Case Name: ROSE et al. v. NEW YORK TELEPHONE CO.
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Term
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1914-06-05
Citations: 147 N.Y.S. 1021
Docket Number: 
Parties: ROSE et al. v. NEW YORK TELEPHONE CO.
Judges: 
Reporter: West's New York Supplement
Volume: 147
Pages: 1021–1024

Head Matter:
ROSE et al. v. NEW YORK TELEPHONE CO.
(Supreme Court, Appellate Term, First Department.
June 5, 1914.)
1. Telegraphs and Telephones (§ 33 )—Operation—Discontinuance of Service.
Where a telephone company, through mistake, failed to credit a subscriber with a payment, or to correct such mistake after it was called to its attention, and discontinued the service, its refusal to restore the service for 11 days after the subscriber had conclusively shown that the discontinuance was unwarranted was an act of bad faith, whether it resulted from spite or from reckless obstinacy.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Telegraphs and Telephones, Cent. Dig. §21; Dec. Dig. § 33.*]
2. Telegraphs and Telephones (§ 28*) — Operation — Discrimination — Statutory Provisions.
Transportation Corporations Law (Consol. Laws, c. 63) § 103, requiring a telephone company to receive dispatches from and for any individual and to transmit them with impartiality and good faith, under a penalty, prohibits the discontinuance in bad faith of a subscriber’s telephone service, since the statute, although to be strictly construed as a penal statute, must be so construed as to have some meaning, and a literal reading of the word “dispatch” makes the section meaningless.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Telegraphs and Telephones, Cent. Dig. §§ 16, 17; Dec. Dig. § 28.*]
Guy, J., dissenting.
Appeal from Municipal Court, Borough of Manhattan, Second District.
Action by Fanny Rose and another against the New York Telephone Company to recover the amount of a statutory penalty. Judgment for plaintiffs, and defendant appeals.
Affirmed.
Argued May term, 1914, before GUY, BIJUR, and PENDLETON, JJ.
Arnold W. Sherman, of New York City, for appellant.
Sackler & Lavitt, of New York City (Abraham Simonoff, of New York City, of counsel), for respondents.
For other cases see same topic & § number in Dec. & Am. Digs. 1907 to date, & Rep’r Indexes

Opinion:
BIJUR, J.
It is quite true that the failure to credit plaintiff with the amount of his July check may have been due only to an oversight or bookkeeping error, although the testimony on that point might warrant a finding of bad faith; but, whatever it was, it was rectified as the result of a visit of the plaintiff on August 5th. The discontinuance of the service on August 25th may have been the result of a second error, namely, failure to note the correction of the first error. But from August 25th until September 2d plaintiff so diligently and so conclusively and overwhelmingly demonstrated to any number of persons in authority in defendant's business that the discontinuance of service was utterly unwarranted that no other conclusion seems to me to be possible than that defendant's conduct in discontinuing the service for the 11 days complained of was in bad faith. Whether it was the result of deliberate spite or of reckless obstinacy calculated to injure the plaintiff is quite indifferent.
Defendant also urges that section 103 of the Transportation Corporations Law, upon the authority of which this penalty was recovered, refers only to telephones in pay stations, and also that it does not relate to the interruption of the use of the telephone for conversation, but only to the transmission of "dispatches." Lor the latter claim there is, of course, some basis in the language of the statute, which evidently has not been sufficiently altered during the course of its frequent amendment to accord fully with modern conditions in the telephone business. But I think that that interpretation of the law is wrong, because, while it claims to be based on the doctrine that the law is penal and should be strictly construed, it violates the fundamental doctrine that the law must be construed to have a meaning, and the transmission of "dispatches" over a telephone is meaningless, if literally read. It is true that a similar statute was so construed in Pollard v. M. & K. Telephone Co., 114 Mo. App. 533, 90 S. W. 121, but I do not find that that case has ever been followed.
In Matter of Baldwinsville Telephone Co., 24 Misc. Rep. 221, 53 N. Y. Supp. 574, it is pointed out by Hiscock, J., that the duty is simply to receive and transmit messages from a general office, but he adds:
"It seemed to be assumed by the defendant upon the argument that the statute contemplated receiving and transmitting messages through a telephone so placed (namely, as desired by the customer), and that a refusal to make such connections amounted to a failure to receive and transmit messages as required."
In Saltzburg v. Utica Home Telephone Co., 159 App. Div. 51, 144 N. Y. Supp. 309, Kruse, J., writing for the Appellate Division in the Third Department, indicates a doubt whether the removal of a telephone from a subscriber's premises is covered by the language of the statute.
Again, in Kevand v. N. Y. Telephone Co., 159 App. Div. 628, at page 631, 145 N. Y. Supp. 414, at page 416 (Appellate Division in the same department), the opinion by Merrell, J., calls attention to the use of the word "dispatches" and expresses the view that the Legislature "had no intention to make it applicable to a refusal on the part of a company to permit a patron to talk over a telephone." The decision, however, is based on the fact that neither discrimination nor bad faith was proved. Of the four judges then sitting, two concurred in the result only, and Kruse, P. J., dissented, saying that the fact disclosed in the case, i. e., the refusal of the defendant to give the plaintiff, over his private telephone, connection with other subscribers, came within the inhibition of the statute.
The judgment should be affirmed, with costs.
PENDLETON, J., concurs.