Case Name: Catharine Dawson, Resp't, v. The City of Troy, App'lt
Court: New York Supreme Court, General Term
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1888-07-03
Citations: 17 N.Y. St. Rep. 559
Docket Number: 
Parties: Catharine Dawson, Resp’t, v. The City of Troy, App’lt.
Judges: 
Reporter: New York State Reporter
Volume: 17
Pages: 559–565

Head Matter:
Catharine Dawson, Resp’t, v. The City of Troy, App’lt.
(Supreme Court, General Term. Third Department,
Filed July 3, 1888.)
1. Municipal corporations—Actions against for negligence—Laws 1886. chap. 572—What is not sufficient as notice.
The plaintiff, a married woman, walking after dark on one of the streets of the defendant city, slipped on the ice which had accumulated there, and fell, sustaining injuries, to recover damages for which this action is brought, it being alleged that the defendant was guilty of negligence. It is provided by Laws 1886, chap. 572, that no action of this kind shall be maintained against any city in this state having over 50,000 inhabitants, unless notice of the intention to maintain such action, and of the time and place at which injuries were received, shall have been filed with the counsel of the corporation, or other proper law officer thereof, within six months after such cause of action shall have accrued. Held, that the commencement without notice of a previous action on the same cause of action, within the time limited for such notice, which was discontinued before the commencement of the present action, did not satisfy the requirements of the statute. Ingalls, J., concurring ; Landon, J., dissenting.
33. Charge to jury—What is error.
Held, that there being no evidence given regarding the probability of future pain resulting from the injuries, it was error for the court to charge that recovery might be had for such pain. Landon, J., dissenting.
-3. Evidence—Conclusions deducidle from.
Held, that the fact that the plaintiff recovered wages for work at a mill, was consistent with the fact that she collected them for her husband.
Appeal by defendant from a judgment entered upon a verdict upon trial at the Rensselaer circuit.
On the 21st of January, 1887, the plaintiff, a married woman, after dark in the evening while walking upon River street, in the city of Troy, slipped upon the ice, fell, and .sustained injuries, to recover damages, for which this action is brought, the defendants being charged with negli.gence.
R. A Parmenter, for app’lt; J. W. Verbeck and D. S. Potter, for resp’t.

Opinion:
Learned, P. J.
In Strohm v. N. Y. L. E. and W. R. R. (96 N. Y., 305), the witness had testified that the plaintiff's condition was very likely to be permanent. The objection was made to the words "very likely," as speculative. The witness then said that such a patient might develop epilepsy, etc. The court held that this was too speculative.
In the present case the doctor testified: "She will very likely recover in time;" "it will probably take until a change of life."
This testimony had just that character of probability • which the court held to be improper in the Strohm case.
But furthermore the doctor did not testify that plaintiff would probably suffer any pain in the future. So that there was really no evidence that she would have further suffering. Whether or not the disease would be painful in the future was a matter (so far as evidence went) of conjecture. But the court charged, against defendant's request and exception, that if the jury believed there would be future bodily pain, they might allow for it. The plaintiff herself testified as to her present pain and suffering; but without evidence that such pain and suffering would continue, we think the jury could not, under the case cited, allow for it.
The plaintiff testified that, at the time of the injury, she was working in a mill, and always collected her wages, and the rate of such wages. That she had no property except what she earned. This seems to be all -the evidence as to her right to her wages. The court charged (and defendant excepted) that if she had been' allowed to make bargains in her own behalf for her labor and services, and had been ac customed to receive and appropriate the compensation therefor as she saw fit, with the approval and consent of Tier husband, then she could recover for any loss, etc.
It seems to us that there was nothing in the case to justify "the supposition, and that the doctrine is not in accordance with Filer v. N. Y. C. R. R. Co. (49 N. Y., 47). There certainly is no evidence, in the language of that case, that she was carrying on any business, trade or labor upon or for her isole and separate account. That she collected her wages, is quite consistent with her collecting them for her husband.
I do not feel willing to disregard the requirements of chapter 572, Laws 1886. The statute says:
" No action shall be maintained unless notice of the intention to commence such action, etc., shall have been filed with the counsel to the corporation within six months, etc." The question is, was the commencement of the former action for this same cause by service of summons and -complaint on the mayor a compliance with this statute.
The service of that complaint was not notice of an intention to commence that action; because it was itself the commencement. It was not notice of an intention to commence this action; because the plaintiff had then and could bave had no such intention.
To construe the service of that former summons and •complaint as a filing of a notice of intention with the corporation counsel under that statute seems to me to be an evasion such as courts sometimes make to relieve a party from a mistake ; and such as always produces mischief in the end by making the law uncertain. The plaintiff did not comply with the statute and did not intend to comply with the statute; probably overlooked it. She commenced Tier action without having filed such notice of intention; and now she asks the court, out of sympathy for her, to say that a complaint which was not, and could not have been, a notice of intention to commence this present action, was such notice; and that a paper served on the mayor was a paper filed with the corporation counsel.
' I do not think our sympathy should lead us to disregard the plain words of the statute. We might as well say that if the corporation counsel had heard in the street that the plaintiff was about to commence this action, such hearing would relieve her for the requirements of that statute. It would give them notice enough to make the necessary investigation as said in Meyer v. Mayor, 12 N. Y. State Rep., 675. The statute is plain and it is best to adhere to it.
Judgment reversed and new trial granted, costs to abide -event.
Ingalls, J., concurs in result on the last ground.