Case Name: PIGORSH v. FAHNER
Court: Michigan Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1972-02-25
Citations: 386 Mich. 508
Docket Number: No. 27; Docket No. 52,822
Parties: PIGORSH v FAHNER
Judges: T. M. Kavanagh, C. J., and Black, Adams, T. G. Kavanagh, and Swainson, JJ., concurred.
Reporter: Michigan Reports
Volume: 386
Pages: 508–531

Head Matter:
PIGORSH v FAHNER
Opinion op the Court
1. Courts—Stare Decisis—Property Rights—Precedents.
Stare decisis is not limited to precedents involving property rights and although courts are not compelled to follow so-called “rules of property” the doctrine is more strictly followed where property rights, especially rights in real property, are concerned and where rights have become vested in reliance on the precedents.
2. Waters and Water Courses—Inland Lakes—Subaqueous Land —Navigable Waters.
One who is owner in fee of all of the upland surrounding one of Michigan’s wholly private inland lakes, a lake having no navigable inlet and no navigable outlet, really owns the subaqueous land of the lake and the water over the latter as well as the upland, and his property right is such that he may exclude all others from the lake, the general public included; the size of the lake matters not nor does it matter that such a wholly private lake is navigable in fact.
References for Points in Headnotes
[1] 20 Am Jur 2d, Courts § 196.
[2-4, 23] 56 Am Jur, Waters § 51.
Title to beds of natural lakes or ponds. 23 ALR 757 s. 112 ALR 1108.
5, 6, 9,14,15,19, 20] 58 Am Jur, Waters § 178 et seq.
7] 58 Am Jur, Waters § 207 et seq.
'8] 58 Am Jur, Waters § 3.
'10-13] 58 Am Jur, Waters §§ 51, 54.
16] 58 Am Jur, Waters §§ 216, 273 et seq.
17, 21] 58 Am Jur, Waters § 2Í6.
Rights, privileges, or easements of public, its grantees or licensees, on land bordering on navigable water. 53 ALR 1191.
[18] 58 Am Jur, Waters § 188.
58 Am Jur, Waters §§ 274, 405 et seq.
3. Waters and Water Courses—Inland Lakes—Statutes—Constitutional Law.
Inland Lakes and Streams Act of 1965, if construed and applied to abrogate the rule of property that one who is owner in fee of all the upland surrounding a private inland lake, having no navigable inlet and outlet, really owns the subaqueous land of the lake and the water over the latter as well as the upland, and his property right is such that he may exclude all others from the lake, the general public included, would collide with and fall before the constitutional provision that private property may not be taken without just compensation (Const 1963, art 10, § 2; MOLA 281.731 et seq.).
Concurring Opinion
Black, J.
See headnotes 1-3.
4. Injunction—Inland Lakes—Trespass.
Plaintiff owners of a lake and all the riparian environs thereof, to which the public has no lawful right of access, are entitled to injunctive relief against the continuing trespass all defendants have threatened.
Dissenting Opinion
T. B. Brennan, J.
5. Navigable Waters—Rivers—Streams—Lakes—Navigable in Tact—Navigable in Law.
Rivers, streams, and lakes which are navigable in fact are navigable in law.
6. Navigable Waters—Waters and Water Courses.
A water course when navigable remains so even after the public convenience and necessity giving rise to its appropriation as a highway ceases.
7. Navigable Waters—Waters and Water Courses—Public Waters—Public Bights.
The public has certain rights in navigable waters which are incident to their status as publie waters and these rights abide, even after the initial commercial use has long since lapsed and even though the incidental publie rights, standing alone, might not have sufficed to warrant a declaration of navigability in the first instance.
8. Words and Phrases—Inland Lakes—Waters and Water Courses
“Inland lake” means any lake other than the Great Lakes, located completely within the State of Michigan.
9. Navigable Waters—Inland Lakes.
Certain factors, which have seemed to bear on navigability as to inland lakes, are: meander line; inlet and outlet; public
access; boatability;-prior commercial use; size.
10. Waters and Water Courses-—Meander Line—Inland Lakes— Land Patents.
A meander line is simply a surveyor’s line and, when used in connection with inland lakes, it refers to a line run by the government land office surveys, upon which titles to Michigan real estate were originally patented to individual owners by the United States.
11. Boundaries-—Meander Line.
Michigan does not regard a meander line as a boundary; meander lines were merely a means of computing the acreage in the uplands.
12. Waters and Water Courses—Littoral Owners—Biparian Owners—Subaqueous Lands—Meandered Lakes—Boundaries —Bottom Land.
That littoral or riparian owners take title to subaqueous lands is too well settled at this point in time to question; the only distinction between meandered and nonmeandered lakes being that in the former, the riparian owners take title to the center of the lake along pie-shaped extensions of their shoreline boundaries—while in the latter case, the riparian owner takes title only to the bottom land lying within the description conveyed to him.
13. Navigable Waters—Meander Line.
The existence of a meander line has not been regarded as conclusive of navigability; in fact, it seems to have little bearing on the question.
14. Navigable Waters—Navigable Outlet—Navigable Inlet—Inland Lakes—Boatability.
Outlet and inlet are very important, at least from the standpoint of an affirmative finding of navigability as, if an inland lake has a navigable inlet or outlet, and if the lake itself is passable or boatable, it seems obvious that the lake forms a part of the aquatie highway and is navigable.
15. Navigable Waters—Fish—Conservation Laws—Land Rights.
Movement of fish has never been the basis of a holding of
navigability; the state, under the conservation laws, can stock private waters with fish without the consent of the owner but fish planting can hardly be made the basis of determining rights in land.
16. Waters and Water Courses—Riparian Owner—Licensees— Lakes—Navigable Waters—Public Access.
The right of every riparian owner to permit limitless numbers of licensees to go upon the whole lake, irrespective of the proportion of his shoreline ownership is undisputed but this does not change the character of the lake as, if the lake is inherently a navigable body of water, he merely makes its use by the public more convenient or possible without antecedent trespass or license from some other littoral owner and if the lake is not inherently a navigable body of water, he does not make it so by providing access to the public.
17. Trespass—Private Lands—Navigable Waters.
The public has no right to trespass upon privately owned uplands or fast lands; but in navigable waters, antecedent trespass as a means of access will not render the boater, or fisherman a continuing trespasser, once he has entered the water.
18. Navigable Waters — Boatability — Floatability — Inland Lakes.
Boatability, or floatability is obviously an essential factor in determining the navigability of an inland lake and, whatever other factors must be present, an inland lake must be boat-able to be navigable.
19. Navigable Waters—Inland Lakes—Size op Lake.
The factor most reliable im, determining the navigability of inland lakes is size.
20. Navigable Waters—Inland Lakes—Size op Lake—Natural Lakes—Boatability—Public Bights.
Classification of navigability of inland lakes between those of less and those of more than ten acres has sufficient basis in history and reason to warrant application in Michigan; that measure recognises that 5,466 of Michigan’s 7,661 inland lakes are of such size that, assuming they are natural bodies and conceding a bootable surface, they constitute the substance of the recreational and navigational heritage of all of the people of the state, to be preserved and maintained against pollution, destruction, impairment or expropriation for private gain to the exclusion of public right.
21. Navigable Waters—-Trespass—-Public Access.
Navigability alone does not invite any right of free public access; trespass upon adjoining uplands has never been and is not now permitted under Michigan law.
22. Navigable Waters—Inland Lakes—Inchoate Public Trust.
A navigable inland lake, even though all of its shoreline and its bottom land be owned by a single private proprietor, is nonetheless impressed with an inchoate public trust, and it may no more be polluted or destroyed than the air above it.
23. Navigable Waters—Waters and Water Courses—Inland Lakes and Streams Act—Injunction.
The Inland Lakes and Streams Act applies to the waters of Wood Lake, a natural body of water comprising approximately 70 acres which has no Inlet and no outlet and is entirely surrounded by plaintiffs’ property, and an appropriate mandatory injunction should be entered for the removal of plaintiffs’ unlawful partial filling thereof (MCLA 281.731 et seq.)
Appeal from Court of Appeals, Division 3, J. H. Gillis, P. J., and R. B. Burns and Y. J. Brennan, JJ., affirming Montcalm, William R. Peterson, J.
Submitted May 6, 1971.
(No. 27
April Term 1971,
Docket No. 52,822.)
Decided February 25, 1972.
22 Mich App 108 affirmed.
Complaint by Walter G. Pigorsh, Ruth Pigorsh, James H. McMullen and Doris G. McMullen against Sheldon Fahner, August Bradley, Harry Carlson, Ben Wall, and the Township Board of Township of Pierson to enjoin trespassing on the lands of plaintiffs and injuring plaintiffs’ property. The Conservation Department of the State of Michigan intervened as defendant and cross-claimed to restrain plaintiffs from further construction of a barrier on their property and to require removal thereof. Judgment for plaintiffs. Defendant Conservation Department appealed to the Court of Appeals. Affirmed. Defendant Conservation Department appeals.
Affirmed.
Boyles $ Van Orden, for plaintiffs.
Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Robert A. Derengoski, Solicitor General, and Jerome Maslowski, Assistant Attorney General, for defendant Conservation Department.

Opinion:
Pee Cueiam.
Upon leave granted (383 Mich 795) we review and affirm the respective judgments of the circuit court and of the Court of Appeals. For those judgments and the presently mentioned factual findings of both courts, see 22 Mich App 108.
Decisions establishing the "rule of property" which of right control disposition of this case were gathered in Putnam v Kinney, 248 Mich 410 (1929). Putnam is "on all fours" here. These decisions go back to the simple proposition that one who is owner in fee of all of the upland surrounding one of our wholly private inland lakes, a lake having no navigable inlet and no navigable outlet, (a) really owns the subaqueous land of the lake and the water over the latter as well as the upland, and (b) that his property right is such that he may exclude all others from the lake, the general public included. All this cannot be gainsaid, nor is it denied. Ás against the successive and fully supported factual findings below the Attorney General responds simply that plaintiffs' Wood Lake is at least navigable in fact and that the "Inland Lakes and Streams Act" of 1965 (No 291 [MCLA 281.731 et seq.; MSA 11.451 et seq.] amended since institution of this litigation by 1968 PA 7), with its declared applicability to "any navigable inland lake or stream," has abrogated Putnam's rule of property.
Our holding is that the act of 1965, so construed and applied, would collide with and fall before § 2 of article 10 of our Constitution. Guided by a familiar rule, we prefer to impute to the legislature an absence of intention to take in such manner private property "without just compensation therefor". The applicable rule of construction appeared first in Van Fleet v Van Fleet, 49 Mich 610 (1883) and will be found echoed in a consistent list of cases appearing as § 117 and 118 of 16 Callaghan's Michigan Digest, Statutes, pp 499-502 and 1971 Cum Supp at pp 166-167.
The size of Wood Lake (74 area acres) matters not. Nor does it matter that such a wholly private lake is navigable in fact. The stated rule of property applies to a privately owned inland lake as large as six mile long Lake St. Helen (St. Helen Shooting Club v Mogle, 234 Mich 60 [1926]) and extends to one smaller than Wood Lake, such as 20-25 acre Giddings Lake (Giddings v Rogalewski, 192 Mich 319 [1916]).
Two ably considered and visibly painstaking opinions of this case were prepared and filed below. The first was written by Circuit Judge Peterson, sitting -in the 8th circuit, wherein Wood Lake is situated. The other was prepared by Court of Appeals Judge V. J. Brennan, for Division 3. The contemplative and discerning reader of Judge Peterson's opinion, consisting as it does of 28 printed pages, and then of the fully consistent and equally level-headed opinion of Division 3, can but conclude that each of the courts below stands for sturdy adherence to the necessary stability of property law and for the due protection of plaintiffs' vested and mature property right.
Affirmed. Costs of all courts to plaintiffs.
T. M. Kavanagh, C. J., and Black, Adams, T. G. Kavanagh, and Swainson, JJ., concurred.
Williams, J., concurred in the result.
Ҥ 196. Property rights.
"Although stare decisis is not limited to precedents involving property rights, and although courts are not compelled to follow so-called 'rules of property/ the doctrine of stare decisis is more strictly followed where property rights, especially rights in real property, are concerned and where rights have become vested in reliance on the precedents." (20 Am Jur 2d, Courts, pp 531, 532).
This of course is the Michigan rule. Lewis v Sheldon, 103 Mich 102, 103 (1894); Pleasant Lake Sills Corp v Eppinger, 235 Mich 174 (1926); Dolby v State Highway Commissioner, 283 Mich 609, 615 (1938).
"We cannot properly hold that the Legislature designed to commit such an act of injustice as to take away vested rights and destroy valuable existing interests. We are bound, if possible, so to construe statutes as to give them validity and a reasonable operation." (Justice Campbell, writing in Van Fleet at 613.)
"In the construction of statutes courts should lean towards that construction which will give the statute force, validity, not to that construction which will nullify it." (Justice Fellows, writing for the Court in Thomas Canning Co v Southern Pacific Co, 219 Mich 388, 400 [1922]).