Case Name: In re MARRIAGE OF BRADLEY GILBERT, Petitioner-Appellant, and LYNETTE GILBERT, Respondent-Appellee
Court: Illinois Appellate Court
Jurisdiction: Illinois
Decision Date: 2004-12-30
Citations: 355 Ill. App. 3d 104
Docket Number: No. 1—03—0497
Parties: In re MARRIAGE OF BRADLEY GILBERT, Petitioner-Appellant, and LYNETTE GILBERT, Respondent-Appellee.
Judges: 
Reporter: Illinois Appellate Court Reports, Third Series
Volume: 355
Pages: 104–123

Head Matter:
In re MARRIAGE OF BRADLEY GILBERT, Petitioner-Appellant, and LYNETTE GILBERT, Respondent-Appellee.
First District (4th Division)
No. 1—03—0497
Opinion filed December 30, 2004.
REID, EJ., dissenting.
Gleason & Schroeder, of Chicago (Margaret E. Daniele, Judith Anne Gleason, and Nancy J. Gleason, of counsel), for appellant.
Barbara J. Agnew, of llene M. Wolf, EC., of Arlington Heights, for appellee.

Opinion:
JUSTICE GREIMAN
delivered the opinion of the court:
The petitioner, Bradley Gilbert, appeals the decision of the circuit court of Cook County which issued on behalf of the respondent, Lynette Gilbert, a plenary order of protection. On appeal, Bradley argues (1) the trial court erred in applying section 8 — 2601 of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/8 — 2601 (West 2002)) in admitting hearsay testimony that he sexually assaulted his daughter; (2) the trial court failed to conduct a reliability hearing with reference to such hearsay; and (3) the hearsay statements lacked the corroboration required by the statute. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the decision of the trial court.
Bradley and Lynette were married in 1994. During their marriage, they had two children, a son, C.G., and a daughter, B.G. On October 17, 1997, Bradley filed a petition for dissolution of marriage. On March 2, 2000, a judgment for dissolution of marriage was entered. The parties also executed a marital settlement agreement and a joint parent ing agreement, which were both entered on March 2, 2000. In the joint parenting agreement, the parties agreed that Lynette would serve as the primary residential parent for the couple's two children.
On August 11, 2000, under the original dissolution case, Lynette filed an ex parte petition for an order of protection on behalf of C.G. and B.G. against Bradley, pursuant to the Illinois Domestic Violence Act of 1986 (Domestic Violence Act) (750 ILCS 60/214 (West 2000)). An affidavit in support of the emergency order of protection was attached to the petition. In the affidavit, it was alleged that, on August 10, 2000, B.G., who was four years old at the time, was visiting Bradley at his home when he sexually abused her. Specifically, it was alleged in the affidavit that B.G. informed Lynette that during the visit, Bradley's penis, or "project" as she referred to it, touched her "private parts."
On August 11, 2000, the trial court found that there were reasonable grounds to believe that abuse had occurred and given the emergency nature of the situation, entered an ex parte order of protection.
Thereafter, a hearing on the matter was held. At that hearing, Lynette testified that on the evening of August 10, 2000, C.G. and B.G. arrived at her home at approximately 8 p.m. after visiting with Bradley. Later that evening, as Lynette was giving B.G. a bath, B.G. said, " '[Mjommy, daddy's private parts touched my private parts today.' " Lynette said that prior to B.G. making this statement, she had not been asking B.G. what she had been doing with her father earlier that day. Lynette testified that this was the first instance that B.G. had ever made such a statement to her. Lynette said that she was not surprised that B.G. referred to her genitals as "private parts" since this is how she had taught B.G. to refer to them.
After B.G. made this statement, Lynette said that she asked B.G. "What did you just say?" Lynette then testified that B.G. again said, " 'Daddy's private parts touched my private parts today, mommy.' " Lynette said that she then took B.G. out of the tub, dried her off, and put some clothes on her so they could sit down and talk in the bedroom.
Once they were in the bedroom, Lynette said that she asked B.G. to tell her what she did with her daddy. Lynette testified that B.G. explained that "daddy said that he had a project for her to do." B.G. explained that Bradley also had a project for C.G. to perform, which was scooping dog "poop" in the backyard. When Lynette asked B.G. what her project was, Lynette said that B.G. began to "withdraw a little bit and say, 'well, I don't know the words, mommy.' " Lynette said that she reassured B.G. and just asked her to explain what she did at "daddy's house."
B.G. then explained, " 'well, he had this project, and he laid her down on the bed and took off her clothes. There was a red pillow and a green pillow. That he then took off his pants or let down his pants and that the project was real little and it got real big.' " Lynette stated that B.G. was referring to Bradley's penis as the "project" at first and then as the "finger" so that she became a little confused as B.G. was telling her story. Lynette said that B.G. said that she "held her mouth like in a circle like uh, and she was real good that she didn't bite." When asked what went into B.G.'s mouth, Lynette responded, "She kept calling it the project and the finger. I was very confused."
Lynette then testified that "[B.G.] kept telling me she didn't know the words but that it tickled, that when daddy's private part touched her it tickled. She showed me it was between her legs and her bottom. She told me that it touched her bottom. And I asked her if it hurt. She said, no, it kind of tickled. And then I realized it was getting late and I still needed to get the laundry, so I just kind of said well, 'you know, you can tell me anything at any time, right?' And she said, 'yes.' I said, 'why don't we go get [C.G.], and let's go downstairs and get the laundry out of the dryer and come back up. Its getting late, and I think we need to go to bed.' "
After they retrieved the laundry, Lynette asked B.G. what color the project was, and B.G. responded that it was "brown and purple." At that point, Lynette said that was the end of their conversation. After consulting with her parents, she decided to call a doctor. Thereafter, she called a doctor and made an appointment for B.G. to see him the next day.
The next day, during the doctor's examination, Lynette said that B.G. refused to answer questions concerning the previous day. The doctor found no physical injury to the child. Before they left the doctor's office, Lynette testified that the doctor informed her that he had an obligation to report the occurrence to the proper authorities. Lynette testified that she responded, "[Y]ou do what you have to do."
Later that afternoon, on August 11, 2000, Lynette and her attorney appeared in court to request an emergency order of protection. Thereafter, she reported the incident to the police.
Later, Lynette said that she had another conversation with B.G. During the conversation, Lynette testified that she asked B.G., "Now when you were telling me about the project you also called it the finger, where was the project? Was it this or was the project something different? And she said 'no,' and she pointed down to her private area. She said, 'the project was down here.' I said, okay. And when you said the project and the finger went in your mouth and you held your mouth like this, but you didn't bite, was it the finger or was it the project down there? And she said, 'it was the project down there.' And I said — I couldn't help myself — I said, 'well, what did you think?' She said, 'it was yucky. I told daddy to get it out.' I said, 'good girl. Thanks. You can go play.' "
Thereafter, B.G. was referred to the Children's Advocacy Center for a victim-sensitive interview on August 15, 2000. B.G. was interviewed by Caryn Brauweiler, who was the assistant director and had conducted 1,000 interviews of allegedly abused children, 300 of which involved a child under the age of four. Detective Dave Bruno of the Hanover Park police department, Investigator Ron Miller of the Department of Children and Family Services, and Assistant State's Attorney (ASA) Ruth Howes of the Cook County State's Attorney's office observed the interview through a one-way glass.
During the interview, B.G. was asked if mommy touched her privates outside of the bathtub and she said "no." When asked if daddy touched her privates outside of the bathtub, she paused and looked away. B.G. then responded, "No, he doesn't."
Later in the interview, B.G. was asked if anyone touched her where she goes potty, she responded, "Yes." When asked who, she shrugged her shoulders but did not respond. When asked to talk about it, B.G. said that she would respond later if she were given some time to color. Thereafter, B.G. was asked about the touching that happened on her private parts and she stated, "I'm scared about it. Daddy does that."
B.G. was then shown anatomically correct dolls and she was able to correctly identify the parts of the dolls, including their genitalia, which she referred to as private parts. Then the interviewer reminded B.G. that they were going to talk about the kind of touching that was scary for her. B.G. responded, "Mom told me if dad touched my private again, I should scream." When asked if that really happened, B.G. stated, "One time he does, a lot of times he does." When asked where this occurred, B.G. stated, "In his bedroom." B.G. then stated that it occurred "[i]n his bed." B.G. then said that her father took her clothes off and that he took his own underwear off.
When asked what happened next, B.G. stated that, "He stuck his private there," as she pointed to her vagina and buttocks. When asked what her father's private's looked like, B.G. responded, "It looks like a boy's private." When she was asked if it looked liked the doll's private, she stated, "It was sticking up." She spontaneously added, "C.G. was picking Lady's poop up." When asked where her father's fiancée was at when this occurred, B.G. responded that she was at work.
B.G. then had the interviewer draw her so that she was lying on her stomach on her father's bed. When asked what happened, she stated, "He put his private on my bottom and stuck it through my legs, and put it here on my private." When asked how it felt, she said "silly." When asked if anything came out of his privates, she responded, "Let's not talk about it. It's yucky."
Later, B.G. began playing with the anatomically correct dolls. During this time, Brauweiler asked B.G. to show her how daddy touched her. B.G. took the small female doll and put it on the floor facedown. She pulled the underwear off and took the large male doll, pulling his pants off, and inserted the penis in the rectum of the small female doll. She then explained that daddy then put his private between her legs and said that it touched her on the private. She then stated, "Let's not talk about it. I'm scared."
Bradley testified that on August 10, 2000, he picked up both B.G. and C.G. from Lynette's house. He said that he spent approximately two hours alone with the children, outside the presence of his fiancée. He explained that during this time he gave C.G. a "project" to do, which was to scoop their dog's "poop" up in the backyard. He stated that C.G. did this task for approximately five minutes. He stated that he did not assign a task to B.G. Bradley said that he used the term "project" because of his job.
He denied ever going into a bedroom with B.G. He stated that there were no red or green pillows in the bedroom at his home. He denied having any sexual contact with B.G. He stated that B.G. never touched his penis. He stated that he had never touched her private parts in an inappropriate way.
Nancy Mulso testified that she was an employee of Judicial Monitoring Resources (JMR) an organization appointed by the trial court to supervise visitation. Mulso stated that JMR provided services to Bradley and the children after the allegations of abuse had been levied. As an employee of JMR, it was Mulso's job to observe the visitation periods that Bradley had with his children.
Mulso testified that Bradley's behavior during visits with his children was appropriate. Mulso testified that when B.G. visited with her father at the Schaumburg library, the child was reluctant to return to her father and stated she was afraid of him. When asked why by Ms. Mulso, B.G. stated "because he did that bad thing." Mulso testified that during one particular visit, B.G. asked Bradley, "[W]hy did you do that?" And he said, "[W]hy did I do what?" B.G. responded, "Why did you touch me when you weren't supposed to?" And he said, "[Wjhen did I do that?" And she said, "[Mjommy said you did." And he said, "[W]ell you'll have to ask mommy when it happened because I didn't do it."
Mulso further testified that on a separate visit, while Bradley and the children were at an ice cream shop, "the children told [Bradley] that he wasn't going to heaven, he was going to hell because he didn't have Jesus in his heart."
On another visit Mulso overheard C.G. telling B.G. that she had to watch out what she said in front of Mulso, "that she's [B.G.] not supposed to say things in front of us that mommy said."
Ron Miller, an investigator with the Department of Children and Family Services, observed that in his experience he had never found a case where a four-year-old was able to make false allegations of sexual abuse.
Following the hearing, on September 10, 2002, the trial court issued a memorandum order. In the order, the trial court initially stated that the matter was "coming on to be heard upon the petition of Lynette Gilbert for an order of protection filed on August 11, 2000." Although improperly captioned Lynette Gilbert v. Bradley Gilbert, it was filed under the original dissolution case number wherein Bradley filed as petitioner and Lynette was the respondent. In the order, the trial court determined that B.G. had been abused by Bradley. The trial court issued a plenary order of protection pursuant to section 220 of the Act, which it incorporated into the March 20, 2000, final judgment for dissolution of marriage. The trial court further provided that visitation with the children would "continue subject to Bradley's compliance with the court's order regarding the counseling program of the Social Service Department."
Thereafter, Bradley filed a petition to vacate, modify, reopen, or reconsider the order entered on September 10, 2002, pursuant to section 2 — 1203 of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2— 1203 (West 2002)), which the trial court denied on December 19, 2002.
On January 17, 2003, Bradley timely filed his notice of appeal wherein he appealed the trial court's orders of September 10, 2002, and December 19, 2002.
On appeal Bradley argues that it is inappropriate to enter an order of protection pursuant to the provisions of the Illinois Domestic Violence Act of 1986 that would vary the visitation rights determined in the dissolution proceedings. Although at least one Illinois case in the Third District, Radke v. Radke, 349 Ill. App. 3d 264 (2004), held that the Illinois Domestic Violence Act had been inappropriately used to alter the defendant's visitation with his minor child, we are not faced with that problem in this case. Here the order of protection was filed under the original dissolution case number so that the thoughtful opinion of the trial court was entered pursuant to that initial dissolution case.
Moreover, in Radke, the court determined that the substance of the plaintiff's complaint was not proven so that the issue of the application of the Domestic Violence Act was, in essence, dicta.
Even if the petition had not been filed under the original dissolution case number, the Domestic Violence Act does not impose any jurisdictional limitations. Section 103(6) of the Domestic Violence Act defines family or household members as any "children" without any reference to previous dissolution proceedings. 750 ILCS 60/103(6) (West 2002).
Similarly, section 205(a), in determining the applicability of the rules of civil procedure, references "[a]ny proceeding to obtain, modify, reopen or appeal an order of protection, whether commenced alone or in conjunction with a civil or criminal proceeding, shall be governed by the rules of civil procedure of this [sjtate." 750 ILCS 60/205(a) (West 2002). Here, again, the drafters suggest that domestic violence proceedings may be commenced in conjunction with other civil proceedings or when another action is pending.
Reference is again made in section 210(a) dealing with process that relates to an action "commenced alone or in conjunction with another proceeding." 750 ILCS 60/210(a) (West 2002). Similarly, section 210.1 refers to seeking an order of protection in conjunction with a pending civil case. 750 ILCS 60/210.1 (West 2002).
The trial court's thorough order provides Bradley with every opportunity to submit recommendations for reasonable alternative arrangements for supervised visitation of the minor children of the parties as well as providing obligations of petitioner to be involved with social service agency supervision and counseling.
Petitioner argues that the trial court erred in admitting into evidence the hearsay evidence of B.G.'s statement as to the sexual abuse imposed by Bradley. While generally hearsay statements are not admissible to prove certain conduct, the Illinois General Assembly has established certain statutory exceptions to the hearsay rule in connection with alleged child abuse.
Section 606(e) of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act provides that "[pjrevious statements made by the child relating to any allegations that the child is an abused or neglected child * shall be admissible in evidence in a hearing concerning custody of or visitation with the child. No such statement, however, if uncorroborated and not subject to cross-examination, shall be sufficient in itself to support a finding of abuse or neglect." 750 ILCS 5/606(e) (West 2002).
The Domestic Violence Act provides that the rules of civil procedure shall be applicable to domestic violence actions (750 ILCS 60/205 (West 2002)). With that in mind, we note that section 8 — 2601(a) of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure states "[a]n out-of-court statement made by a child under the age of 13 describing any act of child abuse or any conduct involving an unlawful sexual act * is admissible in any civil proceedings, if * the child * is unavailable as a witness and there is corroborative evidence of the act which is the subject of the statement." 735 ILCS 5/8 — 2601(a) (West 2002).
A similar provision with almost identical language is contained in the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (Juvenile Court Act) (705 ILCS 405/ 2 — 18(4) (c) (West 2002)).
Although the relief sought in the instant petition refers to the Domestic Violence Act, the essence of the court's ruling clearly implicates questions of custody and visitation. Accordingly, we find section 606(e) of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act would apply. In re Marriage of Rudd, 293 Ill. App. 3d 367 (1997).
We recognize that if this were a proceeding under the Domestic Violence Act, it might be argued that the guiding rules are those set out in the Domestic Violence Act or perhaps even those set out in the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure.
In examining the cases, it does not seem to make a difference. All of the statutes relate to statements of abuse by the child and the requirement that there must be corroborating evidence.
However, we believe that section 606(e) of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act is the appropriate statute to consider in relation to these hearsay statements because the instant petition was brought under the name and title of the original dissolution petition. 750 ILCS 5/606(e) (West 2002).
Next, we consider whether it was error for the trial court not to conduct a reliability hearing with reference to B.G.'s hearsay. Section 606(e) of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act does not provide for a reliability hearing and we find that none is required in a bench trial. Of the several acts dealing with hearsay of an allegedly abused child, only section 8 — 2601(a) provides that the statements shall be admitted only if "the court conducts a hearing outside the presence of the jury and finds that the time, content and circumstance of the statement provide sufficient safeguards of reliability." 735 ILCS 5/8 — 2601(a) (West 2002)) Subsection (b) of section 8 — 2601 sets forth the content of instructions to the jury where such a statement has been allowed into evidence. Section 8 — 2601 contemplates use of the hearsay statements in jury trials and seemingly imposes the reliability hearing in these matters. Since no such provision is set forth in section 606(b), we do not believe the requirement is imposed upon the trial courts hearing matters under the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act.
Even if such a hearing was required in jury cases, in a bench trial the trial judge is presumed to have considered the time, content and circumstances under which the statement was made in determining the reliability of the statements. People v. Hart, 214 Ill. App. 3d 512 (1991). In the Hart case, the failure to hold a separate hearing in a bench trial was harmless error. It is difficult to imagine that the plethora of evidence and testimony surrounding B.G.'s statement would not satisfy the safeguards of reliability as to time, content and circumstances of their making. In re Marriage of Rudd, 293 Ill. App. 3d 367 (1997).
Lastly, we address Bradley's claim that B.G.'s hearsay statements lack the corroboration required by the statute.
In In re A.P., 179 Ill. 2d 184 (1997), which was a case arising under the Juvenile Court Act, our supreme court acknowledged that the "form of corroboration will vary depending on the facts of each case and can include physical or circumstantial evidence." In re A.P, 179 Ill. 2d at 199.
The language of the governing statute under the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act contains precisely the same language as that set forth in the Juvenile Court Act.
The trial court properly relied heavily upon two cases. In the First District case In re C.C., 224 Ill. App. 3d 207 (1991), as in the case at bar, C.C. told his story of his father's sexual abuse. The court determined there was appropriate corroboration where the declarant, playing a game with puppets, described the sexual activity of his father, a social worker observed him playing that game, and an interdisciplinary group made up of child rights specialists, psychologists, social workers, psychiatrists and nurses examined the activities of the declarant, and although there were no physical issues noted, they concluded from their interviews, evaluations and observations that the declarant was a victim of sexual abuse. The conclusion was reached in part by C.C.'s discussion about touching his penis, touching his father's penis when both were erect and then soft again, and about " 'yell°w stuff.' " In re C.C., 224 Ill. App. 3d at 210.
In evaluating the minor's out-of-court statements, the In re C.C. court determined that these evaluations and observations were corroborative evidence within the purview of an earlier case, In re K.L.M., 146 Ill. App. 3d 489 (1986).
In In re K.L.M., the court found sufficient corroboration in the testimony of caseworkers and a psychotherapist that the four-year-old child was anxious, that the child would have had limited opportunity to have learned about sexual matters that she purported to describe, and that there was some skin irritation in her genital area.
A recent case would suggest a different outcome. In In re Marriage of Flannery, 328 Ill. App. 3d 602 (2002), the court determined that merely observing the physical evidence of the child's hearsay statements of sexual abuse, such as using puppets or other "games," was insufficient to provide corroboration under any of the operative statutes. The statements relating to observation of the child were also hearsay.
If the Flannery case is bedrock precedent, it would be almost impossible to obtain a finding of sexual abuse unless there was some physical evidence on the body of the child or unless the abuser had other witnesses to his abuse, a matter that is certainly unlikely.
The trial court had available the observation of Caryn Brauweiler, the assistant director of the Child Advocacy Center of Northwest Cook County, who has, as we have noted, conducted 1,000 interviews of allegedly abused children, 300 of which involved a child under the age of four. She witnessed B.G.'s use of anatomically correct dolls to demonstrate the abuse, noting that B.G. was able to discuss the fact that Bradley's penis was "sticking up." She also was the person who responded to B.G.'s request to draw a picture of B.G. lying in her father's bed and a physical demonstration of what happened to her in that position.
Additionally, there were the observations of the victim-sensitive interview by Detective David Bruno of the Hanover Park police department and DCFS Investigator Ron Miller, who observed that in his experience he had never found a case where a four-year-old was able to make false allegations of sexual abuse, particularly in view of the lengthy details and complex victim-sensitive interview. He also observed B.G. discussing the "touching" before the dolls were brought out.
Perhaps the most compelling testimony is that of Nancy Mulso of the Judicial Monitoring Resources, who observed B.G. confronting Bradley with respect to allegations of abuse. It is difficult to imagine that a four-year-old would confront her father over deeds that never happened.
Moreover, B.G. visited with her father at the Schaumburg library and as she was reluctant to return to her father, she stated she was afraid of him. When asked why by Ms. Mulso, she responded "because he did that bad thing."
Additionally, Bradley used the word "project" often in speech and B.G. used it in identifying the incident as a "project," as well as in referencing genitals as a "project."
The trial court also noted the improbability that B.G. would be aware of knowledge about a penile erection in that it would be "real little and then it would get real big" or that she had some knowledge of ejaculation as evidenced by her comment, "Let's not talk about it. It's yucky."
All of the above fall within the ambit of the First District case In re C.C. and the Fourth District case In re K.LM.
Bradley suggests that Lynette had motivation to fabricate the entire scenario and that during the course of the dissolution proceedings, she threatened to raise issues of interfamily sexual abuse that had occurred in Bradley's family. To the contrary, the trial court's opinion states that "there is no evidence of any motivation in this child or the mother to fabricate this story." The trial court goes on to note that Lynette was aware of Bradley's relationship with his fiancée for a very long time.
The trial court had an opportunity to hear the evidence, view the witnesses and make judgments as to their credibility, and in its well-considered order, it stated that the evidence "is just simply not enough to form a basis to conclude there was fabrication, or to infer it from these facts." Additionally, the trial court suggests the young age of the child and the facts of the case make it unlikely that the child fabricated.
Based upon the record before us, we cannot say that the trial court's findings were against the manifest weight of the evidence.
Affirmed.
QUINN, J., concurs.