Case Name: STATE v. MOSS
Court: Oregon Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Oregon
Decision Date: 1919-06-17
Citations: 95 Or. 616
Docket Number: 
Parties: STATE v. MOSS.
Judges: McBride, C. J., and Bennett and Harris, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Oregon Reports
Volume: 95
Pages: 616–643

Head Matter:
Argued April 4,
reversed and remanded June 17,
petition for rehearing filed July 14, rehearing granted August 23) 1919) reargued in banc February 5, original opinion reaffirmed with modification March 30, 1920.
STATE v. MOSS.
(182 Pac. 149; 188 Pac. 702.)
Larceny—Indictment—V ariance.
1. Where plaintiff was indicted under Section 1950, L. O. L., denouncing the crime of lareeny by stealing cattle, the indictment must be considered solely with reference to that offense, and a conviction cannot be sustained on proof that defendant, in violation of Section 1954, knowingly defaced brands on cattle.
Animals—Brands—Presumption of Ownership.
2. Under Laws of 1915, page 44, Section 8, declaring that the brand of any animal shall be prima facie evidence that the animal belongs to the owner of the brand, where there are two recorded brands upon the animal, the presumptions balance each other.
Larceny—Burden of Proof.
3. In a prosecution under Section 1950, L. O. L., for larceny of cattle, the state has the burden of proving that the cattle were property of individuals named as owners in the indictment, and that defendant took or asported the animals.
Larceny — Evidence.
4. In a prosecution under Seetion 1950, L. O. L., for the larceny of cattle, where it appeared that the animals defendant was charged with stealing were on open range, held that, though brands^ thereon had been obliterated, etc., and though defendant and his hired man were in proximity to the cattle which were with a laTger number admittedly belonging to defendant, sueh facts did not show an asportation.
ON REHEARING.
Larceny — Finding of Defendant’s Brand upon Animal Stolen Insufficient in Itself to Justify Conviction,
5. The finding of one man’s brand upon another man’s cow is not alone sufficient to justify a conviction of larceny.
[As to brands on animals as evidence of ownership, see notes in 12 Ann. Cas. 414; 18 Ann. Cas. 544; Ann. Cas. 1913EÍ, 133.]
Larceny — Evidence That Defendant’s Brand is upon Stolen Cattle- is Admissible.
6. In a prosecution for larceny of eattle, evidence that defendant’s brand is found upon the animals alleged to have been stolen, with or without a disfiguration of the old brands, is admissible.
Criminal Law — What Deemed “Evidence to Support Verdict”— “Satisfactory Evidence.”
7. The mere existence in a criminal ease of any competent evidence, however conclusive, any circumstance, however remote, which a jury would have a right to consider if submitted along with other evidence, is not “evidence to support the verdict” within the constitutional provision, in view of Section 697, L. O. L., providing that evidence is deemed satisfactory which ordinarily produces moral certainty and conviction in an unprejudiced mind, and that sueh evidence alone will justify a verdict.
Larceny — Evidence Held Insufficient to Show That Defendant Placed His Brand upon Stolen Cattle.
8. In a prosecution for larceny of cattle, that about 300 of the stolon animals were found in one small valley on a publie range used by defendant as a sheep range, that defendant’s employee was seen in the vicinity, and that the eattle bore defendant’s brand, was insufficient to connect defendant with the branding.
Criminal Law — Authority to Commit Crime not Inferred from Employment of Agent by Defendant.
9. Authority to commit a criminal act can never be inferred from the mere fact that the alleged agent was in the lawful employ of defendant.
Criminal Law — Admission of Ownership Held Insufficient to Show That Accused Disfigured Brands on Stolen Cattle.
10. In a prosecution for lareeny of cattle whieh had been found carrying defendant’s brand apparently superimposed upon an older brand, the mere fact that defendant said he thought some of the eattle were his was insufficient to connect him with the disfigurement of the brands.
Animals — Presumption Arising from Brands Stated.
11. Where two brands are found upon an animal, one older than the other, the presumption from the brands alone is that the ownership of the animal belongs to the older brand, and ordinarily under such conditions the burden is upon the owner of the later brand to establish his right to put sueh brand upon the animal.
Criminal Law — Cattlemen Co.uld Testify as Experts as to Brands upon Animals Stolen.
12. In a prosecution for larceny, where defendant’s brand had been found superimposed upon another brand on the animals stolen, it was not error to permit old cattlemen of long experience to testify as experts in relation of the growth of brands with the growth of the animal and the effect of a second burn on the old scar.
Criminal Law — Instruction as to Effect of Brands to Show Ownership Held Erroneous as Invading Province of Jury.
13. In a prosecution for larceny of cattle, an instruction that, if the company claiming to be owner of the stolen animals had “plaeed its brand on any of the animals, it is sufficient evidence” that the animals belonged t"o it, was erroneous as invading the province of the jury.
^-Larceny — Evidence as to Possession of Stolen Goods Admissible, Although not Recent or Exclusive.
14. In larceny cases the fact of possession of the stolen goods by defendant is admissible, notwithstanding such possession is not recent or exclusive, although such fact may not in itself be sufficient to raise a presumption of guilt.
From Lake: L. F. Conn, Judge.
Department 1.
The defendant was indicted for the larceny of two steers, seven cows and one calf, all branded and said to be owned by different parties, two of whom had a recorded brand. We condense the' statement following from the brief for the state, supplemented by some of its testimony: The defendant himself was the owner of several hundred head of cattle which with the animals mentioned in the indictment and still others owned by other and different parties were ranging on a tract in the forest reserve, the pasturage of which had been allotted to the defendant. Those in dispute were collected by an inspector of brands and his assistants. Six heads of them were taken from a band of about three hundred others of which it was estimated four fifths were the property of the defendant and the remainder belonged to other individuals without dispute. The other four were found at large in the same neighborhood.
There was evidence to the effect that most of the ten head mentioned in the indictment had on them mutilated brands of the alleged owners and the brand of the defendant as well. The cattle in question were taken by the inspector to Lakeview and kept there in custody of the sheriff pending the trial of the defendant. When the inspector went into the country where the cattle were feeding he met a man named Silvers, said to be the defendant’s employee, about half a mile from the herd. There was testimony to the effect that Silvers had been sent there by the defendant to build a corral into which to put his calves during the weaning period and that the defendant himself had also gone there to instruct Silvers where to build the enclosure. Two witnesses testified to the effect that when the cattle had been brought to Lakeview the defendant was asked concerning them and said, “Some of them are mine.” Eespecting the range where the cattle in question were found, the following excerpt from the testimony of John Allen, a witness for the state, is here set down:
“Q. What is the nature of the country in general, between Sherman Valley and where they had these cattle?
“A There is just cattle trails between the south fork and that, a kind of a rim, a rocky rim with trails—
£<Q. Can cattle pass from one place to another?
££A. Yes, sir.
‘ ‘ Q. Was that in a little valley where they had them ?
<£A. Yes, sir; in between the two mountains.
“Q. Approximately how large is Sherman Valley, if. you can give us an idea, how far across it? Just to give us a general idea.
“A. I should judge there is two or three hundred acres in Sherman Valley, what they call Sherman Valley meadow. * *
“Q. Do you know anything about whose range that is, whether it is under lease, or anything about that?
“A. Yes, sir.
“Q. Whose is it?
“A. Anybody’s that runs cattle on the reserve.
“Q. Anybody that gets a permit can run cattle there?
“A. Yes, sir. * *
“Q. The cattle don’t know who has a permit, do they?
“A. No, sir.
“Q. The range is not fenced in?
“A. No, sir.
“Q. Any of the cattle that are out on the public range, outside of the Forest Reserve, can get in there if they want to ?
“A. Yes, sir.
“Q. Do you know whether it is the habit of cattle to follow other cattle in the hills, and congregate together?
“A. Yes, sir.
“Q. That is their habit?
“A. Yes, sir.
“Q. Do you know whether these cattle, at the time you saw them, were on the Forest. Reserve,.or off?
“A. On.
“Q. Know where the Forest Reserve lines are?
“A. Yes, sir.
“Q. The Forest Reserve line there runs almost directly north and south, doesn’t it, the exterior line on the east side?
“A. Right down below, I think it does, it jogs on the way there, though.
“Q. It may jog on a section line, or something of that kind, but the general course is north and south?
“A. Yes, sir.
“Q. Off on east of that, what is it, the general coun- . try east, as to being open public range, or being fenced up?
“A. It is all open public range all through there.
“Q. Is there any obstruction of any kind to keep cattle from going right on to the Forest Reserve?
“A. No, sir; only around the meadows, is all.
“Q. Whenever a man has a small ranch or meadow fenced, that is the only fenced land?
“A. Yes.
“Q. And cattle turned loose on the public range can go right on the Forest Reserve if they wish to?
“A. Yes, sir.
“Q. What do you say as to whether there are good trails between the public range and the Forest Reserve, showing cattle travel them?
“A. There are trails all through there. * *
“Q. During the summer, prior to the time these cattle were found there, did you see cattle of other people besides those you have mentioned, on that range?
“A. Yes, I was up about twice this summer, or three times, that I went through, before that, and I run on quite a bunch of cattle before that. Saw cattle when I was up there, always do in the summer time.
“Q. It is not a range that is set aside for Mr. Moss?
“A. No, sir.
“Q. All of the people who run cattle in the neighborhood find cattle on the range in that locality right along?
“A. Yes, sir.”
All the other witnesses for the state who spoke on that subject agree with Allen.
The only testimony in support of the allegation of ownership of any of the cattle as laid in the indictment is derived from brands and changes and obliterations of them. No witness testified who identified them except by brand, or imputed to the defendant any actual knowledge of the presence of the cattle on his range or intimated that he was ever seen in their neighborhood, or ever applied any brand to them.
From a judgment on a verdict of guilty as charged, the defendant appealed.
Reversed and Remanded.
For appellant there was a brief over the names of Mr. Herbert P. Welch and Messrs. McCamant, Bronaugh & Thompson, with an oral argument by Mr. W. Lair Thompson.
For the State there was a brief over the names of Mr, Gjeorge M. Brown, Attorney General, Mr. T. S. McKinney, District Attorney, Mr. G. H. Leonard, and Mr. Lionel B. Webster, with an oral argument by Mr. Brown.

Opinion:
BURNETT, J.
There are numerous assignments of error, but we shall consider only one of them, that challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a conviction. The defendant was indicted under Section' 1950, L. O. L., reading thus:
"If any person shall commit the crime of larceny by stealing any horse, gelding, mare, mule, ass, jenny or foal, bull, steer, cow, heifer, hog, dog or sheep, such person, upon conviction thereof, shall be punished by imprisonment in the penitentiary not less than one nor more than ten years, or by imprisonment in the county jail not less than three months nor more than one year, or by fine of not less than $50 nor more than $1,000. ' '
There is another statute, Section 1954, L. O. L., which is here quoted:
"If any person shall willfully and knowingly make, alter or deface any artificial earmark or brand upon any horse, mare, gelding, foal, mule, ass, jenny, sheep, goat, swine, bull, cow, steer or heifer, the property of another, with intent thereby to convert the same to his own use, such person shall be deemed guilty of larceny, and upon conviction thereof shall be punished by imprisonment in the penitentiary not less than one nor more than five years."
As the indictment is drawn under the former section, it must be considered solely with reference to that standard, for, as taught in State v. Howard, 41 Or. 50 (69 Pac. 50), the two offenses are distinct and a conviction cannot be had under an indictment charging one offense when the evidence points exclusively to the other. There is no evidence in the record of any actual asportation of the property from the custody of the true owner. As stated, all the evidence of property rests upon the testimony concerning the presence of mutilated brands on the animals listed in the indictment. It is said in Section 8 of Chapter 33, Laws of 1915:
"In all suits at law or in equity, or in any criminal proceedings, when the title or right of possession is involved, the brand of any animal shall be prima facie evidence that the animal belongs to the owner or owners of the brand, and that such owner is entitled to the possession of the animal at the time of the action; provided, that such brand has been duly recorded as provided by law."
So far as this statute is concerned, without reference to the presumptions of innocence, regularity of private transactions and the like and confining ourselves to the mere presence of a brand upon an animal which is all the statute deals with, the same presumption must affect' any brand coming within the purview of the enactment, viz., a recorded brand found upon the animals in question. The statute says nothing about age or priority of brands and in construing it or giving value to the prima facie presumption it creates, we cannot read into the law anything of that kind. Viewing the matter, therefore, from the statutory standpoint, when we find two recorded brands upon a cow the presumptions arising from them balance each other and the state must produce something to disturb this equipoise adversely to the defendant, if it would prove the property to be that of another, or that the defendant stole it. The prosecution relies upon the testimony about discovering the cattle mentioned in the indictment in company with defendant's herd and still other cattle on the public domain where all cattle indiscriminately in that region could and did range. They were not in the actual custody of the defendant, neither is there any evidence tending to show that they ever were in his actual control. The question then is whether such testimony is sufficient to turn the scale against the defendant.
Much stress was laid also in argument upon the testimony about the mutilation and changes of brands upon the animals in question, the comparative ages of different brands on the same animals, the earmarks and dewlaps, and the like; but all this only goes to affect the question of property of someone in the cattle in dispute. The state had the burden of proving that the animals in question were the property of individuals named as owners in the indictment. Its task did not end there. It was compelled to go further and prove the other essential element, that the -defendant tookthe cattle. We may safely say that there is testimony sufficient to go to the jury that the individuals named in the indictment owned the cattle described therein and that someone changed or effaced their brands and put on other brands and marks, but there is no evidence in the record that the defendant is that someone who made such changes either in person or by an agent. This constitutes a hiatus in the case that is fatal to the prosecution.
It -will not fill the gap to show that the defendant or his employee was in the vicinity where the cattle ranged. They both had a right to be there. In State v. Odell, 8 Or. 30, it was decided that proof that the prisoner was in the same town about the time of an alleged larceny in a store is not alone sufficient to corroborate the testimony of an accomplice or warrant a conviction, and it is the duty of the court so to instruct the jury. If such circumstances will not corroborate an accomplice who made a clean breast of his connection with and the participation of the defendant in the commission of the crime charged, by a parity of reasoning similar testimony adds nothing to the state's case against the present defendant. State v. Odell, 8 Or. 30, was approved in State v. Townsend, 19 Or 213 (23 Pac. 968), but was distinguished-in the latter case on the ground that the defendant's presence near the scene of the crime was connected with suspicious circumstances, among which were that it was unusual for him to be in that vicinity; that he was there under an assumed name and that he was acting in concert with the other defendant, who avowed his own guilt. The Odell case was approved and followed in State v. Scott, 28 Or. 331 (42 Pac. 1), which teaches that mere opportunity to commit adultery is not sufficient to corroborate the woman who gave a detailed account of her adulterous liaison with the defendant when they were spending the day together in the woods where she affected to be hiding from her husband and the defendant was ostensibly fishing. Other parties saw them in the woods together and on the next day, according to the declarations of other witnesses, they went to Portland on the same train. Mr. Justice Mooke quotes with approval this excerpt from 1 Eoscoe's Cr. Ev., page 133:
"What appears to be required, is that there shall be some fact deposed to independently altogether of the evidence of the accomplice, which, taken by itself, leads to the inference, not only that a crime has been committed, but that the prisoner is implicated in it."
The deduction is that the mere presence of the defendant or his hired man on the range where his cattle and those mentioned in the indictment were being pastured and where both of the men had a right to be, is not a circumstance sufficient to establish the asportation of the animals included in the charge, which were all the time ranging there.
Whether or not it is a happy expression to speak of balancing the statutory presumptions arising from the presence of two or more brands upon an animal, it refers only to the proof of ownership of the cattle. In the absence of any testimony competent to show that the defendant branded any of them or aided or abetted in such branding, it cannot affect the element of asportation so requisite to constitute larceny.
It is said in 17 E. C. L., page 73:
"The general rule that the possession of stolen property is evidence of guilt is limited by the rule that to warrant an inference of guilt it must further appear that the possession was personal, and that it involved a distinct and conscious assertion of possession by the accused. It would be pushing the rule too far to require of one accused of a crime an explanation of his possession of the stolen property, when such possession could also, with equal right, be attributed to another. Hence the mere fact of finding stolen articles on the premises of a man of a family or in a place in which many others have free access without showing his actual conscious possession thereof discloses only a prima facie constructive possession and is not such a possession as will justify án inference of guilt by reason thereof."
Similar language is found in Underhill on Criminal Evidence (2 ed.), Section 33.
The following excerpt is taken from State v. Ford, 175 N. C. 797, 801 (95 S. E. 154, 155):
"In State v. Graves, 72 N. C. 485, Pearson, C. J., says that the presumption does not arise except when 'the fact of guilt must be self-evident from the bare fact of stolen goods, and Hoke, J., in State v. Anderson, 162 N. C. 571 (77 S. E. 238), that it is only when he could not reasonably have got possession unless he had stolen them himself.' The principle is usually applied to possession which involves custody about the person, but it is not necessarily so limited. 'It may be of things elsewhere deposited, but under the control of a party. It may be in a storeroom or barn when the party has the key. In short, it may be in any place where it is manifest it must have been put by the act of the party or his undoubted concurrence': State v. Johnson, 60 N. C. 237 (86 Am. Dec. 434)."
In People v. Hurley, 60 Cal. 74 (44 Am. Rep. 55), the syllabus reads thus:
"To justify the inference of guilt from the fact of possession of stolen property, it must appear that the possession was personal, and that it involved a distinct and conscious assertion of possession by the accused."
In State v. Drew, 179 Mo. 315 (78 S. W. 594, 101 Am. St. Rep. 474), the defendant was charged with burglary and larceny in a store. Among other things stolen were some pieces of cloth, one of which was found in the defendant's residence locked up in a trunk the key of which was in the custody of his daughter. The court held that:
"The finding of recently stolen articles on the premises of a man of a family, without showing his actual, conscious possession thereof, discloses only a prima facie constructive possession, and is not such a possession as will justify a presumption of guilt by reason thereof."
The same doctrine is taught in State v. Warford, 106 Mo. 55 (16 S. W. 886, 27 Am. St. Rep. 322); Cooper v. State, 29 Tex. App. 8 (13 S. W. 1011, 25 Am. St. Rep. 712); Lehman v. State, 18 Tex. App. 174 (51 Am. Rep. 298); People v. Friedman, 149 App. Div. 813 (134 N. Y. Supp. 153); Ex parte La Page (D. C.), 216 Fed. 256; People v. Wilson, 151 N. Y. 403 (45 N. E. 862).
In order to constitute larceny of the kind charged in the indictment there must be an asportation. The evidence was that all the cattle mentioned in the testimony were running at large on the public range or at least in places where cattle indiscriminately could and did go at will, and were so running at the time of the occurrence described by the witnesses. As stated, indeed, the testimony was to the effect that by far the greater part of the band where the cattle were found belonged to the defendant. One witness said about sixty were owned by another man and a few head in addition were the property of still other individuals. Under such conditions a felony is not to be imputed to the defendant respecting the animals in dispute on account of his owning the majority of the band. An inference might as well be drawn unfavorable to the owner of the sixty head. Under such circumstances, every animal is constructively in the possession of its owner and, as stated in State v. Childers, 71 Or. 340 (142 Pac. 333):
"Constructive possession cannot be in two people at the same time, whose interests are adverse to each other."
In short, there is nothing shown in the testimony that amounts to a disturbance of the constructive possession of whoever owned the cattle mentioned in the indictment. It is not shown that the defendant put his brand on the cattle or authorized it to be done. Although it is not necessary to the case, yet it is proper to state that he gave evidence of a disinterested witness to the effect that a branding iron of the defendant had been stolen from a ranch where the witness was employed and had been missed from there about a year prior to the discovery of the cattle in question. Unless there is some evidence tending to show that the defendant either branded the cattle himself or authorized it to be done as an aid to his larceny of them, the matter of finding his brand on the cattle must be laid out of the calculation in a case like the one before us. There is an utter absence of any testimony showing an asportation necessary to constitute the crime of larceny as charged in this indictment.
The court was in error in not directing a verdict for the defendant on his motion at the close of all the evidence in the case. It is unnecessary to consider the other assignments. The judgment of the circuit court is reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings. It is possible that the prosecution may be able to make a better case at another trial, but a conviction cannot be sustained rightly on the record before us. Reversed and Remanded.
McBride, C. J., and Bennett and Harris, JJ., concur.
Original opinion reversing the judgment reaffirmed -with modification March 30, 1920.