Case Name: Asa May, Adm'r., &c., and in his own right, and Wife, Appellants, vs. Alvin May and Wife, and others, Appellees
Court: Florida Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1857-01
Citations: 7 Fla. 207
Docket Number: 
Parties: Asa May, Adm’r., &c., and in his own right, and Wife, Appellants, vs. Alvin May and Wife, and others, Appellees.
Judges: 
Reporter: Florida Reports
Volume: 7
Pages: 207–264

Head Matter:
Asa May, Adm’r., &c., and in his own right, and Wife, Appellants, vs. Alvin May and Wife, and others, Appellees.
In the construction of a marriage settlement, the manifest intention of the grantor will prevail over the doubts which might be raised by strict grammatical construction.
Where a father settles by deed of trust upon his certain daughter, certain slaves for Efe, and provided she married, then in trust for the joint use of herself and husband, and in case of the death of either of them, then in trust for the survivor of them, and upon the death of the survivor, then to the issue that may hereafter be born of said marriage, absolutely, the daughter having married twice, and having issue of both marriages: Held, that the issue of both marriages toot, share and share alike.
A judgment in dower for an unascertained sum of money is void.
An administrator cannot bind the estate of his intestate by any contract of Ms, and a recognition by liim of a claim against the estate, arising subsequent to tlie intestate’s death, gives it no additional validity.
Upon the equity of the statute giving dower, the widow will be allowed her portion of mesne profits, from the death of her husband np to the period at which the dower shall bo set off, and the Court, upon proper application, will refer it to a Master, to state the account and ascertain the widow’s share. But this is not competent to he done by Commissioners in Dower, acting under the provisions of the statute directing the method to be observed in laying out dower.
It is the duty of an administrator, under the statute regulating his duties, to make all sales of the personalty at public auction. A reversionary interest in slaves is not the subject of such salo; hut that such future vested interest may bo subjected to the payment of debts by proceedings in equity, there can be no doubt.
An administrator or executor may not enter into hazardous bargains, whereby they jeopardise the interest confided to their care, and a mistake which works injury is always a ground for relief in equity. The rule in Chancery is, that the purchaser of a reversion must prove that he gave a full price, and this rule applies with greater force to a purchaser who bore the relation of trustee to those in remainder.
Appeal from a decree of the Circuit Court of the Middle Circuit for Jefferson County, sitting in Chancery.
On the first day of May, 1828, Burwell McBride, of South Carolina, executed a deed of trust to certain trustees, conveying to them certain negroes therein named, subject to the following among other trusts, viz: “ for the use of his daughter Caroline McBride, during her natural life, and in case she should marry, then in trust to and for the use of the said .Caroline and her husband, during their natural lives, to take and receive the profit, labor and employment of said slaves, to their joint use and behoof, and from and Immediately after the death of either the said Caroline or her husband, leaving issue alive of the said marriage, then irr trust, to permit the survivor to take, have and receive the profits, labor and employment of the said slaves, to her or his proper use and behoof, or that the said trustees apply the rents and profits thereof in such manner, and to such intents and purposes, as the said survivor shall direct, during the said term, and from and immediately after the death of such survivor, then in trust, to and for the equal benefit and behoof of the issue that may hereafter be born of the said marriage.”
Shortly’ after the execution of this deed of trust, the said Caroline McBride intermarried with Alexander Murray, who died in Jefferson county, Florida, early in the year 1836, leaving the said Caroline his widow, and Margaret, the wife of Asa May, and Caroline, the wife of Alvin May, his two children, who were infants,-the issue of said marriage, surviving.
In March, 1836, administration on the estate of said Alexander Murray was duly committed to Bunvell McBride, by the then County Court of Jefferson County, Florida.
In 1839, Caroline, the widow of said Alexander Murray, intermarried with Richard B. Cole, who afterwards, and about the third day of April, 1848, died intestate, in Jefferson county, leaving the said Caroline his widow, and five infant children, the issue'of the said marriage, surviving. On the 25th day of September, 184S, administration on the estate of Richard B. Cole was duly granted in the county of Jefferson, aforesaid, to said Caroline, his widow.
On the 18th day of September, 1852, the said Caroline, widow of said Richard B. Cole, and the original cestui gut\ trust, in said deed of trust, died intestate, in the county of Jefferson, aforesaid, leaving Margaret, the wife of Asa May, and Caroline, the wife of Alvin May, and the five infant children of Richard B. Cole, her children and heirs at law. Administration on her estate was, on the 24th day of November, 1852, duly granted to complainant, Asa May, and on the same day, administration de bonis non on the estate of Richard B. Cole, was also granted to complainant, Asa May.
In the year 1846, Asa May intermarried with Margaret, one of the children of the marriage of Alexander Murray to Caroline McBride, then under age, arid in the year 1848, Alvin May intermarried with Caroline, another of the children of said marriage, who was also at the time under age.
Alexander Murray at his death owned considerable property but his estate it is alleged was embarrassed by debts. His widow Caroline being entitled to dower and widow’s shares in his estate real and personal, in conjunction with her subsequent husband Richard B. Cole, alter their intermarriage, applied by petition to the Superior Court of Jefferson county, to have her dower out of the estate of Alexander Murray set off to her, and obtained an allotment of slaves to her for the term of her natural life. In addition to the slaves allotted, the Commissioners reported and the Court ordered that one third of the nett proceeds of the cotton crop grown on the plantation of Alexander Murray during the years 1836, 1837, 1838 and 1830, be paid to thesaid petitioners by the administrator of said Alexander Murray.
The bill alleges that in the execution of said decree with respect to the interest of said Caroline in said crops the ¡¡aid administrator calculated the “nett proceeds” of the crops of said years by referring to the account sales and deducting only the expenses of such sales, whereas in truth and in fact, the nett proceeds of the crops of said years could only be Correctly ascertained and adjusted by deducting from the sales of the crops, the expenses of the plantation, including the overseer’s wages, provisions and supplies, medical bills, taxes, farming utensils purchased and other expenses incident to the growing and gathering of said crops, as well as the expenses of the transportation and sale of the same ; and that the said administrator committed an error and mistake in the adjustment of the amount of said “nett proceeds,” which can and ought to be corrected without injury or loss to the said Burwell McBride, the said administrator.
The bill also alleges that the said McBride, administrator of said Alexander Murray, having so erroneously estimated the in'erest of said Caroline Cole in said crops, did on the 7th day of January, 1843, in consideration of the sum allowed said Coroline as her interest in said crops, viz : the sum of $4,878 05, and of the further sum of $48 44 reported to be due said Caroline in cash to make up her one-third of the chattels allotted to her, execute and deliver to Richard B. Cole a bill of sale and conveyance of the reversion of the estate of Alexander Murray, in and to the slaves allotted for dower to said Caroline Cole, under the mistaken belief that saidoonveyance and said sale to said Cole for said consideration, were not injurious or prejudicial to the interests of the children and heirs of Alexander Murray.
The bill charges that said reversionary interest of the estate of Murray in said slaves was really worth not only more than the true balance then due to Mrs. Colo for her interest in the crops, but also more, and largely more, than the incorrect and erroneous estimate which formed the basis of the settlement made by said Burwell McBride, administrator of the estate of said Murray.
The bill also charges that the said Burwell McBride, as administrator as aforesaid, had no authority or power tosell such reversionary interest — that the price was inadequate, and that to the heirs at law of said Alexander Murray* the •said slaves allotted as aforesaid ought to revert* and be distributed between Margaret, the wife of Asa May, and Caroline, the wife of Alvin May, in which event the complainants are willing that the slaves conveyed by the deed of trust aforesaid and their increase shall be distributed between all the children of said Caroline Cole.
The bill further alleges that the complainant Asa May, feels it bis dut}’ to present Fully all the facts connected with the title to said slaves, and to distribute them a3 the property of Richard B. Cole between his children, if they are in the opinion of the Court really the property of the estate of said Richard B. Cole. That said Asa May as ad ministra' or de bonis non of the estate of said Richard B. Cole cannot assume to act upon bis individual views, and for as much as a conflict exists between the claims of Margaret, the wife of said Asa May, and of said Asa May in her right, and the •claimsof said Asa May as administrator de bonis non as aforesaid, and his duty to the infant, children of Richard B. Cole, the bill charges that t-lie said Asa May is entitled to the advice and direction oí the Court in the premises.
The complainants disclaim all desire for any re-examination or re-opening of the accounts of Burweli McBride, administrator of Alexander Murray, for the purpose of subjection him to any liability to them on account of bis said administration, and conclude with a prayer that the Court may set aside the sale from-McBri-'e to Richerd B. Cole, and direct that, the slaves therein conveyed be distributed between Margaret, the wife of Asa May, and Caroline, the Wife of Alvin May, who are the legal heirs of Alexander Murray, deceased, and also for general directions and the advice of Che Court.
The defendants, Alvin May and wife, admit in their aaBwer ali -the allegations in the bill and consent to all orders and directions prayed for therein.
Thte. infant defendants who are the children of Richard B. Cole by their guardian ad litem, insist upon ther right toparticipate in the property conveyed by the deed of trust above mentioned, and also that the conveyance made by Burweli McBride to Richard B. Cole of the reversionary interest of Murray’s estáte in the dower negroes, was a good said proper conveyance .upon h good and Valuable coiísid eration, and should not be set aside.- They deny that the sum of money allotted to Mrs. Cole as dower out of the crops of Murray’s estate was too large or erroneously estimated or that the reversionary interest in the slaves conveyed was more valuable than the sum so allotted. They claim that these slaves should be distributed as the property of the estate of Richard B. Cole, equally among them to the exclusion of said Margaret, wife of Asa May, and Caroline, wife of Alvin May, who are the heirs at law of Alexander Murray.
The Commissioners appointed under the order of the Superior Court for the allotment of dower, in their report.say: “The Commissioners having been informed of other property which for obvious reasons, to-wit: the absence of the administrator, cannot be exhibited to them, recommend that the applicant for dower be allowed the third of nett proceeds of the crops of cotton made on the plantation of the estate during the years 1836, ’37, ’38 and ’39, when said amount can be ascertained.”
- The complainants exhibited to the Court the following certified copy of a paper writing which was read in. evidence :
1837. —Amount of 66 Bales Cotton:
February 7 — Sold Wm. Maner crop of 1856,... .#4,[ XXX XX XXXX ].
March 8 — Amount 73 bales sold John B. Collins, 2,404 07 28 « “ J. B. Collins,... 657 40 93 bales entire crop 1837.
1839.
Jan. I — Amount 22 bales sold Gamble & Reid,.. 886 56
Feb. 28— 74 “ “ by Legan & D.'H., 3,799 05 06 “ entire crop of 1838.
1840.
Feb. 7 — Amt. 31 bales sold by W. Mathers,..... 1,190 52
May 22— 59 “ “ « Legan & D. Hear. 2,186 31 90 “ entire crop of 1839. - — ——— #14,634 17
$14,131 17 1 One third of this amout I am or- ■-> dered to pay to R. B. Cole and wife, 4,878 05 ) amounting to...................154,878 05
A reference to my account current in the Clerk’s office, Monticello, will perhaps be necessary, as I may be in error from this hurried statement in the exact, amount due Mr. Cole.
State of Florida, ) I, C. Gr. Fife, Clerk of Jefferson Cir-Jefferson County. \ eu¡t Court, do certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the original now upon file in my office.
. In testimony whereof I have hereto set my hand and [L.S.] affixed the seal of said Court, this 30th day of June, 1848. CRAVEN C. FIFE, Cl’k.
The complainants also exhibited to the Court the following certified copy of a paper writing which was also read in evidence:
Be it remembered, That T, Richard B. Cole, have this day received from Burwell McBride, administrator of the estate of Alexander R. Murray, a bill of sale of the right, title and reversion in the following slaves which on petition were allotted to me in righ of my wife, for the term of her natural life, by the Honorable Samuel James Douglas, Judge of the Superior Court of the Middle District of Florida, at a term holdenin April, 1842.
The names of said slaves are as follows: George, Marlon» Isaac, Hannvh, George, jr., Dick, Paul, Saphronia, Robin, Dandy, Jane, Ellen, Jim, Peggy, jr., Judy, Tarner, Ned, John, Minns, jr., Charlotte, Stephen, July, Ben, Martha; in full discharge and payment of the sum of $4,878 05, being ono third part of the crops of the years 1836, 1837,1838 and 1839, allowed by said decree ; also in full discharge and payment of the sum of $39 32 allowed me by the Commissioners in their report on said petition, and I do hereby acquit and discharge the said administrator and the estate h» represents from all claims and demands, both in law and equity which I have in right of my wife, the said Caroline.
In testimony whereof I have hereunto set my hand, this 7th day of January, 1853. R. B. COLE.
q®") Signed in presence of us. ____ > J. McOants, $4,516 37J T. J. Heir.
Territory of Florida, i Be it remembered, That on the Jefferson County, j seventh day of January in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and forty-three, R. B. Cole, the person who executed the foregoing instrument of writing, came personally before me the subscriber, Clerk of the County Court for the county aforesaid, and acknowledges the same to be his voluntary act and deed for the use and purposes therein mentioned, whereupon I have duly recorded the same.
In witness whereof I have hereunto set my hand and [L.S.] the seal of said Court, the day and year above written. WM. BUDD, Cl’k.
State of Florida, i I, Thomas J. Chace, Judge of Pro-Jefferson County, j bate in and lor said county, do hereby certify that the foregoing is a true and correct copy of voucher No. 29 in account current of Burwell McBride as administrator of the estate of Alexander R. Murray, which said account was filed and approved at March term, 1843,, as appears of record in my office.
In testimony whereof I have hereunto set my hand and affixed my seal of office, this thirtieth day of June, one thousand eight hundred and forty-eight.
THOMAS J. CHACE,
Judge of Probate.
The Court below decreed that so much of the prayer of the bill as asks that the deed from McBride to Richard B. Cole, conveying the reversion of the dower n grots be set aside, be refused, and that the slaves named in the deed of trust from McBride for the bene'dtof his daughter, and their increase, be declared to belong to Margaret, the wife of Asa May, and Caroline, the wife of Alvin May, who are the children of the marriage of said Caroline Cole, deceased,' with Alexander Murray, her first husband.
From this decree the complainants appealed.
Archer & Papy for appellants.
Bolling Baker for appellees.

Opinion:
Pearson, J.,
delivered the Opinion of the Court:
The first question presented in this record for decision is as to the proper construction of the deed of settlement of McBride, in trust for the benefit cf his daughter Caroline.— Caroline having twice married, and having issue by each marriage, the question is whether both sets of children take in remainder, or only .those of (he first marriage.
The trusts declared in this deed are, in relationto certain slaves which are conveyed to trustees to and for the use of the said Caroline during her natural life, and in case she should marry, then in trust for the joint use of herself and husband, and provided either of them should die, then in trust for the survivor of them, "and from and immediately after the death of such survivor, then in trust to and for the equal benefit and behoof of the issue that may hereafter be born of said marriage, and the representative and representatives of such as may be deceased, they taking amongst them a parent's share, to be equally divided to them, their executors, administrators and assigns forever, and in default of issue of the said Caroline McBride by her husband at the death of the survivor of them, in trust to and for the sole use and benefit of the heirs of the said B. McBride, share and share alike."
The Court is unanimously of opinion that under a proper construction of this deed both sets of children should take share and share alike ; they were alike the objects of the grand-father's care and the children of his daughter, who was the meritorious cause of his bounty. The contextshows plainly that it was his object to settle a life estate upon his daughter to be enjoyed jointly with her husband, provided she married, but that the remainder should be a provision for her issue. There is nothing in the deed itself to show that any particular marriage was in contemplation at the time of its execution, nor has any evidence aliunde been advanced to connect the deed with the particular marriage toMui ray, the first husband. Suppose all the children had been the issue of the second marriage to Cole; can it be doubted that they would have taken in remainder as the issue of his daughter and the objects of the grand-father's solicitude? In the construction of marriage settlements the manifest intention of the grantor will prevail over the doubts which might be raised.by a strict grammatical construction. The cases of Beale vs. Dodd. 1 T. Rep. 202, and 1 D. and E. 193 are conclusive in support of these views, and we do not consider it necessary to extend this argument, since we are so fully sustained in this construction both by authority and the plain intention of the grantor.
The next question is as to the validity of the transfer made by McBride, administrator of Murray, of the reversionary interest of that estate in the negroes allotted to his widow for dower, in satisfaction of a claim against the estate presented in her behalf by her second husband Cole. To determine this question several things are to be considered.
The first inquiry is as to the nature of the debt or claim for which this reversion was bartered.
To ascertain this we must look to the proceedings in the Court of law had under our statute for the laying off and assignment of Mrs. Murray's(then Mrs. Cole)dower. It seems to have been upon the report of the eommissioners in dower in that case, that this claim first arose. Their report says, The Commissioners having been informed of other property which for obvious reasons, to-wit; the absenceof the administrator cannot be exhibited to them, recommend that the applicant for dower be allowed the third of nett proceeds of crops of cotton made on the plantation of the estate during the years 1836, '37, '38 and '39, when said amount can be ascertained."
Subsequently an account is filed in th8 Clerk's office ofthe sales of the cotton crops during the several years mentioned in the report, concluding with a division, giving Mrs. Cole 4,878 05-100 dollars, but with the usual mercantile E. E., and • appending thereto a memoranda in these words : " A reference to my accounts current in the Clerk's office, Monticello, will perhaps be necessary, as I may be in error from this hurried statement in the exact amount due Mrs. Cole."
This account though not authenticated by anysignature, seems to have been incorporated with the proceedings in that case, connects itself with them by its contents, and is made the. basis of the subsequent settlement of this claim by the administrator, as appears from Cole's receipt to him. This receipt show's that in consideration of the release of the widow's share of the four cotton crops, amounting to the exact sum stated in this account, the administrator transferred the reversion in the slaves allotted her for dow'er, to Cole.
The Commissioners' report and this account are certified as being on file in the Clerk's office by the Clerk of Jefferson superior Court. And although it does appear that the report has been confirmed by the Court, yet the confirma tion is in the language of the report itself and assigns one-third of the eotton crops to the widow, without stating the amount of the same. Now it remains to be seen how far this establishes a debt from Murray's estate in favor of Mrs. Cole. It appears to us that the mere appointment of Commissioners by the Sheriff to make partition, clothes them with no further authority than to perform an executive duty prescribed by statute and make their reportto the Court, which report has no conclusive validity until confirmed by the Court; otherwise the Court would be ousted of its jurisdiction and it would be transferred to the Commissioners summoned by the Sheriff. Again if it should be said that the report of the Commissioners was of authority to establish this claim, it must be considered what was the extent of their powers. Our statute provides that the Commissioners shall allot and set off to the widow one-third part of the real estate of which her husband " died, seized and possessed," and at the same time "shall allot and setoff" to such widow her portion of the personal estate of which her husband died possessed. Did the husband in this instance die possessdd of the annual crops of his plantation made during four successive years subsequent to his death? Although the widow might have had some sort of equitable claim to a portion of the income of the estate anterior to the assignment of her dower, yet was it competent for these Commissioners, acting under statutory regulations, to adjudicate and determine that question as to mesne profits without the sanction of the Court; and even if such extraordinary power were accorded to them, they have not accomplished their work. Their business is mainly, if not entirely, to divide the property of the estate in specie, but here they have gone into matters of account fit only for reference to a. master, and at length awarded no sum of money as due out of the proceeds of these four crops, but merely "recommend that the applicant for dower be allowed one third of the nett proceeds" of the crops mentioned, "when said amount can be ascertained." Can there be a conclusive judgmenttor any other than an ascertained sum ? Is it not the office and the very essence of a judgment to ascertian the amount of a debt 1 There is inthis instance no such ascertainment, but merely a recommendation to the proper tribunal to allow to the applicant a certain proportion of the subject matter, when the amount was ascertained. Now it is manifest that the amount of such portion has never as yet been ascertained either by the Commissioners or the judgment of the Court. The statement on file in the Clerk's office disobeys the recommendation of the Commissioners and allows the widow one third of the gross proceeds instead of the nett proceeds of the four crops, and to this statement itself is appended the initials for errors excepted, together with a declaration that it may be wrong onaccount of the absence of accounts and the hurried manner in which it is made. This statement is the only distinct evidence of the value of these crops presented, and it departs from the rule of calculation recommended in the Commissioners' report and confirmed by the Court, and thereby reaches a conclusion inconsistent therewith. If it is evidence to charge the estate of Murray, then it must be equally evidence to discharge that estate to the extent of the evidence it affords of errors and mistakes in making up the account. It is said however, that the receipt taken by the administrator, McBride, from Cole for the precise sum ascertained by this statement on that account, amounts to an acknowledgement on his part that such sum was due. On the contrary it appears to us that it only affords evidence that the administrator had only proceeded upon his original error in his settlement of this claim.— But it is a very familiar principle that the administrator has no power to bind the estate by any contract or promise of his, and his negotiation could give no higher validity to a claim like this, originating subsequent to the death of his intestate, than it previously possessed.
Upon the equity of the statute giving dower, the widow will be allowed her portion of mesne profits from the death of the husband up to the period at which the dower shall be set off, and the Court upon proper application will refer it to the master to state the account as to mesne profits, and ascertain the widows portion; but this is not competent to be done by Commissioners in dower, acting under the the provisions of our statute directing the method to be observed in laying out dower. See Thom. Dig. p. 186. This then is a claim in the nature of dower unascertained by any competent authority, and in the estimate of which the administrator has fallen, by his own showing, into gross errors and mistakes. Such is the claim presented by Cole and wife against the estate of Murray.
It now remains to examine the duty and authority of the administrator to settle it in the mode which he has adopted. Wehaveseenthathe could not create it and that he could not adjudicate it, and that it had not been adjudicated and ascertained either by the commissioners in dower or by the judgment of the Circuit Court. Why then should he assume to cancel it by an assignment and conveyance of the most important interest of the estate, to the claimant 1 That this transaction was private and that no public sale of the reversion was made, was not contested in the argument, and is sufficiently attested by the receipt given by Cole to the administrator explaining the whole transaction. Cole it will be remembered, stood in privity with the estate of Murray by reason of the accrual of his marital rights upon intermarriage with the widow, and was dealing with •the administrator for the expectancy of the heirs in this reversion, upon a demand claimed in right of his wife, and for property- then in his possession in the same right. Of the quality and value of this property he therefore must have been the best judge, for it appears that the administrator* McBride, was a citizen of South Carolina, where the deed of settlement was executed, arid that the commissioners in dower complain that all the property of the estate was not exhibited to them by reason of his absence. Hisaccountof the sales of the four crops, it seems, was made in the absence of vouchers and erroneously, and finally he is made party to this bill by publication, not being a resident of this State. It is manifest, therefore, that the administrator was in a condition, whatever might have been his intentions, to be imposed upon, and to commit errors and mistakes. This Court in the case of Ls Barron and Colquit vs. Fauntleroy, 2 Fla. Rep. 294, distinguishing between our system and the old common law, defines the administrator to be " an agent or officer merely, for the settlement of the estate, with no further interest than commissions and fees." He has not therefore as at common law, a vested right to the personalty, and may not dispose of it at his good pleasure, but is " an agent or officer merely," and must proceed sub modo according to the statutes which guide and govern and restrain him. According to the English authorities, a reversion is assets in the hands of the administrator coupled with an interest in himself, and like all other assets of the estate it was in his power to dispose of it at private sale, and to confer on the purchaser a good title, though he still remained liable to the distributees for any fraud or collusion in the sale. This interest " which is attended with such important consequences" in the case above referred to, is declared to be " expressly done away" by our statute. It was clearly then the duty of the administrator to pursue the statutory regulations defining his duties, provided he found it necessary to make sale of the reversion in question* The 1st and 2d paragraphs of sec. 6 Tho. Dig. 202, prescribe -, the mode in which the personalty shall be disposed rf by the administrator. We think these two sections, which must be construed together, as they are part of the same law, clearly indicate the intention of the Legislature that all such sales should be public. Let us see now whether a reversion can be the subject of a public sale. That such a sale cannot be made by a Sheriff of the remainderman's interest pending the life estate, is expressly decided in Dargan and Bradford vs. Richardson, Dudley So. Car. Repts., 1 Part 62, and in Devon vs. Kemp, decided May Term, 1837, and also in the case of Collins vs. Montgomery 2 Nott and McCord 392. These cases proceed upon the ground that the presence of the property and the delivery of it to the purchaser, was necessary to perfect the sale. And Judge Butler saj-s in his opinion' in the case first referred to above, "in England such an interest would be considered as nothing more than a trust in the one having the interest for life, for those in remainder;" and further, "if so it would be a mere equity, which might be assigned, but which could not be levied upon and sold under a fi.fa." That such future vested interest may be subjected to the payment of debts by proceedings in Equity, there can be no doubt.— But the question here is as,to the duty of the administrator. He had no legal power to take possession of and expose to sale and actually sell and deliver personal property of which the tenant for life had a rightful and exclusive possession. Delivery is essential to perfect the sale of a cha' tel and such. delivery was impossible in this case. We see then that a public sale of this reversion was impracticable and illegal, yet it was the duty of the administrator to have made the sale at public auction if made at all. But he disregarded his duty and sold at private sale to the only person who could have had possession — the owner of the life •estate. In such sale there could have been no competition amongst purchasers, and little prospect of obtaining the full value. The general question whether a private sale by an administrator would carry the title to a bona fide purchaser without notice, where there was no mistake, fraud or collusion, notwithstanding a statutory direction that all sales shall be public was not observed, we do not consider necessary to be discussed here.
The relation in which Cole stood to the property and the parties in interest, together with the prima facia inadequacy of price growing out of gross mistakes, we think sufficient to annul this sale, although it should have been made in a regular manner. McBride, the administrator, in this transaction, was undoubtedly acting as trustee for the distributees of Murray, and according to the authority ofDargan & Bradford vs. Richardson, above cited, Cole who possessed the life estate, stood in the same relation to them.— They are now complaining in their own person against both, and should not suffer the loss of their rights by the lollies and mistakes, and negligences of their trustees. An executor may not enter into hazardous bargains, whereby he jeopardizes the interests confided to his care. 4 Muntford Rep., 332. And a mistake which works injury, is always a ground of relief. Now here are two parties, both standing in the relation of trustees to these minors, bargaining hazardously together, under evident and gross mistake, to the prejudice of their cestui que trust. For it is manifest if they acted in good faith, (and if they did not the transaction fails,) that they supposed the erroneous value placed upon the widow's share of the four crops, was no more than the value of the reversion exchanged for and in satisfaction of it; when it appears therefore that this value was estimated materially too high, their own estimates fail to that extent of the value of the reversion. Every one knows the vast; and yet variable difference between the nett and gross value of the cotton crops on a plantation; some planters purchasing their supplies, while others produce them mainly sfi home. Nor is the value of a reversion in slaves after a life estate, less uncertain. Many circumstances may add vastly to their value, or diminish it during the continuance of the particular estate. The usual estimate of the annual increased value of a gang of slaves, we suppose to be about six per cent., and if this be true in this instance, their a purchaser who had paid the whole value of the slaves, would have received them at the termination of the life estate, with the addition of a natural annual increase of six per cent, in value, and this too, free of all charge or expense in keeping them; and this alone would have been no mean income on the investment. The facts of this case it is alledged, shows a result of this kind. But these conjectures are capaple of being reduced to proximate certainty by reference to a master.
It is suggested however,that there is an entire absence of proof as to the value of this reversion ; we do not think so. It is apparent from the record that the consideration was materially less than the estimate of the parties, and to this extent at least, there was inadequacy. But if there was no light upon this subject, the rule in chancery is that the purchaser of a reversion must prove that he gave a full price. Hickman vs. Smith 3 Russ. 433 ; Davis vs. The Duke of Marlboro' 2 Swanson p. 147, 151, 2 Atkins 185, 2 Vesy 149, 155 ; Wiseman vs. Beach, 2 Vernon 121 ; Barney vs. Tison 2 Vent. 359. With how much greater force must this doctrine apply to a purchaser who stands in the relation of trustee and is in privity with the estate for which he deals. The cases go so far as to declare that age makes no difference against persons dealing for their expectancies and some of them hold the doctrine that the character of heir is not a necessary ground of relief. Surely the present complainants are entitled to the benefit of these principles, when both the vendor and purchaser stood in the relation of trustees to them when they were dealing with their expectancies. In the absence therefore of proof that the sale was fair and for afull consideration, it canneverbe confirmed infavorof a trustee in privity with the estate.
We are of opinion that this bill is well brought and the complainants entitled to relief, That the slaves with their increase named in the deed of settlement should be partitioned among all the children of Mrs. Murray, afterwards Mrs. Cole. That the sale of the reversion of the negroes allotted to Mrs. Cole as dower be allowed to stand only as a mortgage to secure the payment to the estate of Cole of the true nett value oí Mrs. Cole's share of the four cotton crops set forth in the pleadings, and that it be referred to a master to ascertain and report such value, upon the payment of which, with interest, the said slaves shall be returned to the estate of Murray.
Let the partition prayed for proceed in reference to the rights of the parties thus established.
The decree is reversed and set aside and the cause remanded to be proceeded in, upon principles not inconsistent with this opinion.