Case Name: Carrol J. RIVET and Kathryn Rivet v. Charles J. LeBLANC, et al.
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1992-05-22
Citations: 600 So. 2d 1358
Docket Number: No. 91 CA 0550
Parties: Carrol J. RIVET and Kathryn Rivet v. Charles J. LeBLANC, et al.
Judges: Before SHORTESS, LANIER and CRAIN, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 600
Pages: 1358–1368

Head Matter:
Carrol J. RIVET and Kathryn Rivet v. Charles J. LeBLANC, et al.
No. 91 CA 0550.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, First Circuit.
May 22, 1992.
Danny J. Lirette, Houma, for plaintiffs and appellants Carrol J. Rivet and Kathryn Rivet.
Lloyd T. Bourgeois, Labadieville, for defendants and appellants Charles J. LeBlanc and State Farm Fire and Cas. Co.
J. Rene Williams, Houma, for defendants and appellees Kermit Wurzlow, Frank Wurzlow Jr., and Aetna.
James R. Degate, Houma, for defendant and appellee Highland Ins. Co.
Before SHORTESS, LANIER and CRAIN, JJ.

Opinion:
SHORTESS, Judge.
Carrol Rivet filed this suit to recover damages for personal injuries he sustained. Rivet, a deputy marshall in the Houma City Court Marshall's Office, while attempting to serve process on Margie Hughes for writing bad checks, fell through the steps of a fishing camp located near Chauvin, Louisiana. Rivet named as defendants Kermit Wurzlow, Frank Wurz-low and their insurer, Aetna Casualty & Surety Company; Rayford Hall; Margie LeBoeuf, a/k/a Marjorie Hughes, a/k/a/ Margie Hughes; and Charles LeBlanc and his insurer, State Farm Fire and Casualty Company. Highland Insurance Company intervened to recover worker's compensation benefits paid to Rivet.
FACTS
The Wurzlows for many years leased out small tracts of land along Bayou Little Caillou for nominal amounts — in recent years $250.00 paid annually — to people who wanted to build fishing camps. Nolan Pi-cou entered into a lease agreement with the Wurzlows and with their permission built the wood frame camp in question. Alton Picou purchased the camp from Nolan Picou in 1981. Alton Picou lived on the property, paying rent to the Wurzlows until 1984, when he sold the camp to Ray-ford Hall. The sale between Hall and Pi-cou was executed in authentic form. It is undisputed that no document establishing separate ownership of the camp structure from the soil was filed in the public records.
After Hall and Picou executed the sale document, Hall and Charles LeBlanc, a fishing buddy, went to the Wurzlows' office and executed a lease. It contains a hold harmless and indemnity provision along with a clause whereby the lessees "accept the premises in its present condition and assume full responsibility for the condition of same without any liability or obligation of any kind whatsoever upon the part of the owners...."
The record also reveals that Hall and LeBlanc entered into a lease/purchase agreement, whereby Hughes purchased, at least according to Hall and LeBlanc, Hall's interest in the camp and lease and Le-Blanc's interest in the lease. The lease/purchase document is dated October 21, 1985. The lease/purchase agreement also contains a clause that purports to transfer risk: "We [Hall and LeBlanc] will not be held responsible for any damages or repairs at said property."
On July 20, 1984, Hall and LeBlanc paid the rent for the period July 20, 1984, through July 20, 1985. On July 8, 1985, Hall and LeBlanc paid the rent for the period July 20, 1985, through July 20,1986. Although Hughes tendered the rent for July 20, 1986, through July 20, 1987, in December 1986, the Wurzlows rejected the offer.
On July 29, 1986, while Hughes was residing in the camp, Rivet fell through the steps while attempting to serve process on her.
After a trial on the merits, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of Rivet and against Hall and LeBlanc. It also dismissed the Wurzlows from the suit. From this judgment, LeBlanc and Rivet appeal.
ANALYSIS
Among other things, Rivet contends the trial court erred in not finding the Wurzlows were the owners of the camp structure, which would render them liable for damages caused by the defective steps. In support of his position, Rivet relies on Louisiana Civil Code article 491, which provides:
Buildings, other constructions permanently attached to the ground, standing timber, and unharvested crops or ungath-ered fruits of trees may belong to a person other than the owner of the ground. Nevertheless, they are presumed to belong to the owner of the ground, unless separate ownership is evidenced by an instrument filed for registry in the conveyance records of the parish in which the immovable is located.
The language of this article is clear and unambiguous; therefore, it must be applied as written. LSA-C.C. art. 9. Under Civil Code article 491, a presumption is created that in the absence of a document filed in the public records the owner of the soil is the owner of its component parts. The presumption is conclusive. Broussard v. Northcott Exploration Co., 481 So.2d 125 (La.1986). Here, since separate ownership was not established in the conveyance records as to third persons, the Wurzlows are considered the owners of the building as well as the underlying soil.
The trial court erred as a matter of law regarding the proper interpretation of Civil Code article 491. However, in the alternative, the trial court ruled that if the Wurzlows were the owners of the structure, they are relieved of liability by the hold harmless agreement found in the tenancy agreement. As stated above, the tenancy agreement contains a hold harmless and indemnity provision along with a clause wherein the lessees "accept the premises in its present condition and assume full responsibility for the condition of same without any liability or obligation of any kind whatsoever upon the part of the owners...."
The lease provision must be read in light of LSA-R.S. 9:3221, which provides:
The owner of premises leased under a contract whereby the lessee assumes responsibility for their condition is not liable for injury caused by any defect therein to the lessee or anyone on the premises who derives his right to be thereon from the lessee, unless the owner knew or should have known of the defect or had received notice thereof and failed to remedy it within a reasonable time.
The record contains no evidence that establishes the Wurzlows had actual or constructive knowledge of the defective stair step. We find the Wurzlows are relieved from strict liability by LSA-R.S. 9:3221 and the pertinent lease provision. Dufrene v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp., 572 So.2d 771 (La.App. 4th Cir.1990). Thus, we affirm the ruling of the trial court dismissing plaintiffs' suit against the Wurzlows.
The trial court implicitly found the lease/purchase agreement between Hall, LeBlanc, and Hughes invalid based on the following facts: that Hughes did not sign the agreement; that the agreement called for monthly payments of $250.00, but Hughes testified she paid $200.00; that Hall did not inform the Wurzlows he sold the camp to Hughes, even though he had the opportunity; that Hall after the date of the sale asked Hughes why she had not paid the rent with the money he had given her; that Hall stated he had not visited the camp after the date of the purported sale, but was seen at the camp on two occasions; and that Hughes was unable to show the Wurzlows proof of ownership when she went to pay the rent in December 1986. Also pertinent is the fact that Hall and Hughes were engaged in an intimate relationship. A trial court's factual findings cannot be reversed on appeal in the absence of manifest error. Rosell v. ESCO, 549 So.2d 840 (La.1989). Based on the record before us, we cannot conclude the trial court was clearly wrong.
The trial court found LeBlanc liable to Rivet as lessee of the premises. Le-Blanc signed the tenancy agreement with the Wurzlows. He paid at least part of the rent. Apparently, he kept his brother's boat at the camp and used the premises to clean his catch and boat after shrimping and fishing. He spent some nights at the camp, and he helped Hall with some repairs. LeBlanc also helped pay for some of the utilities such as the water bill. Le-Blanc signed the alleged lease/purchase agreement which only referred to the camp structure. Moreover, LeBlanc in the tenancy agreement agreed to indemnify and hold the Wurzlows harmless from liability to third persons. Based on the record before us, we cannot conclude the trial court was clearly wrong in this finding. Rosell v. ESCO, 549 So.2d at 844-45.
The trial court awarded Rivet $70,000.00 in general damages, $15,750.00 for lost wages, and $12,879.57 for medical expenses. Ms. Rivet was awarded $5,000.00 for her loss of consortium claim. Rivet contends the general damage award is inadequate and should be raised to $125,-000.00.
Before an award for damages can be questioned as inadequate, the reviewing court must look first not to prior awards, but to the individual circumstances of the present case. A damage award should not be disturbed by a reviewing court absent a showing of clear abuse. Reck v. Stevens, 373 So.2d 498 (La.1979); Coco v. Winston Industries, 341 So.2d 332 (La.1976). Relying on prior awards in similar cases is proper only after an articulated analysis of the facts discloses an abuse of discretion. Reck v. Stevens, 373 So.2d at 501.
Rivet, as he was walking up the steps to the door of the camp, fell through a defective step. After going home to clean up, he continued to work the rest of the day. The next morning he began to experience pain in his joints and arms. Two weeks later, Rivet went to his family practitioner, Dr. Richard Haydel, who placed him on cortisone injections. On the fourth visit, Haydel ordered a CAT scan. The scan revealed a one millimeter bulging disc at G-3 and C-4, a one to two millimeter bulging disc at C-4 and C-5, and a three millimeter disk protrusion at C-5 and C-6. The scan also revealed narrowing of the disc spaces at C-6 and C-7 along with mild degenerative changes at C-2 and C-3. Haydel called in Dr. William Kinnard, an orthopedic surgeon.
Dr. Kinnard performed a myelogram on September 5, 1986, apparently because Rivet complained of numbness and radiating pain. The test indicated cervical spondylo-sis, nerve root impingement, and neurologic impairment. Kinnard recommended Rivet undergo an anterior cervical discectomy and fusion at C-5 and C-6, and C-4 and C-5. Kinnard performed the surgery on September 8, 1986. Rivet was in the hospital about eight days. He continued to see Kinnard for about eight months after the operation. Although the operation was successful, Kinnard assigned a disability rating of 20% of the body as a whole.
According to Rivet, he still has headaches two to three times a month. His wife applies hot compresses on his neck every morning and massages his neck and shoulders. Rivet complains he cannot engage in many of the activities he once enjoyed, such as fishing and mowing the grass. Rivet also testified he has not had sexual relations with his wife since the accident.
We cannot say from our review of this record that the trial court abused its great discretion in its awards to the Rivets, and we affirm said awards.
The trial court awarded Highland Insurance Corporation, intervenor, $7,110.51 for worker's compensation benefits and $12,-879.51 in medical expenses that Highland paid. Rivet assigns as error the failure of the trial court to assess Highland with its portion of the cost of litigation, including attorney fees, under Moody v. Arabie, 498 So.2d 1081 (La.1986).
In Moody, the Louisiana Supreme Court held that an employer who has made worker's compensation payments to an injured employee co-owns the right to recover the paid compensation from a third party tort-feasor, and as a co-owner the employer must share on a pro-rata basis the cost of recovering the amount paid. Moody instructs the lower courts to examine, among other factors, the contingency fee contract between the plaintiff and his attorney, the cost associated with the recovery, and the time and resources expended by the intervenor, if any, which may have aided in the recovery. Moody also mandates contribution of litigations costs by the employer. Major v. Cotton's, Inc., 551 So.2d 57 (La.App. 1st Cir.1989). But a plaintiff who seeks to recover from the intervenor a proportional share of the cost of recovery, must introduce evidence sufficient to enable the court to make the proper apportionment. Plaintiff may introduce this evidence at the trial. He also has the right to have a post-judgment hearing on this issue. Samanie & Barnes v. Lawler, 517 So.2d 340 (La.App. 1st Cir.1987); Thomas v. Hartford Ins. Co., 540 So.2d 1068 (La.App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 542 So.2d 516 (La.1989). Rivet did not introduce evidence at the trial, or file a rule to apportion litigation costs, including attorney fees. Accordingly, the trial court did not have at its disposal the information needed to resolve the issue. Thus, we affirm the trial court's ruling on this issue.
Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed at LeBlanc's and State Farm's costs.
AFFIRMED.
LANIER, J., concurs in the result and assigns reasons.
. Carrol Rivet's wife, Kathryn Rivet, also joined in the suit.
. A preliminary default judgment was entered against Hughes early in the proceedings but was never confirmed, according to the record. Hughes is not a party to this appeal.
. The record does not contain a written sale document between Nolan Picou and Alton Pi-cou.
. The trial court found the accident occurred on July 19, 1986; however, this finding is not supported by the record.
. Specifically, Civil Code article 2322 provides that "[t]he owner of a building is answerable for the damage occasioned by its ruin, when this is caused by neglect to repair it, or when it is the result of a vice in its original construction." (Footnote omitted.)
. The trial court found the lease between the Wurzlows and Hall and LeBlanc had reconduct-ed by the continued presence of Hall and Le-Blanc's assignee, Hughes. We find no error in this ruling. G. Armstrong, Louisiana Landlord and Tenant Law 223, issue 4 (1992).