Case Name: Gerald A. LEWIS, etc., et al., Appellants, v. THE FLORIDA BAR, Appellee
Court: Florida Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1979-06-28
Citations: 372 So. 2d 1121
Docket Number: No. 54777
Parties: Gerald A. LEWIS, etc., et al., Appellants, v. THE FLORIDA BAR, Appellee.
Judges: ADKINS, BOYD, OVERTON, HATCH-ETT and ALDERMAN, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 372
Pages: 1121–1123

Head Matter:
Gerald A. LEWIS, etc., et al., Appellants, v. THE FLORIDA BAR, Appellee.
No. 54777.
Supreme Court of Florida.
June 28, 1979.
Jim Smith, Atty. Gen. and David K. Miller, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, for appellants.
Carl R. Pennington, Jr. and Everett P. Anderson of Pennington & Wilkinson, Tallahassee, for appellee.

Opinion:
PER CURIAM.
We have for review by direct appeal the decision of the District Court of Appeal, First District, in The Florida Bar v. Lewis, 358 So.2d 897 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978), holding that the Bar's requested refund of a documentary stamp tax and penalty should be granted since to impose a tax upon a note given by a tax-immune arm of government is an unconstitutional application of sections 201.01 and 201.08(1), Florida Statutes (1975). We have jurisdiction pursuant to article V, section 3(b)(1), Florida Constitution.
The issue before us is whether imposition of documentary stamp taxes, pursuant to sections 201.08(1) and 201.01, Florida Statutes (1975), upon a transaction between The Florida Bar and Barnett Bank of Tallahassee, is an unconstitutional application of these statutes.
We agree with the district court that imposition of the documentary stamp tax upon the transaction between The Florida Bar and the Barnett Bank is an unconstitutional application of these statutory provisions.
The pertinent facts and arguments of the parties are succinctly stated in the opinion of the district court. The district court gave the following rationale for its decision:
The Florida Bar is an arm and part of the judiciary, one of the three co-equal departments of state government. While the Constitution does not expressly provide that the legislature may not tax the judiciary, the purpose of the framers or adopters -of the Constitution may be shown by implication as well as by express provision, and what is implied in a Constitution is as effective as that which is expressed. See State ex rel. Church v. Yeats, 74 Fla. 509, 77 So. 262 (1917); State ex rel. Nuveen v. Greer, 88 Fla. 249, 102 So. 739 (1924); Amos v. Matthews, 99 Fla. 1, 126 So. 308 (1930). Constitutional restraint may be found either in the express language employed or in the purpose clearly, though impliedly, evidenced thereby. Amos v. Matthews, supra. To hold that the legislature has the power to tax the judiciary would make a mockery of the separation of powers provision of the Constitution. The judiciary, and the Florida Bar as part of the judiciary, is immune from taxation.
We must turn now to the proposition of whether or not the particular transaction between the tax immune Florida Bar and the Barnett Bank of Tallahassee is a taxable transaction. It is common knowledge that lenders universally require borrowers to assume the burden of any taxes imposed upon a loan transaction. If a borrower is to obtain a loan, he must agree to pay the taxes on the transaction. This is such common practice that the Court can and we do take judicial notice of it. It is apparent under these circumstances that the legislative act, if applied to a transaction between a lender and a tax immune body, constitutes an indirect tax upon the tax immune body. As stated by the Supreme Court in State ex rel. Powell v. Leon County, 133 Fla. 68, 182 So. 639 (1938),
"It is fundamental and elementary that the legislature may not do that by indirect action which it is prohibited by the Constitution to do by direct action."
To impose a tax upon a note given by a tax immune arm of government is an unconstitutional application of the foregoing statute.
358 So.2d at 899.
We agree with the rationale of the district court, and its decision is, hereby, affirmed.
It is so ordered.
ADKINS, BOYD, OVERTON, HATCH-ETT and ALDERMAN, JJ., concur.
SUNDBERG, J., concurs specially with an opinion.
ENGLAND, C. J., dissents with an opinion.
. Section 201.01 provides in pertinent part:
There shall be levied, collected and paid the taxes specified in this chapter . by any person, who makes, signs, executes, issues, sells, removes, consigns, assigns, or ships the same, or for whose benefit or use the same are made, signed, executed, issued, sold, removed, consigned, assigned, or shipped in the state. .
. Section 201.08 provides in part:
(1) On promissory notes, nonnegotiable notes, written obligations to pay money, as signment of salaries, wages, or other compensation, made, executed, delivered, sold, transferred, or assigned in the state, and for each renewal of the same on each $100 of the indebtedness or obligation evidenced thereby, the tax shall be 15 cents on each $100 or fraction thereof. .