Case Name: The People of the State of New York, Appellant, v. Ernest A. Steuding, Defendant, and Morgan D. Ryan, Respondent
Court: New York Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1959-07-08
Citations: 6 N.Y.2d 214
Docket Number: 
Parties: The People of the State of New York, Appellant, v. Ernest A. Steuding, Defendant, and Morgan D. Ryan, Respondent.
Judges: 
Reporter: New York Reports
Volume: 6
Pages: 214–225

Head Matter:
The People of the State of New York, Appellant, v. Ernest A. Steuding, Defendant, and Morgan D. Ryan, Respondent.
Argued May 28, 1959;
decided July 8, 1959.
Bernard Tompkins, Special Assistant Attorney-General (Leonhard E. R,eisman, Wilfred R. Caron and Robert Orseck of counsel), for appellant.
I. Respondent Ryan was properly summoned and sworn and his constitutional privilege was in no way infringed. (Matter of Doyle, 257 N. Y. 244; People v. Anhut, 162 App. Div. 517, 213 N. Y. 643; Matter of Bojinoff v. People, 299 N. Y. 145; People v. Gowasky, 244 N. Y. 451; People ex rel. Jannicky v. Warden, 231 App. Div. 131; People v. Molineux, 168 N. Y. 264; Teachout v. People, 41 N. Y. 7; People v. Hendrickson, 10 N. Y. 13; People ex rel. Hummel v. Davy, 105 App. Div. 598,184 N. Y. 30; People v. Burke, 72 Misc. 336.) II. Defendant Ryan did not receive immunity. The Appellate Division erroneously declared section 2447 of the Penal Law unconstitutional. (People v. De Feo, 308 N. Y. 595; People v. Freistadt, 6 A D 2d 1053; People ex rel. Coyle v. Truesdell, 259 App. Div. 282; People v. Bermel, 71 Misc. 356; People v. Singer, 18 Abb. N. C. 96; People v. Caminito, 3 N Y 2d 596; People v. Doran, 246 N. Y. 409; People v. Barbato, 254 N. Y. 170; Kaplan v. United States, 7 F. 2d 594, 269 U. S. 582.) III. The Appellate Division in dismissing the indictment violated the principle of res judicata. IV. The indictment, based solely on legal and sufficient evidence, was improperly dismissed. (People v. Howell, 3 N Y 2d 672; People v. Nitzberg, 289 N. Y. 523; People v. Glen, 173 N. Y. 395; People v. Freistadt, 6 A D 2d 1053; People ex rel. Coyle v. Truesdell, 259 App. Div. 282; People v. Bermel, 71 Misc. 356; People v. Singer, 18 Abb. N. C. 96; People v. Leary, 282 App. Div. 476; People v. Anhut, 162 App. Div. 517, 213 N. Y. 643.)
Edward S. Silver, District Attorney (William Sonenshine and Aaron E. Koota of counsel), for New York State District Attorneys’ Association, amicus curiae, in support of appellant’s position.
No constitutional prerogative of a witness is violated where he testifies before a Grand Jury without raising his privilege against self incrimination although fully advised of his rights. (People v. Gardner, 144 N. Y. 119; People v. Gillette, 126 App. Div. 665; People ex rel. Coyle v. Truesdell, 259 App. Div. 282; People v. De Feo, 308 N. Y. 595; People v. Bermel, 71 Misc. 356; People v. Reiss, 255 App. Div. 509; People ex rel. Hofsaes v. Warden of City Prison, 277 App. Div. 398, 302 N. Y. 403; People ex rel. Lewisohn v. O’Brien, 176 N. Y. 253; People v. Burke, 72 Misc. 336.)
N. Le Van Haver and John E. Egan for respondent.
I. Ryan was one of the targets of the investigation and it was, therefore, a flagrant violation of his constitutional right against self incrimination to subpoena him before the Grand Jury, swear him as a witness and compel him to give self-incriminating testimony which, in whole or in part, supplied the basis for the indictment against him. (People v. Ferola, 215 N. Y. 285; People v. Gillette, 126 App. Div. 665; People v. Cahill, 193 N. Y. 232; People v. Cummins, 153 App. Div. 93, 209 N. Y. 283.; People v. De Feo, 308 N. Y. 595; People v. Seaman, 174 Misc. 792; People v. Luckman, 164 Misc. 230; People v. Rauch, 140 Misc. 691; People v. Bermel, 71 Misc. 356; People ex rel. Hummel v. Davy, 105 App. Div. 598; Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U. S. 547; People v. Singer, 18 Abb. N. C. 96.) II. Since the indictment was based, in whole or in part, on testimony wrongfully procured from defendant in violation of his constitutional rights, it was entirely void and properly dismissed. (People ex rel. Coyle v. Truesdell, 259 App. Div. 282; Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U. S. 547.) III. To allow the People the opportunity of resubmitting the case to another Grand Jury, even though sans defendant’s original testimony, would be a serious violation of defendant’s constitutional rights because, while it would be possible, on such resubmission, to exclude consideration of defendant’s original testimony, per se, it would not be possible to exclude the evidence derived from the links and leads furnished by that testimony. Thus, by indirection, the prosecutor would, by allowance of a resubmission, be able to circumvent defendant’s rights. (People v. Freistadt, 6 A D 2d 1053; People ex rel. Lewisohn v. O’Brien, 176 N. Y. 253; Matter of Doyle, 257 N. Y. 244; People ex rel. Kenny v. Adams, 292 N. Y. 65.)

Opinion:
Ftjld, J.
By virtue of the Constitution of this State (art. I, § 6) — and it is solely the Constitution of New York with which we are now concerned — a prospective defendant or one who is a target of an investigation may not be called and examined. before a Grand Jury and, if he is, his constitutionally-conferred privilege against self incrimination is deemed violated even though he does not claim or assert the privilege. (See, e.g., People v. De Feo, 308 N. Y. 595, 603; People v. Ferola, 215 N. Y. 285, 289-290; People v. Gillette, 126 App. Div. 665, 667 et seq.) People v. Bermel, 71 Misc. 356, 359 et seq.) An automatic result of the violation of this constitutional privilege is that the defendant is protected not only from indictment based on any incriminating testimony which he may have given, but also from use of such evidence. And the right and protection thus accorded by the Constitution may not be taken away or cut down by statute.
Section 2447 of the Penal Law, which prescribes the method by which an " immunity " may be conferred upon " witnesses," is unquestionably constitutional and valid, insofar as it is applied to witnesses who are, in truth and fact, witnesses. The statute does not apply in terms to a defendant or to one who is in the shoes of a defendant, insofar as it provides that the burden is cast upon him of claiming privilege, and any attempt to invoke it against such a person would offend against the constitutional provision to which we have referred above. In other words, since the right granted by the Constitution is automatically conferred, section 2447 is ineffectual to destroy or curtail it and any attempt to do so must be stricken as unconstitutional.
A violation of the constitutional privilege carries with it a dismissal of the indictment returned by the Grand Jury before which the defendant testified. Whether, however, it also cloaks him with an immunity, a freedom from prosecution for the crime for which he has been indicted, is a question with which we are not now concerned. Its answer must await a case in which it is presented.
The order appealed from should be affirmed.
. Since we deal with a provision of New York's Constitution, we need not become involved, as has the dissent, with a discussion or treatment of eases in the Federal courts relating to the validity and effect of Federal compulsory testimony legislation under the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States.