Case Name: Geneva VON CANNON, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. STATE of Louisiana, Through the DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS, Defendant and Appellant, Yvonne S. DONALDSON, Third-Party Defendant and Appellant
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1975-01-15
Citations: 306 So. 2d 437
Docket Number: No. 4662
Parties: Geneva VON CANNON, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. STATE of Louisiana, Through the DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS, Defendant and Appellant, Yvonne S. DONALDSON, Third-Party Defendant and Appellant.
Judges: Before HOOD, CULPEPPER and DO-MENGEAUX, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 306
Pages: 437–449

Head Matter:
Geneva VON CANNON, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. STATE of Louisiana, Through the DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS, Defendant and Appellant, Yvonne S. DONALDSON, Third-Party Defendant and Appellant.
No. 4662.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Third Circuit.
Jan. 15, 1975.
Dissenting Opinion Jan. 24, 1975.
Rehearing Denied Feb. 5, 1975.
Writs Refused March 21, 1975.
William T. Kivett, Philip K. Jones, Norman L. Sisson, Robert J. Jones, Howard P. Elliott, Jr., William J. Doran, Jr., Baton Rouge, for defendant and appellant.
Sledge, Garroway & Sleeth by L. D. Sledge, Baton Rouge, for plaintiff and ap-pellee.
William E. Skye, Alexandria, for plaintiff and appellee and third-party defendant and appellant.
Before HOOD, CULPEPPER and DO-MENGEAUX, JJ.

Opinion:
CULPEPPER, Judge.
Mrs. Geneva Von Cannon instituted this suit against the State of Louisiana, through the Department of Highways, to recover damages for personal injuries sustained by her when an automobile in which she was riding as a guest passenger collided with a barricade which had been constructed by defendant. The Department of Highways filed a third party demand against Mrs. Yvonne S. Donaldson, the driver of the vehicle in which plaintiff was riding, to recover one-half the amount the Department might be condemned to pay plaintiff.
Judgment was rendered by the trial court in favor of plaintiff against the Department of Highways for $141,830.10. Judgment also was rendered in favor of the Department of Highways against the third party defendant, Mrs. Donaldson, for $70,915.05. The Department of Highways and Mrs. Donaldson have appealed.
After the appeal was perfected, plaintiff filed a motion to remand the case to the trial court to permit her to introduce evidence showing additional damages which she sustained pending the appeal. The casé is now before us on the merits and on the motion to remand.
The issues presented are: (1) Was the Department of Highways negligent in failing to maintain a reasonably safe highway? (2) Was Mrs. Donaldson negligent? (3) Was plaintiff guilty of contributory negligence? (4) Is the award of damages excessive? (5) Should the case be remanded to permit plaintiff to introduce evidence showing additional injuries?
The accident occurred about 1:50 a. m. oh June 10, 1971, at a point on U. S. Highway 165, in Rapides Parish, where the highway narrows from four lanes to two lanes. The highway runs north and south, and on the above mentioned date the part of it which was south of the scene of the accident was a four lane, divided thoroughfare. The two north bound lanes terminated at the place where the accident occurred. A temporary "cross-over" was located near the end of those lanes and it was designed to enable motorists to turn leftj cross the neutral ground and then continue northward on the old two-lane highway.
Immediately before the accident occurred, plaintiff was riding as a guest passenger in an automobile being driven by Mrs. Donaldson. The car was traveling north on the two north bound lanes of the divided highway. When it reached the point where those lanes terminated, Mrs. Donaldson failed to turn left at the "cross-over." Her automobile struck a large wooden barrier which had been erected by the Highway Department near the end of the north bound lanes. Plaintiff sustained serious injuries as a result of the accident.
The weather was clear, the highway was dry, and visibility was good for night driving when the accident, occurred. Mrs. Donaldson, according to her uncontradicted testimony, was driving at a speed of between 40 and SO miles per hour at that time, which was within the legal speed limit. The right front part of her automobile struck the west end of the barricade, • and the impact caused Mrs. Von Cannon to be thrown out of the car. There were no skidmarks left by Mrs. Donaldson's automobile at the scene of the accident.
Plaintiff contends that the Highway Department was negligent in having failed to maintain a reasonably safe highway at that point, and that its negligence in that respect was a proximate cause of the accident.
The barrier struck by the Donaldson vehicle was constructed of heavy creosoted wood, and it was located three or four feet north of the end of the north bound lanes of traffic. The west end of the barricade extended a few feet east of the east edge of the pavement.
Although the barricade was dark in col- or, there were at least eight "left hazard markers" and about that many "bulls eye" markers affixed to the face or to the south surface of the barricade in such a way that north bound motorists would see these markers as they approached them. Each left hazard marker consisted of a board, about six or eight inches wide and two or three feet long, on which diagonal black and white stripes had been painted with reflecting paint. The diagonal lines slanted downward to the left, the purpose being to indicate that the approaching motorist should make a left turn. These markers were spaced about six feet apart over the barricade. The "bulls eye" markers were round, reflecting markers, about four inches in diameter, and they were interspaced with the left hazard markers. They were designed to reflect the headlights of north bound automobiles.
Immediately above the barricade were two large light reflecting signs, each showing a heavy black arrow on a yellow background. The arrow on each sign pointed to the left, indicating that the north bound motorist was required to make a left turn there. One of these signs measured four feet by eight feet, and the other appears from the photographs to have been about two feet by four feet in size. The bottom of each sign was approximately five feet above the surface of the road. The signs were directly in line with the north bound lanes of traffic and they were located at the point where those lanes terminated.
A number of other signs, all painted with light reflecting paint, were located south of the barricade, and they were designed and placed so that they would be seen by north bound motorists. Two large signs, each measuring four feet by five feet and reading "Form Single Line— Right", were located on each side of the north bound lanes of traffic, several hundred feet south of the barricade.
Two diamond shaped light reflecting signs, each about two feet square, were located about 100 or 200 feet nearer to the barricade. Each of these signs read, "Divided Highway Ends." These signs were erected on either side of the north bound lanes of traffic, near the pavement.
Another light reflecting sign reading "Speed Zone Ahead" was located closer to, and about 400 feet south of the barricade. It was on the right side of the north bound lanes, near the pavement.
A gasoline service station was located about 200 feet north of the barricade, and a large lighted sign bearing the name 'Hudson" and some gasoline prices was located on the premises of that station. The sign was high above the ground and it faced south so that north bound motorists could see it. When lighted, the sign could be seen by north bound motorists at night above the barricade and the markers clustered around it.
The north bound lanes of traffic were constructed of light colored concrete. The cross-over was surfaced with asphalt or a dark colored substance of that kind. A white line, called an "edge line", had been painted along the right or east edge of the north bound lanes for the convenience and safety of motorists, and that line ended abruptly 45 feet south of the point where the north bound lanes of traffic terminated.
Mrs. Donaldson had never driven over that highway before. She stated that plaintiff was directing her to their destination, a house at which they expected to find Mrs. Donaldson's boyfriend with another woman. Plaintiff and Mrs. Donaldson were discussing the activities and supposed fickleness of the latter's boyfriend immediately before the accident occurred. Mrs. Donaldson testified that she was not upset about it, although she was curious. She conceded that she had been up since 6:00 a. m. on the day before the accident occurred, that she had worked hard all day and that she had consumed one drink of an alcoholic beverage and a few sips from another shortly before the accident occurred. A breathilizer test was administered to Mrs. Donaldson about two hours after the accident occurred, and it showed that the alcoholic content of her blood was .088%.
Mrs. Donaldson does not recall seeing any signs at all as she approached the cross-over and the barricade. She does not remember seeing the "Divided Highway Ends" signs, the "Form Single Line— Right" signs, the "Speed Zone Ahead" sign, or either of the two large signs containing arrows pointing to her left and located immediately aboye the barricade. She stated that she did not see the barricade, with its hazard markers and bulls eye reflectors, until she was within a few feet of it. Her testimony was that "all of a sudden it (the barricade) seemed like it was right there in front of me," that she screamed to her passenger to "look out," and that she "tried to swerve to miss the barricade." She does not remember which of the two north bound lanes of traffic she was in as she approached the barricade, and she apparently was not misled or trapped by the white line which ran along the east edge of those lanes of traffic since she did not mention having ever seen or noticed that line. Mrs. Donaldson also does not remember whether her headlights were on high or low beam, or whether the "Hudson" sign located north of the barricade was lighted at the time of the accident. She testified that the area was very dark immediately after the accident occurred, making it difficult for her to find her passenger who had been thrown out of the car, and that indicates that the service station sign was not lighted at that time.
Mrs. Von Cannon has no recollection at all of what happened immediately after the accident occurred. She stated that she does not drive an automobile, but that she previously had ridden as a passenger over that section of the highway during daylight hours.
Three qualified traffic experts who testified in behalf of plaintiff expressed the opinion that the design and construction of the cross-over and barricade were potentially hazardous to motorists. All of them felt that the "rate of taper", or the angle, of the cross-over was too sharp, making it difficult for a motorist to negotiate the cross-over safely at a speed in excess of 35 miles per hour. They agreed that a massive barrier, such as the one which was struck by the Donaldson car here, was more dangerous than a breakaway barrier would be, and that the warning signs and markers which had been erected on, near and south of that barricade were inade quate to sufficiently warn north bound motorists of the danger.
All of these experts expressed the view that a north bound motorist approaching the barricade at night, with his lights on low beam, would not be able to see and react to the barrier in time to avoid an accident. Two of them, Jack Bishop Hum-phries and Robert Richard Canfield, felt that such a driver would not see the barricade until he reached a point about 250 feet from it. The other expert, Francis E. Twiss, was of the opinion that the night driver should see the barricade within a distance of at least 150 feet of it. All of these experts conceded that if the lights of the vehicle were on high beam, the driver could see the barricade at a much greater distance than those just mentioned. The evidence in the instant suit does not show whether the lights on the Donaldson car were on high or low beam, and we find no^ justification for assuming that either was the case.
NEGLIGENCE OF THE DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS
The Department of Highways has the duty to maintain state highways in such a condition that they will be safe for the ordinary motorist using reasonable care under the circumstances. LSA-R.S. 32:2; McCallum v. State, Department of Highways, 246 So.2d 46 (La.App., 3rd Cir. 1971); Dupre v. Louisiana Department of Highways, 154 So.2d 579 (La.App., 3rd Cir. 1963). This includes the duty of providing adequate warnings of and safeguards against dangerous conditions in the highway. There is no hard and fast rule as to the types of warnings or safeguards. Warnings should be sufficient to alert the ordinary, reasonable motorist, having in view the probable traffic, the character of the road and the use reasonably to be anticipated, Christ v. State, Department of Highways, 161 So.2d 322 (La.App., 3rd Cir. 1964). Safeguards should be commensurate with the danger.
The trial judge held that "this cross-over was not reasonably safe for the general or ordinary motorist, was inadequate in curvature of cross-over in design and was inadequately marked to alert a north bound motorist of the situation which he would be confronted with." He found the Highway Department to be negligent in the following respects:
1. The design of the cross-over created an extremely sharp taper which could not be negotiated safely at speeds greater than 25 to 30 miles per hour;
2. The placing of the massive wooden barrier within 3 to 4 feet of the roadway created a greater hazard than which it sought to protect the motorist from;
3. The white edge line down the right side of the road terminated some 45 feet from this barricade which had the effect of drawing the night time motorist into a dangerous trap-like situation;
4. There were no test runs made to determine the effectiveness of the large arrow signs at night;
5. There were no advance warning signs to alert the motorist to the sharp change and alignment of the highway at this change over;
6. There were no signs indicating that the motorist would have to reduce speed in order to safely negotiate the cross-over in spite of the fact that the statutory speed limit under the laws of the State of Louisiana for a four-lane highway is 70 miles per per hour; and
7. There were no cones, barrels, or other channelizing devices in place to guide the motorist through this sharp cross-over safely.
The evidence clearly supports the finding of the trial judge that the cross-over was at too sharp an angle to be negotiated safely at speeds greater than 25 or 35 miles per hour. As stated above, three qualified traffic experts testified for the plaintiff that the construction of the cross-over was hazardous to motorists. Furthermore, Mr. Lonnie Luno, the defendant's project engineer, also testified that the taper of the cross-over was too sharp. Luno explained that the plans for final construction provided a permanent cross-over with a long, gentle taper, joining the new north bound lanes with the old original south bound two-lane highway. The cross-over involved in this litigation was intended to be only temporary, but due to lack of funds or equipment it was never changed.
The evidence also supports the finding of the trial judge that the massive wooden barrier constructed within three or four feet of the point where the newly constructed north bound lanes terminated, also created an unreasonable hazard. The photographs, P-91 and P-92, show that at the time of the accident this massive wooden barricade extended to the extreme western edge of the point where the newly constructed north bound lanes terminated. It would have been preferable to erect a barricade of lighter construction which would break in the event of being struck. Or it would have been even more preferable to have no barricade, but instead to have a line of cones, barrels or other channelizing devices to guide the motorist into the cross-over.
As to the findings of the trial judge listed above as numbers 3, 4, S and 6, the Department of Highways makes a persuasive argument that even assuming these deficiencies in the prewarning signs, white lines, etc., they have no causal connection with the accident in this case, because the defendant motorist, Mrs. Donaldson, testified that she did not see any of the pre-warning signs, white lines, etc. Mrs. Donaldson testified the first thing she saw was the barricade a few feet in front of her.
However, even assuming that these deficiencies listed as numbers 3, 4, 5 and 6 were not causally connected with the accident, we agree with the finding of the trial judge that the Department of Highways was negligent in not providing cones, barrels or other channelizing devices to guide the motorists safely through this sharp cross-over on a main highway where the speed limit was 60 or 70 miles per hour. It is noteworthy that after this accident the heavy wooden barricade was removed and such channelizing devices were installed. The pictures filed in evidence show this. If such channelizing devices had been in place at the time of the accident, Mrs. Donaldson probably would have seen them in time to turn to the left and miss the end of the barricade.
The evidence shows that the right front part of the car struck the extreme left, or west, end of the barricade. Mrs. Donaldson did not remember which of the two north bound lanes of traffic she was in as she approached the barricade. No skid-marks were left by her vehicle prior to the collision. But she did testify that she did not see the barricade until she was within a few feet of it, and that, although she attempted to turn to her left, she doesn't remember whether she had actually started that turning maneuver before her car crashed into the barrier. The evidence convinces us that Mrs. Donaldson was traveling in the left, or west, lane of traffic when she observed the barricade, because otherwise she would have had to make a very sharp left turn from the right lane and cross the entire left lane.
Even without the channelizing devices, Mrs. Donaldson saw the barricade almost in time to swerve to the left and avoid the accident. If channelizing devices had been placed in the highway in advance of the barricade, she probably would have been able to swerve and avoid striking the west end of the barricade.
We conclude that the lack of channelizing devices, together with the sharpness of the cross-over, constituted negligence which was a legal cause of this accident.
THE NEGLIGENCE OF MRS. DONALDSON
The driver of a motor vehicle has the duty to maintain a lookout and to see that which an ordinary reasonable motorist would have seen under the circumstances. Mrs. Donaldson did not see any of the advance warning signs described above. She did not see the barricade, or the two large arrows above the barricade, until she was a few feet from it. The evidence does not show whether her lights were on high or low beam. However, even with her lights on low beam, she should have seen the barricade much sooner than she did. The evidence is sufficient to support the finding of the trial judge that Mrs. Donaldson did not act as a reasonably prudent driver, and that her negligence was a legal cause of the accident.
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE OF MRS. VON CANNON
The Department of Highways contends that Mrs. Von Cannon was contribu-torily negligent in that she was familiar with this cross-over and failed to warn Mrs. Donaldson about it; that Mrs. Von Cannon and Mrs. Donaldson had been drinking and plaintiff knew or should have known that Mrs. Donaldson's ability to drive was impaired; and that plaintiff distracted Mrs. Donaldson by talking to her. The trial judge correctly rejected these arguments. The evidence does not show that Mrs. Donaldson's ability to drive was impaired by intoxication, nor does it show that Mrs. Von Cannon breached any duty as a guest passenger to direct Mrs. Donaldson in the manner in which she was driving.
THE QUANTUM OF THE AWARD
The award by the district judge is itemized in his written reasons as follows:
"1. For pain and suffering, loss of her right leg, injuries to her shoulders, fractures to her left femur, and fractures of her jaw and teeth — $105,-000.00
"2. Loss of wages —$26,849.07
"3. Past and future medical expense— $9,981.03
"Total — $141,830.10."
At the time of the accident, Mrs. Von Cannon was approximately 47 years of age and was working as a beauty shop operator, earning about $200 per month. She received a severe injury to the right leg, requiring amputation and leaving about a- 9 inch stump. Head injuries consisted of fractures of the facial bones, fractures of the jaw, and loss of teeth, leaving a permanent loss of facial sensation. She also received fractures of the pelvis, the left hip and left ankle, requiring prolonged treatment and leaving residual disability of that leg. Both shoulders were fractured.
The awards are clearly within the much discretion of the trial judge as to the quantum of damages for personal injuries.
THE MOTION TO REMAND
The plaintiff did not appeal or answer the appeal requesting an increase in the award for damages. However, after the delays for appealing or answering the appeal had elapsed, the plaintiff filed in the appellate court a motion to remand this case to the district court for the introduction of additional evidence to show damages resulting from plaintiff's partial blindness and brain damage.
In the case of McKinney v. Levy, 212 So.2d 279 (La.App., 3rd Cir. 1968), we stated the rule that although courts of appeal generally have the right to remand cases for additional evidence to prevent a miscarriage of justice, LSA-C.C.P. Articles 2082 and 2164, this discretion must be sparingly exercised. In the present case the accident occurred on June 10, 1971. the trial commenced two years later, on June S, 1973, and lasted for a period of four days. On August 21, 1973, the district judge granted a motion by plaintiff to file additional medical records of treatment administered after the trial. The district judge considered all of this medical evidence. In his written reasons, he stated the award contemplated future suffering, disability, loss of wages and medical expenses.
We conclude this is not a proper case for the exercise of our sparingly used discretion to remand for additional evidence to prevent a miscarriage of justice.
For the reasons assigned, the judgment appealed is affirmed. All costs of this appeal are assessed against the plaintiff appellant.
Affirmed.
HOOD, J., dissents and assigns written reasons.