Case Name: The People against Vermilyea and Barker
Court: New York Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1827-08
Citations: 7 Cow. 369
Docket Number: 
Parties: *The People against Vermilyea and Barker.
Judges: 
Reporter: Cowen's Reports
Volume: 7
Pages: 368–399

Head Matter:
*The People against Vermilyea and Barker.
UTICA,
August, 1827.
a new trial TlU, ]?ot be granted, even in a criminal case, because the district attorney, by mistake, withholds in his hands papers important to the defendant, unless the latter uses due diligence to.obtain them.
Where the district attorney told him, by mistake, they were in the hands of.C., who, or being applied to, answered they were with the district attorney; but the defendant did not explain the mistake, and apply to the district attorney again; held, a want of due diligence.
Indi’awing a jury under the statute, (1 R. L. 331,s. 20,) if any juror does not appear when drawn and his name called, he may be refused a place in the box, though he afterwards appear and answer before a fall jury is drawn.
Or, semble, he may be received, in the discretion of the court.
A new trial, will not be granted, on motion of a defendant convicted in a criminal case, on the ground that a co-defendant tried at the same time, and acquitted, was a material witness for. the convicted defendant.
Where several are indicted jointly, for an offence not capital, or where there is no right of peremptory challenge, it is in the discretion of the court which tries, to grant a separate trial to each defendant or not.
So, it seems, in a capital ca.se, or a case where the right of peremptory challenge prevails.
Where, on a cause being carried down for trial, for the first time, the defendant moves to but off the trial ibr the absence of a material witness, having used due diligence to obtain nis attendance, though such witness reside out of the jurisdiction of the court, the trial should be postponed.
The defendants, indicted with Davis and others, were tried jointly with him at the last circuit court in the city v J 0 and county of New York, before Edwards, 0. Judge.
It is no answer to the application, to admit that the witness required, would, if present, testify to the facts supposed in the affidavit on which the motion to postpone is founded.
Though, semble, it would he an answer, to admit unqualifiedly the truth of such fácts.
Short of this, the party is entitled to time for obtaining the oral examination of his'witness, before the jury.
In all such cases, the questions are, 1. Is the witness material? 2. Has the defendant been guilty of laches? 3. Can the witness be procured at the next court?
Where a criminal cause is removed by certiorari into the supreme court, and retained on the civil side, a commission may issue to take the deposition of a foreign witness, as in a civil cause.
The rule as to putting off trials for the absence of witnesses, is the same, both in civi’ and criminal cases.
The court has a discretion as to putting off; but it is a legal discretion; and if not properly exercised by a judge at the circuit, thé supreme court will interfere on motion.
Semb. though a juror may once have entertained and expressed an opinion hostile to a party; yet, if it satisfactorily appear that he has changed his views, it is no ground tor anew trial, that ho concealed his former hostility, when called as a juror.
Davis was acquitted; but the defendants, V. & B., were eonvjctecl.
A. Spencer, for Barker,
now moved for a new trial, on several grounds disclosed in affidavits, which he read. These grounds are fully stated by Savage, Oh. J., in his opinion; but for the purpose of the arguments, it is neces sary briefly to state them here.
A new trial having been granted to the defendants at the last May term; (vid. ante, 108,) on the 29th of May, the cause was directed by this court, to be tried at the circuit. The district attorney then declared to the court, *that he should indict the defendants de novo in the oyer and terminer. The defendants were recognised, in the form mentioned, ante 141, note.(6) On the 13th of June, the district attorney noticed the trial for the 17th of the same month. The trial was moved on the 19th; when Barker made a motion for a separate trial; which was denied. But the judge decided that the case of each defendant should be submitted separately to the jury. The defendants also moved to put off the trial on account of the absence of Gen. Swift, a witness now residing in the state of Tennessee, about 1500 miles distant; but who had promised to attend in person. The defendants swore that they believed they could obtain his attendance in August or September. They specified also by affidavit what they believed Gen. Swift would prove. An affidavit was read on the part of the people, that there had been two trials of the cause before in the court of oyer and terminer. The judge granted the motion to postpone; whereupon the district attorney offered to admit that Gen. Swift would swear to the facts stated in the defendants’ affidavits, which should be received on the trial as his testimony; reserving the right to contradict and impeach it. Hereupon the judge ordered on the trial; though the defendants still persisted in their motion to postpone. Upon the trial, evidence was produced by the district attorney, of Gen. Swift’s declarations that he was ignorant of. the facts which the defendants swore they believed he would prove. Affidavits were now also read, that Davis was a material witness for the defendants: and that certain papers material to B’s defense were, by mistake, withholden from him by the district attorney, who told B. he supposed they were with the clerk of the oyer and terminer; who, on application to him, replied, they were with the district attorney: to whom B. did not apply a second time.
In calling the jury, one of them did not at first appear. The drawing and calling proceeded; but before it was completed, the defaulting juror appeared. The defendants insisted that he should then be called; but this was denied; and the number was completed without him.
*Spencer.
The affidavit to put off the trial was admitted to be full and sufficient in every particular. Indeed, it contained much more than was necessary. Every fact that Barker supposed Gen. Swift would swear to, is stated. Beyond all doubt, his attendance might have been procured at "the next circuit. This was the first application to put off the trial. Yet we were compelled to go to trial, on the concession that Gen. Swift would swear as stated in B.’s affidavit, reserving the right to impeach his evidence. That evidence was impeached most effectually.
We complain that we were deprived of the personal attendance of the witness. We were entitled to his attendance and examination before the jury. I have had recourse to all the authorities; and I do not find that a trial was ever brought on upon such a qualified admission. The rule as to putting off a trial, is the same in criminal as in civil cases. (Rex v. D'Eon, 1 W. Bl. 514. 3 Bur. 1514, S. C.) This is a leading case. It lays down the rules to be followed; and which have ever since been followed. (1 Chit. C. L. 490, 491; 2 Tidd, 708; 2 Archb. 210; 8 East, 31.) It is a matter of right to have the trial put off once, on the general affidavit; where the object does not appear to be delay. ' Here was no pretence of delay. In Rex v. D'Eon, the motion was denied on the ground that the witnesses evidently could never be procured, that they were not material, and the party had been wanting in diligence. All these objections fail in this case. The party has a right to the personal presence of the witness, to explain or controvert anything which may be said against him. The evidence admitted was inferior to a written deposition. The jury could not help seeing, that Gen. Swift had never testified at all; and weak as such evidence was in itself, it was nullified by the adverse evidence. I need not vindicate the importance of oral examination in presence of the jury. It is among the elements of the common law. (3 Bl. Com. 373.) And the only way in which B. could have a sure equivalent, was to admit the truth of the facts which he stated in his affidavit would be verified by the witness.
*Ho doubt there is a discretion in the judge; but not an arbitrary discretion, which cannot be reviewed on appeal. It is a sound legal discretion. There is a discretion to require .an affidavit of what the witness will prove; to collect the whole case, and decide upon it. Yet, in any stage of the application, the court will examine, and see whether he has exercised his discretion legally. If he has not done so, they will set him right. The discretion is to be exercised in discovering and applying the rules of law. (7 John. 306.) In Ogden v. Payne, (5 Cowen, 15,) this court held that the affidavit of specification was prematurely required ; and in Hooker v. Rogers, (6 Cowen, 577,) they held that it was irregular to require the party to consent to an examination de bene esse.
The counsel examined the facts laid before the circuit judge on the motion for a separate trial; and that in a sound exercise of discretion, it should have been granted. These facts were similar to those stated ante, 136, on B.’s motion at bar. He said the case of The People v. Howell, (4 John. 296, 301,) settled that this was a matter of discretion, where there is no right of peremptory challenge. This court will see that such discretion be not'abused.
Davis, being acquitted, became a competent witness. He was not so before. (10 John. 95.) He is, then, within the reason of the rule, (2 Caines, 155,) which gives a new trial on the ground of newly discovered testimony. It is the same case in principle, as if a witness is, by mistake, reported to be dead at the time of trial, in consequence of which his testimony is lost. In Rex v. Mawbey et al., (6 T. R. 619, 627, 638,) the depositions of co-defendants who were acquitted, were received in support of a motion for a new trial, in behalf of those who were convicted. This was on the ground that they were competent witnesses, in consequence of the acquittal, and not before.
B. was also deprived of papers material to his defense, by the mistake of the district attorney.
'•'As to the defaulting juror, the mode of treating such a case is not, in terms, pointed out by the statute, (1 R. L. 331,) upon which this question depends. The act is, that the 12 first drawn and appearing shall make the jury. It is not necessary that they should appear at the moment. Our construction is, that the 12 who appear during the progress of impannelling, shall make the jury. This, however, we agree is a question of practice still open; and which we submit to the court, without farther comment.
H. Maxwell, (district attorney,) and O. Hoffman, contra.
The defendants were guilty of negligence in not resorting .to the means in their power, to procure the testimony of Gen. Swift. They might have applied for a commission in May term, after the decision in favor of a new trial was pronounced. Had the district attorney refused his assent to the commission, this court would have put off the trial till he should consent; or a motion might here have been ma¿e for an absolute postponement. We hear nothing of ^-s eyi¿ence¡ till the trial is called on at the circuit.
It is true, there are general expressions in the books, that the rule, in regard to putting off trials, is the same both in criminal and civil cases;• but on reflection, the counsel will see there are several points of difference. In the latter cases, the cause goes off on payment of costs; as the penalty of not being ready, and an earnest of the defendant’s sincerity. But in criminal cases, beside the want of this check, a heavy punishment may follow conviction; to avoid which, the defendant has every inducement to run into the additional crime of pretending witnesses which he can never' obtain, or misrepresenting and discoloring the testimony of those which be may obtain. The court will, therefore, look into the case with more jealousy. Public policy often requires this; and in Rex v. D'Eon, it was agreed that the court should examine for grounds of suspicion, or attempts at delay. Was there not ground for the judge to entertain» suspicion as to the bonaftdes of this application? The defendants swore they were innocent, *and that Gen. Swift would prove them to be so. Why should we be put to grant this, without the liberty of contradicting it ? Where was the impropriety of impeaching the evidence? Was the proposition ever before heard, that the application to postpone on an affidavit of particulars, cannot be obviated short of absolutely admitting its truth? The personal attendance of a witness is important; but it is dispensed with every day by the use officommissions. It is admitted that the court had a discretion. We agree that this is a discretion in applying the law to the facts; and we do not deny that he may be set right if he err in the exercise of it; but we trust not on the ground that he allowed the defendants’ evidence to be contradicted. The court must be satisfied that injustice has been done. In Ogden v. Payne •and Hooker v. Rodgers, there was no ground of suspicion that the defendants sought to delay the cause, or that the affidavits did not properly represent the importance of the evidence required. These were civil cases, and the ground for watchfulness not so great. They were the ordinary cases of a first application to put off a civil cause.
This is the case of a conspiracy; and of all cases, the most proper for a joint trial. The declarations of each alleged conspirator must be given in evidence; and are of force as to all. Separate the defendants; and the effect of such evidence is very much impaired. The cases were separately submitted to the jury. This is the utmost that should ever be done in a case of conspiracy. (Young v. Rex, 3 T. R. 106, 7; Stark. Cr. Pl. 40, and note (p.) A separate trial is, in all cases, matter of discretion with the court who tries; and this even in trials for capital crimes. (4 John. 301; 12 Wheat. 480; Stark. Cr. Pl. 40.) In cases of conspiracy, no advantage can arise from a separate trial; for the evidence must still be .joint. It must include the defendant with others. A conspiracy must be the act of more than one. One cannot be convicted without reference to others.
As to the defaulting juror; this is admitted to be a matter of practice; which the court will, of course, so settle *as to prevent its being turned to mischievous purposes. The juror is ascertained by the draft; and is then open to the practices of the party, till the panel is nearly complete. This is contrary to the spiritAf the rule which keeps him separate, and in the custody of the officer. In an important case, he might be influenced, or even bribed before he takes his place. The safer course is to require his immediate presence on being drawn; or upon his default to reject him, and obtain a jury by following up the draft, or by tales. The very words of the act are, that the jurors shall go into the box in the order in which they are called and appear. And such we infer to be the English practice.
Davis was known to be a material witness as well at the time of trial as now. Suppose the case is sent down agaig. for that reason. Next, B. is acquitted, and A. convicted. The latter must then have a new trial for the sake of B.’s evidence. Thus, there is no end of new trials. One who is associated with others, in the indictment, by the grand jury, but who escapes by the skin of his teeth, may thus be brought in to swear his fellow clear. Criminals cannot permitted to become compurgators for their associates in ^,js way, after a grand jury have’thought proper, on their oath, to join them with others. This operates as a permanent disqualification to swear for their fellows. If B. was not entitled to a separate trial, then, of course, he is not entitled to a new trial on account of D.’s testimony. If the defendants wished his testimony, they should have moved to have his ease first submitted; and, on his acquittal, might have sworn him.
There was a want of due diligence in B. as to procuring the papers. He should have applied a second time to the district attorney, on being informed by the clerk that they were with the former.
A. Spencer, in reply.
Putting off a trial when the cause, is first called on, is not a mere matter of favor. It is the right of the party on the general affidavit. Here has been no delay. A new trial was granted"till the 29th of *May, when the hearing on non-enumerated motions had ceased. It would have been indecent and premature, to have proved, before the order for a new trial. Till after this, it could not be known where the cause would be tried; whether on the criminal or civil side. Beside; we were not to be driven to a commission. Various and repeated explanations would become necessary, requiring the personal attendance of the witness. No. doubt it would have been necessary to call him to the stand several times.
It now appears that the receipt of the defendants’ affidavits, as a substitute for Gen. Swift himself, subject to the right of impeachment, is a perfect novelty. No parallel case is produced; and we are authorised to reiterate with perfect confidence, that such a strange course was never before thought of. No admission short of an absolute one could be received.
Suppose we had moved a commission at May term. There is no pretence that we could' have executed it for the June circuit. The witness resided at 1500 miles distance. Had the case been put over the circuit, we did in tend, for more abundant caution, to move for a commission at this term; by no means, however, relaxing in our efforts to procure the witness’ personal attendance.
Davis could have been of no service to us as a witness, had his case been first submitted. The evidence was finally closed as to all. Besides, it was impossible to say which would be acquitted, and which convicted.
D. Selden, for Vermilyea.
In The People v. Howell, it did not appear affirmatively, that a separate trial could be useful in attaining the ends of justice. The case passed without showing the court anything beyond the nature of the crime. A separate submission of a defendant’s case to a jury, who have already found his co-defendant guilty of the same crime, is far from securing that strict impartiality of trial which a criminal is entitled to by the law. It is an evasion of the rule established by this court, which forbids a juror to sit in a case, where he has already formed an opinion upon it, on full hearing. Can a case be *found, where a separate trial was refused, if counsel advised, and the facts disclosed warranted the advice, that such a course was necessary in safety to the accused ?
On this point, the only ground upon which a new trial can be refused, is public convenience; the purpose of expediting the public business. We ask, whether such considerations are,to apply, when put in competition with the rights of the citizen to a fair trial.
Mor ought a criminal to be compelled to go to trial upon testimony inferior in degree and weight, until his means of procuring the best evidence are exhausted. (1 Stark. Ev. 129, 30.) The witness should be present. A jury have a right to gather knowledge from seeing, as well as hearing the witness. On this hangs the safety of the criminal.
In Hooker v. Rogers, this court acted on that principle. They declare, in terms, that the defendant, even in a civil' case, shall not be driven to written evidence, if the personal attendance of the witness can be procured by putting' off the trial. And they enforced this right by setting aside a verdict, obtained upon the contrary rule. The courts have never acquired an examination on interrogatories, un less the party desired it. It is enough, that it appear pro ^^g the witness can be procured in a reasonable time.
S. P. Staples, contra.
It is agreed that the instance was never known of a separate trial being enforced, on the application of one criminal who is indicted with another. It has always been regarded as absolutely within the discretion of the tribunal which is to try; and the better opinion now is, that this is so even in cases where peremptory challenges are allowable. (United States v. Marchant, 12 Wheat. 480.) It has been already shown, that a joint trial is peculiarly proper in cases of conspiracy, where, though the defendants be separated, you must still resort to proof of joint acts and joint declarations.
Great latitude of discretion must, in the nature of the case, be allowed to the court who is to try, upon the question of putting off the trial. That court alone can have a view of the whole ground. Unless we allow it to act upon *that view, and act freely in refusing to postpone, eithei absolutely, or on certain terms and admissions of the opposite party, there are many cases in which a cause never can be tried. Suppose a man wishes to prove character. One of several witnesses happens to be absent; should the trial be postponed? If the transaction to be proved isa private one, depending upon a single witness, the case is different. The party can safely and properly swear, that a subscribing witness to an essential muniment is indispensable ; and the court can see it, and will put off the trial again and again, if due diligence be used to obtain the witness. But where the transaction to which the absent witness will speak, is public and notorious, and known to many, the court cannot help seeing that any single witness is not essential. Others will answer the same end. It is artful, and calculated of itself to excite suspicion of a wish to delay justice, for a party to fix on a foreign and distant witness, when he has many others around him who can attest to the same thing. In this way, trials may be indefinitely postponed. The witness in question was beyond the juris diction of the court. It was optional with. Mm whether to attend the trial or not. There is no case of putting off a trial for the absence of such a witness. The party should have taken his commission, and moved for a postponement at the last term. He has had already what is equivalent to a commission. He makes out his own case, and it is (received as sworn to by Gen. Swift. The right to contradict always exists as well where the evidence is by deposition as by parol. Was it ever heard of, that a party should have a new trial after reading his depositions upon commission, because he might have done better upon oral examination ? The testimony here stands exactly on the ground of a commission. If there is a difference, it is in favor of the defendants. Gould they have got more by a commission, than they themselves will swear to? The court will hardly take their word for such a position. Would it be an objection to evidence on a commission, that explanations are necessary to sustain it. It would be of no importance for the witness to come up and repeat what *he had sworn ; or say, that he had never told the contradictory story imputed to him. He would not be the more believed. Every thing necessary to that end is involved in the propositions to which he first swears. The same remarks apply to taking testimony de lene esse. If the court see that these defendants have had all they were entitled to, no new trial should be granted.
D. B. Ogden, in reply.
I deny that a first application to postpone a trial on account of the absence of a material witness, is a matter of discretion. It is a matter of right. The court never will require a defendant in a criminal case to take out a commission. The public prosecutor must either admit the facts stated in the "affidavit, or the cause must go off. The reason of the cause being ordered on, was an assumption that'the attendance of the witness was not necessary. The court will never require the party to be satisfied with inferior evidence, unless it is placed on such a tooting as to secure all the effect of oral evidence. The party should be put beyond danger. We ought not, in this first instance, even to have been put to our specification. wag ¿|jfficu¡|; an¿ embarrassing, and, indeed, impossible por ug g^ye Qen_ g^jf^g evidence, by our afiidavit, in a proper manner; or even to state the matter of it fully. We went as far as we could. But how can one man say precisely what another will swear to ? Had this been a second application, the considerations would have been verg different. But even then we could have been required to show no more than we have shown here; to state the facts, and show due diligence.
We are now told much about the great inconvenience, or, at least, uselessness, of a separate trial. Why, a se parate trial was ordered in this very cause, in the case of Swift, who was acquitted. This was on Swift’s mere suggestion. The judge was of opinion that he had power to try separately. Eckford, and various others, yet remain to be tried for the same offence. They certainly must be tried separately from these defendants, if the cause continues the same course. There is, then, no difficulty in trying conspirators separately. '
Ante, 108, S. C.

Opinion:
*Savage, Ch. J.
These defendants, and six others, were indicted in August last, (1826,) for a conspiracy to defraud several incorporated companies, and several individuals, named in the indictment. A trial was had of all the defendants, in the oyer and terminer in September last; but no verdict. Another trial was had of three defendants, and some of the others in November last; when the defendants, now before us, were convicted. But before judgment was given, the cause was removed into this court by certiorari; and at the last May term, a new trial was granted, for irregularity in receiving a juror on the second trial, who, when called to the book, admitted he had formed and expressed an opinion as to the guilt of the defendants, from having heard the whole testimony on the first trial. Joseph Gr. Swift, was tried separately in the oyer and terminer, after the trial of these defendants, and was acquitted.
According to the usual, and, I believe, invariable practice of this court, the record was retained ; and a trial or* dered in the circuit court, to be held in and for the city of ¡Slew-York. This direction was given to the cause on the 29th of May; when the district attorney rose, and, addressing the court, remarked that he should not proceed on this hidictment; but would procure a new indictment in the court of oyer and terminer. The object of this communication probably was, to give notice to the defendants, then in court, that no proceedings would be had-in the circuit, provided a new indictment could be procured in the oyer and terminer. I infer such to have been his object, as this court was not concerned to know what were the intentions of the district attorney. On the next, or succeeding day, these defendants ¿ntered into recognizance to appear here at this term, and in the mean time, to attend at the next circuit court, to be held in and for the city and county of Mew-York. On the 13th of June, the district attorney gave notice to the defendant, Barker, that the trial would be brought on against the three defendants, Barker, Vermilyea and Davis, on the 17th. The trial was, in fact, moved on the 19th of June; when the defendant, ^Barker, moved for a separate trial, which was refused ; the judge saying that each case should be submitted to the jury separately, in regard to each defendant. The defendant, Vermilyea, then moved to put of the trial, on the ground of the absence of a material witness, Joseph Gr. Swift; which the judge decided should be granted. But, on the district attorney offering to admit that Gren. Swift, would swear what the defendant averred, reserving the right of contradiction and impeachment, thejudge directed the defendants to specify what Swift would prove; and, on receiving such specification, ordered the trial to proceed; an affidavit having been read, that there had been previously two trials of this cause in the oyer and terminer. The defendants, Davis and Barker, also moved for a postponement of the trial, on account of Gren. Swift's absence"; which motions were on the same grounds as that of Vermilyea. A jury was then impanneled and sworn. The defendants, Vermilyea and Barker, were convicted, and Davis acquitted.
The defendants, Barker and Vermilyea, now move for a new trial, on several grounds; some of which até common to both, and some relied on by Barker only. These grounds I will briefly consider, though not in the order in which they were arguéd.
1. Barker's papers were withheld, and in possession of the district attorney. It certainly does not appear that Barker used due diligence to obtain these papers. It is true, that the district attorney had them, and informed Barker that he had them not. But they would have been obtained, if the mistake had been explained ; or, if then refused, application should have been made to the court, either to compel their delivery, or to postpone the trial on the ground that this was refused.
2. Exception has been taken to some of the .jurors, which has béen very properly abandoned as to all except Bruen. The declarations relied on, were made nine months before the trial, and soon after the indictment found, What the juror's opinion was founded on, does *not appear. But, as he was not on the grand jury, it could not have been on hearing the testimony. It was probably on common report. But the charge is denied by the juror himself. Other facts are shown, which render it improbable that the words imputed were ever spoken; and his conduct in the jury room shows, that if they were spoken, he had changed his Opinion before the trial, He then seemed rather friendly to Barker than otherwise.
3. The mode of drawing the jury was correct. The act, (1 R. L. 331, s. 20,) directs, that the clerk of the court, or some other indifferent person, by direction of the court,, shall, in open court, draw out twelve of the papers or parchments, one after another; and if any person, whose name shall be so drawn, shall not appear, or be challenged and set aside, then such further number thereof shall be drawn as shall make up the number twelve, who do appear, after all causes of challenge allowed, as fair and indifferent, &c. My construction of this act is, that if a juror does appear when first called, the panel is to be gone through, if necessary, for the purpose of obtaining a full jury, before the clerk shall call, a second time, those who were absent on the first call. I will not say, however, that should the contrary method be adopted, that would be good ground to set aside a verdict, provided there was no reason to suspect the fairness of the proeeeding. I desire to be understood as saying merely, that the mode adopted in this instance corresponds with my notions of correct practice in drawing a jury under the statute.
4. Another ground is, the acquittal of Davis. He has become a competent witness in virtue of his acquittal; but the absence of all authority on the point, is a strong argument against the sufficiency of this ground for granting a new trial. Such a rule would be highly inconvenient in practice. The proper course was, if the testimony against *Davis was slight, to have the jury pass on his case, and then introduce him as a witness on behalf of his co-defendants. Such testimony is not newly discovered, though the acquitted defendant is now, for the first time, competent as a witness. This ground, of itself, cannot be considered sufficient, though I will not say, that, among other considerations, it is not entitled to some weight.
5. A separate trial was refused. The judge, who pre sides at a trial, must exercise a discretion upon many questions. In The People v. Howell, (4 John. 302,) it is said, that in all cases where the right to peremptory challenge does not exist, defendants jointly indicted may be tried either jointly or separately; and when two or more persons are charged in the same indictment with a capital offence, a separate trial, without the consent of the public prosecutor, is not matter of right in the parties, but of discretion in the court. (U. States v. Marchant, 12 Wheat. 480.) In case of an indictment for a conspiracy to commit a joint offence, the discretion of the judge ought not to be lightly interfered with. But the defendants had substantially the benefit of a separate trial. The testimony, applicable to each, was separately laid before the jury, and they passed separately upon it in that way. To have put each upon separate and successive trial, might have consumed unnecessary time, and unduly embarrassed the prosecution. That the jury were capable of separating the testimony applicable to each, is proved by the fact that one of the defendants was acquitted.
6. The defendants asked for a postponement of their trial, on account of the absence of a material witness. This is a good ground for putting off a trial under certain circumstances. When there is no cause for suspicion that the object is delay, it is sufficient to state that the absent witness is material ; that he cannot be procured at the time when the trial is about to be brought on; and that there is reasonable ground to expect his future attendance. But if there are suspicious circumstances attending the application, then the court will require the party to be more minute in stating the circumstances and facts on which the *application rests. This general rule is found in books of practice both civil and criminal. (2 Tidd, 708; 1 Archb. 210; 1 Dunl. 586, 7; 1 Chit. Cr. Law, 492.)
The case of The King v. D'Eon, (1 Bl. Rep. 510, and 3 Burr. 1513,) is a leading case on this subject; and contains the principles which have since prevailed in relation to putting off trials. Lord Mansfield says in that case, " three things are necessary to put off a trial. 1. That the witness is really material, and appears to the court so to be. 2. That the party who applies has been guilty of no neglect. 3. That the witness can.be had at the time to which the trial is deferred." Wilmot, J., said the rule is the same in criminal and civil cases; and Yates, J., said, whatever indulgence the law gives to defendants in civil cases, it ought, a fortiori, to give in criminal.
In that case, however, the motion was denied; the court not being satisfied upon any of the points necessary to' be sustained. First, it was apparent that the witnesses named could not be material, as they had left England, and gone to France in November or December; and the libel, in respect to which the defendant was indicted, was not published till March or April after: Secondly, the defendant had notice of the information on the 12th of April; and no effort had been made on the 30th. of June, when the motion was made, to bring over the witnesses: Thirdly, there was no probability that the persons named would return to England. They were subjects of France, in the service of the king of France; and would not probably be sent by him to testify against his then minister, who had been libelled by D'Eon. The whole court, therefore, were clearly of opinion, that putting off the trial could not tend to advance justice; but on the contrary would delay it.
In the case of The King v. Jones, (8 East, 31 to 37.) the defendant moved to put off his trial, till he could procure testimony from Barbadoes, Grenada and Dominica. The motion was made upon the common affidavit; but the court required him to show in what respect the evidence was material; recognizing the whole doctrine in D'Eon's case. Lord EUenborough intimated that in ordinary cases, *the common affidavit was sufficient when the trial was to be put off from one assizes or sittings to the next; but when so long a time must intervene, it was necessary to be more particular; there being a temptation to offenders to gain time. Lawrence, J., said it was not required of him to state his evidence, but the nature of it. Accordingly, at another day, he made another affidavit, showing generally the nature of the transactions in question; and that the persons named were acquainted with them; that the application was not for delay; but to obtain evidence which he was advised and believed to be material. The motion was not further opposed by the attorney general; and was granted, the court relying on the case of The King v. D'Eon.
This court has several times granted a new trial, when, as it appeared to us, the defendant's application to put off his trial should have been granted. In Ogden v. Payne, (5 Cowen, 15,) the judge refused to put off the trial on the common affidavit; requiring the defendant to state what he expected to prove by the witness, who was attorney for the plaintiff. This he refused to do, and the trial proceeded. We granted a new trial, saying that the practice requiring a specification of the testimony did not apply, unless circumstances of suspicion are made to appear. In the case of The Bank of Utica v. Hilliard, (May term, 1826,) we granted a new trial after a former verdict had been set aside; the judge at the circuit having refused to put off the trial on an affidavit, that a material witness had lately removed from Lockport to the state of Ohio, as he, the defendant, was informed and believed, about three months before the trial; and that he expected to procure the attendance of the witness at the next circuit. The judge thought the affidavit too loose in merely stating information and belief of the witness' removal. We were of opinion that it was sufficient in the first instance; no suspicion existing that delay was the object.
In the case of Hooker v. Rogers, (6 Cowen, 577,) the witness was unable to attend; and this we held sufficient cause for putting off the trial; saying, that substituting an ^"examination of witnesses on interrogatories for their personal attendance, might prejudice the defendant's rights. He was entitled to their personal attendance.
In all cases of this description, the questions are. 1. Is the witness material ? 2. Has the defendant been guilty of any laches ? 3. Can the attendance of the witness be procured at the next court? If these questions can be satisfactorily answered by the defendant, his trial should be postponed.
Let us see how the present defendants appeared, and answered these interrogatories in June last, when their causes were brought on to trial. The materiality of the testimony, was sworn to by them, not by way of the general affidavit; but stating particulars to the satisfaction of the judge who held the court. This was going farther than was necessary in the first instance, unless laches were imputable to them. As to the 2d particular; can it be said that any culpable negligence was imputable to them ? There had bean two trials in the oyer and terminer, when this cause re moved by certiorari. After the conviction of these defendants, Gen. Swift was acquitted. He then became a tent witness. In April, he left the state, and went to Tennessee. Could the defendants have examined him as a witness, had that been established as necessary at any stage ? That it is not necessary, is strongly intimated in Hoolcer v. Rodgers. But it would surely have been premature in this case. The defendants knew not, when Gen. Swift left the state, that a new trial would be granted at all: and could they have anticipated our decision on that question, there was another difficulty: they could not foresee whether their cause would be tried at the circuit or the oyer and terminer. It seems to me, therefore, that any attempt to examine Gen. Swift would have been premature and irregular. In omitting this, then, there was no laches. It is said, however, that, at the May term, the defendants should have applied for a commission, and for a postponement of the trial until the return of the commission, or until the attendance of the witness could be procured. It is certainly true, that this might have been done. *But are they not excused for not making this application, by the declarations of the public prosecutor, who intimated very strongly that he should proceed no farther upon this indictment; and gave no notice of an intention to try till four days before the circuit. These circumstances surely are entitled to consideration ; and go far in excuse for the negligence of the defendants in not making some proper motion, after this court had decided that the cause should be tried at the circuit.
But if laches are imputable to them, they have done all that can be required. They have disclosed what they expect to prove by them witness. I am aware that this is not now entirely conceded j but it was conceded by the judge at the circuit, who was in the first instance the judge of the sufficiency of their disclosure. Without laches, the general affidavit would have been enough. But being guilty of laches, they atone for it by disclosing the evidence they expect from their absent witness. The judge was satisfied on that point; and I think correctly.
As to the third particular, the defendants swore that the wjtness had sent a message to one of them, and the other was informed and believed, that he would attend when it should become necessary. These affidavits were not contradicted by the district attorney; and there is no presumption against the attendance of the witness, as there was in D'Eon's case. It does not appear from the papers before' us, that the probability of the witness, attending on a future occasion was doubted by the judge; for he decided that there was sufficient cause shown for the postponement.
Thus far, the judge appears to have acted discreetly and correctly. If he erred at all, it was in compelling the defendants to go to trial on the admission of the public prosecutor, that if their witness was present, he would swear as the defendants expected he would.
If it be admitted that the defendants were entitled to the testimony of the witness, then the only question is, had they the benefit of his testimnoy ? In my judgment, most clearly they had not. When testimony was given *showing, prima facie, that the witness could not swear as it was admitted he wohld, without being guilty of a contradiction, could the jury shut their eyes to the fact which was staring them in the face, that Glen. Swift had not sworn anything about it ?
It is true that had the witness been examind on commission, (and this is all the testimony the defendants are sure of obtaining,) his testimony might still have been attacked in the same way. But they will then, at least, have the oath of the witness; and such interrogatories may be put as will lead to a full disclosure of all the facts necessary to every explanation. But should the defendants procure the personal attendance of the witness, and this does not seem to have been thought improbable at the circuit, then it cannot be pretended but that the defendants would be in a much better situation, than with the stipulation of the district attorney.
The practice of requiring concessions in such cases is novel; and I apprehend not well calculated to advance jus tice. But if to be encouraged, it seems to me that the. prosecutor should admit all that the defendant can possibly tain by the witness; which is the truth of the facts proposed to be proved. Such seems to have been the opinion of this court in Brill v. Lord, (14 John. 341.) That cause came up on a certiorari from a justice's court. The defendant below wanted an adjournment, on the ground of the absence of a material witness. The plaintiff proposed to admit what was expected to be proved by the absent witness, and the cause proceeded to trial. This court held the proceeding regular. They said the object of the adjournment, as avowed, was to procure the testimony of a certain witness; and the plaintiff offered to admit, and did admit what it was alleged the witness would prove. If the plaintiff will admit the testimony, no time can be wanted for that purpose; besides, it is added, in this case the defendant agreed to go to trial upon such admissions; and he ought not afterwards to be permitted to violate such agreement. In that case, the court did not place the regularity entirely upon the admission of the testimony *by the plaintiff; but they say emphatically that the defendant had agreed to go to trial upon such admissions. Had the justice then refused the adjournment oh the plaintiff's admitting that the defendant's witness would swear as the defendant alleged, and he had protested against going to trial upon such admission, there cannot be a doubt that this court would have reversed the judgment.
Though this is comparing small things with great, still the principle is the same. The defendant before the justice, by his oath, was entitled to an adjournment. So were these defendants. The right of the defendant before the justice arose under ttie statute, and the right of these defendants by virtue of the common law. Both laws are of equal obligation. When the defendants here and before the justice had, by their affidavits, brought themselves within the provisions of the law, there was no more discretion in the one case than in the other. The discretion of both was a legal discretion: the very same discretion which we are now called upon to exercise in deciding the present motion.
Under these views of the rights of the parties, and the power and discretion of the court, I feel hound to say that an error was committed in compelling the defendants to accept of the offered stipulation: and, of course, that a new trial must he granted.
See Com. v. Williams, 2 Ashm. 69; Gilbert v. State, 7 Humph. Rep. 524; Bennett v. Com., 8 Leigh, 745; Com. v. Benesh, Thatch. Cr. Cas. 84; State v. Harding, 2 Bay, 267; Friar v. The State, 7 How. Miss. Rep. 365; The State v. Blennerhassett, Walker's Rep. 7.
See.fdrthér Waterman's Archhold's Cr. Practice & Pleading, tit New Trial.
Would not the statute be considered as directory merely; and satisfied by either course, if no abuse appear ? (Vid. Cole v. Perry, 6 Cowen. 584).
See U. S. v. Gilbert. 2 Sumner. 20; Com. v. Chauncey, 2 Ashmead, 90.