Case Name: CASCADEN v. DUNBAR et al.
Court: United States District Court for the District of Alaska
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 1909-12-28
Citations: 3 Alaska 671
Docket Number: No. 165
Parties: CASCADEN v. DUNBAR et al.
Judges: 
Reporter: Alaska Reports
Volume: 3
Pages: 671–690

Head Matter:
CASCADEN v. DUNBAR et al.
(Fourth Division. Fairbanks.
December 28, 1909.)
No. 165.
1. New TRial (§ 117*) — Motion—Time foe Filing.
Carter’s Ann. Code Civ. Proc. § 228, requiring motion for new trial to be filed within 20 days of filing of a decision in vacation, except in certain cases, applies to equity cases as well as actions at law.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see New Trial, Dec. Dig. § 117.*]
2. New Teial (§ 116*) — Motion—Time foe Filing.
Under Carter’s Ann. Code Civ. Proc. § 228, requiring motion for new trial to be filed within 20 days of filing of a decision in vacation, except in certain cases, a motion, filed March 22d, to set aside a judge’s findings, conclusions of law, and decree, and a motion, filed April 5th, to alter, complete, and correct such documents, are in time, where such documents were signed in vacation January 24th, but were not filed until March 19th.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see New Trial, Dec. Dig. § 116. ]
8. Judgment (§ 297*) — Correction—Power of Succeeding Judge.
A new judge can entertain motions to set aside, or to alter, complete, or correct, findings, conclusions, and a decree entered by his predecessor, where the entire record on which they were based is before him.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Judgment, Dec. Dig. § 297.*]
4. Judgment (§ 248*) — Validity—Nonsupport by Pleadings and Proof.
A decree, not supported by the pleadings or proof, is void. [Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Judgment, Cent. Dig. § 434; Dec. Dig. § 248.*]
5. Appeal and Error (§ 1203*) — Disposition of Cause — Remand— Accounting.
A judgment on appeal, directing award of an undivided one-half interest in mining claims and an appropriate interest in the proceeds thereof, authorizes an accounting as to the proceeds.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Appeal and Error, Dee. Dig. § 1203.*]
6. Appeal and Error (§ 1203*) — Proceedings on Remand — Accounting.
Where plaintiff has been awarded an interest in mining claims after mandate on appeal, an account may be taken as to gold extracted by defendants, if the pleadings justify it, though no evidence of extraction was offered at the original trial.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Appeal and Error, Dee. Dig. § 1203.*]
7. Account (§ 17*) — Pleading—Sufficiency.
A complaint to recover an interest in mining claims and for accounting, alleging that defendants were extracting gold from the mine, which the answer admitted, warrants an accounting as to plaintiff’s interest in the mine’s output since commencement of the suit.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Account, Dec. Dig. § 17.*]
8. Mines and Minerals (§ 50 ) — Establishment of Rights — Presumptions — Operation of Mines.
In a suit to recover an interest in a mine and for an accsunting as to its output, it must be assumed that no gold was extracted before the suit, where there is no evidence, and plaintiff does not claim, that any was extracted.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Mines and Minerals, Dec. Dig. § 50.*]
9. Mines and Minerals (§ 50*) — Mining Claims — Interest in Output-Estoppel.
One recovering a one-half interest in a mine is entitled to one-half of the royalties received from lessees by defendants, and not one-half of the gross output, where he did not seels injunction against operating the mine until after judgment, and where he agreed not to interfere with the lessees.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Mines and Minerals, Dec. Dig. § 50.*]
10. Vendor and Purchaser (§ 228*) — Bona Fide Purchasers— Notice.
Persons having purchased a mining interest, with notice of plaintiff's claim of an interest, purchased subject thereto.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Vendor and Purchaser, Cent. Dig. §§ 495-501; Dec. Dig. § 228.*]
11. Mines and Minerals (§ 50*) — Interest in Output — Right to Recover.
On recovering a one-half interest in a mine, plaintiff is entitled to recover from defendants royalties received by them in excess of their interest.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Mines and Minerals, Dec. Dig. § 50. ]
12. Bis Pendens (§ 22*) — Scope.
An action can only serve as a lis pendens over the property in controversy, and hence one suing for and recovering a one-half interest in a mine, and an accounting, is not entitled to claim the whole output as against an assignee of part of it, on account of past conversions by defendants, where plaintiff did not disclose an intent to claim the whole.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Bis Pendens, Dec. Dig. § 22.*]
13. Receivers (§ 103*) — Right to Acquire Interest in Fund.
One who was appointed receiver of a fund in litigation, to hold it until further order, though agreed upon by the parties. was bound to take notice that tbe whole fund was involved,' and an assignment to him of an interest in the fund pending - his receivership was void as against plaintiff, who recovered an interest therein.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Receivers, Cent. Dig. § 190;. Dec. Dig. § 103. ]
Suit by David H. Cascaden against George F. Dunbar and others. On motion by defendants F. G. Manley and A. C. Rice to set aside the findings, conclusions of law, and decree after mandate on appeal, and on motion by plaintiff to alter, complete, and correct the findings, conclusion, and decree. Decree directed. ' -
H. J. Miller and Ferdinand De Journel, for plaintiff.
W. H. Adams, for defendants Manley and Rice.
McGinn & Sullivan, for defendants Bennett, Scott, and Dunbar, and S. A. Bonnifield, their assignee.
Sea same topic & § number in Dec. & Am. Digs. Key No. Series & Rep’r Indexes
See same topic & § number in Dec. & Am. Digs. Key No. Series & Rep’r Indexes
See same topic & § number in Dec. & Am. Digs. Key No. Series & Rep’r Indexes
See same topic & § number in Deo. & Am. Digs. Key No. Series & Rep’r Indexes ■

Opinion:
LYONS, District Judge.
On the twenty-fo'urth day of January, 1909, Hon. Silas H. Reid, the then presiding judge of this division of the district of Alaska, made findings of fact and conclusions of law and signed a decree in the above-entitled cause. Said findings, conclusions of law, and decree were signed on the twenty-ninth day of January, 1909, at Valdez, Alaska (then within this jurisdiction), in vacation, and were forwarded by Judge Reid to the clerk of this court at Fairbanks, and by the clerk received and filed in this cause on the 19th day of March, 1909. Thereafter, and on the 22d day of March, 1909, the defendants Manley and Rice, by their attorney, W. H. Adams, filed a motion to set aside the findings, conclusions, and decree so made and filed, and thereafter, on the 5th day of April, 1909, the plaintiff filed his motion in this cause to alter, complete, and correct said findings, conclusions, and decree.
Before passing on the merits of the respective motions, it becomes necessary to inquire as to the power of the court as now constituted to entertain said motions. The plaintiff contends that the present judge of this court, to whom these motions are addressed, not being the same judge who entered the findings and conclusions and signed the decree herein, is without power to set the same aside, but that he has power to cor-' rect the same for the. purpose of making them conform to the pleadings and proof, and also for the purpose of correcting any apparent clerical errors discoverable in said findings, conclusions, or decree.
Section 228, p. 190, Carter's Ann. Alaska Code, provides as follows :
"Upon a trial by the court, when a decision is given in vacation, a motion for a new trial shall be filed within twenty days from the' time of filing such decision, except as hereinafter provided."
The above section is quoted from chapter 22, governing motions for a new trial, which must apply to equitable causes, as; well as cases at law. It is therefore apparent that both motions now under consideration, under the provisions of the statute above referred to,- have been filed within the time provided by law. But the plaintiff contends that, even though the motion of defendants Manley and Rice was filed within the statutory time, yet this court as presently constituted has no power. to entertain the same, for the reason that a different judge is now presiding than the one who entered the findings and decree complained of.
"Tbe power to vacate or open a judgment, or to set it aside, is a common-law power possessed by the court as a part of its necessary-machinery for the administration of justice, and hence might be exercised without the grant of special statutory authority." 1 Blade on Judgments, § 297.
It is conceded that, if the findings and decree in this cause are void, the court as at present constituted has the power to set the same aside; but plaintiff contends that the record does not disclose the fact that the judgment is void.
"Where the judge of the .superior court who directed, the judgment retired from office, and his successor occupied'the office at the time when the motion to vacate the judgment was miade, the action of the superior court is that of the judge of the court, and a change in the persons who occupied the position does not affect the consideration of the vacation of the judgment." State ex rel. Rucker v. Superior Court, 18 Wash. 227, 51 Pac. 366
If the entire record upon which the former judge of this court based his findings of fact, conclusions of law, and decree were not before this court at the present time, the court as presently constituted would probably not have the power to review the findings of the former judge; but, since the entire record has been transcribed and is before the court at the present time, there appears to be no reason in law, and certainly none in justice, why the court as at present constituted should not have the power, equal in that regard with that cA the judge who rendered the decree, to consider the motions now before this court. But, even though the court as at present constituted has not equal power with reference to the disposition of such motions with that of Judge Reid, were he still the presiding judge of this court, that question becomes immaterial under the view entertained by this court of the decree herein, because it is apparent to the court that said decree is supported neither by the pleadings nor the proof, and for that reason is void, as to the defendants Manley and Rice; and it is equally apparent that the direction in the conclusions of law that "the plaintiff, Cascaden, is entitled to the $51,675.36, less all charges, if any, due the clerk of court," is void, because not supported either by the pleadings or proofs. The objections to this court as presently constituted hearing the motion of the defendants are, therefore, not well taken; for, as this court views the situation, it is his duty to hear and at this time determine both motions.