Case Name: PEOPLE v. CORTEWAY
Court: Michigan Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1995-08-01
Citations: 212 Mich. App. 442
Docket Number: Docket Nos. 157053, 167861
Parties: PEOPLE v CORTEWAY
Judges: Before: Hood, P.J., and Mackenzie and T. R. Thomas, JJ.
Reporter: Michigan appeals reports; cases decided in the Michigan Court of Appeals.
Volume: 212
Pages: 442–454

Head Matter:
PEOPLE v CORTEWAY
Docket Nos. 157053, 167861.
Submitted April 6, 1995, at Grand Rapids.
Decided August 1, 1995, at 9:00 a.m.
Leave to appeal sought.
Stephen M. Corteway pleaded guilty in the Kalamazoo Circuit Court, Richard Ryan Lamb, J., of murder in the first degree. The defendant appealed, and the Court of Appeals, while retaining jurisdiction, remanded to the circuit court to allow the defendant to move to withdraw his plea on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel. On remand, the circuit court, following a hearing at which there was testimony that counsel had discussed the nature and sentencing consequences of first-degree murder, the possible defenses, the possibility of a conviction of a lesser included offense, the strength of the prosecution’s case and of the defenses, and the advantages and disadvantages of going to trial, concluded that although counsel's representation was otherwise adequate, counsel’s failure to make a specific recommendation concerning whether the defendant should plead guilty or go to trial constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. An order granting the defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea was entered. The people appealed by leave granted. The appeals were consolidated.
The Court of Appeals held:
1. While a defense counsel may elect to offer a client a specific recommendation whether to go to trial or to plead guilty, there is no requirement that such a recommendation necessarily be given, nor does the failure to provide such a recommendation necessarily constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. The test is whether a counsel’s assistance enabled a defendant to make an informed and voluntary choice between trial and a guilty plea. Absent unusual circumstances, an informed and voluntary choice can be made by a defendant without a specific recommendation by counsel where the counsel has apprised the defendant adequately of the nature of the charges and the consequences of a plea. The fact that the charged offense in this case was punishable by life imprisonment was not by itself a special circumstance that would obligate the defense counsel to make a specific recommendation or to object to the defendant’s decision to plead guilty. Therefore, because the record discloses no unusual or special circumstances in this case that would require the defendant’s counsel to make a specific recommendation concerning whether the defendant should plead guilty, the trial court erred in finding ineffective assistance of counsel.
References
Am Jur 2d, Criminal Law §§ 470, 474, 985.
See ALR Index under Attorney or Assistance of Attorney; Guilty Plea.
2. The defendant’s assertion that he should be allowed to withdraw his guilty plea because of the failure of the trial court to comply with the requirements of MCR 6.301(B)(2) was not preserved for appellate review by reason of the failure of the defendant to move in the trial court to withdraw his guilty plea on that basis or to raise that claim on appeal in a timely manner.
Reversed and remanded for reinstatement of conviction.
Hood, P.J., dissenting, stated that the order of the trial court allowing the defendant to withdraw his guilty plea should be affirmed, because, under the circumstances of this case, especially in light of the fact that the plea was to first-degree murder with its mandatory life sentence, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the defendant to withdraw his plea on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel, the defendant having been prejudiced by the failure of his counsel to inform him specifically that absolutely nothing was gained by pleading guilty.
Criminal Law — Guilty Pleas — Withdrawals of Guilty Pleas — Ineffective Assistance of Counsel.
A counsel for a criminal defendant may elect to offer the defendant a specific recommendation whether to go to trial or to plead guilty; however, there is no requirement that such a recommendation necessarily be given, nor does the failure to provide such a recommendation necessarily constitute ineffective assistance of counsel; absent unusual circumstances, a defendant can make an informed and voluntary choice whether to plead guilty or go to trial without a specific recommendation having been made by counsel where the counsel has apprised the defendant adequately of the nature of the charges and the consequences of a plea.
Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Thomas L. Casey, Solicitor General, James J. Gregart, Prose cuting Attorney, and Judith B. Ketchum, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for the people.
State Appellate Defender (by Rolf E. Berg\ for the defendant on appeal.
Before: Hood, P.J., and Mackenzie and T. R. Thomas, JJ.
Circuit judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.

Opinion:
Mackenzie, J.
Defendant pleaded guilty of first-degree murder, MCL 750.316; MSA 28.548, and was sentenced to life imprisonment without parole. He appealed as of right, and this Court remanded to the trial court to allow defendant to move to withdraw his plea on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel. On remand, the trial court entered an order granting defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The people appeal that order by leave granted. We reverse and remand for reinstatement of defendant's conviction.
In People v Pickens, 446 Mich 298; 521 NW2d 797 (1994), our Supreme Court adopted the test set forth in Strickland v Washington, 466 US 668, 687; 104 S Ct 2052; 80 L Ed 2d 674 (1984), for determining whether a defendant has been denied effective assistance of counsel. Under that test, a defendant must show, first, that counsel's performance was deficient, and, second, that the deficient performance was prejudicial to the defendant. Id.
When reviewing a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel arising out of a guilty plea, courts apply the test set forth in Strickland in light of McMann v Richardson, 397 US 759; 90 S Ct 1441; 25 L Ed 2d 763 (1970), and Tollett v Henderson, 411 US 258; 93 S Ct 1602; 36 L Ed 2d 235 (1973). People v Thew, 201 Mich App 78, 89; 506 NW2d 547 (1993). See also In re Oakland Co Prosecutor, 191 Mich App 113, 120-122; 477 NW2d 455 (1991). To establish ineffective assistance of counsel in the context of a guilty plea, courts must determine whether the defendant tendered a plea voluntarily and understandingly. Thew, supra, p 89; People v Mayes (After Remand), 202 Mich App 181, 183; 508 NW2d 161 (1993).
Guilty pleas have been found to be involuntary or unknowing on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel where defense counsel failed to explain adequately the nature of the charges or the consequences of the guilty plea. Thew, supra, p 91. Guilty pleas have also been found to be involuntary or unknowing where counsel has failed to discuss possible defenses to the charges to which the defendant is pleading guilty. Id. In these situations, counsel's deficient representation effectively renders the defendant's guilty plea involuntary because it deprives the defendant of the ability to make an intelligent and informed choice from among his alternative courses of action. Thew, supra, p 92, quoting Rinehart v Brewer, 561 F2d 126, 132 (CA 8, 1977).
In this case, the testimony at the hearing on remand established that defendant and his attorney discussed the nature and sentencing consequences of the first-degree murder charge, the possible defenses, the possibility of a conviction of a lesser included offense, the strength of the prosecution's case and of the available defenses, and the advantages and disadvantages of going to trial and pleading guilty. Counsel, however, did not specifically recommend which course of action defendant should take. The trial court concluded that, although counsel's representation was otherwise adequate, counsel's "neutrality" — his failure to make a specific recommendation that defendant either plead guilty or go to trial — constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. We reject this analysis.
The decision to plead guilty is the defendant's, to be made after consultation with counsel and after counsel has explained the matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make an informed decision. See MRPC 1.2(a) and MRPC 1.4(b). While an attorney may elect to offer a client a specific recommendation whether to go to trial or to plead guilty in the course of that consultation, we decline to hold that such a recommendation is required or that the failure to provide such a recommendation necessarily constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel. The test is whether the attorney's assistance enabled the defendant to make an informed and voluntary choice between trial and a guilty plea. Absent unusual circumstances, where a counsel has adequately apprised a defendant of the nature of the charges and the consequences of a plea, an informed and voluntary choice whether to plead guilty or go to trial can be made by the defendant without a specific recommendation from counsel. See Jones v Estelle, 584 F2d 687, 690 (CA 5, 1978); Trahan v Estelle, 544 F2d 1305, 1319-1320 (CA 5, 1977) (Goldberg, J., concurring).
The record in this case shows that the defense counsel made certain that defendant was aware of the nature of the charges and the consequences of his guilty plea or alternative courses of action, including the existence of possible defenses and lesser included offenses. Thew, supra. The record discloses no unusual or special circumstances in this case that would require defendant's counsel specifically to advise him to plead guilty or to go to trial. Furthermore, the fact that defendant was charged with an offense punishable by life imprisonment without parole did not, without more, obligate defense counsel to object to defendant's decision to plead guilty or to insist that he go to trial. See People v Stewart, 442 Mich 890; 498 NW2d 430 (1993). Under these circumstances, the trial court erred in finding ineffective assistance of counsel. Accordingly, we reverse the order granting defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea.
In addition to his ineffective assistance of counsel claim, defendant also contends in two related arguments that he should be allowed to withdraw his guilty plea because the trial court did not comply with the requirements of MCR 6.301(B)(2). Defendant did not move in the trial court to withdraw his guilty plea on these grounds, nor did he raise the claims in a timely manner before this Court. Therefore, they are not properly preserved for our review. MCR 6.311(A) and (C); MCR 7.208(B); MCR 7.211(C)(1).
Reversed and remanded for reinstatement of defendant's conviction. We retain no further jurisdiction.
T. R. Thomas, J., concurred.