Case Name: Mary CRAIG, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 2013-08-14
Citations: 525 F. App'x 923
Docket Number: No. 12-11423
Parties: Mary CRAIG, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee.
Judges: Before BARKETT, JORDAN, and RIPPLE, Circuit Judges.
Reporter: West's Federal Appendix
Volume: 525
Pages: 923–924

Head Matter:
Mary CRAIG, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee.
No. 12-11423.
United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.
Aug. 14, 2013.
Kurt Ward, Kurt R. Ward, Attorney at Law, LLC, Atlanta, GA, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
Elizabeth J. Bondurant, Nikole Marie Crow, Smith Moore Leatherwood, LLP, Atlanta, GA, for Defendant-Appellee.
Before BARKETT, JORDAN, and RIPPLE, Circuit Judges.
Honorable Kenneth F. Ripple, United States Circuit Judge for the Seventh Circuit, sitting by designation.

Opinion:
PER CURIAM:
Following oral argument, and a careful review of the 1700-page administrative record, we affirm the district court's judgment in favor of MetLife in this ERISA case. The record contains some objective evidence, as well as several clinical findings, that Ms. Craig suffered from radicu-lopathy, a disorder for which long-term disability benefits would not be capped at 24 months. But, as the district court correctly noted, portions of the record also indicate that she did not have radiculopa-thy. For example, Dr. Orr — one of Ms. Craig's physicians — acknowledged that none of the EMGs, MRIs, or nerve conduction studies showed a radiculopathy. On this record, we cannot say that Met-Life's decision was arbitrary or capricious, even taking into account the conflict of interest created by MetLife's dual role as administrator and insurer. See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 115, 109 S.Ct. 948, 103 L.Ed.2d 80 (1989); Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn, 554 U.S. 105, 114-17, 128 S.Ct. 2343, 171 L.Ed.2d 299 (2008).
We do not address Ms. Craig's argument that the 24-month limit applies only if the disabling disorder is both "neuro-musculoskeletal and soft tissue" in nature, see Appellant's Br. at 20-21, because that argument was not made below in the motion for judgment or in response to Met-Life's motion for judgment. See, e.g., In re Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 905 F.2d 1457, 1461-62 (11th Cir.1990) (issues or arguments not presented to the district court generally cannot be raised on appeal for the first time). We also do not address the assertion that Ms. Craig suffers from myelopathy, one of the other exclusions/exceptions to the 24-month limit for long-term disability benefits. See Appellant's Br. at 25. We agree with the district court that Ms. Craig did not present this claim to MetLife during the administrative process. See Blankenship v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 644 F.3d 1350, 1354 (11th Cir.2011) (per curiam) ("Review of the plan administrator's denial of benefits is limited to consideration of the material available to the administrator at the time it made its decision.").
Affirmed.