Case Name: Ebenezer Loker versus Martin Haynes
Court: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
Jurisdiction: Massachusetts
Decision Date: 1814-11
Citations: 10 Tyng 498
Docket Number: 
Parties: Ebenezer Loker versus Martin Haynes.
Judges: 
Reporter: Massachusetts Reports
Volume: 11
Pages: 447–449

Head Matter:
Ebenezer Loker versus Martin Haynes.
The grantor in a deed, not being interested in the event of the suit, is a competent witness to show that the deed was fraudulent.
This was an action of entry sur disseisin, and was tried on the general issue, before the present chief justice; from whose report of the trial, it appears that the demandant’s title was under the levy of an execution upon the premises demanded, to satisfy a judgment regularly obtained by him against one Samuel Haynes, who was formerly seised of the land.
The tenant claimed title under the said Samuel Haynes, who, by deed, on the 23d of December, 1805, conveyed the premises to Susannah Haynes, who, by deed dated the 29th of [*499] November, 1809, conveyed the same to the * tenant. These conveyances were suggested to be fraudulent; and all the evidence, offered to prove them so, was left to the jury; except that the demandant’s motion to admit the said Samuel and Susannah, the two grantors aforesaid, to testify that the deeds made by them were fraudulent, was overruled.
The verdict being for the tenant, the demandant moved for a new trial, because of the rejection of that testimony.
Ward, for the demandant,
at the last term said he had been surprised, at the trial, by the rejection of the evidence offered, and that he had relied on the admission of the like evidence by the late Chief Justice Parsons, at the trial of the action of Fay vs. Parkman; and, on this ground, he urged the motion for a new trial, even if the decision of the judge at nisi prius had been correct in the present case; but, in opposition to that decision, he referred the Court to the cases cited in the margin ; contending that the rule extended only to negotiable securities.
Hoar, for the tenant,
cited the cases of Revere vs. Leonard & Al., and Storer vs. Batson.
7 D. & E. 601, Jordaine vs. Lashbrook & Al.. — 3 D. & E. 308, Bell vs. Harwood.— 2 Lord Raym. 1008, Title vs. Grevett. — 2 Binney, 162, Baring vs. Shippen, in n tis. — 4 Mass. Rep. 702, Bartlet vs. Delpratt. — Ibid. 156, Churchill vs. Suter— 3 Mass. Rep. 565, Parker vs. Lovejoy.
1 Mass. Rep 90.
8 Mass. Rep. 440.

Opinion:
At the present term, the opinion of the Court was delivered by
Parker, C. J.
A new trial is moved for in this case, because certain witnesses for the demandant, to prove that the conveyances, under which the tenant holds, were fraudulent, were not permitted to be sworn ; being considered by the judge as incompetent, because they were the grantors in the deeds, which they were about to impeach by their testimony.
There were no covenants, by which they were rendered interested in the event of this suit; and the sole ground of rejection was that, being parties to the deeds, and having, by their signatures and seals, given effect and credit to them, they could not, upon principles of public policy and morality, be suffered to impeach them.
This case has had a very attentive consideration ; and the question, so much vexed in England, has not been without [ *500 ] * its difficulty with us. We have, however, concluded that the witnesses offered were competent, notwithstanding the objection; and that the general rule, that all persons, not affected by interest or crime, are competent witnesses, must have its effect in this instance.
The only exception, which has been deliberately made, applies to negotiable instruments alone; and the reasons upon which that exception has been established are ably and lucidly stated by the late Chief Justice Parsons, in the case of Churchill vs. Suter, cited by the counsel for the demandant.
The testimony of persons, thus coming forward to stamp their own acts with fraud, is certainly of a very questionable character; but upon this delicate subject of the rules of evidence, it is best to avoid further obscurity or complication. A discriminating jury will know how to weigh the testimony ; and to that body must be left the effect and consequence of suspicious evidence.
This particular question does not appear to have been decided in England, nor in the courts of those states whose reports we are accustomed to examine, nor in our own courts,
A new trial granted.
Vide Worcester vs. Eaton, ante, 375, and note. — Davis vs. Spooner, 3 Pick. 284, — Packard vs. Richardson, 17 Mass. Rep. 127. — Fox vs. Whitney, 16 Mass. Rep. 118.