Case Name: In the Matter of Claude C. WILD, Jr., a Member of the Bar of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals
Court: District of Columbia Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: District of Columbia
Decision Date: 1976-07-13
Citations: 361 A.2d 182
Docket Number: No. M-9-74
Parties: In the Matter of Claude C. WILD, Jr., a Member of the Bar of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals.
Judges: Before KELLY, KERN and MACK, Associate Judges.
Reporter: West's Atlantic Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 361
Pages: 182–187

Head Matter:
In the Matter of Claude C. WILD, Jr., a Member of the Bar of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals.
No. M-9-74.
District of Columbia Court of Appeals.
Submitted March 24, 1976.
Decided July 13, 1976.
Fred Grabowsky, Washington, D. C., for petitioner.
James R. Murphy, Washington, D. C, for respondent.
Before KELLY, KERN and MACK, Associate Judges.

Opinion:
KELLY, Associate Judge:
Respondent Claude C. Wild, Jr., former Vice-President for Government Relations of the Gulf Oil Corporation, pled guilty before Judge George L. Hart, Jr., of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, to a violation of 18 U. S.C. § 610, a misdemeanor, and was fined $1,000. Upon receipt of a certificate of respondent's conviction, this court referred the matter to its Disciplinary Board pursuant to Disciplinary Rule XI, Section 15(5). Formal disciplinary proceedings were thereafter instituted and the matter was heard by a Hearing Committee of the Board. As this Committee stated in its report to the Board:
There is no dispute that Claude C. Wild, Jr., did make contributions to the reelection campaign effort on behalf of President Nixon — to the Committee to Reelect the President; that he did so after being solicited by two Cabinet officers (Attorney General John Mitchell and Secretary of Commerce Maurice Stans) and their agents, and that he did so out of a fear of what would happen if he did not take such action. [Footnote omitted.]
After taking into account all mitigating circumstances, the Committee found that respondent Wild had, as charged violated Disciplinary Rule 1-102(A)(3), (4) and (5), and recommended that he be suspended from the practice of law for a period of two years. The Disciplinary Board reviewed the finding and recommendations of the Hearing Committee and, after briefing and argument of counsel, adopted its findings of fact but submitted to this court a recommendation that respondent Wild be suspended from practice for only one year. One Board member dissented, stating that this matter was no different than that of Richard G. Kleindienst, which ultimately resulted in a 30-day suspension, and suggested that a similar sanction would be appropriate here. The dissenting member was concerned that a different approach would make the "Bar and the entire disciplinary process suspect."
The Disciplinary Board found it unnecessary to determine whether respondent's conduct involved moral turpitude (DR1-102(A)(3)) or was prejudicial to the administration of justice within the meaning of DR1-102(A) (5) since it found a clear violation of DR1-102(A)(4) in respondent's secretly transferring funds of a Bahamian subsidiary of Gulf Oil Corporation to President Nixon's Reelection Committee and directing Maurice Stans to list the contributions as made by "employees of Gulf Corporation" — a patent effort to circumvent the law in violation of the public interest and the public good. Respondent contends that this finding overlooks the fact that he acted only as a conduit of the funds and the question of how the contributions were to be listed is immaterial to the charge before the Board. It was the Board's findirijg, however, that the misrepresentation and deceit was not between the contributor and recipient of the funds but to the corporation's shareholders and to the public "in an effort to prevent pub-lie disclosure of a political gift by a corporation."
Respondent does not contend that no disciplinary action should be applied in this case. He does urge, however, that with the Kleindienst case as precedent and the comparison of his misconduct with that of Richard Kleindienst, a token suspension of thirty days "would serve as sufficient disciplinary action in the maintenance of the distinction between fitness and punishment."
In considering the appropriate disciplinary action to take, the Board made the following statement, with which we are in full agreement:
We do not read the Kleindienst Case as setting the disposition standard for cases involving criminal conduct affecting the political process. We believe that the proper discharge of our function requires that we recommend what appears to us to be the appropriate and reasonable sanction under all the circumstances of the particular case. In arriving at a recommendation for discipline, the specific misconduct involved must be weighed against the purposes of disciplinary proceedings. The discipline im- posed should be commensurate not only with the need to maintain the integrity of the profession and the protection of the public, but with the need for the deterrence of other lawyers from engaging in similar misconduct. . . .
The Kleindienst case is unique in its holding that the Board's recommendation there "appear [ed] to have been underpinned by punitive considerations" and that a one-year suspension would be primarily punitive and hence inappropriate. This court reasoned, too, that:
In this matter a criminal prosecution was brought; it became the appropriate vehicle for punitive determinations. Any further attempt to punish in this proceeding inferentially would carry with it an implied expression of disagreement with the trial court's sentencing judgment [$100 fine and one month imprisonment, suspended, with one month's unsupervised probation], which would not be an appropriate consideration in our exercise of disciplinary judgment. . . . [Footnote omitted.]
Following this reasoning, it is appropriate to note that during the sentencing proceedings which culminated in the imposition of a maximum fine on respondent Wild, Judge Hart said, in passing: "You know, you say this is not a crime of violence. Of course, it is not, but it may be a much worse crime because what you are doing is corrupting our government."
We have recently been reminded, in the case of an attorney suspended for one year from practice before the Federal Trade Commission, that: "[C]ontrary to the Commission's concept, disciplinary proceedings 'are adversary proceedings of a quasi-criminal nature,' and '[d]isbarment, designed to protect the public, is a punishment or penalty imposed on the lawyer.' " [Footnote omitted.] Charlton v. Federal Trade Commission, - F.2d - (D.C.Cir., No. 74-1571, March 10, 1976), quoting from In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544, 88 S.Ct. 1222, 20 L.Ed.2d 117 (1968). Because this is so, a person subject to disciplinary charges is entitled to due process. In re Ruffalo, supra. See also Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511, 87 S.Ct. 625, 17 L.Ed.2d 574 (1967).
We do not view the Kleindienst case as mandating a like sanction for respondent Wild. Wild was instrumental in making secret campaign contributions to-talling $100,000 to the Committee to Reelect the President. He knowingly engaged in a deliberate and designed course of illegal conduct, albeit under some pressure, and thereafter attempted to prevent public disclosure of that fact. His conduct involved deceit and misrepresentation within the meaning of DR1-102(A) (4) and directly reflects on his ethical fitness to practice law. As stated above, we agree with the Disciplinary Board's perception of its general function in all disciplinary proceedings and its expressed opinion that each case must be decided on its own facts. It has made the delicate judgment that respondent Wild should be suspended for one year. We are of a like opinion and hereby impose a one year suspension upon the respondent.
So ordered.
. Illegal campaign contributions.
. Report of the Hearing Committee, p. 3.
. Disciplinary Rule 1-102(A) (3), (4) and (5) provide:
Misconduct.
(A) A lawyer shall not:
(3) Engage in illegal conduct involving moral turpitude that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law.
(4) Engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation.
(5) Engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice.
. See District of Columbia Bar v. Kleindienst, D.C.App., 345 A.2d 146 (1975).
. Findings and Recommendations of the Disciplinary Board, p. 6.
. The fact that respondent's duties as Vice-President for Government Relations did not include the active practice of law was not considered germane to the issue before it. Id. at 3. See In re Kirtz, 494 S.W.2d 324 (Mo.1973).
. Findings and Recommendations of the Disciplinary Board, p. 3.
. Brief of Respondent, pp. 5-6.
. Findings and Recommendations of the Disciplinary Board, p. 4.
. District of Columbia Bar v. Kleindienst, supra at 148.
. Id. at 149.
. The money was ultimately returned to Gulf Oil by the Committee to Reelect and respondent Wild paid Gulf Oil $25,000 toward its legal expenses in the criminal case. Gulf Oil pled guilty to making the same $100,000 campaign contribution as well as making a $15,000 contribution to a representative of the Mills for President Committee and $10,000 to a representative of the Citizens for Jackson Campaign Committee.
.See D.C.App. R. XI, Sec. 2.