Case Name: ROYAL OAK TRUCKING COMPANY v. KELLER
Court: Michigan Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1969-05-29
Citations: 17 Mich. App. 532
Docket Number: Docket No. 4,360
Parties: ROYAL OAK TRUCKING COMPANY v. KELLER
Judges: BEFORE: Levin, P. J., and R. B. Burns and Dalton, JJ.
Reporter: Michigan appeals reports; cases decided in the Michigan Court of Appeals.
Volume: 17
Pages: 532–540

Head Matter:
ROYAL OAK TRUCKING COMPANY v. KELLER
Opinion of the Court
1. Appeal and Error — Judgment—Time for Appeal.
Provision in Bevised Judicature Act that the period allowed for appealing from a judgment shall not commence to run until proof of service of the judgment is filed does not apply where a verdict has been rendered and the eourt forthwith renders judgment and enters it in its doeket; therefore an appeal from a municipal eourt judgment was properly dismissed by the circuit court when the appeal was not taken within ten days after judgment was entered, but was taken within ten days after notice of entry of judgment was served (CLS 1961, § 600.7115).
Dissenting Opinion Levin, P. J.
2. Appeal and Error — Judgment—Time for Appeal.
Provision in Revised Judicature Act tolling the ten-day limitation period within which appeals must he talcen until proof of having served notice of rendition of judgment is filed does not apply to cases where a verdict is rendered (CLS 1961, § 600.7115; GCS 1963, 701.4[2]).
Beferences for Points in Headnotes
[1] 4 Am Jur 2d, Appeal and Error §§ 292, 296, 302-304.
[2] 4 Am Jur 2d, Appeal and Error § 293.
[3] 53 Am Jur, Trial § 1005.
[4] 4 Am Jur 2d, Appeal and Error § 303.
[5] 4 Am Jur 2d, Appeal and Error §§ 323, 327.
3. Words and Phrases — Verdict—Definition.
The term “verdict” means a determination by a jury and does not comprehend a judge’s determination.
4. Appeal and Error — Judgment—Time for Appeal — Statute.
Circuit court’s dismissal of defendant’s appeal from a municipal court judgment on the ground that the appeal was not filed within ten days after judgment ivas entered was improper, because a ruling made by the municipal court in the presence of the parties was not a verdict, and therefore the case did not fall within any exception to the Sevised Judicature Act provision tolling the limitation period for appeals until after proof of having served notice of rendition of judgment was filed (CLS 1961, § 600.7115; GCS 1963, 701.4[iS]).
5. Appeal and Error — Jurisdiction—-Costs—Bond on Appeal.
Failure to pay court costs and to file a proper appeal bond are not jurisdictional and therefore dismissal of an appeal from failure to talse these steps is discretionary with the trial court.
Appeal from Oakland, William John Beer, J. Submitted Division 2 May 10,1968, at Detroit.
(Docket No. 4,360.)
Decided May 29, 1969.
Leave to appeal denied November 20, 1969.
See 382 Mich 795.
Royal Oak Trucking Company, a Michigan corporation, recovered a judgment from Robert Keller in Walled Lake municipal court. Defendant appealed to Oakland county circuit court. Plaintiff’s motion to dismiss defendant’s appeal granted. Defendant appeals.
Affirmed.
Maurice A. Merritt, for plaintiff.
Eliot Charlip, for defendant.
BEFORE: Levin, P. J., and R. B. Burns and Dalton, JJ.
Circuit Judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.

Opinion:
R. B. Burns, J.
Plaintiff recovered a money judgment in municipal court from which, defendant appealed to the circuit court. Defendant now appeals the circuit court order dismissing his appeal for failure to timely file it. The claim of appeal filed with the circuit court states that the defendant appeals from a judgment entered by the municipal judge on June 7,1967 and notice of entry served on June 15, 1967.
The defendant contends that under provisions of RJA § 7115 (CDS 1961, § 600.7115 [Stat Ann 1962 Rev § 27A.7115]) the period allowed for appealing from the judgment did not commence to run until proof of service was filed on June 15, 1967, while plaintiff contends that under the provisions of GCR 1963, 701.4(2) the 10-day period during which an appeal may be taken as of right commences to run upon entry of the order appealed from without regard to when the notice of rendition of the judgment is mailed or proof of service is filed.
In our opinion the provision of RJA § 7115 stating that "the period allowed for appealing from said judgment shall not commence to run until proof of such service is filed in said cause" does not apply where, as set forth in RJA § 7115, a verdict has been rendered and the justice in fact forthwith renders judgment and enters it in his docket. It is not claimed that the municipal judge in this case did not in fact render the verdict in the presence of counsel for the litigants and "forthwith render judgment and enter the same in his docket." As set forth above, the claim of appeal states that the judgment was entered on June 7, 1967, and it appears that the parties appeared before tbe municipal judge on tbat date. Since in our view tbe provision in RJA § 7115 tolling tbe time for taking appeal until proof of service is filed is not bere applicable, there is no need to attempt to reconcile tbat statutory provision with tbe previously mentioned provision of GrCR 1963, 701.4(2).
Affirmed. Costs to plaintiff.
Dalton, J., concurred with R. B. Burns, J.