Case Name: Gary Alan DASHIELD, Jr., Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee
Court: Texas Courts of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 2003-04-17
Citations: 110 S.W.3d 111
Docket Number: No. 01-01-00697-CR
Parties: Gary Alan DASHIELD, Jr., Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.
Judges: Panel consists of Justices HEDGES, KEYES, and DUGGAN.
Reporter: South Western Reporter Third Series
Volume: 110
Pages: 111–126

Head Matter:
Gary Alan DASHIELD, Jr., Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.
No. 01-01-00697-CR.
Court of Appeals of Texas, Houston (1st Dist.).
April 17, 2003.
Discretionary Review Refused Sept. 24, 2003.
Lott J. Brooks, III, Houston, TX, for Appellant.
Charles A. Rosenthal, Jr., District Attorney-Harris County, Donald W. Rogers, Jr., Assistant District Attorney, Houston, TX, for Appellee.
Panel consists of Justices HEDGES, KEYES, and DUGGAN.
The Honorable Lee Duggan, Jr., retired Justice, Court of Appeals, First District of Texas at Houston, participating by assignment.

Opinion:
ADELE HEDGES, Justice.
EN BANC OPINION
Appellant pleaded not guilty by reason of insanity to aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. After appellant waived his right to a jury trial, the trial court found him guilty and assessed punishment at 20 years' confinement. We affirm.
Background
Appellant engaged in an unprovoked attack on a convenience store clerk, Dai Trang Nguyen, the complainant. In his sole point of error, appellant contends that the evidence is factually insufficient to support the trial court's rejection of his insanity defense.
Standard of Review
A defendant cannot be convicted of a criminal offense if he is legally insane at the time of the crime. Tex. Pen.Code Ann. § 8.01(a) (Vernon 2003). The standard is whether "at the time of the conduct charged" the defendant, "as a result of severe mental disease or defect, did not know that his conduct was wrong." Id.
The issue of insanity lies within the province of the jury (or, as here, the judge as sole fact-finder) to decide, not only as to the credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence, but also as to the limits of the defense. Bigby v. State, 892 S.W.2d 864, 878 (Tex.Crim.App.1994). When we review the fact-finder's rejection of an insanity defense, we must determine whether the finding is so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be manifestly unjust. Id. at 875.
Evidence Presented
The complainant was the only eyewitness who testified. She testified that, on April 4, 2000, appellant came into the convenience store where she worked. Appellant asked if the complainant had seen "a lady in pink come over here." She answered "no," and appellant left. Two hours later, appellant returned to the store with a brick in his hand. He waited in line while the complainant helped other customers. Appellant approached the counter, laid the brick on it, and then picked it up several times as if to throw it at the complainant. When the complainant reached for the telephone, appellant threw the brick at her, knocking her out. She suffered a broken jaw and facial lacerations. The complainant testified that, the first time appellant came into the store, she thought his question about the lady in pink was strange, but he looked normal. "But the second time he [sic] a little bit crazy, like, he angry," although the complainant had done nothing to provoke him. A lady dressed in pink had come in the store, but police could not establish any relationship between appellant and the lady in pink.
The store's videotape was admitted as State's exhibit 5. It shows that, as appellant left the store the first time, he looked at the complainant and said, "You're fixing to go down." When appellant returned, he approached the store four times before going in, each time tossing the brick in his hand. Once inside, he paced around, stood in line, disappeared from the camera view, and then reappeared at the counter. Appellant feigned with the brick as if to throw it at the complainant, and then threw it at her. The brick hit the com plainant, and she fell to the ground. Finally, the videotape shows appellant muttering something and leaving the store.
Houston Police Officer Millard F. Waters interviewed appellant 10 days after the assault at the Harris County Psychiatric Center, where appellant was being held. Officer Waters testified that appellant was lucid, knew his whereabouts, and understood why Waters was there. Officer Waters also testified that appellant had made some responses that "were not in reference" to questions asked of him.
Appellant's sole witness was Dr. Ramon A. Laval, Ph.D., a forensic psychiatrist in the psychiatric unit of the Harris County jail for the Department of Mental Health and Mental Retardation (MHMRA). Dr. Laval acts as a consultant and is often appointed by the court to evaluate inmates' competency and sanity. Dr. Laval had been a consultant for the MHMRA since 1985. He explained that it is only in "very, very, very few occasions- — -less than one in a thousand — that a person would justifiably be found insane at the time of the alleged offense."
Dr. Laval examined appellant on September 28, 2000, pursuant to defense counsel's motion. He concluded that appellant was psychotic and incompetent to stand trial. After a competency hearing, the jury found appellant mentally incompetent, but also found a substantial probability that he would attain competence within the foreseeable future. A few months later, after a period of observation and treatment, the MHMRA reported to the trial court that appellant was competent to stand trial.
On January 24, 2001, Dr. Laval re-examined appellant and reviewed appellant's records from the Harris County Psychiatric Center, where appellant had been admitted after the offense. Dr. Laval testified that appellant had a history of previous psychiatric episodes. He concluded that appellant was competent to stand trial, but was insane at the time of the offense.
Although Dr. Laval repeatedly expressed his opinion that appellant was insane at the time of the offense, his testimony contained some conflicting and inconclusive statements. For example, Dr. Laval testified that appellant's behavior on the store videotape was "not consistent" with schizophrenia or other major mental disorders: "Most people who suffer from a mental illness do not commit this type of offense. So, it has nothing to do with a mental illness." Despite this inconsistency, however, Dr. Laval did not change his opinion.
Additionally, Dr. Laval testified about his uncertainty regarding exactly when appellant could not discern between right and wrong: "So, I don't know whether five minutes prior or 20 minutes prior he would have known right from wrong. Insanity or sanity is in reference to a particular act, not in reference to just any type of psychiatric condition. So, I couldn't tell you." He further testified that appellant was of normal intelligence and was not retarded, and that it was possible appellant was "just plain mean."
Moreover, Dr. Laval acknowledged the dispute — regarding the exact diagnosis of appellant's mental condition — among other mental health professionals who had examined appellant. He explained that "it is not an exact science." He testified that there has been "from time to time dispute as to actually what he was suffering from," in terms of mental disease or defect, namely whether it was schizoaffective disorder, bipolar disorder, manic depression, schizophrenia, or a combination thereof. He also conceded that persons with such men tal illnesses are not necessarily insane at the time of an offense.
Insanity
Insanity is an affirmative defense. Tex. Pen.Code § 8.01. A defendant bears both the burden of proof and the burden of persuasion. Meraz v. State, 785 S.W.2d 146, 150 (Tex.Crim.App.1990); Taylor v. State, 856 S.W.2d 459, 461 (Tex.App.-Houstdn [1st Dist.] 1998), aff'd, 885 S.W.2d 154 (Tex.Crim.App.1994). The purpose of the insanity defense is to determine whether the accused should be held responsible for the crime, or whether his mental condition excuses him from such responsibility. Graham v. State, 566 S.W.2d 941, 948 (Tex.Crim.App.1978); Taylor, 856 S.W.2d at 468. To establish the defense of insanity, the defendant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that (1) because of severe mental disease or defect, (2) he did not know right from wrong at the time of the offense. Tex. Pen.Code § 8.01.
Expert witnesses, although capable of aiding the trier of fact in determining the issue of insanity, do not dictate the results. Graham, 566 S.W.2d at 948-49. Thus, expert testimony on the issue of appellant's ability to determine right from wrong does not establish insanity as a matter of law. Id. at 951; Torres v. State, 976 S.W.2d 345, 347-48 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1998, no pet.). The ultimate issue of criminal responsibility is beyond the province of an expert witness; otherwise, the issue "would be tried in hospitals rather than in courts." Graham, 566 S.W.2d at 949. While expert testimony may be helpful to the trier of fact, the ultimate determination of insanity is outside the purview of medical experts and should be left to the discretion of the trier of fact. Id. at 952-53.
It is not necessary for the State to present expert medical testimony that a defendant is sane in order to counter defense experts. Id. at 950. The trier of fact may accept or reject in whole or in part the testimony of expert medical witnesses. Id. at 950-51. Rarely will the trier of fact's findings regarding an insanity defense be overturned on appeal. Id. at 953. Accordingly, because the trial court was the sole judge of the credibility and weight to be given the testimony, the court was free to believe or disbelieve all or part of any witness's testimony. Alvarado v. State, 853 S.W.2d 17, 23 (Tex.Crim.App.1993).
Analysis
In addition to the expert testimony, the trial court heard lay testimony from the complainant and a police officer. The trial court also watched the videotape, which showed the offense and contained audio portions of the words spoken by appellant. There was evidence in the record to indicate that appellant approached the store four times before entering, placed the brick on the counter, picked it up several times as if to throw it at the complainant, and then threw the brick at the complainant. Appellant's equivocation could give rise to an inference that he was debating the rectitude of his assault, and thus, did appreciate the difference between right and wrong. He then left the store, which gives rise to a fair implication that he attempted to flee the scene before the police arrived. The trier of fact may consider appellant's demeanor before and after the offense, Schuessler v. State, 719 S.W.2d 320, 329 (Tex.Crim.App.1986), overruled on other grounds, Meraz, 785 S.W.2d at 155, and appellant's attempts to evade police. Murray v. State, 147 Tex. Crim. 474, 182 S.W.2d 475, 477 (1945).
The dissent bases its disposition on the fact that the expert's testimony was not controverted by the State. We do not believe that fact to be controlling. The State is not required to present expert medical testimony. Wade v. State, 630 S.W.2d 418, 419 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1982, no pet.). The issue of sanity is a question for the finder of fact, who may believe or disbelieve experts or lay witnesses as it chooses. Id. As the Court of Criminal Appeals explained, "The doctors' conclusions in terms of the statutory defense (as distinguished from their descriptions of the diagnostic process and results, and other properly medical matters) are of negligible weight in considering this issue." Graham, 566 S.W.2d at 951. Opinion testimony does not establish material facts as a matter of law. Id. (citing Muro v. Houston Fire & Casualty Ins. Co., 329 S.W.2d 326 (Tex.Civ.App.-San Antonio, 1959, writ ref. n.r.e.)).
We disagree with the dissent that the "relevant evidence leads to only one conclusion" — that appellant was legally insane at the time of the assault. The record in this case contains controverting evidence as to whether appellant knew the difference between right and wrong at the time of the offense. The trial court had the benefit of observing appellant's actions and demeanor in a videotape of the incident, hearing appellant's words in the audio portion of the tape, and listening to testimony from an eyewitness's account of the events. The trial court had sufficient information from appellant's words, actions, and demeanor during the offense to determine that appellant was legally sane. The only evidence suggesting that appellant was insane came from appellant's expert, whom the trial court found unpersuasive. There was no other expert testimony corroborating Dr. Laval's opinion. As noted above, the State was not required to present its own expert. See Wade, 630 S.W.2d at 419.
Credibility determinations must be left to the fact-finder at trial. The trial court reasonably could have resolved the conflicting evidence regarding insanity by concluding that appellant had not met his burden of proving insanity by ⅝ preponderance of the evidence. Therefore, the trial court's decision is not so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence that it is clearly wrong.
Conclusion
We overrule the sole point of error and affirm the judgment of the trial court.
En banc consideration was requested.
A majority of the justices of the Court voted to consider the case en banc.
The en banc Court consists of Chief Justice RADACK and Justices HEDGES, TAFT, NUCHIA, JENNINGS, KEYES, ALCALA, HANKS, HIGLEY, and DUGGAN.
Justice HEDGES, writing for the majority of the en banc Court, joined by Chief Justice RADACK and Justices TAFT, NUCHIA, JENNINGS, ALCALA, HANKS, and HIGLEY.
Justice KEYES dissenting, joined by Justice DUGGAN.
. This is not a case like Van Guilder, wherein the defense presented five psychiatrists, including one hired by the State, who concluded the defendant was insane, and the jury •found the defendant not guilty by reason of insanity on four of the five offenses committed during the same criminal episode. Van Guilder v. State, 709 S.W.2d 178 (Tex.Crim. App.1985).