Case Name: In re ROUSE et al. HOPKINS et al. v. ROUSE
Court: Florida Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1953-06-02
Citations: 66 So. 2d 42
Docket Number: 
Parties: In re ROUSE et al. HOPKINS et al. v. ROUSE.
Judges: TERRELL, SEBRING and DREW, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 66
Pages: 42–52

Head Matter:
In re ROUSE et al. HOPKINS et al. v. ROUSE.
Supremo Court of Florida, en Banc.
June 2, 1953.
Hoffman, Kemper & Johnson, Miami, for petitioners.
Ruff & Ready, Miami, for respondent.
RedFearn & Ferrell, Miami, as amicus curiae.

Opinion:
ROBERTS, Chief Justice.
We here review, on certiorari, an order of the Circuit Court of Dade County quashing and setting aside an order of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of that county respecting the custody of minor children resident therein. A chronology of the events culminating in the order complained of is as follows:
The petitioner, Martha Welsh Hopkins, is the mother of the minor children and the respondent, John Luke Rouse, is the father. These parties were divorced by a final decree of the Circuit Court of Dade County in June 1950, which decree also awarded the custody of the children to the father. The mother subsequently married the petitioner, James Hopkins; and on May 7, 1951, she filed in the Circuit Court of Dade County a petition for modification of the final decree so as to have the custody of the children transferred to her. By an order dated May 9, 1951, the Chancellor, of his own motion, transferred the proceedings to the Dade County Juvenile and Domestic Court. No appeal was taken by the father from this order of transferral.
It appears that, in the proceedings had before the judge of the Juvenile Court, counsel for the father made an oral motion attacking the constitutionality of the Act establishing the court and questioning its jurisdiction of the cause. This motion.was denied, and the judge entered his order denying the mother's petition, but without prejudice to her applying within a reasonable length of time thereafter, upon a showing of changed conditions, for a modification of the custody provisions of the decree. This order was entered on November 2, 1951.
On May 1'5, 1952, the mother filed in the Juvenile Court a petition seeking to have the custody of the children awarded to her during the summer months. The judge granted such petition by an order dated May 23, 1952. In this latter proceeding, no attack was made by the father, either orally or by written pleading, on the jurisdiction of the Juvenile Court.
The Juvenile Court order of May 23, 1952, was reviewed by the Circuit Court of Dade County on the father's petition for the writ of certiorari; and, on August 8, 1952, an "Opinion and Order" was entered by the judge of said court, in which it was held that the Juvenile Court had no jurisdiction to grant the order of May 23, 1952, which order was thereupon set aside. It is this order of August 8, 1952, which we here review.
The Juvenile "nd Domestic Relations Court of Dade County (herein referred to as the "Juvenile Court"), as presently established, was authorized by Chapter 27,000, Laws of Florida, Acts of 1951, which is a population act applicable only to counties having a population of over 350,000. The principal questions here are: (1) Is such act valid as a general act of local applica tion, within the meaning of sections 20 and 21 of Article III of our Constitution, F. S.A.; and (2) If valid, did the act, by its terms, confer jurisdiction upon the Juvenile Court in proceedings of this nature?
Chapter 27,000, supra, was enacted by the Legislature pursuant to the constitutional authority granted by section SO of Article V of the Constitution, adopted at the general election in 1950. By this constitutional amendment, it was provided that
"The Legislature shall have power to create and establish Juvenile Courts in such County or Counties or Districts within the State as it may deem proper, and to define the jurisdiction and powers of such courts and the officers thereof, and to vest in such courts exclusive original jurisdiction of all or any criminal cases where minors under any age specified by the Legislature from time to time are accused, including the right to define any or all offenses committed by any such persons as acts of delinquency instead of crimes;
It is here contended that Chapter 27000 violates those provisions of the Constitution respecting the enactment of special or local laws, sections 20 and 21 of Article III. This contention cannot be sustained.
The Act is a "population act," applicable "in any of those counties of this State which now have, or may hereafter have, a population of over 350,000 ." The yardstick to be applied in determining the validity of such Acts is stated in Waybright v. Duval County, 142 Fla. 875, 196 So. 430, 439, as follows:
"When classifications of counties for the enactment of general laws are based solely upon population alone, there should be a fair relation of such population, as to size or otherwise, to the purpose of the enactment, that justifies the particular legislative regulations for the county or counties as •classified only by population. A mere arbitrary classification of counties by population, to avoid the organic requirements for notice of proposed local laws or for other purposes, is not permitted by sections 20 and 21, Article III, in making legislative classifications for statutory regulations by general laws."
While there can be no doubt that the welfare of a child is just as important in the county of 350,000 population as it is in a county of 10,000 population, it is equally clear that the problem is not the same in the one county as in the other. This court can take judicial notice that in Dade County, which is the only county presently affected by the statute in question, the volume of divorce cases heard by the circuit judges in that judicial circuit is tremendous; and that in a large proportion of these cases, the custody and support of children is involved. The same thing can be said of the other large counties of this state, whose expected growth in population will soon bring them within the population bracket prescribed in Chapter 27000, supra.
In addition to the vast difference in the number of cases handled in the large and the small counties, it is also inescapable that the problems inherent in dealing with dependent children in a large urban area are more complex and difficult than in a small rural community.
The provisions of Chapter 27000 authorizing the various circuit judges in our larger counties to transfer all problems relating to the welfare of dependent children to a single court- — -where adequate investigation and supervision may be had by impartial probation officers of such court —is a wise and salutary one — one that is not arbitrary but, on the contrary, has been made necessary by, and is designed to dispose of, as fairly and expeditiously as possible, the large number of cases involving dependent children arising in such counties. There is "a fair relation of such population to the purpose of the enactment " and, as such, the statute is well within the rule of Waybright v. Duval County, supra.
The question then becomes: Did the Act confer jurisdiction upon the Juvenile Court in proceedings such as those involved in the instant case?
Section 3 of Chapter 27000 provides in part as follows:
" jn addition to the jurisdiction, power and authority now existing, or that shall hereafter be conferred thereon as Juvenile Courts, such courts shall hereafter have and possess the additional jurisdiction, power and authority to receive, investigate, hear and determine complaints, render judgment, and make lawful and reasonable orders for the enforcement thereof, involving any of the following: concerning the custody of any child present before the Court or residing in the county, when not in conflict with the jurisdiction assumed by any other court in such county, and to change such custody when deemed for the ivel-fare of such child-, ." (The emphasis is supplied.)
Section 9 of Chapter 27,000 provides that
"Whenever in any cause pending in any other Court in such County involving matters within the jurisdiction of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court, it may appear, in the furtherance of justice, for such cause to be transferred, and more appropriately considered and disposed of by the said Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court, the Judge of said Court in which said cause is pending, on his own motion may summarily transfer said cause by appropriate written order to the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court to be dealt with by said Court, under the provisions of this Act, in keeping with said order of transfer and the procedure of such Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court, which Cotirt shall thereafter hear and determine said cause as though the same had been originally initiated in said Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court. '» (The emphasis is supplied.)
It is here contended that the above-quoted provisions of section 3 is applicable only when the minor children are either dependent or. delinquent children. It is true that in that provision of section 3 giving to the Juvenile Court jurisdiction for the enforcement of custody or support decrees of other courts, the jurisdiction is expressly limited to those cases in which the child is "threatened with becoming dependent upon the public for support because of non-compliance with such decree or order, " ; but there is no such limitation upon the quoted provision of section 3. And, when considered in the light of the quoted provisions of section 9, supra, we think there can be no doubt that the Juvenile Court is given concurrent jurisdiction with the Circuit Court of cases involving child custody, regardless of the questions of dependency or delinquency.
Therefore, the only question here is whether the Juvenile Court assumed jurisdiction in conflict with that of any other court. And, clearly, it did not. Upon the presentation by the mother of her petition for modification of the decree, the Circuit Court, of its own motion, transferred the cause to the Juvenile Court — it yielded and abdicated its jurisdiction over the cause, as it was authorized to do by section 9 of the Act, quoted supra. Thus, the Juvenile Court had the power and authority to entertain the cause and to enter its order modifying the decree as to custody, as expressly provided by section 3, quoted supra.
For the reasons stated, certiorari is granted, the order of the Circuit Court, dated August 8, 1952, is quashed, and the order of the Juvenile Court of May 23, 1952, is reinstated, but without prejudice, of course to the father to re-apply upon a change of conditions for an order of modification.
TERRELL, SEBRING and DREW, JJ., concur.
THOMAS and MATHEWS, JJ., and WARREN, Associate Justice, dissent.