Case Name: Ignacio Gonzalez QUINONEZ, Petitioner, v. Loretta E. LYNCH, Attorney General, Respondent
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 2015-07-24
Citations: 610 F. App'x 633
Docket Number: No. 11-74022
Parties: Ignacio Gonzalez QUINONEZ, Petitioner, v. Loretta E. LYNCH, Attorney General, Respondent.
Judges: Before: W. FLETCHER, PAEZ, and BERZON, Circuit Judges.
Reporter: West's Federal Appendix
Volume: 610
Pages: 633–634

Head Matter:
Ignacio Gonzalez QUINONEZ, Petitioner, v. Loretta E. LYNCH, Attorney General, Respondent.
No. 11-74022.
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
Submitted July 8, 2015.
Filed July 24, 2015.
Todd Becraft, Law Office of Todd Be-craft, Los Angeles, CA, for Petitioner.
O.I.L., Ann M. Welhaf, DOJ-U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, Chief Counsel Ice, Office of the Chief Counsel Department of Homeland Security, San Francisco, CA, for Respondent.
Before: W. FLETCHER, PAEZ, and BERZON, Circuit Judges.
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

Opinion:
MEMORANDUM
Ignacio Gonzalez Quinonez petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals's (BIA) decision finding him removable for having been convicted of two crimes involving moral turpitude (CIMTs), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii), and an aggravated felony, 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii); 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F), and pretermi-ting his applications for cancellation of removal, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a), and under former section 212(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c). We deny the petition.
1. As the government concedes, the BIA's pretermission of 212(c) relief based on the lack of a "statutory counterpart in the grounds of inadmissability" was erroneous. See Judulang v. Holder, — U.S. -, 132 S.Ct. 476, 181 L.Ed.2d 449 (2011).
2. Remand would be futile. Gonzalez admitted that he had been convicted in 2009 for a violation of California Penal Code § 422 and in 2011 for a violation of California Penal Code § 647(b). The Immigration Judge (IJ) found the convictions established by clear and convincing evidence, and Gonzalez did not challenge that conclusion before the BIA.
We have held that convictions under both statutes are categorically CIMTs. See Rohit v. Holder, 670 F.3d 1085 (9th Cir.2012); Latter-Singh v. Holder, 668 F.3d 1156 (9th Cir.2012). Therefore, even without relying on the 1993 conviction at all, Gonzalez is removable for having committed two CIMTs.
Gonzalez is ineligible for relief from that ground of removability. First, because both convictions were entered after April 1, 1997, even if Gonzalez were granted 212(c) relief, it would not waive this ground of removability. Matter of Abdelghany, 26 I. & N. Dec. 254, 261 (BIA 2014). Second, Gonzalez is ineligible for cancellation, both because he was previously convicted of an aggravated felony, see Becker v. Gonzales, 473 F.3d 1000, 1003-04 (9th Cir.2007), and because, in order to avoid being separately removable for the aggravated felony, he would need to obtain 212(c) relief, which would foreclose also seeking cancellation, see Garcia-Jimenez v. Gonzales, 488 F.3d 1082, 1085-86 (9th Cir.2007).
Neither the IJ nor the BIA held that the 2011 conviction was a CIMT. No remand is necessary, however, because that question has been settled by Rolvit. See Medina-Lara v. Holder, 771 F.3d 1106, 1117 (9th Cir.2014).
PETITION DENIED.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.