Case Name: PEOPLE v. WATKINS
Court: Michigan Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1971-10-19
Citations: 36 Mich. App. 380
Docket Number: Docket No. 9650
Parties: PEOPLE v. WATKINS
Judges: Before: R. B. Burns, P. J., and Holbrook and Levin, JJ.
Reporter: Michigan appeals reports; cases decided in the Michigan Court of Appeals.
Volume: 36
Pages: 380–399

Head Matter:
PEOPLE v. WATKINS
Opinion of the Court
1. Homicide — First-Degree Murder — Deliberation—Premeditation —Time.
Murder in the first degree is a killing of another which is deliberate and premeditated, but the length of time before the act when the purpose to kill another was deliberately formed and the act premeditated is unimportant; it is enough that the purpose was deliberately formed and preceded and induced the act (MCLA § 750.316).
2. Homicide — First-Degree Murder — Deliberation—Premeditation —Evidence—Inferences.
Deliberation and premeditation, elements of the crime of first-degree murder, can be proved by inference from evidence showing the character of the weapon used, the wound inflicted, and the circumstances surrounding the killing (MCLA § 750-.316).
3. Homicide — First-Degree Murder — Evidence—Sufficiency.
The appellate court, in determining whether there was sufficient evidence presented at trial to warrant an instruction to the jury on first-degree murder, must take the state’s evidence as true and view it in the light most favorable to the state giving the prosecution the benefit of every reasonable inference to be drawn from its evidence (MCLA § 750.316).
4. Homicide — First-Degree Murder — Evidence—Sufficiency.
The evidence produced by the prosecution, viewed in the light most favorable to it, was sufficient to warrant submission to the jury of the issue of first-degree murder where the two witnesses upon whose testimony the ease was submitted stated that there was no evidence of animosity between the defendant and the victim, and that after the witnesses had retired to an adjoining bedroom and while they were engaged in an act of sexual intercourse, the defendant came into the bedroom and told them to get the victim before he killed him, left the bedroom, and then, a short time later came back and reported that the victim had been cut, and where the record shows that the defendant had stabbed the victim with a butcher knife (MCLA § 750.316).
References for Points in Headnotes
[1, 2, 6, 7] 40 Am Jur 2d, Homicide § 52.
[3, 4] 40 Am Jur 2d, Homicide § 425 et seq.
[5] 40 Am Jur 2d, Homicide § 44.
[8-10] 40 Am Jur 2d, Homicide § 265 et seq.
[11] 53 Am Jur, Trial § 1033.
Dissent by Levin, J.
5. Homicide — Hirst-Degree Murder — Statutes—Common-Law Offense.
First-degree murder is a statutory offense, the common-law offense of murder with the added element that the murder is “willful, deliberate, and premeditated” (MCLA § 7BO.316).
6. Homicide — Hirst-Degree Murder — Deliberation.
What is done on sudden impulse or hastily is not done deliberately within the meaning of the statute defining first-degree murder (MCLA § 750.316).
7. Homicide — Hirst-Degree Murder — Deliberation—Premeditation —Evidence.
Evidence that a homicide occurred during an affray whose nature would not permit cool and orderly reflection is insufficient to warrant submission to the jury of the issue of first-degree murder since it would not support a finding that there was deliberation and premeditation (MCLA § 750.316).
8. Homicide — Hirst-Degree Murder — Premeditation—Evidence— Sufficiency — Deadly Weapon.
The use of a deadly weapon m a homicide is not alone sufficient evidence of premeditation to warrant submission to the jury the issue of first-degree murder (MCLA § 750.316).
9. .Homicide — Hirst-Degree Murder — Premeditation—Evidence— Sufficiency.
Evidence that a homicide was committed with a deadly weapon is insufficient to establish the element of premeditation necessary to submit to the jury the issue of first-degree murder where there is no evidence of other circumstances showing motive or plan which would malee reasonable the inference that the use of the deadly weapon was not a spur-of-the-moment decision, but rather that it was acquired or positioned with the thought beforehand of using it to kill the victim (MOLA § 7BO.316).
10. Homicide — First-Decree Murder — Evidence—Sufficiency.
The evidence produced by the prosecution, viewed in the light most favorable to it, was insufficient to warrant submission to the jury of the issue of first-degree murder where the two witnesses upon whose testimony the case was submitted stated that there had been no evidence of animosity between the defendant and his victim but that after the witnesses had retired to an adjoining bedroom and while they were engaged in an act of sexual intercourse the defendant came into the bedroom and told them that they had better get the victim before he killed him, left the bedroom, and then seconds later came back and reported that the victim had been out, nothing in the record would support a finding that the defendant had deliberated and reflected in a cool state of blood upon a decision to kill the victim even though the evidence showed that he stabbed the victim with a butcher knife, and the first statement he made to the witnesses does not evidence an intention both premeditated and deliberated upon, to kill the victim, but rather a desire to prevent the killing (MOLA § 750-.316).
11. New Trial — -Homicide—Murder—Instructions to Jury — Compromise Verdict — Evidence.
Defendant's conviction of second-degree murder should be reversed and he should be entitled to a new trial where he was charged with first-degree murder and the jury was instructed on that charge but returned a verdict of guilty of second-degree murder and where the evidence submitted by the prosecution would not support a finding of deliberation and premeditation, thus making the instruction on first-degree murder unwarranted and the possibility of a compromise verdict nonexcludable (MCLA §§ 750.316, 750.317).
Appeal from Muskegon, Charles A. Larnard, J.
Submitted Division 3 May 4, 1971, at Grand Rapids.
(Docket No. 9650.)
Decided October 19, 1971.
Leave to appeal granted, 386 Mich 782.
DeShorn Watkins was convicted of second-degree mnrder. Defendant appeals.
Affirmed.
Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Robert A. Derengoski, Solicitor General, Paul M. Ladas, Prosecuting Attorney, and Lawrence R. Rackofen, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for the people.
Carl S. Krueger, for defendant on appeal.
Before: R. B. Burns, P. J., and Holbrook and Levin, JJ.

Opinion:
Holbrook, J.
In a trial before a jury defendant DeShorn Watkins was tried for the crime of first-degree murder and convicted of second-deg'ree murder. He was sentenced to prison for a term of from 10 to 15 years. He states one issue on appeal as follows:
Did the trial court err in failing to grant a motion to dismiss the charge of first-degree murder and later in instructing the jury on the offense of first-degree murder in view of the evidence in this case?
On the evening of December 31, 1969, defendant and Crawford Crowell had attended a social gathering in Muskegon Heights with two or three other persons, including Dora Kirks.
There had been some drinking of beer by the men. Earlier defendant and Crowell had been drinking wine at Crawford Crowell's house. Sometime after 11 p.m. defendant left with Crawford Crowell and Dora Kirks to go to defendant's apartment. On the way they met Larry Kirk, the deceased, and Arnold Penn who were invited to accompany them to defendant's apartment. After arriving at defendant's apartment they entertained themselves by talking and listening to some records. The men engaged in drinking beer and whiskey and Dora Kirks had one beer. For a period of time defendant was demonstrating karate to Larry Kirk. Arnold Penn fell asleep in a chair in the living room. Then defendant and Kirk went to the bathroom and they were apparently in a jovial mood. Shortly before they returned to the living room, Crawford Crowell and Dora Kirks retired to the bedroom. She testified the door was left slightly ajar and he testified he closed it. They engaged in an act of sexual intercourse. After a short time, according to Dora Kirks, the defendant came and opened the bedroom door and said "you better come and get this mother before I kill him".
Both Dora Kirks and Crawford Crowell testified that at this time their act of intercourse was not completed. Later defendant came back again and said he had cut him or something. At that time Crowell got up and dressed and went out into the living room where he observed that the deceased had been cut with a knife. It was established that the weapon (knife) had been out in the kitchen. Dora Kirks, at the sight of blood, said she felt faint and she was told she could leave and she left.
Dora Kirks and Crawford Crowell testified that they did not notice any animosity between defendant and the deceased during the course of the night except for the two times when defendant came to the bedroom and made the remarks stated.
That night before the police arrived, defendant told Crowell that a guy came into the apartment and got into it with Kirks and cut him and then ran out.
In 3 Gillespie, Michigan Criminal Law & Procedure (2d ed), First-Degree Murder, § 1638, p 1972, the author states:
"To constitute murder in the first degree the killing must have been deliberate and premeditated, but the length of time before the act when this purpose was deliberately formed and the act premeditated is unimportant. It is enough that the purpose was deliberately formed, and preceded and induced the act."
In the case of People v. Lem Dumas (1970), 25 Mich App 173, 174, our Court stated:
"Defendant contends that there was no direct evidence produced at trial to sustain a verdict of either first- or second-degree murder. We disagree.
"Deliberation and premeditation, which would have been necessary to prove first-degree murder, could have been inferred from the character of the weapon used, the wound inflicted, and the circumstances surrounding the killing. People v. Bauman (1952), 332 Mich 198, 205; People v. Wolf (1895), 95 Mich 625, 629. Since there was ample evidence for the jury to find murder in the first or second degree, it was properly a jury question; thus, there was no reversible error in allowing the question to go to the jury."
' In determining whether or not there was sufficient evidence present in the case to submit to the jury an instruction on first-degree murder, we follow the rule set forth in the case of People v. Livermore (1967), 9 Mich App 47, 59:
"In passing on the motion for dismissal or nonsuit, the State's evidence must be taken as true, and viewed in the light most favorable to the State, which is entitled to the benefit of every reasonable inference to be drawn therefrom."
Dora Kirks testified in part as follows:
"Q. Am I correct in understanding that DeShorn Watkins came into the bedroom at the time he said this?
"A. Yes, he came in and said that and left.
"Q. He opened the door, and he came into the room and said that?
"A. Yes.
"Q. All right. Now, were you still in the act of having intercourse at this particular time?
"A. When he first came in?
"Q. When he came in and uttered those words, were you in the process of and in the act of having intercourse at this time ?
"A. Yes, sir.
"Q. Now, was this the first time you had ever had intercourse with Crawford Crowell?
"A. Yes.
"Q. What is your answer?
"A. Yes.
"Q. Now, he immediately left out of the room again, is that right?
"A. DeShorn?
"Q. Yes.
"A. He came hack in and he left out again.
"Q. Now, how long was he in the room?
"A. He just came in and told him that, and then he left back out.
"Q. Long enough to make one statement?
"A. Yes, and then he came back in and said he had cut him, and went back out.
"Q. Now, he came in the room and he made one statement, and immediately left the room?
"A. Yes.
"Q. Now, did he immediately come back into the room again?
"A. He stayed in there for awhile, and then he came back and he told Crawford that he had cut him, and then Crawford—
"Q. Now, just answer my questions, if you will, please. He went out of the room?
"A. Yes.
"Q. And how long before he came back in again?
"A. It wasn't that long.
"Q. How long was it?
"A. Jnst a few minutes. He just went back out and he came back in again."
She later testified that it was seconds between the first time and the second time that defendant came to the bedroom. She also testified as follows:
"Q. All right. And was there any other conversation besides DeShorn telling Crawford Crowell to get an ambulance for Larry Kirk?
"A. Then I said that I had to go before I faint, and he told me that I could go, because I didn't see nothing, and I didn't hear nothing, and then Watkins told Crawford that he was going to prison.
"Q. And that is all you heard is a conversation between these boys to that extent?
"A. Yes."
Crawford Crowell testified in part as follows:
"Q. After you went in the bedroom, was the door closed or was it left open?
"A. I closed the door myself.
"Q. Do you know if it was tight or fastened tight?
"A. I closed the door all the way. But I couldn't say whether it came out a little bit after that.
"Q. You don't know if it was latched?
"A. It was not enough crack for you to see in or out.
"Q. All right. And how long were you in the bedroom?
"A. About 15 or 20 minutes.
"Q. And what were you doing in the bedroom?
"A. Well, having intercourse.
"Q. Now, could you hear anything that was going on out in the living room during this time?
"A. Well, you could hear some talking, but you didn't know or couldn't say what they were saying. They were talking.
"Q. Did anyone come into the bedroom before yon left the bedroom on this morning?
"A. Yes.
"Q. And who was it?
"A. DeShorn Watkins.
"Q. And yon had been in there how long when he came in?
"A. I would say about 15 minutes. It was a pretty good while, about 15 minutes.
"Q. Were you all through having intercourse at the time he came in?
"A. No."
Crowell's account of what happened when first interrogated and his testimony at trial were not the same, and he admitted he had changed his story.
At the trial the defendant testified, in essence, that he was out of the living room and when he returned to the living room Larry Kirk held a knife and when he was asked to put down the knife challenged De-Shorn Watkins to take it from him. That he, De-Shorn Watkins, then went to the kitchen and picked up a butcher knife and returned with the knife holding it extended toward Larry Kirk and stated, "Give me the knife", whereupon Larry Kirk lunged at DeShorn Watkins with the knife^n his hand held in a stabbing gesture and was speared upon the end of the blade held by the defendant.
We rule that the testimony produced at trial would justify a finding by the jury that defendant deliberately formed in his mind beforehand the intent to kill the deceased. As a result of this determination, we are constrained to rule, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the people, that the jury could also have determined that sufficient time had elapsed between the time defendant deliberately formed in his mind the intent to kill the deceased and the act of stabbing the deceased which caused Ms death, to justify a finding of premeditation.
Affirmed.
R. B. Burns, P. J., concurred.
MCLA § 750.316 (Stat Ann 1971 Cum Supp § 28.548).
MOLA § 750.317 (Stat Ann 1954 Rev § 28.549).