Case Name: Mrs. Roy Taylor v. The State
Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1924-04-16
Citations: 101 Tex. Crim. 201
Docket Number: No. 8061
Parties: Mrs. Roy Taylor v. The State.
Judges: 
Reporter: Texas Criminal Reports
Volume: 101
Pages: 201–214

Head Matter:
APRIL 1924.
Mrs. Roy Taylor v. The State.
No. 8061.
Delivered April 16, 1924.
Rehearing granted State, May 28, 1924.
Rehearing granted Appellant, June 26, 1925.
1.&emdash;Possessing Intoxicating Liquor&emdash;Misconduct of Jury&emdash;Held: Reversible Error.
Where on a trial for unlawfulpossession of intoxicating liquor, the jury after retiring receives other evidence than that which came from the wit- nesses, before the punishment has been agreed upon, the cause must be reversed.
ON REHEARING
2.&emdash;Same&emdash;Misconduct of Jury&emdash;When ReversibleError.
Where a juror, before an agreement as to the penaltybut after an agree- ment of conviction, remarks, “the defendant has been convicted in the Federal Court,” and the foreman in reply to such remark says that it must not be considered, and no injury or probable injury is shown to have been done the appellant, such remark of the juror will not warrant a reversal of the case. Distinguishing Gilbert v. State, 215 S. W. 110, and Weaver v. State, 210 S. W. 698. W. 110, and Weaver v. State, 210 S. W. 698.
3. —Same—Above Subject Continued.
Where an infraction of subdivision 7, Art. 837, C. C. P., is shown there still remains the question to be decided from the whole record as to the materiality, and likelihood of injury resulting therefrom, and that unless sound reason and judgment accord with the view that by what'was said and done in the jury room, the fairness - and impartiality of the trial was, or probably was, affected, the case should not be reversed for such reason, and the State’s motion for rehearing is granted, and the reversal set aside, and the cause affirmed. See opinion on rehearing for collation of authorities.
4. —Same—Postponement—Refusal of — Not Considered — No Bill of Exception.
Where complaint is made of the refusal of a requested motion for a postponement on account of the absence of a witness, which is not supported by a. bill of exception, it will not be considered. See Vernon’s Ann., C. C. P., pages 529-30.
ON REHEARING-BY APPELLANT.
5. —Same—Rehearing—Erroneously Granted State.
On reconsideration of our former opinion on rehearing by the State, we have reached the conclusion that we were in error in granting the motion of the State and affirming this cause, and that our original opinion, reversing and remanding the cause should not be disturbed.
6. —Same—Misconduct of Jury — Former Conviction — Not to be Considered.
Where one of the jurors in their retirement stated that appellant had been convicted in the federal court, of some offense when in truth she had not been so convicted, the cause must be reversed. Art. 843, C. C. P., provides that “The former conviction shall be regarded as no presumption of guilt, nor shall it be alluded to in the argument.” In the present case, according to the undisputed evidence upon the motion for new trial, there had been no other conviction of the accused. See Smith v. State, 52 Tex. Crim. Rep. 351.
7. —Same—Misconduct of Jury — Prejudice Evidenced — Not Impartial.
Where .a juror in retirement, states to the jury that appellant has been convicted of another offense, such statement evidences that the juror is not a fair and impartial juror, and when a juror is guilty of such misconduct, or if he cannot be regarded as an impartial juror, the verdict ought not to stand. It is the verdict of the twelve. See Ruling Case Law, Vol. 16, Sec. 120, p. 812, also 134 Am. St. Rep. 1034, Long v. State, 28 Tex. Crim. App. 532 and other cases cited.
8. —Same—Misconduct of Jury — Distinguishing Former Decisions.
There is a distinction between the instant case, and those cases in which this court has held that the incidental mention of a prior conviction, in the same case, has been held harmless. The conduct of the juror in this case in stating that appellant had been convicted in the federal court, whatever may have been his motive, was calculated to injure the accused, and apparently was so intended, and the contrary cannot be presumed. Distinguishing Smith v. State, 52 Tex. Crim. Rep. 344.
See concurring opinion by Judge Hawkins, and dissenting opinion by Judge Lattimore.
Appeal from the District Court of Wichita County. Tried below before the Hon. P. A. Martin, Judge.
Appeal from a conviction for unlawful possession of intoxicating liquor, penalty fifteen months in the penitentiary.
The opinion states the case.
Heyser & Hicks; and Taylor & Taylor, for appellant.
James V. Allred, District Attorney; Tom Garrard, State Attorney, Grover C. Morris, Assistant State’s Attorney, for the State.

Opinion:
LATTIMORE, Judge.
Conviction was in the District Court of Wichita county for possessing intoxicating liquor for purposes of sale, the penalty being fixed at fifteen months in the penitentiary.
In view of the disposition of this case a discussion of the facts will be omitted. It was insisted in support of the motion for new trial that the jury received other evidence than that which came from the witnesses. A number of jurors were introduced and it appears without controversy that after they had agreed upon the guilt of appellant, and when they were divided as to her punishment, nine of the jurors apparently being for a year in the penitentiary, a statement was made by one of the members of the jury that appellant had been convicted in the Federal court. Almost at once thereafter an agreement was reached fixing the penalty as appears in the record. It is admitted on behalf of the State by the State's attorney that this conduct of the jury was such as to call for a reversal. We are inclined to agree to the correctness of this proposition.
For the error based on the misconduct of the jury the judgment is reversed and the cause remanded.
Reversed and remanded.