Case Name: Ralph M. Verni, as Administrator of the Estate of Michael J. Verni, Deceased, Appellant, v. Evald Johnson, Respondent
Court: New York Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1946-07-23
Citations: 295 N.Y. 436
Docket Number: 
Parties: Ralph M. Verni, as Administrator of the Estate of Michael J. Verni, Deceased, Appellant, v. Evald Johnson, Respondent.
Judges: 
Reporter: New York Reports
Volume: 295
Pages: 436–439

Head Matter:
Ralph M. Verni, as Administrator of the Estate of Michael J. Verni, Deceased, Appellant, v. Evald Johnson, Respondent.
Argued April 16, 1946;
decided July 23, 1946.
Isidor Unger for appellant.
The trial court committed reversible error in submitting to the jury the question whether this child of three years and two months was sui juris and in admitting testimony over objection and exception from which the jury could infer that the parents of the child were negligent in their supervision. (Meyer v. Inguaggiato, 258 App. Div. 331; Mangam v. Brooklyn R. R. Co., 38 N. Y. 455; Camardo v. New York State Railways, 247 N. Y. 111.)
Julius S. Christensen and James J. McLoughlin for respondent.
The capacity of the infant to exercise care commensurate with his age, intelligence and experience, and the question of his contributory negligence, if any, was properly left to the jury. (Weidenfeld v. Surface Transportation Corp., 269 App. Div. 341; Richmond v. Krasne, 273 N. Y. 472; Zwack v. N. Y., L. E. & W. R. R. Co., 160 N. Y. 362; Goodheart v. American Airlines, Inc., 252 App. Div. 660; Whitcher v. Board of Education, 233 App. Div. 184; Bressler v. New York Rapid Transit Corp., 270 N. Y. 409; Camardo v. New York State Railways, 247 N. Y. 111.)

Opinion:
Desmond, J.
The testimony here raised a question of fact as to defendant's negligence. The Trial Justice submitted to the jury that issue and an issue as to contributory negligence of plaintiff's intestate, an infant three years and two months old at the time of the accident. Plaintiff's counsel requested a charge that " a child of the age of three years and two months is non sui juris and incapable of being guilty of negligence ". The request was refused. We granted leave to appeal so that we might pass on the correctness of the rule of law contended for in that request to charge.
Ip every reported case where the question has been squarely raised, this court has held that a three-year-old child is conclusively presumed to be incapable of negligence (Mangam v. Brooklyn R. R. Co., 38 N. Y. 455, 459, 460; Ihl v. Forty-second Street & Grand St. Ferry R. R. Co., 47 N. Y. 317, 322, 323; Prendegast v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. R. Co., 58 N. Y. 652, 653; McGarry v. Loomis, 63 N. Y. 104,106). In Meyer v. Inguggiato (258 App. Div. 331, 333) the second department joined unani mously in an opinion by Justice Hagarty holding that " a child under the age of four years is non sui juris, as a matter of law ". We denied leave (282 N. Y. 811). The argument for leaving the question of competency to juries is based on certain language in Camardo v. New York State Railways (247 N. Y. 111). The Gamardo child was just under five years of age and the language of this court's opinion must be read with that in mind. There is no sign in that opinion of any intent to overrule the Mangam, Ihl, Prendegast and McGarry cases, above cited.
Throughout the United States, " as regards a child between three and four years of age, the weight of authority is in favor of a conclusive presumption of incapacity " (107 A. L. R. 100).
The rule which refuses to allow such young children to be penalized for supposed faults has been followed in this court at least since 1868 (Mangam v. Brooklyn R. R. Co., supra). It is not an unjust rule or one which changing conditions make obsolete. No reason appears for changing it.
The judgments should be reversed and a new trial granted, with costs to abide the event.