Case Name: RIDGWAY v. SUPERIOR COURT OF YAVAPAI COUNTY et al.
Court: Arizona Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Arizona
Decision Date: 1952-06-09
Citations: 74 Ariz. 117
Docket Number: No. 5640
Parties: RIDGWAY v. SUPERIOR COURT OF YAVAPAI COUNTY et al.
Judges: UDALL, C. J., and STANFORD and DE CONCINI, JJ., concurring.
Reporter: Arizona Reports
Volume: 74
Pages: 117–132

Head Matter:
245 P.2d 268
RIDGWAY v. SUPERIOR COURT OF YAVAPAI COUNTY et al.
No. 5640.
Supreme Court of Arizona.
June 9, 1952.
Richard H. Chambers and E. T. Cusick, Tucson, and Jesse A. Udall, Safford, for petitioner.
Favour & Quail, Prescott, for Superior Court of Yavapai County, W. E. Patterson, Judge, respondent.
John J. Flynn, Dix W. Price, and Allan K. Perry, all of Phoenix, for Superior Court of Maricopa County, Charles C. Bernstein and Fred C. Struckmeyer, Jr., Judges, respondents.

Opinion:
LA PRADE, Justice.
This proceeding was instituted directly in this court by petitioner George Ridgway, Superintendent of the State Industrial School for Boys at Fort Grant, Arizona, asking for a writ of prohibition against the Superior Court of Yavapai County, Arizona, W. E. Patterson, Judge thereof, and the Superior Court of Maricopa County, Charles C. Bernstein and Fred C. Struckmeyer, Jr., Judges thereof, hereinafter called respondents, to compel respond ents to cease and. desist from proceeding in. certain contempt proceedings then and now pending in said courts against petitioner. An alternative writ of prohibition was issued by this court and the matter is now before us on motions to quash the alternative writ.
The petition for the writ showed that the Honorable W. E. Patterson, Judge of the Superior Court of Yavapai County, Arizona, had theretofore issued separate rules to show cause and directed petitioner and three present employees and one former employee of the school to show cause in the Superior Court of Yavapai County, Arizona, why they should not be held in contempt of that court for subjecting two juveniles, theretofore committed by that court, to cruel, unusual and inhuman punishment. The rule asserted that the alleged conduct of the Superintendent and the employees was a wilful violation of the orders of the court.
While these proceedings were pending, the Honorable Charles C. Bernstein, one of the judges of the Superior Court of Maricopa County (presiding as Jttvenile Judge), issued an order to show cause against petitioner and four present and two former employees of the school. This order to show cause asserted that in connection with the disciplinary methods of petitioner and his subordinates the .orders of the court, the Constitution and the statutes of the state were being violated. In these charges some 18 wards committed to the school were alleged to have been mistreated in connection with disciplinary procedures at the school.
The rules to show cause from the Yavapai Court, directed to petitioner, charged that he was an officer of the court and that in such capacity he had subjected the named wards to cruel and unusual punishment in that he caused them to be subjected to corporal punishment exceeding the bounds of reasonable discipline, to wit: floggings, being compelled to walk long distances in bare feet and forced to work in briar patches barefooted at a time when their feet were blistered. Other charges were designated as cruel and unusual punishment, the specifications being that the wards had been subjected to ridicule by having their hair cut and clipped; deprived of food for two consecutive meals and compelled to stand at attention in the mess hall without food while other wards were eating their meals; to humiliation and fear by having directed to them opprobious epithets; being compelled to witness the- striking of other wards and hearing threats of punishment made to them; that the named employees had appeared in the presence of the wards under the influence of liquor, thereby subjecting them "to care and environment contrary to his commitment and contrary to the moral welfare of said minor".
The order to show cause issued by Judge Bernstein directed petitioner and others to-show cause before Judge Struckmeyer
'"why the orders and judgments of this Court and the laws of Arizona had not been obeyed relating to said wards of this Court, all by reason of the acts set forth in the affidavits on file herein and attached hereto".
'The affidavits referred to charged as cruel and unusual punishment striking, beating .and kicking of certain children, requiring them to walk long distances without shoes, food and adequate water, to work in sticker patches without shoes, shaving of heads, using obscene and vile names in the presence of wards, etc.
The petitioner asserts that a superior court is without jurisdiction to institute or prosecute proceedings in contempt for any of the matters or things set forth in the several rules to show cause directed against him and the other named employees.
Respondents, in support of their motions to quash the alternative writ, and relying on the case of Howard v. State, 28 Ariz. 433, 237 P. 203, 40 A.L.R. 1275, contend that the courts have jurisdiction to proceed by contempt for violation of their orders.
At this juncture, it might be well to observe what were the specific orders alleged to have been violated. The commitment from the Yavapai court recited that a petition had been filed against the named child charging him with being a delinquent, that a hearing was had; that the court found that he was a delinquent child, naming the particulars, and that he was a minor subject to the provisions of the juvenile court laws of the state, and then decreed:
"It is therefore ordered, adjudged and decreed that the said Frankie Holt •be and he is hereby committed to the Industrial School for Boys located at Fort Grant, Arizona, for the period of his minority, unless sooner discharged by due process of law. It is further ordered that this Court retain jurisdiction over said minor."
The Maricopa commitment was to the same general effect and, in addition thereto, provided that
"A certified copy of this order shall be a warrant for the Sheriff of Maricopa County to deliver the said child to the said Industrial School, and for the authorities of said Industrial School of the State of Arizona to receive and keep said child as herein ordered and provided."
It is our opinion that these commitments are no more nor no less than orders to receive and keep the named child for the period of his minority unless sooner discharged by law.
Respondents contend that under the provisions of the Constitution and applicable statutes the juvenile court has exclusive and continuing jurisdiction in all proceedings and matters affecting delinquent children, and as a consequence can punish a disobedience of its order in relation thereto by contempt proceedings. The applicable portion of the Constitution (Art. 6, Sec. 6), in part, reads as follows:
" The superior court shall have exclusive original jurisdiction in all proceedings and matters affecting dependent, neglected, incorrigible, or delinquent children, or children accused of crime, under the age of eighteen years. The powers of said judges to control such children shall be as prescribed by law. "
The statutory provisions (Juvenile Code) are to he found in Chapter 80 of the Session Laws of 1941, the various sections of which have now been given arbitrary section numbers in the Supplement to the Arizona Code Annotated, 1939. The applicable code provisions are:
Section 46-118, Jurisdiction of juvenile court, is a rescript of the constitutional provision just quoted.
Section 10 of said Chapter 80, Session Laws of 1941, section 46-125, is entitled Disposition of Child. (This section was attempted to be amended by Chapter 13, Session Laws 1951, but is now held in abeyance, referendum having been filed against it.) It specifically authorizes the commitment of children to various institutions including the State Industrial School.
Section 46-132, Code Supplement, in part provides as follows:
"(a) When jurisdiction has been obtained by the juvenile court in the case of any child, the child shall continue under the jurisdiction of the court until' he becomes twenty-one (21) years of age, unless sooner discharged. No-commitment shall divest the court of jurisdiction for the purpose of enforcing its judgments and orders. No commitment of any child shall extend beyond the minority of the child, and commitments to the state industrial school or a school or institution for girl juvenile offenders shall be for the term of the child's minority, unless sooner discharged."
By Chapter 98, Session Laws of 1952, (effective June 26, 1952) this section was-amended by striking therefrom the sentence :
"No commitment shall divest the court of jurisdiction for the purpose of enforcing its judgments and orders."
and in lieu thereof, there was inserted a sentence referring to committed children,, as follows:
"A child shall be subject to the exclusive control of the board of directors of state institutions for juveniles until his absolute release."
Section 46-136, When board may release-child, authorizes the board of directors of' state institutions for juveniles to issue an absolute release of a child when certain conditions exist. Under the provisions of' this section, as originally enacted by Chapter 80, Session Laws 1941, the board could not release except with the consent of the-court. This section was amended by Sec tion 2, Chapter 28, Session Laws 1945, vesting the hoard with the sole power to release.
Section 46-139, Contempt, reads as follows :
"Any person who wilfully violates or neglects or refuses to obey or perform any order of the juvenile court may be proceeded against for contempt."
This section was in effect at the time these contempt proceedings were initiated, but has now been repealed. (Sec. 3, Ch. 98, S. L.1952, effective June 26, 1952.)
For the past 50 years the state has maintained an institution for the confinement, discipline, education, employment and reformation of juvenile delinquents. See Section 3733, Revised Statutes Arizona 1901. The general supervision and government of the institution was vested in a board of trustees.
Under our existing statutes, we have institutions for juvenile offenders under the government, management and control of a board. By the provisions of Section 47-402, A.C.A.1939,
"The government of state institutions for juvenile offenders and the administration of laws for the detention, education and treatment of juvenile offenders is vested in the board." (Emphasis supplied.)
The board consists of five members appointed by the Governor, by and with the advice and consent of the State Senate. The term of office is for five years with one term expiring each year, thus insuring continuity of personnel on the board. Sec. 47 — 403 as amended by Ch. 5, S.L.1951. (This latter amendment was repealed by Ch. 13, S. L.1951, now held in abeyance by referendum proceedings.)
Section 47-404 relates to the powers and duties of the board. Among other things, the board is required to make frequent inspections of the institutions, supervise the instruction given in the schools connected with the institutions, appoint a superintendent, and prescribe rules and regulations for the government of the institutions.
Section 47-406 provides for the appointment of a superintendent by the board who must be qualified in business administration, education and public welfare.
Section 47-407 relates to the duties of the superintendent. This section, among other things, provides that
" (he) shall: (a) Reside at the institution, (b) Have charge of the institution and its management, subject to the direction of the board. (e) Make a report to the board at the end of each fiscal year, and an account of rehabilitation work done, methods employed, and results obtained; (f) Direct subordinate officers and employees in their duties and supervise their work, (g) Provide for the care of residents of the institution, protection of their health, their instruction in academic subjects and useful trades and occupations, development of their characters, and inculca tion of principles of morality, sobriety and industry."
Section 47-408. All teachers, medical officers and other employees are appointed by the board.
These statutory provisions show that the legislature has given serious consideration to the matter of providing for the detention, support, health, education and rehabilitation of juvenile offenders. Public records disclose that the average daily attendance at the industrial school is 70, and that for the past several years there has been made available for the operation of the institution approximately $150,000 per year.
It is the theory of the respondents that by virtue of the law conferring upon superior courts the exclusive jurisdiction in all matters and proceedings affecting delinquent children, and that no commitment shall divest the court of its jurisdiction for the purpose of enforcing its judgments and orders, that the board and superintendent of the industrial school are officers of the court and that the superintendent acts as bailee or custodian of the court.
Respondents also contend that a commitment of the juvenile court brings into operation all the statutory provisions relating to juveniles (to be executed by the board and its superintendent), and by necessary implication constitutes such provisions an integral part of the order of commitment. With this contention we do not agree. By stressing the power of "continuing jurisdiction" with the idea that the superintendent is the custodian of the court results in the-conclusion that the superintendent of the school has fourteen (number of juvenile-courts) masters to satisfy under the threat of punishment by way of contempt should, the methods employed by him in providing for the health, instruction, development of character, and inculcation of principles of' morality, sobriety and .industry not meet with the ideas of the committing judge.. "No man can serve two masters." Matt. VI, 24.
Under our fundamental law providing-for a separation of powers, the Constitution, provides (Art. 3):
"The powers of the government of the state of Arizona shall be divided into three separate departments, the Legislative, the Executive, and the Judicial; and, except as provided in this-constitution, such departments shall be separate and distinct, and no one of such departments shall exercise the powers properly belonging to either of the others."
It requires no analysis or dissertation to-establish that the industrial school is a. branch of the executive department of government and controlled by executive officers. By the express provisions of Section. 47-402,
"The government of state institutions for juvenile offenders and the administration of laws for the detention, education and treatment of juvenile offenders is vested in the board.""
Under the constitutional provisions of Art. •6, Sec. 6,
" The powers of said judges to control such children shall be as prescribed by law. "
The only power that has been prescribed by law and conferred upon judges, insofar as we are here concerned, is the power to commit. While it is true that no commitment shall divest the court of jurisdiction for the purpose of enforcing its judgments and orders, in the instant case it has made no orders other than that the boys should be received and detained until released as provided by law. In view of the fact that the government of the institution provided for juvenile offenders " and the administration of (the) laws for the detention, education and treatment of juvenile offenders is vested in the board," we cannot conceive of any order that the court could initially make other than the order of commitment to receive and keep. The board and its superintendent are state officers of the executive branch of the government and their allegiance as such officers is not to the court but to the law, the penalty for nonperformance of their duties being removal from office or fine and imprisonment.
We have several criminal statutes in the 1939 Code for the protection of children which subject any person to criminal prosecution who commits any offense against children. By the provisions of Section 43-1001, any person who contributes to the delinquency of a child or who for any cause shall be responsible therefor is guilty of a misdemeanor and subject to fine and imprisonment. Any adult person who assaults a child is guilty of a felony. Section 43-603. And by the provisions of Section 43-3909
" Every officer who is guilty of wilful inhumanity or oppression toward any prisoner under his care or in his custody, or who, under color of authority, without lawful necessity, assaults or beats any person, is punishable by fine not exceeding one thousand dollars ($1,000) ".
Violation of these statutes infringing upon the civil rights of these wards should be called to the attention of the county attorney of the county where the offense is committed. If he refuses to take appropriate action, the Attorney General, by the direction of the Governor, might initiate prosecutions, Westover v. State, 66 Ariz. 145, 185 P.2d 315, or appeal may be made to the judge of the superior court who could impanel a grand jury that has the power of indictment to make inquiry.
This court, in Howard v. State, supra, held that the sentencing court (superior court) had jurisdiction to proceed in contempt proceeding upon a petition for a rule to show cause which showed that the petitioner, a prisoner, was being subjected to cruel and unusual punishment by the warden of the state penitentiary. The court observed [28 Ariz. 433, 237 P. 204]:
"Considering the whole history of penal legislation of the last 100 years in the United States, and particularly of the last generation in Arizona, we feel justified in stating that our state at present adheres to the general policy, that while for the protection of society it is necessary to deprive the offender against its laws of his liberty for a greater or lesser period, yet such deprivation should be conducted as humanely as possible, and with the view of eventually, if that happy result is possible of realization, restoring him as a useful citizen to society.
"When, therefore, the superintendent of the prison receives the commitment, which is his only authority for detaining any man within that prison, he may only do what that commitment orders him, to wit, 'receive and safely keep* the defendant for the time specified therein. If, without legal justification, he does more than is necessary to so safely keep him, he is violating the law just as much as he is in releasing him before the expiration of his minimum term of sentence unless he has been legally pardoned. On the other hand, he not only may but must do what is necessary to 'safely keep' the prisoner.
"-But, in any case, he is still under both the power and protection of that law which should be as vigilant to guard his rights as to punish his transgressions. Nor should the fact that he has once fallen under its ban deafen the ear of justice. If he complains that the rights still left him are being violated, the law should be particularly zealous to investigate an alleged wrong against one whom it has deprived, even though justly, of the precious boon of liberty. We hold, therefore, that any prisoner who, while under sentence for crime, is subjected to unreasonable and harsh treatment without legal justification therefor, may appeal to the law for protection
The court then concluded that the alleged treatment was prima facie harsh and unreasonable and demanded inquiry and correction. The court then said:
" The situation thus stated obviously suggests the proper remedy. When a court of record in a civil action orders a party to do or not to do a certain thing, and its order is disobeyed the remedy is the invocation of that inherent power existing in all such courts to punish a violation of its order as a contempt.
"The superintendent of the state prison is ex officio an officer of each superior court of the state for the purpose of carrying out its proper sentences, and is subject to attachment for contempt if he departs therefrom, either on the side of excessive leniency or severity, without legal excuse therefor." (Emphasis supplied.)
The situation there presented was shocking in a country and state where vengeance and brutality have been practically extinguished through Christian teachings. But our considered opinion at this time is that the court was so anxious to remedy a wrong that it persuaded itself to grasp at the inherent powers of the court to protect itself and enforce its orders by the summary and plenary proceedings of contempt. It had to look to its "order", the order to detain or "safely keep" and then reasoned that excessive and cruel treatment exceeded the order and was a violation of the order. This required recourse to the suggestive significance of the words of the order apart from their explicit and recognized meaning; so the court held that the words "safely keep" have the connotation of keep with such force only as is required for restraint, and if more is done there is a violation of the law. In this view we concur, but the violation of the law is not redressible by contempt. People ex rel. Grenfell v. District Court, 1931, 89 Colo. 78, 299 P. 1. Our philosophy and legal approach to the concept of governmental theory under which we live suggests to us that the judiciary should closely scrutinize its assigned field or sphere and rotate in its own orbit. The courts are not the masters nor are they vested with totalitarian powers to correct all evils and aggressions on the rights of our citizens. That they, are solicitous of . the welfare of óur people is to be expected and commended, but under our scheme of government there are other branches manned by officers of like attitudes and sensibilities to whom is assigned the duty of governing such institutions as the one under review. In so doing they have prescribed powers and duties all of which have been enacted and promulgated by the people, speaking through the legislative branch of the government.
A review of the statutory provisions, supra, relating to juveniles, demonstrates-the benevolence of their provisions. These laws are to be executed by the executive branch of the government and not by the judiciary. These observations and opinions lead us to believe that the holding of this court in Howard v. State was erroneous and usurped to the courts powers not intended or conferred. Insofar as the decision and the rule therein laid down in Howard v. State impliedly holds that the superintendent of the industrial school may be proceeded against as for a contempt for allegedly inflicting upon one in their custody cruel and unusual punishment, it is-overruled. In so holding, we do not intend to deviate from the rule laid down in Re Wright, 36 Ariz. 8, 281 P. 944, and State ex rel. Murphy (Sims) v. Superior Court, 30 Ariz. 332, 246 P. 1033, 47 A.L.R. 401,. wherein it was determined that the warden could be proceeded against by contempt proceedings for permitting a prisoner to-roam at large or be released prior to the expiration of his sentence. The rule of these cases holds a warden or superintendent of the industrial school to the explicit words of the mandate of the commitment but not to its connotations. Connotations or implications from orders are of many hues and distinctions. In no event are they of the stature of orders that no one can or should misinterpret and for whose violation the stern remedy of contempt will reach.
We hold that petitioner, - as Superintendent of the Industrial School for Boys, is not subject to attachment for contempt for allegedly subjecting wards of the state in his custody to such severe punishment that it is properly designated as cruel and unusual. We do not want it understood that this court condones in the slightest the more ' serious specifications set forth in the several rules to show cause. If the assaults charged were in fact committed their perpetrators should be prosecuted, but the short-cut route selected was without authority of law. The named courts being without jurisdiction in the premises, it follows that the motion to quash.the alternative .writ must be denied and it is so ordered.
It is further ordered that the alternative writ be made permanent.
UDALL, C. J., and STANFORD and DE CONCINI, JJ., concurring.