Case Name: DAVIS v. DODGE
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1908-05-12
Citations: 110 N.Y.S. 787
Docket Number: 
Parties: DAVIS v. DODGE.
Judges: 
Reporter: West's New York Supplement
Volume: 110
Pages: 787–793

Head Matter:
DAVIS v. DODGE.
(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department.
May 12, 1908.)
1. Evidence—Parol Evidence—Written Instrument—Explanation.
Where plaintiff, a professional race horse driver and trainer, who had worked for defendant for some time, executed a written contract agreeing to give “his entire business services” to defendant for a specified time, the contract was ambiguous as to the kind of services plaintiff was to render ; and paroi evidence to show that it was the intention of the parties that the services were to be such as defendant required in plaintiff’s special line of work, and that it was not the intention of the parties that defendant should be entitled to direct plaintiff to devote his time to whatever engagement defendant saw fit was admissible.
[Ed. Note.—For cases in point, see Cent. Dig. vol. 20, Evidence, §§ 2129-2133.]
2. Master and Servant—Contract—Breach—Measure of Damages.
In case of breach of a contract of employment by the employer, a servant is not limited to an action for wages, but may sue before the expiration of the contract term for breach of contract, in which action he is not limited to the amount of wages he would have earned up to the time of the trial, but may recover all the damages he can prove to have sustained by a total breach of the contract.
[Ed. Note.—For cases in point, see Cent. Dig. vol. 34, Master and Servant, §§ 50-53.]
3.. Same—Measure of Damages.
Where a servant was wrongfully discharged before the end of the contract term, the measure of his damages in an action for breach of contract was the amount of his wages due at the time of the trial less his actual earnings up to that time, plus the amount of wages which would become due after the trial, less the probable amount of his future earnings.
[Ed. Note.—For cases in point, see Cent. Dig. vol. 34, Master and Servant, §§ 54^56.]
Appeal from Trial Term, Suffolk County.
Action by Robert L. Davis against John D. Dodge. Judgment far plaintiff, and defendant appeals.
Affirmed.
The action was brought to recover damages for breach of the following contract of employment: “6/19/05. Agreement between R L. Davis & John D. Dodge entered into on this date whereby they mutually agree that the former shall give his entire business services and that the latter shall accept and pay for the same for the term of two years and three months at a salary, payable monthly, of $5,000 per year and one half of any profit accruing in any year above said amount. [Signed] John L. Dodge. R. L. Davis”—and from an order denying defendant’s motions to set the verdict aside and for a new trial. The jury rendered a verdict in favor, of the plaintiff for $6,499.90. The trial court granted defendant’s motion to set the verdict aside unless the plaintiff stipulated within 10 days that the verdict be reduced to $5,899.90, in which event the motions were denied. The plaintiff filed the stipulation, and the judgment appealed from was entered accordingly. The defendant broke the contract by discharging- the plaintiff without cause on February 22, 1906. The trial occurred on January 10, 1907. The contract period did not expire until June 6,1907.
Argued before JENKS, HOOKER, GAYNOR, RICH, and MILDER, JJ.
Frank C. Avery (Mark M. Schlesinger, on the brief), for appellant.
Thomas J. Ritch, Jr., for respondent.

Opinion:
RICH, J.
Upon the trial the learned justice presiding ruled that the words used in the contract, "his entire business services," and the omission to state or indicate the services to be performed by plaintiff, made the contract ambiguous, and received paroi evidence to explain their meaning and show their application. It had appeared in evidence without objection that, for 23 years preceding the making of the contract, the plaintiff had followed the business of a horse trainer and driver in races, developing trotting and pacing horses, and making a specialty of driving in races, and at the time the contract was made, and for some time prior thereto, had some of the defendant's horses in his care and had driven them in races which were attended by defendant. The plaintiff's contention was that because of this fact, the knowledge of defendant that he was a driver and trainer of experience, and his lack of knowledge and experience in other lines of business, the words, in the contract were understood and intended by the parties to apply to the services with which he was familiar and in the rendition of which he was an expert. While it was claimed by defendant that the understanding and intention of the parties was that the plaintiff should do whatever the defendant required of him in a business way, and that he had the right to direct him to devote his time to whatever he saw fit and at such places as the defendant saw fit to send him, to the exclusion of the profession to which the plaintiff had devoted his life, either of these constructions might very properly be given to the words used. A contract is ambiguous when it is open to various interpretations, has a double meaning, and is therefore of doubtful purport. I think paroi evidence as to what the understanding and intention of the parties was at the time they entered into the contract - was properly received. Petrie v. Trustees of Hamilton College, 158 N. Y. 458, 53 N. E. 216; Emmett v. Penoyer, 151 N. Y. 564, 45 N. E. 1041, and cited cases; Dodge v. Zimmer, 110 N. Y. 43, 17 N. E. 399; Kenyon v. K., T. & M. M. A. Ass'n, 122 N. Y. 247, 25 N. E. 299. And the jury have resolved the question of fact as to the contention of the parties in favor of the plaintiff. This brings us to the consideration of the only other question presented which it is necessary to consider.
The contract was executed on June 19, 1905, and on the 1st of July following the plaintiff entered upon its performance. He had the care and training of horses for the appellant and others until December of that year, when he was sent South to sell the capital stock of the E. D. Johns Company, with the understanding, he testifies, that the defendant would send for him in May following, at which time a good string of horses would be purchased and placed in plaintiff's charge. After a short time spent in trying to sell the stock, the plaintiff became dissatisfied with the work and wrote the defendant complaining of his experience, expressing his dissatisfaction. Within a month after this time he was discharged. He had been paid in full to March 1st. This action was commenced on the 16th of the following month and was tried in January, 1907, some eight months before the expiration of the time stated in the contract for its termination.
The plaintiff has recovered more than his wages would have amounted to at the time of the trial, and defendant contends that the recovery could not, in any event, exceed the amount unpaid and due at the time of the trial, less deductions for earnings subsequent to his discharge. The answer to this is that the action is not brought to recover wages, but is to recover damages for a breach of the contract of employment, for which the plaintiff can maintain but one action, and in which all of the damages sustained by him that are susceptible of proof may properly be recovered. In such an action, the plaintiff is entitled to recover such damages as he can show he has sustained by a total breach of the contract. Where it is certain that damages have been caused by a breach of the contract and the only uncertainty is as to their amount, no good reason exists for denying a recovery to the extent of such as are reasonably certain and actually might follow such breach determinable approximately by a jury upon reasonable conjecture and probable estimates. Wakeman v. Wheeler & Wilson Mfg. Co., 101 N. Y. 205, 4 N. E. 264, 54 Am. Rep. 676. In the case at bar the damages sustained by plaintiff were clearly the amount of his wages due at the time of the trial, less his actual earnings up to that time, and those that would have become due after the trial being reduced by the amount of his future earnings. In American China Development Company v. Boyd (C. C.) 148 Fed. 258, the plaintiff had been employed for a term of five years and discharged one year and ten months before the expiration of the contract period. There was due the plaintiff at the time of trial salary for two months and ten days, $1,166. Had he been permitted to discharge his duties under the contract until the expiration of the term, his salary would have amounted to $18,500. The recovery was for $13,519, and was upheld. In Pierce v. Tennessee Coal, etc., R.. R. Co., 173 U. S. 1, 19 Sup. Ct. 335, 43 L. Ed. 591, the same court held that on being discharged from a contract of employment the party discharged might in an action to recover the full value of the contract include all that he would receive in the future under its provisions, deducting any sum that he might thereafter.earn.
A careful examination of the record fails to disclose any substantial error, and the judgment and order must be affirmed.
Judgment and order unanimously affirmed, with costs. All concur.