Case Name: GULF OIL CORPORATION v. STATE MINERAL BOARD et al.
Court: Louisiana Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1974-12-02
Citations: 317 So. 2d 576
Docket Number: No. 54776
Parties: GULF OIL CORPORATION v. STATE MINERAL BOARD et al.
Judges: BARHAM, J., concurs in result and assigns reasons.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 317
Pages: 576–605

Head Matter:
GULF OIL CORPORATION v. STATE MINERAL BOARD et al.
No. 54776.
Supreme Court of Louisiana.
Dec. 2, 1974.
On Rehearing July 25, 1975.
Henican, James & Cleveland, C. Ellis Henican, Carl W. Cleveland, New Orleans, for Milner Realty Co., Inc., Louis Carma-delle, Jr. and Gustave Carmadelle, defendants-relators.
William- J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Edward M. Carmouche, Charles Romano, Sp. Asst. Attys. Gen., for defendants-respond ents State Mineral Bd. and Register of State Land Office.
Arthur D. Mouton, Wm. H. Mouton, Wm. H. Mouton Law Offices, Lafayette, for amici curiae.
Blake G. Arata, John M. McCollam, Gordon Arata, McCollam & Watters, New Orleans, for amicus curiae.

Opinion:
SANDERS, Chief Justice.
Gulf Oil Corporation deposited a substantial sum of money in the registry of the Twenty-Fifth Judicial District Court and instituted a concursus proceeding to determine the true owner of property which it was leasing. The district court rendered judgment in favor of the State Mineral Board and the Register of the State Land Office.
Milner Realty Co., Inc., Louis Carma-delle, Jr., and Gustave Carmadelle appealed. The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment of the trial court, decreeing the State of Louisiana the owner of certain water bottoms located in Plaquemines Parish and awarding oil royalty payments to the State Mineral Board. 291 So.2d 807. We granted certiorari to review the judgment of the Court of Appeal. La., 294 So.2d 831.
Milner Realty Co., Inc., Louis Carma-delle, Jr., and Gustave Carmadelle, relators, urge that the Court of Appeal erred in holding that the nullity of a patent of navigable water bottoms was not cured by the lapse of six years, pursuant to Act 62 of 1912 (LSA-R.S. 9:5661), which provides:
"Actions, including those by the State of Louisiana, to annul any patent issued by the state, duly signed by the governor and the register of the state land office,- and of record in the state land office, are prescribed by six years, reckoning from the day of the issuance of the patent."
The State advances several grounds for affirming the judgment of the Court of Appeal. It argues that the private claimants are precluded from maintaining that the property was the bed of a navigable water bottom at the time of the Sheriff's sale to the original patentee on October 29, 1910, or on the date of the alleged patent, citing State v. Scott, 185 So.2d 877 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1966). In addition, the State asserts that where a portion of the bed of a navigable body of water is adjudicated to the State for taxes, Article 4, Section 2 of the Louisiana Constitution prohibits a redemption. The State also submits that Act 62 of 1912, the prescriptive statute relied upon by the private claimants, is inapplicable to the patent involved in this proceeding. We are of the opinion that the latter argument is well founded.
It is well settled that prescriptive statutes are stricti juris and will not be extended beyond the letter of the law. Foster v. Breaux, 263 La. 1112, 270 So.2d 526 (1972); Coastal States Gas Producing Co. v. State Mineral Board, 199 So.2d 554 (La.App., 3rd Cir. 1967); Hebert v. Spano, 233 La. 813, 98 So.2d 199 (1957); United Carbon Company v. Mississippi River Fuel Corp., 230 La. 709, 89 So.2d 209 (1956); Hayes v. Levy, 81 So.2d 172 (La.App., 2nd Cir. 1955); Meyer v. Parish of Plaquemines, 11 So.2d 291 (La.App., Orl.Cir. 1942); State v. Stewart Bros. Cotton Co., 193 La. 16, 190 So. 317 (1939).
In United Carbon Company v. Mississippi River Fuel Corp., supra, this Court stated:
"It is equally well settled that prescriptive statutes are strictly construed, and the facts of the case must bring the action clearly within the specific provisions of the law sought to be applied."
By its terms, Act 62 of 1912 designates the patents to which it applies as those duly signed by the Governor, duly signed by the Register of the State Land Office, and recorded in the State Land Office. The State points out that the patent here was signed neither by the Governor nor the Register of the State Land Office. Nor was it recorded in the State Land Office.
Although the original patent was unavailable for examination, the certified copy of the patent offered into evidence indicates that the original was signed by the Governor. The original patentee, over the State's objection, confirmed that the original was signed by the Governor, but that it had been destroyed. For purposes of this decision, this Court accepts the relators' allegation that it was signed by the Governor. The patent, however, still does not qualify as a prescriptible patent within the intendment of Act 62 of 1912. There is no evidence that the patent was signed by the Register of the State Land Office. Although the private claimants assert that the original patent was signed by I. S. Haspel, President of the Board of Commissions for the Grand Prairie Levee District, that signature is insufficient to bring it within the terms of the statute. The statute specifies the signature of the Register of State Lands. Admittedly, the essential signature did not appear on the document.
Moreover, the contested patent is not registered in the State Land Office. The patent was given to the State Land Office only four or five years before the present suit. The record reflects that it was accepted as supplemental information.
We conclude that Act 62 of 1912 is inapplicable to the present patent, because it was not signed by the Register of the State Land Office nor duly recorded in the State Land Office.
It follows, therefore, that the lower courts were correct in holding that the State of Louisiana is the true owner of the property leased by the Gulf Oil Corporation.
For the reasons assigned, the judgment of the Court of Appeal is affirmed.
BARHAM, J., concurs in result and assigns reasons.
SUMMERS, J., concurs for the reasons assigned.
. In placing our decision on the ground that the prescriptive statute is inapplicable, we do not imply that the other grounds advanced for affirming the judgment may not have merit. We do not reach them.