Case Name: The State ex rel Francis T. Nicholls, Governor, et al., vs. Joseph A. Shakespeare, Mayor of New Orleans, et al.
Court: Louisiana Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1889-02
Citations: 41 La. Ann. 156
Docket Number: No. 10,247
Parties: The State ex rel Francis T. Nicholls, Governor, et al., vs. Joseph A. Shakespeare, Mayor of New Orleans, et al.
Judges: 
Reporter: Louisiana Annual Reports
Volume: 41
Pages: 156–178

Head Matter:
No. 10,247.
The State ex rel Francis T. Nicholls, Governor, et al., vs. Joseph A. Shakespeare, Mayor of New Orleans, et al.
In a suit- by tlie Governor, intended to enforce tlie execution of a statute, the effect of which would be to coerce a municipal corporation, resisting the act. to make an annual appropriation of not less than $150,000 for a designated purposo, tlie same to be beyond the discretion and control of the corporation, tlie jurisdiction of an appeal is vested in the Supreme Court.
Mandamus is the proper remedy, and not quo warranto to compel the mayor and council of a municipal corporation to execute tlie duties imposed upon them by law, in the performance of which they are allowed no discretion.
Act 63 of 1888, which creates a police hoard for the City of New Orleans and defines its powers, is not unconstitutional, and its provisions must he carried out.
Laws are presumed to he constitutional until the contrary is judicially established, and they must he executed by the officers upon whom they impose the, duty of doing so, who have no authorrtyto resist the execution thereof, on tlie ground that they contravene the Constitution.
In furthering the law, they enjoy immunity from responsibility.
When in 1882, the, Legislature unnoted tipi Charter of the City of New Orleans, it did so, in furtherance of authority delegated by the Constitution, and did not exhaust tho powers thus conferred. It has preserved the right of amending or changing tho Charter, in all respects, provided that, in doing so, it infringes no constitutional inhibition.
It has lawfully done so, in the exercise of such powers,’when it enacted Act 63 of 1888, under consideration, which transgresses no constitutional limitation, and which, being constitutional, must bo executed as intended by the Legislature.
APPEAL from the Civil District Court tor the Parish of Orleans. Voorldes, J.
Walter ill. Moyers, Attorney General, li. Ji. Moise and W. W. Vance for the Relators and Appellants:
1. A mandamus lies to commissioners, or other ministerial officers, to compel them to discharge the duties imposed by legislative enactments. 2 McCord (S. C.) 176 Ann.
2. There need be no positive refusal to perform the duty. It is sufficient if there be unreasonable delay, and manifest intention not to perform it. 32 H. J. Law, 39.
3. In proceeding by mandamus, want of interest should be specially pleaded in return. 3. H. J*. H. 259.
4. In order that a party seeking to have declared unconstitutional a law, it is necessary to show not only wherein he will he injured, but in what respect he will be injured or prejudiced. Injury will not be presumed. 56 Penn. State 359.
5. Ministerial officers, created by legislative authority, will not be heard to plead the uneon stitutionality of a law as a justification of refusal to discharge a plain statary duty. Horthwestern llop. 25, p. 587, 11 Ami. 587.
6. The public officers necessary for the police of tho City of New Orleans, within the meaning of Article 253 of tho Constitution, are the permanent officers, purely municipal, ere ated by the charter, such as the mayor, treasurer, comptroller, commissioners of public works and police, and common council. 13 Ann. 304.
7. Article 253 of the Constitution, which provides, “pursuant to tho mode of election which shall be provided by the General Assembly, ” is a complete recognition of the legislative-power to enact Act 63 of 1888. Id.
8. It is tho duty of the Governor and Attorney General to appear for, institute and prose secute all suits they may deem nocessary for the prosecution of the interest and rights of the State. Astiole 71. Constitution. Act 65.1884.
Garleton Burnt, City Attorney, for the Respondents and Appellees:
Where, in a petition for a mandamus to compel the Mayor and the members of the Council of the City of New Orleans, to execute an act of the Legislature, by proceeding, among other things, to an election thereunder, and there is no actual default or omission of duty alloged by relators, there is no cause of action for a mandamus.
Where relators seek enforcement of an act of the Legislature, and among other things, the time and manner of the execution thereof is left, by tho act, discretionary with respondents. there is no cause of action for a mandamus.
The relator, in proceeding for a mandamus, is the real plaintiff. On tho trial on tho morits# the relator must make out his case by offering, introducing and causing to be filed the evidence required to support his demand, and if ho does not do this, his demand will bo rejected .-
Act 63 of the Acts of 1888, entitled “An Act to create a Police Board” for the City of New Orleans, and defining its powers, is repugnant to Article 253 of tho Constitution of Louisiana which guarantees to tho citizens of the City of New Orloans tho right of appointing tho soveral public oflicors nocessary for the administration of the police of said City, and is therefore null and void.

Opinion:
On Motion to Dismiss.
The opinion of the Court was delivered by
Poché, J.
Relators, whose object was to enforce the execution of Act No.' 63 of 1888, entitled "An Act creating a Police Board for the City of New Orleans, and defining its powers," are appellants from a judgment which, rejected their application for a writ of mandamus to the end proposed by them.'
Appellee's motion to dismiss the appeal is grounded as follows.:
" That this Court is without jurisdiction ratione materia) to entertain and pass upon relators' petition, there being no pay attached to the office of commissioner of police herein involved, and nothing to show that the amount in dispute exceeds $2000 00."
If the controversy involved no other issue but the creation of the right to the office of commissioner of x>olice, there would be some merit in the motion. But such is not the case under a proper appreciation of the pleadings, and a due consideration of the statute sought to be enforced, which, is made part of relators' petition in the case.
. A careful analysis of the act discloses that its true and clear purport is to provide for a complete reorganization of the entire police force of the City of New Orleans, by withdrawing from the Mayor and City Council the power of appointing and controlling the force, and by conferring that'power to the Police Board created by the statute.
And in terms, the act includes in the powers conferred to the Board, that, which might have been claimed by logical inference, of administering the fund to be appropriated by the city authorities to moot the payment of the salaries of all persons employed in, or connected with, the force.
After imposing on the Board the duty of malting ah annual estimate o.f the sums required for the expenses of maintaining the force during the ensuing year, Section 20 of the Act provides: "The Common Council shall set aside in the budget of cxx>enses, a sum equal to that required according to the estimate made as aforesaid, by the Police Board; provided, that said Council shall have 'the right to reduce said estimate to a sum not less than one hundred and fifty thousand dollars ($150,000) for the police department, including the amount to bo received" "from the wharf lessees, whenever the revenues of the city will not justify or permit a larger appropriation."
By reference to previously existing laws, under which the compensation and the control of the police force were loft to the Mayor and City Council, it appeal's that the widest latitude and absolute option were left to the city as to the appropriation and as to the disbursement of funds needed for the salaries of all persons employed on the force.
The only mandates of the law on the subject were to the effect of conferring the power to, surd making it the duty of, the council, "to preserve the peace and good order of the City," and " to organize and provide an efficient police," coupled with the general power and corresponding duty of providing pecuniary means necessary to that end.
That, under such grant of power, the City had the option to organize a small or a large police force, and by that means, as well as by the way of fixing- the salaries of all persons on the force, to determine the amount to be appropriated therefor. But under the law which the Governor is now seeking to enforce, all matters connected with the costs of providing an efficient xiolice are removed from the discretion or control of the City, and the latter is ordered, in mandatory terms, to provide annually a sum, not less than $150,000, for the purpose of maintaining the police, force. It thence follows, that a judgment which would enforce the execution of the act in question would, in its pecuniary effect or result, be tantamount to a mandamus directed to the City Council, ordering an annual ax>propriation, for an indefinite number of years, of not less than $150,000, for a designated purpose, which cannot be varied or departed from under any circumstances.
It is too x>atent to admit of any doubt or .discussion that, by such a judgment, the City, herein represented by the Mayor and Council, would be affected in her pecuniary interests in an amount exceeding $2000, and that is the matter in dispute in the controversy.
It therefore follows that, if cast in the suit, the defendant would have had the unquestioned right of ax>peal to this Court, and it is well settled in our jurisprudence, that such a feature in a cause is the proper test of jurisdiction in case of appeal by either party to the controversy.
Conceding, therefore, that the Governor has no direct or pecuniary interest in the contestation, it is quite apparent that the jungment to be rendered in the cause will affect the City of New Orleans in an amount exceeding the lower limit of our jurisdiction, and that his right of appeal to this tribunal must be recognized and enforced.
The motion to dismiss is therefore denied, at appellees' costs.