Case Name: McLAREN v. STATE
Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1917-11-07
Citations: 199 S.W. 811
Docket Number: No. 4669
Parties: McLAREN v. STATE.
Judges: PRENDERGAST, X, dissents.
Reporter: South Western Reporter
Volume: 199
Pages: 811–816

Head Matter:
McLAREN v. STATE.
(No. 4669.)
(Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
Nov. 7, 1917.
On Motion for Rehearing, Dec. 21, 1917.
Dissenting Opinion Dec. 31, 1917.)
1. Infants <&wkey;16 — Juvenile Defendants — PROSECUTION FOR FELONY — STATUTES.
Acts 33d Leg. c. 112, § 1, amending Code Cr. Proc. art. 1195 (Vernon’s Ann. Code Cr. Proc. 1916, art. 1195), and providing that, when an indictment for felony is returned against any male juvenile under the age of 17, his parent, attorney, etc., may file a sworn statement before the case is ready for trial setting forth his age, and that the judge shall hear evidence on the question of his age, and that, if satisfied that he is under 17, he shall dismiss the prosecution, and try the juvenile as a delinquent, and further providing for a commitment to the State Industrial School for Boys upon an indeterminate sentence, is mandatory, and where such fact is shown by evidence the court has no discretion to refuse to dismiss the prosecution.
2. Statutes <&wkey;227 — Mandatory Provisions —“Shall.”
The word “shall” is not always given a mandatory effect in construing a statute, and a statute, notwithstanding use of such word, is sometimes held directory, but when the word is used, the presumption is that it is in the imperative, and not in the directory, sense (citing Words and Phrases, Second Series, Shall).
3. Statutes &wkey;>230 — Amendment—Intent to Change Law — Presumption.
The presumption is that the Legislature in adopting an amendment intended to change the law, and the phraseology of the amended act materially different from that of the original act raises a presumption of an intent to change the meaning.
4. Constitutional Law &wkey;>250 — Classification of Persons for Punishment — Legislative Power.
The Legislature in the passage of criminal laws may take cognizance of the youth of offenders and make provisions modifying or exempting them from punishment, which classification is valid where it operates in a uniform manner upon the individuals of the class.
On Motion for Rehearing.
5. Infants <§=^16 — Juvenile Court — Offenders — Repeal of Statute.
Acts 33d Leg. c. 112, § 1, amending Code Cr. Proc. art. 1195 (Vernon’s Ann. Code Cr. Proc. 1916, art. 1195), and repealing a former provision under which the transfer of a case of a juvenile charged with felony to the juvenile court was within the discretion of the trial judge, repealed Rev. Civ. St. art. 2200, containing a similar provision.
6. Infants <&wkey;16 — Juvenile Offenders — Statutes.
Rev. Civ. St. art. 5229, as amended by Acts 33d Leg. (1st Called Sess.) c. 6, § 9 (Vernon’s Sayles’ Ann. Civ. St. 1914, art. 5229), providing that a boy under 17 convicted of a felony shall be sent to the training school for boys instead of the penitentiary, does not conflict with the mandatory provisions of Acts 33d Leg. c. 112, § 1, amending Code Cr. Proc. art. 1195 (Vernon’s Ann. Code Cr. Proc. 1916, art. 1195), requiring the judge, on a showing that a male person indicted for felony is under 17, to dismiss the prosecution and proceed to try him as a juvenile delinquent.
7. Constitutional Law &wkey;>70(3) — Construction of Statute — Policy of Law.
The argument that the policy of a law is unsound is not available to control its construction contrary to the expressed legislative intent.
Prendergast, J., dissenting.
Appeal from Criminal District Court, Williamson County; James R. Hamilton, Judge.
J. C. McLaren was convicted of murder, and lie appeals.
Reversed.
J. F. Taulbee, of Georgetown, for appellant. W. G. Love, of Houston, Wilcox, Graves & Metcalfe, of Georgetown, and E. B. Hendricks, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.

Opinion:
MORROW, J.
Appellant was convicted of murder. He was a boy under 17 years of age at the time of the commission of the offense and at the time of the trial. This fact was brought to the attention of the court by a sworn statement in accord with article 1195, Vernon's Ann. Code Cr. Proc. 1916, and the fact duly established by evidence, and found to exist by the court as shown by the bill of exceptions. Appellant sought, in consequence thereof, to have the felony indictment dismissed. The action of the court in refusing to dismiss the felony charge is made the basis of complaint and properly brought before this court for review.
Article 1195, supra, is as follows:
"Male Persons under the Age of /Seventeen Accused of Felony to be Prosecuted as Juvenile Delinquents; Committed to State Industrial School for Boys upon Indeterminate Sentence; Time of Detention; Proof of Age; Proviso.— When an indictment is returned by the grand jury of any county charging any male juvenile under the age of seventeen years with a felony, the parent, guardian, attorney or next friend of said juvenile, or said juvenile himself, may file a sworn statement in court, setting forth the age of such juvenile, at any time before announcement of ready for trial is made in the case. When such statement is filed, the judge of said court shall hear evidence on the question of the age of the defendantand, if he be satisfied from the evidence that said juvenile is less than seventeen years of age, said judge shall dismiss such prosecution and proceed to try the juveniíe as a delinquent, under the provisions of this act. If said juvenile be found to be delinquent, and sentence be not suspended, as provided in the laws of this state in cases of felony on first offense the defendant shall be committed to the State Industrial School for Boys upon an indeterminate sentence: Provided, that such defendant shall not be detained in said school after he has reached the age of twenty-one years. Such defendant shall be conveyed to the said school by the probation officer, sheriff or any peace officer designated by the court: Provided, that such conviction and detention in said school shall not deprive defendant of any of his rights of citizenship when he shall become of legal age: And provided, further, that the age of the defendant shall not be admitted by the attorney representing the state, but shall be proved to the satisfaction of the court by full and sufficient evidence that the defendant is less than seventeen years of age, before the judgment of commitment to said institution'shall be entered. The officer-conveying any defendant to said school shall be-paid by the .county in which conviction is rendered the actual traveling expenses of said officer and defendant: Provided, further, that nothing in this act shall be held to affect, modify or vitiate any judgment heretofore entered confining any defendant to the State Institution for the Training of Juveniles; but the unexpired portion of any such judgment shall be fulfilled by the confinement of' any such defendant in the State Industrial School for Boys."
It is contended that the provisions of this statute are mandatory, and that, when it is made to appear in the manner required by the statute that appellant, who was charged with a felony, was a boy under 17 ydars of age, and the fact was established by evidence, the court was without discretion to refuse to dismiss the prosecution. The point has not heretofore been directly brought before this court for review. There is a statement in one of the opinions, Town-ser v. State, 182 S. W. 1104, in which views are expressed indicating that the provisions of the statute were not mandatory. The question, however, was not involved in the fates of that case, as the appellant was a female, whose rights were not defined by the statute mentioned, which applies only to males under 17 years of age. Neither was it involved in McCallan v. State, 76 Tex. Cr. R. 353, 174 S. W. 613, for the reason that the appellant was charged with a misdemeanor, and the statute in question deals with the charge of felony. We have not been furnished with a brief defining the state's views. We assume, however, that the learned trial judge was guided by the expressions of opinion that the statute was not mandatory contained in the McCallan's Case, supra, and Townser's Case, supra. The article of the statute is amendatory of a similar provision in the act of 1909 (page 100), which act in express terms left the question as to whether the proceeding should be dismissed to the discretion of the trial judge. It authorized him to dismiss it, "or the judge of the district court may in his discretion proc.eed to try the case as provided by law." This provision touching discretion was held effective by this court in Ragsdale v. State, 61 Tex. Cr. R. 145, 134 S. W. 234, decided February 15, 1911. At a subsequent session of the Legislature the provision thus passed upon by the court in Ragsdale's Case was amended so as to eliminate the language in express terms giving the district judge discretion with reference to the dismissal of the prosecution, and substituting therefor the words:
"When such statement is filed, the judge of said court shall hear evidence on the question of the age of the defendant; and, if he be satisfied from the evidence that said juvenile is less'than seventeen years of age, said judge shall dismiss such prosecution and proceed to try the juvenile as a delinquent, under the provisions of this Act." Acts 1913, pi 214, c. 112.
The Legislature was cognizant of the opinion of this court in the Ragsdale Case, supra, at the time the amended statute was written. If it had been the desire' of the Legislature to leave the discretion in the district judge, provided in the act of 1909, the change in the language was unnecessary. To hold that by changing the provision expressly giving discretion to one in terms mandatory the Legislature intended that the man-1 datory words should be given the same interpretation as the discretionary words would, we think, be contrary to established rules touching the interpretation of statutes. 36 Cyc. 1165.
The word "shall" is not always given a mandatory effect in construing a statute. A statute, notwithstanding the use of the word "shall," is sometimes held directory. Words and Phrases (2d Ser.) p. 557. When the word "shall" is used, however, the presumption is that it is in the imperative, and not a directory, sense. Haythorn v. Van Kauren, 79 N. J. Law, 101, 74 Atl. 502; Holmes v. Royal Loan Ass'n, 128 Mo. App. 329, 107 S. W. 1005; Whitsett v. Wamack, 95 Mo. App. 290, 69 S. W. 24.
The presumption is that the Legislature in adopting the amendment intended to change the law, and the phraseology of the amended act, being materially different from that of the original act, raises the presumption of an intent to change the meaning. Railway v. Telephone Co., 93 Tex. 321, 55 S. W. 117, 49 L. R. A. 459, 77 Am. St. Rep. 884; Jessee v. De Shong (Tex. Civ. App.) 105 S. W. 1011; Evansole v. Evansole, 169 Ky. 793, 185 S. W. 487; 36 Cyc. 1165.
The classification of persons amenable to punishment for crime, within constitutional limitations, is a legitimate exercise of legislative authority (Wharton on Crim. Law, § 364-370; Ruling Case Law, vol. 8, p. 64), but crimes and the punishment therefor must be defined by the lawmaking power, and operate in a uniform manner upon the individuals of the class embraced in the law. The intent to vest in the trial judge the discreation to determine which individual shall be prosecuted for a felony and which treated as a delinquent juvenile is not to be inferred. The power is doubtful because it would commit to the trial judge the arbitrary discretion to determine the grade of the offense, without judicial investigation of the facts, or facility for review. Penal Code, arts. 1-3; King v. State, 87 Tenn. 304, 10 S. W. 509, 3 L. R. A. 210; Ex parte United States, 242 U. S. 47, 37 Sup. Ct. 72, 61 L. Ed. 129, Ann. Cas. 1917B, 355; Snodgrass v. State, 67 Tex. Cr. R. 615, 150 S. W. 162, 41 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1144; Marshall v. State, 72 Tex. Cr. R. 83, 161 S. W. 112. The legislative right to take cognizance of the youth of offenders in the passage of criminal laws and to make provisions modifying or exempting them from punishment is universally conceded. 14 .Ruling Case Law, 264, and cases cited; Carr v. State, 24 Tex. App. 562, 7 S. W. 328, 5 Am. St. Rep. 905; State v. Yeargan, 117 N. C. 706, 23 S. E. 153, 36 L. R. A. 196, and notes. Numerous examples of the exercise of such authority are found in our own statutes, notably article 34 of the Penal Code, declaring that no person under 9 years of age shall be punished for crime except for perjury, and none between 9 and 13 except upon proof of understanding of tlie nature and. illegality of the offense. Vernon's Ann. Pen. Code 1916, p. 15.. Article 35 of the same Code exempts persons under 17 years from punishment with death. The act of the Thirty-Third Legislature under consideration (article 1195, supra), given the mandatory construction discussed, is but another example of the exercise; of ⅛⅞ same power, an'd, so construed, it gives the youth under 17 years of age charged with a felony the privilege of exemption therefrom, makes it obligatory upon the court to recognize the exemption by the dismissal of the prosecution for felony, and gives the state the right to proceed against him as a delinquent The intent of the Legislature to make the provision mandatory is emphasized by reference to another act of the same session provided for indeterminate sentences, in that it extended the merciful 'provision of the indeterminate sentence only to those felons above the age of 17 years, clearly indicating the legislative view that there should be no felons under that age. Article 865a, C. O. P.
The trial court in denying appellant's motion to dismiss committed error which requires a reversal of the judgment, which is ordered.
PRENDERGAST, X, dissents.
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