Case Name: Slaughter-House Cases. The Butchers' Benevolent Association of New Orleans v. The Crescent City Live-Stock Landing and Slaughter-House Company; Paul Esteben, L. Ruch, J. P. Rouede, W. Maylie, S. Firmberg, B. Beaubay, William Fagan, J. D. Broderick, N. Seibel, M. Lannes, J. Gitzinger, J. P. Aycock, D. Verges, The Live-Stock Dealers' and Butchers' Association of New Orleans, and Charles Cavaroc v. The State of Louisiana, ex rel. S. Belden, Attorney-General; The Butchers' Benevolent Association of New Orleans v. The Crescent City Live-Stock. Landing and Slaughter-House Company
Court: Supreme Court of the United States
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 1872-12
Citations: 16 Wall. 36
Docket Number: 
Parties: Slaughter-House Cases. The Butchers’ Benevolent Association of New Orleans v. The Crescent City Live-Stock Landing and Slaughter-House Company. Paul Esteben, L. Ruch, J. P. Rouede, W. Maylie, S. Firmberg, B. Beaubay, William Fagan, J. D. Broderick, N. Seibel, M. Lannes, J. Gitzinger, J. P. Aycock, D. Verges, The Live-Stock Dealers’ and Butchers’ Association of New Orleans, and Charles Cavaroc v. The State of Louisiana, ex rel. S. Belden, Attorney-General. The Butchers’ Benevolent Association of New Orleans v. The Crescent City Live-Stock. Landing and Slaughter-House Company.
Judges: I am authorized by the CHIEF JUSTICE, Mr. Justice SWAYNE, and Mr. Justice BRADLEY, to state that they concur with me in this dissenting opinion.
Reporter: United States Reports
Volume: 83
Pages: 36–130

Head Matter:
Slaughter-House Cases. The Butchers’ Benevolent Association of New Orleans v. The Crescent City Live-Stock Landing and Slaughter-House Company. Paul Esteben, L. Ruch, J. P. Rouede, W. Maylie, S. Firmberg, B. Beaubay, William Fagan, J. D. Broderick, N. Seibel, M. Lannes, J. Gitzinger, J. P. Aycock, D. Verges, The Live-Stock Dealers’ and Butchers’ Association of New Orleans, and Charles Cavaroc v. The State of Louisiana, ex rel. S. Belden, Attorney-General. The Butchers’ Benevolent Association of New Orleans v. The Crescent City Live-Stock. Landing and Slaughter-House Company.
1. Tire legislature of Louisiana, on the 8th of March, 1869, passed an act granting to a corporation, Created by it, the. exclusive right, for twenty-five years, to have and maintain slaughter-houses, landings for cattle, and yards for inclosing cattle intended for sale or slaughter within the parishes of Orleans, Jefférson, and St. Bernard, in that State (a territory which, it was said, — see infra, p. 85, — contained 1151 square miles, including the city of New Orleans, and a population of between two and three hundred thousand people), and prohibiting all other persons from building, keeping, or having slaughter-houses, landings for cattle, and yards for cattle intended, for sale or slaughter, within those limits; and requiring that all c.attle and other animals intended for sale or slaughter in that district, should be brought to the yards and slaughter-houses of the corporation; and authorizing the corporation to exact certain prescribed fees for the use of its wharves and for each animal landed, and certain prescribed fees for each animal slaughtered, besides the head, feet, gore, and entrails, except of swine : Held, that this grant of exclusive r'ight or privilege, guarded by proper limitation of the prices to be charged, and imposing the duty of providing ample conveniences, with permission to, all owners of stock to land) and of all butchers to slaughter at those places, was a police regulation for the health and comfort of the people (the statute locating them where health and comfort required), within the power of the State legislatures, unaffected by the Constitution of the United States previous to the adoption of the thirteenth and fourteenth articles of amendment.
2. The Parliament of Great Britain and’theState legislatures of this country have always exercised the power of granting exclusive rights when they were necessary and proper to effectuate a purpose which had in view the public good, and the power here exercised is of that class, and has until now never been denied.
Such power is not forbidden by the thirteenth article of amendment and by the first section of the fourteenth article. Ah examination of the history of the causes which led to the adoption of.those amendments and of the .amendments themselves, demonstrates that the main purpose of all the three last amendments was the freedom of the African race, the security, and perpetuation of that freedom, and their protection from the oppressions of the white.men who had formerly held them in slavery.
3. In giving construction to any of those articles it is necessary to keep this main purpose steadily in view, though the letter and spirit of those articles must apply to all cases coming within their purview, whether the party concerned be of African descent or not.
While the thirteenth article of amendment was intended primarily to abolish African slavery, it equally forbids Mexican peonage or the Chinese coolie trade, when they amount to slavery or involuntary servitude; .and the use of the word “servitude” is intended to prohibit all forms of involuntary slavery of whatever class or name.
The first clause of the fourteenth article was primarily intended to confer, citizenship on the negro race, and secondly to give definitions of citizenship of the United States, and citizenship of the States, and it recognizes the distinction between citizenship of a State and citizenship of the United States by "those definitions. ■
The second clause protects from the hostile legislation of the States the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States as distinguished from the privileges and immunities of citizens of the States.
These latter, as defined by Justice Washington in. Corf eld v. Coryell, and by this court in Ward v. Maryland, embrace generally those fundamental civil rights for the security and establishment of which organized society is instituted, and they remain, with certain exceptions mentioned in the Federal Constitution, under the care of the State governments, and of this class are those sot up by plaintiffs.
Í. The privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States are those which arise out of the nature and essential character of the National government, the provisions of its Constitution, or its laws and treaties made in pursuance thereof; and it is these which are placed under the protection of Congress by this clause of the fourteenth amendment.
It is not necessary to inquire here into the full force of the clause forbidding a State to enforce any law which deprives a person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, for that phrase has been often the subject of judicial construction, and is, .under no admissible view of it, .applicable to the present case.
6 The clause which forbids a State to deny to any person the equal protec- . tion of the laws was clearly intended to prevent the hostile discrimination against the negro race so familiar in the States where he had been a slave, and for this purpose the clause confers ample power in Congress to secure his rights and his equality before the law.
Error to the Supreme Court of Louisiana.
The three cases — the parties to which-as plaintiffs and defendants in error, are given specifically as a sub-title, at the head of this report, but which are reported together'also under the general name which, in common parlance, they had acquired — grew out of an act of the legislature of the State of Louisiana, entitled': “ Ah act to protect the health of the City of New Orleans, to locate the stock landings and slaughterhouses, and to incorporate ‘ The Crescent City Live-Stock Landing and Slaughter-House Company,’” which was approved on the 8th of March, 1-869, and went into operation on the 1st of June following; and the three cases were argued together.
The act was as follows:
“Section 1. Be it enacted, &c., That from and after the first day of June, A.D. 1869, it shall not be-lawful to land, keep, or slaughter any cattle, beeves, calves, sheep,- swine, or other animals,'or to have, keep, or establish any stock-lauding, yards, pens, slaughter-houses, or abattoirs at any point or place within the city of New Orleans, or the parishes of Orleans, Jefferson, and St. Bernard, or-at any point or place'ort -the east bank of the Mississippi Eiver within the.eorporate limits of .the city of New Orleans, or at any point on the west bank of the Mississippi Eiver, above the present depot of the New Orleans, Opelousas, and Great Western Railroad Company, except that the ‘ Crescent City Stock Landing and Slaughter-House Company’ may establish themselves at any point ór place as hereinafter provided. Any person or persons, or corporation or company carrying on any business or doing any act in contravention of this act, or landing, slaughtering or keeping any animal or animals in violation of this act, shall be liable to a fine of $250, for each and every violation, the same to be recoverable, with costs of suit, before any court of competent-jurisdiction.”
The second section of the act created one Sanger and sixteen other persons named, a corporation, with the usual privileges of a corporation,' and including power to appoint officers, and fix their compensation and term of office, and to fix the amount of the capital stock of the corporation and the number of shares thereof.
The act then went on :
“Section 3. Be it further enacted, dec., That said company or corporation is hereby authorized to- establish and erect at its own expense,’at any point or place on the east bank of the Mississippi River within the parish of St. Bernard, or in the corporate limits of the city of New Orleans, below the United States Barracks, or at any point or place on the west bank of, the Mississippi River below the present depot of the New Orleans, Opelousas, and Great Western Railroad Company, wharves, stables, sheds, yards, and buildings necessary to .land, stable, shelter, protect, and preserve all kinds of horses, mules, cattle, and other animals; and from and after the time such buildings, yards, &e., are ready and complete for business, and notice thereof is given in the official journal of the State, the said Crescent City Live-Stock Landing and Slaughter-House Company.shall have the sote and exclusive privilege of conducting and carrying on the live-stock landing and slaughter-house business within the limits and privileges granted by the provisions of this'act; and cattle and other animals destined for sale or slaughter in the city of New Orleans, or its environs, shall be landed at the livestock landings and yards of said comjíány, and shall be yarded, sheltered; and protected,, if necessary, by said company or corporation; and said company or corporation shall be entitled to have and receive for each steamship landing at the wharves of the said company or corporation, $10; for each steamboat or other water craft, $5; and for each horse, mule, bull, ox, or cow landed at their wharves, for each and every day kept, 10 cents; for each and every hog, calf, sheep, or goat, for each and every day kept, 5 cents, all without including the feed; and said company or corporation shall be entitled to keep and detain each and all of said animals until said charges are fully paid. But if the charges of landing', keeping, and feeding any of the aforesaid animals shall not be paid by the owners thereof after fifteen days of their being landed and placed in the custody of the said' company of corporation, then the said company or corporation, in order to reimburse themselves for charges and expenses incurred, shall have power, by.resorting to judicial proceedings, to advertise said animals for sale by auction, in any'two newspapers published in the city of New Orleans, for five days; and after the expiration of said five days, the said company or corporation may proceed to sell by auction, as advertised, the said animals, and the proceeds of such sales shall be taken by the said company or corporation, and applied to the payment of the charges and expenses aforesaid, and other additional costs; and tho balance, if any, remaining from such sales, shall be held to the credit of and paid to the order or receipt of the owner of said animals. Any person or persons, firm or corporation violating any of the provisions of this act, or interfering with the privileges herein granted, or landing, yarding, or keeping any animals in violation of the provisions of this ac.t, or to the injury of said company or. corpoi’ation, shall be liable to a fine or penalty of $250, to be recovered with costs of suit before any court of competent jurisdiction'.
“ The company shall, before the first of. June, 1869, build and complete a grand slaughter-house of sufficient capacity to accommodate all butchers, and in which to slaughter 500 ani-ruáis per day; also a sufficient number of sheds and stables shall be erected before the date aforementioned, to accommodate all the stock received at this port, all of which to be accomplished before the date fixed for the removal of the stock landing; as provided in the first section of this act, under penalty of a forfeiture. of their charter.
“ Section 4. Be it further enacted», &c., That the said company or corporation is hereby authorized to erect, at its own expense, one or more landing-places for live stock, as aforesaid, at any points or places consistent with the provisions of this act, and to have and enjoy from the completion thereof, and after' the first day of June, A.D. 1869, thé'exclusive privilege of having landed at their wharves or landing-places all animals intended, for sale or slaughter in the parishes of Orleans and Jefferson; and are hereby also authorized (in connection) to erect at its own expense one or more slaughter-houses, at any points or places consistent with the provisions of this act, and to have and enjoy, from the completion thereof, and after the first day of June, A.I). 1869, the exclusive privilege of having slaughtered therein all animals, the meat of which is destined for sale in the parishes of Orleans and Jefferson.
“ Section 5. Be it further enacted, &e., That whenever said slaughter-houses and accessory buildings shall be completed and thrown open for the use of the public, said company or corporation shall immediately giye public notice for thirty days, in the official journal of the State, and within said thirty days’ notice, and within, from and after ,he first day of'June, A.D. 1869, all other ■stock landings and slaughter-houses within the parishes of Orleans, Jefferson, and St. Bernard shall be closed, and it will no longer be lawful to slaughter cattle, hogs, calves, sheep, or goats, the meat of which i¿ determined for sale within the parishes aforesaid, under a penalty of $100, for each and eoery offence, recoverable, with costs of suit, before any court of competent jurisdiction; that all animals to be slaughtered,the meat whereof is determined for sale in the parishes of' Orleans or Jefferson, must be slaughtered in the slaughterhouses erected by the said company or corporation; and upon a refusal of said company or corporation to allow any animal or animals to be slaughtered after the same has been certified by the inspector, as hereinafter provided, to be fit for human food, the said company or corporation shall be subject to a fine in each case of $250, recoverable, with costs of suit, before any court of competent jurisdiction; said fines and penalties to be paid over to the auditor of public accounts, which sum or sums shall be credited to the educational fund.
“Section 6. Be it further'enacted, &c., That-the governor of the State of Louisiana shall appoint.a competent person, clothed with police powers, to act as inspector of all stock that is to be slaughtered, and whose duty it will be to examiue closely all animals intended to be slaughtered, to ascertain whether they are sound and fit for human food or not; and if sound and fit for human food, to furnish a certificate stating that fact, to the owners of the animals inspected; and without said certificate no animals can' be slaughtered for sale in the slaughter-houses of said company or corporation. The owner' of said animals so inspected to pay'the inspector 10 cents for each and every animal bo inspected, one-half of which fee the said inspector shall retain for his services, and the other half of said fee shall be paid over to the auditqr of public accounts, said payment to be made quarterly. Said inspector shall give a good and sufficient ■bond to the State, in the sum cf $5000', with sureties subject to the approval of the governor of the State of Louisiana, for the faithful performance of his duties. Said inspector shall be fined for dereliction of duty $50 for each neglect^ Said inspector may appoint as many deputies as may be necessary. The half of the fees collected as provided above, and paid over to the auditor of public accounts, shall be placed to the credit of the educational fund.
“ Section 7. Be it further enacted, (fee., That all persons slaughtering or causing to be slaughtered,-cattle or other animals in said slaughter-houses, shall pay to the said company or corporation the following rates or perquisites, Viz.: For all beeves, $1 each.; for all hogs and calves, 50 cents each; for all sheep, goats, and lambs, 30 cents each ; and, the said company or corporation shall be entitled to the head, feet, gore, and entrails of all animals excepting hogs, entering the slaughter-houses and killed therein, it being understood that the heart and liver are not considered as a part of the gore and entrails, and that the said heart and liver of all animals slaughtered in the slaughter-houses of the said company or corporation .shall belong, in all cases, to the owners of the animals slaughtered.
“Section 8. Beit further enacted, &c., That all the fines and penalties incurred for violations of this act shall be recoverable in a civil suit bbfore any court of competent jurisdiction, said suit to be brought'and prosecuted by said company or corporation in all cases where the privileges granted to the said company or corporation by the provisions of this act are violated or interfered with ; that one-half of all the fines and penalties recovered by the said company or corporation [Sic in copy — Rep.], in consideration of their prosecuting the violation of this act, and the other half shall be paid over to the auditor of public accounts, to the credit of the educational fund.
“ Section 9. Be it further enacted, '&c., That said Crescent City. Live-Stock Landing and Slaughter-House Company shall have the right to construct a railroad from their buildings to the limits of the city of New Orleans, and shall have the right to ran cars thereon, drawn by horses or other locomotive power, as they may see fit; said railroad to be built on either of the public roads running along the levee' on each side of the Mississippi River. The said company or corporation shall also have the right to establish such steam ferries as they may see fit to run on the Mississippi River between their buildings and any points or places on either side of said river.
“Section 10. Be it further enacted, <&c., That at the expiration of twenty-five years from and after the passage of this act the privileges herein granted shall expire.”
The parish of Orleans containing (as was said ) an area of 150 square mile's; the parish of Jefferson of 384; and the parish of St. Bernard of 620; the three parishes together 1154 square miles, and they having between two and three hundred thousand péople resident therein, and prior to the passage of the act above quoted, about 1000 persons employed daily in the business of procuring, preparing, and selling animal food, the passage of the act necessarily produced great feeling. Some hundreds of suits were brought on the one side or on the other; the butchers, not included ■in the “monopoly” as it was called, acting sometimes in combinations, in corporations, and companies, and sometimes by themselves; the same counsel, however, apparently representing pretty much all of them. The ground of the opposition to the slaughter-house company’s pretensions, so far as any cases were finally passed on iii this court was, that the act of the Louisiana legislature made a monopoly and was a violation of the most important provisions of the thirteenth and fourteenth Articles of Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. The language relied on of these articles is thus:
amendment xiii.
“Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime, whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, nor anyplace subject to their jurisdiction.”
AMENDMENT XIV.
“All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.
“No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United St ates, nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law, nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”
The Supreme Court of Louisiana decided in favor of the company, and fiv.e of the cases came into this court under the 25th section of the Judiciary Act in December, 1870; where they were the subject of a preliminary motion by the plaintiffs in error for an order in the nature of a supersedeas. After this, that is to say, in, March, 1871, a compromise was sought to be effected, and certain parties professing, apparently, to act in a representative way in behalf of the opponents to the company, referring to a compromise that they assumed had been effected, agreed to discontinue u all writs of error concerning the said company, now pending in the Supreme Court of the United States;” stipulating further “ that their agreement should be sufficient authority for any attorney to appear and move for the dismissal of all said suits.” Some of the cases were thus confessedly dismissed. But the three of which the names are given as a sub-title at the head of this report were, by certain of the butchers, asserted not to have been dismissed. And Messrs. M. II. Carpenter, J. S. Black, and' T. J. Durant, in behalf of the new corporation, having moved to dismiss them also as embraced in the agreement, affidavits were filed on the one side and on the other; the affidavits of the butchers opposed to the “monopoly” affirming that they were plaintiffs in error in these three cases, and that they never consented to what had been done, and' that no proper authority .had been given to do it. This matter was directed to be' heard with the merits. The case being advanced was first heard on these, January 1.1th, 1872; Mr. Justice Nelson being indisposed and not in his seat.' Being ordered for reargumeht, it was heard again, February 3d, 4th, and 5th, 1873.
Mr. John A. Campbell, and also Mr. J. Q. A. Fellows, argued the case at much length and on the authorities, in behalf of the plaintiffs in error.
The reporter cannot pretend to give more than such an abstract of the argument as may show to what thé opinion of the court was meant to be responsive.
I. The learned counsel quoting Thiers, contended that, “the right to one’s self, to one’s own faculties, physical and intellectual, one’s own brain, eyes, hands, feet, in a word to his soul and body, was an incontestable right; one of whose enjoyment and exercise by its owner no one could complain, and one which no one could take away. More than this, the obligation to labor was a duty, a thing ordained of God, and which if submitted to faithfully, secured a blessing to the human family.” Quoting further from Turgot, De Tocqueville, Buckle, Dalloz, Leibei’, Sir G. C. Lewi?, and others, the counsel gave a vivid and very interesting account of the condition and grievances of the lower orders in various countries of Europe, especially in France, with its banalités and “ seigneurs jusiiciers,” during those days when “ the prying eye of the government followed the butcher to the shambles and the baker to the oven;” when “the peasant could not cross a river without paying to some nobleman a toll, nor take the produce which he raised to market until he had bought leave to do so; .nor consume what remained' of his grain till he had sent it to the lord’s mill to be ground, nor full his cloths on his own works, nor sharpen hjs'tools at his own grindstone, nor make wine, oil, or- cider at his own press;” the 'days of monopolies; monopolies which followed men .in their daily avocations, troubled them with its' meddling spirit, and worst of all diminished their responsibility to themselves. Passing from- Scotland, in which the cultivators of each barony or regality were obliged'to pay a “ multure ” on each stack of hay or straw reaped by the farmer — “thirlage” or “thraldom,” as it was called — and when lands were subject to an “ astriction ” astricting them and their inhabitants to particular mills for the grinding of grain that'was raised on them, and coming to Great Britain, the counsel adverted to the reigns of Edward III, and Rich ard II, and their successors, when the price of labor was fixed by law, and when every able-bodied man and woman, not being a merchant or craftsman, was “ bounden ” to serve at the wages fixed, and when to prevent the rural' laborer from seeking .the towns he was forbidden to leave his own village. - It was in England that the earliest battle for civil liberty had been made. Macaulay thus described it:
“It was in the Parliament of 1601, that the opposition which had, during-forty years, been silently gathering and husbanding strength, fought its-first great battle and won its first victory. The ground was well chosen. The English sovereigns- had always been intrusted with the supreme direction of commercial police. It was their undoubted prerogative to regulate coins, weights, measures, and to appoint fairs, markets, and ports. The line which bounded their authority ovpr trade, had, as usual, been but loosely drawn. They therefore, as usual, encroached on the province which rightfully belonged to the legislature. The encroachment was, as usual, patiently borne, till it became serious. But at length the Queen took upon herself to grant patents of monopoly by scores. There was scarcely a family in the realm that did not feel itself aggrieved by the oppression- and extortion which the abuse naturally caused. Iron, oil, vinegar, coal, lead, starch, yarn, leather, glass, could be bought only at exorbitant prices. The House of Commons met in an angry and determined mood. It was in vain that a courtly minority blamed the speaker for suffering the acts of the‘Queen’s highness to be called in question. The language of the discontented party was high and menacing, and was echoed .by tbe voice of the whole nation. The coach of the chief minister of the crown was surrounded by an indignant populace, who cursed monopolies, and exclaimed that the prerogative should not be allowed to touch the old liberties of England.”
Macaulay proceeded to say that the Queen’s reign was in danger of a shameful and disgraceful end, but that'she, with admirable judgment, declined the contest and redressed the. grievance, aud in touching language' thanked the Commons for their tender care of the common weal.
The great grievance of our.ancestors about the time that, thej' largely left England, was this very subject. Sir John Culpeper, in .a speech in the Long Parliament, thus spoke of these monopolies and. pollers of the people:
“They are a nest of wasps — a swarm of vermin which have overcrept the land. Like the frogs, of Egypt they have gotten possession of our dwellings, and we have scarce a room free from them. They sup in our cup; they dip in our dish; they sit by our fire: We find them in the dye-fat, wash-bowl, and powderiug-tub. They share with the butler in his box. They will not bait us a pin. We m-ay not buy our clothes without their brokage. These are the leeches that have sucked the commonwealth so hard that it is almost hectical.' Mr. Speaker! I have echoed to you the-cries of the Kingdom. I will tell you their hopes. They look, to Heaven for a blessing on this Parliament ” ... .-
Monopolies concerning wine; coal, salt, starch,, the dressing of meat in taverns, beavers, -belts j bone-lace, leather, pins, and other things, to. the gathering of rags, are -referred to in this speech.
But more important than these discussions in Parliament were the solemn judgments of the courts, of'Great Britain. The great and leading ease was that reported by Lord Coke, The Case of Monopolies. The patent was granted to Darcy to buy beyond the sea all such playing-cards as he thought good-, and to utter and. selhthem within the kingdom, and that he and his agents and deputies should have-the whole trade, .traffic, and merchandise of playing-cards, and that another person and none other should have the making of playing-cards within the realm. A suit was brought against a citizen of London for selling playing-cards, and he pleaded that being a citizen free of the city he had a right to do so. And-;—
“Resolved (Popham, C;J.) per totam Curiam,.that the said grant of the plaintiff of the sole making of cards within the realm, was utterly void, and for two reasons:
“1. That it is a monopoly and against the common law.
“ 2. That it is against divers acts of Parliament.”
[The learned counsel read Sir Edward Coke’s report of the judgment in this case, which was given fully in the brief at length, seeking to apply it to the case's before the court.]
It was from a country which had been thus oppressed by monopolies that our ancestors came.- And a profound conviction of'the truth of the sentiment already quoted from M. Thiers — that every man has a right to his own faculties, physical and intellectual, and that this is. a right, one of whjch no one can- complain, and no one deprive him — was at the bottom of the .settlement of the country by them. Accordingly,'free competition in business, free enterprise, the absence of all exactions by petty tyranny, of all spoliation of private right by public authority — the suppression of sinecures, monopolies, titles of nobility, and exemption from legal duties — were exactly what the.colonists sought for and obtained by their settlement here, their long-contest with physical evils that attended the colonial condition, their struggle'for.independence, and their efforts, exertions, and sacrifices since.
Now, the act of the Louisiana legislature was in the face of all these principles; it made it unlawful for men to use then own land for their own purposes; made it unlawful to any except the seventeen of this company to exercise a lawful and necessary business for which others were as competent as they, for which at .least one thousand persons in the three parishes named had qualified themselves, had framed their arrangements in life, had invested their property, and had founded all their hopes of success on earth. The act was a pure monopoly; as such against common right, and void at the common law of England. - And it was equally void by our own law. The case of The Norwich Gaslight Company v. The Norwich City Gaslight Company, a case in Connecticut, and more pointedly still, The City of Chicago v. Rumpff, a case in Illinois, and The Mayor of the City of Hudson v. Thorne, a case in New York, were in entire harmony with Coke’s great case, and declared that monopolies are against common right.
How, indeed, do authors and inventors maintain a monopoly in even the works of their own brain? in that which in a large sense»may be .called their own. Only through a provision of the Constitution preserving such works to them. Many State constitutions have denounced monopolies by name, and it is certain that every species of exclusive privilege is an offence to the people, and that popular aversion to them does b.ut increase the more largely that they are granted.
II. But if this monopoly were, not thus void at common law, it would be so under both the thirteenth dnd the fourteenth amendments.
The thirteenth amendment prohibits “slavery and involuntary servitude.” The expressions are ancient ones, and were familiar even before the time when they appeared in the great Ordinance of 1787, for the government of our vast Northwestern Territory; a territory from which great States were to arise. In that ordinance they are associated with enactments affording comprehensive protection, for life, liberty, and property; for the spread of religion, morality, and knowledge; for maintaining the inviolability'of contracts, the freedom of navigation upon the public rivers, and the unrestrained conveyance of property by contract and devise, and for equality of children in the inheritance of patrimonial estates. The ordinance became a law after Great Britain, in form the most popular government in Europe, had been expelled from that territory because of “injuries and usurpations having in direct object the establishment of an absolute tyranny over the States.” Feudalism at that time prevailed in nearly all the kingdoms of Europe, and serfdom and servitude and feudal service depressed their people to the level of slaves. The prohibition of “ slavery and involuntary servitude” in every form and’degree, except as a sentence upon a conviction for crime, comprises mrich more than.the abolition or prohibition of African slavery. Slavery in the annals of the world had been the ultimate solution of controversies between the creditor and debtor; the conqueror and his captive; the father and his child; the state and an offender against its laws. The laws might enslave a man to the soil. The whole of Europe in 1787 was crowded with persons -who were held as vassals to their landlord, and serfs ou his dominions. The American constitution for that great territory was framed to abolish slavery and involuntary servitude in all form,s, and iii all degrees in which they have existed- among men', except as a punishment for crime duly proved and adjudged.
Now, the act of which we complain has made of three parishes of Louisiana “ enthralled ground.” “ The seventeen” have asiricted not only the inhabitants of those parishes, but of all other portions of the earth who may'have cattle or animals for sale or for food, to land them at the 'wharves of that company (if brought to that territory), to keep them in their pens, yards, or stables, and to prepare them for market-in their abattoir or slaughter-house. Lest, some competitor may present -more tempting or convenient arrangements, the act directs that all of these shall be closed on a particular day, and prohibits any one from having, keeping, or establishing any other; and a peremptory .command is given that all animals shall be sheltered, preserved, and protected by this corporation, and by none other, under heavy’penalties.
Is not this “ a servitude?” .Might it not be so considered-in a strict sense ? Tt is like the “ thirlage” of the old Scotch law and the banalités of seignioral France;- which were ser-, vitudes’.undoubtedly. But, if not strictly a servitude, it is-certainly a servitude in a more popular sense, and, being an enforced one, it is an involuntary.servitude. Men are surely subjected to a servitude when, throughout three parishes, embracing 1200 square miles, every man and every woman in them is compelled to refrain from'the use of their own land aiid exercise of their own industry and the improve. ment' of their own property, in a way confessedly lawful and necessary in itself, tpid made unlawful and unnecessary only because, at their c^st, an exclusive privilege is granted-to seventeen other persons to improve and exercise it for them. We have here the “servients” and the “dominants” and the “ thraldom” of the old seignioral system. The servients in this case-are all the inhabitants in any manner using animals brought to the markets for sale or for slaughter. The dominants are “ the seventeen” made into a corporation, with these seignioral rights and'privileges. The masters are these seventeen, who aloue can admit or refuse other members to their corporation. The abused persons are the community, who are deprived of what was a common right and bound under a thraldom.
III. The act is even more plainly in the face of the fourteenth amendment. That amendment was a development of the thirteenth, and is a more comprehensive exposition of the principles which lie at the foundation of the thirteenth.
Slavery had been abolished as the issue of the civil-war. More thau -three millions of a population lately servile, were liberated without preparation for any political or civil duty. Besides this population of emancipated slaves,, there was a large and growing population who came to this country without .education in the laws and constitution of the country, and who had begun to exert, a perceptible influence over our government. There were also a large number of unsettled and difficult questions of State and National right that had no other settlement or solution but what the war had afforded. It had been maintained from the origin of the Constitution, by one political party — men of a high order of ability, and who exerted a yeat influence — that the State was the highest political organization in the United States; that through the consent of the separate States the Union had been formed for limited purposes; that there was no social union except by and through the States, and that in extreme cases the several States might cancel the obligations to the Federal government and reclaim the allegiance and fidelity of its members. Siich were the doctrines of Mr. Calhoun, and of others; both those who preceded and those who have followed him. It is nowhere declared in the Constitution what “a citizen” is, .or what constitutes citizenship; and what ideas were eutertained of citizenship by one-class in our country may be seen in.the South Carolina case of Hunt v. The State, -where Harper, J., referring to the arguments of Messrs. Petigru, 'Blanding, McWillie, and Williams — men eminent in the South as jurists — who were opposing nullification, says:
“ It has been admitted, in argument by all the counsel except one, that in case of a secession- by the State from the Union, the citizens and constituted authorities would be bound to obey and give effect to the act.”
But the fourteenth amendment does define - citizenship and the relations of citizens to the State'and Federal government. -It ordains that “ all persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof are citizens of the United- States and of the State where they reside.” Citizenship in a State is made by residence and 'without reference to the consent of the State. Yet, by the same amendment, when it exists, no State can abridge its privileges or immunities. The doctrinó of the “ States-Rights party,” led in modern times by Mr. Calhoun, was, that there was no citizenship in fhe. whole United States, except sub modo and by the permission of the States. According to their theory the United States, had no integral existence except as an incomplete combination among several integers. The fourteenth amendment struck at, and forever destroyed, all such doctrines. It seeriis to have b.ee'n made under an apprehension of a destructive faculty in the State governments. ’ It consolidated the several' “ integers” into a consistent whole. Were there Brahmans in Massachusetts, “the chief of all creatures, and with the universe held in charge for them,” and Soudras in Pennsylvania, “who simply had life through the benevolence of the other,” this amendment places them on the same footing. By it the national principle has received an indefinite enlarge ment. The tie'between the United States and every citizen in every part of its own jurisdiction has been made intimate and familiar. To the same extent the confederate features of the government have been obliterated. The States in their closest connection with the members of the State, have been placed under the oversight and restraining and enforcing hand of Congress. The purpose is manifest, to establish through the whole jurisdiction of the United States one people, and that every member of the empire shall understand and appreciate the fact that his privileges and immunities cannot be abridged by State authority; that State laws must be so’ framed .as to secure life, liberty, property from arbitrary violation and secure protection of law to all. Thus, as the great personal rights of each and every person were established and guarded, a reasonable confidenee'that there would be good government might seem to be justified. The amendment embodies all that the statesmanship of the country has conceived for accommodating the Constitution and the institutions of the country to the vast additions of territory, increase of the population, multiplication of States and Territorial governments, the annual influx of aliens, and the mightychanges produced by revolutionary events, and by social, industrial, commercial development. It is an act of Union, an act to determine the reciprocal relations of the millions of population within the bounds of the United States — the numerous State governments and the entire United States administered by a common government — that they might mutually sustain, support, and co-operate for the promotion of peace, security, and the assurance of property and liberty.
Under it the fact of citizenship does not depend upon parentage, family, nor upon the historical division of the land into separate States, some of whom had a glorious history, of which its members were justly proud. Citizenship is assigned to nativity in any portion of the United States, and every person so born is a citizen. The naturalized person acquires citizenship of the same kind without any action of the State at all. So either may by this title of citizenship make his residence at any place in the United States, and under whatever form of State administration, he must be treated as a citizen of that State. His “privileges and immunities” must not be impaired, and all the privileges of the English-Magna Charta in favor of freemen are collected upon'him and overshadow him as derived from this amendment. The States must not weaken nor destroy them. The comprehensiveness of this amendment, the natural and.necessary breadth of the language; the history of some of the clauses; their connection with discussions, contests, and domestic, commotions that form landmarks in the annals of constitutional government; the circumstances under which it became part of the Constitution, demonstrate that the weighty import of what it ordains is not to be misunderstood.
From whatever cause originating, or with whatever special and present or pressing purpose passed, the fourteenth amendment is not confined to the population that had been servile, or to that which had any of the disabilities or disqualifications arising from race or from contract. The vast number of laborers in mines, manufactories, commerce, as well as the laborers on the plantations, are defended against the unequal legislation of the States. Nor is the amendment confined in its application to laboring men. The mandate is universal in its application to persons of every class and every condition. There are forty millions of population who may refer to it to determine their rank in the United States, and in any particular State. Thére are thirty-seven governments among the States to which it directs command, and the States that may be hereafter admitted, and thé persons hereafter to be horn or naturalized will find here declarations of the same weighty import to them all. • To the State governments it says: “Let there be no law made or enforced to diminish one of the privileged and immunities of the people of the United States;” nor law to deprive them of their life, liberty, property, or protection without trial. To the .people the declaration is: “Take and hold this your certificate of status and of capacity, the Magna Charta of yonr rights and liberties.” To the Congress it says: “ Take care to enforce this article by suitable laws.”
The only qqestion then is this : “ When a State passes a law depriving a thousand people, who have acquired valuable property, and who, through its instrumentality, are engaged in an honest and necessary business, which they understand, of their right to use such their own .property, and to. labor in such their honest and necessary business, and gives a monopoly, embracing the whole subject,- including the right to labor.in such business, to seventeen other persons— whether the State has abridged any of the privileges or immunities of these thousand persons?”
Now, .what are “ privileges and immunities” in the sense of the Constitution ? They are undoubtedly the personal and civil rights which usage, tradition, the habits of society, written law, and. the common sentiments of people have reeogu.ized as forming the basis of the institutions of the country. The first clause in the fourteenth amendment' does not deal with any interstate relations, nor relations that depend in any manner upon State laws, nor is any standard among the States referred to for the ascertainment of these privileges and immunities.- It assumes that there were privileges and immunities that belong to' an American citizen, and the State is’commanded neither to make nor to enforce any law that will abridge them.
The case of Ward v. Maryland bears upon the matter. That case involved the validity of a statute of Maryland which imposed a tax. in the form of a license to sell the agricultural and manufactured articles of other .States than Maryland by card, sample, or printed lists, or catalogue. The purpose of the tax was to prohibit sales in that mode, and to relieve the resident merchant from the competition of these itinerant .or transient dealers. This court decided that the power to carry on commerce .in this form was “a privilege or immunity” of the sojourner.
2. Hie act in question is equally im the face of the fourteenth amendment in that it denies to the plaintiffs the equal protection of the laws. By an act of legislative partiality it enriches seventeen persons and deprives nearly a thousand others of the san^ class, and as upright and competent as the seventeen, of the means by which they earn their daily bread.
3. It is equally in violation of it, since it deprives them of their property without due process of law. The right to labor, the right to one’s self physically and intellectually, and to the product of one’s own faculties, is past doubt property, arid property of a sacred kind. Yet this property is destroyed by the act; destroyed not by due process of .law, but by charter; a grant of privilege, of monopoly; which allows such rights in this matter to no one but to a favored “.seventeen.”
It will of course be sought to justify the act as an exercise of the police power; a matter confessedly, in its general scope, within the jurisdiction of the States. Without doubt, in that general scope, the subject of sanitary laws belong to the exercise of the power set up; but it does not follow there is no restraint on State power of legislation in police matters. The police power was invoked in the case of Gibbons v. Ogden. New York had grafted-to eminent citizens a monopoly of steamboat navigation in her waters as compensation for their enterprise and invention. They set up that Gibbon's should, not have, keep, establish, or land with a steamboat to carry passengers and freight on the navigable waters of New York. Ofcourse the State had a great jurisdiction over'its waters for all purposes of police, but none to control navigation and intercourse between ■ the United States and foreign nations, or among the States. . Suppose the grant to Fulton and Livingston had been that all persons coming to the United States, or from the States around, should) because of their "services to the State, land on one of their lots and pass through their gates. This would, abridge the rights secured in the fourteenth amendment. The right to move with freedom, to choose his highway, and to be exempt from impositions,.belongs to the citizen. He must have this power to move freely to perforin his duties as a citizen.
The Passenger Cases, in 7 Howard, are replete with discussions on the police powers of the States. The arguments in that case appeal to the various titles in which the freedom of State action has been supposed to be unlimited. Immigrants, it was said, would bring pauperism, crime, idleness, increased expenditures, disorderly conduct. The acts, it was said, were in the nature of health acts. But the court said that the police power could not be invoked to justify even the small tax there disputed.'
Messrs. M. H. Carpenter and J. S. Black (a brief of Mr. Charles Allen being filed on the same side), and Mr. T. J. Durant, representing in addition the State of Louisiana, contra.
See infra, pp. 85, 86.
De la Propriété, 36, 47.
History of England, vol. 1, p. 58.
11- Beports, 85.
25 Connecticut, 19.
45 Illinois, 90.
7 Paige, 261.
The statement of these eases being made, infra, pp. 106-109, in the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Jñeld, is nothere given.
12 Wallace, 419.
"9 Wheaton, 203.
See supra, p. 36, sub-title.

Opinion:
Mr. Justice MILLER,
now, April 14th, 1873, delivered the opinion of the court.
These cases are brought here by .writs of error to the Supreme Court of the State of Louisiana. They arise out of the efforts of the butchers of New Orleans to resist the Crescent City Live-Stock Landing and Slaughter-House Company in the exercise of certain powers conferred by the charter which created it, and which was granted by the legislature of that State.
The cases named on a preceding page, with others which have beeu brought here and dismissed by agreement, were all decided by the Supreme Court of Louisiana in favor of the Slaughter-House Company, as we shall hereafter call it for the sake of brevity, and these writs are brought to reverse those decisions.
The records were filed in this court in 1870, and were argued before it at length on a motion made by plaintiffs in error for an order in the nature of an injunction or super sedeas, pending the action of the court on .the merits. The opinion on that motion is reported in 10 Wallace, 278.
On account of the importance of the questions involved in these eases they were, by permission of the court, taken up out of their order on the docket and argued in January, 1872. At that hearing one of the justices was absent, and it was found, on consultation, that there was a diversity of views among those who wore present. Impressed with the gravity of the questions raised in the argument, the court under, .these circumstances ordered that the cases be placed on the calendar and reargiled before a full bench. This argument was had early in February last.
Preliminary to t.he consideration of those questions is a motion by the defendant to dismiss the cases, on the ground that the contest between the parties has been adjusted by an agreement made since the records came into this court, and that part of that agreement is that these writs should be dismissed. This motion was heard with the argument on the merits, and was much pressed by counsel. It is supported by affidavits and by copies of the written agreement relied on. It is sufficient to say of these that we do not find in them satisfactory evidence that the agreement is binding upon all the parties to the record who are named as plaintiffs in the several writs of error, and that there are parties now before the court, in each of the three cases, the names of which appear on a preceding page, who have not consented to- their dismissal, and who are not bound by the action of those who have so consented. They have a rigiat to be heard, and the motion to dismiss cannot prevail.
The records show that the plaintjffs in error relied upon, and asserted throughout the entire course of the litigation in the State courts, that the grant of privileges in the charter of defendant, which they were contesting, was a violation of the most important provisions of the thirteenth and fourteenth articles of amendment of the Constitution of- the Üñited States. The jurisdiction and the duty of this court to review the judgment of the State court on those questions is clear and is imperative.
The statute thus assailed as unconstitutional was-passed March 8t-h,-1869, and is entitled'"An act to protect the health of the city o.f New Orleans, to locate the stock-landings and slaughter-houses,, and to incorporate the Crescent City Live-Stock Landing and Slaughter-House Company."
The first section forbids the lauding or slaughtering of animals whose fiesh is intended for food, within the city of New Orleans and other parishes and boundaries named and defined, or the keeping or establishing any slaughter-houses or abattoirs within those limits- except by the corporation thereby created, which is also limited to certain places after-wards mentioned; Suitable penalties are enacted for violations of this prohibition.
• The second section designates the corporators, gives the name to the corporation, and confers on it the usual corporate powers.
The -third aud fourth sections authorize the company to establish and erect within certain territorial limits, therein defined, one or more stock-yards, stock-landings, and slaughter-houses, and imposes upon it the duty of erecting, on- or before the first day of June, 1869, one grand slaughterhouse of sufficient capacity for slaughtering five hundred animals per day.
It declares that the company, after it shall have-prepared all the necessary buildings, yards, and other conveniences for that purpose, shall have the sole aud exclusive privilege of conducting and carrying on the live-stock landing and slaughter-house business within the limits and privilege granted by the act, and that all such animals shall be landed at the stock-landings and slaughtered at the slaughterhouses of the company, and nowhere else. Penalties are enacted for infractions of this provision, and prices fixed for the maximum charges of the company for each steamboat aud for each animal landed.
Section five orders the closing up of all other stock-land inga and slaughter-houses after the first day of Juné, in the parishes of Orleans, Jefferson,'and St. Bernard, and makes it the duty of the company to permit any person to slaughter animals in their slaughter-houses under a heavy penalty for each- refusal. Another section fixes a limit to the charges to be made 'by the company for each animal so slaughtered in their building, and another provides for an inspection of all animals intended-to be so slaughtered, by an officer appointed by the governor of the State for that purpose.
These are the principal features of the statute, and are all that have any bearing upon the questions to be decided by us.
This statute is denounced not only as creating a monopoly and conferring odious and exclusive privileges upon a small number of. persons at the expense of the great body of the community of New Orleans, but it is asserted that it deprives a large and meritorious class of citizens — the whole of the butchers of the city — of the right to exercise their trade, the business to which they have been trained and on which they depend for the support of .themselves and their families; and that the unrestricted exercise of the business of butchering is necessary to the daily subsistence of the population of the city.
But a critical examination of the act hardjy justifies these assertions.
It is true that it grants, for a period of twenty-five years, exclusive privileges. And whether those privileges are at the expense of the community in the sense of a curtailment of any of their fundamental rights, or even in the sense of doing them an injury, is a question open to considerations' to be hereafter stated. But it is not true that it deprives the butchers of the right to exercise their trade, or imposes upon them any restriction incompatible with its successful pursuit, or furnishing the people of the city with the necessary daily supply of animal food.
The act divides itself into two main grants of privilege,— the one in reference to stock-landings and stock-yards, and the other to slaughter-houses. That the landing of live-, stock in large droves, from steamboats on the bank of'the river, and from railroad trains, should, for the safety and comfort of the people and the care of the animals, be limited to proper places, and those not numerous, it needs no argument to prove. Nor can it be injurious to the general community that while the- duty of making ample nreparation for this is imposed upon a few men, or a corporation, they should, to enable them to do it successfully, have the exclusive right of providing such landing-places, and receiving a fair compensation for the service.
It is, however, the slaughter-house privilege, which is mainly relied on to justify the charges of gross injustice to the public, and invasion of private right.
It is not, and cannot be successfully controverted,-that it is'both the right and the duty of the legislative body — the supreme power of the State or municipality — tó prescribe and determine the localities where the business of slaughtering for a great city may be conducted. To do this effectively it is indispensable that all persons who slaughter animals for food shall do it in those places and nowhere else.
The statute under consideration defines these localities and forbids slaughtering in any other. It does not, as has been asserted, prevent the butcher from doing his own slaughtering. On the contrary,.the Slaughter-House Company is required, under a heavy penalty, to permit any person who wishes to do so, to- slaughter in their houses; and. they are bound to make ample provision for the convenience of all the slaughtering for the entire city. The butcher then is still permitted to slaughter, to prepare, and to sell his own meats; but he is required to slaughter at a specified place and to pay a reasonable compensation for the use of the accommodations furnished him at that place.
The wisdom of the monopoly granted by the legislature may be open to question, but it is difficult to see a justification for the assertion that the butchers are deprived of the right to labor in their occupation, or the people of their daily service in preparing food, or how this statute, with the duties and guards imposed upon the. company, can be said to destroy the business of the butcher, or seriously interfere with its pursuit.
The power here exercised by the legislature of Louisiana is, in its essential - uature, one which has been, up to the present period in the constitutional history of this country, always conceded to belong to the States, however it may now be questioned in some of its details.
" Unwholesome trades, slaughter-houses, operations offensive to the senses, the deposit of powder, the application of steam power tq propel cars, the building with combustible materials, and the burial of the dead, may all," says Chancellor Kent, " be interdicted by law', in the midst of dense-masses of population, on the general and rational principle, that every person ought so to use his property as not to injure his neighbors; and that private interests must be made subservient to the general interests of. the community." This is called the police power; and it is declared by Chief-Justice Shaw that it is much easier to perceive-and realize the existence and sources of it than to mark its boundaries, or prescribe limits tó its exercise.
This power is, and-must be from its very nature, incapable of any very exact definition or limitation. ' Upon it depends the security of social order, the life and health of the citizen, the comfort of an existence in a thickly populated community, the enjoyment of private and social life, and the beneficial úse of property. "It extends," says another eminent .judge, "to the protection of the lives, limbs, health, comfort, and quiet of all persons, and the protection of all property-within the State; . . . and persons and property are subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens in order to secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the State. -Of the perfect right of the legislature to do this no question ever was, or,' upon acknowledged general principles, ever cau be made, so far as natural persons are concerned."
The regulation of the place and manner of conducting the slaughtering of animals, and the business of butchering within a city, and the inspect!' n of the animals to be killed for meat, and of the meat afterwards, are among the most necessary and frequent exercises of this power.' It is .not, therefore, needed that we should seek for a comprehensive definition, but-rather look for the proper source of its exercise.
In Gibbons v. Ogden Chief Justice Marshall, speaking of inspection laws passed by the States, .says: " They form a portion of that immense mass of legislation which .controls everything within the territory of a State not surrendered to the General Government — all which can be most advantageously administered by the States themselves. Inspection laws, quarantine laws, health laws of every description, as well as laws for regulating the internal commerce of a State, and those which respect turnpike roads, ferries, &e., are component parts. No direct general power over these objects is granted to Congress; and consequently they remain subject to State legislation."
The exclusive authority of State legislation over this subject is strikingly illustrated in the case of the City of New York v. Miln. Iu that case the defendant was prosecuted for failing to comply with a statute of New York which required of every master of a vessel arriving from a foreign port, in that of New York City, to report the names of all his passengers, with certain-particulars of their age, occupation, last place of settlement, and place of their birth. It was argued that this act was an invasion of the exclusive, right of Congress to regulate commerce. And it cannot be denied that such a statute operated at least indirectly upon the -commercial intercourse between the citizens of the United States and of foreign countries. But notwithstanding this it was held to be an -exercise of the police power properly within the control of the State, and unaffected by the clause of the Constitution which conferred on Congress the right to regulate commerce.
To the same purpose are the recent case's of the The License Tax, aud United States v. De Witt. In the latter case an act of Congress which undertook as a part of the internal revenue laws to make it a misdemeanor to mix for sale naphtha and illuminating oils, or to sell oil of petroleum inflammable at less than a prescribed temperature, was held to be void, because as a police regulation the power to make such a law belonged to the States, and did not belong to Congress.
It cannot be denied that the statute under consideration is aptly .framed to remove from the more densely populated part of the city, the noxious slaughter-houses, and large and offensive collections of animals necessarily incident to the slaughtering business of a large city, aud to locate them where the convenience, health, and comfort of the people require they shall be located. And it must be conceded that the means adopted by the act for this purpose are appropriate, are stringent, and effectual. But it is said that in creating a corporation for this purpose, and conferring upon it exclusive privileges — privileges which it is said constitute a monopoly — the legislature has exceeded its power. If this statute had imposed on the city of New Orleans precisely the same duties, accompanied by the same privileges, which it has on the corporation which it created, it is believed that no question would have been raised as- to its constitutionality. In that case the effect on the butchers in pursuit of their occupation and on the public would have been the same as it is now. Why cannot the legislature confer the same powers on another corporation, created for a lawful and useful public object, that it can on the municipal corporation already existing? That wherever a legislature has the right to accomplish a certain result, and that result is best a Stained by means of a corporation, it has the right to create such a corporation, and to endow it with the powers necessary to effect the desired and lawful purpose, seems hardly to admit- of debate. The proposition is ably discussed and affirmed in the ease of McCulloch v. The State of Maryland, in relation to the power of .Congress to organize the Bank of- the United States to aid in the fiscal operations of the government.
It can readily be seen that the interested vigilance of the corporation created by the Louisiana legislature will be more efficient in enforcing the limitation prescribed for the stock-landing and slaughtering business for the good of the city than the ordinary efforts of the officers of the law.
Unless, therefore, it can be maintained that the exclusive privilege granted • by this charter to the corporation, is beyond the power of the legislature of Louisiana, there can be no just exception to the validity of the statute. And in this respect we are not able to see that these privileges are especially odious or objectionable. The duty imposed as a-consideration for the privilege is well defined, and its enforcement well guarded. The prices or charges to be made by the company are limited by the statute, and we are not advised that they are on the whole exorbitant or unjust.
The proposition is, therefore, reduced to these terms: Can any exclusive privileges be granted to any of its citizens, or to a corporation, by.the legislature of a State?
The eminent and learned counsel who has twice argued the negative of this question, has displayed a research into the history- of monopolies in England, and the European continent, only equalled by the eloquence with which they are denounced.
But it is to be observed, that all such references are to monopolies established by the monarch in derogation of the-rights of his subjects, or arise out of transactions in which-the people were unrepresented, and their interests uncared for. The great Case of Monopolies, reported by Coke, and so fully stated in the brief, was undoubtedly a contést of the commons against the monarch. The decision is based upon .the ground that it was against common law, and the' argument was aimed at the unlawful assumption of power by the crown; for whoever doubted the authority of Parliament to change or modify the common law ?, The discussion in the House, of Commons cited from Macaulay clearly establishes that the contest was between the crown, and'the people represented in Parliament.
But we think it may be safely affirmed, that the Parliament of Great Britain, representing the people in their legislative functions, and the legislative bodies'of this country, have from time immemorial to the present day, continued to grant to persons and corporations exclusive privileges — privileges denied to other citizens — privileges which come within any just definition of the word monopoly, as .much as those now under consideration ; and that the power •to do this has never been questioned or denied.. Nor can it he truthfully denied, that some of the most useful and beneficial enterprises set on foot for the general good, have been made successful by means of these exclusive rights, and could only have been conducted to success in that way.
It may, therefore, he considered as established, that the authority of the legislature of Louisiana to pass the present statute is ample, unless some restraint in the exercise' of that power be found in the constitution of that-State or in the amendments to the Constitution of the United States, adopted since the date of the decisions we have already cited.
If any such restraint is supposed to exist in the constitu-' tion of the State, the Supreme Court of Louisiana hawing necessarily passed on that question, it would not be open to review in this court.
The plaintiffs in error accepting this issue, allege that- the statute is a violation of the Constitution of the United States in these several particulars:
That it creates an involuntary servitude forbidden by the thirteenth article of amendment;
That it abridges the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States;
That it denies to the plaintiffs the equal protection of the laws; ánd,
That it deprives them of their property without due process of law; contrary to the provisions of the first section oí the fourteenth article of amendment.
This court is thus called upon for the first, time to give construction to these articles.
We do not conceal from ourselves the great responsibility which this duty devolves upon us. No questions' so far-reaching and pervading in theii consequences, so profoundly interesting to the people of this country, and so important in their bearing-upon the relations of the United-States, and of the several States to each other and to the citizens of the States and of the United States, have been before this court during the official life of any pf its present members. We have given every opportunity for a full tearing at the bar; we have discussed it freely and compared views amoiij ourselves; we have taken ample time for careful delibeiation, and w.e now propose to announce the judgments which we have formed in the construction of those articles,, so far as .we have found them necessary to the decision of the cases before, us, and beyond that we have neither the inclination nor the right to go.
Twelve articles of amendment were added to the Federal Constitution soon after the original organization of the government under it in 1789. Of these all but the last were adopted so soon afterwards as to justify the statement that they were practically contemporaneous with the adoption of the original; and the Twelfth, adopted in eighteen hundred and'three, was so nearly so as'to have become, like all the others, historical and of another age.- But within the last eight years three other articles of amendment of vast importance have been added by the voice of the people to that now venerable instrument.
The most cursory glance at these articles discloses a unity of purpose, when taken in connection with the history of the times, which cannot fail to have an important bearing on any question of doubt coueeruing their true meaning. Nor can such doubts, when any reasonably exist, be. safely and rationally solved without a reference to that history; for in it is found the occasion and the necessity for recurring again to the great.source of power in this country, the people of the States, for additional guarantees of human rights; additional powers to the Federal government.; additional restraints upon those of the States. Fortunately that history is fresh within the memory of us all, and its leading features, as they bear upon the matter before us, free from doubt.
The institution of African slavery, as it existed in about half the States of the Union, and the contests pervading the public mind for many years, between those who desired its curtailment and ultimate extinction ánd those who desired additional safeguards for its security and perpetuation, culminated in -the effort, on the part of most of the States in Which slavery existed, to separate from the Federal government, and to resist its'authority. This constituted the war of the- rebellion, and whatever auxiliary causes may have contributed to bring about this war, undoubtedly the overshadowing and efficient cause was African slavery.
In that struggle slavery, as a legalized social relation, perished. It perished as a necessity of the bitterness and force of the conflict. When the armies of freedom found themselves upon the soil of slavery they could do nothing.less than free the poor victims whose enforced servitude was the foundation of the quarrel. And when hard pressed in the contest these men (for they proved themselves men in that terrible crisis) offered their services.and were accepted by thousands to aid in suppressing the unlawful rebellion, slavery was at an end wherever the Federal government succeeded in that purpose. ' The proclamation of President Lincoln expressed an accomplished fact as to a large portion of the insurrectionary districts, when he declared slavery abolished in them all. But the war being over, those who had succeeded in re-establishing the authority of the Federal government were not content to permit this great act of emancipation to rest on the actual results of the contest or the proclamation of the Executive, both of which might have been questioned in after times, and they determined to place this main and most valuable result in the Constitution of the restored Union as one of its fundamental articles. Hence the thirteenth article of amendment of that iustru ment. Its two short sections seem hardly to admit of construction, so vigorous is their expression and so appropriate to the purpose we have indicated.
" 1. Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime, whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States or any place subject to their jurisdiction.
" 2. Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation."
To withdraw the mind from the contemplation of this grand yet simple declaration of the personal freedom of all' the human race within the jurisdiction of this government— a declaration designed to establish the freedom of four millions of slaves — and with a microscopic search endeavor to find in it a reference to servitudes, which may have been attached to property in certain localities, requires an effort, to say the least of it.
That a personal servitude was meant is proved by the use of the word "involuntary," which can only apply to human beings. The exception of servitude as a punishment for crime gives-an idea of the class of servitude that is meant. The word servitude is of larger meaning than slavery, as the latter is popularly understood in this country, and the obvious purpose, was to forbid all shades and conditions of African slavery. It was very well understood that in the form of apprenticeship, for long terms, as it had been practiced in the West India Islands, on the abolition of slavery by the English government, or by reducing the slaves to the condition of serfs attached to the plantation, the purpose of the article might have been evaded, if only the word slavery had been used. The case of the apprentice slave, held under a law of Maryland, liberated by Chief Justice Chase, on a 'writ of habeas- corpus under this article, illustrates this course of observation. And it is all that we deem necessary to say on the application of that article to the statute of Louisiana, now under consideration.
The pi'oeess of restoring to their proper relations with the Federal government and with the other States those which had sided with the rebellion, undertaken under the proclamation of President Johnson in 1865, and before the assembling of Congress, developed the fact that, notwithstanding the formal recognition by those States of the abolition of slavery, the condition of the slave race would, without further protection of the Federal government, be almost as bad as it was before. Among the first acts of legislation adopted by several of the States in the legislative bodies which claimed to be in their normal relations with the Federal government, were laws which imposed upon the colored race onerous disabilities and burdens, and curtailed their rights in the pursuit of life, liberty, and property to such an extent that their freedom was of little value, while they had lost the protection which they had received from their former owners from motives both of interest and humanity.
They were in some States forbidden to appear in the towns in any other character than menial servants. They were required to reside ou and cultivate the soil without the right to purchase or own it. They were excluded from, many occupations of gain, and were not permitted' to give testimony in the courts' in any case where a white man was a party. It was said that their lives were at the mercy of bacl men, either because the laws for their protection were insufficient or were not enforced.
These circumstances, whatever of falsehood or misconception may have been mingled with their presentation, forced upon the statesmen who had conducted the Federal government in safety through the crisis, of the rebellion, and who supposed that by the thirteenth article of amendment they had secured the result of their labors, the conviction that something more was necessary in the way of constitutional protection to the unfortunate race who had suffered so much. They accordingly passed through Congress the proposition for the fourteenth amendment, and they declined to treat as restored to their full participation in the government of the Union the States which had been in insurrection, until they ratified that article by a formal vote of their legislative bodies.
Before we proceed to examine more critically the provisions of this amendment, on which the plaintiffs in error rely, let us complete aud dismiss the history of the recent amendments, as that history relates to the general purpose which pervades them all. A few years' experience satisfied the thoughtful men who had been the authors, of the other two amendments that, notwithstanding 'the restraints of those articles on the States, aud the laws passed under the additional powers granted to Congress, these were inadequate for the protection of life, liberty, and property, without which freedom to the slave was no boon. They were in all those States denied the right of suffrage. The laws were administered by the white man alone. It was urged that a face of men distinctively marked as was the negro, living in the midst of another and domiuant'race, could neyer be fully secured in their person and their property without the right of suffrage.
Hence the fifteenth amendment, which declares that " the right of a citizen of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude." The negro having, by the fourteenth amendment, been declared to be a citizen of the United States, is thus made a voter in every State of the Union.
We repeat, then, in the light of this recapitulation of events, almost too recent to be called history, but which are familiar to us all; and on the most casual examination of the language of these amendments, no one can fail to be impressed with the one pervading purpose found in them all, lying at the foundation of each, and without which none of them would have been even suggested; we mean the freedom of the slave race, the security and firm establishment of that freedom, and the protection of che newly-made freeman aud citizen from the oppressions of those who had formerly exercised unlimited dominion over him. It is true that only the fifteenth amendment, in terms, mentions the negro by speaking of his color and his slavery. But it is just as true'that each of the other articles was addressed to the. grievances of that race, and designed to. remedy thém as the fifteenth.
We do not say that ho one else but the negro can share in . this protection. Both the language and spirit of these articles are to have their fair and just weight in any question of construction. Undoubtedly while negro slavery alone was in'the mind of the Congress which proposed the thirteenth article,, it forbids any other kind of slavery, now or hereafter. If Mexican peonage or the Chinese coolie labor system shall develop-slavery of the Mexican or Chinese race within our territory, this amendment may. safely be trusted to make it void.' And so if other rights are assailed by the States which properly and necessarily fall within the protection of these articles, that protection will apply, though the party interested may Hot be of African descent. But what we do say, and what we wish tó be 'understood is, that in any fair and just construction of any section or phrase of these amendments, it is necessary to look to th'd purpose which we have said-was'the. pervading spirit of them all, the evil which they were designed to i'emedy, and the process of continued addition to the Constitution, until that purpose was supposed to be accomplished, as far as constitutional law can accom plish it.
The fibst section of the .fourteenth article, to which our attention is more specially- invited, opens with a definition of citizenship — not only citizenship of the United States, but citizenship of the States. No such definition was previously found in the Constitution, nor had any attempt been made to define it by act of Congress. It had been the occasion of much discussion in the courts, by the executive departments, and in the public journals. It had been said by. erhiuent judges that no man was a citizen of the United States, except as he was a citizen of one of the States composing the Union. Those, therefore, who had been born and resided always in the District of Columbia or in the Territories, though within the United States, were not citizens. "Whether this proposition was sound or not had never been judicially decided. But it had been held by this court, in the celebrated Dred Scott ease, only a few years before the outbreak of the civil war, that a man of African descent, whether a slave or not, was not and could not be a citizen of a State or of the United States. This decision, while it met the'condemnation of some of the ablest statesmen and constitutional lawyers of the country, had never been overruled; and if it was to be accepted as a constitutional limitation of the right of citizenship, then all the negro race who .had recently been made freemen, were still, not only not citizens, but were incapable of becoming so by anything short of an amendment to the Constitution.
To remove this difficulty primarily, and to establish a clear and comprehensive definition of citizenship which should declare what should constitute citizenship of the' United States, and also citizenship of a State, the first clause of the first section was framed.
"All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, áre citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside."
The first observation, we have to make on this clause is, tliat.it puts at rest both the questions which we stated to have been the subject of differences of opinion. It declares that persons may be citizens of the United States without regard to their citizenship of a particular State, and it overturns the Dred Scott decision by making all persons born within the United States and subject to its jurisdiction citizens of the United States. That its main purpose Was establish the citizenship,of the negro can' admit of no doubt. The phrase, "subject to its jurisdiction" was intended to exclude from its operation children of ministers, consuls, and citizens or subjects of foreign States born within the United States.
The next observation is more important in view of the arguments of counsel in the present case. It is, that the distinction 'between citizenship of the United States and citizenship of a State is clearly recognized and established. Not only may a man be a citizen of the United States without being a citizen of a State, but an important element is necessary to convert the former into the latter. lie must reside withiu the State to make him a citizen of it, but it is only necessary that he should be born or naturalized in the United States to be a citizen of the Union.
It is quite clear, then, that there is a citizenship of the United States, and a citizenship of a State, which are distinct from each other, and which depend upon different characteristics or circumstances in the individual.
We think this distinction and its explicit recognition in this amendment of great weight in this argument, because the next paragraph of this same section, which is the one mainly relied on by the plaintiffs in error, speaks only of privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States, and does not speak of those of citizens of the several States. The argument, however, in favor of the plaintiffs rests wholly ou the assumption that the citizenship is the same, and the privileges and immunities guaranteed by the clause are the same.
The language is, "No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States." ' It is a little remarkable, if this clause was intended as a protection to the citizen of a State against the legislative power of his own State, that the word citizen of the State should be left out when'it is so carefully used, aud used in contradistinction, to citizens of the United States, in the very sentence which precedes it.. It is too clear for argument that the change in phraseology was adopted under.standingly and with a purpose.
Of the privileges and immunities of the citizen of the United States, and of the privileges and immunities of the citizen of the State, and what they respectively are, we will presently consider; but we wish to state here that it is only" the former which are placed by this clause under the protection of the Federal Constitution, and that the latter, whatever they may be,- are not intended to have any additional protection by this paragraph of the amendment.
If, then, there is a difference between the privileges and immunities belonging to a citizen of the United States as such, and those belonging to the citizen of the State as such the latter must rest-for their security and protection where they have heretofore rested; for they are n.ot embraced by this paragraph of the amendment.
The first occurrence of the words 'privileges and immunities" in our constitutional history, is to be found in the fourth of the articles of. the old Confederation.
It declares "that the better to secure and perpetuate mutual friendship and intercourse among the people of the different States in this Union, the free inhabitants of each of these States, paupers, vagabonds, and fugitives from justice excepted, shall be entitled to all the privileges. and' immunities of free citizens in the several States; and the people of each State shall have free ingress and regress to and from any other State, and shall enjoy therein all the privileges, of' trade and commerce, subject to the same duties, impositions:,, and restrictions as the inhabitants thereof respectively/*
. In the Constitution of the United States, which superseded the Articles of Confederation, the corresponding provision- is found iu section two of the fourth article, in the following words: " The citizens of each State shall be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens of the several States."
There can be but little question that the- purpose of both these provisions is the same, and that the privileges and immunities intended are the same in each. Iu the article of the Confederation we have some of these specifically mentioned, and enough perhaps to give som,e general idea of the class of civil rights meant by the phrase.
Fortunately we are not without judicial, construction of this clause of the Constitution. The first and the leading case on the-subject is that of Corfield v. Coryell, decided by Mr. Justice Washington iu the Circuit Court for the District of Pennsylvania iu 1828. '
" The inquiry," he says, " is, what are the privileges and immunities of citizens of the several States ? ' "We feel no hesitation in confining these expressions to those privileges and immunities which ar & fundamental; which belong of right to the citizens of all free governments, and which ha. e at all times been enjoyed by citizens of the several States which compose this Union; from the time of their becoming free, independent, and sovereign. What these fundamental' principles are, it would be more tedious than difficult to enumerate. They may all, however, be comprehended under the following general heads: protection by the government, With the right to acquire and possess property of every kind, and to pursue and obtain happiness and safety, subject, nevertheless, to such restraints as the government may prescribe for the general good of the whole."
This definition of the privileges and immunities of citizens of the States is adopted in the main by this court in the recent case of Ward v. The State of Maryland, while it declines to undertake an authoritative definition beyond what was necessary to that decision. The description, when taken to include others not named, but which are of the same general character, embraces nearly every civil right •for the establishment and protection of which. organized government is .instituted. They are, in the language of Judge Washington, those rights which are fundamental. Throughout his opinion, they are spoken of as rights belonging to the individual as a citizen of a State. They are so spoken of in the constitutional provision which he was construing. And they have always been held to be the class of rights which the State governments were created to establish and secure.
In the case of Paul v. Virginia, the court, in expounding this clause of the Constitution, says that "the privileges and immunities secured to citizens of each State in the several States, by the provision in question, are those privileges and immunities which are common to the citizens in the latter States under their constitution and laws by virtue of their being citizens."
The constitutional provision there alluded to did not create those rights, which it called privileges and immunities of citizens of the States. It threw around them in that clause no security for the citizen of the State in which they were claimed or exercised. Nor did it profess to control the power of the State governments over the rights of its own citizens.
Its sole purpose was to declare to the several States, that whatever those rights, as you grant or establish them to your own citizens, or as you limit or qualify, or impose restrictions on their exercise, the same, neither more nor less, shall be the measure of the rights of citizens of other States within your jurisdiction.-
It would be the vainest show of learning to attempt to prove by citations of authority, that up to the adoption of the recent amendments, no claim or pretence was set up that those rights depended on the Federal government for their existence or protection, beyond the /very few express limitations which the Federal Constitution imposed upon the States — such, for instance, as the prohibition against ex post facto laws, bills of attainder, and laws impairing the obligation , of contracts. But with the exception of these and a few other restrictions, the entire domain of the privileges and immunities of citizens of the States, as above defined, lay within the constitutional and legislative power of the States, and without that of the Federal government. Was it the purpose of the fourteenth amendment, by the simple declaration that no State should make of enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States, to transfer the security and protection of all the civil rights which we have mentioned, from the States to the Federal government? And where it is declared that Congress shall have the power to enforce that article, was it intended to bring within the power of Congress the entire domain of civil rights heretofore belonging exclusively to the States?
All this and more must follow, if the proposition of the plaintiffs in error be sound. For not only are these rights subject to the control of Congress whenever in its discretion any of them are supposed to be abridged by State legislation, but that body may also pass laws in advance, limiting and restricting the exercise of legislative power by the States, in their most ordinary and usual functions, as in its judgment it may think proper on all such subjects. And still further, such a construction followed by the reversal of the judgments of the Supreme Court of Louisiana in these cases, would constitute this court a perpetual censor upon all legislation. of the States, on the civil rights of their own citizens, witji authority to nullify such as it did not approve as consistent with those rights, as,they existed at the time of the adoption of this amendment. The argument we admit is not always the most conclusive which is drawn from the consequences urged against the adoption of a particular construction of an instrument. But when, as in the case before us, these consequences are so serious, so far-reaching and pervading, so great a departure from the structure and spirit of our institutions; when the effect is to fetter and degrade the State governments by subjecting them to thecoutrol of Congress, in the exercise of powers' heretofore universally conceded to them of the most ordinary and fundamental character; when in fact it radically changes the whole theory of the relations of the State and Federal governments to each other and of both these governments to the people; the argument has a force that is irresistible, in the absence of language which expresses such a purpose too clearly to admit of doubt.
We are convinced that no such results were intended by the Congress which proposed these amendments, nor by the legislatures of the States which ratified them.
Having shown that the privileges and immunities relied on in the argument are those which belong to citizens of the States as such, and that they are left to the State governments for security and protection, and not by this article placed under the special care of the Federal government, we may hold ourselves excused from defining the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States which no State can abridge, until.some case involving those privileges may make it necessary to do so.
But lest it should be said that no such privileges and immunities are to be found if those we.have been considering are excluded, we venture to suggest some which owe their -existence to the Federal government^ its National character, its Constitution, or its iaws.
One of these is well described in the case of Crandall v. Nevada It. is said to be-the right of the citizen of this great country, protected by implied guarantees of its Constitution, "to come to the seat of government to assert any claim he may have upon that government, to transact any business he' may have with it, to seek its protection, to share its offices, to engage in administering its functions. He has the right of free access to its seaports, through which .all operations of foreign commerce are conducted, to the sub-treasuries, land offices, and courts of justice in the several States." And quoting from the language of Chief Justice Taney in another ease, it is said " that for all the great purposes for which the Federal government was established, we are one people, with one common country, we are all citizens of the United States;" and .it is, as snch citizens, that théir rights are. supported in this court in Crandall v. Nevada.
Another privilege of a citizen of the United States is to demand the care and protection of the Federal government over his life, liberty, and property when on the high seas or within the jurisdiction of a foreign government. Of this there can be no doubt., nor that the right depends upon his character as a citizen of tile. United States. The right to peaceably assemble- and petition for redress of grievances, the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, are rights of the citizen guaranteed by the Federal Constitution. The right to use the navigable waters of the United States,'however they may-penetrate the territory of the several States, all rights secured to.our citizens by treaties with foreigu nations,' are dependent upon citizenship of the United States, and not citizenship of a State. One Of these privileges is conferred by the very article under consideration. ' It is that a citizen of the United States.can, of his own volition, become a citizen of any State of the Union by a bond fide residence therein, with the same rights as other citizens of that State. To these may be added the rights secured by the thirteenth and fifteenth articles of amendment, and by the other clause of the fourteenth, next to be considered.
But it is useless to'pursue this branch of the inquiry, since we are of opinion that the tights claimed by these plaintiff's in drror, if they have any existence, are not privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States within the meaning of the clause of the fourteenth amendment under consideration.
"All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the-United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the Uuited States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor deny to any person within itá jurisdiction thé equal protection of its laws."
The argument has not been much pressed in these cases that the defendant's charter deprives the plaintiffs of their property without due process of law, or that it denies to them the equal protection of the law. The first of 'these paragraphs has .been in the Constitution since the adoption of the fifth amendment, as a restraint upon the Federal power. It is also to be found in some form of expression in the constitutions'of nearly all the States, as a restraint upon the power of the States. This law. then, has practically been the same as it'now is during the existence of the government, except so far as the present amendment may place the restraining power over the States in this matter in the hands of the Federal government.
We are not without judicial interpretation, therefore, both State and National, of the meaning of this clause. And it is sufficient tó say that under no construction of that provision that we have ever seen, or any that we deem admissible, can the restraint imposed by the State of Louisiana upon the exercise of their trade by the- butchers of New Orleans be held to be a deprivation of property within the meaning of that provision.
"Nor sliall any State deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
In the light of the history of these amendments, and the pervading purpose of 'them, which we have already discussed, it is not difficult to give a meaning to this clause. The existence of laws in the States where the newly emancipated negroes resided, which discriminated with gross injustice and hardship against them as a class, was the evil to be' remedied by this clause, and by it such laws are forbidden.
If, however, the States did not conform their laws to its requirements, then by the fifth section of the article of amendment Congress was authorized to enforce it by suitable legislation. We doubt very much whether any action of a State not directed by way of discrimination against the negroes as a class, or on account of their race, will ever' be held to come within the purview of this provision. It is so clearly a provision for that race and that emergency, tha.t a'strong case would be necessary for its application to any other. But as it is a State that is to be dealt with, and not alone the validity of its laws, we may safely leave that matter until Congress shall have exercised its power, or some case of State oppression, by denial of equal justice in its courts, shall have claimed a decision at our hands. We find no such ease iu the one before us, and do not deem it necessary .to go over the argument again, as it may have relation to this particular clause of the amendment.
In the early history of the organization of the government, its statesmen seem to have divided on the line which should separate the powers of the National government from those of the State governments, and though this line has never beeu' very well defined in public opinion, such a division has continued from that day to this.
The adoption of the first eleven amendments to the Constitution so soon after the original instrument was accepted, shows a prevailing sense of danger at .that time from the Federal power. And it cannot be denied' that such a jealousy continued to exist with many patriotic men until the breaking out of the late civil war. It was then discovered that -the true danger to the perpetuity of the Union was in the capacity of the State organizations to combine and concentrate all the powers of the State, and of contiguous States, for a determined- resistance to the General Government.'
Unquestionably this has given great force to the argument, arid added largely to the number of those who believe in the necessity of a strong National government.
But, however pervading this sentiment, and however it may have contributed to the adoption of the amendments we have been considering, we do not see in those amendments afiy purpose to destroy the main features of the gen-' eral system.- Undertbe pressure of all the excited feeling growing out of the war, "our statesmen have still believed that the existence of the States with powers for domestic and'local government, including the regulation of civil rights — the rights of person and of property — was essential to the perfect working of our complex form of government, though they have thought proper to impose additional limitations on the States, and to confer additional power On that of the Nation.
But. whatever fluctuations may be seen in'the history of public opinion on this subject during, the period of our' national existence, we think it will be fouud that this court, so far as its functions required, has always held with a steady and an even hand the balance between State and Féderal power, and we trust that such may continue to be the history of its relation to that subject so long as it shall have duties to perform which demand of it a construction of the Constitution, or of any of its parts.
The judgments of the Supreme Court of Louisiana in these cases a~e
Affirmed.
See subtitle, supra, p. 36. — Rep.
2 Commentaries, 340.
Commonwealth v. Alger, 7 Cushing, 84.
Thorpe v. Rutland and Burlington Railroad Co., 27 Vermont, 149.
9 'Wheaton, 203.
11 Peters, 102.
5 Wallace, 471.
9 Id. 41.
4 Wheaton, 316.
Matter of Turner, 1 Abbott United States Reports, 84.
4 Washington's Circuit Court", 371.
12 Wallace, 430.
8 Id. 180.
6 Wallace, 36.