Case Name: AYERS v. BARNEY A. SMITH MOTORS, INC. et al.
Court: Court of Appeals of Georgia
Jurisdiction: Georgia
Decision Date: 1965-10-20
Citations: 112 Ga. App. 581
Docket Number: 41494
Parties: AYERS v. BARNEY A. SMITH MOTORS, INC. et al.
Judges: Deen, J., concurs. Felton, C. J., concurs specially.
Reporter: Georgia Appeals Reports
Volume: 112
Pages: 581–585

Head Matter:
41494.
AYERS v. BARNEY A. SMITH MOTORS, INC. et al.
Argued September 7, 1965
Decided October 20, 1965
Rehearing denied November 3, 1965.
Greer, Morris & Murray, Richard G. Greer, for plaintiff in error.
Jones, Sparks, Benton & Cork, Edward L. Benton, Willis B. Sparks, III, contra.

Opinion:
Jordan, Judge.
The trial court erred in granting a summary judgment in favor of the defendant motor company. The fact that this defendant owned the automobile involved in the fatal occurrence and that its employee was driving the vehicle at the time, was sufficient to raise a presumption that the employee was operating the defendant's automobile within the scope of his employment. Dawson Motor Co. v. Petty, 53 Ga. App. 746 (1) (186 SE 877); Hall v. Cassell, 79 Ga. App. 7 (52 SE2d 639); Hix-Green Co. v. Dowis, 79 Ga. App. 412 (2) (53 SE2d 601); Fielder v. Davison, 139 Ga. 509 (77 SE 618).
This presumption is a rebuttable one, but "in order to overcome it as a matter of law the evidence of the defendant should be clear, positive, and uncontradicted that the servant was not at the time in the prosecution of his master's business or acting within the scope of his employment." Abelman v. Ormond, 53 Ga. App. 753, 761 (187 SE 393). "Where there are circumstances developed by the evidence other than those'which gave rise to the presumption from which the jury might legitimately infer that the servant was acting within the scope of his employment the presumption is not overcome as a matter of law even though the master and servant positively testify that what he was doing was without the scope of his employment. The issue is generally one for the jury." F. E. Fortenberry & Sons, Inc. v. Malmberg, 97 Ga. App. 162, 166 (102 SE2d 667).
In addition to the circumstances which gave rise to the presumption in the present case, the record discloses the fact of the full-time assignment of a new demonstrator automobile to the defendant company's salesman who was employed on a commission only basis, his unrestricted authority to solicit prospective purchasers, and the fact that he would have attempted to make a sale during the weekend visit to his parents if the opportunity had presented itself. The evidence further showed that this automobile was being operated under a dealer's license tag issued to the defendant motor company; and under the provisions of 'Code Ann. § 92-2903, "such tag is to be used solely 'for the purpose of demonstrating or transporting dealers' vehicles or trailers for sale.' " Home v. Great American Ins. Co., 109 Ga. App. 24, 28 (134 SE2d 865).
Under these facts and circumstances a jury could, as stated in the Fortenbeny case, supra, at p. 166, "legitimately infer that the servant was acting within the scope of his employment . . . even though the master and servant positively testify that what he was doing was without the scope of his employment."- It cannot be said, therefore, under the record in this case that a finding was demanded for the employer on this issue, which "is generally one for the jury."
The cases of Stenger v. Mitchell, 70 Ga. App. 563 (1) (28 SE2d 885), and Fambro v. Sparks, 86 Ga. App. 726 (3) (72 SE2d 473), which are relied upon by the defendant motor company as authority for its contention that a finding was demanded as a matter of law that the defendant salesman was not acting within the scope of his employment, are distinguishable from the present case. Among other things, these cases did not involve a factual situation in which a new demonstrator automobile had been assigned to the defendant's employee on a full-time basis, and this court in the Farnbro case, supra, cited this fact in distinguishing the Petty case, supra, relied upon by the plaintiff here, where the defendant's agent "in connection with his employment . . . was furnished a new model Ford V-8 as a demonstrator car, his duty being to demonstrate the car to prospective purchasers."
The factual situation here was sufficient to make a genuine issue of material fact and the trial court erred in granting the defendant's motion for a summary judgment.
Judgment reversed.
Deen, J., concurs. Felton, C. J., concurs specially.