Case Name: UDELL v. STEARNS et al.
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1908-03-11
Citations: 109 N.Y.S. 407
Docket Number: 
Parties: UDELL v. STEARNS et al.
Judges: 
Reporter: West's New York Supplement
Volume: 109
Pages: 407–411

Head Matter:
UDELL v. STEARNS et al.
(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department.
March 11, 1908.)
1. Descent and Distribution—Effect of Wile—After-Born Children.
In determining the right of after-born children to share in a testator's estate, as provided by 2 Rev. St. (1st Ed.) pt. 2, e. 6, tit. 1, § 49, as amended by Laws 1869, p. 40, c. 22, and Code Civ. Proe. § 1868. where they are neither provided for nor mentioned in the will made prior to their birth, the intention of the testator to leave nothing to them, as to his children in being when he made his will leaving all his property to his wife, cannot be drawn from the will itself, coupled with the fact that he did not make a new one, and the presumption that every one knows the law.
[Ed. Note.—For cases in point, see Cent. Dig. vol. 16, Descent and Distribution, § 78.]
2. Champerty and Maintenance—Grant of Lands Held Adversely.
As 1 Rev. St. (1st Ed.) pt. 2, c. 1, tit 2, § 147, avoids a deed only when the land conveyed is in “actual” possession of a person claiming adversely to the grantor, a deed is not void for champerty in the absence of actual possession by the adverse claimants.
[Ed. Note.—For cases in point, see Cent. Dig. vol. 9, Champerty and Maintenance, §§ 66-83.]
Rich, J., dissenting.
Appeal from Kings County Court.
Action by Jennie Udell against Henry S. and Amy B. Stearns. From an interlocutory judgment for plaintiff, defendants appeal. Affirmed.
This is an action of partition of real estate.
One Wilder died possessed of the land in question in 1880, leaving a widow and four children. He left a will which was made in 1874. It left all of his property to his widow. Two of the children were bom after the will was made, but during the testator’s lifetime.
The land was unimproved and unoccupied. The widow conveyed it, and the defendants have succeeded to the title conveyed by her. The two after-born children of the testator afterwards on coming of age conveyed an undivided one-half thereof, and the plaintiff has succeeded to that title.
Argued before JENKS, HOOKER, GAYNOR, RICH, and MILLER, JJ.
Hector M. Hitchings, for appellants.
Edward J. Byrne, for respondent.

Opinion:
GAYNOR, J.
.The two after-born children succeeded as heirs, each to an undivided one-fourth of the land of the testator upon his death, for it was provided by the Revised Statutes that whenever a testator should have a child born after the making of his will, either during his life or after his death, such child should "succeed" to the. same portion of the testator's real and personal estate as would have "descended or been distributed" to him if the testator had died intestate ; provided (as is the case here) such child were left "unprovided for by any settlement, and neither provided for nor in any. way mentioned in such will." 2 Rev. St. (1st Ed.) p. 65, pt. 2, c. 6, tit. 1, § 49, as amended by chapter 22, p. 40, Laws of 1869; Smith v. Robertson, 89 N. Y. 556; Herriot v. Prime, 155 N. Y. 8, 49 N. E. Í42; Matter of Murphy, 144 N. Y. 557, 39 N. E. 691; Luce v. Bur chard, 78 Hun, 537, 29 N. Y. Supp. 215. Section 1868 of the Code of Civil Procedure also recognizes that such after-born children succeed to their share of the realty as if there had been an entire intestacy, and authorizes them to maintain an action of partition. The argument of the learned counsel for the defendants that it is permissible to spell out of the will itself, coupled with the fact that the testator did not make a new one, and the presumption that every one knows the law, an intention by him to leave his after-born children, the same as his children in being when he made his will, nothing, goes down before the words of the statute and the decisions under it. To thus ascertain the intention of the testator, and give force to it, would nullify the statute. It may well be that the statute should be amended so as not to apply to a will by which one spouse leaves all of his property to the other spouse, but we have to accept it as it now is.
As neither adverse possession nor the statute of limitations is pleaded as a defense, they are not to be considered, and as there was no actual possession by the defendants of their predecessors in title, the conveyances of the two after-born children and their grantees could not be void for champerty, for, by the terms of the statute the possession of the person claiming under a title adverse to that of the grantor must be "actual," not merely constructive, to make such grantor's deed void. 1 Rev. St. (1st Ed.) p. 739, pt. 2, c. 1, tit. 2, § 147; Dawley v. Brown, 79 N. Y. 390; Saunders v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. Co., 135 N. Y.' 613, 32 N. E. 54.
The judgment should be affirmed.
Interlocutory judgment of the county court of Kings county affirmed, with costs. All concur, except RICH, J., who dissents.