Case Name: Daniel Irwin et al. v. Sarah Dyke et al.
Court: Illinois Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Illinois
Decision Date: 1885-06-12
Citations: 114 Ill. 302
Docket Number: 
Parties: Daniel Irwin et al. v. Sarah Dyke et al.
Judges: 
Reporter: Illinois Reports
Volume: 114
Pages: 302–312

Head Matter:
Daniel Irwin et al. v. Sarah Dyke et al.
Filed at Springfield June 12, 1885.
Specific peefobmanoe—parol gift of land by a father to Ms son. In this case the facts established were considered sufficient to bring it within the rule, that where a father makes a verbal agreement with a son to convey to him a tract of land if the latter will go and live upon the same, make expenditures upon and improve it, and this is done in reliance upon the promise, a court of equity will enforce the specific performance of the agreement.
Appeal from the Circuit Court of McLean county; the Hon. Owen T. Reeves, Judge, presiding.
This was a bill for partition of a certain two hundred acres of land, described in the bill filed October 21, 1881, by Daniel Irwin, and Narcissa Irwin, his wife, setting out that Daniel Irwin was the owner in fee of the undivided half of the land, and that Lewis M. Dyke and said Narcissa Irwin, the only children and heirs at law of Benjamin Dyke, deceased, were the owners in fee of the other undivided half of the land, and praying partition accordingly. The answer of Lewis M. Dyke admits the interest of Daniel Irwin as alleged, and that Benjamin Dyke, at the time of his death, held the legal title to the one undivided half of the land, but that it was in trust for him, Lewis M. Dyke, who was-the equitable owner thereof. The answer alleges that from January, 1875, until February, 1879, Lewis M. Dyke and his wife lived at the house of Benjamin Dyke, and, during all that time, worked for him with the horses and farm machinery of said Lewis M., without ever having received any pay therefor, except through said land; that at the time said Lewis M. went to live with said Benjamin, it was under an agreement between them that if the former would come and live with the latter, said Benjamin would buy a farm, as soon as lie got able, for said Lewis M., which the latter should have, and that it was upon that inducement and promise said services were rendered; that about January 1, 1879, the said Benjamin Dyke and Daniel Irwin purchased the land described in the bill; that in pursuance of said agreement, Benjamin Dyke, placed the said Lewis M. in possession of the land, and the land was by the said Benjamin, up to the time of his death, treated, in all respects, as the land of the said Lewis M., but was not deeded to him; that soon after the purchase of the land, Lewis M. and Daniel Irwin partitioned the land between them, by verbal agreement; that the said Lewis M. took possession of his part, and has been in possession ever since, and has put considerable improvement on the same, and has paid about $1200 on the notes given by Benjamin Dyke for the purchase of the land. A cross-bill was filed by Lewis M. Dyke, setting forth the same facts stated in his answer, and praying that the verbal partition of the land between them, made by the said Daniel Irwin and Lewis M., be confirmed, and that the said Irwin and Narcissa Irwin make to the said Lewis M. a deed for his portion! of the land. Replications were filed to the answers to the original and cross-bills, and proofs taken, and, on final hearing, the court decreed relief in accordance Avith the prayer of the cross-bill, and the complainants appealed to this court.
Mr. J. S. Neville, for the appellants:
The mere possession of land under a parol agreement to convey, even with the superadded fact of valuable improvements, will not be deemed sufficient if the possession was obtained otherwise than under the contract. Padfield v. Padfield, 92 Ill. 198.
To entitle a party to specific performance, the proof must be clear, and it must also be fair, and it must be proved as laid, and not otherwise. Hatwell v. Black, 48 Ill. 301.
Where a contract for the sale of land rests in parol, it must clearly appear that the contract of sale has been made. Its terms must be clearly proved, and it must appear that they have been relied on and performed by the party seeking the enforcement of the contract, in order to entitle him to a decree for specific performance. Gosse v. Jones, 73 Ill. 508.
A court of equity, when called on to decree a specific performance of an alleged parol agreement, is asked to exercise an extraordinary jurisdiction. The court must be well satisfied of the existence and character of the agreement, and will always look to the substantial justice of the case. It must be satisfied that any resistance to the completion of the agreement alleged and proved, would operate as a fraud upon the other party. Selton v. Shipp, 65 Mo. 297.
The act relied upon as a part of performance, must, in itself, furnish evidence of the identity of the contract, and it is not enough that it is evidence of some agreement, but it must relate to and be equitable evidence of the particular agreement charged in the bill. Wallace v. Rappleye, 103 Ill. 229.
Messrs. Fifer & Phillips, for the appellees:
This court has repeatedly held, that where a father gives land to his son by parol, and the son moves upon the land and makes thereon valuable improvements, the father retaining the legal title in himself, the contract stands upon the same basis as a bargain and sale for a valuable consideration, and equity will compel a conveyance of the legal title. Smith v. Yocum, 110 Ill. 142; Warren v. Warren, 105 id. 568; McDowell v. Lucas, 97 id. 489; Bohanan v. Bohanan, 96 id. 591; Langston v. Bates, 84 id. 524; Kurtz v. Hibner, 55 id. 514; Bright v. Bright, 41 id. 97; Ramsey v. Liston, 25 id. 98.

Opinion:
Mr. Justice Sheldon
delivered the opinion of the Court:
The Statute of Frauds was not set up in the pleadings, which was necessary to be done in order to avail of that statute.
The proofs quite well establish that Lewis M. Dyke, in August, 1873, soon after he became twenty-one years of age, married, and lived with his parents until in the following spring, when he moved to Blue Mound, and went to farming on his own account. His father, Benjamin Dyke, and his mother, Sarah Dyke, were living on a rented farm, called the "Davis farm, " and seem to have been both in feeble health. Benjamin Dyke proposed to his son; Lewis M., that if the latter would come back to the Davis farm, they would work together, and as soon as they got money enough they would buy a farm, and it should be Lewis'. Lewis Dyke thereupon left Blue Mound, where he had been about one year, and, together with his wife, moved back to the Davis farm, where he remained with his father and mother some four years, his wife doing the house-work, and he working on the farm. In the fall of 1878, Benjamin Dyke and Daniel Irwin purchased the two hundred acres of land described in the bill, taking a deed to themselves, jointly. The purchase price of the land was $7000, of which each was to pay one-half. They made a cash payment of $4000, including two assumed incumbrances of $900, and gave -their three promissory notes, of $1000 each, due in one, two and three years, respectively. In the spring of 1879, Daniel Irwin and Lewis Dyke took possession by moving upon the land. They made a division of the land between them, and have, from that time down to the present, continued to occupy and cultivate the lands so set apart between them, in severalty. Benjamin Dyke remained on the Davis farm, and died September 19, 1880. Of the purchase money which remained unpaid at the time of the purchase, Lewis Dyke has paid some $1200, a part thereof ($519) having been paid previous to the -death of Benjamin Dyke, and by the decree Lewis Dyke is to pay the balance of $500 remaining unpaid on the last of the three purchase money notes given by Benjamin Dyke and Daniel Irwin. After the purchase of the land, Benjamin Dyke treated the land as belonging to Lewis Dyke, often saying that he bought it for Lewis, and that it wras Lewis' land. Although it does appear that on two occasions he expressed an intimation that he might not let Lewis have the 'land, this is of little weight against the greatly preponderating evidence of the contrary intention. Lewis Dyke made some small improvements upon the land, putting up a smoke-house about ten feet square, and a granary about five by ten feet, as one witness says, or as he says, ten by sixteen feet, and making some little fence.
On two or three occasions, Benjamin Dyke spoke of Lewis having four years' work in the land, thereby recognizing that the purchase of the land was for Lewis in fulfillment of the agreement to buy a farm for the latter, and under which he came to live with his father and performed the services he did for him. It may be said, then, that it was on the faith of the agreement that he should have the land, that Lewis Dyke rendered the services which he did for his father, moved upon and lived on the land, making some improvements, and paid a considerable portion of the purchase money which his father agreed to pay for the land,—as much as $1200 of it. We think this brings the case within the rule of repeated decisions of this court, that where a father makes a verbal agreement with a son to convey to him a tract of land if the latter will go and live upon the same, make expenditures upon and improve it, and this is done in reliance upon the promise, a court of equity will enforce a specific performance of the agreement. Bright v. Bright, 41 Ill. 97; Kurtz v. Hibner, 55 id. 514; Langston v. Bates, 84 id. 524; Bohanan v. Bohanan, 96 id. 591; McDowell v. Lucas, 97 id. 489; Warren v. Warren, 105 id. 568; Smith v. Yocum, 110 id. 142.
The decree will be affirmed.
Decree affirmed