Case Name: Albert EAKIN et ux. v. ASCENSION PARISH POLICE JURY et al.
Court: Louisiana Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1974-04-29
Citations: 294 So. 2d 527
Docket Number: No. 54069
Parties: Albert EAKIN et ux. v. ASCENSION PARISH POLICE JURY et al.
Judges: MARCUS, J., dissents and assigns reasons.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 294
Pages: 527–532

Head Matter:
Albert EAKIN et ux. v. ASCENSION PARISH POLICE JURY et al.
No. 54069.
Supreme Court of Louisiana.
April 29, 1974.
Miriam T. Attaya, Lake Charles, John F. Robichaux, Camp, Carmouche, Palmer, Carwile & Barsh, Lake Charles, for plaintiff-applicant.
John A. Lieux, Gonzales, for East Ascension General Hospital.
Antoine J. Kling, Jr., Gonzales, for Ascension Parish Police Jury.

Opinion:
DIXON, Justice.
This action was filed against East Ascension General Hospital, the former employer of Mrs. Joyce W. Eakin, and the Ascension Parish Police Jury for alleged violations of the equal pay provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C.A. Section 201 et seq., as am'ended. Although federal rights are involved, this court has jurisdiction. 29 U.S.C.A., Section 216(b).
Mrs. Eakin was employed by East Ascension General Hospital during the period between July 25, 1968 and July 22, 1970 as a nurse's aide. Her starting salary was $1.30 per- hour, which was subsequently raised on November 27, 1968 to $1.45 per hour, and later elevated on April 16, 1970 to $1.57i^ per hour. Two male orderlies hired by the hospital on July 25, 1968 were paid a starting wage of $1.45 per hour that was eventually raised on November 27, 1968 to $1.70 per hour where it remained until the termination of their employment in 1969. Mr. Eakin, on behalf of the community, filed this action on March 3, 1971, seeking to recover $706.47 in additional wages based on the pay scale of the hospital orderlies, plus a similar amount as liquidated damages and attorney's fees. In an amended petition applicants sought to recover payment for overtime. Relators allege that Mrs. Eakin was discriminated against on account of her sex.
The trial court rendered judgment in favor of the defendants. The Court of Appeal affirmed this ruling based on evidence that the orderlies performed additional duties, including working at night to maintain security, engaging in heavy lifting and catheterizing male patients. 283 So.2d 274. We granted writs to determine whether discrimination prohibited by the act did occur.
The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C.A., Section 206(d)(1) reads as follows:
"No employer having employees subject to any provisions of this section shall discriminate, within any establishment in which such employees are employed, between employees on the basis of sex by paying wages to employees in such establishment at a rate less than the rate at which he pays wages to employees of the opposite sex in such establishment for equal work on jobs the performance of which requires equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and which are performed under similar working conditions, except where such payment is made pursuant to (i) a seniority system; (ii) a merit system; (iii) a system which measures earnings by quantity or quality of production; or (iv) a differential based on any other factor other than sex . . ."
When Congress enacted the equal pay act, it substituted the word "equal" for "comparable." The standard of equality is higher than comparability, but lower than absolute identity. Cong.Rec., Vol. 109, Part 7 (88th Congress, 1st Session); Brennan v. City Stores, Inc., 479 F.2d 235 (5th Cir. 1973). Inconsequential differences may be disregarded as long as the jobs are "substantially equal." Hodgson v. Behrens Drug Co., 475 F.2d 1041 (5th Cir. 1973); Hodgson v. Corning Glass Works, 474 F.2d 226 (2d Cir. 1973).
The evidence does not support the conclusion that male orderlies were hired for security purposes. Their salary was the same, whether or not they worked at night. Nor does the record reveal that an orderly was always on duty during darkness. It is significant that the orderlies did not perform any specific duties in connection w'ith security. Artificially created job descriptions or classifications should be disregarded. Schultz v. Wheaton Glass Co., 421 F.2d 259, 265 (3rd Cir. 1970).
Although the orderlies were generally responsible for the heavy lifting of patients and equipment, there were numerous occasions when nurse's aides performed such duties without assistance from their male counterparts. Employers may not frustrate the intent of the act by calling occasionally for extra effort. Hodgson v. Brookhaven General Hospital, 436 F.2d 719 (5th Cir. 1970). Equal pay for equal work is required by the act despite limited differences in skill, effort and responsibility.
Admittedly, the catheterization of male patients was performed exclusively by the orderlies. Although the nurse's aides were not qualified to do this work, they engaged in other activities also requiring special skills. Mrs. Jo Ann Brown, a practical nurse, testified that the orderlies neither worked in the nursery nor in the OB section of the hospital, as did the nurse's aides.
The Fair Labor Standards Act provides a two year statute of limitations for such actions, except that a cause of action arising out of a willful violation may be commenced within three years. 29 U.S.C. A. Section 255(a), as amended in 1966. In Coleman v. Jiffy June Farms, Inc., 458 F. 2d 1139 (5th Cir. 1972) the court held that a willful violation occurred even if the employer was in good faith if he knew of the possibility of FLSA coverage. Judge Wisdom noted that the "entire legislative history of the . . . FLSA indicates a liberalizing intention on the part of Congress." Id. at 1142; Brennan v. J. M. Fields, Inc., 488 F.2d 443 (5th Cir. 1973). We hold that East Ascension General Hospital's decision to employ its female employees at a lower rate of pay constituted a "willful" violation. As such, this action was timely filed, and defendants' plea of prescription is without merit.
Respondent, Ascension Parish Police Jury, urges that it is not a proper party defendant and should be released from liability. We agree. R.S. 46:1060 provides that a hospital service district created and named by any police jury shall constitute a corporate body with the power to sue and be sued. The hospital was Mrs. Eakin's employer, having hired her and paid her salary.
The next question concerns the fixing of reasonable attorney's fees. 29 U.S.C.A. Section 216(b). This issue was thoroughly discussed in Montalvo v. Tower Life Building, 426 F.2d 1135, 1150 (5th Cir. 1970). In that case the court ruled that the trial court may award attorney's fees without receiving evidence as to the proper amount, since that court had firsthand knowledge of the proceedings. We elect to follow this holding of the Fifth Circuit since the area is governed exclusively by federal l'&w. Having reviewed the entire record, this court has made an independent assessment of the amount to be awarded rather than remand the case to the lower court. We fix attorney's fees at $500.00, based on the length of the record (approximately two hundred pages) and the period of time involved in the pleadings, briefing, trial and appeals. This sum may not adequately compensate the attorneys for their time and effort, but we feel that such an award is reasonable under the circumstances, in view of the amount involved.
The plaintiff alleged in her supplemental petition that she was entitled to additional compensation for overtime. We affirm the trial court's finding that no evidence was presented to prove that any overtime was worked. As for the main demand, plaintiff, Mrs. Joyce W. Eakin, will be awarded $706.47 in additional wages plus $706.47 as liquidated damages. The demand against Ascension Parish Police Jury is dismissed.
For these reasons, the judgment of the Court of Appeal is reversed, and there is now judgment in favor of plaintiff, Mrs. Joyce W. Eakin (see 686 C.C.P. as amended), and against defendant, East Ascension General Hospital, in the full sum of $1,412.94, plus $500.00 as attorney's fees, with legal interest from demand until paid, and all costs.
MARCUS, J., dissents and assigns reasons.
SUMMERS, J., dissents and assigns reasons.