Case Name: Donald Lee ADAMS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1982-03-15
Citations: 414 So. 2d 1079
Docket Number: No. ZZ-435
Parties: Donald Lee ADAMS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: BOOTH and WENTWORTH, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 414
Pages: 1079–1081

Head Matter:
Donald Lee ADAMS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. ZZ-435.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
March 15, 1982.
On Certification May 26, 1982.
Michael E. Allen, Public Defender, and Carl S. McGinnes, Asst. Public Defender, Tallahassee, for appellant.
Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., and Miguel A. Olivella, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, for appellee.

Opinion:
PER CURIAM.
Appellant entered a plea of guilty to one count of burglary of a dwelling. The trial court adjudged appellant guilty and placed him on 15 years probation with a special condition of probation that the first two years were to be served in prison. Subsequently, appellant filed a motion to correct sentence, arguing that his probationary sentence was illegal under Villery v. Florida Parole and Probation Commission, 396 So.2d 1107 (Fla.1980). At the hearing on appellant's motion, all parties agreed that, if the motion were granted, the trial court had the authority to impose any sentence which it could have lawfully imposed at the original sentencing hearing. The motion was then granted, and the trial court imposed a sentence of ten years in prison.
On appeal, appellant argues the trial court erred in imposing a more severe sentence after having vacated the previously imposed probationary order. We find appellant's argument to be without merit. In Villery, supra, the Florida Supreme Court stated that, in correcting an illegal order, the trial court has the option of withdrawing the order and imposing a sentence of imprisonment not to exceed the period of time of the original total term of probation. The ten-year term of imprisonment imposed here does not violate Villery.
We also reject appellant's contention that his sentence is unconstitutional under North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 89 S.Ct. 2072, 23 L.Ed.2d 656 (1969), in that it imposed a more severe sentence without affirmatively explicating the new factual material forming the basis of the sentence. Pearce is inapplicable to this case because appellant's resentence of ten years does not exceed the entire term of fifteen years previously imposed. Williams v. State, 405 So.2d 436, 437 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981); see Lewis v. State, 402 So.2d 482 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981); Noles v. State, 407 So.2d 370 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981); Joyce v. State, 404 So.2d 850 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981).
BOOTH and WENTWORTH, JJ., concur.
SHAW, J., dissents in part and concurs in part with written opinion.