Case Name: Neil VELDEN, Appellant, v. NATIONSTAR MORTGAGE, LLC, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 2018-01-12
Citations: 234 So. 3d 850
Docket Number: Case No. 5D16-3628
Parties: Neil VELDEN, Appellant, v. NATIONSTAR MORTGAGE, LLC, Appellee.
Judges: COHEN, C.J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Third Series
Volume: 234
Pages: 850–853

Head Matter:
Neil VELDEN, Appellant, v. NATIONSTAR MORTGAGE, LLC, Appellee.
Case No. 5D16-3628
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
January 12, 2018
Mark P. Stopa, of Stopa Law Firm, Tampa, for Appellant.
. Nancy M. Wallace, of Akerman LLP, Tallahassee, William P. Heller of Akerman LLP, Fort Lauderdale, Celia C. Falzone, of Akerman LLP, Jacksonville and Eric M. Levine, of Akerman LLP, West Palm Beach, and Charles P. Gufford, of McCalla Raymer Pierce, LLC, Orlando, for Appel-lee.

Opinion:
PALMER, J.
Neil Velden appeals the final judgment of foreclosure entered by the trial court in favor of Nationstar Mortgage, LLC (Na-tionstar). We affirm in all respects except to the extent the final judgment includes some payments barred by the statute of limitations.
In July 2014, Freedom Mortgage Corporation (Freedom) filed a mortgage foreclosure complaint against Velden, alleging that Velden failed to make his February 1, 2009 mortgage payment as well as all subsequent payments. Thereafter, Nationstar was substituted for Freedom. After trial, the court entered a final judgment of foreclosure in favor of Nationstar, awarding the full amount of the unpaid note plus interest, dating back to January 2009.
Velden asserts that the trial court erred in denying his motion for the entry of an involuntary dismissal because Freedom's complaint was filed more than five years after the date of his first missed payment. We disagree.
' Section 95.11(2)(c) of the Florida Statutes (2014) provides that an action to foreclose a mortgage shall be commenced within five years. In Klebanoff v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon, 228 So.3d 167, 168-69 (Fla. 5th DCA 2017), we affirmed a final judgment of foreclosure, rejecting the same statute of limitations argument raised here:
Because the Bank alleged and proved missed payments within the five years prior to the filing of its complaint, its action was not barred by the statute of limitations.
See also U.S. Bank, N.A. v. Diamond, 228 So.3d 177, 178 (Fla. 5th DCA 2017).
Velden further argues that the trial court erred in awarding Nationstar amounts which accrued beyond the five-year limitations period. We agree.
In U.S. Bank National Association v. Bartram, 140 So.3d 1007 (Fla. 5th DCA 2014), affirmed, 211 So.3d 1009 (Fla. 2016), we quoted with approval from the federal district court case of Kaan v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 981 F.Supp.2d 1271, 1274 (S. D. Fla. 2013):
While any claims relating to individual defaults that are now more than five years old may be subject to the statute of limitations, each payment that is less than five years old . created a basis for a subsequent foreclosure and/or acceleration action.
In Diamond, 228 So.3d at 179, under similar facts, we remanded with instructions for the trial court "to exclude any defaults that occurred more than five years prior to the filing date of the current suit, nunc pro tunc to the original date judgment was entered." See generally Greene v. Bursey, 733 So.2d 1111 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999) (recognizing that statute of limitations may run on some payments due on a promissory note but not on others); Cent. Home Tr. Co. of Elizabeth v. Lippincott, 392 So.2d 931 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981) (holding that installment payments due on a promissory note more than five-years old are barred by the statute of limitations, although more recent missed payments are.collectible);
Accordingly, we. affirm the judgment as to liability, but reverse and remand for the trial court to exclude an award of damages for any defaults that occurred more than five years prior to the filing date of the current lawsuit, nunc pro tunc to the original date judgment was entered.
AFFIRMED in part; REVERSED in part; and REMANDED.
COHEN, C.J., concurs.
LAMBERT, J., concurs and concurs specially, with opinion.
. We reject Velden's standing argument without further elaboration.