Case Name: A.T., AN INFANT BY HER MOTHER AND NATURAL GUARDIAN, T.T., AND T.T., INDIVIDUALLY, PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS, v. M. COHEN, M.D., KHALID SAVAGED, M.D., CINDY GALOOTS, CNM, JULIO CABAN, M.D., BAOHUOING TRAN, M.D., AND NEWARK BETH ISRAEL MEDICAL CENTER, DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS
Court: New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New Jersey
Decision Date: 2016-04-27
Citations: 445 N.J. Super. 300
Docket Number: 
Parties: A.T., AN INFANT BY HER MOTHER AND NATURAL GUARDIAN, T.T., AND T.T., INDIVIDUALLY, PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS, v. M. COHEN, M.D., KHALID SAVAGED, M.D., CINDY GALOOTS, CNM, JULIO CABAN, M.D., BAOHUOING TRAN, M.D., AND NEWARK BETH ISRAEL MEDICAL CENTER, DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS.
Judges: Before Judges FISHER, ESPINOSA, and CURRIER.
Reporter: New Jersey Superior Court Reports
Volume: 445
Pages: 300–314

Head Matter:
137 A.3d 1218
A.T., AN INFANT BY HER MOTHER AND NATURAL GUARDIAN, T.T., AND T.T., INDIVIDUALLY, PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS, v. M. COHEN, M.D., KHALID SAVAGED, M.D., CINDY GALOOTS, CNM, JULIO CABAN, M.D., BAOHUOING TRAN, M.D., AND NEWARK BETH ISRAEL MEDICAL CENTER, DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS.
Superior Court of New Jersey Appellate Division
Argued January 20, 2016
Decided April 27, 2016.
Before Judges FISHER, ESPINOSA, and CURRIER.
Alan Roth argued the cause for appellants (Bendit Weinstock, P.A. and Gary P. Falkowitz (Parker Watchman LLP), attorneys; Mr. Roth, on the briefs).
Lauren M. Strollo argued the cause for respondents (Vasios, Kelly & Strollo, P.A., attorneys; Ms. Strollo, of counsel and on the brief; Linda Fulop-Slaughter, on the brief).
An amended complaint corrected the name of the defendant to Cindy Galeota.

Opinion:
The opinion of the court was delivered by
CURRIER, J.S.C. (temporarily assigned).
The issue in this medical malpractice case is whether the minor plaintiff can take a voluntary dismissal without prejudice to avoid a dismissal with prejudice of her complaint for the failure to provide an affidavit of merit (AOM) within the required time-frame. We conclude that Rule 4:37-l(b) cannot be used to circumvent the time strictures set forth in the AOM statute even if the statute of limitations has not yet expired. As a result, we affirm the trial judge's denial of the motion to take a voluntary dismissal and the granting of summary judgment to defendants.
T.T. brought this action individually and on behalf of her daughter A.T., asserting medical malpractice claims against all defendants. The complaint alleges that A.T. suffers from Erb's palsy as the result of a brachial plexus injury caused at her birth in 2011. An answer was filed on December 5, 2013 on behalf of all defendants with the exception of Savaged.
On April 7, 2014, defendants moved for summary judgment on the grounds that plaintiff had failed to file an AOM as required by N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-27. In opposition to the motion, plaintiff attached an AOM dated May 22, 2014. During oral argument on the motion, plaintiffs counsel requested the court permit the filing of a Rule 4:37-l(b) motion before consideration of the pending summary judgment motion. Counsel advised that the failure to file a timely AOM was an "oversight," and in response to a question from the judge, conceded that the firm did not have a "seasoned New Jersey medical malpractice attorney." The judge granted the request to adjourn the summary judgment motion for a month.
Present counsel entered an appearance as co-counsel for plaintiff and filed a motion for a voluntary dismissal under Rule 4:37-1(b). At oral argument on that motion, counsel requested leave to dismiss the complaint without prejudice, advising the judge that if his review of the file deemed it appropriate, he would re-file the complaint with an AOM. As A.T. was a minor, there remained many years prior to the running of the statute of limitations. Counsel also asked the judge to again adjourn the summary judgment motion, raising for the first time the constitutionality of the AOM statute.
The judge denied the additional adjournment and granted summary judgment to defendants, ruling that plaintiffs failure to file an AOM within the statutory period required the dismissal of her complaint with prejudice. She stated:
The plaintiff seeks a dismissal without prejudice, on terms that if it gets re-filed then the Affidavit of Merit would be with it. That's . engaging in a fiction to make it look like I'd be doing something that . really wasn't allowed, which would be extending the time beyond the 120 days.... I would be extending the time for the Affidavit of Merit beyond the time set forth in the statute.
The judge also noted there was no vehicle in which to consider the constitutionality of the statute as no motion had been presented to her on that issue. She, therefore, declined to address that argument.
Plaintiff moved for reconsideration. In counsel's supporting certification, he sought a review of the judge's previous decision or "in the alternative to have the [cjourt declare the Affidavit of Merit Statute unconstitutional." In denying the motion, the judge reiterated her reasoning expressed during her original ruling and found that no new information had been presented to her. In addressing the constitutionality argument, she stated:
If anybody wanted to raise that, you should have made a motion before I dismissed the case, notice to the defendant, opportunity to reply, notice to the Attorney General-None of that happened. And it's not appropriate to raise it, even as minimally as it was raised in the papers, on a Motion for Reconsideration.
This appeal followed.
On appeal, plaintiff argues that (1) the judge erred in dismissing the case with prejudice; and (2) the AOM statute is unconstitutional as it invades the judiciary's power to regulate practice and procedure. We do not address the merits of plaintiffs constitutionality argument as we find it was not properly raised to the trial judge. This court will "decline to consider questions or issues not properly presented to the trial court when an opportunity for such a presentation is available unless the questions so raised on appeal go to the jurisdiction of the trial court or concern matters of great public interest." Selective Ins. Co. of Am. v. Rothman, 208 N.J. 580, 586, 34 A.3d 769 (2012) (quoting Nieder v. Royal Indem. Ins. Co., 62 N.J. 229, 234, 300 A.2d 142 (1973)).
Plaintiff does not contest that her failure to file an AOM within the statutory timeframe required a dismissal of the complaint; rather, she argues that the judge should have granted a dismissal without prejudice under Rule 4:37-l(b) due to A.T.'s status as a minor. Plaintiff contends that, as there remain many years until the expiration of the statute of limitations, and there has been no prejudice to the defendants, the dismissal should be without prejudice "in the interest of justice and fairness."
A failure to comply with the AOM statute "generally requires dismissal with prejudice because the absence of an affidavit strikes at the heart of the cause of action." Paragon Contractors, Inc. v. Peachtree Condo. Ass'n, 202 N.J. 415, 422, 997 A.2d 982 (2010); see N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-29. Absent extraordinary circumstances, a failure to comply with the AOM statute requires a dismissal with prejudice. Cornblatt v. Barow, 153 N.J. 218, 247, 708 A.2d 401 (1998). "A dismissal for failure to submit an affidavit of merit is a violation of a statute rather than a court-imposed rule or order. The violation giving rise to the dismissal goes to the heart of the cause of action as defined by the Legislature." Id. at 244, 708 A.2d 401.
Plaintiff does not assert the existence of extraordinary circumstances; she merely states that her failure to provide an AOM within the required statutory timeframe was an "oversight." The Supreme Court has determined that attorney inadvertence falls short of establishing extraordinary circumstances required to avoid a dismissal with prejudice. Palanque v. Lambert-Woolley, 168 N.J. 398, 405, 774 A.2d 501 (2001). See also Burns v. Belafsky, 326 N.J.Super. 462, 470, 741 A.2d 649 (App.Div.1999) ("Carelessness, lack of circumspection, or lack of diligence on the part of counsel are not extraordinary circumstances which will excuse missing a filing deadline.") (quoting Hyman Zamft and Manard v. Cornell, 309 N.J.Super. 586, 593, 707 A.2d 1068 (App.Div.1998)).
Nonetheless, plaintiff asks us to circumvent the finality of the AOM statute by utilizing Rule 4:37-1 (b) to dismiss her claim without prejudice with the ability to re-file her complaint with an AOM at a later time.
The decision whether to dismiss a matter without prejudice under Rule 4:37-l(b) lies within the judge's sound discretion. Mack Auto Imports, Inc. v. Jaguar Cars, Inc., 244 N.J.Super. 254, 258, 581 A.2d 1372 (App.Div.1990). "In exercising that discretion, the court is chiefly required to protect 'the rights of the defendant.'" Shulas v. Estabrook, 385 N.J.Super. 91, 97, 895 A.2d 1234 (App.Div.2006) (quoting Burke v. Cent. R. Co., 42 N.J.Super. 387, 397, 126 A.2d 903 (App.Div.1956)). In Shulas, supra, 385 N.J.Super. at 101-02, 895 A.2d 1234, we instructed that "an examination into the propriety of a voluntary dismissal without prejudice requires an investigation into the reasons why the order was sought as well as the actions or inactions of the parties that preceded its entry."
Facing defendants' motion for summary judgment and the expiration of the statutory timeframe within which to file an AOM, plaintiff moved for a voluntary dismissal. Counsel candidly explained that this would provide him the opportunity to review and investigate the matter and, if appropriate, re-file the complaint with an AOM. Since A.T. was a minor, counsel reasoned that the new complaint would be filed within the statute of limitations, therefore causing no prejudice to defendants.
We find that permitting a voluntary dismissal in these circumstances would render the AOM statute meaningless in the case of a minor plaintiff. The purpose underlying the statute has been oft explained. "It was designed as a tort reform measure and requires a plaintiff in a malpractice case to make a threshold showing that the claims asserted are meritorious. It is designed to weed out frivolous lawsuits at an early stage and to allow meritorious cases to go forward." Galik v. Clara Maass Med. Ctr., 167 N.J. 341, 350, 771 A.2d 1141 (2001) (citing Cornblatt, supra, 153 N.J. at 242, 708 A.2d 401).
If plaintiff were permitted to take a voluntary dismissal, the timeframes in the AOM statute and the purpose behind it would be defeated. Defendants would be faced with waiting indefinitely for a resolution of the litigation against them, incurring costs to defend each newly filed action. The statute would be rendered moot.
We have previously addressed this issue and rejected the argument that justice requires a dismissal without prejudice due to the plaintiffs status as a minor. As we stated in Kubiak v. Robert Wood Johnson University Hospital, 332 N.J.Super. 230, 238, 753 A.2d 166 (App.Div.2000):
[W]here, as here, a guardian ad litem pursues a child's claim on behalf of the minor, the guardian steps into the shoes of the minor and is obligated to comply with court rules and the applicable statutes. In short, a minor is protected from a parent's or guardian's inaction, but not from their improvident actions in the course of litigation.
Our dissenting colleague posits that the dismissal of A.T.'s complaint under these circumstances is "illogical and inconsistent with other recognized instances of 'extraordinary circumstances' " and "fails to respect the solicitude the law affords minors." Plaintiff, however, does not assert the existence of extraordinary cir cumstances nor does she argue substantial compliance; just that it was "an oversight" not to file the AOM. And we agree with our colleague that the tolling of the statute of limitations in tort cases for minors has afforded them protection. However, those exceptions were put into place as a result of legislative action. The Legislature did not choose to carve out an exception for minors when crafting the AOM timeframes. We find this significant. In Kubiak, we noted that similar omissions by the Legislature have been dispositive. Kubiak, supra, 332 N.J.Super. at 238, 753 A.2d 166; see Scharwenka v. Cryogenics Mgmt., Inc., 163 N.J.Super. 16, 21, 394 A.2d 137 (App.Div.1978) ("That there is no tolling proviso in the [worker's] compensation act is perfectly clear.... No exception or qualification for infancy or incompetency is provided for, in contrast with the express provision therefor in the general statutes of limitations."); see also Giantonio v. Reliance Ins. Cos., 175 N.J.Super. 309, 315, 418 A.2d 303 (Law Div.1980) ("[H]ad the Legislature intended that the time limitations be tolled for an infant until he reaches his majority, it could have quite effortlessly inserted just such a specific provision. This court cannot by judicial construction do what the Legislature expressly or inferentially declined to do.").
We affirm the denial of the voluntary dismissal motion, the grant of summary judgment to defendants, and the dismissal with prejudice of the complaint.
Affirmed.
We refer to T.T. and A.T. collectively as plaintiff.
Pursuant to NJ.S.A. 2A:53A-27, a plaintiff has sixty days from the date of the defendant's answer to file an AOM. The court may grant the plaintiff an additional sixty days "upon a finding of good cause." Ibid. The deadline for plaintiff to file an AOM was April 4, 2014.
The AOM was authored by a physician specializing in the field of obstetrics/gynecology and opined that the care exercised in the treatment of plaintiff "fell outside acceptable professional standards as they apply to representatives and medical personnel of the Defendant, Newark Beth Israel Medical Center."
Rule 4:37 — 1(b) states in pertinent part: "An action shall be dismissed at the plaintiffs instance only by leave of court and upon such terms and conditions as the court deems appropriate.... Unless otherwise specified in the order, a dismissal under this paragraph is without prejudice."
The principal office of counsel was located outside New Jersey.
The argument was raised for the first time at oral argument on the summary judgment motion and then in a motion for reconsideration. The Attorney General was only noticed on the motion for reconsideration and did not enter an appearance in the trial court or in this appeal.
We also note the potential impact a dismissal without prejudice might have on a health care professional under NJ.S.A. 17:30D-22, wherein a medical malpractice premium may not be increased if an insured is dismissed from a medical malpractice action within 180 days of the filing of the last responsive pleading.