Case Name: STATE of Louisiana, Appellee, v. Marshall T. BATCHELOR, Appellant
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 2002-05-10
Citations: 823 So. 2d 367
Docket Number: No. 35,478-KA
Parties: STATE of Louisiana, Appellee, v. Marshall T. BATCHELOR, Appellant.
Judges: Before NORRIS, C.J., BROWN and STEWART, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 823
Pages: 367–380

Head Matter:
STATE of Louisiana, Appellee, v. Marshall T. BATCHELOR, Appellant.
No. 35,478-KA.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Second Circuit.
May 10, 2002.
Opinion on Grant of Rehearing July 24, 2002.
Paula Corley Marx, Lafayette, Carey J. Ellis, III, Rayville, Marshall T. Batchelor, for Appellant.
Richard Ieyoub, Attorney General, James David Caldwell, District Attorney, James Trey Phillips, Assistant District Attorney, for Appellee.
Before NORRIS, C.J., BROWN and STEWART, JJ.

Opinion:
| MORRIS, Chief Judge.
Marshall Batchelor appeals his conviction of armed robbery and sentence of 60 years at hard labor without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence, with credit for time served. For the following reasons, we reverse his conviction and sentence and remand the case to the trial court.
Facts
.On June 22, 1998, Batchelor was drinking beer outside of the Wyche Apartments when Brett Peoples delivered a pizza there to Theodore and Annie McGowan. After Peoples delivered the pizza, Batchelor and his two associates, Tyrone Henton and Na-kia Brown, forced Peoples behind the building. Peoples offered no resistance, pleaded for them to leave him alone, and told his assailants to take whatever of value he had. Instead, his assailants knocked him to the ground and began hitting and kicking him about the body and head. Peoples was aware of someone taking his watch, wallet, and shoes before he lost consciousness.
From inside her apartment, Annie McGowan heard the men forcing Peoples behind the building and opened her door to see the source of the noise. She saw that Batchelor, Henton, and Brown had Peoples on the ground and were beating and kicking him. Specifically, she saw Batchelor beating Peoples with a rusty iron implement and a brick. Her husband, Theodore, also saw Batchelor strike Peoples with a brick several times. The McGowans then went back into their apartment and called the police to report the crime. A neighbor of theirs, Latasha Dixon, also saw the events |zthat evening and went to a payphone to call the authorities.
Peoples appeared dead to paramedics who arrived at the scene about the same time as the police. He had suffered blunt trauma to the head, bleeding from the ears and mouth, and permanent brain damage as a result of the severe beating. He also had severe facial edema, or swelling, and showed signs of a possible linear skull fracture.
Batchelor was apprehended by police that same evening when he returned to the scene. He was taken into custody that night and gave a statement of his involvement in the crime. Batchelor was charged with several felony offenses and found guilty of armed robbery by trial before a jury on December 1, 2000. He was sentenced to 60 years at hard labor, without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence, with credit for time served.
Batchelor objected to the sentence at the sentencing hearing, although he filed no written motion to reconsider sentence. Batchelor then filed for appeal. Batchelor argues that the evidence presented is insufficient to support a conviction for armed robbery, that his sentence of 60 years at hard labor is unconstitutionally excessive, and argues pro se that he was denied his constitutional right to self-representation.
Discussion — Sufficiency of the Evidence
Although the record does not reflect that Batchelor filed a motion for post verdict judgment of acquittal pursuant to La. C.Cr.P. art 821, this court will consider sufficiency arguments in the absence of such a motion. State v. Green, 28, 994 (La.App.2d Cir.2/26/97), 691 So.2d 1273.
|sWhen issues are raised on appeal both as to the sufficiency of the evidence and as to one or more trial errors, the reviewing court should first determine the sufficiency of the evidence. The reason for reviewing sufficiency first is that the accused may be entitled to an acquittal under Hudson v. Louisiana, 450 U.S. 40, 101 S.Ct. 970, 67 L.Ed.2d 30 (1981), if a rational trier of fact, viewing the evidence in accord with Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979), in the light most favorable to the prosecution, could not reasonably conclude that all of the elements of the offense have been proved beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Hearold, 603 So.2d 731 (La.1992); State v. Bosley, 29,253 (La.App.2d Cir.4/2/97), 691 So.2d 347, writ denied, 97-1203 (La.10/17/97), 701 So.2d 1333.
The Jackson standard is applicable in cases involving both direct and circumstantial evidence. When the direct evidence is thus viewed, the facts established by the direct evidence and inferred from the circumstances established by that evidence must be sufficient for a rational trier of fact to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was guilty of every essential element of the crime. State v. Sutton, 436 So.2d 471 (La.1983); State v. Owens, 30,903 (La.App.2d Cir.9/25/98), 719 So.2d 610, writ denied, 98-2723 (La.2/5/99), 737 So.2d 747.
In order to support a defendant's conviction as a principal, the state must show that the defendant had the requisite mental state for the crime. State v. Brooks, 505 So.2d 714 (La.1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 947, 108 S.Ct. 337, 98 L.Ed.2d 363 (1987); State v. Richardson, 96-2598 (La.App. 44th Cir.12/17/97), 703 So.2d 1371, unit denied, 98-0228 (La.9/25/98), 726 So.2d 7. The determination of whether the requisite intent is present in a criminal case is for the trier of fact. State v. Huizar, 414 So.2d 741 (La.1982); State v. Dean, 528 So.2d 679 (La.App. 2d Cir.1988). Though intent is a question of fact, it need not be proved as a fact. It may be inferred from the circumstances. State v. Kahey, 436 So.2d 475 (La.1983).
All persons concerned in the commission of a crime, whether present or absent, and whether they directly commit the act constituting the offense, aid and abet in its commission, or directly or indirectly counsel or procure another to commit the crime, are principals. La. R.S. 14:24.
Armed robbery is defined as "the taking of anything of value belonging to another from the person of another or that is in the immediate control of another, by use of force or intimidation, while armed with a dangerous weapon." La. R.S. 14:64. A dangerous weapon is defined as "any gas, liquid or other substance or instrumentality, which, in the manner used, is calculated or likely to produce death or great bodily harm." La. R.S. 14:2(3).
The production of a weapon is not necessary in an armed robbery prosecution where the state can establish through witness observations at the crime scene, all of the elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt, including the existence and use of a -dangerous weapon. State v. James, 33,262 (La.App.2d Cir.3/10/00), 754 So.2d 429, unit denied, 2000-0956 (La.3/9/01), 786 So.2d 113.
This court's review does not extend to credibility determinations | Bmade by the trier of fact. La. Const. art. 5, § 10(B); State v. Williams, 448 So.2d 753 (La.App. 2d Cir.1984). The jury's decision to accept or reject the testimony of a witness in whole or in part will be accorded great deference. State v. Bosley, supra; State v. Rogers, 494 So.2d 1251 (La.App. 2d Cir. 1986), writ denied, 499 So.2d 83 (1987).
The record is replete with direct and circumstantial evidence which, viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, supports the jury's finding that Batchelor was guilty, beyond a reasonable doubt, of being a principal in the armed robbery of Brett Peoples. Jackson v. Virginia, supra. Even without considering Batche-lor's incriminating recorded statement and the testimony of his co-defendant, Brown, the testimony of objective eyewitnesses, the McGowans and Dixon, is direct evidence supporting the jury's finding that Batchelor was involved in .the taking of something of value belonging to Peoples, from the person of Peoples, by use of force while armed with a dangerous weapon.
The- evidence shows that the brick was a dangerous instrumentality in the instant case. In the manner Batchelor used, the brick, it was likely to produce death or great bodily harm, and can therefore be defined as' a dangerous weapon. La. R.S. 14:2(3). This conclusion is supported in part by testimony given by Jerry Strong, the emergency medical technician, together with the photographs and testimony of the victim, Brett Peoples, regarding the severity of the injuries the victim suffered as a result of the crime.
From the McGowans' testimony alone the jury could reasonably [^conclude that Batchelor was a principal, as he was directly involved in the commission of this armed robbery. La. R.S. 14:24. The McGowans' testimony directly supports the finding that Batchelor participated in beating the victim while his co-defendants robbed the victim. Batchelor's criminal intent to commit the armed robbery of the victim is easily inferred from these circumstances. State v. Kahey, supra.
Under La. R.S. 14:24, the state need not prove that the defendant directly took anything of value from the victim during the crime to be found a principal to the armed robbery. Nevertheless, the McGowans' testimony was corroborated by Latasha Dixon, and the physical evidence supports the trial testimony that the victim's wallet, keys, and shoes were taken during the crime. Batchelor's role as a principal in this armed robbery is further supported by Brown's testimony, which implicates Batchelor as the instigator of the crime and a recipient of some of the stolen money. Finally, in Batchelor's own recorded statement he admits that he participated in kicking the victim and threw a brick at him. Batchelor's admission that he "let" his co-defendant take the victim's valuables is further proof of his role in the crime.
Contrary to Batchelor's argument, the production at trial of a weapon was not necessary for Batchelor's armed robbery conviction. The state established through witness observations at the crime scene all of the elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt, including the existence and use of a dangerous weapon. State v. James, supra. This assignment is therefore without merit.
| tSelf-representation
In his pro se brief, Batchelor asserts that the trial court was in error for failing to grant his motion to dismiss his counsel and allow him to represent himself at trial. Batchelor claims that his conviction was obtained in violation of his constitutional right to self-representation, as recognized by the case of Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975), because the trial court failed to conduct a proper Faretta hearing.
An accused has the right to choose between the right to counsel and the right to self-representation. State v. Bridgewater, 2000-1529 (La.1/15/02), 823 So.2d 877; State v. Strain, 585 So.2d 540, 542 (La.1991). As the Louisiana Supreme Court has noted, "A trial judge confronted with an accused's unequivocal request to represent himself need determine only whether the accused is competent to waive counsel and is 'voluntarily exercising his informed free will.' " State v. Santos, 99-1897 (La.9/15/00), 770 So.2d 319, 321, quoting Faretta, supra.
Batchelor first filed his written motion to dismiss counsel and represent himself on October 14, 1999. He reiterated this request immediately before his trial by a written filing on November 29, 2000. In both of his filings, Batchelor specifically cited Faretta and claimed the constitutional right to represent | Rhimself, stating that he desired to proceed pro se with stand-by counsel only, and that he was making this request "with his eyes opened." R. p. 114. Batchelor clearly and unequivocally declared his desire to exercise his Sixth Amendment right to represent himself. See State v. Carpenter, 390 So.2d 1296 (La.1980).
The motion was heard in open court February 7, 2000, at which time trial was set for March 20, 2000. As in Santos, supra, Batchelor's request was made -"under circumstances which precluded a finding that he was simply engaged in dilatory tactics." Bridgewater, supra.
A review of the transcript of the trial court proceeding which resulted in the denial of Batchelor's motion reveals that the trial court did not conduct any meaningful inquiry to determine if Batchelor was competent to waive his right to counsel. At the hearing, Batchelor's court-appointed attorney told the court that he believed Batchelor "has a right to represent himself." The trial court then asked Batche-lor if he "had anything to say." Batchelor replied, "No, sir." The trial court then denied his motion. See, Supp. R. (2/7/00), p. 10.
The trial court should have interrogated Batchelor to determine if he was competent to waive his right to counsel. The competence that is required of a defendant seeking to waive his right to counsel is the competence to waive the right, not the competence to represent himself. Santos, supra, quoting Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 113 S.Ct. 2680, 125 L.Ed.2d 321 (1993). The trial court must determine whether defendant's waiver of counsel is "intelligently and voluntarily made." State v. Carpenter, supra; State v. Hegwood, 345 So.2d 1179 (La.1977). "There must be a sufficient inquiry (an interchange with more than "yes" and "no" responses by the defendant) to establish on the record that the defendant is making an intelligent and knowing waiver under the circumstances." Strain, supra, at 542.
During this hearing, the defendant should have been informed of the consequences of proceeding without counsel. State v. LaFleur, 391 So.2d 445 (La.1980), citing Faretta, supra. There should be some indication that the trial judge tried to assess the defendant's literacy, competency, understanding and volition. State v. Bell, 381 So.2d 393 (La.1980). The trial judge should have advised the defendant of the nature of the charges and the penalty range, inquired into the accused's age, education and mental condition, and determined according to the totality of the circumstances whether the accused understood the significance of the waiver. State v. Dunn, 30,269 (La.App. 2 Cir. 2/25/98), 713 So.2d 479, citing Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 68 S.Ct. 316, 92 L.Ed. 309 (1948).
The trial court's error in denying Batchelor his Sixth Amendment right to self-representation is not subject to harmless-error analysis. Santos, supra; McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 104 S.Ct. 944, 79 L.Ed.2d 122 (1984). Because Batchelor's conviction and resulting sentence are reversed, it is not necessary to address Batchelor's claim that he received a constitutionally excessive sentence.
Because we find that the trial court made no meaningful effort to inform Batchelor of the consequences of proceeding without counsel, try to assess the defendant's literacy, competency, understanding, or volition, or determine whether defendant's waiver of counsel was "intelligently and voluntarily made," we must reverse the conviction and sentence, and remand this case to the trial court for new proceedings.
| inConclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Batchelor's conviction and sentence are reversed and this case is remanded to the trial court for all proceedings consistent with the views expressed herein.
CONVICTION AND SENTENCE REVERSED;
CASE REMANDED.
BROWN, J., dissents with reasons.