Case Name: Felipe OQUENDO and Isora Oquendo, Appellants, v. CITIZENS PROPERTY INSURANCE CORP., Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 2008-11-26
Citations: 998 So. 2d 636
Docket Number: No. 3D07-2522
Parties: Felipe OQUENDO and Isora Oquendo, Appellants, v. CITIZENS PROPERTY INSURANCE CORP., Appellee.
Judges: Before COPE, CORTIÑAS, and LAGOA, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 998
Pages: 636–641

Head Matter:
Felipe OQUENDO and Isora Oquendo, Appellants, v. CITIZENS PROPERTY INSURANCE CORP., Appellee.
No. 3D07-2522.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
Nov. 26, 2008.
Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc Denied Jan. 23, 2009.
Ligman Martin and Michael R. Seward, for appellants.
Groelle & Salmon and Gina L. Clausen, for appellee.
Before COPE, CORTIÑAS, and LAGOA, JJ.

Opinion:
COPE, J.
This is an appeal from a final judgment denying, in part, a motion for trial court attorney's fees under section 627.428, Florida Statutes (2005). We affirm.
Felipe and Isora Oquendo were the insureds under a homeowners' insurance policy issued by Citizens Property Insurance Corp. Their home was destroyed by fire. The insureds brought suit against the insurer and recovered judgment in the trial court.
The insureds sought an award of attorney's fees under section 627.428. The insurer contested both entitlement and amount. The trial court ruled in the insureds' favor on entitlement and conducted an evidentiary hearing to set the amount. The trial court awarded attorney's fees for time reasonably expended in the trial phase of the litigation, and also made an award for the time expended on the issue of entitlement. The trial court denied "fees for fees," that is, attorney's fees for preparing for, and participating in, the evi-dentiary hearing to set the amount of attorney's fees. The insureds have appealed the judgment insofar as it denied "fees for fees."
The Florida Supreme Court has "held that attorney's fees may properly be awarded under section 627.428 for litigating the issue of entitlement to attorney's fees, but not for litigating the amount of attorney's fees." Lugassy v. Indep. Fire Ins. Co., 636 So.2d 1332, 1336 (Fla.1994) (citing State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Palma, 629 So.2d 830 (Fla.1993)).
The insureds argue, however, that this case is distinguishable because the insureds' retainer agreement with counsel includes the following:
The Client agrees to compensate Joseph W. Ligman, P.A. $350.00 per hour for any time, costs, and effort for litigating the amount of court awarded attorneys' fees if the court does not award attorney's fees for time spent litigating the amount of attorney's fees.
The insureds contend that since they are obligated to pay their counsel for the time spent in litigating the amount of attorney's fees, it follows that the insureds are entitled to recover those amounts under section 627.428. They point out that Palma was based, in part, on the proposition that litigating the amount of attorney's fees "inures solely to the attorney's benefit and cannot be considered services rendered in procuring full payment of the judgment." Palma, 629 So.2d at 838. The insureds assert that since they are obligated under their retainer agreement to pay counsel for time expended in litigating the amount of attorney's fees, it follows that making such an award in this case is for the benefit of the insureds, not just the attorneys.
We do not agree with the insureds' argument. The Palma decision was based in part on statutory construction. Id. ("The language of the statute [§ 627.428] does not support such a conclusion [that attorney's fees may be awarded for litigating the amount of attorney's fees].") (emphasis added). Since Palma is based both on (a) statutory interpretation, and (b) the proposition that litigating the amount of fees inures solely to the attorney's benefit, id., the fact that the retainer agreement in this case has a "fees for fees" provision makes no difference.
The Fourth and Fifth Districts have rejected the argument that the insureds make here. See Paladyne Corp. v. Weindruch, 867 So.2d 630, 634 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004) ("Mr. Weindruch attempts to avoid the holding in these cases by suggesting that his attorney's fee contract gives him an interest in the recovery of the fee. First of all, we find nothing in the attorney's fee contract that would avoid the holding of Palma. Secondly, as we pointed out in Mangel, the litigant's fee arrangement with his or her attorney is 'not determinative of the fees he is entitled to recover as reasonable attorney's fees' "); Mediplex Constr. of Fla., Inc. v. Schaub, 856 So.2d 13, 14-15 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003) (based on the attorney's fee agreement, the plaintiffs "attempt[ed] to differentiate Palma on the basis that they, unlike the client in Palma, directly benefited from the time their counsel spent litigating the amount of attorney's fees.... Certainly we recognize that fees for fees may not always inure to the exclusive benefit of the lawyer, but Palma still applies."); Mangel v. Bob Dance Dodge, Inc., 739 So.2d 720, 724 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999) ("Mangel also argues that he has an interest in passing his fee obligations on to defendants, since his fee agreement with Blau required Mangel to pay Blau for the time spent litigating both entitlement to and the amount of his fees. This contractual provision is apparently designed to avoid the rule of State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Palma, 629 So.2d 830 (Fla.1993). Mangel therefore asserts that he should be able to recover Blau's fees as part of his 'reasonable fees.' However, Mangel's own fee arrangement with Blau is not determinative of the fees he is entitled to recover as reasonable attorney's fees.").
We follow the Fourth and Fifth Districts and affirm the trial court's order denying "fees for fees."
Affirmed.
. The insurer initially maintained that it was not covered by section 627.428, Florida Statutes, but has abandoned that position.
. This court has previously denied "fees for fees" in a number of contexts, but those cases did not involve a claim that Palma should be distinguished where the attorney-client fee agreement provided for "fees for fees." See Cincinnati Equitable Ins. Co. v. Hawit, 933 So.2d 1233 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006) (medical insurance coverage claim); N. Dade Church of God, Inc. v. JM Statewide, Inc., 851 So.2d 194, 196 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003) (mortgage foreclosure action); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Blanco, 791 So.2d 515 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001) (homeowner's insurance claim); Oruga Corp. v. AT & T Wireless of Fla., Inc., 712 So.2d 1141, 1145 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998) (offer of judgment under section 768.79, Florida Statutes); Eisman v. Ross, 664 So.2d 1128, 1129 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995) (award under subsection 57.105(1), Florida Statutes).