Case Name: Winston BIGGS, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1999-11-03
Citations: 745 So. 2d 1051
Docket Number: No. 97-3366
Parties: Winston BIGGS, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: Before SCHWARTZ, C.J., and COPE and SORONDO, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 745
Pages: 1051–1055

Head Matter:
Winston BIGGS, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. 97-3366.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
Nov. 3, 1999.
Bennett H. Brummer, Public Defender, and Luis Fernandez, Special Assistant Public Defender for appellant.
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, and Linda S. Katz, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
Before SCHWARTZ, C.J., and COPE and SORONDO, JJ.

Opinion:
COPE, J.
Winston Biggs appeals his conviction after trial by jury. He was convicted of two counts of armed robbery, one count of armed burglary, five counts of kidnapping, and three counts of aggravated assault. We affirm.
. As Charmaine Brown attempted to enter her home, defendant-appellant Biggs and several other individuals forced their way into the home by holding Charmaine at gunpoint. Once inside, they forced Charmaine and her teen-age sister Janelle, who was downstairs at the entrance of the home, to an upstairs bedroom. They were detained in the upstairs bedroom with their mother, June, and two pre-school-age siblings, Malika and Yohancey. The intruders tied the hands of Charmaine and Janelle, demanded money and valuables, and held the victims at gunpoint while they ransacked the room. The victims were then moved to another upstairs bedroom and were forced to show the intruders where valuable items were located. When the robbers believed the victims were lying about where valuables were located, they struck some of the victims several times and threatened to kill the victims, including the teenage victim's infant son who was sleeping in that room. After approximately 45 minutes, the intruders became aware of police officers outside the residence. At that point, after complaints from one of the victims that she was tied so tight she might faint, the robbers untied the victims and fled.
On appeal, defendant contends that the confinement of the victims was inconsequential and merely incidental to the robbery and therefore insufficient to support the convictions for kidnapping. For this proposition defendant relies on Faison v. State, 426 So.2d 968 (Fla.1983).
It is important to point out that defendant's case went to the jury under not one, but two, subparagraphs of the kidnapping statute. The statute states in relevant part:
(l)(a) The term 'kidnapping' means forcibly, secretly, or by threat confining, abducting, or imprisoning another person against his will and without lawful authority, with intent to:
2. Commit or facilitate commission of any felony.
3. Inflict bodily harm upon or terrorize the victim or another person.
§ 787.01(l)(a)2, 3, Fla. Stat. (1991).
The Faison test applies only to subpara-graph 2: confining, abducting, or imprisoning someone with intent to "[cjommit or facilitate commission of any felony." See Bedford v. State, 589 So.2d 245, 251 (Fla. 1991). It does not apply where the charge is confining, abducting or imprisoning with intent to "[ijnflict bodily harm upon or terrorize the victim or another person." § 787.01(l)(a)3, Fla. Stat.; see Bedford, 589 So.2d at 251; Waddell v. State, 696 So.2d 1229, 1229-30 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997), rev. denied, 707 So.2d 1128 (Fla.1998); Chaeld v. State, 599 So.2d 1362, 1364 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992). For purposes of subpara-graph 3 of the statute, we disregard Fai-son.
Defendant contends that the evidence was legally insufficient to support the conviction of kidnapping under subparagraph 3. We disagree. The evidence outlined at the outset of this opinion certainly shows confinement of the five victims with in tent to terrorize them. The evidence was legally sufficient. That being so, we need not reach defendant's arguments regarding subparagraph 2.
Defendant next argues that his convictions for aggravated assault (of Janelle, Malika and Yohancey) were improper because there was no testimony from these victims that defendant created a well-founded fear that violence was imminent. See § 784.011, 784.021, Fla. Stat. (1991). We disagree. For forty-five minutes, the intruders pointed guns at the victims and threatened to kill them, including the teenage victim's infant son. Mali-ka urinated as a result of her fear. Yo-hancey told the intruders to leave them alone. "[I]t is not always necessary for the victim to testify that he was afraid in order to sustain a conviction of assault." Dunn v. State, 397 So.2d 748, 751 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981). "[W]here the circumstances were such as to ordinarily induce fear in the mind of a reasonable man, then the victim may be found to be in fear, and actual fear need not be strictly and precisely shown." Gilbert v. State, 347 So.2d 1087, 1088 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977). In this case there is a factual basis on which the jury could find fear on the part of the victims. Under the circumstances existing here, any reasonable person would have "a well founded fear of imminent violence." § 784.011, Fla. Stat. (1991). We affirm the convictions for aggravated assault.
Finally, defendant argues that the court erred in granting the State's motion to reopen its case in chief prior to the closing arguments. We find no abuse of discretion. See Delgado v. State, 573 So.2d 83, 86 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990).
Affirmed.
SCHWARTZ, C.J., concurs.
SORONDO, J., specially concurs.
. The date of the crime was February 18, 1992. Defendant is proceeding here on a belated direct appeal.
. A judgment of acquittal was granted with respect to the charge of kidnapping of the sleeping infant.