Case Name: McDOWELL v. NATIONAL SUR. CORP. et al.
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1953-10-06
Citations: 68 So. 2d 189
Docket Number: No. 3695
Parties: McDOWELL v. NATIONAL SUR. CORP. et al.
Judges: 
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 68
Pages: 189–203

Head Matter:
McDOWELL v. NATIONAL SUR. CORP. et al.
No. 3695.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana. First Circuit.
Oct. 6, 1953.
Rehearing Denied Dec. 8, 1953.
Writ of Certiorari Denied Feb. 15, 1954.
Huckabay, Seale, Kelton & Hayes, Baton Rouge, for appellants.
F. Louis Gonzales, Baton Rouge, for ap-pellee.

Opinion:
LOTTINGER, Judge.
This is a suit for damages by Louis Wilburn McDowell against National Surety Corporation and the National Surety Marine Insurance Corporation. The claim is for- the total sum of $24,690 for personal injuries suffered by petitioner resulting from an automobile accident. The lower court rendered judgment in petitioner's favor in the sum of $17,924.50. Defendant has taken this appeal.
The facts, as found by the lower court, and which are not seriously disputed, are as follows. The defendant company issued to petitioner a liability insurance policy on June 8, 1951, which policy was in full force and effect at the time of the accident. The limits of liability stated in the policy are as follows: "Bodily injury liability $25,000 ea.ch person $100,000 each accident". It is further provided in said policy -that the insurer agrees
"to pay on behalf of the insured all sums which the insured shall become legally obligated to pay as damages because of bodily injury, sickness of disease, including death at any time resulting therefrom, sustained by any person, caused by accident and arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of the automobile."
On the day of the accident, the petitioner and his wife drove the car owned by petitioner and covered by the said liability insurance policy to Thibodaux, Louisiana, to a baseball game. Upon their return trip to Baton Rouge, some distance from Don-aldsonville, petitioner's wife took over the driving of the car while petitioner went to sleep on the rear seat. The evidence shows that Mrs. McDowell was a competent driver, and had never had an accident during her some ten years of driving.
Shortly after Mrs. McDowell took over the driving, she was driving at a speed of forty-five to fifty miles per hour when the weather became foggy. She slacked her speed little, if any, although her visibility was reduced by the fog. She was approached by an automobile coming in the opposite direction, the driver of which neglected to give her his dimmers, although Mrs. McDowell signalled for his dimmers two or three times. She became blinded by his bright lights, and collided with another vehicle traveling in the same direction as Mrs. McDowell and on the same side of the highway. The first thing Mrs. McDowell saw of the automobile with which she collided was a "turning wheel". She attributes the accident to the blinding lights of the oncoming car and to the condition of the weather, both of which obscured her vision. Prior to the time that she took the wheel, the weather was clear.
As a result of the collision, the petitioner was knocked unconscious. He sustained a brain concussion, a serious injury to one of his eyes, necessitating its removal, a torn cartilage and several other bodily injuries leaving scars on his chin and eyelid. The lost eye has been replaced by a glass eye.
Prior to the accident, petitioner was employed as Captain of the Baton Rouge Fire Department and earned a salary of $275.50 per month. By reason of his physical: impairment to his sight, he was demoted from the position of Captain to a Fire Alarm Operator at a salary of $213 per month.
The injuries required petitioner to spend seven or eight days in hospitals and he was incapacitated from any kind of work for four or five months. According to his own testimony and that of the doctors who testified in the case, the petitioner suffered great pain and now, long after the accident, he claims to have severe headaches which, one of the doctors stated, could easily be attributed to the injury.
Defendant first filed exceptions of no cause or right of action, which were overruled • by the lower court. The defendant then filed answer denying most of the allegations of the petition but admitting the issuance of the insurance policy upon which the suit is predicated. It denies, however, any liability for the damages under the terms of said policy.
The lower court rendered judgment in favor of petitioner in the amount stated above. The defendant has taken this appeal.
The defendant assigns as errors committed by the lower court, the following reasons:
1. Louisiana Revised Statutes, Title 22, Section 655, for the year 1950, as Amended, which authorizes a direct action against an insurer does not contemplate an action of the nature herein alleged upon and in fact the statute prohibits such a suit as specifically set forth therein.
2. Plaintiff's petition and all of the evidence adduced specifically shows that plaintiff and plaintiff's wife were on a community mission in the nature' of a joint venture and any negligence on the part of plaintiff's wife acting as the agent of the community is imputed under the law of Louisiana to plaintiff, her husband, and bars his recovery.
3. Both section 655, Louisiana Revised Statutes of 1950, as amended, and the judgment rendered herein by the Honorable Lower Court, are in clear violation and contravention of the United States Con stitution, Article 1, Section. 10, and the Fourteenth Amendment thereto.
4. Plaintiff's suit should be dismissed for the reason that the evidence introduced does not show that Mrs. McDowell was negligent and that her negligence was the proximate cause of the accident.
5. In any event and with all factors considered, the judgment rendered herein by the Honorable Lower Court exceeds a genuinely reasonable amount by more than one-half, and should be reduced.
We will discuss the alleged reasons of error by the lower court, in the order given above.
Defendant claims that LSA-R.S. 22:655, which provides for a direct right of action against the insurer, clearly states that it is the intent that defendant has the same defenses as the insured and that petitioner's right of action is subject to all of the lawful conditions of a policy or contract that could be urged by his wife, Mrs. McDowell. No cases are cited in support of its contention. The portion of the statute which is particularly referred to in its allegation that the same defenses are available to the defendant as are available to the insured, reads as follows: .
" It is the intent of this Section that any action brought here- . under shall be subject to all of the lawful conditions of the policy or contract. and the defenses which could be urged by the insurer to a direct action brought by the insured, provided the terms and conditions of such policy or contract are not in violation of the laws of this state." 1
Our interpretation of the quoted portion of the statute is that the insurance company shall have any defenses in a direct, action brought by the injured party that, it would have to an action brought by its insured. Suppose, for instance that an injured party chose, instead of suing the insurer, to sue the insured party. and was awarded judgment.' There would be no-question then that the insured' party could sue his insurer for the amount collected by the injured party. The direct action statute merely gives to the insurance company any defense in the direct action which it might have had in an action by its insured.
In this case, although the policy of defendant was issued in the name of petitioner, according to the terms and conditions of the policy, the insured party, under the clear wording of the policy as will be discussed later, was Mrs. McDowell. Although the defendant has not indicated any defense in particular which he claims would come under the quoted portion of the statute, we assume that he means that-the personal defense of coverture available to Mrs. McDowell to a suit instituted against her by her husband would,' in this case, inure to the benefit of the defendant insurer. Such a situation, as we see it would not be covered by the provision of the statute. This defense would not have been available to the defendant (insurer) in a direct action against it brought by the insured (Mrs. McDowell). Recovery has been allowed in similar cases in our jurisdiction. Edwards v. Royal Indemnity Co., 182 La. 171, 161 So. 191; McHenry v. American Employers Ins. Co., 206 La. 70, 18 So.2d 656; Id., La.App., 18 So.2d 840, 843; Hardtner v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., La.App., 189 So. 365 and Scarborough v. St. Paul Mercury Indemnity Co., La.App., 11 So.2d 52.
The defendant next claims that petitioner and his wife were on a community mission in the nature of a joint venture and any1 negligence on the part of petitioner's wife would be imputed to petitioner and would bar his recovery in this matter. We feel that there is no doubt that the couple were on a community mission in the nature-of a joint venture. In the event that suit had been instituted by a third party, the petitioner would have been held liable for the negligent acts of his wife under the rules pertaining to the principal and agent relationship. However, there -is .no third party suing in this case. The sitúa-, tion presented here is one where, the principal is attempting- to' recover for the neg- • ligent acts of his agent, and there can be no quarrel against recovery having been allowed many times in such a situation. In McHenry v. American Employers Insurance Co., supra, [18 So.2d 843] the court said:
"The Supreme Court has held that plaintiff may recover from his wife's insurer the damages sustained by him from her negligence. In view of this holding we cannot perceive any sound reason why he should be barred from recovery because, as head and master of the community, he could have been held to respond in damages to a third person injured by his wife. It certainly is not consistent to say that cover-ture in this case does not forbid the husband to recover from the wife's insurer and then say he may not recover because the wife was , performing a service for the benefit of the community, a legal result of coverture, when the accident happened."
In Hardtner v. Aetna Casualty Co., supra, [189 So. 370] the court said:
"The only way or theory upon which negligence of one person may be imputed to another is under that of agency; and even where the relationship of master and servant, or principal and agent exists, the principal or master has a cause and right of action against the agent or servant for the damage the principal or master, has suffered by the wrongful acts of his agent or servant."
In the instant case the wife, in driving the car, was acting as agent for the community of acquets and gains. As to any damages to third persons, the negligence of the wife would have' been imputed to the husband, the principal in the community agency. Thus, he would have had no defense to an action instituted by third persons, under the. circumstances of this. case. However, in the agency relationship, the law allows the principal to recover from the agent for the damages sustained by the principal as a result of the negligent acts' of the agent., The same principal would apply here. Although the petitioner could not have brought a direct action against his wife under our rules of coverture, the defense of coverture is personal to- the wife and would not inure to the benefit of the insurance company herein. We, therefore,, feel that the second assignment of error by defendant is without merit.
Defendant next contends that LSA-R.S. 22:655 and the judgment rendered below are in violation of the United States Constitution, Article 1, Section 10, and the Fourteenth Amendment thereto. It claims that the right of direct action given by the statute impairs the obligation of contract and deprives the defendant of its property without due process of law.
The said statute has-been held constitutional. Churchman v. Ingram, La. App., 56 So.2d 297, 307. Furthermore, the defendant, being an insurer doing business in the State of Louisiana, has consented to be sued in Louisiana directly by an injured party. The policy itself provides:
"23; Terms of Policy Conformed to Statute. Terms of this policy which are in conflict with the statutes of the State wherein this policy is issued are hereby amended to conform to such statutes."
In this connection, in Buxton v. Midwestern Ins. Co., D.C., 102 F.Supp. 500, 507, the court said that the insurer in return for the privilege of doing business, had consented to the direct action. "It cannot say yes or I do in one breath and no or I do not or will not in another."
Defendant's fourth contention of error is that the evidence failed to show negligence on the part of Mrs. McDowell and that her negligence was 'the proximate cause of the accident. On this point, the lower court stated as follows:
"Let us preface our opinion by saying that from the, evidence adduced, Mrs. McDowell was guilty of negligence in the operation of the plain tiff's car, which negligence was the proximate cause of the accident. It is true that the only evidence in the record bearing upon this question is that of Mrs. McDowell. Her account of the accident, however, is not disproved by direct, physical or circumstantial evidence. No explanation was made by either side as to who the party was into whose car Mrs. McDowell ran her car.
"However, Mr. T. B. Beale, Jr., representing the defendant company, testified that he interviewed the driver of the other car and on behalf of defendant paid the owner of the other car for the damage done his car by the collision. This payment presumably was made by defendant company because it was of the opinion that the collision was due to the negligency of Mrs. McDowell.
"Aside, from this, the law is well settled that when the driver of an automobile is blinded by the lights of another car, he or she should reduce his or her speed to such an extent that the car can be stopped at once if faced with an emergency.
"In Mickens v. F. Strauss & Son, Inc., La.App., 28 So.2d 84, we find the following at page 87: 'It has been repeatedly held that when visibility is materially impaired because of smoke, mist, dust, etc., a motorist should reduce his rate of speed to such extent and keep his car under such control as to reduce to a minimum the possibility of accident from collision; and as an extreme measure of safety, it is his duty, when visibility ahead is not possible or greatly obscured, to stop his car and remain at a standstill until conditions warrant going forward. Locke v. Shreveport Laundries, Inc., supra (18 La.App. 169, 137 So. 645)'
"There are many decisions of the Appellate Courts to the same effect."
Although Mrs. McDowell was the only witness who testified as to the actual cause of the accident, her evidence clearly shows that the accident was caused solely by her negligence in proceeding at too great a speed under the foggy conditions, and driving while being blinded by the headlights of an approaching car. Had she reduced her speed to what was reasonable and proper under the circumstances, she could have stopped within her vision and the accident would have been avoided. It is the established jurisprudence of this state that the driver of a vehicle is required to maintain such control over his automobile as to permit him to bring it to a stop within the range of his lights and it is further negligence in failing to decrease his speed when temporarily blinded by the headlights of an approaching vehicle. It is further well established as the jurisprudence of this state that when a driver of a vehicle finds that he is unable to see the road ahead of him, for any reason whatever, whether blinded by bright lights, smoke, dust, fog or for any other reason, it is his duty to at least bring his car under such control that it can be stopped in a moment in case of an emergency and in extreme cases, it is his duty to stop. See Rachal v. Balthazar, La.App., 32 So.2d 483 and Dauzat v. Kelone, La.App., 65 So.2d 924. Therefore, we are of the opinion that Mrs. McDowell was negligent and that her negligence was the proximate cause of her husband's injury. We are not of the opinion that this is one of the exceptional type of cases that would relieve Mrs. McDowell of negligence. Furthermore, even were we to consider that Mrs. McDowell's negligence was not the sole cause of the accident, but was merely a contributing cause, the petitioner would still have his right of action, as the courts have held that when a defendant is responsible for one, two or more proximate causes of an injury, he cannot escape liability because a third person is responsible for a concurrent proximate cause. Abrego v. Tri-State Transit Co., La.App., 22 So.2d 681, 683; Shield v. Johnson & Co., Ltd., 132 La. 773, 61 So. 787, 47 L.R.A.,N.S., 1080.
Before proceeding with defendant's last assignment of error, that of quantum,, we feel it our duty to dwell further on what we feel to be the major point at issue in this case, and which is a question res novo in our jurisdiction. This question is, can the husband, the named insured in a liability policy, recover from his insurer for injuries sustained by him as a result of the negligence of his wife, who is driving with his permission, under the terms of the policy.
Coverage A of the policy, which was introduced into evidence provides that the insurance company agrees:
"To pay on behalf of the insured all sums which the insured shall become legally obligated to pay as damages because of bodily injury, sickness or disease, including death at any time resulting therefrom, sustained by any person, caused by accident and arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of the automobile."
The policy further provides, in Section III, under Definition of Insured, as follows :
"With respect to the insurance for bodily injury liability and for property damage liability the unqualified word 'insured' includes the named insured and also includes any person while using the automobile and any person or organization legally responsible for the use thereof, provided the actual use of the automobile is by the named insured or with his permission."
In the present case, it is clear from reading Section III of said policy, that Mrs. McDowell was an insured under the terms thereof. She was driving with the permission of the named insured. Furthermore, keeping in mind that Mrs. McDowell was the insured, and by reading Coverage A of the policy, it is clear to us that the company is liable, on behalf of the insured, for bodily injury, sickness or'disease sustained by my person caused by an accident of the automobile. The terminology "any person" is a broad one.' Had the company desired to qualify this phrase, they could easily have done so. As a matter of fact, the policy did list certain exceptions, or exclusions, one of which, as pertains to the property damage liability, reads as follows:
"(F) The policy does not apply to injury to or destruction of property owned by, rented to, in charge of or transported by the insured."
This exclusion is clear, and relieves the insurer of liability'for damage to property owned by, or in the charge of, the insuréd. Certainly had the insurer desired to relieve itself of liability for personal injuries to the named insured, it could easily have done so by inserting appropriate language to that effect into the policy.
As to the provisions of the policy, the lower court, found as follows:
"The liability insurance policy here involved operates for the benefit, not only of the named insured but for the benefit of any person driving the automobile with the permission of the named insured. Hence, it operated for the benefit of Mrs. McDoweil. Here, let us again quote from the policy, Coverage A, as follows: The Insurance Company agrees 'To pay on behalf of the assured all sums which the insured shall become legally obligated to pay as damages because of bodily injury sustained by my person.' The words 'Any person' includes the named insured if he was a passenger in the autpmobile and the driver was the assured. See Hardtner v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., La.App., 189 So. 365. Let us quote from this decision, as follows:
" 'Appleman's Automobile Liability Insurance, published in 1938, under the title "Bodily injury or Death of iNamed Insured", on page 135, has the following to say:
" ' "An attorney unfamiliar with automobile insurance law might be inclined to feel this clause to be pure surplus- age. It is conceded that the intention of an automobile policy .is to protect the named insured and persons operat- ing with his permission from legal liability, and,is not intended to compensate the insured for his own injuries.It is a liability rather than a personal injury policy. In the absence of such a clause, however, the courts have had a sharp conflict of authority and the majority have permitted the named insured to recover for his own injuries. Of course the situation can only arise where a person other than the insured is operating the vehicle. The reason for the majority rule is.not without logic. It is somewhat as follows: The insurer intends to protect any person operating with the insured's consent in every case. • That operator may have an accident in which he becomes legally liable to the insured for his negligence in operation. If the insurer denies a recovery, then it is not affording complete protection to the additional insured. Since it purports to render complete protection by the omnibus clause the rule of strict construction against the company must be applied. By applying this rule favorably to the additional insured the accident is covered and the named insured permitted to recover." '
"Obviously, the reasoning of the Courts in holding as they do on this question is that the Insurance Company could exclude in no uncertain terms its named assured, and by failing to do so, accepts liability to its named insured if it has adopted another assured who operates the vehicle and negligently causes injury."
Under the holdings of the Hardtner and McHenry cases the petitioner should be allowed recovery from his insurer for injuries suffered from the negligence of his wife, the insured under the omnibus clause of the policy.'
As to any question relative to negligence on the part of petitioner, we feel that there was none. The facts show that Mrs; McDowell had been driving a car • for some ten years. Testimony shows that she had, on several occasions, driven at night. She had never had an automobile accident. On the night in question,' and at the time of the accident,' petitioner'was on- the back seat asleep. We 'd'o' not feel that these facts show any negligence whatsoever on the part of petitioner.
As to the question, as to whether recovery in this suit would unjustly enrich the community existing between petitioner and his wife, the Supreme Court, in McHenry v. American Employers Insurance Co. [206 La. 70, 18 So.2d 658], stated: " the community will not be enriched but will only be reimbursed for the loss it has sustained as a result of the accident."
The lower court gave judgment for petitioner in the total sum of $17,924.50. The petitioner claims said sum to be inadequate, whereas the defendant claims it to be excessive.
Of said sum, $15,000 was allowed for permanent disability sustained by petitioner, including the loss of his eye. The petitioner was 28 years of age at the time of the accident. Because of the loss of the eye, he was reduced from rank of Captain in the Fire Department, paying a salary of $275.50 per month, to that of Beginner Fire Alarm Operator, paying a salary of $213 per month. Under the Mortality Table, LSA-R.S. 47:2405, petitioner had a life expectancy of 36.73 years at the time of the accident. While there was the possibility of advancement from the rank of Captain, there is now a possibility of advancement from the rank of Beginner Fire Alarm Operator. The evidence shows that, because of the injuries, petitioner lost some six months from his work. Under the circumstances, we believe that the allowance of $15,000 was neither inadequate or excessive.
The lower court further allowed $2500 for pain and suffering, $211.50 for medical bills, $33 as hospital bills and $140 as cost of a permanent glass eye. : .The eyidence. shows that -the injuries, especially, to the eye, were extremely painful. : Petitioner, at the time- of -trial, was still suffering from headaches, a likely result, of said injuries: We believe -that the damages, as awarded, were proper.
For the reasons assigned, the 'judgment of the lower court will be affirmed.
Judgment Affirmed.'