Case Name: LOMBARD v. BIETAU
Court: Oregon Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Oregon
Decision Date: 1917-09-11
Citations: 90 Or. 182
Docket Number: 
Parties: LOMBARD v. BIETAU.
Judges: Burnett, Benson and Harris, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Oregon Reports
Volume: 90
Pages: 182–192

Head Matter:
Motion to dismiss- appeal as to E. W. A. Peake allowed September 11, 1917.
Argued on tbe merits July 18, affirmed September 17, supplemental opinion filed September 24, rehearing denied November 19-, 1918.
LOMBARD v. BIETAU.
(167 Pac. 310; 174 Pac. 1165, 1167.)
Appeal and Error — Stipulation—Rule of Court — -Oral Argument.
1. In view of Rule 22 of the Supreme Court (56 Or. 623, 117 Pac. xii), providing that all motions, unless otherwise ordered, must be submitted without oral argument, and on printed or typewritten briefs, where the records of the Supreme Court fail to show that any application has been made or order granted permitting oral argument of the motion to dismiss appeals when the cause is heard or at any other time, the attorney’s stipulation that the motion be argued in the -Supreme Court when the cause is heard on the merits will be disregarded.
Appeal and Error — Acquiescence in Decree — Statute.
2. Under Section 549, L. O. L., providing that any party to a decree other than one given by confession or for want of an answer may appeal, in suit to foreclose a real estate mortgage, where a defendant denied that he had any or claimed to have any interest in the property, also consenting that decree might be rendered on the pleadings against him, his acquiescence having been acted upon, he had no appealable interest in the filial decree.
ON THE MERITS.
Mortgages — Invalidity as Between Parties — Mortgage to Self.
3. Mortgage from holder of bare legal title to real and equitable owner as between parties was void, as being equitably a mortgage from equitable owner to himself.
Mortgages — Mortgage to Self — Lien—Assignment.
4. Mortgage made to a real equitable owner of property by his own agent and for his own purposes gave him no lien on property; neither could any assignment thereof convey equitable right to any but innocent purchaser, who can have benefit of it only to extent of claim.
From Multnomah: John P. Kavanaugh, Judge.
Tn Banc. Statement by Mr. Justice Moore.
This is a suit to foreclose a real estate mortgage executed by the defendant "Wanda Bietau to the plaintiff, B. M. Lombard, on account of which lien there remained due, when this suit was instituted, $1,405 with interest at six per cent per annum from June 29, 1915. The complaint is in the usual form and alleges that the defendants E. W. A. Peake, Ursula E. Young, George R. Hogshire, and Jane, his wife, have or claim some interest in the real property so mortgaged, hut that the estate of either therein, if any, is inferior to the lien of the plaintiff.
The defendants Wanda Bietau and E. W. A. Peake separately answered admitting most of the averments of the complaint, but denying that either of the original defendants had or claimed any interest or estate in the mortgaged premises. Harriet E. Good was subsequently made a party defendant. The defendants Ursula E. Young, George E. Hogshire, and Jane, his wife, though duly served with process, failed to appear or answer, and the default of each was entered of record. Harriet E. Good separately answered, alleging the execution to her by Wanda Bietau of a first mortgage of the premises to secure the payment of $3,750, with interest at seven and one-half per cent per annum from May 29,1915, to recover which amount a decree was prayed for directing a foreclosure of the latter mortgage and a sale of the real property.
• Replies by the plaintiff put in issue the allegations of new matter in the separate answers. The court, on April 25, 1916, upon motion of the defendant Harriet E. Good rendered a decree upon the pleadings against Wanda Bietau and E. W. A. Peake, the latter defendants consenting thereto. The cause was tried and a final decree given November 14,1916, foreclosing both mortgages but making Harriet E. Good’s lien inferior to that of the plaintiff. Prom this decree she and E. W. A. Peake undertake to appeal. The transcript having been sent up plaintiff’s counsel move to dismiss the appeal as to Peake on the ground that he consented to the decree which was given on the pleadings. The attorneys for the respective parties stipulate that the motion may be argued in this court when the cause is heard on the merits.
Appeal Dismissed as to E. W. A. Peake.
Messrs. Littlefield & Maguire, for the motion.
Messrs. Howland & Nolan and Mr. Guy C. H. Corliss? contra.

Opinion:
MOORE, J.
Rule 22 of this court reads:
"All motions, unless otherwise ordered, must be submitted without oral argument and on printed or typewritten briefs, copies of which shall be served in the manner and within the time prescribed by Rule 23": 56 Or. 623 (117 Pac. xii).
Our records fail to show that any application has been made or order granted permitting an oral argument of the motion when the cause is heard or at any other time. Such being the case the stipulation will be disregarded.
Considering the motion filed in this court the statute so far as involved herein reads:
"Any party to a judgment or decree other than a judgment or decree given by confession or for want of an answer may appeal therefrom": Section 549, L. O. L.
The answer of Wanda Bietau and E. W. A. Peake contains a clause as follows:
"Deny that these defendants or either of them, have or claim to have, any interest in the real property described in said complaint. ' '
It will also be remembered that Peake consented that a decree might be rendered on the pleadings against Mm. Such acqMescence having been acted upon he has no appealable interest in the final decree. As to him the motion to dismiss should be allowed, and it is so ordered.
Appeal Dismissed as to E. W. A. Peake.