Case Name: WILSON v. NORTHSIDE PLUMBING COMPANY, INC.
Court: Court of Appeals of Georgia
Jurisdiction: Georgia
Decision Date: 1973-03-13
Citations: 128 Ga. App. 625
Docket Number: 47593
Parties: WILSON v. NORTHSIDE PLUMBING COMPANY, INC.
Judges: Bell, C. J., Panned, Been, Quillian and Clark, JJ., concur. Hall, P. J., Eberhardt, P. J., and Stolz, J., dissent.
Reporter: Georgia Appeals Reports
Volume: 128
Pages: 625–630

Head Matter:
47593.
WILSON v. NORTHSIDE PLUMBING COMPANY, INC.

Opinion:
Evans, Judge.
Northside Plumbing Co., Inc. brought an action on account against J. H. Wilson and P. H. Thompson jointly and severally for plumbing materials and services furnished for and on behalf of property owner-defendant Wilson at the request of defendant Thompson. A default judgment was entered against Thompson. The plaintiff obtained a verdict and judgment against Wilson, and this court reversed the judgment denying Wilson's motion for new trial. See Wilson v. Northside Plumbing Co., 124 Ga. App. 390 (184 SE2d 40). Upon the second trial of the case, the plaintiff again obtained a verdict and judgment. The defendant appeals from the denial of his motion for a new trial. Held:
1. There was evidence that the defendant had issued a check to the plaintiff in part payment of a portion of the work completed by the plaintiff, and that he had obtained a construction loan on the house here involved. The finding — that Thompson obtained the services for and on behalf of defendant Wilson as his agent or job supervisor — which was made by two separate juries and approved by the trial judge, was authorized by some evidence. Therefore, the trial judge did not err in overruling the general grounds of the motion for a new trial.
2. The main issue in the case, as correctly charged by the trial judge, was Thompson's agency; and it was not error to refuse to give a requested charge to the effect that the agency could not be proved merely by the declarations of the purported agent, where there was evidence of agency other than such declarations, as set forth in Division 1 hereinabove. Furthermore, the defendant's counsel made no objections and requested no additional instructions when the trial judge specifically allowed and requested him to do so.
3. But the lower court erred in denying defendant's motion for mistrial based upon the prejudicial argument of plaintiffs counsel. During argument plaintiffs counsel made the following statement: "At the last trial we obtained a judgment. . ." Defendant's counsel promptly moved for a mistrial because of such improper argument, and the trial judge did not, in the presence of the jury, take any corrective action. The judge did send the jury out, and in the absence of the jury, reprimanded counsel for his offensive language and overruled the motion for mistrial, and then had the jury brought back. The judge did not promptly call to the jury's attention the improper argument with cautionary instructions to disregard same; nor was any action ever taken to let the jury know that the trial judge disapproved of such argument, and that counsel for plaintiff committed an impropriety in making such argument. No apology was made by counsel for such language in the presence of the jury.
After counsel for each party had completed argument to the jury, the court charged the jury, and then, at the end of the charges, and as an afterthought, instructed the jury: "Now, there is one other thing that I forgot, you heard some words here about a previous trial of this case. I charge you that what has gone on before in connection with this case is of no concern whatever to you, and you are to give no consideration whatever to it. You couldn't help it, I couldn't help it, and it has no relation whatever to this case. Your verdict is to be based entirely on what you have heard and what you have seen, and what you have been instructed here .today. You may retire." (Emphasis supplied.)
It appears that the trial judge carefully refrained from directing any criticism, rebuke, or reprimand toward offending counsel in the presence of the jury, nor did he act with promptness in even mentioning the matter to the jury.
After completing his charge, the very vague, ambiguous, and general statement to the jury, as an afterthought, and which he told the jury he almost forgot, did not even advise the jury as to the name of the person who uttered the "words about a previous trial" and the jury had to use its own devices in order to determine whether some witness, or one of the attorneys, was referred to by the judge, or even some statement injected by the judge himself. The transcript shows that there were words heard by the jury about a previous trial that came from the witness Thompson, a codefendant, and that the court also in the presence of the jury spoke of a previous trial. Thus, with testimony by a witness and with words injected by the court about a previous trial it cannot be successfully argued that the trial judge sufficiently stated with the required specificity as to what words he referred to and by whom they were uttered. Therefore, the court's instructions were contradictory and confusing in that the jury was told therein to base its verdict "on what you have heard," a part of which was the improper language used by the plaintiffs counsel in boasting of having obtained a judgment at the last trial.
Argued October 2, 1972
Decided March 13, 1973
Rehearing denied March 30, 1973
Sam G. Bettelbach, for appellant.
Richardson, Chenggis & Constantinides, Robert P. Mallis, for appellee.
In order to avoid a mistrial the court must promptly instruct the jury to disregard the alleged improper remarks and rebuke the attorney making them. Code § 81-1009; McCoy v. Scarborough, 73 Ga. App. 519, 520 (37 SE2d 221); Ga. Life Ins. Co. v. Hanvey, 143 Ga. 786 (3) (85 SE 1036). This error requires the grant of a new trial.
Judgment reversed.
Bell, C. J., Panned, Been, Quillian and Clark, JJ., concur. Hall, P. J., Eberhardt, P. J., and Stolz, J., dissent.