Case Name: Joyce HERTZ, Appellant-Plaintiff, v. SCHOOL CITY OF EAST CHICAGO, Appellee-Defendant
Court: Court of Appeals of Indiana
Jurisdiction: Indiana
Decision Date: 2001-02-06
Citations: 744 N.E.2d 484
Docket Number: No. 45A04-0004-CV-162
Parties: Joyce HERTZ, Appellant-Plaintiff, v. SCHOOL CITY OF EAST CHICAGO, Appellee-Defendant.
Judges: MATTINGLY, J., concurs.
Reporter: North Eastern Reporter 2d
Volume: 744
Pages: 484–490

Head Matter:
Joyce HERTZ, Appellant-Plaintiff, v. SCHOOL CITY OF EAST CHICAGO, Appellee-Defendant.
No. 45A04-0004-CV-162.
Court of Appeals of Indiana.
Feb. 6, 2001.
Andrew A. Crosmer, Rubino & Crosmer, Munster, IN, Attorney for Appellant.
Bruce P. Clark, Stacy J. Vasilak, Bruce P. Clark & Associates, Munster, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.

Opinion:
OPINION
ROBB, Judge
Joyce Hertz appeals the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of School City of East Chicago (the "school"). We reverse.
Issues
Hertz raises the following restated issues for our review:
1. Whether the school was entitled to summary judgment because as a governmental entity, it was immune from suit pursuant to Indiana Code section 84-13-3-8.
2. Whether the school was entitled to summary judgment because as a governmental entity, it was entitled to common law sovereign immunity.
Facts and Procedural History
The facts most favorable to the non-movant reveal that Hertz is employed as a teacher by the school. On February 1, 1997, Hertz arrived at the school to attend a wrestling meet. As she crossed the parking lot, she slipped and fell. She fell a second time on the sidewalk leading to the school. There was an accumulation of ice and snow on both the parking lot and the sidewalk of the school. As a result of the two falls, Hertz was injured.
On September 10, 1998, Hertz filed a complaint against the school alleging that she was injured as a result of the school's negligence. Thereafter, the school filed a motion for summary judgment claiming that it was statutorily immune under the Indiana Tort Claims Act from Herts's claim of negligence. Following a hearing, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the school. This appeal ensued.
Discussion and Decision
I. Standard of Review for Summary Judgment
We employ the same standard used by the trial court when reviewing the grant or denial of summary judgment. Dague v. Fort Wayne Newspapers, Inc., 647 N.E.2d 1138, 11839 (Ind.Ct.App.1995), trans. denied. "Summary judgment is appropriate only when the evidentiary matter designated by the parties shows that there are no genuine issues as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Id. at 1139-40 (citing Ind. Trial Rule 56(C)). Although our analysis proceeds from the premise that summary judgment is rarely appropriate in negligence actions, "a defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law when the undisputed material facts negate at least one element of the plaintiff's claims." Colen v. Pride Vending Serv., 654 N.E.2d 1159, 1162 (Ind.Ct.App.1995), trans. denied. A trial court's grant of summary judgment is "clothed with a presumption of validity" on appeal, and the appellants bear the burden of demonstrating that the trial court erred. Id. Nevertheless, we must carefully serutinize the trial court's decision to ensure that Herts was not improperly denied his day in court. See id.
Therefore, on appeal, we must determine whether the record reveals a genuine issue of material fact and whether the trial court correctly applied the law. Shuamber v. Henderson, 579 N.E.2d 452, 454 (Ind.1991). A fact is material if it facilitates the resolution of any of the issues involved. State Street Duffy's, Inc. v. Loyd, 628 N.E.2d 1099, 1100 (Ind.Ct.App.1993), trans. denied. Any doubt as to a fact, or an inference to be drawn, is resolved in favor of the non-moving party. Malachowski v. Bank One, Indianapolis, 590 N.E.2d 559, 562 (Ind.1992).
II. Statutory Immunity
Hertz contends that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the school because the governmental entity was not entitled to immunity under Indiana Code section 34-183-3-3. We agree.
Governmental immunity from suit is regulated by Indiana Code sections 34-13-1-1 through 34-13-6-7, (the "Act"). Pursuant to the Act, governmental entities are subject to liability for torts committed by their agencies or employees unless one of the immunity provisions of the Act applies. Scott v. City of Seymour, 659 N.E.2d 585, 588 (Ind.Ct.App.1995). The entity seeking immunity bears the burden of proving that its conduct falls within one of the exceptions set out in the Act. Id. Because the Act is in derogation of the common law, it is narrowly construed against the grant of immunity. Jacobs v. Board of Comm'rs of Morgan County, 652 N.E.2d 94, 98 (Ind.Ct.App.1995), trans. denied. Whether a governmental entity is immune from Hability is a question of law for the courts, although it may include an extended factual development. Peavier v. Board of Comm'rs of Monrce County, 528 N.E.2d 40, 46 (Ind.1988). The relevant immunity provision in the Act provides in pertinent part that: Ind.Code § 34-13-3-3(8). We have previously held that Indiana Code section 34-13-3-3 is a codification of a governmental entity's common law duty to exercise reasonable care and diligence to keep its streets and sidewalks in a reasonably safe condition for travel. Walton v. Ramp, 407 N.E.2d 1189, 1191 (Ind.Ct.App.1980).
A government entity or an employee acting within the seope of the employee's employment is not liable if a loss results from: . the temporary condition of a public thoroughfare that results from weather.
We believe that the determination of whether the school was entitled to summary judgment hinges on whether the ice and snow accumulation on the school's parking lot and sidewalk was a "temporary" condition within the meaning of Indiana Code section 34-18-8-8. "Temporary" is the opposite of permanent. State v. Curtis, 241 Ind. 507, 173 N.E.2d 652, 653 (1961). However, the definition of temporary is not so broad as to include everything that is not permanent. Van Bree v. Horrison County, 584 N.BE.2d 1114, 1117 (Ind.Ct.App.1992), trans. denied. Recently, this court examined the term "temporary" as contained in Indiana Code section 34-18-3-8. Catt v. Board of Comm'rs of Knox County, 736 N.E.2d 341 (Ind.Ct.App.2000). In Caft, the plaintiff was injured when he drove into a ditch where a culvert had existed but had been washed away by heavy rainfall. Id. at 344. The culvert had washed away several times prior to the date of the plaintiff's accident. Id. at 346. Consequently, the plaintiff filed suit against the governmental unit alleging negligence in the inspection, design, and maintenance of the culvert. Id. at 344. Thereafter, the governmental unit moved for summary judgment on the basis that it was statutorily immune under the Act pursuant to Indiana Code section 34-13-3-3. Id. We stated that:
[A] determination of whether a condition is 'temporary' as set forth in Indiana Code section 34-13-3-8 hinges on the unique factual cireumstances of a case; a 'bright line test' is inapplicable for purposes of this analysis. Id. at 845. For example, inclement weather, such as heavy rainfall, may temporarily cause a roadway or bridge to be dangerous or impassable for motorists because of flooding. However, if this condition is due to poor inspection, design, or maintenance of the thoroughfare then the condition of the thoroughfare could be considered 'permanent' under Indiana Code section 34-13-3-8.
Id. at 346. After examining the designated materials, we reversed the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the governmental unit. Id. at 847.
In opposition to the school's motion for summary judgment, Hertz designated her deposition that established that on February 1, 1997, she suffered injuries when she fell due to the icy condition of the school's parking lot and sidewalk. R. 97, 78. In addition, Hertz designated the deposition of Victor Sanchez, the maintenance supervisor of the school, which established that there was no precipitation on February 1, 1997, and that the last day it had snowed was on January 26, 1997. Thus, a significant time period existed between the accumulation of snow and ice and Hertz's fall on the parking lot and sidewalk of the school. Therefore, we believe that Hertz's designated materials are sufficient to raise an issue of fact with respect to the school's contention that the sole and proximate cause of Hertz's injuries was the "temporary" condition of the parking lot and sidewalk caused by the snow and ice. Because the school failed to satisfy its burden of proof that no genuine issue of material fact exists, we believe that the trial court erred in concluding that the school was entitled to statutory sovereign immunity.
III Common Law Sovereign Immunity
Hertz also contends that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the school because the governmental unit was not entitled to common law sovereign immunity. We agree.
Because the school is not entitled to immunity under the Act, we must now examine whether common law sovereign immunity shields the school from tort liability. Common law sovereign immunity has long been recognized in Indiana. See eg., Perkins v. State, 252 Ind. 549, 251 NE.2d 30, 32 (1969). Recently, the Indiana Supreme Court clarified the doe-trine of common law sovereign immunity in Benton v. City of Oakland City, Indiana, 721 N.E.2d 224 (Ind.1999). The Court stated that "the duty owed to a private individual" was nothing more than a "duty to use reasonable care" and that a governmental unit is bound by the same duty of care as a private individual, exeept in a few limited cireumstances. Id. at 228, 230. The Court in Benton listed three cireumstances where a governmental unit could invoke common law sovereign immunity, these being: (1) where a city or state fails to provide adequate police protection to prevent crime; (2) where a state official makes an appointment of an individual whose incompetent performance gives rise to a suit alleging negligence on the part of state official for making such an appointment; and (8) where judicial decision-making is challenged. Id. at 230. Thereafter, this court held that the failure to provide fire protection should be treated as an exception to governmental tort liability. Gates v. Town of Chandler, Water Dept., 725 N.E.2d 117, 120 (Ind.Ct.App.2000). Therefore, "the current presumption in Indiana is that governmental units are liable for any breach of a duty owed to a private individual exeept for such claims as a failure to prevent crime, inadequate fire protection, appointment of an incompetent official, or an incorrect judicial decision." St. John Town Bd. v. Lambert, 725 N.E.2d 507, 514 (Ind.Ct.App.2000).
We believe that the school was not entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law after applying Indiana common law sovereign immunity to the facts of the present case. As discussed earlier, all governmental units are bound, both directly and under the theory of respondeat superior, by the common law duty to use ordinary and reasonable care under the cireumstances except for a few exceptions not applicable here. Under the common law, a governmental entity is not generally liable for injuries caused by defects in sidewalks and streets due to natural accumulation of snow and ice. City of South Bend v. Fink, 189 Ind.App. 282, 219 N.E.2d 441, 448 (1966). However, a city could be held liable under the common law for failure to remove snow and ice if it could be shown that the snow and ice were an obstruction to travel and that the city had an opportunity to remove the snow and ice. Ewald v. City of South Bend, 104 Ind.App. 679, 12 N.E.2d 995, 997 (1988). Ordinance 12.24.040 of the Municipal Code of East Chicago provides that:
Every owner, lessee, tenant, occupant or other person having charge of any building or lot of ground in the city abutting upon any public way shall remove the snow and ice on the sidewalk in front of the building or lot of ground. If the sidewalk is of greater width than six feet, it shall not be necessary for such person to remove snow or ice for a space wider than six feet.
In case the snow and ice on the sidewalk shall be frozen so hard that it cannot be removed without injury to the pavement, the person having charge of any building or lot of ground as foresaid shall, within the time specified, cause the sidewalk abutting on such premises to be strewn with ashes, sand, sawdust, or some similar suitable material and shall, as soon thereafter as the weather shall permit, thoroughly clean such sidewalk.
The snow which falls or accumulates during the day (excepting Sundays) before four p.m. shall be removed within three hours after the same has fallen or accumulated. The snow which falls or accumulates on Sunday or after four p.m. and during the night on other days shall be removed before ten a.m. in the following morning. (Prior code § 41-30).
Thus, we believe the school had a duty to the general public, including Hertz, to use reasonable care in removing ice and snow from its public thoroughfares within the time limits proscribed by the City of East Chicago's municipal ordinance. Because the school had a duty to Hertz, because this duty does not fit within one of the limited circumstances in which the governmental unit may invoke common law sovereign immunity, and because the school is not entitled to immunity under the Act, we believe that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the school.
Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, we hold that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the school because the governmental unit was not entitled to either common law or statutory sovereign immunity.
Reversed.
MATTINGLY, J., concurs.
MATHIAS, J., dissents with opinion.
. Formerly Indiana Code section 34-4-16.5-3.
, We agree with the dissent that Heriz has not alleged thai the parking lot and sidewalk were defectively designed. However, unlike the dissent, we believe it is a question for the fact finder whether the school's parking lot and sidewalk remained a "temporary condition" in light of the allegations that the school had failed to act in a timely manner as provided in the statute and local ordinance in not removing the ice and snow which had accu mulated and caused the thoroughfares to become slick, and thus defective.