Case Name: Johnson, Appellant, et al. v. Montgomery; Thirty-Eight Thirty, Inc., et al., Appellees
Court: Supreme Court of Ohio
Jurisdiction: Ohio
Decision Date: 2017-09-06
Citations: 151 Ohio St. 3d 75
Docket Number: No. 2016-0790
Parties: Johnson, Appellant, et al. v. Montgomery; Thirty-Eight Thirty, Inc., et al., Appellees.
Judges: O’Connor, C.J., and Kennedy and Fischer, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Ohio State Reports, Third Service
Volume: 151
Pages: 75–85

Head Matter:
Johnson, Appellant, et al. v. Montgomery; Thirty-Eight Thirty, Inc., et al., Appellees.
2017-Ohio-7445.]
(No. 2016-0790
Submitted April 6, 2017
Decided September 6, 2017.)

Opinion:
DeWine, J.
{¶ 1} Under Ohio's Dram Shop Act, R.C. 4399.18, someone injured by an "intoxicated person" may sue a liquor-permit holder for an off-premises injury only when the permit holder or its employee served the person knowing her to be intoxicated or underage. This case, which has reached us by way of a discretionary appeal, involves a dancer at a strip club who left the club intoxicated and caused an accident on her way home. The question is whether the dancer qualifies as an "intoxicated person" under the statute or whether the term encompasses only the permit holder's patrons. The plain language of the statute provides the answer: the ordinary meaning of "person" includes not only patrons but also dancers, workers, independent contractors, and others served by the permit holder. Thus, the .accident victim may pursue a claim against the club only under the Dram Shop Act.
I. An Intoxicated Strip-Club Dancer Causes an Accident
{¶ 2} Nichole Johnson was severely injured when the car in which she was a passenger was struck by another car. The other car was driven by Mary Montgomery, who had just finished her shift as a dancer at a strip club known as The Living Room. Montgomery admitted that she was intoxicated when she left the club: she had ingested cocaine that day, and while working, she had drunk "a few" beers that had been purchased for her by customers.
{¶ 3} Drinking while working was not unusual at The Living Room. Although not required to drink, the dancers did so as a matter of course, often to embolden themselves to perform. The practice was encouraged by the club's waitresses, who urged customers to buy drinks for the dancers. Thirty-Eight Thirty, Inc., which operated The Living Room, benefited from the dancers' drinking: the club charged a higher price for drinks purchased for dancers. According to Michael C. Ferraro, the sole officer and shareholder of Thirty-Eight Thirty, 95 percent of the club's profits came from alcohol sales, and 30 to 40 percent of the alcohol sold was purchased by customers for the dancers. Virtually no limits were placed on how much a dancer could drink while working. And while Ferraro claimed that a dancer's husband or boyfriend would be called in the event the dancer became too intoxicated to drive, Montgomery testified that no one had ever arranged a ride home for her.
{¶ 4} Under a contract with Thirty-Eight Thirty, Montgomery paid $30 a night to lease space for her dancing. In return, she kept all the tips from customers. She received no wages or compensation from Thirty-Eight Thirty or Ferraro.
II. The Proceedings Below
{¶ 5} Johnson filed a complaint asserting common-law-negligence claims against Montgomery, Ferraro, and Thirty-Eight Thirty and a claim for violation of the Dram Shop Act against Thirty-Eight Thirty and Ferraro. A default judgment was rendered against Montgomery. The claims against Thirty-Eight Thirty and Ferraro were tried to a jury. At the conclusion of Johnson's case, a magistrate directed a verdict in favor of Ferraro as to his personal liability and in favor of Thirty-Eight Thirty as to its liability under the Dram Shop Act. Thirty-Eight Thirty's motion for a directed verdict on the issue of common-law negligence was denied. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Johnson for $2,854,645.55 on the negligence claim. The trial court adopted the magistrate's decision and entered judgment in accordance with the jury's verdict.
{¶ 6} Johnson appealed the trial court's judgment directing a verdict for Ferraro on the issue of personal liability. Thirty-Eight Thirty and Ferraro cross-appealed. They argued that outside the Dram Shop Act, Ohio does not recognize a cause of action based on negligently furnishing a tortfeasor with intoxicating beverages and that the trial court should not have instructed the jury on common-law negligence. The Second District Court of Appeals agreed and concluded that because the Dram Shop Act provides the exclusive cause of action against Thirty-Eight Thirty, the trial court had erred when it allowed the issue of common-law negligence to go to the jury. Thus, the judgment against Thirty-Eight Thirty on the common-law-negligence claim was reversed. The reversal of that verdict rendered moot the question of Ferraro's personal liability. We accepted Johnson's discretionary appeal. 146 Ohio St.3d 1502, 2016-Ohio-5792, 58 N.E.3d 1173.
III. Ohio's Dram Shop Act
{¶ 7} "The Ohio Dramshop Act, R.C. 4399.18, embodies [the] general, common-law rule that a person (or his representative) may not maintain a cause of action against a liquor permit holder for injury resulting from the acts of an intoxicated person." (Emphasis sic.) Klever v. Canton Sachsenheim, Inc., 86 Ohio St.3d 419, 421, 715 N.E.2d 536 (1999). Liability attaches only under the limited circumstances prescribed by the statute. Johnson maintains that the Dram Shop Act does not apply under the facts of this case and that Thirty-Eight Thirty's liability for her injuries should be determined under common-law-negligence principles. The gist of Johnson's argument is that the statute determines a permit holder's liability only with respect to acts by its patrons, not by its workers or independent contractors.
{¶ 8} Our starting point is the language of the statute:
Notwithstanding division (A) of section 2307.60 of the Revised Code and except as otherwise provided in this section, no person who suffers personal injury, death, or property damage as a result of the actions of an intoxicated person has a cause of action against any liquor permit holder or an employee of a liquor permit holder who sold beer or intoxicating liquor to the intoxicated person unless the personal injury, death, or property damage occurred on the permit holder's premises or in a parking lot under the control of the permit holder and was proximately caused by the negligence of the permit holder or an employee of the permit holder. A person has a cause of action against a permit holder or an employee of a permit holder for personal injury, death, or property damage caused by the negligent actions of an intoxicated person occurring off the premises or away from a parking lot under the permit holder's control only when both of the following can be shown by a preponderance of the evidence:
(A) The permit holder or an employee of the permit holder knowingly sold an intoxicating beverage to at least one of the following:
(1) A noticeably intoxicated person in violation of division (B) of section 4301.22 of the Revised Code;
(2) A person in violation of section 4301.69 of the Revised Code.
(B) The person's intoxication proximately caused the personal injury, death, or property damage.
R.C. 4399.18.
{¶ 9} The statute is straightforward. The only cause of action against a liquor-permit holder for off-premises injuries caused by an intoxicated person arises when the permit holder (or an employee) knowingly sells alcoholic drinks to a noticeably intoxicated person or an underage person. What constitutes a sale is defined broadly: " '[S]ale' and 'sell' include exchange, barter, gift, offer for sale, sale, distribution and delivery of any kind, and the transfer of title or possession of beer and intoxicating liquor either by constructive or actual delivery by any means or devices whatever R.C. 4301.01(A)(2). So, the Dram Shop Act applies even if the beer or liquor was not purchased directly by the intoxicated person but was purchased by someone else and given to her.
{¶ 10} Johnson does not dispute that when the Dram Shop Act applies to a given set of facts, it provides the exclusive basis for relief again a permit holder. But she maintains that the statute does not apply here, because Montgomery was not the club's customer; she was its worker or its independent contractor. Thus, she argues that Thirty-Eight Thirty's liability is based in common-law negligence, not the Dram Shop Act. In Johnson's view, "intoxicated person" really means "intoxicated patron"—a reading she claims is supported by the language and legislative history of the statute.
A. "Person" Means Person, and a Dancer Is a Person
{¶ 11} Johnson insists that the Dram Shop Act's limitation of a permit holder's liability to situations in which it "knowingly sold an intoxicating beverage to [a] noticeably intoxicated person" means that the statute covers claims involving only a permit holder's patrons, not its workers or independent contractors. She notes that this court and others have referred to "patrons" when discussing the Dram Shop Act. For example, in Klever, 86 Ohio St.3d at 421, 715 N.E.2d 536, we noted that the appellee's claim was that "the Ohio Dramshop Act allows a cause of action by an intoxicated, underage patron (or his representative) against a liquor permit holder for injuries (or death) that the intoxicated, underage patron inflicts upon himself." And we held in that case that "in Ohio there is no cause of action against a liquor permit holder by a voluntarily intoxicated patron (or his representative) who is 'underage' pursuant to R.C. 4301.22(A)(1) and 4301.69, but who has attained the age of majority, for self-inflicted injury (or death) due to being intoxicated." Id. at 423.
{¶ 12} But the decisions cited by Johnson do not squarely address the issue whether "intoxicated person" should be interpreted to include only intoxicated patrons. The word "patron" was used in those cases because the allegedly intoxicated person was in fact a patron; the word was not intended as a limitation on the class of persons covered by the statute. Notably, the court in Klever did not use the word "patron" exclusively when discussing the act. See Klever at 421 (the Dram Shop Act reflects the common-law rule barring suit "against a liquor permit holder for injury resulting from the acts of an intoxicated person").
{¶ 13} Nothing in our precedents dictates that the word "person" be limited to patrons. When words are not defined in a statute, we give them their "plain, everyday meaning." Sharp v. Union Carbide Corp., 38 Ohio St.3d 69, 70, 525 N.E.2d 1386 (1988). The plain, everyday meaning of "person" is not limited to patrons. A patron or a customer is a person, as is a dancer or a worker or an independent contractor. The statute does not limit the definition of "person" based on the individual's relationship to the permit holder. We conclude that "intoxicated person" includes an "intoxicated worker."
B. No Need to Look Beyond the Plain Words of the Statute
{¶ 14} Despite the plain language of the statute, Johnson urges us to interpret it more narrowly to apply only to acts of permit holders' patrons. She insists that such an interpretation is consistent with the legislative history of the Dram Shop Act and with the strong public policy against drunken driving. But the case is determined by the plain language of the statute.
{¶ 15} When a statute is unambiguous, we need go no further to ascertain the legislature's intent; we apply the statute as written. State ex rel. Savarese v. Buckeye Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn., 74 Ohio St.3d 543, 545, 660 N.E.2d 463 (1996). Here, the statute is unambiguous: liability is imposed upon a permit holder only when it knowingly sells beer or liquor to a noticeably intoxicated person. Moreover, while we are not indifferent to the steep toll exacted by drunken driving, it is not for us to determine whether public policy would be better served by a Dram Shop Act that applied only to a permit holder's sales to its patrons. "The role of this Court is to apply the statute as it is written—even if we think some other approach might 'accord[ ] with good policy.' " Burrage v. United States, — U.S. -, -, 134 S.Ct. 881, 892, 187 L.Ed.2d 715 (2014), quoting Badaracco v. Commr. of Internal Revenue, 464 U.S. 386, 398, 104 S.Ct. 756, 78 L.Ed.2d 549 (1984). Arguments for narrowing the application of the statute are more properly addressed to the legislature. Our review starts and stops with the unambiguous language of the statute.
C. No Liability Under the Dram Shop Act
{¶ 16} The Dram Shop Act applies to this situation: Johnson's injury was proximately caused by the negligent actions of an intoxicated person—Montgomery—away from Thirty-Eight Thirty's premises. Under the statute, then, neither Thirty-Eight Thirty nor Ferraro can be held liable unless the club (or one of its employées) knowingly sold an intoxicating beverage to Montgomery when she was noticeably intoxicated. The trial court found that Montgomery was not noticeably intoxicated—a determination that was not challenged on appeal. Thus, Thirty-Eight Thirty and Ferraro are not liable under the Dram Shop Act.
{¶ 17} The dissenting justice agrees that we have answered the legal question here correctly but doesn't like the outcome of the case. Like the dissenting justice, we are sympathetic to Johnson's suffering as a result of her terrible injuries. And like the dissenting justice, we do not condone The Living Room's distasteful business practices. But it is not the role of this court to create out of whole cloth the case we want to resolve. We review the issues that are raised by the appellant. Here, the magistrate presiding over Johnson's jury trial concluded, as a matter of law, that she had no cause of action under the Dram Shop Act. Nowhere—not in her objections to the magistrate's decision, nor in her appeal to the Second District, nor in her argument to this court—has Johnson argued that that conclusion was error—plain or otherwise. To suggest that absent such argument from Johnson, this court could sua sponte find plain error here ignores the constraints of appellate review. The dissenting justice's real quarrel is with the language of the Dram Shop Act—its requirement that one "knowingly" sell alcohol to a "noticeably intoxicated person" in order to be held liable. But that fight belongs in the General Assembly.
{¶ 18} As even the dissenting justice acknowledges; the Dram Shop Act applies here. Because the act applies, Ferraro and the club may not be held liable under common-law-negligence principles. The court of appeals properly vacated the judgment against Thirty-Eight Thirty.
IV. Conclusion
{¶ 19} As used in Ohio's Dram Shop Act, R.C. 4399.18, the phrase "intoxicated person" includes any person, not just a permit holder's patrons. Thus, the Dram Shop Act applies to determine the liability of a liquor-permit holder who sold intoxicating beverages to an intoxicated worker or independent contractor whose intoxication causes an injury. We affirm the judgment of the court of appeals.
Judgment affirmed.
O'Connor, C.J., and Kennedy and Fischer, JJ., concur.
O'Donnell and French, JJ., concur in judgment only.
O'Neill, J., dissents, with an opinion.
. Johnson does not suggest that Montgomery was an employee of Thirty-Eight Thirty.
. Amicus curiae Mothers Against Drunk Driving of Ohio does challenge the Second Appellate District's conclusion regarding the exclusivity of the Dram Shop Act as a remedy, but we will not address the issue because it has not been raised by a party to this appeal. See Wellington v. Mahoning Cty. Bd. of Elections, 111 Ohio St.3d 143, 2008-Ohio-554, 882 N.E.2d 420, ¶ 53.