Case Name: PEOPLE v. WILSON
Court: Michigan Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1981-01-06
Citations: 102 Mich. App. 626
Docket Number: Docket No. 44576
Parties: PEOPLE v WILSON
Judges: Before: Bashara, P.J., and M. J. Kelly and D. R. Freeman, JJ.
Reporter: Michigan appeals reports; cases decided in the Michigan Court of Appeals.
Volume: 102
Pages: 626–635

Head Matter:
PEOPLE v WILSON
Docket No. 44576.
Submitted April 2, 1980, at Lansing.
Decided January 6, 1981.
Leave to appeal denied, 410 Mich 919.
Ronald D. Wilson was convicted in Detroit Recorder’s Court, Donald L. Hobson, J., of receiving or concealing stolen property with a value over $100. A supplemental information charging defendant as a fourth offender was filed 18 days later. Defendant pled guilty to the fourth offender charge and was subsequently sentenced to concurrent terms of 3 to 7 years imprisonment for the habitual offender conviction and 2 to 5 years for the underlying felony. The prior convictions against defendant had all been obtained in Recorder’s Court also. On appeal, defendant contends that the filing of the postconviction information charging him as an habitual offender violated the rule that a prosecutor with knowledge of a defendant’s prior felony record must proceed promptly, if at all, against such person as an habitual offender and that the supplemental information charging a defendant as an habitual offender must be filed with the information charging the last felony in order to provide fair notice to the accused and to avoid an appearance of prosecutorial impropriety. This rule was announced by the Supreme Court in People v Fountain, 407 Mich 96; 282 NW2d 168 (1979), and the issue in the present case is whether this rule should be given retroactive application. Held:
A prosecutor is presumed to have knowledge of a defendant’s prior felony record where the convictions occurred in the prosecutor’s county. The purpose of the Fountain rule is to provide fair notice to the accused and avoid an appearance of prosecutorial impropriety. This presumption of prosecutorial knowledge, and the reasoning behind it, is applicable to cases of postconviction filings of habitual offender charges which oc curred prior to the decision in Fountain and should be retroactively applied.
References for Points in Headnotes
[1, 2, 6] 20 Am Jur 2d, Courts §§ 85, 86.
39 Am Jur 2d, Habitual Criminals and Subsequent Offenders § 17 et seq.
[3] 20 Am Jur 2d, Courts § 86.
[4] 39 Am Jur 2d, Habitual Criminals and Subsequent Offenders § 19.
[5] 20 Am Jur 2d, Courts § 85.
Bashara, P.J., concurred in the result but wrote separately to express his position that the Fountain rule should be retroactively applied only where, as here, a defendant has not received notice that a supplemental information would be filed until after he has been convicted on the underlying felony and that lack of notice works to the prejudice of the defendant.
Defendant’s habitual offender sentence is vacated and the case is remanded for sentencing on the underlying conviction.
M. J. Kelly, J., dissented. He would hold that where, as here, a new rule does not affect the determination of guilt or innocence, a retrospective application is not necessary and that retroactive application would benefit defendants unable to demonstrate actual prejudice and would prejudice prosecutors for failing to meet a previously nonexistent standard. He would affirm.
Opinion by D. R. Freeman, J.
1. Criminal Law — Habitual Offenders — Postconviction Filing — Presumption of Knowledge.
A prosecutor is presumed to know of a defendant’s prior felony record where the prosecutor’s office prosecuted the defendant for the prior felonies; this presumption of knowledge may be retroactively applied to cases in which postconviction filing of a supplemental information charging the defendant as an habitual offender occurred prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in People v Fountain, 407 Mich 96; 282 NW2d 168 (1979), wherein the Court announced the rule that a prosecutor with knowledge of a defendant’s prior felony record must proceed promptly, if at all, against the defendant and that the supplemental information charging a defendant as an habitual offender must be filed with the information charging the last felony in order to provide fair notice to the accused and avoid an appearance of prosecutorial impropriety; the rule should not be restricted only to prospective application and to cases pending on appeal on the date of the Fountain decision but should also apply retroactively to all cases in which a recidivist charge was filed after conviction for the principal offense.
Concurrence by Bashara, P. J.
2. Criminal Law — Habitual Offenders — Postconviction Filing — Limited Retroactive Application.
The rule that a supplemental information charging a defendant as an habitual offender must be Sled with the information charging the last felony should be retroactively applied to cases where postconviction Sling occurred prior to August 28, 1979, only where the defendant has not received notice that a supplemental information would be Sled and that lack of notice works to the prejudice of the defendant.
Dissent by M. J. Kelly, J.
3. Courts — Decisions — Retroactively Applied Law — Prospectively Applied Law.
A three-factor test is applied to measure the necessity of retroactive application of a new rule of law: (1) the purpose to be served by the new rule, (2) the degree to which law enforcement agencies relied upon the former rule or standard, and (3) the effect of retroactive application of the new rule on the administration of justice; the purpose to be served by the new rule has been accorded paramount status, with the remaining factors given controlling signiScance where the purpose of the rule in question does not clearly favor either retroactivity or prospectivity.
4. Criminal Law — Habitual Offenders — Simultaneous Filing op Charges — Purpose of Rule.
The purpose of the rule that a supplemental information charging a defendant as an habitual offender must be Sled with the information charging the last felony is to provide fair notice to the accused and to avoid an appearance of prosecutorial impropriety.
5. Criminal Law — Courts — Decisions — New Rules of Law — Retroactive Application.
Retroactive application of a new rule of law is not mandated where the new rule does not affect the determination of guilt or innocence.
6. Criminal Law — Habitual Offenders — Simultaneous Filing of Charges — Retroactive Application.
The rule that a supplemental information charging a defendant as an habitual offender must be Sled with the information charging the last felony should not be given retroactive application because to do so would beneSt defendants unable to demonstrate actual prejudice and penalize prosecutors for failing to meet a previously nonexistent standard.
Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Robert A. Derengoski, Solicitor General, William L. Cahalan, Prosecuting Attorney, Edward Reilly Wilson, Principal Attorney, Appeals, and Timothy A. Baughman, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for the people.
Cornelius Pitts, for defendant on appeal.
Before: Bashara, P.J., and M. J. Kelly and D. R. Freeman, JJ.
Circuit judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.

Opinion:
D. R. Freeman, J.
Defendant appeals from his plea-based conviction as a fourth offender, MCL 769.12; MSA 28.1084. The information charging the defendant as an habitual offender was filed December 18, 1978, subsequent to his December 1, 1978, conviction for receiving or concealing stolen property with a value over $100. MCL 750.535(1); MSA 28.803(1). The trial court later sentenced the defendant to concurrent terms of imprisonment of 3 to 7 years as an habitual offender and 2 to 5 years for the underlying felony.
The defendant contends that the postconviction information charging him as an habitual offender violated the rule later announced by the Supreme Court in People v Fountain, 407 Mich 96, 98; 282 NW2d 168 (1979), requiring a prosecutor with knowledge of a defendant's prior felony record to "promptly proceed" against such person. Examination of the supplemental information filed against the defendant indicates that each of the prior felony convictions was obtained in the Recorder's Court. Thus, if applied retroactively to the instant case, Fountain's presumption of prosecutorial knowledge of prior convictions in the same court would apply to make invalid the defendant's habitual offender conviction.
Three factors for determining the retroactive application of a new rule of law were described in People v Hampton, 384 Mich 669, 674; 187 NW2d 404 (1971). These factors included: (1) the purpose of the new rule; (2) general reliance on the prior rule; and (3) the effect of retroactive application on the administration of justice. See also People v Kamin, 405 Mich 482; 275 NW2d 777 (1979).
Analysis of the Fountain opinion discloses two rules of law, the first previously settled upon and the second without prior recognition. The rule that a prosecutor with knowledge of a defendant's prior conviction must proceed against a multiple offender "promptly" was noted in People v Hatt, 384 Mich 302; 181 NW2d 912 (1970), adopting the rationale of then Judge Levin in People v Stratton, 13 Mich App 350; 164 NW2d 555 (1968). However, the rule that the defendant's recidivist charges should have been filed "with the information which charged the last felony", based upon a presumption of prosecutorial knowledge of prior offenses, is without foundation in prior statutes or case law.
Applying the Hampton factors, it is first apparent that the intent behind the simultaneous filing rule was to protect defendants against unbridled prosecutorial discretion to file habitual offender charges and to avoid unfair surprise to a defendant. Further, while prosecutors may not have endeavored to file recidivist charges simultaneously in past cases, it is equally true that postconviction filings were not the general practice. Finally, where postconviction filings were not generally sought, the administration of justice will not be adversely affected by some retroactive application of its dictates.
A recent decision of this Court specifically ad dressed the retroactive effect of the Fountain presumption. In People v Reese, 97 Mich App 785; 296 NW2d 172 (1980), the Court balanced the factors bearing on retroactivity in a case where the habitual offender charge was filed after conviction for the principal offense. The Reese Court concluded:
"After balancing these considerations we believe that the rule of Fountain should be applied to future cases and to all cases which were pending on appeal at the date of the Fountain decision. The present case should therefore be judged by the requirements of Fountain in the interest of the administration of justice." Id., 788.
To the Reese holding we would add an additional class of cases. To avoid the appearance of impropriety, the Fountain presumption of prosecutorial knowledge should extend to cases like the present, in which a recidivist charge is filed after conviction for the principal offense. Further, application of the presumption to cases of postconviction filings should not be restricted to any future case or cases pending on appeal on the day Fountain was decided. In balancing the Hampton considerations, we find that for pre-Fountain cases of postconviction filing, it is important to discourage improper prosecutor conduct. We hold the Fountain presumption of prosecutorial knowledge to be applicable to cases of postconviction filings decided prior to Fountain.
The conclusion is also supported by the Fountain language itself. The Supreme Court held:
"Here the prosecutors must be presumed to have known of the defendants' prior felony records because their respective offices prosecuted the prior felonies. The habitual offender charges should have been filed with the information which charged the last felony to provide fair notice to the accused and avoid an appear anee of prosecutorial impropriety." People v Fountain, supra, 99.
From this discussion, the Supreme Court's intent that the rule have retroactive application is made apparent. Had the Court desired prospective application of its new rule, it would have exempted the case before it since the prosecutors in Fountain had no more notice of the rule than the prosecutor in the present case. For the Supreme Court to intend retroactive effect only to the cases before it would create an artificial distinction not warranted by the interest in effective administration of justice.
The defendant herein pled guilty to the supplemental information charging him as an habitual offender, based upon four prior convictions obtained in Recorder's Court. Applying retroactively the Fountain presumption, the prosecutor is presumed to have known of the prior felonies at the time the information charging defendant with receiving and concealing stolen property was filed. Thus, the prosecutor should have charged the defendant as an habitual offender prior to his conviction for the principal offense. In the absence of such appropriately filed recidivist charges, we vacate the defendant's habitual offender sentence and remand the case for sentencing on the underlying conviction.