Case Name: UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Carmelo VARGAS, Defendant-Appellant
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 2012-03-21
Citations: 467 F. App'x 71
Docket Number: No. 10-3521-cr
Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Carmelo VARGAS, Defendant-Appellant.
Judges: 
Reporter: West's Federal Appendix
Volume: 467
Pages: 71–72

Head Matter:
UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Carmelo VARGAS, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 10-3521-cr.
United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
March 21, 2012.
Julia Pamela Heit, Esq., New York, NY, for Appellant.
Thomas G.A. Brown, Katherine Polk Failla, Assistant United, States Attorneys, for Preet Bharara, United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, New York, NY.
Present: RALPH K. WINTER, REENA RAGGI, Circuit Judges, and JED S. RAKOFF, District Judge.
Judge Jed S. Rakoff of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, sitting by designation.

Opinion:
SUMMARY ORDER
Defendant Carmelo Vargas, who was convicted based on guilty pleas to conspiratorial and substantive counts of trafficking in 50 grams or more of crack cocaine, see 18 U.S.C. § 2; 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A), 846, and sentenced to a total of 121 months' imprisonment, now appeals from a judgment reducing his sentence to 120 months' imprisonment pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) and amendments to the United States Sentencing Guidelines ("U.S.S.G") applicable to crack cocaine offenses. See United States v. Rivera, 662 F.3d 166, 168 (2d Cir.2011) (discussing retroactivity of crack cocaine Guidelines amendments). We review sentencing reductions under § 3582(c)(2) only for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Borden, 564 F.3d 100, 101 (2d Cir.2009). We assume familiarity with the facts and the record of prior proceedings, which we reference only as necessary to explain our decision to affirm.
Vargas's only contention on appeal is that the district court abused its discretion by failing to hold an evidentiary hearing on whether Vargas's prison term should be reduced below 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(l)(A)'s 120-month mandatory minimum because of his own and his family's alleged cooperation with the government before and after his original sentencing. This contention is meritless. Vargas moved for a reduced sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), which does not authorize "plenary resentencing proceedings." Dillon v. United States, — U.S. -, 130 S.Ct. 2683, 2692, 177 L.Ed.2d 271 (2010); accord United States v. Rivera, 662 F.3d 166, 171 (2d Cir.2011). Rather, in a § 3582(c)(2) proceeding, a district court is not authorized to "reduce [the defendant's] term of imprisonment below the minimum of [the] amended sentencing range except to the extent the original term of imprisonment was below the range then applicable." Dillon v. United States, 130 S.Ct. at 2687.
Here, Vargas's original 121-month term of imprisonment was undisputedly within the then-applicable Guidelines range. Thus, the district court had no authority in the context of a § 3582(c)(2) resentencing to impose a revised sentence below that provided for in the amended Guidelines. See Dillon v. United States, 130 S.Ct. at 2687. The district court found that Vargas's post-amendment Guidelines range provided for a 97- to 121-month prison term, and Vargas does not dispute that finding. In light of U.S.S.G. § 5G1.1(c)(2), these amended Guidelines did not permit the district court to impose a sentence lower than the 120-month mandatory minimum prison term provided for in 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A). See United States v. Williams, 551 F.3d 182, 185-86 (2d Cir. 2009).
For the foregoing reasons, the district court's judgment is AFFIRMED.