Case Name: David EVERETTE, Petitioner, v. FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, Respondent
Court: Florida Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 2007-06-28
Citations: 961 So. 2d 270
Docket Number: No. SC05-1996
Parties: David EVERETTE, Petitioner, v. FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, Respondent.
Judges: WELLS, ANSTEAD, PARIENTE, and QUINCE, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 961
Pages: 270–277

Head Matter:
David EVERETTE, Petitioner, v. FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, Respondent.
No. SC05-1996.
Supreme Court of Florida.
June 28, 2007.
Bennett H. Brummer, Public Defender, and John Eddy Morrison, Assistant Public Defender, Eleventh Judicial Circuit, Miami, FL, for Petitioner.
Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, Richard L. Polin, Criminal Appeals Bureau Chief, and Annette M. Lizardo, Assistant Attorney General, Miami, FL, and Amy McKeever Toman, Senior Attorney, Agency for Persons with Disabilities, Marianna, FL, for Respondents.

Opinion:
PER CURIAM.
This case is before the Court for review of the decision of the Third District Court of Appeal in State v. Everette, 911 So.2d 119 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004). The district court's decision expressly affects a class of constitutional or state officers. Therefore, this Court has jurisdiction to review the district court's decision. See art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
David Everette suffers from moderate mental retardation, epilepsy, cerebral palsy, schizoaffective disorder, and an impaired gait as a result of an atrophied leg. At the age of sixteen, Everette was placed in the care of the State. A number of years later, in 1994, Everette was charged with first-degree felony attempted murder and aggravated assault with a deadly weapon after he stabbed an individual during an altercation at the group home where he was living. See Everette, 911 So.2d at 119. As a result of Everette's mental retardation, he was declared incompetent to stand trial and involuntarily committed pursuant to section 916.13 of the Florida Statutes to the Mentally Retarded Defendants Program at the Florida State Hospital pending the dismissal of the charges against him. See § 916.13, Fla. Stat. (1993). On December 18, 1996, pursuant to then-numbered section 916.145 of the Florida Statutes, which provided a two-year time period for the dismissal of criminal charges against persons adjudicated incompetent due to mental retardation or mental illness, the trial court dismissed the charges against Everette. Additionally, because of his inability to care for himself and the possible threat to himself or others if he was permitted to remain at liberty, the trial court involun tarily committed Everette pursuant to section 393.11 of the Florida Statutes, Florida's civil commitment statute, which permits an involuntary admission to residential services when:
Because of the person's degree of mental retardation or autism, the person:
a. Lacks sufficient capacity to give express and informed consent to a voluntary application for services pursuant to s. 393.065 and lacks basic survival and self-care skills to such a degree that close supervision and habilitation in a residential setting is necessary, and, if not provided, would result in a real and present threat of substantial harm to the person's well-being; or
b. Is likely to physically injure others if allowed to remain at liberty.
§ 393.11(8)(b)(3), Fla. Stat. (2004).
The trial court order stated "that the charges against the Defendant are dismissed and he is committed to the Department of Children and Families for secure Residential Placement and appropriate services for a period of time that shall not exceed the maximum sentence for the crime for which he was charged." Subsequently, Everette was placed in Pathways, a secure Department of Children and Family Services ("DCF") facility that was then located in Miami, Florida. On June 29, 2004, DCF filed a notice in the Eleventh Judicial Circuit of its intention to transfer Everette to a non-secure residential setting. On August 2, 2004, the court issued an order appointing two experts to evaluate Everette "to determine whether the defendant continues to meet the criteria for involuntary residential services (FI. Statutes 393.11) and, if so, whether the defendant still requires placement in a secure facility because he is likely to physically injure others." At a hearing held the same day, the trial court orally ordered DCF to be responsible for coordinating Everette's transport to and from these evaluations. On August 3, 2004, the Pathways facility relocated from Miami, Florida to Marianna, Florida, and Everette was relocated along with the entire facility. On August 25, 2004, DCF filed a motion in the Eleventh Circuit requesting a transfer of jurisdiction to the Fourteenth Circuit, which the circuit court denied. Subsequent to the move of the facility, the circuit court issued two orders directing DCF to transport Everette to the court-ordered evaluations.
DCF filed two separate petitions for writ of certiorari with the Third District, requesting that the trial court orders be quashed, which were ultimately consolidated for review. The fundamental issue presented in these petitions was whether, under the Florida Statutes, the sheriff and not DCF was the party responsible for Everette's transport to and from the court-ordered evaluations. DCF asserted that because the trial court ordered Everette's involuntary commitment to a secure facility pursuant to section 916.303(2)(b) of the Florida Statutes (2004), Everette is therefore a "forensic client" under chapter 916 of the Florida Statutes whose transportation is to be coordinated by the sheriff according to the dictates of section 916.107(10), Florida Statutes (2004). Everette countered that he is not a forensic client under chapter 916 because he was civilly committed pursuant to section 393.11 subsequent to the dismissal of the criminal charges against him.
On October 27, 2004, the Third District issued the decision below, which granted the petitions for writ of certiorari, quashed both orders of the trial court, and remanded the matter to the trial court with directions that the trial court order the county sheriff to arrange any transport deemed necessary. See Everette, 911 So.2d at 121. The district court reasoned that although Everette was committed pursuant to section 393.11, after the dismissal of the criminal charges against him, his placement in a secure facility was pursuant to chapter 916, and, therefore, he was a forensic client under section 916.106(7), Florida Statutes (2004) and his transport was governed by section 916.107(10). This Court granted discretionary review based upon Everette's assertion that the decision below expressly affects a class of constitutional officers by obligating the county sheriff to transport certain persons now classified as "forensic clients."
ANALYSIS
Failure to Join the Sheriff
In the decision below, the Third District held that the sheriff is responsible for the transportation of Everette and all those similarly situated, but the sheriff was not joined as a party to the proceedings. It is a longstanding principle of Florida law that "[a]ll persons materially interested in the subject matter of a suit and who would be directly affected by an adjudication of the controversy are necessary parties." W.F.S. Co. v. Anniston Nat'l Bank of Anniston, Ala., 140 Fla. 213, 191 So. 300, 301 (1939). Necessary parties must be made parties in a legal action. See Oakland Properties Corp. v. Hogan, 96 Fla. 40, 117 So. 846 (1928). The decision of the district court below obligates the sheriff to coordinate and fund the transportation of all persons placed in a secure facility following the dismissal of criminal charges against them. This decision could produce a substantial strain on the resources of the sheriffs in Florida. Therefore, the sheriff was a materially interested necessary party to the proceedings below, and the district court erred in failing to provide the sheriff notice and an opportunity to be heard before deciding that the sheriff was responsible for Everette's transportation. Therefore, we quash the decision of the Third District below and remand for further proceedings.
Everette Is Not a Criminal Defendant Subject to Section 916.107(10)
In addition to failing to join the sheriff as a necessary party, the Third District below also erred in holding that the sheriff is responsible for transporting Everette under section 916.107(10) of the Florida Statutes. The dissenting opinion of Judge Ramirez below accurately expresses why this section is inapplicable in the instant matter. See Everette, 911 So.2d at 123 (Ramirez, J., dissenting). Section 916.107(10) is part of chapter 916 of the Florida Statutes, which addresses the treatment of mentally deficient and mentally ill defendants. See ch. 916, Fla. Stat. (2006). As noted by Judge Ramirez below, Everette has not been a criminal defendant since December 18, 1996, when the criminal charges against him were dismissed and he was involuntarily committed to residential services pursuant to section 393.11 of the Florida Statutes. As Everette is currently a civilly committed person, the transportation provision of section 916.107(10) is inapplicable to him, and the sheriff is not responsible for his transportation. Everette is currently committed to the care of DCF, and DCF is responsible for coordinating his transportation to the court-ordered evaluations at issue in the instant dispute. Therefore, we also quash the decision below on this basis and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
WELLS, ANSTEAD, PARIENTE, and QUINCE, JJ., concur.
LEWIS, C.J., concurs in part and dissents in part with an opinion, in which CANTERO, J., concurs.
BELL, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with an opinion.
. In 1998, section 916.145 was amended to address only persons adjudicated incompetent due to mental illness and increased the time after which charges must be dismissed from two years to five years for such persons. See ch. 98-92, § 18, at 718, Laws of Fla.; § 916.145, Fla. Stat. (Supp.1998). In that same chapter law, section 916.303 was created and subsection (1) addressed the dismissal of charges against persons adjudicated incompetent due to mental retardation or autism and maintained the two-year deadline for the dismissal of charges. See ch. 98-92, § 27, at 724, Laws of Fla.; § 916.303(1), Fla. Stat. (Supp.1998).
. In 2004, the Agency for Persons with Disabilities ("APD") was created and became the real party in interest with respect to the instant matter, which involves the developmental services programs of DCF. Although this Court recognizes that APD is the real party in interest, for the sake of consistency between this decision and the decision of the Third District below, this opinion will continue to refer to DCF as the Slate agency involved in this dispute.