Case Name: STATE of Louisiana in the Interest of S.M., et al.
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1998-03-04
Citations: 709 So. 2d 927
Docket Number: No. 97-CA-1896
Parties: STATE of Louisiana in the Interest of S.M., et al.
Judges: Before PLOTKIN, LANDRIEU and MURRAY, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 709
Pages: 927–933

Head Matter:
STATE of Louisiana in the Interest of S.M., et al.
No. 97-CA-1896.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fourth Circuit.
March 4, 1998.
Writ Granted May 15, 1998.
Anne Derbes Keller, Law Offices of Adams, Johnston & Oreck, New Orleans, for S.M., K.M. and J.M., Appellants.
Clarence Richardson, Orleans Indigent Defender Program, New Orleans, for Appellee, Nyress M.
F. Clayton Latimer, Department of Social Services, Bureau of General Counsel, New Orleans, for State.
Before PLOTKIN, LANDRIEU and MURRAY, JJ.

Opinion:
_JiMURRAY, Judge.
In this appeal, brought on behalf of three minor children, we are asked to review the juvenile court's judgment that the permanence plan for these children is reunification with their mother, N.M. (hereafter referred to as "Mother"). We affirm.
Mother, who was 22 at the time the Permanent Planning Judgment was entered, lost her mother at age three. Until she was removed by Child Protection at age nine, she lived with her maternal grandmother, who she alleges beat her daily. She then lived with her paternal grandmother, R.D. (hereafter referred to as "Grandmother"), until she was twelve. At that time she began running away from home. At some point she was referred to New Orleans Adolescent Hospital. When she was released to Grandmother's care, she again ran away and did not return. She became pregnant with her first child at age sixteen, and gave birth to Keonte in California on July 16, 1991. This child's father's whereabouts are ^unknown. Mother returned to New Orleans when Keonte was approximately six months old. Grandmother eventually took Keonte into her home, but would not allow mother to live with her. Mother became pregnant with her second son when she was seventeen, and gave birth to Shawn on November 2, 1992. Shawn's father has refused to acknowledge him to anyone except Mother. L. H., with whom Mother lived during her pregnancy, believed he was Shawn's father. Shawn lived with L.H.'s mother (hereafter referred to as "Ms. Edna"), whom he knows as his grandmother. Mother became pregnant once again when she was eighteen. She gave birth to a daughter, Jasmine, on June 13, 1994.
During her pregnancy with Jasmine, Mother began living with J.J. At J.J.'s insistence, Mother brought Keonte and Shawn to live with them. On January 10,1996, Mother called 911 because Shawn was not breathing. He was taken to Medical Center of Louisiana, where he was revived and stabilized; he remained in the hospital until January 24. Medical personnel noted that Shawn had lacerations, abrasions and contusions of the head, face, chest and pelvis as well as burns and healed burns in the genital area.
Detective Riles of the Child Abuse Section of the Emergency Services Bureau was notified of a possible incident of cruelty to a juvenile. He spoke to Mother, who agreed to make a statement. She told Detective Riles that she found Shawn standing in the bathtub when she arrived home earlier that day. When she questioned J.J. about bruises she found on Shawn, he told that her that the child had fallen. Later that evening J.J. called her to the bathroom and told her that Shawn was having an asthma attack. When Mother saw that Shawn was not breathing she attempted to perform CPR, and then called 911.
laMother stated that J.J. had been physically abusing her and Shawn since March of 1995. She described J.J.'s making Shawn sleep in the bathtub, and hitting him with his hands and, on one occasion, a bowl of food. She also related an incident in which Shawn had been burned with hot water. She stated that she did not tell anyone about the abuse because J.J. threatened to "take care of her" if she told, and she was afraid. Mother stated that she had seen J.J. punch Shawn in the chest and back earlier on the evening of the 10th. She denied that J.J. abused her other two children.
Detective Riles also questioned Keonte, who, along with Jasmine and Mother, had been brought to the Child Abuse Office. Keonte stated that J.J. hit him, and had put hot water on both him and Shawn. He told the detective that he had seen J.J. hit Shawn with his hand and his mother's shoe, and tie Shawn's hands. Physical examination revealed that Keonte had bruises on his chest and behind his right ear as well as old scars from belt marks on his buttocks. Jasmine had a bump on her forehead.
Mother was placed under arrest and charged with three counts of cruelty to a juvenile. She pled guilty and was sentenced to five years with the Department of Corrections on each count, to run concurrently. The sentence was suspended, and Mother was placed on five years active probation. As special conditions of probation, Mother was to serve twelve months, earn her G.E.D., and get training through the regional vocational technical school.
A verbal instanter order placing the three children in the custody of the State of Louisiana was issued on January 11, 1996. On January 16, 1996, a judgment Uplacing the children in the provisional protective custody of the State was entered. The State petitioned to have Keonte, Shawn and Jasmine adjudicated children in need of care. This petition was heard on May 15, 1996. It was stipulated that the children were abused/neglected children in need of care, and the court ordered that they be taken into protective custody. Care, custody and control of the children was given to the Office of Community Services (OCS). Shawn was to remain in the foster home where he was placed upon his discharge from the hospital; Keonte and Jasmine were to remain with Grandmother.
A case plan goal for reunifying the children with their mother was developed by OCS. Following a review hearing on November 14, 1996, a judgment was entered continuing the children in the legal and physical custody of OCS and in their placements, finding that those placements were the least restrictive and in the children's best interest. The judgment provided for Mother's weekly supervised visitation with the children, and liberal sibling visitation. In addition, the court ordered that Mother participate in parenting classes and a "Battered Women's" program, submit to a psychological evaluation, submit to treatment as indicated and fully participate in counselling and treatment consistently, obtain stable housing and maintain contact with OCS. A judgment entered on January 30, 1997, following a second review hearing, noted that Mother had been complying with the case plan and the court's orders, and continued the children in the custody of OCS and their placements. The judgment also set the matter for a Permanency Planning Hearing on July 31, 1997.
|5On that date the court heard testimony from Zelda Sereal of OCS and Mother. The court also reviewed the CASA report and the OCS report, with attachments. It then entered the Permanency Planning Judgment that is the subject of this appeal. That judgment continued the children in the custody of OCS and in their placements, and approved the OCS Permanency Plan, which was reunification. However, the court did not order that these children be returned to Mother immediately. Instead it concluded that reunification should be gradual and incremental, beginning with Jasmine, the youngest child. The court ordered that Mother continue to take those steps necessary to enable her to care for her children; she was to submit to psychotherapy, participate in family therapy with her children, and obtain stable housing, all to the court's satisfaction. When OCS felt that it was appropriate for Jasmine to be returned to Mother's care, it was to notify all counsel, and schedule another hearing. The court ordered that it, rather than OCS, was to have oversight of this case. These children will not be returned to Mother unless and until the court is'fully satisfied that to do so is in their best interest.
The attorney representing the three minor children appeals the Permanency Planning Judgment, contending that reunification is contrary to the law and the evidence and not in these children's best interest. Counsel argues that the permanency plan should have been termination for the purpose of freeing the children for adoption.
The Department of Social Services and Mother have filed briefs in support of the trial court's decision. Each argues that there is not sufficient evidence to terminate Mother's parental rights. OCS contends that: "In view of the progress Ms. M. has made in complying with and completing several parts of her care plan, |6the decision to continue to work toward returning the children to her is the only Permanent Plan that is consistent with the mandates of federal, state and constitutional law." We agree.
The grounds for the involuntary termination of parental rights are set forth in article 1015 of the Louisiana Children's Code. In order to terminate parental rights the State must prove every element of any one section of that article by clear and convincing evidence. La.Ch.C. art. 1035.
The children's counsel argues that there was clear and convincing evidence proving grounds for termination under subsections (1) and (4) of the version of art. 1015 that was in effect at the time of this hearing. Either subsection requires the State to prove that the parent, whose rights it seeks to terminate, is unfit to retain parental control and that there is no reasonable expectation of his reformation in the foreseeable future.
Counsel contends that the evidence is overwhelming that Mother is unfit, and that she has not reformed in a manner that demonstrates a substantial change in the behavior that served as the basis for the removal of the children from her custody. Counsel points to Mother's past and current history of unstable relationships, financial irresponsibility, and lack of ability to care for her children. She notes that Mother does not seem to have benefitted from the parenting classes because she spanked one of the children during a supervised visit. Counsel argues that it is doubtful that Mother will ever be able to care for her children properly. She notes that Mother, even without the financial burden of these children, has not 1 ysaved any of her earnings. The children's counsel contends that the psychological evaluation, which found Mother's ability to parent children limited and expressed concern that she would be overwhelmed if all of the children were returned to her care at one time, supports her argument. Finally, counsel argues that rehabilitation, even if possible, cannot occur within a reasonable period of time so that these children's best interest would be served by freeing them for adoption.
The trial court disagreed. Following the July hearing the court determined that it would be legal error and not in these children's best interest to close the door on reuniting them with their mother. The court noted that it shared all of counsel's concerns for these children, stating that: "I have read the same reports that she has read." Despite those concerns, however, the court found that Mother had made significant improvement. Although there was still more improvement needed before the court was satisfied that the children could be returned to her, Mother had completed the parenting classes and the "Battered Women's" program, obtained her G.E.D., secured a job, submitted to a psychological evaluation, and attended three counselling sessions. She had done everything that the court had ordered except to continue in counselling and obtain stable housing.
A reasonable expectation of reformation exists if a parent has cooperated with state officials and has shown improvement, although all of the problems may not have been eliminated. State in the Interest of L.L.Z. v. M.Y.S., 620 So.2d 1309, 1317 (La.1993). Although counsel argues that Mother simply has "gone through the mechanics" without showing significant improvement, a court's findings as to whether a significant substantial indication of reformation has been shown and whether the parent is likely to reform will not be set aside absent manifest error. State in Interest of BJ, 95-1915, p. 15-16 (La.App. 1st Cir. 4/4/96), 672 So.2d 342, 351, writ denied, 96-1036 (La.5/31/96), 674 So.2d 264.
There is no question that these children have suffered because their mother did not protect them from abuse. There is also no question that Mother is poorly equipped to deal with her children. However, the record supports the trial court's conclusion that she has cooperated with OCS, and is making a sincere effort to do what is necessary to regain custody of her children. For these reasons we affirm the permanency plan to continue to work toward reunification.
AFFIRMED.
PLOTKIN, J., concurs.
. In keeping with this Court's policy in juvenile cases we have used initials, first names, or other generic identifiers.
. J.J. also was charged with three counts of cruelty to a juvenile and the attempted second degree murder of Shawn.
. On August 30, 1996, Shawn was placed with Ms. Edna. Keonte and Jasmine remained with Grandmother until some time after the July 31, 1997, judgment, when they were placed in a foster home.
. Article 1015 was changed significantly during the 1997 Regular Legislative Session.
. Under the provisions of the Children's Code in effect at the time the State was required to prove facts under art. 1015(2) and 1015(3) beyond a reasonable doubt. As to all other grounds, the facts alleged must be proven by clear and convincing evidence.
. It may be that additional services will be needed in order to prepare Mother to accomplish the goal of reunification. For instance, additional parenting classes designed to correct specific deficiencies noted in the psychologist's reports and/or a program to teach Mother about basic money management may be helpful.