Case Name: Lucas v. Lacy
Court: Arkansas Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Arkansas
Decision Date: 1925-06-29
Citations: 169 Ark. 145
Docket Number: 
Parties: Lucas v. Lacy.
Judges: 
Reporter: Arkansas Reports
Volume: 169
Pages: 145–148

Head Matter:
Lucas v. Lacy.
Opinion delivered June 29, 1925.
Kincannon & Kinccmnon, for appellant.
Ewans é Evans, for appellee.

Opinion:
Haet, J.,
(after stating the facts). The widow filed her renunciation of the will within the time prescribed by statute, and the correctness of the judgment of the circuit court depends upon the construction to be given to the statute as applied to the facts of the case at bar.
See. 3540 of Crawford & Moses' Digest reads as follows: "If a widow, for whom provision has been made by will, elect to be endowed of the lands and personal property of which her husband died seized, she shall convey, by deed o,f release and quitclaim, to the heirs of such estate the land so to her devised, and bequeathed, which deed shall be acknowledged or proved and recorded as other deeds for real estate are required to be acknowledged or proved and recorded."
The record shows that Isaac J. Lucas died on the 14th day of January, 1922, and that Mrs. Lucas, his widow, executed the deed of release on the 20th day of April, 1923. The grantees in the deed of release and quitclaim are the heirs of .Isaac J. Lucas and the devisees under his last will and testament, who are specifically named as grantees.
The statute provides that the widow shall convey by deed of release and quitclaim to the heirs of her husband's estate. In the case at bar she not only conveyed to the heirs of her deceased husband, but also to such of her collateral heirs as were named as devisees in the will. This was not the renunciation of the will provided by statute. The object of the Legislature was to compel the widow to make her election to take her dower, instead of the provision made her under the will in lieu thereof, by some method which was plain and could not be misunderstood. The statute prescribes definitely the grantees in the deed, and it appears to have been enacted, not only for the purpose of fixing a definite manner of election, but to provide that the title of the real estate of the testator might be made a matter of record, to the end that those dealing with the property might be advised regarding the title. The will would be a matter of record when it was recorded, and in like manner, if the widow executes a deed of release and quitclaim as provided by the statute, it may be placed of record and thus a complete record of the title is provided for. It was not alone for the purpose of divesting the widow of any interest in the lands she might have under the will that the statute required renunciation, but for the sake of the heirs of the deceased, in order that they might be advised of her disposition .in the matter.
It will be presumed that the devisees under the will would be bound to receive notice in due course of the administration of the estate under the will. Be that as it may, the statute provides that the deed of release and quitclaim shall be executed to the heirs of the estate of her deceased husband, and, this being the mode of renunciation pointed out by the statute, the courts have no power to adopt a substitute. This is the effect of our previous construction of the statute. Pumphry v. Pumphry, 52 Ark. 193, and Cooley v. North, 130 Ark. 350.
The effect of our holding is that Mrs. it. A. E. Lucas, as widow of Isaac J. Lucas, deceased, is entitled to the use of all of her husband's property, both real and personal, during her natural life, in accordance with the principles of law laid down in Galloway v. Sewell, 162 Ark 627.
The result of our views is that the judgment of the circuit court must be affirmed.