Case Name: State of Louisiana vs. Numa Dudoussat
Court: Louisiana Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1895-05-06
Citations: 47 La. Ann. 977
Docket Number: No. 11,763
Parties: State of Louisiana vs. Numa Dudoussat.
Judges: 
Reporter: Louisiana Annual Reports
Volume: 47
Pages: 977–1017

Head Matter:
No. 11,763.
State of Louisiana vs. Numa Dudoussat.
Where the testimony of a witness has been assailed as to a particular fact stated by him, similar prior statements made at art unsuspicious time may be received, to corroborate his testimony.'
Article 173 of the Constitution and Act 78 of 1890, create two distinct offences, the giving of a bribe, and the receiving of the same. There may be no intention to bribe by the giver, but if the party who accepts the same does so with the intent to influence h’is official action, he is guilty under the statute.
A general charge, which substantially covers the special charge requested, will justify the rejection of the special cnarge.
It is legitimate and proper to adopt rievices or traps to detect cr'me, provided the device is not a temptation and solicitation to commit it.
The doctrine of estoppel does not apply to the State in criminal proceedings.
Where a written charge has been requested .and.given, and the jury, after deliberating, returns into court and asks for instructions, in the absence of a bill of exceptions containing the oral instructions, it will be presumed the trial judge confined himself to his original' charge. The absence- of counsel for the defense, when the jury returns, is not sufficient to set aside the verdict.
Where the jury returns into court and informs it that they are unable to agree, it ' is not error for the judge to imprest upon them the importance of the case, and urge them to listen to argument and sacrifice the pride of opinion, and send them back for further deliberation, when it does not appear that the jury was coerced into a verdict by a prolonged session, followed by physical suffering.
Miller, J., Concurring. The difference between this present case and the Callahan case (47 An. Hi) is obvious. In the latter case it was conceded the witness to be corroborated was an accomplice in the fullest sense; in this case the guilty complicity of the witness is put at issue by argument and testimony laid before the jury.
The distinction between the accomplice and the feigned, accomplice is recognized. When a feigned accomplice, the corroboration is not that required to sustain the credit of the ordinary accomplice. 1 Green leaf, Sec. 382.
APPEAL from the Criminal District Court for the Parish of Orleans. Ferguson, J.
M. J. Gunningham, Attorney General, and Charles A. Butler, District Attorney (Lionel Adams of Counsel), for the State, Appellee:
I.
The only question properly put in issue by the first bill is whether the corroboration of an apparent or feigned accomplice must be limited to evidence which tends to confirm the testimony of the feigned accomplice upon a point material to the issue in the sense that it tends to prove the guilt of the defendant; or, whether he is to be treated as an ordinary witness, and, where a design to misrepresent from some motive or relationship is imputed to him, he is to be permitted to show, in order to repel such imputation, that he made a similar statement at a time when the supposed motive did not exist, and when the relations of the parties were different.
Whether the witness was a feigned, or a guilty accomplice is not to be determined by the court from the pleadings, but by the jury from the evidence. Wright vs. State, 7 Tex. Ap. 574; State vs. McKean, 36 Iowa, 343; People vs. Farrell, 30 Cal. 316; People vs. Bolanger, 71 Cal. 19, 20¿
An accomplice is one who knowingly, voluntarily and with a common intent with the principal offender, unites in the commission of a crime. To constitute him an accomplice lie must participate in the criminality of an act, either as a principal or as an accessory. Whart. Or. Ev., Sec. 440; Bish. Or. .Pro., Sec. 1159; People vs. Bolanger, 71 Oal. 20 (1886) ; Polk vs. State, 36 Ark. 126 (1880) ; 1 Russ. Or. 26.; 4 Bl. Oom. 34, 331.
A person who enters into communication with criminals and assists them without any criminal intent, but solely for the purpose of discovering and making known their crimes, is not an accomplice. 1 Am. and Eng. Enoy. Law, 65; 1 Greenl. Ev., Sec.'382 and (n.); Whart. Or. Ev., See. 440; 1 Bish. Or. Pro., Secs. 1169, 1173, 1174; Oom. vs. Downing, 4 Gray (Mass.), 29; Oom. vs. Willard, 22 Pick. (Mass.) 476; People vs. Smith, 28 Hun. (N.Y.) 626, affirmed 94 N. Y. 649; Harrington vs. State, 36 Ala. 236; Campbell vs. Com., 84 Pa. St. 187.
The test is whether the participant in the criminal act can be indicted’ either as a principal or as an accessory. Oom. vs. Wood, 11 Gray (Mass.), 85; Oom. vs. Boynton, 116 Mass. 343.
The testimony of a feigned accomplice does not need corroboration, and his case is not treated as the case of an accomplice. 1 Greenl., Sec. 382; 1 Tayl. Ev., Sec. 971; Whart. Or. Ev., Sec. 440; And. Law Diet. 15; Rex vs. Despard, 28 Howell’s- St. Tr. 489, per Lord Ellenborough; State vs. McKean, 36 Iowa, 343; ■People vs. Farrell, 30 Oal. 316; People vs. Barrie, 49 Oal. 342.
Where evidence has been offered to show bias, improper motive* or recent fabrication, on the part of a witness, calculated to account for the testimony given, on redirect examination, or in rebuttal, proof of prior similar statements, made before such bias or motive could have actuated the witness, will be received. Best’s Prin. Ev. 633 (n.), subhead “ Corroborating Statements” ; Rapalje Or. Pro., Sec. 316; 2 Phil. Ev. 523 (10th Ed.) ; 1 Rose. Or. Ev. 164 (n.); Whart. Or. Ev., Sec. 492; 2 Tayl. Ev., Sec. 1330; 1 Greenl. Ev., Sec. 469; 1 Stark. Ev. 253; 3 Russ. Or. 293; State vs. Oady, 46 An. 1346; Oom. vs. Wilson, 1 Gray, 340, etc.
II.
The Intent or the Bribe-Giver.
The proposition ,of -law contained in the general charge of the court to which this bill was reserved was in these words:
“ I charge you, gentlemen, that if you find from the evidence, beyond a treasonable doubt, that the defendant, at the time stated in the information, was a municipal officer; that said defendant received the said amount of money as a bribe, with intent to be influenced thereby in the performance of his public duties, with partiality and favor, he is chargeable with the crime of receiving a bribe, whether the giver of the bribe acted himself merely with a view to secure the detection and conviction of the accused or otherwise.”
No objection was made at the trial that the charge contained contradictory statements; no opportunity was afforded the District Judge to correct a mistake evidently due to inadvertence; no bill was reserved setting up this ground of complaint; nor was it assigned as error. The matter is urged for the first time on appeal, and, therefore, can not be considered. State vs. Deas, 38 An. 581; State vs. Romano, 37 An. 98; State vs. Johnson, 33 An. 889; State vs. Nelson, 32 An. 842; State vs. Bass, 12 An. 862; State vs. Benjamin, 7 An. 47.
The only legal question involved in the consideration of this bill is the correctness of the instruction given.
The defendant contends that “to constitute the crime of bribery, which is a corrupt agreement, there must co-exist, on the part of the giver and receiver of the bribe, a corrupt intent; one to influence the other, and the other to be influenced to perform official duty.”
The State maintains, on the other hand, that if the defendant, believing that a bribe was being given to him, received it with the corrupt intent to be induced and influenced to perform the duties of him required, in the execution of his office, with partiality or favor, his guilt is absolute without regard to the existence or non-existence od the part of the giver of a corrupt purpose to bribe.
The statute under which the trial was had provides substantially, in so far as this case is concerned, as follows:
“Any person who shall * * * offer or give any * * * money * * * to any officer, State, parochial, or municipal * * * with intent to induce or influence such officer * * * to perform any duty of him required, with partiality and favor, the person giving or offering to give, and the officer * * * so receiving or agreeing to receive any money * * * with the intent, or for the purpose or consideration aforesaid, shall be guilty of bribery, * * * .” Act 78 of 1890, Sec. 1.
No connection is made in this enactment between the intent of the giver and that of the receiver. They are not required to be reciprocal in the sense that the corrupt intent must co-exist in both. The intent of the giver is not referred to as a factor in the constitution of the crime of the bribe-taker.
To uphold the unreasonable construction placed upon the statute by defendant’s counsel, it would be necessary to lose sight of the reason and spirit of the law — the evils to be remedied — and to read into it words and a meaning utterly at variance with the legislative purpose.
It is not provided that “the officer who, with a like purpose or intent, shall receive any bribe given with the intent, or for the purpose or consideration aforesaid, shall be guilty of bribery.”
In defining the crime of the officer who receives or agrees to receive the bribe, it is made an offence to receive money given with a corrupt purpose or as a corrupt consideration to influence official conduct; the terms of the act being, “and the officer * * * so receiving or agreeing to receive any money, etc., * * * for the purpose or consideration aforesaid, shall be guilty of bribery.”
But the statute also denounces as a separate, complete and independent offence, the receiptor agreement to receive by the officer, with the intent to be induced and influenced to act corruptly, of any bribe, without reference to the intent or purpose of the giver, who is not even mentioned in this connection. The language is “ and the officer * * * so receiving or agreeing to receive any money, etc., * * * with the intent * * * aforesaid, shall be guilty of bribery.”
This last construction meets the requirements of two fundamental rules of interpretation. It promotes the true policy and objects of the Legislature, and it derives the legislative intent from the words of the act, and not from conjecture aliunde. State vs. McOrystol, 43 An. 911; Com. vs. Inter. Liquors, 100 Mass. 21; Sedg. St. & Const. Law, 289; U. S. vs. Lucher, 134 U. S. 624; State vs. Archer, 73 Md. 44; Indianapolis vs. Hengele, 115 Ind.581; State vs. Godfrey, 97 N. O. 507; 23 Am. & Eng. Ency. Law, 297, 305; Mr. Justice Story, iu Gardiner vs. Collins, 2 Pet. (U. S.) 93; Brewer vs. Blodgher, 14 Pet. (U. S.) 178.
Not only does such a construction harmonize with the recognized canons of correct interpretation, but it is in accord with the' spirit and reason of the common law adjudications.
To show that the guilt of the giver and that of the receiver are not reciprocal in' the sense of being necessarily concurrent, it may be pertinent to consider what.was originally understood to constitute bribery at common law, and what was formerly the law' With us.
Blackstone defines: “Bribery is where a judge or other personconcerned in the adminiatration of justice takes any undue reward to influence his behavior in office.” 4 Bl. Com. 139.
It is treated in the same limited and restricted sense by Lord Coke." 3 Inst. 145..
So'that anciently the offence could only be committed by the bribe-taker.
It was afterward made to include officers not concerned in the. administration of justice, and was extended so as to cover the case of giving a bribe.
By way of contrast, it may be stated that in Louisiana, between 1855 and 1878, bribery was defined to be the giving or promising to any judge or other person concerned in the administration of justice any bribe or reward to influence his behavior in office. Act 130 of 1855; R. S. 1870, Sec. 860; Act 59 of 1878.
So that it appears that neither in England nor here has the crime of bribery been considered to require the co-existence of a common corrupt intent on the part of bribe-giver and bribe-taker.
Nor have the courts so construed the law.
In Com. vs. Murray it was decided that if a person make a full and ■ complete delivery of money to a magistrate, with the corrupt intention of influencing his decision in a matter pending before him, such person is guilty of corruptly giving a gift to the magistrate, although the latter receives the money in ignorance •of what it is, and retains it solely for the purposes of public justice. 135 Mass. 530.
And in'Henlow vs. Fossat, Patterson aüd Coleridge, justices, held ' that if it was clearly shown in. a prosecution for corrupting a voter, that Garner, the person who received the money, never intended to give the vote — that is, never intended to be influenced by the bribe — but concealed this intention from the defendant, the offence was complete on the part of Fossatt (the defendant) by his, giving the money for the purpose of inducing Garner to vote, and by Garner professedly accepting it on these terms. • 3 Ad. and Ellis,, 51.
So in the case before the court here, if Sherman never intended to bribe Dudoussat, but concealed this intention from him, the offence was complete on the part of the defendant by his receiving the money with the- corrupt intent to be influenced in the performence of his. official duties, and by Sherman professedly giving it on these terms.
No amount of research has been able to discover a single case in ■ which defendant’s contention has been maintained.
In this State bribery is a statutory offence, and consists in the doing • of what is prohibited by the act which creates it.
Suppose that, without any reference to Sherman or his purpose in paying over the money, pursuing the words of the statute, it was charged that Dudoussat, with the corrupt intent to be influenced to perform the duties required of him as a councilman with partiality and favor, corruptly received from one Charles Sherman the sum of one hundred dollars as a bribe, with the corrupt intent on the part of Dudoussat and in consideration that he (Dudoussat) would corruptly favor a petition then pending before the council, granting to the said Sherman the privilege of operating a barroom, etc., would not the information be good in law?
It is sufficient if an indictment for an offence prescribed by statute states all of the facts and circumstances that constitute the of-fence, so as to bring the party indicted within the provisions of such statute. State vs. McClanahan, 9 An. '210; State vs. Boasso, 38 An. 202; Whar. Cr. P. and P., See. 158; 1 Bish. Or. • Pro., Sec. 509.
Nor is it necessary to prove more than is required to constitute the offence defined by the statute.
III.
The Doctrine of Estoppel.
The doctrine of estoppel has no place in the practice of criminal courts, where it is entirely inapplicable.
When a variance exists between the averments of the information and the proof offered in support thereof, the only material inquiry is whether what has been established amounts in law to a complete offence under the statute.
It is not required to charge in an information any more than is necessary to accurately and adequately express the offence, and when unnecessary averments and aggravations are introduced, they can be considered as surplusage, and as such be disregarded. Whart. Cr. P. and P., Sec. 158.
All unnecessary words may, on trial or arrest of judgment, be rejected as surplusage, if the indictment would be good upon striking them out. Whart. Cr. Ev., Secs. 138, 139; 1 Bish.. Cr. Proe., Sec. 478.
The same rule has been repeatedly recognized in this State. State vs. Minau, 37 An. 526; State vs. Johnson, 30 An. 305; State vs. Crittenden, 38 An. 448.
IV.
Ever since Strouderman’scase, 6 An. 286, it has been uniformly held, in this State, that it is the duty of counsel to show by his bill of exceptions that he asked for instructions to the jury that were material, and that he did not require the judge to charge an abstract proposition of law. It is not possible for the Supreme Court to determine the applicability of the instruction unless the bill of exceptions contains a recital of the circumstances to which the law is to be applied. State vs. Riculfi, 35 An. 770; • State vs. Daley, 37- An. 576; State vs. Melton, lb. 82; State vs. Ford, lb. 464; State vs. Tucker, 38 An. 539.
In the absence of statutes providing otherwise, the’ judge is at liberty to disregard the requests for instructions which have been made, and to instruct a jury wholly in his own language. Thomp. Trials, Sec. 2351; State vs. Ott, 49 Mo. 326.
The court is not bound to give instructions precisely in the form or in the identical terms put by the counsel for the accused, but it is sufficient if such instructions are given to the jury as substantially embody the principle invoked, and state the law correctly upon the issues involved. State vs. Riculfi, 35 An. 770; State vs. Porter, 16. 1159; State vs. Durr, 39 An. 751; Thomp. Trials, Sec. 2350; Story, J., in Olymer vs. Dawkins, 3 How. (U. S.) 674, 688; and in Pitts vs. Whitman, 2 Story O. C. 609, 620.
The District Judge had already correctly charged the principle of law invoked in the instructions requested, and had recognized “ a marked and clear distinction between artifices used to detect persons suspected of being engaged in criminal acts, and means used lo tempt them to adopt such acts,” and that while “it is legitimate to adopt such measures as may be deemed necessary to detect crime,” nevertheless, the means used for the purpose must not “amount .to a practical inducement or solicitation to commit it.” And the jury had been admonished that “though a great degree of objection or disfavor may attach to him (the apparent accomplice) for the part he has acted as an informer, or on other accounts, yet his case is not treated as the case of an accomplice.”. 1 Greenl. Ev., Sec. 382 and (n.) ; 1 Russ. Or. 26; 1 Tayl. Ev. 832; 1 Am. aud Eng. Ency. Law, 65; Whar. Or. Ev., See. 440; 1 Bish. Or. Proc., Secs. 1169, 173, 174; St: Charles vs. O’Mailey, 18 111. 407, 412; State vs. McKean, 36 Iowa, 343; Oom. vs. Wood, 11 Gray (Mass.), 85; Com. vs. Boynton, 116 Mass. 343; And. Law Diet. 15.
It is not error upon the part of the trial court to refuse to give an instruction, however faultless in point of law, when the same, in substance, has already been given. 10 An. 264; 14 An. 461; 23 An. 8; 25 An. 407; 27 An. 693; 28 An. 65; 30 An. 1176; 31 An. 302; 32 An. 1270; 33 An. 537; 16. 679; 35 An. 775; 26. 970 ; 26. 1180; 26. 1159; lb. 1058; 36 An. 81; 37 An. 77; 38 An. 202; 26. 459; 16. 795; 41 An. 317; 26. 600; 26. 780.
It is everywhere held by the courts that while an original solicitation or instigation to commit crime will not be countenanced, yet where the defendant has formed a guilty intent to commit the crime, any person may furnish opportunities, and even lend assistance to the criminal with the commendable purpose of exposing and punishing him. And the fact that there existed a plot to entrap him will not affect the criminality of his act or render him any less liable to punishment. Grimm vs. U. S., recently decided by the United States Supreme Court; 1 Bish. Or. Law, Sec. 262; U. S. vs. Whittier, 5 Dill. 35; Rex vs. Eggington, 2 Bos. and Pul. 508; Rex vs. Ady, 7- Car. and Payne, 140; Rex vs. Holden, 2 Taunton, 334.
The rule of law laid down in these decisions is substantially that formulated by the trial judge in his general charge.
As we have already had occasion to maintain, it is not correct to instruct the jury that “ accomplices are all those who take part or participate in the commission of an unlawful act, whether before or at the time that it is committed.” This definition would include every apparent or feigned accomplice. The participation must be in the criminality of the act either as a principal or as an accessory. The accomplice is one who knowingly, voluntarily and with common intent with the principal offender unites in the commission of a crime; and the test is whether the parti - ticipant in the act can be indicted for his connection therewith. Whart. Or. Ev., Sec. 440; 1 Bish. Or. Pr., Sec. 1159; And. Law Diet. 15; Oom. vs. Wood, 11 Gray (Mass.), 85; Oom. vs. Boynton, 116 Mass. 343; Polk vs. State, 36 Ark. 126; People vs. Bolanger, 71 Oal. 20; 1 Russ. Or. 26; 4 Bl. Oom. 34, 331.
The feigned accomplice does not need corroboration. His case is not treated as the case of an accomplice. 1 Greenl. Ev., Sec. 382; l.Tayl. Ev., Sec. 971; Whart. Orl. Ev., Sec. 440; And. Law Diet. 15; Rex vs. Despard, 28 How. St. Tr. 489, per. Lord Ellen - borough;. State vs. McKean, 36 Iowa, 363; People vs. Farrell, 30 Oal. 316; People vs. Barrie, 49 Oal. 342.
Special instruction No. 8. was: “ The court further charges the jury .. that' it is dangerous to convict an accused upon the testimony of an accomplice who is not corroborated by other evidence.”
•This was refused by. the trial court because (1) Sherman was not an accomplice; (2) that conceding Sherman to be an accomplice, to require corroboration or not was discretionary with the judge.
In Russel’s case the Supreme Court declared the doctrine to be that 1 whether the judge shall enforce as a rule of practice the require- ■ ment that the testimony of an accomplice be corroborated lies in his discretion, and in its application much depends upon the nature of the offence and the extent of the witness’ complicity. 33 An. 138; Fisher’s Digest, 563.
While it is discretionary, in this State, with the trial judge to determine whether he will'charge'that it is unsafe to convict upon the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice, yet the evidence of a feigned accomplice will never require corroboration. See authoritids cited supra.
Y.
The Oral “ Additional Instructions.”
It did not appear from the minutes that a written charge had been requested, and the record establishes that at the time the cautionary remarks were orally addressed to the jury the judge was ignorant that such a request had been made.
The declarations of counsel that the request was verbally presented' are accepted as unimpeachable.
The remarks complained of are substantially set out in the body of this brief, andaré copied in full into the “ transcript of appeal.”
In their brief, in treating of this suqject, counsel for defendant say; “ There is one matter, however, which we press upon the attention of this honorable court. It relates to ‘ additional instructions ’ which were orally given to the jury in the absence of defendant’s counsel. We do not complain that they were given to the jury in the absence of counsel for the accused; we say, however, that these instructions were given ‘ orally,’ after a formal request had been made to charge the jury in writing; moreover, that they were coercive of the. verdict in the case.”
This sets out the entire burden of their complaint.
(a) That the remarks were delivered orally.
There was no denial of a right by the judge, but simply an entire ignorance that the request for a written charge had been made.
“ It is a general rule that a party loses his right to complain, in an appellate court,, of an interlocutory error committed by the5 court in the trial of the case, unless he makes his objection and reserves his bill at the time;” Thomp. Uharg. Jury, 156.
The reason is that the court is entitled to an opportunity to correct any error inadvertently committed at the trial, and a party should not be permitted to seek relief by appeal When the omission-might-have been prevented by objecting at the proper time.'
Objection- to the charge-being oral, instead of written, must be made at-the time the instructions are. given; if not, the error will be regarded as waived. 11 Am. and Eng. Ency. Law, 265; State vs. Sipnlt, 17 Iowa, 575; Yanway vs. State, 41 Tex. 639.
Charges to the jury will not, in this State, be reviewed by the Supreme Court, unless they were in writing, and the defendant excepted thereto at the time they were given. State vs. Curtis, 34 An. 1213; State vs. Sheard, 35 An. 543; State vs. Mangrum, 16. 619; State vs. Riculñ, 16. 770; State vs. Bird, 38 An. 497.
Oral remarks made by the judge after giving his charge in writing, and which are not complained of as erroneous, will not be considered when not objected to at the time they were addressed to the jury. State vs. Outs, 30 An. 1115; Thomp. Charg. Jury, 105.
None of the admonitory remarks of the judge made during the absence of defendant’s counsel can, by any reasonable interpretation, be looked upon as conveying to the jury any knowledge upon a question of law. They did not, therefore, constitute “ a charge” within the meaning of the statute which requires a judge to deliver his charge to the jury in writing at the request of the counsel of either party. R. S., Secs. 991, 1966; 2 Thomp. Tr., Sec. 2380.
On the subject of giving oral instructions in violation of a statute which requires that they be given in writing, it has been justly observed: “If oral instructions should be given, and it could not be ascertained what they were, * * * it would be a cause for reversing the judgment. But if they are preserved in the bill of exceptions, and it appears they * * * did not at all affect his rights as a suitor, it would be difficult to find a ground upon which to place such a construction of the statute as would overturn the judgment.” 10 Mo. 483, 487; Thomp. Tr., Sec. 2379.
That a verdict will not be disturbed where the error complained of in the charge to the jury could not have prejudiced the defendant, has become consecrated in the practice of our courts. 35 An. 1103; 34 An. 959; 33 An. 889; 32 An. 621; 28 An. 170; 8 An. 109.
(bj That the instructions were coercive.
The judge admonished the jury as follows: “ It is exceedingly important, gentlemen, that you should find a verdict one way or the other. A great deal of time has, it is true, been consumed, but for various reasons it is exceedingly desirable to agree as soon as possible. The court has no disposition to coerce the jury, or to be harsh or disagreeable. You are all gentlemen of intelligence; suppose you should try again, say for half an hour.” (Here Judge Ferguson reflected a few seconds, and then said) : “ Suppose you try once more. * * * This is a case of great importance. If it were an ordinary case I should discharge the jury and order a mistrial to be entered, but I can not do so without mature deliberation in the present case. Suppose you try once more to agree, in view of the importance of the case.”
Not only are such cautionary remarks considered as not having a tendency to coerce, but rather to quicken the intelligence of the jurors and the sense of their obligations to give true deliverance on the evidence before them, but they are held to have always been regarded as a matter within the discretion of the court, and not as giving rise to an error affecting the result. This conclusion was reached by the Supreme Court of this State in an extreme ease in which they were not “able to approve of the expressed determination of the court to keep the jury empanelled until a verdict was reached.” State vs. Green, 7 An. 518, 520.
Commenting on a similar objection, Mr. Thompson caustically declares: “There seems to be no end to the fantastic questions which the ingenuity of lawyers will bring before the courts of error for their decision. When we consider the rigor with which, under the old law, judges kept juries together until they should agree, we can scarcely credit that it was assigned for error that the judge urged the jury to agree upon a verdict, etc.” Thomp. Tr., Sec. 2802.
The case which gave rise to these observations was Allen vs. Wood-son, in which, in the language of Judge Thompson, “the Supreme Court did not notice the point in its opinion; but the official syllabus, prepared by the judge who delivered the opinion, recites that it was overruled.” 50 Ga. 58, 70.
He adds this in a note to the last edition of his work: “The Supreme Court of Michigan were obliged to rule the same point in Pierce vs. Rehfuss, 85 Mich. 58. To the same effect see State vs. Rollins, 77 Me. 880.” Thompson Tr. 1658 (n.).
The right of the trial judge to admonish the jurors that they should not, through sheer stubbornness and .pride of opinion, decline, without reason, to yield; but should, on the contrary, listen to the views of their fellows in arriving at an honest verdict is sanctioned and approved. by the highest authority as absolutely sound, and in so far as patient, and exhaustive research can discover, has never been successfully disputed in the courts. 1 Bish. Or. Pro., Sec. 982; Thomp. Tr., Sec. 2303; Com. vs.Tuey, 8 Cush. (Mass.), 1; Clem. vs. State, 42 Ind. 420, 438; State vs. Smith, 49 Conn. 376, 386; Swallow vs. State, 20 Ala. 30; The State vs. Bybee, 17 Kan. 462.
Charles Louque and James C. Walker for Defendant and Appellant:
That Charles Sherman is an accomplice of the defendant appears on the face of the indictment, and on the face of the statute under which the information or indictment was framed. Sec. 1, Act 78 of 1890; Constitution of Louisiana, Art. 173, and from the fact that he was so considered by the trial judge in his charge to the jury. Callahan’s Case, 47 An. 444.
Therefore his testimony can not b.e .“ bolstered up ” by proof that he made a “previous statement” to Henry Lochte out of the presence and hearing of the accused. Middleton vs. State, 52 Ga. 527; Joy’s Ev. of Accomplices, 35.
Evidence to corroborate an accomplice must relate to some portion of the testimony which is material to the issue, in the sense that it connects or identifies the accused with the commission of the crime. Commonwealth vs. Bosworth, 22 Pickering, 397; Com. vs. Larrabee, 99 Mass. 413; Com. vs. Elliott, 110 Mass. 104; Com. vs. Stone, 11 Mass. 411; Com. vs. Scott,'123 Mass. 222; Com. .vs. Holmes, 127 Mass. 424; Childress vs. State, 52 Ga. 106; Watson vs. Com. 95 Pa. 424; Rex vs. Farlow, 8 Car. and P. 106; State vs. Chioyk, 92 Mo. 395; People vs. Elliott, 5 N. Y. 204; Boyce vs. People, 55 N. Y. 545; Armstrong vs. Peo - pie, 70 N. Y. 38;. People vs. Platt, 100 N. Y. 593; 3 Rice Grim. Ev. 325; Greenlief 381; 1 Philips Ev. 30; “ Callahan’s Case,” 47 An. 444.
The testimony of an .accomplice cannot.be confirmed except by evidence from a purer source. . 1 Bishop, 1170; State vs.. Mason, 38 An. 476.
The State has treated the witness, Charles Sherman, as a guilty accomplice, by so charging him to be in the indictment or information, and should not be permitted to “ shift her position at' will to a contradictory one to defeat the action of the law upon it,” by maintaining that he was not an accomplice at all, or only a feigned accomplice, to admit proof that he made a “previous statement” to Henry.Loehte. Gridley vs. Conner, 4 An. 417; Denton vs. Erwin, 5 An. 22.
The State is firmly bound by her judicial declarations in the information or indictment that “ the bribé was feloniously and corruptly given by the witness, Charles Sherman,” thus fixing his status as a guilty accomplice; and, therefore, the State is forbidden by the law from contradicting the statement thus made. Farrar vs. Stacey, 2 An. 211; Gridley vs. Conner, 4 An. 416; Durham vs. Williams, 32 An. 962; Gilmore vs. O’Neal, 32 An. 979; Dickson vs. Dickson, 33 An. 1370. “And this doctrine is so firmly sanctioned, both by reason and justice, that our courts have unhesitatingly extended its - operation to the State itself.” State vs. Taylor, 28 An. 460; State ex rel. Morgan, 28 An. 121; State vs. Ober, 34 An. 360; Folger vs. Palmer, 35 An. 744.
It deserves consecration as a maxim of law, honorable to human nature, that no accused should be convicted by other than legal evidence.
When the court’s charges to the jury are confused and contradictory, it is ground for reversal, as where the trial judge charges the jury that it is incumbent upon the State to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the witness, Charles Sherman, feloniously and corruptly gave a bribe to the accused, in order feloniously and corruptly to induce him to perform his official duty with partiality and favor; and then again instructs the jury that it matters not whether the said Charles Sherman so acted, or that he acted merely with a view to secure the detection of the accused.
Where instructions of such character, inharmonious and misleading, are given, it is sufficient reason for reversing a judgment. Prof. Jury Tr., Sec. 345. “ It is held that the court errs when giving instructions apparently conflicting, leaving the jury to conjecture which of them should be applied to a given state of facts.” Clem. vs. State, 31Ind. 480; Note to Prof. Jur. Tr., Sec. 845.
“ It is of the first consequence in every case that the principles of law applicable thereto should be so plainly stated to the jury that they are thereby enabled to comprehend them.” Watkins vs. Wallace, 19 Mich. 57.
Bribery is, so to speak, in the nature of a contract of hiring, in this, that one person pays to another a corrupt price to perform a corrupt service in his official character.
According to Act No. 78 of 1890 and Art. 173 of La. Con. 1879, to constitute the crime of receiving a bribe, there must co-exist on the part of the giver of the bribe, and on the part of the receiver of the bribe, a felonious and corrupt intent by one to induce the other to perform official duty, and by the other to be corruptly induced to perform such duty.
The words “so receiving,” in Sec. 1 of Act 78 of 1890, evidently relate back to the words of the section with regard to the person who “shall give any sum of money, bribe, present or reward,” etc. Callahan’s Case, 47 An. 444.
Thus, the words “ so receiving,” by reasonable intendment, provide that to constitute the crime, the bribe must have been given and received with corrupt intent.
It is appropriate and pertinent to the law and facts of the case to ask the court to define to the jury that accomplices are all those who take part in committing an unlawful act, etc., and it is error to refuse to so instruct the jury, on the ground that it is a request to charge a mere abstract proposition of law, when the indictment or information distinctly charges that there was an accomplice in the crime charged.
If is error to refuse to charge the jury that it is dangerous or unsafe to convict on the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice, and at the same time to instruct them that apparent accomplices need not be corroborated.
Where a special charge requested by counsel for the accused is correct in point of law, pertinent to the law and evidence of the case, and does not assume that facts have been proved, the jury should be so instructed by the court. State vs. Abe Thompson, 45 An. 969; State vs. Tucker, 38 An. 789.
When a request is made by counsel for the accused that the judge charge the jury íd writing, such request applies to whatever additional instructions the court may consider proper to give to the jury, and it is error to so instruct the jury otherwise than in writing. The law, R. S. 1966, is mandatory in this respect, and is to be strictly construed. The giving of oral instructions, after such request, is ground for reversal. See Thomson Tr., Sec. 2375; Am. and Eng. Ency., Vol. 11, pp. 261, 263; State vs. Gilmore, 26 An. 599; State vs. Porter, 35 An. 535.
“ The law-maker must have attached value to the right, or he would not have been at pains to pass the law conferring it; * * * at all events the right is clear, the duty of the judge absolute, and the denial is error.” Fenner, J., in 35 An. 535.
‘‘The privilege of requiring a written charge is unqualified and absolute. We can not, therefore, be abridged by any rule or dictum of the court; as the law does not authorize the judge to make any rule on this subject, we can not delegate to him any power in this respect. The judge was bound to give the written charge asked. He has erred in refusing to do so. This is enough to set aside the verdict, annul the sentence, and remand the ease. Bermudez, O. J., Ibid.
When the jury are sent for by the judge and brought into court a second time, having failed to agree, without any request on their part for additional instructions, it is cautionary and paternal, but not consistent with law and approved practice, for the trial judge to advise them not to be stubborn and hold out to the end because of their privaDe opinions, but to yield of their opinions to others, etc. Such instructions, aside from being oral, are coercive of the verdict, and invade the province of the jury, especially when they are sent back to- deliberate half an hour longer, and are then locked up for the night of the tenth day of a protracted trial.
Argued and submitted, March 30, 1895.
Opinion handed down, May 6, 1895.
Rehearing refused, June 3, 1895.

Opinion:
The opinion of the court was delivered by
McEnery, J.
The accused was a member of the Oity Council of New Orleans. One Sherman had pending before the Council an application to be permitted to open a barroom in his place of business. The ae cused made a proposal to him that for one hundred dollars he would secure him the privilege asked for. Subsequent to this proposal, Sherman, O'Malley, Sergeant Aucoin of the police force, and some newspaper reporters arranged a plan to entrap the accused. The plan was successful. Marked money, to the amount of one hundred dollars, was tendered to the accused, in response to his proposal, by Sherman, and he accepted it.
The other parties were secreted and witnessed the transaction. There is a contention that Sherman was an actual accomplice, and not a feigned accomplice.
The judge's charge to the jury, and the admission of testimony, were based on the theory that the witness and prosecutor, Sherman, was an apparent or feigned accomplice. This question is disposed of in the discussion of bill No. 2. We will, as we have ascertained from the evidence in the record that the man Sherman was a feigned accomplice, treat him in discussing the following bills as an ordinary witness.
Before doing so, however, we will notice that part of defendant's complaint to the inconsistency of the judge's instructions to the jury.
In one part of the charge the trial judge says that if the giver of a bribe acted merely with a view to secure the detection and conviction of the accused, and the latter accepted the bribe with the intent to be influenced thereby, he is guilty, and the other part of the charge is that the State must establish beyond a reasonable doubt, all the material averments in the indictment, to-wit: "That the defendant, a member of the City Council and a municipal officer, in such capacity, received one hundred dollars from Sherman as a bribe, present aud reward, which was corruptly given to him by said Sherman."
Here were two charges on two different theories of the case, one by the State, that Sherman was a feigned accomplice, and the other by tbe accused, that he was an actual accomplice under the averments of the indictment. We think the charge is not objectionable; certainly, it did the accused no injury, as it was based on the theory of his defence.
Bill No. 1 in the record has reference to the testimony of one Henry Lochte. Considering Sherman to be an ordinary witness, Lochte's testimony is objected to on the ground that it was the statement of a collateral fact, and in no way connected with the act of bribery committed on the 29th of August, 1894, and in no way tended to confirm the testimony of Sherman, and was irrelevent and heresay.
The testimony of this witness is to the effect that some five days prior to the date of the offence with which the defendant is charged, Sherman, the prosecuting witness, said to him that the defendant wanted one hundred dollars to get him, the witness, a permit to run a barroom in his place of business; that he told the witness that the proper place for him to go was before the grand jury. Sherman said he would go, but he first wanted to get his permit. After the arrest of defendant, he saw Sbarman in company with one O'Mally at his store, and the visit of these men was to see about the proposition made to him by Dudoussat.
For the admission of this testimony the trial judge assigned as a reason that fabrications, improper motives and prevarication had been imputed to the witness Sherman,'and on the ground that Sherman was an apparent accomplice, he permitted the testimony to be received to confirm the statements of the witness Sherman, which had been assailed, those statements being prior to and were similar statements made by the witness, and made at an unsuspicious time.
" Where the opposing case is that the witness testified under corrupt motives, or where the impeaching evidence goes to charge the witness with a recent fabrication of his testimony, it is but proper that such evidence should be rebutted." Whart. Crim. Ev., Sec. 192.
The case of State vs. Cady, 46 An. 1347, sustains this doctrine. In this case the general character of the witness was not attacked for truth and veracity, but particular facts were charged as false and fabricated. Hence it was competent to show that at a time unsuspicious he made similar statements as to the facts contradicted.
But we think under the facts of this case the evidence was material and important, and had direct bearing upon the issues presented, and were, in fact, a part of the transaction, to understand which it was essential that these facts should have been narrated.
If the "trap " prepared and arranged by the witness Sherman, O'Malley and certain newspaper reporters and a sergeant of police, to procure evidence of bribery against the witness stood alone, it would at once appear that it was an inducement, an opportunity offered, and a temptation presented to commit the crime. The defendant, under such a. state of facts, would have been entitled to a verdict of not guilty.
It was essential therefore to show that the defendant proposed to commit the crime, and the means employed were not used as an inducement or temptation, but for the purpose of securing the evidence. From the testimony embodied in the bills of exception it appears that the defendant had made up his mind to commit the of-fence., and had made a proposition to the witness that for one hundred dollars he would, in his official capacity as councilman, procure him a permit to conduct a barroom. The application for the license was pending whon the trap was laid. These matters had been sworn to by Sherman. They were contradicted as being fabricated. There can be no doubt, therefore, that prior statements similar to those made on the trial, made at an unsuspicious time, were legal and competent testimony, and were, in fact, a part of the transaction necessary to disclose, in order to convict the defendant.
We are not disposed to commend the means employed in this particular case, and, under the circumstances, they were of such character as to leave but little discrimination between prosecutor and accused. The defendant might have escaped disgrace if the opportunity had not been presented. But he had proposed to commit the crime, and seized the opportunity presented to do so.
Bill No. 2 was reserved to a portion of the written charge, and is to the effect that the charge was erroneous, as it did not instruct the jury, that to constitute the crime of receiving a bribe there must co-exist on the part of the giver and receiver of the bribe a corrupt intent — one to influence the other, and the other to be influenced to vote or to exercise official power or perform official duty with partiality or favor. The bill, in effect, denies that there can be a feigned accomplice in bribery, and, therefore, the theory upon which the conviction was had is incorrect. The indictment charges as though the prosecuting witness was an accomplice. The charge as to him may has been groundless; he may be innocent of the charge, but the question is, was the charge properly made against defendant. In other words, could he commit the crime of bribery without the co-operation of the defendant? Was the joint act of both necessary?
The statute defining the offence is in the language of the article of the Constitution. It has a dual capacity. It charges two acts, and affixes to them the same designation and gives the same description, and imposes the same penalty; yet they are each distinct offences.
An analysis of the article of the Constitution and Act No. 78 of 1890 will show that it is made an offence to give a present or reward to any officer of the State or of a municipality with the intent to influence him in the discharge of official duty. Any officer so receiving such reward or present is also charged with the same offence — bribery. They are intimately associated, it is true, and the words so receiving would at first reading incline one to the opinion that there necessarily must be co-existent the giving and taking with the intent charged in the statute. The giver may tender with the intent to corruptly influence, and the acceptor may receive without such intent — the present or reward. Unquestionably, the giver would be guilty of a violation of the statute. And so the acceptor may take a present innocently tendered, yet if it should be proved that it influenced his official action, he would also be guilty of a violation of the statute.
We are of the opinion that the statute does not require a mutual or reciprocal agreement to commit the crime of bribery.
Bill No. 3. After the judge had charged the jury, twelve additional special charges were tendered to him, which he refused, and gave his reason for refusing each special instruction. Special charge No. 1 was refused because the trial judge had in substance given the same in his general charge. This was sufficient. When he correctly announces the law in his own language, he is not required to give the same instructions to the jury in the language of counsel.
Nos. 2. and 3 have been passed upon by this court, and No. 4 has been passed upon in this opinion. The refusel to charge as requested in No. 6 is stated by the judge to be that he had already charged that there was a marked distinction between artifices used to detect persons suspected of being engaged in criminal acts and means used to tempt those to commit such acts. In his charge, the judge stated, "it is legitimate to adopt such measures as may be deemed necessary to detect crime, provided the means used do not amount to a practical inducement or solicitation to commit it." This instruction is supported by the authorities. Under the evidence introduced it was competent for a jury to determine whether the accused was a feigned or an actual accomplice. The record shows all the facts necessary to form a conclusion on this point went to the jury. The special instruction, therefore, was properly refused. No. 7 is practically the same as above. Nos. 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 relate to the corroboration of the testimony of accomplices, which has already been disposed of. The general charge in all matters referred to therein, and to which the special charges alluded, covered all the. matter, not so much in detail, but sufficiently in substance, to intelligently inform the jury of the law applicable to the case. Those which were refused have'been fully discussed herein, sustaining the trial judge in his ruling.
Bill No. 4. The defendanf asked a witness: " What did Sherman, the prosecuting witness, or one of the witnesses of the State, say about his father and mother," to show that the prosecuting witness was not named Sherman, but that he had assumed said name to cover up his idendity and to discredit his general reputation. The question was objected to by the District Attorney and the objection sustained. 'The evidence was irrelevant and immaterial, and the ruling was correct.
There is nothing in the motion for a new trial to attract our atten - tion except the oral instructions of the judge to the jury, who came into court, on failing to agree, and these oral instructions were then given. The counsel for the accused were not present. They were looked for but could not be communicated with. It was not essential that they should have been present.
It appears that in the early stage of the case the attorneys for the defence had requested a written charge. This was given as requested. When the jury returned into court, in the absence of a bill of exception reciting the oral charge, we will presume that the judge only reiterated what was in his written charge.
It does not appear that any instructions as to the law in the case were given to the jury.
The oral instructions were simply in reference to the jury's inability to agree upon a verdict. The judge told the jury that it was exceedingly desirable that they should agree as soon as possible, and that the court had no desire to coerce them; that jurors were sometimes stubborn and held out to the end, assigning no reasons for their stubbornness; that he hoped the jury possessed no such feeling. Some jurors might think it humiliating to yield their opinion, but they should listen to the views of others and arrive at an honest verdict. If it were an ordinary case he would order a mistrial, but as the case was one of importance he would not do so without mature deliberation. We fail to perceive any coercion of the jury, or any wrong inflicted upon the defendant, or any reason why there should be a new trial because of the absence of defendant's counsel at this interview between judge and jury. State vs. Green, 7 An. 518.
If a case should occur where the trial judge should force a verdict against the accused by prolonging the deliberations of the jury beyond a reasonable period, imposing upon them physical suffering and endangering their health, it will be time for an expression of opinion as to the relief prayed for by the defendant. The instant case affords no opportunity for an expression of an opinion on this subject.
The witness, Sherman, was indicted as an accomplice. The defendant's counsel urge that this operates as an estoppel, and the State can not deny that fact, and that the introduction of evidence and the rules applicable to the same must be governed by this fact.
We know of no law which applies the doctrine of estoppel in criminal trials. The State might indict A for the murder of B. A might be acquitted. This would not estop the State from punishing 0, the real criminal.
Judgment affirmed.