Case Name: Katherine E. HAMMOND, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Jo Anne B. BARNHART, Commissioner of the Social Security Administration, Defendant-Appellee
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 2005-05-17
Citations: 132 F. App'x 6
Docket Number: No. 04-20107
Parties: Katherine E. HAMMOND, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Jo Anne B. BARNHART, Commissioner of the Social Security Administration, Defendant-Appellee.
Judges: 
Reporter: West's Federal Appendix
Volume: 132
Pages: 6–7

Head Matter:
Katherine E. HAMMOND, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Jo Anne B. BARNHART, Commissioner of the Social Security Administration, Defendant-Appellee.
No. 04-20107.
United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.
Decided May 17, 2005.
Morgan & Weisbrod, William L. Fouche, Jr., Law Offices of William Fouche, Dallas, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
Tasha W. Stevenson, Social Security Administration Office of General Counsel, Dallas, TX, for Defendant-Appellee.
Before DAVIS, SMITH, and DeMOSS, Circuit Judges.

Opinion:
On Petition for Rehearing
PER CURIAM:
IT IS ORDERED that the petition for rehearing is DENIED. We do, however, elect to comment on two points raised in the petition.
In her petition for rehearing, Hammond argues that Istre v. Apfel, 208 F.3d 517 (5th Cir.2000), stands for the proposition that the good cause requirement applies only to cases brought under sentence (6) of § 405(g), in which new evidence is presented for the first time in the district court. Although that happens to be the procedural posture of this case, we do not read the important holding of the opinion in that way. Instead, Istre holds that there are no permissible bases for remand other than under sentences (4) and (6) of § 405(g). The district court did not remand here, so Istre is inapplicable. In other words, Istre concerned the circumstances under which a case may be remanded, not the circumstances under which it must be remanded.
Also in her petition for rehearing, Hammond argues that "new evidence submitted to the Appeals Council justifies reversal." Hammond indeed introduces evidence that would have been material, had the date of the hearing been later. We, however, cannot deem evidence material insofar as it details the alleged worsening of a claimant's condition after the date of the hearing. This is not to say that we cannot consider any evidence post-dating a hearing, but that medical evidence must shed light on the severity of a claimant's medical condition before the hearing.