Case Name: Arthur W. Russell vs. John F. Annable
Court: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
Jurisdiction: Massachusetts
Decision Date: 1871-11
Citations: 109 Mass. 72
Docket Number: 
Parties: Arthur W. Russell vs. John F. Annable.
Judges: 
Reporter: Massachusetts Reports
Volume: 109
Pages: 72–78

Head Matter:
Arthur W. Russell vs. John F. Annable.
A bend given for the purpose of obtaining a dissolution of an attachment of paitnership property, and executed in the name of the firm by only one of two partners named a» principals therein, cannot be enforced against a surety without evidence of the assent of the other partner to its exeotion. Wells, J., dissenting.
Contract, brought August 3, 1870, against one of the sureties in the following bond given under the Gen. Sts. o. 123, § 104, to dissolve an attachment:
“ Know all men by these presents, that Erastus Dennett and ' Charles R. Pottle, of Boston in the county of Suffolk, as principal, and George M. Stevens, of Cambridge, and John F. Annable, of Somerville, in the county of Middlesex, as surety, are holden and stand firmly bound and obliged unto Arthur W. Russell, of Cambridge in said Middlesex, in the full and just sum of two hundred dollars, to be paid unto the said Russell, his executors, administrators or assigns, to which payment, well and truly to be made, we bind ourselves, our heirs, executors and administrators, jointly and severally, firmly by these presents, sealed with our seals, dated the twenty-second day of July in the year of oui Lord one thousand eight hundred and sixty-nine. The condition of this obligation is such, that, whereas the said Russell has caused the goods and estate of said Dennett & Pottle, to the value of two hundred dollars, to be attached on mesne process in a civil action, by virtue of a writ bearing date the 21st day of July, A. D. 1869, and returnable to the superior court for civil business to be holden at said Boston within and for the county of Suffolk on the first Tuesday of October next, in which said writ the said Arthur W. Russell is plaintiff, and the said Erastus Den-nett and Charles R. Pottle the defendants; and whereas the said defendants wish to dissolve the said attachment according to the provisions of the General Statutes in such cases made and provided ; Now, therefore, if the above bounden Russell shall pay to the plaintiff in said action the amount, if. any, which he shall recover therein, within thirty days after the final judgment in said action, then the above written obligation shall be null and void, otherwise to remain in full force and virtue.
“ Signed, sealed and deliv- “ Dennett & Pottle, [seal]
ered in presence of “ George M. Stevens, [seal]
Edward Raymond.” “ John F. Annable. [seal] ”
The declaration alleged that the plaintiff at said October term 1869 of the superior court duly entered the action named in the bond, and such proceedings were had therein that he obtained judgment against said Dennett & Pottle at April term 1870 for $110 damages and $21.49 costs, and no part of said judgment had been paid, though the defendant had often been requested to pay the same, and the defendant owed him the amount of said judgment and the costs subsequently accrued thereon. The answer denied each and every allegation of the plaintiff.
Trial in the superior court before Scudder, J., who by consent of the parties reported the following case before verdict: “ This was an action on a bond, of which a copy is annexed. It appeared that Erastus Dennett and Charles R. Pottle were copartners, under the firm name of Dennett & Pottle, and that the execution of the bond, as to the principal, was by one of them. It was contended by the defendant that the bond was void upon its face ; also that there was no legal execution of it by the principals, and therefore it was void as to the defendant. If these objections are valid, then judgment is to be for the defendant; if invalid, then judgment for the plaintiff for $138.83, with interest from June 24, 1870, being the date of original judgment and costs. The officer’s return on the original writ and judgment may be referred to. The execution of the bond by the defendant tvas admitted.” The return of the officer, thus referred to, certified that the property attached by him, for dissolution of which attachment the bond was given, was' property of Dennett & Pottle, and that he took the bond “ of said Dennett & Pottle, with George M. Stevens and John F. Annable as sureties.”
J. S. Abbott, for the plaintiff.
O. G. Read, for the defendant.

Opinion:
Ames, J.
It is well settled that one partner cannot bind his associates by affixing his signature, in the name and style of the firm, to an instrument under seal. To make such a transaction binding, it must appear that there was either a previous author* ity, or a subsequent ratification on the part of the other partners, adopting the signature as binding upon them. Cady v. Shepherd, 11 Pick. 400. Van Deusen v. Blum, 18 Pick. 229. Swan v. Stedman, 4 Met. 548. Dillon v. Brown, 11 Gray, 179. The report in this case presents no evidence of any previous authority or subsequent ratification, and it follows that the bond is not so executed as to bind the members of the firm.
The bond purports to be the joint and several contract of certain persons named therein as principals, and the defendant and George M. Stevens as sureties. The defendant's undertaking is only that the principal obligors shall fulfil the obligation which by the terms of the bond they have assumed. But. if the bond was not binding upon both Dennett and Pottle, (as it was not, for want of due and proper execution of the instrument on their part,) they assumed no obligation, and it was not binding upon the sureties. It was essential to the bond that the principals should be parties to it; it is recited that they are so, and the instrument is incomplete and void without their signature. The remedy of sureties against their principals might be greatly embarrasssed, if such an instrument as this should be held binding. There is nothing to estop any member of the firm, who did not sign it, from denying that he was a party to it, and it was no part of the defendant's contract that he should be surety for one member of the firm, and not for both. The instrument is incomplete without the signature of each partner, or proof that the signature affixed had the assent and sanction of each of them. The sureties on a bond are not holden, if the instrument is not executed by the person whose name is stated as the principal therein. It should be executed by all the intended parties. Bean v. Parker, 17 Mass. 591. Wood v. Washburn, 2 Pick. 24.
The instrument, being found incapable of taking effect as a specialty, cannot operate as a simple contract. Cases have indeed arisen, in which a bond, duly executed, expressing a contract which the parties had a right to make, has been held to be valid at common law, although not made with the formalities, or exe* rated in the mode, provided by a statute under which it purports to have been given. See Sweetser v. Hay, 2 Gray, 49, and casas there cited. But we find no case in which it has been held that a written instrument, purporting to be a specialty, and plainly intended by the parties to have all the incidents and characteristics of a bond in the strict and technical sense of that word, has ever been transmuted by the court into a simple contract, for the reason that it has not been properly executed to take effect as a contract under seal.
It is therefore held, by a majority of the court, that there should be judgment for the defendant.