Case Name: Carlos Wayne HICKS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1981-12-02
Citations: 407 So. 2d 252
Docket Number: No. 80-1115
Parties: Carlos Wayne HICKS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: FRANK D. UPCHURCH, Jr., J. concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 407
Pages: 252–257

Head Matter:
Carlos Wayne HICKS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. 80-1115.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
Dec. 2, 1981.
James B. Gibson, Public Defender, and Brynn Newton, Asst. Public Defender, and Julianne Piggotte, Certified Legal Intern, Daytona Beach, for appellant.
Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Evelyn D. Golden, Asst. Atty. Gen., Dayto-na Beach, for appellee.

Opinion:
ORFINGER, Judge.
Appellant challenges his conviction for burglary of a dwelling on the ground, among others, that the trial court erred in not granting his motion to dismiss the information based on the specific ground that it failed to allege that appellant's entry into the dwelling was without the consent of the owner or occupier. On this point, the issue is whether a non-consensual entry is a necessary element of the crime of burglary which must be alleged and proved by the State, or whether consent is a matter of defense to be raised and proved by defendant. We hold that under the current burglary statute, non-consent to the entry is an essential element of the crime which must be alleged and proved by the State.
Section 810.02(1), Florida Statutes (1979), defines the crime of burglary as:
"Burglary" means entering or remaining in a structure or conveyance with the intent to commit an offense therein, unless the premises are at the time open to the public or the defendant is licensed or invited to enter or remain.
In State v. Thompson, 390 So.2d 715 (Fla.1980), the Supreme Court confirmed the rule of construction asserted in Baeumel v. State, 26 Fla. 71, 7 So. 371 (1890), as follows:
In a statutory offense, it depends very much, though not exclusively, on the words of the statute, whether a particular matter is one of defense, or whether the negative of the matter enters into the definition of the crime. Therefore, as a general rule, we have what has already been laid down, namely, "if there is an exception in the enacting clause, the party pleading must show that his adversary is not within the exception: but, if there be an exception in a subsequent clause, or subsequent statute, that is a matter of defense, and is to be shown by the other party."
Baeumel, 7 So. at 372.
In Baeumel, the statute in question required all dealers in "spirituous, vinous or malt liquors" to pay a fee and secure a license before engaging in such sales, and all persons who sold such beverages were deemed dealers within the meaning of the act. There then followed a proviso that druggists could use such liquors in the preparation of prescriptions without being required to have such license. A defendant charged with violating the statute argued unsuccessfully that in order.to charge him with a crime under the statute it was necessary for the State to allege and prove that he was not a druggist, but the trial court held and the supreme court agreed that
The enacting clause of the act . under which plaintiff in error was convicted contains no exception or provision as to druggists, and therefore it was not necessary for the indictment to allege that the accused was not, at the time of the alleged sales, a druggist...
Id. at 373.
In Thompson, the court applied the same principle to section 790.221, Florida Statutes (1977), the statute proscribing possession of short barrelled rifles, short barrelled shotguns or machine guns, and held that the antique firearm exception in the statute was a matter of defense, rather than a necessary element of the crime to be alleged and proved by the State, because of the placement of the exception language in the statute.
Applying the simply stated but difficult to apply rule to the issue at hand, we discern that in the current statute, the legislature has made the element of non-consent a part of the "enacting clause." Section 810.-02(1) states the legislative definition of burglary, and that definition includes the phrase "... unless the premises are at the time open to the public or the defendant is licensed or invited to enter or remain." If we eliminate this language in identifying the crime, we use only part, but not all, of the statutory definition.
Prior to 1974, the burglary statute required a breaking and entering. Under that statute, the Supreme Court held that non-consent of the owner of the building was not an element of the crime, although it defined the element of "breaking" as the actual or constructive use of force in effectuating an unconsented to entry. State v. Jackson, 281 So.2d 353 (Fla.1973). Thus, even under that statute, non-consent to enter was inferentially alleged when the information charged a "breaking," and had to be proved by either direct or circumstantial evidence.
When the legislature adopted the current statute, it eliminated "breaking" as an element, but it did not eliminate non-consent as a necessary ingredient of the crime. Under the old statute, the allegation in an information that a defendant did "break and enter" of necessity was an allegation that the entry was without consent. With the elimination of "breaking" as an element of the crime, the legislature placed the still present ingredient of non-consent into the statutory definition as an element of the crime. Whereas under the old statute non-consent was in effect alleged when a "breaking" was alleged, with "breaking" no longer required, it is necessary to directly allege the element of non-consent.
An information must allege each of the essential elements of a crime to be valid; no essential element should be left to inference. State v. Dye, 346 So.2d 538 (Fla.1977). Since the information omitted an essential element of the crime of burglary, which omission was specifically raised in the motion to dismiss, the court erred in not dismissing the information.
Since we hold that the motion to dismiss the information should have been granted, we need not discuss appellant's remaining points on appeal. The judgment of conviction is reversed and the cause is remanded for further proceedings consistent herewith.
REVERSED and REMANDED.
FRANK D. UPCHURCH, Jr., J. concurs.
COWART, J., dissents with opinion.
. The information alleged that appellant:.
Did unlawfully commit a burglary by entering or remaining in a structure, to-wit: Dwelling, the property of Leonard Terry, as owner or custodian, located in the vicinity of 1706 West 12th Street, Sanford, with the intent to commit theft therein, and during the commission of such burglary did arm himself with a dangerous weapon, to-wit: a shotgun or pistol as defined by section 790.001(6), Florida Statutes, in violation of sections 810.-02(1), 810.02(2)(b), 775.087(2), Florida Statutes.
. For other cases applying this principle in different contexts, see: State v. Buchman, 361 So.2d 692 (Fla.1978), (sale of unregistered securities); State v. Kahler, 232 So.2d 166 (Fla.1970), (possession of certain unlabeled drugs as prima facie evidence that possession is unlawful); Benitez v. State, 172 So.2d 520 (Fla.2d DCA 1965) (possession of firearms by convicted felons).
. Grammatically, the word "unless" is considered a subordinating conjunction, thus it precedes and connects a subordinate clause or a dependent clause, with the remainder. See Harbrace College Handbook p. 474 (7th Ed. 1972), p. 474.
. Significantly, it is of interest to note that section 2.07 of the Florida Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases, Second Ed. (1975) states that one of the essential elements of the crime of burglary which must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt is that:
1. The defendant did enter (did remain in) a structure (conveyance) owned by or in the possession of (person alleged) without the knowledge or consent of (person alleged) at a time when such structure was not open to the public.
Of interest also is the inference, at least, that non-consent is an essential element of burglary, found in the majority opinion in Cladd v. State, 398 So.2d 442, (Fla.1981) viz:
We reject the defendant's contention that the marriage relationship and the right of consortium deriving therefrom preclude the State from ever establishing the nonconsensual entry requisite to the crime of burglary . (emphasis added). Id., at 444.