Case Name: William Pinkney McLEAN, Appellant, v. STATE of Texas, State
Court: Texas Courts of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1982-06-30
Citations: 638 S.W.2d 124
Docket Number: No. 2-81-172-CR
Parties: William Pinkney McLEAN, Appellant, v. STATE of Texas, State.
Judges: Before HUGHES, BROWN and HOLMAN, JJ.
Reporter: South Western Reporter Second Series
Volume: 638
Pages: 124–127

Head Matter:
William Pinkney McLEAN, Appellant, v. STATE of Texas, State.
No. 2-81-172-CR.
Court of Appeals of Texas, Fort Worth.
June 30, 1982.
On Rehearing Aug. 11, 1982.
Discretionary Review Refused Nov. 10, 1982.
Tom E. Hill, Fort Worth, for appellant.
Tim Curry, Dist. Atty., and James J. Heinemann, Asst. Dist. Atty., Fort Worth, for appellee.
Before HUGHES, BROWN and HOLMAN, JJ.

Opinion:
OPINION
HOLMAN, Justice.
This appeal is from a jury conviction for terroristic threat, a Class A misdemeanor. V.T.C.A. Penal Code 22.07(a)(3). The jury assessed punishment of one year in county jail, probated, and a five hundred dollar fine. We reverse and remand, with instructions.
We agree with appellant's contention that the State did not comply with the Speedy Trial Act, and that his motion to dismiss the indictment should be granted.
The Act required the State to be prepared for trial within 90 days of the commencement of the criminal action against appellant. V.A.C.C.P. art. 32A.02, sec. 1(2).
The action began December 2,1980, when appellant was arrested, and was first set for pretrial conference more than 90 days later. At the first pretrial hearing, March 18, 1981, appellant filed a motion to dismiss the indictment because the State had not complied with the Speedy Trial Act.
Although the date stamp affixed by the court clerk is not clear, the State's initial announcement of "ready" was filed on either March 18 or 19. The announcement was a prima facie showing of compliance with the Act. Barfield v. State, 586 S.W.2d 538 (Tex.Cr.App.1979).
Barfield made clear, however, that a defendant may rebut the State's prima fa-cie readiness with evidence that the State was not actually prepared for trial within the time required by the Act. That evidence may be from any source, including cross-examination of those responsible for preparing the State's case for trial, and may consist of evidence that the State did not have a key witness available, so that the State was not prepared to try the case.
At the hearing of appellant's motion to dismiss, March 26, 1981, four assistant district attorneys testified.
The first was the assistant who prepared the case for its presentation to the grand jury. She testified that from the date she presented the case to the grand jury, within the applicable 90 days, the State would have been ready for trial. However, she was not one of the prosecutors assigned to try cases in the court during the pendency of the case against appellant.
The first trial prosecutor testified that during the time he was assigned to try cases in the court below, he was unaware there was a case pending against appellant, did not read the file, and had no information as to the identity or availability of witnesses in the case.
The second prosecutor testified that, during his tenure in the court, he was never assigned to try this case and had not been prepared to do so.
The third prosecutor testified that as of March 18, 1981, he had never read the case file and conceded that it would have been "difficult, if not impossible" to have prosecuted the case under that circumstance.
After the hearing, the court denied the motion to dismiss, and the case was tried to a jury.
We sustain appellant's ground of error and hold that the evidence sufficiently rebutted the State's prima facie readiness by showing that the State was not prepared to try the case within the time required by law.
By enacting the Speedy Trial Act, the Legislature has imposed upon the State a duty to be ready for trial within the applicable time. When a defendant challenges the State's actual readiness and shows it to be lacking, the statute grants him the right to have the charges against him dismissed.
Judgment is reversed, and the indictment is ordered dismissed and the appellant discharged.