Case Name: Buster & Jones et al vs Wright et al.
Court: Court of Appeals of Indian Territory
Jurisdiction: Oklahoma
Decision Date: 1904-10-19
Citations: 5 Indian Terr. 404
Docket Number: 
Parties: Buster & Jones et al vs Wright et al.
Judges: 
Reporter: Indian Territory Reports
Volume: 5
Pages: 404–451

Head Matter:
Buster & Jones et al vs Wright et al.
Opinion delivered October 19, 1904.
1. Indian Laws — License Fees for Traders a Tax not a Debt — Payment Enforceable by Interior Department.
Under the provisions of the Treaty of 1856 between the United States and Creek Nation giving the latter unrestricted right of self-government and full jurisdiction and control over all persons and propertj'' within the limits of their Nation and authorizing the removal therefrom, by the agents of the Interior Department, of all intruders, these including traders failing to pay license fees, a tax collector, acting under the direction and as the agent of the Interior Department, has the right, to close the places of business of merchants in the Creek Nation refusing to pay the license fee prescribed by the Nation, the fee being a tax and not a debt.
2. Indian Laws — Taxes and Royalties — U. S. Courts no Jurisdiction to Collect.
The United States Courts in the Indian Territory have no jurisdiction to collect .taxes for the Creek Nation.
Clayton, J., Dissenting.
Appeal from the United States Court for the Western District.
Chas. W. Raymond, Judge.
Action by Buster & Jones and others against J. George Wright and others. Judgment dismissing the complaint. Plaintiffs appeal.
Affirmed.
On August 23, 1901, the appellants (plaintiffs below) filed their complaint in equity against the appellees (defendants below), asking for a temporary restraining order enjoining the defendants, among other things, from closing up the places of business of plaintiffs, or in any other manner interfering with plaintiffs. The plaintiffs alleged that one Cobb, an alleged tax collector for the Creek Nation, Ind. Ter., acting under the direction of the Secretary of the Interior, through the orders issued by the Indian inspector for the Indian Territory, notified the firm doing business under the name of the Wagoner Hardware Company, one of the plaintiffs, that, unless they paid a certain sum demanded as a tax for the privilege of doing business as merchants in the Creek Nation, he would close their place of business; that he also made the same threats to the other plaintiffs. The plaintiffs alleged the tax was illegal and unjust, and levied without authority of law, for reasons set forth in said complaint. On August 27,1901, defendants filed their demurrer, and on same day both plaintiffs and defendants agreed by stipulation that the case be submitted on the facts therein set forth, and on same day the court, Judge Gill presiding, rendered its decision as follows: “Now, on this 27th day of August, A. D. 1901, comes on to be> heard the above-entitled cause upon the demurrer of the defendants to the complaint of the plaintiffs; it being agreed by written, signed stipulation between the parties thereto that in determining said demurrer the court shall take into consideration said stipulation, the same as if the acts set forth in said stipulation had been incorporated in said bill of complaint. And the court, after hearing the argument of the parties, and being fully advised in the premises, doth sustain said demurrer; and, said plaintiffs refusing to plead further, it is by the court ordered, adjudged, and decreed that said defendants have judgment, and that said plaintiffs take nothing by their prayer. To all of which said plaintiffs in open court at the time duly excepted, and still except, and pray an appeal, which is allowed by the court.”
On December 31, 1902, in the court at Wagoner, in the Western District of the Indian Territory, the plaintiffs presented the mandate of the Court of Appeals of the Indian Territory in this case, and asked the same to be spread on the records of this court, which was granted. Said mandate is as follows: “Be it remembered that at a term of the Court of Appeals in the Indian Territory begun and held at the courthouse in the city of South McAlester on the 23d day, being the fourth Tuesday, of September, A. D. 1902, amongst others, were the following proceedings, to wit: On the 25th day of September, A. D. 1902, a day of said term: Buster & Jones et al., Appellants, vs J. George Wright et al'., Appellees. Appeal from the Court of the Northern District of the Indian Territory. This case came on to be heard upon the transcript of the record of the court for the Northern District of the Indian Territory, and was argued by counsel, on consideration whereof it is the opinion of the court that there is error in the proceedings and judgment of said court for the Northern District in this cause, in this: the court below erred in sustaining the demurrer to the complaint filed by the defendants. It is therefore considered by the court that the judgment of said court for the Northern District in this cause rendered be, and the same is hereby, for the error aforesaid, reversed, annulled, and set aside, with' costs, and that this cause be remanded to said court for the Northern District for further proceedings to be therein had according to law, and not inconsistent with the opinion herein delivered.”
On March 10, 1903, the defendants filed their answer to the complaint in this cause, and admitted that said Cobb, acting in the capacity alleged, made the demand of said hardware company “that, unless a certain sum of money due the Creek Nation for a license or permit to transact business in the Creek Nation was paid by a certain day, he would close up the place of business of the said Wagoner Hardware Company, and prevent said company from further conducting their said business;” admit the same demand was made of each of the other plaintiffs; deny that the tax levied by the Creek Nation is illegal and unjust, and that the same was levied without authority of law; deny the ■ other allegations of said complaint; and allege that on November 25, 1900, the Creek Nation passed an act, which was approved by the President of the United States, requiring permits to be secured for the transaction of business within the limits of the Creek Nation by persons who are not citizens thereof, which, in part, is as follows:
“Section 1. That all persons who are not citizens by blood of the Muskogee Nation, or who have not been adopted by the Muskogee Nation, and whose names do not appear on authenticated rolls of the Muskogee Nation, who shall desire to engage in any manner of business in the Muskogee Nation, shall obtain the consent of the United States government, and shall pay to the United States Indian agent, at Union Agency, Muskogee, Indian Territory, for the benefit of the Muskogee Nation, the annual permit tax hereinafter fixed; the same to be paid quarterly, in advance in all cases, except where based on the cost of goods offered. Quarters to begin January first, April first, July first and October first of each year. All legitimate business houses of whatever character or capacity engaged in the sale of all manner of dry goods, groceries, provisions, hardware, lumber, drugs, millinery, leather goods, or any other articles known or designated as merchandise, shall pay an annual tax of one-half of 1 per cent, of the first cost of all goods offered for sale, excepting such goods as have been, actually produced in the Muskogee Nation, or shall have been brought within the limits of the nation, from traders who shall have previously paid this tax of one-half of 1 per cent, of such goods; all.payments to be accompanied by sworn • statements, said statements to be verified by personal inspection by a proper inspector of the original invoices or the books of the trader. * * *
“ Section 3. This act shallbecome a law upon the approval of the President of the United States, and shall be in full force and effect from and after January first, 1901. All laws heretofore enacted by the National Council of the Muskogee Nation, relating to permit tax which are in conflict with this act, are hereby repealed.”
They further allege “that by virtue of the laws of the Creek or Muskogee Nation above set forth, and the laws of the United States governing the power and authority of the Secretary of the Interior in relation to such matters as are involved in this action, the said Secretary of the Interior proceeded to collect the revenues due the Creek or Muskogee Nation by, through and with the assistance of the defendants in this action, who are at all times acting under the authority of the said Secretary of the ■Interior; that the Secretary of the Interior, by virtue of the authority vested in him by law, prescribed certain rules and regulations which were duly transmitted to the United States Indian inspector and the United States Indian agent, defendants hérein, providing the manner of collecting the revenues due the Creek Nation aforesaid; that sections 13 and 14 of the rules and regulations of the Secretary of the Interior governing mineral leases, the collection and disbursement of revenues and the supervision of schools in the Indian Territory issued at Washington November 4, 1898, are as follows, to wit:
“ ‘Section 13. The said United States Indian agent shall receive and receipt for all royalties paid into his hands when accompanied by the sworn statement as provided in the preceding regulation, but not otherwise, and it shall also be his duty to collect under the supervision and direction of the United States Indian inspector for the Indian Territory, all rents, permits, revenues and taxes of whatsoever kind or nature that may be due and payable to any Indian tribe or tribes to which these regulations may apply as provided for by the laws of such tribe or tribes.
“ ‘Section 14. The rents, permits, taxes and revenues provided for by the foregoing regulation to be collected by the United States Indian agent shall be due and payable to him in lawful money of the United States at the time when such rents, permits, taxes and revenues would, under the laws of the particular nation, have^been due and payable to the authorities of such nation had not the act of June 28, 1898, and especially section 16 thereof, been passed.”
They further allege that the Secretary of the Interior requested an opinion from the Attorney General of the United States “as to the duties, power, and authority of this department in the matter of the collection of permit taxes imposed by the laws of the respective Indian nations in the Indian Territory, known as the ‘Five Civilized Tribes/ upon noncitizens engaged in various pursuits within the territorial limits of such nations,” and requested said Attorney General to answer, among others, the following question: “Has it authority, in the case of a merchant refusing to pay such tax, to close his place of business, or to remove his stock of merchandise beyond the limits of the Nation?” On September 7, 1900, the Attorney General rendered his opinion, in which he held that it is the duty of the Interior Department “to close all business which requires a permit or license, and is being carried on there without one.”
Defendants further allege that under and by virtue of the laws of the United States, the laws of the Creek Nation, and the rules, regulations, and instructions of the Secretary of the Interior, they had power and authority to collect from the plaintiffs herein the sums demanded for permission to conduct their respective occupations or business enterprises within the limits of the Creek or Muskogee Nation, and that in collecting said sums of money said defendants last above named, or either or all of them, had authority and power to close the business houses of the said plaintiffs; the said plaintiffs not having procured from the Creek or Muskogee Nation permits to carry on said business enterprises. Said defendants, further answering, say that this court is without jurisdiction to control the actions of these defendants, or either of them, in carrying out the laws of the United States, the laws of the Creek Nation, and the rules and regulations and instructions of the Secretary of the Interior in the collection of the sums of money demanded for permission to conduct the various business, enterprises of plaintiffs within the limits of the Creek or Muskogee Nation. And these defendants deny that said plaintiffs are entitled to any writ of injunction restraining these defendants from proceeding to collect the sums of money aforsaid, or from closing the places of business of the plaintiffs herein, or from any other act in collecting the money aforesaid, and ask to be dismissed, with costs. On March 25, 1903, plaintiffs filed their demurrer to the answer of defendants.
On August 19, 1903, the parties, by their attorneys, filed their stipulation in this cause, which is as follows: “Stipulation. It is hereby stipulated and agreed by and between the parties plaintiff and Maxey & Hunt, their attorneys of record, and the parties defendant and their attorney of record, William M. Mellette, United States Attorney, that this cause be submitted to the court for final hearing upon the complaint and answer filed herein. And there being no dispute between the plaintiffs and defendants as to the facts in this case, it is hereby agreed that the several allegations of fact in the complaint be taken as true, and the several laws of the Creek Nation and the several regulations of the Secretary of the Interior set forth therein are true copies of the original laws of the Creek Nation, and the original regulations of the Department of the Interior duly promulgated. Maxey & Hunt, Attorneys for plaintiffs. Wm. M. Mellette, U. S. Attorney and Attorney for Defendants.”
On same day, this cause coming on to be heard, the court rendered the following decree: “And now, on this 19th day of August, 1903, come the above-named defendants, by William M. Mellette, their attorney, and the United States attorney, and withdraw demurrer to the complaint of plaintiffs heretofore filed. Come also the above-named plaintiffs, by their attorneys, Maxey & Hunt, and withdraw demurrer to answer heretofore filed. And come the parties plaintiff and defendant, by their respective attorneys above set forth, and submit this cause for final hearing upon the complaint and answer and upon the stipulation of facts this day filed herein. And the court, after due consideration of law and the facts, doth find the issues of law and issues of fact for the defendants. Whereupon it is ordered by the court that the bill of plaintiffs be dismissed for want of equity, and that the defendants have and recover of the said plaintiffs their costs laid out and expended in this cause, and that the application for injunction be denied.” To which plaintiffs excepted, and appealed to this court.
Maxey & Hunt, for appellants.
Leslie C. Fuller and W. M. Mellette, for appellees.

Opinion:
Townsend, J.
The appellants have filed assignments of error as follows: "(1) The court erred in dismissing plaintiffs' bill, and not complying with the mandate of the court of appeals (2) The court erred in holding that the defendants had a right to collect the taxes imposed by the Creek Nation upon the plaintiffs and others similarly situated. (3) the court erred in holding that the defendants had a right to close up the places of business of the plaintiffs, and remove them from the Indian Territory if they attempted to reopen. (4) The court erred in refusing to obey the mandate of the Court of Appeals of the Indian Territory, and, in effect, attempting to overrule the Court of Appeals. (5) The court erred in passing on the merits of the case when there was nothing before it that was not in the case as previously submitted to the Court of Appeals, and the Court of Appeals had directed it to proceed with the case in accordance with law, and not inconsistent with the opinion of the Court of Appeals."
Article 15 of the treaty of 1856 between the United States and the Creek Nation (11 Stat. 703) provides as follows: "Treaty of 1856. Art. 15. So far as may be compatible with the Constitution of the United States, and the laws made in pursuance thereof, regulating trade and intercourse with the Indian tribes, the Creeks and Seminóles shall be secured in the unrestricted right of self-government, and full -jurisdiction over persons and property, within their respective limits; excepting, however, all white persons with their property, who are not, by adoption or otherwise, members of either the Creek or Seminole tribe; and all persons not being members of either tribe, found within their limits, shall be considered intruders, and be removed from and kept out of the same by the United States agents for said tribes, respectively (assisted, if necessary, by the military); with the following exceptions, viz: Such individuals with their families as may be in the employment of the government of the United States; all persons peaceably traveling, or temporarily sojourning in the country, or trading therein under license from the proper authority of the United States; and such persons as may be permitted by the Creeks or Seminóles, with the assent of the proper 'authority of the United States, to reside within their respective limits without becoming members of either of said tribes."
In Maxey et al vs Wright, 3 Ind. Ter. Rep. 243, (54 S. W. 807), this court, in affirming the judgment of Judge Thomas, quoted as follows (page 809): "Article 7 of the treaty between the United States and the Choctaw and Chickasaw Nations (11 Stat. 613) is, upon the question here involved, identical with article 15 of the Creek treaty; and the question as to whether these nations had the power to enforce their permit laws was passed upon by Atty. Gen. Wayne McVeagh in 1881. He says: 'The validity of such permits is recognized by the concluding clause of article 7 of the treaty of June 22, 1855, which is not inconsistent with the terms of the later treaty. 17 Ops. Attys. Gen. 134. Upon the same subject, Atty. Gen. Phillips, in 1884, says: 'In the absence of treaty or statutory provision to the contrary, the Choctaw and Chickasaw Nations have power to regulate their own rights of occupancy, and to say who shall participate, and upon what conditions, and hence may require permits to reside in the nations from citizens of the United States, and levy a pecuniary exaction therefor. The clear result of all the cases, as restated in Beecher vs Wetherby, 95 U. S. 526, 24 L. Ed. 442, is, 'The right of the Indians to their occupancy is as sacred as that of the United States to the fee.' We fully agree with these opinions, and hold, therefore, that unless since the ratification of the treaty of 1856 there has been a treaty entered into, or an act of Congress passed, repealing it, the Creek Nation had the power to impose this condition or occupation tax, if it may be so called, upon attorneys at law (white men) residing and practicing their profession in the Indian Territory. We are of the opinion, however, that the Indian agent, when directed by the Secretary of the Interior, may collect this money for the Creeks. The intercourse laws (Rev. St. U. S. § 2058; Ind. Ter. St. 1899,§ 4268) provide that 'each Indian agent shall, within his agency, manage and superintend the intercourse with the Indians, agreeably to law, and execute and perform such regulations and duties, not inconsistent with law, as may be prescribed by the President, the Secretary of the Interior, the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, or Superintendent of Indian Affairs.' In this case the Indian agent was acting in strict accordance with directions and regulations of the Secretary of the Interior, in a matter clearly relating to intercourse with the Indians. And when it is remembered that up to the time that the United States courts were established in the Indian Territory the only remedy for the collection of this tax was by removal, and that the Indian nations had no power to collect it, except through the intervention of the Interior Department, it is quite clear that if, in the best judgment of that department, it was deemed wise to take charge of the matter and collect this money and turn it over to the Indians, it had the power to do so, under its superintending control of the Indians, and the intercourse of white men with them granted by various acts of Congress; and, in our opinion that power has not been taken' away by any subsequent act of Congress or treaty stipulation. The decree of the court below, sustaining the demurrer to the complaint and dismissing the case, is affirmed."
In Buster et al vs Wright et al., 4 Ind. Ter. Rep. 300 (69 S. W. 822) this court, in reversing the judgment of Judge Gill on the former appeal of this case, says: "As to the power of the Interior. Department of the United States government to remove white men from the Indian Territory who refuse to pay such amounts as may be required by the laws of the Creek Nation for the privilege of being permitted to come into that nation and to engage in business therein, we simply refer to the case of Maxey vs Wrigbt (heretofore decided by us, and which was affirmed by the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit,) 3 Ind. Ter. Rep. 243, (54 S. W. 807). In that case we decided the question against the contention of the plaintiffs, and, if this were the only ground alleged in the complaint for an injunction, the action of the court below in sustaining the demurrer would be upheld. But the threat to remove plaintiffs from the Indian Territory -was not the principal ground set up in the complaint. It was "that unless they (plaintiffs) paid a certain sum demanded, by one o'clock of that day, they would close up their place of business, and, if they attempted to open up their said places of business, that they (plaintiffs) would be reported by the Indian inspector to the Secretary of the Interior, and an order asked for their removal from the Indian Territory, to prevent them from doing business any further until they paid the sum demanded.' While by the treaty and the statutes the Secretary of the Interior may find the fact that a man is an intruder in the Creek Nation, because he fails to comply with the conditions upon which he was permitted to enter, and put him out, he cannot collect the debt by closing his place of business. The one is the enforcement of a penalty for being an intruder; the other, if allowed, would be the means of collecting a debt. The one, the law provides for; the other, it does not. We know of no provision of treaty or statute law providing or such a remedy to be enforced by the Interior Department of the government. Since the entry of the decree in the court below, Congress, by act approved May 27, 1902, c. 888, 32 Stat. 259, has provided 'that it shall hereafter be unlawful to remove or deport any person from the Indian Territory who is in lawful possession of any lots or parcels of land in any town or city of the Indian Territory which has been designated as a town site under existing laws or treaties.' The complaint, in effect, alleges that Wagoner has been so designated, and that the plaintiffs are in lawful possession of lots therein; and as we hold that the property of the plaintiffs cannot be seized, and the doors of their business houses closed, and as the act referred to provides that the plaintiffs cannot be removed or deported from the Indian Territory, it follows that the only method left for the collection of the debt is through the ordinary channels of the courts."
It thus appears that, while this court sustained the right of the Secretary of the Interior 'to remove white men from the Indian Territory who refuse to pay such amounts as may be required by the laws of the Creek Nation for the privilege of being permitted to come into that nation and to engage in business therein, we held in Buster et al vs Wright et al., supra, that the Secretary of the Interior 'cannot collect the debt by closing his place of business."' It would seem, upon reflection, that, perhaps, when we spoke of this license fee for this privilege of doing business as a debt, we were inaccurate, as it is not a debt. In Crabtree vs Madden, 54 Fed. 431, 4 C. C. A. 408, the court say: "The counsel for plaintiffs attempts to escape from this conclusion by the argument that this tax is a debt; that it arises upon an implied contract; that the court has jurisdiction to enforce such contracts, and hence of this action. This position is not tenable. Taxes are not debts. They do not rest upon contract, e-xpress or implied. They are imposed by the legisa-tive authority, without the consent and against the will of the persons taxed, to maintain the government, protect the rights and privileges of its subjects, or to accomplish some authorized special purpose. They do not draw interest, are not subject to set-off, and do not depend for their existence or enforcement upon the individual assent of the taxpayers. Meriwether vs Garrett, 102 U. S. 472, 513, 26 L. Ed. 197; Lane County vs Oregon, 7 Wall. 71, 80, 19 L. Ed. 101; In re Duryee (D. C.) 2 Fed. 68; Peirce vs Boston, 3 Metc. (Mass.) 520; Perry vs Wash- burn, 20 Cal. 318; Webster vs Seymour, 8 Vt. 135, 140; Johnson vs Howard, 41 Vt. 122, 125, 98 Am. Dec. 568."
The appellees in this case were acting under the orders of the Secretary of the Interior in closing the stores of appellants, who were "traders in the Creek Nation without license." They show that they were violating the treaty between the government of the United States and the Creek Nation, and the Secretary was endeavoring to enforce the treaty by requiring them to comply with its terms. In thus acting, was he not within the scope of his authority? In United States vs Mullin (D. C.) 71 Fed. 682, 689, Judge Shiras says: "Nearly all judicial writs and process addressed to the marshal issue in the name of the President of the United States. The judicial branch hears, decides,' and declares its judgment upon the questions brought before it; * but when action is needed to enforce the judgment of the court, ordinarily, the appeal is to the executive powers of the government. The power to issue writs in the name and by the authority of the President of the United States is not because, in any sense, the President is a member of the judicial branch, but because he is the head and chief of the executive department of the national government. Therefore the fact that in a particular instance a writ is not based upon an order or judgment of a court or judge does not tend to show that it may not be a legal writ. Whenever, by.the provisions of the Constitution, or of a treaty made in pursuance thereof, or of an act of Congress, the executive department of the government is charged with the performance of some duty or obligation, and, to secure due performance thereof, it becomes necessary that certain action be taken, and the executive department, acting through the proper channel, issues a written order or mandate requiring the doing of the appropriate act, and directing a proper pei'son to execute such mandate, or command, such writing is, in my judgment, a legal writ, * ‡ ‡ tand an order in writing by him, issued to secure the performance of the duty thus imposed upon him as an executive officer of the government, being an order requiring obedience upon the part of all within its terms, is therefore a legal writ, and any one who willfully obstructs or resists an officer of the United States in the service or execution of such an order is guilty of the offense defined in section 5398, Rev. St. U. S. (U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3655), to wit, of obstructing or resisting the service or an execution of a legal writ."
If these orders of the Secretary of the Interior in the exercise of his control and supervision of this Indian tribe, and for the enforcement of the provisions of the treaty, had the force and effect of a* legal writ, then it would seem that we misapprehended the authority under which appellees were acting; that, instead of acting unlawfully, they were engaged in the lawful performance of a duty. In deciding said case of Buster et al. vs Wright et al., supra, we say, after quoting the act of Congress approved May 27, 1902, and stating that it is by said act made unlawful to remove the purchaser in possession of a lot, that the property of plaintiffs cannot be seized and the doors of their business houses closed. "It follows that the only method left for the collection of the debt is through the ordinary channels of the courts." We were unquestionably mistaken in this suggestion, for the identical question had been passed upon in Crabtree vs Madden, 54 Fed. 431, 4 C. C. A. 408; this being the decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, and a case appealed from the Indian Territory. Judge Sanborn, in delivering the opinion of the court, says: "The considerations to which we have adverted, and especially the conviction that, if Congress had intended to confer on the court in the Indian Territory a jurisdiction so extraordinary in its character and so far-reaching in its effects as that here claimed, it would not have failed to clearly and unmistakably express that intention, have forced us to the conclusion that it never did intend to confer that jurisdiction. Nor do we find in this case any foundation on which to base the conclusion that the Creek tribe itself has either expressly or by implication prescribed or consented to so unique a method of enforcing its revenue laws. Our conclusion is that the court below had no jurisdiction of this action, and the judgment below is affirmed, with costs." It was thus expressly held in 1893 that the courts of this territory had no jurisdiction to collect taxes for the Creek Nation.
For the errors committed by this court in the former decision, we are of the opinion that said ease should be overruled. We have at this term decided the same question presented by this record in the case of J. W. Zevely et al., Appellants, vs W. G. Weimer et al., Appellees, 5 Ind. Ter. Rep. (-) (82 S. W. 941), on appeal from the Central District, Ind. Ter., in which we have endeavored to present the views of the court more at length than in this decision. Reference is respectfully made to the decision in that case.
It is our opinion that the court below did not err in dismissing the complaint and refusing the injunction, and its judgment is therefore affirmed.