Case Name: POLETOWN NEIGHBORHOOD COUNCIL v. CITY OF DETROIT
Court: Michigan Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1981-03-13
Citations: 410 Mich. 616
Docket Number: Docket No. 66294
Parties: POLETOWN NEIGHBORHOOD COUNCIL v CITY OF DETROIT
Judges: Coleman, C.J., and Kavanagh, Williams, Levin, and Blair Moody, Jr., JJ., concurred.
Reporter: Michigan Reports
Volume: 410
Pages: 616–684

Head Matter:
POLETOWN NEIGHBORHOOD COUNCIL v CITY OF DETROIT
Docket No. 66294.
Argued March 3, 1981
(Calendar No. 7).
Decided March 13, 1981.
Dissenting opinion of Justice Ryan filed April 20,1981.
The Poletown Neighborhood Council, an unincorporated association, and ten residents of the Poletown area of Detroit brought an action against the City of Detroit and its Economic Development Corporation for declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent the condemnation of land in Poletown to be conveyed by the economic development corporation to General Motors Corporation for the construction of new Fisher Body and Cadillac assembly plants. The plaintiffs raised several grounds for relief, among them that the condemnation of land in this case is a taking of private property for a private use in violation of the state Constitution, and that the cultural and social institutions of Poletown would be destroyed in violation of the Michigan Environmental Protection Act. The Wayne Circuit Court, George T. Martin, J., held against the plaintiffs on these and other issues, and denied relief. The plaintiffs appealed to the Supreme Court by leave granted prior to decision by the Court of Appeals. In a per curiam opinion signed by Chief Justice Coleman and Justices Kavanagh, Williams, Levin, and Moody, the Supreme Court held:
The taking in this case is for a public purpose and does not violate the Constitution, and social and cultural environments are not protected by the Michigan Environmental Protection Act.
References for Points in Headnotes
[1-4, 6, 7, 9,11-20] 26 Am Jur 2d, Eminent Domain §§ 25-40.
[5] 26 Am Jur 2d, Eminent Domain §§ 2,10-13.
[7] 26 Am Jur 2d, Eminent Domain § 32.
[8] 26 Am Jur 2d, Eminent Domain §§ 33, 34, 66.
Propriety of court’s consideration of ecological effects of proposed project in determining right of condemnation. 47 ALR3d 1267.
[9,19] 26 Am Jur 2d, Eminent Domain §§ 38, 39. 27 Am Jur 2d, Eminent Domain §§ 402, 408, 506.
[10, 24] 26 Am Jur 2d, Eminent Domain §§ 32, 42,120.
[15-18] 71 Am Jur 2d, State and Local Taxation §§ 45, 70.
[19] 26 Am Jur 2d, Eminent Domain §§ 7, 8, 26, 150. 27 Am Jur 2d, Eminent Domain § 376.
[21] 26 Am Jur 2d, Eminent Domain §§ 20, 45-48, 51, 54, 119, 123, 125, 136, 137, 141.
[25] 26 Am Jur 2d, Eminent Domain §§ 34, 37.
1. All are agreed that the provision of the Constitution that private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation first being paid or secured forbids condemnation except to further a public use or purpose. The plaintiffs urge a distinction between "use” and "purpose”, but the terms have been used interchangeably in Michigan statutes and decisions in an effort to describe the protean concept of public benefit. The term "public use” has not received a narrow or inelastic definition by the Court, and indeed changes with changing conditions of society. The heart of this dispute is whether the proposed condemnation is for the primary benefit of the public or the private user.
2. The Economic Development Corporations Act is part of comprehensive legislation which attempts to provide for the general health, safety, and welfare. One of its objectives is to alleviate unemployment by assisting industry. To further the objectives of the act, the Legislature has authorized municipalities to acquire property by condemnation in order to provide industrial and commercial sites and the means of transfer from the municipality to private users. The Legislature has determined that governmental action of the type contemplated here meets a public need and serves an essential public purpose. The Court’s role after such a determination is made is limited: the determination should not be reversed except in instances where it is palpably and manifestly arbitrary and incorrect. When a legislature speaks, the public interest has been declared in terms well-nigh conclusive.
3. The Legislature has delegated the authority to determine whether a particular project constitutes a public purpose to the governing body of the municipality involved. The plaintiffs in this case challenged the necessity for the taking of the land. The city presented evidence of the severe economic conditions facing the residents of the city and state, the need for new industrial development to revitalize local industries, the economic boost the project would provide, and the lack of other adequate available sites to implement the project. The benefit to be received by the municipality is a clear and significant one and is sufficient to satisfy the Court that such a project was an intended and a legitimate object of the Legislature when it allowed municipalities to exercise condemnation powers even though a private party will also, ultimately, receive a signifi cant benefit as an incident. Where the power of condemnation is exercised in a way that benefits specific and identifiable private interests, the claim that the public interest is the predominant interest being advanced is inspected with heightened scrutiny. The public benefit cannot be speculative or marginal but must be clear and significant to be within the legitimate legislative purpose. This project is warranted because its significance for the people of Detroit and the state has been demonstrated.
4. The Michigan Environmental Protection Act is stated to be "for the protection of the air, water and other natural resources and public trust therein from pollution, impairment or destruction”, and the reference to "air, water and other natural resources” appears in several sections of the act and in its title. Given its plain meaning, the term "natural resources” does not encompass a "social and cultural environment”. The "social and cultural environments” are matters not within the purview of the Michigan Environmental Protection Act and are outside its legislative intent.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Justice Fitzgerald, joined by Justice Ryan, dissented because he believes that the proposed condemnation clearly exceeds the government’s authority to take private property through the power of eminent domain. He concurred in the discussion of the issue of the environmental protection act.
1. The city attaches great importance to the explicit legislative findings in the Economic Development Corporations Act that unemployment is a serious problem and that it is necessary to encourage industry in order to revitalize the economy of the state, and to the legislative declaration in the act that the use of the power of eminent domain shall be considered necessary for public purposes and for the benefit of the public. While such legislative pronouncements are entitled to great deference, determination whether a taking is for a public or a private use is ultimately a judicial question.
2. There is simply no precedent for this decision in Michigan cases. Slum clearance cases in which it has been held that the taking is for a public use even though the property taken is eventually transferred to private parties, while superficially similar in respect to the disposition of the property, do not justify the condemnation in this case. The public purpose in slum clearance is the benefit to the public health and welfare that results from the elimination of existing blight, even though the ultimate disposition of the property will benefit private interests; but in this case it is only through the acquisi tion and use of the property by General Motors that the "public purpose” of promoting employment can be achieved, and thus the economic benefits of the project are incidental to the private use of the property. Cases that have found the objective of economic development to be a sufficient "public purpose” to support the expenditure of public funds in aid of industry are not applicable here, because public purpose in a context of governmental taxing and spending powers cannot be equated with that term in connection with the power of eminent domain. Condemnation places the burden of aiding industry on the few, who are likely to have limited power to protect themselves from the excesses of legislative enthusiasm, whereas the burden of taxation is distributed over the great majority, leading to a more effective check on the improvident use of public funds.
3. Decisions from other states on this subject are instructive but are not controlling of the disposition of this case because each is presented against the background of a particular state’s constitutional and statutory framework, each has its peculiar facts, making comparison difficult, and each is decided in the context of the state’s body of case law which may have given either a broad or narrow interpretation to the term "public use”. Michigan law seems more consistent with that of states that give a more limited construction to the term. The scope of "public use” in Michigan is quite similar to that in states that have rejected development projects on the theory that they would improve general economic conditions. The cases in other states that have allowed condemnation solely because of the economic benefits of development are distinguishable in that it was the governmental unit that selected the site for commercial or industrial development, whereas in this case General Motors solicited the city for its aid in locating a site.
4. The evolution of the concept of public use has not eroded our historic protection against the taking of private property for private use to the degree sanctioned by the Court’s decision in this case. The decision that the prospect of increased employment, tax revenue, and general economic stimulation makes a taking of private property for transfer to another private party sufficiently "public” to authorize the use of the power of eminent domain means that there is virtually no limit to the use of condemnation to aid private businesses.
Justice Ryan also wrote a separate dissenting opinion. In this extraordinary case, the Court, by its decision, has altered the law of eminent domain in this state in a most significant way and seriously jeopardized the security of all private property ownership. This case will stand for judicial approval of municipal condemnation of private property for private use, and puts the judicial imprimatur upon government action taken under the policy of the end justifying the means.
1. The central issue is the right of government to expropriate property from those who do not wish to sell for the use and benefit of a strictly private corporation. It is not disputed that this action was authorized by statute, the Economic Development Corporations Act. The question is whether such authorization is constitutional.
2. The state constitution uses the term "public use” in the taking clause dealing with the power of eminent domain, and the term "public purposes” in the taxation provision giving cities and villages the power to levy taxes. Well over a century ago, a clear line was drawn between the powers of eminent domain and taxation, setting the jurisprudences of the taking clause and the taxing clause on separate, independent courses. What is "public” for one is not necessarily "public” for the other. The distinction has been consistently maintained by the Supreme Court until now; in failing to make it in this case the Court loses its way. The early cases construed "public purpose” for taxation more narrowly than "public use” for eminent domain, but the principle that they are different remains unaffected in later cases. Since the early decisions the taxing power has been significantly expanded, so that today, when dealing with eminent domain unrelated to avenues of commerce, it is reasonable, indeed necessary, to conclude that, for purposes of aiding private corporations, eminent domain is more restrictive than the power of taxation.
3. The distinction between "public use” for eminent domain and "public purpose” for taxation is further reflected in the Legislature’s proper role, as the Court has defined it, in describing the ambits of the terms. Cases on taxation abound with statements of deference to legislative determinations respecting the boundaries of "public purpose”. On the other hand, it has always been the case that the Court has accorded little or no weight to legislative determinations of "public use”. It has repeatedly said that the question is a judicial question. It is true that the Fifth Amendment taking clause applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment due process clause and that the Supreme Court of the United States has adopted a deferential standard of review in construing the Fourteenth Amendment, but the deference is paid not to the decisions of state legislatures but to the judgments of state courts. The distinction is critical and, in this case, makes the whole differ ence. The Supreme Court of Michigan has never employed the minimal standard of review in an eminent domain case which is adopted in this case. Notwithstanding explicit legislative findings, the Court has always made an independent determination of what constitutes a public use for which the power of eminent domain may be utilized.
4. As a general rule, the state constitution forbids the taking of land for ultimate conveyance to a private corporation to use as it sees fit as a taking for a private use. Condemnation of property for transfer to private corporations is not wholly proscribed; there is an exception to the general rule, what might be called the instrumentality of commerce exception, which has permitted condemnation for the establishment or improvement of the avenues of commerce: highways, railroads, and canals, for example. But this case does not fall within the instrumentality of commerce exception. Cases involving that exception show three common elements explicating and justifying the use of eminent domain for private corporations: public necessity of the extreme sort, continuing accountability to the public, and selection according to facts of independent public significance.
The principle of public necessity has not to do so much with public benefit, which is always present to some extent, as with the indispensability of compelled expropriation of property to the very existence of the enterprise pursued by the private corporation. Without eminent domain, highways, railroads, canals and other instrumentalities of commerce, all of which require particular configurations of property — narrow and generally straight ribbons of land — would be impracticable; they could not exist at all. But it cannot be contended that the existence of the automotive industry or the construction of a new General Motors assembly plant requires the use of eminent domain.
Another circumstance common to the instrumentality of commerce cases is the retention of some measure of government control over the operation of the enterprise after it has passed into private hands. Public control of the use of the land after transfer to the private entity invests the taking with far greater public attributes than would exist without control and fortifies the justification for the abridgment of individual property rights. Once the land in this case is sold to General Motors, there will be no public control whatsoever over the management, or operation, or conduct of the plant to be built there. Even if employment per se is a necessity of the extreme sort, the level of employment at the new plant will be deter mined by private corporate managers primarily with reference, not to the regional rate of unemployment, but to profit.
The third element common to the cases is that determination of the specific land to be condemned is made without reference to the private interests of the corporation, but instead to criteria related to the public interest. For instrumentalities of commerce, particular land is condemned because of the inherent nature of those instrumentalities, which normally demand narrow and generally straight parcels of land, and because of the location of centers of population and natural conditions such as rivers. These are facts of independent public significance. The location of the land in this case is solely a result of conditions laid down by General Motors, which were designed to further its private pecuniary interest. These are facts of private significance.
5. The only authorities that even arguably support or justify the use of eminent domain in this case are the "slum clearance” cases, which hold that slum clearance is a public use for which eminent domain may be employed. However, the distinction between those cases and this one is evident. Even if circumstances made redevelopment impossible, slum clearance would be justified on the ground that clearance in itself is a public use. The object of eminent domain when used in connection with slum clearance is not to convey land to a private corporation as it is in this case, but to erase blight, danger, and disease.
6. The condemnation of land in this case is not consistent with any of the three significant elements present in the instrumentality of commerce cases, elements which together justify, in a principled manner, the use of eminent domain for private corporations. A more general principle, consonant with prior decisions of the Court and entirely contrary to the holding in this case, is contained in the state taking clause: the right to own and occupy land will not be subordinated to private corporate interests unless the use of the land condemned by or for the corporation is invested with public attributes sufficient to fairly deem the corporate activity governmental. That principle has been consistently honored by the Court until the decision in this case. The eminent domain provision of the Economic Development Corporations Act is unconstitutional both facially and as applied because it authorizes a taking of property for private use.
Opinion of the Court
1. Constitutional Law — Eminent Domain — Public Use.
The Constitution requires that the power of eminent domain not be invoked except to further a public use or purpose (Const 1963, art 10, § 2).
2. Eminent Domain — Public Use — Public Purpose — Words and Phrases.
The terms "public use” and "public purpose”, as they pertain to the law of eminent domain, have been used interchangeably in Michigan statutes and decisions in an effort to describe the protean concept of public benefit.
3. Eminent Domain — Public Use.
A public use, as the term is used in the law of eminent domain, changes with changing conditions of society; the right of the public to receive and enjoy the benefit of the use determines whether the use is public or private.
4. Eminent Domain — Economic Development Corporations — Public Purpose.
The Legislature has declared, in the Economic Development Corporations Act, that programs to alleviate and prevent conditions of unemployment and to preserve and develop industry and commerce are essential public purposes, and has authorized municipalities to acquire property by condemnation to provide industrial and commercial sites and the means of transfer from the municipality to private users; the determination of what constitutes a public purpose is primarily a legislative function (MCL 125.1602, 125.1622; MSA 5.3520[2], 5.3520[22]).
5. Constitutional Law — Eminent Domain — Inherent Power.
Eminent domain is an inherent power of the sovereign of the same nature as, albeit more severe than, the power to regulate the use of land through zoning or the prohibition of public nuisances.
6. Eminent Domain — Economic Development Corporations — Public Purpose.
Condemnation by the City of Detroit of land in the city for eventual conveyance by the Detroit Economic Development Corporation to General Motors Corporation for construction of new factories on the land held to be an intended and a legitimate object of the Legislature when it allowed municipalities to exercise condemnation powers in the Economic Development Corporations Act, even though a private party will also, ultimately, receive a benefit as an incident, where the benefit to be received by the municipality invoking the power is a clear and significant one (MCL 125.1602, 125.1622; MSA 5.3520[2], 5.3520[22]).
7. Eminent Domain — Economic Development Corporations — Public Purpose.
The power of eminent domain is restricted to furthering public uses and purposes and is not to be exercised without substantial proof that the public is primarily to be benefited; where, as in a condemnation for an economic development corporation project, the power is exercised in a way that benefits specific and identifiable private interests, a court inspects with heightened scrutiny the claim that the public interest is the predominant interest being advanced (MCL 125.1602, 125.1622; MSA 5.3520[2], 5.3520[22]).
8. Environment — Statutes — Natural Resources — Social and Cultural Environments.
The Michigan Environmental Protection Act is for the protection of air, water, and other natural resources, and the plain meaning of the term "natural resources” does not encompass a "social and cultural environment” (MCL 691.1201 et seq.; MSA 14.528[201] et seq.).
Dissenting Opinion by Fitzgerald, J.
See headnote 8.
9. Eminent Domain — Public Use.
Legislative pronouncements that a certain use of the power of eminent domain is for a public use are entitled to great deference, but determination whether a taking is for a public use or a private use is ultimately a judicial question of law.
10. Eminent Domain — Public Purpose — Slum Clearance.
The public purpose that has been found to support the use of the power of eminent domain in slum clearance cases is the beneñt to the public health and welfare that arises from the elimination of existing blight, the controlling purpose, even though the ultimate disposition of the property by resale will beneñt private interests.
11. Eminent Domain — Economic Development Corporations — Public Purpose.
Transfer of property taken by condemnation under the Economic Development Corporations Act to General Motors Corporation for use as a factory site cannot be considered incidental to the taking, because it is only through the acquisition and use of the property by General Motors that the "public purpose" of promoting employment can be achieved, and thus it is the economic beneñts of the project that are incidental to the private use of the property (MCL 125.1602, 125.1622; MSA 5.3520[2], 5.3520[22]).
12. Eminent Domain — Public Purpose — Economic Development — Words and Phrases.
’’Public purpose" in the context of governmental taxing and spending power cannot be equated with that term as used in connection with the power of eminent domain; decisions that have found the objective of economic development to be a public purpose to support the expenditure of public funds in aid of industry are not appropriate authority where the question is the taking of land for an economic development corporation to convey to an industrial corporation to use as a factory site.
13. Eminent Domain — Public Use — Economic Development.
The result of decisions in Michigan has been to limit the power of eminent domain to situations in which direct governmental use is to be made of the land or in which the private recipient will use it to serve the public; in this respect, the scope of "public use” in Michigan is quite similar to that in states that have rejected development projects on the theory that they would improve general economic conditions.
14. Eminent Domain — Public Use.
Condemnation of land for conveyance by an economic development corporation to General Motors Corporation for use as a factory site goes beyond the scope of the power of eminent domain in that it takes private property for a private use.
Dissenting Opinion by Ryan, J.
15. Constitutional Law — Eminent Domain — Public Use.
A "public use” for purposes of the eminent domain clause of the Constitution is to be distinguished from a "public purpose” as that term is used in the clause conferring powers of taxation on cities and villages; what is public for one is not necessarily public for the other (Const 1963, art 10, §2; art 7, §21).
16. Constitutional Law — Eminent Domain — Public Use.
The distinction between "public use” in the law of eminent domain and "public purpose” in the law of taxation has been consistently maintained by the Supreme Court for well over a century (Const 1963, art 10, §2; art 7, §21).
17. Constitutional Law — Eminent Domain — Public Use.
The concept of "public purpose” for taxation, originally construed more narrowly than the concept of "public use” for eminent domain, has grown broader as the taxing power has been expanded, so that today, for purposes of aiding private corporations, eminent domain is more restrictive than the power of taxation (Const 1963, art 10, § 2; art 7, § 21).
18. Constitutional Law — Eminent Domain — Public Use — Legislative Determination.
The Supreme Court has long accorded deference to legislative determinations of "public purpose” in taxation cases, but has accorded little or no weight to legislative determinations of "public use” in eminent domain cases, holding instead that public use is a judicial question and making an independent determination of what constitutes a public use (Const 1963, art 10, §2; art 7, §21).
19. Constitutional Law — Eminent Domain — Public Use — Due Process.
The Fifth Amendment taking clause applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment due process clause, and in construing the Fourteenth Amendment the Supreme Court of the United States has adopted a deferential standard of review, but the deference is paid to judgments of state courts, not the decisions of state legislatures, on questions of public use under state law; whether a use is public or private is ultimately a judicial question (US Const, Ams V, XIV; Const 1963, art 10, §2).
20. Eminent Domain — Public Use — Public Purpose — Words and Phrases.
The terms "public use” and "public purpose” have indeed been used interchangeably in the inexact language of both eminent domain and taxation cases written by the Supreme Court, but the different principles informing those terms have not been interchanged.
21. Eminent Domain — Instrumentality of Commerce — Private Corporations.
An exception to the general rule that condemnation of property for transfer to a private corporation is forbidden, the instrumentality of commerce exception, has long been recognized; this exception permits condemnation for the establishment or improvement of the avenues of commerce — highways, railroads, and canals, for example.
22. Eminent Domain — Instrumentality of Commerce — Private Corporations.
Three common elements appear in the instrumentality of commerce cases justifying the use of eminent domain for private corporations: public necessity of the extreme sort, the indispensability of compelled expropriation of property to the very existence of the enterprise pursued by the private corporation; continuing accountability of the corporation to the public, the retention of some measure of government control over the operation of the enterprise after it has passed into private hands; and determination of the speciñc land to be condemned based upon criteria related to the public interest rather than the private interests of the corporation.
23. Eminent Domain — Instrumentality of Commerce — Private Corporations — Manufacturing Plant.
The three common elements of the instrumentality of commerce cases which justify the condemnation of land for use by a private corporation do not appear in a case of condemnation of land for the construction of an automobile manufacturing plant where: there is no public necessity of the extreme sort, because the plant could be built somewhere without the use of condemnation; there is no continuing accountability to the public because the plant will be operated without any public control over its management or operation, and with reference not to the regional rate of unemployment, but to proñt; and there is no independent public signiñcance to the criteria used in selecting the land, but the location is a result of conditions laid down by the manufacturer to further its private pecuniary interest.
24. Eminent Domain — Private Corporations — Slum Clearance.
The object of eminent domain when used in connection with slum clearance is not to convey land to a private corporation, although that may ultimately be done, but to erase blight, danger, and disease, and when the area has been cleared the public purpose has been fulñlled; cases holding slum clearance to be a public purpose justifying the use of eminent domain are not authority for the use of eminent domain when the object is conveyance of the land to a private corporation for use as a factory site.
25. Constitutional Law — Eminent Domain — Private Corporations.
The general principle in the eminent domain taking clause of the state Constitution is that the right to own and occupy land will not be subordinated to private corporate interests unless the use of the land condemned by or for the corporation is invested with public attributes sufficient for the corporate activity fairly to be deemed governmental (Const1963, art 10, § 2).
Reosti & Papakhian for plaintiffs.
Sylvester Delaney, Acting Corporation Counsel, by Joseph N. Baltimore, and Honigman Miller Schwartz & Cohn, by Jason L. Honigman, William G. Christopher, and Norman C. Ankers, Special Counsel, for the City of Detroit.
Lewis, White, Clay & Graves, P.C., by David Baker Lewis, Eric L. Clay, and Victoria A. Roberts, General Counsel, for the Detroit Economic Development Corporation.

Opinion:
Per Curiam.
This case arises out of a plan by the Detroit Economic Development Corporation to acquire, by condemnation if necessary, a large tract of land to be conveyed to General Motors Corporation as a site for construction of an assembly plant. The plaintiffs, a neighborhood association and several individual residents of the affected area, brought suit in Wayne Circuit Court to challenge the project on a number of grounds, not all of which have been argued to this Court. Defendants' motions for summary judgment were denied pending trial on a single question of fact: whether, under 1980 PA 87; MCL 213.51 et seq.; MSA 8.265(1) et seq., the city abused its discretion in determining that condemnation of plaintiffs' property was necessary to complete the project.
The trial lasted 10 days and resulted in a judgment for defendants and an order on December 9, 1980, dismissing plaintiffs' complaint. The plaintiffs filed a claim of appeal with the Court of Appeals on December 12, 1980, and an application for bypass with this Court on December 15, 1980.
We granted a motion for immediate considera tion and an application for leave to appeal prior to decision by the Court of Appeals to consider the following questions:
Does the use of eminent domain in this case constitute a taking of private property for private use and, therefore, contravene Const 1963, art 10, §2?
Did the court below err in ruling that cultural, social and historical institutions were not protected by the Michigan Environmental Protection Act?
We conclude that these questions must be answered in the negative and affirm the trial court's decision.
I
This case raises a question of paramount importance to the future welfare of this state and its residents: Can a municipality use the power of eminent domain granted to it by the Economic Development Corporations Act, MCL 125.1601 et seq.; MSA 5.3520(1) et seq., to condemn property for transfer to a private corporation to build a plant to promote industry and commerce, thereby adding jobs and taxes to the economic base of the municipality and state?
Const 1963, art 10, § 2, states in pertinent part that "[p]rivate property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation therefor being first made or secured in a manner prescribed by law". Art 10, § 2 has been interpreted as requiring that the power of eminent domain not be invoked except to further a public use or purpose. Plaintiffs-appellants urge us to distinguish between the terms "use" and "purpose", asserting they are not synonymous and have been distinguished in the law of eminent domain. We are persuaded the terms have been used interchangeably in Michigan statutes and decisions in an effort to describe the protean concept of public benefit. The term "public use" has not received a narrow or inelastic definition by this Court in prior cases. Indeed, this Court has stated that " '[a] public use changes with changing conditions of society' " and that " '[t]he right of the public to receive and enjoy the benefit of the use determines whether the use is public or private' ".
The Economic Development Corporations Act is a part of the comprehensive legislation dealing with planning, housing and zoning whereby the State of Michigan is attempting to provide for the general health, safety, and welfare through alleviating unemployment, providing economic assistance to industry, assisting the rehabilitation of blighted areas, and fostering urban redevelopment.
Section 2 of the act provides:
"There exists in this state the continuing need for programs to alleviate and prevent conditions of unemployment, and that it is.accordingly necessary to assist and retain local industries and commercial enterprises to strengthen and revitalize the economy of this state and its municipalities; that accordingly it is necessary to provide means and methods for the encouragement and assistance of industrial and commercial enterprises in locating, purchasing, constructing, reconstructing, modernizing, improving, maintaining, repairing, furnishing, equipping, and expanding in this state and in its municipalities; and that it is also necessary to encourage the location and expansion of commercial enterprises to more conveniently provide needed services and facilities of the commercial enterprises to municipalities and the residents thereof. Therefore, the powers' granted in this act constitute the performance of essential public purposes and functions for this state and its municipalities." MCL 125.1602; MSA 5.3520(2). (Emphasis added.)
To further the objectives of this act, the Legislature has authorized municipalities to acquire property by condemnation in order to provide industrial and commercial sites and the means of transfer from the municipality to private users. MCL 125.1622; MSA 5.3520(22).
Plaintiffs-appellants do not challenge the declaration of the Legislature that programs to alleviate and prevent conditions of unemployment and to preserve and develop industry and commerce are essential public purposes. Nor do they challenge the proposition that legislation to accomplish this purpose falls within the constitutional grant of general legislative power to the Legislature in Const 1963, art 4, § 51, which reads as follows:
"The public health and general welfare of the people of the state are hereby declared to be matters of primary public concern. The legislature shall pass suitable laws for the protection and promotion of the public health."
What plaintiffs-appellants do challenge is the constitutionality of using the power of eminent domain to condemn one person's property to convey it to another private person in order to bolster the economy. They argue that whatever incidental benefit may accrue to the public, assembling land to General Motors' specifications for conveyance to General Motors for its uncontrolled use in profit making is really a taking for private use and not a public use because General Motors is the primary beneficiary of the condemnation.
The defendants-appellees contend, on the other hand, that the controlling public purpose in taking this land is to create an industrial site which will be used to alleviate and prevent conditions of unemployment and fiscal distress. The fact that it will be conveyed to and ultimately used by a private manufacturer does not defeat this predominant public purpose.
. There is no dispute about the law. All agree that condemnation for a public use or purpose is permitted. All agree that condemnation for a private use or purpose is forbidden. Similarly, condemnation for a private use cannot be authorized whatever its incidental public benefit and condemnation for a public purpose cannot be forbidden whatever the incidental private gain. The heart of this dispute is whether the proposed condemnation is for the primary benefit of the public or the private user.
The Legislature has determined that governmental action of the type contemplated here meets a public need and serves an essential public purpose. The Court's role after such a determination is made is limited.
" 'The determination of what constitutes a public purpose is primarily a legislative function, subject to review by the courts when abused, and the determination of the legislative body of that matter should not be reversed except in instances where such determination is palpable and manifestly arbitrary and incorrect.' " Gregory Marina, Inc v Detroit, 378 Mich 364, 396; 144 NW2d 503 (1966).
The United States Supreme Court has held that when a legislature speaks, the public interest has been declared in terms "well-nigh conclusive". Berman v Parker, 348 US 26, 32; 75 S Ct 98; 99 L Ed 27 (1954).
The Legislature has delegated the authority to determine whether a particular project constitutes a public purpose to the governing body of the municipality involved. The plaintiffs concede that this project is the type contemplated by the Legislature and that the procedures set forth in the Economic Development Corporations Act have been followed. This further limits our review.
In the court below, the plaintiffs-appellants challenged the necessity for the taking of the land for the proposed project. In this regard the city presented substantial evidence of the severe economic conditions facing the residents of the city and state, the need for new industrial development to revitalize local industries, the economic boost the proposed project would provide, and the lack of other adequate available sites to implement the project.
As Justice Cooley stated over a hundred years ago "the most important consideration in the case of eminent domain is the necessity of accomplishing some public good which is otherwise impracticable, and the law does not so much regard the means as the need". People ex rel Detroit & Howell R Co v Salem Twp Board, 20 Mich 452, 480-481 (1870).
When there is such public need, "[t]he abstract right [of an individual] to make use of his own property in his own way is compelled to yield to the general comfort and protection of community, and to a proper regard to relative rights in others". Id. Eminent domain is an inherent power of the sovereign of the same nature as, albeit more severe than, the power to regulate the use of land through zoning or the prohibition of public nuisances.
In the instant case the benefit to be received by the municipality invoking the power of eminent domain is a clear and significant one and is sufficient to satisfy this Court that such a project was an intended and a legitimate object of the Legislature when it allowed municipalities to exercise condemnation powers even though a private party will also, ultimately, receive a benefit as an incident thereto.
The power of eminent domain is to be used in this instance primarily to accomplish the essential public purposes of alleviating unemployment and revitalizing the economic base of the community. The benefit to a private interest is merely incidental.
Our determination that this project falls within the public purpose, as stated by the Legislature, does not mean that every condemnation proposed by an economic development corporation will meet with similar acceptance simply because it may provide some jobs or add to the industrial or commercial base. If the public benefit was not so clear and significant, we would hesitate to sanction approval of such a project. The power of eminent domain is restricted to furthering public uses and purposes and is not to be exercised without substantial proof that the public is primarily to be benefited. Where, as here, the condemnation power is exercised in a way that benefits specific and identifiable private interests, a court inspects with heightened scrutiny the claim that the public interest is the predominant interest being advanced. Such public benefit cannot be speculative or marginal but must be clear and significant if it is to be within the legitimate purpose as stated by the Legislature. We hold this project is warranted on the basis that its significance for the people of Detroit and the state has been demonstrated.
II
Plaintiffs' complaint also alleged that the proposed project violates the Michigan Environmental Protection Act (MEPA), MCL 691.1201 et seq.; MSA 14.528(201) et seq., because it "will have a major adverse impact on the adjoining social and cultural environment which is referred to as Pole-town". The trial court dismissed this claim, stating that " 'social and cultural environments' are matters not within the purview of the MEPA and outside its legislative intent". We agree.
MCL 691.1202(1); MSA 14.528(202)(1) permits maintenance of an action for declaratory and equitable relief against the state, its political subdivisions, or private entities, "for the protection of the air, water and other natural resources and the public trust therein from pollution, impairment or destruction". (Emphasis supplied.) The reference to "air, water and other natural resources" is also made in other sections of the act and in its title. Given its plain meaning, the term "natural resources" does not encompass a "social and cultural environment". Moreover, under the principle of ejusdem generis, where a statute contains a general term supplementing a more specific enumeration, the general term will not be construed to refer to objects not of like kind with those enumer ated. 2A Sutherland, Statutory Construction (4th ed), § 47.18-47.19, pp 109-114.
The decision of the trial court is affirmed.
The clerk is directed to issue the Court's judgment order forthwith, in accordance with GCR 1963, 866.3(c).
No costs, a public question being involved.
Coleman, C.J., and Kavanagh, Williams, Levin, and Blair Moody, Jr., JJ., concurred.
Shizas v Detroit, 333 Mich 44, 50; 52 NW2d 589 (1952).
City of Center Line v Michigan Bell Telephone Co, 387 Mich 260; 196 NW2d 144 (1972); Gregory Marina, Inc v Detroit, 378 Mich 364; 144 NW2d 503 (1966); and In re Slum Clearance, 331 Mich 714; 50 NW2d 340 (1951).
Hays v Kalamazoo, 316 Mich 443, 453-454; 25 NW2d 787; 169 ALR 1218 (1947), quoting from 37 Am Jur, Municipal Corporations, § 120, pp 734-735.
MCL 125.1610(2); MSA 5.3520(10)(2).
MCL 125.1603(e); MSA 5.3520(3)(e).
MCL 125.1608, 125.1609; MSA 5.3520(8), 5.3520(9).