Case Name: DEN ON DEMISE OF JONATHAN PACE vs. JAMES STATON
Court: Supreme Court of North Carolina
Jurisdiction: North Carolina
Decision Date: 1843-12
Citations: 4 Ired. 32
Docket Number: 
Parties: DEN ON DEMISE OF JONATHAN PACE vs. JAMES STATON.
Judges: 
Reporter: North Carolina Reports
Volume: 26
Pages: 32–34

Head Matter:
DEN ON DEMISE OF JONATHAN PACE vs. JAMES STATON.
^ possession of .twenty-one years under colorable title and under known and visible boundaries, will confer a good title and bar the entry of any person, claiming under the State, without any reference to the period, at which the person so entering on the previous possessor' acquired! his right or claim under the State. -
The word “ entry” in the act of Assembly (Rev. Stat. c. 65, s. 2) means an actual entry into the land, as the exercise of a right under a valid legal title' derived from the State, and not an entry in a public office, as of vacant and unappropriated land, to which the party intends to perfect a title.
Appeal from the Superior Court of Law of Henderson County, at Fall Term, 1843, his Honor Judge Dick, presiding.
This action of ejectment was instituted on the 3d of February, 1842, and the plaintiff claimed title as follows : In November, 1815, Moses Martin by deed conveyed the premises, as described in the declaration, to the lessor of the plain-tifi; and he immediately entered and hath retained possession ever since ; except, as it appeared, that at the time of bringing this suit the defendant had taken possession of a field, part of the land so conveyed to, and possessed by the lessor of the plaintiff.
To shew the title in himself, the defendant produced a grant from the State to him, dated in April, 1836, for that part of the land into which he had thus entered. And. on the part of the defendant it was insisted, that the plaintiff could not recover, because his lessor had not possession of the premises for twenty-one years before the issuing of the grant to the defendant.
Of that opinion was the Court and so instructed the jury, who gave a verdict for the defendant, and from the judgment rendered thereon the plaintiff appealed.
No counsel for either party in this court.

Opinion:
Ruffin, C. J.
It must be assumed upon the case as sta ted, that the defendant, did not take possession of tile field claimed by him before 1842; because he proved no' possession before that time, and because' the decision of the Court is based on the fact, that the grant issued to' the defendant before the possession of the plaintiff had Continued for twenty-one years, and n5t upon the ground,' that the defendant had entered under his grant before the expiration of the twenty-one years. In that we think the opinion delivered by .his Honor is erroneous. It the truth be, as it is necessarily to be inferred here, that the lessor of the plaintiff had possession for twenty one years, under colorable title, of the premise's, u'nder known and visible boundaries, before the' defendant entered, then the title of the lessor of the plaintiff is ratified, couñrmed, and declared a good and legal b'ar to the entry of the defendant under the right or claim of the State, by the express words of the act of 1791 (Rev. Stat. c. 65, s. 2); and that, without any reference whatever to the period, at which the defendant, thus entering on the previous1 possessor, acquired his right or claim under the State — in other words, obtained his grant. We-have bee'n ht a loss to conjecture a ground for the construction of the act, which was adopted in the Superior Court. The only color for it, that has been suggested, is, that the "entry" mentioned in the act and thereby barred is to be understood as " an entry of the land as vacant; " and, therefore,- that making such an entry and obtaining a grant thereon, before the expiration of twenty-one years, vest in the grantee a good title', provided he' sue for or take possession of the land within seven years alter the grant. But that is manifestly, we think, a mistake of the sense of the Legislature. The term " entry" in the act of 1791 means precisely what it does in that of 1715, both being acts for quieting ancient titles to lands, and, thus, in pari materia. In the act of 1715 the language is, that no preson, who'shall' have title to lands, "shall thereunto enter or make claim " but within se'ven years,- but that all possessions, held without suing such claim as aforesaid,- shall be a perpetual bar against all persops :• which unquestionably means an entry into the land or a taking possession thereof. From the nature of the subject, the same word, even if standing alone, must be received in the like sense in the latter statute. But tke context pUts jt beyond doubt. The subsequent words, "under the right or claim of the State," annexed to and qualifying the term "entry" prove the act to mean an entry into the lands, as the exercise of a right under a valid legal title derived from the State, and not an entry in a public office, as of vacant and unappropriated land, to which the party intends to perfect a title.
Per Curiam, Judgment reversed and venire de novo.