Case Name: Robert M. HOOVER, Jr., Appellee, v. The KIOWA TRIBE OF OKLAHOMA, Appellant
Court: Oklahoma Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Oklahoma
Decision Date: 1999-06-29
Citations: 986 P.2d 516
Docket Number: No. 87,139
Parties: Robert M. HOOVER, Jr., Appellee, v. The KIOWA TRIBE OF OKLAHOMA, Appellant.
Judges: ¶ 7 SUMMERS, C.J., LAVENDER, KAUGER, JJ. — concur.
Reporter: Pacific Reporter 2d
Volume: 986
Pages: 516–522

Head Matter:
1999 OK 61
Robert M. HOOVER, Jr., Appellee, v. The KIOWA TRIBE OF OKLAHOMA, Appellant.
No. 87,139.
Supreme Court of Oklahoma.
June 29, 1999.
William J. Robinson, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Appellee and Cross-Appellant.
R. Brown Wallace, Oklahoma City, OMa-homa, Appellant and Cross-Appellee.

Opinion:
SUMMERS, C.J.:
¶ 1 This Court issued an opinion in this case on April 13, 1998. Consistent with an earlier opinion resolving a contractual dis pute between the same parties in favor of the Plaintiff/Hoover and against the Defen-dani/Tribe, that earlier case being known as Hoover v. Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma, 909 P.2d 59 (Okla.1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1188, 116 S.Ct. 1675, 134 L.Ed.2d 779 (1996), (hereinafter Hoover I) we affirmed summary judgment in favor of Hoover on a promissory note. Although in the first case the Tribe's petition for certiorari was denied by the United States Supreme Court, in this second case it was granted. We prematurely issued the mandate in this case prior to the U.S. Supreme Court notifying us of certiorari being granted by that Court. We hereby recall the mandate as erroneously issued,
¶ 2 On October 8, 1998 the Clerk of the Supreme Court of the United States mailed to the Clerk of this Court a file-stamped copy of the following order with respect to this case, or Hoover II.
The petition for a writ of certiorari is granted. The judgment is vacated and the case is remanded to the Supreme Court of Oklahoma for further consideration in light of Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma v. Manufacturing Technologies, Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 118 S.Ct. 1700, 140 L.Ed.2d 981(1998).
Upon reconsideration we overrule our earlier opinion and remand to the trial court.
¶ 3 The case arose out of an action in state court, initiated by Hoover against the Kiowa Tribe for default on a note. In the first action the trial court dismissed the action on the basis of tribal sovereign immunity. This Court reversed, holding that state courts have jurisdiction over Indian Tribes in contract disputes where the contract was executed outside of Indian country between a tribe and a non-Indian. Hoover I, supra. On remand to the trial court after this Court's opinion in Hoover I, the trial court granted summary judgment to Hoover on his promissory note. The Tribe appealed, and we retained the case.
¶4 In the second opinion, Hoover v. Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma, 1998 OK 23, 957 P.2d 81 (Okla.1998)(hereinafter Hoover II), this Court added detail to its earlier reasoning in Hoover I. The Court analyzed certain historical events in Oklahoma, including the adoption of the Organic Act of 1890, 26 Stat.81 the Enabling Act, 34 Stat. 267 and the Oklahoma Constitution, which, the Court concluded, supported its decision in Hoover I that Oklahoma courts have jurisdiction over litigation against Indian tribes. Again affirming the state court's authority over this contract dispute, the Court concluded the "the legal status of the Tribe in its contractual relationship with Hoover to be that of a private party and subject to the jurisdiction of this state." Id. at 96. It is Hoover II that is before us now on remand from the United States Supreme Court.
¶ 5 After Hoover II was decided by us the United States Supreme Court decided Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma v. Manufacturing Technologies, Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 118 S.Ct. 1700, 140 L.Ed.2d 981 (1998), granting certiorari to review an unpublished Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals opinion that had relied on Hoover I in holding against the Tribe. The Supreme Court there revisited the concept of Indian tribal immunity from suit. With facts nearly identical to the facts in the case at bar, an obligee brought suit in state court to recover on a promissory note executed by the Tribe. The Tribe moved to dismiss based on tribal sovereign immunity from suit. There the U.S. Supreme Court held that "[a]s a matter of federal law, an Indian tribe is subject to suit only where Congress has authorized the suit or the tribe has waived its immunity." Id. at 1702. The Court further noted that thus far, no distinction has been drawn as to whether the activity is commercial or governmental. Id. "[Tjribal immunity is a matter of federal law and is not subject to diminution by the States." Id. at 1702. "As sovereigns or quasi-sovereigns, the Indian nations enjoyed immunity 'from judicial attack' absent consent to be sued." Id. at 1703, quoting United States v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 309 U.S. 506, 512, 60 S.Ct. 653, 84 L.Ed. 894 (1940).
¶ 6 This recent U.S. Supreme Court decision dictates that this Court's earlier opinion in Hoover II be overruled. We so hold. The U.S. Supreme Court has in this case vacated the judgment of the District Court which we, by our opinion in Hoover II, had previously affirmed. On remand from the U.S. Supreme Court we in turn remand the cause to the District Court of Oklahoma County with instructions to enter judgment for the Tribe.
¶ 7 SUMMERS, C.J., LAVENDER, KAUGER, JJ. — concur.
118 SIMMS, WATT, JJ. — concur in deference to stare decisis.
¶ 9 HARGRAVE, V.C.J., HODGES, OPALA, WILSON, JJ. — dissent.
. The dissenting opinion's argument that the Tribe waived its immunity from suit in this trans action is clearly in error. Both the note upon which the suit is founded and the attendant security agreement provide:
"Nothing in this (note)(agreement) subjects or limits the sovereign rights of the Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma."