Case Name: PIATKOWSKI v. MOK
Court: Michigan Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1971-01-18
Citations: 29 Mich. App. 426
Docket Number: Docket No. 7142
Parties: PIATKOWSKI v. MOK
Judges: Before: E. B. Burns, P. J., and Levin and Churchill, JJ.
Reporter: Michigan appeals reports; cases decided in the Michigan Court of Appeals.
Volume: 29
Pages: 426–432

Head Matter:
PIATKOWSKI v. MOK
Opinion op the Court
1. Judgment — Basis—Proofs—Court Rule.
A judgment must be based on what is proved rather than on what is pleaded (OCR 518.3).
2. Damages — Amount Recoverable — Provable Damages — Ad Damnum . Clause.
A plaintiff may recover a judgment in the amount of his provable damages irrespective of his ad damnum clause.
Concurring Opinion by Churchill, J.
3. Damages — Amount Recoverable — Ad Damnum Clause — Court Rule.
A plaintiff cannot recover damages in an amount greater than that demanded, if proved, because allowing recovery of amounts greater than that in ad damnum clause would cause unlimited mischief in excess-liability insurance situations and would discourage non-contests of liability (GCZ 1963,518.3).
References for Points in Headnotes
1] 46 Am Jur 2d, Judgments § 1 et seq.
2, 3] 46 Am Jur 2d, Judgments §§ 81-84.
4-6] 41 Am Jur, Pleading §§ 288-315.
4. Pleading — Amendment—Allowance—Prejudice.
An amendment to the pleadings is not allowed when prejudice would result and when the substantial rights of the parties would be adversely affected.
5. Pleadings — Amendment—Delaying Eppect — Discretion.
The delaying effect, if any, of granting a motion to amend after pre-trial conference is a factor for consideration in the exercise of discretion.
6. Pleadings — Ad Damnum Clause — Amendment — Findings op ■ Fact.
Denial of plaintiff’s motion to amend her pleadings to increase her ad damnum clause should be remanded for further proceedings where the trial judge did not malee findings of fact or state conclusions of law in denying plaintiff’s motion (GGR 1963, 517.1).
Appeal from Wayne, James M. Eyan, J.
Submitted Division 1 May 11,1970, at Detroit.
(Docket No. 7142.)
Decided January 18, 1971.
Complaint by Philip and Helen Piatkowski and others against Ira E. Mok for personal injuries received in an automobile accident. Plaintiff Helen Piatkowski’s motion to amend her complaint denied without prejudice. Plaintiff appeals.
Eemanded for entry of order granting the motion to amend the complaint and allowing defendant to amend his answer.
Zeff & Zeff, for plaintiffs.
Marble & Marble, for defendant.
Before: E. B. Burns, P. J., and Levin and Churchill, JJ.
Circuit judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.

Opinion:
E. B. Burns, P. J.
Although I am in complete agreement with Judge Churchill's decision to re mand this case to the trial court, I must take issue with his construction of GrCR 1963, 518.3. Judge Churchill concedes that his interpretation is contrary to that adopted by the Federal courts in their analysis of rule 54(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. His interpretation is also contrary to the rule's purpose as envisioned by the Joint Committee on Michigan Procedural Revision. See 2 Honigman & Hawkins, Michigan Court Rules Annotated (2d ed), p 626 (Committee Notes). More importantly Judge Churchill's construction directly conflicts with the express language of the rule.
The language of 518.3, in no uncertain terms, states that a judgment must be based on what is proved rather than on what is pleaded. To base a judgment solely on what is pleaded totally ignores the word "entitled" and the phrase "even if" contained in GCR 1963, 518.3. The plain meaning of a general court rule should not be ignored by this Court.
We hold the plaintiff may recover a judgment in the amount of his provable damages irrespective of the ad damnum clause.
The case is remanded for entry of an order granting the motion to amend plaintiff's ad damnum clause and allowing defendant to amend his answer and defend on the merits of liability.
We do not retain jurisdiction.
Levin, J., concurred.
For the Federal court analysis of 54(e), GCR 518.3's equivalent, see 3 Barron and Holtzoff, Federal Practice & Procedure (Wright ed), § 1194, p 34. In Michigan the Supreme Court gives great weight to the decisions of another state from which a particular statute is substantially adopted. In re Atherton's Estate (1952), 333 Mich 193. In fact it is presumed that a statute is adopted with its judicial gloss. In re Rackham's Estate (195.1), 329 Mich 493. It is entirely reasonable to presume that the Michigan Supreme Court was well aware of and readily accepted the interpretation of 54(c) as given by the Federal courts prior-to its adoption by the Court into Michigan practice.
See Cullum, v. Topps-Stillman's, Inc. (1965), 1 Mich App 92, where this Court stated, in its interpretation of 518.3, that an award must be justified on the basis of what the party is "entitled" to receive.
"[E]very final judgment shall grant the relief to which the party in whose favor it is rendered is entitled, even if the party has not demanded sueh relief in his pleadings." (Emphasis supplied.)