Case Name: Floyd WILLIAMS v. STATE of Mississippi
Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Mississippi
Decision Date: 1983-02-09
Citations: 427 So. 2d 100
Docket Number: No. 53809
Parties: Floyd WILLIAMS v. STATE of Mississippi.
Judges: All Justices concur, except DAN M. LEE, J., who dissents.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 427
Pages: 100–111

Head Matter:
Floyd WILLIAMS v. STATE of Mississippi.
No. 53809.
Supreme Court of Mississippi.
Feb. 9, 1983.
Gary L. Bates, William E. Chapman, III, Jackson, for appellant.
Bill Allain, Atty. Gen. by Carolyn B. Mills, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., Jackson, for appellee.
. We must give appellant’s counsel credit that he would not appeal this case and assign as error No. VI, if he was aware the case might be reversed and remanded for consideration of imposing the death penalty.

Opinion:
WALKER, Presiding Justice,
for the Court on Parts I — V.
ROY NOBLE LEE, Justice, for the Court on Part VI.
This is an appeal from the Circuit Court of Copiah County wherein the appellant, Floyd Williams, was convicted of the rape of a female under the age of twelve years and sentenced to life imprisonment in the Mississippi Department of Corrections. Having perfected his appeal, the appellant raises several assignments of error.
Hattie Hillard, a female child of eleven years of age, testified that' Floyd Williams lived with her mother, Mable Hillard, in a trailer near Crystal Springs, Mississippi, along with Hattie's other brothers and sisters. Hattie stated that on Sunday, June 28, 1981, around 4:00 p.m., Floyd Williams came into the trailer and sent Hattie's brother on an errand and then told Hattie to go in the back room and pull her clothes off. Hattie further testified that the appellant had been drinking and that he hit her with an electrical cord. She also testified that his penis went inside her and that if she told anyone he would kill her.
After Williams left the trailer, Hattie stayed in the trailer without notifying anyone except her brother, Antonio, that she had been raped. On direct examination, Hattie stated that she did not tell her mother because her mother would not have believed her and that she was afraid of the appellant who lived with them.
The next morning, upon waking, Hattie awakened her older sister, Constance Hil-lard Williams (no relation to the appellant), and told her that she had been raped. Upon examining Hattie, Constance observed that her vagina was swollen and darkened, and that her panties contained a yellow discharge. Constance immediately notified the police, who in turn called Reverend J.C. Killingsworth, a local minister, to transport Hattie and her mother to a physician for treatment.
Upon referral by a local physician, Rev. Killingsworth took Hattie and Mrs. Hillard to the University Hospital in Jackson where Hattie was treated by Dr. Reeda Lyons. Dr. Lyons testified that Hattie had a two to three millimeter laceration on the perineal. Dr. Lyons estimated that due to the freshness of the scab covering the laceration, the trauma causing the laceration occurred within the last six to twelve hours.
The defense presented several witnesses who testified that the appellant was present at a party next door to the trailer all afternoon, and that he never left the party except to pick blueberries with some of the witnesses.
On appeal, the appellant raises the following assignments of error for review:
I.
The trial court erred in admitting hearsay testimony by the State's witnesses, C. Williams and Killingsworth, of the child's statements which were not made in the presence of the defendant as to who committed the alleged crime.
The appellant contends that the complaints of the alleged victim were strictly hearsay and inadmissible since they were not made as soon as a reasonable opportunity presented itself. However, the testimony of the victim indicated that she had been threatened by the appellant that he would kill her if she told anyone of the incident; and, that even if she had told her mother, her mother would not have believed her. Further, Rev. Killingsworth testified as to the attitude of Mrs. Hillard (the mother) toward her child:
BY MR. HORN:
Q. Reverend Killingsworth, again, sir, what, if anything, did Mable Hillard tell you concerning her daughter, Hattie Hil-lard, when you were there at the Davenport house?
A. Said she had not been raped. It was a God damn lie, and she was going to beat her God damn brains out—
Q. Now, later—
A. —for telling a lie. And I told her: "It may be that you better not hit her under these circumstances, you might better wait." And the (sic) said that the laws had been out there messing with her, and the damn monkies and now, here you come.
Q. Later when you went to the University Hospital, what, if anything, did Mable Hillard say concerning her daughter, Hattie?
A. The girl came out and told her, "yes", that she was raped, that "Floyd raped me."
Q. What did Mable say?
A. Mable told her that she was a God damn liar. She hadn't been raped, wasn't nothing wrong with her. She just needs her damn brains beat out, that's all that was wrong with her.
Q. Did she say that to Hattie or to the person at the University Hospital.
A. To Hattie.
Q. Who was there?
A. In my presence.
It is obvious from the record that the child was intimidated by the appellant and her mother, and that she had no one to turn to at the time of the attack except her twelve-year-old brother, Antonio. The appellant and the mother returned to the trailer in the early evening. The child reported the rape the next morning to her older sister as soon as she had an opportunity without fear of reprisal or attack.
This Court stated the general rule on the admissibility of the victim's outcry after being raped in Anderson v. State, 82 Miss. 784, 788, 35 So. 202, 203 (1903):
Ordinarily any and all statements made by a party assaulted after the commission of the crime is hearsay, and not admissible. An exception is made in the case of rape alone, but even in that case no statements made by the prosecutrix are admissible except her complaint that she had been ravished. The details of the transaction, the name of the party accused, the place where it is said to have occurred, the time of the alleged offense, cannot be proven by a repetition of the words of the prosecutrix. The exception in cases of rape is made upon the idea that outraged virtue will proclaim her wrong, and therefore silence might be considered as raising a suspicion of consent.
See also Brooks v. State, 242 So.2d 865 (Miss.1971); Dickey v. State, 86 Miss. 525, 38 So. 776 (1905); Ashford v. State, 81 Miss. 414, 33 So. 174 (1902).
When faced with a similar situation concerning hearsay testimony following a sexual assault, the Michigan Court of Appeals stated:
Hearsay testimony concerning the details of a complaint of sexual assault is admissible where the complainant is of "tender years" if her statement is shown to have been spontaneous and without indication of manufacture, and if any delay in making the complaint is excusable insofar as it is caused by fear or other equally effective circumstances. (Emphasis added). (People v. Mikula, 84 Mich.App. 108, 116, 269 N.W.2d 195, 199 (Mich.Ct.App.1978)).
We adopt the reasoning of the Michigan Court as sound and hold that the child's delay in reporting the incident was justified under the circumstances.
The appellant also contends that the trial court erred in admitting the testimony of Rev. Killingsworth as to who committed the crime. The trial court properly sustained the defense's objection to this portion of Killingsworth's testimony and received adequate assurance from the jurors that they would disregard his remarks that the victim told him that the appellant raped her.
II.
The appellant assigns as his second error that the lower court erred in not granting the appellant's motion for a directed verdict after the State had concluded its case.
The trial court properly overruled the appellant's motion for a directed verdict. The testimony of the State's witnesses established that:
(1) The child was alone in the trailer at the time of the rape, except for her brothers and sisters.
(2) The appellant had been drinking.
(3) The child testified that the appellant had raped her which was consistent with the medical examination which revealed that the child's private parts had a two to three millimeter laceration with a fresh scab, six to twelve hours old.
(4) Medical testimony indicated that the child's vaginal wall was easily expandable as if there had been something that had expanded the vagina.
(5) The child's testimony concerning physical abuse and threats by the appellant.
III.
The appellant assigns as error that the trial court erred in overruling the appellant's motion for a mistrial after Rev. Kill-ingsworth testified that the child said she had been raped twice by the appellant. The following occurred during the trial:
Q. Now, would you please tell the Jury what, if anything, Mable Hillard said concerning her daughter, Hattie, at the University Hospital?
A. Mable—Hattie told her that, "Mama, Floyd raped me twice."
BY MR. MAY:
You Honor, we're going—
A. You don't want to know that?
BY MR. MAY:
May it please the Court, I'm going to have to make a Motion at this time.
BY THE COURT:
I'll sustain the objection and limit—as I recall, there was no foundation laid for anything that Hattie Hillard said to her mother, Mable Hillard, so I will sustain the objection. Ladies and gentlemen of the Jury, would you disregard that last remark and not consider it in arriving at your verdict? Will each of you do so? If you will disregard it, hold up you hand, please.
(All 12 Jurors held up hand).
Very well, let the record show that all 12 jurors held up their hand.
We find that the trial court's instructions to the jury to disregard the objectionable portion of Rev. Killingsworth's testimony was sufficient and it is presumed that the jury heeded the trial judge's admonition.
IV.
The appellant assigns as error that the trial court erred in granting the State's jury instruction No. S-l which states:
The Court instructs the jury that if you believe from the evidence in this ease beyond a reasonable doubt that on or about the 28th day of June 1981, the defendant, Floyd Williams, a male person over the age of eighteen years, lacerated or tore the private parts of Hattie Hil-lard, a female child under the age of twelve years in an attempt to have carnal knowledge of her, then you should find the defendant guilty as charged.
Jury Instruction No. S-l tracks the language of Mississippi Code Annotated § 97-3-65 (Supp.1981):
In all cases where the female child is under the age of twelve (12) years it shall not be necessary to prove penetration of the female's private parts where it is shown the private parts of the female have been lacerated or tom in the attempt to have carnal knowledge of her.
The instruction properly followed the statute and was not error. When an accused is charged with having carnal knowledge of a female under the age of twelve years, the State's proof need not show penetration, but only that the private parts of the female have been lacerated or torn in the attempt to have sexual intercourse with her. In this case, there was not only proof of a laceration of the victim's private parts, but she testified that appellant inserted his penis into her vagina.
V.
The appellant assigns as error that the jury verdict was against the overwhelming weight of the evidence.
We have stated many times that the jurors may accept the testimony of some witnesses and refuse that of others and that they may accept in part and reject in part the evidence on behalf of the State and on behalf of the accused. McLelland v. State, 204 So.2d 158, 164 (Miss.1967). It is not for this Court to pass upon the credibility of witnesses and where the evidence justifies the verdict it must be accepted as having been found worthy of belief. See also Gathright v. State, 380 So.2d 1276, 1278 (Miss.1980).
THE JUDGMENT OF THE LOWER COURT FINDING THE APPELLANT GUILTY IS AFFIRMED.
All Justices concur, except DAN M. LEE, J., who dissents.
VI.
ROY NOBLE LEE, Justice, for the Court:
The appellant next assigns as error that the trial court was without authority to impose a sentence of life imprisonment.
The appellant's brief under Assignment VI constitutes a single paragraph, embracing four (4) lines. The State's response to that assignment consists of one (1) paragraph comprising five (5) lines. The appellant's reply brief contains one (1) page and, for the first time, states that the prosecution did not follow the applicable sentencing feature; that the penalties under Mississippi Code Annotated § 97-3-65(1) (Supp.1982) were waived, and that the court was required to impose a sentence reasonably less than life. [See Appendix].
The charge in the indictment follows Section 97-3-65, which states, in part:
(1) Every person eighteen (18) years of age or older who shall be convicted of rape by carnally and unlawfully knowing a female child under the age of twelve (12) years, upon conviction, shall be sentenced to death or imprisonment for life in the state penitentiary;....
(2) Every person who shall forcibly ravish any female of the age of twelve (12) years or upward, or who shall have been convicted of having carnal knowledge of any female above the age of twelve (12) years without her consent, . and in cases where the jury fails to fix the penalty at life imprisonment the court shall fix the penalty at imprisonment in the state penitentiary for any term as the court, in its discretion, may determine. (Emphasis added)
It is obvious that an accused convicted of raping a child under the age of twelve (12) years shall be sentenced either to death or to life imprisonment in the penitentiary. The appellant misread, or misinterpreted, the statute and has presented the question here solely on the proposition that the trial judge had no authority to impose the life sentence and that the case should be remanded for him to sentence the appellant to a term reasonably less than life, citing Lee v. State, 322 So.2d 751 (Miss.1975) and Stewart v. State, 372 So.2d 257 (Miss.1979). In taking that position, the appellant relies upon the last sentence of Section (2) of the statute which provides: "... and in cases where the jury fails to fix the penalty at life imprisonment the court shall fix the penalty at imprisonment in the state penitentiary for any term as the court, in its discretion, may determine."
There is no merit in that contention. However, by the Assignment VI, appellant has raised, apparently unintentionally, the more serious questions of (a) whether the case must be presented to a jury for imposition of sentence, either death or life imprisonment, (b) whether the State waived (and can waive) the death penalty, and (c) whether the case, from its beginning, proceeded as an offense which required a sentence no greater than life imprisonment.
Mississippi Code Annotated § 99-19-101 (Supp.1982) provides that the jury shall determine punishment in capital cases, regardless of whether the accused enters a guilty plea or is found guilty in the guilt phase.
In Rouse v. State, 222 So.2d 145 (Miss.1969), a forcible rape trial, the jury returned a verdict finding the accused guilty as charged. On that verdict, the trial judge sentenced the appellant to death. Three (3) jurors who expressed conscientious scruples against imposing the death penalty were challenged for cause by the State and were excused. The court reversed for that reason, stating:
We reverse the order of the trial court sentencing the appellant to death and remand for a new trial as to punishment only. Witherspoon v. Illinois [391 U.S. 510, 88 S.Ct. 1770, 20 L.Ed.2d 776], supra; Yates v. Breazeale, Supt. of Miss. State Penitentiary, 402 F.2d 113 (5th Cir.1968); and Irving v. Breazeale, Supt. of Miss. State Penitentiary, 400 F.2d 231 (5th Cir. 1968).
There is an alternative open to the court which would obviate the impaneling of a new jury to pass upon the punishment to be imposed. If the district attorney and the trial judge agree, then the trial judge could sentence the appellant to life imprisonment without the intervention of a jury.
We express no opinion as to which of the two procedures outlined above should be followed in this case; the decision is up to the district attorney and the trial judge. We only point out the alternatives open to the trial court. (Emphasis added)
In Bullock v. Harpole, Supt. State Penitentiary, 233 Miss. 486, 494-95, 102 So.2d 687, 690 (1958), in approving a sentence of life by the trial judge, the Court said:
A jury in this case could have fixed no lighter punishment than that which the court imposed. The appellant could have gained nothing by having the court go through the formality of empaneling a jury for the purpose of obtaining the jury's approval of the sentence of life imprisonment, and no prejudice resulted from the failure of the trial judge to empanel a jury to fix the punishment. We think that no constitutional right of the appellant was violated when the court pronounced the sentence without empaneling a jury to fix the punishment.
We recognize that in Shorter v. State, 257 So.2d 236 (Miss.1972), the Court, citing Anthony v. State, 220 So.2d 837 (Miss.1969), said that the jury has a right to return a death penalty in murder cases and when such verdict is returned, the judge has no alternative except to sentence the prisoner as is required by statute. However, we distinguish that case from the case sub judice where it is apparent that, from its beginning, the court and all involved proceeded on the trial with life imprisonment being the maximum punishment.
The record reflects that, at the outset of the trial, on voir dire examination, during the trial, arguments and instructions, the jury was not told that the appellant was being tried on a capital charge punishable by the death penalty. Neither the State's brief nor appellant's brief even suggests the case involved the death penalty, and there is no cross-appeal by the State from the lower court's action and judgment. The only indication in the record of a capital case was the recognizance bond fixed at the preliminary hearing, which bond set forth "capital case." Bond was fixed in the amount of thirty-five thousand dollars ($35,000) when, if the State had been pursuing the matter as a capital charge (death penalty), no bond would have been allowed.
It is inconceivable that an experienced trial judge and attorneys would build a record void of any reference to the death penalty and absent that which was absolutely necessary to protect the constitutional rights of the defendant, if he was being tried for a capital case with possibility of the death penalty being inflicted. It is inescapable from the record that the trial court, the prosecuting attorney, and the defense attorney were not trying the case, and the jury was not hearing it, with a view of the death penalty, and that the case was tried upon the theory that the Highest penalty to be inflicted was life imprisonment.
We know, through experience and as a matter of common knowledge, that numerous homicide cases occur in this state during the period of a year. Probably a great many of those homicides result in indictments for capital murder. However, very few capital murder cases, compared to the great number of homicide cases, are appealed to this Court for decision. It stands to reason, therefore, that in many capital murder cases the State does not proceed on capital murder for infliction of the death penalty and the cases are disposed of either on pleas of guilty to simple murder or on trials for murder (rape) less than capital.
The following are instances where the trial judge, whether erroneously or correctly, may rule against the death penalty in a capital case:
(1) Grant a motion for directed verdict or request for peremptory instruction of not guilty (either phase).
(2) Sustain a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (either phase).
(3) Sustain a motion for new trial.
(4) Grant a mistrial after selection of the jury without having a lawful ground therefor.
The record, or lack of record, in the case sub judice indicates without doubt that the case proceeded to trial as a rape not justifying the death penalty. The jury found the appellant guilty as charged, and the only sentence under such verdict which could be imposed was a life sentence by the trial judge. On that guilty verdict by the jury, with no other sentence to be imposed, the status of the case was the same as in Bullock v. Harpole, supra. Therefore, we hold that the trial judge was not required to send the jury back to the jury room for the purpose of returning a verdict of life imprisonment, and he did not commit error in the procedure followed by him.
For the reasons stated, the judgment and sentence of the lower court is affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
BROOM, P.J., BOWLING, HAWKINS and ROBERTSON, JJ., concur with Part VI.
PATTERSON, C.J., WALKER, P.J., and PRATHER, J., dissent as to Part VI.
DAN M. LEE, J., takes no part as to Part VI.
APPENDIX
Appellant's Brief (P. 14)
The Appellant submits that since the jury did not recommend a sentence of life imprisonment, under Lee v. State, 322 So.2d 751 (Miss.1975) no such sentence could be imposed by the trial court and thus a sentence of life imprisonment is void.
Appellee's Brief (P. 14)
Appellant argues that since the jury did not recommend a sentence of life imprisonment the life sentence was improper. Ap-pellee would show the record does not contain the written verdict of the jury. Appellant has presented an insufficient record for determination of the error he claims.
Appellant's Reply Brief (P. 8)
Even though the record does not contain the written verdict on the jury, it is however, sufficient for determination of the error complained of under this Proposition. It is clear from a review of the two (2) Jury Instructions given by the state the jury was without authority to return a sentence of life imprisonment. The jury was instructed their verdict upon finding the Appellant guilty should be in the form "We the Jury, find the defendant guilty as charged." (R. 246) In addition the trial court Minute Book reflects the verdict returned into open court as "We, the Jury, find the Defendant Guilty." (R. 252)
Since the crime the Appellant was indicted, arraigned and tried for is a capitel [sic] offense, Section 99-19-101 of the Mississippi Code Annotated of 1972 (as amended) is the sentencing procedure mandated by law. The Appellant submits since the jury was not instructed regarding the sentence to be given the Appellant and thus unable to recommend one and since the prosecution did not follow the applicable sentencing procedure, the penalties under Section 97-3-65(1) of the Mississippi Code Annotated of 1972 (as amended) were waived. Therefore the sentence of life imprisonment imposed on the Appellant is void and the Appellant submits he can only be sentenced to a term of years reasonably expected to be less than life. Stewart v. State, 372 So.2d [257] 259 (Miss.1979).
. When the evidence is clear or the presumption is great that the accused committed a capital crime (death penalty) he is not entitled to bond.