Case Name: RICE v. PETERS
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1908-11-11
Citations: 113 N.Y.S. 40
Docket Number: 
Parties: RICE v. PETERS.
Judges: 
Reporter: West's New York Supplement
Volume: 113
Pages: 40–42

Head Matter:
(128 App. Div. 776.)
RICE v. PETERS.
(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Department.
November 11, 1908.)
1. Landlord and Tenant (§ 331 )—Renting on Shares—Actions Between Parties—Accounting.
Where a lessor of a farm on shares sold the crops and received the proceeds, with the consent of the lessee, the lessee was entitled to an accounting ; the parties being tenants in common of the crops.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Landlord and Tenant, Dec. Dig. § 331.*]
2. Tenancy in Common (§ 37*)—Mutual Liabilities—Accounting.
A tenant in common receiving the common property, éither wrongfully or by consent, holds it as trustee for his co-tenant to the extent of the interest of the co-tenant, who may compel an accounting.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Tenancy in Common, Cent. Dig. § 106; Dec. Dig. § 37.*]
3. Account (§ 3*)—Joint Ventures—Accounting.
Plaintiff and defendant’s testator engaged in buying, training, and selling horses on the understanding that testator should advance the money, and that the profits should be shared equally. Plaintiff performed the contract and several horses were sold at a profit, and testator received the proceeds. Some were retained by testator for his own use which could have been sold at a profit. Held, that there was a joint venture authorizing plaintiff to compel an accounting.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Account, Cent. Dig. §§ 10-12; Dec. Dig. § 3.*]
Appeal from Trial Term, Washington County.
Action by George Carver Rice against William R. Peters, as executor of Orrin K. Rice, deceased. From a judgment of dismissal (111 N. Y. Supp. 5), plaintiff appeals.
Reversed, and new trial granted.
Argued before SMITH, P. J., and CHESTER, KELLOGG, COCHRANE, and SEWELL, JJ.
Edgar T. Brackett (William S. Ostrander, of counsel), for appellant.
Herbert Van Kirk, for respondent.
For other oases see same topic & § number in Dec. & Am. Digs. 1907 to date, & Rep’r Indexes'

Opinion:
SMITH, P. J.
The complaint was dismissed at the opening of the" trial before evidence taken. The sole question for determination, therefore, is whether the complaint states a cause of action. We may assume for the argument that no cause of action is stated for a discovery of evidence, nor a cause of action at law for damages, .because no definite sum is stated in which plaintiff has been damaged. Nevertheless we are of opinion that the complaint stat'es two causes of action in equity for an accounting.
The first cause of action stated is for an accounting for the proceeds of certain farm produce, which was the product of a farm which plaintiff was working upon shares for the defendant's testator. This farm produce was intrusted by the plaintiff to defendant's ^ testator for sale, and "sold and disposed of by said deceased in his lifetime, and the proceeds thereof received by him for the joint use and benefit of himself and the plaintiff." The lessor and lessee under a lease of a farm upon shares become tenants in common of the crops. If one tenant in common receives the common property, either by consent or wrongfully, he holds it as trustee for his co-tenant to the extent of the interest of that co-tenant, and the co-tenant is entitled to proceed in equity to compel an accounting. Abbey v. Wheeler, 170 N. Y. 122, 62 N. E. 1074; Dyckman v. Valiente, 42 N. Y. 549.
For a second cause of action the plaintiff alleges that he and the deceased—
"were engaged in the business of buying, training, improving, and selling horses, upon the understanding and agreement that said deceased should advance the money for the purchase and transportation of said animals and the expenses of plaintiff while engaged in buying the same, and that the plaintiff should perform the services of selecting and buying of said animals and training and caring for them and assist in selling them, and that whatever profits should be realized upon such dealings should be shared equally between the plaintiff and said deceased."
The plaintiff then alleges his performance of the contract; that several such animals were sold at a profit, and some" were retained by deceased for his own use which could have been sold at a large profit; that the deceased received the proceeds of the sale of all of said animals, and has never rendered an account thereof to plaintiff, though often requested by plaintiff so to do. The right to proceed in equity for an accounting upon this cause of action is not entirely clear. The case comes very near to the case of Smith v. Bodine, 74 N. Y. 30, in which an employé was to receive a percentage of the profits as payment for services, and in which it was held that the employé was not entitled to proceed in equity for an accounting. In the case of Marston v. Gould, 69 N. Y. 220, however, we find the situation very similar to the case at bar. In that case it was held that there was such a joint enterprise as authorized an action in equity for an accounting. We are of opinion that the facts stated showed a joint venture, distinguishable from the facts in the case of Smith v. Bodine, and one of which equity ought to take cognizance for the purpose of establishing the accounts between the parties. Our conclusion is that the complaint was improperly dismissed, and that judgment should, therefore, be reversed and a new trial granted, with costs to appellant to abide the event.
Judgment reversed and new trial granted, with costs to appellant to abide event. All concur.