Case Name: Christopher M. NEILSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1998-07-24
Citations: 713 So. 2d 1110
Docket Number: No. 96-00197
Parties: Christopher M. NEILSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: QUINCE, J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 713
Pages: 1110–1113

Head Matter:
Christopher M. NEILSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. 96-00197.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
July 24, 1998.
Gerald A. Tavares, Tarpon Springs, for Appellant.
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Ann Pfeiffer Corcoran, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appel-lee.

Opinion:
BLUE, Judge.
Christopher M. Neilson appeals his convictions for first-degree arson of a flea market, possession of a destructive device, and possession of a fire bomb. Neilson contends the State failed to present sufficient evidence to prove that he knew or should have known the structure, which was the subject of the arson charge, was occupied. We agree and reverse. On remand, the court shall enter a judgment of second-degree arson and resen-tence Neilson. On all other issues, we affirm.
The fire occurred at 11:00 p.m. on a Sunday, a time when the flea market was closed to the public. The State presented overwhelming evidence, including statements by Neilson, to support an arson charge. However, in order to support a conviction of first-degree arson under section 806.01(1), Florida Statutes (1991), the State was required to prove that Neilson knew or had reasonable grounds to believe the structure was occupied by a human being. See Erwin v. State, 532 So.2d 724 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988). It is this evidence we find lacking.
The State relied in part on the testimony of Thomas Hancock, a resident of the RV park located adjacent to the flea market. Hancock testified that a security guard was present at the flea market when the market was closed. He also related there was a small mobile home on the premises in which someone resided. Hancock testified that the security guard sometimes walked but also used a pick-up truck to patrol the flea market property! Hancock did not testify where the security guard was located in relationship to the fire nor did he offer any testimony that would impute his knowledge to Neilson.
There are two references to the security guard in Neilson's statement. First, he stated that security was observed in a small pickup truck. Second, Neilson disclosed that the security guard chased him and the other perpetrators after the fire started. These statements are proof that Neilson was aware a security guard was on the property where the arson occurred. We conclude, however, that this evidence does not provide a basis for a jury finding that Neilson knew or should have known that the structure was occupied.
There was no testimony or other evidence to connect the presence of a security guard in a vehicle with a conclusion that any of the buildings were occupied. The second part of Neilson's statement indicates the security guard was on foot, but this sighting of the guard occurred after the fire began and indicates knowledge acquired only after the commission of the arson. The security guard was not called as a witness and there is no record evidence that any of the structures were occupied on the night of the arson. Because the State failed to prove an essential element of first-degree arson under section 806.01(l)(c), we reverse. The evidence, however, supports a conviction of second-degree arson under section 806.01(2), and judgment shall be entered for this lesser charge on remand.
Neilson also contends the trial court erred when it permitted the investigating officer to testify that two State witnesses, Mr. and Mrs. Hancock, had identified two of Neilson's co-perpetrators from a photo pack. The State failed to question the Hancocks concerning their photo pack identification. Later in the trial, the State asked Detective Lawless if the witnesses had made a photo pack identification. The defense objected on the ground that the testimony was hearsay.
The State contended that because the Hancocks had been called as witnesses and were subject to cross-examination, the detective's testimony was admissible under an exception to the hearsay rule. The fallacy of this argument results from the State's failure to elicit any testimony from the Hancocks concerning the identification, thereby making cross-examination on the subject inappropriate. See State v. Freber, 366 So.2d 426 (Fla.1978) (holding that testimony regarding a prior, out-of-court identification is admissible if the identifying witness testifies to such identification and is subject to cross-examination). Because the Hancocks did not testify concerning the photo pack identifications, the trial court erred by admitting the detective's testimony pertaining to these identifications. Although obvious error, we conclude it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
Because there was insufficient evidence to sustain Neilson's conviction of first-degree arson, we reverse and remand for entry of judgment of second-degree arson and resen-tencing. In all other respects, we affirm.
QUINCE, J., concurs.
CAMPBELL, A.C.J., dissents with opinion.
. The Slate does not appear to contend the resident of the mobile home constituted the human being about whom Neilson knew or should have knpwn. There was no evidence that the mobile home was involved in the fire or even occupied on the night of the fire.
. In Pacheco v. State, 698 So.2d 593 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997), this court reversed the conviction of one of Neilson's co-perpetrators. The opinion indicates that Neilson's statement, erroneously admitted at Pacheco's trial, provided the only evidence showing that Pacheco was aware a security guard was patrolling the flea market. At Neilson's trial, only portions of his statement were admitted into evidence. These portions do not suffice to prove Neilson's knowledge that the flea market was occupied prior to the arson.
. "A statement is not hearsay if the declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement and the statement is: . [o]ne of identification of a person made after perceiving the person." § 90.80 l(2)(c), Fla. Stat.