Case Name: WEIDMAN'S APPEAL
Court: Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
Jurisdiction: Pennsylvania
Decision Date: 1885-03-16
Citations: 2 Walk. 359
Docket Number: No. 343
Parties: WEIDMAN’S APPEAL.
Judges: 
Reporter: Reports of cases decided by the supreme court of pennsylvania which have been omitted from the regular reports
Volume: 2
Pages: 359–362

Head Matter:
WEIDMAN’S APPEAL.
In expounding a will, the question is, not what the testator meant, but what do the words he used mean.
Appeal from the Orphans’ Court of Berks County. No. 343 January Term, 1885.
The following extract from the adjudication and distribution of the Orphans’ Court upon the accounts of the executors of Samuel Sheeler, deceased, gave rise to this controversy, viz :
In the distribution of decedent’s estate it becomes necessary to put a construction on his will. So far as the advancements to his son Henry and the advancement to his late daughter Sarah, and the debt due the estate by her husband, Augustus Holler, are concerned, the will is simple and clear. Their advancements and her husband’s debts will have to be treated in making distribution as advancement.
The will in its third item employs language as follows: “All my children shall have equal shares, share and share alike.” In its fifth item it makes use of language as follows: “If any one of my children at the time of my decease is indebted to my state by note, bond, or in my family book, or otherwise, then it shall be taken from their share or shares such amount or sum and if any of my sons-in-law are indebted" to my estate and is unable to pay the same, then it shall-be taken from their children’s share.
Under the third item of his will the testator appears to" have been anxious to have all his children receive an equal portion of his estate.
Under fourth item he gave to his grandchildren the portion of their deceased parent respectively.
Under the fifth item he appears to se k to further equalize the shares among his several children by including the indebtedness to his estate of his sons-in-law.
Taking the whole will .into consideration, I find that his general intent was to divide his entire estate, including debts of his sons-in-law, equally among children ; and. the grandchildren of deceased parents to receive their respective share , vnd ■ that his children, as well as his grandchildren, take subject, to advance- meats and debts of his children, as also of all debts due the estate by his sons-in-law.
It is a well established principle in construing wills, that after the general intent of the testator has been found, particular ones in direct conflict therewith fall.
It is a grave question what the testator meant to promulgate by the fifth item, by the words “from their children’s share.” At first view it might be supposed he intended his grandchil-. dren. But such a construction would be entirely at variance with the general spirit and intent of other portions of his will. In my opinion the words “their wives or” have been omitted between the words “from” and “their children.” If they had been inserted, the will would be intelligible and comprehensible.
Distribution will be made in accordance with the views and principles expressed.
In accordance with the views above expressed, the Court deducted from the share of Rebecca Weidman, a daughter of the testator, $621.10 the balance due on a judgment obtained by Samuel Sheeler against H. B. Weidman, the husband of Rebecca Weidman, who then appealed complaining of the decree of the Court in this respect.
J. K. Grant, Esq. for appellant
cited Eollweiler’s Appeal, 102 Pa. 581; Board of Missions vs. The Society, 9 Phila. 279; Sea-grist’s Appeal, 10 Pa. 424; Whelen’s Appeal, 70 Pa. 410; Varner’s Appeal, 87 Pa. 422; Hallowell’s Estate, 11 Phila. 55; Holland’s Estate, 6 W. N. C. 469; Griffith vs. Woodward, 1 Yeates, 316; M’Keehan vs. Wilson, 53 Pa. 74.
A. R. Heilig, Esq., contra
cited Clarke’s Estate, 82 Pa. 528; Middleswarth vs. Blackmore, 74 Pa. 414; Schott’s Estate, 78. Pa. 40; Sheetz’s Appeal, 82 Pa. 213; Malone vs. Dobbins, 23 Pa. 296; Hitchcock vs. Hitchcock, 35 Pa. 399; Doebler’s Appeal, 64 Pa. 15 ; Fahrney vs. Holsinger, 65 Pa. 393. The scrivener no doubt made a mistake and the words are properly supplied by the Court; McKeehan vs. Wilson, 53 Pa. 77; Langton vs. Pole, 2 Moore & Payne 490; Graham vs. Graham, 3 Clark 212; Findlay vs. Riddle, 3 Binney 139.

Opinion:
The Supreme Court reversed the decree of the Orphans' Court on March 16, 1885, in the following opinion per:
Trunkey, J.
Augustus Holler and IT. B. Weidman were sons-in-law of the testator. Holler's wife, Sarah, who was a daughter of the testator, died before the execution of the will. After directing that all his property should be converted into money, the testator made the following provisions, which are all that require notice in determining the question presented in this appeal, namely, shall the indebtedness of Ii. B. Weidman be taken from the legacy due to his wife ?
"3. All my children shall have equal shares, share and share alike.
"4. The children of my son Isaac', deceased, and my daughter Sarah, deceased, shall have their parents' share, in equal shares, except Charles Henry, my son's son, shall have two dollars to the others one dollar.
"5. If any one of my children, at the time of my decease, is indebted to my estate, by note, bond, or in my family book, or otherwise, then it shall be taken from their share or shares such amount or sum, and if any one of my sons-in-law are indebted to my estate, and is unable to pay the same, then it shall be taken from their children's share."
"The question in expounding a will is not what the testator meant, but what is the meaning of his words. The will must be expressed in writing, and that writing only is to be considered. And in construing that writing, the rule is, to read it in the ordinary and grammatical sense of the words, unless some obvious absurdity, or some repugnance with the declared intentions of the writer, to be extracted from the whole instrument, shall follow from so reading it."
We are not pursuaded that any such absurdity or repugnance exists in this will. On the contrary, the meaning of the words seems plain, unless there should be an attempt to reconcile them with an intention not apparent upon the reading of the whole instrument. In the clause, "if any one of my Sous-in-law are indebted to my estate, and is unable to pay the same, then it pbp.ll be taken from their children's share," there is nothing absurd ; nor is the intent doubtful. One of the testator's sons-in-law* had children, and a bequest of a share was expressly made to those children. In relation to him and his children the clause needs no interpretation. Other words could not make it plainer, that if Holler is indebted, and is insolvent, the debt shall be deducted from his children's legacy. If the clause be not strictly grammatical, its sense is in nowise obscure. Had Hebecca Weidman died before the decease of the testator then, her children would be entitled to the share bequeathed to her, and the clause would also apply to them and H. B. Weidman.
Nothing in the will warrants the inference that by mistake the words "and their wives or," were omitted from said clause. To insert them would be making a new provision affecting the legacy of Mrs. Weidman. The.will clearly shows that the testator remembered the status of each member of his family, and his will, -with regard to each, is expressed. But it is itrged that said clause, in its l'elation to Weidman, is repugnant to the third item of the will, which declares that the testator's children shall have equal shares. But the whole instrument must be taken together, the third, fourth, and fifth items must be read with reference to each other — not one alone — and then there is no repugnancy, unless an exception to a general direction be called a repugnancy, instead of what it is. Thus read, the testator gives equal shares to his children, except that the sum of the indebtedness of each child to his estate shall be • deducted from his or her share, and the indebtedness of each insolvent son-in-law shall be deducted from the share of his children ; but it is no where said that the indebtedness of a son-in-law shall be deducted from the share of his wife, the testator's only surviving daughter.
We are of opinion that the learned judge of the Orphans' Court erred in refusing Hebecca Weidman a full distributive share under the will, without deducting therefrom the indebtedness of H. B. Weidman to- the testator's estate. The record will be remitted that the decree of distribution may be corrected so as to accord with this opinion.
Decree reversed, record to be remitted for further proceedings, costs to be paid by the executors out of the estate.