Case Name: Moss Point Lumber Company v. Harrison County
Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Mississippi
Decision Date: 1906-11
Citations: 89 Miss. 448
Docket Number: 
Parties: Moss Point Lumber Company v. Harrison County.
Judges: Whitfield, O. J., dissented.
Reporter: Mississippi Reports
Volume: 89
Pages: 448–587

Head Matter:
Moss Point Lumber Company v. Harrison County.
[42 South. Rep., 290, 873.]
1. School Lands. Sixteenth sections. Code 1880, § 732. Leases. Construction.
A conveyance by tbe board of supervisors- of sixteenth section school land, under Code 1880, § 732, authorizing the same for a term of ninety-nine years, is, under the statute, a mere lease, the estate conveyed a leasehold, governed by the principles applicable to estates for years, and it does not give a right in the fee.
2. Same. Waste. Liability of tenant.
A tenant for years, unless exempted by the terms of his lease, is liable for waste as an incident of the character of his estate, without reference to the number of years his tenancy may run.
3. Same. Statute of Marlbridge. Statute of Gloucester.
While the English statutes of Marlbridge and Gloucester, declaring a tenant for years liable for waste, have no force as statutes in Mississippi,' the principle announced by them is a part of the law of the state.
4. Same. Loads governing leases. Repeals. Code 1880, § 3.
A lease of school lands for a term of ninety-nine years, made in 1882 in conformity with Code 1880, § 732, prescribing how sixteenth section school lands should be leased, is to be construed according to the provisions of that code; all preceding acts upon the subject having been repealed by Code 1880, § 3, providing that all acts and parts of acts the subject whereof were revised, consolidated, and reenacted1 in said code should be repealed.
5.Same. Loads 1818, 1824, 1833. Declaratory statutes.
The sixteenth section acts of 1818 and 1824, while expressly prohibiting a tenant of sixteenth section school lands from committing waste, did not create liability, but merely declared the common law rule on the subject, and the omission of the provision from the act of 1833 and subsequent acts did not affect a tenant’s liability for waste.
6. Same. Construction.
The phrase, “the right, title, use, interest, and occupation,” as used in the statutes providing that lessees of school lands shall be vested with “the right, title, use, interest, and occupation of” the lands, must be construed as used in connection with the character of the estate which is authorized to be conveyed, which is a leasehold estate, and it conveys only such right, title, use, interest, and occupation as go with a leasehold estate.
7. Same. Laws 1833. Construction.
The act of 1833, authorizing the leasing of sixteenth section school lands for ninety-nine years, did not affect a tenant’s liability for waste as declared in the act of 1818, providing for three-year leases, and the act of 1824, providing for five-year leases.
8. Same. What constitutes waste. Timber cutting.
The cutting of timber' for commercial purposes by a tenant for years is waste. ,
9. Same. Extent of tenant’s right.
A tenant for years. may cut timber for clearing so much of the leased premises as the needs of his family and himself may require, and he may clear for cultivation such portions 'as a prudent owner in fee would clear for that purpose, leaving necessary timber for the permanent use of the inheritance.
10. Same. Rule for determining waste.
What constitutes waste by a tenant for a term of years is determined by a consideration as to whether or not an act done results in injury to the inheritance; and whether or not an act is waste is determined by the conditions which exist at the time the act is committed.
11. Same. Timber valueless at date of lease.
A tenant for years-is guilty of waste if he cut timber from the leased premises for sale and use it beyond his right as tenant, although it was valueless at the time of the making of the lease.
12.. Same. Purposes of the lease. Presumptions.
A lessee of sixteenth section school land is presumed, in the absence of a stipulation in the lease to the contrary, to have taken the land for agricultural purposes and only with such rights as go with a lease of lands.
13. Same. Liability of an assignee.
The assignee of a ninety-nine-year lease of sixteenth section school lands who commits waste thereon by cutting the timber for commercial purposes, is liable therefor just as the original tenant would have been.
14. Same. Duty of courts. Condition of country.
To ascertain the rights of a lessee of sixteenth section school lands for a term of ninety-nine years, the courts must, where the terms of the lease are plain and the rights which go with it measured by law, seek the true definition of the term “lease” and cannot depart therefrom because of the conditions of the country at the time the lease was made.
15. Same. Statutory construction.
The provisions of the statute authorizing the leasing of sixteenth section school lands for ninety-nine years, which required the lessees to pay taxes and gave them the right to sue for waste, were not inconsistent with the idea that they took only a lease-
• hold estate and did not enlarge such estate into a freehold.
16. Coubts. Rule of Decision. Stare Decisis.
Where a question has been settled by the supreme court, it should be treated as no longer open for review, 'unless the evil resulting from the principle established be manifest and mischievous.
From: tbe chancery court of Harrison county.
Hon. Thaddeus A. Wood, Chancellor.
Harrison county, the appellee, was complainant in the court below; the lumber company, the appellant, was defendant there.
From a decree overruling a demurrer to the bill of complainant the defendant appealed to the supreme court. The facts are fully stated in the several opinions delivered in the case.
The case was twice decided; at first the decree apjiealed from was reversed and remanded and the suit dismissed; upon suggestion of error a rehearing was granted — Justice Truly leaving the bench and being succeeded by Justice Mayes after the first decision and before the second hearing. The second decision affirmed the decree, from which the appeal was taken.
Ford & White, and Green & Green, for appellant.
While the lease in controversy was made under the code of 1880, it is necessary to consider and define the status of sixteen sections, from the beginning.
1. The United States acquired title to Mississippi territory by the cession from the state of Georgia of April 24, 1802, Hutch. Code, 1848, pp. 55, 56, whereby: “The state of Georgia cedes to the United States all the right, title and claim which the said state has to the jurisdiction and soil of the, land situated,” etc.
Then by the first clause of said cession it is provided that out of the proceeds of the sales of the lands ceded to the United States, Georgia was to be first paid $1,250,000; and, third, “that all lands ceded by the agreement to the United States, after satisfying the above-mentioned payments of $1,250,000 to the state of Georgia, and the grants recognized by the preceding conditions, be considered as a common fund of the United States, Georgia included,” etc.
By the act of congress, May 10, 1800, 2 U. S. Stat., p. 69,-supplemental to the act authorizing the establishment of Mississippi territory, section 7, it is provided: “That nothing in this act shall in any respect impair the right.of the state of Georgia to the jurisdiction, or of the said state, or any person or persons to the soil of said territory, but the rights and claims of the said state, and all persons interested, are hereby declared to be affirmed and available as,if this act had never been made;” and by section 10 the commissioners appointed were authorized to compromise, and-to receive on behalf of the United States a cession of any lands therein mentioned, or of the jurisdiction thereof on such terms as to them shall appear reasonable.”
It thus appears that under this act Georgia had the title to the lands in 1800, and provision was then made for acquiring Georgia’s title by the United States, and this was done by the Georgia cession of 1802.
Whether the United States took title, as trustee, under the Georgia cession, as held in Jones v. Madison County, 72 Miss., 777 (s.c., 18 South. Rep., 87), supra, or not, this essential proposition is conceded by both lines of contention; viz: That the sixteenth sections were a trust for school purposes with the inhabitants of the township as cesiui que trust.
The decisions of our court prior to J ones v. Madison County, had uniformly held that the title to these lands was ill the United States, with power in the state, within the limits of the trust, to make regulations in regard thereto. Moretón v Grenada, 8 Smed. & M., 773 (1847), per Sharkey; Phillips v. B-urrus, 13 Smed. & M., 36 (1849), per Sharkey; Hester v. Crisler, 36 Miss.,. 681 (1859), per Harris; Windham v. Chisholm, 35 Miss., 531 (1858), per Handy; Babb v. Supervisors, 62 Miss., 594 (1894), per Arnold; Chamberlain v. Lawrence Co., 71 Miss., 985 (s.c., 15 South. Rep., 40) (1894), per Cooper; and while these cases, we insist, set forth the correct rule, they were overruled by Jones v. Madison County, supra. The presumption would be that this court will follow its own last decision and leave the final decision of these matters to the federal courts, it being a federal question.
The rules announced in Jones v. Madison County favor our contention here, for it is there expressly decided that the lands were a trust for the inhabitants of the township. It matters not who the trustee is, the rights of the cestui que trust cannot be legislatively or otherwise impaired.
The court, with all deference, in Jones v. Madison County, 72 Miss., 777 (s.c., 18 South. Rep., 87), fell into' error by relying upon Gaines v. Nicholson, 9th TIow., U. S., and upon the assumption that the state of Georgia, and not the United States, was donor, and in following Long v. Brown, 4 Ala., and other cases, contrary to the express decision of Trustee v. Slate, 14 How., U. S., supra.
The clear distinction between Long v. Brown, 4 Ala., as re cited in Jones v. Madison County, p. 799-800, and the status • of these titles in Mississippi is that the act of congress admitting Alabama as a state declared that sixteenth sections shall be granted to the inhabitants of such township for the use of schools, while the act of congress admitting Mississippi contains no such provision. Hutch. Code, p. 59.
It is difficult to understand that the supreme judges of this state, who were familiar with the early history of the state, and of the reasons for the act of 1833, Hutch. Code, 213, 214, should have, from’ the earliest times, and contemporaneously with the happening of the events, interpreted these acts of congress as being the source of the title to the sixteenth sections, and in holding that the legal title was and continued to be in the Hnited States, if that had not been the true interpretation. This was the interpretation by congress in the passage of the act of congress of 1852, code of 1857, p. 696. This was the accepted interpretation of these titles by the supreme court of the Hnited States, by congress, by the legislature, and by the supreme court of this state for a great number of years, and it was for the court in Jones v. Madison County to erroneously discover, for the first time, that this interpretation was a mistake. Judge Cooper, who delivered the opinion in the ease of Jones v. Madison County, had concurred in the opinion of Bolivar County v. Coleman, 71 Miss., 832, in which it was held that if the record did not affirmatively show the consent of the heads.of families, the lease was void, and this was overruled by. Jones v. Madison County. Neither court nor counsel cited or referred'to Davany v. Koon, 45 Miss., 71, on this point, which disapproved Phillips v. Doe, 13 Smed. & M., 35, and approved Wray v. Doe, 10 Smed. & M., 453, as applicable to leases under the act of 1833 and the act of 1841, and applying the maxim Omnia rite esse acta presumuntur.
There is no reference in “An ordinance for the government of the Territory of the Hnited States northwest of the Hi ver Ohio,” of July 13, 1787 (Laws, etc., relating to Public Lands, p. 256), to the sixteenth sections. The only parts of said ordinance pertinent to the origin of Mississippi is transcribed into Hutchinson’s Code, p. 53.
Under “An ordinance for ascertaining the mode of disposing qf lands in the Western Territory,” May 1785 (Laws, etc., relating to Public Lands), two years before the ordinance for the government of the northwest territory, it was provided: That the territory ceded by individual states to the United States which had been purchased of the Indian inhabitants shall be disposed of as follows: Surveys are to be made, and “There shall' be reserved for the United States, out of every township, the four lots, being numbered 8, 11, 26, 29, and out of every fractional part of a township so many lots of the same number as shall be found therein for further sale. There shall be reserved the lot No. 16 of every township for the maintenance of public schools within said township,” etc.
Ordinance 23 (Laws, etc., relating to Public'Lands, p. 362), styled “Powers of the board of treasury to contract for the sale of the western territory,” of July 13, 1787, authorizes the board of treasury to contract for the sale of certain tracts of land to be surveyed and contents ascertained by the United States geographer, the purchaser within seven years to lay off the tract into townships and fractions according to the land ordinance of May 20, 1785; “the lot No. 16 in each township, or fractional part of township, to be given perpetually for the purposes contained in said ordinance.” And this purpose was for “the maintenance of public schools within said township.”
The title to the land composing the state of Mississippi was, in 1802, under this Georgia cession, vested in the United States.
The United States then proceeded to dispose of the lands thus vested in it, and by the act of 1803, Hutch. Code, 1848, p. 563, it established a commission to settle the British and Span ish titles, and to sell the lands to pay Georgia, and generally to dispose of said lands by sale; and congress, by section 12 of that act, Hutch. Code, 568, for the first time, and long prior to the survey of the lands, reserved the sixteenth sections in each township from sale, providing: “That all the lands aforesaid, not otherwise disposed of, excepted by virtue of preceding sections of this act, shall, with the exception of the section number sixteen, which shall be reserved in each township for the support of schools within the same ... be offered for sale,” etc.
Thus the trust is created by congress not in or for the state, but the title to the land then being in the United States was reserved from sale “for the support of schools within the same” (township).
Congress proceeded, after creating this trust, to make it effective by the creation of trustees; and so, prior to the organization of the state and prior to its admission, congress passed the act of 1815 (3 IT. S. Stats., p. 163), providing that the county courts in each county in Mississippi Territory are authorized to appoint not exceeding five agents “who shall have power to let out or lease for the purpose of improving the same the sections of land reserved by congress for the support of schools lying within the county, for which the agents respectively are appointed, or to let them out at an annual rent, as they shall judge proper,” and said agents, under the direction of the county courts, shall impartially apply the proceeds arising from the rents of each section to the purpose of education and to no other use whatsoever, within the particular township, “according to the true intent of the reservation made by congress,” and in every case, whether of lease for the improvement of the lots, or for an annual rent, the lessee “shall be bound -in a suitable penalty not to commit waste on the premises by destroying of timber or removing of stone, or any other damage that may be done to the same, whether by persons residing thereon or others, the damage to' be divided one-half to the agents and one-half to the same purpose as the proceeds of rent from the land. That every lease made under this act shall be limited to the period of the territorial form of government in said territory, and shall cease to have force or effect after the first day of January next succeeding the establishment of a state government.”
Under this act of congress the policy of leasing for a short period of time or term was established, and, in contemplation of the early organization of the state, it was provided that the leases should expire with the territorial government in 1817. It is to be noted, also, that this act of congress, as does the code of 1892, confers the power of appointment of these agents or trustees upon the county court — board of supervisors.
Two years later, in 1817, congress passed the act enabling the people to organize Mississippi as a state. Hutch. Code, p. 59. Under this act the constitution of 1817 was ordained.
This court, in Jones v. Madison Gounty, has gone over the phases of the question as to the source of the title, and has decided the proposition as to the federal questions set up against our contentions. But if Jones v. Madison Gounty is right, which we deny, still our position is sound.
In Trustees of Vincennes University v. State of Indiana, 14 How., 268, 274, supra, it was held: “In the states where school lands have been reserved, the legislatures have enacted laws to carry out and effectuate the benign policy of the general government. Special authority has been given to individuals elected, in the respective townships, to lease the lands, sue for rents, etc., exercising, to some extent, corporate powers. The citizens within the township are the beneficiaries of the charity. The title to these lands has never been considered as vested in the state; and it has no inherent power to sell them, or to appropriate them to any other purpose than for the benefit of schools. For the exercise of the charity under the lease, the title is in the township. No patent has been issued by the federal government, in such cases, as it has not been considered necessary. For the sale of school lands the consent of congress has been obtained, as that changes the character of the fund,” and, that the title remained in abeyance upon the creation of the trust until the lands were surveyed, and until the appointment of trustees for the township; and that the trust was a private one for the citizens of the township; and not a delegation of governmental functions, and that it is beyond the power of the legislature to divest the title out of the township trustees, or to legislate prejudicially to the trust (p. 275-6). See also Ould v. Washington Hospital, 95 H. S., 313.
It is particularly to be noted that this, being an interpretation by the federal court of federal statutes, and of a federal treaty —the Georgia cession — held that “for the exercise of the charity under the lease the title is in the township,” and 'that it was beyond the power of the state to divest the title out of the township trustees.
The legislature proceeded, after the act of congress became inoperative by its own terms, to execute what it believed to be the proper methods of dealing with the trust. The policy first adopted, as will be seen by reference to some of the acts, was 'that short leases (Act 1818, Hutch Code, 205), three years and five years, etc., should be made (Acts 1824, pp. 17, 19). The trustees under these leases were empowered expressly to sue tenants and others for damages for cutting timber, etc. (sec. 4, p. 19). See also Acts 1830 (Acts 1824-1836, p. 253), for leasing by trustees for twelve years in Claiborne county; act of 1830 (Acts, 1824-1836, p. 302), authorizing trustees in Pike, Wayne, Jones, Covington and Copiah counties to lease for fifteen years; and Id., p. 330, those in Madison, Jefferson, Claiborne, Monroe and Lowndes at not less than $5 per acre, but by consent of the heads of families at not less than $2 per acre; and p. 332, authorizing the trustees of Wilkinson county to lease for five years; and reciting that transient persons, such as wood-cutters, are destroying the timber, and conferring the powers recited in sec. 4 (Act, 1824, supra), as to suing for cutting the timber; and it is to be noted that it required the creation of a statutory liability in these leases for years for cutting timber.
The acts of 1824, supra, was amended (Acts, 1824-1836, p. 91), by the acts of 1828, providing that the trustees of a certain township might lease for ninety-nine years at not less than $10 per acre.
Such was the discordant policy of the legislature prior to 1833, and it evidenced the necessity of a change of policy which would bring greater revenue to the township school fund and make these wild lands marketable. The short leases had proved failures. These sixteenth sections, in 1833, were primeval forests, and no one would accept a lease for these short terms, especially with all of their incidents of liability for waste under said section 4. The acts of 1824, as also the act of congress of 1815, in making thé tenants liable for cutting the timber, and only permitting use of the timber for reasonable estovers, imposed conditions unsuited to the leasing of the lands in their then condition, and the then existing conditions in the state made a change imperative.
Think of leasing lands in 1833, without privilege of using’ the timber on it except for estovers, when the whole'state was a howling wilderness of forests. The Natchez trace was about the only road across the state; markets and produce non est, and Indians about the only inhabitants. Such was the condition of the state in 1833 that the trees were.a burden to the land, of no market value whatever, and were gladly burned to get them out of the way; in some degree like the delta country up to a few years ago, and before railroads penetrated it and made a market, and, hence, a value for timber.
Such were the conditions which confronted the legislature, in 1833, when it became absolutely necessary to do something with these sixteenth sections to make them produce a revenue to the township school fund.
The legislature, by the act of 1833, changed the whole system, and repealed all former ads. Acts, 1824-1836, 452 Codified, omitting repealing section, Hutch. Code, 1848, pp. 213, 214. Thereby the trustees at the request of the heads of families, were authorized, at auction, to “lease said section . . . for the term of ninety-nine years,” upon a credit of one, two, three and four years, with promissory notes, to “operate as a lien an’d special mortgage on the land . . . ; and it shall be the duty of said trustees on the final payment of the money . . . to convey the right, title, use, interest and occupation of said sections ... to the lessee or lessees for and during and until the full end and term of ninety-nine years.” (Italics ours.) The proceeds of sale of the lease were to be invested in the bank stock. Null payment was required before any title passed to the lessee. Sexton v. Board, 86 Miss., 380 (s.c., 38 South. Rep., 636), supra.
It will be at once noted that this was not to be an ordinary lease upon a rent reserved, hut the sale of a term in gross for a specific sum, and that term to be ninety-nine years. It is, also, to be noted that while all former acts - had authorized leases, they never, as did this one, prescribe the estate the grantor was to convey, and the words he was to use; and from this it- is manifest that the legislature intended that the sale should pass more than a mere ordinary leasehold interest. Calling it a lease does not make it one, if its legal effect be otherwise. Gunningham v. Davis, 62 Miss., 368.
Effect must be given to the operative words of the grant. Here the deed of the trustee, at the request of the heads of families (the cestui que trust), was to convey the right, title, use, interest and occupation of said sections, for, during and until the full end and term of ninety-nine years. These are not the apt words of a lease. The intent was that the pur chaser of the term of ninety-nine years, for a gross sum prepaid, should be more than a mere lessee; and that, for that period or term he should enjoy the estate as if he was owner. The language used to define the estate granted is the same as that used by the Georgia cession to the United States (TIutch. Code, p. 55), “right, title, interest,” etc. The grant was not only to convey the right, Ulle and interest, but also “the use and occupation::’J “At grant of the ‘title’ in the strict application to real property, denotes a collection of all the facts of ownership.” 26 Am. & Eng. Ency. Law (1st ed.), p. 20, note 1.
So if the grant had stopped with the “title” for the term of ninety-nine years it would have vested in the grantee “all of the facts of ownership,” and this would mean the enjoyment during that period of the right of property, right of possession and possession.
A deed conveying the “right, title and interest” in land passes the estate of the grantor in the land then existing. Brown v. Jackson, 3 Wheaton, 452; Allison v. Thomas, 72 Cal., 564; Bramlett v. Roberts, 68 Miss., 323 (s.c., 10 South. Hep., 56); Ghapman v. Sims, 53 Miss., 154.
If the owner grants the “right, title and interest” and the “use and occupation” in land during ninety-nine years, it would pass title to the grantee 'to the land with all of the incidents of ownership during that period.
The covenant for use and occupation is one for quiet-enjoyment, and was added manifestly to exclude the implication that a covenant for the quiet enjoyment was not embraced in the lease. 18 Am. & Eng. Ency. Law (2d ed.), 612.
The rule is that the terms of the deed are to be construed most favorably to the grantee; and- this rule applies to even public grants where a consideration is paid for them. 17 Am. & Eng. Ency. Law (2d ed.), 14, 15. The grant of the “right, title and interest” of the trustee and of the cestui que trust is incompatible with any reserved right in the reversioner. Dur ing that period the deed creates a determinable fee to end upon the passage of ninety-nine years. The language is not as ordinarily used, “demise, lease and to farm let,” during the term of ninety-nine years, 18 Am. & Eng. Ency. Law (2d ed.), 599, ■but this broader and more comprehensive language is directed to be used in the enabling act. Theretofore, the acts directed a lease without prescribing the terms of the grant; and this created merely a lease, and with the incidents of the act of 1824, sec. 4, of statutory liability for injury to the reversion. But this act of 1824 is repealed by the act of 1833, and the new grant is authorized upon new terms, without liability for waste, and creating a new and different estate in the grantee. The very language used in this act of 1833 is shown to have been the work of a lawyer. It avoids the use of the apt words of a lease; it guards against the implication against a covenant for quiet enjoyment; it provides that the estate is to continue, not as ordinarily, for and during the full term of ninety-nine years, but “for and during and until the full end and term of ninety-nine years.” It reserves a lien for the purchase money, not upon the leasehold interest, but to “operate as a lien and special mortgage on the land.” Instead of rent reserved it requires prepayment of purchase money before any title vests. Bextion v. Board, supra.
The leasehold, as a separate entity, is specially subjected to taxation, and it is the only title of any lessee or lease which was expressly and separately taxed from the reversion in the land; and then only such are taxed as were made after the act of 1833 (Revenue act of 1841, Hutch. Code, p. 188) ; and in case of sale for taxes “the title of the lessee. . . . shall be conveyed.” Hutch. Code, 188-9. To confirm this interpretation the act of 1841 (Hutch Code, p. 221) amending the act of 1833, provided:
“The lessees of the sixteenth sections, and all other school lands, shall be authorized to, and may maintain and carry on, all such suits at law or in equity, immediately after the leasing, as they could or might maintain or carry on were they the fee simple owners of the leased premises except against the lessors.”
If all rights of action of fee simple owners were vested in the lessee against the world, except the lessors, then, it is conclusive evidence that their estate was more than a lease.
The lessee under this act of 1833 could sue in trespass for cutting trees, an injury to the reversion, under this act, as was expressly held in Davany v. Koon3 45 Miss., 71. This could only be sustained on the ground that the trees belonged to the lessee and not to the reversioner.
There is no requirement that the proceeds of such recovery should be accounted for by the lessee to the lessors. Manifestly, this act of 1841 conferred the same rights of action as to the property as if the lessee was owner in fee, and, thus, is affirmatively declared the construction for which we contend. That more was intended than an ordinary lease is clear from the amendments thereto by Arts., Hutch. Code, 19, 24, 26, pp. 219, 221, 226. 'The calls of the grant can only be satisfied by vesting a determinable fee in the grantee during the period of ninety-nine years.
The legislature manifestly thought that such was the effect of the grant, for after these grants, the matter so vital, ordinarily, as these sixteenth sections, lapsed into forgetfulness. The code of 1857 only renews the taxation of the leases, and has nothing to say as to the sixteenth sections. Thirty-six years afterwards, and after the constitution of 1869, in the new atmosphere after the war, there were provisions in the code of 1871, ch. 39, in regard thereto, and the title to the sixteenth sections was there treated as vested in the lessees, as is shown by sec. 2056, code of 1871, validating contracts for the purchase money.
There is nothing in qny of the codes, nor since the act of 1824, giving the right to sue for cutting timber, or for waste, or creating any liability therefor. A statutory lease must be measured by the statue and not by the common law.
The trustees became a quasi corporation against whom the statute of limitation ran. Marshall v. Hamilton, 41 Miss., 229 ; Carmichael v. Trustees, 2 How. (Miss.), 84; Connell v. Woodward, 5 How. (Miss.), 665; Bishop v. McDonald, 27 Miss., 371; Pressley v. Ellis, 48 Miss., 575; Brown v. Supervisors, 54 Miss., 233; Jones v. Madison County, 72 Miss., 806 (s.c., 18 South. Hep., 87).
Such is the status of the leases under the act of 1833.
In 1880, ch. 16, code of 1880, secs. 732-744, the legislation confirms this interpretation, and as the lease in the instant case arises under the code of 1880, its provisions should be carefully noted.
Section- 732 provides that “whenever a majority of the resident heads of families (minors and females not excepted)” the cestui que trust, shall petition therefor the board of supervisors shall appoint “three intelligent citizens of the township to appraise said land, who shall do so, and make report, under oath, to such board of the value of such land; and thereupon, said board of supervisors shall direct that said land be leased to the highest bidder for the term of ninety-nine years” (Italics ours.)
It is to be noted that the land, not the term of ninety-nine years, and as if for the sale of the entire interest therein, is to be valued.
Section 733 provides that said lease shall be made “under the direction of the president of the board of supervisors, or of some person or persons appointed therefor by the board of supervisors, for ninety-nine years, on a credit of one, two, three and four years,” to be evidenced by promissory notes, with good sureties, payable to the president of the board of supervisors, and said notes, with interest, “shall operate as a lien and special mortgage on the lands until the payment thereof,” and the president of the board of supervisors shall execute and deliver to the lessees of said lands a written lease thereof, for the period of ninety-nine years, the said lessee paying the expense of the execution and delivery of such instrument. (Italics ours.)
By section 734 the majority of the resident heads of families may by petition have such leasing for any number less than ninety-nine years.
Section 735 provides, "In ño ease shall said lands be leased for less than their appraised value,- and in all cases sufficient sureties shall be required of the lessee for the performance of his obligation, whether the lease be for ninety-nine years, or a less term.”
By section 736 the notes shall be delivered to the county treasurer and be collected by him, and if not paid, shall by him be placed in the hands of the district attorney for suit, and the money when collected may be loaned as the board of supervisors may direct, the interest thereon to be paid over to the township trustees elected by the inhabitants of that township.
Section 737 applies to divided townships.
Section 738 provides that the money derived from the sale or lease of section number sixteen, or other section in lieu thereof, reserved by act of congress of the United States, shall be applied for the support of schools within the township for which such section of land was so reserved.
By section 739 the board of supervisors is given the management and control of such money, and, in case of division of township between two counties, to apportion it.
Section 740 provides that on the money arising from the sale or lease of sixteenth sections, the interest shall be annually applied for the support of schools, “within the township for which such section was reserved by act of congress” . . . “and the trustee of such township may institute any proper legal or equitable proceedings to compel a due observance of the rights of the inhabitants of the township, as to the money arising from the disposition of said school section.” (Italics ours.) By section 741 “the heads of families in any township may elect three trustees for such township to represent the inhabitants thereof, in all matters pertaining to the section number sixteen . . . or ■ the money arising from any disposition of such section, which trustees shall have the power to receive, manage and control the annual income from said land or money, and shall apply it for the support of schools within said township, in such manner as to secure the benefits thereof to the inhabitants of such township; and said trustees may maintain all actions or suits which may be'necessary to secure to the inhabitants of the township their rights to the sixteenth section thereof or other land in lieu thereof or the income arising therefrom, for the support of schools within such township.” Section 742 provides for the election of trustees, and section 743 for use of unidentified money. And by section 744 it is provided: “The board of supervisors of any county may sue for and collect any money due for any school land or money loaned or in any manner due, which constitutes any part of a school fund to be applied for the support of schools in such county.”
It is particularly to be noted that the code of 1880 provides for a valuation of the land, and for a lease of ninety-nine years at not less than such valuation, and at a gross sum,- but does not require pre-payment of purchase money to vest title, security being substituted for such reservation of title. The trustees are provided for, and it is more than once repeated that the sixteenth sections were “reserved by act of congress.” Under these provisions, as under the act of 1833, the lessee takes a qualified fee for the ninety-nine years. The purchase price represents not less than the value of the land; the dominant idea being that a lease for ninety-nine years — as long as the average of three lives — carries with it more than the ordinary incidents of a lease.
In Montague v. Smith, 13 Mass., 403, a lease for nine hun dred and ninety-nine years was regarded, to all intents and purposes, a fee simple estate charged with a ground rent.
By Acts 1884, p. 90, the trustees were required to give bond, and by Acts 1886, p. 33, the trustees were required to file an account, semi-annually, with the clerk of the board of supervisors, and 'code of 1880, sec. 739, was so amended that the board of supervisors “may maintain all actions and suits necessary to secure to the inhabitants of the township their rights to such section or other land, with proceeds, rental or income thereof.”
And said section 741 was so amended that “in case the board of supervisors shall reject or refuse to secure the inhabitants of the township their right to said section or money arising therefrom, or the income or rental thereof, if the board of supervisors shall fail to pay over to said trustees any such income or annual rental when collected as provided in section 736, the said trustees may maintain any suit necessary to secure to state (such) inhabitants of the township their rights to said section or money, or to the proceeds, income or annual rental therefrom.”
Nothing is said in the code of 1880, nor in this act of 1886, as to any suits for waste. The controlling idea is that the land itself had passed, when leased, beyond any present interest, and attention is given to taking care of the money arising therefrom.
Chapter 123, code of 1892,' proceeds upon the same theory, and seeks to ascertain the status of the title, and when the leases will expire, and to care for the money arising from the leases; but not since Laws 1824, § 4, supra, has there been any statute in regard to suits against timber cutters for waste.
It is true that in Chamberlain v. Lawrence County, 71 Miss. (1894), 949 (s.o., 11 South. Rep., 40), .under sec. 744, code of 1880, supra, because the money if recovered would constitute a part of the school fund, held that the board of supervisors could sue a stranger in trespass for damages for cutting trees on the school land, and that the title and possession of the land, if it had never been lawfully leased by public authority, remained in the United States, which cannot be disseized. This case could hardly be maintained in holding that because the money would belong to the school fund, if recovered, that a suit could be maintained in trespass quare by a stranger to the legal title. It is overruled in its holding that because the title was in the United States it could not be disseized by Jones v. Madison Gounty, 72 Miss., supra. It refers as authority to Code 1880, § 744, ignoring the amendment by the act of 1886, and holds, directly opposite to Babb v. Supervisors, 62 Miss., supra, that under the code of 1880 the board could sue. This section 744, or the amendment by the act of 1886, was not brought forward in the code of 1892, and, .hence, cannot now avail.
To maintain trespass quare the plaintiff must have title and possession. Gathings v. Miller, 76 Miss., 651 (s.o., 24 South. Pep., 964) ; Page v. Davidson, 22 111., Ill, supra; 22 Ency. PL &'Pr., 1906, supra.
A disseizee cannot maintain trespass quare until re-entry. Alliance Trust Co. v. Hardwood Go., 74 Miss., 588 (s.o., 21 South. Pep., 396) ; Wesson v. Miller, 58 Miss., 831; Ghamberlain v. Board, 71 Miss., supra.
In Davany v. Koon, 45 Miss. (April, 1871), 71, supra, it was held that the lessees under the act of 1833, and under the act of 1841, supra, could maintain trespass and recover for cutting- trees from sixteenth sections. The court saying, p. 75: “The township trustees, and, in special1 circumstances, the board of police, are authorized by law to sell for a limited time the school lands.”'
With this judicial interpretation of the status of the lessee, and of the effect of the lease, the code of 1880 was enacted, providing for the sale (lease) of the lands for a limited term at not less than the appraised value of the lands.
The decision in Davany v. Koon is incompatible with any right in the lessor to recover for cutting the trees. This interpretation is confirmed by Bond v. Griffin, 74 Hiss. (1897), 599 (s.c., 22 South. Rep., 187), where the lessee recovered in replevin the value of the trees cut and removed by a trespasser— the logs not being found.
Also,' by Stale v. Fitzgerald, 76 Hiss. (1898), 502 (s.c., 24 South. Rep., 872), under code of 1892, where the state purchased at tax sale the interest of the lessee of the sixteenth section, and the state, as such purchaser, brought replevin against a trespasser for the timber cut and removed, and recovered therein. The title of the lessee only, under the statute, could be sold for taxes, and upon the lessees’ title this recovery for the timber was held.
Thus by three decisions the title of the lessee to the timber, even after it lias been cut and removed, has been maintained.
In Learned v. Ogden, 80 Hiss., 769 (s.c., 32 South. Rep., 278), it was held as between the tenant by the curtesy and the reversioner that when trees are severed for profit they become personalty, and in which the tenant by operation of law has no interest, and that the reversioner may maintain an action therefor, or for damages to the inheritance.
The rule is different with a tenant for years. He is not liable for waste at common law. His liability for waste was created by statute of Harlebridge, Hen. Ill; 1 Wash. Real. Prop. (6th ed.), 270; 2 Hinors Inst., p. 112; 2 Taylor Land & T. (9th ed.), sec. 686.
This statute of Harlebridge is not a part of the jurisprudence of Hississippi. Jordan v. Roach, 32 Hiss., 482.
Section 4, Acts 1824, created a liability for waste, but that was repealed by the act of 1833, and has never been re-enacted.
The case of Warren County v. Gans, 80 Hiss., 76 (s.c., 31 South. Rep., 539), varies from Davany v. Koonj Bond v. Griffin, and State v. Fitzgerald, supra, in some de gree, but we respectfully insist that case, so far as it militates against these cases, should not be followed. The court could not be blamed for being misled. It appears from the reported case that while the appellant filed an elaborate brief and made such erroneous contentions as that said sec. 4, act of 1824, was a part of the statutory scheme under the act of 1833, and without citation of any of the cases, supra, and contending that at common law the lessee was liable for waste; and the brief for appellee does not cite a single statute or authority to show that the common law rule as to tenants by operation of law as to waste did not apply; and so the court had the right to take for granted that the said rule of the common law was applicable.
The opinion makes no reference to the act of 1833, nor to other acts, nor to cases in this state, and contrary to Jordan v. Roach, supra, holds that the ancient English statutes are in force here.
That the lessee acquired more than a mere leasehold estate is further evidenced by the act of 1902, ch. 78, acts of 1902, which provides that upon proof made of existence of the lease, the court may decree confirmation of the title of the lessee “and such decree shall vest in the complainant a good and perfect title to the term of the lease for the time fixed in such decree.” If it is decreed that the lease was illegally made, that an account is to be taken of the amount of money, principal and interest, actually paid upon the lease, and of the rents, issues and profits arising from such land, less the cost of any necessary, permanent, valuable, and not ornamental improvements made upon the land. This is the equity rule of a bona fide purchaser for value. It is thus clear that the legislature interpreted valid leases to •confer a good and perfect title to the term of the lease; and even when there had been an invalid lease made, that there should be an accounting in good faith, in which the lessee should get back his money and interest, -and be charged with rents, issues and profits, less improvements made. Not a squint at liability for damages in trespass for injury to tbe reversion by cutting the trees, even as to an invalid lease; but, on tbe contrary, if tbe lessee in sucb void lease made improvements, they were to be compensated therefor. If sucb should be tbe statutory rule in dealing with an illegal “and void” lease, it must be apparent that a valid lease conveyed an estate not subject to ac-' counting of any character.
In tbe case at bar the value of the land was appraised, under tbe code of 1880, and tbe bill avers that tbe land is of no value without tbe timber. Thus, we have a tract of land of no value except for'the timber — not suited to tillage — leased at a price representing tbe value of tbe land, and in which, it is contended, tbe sole right of tbe lessee is to clear for tbe impossible purpose of tillage.
Tbe act of 1898, >ch. 41, and that of 1904, cb. 124, evidence still further tbe idea that tbe timber was severable, in tbe eye of tbe law, from reversion, authorizing a sale of tbe merchantable timber and wood therefrom, and, also, to lease for turpentine purposes, and this irrespective of any tillage
Section 211, Constitution 1890, also makes this manifest, fob it authorizes a lease for sucb period as may be deemed proper in consideration of tbe improvement thereof. Thus separating tbe classes of leases, and so far from prohibiting tbe cutting of timber, it encourages tbe cutting of timber from “uncleared lands.”
To make efficient tbe beneficial enjoyment of a lease for ninety-nine years, when in tbe course of nature tbe mature timber trees then existing would be destroyed by lapse of time, and tbe forest at tbe date of tbe lease would not be that at its termination, and when tbe only timber on it at tbe termination would be that allowed to grow up thereon during tbe term, it would be necessary to permit tbe lessee to use tbe timber for profit. Else, why, under tbe code of 1880, should tbe land be appraised and the lessee be required to pay at least, this value of the land, and which, in the instant case, was the value only for the timber. Essentially, in such case, it was a sale of the timber only, as the timber alone gave this value to the land.
Longino, Willing & Wilson, for appellee.
We maintain that the lessee, or his assignee, of a sixteenth section can only cut timber (1) for the purpose of clearing for cnltivation such portions of the land as a prudent owner in fee would clear for that purpose,' provided he leaves enough timber and wood as may be necessary for the permanent use of the estate. (2) That his right to open and clear for cultivation wild and uncultivated lands is that of a prudent owner having regard for the amelioration of the inheritance. (3 That the tenant can cut timber for the purpose of clearing land only for immediate cultivation, in which event he can appropriate the proceeds to his own benefit, but that he cannot cut timber for sale without making himself amenable for waste.
The court will see at a glance that our contention is founded upon the opinion rendered in the case of Warren County v. Cans, 80 Miss., 76 (s.o., 31 South. Eep., 539), and it seems strange to us that we should be called upon to defend our position in view of the able opinion of the court in that case.
Counsel for appellant, however, in their brief, challenge the correctness of the decision of the court in that case, and earnestly insist that it ought to be overruled. We submit that the decision in the case above quoted is sound in principle, supported by incontrovertable logic, and by the overwhelming weight of authority which leads irresistably to the conclusion reached by the court.
Inasmuch, however, as counsel have challenged the correctness of that decision, we will attempt to marshal in invincble array the authorities in support of the conclusion of the court in that case.
Counsel for appellant contend that in Mississippi a tenant for years cannot commit waste, and in support of that novel position they cite the fact that at the common law the tenant for years is not liable for waste, but that his liability was created by the statute of Marlebridge, Henry III. They then proceed to argue on the authority of Jordan v. Roach, 32 Miss., 482, that this statute of Marlebridge, not being a part of the jurisprudence of Mississippi, there is no law against the commission of waste by the tenant for years, the only law ever on the statute books of Mississippi on that subject being sec. 4 of the act of 1824, which counsel solemnly contend was repealed by the act of 1835, and has never been re-enacted.
Counsel contend that the court, in rendering the decision in the case of Warren Gounty v. Gans, supra, must have been misled, because counsel for appellant in that case filed “an elaborate brief in which he took the erroneous view that sec. 4, act of. 1824, was a part of the statutory scheme under the act of 1833, and without citation of any of the cases” contended that at common law the lessee was liable for waste.
We propose to show later on that sec. 4, act of 1824, was not repealed by the act of 1833, but that it remained in full force and effect.
We submit that neither of these acts has any bearing whatever on the question we are now discussing. We propose to show, both upon reason and authority, that a tenant for years is liable for waste, not only in England by the statute of Marlebridge, hut in almost every state of ihe Union, and especially in Mississippi, hy a multiplicity of decisions, of the courts of last resort.
The position contended for by counsel for appellant is not founded upon reason and principle. Let us suppose a case by way of illustration:
“A leases to B 640 acres of land', of which 140 are in cultivaton, on which have been erected valuable improvements. The balance of the land, we will say, is covered with a fine growth of yellow pine timber. For a small annual rental the possession of the estate is delivered to the tenant for years. No restrictions are placed in the lease as to the commission of waste, either voluntary or permissive, because to do so would be an idle pei’formance, the law implying that the tenant will do no lasting damage to the inheritance, and that he will farm the estate according to the dictates of good husbandry. B, the tenant, learning that the statute of Marlebridge has not been re-enacted in Mississippi, and, on the authority of Jordan v. Roach, supra, that he is unimpeachable for waste, proceeds in flagrant disregard of the rights of his landlord, to cut and convert into lumber the timber standing on the 500 acres of land, worth at present prices, about $15,000. He tears down the buildings erected on the premises, destroys orchards, ornamental shrubs and shade trees of a hundred years’ growth, thus bringing utter destruction and ruin upon the estate of the reversioner, and yet we are told by counsel for appellant that the tenant for years is unimpeachable for waste in Mississippi, and the landlord is utterly without remedy to redress the flagrant violation of his rights by the tenant. To such an illogical conclusion does the argument of counsel for appellant lead.
Not only is the position contended for by appellant imsound in principle, but it is contrary to the overwhelming array of authority. “The rule is now universal that unless exempted by the terms of his lease from responsibility for waste, a tenant for years is responsible for voluntary waste of the premises.” 30 Am. & Eng. Ency. Law (2d ed.), 259, and the long list of authorities cited in note 6, thereunder.
“A tenant, regardless of the duration of his lease term, is liable for voluntary or permissive waste.” Boefer v. Sheridan, 42 Mo. App., 226.
“Unless excepted by the terms of his lease from responsibility for waste, a tenant for life or years is responsible for waste committed upon tbe demised premises.” Con. Coal Co. v. Savit, 57 111. App., 659.
“The liability of tenant for waste does not depend upon negligence, but is imposed on ground of public policy.” “In tbe absence of some agreement to tbe contrary, tbe tenant is responsible for all waste however or by whomsoever committed, ■ except if occasioned by tbe act of God, tbe public enemy, or tbe act of tbe reversioner himself.” Parott v. Barney, Fed. Cas., 1st Sawyer, 423; Nitroglycerin case, 85 U. S., 524.
“Felling trees by a tenant for years renders him liable to another for waste.” Robinson v. Kline, 70 N. Y., 147. See, also, Parkins v. Cox, 3 N. 0., 339; Robertson v. Meadows, 73 Ind., 43; Chappel v. Iiill, 60 Mich., 167; Kidd v. Dennison, 6 Barb. (N. Y.), 9; Jones v. Whitehead, 1 Pars. Eq. Cas., 304,-4 Clark, 330.
Tbe statutes of Marlebridge and Gloucester bad to do with tbe remedy. Tenants for years and life, at tbe common law, could commit waste, regardless of tbe statutes above referred to. See Smith’s Manual of Common Law, pp. 100 to 106 inclusive; Co. Litt., p. 53; 2d Blackstone’s Commentaries, p. 281.
In Walton v. Lowrey, 74 Miss., 487 (s.c., 21 South. Bep., 243), tbe court held that a lease of land for one year gave no authority to cut timber except for repairs.
This question has been forever set at rest, however, by tbe decision of this court in tbe case of Warren County v. Cans, supra. Let us quote from that opinion: “By tbe common law of England, Vaste’ is defined with great accuracy, and ancient statutes there have made tenants for years liable for waste.. Tbe doctrine has been adopted in -this country so far as it is suitable to our condition and circumstances as a new and growing country, and, in a more or less modified form, is administered in most, if not all, of tbe states of tbe American Union.” (80 Miss., 81.)
Counsel for appellant contend that tbe common law doctrine of waste does not apply in Mississippi because in its earliest days the conditions were totally different from those in England, when the whole state was a “howling wilderness” of forest, the Natchez trace the only road across the state; when markets and produce non est, and Indians were the only inhabitants. That the trees were a burden to the land, of no market value whatever, and were gladly burned to get them out of the way.' That there were no railroads, and no market for timber, .and that therefore it had no value. Eor these reasons they contend that the conclusions reached by the court in the case of Warren County v. Cans were inadvised and hasty.
You would imagine that counsel had discovered some new argument, the irresistible logic of which would overthrow .the decision in the case above mentioned. Not so, 'however; the 'howling wilderness” argument was made by learned counsel for appellee on the trial of the Cans"case. Let us quote from their brief a few moments: “This theory is borne out by the surrounding conditions at that time. These sixteenth sections were most of them nothing more or less than ‘howlvng wildernesses/ The very purpose of leasing them out for a period of ninety-nine years was to have them settled up by the farmers and planters of the country, and have them cleared up and put in cultivation, and made profitable. If they were not leased for this purpose, the question is, what were they leased for ?”
In reply to this argument the court in its decision of the Cans case said: “The rigid rule of the common law that a tenant of a particular estate could not cut timber, except for estovers only, is in many jurisdictions modified so as to allow him to cut off the timber for clearing so much of the estate as the needs of his family may require for their support, though the timber be destroyed thereby. And he may clear for cultivation such portions of it as a prudent owner in fee would clear for that purpose, provided he leaves enough timber and wood as may be necessary for the permanent use and enjoyment of the inheritance. His right to open and clear for cultivation wild and uncultivated lands is that of a prudent owner in fee, having a regard for its amelioration as an inheritance. When the particular tenant cuts timber in the process of clearing the land for immediate cultivation, he can appropriate It or its proceeds to his own benefit, but he cannot cut the timber for sale without making himself amenable for waste.”
Nor was this any new interpretation of the law.
The “howling wilderness” argument was long ago .made and duly allowed for. We refer the court to the opinion in the case of Gannon v. Barry, 59 Miss., 289, which contains the following: “The locus in quo consists of twelve hundred acres of land, of which about three hundred acres only are arable, the balance being swampy in character and heavily timbered. When the defendant took possession the arable portion was in such condition that it was wholly unproductive for the first year thereafter. By rebuilding the fences, clearing thirty or forty acres additional, removing some of the tenant’s cabins to other locations, and building several new ones, he has brought up the rental of the place to something less than three hundred dollars per annum, exclusive of the amounts expended each year in making these improvements. In accomplishing these results he has freely cut and used the growing timber on the place, of which there is a superabundance for this and all other purposes. In so doing, as well as in removing the cabins and perhaps in other respects, he has unquestionably been guilty of that which would be deemed wasted under the English authorities, but which we cannot pronounce to be such under the state of things existing with us, and under the circumstances of this case. The condition of this country and that of England are wholly dissimilar, and that which would be a safe test there is altogether inapplicable here. With us, speaking generally, it may be said that nothing will ordinarily be held to constitute waste which is dictated by good husbandry, and promotes rather than diminishes the permanent value of the property as an estate of inheritance. That .such has been the nature and effect, in the name of the acts of the defendant, is incontestably established by the testimony in the case.”
See, also, Learned v. Ogden, 80 Miss., 769 (s.c., 32 South.' Rep. , 278), from which we quote the following: "While the law of waste, as established in England, is modified in its transportation to this country to suit the conditions of a new and uncleared country, and to allow a tenant for life to open wild lands for necessary cultivation, or to. change the course of agriculture, without being liable for waste, yet the cutting down of trees for 'his mere profit is here, as there, considered waste. A tenant by the courtesy, as an incident to his estate, may tahe reasonably estovers of all hinds, and he may cut timber to pay taxes, or to improve the land, and when so cut it belongs to. the tenant, and not to the reversioner. But the cutting down by the tenant of trees for sale is waste, and the felling of trees by the tenant or others for a sale of them is an injtory to the inheritance, fgr which the reversioner have their appropriate action.”
We thus see that in the Gans case, and in the cases of Learned v. Ogden and Gannon v. Barry, supra, due regard has been given to the changed condition of affairs in a new country like Mississippi, and the strict rules of the law as to waste, according to the common law of England, have been radically changed in Mississippi, and that the above mentioned cases have modified the rigid rule of the common law on that subject so as to conform to the changed condition of affairs.
Thus we see that there is nothing in the “howling wilderness” argument which has not already been contended for and duly allowed by the decisions of this court.
See to the same effect McCoy v. Wait, 51 Barb., 225. From that case we quote the following:
“The doctrine of waste in common law is not in its strictness applicable to the conditions of things in this country, but the law remains with us, as in England, that such cutting of tree or timber as will work a permanent injury to the freehold or inheritance in the absence of a specific license, is waste, for which an action will lie in equity by injunction or at law for damages.”
See, also, Robinson v. Kine, 70 N. Y., 147; Parkins v. Cox, 3 N. 0., 339; Dickinson v. Jones, 36 Ga., 97; Robertson v. Meadows, 73 Ind., 43; Ward v. Sheppard, 3 N. C., 283; Moorhouse v. Ootheal, 22 N. J. Law (2 Zab.), 521; Yandusen v. Young, 29 N. Y, 9; Jackson v. Brownson, 7 Johns, 227; Selden v. Mann, 2 N. Y. Leg. Abs., 329; Thurston v. Mmtin, 3 Chanch. C. 0., 335; Fleming v. Collins, 2 Del. Oh., 230; Bushman v. Jones, 34 Minn., 547; Boefer v. Sheridan, 42 Mo. App., 226; Consolidated Coal Co. v. Savits, 57 111. App., 659.
Where the whole of a farm, when leased, is in a wild and unsettled state, with the exception of a few acres, and for the use of which the lessee agrees to pay rent, the parties will be held to have intended that the lessee should be at liberty to fell part of the timber in order to fit the land for cultivation^ but this right will not authorize the lessee to destroy all the timber and thereby work irreparable injury to the premises or permanently diminish their value, and when he cuts the trees upon the demised premises, not for the purpose of preparing the land for cultivation, but for the sake of the profit to be derived from the sale of the timber, he is guilty of waste. Kidd v. Dennison, 6 Barb. (N. Y.), 9.
This is a case exactly in point and supports in eyery particular the decision of the Cans case.
See, also, Jones v. Whitehead, 1 Bars. Eq. Oas. 304 — 4 Clark, 330. See, also, vol. 30, Am. & Eng. Eney. Law (2d ed.), pp. 238, 239, 240, 241, 242, 243, 244, and the numerous authorities cited thereunder. See, also, Taylor on Landlord and Tenant (8th ed.), sec. 345 (28 Aim. & Eng. Ency. Law (1st ed.), 870); Clarke v. Holden, 66 Am. Dec., 450; Clemens v. Steer (R. I.), 53 Am. Dec., 621; Jones, Lee & Co. v. Britton (N. C.), 4 L. R. A., 178; Brashear v. Macy, 3 Marsh. (Ky.), 89; Buckley v. Dolbeare, 7 Conn., 232; Johnson v. Johnson, 18 N. H., 594; Davis v. Gilliam, 5 Ird. (N. 0.), 309; Davis v. Clarke, 40 Mo. App., 515; Owens v. Hyde, 6 Yerger (Ky.), 334; Mooers v. Wait, 3 Wend, 104 (20 Am. Rec., 667).
We thus see from the overwhelming weight of authority of the American statutes that the tenant for years has no right to the growing timber on lands other than the right to use the same for reasonable purposes of estovers; that is to say, for the building of houses and fences and for firewood, and that he has no right to clear- the land except for purposes of cultivation in such a manner as a prudent owner in 'fee would clear for that purpose, and that he must leave enough timber and wood as would be necessary for the permanent use and enjoyment of the inheritance. That in clearing wild and uncultivated land, due regard must be had for the amelioration of the inheritance. That when land is cleared it must be cleared for immediate' cultivation, in which event the tenant can appropriate the proceeds to his own behalf, but he cannot cut the timber for sale without being liable for waste.
In the case at bar it was alleged in the bill of complaint that appellant had cut timber from the land, and was threatening to cut all of it therefrom, not for the purpose of cultivation, but for commercial purposes, for its own mere profit. The allegation of the bill put the case at bar squarely within the decision of the Gans case, and within all of the vast array of authorities in support of the Gans case which we have above cited.
In the North Carolina case of Ward v. Sheppard, above referred to, the court said: “Cutting timber for clearing is not waste, but if done for the purpose of sale it is waste.”
Let us proceed now to a discussion of the general policy of the law on the subject of sixteenth sections as indicated by the various statutes enacted on the subject of school lands, and see if we can find in the history of the legislation on this subject any reason why the Gans case should be overruled.
It will be remembered that the act of congress, 1815, regarding the subject of school lands while„ Mississippi was a territory, and the act of the Mississippi legislature, 1824, on the same subject, made the tenant liable for cutting trees or timber.
Counsel for appellant says the conditions contained in these laws were unsuited to the leasing of lands in their then wild conditions, and the then existent conditions in the state made a change imperative, and that therefore the legislature, by the act of 1833, changed the whole system and repealed all former acts, and that the provisions of the law of 1824 with reference to the commission of waste were repealed, thereby indicating an intention on the part of the legislature that these lands should be held, as it were, in fee simple by the tenants, unimpeachable for waste.
We deny the correctness of this proposition, and submit that the act of 1833 did not repeal the act of 1824, and the argument of counsel that a sweeping change was effected in the whole system of leasing the school lands by the act of 1833 falls to the .ground.
Section 1 of the act of January 9, 1824, provides for five trustees in each township shall be elected by heads of families for one year. Section 2 provides for the treasurer, his duty and liability. Section 3 for schoolhouses and teachers. . Section 4 provides as follows: “The trustees aforesaid shall carefully and faithfully preserve» the school lands and timber thereon from all improper waste; and shall institute suits in any court having competent jurisdiction against any person, tenants as well as others, who may be found damaging, in any manner, the lands, timber or improvements, reserving to tenants the full liberty of their several leases; and any money thence arising shall be appropriated to the same uses as other moneys in the township treasurer’s hands; and the trustees shall from time to time, on the expiration of the leases already granted, as well as any land not heretofore so let out, rent the whole or any part to the highest bidder, for any term not exceeding five years, public notice having been first given for the space of six weeks before the said lands are to be leased out or rented.”
The act of February 27, 1833, is entitled “An act to authorize the trustees of the school lands within each township in this state to lease the sixteenth sections within the same for ninety-nine years, and for other purposes.” Sections 1 and 2 provided that “whenever a majority of the resident heads of families (minors not excepted), in each township or fractional township containing section number sixteen, or such section as may be reserved for the use of schools in lieu thereof, within this state, shall request the same, it shall be the duty of the trustees now in office, or who may hereafter be in office, to lease the said section of their respective townships to the highest bidder for the term of ninety-nine years,” etc. Sections 3, 4 and 5 provided for the application of the funds, reservation of certain lands for sohoolhouses, and for application of funds arising from funds invested in bank stock. Sections 6 and 7 provided for the loaning of the amount of lease, if under $100, and for the giving of bond by trustees.
Nothing is said in the entire act of 1833 about the election of trustees. It presupposes that the trustees are in existence. Indeed, the act of 1824 provided for the election of trustees, and the act of 1833 is simply an act amendatory to the act of 1824, and did not repeal that act; otherwise there would have been no trustees in office and no mode prescribed for their election. In Hutchinson’s Code, at the end of the act of 1833, it is expressly stated that this act is amendatory to the act of 182-4.
“It is a cardinal rule of the construction of statutes that the law does not favor a repeal by implication, and even when two statutes are seemingly repugnant they must be so construed, if possible, that the. latter shall not be a repeal of the former by implication.” McAfee v. Southern Railroad Co., 36 Miss., 669.
“Where an act contains no explicit repeal of a previous act, it does not operate as a repeal except in so far as it may be inconsistent with the previous act.” Hearn, et al., v. Brogam, 64 Miss., 335.
“Repeal of statutes by implication is not favored by courts.” Swan v. Buck, 40 Miss., 268 (s.c., 1 South. Rep., 246). See, also, House y. State, 41 Miss., 1B1; Commercial Bank v. Chambers, 8 Smed. & M., 1.
There is nothing in the act of 1833 inconsistent with, or repugnant to, the act of 1824. The' two statutes constitute one harmonious whole. The act of 1833 simply added to the act of 1824, but did not repeal either section 1, which provides for election of trustees, or section 4, which provides for the preservation of school lands and timber from all improper waste, and directing that the trustees should institute suits in any court having competent jurisdiction against any person or persons, tenants as well as others, who may be found damaging in any manner the lands, timber or improvements, reserving to tenants the full liberty of their several leases. The act of 1833 did -not, therefore, as contended for by counsel for appellant, change the whole system and repeal all former acts, and did not provide a scheme by which was to be conveyed to the lessee of the sixteenth section lands more than a mere ordinary leasehold interest.
This was the construction placed upon these two statutes by the attorney-general, John D. Freeman, in 184Y.
Counsel for appellant have in their possession a curious document of antiquity which they propose to use on the oral argument of this case. This is a form of lease prepared by the attorney-general, John D. Freeman, to be used in making leases of the sixteenth section lands. On this form the court will notice printed instructions from the attorney-general directing how this lease shall be made and citing the statutes on which they are based. He first cites the act of 1824, showing how the trustees- shall be elected. He then cites the act of 1833, showing how, and for how long, this lease shall be made, thus showing conclusively that it was his opinion that these acts were not in conflict with each other, and that the act of 1833 did not repeal the act of 1824, but that they were parts of one harmonious whole, each entirely dependent upon the other.
Counsel for appellant seems to get some comfort out of the fact that the act of 1833, authorizing the lease, provided that it should be the duty of the trustees, on the final payment of the money, to convey the “right, title, use, interest and occupation” of said section to the lessee or lessees for, and during, and until the end of the full term of ninety-nine years. They claim that this was therefore not an ordinary lease upon a rent reserved, but the sale for a term in gross for a specific sum; that it was the manifest intention of the legislature that the sale should pass more than an ordinary leasehold interest. We submit that the words “right, title, use, interest and occupation” contained in the act of 1833, and in the lease, were not intended to give, and did not give, any greater right in regard to the use and occupation of the land than the ordinary common law lease for a term of years, and the only rights that the tenant acquired to the use and occupation of the land, under and by virtue of said lease, were such rights as pertained to an ordinary lease for a terra of years.
It is a cardinal rule of construction that “one part of a statute is called in to help in the construction of another part, and they are to be so expounded as to support and give effect to the whole.” Swan v. Buck, 40 Miss., 270.
The whole act and the whole lease must be construed together. The words “right, title and interest” are defined and limited by the words “use and occupation of said section to the lessee or lessees for, during, and until the full end of the term of ninety-nine years.” How could the legislature’s intent to provide for an ordinary lease of ninety-nine years be expressed more plainly? What matters it whether the rent be paid in a gross sum or whether it be paid in annual installments? It was not the legislature’s intent that the purchaser of a term of ninety-nine years should be more than a mere lessee, and that for that period he should enjoy the estate as if he were the owner of it. While apt words of a lease are not used, that makes no difference, as was said in the case of Ounningiiam v. Davis, 62 Miss., 366, the name by which an instrument is called makes no difference. The character of the instrument is to be determined by its legal effect.
“No particular form of expression or technical words are necessary to constitute a lease, but whatever expressions explain the intention of the parties to be, that one shall divest himself of the possession of his property, and the other shall take it for a certain space of time, are sufficient, and will amount to a lease for years, as effectually as if the most proper and permanent form of words had been made use of for that purpose. 12 Am. & Eng. Eney. Law (1st ed.), 977.
The grant of the right, title and interest, and the use and occupation of land for ninety-nine years, simply passes to the lessee the title of the grantor to the land with all the incidents, not of ownership, during that period, but of a leasehold interest for that period of time.
The word “title” in real property, according to the classic authorities, is “the means whereby a man holdeth land.” This is the definition given by Coke and Blackstone, and all the old authorities. The word “title” in the act of 1833 and in the old leases meant simply the means whereby the lessee held an unexpired lease of ninety-nine years to the land described in the lease. Simply this, and nothing more!
It is true as stated by counsel for appellant that the word “title” denotes a collection of all the facts of ownership. In the lease above referred to it simply meant a collection of all the facts of ownership of a lease for ninety-nine years, with all the incidents pertaining thereto.
“The intention of the party is to be ascertained from the entire instrument, not from particular words or phrases without reference to the context, and the instrument shall operate according to the intention, unless it be contrary to law.” Berridge v. Glassy, 112 Penn. S. T„ 442.
Measured by this standard construing all the words of the lease, it can mean nothing else but an ordinary lease for ninety-nine years.
It was held in the case above referred to that “an instrument, purporting to be a lease for a term of years at a specified yearly rental is not converted to a deed in fee by the fact that it runs “to the second party, her heirs and assigns.” The words of the lease in question were as follows: “Leonard Prailey doth lease unto the said Jane Classy, her heirs and assigns for the term of five years from the first day of December next, for the yearly rent of three dollars, which yearly rent the said Jane Glassy doth for herself, her heirs and assigns, covenant and agree to pay to the said Leonard, his heirs and assigns, the said rent.” Considering only the first part of the lease above referred to, it would clearly convey an estate in fee simple, because the words “heirs aud assigns” are words of inheritance and are construed to pass an estate in fee. This, however, was held to be qualified and limited by the words “for the term of five years,” etc., “for the yearly rental,” etc.
Counsel quote in support of their contention the case of Bramlebk v. Roberts, 68 Miss., 325 (s.c., 10 South. Rep., 56). This case is authority to the position taken by us. The court held: “We recognize the doctrine that the estoppel of conveyance óf land is only ‘co-extensive with the estate, right or interest, which the conveyance purports to pass,’ as held in Mclnnis v. Pichett, 65 Miss., 354 (s.c., 3 South. Rep., -660).” The estate which the lease in question purported to pass was a leasehold interest for a term of years.
Counsel contend that the language used to define the estate granted in the lease is the same used by the Georgia cession, Hutch. Code, 55, which contains the words “right,” “title,” “claim,” “interest.” This is not an analogous case. The Georgia cession to the United States did not limit the use and occupation for a term of ninety-nine years, as in the case of leases. There is a world-wide difference in the language used in the act of cession and in the leases.
Counsel contend in their brief that there is nothing in any of the codes, nor since the act of 1824, giving the right to sue for cutting timber, or for waste, or creating any liability therefor. We answer this by saying that we have demonstrated that the act of 1824 was not repealed by the act of 1833, and that even if the act of 1824 is not now in force, there are ample provisions in the common law, as modified by our decisions, for creating liability for cutting timber by tenant for years, and giving the right to sue therefor, either at law or in equity. We think we have already demonstrated this proposition by the authorities cited by us in discussion of the question of waste by life tenants.
Counsel for appellant contend that to maintain trespass the plaintiff must have title and possession, and that a disseizee cannot maintain trespass until re-entry.
We answer that by saying that “by common law an action of waste may be maintained by remaindermen, or reversioners for waste committed by tenant during occupation of the tenant.” 30 Am. & Eng. Ency. Law (2d ed.), 275.
“It is not necessary to the maintenance of a bill for injunction that either complainant or respondent be in possession.” 30 Am. & Eng. Ency. (Law 2d. ed.), 287.
Counsel for appellant cited Davany v. Koon, 45 Miss., 71; Bond v. Griffin, 74 Miss., 599 (s.c., 22 South. Hep., 187); State v. Fitzgerald, 76 Miss., 502 (s.c., 24 South Hep., 872), in support of the contention that the fact that the lessee was allowed to recover for cutting of trees, is inconsistent with any right with the lessor to recover therefor. With all due deference, we maintain that these authorities do not bear out the contention of counsel. Let iis examine for a moment these authorities. In the case of Devaney v. .Koon, 45 Miss., 71, the decision was based upon the act of January 20, 1841, Hutch. Code, 221, which gave the lessee' of school lands the same rights of action, and remedies against strangers as if they were the fee simple owners. In that case the lessee claimed under a bond for title made to him by the judge of probate of the county, and it was held that he had color of title, which, coupled with his possession, entitled him to maintain his action unless the defendant could show title in himself or some third person.
In Bond v. Griffin, †4: Miss., 599 (s.c., 22 South. Hep., 187), it was expressly held that the plaintiff, who ivas the lessee of the school' lands, had only a limited interest in the property, and that he could only recover to the Avalué of such interest. It has been held always that a person Avith a special or limited interest can recover as against a stranger, though he might not 'be able to prevail in a suit with a party holding the general title. So this authority does not support the contention of counsel.
Slate v. Fitzgerald, 76 Miss.,'502 (s.c., 24 South. Rep., 872), simply held that the land commissioner has authority to maintain, in the name of the state, replevin for crossties cut by a trespasser from a sixteenth section of land which had been sold to the state for non-payment of taxes. The lessee did not recover by replevin, but the recovery was made by the land commissioner. This question, however, has been set at rest forever by the case of Jones v. Madison County, 72 Miss., 777 (s.c., 18 South. Rep., 87), which held that the title to these lands is in the state of Mississippi in trust for the inhabitants of the several townships, which opinion was based upon the decision of the United States supreme court in the case of Gaines v. Nicholson, 9th How. (U. S.), 358, and upon the case of Long v. Brown, 4 Ala., 62-2.
Counsel for appellant. endeavor to draw a distinction between the Alabama case and the Madison county case, because the act of congress admitting Alabama as a state declared that sixteenth sections should be granted to the inhabitants of each township for the use of schools, while the act of congress admitting Mississippi contained no such provision. In view of the fact that the supreme court of the United States expressly held in the case of Gaines v. Nicholson, supra, that the title to this land is in the state of Mississippi by virtue of the cession from the state of Georgia, we fail to see how the provisions of the act of congress admitting Mississippi could affect this title.
The United States, having no title to these lands, could neither confer title to the state of Mississippi by said act, nor could it deny the title which the state of Mississippi had already acquired from Georgia.
Counsel. argues that the legislature intended that by the leases of the sixteenth section land there should be conveyed to the lessee an estate greater in extent than a lease, because, of the fact that under the act of 1833, and under the revenue act, 1841, Hutch. Code, 188, the lessees were subject to taxation separate from the reversioner in the land. Let us quote this section: “The school lands known as the sixteenth sections of land in this state, which shall have been leased subsequent to the passage of the revenue act, approved February 24, 1844, shall be subject to taxation during the continuance of the lease, in the same manner and proportion as other lands; provided, in case of the sale of such leased lands, or any part or parcel thereof, for taxes, the title of the lessee, or his assignee, only shall be conveyed.” ITutch. Code, 188.
This act expressly provides that in the case of sale of such leased lands for taxes, the title of the lessee, or his assignee, only shall be conveyed, thus clearly showing that the lessee held simply an ordinary leasehold, and not some imaginary estate greater than a lease.
The title of the lessee only was to be conveyed! Title to what ? The title to this unexpired lease for ninety-nine years.
Counsel also seems to get some comfort out of the act of 1841, Hutch. Code, 221. “The lessees of sixteenth sections, and all other school lands, shall be authorized to, and may maintain and carry on, all such suits at law or equity, immediately after leasing, as they could or might maintain or carry on were they the fee simple owners of the leased premises, except as against the lessors.”
They argue that if all the rights of action of fee simple owners were vested in them against the world, except the lessor, that it was conclusive evidence that their estate was more than a lease. We submit that this is conclusive evidence of no such thing! It was conclusive evidence that the fee simple title was in some one other than the lessee, and the lessee possessing simply a term of years, an ordinary leasehold interest, had no right to institute suit with reference to the school lands, as that right was vested solely in the owner of the fee. This act was passed simply to protect the lessee, and enable him to maintain such actions as but for this act could only have been brought by the owners of the fee, and even then it is provided that they can maintain and carry on such actions as they might maintain if they were the fee simple owners, except against the lessor. This shows conclusively that the legislature recognized that the title was in the lessor and that the lessee had simply a leasehold interest. It may be remarked in passing that this act has been repealed, and is only interesting now by way of illustration.
Let us discuss now briefly the provisions of the code of 1880, under which the lease was made in the instant case.
Section 732 provides that “whenever a majority of the resident heads of families shall petition therefor, the board of supervisors shall appoint three intelligent citizens of the township to appraise said land, who shall do so, and make oath to such board of the value of the land, and thereupon said board of supervisors shall direct that said lands be leased to the highest bidder for a term of ninety-nine years.” It will be noticed that this section provides not for a sale of land, but for the lease of the land to the highest bidder for the term of ninety-nine years. This clearly shows that the legislature contemplated the conveyance of a leasehold interest, and not of a qualified fee for ninety-nine years, as contended for by counsel for appellant.
It is true that this section provided that three intelligent citizens should appraise said lands, and make report to the board of supervisors of the value of such land, and section 735 provided that in no case should lands be leased for less than the appraised value. The clear meaning of these two sections is that the three intelligent citizens should appraise the value of the land for a term of ninety-nine years, and not its value in fee simple, and that the said lands should be leased for not less than their appraised value; that is, for- the appraised value of the leasehold for the term of ninety-nine years, or less term. All through the various sections pertaining to six teenth section lands mention is constantly made of the leasing of said lands, and no provision is made for any sale of sixteenth section lands, and no sale was contemplated. The scheme was that the lands should be leased for ninety-nine years, and leased for not less than the appraised value of the leasehold interest for ninety-nine years. This interpretation is perfectly manifest when we look at the code of 1892, sec. 4155 of which said code provides that three disinterested freeholders of the county shall, be appointed by the board of supervisors to appraise and report to the board the actual rental value of each lot or parcel thereof, with improvements, if any, for a term of twenty-five years. The only difference between this section and the code of 1880 is that by section 4155 the appraisers are directed to ascertain and report the actual annual rental value, while by section 732 of the code of 1880 they are directed to appraise the value of the land for a term of ninety-nine years in gross. By the act of 1880 the lands were to be leased on a credit of one, two, three and four years, in equal annual installments, for which the lessee executed promissory notes, and it was provided that the notes should operate as a lien .and special mortgage on said lands until the payment thereof. The clear meaning of this provision is that the notes should operate as a lien and special mortgage on said lease for ninety-nine years, and in case it should become necessary to foreclose the lien the decree of the court would have been for a sale not of the fee simple title, but for the sale of the unexpired leasehold interest for ninety-nine years.
Section 733 provided that the president of the board of supervisors should execute and deliver to the lessee of lands a written lease thereof for ninety-nine years, the said lessee paying the expense of the execution and delivery of said instrument.
Section 734, code of 1880, provided that if a majority of the resident heads of families should petition therefor, the board, of supervisors, instead of directing the' said lands to be leased for ninety-nine years, might cause them to be leased in such manner as they might deem best, for a single year or any number of years less than ninety-nine, but in no case, as provided in section 734, should the land be leased for less than its appraised value.
The act of 1898, ch. 41, and the act of 1904, ch. 124, au•ihorizing a sale of the merchantable timber and wood therefrom, and also the leasing for turpentine purposes, shed no light on this controversy. These acts certainly do not aid the contention of counsel for appellant. If any inference is to be drawn from them, it should be drawn in our favor. It shows that the lessee for a term of ninety-nine years has no right to the timber except for reasonable purposes of estovers, otherwise why authorize a sale of merchantable timber outright, and why authorize a lease for turpentine purposes? The passage of these acts show clearly that neither the board of supervisors nor the county had any right to sell the timber outright until the passage of the act of 1898, otherwise why the necessity of the act of 1898, if during all these years the board of supervisors or the county had the right to §ell the timber ?
The title of the appellant is based upon the assignment of a lease for ninety-nine years executed by the board of supervisors of Harrison county, in accordance with the provisions of the code of 1880. The lease differs from the form of lease provided by the act of 1833, and it is written in the regular form of a lease. See exhibit “A” to the bill of complaint, transcript, p. 7.
We submit that under and by virtue of this lease appellant acquired a leasehold interest for a term of ninety-nine years, and that it had no right to commit waste upon the leased premises; that it had no right to cut and remove valuable timber therefrom, and convert the same to its own use for commercial purposes and its own mere profit. That such action on its part justified the issuance of the injunction in this case, and the learned chancellor ruled correctly when he overruled the demurrer of appellant to the bill of complaint.
R. V. Fletcher, attorney-general, on the same side.
Warren County v. Cans, 80 Miss., 67 (s.o., 31 South. Hep., 539), was a sixteenth section case, and involved precisely the principle now under investigation. The argument was made there, as here, that the lease was really a sale of the land for a limited term, and vested in the lessee all the rights of fee simple owner, and that the common law doctrine of waste did not apply. But the court held that while the lessee might clear the land for purposes of cultivation, and might dispose of the timber on such cleared land as he saw proper, yet that he cannot cut the timber for sale without making himself amenable for waste. The decision is a clear-cut adjudication of the question, and we rest confidently upon its soundness and authority.
The eminent counsel for appellant earnestly insists that the case should not be followed. It is contended that it was not fully and adequately represented on behalf of the contention pressed in the instant case, and six reasons were given why the doctrine of the Cans case is unsound.
1. The statute of 1824, prohibiting waste on sixteenth section lands, was repealed by the statute of 1'833, thus by implication committing the state to the policy that waste could not be committed on these lands.
2. The words used in the lease in question and in the various .acts authorizing leases are not the opposite words of a common law lease.
3. The character of the lands and the conditions of the country when the leasing system was established render it improbable that the legislature ever contemplated that timber could not be cut at will by the lessee.
4. At early common law waste could not be committed by a tenant for years, and tbe statute of Marlbridge lias never been a part of our jurisprudence.
5. Tbe appraisers in the instant case in valuing the term took into consideration the actual worth of the timber, and the purchase price given by the lessee represented the value of the timber.
6. The legislature in recent years by certain statutes relating to the sale of timber has recognized the correctness of appellant’s contention.
I purpose briefly to consider these points in order named.
1. The act of 1824, approved January 9th, provided for the election of five trustees in each township, and defined the duties of such trustees as to control and management of moneys derived from the sale of sixteenth section lands. It further provided, by section 4, “that the trustees aforesaid shall carefully and faithfully preserve the school lands and timber thereon from all improper waste and shall -institute suits . . . against any persons, tenants as well as others, who may be found damaging in any manner the lands, timber or improvements,” etc. This section does not define the incidents of the lease. It assumed that such leases as had been made under previous acts were the ordinary leases, with the common law incidents, and the act, enacted primarily for the purpose of defining the duties of trustées, recognizing that under these leases there was an implied prohibition against waste, placed upon the trustees to protect the property. Such being the purpose of the statute, it cannot be said that the act of 1833, approved February- 27th, in any way repealed this section. This act changed the term of the leases and provided for leasing by the trustees for a term of ninety-nine years, and enlarged the powers of the trustees as to the disposition of the funds, but it left undisturbed the other duties imposed upon the trustees by the act of 1824. Of course, it is a fundamental rule of construction that one statute will not be held to have repealed a previous one unless the terms are clearly inconsistent. Hepeals by implication are never favored. This statute of 1824 is of value in the discussion only this far: that it shows unmistakably that at the time of its enactment it is the recognized doctrine in this state that these leases did not permit waste. Now this doctrine, thus early implanted in our legislative enactments, has never been gainsaid or overruled by either the general assembly or the courts. Certainly the act of 1833 does not intimate that this theory had been abandoned. Nor is there anything in the act of 1836 which tends to show any change of policy on the part of the law-making power. All of these acts are compiled and reduced to order in Hutchinson’s Code, and it does not appear in this compilation that the act of 1833 repeals the act of 1824. Indeed, by the act of February 24, 1844, waste is penalized when committed on seminary lands, and this tends to show that at this time it was settled policy of the state to prohibit waste upon any of these leased school lands. In the absence of any legislative declaration from 1824 to the present time on this question of waste, no presumption can arise that there has been any change in our policy as to the doctrine of waste.
2. The argument that the words of the statute of 1833 are not the apt words of a lease, but that they convey more than an ordinary household estate, may ha^e merit, but it is sufficient to say that the lease under review was made under the code of 1880, and the words of the statute of 1833 are not used in the code of 1880. The only expression there employed is “lease.” This term is used repeatedly. It is not accompanied by any qualifying or explanatory words. It uses this simple term as being one with well understood and well settled meaning. It must mean, and can only mean, such a disposition of lands as is commonly referred to as a “lease.” The proper words to be employed to create a “lease,” according to the view of the code makers, is found in section 1238 of the code of 1880. There it is held sufficient to say that the lessor leases the land to the lessee. When the word “lease” is used in the statute, it only remains to refer to the settled principles of law to ascertain what is a lease and what are its recognized incidents. I contend, therefore, that it is not important to inquire what were the exact terms of the statute of 1833, since this act was not in effect at the time the lease was made.
3. The argument drawn from the character of the land and the condition of the country is the precise argument that was made and disallowed by this court in the Gans case, supra. If it is argued that the case was not adequately presented upon other grounds, it cannot be said that the learned counsel for appellant did not press this point with skill and force. See his brief as reported. I take it that the court will not reverse upon this contention.
4. The ingenious argument that our courts do not recognize the statute of Marlebridge as part of the common law is based exclusively upon the early case of Jordan v. Roach, 32 Miss., 481, which seems to hold that certain English statutory additions to the common law are not in force in Mississippi. However we may regard this decision as authority in regard to the particular question there under review, it is well settled that a modified form of the common law doctrine of waste, as it prevailed after the incorporation of the statute of Marlebridge, has always been recognized by our court. The common law doctrine of waste, either with or without the statute of Marlebridge, has not been incorporated into our jurisprudence in its entirety. The rule has been modified to suit the changed conditions of a new and largely undeveloped country, so that when we come to seek for the law of waste in Mississippi, the common law is not an absolutely safe guide. Like many others of our rules of law, the courts of this state have, on broad lines,''and of necessity, by a species of judicial legislation built up and established a rule of waste based on the common law but adapted to our peculiar needs and conditions. Thus in Eskridge v. Eskridge, 51 Miss., 522, it is said that the reversioner may against the life tenant maintain an injunction to prevent a permanent injury to the freehold. ’
In Gannon v. Barry, 59 Miss., 289, a controversy between the remainderman and the life tenant, the court held that the remainderman might enjoin the owner of the life estate from committing voluntary waste -to the permanent injury of the estate. The question is thoroughly examined and put to rest in Learned v. Ogden, 80. Miss., 769 (s.c., 32 South. Kep., 278), where it is said that “while the law of waste, as established in England, is modified by its transmission to this country to suit the conditions of a new and uncleared country, and to allow a tenant for life to open wild land for necessary cultivation or to change the course of agriculture, without being liable for waste, yet the cutting down of trees for his mere profit is here, as there, considered waste.”
It is true that by the ancient common law before the enactment of the statute of Marlebridge tenants by the courtesy were liable for waste, but that the doctrine is also applicable to limited estates by deed is expressly held in Warren Gounty v. Gans, supra, where the language of the court shows that the statute of Marlebridge and Gloucester are considered as part of our law, for it is there said: “By the common law of England waste is defined with great accuracy, and ancient statutes there have made tenants for years liable for waste,” etc.
It is hardly to be conceived that this court will hold, now, that every landlord or lessor 'for a year or more must especially provide against waste by his tenant in order to protect the estate from permanent injury. It is contrary to the whole course and spirit of our law. There is probably not a single state in the union where the statute of Marlehridg© is not recognized as a component part of-the common law. 30 Am. & Eng. Ency. Law, 259. Nor is there any dissent as to the doctrine of waste by cutting timber and selling the same for gain. 30 Am. & Eng. Ency. Law, 244; Jaclcson v. Brownson, 5 Am. Dec., 258; Thurston v. Mustin, 3 Cranch. O. C.,. 335; Fleomng v. Collins, 2 Del. Oh., 230; Bond v. Loclcwood, 33 111., 212; Padelford v. Padelford, 24 Mass., 152; Butman v. Jones, 27 N. W., 66; Moorehouse v. Cotheal, 22 N. I. Law, 521; Kidd v. Dennison, 6 Barb., 9; Woodman v. Gates, 38 Gla., 205; Drawn v. Smith, 52 Me., 141.
5. It is contended that weight should be given to the fact that the appraisers in valuing the land took into consideration the value of the timber, but this action on the part of the appraisers can bind nobody if the appraisers- proceeded upon a theory not warranted by law. Certainly the state suffers because the appraisers mistook the meaning of the law- And, further, the appraisement was proper, since the grantees might sell the timber on land cleared for purposes of husbandry, and in putting a valuation upon the land, it would be a correct method of valuation to take the timber- into consideration.
It is not the contention of appellee that the timber may not be cut in clearing the land and improving the freehold. It is' the cutting of the timber for purely commercial purposes. that is objectionable under the authorities citied.
6. No comfort can be derived by appellant from recent legislation bn this subject. The acts of 1902, ch. 78, throws no light on the subject as affectinf? the character of the lease. Chapter 41 of the acts of 1898, and chapter 124 of the acts of 1904, dealing with the sale of merchantable timber and the exemption of turpentine leases, indicates, rather to my mind that the legislature did not consider that ordinary leases already provided for by statute carried with them the right to cut this timber.
Argued orally by J. I. Ford, Walter White, and Marcellus Green, for appellant; and by A. H. Longino, and B. P. Willing, for appellee.

Opinion:
Calhoon, J.,
delivered tbe opinion of the court on the first decision of the cause.
This is a bill to enjoin the appellant from further cutting or removing timber from a sixteenth section, which- it held under a lease of ninety-nine years, and for an accounting of that already cut, on the ground that such cutting was waste. The bill charges that the cutting was purely for sale, and that the avowed purpose is to cut and remove the entire timber growth, and solely for commercial uses. It charges that the lease was made in 1882, for the sum of $885, and, as will be particularly noted, states as follows: "That said land, by reason of the character of the soil, is unfit for cultivation, and that the only value it possesses is given it by the merchantable pine timber growing thereon." The lease is under Code 1880, § 132, pursuant to appraisement under that section, of "the value of the land." A demurrer to this bill was filed on the grounds, first, that the right to cut was contemplated by the parties to the lease; second, that the title to the trees was vested by the lease; third, that the bill showed that the lease was of no value, except for the trees; and, fourth, that there is no equity on the face of the bill. This demurrer was overruled, and the timber company appeals to settle the principles of the case.
It is apparent that the scope and meaning of the lease, and the intent and understanding of the parties to it, must be determined by the act of 1833 in reference to such leases of school lands, construed in the light of the common law, and the condition of the country at that time, and the usage of the country since. It must be noted that no question was ever made of the right of such lessees to do what they pleased with the growing timber until about six years ago. We will first invite the attention of the profession to a careful consideration of the common law, and then examine the statutes read in the light of the then situation in the state. There is no decision as to waste on ninety-nine year leases of public lands in any other state that we can find.
In 28 Am. & Eng. Ency. Law (1st ed.), p. 891, the text is as follows (see, also, 30 Am. & Eng. Ency. Law [2d ed.], p. 258 el seq.) : "At the common law a tenant for life or years was not liable for waste, because it was presumed that the demise or lease creating his estate would have provided against waste if it were to be prohibited; but the common law was changed by the statutes of Marlebridge (52 Henry III.), and Gloucester (6 Edw. I., c. 5), and tenants for life or years were made liable for waste. These statutes have been modified, and some of their provisions re-enacted, in some of the states of the union, or are considered a part of their common law." The statute of Marlebridge referred to in the text was ordained A.D. 1269, and that of Gloucester A.D. 1278, before when we may assume that England, in the particular of forest growth, bore some resemblance to Mississippi in 1833. Note 2 to the text of the encyclopaedia cites Moore v. Ellsworth, 3 Conn., 483, and Poe v. Hardie, 65 N. C., 447, and reproduces the language of Lord Coke, 2 Inst., 300, as follows: "For that the law created their [tenants in dower and by the curtesy] interests, therefore the law gave against them a remedy; but a tenant for life or years came in by demise and lease of the owner- of the land, etc., and therefore he might in his demise have provided against the doing of waste by his lessee, and, if he did not, it was his negligence and default." It may be noted here that Lord Coke (Inst. by. 2, *634, *635) repeats this doctrine in these words: "In this particular case the statute of Gloucester, which giveth the action of waste against the lessee for life or years (which lay not against them at common law)," etc. So, in the note to top page 266, vol. 3 of Thomas' edition of Coke upon Lyttleton, it is stated that a person holding for life or years, by grant, was not liable to an action for waste unless restrained from it by the terms of the lease, "because it was in the power of the person who created the estate to impose such terms on the tenant as he thought proper." The annotation then says: "Sed vide Brae-ton, lib. 4, c. 18; 2 Reeves'. Hist., 73, 74, 148" — •thus indicating that these authors differed with Lord Coke, as they in fact do, as to the scope of the common law in the remedy for waste. See Einlason's edition of Reeves.' Hist, of English Law, vol. 1, p. 386, and vol. 2, pp. 58, 59, and notes. In Thomas' edition of Coke upon Lyttleton, vol. 3, top page 272, we find it for the third time stated by this high authority that "a prohibition of waste did lie against tenant by curtesy, tenant in dower, and a guardian in chivalry, by the common law, but not against tenant for life or years, because they came in by their own act, and he might have provided that no waste should be done." See, also, 2 Saunders (by Williams), 47e, and 3 Saunders (by Williams), 252, and note 7, and Pryne v. Dor, 1 Durnford & East) 55, keeping in mind that there is no question whatever of equitable waste in the case we now have before us. It is either legal waste or nothing. The English work of Woodfall on Landlord and Tenant (1 Am. Ed., by Webster), vol. 2, p. 609, says: "At common law an action for waste lay only against tenants by the curtesy, tenants in dower, and guardian, whose estates were created by act of law. But tenants for life or years had an interest in the land by the act of the lessor, who might and ought to have provided against waste by some express covenant or condition; and such tenants were not liable at common law either for voluntary or permissive waste." See, also, citations in note "d." This author then proceeds to consider the statutes of Marlbridge and Gloucester, changing the common law, and on page 611 he says: "A tenant at will is not within the statute, and therefore not Hable upon the statute for either kind of waste, although, if he commit waste, he thereby in effect determines his tenancy," etc. In Smith on Landlord and Tenant, another English work of high reputation, we find on top page 24-0 the following: "At common law there was a distinction between the tenants of estates created by the act of the law and tenants of estates created by the contract of the parties; the former having always been punishable-for committing.waste, and the latter not so. Thus tenant by the curtesy or in dower was at all periods of the law restrained from waste; tenant for term of years was not so. And the reason of this distinction was that it was thought it would be a hardship if the law were to give the estate without restraining the person to whom it was given from doing injury to the inheritance, while it was thought to be a hardship on a person who had let a tenant in by express contract, and who had the power of inserting in the contract stipulations against the commission of waste, it was thought to be no hardship upon him to leave the tenant in the same situation in which he had himself placed him by the contract." This author then shows the change in the law worked by the statutes of Marlebridge and Gloucester.
In all discussions of waste in the texkwriters and the reports it will be seen that they have reference to leases, since those statutes in nearly every instance, and that there is no difference about what the common law was before those statutes. In 3 Washburn on Real Property, sec. 270, the common law rule is stated as in Smith and Woodfall, supra. In the opinion in the case of Moore v. Ellsworth, 3 Conn., 487, 488, is this language: "It is said by Sir Edward Coke (2 Inst., p. 145) that waste was punishable at common law in tenant in dower, tenant by the curtesy, and a guardian, but not in tenant for life or for years; and for the distinction he assigns this reason: That the law, which created the former of these estates and interests, provided a remedy itself against waste, but left the owners of land, who created the others, to provide a remedy in their demise. This reason, Reeves, in his History of the English Law, considers as only plausible, and the diversity as ideal. But, visionary as lie supposes it to be, it bas b.een embraced as sound by tbe most eminent English jurists; and tbe common law, as stated by Lord Coke, bas been recognized by all tbe respectable law writers in England to tbe present time. And it must not be forgotten that Sir Edward Coke appeals to 'the rule of tbe register' for tbe doctrine which be affirms. Chief Baron Oomyns, whose, opinion alone was said by Lord Kenyon to be an authority, declares in bis Digest that 'by the common law waste did not lie against lessee for life or years; for it was laches in tbe lessor that be did not provide against waste.' Title 'Waste,' A, 2. In the second volume of bis Commentaries, 282, 283, it is said by Sir William Blackstone that 'waste was not punishable in any tenant save only in three persons, guardian in chivalry, tenant in dower, and tenant by tbe curtesy, and not in tenant for life or years. And tbe reason of tbe diversity was that tbe estate of tbe three former was created by act of tbe law itself, which, therefore, gave a remedy against them; but tenant for life or for years came in by tbe demise and lease of tbe owner of tbe fee, and therefore be might have provided against tbe committing of waste by bis lessee; and, if be did not, it was his own fault.' It is laid down by Cruise, in tbe first volume of bis Digest (p. 68, sec. 35), that 'by tbe common law, where lands were granted to a person for life, be was not liable to an action for waste, unless be was restrained by particular words in bis conveyance from committing waste, because it was in the power of tbe person who created tbe estate to impose such terms as be thought proper.' If it be said that tbe persons whose works are cited found themselves on tbe doctrine and reasons of Sir Edward Coke, it will not be denied. It only proves that tbe authority of Bracton (on whom Beeves stands) cannot stand in competition with tbe transcendent authority of tbe great law luminary in tbe opinion of celebrated jurists perfectly capable of appreciating their respective merits. The law, as applicable to tbe situation of this, as of tbe mother country, accompanied our ancestors in their migration hither; and, having never been abrogated or altered, it is the law of the state at the present time." Accordingly the Connecticut-court sustained the right of a tenant for life to cut down and. sell the timber. In 2 Minor's Inst., 546, the author states the common law rule as we have stated it — -that tenants for life or years, by contract, are not liable for waste. In Poe v. Hardie, 65 N. C., 449, the court declined to follow the common law, and held that the occupant of a homestead, although an estate created by law, and not by contract, was not liable for waste. In Hastings v. Crunckleton, 3 Yeates (Pa.), 261, the court, in a case against a widow for waste in dower lands, said there was "a material difference between the local circumstances of this' state and Great Britain. It would be an outrage on common sense to suppose that what would be deemed waste in England could receive that appellation here. Lands in general with us are enhanced by being cleared, provided a proper proportion of woodland is preserved for the maintenance of the place. If the tenant in dower clears part of the land assigned to her, and does not exceed the relative proportion of cleared land considered as to the whole tract, she cannot be said to have committed waste thereby." The court had in view here the case of an improved and inhabited tract of land, and not the case before us, but still would not be bound by the universal rule of the English common law that tenant in dower was liable for waste, because of the different conditions here. In Findlay v. Smith,, 6 Munf. (Va.), 142 (8 Am. Dec., 733), Judge Oabell said: "The law of waste in England varies, and accommodates itself to the varying wants and situations of the different counties in that country. Thus what is waste in one county is not waste in another. On the same principle, the law of waste, in its application here, varies and accommodates itself to the situation of our new and unsettled country." Further on in his opinion he says, on page 145' of Munf. (8 Am. Dec., 733) : "A tenant for life of a mine of coal may use it till he exhausts it, even although the interest of the remainderman may be thereby entirely destroyed. If this be the case when the thing itself is consumed by the use, never to be reproduced, a fortiori the right' exists in the case of wood, which will reproduce itself in a series of years." In this case Judge Coalter and Judge Brook held to the same views with Judge Cabell. Judge Roane dissented in so far as it was held that all the wood might be cut, but is in full accord as to the law of waste varying with varying conditions. See, also, Sherrill v. Conner, 107 N. C., 630 (12 S. E., 588); Ward v. Sheppard, 2 Hayw. (N. C.), 283 (2 Am. Dec., 625), was a case against a widow for waste of dower lands, inhabited and partly cleared, and the court sayá: "Waste in this country is not to be defined by the rules of the English law in all respects; for cutting timber trees for the purpose of clearing the lands was not waste here, though it was so in England. If lands were leased to a lessee in an uncultivated state, he must of necessity have the power to clear; otherwise the lease would be of no profit or advantage to him. The same is the case of dower lands." The opinion, however, proceeds to hold the particular case that, if the widow had cut the trees, not merely for clearing, but for sale, she would be liable. On the same line is Jackson v. Brownson, 7 Johns. (N. Y.) 227 (5 Am. Dec., 258).
As before indicated, all the decisions in this country on the subject of waste have reference to waste on farms in cultivation. Many of the states have re-enacted the statute of Marie-bridge and Gloucester in ohe shape or another, and some courts have simply followed the English decisions on these statutes as if they announced the common law. But these statutes have not, and never did have, any force in Mississippi. English statutes have no force in,this state since the act of 1807. Jordan v. Roach, 32 Miss., 482; Sessions v. Reynolds, 7 Smed. & M., 130; Boarman v. Catlett, 13 Smed. & M., 149; Ingraham v. Regan, 23 Miss., 213. Even the common law has no force where not adapted to "our institutions and circumstances." Railroad Co. v. Patton, 31 Miss., 156 (s.c., 66 Am. Dec., 552) ; Green v. Weller, 32 Miss., 650; Crane v. French, 38 Miss. 503. So, in determining adaptitudes to our condition our courts are continually building up a common law of our own. However, the courts of no state have gone further than those of our own in holding that the common law, where not repugnant to our institutions, conditions and circumstances, must always -prevail unless displaced by plain statute. So, if seen fit, this case might go off on the reasoning that it required English statutes, of no force in our state, to make a tenant for years liable for waste. The sages of the common law held a tenant for years not so liable on the assumption that, if he was to be, it wóuld have been so expi'essed in the lease. We have no statute of waste, and our common law is what this court may declare it, and why shall not our judgment be with the early judges of England, that a tenant for ninety-nine years shall not be liable for waste, because, if it were intended he should be, it would*" have been so declared in the statute providing for such a lease. In England the common law varies with different counties as to the subjects of which waste is predicable, and the judges here, in declaring the law, should have regard to the conditions. Waste is an injury to the remainder or reversion (the fee), something that lessens the value of the estate. Who can say that removing the pine trees will injure the estate to. the taker of it ninety-nine years hence? To hold the removal waste when, manifestly, that was the very ,purpose of it, seems quite harsh. Judge Strong, in Heil v. Strong, 44 Pa., 264, said the statute of Pennsylvania was not applicable when the very purpose of the lease was to get the timber. At common law, when a mine is leased, the lessee may exhaust it, for he is simply pursuing his right. See 6 Munf. (Va.), 134 (8 Am. Dec., 733) ; 44 Pa., 264; Owen v. Hyde, 6 Yerg. (Tenn.), 334 (27 Am. Dec., 467); 107 N. C., 630 (12 S. E., 588).
By universal understanding the lessee for ninety-nine years of sixteenth section lands acquired all of'the rights of an owner in fee for the time. The long time, the public necessity for clearing, the fact that practically the whole state was forest in 1833, the uncertainty of the future, the fact that the soil of a great majority of these sections in the pine regions was regarded as absolutely worthless for agriculture, the absence of any provision for liability of the tenant of any sort, the carelessness of our people about anything so long off, all argue persuasively for the immunity of the lessee. Twenty years' growth is held to constitute timber. In case of a lease for ninety-nine years, or other long periods, the trees being cut away, the land will reproduce the trees several .times over before the right of the reversioner accrues. David said: "There is hope of a tree, if it be cut down, that it will grow again," and we know that land denuded of its growth will reproduce. Who can say, in this case, that the interest of those who come after will be harmed by removing the timber ? Aside from all else, the fact that the lands were authorized to be sold for ninety-nine years, in the then condition of the state, without any limitations, restrictions, or conditions, would no doubt cause the sages of the common law to hold that the lessee was vested with the rights of an owner, and not answerable for the destruction of timber. It seems, then, that at the common law a tenant for life, by lease, was not liable for waste. But it is not necessary, in the case at bar, to determine whether the common law did, or whether existing law does, make such tenant for life, or tenant for years or at will, so liable. That must, when it maybe necessary to settle it, be decided on the condition of our country, the practice and custom of our people, and the circumstances of the particular contract.
After the' foregoing necessary review of the decisions on the common law, it is necessary to examine the legislation of Mississippi, in order to ascertain the intention of the parties in a contract for a ninety-nine-year lease of sixteenth section school lands made in the year 1833. The first settlement of this state was along water courses, and the lands and timber had practically no value, unless near little towns and villages. Even in the 50's, except on the strips of alluvion along streams, timbered land was not regarded, and, within thirty years past, public lands were sold in fee at five, ten, fifteen and twenty-five cents per acre. As late as 1877 public lands, of equal value with sixteenth sections, were authorized to be sold outright at a minimum value of twenty-five cents per acre. Pamph. Acts 1877, p. 34. Taking the history of the legislation about these sections, we find that in 1818 the justices of the county court were authorized to make leases for not more than three years, and that, "in all cases, the lands shall be protected against improper waste of soil and timber." This act is silent as to the terms of the conveyance by the lease. In 1824 an act provided that five trustees be elected by the resident heads of families, and it authorized these trustees to lease for not longer than five years, and provided that they "faithfully preserve the school lands and timber thereon from all improper waste, and shall institute suits against any person or persons, tenants as well as others, who may be found damaging, in any manner, the lands, timber or improvements, reserving to tenants the full liberty of their several leases." It is fair to presume that in these two acts the legislature had in mind that without these provisions there would be no liability, because of the common law, for waste without express provision for it. But it turned out to be utterly impracticable to make these leases witli prohibition of waste, except in scattered instances, where the lands were in or near towns. Nobody wanted them. The act of 1833 reviews the whole subject and authorizes the leases for ninety-nine years, which leases shall "convey the right, title, use, interest and occupation of said sections," and by an act of 1841 (Laws 1841, p. 127, c. 25) the lessees can sue as if they were "the fee simple owners of the leased premises, except as against the lessors."
The precise question, is, what was the understanding of the parties to the leases of sixteenth sections under the law of 1833 ? In that year there were less than five inhabitants to the square mile in a state with 16,000 square miles of territory, capable of supporting 20,000,000 of population, and then be considerably less densely settled than several of the kingdoms of Europe. The vote in a heated election for governor in 1833 was less than 13,000. Timber was not considered at all. It cumbered the earth. It had no value, except along streams capable of floating logs, or of easy haul to occasional small sawmills. The lands themselves were, except in the instance hereinbefore adverted to, of small, if any, value, and in the pine regions, where those in controversy lie, generally regarded as worthless, "barren wastes," infertile and unproductive, unfit for agriculture. There was, perhaps, the idea, with some of the far-sighted, that the timber at some remote period might be of some worth. Certain it appears to be that there could not have been any sale or lease of such wild lands, except for the timber on them. A lease for life, by fiction of the law, is regarded as of greater dignity than for any period of years; but, in fact, we know that a lease for ninety-nine years is far more desirable and of much greater market value than one for life. It is incredible, then, that in 1833 any sane man would have leased a pine barren for ninety-nine years, except for the timber on it. It is equally incredible that the state (the lessor) could have had any other idea in demising for a period so long that forests reproduce themselves, in the same, or often more desirable, growth, several times over. Such cases cannot be assimilated to ordinary leases of improved lands in the then condition of the country. In this view the terms of the lease, unheard of in such instruments, conveying, as required by law, "the right, title, me, interest and occupation," become of great significance, the more especially since there was no market for leases with any reservation as to waste.
The criterion of damage is the injury to the reversion!. Who can say there will be any here? Who can say that it will not be restored in a much more valuable condition? Can waste be predicated of the removal and sale of all the timber, where fine brick building's have been erected on the plot of their growth? Such is the case in several instances in towns and cities of the state. There could have been no intent or expectation of either party to restrict the cutting of trees, and such was the public and universal construction of these leases by the unquestioning usage of about seventy years. The case of Warren County v. Gans, 80 Miss., 76 (s.c., 31 South. Rep., 539), cites in its support Jackson v. Brownson, (N. Y.) (5 Am. Dec., 258) ; but it must be noted that in that case there was an express covenant, to which the court said it was tied down, against waste, and the lease was of a farm, and the court said the covenant prevented consideration of intention. It also cites Mooers v. Wait, (N. Y.) (20 Am. Dec., 667) ; but there the lease was for four years, with condition that the lessee should have full title only on compliance with conditions named. We approve both these cases. Note that both are New York cases. However, they throw no light on the question here as to the intention of the parties to the contract before us, viewed in reference to its terms and the conditions in Mississippi. . It follows that we were in error in the Cans case, as it should be overruled. In New York the statute of Gloucester was in force. Before the Cans case we are not directed to any decision, and we find none, on the ninety-nine year leases of public school lands, and so must decide on our own statutes and the history of our own conditions, and are not bound to the same view in reference to the usual leases of farm lands. As to these, the courts will consider whether a common law has not grown up here from custom and usage, and from these .will ascertain the intent of the parties. Thruston v. Mustin, 3 Cranch. C..C. (U. S.) 335, Fed. Gas. No. 14013, is conclusive, so far as it goes, in favor of this opinion. Judge Crawch plainly shows that except for the statute of Gloucester being in force and adopted in the constitution and bill of rights of Maryland, the decision would have been the reverse of what it is. Besides, in that case, the lease was of a cultivated farm and a personal private lease, and the waste confined to the cutting of "young and green wood," and the terms of the lease the usual terms.
This case falls distinctly in the class referred to above, where the statute of Gloucester is put in force by enactment. There is, as before stated, another class of cases, which assume that statute to be in force as common law without discussion. If it can be said of any principle that it is immovably fixed in the law of Mississippi, it is that no statute ever enacted in Great Britain has any force here unless re-enacted by our own legislature. Jordan v. Roach, 32 Miss., 481; Boarman v. Catlett, 13 Smed. & M., 149; Sessions v. Reynolds, 1 Smed. & M., 130; Ingraham v. Regan, 23 Miss., 213. Surely any assault on this proposition need not be noticed. It follows, therefore, that the statutes of Marlbridge and Gloucester are nullities so far as this state is concerned, and it is the law of this state, as applicable to a . ninety-nine-year school land lease of this state, which we are considering. On this we are driven to the common law existing before those statutes, and which, by all the decisions, is the law here, so far as suitable to our conditions at the date of the contract. To learn what this common law is, we have quoted three distinct utterances of Lord Coke. If these are "idle talk," and so to be considered by the profession, though sustained by nearly all of the learned law writers and judges who have treated the subject, of course there is an end to argument on that line; but this would not affect our conclusion from a proper interpretation of the statutes of Mississippi and of this particular lease. Our view is that this lease, in view of the conditions existing in 1833, the course of legislation, the terms of the act authorizing it, and the understanding of the people for seventy years, was intended to convey, and did convey, absolute ownership for the ninety-nine years. The statute orders the trustees "to convey the right, title, use and occupation" for ninety-nine years.
It is contended that the act of 1833 is not a repeal as to waste, but an amendment of the act of 1824, and that Hutchinson says so. We deny both propositions. The last act reviews the whole subject and is silent as to waste. Hutch. Code, pp. 205, 210, 213, c. 9, arts. 2, 5, 12. The machinery for leasing is unaffected. The terms of the law show the intent. It is idle to cite cases, in which the boohs abound, that waste is predicable of all leases. These are all, in all instances, from states where the statutes of Marlbridge and Gloucester are in force, and from nowhere else. Everywhere else the question of waste can or cannot be implied in reference to the common law as applied to local conditions. In Smith's. Manual, an English hornbook for boys, the two statutes are, in general terms, taken as common law; but in his elaborate and extended work of Landlord and Tenant, as before shown, he states the rule as Lord Ooke does and as we do. It is idle, also, to confuse legal with equitable waste, and produce authorities on this. Here the question is one of the intent of the parties to the contract. Here the timber is the only thing of value in the present lease, and was of no value at all in 1833. The idea that the universal demand is to sustain suits for waste is without a place in courts. And so of the idea of the benefits to unborn children. The only question is what the law is. The people want to be honest. But it is not true in fact. The children will be benefited throughout the state by our view.
Reversed, demurrer to bill sustained, and remanded.