Case Name: CITY OF HOUSTON, et al., Appellant, v. Gary A. JONES, et al., Appellee
Court: Texas Courts of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1984-06-07
Citations: 679 S.W.2d 557
Docket Number: No. C14-83-375CV
Parties: CITY OF HOUSTON, et al., Appellant, v. Gary A. JONES, et al., Appellee.
Judges: Before JUNELL, MURPHY and SEARS, JJ.
Reporter: South Western Reporter Second Series
Volume: 679
Pages: 557–562

Head Matter:
CITY OF HOUSTON, et al., Appellant, v. Gary A. JONES, et al., Appellee.
No. C14-83-375CV.
Court of Appeals of Texas, Houston (14th Dist.).
June 7, 1984.
James K. Gardner, Senior Asst. City Atty., Bernardo S. Garza, Asst. City Atty., Houston, for appellant.
Ben Blum, Bailey, Blum & Lipper, Houston, for appellee.
Before JUNELL, MURPHY and SEARS, JJ.

Opinion:
MURPHY, Justice.
This is an appeal from a temporary injunction in a suit brought by Gary A. Jones and his business associate Norman A. Rund (appellees) seeking judicial review of the City of Houston's (appellant) issuance of a stop order on a commercial building permit pursuant to Article 974a-2, § 7, Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 974a-2, § 7 (Vernon Supp.1982-1983). Appellant can-celled appellees' building permit due to ap-pellees' failure to file a certified copy of deed restrictions on the use of the property along with his application for the permit. Appellant determined that the permit issued to appellees was void because the permit had not been acquired in full compliance with § 3(a) of Article 974a-2, Tex.Rev. Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 974a-2, § 3(a) (Vernon Supp.1982-1983). Appellees contend that the appellant's issuance of the stop order was arbitrary and capricious because the property in question had been used for commercial purposes for fourteen years prior to issuance of the permit. Trial was to the court which revoked the stop order issued in connection with appellees' building permit; reinstated the building permit; and temporarily enjoined the appellant from interfering with the construction.
Evidence adduced at the show cause hearing reveals that appellees purchased Lots 1, 2, 3, the west 45 feet of 4, 15 and 17, in Block 2 of the Gulfview Manor Subdivision on May 26, 1982. At the time of the purchase, Loadcraft Company, a subsidiary company of Allied Products, had been using the property for manufacturing, storing and selling low-boy trailers. William Stegin, Loadcraft's sales manager, testified that commercial buildings were standing on the property when the company made the purchase in 1977. During the five years Loadcraft owned the property, one commercial building permit was obtained and a shop building was constructed on Lots 3 and 4.
Jones testified that when he made the purchase from Allied Products he knew that there were deed restrictions which restricted the use of the property to single family residences. However, he made a business decision to purchase the property because he believed that the restriction affecting the property would not be enforceable.
On January 6, 1983, appellees obtained a commercial building permit from the City of Houston in order to construct a showroom on Lots 1, 2, 3, 4 and 15. It is undisputed that appellees failed to comply with Section 3(a) of Article 974a-2 when applying for the permit because they failed to file a copy of the restrictions with their application.
After the permit was issued, appellees discovered that the shop building constructed by Loadcraft was askew of the property line. Appellees then dismantled the shop building piece by piece, poured a slab on Lot 17 and commenced to re-erect the building on the slab. At the time of the issuance of the stop order, the structural steel of the shop building had been re-erected.
Appellant's first point of error contends that the trial court abused its discretion in granting the temporary injunction because the appellee failed to establish a probable right to recovery on the trial on the merits and probable injury if the writ was not granted. Specifically, appellant argues that the building permit issued by the Public Works Department was void upon issuance because the appellee failed to comply with Article 974a-2, § 3(a). We agree.
The applicable statute governing the issuance of a commercial building permit by the City of Houston is Article 974a-2, Tex. Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 974a-2 (Vernon Supp.1982-1983). The pertinent sections of that statute provide:
Sec. 3. (a) A person who desires a commercial building permit shall file with his application a certified copy of any instrument which contains a restriction on the use of or construction on the property described in the application, together with a certified copy of any amendment, judgment, or other documents affecting the use of the property. Sec. 4. (c) A person who desires a commercial building permit for property which is included in any plot or restrictions on file with the department is not required to file a copy of the plat and restrictions with his application.
Sec. 5. (c) Any commercial permit obtained without full compliance with this Act is void. (Emphasis added).
The language in Sections 3(a), 4(c) and 5(c) is clear; in order to obtain a valid building permit from the City of Houston, an applicant must file a certified copy of any deed restrictions on the use of the property with his application, unless a copy of the restrictions are on file with the Public Works Department.
The burden of proof on a statutory exception rests on the party seeking to benefit from the exception. Franklin v. Pietzsch, 334 S.W.2d 214, 219 (Tex.Civ.App. —Dallas 1960, writ ref'd n.r.e.). In the case at bar, appellees seek the benefit of Section 4(c) and thus, the burden of proof was upon appellees to come within the exception of Article 947a-2, Sec. 4(c). Ap-pellees failed to plead or prove that the deed restrictions were on file with the Public Works Department at the time they applied for the building permit. Accordingly, appellees failed to establish a probable right of recovery and a probable injury because the permit, void upon issuance, conferred no legal right on appellees to erect a commercial building on land restricted to residential use.
In order to dissolve a temporary injunction, the appellate court must find an abuse of discretion. Davis v. Huey, 571 S.W.2d 859, 862 (Tex.1978). When the evidence upon which a temporary injunction is granted fails to furnish any reasonable basis for concluding that the applicant has a probable right to recovery and resulting injury, an abuse of discretion occurs. Camp v. Shannon, 162 Tex. 515, 348 S.W.2d 517, 519 (1961); Kees v. Medical Directors, Inc., 583 S.W.2d 475, 478 (Tex. Civ.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.). We conclude that the evidence brought forth by appellees fails to establish any right on their part, which would be protected by the issuance of the temporary injunction. It was incumbent upon appellees to establish the application of Article 974a-2, Section 4(c) in order to prove that the building permit issued by appellant created a vested legal right in favor of appellees. See Murphy v. Tribune Oil Corp., 656 S.W.2d 587, 589 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1983, writ dism'd).
Appellant's first point of error is sustained.
For the reasons stated above, we dissolve the injunction. Having granted ap pellant the relief which it requested by sustaining its first point of error, we need not address the appellant's remaining point of error.
The order of the court granting appel-lees' prayer for injunctive relief is reversed and the temporary injunction is dissolved.