Case Name: Willie D. SCOTT, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. HARTFORD ACCIDENT & INDEMNITY COMPANY et al., Defendants and Appellants
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1974-10-16
Citations: 302 So. 2d 641
Docket Number: No. 4678
Parties: Willie D. SCOTT, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. HARTFORD ACCIDENT & INDEMNITY COMPANY et al., Defendants and Appellants.
Judges: Before HOOD, CULPEPPER and DO-MENGEAUX, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 302
Pages: 641–649

Head Matter:
Willie D. SCOTT, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. HARTFORD ACCIDENT & INDEMNITY COMPANY et al., Defendants and Appellants.
No. 4678.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Third Circuit.
Oct. 16, 1974.
Rehearing Denied Nov. 20, 1974.
Gold, Hall, Hammill & Little by James D. Davis, Alexandria, for Houston Gen. Ins. Co.
Brittain & Williams, by Jack O. Brittain, Natchitoches, for Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. and others.
Gerard F. Thomas, Jr., Natchitoches, for appellant Scott.
Before HOOD, CULPEPPER and DO-MENGEAUX, JJ.

Opinion:
DOMENGEAUX, Judge.
This is a workmen's compensation suit in which the plaintiff, Mrs. Willie D. Scott, alleges that she sustained lower back injuries on or about September 22, 1972, and March 30, 1973, while in the employ of Natchitoches Manor Nursing Home, Inc., and that as a result of said injuries she has become totally disabled. Defendants are the plaintiff's former employer (the nursing home), Hartford Accident and Indemnity Company (the nursing home's workmen's compensation insurer in September, 1972), and Houston General Insurance Company (workmen's compensation insurer of the defendant-nursing home in March, 1973).
Judgment was originally rendered in favor of the plaintiff for total and permanent disability benefits, medical expenses, and penalties and attorney's fees, solely against the defendant, Houston General Insurance Company. Subsequently, however, a new trial was granted and the district judge amended his former decree to include the defendant nursing home as a liable party and to dismiss all claims for penalties and attorney's fees. From said judgment the plaintiff, the defendant nursing home, and Houston General Insurance Company have appealed. Hartford Accident and Indemnity Company has neither appealed nor answered the appeal.
The facts leading up to this suit are as follows: In September, 1972, the plaintiff was employed at the defendant-nursing home as an aid and laborer and as such was required to perform the usual duties surrounding the assistance and care of elderly patients, i.e. cleaning and waxing of floors, moving of beds and furniture, lifting of patients, etc. While in such employ, on or about September 22, 1972, the plaintiff sustained an injury to her lower back as she was engaged in lifting a mop bucket filled with water. As a result she was hospitalized for four days under the care of Dr. David T. Henry, who diagnosed her problem as an acute lumbosacral sprain. Mrs. Scott saw her treating physician a number of times during the months following her release from the hospital. During said period, although her back condition improved, she continued to have diminished paravertebral spasms and pain. Plaintiff was also referred for consultation to an orthopaedic surgeon, Dr. J. P. Williams of Shreveport, whom she saw on October 18th. His findings were consistent with those of Doctor Henry. Mrs. Scott was again examined by Doctor Henry on December 15, 1972, at which time she asked that she be allowed to return to work. At this time she was experiencing less pain than before (although on continued medication) and Doctor Henry explained that the only way she would know if she could work was to return and try. Plaintiff did in fact return to her former duties at the nursing home on January 1, 1973.
During the three-month period following plaintiff's September 22, 1972, accident she was considered by Doctor Henry to be disabled from returning to her former job duties. As a result the nursing home's compensation insurer, Hartford, paid all of plaintiff's medical expenses as well as workmen's compensation benefits (at the rate of $41.60 per week) during said period. Subsequent to the aforementioned December 15th doctor's visit, Doctor Henry forwarded a report to plaintiff's employer indicating that as of December 29, 1972, the plaintiff could resume work and was capable of doing the same work as before her injury with no permanent disability. Thereafter Hartford discontinued workmen's compensation benefits.
Subsequently plaintiff was twice seen by Doctor Henry in February, 1973. Even though she had returned to work Doctor Henry testified Mrs. Scott was still having lower back pain during this period, and also began to experience stomach problems. On March 30th plaintiff again visited Doctor Henry and explained that she had experienced a sudden acute episode of lower back pain in the same area as before. The doctor's findings were essentially the same as after the September, 1972, injury and he diagnosed an acute bilateral lumbosacral sprain. At this visit Mrs. Scott did not explain what had precipitated the onset but did state that it was sudden and acute. Thereafter, in a later visit, the doctor learned that the plaintiff was bent over cranking up a hospital bed when the acute pain set in. Subsequently on April 8th plaintiff was admitted to the local hospital for her back problems as well as her stomach complaints.
Following the March 30th incident (and subsequent hospitalization) Doctor Henry once again considered the plaintiff disabled from performing the manual labor related to her former job..
In the ensuing months the defendant-nursing home received several hospital and doctor's bills and statements related to the plaintiff's March 30th injury. The nursing home was of the opinion that the latter injury was related to the earlier September, 1972, injury so it forwarded the bills and reports to the insurer at that earlier date, Hartford. Previously, however, in February, 1973, the defendant, Houston General, had acquired the contract to insure Natchitoches Manor. Apparently this latter insurer was not notified of plaintiff's claims at this time and did not learn of such until eight days prior to trial. Subsequent demand was made by plaintiff upon Hartford for resumption of compensation benefits and for the hospital and doctor bills incurred after the March 30th injury. After receiving no payment plaintiff filed suit on September 19, 1973.
As . aforementioned, a final judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiff against Houston General and Natchitoches Manor Nursing Home for workmen's compensation benefits and medical expenses. In so holding the trial judge was of the opinion that plaintiff's disability was due entirely to the injury of March 30th, 1973 (at which time Houston General was the insurer of the defendant-nursing home).
Plaintiff appeals said judgment claiming disability benefits (as were granted by the trial judge) regardless of whether either or both of the injuries were the cause of her condition and additionally alleges that penalties and attorney's fees should be assessed.
Houston General also appeals alleging that plaintiff's disability is due entirely to the September 22, 1972, accident and that no accident took place on March 30, 1973. Alternatively it asserts that the second injury was only a contributing cause or aggravation of the first and therefore both it and Hartford should be liable in solido. Houston also claims no liability for penalties and attorney's fees.
Hartford in turn argues in brief that plaintiff's disability is due entirely to the March 30, 1973, injury, and as a result it cannot be liable for compensation or penalties and attorney's fees since it was not the insurer of the defendant nursing home on that date.
Two issues are therefore presented for determination on appeal.
We address ourselves to the first, being whether plaintiff's present disability resulted from the accident which occurred in September, 1972, whether same is due solely to the alleged incident in March, 1973, or whether both of those accidents caused the disability.
If either accident was the sole cause of plaintiff's disability, only one of the de fendant-insurers would be liable for compensation benefits, payable on account of total disability. Pender v. National Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 255 So.2d 95 (La.App. 3rd Cir. 1971); Castille v. Trinity Universal Ins. Co., 177 So.2d 647 (La.App. 3rd Cir. 1965); Employers Liability Assurance Corp. v. General Accident, Fire & Life Assurance Corp., 148 So.2d 425 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1962).
However, if plaintiff's present disability is due to a combination of both incidents or by virtue of the second accident aggravating the prior injury, both the present compensation insurer and the insurer at the time of the first accident would be liable in solido for compensation benefits. Pender v. National Fire & Marine Ins. Co., supra; Castille v. Trinity Universal Ins. Co., supra; Stockstill v. Bituminous Casualty Corp., 144 So.2d 918 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1962); Fontenot v. Great American Indemnity Co., 127 So.2d 822 (La.App. 3rd Cir. 1961) ; Stansbury v. National Auto & Cas. Ins. Co., 52 So.2d 300 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1951) ; White v. Taylor, 5 So.2d 337 (La.App. 2nd Cir. 1941).
We find as a matter of fact that both incidents caused or contributed to plaintiff's disabling condition. The only physician to testify, Dr. David Henry, clearly indicates that in his opinion the March 30th incident was an acute re-acceleration or aggravation of the pre-existing condition. There is nothing in the record to substantiate the contention that the March 30th injury was the sole cause of plaintiff's present disability. The evidence further reflects that plaintiff never fully recovered from the September, 1972, injury. She was, however, able to return to work with minimal pain until the March, 1973, incident. Thereafter she has been disabled from returning to her former job duties.
Accordingly, we hold both insurers and the defendant-nursing home liable in solido for workmen's compensation benefits due as a result of plaintiff's present disability, plus medical expenses incurred therewith.
The second and remaining issue is that of penalties and attorney's fees.
Insofar as Houston General is concerned, we agree with the trial judge that penalties and attorney's fees are not due. Its first notice of a claim by plaintiff was October 30, 1973, only eight days prior to the first trial date. Under these circumstances we cannot therefore see how this insurer can be termed arbitrary and capricious in its behavior.
Hartford, on the other hand, was notified by the nursing home of plaintiff's hospitalization and medical bills after the March 30, 1973, injury. It apparently concluded that the disability was due entirely to the March 30, 1973, accident and not a re-occurrence or aggravation of the September, 1972, injury. As a result, since it was not the insurer of the defendant nursing home in March, 1973, it took the firm position that it had no responsibility for workmen's compensation benefits or medical expenses.
This stand taken by the insurance company did not change even upon receipt of a letter, dated August 6, 1973, from plaintiff's attorney demanding workmen's compensation benefits. Attached thereto was a report from Dr. David T. Henry to plaintiff's attorney which stated clearly that plaintiff's disability at that time was causally related to the first accident. The defendant had no contrary medical evidence in its possession.
Hartford still refused payment and as a result the plaintiff had no choice but to commence these proceedings. We conclude such action was arbitrary, capricious, and without probable cause, under LSA-R.S. 22:658 and 23:1201.2, and as a result penalties and attorney's fees should be assessed.
In regard to the amount of attorney's fees the appellant seeks an award of $3,000.00. We deem such an award to be proper under the circumstances herein. See Bushnell v. Southern Farm Bureau Casualty Ins. Co., 271 So.2d 267 (La.App. 3rd Cir. 1972).
For the above and foregoing reasons the judgment of the trial court is affirmed insofar as it dismissed claims for penalties and attorney's fees against Houston General Insurance Company. The judgment in respect to liability, however, is reversed and it is hereby ordered, adjudged, and decreed that there be judgment in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants, Hartford Accident and Indemnity Company, Houston General Insurance Company, and Natchitoches Manor Nursing Home, Inc., in solido for workmen's compensation benefits in the sum of $42.80 per week from March 30, 1973, during plaintiff's period of disability, not to exceed a total of five hundred weeks, together with legal interest on each past due installment from its due date until paid, subject to a credit for those amounts previously paid. Plaintiff is further awarded judgment against said defendants in solido for all medical expenses incurred in connection with plaintiff's present disability, to the legal maximum. There will be further judgment in favor of the plaintiff and against Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co. in the amount of $3,000.00 attorney's fees, plus penalties at the rate of 12% of plaintiff's claim. Costs at both trial and on appeal are assessed against all three defendants.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and rendered.
HOOD, J., dissents and assigns written reasons.
. Actually Houston General had inadvertently not been made a party defendant in the initial suit. As a result plaintiff's attorney amended the original petition making- Houston a party defendant and a new trial was granted wherein the parties offered the testimony and documents originally filed at the first trial, in addition to being allowed to place into the record whatever evidence they considered useful for review by the Court of Appeal.