Case Name: STATE of Minnesota, Appellant, v. Adria Anne JOHNSON, Respondent, David Anthony Fineday, Respondent
Court: Minnesota Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Minnesota
Decision Date: 1999-08-12
Citations: 598 N.W.2d 680
Docket Number: Nos. C5-96-1854, C5-96-1858
Parties: STATE of Minnesota, Appellant, v. Adria Anne JOHNSON, Respondent, David Anthony Fineday, Respondent.
Judges: 
Reporter: North Western Reporter 2d
Volume: 598
Pages: 680–689

Head Matter:
STATE of Minnesota, Appellant, v. Adria Anne JOHNSON, Respondent, David Anthony Fineday, Respondent.
Nos. C5-96-1854, C5-96-1858.
Supreme Court of Minnesota.
Aug. 12, 1999.
Jon P. Ectov, Assoc. Cass County Atty., Walker, Michael A. Hatch, Atty. Gen., St. Paul, for appellant.
Amber J. Ahola, Anishinabe Legal Services, Cass Lake, for respondents.

Opinion:
OPINION
STRINGER, J.
The question before us is whether the State of Minnesota has subject-matter jurisdiction over the traffic offenses of failure to produce proof of insurance in violation of Minn.Stat. § 169.791 (1998), and driving after revocation in violation of Minn.Stat. § 171.24, subd. 2 (1998), when these offenses are committed by enrolled tribal members on the tribal reservation. We hold that under our ruling in State v. Stone, 572 N.W.2d 725 (Minn.1997), the state lacks jurisdiction because these offenses are not violations of criminal laws. We affirm the court of appeals.
Respondent Adria Anne Johnson is an enrolled member of the Minnesota Chippewa Tribe, Leech Lake Band. Her driver's license was revoked on October 11, 1994 for failure to provide proof of insurance in violation of Minn.Stat. § 169.791. In the early morning hours of January 13, 1996 while within the boundaries of the Leech Lake Reservation, she was stopped on Highway 60 in Cass County by a Cass County Deputy Sheriff and issued a citation for driving after revocation of her driver's license in violation of Minn.Stat. § 171.24, subd. 2, and for driving with an expired registration in violation of Minn. Stat. § 169.79. Approximately one hour later, the same officer stopped Johnson at a different location in Cass County but still within the boundaries of her tribal reservation, and again cited her for driving after revocation and for failing to provide proof of insurance in violation of Minn. Stat. § 169.791. Johnson moved to dismiss the charges for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction because she is an enrolled member of the Minnesota Chippewa Tribe, Leech Lake Band, and the alleged offenses occurred within the boundaries of the Leech Lake Reservation. The district court denied Johnson's motion. Pursuant to a plea agreement, the state dismissed the expired registration charge and Johnson pleaded guilty to both driving after revocation charges and the charge of failure to provide proof of insurance. For each of the offenses, the court sentenced Johnson to a fine of $500 and 50 days in jail but stayed $150 of each fine and the jail term.
Respondent David Anthony Fineday was cited by a Cass Lake police officer for failing to provide proof of insurance in violation of Minn.Stat. § 169.791 following a minor traffic accident in the City of Cass Lake on the morning of July 20, 1996. At his arraignment Fineday moved to dismiss the charge because the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. He offered no evidence in support of this assertion, however. The court denied Fineday's motion to dismiss and he pled guilty to the violation of failure to provide proof of insurance. Fineday was sentenced to a $500 fine and 50 days in jail with the jail time stayed conditionally.
Johnson and Fineday each appealed to the court of appeals the district court's denial of their respective motions to dismiss and the two cases were consolidated for review. The court of appeals reversed concluding that the state does not have subject-matter jurisdiction to enforce either Minn.Stat. § 171.24, subd. 2 (driving after revocation) or Minn.Stat. § 169.791 (failure to provide proof of insurance) when violations are committed by enrolled tribal members on the tribal reservation. State v. Johnson, 1997 WL 104577 (Minn.App. March 11, 1997). We granted review of the consolidated appeals but stayed proceedings pending our decision in State v. Stone, 572 N.W.2d 725 (Minn.1997), and State v. Jackson, 570 N.W.2d 503 (Minn.1997). The state now asks us to revisit and reverse our decision in Stone and to hold that the state has subject-matter jurisdiction over violations of driving after revocation and failure to provide proof of insurance even though the violations are committed by enrolled tribal members on the tribal reservation. We decline to do so.
In our recent decision in State v. Stone, we thoroughly reviewed the history and precedents relating to the confluence of tribal sovereignty with the enforcement of state traffic laws against tribal members on tribal lands, looking particularly to California v. Cabazon Band of Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 107 S.Ct. 1083, 94 L.Ed.2d 244 (1987), for guidance. See Stone, 572 N.W.2d at 728-31. Because under the authority of Public Law 280 and the Supreme Court's ruling in Cabazon only criminal laws can be enforced against tribal members on tribal land, we carefully articulated a test for determining whether a state law was civil/regulatory or criminal/prohibitory. Id. at 730. Based upon the Supreme Court's ruling in Cabazon, the test we articulated looks to the intent of the state law:
[ I]f the intent of a state law is generally to prohibit certain conduct, it falls within Pub.L.280's grant of criminal jurisdiction, but if the state law generally permits the conduct at issue, subject to regulation, it must be classified as civil/regulatory and Pub.L. 280 does not authorize its enforcement on an Indian reservation. The shorthand test is whether the conduct at issue violates the State's public policy.
Stone, 572 N.W.2d at 729 (quoting Cabazon, 480 U.S. at 209, 107 S.Ct. 1083).
We acknowledged that the Cabazon test "admits of some ambiguity," and adopted a two-step approach for its application:
The first step is to determine the focus of the Cabazon analysis. The broad conduct will be the focus of the test unless the narrow conduct presents substantially different or heightened public policy concerns. If this is the case, the narrow conduct must be analyzed apart from the broad conduct. After identifying the focus of the Cabazon test, the second step is to apply it. If the conduct is generally permitted, subject to exceptions, then the law controlling the conduct is civil/regulatory. If the conduct is generally prohibited, the law is criminal/prohibitory. In making this distinction in close' cases, we are aided by Cabazon's "shorthand public policy test," which provides that conduct is criminal if it violates the state's public policy.
Stone, 572 N.W.2d at 730 (emphasis in original). We then interpreted "public policy" to mean public criminal policy - that is, policy that "seeks to protect society from serious breaches in the social fabric which threaten grave harm to persons or property." Id. Applying this test, we concluded that the state's driving regulations have as their general public policy protecting "the safety of persons and property on the roadways." Id. We cited a number of regulations related to requiring a valid license, obeying the speed limits, and mandating the use of personal restraint systems as examples of laws that do not raise concerns "substantially different or heightened from the general public policy behind the driving laws, [and] they are properly analyzed as part of the broad conduct of driving." Id. at 730-31. Laws requiring proof of insurance are more closely related to economic reparations than safety, but we saw no need to distinguish them from the general public policy relating to the safety of persons and property on the roadways, so these laws were also properly analyzed as part of the broad conduct of driving. See id. In contrast, we then cited traffic laws "which might raise substantially different or heightened public policy concerns" - laws prohibiting drinking and driving, and reckless or careless driving. Id.
We concluded in Stone that under the Cabazon test the broad conduct of driving is the proper focus and held that "driving is generally permitted, subject to regulation." Id. As a consequence, we held that each of the following regulations were civil/regulatory and the state therefore had no jurisdiction under Public Law 280 to enforce them against members of the White Earth Band of Chippewa for conduct occurring within the boundaries of their reservation:
1. Failure to provide motor vehicle insurance (Minn.Stat. § 169.797 (1996));
2. No proof of insurance (Minn.Stat. § 169.791 (1996));-
3. Driving with an expired registration (Minn.Stat. § 168.09 (1996));
4. Driving without a license (Minn.Stat. § 171.02 (1996));
5. Driving with an expired driver's license (Minn.Stat. § 171.27 (1996));
6. Speeding (Minn.Stat. § 169.14 (1996));
7. Driving with no seat belt (Minn.Stat. § 169.686 (1996)); and
8. Failure to have child in a child restraint seat (Minn.Stat. § 19.685, subd. 5 (1996)).
Stone, 572 N.W.2d at 728, 732.
I.
Our holding in Stone that failure to produce proof of insurance in violation of Minn.Stat. § 169.791 is civil/regulatory is conclusive as to the charge against Johnson for violating Minn.Stat. § 169.791 and the charge should have been dismissed. We so order. The charge against Fineday for violating the same law should also be dismissed upon proof that he is an enrolled member of the Minnesota Chippewa Tribe, Leech Lake Band, and that his alleged violation occurred within the boundaries of the Leech Lake Reservation. We therefore remand to the district court to make these factual determinations and to dispose of the matter in accordance with the findings and this court's ruling.
II.
We next consider whether driving after revocation in violation of Minn.Stat. § 171.24, subd. 2, is criminal/prohibitory or civil/regulatory.
A fundamental difference between the offense of driving after revocation and other traffic offenses is that driving after revocation is a subsequent violation committed only after a driver's license has been revoked' because of a prior offense. See Minn.Stat. § 171.24, subd. 2. Obviously the prior offense carries its own sanction based upon the severity of the conduct. As each offense is triggered by different and unrelated conduct, the issue might then arise whether fairness should dictate that the nature of the subsequent offense, for purposes of the Stone analysis, not be measured by the nature of the prior offense, because if it were the offender could be subject to being sanctioned twice for the prior offense. Further, it is significant here that in Stone we held that driving without a valid license does not raise policy concerns substantially different from the general policy of public safety and therefore the violation is civil/regulatory. We would hardly be consistent to now conclude that even though a tribal member is not required to have a driver's license at all while driving on a tribal reservation, driving after revocation of a license should be an offense that rises to the level of a "heightened public policy" concern. Stone, 572 N.W.2d at 730.
Appellants' concern that it will be difficult or impossible for law enforcement to determine at the scene of the traffic stop whether or not the state has jurisdiction over the alleged offense is misplaced. The simple answer is that a determination of jurisdiction need not be made at that time. The rule governing a challenge to jurisdiction of the court in misdemeanor cases states that "[a] motion to dismiss for want of personal jurisdiction shall not be made until after a complaint is filed Minn. R.Crim. P. 10.02 (emphasis added).
We reaffirm our holding in Stone that failure to produce proof of insurance in violation of Minn.Stat. § 169.791 is a civil/regulatory traffic violation over which the state had no jurisdiction when committed by tribal members on tribal land. We further hold that driving after revocation in violation of Minn.Stat. § 171.24, subd. 2, is also a civil/regulatory traffic violation as to which the court has no jurisdiction when committed by tribal members on tribal land.
Affirmed.
. The record does not reveal the basis for this assertion before the trial court. On appeal, Fineday argues that he is an enrolled member of the Minnesota Chippewa Tribe, Leech Lake Band, and that the alleged offense occurred within the boundaries of the Leech Lake Reservation.
. The dissent bases its disagreement with our opinion on a misperception of the offense of driving after revocation - that it evidences dangerous and noncompliant conduct, and "actively threatens physical harm to persons or property." Such a conclusion is no more warranted for driving after revocation than it would be for any of the eight offenses we held in Stone to be civil regulatory, and may in fact be less warranted than speeding, for example, where the conduct itself might have real and present implications of public endangerment.
. The state asserts that even if Minnesota was not granted jurisdiction over the offenses charged under Public Law 280, the state may enforce its motor vehicle laws under Caba-zon's preemption analysis because the state's interest exceeds that of the federal and tribal governments. See Cabazon, 480 U.S. at 215, 107 S.Ct. 1083 (commenting that under "exceptional circumstances" states may assert jurisdiction over the conduct of tribal members on tribal land) (quoting New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 331-32, 103 S.Ct. 2378, 76 L.Ed.2d 611 (1983)). We rejected this argument in Stone and need not repeat our analysis here. Stone, 572 N.W.2d at 731-32.