Case Name: CLEVELAND RY. CO. v. SUTHERLAND
Court: Supreme Court of Ohio
Jurisdiction: Ohio
Decision Date: 1926-06-15
Citations: 4 Ohio Law Abs. 708
Docket Number: No. 19522
Parties: CLEVELAND RY. CO. v. SUTHERLAND
Judges: 
Reporter: The Ohio Law Abstract
Volume: 4
Pages: 708–709

Head Matter:
CLEVELAND RY. CO. v. SUTHERLAND
Ohio Supreme Court
No. 19522.
Decided June 15, 1926
Attorneys — Squire, Sanders & Dempsey for Company; Gott, Bloomfield & Orr and Lewis Druck'er for Sutherland; all of Cleveland.

Opinion:
PER CURIAM.
Hazel Sutherland brought an action against the Cleveland Railway Co. in the Cuyahoga Common Pleas seeking, to recover damages for injuries sustained by her due to the alleged negligence of the company, in that while standing in a safety zone waiting for a street car, a glass from one of the company's cars fell and pieces thereof struck her on the head and face.
The court instructed the jury that if the injury was caused by the falling of the glass, a presumption arises in absence of other proof that the company was negligent. The trial resulted in a verdict in favor of Sutherland and judgment thereon was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
The case was taken to the Supreme Court and it was contended by the company that testimony to the effect that the glass did not fall out, but that there was merely a hole of about six inches punched in the glass. Sutherland contended that the negligence of the Company in stopping the car with suddenness together with its overcrowded condition, was the negligence which caused the breaking of the glass and the consequent injury. The Supreme Court held:
1. The question presented is whether the res ipsa loquitur rule has any application in this case.
2. Counsel for Sutherland state their view of the proposition as follows: — "The negligence of itself, in the absence of explanation by the defendant, affords prima facie evidence that there was want of due care."
3. The res ipsa loquitur doctrine does not apply where there is direct evidence as to the cause, or where an inference can be drawn from the facts that the accident was due to a cause other than defendants negligence as reasonably as that it was due to its negligence.
4. The facts do not indicate that the window was broken because of any faulty construction; but rather by reason of some outside physical force.
5. It is clear that the breaking of the glass could have occurred without any negligence of the Company, and an inference might be drawn that the window was broken by the act of a third person with which the company had nothing to do.
Judgment reversed.