Case Name: John M. PAFF, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 2004-08-13
Citations: 884 So. 2d 271
Docket Number: No. 2D03-2950
Parties: John M. PAFF, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: SILBERMAN, J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 884
Pages: 271–276

Head Matter:
John M. PAFF, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. 2D03-2950.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
Aug. 13, 2004.
Rehearing Denied Sept. 16, 2004.
James Marion Moorman, Public Defender, and Cynthia J. Dodge, Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellant.
Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Helene S. Parnés, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appel-lee.

Opinion:
ALTENBERND, Chief Judge.
John M. Paff appeals a judgment withholding adjudication for possession of cocaine. Mr. Paff entered an open plea of guilty to the charge, reserving the right to appeal the denial of his dispositive motion to suppress the cocaine. We reverse the judgment because law enforcement officers did not have a reasonable suspicion to stop Mr. Paffs vehicle. Even if Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 120 S.Ct. 673, 145 L.Ed.2d 570 (2000), applies to the stop of a vehicle, Mr. Paff was not violating any traffic regulation and his vehicle was not otherwise engaged in flight when he was seized and his car searched.
Around midnight on August 24, 2002, a deputy sheriff on patrol in Sarasota pulled into a gas station and noticed two cars parked in a shadowy area of the driveway. The cars were stopped, each facing an opposite direction with the driver's side windows aligned. This was not a designated parking area, and the cars were obstructing traffic flow through the gas station, which apparently was .open. As the deputy sheriff pulled into the station, he believed that the occupants of the cars noticed his vehicle. Both cars then left the gas station. Although the deputy sheriff described the two cars as leaving the gas station "real quick," he admitted that neither driver committed any traffic infraction when leaving the gas station. Because the deputy knew that drug deals commonly occurred in this parking lot, he believed that the occupants of the vehicles had participated in a drug transaction. Thus, he immediately performed a Terry stop of Mr. Paffs vehicle and detained it to await the arrival of a police dog to sniff the vehicle for drugs. After a considerable period, the canine unit arrived and the dog alerted to an area within the vehicle. The deputy searched the interior and discovered two rocks of crack cocaine, which Mr. Paff was charged with possessing.
Mr. Paff filed a motion to suppress the cocaine, asserting that the deputy sheriff lacked reasonable suspicion to stop his vehicle. See § 901.151(2), Fla. Stat. (2002); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). The circuit court denied the motion, based primarily upon the State's argument that Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 120 S.Ct. 673, 145 L.Ed.2d 570, applied to this scenario and supported a finding that the deputy sheriff had a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity sufficient to permit an investigatory stop of Mr. Paffs vehicle.
In Wardlow, officers patrolling a "high crime area" observed Wardlow, who upon seeing them, turned and fled, running through a gangway, an alley, and then onto the street. 528 U.S. at 121-22, 120 S.Ct. 673. In holding that the officers had a reasonable suspicion to stop Wardlow based upon his "unprovoked flight" in the "high crime area," the United States Supreme Court noted that "nervous, evasive behavior is a pertinent factor in determining reasonable suspicion." Id. at 124, 120 S.Ct. 673. The Supreme Court explained, "Headlong flight — wherever it occurs — is the consummate act of evasion," and "[fjlight, by its very nature, is not 'going about one's business.' " Id. at 124, 125, 120 S.Ct. 673.
As this court previously noted, prior to the Supreme Court's opinion in Wardlow, Florida courts generally held that a person's elusive behavior upon spotting a police officer in a high-crime area did not provide an officer with reasonable suspicion that the person had committed, was committing, or was about to commit a crime. See Copeland v. State, 756 So.2d 180 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000). Wardlow thus effectively reversed Florida decisions suppressing evidence retrieved as a result of a stop of a defendant based upon that person's presence in a high-crime area and his or her flight upon seeing police.
Prior to Wardlow, this court held that the stop of a motor vehicle under circumstances similar to those presented in this ease was unlawful because the circumstances did not support a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. See Jordan v. State, 707 So.2d 338 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998) (citing McCloud v. State, 491 So.2d 1164 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986)). The State suggests that Wardlow effectively overruled this line of cases. We disagree. See McMaster v. State, 780 So.2d 1026 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001).
Flight on foot is distinctly different than flight in a car. When "headlong flight" occurs on foot, the defendant's intent to elude an officer may be clear, even though no law is broken. When "flight" occurs in a vehicle, the vehicle often conceals the emotions of its occupants and it 'is more difficult to determine that such a defendant is demonstrating "nervous, evasive behavior," or is intending to engage in "headlong" flight. Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124, 120 S.Ct. 673. A car that obeys all traffic regulations when leaving a location when a police car arrives would seem to be the motor vehicle equivalent of a person who simply walks away from an officer on foot. Such a pedestrian does not invoke the rule of Wardlow. See, e.g., Lee v. State, 868 So.2d 577 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004) (refusing to apply Wardlow to justify stop when defendant was part of crowd that merely "dispersed" upon approach of law enforcement and defendant was simply walking quickly).
In this case, Mr. Paff simply drove away from the gas station in a manner and at a rate of speed that did not violate any traffic laws. The officer did not observe any transaction or discussion between the occupants of the .two cars nor did he see Mr. Paff acting nervously. The officer did not testify that Mr. Paff was driving eva sively. He stopped Mr. Paffs car as soon as it left the station and did not follow the car for a few blocks to observe the types of conduct that officers sometimes describe as evasive. This cannot be considered "headlong flight" from the sheriffs deputy, even if it was triggered by the sight of the patrol car. Particularly in light of the officer's testimony that the cars were blocking the through-way of the gas station when the deputy sheriff pulled in behind them, Mr. Paffs behavior was fully consistent with "going about one's business" when approached by an officer. See Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 125, 120 S.Ct. 673; Lee, 868 So.2d 577. Under these circumstances, the deputy sheriff had only a mere hunch, and not a reasonable suspicion, that Mr. Paff had committed, was committing, or was about to commit a criminal offense. See Jordan, 707 So.2d 338. We therefore reverse Mr. Paffs judgment and sentence and remand with instructions that the circuit court grant the motion to suppress.
Reversed and remanded.
SILBERMAN, J., concurs.
CANADY, J., dissents with opinion.
. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968).
. In F.E.A. v. State, 804 So.2d 528, 530 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002), the First District stated its "belief' that Jordan "may have been overruled by Wardlow," but the First District specifically declined to reach the issue. In F.E.A., officers observed the defendant run, jump into a car, and "speed-away." F.E.A., 804 So.2d at 529. This behavior is significantly more consistent with "headlong flight" than the behavior described in Jordan or in the present case. In cases in which the only "flight" alleged is the defendant's driving away in a vehicle in a manner that does not violate the traffic laws, we conclude Jordan applies and has not been overruled by Ward-low. Accord McMaster, 780 So.2d 1026.