Case Name: Paul Donald WIGHT, Appellant, v. Melissa Anne WIGHT, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 2004-04-28
Citations: 880 So. 2d 692
Docket Number: No. 2D02-4036
Parties: Paul Donald WIGHT, Appellant, v. Melissa Anne WIGHT, Appellee.
Judges: KELLY, J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 880
Pages: 692–696

Head Matter:
Paul Donald WIGHT, Appellant, v. Melissa Anne WIGHT, Appellee.
No. 2D02-4036.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
April 28, 2004.
Dorothy C. Venable and Edward M. Brennan of Gallagher & Howard, P.A., Tampa, for Appellant.
Ingrid Anderson and Ann Loughridge Kerr, Clearwater, for Appellee.

Opinion:
COVINGTON, Judge.
In this postjudgment dissolution proceeding, the husband appeals from an order awarding attorney's fees and costs to the wife. Because we agree that the trial court erred in establishing the amount of the attorney's fees, we reverse and remand for recalculation of the attorney's fees award.
After conducting discovery, the husband and wife entered into settlement negotiations hoping to resolve their disputes. Part of their agreement called for the husband to pay $3000 per month in child support and obtain, as security for this obligation, a $500,000 life insurance policy. Some time thereafter, since the husband did not obtain the life insurance policy, the wife filed several motions to enforce the agreement. In addition, the wife filed motions for contempt relying on the fact that the husband had not timely remitted the child support payments. Before the hearing on the contempt motions was held, the husband paid the arrearage and became current with respect to his obligations.
The wife's attorney then filed a motion for attorney's fees for the time spent litigating both the life insurance matter and the contempt issues. Pursuant to section 61.16(1), Florida Statutes (2000), the trial court awarded attorney's fees to the wife in the amount of $27,833.21. On appeal the husband raises several claims in support of his contention that the attorney's fees award should be set aside. While we affirm the award in all other respects, we do find merit to one of the husband's arguments.
A portion of the fee awarded to the wife included time billed for litigating the amount of attorney's fees. Relying on State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Palma, 629 So.2d 830, 833 (Fla.1993), the husband submits that while it may be permissible to award attorney's fees for litigating entitlement to fees, such an award should not include the time spent litigating the amount of the fees. In denying fees for fees, the Palma court reasoned that work performed by an attorney concerning the amount of the fee "inures solely to the attorney's benefit and cannot be considered services rendered in procuring full payment of the judgment." Id. at 833.
We are cognizant that under certain limited circumstances, Florida courts have determined that they are not bound by Pal-ma and have permitted the awarding of fees for litigating the amount of fees. See, e.g., Condren v. Bell, 853 So.2d 609 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003) (permitting fees for fees because the fee awarded was a sanction); Citibank Fed. Sav. Bank v. Sandel, 766 So.2d 302 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000) (permitting fees for fees because federal law controlled the award of fees); Diaz v. SantaFe Healthcare, Inc., 642 So.2d 765 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994) (permitting fees for fees in claim for lost wages filed pursuant to § 448.08, Fla. Stat. (1995)).
However, this court has declined to apply Palma only to contingency fee actions or to otherwise limit Palma's holding. We have denied fees for litigating the amount of fees in a number of different contexts. See, e.g., Fleet Servs. Corp. v. Reise, 857 So.2d 273 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003) (concerning fees sought pursuant to § 57.105, Fla. Stat. (1997), in a case involving the collection of a promissory note); Barron Chase Sec., Inc. v. Moser, 794 So.2d 649 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001) (involving arbitration award against securities dealer pursuant to § 517.211(6), Fla. Stat. (1997)); Nat'l Portland Cement Co. v. Goudie, 718 So.2d 274 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998) (denying fees for litigating amount of fees in wrongful termination action filed pursuant to § 448.08, Fla. Stat. (1995)); and Pelaez v. Persons, 664 So.2d 1022 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995) (denying fees for litigating amount of fees sought pursuant to § 45.061, Fla. Stat. (1987), in an action involving breach of home repair contract).
This court is not alone in its interpretation of Palma. Generally speaking, courts throughout Florida have interpreted Pal-ma to apply not only to contingency fee cases, but to other matters as well. See, e.g., Mediplex Constr. of Fla., Inc. v. Schaub, 856 So.2d 13, 14 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003) (barring fees for fees under § 57.105(7), Fla. Stat. (2003), in contract dispute); Oruga Corp., Inc. v. AT & T Wireless of Fla., Inc., 712 So.2d 1141, 1145 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998) (barring fees for fees under offer of judgment statute § 768.79(6)(a), Fla. Stat. (1995)); Dep't of Transp. v. Robbins & Robbins, Inc., 700 So.2d 782, 785 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997) (barring fees for fees under § 73.091 and 73.092, Fla. Stat. (1993), in eminent domain proceeding).
We recognize that Palma was a case against an insurance carrier involving a contingency fee, while the case at bar is a dissolution proceeding. However, the fact that this is an hourly fee case, as opposed to a contingency fee case, should not make a difference. McMahan v. Toto, 311 F.3d 1077, 1085 (11th Cir.2002) cert. denied sub nom. Nemesis Veritas, L.P. v. Toto, 539 U.S. 914, 123 S.Ct. 2273, 156 L.Ed.2d 129 (2003). In McMahan, the party who sought fees for litigating the amount of fees argued that because his was an hourly fee case and Palma was a contingency fee case, Palma's reasoning should not apply. Id. at 1086. The Eleventh Circuit, applying Florida law, was tasked with deciding whether Palma was distinguishable. Id. The court analyzed Palma and concluded that its holding applied to hourly fee cases as well as contingency fee cases. Id. The McMahan court stated, "[T]he Florida Supreme Court has explained that whether attorney's fees should be awarded for litigating the amount of fees due depends on the purpose of the statute under which the fees are sought; it does not depend on the method of calculating them. Palma, 629 So.2d at 833." McMahan, 311 F.3d at 1086.
"In awarding fees for litigating all issues relating to attorney's fees, the federal courts have noted that such awards comport with the purpose behind most statutory fee authorizations, namely to encourage attorneys to represent indigent clients." Palma, 629 So.2d at 833. Following the Palma court's analysis, if a statute's intent is to promote the representation of the poor, attorneys would be permitted to recoup fees for litigating the amount of fees. However, when the purpose of the statute is " 'to discourage the contesting of valid claims against insurance companies and to reimburse successful insureds for their attorney's fees,' " such fees are not recoverable. Palma, 629 So.2d at 833 (quoting Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Lexow, 602 So.2d 528, 531 (Fla.1992)).
In a dissolution proceeding, the determination of an appropriate attorney's fee is governed by section 61.16, Florida Statutes, which specifically provides that "the financial resources of both parties" are to be considered in awarding attorney's fees. Unlike the federal statutes referred to in Palma, there is no indication of legislative intent in this statute to encourage lawyers to represent indigent clients. Rather, "[t]he statute's purpose is to ensure that both parties possess a similar ability to retain competent legal counsel." Lopez v. Lopez, 780 So.2d 164, 166 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001).
The rule limiting fees for fees has the advantage of encouraging parties to litigate fees in an efficient manner. If litigants are able to obtain fees for litigating the amount of fees, then the party who expects to win lacks an incentive not to excessively litigate the issue. The opposing party is left with little choice but to do the same. While there certainly are valid reasons why fees should be awarded for litigating the amount of fees, it is the role of the legislature, rather than the courts, to broaden the statute. See Palma, 629 So.2d at 833; Mediplex, 856 So.2d at 15.
Because we find that Palma controls, we reverse on this issue and remand for the trial court to recalculate the award, eliminating those fees incurred for time spent litigating the amount of attorney's fees. In all other respects the order of the trial court is affirmed.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
KELLY, J., concurs.
SILBERMAN, J., concurs specially.
. In Goudie, this court certified conflict with Diaz.