Case Name: Union & Planters' Bank & Trust Company v. Pope
Court: Arkansas Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Arkansas
Decision Date: 1928-04-16
Citations: 176 Ark. 1023
Docket Number: 
Parties: Union & Planters’ Bank & Trust Company v. Pope.
Judges: 
Reporter: Arkansas Reports
Volume: 176
Pages: 1023–1029

Head Matter:
Union & Planters’ Bank & Trust Company v. Pope.
Opinion delivered April 16, 1928.
B. J. Semmes, for appellant.
R. H. Crockett and J. T. Coston, for appellee.

Opinion:
Hart, C. J.,
(after stating the facts). The order appealed from was made on an adjourned day of the same term of the court at which a confirmation of the sale of the lands in which T. A. Pope had an interest was made. Hence the court had jurisdiction in the matter. Wofford v. Young, 173 Ark. 802, 293 S. W. 725.
The record shows that T. A. Pope owned the fee simple title to an undivided one-fourth interest in 1,360 acres of land which were embraced in the mortgage foreclosed. The consideration recited in his deed was $4,000, and the deed was executed to him on the 30th day of March, 1901, which was 27 years ago. Lady Pope, the wife of J. H. Pope, does not appear to have signed the mortgage. The mortgage was given to secure an indebtedness of $30,000 of her husband. This tends to show that the interest of T. A. Pope in said lands was worth much more than the sum of $140 for which the lands were bid in at the foreclosure sale by the plaintiff. In addition thereto, the mortgage executed by T. A. Pope contains an express exemption of an interest in said lands to the extent and value of $4,000. This indicates that the parties at the time believed that the interest of T. A. Pope in said lands was worth more than $4,000, and the legal effect of the clause was to reserve in said T. A. Pope the sum of $4,000 at the' foreclosure sale of his interest in said land. In other words, if the lands did not sell for more than $4,000, no legal sale of them could 'be made under the mortgage, for T. A. Pope had expressly exempted from sale his interest to the value of $4,000.
While this court has held that mere inadequacy of price will not justify a chancery court in refusing to approve a sale and deprive a purchaser of the benefits of his purchase, yet, if a purchaser has been guilty of any unfairness or has taken any undue advantage, the sale will be regarded as fraudulent, and the party injured will be permitted to set aside the sale. Great inadequacy in price requires only slight circumstances of unfairness in the conduct of the party benefited by the sale to raise the presumption of fraud. Stevenson v. Gault, 131 Ark. 397, 199 S. W. 112, Ann. Cas. 1918E, 433; Moore v. McJudkins, 136 Ark. 292, 206 S. W. 445; Chapin v. Quisenberry, 138 Ark. 68, 210 S. W. 641; and Wofford v. Young, 173 Ark. 802, 293 S. W. 725. In Schroeder v. Young, 161 U. S. 334, 16 S. Ct. 512, 40 L. ed. 721, the rule is stated that, where there is great inadequacy of price, coupled with circumstances tending to show that the land was sold in such manner that its full value could not be realized, the court is justified in setting aside the sale. Here there was notice, by the terms of the mortgage itself, that T. A. Pope had excepted from its provisions an interest in the land to the value of $4,000. Hence, under the circumstances described 'by the record, the chancellor was justified in setting aside the sale of the interest of T. A. Pope in said land; and it was his duty to have done so if proper notice of the application had been made.
Counsel for appellant seek to obtain a reversal of the order setting aside the sale on the ground that no notice of the application to vacate the sale was given to the Union & Planters' Bank & Trust Company, under the rule laid down by this court in Miller v. Henry, 105 Ark. 261, 150 S. W. 700, and the general rule announced in an annotation to that case in Ann. Cas. 1914D, 758. It is true that, under the authorities there announced, notice should have been given to the purchaser of the application to vacate the sale after it had been confirmed. But, under the 'circumstances, this action of the court is only, in general, reversible error, and was not a prerequisite to the exercise of jurisdiction by the court. It is well settled in this State that a court has the power to set aside or modify its decrees at any time during the term, and this rule applies to an adjourned day of the term. Wofford v. Young, 173 Ark. 802, 293 S. W. 725.
Under the circumstances of this case, however, we do not think this error of the chancery court constitutes reversible error. The Union & Planters' Bank & Trust Company was the plaintiff in the case, and, as such, was a party to the suit before it became a purchaser at the foreclosure sale. It does not make any difference whether T. A. Pope was legally served with summons in the mortgage foreclosure suit or not. He became a party to this proceeding by moving to set aside the sale under the foreclosure decree. While no notice was given to the Union & Planters' Bank & Trust Company of the application of T. A. Pope to set aside the sale under the foreclosure decree and the confirmation thereof, the court did set aside said sale, and had the jurisdiction to do so. An appeal has been taken only from the action of the court in setting aside the sale, and the appeal to this court has the effect of entering the appearance of the Union & Planters' Bank & Trust Company to the application to set aside the sale. Having appealed to this court, the plaintiff became a party to the proceeding, and must follow the cause to its conclusion or take the consequences. Hodges v. Frazier, 31 Ark. 58; Ben jamin v. Birmingham, 50 Ark. 443, 8 S. W. 183; Walker v. Walker, 147 Ark. 376, 227 S. W. 762; and Lingo v. Swicord, 150 Ark. 384, 234 S. W. 264.
Under the views we have expressed above as to the rights of T. A. Pope under the reservation or exception in his mortgage, he would have been bound to prevail if notice had been given to the plaintiff of his application to set aside the sale. Hence no useful purpose could be served by reversing the order setting aside the sale and remanding the cause, with directions to the chancery court to set aside the sale upon the facts established. This would be an empty victory for the plaintiff, and could result in no useful purpose.
The costs in a chancery case are within the discretion of the court, and it is our opinion that the costs of the appeal should be paid by the plaintiff, who is the appellant in the ease.
Argument is made by counsel for appellant as to estoppel which should apply to Lady P. Pope. We do not deem it necessary to discuss or to determine this issue, for it is not involved in this appeal. No appeal was taken by Lady P. Pope, and the appeal of the plaintiff does not in any wise affect her rights in the premises. The record expressly shows that the plaintiff only appealed from the decree of the chancellor in setting aside the foreclosure sale in so far as it affected the interest of T. A. Pope.
Therefore the decree will be affirmed.