Case Name: Lewis v. Burke, Ex. of the Estate of Grace Copeland
Court: Supreme Court of Indiana
Jurisdiction: Indiana
Decision Date: 1967-05-16
Citations: 248 Ind. 297
Docket Number: No. 31,175
Parties: Lewis v. Burke, Ex. of the Estate of Grace Copeland.
Judges: Myers, J., concurs.
Reporter: Indiana Reports
Volume: 248
Pages: 297–313

Head Matter:
Lewis v. Burke, Ex. of the Estate of Grace Copeland.
[No. 31,175.
Filed May 16, 1967.
Rehearing denied June 20, 1967.]
Kartell Denmure, of Aurora, and Robert S. Justice, of Logansport, for appellant.
Chester R. Callis, of Yevay, Cooper, Cooper, Cooper & Cox, of Madison, and Frank E. Spencer, of Indianapolis, for appellee.

Opinion:
Arterburn, C. J.
This case comes to us on transfer, from the Appellate Court. (See 214 N. E. 2d 186 for opinion of Appellate Court.)
The petition to transfer is now granted.
This is an appeal from denial of a petition of the appellant against the estate of Grace L. Copeland, deceased, in which the appellant claims ownership of household goods and furnishings located in the decedent's home in Vevay, Indiana. The claim is made by virtue of an alleged gift the decedent made prior to her death.
The appellee first contends that the petition filed for recovery of the specific property was not in proper form since the petition did not comply with the Probate Code (Burns' Ind. Stat. Anno. § 7-802 [1953 Repl.]) under which an affidavit is required stating that there are no setoffs, credits or deductions to which the estate is entitled. Appellee cites no authorities to support such a contention. Admittedly, the petition for this personal property was not filed under Burns' Ind. State. Anno. § 7-802 (1953 Repl.) as a claim, but rather under Acts 1953, ch. 112, § 1421, p. 295, being Burns' Ind. Stat. Anno. § 7-821 (1953 Repl.), which provides as follows:
"When any person claims any interest in any property in the possession of the personal representative adverse to the estate he may file, prior to the expiration of six (6) months after the date of the first published notice to creditors, a petition with the court having jurisdiction of the estate setting out the facts concerning such interest and thereupon the court shall cause such notice to be given to such parties as it deems proper and the case shall be set for trial and tried as in ordinary civil actions."
This is a new provision under the Probate Code, and the obvious purpose of this provision was to provide a remedy to those persons who claimed specific personal property which happened to be in the possession of the decedent at the time of the decedent's death. Under the law prior to the Probate Code, the normal remedy was merely a claim to be paid in money for the value of the property. This was not always an adequate remedy, particularly if the estate was insolvent or the owner of the property desired the specific property because of its peculiar value. The new section (Burns' Ind. Stat. Anno. § 7-821 [1953 Repl.]) of the Probate Code provides the same remedy against an estate as one might have in an action of replevin against an individual, namely, recovery of specific personal property. We therefore cannot agree with the contention of the appellee.
The brief of the appellee states:
"The Appellee is in agreement with the Appellant as to the fundamental question facing the Court in this case, which is whether the decedent, Grace L. Copeland, made a complete gift inter vivos of her household goods to George C. Lewis, the Appellant, by her letter of May 9, 1957."
We therefore take up at this point the primary question in this case. It appears from the evidence the decedent, Grace L. Copeland, went to the law office of Hillis & Hillis, Logansport, Indiana, and under the advice of the attorneys, prepared and signed in the presence of two witnesses, the following letter :
"HILLIS & HILLIS
Attorneys at Law
Fourth and North Sts.
Logansport, Indiana
May 9, 1957
"George C. Lewis
203 Twenty-sixth Street
Logansport, Indiana
My dear George :
I am writing this letter to you to confirm my promises and statements heretofore made to you about the furnishings and contents of the home in Vevay in which I am now living and where I have lived for forty odd years in the past.
These furnishings and the contents of my home are all yours, and I know you will get great pleasure and enjoyment out of them.
There are many items that your wife will like and will really appreciate. So I want Elva to enjoy these many fine items that are in my home.
Right now you and your wife are helping me in my time of need—and it will be a pleasure for me to know in my life time that it is George and Elva who now know that the things that gave great satisfaction to Dr. Copeland in his life time, and to me for so many years, are yours and that you folks can live in my home and enjoy the many articles that Doctor and I enjoyed.
So all these items are yours now and you take them whenever you want to.
With all my love and best wishes.
/s/ Grace L. Copeland
WITNESS:
/s/ Marylin Wikle
/s/ Jennifer Wallace"
Both witnesses to this letter or instrument appeared at the trial and testified to its authenticity. The evidence further shows that Mrs. Copeland lived in Vevay, Indiana, while Mr. Lewis lived in the northern part of the state, and most of the furnishings and contents for a house remained in her home until her death approximately three years later.
The evidence shows that, at or prior to the time of Mrs. Copeland's death, the appellant, George C. Lewis, had possession of the letter and instrument of May 9,1957. There is no evidence that Mrs. Copeland, the decedent, or her attorneys retained the possession of such letter. Possession of the deed of gift, or a deed in the case of real estate raises a presumption of acceptance and delivery of the same. Klingaman v. Burch (1940), 216 Ind. 695, 25 N. E. 2d 996.
The main contention of the estate is that a gift of tangible personal property cannot be made by a written instrument or deed of gift; that delivery of the personal property, symbolically or totally, must take place regardless of any written insrument.
Historically, in the days when few people could write, formal cerémonies and physical acts in the presence of witnesses were given legal significance. Delivery of personal property was one form of making a gift or of transfering title. This was true in the case of real estate, where livery of seisin was necessary to transfer ownership of real estate. As people became more literate and writing became more common, deeds and written instruments replaced largely these physical ceremonies and were found to be more reliable in demonstrating the intentions of the parties with reference to transferring title. In those early days people relied on seals to make a written instrument genuine and authentic. Sealed instruments were so inviolate in early law that once a seal was attached to a writing it was held that not even, fraud or forgery could be shown to avoid its effectiveness. The seal was conclusive of the intent of parties. Since people have become more literate, the seal has lost its immutability, but the execution of a writing as the expression of the intentions of parties is still of highest importance in the law. In Indiana we have eliminated the necessity of a seal on a written instrument to give it an elevated and an unusual position of credibility.
Acts 1881 (Spec. Sess.), Ch. 38, § 319, p. 240, being Burns' Ind. Stat. Anno. § 2-1601 (1946 Repl.) provides:
"There shall be no difference in evidence between sealed and unsealed writings; and every writing not sealed shall have the same force and effect that it would have if sealed. A writing under seal, except conveyances of real estate, or any interest therein, may, therefore, be changed, or altogether discharged, by a writing not under seal. An agreement in writing without a seal for the compromise or settlement of a debt is as obligatory as if a seal were affixed."
In the case before us under the statute, therefore, this letter prepared by attorneys for the purpose of effecting a valid gift has the same significance legally as if it were a sealed instrument. In other words, is a gift by deed or other instrument under seal of physical personal property valid in the State of Indiana? This letter and the instrument in question are in the present tense, purporting to divest the owner of title effective immediately. It is not a gift causa mortis or testamentary in character, to take effect in the future, although it has two witnesses, as in the case of a will. We can consider it only as an act in the present.
It is urged that the law requiring only an actual physical delivery is a safeguard against fraud or impulsive promises. We are unable to follow such reasoning, particularly where a party goes into a law office and after consultation with attorneys, prepares the instrument in question and in this case, in the presence of two witnesses. To us it appears the action taken in this case is one to prevent any question of fraud. On the other hand, the physical possession of property, which must be explained by oral testimony of witnesses after the death of an individual, opens the door to more possibilities than does the written instrument in the present case.
Some attempt has been made in the argument to distinguish transfers of title to personal property by bills of sale, gifts made of intangible personal property and trusts done by way of a written instrument, from the facts in the case before us. We see no reason for making any distinction. If those engaged in business and commercial transactions have found written instruments sufficient to convey title without physical delivery of possession, we see no reason why persons desiring to make a gift should be deprived of the benefits of the same principle of law.
It is almost universally recognized in all jurisdictions under Anglo-American law that a person may give physical personal property by means of a written instrument expressing a present intent to make the transfer of title immediately. This may be done without delivery of the personal property if, at the time, the written instrument or deed of gift, as it is sometimes called, is delivered to the donee.
"It is almost uniformly held that a gift inter vivos or causa mortis may be effected by writing without delivery, where the writing is a deed or instrument under seal." 24 Am. Jur., Gifts, § 33 (1939).
"Where the gift is evidenced by a writing executed by the donor, delivery of the writing is a sufficient delivery to support the gift." 38 C.J.S., Gifts, § 22b (1943).
"It is almost universally held that a gift by instrument in writing is good without a delivery of the property, where the instrument is a deed or is under seal." 63 A.L.R. 537, 540.
A later annotation in A. L. R. 2d states:
"The later cases appear to support the rule that no delivery of a tangible chattel or security is necessary to a gift thereof where the gift is evidenced by a formally executed and delivered deed or other instrument under seal, and the same appears to be true where the written instrument relied upon, although not under seal, is a formally executed assignment or bill of sale of the property." 48 A.L.R. 2d 1405, 1407.
Indiana has recognized this rule:
In Crawfordsville Tr. Co. v. Elston Bank & Tr. Co. (1940), 216 Ind. 596, 625, 25 N. E. 2d 626, 637, it is stated:
". . . Actual physical delivery of the object of the gift is not required. The delivery may be either actual, constructive or symbolical. Richards v. Wilson, supra, recognized that such gift might be made by a deed without delivery." (Our italics)
We therefore conclude that the law in Indiana is such that gift or transfer of title to tangible as well as intangible personal property may be made by written instrument (or deed of gift) stating a present intent. This may be done without a physical delivery of the property at the time, if the written instrument is delivered.
Some contention has been made in this case that there was evidence that the decedent-donor continued to pay taxes on the personal property following the execution of the written instrument of gift, and there was other evidence that possession of the property remained in the decedent, which the appellee contends is inconsistent with an intent on the part of the donor to make the gift. With reference to such items of evidence, we must state that the admission or consideration of the same violates the well known principle of the parol evidence rule. Parole evidence or other evidence extrinsic to a written instrument is not admissible for the purpose of altering, modifying or changing its meaning, terms or conditions. If a written instrument appears to be complete on its face and executed, there is a conclusive presumption (a rule of substantive law) that it is the ultimate intention of the maker, and its terms or conditions may not be varied or changed by parol or extrinsic evidence coming de hors the instrument. Only fraud, mistake and like matters going to the validity of its execution may be considered if put in issue. In Matter of Estate of Harvey, etc. v. Huffer (1955), 125 Ind. App. 478, 126 N. E. 2d 784; 13 I.L.E., Evidence § 181 (1959).
This appeal is transferred from the Appellate Court to the Supreme Court.
The judgment of the trial court is reversed, with directions to enter judgment for appellant.
Myers, J., concurs.