Case Name: THE FLORIDA BAR, Complainant, v. Anthony L. BAJOCZKY, Respondent
Court: Florida Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1990-03-22
Citations: 558 So. 2d 1022
Docket Number: No. 73377
Parties: THE FLORIDA BAR, Complainant, v. Anthony L. BAJOCZKY, Respondent.
Judges: overton, McDonald, shaw, BARKETT, GRIMES and KOGAN, JJ„ concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 558
Pages: 1022–1025

Head Matter:
THE FLORIDA BAR, Complainant, v. Anthony L. BAJOCZKY, Respondent.
No. 73377.
Supreme Court of Florida.
March 22, 1990.
John F. Harkness, Jr., Executive Director, John T. Berry, Staff Counsel, and James N. Watson, Jr., Bar Counsel, Tallahassee, for complainant.
John A. Weiss, Tallahassee, for respondent.

Opinion:
PER CURIAM.
The respondent petitions this Court to review the referee's report recommending he be publicly reprimanded. We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 15, Fla. Const.
In her findings of fact, the referee concluded that Bajoczky was retained to represent Janet Gary Cox in a marital dissolu tion proceeding. Cox paid Bajoczky with $3,000 borrowed by Cox's parents, the Gar-ys, for their daughter to use. Later, Ba-joczky requested another $2,000 in fees, which Cox also paid from funds borrowed by the Garys for their daughter.
The dissolution proceeding was complicated, involving several properties and businesses owned by Cox and her husband, which had incurred a number of substantial liabilities. At the time the proceedings began, there was a risk Cox might be forced into bankruptcy. After the dissolution was final, Bajoczky obtained a settlement agreement by which Cox's husband agreed to pay $4,000 in cash and execute-a second mortgage for $16,000 in favor of his wife's parents in satisfaction of their equity in one of the Cox's businesses.
Cox asked that her former husband give the $4,000 in cash directly to her parents to partly repay money loaned by the Garys to help the Coxes set up this business. The parents later testified that they had never entered into any agreement with Bajoczky and had understood that the $4,000 money would be paid to them by their former son-in-law.
When the settlement check arrived, it was in the name of Cox's parents and Ba-joczky. Cox's parents testified that they went to Bajoczky's office and waited for two hours for the attorney to return. When Bajoczky did not appear, the Garys said they endorsed the check with the understanding that Bajoczky then also would endorse it and pay them the $4,000 after he had returned to his office.
Bajoczky, however, testified that the parties had agreed to apply the $4,000 toward attorney's fees. This contention was supported by testimony from Bajoczky's legal associate, Ms. Fournier. Based on this understanding, Bajoczky later sent Cox and her parents a notice that he had used the money for this purpose and would not pay it to Cox's parents.
The referee concluded that Bajoczky had engaged in conduct involving misrepresentation, in violation of Disciplinary Rule 1-102(A)(4) of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The referee gave the following reasons for this conclusion:
(1) There was no written agreement between Respondent and the Garys that they would be responsible for Janet Cox's attorneys fees.
(2) Mr. Gary was never present during any of the times Respondent testified that discussions took place regarding applying the $4,000.00 to Janet Cox's attorneys fees.
(3) The supplemental judgment clearly show[s] the $4,000.00 was to belong to the Garys.
(4) The testimony of the Garys and Janet Cox is supported by their having returned to Respondent's law office and wait[ed] several hours for Respondent's return. This supports their belief that Respondent was to return and endorse the trust account check.
(5) The Garys were nonparties to the dissolution action and the agreement of their receiving $4,000.00 for special equity contradicts the existence of any clear agreement that such money was to go to Respondent.
Based on these reasons, the referee recommended that Bajoczky be publicly reprimanded and pay the costs of this disciplinary proceeding.
In its complaint, The Florida Bar argues that Bajoczky's conduct, as characterized in the referee's report, constituted a deliberate conversion of funds. Bajoczky, however, argues that this Court should dismiss this complaint or at most impose a private reprimand, because the facts of this case were disputed.
Be that as it may, this Court does not sit in bar discipline hearings as a finder of fact. We have delegated this responsibility to the referees and, based on well-established principles of law, have determined that the referees' findings will be upheld unless they are without support in the evidence. The Florida Bar v. Carter, 410 So.2d 920, 922 (Fla.1982); The Florida Bar v. Lopez, 406 So.2d 1100, 1102 (Fla. 1981); The Florida Bar v. Stillman, 401 So.2d 1306, 1307 (Fla.1981); The Florida Bar v. McCain, 361 So.2d 700, 706 (Fla.1978).
In this instance, the referee has determined the Garys' version of the facts to be truthful and has rejected that of Bajocz-ky and his associate. The Garys' story indicated, as the Bar has argued, a deliberate conversion of their funds. We can only conclude that there is substantial competent evidence supporting the referee's findings, because the Garys have supplied it in their testimony. Accordingly, we are bound by the referee's findings.
We note that a deliberate conversion of funds belonging to nonclients usually would warrant greater discipline than the referee has recommended. However, the particular facts of this case indicate otherwise, as the referee properly concluded. The Bar does not dispute that the quality of Bajoczky's legal representation was good. And it appears that all those involved in this matter — Cox, the Garys and Bajoczky alike — failed to be vigilant in specifying exactly what was to be done with the $4,000. However, because of Ba-joczky's role and special skills as a lawyer, the referee placed the onus of this failure on Bajoczky.
We must agree with this decision. A lawyer's special training creates an obligation to make sure that clients understand and clearly consent to fee arrangements. The kind of self-help debt collection found to exist by the referee in this instance is impermissible. Indeed, Bajoczky in his brief asks the question, "[wjhere was the rest of the money to come from" if not from the $4,000? This, we believe, was a concern Bajoczky should have resolved long before this proceeding. The fact that he must ask it now only underscores the conclusion that Bajoczky has failed to meet his obligation.
For the foregoing reasons, we adopt the findings of the referee and impose a public reprimand on Bajoczky. Judgment for costs is entered in favor of The Florida Bar in the amount of $1,680, for which sum let execution issue.
It is so ordered.
overton, McDonald, shaw, BARKETT, GRIMES and KOGAN, JJ" concur.
EHRLICH, C.J., concurs in part and dissents in part with an opinion.