Case Name: Michael CUMMINGS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ARAPAHOE COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT and David C. Walcher, individually and in his capacity as Arapahoe County Sheriff, Defendants-Appellants.
Court: Colorado Court of Appeals, Division A
Jurisdiction: Colorado
Decision Date: 2018-09-06
Citations: 440 P.3d 1179
Docket Number: Court of Appeals No. 18CA0499
Parties: Michael CUMMINGS, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
ARAPAHOE COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT and David C. Walcher, individually and in his capacity as Arapahoe County Sheriff, Defendants-Appellants.
Judges: 
Reporter: Pacific Reporter 3d
Volume: 440
Pages: 1179–1194

Head Matter:
Michael CUMMINGS, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
ARAPAHOE COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT and David C. Walcher, individually and in his capacity as Arapahoe County Sheriff, Defendants-Appellants.
Court of Appeals No. 18CA0499
Colorado Court of Appeals, Division A.
Announced September 6, 2018
I. Introduction and Summary
¶ 1 This lawsuit pits the Arapahoe County Sheriff (the Sheriff) against one of his former deputies, Michael Cummings, whose employment was terminated by the Sheriff. Cummings contends that the written employment policies promulgated by the Sheriff contained in the Sheriff's employee manual (the Manual) constitute an implied contract of employment that the Sheriff breached when he fired Cummings. In denying the Sheriff's summary judgment motion, the district court agreed with Cummings. The Sheriff brings this interlocutory appeal under C.A.R. 4.2, challenging the district court's denial of summary judgment.
¶ 2 Resolution of this appeal requires us to construe section 30-10-506, C.R.S. 2017, which governs the employment relationship between Colorado's elected sheriffs and the deputies they appoint. It provides in relevant part as follows:
Each sheriff may appoint as many deputies as the sheriff may think proper and may revoke such appointments at will; except that a sheriff shall adopt personnel policies, including policies for the review of revocation of appointments. Before revoking an appointment of a deputy, the sheriff shall notify the deputy of the reason for the proposed revocation and shall give the deputy an opportunity to be heard by the sheriff.

Opinion:
§ 30-10-506.
¶ 3 In Seeley v. Board of County Commissioners , the Colorado Supreme Court authoritatively construed a prior version of this statute, holding that sheriffs' deputies were employees at will and that a sheriff "did not possess the statutory authority to limit his power to discharge [his deputies] 'at his pleasure.' " 791 P.2d 696, 700 (Colo. 1990).
¶ 4 As was its right, the General Assembly legislatively overruled the supreme court's decision by amending the statute in 2006. Hearings on H.B. 1181 before the H. Local Gov. Comm., 65th Gen. Assemb., 1st Sess. (Feb. 7, 2006); cf. Gallegos v. Phipps , 779 P.2d 856, 861 (Colo. 1989) (noting General Assembly's enactment of another statute "for the explicit purpose of" overruling the particular case).
¶ 5 We conclude that the General Assembly legislatively partly overruled Seeley because, contrary to Seeley , the General Assembly decided to grant certain employment rights to the deputies that are, at least in part, inconsistent with the concept of at-will employment as it is known in Colorado law. Hearings on H.B. 1181 before the H. Local Gov. Comm., 65th Gen. Assemb., 1st Sess. (Feb. 7, 2006). But we also know from the plain language of the amended statute that in other respects, the General Assembly intended to preserve the doctrine of at-will employment.
¶ 6 Considering the plain language of the 2006 amendments, the legislative history, and commonly recognized rules of statutory construction, we conclude that section 30-10-506 does the following:
• It grants two unwaivable rights to the deputies: the right of notification "of the reason for the proposed revocation" of their employment, and "an opportunity to be heard by the sheriff" before their employment is terminated.
• It requires each sheriff to "adopt personnel policies, including policies for the review of revocation of appointments," but except for the two statutory rights noted above, these policies need not be binding and sheriffs may reserve their right to depart from such policies in any particular case or matter. To that extent, the doctrine of at-will employment is preserved.
• It permits a sheriff to promulgate binding employment policies, and if the sheriff elects to do so, those policies are enforceable in accordance with their terms.
¶ 7 Applying this construction of section 30-10-506 to the facts presented in the Sheriff's summary judgment motion, but also considering the dispositive legal effect of clear and conspicuous disclaimers of any contractual relationship, we affirm the district court's denial of summary judgment with respect to the specific rights granted by section 30-10-506, but otherwise reverse the court's denial of summary judgment on Cummings' implied contract claim.
II. Relevant Facts and Procedural History
¶ 8 Cummings was a deputy sheriff in Arapahoe County. The Sheriff terminated Cummings' employment, asserting that he violated several of the Manual's policies and was dishonest in the course of the investigation of the original charges against him.
¶ 9 After exhausting his remedies within the Sheriff's department, Cummings sued, asserting two claims for relief: wrongful discharge in violation of public policy and breach of an implied contract of employment based on the employment policies contained in the Manual.
¶ 10 Cummings contends that while the Sheriff informed him of the reasons for the initial investigation into his conduct, the Sheriff did not provide him with notice of the charges that eventually led to his termination. He also contends that the Sheriff denied him an adequate opportunity to defend himself by not following the procedural policies of the Manual during the disciplinary process.
¶ 11 The Sheriff moved to dismiss the wrongful termination claim under C.R.C.P. 12(b)(1) based on governmental immunity. The district court held a Trinity hearing on the wrongful discharge in violation of public policy claim and dismissed that claim with prejudice. See Trinity Broad. of Denver v. City of Westminster , 848 P.2d 916 (Colo. 1993).
¶ 12 After the district court denied the Sheriff's motion to dismiss the implied contract claim for failure to state a claim, the Sheriff moved for summary judgment. He contended that the at-will language in section 30-10-506 prevented him from promulgating binding personnel policies; that the disclaimers contained both in the Manual itself and in separate, yearly disclaimers signed by Cummings precluded as a matter of law any implied contract claim; and that, in any event, he had not violated any of the Manual's policies.
¶ 13 The district court denied the Sheriff's motion, holding that there was an implied contract of employment. The district court reasoned that it was illogical to conclude that the General Assembly would at once require sheriffs to promulgate employment policies, but then authorize sheriffs to wholly ignore them. Thus, the court held that all provisions in an employment manual promulgated by a sheriff pursuant to section 30-10-506 were binding and formed an implied employment contract. As to the disclaimers, the court ruled that they were ineffective because they could not countermand the statutory requirement that the policies be binding. And, as to the Sheriff's argument that he did not violate any of the policies, the court concluded that disputed issues of material fact precluded summary judgment.
¶ 14 Although ordinarily an order denying summary judgment is not a final appealable order, the Sheriff petitioned for an interlocutory review of the order. Recognizing the internal conflicts within the statute, the district court certified its summary judgment order for interlocutory appeal under C.A.R. 4.2. Agreeing with the district court that the Sheriff met the requirements for an interlocutory appeal, and that this is a matter of substantial public concern, we granted the petition.
III. The District Court Correctly Denied The Sheriff's Motion for Summary Judgment With Respect To The Specific Rights Granted by Section 30-10-506
¶ 15 For the same three reasons that he sought summary judgment in the district court, the Sheriff contends that the court erred in denying his motion for summary judgment.
A. Standard of Review
¶ 16 We review a grant (or, when authorized by law, a denial) of summary judgment de novo. Geiger v. Am. Standard Ins. Co. of Wisc. , 192 P.3d 480, 482 (Colo. App. 2008) (holding that we review a denial of summary judgment de novo). "Under C.R.C.P. 56(c), summary judgment may be granted if there is no genuine contested issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Georg v. Metro Fixtures Contractors, Inc. , 178 P.3d 1209, 1212 (Colo. 2008). We grant the nonmoving party the benefit of all favorable inferences that may reasonably be drawn from the undisputed facts and resolve all doubts against the moving party. Bebo Constr. Co. v. Mattox & O'Brien, P.C. , 990 P.2d 78, 83 (Colo. 1999).
B. Rules of Statutory Interpretation
¶ 17 Resolution of this appeal requires us to determine the meaning of section 30-10-506, which is a question of law that we review de novo. Wolf Ranch, LLC v. City of Colorado Springs , 220 P.3d 559, 563 (Colo. 2009).
¶ 18 In interpreting a statute, we first give the words and phrases of the statute their plain and ordinary meanings according to the rules of grammar and common usage. § 2-4-101, C.R.S. 2017; Jefferson Cty. Bd. of Equalization v. Gerganoff , 241 P.3d 932, 935 (Colo. 2010). We consider the words and phrases of the statute both in the context of the statute itself and in the context of any comprehensive statutory scheme of which the statute is a part. Jefferson Cty. Bd. of Equalization , 241 P.3d at 935. By applying these principles, we attempt to determine the General Assembly's intended meaning of the words and phrases, and harmonize that meaning with the comprehensive statutory scheme. Id.
¶ 19 If the statutory language is susceptible to only one reasonable meaning, we enforce it as written and do not resort to other rules of statutory construction. Vaughan v. McMinn , 945 P.2d 404, 408 (Colo. 1997). However, if a statute is susceptible to more than one reasonable meaning, we employ other tools of statutory interpretation, including legislative history, to ascertain the General Assembly's intent. People v. Luther , 58 P.3d 1013,1015 (Colo. 2002).
C. The Implied Contract Exception to At-Will Employment
¶ 20 In Colorado, an employee who is hired for an indefinite period is presumed to be an at-will employee, but this presumption may be rebutted. Cont'l Air Lines, Inc. v. Keenan , 731 P.2d 708, 711-12 (Colo. 1987).
¶ 21 Policies contained in an employee manual addressing discipline or the termination of employment may, under some circumstances, serve as the basis for claims of either a breach of implied contract or promissory estoppel. Id. These claims may be asserted by both private and public employees. Adams Cty. Sch. Dist. No. 50 v. Dickey , 791 P.2d 688, 694 (Colo. 1990).
¶ 22 Employees claiming a breach of an implied contract of employment based on an employee manual bear the burden of rebutting the presumption of at-will employment. Keenan , 731 P.2d at 711. To do so, they must demonstrate:
first, that in promulgating the termination procedures the employer was making an offer to the employee-that is, the employer manifested his willingness to enter into a bargain in such a way as to justify the employee in understanding that his assent to the bargain was invited by the employer and that the employee's assent would conclude the bargain, Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 24 (1981) -and second, that his initial or continued employment constituted acceptance of and consideration for those procedures.
Id.
D. Analysis
1. Binding Personnel Policies May Be Promulgated by the Sheriff Under Section 30-10-506
¶ 23 Relying on Seeley , the Sheriff contends (and the special concurrence apparently agrees) that the retention of the at-will employment concept in the statute requires us to hold that all policies promulgated by a sheriff relating to the termination of deputy sheriffs' employment are only precatory. To conclude otherwise, according to the Sheriff, would write out of the statute the Sheriff's statutory power to terminate at will the employment of a deputy.
¶ 24 For two reasons, we reject the Sheriff's interpretation of section 30-10-506. First, it is inconsistent with the statute's conferral on the deputies of at least two due process rights. Second, based on the amended statutory language, we have no doubt that the General Assembly legislatively partly overruled Seeley . See Hearings on H.B. 1181 before the H. Local Gov. Comm., 65th Gen. Assemb., 1st Sess. (Feb. 7, 2006).
¶ 25 When it amended section 30-10-506, the General Assembly combined two contradictory concepts-at-will employment for deputies, on the one hand, and the requirement that sheriffs provide at least some binding employment rights to their deputies, on the other. These inherent contradictions render the statute susceptible to at least two reasonable understandings; thus, it is ambiguous. People v. Jones , 2015 CO 20, ¶ 10, 346 P.3d 44.
¶ 26 Our job is to rationally construe the statute to give effect to all, not just some, of the words of the statute and to recognize the legislative intent to overrule Seeley in part. Luther , 58 P.3d at 1015.
¶ 27 The statute unambiguously confers two due process rights on the deputies: "Before revoking an appointment of a deputy, the sheriff shall notify the deputy of the reason for the proposed revocation and shall give the deputy an opportunity to be heard by the sheriff." § 30-10-506.
¶ 28 But the statute does more. It also requires sheriffs to "adopt personnel policies, including policies for the review of revocation of appointments." Id. The statute says nothing about whether any employment policies promulgated by sheriffs, beyond notice and a right to be heard, must be binding on the sheriff. We agree with the Sheriff that a construction of the statute that all such policies are binding ignores and essentially writes out the at-will employment language. This is what the district court's construction of the statute did, but neither the district court nor this court has that authority. Jefferson Cty. Bd. of Equalization , 241 P.3d at 935.
¶ 29 But, if all of the policies, save the two due process rights identified above, were precatory, then the at-will employment relationship, though modified somewhat, would be preserved.
¶ 30 In Seeley , the supreme court held that the prior version of the statute simply did not authorize a sheriff to limit his right to fire his deputies at will. 791 P.2d at 700. But the amendments to the statute overruled that holding, at least in part. Hearings on H.B. 1181 before the H. Local Gov. Comm., 65th Gen. Assemb., 1st Sess. (Feb. 7, 2006). While the statute does confer on the deputies two binding due process rights, nothing in the statute expressly requires that all policies adopted by the sheriff are binding.
¶ 31 We reject the district court's reasoning that it is illogical for the General Assembly to require the promulgation of employment policies and then permit the sheriff to ignore at least some of those policies. As a division of this court observed in Jaynes v. Centura Health Corp. , precatory employment policies are not useless; they may serve as "guidelines" for the employer, managers, and his employees. 148 P.3d 241, 249 (Colo. App. 2006). We thus reject the district court's conclusion that only binding employment policies are meaningful and that all employment policies promulgated by the Sheriff must be binding.
¶ 32 But that does not mean that the Sheriff is prohibited by section 30-10-506 from promulgating binding employment policies.
¶ 33 To summarize, the amended statute requires a sheriff to promulgate written employment policies. The sheriff must give his deputies the rights of notice and opportunity to be heard. Other employment policies promulgated by the sheriff may be, but are not required to be, binding. And if the sheriff elects to confer binding employment rights on his deputies, those rights are enforceable in accordance with their terms.
¶ 34 In this way, "we give effect to every word and render none superfluous because we 'do not presume that the legislature used language idly and with no intent that meaning should be given to its language.' " Lombard v. Colo. Outdoor Educ. Ctr., Inc. , 187 P.3d 565, 571 (Colo. 2008) (quoting Colo. Water Conservation Bd. v.Upper Gunnison River Water Conservancy Dist. , 109 P.3d 585, 597 (Colo. 2005) ).
¶ 35 Our construction of section 30-10-506 finds support in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado's decision in Tonjes v. Park County Sheriff's Office , the only published case that has addressed the 2006 version of section 30-10-506. 300 F.Supp.3d 1308 (D. Colo. 2018).
¶ 36 In Tonjes , as here, a sheriff's deputy contended that the sheriff was bound by the employee manual's policies, while the sheriff argued that section 30-10-506 and the manual's disclaimer precluded the formation of an implied contract of employment. Id. at 1319-20. Consistent with our holding, the federal court held that because of the 2006 amendments to section 30-10-506, sheriffs have "the ability to adopt policies that limit [their] power to terminate (demote, discipline, etc.) employees at will." Id. at 1319.
2. The Written Disclaimers Preclude an Implied Contract Claim as a Matter of Law, Except as to the Due Process Rights Conferred by Statute and by Those Terms in the Manual
¶ 37 The Sheriff next argues that, even if section 30-10-506 permits sheriffs to promulgate binding personnel policies, the disclaimers in both the Manual and the separate yearly disclaimers signed by Cummings preclude, as a matter of law, the formation of an implied contract of employment.
¶ 38 The Manual included the following disclaimer:
These guidelines do not alter the at-will status of employees of the Sheriff. The Sheriff may terminate members or revoke deputy appointments at will, with or without cause. No portion of these guidelines or policies shall constitute a contract of employment, either express or implied, between the Sheriff and the member, or the County and the member, nor is it a guarantee of employment for a specific term or duration.
Additionally, once a year, Cummings signed a form that reiterated the terms of this disclaimer and stated:
THE SHERIFF'S OFFICE DETENTION DIVISION MANUAL IS NOT INTENDED TO BE, NOR DOES IT CONSTITUTE A CONTRACT BETWEEN THE ARAPAHOE COUNTY SHERIFF AND ANY OF HIS EMPLOYEES. ALL ARAPAHOE SHERIFF EMPLOYEES ARE AT-WILL EMPLOYEES. All Arapahoe County Sheriff employees have the right to end their work relationship with organization with or without advance notice or cause. The Arapahoe County Sheriff has the same right to end the relationship.
¶ 39 Whether a contract disclaimer is clear and conspicuous is a question of law for the court. Jaynes , 148 P.3d at 248. The disclaimers in most of the yearly forms signed by Cummings were written in capitalized letters, bolded, and underlined. We need not determine whether the disclaimer in the Manual is clear and conspicuous, because the disclaimers in the yearly forms undoubtedly are clear and conspicuous under Colorado law. Id.
¶ 40 We next must determine whether these clear and conspicuous disclaimers preclude, as a matter of law, Cummings' implied contract claims. Except with respect to the rights expressly granted to the deputy sheriffs by statute, we hold that they do.
a. The Manual's Notice of Charges and Opportunity to be Heard Employment Policies
¶ 41 In his response to the Sheriff's summary judgment motion, Cummings specifically contended that the Sheriff violated the Manual's policy (and the statutory mandate) requiring that deputies receive timely notice of the reason for their proposed termination. While Cummings appears to concede that he received timely notice of the initial charges against him, he contends that he did not receive proper, timely notice of the additional charges that actually led to his termination.
¶ 42 As we held above, a deputy's right to notice and an opportunity to be heard are explicitly protected by section 30-10-506. To the extent the Manual enforces these statutory rights, the Manual may form the basis of an implied contract claim.
¶ 43 Parties may not contract to abrogate statutory requirements and thereby contravene the public policy of this state. Peterman v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. , 961 P.2d 487, 492 (Colo. 1998). "A contract provision that violates public policy by diluting, conditioning or unduly limiting statutory coverage may be declared void and unenforceable." Id. Thus, to the extent the disclaimers purport to waive, as a condition of public employment, the deputies' rights to notice and the opportunity to be heard, they contravene the express terms of section 30-10-506 and are void as against public policy. See id.
¶ 44 Cummings claims that he did not receive the required notice of the charges that led to his dismissal, and the Sheriff disputes that interpretation of the record. Because the material facts on this question are disputed, a trier of fact (in this case a jury) must determine whether the Sheriff violated the Manual's policies regarding notice of the charges against Cummings.
b. Other Policies in the Manual and the Disclaimers
¶ 45 Many of the policies contained in the Manual are worded in mandatory terms. We now address the purported conflict between the disclaimers and the mandatory language used in some of the policies, other than those that effectuate the due process rights conferred by section 30-10-506.
¶ 46 Several reported Colorado Court of Appeals cases have addressed this conflict, but the Colorado Supreme Court has not.
¶ 47 In Allabashi v. Lincoln National Sales Corp. of Colorado-Wyoming , 824 P.2d 1, 3 (Colo. App. 1991), although the employee handbook contained a disclaimer of any contractual rights, other documents provided to Allabashi contained termination procedures and policies requiring just cause for termination. Allabashi testified that she relied on those policies and procedures. Id. Relying on Cronk v. Intermountain Rural Electric Ass'n , 765 P.2d 619 (Colo. App. 1988), and distinguishing Ferrera v. Nielsen , 799 P.2d 458 (Colo. App. 1990), the division held that the trial court did not err in submitting the implied contract claim to the jury. Allabashi , 824 P.2d at 3.
¶ 48 In Cronk , the manual set "forth certain express events which might cause the employee to be terminated. In addition, the manual state[d] that other reasons, not so expressed, could be grounds for termination, 'as long as such legitimate reasons constitute just cause.' " 765 P.2d at 623. Noting that "[t]he disclaimer upon which the trial court relied was added after the plaintiffs commenced their employment with IREA," and that in their summary judgment affidavits, the "plaintiffs asserted that they had relied on the employee manual provisions concerning termination," the division held that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to the employer. Id.
¶ 49 In Ferrera , 799 P.2d at 461, the division appears to have reached a conclusion contrary to that reached in Allabashi . Ferrera brought an action alleging wrongful discharge and both implied contract and promissory estoppel claims based on the employee handbook. Id. at 459. The district court granted summary judgment to the employer on the implied contract claim, based on a disclaimer contained in the handbook.
¶ 50 The division affirmed on two bases. Id. at 459-61. First, the division concluded that the handbook did not either expressly require just cause for dismissal or prescribe a progressive discipline process. Id. at 461. Rather, the handbook expressly reserved the right to discharge an employee whose conduct "in the opinion of the Company" warrants it. Id.
¶ 51 Second, the division held that "[s]ummary judgment denying claims based on a handbook is appropriate if the employer has clearly and conspicuously disclaimed intent to enter a contract limiting the right to discharge employees." Id. Concluding that the disclaimer was both "sufficiently clear" and "sufficiently conspicuous," the division affirmed the summary judgment. Id.
¶ 52 More recently, a division addressed this question in Evenson v. Colorado Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co. , 879 P.2d 402 (Colo. App. 1993). Citing Ferrera , the division stated "[s]uch a manifestation of willingness to be bound can be inferred if there is no disclaimer in the manual stating that it does not constitute a contract or if such disclaimer, though present, is not clear and conspicuous." Id. at 409. But then, the division proceeded to say that "[f]urthermore, even if there is a disclaimer in the manual, an employer may nevertheless be found to have manifested an intent to be bound by its terms if the manual contains mandatory termination procedures or requires 'just cause' for termination." Id.
¶ 53 If employees could not reasonably construe anything in the manual as a promise of either procedural or substantive employment rights, an implied contract claim fails irrespective of whether there was a clear and conspicuous disclaimer. Jaynes , 148 P.3d at 248 ; George v. Ute Water Conservancy Dist. , 950 P.2d 1195, 1198 (Colo. App. 1997). This is so because a fundamental requirement of all contracts is that the terms of a contract "must be sufficiently definite to enable the court to determine whether the contract has been performed or not." Stice v. Peterson , 144 Colo. 219, 224, 355 P.2d 948, 952 (1960) (quoting Newton Oil Co. v. Bockhold , 115 Colo. 510, 518, 176 P.2d 904, 908 (1946) ); see also Sheridan Redevelopment Agency v. Knightsbridge Land Co. , 166 P.3d 259, 262 (Colo. App. 2007). If the disclaimer is not clear and conspicuous, it is wholly ineffective to displace promises contained in the handbook that are relied on by the employees. See Ferrera , 799 P.2d at 461.
¶ 54 To the extent that some divisions of this court have held that even when the disclaimer is clear and conspicuous, the case nevertheless goes to the jury, we cannot subscribe to that result because it gives insufficient weight to a clear and conspicuous disclaimer. See People v. Smoots , 2013 COA 152, ¶ 20, 396 P.3d 53 (holding that we are not bound by the decisions of other divisions of this court). That result also is not faithful to supreme court cases that have repeatedly reaffirmed the doctrine of at-will employment in Colorado (subject to several enumerated exceptions). See, e.g. , Keenan , 731 P.2d 708.
¶ 55 The purpose of a disclaimer is to inform the employee that the employer is not making contractual promises and that the employee remains an employee at will. It is difficult to understand how a reasonable employee could believe that the employer has made contractual promises in the face of a clear and conspicuous disclaimer that says exactly the opposite.
¶ 56 Thus, we hold that when a clear and conspicuous disclaimer informs an employee that he or she cannot reasonably rely on termination procedures or substantive restrictions on termination contained in an employee manual, a claim based on an implied contract claim ordinarily fails as a matter of law.
¶ 57 We acknowledge that courts in other states have reached widely varying results on this question. See Stephen F. Befort, Employee Handbooks and the Legal Effect of Disclaimers , 13 Indus. Rel. L.J. 326 (1991-92) (collecting cases).
¶ 58 We perceive that the rule we apply here is the majority rule. See Fed. Exp. Corp. v. Dutschmann , 846 S.W.2d 282, 283 (Tex. 1993) ("A disclaimer in an employee handbook, such as the one included by Federal Express, negates any implication that a personnel procedures manual places a restriction on the employment at will relationship."); see also Davis v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. , 218 F.Supp.2d 256 (D. Conn. 2002) ; Anderson v. Douglas & Lomason Co. , 540 N.W.2d 277 (Iowa 1995) ;
Byrd v. Imperial Palace of Miss. , 807 So.2d 433 (Miss. 2001) ; Woolley v. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc. , 99 N.J. 284, 491 A.2d 1257 (1985), modified , 101 N.J. 10, 499 A.2d 515 (1985) ; Ruzicki v. Catholic Cemeteries Ass'n of Diocese of Pittsburgh , 416 Pa.Super. 37, 610 A.2d 495 (1992) ; Bine v. Owens , 208 W.Va. 679, 542 S.E.2d 842 (2000) ; Bear v. Volunteers of Am., Wyo., Inc. , 964 P.2d 1245 (Wyo. 1998).
¶ 59 Other states hold that the existence of a disclaimer, even one that is clear and conspicuous, is but one factor in determining whether an employee manual forms an implied contract. See, e.g. , Brace v. Int'l Bus. Machs. Corp. , 953 F.Supp. 561, 567 (D. Vt. 1997) ; Gonsalves v. Nissan Motor Corp. in Haw., Ltd. , 58 P.3d 1196 (Haw. 2002) ; Lee v. Canuteson , 214 Ill.App.3d 137, 157 Ill.Dec. 900, 573 N.E.2d 318 (1991) ; Hunt v. Banner Health Sys. , 720 N.W.2d 49 (N.D. 2006) ; Hodgson v. Bunzl Utah, Inc. , 844 P.2d 331 (Utah 1992).
¶ 60 In view of the indisputable presence of clear and conspicuous disclaimers, we need not determine whether the Manual, in fact, creates sufficiently definite promises or rights capable of enforcement under contract law. As a matter of law, these disclaimers preclude a successful implied contract claim based on any rights other than those that effectuate the specific due process rights granted by section 30-10-506.
IV. Conclusion
¶ 61 That part of the district court's summary judgment order permitting Cummings to pursue an implied contract claim based on rights conferred in the Manual that effectuate the due process rights granted by section 30-10-506 is affirmed. In all other respects, the district court's summary judgment order is reversed, and on remand the court is directed to grant the Sheriff's motion for summary judgment to that extent.
JUDGE FREYRE concurs.
JUDGE BERNARD specially concurs.
Under Colorado law, an "at will employee" is one whose "employment may be terminated by either party without cause and without notice, and whose termination does not give rise to a cause of action." Cont'l Air Lines, Inc. v. Keenan , 731 P.2d 708, 711 (Colo. 1987).
That claim is not before us on this interlocutory appeal.
Later in the opinion, the division suggests another basis for its decision: "[W]hile the disclaimer provisions[ ] are clear, they were not emphasized. Indeed, they contain nothing to make them conspicuous." Evenson v. Colo. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. , 879 P.2d 402, 409 (Colo. App. 1993).
In both Jaynes v. Centura Health Corp. , 148 P.3d 241, 248 (Colo. App. 2006), and George v. Ute Water Conservancy Dist. , 950 P.2d 1195, 1198 (Colo. App. 1997), divisions of this court were able to avoid either reconciling or disagreeing with the cases cited above. In both of those cases, the divisions concluded that the plaintiffs failed to cite policies in the employers' manuals that could be construed as a promise of either procedural or substantive rights and thus failed to show that the manuals created an implied contract or were binding on promissory estoppel principles. Jaynes , 148 P.3d at 248 ; George , 950 P.2d at 1198.
We do not eliminate the possibility that evidence other than the employee manual and the disclaimer could result in a factual question of whether an implied contract has been formed. Indeed, these facts seem to be in play in Evenson , 879 P.2d at 409, where the division referred to testimony by the company's managers to the effect that they regarded the disciplinary procedures as mandatory and treated them as mandatory. Whether viewed as an amendment to or an implied revocation of the disclaimer, facts such as those may well preclude summary judgment and require the fact finder to ultimately determine whether an implied contract was created. See I.M.A., Inc. v. Rocky Mountain Airways, Inc. , 713 P.2d 882, 887 (Colo. 1986) ("[I]t is for the jury to determine whether the parties have entered into a contract."). But Cummings neither pleaded such circumstances nor supported his summary judgment opposition with such evidence.
Because no promissory estoppel claim was pleaded in this case, we do not address the legal effects of clear and conspicuous disclaimers on such claims.