Case Name: WILLIAMSON HEATER CO. v. PAXVILLE SCHOOL DISTRICT ET AL.
Court: Supreme Court of South Carolina
Jurisdiction: South Carolina
Decision Date: 1915-05-12
Citations: 102 S.C. 295
Docket Number: 9100
Parties: WILLIAMSON HEATER CO. v. PAXVILLE SCHOOL DISTRICT ET AL.
Judges: Messrs. Chiee Justice Gary and Justices Hydrick and Gage concur in the opinion delivered by Mr. Justice Eraser.
Reporter: South Carolina Reports
Volume: 102
Pages: 295–302

Head Matter:
9100
WILLIAMSON HEATER CO. v. PAXVILLE SCHOOL DISTRICT ET AL.
(87 S. E. 69.)
Sales. Breach of Warranty. Notice. Waiver. Expert Management. Estoppel. Issue. Counterclaim.
1. Sales—Breach of Warranty—Notice.—Where defects in, and breach of warranty as to, an article sold can only be ascertained after actual use, efforts of the buyer to test the article and give it a fair trial may explain and excuse his delay for a long time after use in calling such defects, or breach, to the seller’s notice.
2. Sales—Trial—Expert Management.—Where expert management of a heating plant for a country school was neither expected nor available, and the purchaser gave the seller every opportunity to make such plant work, and the latter fails to do so, he cannot defend against breach of warranty on the ground that the failure to work was due to lack of expert management.
3. Sales—Breach of Warranty—Estoppel.—Where there has been no change of position of the original parties, and the rights of third parties have not intervened, mere delay in giving notive of defect, or breach of warranty, does not defeat the right of action therfor.
4. Waiver—Issue.—Waiver is ordinarily a question to be submitted to a jury.
5. Sales—Breach of Warranty—Counterclaim.—Damages arising from breach of warranty on a sale may be set up as a counterclaim, in an action on a note given for the purchase money.
Before Rice, J., Manning, Pall term, 1914.
Affirmed.
Action by the Williamson Heater Company, plaintiff-appellant, against the Paxville School District No. 19, P. S. Geddings, J. W. Mims, T. Parker Brown, trustees Paxville School District No. 19, and F. S. Geddings and T. Parker Brown, individually, defendants-respondents.
From a judgment for defendants, plaintiff appeals.
The facts are stated in the dissenting opinion, delivered by Mr. Justice Watts.
Mr. J. J. Cantey, for appellant,
submits: Purchaser was estopped to plead breach of warranty: 52 S. C. 382; 97 S. C. 129; 134 Ga. 325; Daniel, Negotiable Instruments (5th ed.), par. 1150. Evidence of waiver: 106 Iowa 85; 148 Fed. 145; 39 Mo. App. 67; 84 S. C. 96. No question for jury under evidence produced: 63 S. C. 197. Effect of giving new note for purchase money: Daniel, Neg. Inst. (5th ed.), pars. 1164, 1162; 20 How. 496. Error in admitting evidence to sustain counterclaim: 91 S. C. 423; 85 S. C. 350; 30 S. C. Ill; 77 S. C. 495; 57 S. C. 493; 78 S. C. 205. Supreme Court should render judgment absolute for plaintiff: 92 S. C. 361.
Mr. Charlton Durant, for respondent.
May 12, 1915.

Opinion:
The opinion of the Court was delivered by
Mr. Justice Fraser.
The dissenting opinion of Mr.. Justice Watts fully sets forth the facts of this case and they need not be twice stated.
It is doubtless true that where a buyer has the opportunity to inspect his purchase before its acceptance he may be held to have waived any defects that were apparent, but here the facts complained of could be made to appear only by actual use. After actual use the defects now complained of were not called to the attention of the plaintiff for a long time, but this is explained by the defendants by saying that they were making every effort to make a fair trial and give the plant the fullest opportunity to do its work under its guarantee, i. e., that it would satisfactorily heat the building.
There is a suggeston, but no proof, that the trouble was that there was a want of expert management of the heating plant. Can it be said that a heating plant for a country school that required expert management was satisfactory? There was no attempt to show that expert management could have been expected or was available. It is not contended that the school did receive that for which they contracted, to wit, satisfactory heat. The defendants then called for and offered to pay for an expert of the plaintiff's own choosing. The expert went to the school, but did not remedy the defect. The defendants gave the plaintiff every opportunity to make its plant work and the plaintiff did not do it.
If the rights of third parties had intervened, a different question would have been presented as in the recent case of Gibbes Machinery Company v. Hamilton, 99 S. C. 57, 84 S. E. 296. No such question is presented here. If the plaintiff were in any worse position than it would have occupied, then estoppel plight have arisen, but no such change of position is pleaded or proved and we do not see the ground for estoppel. Waiver is ordinarily a question for the jury, and we do not see that it has become a question of law here so as to authorize the Judge to declare as a matter of law that the defendants have waived the question of failure of consideration.
5 The defendants further .set up damages for the failure of the guarantee. The defendants had. the right to pay the note and bring suit on the breach of the guarantee, or they had the right to set it up in this action. See Kirven v. Chemical Co., 77 S. C. 493, 57 S. E. 424.
There was evidence to sustain the claim and the judgment is affirmed.
Inasmuch as the verdict of the jury practically set aside the contract as broken, and defendant recovered judgment for all that had been paid thereon, the plaintiff should be allowed to remove the useless heating plant, provided the building be left in substantially as good condition as it now is.
Messrs. Chiee Justice Gary and Justices Hydrick and Gage concur in the opinion delivered by Mr. Justice Eraser.
Footnote.—As to necessity of compliance with conditions of warranty, see note in 50 L. R. A. (N. S.) 783 to 805, and as to right of purchaser to reject goods for breach of warranty, see note in 27 L. R. A. (N. S.) 914 to 924.