Case Name: Phillip CASSAMASSIMA, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1995-06-02
Citations: 657 So. 2d 906
Docket Number: No. 93-2522
Parties: Phillip CASSAMASSIMA, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: COBB, GOSHORN and PETERSON, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 657
Pages: 906–917

Head Matter:
Phillip CASSAMASSIMA, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. 93-2522.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
June 2, 1995.
Certification Denied July 11, 1995.
James B. Gibson, Public Defender, and M.A. Lucas, Asst. Public Defender, Daytona Beach, for appellant.
Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Carmen F. Corrente, Asst. Atty. Gen., Daytona Beach, for appellee.

Opinion:
GRIFFIN, Judge.
We have voted to hear this case en banc to reconsider the panel decision in Hart v. State, 633 So.2d 1189 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994), involving the same issue as the present ease. The question presented is whether a person convicted of lewd assault on a child can be required to submit to a polygraph at regular intervals (in this case, twice a year) as a condition of probation or community control. We answer the question in the affirmative.
Since 1952, polygraph results have been held inadmissible in Florida to prove guilt, based on what was then a uniform body of law from other jurisdictions finding a lack of general acceptance of their accuracy by the scientific community. The Supreme Court of Florida also has previously expressed hostility to the use of polygraphs for investigative purposes. Many jurisdictions, however, including Florida, do allow evidence of a polygraph by agreement of the parties. Davis v. State, 520 So.2d 572, 574 (Fla.1988); Jones v. State, 453 So.2d 226 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984).
To this day, absent a stipulation, very few courts will allow evidence of polygraph results to be admitted for any purpose. The most notable exception is United States v. Piccinonna, 885 F.2d 1529, 1532 (11th Cir.1989). In 1989, the Eleventh Circuit sitting en banc surveyed the developing scientific literature and concluded that it was "no longer accurate to state categorically that polygraph testing lacks general acceptance for use in all circumstances." 885 F.2d at 1532. The Piccinonna court made mention of the fact that polygraph tests are in wide use for non-evidentiary purposes and that better equipment and better trained examiners have greatly improved accuracy. Thus, in the Eleventh Circuit, polygraph evidence is now admissible to impeach or corroborate the testimony of a witness. The only state court that permits similarly broad admissibility is New Mexico. Giannelli, 30 Crim. L.Bull. at 373.
It appears that factors other than reliability have influenced courts against the eviden-tiary use of lie detector test results, including the risk that the issue of the polygraph and its accuracy will generate disproportionate expense on both sides of a criminal trial and degenerate into a battle of experts that will unduly bog down the trial or become the focus of the case. Also, there is the danger that the jury may give disproportionate weight to this scientific means of assessing credibility. Id. at 369. It is therefore not surprising that in non-trial contexts such as suppression hearings, prison disciplinary hearings, or motions for new trial, polygraph results are much more likely to be admitted. Id. at 377.
At least two other Florida courts have assumed the validity of a polygraph examination as a condition of probation. Nichols v. State, 528 So.2d 1282, 1284 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988); Hockman v. State, 465 So.2d 619, 620 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985). Nevertheless, the majority in Hart held that such a condition is invalid because to rely on the results of a polygraph examination is an improper delegation of a trial court's fact finding authority and because the polygraph is unreliable for forensic use. While the dissent agreed that the results of the polygraph were inadmissible to prove a probation violation, it found the condition valid for purposes of deterrence and supervision of the probationer. We approve the latter approach.
The trial judge in this case, who is the same as in Hart, again expressed her reason for imposing the polygraph examination condition:
THE COURT: As a special condition of your Community Control and probation, I am going to require that within the first ninety days that you are on this sentence that you obtain an evaluation by an evaluator who is experienced in dealing with sex offenders, that you attend and successfully complete any counselling required as a result of that evaluation.
You may choose the evaluator and you may choose the counselling facility or counselor, but they must be ones that are acceptable to your Community Control or probation officer.
I am going to agree to waive the costs of your supervision of Community Control or probation while you are engaged in coun-selling of any type, either sex counselling or drug offender counselling, in order to assist you with paying these costs, but you will be required to make these restitution payments until the restitution is paid in fuH.
THE COURT: As a part of the counsel-ling which, if counselling is indicated, then as a part of the counselling, if there is no sex offender counselling indicated, then independently at least once every six months for the first two years and then once every year thereafter, I am going to require that you obtain a monitoring examination, a polygraph examination by an experienced polygraph examiner and that at that time following that you answer the following questions in the polygraph, the first is since your last polygraph test or since sentencing in the case which would be the question at the very, very, first, have you been alone with a child and since your last polygraph test or since sentencing have you had any manner of sexual contact with a child.
The polygraph will be administered by a polygraph examiner who is experienced in administering polygraphs to sex offenders.
There are several in our area.
You may choose one as long as that one is acceptable to your Community Control or probation officer.
The Court imposes the special condition based on research which shows that this is a valid and effective deterrent to reoffend and is both valid and effective in dealing with denial that are critical in dealing with evaluation of rehabilitation of sex offenders and in large part because sex crimes, particularly with children, are secret crimes as to which it is very difficult to make an effective either detection or an effective way to monitor whether we are having a violation of either the Community Control or the probation.
A yes answer to either of those questions or a no answer which indicates deception would form the basis for a violation of community control or probation in this case.
Section 948.03, Florida Statutes (1993) establishes that probationers may be subject to a variety of requirements, such as mandatory drug or alcohol testing, that would significantly interfere with their rights or liberties in other contexts. So long as the condition is reasonably related to the offense, to the rehabilitation of the defendant or to the protection of the public, it is a valid condition of probation or community control. Grubbs v. State, 373 So.2d 905, 909 (Fla.1979); Nichols, 528 So.2d at 1284. In Lar son v. State, 572 So.2d 1368 (Fla.1991), in considering a condition of probation that forbade the defendant from entering Tallahassee, the high court said that:
As a general rule, a condition of probation that burdens the exercise of a legal or constitutional right should be given special scrutiny. However, a defendant cannot successfully challenge every aspect of a prior order of probation simply because it infringes on some such rights. Most sentences and orders of probation have that effect, if only because they restrict liberty to some extent.
Larson, 572 So.2d at 1371.
The courts of other jurisdictions are virtually unanimous in approving the requirement of a polygraph as a condition of probation. See generally Anne M. Payne, Annotation, Propriety of Conditioning Probation on Defendant's Submission to Polygraph or other Lie Detector Testing, 86 A.L.R.4th 703 (1991). This is so, even though in those jurisdictions, as in Florida, polygraph results are not admissible evidence in a criminal trial. These courts seem to recognize that such a condition of probation is valid because it provides a psychological deterrent, Mann v. State, 154 Ga.App. 677, 269 S.E.2d 863, 866 (1980), and will assist the work of the probation officer in assuring the probationer does not re-offend. People v. Miller, 208 Cal.App.3d 1311, 256 Cal.Rptr.587 (1989). Many of the decided cases involve sex offenders. See, e.g., State v. Sejnoha, 512 N.W.2d 597 (Minn.Ct.App.1994); Miller, supra. At least one court, however, has reached a result virtually identical to the one we reach in the context of a burglary case. Patton v. State, 580 N.E.2d 693 (Ind.Ct.App.1991). In State v. Flores-Moreno, 72 Wash.App. 733, 866 P.2d 648, 655, review denied, 124 Wash.2d 1009, 879 P.2d 292 (1994), the court found that a condition requiring a drug offender to submit to a polygraph examination was proper so long as the polygraph examinations related to drugs and did not stray into subjects not directly related to his offense. In Oregon, by statute, polygraph examinations are a valid condition of probation. Patton, 580 N.E.2d 693. Or.Rev.Stat. § 137.540(2)(b); State v. Victoroff, 96 Or. App. 176, 770 P.2d 922 (1989).
Some jurisdictions have gone even farther in using polygraph test results in probation proceedings. Recently, in State v. Travis, 125 Idaho 1, 867 P.2d 234 (1994), the high court of Idaho held that evidence of the results of a polygraph examination was admissible in a probation revocation hearing as a factor that the court could consider in concluding it was appropriate to revoke the probation of a probationer who had been convicted of lewd conduct with an eight-year old. The polygraph test results indicated he had been deceptive in answering questions concerning whether he had been involved in sexual activity with minors. Accord State v. Fogarty, 187 Mont. 393, 610 P.2d 140 (1980), overruled by State v. Burke, 235 Mont. 165, 766 P.2d 254 (1988).
Several courts have considered Fifth Amendment objections to such a condition of probation, but these objections usually have been rejected on the ground that the intrusion into the area of self-incrimination when someone is required to answer truthfully during a lie detector examination is no greater than the requirement that a probationer answer truthfully all reasonable inquiries of his probation officer. Owens v. Kelley, 681 F.2d 1362, 1370 (11th Cir.1982); see also Fogarty, 610 P.2d at 149; Mann, 269 S.E.2d 863; State v. Age, 38 Or.App. 501, 590 P.2d 759 (1979). Such a condition "clearly is reasonably related to [the offender's] probation in that it deters him from violating the terms of his probation by instilling in him a fear of detection." Owens, 681 F.2d at 1370. The court may require certain questions be asked of the probationer and when the question is asked, the probationer is free to assert a Fifth Amendment privilege, if appropriate. Id. at 1369.
The United States Supreme Court in Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 436-39 n. 7, 104 S.Ct. 1136, 1147 n. 7, 79 L.Ed.2d 409 (1984) has explained that a probationer may not refuse to answer a question just because his answer would disclose a probation violation; he may only refuse to answer if a truthful answer would expose him to prosecution for a crime different from the one of which he was already convicted. Murphy, 465 U.S. at 442-43, 104 S.Ct. at 1150 (Marshall, J. dissenting.) It is permissible to order no contact with children as a condition of probation and to require the defendant to answer whether he had such contact. As Judge Harris points out in his concurring opinion, this appears to be what the Florida Supreme Court was alluding to in State v. Heath, 343 So.2d 13, 16 (Fla.1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 893, 98 S.Ct. 269, 54 L.Ed.2d 179 (Fla.1977). As the Heath court said, a probationer may be required to provide all necessary information for his supervision. He may be required to confirm or deny his location at a particular place at a particular time, explain his non-criminal conduct and submit to a search of his quarters and of his person; his Fifth Amendment rights relate only to a separate criminal offense. Id. If a probationer chooses not to answer questions about non-criminal conduct or to submit to such searches, his probation can be revoked.
The United States Supreme Court in Murphy also recognized the right of the state to require a probationer to answer even incriminating questions so long as the answers are not used against him in a prosecution for the criminal conduct:
Our cases indicate, moreover, that a State may validly insist on answers to even incriminating questions and hence sensibly administer its probation system, as long as it recognizes that the required answers may not be used in a criminal proceeding and thus eliminates the threat of incrimination. Under such circumstances, a probationer's "right to immunity as a result of his compelled testimony would not be at stake," [citations omitted] and nothing in the Federal Constitution would prevent a State from revoking probation for a refusal to answer that violated an express condition of probation or from using the probationer's silence as "one of a number of factors to be considered by the finder of fact" in deciding whether other conditions of probation have been violated. [Citations omitted].
Id. at 435, 104 S.Ct. at 1146.
In the present case, the lower court expressed the view that the polygraph condition was justified by the circumstances of the particular offense and the information available to the court suggesting that polygraphs offered a deterrent to re-offense. We hold that the lower court may require this defendant to take a polygraph at reasonable intervals and to respond to questions that concern non-criminal conduct so long as the results of the polygraph are not offered in evidence. Consistent with Murphy, the probationer may only refuse to answer if it is within his Fifth Amendment right to do so. The state then may elect whether to require the answer by eliminating the threat of prosecution for the crime.
AFFIRMED in part; REVERSED in part.
COBB, GOSHORN and PETERSON, JJ., concur.
HARRIS, C.J., concurs and concurs specially, with opinion, in which COBB, J., concurs.
DAUKSCH, J., dissents, with opinion, in which W. SHARP, and THOMPSON, JJ., concur.
W. SHARP, J., dissents, with opinion.
THOMPSON, J., dissents, with opinion, in which W. SHARP, J., concurs.
. This precise issue was not raised below, but the contemporaneous objection rule would be inapplicable to an illegal condition of probation. Larson v. State, 572 So.2d 1368 (Fla.1991).
. Delap v. State, 440 So.2d 1242, 1247 (Fla.1983); Kaminski v. State, 63 So.2d 339 (Fla.1952). Although not necessarily dispositive, we have considered whether the polygraph has now gained the requisite measure of acceptance in the scientific community. A recent article on polygraph evidence, published in two parts, by Professor Paul C. Giannelli, Forensic Science: Polygraph Evidence: Part I, 30 Crim.L.Bull. 262 (May-June 1994; Forensic Science: Polygraph Evidence: Part II, 30 Crim.L.Bull. 366 (July- Aug. 1994), offers a current survey of both the science and the law pertaining to polygraphs. The author notes that the amount of scientific research conducted in the last ten years has far outpaced all prior efforts. Id. at 270. He reports that some researchers claim a polygraph accuracy rate of 95% or higher, id. at 273, while others report results as low as 64%. Id. at 272. It appears that the use of computers has had a significant and positive effect on polygraph quality control. Id. at 269. Nevertheless, Professor Giannelli concludes that: "The validity of polygraph testing in criminal investigations remains controversial." Id. at 269.
. Kaminski, 63 So.2d at 340.
. In Farmer v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 427 So.2d 187 (Fla.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 816, 104 S.Ct. 74, 78 L.Ed.2d 86 (1983), the high court said:
The city agrees that polygraph testing is not foolproof and concedes that it could not use any evidence obtained from the test in any subsequent judicial proceeding concerning job dismissal. It argues, however, that information obtained from the test could be used as a basis for further investigation, such as identifying co-conspirators or locating the proceeds of the alleged crime. Any such evidence obtained in such an indirect manner would then be admissible in court. Aside from the questionable relevance of such a procedure in relation to the case sub judice, . we must hold that the possible investigative benefit of building a case upon the foundation of the results of a polygraph examination is too thin a reed to support a denial of a police officer's right to be subjected to only lawful and reasonable orders.
As mentioned above, petitioner did answer questions about the incident as he would have been constitutionally required to do under Garrity. To further subject petitioner to the same questions when he is attached to a machine of undemonstrated scientific reliability and validity to obtain test results which could not be used in court, is, we believe not a lawful and reasonable order and can thus not provide a basis for dismissal.
Id. at 190, 191. Farmer, however, was a police officer with a vested property right in his government employment. The defendant sub judice is a convicted sex offender on community control as part of a stipulated downward departure sentence. As such, he is subject to a whole range of requirements that would be considered "unlawful" or "unjust" if applied to a police officer in the employment context.
.One of the cases on which Piccinonna relied was Commonwealth v. A Juvenile, 365 Mass. 421, 313 N.E.2d 120 (1974), in which the Supreme Judicial Court oi Massachusetts had approved the evidentiary use of polygraphs for certain purposes. Ironically, three months after Piccinon-na, the Massachusetts court receded from its earlier position. Commonwealth v. Mendes, 406 Mass. 201, 547 N.E.2d 35 (1989).
. In fact, our opinion in Hart stands virtually alone in its categorical rejection of the use of polygraphs as a condition of probation.
. The Florida Supreme Court standard form order of probation requires the probationer to "promptly and truthfully answer all inquiries directed to you by . the [probation] officer." Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.986.
. Other courts have approved such a condition in order to assure the probationer is avoiding contact with young people. Sejnoha, 512 N.W.2d at 601. It is conceivable that such a question might appropriately warrant the invocation of the privilege against self-incrimination. If so, as with any other question, it may be invoked.
. This limitation does not eliminate the utility of polygraphs, however. As the dissent in Hart observed:
A "false" answer may not be a basis to violate the offender's probation, but it certainly would offer a reasonable basis for the probation officer to enhance his supervision of the probationer and prevent further crimes. Or, perhaps, through investigation or more careful scrutiny, admissible evidence that the probationer has, in fact, violated the terms of his probation by perpetrating further sex crimes could be uncovered. In other words, failing the polygraph would simply alert the probation officer that the probationer needs attention. As a means of husbanding the system's badly overtaxed resources, this might help monitor the probationer.
Hart, 633 So.2d at 1190. See also Owens, 681 F.2d at 1369.