Case Name: Marlon LITTLE v. STATE of Mississippi
Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Mississippi
Decision Date: 2017-10-12
Citations: 233 So. 3d 288
Docket Number: NO. 2014-CT-01505-SCT
Parties: Marlon LITTLE v. STATE of Mississippi
Judges: RANDOLPH, P.J., COLEMAN, BEAM AND CHAMBERLIN, JJ., CONCUR. KITCHENS, P.J., DISSENTS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION JOINED BY KING, J. WALLER, C.J., AND ISHEE, J., NOT PARTICIPATING.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Third Series
Volume: 233
Pages: 288–299

Head Matter:
Marlon LITTLE v. STATE of Mississippi
NO. 2014-CT-01505-SCT
Supreme Court of Mississippi.
10/12/2017
Rehearing Denied January 25, 2018
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT: OFFICE OF THE STATE PUBLIC DEFENDER BY: W. DANIEL HIN-CHCLIFF, GEORGE T. HOLMES
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BY: JOSEPH SCOTT HEMLEBEN

Opinion:
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI
MAXWELL, JUSTICE,
FOR THE COURT:
¶1. Sitting as "thirteenth juror," the Court of Appeals reversed Marlon Little's convictions and remanded for a new-trial, finding the weight of the evidence preponderated heavily against the verdict. We granted certiorari to clarify the .appellate court's role when reviewing a motion for new trial. Despite this Court's prior language suggesting otherwise, neither this Court nor the Court of Appeals assumes the role of juror on appeal. We do not reweigh evidence. We do not assess the witnesses' credibility. And we do not resolve conflicts between evidence. Those decisions belong solely to the jury. Our role as appellate court is to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and disturb the verdict only when it is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence that to allow it to stand would sanction an unconscionable injustice.
¶2. Applying this standard, we find no reason to disturb Little's guilty verdict. Therefore, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and reinstate and affirm the judgment of the Claiborne County Circuit Court.
Background Facts and Procedural History
I. Investigation and Conviction
¶3. Nurse practitioner David Ellis was attacked from behind and robbed while leaving his medical clinic. Ellis reacted by swinging his computer bag at the assailant's head. During the struggle, Ellis fell down, and his attacker also stumbled. Ellis was on the ground when his attacker stuck a gun in Ellis's face. Elljs saw the man "square in the face" from about three feet away. The man demanded Ellis's wallet. Ellis complied. And the man fled.
¶4. Ellis went straight to the Port Gibson Police. He described the robber as "a black male wearing all black with a hood over his head." His body type was "small." And he "actually could have been between 20 or better."
¶5. A few days later, Police Chief Calvin Jackson received a tip from an informant. Based on this tip, Chief Jackson put Little's photo in a lineup. Chief Jackson presented the seven-photo lineup to Ellis. When Ellis saw the photo of Little, the fourth in the lineup, Ellis recognized him as the robber immediately. Little was indicted for armed robbery and tried a month later.
¶6. The State called both Chief Jackson and Ellis as witnesses. Chief Jackson testified about the informant's tip connecting Little to the robbery. Based on this tip, he composed the photo lineup and showed it to Ellis. On cross-examination, Chief Jackson was asked about discrepancies between Ellis's initial description of his at-. tacker given to the police and Little's actual physical characteristics. He was also asked about a later description given to a private investigator hired by Little's attorney. In Ellis's statement to Little's private investigator, Ellis said the robber was clean-shaven, while Little was known to have a- goatee. Chief Jackson did not know if Little had facial hair when he was arrested, But Chief Jackson agreed with defense counsel that Little was not "stocky or muscular." Chief Jackson was also asked about Little's gold teeth and the fact Ellis never mentioned them to the private investigator. Chief Jackson did not recall any mention of Little's teeth in Ellis's initial description. '
¶7. When Ellis took the stand, he stated clearly and unequivocally that Little was man who robbed him. Ellis recognized Little based on Little's entire face, especially Little's pronounced facial creases.- Drawing from his medical background, Ellis described Little's facial creases as "nasolabial folds." Ellis testified that he too shared the same physiological feature. Ellis also told the jury that he recognized Little by his eyes. He remembered them because they were "scared-looking." He described Little as "slender but solid"—meaning Little was not easily moved or knocked down when Ellis struck him with, the computer bag. •
•¶8. When questioned by defense counsel, Ellis conceded that he probably had described the robber previously as "muscular and stocky" in the recorded statement to Ellis's investigator. Ellis explained that Little seemed "solid as a rock" when Little jumped him and grabbed him. As for Little's .mouth, Ellis said he had not noticed Little's teeth because Ellis "had a .45 pistol .stuck right there in my face." Ellis also was asked about the robber's age discrepancy. He described the robber to Chief Jackson as twenty years old "or better." And Little was actually thirty-nine at the time of the attack. To this, Ellis said he did not know how old Little actually was. He explained he was not a good judge of age. ' •
¶9. Little called no witnesses. The jury found him guilty of armed robbery and possession of a weapon by a convicted felon. He was sentenced to thirty years' imprisonment for armed robbery and ten years' for felon-in-possession, with his sentences to run concurrently. After his post-trial motions for judgment not withstanding the verdict and for a new trial were deniéd, he timely appealed.
II. Court of Appeals' Decision
¶10. Little's appeal was assigned to the Court of Appeals. Little raised one issue— that his conviction was against the weight of the evidence, requiring a new trial. In a six-three opinion, the Court of Appeals reversed Little's convictions and remanded for a new trial. Little v. State, No. 2014-KA-1505-COA, 233 So.3d 311, 2016 WL 6876506 (Miss. Ct. App. Nov. 22, 2016).
¶11. Quoting Bush v. State, 895 So.2d 836 (Miss. 2005), the Court of Appeals majority described its appellate posture as that of "thirteenth juror." Little, 233 So.3d at 313, 2016 WL 6876506, at *2 (¶7). And in this role, "if it 'disagrees with the jury's resolution of the conflicting testimony,' the property remedy is to grant a new trial." Id. (quoting Bush, 895 So.2d at 844).
¶12. The appellate court majority found Ellis's initial identification conflicted with Little's "actual physical attributes, includ ing age and build." Id. at *2 (¶10). And because Ellis's identification of Little as the robber was the only substantive evidence against Little, the majority found a new trial was warranted. Id. at *3 (¶11).
¶13. The dissent disagreed with the majority's use of the "thirteenth juror" standard of review. Id. at *3 (¶14) (Griffis, J., dissenting). The dissent quoted extensively from Judge Larry Roberts's special concurrence in Hughes v. State, 43 So.3d 526, 530-33 (Miss. Ct. App. 2010). Little, 233 So.3d at 314-17, 2016 WL 6876506, at *3-6 (¶16) (Griffis, J., dissenting). In that case, Judge Roberts traced the history of the "thirteenth juror" language and explained how an appellate court, faced with a cold record, can never perform the function of "juror." Hughes, 43 So.3d at 530-33 (Roberts, J., dissenting). Applying an abuse-of-discretion standard, the dissent in Little saw no abuse in the trial judge's denial of Little's motion for a new trial. Little, 233 So.3d at 318, 2016 WL 6876506, at *7 (¶18) (Griffis, J., dissenting).
¶14. The State filed a petition for certio-rari, which we granted to clarify Bush's "thirteenth juror" language.
Discussion
¶15. We take this opportunity to clarify that neither this Court nor the Court of Appeals ever acts as - "juror" on direct appeal. "We sit as an appellate court, and as such are ill equipped to find facts." Gavin v. State, 473 So.2d 952, 955 (Miss. 1985). "[E]ven if we wanted to be fact finders, our capacity' for such is limited in that we have only a cold,' printed record to review." Id.
¶16. The concept of the appellate court acting as "thirteenth juror" was birthed in Bush. In that case, this Court sought to distinguish the standard of review for the denial of a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, which challenges the sufficiency of the'evidence, from the standard of review for the denial of a motion for a new trial, which challenges the weight of -the evidence. Bush, 895 S.o.2d at 843-45. In ^explaining the standard of review for the denial of a motion for a new trial, we borrowed language from Amiker v. Drugs For Less, Inc., 796 So.2d 942 (Miss. 2000):
[T]he court sits as a thirteenth juror. The motion, however, is addressed to the discretion of the court; which should be exercised with caution, and the power to grant a new trial should be invoked only in exceptional cases in which the evidence preponderates heavily against the verdict.
Bush, 896 So.2d at 844 (quoting Amiker, 796 So.2d at 947).
¶17. But as Judge Roberts pointed out in his special concurrence in Hughes, "[i]n Amiker, the central issue was whether a successor judge could vacate his predecessor's order granting a new trial." Hughes, 43 So.3d at 531 (citing Amiker, 796 So.2d at 946) (Roberts, J., specially concurring). And this Court concluded the.predecessor trial .judge, who sat through trial and observed the witnesses first hand, was in a "superior position" to his successor, who only had "a cold, printed record of a case." Amiker, 796 So.2d at 947-48.
¶18; This conclusion was based on the longstanding "recognition] that the trial judge is in the best position to view the trial." I'd. at 947. "The trial judge who hears' the witnessés live, observes their demeanor and in general'smells the smoke of the battle is by his very position far better equipped to make findings of fact which will have the reliability that we need and desire." Id. (quoting Gavin, 473 So.2d at 955). By contrast, a successor judge, who enters the,fray after the battle, is "in no better position than this Court to do what this . Count does not do." Id. at 948 (emphasis added). And what, according to Amiker, does this Court not do? "This Court justifiably refuses to review grants of a new trial based in part on the superior position of the-trial court to decide such matters." Id.
¶19. In now revisiting Amiker, we agree with Judge Roberts that the "thirteenth juror" referred to the trial court—and the trial court alone. See Hughes, 43 So.3d at 531-32 (Roberts, J., specially concurring). Thus, it was error in Bush to conflate our role as appellate court with the trial court's and to assume the role of "thirteenth juror" for ourselves when reviewing the trial court's grant or denial of a new trial. See Bush, 895 So.2d at 844 n.2 (noting "when the trial court (and subsequently the appellate court) reviews a verdict that is alleged to be against the overwhelming weight of the evidence, this presents a distinctive situation which necessitates the court sitting as a 'thirteenth juror' ").
¶20. To be clear, when reviewing a motion for new trial, neither this Court nor the Court of Appeals "sits as thirteenth juror." Bush, 895 So.2d at 844. We do not make independent resolutions of conflicting evidence. See id. Nor do we reweigh the evidence or make witness-credibility determinations. Instead, "when the evidence is conflicting, the jury will be the sole judge of the credibility of witnesses and the weight and worth of their testimony." Gathright v. State, 380 So.2d 1276, 1278 (Miss. 1980); see also Lenoir v. State, 222 So.3d 273, 278 (Miss. 2017).
¶21. Our role as appellate court is to review the trial court's decision to grant or deny a new trial for an abuse of discretion. See Amiker, 796 So.2d at 948 (citing Dorr v. Watson, 28 Miss. 383, 395 (1854) ("The granting a new trial rests in a great measure upon the sound discretion of the court below, to be exercised under all the circumstances of the case with reference to settled legal rules as well as the justice of the particular case. If a new trial be refused, a strong case must be shown to authorize the appellate court to say that it was error; and so, if it be granted, it must be manifest that it was improperly granted.")). In carrying out this task, we weigh the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, "only disturbing] a verdict when it is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence that to allow it to stand would sanction an unconscionable injustice." Lindsay v. State, 212 So.3d 44, 45 (Miss. 2017) (quoting Bush, 895 So.2d at 844).
¶22. Applying that standard here, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's denial of Little's motion for a new trial. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, the trial court did not sanction an "unconscionable injustice" in ruling the judgment must stand. Ellis positively identified Little as the robber from a photo lineup and again from the witness stand. The conflicting portions of Ellis's descriptions were thoroughly presented to the jury. And obviously the jury resolved these conflicts and concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that Little was the man who attacked Ellis, pointed a gun in his face, and robbed him.
¶23. We thus reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals. And we reinstate and affirm the judgment of the Claiborne County Circuit Court, which convicted Little of armed robbery and felon in possession of a weapon and sentenced him to concurrent sentences of thirty years and ten years respectively.
¶24. THE JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF APPEALS IS REVERSED. THE JUDGMENT OF THE CLAIBORNE COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT IS REINSTATED AND AFFIRMED.
RANDOLPH, P.J., COLEMAN, BEAM AND CHAMBERLIN, JJ., CONCUR. KITCHENS, P.J., DISSENTS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION JOINED BY KING, J. WALLER, C.J., AND ISHEE, J., NOT PARTICIPATING.
. Before trial, Little stipulated he was a coh-victed felon.