Case Name: Bob BULLOCK, Comptroller of Public Accounts of the State of Texas, Jim Mattox, Attorney General of the State of Texas and Ann Richards, Treasurer of the State of Texas, Appellants, v. TEXAS MONTHLY, INC., Appellee
Court: Texas Courts of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1987-05-27
Citations: 731 S.W.2d 160
Docket Number: No. 14692
Parties: Bob BULLOCK, Comptroller of Public Accounts of the State of Texas, Jim Mattox, Attorney General of the State of Texas and Ann Richards, Treasurer of the State of Texas, Appellants, v. TEXAS MONTHLY, INC., Appellee.
Judges: Before SHANNON, C.J., and BRADY and CARROLL, JJ.
Reporter: South Western Reporter Second Series
Volume: 731
Pages: 160–170

Head Matter:
Bob BULLOCK, Comptroller of Public Accounts of the State of Texas, Jim Mattox, Attorney General of the State of Texas and Ann Richards, Treasurer of the State of Texas, Appellants, v. TEXAS MONTHLY, INC., Appellee.
No. 14692.
Court of Appeals of Texas, Austin.
May 27, 1987.
Rehearing Denied June 24, 1987.
Jim Mattox, Atty. Gen., David Mendez, Asst. Atty. Gen., Austin, for appellants.
R. James George, Jr., Eric G. Behrens, Graves, Dougherty, Hearon & Moody, Austin, for appellee.
Before SHANNON, C.J., and BRADY and CARROLL, JJ.

Opinion:
ON MOTION FOR REHEARING
SHANNON, Chief Justice.
The opinion handed down by this Court on March 18, 1987, is withdrawn and this opinion is filed in its place.
Appellee, Texas Monthly, Inc., sued the Comptroller of Public Accounts and others in the district court of Travis County seeking recovery of sales taxes paid under protest. After trial to the court, the district court rendered judgment that Texas Monthly recover $149,107.74. This Court will reverse the judgment.
Texas Monthly publishes a general interest magazine on a monthly basis. Effective October 2, 1984, the sales of its magazine became subject to the sales tax. Tex. Tax Code Ann. § 151.051 (Supp.1987). Texas Monthly paid, under protest, $149,-107.74 which sum represented the tax on the sale of its magazine between January 21, 1985 and December 18, 1985.
Texas Monthly's suit for refund was predicated upon the fact that certain publications are exempted from payment of the sales tax. Tex. Tax Code Ann. § 151.312. That section provides:
Periodicals that are published or distributed by a religious faith and that consist wholly of writings promulgating the teaching of the faith and books that consist wholly of writings sacred to a religion or religious faith are exempted from the taxes imposed by this Chapter.
In its trial petition, Texas Monthly pleaded that:
Section 151.312 exempts from the sales tax religious periodicals. Such an exemption constitutes an unlawful discrimination based on the content of a publication and thus violates Plaintiff's rights guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States and Article 1, § 8 of the Constitution of Texas.
The district court's judgment declared § 151.312 unconstitutional "because it constitutes an unlawful discrimination based on the content of [Texas Monthly's] publication in violation of its rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution and Article VIII § 1 of the Texas Constitution...."
Although the trial petition and the judgment are not entirely clear, the Comptroller and Texas Monthly in their briefs and oral argument took the position that the district court's judgment was grounded upon the premise that the § 151.312 exemption violated the equal protection and free speech clauses of the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States and the equal and uniform clause of Article 8 § 1 of the Constitution of Texas. In its brief, Texas Monthly discusses the establishment clause of the First Amendment but only as a part of its equal protection analysis.
Under point of error one, the Comptroller first asserts that the district court erred in concluding that § 151.312 violated the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution and the equal and uniform clause of the Texas Constitution. We agree.
It is inherent in the exercise of the power to tax that a state be free to select the subjects of taxation and to grant exemptions. Equal protection does not impose on a state any rigid equality of taxation. Inequalities which result from sin gling out one particular class for taxation or exemption infringe no constitutional limitation. Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co., 301 U.S. 495, 57 S.Ct. 868, 81 L.Ed. 1245 (1937). Like considerations govern exemptions from the operation of a tax imposed on the members of a class. The legislature is not bound to tax every member of a class or none at all. The legislature may make rational distinctions of degree having a rational basis. Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co., supra; Hurt v. Cooper, 130 Tex. 433, 110 S.W.2d 896 (1937); American Transfer & Storage Co. v. Bullock, 525 S.W.2d 918 (Tex.Civ.App.1975, writ ref'd). The exemptions, when subjected to judicial scrutiny, must be presumed to rest on a rational basis if any state of facts would support such basis. Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co., supra. Indeed, it is said that "the presumption of constitutionality can be overcome only by the most explicit demonstration that a classification is a hostile and oppressive discrimination against persons and classes. The burden is on the one attacking the legislative arrangement to negate every conceivable basis which might support it." Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83, 60 S.Ct. 406, 84 L.Ed. 590 (1940).
In its effort to meet this burden, Texas Monthly suggests that the § 151.312 exemption constitutes a law "respecting an establishment of religion," in violation of the United States Constitution, and therefore is unsupported by any legitimate basis.
The United States Supreme Court has created a three-part test to aid in determining whether a statute violates the establishment clause:
First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion, . finally, the statute must not foster "an excessive entanglement with religion."
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13, 91 S.Ct. 2105, 2111, 29 L.Ed.2d 945 (1971). "Each value judgment under the religion clauses must . turn on whether particular acts in question are intended to establish or interfere with religious beliefs and practices or have the effect of doing so." Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664, 669, 90 S.Ct. 1409, 1411, 25 L.Ed.2d 697 (1970). Applying this criteria, this Court concludes that § 151.312 does not violate the establishment clause. Furthermore, we are of the view that the classification established by this tax exemption has a rational basis and, accordingly, does not deny appellee equal protection of the law.
The secular purpose served by a tax exemption for religious organizations was described in Walz, supra. In Walz the Supreme Court reasoned that such a tax exemption "restricts the fiscal relationship between church and state, and tends to complement and reinforce the desired separation insulating each from the other." Id. at 676, 90 S.Ct. at 1415 (emphasis supplied).
Furthermore, the opinion in Walz demonstrates that the tax exemption at issue does not have the primary effect of advancing or inhibiting religion. To the contrary, the effect of religious tax exemptions such as § 151.312 is to permit religious organizations to be independent of government support or sanction. Although Walz recognized that "[gjranting tax exemptions to churches necessarily operates to afford [them] an indirect economic benefit," the Court concluded that
[ t]he grant of a tax exemption is not sponsorship since the government does not transfer part of its revenue to churches but simply abstains from demanding that the church support the state. No one has ever suggested that tax exemption has converted libraries, art galleries, or hospitals into arms of the state....
Id. at 674-75.
Nor does the fact that Walz involved an exemption granted to other "nonprofit, quasi-public corporations," as well as to religious groups, distinguish it from this appeal. Although the broader based exemption in Walz provided a clearer case of non-sponsorship than is here present, the neutrality toward religion effected by the grant of an exemption for religious periodicals is just as evident. To discover an advancement of religion in this statutory scheme is to turn the intent and effect of § 151.312 on its head.
Finally, this Court concludes that § 151.312 does not excessively entangle the state in religious activities and, accordingly, the statute meets the third prong of the Lemon v. Kurtzman test. Once again, we refer to Walz as authority for our view. In Walz the Court noted that, generally, the grant of an exemption to religious organizations leads to lesser involvement by the State than does taxation. Nevertheless, "[i]n analyzing either alternative the questions are whether the involvement is excessive, and whether it is a continuing one calling for official and continuing surveillance leading to an impermissible degree of entanglement." Id. at 675. This analysis involves examination of "the character and purposes of the institutions that are bene-fitted, the nature of the aid that the State provides, and the resulting relationship between the government and the religious authority." Lemon, supra at 615, 91 S.Ct. at 2112.
To the extent § 151.312 creates entanglement, it creates entanglement between government and institutions with purely religious purposes. We are not faced, therefore, with the difficulties presented when the government attempts to limit its intrusion to the secular endeavors of a religious organization — for example, where government attempts to provide aid for the non-religious curriculum of sectarian schools and yet creates excessive entanglement by oversight measures intended to insure that the aid is not directed to religious purposes. See Lemon, supra; Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 372, 95 S.Ct. 1753, 1766, 44 L.Ed.2d 417 (1975). Accordingly, our focus is on the nature of the State's aid and the relationship between the State and religious publishers that results from the aid.
The aid at issue is, of course, the indirect subsidy provided by the tax exemption to religious periodicals. No affirmative action by state government is necessary to bestow this benefit. Due to its passive nature, the tax exemption does not create the appearance of an ongoing partnership between the State and religion presented by direct aid. More important, the exemption is administered in such a manner that "official and continuing surveillance" by the government is avoided.
Wanda Hutcheson, supervisor for sales tax policy in the Comptroller's Office, testified that religious publishers may qualify for an exemption by making a one-time showing that they are a bona fide religious organization under Tex. Tax Code Ann. § 151.310. Hutcheson further testified that "we leave it to [the organization] to decide whether or not it's . a publication that teaches their faith."
The Comptroller's application of § 151.-312 in no manner resembles the "comprehensive, discriminating, and continuing state surveillance" which confronted the Supreme Court in Lemon. Id. at 619, 91 S.Ct. at 2114. In Lemon, the State had conditioned its direct aid to nonpublic schools with "pervasive" restrictions and a continuing right to inspect and audit school records. In contrast, our record demonstrates that the exemption is administered with a minimum of church-state entanglement and with an eye toward the goal of state neutrality codified in § 151.312 and elaborated in Walz.
Because the record in this appeal reveals "no realistic likelihood" that § 151.312 is enforced in such a way as to allow impermissible entanglement, this Court corn eludes that the Comptroller has met the third prong of the Lemon test. See Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 747-48, 93 S.Ct. 2868, 2876-77, 37 L.Ed.2d 923 (1973) (statute was constitutional where administrative scheme negated possibility that breadth of statute would lead to excessive entanglement).
The policy of neutrality toward religion embodied in § 151.312 provides a rational basis for the exemption and defeats any claim that the exemption violates the establishment clause. Accordingly, we conclude that § 151.312 does not deny ap-pellee equal protection of the laws, nor does it violate the equal and uniform clause of the Texas Constitution.
Also under its first point of error, the Comptroller asserts that the district court erred in concluding that the § 151.-312 exemption violated the free speech clause of the First Amendment. We agree.
This issue is controlled by the holding of the United States Supreme Court in Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Washington, 461 U.S. 540, 103 S.Ct. 1997, 76 L.Ed.2d 129 (1983). Regan involved the validity of Internal Revenue Code provisions which allowed contributions to tax exempt organizations to be tax deductible only if the organization did not engage in lobbying. Taxation With Representation claimed the denial of this tax benefit was an "unconstitutional condition" on its exercise of free speech through lobbying. The Supreme Court rejected this claim, stating that "[tjhis Court has never held that Congress must grant a benefit such as [Taxation With Representation] claims here to a person who wishes to exercise a constitutional right." Id. at 545, 103 S.Ct. at 2001 (emphasis supplied). In short, the Supreme Court held that the failure of the State to subsidize speech does not significantly interfere with First Amendment rights.
The same logic applies to § .151.312 of the Tax Code. The legislature has chosen to grant a tax benefit to religious publications. However, Texas Monthly has not shown that the legislature's failure to grant this benefit to other types of publications has "coerced" them into restricting their right of free speech. Cf. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 78 S.Ct. 1332, 2 L.Ed.2d 1460 (1958). The first point of error is sustained.
On motion for rehearing, Texas Monthly contends that the opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States in Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, - U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 1722, 95 L.Ed.2d 209 (1987) is dispositive of its claim that § 151.312 violates its right of free speech. Texas Monthly's position is predicated on a misinterpretation of Ragland.
In Ragland, the Supreme Court identified two impermissible types of discrimination against the press:
(1) a tax which treats the press differently from other enterprises;
(2) a tax which targets a small group within the press as a whole.
The Supreme Court determined that the tax exemption in Ragland was so broad that it had the effect of singling out a very small group of magazines for taxation. This appeal, to the contrary, presents the opposite situation. The great mass of publishers remain subject to the sales tax. The Legislature has rationally determined to exempt religious periodicals as a means of furthering the separation of church and state. Neither of the situations deemed objectionable by the Supreme Court in Rag-land is presented in this appeal. As stated in the original opinion, this appeal falls within the Supreme Court's holding in Regan v. Taxation With Representation of Washington, supra.
Texas Monthly points out further that this Court failed in the original opinion to address the issue of whether the tax exemption at issue violates the free speech provisions of the Texas Constitution, Tex. Const.Ann. art. 1, § 8 (1984). This Court has discovered no Texas authority addressing this issue. Texas Monthly's motion for rehearing relies almost entirely on analysis of federal opinions to support its position that Article 1, § 8 has been violated. Moreover, Article 1, § 8, as it respects limitations on the government's right to restrict speech, is stated in terms practically identical to the free speech clause of the First Amendment.
Under these circumstances, this Court will rely on federal law for guidance, See Jones v. Memorial Hospital System, 677 S.W.2d 221 (Tex.App.1984, no writ). We conclude that the analysis set forth in Regan v. Taxation With Representation, su pra, applies with equal force to Texas Monthly's challenge under Article 1, § 8. Accordingly, we sustain the Comptroller's point of error number one, as it relates to the district court's conclusion that § 151.-312 violates Article 1, § 8 of the Texas Constitution.
In its prayer for relief, Texas Monthly, of course, asked that this Court affirm the district court's judgment. If, however, this Court concluded that the district court erred respecting § 151.312, Texas Monthly then requested that we remand the cause to district court for its consideration of issues raised but not there determined.
At oral submission, the Court inquired of counsel whether Texas Monthly had preserved its complaint concerning the issues not determined by the district court. By way of answer counsel requested, and obtained, leave to file a post-submission brief.
It is true that Texas Monthly pleaded that it was entitled to recovery of the taxes based upon one of several grounds. It is likewise true that the district court predicated its judgment upon only one such ground — the claimed unconstitutionality of § 151.312. Texas Monthly, however, did not complain in district court of the court's failure to consider and pass on its other asserted grounds of recovery, nor did it assert any such complaints by cross-points in this Court.
The trial court, of course, should be afforded an opportunity to correct any errors that it might have made in the judgment. Accordingly, to complain of the judgment on appeal, an appellee is required to bring those errors to the trial court's attention in some manner whether by filing exceptions to the judgment, notice of appeal, motion for new trial, or other. West Texas Utilities Co. v. Irvin, 161 Tex. 5, 336 S.W.2d 609 (1960); Saenz Motors v. Big H. Auto Auction, Inc., 653 S.W.2d 521, 526 (Tex.App.1983), aff'd 665 S.W.2d 756 (Tex.1984); State Bar of Texas, Appellate Procedure in Texas § 15.16 at 351 (2nd ed. 1979). See Luna v. Southern Pacific Transportation Co., 724 S.W.2d 383 (Tex.1987).
Contrary to appellee's argument in its motion for rehearing, the fact that this Court granted appellee leave to file a post-submission brief does not somehow supply the missing trial court predicate for the assertion of cross-points in this Court nor does it cure appellee's failure to complain by cross-points in this Court of the trial court's failure to rule on its additional grounds of recovery.
Accordingly, Texas Monthly waived any right it may have had to require the district court to consider and pass on its other grounds of recovery. State Bar of Texas, Appellate Procedure in Texas § 15.16 at 351 (2nd ed. 1979).
The judgment of the district court is reversed and judgment is here rendered that Texas Monthly take nothing.
. United States Const, amend. I states in part: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion_"