Case Name: IN RE Gregory GADLIN, on Habeas Corpus.
Court: Court of Appeal, Fifth District, California
Jurisdiction: California
Decision Date: 2019-01-28
Citations: 243 Cal. Rptr. 3d 331
Docket Number: B289852
Parties: IN RE Gregory GADLIN, on Habeas Corpus.
Judges: 
Reporter: West's California Reporter
Volume: 243
Pages: 331–340

Head Matter:
IN RE Gregory GADLIN, on Habeas Corpus.
B289852
Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 5, California.
Filed January 28, 2019
I. INTRODUCTION
In 2016, voters approved Proposition 57, which added a provision to the California Constitution that significantly expanded parole consideration to all state prisoners convicted of a nonviolent felony offense. ( Cal. Const., art. 1, § 32, subd. (a)(1) (section 32 (a)(1).) ) Petitioner Gregory Gadlin, a third-strike offender with two prior convictions that render him a sex-offender registrant, contends the regulations of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) invalidly exclude him from Proposition 57 relief. We agree and grant the petition.
II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In 2007, a jury convicted Gadlin of assault with a deadly weapon ( Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1) ). The jury sustained allegations of two prior serious felony convictions (§ 667, subd. (a)(1) ). Those priors were: (1) a 1984 conviction for forcible rape (§ 261, former subd. (2) ); and (2) a 1986 conviction for forcible child molestation (§ 288, subd. (b) ), each of which is a registrable offense under the Sex Offender Registration Act (§ 290, subd. (c) ). Gadlin was sentenced to 25 years to life pursuant to the Three Strikes law (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12), plus an additional 5-year term for each of his prior serious felony convictions, for a total of 35 years to life in state prison. On appeal, this court affirmed the judgment. ( People v. Gadlin (May 21, 2009, B203647) 2009 WL 1415943 [nonpub. opn.].)
On November 22, 2017, Gadlin filed a habeas corpus petition in the superior court, challenging his exclusion from early parole consideration by CDCR. On March 2, 2018, the superior court denied the petition, concluding that under the then-applicable regulations, Gadlin was not entitled to early parole consideration because he had been sentenced as a third-strike offender.
On May 7, 2018, Gadlin filed a habeas corpus petition in this court. We appointed counsel for Gadlin and directed counsel to file an amended petition addressing the validity of CDCR's regulations. Appointed counsel thereafter filed an amended petition challenging CDCR's regulations. We issued an order to show cause why the relief requested in the petition should not be granted. CDCR filed a return to the order to show cause, arguing that the following two factors render Gadlin ineligible for early parole consideration: (1) his status as an inmate serving an indeterminate Three Strikes sentence with the possibility of parole; and (2) his prior convictions for sex offenses that require him to register as a sex offender.
The CDCR then adopted emergency regulations, effective January 1, 2019, to comply with our holding in In re Edwards (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 1181, 1192-1193, 237 Cal.Rptr.3d 673 ( Edwards ). ( Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, § 3491, subd. (b)(1), Register 2018, No. 52 (Dec. 26, 2018).) Those modified regulations moot CDCR's argument that Gadlin is ineligible for early parole consideration based on his status as a Three Strikes offender. We thus consider only CDCR's second argument, that Gadlin's two prior convictions for registrable sex offenses render him ineligible for consideration for early release.
III. DISCUSSION
A. Proposition 57
On November 8, 2016, California voters passed Proposition 57, also known as the Public Safety and Rehabilitation Act of 2016, adding section 32, article I, to the California Constitution. "As relevant here, the (uncodified) text of Proposition 57 declares the voters' purposes in approving the measure were to: '1. Protect and enhance public safety. [¶] 2. Save money by reducing wasteful spending on prisons. [¶] 3. Prevent federal courts from indiscriminately releasing prisoners. [¶] 4. Stop the revolving door of crime by emphasizing rehabilitation, especially for juveniles.' (Voter Information Guide, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 8, 2016) text of Prop. 57, § 2, p. 141.)" ( Edwards, supra , 26 Cal.App.5th at p. 1185, 237 Cal.Rptr.3d 673.) Under section 32(a)(1), "Any person convicted of a nonviolent felony offense and sentenced to state prison shall be eligible for parole consideration after completing the full term for his or her primary offense." And for purposes of section 32(a)(1), "the full term for the primary offense means the longest term of imprisonment imposed by the court for any offense, excluding the imposition of an enhancement, consecutive sentence, or alternative sentence." CDCR was directed to "adopt regulations in furtherance of these provisions, and the Secretary of [CDCR] shall certify that these regulations protect and enhance public safety." ( Cal. Const., art. 1, § 32, subd. (b).)
CDCR's regulations exclude from early parole consideration an inmate who "is convicted of a sexual offense that currently requires or will require registration as a sex offender under the Sex Offender Registration Act, codified in sections 290 through 290.024 of the Penal Code." ( Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, § 3491, subd. (b)(3) ( section 3491(b)(3).) ) In a Final Statement of Reasons accompanying the adopted regulations, CDCR stated, "these sex offenses demonstrate a sufficient degree of violence and represent an unreasonable risk to public safety to require that sex offenders be excluded from nonviolent parole consideration." (Cal. Dept. of Corrections, Credit Earning and Parole Consideration Final Statement of Reasons, Apr. 30, 2018, p. 20.)
B. Standard of Review
" 'In order for a regulation to be valid, it must be (1) consistent with and not in conflict with the enabling statute and (2) reasonably necessary to effectuate the purpose of the statute. ( Gov. Code, § 11342.2.)' ( Physicians & Surgeons Laboratories, Inc. v. Department of Health Services (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 968, 982 [8 Cal.Rptr.2d 565] ; see Henning v. Division of Occupational Saf. & Health (1990) 219 Cal.App.3d 747, 757 [268 Cal.Rptr. 476] ( Henning ).) Therefore, 'the rulemaking authority of the agency is circumscribed by the substantive provisions of the law governing the agency.' ( Henning, supra, at p. 757 [268 Cal.Rptr. 476].) ' "The task of the reviewing court in such a case is to decide whether the [agency] reasonably interpreted [its] legislative mandate. ... Such a limited scope of review constitutes no judicial interference with the administrative discretion in that aspect of the rulemaking function which requires a high degree of technical skill and expertise. ...
[T]here is no agency discretion to promulgate a regulation which is inconsistent with the governing statute. ... Whatever the force of administrative construction ... final responsibility for the interpretation of the law rests with the courts. ... Administrative regulations that alter or amend the statute or enlarge or impair its scope are void. ..." [Citation.]' ( Id. at pp. 757-758 [268 Cal.Rptr. 476].)" ( Edwards, supra , 26 Cal.App.5th at p. 1189, 237 Cal.Rptr.3d 673.)
"When construing constitutional provisions and statutes, including those enacted through voter initiative, '[o]ur primary concern is giving effect to the intended purpose of the provisions at issue. [Citation.] In doing so, we first analyze provisions' text in their relevant context, which is typically the best and most reliable indicator of purpose. [Citations.] We start by ascribing to words their ordinary meaning, while taking account of related provisions and the structure of the relevant statutory and constitutional scheme. [Citations.] If the provisions' intended purpose nonetheless remains opaque, we may consider extrinsic sources, such as an initiative's ballot materials. [Citation.] Moreover, when construing initiatives, we generally presume electors are aware of existing law. [Citation.] Finally, we apply independent judgment when construing constitutional and statutory provisions. [Citation.]' ( California Cannabis Coalitionv. City of Upland (2017) 3 Cal.5th 924, 933-934 [222 Cal.Rptr.3d 210, 401 P.3d 49] )" ( Edwards, supra , 26 Cal.App.5th at p. 1189, 237 Cal.Rptr.3d 673.)
C. Analysis
Section 32 (a)(1) provides, "Any person convicted of a nonviolent felony offense and sentenced to state prison shall be eligible for parole consideration after completing the full term for his or her primary offense." The reference to "convicted" and "sentenced," in conjunction with present eligibility for parole once a full term is completed, make clear that early parole eligibility must be assessed based on the conviction for which an inmate is now serving a state prison sentence (the current offense), rather than prior criminal history. This interpretation is supported by section 32 (a)(1)'s use of the singular form in "felony offense," "primary offense," and "term."
Gadlin's current offense triggering his Three Strikes sentence is assault with a deadly weapon ( § 245, subd. (a)(1) ), which does not require registration as a sex offender. CDCR argues that its application of the regulations to exclude inmates who have sustained prior registrable convictions is consistent with its determination that registrable sex offenses involve a sufficient degree of violence and registrable inmates represent an unreasonable risk to public safety. These policy considerations, however, do not trump the plain text of section 32 (a)(1).
CDCR's application of section 3491(b)(3) to exclude Gadlin and all similarly situated inmates from early parole consideration runs afoul of section 32 (a)(1). Gadlin is entitled to early parole consideration.
We express no opinion on whether CDCR's application of its regulations to exclude inmates whose current offense requires registration as a sex offender similarly violates section 32(a)(1).
IV. DISPOSITION
The petition for habeas corpus is granted. The California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation is directed to consider Gadlin for early parole consideration within 60 days of remittitur issuance.
I concur:
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise stated.
In 1998, Gadlin was previously convicted of identical charges, resulting in the same 35 years to life sentence. This court affirmed the judgment on appeal. (People v. Gadlin (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 587, 92 Cal.Rptr.2d 890.) In 2006, the United States District Court for the Central District of California granted Gadlin's petition for writ of habeas corpus, and directed the State of California to provide Gadlin with a new trial. (Gadlin v. Woodford (C.D.Cal. May 2, 2006, Case No. CV-02-7759-PA (AJW) ) 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101656.)
We note that this holding only permits Gadlin early parole consideration, not release. The Board of Parole Hearings will be permitted to consider his full criminal history, including his prior sex offenses, in deciding whether a grant of parole is warranted. (§ 3041, subd. (b); Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, § 2449.32, subd. (c).)

Opinion:
MOOR, J.