Case Name: BERK v. BLAHA
Court: Michigan Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1969-12-10
Citations: 21 Mich. App. 83
Docket Number: Docket No. 6,738
Parties: BERK v. BLAHA
Judges: Before: Fitzgerald, P. J., and Levin and T. M. Burns, JJ.
Reporter: Michigan appeals reports; cases decided in the Michigan Court of Appeals.
Volume: 21
Pages: 83–93

Head Matter:
BERK v. BLAHA
Opinion op the Court
1. Automobiles — Anticipation op Danger — Collision.
A driver is not required to have his ear under such control as to be able to avoid collision with a ear coming illegally into his path, but, after he realizes impending danger he must exercise reasonable care for his own protection and take steps to avoid a collision.
2. Automobiles — Negligence—Reasonable Care — Collision.
The duty of care when another driver comes illegally into one’s path arises when continuing observations reveal, or should reveal, impending danger to a reasonably prudent man and post-observation negligence or the lack of it is determined by scrutinizing the driver’s actions after the time he became aware of the danger to determine whether he is guilty of negligence for failure to act as a reasonably prudent person acting in an emergency not of his making.
3. Automobiles — Negligence—Directed Verdict.
Directed verdict for defendant in aetion for injuries sustained when car in which plaintiffs were riding, after failing to stop at a flashing red signal, collided with defendant’s ear, held proper where defendant had a right to assume that the plaintiff’s ear would stop at the signal as required by law and where there was no indication that the defendant was negligent after he observed that plaintiffs’ car was not going to stop (MCLA § 257.615).
References por Points in Headnotes
7 Am Jur 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 355, 356.
8 Am Jur 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 748.
8 Am Jur 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 742.
[4, 5, 7, 8] 7 Am Jur 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic § § 195, 210.
Dissenting Opinion
Levin, J.
4. Automobiles — Yellow Flasher — Statutes.
The exercise of caution when proceeding through a yellow flasher signal is required by statute (MCLA §257.614).
5. Automobiles — Negligence—Directed Verdict.
Directed verdict for defendant motorist, the sole witness, who testified as an interested witness, that his view on approaching the intersection where his vehicle collided with a vehicle in which the plaintiffs were riding was unobstructed for 250 feet and that he slowed down and looked before proceeding through a yellow flasher at the intersection but still did not see plaintiffs’ vehicle, although it was there to be seen, until it had passed through a red flasher and entered the intersection, was erroneous and the case should have been submitted to the jury because reasonable men could infer from the evidence that had defendant used the caution required of one passing through a yellow flasher, he would have seen plaintiffs’ vehicle in time to avoid the collision (MCLA §257.614).
6. Automobiles — Negligence—Intersection—Bed Flasher.
Principle that defendant motorist had a right to assume that vehicle in which plaintiffs were riding would stop at a red flasher before entering an intersection is without application where the defendant had not even seen plaintiffs’ vehicle until immediately before the collision and had no right to dispense with observation on the assumption that any motorist approaching the intersection facing the red flasher would stop (MCLA § 257.614).
7. Automobiles — Negligence—Yellow Flasher — Intersection— Duty.
A motorist facing a yellow flasher is expected to take some affirmative action to avoid collision with intersecting vehicles coming illegally into his path through a red flasher and must exercise a higher degree of care than the ordinary care to be observed at uncontrolled intersections (MCLA §257.614).
8. Automobiles — Negligence—Yellow Flasher — Intersection— Caution.
Blindly entering an intersection controlled by a yellow flasher on the assumption that intersecting traffic will stop and not challenge onefs right of way until one happens to see another vehicle proceeding in a manner inconsistent with that assumption does not constitute the degree of caution required to preclude negligence (MCLA §257.614).
Appeal from Oakland, Robert L. Templin, J.
Submitted Division 2 June 10, 1969 at Detroit.
(Docket No. 6,738.)
Decided December 10, 1969.
Leave to appeal granted August 13, 1970,
383 Mich 817.
Complaint by William Berk, guardian of Cheryl Lynn Berk, a minor, and by Ann T. Berk against Robert Blaha, Sr. and Robert Blaha, Jr. for injuries sustained in an automobile collision. Judgment for defendants. Plaintiffs appeal.
Affirmed.
Charfoos & Charfoos, for plaintiffs.
Plunkett, Cooney, Butt & Peacock (John D. Hayes of counsel), for defendants.
Before: Fitzgerald, P. J., and Levin and T. M. Burns, JJ.

Opinion:
T. M. Burns, J.
Plaintiffs were injured when the car in which they were riding failed to stop for a red flasher signal at an intersection and collided with defendants' vehicle.
At the trial defendant was the only witness that testified as to how the accident happened and he was called by plaintiff for cross-examination pursuant to the provisions of MCLA § 600.2161 (Stat Ann 1962 Rev § 27A.2161). Although his testimony revealed that he did not see the plaintiffs' vehicle as it approached the intersection, he did indicate that he was traveling below the posted speed limit for that area; that he slowed his vehicle as he approached the intersection which from his direction bore a flashing amber light; and that he applied his brakes immediately upon seeing the vehicle which was then about 20 feet in front of him.
After the defendant testified the trial court granted defendant's motion for a directed verdict of no cause of action.
Plaintiffs argue on appeal that a question of fact as to defendant's negligence was raised as a consequence of the testimony that should have been submitted to the jury. We do not agree.
The standard to be applied in cases of this type is well stated in McGuire v. Rabaut (1958), 354 Mich 230, 236:
"The favored driver is thus not required to have his car under such control as to be able to avoid collision with a subordinate driver coming illegally into his path. At what point, then, does the second principle (that of exercising reasonable care for his own protection) come into operation, requiring him to take steps to avoid collision with a subordinate driver? Only at that point when his continuing observations (which he must make, despite the fact that he is on an arterial highway) reveal, or should reveal to the reasonably prudent man, an impending danger. It is at this time that his duty of care with respect to the subordinate driver arises, and his post-observation negligence, or lack thereof, is measured by his actions after this point. Consequently, in the case before us the favored driver was entitled to assume, as he approached the Hastings intersection, that his right-of-way would not be contested by a subordinate driver. He was entitled to rely upon this assumption until it became clear to him (or, until, as a reasonable man, considering pertinent surrounding circumstances of traffic and terrain, it should have been clear to him) that a subordinate driver was going to challenge or obstruct his right-of-way. At this point his duty to attempt to avoid the impending collision began. It is from this point onward, and not before, with respect to a crossing subordinate driver appearing in his path, that we scrutinize his acts to determine whether or not he is guilty of negligence for failure to act as a reasonably prudent person, and, in all fairness to him, we must measure his conduct in the light of the emergency then presented, if not of his making."
See also: Churuckian v. LaGest (1959), 357 Mich 173, 182-184; Haney v. Frederick v. Gentsch, Inc. (1962), 368 Mich 354, 359-362; and DePriest v. Kooiman (1967), 379 Mich 44.
Defendant had a right to assume that plaintiff would stop at the signal as required by law (MOLA § 257.615 [Stat Ann 1968 Rev § 9.2314]). Further, from the testimony in this case there is no indication that the defendant was guilty of negligence from the point that he observed that plaintiff's car was not going to stop. Therefore, there was no question of fact that could be presented to the jury and the trial court did not err in granting the directed verdict.
Affirmed.
Fitzgerald, P. J., concurred.
Plaintiffs' driver breached bis plain duty under MCLA § 257.614, 257.651 (Stat Ann 1968 Rev § 9.2314, 9.2351) to stop and' yield right of way to the defendant.