Case Name: The Greenwood Lake & Port Jervis R. R. Co., App'lt, v. The New York & Greenwood Lake R. R. Co., Resp't
Court: New York Supreme Court, General Term
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1889-12-09
Citations: 28 N.Y. St. Rep. 739
Docket Number: 
Parties: The Greenwood Lake & Port Jervis R. R. Co., App’lt, v. The New York & Greenwood Lake R. R. Co., Resp’t.
Judges: 
Reporter: New York State Reporter
Volume: 28
Pages: 739–743

Head Matter:
The Greenwood Lake & Port Jervis R. R. Co., App’lt, v. The New York & Greenwood Lake R. R. Co., Resp’t.
(Supreme Court, General Term, Second Department,
Filed December 9, 1889.)
1. Easement—Grant, op use op land, when not a mere license.
A grant of a right to use land as a means of ingress and regress, upon which the grantee may pass and repass cars containing ice, with their employees, etc., and which provides that such right is not exclusive and is not to be assigned, except to the grantee’s successors in the ice business, and for the purposes of that business, is a grant of a right of way, and not a mere license.
%. Same.
Where the grant included a strip of land seventy-five feet wide, the grantee is not confined to the track as originally made, but may make a cut within such strip to improve the grade and curves.
3. Deed—Title—Railroad companies.
Plaintiff derived its title by conveyance from a railroad company which, when it acquired title, had been organized for ten years, but had not commenced building its road. Held, that as by the statute it ceased to exist after five years, unless a beginning was made, it could not take title and could convey none.
Appeal from judgment dismissing complaint.
Action for trespasses on real estate near Greenwood Lake in Orange county. The complaint alleged two trespasses, one in using the real estate and the other in changing the track thereon.
In March, 1887, James W. Weston and. Mary E. Burt conveyed a strip of land seventy-five feet wide to one Myers, named as trustee, to be used only for railroad purposes and on condition that the railroad should be built and trains run thereon within six months, which was done. Myers conveyed to one Thorpe and he to one Traphagen, who in May, 1886, conveyed to one McDowell an undivided half of the farm and this seventy-five foot strip. McDowell conveyed to the Mew England, M. Y. & Pa. E. E. Co., which conveyed to plaintiE Said railroad company was organized in 1878, But up to 1885 had done nothing towards commencing the construction of its road.
In 1877 Traphagen executed and delivered to the Greenwood Lake Ice Company, in consideration of one dollar, an instrument in writing as follows:
“ I do hereby grant to the said ice company and to their assigns and successors in said ice business, the right to use said property for the purpose of a way of ingress, egress and regress over and upon which they may pass and repass railroad cars containing ice- and materials, said supplies for use in said ice business, together with themselves, their employees and servants, but it is expressly understood that this license to use said railroad is not an exclusive. right to the said company.
“ And it is further agreed that the right hereby conveyed is not to be assigned by the said company except to the successors in, and assigns of said ice business, and only for the purpose of said business.”
The ice company thereafter conveyed its premises, together with its rights in this strip, to Edward Cooper and Abraham S. Hewitt, who have since continued the business.
Myers and Thorpe were trustees for the president of the Montclair & Greenwood Lake Eailroad Company, which was after-wards reorganized, and defendant is its successor. In 1887 a change was made by defendant, with the consent of Cooper and Hewitt, in the location of the railroad track and a cut made for the purpose of increasing the availability of the road for the ice business. These are the acts complained of, and also that the tracks were used to store defendant’s passenger cars, plaintiff claiming that the deed from Traphagan was a mere license, revocable at the pleasure of the owner of the land.
The court at special term dismissed the complaint and delivered the following opinion:
Barnard, J. The paper proven on the trial accompanying the site of the ice-house property evidenced a grant of a right of way, and not a mere license. The paper states that it grants a right of way. The only limitation is that it is incident to the ice-house property, and cannot be sold except to the successor in the ice business, and it is not an exclusive right to the land over which the way is constructed. The surrounding circumstances favor this construction: A valuable property is sold, surrounded by lands of the grantor, which was already established as an ice business by the erection of large ice-houses thereon. The ice was designed for a foreign market, and this was a piece of railroad leading from defendant’s road to the ice-houses then made. The railroad follows within a strip of seventy-five feet wide, which was in the future to be a railroad. The right of way proper did not, in terms, restrict the right to this strip, but that that was the design of the parties is the best inference. This is especially the inference as the deeds, or some of them, are subject to the right of way, as the, right of way is subject to the real owner, except so far as the right of way is permanent.
The right of way is not restricted to the road as now built. The paper does not say so, and the absolute right given carries with it the right to make the way useful for railroad cars. Cooper and Hewitt had, under it, a right to make a good grade and good curves, so that the ice could be drawn out over the right of way in cars. The cut was, therefore, properly made for this purpose; and, assuming the plaintiff’s right as owner of the seventy-five foot strip, no action will lie for this cut inside of the strip. The right of way was never designed to be attached to the main track of the to be built railroad. The ice-house had its right of track, and the prospective railroad company had all that was left within the strip.
After the new way was made it left a piece of road on the strip which belonged to the owner of the strip and the defendant has used this piece to land passengers at a pavilion erected by the owner of the land outside. If the plaintiff owns this strip it is entitled to recover for the use of this piece of railroad. The plaintiff derives title to the strip through a railroad company which was never really organized, and never authorized to commence the construction of a railroad under it. When the title to the strip was conveyed to it by McDowell it was some ten years after its proper organization, and by our general railroad act it ceased to exist after five years unless a beginning was made within that period. This company could not therefore take a title and on conveyance could convey none. The original grant was for railroad purposes and limited that time as a condition of the grant that the road should be built within ten years, and it is doubtful whether the grantees under the grant, who had never taken possession and had never even attempted to commence the construction of the road, had any title to give to this defunct corporation. If there is any claim for the use of this piece of railroad extending beyond thie pavilion it is in Van Yleck, and he consented to the use of it and it was used for his benefit.
The complaint should therefore be dismissed, with costs.
Charles A Noyes, for app’lt; Lewis LJ. Carr, for resp’t

Opinion:
Dykman, J.
The judgment from which the appeal in this action is taken should be affirmed on the opinion of the trial judge printed in the case.
Pratt, J., concurs.