Case Name: STATE of Florida, Petitioner, v. Anthony BARRITT, Respondent
Court: Florida Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1988-09-29
Citations: 531 So. 2d 338
Docket Number: No. 71624
Parties: STATE of Florida, Petitioner, v. Anthony BARRITT, Respondent.
Judges: EHRLICH, C.J., and OVERTON, MCDONALD, GRIMES and KOGAN, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 531
Pages: 338–344

Head Matter:
STATE of Florida, Petitioner, v. Anthony BARRITT, Respondent.
No. 71624.
Supreme Court of Florida.
Sept. 29, 1988.
Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen. and Royall P. Terry, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, for petitioner.
Michael E. Allen, Public Defender and P. Douglas Brinkmeyer and Pamela D. Pres-nell, Asst. Public Defenders, Second Judicial Circuit, Tallahassee, for respondent.

Opinion:
BARKETT, Justice.
We review Barritt v. State, 517 So.2d 65 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987), in which the district court held that reckless driving is a necessarily lesser included offense of vehicular homicide. The district court certified the following question as one of great public importance:
Is reckless driving a necessarily lesser included offense of vehicular homicide such that, where a court refuses to give the requested instruction on reckless driving during a trial on vehicular homicide, it commits reversible error?
Id. at 68. We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const.
Respondent was charged with leaving the scene of an accident involving personal injury and vehicular homicide. The trial court denied respondent's request for a jury instruction on reckless driving as a lesser included offense of vehicular homicide. Respondent was found guilty on both counts and sentenced to five years on each count to run concurrently.
The First District reversed, finding respondent entitled to the requested instruction under this Court's decisions in Chikitus v. Shands, 373 So.2d 904 (Fla.1979), and State v. Wimberly, 498 So.2d 929 (Fla.1986). The First District perceived some lack of clarity, however, between these decisions and our statement in Martin v. State, 342 So.2d 501, 502 (Fla.1977), that where a homicide has taken place, "proper jury instructions are limited to those charges involving lawful and unlawful homicide," id. at 502, and certified the question presented.
In Chikitus, the defendant was convicted of reckless driving after causing an accident in which two people were injured. Subsequent to his convictions, the two accident victims died and the state attempted to charge Chikitus with vehicular homicide. This Court held that double jeopardy precluded any trial for vehicular homicide because the defendant's conviction for reckless driving stemmed from the same facts that supported the reckless driving convic tion. 373 So.2d at 905. In that context, we recognized that the state could not prove vehicular homicide without also proving that the defendant had been driving in a reckless manner. Id. We adhere to Chiki-tus for double jeopardy purposes.
However, this case does not present a double jeopardy question. The issue here is only the appropriateness of legal instructions necessary to determine the degree of culpability at trial.
Technically, reckless driving is a necessarily lesser included offense of vehicular homicide. Normally, a defendant is entitled to an instruction on all necessarily lesser included offenses. Wimberly. Furthermore, a trial judge must give a requested instruction on a necessarily lesser included offense even when the evidence at trial, which is sufficient to convict of the lesser included offense, also incontrovertibly shows that the lesser included offense could not have been committed without also committing the greater charged offense. Id. at 930.
In this case, however, unquestionably a death occurred, and in cases of homicide we have treated the technically required instructions on lesser included offenses differently. In Martin, we held that a defendant who is charged with second-degree murder is not entitled to an instruction on aggravated assault even though aggravated assault technically may qualify as a lesser included offense of murder. 342 So. 2d at 502. We reasoned that where death is not an issue, no rational purpose would be served by instructing on aggravated assault. Id. We find the rationale of Martin equally applicable when vehicular homicide is the charge.
Thus, Martin controls this case and mandates a negative answer to the certified question. If vehicular homicide is charged, a requested instruction on reckless driving need not be given where it is undisputed that a death has occurred as a result of the accident. We thus quash the decision of the First District and remand for reinstatement of respondent's judgment and sentence.
It is so ordered.
EHRLICH, C.J., and OVERTON, MCDONALD, GRIMES and KOGAN, JJ., concur.
SHAW, J., concurs specially in result only with an opinion.
Vehicular homicide, a third-degree felony, "is the killing of a human being by the operation of a motor vehicle by another in a reckless manner likely to cause the death of, or great bodily harm to, another." § 782.071, Fla.Stat. (1985). Reckless driving, a misdemeanor, is "driv[ing] any vehicle in willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property." § 316.192, Fla.Stat. (1985).