Case Name: Jackson, ex dem. Cornelius and others, against M'Kee
Court: New York Supreme Court of Judicature
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1811-10
Citations: 8 Johns. 429
Docket Number: 
Parties: Jackson, ex dem. Cornelius and others, against M‘Kee.
Judges: 
Reporter: Johnson's Reports
Volume: 8
Pages: 429–431

Head Matter:
Jackson, ex dem. Cornelius and others, against M‘Kee.
rn cases o£ OnimcLgu.comt" Mothers" un?er legal disabdities, at the time of the a-their after coin‘"^ovalf ofr the ‘h.sa,lll<ty, otherwlSe, they wiii he barred.
It is not sufficient te bring an the°three yeire! fiied™&sent"^
, Whether the or not> the <1U-sent is equallv necessary, 57; orew mr-n.
THIS was an action of ejectment, brought to recover the possession of lot No. 36. in the township of Dryden, in the county of Cayuga. The cause was tried at the Cay up a circuit, in June last, before Mr. T ustice Tates. ’ J J
. The plaintiff gave m evidence a patent dated the 7th July, 1790, to John Cornelius, for the lot in question) a deed from Henry Hart, dated 17th January, 1784. The present suit was commenced the 5th September, 1808. No improvements were made on the lot prior to August. * *■ o / 1808*
rail i C 1 . . - Ihe defendant gave in evidence an award of the Onondaga commissioners, the 17th December, 1799, by which they awarded the said lot to John Patterson, and William I. Vredenbursch. It was proved that the defendant was in possession under Vredenburq-h, a few days be- , fore the commencement of the suit. It was admitted that no dissent was entered. It appeared that Ilarmau- . " Visger Hart, one of the lessors, was an infant when the ■ award was made, and that the present suit was brought: withi11 three years after he came of age. The judge ruled that it was not necessary to show a dissent, and. the jury, under his direction, found a verdict for the plaintiff. !
A motion was made to set aside the verdict, for th& misdirection of the judge."
Cady, for the defendant,
contended, that, by the act to settle disputes concerning the title to lands in the county of Onondaga, passed the 24th March, 1797, (sess. 20. c. 51.) it was indispensable that a dissent .should be filed, and a suit commenced within three years thereafter.. The 8th section of the act provides for the rights of infants and others, under legal disabilities, and that nothing shall prejudice their rights, “ if such infants shall, within three years after coming of age, make their dissent, and bring their suit and prosecute the same to effect.”
Van Vechten, contra.
In Jackson v. Huntly, it Was decided, that the act did not apply to the case of vacant lands. Tp render an award operative, the party in whose" favour it is made, must take possession ; and that possession . must be followed by an action. The award could not operate against persons under legal disabilities. The award merely does not constitute the bar; but pos- ~ session must be taken within a reasonable time, at least within two years, and continue during three years there-; after, to make a complete bar. This being a statute bar, is to be taken strictly. In the present case, the suit was commenced, as soon as practicable, within a few days' after possession was taken by. the defendant.
5 Johns. Rep. 65.

Opinion:
Per Curiam.
The lessor of the plaintiff, Hart, ip whom the title resided, was an infant when the award was made, and he has brought his suit within three 0 . years after he came of age, but it does not appear that he has filed his dissent to the award. The act relative to the Onondaga titles required all persons against whom an award might be made, to enter their dissent within two years and bring their suit within three years, or they should be barred. But the statute saved the rights of infants, if within three years after coming of age, they et make their dissent and bring their suit and prosecute the same to effect as aforesaid." (Laws, vol. 2. 269.) The lessor has brought his suit within the time; but he has filed no dissent; and this dissent was an act of solemnity to be put upon record, and which the statute has required in every case, as indispensable, if the party meant to controvert the award. If the land was wild and unreclaimed, without any possession, the act did not conclude the party who had not brought his ejectment within the three years, because the object of the act could not be answered by a suit in such a case. This was the decision in Jackson v. Huntly. (5 Johns. Rep. 65.) But the court did not say that the dissent must not be entered within the time limited; nor is there any objection in such a case to the provision requiring the dissent. The reason and the utility of the dissent does not depend upon the fact of the land being at the time occupied or not. The dissent is necessary in every case; and as there was none in this case, the plaintiff was barred, and the motion to set aside the verdict must be granted with costs to abide the event of the suit.
Motion granted.