Case Name: ANDERSON et al. v. BLACKMON et al.
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia
Jurisdiction: Georgia
Decision Date: 1974-03-08
Citations: 232 Ga. 4
Docket Number: 28583
Parties: ANDERSON et al. v. BLACKMON et al.
Judges: All the Justices concur, except Gunter, J., who dissents.
Reporter: Georgia Reports
Volume: 232
Pages: 4–9

Head Matter:
28583.
ANDERSON et al. v. BLACKMON et al.
Submitted January 15, 1974
Decided March 8, 1974
Rehearing denied March 21, 1974.
Gettle & Fraser, Sherman Fraser, for appellants.
Charles W. Stephens, Arthur K. Bolton, Attorney General, H. Perry Michael, Gary B. Andrews, Assistant Attorneys General, for appellees.

Opinion:
Grice, Presiding Justice.
This appeal involves another action seeking injunctive and declaratory relief from an order of the State Revenue Commissioner requiring increases in county tax assessments on real and personal property so as "to achieve a digest of 40% of fair market value as required by Georgia Law." See Griggs v. Greene and Blackmon v. Brasington, 230 Ga. 257 (197 SE2d 116); Cox v. Blackmon, 230 Ga. 275 (196 SE2d 403) (U. S. appeal pending); and Blackmon v. Ewing, 231 Ga. 239 (201 SE2d 138).
This suit was instituted in the Superior Court of Fannin County by George Anderson and other named persons, individually and as a class in behalf of all persons similarly situated, seeking to have the county tax digest modified and declared unconstitutional. The complaint alleged that the class consisted of three types: "those who have paid their taxes, those who have paid their taxes under protest, and those who have not paid their taxes."
After a hearing the trial court entered a judgment declaring the assessment increases unconstitutional under the rulings of this court in Griggs v. Greene and Blackmon v. Brasington, 230 Ga. 257, supra. It further found that no proper class action was presented by the evidence or the complaint because "the multiplicity of varying facts that would have to be presented by each plaintiff similarly situated are such that they outweigh whatever common questions of law may exist."
It thereupon held that "any plaintiff in this case whose property has been finally assessed at more than forty percent of its fair market value by the application of percentage and adjustments ordered by the State Revenue Commissioner, is entitled to and will be granted appropriate relief. Such taxpayer must, however, within thirty days from the date of this order, apply to the Tax Commissioner for such relief which may be granted in the form of a rebate or as a credit against future taxes. Issues of fact as to whether a taxpayer's property has been assessed at more than forty percent of its market value is a jury question and will be resolved by a jury in Fannin Superior Court unless the parties can agree to try said issue before a Special Master or Auditor to be agreed upon by the parties." Those taxpayers who had withheld payment of their 1972 taxes because of the suit were allowed 15 days from the date of the order to pay without penalty or interest.
The above judgment was certified for immediate review.
1. The trial court correctly found that under our decision in the Griggs case the order of the State Revenue Commissioner adjusting the valuation of the types of property involved by varying percentages was illegal and unconstitutional as to the appellants. 230 Ga. 264-266. However, their assertion that the ruling should be expanded by voiding the entire tax digest must be sustained.
The trial court had no authority to replace the illegal assessments with legal assessments since it could not order the county to collect taxes on a digest which had not been approved by the State Revenue Commissioner. Code § 92-6917, as amended, Ga. L. 1945, p. 251; Colvard v. Ridley, 219 Ga. 361, 364 (133 SE2d 364). The court was only authorized under its equitable powers to fashion a reasonable temporary decree for the temporary payment of taxes so that the county would be able to function until a new tax digest was approved. Blackmon v. Ewing, 231 Ga. 239, 242, supra.
2. It was likewise error to find that no proper class action was presented by the evidence or the complaint.
The voluntary payment of taxes cannot be recovered (Blackmon v. Ewing, 231 Ga. 239, 242, supra), and the law makes no provision for the payment of taxes under protest. Therefore, neither the named appellants nor anyone they purported to represent who had paid their taxes prior to the issuance of the trial court's order can recover such payments.
Colvard v. Ridley, 219 Ga. 361, supra, did not involve the voluntary payment of taxes. That suit was to enjoin the issuance of tax fi. fas. for unpaid taxes and we held that the payment of taxes could not be enforced upon a digest not approved by the Revenue Commissioner. It did not hold that taxes voluntarily paid could be recovered except under a temporary order of the court. See Blackmon v. Ewing, 231 Ga. 239 (2), supra.
However, since the entire tax digest must be voided, the elements necessary to constitute a class and maintain an action in behalf of all those who had not paid their taxes were sufficiently met by the appellants here. Ga. L. 1966, pp. 609, 632 (Code Ann. § 81A-123).
Judgment affirmed in part; reversed in part.
All the Justices concur, except Gunter, J., who dissents.