Case Name: Goldie Hause KIZER v. Fred LILLY, Jr.
Court: Louisiana Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1985-06-21
Citations: 471 So. 2d 716
Docket Number: No. 84-CC-1509
Parties: Goldie Hause KIZER v. Fred LILLY, Jr.
Judges: LEMMON, J., concurs and assigns reasons.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 471
Pages: 716–724

Head Matter:
Goldie Hause KIZER v. Fred LILLY, Jr.
No. 84-CC-1509.
Supreme Court of Louisiana.
June 21, 1985.
Dissenting Opinion June 25, 1985.
Rehearing Denied Sept. 9, 1985.
Ronald C. Kizer, Ronald C. Kizer, Jr., Kizer & Kizer, Baton Rouge, Richard Kil-bourne, Clinton, for relators.
Ronald G. Coleman, Walton J. Barnes, Law Offices of Walton J. Barnes, Baton Rouge, for respondent.

Opinion:
WATSON, Justice.
Plaintiff, Goldie Hause Kizer, brought this possessory action, alleging possession of a servitude of passage on a twenty foot gravel roadway located on the northwestern boundary of land owned by defendant, Fred Lilly, Jr. According to her petition, the road offered Kizer's estate its "only access to a public highway," Louisiana Highway 412, and Lilly disturbed her use of the servitude by erecting a fence at the junction of the gravel road and Louisiana Highway 412. Kizer began using the servitude in the 1930's and its use by her and her lessees had allegedly been quiet and uninterrupted until defendant's fence was built on May 23, 1984.
The trial court overruled an exception of no cause of action by defendant. The Court of Appeal, First Circuit, granted a writ and ordered that judgment be entered sustaining defendant's exception of no cause of action, citing Broussard v. Booth, 446 So.2d 974 (La.App. 3 Cir.1984). A writ was granted to consider the question. 457 So.2d 1 (La., 1984).
LSA-C.C. art. 740 provides:
"Apparent servitudes may be acquired by title, by destination of the owner, or by acquisitive prescription."
The comments under this new article note that it changes the law by allowing prescriptive acquisition of apparent discontinuous servitudes but state that the provision is not retroactive. A right-of-way over a paved roadway was an apparent discontinuous servitude.
Assuming good faith and just title for purposes of the exception, the prescriptive period for the acquisition of an apparent servitude would be ten years. LSA-C.C. art. 742. Professor A.N. Yiannopoulas has discussed the effect of LSA-C.C. art. 740:
"The 1977 revision broadened the availability of acquisitive prescription by dispensing with the requirement of continuity. According to revised article 740 of the Civil Code, apparent servitudes may be created by prescription, even though they may have been considered discontinuous and therefore insusceptible of creation by prescription under the 1870 Code. Thus, in contrast with the 1870 Code, a right of passage exercised over a railroad track, a paved road, or any other construction regarded as an exterior sign of a servitude may be created by prescription. However, article 740 may not be applied retroactively. Therefore, the possession of a servitude that would be discontinuous under the 1870 Code does not give right to prescriptive rights except from the effective date of the new legislation." 43 La.L.Rev. 58, 59.
Under the 1870 Code, the servitude of passage over the gravel road would be an apparent one. LSA-C.C. art. 728. The gravel road would constitute an apparent exterior work. Under the 1870 Code, a servitude of passage is discontinuous. LSA-C.C. art. 727. The distinction between continuous and discontinuous servi-tudes has been criticized. See Yiannopou-las, supra, at p. 60. It was nonetheless firmly embedded in the Civil Code until the 1977 revision and LSA-C.C. art. 740 is not retroactive.
Plaintiffs possession was disturbed on May 23,1984, and her possessory action, alleging quiet and uninterrupted possession for the preceding year, comes within the amended codal articles on occupancy and possession effective January 1, 1983. She and her lessees allegedly exercised a servitude of passage, a quasi-possession, on the road for over a year immediately prior to the disturbance. LSA-C.C. art. 3421 . According to LSA-C.C. art. 3421, the rules governing possession apply by analogy to the quasi-possession of incorporeals. Thus, the possessory action is available to quasi-possessors.
LSA-C.C. art. 3435 provides that discontinuous possession has no legal effect. However, the new codal definition of discontinuous possession is that which is "not exercised at regular intervals." LSA-C.C. art. 3436. Plaintiffs petition alleges that she and her lessees have used the gravel road as access to her land "on a regular basis," i.e., at regular intervals. Therefore, her possession has not been discontinuous.
Plaintiff's petition meets the requirements of a possessory action under LSA-C. C.P. art. 3658 as follows:
"To maintain the possessory action the possessor must allege and prove that:
"(1) He had possession [quasi-possession] of the immovable property or real right therein at the time the disturbance occurred;
"(2) He and his ancestors in title had such possession [quasi-possession] quietly without interruption for more than a year immediately prior to the disturbance, unless evicted by force or fraud;
"(3) The disturbance was one in fact or in law, as defined in Article 3659; and
"(4) The possessory action was instituted within a year of the disturbance."
In addition, quasi-possession of a servitude must be exercised "with the intent to have it as one's own." However, there is a presumption that one intends to possess as owner, and intent may be alleged generally, rather than with particularity. See Mayer v. Valentine Sugars, Inc., 444 So.2d 618 (La.,1984). Intent to own the servitude can be inferred from plaintiff's petition. Louisiana has fact pleadings and it is not necessary to plead the theory of the case in a petition. Any doubt as to the sufficiency of a cause of action should be resolved in favor of petitioner. Weber v. H. G. Hill Stores Co., 210 La. 977, 29 So.2d 33 (1946). Since plaintiff's petition meets the requirements of LSA-C.C.P. art. 3658, the court of appeal erred in sustaining defendant's exception of no cause of action.
Therefore, the judgment of the court of appeal is reversed, the exception of no cause of action is overruled, and the matter is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings according to law.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
LEMMON, J., concurs and assigns reasons.
MARCUS, J., dissents for reasons assigned by DIXON, C.J.
DIXON, C.J., dissents with reasons.
BLANCHE, J., dissents and will assign reasons.
. The roadway's description is as follows:
"A parcel of land located in Section 5, T4S RIE and being twenty feet (20') in width and running northeasterly from the north boundary of Louisiana Highway No. 412 and along and parallel to the northwesterly boundary of property of Fred Lilly, Jr. for a distance of 586.6 feet and continuing northeasterly from the northernmost corner of property of Lilly for a distance of approximately 900 feet to the property or land of Goldie H. Kizer hereinafter described." (Tr. 17)
. Kizer's property is described as:
"276¾ acres of land, more or less, situated in Section 5, T4S R1E, Parish of East Feliciana, State of Louisiana, and bounded, now or formerly, as follows: North by B.F. Appleby; East By A.C. Watson; south by A.C. Watson and public road and west by Mrs. C. Appleby." (Tr. 18)
. Broussard v. Booth is not in point.
. LSA-C.C. art. 742 provides:
"The laws governing acquisitive prescription of immovable property apply to apparent ser-vitudes. An apparent servitude may be acquired by peaceable and uninterrupted possession of the right for ten years in good faith and by just title; it may also be acquired by uninterrupted possession for thirty years without title or good faith."
. W.R. Irby Professor of Law, Tulane University-
. Prior to its amendment, LSA-C.C. art. 728 read as follows:
"Again, servitudes are either visible and apparent or nonapparent.
"Apparent servitudes are such as are to be perceivable by exterior works; such as a door, a window, an aqueduct.
"Non-apparent servitudes are such as have no exterior sign of their existence; such, for instance, as the prohibition of building on an estate, or of building above a particular height."
. Prior to its amendment, LSA-C.C. art. 727 read as follows:
"Servitudes are either continuous or discontinuous.
"Continuous servitudes are those whose use is or may be continual without the act of man.
"Such are aqueducts, drain, view and the like.
"Discontinuous servitudes are such as need the act of man to be exercised.
"Such are the rights of passage, of drawing water, pasture and the like."
."The requirement that the servitude be continuous is even less justifiable. According to the medieval scholars, discontinuous servitudes could not be created by prescription because such servitudes were considered to be insusceptible of continuous possession, a requirement for acquisitive prescription. However, modern writers have discarded this explanation as theoretically faulty. As a matter of fact, for purposes of acquisitive prescription, discontinuous servitudes are as much susceptible of continuous possession as corporeal immovables. Thus, the regular use of a servitude for the drawing of water is as much a continuous possession of the servitude as possession of the body of water itself and the regular use of a servitude of passage is as much a continuous possession of the right of way as adverse possession of the strip of land itself."
"Certain authors later proposed another explanation for the requirement that the servitude be continuous. Discontinuous servitudes may not be created by prescription because they are used by means of isolated acts that are insufficient to give notice to the owner of the would-be ser-vient estate; therefore, such acts must be regarded as tolerated in the spirit of good neighborhood. This explanation is equally unacceptable, because it is based on the unrealistic presumption that in the absence of title, the possession of a discontinuous servitude is necessarily precarious." 43 La.L.Rev. at p. 60.
. LSA-C.C. art. 3421 provides:
"Possession is the detention or enjoyment of a corporeal thing, movable or immovable, that one holds or exercises by himself or by another who keeps or exercises it in his name. "The exercise of a real right, such as a servitude, with the intent to have it as one's own is quasi-possession. The rules governing possession apply by analogy to the quasi-possession of incorporeals."
. LSA-C.C. art. 3435 provides:
"Possession that is violent, clandestine, discontinuous, or equivocal has no legal effect."
. LSA-C.C. art. 3436 provides:
"Possession is violent when it is acquired or maintained by violent acts. When the violence ceases, the possession ceased to be violent.
"Possession is clandestine, when it is not open or public, discontinuous when it is not exercised at regular intervals, and equivocal when there is ambiguity as to the intent of the possessor to own the thing."
. LSA-C.C. art. 3421, supra.
. LSA-C.C. art. 3427 provides:
"One is presumed to intend to possess as owner unless he began to possess in the name of and for another."
. LSA-C.C.P. art. 856 provides:
"In pleading fraud or mistake, the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake shall be alleged with particularity. Malice, intent, knowledge, and other condition of mind of a person may be alleged generally."
. Plaintiff's petition could also be read as a claim by the owner of an enclosed estate for a right of passage over neighboring property. "Said land formerly bordered on and had access to a public road, namely, the old Slaughter-Oliver Branch public road. This road was abandoned in about 1925 when a new gravel road, which is now Louisiana Highway 412, was constructed between Slaughter and Olive Branch, by-passing plaintiffs above described land and leaving same with no access to the new public road except over the old, abandoned road which was used for access by plaintiff to and from her property until it became impassable in the 1930s at which time The Property, located on land of the Watson Estate just west of and parallel to the old road, began being used for access to and from plaintiffs above described land, located north of the new road (now Highway 412) by plaintiff and various lessees of said land, ." (Tr. 18)
"The owner of an estate that has no access to a public road may claim a right of passage over neighboring property to the nearest public road. He is bound to indemnify his neighbor for the damage he may occasion." LSA-C.C. art. 689.
"The right of passage for the benefit of an enclosed estate shall be suitable for the kind of traffic that is reasonably necessary for the use of that estate." LSA-C.C. art. 690.
"The owner of the enclosed estate may construct on the right of way the type of road or railroad reasonably necessary for the exercise of the servitude." LSA-C.C. art. 691.
"The owner of the enclosed estate may not demand the right of passage anywhere he chooses. The passage generally shall be taken along the shortest route from the enclosed estate to the public road at the location least injurious to the intervening lands." LSA-C.C. art. 692.