Case Name: Cupps v. Traction Company
Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
Jurisdiction: Pennsylvania
Decision Date: 1900-05-24
Citations: 13 Pa. Super. 630
Docket Number: Appeal, No. 118
Parties: Cupps v. Traction Company.
Judges: Before Rice, P. J., Beaver, Orlady, W. W. Porter and W. D. Porter, JJ.
Reporter: Pennsylvania Superior Court Reports
Volume: 13
Pages: 630–638

Head Matter:
Cupps v. Traction Company.
Street railway — Contributory negligence — Province of court and jury.
The case discloses contributory negligence where the situation presented is that of a man who looked and listened before he started his team, but who, in the middle of the block, not at a street crossing, drove diagonally across the tracks of the trolley company, in front of a moving car (which before starting he observed to be approaching at a distance of 321 feet) and who after starting his team, did not look again until the car was practically upon him. Under such circumstances there was no right of recovery.
Argued April 26, 1900.
Appeal, No. 118, April T., 1900, by defendant, in a suit of J. W. Cupps against the Consolidated Traction Company, from judgment of C. P. No. 3, Allegheny Co., May T., 1899, No. 613, on verdict for plaintiff.
Before Rice, P. J., Beaver, Orlady, W. W. Porter and W. D. Porter, JJ.
Reversed.
Opinion by W. W. Porter, J. Orlady, J., dissents.
Trespass for personal injury.
Before Evans, J.
It appears from the evidence that the Consolidated Traction Company operates a double track street car line the entire distance of Fifth avenue in the city of Pittsburg. In the portion of the city generally known as East End, about midway between Moorewood avenue and Bidwell street which both cross Fifth avenue at right angles, and fronting upon Fifth avenue, is the residence of Mr. Reuben Miller. There is a driveway from Mr. Miller’s place out to, and connecting with, Fifth avenue. Mr. Miller’s residence is on the right-hand side of Fifth avenue, as you go towards Wilkinsburg, and, therefore, the east bound track, or the track upon which the cars run to Wilkinsburg, is nearest to his residence, and the west bound track, or the track upon which the cars run to the city is farthest away from his residence.
On the day of the accident, Mr. Cupps, the plaintiff in this case, drove a two-horse team and a wagon loaded with old lumber and other refuse material which he was taking away from Mr. Miller’s place down the drive and out on to Fifth avenue. He stopped in the gutter of Fifth avenue to unloosen the brake which he had set for the purpose of coming down the hill out of Mr. Miller’s grounds. The testimony shows that while at this point, a car going towards Wilkinsburg passed him,-on the track nearest to him. He was at that time about twenty feet from the rail of the track upon which the collision occurred, and his purpose was to drive towards Pittsburg in the same direction that the car was traveling, which finally struck his Wagon.
While at that point he looked in both directions and had an unobstructed view for several squares of the track. He testifies that he saw the car with which he came into collision, and it was then at Moorewood avenue, which was some 800 feet away, and he supposed that he would have time to cross in front of it, and so climbed on to his wagon, but without looking again at ‘ the car, he pulled over the intervening trank diagonally away from the car which was approaching him, and which was all the time within view, and then crossed the intervening space between the tracks and on to the farther track and got his horses over it, when the car. struck the hub of the front wheel of his wagon. At the time of the accident the car was running between crossings on a down grade with the power thrown off.
Plaintiff’s testimony tended to show that the car was running at an excessive and unusual rate of speed.
The motorman explains that when he first saw the wagon it was standing still, and when it started, the horses’ heads were turned to go on the opposite track which was at that time clear and would have been perfectly safe, and only when he was within such a short distance as to-make it impossible to stop, did the plaintiff turn his horses across the track upon which the car was approaching. He testified that he did all he could do to stop the car but failed.
Upon the trial the court overruled a motion for a compulsory nonsuit and also for binding instructions.
Verdict and judgment for plaintiff for f1,250. Defendant appealed.
Error assigned was in refusing binding instructions for defendant.
S. L. Castle, with him Geo. C. Wilson and W. P. Potter, for appellant.
There is nothing peculiar in this case beyond the fact that the accident for which the suit was brought was caused, as we view the evidence, by reason of the plaintiff driving directly across a wide public highway, in broad daylight and upon the track, in front of an approaching car, when it was so near that the motorman was unable to stop. It seems to us that there was no excuse for the plaintiff getting in the way of the car at the time and under the circumstances in which the accident happened: Wheelahan v. Traction Co., 150 Pa. 187; Smith v. Traction Co., 187 Pa. 110; Darwood v. Traction Co., 189 Pa. 592; Jones Bros. v. Railway Co., 9 Pa. Superior Ct. 65.
It was a dangerous place, and the driver well knew it to be so: Callahan v. Traction Co., 184 Pa. 425.
Body P. Marshall, with him Thos. M. Marshall, for appellee.
In many cases it has been declared by this and the Supreme Court that so long as a use in common of the streets exists, it is the duty of street railway companies to exercise such watchful care as will prevent accident, and the degree of care must vary with the circumstances of the case, and when the testimony is conflicting, and there is doubt as to the facts and deductions to be drawn therefrom, the case is for the jury: Smith v. Phila. Traction Co., 3 Pa. Superior Ct. 129; Davidson v. Traction Co., 4 Pa. Superior Ct. 86; Gibbons v. Railway, 155 Pa. 279; Kestner v. Traction Co., 158 Pa. 422; Lott v. Railroad, 159 Pa. 471; Thatcher v. Traction Co., 166 Pa. 66.
May 24, 1900:
The cases cited by the appellant are different from the one now being considered.
In Ehrisman v. East Harrisburg St. P. R. Co., 150 Pa. 180, the plaintiff had driven sixty feet after having stopped, looked and listened, but in the opinion in that case Chief Justice Pas-son said : “ On the other hand, it is the duty of the companies to see that their motorman shall be on the alert, not only at street crossings, but everywhere, upon the tracks to see that citizens are not run down and injured.”
If the court would have held as matter of law, that plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence in starting to cross the tracks when the car was 375 feet distant, then on many of the streets of Pittsburg a man would never cross a street car track without being guilty of negligence.

Opinion:
Opinion by
William W. Porter, J.,
The only specification of error is the refusal of the court below to direct a verdict for the defendant as requested by the point of charge. There is little discussion in the arguments directed to the allegation of negligence on the part of the defendant. The appellant urges that the negligence of the plaintiff contributed to the accident which caused his injury, and claims that there should be a reversal of the judgment.
The plaintiff, with his wagon loaded with lumber, drove out of the private grounds of Mr. Miller. The driveway was a declivity. The plaintiff locked the rear wheels until the wagon reached the gutter of Fifth avenue. He then descended, partially loosened his brake and climbed up on the load upon his wagon. He looked up the street and down for the cars. He says: " There was one car leaving Bidwell street, going east, the other was coming from Moorewood avenue. I started across the street. I was not dreaming of danger. I thought I had plenty of room and time to make it. The horses was walking at a reasonable step. As the horses got off the west going track, I thought I heard a car. I was sitting on the front of the wagon with my feet hanging over the lower front wheel, As I turned around I heard no bell. Thought I heard the ear: I looked around and I had no sooner looked than it struck," He further testifies that the distance from tbe point where he loosened the brake of his wagon to Moorewood avenue, where he saw the approaching car, was 321 feet, and that there was a clear straight track between him and the car. He saw the car coming at Moorewood avenue, and after that he started his team. He was asked: " Then you did not look at the car again until yoii were struck? A. Until just I thought I heard it." And again, after saying that he looked when he started to go over, he was asked: " But you drove across the space between the curb and the first track and across the space between the two tracks and then on to the second track, and you didn't look for the car at all as you went on the second track ? " - To which he replied: "I didn't suppose that I needed to keep looking."
The case thus presented is that of a man who looked and listened before he started his team; who in the middle of a square, not at a street crossing, drove diagonally -across the tracks of the trolley company in front of a moving car (which before starting he observed to be 321 feet away) and who, after starting his team, did not again look until the car was practically upon him.
The plaintiff seems to have observed the rule to look, listen and, if necessary, stop, before attempting to make the crossing, but where such an attempt is made, one look may or may not be sufficient. It is the look which is made just before he attempts to cross which protects one from the imputation of contributory negligence: Ehrisman v. R. R. Co., 150 Pa. 180. It is true that street railways have not the exclusive right of way of their tracks. Their rights are superior, however, to those of the traveling public. It is the duty of those using' the highways, whether on foot or in vehicles, to yield the right of way to the cars: Jones v. R. R. Co., 9 Pa. Superior Ct. 65; Smith v. Traction Co., 187 Pa. 110.
The plaintiff had no right to assume that the duty of avoid: ing the collision rested upon those in control of the car. He evidently made a miscalculation of his chance in: attempting to cross in front of the approaching car, but such a miscalculation does not relieve from the charge of contributory negligence, even at a street crossing: Callahan v. Traction Co., 184 Pa. 425.
We are of opinion that from all the testimony in the case, and particularly from the testimony of the plaintiff himself, there was no right of recovery, because of contributory negligence. Wherefore, the judgment is reversed.