Case Name: Henry Trammell et al. v. Nicholas J. Trammell et al.
Court: Supreme Court of Texas
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1860-10
Citations: 25 Supp. Tex. 261
Docket Number: 
Parties: Henry Trammell et al. v. Nicholas J. Trammell et al.
Judges: 
Reporter: Texas Reports
Volume: 25 Supp.
Pages: 261–271

Head Matter:
Henry Trammell et al. v. Nicholas J. Trammell et al.
The power which this court retains over its records and judgments of a former term was considered in the case of Chambers v. Hodges, 3 Tex., 517.
It was considered, that when the judgment of this court is entered, its minutes authenticated as a record, and the term of the court closed, the court has no further power over the judgment for the purpose of a revision or modification thereof upon the merits; but that the court may, after the term, amend its records and judgments, so far as to correct merely clerical errors or mistakes, or by adding such omitted clause in the rendition of the judgment as may be necessary to give it effect when there is anything in the judgment by which to amend.
It is the uniform practice, in compliance with the direction of the statute, (0. & W. Dig., Art. 1921; Paschal-’s Dig., Art. 1571,) to enter judgment against the principal and sureties in the injunction bond. The entry in this case is in the usual form, “that the judgment of the court below be in all things affirmed, and the appellees recover of the appellant and his sureties, Harrison Askey and 0. E. De Witt,” &c., omitting the name of Watson, the remaining surety on the bond. As there was no discontinuance or dismission as to him, we must suppose the omission of his name in the entry was a clerical omission. As such, it is the proper subject of amendment, and there is enough in the record to amend by.
Appeal from Gonzales. Tlie original case was tried before Hon. Fielding Jones, one of the district judges.
The judgment in favor of Henry Trammell v. Nicholas Trammell et al., for the recovery of certain Slaves and their hire, was affirmed, on the 21st December, 1857, at Austin; and it is reported in the case of Trammell v. Trammell et al., 15 Tex., 291. But in affirming the judgment, under the act of the 13th March, 1848, regulating practice in the Supreme Court, the clerk omitted to render judgment against Watson, one “of the securities on the appeal bond.” (Paschal’s Dig., Art. 1571, Note 606.) This led to the perpetual injunction reported in Trammell v. Watson, (ante, p. 210.) The case was brought before the Supreme Court on the 22d November, 1859, upon the following motions and affidavits:
“In the Supreme Court, at Austin, Texas, Fall Term, A. D. 1859. This day come the appellees, in the above-stated cause, hy attorneys, and move the court to correct the judgment rendered in said cause hy this court, at the fall term thereof, 1857, upon the'following ground, to wit:
“The name of John Watson, one of the sureties in the appeal bond, hy clerical error, was omitted in said judgment.
“And appellees pray that said judgment be so corrected, nunc pro tunc, that the judgment of this court may be enforced against him, said Watson.
“R M. Tevis,
“W. L. & C. L. Robares,
uAttorneys for Appellees.”
“In Supreme Court. And now come appellees in said cause, and, by leave of the court first had, amend their original motion in said cause, and now move the court to so amend the last clause of the judgment herein rendered, on the 21st December, 1857, that it may read as follows, to wit:
“‘It is ordered, adjudged, and decreed, that the judgment of the court below he in all things affirmed, and that the appellees recover of the appellant and his sureties, Harrison Askey, C. E. De Witt, and John Watson, the property in controversy, or the value thereof adjudged below, and all further sums of money adjudged against the appellant in the court below, and all costs in this behalf expended, and this decision he certified below for observance,’ and that the same be so amended nunc pro tunc, as the judgment of this court rendered in said cause at the date aforesaid. “ W. L. & C. L. Bobards,
“Attorneys, ¿-c.”
“H. Trammell, appellant h
v. >613.
“ÍT. Trammell et al., appellees. J
“In the Supreme Court of the State of Texas, fall term, 1859.
“Benjamin Shropshire makes oath and says, that when the above-stated cause was submitted to the court, at the fall term, 1857, affiant was attorney for the appellees, and had also been attorney fbr the same parties in the court below; that said cause was submitted on briefs, without oral argument; that no arrangement or understanding was had by the parties or their attorneys in either the court below or in this court, other than appears of record; that, when the judgment of the court below was affirmed by this court in said cause, affiant was not present in court) but, in accordance with the almost universal practice, the entry of the judgment in this court was intrusted to the clerk of this court, who is well known to be exceedingly accurate and particular in the performance of such duties; that Harrison Aslcey, O. E. Be Witt, and John Watson, were sureties in the appeal bond, and, in entering up the judgment of this court in said cause, at said fall term, 1857, by clerical mistake or omission the name of John Watson was not entered in said judgment; that the clerk issued execution against all the sureties in the appeal bond, including the name of said John Watson. Affiant further states, that appellant, Henry Trammell, and his other sureties, Harrison Aslcey and C. E. Be Witt, have been pursued to insolvency, and upon the issuance of the fifth execution from the court below, and the same being levied upon the property of said John Watson, the said Watson sued out an injunction, which, upon the hearing in the court below, was perpetuated, from which judgment appellees appealed to this court, and the transcript in the case of N". Trammell et al. v. J. M. "Watson, No. 2184," from Gonzales, is referred to as part of this affidavit for greater certainty. Affiant further states, that, until a short time before the filing of the petition for injunction ■in said cause, affiant and his clients, appellees in this cause, as he believes, were not cognizant of the fact that said mistake or omission had been made. Dates and facts of record he can only state from memory, and may not be strictly correct. Nor is he positive about the number of executions issued. For these facts" he refers to the records and papers. * B. Shropshire.
“The State op Texas, •>
“ County of Fayette, j set‘
“B. Shropshire this day personally appeared before me, William G-. Webb, notary public in and for said county and State, and, upon being duly sworn, made and subscribed the foregoing affidavit. ■
“In witness whereof I hereunto set my hand and affix my seal of office, this November 27th, A. D. 1859. r-L g-i “William G-. Webb, "
“ Notary Public Fayette county, Texas.”
W. L. C. L. Fobards, for the motion.
— On-21st December, 1857, this court, after reciting the cause, entered the following order upon the minutes:
“ This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of the record of the court below, and, the same being inspected, because it is the opinion of this court that there was no error in the judgment of the court below, it is ordered, adjudged, and decreed, that the judgment of the court below be in all things affirmed, and the appellees recover of the appellant and his sureties, Harrison Askey and O. E. He Witt, the property in controversy, or the value of the same adjudged below, and all costs in this behalf expended, and this decision be certified below for observance.”
I£he following parties executed the appeal bond in said cause, to wit: Henry Trammell principal, Harrison Askey, 0. E. He Witt, John Watson; but in entering up judgment the name of John Watson was omitted.
We insist that this was merely a clerical error, which this court can now correct.
In Shackleford’s Heirs v. Fountain’s Heirs, 1 Monr., Ky. R., 252, the court held, that the clerk, in entering up judgment against “ Fountain’s heirs,” without giving their full names, was a mere clerical error, and amendable.
In Chambers v. Hodges, 3 Tex., 529, this court, after declaring that a judgment cannot be “revised or modified upon its merits at a subsequent term,” say: “This limitation upon the authority of the court will not prevent the correction of clerical errors, or mistakes, or defects of form, or the addition of such clause as may be necessary to carry out the judgment of the court.”
In this cause the decree of the court was, “that the judgment of the court below be in all things affirmed.” In order to carry out this judgment, it follows, that it is necessary that judgment should be rendered against John Watson, one of the sureties in the appeal bond.
In The Bank of Commonwealth of Kentucky v. Western et al., 3 Peters, 432, Chief Justice Marshall held, that the omission of the clerk to enter a judgment for interest should be corrected at a subsequent term of the court. “The reason is, that by a rule of this court, when there are no special circumstances, six per cent, interest is allowed upon the amount of judgment in 'the court below.” This was on a motion at a subsequent terra, after the mandate had issued, and after full argument by Judge Bibb. The same reason will apply in this case. It is a rule of this court, in all cases, to enter judgment against the principal in the appeal bond and all the sureties, which is a mere consequence of the affirmance of the judgment. ,
In addition to the authorities already cited, we call the attention of the court to the following authorities: Poule v. Lanquinville, 2 Saund. R., 289; Blakely v. Birmingham, 2 Strange R., 1132; Helderson v. Skelding, 2 Strange R., 1182; Phillips v. Smith, 1 Strange R., 138; Faulkner’s case, 1 Saund. R., 250b, note; Maury v. Blothford, 2 Wend., 221; Waters v. Travis, 8 Johns. Ch. R., 556; McKey v. Moore, 4 Bibb R., 321; Brambeter’s Heirs v. Pickett’s Heirs, 2 Marsh. Ky. R., 10; Bank of Kentucky v. Lacy & Cox, 1 Monr. Ky. R., 7; Cannon v. Moore, 1 Monr. Ky. R., 213; Norton v. Saunders, 7 J. J. Marsh., 62; Ramon v. Caldwell’s Heirs, 2 Dan. Ky. R., 20; Jeffries’ Heirs v. Collis, 4 Dan. Ky. R., 468; Graham v. Lynn, 4 B. Mon., 18; Den v. Taylor, 2 Green N. J. R., 81; Limerick’s Petitioners, 18 Me. R., 183; People v. McDonall, 1 Cow. R., 189; Chichester v. Cande, 3 Cow. R., 41, and the very learned note, in which the doctrines of amendments are discussed at great length and with ability; Lansing v. Lansing, 18 Johns. R., 502; Bank of Newburg v. Seymour, 14 Johns. R., 219; 1 Bac. Abridg., 251, tit. “Amendment and Jeofails, F., of amending the judgment.”
William H. Stewart, for Watson.
—1. The present is not a motion to correct the judgment as to the principal, but as to one of the alleged sureties in the appeal bond; and hence, whatever liabilities by way of construction in correction of judgments might be urged, no such latitude should be observed in correcting a judgment so as to bind a surety-not bound in the judgment.
2. The appeal bond, if signed by Watson, which is not-admitted, does not properly recite the judgment below, and is not valid as an appeal bond, because it describes a judgment against Trammell alone, whereas the judgment below was against Trammell, and De Witt, and Askey, sureties on the forthcoming bond.
3. The motion does not come in time, for it has been nearly six years since the rendition of the judgment below upon which the appeal was taken, and it has been two years since the rendition of the judgment of the Supreme Court.
4. The parties have acquiesced in the judgment of this court as it now stands, and all of that part of the judgment of the Supreme Court which looks to the sureties has long since been collected of Watson and others by execution upon the judgment as it went down from this court, and Watson has been released by the laches of the plaintiffs in not having hitherto moved to have the judgment corrected.
5. The motion does not contemplate the correction of the judgment for a mere clerical error in the omission of Watson’s name; but seeks a new and different judgment in every essential, particular.
6. The judgment below was against Trammell for $1,400, and against Trammell for the negroes, and conditionally against Trammell, De Witt, and Askey, for the value of the negroes, $3,600; and the judgment as to the $3,600 has been long since made under execution, and Watson was surety below after the rendition of the judgment in the Supreme Court for the forthcoming of the negroes to the sheriff on sale-day, and paid the $3,600, the whole amount he was bound for.
7. At the time of the rendition of the judgment in the Supreme Court Trammell was solvent, and so were the sureties, Askey and De Witt; but both the said Trammell and Askey and De Witt are now totally insolvent; - and if said Watson was bound by the appeal bond, which is denied, (for he denies the execution thereof by him,) by the conduct of the plaintiffs in acquiescing thus long in the judgment, he is thereby released by the laches of the plaintiffs; for, if Watson had been made a party to the judgment in the Supreme Court, he would have then had it in his power to have enforced the judgment against Trammell, and, in case the amount thereof should not have been collected, Watson would have been entitled to contribution from Askey and De Witt, who were at that time solvent, but all of whom -are now hopelessly insolvent; and thus, by the laches of plaintiffs, if the judgment should now be altered as prayed for in the motion, said Watson would be compelled to pay the entire $1,400, with interest, without the possibility of any reimbursement from Trammell or contribution from Askey and De Witt.
8. The motion seeks not to correct mere clerical error, or mere defect of form, but a revision and modification upon the merits, and a substantial change in the judgment. The judgment has been rendered upwards of two years, and terms of the court have intervened, and the court possesses no such power over its own decrees to give the party the relief sought. (Chambers v. Hodges, 3 Tex., 528.) In the present motion, it must be borne in mind that Watson is alleged to be surety on appeal bond, and the mandate of this court was certified below for observance, and has been fully complied with, so far as the same bound the sureties, and settled up more than eighteen months before the filing of motion to correct judgment.
9. The record is not such as the court can act on, as it is without the seal to the tie.
10. The record does not disclose the day of the judg ment, and the bond might as well refer to any other judgment as that in the record.

Opinion:
Wheeler, O. J.
—The power which this court retains over its records and judgments of a former term was considered in the case of Chambers v. Hodges, 3 Tex., 517. What is deemed the sound and correct doctrine on the subject was there laid down with care and precision, and has been since followed as the settled law of the court. It-was considered, that when the judgment of this court is entered, its minutes authenticated as a record, and the term of the court closed, the court has no further power over the judgment, for the purpose of a revision or modification thereof upon the merits; but that the court may, after the term, amend its records and judgments so far as to correct merely clerical errors or mistakes, or by adding such omitted clause in the rendition of the judgment as may be necessary to give it effect, when there is anything in the judgment by which to amend.
The question now to be considered is, whether the omission of the name of Watson, one of the sureties in the appeal bond, in the entry of the judgment of this court, is to be deemed a clerical omission or mistake. We incline to the opinion that it is.
It sometimes happens, that the death of a surety is suggested, or for some other cause there is a dismission as to one, and judgment taken as to the principal and the other surety. When this is the case, the practice is, to enter the suggestion and dismission on the court docket, and indicate the judgment that is to be entered up as to the others. We have referred to the court docket of the term at which the judgment here in question was entered, and find no dismission as to the surety, Watson, but only an entry in the usual manner of affirmance of the judgment. In such case, it is the uniform practice, in compliance wdth the direction of the statute, (0. & W. Dig., Art. 1921; Paschal's Dig., Art. 1571,) to enter judgment against the principal and sureties in the injunction bond. The entry in this case is in the usual form, " That the judgment of the court below he in all things affirmed, and the appellees recover of the appellant and his sureties, Harrison, Askey, and C. E. He Witt," &c., omitting the name of Watson, the remaining surety on the bond. As there was no discontinuance or dismission as to him, we must suppose the omission of his name in the entry was a clerical omission. As such, it is the proper subject of amendment, and there is enough in the record to amend hy. Judgment was rendered against the principal and his sureties, which included all whose names were upon the bond; but, in naming them, one was omitted. It is plain from the record that his name, as well as the others, ought to have been inserted; and the record thus furnishes the means of supplying the omission.
There is a case reported in 14 Johns. B. where a similar amendment of the record of the judgment, hy adding the name of another defendant, was allowed by the Supreme Court of Hew York. (Bank of Newburg v. Seymour, 14 Johns. R., 219.)
So in the case of Van Buren v. Palmer, 18 Johns., 502, where, under a statute which subjected the lands and tenements, as well as the goods and chattels, of the debtor, judgment was rendered against the goods only, it was allowed," after the return of a fieri facias, showing that sufficient goods of the debtor were not found to satisfy the judgment, to amend, so that execution might be had against the lands and tenements, saving the rights of any subsequent incumbrancer. It was considered that the omission thus to enter the judgment in the first instance was a clerical mistake.
The Supreme Court of the Hnited States allowed an amendment of a judgment of a former term, in which interest was - not included, hy so reforming the judgment as to allow interest at the rate of six per cent. The reason assigned by Chief Justice Marshall was, that by a rule of the court six per cent, interest was allowed upon the amount of the judgment of the court below, and the omission to include it in the entry of the judgment was deemed by the court a clerical error. (Bank of Kentucky v. Wistar, 3 Peters, R, 431.)
The case of correcting clerical mistakes in the names of parties in the entry of the judgment by another part of the record is a common case of the exercise of the power of amendment. (1 Bac. Abridg. tit., Amendment F.)
We think these authorities sufficient to evince that the present is a proper case for the exercise of the power.
The question of the sufficiency of the appeal bond was adjudicated at a former term, previously to the affirmance of the judgment. (Trammell v. Trammell, 15 Tex., 291.)
We think the delay in permitting a term to pass by before making the motion, is sufficiently accounted for by the affidavit filed in support of the motion. (See Trammell v. Watson, ante, p. 210.)
It is not perceived that there is anything in the fact that the surety was omitted in the rendition of the judgment to release him from his obligation as surety. And we are of opinion that the amendment be made, and the judgment so reformed as to include therein the surety, Watson, whose name was omitted in making the entry, and it is
Ordered accordingly.