Case Name: DUTTON v. VIERLING
Court: Texas Courts of Civil Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1912-05-29
Citations: 152 S.W. 450
Docket Number: 
Parties: DUTTON v. VIERLING.
Judges: 
Reporter: South Western Reporter
Volume: 152
Pages: 450–455

Head Matter:
DUTTON v. VIERLING.
(Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. Austin.
May 29, 1912.
On Motion for Rehearing, Nov. 27, 1912.
Rehearing Denied Dec. 18, 1912.)
On Motion for Rehearing.
1. Waters an.d Water Courses (§ 89 )— Bed or Stream — Boundaries—Intent or Grantor.
Although a grant may call for marked corners upon the bank of a nonnavigable stream, and for a line or lines between such corners which do not correspond with the center of the stream, yet the boundary line extends to the center of the stream unless there is a clear intent that the grantor wished otherwise.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Waters and Water Courses, Cent. Dig. §§ 91, 92, 107; Dec. Dig. § 89. ]
2. Boundaries (§ 43 ) — Judgment — Construction-Field Notes.
Where a judgment gives to a certain party a tract of land, and in describing it used the same field notes that were used in a survey made many years before, the construction thereof as to boundaries will be the same as though the field notes were contained in a voluntary deed.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Boundaries, Cent. Dig. § 208; Dec. Dig. § 43. ]
Appeal from District Court, McCulloch County; John W. Goodwin, Judge.
Action between M. C. Dutton and G. W. Vierling. Judgment for the latter, and the former appeals.
Affirmed on motion for rehearing.
F. M. Newman, of Brady, for appellant. J. E. Shropshire, of Brady, for appellee.
For other eases see same topic and section NUMBER in Dec. Dig. & Am. Dig. Key-No. Series & Rep'r Indexes
For other eases see same topic and section NUMBER in Deo. Dig. & Am. Dig. Key-No. Series & Rep’r Indexes

Opinion:
Findings of Fact.
KEY C. J.
The only issue involved in this suit is that of boundary. In 1889 a patent was issued to appellant to 160 acres of land. Prior to 1904 appellant brought suit for this 160 acres against Oscar Thompson. On May 2, 1904, judgment was rendered in favor of plaintiff in that suit for the land sued for less 9.733 acres, for which judgment was rendered for the defendant Thompson. Said 9.733 acres is described in said judgment as "beginning at a rock mound in the south line of said 160 acre tract 481.4 vrs. west of its S. E. corner, from which an L. O. 12 inches bears S. 16°31' W. 105 vrs.; thence north 522.72 vrs. to pecan 12 in. dia. marked # standing on south bank of Brady creek, thence S. 79°25' east down Brady creek 111.28 vrs. to a stake, from which a pecan 7 in. dia. bears S. 14 W. 12% vrs.; thence S. 499 vrs. to stake; thence W. 109.62 vrs. to place of beginning." Appellee claims title from Thompson under this judgment. There is no dispute as to the location of any of the corners described in said judgment, except the northwest corner. The pecan tree called for in said judgment is found and identified by the # marked on it at the proper distance from the southwest corner of said 9.733-acre tract, standing on the sloping bank of said creek, 78 feet north of where the slope begins, and 16 feet south of the water's edge. Between this marked tree and the water's edge there is another large pecan tree six feet nearer the water. Running from the pecan tree marked # the course called for there are other trees -between the line and the water for the first 100 feet, at which point the line thus run is 13% feet from the water. Continuing said line it enters the water at 192 feet. Continuing the course and distance called for places the northeast corner in about the middle of the creek bed below a large and deep hole of water in front of this tract down to 192 feet from said marked pecan tree. The bearing tree called for the northeast corner is gone, and said corner is found by running S. 79° E. from said marked pecan tree course and distance as called for in thg field notes of said tract. The creek is usually dry at the point where the northeast corner is located, but the hole of water above referred to is permanent.
Upon the uncontradicted facts above set out, the trial court, no jury having been demanded, rendered judgment for appellee, from which we quote as follows: "And it is ordered, adjudged, and decreed by the. court that the north line of said 9.733-acre tract as above described is not restricted to call for course and distance in running from the pecan tree at its northwest corner to the stake called for at its northeast corner, but that said line extends to the middle thread of Brady creek, and that the call in said line for the south bank of Brady creek means the center of' Brady creek, and that the true and correct north boundary line of said 9.733-acre tract is a line beginning at a point in the center thread of the stream of Brady creek, due north from said pecan tree marked # standing on the south bank of Brady creek, called to be the northwest corner of said 9.733-acre tract, and running thence in an easterly direction down the center of Brady creek about 111.62 varas to where it intersects the meridian line running north and south along the east boundary of said 9.733-acre tract."
Opinion.
It will be seen from the foregoing findings of fact that the issue in this ease is the proper construction of the calls in the judgment in the ease of Dutton v. Thompson, with reference to the location of the northwest corner of said 9.733-acre tract.
There is a general rule in reference to the location of boundary lines that the footsteps of the surveyor who made the original survey are to be followed, if they can be ascertained. In this case they can be ascertained with certainty. There is no dispute as to the southwest corner. That is found just where the original surveyor placed it. Beginning at this corner and running north the distance called for it in the field notes, we find and identify with absolute certainty the marked pecan tree called for as the northwest corner of the Thompson 9.733-acre tract.
But there is one exception to following the footsteps of the surveyor in establishing the boundaries of a survey, and that is where the surveyor ran the line to the bank of a stream and marked bearing trees to identify the place on the bank of the stream where he stopped, so that we may identify such place with certainty. Nevertheless, in most instances, the corner of the tract surveyed by him will not be the place on the bank where he stopped, but the center of the stream, and where he actually surveys from the place on the bank where he stopped to another place on the bank of said stream above or below, and calls In his field notes to run up or down the stream to such other place, the boundary line will not be where he actually ran from one such corner to the other, but it will be the center of the stream. This rule was applied to this case by the learned judge who tried it. But this is a rule of reason, and not a rule of thumb. It is applied because from the necessity of the case. The surveyor usually could not go into a stream to make a corner, and he makes his corner on the bank, because it is desirable, where it can be done, to identify the place where he stopped; and such place is to be taken in most cases, not as the corner, but the place where the projected line enters the stream, and it is immaterial whether such place be at the edge of the water or at a convenient distance back on the lin'e.
This rule is applied in public grants for the reason that it is the policy of the government to ultimately grant all of its lands to individuals. Where streams are made the boundaries of surveys, it is in order that the owners on each side may have access to the water; and it is unreasonable to suppose that the government intended to reserve the narrow strip of land between surveys covered by nonnavigable streams. For a like reason the rule usually applies to private grants.
But the rule that the footsteps of the original surveyor must be followed, and the rule that the call for the bank of a stream will be construed to extend to the middle of the stream, are subordinate to another rule of law, and that is that every contract is to be so construed as to carry into effect the intention of the contracting parties. The purpose of all rules of construction is to carry into effect this primary rule of law. Every written instrument must be construed by its own language, read in the light of the surrounding circumstances. In this ease appellant was formerly the owner of the land upon both sides of the creek. She is still such owner, unless the judgment in Dutton-Thompson Case vested title in Thompson to the middle of the stream. To determine whether or not it did so, we must look to the language of such judgment, read in the light of the surrounding circumstances.
Appellee asserts that, where a private grant is bounded by a nonnavigable stream, it will pass title to the center of the stream. True; but to say that, therefore, the appel-lee should recover in this case is to assume the very point in issue, viz.; Is the creek the north boundary line of the tract recovered by Thompson? It is not so stated in said judgment. Had the call been for a stake on the south bank of the creek, and thence down the creek with its meanders to another point on the south bank of the creek, under the adjudicated cases, we would be compelled to hold that the calls carried the boundary line to the center of the stream. In some cases it has been held that a call '.down or up a stream means with the meanders. This would be so where there were a number of calls intended to point out the course of the stream in its meanders. To hold that the calls in the Thompson judgment extended the west line to the center of the creek is to arbitrarily enforce the presumption that a call for a corner on the bank of a stream will extend the call to the center of the stream where the reason for such presumption does not exist. Said judgment shows upon its face that the land therein described was actually surveyed at some time prior to the entry of said judgment. The evidence shows that the pecan tree called for as the northwest corner of the Thompson tract marked # has been thus marked for at least 15 or 20 years. The calls in the judgment show that this survey was made with unusual particularity. Its beginning corner is identified by its distance from the original southeast corner of the 160-acre survey of which it is a part, and also by a bearing tree. The call is thence north 522.92 varas. It is not usual for calls in distances to be stated more accurately than one-fourth of a vara. In rare instances calls are made to the tenth of a vara, but here the call in a line over 500 varas long is to the hundredth part of a vara. Calls for course are seldom more accurate than to one-fourth of a degree; but here the call for the second line is south 79°25' east. Calls for quantity in surveys are rarely made for a less fraction than tenths, but here the calculation is carried to the thousandths. The call for the west line is "north 522.72 vrs. to pecan 12 in. dia. marked This tree is found and identified. The plain language of the field notes make this the northwest corner. Why should it not be so held? It is true this tree is further described as standing on the bank of the creek. The surveyor did not stop here because he could go no further. He did not stop where the bank began to slope. That was 78 feet farther back. He «could have gone 16.8 feet further before reaching the water's edge. He did not stop at this tree because it was the last place where he could have a permanent mark on the line. There was another large pecan tree 6 feet nearer the water. It may be said that 6 feet or even 16.8 feet to the water's edg/3 would not have amounted to much in the area; but we think it is worthy of consideration, where the length of the,line is given to Vioo part of a vara, and the area to the Viooo part of an acre. The seventh finding of fact made by the court is as follows: "I find that the pecan tree called for as standing on the bank of Brady creek, and marked # is on the ground, and that it is the corner of said 9.733-acre tract." We do not think that this finding of fact will sustain the judgment in this ease in the middle of the creek 16.8 feet, plus one-half the width of a large hole of water north of said tree.
One of the rules of construction which aids the rule that a line calling for a non-navigable stream as a boundary will be held to extend to the center of the stream is that the language of a grant will be construed most strongly against the grantor; and, in view of the general prevalence of said rule of construction, if a grantor does not so intend, he could and should protect himself against such rule by expressly declaring in the grant that it is not the purpose of the grantor to convey any portion of the stream. This rule cannot be applied in this case, for the. reason that the judgment in favor of Thompson was not a voluntary grant on appellant's part, but it took the land awarded to him from her and against her will. That judgment is res adjudicata in her favor as to all of said 160-acre survey, except the 9.733 acres described in said judgment, and that exception and the adjudication of that tract to Thompson was not equivalent to a voluntary grant by- appellant.
For the reasons herein given, the judgment of the trial court is here reversed and rendered so as to establish said pecan tree, as the northwest corner of said 9.733-aere tract, and the north line of same a line run from said tree north 79°25' east to intersection of the east line of said grant.
Reversed and rendered.