Case Name: Sylvester GREEN et ux., Plaintiffs-Appellees-Appellants, v. SOUTHERN FURNITURE COMPANY, Inc., et al., Defendants-Appellants-Appellees; Daniel G. BAILEY et ux., Plalntiffs-Appellees-Appellants, v. SOUTHERN FURNITURE COMPANY, Inc., et al., Defendants-Appellants-Appellees; Mrs. Rogenia LEGER, Plaintiff-Appellee-Appellant, v. SOUTHERN FURNITURE COMPANY, Inc., et al., Defendants-Appellants-Appellees
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1957-03-25
Citations: 94 So. 2d 508
Docket Number: Nos. 4350-4352
Parties: Sylvester GREEN et ux., Plaintiffs-Appellees-Appellants, v. SOUTHERN FURNITURE COMPANY, Inc., et al., Defendants-Appellants-Appellees. Daniel G. BAILEY et ux., Plalntiffs-Appellees-Appellants, v. SOUTHERN FURNITURE COMPANY, Inc., et al., Defendants-Appellants-Appellees. Mrs. Rogenia LEGER, Plaintiff-Appellee-Appellant, v. SOUTHERN FURNITURE COMPANY, Inc., et al., Defendants-Appellants-Appellees.
Judges: ELLIS, J., dissents from the refusal to grant rehearings in these cases.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 94
Pages: 508–524

Head Matter:
Sylvester GREEN et ux., Plaintiffs-Appellees-Appellants, v. SOUTHERN FURNITURE COMPANY, Inc., et al., Defendants-Appellants-Appellees. Daniel G. BAILEY et ux., Plalntiffs-Appellees-Appellants, v. SOUTHERN FURNITURE COMPANY, Inc., et al., Defendants-Appellants-Appellees. Mrs. Rogenia LEGER, Plaintiff-Appellee-Appellant, v. SOUTHERN FURNITURE COMPANY, Inc., et al., Defendants-Appellants-Appellees.
Nos. 4350-4352.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana. First Circuit.
March 25, 1957.
Rehearing Denied! May 2, 1957.
Nos. 4350, 4352:
Wood & Jackson, Leesville, La., for plaintiff-appellant.
Plauche & Plauche, Lake Charles, La., for defendant-appellant, Southern Furniture Co. et al., tenant.
Porter & Stewart, Lake Charles, La., for defendant-appellee Kaplan et al. (owners). ■No. 4351:
Robert L. Collings, Lake Charles, La., for plaintiff-appellant.
Plauche & Plauche, Lake Charles, La., for defendant-appellant, Southern Furniture Co. et al., tenant.
Porter & Stewart, Lake Charles, La., for defendant-appellee Kaplan et al. (owners).

Opinion:
TATE, Judge.
Essentially, the question involved in this appeal is whether legal liability for personal injuries to third persons attached to the landlord or to his tenant, or to both, when the canopy of a store building owned by the former and leased by the latter fell and injured three lady pedestrians.
In this opinion we will give reasons for judgment as to the questions of law common to the separate suits, involving the same defendants; in which individual discussions of quantum and decrees will be rendered, Green 94 So.2d 525, Bailey 94 So.2d 527, and Leger 94 So.2d 529.
The store building in question was located at 718 Ryan Street in the main business district of the city of Lake Charles. Shortly after noon on August 30, 1955, the canopy attached to the store building and overhanging the sidewalk fell and injured the three lady plaintiffs. As the District Court found, the evidence is substantially in agreement that the principal cause of the canopy's collapse was that an iron supporting rod holding up the store canopy was pulled loose from the rotted piece of lumber to which attached by the additional weight of approximately five tons of water collected on top of the canopy after two days of downpour. The water had collected on the roof of the canopy because the drainage downspout did not drain the water off fast enough, either because basically the downspout did not afford sufficient outlet to take care of the not-usual downpour or because (although there is no evidence to support, or to contradict, this argument) it had been allowed to become clogged with leaves and other refuse.
The board which gave way causing the collapse had become rotted by the seepage of water over an undeterminable period of time. The rotted condition of this lumber could not have been detected by inspection. Neither the owner nor the tenant had knowledge or notice of this structural defect.
The three ladies injured were Mesdames Cora Green, Rogenia Leger, and Eulith Bailey; and they, together with Sylvester Green, husband of the former, and Daniel Bailey, husband of the latter, — Mrs. Leger was a widow — brought suit for personal injuries and medical expenses sustained as a result of the accident.
Made defendants were: Southern Furniture Company, Inc., the tenant, and its public liability insurer, the General Accident Fire & Life Assurance Corporation, Ltd. (hereinafter sometimes jointly referred to as the "tenant" or as "Southern"); and Mrs. Ida I. Kaplan, David Kaplan, and Mrs. Patricia Kaplan, the owners in indivisión of the property and their public liability insurer, the Phoenix Indemnity Company (hereinafter sometimes jointly referred to as the "owner"). By third-party petitions, both the owner and the tenant called the other opposing defendants in warranty should they be cast.
The District Court entered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and against Southern ; rej ecting all demands against the owner. The tenant appealed, urging that the owner be held liable and alternatively that the amounts awarded be reduced. The plaintiffs also appealed the dismissal of their suit as against the owner. The latter answered the appeals urging affirmance of the judgments, and alternatively (besides reduction of the award) that if it — the owner — be cast, then that there be judgment over in its favor and against Southern, in accordance with its third party petition and call in warranty.
Briefly, the opposing legal contentions of both sets of defendant-litigants may be summarized as follows: The owner-lessor argues that the tenant assumed in the written lease full responsibility for liability to others resulting from structural defects (except when the owner failed to repair same after notice); and therefore under LSA-R.S. 9:3221 (incorporating Act 174 of 1932 and set forth in full hereinafter), permitting such assumption as against third persons, is the proper party to be cast for damages herein. Contrariwise, the tenant argues that by the terms of the lease the owner reserved responsibility for structural defects and therefore retains its ancient civil law liability to others injured as a result of failures of the parts excepted from the tenant's assumption of liability.
We deem it advisable to discuss the pertinent law before discussing its application to the particular lease provisions with which we are concerned herein.
1. Civil law liability of owner and landlord.
Under the Louisiana civil law, unlike the rule in common law jurisdictions, the owner-lessor is held to strict liability, or liability without fault, for personal injuries sustained by others through the defective condition of the leased premises. Comment, "Lessor's Liability in Louisiana", 7 La.L.Rev. 406; Comment, "Liability of Lessor to Third Persons Lawfully on the Leased Premises," 16 Tul.L.Rev. 448.
LSA-Civil Code, Articles 670 and 2322, provide that the owner of a building is li able for damages caused by its ruin or fall, whether a result of neglect to repair it or of a vice in its original construction. "Neither ignorance of the condition of the building nor the circumstance that the defect could not be easily detected can be successfully urged as a defense by the owner," Thompson v. Commercial Nat. Bank, 156 La. 479 at page 486, 100 So. 688, at page 690; see also Roppolo v. Pick, La.App. Orleans, 4 So.2d 839, and the authorities cited therein (syllabus 5); Thiel v. Kern, La.App. Orleans, 34 So.2d 296 (certiorari denied), and authorities cited therein (syllabus 1). These cases hold that, for purposes of suits by injured tenants or third persons against him, knowledge of even latent defects for which he is responsible is imputed to the owner; he is presumed to know of them. See, among recent cases, Green v. Billa, La.App. Orleans, 86 So.2d 578, Gaida v. Hourgettes, La.App. Orleans, 67 So.2d 737.
Parenthetically, it should be remarked that the similar liability of the lessor under LSA-Civil Code, Articles 2693 and 2695, to which we are also cited as a basis for liability, is not necessarily coextensive with that of the owner under LSA-Civil Code, Articles 670 and 2322. The lessor's liability under the former codal articles has been held to be only to the tenant and not to third persons (not even to the tenant's wife), where the lessor was not the owner of the property (as under a sublease), Duplain v. Wiltz, La.App. Orleans, 194 So. 60, Graff v. Marmelzadt, La.App. Orleans, 194 So. 62, both cases noted, 2 La. Law Review 744; see: Girouard v. Agate, La.App. 1 Cir., 44 So.2d 388, Tesoro v. Abate, La. App. Orleans, 173 So. 196, 197. However, other cases are said to hold to the contrary, Comment, 16 Tul.L.Rev. 448 at 451, Note, 26 Tul.L.Rev. 103 at 105; and although these cases so cited do rest liability to third persons upon the lessor's duties under LSA-Civil Code, Articles 2692-2695, Thomson v. Cooke, 147 La. 922, 86 So. 332, Robinson v. Fossett, La.App. 2 Cir., 33 So.2d 546, Willis v. Cahn, La.App. 2 Cir., 164 So. 452, Potter v. Soady Bldg. Co., La.App. 2 Cir., 144 So. 183, they do so without discussion of any difference between the liability.of the owner and the lessor; and it may be significant that the facts therein show that certainly in the latter three cases, and probably in the other (Thomson) case cited, the landlord was also the owner of the property leased. Decision as to this distinction is unnecessary herein where the lessor's liability to the third persons for their injuries sustained can be predicated upon its legal liability as owner of the leased premises.
However, these strict codal obligations of the owner-lessor as to the condition of the premises may validly be assumed by the tenant as a condition of the lease; and thereby will be barred the tenant's recovery for damage sustained through structural defects for which the owner would otherwise be responsible. Clay v. Parsons, 144 La. 985, 81 So. 597; Pecararo v. Grover, Orleans, 5 La.App. 676. Likewise, the tenant could assume, as between himself and the owner, the latter's liability to third persons for personal and other injuries resulting from structural defects, Terrenova v. Feldner, La.App. Orleans, 28 So.2d 287, discussed in detail below.
But as squarely held by Klein v. Young, 1927, 163 La. 59, 111 So. 495, although the lessee might validly assume such obligation as between himself and the owner-lessor, this assumption of liability by the tenant could not absolve the owner of responsibility to third persons injured through defects in the premises for which the owner was liable under the Civil Code, nor could it affect the rights of third persons to recover resultant damages from the owner. However, the effect of this Klein case was modified and largely overruled by the legislative enactment of Act 174 of 1932, discussed immediately hereafter, see, e. g., Paul v. Nolen, La.App. Orleans, 166 So. 509.
2. Effect and application of LSA-RS. 9:3221, Act 174 of 1932.
LSA-R.S. 9:3221 incorporates Act 174 of 1932 in substantially similar wording as:
"The owner of premises leased under a contract whereby the lessee assumes responsibility for their condition is not liable for injury caused by any defect therein to the lessee or anyone on the premises who derives his right to he thereon from the lessee, unless the owner knew or should have known of the defect or had received notice thereof and failed to remedy it within a reasonable time." (Italics ours.)
Clauses by which the tenant assumed responsibility for the condition of the premises have been held in numerous cases, some of which are cited in Thompson v. Suprena, La.App. Orleans, 65 So.2d 801, at page 803, to exonerate the owner from liability for, and to make the tenant alone liable for, injuries resulting from structural defects in the premises and sustained by the tenant or others on the premises through consent of the tenant.
But in the present case it is undisputed that the plaintiff ladies were not injured on the premises, but by the fall of the store canopy overhanging the public sidewalk. Although this point was not raised below, and therefore the able District Court did not pass upon it, we feel it is determinative of the primary liability herein, since LSA-R.S. 9:3221 specifically permits exoneration of the owner's civil law liability for structural defects only insofar as injuries "to the lessee or anyone on the premises who derives his right to be thereon from the lessee" are concerned. The statute thus does not permit the owner to exempt himself from such liability to others of the general public by reason of the condition of the premises owned by him. Plaintiffs were passers-by or neighbors injured by the fall of the materials composing the store building owned by the Kaplans, so as to constitute the owner liable to plaintiffs squarely under the terms of Article 670, LSA-Civil Code (set forth in full, footnote 1 above), as well as under Article 2322 (likewise, footnote 1).
Assuming that the plain provision of the subject section of the Louisiana Revised Statutes was ambiguous so as to entitle us to refer to the source statutes to explain the meaning, Perkins v. Brothers of Christian Schools, La.App. 1 Cir., 71 So. 2d 400, Note, 15 La.Law Rev. 472, we find that the Legislature clearly intended to restrict the application of the statute to injuries sustained by tenants or occupants themselves, and persons deriving their rights therefrom such as "sub-tenants, roomers, servants, guests, customers, employees, members of the family and others of a similar status," Section 2, Act 174 of 1932. It might be surmised that the legislature merely intended to prevent the prospective abuse inherent under Klein v. Young, 163 La. 59, 111 So. 495, where even though the tenant assumed full responsibility for the condition of the premises, his wife—cf., Ciaccio v. Carbajal, 142 La. 125, 76 So. 583-or members of his family or his guests or roomers — all being equally considered third persons — could still hold the premises' owner primarily liable; the owner being relegated to a right to indemnification under the lease contract from the possibly financially irresponsible tenant, cf. Terrenova v. Feldner, La.App. Orleans, 88 So.2d 287.
For these reasons we hold that the lease provisions concerning responsibility for the condition of the premises, as between the present owner-lessor and tenant, could not divest the owner of his primary liability under our Civil Code for injuries sustained by plaintiffs: The latter were not lessees or derivees of lessees, from liability to which classes of persons alone LSA-R.S. 9:3221 permits an owner to exempt himself. Klein v. Young, 163 La. 59, 111 So. 495.
3. Liability as between owner and ten'ant tmder particular lease herein.
But although the owner herein retained his civil law primary liability to plaintiffs, the lease provisions govern as to whether, ultimately, the owner-lessor or the tenant should be responsible (as between them) for the damages caused to others by the defective condition of the premises, Terrenova v. Feldner, 28 So.2d 287, discussed below.
The lease was executed on November 30, 1953, for a term of five years and ten months commencing August 1, 1954 and terminating May 31, 1960. And it was of course during this term that the accident occurred. The lease reflects that the tenant was in possession of the premises at the time the lease was executed, and was to continue therein until occupancy under the written lease commenced August 1, 1954. (The evidence further shows that the tenant, or parties in privity with it, had been in possession of the premises and running their furniture business therein for about six years before execution of the lease, under other rental arrangements.)
There are three especially pertinent clauses or conditions of the lease which, for convenience in discussion, we shall label as Clause "A", Clause "B", and Clause "C", set forth in full in the margin. Clause "A" pertinently provides that the tenant "at its own risk, hereby accepts full responsibility for the condition thereof [of the leased premises] during the term of the lease"; Clause "B", that although the tenant "accepts the building in its present condition" and shall pay for alterations and incidental repairs, nevertheless all "repairs necessary because of structural weakness, or defects in the building, itself, shall be repaired at the cost of the Lessor"; and Clause "C", that the "Lessor will not be responsible for damage caused by leaks in the roof, or by any vices or defects of the leased property, or the consequences thereof, except in the case of neglect or failure to take prompt action toward the remedying of such defects after having received written notice" of them from the tenant. (Italics ours.)
Counsel for the tenant most skillfully argues that by Clause "B" the owner retained its liability for, and the tenant assumed no liability for, the structural weakness in the building itself which caused the canopy to fall. We, however, agree with the construction by the District Court herein that by Clause "A" and Clause "C", the parties agreed that the tenant assumed full responsibility for the condition of the premises and that the owner would not be responsible for damages resulting from the failure to correct structural weaknesses (for which repairs the owner was obligated to pay by Clause "B") except upon the owner's failure to repair such defects promptly after receiving notice from the tenant. (And as all parties agree, neither owner nor tenant had notice or knowledge of the latent and not reasonably discoverable defects which caused the accident.)
Thus, we feel that Clause "B" was not— as argued for the tenant, relying by analogy on Thiel v. Kern, La.App. Orleans, 34 So.2d 296-an assumption or retention of liability by the owner, but merely an agreement by the latter to pay for repairs. Clause "C" contains the sole provisions as to the owner's liability for the consequential damages resulting from the. failure to correct such structural defects; and this clause, as aforesaid, restricts such liability to instances where the owner neglects, after notice from the tenant, to repair promptly defects called to the owner's attention by the tenant.
If by Clause "B" the owner retained the liability in all cases for consequential damages resulting from the failure to make structural repairs needed because of vices or defects in the leased property, then completely meaningless would be Clause "C" 's restriction of such liability to instances ^ when the owner failed to make repairs for which he was responsible after receiving 1 notice of the defects: for under the interpretation of Clause "B" so ably urged by , counsel for tenant, the owner would be ; liable regardless of notice. But an agreement must be interpreted as a whole and, where possible, effect should be given to all clauses of an agreement; and a construction will be preferred which gives a reasonable meaning to each clause of an agreement, rather than one which leaves any clause useless or inexplicable. Articles 1951, 1955, LSA-Civil Code, and jurispru- i dence thereunder.
We think the case of Terrenova v. Feldner, 28 So.2d 287, decided by the Orleans Court of Appeal through Judge (now Mr. Justice) McCaleb to be especially apropos here. An employee of the tenant brought suit therein against both the owner-lessor and the tenant for personal injuries suffered when a stairway came loose from the wall and fell. The original lease was executed in 1929 (i. e., prior to the 1932 act), although the injuries were sustained in 1943.
The provisions of the Terrenova v. Feldner lease, set forth at 28 So.2d 288, were extremely similar to those in the present case. The lease therein provided that the premises were "accepted by the lessees in their present condition , except for such repairs written into this lease . The lessee agrees to keep them [the premises] in the same order as received during the term of this lease
The Terrenova lease then contains the following provision (almost identical with the present) regulating liability for consequential damages from failure to repair structural defects:
"Lessor will not be responsible for damage caused by any vices or defects of the leased property, or the consequences thereof, except in case of positive neglect or failure to take action toward the remedying of such defects within reasonable time after having written notice from the lessee of such defects and the damage caused thereby."
The District Court rendered judgment against the tenant. The Orleans Court rejected the tenant's arguments that the owner-lessor should be cast instead. The tenant argued that (1) these lease provisions did not constitute an assumption of liability for injuries sustained by others consequential to a failure to correct vices and defects of the leased property, and (2) even if held otherwise, the lessor remained solely liable because the lease was con-fected prior to the 1932 act (now LSA-R..S. 9:3221.)
Judge McCaleb's opinion points out that covenants by which the tenant assumes responsibility for the condition of the premises and by which the owner will not be responsible for damage caused "by any vices or defects of the leased premises or the consequences thereof" have been consistently interpreted to import liability to the tenant for injuries suffered by third persons through vices or defects of the leased premises, 28 So.2d 289-290.
But, most interestingly, the opinion continues that the "fundamental error" of appellant's second argument was that it overlooked that even before passage of the 1932 Act the tenant was under these clauses at all times responsible to the owner for damages resulting from defects in the premises, even though these clauses did not constitute a defense to an action for such damages by a third person, Klein v. Young, 163 La. 59, 111 So. 495. Referring to the Klein opinion, Judge McCaleb concludes, 28 So.2d 290-291:
"The opinion does not say, nor do we think it was ever contemplated by the court, that an owner, condemned to pay damages to a third person as a result of the lessee's breach of a provision in the lease whereby the latter assumed responsibility for vices and defects in the property, could not maintain an action against the lessee for the damages he sustained by the breach or that the lessor, who was compelled to defend a suit brought by a third person sustaining injuries by reasons of the lessee's 'breach of covenant, could not call the lessee in warranty."
Very similar or identical lease covenants —essentially, (1) that the tenant assumes responsibility for the condition of the premises, in conjunction with (2) a clause that the lessor will not be responsible for damages resulting from vice or defect in the premises except upon his failure to make timely repairs after notice of the defect-have been construed as making the tenant ultimately liable to third persons for personal injuries resulting from a vice or defect in the premises, not only in the Terrenova case, 28 So.2d 287, but also in the following cases, all but the first (Poss v. Brown) decided by the Orleans Court of Appeal: Poss v. Brown, La.App. 2 Cir., 73 So.2d 661; Thompson v. Suprena, La. App., 65 So.2d 801, 803; Thiel v. Kern, 34 So.2d 296, 297; Mitchal v. Armstrong, La. App., 13 So.2d 506; Atkinson v. Stern, La. App., 175 So. 126, 127; Paul v. Nolen, La. App., 166 So. 509; McFlynn v. Crescent Realty Corp., La.App., 160 So. 454.
We are unable to see any distinction between the covenants in such cases and those in the present instance. True, the quoted portion of none of these leases includes the specific agreement of Qause "B" herein of the landlord to pay for repairs of vices and defects of the building itself. But each (except the Atkinson oral lease) contains the specific provision that the lessor would not be responsible "for damage caused by vices or defects of the leased property or the consequences thereof, except in case of positive neglect or failure to take action toward the remedying of such defects'' after written notice from the tenant, see, e. g., Terrenova lease, 28 So.2d 288. This provision indicates to us quite conclusively that the owner-lessor retained under these leases his legal liability to make and pay for repairs necessitated 'by defects in the leased premises, LSA-Civil Code, Articles 2692 (2), 2693, 2694, 2717, cf. Articles 2715, 2716 (which we feel to be the sole intent and effect of Clause "B" herein), although relieved from liability for damages for defects or failure to make repairs unless he unreasonably delayed in correcting the defect after receiving notice thereof.
The tenant-appellant argues that despite his lack of actual notice of the defect causing the injuries herein, the owner-lessor is liable because the owner is legally held to imputed or constructive knowledge even of latent defects. This argument overlooks that such imputed knowledge may be used to justify strict liability of the owner to others for injuries caused through defects in the leased premises, but it is inapplicable where the tenant has assumed such liability. Otherwise, the provision commonly found in the leases that the lessor is not responsible for such damages except when he fails to repair the lease after notice, and LSA-R.S. 9:3221 upholding the validity of such assumption of liability as against third persons "unless the owner knew or should have known of the defect or had received notice thereof and failed to remedy it within a reasonable time", would never serve to shift the liability for damages caused by structural defects from the owner to the tenant. (For under the civil law doctrine of strict liability the owner is always presumed to know of obvious or even of latent defects, see subheading 1 above.) That such clauses and the statutory provision do effectively shift liability is demonstrated clearly by the jurisprudence above cited.
For these reasons, it is our conclusion that under the covenants in the lease in question the tenant is ultimately responsible under the circumstances of this case for the damages sustained by plaintiffs because of the structural defects. The owner's third party petition against and call in warranty of Southern will therefore be sustained.
4. Independent or direct liability of tenant.
While it seems well settled that an assumption of liability by the tenant under the provisions of the 1932 act, LSA-R.S. 9:32Zl, gives rise to a direct action by the injured third person against the tenant, see e. g., Terrenova v. Feldner, La.App. Orleans, 28 So.2d 287, we are cited to no authority where such direct action against the ultimately responsible tenant (in addition to that against the primarily responsible owner) lies in the absence of application 1 of the 1932 act or of independent negligence ' on the part of the tenant.
We are unable to hold manifestly erroneous the District Court's determination that the present tenant's addition of the relatively slight additional weight of an asbestos undersheeting to the canopy and the tenant's failure to inspect the canopy to discover the poor drainage and the sudden accumulation of water and to anticipate the danger, under the circumstances of this case, did not substantially contribute to the accident so as to constitute actionable negligence and to cause the tenant to become independently negligent and solidarily liable.
In view of our determination holding the tenant ultimately liable herein, we do not feel called upon, either, to determine whether the stipulation in the lease assuming liability constituted an agreement in favor of third persons (i. e., a stipulation pour autrui, LSA-Civil Code Articles 1890, 1902) so as to make the tenant directly liable to these injured third persons. Contra: Grundmann v. Trocchiano, 13 La.App. 277, 125 So. 171 (on rehearing), 13 La.App. 277, 127 So. 748.
5. Decrees to be rendered.
By appropriate appeals and answers to the appeals all parties are properly before this court. We shall render separate decrees in favor of plaintiffs and against the owner based upon the latter's primary legal liability, and then shall render judgments in favor of the latter under its third party petition and call in warranty and against the Southern Furniture Company, Inc. (the only codefendant against which the owner sought judgment over against in the owner's answers to the appeals, thus affirming the District Court's determination that the tenant-appellant is ultimately liable under the lease contract for the damages allowed herein.
Amended and recast and affirmed.
. "Art. 670. Every one is bound to keep bis buildings in repair, so that neither their fall, nor that of any part of the materials composing them, may injure the neighbors or passengers,* under the penalty of all losses and damages, which may result from the neglect of the owner in that respect."
(* LSA-R..S. Note: "Error in English translation of French text — the word 'passengers' should be 'passers-by'.")
"Art. 2322. The owner of a building is answerable for the damage occasioned by its ruin, when this is caused by neglect to repair it, or when it is the result of a vice in its original construction."
. "Art. 2693. The lessor is bound to deliver the thing in good condition, and free from any repairs. He ought to make, during the continuance of the lease, all the repairs which may accidentally become necessary; except those which the tenant is bound to make, as hereafter directed.
"Art. 2695. The lessor guarantees the lessee against all the vices and defects of the thing, which may prevent its being used even in case it should appear he knew nothing of the existence of such vices and defects, at the time the lease was made, and even if they have arisen since, provided they do not arise from the fault of the lessee; and if any loss should result to the lessee from the vices and defects, the lessor shall be bound to indemnify him for the same.
. "[Clause A] The leased premises are presently occupied by this Lessee. Lessee leases and accepts the said premises in their present condition, subject only to reasonable wear and tear from this date [November 30, 1953] to August 1, 1954, and at its own risk, hereby accepts full responsibility for the condition thereof during the term of the lease.
"[Clause B] It is agreed by and between the parties hereto that the Lessee accepts the building in its present condition, and shall, at its own expense, during the entire period of this lease make any alterations, changes, improvements, or betterments, and shall likewise pay for all incidental repairs to the building (including all plumbing and wiring, as well as cost of painting and redecorating) that may be necessary during the term of this lease in order to keep the said building in a reasonably good state of repairs, it being understood, hoioever, that all repairs necessary to the roof, the rear and side walls of the building, the floor and foundation, and other repairs necessary because of structural weakness, or defects in the building, itself, shall be repaired at the cost of the Lessor.
"[Clause C] Lessor will not be responsible for damage caused by leaks in the roof, or by any vices or defects of the leased property, or the consequences thereof, except in the case of neglect or failure to take prompt action toioard the remedying of such defects after having received written notice, or, in emergency, verbal notice from Lessee of such defects and the damage caused thereby. Should Lessee fail to promptly so notify Lessor, as above provided, of any such defects, Lessee will become responsible for any damage resulting to Lessor or other parties." (Italics by the court.)
. The Poss and Thiel cases, after noting the effect of the covenants as shifting liability arising from defects in the leased premises, held the covenants ineffective under the circumstances of those cases since the injuries arose from defects in a portion of the premises reserved for joint use of the tenant and others and outside the leased premises. The Thompson and Mitchal cases refused to relieve the owner of liability because he actually knew, or should actually have known, of readily discoverable defects in the leased premises — a situation which admittedly does not apply here.
The Atkinson case concerned an oral agreement by the tenant to assume all responsibility for the condition of the premises, without a specific agreement that the lessor would be absolved of lia bility to others for vice or defects in the premises; nevertheless, such oral agreement was held to have this effect. The other cases cited concerned leases containing both covenants approximately identical with the clauses of the Ter-renova ease.
Cf. also Gardiner v. De Salles, 1930, 13 La.App. 83, 126 So. 739, decided before the 1932 statute, concerning covenants identical to those in the Terrenova case, where the trial court held the tenant solidarily liable with the owner (the tenant did not appeal, however, so the decision is not necessarily authority for the solidary liability of landlord and tenant under such on-vunstances).