Case Name: CUCA v. LACKAWANNA STEEL CO.
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1910-05-04
Citations: 122 N.Y.S. 732
Docket Number: 
Parties: CUCA v. LACKAWANNA STEEL CO.
Judges: 
Reporter: West's New York Supplement
Volume: 122
Pages: 732–736

Head Matter:
CUCA v. LACKAWANNA STEEL CO.
(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Fourth Department.
May 4, 1910.)
Discovery (§ 53 )—Under Statutory Provisions—Inspeotion of Premises.
Plaintiff in a personal injury case is not entitled to an order permiting an inspection of the place in- defendant’s premises where plaintiff was injured, and of an engine, car, and connecting bar alleged to have caused the injury, where application is made more than three years after the accident.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Discovery, Cent. Dig. § G6; Dec. Dig. § 53. ]
Spring, J., dissenting.
Appeal from Special Term, Erie County.
Action by Steve Cuca against the Lackawanna Steel Company. From an order directing defendant to permit plaintiff to inspect the defendant’s premises, where plaintiff’s accident occurred, defendant appeals.
Reversed, and motion denied.
The action was commenced on the 14th day of September, 1909, to recover damages sustained by the plaintiff while in defendant’s employ resulting from an accident which occurred on the 17th day of September, 1907, alleged to have been caused solely through the negligence of the defendant.
The order is challenged by the defendant because, as is claimed, in view of the grounds of negligence stated in the complaint and in the notice served under the employer’s liability act (Consol. Laws, c. 31), it is not shown that the inspection directed would throw any light upon the question of defendant’s negligence as set forth in such complaint and notice; also on the ground that under section 803 of the Code, with the amendment “or to make discovery of any article or property,” the court had no power,to compel the defendant to permit the plaintiff and a representative to enter upon its premises and to make an inspection thereof and of its property.
Argued before McLENNAN, P. J., and SPRING, WILLIAMS, KRUSE, and ROBSON, JJ.
Evan Hollister, for appellant.
M. W. Casey, for respondent.
For other cases see same topic & § number in Dec. & Am. Digs. 1907 to date, & Rep’r Indexes

Opinion:
McLENNAN, P. J.
As to the first objection: The allegations of the complaint, so far as they charge the defendant with negligence, are, in effect: (1) That the defendant at the time of the accident did not have competent and skillful engineers in charge and control of the running of said engine; (2) that it did not provide a suitable, safe, and sufficient roadbed over which to operate its engines and cars at said •plant; (3) that it did not see to it that the engines and cars were properly inspected and maintained; (4) that it did not supply plaintiff with suitable and safe means, material, implements, drawheads, connecting bars, and light, and maintain the same, to enable plaintiff to safely perform his duty as brakeman; (5) that it did not have proper and safe rules and regulations in running and operating said engine for the protection of its employés and to give proper warning and notice to said plaintiff and those employed in like capacity of the approach and movements of said engine. It is alleged that the defendant was guilty of negligence because it omitted and neglected to do any of the things above enumerated; that as a result plaintiff sustained the injury of which he complains, and without any fault or neglect on his part.
Clearly, an inspection of the plaintiff's plant and property at the time the order in question was made could not have given to the plaintiff any information respecting any of the charges of negligence which he .alleges against the defendant in view of the fact that such inspection is sought after three years from the time when the accident happened. No inspection could disclose whether or not the defendant had competent or skillful engineers, or whether it saw to it, or did not see to it, that the engines and cars were properly inspected and maintained, •or as to whether or not it supplied the plaintiff with suitable and safe means and appliances with which to perform his work, or whether or not it promulgated rules for the purpose of insuring his safety. Those are all matters which can only be established by witnesses who were present at or about the time of the accident. There is nothing that can be seen at this time by the plaintiff, or by his representative, that will throw any light upon either of those questions.
Whether or not the defendant provided a suitable, safe, and sufficient •roadbed at the time of the accident, three years before this application was made, cannot be discovered by any inspection or examination which can be made at this time.
The allegations of negligence contained in the notice served under the employer's liability act, while more specific, are of the same general character. It is therein alleged that the drawhead and connecting bar were out of order; but it is nowhere suggested in the •petition that such drawhead or engine or connecting bar is in the same condition now as it was at the time of the accident. A court would .almost take judicial notice of the fact that those conditions would have materially changed in a plant of this character during a period of three years.
It is proper to inquire what the plaintiff and his representative can 'be reasonably expected to discover from an inspection, if now made, which would throw any light upon the conditions which existed at the '.time of the accident; yet that is the only matter which would be material upon the trial of this action. The conditions now existing could not be proven—would not be competent, unless there was proof indicating that the conditions complained of were the same at the time the inspection was made as at the time the accident occurred. There is no allegation in the moving papers that the car or engine which the plaintiff was engaged in coupling are even at the defendant's plant at the present time, or that the drawhead, which it is alleged in the notice was defective, or the connecting bar, are at the plant, or are now being used or operated, or, if so, that they are in the same condition as at the time of the accident. The same is true of the roadbed and tracks of defendant.
The plaintiff has utterly failed to show that any conditions which might be discovered by inspection at the defendant's plant at the present time are the same as existed at the time of the accident and upon which the defendant's negligence is based, and for that reason the order should be reversed.
Having reached such conclusion, it is unnecessary to consider the effect of the amendment to section 803 of the Code of Civil Procedure to which attention has been called.
_ Order reversed, with $10 costs and disbursements, and motion denied, with $10 costs.
WILLIAMS, KRUSE, and ROBSON, JJ., concur. SPRING, J., dissents.