Case Name: Samuel Penrose and Thomas Fleeson executors of Plunket Fleeson against Daniel King surviving obligor of Joseph Moore
Court: Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
Jurisdiction: Pennsylvania
Decision Date: 1794-04
Citations: 1 Yeates 344
Docket Number: 
Parties: Samuel Penrose and Thomas Fleeson executors of Plunket Fleeson against Daniel King surviving obligor of Joseph Moore.
Judges: 
Reporter: Reports of cases adjudged in the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania (Yeates)
Volume: 1
Pages: 343–346

Head Matter:
Samuel Penrose and Thomas Fleeson executors of Plunket Fleeson against Daniel King surviving obligor of Joseph Moore.
The presumption of payment of a bond, arising from length of time, shall be suspended between ist January 1776 and 21st June 1784 under the law passed 21st June 1781.
DkbT 6ol. sur obligation dated 8th December 1768, conditioned for the payment of 40I. on the 1st January 1769. Plea payment with leave to give the special matter in evidence.
The defendant was security for Moore, a blacksmith who was deceased, and worked for the plaintiff by supplying him with sundry articles as an upholsterer. He rested his defence on the presumption arising from length of time, there being no receipts indorsed on the bond, or any proof of a demand made on the principal or surety. He also contended, that it appeared from the books of the testator, that Moore had settled an account with him on the 27th November 1770, and received a balance from him of 3I. 3s. 2d.; and thence inferred, it was highly probable that the bond had been discharged in some other manner, which could not now be made appear.
*34.u] *On inspection of the books, it appeared that the J account was opened on the 9th November 1761, and continued to the 7th March 1773. It consisted of a variety of articles furnished by Moore, and of many different sums paid him by the testator. No notice whatever was taken of the bond in any part of the books. The sum of 3I. 3s. 2d. was charged against him as paid in November 1770, but the same was not the exact balance of their dealings in the book. Moore died in 1780 or 1781, and in the former year made a voluntary conveyance to one William Smallwood of two small houses and lots of ground in the city of Philadelphia.
For the defendant it was urged, that where no interest had been paid on a bond for twenty years it shall be presumed to be satisfied, and Ford Raymond has left it to the jury on sixteen years, where there were circumstances to fortify the presumption. 1 Espin. 254. (Fondon edit.) 1 Burr. 434 calls it 18 years. Cowp. 109. This rule had also been recognized in equity. 2 Atky. 144. Should the time be thought to fall short of twenty years, yet the account settled between the parties and no notice taken of the demand would fortify the presumption of payment. 1 Term Rep. 270. In Cowp. 109, Ford Mansfield lays down the rule, that where no interest appears to have been paid for sixteen years, a jury ma3' presume the debt to be discharged.
It was of no moment to the defendant, whether the length of time operated as a positive bar, or the payment was to be inferred from thence under the legal decisions.
For the plaintiff it was said, that there existed no statute of limitations in England respecting personal demands, .until 21 Jac. 1, about 1625. The doctrine of twenty years presumption was first taken up by Ford Hale, who was followed by Ford Holt, and afterwards by Ford Raymond. 1 Term Rep, 271. In the case of a bond Ford Mansfield says (lb. 273,) be believed, no positive time had been expressly laid down by the court; that it might be eighteen or nineteen years.
Under the act of assembly passed 21st June 1781, 1 St. Laws 496, Loose Laws 468, § xo, enacts, that “no debt or ‘ ‘ demand, which was not barred by any act for the limitation “of actions, on the 1st January 1776, shall be barred by the ‘ ‘ said act, until two years after passing of the same, and until “such time as is limited by law, according to the nature of “each case.” And the act passed 12th March 1783, 2 Dali. Laws 91, Loose Laws, 138, § 6, directs, that no act. of limitations shall run between the 1st January *1776, and the 21st June 1784. And therefore 8 years 5 months *- and 21 days are to be taken from the calculation of time on which the limitation act is to operate. It is true, our limitation act does not mention obligations, but the resolutions of courts of justice, as to the legal presumption, have sprung from that source; and ubi eadem ratio, ibi idem jus. Consequently, if the position is right, there remain only 15 years 5 months and 6 days from the time of payment of the bond, until the suit brought, which is of itself, not sufficient to infer a presumption of payment.
There is no corroborating circumstance in this case to fortify the presumption of payment, nor indeed any proof of a settlement of accounts. The sum paid was on the foot of a running account. The jury therefore must determine on the circumstances, whether there is proof satisfactory to their minds, to evince the discharge of the bond.

Opinion:
By the court.
Neither the English statute of 21 Jac. 1, nor our limitation act, prescribes the period when a suit on a bond shall be barred. But the judges there, adverting to the principle on which the statute of James was enacted, have determined that after a certain length of time, the law will presume that a debt on bond has been discharged; and the courts here have adopted the same idea, in order to prevent stale outstanding debts founded on obligations from being recovered, unless the delay can be accounted for.
Our legislature for wise reasons have determined, that the operation of the limitation act should be suspended between the 1st January 1776 and the 21st June 1784. And we think we tread in the steps of the English judges exactly, when we declare our opinion, that during this period, the presumption of payment of a bond, arising from length of time, should also be suspended. This will necessarily throw out of the calculation, 8 years 5 months and 21 days.
The length of time then of itself is no positive bar in this case; but the circumstances offered being matters of fact, are proper evidence to be left to the jury to decide on the presumption. The impression which the evidence has made on their minds, after a calm and dispassionate consideration of all the circumstances, must determine their verdict.
Cited in 4 Watts, 297.
Mr. Eevy for the plaintiffs.
Mr. Thomas .for the defendant.
Verdict for the defendant.