Case Name: THE STATE v. SPENCE
Court: Court of Appeals of Georgia
Jurisdiction: Georgia
Decision Date: 1986-06-17
Citations: 179 Ga. App. 750
Docket Number: 72150
Parties: THE STATE v. SPENCE.
Judges: Birdsong, P. J., and Sognier, J., concur.
Reporter: Georgia Appeals Reports
Volume: 179
Pages: 750–754

Head Matter:
72150.
THE STATE v. SPENCE.
(347 SE2d 612)

Opinion:
Banke, Chief Judge.
At issue in this appeal is whether a criminal defendant can file a valid demand for trial, within the contemplation of OCGA § 17-7-170 (a), with respect to a traffic charge which has not yet been formally docketed or filed in any court.
The defendant in this case was arrested by a state patrolman on February 1, 1985, on charges of driving under the influence and violating the Georgia Controlled Substances Act. A separate "Uniform Traffic Citation, Summons, Accusation/Warning" was executed by the patrolman with respect to each offense. See generally OCGA § 40-13-1. The defendant was then transported to the DeKalb County Jail, where, upon being released on bond, he was given a notice purporting to have been issued by the Clerk of the State Court of DeKalb County directing him to appear in that court for arraignment on May 6, 1985. The uniform traffic citations were subsequently delivered to the Office of the DeKalb County Solicitor.
On March 28, 1985, the defendant filed with the Clerk of the State Court of DeKalb County a demand to be tried on the charges within the next subsequent term of court. It is undisputed that the language of this demand met the requirements of State v. Adamczyk, 162 Ga. App. 288 (290 SE2d 149) (1982), so as to invoke the automatic acquittal provisions of OCGA § 17-7-170 (a). However, at the time the demand was filed, the traffic citations had not yet been filed with the clerk's office but were still in the possession of the solicitor's office. The solicitor's office filed the citations a week later, on April 4, 1985, along with a formal accusation signed by the solicitor.
The State Court of DeKalb County has four annual terms, beginning in January, April, July, and October, respectively, of each year. The defendant filed his demand for trial during the January term, at a time when it is undisputed that there were qualified jurors impaneled before whom he could have been tried. The defendant was not placed on trial during that term or within the next subsequent term; and, consequently, on July 8, 1985, he successfully moved for discharge and acquittal pursuant to OCGA § 17-7-170. On appeal, the state contends that the defendant's demand for trial was invalid because it was filed before any accusation had been filed against him. Held:
OCGA § 17-7-170 provides as follows: "(a) Any person against whom a true bill of indictment or an accusation is found for an offense not affecting his life may enter a demand for trial at the court term at which the indictment or accusation is found or at the next succeeding regular court term thereafter; or, by special permission of the court, he may at any subsequent court term thereafter demand a trial. In either case, the demand for trial shall be placed upon the minutes of the court, (b) If the person is not tried when the demand is made or at the next succeeding regular court term thereafter, provided at both court terms there were juries impaneled and qualified to try him, he shall be absolutely discharged and acquitted of the offense charged in the indictment or accusation." (Emphasis supplied.)
In Mafia v. State, 174 Ga. App. 432 (1), 433 (330 SE2d 171) (1985), citing similar language appearing in Collins v. State, 154 Ga. App. 651 (1) (269 SE2d 509) (1980), this court stated that where a defendant is issued a Uniform Traffic Citation, "the citation itself contains the accusation, and an accusation subsequently filed by the solicitor's office is superfluous." This ruling is consistent with the language of OCGA § 40-13-3, which provides, in pertinent part, as follows: "Except for offenses tried in the superior courts, all other courts having jurisdiction of the offense shall proceed with the adjudication of the offenses contained within the [uniform traffic citation and complaint form] without the necessity of filing an indictment or other accusation in order to bring the accused to trial." (Emphasis supplied.) But see Roberts v. State, 171 Ga. App. 131 (1) (319 SE2d 42) (1984) (in which a contrary holding was set forth, without reference either to the above statute or to the existing authority of Collins v. State, supra).
In Mafia and Collins, supra, this court held that a defendant's right to file a demand for trial with respect to a charge for which he had been arrested and issued a uniform traffic citation commenced upon the return of the citation to recorder's court, even though the recorder's court did nothing more than transfer the case to state court for trial. These two cases would appear to stand for the general proposition that an accusation embodied in an existing uniform traffic citation is "found" within the meaning of OCGA § 17-7-170 (a) at the moment any court which is lawfully entitled to do so asserts its jurisdiction over the case.
Although in the present case no judge had taken any action on the charges against the defendant at the time he filed his demand for trial, we hold that the issuance by the clerk of the state court of the notice directing him to appear in that court on a specified date for arraignment constituted a sufficient exercise of jurisdiction over the case by that court to support the filing of the demand. Consequently, we hold that the trial court did not err in granting the motion for discharge and acquittal. To rule otherwise would be to enable a state court solicitor effectively to frustrate a defendant's rights pursuant to OCGA § 17-7-170 by the simple expedient of delaying, perhaps for many months, the filing of the uniform traffic citation with the clerk's office.
Judgment affirmed.
Birdsong, P. J., and Sognier, J., concur.