Case Name: Vance and Augusta WILLIAMS v. MARTIN MARIETTA ALUMINA, INC., Appellant
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 1987-04-29
Citations: 817 F.2d 1030
Docket Number: No. 86-3003
Parties: Vance and Augusta WILLIAMS v. MARTIN MARIETTA ALUMINA, INC., Appellant.
Judges: Before SLOVITER, STAPLETON and ROSENN, Circuit Judges.
Reporter: Federal Reporter 2d Series
Volume: 817
Pages: 1030–1047

Head Matter:
Vance and Augusta WILLIAMS v. MARTIN MARIETTA ALUMINA, INC., Appellant.
No. 86-3003.
United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.
Argued Dec. 4, 1986.
Decided April 29, 1987.
Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc Denied May 20, 1987.
Douglas L. Capdeville (argued), Law Offices of R. Eric Moore, Christiansted, St. Croix, U.S.V.I., for appellant.
Thomas Alkon (argued), Alkon and Rhea, Christiansted, St. Croix, U.S.V.I., for appellees.
Before SLOVITER, STAPLETON and ROSENN, Circuit Judges.

Opinion:
OPINION OF THE COURT
SLOVITER, Circuit Judge.
I.
Facts
Martin Marietta Alumina, Inc. appeals from the denial of its motion for judgment n.o.v. or in the alternative for remittitur or a new trial following a $600,000 jury award in favor of Vance Williams for injuries suffered when he fell while working on the roof of a building on Martin Marietta's property. At the time of his injury, Vance Williams was working as a pipefitter for Riggers and Erectors (Riggers), an independent contractor hired by Martin Marietta to relocate an oil tank on Martin Marietta's property. Williams' job was to relocate oil lines on a building roof.
The roof of the substation on which Williams was working was of two heights because a structure had been added at the western part of the building in 1979. An air conditioning duct had been installed on the upper roof and a stationary ladder was permanently affixed to the west side of the building which provided access to the upper roof. There was no ladder giving access to the lower roof three feet below, which topped the remainder of the building. Williams' work site was on the west side of the lower roof, near the upper roof.
The parties gave conflicting stories concerning the events leading to Williams' fall. Williams testified that when he arrived at the work site the first time, he was with Felix Diaz, his Riggers' supervisor, and Sylvester Gonzales, Martin Marietta's project representative. According to Williams, they pointed out the pipes on the lower roof that were to be relocated and when he asked how to get to the lower roof, Gonzales told him "Follow me". App. at 74. Williams testified that Gonzales then demonstrated how to gain access to the lower roof by climbing eight feet up the affixed ladder and then stepping from the ladder sideways onto a row of plasticoated electrical conduit pipes which led to the lower roof. App. at 75.
Williams' testimony in this respect was unequivocal. Pointing to a diagram, he told the jury, "[Gonzales] took me up this ladder, come up the ladder, come across on these pipes, and onto this roof." App. at 75. In response to the question, "[D]id Mr. Gonzales go up on the roof with you?", he answered, "Yes, sir, he went up first and then Tito [Diaz] then me." Id. Williams' testimony was confirmed by that of Raphael Phillip, a Riggers welder, who said, "Judging by this ladder here, this was the way that Mr. Sylvester Gonzales and Tito Diaz went up to show us what he wanted done." Tr. at 93.
Williams testified that he used this method of access three to four times a day for the two weeks he worked there. App. at 84. According to Williams, Gonzales observed him working on the roof several times and never mentioned another way to obtain access. App. at 75.
Contrary testimony was given by Gonzales who testified that he did not instruct either Williams or Phillip how to gain access to the lower roof, App. at 170, and that he had no knowledge that Riggers' employees were using the ladder for access to the lower roof. App. at 174.
Williams injured his back when he fell eight feet when he was moving from the ladder to the conduit pipes while trying to gain access to the lower roof. Williams sued Martin Marietta, contending that it was negligent both because it failed to provide a safe access to the work area on the lower roof and because Gonzales instructed him to use an unsafe method for gaining access to the lower roof. Tr. at 10, 493-95. The district court instructed the jury that it could find Martin Marietta liable for Williams' injuries if it found that Martin Marietta selected the means of access to the work site and that Martin Marietta did not exercise reasonable care in selecting that means of access or if it found that Williams' injury was caused by a condition on Martin Marietta's land that Martin Marietta knew of or by the exercise of reasonable care should have known posed an unreasonable risk to Williams as a business invitee. The court also told the jury that if Martin Marietta retained control over the manner in which the work was performed, it could find Martin Marietta liable for any injury to Williams caused by the negligence of Riggers. Tr. at 559-63.
The jury returned a general verdict in favor of Williams and awarded him $600,-000 in compensatory damages.
II.
Liability
A.
Failure to Provide Safe Access to the Work Site
Williams predicated his case on two theories of negligence, one being Martin Marietta's failure to provide him with a safe access to the work site and the other being the negligence of Gonzales, Martin Marietta's representative on the site, in directing access by an unsafe route. Williams' first theory is based on section 343 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965), dealing with the "special liability of possessors of land to invitees," which provides:
§ 343. Dangerous Conditions Known to or Discoverable by Possessor
A possessor of land is subject to liability for physical harm caused to his invitees by a condition on the land if, but only if, he
(a) knows or by the exercise of reasonable care would discover the condition, and should realize that it involves an unreasonable risk of harm to such invitees, and
(b) should expect that they will not discover or realize the danger, or will fail to protect themselves against it, and
(c) fails to exercise reasonable care to protect them against the danger.
The district court instructed the jury on this theory as follows:
A possessor of land such as Martin Marietta is also subject to liability for physical harm caused to its business invitees such as Vance Williams, by a condition on the land if, but only if, the possessor, that is, Martin Marietta knows, or by the exercise of reasonable care would discover the condition and should realize that it involves an unreasonable risk of harm to such invitee, and should expect that the invitee will not discover or realize the danger or will fail to protect himself against that danger and that the possessor fails to exercise reasonable care to protect the invitee against the danger in question.
App. at 560-61.
Many jurisdictions hold that a possessor of land is not liable to the employees of an independent contractor for open and obvious dangers. See S. Speiser, C. Krause & A. Gans, The American Law of Torts § 14.12, at 916-17 (1986). However, in the Virgin Islands, in the absence of local laws to the contrary, the principles of the Restatement provide the rules of decision. 1 V.I.C. § 4. Section 343A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts permits imposition of liability even for known or obvious dangers when the possessor should anticipate the harm. Thus, the court instructed the jury as follows:
However, such a possessor of land as Martin Marietta is not liable to the invitee, Vance Williams, for physical harm caused to the invitee, by any action or condition on the land who's [sic] danger is known or obvious to the invitee unless the possessor should anticipate the harm despite such knowledge or obviousness.
App. at 561.
Martin Marietta does not argue that the district court did not correctly state the applicable law. Instead, it argues that the court should not have submitted this issue to the jury because it was not the legal possessor of the work site where Williams was injured, and therefore Martin Marietta had no duty to provide Williams, a business invitee, with a safe workplace. Martin Marietta relies for its argument primarily on two cases in which the possessor of land was held not to be liable to the employee of an independent contractor injured at the workplace.
In Fisher v. United States, 441 F.2d 1288 (3d Cir.1971), an employee of a subcontractor was injured while working at the site of the construction of a dam on land owned by the United States. The government had contracted with a general contractor to construct the dam, and it in turn engaged a subcontractor who in turn engaged the subcontractor for whom the plaintiff worked to perform the structural steel work for the support of concrete for the dam. The plaintiff Fisher was injured when a wooden "spreader" used to hold apart a form for the concrete on which he was walking broke, causing him to fall. The district court imposed liability on the United States under section 318 of the Restatement which establishes the duty of a possessor of land to control the conduct of its licensees so as to prevent harm to third persons. We reversed because we held that there was insufficient evidence that the United States was in possession of the property at the time. We stated that under applicable Pennsylvania law the presence of a few government employees, such as an engineer with authority to require the contractor's compliance with a safety plan and two inspectors whose duties included seeing that work was done in accordance with specifications and enforcing safety regulations, at "the construction site of a large dam" was not evidence that the United States was in possession of the site. Id. at 1291-92.
In the second case, Hader v. Coplay Cement Mfg. Co., 410 Pa. 139, 189 A.2d 271 (1963), also cited in Fisher, the injured plaintiff was the employee of an independent contractor who had been hired by the landowner, Coplay Cement, to install a stone crusher weighing two and a quarter million pounds in an open quarry and to erect a 50 foot high structure to house the crusher. Hader was injured while working on that structure. The Pennsylvania Court articulated the applicable rule as follows:
An independent contractor is in possession of the necessary area occupied by the work contemplated under the contract and his responsibility replaces that of the owner who is, during the performance of the work by the contractor, out of possession and without control over the work or the premises.
410 Pa. at 151, 189 A.2d at 277, quoted in Fisher, 441 F.2d at 1292. The Court held that Coplay was not liable to the injured employee on the basis of ownership of the property because it was out of possession. The presence of the owner's employees at the site did not indicate otherwise, because they did not exercise any control over the work of installing the crusher.
Both Fisher and Hader are factually and legally distinguishable from this case. The employees in those cases were injured while working on structures which were built by the independent contractor, rather than on an access provided by the owner. Also, in those cases it was evident that the independent contractor's work had necessarily displaced the owner's possession. The government was not conducting operations at the still unconstructed dam in Fisher nor was Coplay Cement quarrying at the specific site at which the crusher was being installed.
In this case, Riggers' exclusive possession over the ladder access to the roof was far from clear. There was evidence, which the jury could have credited, that Martin Marietta electricians were working on the roof while this job was proceeding and that they even used the same ladder to get up there. App. at 97. In fact, Gonzales himself, the Martin Marietta project representative, did not deny that. App. at 461. He would not testify that Martin Marietta had relinquished all accesses to the roof once Riggers began working, instead responding "I can't answer that with a yes or a no." Id. The comments to section 343 nowhere suggest it is inapplicable if the possessor of land has turned over possession to an independent contractor. We need not decide that issue. Since it is not clear that Martin Marietta had relinquished possession of the access to the roof to Riggers, the court did not err in instructing the jury on liability under section 343.
Section 343 governs the duty of a possessor of land to insure that premises are safe for invitees. As applied to an employee of an independent contractor, section 343 is referred to as the " 'safe workplace' doctrine, under which one who contracts with an independent contractor has a duty to provide a safe workplace for the employees of the independent contractor." Donovan v. General Motors, 762 F.2d 701, 704 (8th Cir.1985).
There was evidence from which the jury could have found' that the conditions of access to the lower roof via the stationary ladder were unsafe. Gordon Finch, plaintiff's consulting safety engineer witness, testified that there were two accesses from the stationary ladder to the lower roof. One was to climb the ladder to the upper roof, walk toward the lower roof and drop the three feet down to it. App. at 107-09. This was the method by which the Riggers' superintendent gained access to the lower roof. App. at 150-51. However, there was no ladder extension or other manner by which the climber could get off the ladder safely and prudently at the upper roof. App. at 107-09. The other access was the way Williams used, to go three quarters of the way up the ladder, move to the left on the conduit and then onto the lower level. There was no handrail across the conduit. Finch testified, "The problem with that conduit access is that . these are PVC-coated pipes. Very round. Whether it is wet or dry, it is slippery. It is not a proper surface to be used for a passageway, or what is defined as an MSHA regulation it is not a bonifide [sic] travelway." App. at 109. Nonetheless, he testified that this method for reaching the lower roof, the one used by Williams, was safer than going to the higher roof and jumping down. App. at 110. Finch concluded that the access provided by the fixed ladder did not satisfy the applicable regulations under the Mine Safety and Health Act, and that it was not safe. App. at 251-57.
Martin Marietta introduced evidence that there were other places at the building where a ladder could have been placed. Williams testified that he believed that a ladder on the other side of the building would have either been in the way of a bulldozer or interfered with tank construction. App. at 90. The differing testimony as to the feasibility of another access thus presented an issue for resolution by the jury.
Martin Marietta argues that it had no duty to protect Williams from conditions at the work site because it contractually delegated that responsibility to Riggers. It points to various contract provisions under which Riggers was responsible for making inspections, furnishing equipment and materials, implementation and operation of its own safety program, and providing handrails and guardrails on all openside floors, decks and walkways with a fall potential of five feet or more. App. at 186-88. It also sent a memorandum to all contractors which stated that "each contractor at a Martin Marietta site is solely responsible for maintaining safe working conditions for its employees." App. at 180.
The one case it cites in support of the proposition that it can contractually delegate responsibility for a safe workplace to an independent contractor, Maltais v. United States, 546 F.Supp. 96, 100-01 (N.D.N.Y.1982), aff'd, 729 F.2d 1442 (2d Cir.1983), is inapposite. In Maltais, the court held that the United States government, which had delegated the primary safety responsibility to an independent contractor, could not be held liable for the negligence of the contractor or its subcontractor. The reason for the holding lay not in the fact of delegation but in the limited waiver of sovereign immunity under the Federal Tort Claims Act which was held not to cover that situation. We are unwilling to hold that as a matter of law a contract between an owner and independent contractor allocating responsibility between themselves for maintaining a safe premises may relieve the owner of liability to invitees for injuries sustained as a result of dangerous conditions known or discoverable by the owner. Instead, the contract was a factor along with others to be considered by the jury in assessing liability for the allegedly dangerous condition of the workplace access turned over by Martin Marietta, and Martin Marietta presented the contract issue to the jury in that light. See Tr. at 515. In summary, the evidence raised questions of fact concerning the safety of the conditions of access, and Martin Marietta's duty with respect thereto. Resolution of the issue of liability on the basis of section 343 was for the jury. We reject Martin Marietta's contention that it could not be held liable under the section as a matter of law.
B.
Negligent Directions of Martin Marietta's Employee
The other theory of liability urged by Williams was based on the negligent directions for access given by Martin Marietta's employee, Gonzales. As a general rule, employers of independent contractors are not vicariously "liable for physical harm caused to another by an act or omission of the contractor." Restatement (Second) of Torts § 409. However, the employer of a contractor may be liable to others for harm caused by its own negligence. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 410-415.
Martin Marietta argues that its liability could not have been predicated on section 414 of the Restatement because that section imposes liability for negligence only on "[o]ne who entrusts work to an independent contractor, but who retains the control of any part of the work," and the evidence was uncontested that it did not, in fact, retain control over any part of the work.
However, it was Martin Marietta, not Williams, who proffered the section 414 instruction. See App. at 499. Assuming, as Martin Marietta argues, that Gonzales' instruction to "Follow me" and his demonstration of reaching the lower roof by using the ladder and conduit pipes do not demonstrate "control" within the meaning of section 414, see, e.g., Rich v. United States Lines, Inc., 596 F.2d 541, 550 (3d Cir.1979) (shipowner not liable under § 414 for injury to longshoreman who fell from container covered with ice even though ship's officer directed which containers to load, discharge or shift), that would not warrant disturbing the jury verdict.
The judge's instructions to the jury were consistent with section 410 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts and the evidence was sufficient to sustain liability under that section. Section 410 provides:
Contractor's Conduct in Obedience to Employer's Directions
The employer of an independent contractor is subject to the same liability for physical harm caused by an act or omission committed by the contractor pursuant to orders or directions negligently given by the employer, as though the act or omission were that of the employer himself.
Under section 410, the employer of an independent contractor is liable for harm caused when the employer instructs the independent contractor to do work which in itself or as ordered to be done is unreasonably dangerous. We have previously stated that this section applies when an employee of the independent contractor is injured. Draper v. Airco, Inc., 580 F.2d 91, 101-02 (3d Cir.1978). We relied on Gonzalez v. United States Steel Corp., 248 Pa. Super. 95, 102-05, 374 A.2d 1334, 1338-39 (1977), aff'd, 484 Pa. 277, 287-88, 398 A.2d 1378, 1383-84 (1979), where the Pennsylvania Superior Court held that an employer of an independent contractor could be liable under section 410 to the employee of an independent contractor injured by the collapse of bricks where the employer instructed the contractor to remove bricks from a wall.
Williams testified that Gonzales, the Martin Marietta representative, demonstrated use of the ladder and conduit pipes as the method for reaching the lower roof. App. at 74-75. Williams' co-worker testified that Gonzales and Diaz, the Riggers' supervisor, demonstrated using the ladder and conduit pipes. App. at 102. Although Gonzales testified that he did not instruct either Williams or Phillip to use this method of reaching the lower roof, as the district court instructed the jury, the issue "boils down . to a matter of credibility." Tr. at 563. The jury apparently found the testimony of Williams and his co-worker credible. We see no reason to disturb the jury's finding.
In reviewing the district court's decision on a motion for judgment n.o.v. we must apply the same standard as did the district court in reviewing the motion. Smollett v. Skayting Development Corp., 793 F.2d 547, 548 (3d Cir.1986). That is, we must determine whether "as a matter of law, the record contains the 'minimum quantum of evidence from which a jury might reasonably afford relief.' " Id. (citation omitted). As the Supreme Court stated in Lavender v. Kurn, 327 U.S. 645, 653, 66 S.Ct. 740, 744, 90 L.Ed. 916 (1946), in reviewing a jury verdict, "[o]nly when there is a complete absence of probative facts to support the conclusion reached does a reversible error appear." Reviewing the record in the light most favorable to the holder of the jury verdict, we cannot conclude that the district court erred in denying Martin Marietta's motion for judgment n.o.v.
III.
Damages
Martin Marietta argues that the award of $600,000 was not rationally based on the evidence produced at trial and that the district court erred in not ordering a remittitur or in the alternative a new trial.
Williams was 38 years old at the time of the accident. He had been a pipefitter for four years. App. at 82. His claim of economic loss was based on diminution of earning capacity. Williams did not contend that he could no longer work in any job, but that he could no longer work as a pipefitter or in the type of manual labor that he had performed, which paid more than the jobs that he would be able to perform. In support of that contention, he introduced the testimony of Stuart Mudge, the personnel manager of Riggers who kept the pay records of Riggers' employees and who testified that at the time of the accident in May of 1983, Williams was an A class pipefitter, made an hourly wage of $9.26, and was working a 40-hour week. App. at 115-16. He also testified that a person with that classification made $10.33 hourly at the time of trial. Id.
Williams then introduced the testimony of James Watson, a vocational rehabilitation counselor, who testified that Williams lost at least 40% of his earning capacity as a result of his injury. Tr. at 210. Watson based his conclusion on the lower pay for the type of work available to Williams in, for example, manufacturing of durable goods, as contrasted with the physically demanding work in an oil refinery or construction project which he assumed Williams could no longer-perform. Id. Finally, Williams' economic expert, Professor Laurence Roberts formerly of the University of Tampa, testified that based on the 1985 salary for pipefitters, an assumed 8% annual wage increase, and twenty-five years' earning capacity, the present value at the time of trial of Williams' lost earning capacity would be $244,518. App. at 133-34. He also testified that Williams had lost $38,520 in the two years since the accident when he had been fully unemployed. App. at 135.
Martin Marietta objects to the method used in computing the lost earnings, arguing that Williams' economic expert improperly assumed that Williams normally worked a 40-hour week. Also, it contends that plaintiff was obliged to provide proof of corroboration of earning history such as by income tax returns, citing Connally v. Chardon, No. 78-52 (D.V.I. Aug. 4, 1978). Although under Chardon plaintiff's self-serving statements may not be enough to support an award of lost income, in this case plaintiff introduced sufficient corroborating evidence in the form of testimony based on the employer's pay records. See Varlack v. SWC Caribbean, Inc., 550 F.2d 171, 178 (3d Cir.1977) (testimony of employer sufficient to support damage award based on full employment throughout plaintiff's projected working life).
Martin Marietta argues in its brief that "pipefitting jobs are cyclical in nature and not permanent." Appellant's Brief at 37. However, Martin Marietta introduced no evidence on this issue and, significantly, even failed to cross-examine Riggers' personnel manager or Williams as to the number of weeks that Williams worked each year. If there had been evidence that Williams, or pipefitters in general, worked less than the full time projected by Williams' witnesses, the portion of the damage verdict reflecting economic loss might indeed be excessive. Martin Marietta apparently made a decision not to inquire further on this issue. In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, the jury was entitled to infer that Mudge's testimony about Williams' weekly hours applied throughout the year. The maximum sought by Williams for economic loss was $283,038. Although we view that as extremely generous, we cannot say that it is not supported by the record.
Martin Marietta also argues that the verdict was not reasonable, apparently asking us to hold that the injury was not as serious as Williams claims. To emphasize the minor nature of Williams' physical injury Martin Marietta points out that Williams did not sustain a herniated or bulging disk, was never hospitalized for his injuries, and did not incur substantial medical expenses.
In Walters v. Mintec/International, 758 F.2d 73, 80 (3d Cir.1985), we reiterated the general principle that the scope of this court's review of a damage award is "exceedingly narrow". We may grant a new trial or a remittitur " 'only if the verdict is. "so grossly excessive as to shock the judicial conscience." ' " Id. (citations omitted). It is not a sufficient basis to reverse if we find only that an award is extremely generous, id. (citation omitted), or that had we been deciding, we " 'would have found the damages to be considerably less.' " Id. (citation omitted).
On the other hand, we have not shirked our responsibility to review a damage award to determine if it is rationally based. For example, in the Walters case we recognized that "['ejvidence of pain and suffering is particularly ill-suited to review upon only a written record," 758 F.2d at 81 (citing Edynak v. Atlantic Shipping Inc. C.I.E. Chambon Maclovia S.A., 562 F.2d 215, 227 n. 16 (3d Cir.1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1034, 98 S.Ct. 767, 54 L.Ed.2d 781 (1978)), but we nonetheless vacated the wrongful death awards for pain and suffering to two children of the decedent. We held that because the children had minimal contact with their deceased father and had not seen him for a number of years, and "the evidence of present pain and suffering [is], at best, minimal," the award of $250,000 to each child extended "beyond all reasonable bounds." 758 F.2d at 81-82. We granted a new trial unless the children elected to file a remittitur of each of their damages in excess of $25,000.
Thus, since we have already held that there is a basis in the record to support a finding of economic loss of $283,038, the question before us is whether we find shocking the total award of $600,000 in damages to Williams, of which approximately $317,000 must necessarily be for his pain and suffering.
Immediately after his fall, Williams was removed to a Martin Marietta first aid station and then to a local hospital. He was discharged after examination and required no hospital care. Tr. at 43-44. Most of the doctors he sought out thereafter saw him only once. Tr. at 76. No surgery was ever performed, none was advised, and no myelograms required. X-rays revealed no fractures in the pelvis, vertebral axis, or coccyx. App. at 160. A CAT (computerized axial tomography) scan taken precisely one year after the accident showed no direct or indirect evidence of intervertebral disc herniation or spinal abnormalities. App. at 429. No objective signs of neurological deficiencies or active radiculopathy were found. Tr. at 352. Dr. Lopez, who examined Williams in April-1984, informed him that he was totally recovered, without any neurological or muscular residual. Tr. at 353.
Several weeks after the accident, Dr. Mercedes Stefani, a physiatrist, examined Williams and thought there was a radiculopathy — a lesion of the root of the nerve — at the L5-S1 level. App. at 312. She prescribed the wearing of a corset which Williams testified he still wears for a half day. Tr. at 45, 53. Dr. Sylvia Payne, also a physiatrist, had a similar impression after performing electromyographic studies in September 1984. App. at 338-40. However, Dr. Rafael Longo, a neurologist, who examined Williams in August 1983, made no diagnostic finding of any radiculopathy. Tr. at 351-52. He characterized as questionable the impressions of the two physiatrists and attributed the minimal narrowing of the L5-S1 interspace to "preexisting relatively long-standing degenerative changes, not unusually seen in a 39 year old man who has been doing heavy work, such as pipefitting for many years." App. at 345. Dr. Payne agreed with that observation. App. at 345-46.
Two neurosurgeons who examined Williams in 1984 at the instance of the Department of Labor for Workmen's Compensation purposes concluded that he had recovered from the injury. Dr. Lopez reported, "[tjhere is no clinical evidence of a neurologic impairment [or] radiculopathy or herniated disk lesion." Tr. at 352. Dr. Mojica found no objective neurological deficit but found back pain due to muscle contraction. He suggested that Williams return to work but avoid bending, heavy lifting, and positional stress. App. at 316.
Dr. Guzman Acosta also saw Williams on February 25, 1985, at the instance of Martin Marietta. He described finding a "relatively fixed, long-standing, rotoscoliotic deformity involving the dorsolumbar spine." App. at 316. He also reported radiculopathies at SI and L5, which he described as "certainly not a surprising electronic finding in a 40-year-old male with a long-standing dorsolumbar rotary scoliosis and a congenital three-quarters of an inch shortening in the right lower extremity." Id.
Dr. Payne, Williams' witness, interpreted Dr. Lopez's report of no clinical evidence of neurologic impairment, radiculopathy, or herniated disk lesion as meaning that Dr. Lopez found that Williams' reflexes are normal, he had no sensory finding, and he had normal strength. Tr. at 247. Dr. Payne testified "I think [Williams] had a symptom related to SI and he was treated and he got better." Id. However, she maintained that Williams still had a sprained muscle, although she too agreed that there were no objective signs of neurological deficits or active radiculopathy. Id. She believed that he could return to work, but not as a pipefitter. Tr. at 248.
Although the plaintiff complained of sexual dysfunction, none of the doctors prescribed any medication for him and the jury made no award for loss of consortium. The only medication he was on at trial time was Flexeril, a muscle relaxant, prescribed by Dr. Henry and Dr. Pederson. Tr. at 78.
Williams' own testimony concerning the extent of his injury is significant. Williams testified that he still has pain in his lower back, App. at 202, that it hurts if he stands up and stretches and if he walks for any distance or sits for a long period of time. Tr. at 48-49. He testified he cannot sit through a whole movie, App. at 205, and can no longer dance. App. at 206. However, Williams also testified that he is able to walk up to 45 minutes before he becomes tired, Tr. at 79, he does exercise for his back including sit-ups, and he lives on the third floor and walks up and down the stairs. App. at 204. None of the doctors who examined Williams found him disabled or unable to work. His greatest physical limitation is that he has been instructed not to lift anything weighing more than twenty pounds. App. at 48.
On the basis of this record, we conclude that the award of the jury of more than $300,000 for pain and suffering was excessive. Our holding is consistent with the decisions of this court and other circuits in cases involving awards for pain and suffering for physical injuries. In Kazan v. Wolinski, 721 F.2d 911, 913-15 (3d Cir.1983), we approved a district court's order of remittitur of $90,000 where the jury awarded $150,000 for injuries to plaintiff's neck and arm. Although there was evidence that the automobile accident in which the plaintiff was involved caused a cervical sprain to the plaintiff's neck and a surgically correctable injury to his arm, as well as testimony that the neck injury would be permanent, we stated, "The neck and arm injury alone would not have been sufficient . to sustain an award of $150,-000." Id. at 914.
In O'Gee v. Dobbs Houses, Inc., 570 F.2d 1084 (2d Cir.1978), a twenty-three year old plaintiff underwent back surgery which left scars, was unable to work for fourteen months, lost $10,000 in wages, returned to a less prestigious position, and was left with numbness and pain requiring medication. Her activities were limited and her gardening was eliminated. The Second Circuit reduced the $170,000 award granted by the district court to $85,000. Id. at 1090.
An award of $170,000 to a railroad worker who was injured was held to be "grossly excessive." Perricone v. Kansas City Southern Railway Co., 630 F.2d 317, 320 (5th Cir.1980). The plaintiff had sustained an earnings loss of $4,000, lost 30 percent of the motion in his neck, sustained substantial damage to his teeth, and suffered occasional periods of discomfort from whiplash. Id. at 319.
Likewise, a 24 year old plaintiff in Ferrero v. United States, 603 F.2d 510, 513-14 (5th Cir.1979), struck by an automobile sustained a compression fracture of the first lumbar vertebra, an abrasion and severe sprain of the left ankle, and a hematoma of the scalp. Doctors agreed that it was probable that she would experience arthritic changes around the fracture site. Plaintiff had a constant pain in her back and sustained an injury to her knee which caused her to experience pain after standing for fifteen to thirty minutes. Nonetheless, the Fifth Circuit reduced the damage award from $650,000 to $150,000. Id. at 515-16.
In Howell v. Marmpegaso Compania Naviera, S.A., 536 F.2d 1032, 1034 (5th Cir.1976), a case in wich the plaintiff suffered injuries not dissimilar but more serious than Williams' injury, the Fifth Circuit found a damage award of $136,000 for pain and suffering and loss of earning capacity to be "simply not in the universe of rational awards." The plaintiff in Howell suffered a defective intervertebral disc which required surgery. The plaintiff continued to experience pain and although he was able to return to work, he could no longer perform such activities as gardening, playing ball with his children and dancing. Id.
Similar results have been reached in other cases. See, e.g., Harper v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 741 F.2d 87, 91-93 (5th Cir.1984) (holding award of $485,000 for pain and suffering excessive where injured plaintiff underwent two back operations and continued to live with some pain); Bullard v. Central Vermont Railway, Inc., 565 F.2d 193, 196-98 (1st Cir.1977) (holding $35,000 award to railway worker who injured foot when jumping from train to escape a collision was grossly excessive); Laaperi v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., Inc., 787 F.2d 726, 735-36 (1st Cir.1986) (holding $750,000 award to plaintiff who suffered first and second degree burns over 12 percent of her body but who had largely recovered "so grossly disproportionate to [her injuries] as to be unconscionable"); Shaw v. United States, 741 F.2d 1202, 1209-10 (9th Cir.1984) (reducing award for loss of child's love and companionship and injury to the parent-child relationship to parents of child with profound mental and physical retardation caused by defendant's negligence from $2,000,000 to $50,000).
We do not suggest that we necessarily agree with the disposition of each of the above cases. Rather, they represent an increasing appellate trend to review the merits of a damage award, even though the scope of our review is limited. Where, as in this case, the award is grossly excessive in relation to a plaintiffs injury, the award will not be permitted to stand. An award in this case in excess of $100,000 for Williams' pain and suffering extends beyond reasonable grounds.
IV.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the district court's order denying Martin Marietta's motion for a judgment n.o.v. However, the judgment will be vacated and the case remanded to the district court for a new trial on the issue of damages unless Williams elects to file a remittitur of the damages in excess of $383,038, since that is the maximum amount of damages that we find supported by the record. Each party to bear its own costs.
. The district court instructed the jury as follows:
[OJne who hires an independent contractor and undertakes to select the means of access by which the employees of said independent contractor are to reach the designated work site must, under the law, exercise reasonable care in selecting said means of access.
Plaintiff Vance Williams has presented evidence tending to prove that defendant Martin Marietta acting through its agent, Mr. Sylvester Gonzales, selected the means of access to the work site in question. Defendant Martin Marietta, on the other hand, has presented evidence tending to prove that it did not select the means of access to the work site. That is, that the means of access was selected solely by Riggers and Erectors. The employer of Williams through its employees, the supervisors of Williams.
If you find that Martin Marietta selected the means of access, then you must determine whether Martin Marietta exercised reasonable care in selecting that means of access.
App. at 541.
. Section 414 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts provides:
Negligence in Exercising Control Retained by Employer
One who entrusts work to an independent contractor, but who retains the control of any part of the work, is subject to liability for physical harm to others for whose safety the employer owes a duty to exercise reasonable care, which is caused by his failure to exercise his control with reasonable care.
. The dissent suggests that Williams assumed. the risk of falling when he used the access directed by Gonzales. Martin Marietta raised assumption of risk at trial, but the district court declined to give its proffered instruction to the jury. Martin Marietta has not raised that issue on appeal, and hence it is not before us.