Case Name: KALMANSON v. UNITED STATES
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 1923-01-02
Citations: 287 F. 71
Docket Number: No. 78
Parties: KALMANSON v. UNITED STATES.
Judges: 
Reporter: Federal Reporter
Volume: 287
Pages: 71–76

Head Matter:
KALMANSON v. UNITED STATES.
(Circuit Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
January 2, 1923.)
No. 78.
1. Criminal law <®=»56i (3) — Good character may alone raise reasonable doubt.
A requested charge that evidence of good character may in and of itself be sufficient to create a reasonable doubt, where without it none would exist, was a correct statement of law.
2. Criminal law <§=»! 163(5), 1186(4) — Refusal to give correct charge does not always constitute reversible error.
A refusal by the trial judge to charge sound law requested by accused doqs not always constitute reversible error, since even in a criminal ease error requiring reversal must he substantial, and prejudice will not he presumed, where it is impossible to see that the error could have wronged the party who complains of it.
3. Criminal law <®=»834(2)— Charge need not be in language of request.
If the law applicable to a criminal prosecution was fairly presented to the jury, neither party has a right to complain because the trial judge preferred his own language to that of counsel.
4. Criminal law <§=s>829(8) — Instruction on weight of evidence of good character held sufficient to justify refusal of requested charge.
Where the accusation was amply proved by the government, and the defendant introduced only colorless evidence as to his good character, the charge of the court that the jury had a right to consider the good character of defendant in determining his guilt or innocence, and consider whether a man of good character would commit that kind of an offense, was sufficient in connection with the charge that the prosecution must prove the offense beyond a reasonable doubt, so that it was not error to refuse a requested charge that evidence of good character might be sufficient in itself to create reasonable doubt, which charge, if given, might have misled the jury into thinking that the court meant that any evidence of good character might he a defense to an amply proven charge of crime.
<S=oFor other cases see same topic £ KEY-NUMBER in fell Key-Numbered Digests & Indexes
Mayer, Circuit Judge, dissenting.
In Error to the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York.
Benjamin Kalmanson was convicted of presenting for payment or approval a claim against the government of the United States knowing it to be -fraudulent, and he brings error.
Affirmed.
See, also, 282 Fed. 619.
Plaintiff in error was indicted and convicted under section 35,■ Criminal Code, as amended by Act Oct. 23, 1918 (Comp. St. Ann. Supp. 1919, § 10199), providing that “whoever shall make or cause to be made, or present or cause to be presented, for payment or approval, to or by any person or officer in the civil * * * service of the United States or any department thereof * * * any claim upon or against the government of the United States, or any department or officer thereof, * * * knowing such claim to he false, fictitious, or fraudulent * * * shall he fined,” etc.
The specific charges against Kalmanson, set forth in 15 counts, were that he had repeatedly presented to the Post Office Department false and fraudulent claims for damage to certain merchandise, viz. eggs shipped to him by parcel post from divers parts of the country. We find that the accusation was amply proved, and shall notice but one assignment of error, viz.: “That the trial court erred in refusing to charge the jury as requested by the defendant on the subject of the good character of the defendant.”
Max D. Steuer and Irving D. Lipkowitz, both of New York City, for plaintiff in error.
John E. Joyce, Asst. U. S. Atty., of New York City (James S. Johnson, Asst. U. S. Atty,, of New York City, on the brief), for the United States.
Before ROGERS, HOUGH, and MAYER, Circuit Judges.

Opinion:
HOUGH, Circuit Judge
(after stating the facts as above). The defendant below did not testify, and the evidence against him was direct, positive, abundant, and credible. He did offer two "character witnesses," of whom one testified in substance that defendant's reputation for honesty was good "with us" — apparently meaning himself and others connected with his corporation. The other testified in common form that he knew Kalmanson, knew other people that knew him, and that his reputation for honesty was good. The court charged with great emphasis on the necessity of the offense being proven beyond a reasonable doubt, and then said:
"You have a right to consider the good character of the defendant, if you find it is good, in making up your mind about the guilt or innocence of the defendant. The court charges you that if you do find the defendant has a good character, you have a right to consider that fact as a circumstance in this ease, as to whether a man of good character would commit this kind— or any offense."
At the close of the colloquial charge the court was requested "to charge that the evidence of good character may in and of itself be sufficient to create a reasonable doubt where without it none would exist." This the court declined, saying:
"I cannot charge that; if they do find that the defendant has a good char-' acter, they may consider that a circumstance in the case the same as in any other case."
The requested words were almost a quotation from Edgington v. United States, 164 U. S. 361, 366, 17 Sup. Ct. 72, 41 L. Ed. 467, and therefore sound law.
The sum of argument at this bar is that a refusal by the trial v judge to charge sound law must constitute reversible error. This is not always true. Even in a criminal case error requiring reversal must be substantial; prejudice will not be presumed when it is "impossible to see that it could possibly have wronged the party who complains of it." Per Rogers, J., in Linn v. United States, 251 Fed. 476, 483, 163 C. C. A. 470, 477.
Nor is it enough to complain of refusal to charge in words selected, by counsel. Taking the whole proceedings together, the fundamental inquiry is:
"Was the law applicable to the controversy fairly presented to the jury? If so, neither party has a right to complain because the trial judge preferred his own language to that of counsel." Green v. United States, 240 Fed. 949, 951, 153 C. C. A. 635, 637.
What the court did say was all that the defendant under the circumstances had a right to insist upon. Upon what insistence may fairly be placed varies with cases. Snitkin v. United States (C. C. A.) 265 Fed. 489, much relied upon by the plaintiff in error, is a good example. In that case there was a serious contest between the stories told on the witness stand by the then defendant and a witness, and the court naturally held that, "in view of the contest over the juror's acceptance of one or the other of their conflicting stories, the error was prejudicial"; i. e., the error of refusing specifically to charge that Snitkm's reputation alone might create a reasonable doubt of guilt.
In Rosen's Case (C. C. A.) 271 Fed. 651, 657, the trial court had fallen into the mistake of specifically stating that, "if there is a doubt in your mind" as to the credibility of certain witnesses, then "you may have recourse to the testimony regarding their good reputation." But there was added to this error the lukewarm statement:
"Indeed, the courts say that a man's good reputation in a case like this may often of itself create a reasonable doubt."
But, under the circumstances disclosed by that record, this court was of opinion that the "jury could not have been misled [nor] the accused prejudiced by the instructions." Neither in Edgington's Case, supra, nor in that of Oppenheim, 241 Fed. 625, 154 C. C. A. 383, nor in any other case, has it ever been held, as incumbent upon the trial court, no matter what the testimony before court and jury, to use the formula requested by counsel for defendant below.
Having regard to this record and to the extremely colorless and insufficient nature of the character evidence, we think that had the formula been repeated, and had been uttered (as rquested) at the close of the court's colloquial charge, it would have been calculated to mislead the jury into thinking that the court meant to say that any evidence of good character might be a complete defense to an amply proven charge of crime.
This plaintiff in error was given an instruction that the evidence concerning his character should be considered with and as a part of all the evidence, and that upon it all they must find the man guilty, if at all, beyond every reasonable doubt. This case (on the point in issue) is substantially identical with that of Warren v. United States, 250 Fed. 89, 162 C. C. A. 261; with the ruling there made we agree.
Being of opinion that this plaintiff in error had a fair trial, and that no reversible error was committed, judgment is affirmed.