Case Name: E. Willard Boies, Respondent, v. Sarah Benham, Impleaded, etc., Appellant
Court: New York Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1891-10-13
Citations: 127 N.Y. 620
Docket Number: 
Parties: E. Willard Boies, Respondent, v. Sarah Benham, Impleaded, etc., Appellant.
Judges: 
Reporter: New York Reports
Volume: 127
Pages: 620–630

Head Matter:
E. Willard Boies, Respondent, v. Sarah Benham, Impleaded, etc., Appellant.
Plaintiff contracted to sell defendant G-. certain premises for $1,800. It was agreed between them and defendant B. that the latter should loan to G-. $1,000, to be paid on the contract, G-. to execute to plaintiff a mortgage on the premises for $800, the balance of the purchase-money, •and to B. a mortgage for the $1,000 loaned, and that the deed and mortgages should be recorded at- the same time. This agreement was carried out and plaintiff received the $1,000 from B. In an action to foreclose plaintiff’s mortgage the referee found that plaintiff neither parted nor intended to part with his equitable lien, and he refused to find that it was agreed that the mortgages should be concurrent liens. Held (Follbtt, Oh. J., dissenting), that plaintiff had unequitable lien for the purchase-money unpaid until the substitution therefor of the legal lien of his mortgage deed, and so, the continuity of the lien was not broken, but merely changed in character, and this lien had priority over that of B.’s mortgage; that while plaintiff might have waived his prior lien or estopped himself from asserting it, the question as to whether he had so done was one of fact upon which the determination of the referee was conclusive; that the agreement that the papers should be recorded at the same time did not, as matter of law, place the liens of the two mortgages on an equality.
Potter v. OrandaU (Clarke, 120), distinguished.
Reported below, 53 Hun, 236.
(Argued June 12, 1891;
decided October 13, 1891.)
Appeal from judgment of the General Term of the Supreme Court in the third judicial department, entered upon an order made July 6, 1889, which affirmed a judgment in favor of plaintiff entered upon the report of a referee.
The plaintiff, by contract with Purple Gardner, agreed to sell and convey to the latter certain premises in Schoharie county for $1,800. Afterwards, on March 11, Í884, the plaintiff received $1,000, made deed of conveyance to Gardner and took from him his bond for $800, the balance of the purchase-money, secured by mortgage on the premises. This action was brought to foreclose that mortgage. The defendant Benham held a mortgage made to her upon the land to secure the payment of $1,000. The plaintiff alleged that the lien of the Ben-ham mortgage was subsequent to that of his mortgage. This she denied and alleged that the lien of hers was synchronous with that of the plaintiff’s mortgage. The referee determined that issue against her, and by his report found that the two bonds and mortgages were made at the same time by Gardner, who then in the presence of the plaintiff borrowed of Benham the $1,000; that the two mortgages were recorded at the same time; that the plaintiff neither parted or intended to part with his equitable lien, and that the lien of his mortgage was prior to that of the defendant Benham. And upon the request of the defendant the referee further found that before the ■conveyance was made it was agreed between the plaintiff, ■Gardner and Benham that Gardner was to execute to her a mortgage on the premises for $1,000, and this money to be paid by Benham directly to the plaintiff; that Gardner was also to execute to the plaintiff another mortgage on the premises for $800 ; that the deed and the two mortgages should be recorded at the same time, and that according to the agreement the deed and mortgages were executed and delivered at "the same time as part of the same and one transaction, and the payment waá made by Benham directly to the plaintiff. The referee refused to find that the two mortgages were equal liens, and the defendant Benham excepted.
E. Countryman for appellant.
The equitable lien of the plaintiff, as grantor for the purchase-money, was waived at the time he gave the conveyance to the purchaser. (Gaylord v. Knapp, 15 Hun, 87; Fish v. Howland, 1 Paige, 20; Shirley Case, 2 Edw. Ch. 505; Stuart v. Harrison, 52 Iowa, 511; Escher v. Simmons, 54 id. 269; Young v. Wood, 11 B. Monroe, 123; Richards v. McPherson, 74 Ind. 159; Little v. Brown, 2 Leigh, 353; Wells v. Harter, 56 Cal. 342; Nairn v. Prowse, 6 Ves. 752; Vail v. Foster, 4 N. Y. 312; Gilmore v. Brown, 1 Mason C. C. R. 191; 4 Wheat. 255.) The equitable hen being waived, thé parties must stand upon an equal footing, if such was their real intention, as ascertained from the'facts found by the trial court. That such was their intention is evident from the terms of their agreement. (Dryden v. Frost, 3 M. & C. 670; McGovern v. Smith, 44 Barb. 232, 239; Nichols v. Glover, 41 Ind. 25; Mitchell v. Butt, 45 Ga. 162; Hamilton v. Gilbert, 2 Heisk. 680 ; Latham v. Staples, 46 Ala. 462; Kittle v. Van Dyck, 1 Sandf. Ch. 76, 81; Jackson v. Austin, 15 Johns. 477, 478; Cunningham v. Knight, 1 Barb. 399; Clark v. Munroe, 14 Mass. 351; Fisk v. Potter, 2 Abb. Ct. App. Dec. 140; Balkum v. Owens, 47 Ala. 266.) Both mortgages having been delivered and recorded concurrently, no question arises under the recording acts. (Green v. Warnick, 64 N. Y. 220.) The plaintiff was not entitled to a foreclosure cutting off the Benham mortgage as a subsequent incumbrance. (Potter v. Crandall, Clark’s Ch. 120.) If some of the findings of fact are more favorable to the appellant than others, she has the right on this appeal to claim the benefit of those which are most favorable to her. (Conselyea v. Blanchard, 103 N0. Y. 231; Redfield Case, 110 id. 611.)
G. M. Palmer for respondent.
There can be no review in this court of the questions of fact depending upon conflicting evidence. (Code Civ. Pro. § 1331; In re Ross, 87 N. Y. 514; Davis v. Clark, Id. 623; Hynes v. McDermott, 91 id. 451; People ex rel. v. French, 92 id. 306.) If there is any evidence to sustain the findings of fact, they are conclusive in this court. ( Van Gelder v. Van Gelder, 77 id. 446; Derham v. Lee, 87 id. 599, 605 ; Raux v. Brand, 90 id. 309, 312; Caswell v. Davis, 58 id. 223.) The referee finds that the two mortgages were not to be equal liens, so even conceding that it was agreed that the mortgages should be recorded at the same time, yet that fact does not make the mortgages of equal lien. While the Benham mortgage might be considered a purchase-money mortgage, as against a previous judgment •creditor of Purple Gardner, the mortgagor, or to such an extent as to cut off the dower of the wife of Purple Gardner, it cannot cut off, or stand equal with, the equitable lien of this plaintiff for his $800, the referee having found as a question of fact, that by the sale plaintiff was entitled to a lien for the unpaid purchase-money, that he did not intend to waive or part with that lien, and that his mortgage was entitled to priority. (Jackson v. Austin, 15 Johns. 477.) The giving of the deed by plaintiff to Gardner and taking the $800 mortgage back was an indivisible transaction. Yo mortgage or •other lien could come in between them. Plaintiff did not part with his equitable interest of $800 in the property, but still owned it; he had only conveyed a $1,000 interest.' (Dusen bury v. Hulbert, 59 N. Y. 541, 544, 545; French v. Leroy, 15 Wkly. Dig. 269; G. S. Co. v. Whitier, 69 N. Y. 337; Ellis v. Harman, 90 id. 466, 472; Jackson v. McKenney, 3 Wend. 235; Stow v. Tifft, 15 Johns. 463; Holbrook v. Finney, 4 Mass. 569; Ransom v. Lampman, 5 N. Y. 456, 461.) The plaintiff’s mortgage attached to the whole estate, while defendant Benham’s mortgage only to the interest which Purple Gardner had, which was the title to the property subject to plaintiff’s mortgage. (Dusenbury v. Hulbert, 59 N. Y. 547.)

Opinion:
Bkadley, J.
The plaintiff had an equitable lien for the purchase-money unpaid until the substitution for it of the legal lien of the mortgage taken by him to secure the payment of the balance of the purchase-money. (Fish v. Howland, 1 Paige, 20; Payne v. Wilson, 74 N. Y. 348.) And the conveyance having been made and the mortgage taken by him in the same transaction, the former will be deemed made subject to the latter, and in practical effect the grantee took by the deed the equity of redemption only. (Stow v. Tifft, 15 Johns. 458 ; Jackson ex dem. v. McKenny, 3 Wend. 233 ; Rawson v. Lampman, 5 N. Y. 456; Dusenbury v. Hulbert, 59 id. 541; Coutant v. Servoss, 3 Barb. 128.) And subject to a mortgage made at the time of conveyance, by the grantee to a third person who advances the purchase-money, are dower (although the mortgage is made by the husband alone) and previous judgments against him. (1 R. S. 740, § 5 ; Id. 749, § 5; Code, § 1254; Jackson v. Austin, 15 Johns. 477; Kittle v. Van Dyck, 1 Sandf. Ch. 76; Cunningham v. Knight, 1 Barb. 399; Clark v. Munroe, 14 Mass. 351.)
But by reason of the pre-existing equitable lien of the vendor and grantor, which continues until the substitution for it of the legal lien of the mortgage to secure the unpaid purchase-money, the mortgage so taken by him has .priority over that of such third person taken at the same-time from the grantee. (Clark v. Brown, 3 Allen, 509; Turk v. Funk, 68 Mo. 18; 30 Am. R. 771; Appeals of Williamsport Nat. Bank, 91 Penn. St. 163.) As to the former, the continuity of the lien is not broken, but merely changed in character from an equitable to a legal one perfected by the mortgage to him for the balance of the purchase-money. (Stafford v. Van Rensselaer, infra; Payne v. Wilson, supra.) And this is not dependent on the statute. It is unnecessary to inquire whether any different question may have arisen in the present case if no equitable title in the vendee, and no equitable lien of the vendor had preceded the time of the execution and delivery of the deed and mortgage.
A grantor may, however, by agreement waive such prior right or estop himself from asserting it, and thus subject the lien of his to the preference of that taken by another at the same time on the property, or place it on an equal footing with it.
The question at the trial was whether that was done in the present caue. Such may have been the intention of the parties; and it may be that the evidence would have warranted that finding by the referee. But the facts found by him did not require such conclusion. While there was evidence on the part of the defendant tending to prove that such was the purpose of the parties at the time of the transaction, that of the plaintiff was to the contrary. The evidence and the inferences derivable from it presented in that respect a question of fact for the referee, whose determination must here be deemed conclusive upon that issue.
The understanding of the parties as found, that the deed and mortgages were to be, and accordingly were, made and recorded at the same time, did not necessarily, and. as a matter of law, place the lien of the two mortgages on an equality, as would have been the case if neither of the mortgagees had been the vendor and grantor of the premises. Upon the facts so found he did not necessarily waive any rights which the relation of the vendor and grantor gave him. The inquiry as to the purpose of the understanding that the mortgages should be made and recorded at the same time was for the consideration of the referee upon the evidence, and whether it was intended to confer greater rights upon the defendant Benham than, would arise from the mere fact that they were so made and recorded was for him to determine. He found that the plaintiff did not waive or intend to waive his equitable lien. By this he meant to be understood that the plaintiff neither waived, or intended to waive, or surrender any of the rights which the equitable lien, existing in his favor up to the time of taking his mortgage, afforded him. This was the right of preference of his hen, presumptively arising from his equitable lien merged in the legal lien of his mortgage. (Stafford v. Van Rensselaer, 9 Cow. 316.) The defendant's hen, having been founded upon the security given for that amount of the purchase-money advanced by her for the grantee, was secondary only to that of the'plaintiff's mortgage.
In Potter v. Crandall (Clarke, 120) all the mortgagees were grantors of the premises, and in that respect their rights, and, consequently, as between themselves, the hens of the mortgages stood on equality. In the case at bar the defendant's claim rests upon an alleged agreement with the plaintiff to place her mortgage in such relation with that of the plaintiff. As that position is not supported by the findings of the referee the hens of the two mortgages must here be treated as having the relation in which the law placed them. While it is true, as suggested, that the defendant is entitled to the benefit of the findings of the referee most favorable to her, if there is any material conflict between them, there is no inconsistency in the findings for the application of that rule to substantially aid. the defendant. (Kelly v. Leggett, 122 N. Y. 633.)
The judgment should be affirmed.