Case Name: Bernadette RUBIN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. LAFAYETTE PARISH SCHOOL BOARD, Defendant-Appellee
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1994-12-14
Citations: 649 So. 2d 1003
Docket Number: No. 93-473
Parties: Bernadette RUBIN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. LAFAYETTE PARISH SCHOOL BOARD, Defendant-Appellee.
Judges: Before LABORDE, YELVERTON, COOKS, SAUNDERS and WOODARD, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 649
Pages: 1003–1022

Head Matter:
Bernadette RUBIN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. LAFAYETTE PARISH SCHOOL BOARD, Defendant-Appellee.
No. 93-473.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Third Circuit.
Dec. 14, 1994.
Rehearing Denied March 1, 1995.
James Isaac Funderburk, Abbeville, for Bernadette F. Rubin.
L. Lane Roy, Lafayette, for Lafayette Parish School Bd., et al.
Before LABORDE, YELVERTON, COOKS, SAUNDERS and WOODARD, JJ.

Opinion:
11 COOKS, Judge.
This ease involves the appeal of a teacher dismissed from her position for willful neglect of duty. Numerous charges were lodged against Bernadette Rubin after she was transferred and assigned to teach 7th graders Life Science at Acadian Middle School. Mrs. Rubin's prior eighteen-year employment history was without blemish. Mr. John Lee, Assistant Principal at Acadian Middle School, testified from his' examination of school records and conversations "with Mrs. Rubin's superior at J.W. Faulk Elementary School there was nothing which remotely suggested she was unskilled or morally unfit to teach the assigned course. Her record, as a whole, demonstrated she was a "good teacher" who had not displayed any prior problems with following school policies or other guidelines. Mr. Mouton, the Principal at Acadian Middle School, also examined Mrs. Rubin's personnel records and accepted the Assistant Principal's recommendation favoring her appointment. He too confirmed nothing in her long employment history warned against her continued service as an elementary teacher. Her family background militated against such negative assessment as well.
Though qualified to teach all subjects in elementary education, Bernadette Rubin's experience as a teacher was limited to instructing third graders. She arrived at Acadian Middle School without any experience teaching 7th graders or instructional familiarity teaching Life Science.
Paul Long, math and science supervisor for the Parish's school system, was 12assigned to review Rubin's progress and to offer his advice in improving her instructional skills. His duties entailed "in-service training" of Rubin. Long also chaired the Sex Education Committee, formed to assist the Lafayette Parish School Board in developing policies and regulations for future sex education instructions if approved by a majority of its members.
Noting Rubin initially experienced adjustment difficulties teaching 7th grade classes, Long explained "there is a world of difference" in teaching students who are eight (8) years of age as opposed to thirteen (13) "not only in content but [facing] what's hap pening to the student[s], emotionally, socially." In his words, "the genes are flying" and a teacher may experience unanticipated problems not only in delivering sensitive information to the students but in managing their classroom conduct. He also stated:
"The main thing is a complete change going from middle school to an elementary school or vice versa. The whole philosophy of the school might be a little different. There's more responsibility put on student's behavior, there's individual contact that must be made with each student, and new teachers don't always understand the procedure that must be followed for them to get the help that they need on disciplining different students."
COURSE MATERIAL AND PREPARATION
The text approved for use in Rubin's class included a section which specifically dealt with the reproduction of animals. Other chapters in the book covered the development of the human body including human heredity, the development of the human child, and the systems of the human body with detailed references to the human female's menstrual cycle. The vocabulary terms used in Chapter 6 included such words as: asexual reproduction, colostrum, egg, embryo, estrus, fertilization, fetus, gestation, ovary, placenta, regeneration, sexual reproduction, sperm, testes, umbilical cord, uterus, vagina, zygote, and mating. In the section relating to the estrus cycle of cows, the text focuses on the process humans normally understand as ovulation which entails the release of an egg from an ovary followed by the discharge of blood through the vaginal canal. In the section discussing the life cycle of frogs, the text explains "the female frog [deposits] her eggs outside of her body and the male frog [swims] over [them] and [excretes] the sperm that fertilizes the eggs." Another section contains photographs depicting a ewe with her baby sheep suckling (breast feeding) with references to the mammillary glands. Other references to the mating practices of mammals are even more sexually explicit. The text also contains specific references to human sex organs, including the vagina and penis. On a counter in the rear of the classroom were various charts depicting portions of the human body including the entire excretory system ofjjjthe male and female with specific references to their sexual parts.
It is undisputed Rubin expressed, at the outset, reluctancy and concern to her supervisors about teaching the information contained in the approved text. She was aware and cautioned by other educators that Life Science is a difficult area of study to teach adolescents themselves undergoing sexual changes, i.e., "puberty." Oftentimes, as explained in the record, these students are naturally inquisitive when terms more familiarly related to human sexuality are defined and added to their still maturing vocabulary.
Rubin requested a curriculum guide to aid her in determining what information from the text she was expected to relate to the students. Initially, she was unable to locate a course guide. She then sought instructional guidance from the Principal and Mrs. Bo-rel, the previous life science instructor. On one occasion, she specifically recalled approaching the Principal and Mrs. Borel to inquire whether it was mandatory that she teach Chapter 6 in the text. As mentioned, this Chapter contained sexually explicit terms which, Rubin explained, were sure to arouse the students' curiosity. The Principal and Mrs. Borel advised Rubin the approved course curriculum required coverage of the sensitive matters contained in Chapter 6.
RUBIN'S CLASSROOM PERFORMANCE: SUPERVISOR'S OBSERVATIONS
On the day Paul Long visited Rubin's class, he stated she was progressing well and it appeared she was not having any discipline problems. In fact, he recalled complimenting her on "bringing students back on task that day." When questioned regarding the selection and use of the approved text book, Long stated the book was selected seven (7) years prior; and he admitted it contained several sections which specifically related to human anatomy and sexual happenings. Even though teachers were instructed by him not to answer "sex education ques tions," he recognized it was very difficult to teach Life Science to 7th graders "full of natural curiosity." Specifically, he stated:
"Q. Isn't it reasonable to believe that students, especially children who are going through puberty, would relate what they are learning in animal reproduction to human development and human reproductive processes?
A. I'm sure they would.
Q. And isn't it correct that the teachers who are called upon to teach this material are more or less thrown out there in the fray to fend for themselves when kids come up with these types of questions?
A. It's very hard on the teachers at this time—
Q. Thank you.
A. —to teach.
LQ. And they just try to do the best that they can with whatever it is they have to work with?
A. That's correct."
RUBIN'S VERSION OF CLASSROOM EVENTS
Rubin admitted, for the first two months of the school year, she imposed mass punishment as a disciplinary measure. As we appreciate, mass punishment is simply holding the entire class or a group of students responsible for the misbehavior of a few or one student. According to the record evidence, mass punishment was generally employed by other teachers in the system as a disciplinary measure without Board objection. All agree, Rubin imposed mass punishment at J.W. Faulk, without complaint or contrary instructions from her superiors. Shortly after her arrival at Acadian Middle School, however, several students complained about Rubin's use of mass punishment to the principal. She was instructed by him to punish only those students who were guilty of violating school rules or who were otherwise disruptive in class. Rubin testified she immediately discontinued this practice. Instead, as she stated, students were punished only if individually guilty of violating school rules. Although she admitted such punishment was. still imposed by her on groups of students thereafter, she insisted each student in the group was individually responsible for the discovered infraction.
As the course progressed, the students acknowledged they questioned Rubin concerning the terms discussed in class. Rubin recalled, for example, a student asked "how a sperm gets up into the cow." In response, she stated the sperm "got into the female cow through the vaginal canal." When a student inquired whether the estrus cycle of the cows was the same as the menstrual cycle in females, Rubin stated she instructed the student to read the section dealing with the estrus cycle. The student proceeded by reading aloud in class. Rubin stated she attempted to avoid answering the student's question by expressing uncertainty regarding the similarities between the estrus cycle and the menstrual cycle. She also recalled one of the students questioned what mating meant; and, she replied it was the same as cohabitation and occurred when the male and female animal had sex. Though her attempts to explain the terminology used in the text were often awkward and difficult, she maintained on many occasions she simply instructed the students to refer to the text's glossary.
According to Rubin, one student blurted a question one day inquiring "why condoms are made of rubber boots or tires." Attempting to "brush the student off," she responded by stating the question was stupid. Mentioning one student in her class was pregnant, Rubin recalled a student asked her "out the blue" whether she believed in abortion. Answering "no," she then | sasked the student "what [was] the importance of the question."
On several occasions outside the classroom students asked her sensitive questions; but, she insisted in similar fashion her responses were brief and intended to avoid in depth discussion of human sexuality. When a student approached Rubin in the hallway one day complaining other students were accusing her of being sexually active because they noticed passion marks on her neck and "other stuff," Rubin stated she told the student "if she wasn't sexually active then don't worry about the other student's comments and if she was active she should be careful and do it safely." Admitting other students may have overheard this hallway discussion, she stated her intention was not to disseminate information regarding sex education generally to students. Her response, Rubin stated, was "right off the cuff' and made without serious reflection.
The students also prepared reports on diseases discussed in the text for extra points, though they were not required to do so. One of the diseases listed was gonorrhea. Rubin stated she clearly explained to the students their selection of diseases was not limited to those listed in the text; they were free to select diseases from other sources. One student, however, prepared a report on gonorrhea using the text and a medical encyclopedia.
LODGING OF COMPLAINTS AND RUBIN'S DISMISSAL
On January 22, 1990 Acadiaris Assistant Principal received a telephone call from Mr. Zerangue, a central office administrative employee, who stated several parents were alleging Rubin was teaching sex education in the classroom. Lee, in response, randomly selected parents of several students in Rubin's classes to inquire whether their children made any statements regarding the teaching of sex education in the classroom. The results of Lee's survey were kept in a daily planner maintained by him with the names of the parents contacted. The majority of the parents contacted stated their children heard "someone was doing this" but they did not possess independent or personal knowledge of such occurrences in the classroom. According to Lee, none of the parents (first contacted) advised him their children had complained about Rubin teaching sex education in the class. The result of this random sample was disclosed to Zerangue the same or next day.
Two days following the call from central office, according to Rubin, Lee handed her a note written on yellow sticker paper. It stated "give Angela Schmidt's mother a call if she could lehelp improve her grades." The mother's name, Lanay Schmidt, was listed with her telephone number. Rubin testified she contacted Lanay Schmidt on the same afternoon. She recalled Schmidt was enraged and proceeded to attack her professional abilities for giving low marks to her daughter. Schmidt also accused her of teaching sex education and threatened to seek her termination if she did not change the student's grade. According to Rubin, she immediately contacted Lee and informed him of Schmidt's complaints and threats. A copy of Rubin's telephone bill was introduced which reflects a long distance telephone call was placed to Lee's residence on the evening of January 24, 1990 from Rubin's residence.
Lee testified, the next day, a number of students approached him and complained Rubin punished the class for talking in the lunch line and they were required to write lines. For the first time, he stated in addition to advising Rubin the students were complaining about her use of mass punishment, he also told her several parents contacted the Board to voice their concerns about what she was teaching in the classroom. He informed her a January 26, 1990 meeting was scheduled to hear the parents' complaints.
In attendance at this meeting was Ze-rangue, from central office, Acadian's Principal and Assistant Principal, and several complaining parents. As Lee related, the matter attracted media attention because he noticed several TV cameramen outside the library area where the meeting was conducted. In any event, school officials collected 15-18 statements from these parents alleging Rubin made inappropriate comments in the classroom. One of the most vocal parent in attendance at this meeting was Lanay Schmidt. Rubin was removed from the classroom and assigned to assist in the resource lab. On January 31, 1990 she was officially suspended from her employment.
Zerangue testified following the January 26th meeting, the Superintendent instructed that he poll the students a second time from a cross section of Rubin's classes to inquire about her teaching sex education. In response, he contacted 50-60 students and obtained statements from them regarding the alleged incidents. Based on all the information gathered, the Superintendent addressed a memo on February 28, 1990 to the Board charging Rubin with teaching sex education |7in the classroom and specifically citing eighteen (18) incidents involving Rubin's alleged use of inappropriate language and references to human sexuality. The Superintendent also charged, on October 5, 1989, Rubin used mass punishment for infractions of a few students. A copy of this memo was eventually reviewed by Rubin who then filed with the Board several motions for its consideration, including:
"1. Objections to the February 28, 1990 memo, use of hearsay evidence and to improper voting procedures.
2. Motion for Discovery (notice of depositions of all potential witnesses including those indicated by Dr. Skidmore);
3. Motion to Compel Disclosure of Favorable Evidence;
4. Objection to dual representation of THE BOARD by L. Lane Roy;
5. Two (2) sets of interrogatories requesting information, much of which was public records;
6. Motion to Produce requested material, much of which was public records;
7. Objection to THE BOARD'S failure to comply with the Accountability Law."
In due course, the Board refused or rejected all the motions filed by Rubin. She next petitioned the District Court for a preliminary and then permanent injunction to prevent the Board from taking any action to terminate her employment. A temporary restraining order was issued on May 14, 1990. The trial judge later dissolved the injunction specifically noting the issues raised in Rubin's petition were more appropriate sub-jeets to raise on appeal after the hearing. Immediately thereafter, the Board forwarded to Rubin a notice fixing the tenure hearing for May 20, 1990. Rubin received the notice only four ft) days prior to the actual hearing.
Following the hearing the Board dismissed, as unsupported by sufficient evidence or untrue, fourteen of the eighteen charges lodged against Rubin. On the remaining four counts, however, a majority of the Board members found her guilty and voted to terminate her employment.
RUBIN'S CONTENTIONS ON APPEAL
On appeal, Rubin assigns the following errors for review:
"I. The Lafayette Parish School Board (hereinafter referred to as "The Board") and the district court erred by misapplying LSA-R.S. 17:443 and thereby depriving Mrs. Rubin of the due process guarantees afforded to tenured teachers by both statute and constitution.
II. The district court erred in affirming the ruling of the Board.
III. The district court erred in finding that the Board had a rational basis for terminating Mrs. Rubin based upon the substantial evidence of this case.
IV. The district court erred in failing to find that the Board acted arbitrarily and abused its discretion in its decision to terminate Mrs. Rubin.
IgV. Neither the Board nor the district court conducted this matter within the scope and spirit of LSA-R.S. 17:433. (Liberal construction in favor of a tenured teacher.)
VI. It was clearly erroneous to find that termination of a tenured teacher was warranted when the teacher had worked for the same system for nearly 20 years without incident, when other disciplinary action was available but not considered."
CONSTITUTIONAL PRECEPTS
Both the federal and state constitutions protect a tenured teacher's right to continued employment by requiring that certain procedural steps are followed before the teacher is terminated. The teacher's right, we have said, is a vested property right statutorily created in LSA-R.S. 17:443 which states:
"A. A permanent teacher shall not be removed from office except upon written and signed charges of willful neglect of duty, or incompeteney or dishonesty . and then only if found guilty after a hearing by the school board of the parish or city, as the ease may be, which hearing may be private or public, at the option of the teacher. At least twenty days in advance of the date of the hearing, the superintendent with approval of the school board shall furnish the teacher with a copy of the written charges. Such statement of charges shall include a complete and detailed list of the specific reasons for such charges and shall include but not be limited to the following: date and place of alleged offense or offenses, names of individuals involved in or witnessing such offense or offenses, names of witnesses called or to be called to testify against the teacher at said hearing, and whether or not any such charges previously have been brought against the teacher. The teacher shall have the right to appear before the board with witnesses in his behalf and with counsel of his selection, all of whom shall be heard by the board at said hearing. For the purpose of conducting hearings hereunder the board shall have the power to issue subpoenas to compel the attendance of all witnesses on behalf of the teacher. Nothing herein contained shall impair the right to appeal to a court of competent jurisdiction.
B. If a permanent teacher is found guilty by a school board, after due and legal hearing as provided herein, on charges of willful neglect of duty, or of incompetency, or dishonesty . the superintendent with approval of the board shall furnish to the teacher a written statement of recommendation of removal or discipline, which shall include but not be limited to the exact reasons(s) offenses(s) or instance(s) upon which the recommendation is based. Such teacher may, not more than one year from the date of said finding, petition a court of competent jurisdiction for a full hearing to review the action of the school board, and the court shall have jurisdiction to affirm or reverse the action of the school board in the matter. If the finding of the school board is reversed by the court and the teacher is ordered reinstated and restored to duty, the teacher shall be entitled to full pay for any loss of time or salary he or she may have sustained by reason of the action of the said school board."
Once property interests are created, they may not be deprived without adequate legal process. Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 345, 96 S.Ct. 2074, 2077, 48 L.Ed.2d 684 (1976); Franceski v. Plaquemines Parish School Board, 772 F.2d 197 (5th Cir.1985). As noted by the United States Supreme Court in Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 105 S.Ct. 1487, 84 L.Ed.2d 494 (1985) "thé right to due process is conferred not by legislative grace, _|gbut by constitutional guarantee." Although a state may establish certain statutory procedural safeguards to protect property rights, still the safeguards may be judged insufficient (depending on the facts and circumstances of a particular case) to guard the particular property interest at risk. Louder-mill, supra.
The Louisiana Supreme Court in Wilson v. City of New Orleans, 479 So.2d 891, 894 (La.1985) also expressed:
"[The] central meaning of procedural due process is well settled. Persons whose rights may be affected are entitled to be heard; and in order that they may enjoy that right, they must first be notified."
An equal concomitant to this right, thus, is "the right to notice and opportunity to be heard" which must be extended at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 92 S.Ct. 1983, 32 L.Ed.2d 556 (1972); Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 85 S.Ct. 1187, 14 L.Ed.2d 62 (1965). Just how much process Rubin should have been afforded before divestiture of her tenure right is the question we must address ultimately. As stated in Wilson "due process is not a technical concept with a fixed content unrelated to the time, place and circumstances." Rather, it requires the implementation of flexible rules which may yield to the demands of the particular situation. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972). The Louisiana Supreme Court in Wilson very aptly articulated:
"The constitutional right to be heard is a basic aspect of the duty of government to follow a fair process of decision making when it acts to deprive a person of his possessions. The purpose of this requirement is to protect a person's use and possession of property from arbitrary encroachment — to minimize substantially unfair or mistaken deprivations of property. Fairness can rarely be obtained by a secret, one-sided determination of facts decisive of rights, and no better instrument has been devised for arriving at truth than to give a person in jeopardy of serious loss notice of the case against him and opportunity to meet it. Wilson, 479 So.2d at 894 (citations omitted and emphasis added).
BOARD'S CONTENTIONS
The Board seeks to convince us that the process provided in LSA-R.S. 17:443 and 17:444 for removal of tenured teachers was followed in Rubin's case. This process, the Board urges with some insistence, adequately protects teachers' due process rights. As a safety net to the process, the Board further argues, the teacher who has been terminated may seek judicial review of the determination and present additional evidence to rebut the validity of the termination.
Judicial review, however, may prove a "hollow remedy" to a teacher wrongfully terminated. This is so partly because the standard of review in tenure cases prevents appellate courts from conducting a de novo examination of the record evidence. Ford v. Caldwell Parish School Board, 541 So.2d 955 (La.App. 2d Cir.1989); Lewis v. East Feliciana Parish School Board, 372 So.2d 649 (La.App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 375 So.2d 959 (La.1979). This State's jurisprudence is saturated with cases routinely reaffirming that the standard for appellate review in tenure eases is limited to assessing whether a board had a "rational basis for the determination supported by substantial evidence." West v. Tangipahoa Parish School Board, 615 So.2d 979 (La.App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 618 So.2d 414 (La.1993); Howell v. Winn Parish School Board, 332 So.2d 822 (La.1976).
The Board suggests further the procedures set forth in LSA-R.S. 17:443 and 17:444 for the removal of tenured teachers comply with the directives given in Louder-mill, supra. It strongly urges Loudermill stamped with approval the process it followed in Rubin's case.
In Loudermill the United States Supreme Court described certain "root requirements" of due process which must be adhered to before terminating a teacher's employment. Before deprivation of any significant property interest, the Supreme Court stated due process requires that the individual affected must be afforded notice, a hearing, and opportunity "to present [his or her] side of the ease." When factual disputes are involved, an employee's "fair opportunity to defend" may also require that she is given adequate time and notice to produce contrary testimony and to confront the accuser in front of the decision maker. As noted in Loudermill, "such an opportunity might not necessitate 'elaborate' procedures . but the fact remains that in some cases only such an opportunity to challenge the source or produce contrary evidence will suffice to support a finding that there are 'reasonable grounds' to believe [the] accusations are 'true'." Furthermore, the advance notice requirement (fundamental to assuring due process) envisions affording and protecting an employee's right to adequately prepare a defense to the charges and to subpoena witnesses expected to offer testimony favoring the employee's version of the facts. Fuentes, supra; Paillot v. Wooton, 559 So.2d 758 (La.1990); Parker v. French Market Corp., 615 So.2d 1347 (La.App. 4th Cir.), writ not considered, 617 So.2d 920 (La.1993). Neither the federal nor this State's adversarial scheme favor trial by ambush whether in a judicial or administrative forum.
Oftentimes dismissal for cause mil involve factual dispute, but the Court cautioned "even where the facts are clear, the appropriateness of the necessity of the discharge may not be; in such cases, the only meaningful opportunity to invoke the discretion of the decision maker is likely to be before termination takes place." Loudermill, supra. See also, Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 583-584, 95 S.Ct. 729, 740-741, 42 L.Ed.2d 725 (1975); Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 784-786, 93 S.Ct. 1756, 1760-1761, 36 L.Ed.2d 656 (1973). Fairly read, Loudermill does not prescribe the precise steps which must be followed in every case where an employee disputes the facts proffered to | nsupport a discharge. Loudermill, supra.
In Wilson, supra, decided nine months after the Loudermill decision, the Louisiana Supreme Court reaffirmed "due process" is not a concept absolute in meaning and unyielding to the demands of a particular situation. The Court referenced an article written by Judge Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U.P.A.L.Rev. 167 (1975) noting he suggested the following safeguards, in priority order as the case dictates, to assure due process: (1) an unbiased tribunal; (2) notice of the proposed action and the grounds asserted for it; (3) an opportunity to present reasons why the proposed action should not be taken; (4-6) the right to call witnesses, to know the evidence against one, and to have the decision based only on the evidence presented; (7) counsel; (8-9) the making of a record and statement of the reasons; (10) public attendance; and (11) judicial review. See also Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 90 S.Ct. 1011, 25 L.Ed.2d 287 (1970).
DISCUSSION
• Although the Board insists it complied with the process established in LSA-R.S. 17:443, et seq. and these provisions exclusively dictate what process was due Rubin, we disagree.
A.
VIOLATIONS OF STATE STATUTORY LAW
First, the actual process used by the Board before Rubin's removal was not "all" that she was statutorily due. The evidence shows the Board did not fully comply with state law mandating "the process" it must follow before voting to terminate a tenured teacher.
In relevant part, LSA-R.S. 17:443 reads:
"Such statement of charges shall include a complete and detailed list of the specific reasons for such charges and shall include but not be limited to the following: date and place of alleged offense or offenses, names of individuals involved in or witnessing such offense or offenses, names of witnesses called or to be called to testify against the teacher at said hearing, and whether or not such charges previously have been brought against the teacher. ."
The teacher's right to a complete and detailed list of the specific reason for each charge against her and the Board's obligation to vote on specific charges are fundamental requisites of the Tenure Act. State ex rel. Franceski v. Plaquemines Parish School Board, 416 So.2d 150 (La.App. 4th Cir.1982), writ denied, 421 So.2d 907 (La.1982); Lewing v. DeSoto Parish School Board, 238 La. 43, 113 So.2d 462 (La.1959); Johns v. Jefferson Davis Parish School Board, 154 So.2d 581 (La.App. 3d Cir.1963); Singleton v. Iberville Parish School Board, 136 So.2d 809 (La.App. 1st Cir.1962). Findings of guilt which do not correspond with specific charges are insufficient to legally support a decision to terminate the teacher's employment. Meaningful judicial review requires that courts know exactly which allegations or combination thereof were I ^judged by the board as substantial evidence supporting the termination.
The ballot used by the Board members to record their votes in Rubin's case contained four charging sections. The second section contained language allegedly used by Rubin which the Superintendent cited as constituting "teaching human sexuality in violation of LSA-R.S. 17:275." We will not repeat all of the allegations contained in section 2 of the ballot listed A through M. Our reticence in so doing is partly out of concern for the teacher's reputation, particularly considering the Board rejected the majority of these allegations as either unsubstantiated or incredible. The third and fourth sections charged that Rubin, on October 5,1989, used mass punishment for misconduct by a few students and on unspecified dates she threatened reprisal against certain students. The first section, however, unlike sections two through four, genetically recited:
"While teaching a prescribed unit of focus on life science, Chapter 6, entitled 'Animal Reproduction,' Mrs. Rubin, in violation of [sic] school board policy and state law, as is prescribed in LSA-R.S. 17:275, instructed her students on human sexuality."
This section does not refer to specific acts nor state the number of times the teacher allegedly instructed the students on human sexuality, and it does not state the dates on which such infractions occurred.
When the votes were finally cast, a majority of the Board members found Rubin not guilty on fourteen of the charges asserted by the Superintendent. They did return a verdict of guilty on the charges reflected in the voting ballot levelled in section 1, section 2 subparts C and M, and that portion of section 3 alleging she used mass punishment.
Rubin complains the statements made in the charges are "nothing more than conclusions which lack the factual basis necessary to comply with the requirement of a complete and detailed list of the specific reasons [for] such charges." She also asserts the allegations contained in subparagraphs A through M, except I, "fail to disclose what she is alleged to have said about each of the stated items" where and when.
In State ex rel. Franceski v. Plaquemines Parish, supra a tenured school employee challenged as vague the following charges:
"5) Said supervisor has failed to sign and submit Student referrals to the Competent Authority Team for significant periods of time resulting in a backlog, delay, and confusion in the evaluation process.
6) Said Supervisor has failed to attend numerous meetings of importance conducted by the Louisiana Department of Education, has arrived late on numerous | ^occasions at such meetings she did attend, and has at times departed such meetings she attended before adjournment.
7) Said Supervisor did direct teacher aids to administer standardized tests to kindergarten and first grade students instead of such testing being administered by the regular kindergarten and first grade teachers."
These charges were filed against France-ski before the amendment to LSA-R.S. 17:443 which now requires that the charges shall include a complete and detailed list of specific reasons and shall include the date, place, and names of individuals involved in or witnessing such offense or offenses. The court in passing noted "had this version of the Act been in effect at the time of the tenure hearing under consideration there would be no question but that the Board failed to comply with these specificity requirements." At the time Fransceki was charged the provision only stated "[a]t least fifteen days in advance of the date of the hearing, the school board shall furnish the teacher with a copy of the written charges ." Nevertheless, the court concluded the amendment to the Tenure Act was merely "a codification of the jurisprudence which had uniformly held that a tenured teacher is entitled to have specific charges brought against her." Finding the charges were too vague, the Court stated Franceski could not prepare an adequate defense against them. Thus, to whatever extent the Board based its ultimate decision on the charges, the court declared, it was unfounded.
The amendment to the Act and the jurisprudence on which it was predicated compels a finding in Rubin's ease that the charge contained in Section 1 of the ballot does not comply with the "specification requirements" imposed in tenure cases. Our jurisprudence has long established that the Teacher Tenure Act should be liberally construed in favor of the teacher it is designed to protect. Thus, school boards must strictly comply with the removal provisions of the Act to legally discharge a tenured teacher. Lewing, supra; Lea v. Orleans Parish School Board, 228 La. 987, 84 So.2d 610 (La.1955); Andrews v. Union Parish School Board, 191 La. 90, 184 So. 552 (La.1938); Fleming v. Concordia Parish School Board, 275 So.2d 795 (La.App. 3rd Cir.), writ denied, 279 So.2d 204 (La.1973); State v. Rapides Parish School Board, 1 So.2d 334 (La.App. 2d Cir.1941); Kennington v. Red River Parish School Board, 200 So. 514 (La.App. 2 Cir.1940).
Unlike Section 2, which contains an itemized listing of language allegedly used by Rubin in instructing the students on human sexuality, Section 1 is couched in "catch-all" language. This section grievously failed to meet the specification requirements mandated in LSA-R.S. 17:443. Rubin could not adequately prepare or present a defense to this vague charge. Furthermore, the charge is so all encompassing and duplicitous in nature, we are unable to properly assess on | ^appeal whether any evidence was presented to support it. As mentioned, the Board rejected fourteen (14) of the charges lodged against Rubin. We are not inclined nor required to ferret through the record in search of other evidence which the Board might have relied upon, if any, in returning a guilty finding on this general charge. The charge is legally deficient and the Board's ultimate reliance on it in discharging Rubin violated the Teacher Tenure Act.
Subparts C and M of Section 2 charged that Rubin used inappropriate language by commenting on the composition of and use of condoms and the human menstrual cycle. Except for the statement that Rubin instructed students on human sexuality "while teaching the prescribed unit of focus on life science," no dates or other time references when the infractions allegedly occurred were mentioned. Although the Superintendent listed the names of several students as potential witnesses, he did not indicate which student, if any, witnessed each of the charges levelled against Rubin.
LSA-R.S. 17:443 also provides that the statement of charges shall include the "date and place of the alleged offense or offenses," and the "names of individuals involved in or witnessing such offense or offenses." Rubin complains without this information she was unable to defend against the allegations contained in Section 2 of the ballot. We note the Board denied Rubin's pre-hearing motion to depose the potential witnesses listed by the Superintendent.
The Board's failure to specify the dates Rubin allegedly used the language stated in Subparts C and M and its failure to further identify which potential witness or witnesses heard each allegation clearly violated the notice provision of the Tenure Act. We cannot say after examining the record as a whole that the Board's failure to provide the required information to Rubin did not prejudice her defense. The record suggests the contrary.
Rubin steadfastly maintained at the hearing she did not teach sex education by instructing students on the use of condoms nor did she provide them with specific information on the human menstrual cycle. The students' version of the occurrences varied; and, at times, are riddled with contradictions. Many students did not hear any discussions whatsoever on the female menstrual cycle or the composition and use of condoms; others were unable to recall whether the alleged comments were in response to questions by students or whether the comments were actually made by the students rather than the teacher. On cross-examination, several students admitted their recollection of what was said in the classroom was not based on independent knowledge but on what they were told by other students. The students who insisted that Rubin told them her daughter's "period had started" and "how many days after [the] menstrual cycle you can get pregnant," could not relate with the same ease of recollection when these comments occurred.
| iSThe students who stated Rubin discussed "what condoms were made of and they should be used to practice safe sex" also suffered memory loss when questioned regarding the dates such statements were allegedly made by her. None of Rubin's colleagues at Acadian Middle School were called to corroborate the students' testimony either by confirming they overheard such alleged comments by Rubin in the classroom; or, more importantly, that the students related to them such discussions took place in the classroom.
While the Board's attorney argues in brief all 45 or 46 students confirmed all the factual allegations made against Rubin, we disagree. Even the Board found 14 of the allegations were not supported by the students' testimony. We must conclude the Board's failure to follow the notice requirements of LSA-R.S. 17:443 also rendered its subsequent finding of guilt based on Sub-parts C and M unfounded.
Even the charge in Section 3 citing Rubin with using mass punishment on October 5, 1989 by incorporating "and at other times" falls short of the specification mandate. The teacher admitted at the beginning of the school year she used mass punishment as a means of disciplining students, a method practiced by her at J.W. Faulk. Several students confirmed it was not uncommon for other teachers at Acadian Middle School to use mass punishment. Rubin insisted, however, she complied immediately with the later instructions given by her superiors to discontinue imposing mass punishment. As to the specific October 9, 1989 charge, many students did not recall the incident or could not remember if she punished the whole class or just a group of students. Rubin acknowledged, though she discontinued imposing mass punishment, she continued to punish several students or a group of students all of whom she considered individually guilty of violating school policies.
The October 9, 1989 infraction, standing alone, is not so egregious as to warrant termination of the teacher or to constitute willful neglect of duty. West, supra; Landry v. Ascension Parish School Board, 415 So.2d 473 (La.App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 420 So.2d 448 (La.1982). The record fails to disclose any rule or regulation adopted by the Board prohibiting the use of mass punishment by teachers. As mentioned, this practice was employed by other teachers in the system at various schools throughout the district. Even at Acadian Middle School, no written policy appears in the record banning the use of such punishment method. As noted, the students testified other teachers at the school used mass punishment in the past. Rubin was not charged with insubordination or otherwise failing to heed orders issued by her superiors.
'Willful neglect" is defined by Black's Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition, as the "intentional disregard of a plain or manifest duty, in the performance of which the public . has an i6Ínterest." The duty not to impose mass punishment, to the extent it existed at all, originated in this case from the preference of Rubin's superiors at Acadian Middle School. This duty was not imposed on all teachers in the system or at Acadian Middle School; and mass punishment as a disciplinary measure was not outlawed by any rules or regulations reflecting a public's interest in prohibiting its use. We believe, therefore, a teacher's action in imposing mass punishment as a disciplinary action does not constitute willful neglect of duty per se.
Moreover, the record in this case does not contain any evidence suggesting Rubin was instructed not to punish more than one student at a time though several were guilty of the same infraction. When fairly reviewed as a whole, the record simply does not establish that Rubin punished students who were not individually guilty of misbehaving on October 9, 1989. The uncertain testimony of the students was not "substantial" enough to factually support a finding of guilt on the mass punishment charge; and legally Rubin's admitted conduct did not constitute willful neglect of duty. The Principal and Assistant Principal stated even if Rubin used mass punishment, this infraction alone would not have caused them to seek her termination. Rubin's eighteen-year employment history evidenced that she was a good teacher who complied with school policies and instructions issued by her superiors. The Board's vote to terminate her employment based on this single remaining charge would render it "arbitrary and capricious" in violation of the Teacher Tenure Act.
Rubin complains further that the ballot additionally violated LSA-R.S. 17:443(B) which allows the Board to use other disciplinary means as punishment without terminating a teacher's employment. Mar guerite Lyle, a board member deposed after the tenure hearing, stated she believed the Board's mission was to decide whether to terminate Rubin and "no other punishment options" were available. By limiting the Board to deciding whether or not to terminate Rubin, the ballot in effect removed the Board's authority to exact a lesser punishment. The ballot was drafted and presented by the Board's attorney who despite objection voiced by Rubin declined to modify it. The Board's authority to impose a disciplinary measure short of termination in a Tenure case is non-delegable. For this reason, as well, we find the Ballot violated the Teacher Tenure Act.
B.
CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATIONS
Second, the actual process used by the Board before Rubin's removal was not "all" that she was constitutionally due.
The statutory requirement that the statement of charges contain certain information is also designed to insure that the teacher is afforded "due process." This right, though protected 117m LSA-R.S. 17:443, is constitutionally guaranteed. U.S. Const. Amend. XIV; La. Const. Art. 1, Sec. 2. Due process necessarily requires that a teacher is jfully apprised of the charges against her and that she is given a fair opportunity to defend. Charges which do not articulate specific facts to support them and provide the dates of the alleged occurrences violate the fundamental requirements of constitutional due process. A teacher is entitled to know exactly what alleged facts form the basis of the proceedings against her so that she is able to prepare an adequate defense. The vague and unspecified charges which the Board judged Rubin guilty violated her due process right to notice. As mentioned, we cannot say this violation was not prejudicial to her defense. Although Rubin filed motions prior to the hearing seeking to depose potential witnesses listed by the board, her.request was denied.
Further, 33 statements authored by students and their parents were disseminated to each Board member in a packet prior to the hearing. These statements contained allegations against Rubin which were not mentioned in the charges filed against her nor disclosed in the Superintendent's February memo. Although the Board was not called to vote on these extraneous allegations, we cannot say they did not affect the Board's decision to terminate Rubin. The submission of the unscreened statements to the Board further infringed on Rubin's due process right to know the allegations against her and to defend against only those allegations actually charged.
DECREE
We pretermit addressing the remaining issues raised by Rubin alleging other constitutional and statutory violations. Considering the violations thus discussed, we cannot affirm the Board's determination. Its failure to comply with the expressed requirements of LSA-R.S. 17:443 and those recognized by constitutional due process principles render the decision to terminate Rubin unenforceable.
Accordingly, the Lafayette Parish School Board is hereby ordered to reinstate Bernadette Rubin to the position of a teacher with tenure at her former employment level; and reimburse her for all pay since the day of discharge, together with all other emoluments she would have been entitled but for the improper discharge. All costs below and on appeal, for which the Board is legally liable, are assessed against it.
REVERSED AND RENDERED.
LABORDE, J., concurs in results and assigns reasons.
YELVERTON and WOODARD, JJ., dissent and assign reasons.
.All who testified confirmed, throughout her long teaching career, Bernadette Rubin distinguished herself in the profession and her personnel record reflects overall satisfactory ratings.
. Rubin acquired a B.S. and a Masters Degree in Elementary Education.
. In January, 1990, he appointed Rubin to serve on this committee.
. At the termination hearing, Lee denied handing Rubin any note; but, when deposed following Rubin's dismissal, Lee admitted he in fact delivered the message to Rubin.
. With interest, we further note several students, particularly those in 7th hour, were not performing well in Rubin's class and they earned grades of "D" or below. These students later voiced the most complaints and led the march, joined by their parents, to oust Rubin from her employment.
. In the February 28, 1990 memo prepared by the Superintendent, only the charge in Section 2 with Subparts A through M was mentioned. Section 1 was not separately identified. In the ballot used by the Board to record their vote, however. Section 2 was divided into two separate charges.