Case Name: O. L. HAAS, Sr. v. SOUTHERN FARM BUREAU CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1975-04-15
Citations: 321 So. 2d 380
Docket Number: No. 6715
Parties: O. L. HAAS, Sr. v. SOUTHERN FARM BUREAU CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY.
Judges: Before LEMMON, SCHOTT and BEER, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 321
Pages: 380–388

Head Matter:
O. L. HAAS, Sr. v. SOUTHERN FARM BUREAU CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY.
No. 6715.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fourth Circuit.
April 15, 1975.
On Rehearing Oct. 9, 1975.
Writ Refused Nov. 21, 1975.
Becnel & Kliebert, Larry C. Becnel, Vacherie, for plaintiff-appellee.
Porteous, Toledano, Hainkel & Johnson, Christopher E. Lawler and John J. Hainkel, Jr., New Orleans, for defendant-appellant.
Before LEMMON, SCHOTT and BEER, JJ.

Opinion:
LEMMON, Judge.
In appealing from an adverse judgment in this suit involving a collision between a moving and a parked vehicle, Southern Farm Bureau Casualty Insurance Company, licbility insurer of the driver of the moving vehicle, contends that plaintiff O. L. Haas' contributory negligence in parking in a dangerous position was a legal cause of the collision which bars Haas' recovery of damages to his car.
The accident occurred on La. Highway 20 in Vacherie. At that point the highway was a straight, two-lane road, 18 feet wide, with a three-foot shoulder on each side and a ditch along each shoulder. Residences and business places were located on both sides of the highway, which was a heavily traveled artery.
At about 6:00 p. m. on January 10, 1972 Haas parked his car in front of one of the residences which fronted on the highway. Although he used a narrow driveway across the ditch to park as far off the highway as possible, his parallel-parked car remained partially in the northbound lane, so that it was necessary for a northbound car to cross the center line in order to pass Haas' parked vehicle. Haas left his emergency lights blinking while he went inside the residence.
Farm Bureau's insured, Carroll Levet, traveling north on the highway, came along about ten minutes later and ran into the fear of the Haas vehicle. Levet testified he never saw the parked car and was blinded just before impact by the headlights of an oncoming vehicle.
Tommy Morvant, driver of the oncoming car, testified that when he saw the parked car with its blinking lights and noticed Levet's car approaching about 30 yards behind the parked car he slowed down while about 100 yards away from the parked car in order to let Levet pass safely. (Levet stated that Morvant's car was just past the point of collision when the impact occurred.)
The record further established that there was no other traffic on the highway at the time and that there were several other places in the vicinity where Haas could have parked his car completely off the highway.
We conclude Levet's negligence was a legal cause. Although he may have been momentarily blinded just before the accident, he had traveled a considerable distance on the straight highway (with no other traffic in the area) before being blinded and should have seen the parked car with blinking lights if he had exercised reasonable care and kept a proper lookout. His inattention was a cause-in-fact of the accident, and his breach of his duty to observe what he should have seen created a risk of colliding with traffic obstructions which made him legally responsible for the resulting collision.
We next inquire into Haas' conduct in parking on the traveled portion of the busy highway. Using the procedure outlined in Laird v. Travelers Ins. Co., 263 La. 199, 267 So.2d 714 (1972) and in Pierre v. Allstate Ins. Co., 257 La. 471, 242 So.2d 821 (1970), we first determine whether that act was a cause-in-fact of the accident. If Haas had not parked in a position which partially obstructed the highway, the accident would not have occurred, and the determination that this act was a cause-in-fact presents no difficulty.
Inasmuch as the mere existence of the causal relationship does not establish legal liability for ensuing harm, we next consider the duty imposed and the risks encompassed within that duty. The duty to refrain from parking on a highway is imposed as a safety measure in order to keep traffic arteries open. The obstruction of highways not only impedes passage, but also creates a risk that a confused or inattentive driver will collide with the stationary vehicle. The risk of harm created by a motorist's obstructing a highway imposes a reciprocal duty on motorists to refrain from doing so.
The exact risk sought to be avoided by imposition of this duty came into being when Haas parked so as to leave insufficient room on the highway for unobstructed passage of northbound vehicles. Admittedly, Levet's inattention constituted later and intervening negligence, but the hazardous condition created by Haas' negligence continued up to the moment of the accident, and the concurrent substandard behavior of both parties combined to create the particular risk involved and to bring about the collision.
Haas contends, however, that the facts of this case fall somewhere between those of the Pierre case (where liability was imposed on the parked defendant) and the Laird case (where liability was not imposed).
Each case, of course, must be considered according to its own facts and circumstances. Under the circumstances of the Laird case the court, recognizing that duties are imposed on motorists to protect some persons under some circumstances against some risks, held that the risk of the occurrence of the ensuing collision with this particular following motorist did not fall within the ambit of Laird's duty, inasmuch as there was no oncoming traffic; the following motorist could have passed Laird without moving out of his assigned lane of traffic; Laird's vehicle, almost completely off the highway with brake lights on, was (even to an inattentive or momentarily distracted driver) obviously stopped; signs warning of highway construction should have alerted any driver that the highway ahead might be blocked; and a person standing by the stopped vehicle attempted to warn the oncoming driver by shouting and waving.
Of these operative facts emphasized in the Laird case, only the warning lights were present in the instant case. This factor, however, is relatively insignificant standing alone, since the accident in the Pierre case happened in broad daylight.
Although Haas' counsel presented a forceful argument and a cogent analysis of the recent cases decided on the duty-risk theory, we conclude that Haas breached a duty of reasonable care by obstructing the highway when it was practicable to park elsewhere and that his breach created the exact risk which the duty not to obstruct highways is designed to prevent. There is an "ease of association" between the duty imposed, the risk created and the damages inflicted. Hill v. Lundin & Associates, Inc., 260 La. 542, 256 So.2d 620 (1972); Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts, Ch. 7 (4th Ed. 1971).
Nevertheless, while Haas' concurrent negligence was a legal cause of the accident, he is entitled to recovery because of the applicability of the doctrine of last clear chance.
In Jackson v. Cook, 189 La. 860, 181 So. 195 (1938) the Supreme Court held that the doctrine applies not only when the defendant actually discovered a continuingly negligent plaintiff's position of peril in time to prevent the accident and failed to do so, but also when the defendant should have discovered such plaintiff's position of peril. Although Louisiana is apparently the only jurisdiction which extends the doctrine to last clear chance to accord recovery under these circumstances, the Jackson case has never been overruled. See the denial of certiorari in Nixon v. Southern Rwy. Co., La., 293 So.2d 182 (1974).
In the present case, therefore, we conclude that although Haas' negligence continued up to the instant of the accident, his recovery is not barred by his contributory negligence inasmuch as Levet had the "unconscious last clear chance." See Restatement (Second), Torts § 479 (1965).
DAMAGES
Haas purchased the 1972 Cadillac on September 22, 1971 for $7,858.99. After the accident less than four months later, Haas' collision insurer (coincidently Farm Bureau) paid him $2,327.87, the estimated cost of repairing the patent damage. Haas then purchased a new car and was allowed $3,100.00 as the trade-in or salvage value of the wrecked car in an unrepaired condition. He now seeks in this suit to recover the damages he sustained in excess of the amount paid by the collision insurer.
An expert in appraising automobile values, whose company had originally sold Haas the subject automobile, inspected the car after the accident and found extensive body and chassis damage. He testified that the car was in excellent condition just prior to the wreck and opined that, because of the scarcity of Cadillacs in January, the car with only 4,000 miles of use could have commanded as high a price just before the accident as the original sales price.
The expert further stated that the extensively wrecked car, had it been repaired, would have suffered a substantial value inferiority (depreciation) in comparison to an identical car (of similar age and mileage) which had not been wrecked. He estimated the value of the car, if repaired after the wreck, to be $5,000.00 to $5,400.-00, thus indicating a value inferiority attributable to the collision in the range of $2,400.00 to $3,000.00.
The trial judge awarded $2,372.13, calculated by subtracting the damages paid by the collision insurer and the salvage value from $7,800.00, which the judge found to be the value just prior to the accident. This amount is also supported by the value opinions contained in the only expert testimony in the record.
The judgment is affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
LEMMON, J., concurs specially and assigns reasons.
BEER, J., dissents and assigns reasons.
. We do not discuss statutory violations. There was no evidence of signs prohibiting parking [R.S. 32:143, subd. A(14)], and R..S. 32:141 may not have been explicitly applicable to this locality. Nevertheless, criminal statutes do not define civil liability, but only provide guidelines (often in terms of minimum standards of behavior) for determining liability in civil cases.
. Although not adopted as controlling in the majority opinion in the Laird case, another point of view advanced was that Laird's slight and momentary obstruction, under the totality of existing circumstances, was not such substandard behavior as to warrant imposition of liability.
. $7,762.50, plus $106.49 for air bags.
. The estimate left open any charges for hidden front and rear end damage.
.He estimated that the slightly used car could have been sold in January for approximately $7,800.00 to $8,000.00. He further noted that Haas' sales price reflected a substantial discount given because of Haas' friendship with the dealer.