Case Name: CONRAD v. WARD
Court: Michigan Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1971-05-21
Citations: 33 Mich. App. 687
Docket Number: Docket No. 7056
Parties: CONRAD v. WARD
Judges: Before: Lesinski, C. J., and R. B. Burns and Levin, JJ.
Reporter: Michigan appeals reports; cases decided in the Michigan Court of Appeals.
Volume: 33
Pages: 687–698

Head Matter:
CONRAD v. WARD
Opinion op the Court
1. Process — Substituted Service — Noncomplianoe.
Quashing service of process for noncompliance with a court order authorizing substituted service was proper where the order required plaintiffs to post the summons and complaint on the front doors of certain specified buildings and to effect personal service upon a member of the defendant’s family and where the papers were tacked to the doors of the specified buildings, but a member of defendant’s family was not served (GCR 1963, 105.8).
2. Process — Substituted Service — Substantial Defect.
Failure to have a defendant personally served or served in the substituted method authorized by the court order constitutes a substantial defect in service (GCR 1963, 105.8).
Dissent by Levin, J.
3. Process — Substituted Service — Defective Service — Avoidance of Service — Evidentiary Hearing.
Evidence that the defendant had been avoiding service of process, although no formal finding so holding had been made, justified remanding for an evidentiary hearing as to whether defendant had notice of the pendency of the action before the statute of limitations expired where plaintiff had not served defendant in strict compliance with a special court order, and the trial judge, although acknowledging the plaintiff’s good faith efforts to serve defendant, quashed the service and dismissed plaintiff’s action as barred by the statute of limitations; if it found that the defendant had notice of the action, the defective service is curable by amendment (GCE 1693, IS, 10S.S, 10S.8).
References for Points in Headnotes
[1,2, 8] 42 Am Jur, Process §§ 57-66.
[3-7, 9] 42 Am Jur, Process §§ 4, 72.
4. Process — Avoidance op Service — Knowledge op Action.
A defendant who successfully avoids service of process should not be permitted to avail himself of any defect or failure in service of process where the action was commenced in the statutorily-prescribed period; if the defendant had notice of the pending action against him, he should not be heard to complain because he successfully avoided plaintiffs’ process server.
5. Process — Service—Limitational Period — Compliance.
The purpose of requiring commencement of an action and service of process within the statutorily-prescribed limitational period is satisfied when (1) a plaintiff commences his action within that period and (2) the defendant learns of the commencement of the action within the statutory period, regardless of how he obtains his notice, whether through formal service or otherwise, if either the plaintiff has substantially complied within the statutory period with the requirement that service be effected or the defendant has attempted to avoid service.
6. Process — Defective Process — Avoidance op Service — Knowledge op Action — Substantial Compliance.
Commencement of negligence action within the statutorily-prescribed period and defendants’ receipt of notice of that action within the statutory period rendered a failure to comply in all aspects with a court-ordered method of substituted service invalidating only in the sense that no judgment could be entered against the defendant until the defect was cured where there was substantial compliance with the requirement that service be effected before the expiration of the statutorily-prescribed period and where defendant actively and successfully avoided service of process.
7. Process — Service of Process — Plaintiff’s Duty.
A plaintiff is required to prosecute his action with due diligence and to either substantially comply with the requirement that formal service be effected or, alternatively, to show that he was prevented from complying because of defendant’s evasive tactics.
8. Process — Substituted Service — Substantial Compliance.
A court order authorizing substituted service of process by plaintiff’s tacking the summons and complaint to the buildings at two specified addresses and leaving a summons and complaint at defendant’s usual abode with a member of defendant’s family who resides there and was of suitable age was sub stantially complied with where plaintiff’s process server went to the addresses, posted the summonses and complaints, lenocked on the doors and rang the doorbells, but no one answered, because plaintiff did all that he could do (GCR 1963, 105.8).
9. Process — Defendant’s Right — Notice of Action — Avoidance of Service.
The right to receive notice of the commencement of an action within the statutory limitational period is a defendant’s only substantial right concerning service; a defendant who avoids service of process is not prejudiced by the failure to receive in hand the summons and complaint which he successfully avoided.
Appeal from Wayne, Blair Moody, Jr., J.
Submitted Division 1 February 2, 1971, at Detroit.
(Docket No. 7056.)
Decided May 21, 1971.
Complaint by Paul M. Conrad and Marguerite E. Conrad against Clarence Gr. Ward and Violet D. Ward for damages arising out of an automobile accident. Substituted service of process quashed. Summary judgment for defendants. Plaintiffs appeal.
Affirmed.
John F. Kane, for plaintiffs.
Martin, Bohall, Joselyn, Halsey & Rowe, for defendants.
Before: Lesinski, C. J., and R. B. Burns and Levin, JJ.

Opinion:
R. B. Burns, J.
After several unsuccessful attempts to locate defendant Clarence Gr. Ward in order to serve him with the complaint and summons, plaintiffs were granted a court order pursuant to GCR 1963, 105.8. The court order author ized substituted service of process by tacking the summons and complaint to the front doors of certain specified buildings, "and, by leaving a summons and a copy of the complaint and this order at defendant's usual place of abode with some member of his family therein residing, who is of suitable age and discretion, informing that person of the nature of the process served". Although the papers were tacked to the doors of the buildings specified in the court order, they were not personally served upon any member of defendant's family. Noncompliance with the court order resulted in an order quashing service of process. Subsequently a summary judgment was entered since the statute of limitations had run on plaintiffs'- claim.
Plaintiffs argue that their "substantial compliance" with the court order authorizing substituted service of process was leg-ally sufficient.
The court rule herein under consideration is relatively new, and was designed to give flexibility to the system by providing a means of service, to be determined by the court, upon any defendant subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state. See 1 Honigman & Hawkins, Mich Court Rules Annotated (2d ed), pp 112, 113.
The trial judge was correct in his refusal to recognize a form of service that complied with only one-half of his order. It should be noted that the trial judge altered plaintiffs' request from "or, in the alternative", to read "and", in order to require both a conspicuous posting of papers "and" service upon some member of the family. Plaintiffs' failure to comply with the court's order which was fair and reasonable under the circumstances precludes their requested relief. See Meier v. Meier (1961), 362 Mich 653.
In Barber v. Tuohy (1971), 33 Mich App 169, the plaintiff filed an action against a nonresident motorist. The Secretary of State was served with a summons and a copy of the complaint. A copy of the complaint was mailed to the defendants and received by them. Barber failed to include in the envelope addressed to the defendants the notice that the Secretary of State had been served as required by the act. This failure was a technical defect that the Court held could be cured by amendment.
In the present case we do not have a technical defect but a substantial defect in that the defendant was not served either in person or by the method authorized by the judge.
Affirmed. Costs to defendants.
Lesinski, C. J., concurred.
"The court in which an action has been commenced may, in its discretion, allow service of process to be made upon a defendant in any other manner which is reasonably calculated to give him actual notice of the proceedings and an opportunity to be heard, if an order permitting such service is entered before service of process is made upon showing to the court that service of process cannot reasonably be made in the manner provided for under other rules."
MCLA § 600.5805(7) (Stat Ann 1962 Eev § 27A.5805[7]); MCLA § 600.5856(3) (Stat Ann 1962 Eev § 27A.5856[3]).