Case Name: DAVID WILLIAM CAMPBELL, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. DEPARTMENT OF MOTOR VEHICLES, Defendant and Appellant
Court: Court of Appeal of the State of California
Jurisdiction: California
Decision Date: 1984-05-11
Citations: 155 Cal. App. 3d 716
Docket Number: No. A020490
Parties: DAVID WILLIAM CAMPBELL, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. DEPARTMENT OF MOTOR VEHICLES, Defendant and Appellant.
Judges: 
Reporter: California Appellate Reports, Third Series
Volume: 155
Pages: 716–721

Head Matter:
[No. A020490.
First Dist., Div. One.
May 11, 1984.]
DAVID WILLIAM CAMPBELL, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. DEPARTMENT OF MOTOR VEHICLES, Defendant and Appellant.
Counsel
John K. Van de Kamp, Attorney General, N. Eugene Hill, Assistant Attorney General, Harold W. Teasdale and Edward P. Hill, Deputy Attorneys General, for Defendant and Appellant.
J. Thomas Sherrod for Plaintiff and Respondent.

Opinion:
Opinion
ELKINGTON, Acting P. J.
On this appeal the sole issue posed by the parties is whether Vehicle Code section 13352—calling for a mandatory driver's license suspension by the state's Motor Vehicle Department, where the driver is for the first time convicted of driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor (Veh. Code, § 23102), and the court either orders license suspension or does not grant probation—is a constitutionally proscribed ex post facto law as to such arrests made prior to the statute's effective date, February 18, 1982.
Plaintiff Campbell was arrested for such an offense, August 30, 1981, and was thereafter convicted of it. Then because of the newly effective statute and the circumstances of his conviction, the Department of Motor Vehicles temporarily suspended his driver's license. On his petition for mandate the superior court set aside the department's action. This appeal ensued.
"The ex post facto clauses (U.S. Const., art. I, § 9, cl. 3; Cal. Const., art. I, § 9) apply only to penal statutes. They prohibit retrospective laws that (1) impose criminal liability for conduct innocent when it occurred, (2) increase the punishment prescribed for a crime at the time it was committed, or (3) by necessary operation and ' "in [their] relation to the offense, or [their] consequences, alter the situation of the accused to his disadvantage. . . ." ' " (Conservatorship of Hofferber (1980) 28 Cal.3d 161, 180 [167 Cal.Rptr. 854, 616 P.2d 836]; italics added.)
Here, if Vehicle Code section 13352 may be deemed penal in nature the superior court's judgment must be upheld.
But it has regularly been held that a statute such as Vehicle Code section 13352, calling under certain circumstances for departmental "suspension or revocation of a [driver's] license is not penal; its purpose is to make the streets and highways safe by protecting the public from incompetence, lack of care, and wilful disregard of the rights of others by drivers." (Beamon v. Dept. of Motor Vehicles (1960) 180 Cal.App.2d 200, 210 [4 Cal.Rptr. 396]; italics added.) Federal authority is in accord: "[I]t is well established that such departmental [driver's license] suspensions are regulatory and not penal." (United States v. Best (9th Cir. 1978) 573 F.2d 1095, 1099.) And to the same effect see Talley v. Municipal Court (1978) 87 Cal.App.3d 109, 113-114 [150 Cal.Rptr. 743]; Goss v. Dept. of Motor Vehicles (1968) 264 Cal.App.2d 268, 270 [70 Cal.Rptr. 447].
The above authority is persuasive, and we honor it. We are therefore obliged to reverse the judgment of the superior court.
The judgment directing the peremptory writ of mandate is reversed.
Holmdahl, J., concurred.