Case Name: William B. Parker, plaintiff in error, vs. Samuel D. Irvin, defendant in error
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia
Jurisdiction: Georgia
Decision Date: 1872-07
Citations: 47 Ga. 405
Docket Number: 
Parties: William B. Parker, plaintiff in error, vs. Samuel D. Irvin, defendant in error.
Judges: 
Reporter: Georgia Reports
Volume: 47
Pages: 405–414

Head Matter:
William B. Parker, plaintiff in error, vs. Samuel D. Irvin, defendant in error.
1. To avail himself of the statute of limitations, the defendant must plead it.
2. There being evidence to sustain the verdict in this case, a new trial will not be granted, on the ground that the verdict is contrary to evidence.
Warmer, Chief Justice, dissented.
Attorney and client. Suit for fees. Commissions. Before Judge Cole. Bibb Superior Court. October Term, 1871.
Samuel D. Irvin brought assumpsit against William B. Parker for $600 00 alleged to be due as attorney’s fees. The defendant pleaded the' general issue.
It appeared from the evidence, that in June, 1866, defendant placed in plaintiff’s hands for collection an execution issued from Dougherty Superior Court, on January 20th, 1857, in favor of defendant against Henry A. Scott, for the sum of $950 00, principal, and......dollars, interest, to January 1st, 1855, with interest from January 1st, 1855; that plaintiff learned from sources of information accessible only to himself, that Scott had a contract with the Southwestern Railroad to cut stringers, by which he was realizing a large sum per month, and that by serving 'a process of garnishment upon the railroad, plaintiff could enforce the collection of tfte fi. fa.; that Scott promised plaintiff to settle Parker’s claim in three payments, two of $600 00 each, and one of $557 00; that on October 25th, 1866, plaintiff collected from Scott $600 00, of which amount he retained $100 00; that on December 8th, 1866, Parker wrote to plaintiff the substance of an interview and settlement he had had with Scott, the letter concluding as follows: “ Resulting in my getting from him two drafts, or rather orders, for my certain balance, payable 25th January and the 25th of February, on the Southwestern Railroad Company ; and for which two orders, executed in my presence, and placed in my hands, I was to suspend for the present all further legal proceedings by so directing you, which I now do, until further advised by me to proceed, if necessary, henceforth that on December 22d, 1866, plaintiff replied to said letter as follows: “ I have been too much engaged in our Court since receiving yours, in reference to adjustment of claim on Henry A. Scott, to reply. You have a right to do as you please with your own, and, of course, what suits you, suits me. I only work for my clients’ interest, and in that case, felt perfectly independent of Dr. Scott, and he knew I had him where I could force him to do as I desired, and hence his approaching you in the way that he did. If you ever realize on those drafts, I shall congratulate you. As you have taken the case out of my hands after I had it secured, I shall expect compensation, of course, proportioned to the service rendered that plaintiff himself never collected on said fi. fa. more than $600 00. Richard K. Plines, Esq., and Richard Hobbs, Esq., attorneys at law, testified that Scott was insolvent; that the usual charges on an insolvent claim were $50 00 retainer, and from ten to fifteen per cent, upon the amount collected; that collecting $1,800 00, the full amount of an old debt in the face of relief, stay law and other repudiating Acts, is worth at least $450 00. William E. Smith, Esq., an attorney, testified as to the insolvency of Scott; that all collections from him was so much made; that he cannot state positively what would be a reasonable fee on a collection from Scott. Wash ington Poe, Esq., an attorney, testified that, under the circumstances, $300 00 would be a reasonable fee for securing the claim. James A. Nisbet, Esq., an attorney, .testified that, under the circumstances, he would consider twenty per cent, a reasonable fee; that in cases of great difficulty, where the defendant was insolvent, it was the custom to charge a considerably higher per cent, than in cases where these circumstances did not exist. Several letters from plaintiff to defendant were introduced in evidence, unnecessary to be here set forth. The garnishment affidavit, bond and summons were submitted to the jury. No signature is attached to the copy summons, and the record fails to disclose that the process of garnishment sued out was ever served.
The following verdict was returned : “ We the jury find for the plaintiff $250 00, with interest from suit, exclusive of, the $100 received.”
The defendant in propria persona moved for a new trial upon the following grounds, to-wit:
1st. That the verdict of the jury is contrary to law and evidence.
2d. That the verdict is illegal, null and void in this, that the verdict was, as defendant has reason to believe, not in accordance -with the views and convictions of the jurors of the right and justice between the parties, and was not unanimous, as the amount rendered for the plaintiff was not the result of calculation upon any correct basis whatever, the individuality of each juror being merged in a general aggregate mass by an early agreement, each juror giving his separate figures and adding them all, greatly diversified as to amounts, together, and dividing the -whole by the number twelve, thus leaving private judgment, conscience and law not properly conformed to — some of said jurors proposing greatly different amounts, and some nothing — the final result, the amount in their verdict rendered, having been arrived at more by chance than otherwise.
The motion for a new trial was overruled by the Court, and plaintiff in error excepted and assigns said ruling as error.
L. E. Bleckley, for plaintiff in error.
B. & W. B. Hill, for defendant.

Opinion:
Montgomery, Judge.
It is hardly necessary to elaborate the decision of the Court on the first point made in this case, that to avail himself of the statute of limitations, a defendant must plead it: Code, 3604.
The evidence shows that but for the services rendered by the plaintiff, (the defendant in error,) Parker would not have received his money. Several attorneys of high standing testify that the services rendered were worth from $300 00 to $450 00, or, to use the exact language of one of them, that under the circumstances, he would consider twenty per cent, a reasonable fee — one only putting it at as low as $300 00. The fact that Parker himself received the .money directly from his debtor, can make no difference. By whose skill was the debtor forced to pay, is the controlling question. It must be a prejudiced mind, indeed, that can read the testimony and come to any other conclusion than that the steps taken and threatened by the attorney forced the payment of the entire debt, as well that collected by the attorney, as that collected by Parker. So the jury seemed to think, and there is abundant evidence to sustain their verdict.
Let the judgment be affirmed.