Case Name: GREATER LORETTA IMPROVEMENT ASSOCIATION, a non-profit corporation, Appellant, v. STATE ex rel. Arthur T. BOONE, Appellee
Court: Florida Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1970-04-22
Citations: 234 So. 2d 665
Docket Number: No. 37933
Parties: GREATER LORETTA IMPROVEMENT ASSOCIATION, a non-profit corporation, Appellant, v. STATE ex rel. Arthur T. BOONE, Appellee.
Judges: ROBERTS and BOYD, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 234
Pages: 665–689

Head Matter:
GREATER LORETTA IMPROVEMENT ASSOCIATION, a non-profit corporation, Appellant, v. STATE ex rel. Arthur T. BOONE, Appellee.
No. 37933.
Supreme Court of Florida.
April 22, 1970.
Rehearing Denied May 20, 1970.
George B. Stallings, Jr., of Stallings & Marr, Jacksonville, for appellant.
William H. Maness, Jacksonville, for appellee.

Opinion:
ADKINS, Justice.
This is a direct appeal from a summary-final judgment declaring Fla.Stat., § 849.-093, F.S.A. (Bingo Statute) to be unconstitutional and void and enjoining appellant from conducting bingo games.
This case involves the meaning of the word "lottery" as used in Sec. 23, art. 3, Fla.Const. (1885), F.S.A. so as to determine whether the Bingo statute is compatible or in conflict with the Constitution.
The word "lottery" is a generic term and is not defined in the Constitution nor in any of the statutes of this State. There are conflicting lines of decisions defining the word "lottery." See 9 Fla. Law Review 93 (1956) where these decisions are discussed. The article suggests "a legislative enactment defining an unlawful lottery" and expressly eliminating the requirement that the lottery must be of widespread effect to violate the Constitution.
State-authorized lotteries were very common in the first decades of this nation's history. Most states used them to raise money, including Florida; the territorial Legislature in 1828 created Union Academy in Jacksonville, and authorized its trustees to raise $1,000 for it by lottery. Page 279, Acts of 1828. The use and control of lotteries had been established long before. New York, while still a British colony, passed what became a typical law, outlawing all lotteries except those "authorized by the Legislature." Ch. XVII, Laws of the Colony of New York, 1774. When New York prohibited lotteries in its 1821 Constitution, it said, "No lotteries shall hereafter be authorized ." Sec. 11, art. VII, Const. (1821). This command clearly speaks to the Legislature. An "authorized lottery" is one "expressly authorized by law." 38 Corpus Juris 323 (1925).
In the years before Florida adopted its lottery prohibition, governmental interest in lotteries was financial. "Lotteries were formerly often resorted to as a means of raising money by states and are still authorized in many foreign countries and in a few of our states 2 Bouvier's Dictionary 127 (1885). Lottery revenue measures were passed for many purposes. For example, in Maryland purposes included Washington College (Ch. 193, Laws of Maryland (1823)), a statute of George Washington (Ch. 125, (1824)), turnpike roads (Ch. 140, (1945); Ch. 200, (1845)), and river channel clearing (Ch. 80, (1853)). In its (1851) Constitution, Maryland banned lotteries, saying no more grants "shall ever hereafter be authorized by the Legislature." Art. Ill, Sec. 37.
By 1867, twenty-one states had banned lotteries, and almost universally the language was addressed to the Legislatures. By 1885, twenty-nine states had banned lotteries, with all Constitutions but one speaking to the Legislature; one (Louisiana) reversed itself to permit the Legislature to authorize lotteries. Prohibition in Legislative Article: Florida Art. Ill, Sec. 23 (1885). Tennessee Art. XI, Sec. 5 (1834). Michigan Art. IV, Sec. 27 (1850). Arkansas Art. V, Sec. 41 (1868). Rhode Island Art. IV, Sec. 12 (1842). New Jersey Sec. VII, Art. 2 (1844). Iowa Art. III, Sec. 28 (1857). Wisconsin Art. IV, Sec. 24 (1848). California Art. IV, Sec. 26 (1879). Maryland Art. Ill, Sec. 35 (1864). Minnesota Art. IV, Sec. 31 (1857). Nevada Art. IV, Sec. 24 (1864). Missouri' Art. IV, Sec. 28 (1865). Nebraska Art. Ill, Sec. 21 (1875). Virginia Art. V, Sec. 18 (1870). Illinois Art. IV, Sec. 27 (1870). Alabama Art. IV, Sec. 26 (1875). Authorization of Lottery Prohibited: New York, Art. I, Sec. 10 (1846). Colorado Art. XVIII, Sec. 2 (1876). Mississippi Art. XII, Sec. 15 (1868). Louisiana Title VI, Art. 113 (1852) amended to permit Legislature to authorize lotteries in 1879. Texas Art. XII, Sec. 36 (1868). Indiana Art. XV, Sec. 8 (1851). West Virginia Art. XI, Sec. 1 (1861-63). Georgia Art. I, Sec. 23 (1868). Lotteries Prohibited "for any purpose": Ohio Art. XV, Sec. 6 (1851). Oregon Art. XV, Sec. 4 (1857). South Carolina Art. XIV, Sec. 2 (1868). Unrestricted Language: Kansas Art. 15, Sec. 3 (1859) (but see restrictions in Art. XVI, Sec. 6, Constitution of 1858; Art. XV, Sec. 2, Constitution of 1855).
It was stated that in "many of the States, the authorizing of lotteries by the Legislature is inhibited, and it is also required that the sale of lottery tickets shall not be allowed." Florida is footnoted as one of the states included. XIII American and English Encyclopedia of Law 1173 (1890).
This Court in Lee v. City of Miami, 121 Fla. 93, 163 So. 486 (1935), studied the meaning of the lottery prohibition, and concluded it referred to authorized lotteries, not private gambling. Quoting from Phalen v. Virginia, 8. How. (U.S.) 163, 168, 12 L.Ed. 1030, we said:
" 'Experience has shown that the common forms of gambling are comparatively innocuous when placed in contrast with the wide-spread pestilence of lotteries. The former are confined to a few persons and places, but the latter infests the whole community: it enters every dwelling; it reaches every class; it preys upon the hard earnings of the poor; it plunders the ignorant and simple.'
"[W]e must conclude that the people of this state had in mind such a lottery as was referred to in Phalen v. Virginia »
Although all of the standards set forth in Lee v. City of Miami, supra, were not followed in some of the subsequent decisions, this Court has never receded from or overruled the Lee case. It is still good law, and was sufficient authority to give the Legislature confidence in enacting the Bingo law.
While some of the subsequent decisions were not entirely consistent with Lee v. City of Miami, supra, and the varying opinions were never reconciled with each other, none were ever overruled. Under these circumstances the Legislature may choose to rely more substantially on one than the other. For this Court to step in now and to recede' from the very decision the Legislature relied upon could create instability in the law.
We cannot declare the Bingo law unconstitutional unless we overrule Lee v. City of Miami, supra, and this would do violence to the time-honored doctrine of stare decisis.
In 1832, only four years after a lottery had been authorized for Union Academy, the Florida Legislature banned all gaming. Sec. 1, Acts of the Legislative Council (1839); modified Ch. 75, Laws of Florida (1846); Ch. 542, Acts of Florida (1868).
In 1868, the anti-lottery provision was inserted in the new Constitution. Immediately after, the Legislature enacted new laws outlawing lotteries and related activities. Ch. X of Ch. 1637, Acts of Florida (1868). .
Ten years later, the Legislature imposed a license tax on certain gambling games, including "keno." Ch. 3099, Sec. 11, Laws of Florida (1879). The Act of 1868 forbidding lotteries was not disturbed.
"Keno" is "a game which stops and a player wins when he has five numbers in a row on a card purchased by him corresponding with numbers on balls, drawn from a globe, or other receptacle. It is said to resemble a lottery, and in some respects a raffle, but not to resemble faro or roulette." 38 C.J.S. Gaming § 1, pp. 40, 41. Keno resembles Bingo in that both are likened to Tango. 38 C.J.S. p. 43.
It is clear that the Legislature, in 1879, considered that the bingo-like game of Keno was not forbidden under the Florida anti-lottery provision of the Constitution.
In 1881, this Court faced the question whether the Legislature had power to im pose a license tax on this game resembling bingo. Overby v. State, 18 Fla. 178 (1881). The case arose when a Jacksonville licensee was arrested for violating the anti-gambling law.
The Court held that keno is a gambling game, but went on to say (at page 183) that the Legislature by authorizing licenses to operate keno games "legalized this game of 'keno' and made it, by the license tax imposed, a source of revenue to the State No constitutional arguments were presented. Overby's conviction was set aside, as were the convictions of three other licensees. Hazen v. State, 18 Fla. 184 (1881).
The correctness of this decision was verified by the Legislature in the same year, when it expressly repealed all laws in conflict with its licensing statute for gambling. Ch. 3277, Acts of Florida, 1881.
In 1885, four years after Overby, supra, the exact language of the anti-lottery provision of the 1868 Constitution was written into a new Constitution (Sec. 23, Art. Ill, Const. (1885)). By establishing rules of construction, the Overby decision retained its authority under the new Constitution.
Therefore, since the Florida Legislature was empowered in 1879 to legalize and license the bingo-like game of keno, it was empowered in 1967 to legalize bingo. Precedent commands this conclusion.
Fourteen years after Overby, the Legislature enacted a new statute governing lotteries and games of chance. Ch. 4373, Laws of Florida, 1895. Gambling in its various forms, and lotteries, are illegal under present law. Ch. 849, F.S.A. Bingo or Guest games do not violate this statute, if played within the restrictions imposed by the Legislature. Ch. 67-178, § 1, Laws of Florida, 1967 (§ 849.093, F.S.A.).
Subsequent decisions of this Court have been compatible with Overby. In Lee v. City of Miami, supra, this Court upheld a statute to license some types of coin-operated machines and concluded the constitutional anti-lottery provision related to state-authorized lotteries. In Stoutamire v. Pratt, 148 Fla. 690, 5 So.2d 248 (1942), this Court upheld a statute permitting coin-operated amusement machines if licensed. Neither case conflicted with State v. Vasquez, 49 Fla. 126, 38 So. 830 (1905), in which this Court found that a slot machine with an element of chance was not protected by a statute permitting licenses for coin-operated machines.
The situation then, as it presents itself in connection with our constitutional provision, is at least that by the decisions of the courts of Florida and other jurisdiction the word "lottery" may have either of several meanings, and that either is reasonable and possible. In such a situation, where a constitutional provision may well have either of several meanings, it is a fundamental rule of constitutional construction that, if the Legislature has by statute adopted one, its action in this respect is well-nigh, if not completely, controlling. As stated in Fargo v. Powers (D.C.), 220 F. 697, 709, it is said:
"If the constitutional provisions in question are susceptible of two constructions — one being that contended for by complainants, the other that taken by the Legislature — the action of the Legislature in adopting one of those constructions and enacting a statute carrying it into effect, as thus construed, must be deemed conclusive. That rule is: 'That the acts of a state Legislature are to be presumed constitutional until the contrary is shown; and it is only when they manifestly infringe some provision of the Constitution that they can be declared void for that reason. In case of doubt, every presumption, not clearly inconsistent with the language or subject-matter, is to be made in favor of the constitutionality of the act. The power of declaring laws unconstitutional should be exercised with extreme caution and never where serious doubt exists as to the conflict.' "
In Jasper v. Mease Manor, Inc. (Fla.1968), 208 So.2d 821, this Court sustained a statute defining the word "charitable" as used in the Florida Constitution even though such definition conflicted with earlier decisions by this Court. Similarly, in Ammerman v. Markham (Fla.1969), 222 So.2d 423, this Court upheld a legislative definition of the terms "real property" and "dwelling house" as used in the Constitution even though such definitions were in conflict with earlier decisions of this Court.
Although the question of whether various transactions constitute lotteries have been considered by the Florida courts many times, the writer's search has revealed no decision holding a statute unconstitutional because it violates the provision of the Constitution prohibiting lotteries. None are cited in appellee's brief.
When the Legislature has once construed the Constitution, for the courts then to place a different construction upon it means that they must declare void the action of the Legislature. It is no small matter for one branch of the government to annul the formal exercise by another of power committed to the latter. The courts should not and must not annul, as contrary to the Constitution, a statute passed by the Legislature, unless it can be said of the statute that it positively and certainly is opposed to the Constitution. This is elementary.
The Bingo law under attack was enacted by the Legislature in 1967, during the regular session of the Legislature. A proposed Constitution was under consideration at the time, and during the special session of June 24-July 3, 1968, the Legislature passed a joint resolution proposing a new Constitution. This Constitution, which was adopted by the people in 1968, contained the following provision as Art. X, § 7:
"Lotteries, other than the types of parimutuel pools authorized by law as of the effective date of this constitution, are hereby prohibited in this state." (Emphasis supplied)
Although this provision has no application to the case sub judice, the Bingo law may be considered as a contemporaneous construction of the word "lottery" as used in the Constitution. There is a strong presumption that such contemporaneous construction rightly interprets the meaning and intention of a constitutional provision. 16 Am.Jur.2d, Constitutional Law, § 85. In doubtful cases such a Legislative construction should, and ordinarily will, be followed, unless it is manifestly erroneous. 16 C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 33.
The term "definition" may be said to be synonymous with "description." The Court, as well as the Attorney General, has "described" lotteries many times. F.S. A., § 849.09, prohibits a lottery and provides the penalties for violations of its provisions, but does not define the term. No decision of this Court or opinion of the Attorney General previously rendered bars the Legislature from partially defining a lottery by excepting Bingo.
The moral issue is not before us. The only issue is whether the Bingo law constitutionally excepts the game from the definition of a lottery. Florida decisions, as well as decisions from other jurisdictions, giving a particular definition of a lottery do not require or justify rejection of the current Bingo statute on constitutional grounds.
We are not required to determine whether or not a particular factual situation, such as Bingo, is a lottery within the meaning of a statute prohibiting lotteries. This case involves a legislative construction of the term "lottery," as used in the Constitution.
Although this case was filed under the 1885 Constitution, the 1967 Legislature which passed the "Bingo" statute also functioned under that Constitution and many of the members of that Legislature were instrumental in the writing and passage of the 1969 Constitution. It appears that when the "Lottery" section was placed under the general section entitled "Miscellaneous" in the new Constitution, that Bingo, together with horse racing, dog racing and jai alai, was an exception to the prohibition of lotteries.
Sec. 7, art. X, Fla.Const. (1968) reads:
"Lotteries, other than the types of parimutuel pools authorized by law as of the effective date of this constitution, are hereby prohibited in this state."
Those activities comprehended as "parimutuel pools" were recognized as lotteries but those in existence and lawful under the case law or legislative statutes prior to January 7, 1969, were "grandfathered in" as exceptions to the prohibition. "Parimutuel pools" is a term applied to horse racing, jai alai, and dog racing and certainly includes bingo by definition.
" 'Pari-mutuel' is defined as a pool in betting, as in a horse race, in which each bettor lays a fixed sum on the contestant he selects, and those who choose the winner, divide the entire stake, less percentage of the person who furnishes the pool tickets, literally mutual bets." (Emphasis supplied) Weiss v. Schachter, 275 Ill.App. 26 (1934).
See definitions in Century Dictionary; Ballentine's Law Dictionary. See Utah State Fair Association v. Green, 68 Utah 251, 249 P. 1016 (1926). "PARIMUTUEL. A mutual stake or wager; a betting pool" Black's Law Dictionary. Webster's Third New International Dictionary defines pari-mutuel as follows:
"A system of betting (as on a horse race) in which those who bet on the winner share the total stakes minus a small per cent for the management."
Funk & Wagnalls, New Standard Dictionary (1950) points out the term "paris mutuels" is "sometimes erroneously spelled pari-mutuel as singular, but that which is mutual commonly relates to two." Paris mutuels is defined as follows:
"A pool in betting in which each bettor lays a fixed sum on the contestant that he selects, and those who choose the winners divide the entire stake, less the percentage of the person who furnishes the pool-tickets."
Although the term pari-mutuel is usually considered a method of betting on horse racing, it should be noted that this form of betting has been authorized for dog racing and Jai Alai. At the horse tracks, dog tracks and frontons, all the money paid for gambling tickets are placed in a common fund and paid to the winners less certain portions reserved for taxes to the State and fees due the track or fronton for operating expenses and for profit. The greater amount invested in tickets, the greater amounts one may win if his choice is correct.
Bingo is similar. The player may usually purchase and play on as many cards as may be desired. The greater amount invested in cards the greater is the chance of winning. .In both racing events and in Bingo games the hope of winning money prizes is not the only motive for attendance. In both instances entertainment, recreation, and social relations are factors of concern to many and just as important as the process of participating in the betting.
At the time the Constitution of 1968 was being prepared and approved by the Legislature, our lawmakers simultaneously authorized the regulation of Bingo. It seems unreasonable to conclude that the people in adopting the Constitution intended to permit some citizens to continue their betting at the race tracks and at the same time prohibit other citizens from continuing their Bingo games at social gatherings.
In view of the fact that Bingo could be considered the same type of gambling as described in the definition of pari-mutuel, the game of Bingo was "authorized by law as of the effective date of the Constitution of 1968."
Obviously, the makers of our 1968 Constitution recognized horse racing as a type of lottery and a "pari-mutuel pool" but also intended to include in its sanction those other lotteries then legally functioning; namely, dog racing, jai alai and bingo. All other lotteries including bolito, cuba, slot machines, etc., were prohibited. The view that bingo was intended to be included in the exception to the constitutional prohibition against lotteries is more persuasive when the bingo statute, Fla.Stat., § 849.093, F.S.A., is examined and found to contain such stringent limitations against abuse.
The pros and cons of the moral issue involved in Bingo is a matter of legislative, not judicial, concern. We are only confronted with the possible violation of our organic law. For the reasons stated above, it does not appear that the members of the Legislature, who are directly responsible to the people, violated the provisions of the Constitution in authorizing and regulating the game of Bingo. Certainly, the Legislature in one breath did not intend to authorize Bingo and in the next breath prohibit it in a proposed Constitution.
Given the uncertainty of interpretation by this Court as evidenced by its past decisions, given the historical context of the chartered lotteries in Florida and other states and the constitutional amendments designed to control them, given the location of the anti-lottery provision within the Legislative (not the judicial) article of the 1868 and 1885 (as differentiated from the 1968) Constitutions, given the consistent construction of the Legislature through the years in assuming and exercising its power to pass laws regulating and at times legalizing bingo-like games — given these factors, we reach the inevitable conclusion that it would be unreasonable and unjust to rule today that the Legislature lacked authority to legalize bingo and write laws for its control and operation to achieve the very ends and avoid the very vices which were the subject of the anti-lottery provisions of 1868 and 1885; the 1967 statute is not in conflict, but actually is in harmony with the. Constitutions.
Having ascertained the meaning of the lottery provision in years past, we must now reach the question whether bingo is invalidated by the lottery provision of the Constitution of 1968. We conclude it is not invalidated, being expressly saved by the language of the lottery provision regarding pari-mutuel pools, and also by the doctrine of contemporaneous enactment.
The Legislature, in its wisdom, has seen fit to permit this form of recreation for those unable to participate in the uncertainties of the authorized pari-mutuel pools, and, at the same time, has allowed worthy organizations to receive the benefits. We should abide by the will of the Legislature in the construction of the Constitution.
The judgment and order of the Circuit Court is reversed and the cause is remanded with instructions to enter final judgment for the defendant.
ROBERTS and BOYD, JJ., concur.
ERVIN, C. J., concurs with opinion.
CARLTON, J., dissents with opinion.
DREW and THORNAL, JJ., dissent and concur with CARLTON, J.