Case Name: John G. Thompson, Relator v. John Phillips
Court: Supreme Court of Ohio
Jurisdiction: Ohio
Decision Date: 1861-12
Citations: 12 Ohio St. 617
Docket Number: 
Parties: John G. Thompson, Relator v. John Phillips.
Judges: 
Reporter: Ohio State Reports, New Service
Volume: 12
Pages: 617–618

Head Matter:
John G. Thompson, Relator v. John Phillips.
The relator is treasurer of Franklin county. Ilis term of office commenced on the first Monday of September, 1860, and will continue to the first Monday of September, 1862. 2 S. & C. 1479, sec. 15. He is making the semi-annual settlement with the defendant, who is auditor of the county, required by the statute. 2 S. & C. 1477, sec. 8. Upon this settlement, it is the duty of the auditor to allow him the compensation to which he is entitled by law for his services as treasurer. Section 8, supra. The auditor offers to allow him the compensation, prescribed by the act of April 9, 1861 (58 O. L. 110), and under instructions from the state auditor, refuses to allow him any more — the sole ground of the refusal being, that, in the opinion of the auditors, his compensation is governed by that act. The relator insists that he is entitled to the compensation prescribed by the laws in force on the first Monday of September, 1860, when his term of office commenced (about $400 more than that offered by the auditor), and he prays for a peremptory mandamus to compel the defendant to allow him that compensation.
A. G. Thurman and T. W. Bartley, for the relator.
James Murray, attorney general, for the defendant.

Opinion:
By the Court.
The relator, to show that he is not affected by the act of April. 9,1861, relies on the following section of the constitution:
" The general assembly in cases not provided for in this constitution, shall fix the term of office, and the compensation of all officers, but no change therein shall affect the salary of any officer during his existing term, unless the office be abolished." Section 20, Art 2.
It is manifest, from the change of expression in the two clauses of the section, that the word " salary " was not used in a general sense, embracing any compensation fixed for an officer, but in its limited sense, of an annual or periodical payment for services — a payment dependent on the time, and not on the amount of the service rendered. Where the compensation, as in this case, is to be ascertained by a percentage on the amount of money received and disbursed, we think it is not a salary within the meaning of the section of the constitution.
Peremptory mandamus refused.