Case Name: PETERS v. MICHIGAN BELL TELEPHONE COMPANY; MORRISH v. GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION
Court: Michigan Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1985-11-22
Citations: 423 Mich. 594
Docket Number: Docket Nos. 71928, 71931
Parties: PETERS v MICHIGAN BELL TELEPHONE COMPANY MORRISH v GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION
Judges: Levin, Cavanagh, and Boyle, JJ., concurred with Williams, C.J.
Reporter: Michigan Reports
Volume: 423
Pages: 594–631

Head Matter:
PETERS v MICHIGAN BELL TELEPHONE COMPANY MORRISH v GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION
Docket Nos. 71928, 71931.
Argued June 4, 1985
(Calendar Nos. 13, 14).
Decided November 22, 1985.
Patricia Peters was awarded workers’ compensation for a psychiatric disability suffered in the course of her employment as a telephone operator for the Michigan Bell Telephone Company. The Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board affirmed. The Court of Appeals, R. M. Maher, P.J., and V. J. Brennan and Hood, JJ., denied the defendant leave to appeal (Docket No. 68071). The defendant appeals.
Margaret E. Morrish was denied workers’ compensation for a psychiatric disability which she' claimed was related to her job with the General Motors Corporation. A hearing referee found that the plaintiff’s disability was not caused, aggravated, or contributed to by her employment. The Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board reversed. The Court of Appeals, Danhof, C.J., and Bronson, J. (Cynar, J., dissenting), denied the defendant leave to appeal (Docket No. 68564). The defendant appeals.
In an opinion by Chief Justice Williams, joined by Justices Levin, Cavanagh, and Boyle, the Supreme Court held:
The Legislature amended the statute at issue in these cases effective January 1, 1982. Because the Court has construed the statute as being applicable to personal injuries occurring after January 1, 1982 (ante, p 531), the Supreme Court declines to reexamine its interpretation of the statute’s predecessor because it is persuaded that it would be unwise to create potentially a third standard for determination of liability for alleged work-related mental disability. The cases are remanded to the Court of Appeals for consideration as on leave granted.
Justice Riley, dissenting, stated that in order to recover workers’ compensation benefits for alleged mental disability, a claimant should establish: by expert testimony by a preponderance of the evidence the existence of a mental disability; by a preponderance of the evidence that, as a matter of objective reality, the physical trauma, event or events which precipitated the mental disability actually occurred and that they were work-related; and by expert testimony by a preponderance of the evidence that the precipitating work-related physical trauma, event or events, to a substantial degree, aggravated, accelerated, or combined with some internal weakness or disease of the claimant to produce the mental disability.
References for Points in Headnotes
[1, 2] Am Jur 2d, Workmen’s Compensation §§ 301, 302.
Mental disorders as compensable under workmen’s compensation acts. 97 ALR3d 161.
[2] Am Jur 2d, Workmen’s Compensation § 528.
Admissibility of opinion evidence as to employability on issue of disability and health and accident insurance and workers’ compensation cases. 89 ALR3d 783.
1. The honest-perception standard which permitted compensation for mental disability where a claimant factually established a subjective, although mistaken, honestly perceived causal nexus between a mental disability and employment, although apparently viable at its inception, proved upon practical application not to be in accordance with the intent of the workers’ compensation act. As a result, a change in that area of the law is necessary. Mental disabilities can arise from a physical trauma, from a specific mental stimulus, or from mental stimuli over a period of time. By requiring expert testimony to establish by a preponderance of the evidence a substantial causal nexus between employment and a proven mental disability, the spirit and philosophy of the act will be carried out. Moreover, this standard will continue to uphold the long-standing principle of Michigan’s workers’ compensation law that employers must take employees as they find them.
2. In order to recover benefits for an alleged mental disability under the workers’ compensation act, a claimant should be disabled and should establish the disability by expert testimony by a preponderance of the evidence. In addition, the claimant should establish by a preponderance of the evidence, as a matter of objective reality, that a precipitating physical trauma, event or events actually occurred. Precipitating physical trauma, event or events are the "personal injury” as set forth in the workers’ compensation act. "Personal injury” includes physical trauma, an event, i.e., a mental stimulus, or events, i.e., mental stimuli over a period of time. Where a mental disability is alleged as a result of continuing stress of employment occurring over a period of time, general conclusions of stress and anxiety would not be satisfactory. There should be specific incidents, shown in enough detail for the factfinder to determine that the specific events actually occurred and that they were work-related. Further, it should be shown that the work-related physical trauma, event or events, to a substantial degree, aggravated or accelerated or combined with some internal weakness or disease of the claimant to produce the mental disability. Expert testimony should establish that the precipitating work-related physical trauma, event or events were stressful to the claimant and that there is a substantial causal nexus, the psychodynamics of which can be identified and elucidated by expert testimony to a reasonable degree of psychiatric certainty, between the precipitating work-related physical trauma, event or events and the mental disability. This standard would apply in all cases involving a mental disability where the date of the personal injury occurred prior to January 1, 1982, which have yet to be filed, have been filed but not yet heard by a hearing referee, or are currently pending and the issue was preserved for appeal.
Justice Ryan, joined by Justice Brickley, concurring in part and dissenting in part with Justice Riley, stated that while expert testimony may be necessary to establish a compensable mental disability, a rule should not be adopted which would automatically require such testimony per se. No provision of the workers’ compensation act, including the provision that regulates process and procedure before a hearing referee or the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board, can be interpreted as requiring introduction of expert testimony to prove a psychiatric disability claim. In addition, lay testimony has been permitted in medical malpractice cases where the lack of professional care is so manifest that it would be within the common knowledge and experience of a layman that the conduct was careless and not within the standards of professional practice and care employed in a community. Likewise, there is the possibility that a mental disability may be so clearly manifest that it could be established by lay testimony.
Dissenting Opinion by Riley, J.
1. Workers’ Compensation — Work-Related Injuries — Mental Disability.
In order to recover workers’ compensation beneSts for alleged mental disability, a claimant must establish: by expert testimony by a preponderance of the evidence the existence of a mental disability; by a preponderance of the evidence that, as a matter of objective reality, the physical trauma, event or events which precipitated the mental disability actually occurred and that they were work-related; and by expert testimony by a preponderance of the evidence that the precipitating work-related physical trauma, event or events, to a substantial degree, aggravated, accelerated, or combined with some internal weak ness or disease of the claimant to produce the mental disability (MCL 418.301[1]; MSA 17.237[301][1]).
Opinion by Ryan, J.
2. Workers’ Compensation — Work-Related Injuries — Mental Disability — Expert Testimony.
Expert testimony should not be required automatically to establish a compensable mental disability under the workers’ compensation act; no provision of the act can be interpreted as requiring such testimony to establish a psychiatric disability claim, and there is the possibility that a mental disability may be so clearly manifest that it could be established by lay testimony.
Sachs, Nunn, Kates, Kadushin, O’Hare, Helves-ton & Waldman, P.C. (by Granner S. Ries), for plaintiff Peters.
Robert M. Crites for plaintiff Morrish.
Lacey & Jones (by Stephen Jay Schwartz) for defendant Michigan Bell Telephone Company.
Conklin, Benham, McLeod, Ducey & Ottaway, P.C. (by Martin L. Critchell), John G. Rahie, Office of General Counsel, and Munroe & Nobach, P.C. (by Cameron C. McComb), for defendant General Motors Corporation.
Amicus Curiae:
Conklin, Benham, McLeod, Ducey & Ottaway, P.C. (by Martin L. Critchell), for Michigan Self-Insurers’ Association.

Opinion:
Williams, C.J.
The Court granted leave in these two cases in order to consider the legal standard to be applied in workers' compensation cases involving psychiatric disabilities related to employment. The Legislature has amended the relevant statute effective January 1, 1982. Because this Court today in Hurd v Ford Motor Co, 423 Mich 531; 377 NW2d 300 (1985), has construed this statute as applicable to "personal injuries occurring on or after January 1, 1982," we decline to reexamine our interpretation of the earlier statute in Deziel v Difco Laboratories, Inc (After Remand), 403 Mich 1; 268 NW2d 1 (1978).
Facts
A. Peters v Michigan Bell Telephone Co
The plaintiff worked as a telephone operator for the defendant from November, 1967, until September, 1977. In September 1978, the plaintiff filed a claim for workers' compensation benefits, alleging a nervous and emotional disorder, aggravation of hypertension, and an aggravation of an injury to the heart, circulatory system, and central nervous system.
Plaintiff was awarded benefits by the hearing referee in 1980, and, on October 29, 1982, the wcab, citing Deziel, affirmed the award with a minor modification. The Court of Appeals denied the defendant's application for leave to appeal from the decision of the board. In an order dated September 19, 1984, this Court granted leave to appeal.
B. Morrish v General Motors Corp
Plaintiff Morrish worked for General Motors from February, 1969, until January, 1978. Subsequently, Morrish filed a workers' compensation claim, alleging a psychiatric disability caused by incidents at work. The hearing referee, on February 4, 1980, determined that there was no causal nexus between plaintiff's disability and her employment. On November 19, 1982, the Workers' Compensation Appeal Board reversed the decision of the hearing referee and awarded benefits. The. Court of Appeals denied defendant's application for leave to appeal on May 25, 1983. In an order dated September 19, 1984, this Court granted defendant's application for leave to appeal.
Discussion
In Deziel, this Court considered the compensability of mental disorders under the existing statute, MCL 418.301(1); MSA 17.237(301X1). In interpreting the statutory requirement that compensable injuries must arise "out of and in the course of' employment, we developed a three-step analysis. This analysis required findings that
1) the claimant was disabled;
2) an injury in the form of a precipitating work-related event had occurred;
3) using a subjective causal nexus standard, the employment had combined with some internal weakness or disease to produce the disability.
Deziel, p 37.
The relevant statute was subsequently changed by the Legislature, 1980 PA 357, MCL 418.301(2); MSA 17.237(301X2), effective January 1, 1982.
Conclusion
In light of the legislative action, we decline to reexamine our interpretation in Deziel as we are persuaded that it would be unwise to create potentially a third standard for the determination of the complex question of liability for alleged work-re lated mental disability. These cases are remanded to the Court of Appeals as on leave granted for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
Levin, Cavanagh, and Boyle, JJ., concurred with Williams, C.J.
"Mental disabilities and conditions of the aging process, including but not limited to heart and cardiovascular conditions, shall be compensable if contributed to or aggravated or accelerated by the employment in a significant manner. Mental disabilities shall be compensable when arising out of actual events of employment, not unfounded perceptions thereof."