Case Name: HOWE v. SOMMERS et al.
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1897-11-30
Citations: 48 N.Y.S. 162
Docket Number: 
Parties: HOWE v. SOMMERS et al.
Judges: 
Reporter: West's New York Supplement
Volume: 48
Pages: 162–169

Head Matter:
(22 App. Div. 417.)
HOWE v. SOMMERS et al.
(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department.
November 30, 1897.)
1. Fraudulent Conveyance—Sufficiency of Evidence.
In an action by a creditor to set aside as fraudulent an assignment of a legacy by the debtor, the plaintiff is only required to establish the fraud by a fair preponderance of evidence.
2. Same.
Plaintiff brought an action against defendant S. to recover for legal services in establishing his claim to a legacy of $6,000. Defendant sought successive adjournments of the trial, on different excuses, and, when a verdict was rendered against him, secured a stay upon representations of his financial responsibility. He then immediately assigned the legacy, his only property, in-payment of an alleged indebtedness, to defendant B., a woman in whose house he had lived for many years. B. soon assigned the legacy to her sister, to pay a debt of some $900. On appeal from a judgment for plaintiff in an action to set side the assignment, held, that the judgment was warranted.
3. Appeal—Review.
In order that the appellate court may reverse a judgment entered on a decision at special term, it is not sufficient that it might have reached a different conclusion from the evidence, but it must be able to assert affirmatively, with reasonable certainty, that in its findings the trial court erred.
Goodrich, P. J., dissenting.
Appeal from special term.
Action by Charles G. Howe against Charles H. Sommers, Mary A. Berrian, and others. Prom a judgment in favor of plaintiff, Charles H. Sommers and Mary A. Berrian appeal.
Affirmed.
Argued before GOODRICH, P. J., and CULLEN, BARTLETT, HATCH, and BRADLEY, JJ.
John T. Canavan, for appellants.
James M. Hunt, for respondent.

Opinion:
CULLEN, J.
This is a judgment creditor's action, to set aside as fraudulent an assignment of a legacy. I concur with the Presiding Justice that the debtor, though insolvent, had the right to prefer one creditor to other creditors; that fraud is to be proved, not presumed; and that,"if the facts proved are as consistent with innocence as with guilt, the evidence is insufficient to establish the fraud. At the same time, fraud can rarely be proved except by circumstantial evidence; and, though the issue be fraud, still in a civil action it is not necessary that the charge should be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. It is sufficient that it is established by a fair preponderance of evidence. Also, we cannot treat the case as though it were before us in the first instance. To reverse the judgment, it is not sufficient that we might have reached a different conclusion from the evidence, but we must be able to assert affirmatively, with reasonable certainty, that in its findings the trial court erred. The learned special term found that the transfer was made by the judgment debtor with intent to defraud his creditors, and that there was grave doubt as to the existence of the consideration. We think the evidence is sufficient to support these conclusions, and for myself I may say that, were the case before me for original disposition, I should be inclined to reach the same conclusion.
The relation between the judgment debtor and Ms assignee was more than that of debtor and creditor. It appears to have been that of a most intimate personal friendship. On the trial of the action in the city court of Yonkers, brought by the plaintiff against the defendant Sommers, to recover Ms claim, the defendant Berrian appeared as a -witness. She must have been familiar with the applications for delays and for stays. A postponement of the cause was requested on the ground of the defendant's illness, and an hour after-wards he appeared in court with the defendant Berrian. The counsel stated to the court, at the time of the first application for the postponement, that the plaintiff would be able to collect his judgment from the defendant Sommers, and on this statement obtained an adjournment for a week, when the cause was tried, and a verdict rendered in favor of the plaintiff, the defendant asked for a stay, on the statement that he was fully able to respond to the claim and to give a bond. On this same day, either at the time the statement was made or after the stay had geen granted on the faith of the statement, Sommers assigned the legacy in suit to Mrs. Berrian, stripping himself of all his property. It was the plaintiff's services that led to the discovery of the very fund which was thus assigned to defeat his claim. It is true that Sommers had the right to prefer Mrs. Berrian (if she was his creditor) to the plaintiff, no matter what his equities may have been; but, if his intention was to prefer his creditor by the payment of an honest debt, he does not seem to have formed it until the very moment when he found he was no longer able to prevent the plaintiff from recovering his just claim. After the receipt of the assignment from Sommers, Mrs. Berrian seems, within a few weeks, to have assigned the legacy to her sister. The amount coming on the legacy was about $6,000. The alleged debt from Mrs. Berrian to her sister was about $900. There are other circumstances, unnecessary to recite, wdiich further strengthen the conclusion that the object of Sommers was not to pay his debt, if there was one, but to put his property out of the reach of his creditor (the plaintiff), and that in this design the defendant Berrian participated. If there were a valid debt existing from Sommers to Mrs. Berrian, that fact would not support the transfer or assignments it was made in bad faith, to hinder or delay Sommers' creditors; and in tnat purpose the defendant Berrian shared. Billings v. Russell, 101 N. Y. 226, 4 N. E. 531. I am also of opinion that the existence of the claim of Mrs. Berrian against Sommers was not satisfactorily established, and that the trial court would have been justified in holding it did not exist.
The judgment appealed from should" be affirmed, with costs. All concur except GOODRICH, P. J., dissenting.