Case Name: Darrell DANOS et al. v. Terry ST. PIERRE et al.
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1980-01-21
Citations: 383 So. 2d 1019
Docket Number: No. 12755
Parties: Darrell DANOS et al. v. Terry ST. PIERRE et al.
Judges: ELLIS, LOTTINGER and PONDER, JJ., concur and assign written reasons.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 383
Pages: 1019–1032

Head Matter:
Darrell DANOS et al. v. Terry ST. PIERRE et al.
No. 12755.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, First Circuit.
Jan. 21, 1980.
Darryl J. Carimi, Gretna, for petitioners and appellees.
Albert Forrest, New Iberia, John Ladd Lanier, Thibodaux, Steven B. Witman, John J. Hainkel, Jr., New Orleans, for defendants and appellants.
Lloyd T. Bourgeois, Thibodaux, Harold J. Lamy, New Orleans, for defendants and appellees.
Terry B. Loup, Baton Rouge, for plaintiffs (Suit No. 84672) and appellees.
Robert Blomefield, New Orleans, for plaintiffs (Suit No. 34002) and appellees.

Opinion:
PER CURIAM:
A basic but delicate question confronts us on this appeal: Can a fetus whose stillbirth results from the negligence of a third person be considered a "person" for purposes of the wrongful death provisions of La.C.C. art. 2315?
The issue arises in a suit for wrongful death, personal injury and property damage brought as a result of a head-on collision.
The collision occurred on August 23,1975, at about 4:00 A.M. on Louisiana Highway 1 in Lafourche Parish, Louisiana. The vehicles involved were the 1971 Chrysler automobile owned by Eroy Danos and driven by Gayle Naccio Danos in which her husband, Darrell A. Danos, was an occupant, and the 1973 Chevrolet automobile owned by Rhonda Rousse Malbrough and driven by Terry St. Pierre in which the owner and two guest passengers in the backseat, Jenny Lynn Au-tin and Nolan Ougel, Jr., were occupants. The accident happened when the Malbrough vehicle veered into the lane of traffic of the Danos vehicle.
Immediately before the wreck, St. Pierre and his passengers had been partying for several hours at a local nightclub where all had consumed copious quantities of alcoholic beverages. They were well acquainted with each other and they knew that St. Pierre was intoxicated when they left the nightclub. At the time of the accident Mrs. Danos was seven months pregnant, and was to be shortly thereafter delivered of a stillborn child. Jenny Lynn Autin and Rhonda Rousse Malbrough died as a result of the injuries they sustained in the accident. Mr. and Mrs. Danos, St. Pierre and Ougel were severely injured.
The plaintiffs, Darrell Danos, Gayle Da-nos and Eroy Danos, sued the defendants, St. Pierre, the Malbrough (Rousse) Estate, Jenny Lynn Autin, and Ougel, and the liability insurers, Aetna Life & Casualty Insurance Company and State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company. Later, Allstate Insurance Company, the Danos' uninsured motorist carrier, was added as a defendant, as was Southern Farm Bureau Casualty Insurance Company, as the insurer of Autin, whose death occurred after suit was filed.
The plaintiffs alleged that the collision was caused by the joint negligence of Terry St. Pierre, in that he was driving an automobile while under the influence of intoxicating beverages, driving at an excessive rate of speed and crossing the center line of the highway into the path of oncoming traffic; and of Jenny Lynn Autin, Nolan Ougel, Jr. and Rhonda Rousse Malbrough, all of whom were passengers' in the Mal-brough vehicle, and whose negligence was alleged to have consisted of their having-been fully aware of St. Pierre's intoxicated condition and of their failure to take steps to prevent him from driving the Malbrough car.
The trial court held that the collision resulted from the joint negligence of the driver and the occupants of the Malbrough vehicle, and awarded judgment in favor of the plaintiffs against all defendants. The defendants, except Ougel, have appealed; he is not before this court and the judgment is final as to him.
The principal issues before us concern:
(1) Whether the parents of a child born dead can recover for its wrongful death.
(2) Whether the owner of an offending vehicle who allows a person she knows is intoxicated to operate her vehicle is guilty of actionable negligence.
(3) Whether the guest passenger of an offending vehicle who knows or should know that the driver is intoxicated is, by such knowledge, answerable solidarily with the driver pursuant to La.C.C. 2324.
There is also a procedural question concerning the validity of the judgment against the Malbrough (Rousse) Estate and an issue of quantum.
WRONGFUL DEATH
It is the holding of a majority of this court that plaintiffs have a cause of action and can recover damages for the loss of their child, which was stillborn as a result of the accident herein. Reasons for and against this holding will be expressed in concurring and dissenting opinions, to be attached hereto.
LIABILITY OF AUTOMOBILE OWNER
The driver of the Malbrough car, Terry St. Pierre, was undoubtedly negligent. He was operating the car while in an intoxicated condition which caused him to invade the traffic lane of the Danos automobile at a high rate of speed and collide head-on with it. The trial court found, and the evidence supports its finding, that Rhonda Rousse Malbrough, the owner, knew that St. Pierre was intoxicated to the point where he was in no condition to drive when she entrusted the car to him.
We thus have no difficulty in affirming the trial court's holding that the owner of the Malbrough vehicle was negligent and was solidarily liable with the driver. It is established law that the owner of an automobile who knowingly entrusts it to an intoxicated, or otherwise incompetent, driver is responsible for the harm resulting from the incompetent operation of the vehicle. Baader v. Driverless Cars, Inc., 10 La.App. 310, 120 So. 515 (Orl.1929); see also Kemp v. Fourmy, 265 So.2d 651 (La.App. 2 Cir. 1972); Winzer v. Lewis, 251 So.2d 650 (La.App. 2 Cir. 1971), writ refused, 259 La. 934, 253 So.2d 379 (1971); Annot., Liability Based on Entrusting Automobile to One Who Is Intoxicated or Known to be Excessive User of Intoxicants, 19 A.L.R.3rd 1175,
LIABILITY OF GUEST PASSENGERS
In holding the guest passengers, Autin and Ougel, solidarily liable with the driver, the trial judge stated:
"The claims in the companion suits were dismissed against the plaintiffs in this suit and the other defendants in each of those suits because the court felt the evidence had established a clear case of assumption of risk by the three guest passengers. This finding was sufficient to deny recovery in those suits. The court finds as a fact, however, that the guest passengers in the Rousse (St. Pierre) vehicle were also joint tort-feasors with the driver, Terry St. Pierre, and hence they, their insurers, and their estates are liable to the plaintiffs in this case."
The trial court's holding was based on its finding that the St. Pierre group had been partying together for several hours at a nightclub and that all members of the party knew that St. Pierre was in an intoxicated condition when they left the club. The holding was apparently based on La.C.C. art. 2324, which provides:
"He who causes another person to do an unlawful act, or assists or encourages in the commission of it, is answerable, in solido, with that person, for the damage caused by such act."
The decision of the trial court was premised on the awareness of the guest passengers of the intoxicated condition of the driver. Finding as a fact that the passengers knew of St. Pierre's excessive intoxication, the trial court concluded that the guest passengers, including the owner, had thus assumed the risk, which barred their own recovery.
The trial judge, from this finding and holding, then assumed that the guest passengers were necessarily joint tort-feasors. Putting it mildly, this is a non sequitur. The mere fact that a guest passenger is precluded from recovery of damages because of assumption of risk or contributory negligence does not inexorably lead to the conclusion that he has breached a duty owed to some third person injured as a result of the accident.
We find from the facts and circumstances of the instant case that there was no special relationship between Autin and the driver, or between Autin and the injured third persons, which imposed a duty upon her to persons outside of the vehicle. Mere knowledge or awareness of the intoxicated condition of the driver, alone, does not create a relationship which imposes a duty upon a guest passenger to protect against the particular risk involved in the instant case. Sloan v. Flack, 150 So.2d 646 (La.App. 3rd Cir. 1963).
This position is consistent with the rule that before a plaintiff can recover from a passenger in the defendant's motor vehicle, he must show a joint interest of the driver and the passenger or an equal right in the passenger to control the driver's operation of the vehicle. Malbrough v. Davidson, 219 So.2d 313 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1969), writ denied 254 La. 10, 222 So.2d 66 (1969). We find nothing in this case to take it out of that general rule.
There is nothing in the record that shows that the passenger had any control or custody over the motor vehicle. She had no interest in the automobile which she could entrust to the driver. The evidence does not establish that Autin was in control of the driver; nor is there evidence of intimidation or forceful persuasion by her. On. the basis of the evidence in this record we cannot be persuaded to extend Article 2324 to hold the guest passenger liable for the plaintiff's damages.
Therefore, we reverse the trial court's finding of fault on the part of Jenny L. Autin.
WAS THE MALBROUGH (ROUSSE) ESTATE PROPERLY BEFORE THE COURT?
The original petition alleged that Rhonda Rousse Malbrough, the owner of the Chevrolet automobile, being fully aware of the driver's intoxicated condition, entrusted the vehicle to him and therefore that the Malbrough (Rousse) Estate, through the administrator of her Estate and/or her heirs, was liable for the damages. It was alleged that her Estate and her insurer were jointly liable with St. Pierre, the negligent driver. The record shows that the Estate, through the succession representative, filed responsive pleadings, made an appearance in the suit and participated in the trial. Thus, we find this party was properly before the court and could have been, as it was, cast in judgment. See La.C.C.P. arts. 6, 7, 925 and 3249; Crane Supply Company v. Drake & Planche, Inc., 255 So.2d 188 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1971).
QUANTUM
The appellants contend that the awards of $10,000.00 and $20,000.00 to Darrell Danos and Gayle Danos, respectively, for their personal injuries were excessive and should be reduced. In making his awards, the trial judge said:
"We now turn to an award for pain and suffering by plaintiff Darrell Danos. .Simply put, his face was fractured. He was first seen by his local doctor, Dr. William George, but because of the nature of his injury he was referred to Dr. James Peltier, an oral surgeon, accepted as an expert by all parties. Dr. Peltier testified that plaintiff Darrell Danos had sustained a fracture of the upper jaw, which in essence totally severed it from the bony structure of the head. There was apparently no laceration, but the fracture was the result of the violent blow received when plaintiff Danos, who was riding in the right front seat of the car, struck the dashboard as a result of the head-on collision. The force of the blow impacted the jaw, which in this case was an advantage in that it helped immobilize the jaw and simplified the treatment. The fracture extended from the middle of the upper jaw on each side of the nose and then the bones over each eye. Dr. Peltier immobilized it with metal plates and wired the jaw shut. This was done following the day of the accident and the situation was static until September 24th, at which time the wires and elastic bands were removed, but the bars or plates were left in place. On October 10th he removed the remaining appliances from his mouth. From Dr. Peltier's testimony and from plaintiff's appearance it was obvious that despite the extensiveness of the facial fracture good results were obtained in treatment. Despite the doctor's assurance that the procedure was not excruciatingly painful, pain is a subjective thing and from the doctor's description of the treatment and the plaintiff's testimony, there is no doubt in the court's mind that for a period of several months after the accident plaintiff was in great discomfort. In addition to this, the accident required repair for a deviated septum. This, too, was a success, but again there was considerable discomfort involved in this surgical procedure. The only other injury to plaintiff Darrell Danos involved an apparent infection to the tear duct of the left eye which was cleared up with three visits to Dr. James Bourgeois. (See Danos-15). Under the circumstances, an award of Ten Thousand and no/100 ($10,000.00) Dollars for pain and suffering for plaintiff Darrell Danos for the injuries he received would seem to be reasonable. This award is sufficient, also, to compensate him for any mental anguish he may have suffered in connection with his own injuries. We reserve for later in these reasons plaintiff Darrell Danos' claim for the loss of the [sic] 'his unborn baby girl'.
"We turn now to damages to be awarded to Mrs. Gayle Danos for her pain and suffering. It was obvious from the medical testimony and evidence that her primary injury was a severe blow in the lower abdominal region, apparently caused by the steering wheel, as a result of the head-on collision. Since Mrs. Da-nos was experiencing abdominal pain and was approximately six (6) months pregnant, she was kept in the hospital, The Lady of the Sea in Galliano, Louisiana, from the date of the accident until August 30th. During this period she was taken to St. Ann Hospital in Raeeland, Louisiana, for examination and it was determined that the child she was carrying was dead. Dr. Frederick Cardwell, accepted as an expert in obstetrics and gynecology, saw her on August 27th, 1975, and he testified that the baby's death was caused by the accident. To the best of his recollection he advised Mrs. Danos and her mother-in-law that in his opinion the baby was dead at the time of this examination. On September 2nd she began having severe pains during the night and called her in-laws, who picked her up to take her to the hospital. When they put her on the stretcher in the parking lot, the dead child spontaneously ejected from the womb stillborn. In contradiction of Dr. Cardwell's testimony, both plaintiff Gayle Danos and her mother-in-law, Mrs. Eroy. Danos, testified that after the examination on August 27th the doctor had told only Mrs. Eroy Danos of his belief that the child was dead. With this conflicting testimony, it cannot conclusively be determined whether plaintiff Gayle Danos knew or did not know in advance that the child had been killed in the accident, but in assessing the measure of damages one situation would seem almost as mentally agonizing as the other. Is there a greater anxiety and mental suffering for a mother carrying her first child in her womb to know she is carrying a dead child, or since movement had ceased to wonder if she is carrying a dead child? Monetary compensation would seem woefully inadequate in either circumstance, but it is the only compensation that can be afforded. Considering the fact that this was her first child and that there were ten days of uncertainty preceding the stillborn delivery, coupled with the final knowledge that indeed she was to be denied the joy of motherhood at this time, an award of Twenty Thousand and no/100 ($20,000.00) Dollars for her pain and suffering and mental anxiety does not seem unreasonable to this court."
Based on the evidence in this case, any reduction of the awards granted Mr. and Mrs. Danos would simply be a substitution of our opinion as to proper quantum for that of the trial court. In view of the injuries sustained and the much discretion allowed the trier of fact in compensating such injuries, we find no manifest error in the awards. La.C.C. art. 1934(3); Coco v. Winston Industries, Inc., 341 So.2d 332 (La.1976); Beal v. New Orleans Public Service, 365 So.2d 1118 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1978).
DECREE
Therefore, for the above and foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial court rendered against Jenny L. Autin is reversed, and in all other respects, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed at defendants-appellants' costs.
REVERSED IN PART AND AFFIRMED IN PART.
ELLIS, LOTTINGER and PONDER, JJ., concur and assign written reasons.
CHIASSON and SARTAIN, JJ., concur for reasons assigned by ELLIS, J.
EDWARDS, J., concurs for the reasons assigned by ELLIS and PONDER, JJ.
COLE, J., concurs for reasons assigned by LOTTINGER, J.
COVINGTON, J., dissents in part, for reasons assigned and concurs in part.
. This action, Number 33,862 on the Docket of the Seventeenth Judicial District Court, was consolidated for trial with the following actions:
a. Nolan Ougel, Jr. versus Aetna Insurance Company, et al., Number 34,002.
b. Garrison J. Autin, et al. versus Aetna Life & Casualty Insurance Company, Number 35,-508.
c.Mr. and Mrs. Edward J. Rousse versus Terry St. Pierre, Number 34,672.
. Government Employees Insurance Company was originally named as a defendant (as an insurer of the Malbrough vehicle), but was dismissed on a peremptory exception.