Case Name: STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Reo Ulrich HILL, Appellee
Court: Florida Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1979-06-07
Citations: 372 So. 2d 84
Docket Number: No. 54280
Parties: STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Reo Ulrich HILL, Appellee.
Judges: BOYD, OVERTON, SUNDBERG and ALDERMAN, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 372
Pages: 84–86

Head Matter:
STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Reo Ulrich HILL, Appellee.
No. 54280.
Supreme Court of Florida.
June 7, 1979.
Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., and Paul Mendel-son, Asst. Atty. Gen., Miami, for appellant.
David P. Horan, Key West,- and Mallory H. Horton, of Horton, Perse & Ginsberg, Miami, for appellee.

Opinion:
ENGLAND, Chief Justice.
We have for review by direct appeal an order of the Monroe County Circuit Court declaring section 370.151(2), Florida Statutes (1977), to be unconstitutional. The statute, which prohibits unauthorized shrimping in certain particularly-described areas of the Tortugas shrimp beds, was held invalid by the trial court because a portion of the restricted area lies outside the territorial boundaries of the state as set forth in article II, section 1(a) of the Florida Constitution. We reverse.
On February 14, 1978, officers of the Florida Marine Patrol observed Reo Hill shrimping in the prohibited Tortugas shrimp nursery area at a point within the territorial waters of the state — i. e., within three marine leagues of the Florida coast— and issued a citation charging him with a violation of section 370.151(2). After formal charges were lodged by information, Hill filed a written motion to dismiss attacking the constitutionality of the statute on the ground that the legislature, by purporting to prohibit shrimping in an area which extends in part beyond Florida's territorial boundaries, had acted in excess of its lawful jurisdiction. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss and held the statute invalid, finding it "immaterial that the Defendant was arrested within the boundaries of the State of Florida . . . . "
Unlike the trial judge, we regard the uncontested fact that Hill's conduct occurred within the territorial jurisdiction of the state to be not only material, but dispositive of this case. Regardless of whether or not the state may prohibit shrimping in waters outside its boundaries, it clearly possesses the authority to proscribe such activities in- areas subject to its jurisdiction. It is a longstanding principle of constitutional adjudication that
[a] statutory regulation may, consistently with organic law, be applied to one class of cases in controversy, and may violate the Constitution as applied to another class of cases. This does not destroy the statute; but imposes the duty to enforce the regulation when it may be legally applied.
Since this statute may be legally applied to Hill under the factual circumstances presented here, he has no standing to complain that it might not be constitutionally enforceable against one who commits a violation in that portion of the prohibited area lying outside the territorial jurisdiction of the state. See, e. g., State ex rel. Hoffman v. Vocelle, 159 Fla. 88, 98, 31 So.2d 52, 57 (1947); Steele v. Freel, 157 Fla. 223, 226-27, 25 So.2d 501, 503 (1946); State ex rel. Buford v. Shepard, 84 Fla. 206, 219, 93 So. 667, 671 (1922).
The trial judge erred in holding that section 370.151(2) is invalid, as the constitutional issue was not presented by a proper party in this case. Accordingly, the order of the trial court is reversed and this cause is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
BOYD, OVERTON, SUNDBERG and ALDERMAN, JJ., concur.
ADKINS, J., dissents with an opinion.
HATCHETT, J., dissents.
. We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const.
.It was stipulated in the trial court that the incident on which these charges are based occurred within the territorial jurisdiction of the state.
.In re Seven Barrels of Wine, 79 Fla. 1, 17, 83 So. 627, 632 (1920). See also, e. g., Ex Parte Wise, 141 Fla. 222, 231-32, 192 So. 872, 875-76 (1940).