Case Name: HARRIS v. STATE
Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1914-06-26
Citations: 169 S.W. 657
Docket Number: No. 3192
Parties: HARRIS v. STATE.
Judges: 
Reporter: South Western Reporter
Volume: 169
Pages: 657–660

Head Matter:
HARRIS v. STATE.
(No. 3192.)
(Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
June 26, 1914.
On Motion for Rehearing, Oct. 14, 1914.)
1. Criminal Law (§ 717 ) — Trial — Argument of Counsel.
Where, after a difficulty between accused and deceased bad terminated and deceased was fleeing, accused pursued and felled him with an ax, and a third person carried deceased to a house to give him aid and ordered accused away, after which, while deceased was being-carried to his home, accused approached and without provocation again struck deceased with an ax, killing him, a statement by the county attorney in argument, that if .deceased and accused engaged in mutual combat and the combat was abandoned by deceased it would be in law the same as if deceased had never engaged in the difficulty with accused at all, was not error.
TEd. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 1682-1687; Dec. Dig. ,§ 717. ]
2. Criminal Law (§ 730 ) — County Attorney-Misconduct.
At the end of a hypothetical question the county attorney stated that as far as the state was concerned it did not desire to do accused anything but justice. Accused objected to the statement as gratuitous, whereupon the county attorney said: “I will withdraw it then. We want to give Mm all the hell we can.” The court at once instructed the jury not to consider the statement, and did so again in his instructions, and the attorney apologized to the court and jury for having used the expressions. Held, that the error was cured.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. § 1693; Dec. Dig. § 730. ]
3. Homicide (§ 81 ) — Murder—Manslaughter — Temporary Insanity — Intoxication.
Temporary insanity produced by the use of intoxicating liquors will not reduce an offense from murder to manslaughter.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Homicide', Cent. Dig. § 107; Dec. Dig. § 81. )
4. Homicide (§ 309 ) — Manslaughter — Intoxication— INSTRUCTIONS.
A request to charge that, if accused’s mind was so intoxicated from the recent immoderate use of intoxicating liquors that he was incapable of cool and collected consideration, that fact should be Considered in passing on the issue of manslaughter, was erroneous, and properly refused.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Homicide, Cent. Dig. §§ 649, 650, 652-655; Dee. Dig. § 309. )
5. Criminal Law (§ 916 ) — Triad-Time to Prepare.
Where appointed counsel was given all the time required by statute to prepare to defend accused, and made no request for further time when the case was called for trial, or during the trial, it was too late, after verdict, to contend' that- counsel should have been given more time to prepare the case, in the absence of some showing that after the trial counsel had learned of testimony which would have been beneficial, and attached the affidavits of the witnesses, stating the facts to which they would testify.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ '2159, 2160; Dec. Dig. § 916.. ]
6. Homicide (§ 28 )— Punishment — Mitigation — Intoxication.
Since the degrees of murder have been abolished, the fact that accused' was temporarily insane from the recent use of intoxicating liquors at the time he killed deceased is available only in mitigation of punishment.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see. Homicide, Cent. Dig. §§ 44, 45, 46., 133; Dec. Dig. § 28. )
On Rehearing.
7. Criminal Law (§ 1206 ) — Punishment — Death Penalty — Indeterminate Sentence Law.
The indeterminate sentence law (Acts 33d Leg. 1st Called Sess. c. 5), amending Ac.ts 33d Leg. c. 132, 'did not operate to impliedly repeal those statutes, authorizing the assessment of the death penalty for specified offenses.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 3271-3277, 3279, 3280; Dec. Dig. § 1206. ]
Appeal from District Court, Jefferson County; W. H. Davidson, Judge.
Sam Harris was convicted of murder, and he appeals.
Affirmed.
V. A. Collins, of Beaumont, for appellant. C. E. Lane, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.
For other eases see same topic and section NUMBER in Dec. Dig. & Am. Dig. Key-No. Series & Rep’r Indexes
For o tiler .cases see same topic and section NUM.BER in Dec. Dig, & Am. Dig. Key-No. Series & Rep’r Indexes.

Opinion:
HARPER, J.
Appellant was found guilty of murder, and his punishment assessed at death, from which conviction he prosecutes this appeal.-
In the first bill of exceptions it is shown that counsel for the state in his argument stated to the jury that if the deceased and defendant engaged in mutual combat, and the combat was abandoned by deceased, it would be in law the same as if deceased had never engaged in the difficulty at all: Under the facts in this case we do not think this was a very improper statement. The evidence shows that when attention was first called to the parties, they were down on the ground fighting; that deceased got up and ran, when appellant took after him and struck him on the head with a small ax, felling him to the ground. Alfred Barnes interfered, and took the deceased into a house to wash the blood off of him; appellant endeavoring to force his way into the house. Barnes ordered him away, and undertook to carry deceased to his home, appellant walking along behind, when without other provocation he again struck deceased with the ax, killing him. Certainly, as qualified by the court, the bill presents no error.
Appellant introduced Dr. Will T. Williams as an expert witness on the issue of insanity. He asked a number of hypothetical questions, to which the witness gave answers, and then the county attorney examined him hypothetically, stating the premises-as he considered the evidence, and at the end of one of the questions stating: "Now, Doctor, that's the best I can state it, and as far as I am concerned, and as far as the state of Texas is concerned, we are not after doing this fellow anything but justice." Appellant objected to this statement as entirely gratuitous. The county attorney stated: "I will withdraw it then. We want to give him all the hell we can." The court at once instructed the jury not to consider such statement, and again in his written charge so-instructed them. The county attorney apologized to the court and jury for having used the expressions. Under such circumstances, as there was nothing in the expressions used, tending to show the guilt of appellant, no error is presented. The county attorney at first was trying to be magnanimous by in-> forming the doctor that neither he nor the-•state wanted any injustice done appellant,, and, when this was objected to, he, as men often do, in a moment of petulancy, made the other remark. As he apologized to the court and jury for having done so, and the jury was twice instructed that it was improper and should not be considered -by them, the hurt, if any, was certainly removed.
Temporary -insanity produced by the-use of intoxicating liquors will not reduce an-offense from murder to manslaughter, and the court did not err in refusing the special charge requesting him to'so instruct the jury. By the terms of article 41 of the Penal Code, it was provided, when murder was divided into two degrees, that .temporary insanity so produced might reduce the offense from murder In the first to murder in the second degree. In all other instances the evidence was admissible only in mitigation of the punishment, but not to reduce the grade of the offense. Evers v. State, 31 Tex. Cr. R. 319, 20 S. W. 744, 18 L. R. A. 421, 37 Am. St. Rep. 811; Clore v. State, 26 Tex. App. 624, 10 S. W. 242; Hernandez v. State, 32 Tex. Cr. R. 271, 22 S. W. 972; Gaitan v. State, 11 Tex. App. 554; Houston v. State, 26 Tex. App. 657, 14 S. W. 352.
Again, in charge No. 2 appellant seeks to have the court, among other things, instruct the jury:
"And if you believe that defendant's mind was so intoxicated from the recent immoderate use of intoxicating liquors that he was incapable of cool and collected consideration," etc., that fact should be considered in passing on the issue of manslaughter.
This is not the law. This is a condition brought about by himself alone, and the court fairly and fully submitted the issue of manslaughter as made by the testimony.
These are all the bills in the record, but in the motion for new trial it is contended that the court should have given appointed counsel more time in which to prepare the case for trial. The court gave all the time the statute requires, and if counsel desired more time, he should have made that fact known at the time the case was called for trial, or if during the trial any state of facts arose which led him to believe that by a postponement of the case he could secure evidence beneficial to his client, he should have asked leave of the court to withdraw his announcement and postpone the case. It is too late after verdict to make such contention, unless some showing is made that since the trial he has learned of testimony which would have been beneficial, attaching the affidavits of the witnesses stating the facts to which they would testify. In this case no showing is made that any witness would swear to any fact; in fact, the motion for a new trial is not sworn to, nor is the affidavit of any witness attached to it, nor in the motion is the name of any witness given.
No objections were made to the charge of the court at the time it was submitted to counsel and before it was read to the jury. However, in the motion for new trial there is some complaint made as to that portion of the charge presenting the issue of temporary insanity from the recent use of intoxicating liquors. This portion is a fair presentation of the issue and not subject to the criticisms leveled at it. It authorized the jury, if they found appellant temporarily insane from the recent use of intoxicants, to take this in consideration in mitigation of the punishment assessed, in case they found appellant guilty. This is all the law authorizes now, since murder is only of one degree.
Counsel were appointed by the court to defend appellant, and they did so ably. They write that it is impossible for them to come to Austin at this time, and ask that the submission of the case be postponed until October. We have already postponed the case once at appellant's request, and while we must commend them, in that they, without money and without price, are willing to come to Austin and present an argument on appeal, yet, as the court must adjourn this week, we do not feel that we would be justified in postponing submission of the case for three months. If, however, after counsel have read this opinion, they still think the record presents error for which the case should be reversed, they will doubtless file a motion for rehearing, and as the death penalty was assessed, and counsel could not come at this time, if they so desire we will hear them on the motion for rehearing.
The judgment is affirmed.
DAVIDSON, J.
This being a death penalty, I think it ought to have been postponed for argument till October term next. I express no opinion as to questions discussed, as I have not had time to investigate them satisfactorily.