Case Name: Raul Rolando FLORES v. STATE of Mississippi
Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Mississippi
Decision Date: 1991-09-18
Citations: 586 So. 2d 811
Docket Number: No. 89-KA-1083
Parties: Raul Rolando FLORES v. STATE of Mississippi.
Judges: Before DAN M. LEE, P.J., and PRATHER and BANKS, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 586
Pages: 811–817

Head Matter:
Raul Rolando FLORES v. STATE of Mississippi.
No. 89-KA-1083.
Supreme Court of Mississippi.
Sept. 18, 1991.
Merrida P. Coxwell, Jr., Randy A. Clark, Stanfield Carmody & Coxwell, Jackson, for appellant.
Mike C. Moore, Atty. Gen., Charles W. Maris, Jr., Sp. Ass’t Atty. Gen., Jackson, for appellee.
Before DAN M. LEE, P.J., and PRATHER and BANKS, JJ.

Opinion:
BANKS, Justice,
for the Court:
I.
This appeal comes from the Circuit Court of Hinds County which convicted the appellant Raul Rolando Flores and his co-defendant James Ray VanEtten of conspiracy to distribute more than one kilogram of marijuana and sentenced each to fifteen years imprisonment. Flores assigns the following errors:
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO SUSTAIN DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO PROVIDE A SPEEDY TRIAL.
II. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR BY PERMITTING THE PROSECUTOR TO MAKE REPEATED REFERENCE TO THE DEFENDANT'S FAILURE TO CALL A WITNESS IN HIS OWN BEHALF.
This case is controlled by and disposed of by our decision in Flores' co-defendant's appeal, Flores (VanEtten) v. State , 574 So.2d 1314 (Miss.1990). Accordingly, we reverse and render because the State failed to prosecute Flores within 270 days, in violation of our speedy trial statute, Miss. Code Ann. § 99-17-1 (Supp.1990).
II.
The facts of the crime charged here are essentially the same as those stated in Flores (VanEtten) v. State and will not be repeated here. We go directly to the dis-positive issue.
III.
To illustrate the speedy trial violation a chronology of events as applicable to Flores together with constitutional and statutory time calculations is shown below.
Event Date Constitutional No. of Days Statutory No. of Days
ARREST 05/06/84 TIME ATTACHES 0
Indictment 06/19/84 44 0
ARRAIGNMENT 06/22/84 47 TIME ATTACHES
Day after Arraignment 06/23/84 48 1
July '84 Term of Court Begins 07/09/84 64 16
VanEtten Moves for Severance (Denied) 07/10/84 65 17
State Moves for Continuance to Feb. '85 Term (Granted) 09/12/84 129 81
1. To keep the two cases distinct, the previous decision involving VanEtten and Flores will be referred to throughout this opinion as Flores (VanEtten).
Event Constitutional Date No. of Days Statutory No. of Days
TIME TOLLED: 09/12/84 to 01/28/85
VanEtten Moves to Dismiss for Failure to Prosecute (Denied) 06/21/85 273 225
July '85 Term of Court Begins 07/08/85 290 242
State Moves for Continuance from July 23 to Aug. 5 Term (Granted) 07/23/85 305 257
TIME TOLLED FROM 7/23/85 TO 8/5/85
Co-Def. moves for continuance for failure of state to comply with discovery. No order entered. 07/25/85
(TIME IS NOT TOLLED. DELAY IS CHARGED AGAINST THE STATE FOR ITS FAILURE TO ACCORD DISCOVERY ON A TIMELY BASIS.)
Flores Moves for Continuance to Sept. '85 Term to File Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Prosecute (Granted) 09/06/85 337 289
TIME TOLLED: 09/05/85 to 02/18/86
Trial Begins* (Both Defendants renew Motions to Dismiss for Failure to Prosecute) 02/18/86
A computation of time reveals that there was a total of 653 days from the day of Flores' arrest to the day of trial and a total of 606 days from the day of his arraignment to the day of trial. Not including the time of continuances granted for good cause, there was a total of 337 days from Flores' arrest to the day of trial and 289 days from the day of his arraignment to the day of trial.
The period between August 5 and September 6, 1985, warrants discussion. In Flores (VanEtten) we considered whether continuances sought by a co-defendant should toll the time as to the complaining defendant. 574 So.2d at 1321. There we counted against the state a four-month period allowed a co-defendant for the purpose of filing a motion. Under the circumstances here we need not consider whether the continuance allowed VanEtten should be counted against Flores in the absence of an affirmative effort by Flores to disassociate with the motion and press for trial.
The continuance sought by Van-Etten on July 24 was on grounds attributable wholly to the state. There is no order granting a continuance and we are, therefore, left to assume that a continuance was granted for the reasons stated. Whether we take the record, as is, with no order of continuance, or assume a continuance on the grounds stated in the motion, the result is the same. Either way the time expended is charged against the state. See Vickery v. State, 535 So.2d 1371, 1377 (Miss.1988); Perry v. State, 419 So.2d 194, 199 (Miss.1982). The state, therefore, violated the statutory 270-day rule by a minimum of 19 days. Miss.Code Ann. § 99-17-1 (Supp.1990).
CONCLUSION
Because Flores was denied a speedy trial pursuant to Miss.Code Ann. § 99-17-1 (Supp.1990), we have no choice but to reverse his conviction and discharge him. Because the speedy trial issue disposes of this case, we need not reach the other assignment of error.
REVERSED AND APPELLANT DISCHARGED.
ROY NOBLE LEE, C.J., and PRATHER, ROBERTSON, SULLIVAN and PITTMAN, JJ., concur.
HAWKINS, P.J., concurs with separate written opinion.
DAN M. LEE, P.J., dissents.
McRAE, J., dissents with separate written opinion.
. It may be "procedural" to members of this Court, but I would surmise it is rather "substantive" to the man who must suffer.