Case Name: Timothy Ray HADDEN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1996-02-14
Citations: 670 So. 2d 77
Docket Number: No. 93-436
Parties: Timothy Ray HADDEN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: BOOTH, JOANOS, KAHN, MICKLE, and LAWRENCE, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 670
Pages: 77–92

Head Matter:
Timothy Ray HADDEN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. 93-436.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
Feb. 14, 1996.
As Corrected Feb. 20, 1996.
Nancy A Daniels, Public Defender; P. Douglas Brinkmeyer, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General; James W. Rogers, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Thomas Falkinburg, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.

Opinion:
EN BANC
MINER, Judge.
Appellant, Timothy Ray Hadden seeks review of his convictions and sentences on three counts of lewd and lascivious acts on a child under twelve years of age. Hadden's appellate counsel filed an initial brief in accordance with Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), and pursuant to State v. Causey, 503 So.2d 321 (Fla.1987), this court reviewed the record on appeal and ordered supplemental briefing on two issues: (1) whether the trial court's findings were sufficient to permit the introduction into evidence of the alleged child victim's hearsay statements; and (2) whether reversible error occurred when the trial court admitted expert testimony that the alleged child victim exhibited symptoms consistent with those of a child who had been sexually abused. Having considered the record and the responses to the Court's briefing order, we hold that the trial court's findings were sufficient to permit introduction of the child's hearsay statements and affirm on this point without further comment. Although we also affirm as to the second issue supplementally raised, we find that some further discussion is warranted.
Hadden was charged by amended information with three counts of sexual battery on a person under twelve years of age by vaginal penetration with his finger between November of 1990 and March of 1992 in violation of section 794.011(2), Florida Statutes. During the course of trial, the state proffered, out of the jury's presence, opinion testimony from veteran mental health counselor and school psychologist, Doug Jones, concerning the symptoms and diagnostic criteria typically associated with sexually abused children. Although Hadden accepted Jones as an expert in child abuse, he objected to this testimony, arguing that it lacked scientific reliability and that Mr. Jones failed to identify enough diagnostic criteria to give an adequate description of the child's condition. The state responded by citing to Ward v. State, 519 So.2d 1082 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988), wherein this court held that testimony similar to Jones' was admissible as circumstantial evidence that the child had been sexually abused. The trial court overruled Hadden's Frye objection and permitted Jones to testify before the jury, without objection, that the alleged victim exhibited symptoms similar to those of a child who had been sexually molested.
Before addressing this case on its merits, we deal first with whether objection to the subject testimony was both timely and sufficient as required by Correll v. State, 523 So.2d 562 (Fla.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 871, 109 S.Ct. 183, 102 L.Ed.2d 152 (1988). In that case, the prosecution sought to introduce the results of a blood test obtained using the electrophoresis method of testing. The defense raised a Frye objection at trial which was overruled. The supreme court agreed with the trial court that the defense objection was not timely or sufficient:
[W]e hold that when scientific evidence is to be offered which is of the same type that has already been received in a substantial number of other Florida cases, any inquiry into its reliability for purposes of admissibility is only necessary when the opposing party makes a timely request for such an inquiry supported by authorities indicating that there may not be general scientific acceptance of the technique employed.
Correll, 523 So.2d at 567. Because it was clear from the record before the court in Correll that the electrophoresis method at issue had been routinely admitted throughout Florida, and the state's expert had testified more than 70 times concerning such testing, the court concluded that the defense could not -surprise the state at trial with what, under the circumstances, must be deemed an unexpected Frye objection.
By contrast, the record in the case at bar contains nothing to indicate that evidence of the type here in question has regularly been admitted in Florida courts or was deemed routinely scientifically reliable at the time of Hadden's 1992 trial. Even if the timeliness of the defense objection in this case were disregarded, we believe that Correll is inapplicable to the instant facts.
Turning next to the merits, the pertinent parts of counselor/psychologist Jones' jury testimony are set out, as follows:
DIRECT EXAMINATION BEFORE THE JURY
Q. Mr. Jones, based upon your experience and training in sexual abuse cases, is it normal for say a child of ten who is the victim of sexual abuse to initially only reveal part of the sexual abuse and then as time goes on to reveal more of what occurred in the sexual abuse?
A. That is common.

Q. It would not be usual then based upon what you've testified to or would it be unusual or not for the — child to initially say there had only been fondling and then move on to indicate that there had [been] a penetration by the finger?
A. That is not uncommon.
Q. And have you had occasion to see T.H., the victim in this case?
A. Yes, I have, on May 13th was the initial visit.
Q. And how many times have you seen her since then?
A. Since that time it has been ten times.
Q. And for what purpose were you seeing T.H.?
A. Seeing her because of emotional adjustment type of issues at home and at school and related to an incident of alleged sexual molestation.
Q. Now, based upon your experience and training in this area, does she exhibit any of the symptoms of a child who has been sexually abused?
A. She does.
Q. And what symptoms are those?
A. Primary things are an unemotional recounting when asked specifically about this incident, flat affect, difficulty describing sometimes very specific details about when and where, those kinds of issues, a sense of guilt, sense of responsibility in ways, number of issues that have to do with a child's reaction to an adult peipetrator.
⅜ * ⅜ ⅜ ⅜ ⅜
A. Now, would it be consistent or not consistent for a child who had been a victim of sexual abuse to continue to go over to the place where she has been sexually abused if she were going over there to see someone other than the person who had abused her such as a friend or something?
A. That's not unusual.
CROSS EXAMINATION
Q. So, doctor, what you're saying is that it's your opinion that this girl was sexually abused?
A. She has the symptoms of a child who has been molested.
(Emphasis added).
In his supplemental brief, appellant cites to the supreme court's decision in Flanagan v. State, 625 So.2d 827 (Fla.1993), as support for the proposition that this court's opinion in Ward, supra, is no longer viable and thus cannot support the trial court's ruling regarding the disputed evidence in the case at hand. We find this argument to be without merit. Ward involved testimony by a clinical psychologist relating to symptoms generally exhibited by children who are sexually abused and that psychologist's opinion that the child-victim in that case displayed symptoms typically seen in sexually abused children.
In Ward, the defendant had unsuccessfully objected to such testimony, arguing that it was unreliable because the field of child sexual abuse had not been adequately explored and developed to such a point as to permit a reasonable opinion in the premises, that the expert's conclusion lent creditability to the child's testimony and that the subject of the expert's testimony required no expertise not already possessed by the jury.
In affirming the trial court's ruling admitting this evidence, this court applied the three-point test contained in Hawthorne v. State, 408 So.2d 801 (Fla. 1st DCA), rev. den., 415 So.2d 1361 (Fla.1982), when it found (1) that the expert was qualified to express an opinion in the matter; (2) that the subject area of child abuse was developed well enough to permit an expert to express an opinion; and (3) that child abuse is not so understandable that lay persons know as much about it as a properly qualified expert.
Subsequent to Ward, this court has had occasion to re-affirm the admissibility of expert testimony similar to that involved in Ward and the case at hand. See Calloway v. State, 520 So.2d 665, 668 (Fla. 1st DCA), rev. den., 529 So.2d 693 (Fla.1988); Brown v. State, 523 So.2d 729 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988). While suggesting that the time may be right to re-examine the use in Florida courts of expert testimony in child sex abuse cases, the Fifth District has also upheld the admissibility of such evidence. Taro v. State, 642 So.2d 78 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994). By contrast, the Second District has rejected such expert opinion testimony in cases involving older children on the ground that its primary purpose and effect is to bolster the credibility of the alleged victim. Ball v. State, 651 So.2d 1224 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995); Audano v. State, 641 So.2d 1356 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994); J.H.C. v. State, 642 So.2d 601 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994); Drawdy v. State, 644 So.2d 593 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994).
In Flanagan, supra, the case on which appellant relies to support his contention that Ward is no longer good law, the Supreme Court addressed two issues pertaining to the admissibility of pedophile profile testimony which concerned traits generally associated with perpetrators of child sexual abuse rather than victims of such abuse. The court made clear that it was concerned with the expert's testimony "about common characteristics of the home environment where sexual abuse occurs and about characteristics of abusers." Although both parties to this appeal argue that Flanagan and the case at bar are factually inappo-site, the fact is that Flanagan stands for the proposition that new and novel scientific evidence is no longer admissible in Florida unless it meets the test enunciated in Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C.Cir.1923), which requires that the scientific principle(s) undergirding such evidence be sufficiently established so as to have general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs. In concluding that the pedophile profile evidence offered in Flanagan did not meet the Frye standard, the court noted that the state did not attempt to satisfy the Frye test by citing eases or other authority showing that such profiles were accepted in the scientific community.
As we see it, the question with which we are faced is whether or not expert testimony of the type admitted below, which is admittedly scientific, is new and novel so as to require Frye testing before its admission? We believe that it is not, based upon State v. Townsend, 635 So.2d 949 (Fla.1994), which case was decided by the supreme court a year after Flanagan and which also involved child sexual abuse. Inter alia, Townsend unequivocally holds:
if relevant, a medical expert witness may testify as to whether, in the expert's opinion, the behavior of a child is consistent with the behavior of a child who has been sexually abused.
Id. at 958 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
In support of this proposition, the supreme comí cited with approval this court's opinion in Ward wherein the issue on appeal was the admissibility of expert testimony of the precise kind as that challenged below and on appeal in the case at bar and approved by a unanimous vote of the Florida Supreme Court in Townsend.
In our view, there are only two ways to interpret the above holding in Townsend, both of which militate against the position taken by appellant in his supplemental brief: (1) that the supreme court concluded that the type of testimony at issue in Ward, scientific though it was, was not so new or novel as to require Frye testing under Flanagan (hence the use of the prefatory words "if relevant") or (2) opinion testimony from an expert on the subject based upon training, experience and observation (as Flanagan holds) would be exempt from Frye testing.
The disputed testimony in the case at bar, like that in Ward, only addresses whether the "the behavior of a child is consistent with the behavior of a child who has been sexually abused." This differs from the pedophile (proclivity) profile evidence condemned in Flanagan where the disputed testimony was intended to and did identify the defendant as the likely perpetrator. The testimony at bar is innocuous by comparison in that it only demonstrates circumstantially that sexual abuse has occurred without identifying a likely perpetrator or that the abuse took place at the time and place charged. Given the clear language in Townsend with its favorable cite to Ward, we conclude that the holding in Flanagan is inapplicable to the type of testimony below.
Even if the conclusion above be found erroneous and the distinction set out in Flanagan (i.e., opinion vs. profile/syndrome) is found to be applicable to this kind of testimony thereby draining Ward of its continuing viability as appellant suggests, it is at best unclear how Jones' trial testimony below could be categorized as profile/syndrome so as to require Frye testing under Flanagan. His testimony was couched in terms of his experience and training in child sex abuse cases. After explaining that he had ten or so visits with the child victim, he testified that, based upon his training and experience, the child exhibited symptoms indicating that she had been sexually abused. Although the witness went on to describe the symptoms he observed, he did not do so in terms of syndrome or profile. He did refer to certain studies during the course of his proffered testimony, but the jury did not hear any reference to profile syndrome or to studies on the subject. Thus, it is clear that Jones' trial testimony did not imply infallibility or suggest to jurors that they should give his conclusions undue weight because they were based on presumably tried and true scientific method as opposed to merely the expert's own experience. (See Flanagan at p. 828). Had Jones testified that the child victim had been sexually abused because she happened to fit a profile or syndrome expounded upon by another expert in the field, arguably a good case could be made for Frye testing under Flanagan. However, we believe it clear that Jones' trial testimony was phrased in terms of an opinion based upon his own experience and observation. Consequently, no Frye testing was required.
To summarize, in view of the supreme court's opinion in Townsend, we re-affirm this court's commitment to the proposition stated in Ward that, if the relevance of such testimony is not outweighed by its prejudice to the defendant, a properly qualified expert witness may testify in a child sex abuse case brought under section 794.011(2), Florida Statutes, that the alleged child victim exhibits symptoms consistent with those displayed by a child who has been sexually abused. While we affirm appellant's conviction and the sentences imposed upon him, we believe there is some merit in the Fifth District's suggestion that the supreme court may wish to re-define the parameters of expert testimony in eases of this type, particularly in the light of what may be described as both inter-district and intra-district philosophical cracks that are beginning to appear in Florida's heretofore adopted position in favor of broad admissibility of such evidence. Accordingly, we certify the following question to the Florida Supreme Court as one of great public importance:
IN VIEW OF THE SUPREME COURT'S HOLDING IN TOWNSEND V STATE, DOES FLANAGAN V. STATE REQUIRE APPLICATION OF THE FRYE STANDARD OF ADMISSIBILITY TO TESTIMONY BY A QUALIFIED PSYCHOLOGIST THAT THE ALLEGED VICTIM IN A CHILD SEX ABUSE CASE EXHIBITS SYMPTOMS CONSISTENT WITH THOSE OF A CHILD WHO HAS BEEN SEXUALLY ABUSED?
BOOTH, JOANOS, KAHN, MICKLE, and LAWRENCE, JJ., concur.
BENTON, J., concurs in result and in certification.
WOLF, J., specially concurs with opinion and concurs in certification.
ERVIN, J., dissents with opinion, in which ZEHMER, C.J., and BARFIELD, ALLEN, WEBSTER, DAVIS, and VAN NORTWICK, JJ., concur.
ZEHMER, C.J., concurs in certification.
. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C.Cir.1923).
. We believe the fact that this case dealt with the admission of battered wife syndrome evidence is of no consequence. The Hawthorne test remains viable where the admissibilily of so-called syndrome evidence is at issue. Also to be noted is that the second prong of the Hawthorne test encompasses the Frye test. State v. Hickson, 630 So.2d 172, 174 n. 4 (Fla.1993).
. Out of the presence of the jury, the prosecutor established counselor/psychologist Jones' qualifications in the area of child sex abuse and tendered him as an expert. Defense counsel asked to voir dire the witness regarding his expert credentials and then proceeded to question him closely about what testimony he intended to give. The prosecutor objected that counsel was going beyond credential voir dire but was overruled. Defense counsel then elicited virtually the same testimony that Jones later gave before the jury. At the conclusion of this "voir dire " questioning, defense counsel asked rhetorically: "So you're basically testifying from your experience?" The witness responded: "That's true."