Case Name: FORRESTER v. STATE
Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1923-03-07
Citations: 252 S.W. 785
Docket Number: No. 7488
Parties: FORRESTER v. STATE.
Judges: 
Reporter: South Western Reporter
Volume: 252
Pages: 785–787

Head Matter:
FORRESTER v. STATE.
(No. 7488.)
(Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
March 7, 1923.
Rehearing Denied June 27, 1923.)
1. Criminal law <3=595(4) — Denying continuance for absent witness, when evidence was immaterial, held proper.
Where one witness named in application for continuance was present but was not used, and the facts attributed to an absent witness were not material, denying application was proper.
2. Criminal law <@=l 171(1) — Remark of district attorney while defense was interrogating jury panel held to present no ground for reversal.. . '
Where defense was inquiring of the jury panel whether they belonged to Ku KIux or the Citizens’ League or other organizations, while the pertinence of the remark of the district attorney that he would not ask a juror, on trial of a Mason, if "he was a Mason, that he had too much respect for the order to insult a man by asking such question, was not apparent, it presented no ground for reversar.
3. Criminal law <g=!091 (I I) — Bill -of exceptions in question and answer form are not proper.
Bills of exceptions in question and answer form are not proper.
4. Criminal law <@=1092(11) — Court unauthorized to qualify bills of exception by statement of matters known personally transpiring outside courtroom and not during trial.
Bills of exception cannot be qualified by a statement of matters known personally to the judge, which transpired out of the courtroom and not during trial.
5. Criminal law @=>1163(2) — Incumbent on defense to show injury from admission of other evidence after request for peremptory, instruction refused.
Where, after defendant’s request for peremptory instruction was refused, state was permitted to introduce other testimony, it was incumbent on defense, to have objection thereto sustained, to show injury thereby.
6. Criminal law @=>687(2) — Evidence introduced at any time before close of argument.
Introduction of testimony at any time before the close of argument is permitted under Texas practice.
7. Criminal law @=>665(4) — Permitting witness, present after order to separate, to testify, within court’s discretion.
Permitting testimony of a witness, present part of the time another witness was testifying, after rule to separate was called for, is within the trial court's discretion.
On Motion for Rehearing.
8. Intoxicating liquors @=>236(7) — Evidence supported conviction for possession of liquors for sale.
In a prosecution fo'r possessing intoxicating liquor for purpose of sale, evidence held to support a conviction.
9. Criminal laW @=>603(2) — Toi entitle one to continuance, averments -must be exact and definite.
One asking for a continuance must show himself entitled to it by exact and definite aver-ments.
Appeal from District Court, Callahan County; W. R. Ely, Judge.
L. T. Forrester was convicted of possessing intoxicating -liquor for the purpose of sale, and he appeals.
Affirmed.
J. Lee Cearley, of Cisco, and Otis Bowyer, of Baird,-for appellant.
R. G. Storey, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.

Opinion:
LATTIMORE, J.
Appellant was convicted in the district court of Callahan county of possessing intoxicating liquor for the purpose of sale, and his punishment fixed at one year in the penitentiary.
The evidence is amply sufficient to support the verdict. Under the provisions of our statute the district judge is authorized to call a special term of his court and to impanel a grand jury, as well as to proceed to try and dispose of cases on his docket. Appellant's bill of exceptions No. 1 complains of the return of the indictment against him at a special term and by a grand jury then impaneled. There is a total lack of showing of any illegality of the calling of said special term, and the impaneling of said grand jury, and the return of said indictment.
Appellant has an application for continuance. The qualification of the trial court thereto shows that one of the absent witnesses named in said application for continuance was present at the trial but was not used as a witness. The facts attributed to the other absent witness do not appear to us to be of such materiality as to have called for the granting of the application.
The bill of exceptions complaining of the remark made by the district attorney, when appellant's counsel inquired of the jury panel as to whether they belonged to the Ku' Klux or the Citizens' League or other organizations, is not approved by the court. It appears from the qualification to this bill that the only thing that transpired was that the district attorney stated to the court, in arguing his objection to the questions being asked by appellant's attorney, that he would not ask a juror on the trial of a -Mason if the juror was a Mason, that he had too much respect for the order of Masonry to insult a man by asking such question. The pertinence of the remark of the district attorney is not apparent, but presents no ground for reversal.
Appellant's bills of exception Nos. 4 and 5 are multifarious, being in question and answer form and presenting a number of questions asked and objections made; the court being entirely unable to ascertain the particular ground of objection insisted upon and presented here. We call attention to the fact that one of said bills of exception is qualified by the learned trial judge by a statement of matters known personally to him which transpired out of the courtroom and not during the progress of the trial. This court could not accept or act upon such qualifications. If the trial courts desire to incorporate matters of that kind in the record, they must assume the attitude of witnesses and state them as such.
There is complaint of the refusal of a peremptory instruction asked on behalf of appellant, and also of the fact that after such refusal' the state was permitted to introduce other testimony. The bill of exceptions complaining of this matter does not make apparent the fact that appellant had permitted any of his -fitnesses to leave the courthouse, or that hé' was surprised by the introduction of such' testimony, or that he was unable to meet and overcome it. The trial courts necessarily' have large discretion in matters pertaining to the introduction of testimony. If appellant desired this court to sustain his objection to such proceeding, he'should make it appear that he was injured thereby. The introduction of testimony at any time before the close of the argument is permissible under our practice. The same rule of discretion in the trial court applies to the testimony of 'a witness who was in the courtroom a part of the time another witness was testifying, and whose testimony was allowed over the objection that the rule had been called for. The mere fact that a witness testifies who has not observed the rule, and that he may have heard all or part of the testimony of some other witness, would not be sufficient ground for the rejection of the testimony of the witness. It is not made to appear that the testimony heard by'said witness was in relation to the same matter about which he testified, or that there was any likelihood of his being influenced thereby, or that there Was any intentional violation of the rule. Unless some of these things are made to appear, this court could not appraise the value of such objection.
We have examined and considered each of the complaints made by appellant, and, finding no error in any of them, the judgment of the trial court will be affirmed.
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