Case Name: The People of the State of New York, Plaintiff, v. Eldon Bisbee, Defendant
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1917-12-21
Citations: 181 A.D. 40
Docket Number: 
Parties: The People of the State of New York, Plaintiff, v. Eldon Bisbee, Defendant.
Judges: 
Reporter: Appellate Division Reports
Volume: 181
Pages: 40–48

Head Matter:
The People of the State of New York, Plaintiff, v. Eldon Bisbee, Defendant.
First Department,
December 21, 1917.
Conservation Law — action to recover penalty for violation of section ' 191 — possession without permit of wild deer lawfully killed in State of Maine.
The possession of wild deer or venison lawfully taken in the State of Maine and transported to this State for the personal use and "consumption of the defendant, without a shipping permit issued by the State Conservation Commission, does not constitute a violation of the provision of section 191 of the Conservation Law, providing that “ Wild deer or venison lawfully taken may be possessed from October first to November twentieth, both inclusive.”
It is only under the second sentence of said section, providing that “ A person may possess such deer or venison from November twenty-first to February first, both inclusive, provided a license so to do shall first be obtained from the Commission,” that it is necessary to procure a license in order that possession shall be lawful.
Latjghhn, J., dissented, with opinion.
Submission of a controversy upon an agreed statement of facts pursuant to section 1279 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
The essential facts agreed upon by the parties (the Attorney-General acting in behalf of the State) are as follows: “ The defendant Eldon Bisbee, a citizen of the United States and a resident of the City, County and State of New York, shipped via American Express Company, a common carrier, from the State of Maine, consigned to the defendant at his residence in the City of New York, two wild deer, to wit: One doe and one buck, the latter having horns more than three inches in length.
“ That both said deer were lawfully taken by said defendant in the State of Maine, pursuant to a license issued by said State which authorized said defendant to take, possess and ship out of said State, two wild deer whether doe or buck, during the open season.
“ That said buck and doe were shipped and arrived in the State of New York in such manner and condition that they were entirely exposed to view and attached to each carcass was a tag taken from said license issued to defendant by the State of Maine, upon which tag was stated the name of the defendant, the number of the license, and the fact that said buck and doe were lawfully taken by defendant in, and lawfully shipped by him from the State of Maine.
“ That said doe was brought into the State of New York by the American Express Company, on or about the 6th day of October, 1916, and was delivered by said American Express Company on or about said date to agents of said defendant duly authorized to receive the same for and on behalf of defendant at his residence in the City of New York. That said doe was, on or about the 7th day of October, 1916, seized by duly authorized agents of the Conservation Commission of the State of New York and taken out of the possession of an agent of the defendant in the said City of New York, into whose possession it had been delivered by agents of the defendant for the personal use and consumption of the defendant and his family.
“ The said buck was brought into the State of New York by said American Express Company on or about the 7th day of October, 1916. That on or about the 10th day of October, 1916, an agent of the defendant duly authorized thereto, called at the office of the American Express Company, signed a receipt for said buck and was about to receive the same when it was seized, on the premises of said American Express Company, by a duly authorized agent of the Conservation Commission.
“ That at all the times herein mentioned, the said buck and doe were wholesome articles of food and were shipped into this State solely for the personal use and consumption of the defendant, and were not taken, possessed or transported for the purpose of sale, or being offered for sale, or for transportation, except as above stated.
“ That neither said buck or doe had attached thereto shipping permits issued by the Conservation Commission of the State of New York.
“ The plaintiff claims that the shipping into the State of New York without having attached to the shipment a shipping permit issued by the Commission as provided by Section 178, and the possession of the same, constitute a violation of the Conservation Law; and that the seizure was lawful; and that by reason of such acts the plaintiff is entitled to collect from the defendant the sum of S400.
“ Defendant claims that such acts do not constitute a violation, and that if such acts are made illegal by the Conservation Law it is null and void, in that it contravenes rights secured to him by the State and Federal constitutions. Especially, that it violates the Commerce Clause and the rights secured by the Fourteenth Amendment.”
B. F. Sturgis, for the plaintiff.
Abraham, Freedman, for the defendant.
See Consol. Laws, chap. 65 (Laws of 1911, chap. 647), § 178, added by Laws of 1912, chap. 318, as amd. by Laws of 1913, chap. 508, and Laws of 1916, chap. 521; Id. § 182, added by Laws of 1912, chap. 318, as amd. by Laws of 1916, chap. 521.— [Rep.

Opinion:
Scott, J.:
In our opinion the submitted case presents but a single question for our determination.
The gravamen of the offense charged against defendant is that " neither said doe or buck had attached thereto shipping permits issued by the Conservation Commission of the State of New York."
The only question left open, under former decisions of this court, is whether or not the " possession " of the deer by defendant, without a shipping permit, constituted an offense.
In People v. Bisbee (173 App. Div. 127) we had before us a precisely similar question as to partridges shot in Maine and shipped to this State, except that the question of possession by the consignee was not involved. It was held that there was no illegality " in shipping them to the State of New York until they [the birds] had arrived at their destination and a delivery made to the defendant."
In thus holding we followed People v. Fargo (137 App. Div. 727) which discussed at some length both the State Game Laws and the so-called Lacey Act (31 U. S. Stat. at Large, 187, chap. 553).
Up to the point, therefore, of the delivery of the deer to the defendant we are constrained to hold that no illegal act is established as against him. It remains only to consider whether possession by him after delivery was unlawful. This must be determined solely by reference to the law of this State, as no Federal question is presented.
Section 191 of the Conservation Law provides in part as follows: " § 191. Possession of wild deer or venison. Wild deer or venison lawfully taken may be possessed from October first to November twentieth, both inclusive. A person may possess such deer or venison from November twenty-first to February first, both inclusive, provided a license só to do shall first be obtained from the Commission." (Consol. Laws, chap. 65 [Laws of 1911, chap. 647], § 191, added by Laws of 1912, chap. 318, as amd. by Laws of 1916, chap. 521.)
The remainder of the section is not relevant to the question now under consideration. It will be seen that the section covers the possession of deer during two seasons, one from October first to November twentieth, and the other from November twenty-first to February first. It is only as to the second season or period that it is necessary to procure a license in order that possession shall be lawful. As to the first season or period (which covers the acts charged as unlawful against defendant) the right of possession is absolute provided only that the deer shall have been " lawfully taken," as it is conceded that the deer in question were.
When the Legislature has explicitly provided as to one season that a permit must be obtained, and has made no similar provision as to the other season we see no escape from the conclusion that it was intended to allow possession from October first to November twentieth without the necessity of procuring a permit.
It follows that upon the agreed facts no unlawful act is established on the part of the defendant, and he is entitled to judgment accordingly, with costs.
Clarke, P. J., Dowling and Smith, JJ., concurred; Laughlin, • J., dissented.