Case Name: SHINN ET AL. v. ROBERTS
Court: New Jersey Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: New Jersey
Decision Date: 1845-05
Citations: 20 N.J.L. 435
Docket Number: 
Parties: SHINN ET AL. v. ROBERTS.
Judges: 
Reporter: New Jersey Law Reports
Volume: 20
Pages: 435–457

Head Matter:
SHINN ET AL. v. ROBERTS.
1. Commissioners, who have sold lands under a decree of the Orphans’ Court, may bring an action in their own names, against a purchaser, who has failed to comply with the conditions of sale.
2. Where it is provided by the conditions of sale, that, if a purchaser shall fail to comply with the terms of the contract, the property will be exposed to sale a second time and the purchaser held liable for any loss that may ensue, the vendor, in an action on such contract, cannot recover the difference between the two sales, unless the conditions of the second sale are the same, or at least so far as regards the credit, equally beneficial to the purchaser, as those of the first sale.
3. The proceedings in the Orphans’ Court, and the report of the commissioners, are not competent evidence of the number of acres, in order to ascertain the extent of the alleged liability of the defendant.
4. Whether a condition be precedent, or otherwise, depends upon the intention manifested by the parties; and in agreements for purchase, the covenants of the respective parties will always be construed dependent, the one precedent to the other, unless a contrary intent appear.
5. In cases of dependent covenants, neither party can bring .an action against the other, without averring performance, or some valid excuse, equivalent thereto. The vendor cannot sue, without averring and proving the execution and tender of a deed, unless discharged from so doing by the purchaser; and such discharge'must be pleaded, or it cannot be proved.
6. Time fixed for performance is of the essence of the contract; and when it enters into the performance of a condition precedent, the plaintiff' must aver and prove it accordingly; the rule applies to an hour, as well as to a day.
7. Proof that the deed was executed two hours, and tendered nine hours, after the lime spepified in the condition, no waiver by the defendant or other excuse being pleaded, is not sufficient.
Oír Rule to show cause why the verdict, which had been rendered for the plaintiffs, should not be set aside.
This was an action of assumpsit on a special agreement, for the sale of certain real estate, situate in the county of Burlington. The contract of sale was made by the defendant with the plaintiffs, who had sold, as commissioners, by virtue of an order of the Orphans’ Court of the county of Burlington. The defendant, at the commissioner’s sale on the 2d of January, 1841, bid off a part of the real estate sold; to wit, a farm, situate in Northampton township in said county, alleged to contain 146tt°t acres for the price of $117 per acre. The conditions of sale, (among others,) were, that the purchaser should pay one-third of the amount of the purchase money on the 20th of March then next, and should give satisfactory security in the mode specified for the remaining two-thirds; should pay one other third in two years, and the remaining one-third in five years from the delivery of the deed, with interest. The sale was subject to a lease of the farm, for three years from the previous 25th day of March, and the rent accruing thereon up to the 25th day of March then next, was reserved. The deed was to be executed to the purchaser on receiving the first payment and satisfactory security for the balance, and was to be executed and ready for delivery on the said 20th'day of March then next, ,at 10 o’clock, A. M. at the house of Charles Bryan, inn-keeper in Mount Holly. In case the purchaser should neglect to receive his deed at the time and place specified, and pay and secure the purchase money, the conditions farther provided, that the property should be advertised and sold again ; and (hat, if it should produce a less sum than the former bid and interest and expenses, the purchaser should be held liable lor the difference.
The defendant, who supposed .himself relieved from the obligation of his contract, having refused to receive a deed and comply with the conditions of sale, the plaintiffs proceeded to offer the farm again at public sale. The second sale took place on the 31st day of July, 1841. The conditions, so far as regarded ■the credit to be given were, that one third of the purchase money should be paid on the 25th of October then next, when the deed would be delivered, and that satisfactory security should be then given for the remaining two-thirds; that one other third should be paid in one year from the 25th day. of March then ¡next, with interest from the said 25th day of March ; and the ¡remaining one-third should be paid in four years from the same time, with interest. The purchaser was allowed interest on the first installment, from the time of payment until the said 25th day of March, to which time the rest was reserved ; the farm, as at the first sale, being sold subject to the above mentioned lease.
At this second sale, the farm sold for the sum of $99 per acre only ; making a loss between the first and second sales ; to recover which and expenses, this action was brought.
The declaration sets forth the sale to the' defendant, and his neglect and refusal to receive a deed and to comply with the conditions, and the consequent subsequent sale. The declaration also contains an express averment, of the readiness of the plaintiffs to execute a good and sufficient title and conveyance for the said premises ; and that they did make and execute such conveyance; and that, on the day and at the place specified in the conditions, then and there, at the hour of ten o’clock in the forenoon of that day, they were ready and offered to deliver the said conveyance to the said defendant, according to the terms and conditions of the said sale.
The cause was tried at the Gloucester Circuit in March 1843, and it appeared in evidence that the defendant came to the Inn of Mr. Bryan in Mount Holly, on the day appointed for the delivery of the deed about a quarter before ten, and remained an hour or more, and that he inquired for the commissioners. After the departure of the defendant, the commissioners arrived and pro cured a deed to be drawn, which they then executed and acknowledged ; the same being ready for delivery perhaps shortly before one o’clock. The defendant, who had been to Bristol in the mean time, on his return again stopped at the same house in the evening of the same day, and the deed of conveyance was then tendered to him by the commissioners. The tender was made at early candle-light about 7 o’clock in the evening; and on its being made, the defendant asked if it was a warranty deed, and said if not he would not receive it.
A letter from the defendant to one of the commissioners, in relation to the purchase, and written shortly before the day appointed for the delivery of the deed, was read in evidence. In this letter, among other things, the defendant said that he would give no such price with the lease on the farm, and concluded by saying “ I hereby submit this to the consideration of the commissioners for a time.”
There was no evidence of the number of acres, further than what appeared on the face of the proceedings in the Orphans’ Court, where the farm was described as containing 150 acres more or less. The deed tendered by the plaintiffs stated that the premises contained 146tA acres.
The Justice on the trial instructed the jury, that the defendant, not having tendered the money, it was not necessary for the plaintiffs to tender a deed.
That if it ever had been necessary, the defendant had absolved the plaintiffs from the necessity of such tender, on the 25th day of March; and that if the defendant desired the deed, he should have given notice accordingly.
The jury found a verdict for the plaintiffs for the sum of $2,-653.83, being the difference between the two sales and expenses of re-sale, &c. On the coming in of the postea, a rule was taken to show cause why the verdict should not be set aside, and a new trial granted.
A. Browning for the defendant, in support of the rule.
1. If the plaintiffs had not lawful authority to sell, the defendant was not bound to accept their deed ; and they were bound to show that they were clearly entitled to make the sale. If a power of sale be defective, or even doubtful, the purchaser is not bound to accept the deed. Atkinson on Titles, 550, 558, 20 Law Library; Wheat v. Hall, 17 Ves. 80; Judson v. Wass, 11 John R. 525: Carpenter v. Bailey, 17 Wend. 244.
In this ease, the power of sale on the part of the plaintiffs was void, or at any rate voidable. The power of the Orphans’ Court to order a sale is given by statute, and if not conferred by the statute no such power exists. Mr. Browning then cited and examined the different statures to show, that the authority of the Court to order a sale did not reach the present case. Act 16th Dec. 1784, Pat. 59; Act 11th Nov. 1799, Pat. 89. This act is still in force. Elm. Dig. 379. Act 7th Feb. 1816; Rev. L. 597, Elm. Dig. 4 94; Act 13th June, 1820, § 19; Rev. L. 782, Elm. Dig. 384.
But if the order was not void, for want of jurisdiction it was voidable. The order for sale was based on the prior order for division; if the basis was defective, the second order must be defective in consequence. The order to divide was defective, because it does not specify the number of shares, nor among whom the estate was to be divided. Elm. Dig. 382 pl. 13; 3 Green’s Rep. 92. Elm. Forms 339.
But the order was defective because it was an order to divide a reversionary interest, and not a present interest in this land. At the time of the order, the land was under lease for three years, Stevens v. Enders, 1 Green 271. The case of Clarissa Burroughs, Ib. 284. Though the order may be valid until set aside by direct proceeding, still the defendant was not obliged to take the deed if there was any defect in the title.
2. The plaintiffs were bound to prove their allegation, that they tendered the deed to the defendant, at the time and place mentioned in the declaration and in the conditions of sale. Proof of tender at another time and place was not sufficient; the proof must be according to the allegation. Specific performance has often been decreed in equity, when the action at law has been lost, as when the terms were not strictly performed ; but to sustain an action at law, performance must be averred according to the very terms of the contract. Sugden on Vendors 246; Davis v. Horn, 2 Sch. and Lefroy 341. Ib. 748. Blood v. Goodrich, 9 Wend. 79.
In mutual conditions, if either party will proceed, he makes his own performance a condition precedent, and he must aver and prove it. Egbert v. Chew, 2 Green 447, 452, 464; Porter v. Rose 12, John. 209.
The letter to one of the commissioners did not amount to a waiver, and did not discharge the plaintiffs from their obligation to prepare and tender the deed. But if so, and if they might have excused themselves in their declaration, still under these pleadings, they were bound to prove their averment.
3. As to the re-sale. If it is intended to hold a purchaser for the difference between two sales, it is necessary that the second sale should be on the same conditions, as near as may be, as the first sale.
4. The sale was made by the acre, and it was necessary to prove the number of acres, in order to ascertain the liability of the defendant. Of this there was no legal proof.
G. D. Wall and W. N. Jeffers for the plaintiffs contra.

Opinion:
The opinion of the Court, Nevius, J. dissenting, was delivered by
Carpenter, J.
This is an action of assumpsit. The plaintiffs are commissioners, authorized by' a decree of the Orphans' Court of the county of Burlington to make sale of the real estate of one Joseph C. Haines, who died seized thereof and intestate. The declaration is special, to recover the specific difference between a first and a second sale; the defendant, a purchaser at the first sale having refused to comply with the conditions of such sale; and the premises on a second sale bringing a much less sum.
Though not made a point on the argument, doubts have been suggested as to the ability of the commissioners to bring a suit in their own, names on the contract entered into between them and the defendant. I do not perceive any difficulty on that point. In the case of such sales, the deed cannot ordinarily be previously prepared and ready for execution on the very day of sale; the purchaser until the sale has taken place being unknown; nor can the purchaser, in the uncertainty of becoming such, be expected to come with the funds to complete the contract. Convenience has rendered it desirable, and even necessary, to insert in the usual conditions of such sales, that the deed shall be delivered and the money paid or securities given, on a subsequent day. In order to bind both parties to the performance of their contract, such contract is necessarily reduced to writing and signed by the parties. I apprehend it will not lie in the mouth of a defendant, who has made such express stipulations with persons having a power of sale, to deny their ability to bring suits for a breach of such contract. The inconvenience would be great, which would result were a rule established that would destroy the ability of commissioners or public officers, selling by mere authority of law, to bring suit on an express agreement. It would place it in the power of any unscrupulous and designing person to bid off property, and afterwards to take it or reject it as caprice or interest might make it desirable. I do not perceive any inconveniences to follow the power. The commissioners are bound to sell for cash, and they must account for the whole sum, for which the property may have been sold. Any other course must be at the hazard of the persons making the sale, and is usually the result of special agreement; as an agreement on the part of the parties in interest to receive the securities taken by the commissioners. Such an arrangement is of frequent occurrence, because a credit given ordinarily produces a better sale. The proceeds of any suit brought by the commissioners, as in the present case, cannot be for their private benefit. Their duty under the authority of the law, being to some extent in the nature of a trust, the money recovered, after deducting expenses and a reasonable remuneration to the commissioners, will be the money of the parties in interest, for whose benefit the sale was made, and its payment over would be enforced by the proper tribunal.
In concurring in the propriety of setting aside the verdict in this case, I do so for the reasons and on the points following.
1st. As to the re-sale. In order to entitle the plaintiffs to recover, in an action like the present, I hold that the second sale must be on the same conditions as the first, as near as may be; or at- least on conditions equally beneficial to the purchaser, so far as regards the credit to be given. The remedy is harsh and rests strictly on the contract; and in my judgment, the plaintiffs ought to be held to show, that they are within the spirit and letter of such contract. It might be ruinous to purchasers, if property could be offered for sale on a considerable credit, and in case of failure on the part of the purchaser to comply with the conditions, the property could be set up at a second sale, either for cash or a reduced credit, and the first purchaser held liable for the difference. Such failure may happen from ignorance, from inadvertence, from subsequent misfortune; and, in the application of an action so harsh and penal, the vendors should be held, in their subsequent sale, to conditions under .which a disposition equally productive' could' ordinarily be expected. I hold the answer of the plaintiffs' counsel, that the vendors have a right to make the conditions of the second sale such, that the second sale in regard to the credit given, shall be equally beneficial to them, as the first would have been, had its conditions been complied with, to be unsatisfactory. Suppose the first sale to have been on a credit of one year — no unusual period of credit — in case of non-compliance, shall the vendors be permitted, at the end of a year, to offer the property again for sale, but for cash, and hold the first purchaser liable for the difference ? In this case, the credit on the second sale was lessened, and I suppose materially, to the probable injury of the sale; but as I know of no mode by which the extent of such reduction may be ascertained and fixed, so as to produce no injury, I hold that the credit cannot be reduced at all, if it is intended to resort to the first purchaser in this form of action in order to recover the difference between the two sales.
2ndly. As the sale was made by the acre, it became necessary on the part of the plaintiffs, to prove the number of acres in the farm, in order to ascertain the difference of the two sales and the extent of the alleged liability of the defendant. The plaintiffs offered no direct evidence of the number of acres. The deed, tendered by them to the defendant, described the premises as containing 146 acres; and upon this quantity the plaintiffs based their claim and the jury rendered their verdict The proceedings in the Orphans' Court, the order of sale, &c., described the farm as containing about 150 acres more or less, and the Judge, who tried the cause, instructed the jury, that these proceedings were prima facie evidence of the quantity of land sold. In this I apprehend the Judge erred. The vague description necessary merely to identify the property, intended to be the subject of such proceedings, is no evidence to fix the liability of this defendant. Yor can the plaintiffs, though acting in a public capacity and under oath for the due performance of their duty, by their own statements in their report or in their deed, be permitted to make evidence for themselves, in their own cause.
But lastly: one of the conditions of sale in this case was: " The deed will be executed and ready for delivery to the respective purchasers, on the said 20th day of March next, at 10 o'clock, A. M. of that day, at the house of Charles Bryan, inn-keeper, in Mount Holly, in said county; and in case any of such purchasers shall neglect to receive his deed at the said time and place, and pay, &c., the property will be advertised and sold again, and if it produce a less sum than the former bid and interest and expenses, the purchaser will be held liable for the difference." It is not necessary again to recite the particular terms of the payment to be made and the security to be given for the balance. It is sufficient to say, that it is a case of dependent covenants. In great relaxation of the technicalities, with which this branch of the law of contracts was formerly loaded and perplexed, it is not now the employment of any particular word, which determines a condition to be precedent, but the manifest intention of the parties. One of the rules, upon which the construction depends, is that where the mutual covenants go to the whole of the consideration on both sides, they are mutual conditions, the one precedent to the other. As where, in the conveyance of property, the whole of the consideration money is either to be paid or secured, on the delivery of the deed. Such is a plain case of stipulation for a contemporaneous performance, a performance uno flatu, and where neither party intends to trust the other. In agreements for purchase indeed, it is now well settled that the covenants are to be construed according to the intent of the parties, and are therefore always to be construed dependent, unless a contrary intent appears. 1 Sugden Vendors 271, (*372,) Bank of Columbia v. Hagner, 1 Peter's R. 464; in Glazebrook v. Woodrow, 8 T. R. 374. The seller ought not to be compelled to part with his property, without receiving the consideration • nor the purchaser to part with his money, without an equivalent in return. Therefore, if either a vendor "or vendee wishes to compel the other to observe the contract, he immediately makes his part of the agreement precedent; for he cannot proceed against the other without an actual performance on his part, or a tender and refusal. On the one hand, the purchaser cannot maintain an action for the non-delivery of the deed, without having first paid or tendered the money. Harvey v. Trenchard, 1 Halst. 126; Ackley v. Elwell, 5 Halst. 304. So on the other hand, a vendor cannot bring his action, for breach of the contract, without first having executed and tendered the conveyance, unless the purchaser has discharged him from so doing ; and an averment of such tender must be made in the declaration, and must be supported by proof. Egbert ads. Chew, 2 Green, 447; Bank v. Hagner, 1 Peter's R. 467; Johnson v. Applegate, Coxe, 233; Green v. Reynolds, 2 John. Rep. 207.
To be sure, if the one party has discharged the other from the strict performance of the condition ; if he has rendered the execution and delivery or tender of a deed, futile and unnecessary by an express declaration that he will not receive it; then, the party proceeding by setting out that excuse upon the face of the declaration, may be relieved from the necessity of proving the offer to perform his part of the mutual agreement. If the defendant prevent the performance of a condition precedent by his own neglect or default, it is equal to a performance by the plaintiffs. Hotham v. East India Co., 1 T. R. 638. In the case of Jones v. Barkley, Doug. 684, where the plaintiff was ready and offered to perform his part, but was discharged by the other; upon averring such discharge in the declaration, it was held that the plaintiff might maintain his action without proving a tender. But if a party plead a tender he must prove it. Per Buller, J., Doug. 695. Such may be regarded as the unquestioned rule. It is unnecessary to examine the letter, written by the defendant to one of the commissioners, to ascertain whether it contains such a declaration of the defendant's intention not to receive the deed and fulfil his part of the contract, as would relieve the plaintiffs from their duty to execute and tender the deed. They have not pleaded the discharge, and therefore cannot use the letter, for the purpose of showing a waiver on the part of the defendant of his right to the performance of this condition precedent. Unless pleaded, the waiver, if any, cannot be proved. The plaintiffs have pleaded a tender, and they must prove it according to the averment in the declaration.
As I hold it, the time fixed for the performance, is at law deemed of the essence of the contract. It is true that it is not, generally, so considered in equity, unless the parties have expressly so treated it, or it necessarily follows from the nature and circumstances of the contract. Courts of equity, for the most part, have regard to time only so far as it respects the good faith and diligence of the parties. Thus courts of equity, sometimes, will not decree a specific performance, though damages may be recovered at law. So those courts frequently decree a specific performance, when the action at law has been lost, by the default of the very party seeking the specific performance, if it be notwithstanding conscientious that the agreement should be performed. It is thus, in cases where the terms of the agreement have not been strictly performed on the part of the person, seeking specific performance; though to sustain an action at law, performance must be averred according to the very terms of the contract. 2 Story, Eq. Jur. § 776, et seq.; 1 Sugden, 245, *340; Taylor v. Longsworth, 14 Peter's R. 174; 5 Vesey Jr., 719, note to Sumner's edition.
" The general opinion," says Sir Edward Sugden, 1 Yol. 294, " has always been, that the day fixed was imperative on the parties at law. This was so laid down by Lord Kenyon, and has never been doubted in practice. The contrary rule would lead to endless difficulties." He adds, that perhaps the power, assumed by courts of equity, of dispensing with the literal performance of contracts is to be regretted. In the case alluded to before Lord Kenyon, it was held, that according to the conditions or covenant and the pleadings thereupon, the seller of an estate was bound to be prepared to produce his title deeds at a particu lar day, and to prove such readiness and that he did produce them. Berry v. Young, 2 Esp. Cas. 641. So in an action of covenant to build a certain mill in a certain place and by a certain time, and an averment accordingly, it was held that the declaration was not supported by proof, that the mill was erected after the time by the consent and agreement of the defendant. The contract must be proved as laid ; otherwise the defendant has no notice of. what he is called upon to answer. Philips v. Rose, 8 John. R. 392. Little v. Holland, 3 T. R. 590. The doctrine is virtually held, in a case decided in this state. A bond was given, conditioned for the performance of certain matters, and afterwards an agreement in writing was entered into between the parties, enlarging the time of performance. It was held, that an action could not be maintained on the bond for the penalty, but that the plaintiff must seek his remedy on the agreement enlarging the time of the performance. It is a decision that arises out of the doctrine that if strict performance be waived, the plaintiff must aver accordingly, so that the proof may correspond with the averments. Ford v. Campfield, 6 Halsted, 327. In the case of Wild v. Fort, 4 Taunt. R. 334, the doctrine is held, that if the vendor of an estate at auction does not show a clear title by the day specified, the purchaser may recover back his deposite and rescind his contract.
It is hardly necessary to multiply authorities. It may be laid down as the settled rule, that where time enters into the performance of a condition precedent, the plaintiffs must aver accordingly, unless strict performance is waived or otherwise discharged by the defendant. In case a discharge of the strict performance be relied upon, as a waiver by the defendant, it must be pleaded. The rule must apply — I can perceive no difference in the principle — to an hour as well as to a day. I do not allude to the question of proof, as to how far a reasonable allowance may be made on account of the difference to be expected in. the clocks and watches of different persons. A contract, to be performed at a given hour, must necessarily be governed by the same principles as when to be performed on a given day; the same rules of pleading and of evidence must apply to the one case, as to the other. The averment of the plaintiffs is, that they did make and execute the deed of conveyance required, and that on the day and at the place specified in the conditions, at the hour of ten in the forenoon of that day, they were ready and offered to deliver the said deed to the defendant, according to the terms and conditions of the said sale. The proof is, that the deed was not executed and ready for delivery until more than two hours, and not actually tendered until some nine hours, after the time specified in the conditions and averred in the pleadings. It is not a mere question of evidence under the pleadings. The plaintiffs are bound to plead according to, and consistently with, the contract under which they sought to recover; and having so pleaded, they were bound to prove the averments in their declaration. Having failed, in my judgment, in the proof of tender averred, I am of opinion that for this as well as for the previous reasons, the verdict should be set aside and a new trial granted.