Case Name: Sandra A. FISHER, et al., v. COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WELFARE, Appellant; Gregory MATIC v. COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WELFARE, Appellant
Court: Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
Jurisdiction: Pennsylvania
Decision Date: 1985-10-21
Citations: 509 Pa. 164
Docket Number: No. 53 M.D. Appeal Docket 1984
Parties: Sandra A. FISHER, et al., v. COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WELFARE, Appellant. Gregory MATIC v. COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WELFARE, Appellant.
Judges: Before NIX, C.J., and LARSEN, FLAHERTY, McDERMOTT, HUTCHINSON, ZAPPALA and PAPADAKOS, JJ.
Reporter: Pennsylvania State Reports
Volume: 509
Pages: 164–182

Head Matter:
501 A.2d 617
Sandra A. FISHER, et al., v. COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WELFARE, Appellant. Gregory MATIC v. COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WELFARE, Appellant.
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
Argued March 6, 1985.
Decided Oct. 21, 1985.
Jean E. Graybill, Asst. Counsel, John A. Kane, Acting Chief Counsel, John P. Krill, Dep. Gen. Counsel, Harrisburg, for Com., Dept. of Public Welfare.
David Woodward, Harry S. Geller, Legal Services Inc., Chambersburg, for Sandra A. Fisher.
David Gates, Bucks County Legal Aid Society, Bristol, for Gunther Schneider.
Peter Zurflieh, Harrisburg, for Enrique Arabi.
Rebecca L. Peace, Blair County Legal Services Corp., Pittsburgh, for William Sharp.
Richard A. Katz, Central Pa. Legal Services, Lancaster, for Arturo LaRue.
Lorraine D. Taylor, Neighborhood Legal Service Assn., McKeesport, for Gregory Matic.
Before NIX, C.J., and LARSEN, FLAHERTY, McDERMOTT, HUTCHINSON, ZAPPALA and PAPADAKOS, JJ.

Opinion:
OPINION
PAPADAKOS, Justice.
Given the substantial public importance of the question ¡involved in these consolidated appeals, and the scant and evenly divided authority existing thereon, we have deemed it appropriate to grant discretionary review. In this case of first impression, we are concerned, primarily, with a matter of statutory construction in which the intent of the Legislature is controlling. After evidence was presented before a hearing officer, all Appellees were granted general assistance benefits as transitionally needy persons. This decision was upheld by the Department of Public Welfare. Timely notices of appeal were filed by each Appellee to Commonwealth Court requesting assistance as chronically needy persons rather than transitionally needy persons. After consolidation, Commonwealth Court reversed the orders of the Department of Public Welfare and remanded for computation of their general assistance benefits as chronically needy persons. Fisher, et al, v. Commonwealth, Department of Public Welfare, 82 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 116, 475 A.2d 873 (1984). Subsequently, timely Petitions for Allowance of Appeal were filed and granted for Sandra Fisher, et al, on September 15, 1984, and for Gregory Matic on October 15, 1984. We now reverse Commonwealth Court.
The factual pattern of employment for each Appellee reveals that all five Appellees applied for unemployment compensation benefits and were denied for various reasons.
Appellee Fisher lacked adequate earnings in her base year to collect unemployment compensation benefits. Appellees Sharp and La Rue were ruled ineligible for unemployment compensation benefits as a result of being fired for willful misconduct. Appellee Schneider was ineligible because he was self-employed. Appellee Arabi lacked eligibility due to his employment record being outside the United States. Appellee Matic was ineligible for unemployment compensation because he voluntarily quit his job with out a compelling and necessitous reason. Thus, each Appellee was properly found ineligible to receive any unemployment compensation benefits. Parenthetically, each Appellee enjoyed at least forty-eight months of full-time employment out of the previous eight years. After being denied unemployment compensation benefits, all Appellees applied for cash assistance benefits and were granted ninety days of general assistance benefits as transitionally needy persons because the Department of Public Welfare determined that they did not meet the criteria for chronically needy (year-round) benefits.
It is undisputed that all Appellees met the work requirement standard set forth in subsection (H), footnote 2, id., but the Department concluded that none had fulfilled the requirement that unemployment compensation benefits be exhausted. The Department of Public Welfare thus classified the Appellees as transitionally needy persons. This ruling was timely appealed by all Appellees to Commonwealth Court.
The sole issue raised by these appeals is Commonwealth Court's conclusion that persons who did not meet statutory requirements for eligibility for unemployment compensation benefits have "exhausted" their unemployment compensation benefits so as to meet the elements of the legislative definition of chronically needy persons. At issue is the meaning of the word "exhausted" as used in the Public Welfare Code.
Our interpretation of statutory language is governed by 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921, Act of December 6, 1972, P.L. 1339, No. 290, § 3, which states:
§ 1921. Legislative intent controls.
(a) The object of all interpretation and construction of statutes is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the General Assembly. Every statute shall be construed, if possible, to give effect to all its provisions.
(b) When the words of a statute are clear and free from all ambiguity, the letter of it is not to be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit.
(c) When the words of the statute are not explicit, the intention of the General Assembly may be ascertained by considering, among other matters:
(1) The occasion and necessity for the statute.
(2) The circumstances under which it was enacted.
(3) The mischief to be remedied.
(4) The object to be attained.
(5) The former law, if any, including other statutes
upon the same or similar subjects.
(6) The consequences of a particular interpretation.
(7) The contemporaneous legislative history.
(8) Legislative and administrative interpretations of such statute.
Furthermore, when the statute's meaning is plain, we may not look to the legislative history when doing so would alter the plain meaning of the statute. Hellertown Manufacturing Co. v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 480 Pa. 358, 390 A.2d 732 (1978).
The supreme principle of statutory interpretation must be that each word used by the Legislature has meaning and was used for a reason, not as mere surplusage. "The Legislature cannot be deemed to intend that its language be superfluous and without import." Commonwealth v. Mack Bros. Motor Car Co., 359 Pa. 636, 640, 59 A.2d 923, 925 (1948). See also, Daly v. Hemphill, 411 Pa. 263, 273, 191 A.2d 835, 842 (1963).
General Assistance has been available to qualified Pennsylvania applicants since 1937 when the Public Assistance Law was originally enacted (Act of June 24, 1937, P.L. 2051, § 4). After numerous changes and refinements, the current Welfare Reform Act was enacted in 1982, Act of April 8, 1982, P.L. 231, No. 75, § 10. The Act is fashioned to tighten the eligibility standards for General Assistance cash payments by encouraging self-sufficiency for able-bodied workers and allocating funds to the most needy. The problem with Commonwealth Court's interpretation is that they are reading words into the Public Welfare Act rather than accepting the plain meaning of the statute.
Its conclusion that an "applicant need only exhaust such benefits should they be available" (page 174), basically is premised on the assumption that these Claimants should be allowed benefits because that is what the Welfare Reform Act was designed to do, and because "the Legislature did not intend a result that is absurd . or unreasonable" (page 174).
By coupling a work history with the necessity of exhausting unemployment compensation benefits, the Legislature in clear language imposed a requirement that a claimant earn, apply for and receive unemployment compensation and use it all up as pre-conditions to qualifying as "chronically needy persons." Inherent in the term "exhaust" is the notion that before something can be exhausted, it first must have been available and, moreover, received to the fullest extent possible. That which does not exist cannot be consumed or used up or exhausted. Similarly, a claimant cannot receive extended benefits until regular benefits have been received and exhausted. Nikolaidis v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 41 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 137, 398 A.2d 755 (1979).
In the instant case, we are urged to believe that the term "exhaust" can be subject to two interpretations, namely, that a claimant must either receive and use up unemployment compensation benefits, or simply apply for unemployment compensation and be denied. This latter interpretation is nothing more than an exhaustion of administrative procedures. It surely is not an exhaustion of benefits. Because we read our statute and the legislative history behind it to impose stricter standards for claimants to receive benefits under the Act, we must conclude that the Legislature intended "exhaust" to mean the Appellees must have qualified for and received unemployment compensation benefits and depleted their entitlement to same in order to qualify for and receive general assistance benefits as chronically needy persons.
The entire legislative history of the Welfare Reform Act has been thoroughly reviewed by this Court. The key term "exhaust" has been discussed during legislative debate and each time the word appears, the conclusion is that unemployment benefits must have been "used up" in order to receive chronically needy benefits. The whole flavor of the Act is to tighten the reigns of spending by imposing strict requirements on claimants seeking general assistance payments and, in doing so, requiring all claimants to exhaust unemployment benefits pursuant to 62 Pa.S. § 432(3)(i)(H).
The decision of Commonwealth Court is reversed.
JUDGMENT
ON CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, it is now hereby ordered and adjudged by this Court that the Order of the Commonwealth Court is reversed.
ZAPPALA, J., filed a concurring opinion.
HUTCHINSON, J., concurs in the result.
NIX, C.J., and LARSEN, J., filed a dissenting opinion.
. Transitionally needy persons are defined as those persons who are otherwise eligible for general assistance but do not qualify as chronically needy. Assistance for transitionally needy persons shall be authorized only once in any twelve-month period in an amount not to exceed the amount of ninety days' assistance. 62 Pa.S. § 432(3)(iii).
. Chronically needy persons are defined by the Legislature in 62 Pa.S. § 432(3)(i) which states:
Chronically needy persons are those persons chronically in need who may be eligible for an indeterminate period as a result of medical, social or related circumstances and shall be limited to:
(H) Any person who has previously been employed full time for at least forty-eight months out of the previous eight years and has exhausted his or her unemployment compensation benefits prior to applying for assistance.
. 43 Pa.S. § 801.
. Although the timeliness of Appellee La Rue's appeal had been previously questioned in Commonwealth Court, this issue has been resolved and is not before us on appeal.
. 43 Pa.S. § 802 provides:
Ineligibility for compensation:
An employee shall be ineligible for compensation for any week—
(e) In which his unemployment is due to discharge or temporary suspension from work for willful misconduct connected with his work, irrespective of whether or not such work is "employment" as defined in this act;...
. 43 Pa.S. § 802(h).
. Appellee Arabi does not seek review of that part of the decision which remanded for a finding of fact on the credibility of his witness.
. 43 Pa.S. § 802(b)(1).
. Appellee Arabi, a native of Cuba, having arrived in the United States in May of 1980, verified by his own sworn affidavit a work history in Cuba which met the forty-eight month requirement. No independent verification of such work history was furnished on the excuse of impossibility. In view of our holding, this issue is irrelevant since the foreign employment is not "covered" employment under the Act and any wages earned could not be considered in determining base year wages and rate of compensation. See 43 P.S. § 753(i) and (j), for definitions of employee and employer covered by the Act.