Case Name: Sidney BENEROFE, Petitioner, v. STATE ROAD DEPARTMENT of Florida, an Agency of the State of Florida, and Escambia County, a political subdivision of the State of Florida, et al., Respondents
Court: Florida Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1969-01-15
Citations: 217 So. 2d 838
Docket Number: No. 37658
Parties: Sidney BENEROFE, Petitioner, v. STATE ROAD DEPARTMENT of Florida, an Agency of the State of Florida, and Escambia County, a political subdivision of the State of Florida, et al., Respondents.
Judges: DREW, THORNAL and CALDWELL (retired), JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 217
Pages: 838–840

Head Matter:
Sidney BENEROFE, Petitioner, v. STATE ROAD DEPARTMENT of Florida, an Agency of the State of Florida, and Escambia County, a political subdivision of the State of Florida, et al., Respondents.
No. 37658.
Supreme Court of Florida.
Jan. 15, 1969.
Jack S. Graff, of Levin, Askew, War-field, Levin & Graff, Pensacola, for petitioner.
Bryan W. Henry, P. A. Pacyna and Louis S. St. Laurent, Tallahassee, for respondents.

Opinion:
ERVIN, Chief Justice.
The petition for writ of certiorari reflected probable jurisdiction in this Court. However, after oral argument and upon further consideration, we have determined the writ was improperly issued and the writ must be and is discharged.
In reaching this conclusion, we call attention to the fact the District Court's opinion, reported in 210 So.2d at page 28, states that while a fee title was condemned, the State Road Department did not seek to condemn the land involved for a limited access highway and the landowner made no showing that the State intended to build any physical barricade which would impede ingress and egress to and from the landowner's abutting property. Under these circumstances the District Court held the trial court properly excluded evidence of severance damages for loss of access. The District Court further held that if the landowner's right to ingress and egress is later taken after the instant condemnation has been concluded, the landowner has remedy by injunction or by inverse condemnation.
It appears to us the cases cited for conflict, Weir v. Palm Beach County (Fla.), 85 So.2d 865, and Houston Texas Gas & Oil Corporation v. Hoeffner (DCA2d), 132 So.2d 38, do not conflict with the District Court decision.
The issue in this case is whether the condemnation of a fee simple title in a strip of land for a right of way for a state highway has the automatic effect of taking the condemnee's right of ingress and egress from his remaining abutting lands. We agree with Respondents it does not. See 26 Am.Jur.2d, Eminent Domain, § 199.
In line with the holding of the District Court and the text from 26 Am. Jur.2d, Eminent Domain, § 199, we agree that even when the fee of a street or highway is in a city or a public highway agency, the abutting owners have easements of access, light, and air from the street or highway appurtenant to their land, and unreasonable interference therewith may constitute a taking or damaging within constitutional provisions requiring compensation therefor. Such easements may be condemned originally, as in the case of a limited access highway; or they may be acquired later on, if need for their acquisition arises, by the municipal or highway authorities; or compensation may be required therefor in timely and proper cases by the abutting landowners where deprivation thereof actually occurs without prior acquisition. Compare Fleming v. State Road Department, 157 Fla. 170, 25 So.2d 373; Selden v. City of Jacksonville, 28 Fla. 558, 10 So. 457, 14 L.R.A. 370, and Florida State Turnpike Authority v. Anhoco Corp. (Fla.1959), 116 So.2d 8.
The writ of certiorari is discharged.
DREW, THORNAL and CALDWELL (retired), JJ., concur.
TAYLOR, Circuit Judge, concurs specially with Opinion.