Case Name: KITCHEN v. STATE
Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1921-10-08
Citations: 267 S.W. 497
Docket Number: (No. 8161.)
Parties: KITCHEN v. STATE.
Judges: 
Reporter: South Western Reporter
Volume: 267
Pages: 497–499

Head Matter:
KITCHEN v. STATE.
(No. 8161.)
(Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
Oct. 8, 1921.
Rehearing Denied Dec. 3, 1924.
Application to File Second Rehearing Denied Jan. 14, 1925.)
1. Criminal law <&wkey;982 — Suspended sentence privilege denied prisoners over 25 years of age when convicted.
Acts 37th Leg. (1st Called Sess. 1921) c. 61, § 2d (Vernon’s Ann. Pen. Code Supp. 1922, art. 588%&4), denying suspended sentence privilege to persons over 25 years of age, convicted of sale of intoxicating liquor, applies to age at time of conviction, not time of offense.
On Motion for Rehearing.
2. Criminal law <&wkey;823(2)— Charge “words need not be spoken to constitute a sale, it may he inferred from the conduct of the parties,” not harmful in view of other charge.
Charge “words need not be spoken to constitute a sale, it may be inferred from the conduct of the parties,” held not harmful, as on weight of evidence in view of other charge.
3. Indictment and information &wkey;>!69 — Testimony as to prior purchase of whisky by witness held admissible.
Testimony that witness purchased whisky from accused three weeks prior to present transaction held admissible under indictment that accused sold whisky to such witness.
Appeal from District Court, Garza County; Clark M. Mullican, Judge.
Oliver Kitchen was convicted of the sale o5t intoxicating liquor, and he appeals.
Affirmed.
J. IT. Cunningham, of Abilene, for appellant.
Tom Garrard, State’s Atty., and Grover C. Morris, Asst. State’s Atty., both of Austin, for the State.

Opinion:
HAWKINS, J.
Conviction is for the sale of intoxicating liquor; punishment, one year in the penitentiary. Appellant filed application for suspended sentence, in which it was averred that he was less than 25 years of age when the offense was committed and the indictment returned, but did not allege that he was under such age at the time of trial; because of failure to so allege the state moved to dismiss the plea. The court found upon hearing the motion that appellant was over 25 years of age at the date of trial, but under said age when the offense was committed and indictment returned. Upon ascertaining these facts the plea for suspended sentence was stricken out, and this action of the court is assigned as error.
Section 2d, c. 61, Acts 1st Called Sess. 37th Leg. (Vernon's Ann. Pen. Code Supp. 1922, art. SSS^al), provides that no peráon over 25 years of age who jnay be convicted of violating any provision of the act prohibiting the manufacture, sale, etc., of intoxicating liquor, shall have the benefit of the suspended sentence law. We think the age at the time of trial controls, and that the court committed no error in striking out the plea of suspended sentence; In Davis v. State, 93 Tex. Cr. R. 192, 246 S. W. 395, it was said:
"By the terms of chapter 61, General Laws of the First and Second Called Sessions of the Thirty-Seventh Legislature, the benefit of suspended sentence is denied to any person convicted of a violation of the present liquor law, who at the time of such conviction is over 25 years of age."
This was reaffirmed in Blonk v. State, 93 Tex. Cr. R. 638, 248 S. W. 375. In Holdman v. State, 94 Tex. Cr. R. 433, 251 S. W. 218, is found the following statement:
"The offense with which he was charged was not within the operation of the suspended sentence statute if the accused was, in fact, over 25 years of age. It is not shown by a bill of exceptions that he was under that ag'e. The motion is not verified by affidavit and contains no recital touching the age of the appellant at the time of the trial. It should be made known to this court that he was under 25 years of age at the time of his trial, otherwise the suspended sentence law would have no application to him and the action of the trial court deprived him 'of no right, and the granting of a new trial would serve no useful purpose."
Holdman's Case is cited with approval in Davidson v. State, 95 Tex. Cr. R. 638, 255 S. W. 404. See, also, Rhodes v. State (Tex. Cr. App.) 262 S. W. 753; Boyd v. State (Tex. Cr. App.) 262 S. W. 499; Davidson v. State, 95 Tex. Cr. R. 638, 255 S. W. 404; Boortz v. State, 95 Tex. Cr. R. 479, 255 S. W. 434; Hooper v. State, 94 Tex. Civ. App. 278, 250 S. W. 694.
We find-no statement of facts in the rec-, ord, and the absence thereof renders it impossible for us to pass upon the objection to the charge defining a "sale." What would be a proper definition under some state of facts would be entirely inapplicable under other circumstances, and, not being apprised of the evidence in the case, we must assume the charge given was a proper one. The same applies to the complaint at the reception of certain evidence set out in bill of exception No. 2. The bill states the grounds upon which objections to the evidence were urged, but the existence of the facts upon which the objections were based is not certified. Necessarily, in this condition of the bill, and in the absence of the facts proven, this court 'has no way of ascertaining the force of the complaint.
The judgment is affirmed.
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