Case Name: HOME INDEMNITY COMPANY v. GODLEY et al.
Court: Court of Appeals of Georgia
Jurisdiction: Georgia
Decision Date: 1970-07-13
Citations: 122 Ga. App. 356
Docket Number: 45090
Parties: HOME INDEMNITY COMPANY v. GODLEY et al.
Judges: All the Judges concur in Division 1 except Bell, C. J., and Evans, J., who dissent. Bell, C. J., and Evans, J., concur in Division 2. Panned, Deen and Qui.llian, JJ., concur specially. Jordan, P. J., Had, P. J., Eberhardt and Whitman, JJ., dissent. Ad the Judges concur in Division 3 except Bed, C. J., and Evans, J., who dissent.
Reporter: Georgia Appeals Reports
Volume: 122
Pages: 356–373

Head Matter:
45090.
HOME INDEMNITY COMPANY v. GODLEY et al.
Argued February 4, 1970
Decided July 13, 1970
Rehearing denied July 30, 1970
Neely, Freeman & Hawkins, Joe C. Freeman, Jr., Thomas H. Harper, Jr., Falligant, Doremus, Karsman & Maurice, Ogden Doremus, for appellant.
Alaimo, Taylor & Bishop, Anthony A. Alaimo, J. B. Hodges, Benjamin R. Martin, Jr., for appellees.

Opinion:
Per curiam.
The insurer is not estopped to deny coverage because it initially began a defense in the first lawsuits which were all voluntarily dismissed by the plaintiffs. Jones v. Ga. Cas. &c. Co., 89 Ga. App. 181 (78 SE2d 861) and State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Anderson, 104 Ga. App. 815 (123 SE2d 191) are inappropriate. In the Jones case the insured defended the case until final judgment without any reservation of rights. The Ander son case held for the insurer on the theory that there had been a valid reservation of rights even though the case was defended up to and through the final judgment.
The law on the question is as follows: "An entry of an appearance for the insured by the insurer does not of itself constitute a waiver of available defenses, but the insurer is entitled to a reasonable time in which to investigate the facts. And the insurer may withdraw from the defense upon learning of facts which constitute a policy breach, and no waiver or estoppel will arise. But the insurer is required to act seasonably in disclaiming liability and it could not delay its decision so long that the insured's rights were prejudiced thereby." 7A Appleman 527, 529, § 4693. "It seems well established that, if a liability insurer's defense of an action against the insured is to work an estoppel barring the insurer from subsequently raising the defense of non-coverage, or some other defense existing at the time of the accident, it must be shown that prejudice resulted from the insurer's conduct in defending its action against the insured." 38 ALR2d 1157. For a recent case where notice that a policy exclusion was not waived was given before trial, see Stillwell v. Iowa Nat. Mut. Ins. Co., 205 Va. 588 (139 SE2d 72).
The accident occurred on January 16, 1966. Less than thirty days later (February 14th) lawsuits were filed against both Godleys. The Godleys' insurer (Home) and his mother's insurer (Phoenix — which covered the automobile being driven by Godley), both assigned the investigation of the acident to an independent adjuster — Crawford & Company. Both insurers employed the same attorney to represent them — -Mr. Ogden Doremus. Less than four months after the accident (June 7, 1966) Home, through its attorney Mr. Doremus, advised Godley that its investigator disclosed that at the time of the occurrence he was driving an automobile owned by his mother, a member of the same household and his relative, and for that reason and others the automobile was not covered under the Home policy. On this same date Mr. Doremus advised the Clerk of the Superior Court of Camden County that his name should be withdrawn as attorney in all cases and that the name of Mr. Wallace E. Harrell should be substituted (attorney for Phoenix). Almost five months thereafter, identical suits were filed in Florida against the Godleys, and in December, 1966, the Camden County suits were voluntarily dismissed by the plaintiffs.
There is no estoppel by virtue of the fact that Mr. Doremus, as attorney for both Home and Phoenix, entered an appearance for the insured in the Camden County cases. On the basis of the investigations of the facts and the policy provisions of both insurers, Mr. Doremus determined that there was no coverage under the Home policy but that there was coverage by Phoenix. His action in withdrawing himself and Home from the defense and turning the defense over to Mr. Harrell (attorney for Phoenix) did not prejudice the rights of Godley because some time thereafter these suits were voluntarily dismissed by the plaintiffs. The Florida suits were not filed until five months after the time Mr. Doremus withdrew from the case.
The evidence is such that reasonable minds may examine it and differ as to its meaning and results. We find the parties admitting that there were three separate insured automobiles, with two separate policies by two separate companies, involving the liability coverage of the petitioner and his widowed mother. There is no question of the mother's liability coverage on her automobile; but we have for determination whether the insurance contract between the insured and the insurer, covers the insured as the driver of his mother's automobile, not his own, which he was driving on the date of the collision. Counsel for appellant argues that the vehicle was not covered as a "non-owned automobile" under the definition in the policy, although, in fact, it was not owned by the driver, since it was the automobile of his mother, a relative, and it was "furnished for the regular use of either the named insured" or his mother, hence the insurer owed no coverage. The testimony does not demand a finding that use by the driver was "regular use" by him, but it was "owned by" and "furnished for the regular use" of his mother. But we now look to other definitions in the policy. Under the definition of "owned automobile" we find that this means coverage of "a temporary substitute automobile" which means "any automobile . . . used with the permission of the owner . as a substitute for the owned automobile . . . when withdrawn from normal use because of its breakdown, repair, servicing, loss or destruction." (Emphasis supplied.) He had two insured vehicles — one in service, the other with a flat tire or one that was going flat. From his testimony, the jury could have inferred the use of his mother's car was in trade for his own, but the jury could just as easily have found from this testimony that his other vehicle (the pick-up truck), being unserviceable, authorized coverage while driving the automobile not owned by him as a "temporary substitute automobile" for his own. After a verdict, the evidence is construed in its light most favorable to the prevailing party, for every presumption and inference is in favor of the verdict. Wren v. State, 57 Ga. App. 641, 644 (196 SE 146); Southern R. Co. v. Brock, 132 Ga. 858, 862 (64 SE 1083); Stapleton v. Amerson, 96 Ga. App. 471 (5) (100 SE2d 628); Young Men's Christian Assn. v. Bailey, 112 Ga. App. 684, 690 (146 SE2d 324). Thus, under the policy, it was an "owned automobile." The facts here are not unlike those found in Cotton States Mut. Ins. Co. v. Lee, 119 Ga. App. 293 (166 SE2d 907).
Damages for bad faith will not be allowable. It is elementary that, "If the evidence is such that a finding in accordance with the contentions of the defendant would have been authorized, a finding of bad faith is not authorized. Royal Ins. Co. v. Cohen, 105 Ga. App. 746, 747 (125 SE2d 709)." St. Paul Fire See. Ins. Co. v. Postell, 113 Ga. App. 862, 863 (149 SE2d 864); American Cas. Co. v. Seckinger, 108 Ga. App. 262 (132 SE2d 794); Lincoln Life Ins. Co. of Ga. v. Anderson, 109 Ga. App. 238 (3) (136 SE2d 1); U. S. Fidel. Sec. Co. v. Biddy Lumber Co., 114 Ga. App. 358, 359 (151 SE2d 466); U. S. Fire Ins. Co. v. Tuck, 115 Ga. App. 562, 574 (155 SE2d 431).
In Division 2 it is asserted that "the evidence is such that reasonable minds may examine it and differ as to its meaning and results." If there is any reasonable ground for contesting the claim there is no bad faith and it is error to award penalty and attorney's fees. Dependable Ins. Co. v. Gibbs, 218 Ga. 305, 316 (127 SE2d 454); Belch v. Gulf Life Ins. Co., 219 Ga. 823, 828 (136 SE2d 351).
One of the errors enumerated is on the failure of the court to charge the difference between a primary policy of insurance and an excess policy of insurance. Whether the insurer be a pri mary or excess carrier, its obligation to defend the insured is the same under the contract. National Surety Corp. v. Dunaway, 100 Ga. App. 842 (112 SE2d 331); U. S. Fidel. &c. Co. v. Watson, 106 Ga. App. 748, 751 (128 SE2d 515). The lower court did not err in failing to charge on excess insurance, which was not relevant or material to this case. Hartford &c. Ins. Co. a. Cochran Oil Mill &c. Co., 26 Ga. App. 288 (105 SE 856); Continental Cas. Co. a. Owen, 90 Ga. App. 200 (82 SE2d 742).
The provisions of a policy for coverage of a substituted vehicle are for the insured's benefit and are to be construed liberally in favor of the insured if any construction is necessary; and the purpose of a substitution clause is not to narrowly limit or defeat coverage, but is to make the coverage reasonably definite as to the vehicle the insured intended normally to use. See Samples v. Ga. Mut. Ins. Co., 110 Ga. App. 297 (138 SE2d 463); Cotton States Mut. Ins. Co. a. Lee, 119 Ga. App. 293 (1) (166 SE2d 907).
But ambiguity is not to be found where none exists, and the contract must be interpreted as written. The substitution provision must neither be unreasonably extended to materially increase the risk, nor is it to be narrowly applied against the insured, inasmuch as it is designed for his protection. Since the policy is not ambiguous, it was not necessary for the court to construe the policy in its charge to the jury. None of the alleged errors enumerated on the failure of the court to give the legal construction of the contract or to construe various language found in the policy is meritorious.
Complaint is made as to the disallowance of appellant's "third-party complaint," "cross claim" and "counter claim." The record shows these pleadings as filed, but we find no ruling by the court thereon, nor does the brief, as required by Rule 17 (Code Ann. § 24-3617) point out the ruling by the court disallowing same which is essential to a consideration of these alleged errors. This record is voluminous, and we will not go out on a searching expedition for error. See Wall v. Rhodes, 112 Ga. App. 572 (145 SE2d 756); Crider v. State of Ga., 115 Ga. App. 347 (154 SE2d 743); Strickland v. English, 115 Ga. App. 384 (154 SE2d 710); Coley v. Smith, 117 Ga. App. 822 (162 SE2d 216); Allen v. Carter, 119 Ga. App. 825 (168 SE2d 901). Again, under the authority of Code Ann. §38-801 (Ga. L. 1966, p. 502; 1968, pp. 434, 435; 1968, p. 1200), a notice to produce certain documents was served. Error is enumerated on the failure to produce, but nothing is shown in the brief as to whether or not these documents were requested of counsel and not produced in court, or whether this was ever called to the attention of the trial court and a definite ruling obtained thereon. As has been heretofore stated by this court in the Wall case, supra, "without the aid of the brief of counsel, this court cannot identify or pass upon the contention which the appellant seeks to urge as cause for reversal," for the brief must make the alleged error intelligible "or this court has nothing before it for decision." The brief fails to point out where in the record or the transcript any ruling of the court was made on this point. Accordingly, these alleged errors are not found to be meritorious.
During the trial, the plaintiff, Godley, was questioned about a conversation he had with an adjuster for the insurer who was investigating the collision, with respect to what Godley, the insured, wanted done with these claims against him, because the answer would be self-serving, hearsay, irrelevant and immaterial. The testimony elicited was in reference to a conversation between the adjuster and the petitioner, part of which was already in evidence, and showed that the plaintiff never signed a "non-waiver agreement," never was advised by the company it was not going to cover him on the cases, was seeking information as to when they would "settle the case and get through with it," and the insured expected the insurer to protect him in the case. This testimony was not self-serving, hearsay, or irrelevant, but material to the issues in the case. We find no error in this complaint.
The correspondence showing the investigation of the collision by agents and attorneys of insurers, the answer in a Georgia case filed by counsel employed by the insurance company, as attorney for the insured, and the Florida judgments being the very sum, substance and subject matter on which this action is based, the court did not err in allowing same in evidence as exhibits. Further, the deposition of the Florida trial judge was taken which showed how the judgments occurred, and the correspondence shows the assumption and responsibility by the insurer, as well as the degree in defending the petition before the company elected to cease same because it felt there was no coverage.
Examination of the entire charge fails to disclose that the charge is "replete and repetitive" insofar as the contentions of the plaintiff are concerned. The court properly charged the jury with respect to the contentions of the defendant and particularly as to its right to disclaim or deny coverage.
The court did not err in refusing to give the requests to charge which were argumentative and more favorable to the defendant.
A denial of summary judgment is not subject to review "by direct appeal or otherwise," unless the requirements that the lower court certify it for direct appeal are met. The same cannot be considered as an ancillary ruling after a final judgment. Moulder v. Steele, 118 Ga. App. 87 (162 SE2d 785); Hood v. General Shoe Corp., 119 Ga. App. 649 (2) (168 SE2d 326); Hill v. Willis, 224 Ga. 263, 266 (161 SE2d 281); Skylark Enterprises v. Marsh & McLennan, 121 Ga. App. 235 (173 SE2d 421).
The rulings in Divisions 1 and 3 will require a reversal and a new trial. Since a new trial will be required, a number of the enumerations of error have not been considered since they may not occur again.
Judgment reversed in accordance with the above opinion.
All the Judges concur in Division 1 except Bell, C. J., and Evans, J., who dissent. Bell, C. J., and Evans, J., concur in Division 2. Panned, Deen and Qui.llian, JJ., concur specially. Jordan, P. J., Had, P. J., Eberhardt and Whitman, JJ., dissent. Ad the Judges concur in Division 3 except Bed, C. J., and Evans, J., who dissent.