Case Name: Douglas EVANS, Appellant, v. Kathie WALL, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1989-05-02
Citations: 542 So. 2d 1055
Docket Number: No. 88-1024
Parties: Douglas EVANS, Appellant, v. Kathie WALL, Appellee.
Judges: Before HUBBART, FERGUSON and JORGENSON, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 542
Pages: 1055–1059

Head Matter:
Douglas EVANS, Appellant, v. Kathie WALL, Appellee.
No. 88-1024.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
May 2, 1989.
Greg C. McGibney, Homestead, for appellant.
Dillon & Carter and Robert E. Dillon, Miami, for appellee.
Before HUBBART, FERGUSON and JORGENSON, JJ.

Opinion:
ON MOTION FOR REHEARING
FERGUSON, Judge.
This case is about reimbursing a woman —ejected from her former lover's home— the reasonable value of capital, materials, and labor invested over a five-year period, in his residential/commercial property. It is not at all about palimony, or any other novel legal theory, as the dissent suggests.
Douglas Evans and Kathie Wall, unmarried, agreed in 1982 that Kathie and her minor child would reside with Douglas in a mobile home on his land. Kathie worked outside the home and used her income to contribute food, telephone, household furnishings, and household services which included cooking, washing, and cleaning. She also worked in Douglas's mango groves spraying, mowing, fertilizing, mulching, and otherwise caring for the grove. With the aid of friends, whom she solicited, Kathie assisted in the construction of a new concrete block dwelling on the land. She also contributed money and supplied materials for the construction of a barn.
Kathie alleges that when Douglas met another woman, with whom he apparently wanted to share his new abode, he ordered Kathie to vacate the premises. Kathie left, after being assaulted by Douglas, taking with her only the personal property which she owned separately. When she moved in with Douglas in 1982 the property had a value of $90,000. When Kathie departed five years later, the land and improvements had a value of approximately $165,000.
Douglas initiated this lawsuit in December, 1987, on a complaint for eviction. Kathie counterclaimed for the imposition of a constructive trust seeking recovery of the value of materials, funds, and labor that she provided to enhance Douglas's lands.
On the counterclaim the material and disputed facts were (1) whether Kathie made contributions to Douglas's lands for the benefit of both parties; (2) whether the contributions were stimulated by a confidential relationship between the parties; (3) whether Kathie's contributions enhanced the value of Douglas's land; and (4) whether failure to grant Kathie an interest in the increased property value would constitute an unjust enrichment to Douglas. After a nonjury trial Kathie was awarded $8,000 plus costs. Douglas appeals contending, first, that this is not a case where equity should intervene.
As a matter of law, a constructive trust may be imposed to do equity between unmarried cohabitants. Botsikas v. Yarmark, 172 So.2d 277 (Fla. 3d DCA), cert. dismissed, 179 So.2d 211 (Fla.1965). A cause of action for a constructive trust is maintainable between parties cohabiting illicitly as long as it is clear that there was a valid, lawful consideration separate and apart from any express or implied agreement regarding sexual relations. Poe v. Estate of Levy, 411 So.2d 253 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982). Money, labor, and material— separate and distinct from spouse-like services — are valid consideration that will support the imposition of a constructive trust. Botsikas.
There is a second theory — equitable lien —which will support the judgment. On similar facts, involving an unmarried cohabiting couple, the supreme court, applying broad equitable principles, held:
An 'equitable lien' . may be declared by a court of equity out of general consideration of right and justice as applied to relations of the parties and circumstances of their dealings in the particular case.
(Cite omitted). Johnson v. Craig, 158 Fla. 254, 258, 28 So.2d 696, 699 (1947). In Johnson the court considered the plaintiffs labor, as well as that of his friends in building the defendant's home, and the plaintiff's donation of borrowed money used to finance the construction.
There may be a legitimate dispute as to the quality and quantity of proof on the value of the services. Our inquiry here, however, is limited to deciding whether there is any competent and substantial evidence in support of the trial court's findings in the nonjury proceedings. Because there is such evidence, although disputed, the judgment must be affirmed. Green v. Hartley Realty Corp., 416 So.2d 50 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982); Oceanic Int'l Corp. v. Lantana Boatyard, 402 So.2d 507 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981).
Affirmed.
. There is also a dissent from the denial of a rehearing en banc on grounds that the case is of exceptional importance. We might infer, from the fact that no motion for rehearing en banc was filed, that the appellant did not think that there was any jurisdictional basis for en banc consideration. The legal theories supporting the trial court judgment are cornerstones of American jurisprudence.