Case Name: ANNIE L. POWER, Appellant, v. WABASH RAILROAD COMPANY
Court: Supreme Court of Missouri
Jurisdiction: Missouri
Decision Date: 1912-06-10
Citations: 244 Mo. 1
Docket Number: 
Parties: ANNIE L. POWER, Appellant, v. WABASH RAILROAD COMPANY.
Judges: Blair, G., not concurring.
Reporter: Missouri Reports
Volume: 244
Pages: 1–25

Head Matter:
ANNIE L. POWER, Appellant, v. WABASH RAILROAD COMPANY.
In Banc,
June 10, 1912.
1. NEGLIGENCE: Master and Servant: Injury to Servant: Question for Jury. Whether a railroad company was negligent in failing to light a trestle which stood between the spot where the company’s employees were clearing away a wreck at night, and the diner where they had to go for food, is, under the circumstances of this case, a question for the jury.
H. -: -: -: Contributory Negligence. Employees of a railroad company had spent the afternoon clearing away a wreck near a trestle. The work train, with the diner and other cars, had been on the same side of the trestle as the wreck, but the position of the cars changed frequently. Night fell and at 8:30, after it had grown very dark, several workmen started for supper, knowing that then they had to cross the trestle to reach the diner. They stepped off the track to go around a car, and one of the men fell to his death from the fill of the trestle. Held, that the question whether deceased was guilty of contributory negligence was for the jury.
Held, by BLAIR, C., dissenting, with whom LAMM, GRAVES and FERRISS, JJ., concur, that, since deceased knew the risk, but elected to proceed toward the trestle in the dark, along the side of the car, on the assumption that the trestle was farther west than it was, he was guilty, as a matter of law, of contributory negligence.
3. -: Question for Jury. Where different inferences may fairly be drawn from the undisputed facts, the question of negligence should be submitted to the jury.
Appeal from Gentry Circuit Court. — Hon. W. G. Ellison, Judge.
Reversed and remanded.
E. E. Aleshire, R. P. Duncan, R. 8. Robertson and 8. 8. Gundlach for appellant.
The only question we think involved in this case is whether or not the defendant was guilty of negligence and whether or not the deceased was guilty of contributory negligence. The answer pleads contributory negligence and assumption of risk. We do not think the latter defense can have much to do with the case. It is an elementary principle of law and decided scores of times in Missouri that a servant never assumes the master’s, negligence. As the court-gave a peremptory instruction in this case at the close of plaintiff’s evidence, all of the testimony has been printed. To sustain our position that the court erred in giving the peremptory instruction we herewith submit the following authorities: Walch v. Trans. Co., 52 Mo. 434; Stevens v. Walpold, 76 Mo. App. 213; Butts v. Bank, 99 Mo. App. 168; McClain v. Railroad, 100 Mo. App. 374; Burkhardt v. Schott, 101 Mo. App. 465; Mitchell v. Railroad, 132 Mo. App. 143; Wiley v. Gas Co., 132 Mo. App. 380; Moellman v. Lumber Co., 134 Mo. App. 485; Crawford v. Stockyards, 215 Mo. 394; Matz v. Railroad, 217 Mo. 275; Holman v. Iron Co., 133 S. W. 379; Dewire v. Bailey, 131 Mass. 169; Railroad v. Johnson, 69 Kan. 721; Railroad v. Martin, 41 Mich. 667; City v. Hoffman, 74 111. App. 503 ; Home v. Mining-Co., 75 Pae. 381; McCarty v. Morse, 197 Mass. 332; D. G-. Co. v. Carr, 85 Ark. 479'; Cordon v. Cummings, 152 Mass. 513; Tel. Co. v. Union, 131 111. App. 248; Finnegan v. Mfg. Co., 180 Mass. 580; Railroad v. Ives, 144 U. S. 408; Frost v. McCarty, 200 Mass. 445.
J. L. Minnis and J. W. Peery for respondent.
(1) The rule which requires the master to exercise ordinary care in providing his servants with a reasonábly safe place in which to work, does not apply to the character of work which was being done in this instance, nor to the circumstances of this case. As shown by the evidence, the work was being done in clearing up a wreck and repairing a track in the nighttime. In such cases, the servant assumes the increased hazard attending the particular work under all of the surroundings. Meehan v. Railroad, 114 Mo. App. 396 ; Railroad v. Henderson, 134 Ind. 636; Railroad v. Jackson, 65 Fed. 48; Hanson v. Armour Co., 113 Mo. App-618. (2) The leaving of the truck car upon the trestle- or culvert, being in the usual course of business, andl one of the incidents of the work in which the deceased,, with the other men were engaged at the time, was not; negligence on the part of the defendant. The evidence-shows that the wrecking train was necessarily moved! back and forth, up and down the track, all the afternoon; and a part of the time during the afternoon was standing upon this trestle. The moving of the train for the purpose of taking off material, and permitting passenger trains to exchange mail, was all a part of the work in hand, and all of which was well known to the deceased. Jackson v. Railroad, 104 Mo. 456; Thomas v. Railroad, 109 Mo. 187; Ring v. Railroad, 112 Mo. 230. (3) There was no absolute obligation on the part of the defendant to look after and take care of the section men engaged in this work, and the failure to do so was not negligence. Sissel v. Railroad, 214 Mo. 515'; Nivert v. Railroad, 232 Mo. 626. (4) The fact that deceased knew all about the culvert or trestle and the underground crossing over which it was constructed, and that his attention was directly called to it, and he was warned of it just before the accident, shows that he was guilty of such gross negligence and recklessness as to prevent a recovery. Sissel v. Railroad, 214 Mo. 514; Price v. Railroad, 77 Mo. 510; Thomas v. Railroad, 109 Mo. 199; BCitz v. Railroad, 152 Mo. App. 687; Hirsch v. Bread Co., 150 Mo. App. 162; Roberts v. Tel. Co., 166 Mo. 370; Loeffler v. Railroad, 96 Mo. 267; Grleeson v. Mfg. Co., 94 Mo. 201; Kenneddy v. Priederieh, 61 N. E. 642-643; Weller v. Gas Co., 91 N. E. 286-287; Railroad v. Samuels, 123 S. W. (Tex.) 121; Railroad v. Baldwin, 164 Fed. 826. (5) The want of sufficient light, or of its being dark, does not excuse the gross negligence of the deceased. The evidence shows that there were both torches and lanterns at the place of the wreck and he could have supplied himself with one or the other; but aside from •that, he knew that it was dark, and the dai'kness was ¡simply an incident of the work in which he was engaged. Nickerson v. Railroad, 144 Mo. App. 401; Anderson v. Box Co., 103 Mo. App. 382; Boymer v. Packing Co., 106 Mo. App. 726; Price v. Railroad, 77 Mo. 510; Railroad v. Jackson, 65 Fed. 48.

Opinion:
ROY, C.
This is an action for damages on account of the death of plaintiff's husband, Alonzo Power, tried in the Gentry county circuit court, where, on a peremptory instruction in the nature of a demurrer to the evidence, there was a verdict for defendant ¡and plaintiff has appealed.
The deceased had been employed as a section hand of defendant almost two years, working on the section at Stanberry. On October 25, 1907, a freight train of twenty-nine cars was wrecked about twenty-two miles east of Stanberry, just oast of what is known as the "curve trestle," tearing up a large portion of the track. The west end of the torn-up track was so close to the trestle that the men, including the deceased, unloaded ties and rails during the afternoon within sixty feet of the trestle and carried them down the track to the place where they were needed. The wrecking train, consisting of a dining car, a truck car and a supply car, carrying the plaintiff's husband and a large number of other section men picked up from Stanberry along the route, reached the wreck about half past one in the afternoon. Prom that time all was quick and rapid action. The cars were shifted from point to point, and left standing as the exigencies of the work required. Near five o'clock the work train was run four or five miles back to McPall in order to let trains from the east and west transfer passengers and mail at the wreck. Then the work train went back to its work, reaching there probably a little late for supper.
The trestle was about twenty feet long, under which was a farm'crossing, with precipitous sides, apparently a ravine about twenty feet deep. There was no railing along the sides of the trestle and no guards at the end. When night came on it was misting rain and at eight-thirty o'clock was, of course, very dark. Neither the ears nor the trestle were marked with lights. The glimmer from bonfires, torches, and probably an occasional lantern from the eastward revealed. the dim outline of cars on or near the trestle, but did not show the trestle, or bank. Several workmen had torches, and-some of them used torches in going to and from supper.0
Prom the time the train had returned from Me-Fall, the workmen, from time to time, as their work would permit, had been going in squads of four or five to their supper which was served in the dining car standing west of the trestle. In the meanwhile the train including the dining car was shifted from time to time. So far as the evidence shows, the workmen who had gone to supper before Power started, had all passed over the trestle without being obstructed by a car thereon. Two of them with a torch had returned over the trestle from supper to where Power was working just before he started to supper.
About half after eight Power, accompanied by Oogdill, Wilson and Gray, his fellow workmen, started to supper. Oogdill and Wilson were witnesses for the plaintiff, but they differed radically' in their testimony. Oogdill says, that they walked on the outside of the ties in going along the track to their supper, giving as a reason for so doing as follows, "well, it is a whole lot -easier walking out there than it is stepping from one tie to the other." Wilson testified that they were all walking between the rails on the track, and that when they reached .the cars, Power and Cogdill stepped off the north side of the track, and he and Gray off the south side. All started around the cars. At that time one of the cars was standing partly on the trestle and partly east of it. .It had not been there over thirty minutes. Some workmen with a torch had returned from supper over the unobstructed trestle to where Power was at work just before Power and his companions started. The dining car was further on west.
All six of the plaintiff's witnesses, who were all at the wreck, testified that they knew about the trestle; and four of them said that Power worked at times within sixty feet of the trestle. The deceased had no knowledge of the vicinity, except what he acquired on that occasion. The principal part of the wreck was about three hundred and sixty feet east of the bridge.
Oogdill testified as follows: "'Q. I will ask you to tell the jury whether you walked up to supper with Mr. Powers that evening or started to? A. Yes sir. I walked up on the north side of the track — -on the cinders. We wasn't on the ties. The truck car was on the culvert, and the supply car, with rails and ties, was east. Before we got to the culvert, recollect, I said to Lon — I said: ' Lon, there is a bridge here some place, bnt I don't know where-abouts.' I knew there was a bridge there, and so did he. He says: 'Well, you follow me. ' Of course I won't make the remarks he did. He said: 'You follow me and I will take you through all right.' Well, he hadn't any more than got the words out of his mouth until he fell. Well, I stepped on the block he fell off of. I come that near falling.
"Q. At that time, you didn't know you were that close to it? A. I didn't know we were that near the culvert.
"Q. And he didn't either? A. If he did, he wouldn't have fell.
" Q. If you had been in front of Mr. Powers, this accident would occurred to you?
"By Mr. Perry, Counsel for Defendant: Hold on, I object. A. I don't know whether it would or not, because—
"By the Court: Hold on. When an objection is made, you must keep quiet until I pass on it.
"Q. Well— A. I'll tell you, Mr. Showen, if he hadn't knowed the road so well, I wouldn't have followed him. But he knew where he was going. But I didn't. I knew there was a bridge there, and I was going to take care of myself. I wouldn't have went just then. There was nobody told us to go to supper at all."
Wilson testified as follows:
"Q. Tell the jury, then, just how he went and all about it, up to the time of this accident. A. There was Harry Gray and myself arid Mr. Cogdill — William Cogdill — and Mr. Powers started up the track to the dining ear. We came to those cars, and we stepped off — Harry Gray and myself stepped off on the south side of the track, and Mr. Cogdill and Mr. Powers on the north side, and, about that time, I spoke to Harry and told him we were getting somewhere near that culvert. I couldn't tell just where. He stopped and he said, 'Yes.' I heard a naan fall then. About that time, Mr. Cogdill called to Mr. Powers, he didn't answer him, and I says: £Mr. Powers fell in that culvert.' "
The petition was broad enough to cover all phases of the evidence and the answer is a general denial, and also a plea of contributory negligence and the assumption of risk
I. Let it be conceded for the purposes of this case that it was not negligence on the part of the company to have no rails or guards at the trestle; and also that it was not negligence under the circumstances to let the car stand on the trestle as shown in evidence. We do not undertake to pass on those questions, but concede them in order to get right at the main points in this case, i. e.: Were the circumstances in evidence such as to authorize a jury to find that the defendant was negligent in failing to mark the location of the trestle by a light or lights so that passing workmen would see the embankment and not fall over? And is the evidence such that the trial court was justified in holding as a matter of law that the deceased was guilty of such contributory negligence as prohibited plaintiff's recovery? •
The changes along and on that railroad track at the scene of the wreck, after the work of reconstruction began had been kaleidoscopic.- The track was being reconstructed, wrecked.cars were being removed. Old land.marks were constantly disappearing and new ones taking their places. Daylight was gone and the clouds and rain intensified the darkness.. The,flicker of distant lights revealed .prominent objects, such as cars, in dim outline, but intensified the darkness at their feet. There is nothing to show from what point deceased started to supper; but, supposing he went from the point of the principal damage, he had over a hundred yards to go before reaching the trestle. Power knew about the trestle; but there is no showing that there was any object near the trestle by which the attention of one passing by would be called to it. Did he think that the trestle was beyond the car and that it was unobstructed for passage? Such a conclusion may be drawn from the evidence. If the evidence showed that he knew the relative position of the car ,and the trestle, of course it was fatal negligence in him to proceed as he did. Evidently the men could not see the trestle or the passage under it even a step in front of them. The very facts relied on by defendant as showing contributory negligence bear the opposite construction. When they started around the car Cogdill said to Power, "Lon, there is a bridge here some place, but I don't know where-abouts." Power said, "You follow me and I will take you through all right," and at once fell to his death; and Cogdill, alert as the evidence shows he was, would doubtless have fallen if Power had not.
The evidence of Wilson shows that he and Gray might have fallen if they had not at the moment heard Power fall.
Counsel for defendant cite Thomas v. Railroad, 109 Mo. 1. c. 199, where it is said in speaking of the workmen, "He must not go blindly and heedlessly to his work, when there is danger. He must inform himself. This is the law everywhere." That is certainly law which no one doubts. But suppose he did just twenty or thirty minutes before ascertain that the trestle was clear and that one car was east of the trestle and the others, including the dining car, were west of the trestle, and suppose that, under all the circumstances, he reasonably believed that tbe situation in that respect remained unchanged, would not his act be based on what he supposed was actual knowledge that the way was safe? When he said "Follow me, and I will take you through all right" he may have been acting carelessly, or lie may have been acting from a reasonable conviction that the danger was not at their feet, bnt that the unobstructed trestle was further on.
Neither do we think that Railroad v. Jackson, 65 Fed. 1. c. 50, is like this case. That was a- case of tearing up, moving and relaying a portion of the track which was in danger of being washed into the river by high water, It was held that the workman had no reason to suppose that the right of way where he was at work would be kept free at every moment from all such impediments as might cause him to lose his footing.
In this ease the dangerous condition was not in that part of the road being reconstructed. The condition of the trestle *and the crossing was not being changed. It remained untouched by the work that was going on. It was between the workmen and their supper; a situation created by the defendant. A lantern hung at nightfall on or near the trestle would have prevented all mistakes.
Counsel for appellant in their printed argument say that deceased had worked in sixty feet of the trestle all that afternoon. The record shows that at times he did so work, but that he was in a work which took the workmen along the track the full length of the wreck. If it were a fact that he worked all afternoon-in sixty feet of the trestle, we could presume he started for his supper from the point where he was at work and then knew that the trestle was about sixty feet in front of him. In that case the contributory negligence would be evident enough. But the evidence shows that he worked all along the line of the wreck, and may have had the full distance to go to his supper. It may be that without being negligent, he miscalculated the distance he had to go to the trestle. He may have been depending on some landmark that had disappeared or had changed its position, as, for instance, the car. His last words clearly show that he was confident that the trestle was further ahead than it was.
In Huhn v. Railroad, 92 Mo. 1. c. 450, it is said that where different inferences may he fairly drawn from the undisputed facts, the question of negligence' should he submitted to the jury. See also Paden v. Van Blarcom, 181 Mo. 1. c. 128; Powers v. Transit Co., 202 Mo. 1. c. 280; Railroad v. Ives, 144 U. S. 417.
The cause should not have been taken from the jury.
The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded.
Blair, G., not concurring.
PER CURIAM.
This case coming into Banc from Division Two on the dissent of Ferriss, P. J., was heard in Banc and the opinion of Rot, C., was adopted by the court.
Valliant, G. J., Woodson, Kennish and Brown, JJ., concur — Woodson, J., in separate opinion. Graves and Ferriss, JJ., dissent, adopting therefor the divisional opinion of Blair, G., in which Lamm, J., concurs in a separate opinion filed.