Case Name: PAYNE v. THE STATE
Court: Court of Appeals of Georgia
Jurisdiction: Georgia
Decision Date: 1976-04-08
Citations: 138 Ga. App. 358
Docket Number: 51593
Parties: PAYNE v. THE STATE.
Judges: Bell, C. J., Pannell, P. J., Deen, P. J., Clark, Webb and Marshall, JJ., concur. Evans, J., concurs in the judgment only. Quillian, J., dissents.
Reporter: Georgia Appeals Reports
Volume: 138
Pages: 358–361

Head Matter:
51593.
PAYNE v. THE STATE.

Opinion:
Stolz, Judge.
On March 1, 1975, the appellant was involved in a five-car collision. All parties denied responsibility for the accident, all parties suffered damage and no civil proceeding has been instituted by any of the parties. The appellant received a traffic citation for "following too closely" and was ordered to appear in the City Court of Atlanta. The appellant pleaded "not guilty," but the trial judge found her guilty of "following too closely," imposed a fine and suspended it. The judge also inquired as to whether the appellant had liability insurance coverage at the time of the collision. Upon learning that the appellant was uninsured, the judge suspended her driver's license indefinitely until such time as restitution of all damages suffered by the owners of the other cars was made. This appeal is taken from that part of the trial judge's order conditioning the suspension of appellant's driving license upon restitution. Held:
We are called upon in this appeal to interpret Code Ann. § 92A-9908 (Ga. L. 1937, pp. 322, 348; 1951, pp. 598, 604): "Upon the conviction of any licensee hereunder in any court of competent jurisdiction in this State of any offense of driving a motor vehicle while intoxicated, or driving a motor vehicle while engaged in a felony, or deliberately, wilfully or negligently violating any traffic law of this State, or any municipality thereof, the court trying the same is hereby given authority and jurisdiction upon such licensee ['s] being adjudged guilty to cancel or suspend the license of such defendant for such time and on such conditions as the court may deem proper. . ." This statute has been repealed by Ga. L. 1975, pp. 1008,1044, effective as of January 1,1976, whereby the authority to suspend licenses is exclusively vested in the Department of Public Safety. What we must decide, however, is whether the City Court of Atlanta had authority under the old law to suspend a driver's license indefinitely until such time as the driver made restitution for the damages resulting from his traffic infraction.
It is clear that driver's licenses are not to be taken away without that procedural due process required by the Fourteenth Amendment. Bell v. Burson, 402 U. S. 535, 539 (91 SC 1586, 29 LE2d 90), reversing 121 Ga. App. 418 (174 SE2d 235). We believe that the hearing afforded the appellant in the City Court of Atlanta satisfies procedural due process and that her conviction for "following too closely" was valid. This being so, we believe that Code Ann. § 92A-9908, which requires conviction as a prerequisite to suspension of a driver's license, is constitutional; the appellant concedes as much.
As we have previously noted, the incident sub judice involved a five-car collision, all parties denied responsibility, all parties suffered damages, and no civil proceedings had been instituted. In addition, a review of the record shows a substantial dispute in the amount of damages involved. Stated in the negative, the rule is that restitution may not be imposed as a condition in such cases where the amount is in dispute, unless the same has been adjudicated. See Code Ann. § 27-2711 (7) (Ga. L. 1956, pp. 27, 32; 1958, pp. 15, 23; 1965, pp. 413, 416); Biddy v. State, 138 Ga. App. 4 (4). The reasons for the rule are obvious, particularly in automobile collision cases, which may involve such issues as comparative negligence, last clear chance, etc. A party may be guilty of violating the traffic laws and be found not liable in a civil suit for damages. Such a party may even effect a recovery of damages. "A criminal trial for infraction of traffic laws does not involve such matters as the relative diligence or negligence of parties to a collision, but concerns only whether or not the defendant on trial is guilty of the violation with which he is charged." Pass v. State, 95 Ga. App. 510, 513 (98 SE2d 135).
Argued January 14,1976
Decided April 8, 1976.
Robert E. Stagg, for appellant.
Paul Walker, Solicitor, for appellee.
The conditional suspension imposed was unauthorized, and the judgment in this case must be reversed.
Judgment reversed.
Bell, C. J., Pannell, P. J., Deen, P. J., Clark, Webb and Marshall, JJ., concur. Evans, J., concurs in the judgment only. Quillian, J., dissents.