Case Name: Johnnie Hollingshed v. State of Indiana
Court: Supreme Court of Indiana
Jurisdiction: Indiana
Decision Date: 1977-08-02
Citations: 266 Ind. 597
Docket Number: No. 976S301
Parties: Johnnie Hollingshed v. State of Indiana.
Judges: 
Reporter: Indiana Reports
Volume: 266
Pages: 597–603

Head Matter:
Johnnie Hollingshed v. State of Indiana.
(No. 976S301.
Filed August 2, 1977.)
Harriette Bailey Conn, Public Defender of Indiana, Eugene C. Hollander, Deputy Public Defender, for appellant.
Theodore L. Sendak, Attorney General, David L. Steiner, Deputy Attorney General, for appellee.

Opinion:
DeBruler, J.
This appeal arises from the denial of a petition for post-conviction relief by which appellant sought permission to withdraw a plea of guilty. The plea was entered before the Honorable Saul I. Rabb on February 8, 1971, to the offense of second degree murder upon a charge of first degree murder. Appellant received a sentence of fifteen to twenty-five years
The verified post-conviction petition was based upon appellant's claim that he had not made his plea knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily, in that the trial court had not informed him of the rights which he would relinquish by pleading guilty. The State in its answer responded that the record of the guilty plea proceedings showed that appellant was entitled to no relief. The Honorable William J. Dougherty denied the petition without a hearing.
Appellant's plea of guilty was entered after the decision in Boykin v. Alabama, (1969) 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274. It was likewise entered after the 1970 guilty plea proceeding found defective upon application of Boykin standards in Brimhall v. State, (1972) 258 Ind. 153, 279 N.E.2d 557. Therefore the record of the guilty plea proceeding at which appellant entered his plea must serve the office of a waiver record, and in order to do so must demonstrate that appellant was advised of the rights enumerated in Boykin. Williams v. State, (1977) 266 Ind. 373, 363 N.E.2d 971; Avery v. State, (1976), 265 Ind. 417, 355 N.E.2d 395; Williams v. State, (1975) 263 Ind. 165, 325 N.E.2d 827; Brimhall v. State, supra.
The transcript of the plea proceeding and the order book entries relating to that proceeding were before the court below. The only reference to an advisement of rights in this written matter is made in the order book entry reflecting such plea proceeding and consists of the general, conclusory statement, "The court advises the defendant of constitutional rights." The transcript of the plea proceeding on the other hand, certified to as true and complete by the court reporter and Judge Rabb, contains no advisement of the rights mentioned in Boykin. In order for this record to be adequate and the plea therefore voluntary, it must provide a sufficient basis for the conclusion "that appellant was meaningfully informed of the specific rights enumerated in Boykin." Williams v. State, supra. In Avery v. State, supra, we considered a record like this one. It consisted of an order book entry of like import and a transcript devoid of an advisement of rights. There we concluded:
"The record of the guilty plea proceedings before us now, contains nothing from which one might conclude that appellant was informed of the right to confront witnesses and to have the benefit of the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, and as required by the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the United States Constitution, made ap plicable to the State of Indiana through the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, upon such record appellant is entitled to withdraw his guilty pleas and to plead anew." 355 N.E.2d at 398
As the major components of the records in this case and the Avery case are the same, they should be treated the same. We therefore conclude that upon this record appellant is entitled to withdraw his guilty plea.
The State suggests that there is something in the case of Anderson v. State, (1975) 263 Ind. 583, 335 N.E.2d 225, which would warrant us in reaching a different conclusion. There the Court reaffirmed the basic proposition that the record of the plea proceeding must affirmatively show a knowing and voluntary waiver of rights before a plea of guilty can be upheld. The Court found such an affirmative showing in that record. That record was very different from the one before us, in that it reflected a variety of events and circumstances wholly absent from this record. However, the principles applied by the Anderson Court are the same as those we apply today.
The judgment of the trial court is reversed and the case is remanded with instructions to grant the petition.
Givan, C J., Hunter and Prentice, JJ., concur; Pivarnik, J., dissents with opinion.