Case Name: D. CHILDREN, Appellant, v. DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 2002-06-05
Citations: 820 So. 2d 980
Docket Number: No. 4D01-1644
Parties: D. CHILDREN, Appellant, v. DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, Appellee.
Judges: MAY, J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 820
Pages: 980–987

Head Matter:
D. CHILDREN, Appellant, v. DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, Appellee.
No. 4D01-1644.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
June 5, 2002.
Rehearing Denied July 24, 2002.
Kathleen K. Peña of the Law Offices of Seiler & Sautter, Fort Lauderdale, for appellant.
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Laurel R. Wiley, Assistant Attorney General, Fort Lauder-dale, for appellee.

Opinion:
KLEIN, J.
We affirm an order declaring three children dependent. The children were ages three, two, and nine months, all at home, prior to the mother bringing the nine-month-old girl to the emergency room where the examining pediatrician found anal trauma, indicative of penetration.
The police investigated, have not been able to identify who caused the injury, and the criminal investigation remains open. The department filed a petition to terminate parental rights, but amended it at the hearing to seek an adjudication of dependency.
The mother told the pediatrician she had left her daughter naked on the floor while she went to get a clean diaper, and when she returned, the baby was having a bloody bowel movement. She told a nurse that she had observed the family Dachshund walking away from the child and thought the dog caused the injury.
There was medical testimony to the effect that there had been blunt trauma to the anus and bruising, which could not have been caused by constipation or any other natural process, or a fall. There were fissures consistent with penetration. None of the experts believed the injury could have been caused by the dog. No one, other than the parents, thought that this was a plausible possibility, and the mother's explanations as to her observations regarding the dog were inconsistent. Moreover, neither parent removed the dog from the household. The court found that neither parent was credible and that the father had not cooperated in the effort to determine the cause of the injury.
The day before this incident, the mother had taken the same child to the emergency room explaining that she had fallen down some steps. The mother had given different versions of how the child had fallen to different people who had interviewed her, and the doctors had found no injury.
We affirm without further discussion the finding of dependency as to the mother in regard to the one child based on the nature of the injury and the fact that it occurred while the child was in her care and presence.
The father argues that there was no evidence to support dependency as to him because he was not at home when the injury occurred. The mother testified that she called him at work as soon as she saw the injury and he immediately came home. As we noted earlier, however, the trial court found neither parent to be credible. We do not, in contrast to the dissent, accept as a given that the father was not in the home at the time the injury occurred. Assuming the father was not home, however, we would still affirm dependency as to him.
In In re B.J., 737 So.2d 1227, 1228-29 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999) a six-month-old infant died from injuries caused either by blunt trauma or shaking which were inflicted between two and five hours prior to his arrival at the hospital. During that period of time the infant was at home with both of his parents. The mother appealed the order terminating her parental rights, but the court affirmed, explaining:
The Mother argues that the trial court could not find that she engaged in egregious conduct by causing infant M.W.'s death because the evidence applies with equal force to her husband. However, where there is evidence that a child suffered abuse by one or both of the parents present, there is clear and con vincing evidence of egregious abuse to support termination of parental rights of both parents. See In re: M.T.T., 613 So.2d 575, 577 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993)(af-firming termination of parental rights of both parents where the evidence showed that the' child was administered an overdose of drugs while in the care of both parents, but it was not clear which parent administered the drugs).
In this case, the DCFS presented evidence that infant M.W. died from abuse inflicted while in the care of both parents. During the time period in which the injuries were most likely inflicted, only the Mother, her husband, their eighteen-month-old child T.W., and infant M.W. were in the residence. There was no testimony that any' adult other than the Mother and her husband had access to the infant between two and five hours prior to his arrival at the hospital.
The court found in B.J. that termination was supported by clear and convincing evidence and affirmed: The present case, unlike B.J., is a dependency case,, not a termination case, and the burden was preponderance of evidence, not clear and convincing evidence. § 39.507(l)(b), Fla. St.at. (2001). The purpose of a dependency proceeding is "the protection of the child and not the punishment of the person creating the condition of dependency." § 39.501(2), Fla. Stat.
The court's discretion is "very broad with respect to proceedings involving child welfare." D.H., 769 So.2d at 426. Considering that: (1) there was ample evidence to support dependency as to the mother, (2) the perpetrator of the abuse has not been identified, and (3) this is an intact family, we find no abuse of discretion in the court finding dependency as to both parents rather than solely as to the mother. All three of the above factors are, however, essential to our affirmance as to the father.
Appellants also argue that the two siblings, who were home when this occurred, should not have been declared dependent, citing In re M.F., 770 So.2d 1189 (Fla.2000). In that case the Florida Supreme Court held that a trial court cannot declare one child dependent solely because a parent committed a sex act on a different child. Rather, the court should focus on all of the circumstances. See also D.H. v. Dep't of Children and Families, 769 So.2d 424 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000). In the present case, however, the trial court was not relying only on the injury to the baby in finding the other two children dependent.
One of the caseworkers, whom the court considered to be an expert on risk assessment, testified that in light of the lack of explanation for this injury "the needs of the parties could not be assessed to ensure the safety of the children." In addition to finding that' witness credible, the trial court also found, based on the injury, that the parents "engaged in egregious conduct or had the opportunity and capability to prevent and knowingly failed to prevent the egregious conduct that threatened the life, safety and physical health of the child" and that all three children were "at substantial risk of abuse or neglect if returned to the home."
Considering how close these children were in age, the unlikelihood of this injury occurring naturally, or by accident, and the lack of the parents' credibility, we conclude that the trial court had the discretion, even though this is a close question, to find dependency as to all three children. We defer to the trial judge, who heard and observed the witnesses, and resolved the conflicts and doubts in favor of protecting all three of the children, not just the one who was abused. Because these children were all very young, and because of the nature of this abuse, we do not agree with the dissent that the fact that the abused child was a girl and the siblings are boys is significant.
Affirmed.
MAY, J., concurs.
WARNER, J., concurs in part and dissents in part.