Case Name: LOOP, INC. v. COLLECTOR OF REVENUE, State of Louisiana
Court: Louisiana Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1987-09-09
Citations: 523 So. 2d 201
Docket Number: No. 87-C-0621
Parties: LOOP, INC. v. COLLECTOR OF REVENUE, State of Louisiana.
Judges: LEMMON, J., dissents and assigns reasons.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 523
Pages: 201–209

Head Matter:
LOOP, INC. v. COLLECTOR OF REVENUE, State of Louisiana.
No. 87-C-0621.
Supreme Court of Louisiana.
Sept. 9, 1987.
Rehearing Granted Oct. 15, 1987.
On Rehearing April 11, 1988.
Mack E. Barham, Robert Arceneaux, Barham & Churchill, New Orleans, Thomas P. James, Lake Charles, CaSandra Jeanell Cooper-Gates, New Orleans, for applicant.
Joanna Wi]son) Robert Carpenter, Jr., Baton Rouge, Douglas Hebert, Kinder, for respondent.

Opinion:
DENNIS, Justice.
A special statutory procedure authorizes the Collector of Revenue to petition for judicial review of a Board of Tax Appeals decision within a specified time in the district court of the parish of the taxpayer's principal office. La. R.S. 47:1434, et seq. The question presented by this case is whether the statutory procedure constitutes the Collector's exclusive means of invoking the jurisdiction of the courts and of obtaining judicial review. The district court dismissed the Collector's petition because he failed to file in the parish of the taxpayer's principal office within the time specified by law. The court of appeal reversed holding that a timely filing in any district court properly invokes judicial jurisdiction, that the place-of-filing requirement is a venue rule, and that a petition timely filed in the wrong district court may be transferred to the parish of the taxpayer's principal office for judicial review. 504 So.2d 592. We reverse. A district court is vested with jurisdiction to review administrative action as provided by law. Consequently, when a litigant relies upon a statute as providing a particular court with jurisdiction to review his case, he must follow the statutory procedure for invoking that court's jurisdiction. The statute relied upon by the Collector, which reflects legislative policies favoring taxpayer convenience and prompt conclusion of litigation, requires that he must timely seek judicial review in the parish of the taxpayer's principal office, as his exclusive means of review and of invoking the subject matter jurisdiction of the courts.
The Department of Revenue and Taxation assessed Loop, Inc. for alledgedly unpaid corporate franchise taxes for the years 1979, 1980 and 1981. Loop appealed the Department's assessment to the Board of Tax Appeals. After a hearing the Board of Tax Appeals ruled in favor of Loop and dismissed the assessment.
The Department sought judicial review by filing a petition for review, within the time prescribed by law, in the district court of Jefferson Parish. It is undisputed that at that time Loop's principal place of business was in Orleans Parish. Loop filed declinatory exceptions of lack of jurisdiction over the person, lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, and improper venue. The district court heard the exceptions and sustained Loop's exceptions of lack of subject matter and personal jurisdiction.
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal affirmed in part the trial court's decision. It disagreed that the trial court lacked jurisdiction but found that the action had been filed in an improper venue. However, the court of appeal refused to transfer the case to the proper venue and dismissed the case, holding that the Collector's claim had either prescribed or had been perempted. Loop, Inc. v. Collector of Revenue, 464 So.2d 785 (La.App. 5th Cir.1985).
The Collector applied for writs and this court summarily granted partial relief. We granted the writ with an order holding that the exception of venue was correctly sustained, but that the appeals court erroneously refused to transfer the case to the proper court. The action was transferred to the civil district court of Orleans Parish with a notation that the " 'underlying question' of prescription or peremption" could be raised there. Loop, Inc. v. Collector of Revenue, 470 So.2d 112 (La.1985).
In the civil district court, Loop filed peremptory exceptions contending that because of the Collector's failure to file his petition for judicial review in a competent court within the thirty day period set out in La. R.S. 47:1434, his right of judicial review was prescribed or perempted. After a hearing, the civil district court sustained the exception of peremption.
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal reversed, holding that because the statute must be construed strictly in favor of judicial review of administrative action, the requirement that a review requested by the collector be filed in the parish of the taxpayer's principal place of business must be construed as a rule of venue rather than of jurisdiction. Accordingly, the court of appeal concluded that any civil district court has jurisdiction to entertain the Collector's petition for review, that his filing of the petition in the instant case nevertheless constituted a timely exercise of the Collector's right to judicial review in a court of proper jurisdiction, and the Collector's failure to file in the proper venue had been corrected when the case was transferred. Loop, Inc. v. Collector of Revenue, 504 So.2d 592 (La.App. 4th Cir.1987).
We granted a writ to review the court of appeal's holding that the statutory rule obliging the Collector to seek review in a particular forum is a rule of venue, not jurisdiction. 504 So.2d 868.
It is well settled that an individual's right of judicial review of administrative proceedings is presumed to exist. La. Const. of 1974, Art. 1, § 2 and 22. Delta Bank & Trust Co. v. Lassiter, 383 So.2d 330 (La.1980); Buras v. Board of Trustees of Police Pension Fund of City of New Orleans, 367 So.2d 849 (La.1979); Bowen v. Doyal, 259 La. 839, 253 So.2d 200 (1971). However, where the legislature has provided a reasonable procedure for obtaining judicial review of a particular agency decision, an individual litigant must follow such procedure in order to obtain review. Corbello v. Sutton, 446 So.2d 301 (La.1984); see also, Whitney National Bank v. Bank of New Orleans & Trust Co., 379 U.S. 411, 85 S.Ct. 551, 13 L.Ed.2d 386 (1965). A government agency which does not have a constitutionally guaranteed right of judicial review necessarily must rely upon and comply with statutory provisions for such review. See, Estep v. United States, 327 U.S. 114, 66 S.Ct. 423, 90 L.Ed. 567 (1946); Board of Commissioners v. Department of Natural Resources, 496 So.2d 281, 287 (La.1986).
Moreover, the 1974 Louisiana Constitution provides that "A district court shall have appellate jurisdiction as provided by law." La. Const. Art. V, § 16 (B). By definition, appellate jurisdiction is the power to review the judgment of another tribunal. Generally, a court's review of an administrative tribunal's action is considered functionally to be an exercise of its appellate review jurisdiction. Central & Southern Motor Freight Tariff Association v. United States, 345 F.Supp. 1389 (D.Del.1972); Neumeister v. City Development Board, 291 N.W.2d 11 (Iowa 1980); Public Employment Relations Board v. Stohr, 279 N.W.2d 286 (Iowa 1979); Walton v. McNamara, 408 So.2d 1144 (La.App. 3d Cir.1981); Collector of Revenue v. Murphy Oil Corporation, 351 So.2d 1234 (La.App. 4th Cir.1977); 5 B. Mezines, J. Stein & J. Gruff, Administrative Law, § 45.04 (1977) [hereinafter Mezines]; 16 C. Wright, A. Miller, H. Cooper & E. Gressman, Federal Practice and Procedure Act, § 3940 (1977); Force and Griffith, Louisiana Administrative Procedure Act, 42 La.L.Rev. 1227, 1272 (1982). Therefore, for the purpose of judicial review of administrative action, the district courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, having only such appellate jurisdiction to review administrative actions as is provided by law or constitutionally required.
Consequently, a litigant seeking judicial review of administrative action in a district court must establish that there is a statute which gives subject matter jurisdiction to that court. When the statute upon which he relies establishes a specific procedure for judicial review of an agency's action, a litigant may invoke the reviewing court's jurisdiction only by following the statutorily prescribed procedure, unless there can be found within the act a genuine legislative intent to authorize judicial review by other means. Corbello v. Sutton, 446 So.2d 301 (La.1984); see also, Whitney National Bank v. Bank of New Orleans & Trust Co., 379 U.S. 411, 85 S.Ct. 551, 13 L.Ed.2d 386 (1965); Memphis Trust Co. v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve, 584 F.2d 921 (6th Cir.1978); Investment Co. Institute v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve, 551 F.2d 1270 (D.C. Cir.1977); Application of Lakeview Gardens, Inc., 227 Kan. 161, 605 P.2d 576 (1980); Montana Health Systems, Agency, Inc. v. Montana Board of Health and Environmental Sciences, 188 Mont. 188, 612 P.2d 1275 (1980); and Bay River, Inc. v. Environmental Quality Commission, 26 Or.App. 717, 554 P.2d 620 (1976). Usually, however, the existence of a special statutory procedure implies a legislative aim that the special statutory procedure is to be the exclusive means of obtaining judicial review for the situations to which it applies. Whitney National Bank v. Bank of New Orleans & Trust Co., supra; Mezines, supra, at § 45:01; Note, Jurisdiction to Review Federal Administrative Action: District Court or Court of Appeals, 88 Harv.L.Rev. 980, 982 (1975).
Applying these precepts to the statute in this case, we conclude that the special statutory procedure requiring the Collector to file a petition within the specified time in the parish of the taxpayer's principal office was intended to be the exclusive method for obtaining judicial review. This is implied by the existence of the specific procedure itself and borne out by a reading of the statute as a whole with consideration of its underlying purposes.
The Board of Tax Appeals and the procedures for the review and enforcement of its decisions were established for the speedy, convenient and inexpensive decision of controversies between the Collector and taxpayers. La. R.S. 47:1401, et seq. (1942 La.Acts 299). It was the express legislative aim thereby to provide a means to hear and decide such disputes "at a minimum of expense to the taxpayer". La. R.S. 47:1401. The Board was empowered to meet anywhere in the state and directed to schedule its hearings "with a view of securing reasonable opportunity to taxpayers to appear before the board with as little inconvenience and expense as is practicable." La. R.S. 47:1403. The Board was admonished to see that "a decision or judgment shall be made as quickly as practicable." La. R.S. 47:1432.
The special statutory review procedure provides that after a decision or judgment of the Board of Tax Appeals "the collector or the taxpayer may, within thirty calendar days after such decision or judgment has been rendered and signed, file a petition with the district court in accordance with the provisions hereinafter set out, for review of the said decision or judgment of the board...." La.R.S. 47:1434. "A decision or judgment of the Board may be reviewed: . In the case of an individual, by the district court for the district whereof he is a resident.In the case of a corporation which has a principal office or agency in Louisiana, then the district court for the district where such principal office is located.... In the case of an agreement between the collector and taxpayer, then by the district court as stipulated in the agreement." La. R.S. 47:1436. The statute does not expressly provide for review procedures in any other court that would be applicable in this case.
The choice of language and the policies expressed indicate a legislative aim to establish an exclusive method of obtaining prompt judicial review at a minimum of expense and inconvenience to the taxpayer. Accordingly, the judicial review must be conducted either by a district court agreed upon by the taxpayer or by the district court for the district whereof he is a resident or where a corporate taxpayer's principal office is located. Any other construction would ignore the plain words of the statute and undermine the dominant purpose of the statute and the special review procedure which is to provide a taxpayer with a speedy, convenient and inexpensive method of contesting the Collector's action or failure to act on a claim for refund or credit of an overpayment. See La. R.S. 47:1431, et seq.
The court of appeal's construction of the statute as vesting jurisdiction for judicial review of each decision of the Board of Tax Appeals in every civil district court in the state would undermine the deliberately worded jurisdiction provisions reflecting clearly expressed legislative policy. By reducing the jurisdictional provisions to mere rules of venue that interpretation would, in effect, waive time-barring provisions when the litigant has previously sought timely review in an improper forum. This construction would not ensure that legislative preferences for reviewing particular actions in particular forums would be respected. Moreover, such an interpretation would impose upon litigants the hardship of shuttling back and forth between courts, increase the taxpayers' expense and inconvenience, and conflict with the purpose of statutory time limits — to bring about the ultimate termination of litigation.
Alternatively, the Collector claims that the thirty day period for filing a petition does not apply to him because prescription and peremption cannot run against the State under Article XII, § 13 of the 1974 Louisiana Constitution. However, Article XII, § 13 provides "Prescription shall not run against the state in any civil matter, unless otherwise provided in this constitution or as expressly provided by law." (emphasis added) Thus, the Collector's argument is clearly without merit because La. R.S. 47:1434 is an express provision by law that the Collector may obtain judicial review only by filing a petition for review in the designated court within thirty days after the Board's decision.
Accordingly, we conclude that the special statutory procedure set forth in La. R.S. 47:1434-36 is the exclusive procedure by which the Collector may obtain judicial re view of a Board of Tax Appeals decision. Because the Collector failed to properly follow this procedure by timely filing his petition for review in the district of the taxpayer's principal office he failed to invoke the jurisdiction of any court in this matter. We failed to recognize or pass upon this issue when we granted a writ and issued a summary order in this case previously. Now, after full consideration, it is our duty to take notice of the courts' lack of jurisdiction, to vacate the judgment of the court of appeal, and to dismiss the Collector's petition for judicial review.
COURT OF APPEAL JUDGMENT VACATED; COLLECTOR OF REVENUE'S PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW DISMISSED AT HIS COST.
LEMMON, J., dissents and assigns reasons.
DIXON, C.J., dissents with reasons.
CALOGERO, J., dissents for the reasons assigned by DIXON, C.J.
. Under the 1921 Louisiana Constitution, a district court's appellate jurisdiction was expressly restricted to the review of decisions of several specifically named municipal and justice of peace courts. La. Const. 1921, Art. VII, § 36. In order to pay respect to this provision and yet afford litigants judicial review of administrative actions by district courts, this court held that such review could be conducted as an exercise of a district court's original rather than its appellate jurisdiction. Bowen v. Doyal, supra. Because the 1974 Louisiana Constitution restores the legislature's plenary power to define district court appellate jurisdiction, the obstacle to legislation vesting the district courts with appellate jurisdiction including judicial review of administrative actions has been removed. La. Const. 1974, Art. V, § 16(B). Therefore, we conclude that under the 1974 Louisiana Constitution a legislative act establishing procedures for judicial review of an administrative tribunal decision by a district court, should properly be considered to be a law providing for that court's appellate jurisdiction. Accord: Touchette v. City of Rayne, Municipal Fire & Police Civil Service Board, 321 So.2d 62 (La.App. 3d Cir.1975).