Case Name: TRANS WORLD TIRE CO. and Transportation Casualty Insurance Co., Appellants, v. Martin HAGNESS, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1995-02-09
Citations: 651 So. 2d 124
Docket Number: No. 93-4213
Parties: TRANS WORLD TIRE CO. and Transportation Casualty Insurance Co., Appellants, v. Martin HAGNESS, Appellee.
Judges: ERVIN, J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 651
Pages: 124–127

Head Matter:
TRANS WORLD TIRE CO. and Transportation Casualty Insurance Co., Appellants, v. Martin HAGNESS, Appellee.
No. 93-4213.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
Feb. 9, 1995.
Rehearing Denied March 27, 1995.
Veronica M. Biddle and John M. Kelley of Kelley, Kronenberg, Kelley, Gilmartin & Fi-chtel, P.A., Ft. Lauderdale, for appellants.
Richard S. Thompson of Vaughan, Dono-hoe & Thompson, Orlando and Bill McCabe of Shepherd, McCabe & Cooley, Longwood, for appellee.

Opinion:
WENTWORTH, Senior Judge.
This is an appeal of a December 6, 1993 final workers' compensation order awarding an attorney's fee to claimant's attorney for securing permanent total disability (PTD) benefits on his client's behalf. We affirm.
Claimant filed an initial claim for benefits on February 10, 1992 seeking medical care and wage loss benefits, and the parties en tered into a joint stipulation settling that claim for benefits and a number of other matters. After claimant reached maximum medical improvement (MMI) on March 13, 1992 and was assigned a permanent impairment rating of 29.5 percent, claimant filed a claim for PTD benefits with supplementals. A pre-trial conference and hearing were held on this claim, but the employer/carrier (E/C) did not appear by counsel or authorized representative at either. The judge of compensation claims (JCC) entered an order on July 19,1993 awarding claimant PTD benefits retroactive to the date of MMI and entitlement to attorney's fees.
A hearing was held on November 22, 1993 to determine the amount of a reasonable attorney's fee. On December 6, 1993, the JCC entered his order awarding a $35,000 fee. In so doing, the JCC began with an uncontested statutory guideline fee of $45,-610.53 calculated according to the present value of benefits claimant's attorney obtained for him, which amounted to $299,070.19. The JCC then considered all of the factors delineated in section 440.34(l)(a)-(h), Florida Statutes (1991), and found that none of them warranted a departure from the guidelines. However, in departing from the guidelines and awarding a $35,000 fee, the JCC stated:
I find that a downward departure from the guideline attorney fee is appropriate in this ease, solely because the statutory guideline attorney fee results in a high hourly rate. Accordingly, because of this factor, and this factor alone, I have chosen to downwardly depart from the statutory guideline attorney fee and award a fee in the amount of $35,000. In arriving at this amount, I have carefully considered the affidavits submitted by both parties, and have fully considered the fact that the expert for the Employee/Claimant was of the opinion that a guideline attorney fee was appropriate and that the expert for the Employer/Carrier felt that a $15,000 attorney fee would be appropriate. However, after considering the totality of the circumstances, each of the factors addressed above, and being fully aware of the circumstances of this case, I have arrived at the amount of $35,-000, which is reasonable.
The starting point in determining a fee award under section 440.34 is the amount of benefits the attorney obtained for the claimant. Fumigation Dep't v. Pearson, 559 So.2d 587, 590 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989). Although "[t]he deputy is vested with considerable discretion in his analysis of the statutory criteria and his conclusion as to what constitutes a reasonable fee," Id, since "the statutory fee schedule embodies a legislative intent to standardize the method for assessing fees[,] departures from its percentage formula should be made only in exceptional circumstances." Tri-State Motor Transit Co. v. Judy, 566 So.2d 537, 539 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990). Judge Johnson's order on attorney fees reflects appropriate consideration of the statutory factors. In his order, he analyzed each factor individually and determined that none warrants a departure from the guidelines fee. However, as above noted, he eventually departed from the guidelines and awarded a fee of $35,000 based on his finding that the statutory fee resulted in a high hourly rate.
In Okaloosa County Gas Dist. v. Mandel, 394 So.2d 453, 454 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981), this court affirmed a fee award, stating: "Although under all the circumstances the award here appears high, especially considering its per hour rate, we cannot say that the deputy abused his discretion in resetting the award at a reduction of the statutory award by about 27%." Id. at 454. Although the court has determined that the hourly fee customarily charged and the time involved are major considerations in determining a reasonable fee in certain cases, the present situation does not fall within those categories. Rivers v. SCA Servs., Inc., 488 So.2d 873 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986) ("the minimum amount of time and labor reasonably required and the hourly fee customarily charged for similar services is properly treated as a major consideration in determining the amount of fee due in bad faith cases where the amount of benefits involved are minimal."); Bacon v. Broward Employment & Training Admin., 501 So.2d 724, 726 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987), dismissed, 509 So.2d 1117 (Fla.1987).
In light of the general rule vesting the JCC with considerable discretion in determining what constitutes a reasonable fee, and the legislature's intent that section 440.34 standardize fees, we conclude that the JCC's award should be affirmed. We note that the determination in an earlier order that a $225 hourly fee was reasonable had been made in light of the specific context in which it was awarded, i.e., services in securing stipulated amounts of medical and disability benefits. From that point, resistance to permanent benefits continued through the date they were finally awarded, and the fact that E/C ultimately did not appear at the hearing does not indicate that the benefits had been uncontested or conceded. The claim instead appears to have been controverted throughout the time when counsel's full preparatory efforts were expended.
AFFIRMED.
ERVIN, J., concurs.
BENTON, J., dissents.
. Since the record indicates that Mr. Thompson expended 20.6 hours representing claimant, a fee award of $35,000 results in an hourly rate of $1,699.03.