Case Name: Mona Lee GLASSMAN, Appellant et al., v. Craig Richard MILLER, Respondent et al.
Court: Minnesota Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Minnesota
Decision Date: 1984-10-19
Citations: 356 N.W.2d 655
Docket Number: No. C4-83-1084
Parties: Mona Lee GLASSMAN, Appellant et al., v. Craig Richard MILLER, Respondent et al.,
Judges: Considered and decided by the court en banc without oral argument.
Reporter: North Western Reporter 2d
Volume: 356
Pages: 655–658

Head Matter:
Mona Lee GLASSMAN, Appellant et al., v. Craig Richard MILLER, Respondent et al.,
No. C4-83-1084.
Supreme Court of Minnesota.
Oct. 19, 1984.
Paul T. Benshoof, Bemidji, for Glassman.
David Schueppert, Bemidji, for Mona Glassman, appellant.
John P. Bailey, Bemidji, for Miller.
Sheldon, D. McRae, Jr., Bemidji, Cooper S. Ashley, St. Paul, for intervenor.
Considered and decided by the court en banc without oral argument.

Opinion:
TODD, Justice.
Mona Glassman and her son Jesse brought suit for injuries received in an automobile accident. They named Beltrami County as a defendant, but did not serve a notice of claim on the county as provided by Minn.Stat. § 466.05 (1982). The trial court granted the county's motion to dismiss. We reverse.
On July 13, 1981, Mona Glassman was operating a motor vehicle in which her minor son Jesse was riding as a passenger. Glassman contends that Craig Miller negligently operated his motor vehicle, causing her vehicle to overturn, with resulting injuries to herself and her son. She also alleges that the negligent design, construction and maintenance of a county road contributed to the damages sustained by her and her son. No notice of claim was served on the county. At the time of the accident, a deputy sheriff conducted an investigation and filed a report with the Beltrami County Sheriff's office. This appeal followed the dismissal of the county as a defendant.
The issues are:
1. Is the notice of claim statute unconstitutional?
2. Is the failure to file a notice of claim as provided by statute a jurisdictional defect?
3. Is the trial court clearly erroneous in finding that the accident investigation by the sheriff's department did not constitute actual notice to the county?
1. Minn.Stat. § 466.05 provides in part: every person who claims damages from any municipality for or on account of any loss or injury within the scope of section 466.02 shall cause to be presented to the governing body of the municipality within 180 days after the alleged loss or injury is discovered a notice stating the time, place and circumstances thereof, and the amount of compensation or other relief demanded. No action therefor shall be maintained unless such notice has been given and unless the action is commenced within one year after such notice. (Emphasis supplied.)
Minnesota has two tort claims acts that apply to governmental units; both require that notice be given to government officials within 180 days after the alleged loss or injury is discovered. Minn.Stat. § 466.05, subd. 1 applies to tort actions brought against municipalities. "Municipality" includes cities, counties, towns, public authorities, public corporations, special districts, school districts, county agricultural societies or other political subdivisions. Minn.Stat. § 466.01 (1982). Tort claims brought against the state must comply with the notice provision set forth in Minn. Stat. § 3.736, subd. 5 (1982).
Until recently, it appeared these notice provisions were identical. A fundamental distinction was observed, however, in Naylor v. Minnesota Daily, 342 N.W.2d 632 (Minn.1984). The state claims act does not contain the following language which is found in the municipal statute: "No action therefor shall be maintained unless such notice has been given and unless the action is commenced within one year after such notice." The omission of this language in the state tort claims act led the court to the conclusion that failure to give notice is not grounds for dismissal of an action against the state. 342 N.W.2d at 634.
In Naylor, the court noted that the municipal statute explicitly precludes suits for failure to give notice. The notiee-of-claim requirement creates two classes of ^governmental tortfeasors by erecting a jur-'isdietional obstacle for victims of torts perpetrated by municipalities that is not encountered by victims of torts committed by the state. The question now presented is whether this distinction violates the equal protection guarantees contained in Article I, Sec. 2 of the Minnesota Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. These provisions require that persons similarly situated be similarly treated unless a rational basis exists for discriminating among them. Schwartz v. Talmo, 295 Minn. 356, 205 N.W.2d 318, (1973), appeal dismissed, 414 U.S. 803, 94 S.Ct. 130, 38 L.Ed.2d 39 (1973). See Wegan v. Village of Lexington, 309 N.W.2d 273, 280 (Minn.1981). See also Harvey v. Clyde Park District, 32 Ill.2d 60, 203 N.E.2d 573, 576 (1965); Gleason v. City of Davenport, 275 N.W.2d 431 (Iowa 1979); Jenkins v. State, 85 Wash.2d 883, 540 P.2d 1363 (1975).
We can discern no rational basis for distinguishing between municipal and state tortfeasors. Thus, the language of Minn. Stat. § 466.05 precluding the bringing of an action unless notice is given pursuant to the statute is stricken as violative of the equal protection requirements of both the state and federal constitutions.
2-3. Having decided that the statute creates an unreasonable distinction between victims of State and municipal torts, we need not consider whether the notice provision is impermissible on the ground that it creates a two-tiered statute of limitations applicable only to claimants suing a governmental entity. We also need not rule on the issue of whether the county had actual notice.
Reversed.
. , The commencement-of-suit provision in the municipal statute was ruled unconstitutional in Kossak v. Stalling, 277 N.W.2d 30 (Minn.1979). Since the court found that actual notice had been given, it did not reach the issue of the constitutionality of the notice requirement.
. Under Naylor v. Minnesota Daily, 342 N.W.2d 632 (Minn.1984) we could have held in the present case that the failure to give notice was not a jurisdictional defect.