Case Name: State of Ohio v. Lynch
Court: Supreme Court of Ohio
Jurisdiction: Ohio
Decision Date: 1910-01-18
Citations: 81 Ohio St. 336
Docket Number: No. 11952
Parties: State of Ohio v. Lynch.
Judges: Summers, C. J., Crew, Spear, Shauck and Price, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Ohio State Reports, New Service
Volume: 81
Pages: 336–343

Head Matter:
State of Ohio v. Lynch.
Resident of "dry” territory — May go into "ivet" county and purchase intoxicating liquors — And bring same into resident territory — Or may make purchase by another — Interpretation of Act of March 5, 1908 (99 O. L., 35).
It is not a violation of the act entitled, “A11 act further to provide against the evils resulting from the traffic in intoxicating liquors by providing for local option in counties” (99 O. L., 35), for one who lives in a county in which the traffic in intoxicating liquors is prohibited under the provisions of the said act, to go into a county where such traffic is not prohibited and purchase intoxicating liquor in any quantity for his own use, and bring the same into the county where he lives to be used therein by him as a beverage; and such a person may, under said statute, not only himself purchase intoxicating liquor as, and for the specific purpose, aforesaid, but he may also do so by another, whom he has constituted his agent for that purpose.
(No. 11952
Decided January 18, 1910.)
Exceptions to the Court of Common Pleas of Champaign county.
The facts are stated in the opinion.
Mr. George Waite, prosecuting attorney, for exceptor.
The question to be decided is: Can a person in dry territory receive money from another, and go into wet territory, purchase intoxicating liquors with the money, carry the liquor back to the place of receiving the money, and deliver it to the person who furnishes the money, to be used by him as a beverage, and not be guilty of furnishing as the term is used in this statute?
In construing a statute, words should be given their ordinary and generally accepted meaning. For the definition of the word “furnish,” see Webster, Standard and Century dictionaries; Lamma v. State, 8 N. P., N. S., 69; State v. Freeman, 27 Vt., 520; People v. Neumann, 85 Mich., 98; Dukes v. State, 77 Ga., 738.
It is claimed in this case that because it is lawful for a person living in dry territory to go into wet territory and purchase a quantity of intoxicating liquor and take it back into dry territory and there use it as a beverage, he can authorize another person to act as his agent and do the same act for him.
If one man can employ another one to purchase and convey liquor to him, a hundred could contribute a sum of money each, and employ a single agent to convey any quantity of liquor to them and distribute it' among them, and thus practically defeat the purpose of this law. State v. Munson, 25 Ohio St., 381.
It is clearly the spirit and purpose of this act to prevent one person from supplying another with intoxicating liquor to be used as a beverage, and we know of no other words or language that could express such purpose in general terms. There is a vast difference between a furnishing, and a sale, or giving away. A supplying of liquor as a sale or a giving away might be lawful and yet be unlawful as a furnishing.
Mr. C. B. Heiserman and Mr. Joseph W. Flaugher, against the exceptions.
The law does not make it penal for a person to go from a dry county into a wet county and purchase intoxicating liquor for himself, to be used as a beverage. Bennett had a right to go to Springfield and purchase' liquor for his own use; and it is claimed that, if it was lawful for Bennett himself to purchase intoxicating liquor in Springfield, it was also lawful for him to do so by his agent or representative, Lynch. So that, so far as the actual purchase of whiskey in Springfield is concerned, there was no violation of law. The sale is complete where the goods are delivered to the carrier and the place of sale is the place of delivery to it. State v. Mullin, 78 Ohio St., 358.
In Ohio, the law does not make penal the transportation of liquors by express companies or carriers into a county where the sale of liquor is prohibited; so that it is certain that no express company or common carrier could be guilty, under this act, of “furnishing” liquor in a dry county by simply delivering to a patron that which he had purchased in some other county.
We think the legislature did not intend to give the word “furnish” the broad meaning claimed for it by the prosecuting attorney, for if such had been the intention, other words could have been used to express such intention. The word “deliver” could have been used
On the subject of “furnishing” reference is made to Express Co. v. State, 33 S. E. Rep., 638.
It seems hardly necessary to refer to the rule that a penal or criminal statute is to be construed strictly and not to be extended by construction beyond its natural meaning. State v. Hall, 20 Ohio, 14; State v. Meyers, 56 Ohio St., 350.
Persons cannot be made subject to such statutes by implication. Only those transactions are included in them which are within both the spirit and the letter, and all doubts in the interpretation of such statutes are to be resolved in favor of the accused. Shultz v. Cambridge, 38 Ohio St., 659; Railway Co. v. Wells, 65 Ohio St., 313; United States v. Reese, 5 Dillon, 405, Fed. Cases, 16137; In re McDonough, 49 Fed. Rep., 360; Leonard v. Bosworth, 4 Conn., 421.

Opinion:
Davis, J.
The defendant in error and one Bennett were inmates of the Champaign county infirmary. In Champaign county it was, under the provisions of the county local option statute, unlawful for any person, personally or by agent, to sell, give away or furnish intoxicating liquors to be used as a beverage. Bennett gave money to the defendant for the purpose of going into an adjoining county, in which the local option law was not then operative, to purchase for him, Bennett, a quart of whiskey to be used by him as a beverage. The defendant did go into the other county, purchased the whiskey, returned with it to Champaign county, delivered it to Bennett, and it was there consumed by both Bennett and the defendant. The defendant was indicted and tried in Champaign county, on the charge of furnishing intoxicating liquor to be used as a beverage.
On the trial, the court charged the jury, in substance, that it was not a violation of the statute for a person in a "dry" county to go into a "wet" county and purchase liquor in any quantity for his own use, to be used as a beverage; and that such a person may, under this statute, not only go himself into a "wet" county and purchase intoxicating liquor in any quantity, to be used as a beverage by himself in a "dry" county, but that he may do so by another, whom he has, in good faith, constituted his agent for that purpose.
The prosecuting attorney excepted to the charge, and although the defendant was found guilty by the jury, and was sentenced by the court, the prosecuting attorney has brought the case here, as provided by Revised Statutes, Sections 7305, 7306, 7307, 7308, for an answer to the sole questio'n, as stated by himself: "Can a person in dry territory receive money from another, and go into wet territory, purchase intoxicating liquors with the money, and deliver it to the person who furnishes the money, to be used by him as a beverage, and not be guilty of furnishing as the term is used in this statute?"
The prosecuting attorney argues for a negative answer to this question; and his argument, in brief, is this: that the word "furnish" in its ordinary and generally accepted meaning signifies to "provide" or "supply." Yet if we substitute either of these alleged equivalent words for the one used in the statute, the application of the statute to the facts of this case is not made any clearer than when we consider it with the legislature's own chosen word, "furnish." In fact, the abstract meaning ot words rarely affords decisive aid in determining the construction of a document or a statute. When attempting to arrive at the meaning and specific intent of a given phrase or sentence, we are generally obliged to consider words in their concrete use, having regard to the general purpose which the draftsman had in view, together with any other circumstances which may aid us in attaining his mental point of view.
Now in the study of this statute (99 O L., 35-38), and especially of its title and Section 2, which is directly under review in this proceeding, it is very clear that it is aimed at the repression of "the evils resulting from the traffic in intoxicating liquors," and the punishment of dealers conducting such traffic. The significant language of Section 2 is as follows: "Whoever violates any of the provisions of this act or. in any manner directly or indirectly, sells, furnishes, or gives away or otherwise deals in any intoxicating liquors as a beverage," etc. The statute seeks to prohibit the traffic, or dealing, in intoxicating liquors in counties in which a majority of the electors have voted "in favor of prohibiting the sale of intoxicating liquors;" and therefore it provides that not only those who sell intoxicating liquors, but also those who furnish, give away, or otherwise deal in them in evasion of the law against the sale of liquors, shall likewise be guilty of a misdemeanor. This was the construction, and no more, which was given to the word "furnish" in State v. Munson, 25 Ohio St., 381; State v. Freeman, 27 Vt., 520; and People v. Neumann, 85 Mich., 98, cited by the prosecuting attorney.
For the foregoing reasons we are unable to accept the construction of the statute, which is claimed, on the part of the state to justify its contention that the charge of the court in this case was erroneous; and we may add a few other considerations leading to the same conclusion.
Admittedly Bennett could have gone in person to another county where the traffic in intoxicating liquors was not prohibited, and there could have bought liquors for his own use in any quantitj'- and could have transported them to the county of his residence, where the traffic was prohibited, and could have there consumed them. We frankly confess that we are entirely unable to understand why one may not lawfully do by the agency of another, that which he may lawfully do himself. The prosecuting attorney contends that the maxim, "Qui facit per alium, facit per se/ cannot apply in criminal law. Why not, in a case like this? There can be no aiders or abettors where there is no crime. When the liquor was purchased and paid for, in a place where the traffic was not prohibited, it thereupon became Bennett's property. The defendant did not, and could not, sell or give it to Bennett, for it was not his to sell or give away. For the defendant to carry and deliver to Bennett his own, was not "furnishing" it to him. • If it be conceded that the mere delivery to the purchaser under such circumstances constitutes "furnishing" within the meaning of the statute, then one who has in his house, in "dry" territory, liquor which he has lawfully obtained, makes his servant or member of his family liable to indictment under this statute, whenever in obedience to his request some of it is brought to the owner. In the absence' of a clear expression to that effect, we are not willing to adopt such an extreme construction.
Exceptions overruled.
Summers, C. J., Crew, Spear, Shauck and Price, JJ., concur.