Case Name: Carolyn A. DINGWALL, Appellant, v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA WATER AND SEWER AUTHORITY, Appellee
Court: District of Columbia Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: District of Columbia
Decision Date: 2002-05-30
Citations: 800 A.2d 686
Docket Number: Nos. 99-CV-79, 99-CV-80
Parties: Carolyn A. DINGWALL, Appellant, v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA WATER AND SEWER AUTHORITY, Appellee.
Judges: Before WAGNER, Chief Judge, and TERRY, STEADMAN, SCHWELB, FARRELL, RUIZ, REID, GLICKMAN, and WASHINGTON, Associate Judges.
Reporter: West's Atlantic Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 800
Pages: 686–692-696

Head Matter:
Carolyn A. DINGWALL, Appellant, v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA WATER AND SEWER AUTHORITY, Appellee.
Nos. 99-CV-79, 99-CV-80.
District of Columbia Court of Appeals.
Argued Nov. 6, 2001.
Decided May 30, 2002.
Carolyn A. Dingwall pro se.
Jack W. Campbell IV, appointed counsel amicus curiae, with whom Robert H. Klo-noff, Washington, DC, was on the brief, argued in support of appellant.
James C. McKay, Jr., Senior Assistant Corporation Counsel, with whom Robert R. Rigsby, Corporation Counsel, and Charles L. Reischel, Deputy Corporation Counsel, were on the brief, for appellee.
Before WAGNER, Chief Judge, and TERRY, STEADMAN, SCHWELB, FARRELL, RUIZ, REID, GLICKMAN, and WASHINGTON, Associate Judges.
The en banc court expresses its appreciation to Mr. Campbell, Mr. Klonoff, and the firm of Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue for their able and highly professional assistance to the court in this matter.

Opinion:
ON PETITION FOR REHEARING EN BANC
Opinion of the court
PER CURIAM.
On February 15, 2001, in Dingwall v. District of Columbia Water and Sewer Auth., 766 A.2d 974 (D.C.2001) (Dingwall I), a division of this court held, inter alia, that in an action for negligence against the District of Columbia Water and Sewer Authority (WASA), appellant Carolyn A. Dingwall' was not required by D.C.Code § 12-309 (1995) to provide pre-suit notice to the Mayor.' Id. at 977-79. The division further held that D.C.Code § 43-1672(b) (1998), which provides in pertinent part, with exceptions not here applicable, that WASA shall be "subject to all laws applicable to offices, agencies, [and] departments of the District government," does not confer upon WASA the protections provided to the District by § 12-309. Id. at 979-80.
On June 7, 2001, we granted WASA's petition for rehearing en banc with respect to the foregoing issues and vacated the decision in Dingwall I. Dingwall v. District of Columbia Water and Sewer Auth., 773 A.2d 423, 424 (D.C.2001) (per curiam) (Dingwall II)- The en banc court now reinstates and adopts the division opinion in Dingwall I, with some brief elaboration as set forth below.
WASA points out that § 12-309 is in derogation of the common law principle of sovereign immunity, that the statute must be construed narrowly against claimants, see, e.g., Gross v. District of Columbia, 734 A.2d 1077, 1081 (D.C.1999), and that § 12-309 therefore applies to suits against agencies that are "within" the District government, whether or not those agencies are sui juris. WASA also argues that the division's construction of the words "subject to" in § 43-1672(b) is too narrow. According to WASA, the two statutes, when considered together, confer upon WASA the right to pre-suit notice which is provided in tort actions against the District by § 12-309.
We do not agree. Section 12-309 applies, by its terms, only to actions against the District of Columbia. By contrast, the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) contains a pre-suit notice provision for claims against a "Federal Agency." 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b). Congress has expressly defined "Federal Agency" to include "the executive departments, the judicial and legislative branches, independent establishments of the United States, and corporations acting as instrumentalities or agencies of the United States." Id. § 2671 (emphasis added). Congress could have written, but did not write, a similarly broad notice provision into § 12-309.
According the language of § 43-1672(b) its common everyday meaning, we conclude, as did the division, that this statute simply requires WASA to comply with all of the laws, regulations, and other obligations applicable to other agencies and instrumentalities of the District of Columbia. In our view, the construction of § 43-1672(b) for which WASA contends goes far beyond the natural import of the words used by the legislature. Accord, United States ex rel Totten v. Bombardier Corp., 351 U.S.App.D.C. 30, -, 286 F.3d 542, 547 (2002) ("an entity is subject to a particular legal regime when it is regulated by, or made answerable under, that regime") (rev'g 139 F.Supp.2d 50 (D.D.C.2001)); see also Downs v. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of the District of Columbia, 112 Daily Wash. L. Rptk. 493, 498 (Super.Ct.D.C.1984) ("the extension of § 12-309 by judicial construction to suits not reached by its terms would, in the court's view, deprive plaintiffs of the right to reasonable notice [of what they must do to have their cases heard on the merits"]) (quoted in Dingwall 1, 766 A.2d at 979).
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment and opinion in Dingwall I are reinstated. The case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings, consistent with this opinion and with Dingwall I, with respect to Count II of the complaint.
So ordered.
. At oral argument, in response to a question from the bench, counsel for WASA did not deny, and thus effectively acknowledged, that this action was properly brought against WASA and could not have been brought instead against the District.
. The appellate court's reading of "subject to" in Totten appears directly contrary to the approach urged by WASA.