Case Name: GLENDALE FEDERAL SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION; Community Federal Savings and Loan Association of the Palm Beaches; Naples Federal Savings and Loan Association; Wilshire Glen Services, Inc., d/b/a Jewel City Insurance Agency, a California Corporation registered to do business in the State of Florida; Comfed, Inc., d/b/a Community Insurance Agency, a Florida corporation, and John O'Conner, Appellants, v. STATE of Florida, DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE, a state agency, and the Honorable Bill Gunter, as Insurance Commissioner and Treasurer of the State of Florida, et al., Appellees
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1991-09-30
Citations: 587 So. 2d 534
Docket Number: No. 88-2266
Parties: GLENDALE FEDERAL SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION; Community Federal Savings and Loan Association of the Palm Beaches; Naples Federal Savings and Loan Association; Wilshire Glen Services, Inc., d/b/a Jewel City Insurance Agency, a California Corporation registered to do business in the State of Florida; Comfed, Inc., d/b/a Community Insurance Agency, a Florida corporation, and John O’Conner, Appellants, v. STATE of Florida, DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE, a state agency, and the Honorable Bill Gunter, as Insurance Commissioner and Treasurer of the State of Florida, et al., Appellees.
Judges: ERVIN, J., and WENTWORTH, Senior Judge, concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 587
Pages: 534–542

Head Matter:
GLENDALE FEDERAL SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION; Community Federal Savings and Loan Association of the Palm Beaches; Naples Federal Savings and Loan Association; Wilshire Glen Services, Inc., d/b/a Jewel City Insurance Agency, a California Corporation registered to do business in the State of Florida; Comfed, Inc., d/b/a Community Insurance Agency, a Florida corporation, and John O’Conner, Appellants, v. STATE of Florida, DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE, a state agency, and the Honorable Bill Gunter, as Insurance Commissioner and Treasurer of the State of Florida, et al., Appellees.
No. 88-2266.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
Sept. 30, 1991.
Rehearing Denied Nov. 4, 1991.
See also 537 So.2d 1097.
Marguerite H. Davis and Edward L. Flutter of Katz, Kutter, Haigler, Alderman, Eaton & Davis, P.A., and Keith C. Tischler and Jack M. Skelding, Jr., of Parker, Skeld-ing, McVoy & Labasky, Tallahassee, for appellants.
Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., Eric J. Taylor, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Lisa S. Santucci, Asst. Gen. Counsel, Dept, of Ins., Tallahassee, for appellees Florida Dept, of Ins. and Ins. Com’r Bill Gunter.
DuBose Ausley, Kenneth R. Hart, and' Steven P. Seymoe of Ausley, McMullen, McGehee, Carothers & Proctor, Tallahassee, for appellee Florida Ass’n of Ins. Agents.
J. Robert McClure, Jr., of Carlton, Fields, Ward, Emmanuel, Smith & Cutler, Tallahassee, for amicus curiae Florida Ass’n of Life Underwriters.
John J. Gill, General Counsel, Michael F. Crotty, Associate General Counsel, and Irving D. Warden, Asst. Counsel, Washington, D.C., for amicus curiae American Bankers Ass’n.
J. Thomas Cardwell and Virginia B. Townes of Akerman, Senterfitt & Eidson, Orlando, for amicus curiae Florida Bankers Ass’n.

Opinion:
PER CURIAM.
This is an appeal of an August 11, 1988 final summary judgment, granting defendants/appellees' motion addressed to appellants' complaint for declaratory relief and denying appellants' motion for such relief. Appellants contend here (1) that the restrictions on insurance agents contained in § 626.988, F.S. (1983), are so vague and ambiguous as to render the statute incapable of proper construction; that it is unconstitutionally violative of equal protection and due process, and constitutes an unlawful delegation of legislative authority to the state Department of Insurance; and that the matter regulated is preempted by federal law. We affirm, finding appellants have not carried their burden of demonstrating from the record here the existence of material disputed facts precluding the trial court's disposition.
Because the vagueness challenge deals with economic regulation, we are con strained to use greater latitude in applying a vagueness test because the affected parties are comparatively sophisticated and are clearly intended to seek administrative guidance. Village of Hoffman Estate v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 102 S.Ct. 1186, 71 L.Ed.2d 862 (1982). See also Department of Legal Affairs v. Rogers, 329 So.2d 257, 264 (Fla.1976). Most of the language questioned can be interpreted according to common understanding and reason, and several terms, such as "financial institution," "insurance agency activities," and "financial institution agency," are expressly defined in the statute. The court correctly found that the statute affords fair notice to the parties that they are affected and what is prohibited, and also affords sufficient guidance to the agency charged with enforcing it.
As to appellant's equal protection and due process arguments, this court previously reversed and remanded an order of dismissal for the expressed purpose of giving appellants a chance to build a record as to alleged discrimination without rational basis in the terms of the act, and "[m]ore importantly . to show [as alleged] that so many financial institutions and their agents are currently being permitted to sell insurance under the grandfather exceptions . that the entire statute has been rendered ineffectual." Glendale Federal Savings & Loan Association v. State of Florida, Department of Insurance, 485 So.2d 1321, 1325 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986). From our reading of the briefs and those portions of the record which are undisputed in any significant respect, we conclude that appellants made no showing sufficient to require the trial court's exercise of any functions beyond the proper scope of the motions for summary judgment, and that the order entered is facially and substantively adequate.
The challenged classifications are (1) financial institutions located in towns with a population of less than 5,000; (2) certain financial institutions exempted from the statute; (3) financial institutions "grandfathered" at the time the statute was enacted; and (4) an exemption allowing financial institutions to sell credit insurance. The population exemption may be related to lack of availability of insurance in smaller towns, the traditional overlapping of functions in their businesses, and the need for additional sources of income for survival of banks in that market. Certain financial institutions are exempt on the apparent theory that they cannot effectively exercise influence or control over a bank or savings and loan association. This exemption prevents the statute's application to institutions that are less likely to indulge in the "evils" of coercion, unfair trade practices, and undue concentration of resources.
The "grandfather" exemption protects vested rights, and cannot here be said to be so lacking in rationality that it constitutes an impermissible denial of equal protection. See City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 305, 96 S.Ct. 2513, 2517-18, 49 L.Ed.2d 511 (1976). Finally, the exemption that allows financial institutions to sell credit insurance is rationally related to the legitimate goal of protecting the proper business interests of those institutions and their loans. Because each classification appears to bear some reasonable relationship to a legitimate state purpose, we conclude that the trial court correctly found no violation of equal protection. And the cited rational bases of prevention of coercion, unfair trade practices, and undue concentration of resources, in light of evidence in the form of affidavits and deposition testimony of expert witnesses, support the conclusions that the legislature could properly decide to act as it did, and that the statute accordingly does not violate due process.
Appellants contend that 12 U.S.C. § 1461, et seq., which governs the manner in which a federal savings and loan association may do business, has preempted § 626.988 as it pertains to savings and loan associations. The Third Circuit recently dismissed this same argument in Ford Motor Co. v. Insurance Commissioner of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 874 F.2d 926 (3d Cir.1989), cert. denied, sub nom. USAA v. Foster, 493 U.S. 969, 110 S.Ct. 418, 107 L.Ed.2d 382 (1989), in determining that Pennsylvania's statute, which precludes companies that sell insurance in Pennsylvania from affiliation with savings and loan institutions, was not preempted by federal legislation. That court stated, and we agree:
We are unpersuaded, however, as were the district courts, that Congress intended to preempt entirely the states' authority to impose regulations upon savings and loan institutions that operate within the state's borders, or, as in the present case, to impose regulations upon other financial institutions that seek affiliations with savings and loans. Affirmed.
ERVIN, J., and WENTWORTH, Senior Judge, concur.
ZEHMER, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with opinion.
. FINAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT This is an action challenging the facial constitutionality of § 626.988, Florida Statutes_alleging the statute violates various provisions of the constitutions of both the United States and the State of Florida. Both Plaintiffs and Defendants have filed motions for summary judgment, stating that no disputed issue of material fact exists.
*
This Court originally dismissed this action on authority of Production Credit Associations v. Dept. of Insurance, 356 So.2d 31 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978). The First District Court of Appeals [sic] reversed and remanded, holding that Production Credit did not rule on the constitutionality of § 626.988. Glendale Federal Savings and Loan Assn. v. Dept. of Ins., 485 So.2d 1321 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986), rev. denied, 494 So.2d 1150 (Fla.1986).
Subsequent to the First District's remand, the parties have developed a factual record through the filing of memoranda and through extensive discovery, including the taking of depositions, requests for admissions, production of documents, and interrogatories.
*
Because the statute concerns the regulation of insurance, it is a matter within the state's exercise of police power and large discretion is vested in the legislature. See, Feller v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc., 57 So.2d 581 (Fla.1952); Collingnon v. Larson, 145 So.2d 246 (Fla. 1st DCA 1962). The legislation will be presumed constitutional .
. if any state of facts, known or to be assumed, justifies the law, the court's power of inquiry ends; questions as to the wisdom, need, or appropriateness are for the legislature.
Fulford v. Graham, 418 So.2d 1204, 05 [1205] (Fla. 1st DCA 1982). Accordingly, only if no rational basis exists for the statute may it be declared unconstitutional. Based on the evidence now in the record, it is clear that the legislative decision in enacting § 626.988 meets this constitutional standard.
*
The United States Supreme Court has held that unless a classification . is drawn upon inherently suspect classifications, a court should defer to legislative determinations as to the desirability of particular statutory dis-criminations. City of New Orleans v. Duke, 427 U.S. 297 [96 S.Ct. 2513, 49 L.Ed.2d 511] (1976). Distinctions may be made with substantially less than mathematical exactitude and legislatures may implement their programs step by step, adopting regulations that only partially ameliorate a perceived evil and deferring complete elimination of the evil to future regulations. Id.
Plaintiffs complain of four classifications created by § 626.988, Florida Statutes: a) those financial institutions located in towns less than 5,000; b) other types of financial institutions not included in the statute; c) those financial institutions "grandfathered" at the time of passage; and d) that exemption which allows financial institutions to sell credit insurance. Based upon the extensive record developed by the parties, this Court finds that the classifications created by § 626.-988, Florida Statutes, are rationally related to legitimate state goals, that of preventing coercion, unfair trade practices, and undue concentration of resources, and that such classifications are sufficiently tailored to achieve those goals.
*
In Daniel v. Family Security Life Insurance Co., 336 U.S. 220 [69 S.Ct. 550, 93 L.Ed. 632] (1949), . the United States Supreme Court upheld against a due process challenge a statute prohibiting undertakers from selling insurance. The Court found that a legislature might well have concluded that the "likelihood of overreaching on the part of insurance companies, combined with the possibility of monopoly control" required prohibiting undertakers from serving as agents for life insurance companies. Id. at 223 [69 S.Ct. at 552],
Similarly in this case, this Court finds § 626.988 to be rationally related to legitimate state goals. Concerns regarding financial institutions' entry into insurance activities, including the prevention of coercion, unfair trade practices, and undue concentration of resources, existed at the time of passage of the statute and remain valid today. Expert testimony filed with this Court shows that a legislature could well have decided that some protection was required, [e.s.] Therefore, the statute is rationally related to valid and permissible legislative goals, is sufficiently tailored to achieve those goals, and is accordingly constitutional under the due process clauses of both the United States and Florida Constitutions.
*
Accordingly, this Court finds and rules, based on the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions, together with the affidavits on file, that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that Defendants are entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.