Case Name: GEORGE E. JENNINGS, GILMAN H. PERKINS and AARON E. PERKINS, Respondents, v. THE GRAND TRUNK RAILWAY COMPANY OF CANADA, Appellant
Court: New York Supreme Court, General Term
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1889-03
Citations: 59 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 227
Docket Number: 
Parties: GEORGE E. JENNINGS, GILMAN H. PERKINS and AARON E. PERKINS, Respondents, v. THE GRAND TRUNK RAILWAY COMPANY OF CANADA, Appellant.
Judges: Dwight, J., concurred.
Reporter: Supreme Court Reports (Hun)
Volume: 59
Pages: 227–246

Head Matter:
GEORGE E. JENNINGS, GILMAN H. PERKINS and AARON E. PERKINS, Respondents, v. THE GRAND TRUNK RAILWAY COMPANY OF CANADA, Appellant.
Principal and agent — shipping note — presumption that the bill of lading contains the same conditions ■ — power of a vendoi' shipping a/riicles to his vendee to limit by a special contract, the carrier's liability — release — protection of a ccwrier from, the negligence of connecting roads — the failure to serve a notice must be specially pleaded— when the defendant canjiot email itself of it.
In 1881 J. So EL Shanly So Co., who resided, in the city of Rochester, were engaged in buying potatoes in Canada, at points upon the line of the defendant’s road, and shipping them to the city of St. Louis for a market. Before making any shipment they requested the general manager of the defendant’s business to give them tb e lowest rates in car-load lots from certain points mentioned, on the defendant’s line, to the city of St. Louis, and the said rates were given to them in a letter written by its general agent.
Upon the trial of an action, brought to recover damages alleged to have been sustained by the plaintiffs because of the defendant having negligently delayed to transport a car-load of potatoes, it appeared that this car-load was delivered to the defendant by one Du Brule, of whom Shanly & Co. had purchased the same, on the eighteenth day of April at Brockville, that Du Brule, at the time of the delivery, notified the defendant’s station agent that they were to be shipped to Shanly & Co., and thereupon Du Brule filled up and signed with his own hand and delivered to the station agent a blank shipping note kept by the defendant and supplied to shippers for that purpose, which, in substance, was a request to defendant to ship said potatoes subject to the terms and conditions printed on the back of such shipping note, which terms were assented to as the basis upon which the defendant’s bill of lading was to be delivered. At the same time the station agent delivered to Du Brule a bill of lading, which he attached to his own draft drawn on Shanly & Co. for the balance due him for the purchase-price of the potatoes. The draft was forwarded for collection and the same was paid a few days thereafter. Neither party put the bill of lading in evidence on the trial or proved its contents.
PLeld, that, as Du Brule was charged by the plaintiffs with the duty of shipping the goods, the carrier was authorized to make a valid and binding special contract with him, such as the owner might have made if he had been personally present conducting negotiations.
That as neither party put in evidence the bill of lading, nor was its contents proved on the trial, it and the shipping note, which were both executed at the same time, and simultaneously delivered and related to the same subject-matter, should be considered as constituting one agreement, and that it would not be assumed that the bill of lading contained any provision changing or modifying the terms or conditions contained in the shipping note, or anything inconsistent with these provisions or conditions.
That as no proof was made in this case as to the laws of Canada, the rule winch prevails in this State allowing a carrier to limit his liability would be presumed to prevail in Canada.
That the facts of this case, that the special rate at which the potatoes were carried was the lowest rate made by the defendant for this class of freight; that it was made at the particular request of the shipper; that it was, in fact, a less rate than the defendant was authorized to charge for the transportation of the potatoes beyond the line of its own road, constituted a good consideration for the special contract which was valid and binding alike upon the carrier and the plaintiffs.
The referee found as a fact that the transportation of the potatoes was negligently hindered and delayed by the defendant upon its own road, and also upon the connecting road, and that in consequence of such delays and the long confinement of the potatoes in the car they were greatly depreciated in their market-value.
It was provided in the contract that the responsibility of the defendant should terminate when the goods should have arrived at the place to be reached on its own road, where it connected with other roads, and that the defendant should not be liable for damages to the property arising from delays which occurred on the connecting roads, the contract providing as follows: “ Nor will the company be liable for damages occasioned by delays caused by storms, accidents, over-pressure of freight or unavoidable causes, or by the weather, wet, fire, heat, frost, or delay of perishable articles, or from civil commotion.”
Held, that as the defendant could legally contract, and had, in this case, agreed to carry and deliver the goods at East St. Louis, the connecting lines engaged by it to carry the goods to their destination were the agents of the defendant, and it was liable for their negligence resulting in damages to the owners.
That, as all the delays occurred in consequence of the defendant’s own negligence, the release did not protect the defendant, as it did not, by its terms or necessary implications, exempt the defendant, from damages arising from its own negligent acts or those of its agent or servants.
The defendant contended that it was exempt from such damages as the plaintiff suffered by loss of market, on account of the delays, under another clause of the contract, which provided “ that the company shall not, in any case or under any circumstances, be liable for loss of market.”
Held, that as this clause did not in terms apply to a case where the loss of a market arose from the defendant’s negligence, the contract should be so construed as to make the release in this respect applicable to cases where the loss of a market arose from other causes, such as a failure to deliver within a stipulated time.
The defendant pleaded, in bar of a recovery for the cause of action set out in the complaint, that no written notice was served of any claim for damages, as required by the twelfth clause printed on the back of the shipping bill, which is as follows: “ IS. That no^claim for damages to, loss of, or detention of, any goods for which this company is accountable shall be allowed, unless notice in writing and the particulars of the claim for said loss, damage or detention are given to tlie station freight agent nearest to the place of delivery within thirty-six hours after the goods, in respect of which said claim is made, are delivered.”
The allegation of the answer, in this respect, was : “And this defendant alleges, upon information and belief, that the notices required by said agreements were never given as thereby required.” No allegation was made that no notice was served within thirty-six hours from the time of the delivery of the freight at the end of its journey to the plaintiff, except inferentially and argumentatively.
Held, that as the court should enforce the common-law obligations of common carriers with rigor, and should modify them only with reluctance and of necessity, and as the defense set up by the defendant did not, in any repect, go to the merits of the controversy between the parties, except as it was founded upon this forfeiture clause contained in the printed conditions indorsed upon the way-bill, that the defense was not sufficiently alleged to enable the plaintiff to avail itself of the clause in question.
The claim was, in fact, presented to the defendant by letter before the action was brought, though not within the thirty-six hours, and an answer was sent from the defendant’s general freight agent’s office acknowledging the receipt of the notice, expressing the sorrow of the agent with regard to the detention of the potatoes, and stating that the plaintiffs were doubtless aware that such detention had arisen through causes over which the defendant had no control, namely, the strike of railway employees in Chicago.
Held, that this was a waiver of the condition.
That the condition was not available to the defendant, under the circumstances of this case, as it was not intended by the officers of the company to apply, when the agreement of the company was to transport freight so far from the place of shipment and beyond the defendant’s line.
That the time limited, in which to ascertain the particulars of the loss and place them before the company, was palpably too short to enable the owners to comply therewith when the delivery was to be made so far off.
That the plaintiffs, under a special contract which was outside of the company’s general business and against its printed regulations, could not be bound by the clause on the back of the shipping bill which, apparently by inadvertence, had not been struck out or adapted to long hauls over other railways than the defendant’s, and to deliveries at great distances from its western terminus. (Barker, J., dissenting.)
Jackson v. St. Paul Pire and Marine Insurance Oompcmy (99 N, Y., 124) followed.
Appeal from a judgment, entered in the office of the clerk of Monroe county on the 21st day of June, 1887, upon the report of a referee, awarding to the plaintiff the sum of $2,420 damages and $675 costs.
The defendant is a foreign corporation, created by and under the laws of Canada, for the transportation of freight and passengers, its western terminus being at Fort Gratiot, where it connects with other railways running west from that point, constituting a through line to the city of St. Louis. In 1881 J, Ii. Shanley & Co., residing in ■ the city of Rochester, N. Y., were engaged in buying potatoes in Canada, at points upon the line of the defendant’s road, and shipping them to the city of St. Louis for a market. Before making any shipments they requested the general manager of the defendant’s business for the lowest rates in car-load lots from points mentioned on the defendant’s line to the city of St. Louis, which were given in a letter written by the general agent, who also, at the same time, informed the defendant’s station agents of the rates which had been given Shanley & Co. Thereafter, and between the eighteenth and twenty-sixth day of April, Shanley & Co. delivered to the defendant, in car-load lots, five separate shipments of potatoes to be transported to St. Louis. It is claimed that the transportation was negligently delayed, and in consequence thereof the potatoes were depreciated in quality and the shipper lost a market. This action is to recover the damages sustained by reason of the delays. One car-load was shipped at Brockville, April 18, 1881, by one Joseph E. Du Brule, of whom Shanley & Co! purchased the potatoes, who, at their request, delivered the potatoes to the defendant for transportation. At the time of the delivery Du Brule signed and delivered to the 'station agent a shipping note, so-called, of which the following is a copy:
“GRAND TRUNK RAILWAY COMPANY OF CANADA.
“ This company will not be responsible for any goods missent, unless they are consigned to a station on their railway. Rates, weights and quantities entered on receipts are not binding on the company, and will not be acknowledged. All goods going to or coming from the United States will be subject to customs, charges, etc.
“ Brockville, April 18th, 1881.
“The Grand Trunk Railway Company of Canada will please receive the undermentioned property, in apparent good order, addressed to order of Merchants’ Bank of Canada, East St. Louis, HI. To be sent by the said company, subject to the terms and conditions stated above and on the other side, and which are agreed to by this shipping note, delivered to said company, as the basis upon which their receipt is to be given for said property.
“ J. E. DU BRULE,
“ Consignors
The material clauses, printed on the back of this paper, are referred to in the opinion. They were printed under a heading, in large type, which reads, viz.: “ General notices and conditions of carriage.” The facts and circumstances connected with each of the other shipments, so far as they differ from the one just referred to, are pointed out in the opinion. Before the commencement of this action Shanley & Co. assigned their cause of action to the plaintiffs.
J£. C. Sprague, for the appellant.
Martin W. Cooke, for the respondents.

Opinion:
Macomber, J.:
The opinion of the presiding justice, which contains all the material facts except as herein mentioned, would lead to an affirmance of the judgment in the case, save for the twelfth printed condition on the back of the bill of lading. That condition is as follows : " 12. That. no claim for damages to, loss of or detention of any goods for which this company is accountable, shall be-allowed unless notice in writing and the particulars of the claim for said loss, damage or detention are given to the station freight agent nearest to the place of delivery, within thirty-six hours after the goods in respect of which said claim is made are delivered."
The notice in writing above mentioned was not given within thirty-six hours to the nearest station freight agent of the defendant, and hence the presiding justice is of the opinion that no recovery can be had .by plaintiff, except for the one car load which was never delivered. I cannot assent to that proposition under the established facts appearing in this case. Courts of law should enforce the common-law obligations of common carriers with rigor, and should modify them only with reluctance and upon necessity. (Express Company v. Caldwell, 21 Wall., 266.) The defense set up in the fifth clause of the answer, now relied upon by the defendant, does not, in any respect, go to the merits of the controversy between the parties, except as it is founded upon this forfeiture clause of the printed conditions indorsed upon the way-bill. But even this defense is not sufficiently alleged to enable the defendant to avail itself of the clause in question. The allegation is, " and tliis defendant alleges, upon information and belief, that the notices required by said agreements were never given as thereby required."
There is no allegation that no notice was served within thirty-six hours from the time of the delivery of the freight at the end of its journey, to the plaintiffs, except inferentially and argumentatively. It is true, that if the notice was never given, it could not well have been given within thirty-six hours, but the question is one of strict defense and the parties will be held to accurate averments. A plea of the ten-year statute of limitations would cover the shorter statute of six years, yet it would be insufficient to enable the defendant, under such a plea, to avail himself of the shorter statute in the proof. The objection must be specifically set up. In this instance the defendant has not alleged specifically that the notice required was not given within thirty-six hours, as it ought to be required to do before permitting a defense of this description to discharge the defendant from liabilities. The allegation of the answer is "that the notices required by said agreements were never given as thereby required." This may, and it probably does, refer only,to the omission of the plaintiffs' assignors to give " the particulars of the claim for said loss," etc.; or it may mean that the notice in writing was not given to the station freight agent nearest to the place of delivery, but to some other station agent. At all events in setting forth this unconscionable forfeiture of the plaintiffs' property rights and the defendant's consequent exemption from liability, the defendant lias not unequivocally placed itself clearly on the thirty-six-hours clause. By not so making the allegation of the breach of the condition this technical defense was waived. But, furthermore, the answer, as it stands, is not true, because the claim was, in fact, presented to the defendant by letter before the action was brought, though not within the thirty-six hours.
Three of the shipments were made on the 18th day of April, one on the 20th of April and one on the 26th of April, all in the year 1881. The usual time for transporting potatoes, the distance assumed to be carried by the defendant, was from four to six days. All the damages sustained by the plaintiffs for the negligence of the defendant was by reason of the detention of the several cars, and not by reason of any injury inflicted after their arrival at the destination, except, in one instance, where the car was never attempted to be delivered to the plaintiffs. On the 21st day of May, 1881, the plaintiffs' assignors wrote a letter to the defendant, in which they stated that the potatoes were detained, and had not arrived; and that it was causing them heavy loss; and that they intended to look to some one to pay the damages. Upon the receipt of that letter, and on May 25, 1881, the defendant made this communication to the plaintiffs' assignors:
"GRAND TRUNK RAILWAY OF CANADA,
"Assistant General Freight Agent's Oeeice
" (Kingston, East).
" Montreal, May 25, 1881,
" Gentlemen. — Your favor of the 21st at hand. I am sorry with regard to the detention of your potatoes. No doubt you are aware that this has arisen through causes over which we had no control, namely, the strike of railway employees in Chicago.
"Yours truly,
"GEORGE B. REEYE,
"A. G. F. A.
" Messrs. J. H. Shanley & Co., 183 East Mann St., Rochester, JR. Y."
All of these cars of freight, with the exception of the car which was lost, had arrived at their destination at the time of the writing of the letter by Shanley & Co. to the defendant; that letter, though its contents are doubtless imperfectly given, owing to the refusal of the defendant to produce it, is broad enough, under the circumstances, to cover all claims to damage which Shanley & Co. had sustained by reason of the delays in the transportation, and the defendant manifestly so regarded it; for instead of placing its denial of liability upon the ground now sought to be set up in its behalf, or on the ground of insufficiency of details of the claim, the defendant placed it wholly upon the proposition that it was absolutely absolved from liability by reason of the labor strikes at or near Chicago, which claim was wholly untenable. This, too, was a waiver of the condition; that a waiver may be made by not insisting upon its fulfillment, or by circumstances, is abundantly established by authority.
In the case of Hermann v. Niagara Fire Insurance Company (100 N. Y., 411), the policy required notice of a loss to be served forthwith on the company. It accepted final proof of loss, without objection that this condition had not been complied with, basing its refusal to pay on the ground that the policy had been canceled. It was held that a strict compliance with the provision had been waived. In the case of Griffey v. The New York Central Insurance Company (100 N. Y., 417) there was a like provision in the policy that notice of any loss should be given forthwith, and it was held that if the holder gave notice without unreasonable delay he was in time. So in the case of Barnum v. Merchants' Fire Insurance Company (97 N. Y., 188), the assured was required by the policy to produce, with the proofs of loss, a certificate of a magistrate or notary public most contiguous to the place of the fire, and not concerned in the loss, stating certain particulars in reference thereto. The certificate accompanying the proofs was of a notary residing within 400 feet of the fire. It appeared, however, that there was another notary who lived nearer. No defect in this respect was pointed out by the defendant until after the commencement of the action. It was held that it was then too late to raise the objection. In the case of Ames v. New York Union Insurance Company (14 N. Y., 253) it appeared that the proofs of loss were required to be furnished within thirty days after the fire, and the company had ninety days thereafter in which either to pay or to object to the sufficiency of the proofs. If objection to the proofs was made, it was competent for the insured to supply any defect by further proof. By the twelfth condition of the policy, any action thereon was required to be brought within six months after the loss. Thus it will be seen that the company could, and in that particular instance did, actually so manipulate the ninth and twelfth conditions printed in its policy that the plaintiff would be required to furnish further proofs of loss, so as to be satisfactory to the insurance company, at a time beyond the six months limited by the twelfth clause, provided the company insisted upon the ninety days which was accorded it in which to pay the loss, and this would so tide the matters over the short statute of limitations of six months that no action could finally be brought upon the policy. It was held that the action might be maintained after the expriation of the six-months limitation.
Moreover, the condition in question, even though not waived and pleaded, is not available to the defendant under the circumstances, as the referee has properly held. It was not intended by the officers of the company to apply, when the agreement of the company was to transport freight so far from the place of shipment and beyond the defendant's fine. The time limited, in which to ascertain the particulars of the loss and place them before the company, was palpably too short to enable the owners to comply therewith, when deliveries were made so far off. The plaintiffs cannot be bound by a clause on the bach of the shipping bill, which, apparently by inadvertence, had not been struck out or adapted to long hauls over other railways than its own, and to deliveries at great distances from its western terminus, under a special contract which was outside of the company's general business and against its printed regulations.
In the case of Jackson v. The St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Company (99 N. Y., 124) the plaintiff, who was the receiver of the Patterson Fire Insurance Company, brought an action upon a policy of reinsurance taken out by the Patterson company upon certain property in California. The blank form which was used in the policy of reinsurance was that of the ordinary policy of insurance, and contained the condition that no action should be begun thereon until after an award had been made, as specified in the policy, fixing the amount of the claim, nor unless the action was begun within twelve months after the loss. It was held that the condition had application to the contract of primitive insurance only, and not to a contract of reinsurance. This case is sufficient authority for us to hold that the mere circumstance of the existence on the back of a contract of affreightment of a condition does not work a forfeiture in cases where manifestly it was not intended to apply, and where it remained only on account of the inadvertence of parties to strike out, so as to conform to an agreement which was not contemplated by the author of the blank form.
I think the judgment was right, and that it should be affirmed.
Dwight, J., concurred.