Case Name: J. W. KIMBROUGH v. WALKER D. HINES, Director General of Railroads, and ATLANTIC COAST LINE RAILWAY COMPANY
Court: Supreme Court of North Carolina
Jurisdiction: North Carolina
Decision Date: 1920-11-10
Citations: 180 N.C. 274
Docket Number: 
Parties: J. W. KIMBROUGH v. WALKER D. HINES, Director General of Railroads, and ATLANTIC COAST LINE RAILWAY COMPANY.
Judges: 
Reporter: North Carolina Reports
Volume: 180
Pages: 274–290

Head Matter:
J. W. KIMBROUGH v. WALKER D. HINES, Director General of Railroads, and ATLANTIC COAST LINE RAILWAY COMPANY.
(Filed 10 November, 1920.)
1. Instructions — Conflicting Charge — Aj>peal and Error — Reversible Error. •
When the trial Judge erroneously instructs tlie jury on the issue of contributory negligence, under conflicting evidence, as to the duty of one driving upon a railroad tract, at a street crossing in a town, to stop, as well as to look and listen for an approaching train, the error is not cured by a correct but conflicting instruction thereon, in another part of the charge, as the jury will not be presumed to know which of these conflicting instructions is the correct principle of law applicable to the evidence.
3. Railroads— Crossings— Collisions— Negligence — Contributory Negligence — Instructions—Appeal and Error — Reversible Error.
Where, upon the trial of an action against a railroad company to recover damages for a personal injury sustained by one driving upon a railroad track at a street crossing in a town, there is evidence tending to show that the view of the plaintiff! was obstructed by box cars the defendant had permitted to remain on spur or lateral tracks at the crossing; that the plaintiff knew of the frequent passing of trains at this place, and the train causing the injury approached without sounding its whistle or ringing its bell, and the plaintiff was prevented from seeing the train approach by the intervening box cars, or hearing it by reason of the noise of the running engine of his automobile, and that, he did not come to a full stop before going on the track, but, not hearing or seeing the train, he increased the speed of his automobile, and was immediately struck upon passing the end of a box car, which would not have happened had he stopped his machine to investigate: Held, an instruct ion to answer the issue as to contributory negligence in the negative, if the plaintiff looked and listened before entering upon the track, under the circumstances, without reference to the law relating to his not stopping to ascertain the danger, is reversible error.
Brown, X, concurring in result; Clark, C. X, and Allen, X, dissenting.
Appeal by defendant from Daniels, J., at March Term, 1920, of Waice.
Plaintiff brought this action to recover damages for personal injuries sustained at Selma, N. 0., 27 January, 1919, as the result of a collision at a public crossing between the automobile which he was driving and a train on the track of the Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Company, which was being operated by the United States Railway Administration. There was testimony on behalf of plaintiff that the .train was running at a speed of thirty or forty miles an hour; that no signal of approach to the crossing was given by whistle or bell; that the view of the track was cut off by a string of cars on a spur track, and that these ears extended two or three feet into the public road. Plaintiff testified that be looked and could not see down tbe track in tbe direction from wbicb tbe train was coming because bis view was obstructed by tbe cars on tbe spur track. '
• There was testimony on belialf of defendant tbat tbe ears on tbe spur track did not obstruct tbe plaintiffs view of tbe train; tbat notice of tbe approach of tbe train bad been given by blowing tbe whistle and ringing tbe bell, and tbat tbe speed of tbe train did not exceed ten or twelve miles an bour.
Tbe defendants pleaded tbe plaintiffs contributory negligence as a defense,-and contended at tbe trial tbat tbe failure of tbe plaintiff to stop before entering upon tbe track, when it was bis duty to do so, was tbe proximate cause of bis injury.
There was evidence tbat plaintiff was familiar with tbe crossing, having passed over it on tbe morning of tbe accident on bis way from Ealeigb to Pine Level. He knew tbat be was approaching a crossing, and says be slowed down. In describing tbe condition at tbe crossing and tbe circumstances of tbe accident, be says: “There were eight or ten box cars on tbe track connecting tbe Coast Line and Southern Eail-ways; tbe doors of tbe box cars were closed, and I could not see through them. Tbe first box car was on the crossing two or three feet. I bad to turn my car to get around it. There were some eight or ten cars back on tbe connecting track tbat prevented me from seeing tbe train coming toward tbe crossing from tbe South, and I came along up to tbe crossing and slowed tbe car down and did not bear anything, and just as I passed tbe car tbe engine struck me and carried me down tbe track. I listened for tbe train. I could not see tbe track at any point to tbe south. I did not bear tbe whistle blow and there was no sound of bell. I listened and looked all I could. I thought there might be a shifting engine going by. As I came toward the track at Selma tbat morning I looked for tbe train and could not see it; tbe box cars prevented it. I could not see south on account of tbe box cars. I just looked right in tbe box cars; tbat was all there was to look at. Tbat was all 'that I could see until I got right down on tbe railroad track; I was looking-right at tbe cars, and I bad to come around tbe edge of tbe box cars and they projected out two feet in tbe road; tbe box cars were within four or five feet of tbe main line of tbe Atlantic Coast Line. I knew tbat trains moved north and south at tbat point. Through passenger trains passed on tbat track. I drove around tbe edge of tbe box cars. When I got around tbe end of tbe box cars my front wheel was on tbe track tbe train was on; I did not stop; I just slowed up and listened. I did not get out and go to tbe edge of tbe box cars and look. I did not stop to see if ■ anything was coming from behind tbe box Cars. I just slowed up, and when I did not bear anything I just pulled through; when I decided to pull through. I speeded up; I did not stop to look around the edge to see if anything was coining. I did not stop anywhere after I came by the Union Fertilizer Company; I just slowed up and listened just about as slow as a car would go and not stop, and I did not hear anything; when you stop a Ford automobile the engine still runs unless you choke it; I slowed down just enough to keep from choking; they cannot chug away pretty heavy in that condition; my engine was running; I did not cut it off; I did not have plenty of time to cut it off behind those box cars; I listened for the train coming with the Ford engine running under my feet; you could not hear the Ford engine 30 yards away; it was running as smooth as a Cadillac; the Ford had been running a year or two, and had just been overhauled; it was not a second-hand car; I had been running it since August; I have no idea how far I had run the car; I expect I would run about 250 miles per week; I had run this car about 5,000 miles. A man ran it before when he traveled for Swift & Company. I should think he made about the same miles as I did. I do not know how long Swift & Company had had the Ford; some one said they had it about a year.”'
D. T. Oliver, witness for plaintiff, testified: “If Mr. Kimbrough had stopped before he got to the crossing, the train would have gone on by and not hit him.”
Richard Britt, witness for plaintiff, testified that plaintiff “was going ten miles per hour. He slowed up just before he got to the crossing and speeded up and went on by.”
D. T. Oliver, plaintiff’s witness, further testified: “Mr. Kimbrough was going about ten miles an hour at the crossing. He was running about as slow as a Ford would go. He kept on running that way until the train hit him. He slowed up from what he was doing possibly. A Ford will not run any less than ten miles an hour.”
Defendant contends that this testimony on behalf of 'plaintiff, construed in the light most favorable to him, establishes the fact that if he had exercised ordinary care under the circumstances he would -have stopped before entering upon the track, and the accident would not have occurred.
In addition to the reasons above set forth, the Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Company and its codefendant contended that the motion to nonsuit should have been granted upon the ground that the record fails to show that this company was in any way connected with the control or operation of its line of railroad at the time of the accident.
Defendants contended that the court not only failed to give the jury appropriate instructions as to plaintiff’s duty to stop, or táke other precaution for his safety, or, in other words, to exercise due care, besides looking and listening, but if the judge did so he gave another instruction - in conflict witb it, wben be told tbe jury tbat if be looked and listened only, tbey should answer tbe second issue “No.” And tbat if be bad listened, and tbe company failed to give- bim proper warning of tbe approach of tbe train, it cannot be imputed to bim as negligence tbat be went on tbe track. Defendants further contended tbat tbe instructions on tbe issue of contributory negligence are erroneous, because tbey withdraw tbe question of plaintiff’s duty to do more than this, if .necessary, from tbe jury’s consideration, and directed tbe jury to find tbat plaintiff was not guilty of contributory negligence if be only looked and listened.
Tbe trial judge gave tbe following instructions on tbe issue of contributory negligence: “Upon this issue tbe burden shifts, and it is upon tbe defendant to satisfy you by tbe greater weight of tbe evidence of tbe truth of their contention, and tbe defendant alleges tbat tbe proximate cause of tbe plaintiff’s injury was bis own failure to exercise care and prudence for bis own safety; tbat as be approached this railroad track at tbe crossing, tbe track being a warning of danger, 'it was bis duty to look and listen for tbe approaching of a train, and tbe defendant alleges tbat be failed to exercise care and to perform this duty, and tbat bis failure was tbe real, or proximate cause of tbe injury. Now, if this evidence satisfies you by its greater weight tbat as be approached tbe zone-of danger be failed to look and listen, and tbat if be did look and listen be could either have seen tbe train or beard tbe signal, and tbat under these circumstances be ventured upon tbe track, then you should answer this fifth issue ‘Yes,’ because be would be guilty of contributory negligence, which would exist and extend up to tbe time of tbe injury, and would be tbe proximate cause of it. Unless you are so satisfied, you will answer this issue ‘No.’ Where tbe view is obstructed, a traveler may ordinarily rely upon bis sense of bearing, and if be does listen and is induced to go on tbe track, then tbe failure of tbe company to warn tbe traveler of danger cannot be imputed to bis contributory negligence. Unless you are satisfied by tbe greater weight of tbe evidence, the burden being upon tbe defendant under this issue, tbat tbe plaintiff failed to exercise tbe care and prudence tbat tbe law required of bim, as I have indicated to you, then you would answer this issue ‘No,’ or, if tbe evidence leaves your mind in such condition tbat you cannot say bow it is, then you will answer it ‘No,’ because tbe burden is upon tbe defendant to satisfy you affirmatively tbat tbe plaintiff was negligent, and tbat bis negligence was tbe proximate cause of bis injury.”
Defendants contended tbat by tbe instructions of tbe court, which are set out above, tbe jury were directed to answer tbe issue of contributory negligence “No,” if tbey found tbat tbe plaintiff, as be approached tbe crossing, merely looked and listened, and tbe principle tbat, under tbe exceptional circumstances which, the jury were fully justified in finding to exist in this case, it was plaintiff’s duty to stop, look, and listen, was entirely ignored. In other words, if the jury should find from the evidence and by its greater weight, the burden being on defendant, that for a distance of several hundred feet the view of defendant’s track to the south was cut off by box cars; that the cars extended two or three feet into the public road; that plaintiff being fully aware that he was approaching a crossing, was driving at a speed of ten miles an hour; that the automobile which he was driving could not be driven at less than ten miles an hour; that as he approached the crossing he drove around the cars and immediately after passing the cars his automobile was upon the track on which the train was approaching; that he did not hear the train and could not see whether a train was approaching until he was on the track; that as he listened for a train the engine of his automobile-immediately in front of him was running with the noise usually incident to the operation of a gasoline engine, and the jury should find that under such circumstances a prudent man would have stopped his automobile and his engine before driving beyond the box cqrs and onto the track, then it would be the duty of the jury to answer the issue of contributory negligence “Yes,” it having been admitted by plaintiff that he did not stop, and the uncontradicted evidence of plaintiff’s witnesses having established the fact that if he had stopped the accident would not have happened.
There was a verdict for the plaintiff, with damages assessed at $20,000. Defendants reserved exceptions, and appealed.
. J. M. Broughton and Douglass & Douglass for plaintiff.
Murray Allen for defendants.

Opinion:
"WalkeR, J.,
after stating the essential facts of the case: The defendants contend that the instruction covered by their exception No. 28, which was taken to the instruction of the court to the jury, was erroneous, and agreed that it is especially objectionable because by it the jury were told that if the plaintiff looked and listened, and did no more, before entering upon the crossing and the track, they should answer the issue as to contributory negligence "No." ¥e will not discuss the question whether other instructions on this phase of the case were given which were, in themselves, correct, because, even if they were, the other one was erroneous, and in conflict with them. The rule of this Court upon such a question is thoroughly well settled by our decisions. Where such a conflict occurs, a new trial is granted, because the jury are not competent, as we have often said, to decide which instruction is correct, or which is incorrect. We find this rule thus stated in Edwards v. R. R.. 132 N. C., 99, where the leading authorities are cited: "The fact that the court, in one part of the charge, told the jury that it is the duty of an engineer, when approaching a crossing, to ring the bell or blow the whistle, did not cure the error he committed in the respect already indicated, that he must ring the bell and sound the whistle. It is well settled that when there are conflicting instructions upon a material point a new trial must be granted, as the jury are not supposed to be able to determine when the judge states the law correctly and when incorrectly. We must assume, in passing upon the motion for a new trial, that the jury were influenced in coming to a verdict by that portion of the charge which was erroneous." Other cases are S. v. Barrett, 132 N. C., 1010; Tillett v. R. R., 115 N. C., 662, and Williams v. Haid, 118 N. C., 481.
The court charged the jury that it was sufficient in law if the plaintiff • "looked and listened," without doing anything more, and if the jury found that he did, they should answer the second issue, as to contributory negligence, in the negative. This instruction was erroneous, because that it is not all that 'is required of the plaintiff, but in addition thereto he must further do what a man of ordinary prudence would have done, as, for instance, stopped his car (if the jury would have found that a man of ordinary prudence would have done so), under the same or substantially similar circumstances, to save himself from injury. So that the instruction fell short of the full measure of plaintiff's duty under circumstances which the jury could have found to exist, and this is true, although the jury should find that one of the defendant's engineers, who was at the time in control of the engine, had failed to give the proper signal.
The rule thus stated was the one adopted in Cooper v. R. R., 140 N. C., 209. Even though 'the plaintiff looked and listened, the jury may have found that the situation was such as to require him to do more, even to stopping his car, as a man of ordinary prudence would have done in like circumstances, or they may have found, by using their common sense and observation, that, notwithstanding what the plaintiff says as to the noise of his car, his ability to hear was so diminished by the noise of the same as to make it imperative that he should stop it, so that he might hear either the noise of the train as it approached nearer and nearer, or the sound of its signal. The jury could have arrived at this conclusion if they accepted the defendant's evidence as true, that the proper signals were given, and there was no reason why the plaintiff should not have heard them and prevented injury to himself, unless his hearing was deadened by his own fault in not stopping his car. And they could also have found that no man of ordinary prudence would venture on the track under the circumstances without assuring himself of the fact that the train, then expected and behind its schedule time, was not actually coming at that time and near tbe crossing, or that some shifting engine was about to pass over tbe crossing, as be testified: "I thought there might be a shifting engine about to pass." Again he stated, "I just slowed up, and when I did not hear anything I just pulled through; when I decided to pull through I speeded up; I did not stop to look around the edge to see if anything was coming. I did not stop anywhere after I came by the Union Fertilizer Company.". The jury may have found from this testimony, taken with some other facts, that a man of ordinary prudence would have looked around the edge of the box cars, which were five feet from the track, to see if a switching engine or train was coming, and that it was negligence, tested by the rule of the prudent man, not only not to do this, but to "speed up" when he decided to "pull through." There are, perhaps, other combinations of facts which the jury may have found to exist, and from which the jury, by applying the rule just mentioned, may have inferred that plaintiff's conduct was imprudent, if not very risky, and was not that of the ideally discreet and careful man. The instruction was wrong in itself, inherently so, and if there was a correct one, it was in conflict with it, and left the jury in ignorance of the true principle of law which should govern them in finding a verdict, or, at least, in a state of utter confusion as to what principle applied to facts as they found them to be. If the instructions were not in conflict, but in perfect harmony, as the last one was erroneous, both were wrong, which required the case to be referred to another jury.
In Shepard v. R. R., 166 N. C., 539, it was said by Justice Hoke, citing many cases, and among them Cooper's case, supra: ."It is also established by the weight of authority that it is not always imperative on a traveler to come to a complete stop before entering on a railroad crossing; but 'whether he must stop, in addition to looking and listening, depends upon the facts and circumstances of each particular case, and so is usually a question for the jury,' " citing Judson v. R. R., 158 N. Y., 597; Malott's case, 159 Ind., 127-134; 3 Elliott on Railroads (2 ed.), sec. 1095, note 147; 33 Cyc., pp. 1010, 1020. In Judson's case, supra, the rule is stated as follows: "A person approaching a railroad crossing is not required, as a matter of law, to stop before attempting- to cross, but his omission to do so is a fact for the consideration of the jury," And in Malott's case, supra: "Exceptional circumstances may also require him to stop, although this proposition generally presents itself as a mixed question of law and fact." And Justice Iloke thus concluded, in Shepard's case: "On a careful perusal of the record we are of opinion that the issue of contributory negligence must be referred to the decision of another jury, when the question whether, on the entire facts and circumstances, as the jury may find them to be, the plaintiff was in tbe exercise of reasonable care at tbe time in entering on tbe crossing without having come to a full stop." (Italics ours.)
And yet tbe court ignored those principles, and omitted important and essential matter from bis instruction on tbe second issue, and .confined plaintiff's contributory negligence to tbe single fact, wbetber be 'looked and listened," witb tbe instruction that if be did to answer tbe issue "No." When tbe court undertakes to define wbat is negligence, it must do so fully, and not leave out any essential element of it, S. v. Phifer, 90 N. C., 721, or to state it differently. When tbe court attempts to charge tbe law, it must be done correctly. S. v. Merrick, 171 N. C., 788, and cases cited, especially Carleton's case, 43 Neb., 373, and Simmons v. Davenport, 140 N. C., 407.
As to tbe motion for a. nonsuit we will reserve our opinion, as the facts may more fully and definitely appear on tbe next trial. Defendants may renew their motion at that time without prejudice.
We are, therefore, of tbe opinion, and so bold, that there was substantial error as pointed out by us, and a new trial is ordered.
New trial.