Case Name: BILL EDWARDS v. LOUISE G. JOHNSON
Court: Supreme Court of North Carolina
Jurisdiction: North Carolina
Decision Date: 1967-01-20
Citations: 269 N.C. 30
Docket Number: 
Parties: BILL EDWARDS v. LOUISE G. JOHNSON.
Judges: 
Reporter: North Carolina Reports
Volume: 269
Pages: 30–45

Head Matter:
BILL EDWARDS v. LOUISE G. JOHNSON.
(Filed 20 January, 1967.)
1. Trial § 31—
On motion for involuntary nonsuit, the evidence must be taken most strongly against defendant.
2. Assault and Battery § 8—
While a person is entitled to defend his home against forcible entry by an intruder, he may not shoot even a trespasser until the trespasser attempts to force an entry in a manner sufficient to lead a reasonably prudent person to believe that the trespasser intends;' to commit a felony or to inflict some serious injury.
3. Weapons and Firearms § 2; Negligence § 4—
A firearm is a dangerous instrumentality, and a person handling a firearm is required to exercise care commensurate with the dangerous character of the article.
4. Same; Negligence § 5—
When a firearm is discharged and inflicts injury while in the possession and control of a person, there is a presumption that the firing is intentional or the result of carelessness or inadvertence on the part of such person, which presumption is sufficient to take the issue of negligence to the jury in the absence of evidence in explanation.
5. Weapons and Firearms § 2— Evidence held for jury upon issue of negligence in accidental discharge of gun, and not to show contributory negligence as a matter of law on part of victim.
The evidence tended to show that plaintiff customarily visited the home of defendant and her husband at nighttime in the transaction of business and on such occasions went to the back door, that on the morning of the occasion in suit he had telephoned that he would stop by when he was in the vicinity, that on the occasion in suit he knew the husband was not home and that defendant was uneasy on such occasions, that he stopped by defendant's home at 9:30 at night and knocked on the back door, that defendant came to the door carrying a loaded and cocked shotgun with her right hand and arm, turned on the porch light, and as she was pushing back the curtain from the door, the barrel of the gun hit the door and the gun fired, injuring plaintiff seriously and permanently. The evidence further tended to show that on a previous occasion plaintiff had seen the gun on the kitchen table when he had knocked at the back door, that the gun belonged to defendant and that she knew how to load it and was accustomed to handling it. Held: The evidence is sufficient to be submitted to the jury on the issue of defendant’s negligence and not to show contributory negligence as a matter of law on the part of plaintiff.
Lake, J., dissenting.
Parker, O.J., joining in the dissent in part.
Branch, J., joins in the dissent of Parker, O.J.
Appeal by plaintiff from HastyS.J., July Civil Session of Foe-syth.
Plaintiff sues for personal injuries sustained on September 28, 1964, when defendant accidentally discharged a shotgun. Plaintiff’s evidence tends to show:
Plaintiff, a loan officer for an industrial bank in Winston-Salem, moonlights as a general insurance salesman. Defendant, Mrs. Louise G. Johnson, lives with her husband and three small children about 6 miles from the center of Winston-Salem and about three-quarters of a mile inside the city limits. Since June 1962, plaintiff has handled the insurance business of defendant and her husband. All his transactions with them have been at their home, usually between 7:00 and 11:00 at night. Defendant had told him that it was not necessary to telephone before stopping by because they were usually up until 11:30 or 12:00 at night. In consequence, plaintiff did not do business with them on an appointment basis. On each occasion when he had visited the Johnson home, plaintiff had gone to the rear door.
On September 28, 1964, Mr. Johnson was in Florida on business, a fact which plaintiff knew. About 11:00 a.m. on that day, defendant called plaintiff with reference to some complications which had arisen in connection with the insurance and loan on the automobile she and her husband had purchased a few weeks earlier. Plaintiff told her he would stop by her home the next time he was in the neighborhood. As a result of that conversation in the morning, plaintiff went to the Johnson home that night about 9:30. He parked his car in the Y-shaped parking area to the left of the driveway about 20 feet from the kitchen window and proceeded to the rear entrance of the house, which was just in front of his automobile to the left. The only light he could see was one in the kitchen. He found the door to the screened back porch standing wide open. A light shone through the curtains over the door between the kitchen and the porch. Plaintiff knocked on the door, waited 20-30 seconds and knocked again before he heard footsteps coming to the door. Then there was a loud explosion and he felt pain. A discharge from a shotgun had fractured his right leg, damaged the nerves, and injured the soft tissues. Defendant cracked the door and screamed when she saw plaintiff. He told her that she had shot him and asked her to call an ambulance. At his request, she procured a cloth, which they applied as a tourniquet while waiting for the ambulance. Defendant remained in the hospital for a month. He was first in a cast, then in a brace for about a year, and it was not until May 1965 that he was able to return to work. He has a permanent, partial injury to his leg.
Plaintiff’s version of defendant’s explanation to him of the shooting was: “She told me that she knew nothing about them (firearms). . . . She told me that she heard a noise. When I knocked, she picked up the gun, loaded it, pulled the hammer back and went to the door. She said as she was reaching to turn on the light switch, the gun went off.” Defendant told plaintiff that the accident was her fault.
On prior occasions, plaintiff had seen the gun, a single barrel 16 gauge shotgun, in Mrs. Johnson’s possession. One night about three weeks earlier when he had stopped by between 9:45 and 10:00, defendant came to the back door, turned on the light, pulled back the curtain, and then opened the door for him. When he walked in, he saw the gun on the kitchen table. Defendant told him she kept the gun for her protection.
Defendant gave the following explanation to L. C. Masencup, the police officer who investigated the shooting immediately after it occurred:
“[S]he (defendant) stated that she was getting ready for bed. . . . when she heard some dogs barking in the back yard and heard someone on her back porch or something on her back porch. She said she took her 16 gauge shotgun and loaded it and went to the back door and turned on the back porch light and saw a shadow on the back porch. She stated as she reached to push the curtains back from the back door — with the 16 gauge shotgun holding it in her hand and under her arm — and as she reached for the curtain, that the gun hit the door and went off. She said she was holding the gun in her right hand. She told and described to us how she had the gun in her arm — down at an angle. I don’t recall her showing us whether she had her hand on the trigger. I asked if the gun was cocked at the time, and she said she could not remember — she didn’t remember cocking the shotgun. . . . She had contacted him on this date requesting that she see him in regard to a loan and some insurance. . . . She was not expecting him this late at night. She said after she saw who it was, she said she didn’t have any intention of shooting him. She stated at that time that there had been some prowlers in the neighborhood, and this was the reason she got the gun, and she looked nervous and upset. She said that she did not do it intentionally, and said she had known him for quite sometime.”
Defendant also told the officer that the gun belonged to her and not to her husband. Masencup found a small amount of white paint on the end of the barrel where it apparently had hit the door.
Defendant’s motion for judgment of nonsuit made at the conclusion of plaintiff’s evidence was denied. Defendant, without offering any evidence, rested and renewed her motion. At the conclusion of all the evidence, the motion was allowed. From a judgment dismissing the action, plaintiff appeals.
White, Crumpler, Powell and Pfefferkorn for plaintiff appellant.
Hudson, Ferrell, Petree, Stockton, Stockton <fc Robinson by R. M. Stockton, Jr. and J. Robert Elster for defendant appellee.

Opinion:
Sharp, J.
Plaintiff alleges that the injuries for which he seeks compensation were caused by the negligent manner in which defendant handled a loaded shotgun. Defendant denies negligence and pleads contributory negligence.
In evaluating a motion for nonsuit, the evidence must be considered in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, who is entitled to every reasonable inference therefrom. "The rule is sometimes stated conversely, with perhaps more pointed significance. Upon demurrer, the evidence must be taken most strongly against the defendant." Fox v. Army Store, 215 N.C. 187, 190, 1 S.E. 2d 550, 551.
Plaintiff's evidence is sufficient to justify the jury in making these findings: Plaintiff handled all insurance matters for defendant and her husband, transacting business with them at night at their home. He always came to the back door, and defendant had told him it was not necessary to telephone before coming. On the morning of September 28, 1964, defendant had telephoned plaintiff about an insurance problem, and he had agreed to stop by when he was in the vicinity. As a result of her call, plaintiff went to defendant's home that night at 9:30 — as usual, without first telephoning. Plaintiff knew defendant's husband was away and that she was uneasy when she was alone in the house. When plaintiff knocked at the kitchen door, according to his custom, defendant came to the door carrying a loaded and cocked shotgun with her right hand and arm. She turned on the back porch light and, as she was pushing back the curtains from the door, the barrel of the gun hit the door and went off, injuring plaintiff seriously and permanently. Although she told plaintiff she knew nothing about firearms, defendant was not unfamiliar with the shotgun. It belonged to her individually. She knew how to load it; she had loaded it when she heard plaintiff's knock at the door. With the hammer down, the gun would not fire; it had to be cocked first. Defendant was accustomed to handling the gun. She had told plaintiff that she kept it for her protection. He had seen it in her possession on prior occasions. Three weeks earlier, he had seen it on the kitchen table when he had knocked at the back door between 9:45 and 10:00 p.m. On that occasion, defendant had turned on the porch light, pulled back the curtain, and had then opened the door for him.
Upon this evidence, defendant contends that she is equally entitled to a judgment of nonsuit on the grounds (1) that the evidence fails to disclose any negligence on her part and (2) that it affirmatively discloses plaintiff's contributory negligence. Defendant argues in her brief that she, "as most women under similar circumstances would be, was frightened and uneasy when at home alone at night in a neighborhood troubled with prowlers"; that plaintiff knew she kept a shotgun for her protection and that her husband was away; and that plaintiff's conduct "in prowling around the back of the defendant's home in the middle of the night . . . and making noises at the kitchen door without any forewarning . . . constituted an emergency situation" which made defendant's response thereto foreseeable; reasonable, and prudent. She further asserts that "fundamental in our law is the sanctity of one's home and the right to protect it."
The right to defend one's home against forcible entry by an intruder is well settled in this State. A householder, however, may not intentionally shoot even a trespasser until he attempts to force an entry in a manner sufficient to lead a reasonably prudent person to believe that he intended to commit a felony or to inflict some serious personal injury upon the occupants of the house. State v. Miller, 267 N.C. 409, 148 S.E. 2d 279. In other words, one may not shoot first and investigate later. "There must be actual or apparent necessity to shoot; otherwise, shooting at a human being is unlawful." State v. Phillips, 262 N.C. 723, 726, 138 S.E. 2d 626, 628.
The evidence in this case does not invoke the right of a householder to defend his habitation for the reason that defendant did not intentionally shoot to repel an invasion of her home or an assault upon her person. She discharged the gun accidentally. Even if this had not been the case, however, she would not have been justified in shooting intentionally, for the person at the door had neither threatened nor attempted any violence. Until he had done so, she was not entitled to assume the worst — certainly not before she had inquired, "Who's there?" Under the circumstances disclosed here, this simple inquiry usually would have been the first act of the average woman of ordinary firmness. Had defendant merely inquired who was at the door before she cocked the gun (an operation performed by the thumb in one second), and before she had turned on the porch light and at tempted to pull back the curtain, this tragedy would have been averted.
In appraising both plaintiff's and defendant's actions, it must be remembered that this was not the first time plaintiff had come to defendant's back door at night, albeit her husband usually had been at home when he came. Plaintiff always did business with defendant and her husband in their home, usually at night and sometimes as late as 11:00. Furthermore, plaintiff always came to the back door — presumably because of the design of the driveway and parking area. On previous occasions, defendant had told him that it was not necessary-to telephone before coming. In addition, she had called plaintiff that very day about an insurance matter, and he had told her that he would come by the first time he was in the vL cinity. When the knock came that night at 9:30, she might reasonably have anticipated that it was plaintiff. It might also have been a neighbor, a visiting relative or friend, the paper boy collecting, or a distressed motorist seeking a telephone. It might have been any one of a number of persons on a lawful mission. The unknown person outside could, of course, have been a marauder, but until he had made some threat or attempt at a forcible entry, she was not justified in convicting him, nor was she relieved of her duty to exercise the utmost care to prevent the unintentional discharge of the gun.
It is settled law with us that the highest degree of care is exacted of those handling firearms. "The utmost caution must be used in their care and custody, to the end that harm may not come to others from coming in contact with them. The degree of care must be commensurate with the dangerous character of the article." Brittingham v. Stadiem, 151 N.C. 299, 302, 66 S.E. 128, 130. See Belk v. Boyce, 263 N.C. 24, 138 S.E. 2d 789. "The same degree of care is, no doubt, expressed by saying that the care which persons using firearms are bound to take in order to avoid injury to others is a care proportionate to the probability of injuries to others. . . ." 56 Am. Jur., Weapons and Firearms § 23 (1947). One who handles a loaded gun is charged with the knowledge that it is a dangerous instrumentality which, if accidentally discharged, might cause injury to others. Naegele v. Dollen, 158 Neb. 373, 63 N.W. 2d 165, 42 A.L.R. 2d 1099. If one is injured from the discharge of firearms negligently used or handled by another, the person causing the injury is civilly liable even though the discharge was not intended. Skinner v. Ochiltree, 148 Fla. 705, 5 So. 2d 605, 140 A.L.R. 410.
"Any loaded firearm . is a highly dangerous instrumentality and, since its possession or use is attended by extraordinary danger, any person having it in his possession or using it is bound to exercise extraordinary care. A person handling or carrying a loaded firearm in the immediate vicinity of others is liable for its discharge, even though the discharge is accidental and unintentional, provided it is not unavoidable." Kuhns v. Brugger, 390 Pa. 331, 338, 135 A. 2d 395, 400, 68 A.L.R. 2d 761, 769.
As the Illinois court pointed out in Atchison v. Dullam, 16 Ill. App. 42, 46 (1884), "Firearms are not usually discharged without the intervention of some human agency. A presumption, therefore . . . is raised that when such weapons are discharged'while in the possession and control of another, the firing is caused either by design, carelessness, or inadvertence upon his part." The opinion in Atchison quotes from Tally v. Ayres, 35 Tenn. 677, a case in which plaintiff's horse was killed when a gun discharged as defendant placed it upon his shoulder:
"[T]he very fact that the gun 'went off', under the circumstances detailed in the proof, implies, of necessity, some inadvertent act, or want of proper caution on the part of the defendant. The lock must either have been defective, or some agency must have been exerted, unintentionally and perhaps unconsciously, by the defendant, otherwise the discharge of the gun could not have happened." Id. at 681.
Certainly, we cannot say, as a matter of law, that an ordinary knock at the door at 9:30 p.m., without more, is calculated to create in a woman, situated as defendant, such a reasonable apprehension of serious and immediate danger that she might be expected to forget all the safety rules for handling a loaded gun, and that she may not, therefore, be held responsible if she permits the gun to discharge as she peers through the curtains to ascertain the identity of her caller. On the contrary, in the absence of any evidence of a mechanical defect in the gun, we think the fact that it did discharge under these circumstances is sufficient evidence to take the case to the jury on the issue of defendant's negligence. She had the sole control and custody of the weapon; no other person was present; no superior agency or outside force intervened. There is no suggestion in the pleadings or evidence that the gun was defective in any way. See Crump v. Browning, 110 A. 2d 695 (D. C. Munic. Ct. App.), 46 A.L.R. 2d 1212; Annot. Bes Ipsa Loquitur-Firearms, 46 A.L.R. 2d 1216; 94 C.J.S., Weapons § 29(d) (1956); 56 Am. Jur., Weapons and Firearms § 22 (Cum. Supp. 1966); 3 Strong, N. C. Index, Negligence § 5 (1960). For the reasons implicit in the preceding dis cussion, it likewise cannot be said that plaintiff's evidence discloses his contributory negligence as a matter of law.
The nonsuit was improvidently granted, and the judgment dismissing the action is
Reversed.