Case Name: CHARLES WOOD, Appellant, v. WILLIAM MITCHELL, Respondent; THOMAS G. MITCHELL, GEORGE M. MITCHELL, MARY H. MITCHELL and TERESA A. MITCHELL, Respondents, v. WILLIAM MITCHELL, Respondent
Court: New York Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1889-07
Citations: 60 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 451
Docket Number: 
Parties: CHARLES WOOD, Appellant, v. WILLIAM MITCHELL, Respondent. THOMAS G. MITCHELL, GEORGE M. MITCHELL, MARY H. MITCHELL and TERESA A. MITCHELL, Respondents, v. WILLIAM MITCHELL, Respondent.
Judges: Bartlett, J., concurred.
Reporter: Supreme Court Reports (Hun)
Volume: 60
Pages: 451–454

Head Matter:
CHARLES WOOD, Appellant, v. WILLIAM MITCHELL, Respondent. THOMAS G. MITCHELL, GEORGE M. MITCHELL, MARY H. MITCHELL and TERESA A. MITCHELL, Respondents, v. WILLIAM MITCHELL, Respondent.
Confession of judgment toan infant — it cannot be made in satisfaction of a tort.
On February 23,1888, a judgment, upon confession, in favor of Thomas G. Mitchell and others, was entered against William Mitchell.
On March 8, 1888, one Challes Wood recovered a judgment against William Mitchell
Wood thereupon made a motion to set aside the judgment entered in favor of T. G. Mitchell, which, it was claimed, was for moneys owing, while the relations of William Mitchell to Thomas G. Mitchell and others was that of a trustee, and that the moneys due the latter were held by William Mitchell, intrust for their benefit, and that, consequently, he had been guilty of a tort in not paying them over, and, also, that at that time the persons, in whose favor the judgment was confessed, had no legal capacity to take the judgment because they were infants for whom no guardian ad. litem had been appointed.
Upon an appeal from an order denying the motion:
Held, that the order should be reversed and the motion should be granted. (Macomber, J., dissenting.)
That the result of sustaining such a judgment would be that a person, who ' had become liable on a tort to an infant, might confess a judgment in favor of the infant, as upon contract, and place this judgment in the way of other creditors pursuing their remedies against his property, which judgment the plaintifE could repudiate upon attaining his majority.
Qiuere, whether, under any circumstances, a confession of judgment may be entered in favor of an infant, and whether the appointment of a guardian ad litem, nunc pro tune, six months after the entry of a judgment, in any way alters the status of the judgment.
Appeal from an order, made at a Special Term held in tbe county of New York, denying the plaintiffs motion in this action to set aside a judgment in favor of Thomas G. Mitchell and others against "William Mitchell, which was entered in the office of the clerk of the city and county of New York on October 15, 1888.
On'the 8th day of March, 1888, the plaintiff, Charles Wood, recovered a judgment against the defendant, William Mitchell. On February 23, 1888, a judgment upon confession had been entered in favor of Thomas G. Mitchell and others against the same defend ant. A motion was made by the plaintiff in this action to set aside this last-mentioned judgment upon the grounds of certain dishonorable practices adopted by William Mitchell in procuring extensions, of time and in postponing by dilatory action the time of the entry of the judgment against him, and, also, upon the ground that the-confession would work a waiver of the tort, which the plaintiffs in the confession had suffered at the hands of the defendant in the confession, and, also, upon the ground that the persons in whose, favor the judgment was confessed had no legal capacity to take the judgment because they were infants for whom no guardian ad litemhad been appointed.
J. C. Bergen, for the appellant.
Barlow & Garman, for the respondent William Mitchell.
Cornelius Doremus, for respondents Thomas G. Mitchell and others.

Opinion:
Van Brunt, P. J.:
We cannot concur in the conclusion to which Mr. Justice. Macomber has arrived in this case. It is not necessary to determine-whether, under any circumstances, a confession of judgment might or might not be entered in favor of an infant, or whether the-appointment of a guardian ad litem, nune fro tuno, six months after the entry of the judgment, in any way altered the status of the judgment. It is, however, clear that the plaintiff in the confession might accept or reject the same, more especially in a case* such as the one at bar, where the acceptance of the confession would work a waiver of a tort which the plaintiff, in the confession, had suffered at the hands of the defendant in the confession. The result-would be that, in the case.of an infant, a person who had become, liable on a tort to an infant might confess a judgment in favor of the infant as upon a contract, and place this judgment in the way of other creditors pursuing their remedies against his property,, which judgment the infant plaintiff could repudiate upon attaining, his majority. Such results should not be permitted unless the law expressly authorizes them; and as no. such inference is to be drawn, in favor of confessions for liabilities arising under circumstances such as the one under consideration, the motion to set aside the •confession in the case at bar should have been granted.
The order should be reversed, with ten dollars costs and disbursements, and the motion granted.
Bartlett, J., concurred.