Case Name: In the Matter of Louis Howard Boehner (Also Known as L. Howard Boehner), an Attorney, Respondent. Association of the Bar of the City of New York, Petitioner
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1966-05-17
Citations: 25 A.D.2d 387
Docket Number: 
Parties: In the Matter of Louis Howard Boehner (Also Known as L. Howard Boehner), an Attorney, Respondent. Association of the Bar of the City of New York, Petitioner.
Judges: Rabin, J. P., McNally, Stevens and Eager, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Appellate Division Reports
Volume: 25
Pages: 387–388

Head Matter:
In the Matter of Louis Howard Boehner (Also Known as L. Howard Boehner), an Attorney, Respondent. Association of the Bar of the City of New York, Petitioner.
First Department,
May 17, 1966.
John G. Bonomi (Michael Franck and Ronald Eisenman with him on the brief), for petitioner,
Louis Spivack for respondent.

Opinion:
Per Curiam.
Respondent was admitted to practice in the Second Department in 1948. Four charges of professional misconduct were filed against respondent. The Referee sustained charge 1, in part (false financial statement), and charge 3 (issuing worthless cheeks). The evidence adduced before the Referee amply supports charges 1 and 3.
It was clearly established that respondent borrowed the sum of $1,044 from a bank and concealed material financial information to obtain the loan. It was also established that on at least 17 occasions respondent issued checks which were returned for insufficient funds.
While commercial activities are not forbidden a lawyer, his dealings as a businessman must be as upright as his dealings in his professional capacity. (Matter of Chartoff, 16 A D 2d 277, 280.) The making of false representations to induce the extension of credit is professional misconduct. (Matter of Schildhaus, 23 A D 2d 152, 156.)
Respondent's conduct is violative of the standards set for the profession and tends to bring it into disrepute. However, we feel, as did the Referee in evaluating his conduct, that it was in some measure induced by his wife's illness. In the light of the mitigating circumstances, we are inclined to be lenient.
Respondent should be suspended for a period of one year.
Rabin, J. P., McNally, Stevens and Eager, JJ., concur.
Respondent suspended for a period of one year, effective June 17, 1966.