only after February 14, 1975 that the state lost track of her, although the evidence suggests she was still in Shreveport, a nearby city. (See S-2, also testimony of the defendant's attorney.)
The state investigator in charge of the case now testifies, after the time-limits had elapsed, that he had tried to locate her diligently. His initial efforts were to ask other deputies on perhaps two occasions to check on her whereabouts, when they were going to Baton Rouge or Lafayette (where she had previously worked) to a convention or on other business. Finally, on October 21, 1975, the state asked the assistance of the Federal Bureau of Investigation in listing her as a missing witness — and eventually, in August 1976, thereby her whereabouts routinely showed up. Following this, her presence was readily secured for trial.
On the other hand, the state made no attempt to locate Miss Lawrence through inquiry of her mother (residing in Kilgore, Texas) or of her former employers or friends in Shreveport. Defense counsel, for instance, testified that he talked with her on a local call by telephone during 1975, during a period in which the investigator's (post-delay) testimony indicated that the state did not then know her whereabouts. By a letter to the prosecutor of March, 1975 (S-2), defense counsel suggested a local Shreveport address where she resided — so far as the record shows, the state investigator did not check this address at that time.
Further, although the state argues that Miss Lawrence's testimony was its chief evidence in the case, the post-prescription record does not establish this. At the hearing, the investigator admitted that she was a "material" witness, not necessarily an eye-witness. He also admitted that others of the available state witnesses were present at the scene of the crime, at least one of whom was also a material witness.
In our opinion, by this showing, the state's heavy burden to prove it could not try the charge within the time mandated by law, even assuming (see footnote 2) that its inability to locate Miss Lawrence could under some circumstances have been "cause beyond the control of the state," by reason of which the defendant "cannot" be tried within such period, La.C.Cr.P. art. 579(2).
Decree
Accordingly, since we find that the state did not try this accused within the time mandated by law, La.C.Cr.P. art. 579(2), the motion to quash the indictment must be granted, La.C.Cr.P. art. 581, the trial court ruling to the contrary must be overruled, and defendant ordered discharged from custody or bail, La.C.Cr.P. art. 538(2).
TRIAL COURT RULING REVERSED AND MOTION TO QUASH GRANTED.
SUMMERS, J., dissents and assigns reasons.
DENNIS, J., dissents.
. Although we do not rely solely upon the following circumstance, the district court calendar shows that the court was open for hearings in Bossier Parish each day during the weeks of August 23 (one judge) and September 6 (two judges). The court rules apparently permitted a special fixing for jury trial of this criminal case on some or all of these days (see La.Civ.P. art. 193); the calendar shows that the date fixed for trial (September 13) was calendar-designated as for regular assignments of felony arraignments and juvenile court, but not for petit jury trials such as the present, specially assigned to be tried that date.
. In additional concurring reasons, the author of this opinion by the court has expressed his personal view to the contrary of this assumption, an issue not reached by the court.
. If, for instance, the state had formally sought continuance from the trial dates earlier fixed, on the ground of Miss Lawrence's absence, there is some doubt that the continuance would have been granted, assuming the same rule applies to the state as to the accused. See interpretations of La.C.Cr.P. art. 709(2), e. g., State v. Cain, 307 So.2d 621 (La.1975), which uphold the denial of a continuance in the absence of a showing of the probability that the presence of the absent witness could be obtained by the date to which the trial will be deferred. Had the state sought and been refused a continuance from an earlier fixing, presumably it would have been forced to try its case absent Miss Lawrence's testimony.