Case Name: FANNY M. DOWELL v. THE CITY OF PORTLAND
Court: Oregon Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Oregon
Decision Date: 1886-03-15
Citations: 13 Or. 248
Docket Number: 
Parties: FANNY M. DOWELL v. THE CITY OF PORTLAND.
Judges: 
Reporter: Oregon Reports
Volume: 13
Pages: 248–271

Head Matter:
[Filed March 15, 1886.]
FANNY M. DOWELL v. THE CITY OF PORTLAND.
Municipal Corporation — Taxation—Sale of Land for Taxes — Statu»' Tory Power. — A municipal corporation in subjecting real property.!;?, salo, for delinquent taxes exercises a naked statutory power, and to gender such a sale valid the statute must be strictly pursued.
Same — Jurisdiction.—The exercise of such a power is not an “ adjudica: - tion,” nor is it the exercise of jurisdiction in any juridical sense.
Same — Assessment to Stranger. — Where a city charter provides that, the assessment roll of taxes for a street improvement, called the “Docket of City Liens,” shall contain the name of the owner of the property assessed; or state that the owner is unknown, an assessment to a stranger to. the title is void.
Same — -Reassessment Void — Injunction.—Where there has been a sale upon such an assessment and payment to the city of the amount thereof, such proceedings exhaust the power of sale in the city, and a subsequent reassessment to the true owner and sale thereunder, after refunding th? money obtained on the first sale, is void. An injunction will bo granted to restrain such subsequent sale.
Purchaser at Void Tax Sale — Volunteer—Caveat Emptor. — A purchaser at a void tax sale of such a character is a mere volunteer, and cannot recover back what he voluntarily paid out. To him the doctrine of caveat emptor applies. Per Lord, J., concurring.
Same. — It is a rule of universal application in tills class of cases that a municipal corporation can make a valid reassessment of property for local improvement in view of an assessment which is insufficient, irregular, or defectivo, only in those cases where there is a proper legislative authority. Thayeb, J., dissenting.
Multnomah County. Plaintiff appeals.
Reversed, and injunction made perpetual.
George W. Yocum, and B. F. Dowell, for Appellant.
This suit can bo maintained under the Code, p. 212, sec. 500, or under the general equity doctrines. (Stark v. Starr, 6 Wall. 402; Murphy v. Sears, 11 Or. 127; Cool-i.dge v. Fomuard, Id. 119; Teal v. Collins, 9 Id. 89; Mason v. Ayers, 28 Wis. 612; 1 High on Injunction, sec. 372; 1 Story’s Eq. Jur., sec. 700, and notes.) A tax purchaser cannot be in any strict technical sense a bona fide purchaser, because ho has full notice of the proceedings. Such a purchaser comes strictly within the rule caveat emptor. (Boaster v. Poppleton,9 Or. 481; Lynde v. Inhabitants of Melrose, 10 Allen, 49; People v. Auditor-General, SO Mich. 12; Cooley on Taxation, 328, 329, note 1, and 375; Hart v. Henderson, 17 Mich. 218.) It makes no difference whether the purchaser gets any title or not by his purchase. He trusted to luck, and got it, (The Key West Gas Light Co. v. Mansell et al., 19 Iowa, 305.) The city cannot reassess property, as there is no provision in the charter that authorizes such a proceeding on the part of the council. The legislature must grant such power to the city before it can reassess. (2 Dillon on Mun. Corp., sec. 751; St. Louis v. Clemens, 52 Mo. 133.) In Himmelmann v. Cofran, 36 Cal. 411, cited on the other side, no sale ever took place under the assessment, and no money was paid, and no lien was ever created or satisfied. No one could invoke the doctrine of caveat emptor. And no time was fixed when the assessment should he made — in our charter the time is fixed. But1 that opinion states the true doctrine of this case thus: “When a power is conferred which, in the nature of things, cannot be but once exercised, a defective execution exhausts, the power.” In the other case cited (Mayor and Aldermen of N. Y. v. Colgate, 12 N. Y. 149), the legislature expressly authorized the proceedings taken.
R.- Williams, for Respondents.
The entry on the lien docket was made by the auditor in the name of B. F. Dowell who had no interest in the lots, instead of Fannie Dowell, the owner. The omission of the auditor to perform his duty did not deprive the council of the power to sell. (Himmelmann v. Cofran, 36 Cal. 411; Breevort v. Detroit, 24 Mich. 322.) The purchase by Monastes and payment of the purchase price did not discharge a lien against these lots that had never been created, nor did it discharge the liability of the owner after the lien was created. (Libby v. Burnham, 15 Mass. 144; The Mayor of N. Y. v. Colgate, 12 N. Y. 149.) When the sale is void, the amount received by the city therefrom must be refunded. (Mayor of N. Y. v. Colgate, supra; Corbin v. Davenport, 9 Iowa, 239.) A collector has no power to receive payment of a tax and execute a receipt therefor before it is assessed. (Cossart v. Spence, 23 Ark. 374; Blackwell on Tax Titles, *414 and 415.) If the plaintiff claims the benefit of the money paid in by Monastes on a void sale of the lots, she cannot, without refunding the purchase-money, have his deed canceled in equity. (Hunt v. Rowland, 28 Iowa, 349; Light v. West, 42 Id. 138; Mayer v. The Mayor etc., 63 N. Y. 455.) When the tax is valid but the sale is irregular, equity will not cancel the tax deed to the land without a tender of the purchase-money. (II. L. L. Society v. Ordway, 38 Cal. 679; Blackwell on Tax Titles, ,491, 492; Pomeroy’s Eq. Jur., sec. 393; Morrison v. Her-shire, 32 Iowa, 271; Harrison v. Haas, 25 Ind. 281.)

Opinion:
Waldo, C. J.
The charter of the city of Portland provides that the assessment roll of taxes for a street improvement, called in the charter the " Docket of City-Liens," shall contain the name of the owner of the property assessed, or shall state that the owner is unknown. The lots were assessed to a stranger to the title. This case arises on an attempt to reassess to the true owner after a sale on the first assessment and payment of the purchase price.
"Tax titles were unknown to the common laws of England. The only way in which an Englishman's lands could be involuntarily aliened, except in case of forfeiture for treason, was by judgment of law; or as it is expressed in the great charter, ' law of the land.' " (9 Amer. Law Rev. 566.) An American may be deprived óf his lands without the judgment of his peers, and even without notice; but it is to the credit of the common law that no sanction for such proceedings is found in its bosom, and that its wise rule of statutory construction, that statutes in derogation of its principles áre to be strictly construed, has not tended to facilitate the divestiture of property by such proceedings — proceedings which are not only alien in principle, but even in the language in which they are expressed. When counsel say, "This is a proceeding in rem," we expect some argument better suited, as the author of the Commentaries in another connection has said, for a despotic monarchy than the free constitutions of an English people.
In this case, the name of a stranger having been entered on the docket, the sale was void as to the plaintiff. (Smith v. Cofran, 34 Cal. 316; Hubbell v. Weldon, Hill & D. Sup. 142; Bush v. Williams, Cooke, 274; Abbott v. Lindenbower, 42 Mo. 162; Dunn v. Winston, 31 Miss. 137; Clarke v. Strickland, 2 Curt. 444; Corporation of Washington v. Pratt, 8 Wheat. 681.)
A power has been stated to be the dominion which one-person exercises over the property of another. (Maundrell: v. Maundrell, 10 Ves. jun. 265.) The city exercised a naked-statutory power. It was not adjudicating anything, and therefore not exercising jurisdiction over anything,, in any juridical sense; or, if so, then every grantee of a. power is exercising jurisdiction when he executes the. power. When the reassessment was ordered, the property had been sold and the assessment paid into the city treasury. The power to sell had been executed and exhausted. There was no authority to refund and reassess. This .suit, therefore, cannot be maintained. (Hamilton v.. Valiant, 30 Md. 139; Lyon Co. v. Goddard, 22 Kan. 398; Harper v. Rowe, 53 Cal. 234; Curry v. Hinman, 11 Ill. 420; Homestead Co. v. Valley R. Co., 17 Wall. 153; Peebles v. Pittsburgh, 101 Pa. St. 304; St. Paul v. Mullen, 27 Minn, 78; Allen v. Smith, 1 Leigh, 231-250; Irvine v. Elnonti 8; East, 54; Smith v. Bowes, 38 Md. 466; Blackwell on Tax Titles, 356.)
The decree below must be reversed, and the court below directed to make the injunction perpetual.