Case Name: REA v. DOW MOTOR CO.
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1948-06-28
Citations: 36 So. 2d 750
Docket Number: No. 7182
Parties: REA v. DOW MOTOR CO.
Judges: 
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 36
Pages: 750–759

Head Matter:
REA v. DOW MOTOR CO.
No. 7182.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Second Circuit.
June 28, 1948.
Rehearing Denied Sept. 15,1948.
Gist, Thornton & Murchison, of Alexandria, for appellant.
Eubank, Richey & Richey, of Alexandria, for appellee.

Opinion:
TALIAFERRO, Judge.
Plaintiff suffered serious physical injuries from, a collision between his two door Dodge automobile and a stationary United States army command car owned by Charles Milby Dow, a resident of the City of Houston, Texas, who is engaged in the business of buying and selling motor .vehicles under the trade name of "Dow Motor Company". . The accident occurred- at about the hour of 7:00 o'clock P.M., January 29, 1945, on state highway No. 165, two miles south of the Village ' of Glenmora, in Rapides Parish, Louisiana.
Plaintiff, accompanied by his wife and adult son, William, left his home in North-port, Alabama, in the Dodge car, early in the morning of the day of the accident, and reached the City of Alexandria, Louisiana, about the hour of 5:45 P.M. There the plaintiff relieved his son as driver and was at the wheel when the accident occurred. The party was enroute to Port Arthur, Texas, to visit with a married daughter.
Defendant, through a representative, on the day of the accident, purchased several motor vehicles (trucks and cars) from the Government.' Several of his employees had driven to Camp Claiborne, where the vehicles were located, and were taking them to Houston, Texas. This was done in units of two vehicles. The front bumper of one was attached to the rear bumper of another so securely that there could not be lateral movement of''the rear one.
The party came over in the command car involved in the accident, and on account of the poor condition of its fabric top, this car was attached, bumper to bumper, to one of the purchased trucks that was being .driven by an employee named Louis Peska. This unit was the most northerly of the cqnvoy., The unit immediately in advance of Peska's was in charge of a Negro man named Hawkins. It consisted of two trucks. Some trouble developed in the mechanism of the front truck of this unit and it was driven entirely onto the west shoulder of the road, twelve feet wide, and stopped to await the arrival of Peska's unit. Peska is an automobile mechanic and had provided himself with tools to do repair woric should need therefor arise. He observed the parked unit in front of him and drove to within about six inches of it and stopped. The truck occupied by'him was driven at an angle entirely off of the pavement but the rear wheel of the command car rested three feet or more from its western edge. Peska got out of the truck and proceeded along the west shoulder to see what had happened to the Hawkins unit. On being informed of the nature of the trouble, he returned to his own vehicle and as he was climbing upon the seat, with the intention of backing up and then going forward to park in front of the Hawkins unit,- the right front end of plaintiff's car ran into the left rear corner of the command car and from this collision this lawsuit arose.
Plaintiff alleged that he was driving at a speed of less than thirty-five miles per hour when suddenly blinded by the lights of an approaching automobile going north on said highway; that he then dimmed his own headlights and reduced the speed of his vehicle, but the other driver did not dim his lights and in spite of these precautions he crashed into the command car, the réar end of which blocked all or nearly all of his side of the road; that as soon as he observed the command car in front of him he tried to avert the accident by applying the brakes and swerving to his left. He further alleged that when the accident occurred a light rain was falling and that the command car was camouflaged, due to it having been originally painted olive-drab; that because, of its color the car could .not, under conditions then prevailing, be seen by the use of ordinary care and vigilance.
Plaintiff's action is predicated upon several instances of negligence accredited to defendant's agent and employee, Peska, including the following:
That the car was stopped with a portion of it on and over the main paved part of the highway in violation of Rule 15 of Section 3 of Act 286 of 1938; that said vehicle was parked without lights or reflectors of any kind or character to apprise traffic from the north of its presence and position; that no flares were placed on the highway, above and below said unit, as required by law, in order to give notice that part of the paved portion of the road was occupied by it.
Plaintiff alleged that said Dow Motor Company is either a corporation or a partnership; and if the former, the names of the members thereof are unknown to him. Service on the Secretary of State, as provided by Act 184 of 1932, was prayed for, and accordingly made.
Following the overruling of exceptions of no cause and no right of action, defendant answered. The answer is in the name of the Dow Motor Company; and as to legal entity it averred that it is neither a corporation nor a partnership, but an individual doing business under the trade name of "Dow Motor Company". The name of the individual was not disclosed in the answer.
Defendant alleged that notwithstanding plaintiff's charges relative thereto to the contrary, the headlights of the command car, as well as its two tail lights, were burning brightly immediately prior to and at the time of the accident, and in addition, as further notice of its presence, to motorists approaching from the north, there were on the rear end of this car two four-inch circular red reflectors that were then normally functioning. Further answering, defendant accredits the accident solely to the negligence and carelessness of plaintiff in that he was driving recklessly on a wet highway at a time when it was-.dark, raining, and visibility poor; that by the,exercise of ordinary care and alertness he should have seen defendant's car in time to avert running into it; that if plaintiff's vision was impaired by the bright lights of an oncoming car, as he alleged, and by atmospheric conditions then prevailing, he was grossly negligent in not bringing his car to a complete stop or reducing its speed to the extent and bringing 'it under such control, that he could have instantly stopped it in the event conditions suddenly developed that would make such action necessary.
In the alternative, the above mentioned acts of negligence on plaintiff's part are pleaded in- bar of recovery by him, should the court find and hold defendant to have been negligent in any respect as a contributing cause of the accident.
The trial judge gave judgment for the plaintiff, and assigned lengthy written reasons to support it. After rendition of judgment but before same was signed, the plaintiff by petition moved to have the case re-opened in - order to allow him opportunity to prove, as he had overlooked doing theretofore, that Charles Milby Dow was the sole owner of the Dow Motor Company as su'ch ownership had not been expressly admitted in defendant's answer.
A rule issued which ordered the defendant to show cause why the case should not be re-opened "for the purpose of taking testimony to determine the name of the individual doing business as Dow Motor Company". Service of the rule was made on the attorneys of record of this company.
Defendant vigorously opposed the application to re-open on several grounds, viz: that it came too late after the case had been tried and judgment rendered against the named defendant; that there is no law, statutory or otherwise, to warrant re-opening a case for a new trial thereof, and to adduce testimony to change, alter, amend or contradict the allegations of the petition or answer either by substitution or adding the name of any person or individual as a party defendant therein, or otherwise ; that service herein was made on the Secretary of State under a statute (Act 86 of 1928, as amended by Act 184 of 1932) authorizing siich procedure on the theory that the Dow Motor Company was either a corporation or a partnership; that, in fact, it is neither, nor is it á legal entity, and for this 'reason the service attempted herein is invalid and of no-effect; that to designate said Dow as a defendant and to include his name in the judgment as being the or a párty condemned, would be without legal service and citation under the laws of Louisiana, and in violation of the due process provisions of the Constitutions of the United States and of this State.
Defendant in his answer to said rule:, also excepted to the application to re-open on the grounds that it disclosed neither a cause nor a right of action.
The court sustained plaintiff's contentions with respect to re-opening the case. Thereafter, he filed an amended petition wherein it is alleged that the defendant herein, Charles Milby Dow, is doing business under the trade name of Dow Motor Company, and who is in reality the sole owner of the business carried on in that name. Testimony taken by depositions amply supports the contention of the plaintiff in this respect. On rule to show cause why this testimony should not be admitted, the Dow Motor Company, through its counsel, of record, but not for Dow, excepted to the rule on the ground that the court is without jurisdiction ratione personae to substitute said Charles Milby Dow, a non-resident, as party defendant in the case, or to render any judgment against him since the suit was not instituted against him, no citation was issued to him, and he has not been served individually or through the Secretary of State to appear and answer plaintiff's demand; and again he charges that to sustain plaintiff's position herein and condemn the said Dow for damages sought, would be in violation of the due process provisions of the Constitutions of the United States and of this State. U.S. Const. Amend. 14; Const.1921, art. 1, § 2.
Admissibility of the mentioned testimony was further objected to by Dow Motor Company on the ground that same is not responsive to any of the allegations of the petition, is immaterial, irrelevant, incompetent, and is offered to enlarge the pleadings and substitute a party defendant who was not made so originally.
The court ruled that the proffered testimony was admissible under the allegations of the amended petition, and then signed judgment against "Charles Milby Dow, doing business as the Dow Motor Company", condemning him to pay to the plaintiff the sum of $15,121.90. Suspen-sive appeal was perfected by Dow and also by the Dow Motor Company.
As we study this record, the pleadings become more' and more interesting. They are unique in that although it is seriously argued and contended that the Dow Motor Company is not a legal entity, has no standing in court as a defendant, and that the service of process herein is invalid and without effect, as against Dow, yet he has in such company a champion who has left no stone unturned to protect him against having to respond for payment under the judgment so vigorously attacked.
Defendant erroneously likens the application to re-open a case for a restricted purpose to a motion for a new trial, and his counsel forcefully argues this proposition. But the premise being not well founded, the argument of necessity loses much of its potency. He argues that a new trial is available only to those persons who are aggrieved by the judgment. The Code of Practice provides that judgments may be revised in four different ways, one of which is by new trial, and prescribes the grounds on and manner and method by which an aggrieved litigant may avail himself of the same. Code of Practice, Articles Nos. 556-563. These articles do not, strictly speaking, control in applications to re-open. Nowhere in this Code, nor elsewhere, do we find any express law that authorizes the re-opening of a case after trial, in order to supply, in a restricted way, evidence appropriate to the ends of justice. However, the practice of re-opening cases for limited purposes is now and has been for a long time well recognized by the courts of this state. Pertinent to this discussion is Code of Practice, Article No. 484, which reads:
"After all incidental questions shall have been decided, and both parties have produced their respective evidence, the argument commences; no witness then can be heard, nor proof introduced except with the consent of all the parties."
Defendant relies heavily upon this article and if it stood alone it would afford much comfort to him, but the strictness of the rule therein announced has been materially modified by repeated rulings of the Supreme Court. In Succession of Lefort, 139 La. 51, 68, 71 So. 215, 220, Ann.Cas. 1917E, 769, the court, after quoting this article, said:
"This article has been interpreted to mean that, after all parties have announced that the testimony is closed, neither party has a legal right to introduce further evidence, hut that the privilege of doing so may be granted by the court in its discretion and in furtherance of justice. The judgment of the court refusing to admit further evidence will not be reversed by this court unless it is manifestly erroneous and productive of injustice. See Vicksburg Liquor & Tobacco Co. v. Jefferies, 45 La.Ann. 621, 632, 12 So. 743; State v. Chandler, 36 La.Ann. 177, and School Board of Union Parish v. Trimble, 33 La.Ann. 1073, 1079."
It may truly be said that applications of the character under discussion address themselves to the sound discretion of the court and when sustained, its action will not be disturbed by an appellate court unless it manifestly appears that harmful results or injustice will follow. In the present case it is obvious that by granting the application to re-open no harm or injustice was done.
But appellant vigorously argues that regardless of the general rule above discussed, 'after a case has been tried, submitted and judgment therein rendered, the door is closed to its further consideration by the trial court, except after a new trial or rehearing timely applied for has been granted; such application to be in proper form and supported by proper basis. He cites Lansing et al. v. Miller, 19 La.App. 257, 140 So. 79 to sustain this position. The question tendered in the application to reopen in that case is quite different from that now before us. In that case, to fasten liability on the defendant for the damage caused by the falling of a deflated balloon, depended upon ownership and control of the balloon at the time it ascended and fell. Ownership in the defendant was not admitted in answer and inadvertently was not proven on trial by the plaintiff. Judgment of necessity went for the defendant after which a new trial was applied for on the ground that plaintiff's counsel was misled by the answer into believing that ownership and control of the balloon were not controverted issues in the case, and, therefore, introduced no proof to establish these very material facts. It was contended that .because of this situation the judgment should have been one of non-suit instead of the'rejection of the demand. This contention was rejected by the lower court for the reason that the answer clearly put at issue the question of ownership and control of the offending balloon. On appeal to this court the judgment was affirmed. This ruling,- in our opinion, should not have any influence in the present case for the primary reason, among others, as we shall hereinafter endeavor to demonstrate, it was not imperatively necessary to< the effectiveness of the judgment as against Dow, that ownership of the business conducted under the trade name "Dow Motor Company" be established prior to signing of judgment. Conversely, in the Lansing case, supra, proof of ownership and control of the balloon at the time of its ascension and falling was absolutely necessary to the success of plaintiff's case.
The adoption of a trade name by one engaged in business is not only lawful but common practice. It is to be condemned only when done to cover up fraud or other illegal practices. While we have not found nor have we been cited to a Louisiana case wherein the question was tendered, the right to sue in a trade name and the corollary right of others to sue one doing business in such name, is well recognized and established in other jurisdictions. 47 Corpus Juris, § 321, 469, verbo "Parties". Surely, recognition of such rights is free of reasonable objection. It is -entirely conceivable that in a given case the identity of the one who owns the business conducted in a trade name could not be timely ascertained for a creditor to protect himself against the fraudulent acts of the unknown and undisclosed owner. We know that it is common practice to ask for judgment not only against the alleged owner of a business carried on in a trade name, but also against the trade name itself. .Property of the owner, whether standing in his individual name or in the trade name, is subject to execution under judgment against either or both.
To illustrate and emphasize this line of reasoning, suppose John Doe assumed the name of John Roe, and under this assumed name he transacts business and incurs obligations in a place where his true name is not known, and he is sued. Judgment is rendered against John Roe. In these circumstances no one would argue that property owned by and standing in the name of John Doe would not be subject to seizure and sale to satisfy the judgment against John Roe. In the suit of Clemmens v. Washington Park Steamboat Company, C. C., 171 F. 168, the court, after attempt to collect judgment, allowed the introduction of testimony to prove that the defendant was only a trade name under which the Gloucester Ferry Company, a corporation, did business. The court, in passing, very properly held that to permit introduction of said evidence would not have the effect of substituting another person as defendant, but did have the effect of establishing the identity of the true defendant. Of course, it follows by implication, if not expressly so stated, that such evidence would not have the effect of altering or changing the judgment in any material respect.
It is our view of the applicable law that any service of process adequate to bring the Dow Motor Company into court and confer jurisdiction ratione personae upon it, has like effect as to Dow, since he and the trade name, so as concerns this suit, are identical. Evidently Dow had knowledge of the filing of the suit and of the service of process on the Secretary of State, because able counsel was promptly employed and that counsel unreservedly came into court and answered the petition in the trade name. Such an appearance being general, waived every legal objection to the validity of citation and service and to the jurisdiction of the court not only as to the trade name but also to Dow. Article 93 of the Code of Practice. Stanley v. Jones, 197 La. 627, 2 So.2d 45.