Case Name: Leon PAULK and Mary Paulk, as Personal Representatives of the Estate of Jeffrey Scott Paulk, Appellants, v. NATIONAL MEDICAL ENTERPRISES INC.; NME Psychiatric Hospitals, Inc.; Psychiatric Institutes of America Inc.; and Lake Hospital, Inc., Appellees
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1996-09-25
Citations: 679 So. 2d 1289
Docket Number: No. 94-3363
Parties: Leon PAULK and Mary Paulk, as Personal Representatives of the Estate of Jeffrey Scott Paulk, Appellants, v. NATIONAL MEDICAL ENTERPRISES INC.; NME Psychiatric Hospitals, Inc.; Psychiatric Institutes of America Inc.; and Lake Hospital, Inc., Appellees.
Judges: STEVENSON, J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 679
Pages: 1289–1292

Head Matter:
Leon PAULK and Mary Paulk, as Personal Representatives of the Estate of Jeffrey Scott Paulk, Appellants, v. NATIONAL MEDICAL ENTERPRISES INC.; NME Psychiatric Hospitals, Inc.; Psychiatric Institutes of America Inc.; and Lake Hospital, Inc., Appellees.
No. 94-3363.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
Sept. 25, 1996.
Searcy Denney Scarola Barnhart & Ship-ley, P.A., and Philip M. Burlington of Caruso, Burlington, Bohn & Compiani, P.A., West Palm Beach, for appellants.
Susan M. Seigle, West Palm Beach, for appellees.

Opinion:
FARMER, Judge.
Plaintiffs sued several hospitals for damages on the theory that the hospitals had operated their hospitals as a criminal enterprise. They alleged that the defendants defrauded their patients by extending their hospitalization, without medical necessity, so that they could exhaust available insurance coverage. As part of their alleged scheme, they assigned patients release dates based on the extent of insurance coverage available, rather than on the medical condition of their patients. The trial court concluded that the presuit notice provisions of chapter 766 applied and dismissed the action. We affirm.
Presuit notices of intent to sue are required by section 766.106, Florida Statutes (1995). Section 766.106(2) states in part that:
"After completion of presuit investigations pursuant to s. 766.203 and prior to filing a claim for medical malpractice, a claimant shall notify each prospective defendant and . the Department of Business and Professional Regulation by certified mail, return receipt requested, of intent to initiate litigation for medical malpractice." [e.s.]
The term "claim for medical malpractice" is defined to mean "a claim arising out of the rendering of, or the failure to render, medical care or services." We have no difficulty in deciding that fraudulent rendering of unnecessary medical care and services is encompassed by the term "arising out of the rendering of . medical care or services."
Presuit investigation is covered by section 766.203, Florida Statutes (1995). Section 766.203(1) provides that "presuit investigation of medical negligence claims and defenses . shall apply to all medical negligence . claims and defenses." [e.s.] The term "medical negligence" is defined in section 766.202(6) to mean "medical malpractice, whether grounded in tort or in contract." The standard for recovery under medical negligence is addressed in section 766.102(1), which embraces:
"any action for recovery of damages based on the death or personal injury of any person in which it is alleged that such death or injury resulted from the negligence of a health care provider." [e.s.]
Under section 766.202(6), we don't think it much matters whether the plaintiffs' claim is framed as an intentional tort or instead as negligence. The legislature was aware of the historical development of the tort. One early theoretical underpinning of claims for medical malpractice was the intentional torts of assault and battery — the departure from the standard of care constituted an uneonsented touching of the patient's body. See, e.g., Pratt v. Davis, 224 Ill. 300, 79 N.E. 562 (1906) (damages for surgery to remove patient's ovaries without her consent affirmed on theory of trespass to patient's body); Birnbaum v. Siegler, 273 A.D. 817, 76 N.Y.S.2d 173 (1948) (consent to surgery obtained by fraud invalid; surgery so performed constitutes assault on patient).
But the legislature has used different locutions in prescribing the applicability of these statutes. Unlike section 766.106, which applies to all claims arising out of the rendering of medical care or services, section 766.203 applies to actions for damages based on death or personal injury resulting from medical negligence. Yet, obviously, the current action has nothing to do with death or personal injury. Rather plaintiffs simply allege that medical services were rendered as part of a scheme to collect more than the medical condition required. A literal reading of the statutory text seems to suggest that section 766.106 requires presuit notice but that section 766.203 does not apply to require presuit screening.
Because this is manifestly absurd given the internal structure and logic of the medical malpractice law, we conclude that both statutes must apply. Moreover, section 766.106(2) rather clearly states that the notice shall be given "[a]fter completion of pre-suit investigation pursuant to s. 766.203." It is clear to us that plaintiffs cannot prove their cause of action without adducing evidence as to the medical necessity for the hospitalization periods. Although we would be more comfortable with the result if the legislature had used consistent qualifying terms in the two statutes, we nevertheless construe the entire statutory scheme in chapter 766 to apply to the kind of claim sought to be maintained in this case.
We also emphasize that plaintiffs' claims are not based on the intentional provision of treatment for a fabricated or nonexistent medical condition, with the fraudulent purpose of receiving insurance payments. Plaintiffs concede that some treatment was necessary but argue that defendants provided treatment different than that indicated by the condition presented.
Plaintiffs' argument on appeal that the claims are not predicated on a breach of the professional standards of care appropriate for the patient's condition is belied by the allegations of their own complaint. Among others, plaintiffs allege that decedent "was in need of psychiatric treatment"; that the providers in this case "failed to provide [decedent] with any meaningful treatment"; and that the treatment provided was "without proper regard for [decedent's] medical needs." In light of these allegations, the conclusion that the cause of action sounds in medical malpractice is inescapable.
AFFIRMED.
STEVENSON, J., concurs.
STONE, J., dissents with opinion.
. See § 766.106(l)(a), Fla. Stat. (1995).
. In this instance, although the opinion does not explicitly say so, the tort was trespass on the case.
. Even though chapter 766 uses the term "negligence" or "medical negligence" in several of its provisions, we do not believe that the legislature intended to limit coverage of the statutory scheme to only those actions framed in terms of negligence. It seems to us that the intent expressed in the text is to extend the statute whenever the medical judgment of the provider is being challenged.