Case Name: Matthew C. Flanagan vs. Jennie E. McLane
Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Connecticut
Decision Date: 1913-07-25
Citations: 87 Conn. 220
Docket Number: 
Parties: Matthew C. Flanagan vs. Jennie E. McLane.
Judges: 
Reporter: Connecticut Reports
Volume: 87
Pages: 220–229

Head Matter:
Matthew C. Flanagan vs. Jennie E. McLane.
Third Judicial District, Bridgeport,
April Term, 1913.
Prentice, C.J., Thayer, Roraback, Wheeler and Beach, Js.
When the author and publisher of an alleged libelous communication acts in the bona fide discharge of a public or private duty, or in the prosecution of his own rights or interests, the occasion of the publication is privileged.
A privileged occasion rebuts the implication of malice which the law draws from the publication of false and defamatory matter respecting a plaintiff, and casts upon him the burden of proving that, the defendant was actuated by malice in fact.
Whether the occasion is one of privilege is a question of law for the court: whether in its use the defendant was actuated by actual malice is a question of fact for the jury.
An appeal which does not challenge the correctness of the rulings or charge of the trial court, but rests solely on the ground that the verdict for the defendant in an action of libel was against the evidence and should have been set aside as requested by the plaintiff, does not bring up for review by this court the question whether the letters complained of as libelous were privileged communications or not.
While the plaintiff, a plumber, and his helper were at work in the defendant’s house, a sum of money disappeared, and the defendant wrote to a constable of the town expressing her conviction that the plaintiff had stolen it, and asked the constable to see what he could do about the matter. Later the money was found, but not where it had been originally placed, and the defendant, by letter, informed the constable of that fact and that she should do nothing further about it, but reiterated her belief that the plaintiff had taken the money and, when suspected, had secretly returned it. Held that under the circumstances the whole correspondence must be taken together, and that the reiteration of her belief in the plaintiff’s guilt, if made honestly and without malice, was a privileged communication for the guidance of one whose duty it was or might become to continue the investigation with a view to criminal proceedings.
Submitted on briefs April 9th
—decided July 25th, 1913.
Action for libel, brought to the City Court of New Haven and tried to the jury before Hoyt, J.; verdict and judgment for the 'defendant, and appeal by the plaintiff. No error.
The complaint contains three separate counts in libel and one in slander. The plaintiff and his helper worked in and about the house of the defendant’s husband for some weeks. During this time a sum of money was missed which afterward reappeared. While the money was missing, the defendant wrote the letter set forth in the first count to one Sturtze, a constable of the town of Hamden, informing him of the loss and of her belief that the plaintiff had taken it. She had already written a similar letter, set forth in the fourth count, to the mother of the plaintiff’s helper. After the money reappeared the defendant again wrote to Sturtze the letter which is the basis of the second count, saying, in effect, that the money had been found in a place where she had never put it, and that she would do no more about the matter, but was satisfied that the plaintiff had taken it, and brought it back again when he found that he was suspected. The third count of the complaint is in slander. The defendant’s answer denied the allegations of the third count, admitted the authorship of the letters, and pleaded privilege and want of malice as to each. Technically, and by reason of verbal inaccuracy, the second count stands unanswered; but the intent to plead the same defense to the second count as was pleaded to the first is manifest, and the case was tried in the court below, and argued here, as if the issue had been so formulated. The jury found the issues for the defendant.
Matthew A. Reynolds, for the appellant (plaintiff).
Edwin S. Pickett, for the appellee (defendant).

Opinion:
Beach, J.
The law implies malice from a libelous publication, except in certain cases of privilege, one of 'which is when "the author and'publisher of the alleged slander acted in the bona fide discharge of a public or private duty, . or in the prosecution of his own rights or interests. . A privileged communication means nothing more than that the occasion of making it rebuts the prima facie inference of malice arising from the publication of matter prejudicial to the character of the plaintiff, and throws upon him the onus of proving malice in fact; but not of proving it by extrinsic evidence only; he has still a right to require that the alleged libel itself shall be submitted to the jury, that they may judge whether there is evidence of malice on the face of it." White v. Nicholls, 44 U. S. (3 How.) 266, 286, 287.
Whether a publication is libelous per se is a question for. the court. Donaghue v. Gaffy, 54 Conn. 257, 266, 7 Atl. 552. Whether the occasion is one of privilege is also a question of law for the court. Atwater v. Morning News Co., 67 Conn. 504, 513, 34 Atl. 865; Hassett v. Carroll, 85 Conn. 23, 36, 81 Atl. 1013. Whether the defendant in the use of the privileged occasion was or was not actuated by malice in fact, is a question for the jury. Donaghue v. Gaffy; Atwater v. Morning News Co., Hassett v. Carroll, supra.
No complaint is made on this appeal in regard to the rulings or charge of the court, and the only alleged error is the denial by the court of the plaintiff's motion to set aside the verdict as against the evidence.
As to the count in slander, the evidence was conflicting and affords reasonable basis for the verdict. So far as the counts in libel are concerned, the only question raised by this appeal is whether there was evidence from which the jury might reasonably have found that the defendant, in writing the letters complained of, was not actuated by malice in fact. Wo think, from an examination of the evidence, that the jury might properly have come to the conclusion, from the defendant's own testimony, that she honestly believed that the plaintiff or his helper had taken her money, and that the letters in question were written in that belief and without malice in fact.
It is claimed in appellant's brief that the letter set out in the second count, which was written to the officer after the money was found, is beyond the pale of privilege, because the defendant was not then in the discharge of any duty or engaged in an effort to recover her money. But, as already pointed out, the question whether the letter was, or might be, if the facts pleaded in the answer were proved, a privileged communication was a question of law for the court; and it nowhere appears that the plaintiff made the claim in the court below, as a claim of law, that the letter was not privileged.
The motion to set aside the verdict is on the single ground that it is manifestly against the evidence. The question whether the letters themselves were privileged communications, on the facts pleaded, was a question of law for the court and is not brought up by this appeal.
We think that the letter set forth in the second count, although written after the money was found, must be dealt with as a part of the whole correspondence between the defendant and the officer. It is not very seriously disputed that the first letter to Sturtze, written before the money was found, is, on the facts pleaded, a privileged communication. Sturtze was a constable, and the defendant appealed to him to investigate her loss with a view to get "evidence and threaten them with arrest." She was concerned more with using the law in terrorem than with the punishment of the supposed thief. Then, when the money was found, she again writes the officer, telling him that it is found, but in a place where she never put it; that she will do no more about the matter; and that she is still satisfied that the plaintiff took it and brought it back again. Clearly this second letter would never have been written except for the first. The defendant was in a way bound to let the officer know that the money had been found, and if she said no more her letter would be taken as an admission that her former suspicions were mistaken. We think, under these circumstances, that the defendant, in writing to an officer already engaged in investigating the loss, was legally entitled, if acting honestly and without malice, to reaffirm her belief in the plaintiff's guilt, for the guidance of the officer in case it was, or might become, his duty to pursue the investigation with a view to criminal proceedings.
There is no error.
In this opinion Prentice, C. J., and Thayer, J., concurred.