Case Name: STATE of Louisiana v. Hector MANSO and Susan Warden
Court: Louisiana Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1984-04-02
Citations: 449 So. 2d 480
Docket Number: No. 82-KA-2244
Parties: STATE of Louisiana v. Hector MANSO and Susan Warden.
Judges: DIXON, C.J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 449
Pages: 480–485

Head Matter:
STATE of Louisiana v. Hector MANSO and Susan Warden.
No. 82-KA-2244.
Supreme Court of Louisiana.
April 2, 1984.
Rehearing Denied May 3, 1984.
William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Barbara Rutledge, Asst. Atty. Gen., Marion B. Farmer, Dist. Atty., Margaret Coon, J. Kevin McNary, Thomas L. Watson, Peter Garcia, Asst. Dist. Attys., for plaintiff-ap-pellee.
Michael M. Ogden, Walter L. Sentenn, Jr., Metairie, for defendants-appellants.

Opinion:
MARCUS, Justice.
Hector Manso and Susan Warden were charged in the same information with one count of possession with intent to distribute cocaine in violation of La.R.S. 40:967(A)(1), one count of possession of methaqualone in violation of La.R.S. 40:967(C) and one count of possession of diazepam in violation of La.R.S. 40:969(C). Defendants entered pleas of not guilty to all three counts. The trial judge denied defendants' motion to suppress which had been submitted on memoranda. Thereafter, pursuant to a plea bargain, Manso entered a plea of guilty to possession with intent to distribute cocaine and Warden entered a plea of guilty to possession of methaqualone. The other two counts were nol prossed as to each defendant. Defendants expressly reserved their right to appeal the court's denial of their pre-plea motion to suppress. Subsequently, Manso was sentenced to serve twelve years at hard labor and to pay a fine of $5,000, or, in default thereof, to serve one year at hard labor; Warden was sentenced to serve three years at hard labor. On appeal, defendants rely on one assignment of error for reversal of their convictions and sentences.
Defendants contend the trial judge erred in denying their motion to suppress evidence seized from a motel room pursuant to a search warrant. They argue that the affidavit supporting issuance of the search warrant failed to set forth facts demonstrating probable cause to believe that illegal drugs were in the motel room.
The search warrant in question was issued to search two adjoining motel rooms rented in the name of Hector Manso, rooms 212 and 214 of the Holiday Inn on Interstate 10 and Gause Blvd. in Slidell. Its purpose was to seize cocaine, marijuana, methaqualone and associated paraphernalia and documents. It was issued based upon facts recited in an affidavit by Officers Freddy Drennan, Stan Hughes and Lynn Bertaut. The affidavit states in full:
That on Saturday September 5, 1981, Hector E. Manso w/m 4500 110 Service Road Metairie, La. a subject known to have trafficked in narcotics, was found to have rented rooms 212 and 214 of the Holiday Inn in Slidell, La. and was in fact staying in both rooms that are adjoining. Subject was observed to be accompanied by one white male and one white female. The investigation began because of Hector Manso's known past narcotic activities. Investigating officers contacted the Jefferson Parish Sheriff's Office and spoke with Agent Dexter Accardo relea-tive [sic] to his investigations releating [sic] to the narcotic arrest of Hector Manso on 12-10-80 and 6-17-81 for possession with the intent to distribute cocaine, marijuana and methaquaalone [sic]. Agent Accardo advised the investigating officers of Manso's method of operation while under investigation in Jefferson Parish. These met the exact method of operation now being observed by the investigating officers. These activities include the use of two adjoining motel rooms to traffic narcotics, numerous incoming and outgoing telephone calls, and awaits a narcotics delivery to be made to his person and to then distribute the narcotics from the rented motel room. This knowledge was gained from undercover operations as well as from overt surveillances [sic] conducted by the Jefferson Parish Sheriff's Office and re-leated [sic] to the investigating officers. Affiants on this warrant have maintained a continuous survellance [sic] of Hector Manso and have observed the same activities as described to the affiant's [sic] by agent Dexter Accardo.
On the basis of the facts described herein affiant's [sic] request a search warrant to be issued for the above described premises.
Constitutional provisions insure a person from an unreasonable search and seizure of his house, papers and effects. No such search or seizure shall be made except upon a warrant issued upon probable cause, supported by an oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. U.S. Const.Amend. IV; La. Const. art. 1, § 5. Comformably, our Code of Criminal Procedure in art. 162 provides in pertinent part:
A search warrant may issue only upon probable cause established to the satisfaction of the judge, by the affidavit of a credible person, reciting facts establishing the cause for issuance of the warrant.
We have held that probable cause exists when the facts and circumstances within the affiant's knowledge, and of which he has reasonably trustworthy information, are sufficient to justify a man of reasonable caution to believe that an offense has been committed. The judicial officer must be supplied with enough information to support an independent judgment that probable cause exists for the issuance of a warrant. State v. Hughes, 433 So.2d 88 (La.1983); State v. Mena, 399 So.2d 149 (La.1981).
Prior to the United States Supreme Court's decision in Illinois v. Gates, — U.S. -, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983), courts mechanically followed the "two-pronged" test of Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 84 S.Ct. 1509, 12 L.Ed.2d 723 (1964) and Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 89 S.Ct. 584, 21 L.Ed.2d 637 (1969), to determine whether an affidavit containing hearsay has established probable cause. Under this test, the affiant was required to articulate facts relating to the informant's "basis of knowledge" and his "veracity" or "reliability." In Gates, supra, the United States Supreme Court abandoned an inflexible application of this test in favor of a "totality of the circumstances analysis." However, although the informant's "veracity" or "reliability" and his "basis of knowledge" are no longer controlling, they are still relevant factors in the totality of the circumstances examination. The Court summarized its holding as follows:
[W]e conclude that it is wiser to abandon the "two-pronged test"_ In its place we reaffirm the totality of the circumstances analysis that traditionally has informed probable cause determinations _ The task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, including the "veracity" and "basis of knowledge" of persons supplying hearsay information, there is a fair probability that contraband . will be found in a particular place. And the duty of a reviewing court is simply to ensure that the magistrate had a "substantial basis for . concluding] that probable cause existed."
In addition, the Court reaffirmed its policy on review of search warrant affidavits. It stated that in light of the fact that affidavits "are normally drafted by nonlawyers in the midst and haste of a criminal investigation[, technical requirements of elaborate specificity . have no proper place." Also, "a magistrate's determination of probable cause should be paid great deference by reviewing courts."
In the instant case, the affidavit states that the Slidell police officer affiants have maintained a continuous surveillance of Manso. On Saturday, September 5, 1981, Manso rented two adjoining motel rooms in Slidell. Because of the affiants' familiarity with Manso's narcotics activity, they contacted a named Jefferson Parish agent about the agent's experience with Manso. The agent told the affiants about Manso's arrest three and nine months earlier for narcotics trafficking. They were also informed that Jefferson Parish undercover operations and overt surveillance leading to these arrests established Manso's method of operation as follows:
the use of two adjoining motel rooms to traffic narcotics, numerous incoming and outgoing telephone calls, and awaits a narcotics delivery to be made to his person and to then distribute the narcotics from the rented motel room.
The Slidell affiants then informed the magistrate that they were now observing these "same activities" and this "exact method of operation" by Manso. In essence, the magistrate was informed that Manso's peculiar modus operandi, which had indicated nar- cotíes activity on two previous occasions, was being repeated in Slidell. The information concerning Manso's previous conduct was supplied to the affiants by a reliable source (police officer). Based on the totality of these circumstances, a practical, common-sense decision would recognize a "fair probability" that contraband would be found in Manso's motel rooms. Hence, we find that the magistrate had a "substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed." Accordingly, since the affidavit in support of the search warrant sets forth facts demonstrating probable cause to believe that illegal drugs would be found in the rooms, the trial judge correctly denied defendants' motion to suppress.
DECREE
For the reasons assigned, defendants' convictions and sentences are affirmed.
DIXON, C.J., concurs.
CALOGERO, J., dissents and assigns reasons.
DENNIS, J., dissents with reasons.
. State v. Crosby, 338 So.2d 584 (La.1976).
. Manso contends in a second assignment of error that his sentence is illegal. He argues that his sentence of twelve years is in excess of the statutory maximum of ten years. However, as provided by La.R.S. 40:967(B)(1), the penalty for possession with intent to distribute cocaine in violation of La.R.S. 40:967(A)(1) is imprisonment at hard labor for up to thirty years. Hence, this assignment of error is without merit.