Case Name: Ontario Knitting Company, Appellant, v. The State of New York, Respondent
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1911-11-15
Citations: 147 A.D. 316
Docket Number: 
Parties: Ontario Knitting Company, Appellant, v. The State of New York, Respondent.
Judges: 
Reporter: Appellate Division Reports
Volume: 147
Pages: 316–335

Head Matter:
Ontario Knitting Company, Appellant, v. The State of New York, Respondent.
Third Department,
November 15, 1911.
Eminent domain — public use — power of court — condemnation of land for barge cañal — powers of ptate Engineer when appropriating land — condemnation of land not necessary to' construction of canal — change of plans — approval of Superintendent of Public Works necessary — authority of public officer—claimant chargeable with knowledge of law.
Where the original map of the barge canal as made by the State Engineer did not appropriate certain adjoining lands, the State Engineer had no authority subsequently to alter the map so as to appropriate -the lands without the approval of the Superintendent of Public Works, as required by section 6 of the Barge Canal Act, nor without the consent of the Canal Board, where the change enhanced the cost to the State.
The owner of lands appropriated by the change of plan, being chargeable with knowledge of the law, was bound to know that no change in the maps could be made so as to appropriate his land without the consent ■ of the Superintendent of Public Works.
Whoever deals with a public officer is chargeable with knowledge of his powers.
(Per Kellogg and Sewell, JJ.): Where lands are to be taken by eminent domain, the court may determine whether or no the use for which they are taken is a public use. •
Although the Barge Canal Act authorizes the State Engineer to' appropriate lands for the use of the improved canals and for the purpose of construction, and to make a map of the lands to be appropriated to be filed with the Superintendent of Public Works, a determination made in good faith as to the necessity for the. appropriation of lands, and the exercise of a sound discretion, are conditions precedent to his right to condemn. ' -
It seems, that where there is a reasonable basis for the determination of the State Engineer in .condemning lands for the construction of the barge canal, the courts will not assert then own judgment as to the necessity for the condemnation against that of the State' Engineer. Appeal from a judgment of the Court of Claims in an action against the . State brought by a mill owner to recover damages alleged to have been suffered by reason of loss, of business, etc., owing to the fact that a special Deputy .State Engineer filed a map permanently appropriating the claimant’s lands for canal uses, which appropriation was made without the approval of the*Canal Board or Superintendent of Public Works. Evidence examined, and held, that the 'claimant’s property was not necessary for the construction of the canal, and that the act of the engineer in appropriating it was arbitrary, capricious and without exercise of judgment, so that the claimant was not entitled to recovery.
Smith, P. J., and Betts, J., dissented, with opinion.
Appeal, by the plaintiff, the Ontario Knitting Company, from a judgment of the Court of Claims of the State of New York in favor of the defendant, entered in the office of the clerk of said court on the 26th day of September, 1910, dismissing the plaintiff’s claim.
The Barge Canal Act, so called (Laws of 1903, chap. 147), in its 3d section designated the general route of the improved canals and directed the Superintendent of Public Works and the State Engineer to improve them in the manner indicated. (See, also, Id. § 3, as amd. by Laws of 1905, chap. 740, and Laws of 1907,-chap. 710.) Section 4, as amended by chapter 365 of the Laws of 1906, provided: “The State Engineer may enter upon, take possession of and use lands, structures and waters, the appropriation of which for the use of the improved canals and for the purposes of the work and improvement authorized by this act, shall in his judgment be necessary. An accurate survey and'map of all such lands shall be made by the State Engineer, who shall annex thereto his certificate that the lands therein described have been appropriated for the use of the canals of the State.” Such map, survey and certificate, are to be filed in his office, and a duplicate certified by him filed in the office of the Superintendent of Public Works, which latter officer is to serve upon the owner a notice of the filing of the. map, the survey and certificate in his office, and thereupon “ the entry upon and the appropriation by the State of the real property therein described for the purposes of .the work and improvement provided for by this act, shall. be deemed complete, and such notice so served shall be conclusive evidence of such entry and appropriation and of the quantity and boundaries of the lands appropriated.” Section 6 required all work to be done by contract, and that the State Engineer divide the canal into sections, make maps, plans and specifications for the work to be done and the material furnished for each section, with a detailed estimate of the cost, and a statement thereof, with the maps, plans and specific?- tions when adopted by the Canal Board, shall be filed in his ■ office and the office of the Superintendent of Public Works, and publicly exhibited to every person proposing or desiring to make a proposal for such‘work. It further provided: “No alteration shall be made in any- such map, plan or specification, or the plan of any work.under contract during its progress, except with the consent and approval of the Superintendent of Public Works and the State Engineer, nor unless a description of such alteration and such approval be in writing and signed by the parties making the same and a copy thereof filed in the office of the State Engineer. No change of plan or specification which will increase the expense of any such work or create any claim against the State for damage arising therefrom shall be 'made unless a written statement, setting forth the object of' the change, its character, amount and the expense thereof, is submitted to the Canal Board, and their assent thereto at a meeting when the State Engineer was present is obtained.” (See, also, Laws of 1901, chap. 394, amdg. said § 6.)
;The Oswego canal, alongside the plaintiff’s premises, Had been laid out, surveyed and mapped, and work on the section embracing it had been contracted for, and the contractors were actually engaged in constructing the canal. Between the walls of the plaintiff’s building and the old canal was a towpath which belonged to the State. The plan of the improved canal ehminated the towpáth so that- the wall of the canal would abut the wall of the plaintiff’s, building. The canal wall at this point was to be four and. one-twelfth feet wide on the top. The original plan contemplated that the State should build an underpinning to the claimant’s mill, three feet in width, to sustain and help support the mill, the canal and the canal .wall, but before the plans were approved by the Superintendent of Public Works the underpinning wall was omitted from the plans and specifications, and it was, therefore, no part of the canal as laid out and approved. While the contractors were engaged in constructing this section of the canal according to the approved plans, a special Deputy State Engineer, on December 31, 1901,, without the approval of the Canal Board or the Superintendent of Public Works, filed in the office of the State Engineer a map of the plaintiff’s property, with a certificate that the land had been permanently appropriated for the use of the canals of the State. The duplicates having been filed in the office of the Superintendent of Public Works, he, January 8, 190.8, caused to be served upon the plaintiff a notice of the filing of the map, the survey and certificate in his office. April 15, .1908, the Superintendent of Public Works questioned the propriety of the appropriation, and April 30, 1908, the Canal Board adopted a resolution requesting the State Engineer to appropriate only so much of the claimant’s property as was necessary to shore up the walls or to alter the plans of the canal by changing the alignment so as to make it unnecessary to appropriate any of the property, and thereafter the line of the canal was moved westerly, so that the claimant’s land was not used or interfered with otherwise than by the mere filing of the map and notice above stated. The property alleged to have' been -appropriated was situated between the canal and a hydraulic canal, and its width averaged from forty to sixty feet, and it was nearly covered with large stone and wooden buildings, and was used as a knitting mill. Plaintiff alleges that immediately after the notice was filed it ceased taking orders for- further business, although it continued to operate the mill for over a year thereafter. The claim filed in the Court of Claims states the damages at over $1,000,000. The evidence as to damages is not in the record, but it is stated that the claimant’s evidence tended to show a damage of about $100,000 and interest, while the evidence of the State tended to show the damage as low as from $125,000 to $150,000.
The Court of Claims dismissed the claim, finding that the appropriation was unnecessary “and was the result of the absence of the exercise of any judgment on the part of the State Engineer. "" * * The State Engineer, in making the alleged appropriation, acted without the exercise of any judgment and acted arbitrarily and capriciously, and the attempted appropriation was wholly unauthorized and is illegal and void, -x-., * * The State had the legal right to construct its canal adjacent to claimant’s buildings without taking precautions to protect the buildings from falling so. long as it did not encroach upon any part of claimant’s property.”
Benjamin N. Cardozo, Charles N. Bulger and Udelle Bartlett, for the appellant.
Thomas Carmody, Attorney-General, Valentine Taylor and Joseph A. Kellogg, for the respondent:

Opinion:
Kellogg, J.:
" Private property cannot he taken for public use unless it is necessary for such public use, but all that is required of such officer or board in determining the necessity for taking private property is that they act in good faith and with sound discretion." (People v. Fisher, 190 N. Y. 468, 477.)
The officer referred' to in that case was the State Engineer who had permanently appropriated certain lands, and the court was . asked to determine that a permanent appropriation was unnecessary as a temporary appropriation was sufficient. The court sustained the appropriation. It was apparent that the officer acted in'good faith and there was at least reasonable 'basis for his action.
In the Appellate. Division (116 App. Div. 677, 686) the same conclusion was reached, the court saying: "We do not decide that where an officer of the State assumes to take private property, ostensibly in the exercise of a discretionary power vested in him by the Legislature which clearly can be seen, under no circumstances and in no event, will be' needed for public purposes, that courts may not intervene and determine contrary to the expressed judgment of such officer the question of the necessity for taking the same, and judicially declare such' an assumption of authority nugatory. "
In every appropriation of private property for alleged public use the .purpose of the appropriation, that is, whether it in fact involves a public use, is a question open to the courts for consideration, for unless there is- a public use the act of appropriation is unwarranted. In this case the line of the canal was fixed, and the State Engineer- was charged with the duty of examining into the facts and passing his judgment as to what property was necessary for canal purposes. He could not act arbitrarily,, capriciously or without judgment, as rib such power is given to .him. His power to condemn arises only from an exercise of a sane judgment and sound discretion, and it is evi dent there must be some basis for his judgment and discretion to rest upon. The property sought to be condemned must in fact be necessary, or at least so situated with reference to the canal work that there may be an honest difference of opinion among reasonable men as to its necessity. If we assume that the State Engineer has filed a certificate appropriating a farm ten miles away from the canal, and which under no circumstances could be available for canal purposes, the invalidity of his action would be apparent. A determination in good faith as to the necessity, and the exercise of a sound discretion with reference to property as to which there is some real basis for such determination, is a condition precedent to his right to condemn. On the other hand, it may be conceded, if the appropriation in question was the result of a determination made in good faith that it was necessary, and there was a reasonable basis upon which such determination can rest, that the courts may not set up their judgment as to its necessity against the judgment of the State Engineer. It is his judgment and not the judgment of the court that is made the condition precedent to the act.
It is clear that the claimant's property was not required as a spoil bank or for convenience in making the canal, for the reason that it was substantially covered by large stone and brick buildings and was, therefore, impossible for that purpose. The State Engineer did not give to the court the benefit of his evidence as to the good faith of the appropriation, and the special deputy, who was sworn as a witness, falls far short of showing that the appropriation was made in good faith or was even deemed necessary. The appropriation map was served January 8, 1908. April 15, 1908, the Superintendent of Public Works questioned the propriety of the appropriation and asked the State Engineer with reference to it. No answer was ever directly given to the Superintendent but a communication from the special deputy to the State Engineer was furnished to the Attorney-General April 21, 1908, in which he indicates the propriety of the appropriation on the ground that the canal wall was not of sufficient strength to hold the water in the canal without a lateral pressure against the walls of the building and "if at any time there should be any excavation made on the property adjacent to this wall it would result in the destruction of the wall." He also stated that in his judgment it was not feasible to extend the canal wall further west and leave an embankment between the wall of the canal and the wall of the claimant's property, and that as the canal wall was to be only about four feet at the top, " the State would have no available room on either side of the canal, and this being a terminal of the canal, it seems that the State. should have sufficient land adjacent to the canal for the purpose of providing facilities for boats tying up while waiting to pass the locks. " He does not in the communication question the sufficiency of the wall except in the contingency, that the wall of the claimant's building and the earth easterly of it are removed, leaving the canal wall without support. As a witness he expresses a fear that the claimant's wall might fall into the canal during the excavation.
The reasons given by him, and they are the only reasons furnished by the State Engineer's office, seem to be rather excuses than reasons, and do not indicate in the light of all the evidence the good faith of the appropriation. It was not for the State Engineer, after the plans and specifications had been approved and the contract let, to change the plans providing for places for boats to tie up in the use of the canal or to appropriate land .which could not be used for' any purpose contemplated by the plans approved.
No reasonable suggestion is made in the evidence that any particular use was to be made of this mill property or any part of it, and no suggestion why if an underpinning of the mill was desired that right was not obtained or the three feet condemned. It was stated that an underpinning to the mill was desirable, not that any use was contemplated of the entire property. It is evident that the underpinning to the mill was as •desirable to the claimant as to the State, and undoubtedly if the claimant had understood that no favors were to be granted it would gladly have conceded without compensation the right to underpin the mill for its own safety and protection. The act of the special deputy, if valid, would have resulted, if the State had built the underpinning to plaintiffs mill, in making the plaintiff's foundation secure, at a conceded expense to the State of from $125,000 to $700,000. The fact that the work on this section of the canal was being performed at that time under a contract, and that it was, therefore, impracticable to use these lands for canal purposes without the consent of the Canal Board, as indicated below, furnishes the strongest possible reason for the conclusion that an appropriation of them without the consent of the Canal Board was absolutely unnecessary and that the alleged appropriation was without any judgment and arbitrary and capricious. The facts in this case are such that there can be no honest difference of opinion upon the question that the appropriation of this $700,000 mill property was not necessary for canal purposes, and that it was not the judgment of the State Engineer or his deputy that it was necessary. The Court of Claims has mildly characterized it by saying, in substance, that it was arbitrary, capricious and without the exercise of any judgment.
The judgment may also be sustained upon the ground that the State Engineer at the time he acted had no legal authority to make an appropriation. Section 6 of the act was intended as a check upon him so that, after contract let, the maps, plans and specifications may not be altered without the approval of the Superintendent of Public Works, and if a proposed change would enhance the cost to the State or create a claim against it, the assent of the Canal Board must be had. It is apparent that if this appropriation is sustained the cost of this section of the canal must be enhanced from $125,000 to $700,000 for land damages, in addition to whatever it may cost to make any use of the property taken. It was impossible to build the canal in any other place or manner on the contracted section without the consent of the Canal Board. These lands could not be used for canal purposes without a change of plan and contract; the appropriation of additional land there for canal purposes could not be necessary and the State Engineer had no power to make such appropriation. The work could only be done by contract and the contractor was actually engaged upon the work. Plaintiff was chargeable with knowledge of the law that at that time no change in the plans could be made by the State Engineer acting alone Whoever deals with a public officer is charged with knowledge of his powers. If, as alleged, plaintiff stopped taking new orders in the mill upon the service of the notice, the loss must fall upon it, as it must be assumed to have such knowledge of the facts as it would have learned on proper inquiry. If the special deputy acted without judgment he was clearly not acting in the interest of the State. He evidently did hot act involuntarily, but for a purpose, and no one could be benefited by that purpose but the plaintiff. If the map was filed as a matter of favor or otherwise to the plaintiff it is not aggrieved. In any event the evidence here . does not put plaintiff in the place of a person who has been injured by the wrongful act of the State Engineer. If it was hot a party to the act it is chargeable with knowledge of the law and the plain facts on which the officer acted. It was its duty before making important commitments to inquire as to the legal power of the officer and to ascertain the facts. At an early day the claimant knew that the State took the position that the alleged appropriation was unnecessary and ineffectual and that the canal was actually being built without interfering with the property. If the claimant has suffered loss the inference is quite strong that it was willing to take the chances of loss in view of the large gain expected if the appropriation could be sustained. A sworn claim filed for $1,000,000 and an attempt to prove but $100,000 of it suggests that the plaintiff expected large benefits from the appropriation. At the most the loss coming to it, if it innocently sustained a loss, came from omitting to take orders for a very short time. When it surrendered up the property and discontinued its business it clearly knew the facts. From what appears and does not appear in the record the plaintiff apparently knew, or willingly chose not to know, the facts and the law governing the situation. By abandoning its property with notice that the State repudiated the alleged appropriation and would not use the land, it chose to stand upon its legal rights. It stands upon an order made without power or right, and the judgment of the Court of Claims is right upon the law and the facts and should be affirmed, with costs.
Sewell, J., concurred; Houghton, J., concurred on ground last stated; Smith, P. J., dissented in opinion in which Betts, J., concurred.