Case Name: O'Bannon & Co. vs. Relf & Bledsoe
Court: Kentucky Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Kentucky
Decision Date: 1838-06-20
Citations: 7 Dana 320
Docket Number: 
Parties: O’Bannon & Co. vs. Relf & Bledsoe.
Judges: 
Reporter: Kentucky Reports
Volume: 37
Pages: 320–328

Head Matter:
O’Bannon & Co. vs. Relf & Bledsoe.
[Mr. Sprigg for plaintiffs: Messrs. Morehead & Brown and Mr. McHenry for defendants.]
Covenant
Fb.om: the Circuit Court for Jefferson County.
As the Court found no question, “ either new or difficult,” in the record of this case, the decision was not written with any view to its publication. But a petition for a re-hearing having been presented, it is made-the duty of the Reporter, by the act of 1838, (5 Dana,. vi.) to print the petition and the decision with it.
The plaintiffs were a firm of merchants in Shelbyville; the defendants, manufacturers of bagging and bale-rope in the same place. On the 7th of April, 1835, these two firms signed and sealed an article of agreement, by which the merchants agreed to purchase of the manufacturers, all the bagging and bale-rope which they had then on hand and could make by the 1st of October following — at 27 cents a yard for the bagging, and 6i cents a pound for the rope: The goods to be received at the factory, from time to time, at specified dates; and payments to be made to the amount of each parcel upon its delivery.' And the manufacturers bound themselves to deliver good heavy merchantable bagging and bale-rope of the usual size and quality. Several parcels, comprising portions of each article, it appears, were, from time to time, delivered and received. But the merchants, finding, some time afterwards, that the bagging was of an inferior quality and not merchantable, brought this action, upon the agreement, to recover damages on that account. The declaration, after setting out the covenant, avers that bagging, to the amount of 19,629 yards, with some bale-rope, was, from time to time, delivered under the contract; and that the plaintiffs had well and truly performed all the covenants on their part; but does not aver, that they had no opportunity to inspect the bagging before they received it; nor that they did not in fact examine it; nor that they ever offered to return it. But the breach, and the only breach, assigned is, that the bagging {was not good heavy merchantable bagging of the usual size and quality.’ To this declaration, there was a demurrer, which the Court below sustained,- and rendered a judgment thereon,for the defendants: to reverse which, this writ of error was prosecuted.
A covenant to de liver goods or chattels of a par ticular description or quality, at a future day, is discharged by the delivery of any description or quality which the . covenantee accepts, after ha ving inspected them, or having had a fair opportunity to do so; and he can maintain no action af-terwards, on account of defects of quality. And herein contracts of this description differ from contracts of warranty upon executed sales.
June 20.

Opinion:
Judge Marshall
announced the decision of this Court, as follows:—
As the declaration shows that the bagging was ac-oepted by the plaintiffs, and does not show, either that they had no opportunity of inspecting it at the time of delivery, or that they did not then know, or might not, from the nature of the goods and of the transaction, have known of the defects now alleged, by reasonable ¿Lili-gence; and as it does not show when the defects were discovered, nor that, when discovered, the defendants were notified, or the return of the goods tendered, nor any reason why this was not done — we are of opinion that, upon the whole declaration, the presumption is, that the acceptance was a discharge of the defendants' covenant; and, therefore, that no cause of action is shown.
Wherefore, the judgment for the defendants, on their demurrer to the declaration, is affirmed.