Case Name: Robert Earl MAGNESS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CADDO PARISH POLICE JURY, Defendant-Appellant
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1975-04-01
Citations: 318 So. 2d 117
Docket Number: No. 12562
Parties: Robert Earl MAGNESS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CADDO PARISH POLICE JURY, Defendant-Appellant.
Judges: Before AYRES, BOLIN, and DENNIS, JJ-
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 318
Pages: 117–125

Head Matter:
Robert Earl MAGNESS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CADDO PARISH POLICE JURY, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 12562.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Second Circuit.
April 1, 1975.
On Rehearing Sept. 3, 1975.
John A. Richardson, Dist. Atty., Lawrence M. Johnson, Asst. Dist. Atty., Shreveport, for defendant-appellant.
Hal V. Lyons, Shreveport, for plantiff-appellee.
Before AYRES, BOLIN, and DENNIS, JJ-

Opinion:
AYRES, Judge.
By this action plaintiff seeks, through injunctive process, to maintain the status quo of a noncomforming use of a described ten-acre tract of land as a motor-home park. Plaintiff's position is that when he acquired the property in 1970 and began its improvement as a motor-home park there was no applicable zoning ordinance affecting the property.
In reconvention, defendant contends that plaintiff's property, now located within a distance of five miles of the corporate boundary of the City of Shreveport, is subject to a comprehensive zoning ordinance and that under its provisions the property is classified as "R-A," that is, "Residential-Agricultural." On a basis of this contention defendant seeks, also by injunctive relief, compliance on the part of plaintiff with the provisions of the aforesaid ordinance.
After trial of this cause upon its merits, the court concluded that plaintiff had established his nonconforming use of the property and consequently rendered judgment in plaintiff's favor enjoining and prohibiting defendant from restraining plaintiff from its aforesaid use. From the judgment thus rendered and signed, defendant prosecutes this appeal.
It is defendant's contention on this appeal that by ordinance effective March 29, 1972, plaintiff's property theretofore lying outside the boundaries of the five-mile area over which the Metropolitan Planning Commission had authority was extended to include this property within the zoning area, and that, under the terms of the zoning ordinance, in order for a structure to acquire and maintain a nonconforming use status, it was necessary that the construction thereof must have commenced prior to the extension of the zoning limits and should have been completed within two years of the extension of the limits.
The defenses are (1) that the improvements contemplated by plaintiff were not begun prior to March 29, 1972, the effective date of the ordinance extending the boundaries of the area over which the Planning Commission had jurisdiction, and (2) that the improvements were not completed within the prescribed two-year period, that is, on or before March 29, 1974.
Pertinent facts established in the record may be first briefly reviewed. The property was acquired by plaintiff in 1970 for the purpose of developing a motor-home park. This was prior to the extension of the Metropolitan Planning Commission's authority over the property. Soon after acquisition of the property, plaintiff, during the year 1970, began and pursued the construction of the improvements thereon which culminated in the construction of the motor-home park. A site was cleared for the construction; plans were drawn; water wells were drilled; and spaces for two or three trailer homes were made available, serviced with electricity and by septic tanks for sewage disposal. Although the work was intermittent and somewhat spasmodic, dependent upon plaintiff's ability, and delayed because of his illness, all of the above was accomplished prior to March 29, 1972, the date the zoning ordinance became effective as to plaintiff's property.
The record further discloses that in the meantime provision had been made for the connection of plaintiff's sewer line with that of an adjoining motor-home park. The connection had not been made by the time of trial due to the delay in the completion' of the neighboring oxidation or disposal plant which awaited approval by the appropriate health authority. Nevertheless, on plaintiff's tract, underground pipe for sew erage and water lines was laid and water meters installed, all of sufficient capacity to serve many motor-park homes. Electrical service was assured and available, but not installed on an individual basis until needed. Three mobile homes were located on the property prior to the expiration of the two-year period, that is, prior to March 29, 1974. These, for sewage disposal, were served by the use of septic tanks.
Hugh D. Wells, a representative of the Metropolitan Planning Commission, testified from proof furnished him that plaintiff's construction had begun before the effective date of the zoning ordinance. Such finding is corroborated by the details of the construction to which we have referred.
The question remains, however, as to whether the construction continued to completion within two years following the effective date of the ordinance. Construction continued during the next two years and the work and improvements were accomplished as related hereinabove. Defendant contends, as heretofore noted, that the improvements had to be completed within the two-year period following the effective date of the zoning ordinance. Wells was questioned as to the criteria for determining "completion of construction." His answer was "minimum compliance — minimum facilities."
Completion of an improvement of the character undertaken here is relative. When more tenants arrive and seek to rent space for their mobile homes, more driveways and other facilities are provided. Completion, therefore, is a relative term. Constant expansion and improvement are contemplated and undertaken as the facility grows and demands for its services increase.
With respect to neighboring mobile-home parks, the record shows they are not yet fully completed. A similar situation exists with respect to plaintiff's project — expansion and improvement are contemplated. Plaintiff relies for compliance with the zoning ordinance upon a definition of a "trailer-court" contained in the zoning ordinance : "Any premises used or set apart for the purpose of supplying to the public parking space for one or more trailer coaches for living and sleeping purposes...."
The record leaves no doubt as to plaintiff's substantial compliance with the requirements of the ordinance. Spaces were provided for and actually used by two or three mobile-home occupants. They were provided with electricity, water, and provisions for sewage disposal through underground septic tanks.
In this connection it appears appropriate to observe that the two or three other motor-home parks with respect to which evidence was given have, under similar circumstances, been accepted and treated by the Commission as completed within the terms of the ordinance. No other view would permit the extension, expansion, or improvement of mobile-home parks so as to accommodate the public to the evergrowing need or increase for such services. We are not impressed that it was the intention of the zoning ordinance to prohibit an extension, expansion, or improvement of services.
The trial court held that plaintiff had met the minimum requirements for the establishment of a mobile-home park. With this conclusion, we are in accord. The principle is well established in this State that zoning ordinances are in derogation of the rights of private ownership and, as they curtail and limit the use of property, they are to be strictly construed in favor of the property owner or possessor. Where exemptions appear they are to be most liberally construed in the property owner's favor. City of Crowley v. Prejean, 173 So.2d 832 (La.App., 3d Cir., 1965); Roberts v. Jefferson Parish Council, 235 So.2d 131 (La.App., 4th Cir., 1970).
In the City of Crowley v. Prejean, supra, Judge Tate, author of the majority opinion, now an associate justice of the Supreme Court, stated in substance that a rule forbidding the enlargement or extension of a nonconforming use, with respect to zoning ordinances, does not prevent an increase in the amount of use within the same area, so that a nonconforming use may not only be continued but also increased in volume and intensity, and that a nonconforming use is not limited to the precise magnitude thereof which existed at the date of the ordinance. It was accordingly held that a nonconforming use permissible under a zoning enactment is not limited to the extent of such prior use on which the nonconforming status of the land is based and the owner of the nonconforming tract is thus ordinarily entitled to increase the amount and extent of such use within the nonconforming tract, unless the zoning regulation provides otherwise.
In the cited case, it was held that where a nonconforming use resulted from the rental of a residential tract for one house trailer, the nonconforming status of the tract entitled the landowners to operate a trailer court not limited to a single house trailer but that the landowner was entitled to increase the extent of the nonconforming use within the nonconforming tract to rental space for two or more house trailers.
The instant case, in our opinion, is subject to and is governed by the aforesaid principles enunciated in the City of Crowley case. See the authorities therein cited.
For the reasons assigned, we find no error in the judgment appealed. It is accordingly affirmed at such costs as are assessable against the defendant.
Affirmed.
DENNIS, J., dissents and assigns written reasons.