Case Name: June C. WAPNER and Keith L. Wapner, H/W, Individually and as Parents and Natural Guardians of Charles P. Wapner and Peter W. Wapner, Their Minor Children, Appellants, v. Herbert J. SOMERS, M.D. and Robert Somers, M.D.
Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
Jurisdiction: Pennsylvania
Decision Date: 1993-08-24
Citations: 428 Pa. Super. 187
Docket Number: No. 455
Parties: June C. WAPNER and Keith L. Wapner, H/W, Individually and as Parents and Natural Guardians of Charles P. Wapner and Peter W. Wapner, Their Minor Children, Appellants, v. Herbert J. SOMERS, M.D. and Robert Somers, M.D.
Judges: Before McEWEN, JOHNSON and HOFFMAN, JJ.
Reporter: Pennsylvania Superior Court Reports
Volume: 428
Pages: 187–199

Head Matter:
630 A.2d 885
June C. WAPNER and Keith L. Wapner, H/W, Individually and as Parents and Natural Guardians of Charles P. Wapner and Peter W. Wapner, Their Minor Children, Appellants, v. Herbert J. SOMERS, M.D. and Robert Somers, M.D.
Superior Court of Pennsylvania.
Argued March 10, 1993.
Filed Aug. 24, 1993.
James E. Beasley, Philadelphia, for appellants.
Daniel F. Ryan, Plymouth Meeting, for appellees.
Before McEWEN, JOHNSON and HOFFMAN, JJ.

Opinion:
JOHNSON, Judge:
This is an appeal from an interlocutory order sustaining preliminary objections by Herbert J. Somers to counts 50-52 in the Complaint filed by June C. and Keith L. Wapner individually and on behalf of their minor children Charles and Peter Wapner. The order, which was certified to this Court by the trial court as involving a controlling issue of law, dismissed Charles and Peter Wapner's claim for the loss of the consortium of their mother. We affirm.
This appeal arises in the context of a medical malpractice action filed by June Wapner against Dr. Herbert Somers and Dr. Robert Somers, not a party to this appeal, for failure to timely diagnose Mrs. Wapner's breast cancer. In conjunction with that claim, Mrs. Wapner's husband and children filed derivative claims for loss of spousal and parental consortium due to Mrs. Wapner's severe illness and incapacity.
Dr. Herbert Somers filed Preliminary Objections, in the nature of a Motion to Strike, requesting the trial court to strike certain paragraphs of the Complaint for failure to comply with Pa.R.C.P. 1019(a), which were denied. Dr. Somers also filed Preliminary Objections, in the nature of a Demurrer, to the claim of loss of parental consortium which the trial court sustained, concluding that there was no legal basis for such a cause of action.
In support of their contention that Pennsylvania should now recognize claims for loss of parental consortium, the Wapners claim that failure to do so deprives the children of equal protection under Article 1, Section 11, of the Pennsylvania Constitution. In addition, the Wapners allege that Pennsylvania should recognize a cause of action for loss of parental consortium under circumstances in which the alleged tortfeasor could have foreseen such a loss as a natural consequence of their negligence. The Wapners maintain that since Dr. Somers knew that the children for whom the claim is made are afflicted with cerebral palsy and are totally dependant upon their mother for their care, this Court should now extend to these children the previously unrecognized cause of action of loss of parental consortium. We disagree.
In Steiner by Steiner v. Bell Telephone Co. of Pennsylvania, 358 Pa.Super. 505, 517 A.2d 1348 (1986), aff'd. per curiam, 518 Pa. 57, 540 A.2d 266 (1987), this Court, sitting en banc, addressed the issue of whether a cause of action for the loss of parental consortium should be recognized. In that case, the child's purported claim arose when the child's mother attempted to be connected to the police by a Bell Telephone operator when someone broke into their home. The mother was put on hold twice before her emergency call was connected. Shortly thereafter, the intruder interrupted the call and raped the mother. The mother suffered emotional problems after her attack which resulted in family discord and disruption.
In Steiner, we carefully considered the arguments by all parties to that case both in favor of and against recognizing a cause of action for loss of parental consortium. Id. 358 Pa.Super. at 509-516, 517 A.2d at 1350-1354. We also reviewed and analyzed the case law from other jurisdictions on this issue. Id. at 516-517, 517 A.2d at 1354. In that case, we held that no cause of action for the loss of parental consortium would be recognized in Pennsylvania. Id. at 522, 517 A.2d at 1357.
In Steiner, supra, we based our decision on several factors. First, we recognized that there is no historical basis for such a claim as the common-law cause of action for loss of spousal consortium stemmed originally from a husband's right to sue for the loss of consortium for his wife. A loss of consortium recovery was originally considered compensation for the deprivation of a possessory right on behalf of the husband and the cause of action was unavailable to wives whose husbands suffered similar injuries. However, Pennsylvania eventually extended the right to sue for the loss of spousal consortium to wives. See Hopkins v. Blanco, 457 Pa. 90, 320 A.2d 139 (1974).
We also recognized, in Steiner, the differences between spousal and filial relationships which justify the differential treatment between spouses and children. There, we stated:
Spouses enter into their relationship freely and by choice and do so to bind one another together into a permanent unity. A child, however, has no control over the commencement of the parent/child relationship, and rather then [sic] trying to become one with his parents, he perpetually strives to develop from a totally dependent person to one which is entirely independent. Although both relationships involve love, companionship, affection, guidance and care, the nature of those elements, the means by which they reach those' ends is subtly but intrinsically different. Therefore, although identical labels can be attached to the elements of the spousal relationship and the parent/child relationship, substantively the relationships are different and not comparable.
Id. 358 Pa.Super. at 518-519, 517 A.2d at 1355.
In Steiner, we were also reluctant, on public policy grounds, to judicially expand tort liability when this is properly the role of the legislature. Id. at 521-522, 517 A.2d at 1356-1357. The legislature would be better able to weigh the costs to society, in terms of increased insurance premiums and other costs, against the benefits to the children of tort victims. The legislature would also be able to set limits as to the amount and types of claims which could be brought.
This Court again considered the issue of whether a child can sustain a cause of action for the loss of parental consortium in Schroeder v. Ear, Nose and Throat Association of Lehigh Valley, Inc., 383 Pa.Super. 440, 557 A.2d 21, appeal denied, 523 Pa. 650, 567 A.2d 653 (1989). There, we recognized that the claim for the loss of parental consortium was controlled by the holding in Steiner, supra, and we affirmed the trial court's dismissal of such a claim, as presenting no legally recognized cause of action.
In the present case, the Wapners contend that the children are denied equal protection under Article 1, Section 11, of the Pennsylvania Constitution through Pennsylvania's nonrecognition of loss of parental consortium claims. That section states:
All courts shall be open; and every man for an injury done him in his lands, goods, person or reputation shall have remedy by due course of law, and right and justice administered without sale, denial or delay.
It is clear that Article 1, Section 11, can be invoked only with respect to a legal injury. Singer v. Sheppard, 464 Pa. 387, 346 A.2d 897 (1975) citing Jackman v. Rosenbaum Co., 263 Pa. 158, 106 A. 238 (1919), aff'd, 260 U.S. 22, 43 S.Ct. 9, 67 L.Ed. 107 (1922). A legal injury is one for which the law recognizes a remedy or a cause of action. Jackman 263 Pa. at 168, 106 A. at 241. Nothing in Article 1, Section 11 can be construed as requiring that this Court create a legally recognized injury where none had previously been recognized. In fact, our supreme court has stated that even where a legal injury had previously been recognized at common law, it may be abolished by the legislature or may change and evolve over time to point where it would no longer constitute a compensable right, without there being a violation of Article 1, Section 11, of the Pennsylvania Constitution. Singer, 464 Pa. at 399-400, 346 A.2d at 903.
This issue was also addressed by this Court in Steiner, supra, where we rejected the notion that nonrecognition of a loss of parental consortium claim amounted to a constitutional violation. There, we stated:
[B]ecause there is no constitutional mandate compelling us to recognize a cause of action for loss of parental consortium, because there is presently no legal basis for allowing the cause of action, because there is no general or growing consensus that such a cause of action should be established, and because to allow such a cause of action is a policy determination which can most thoroughly and representatively be considered by the legislature, we do not recognize a child's cause of action for loss of parental consortium due to tortious interference of a third party.
Steiner at 522, 517 A.2d at 1357.
In addition, the Wapners assert that their case is unique and requires a re-examination of Pennsylvania policy as articulated in Steiner because here, Dr. Somers could foresee the harm that would result to the children due to their mother's illness and incapacity.
We agree that foreseeability of harm is a crucial element to establishing a claim in negligence. However, as this case involves a derivative claim, we are examining the extent of a tortfeasor's liability, after negligence has been established. We are unable to conclude that because an appellant can establish that the alleged harm suffered by the children was foreseeable to the alleged tortfeasor, we are thus compelled to create an entirely new cause of action. Pennsylvania, through its courts, has chosen not to extend the right to sue for damages to children whose parents are injured regardless of whether those injuries can be proved or whether the risk of harm to the children were known in advance to the tortfeasor. This is the public policy line that our courts have drawn limiting the extent of liability for any single tortious act. Moreover, the fact that harm to the children in this case was foreseeable does not permit a panel of this Court to overrule what is the established precedent of this Commonwealth.
After due consideration of the Wapner's claim, we conclude that it does not assert a cause of action recognized in this Commonwealth. We, therefore, affirm the order of the trial court.
Order Affirmed.
McEWEN, J., files a concurring opinion.