Case Name: Albert G. Compton v. The Western Stage Company
Court: Supreme Court of Texas
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1860-10
Citations: 25 Supp. Tex. 67
Docket Number: 
Parties: Albert G. Compton v. The Western Stage Company.
Judges: 
Reporter: Texas Reports
Volume: 25 Supp.
Pages: 67–81

Head Matter:
Albert G. Compton v. The Western Stage Company.
The Act of the 13th May, 1846, to regulate proceedings in the District Court, declares that “ no plea in abatement, except a plea to the jurisdiction of the court, or where the truth of the plea appears of record, shall be received or admitted, unless the party pleading the same, or some other person for him, shall make affidavit to the truth thereof; and all pleas filed shall be taken up and disposed of by the court in due order of pleading.” (Paschal’s Dig., Art. 1 and 2, Notes 221, 222.)
And by the same act it is declared, 1. That “no person who is an inhabitant of this State shall be sued out of the county where he has his domicile, except in the following cases: ” * * * “in cases where a person has contracted to perform an obligation in any particular county, in which case suit may be instituted in that county, or where the defendant has his domicile." (Paschal’s Dig., Art. 1423, Note 533.)
After a general demurrer and general denial, a plea to the jurisdiction comes too late; being a dilatory plea, it must precede a general demurrer and general denial.
Whatever form it may assume, an objection that a party is sued in a wrong ■ county is a plea of privilege in abatement of the suit, under the 1st section of the Act. (Paschal’s Dig., Art. 1423; 0. ’& W. Dig., Art. 401.)
Where the plaintiff declared upon a written contract, to which the defendants’ names nowhere appeared, the general denial puts the plaintiff upon the proof of the authority of the agent, without the necessity of a sworn plea, as required by the statute. (Paschal’s Dig., Art. 1442, 1443, Note 549.)
To make such a contract binding, it was necessary, under the general denial, to prove that the persons sued as partners were such, and that they had authorized the agent to make such a contract, or that they had conferred upon him powers sufficiently large to authorize him to execute the instrument’. Where the contract included not only the withdrawal of an opposition line of stages, but also bound each party to run his end of the line, the effect was to make both lines run in connection with each other; and, therefore, the defendants had the right to prove the failure of plaintiff to run his line in such manner as to secure travel.
The terms of the contract were, “that they would run in connection)their respective routes between Austin and Waco and Waco and Dallas.” As to passengers, the effect of the contract was to make the whole distance between Austin and Dallas one line. They might pay at one end of it their passage through to the other; so of any part of the line. It was, therefore, necessarily contemplated in the contract, and as the very essence thereof, that each party should not only run his part of the line, but also run it in such way as to reasonably accommodate the passengers throughout the whole contracted line, at whatever end or part of each line they might start. Withdrawing the opposition line of the plaintiff was not all the considerations moving the defendants to make the contract. He must perform his part in keeping up his end of the line.
Appeal from Travis. The case was tried before the Hon. A. "W. Terrell, one of the district judges.
Albert Q-. Compton sued B. A. Bisher and several other defendants as partners, running stages and carrying mails under the name of “The Western Stage Company.” The plaintiff declared upon a contract in the following words:
“ Memorandum of agreement made between R M. Saunders, agent of the Western Stage Company, and A. G-. Compton, to wit: A. G. Compton agrees, on his part, to draw off his stock from the road between Austin and Waco, and not to run opposition from and after; this date.
“And it is agreed between both parties, that they will run in connection their respective routes between Austin and Waco and between Waco and Dallas; and that the fare from and between Austin and Dallas shall bo sixteen dollars, ($16,) of which amount the said Compton shall receive ten dollars, ($10,) and the said company shall receive six dollars, ($6;) and for all passengers beyond Waco, either going or coming to or from Austin, the said company shall be entitled to receive six dollars, ($6,) and in proportion for all less distances, until such time as both parties agree upon an advancement of rates. This agreement to be and remain in full force until the expiration of the present mail contracts. It is further agreed, that through-passengers shall at all times be entitled to seats in preference.
“ Signed at Austin, this 11th day of December, 1854.
“A. G. Compton,
“R. M. Saunders.
“Witness:
“W. G. Wood,
“R. A. Kelley.”
He averred that Saunders was fully and legally authorized to make the contract for the defendants, and that they' and he became bound thereby, and acted upon the contract; that he received $6 per passenger on said contract, being his proportion of the fare of passengers from Austin to Waco; and that he was justly entitled to receive $4 fo'r each through-passenger, and that he did receive the same up to the 17th day of March, 1856; that after that time the company refused to comply, by which he was damaged $595 20.
On the 26th November, 1857, the defendants filed a general denial, not under oath, and at the same term, on the 4th December, 1857, they filed an amendment to the demurrer, as follows: “That the same is insufficient in this, that it does not show that these defendants are residents of this said county of Travis, or that the subject-matter of the said suit is within the jurisdiction of this court, and of this they pray judgment,”.&c., &c.
They also “ specially deny that they ever authorized the said Saunders, or any othep person for them, to enter into or execute the pretended contract set up in the plaintiff’s petition, and they deny that the said Saunders was authorized to sign the said contract on their behalf, and had any authority to bind them, if the said instrument of writing was ever signed by the said Saunders.” .
This plea was sworn to by Bisher.
They also plead that the contract w;as obtained by false representations to the defendants as to the value of the line.
The plaintiff amended, by averring that the contract was made and to be executed in the city of Austin, thus seeking to justify the bringing the suit in Travis county, where neither of the defendants resided, under the first section of the Act to regulate proceedings in the District Court. (Paschal’s Annotated Digest, Art.'1423, Bote 533, p. 347.)
To this the defendants answered as follows:
“And now come the defendants, and with leave of the court first had and obtained, amend their answers heretofore filed in the above cause, and by way of replication to the said plaintiff’s last amended petition, they deny that there was any agreement on the part of these defendants to pay or perform, in the city of Austin, in the said county of Travis, the said pretended contract in said plaintiff’s petition set up, and deny that any payment^ were so made, in accordance with any such understanding. They further deny that they are citizens of said county of Travis, and deny that the said contract was to be performed in said • county; and say that this court has no jurisdiction of this cause for the above reasons. They, therefore, pray that these facts may be inquired of by the country, and they be dismissed hence with their costs.”
The plaintiff moved to strike out this plea, for the following reasons:
“1. Because they have submitted to the jurisdiction, by their appearance heretofore, and filing demurrers and answers, and pleading to the merits of the cause.
“2. Because the said amended answer is not signed and sworn to by the parties defendant.”
The plaintiff again amended, by averring that it was agreed that the payments should be made in the county of Travis, and that they had been so made, and it was further" agreed that they should continue to be so made. The defendants further amended, denying that the contract was ever in form ratified, and they averred that they had repudiated the same; and they plead in avoidance, that Compton had failed to keep Ms part of the contract, by keeping up coaches and keeping Ms end of the line in good order, as stipulated. At the June Term, 1858, the court sustained the demurrer to the defendants’ plea of non est factum, and continued the cause at the cost of plaintiff. On 3d July, 1858, the defendants filed a plea of non est factum, denying that they ever executed the instrument, or that they authorized Saunders to execute it, or that they ever ratified the act. TMs plea was sworn to by Ttisher, one of the defendants, on the 7th December, 1858. The plaintiff put in a special demurrer to the plea to the jurisdiction of the court, on the ground that it came after the general denial and after the plea to the merits. The court set aside its order to sustain the demurrer to the plea of non est factum.
On the 7th December, 1858, the plaintiff specifically amended his petition, setting forth items, and claiming §1,364. The court sustained the demurrer to the plea to the jurisdiction, and submitted the other issues to the jury. There were exceptions to the rulings, by wMch evidence was given to prove that the plaintiff’s end of the line was irregularly and badly conducted, and that the coaches and horses were unfit for travel.
The plaintiff read the agreement declared on, and also the agreement of counsel, that it expired on the 1st July, 1858; he proved that before the agreement each company was in the habit of selling through-tickets and settling every three months, and that after the agreement he made settlements in accordance therewith as long as witness was agent, and that, in accordance with the agreement, the plaintiff withdrew his opposition to the line of the defendants; that Saunders was agent, and Eisher principal manager, of the defendants’ stage-line. The witness failed to carry home knowledge of these settlements to Eisher. Carr, a witness of the plaintiff”, proved similar payments, and that after 1st March, 1856, they ceased to sell through-tickets, or to recognize the rights of the plaintiff.
The account of receipts was also proved.
Finnin, another witness, proved that Eisher repudiated the contract made by Saunders as soon as he saw it, and denied the authority of Saunders; but said that he had made some arrangements with Jefferson to bargain with Compton; that Jefferson had given instructions to Saunders, but that he (Saunders) had violated the instructions. The denial of Eisher seemed to be of a qualified' character. Other witnesses proved the character of the service, stages, and facts connected with the line; some stating that Compton’s coaches were of a very inferior character, and that the service was badly performed. The statement of facts was voluminous; but the principal facts may be gathered from the charge of the judge who tried the cause and the opinion of the court.
The judge charged the jury as follows:
“ 1. The defendants having denied, under oath, the authority of Saunders to execute for them the contract set forth in the petition, and that they ever ratified the same, the burden of proof is devolved upon the plaintiff, to show that' Saunders had authority to execute the contract, or that the Western Stage Company ratified the same. Unless you find that Saunders had such authority, or that defendants ratified the same, you will find for defendant. If you find that defendants ratified the contract made by Saunders, they would thereby make such contract their act, and would be bound by the terms of the same. Such ratification need not be established by an act or declaration having that object directly in view; any act of defendants, or their authorized agents, unequivocal in its character, showing a recognition of the contract, and of defendants’ obligations under the same, would be a sufficient ratification. Should you find that said contract was ratified, you will then proceed to determine the rights of the parties, under the following instructions:
“ 2. The plaintiff, by contracting to run his fine from Waco to Dallas, in connection with defendants’ line from Waco to Austin, and by fixing by contract the respective interests in the fare of passengers travelling through over both lines, became bound to run such a line from Waco to Dallas as would be sufficient to convey the passengers on said route as were carried by defendants’ line to Waco; he was not bound to keep so valuable a line of stage-coaches as defendants may have run, but he was bound to keep such a line as was necessary to convey through-passengers carried by defendants’ line to Waco; and if he failed to run such a line before the 17th of March, A. D. 1856, he would not be entitled to recover, and you would, in that event, find for defendants.
“3. If, on the other hand, you find that the plaintiff" complied with the terms of his contract and the obligations devolved upon him by the same, and the said contract was broken and disregarded by defendants, as charged, you will then return a verdict for the plaintiff for such an amount as he has been actually damaged by the breach of said contract.
“4. If the defendants first broke or disregarded the contract, as charged by plaintiff, then, and in that event, the fact that after the breach of contract by plaintiff he kept the inferior line between Waco and Dallas complained of would not relieve defendants from their obligation to him in .damages.”
Verdict and judgment for defendants.
Flournoy Flournoy, Robarás $ Robarás for appellant.
It was established, that previous to the making of said contract, and up to the time it was made, the appellant had been running a line of stages from Austin to Waco, in opposition to that of appellees, and was also running one from Waco to Dallas. The contract being construed in reference to all the facts, the fair interpretation is, that after the opposition by appellant from Austin to Waco had been withdrawn, the parties were “to continue to run their respective routes in connection,” and (it not being provided that either line should be improved) that each was to be kept in as good condition as it was at the time of, and previous to, the execution of the contract.
If appellant had departed from his contract, such departure must appear to have been within the time elapsing from the date of the contract up to the time of the admitted breach by appellees, and further, that such a departure continued up to the time of the breach.
It was insisted, thirdly, that the violation of the contract by appellant having been proven, (whiéh was not, however, done,) it was further necessary, in order to justify the breach by appellees, to show that the defendants below had suffered actual damage by such violation.
On the second point, we refer to Brinley v. Tibbets, 7 Greenl., 75; Lindsey v. Gordon, 1 Shepley, 60; Burry v. Palmer, 19 Maine, 303; Hill v. Hill, 19 Tex., 76. On construction of contract in reference to all the facts, Haldeman v. Chambers, 19 Tex., 1.
We rely also on the second assignment of errors, asking that all evidence which had been received in support of the pretended plea of “non est factum” should be excluded from the consideration of the jury.
This was but asking the court below to reconsider its action in setting aside the order striking out the plea of “non est factum.”
On 26th November, 1857, there were a general demurrer and general denial filed. On December 4, 1857, amended demurrer, setting up special matter of exception, and also answer containing special matter of defense: the last, among other things, alleging that defendants never executed the contract sued on, by themselves or by agent, and that the signature of Saunders was procured by fraud. Annexed to this amended answer is the affidavit of B. A. Bisher, one of the defendants. It states, “«That the defendants never signed or executed the said contract set up in plaintiff’s petition, nor did the said Saunders, or any one else, have authority from these defendants to' execute the said contract or instrument set forth in said plaintiff’s petition.”
To this plaintiff excepted, upon the ground, 1st, that having previously filed a general demurrer and answer, the defendants could not now plead “non est factum;” it being a special bar, should, in due order of pleading, precede the general issue; and, 2d, because the amended answer is not signed and sworn to by all the parties defendant.
The exceptions were at first sustained, but subsequently the plea was reinstated.
The exceptions were well taken, and the court erred in reinstating the plea. The exceptions embraced nothing of form, but very grave matter of substance. (Art. 426, O. and W.’s Digest; Drew v. Harrison, 12 Tex., 279; Drake v. Brander, 8 Tex., 352.)
There was another pretended plea of “non est factum” filed on July 3,1858, and which, if considered of the plead ings in the cause, is liable to all but one of the exceptions filed to the previous plea, and to the additional objection that it is an amended oath.
It cannot, however, properly be considered as part of the pleadings in the cause. It purports to be an amended plea, but is not, there being no plea of “non est factum” in the cause at the time it was filed, July 3, 1858. On August 14,1858, the defendants submitted their motion to reinstate their original plea, which was sustained, by the coimt. This successful effort to reinstate their original plea must be regarded as an abandonment of the subsequent plea.
We have been thus particular, because in the last-named plea alone does the affiant, Risher, one of the defendants, state that the contract had not been ratified. It is true that the question of ratification, vel non, is one of law, and cannot be solved by the oath of one of the parties to the plea; yet such issue must be made by the plea before the jury can inquire into it.
If, therefore, our views as to the latter plea of “non est factum” be correct, the court erred in presenting it in the charge, by presenting to the jury the question of ratification.
Hancock f West, for appellee.
—It is believed that the general demurrer was sufficient to have reached so potent a defect as to manifest want of jurisdiction. (13 Tex., 38; 11 Tex., 478; 9 Tex., 472.)
If, however, it was not sufficient, it was surely competent to amend this demurrer, and make it more special. (Hart. Dig., Art. 693.)
The court never had jurisdiction of the cause, and that the suit should have been dismissed on that ground. (Roesner v. Bellmer, 7 Tex., 1.)
A plea to the jurisdiction need not be sworn to. .(Hart. Dig., Art. 690.) If it were necessary that the plea filed should have heen sworn to, it was not objected to on that ground; and hence the pleas to the jurisdiction were in every sense good. (Bailes v. Williams, 9 Tex., 61.)
By the terms of the contract, and on every principle of common sense, Compton was bound to run such a line as would accommodate the travel brought to Waco by appellees. This was evidently intended by the terms, “run in connection” their “ respective routes; ” for, unless appellant could carry off the ordinary travel brought, he could not fairly be said to be running in connection with appellees. (Chitty on Contracts, ch. 1, pp. 18, 19; 4 Conn. R., 524; 3 Conn. R., 365; 1 Story on Contracts, § 12, p. 5.)
We contend, then, to briefly recapitulate—
1. That the record shows that there was no jurisdiction.
2. That the verdict of the1 jury sustains the plea of non est factum, and proves that we made no such contract.
3. The verdict shows, that if any such contract were made, appellant was first to violate it.

Opinion:
Roberts, J.
—The special exceptions of defendants in the nature of a plea of privilege, being matter alone pleadable in abatement, and being filed after a general demurrer and general denial, was properly overruled by the court. They were not filed in "the due order of pleading." (O. & W. Dig., Art. 426.) The fact that the matter embraced in the special exceptions was shown in the petition, so that "the truth of the plea appeared of record," would dispense with its being pleaded formally under oath, and with the necessity of adducing other proof in support of it; nevertheless, it was a dilatory plea, (however it might be presented,) which must precede a general demurrer and general denial. (Paschal's Dig., Arts. 1 to 4.)
Whatever form it may assume in its presentation, it is a plea of privilege, in abatement of the suit, claimed under the statute, which prescribes that "no person, who is an inhabitant of the State, shall be sued out of the county where he has his domicile, except," &c. (0. & W. Dig., 401.)
The court was also correct in overruling the exception of plaintiff to the special plea of the defendants, in the nature of a plea of non est factum, and in refusing to exclude the evidence of defendants in support of it. For in this case the general denial would have accomplished the same object. The contract purported to have been executed, not by defendants, in their own names, signed by themselves, or for them by Saunders, but by Saunders himself; he assuming therein to act as " agent of the "Western Stage Company," and simply subscribing his own name thereto, "R. M. Saunders." The defendants' names do not appear in any part of the instrument. Therefore, to make this contract binding on these defendlnts, as their contract, it was incumbent upon Compton to allege, and, under the issue formed by a general denial, to prove, that the persons constituting the Western Stage Company were these defendants; and, further, that they had authorized Saunders to make such a contract, or that they had conferred upon him powers sufficiently enlarged to include the authority to make this instrument for them. There may be other reasons why the court was correct; this will suffice.
The next point arises upon the bill of exceptions of the plaintiff. That relates to the ruling of the court, in the admission of the evidence adduced by defendants to prove that the plaintiff had failed to perform his part of the contract, by which the defendants were released from continuing the connection and co-operation stipulated in the agreement, and from paying to the plaintiff the amounts upon passengers on their stage-line therein agreed upon.
The solution of the question here presented must depend upon the proper, construction to be given to the contract sued on.
It appears, that, previous to this agreement, the defendants were the contractors and owners of a line of stages from Waco to Austin, and the plaintiff of one from Waco to Dallas, being of about equal length; that plaintiff was running not only his own line, hut also continued his line of stages along the defendants' line, from Waco to Austin, so as to run in opposition to defendants; and that, on account of the advantage of its connection, throughout the whole route from Austin to Dallas, the plaintiff's opposition stages between Austin and Waco got more passengers than the regular line of defendants.
Under these circumstances, it was agreed, that plaintiff should stop running his opposition line from Waco to Austin; that each party should run his own line; and that the two lines should run in connection with each other; and that, in the division of the passengers' fare over the lines, the plaintiff should receive an advantage over the defendants, in proportion of $10 to $6.
This contract was intended to continue in operation until July, 1858. It was complied with, on the part of defendants, fully, from its date to the 17th of March, 1856; after which they continued to run their own line separately, and refused to pay plaintiff, any of the proceeds thereof during the balance of the time.
The defendants sought to justify their refusal to pay further on said contract, by alleging and proving, not that plaintiff did not run. his line from Waco to Dallas at all, hut that he ran it so irregularly, and with such inadequate means of transportation, arising from insufficient vehicles, horses, and drivers, that the line, as a whole, running in connection, was greatly injured by the failure of plaintiff to accommodate and facilitate the travel on the route in a manner reasonably appropriate, and defendants sustained loss thereby. The evidence objected to was appropriate to prove these things during the years 1855-'56-'57.
How, if the plaintiff was bound by the contract, not only to run his line, hut also to run it in such a way as to accommodate and facilitate the travel of passengers, who might wish to pass along both lines, in a manner reasonably appropriate, then this evidence of the condition, and management of plaintiff's line, both abstractly and in comparison with that of defendants' line, during the whole time the contract was intended to continue in force, was admissible.
The terms of the contract on this subject are, that "they will run in connection their respective routes between Austin and Waco and between Waco and Dallas."
As to passengers, the effect of the contract was to make the whole distance between Austin and Dallas one line. They might pay their passage-money at one end of it through to the other; so of any part of the line. It was, therefore, necessarily contemplated in the contract, and, as the very essence thereof, that each party should not only run his part of the line, but also run it in such a way as to reasonably accommodate the passengers throughout the whole connected line, at whatever end or part of each line they might start." This was evidently the construction placed upon the contract by the court below in the charge to the jury, to which no exceptions were made by either party.
Withdrawing the opposition line of plaintiff was not all the consideration moving from plaintiff to defendants under this contract. The running his part of the line in such way as that the travel on the whole line might be reasonably accommodated and facilitated, and travel thereon thereby encouraged and attracted, was also a consideration of the contract; and, when that failed, the defendants were absolved from continuing the- connection under the contract. It certainly could not prejudice the rights of the plaintiff to prove such failure after the 17th of March, 1856, as well as before that time. For, during whatever time such failure existed before the time for the expiration of the contract, the plaintiff had no right to complain of their non-performance.
This is one of that species of contracts that usually makes a winning bargain as between the parties, but a lost prize before the jury, unless very strictly performed by the complaining party, who has the advantage in it.
It, therefore, imposes on the court trying the cause the duty of great caution, to have the legal rights of the complaining party strictly awarded to him, in the admission of the evidence, and in the charge given to the jury.
We think this duty was fully performed by the court below in the trial of this cause.
Judgment affirmed.