Case Name: Terry JARRETT, Appellant (Defendant Below), v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff Below)
Court: Supreme Court of Indiana
Jurisdiction: Indiana
Decision Date: 1986-10-21
Citations: 498 N.E.2d 967
Docket Number: No. 1285S528
Parties: Terry JARRETT, Appellant (Defendant Below), v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff Below).
Judges: DeBRULER and SHEPARD, JJ., concur.
Reporter: North Eastern Reporter 2d
Volume: 498
Pages: 967–971

Head Matter:
Terry JARRETT, Appellant (Defendant Below), v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff Below).
No. 1285S528.
Supreme Court of Indiana.
Oct. 21, 1986.
John C. Wood, Howard County Deputy Public Defender, Kokomo, for appellant.
Linley E. Pearson, Atty. Gen., Jody Cus-son-Cobb, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellee.

Opinion:
DICKSON, Justice.
Defendant Terry Jarrett was found guilty by a jury of the crime of burglary, a class B felony. Among the issues presented for review is whether the trial court erred in refusing to permit two co-offenders to be cross-examined regarding the penalties they would have faced had they not entered into plea bargains.
On September 27, 1984, defendant and two co-offenders broke and entered into a private residence and removed various items. Both accomplices testified on behalf of the State following plea agreements in which they pled guilty to lesser offenses which would result in their avoidance of imprisonment. The trial court sustained the State's objections to defendant's questions regarding the potential penalties facing these witnesses had they not agreed to testify.
Defendant contends that the possible penalties faced by the witnesses was proper evidence necessary for the jury's determination of weight and credibility. In Newman v. State (1975), 263 Ind. 569, 334 N.E.2d 684, 686-87, Justice Arterburn observed:
An accomplice who turns "state's evidence" and agrees to "cooperate" with the State in consideration of leniency or the dismissal of charges by the State, to be realistic, is being bribed, regardless of the fact that public policy has approved such action in the interest of effective law enforcement. It does not necessarily follow that because of inducements offered to the accomplice his testimony is false. It is, however, highly suspect. Because of the pressure of such undue influence upon the witness in such cases the jury should have the evidence relating thereto. Such type of influence natu-
rally impairs the credibility of such a witness.
3 s * 3
Because human nature would tend to cause accomplices to "unload" against their partners and desire to clear themselves as much as possible of blame for a crime, such testimony should be highly scrutinized by the jury or fact finder. Such fact finding body should have before it all the relevant circumstances that caused or induced such witness to testify, including the rewards for such testimony. [Emphasis added]
The State argues that such questioning amounted to indirect attempts by the defense to inform the jury of the potential penalty facing the defendant. It is argued by the State that, since the jury has no sentencing function, it should not be informed as to the range of sentences possible. Wisehort v. State (1985), Ind., 484 N.E.2d 949; Griffin v. State (1981) 275 Ind. 107, 415 N.E.2d 60.
While sentencing information may not be relevant to the jury's duty in a criminal case, we do not perceive it to present a substantial risk of prejudice to the State. To the contrary, however, significant harm results when the jury is prevented from learning the extent of benefit received by a witness in exchange for his testimony. It would be obviously relevant and proper for a jury to consider the amount of compensation a witness expects to receive for his testimony. It is equally proper for this jury to know the quantity of benefit to accusing witnesses. It is quite relevant whether they are thereby avoiding imprisonment of ten days, ten weeks, or ten years.
The exposure of a witness's motivation in testifying is a proper and important function of the constitutionally protected right of cross-examination. Davis v. Alaska (1974), 415 U.S. 308, 94 S.Ct. 1105, 39 L.Ed.2d 347; Greene v. McElroy (1959), 360 U.S. 474, 79 S.Ct. 1400, 3 L.Ed.2d 1377. Against the crucial role of full and proper cross-examination, the State's desire to cen sor sentencing information is clearly subordinate.
The judgment of the trial court is reversed, and this cause is remanded for a new trial.
DeBRULER and SHEPARD, JJ., concur.
GIVAN, C.J., dissents.
PIVARNIK, J., dissents with opinion in which GIVAN, C.J., concurs.