Case Name: PEOPLE v. BURKES
Court: Michigan Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1982-03-02
Citations: 113 Mich. App. 674
Docket Number: Docket No. 48088
Parties: PEOPLE v BURKES
Judges: Before: Bashara, P.J., and N. J. Kaufman and J. L. Banks, JJ.
Reporter: Michigan appeals reports; cases decided in the Michigan Court of Appeals.
Volume: 113
Pages: 674–678

Head Matter:
PEOPLE v BURKES
Docket No. 48088.
Submitted May 6, 1981, at Detroit.
Decided March 2, 1982.
Helen F. Burkes was charged with equipping her automobile with a radar-detecting device. The Recorder’s Court of Detroit, Leonard Townsend, J., dismissed the charge, holding that the statute prohibiting such devices did not apply because the device was disconnected and lying on the floor of the vehicle when the defendant was arrested. The people appeal. Held:
The prosecution contends that the device was located in such a way that it could have been made operable merely by plugging it in. If proven, that would be sufficient to constitute "equipping” the vehicle with the device within the meaning of the statute.
Reversed and remanded.
J. L. Banks, J., dissented. He would hold that the statute does not apply to radar detectors because federal regulations make no specific assignment of frequencies for police radar or speed measuring devices and, therefore, there is no frequency assigned "for police purposes” as used in the statute. He would affirm.
Opinion of the Court
1. Criminal Law — Radar Detectors — Statutes.
The possession of a police radar detection device when disconnected but placed in an automobile in such a way that it could be utilized merely by plugging it in constitutes "equipping” the vehicle with the device under the terms of the statute which prohibits equipping a vehicle with such a device (MCL 750.508; MSA 28.776).
References for Points in Headnotes
[No reference]
7A Am Jur 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 171.
Dissent by J. L. Banks, J.
2. Statutes — Federal Preemption — Radar Detectors — Criminal Law.
Federal legislation and regulation of radio frequencies have preempted state regulations; because the federal regulations make no specific assignment of frequencies to police radar nor speciñcally authorize speed-measuring devices there is no frequency assigned "for police purposes” within the meaning of the statute prohibiting the equipping of a vehicle with a device for receiving such frequencies and the statute therefore does not apply to prohibit radar detectors (MCL 750.508; MSA 28.776).
Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Louis J. Caruso, Solicitor General, William L. Cahalan, Prosecuting Attorney, Edward Reilly Wilson, Principal Attorney, Appeals, and A. George Best, II, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for the people.
Parzen & Parzen, for defendant on appeal.
Before: Bashara, P.J., and N. J. Kaufman and J. L. Banks, JJ.
Circuit judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.

Opinion:
N. J. Kaufman, J.
Defendant was charged with equipping her automobile with a "Fuzz-buster" radar-detecting device, contrary to the prohibition of MCL 750.508; MSA 28.776. The trial court dismissed the charge after concluding that the conduct alleged did not constitute "equipping" within the statute. The prosécution appeals.
The sole issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred in concluding that the conduct alleged did not fit within the statutory term "equipping", but instead constituted mere possession of the device. We hold that error did occur. Apparently, the Fuzz-buster device was on the floor of defendant's vehicle but was not plugged in when the police approached her car. The prosecution contended that the device merely could have been disconnected at the time of the traffic stop. Thus, the position of the prosecution was that the device was placed within the automobile in such a way that it could be utilized merely by plugging it in. We believe that such an allegation, if proven, would be sufficient to constitute "equipping" under the terms of the statute.
Defendant has not filed a cross-appeal concerning the validity of the statute, so that issue is not properly before this Court for review. In any event, we find preferable the reasoning and holding of People v Gilbert, 88 Mich App 764; 279 NW2d 546 (1979), on reh 93 Mich App 321; 287 NW2d 220 (1979), lv gtd 408 Mich 960 (1980).
Reversed and remanded for trial.
Bash ara, P.J., concurred.