Case Name: STATE of Louisiana v. Richard E. REED
Court: Louisiana Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1974-02-18
Citations: 290 So. 2d 835
Docket Number: No. 54004
Parties: STATE of Louisiana v. Richard E. REED.
Judges: SANDERS, C. J., dissents with written reasons.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 290
Pages: 835–840

Head Matter:
STATE of Louisiana v. Richard E. REED.
No. 54004.
Supreme Court of Louisiana.
Feb. 18, 1974.
Rehearing Denied March 22, 1974.
William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Barbara Rutledge, Asst. Atty. Gen., Ossie
Brown, Dist. Atty., Ralph L. Roy, Asst. Dist. Atty., for plaintiff-appellee.
Murphy W. Bell, Trial Atty., Warren J. Hebert, Baton Rouge, for defendant-appellant.

Opinion:
BARHAM, Justice.
Defendant, Richard E. Reed, was charged with aggravated rape, and was convicted after trial by jury of simple rape, in violation of R.S. 14:43. He was sentenced to serve twenty years in the custody of the Department of Corrections. In this appeal he relies on three bills of exceptions.
At the time of the alleged rape, October 24, 1971, the defendant and the prosecutrix both lived on the same street in North Baton Rouge, 72nd Avenue On that night, the victim and her male companion were out walking, looking for her younger brother. They passed a group of young blacks in front of a bar on Scenic Highway, inquired about the child, and were proceeding on when someone struck the young man and grabbed the victim. The girl was dragged into a ditch, and then around the side of a house where the rape took place. The only eye witness to what occurred was one of the five other blacks, Allen Ginn.
BILL OF EXCEPTIONS NO. 1
This bill was reserved when the State played, as rebuttal testimony, an unsworn, taped statement by a deceased defense witness, Allen Ginn, whose preliminary hearing testimony, which included cross-examination by the State, had been read into the record. Defense counsel objected on the grounds that it denied the defendant the right to cross-examine the witness as to the voluntariness of the statement, and as to the reasons for any inconsistencies. Allen Ginn was the lone person who went back to observe Reed and the prosecutrix after everyone scattered.
Ginn's testimony at the preliminary hearing was favorable to the defend ant and strongly supported his defense of consent. Ginn stated he had seen the pros-ecutrix around, that it appeared to him that she and Reed knew each other prior to the incident, that she told someone to hit the white boy (McAllister), and that the group scattered after the hit. When he went back he saw the couple and they appeared to be making love; they were not struggling, she was not screaming, talking or asking for help. He told Reed to leave the girl alone because he might get in trouble for fooling around with a white girl. The witness' prior statement to the police was pointed out by defense counsel at the preliminary hearing. The State cross-examined the witness, but did not use the prior statement in cross-examination and made absolutely no reference to it. The transcript of the preliminary examination testimony of a witness may be used at the trial of the case for any purpose when the witness is deceased. Therefore, the testimony of Ginn was properly admissible in this case. This rule has no application to the taped statement which was not a part of the preliminary examination.
The taped statement was made to the police around 4 a. m. the morning after the rape, when Ginn was being interrogated as to his knowledge of the incident. He said Reed hit the white boy (though at trial McAllister testified that it definitely was not the defendant who hit him) and grabbed the white girl when she fell, while all the others were scattering. When he went back, the girl was lying in a ditch and Reed was standing over her. Ginn told Reed to leave her alone, that "this was not cool", but Reed told him he didn't know what he was talking about. In both instances he testified the group was walking along drinking wine together and having a friendly conversation. At the time of his police questioning, he said he didn't want to get involved, and he didn't want to serve time for anyone else.
The admission of the unsworn taped statement was error. R.S. 15:493 provides:
"Whenever the credibility of a witness is to be impeached by proof of any statement made by him contradictory to his testimony, he must first be asked whether he has made such statement, and his attention must be called to the time, place and circumstances, and to the person to whom the alleged statement was made, in order that the witness may have an opportunity of explaining that which is prima facie contradictory. If the witness does not distinctly admit making such statement, evidence that he did make it is admissible."
This article has always been strictly construed. The proper foundation must be laid. State v. Rogers, 256 La. 447, 236 So.2d 795 (1970). There has been no exception for the death of a witness; Demasi v. Whitney, 176 So. 703 (Orleans La.App. 1937), or for rebuttal evidence, State v. Augusta, 199 La. 896, 7 So.2d 177 (1942). This is also the general rule in the rest of the country as pointed out by McCormick in the 2d ed. of Evidence, § 37, note 52. See Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 15 S.Ct. 337, 39 L.Ed. 409 (1895).
The admission of the statement was reversible error because the codal requirement of laying the proper foundation was not complied with. The jurisprudence has construed this to mean there are no exceptions to this rule, not even for the death of a witness. The error was compounded by the fact that the statement was unsworn. C.Cr.P. Art. 776, State v. Bussey, 162 La. 393, 110 So. 626 (1926). Additionally, the admission denied the defendant his right to confront the witnesses against him as provided for by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article 1, § 9 of the Louisiana Constitution. In the context of an inflammatory rape trial, the admission of this statement was highly prejudicial to the defendant.
Allen Ginn was a key defense witness. He was the only person who observed what took place between the prose-cutrix and the defendant. While under oath at the preliminary hearing, his testimony was favorable to the defendant and strongly supported his defense of consent and his story of having had sexual relations with the prosecutrix prior to the alleged rape. His prior inconsistent statement (at police headquarters in the early morning hours the day after the alleged rape) was not under oath. At that time he admitted he was scared, he did not want to get involved, and he did not want to serve time for anyone else. This statement was referred to by defense counsel at the preliminary hearing. The State was on notice the witness had made a prior statement; they cross-examined him, but not about the statement. The State had the opportunity to impeach the witness, but failed to do so.
Admission of the unsworn taped statement by the deceased witness, Ginn was reversible error under Code of Criminal Procedure Article 921 because it violated both statutory and constitutional rights of the defendant.
Having found merit in Bill of Exceptions No. 1, we will not consider the other bills reserved. The defendant's conviction and sentence are reversed, and the case is remanded for re-trial.
SANDERS, C. J., dissents with written reasons.
SUMMERS, J., dissents and assigns reasons.
O.Cr.P. Art. 295 :
"The transcript of the testimony of any other witness who testified at the preliminary examination is admissible for any purpose in any subsequent proceeding in the case, on behalf of either party, if the court finds that the witness is dead, too ill to testify, absent from the state, or cannot be found, and that the absence of the witness was not procured by the party offering the testimony.
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