Case Name: STAFFORD'S RESTAURANT OF BLOOMFIELD, INCORPORATED v. WEST BLOOMFIELD TOWNSHIP BOARD
Court: Michigan Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1978-04-17
Citations: 82 Mich. App. 607
Docket Number: Docket Nos. 77-41, 77-2411
Parties: STAFFORD’S RESTAURANT OF BLOOMFIELD, INCORPORATED v WEST BLOOMFIELD TOWNSHIP BOARD
Judges: Before: Beasley, P. J., and D. E. Holbrook, Jr. and M. J. Kelly, JJ.
Reporter: Michigan appeals reports; cases decided in the Michigan Court of Appeals.
Volume: 82
Pages: 607–620

Head Matter:
STAFFORD’S RESTAURANT OF BLOOMFIELD, INCORPORATED v WEST BLOOMFIELD TOWNSHIP BOARD
Docket Nos. 77-41, 77-2411.
Submitted November 2, 1977, at Detroit.
—Decided April 17, 1978.
Leave to appeal applied for.
Plaintiff, Stafford’s Restaurant of Bloomfield, Incorporated, applied for a class C liquor license approval of which was denied by the West Bloomfield Township Board because the area in question was "saturated” with taverns and bars, and because the hoard had a policy of allowing only "one license per mall”. Subsequently, the board approved an application for the transfer of an existing class C license to the area and an application, made prior to plaintiff’s, for a new license at a bowling alley located two-tenths of a mile from plaintiff. Again plaintiff applied for a liquor license, and again it was denied for the same reasons. Later, the board in review reaffirmed its denial. Plaintiff sought a restraining order preventing the depletion of the remaining available licenses and an order of superintending control requiring the defendants to approve the plaintiff’s application. The Oakland County Circuit Court, William John Beer, J., found that the board had not complied with its own procedure for granting licenses, ordered further proceedings by the township, and denied injunctive relief. Plaintiff appealed by leave granted. After further review by the township, plaintiff’s application was again denied, and the circuit court then dismissed plaintiff’s complaint. Plaintiff appeals that judgment, and the two appeals were consolidated, on the court’s own motion, for hearing and decision. Held:
1. The phrase "one license per mall” is impermissibly vague because what constitutes a mall is not defined, and further any claimed resolution under which it was applied was ineffective since it was not published according to law.
References for Points in Headnotes
[1] 45 Am Jur 2d, Intoxicating Liquors § 78.
45 Am Jur 2d, Intoxicating Liquors § 135.
45 Am Jur 2d, Intoxicating Liquors § 425.
45 Am Jur 2d, Intoxicating Liquors §§ 119, 135, 174, 175.
Grant or renewal of liquor license as affected by fact that applicant held such license in the past. 2 ALR2d 1239.
45 Am Jur 2d, Intoxicating Liquors §§ 163, 164.
45 Am Jur 2d, Intoxicating Liquors § 26.
45 Am Jur 2d, Intoxicating Liquors § 182.
Transfer of retail liquor license or permit from one location to another. 98 ALR2d 1123.
2. On remand, the township board should, if denial results, provide a statement of reasons for denial other than only “one license per mall”, and should define a “saturated area”.
3. The approval by the township board of a license transfer applied for by another party and the granting of a prior application for license to another party are inapplicable to the issue of the grant or denial of plaintiff’s applications.
Reversed and remanded to the township board for further proceedings.
Beasley, P. J., dissents on the ground that the phrase "one license per mall” is not impermissibly vague, and that to require a governing body to publish in advance every reason and standard that may be used in denying an application for a liquor license improperly shifts the burden of proof to the governing body to justify a denial. The Administrative Procedures Act does not apply to township boards acting on new liquor license applications. Judicial review of denial of applications for new liquor licenses should be very narrow and limited to cases in which the applicant sustains the heavy burden of proof of unmistakable discrimination or arbitrary and capricious abuse of discretion. Applicants for new liquor licenses are entitled to a fair exercise of discretion by the township board and nothing more.
Opinion op the Court
1. Intoxicating Liquors — Licenses—Local Legislative Bodies— Judicial Review.
The power of the local communities to control alcoholic beverage traffic is extremely broad, but does not permit local legislative bodies to act arbitrarily and capriciously, and when the local bodies conduct themselves in such a manner their actions are reviewable by the courts.
2. Towns — Township Board — Intoxicating Liquors — Licenses—License Applications — Vagueness.
A township board’s unpublished policy for consideration of liquor license applications allowing only "one license per mall” is impermissibly vague since what constitutes a mall is not defined.
3. Towns — Township Board — Intoxicating Liquors — Licenses— Local Legislative Bodies — Resolutions—Publication.
Failure to publish a resolution stating the policy of a township board in considering liquor license applications renders the resolution ineffective since failure to publish as required by law fails to establish a prima facie case for the existence and validity of the resolution (MCLA 600.2116; MSA 27A.2116).
Dissent by Beasley, P. J.
4. Intoxicating Liquors — Licenses—New Licenses — Renewals— Local Legislative Bodies — Discretion.
The discretion vested in local governing bodies with respect to applications for new, class C, tavern licenses is broader than where a question of renewal or revocation is involved.
5. Intoxicating Liquors — Licenses—Local Legislative Bodies— Discretion — Judicial Review — Burden of Proof.
The widest and broadest discretion should be left to the local governing body where an applicant for a liquor license seeks approval of the local governing body, and judicial review of its decision should be very narrow and very limited; a heavy burden of proof should be on the applicant to show unmistakable discrimination or arbitrary and capricious abuse of discretion.
6. Administrative Law — Intoxicating Liquors — Licenses—Local Legislative Bodies — Administrative Procedures Act.
The Administrative Procedures Act is inapplicable to a township board exercising its discretion in considering applications for new liquor licenses.
7. Statutes — Evidence—Prima Facie Evidence — Public Records— Townships — Resolutions—Validity—Statutory Construction.
A statute providing that a record or certiñed copy of a published resolution provides prima facie evidence of the existence and validity of the resolution is merely a rule of evidence simplifying admissibility into evidence of certain public records; it is not intended to and does not operate to switch the burden of proof of existence and validity of township resolutions to the township board (MCLA 600.2116; MSA 27A.2116).
8. Intoxicating Liquors — Towns—Township Boards — Licenses— Local Legislative Bodies — Discretion.
An applicant for a new liquor license is entitled to a fair exercise of discretion by a township board considering the application and nothing more.
9. Intoxicating Liquors — Licenses—New Licenses — Renewals— Abuse of Discretion.
The transfer of an existing liquor license to a new location is a different situation from the issuance of a new license, involving different statutory and other considerations; thus, approval of a transfer of a liquor license to a location near to the location of an applicant for a new license whose application is denied does not constitute arbitrary and capricious discrimination against the applicant.
10. Intoxicating Liquors — Towns—Township Boards — Licenses— Local Legislative Bodies — Policy—Vagueness.
The policy of a township board in considering applications for new liquor licenses to allow only "one license per mall" is not impermissibly vague.
Dennis G. Vatsis, for plaintiff.
Brennan & Bibeau, P. C. (by Teresa E. Schafer), for defendants.
Before: Beasley, P. J., and D. E. Holbrook, Jr. and M. J. Kelly, JJ.

Opinion:
M. J. Kelly, J.
Two cases are consolidated for this appeal.
Initially, plaintiff appeals by leave granted (Docket No. 77-41) from a November 3, 1976, Oakland County Circuit Court order that defendants refer plaintiff's application for a Class C liquor license to the planning commission and police department, and then to reconsider the application. This Court on April 11, 1977, restrained defendants from depleting the remaining quota of available liquor licenses pending further order of the Court.
Plaintiff also appeals from the trial court's final order of June 9, 1977 (Docket #77-2411) dismissing plaintiff's complaint for superintending control. This Court ordered the cases (77-41 & 77-2411) consolidated on July 7, 1977. The parties raise no issues in case No. 77-2411 that were not raised in case No. 77-41.
On June 27, 1975, plaintiff applied to the Michigan Liquor Control Commission (MLCC) for a Class C liquor license to be used at its Orchard Mall location in West Bloomfield Township. This application was referred by the MLCC to the West Bloomfield Township Board for its consideration.
The. board resolution outlining procedures for license determinations provides that the board shall refer all applications to the planning commission and the police department before reaching a decision. At trial, the township clerk testified that plaintiff's application had never been referred to the planning commission or to the police department. The attorney for the township, however, stipulated that the planning commission and the police department would not have objected to approval of the application. Local approval was ultimately denied.
The township clerk further testified that the basis for the decision was that there was already one establishment in the mall which had a liquor license. It was also the consensus of the seven board members that there were already too many licensed establishments in the area. She admitted that the "one license per mall" policy was not contained in the township resolution and that no study had been done to support the reasonableness of such a policy. According to the concise statement of facts, approval was denied because the area in and around the mall was "saturated" with taverns and bars. Only two establishments in the area had Class C licenses in June of 1975.
In June of 1976 the plaintiff reapplied, this time for a "tavern" license. Once again, the application was referred to the West Bloomfield Township Board. On July 20, 1976, the chairman of the township liquor license committee informed the plaintiff that the "one license per mall" policy had not changed. The board was also concerned about the concentration of taverns and bars in any given area of the township and felt that the intersection where Orchard Mall is located "had reached the saturation point". Plaintiff's attorneys appeared before the township board on September 7, 1976. Their attempt to seek review of the denial resulted in a reaffirmation of the denial.
On May 2, 1977, the township adopted new "liquor establishment requirements" with regard to local approval of liquor licenses. On May 18, 1977, plaintiff's original application again came before the board after being referred to the planning commission and police department in compliance with the lower court order of November 3, 1976. The application was denied a second time.
After denying plaintiff's original application, the board approved the transfer of an existing Class C license to Bloomfield Charlie's which bordered Orchard Mall. Also approved after June of 1975 was the granting of a new license to a bowling alley south of the Maple-Orchard Lake intersection, plaintiff being north. The application for the bowling alley had been submitted in 1972.
On appeal plaintiff challenges the township board resolution, which provides that the board shall have unlimited discretion concerning the approval of a new liquor license, as unconstitutionally overbroad. Furthermore, plaintiff claims the township board acted arbitrarily and capriciously in disapproving its application.
The Michigan Supreme Court has stated:
"[T]he power of the local communities to control alcoholic beverage traffic is extremely broad but does not permit local legislative bodies to act arbitrarily and capriciously and further, when the local bodies conduct themselves in such a manner their actions are reviewable by the courts."
Bundo v Walled Lake, 395 Mich 679, 700-701; 238 NW2d 154, 164 (1976). See MCLA 436.17; MSA 18.988. Plaintiff, however, must establish a showing of an abuse of discretion or an arbitrary exercise of power on the part of the township board. 395 Mich at 701.
The phrase "one license per mall" is impermissibly vague since what constitutes a mall is not defined. Furthermore, the township was required to publish the resolution under MCLA 42.8; MSA 5.46(8), and failed to do so. Cf. Mallchok v Liquor Control Commission, 72 Mich App 341; 249 NW2d 415 (1976). A record or certified copy of a published resolution would have provided "prima facie evidence of the existence and validity of such resolution ". MCLA 600.2116; MSA 27A.2116. Since the township has failed to publish as required by law, we hold it has failed to establish a prima facie case of the existence and validity of the resolution. The failure to publish renders the resolution ineffective.
The township denied the instant license relying on the resolution and also because the area had become "saturated". There is no evidence concerning what constitutes a saturated area. We, therefore, reverse and remand the case for further proceedings before the township board, and if denial results, for the board to provide a statement of reasons for denial of the license other than the "one license per mall" argument, and for a definition of "saturated area".
On remand, the board does not have to justify further the two liquor licenses which were given to other establishments in the same area after plaintiff was denied a license. The license given to Bloomfield Charlie's, aside from not being within the same mall, was a transfer of an existing license, and, therefore, inapplicable to the instant issue.
Furthermore, the liquor license granted to the bowling alley, some distance away from the Orchard Mall, was applied for by the bowling alley prior to plaintiff's instant application. The granting of that license also has little bearing on this case.
Reversed and remanded. Costs to the prevailing party on remand.
D. E. Holbrook, Jr., J., concurred.