Case Name: Samuel E. GILLIS, Petitioner, v. Harold R. SWENSON, Respondent
Court: Supreme Court of Missouri
Jurisdiction: Missouri
Decision Date: 1973-06-11
Citations: 495 S.W.2d 658
Docket Number: No. 58131
Parties: Samuel E. GILLIS, Petitioner, v. Harold R. SWENSON, Respondent.
Judges: DONNELLY, J., concurs.
Reporter: South Western Reporter Second Series
Volume: 495
Pages: 658–668

Head Matter:
Samuel E. GILLIS, Petitioner, v. Harold R. SWENSON, Respondent.
No. 58131.
Supreme Court of Missouri, En Banc.
June 11, 1973.
John W. Frankum, Henry Andrae, Hen-dren & Andrae, Jefferson City, for petitioner.
John C. Danforth, Atty. Gen., Stephen D. Hoyne, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, for respondent.

Opinion:
HENLEY, Judge.
This is a habeas corpus proceeding commenced in this court. Petitioner is in the custody of and is detained by respondent as warden of the Missouri state penitentiary pursuant to a judgment of the circuit court of Jackson County. He alleges that the term of his sentence has expired and, therefore, his imprisonment is unlawful. We quash the writ and remand petitioner.
On December 6, 1967, Paul E. Varde-man, one of the judges of the circuit court of Jackson County, sentenced petitioner to imprisonment in the penitentiary for a term of five years on his plea of guilty to the offense of stealing from the person as charged in Jackson County case number C-36487. On the same day, Judge Varde-man placed him on parole for a period of five years.
On October 20, 1970, William J. Peters, one of the judges of the circuit court of Jackson County, sentenced petitioner to imprisonment in the penitentiary for a term of five years on his plea of guilty to the offense of first degree robbery as charged in Jackson County case number C-38345B. The court gave him credit on this sentence for the time spent in jail prior to conviction, i.e., from February 16, 1969, until the date he was received at the penitentiary, said to be 614 days.
On October 30, 1970, Judge Vardeman revoked petitioner's parole in the stealing case and the five-year sentence imposed in December, 1967, was ordered executed. The court did not give petitioner credit on this sentence for that portion of the time on parole which was spent in jail, i.e., from February 16, 1969 until his delivery to the penitentiary. On February 17, 1969, while confined in the Jackson County jail awaiting disposition of the robbery charge, petitioner was ordered held pursuant to a detainer warrant issued by the State Board of Probation and Parole.
Respondent admits in his return that petitioner has completed service (under the three-fourths rule, § 216.355, RSMo 1969, V.A.M.S.) of the sentence imposed in the robbery case in which he was given credit for time spent in jail, but alleges that petitioner has not completed service of the sentence imposed in the stealing case and for that reason he lawfully retains petitioner's custody.
Petitioner contends that he is entitled to credit on the stealing sentence also for the approximately 614 days spent in jail after the detainer warrant was issued; that by reason thereof he is entitled to discharge and respondent's detention of him is unlawful.
Admittedly, he would have completed his sentence in the stealing case in November, 1972, and would be entitled to discharge, if under the law credit is required to be given him on that sentence for the time in jail.
Section 549.101, § 1, RSMo 1969, V.A.M.S., provides that when a judicial parole is revoked "[t]he court in its discretion may order the allowance in mitigation of the sentence credit for all or for part of the time the defendant was upon probation or parole." The court, in its discretion, refused to allow petitioner credit on the stealing sentence for any part of the time he was on parole. No abuse of that discretion appears.
Petitioner contends that § 546.615, RSMo 1969, V.A.M.S., requires that he be given credit on this sentence for the time spent in the county jail subsequent to his December, 1967, sentence. At the time the sentence was imposed and when ordered executed, § 546.615, § 1, subdivision (1) read as follows: "When a person has been convicted of a criminal offense in this state [t]he time spent by him in jail subsequent to the date of his sentence and prior to his delivery to the state department of corrections shall be calculated as a part of the sentence imposed upon him Petitioner argues that although the time spent in jail between February 16, 1969 and the date of his delivery to the penitentiary was time on parole, credit for which is discretionary with the court, it was also time in jail "subsequent to the date of his sentence," credit for which is mandatory. In other words, petitioner says that the same period of time (February 1969 to date of delivery to the penitentiary in October, 1970) spent in jail before his robbery conviction, for which the court in its discretion gave him credit on his sentence for that offense, is also time spent in jail "subsequent to the date of his sentence" for the prior stealing conviction within the meaning of that part of subsection 1 of § 546.615 quoted above.
Section 546.615 is not applicable to a situation where a person has been convicted and sentenced, released on parole, and the parole thereafter revoked and the sentence ordered executed, as here. In that situation the applicable and controlling statute is § 549.101 relative to persons on probation or parole. The first section, a part of the chapter of our statutes on trials, judgments, and executions in criminal cases, refers or speaks to credit for time in jail before and after a sentence for which a convicted person is to be delivered immediately to the penitentiary by an officer who is required to deliver with him a commitment on which the officer must endorse the length of time spent in jail by his prisoner subsequent to sentence and prior to delivery to the department of corrections (and, if applicable, the time spent in jail, before conviction ); it obviously does not contemplate or speak to a situation where a convicted person is immediately released on parole after sentence-
It has been suggested that the two sections are somewhat in conflict in that one (§ 546.615) makes it mandatory that a convicted person be given credit on his sentence for time in jail after sentence, and the other (§ 549.101) makes it discretionary with the court whether to give credit on his sentence for time on parole (part of which is spent in jail) after sentence. We do not agree that there is a conflict. However, assuming for the purpose of discussion that there is, § 549.101 would control because it is applicable specifically to the revocation of parole and the effect thereof. We believe that the legislature intended for good reason that discretion be vested in the trial judge whether to allow credit for jail time on the sentence of a person who has been granted but has breached his parole rather than make it mandatory that he be given credit along with those persons who had not been granted the privileges the parolee had been accorded and forfeited.
Petitioner also contends that to deny him credit on the stealing sentence for the 614 days in jail denies him constitutional rights to due process and equal protection of the law and "protection from double jeopardy," and that such denial is cruel and unusual punishment. Essentially the same contentions were made and ruled adversely to petitioner's position in State v. Crockrell, 470 S.W.2d 507 (Mo.1971). His contention is without merit.
The time for which petitioner may be legally detained by respondent under the sentence for stealing from the person (Case number C-36487) has not expired.
The writ of habeas corpus is quashed and petitioner is remanded to the custody of respondent,
DONNELLY, J., concurs.
FINCH, C. J., concurs in separate concurring opinion filed.
HOLMAN, J., concurs and concurs in separate concurring opinion of FINCH, C. J.
SEILER, J., dissents in separate dissenting opinion filed.
MORGAN, J., dissents and concurs in separate dissenting opinion of SEILER, J.
BARDGETT, J., dissents and concurs in separate dissenting opinion of SEILER, J., except those portions thereof which the dissenting opinion indicates are not necessary to the dissent.
. This was a part of the provisions of § 546.615 before its amendment in 1971, effective September 28, 1971. As amended, that section now makes allowance of jail time before conviction mandatory and requires the officer to endorse that time on the commitment.