Case Name: In re: Jane DOE 06-C
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 2006-12-12
Citations: 948 So. 2d 30
Docket Number: No. 1D06-5226
Parties: In re: Jane DOE 06-C.
Judges: BENTON, J., concurs with opinion; HAWKE S, J., dissents with opinion.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 948
Pages: 30–36

Head Matter:
In re: Jane DOE 06-C.
No. 1D06-5226.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
Dec. 12, 2006.
Richard M. Benham, Tallahassee; Randall C. Marshall of ACLU Foundation of Florida, Inc.; Miami; and Rebecca Harrison Steele of ACLU Foundation of Florida, Inc., Tampa, for Appellant.

Opinion:
ALLEN, J.
In this appeal from a final order by which the trial judge dismissed the appellant minor's petition for judicial waiver of parental notice of termination of pregnancy, the appellant asserts that' the trial judge improperly disqualified one of her attorneys, thereby depriving her of counsel of her choice at the hearing on her petition. Because the trial judge erred in disqualifying the appellant's attorney, because we are unable to conclude that this error was harmless, and because remand for a new hearing is not authorized in proceedings of this type, we previously entered an order by which we reversed the order under review and remanded this case with directions for the trial judge to enter an order granting the appellant's petition. This opinion is written to provide a complete explanation of the rationale for our decision.
An attorney named Pfeiffer, who also works as an assistant public defender, appeared as counsel on behalf of the appellant at the hearing on her petition. Another attorney named Benham served as co-counsel, though Mr. Benham advised the court that he lacked litigation experience. The record strongly suggests that the plan was for the experienced litigator, Mr. Pfeiffer, to have primary responsibility for handling the hearing.
Although Mr. Pfeiffer explained to the trial judge that his representation of the appellant was not related to his work with the office of the public defender, and al though he further explained that he had sought and received the public defender's permission to provide this representation, the trial judge expressed her view that, because of Mr. Pfeiffer's association with the public defender's office, it would be inappropriate under "Florida law and ethical rules" for him to represent the appellant. Mr. Pfeiffer therefore indicated that "if necessary Mr. Benham could proceed" with the hearing. Mr. Benham then responded that he would be willing to proceed with the hearing, but he explained that, in light of his lack of litigation experience, he would like to have Mr. Pfeiffer available to consult with him during the course of the hearing. The judge denied this request, instructing Mr. Pfeiffer to leave the courtroom and thereby functionally disqualifying Mr. Pfeiffer as counsel for the appellant. Mr. Benham was therefore left to represent the appellant during the balance of the hearing without assistance, even though he had previously advised the trial judge of his lack of litigation experience.
In the order entered following the hearing, the trial judge provided the following explanation for her disqualification of Mr. Pfeiffer:
At the hearing, an attorney with the Office of the Public Defender desired to act as co-counsel. However, neither the [Parental Notice of Abortion] Act nor section 27.51, Florida Statutes, authorize such representation, particularly where the petitioner has already retained private counsel. Additionally, section 27.51, Florida Statutes, seems to prohibit any such representation.
Disqualification of a party's counsel strikes at the heart of an important right — the right to choose one's own lawyer — and it should be employed only when clearly necessary. See, e.g., Coral Reef of Key Biscayne Developers, Inc. v. Lloyd's Underwriters at London, 911 So.2d 155 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005); Whitener v. First Union Nat'l Bank of Florida, 901 So.2d 366 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005); Herschowsky v. Guardianship of Herschowsky, 890 So.2d 1246 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005). In the present case, there was no necessity for the disqualification of the appellant's counsel. Although the trial judge referenced three authorities for her ruling. — (1) the Parental Notice of Abortion Act, which appears at section 390.01114, Florida Statutes; (2) section 27.51, Florida Statutes; and (3) "ethical rules" — none of these authorities precludes an attorney who wishes to provide private representation in connection with a non-criminal petition for judicial waiver of parental notice of termination of pregnancy from doing so merely because the attorney also serves as an assistant public defender in unrelated criminal cases.
The United States Supreme Court recently recognized the practical impossibility of assessing whether trial court error resulting in the unlawful denial of a litigant's counsel of choice is harmless error. The Court explained:
It is impossible to know what different choices the rejected counsel would have made, and then to quantify the impact of those different choices on the outcome of the proceedings. Many counseled decisions . do not even concern the conduct of the trial at all. Harmless-error analysis in such a context would be a speculative inquiry into what might have occurred in an alternative universe.
United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, — U.S. -, 126 S.Ct. 2557, 2565, 165 L.Ed.2d 409 (2006). Agreeing with these observations, we are unable to conclude that the trial judge's error in disqualifying the appellant's counsel in the present case amounted to harmless error.
Although a trial judge's erroneous disqualification of a litigant's counsel of choice would normally result in a remand for a new hearing, remand was not possible in the present case. A remand for a new hearing would have violated the legislative intention for this type of proceeding to progress through the judicial system without delay and within the time limits specified in section 390.01114. See In re Doe, 932 So.2d 278 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005); In re A.S., 909 So.2d 524 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005). Our reversal of the order under review was therefore accompanied by an instruction for the trial judge to grant the appellant's petition.
BENTON, J., concurs with opinion; HAWKE S, J., dissents with opinion.