Case Name: Donald REAM and Curtis Ream, Appellants, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1984-05-09
Citations: 449 So. 2d 960
Docket Number: No. 83-1477
Parties: Donald REAM and Curtis Ream, Appellants, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: ANSTEAD, C.J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 449
Pages: 960–963

Head Matter:
Donald REAM and Curtis Ream, Appellants, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. 83-1477.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
May 9, 1984.
Bernard Berman, Fort Lauderdale, for appellants.
Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Max Rudmann, Asst. Atty. Gen., West Palm Beach, for appellee.

Opinion:
DOWNEY, Judge.
This is an appeal by codefendants from an order denying their Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 motions for post conviction relief after an evidentiary hearing. In their motions for post conviction relief defendants contended that their lawyers (one succeeded the other) advised them he had obtained a plea bargain or agreement for them to plead guilty to the charges, abandon any claim to an airplane and truck involved in the criminal episode, cooperate with law enforcement by informing on other persons involved in drug trafficking, in return for three years' probation. This cause is here for the second time after a remand to permit the defendants, in view of the cloudy record, to present evidence to support their motions. Ream v. State, 426 So.2d 1310 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983).
The cloudy record referred to in our earlier opinion showed that the State charged defendants, who are brothers, with trafficking in marijuana. Pleas of guilty were entered sometime prior to March 3, 1982. On March 8, 1982, defendants appeared for sentencing, part of which was done in camera. The court sealed the transcript of that hearing to protect the defendants and ordered it unsealed for inclusion in the present record on appeal. At that hearing a customs official outlined for the court how the defendants had cooperated with the authorities by informing on various persons involved in illegal drug traffic leading to various arrests. Thereafter, defense counsel urged probation because of the defendants' cooperation. The prosecutor then said he wanted, in the presence of the defendants, to go over what his understanding of the agreement was. He said he had received cooperation, but not as much as he had hoped, and that the State could not openly recommend probation. The State would not oppose probation if the court felt it should be given and that the State was willing to go along with probation. The court announced it was convinced there was cooperation. It then said it would sentence the defendants in open eourt, and that because of their cooperation and the information gleaned from the PSI, it was going to cut their sentences to half what it would otherwise have been. After the in camera session, appellants were each sentenced in open court to three years in prison and a $10,000 fine.
At the evidentiary hearing held on remand both defendants testified that both of their lawyers had advised them to accept the State's offer of three years' probation in return for entry of guilty pleas, abandonment of an airplane and truck, and cooperation with law enforcement. At this evidentiary hearing the State offered no evidence whatsoever. Nonetheless, the trial court denied the motion, and this appeal ensued.
We are unable to determine any basis upon which the motion could be denied. The only testimony before the trial court on this motion was appellants'. They say they pleaded guilty because they were assured by both their lawyers that an agreement had been reached with the State for three years' probation on the conditions referred to above. There is no contradicting testimony. Nor does the record contain any other evidence to contradict that contention. A guilty plea induced by a promise of defense counsel that is not kept is involuntary. Cooley v. State, 245 So.2d 679 (Fla. 4th DCA 1971).
We note in passing that the colloquy between the judge and appellants when their plea was taken is inadequate to meet the requirements for determination of vol-untariness. Such inadequacy is not enough to permit withdrawal of the defendants' guilty pleas had the State proved the volun-tariness and intelligence of the pleas. See, e.g., United States v. Pricepaul, 540 F.2d 417 (9th Cir.1976); Sena v. Romero, 617 F.2d 579 (10th Cir.1980). Thus, because of the inadequate interrogation at the plea hearing the burden was on the State at the Rule 3.850 evidentiary hearing to show the nature of that agreement if it differed from appellants' version!
In view of the foregoing, we reverse the order appealed from and remand the cause with directions to vacate the judgment and sentence and allow appellants to withdraw their pleas. Cf. Rimanich v. United States, 357 F.2d 537 (5th Cir.1966).
REVERSED AND REMANDED, with directions.
ANSTEAD, C.J., concurs.
GLICKSTEIN, J., concurs specially with opinion.