Case Name: The State, ex rel. City of Toledo, v. Lynch, Auditor
Court: Supreme Court of Ohio
Jurisdiction: Ohio
Decision Date: 1913-05-06
Citations: 88 Ohio St. 71
Docket Number: No. 14064
Parties: The State, ex rel. City of Toledo, v. Lynch, Auditor.
Judges: Newman and Wilkin, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Ohio State Reports, New Service
Volume: 88
Pages: 71–150

Head Matter:
The State, ex rel. City of Toledo, v. Lynch, Auditor.
Provisions of the l8th article of the constitution—As amended September, 1912—Continue in force the general laws—For government of cities and villages until changed—By (1) general laws, (2) additional laws ratified by electors, .(5) adoption of municipal charter—Municipality may not establish moving-picture theaters, when.
1. -The provisions of the eighteenth article of the constitution as amended in September, 1912, continue in force the general laws for the government of cities and villages until the ISth day of November following, and thereafter until changed in one of the three modes following: (1) By the enactment of general laws for their amendment, (2) .by additional laws to be ratified by the electors of the municipality to .be affected thereby, (3) by the adoption of a charter by the electors of a municipality in the mode pointed out in the article.
2. Whether a municipality acquires authority “to exercise all the powers of local self-government” by adopting a charter, or adopts a charter as an indispensable mode of exercising the authority, the powers to be exercised, being governmental, do not authorize taxation to establish and maintain moving-picture theaters.
(No. 14064
Decided May 6, 1913.)
In Mandamus.
' The petition alleges the organization and existence of thé relator, the city of Toledo, as a municipal corporation under the laws of the state; that the defendant is its duly qualified and acting auditor; that after November 15, 1912, its council passed an ordinance of which the following is a copy:
“An Ordinance, .
“Transferring the sum of one thousand dollars from the General Fund, to the Department of Public Service Fund, and transferring the same for the purpose of establishing a municipal moving-picture theater, and directing the City Auditor to furnish to the Director of Public Service a certificate of such transfer and appropriation as provided by Section 3806 of the General Code of the State of Ohio.
“Be it Ordained by the Council of the City . of Toledo, State of Ohio:
“Sec. 1. That the sum of one thousand dollars be and is hereby transferred from the General Fund to the Department of Public Service Fund, and such amount is hereby appropriated for the purpose, of establishing a municipal moving-pic turé theater, and shall be used for no other purpose, and the Auditor of the city of Toledo is hereby directed to make such transfer on the records of his office and to furnish a certificate of such transfer and appropriation to the Director of Public Service as is provided in Section 3806 of the General Code of the State of Ohio.
“Sec. 2. This ordinance shall become operative from and after the earliest period allowed by law and is hereby declared to be an emergency measure to take effect immediately.”
That the ordinance was approved by the mayor, and that, on demand, the defendant as auditor, refused to make the transfer and furnish the certificate required by the ordinance. The prayer of the petition is for a writ of mandamus to compel compliance by the defendant with the ordinance.
The defendant, answering, admits the corporate character of the relator, his own official character, the passage of the ordinance, and his refusal upon demand to comply with its terms. To justify his refusal he alleges that: (1) The statutes of the state do not give to municipalities authority to establish a moving-picture theater, and (2) the amendment to the constitution of the state, adopted in September, 1912, relating to local government for municipalities, is not yet effective for the reason that the city of Toledo has not framed and adopted a charter providing for home rule in accordance with the provisions of said amendment. The pertinent provisions of the constitutional amendments .referred to in the answer and relied upon by the relator, were adopted in September, to become effective November 15, 1912. All are in ' the fourteen' sections of the eighteenth article. They are, in form or adequate summary,, as follows
“Sec. 1. Municipal corporations are ' hereby classified into cities and villages. All such corporations having a population of five thousand or over shall be cities.; all others shall be villages. The method of transition from one class to the other shall be regulated by law.
“Sec. 2. General laws shall be passed to provide for the incorporation and government of cities and villages; and additional laws may also be passed for the government of municipalities adopting the same; but no such additional law shall become operative in any municipality until it shall have been submitted to the electors thereof, and affirmed by a majority of those voting thereon, under regulations to be established by law.
“Sec. 3. Municipalities shall have authority to exercise all powers of local self-government and to adopt and enforce within their limits such local police, sanitary and other similar regulations, as are not in conflict with general laws.”
Sections 4, 5 and 6 relate to establishing and acquiring public utilities.
“Sec. 7. Any municipality niay frame and adopt or amend a charter for its government and may, subject to the provisions of Section 3 of this article, exercise thereunder all powers of local self-government.
“Sec. 8. The legislative authority of any city or village may by a two-thirds vote of its members, and upon petition of ten per centum of the electors shall forthwith, provide by ordinance for the submission to the electors, of the question, ‘Shall a commission be chosen to frame a charter?’ The ordinance providing 'for the submission of such question shall require that it be submitted to the electors at the next regular municipal election if one shall occur not less than.sixty nor more than one hundred and twenty days after its passage; otherwise it shall provide for the submission of the question at a special election to be called and held within the time aforesaid. The ballot com taining such question shall bear no party designation, and provision shall be made thereon for the election from the municipality at large of fifteen electors who shall constitute a commission to frame a charter; provided that a majority of the electors voting on such question shall have voted in the affirmative. Any charter so framed shall be submitted to the electors of the municipality at an election to be held at a time fixed by the charter commission and within one year from the date of its election, provision for which shall be made by the legislative authority of the municipality in so far as not prescribed by general law. Not less than thirty days prior to such election the clerk of the municipality shall mail a copy of the proposed charter to each elector whose name appears upon the poll or registration books of the last regular or general election held therein. If such proposed charter is approved by a majority of the electors voting thereon it shall become the charter of such municipality at the time fixed therein.”
Section 9 relates to the amendment of charters. Sections 10, 11 and 12 relate to acquiring property for public uses by municipalities and providing money therefor.
“Sec. 13. Laws may be passed to limit the power of municipalities to levy taxes and incur debts for local purposes, and may require reports from municipalities as to their financial condition and transactions, in such form as may be provided by law, and may provide for the examination of the vouchers, books and accounts of all municipal authorities, or of public undertakings conducted by such authorities.
“Sec. 14. All elections and submissions of questions provided for in this article shall be conducted by the election authorities prescribed by general law. The percentage of electors required to sign any petition provided for herein shall be based upon the total vote cast at the last preceding general municipal election.”
Mr. Cornell Schreiber, city solicitor, and Mr. Alonso G. Duer, assistant city solicitor, for relator.
We contend that Section 3 granting to cities all powers of local self-government became effective November 15, 1912, and that no further action on the part of the legislature or on the part of the city is necessary to secure to cities all of the powers granted in Section 3.
It is a rule of statutory or constitutional construction that an act or a constitution, or the rights conferred by either, become effective at once, unless an intention to postpone the time that the same shall take effect is conclusively apparent. 1 Lewis’ Sutherland Stat. Constr. (2 ed.), 308.
We contend that the time that Section 3 takes effect is not in any wise limited or postponed by any other section of Article XVIII. Section 3 grants general power to the municipalities, beginning “Municipalities shall have authority,” etc.
Section 7 does not provide that the city must adopt a charter. It simply provides' that the city may frame and adopt a charter, leaving it optional with the city whether or not it wishes so to do. To say that Section 7 limits or postpones the powers granted by Section 3 would be to construe Section 7 as a proviso or limitation. That Section 7 is not intended as a proviso or limitation upon Section 3 is quite clearly apparent from its position in the amendment. Between Sections 3 and 7 are Sections 4, 5 and 6, pertaining to public utilities. The natural and logical position of a proviso is immediately after the matter which it is intended to limit. 2 Lewis’ Sutherland Stat. Constr. (2 ed.), Secs. 352, 420.
The very language of Section 3 makes this section self-executing. It provides that municipalities shall have authority to exercise all powers, etc. The word “shall” here has a significant and conclusive meaning, which is strengthened by the argument that this is an entirely new section of the constitution, granting, certain rights which the city did not heretofore have and which the legislature could have granted without the adoption of this amendment, and which the constitution evidently intends to secure to the municipalities without hindrance from any one. . The word . “shall” must be construed in this light when, it is considered in connection with the object manifestly intended to be accomplished. Willis v. Mahon, 48 Minn., 140.
In the constitution of Ohio and in the amendments adopted on September 3, 1912, there are very many provisions that undoubtedly are self-executing, and as well stated in the above case such provisions are becoming more and more common for the purpose of granting absolute rights which the legislature cannot destroy.
In this very case, State, ex rel., v. Lynch, 87 Ohio St., 444, this court has declared one provision of the constitution to be self-executing, in the first and second sections of the syllabus. Hannibal & St. Jo. Rd. Co. v. State Board of Equalization, 64 Mo., 294.
That Section 3 is self-executing and imperative is further apparent from the fact that Article XVIII of the constitution clearly uses the words both “may” and “shall” advisedly and in their usual sense.
It seems to us to be perfectly clear that when the words “may” and “shall” appear so frequently in the same article and in such close proximity, that the same are used advisedly and in their natural sense, the word “shall” conveying the impression of command and the word “may” of permission. 2 Lewis’ Sutherland Stat. Constr. (2 ed.), 1154.
That the provisions of Section 3 may be carried out under existing laws is quite in line with the decision of the New York court of appeals in People, ex rel., v. Roberts, 148 N. Y., 360, 31 L. R. A., 399.
We contend that a municipal moving-picture theater is properly a municipal enterprise. 1 Dillon on Municipal Corporations (5 ed.), Sec. 21.
It will be apparent from all the foregoing that our contention is that Section 3 enlarges the powers of the cities so that they now have all powers of local self-government. By this we do not mean to say that the cities are not subject to any laws of the state. Not at all. We simply mean to say that they operate under the general laws, but with enlarged powers. So that the amendment to the constitution supersedes those sections of the statutes conferring specific powers upon municipalities, but still leaving cities subject to the general laws as to the details with which such powers may be carried out.
Mr. Frederick J. Flagg, for respondent.
The contention of the respondent is that Section 3 is a declaration of a principle; that it is addressed to, and is a limitation on, the legislature; and that Section 2 and Sections 7, 8 and 9, prescribe the methods by which the local self-government shall be carried into effect; that Section 3 does not contain within itself the method or the means by which the right should be exercised, nor does it define what local self-government is and what its limits are, and that Section 3 is not self-executing. Cooley on Const. Lim. (7 ed.), 121; Illinois Central Ry. Co. v. Ihlenberg, 75 Fed. Rep., 877; Morley v. Thayer, 3 Fed. Rep., 740.
: Construing the whole of Article XVIII together, it is apparent that Sections 2 and 7 point out the way the authority shall be given to municipalities.
' It is clearly the intention of the constitution that general laws “shall be passed” for the incorporation and government of cities under the idea that those cities shall exercise the powers of self-government, and it is also clear that there are now no general laws in force for the incorporation and government of cities, having in view the declarations of Section 3, that cities shall have authority to exercise all powers of local self-government. Section 6, Article XIII of the Constitution of 1851, said: “The general assembly shall provide for the organization of cities * * * by general laws and restrict their power of taxation,” etc. The word “government” in Section- 2 of Article XVIII is very important and was put there for a purpose..
We contend that these sections supply the method which is lacking in Section 3 and that they should be construed with Section 3 to effectuate the spirit of the article, which is home rule for cities, the -powers of government coming from the electors. Section 7 is made subject to Section 3, which shows they should be construed together.
It is very clear from the whole article that the powers of local self-government shall be exercised by cities under general laws to be passed by the general assembly. This appears from Section 2, Section 3 and Section 7. The article does not mean that municipalities shall be absolutely independent in their local self-government.
We submit that the words, “shall have authority” mean that the general assembly shall in the future give the cities their powers, or they can secure them by the adoption of a charter. Under the prior constitutions, the general assembly has always given to cities their powers, and it is a fair argument to say that the constitutional convention had this in mind when they drafted this section. The interpretation of one constitution may be aided by the provisions of the constitution preceding. City of Newport News v. Woodward, 104 Va., 58.
It is significant that although California has had a section similar to Section 3 for many years, and Washington for several years, counsel for relator do not cite any case which holds that the cities of California had the authority to make and enforce within its limits all “such local police, sanitary and other similar regulations,” without first having framed a charter. That they have not, is proof that there is none.
After the Washington constitution was passed, the legislature passed an act providing for the organization, classification, incorporation and government of cities. Seattle v. Clark, 28 Wash., 723; 8 Cyc., 739; Langdon v. Applegate, 5 Ind., 327.
Parts of the Ohio constitution have been held not to be self-executing. Lamb v. Lane, 4 Ohio St., 167.
In Illinois, Missouri, West Virginia and Alabama, the constitutional provisions against taking private property for public use without just compensation therefor, are held to be self-executing, even though the method of ascertaining such compensation is left in the legislature’s determination. 6 Am. & Eng. Ency. Law (2 ed.), 913; 8 Cyc., 754.
Thus Ohio, in the matter of construing this provision of the constitution, does not go as far as the states mentioned. W. T. Spice & Son v. Steinruck, 14 Ohio St., 213.
In other states the authorities do not agree as to whether constitutional provisions authorizing cities of a limited number of inhabitants to frame charters for themselves are self-executing. 8 Cyc., 757; People v. Hoge, 55 Cal., 612; Reeves v. Anderson, 13 Wash., 17; Fusz v. Spaunhorst, 67 Mo., 256; Tuttle v. Natl. Bank of Republic, 161 Ill., 501.
If a constitutional provision succeeds another on the same subject, and the former plainly required legislative action to become effective, while the latter is ambiguous on that subject, the courts will hold- that the latter requires legislative action also. Newport News v. Woodward, 104 Va., 58; 8 Cyc., 753.
If Section 3 gives full powers of local self-government to all cities, then Sections 7, 8 and 9 are entirely unnecessary, and cities under Section 3 would have full power to make any kind of a charter by any method they pleased.
If Section 3 gives of itself full powers of self-government to municipalities, they may by ordinance establish a municipal moving-picture theater, and by ordinances do all the things they wish to, such as pass rules for their government. Then these ordinances would be their charter, and it would be by a different method from that laid down in Section 7, and absolutely opposed to it, and" to the-spirit of it, as it would be the legislative authority which would be framing the charter and not the electors. It would give the.legislative authority in cities eo instanti,.all (he ,authority possible'which .the people under Section 7. might or might not give them. . • ;.
Mr. Timothy S. Hogan, attorney general, and Mr. J. M. McGillivray, special counsél, amici curiae.
The powers of municipalities are such as are expressly conferred by law, and such implied'power as may be necessary to carry the express powers into effect. Ravenna v. Pennsylvania Co., 45 Ohio St., 118.
Their powers are strictly limited. Bloom v. Xenia, 32 Ohio St., 465. •'
Inasmuch as the grant of power, in Section-3 of Article XVIII,. is worded, “Municipalities'Shall have authority to exercise all powers of local self-government,” and the contention of relator is'that the power to •• pass the ordinance in question is found in this - grant, does' not the conceded fact that there are no laws now in force authorizing the doing of that which is attempted end the' controversy, because, all laws then in forcé (meaning, of course, as to the matter under consideration November 15, 1912), shall remain in'- force-"until amended or repealed, unless they be inconsistent with the amendment?
The result, therefore, is, laws in force on November 15, 1912, are still in force. They dd not authorize the. Toledo ordinance, yet it is claimed to be supported and given validity by Section 3 of Article XVIII on account of- the fact thát it is-claimed to .bé self-executing. ¡-
As a term descriptive of a policy, home rule is significant and appropriate, but as descriptive of a right is indefinite, for it is coextensive with the right of local regulation and control and its extent must always be tested by the constitution. 21 Cyc., 447; Attorney General v. Lowrey, 131 Mich., 642.
What is local self-government? The answer to this question is to be found, in so far as we have any answer, in conditions that prevailed prior to the adoption of the home-rule amendment and in the light that existed prior to that time. Cooley on Const. Lim. (7 ed.), 265.
Local powers and rights are powers and rights that are inherent in a municipality. The legislature does not confer such local powers and rights— it has only the right of regulation, and there should be reasons of state policy before this right is to be interposed. So that, in theory, the home-rule amendment has conferred very little upon municipalities which they did not heretofore enjoy. What has heretofore been understood as matters proper to be regarded as coming under the head of local government are still so, and nothing beyond that. It may be said at this point that the legislature has power to make laws only because that power has been conferred by the constitution. Cooley Const. Lim. (7 ed.), 264.
Will it be said for a moment that although the legislature must look to the people speaking through the constitution for legislative power, and although they are subject to all of the limitations contained in the constitution of Ohio, yet a municipal corporation by virtue of Section 3 of Article XVIII, and Section 3 of Article XVIII only, is an omnipotent local legislature? Such an interpretation as this would confer upon the council of a municipal corporation a prerogative equalled only by the British parliament. Surely we have not in Ohio approached such vagaries as that. If unbridled license is given to the council of a municipal corporation under Section 3 of Article XVIII, what need of the grant of power contained in Sections 4, 5 and 6 following Section 3? The fact of the necessity of adding the subject-matters contained in Sections 4, 5 and 6 discloses that the powers therein to be exercised have not heretofore been regarded as coming properly undér the head of local self-government. Cooley Const. Lim. (7 ed.), 265.
How can it well be claimed that the legislature could heretofore invest municipalities with the right to go into the picture-show business? Is that a governmental business? Opinion of Justices, 155 Mass., 601; Baker v. Grand Rapids, 142 Mich., 687.
Mr. Henry J. Booth; Mr. Thomas H. Hogsett; Mr. Thomas J. Keating and Mr. Frank M. Cobb, for respondent.
One of the cardinal rules of interpretation requires that all provisions in pari materia must be construed with reference to each other, so that, if possible, effect may be given to every word, clause and sentence in the article or statute under consideration; another is that grants of power to municipal corporations are strictly construed against the corporation and in favor of the public. Markley v. Mineral City, 58 Ohio St., 430; 1 Smith’on Municipal Corporations, Sec. 82; Abbott on Municipal Corporations, Secs. 113, 890.
The 'power to establish, maintain and operate theaters and other similar enterprises may, and in most instances 'would/ involve the exercise of the power of taxation, the incurring of indebtedness and the expenditure of public moneys; and thé rule which prevails with reference to the construction of statutes would by parity of reason apply to the construction of constitutional provisions. 2 Lewis’ Sutherland Stat. Constr. (2 ed.), 632; Sedgwick on Stat. and Const. Constr., 19; Cooley’s Const. Lim. (7 ed.), 271; Dillon on Municipal Corporations (5 ed.), Sec. 239; Leonard v. Canton, 35 Miss., 189; Opinion of Justices, 155 Mass., 598; Sutherland-Innes Co. v. Village of Evart, 86 Fed. Rep., 597, 30 C. C. A., 305; Lowell v. Boston, 111 Mass., 454; Loan Assn. v. Topeka, 20 Wall., 655; Ottawa v. Carey, 108 U. S., 110; Cole v. La Grange, 113 U. S., 1; State v. Osawkee Tp., 14 Kans., 418; Allen v. Inhabitants of Jay, 60 Me., 124; Mather v. Ottawa, 114 Ill. 659.
' Section 3 of Article' XVIII of the constitution authorizes municipalities to exercise all powers of local self-government, etc.
Is. the establishment of a moving-picture theater - the:exercise of such power? ■ If not, the relator is-not (entitled to the relief sought in this case.
Municipal corporations perform two kinds of functipns—governmental and proprietary—and this-court'-has- frequently recognized the well-defined distinction between thése funct'ibns.
The power which the city of Toledo is seeking ;to exercise by establishing a moving-picture theater is not governmental. Cincinnati v. Cameron, 33 Ohio St., 336.
The principle.of respondeat superior applies to municipal corporations where the acts of their servants or agents refer to powers and duties ministerial in their nature and character. Toledo v. Cone, 41 Ohio St., 149; Davoust v. City of Almeda, 149 Cal., 69, 5 L. R. A., N. S., 536; South Carolina v. United States, 199 U. S., 437; Western Savings Fund Society v. Philadelphia, 31 Pa. St., 175.
It is certainly unnecessary to cite authorities to this court in support of the proposition that no such action would lie in case of injury resulting from negligence where the municipality is exercising purely governmental functions. Wheeler v. Cincinnati, 19 Ohio St., 19.
The constitution provides that private property shall not be taken' for public use without just compensation. If the establishment, maintenance and operation of a theater, as held in Brooks v. Brooklyn, 146 Ia., 136, and on principle in numerous other cases, is not within the corporate powers of a municipality, we insist that the taxation necessary to procure' funds for such an enterprise is the taking of private property without just compensation. Opinion of Justices, 58 Me., 590; Opinion of Justices, 204 Mass., 607; Kingman v. Brockton, 153 Mass., 255; Baker v. Grand Rapids, 142 Mich., 687; Hayward v. Red Cliff, 20 Cal., 33; Eufaula v. McNab, 67 Ala., 588; Donable’s Admr. v. Harrisonburg, 104 Va., 533; Keen v. Waycross, 101 Ga., 588; City of Radford v. Clark, 73 S. E. Rep., 571; 1 Cooley on Taxation (3 ed.), 210; Audit Co. of N. Y. v. City of Louisville, 185 Fed. Rep., 349.
We claim, first, that Section 3 of Article XVIII is merely the declaration of a general principle and does not provide any procedure or rule by which the same may be carried into effect; second, that if the powers of local self-government specified in Section 3 may be exercised by municipalities the mode of such exercise is specified in Sections 7, 8 and 9. Cooley’s Const. Lim. (7 ed.), 121; 8 Cyc., 753; Davis v. Burke, 179 U. S., 399.
Municipalities may exercise the power of local self-government only as provided in Sections 7, '8 and 9 of Article XVIII. State v. Covington, 29 Ohio St., 102.
The question of the construction of these provisions and the power conferred is considered at length in Dillon on Municipal Corporations (5 ed.), Sec. 63. In all of the states where freeholders’ charters are authorized by the constitution, there are provisions similar to those contained in Section 3, Article XVIII of the Constitution of Ohio, that is, provisions authorizing the municipality to exercise all powers of local self-government. In all of them it has been held that the adoption of a freeholders’ charter is the means by which the electors of a municipality may exercise the powers of local self-government. In none of these states is it suggested that the. council of a municipal corporation may frame such a charter. In fact, the right to frame a charter otherwise than by a charter commission has never been attempted, at least so far as the reported decisions disclose. All of the cases assume, and in some cases it is expressly stated, that the right to frame a charter must be exercised under and in accordance with the procedure set forth in the constitution. People v. Gunn, 85 Cal., 238; Ex parte Braun, 141 Cal., 204; Reeves v. Anderson, 13 Wash., 17; State v. Field, 99 Mo., 352; Kansas City v. Marsh Oil Co., 140 Mo., 458; State, ex rel., v. Scales, 21 Okla., 683.
In Ohio only a few provisions of the constitution have been passed upon by this court in respect to the question of whether or not they are self-executing. These decisions will be supplemented by authorities from other jurisdictions which may be of assistance in passing upon the question involved. Lamb et al. v. Lane, 4 Ohio St., 167; Kulp v. Fleming, 65 Ohio St., 321; Middletown Natl. Bank v. Toledo, A. A. & N. Ry. Co., 197 U. S., 394; Older v. Superior Court, 157 Cal., 770; Woodworth v. Bowles, 61 Kans., 569; Tuttle v. Natl. Bank, 161 Ill., 497; Lewis v. Lackawanna County, 200 Pa. St., 591; Commonwealth, ex rel., v. Harding, 87 Pa. St., 343; Morley v. Thayer, 3 Fed. Rep., 737; Roback v. Taylor, 2 Bond, 36; Austin v. Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. Co., 45 Tex., 234; Brown & Co. v. Seay, 86 Ala., 122; State, ex rel., v. Spokane, 24 Wash., 53; Newport News v. Woodward, 104 Va., 58; Chittenden v. Wurster, 152 N. Y., 345.
Mr. Scott D. Kenñeld and Mr. A. J. Freiberg, also submitted briefs on behalf of respondent.

Opinion:
Shauck, C. J.
We understand it to be conceded that prior to November 15, 1912, when the constitutional amendment set out in the statement of the case became effective, the councils of municipalities were without authority to use public moneys for the purpose of establishing and operating moving-picture shows. Certainly the absence of plain statutory authority therefor denotes its absence. As the city of Toledo had existed and flourished from its founding without a municipally-owned attraction of that character, the declaration of the second section of the ordinance that it is an "emergency measure" must be taken to mean that it is a measure for which there is now supposed' to be opportunity.
The case of the relator requires it to maintain the two propositions that without action by the general assembly or the electors of the city' its council may "exercise all powers of local self-government," and that the suggested mode of entertainment is within those powers. Both propositions are denied. Brief attention to the history out of which this amendment arose will aid materially in understanding its form and some of its provisions and in answering some of the questions which the present case presents for determination.
The first half-century of our statehood, as was universally conceded, had demonstrated the necessity for uniform legislation upon the subject of corporations, both municipal and private, in order that there might be a system of corporate law. This was a recognition of the very great importance of opportunity to know what the law is. Such uniformity was in terms required by the constitu tion of 1851. Thereafter municipalities rapidly increasing in size and numbers attracted the attention of lobbyists whose schemes were not always acceptable to each other nor to a majority of legislators, and resort was had to a scheme of acts of limited operation, though in a form assumed to be general, whereby the-practical operation of the requirement was weakened and finally so far annulled that the municipal law of the state was without form and much of it was void. By the year-1902, the situation was recognized as intolerable and the full operation of the constitutional requirement was restored. Throughout the ensuing decade, that requirement was respected by all departments of the government of the state; municipal credit was greatly improved, and it became apparent that every city in the state had a much better government than any had before. But progress toward the perfection of the uniform municipal code was slow. It-was retarded partly,' at least, by differences in the suggestions of natural persons who control or desire to control the exercise .of municipal power. These were said to be differences in the needs of different municipalities. Many believed that thfe differences were altogether subjective and in no sense objective. There was, too, a belief entertained by many disinterested persons that the form of government devised was, at least in many of the municipalities, too expensive and that it added unnecessarily to the burden of taxation. It resulted that in framing the amendment now under consideration, influence was exercised both by those who believed that the best results could be obtained by continuing to unite the intelligence and activity of the state upon a further improvement of the General Code and by those who believed that more satisfactory results could be reached by conferring upon the electors of different municipalities a larger influence in establishing the instrumentalities for their local government. Full authority for this statement is found in the provisions of the article.
By the first and second sections municipalities are classified as cities and villages, and the legislature is peremptorily required to pass general laws for their organization and government. On the 15th of November, when the article took effect, such laws were already in force, and they continued to be in force, operating upon every municipality in the state until a change should be effected in some mode authorized by the amendment. This conclusion results necessarily from the fa.miliar doctrine of Cass v. Dillon, 2 Ohio St., 607, where it was held that the new constitution of the state (that of 1851) created no new state. It only altered in some respects the fundamental law of a state already in existence; and even this was done pursuant to the prior constitution, under whose provisions the convention was called and the new constitution framed. It follows that all laws in force when the latter took effect, and which were not inconsistent with it, would have remained in force without an express provision to that effect: and all inconsistent laws fell simply because they were inconsistent; in other .words, all repugnant laws were repealed by implication. The conclusion also results from the express provision of the general schedule to the present amendments: "All laws then in force [when the adopted amendments took effect] not inconsistent therewith shall continue in force until amended or repealed." It follows that on the 15 th of November the government of every municipality in the state remained unchanged.
But the amended article authorizes the electors of a municipality to secure some immunity from the uniform government which it perpetuates as the primary status of all municipalities, and to entitle their municipality "to exercise all powers of local self-government." We have heard and read much discussion of the cases upon the self-executing capacity of constitutional provisions. The rational rule upon the subject clearly deducible from the decided cases is that such provisions are, or are not, self-executing according to their nature and terms. Much of the discussion in the cases cited relates to constitutions which perform the function heretofore regarded as appropriate of locating the powers of government and defining the modes of their exercise. From that source but little argument can be drawn to affect the interpretation of an instrument so largely legislative as is this. It is also to be observed that questions respecting the self-executing capacity of constitutional provisions usually relate to the necessity for legislative action to make them effective. This article provides two modes of securing the permitted immunity from the operation of the uniform laws which the legislature is required to pass. One of them is defined in the second section, and manifestly it is .not self-executing, for it expressly authorizes the legislature to pass "additional laws," that is,- taws additional to the general laws which the legislature is required to pass, such additional laws to become operative in a municipality only after their submission to the electors thereof and affirmance by a majority of those voting thereon. The other mode is defined in the provisions of the later sections relating to the adoption of charters. From the terms and nature of these latter provisions they are self-executing in the sense that no legislative act is necessary to make them effective.
A fundamental defect in the relator's case is that it assumes that a power conferred upon a municipality is conferred upon its council, although every provision of the amendment with respect to this body merely áuthorizes. it to make provisions for ascertaining the will of the electors. No additional act of the legislature is contemplated with respect to the adoption of a charter. The clear provisions of that article are first for the submission by the council to the electors of the question: "Shall a commission be chosen to frame a charter?" and, that question being answered in the affirmative by a majority of the electors, that any charter framed shall be submitted to the electors at. an election "provision for which shall be made by the legislative authority of the municipality in so far as not prescribed by general law;" the meaning of. which plainly is that the municipal council may legislate first with respect to the preparation of a charter and second with respect to a submission to a popular vote of a charter framed, and that an approving vote of a majority of the electors of the municipality is indispensable to the adoption of a charter or the securing of any power beyond the general law. It seems, therefore, to be entirely beyond doubt that'since the city of Toledo had not by a vote of its electors approved any additional law passed by the general assembly, • and that its electors had not adopted a charter, the municipality and all of its departments have only such powers as were conferred by the general law; that is, such power only as it had prior to the 15th of November. In some of the cities of the state the subject of adopting charters is, as we learn from counsel and from the public press, receiving consideration. It should occasion no •surprise that we are urged to attempt here a complete exposition of the powers of local self-government which in that mode municipalities may exercise. But as the case we are to determine does not call for such comprehensive exposition, judicial propriety forbids it. Obviously, the adoption of a charter will be regarded as offering opportunities for the use of public money which the uniform law does not permit, and which perhaps it will never permit, but we cannot anticipate all the enterprises which may be suggested, and we should not assume in advance to be able to anticipate all the learning which may be bestowed upon an analysis of the instrument. It is, however, pertinent to observe that at a time when there is serious need to use the public credit for the repair of extensive injuries to public property wrought by disastrous floods, something has occurred to impair that credit to a very serious extent. Obviously, there are far-reaching laws which cannot be annulled by statutes or constitutional amendments.
But the case before us presents the question whether the establishment and operation of a moving-picture show is within "the powers of local self-government," and the question has received' the attention of able counsel. In the amendment the phrase is used without definition and with the manifest intent that its operation shall be according' to its established meaning. It is fundamental in interpretation that statutes in derogation of the common law and amendments to statutes and constitutions shall have such and only such operation as is due to the natural import of their terms. The effective search for truth as well as the decorum due the convention and the people by whom the' amendment was framed and adopted requires us to impute to them a knowledge of that fundamental and familiar rule, and also to assume that they expected the courts to apply it to their work. Since municipalities get their powers from the. state, it is mathematically certain that they can include no power not possessed by the state. Local self-government is necessarily a part of government less than the whole.
In The State, ex rel., v. Guilbert, 56 Ohio St., 575, we recognized the truth familiar to all constitutional lawyers, that the functions of the state are governmental only, except so far as proprietary rights may become incident to the exercise of the primary function, and that since the insuring of titles does not essentially differ from any other insurance or business, the state cannot enter upon the business of insurance. How little would remain of the assurance which the Bill of Rights gives to minorities as well as to majorities that:' "All men . * have certain inalienable rights, among which are those of acquiring, possessing and protecting property," and that private property may be taken only for uses which are public, if the proceeds of industry and thrift may be seized for the establishment and operation of moving-picture shows and all other imaginable purposes not more frivolous nor more remote from the functions of government.
Consciousness of inadequate prevision forbids an attempt at a conceptual definition of the phrase "all powers of local self-government" to be applied to all cases that might arise. But an obviously correct descriptive definition is sufficient for the case in hand. They are such powers of government as, in view of their nature and the field of their operation, are local and municipal in character. The force of the terms employed requires the inclusion of such powers to be exercised by officials who in some manner and to some extent represent the sovereignty of the people. It as clearly excludes the exercise of functions which are appropriately exercised by caterers and impresarios. The suggestion that moving-picture exhibitions might be made educational is gratuitous because^ that is not their natural object. It is unavailing because article VI. of the Constitution shows that education supported by taxation is to be conducted by "a system of common schools throughout the state."
Among those who had attentively studied the functions of written constitutions it was accepted as a sound proposition that a municipality might own and operate only such utilities as it used in / its municipal operations. Those- who are respon-' sible for this amendment were aware that no enlargement of that capacity was denoted by the provisions of the third section that "municipalities shall have authority to exercise all powers of local self-government," and, therefore, they employed the express language of the later section of the article to confer that capacity with respect to other utilities. And as to them there are provisions to safeguard the interests of the people, while capacity to operate- amusements, if conferred at all, is conferred without restriction. If the language of this instrument were so doubtful as to require construction, a most natural question would occur, and the answer to it would be inevitable: Could we rationally impute an intention to authorize such use of the public money to those who were seeking to reduce the cost of municipal government and the consequent burdens of taxation?
The conclusion that this would be an unauthorized use of public money seems clearly to result from these considerations. If additional authority is desired to support a conclusion so obvious, it may be found in the reporter's abstract of the briefs.
Writ refused.
Newman and Wilkin, JJ., concur.
Johnson, J., concurs in the first proposition of the syllabus and in the judgment.