Case Name: The State of Ohio v. Carl
Court: Supreme Court of Ohio
Jurisdiction: Ohio
Decision Date: 1905-01-03
Citations: 71 Ohio St. 259
Docket Number: No. 8523
Parties: The State of Ohio v. Carl.
Judges: Spear, C. J., Davis and Summers, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Ohio State Reports, New Service
Volume: 71
Pages: 259–273

Head Matter:
The State of Ohio v. Carl.
Carnal abuse of female — Section 6816, Revised Statutes — Indictment reading “with her consent" — Proof of non-consent— Yariance not fatal to conviction — Interpretation of statute— Court procedure.
On the trial of an indictment under section 6816, Revised Statutes, for carnally knowing and abusing a fefnale person under the age of sixteen years with her consent, the evidence having established the carnal knowledge and the alleged ages of the parties, evidence tending to show that the act was committed without consent does not constitute a fatal variance.
(No. 8523
Decided January 3, 1905.)
Exception to the ruling of the Court of Common Pleas of Summit county.
Carl was indicted by the grand jury of Summit county under section 6816, Revised Statutes, for abusing and carnally knowing E. W., a female person under the age of sixteen years, he being more than eighteen years of age.
The indictment charged: That the defendant, “being then and there a male person of the age of eighteen years and upward, did- unlawfully and knowingly carnally know and abuse one, E. W., with her consent, she, the said E. W., then and there being á female person under the age of sixteen years, to-wit, of the age of fourteen years, contrary to the form of. the statute in such case made and provided and against the peace and dignity of the state of Ohio.”
The defendant entered a plea of not guilty. Upon ' the trial the evidence showed, at least tended to show, the alleged carnal knowledge, that the defendant was more than eighteen years of age and that E. W. was less than sixteen years of age. When upon the witness stand she testified that she did not consent to the intercourse but that it was accomplished by the defendant forcibly and against all the resistance she was able to interpose.
Thereupon counsel for the defendant asked the court to direct the jury to return a verdict for the. defendant upon the ground that with respect to her consent there was a fatal variance between the indictment and the evidence.
That direction was given by the court and the prosecuting attorney’s exception thereto presents the question which is for consideration here.
Mr■. H. M. Hagelbarger, prosecuting attorney.
We claim that the trial court erred in directing the jury to return a verdict for the defendant.
First: For the reason that although the prosecuting witness testified, that the act was committed forcibly and against her will, it was not material in the case, the state having shown that she was under sixteen years of age, and that the defendant was over eighteen years of age.
Second: Under favor of section 7216, Revised Statutes, if there was a variance between the in dictment and the proof, the variance was not material or prejudicial to the defendant, and the court should not have directed an acquittal.
Third: If such variance was material, then under favor of section 7303, the jury should have been discharged.
Counsel then cite and comment upon: Section 6816, Rev. Stat.; sec. 6817, Rev. Stat.; 95 O. L., 344; Baker v. State, 12 Ohio St., 214; Mitchell v. State, 42 Ohio St., 386; O’Meara v. State, 17 Ohio St., 516; Exon v. State, 33 S. W. Rep., 336; State v. Black, 63 Me., 210; Wood v. State, 46 Nev., 59; 23 Am. & Eng. Ency. Law (2 ed.), 854; Commonwealth v. Sugland, 4 Gray, 7; People v. McDonald, 9 Mich., 150; People v. Crosswell, 13 Mich., 427; 87 Am. Dec., 774; Ballinger’s Ann. Codes & St., sec. 7062; Regina v. Neale, 1 Car. & Kir., 591; 1 Den. C. C., 36; Gosha v. State, 2 Ann. Crim. Rep., 589; 56 Ga. Bep., 36; 4 Blackstone (Cooley), 210, 212; Stephens v. State, 11 Ga. Rep., 236; Coates v. State, 50 Ark., 330; State v. Erickson, 45 Wis., 86; Oliver v. State, 45 N. J., 46; Regina v. Day, 9 C. & P., 722; Buchanan v. State, 52 S. W. Rep., 769; State v. Mahoney, 61 Pac. Rep., 647; State v. Tuttle, 67 Ohio St., 440; People v. Verdegreen, 39 Pac. Rep., 607; People v. Roach, 61 Pac. Rep., 574; 129 Cal., 33; State v. Clark, 29 N. J. Law, 96; Tarbox v. State, 38 Ohio St., 581; Mitchell v. State, 42 Ohio St., 383.
Messrs. Tibbals <& Frank, on behalf of the court.
Three questions are made by the prosecutor. The determination of the first will probably dispose of the others.
First: Section 6816, Bevised Statutes of Ohio, in defining the crime of rape divides the offense into two distinct grades and classes, viz.: Carnal knowledge of a female person forcibly and against her will irrespective of the age of the woman; and- again, carnal knowledge by a male eighteen years of age with her consent.
The indictment in the case at bar was laid under the second of these classes. The proof brought it up under the first. Was it proper under such a state of facts to direct a verdict for the defendant?
The indictment in this case did not charge the accused with “Having carnal knowledge of a female person forcibly and against her will,” but on the other hand charged that he did “Unlawfully and knowingly carnally know and abuse one Edna Weaver with her consent, she the said Edna Weaver then and there being a female person under the age of sixteen years.”
This brings us to a discussion of the meaning of the words in the statute “with her consent,” and the purpose of the legislature in providing a statute different in its language from the statutes in the other states — statutes that omit the words “with her consent,” and making it an offense to have intercourse with a female under the statutory limit. •
An examination of the various statutes discloses that although they have certain features in common, they differ somewhát in certain particulars. The age fixed as the age of consent varies from perhaps twelve years, the lowest, to eighteen years, the highest. With but very few exceptions' these statutes are silent as to the consent of the woman. In one state the language, “with or without the consent of the woman,” is used; while Nebraska has a statute practically like ours. In the other states, so far as the statutes have come under our notice, there appears no reference as to the consent of the woman.
In those states where the statute is silent on. the subject of the assent of the woman, we find that the courts have held that under the specified age, that force is to be conclusively presumed; or, that under the specified age, the woman is conclusively presumed to be incapable of consenting to her violation.
It must be apparent, even upon a casual examination of our statute, that our legislature did not intend to adopt either of these rules so uniformly met with in other states. The framers of our law must have felt that between the ages of twelve and sixteen the presumption' of force would not necessarily be a true presumption; and the inability of the woman to give full and intelligent consent might in many cases be nothing more than the purest fiction. Our legislature, therefore, intending to avoid both fiction and untenable presumption, framed our law so that resort to them would not be necessary. This clearly appears in the provisions ' of section 6816 by which the maximum punishment for rape is inflicted upon the offender against the virtue of a child finder twelve years of age; while the minimum punishment is put upon him who carnally knows a female person under the age of sixteen years with her consent.
We believe-that an examination of our' statute must lead to the conclusion that the two classes of cases mentioned and provided for are distinct and definitely defined classes, as much so as if they appeared in different sections of the statute. There are two distinct lines of cases. One where force is used as wé understand it at common law, including the violation of children of such tender age that they are actually incapable of consenting, and the second class embracing a lesser offense, an offense against public morals, an offense against society, an offense against woman, but not so aggravated from the fact that the woman is capable of. becoming a party to it by yielding her assent to the forbidden conduct.
The authorities whieh throw any light upon this proposition are not numerous. Our answer to those cited by the prosecutor is, that the rule in those states where the statute is silent on the subject of the consent of the woman, and where there is a conclusive presumption that force is used, and that the woman is incapable of consenting, do not furnish the proper test for the rule of this state, where it is' clear that the legislature meant it to be understood that the presumption of force should not prevail where none in fact is used, and that a woman under the age of sixteen years is not necessarily incapable of consenting to her violation. If the words “with her consent” can be stricken from section 6816; and if the small punishment fixed by section 6817 upon the man who had carnal knowledge of a woman under the age of sixteen years with her consent has no significance, then perhaps the prosecutor may be right; but we contend that the language of section 6816 is significant; that the words “with her consent” are important; and we think must receive due consideration in the construction of the section.
Counsel then cite and comment upon: O’Meara v. State, 17 Ohio St., 516; Jenkins v. State, 29 S. W. Rep., 1078; Morgan v. State, 50 S. W. Rep., 718; Nicholas v. State, 5 S. W. Rep., 239; State v. Hamey, 65 S. W. Rep., 946; Hall v. State, 58 N. W. Rep., 929; State v. Wheat, 22 Atl. Rep., 720.

Opinion:
Shauck, J.
The statutory definition of the crime for which Carl' was indicted is found in section 6816 of the EeviSed Statutes:
"Whoever has carnal knowledge of a female person, forcibly and against her will, or, being eighteen , years of age, carnally knows and abuses a female person under sixteen years of age, with her consent, is guilty of rape."
The ruling of the judge of the court of common pleas must have been prompted by the view that the phrase "with her consent" defines an essential element of the crime charged. At least that view pervades the brief in support of the ruling. To justify the ruling it is essential that the view be maintained since a variance is a disagreement between the allegations and the proof in an essential matter. In this view the omission of the phrase "with her consent" would have rendered the indictment fatally defective because of the failure to charge an essential element of the crime. It imputes to the legislature an intention to make an act of the character of this a crime if committed with consent, although under the circumstances it would not be if committed without consent. Obviously the terms of the statute do not require that it be so astonishingly interpreted. In this regard the effect of the statute is to nullify the consent of the female under sixteen years of age. It is as if with respect to such persons the provision was that the crime shall be complete notwithstanding her consent. To say that the view taken by the judge of the court of common pleas is necessary in order that the accused may have proper opportunity to prepare his defense is only another mode of presenting the same misconception of the statute. The essential elements of the crime charged are the' com mission of the act by a male person more than eighteen years of age upon a female person less than sixteen years of age. Certainly the accused was to be tried for the offense charged and no other. It being alleged that the act was committed .with consent, it was not competent to show that it was done otherwise. The jury should have been instructed to return a verdict of guilty if the evidence established the offense charged but otherwise to acquit. The accused was not entitled to an opportunity to prepare to prove a fact which if proved would have left him guilty of the offense charged. The supposed necessity for proving that the act was done with consent was disposed of by the terms of the indictment, and it would have been obviated by the exclusion of incompetent testimony and by the proper instruction as to the circumstances under which the jury should convict or acquit.
Exception sustained.
Spear, C. J., Davis and Summers, JJ., concur.