Case Name: JENNINGS v. SOUTHWOOD
Court: Michigan Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1993-03-16
Citations: 198 Mich. App. 713
Docket Number: Docket No. 119614
Parties: JENNINGS v SOUTHWOOD
Judges: Before: Griffin, P.J., and Neff and Corrigan, JJ.
Reporter: Michigan appeals reports; cases decided in the Michigan Court of Appeals.
Volume: 198
Pages: 713–722

Head Matter:
JENNINGS v SOUTHWOOD
Docket No. 119614.
Submitted October 7, 1992, at Grand Rapids.
Decided March 16, 1993, at 9:05 a.m. .
Dean S. Jennings, as conservator of the estate of Cynthia K. Rasmussen, an incapacitated person, brought an action in the Berrien Circuit Court against Richard J. Southwood, Bill Boyd, Jr., Dan Daniels, Lake Township, and Lake Township Ambulance and Rescue, seeking damages resulting from the failure of emergency medical personnel to transport Cynthia to a hospital after responding to a call that she was experiencing a diabetic seizure. Cynthia has remained in a coma since the day of the incident. The plaintiffs pleadings asserted that the defendants’ actions amounted to gross negligence, thereby subjecting them to liability pursuant to the gross negligence exception to the immunity afforded under the emergency medical services act. The plaintiff, however, did not present any evidence of precedent negligence on the part of Cynthia or her mother occurring before the defendants’ alleged negligence, but argued that the defendants’ conduct was so sufficiently reckless as to demonstrate a substantial lack of concern for whether an injury might have resulted. The court, John T. Hammond, J., entered judgments for the defendants consistent with the jury’s verdict. The plaintiff appealed.
The Court of Appeals held:
1. The court erred in attempting to illustrate the concept of gross negligence to the jury by citing analogous examples of criminal misconduct. The error, however, does not require reversal because the failure to reverse is consistent with substantial justice.
2. To avoid the immunity afforded the individual defendants under the emergency medical services act, pursuant to the gross negligence exception of the act, MCL 333.20737; MSA 14.15(20737), now MCL 333.20965; MSA 14.15(20965), the plain tiff was required to plead and prove that their negligence occurred after some precedent negligence on the part of Cynthia or her mother.
References
Am Jur 2d, Appeal And Error §§ 716-819; Hospitals and Asylums § 15; Negligence § 25.
Liability for injury or death allegedly caused by actitivies of hospital "rescue team.” 64 ALR4th 1200.
3. The court erred in granting summary disposition in favor of the municipal defendants after incorrectly concluding that they could not be held vicariously liable for the gross negligence of the emergency personnel. Reversal is not required, however, because there was no gross negligence as a matter of law, and, therefore, the court reached the right result, albeit for the wrong reason.
Affirmed.
Neff, J., concurring in the result only, stated that the Supreme Court should resolve the issue whether the precedent negligence requirement for a claim of gross negligence survived the adoption of comparative negligence in Placek v Sterling Heights, 405 Mich 638 (1979); that the precedent neligence requirement makes no sense in a comparative negligence context; that in the context of emergency medical service, the only definition of gross negligence that makes sense is that provided by MCL 691.1407(2)(c); MSA 3.996(107)(2)(c): conduct so reckless as to demonstrate a substantial lack of concern for whether an injury results; and that, were the Court of Appeals not bound by stare decisis and Administrative Orders Nos. 1990-6, 1991-11, and 1992-8, it should find that the plaintiff properly pleaded the existence of gross negligence, that the trial court’s instructional error was not harmless, and that failure to reverse the judgment would be inconsistent with substantial justice.
Governmental Immunity — Emergency Medical Personnel — Gross Negligence.
To avoid the individual immunity afforded emergency medical personnel under the emergency medical services act, a plaintiff must establish that the defendant’s act or omission amounted to gross negligence or wilful misconduct; to establish gross negligence, the plaintiff must plead and prove that the defendant’s negligence occurred after some precedent negligence on the part of the plaintiff (MCL 333.20737; MSA 14.15[20737], now MCL 333.20965; MSA 14.15[20965]).
John T. Burhans, for the plaintiff.
Cummings, McClorey, Davis & Acho, P.C. (by Marcia L. Howe), for Richard J. Southwood, Bill Boyd, Jr., and Dan Daniels.
Before: Griffin, P.J., and Neff and Corrigan, JJ.

Opinion:
Per Curiam.
In this lawsuit involving issues of governmental immunity, plaintiff appeals as of right judgments entered in favor of defendants. We affirm.
This case arose as a result of defendants' failure to transport thirteen-year-old Cynthia K. Rasmussen to a hospital. Defendants Richard J. South-wood, Bill Boyd, Jr., and Dan Daniels are emergency medical personnel who on November 25, 1986, responded to a call that Cynthia was experiencing a diabetic seizure. At trial there was conflicting testimony regarding whether these defendants or Cynthia's mother made the ultimate decision not to transport Cynthia to a hospital. It is undisputed, however, that Cynthia has been in a coma since the day of the incident.
Plaintiff raises two issues for our review. To properly resolve this appeal, it is necessary to review plaintiffs second issue first. To abrogate defendants' individual immunity under the emergency medical services act (emsa), plaintiff was required to establish an act or omission amounting to "gross negligence or wilful misconduct." MCL 333.20737; MSA 14.15(20737), now see MCL 333.20965; MSA 14.15(20965). Plaintiff did not plead wilful misconduct. Rather, the only exception to immunity that plaintiff asserted was gross negligence.
On appeal, plaintiff argues that it was error for the trial court to attempt to illustrate the concept of gross negligence to the jury by citing analogous examples of criminal misconduct. Although we are persuaded that the trial court erred in this regard, we are not persuaded that plaintiff is entitled to reversal.
As another panel of this Court recently ob served, few aspects of negligence law have proven more frustrating to the courts of this state than the construction of the term "gross negligence." Pavlov v Community Emergency Medical Service, Inc, 195 Mich App 711, 718; 491 NW2d 874 (1992). Nonetheless, for purposes of the emsa, the common-law definition of gross negligence adopted in Gibbard v Cursan, 225 Mich 311, 319; 196 NW 398 (1923), has been retained. Accordingly, to avoid the immunity afforded under the emsa pursuant to the gross negligence exception of the emsa, plaintiff was required to plead and prove that defendants' negligence occurred after some precedent negligence on the part of Cynthia or her mother. Pavlov, supra; Abraham v Jackson, 189 Mich App 367, 372; 473 NW2d 699 (1991). This plaintiff has not done. Viewed in a light most favorable to plaintiff, the allegations in plaintiff's complaint allege solely that defendants failed to conduct a proper inquiry to determine whether Cynthia was actually experiencing a diabetic seizure. No averment of precedent negligence appears in plaintiff's complaint:
17. [D]efendants were guilty of gross negligence in failing to transport plaintiff, Cynthia K. Rasmussen to the services of appropriate health care persons on November 25, 1986 at approximately 7:22 p.m. for the following reasons:
(a) Cynthia K. Rasmussen was emotionally distraught.
(b) Cynthia K. Rasmussen was suffering from seizure activity.
(c) Cynthia K. Rasmussen was exhibiting vital signs indicative of hypoglycemia.
(d) Defendants failed to consult an appropriate licensed physician pursuant to the protocol of the Berrien County Emergency Medical Control Authority protocol for diabetic emergencies.
(e) Defendants failed to obtain permission from a duly licensed physician for the purposes of declaring this to be a nonemergency pursuant to the health code.
(f) An additional failure of these defendants in that they failed to obtain a proper and adequate history of Cynthia K. Rasmussen.
20. That defendants were guilty of gross negligence with regard to the care and treatment rendered to plaintiff, Cynthia K. Rasmussen on November 26, 1986 at approximately 12:30 a.m. despite defendants' prior knowledge of plaintiff, Cynthia K. Rasmussen's diabetic condition and the symptoms exhibited by her upon examination did not administer an iv solution containing glucose to offset the extremely dangerous glucose levels of plaintiff, Cynthia K. Rasmussen's blood.
Similarly, in his brief on appeal, plaintiff does not direct this Court to any record evidence of precedent negligence. Plaintiff argues instead that there was testimony that defendants' conduct was sufficiently reckless so as to demonstrate a substantial lack of concern for whether an injury might result. As noted above, however, this is not the appropriate test for avoiding immunity under the emsa.
It is well settled that instructional error compels reversal only where the failure to do so would be inconsistent with substantial justice. Reisman v Regents of Wayne State Univ, 188 Mich App 526, 532; 470 NW2d 678 (1991). Such injustice is not present in this case for the reason that plaintiff has failed to plead or prove gross negligence as defined by Gibbard, supra.
In view of our resolution of plaintiff's second issue, plaintiff's first issue merits only cursory discussion. Plaintiff contends that the trial court erred in granting summary disposition in favor of the municipal defendants, Lake Township and Lake Township Ambulance and Rescue. We agree, but again conclude that reversal is not required. Under the recent decision of the Supreme Court in Malcolm v East Detroit, 437 Mich 132, 147-148; 468 NW2d 479 (1991), the trial court's conclusion that the municipal defendants were entitled to judgment as a matter of law because they could not be held vicariously liable under the former statute for the gross negligence of their emergency personnel was incorrect. However, because there was no gross negligence as a matter of law, vicarious liability of the municipality is no longer at issue. An order of summary disposition need not be reversed where the trial court reaches the right result but for the wrong reason. See State Mutual Ins Co v Russell, 185 Mich App 521, 528; 462 NW2d 785 (1990).
Affirmed.
As noted in Pavlov, supra, p 720, Abraham is controlling precedent under Administrative Order No. 1990-6, 436 Mich lxxxiv.