Case Name: BRYANT v. RUCKER et al.
Court: Court of Appeals of Georgia
Jurisdiction: Georgia
Decision Date: 1970-03-16
Citations: 121 Ga. App. 395
Docket Number: 44667
Parties: BRYANT v. RUCKER et al.
Judges: Bell, C. J., Jordan, P. J., Eberhardt and Whitman, JJ., concur. Pannell, Deen, Quillian and Evans, JJ., dissent.
Reporter: Georgia Appeals Reports
Volume: 121
Pages: 395–412

Head Matter:
44667.
BRYANT v. RUCKER et al.

Opinion:
Hall, Presiding Judge.
Plaintiff appeals from a summary judgment for the defendants. Plaintiff had brought her children to play at the home of defendants, who were family friends. This was not her first visit to their house. The carport was wet from water which the children had splashed out of a small swimming pool. One child had already slipped there the same day, but defendants did not warn plaintiff of the wet condition or the previous fall. Plaintiff slipped.
The law of Georgia and the decisions of this court hold that a social guest in a defendant's private home is a bare licensee. Stanton v. Grubb, 114 Ga. App. 350 (151 SE2d 237); Laurens v. Rush, 116 Ga. App. 65 (156 SE2d 482); Hall v. Capps, 52 Ga. App. 150 (182 SE 625).
" 'If plaintiff is a social guest in defendant's home, the great weight of Anglo-American authority classifies him'as. a bare licensee, even though he was expressly .invited. [Ann. 25 ALR2d 598]. This classification is often invoked to deny the host's liability for harm caused by a concealed danger that he did not know of, but which would have been discoverable by inspection. . . Such a limitation of duty probably conforms to people's reasonable expectations in the ordinary host-guest situation. If the host is the kind of person who does not inspect and maintain his property on his own account, the guest scarcely expects an exception to be made on the occasion of his visit. In this country, moreover, where most social contact is among people who are on a similar economic footing, the host is usually in no better position than the guest to absorb or distribute the loss.' 2 Harper & James, The Law of Torts 1477, § 27.11. 'He does not come as a member of the public upon premises held open to the public for that purpose, and he does not enter for a purpose directly or indirectly connected with business dealings with the possessor. The use of the premises is extended to him merely as a personal favor to him. The explanation usually given by the courts for the classification of social guests as licensees is that there is a common understanding that the guest is expected to take the premises as the possessor himself uses them, and does not expect and is not entitled to expect that they will be prepared for his reception, or that precautions will be taken for his safety, in any manner in which the possessor does not prepare or take precautions for his own safety, or that of the members of his family.' 2 Restatement of the Law, Torts 2d 175, § 330." Laurens v. Rush, 116 Ga. App. 65, 66, supra.
The factual situation of the Stanton case, supra, is nearly identical with this case. In Stanton the water was tracked into the basement by other guests coming from the defendant's swimming pool. In this case the water was splashed in the yard outside the house by children.
This court has held, even as to a business invitee, that a business proprietor cannot reasonably be expected to prevent the presence of some water on a normal floor during a period of time when it is continually raining. Gibson v. Consolidated Credit Corp., 110 Ga. App. 170 (2c) (138 SE2d 77); Card v. Chi-Chesters Baconfield Pharmacy, 111 Ga. App. 358 (141 SE2d 790); Angel v. Varsity, Inc., 113 Ga. App. 507 (148 SE2d 451). If a business proprietor is not required to be continually mopping up rainwater inside his store to protect a business invitee, it ought to follow that an owner of a private home is not required to be continually mopping up water around his swimming pool outside his house to protect a social guest.
Submitted September 11, 1969
Decided March 16, 1970.
Paul C. Myers, for appellant.
Nall, Miller, Cadenhead & Dennis, Douglas Dennis, Baxter L. Davis, for appellees.
This is not a case of hidden peril, pitfall or mantrap. Crosby v. Savannah Electric &c. Co., 114 Ga. App. 193, 198 (150 SE2d 563).
Judgment affirmed.
Bell, C. J., Jordan, P. J., Eberhardt and Whitman, JJ., concur. Pannell, Deen, Quillian and Evans, JJ., dissent.