Case Name: Lynda Russell SCHROEDER and Mark Stenstrom, etc., Appellants, v. Joyce F. JOHNSON, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1997-07-03
Citations: 696 So. 2d 498
Docket Number: No. 96-2843
Parties: Lynda Russell SCHROEDER and Mark Stenstrom, etc., Appellants, v. Joyce F. JOHNSON, Appellee.
Judges: GRIFFIN, C.J., concurs and concurs specially with opinion.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 696
Pages: 498–503

Head Matter:
Lynda Russell SCHROEDER and Mark Stenstrom, etc., Appellants, v. Joyce F. JOHNSON, Appellee.
No. 96-2843.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
July 3, 1997.
Thomas A. Speer of Thomas A. Speer, P.A., and George B. Wallace of George B. Wallace, P.A., Sanford, for Appellants.
R. Edward Cooley of Shepherd, McCabe & Cooley, Longwood, for Appellee.

Opinion:
COBB, Judge.
The appellee, Joyce Johnson, filed her complaint below seeking a declaratory judgment that a lease between herself and the Eleanor C. Russell Inter Vivos Trust provided for perpetual renewals. The lease was prepared by Johnson's attorney and executed by a prior trustee who, at the time, was in federal prison and dying of cancer. That trustee died several months after execution of the lease, and his testimony as to intent was not available at trial. The specific lease provision relied upon by Johnson is paragraph 6 which states:
Landlord does hereby grant to Tenant the right to extend this lease for successive five (5) year periods. Such right shall be executed by Tenant giving written notice of intent to exercise right of extension which written notice shall be delivered to Landlord by certified mail return receipt requested not less than ninety (90) days prior to the termination of the then existing rental.
The present trustees argue against any interpretation that the lease is "perpetual," and rely, inter alia, on the ease of Hutson v. Knabb, 212 So.2d 362 (Fla. 1st DCA 1968). In Hutson, the operative words of the lease provided for "an option of renewal every five years." The opinion, citing to Thompson on Real Property, Vol. Ill, section 1088, p. 313, observed that leases in perpetuity are not favored and will not be so construed unless the intention to give them that effect is expressed in unequivocal terms. The Hutson opinion quoted from 31 A.L.R.2d 607 at 610:
"As indicated by numerous eases discussed or referred to in § 3 to 7, inclusive, the courts are loath to construe a covenant for renewal as providing for more than one renewal after the expiration of the original lease, and the language of the lease with respect to renewal must indeed be clear and explicit to impel the court to construe the lease otherwise. Thus, in the absence of unambiguous terminology indicating the intention of the parties to provide for plural renewals, it is generally held that the covenant to renew is satisfied by one renewal, and does not require the insertion of a renewal clause in the instrument under which the lessee in holding subsequently to the expiration of the original lease. In other words, the term "renewal" imports a new lease for the same period of time and on the same terms, but without any covenant for a further extension."
Hutson, supra at 364.
The trustees also rely on language from the Florida Supreme Court case of Sisco v. Rotenberg, 104 So.2d 365, 368 (Fla.1958), which held that the argument that a plaintiffs exercise of his option to renew brought about a new contract with identical provisions of an old contract would have to fail since, "most courts have taken the view a covenant to renew is satisfied by one renewal thereof, due to their disfavor of perpetuities and perpetual leases" (cites omitted). See also Sheradsky v. Basadre, 452 So.2d 599, 603 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984), rev. denied, 461 So.2d 113 (1985).
Johnson asserts in her answer brief that the lease was ambiguous to the extent it did not specify the number of renewals contemplated by the parties, and was therefore subject to construction based on parol evidence. Based on testimony at trial, the trial court concluded that the parties intended that the tenant, Joyce F. Johnson, should have the right to renew the lease in five year intervals during her lifetime.
We agree with the appellant in respect to the term of the lease. Since there is no unambiguous and explicit language in the lease evincing the intent to grant perpetual renewals, or even renewals for Johnson's life, we hold that the lease provides for only two successive five-year renewals — ie., a maximum potential lease term of fifteen (15) years. See Sisco; Sheradsky; Hutson, supra.
In regard to the second issue raised on appeal, we affirm the trial court's construction of the provision in the contract dealing with rental proceeds.
AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; AND REMANDED.
GRIFFIN, C.J., concurs and concurs specially with opinion.
W. SHARP, J., concurs in part, dissents in part, with opinion.