Case Name: Lloyd E. SCHLUP, Appellant, v. Paul K. DELO, Appellee
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 1993-11-15
Citations: 11 F.3d 738
Docket Number: No. 93-3272
Parties: Lloyd E. SCHLUP, Appellant, v. Paul K. DELO, Appellee.
Judges: Before JOHN R. GIBSON, Circuit Judge, HEANEY, Senior Circuit Judge, and BEAM, Circuit Judge.
Reporter: Federal Reporter 3d Series
Volume: 11
Pages: 738–755

Head Matter:
Lloyd E. SCHLUP, Appellant, v. Paul K. DELO, Appellee.
No. 93-3272.
United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.
Submitted Nov. 3, 1993.
Decided Nov. 15, 1993.
Order Denying Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc and Motion for Stay Nov. 17, 1993
Sean D. O’Brien of the Missouri Capital Punishment Resource Center, argued, Kansas City, MO, for appellant.
Frank A. Jung, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, MO, argued for appellee.
Before JOHN R. GIBSON, Circuit Judge, HEANEY, Senior Circuit Judge, and BEAM, Circuit Judge.

Opinion:
BEAM, Circuit Judge.
Lloyd Eugene Schlup, a Missouri death-row inmate, requests a stay of execution and reversal of the district court's judgment denying his second petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The district court dismissed Mr. Schlup's second petition on August 23, 1993, and denied his subsequent Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e) motion to set aside the dismissal order. The district court's final ruling came on September 13, 1993, and Mr. Sehlup's appeal and motion for a stay of execution pending the resolution of his appeal followed.
The district court dissolved its stay of execution on September 15, 1993, in conjunction with its final rulings on the second petition. After a hearing, we denied the motion for stay pending appeal. Schlup v. Delo, No. 93-3272, 1993 WL 409815, 1993 U.S.App. LEXIS 26748 (8th Cir. Oct. 15, 1993). We now vacate that opinion and consider a renewed request for stay and the merits of Mr. Sehlup's appeal.
In support of his second petition for habe-as relief, this appeal, and the renewed request for stay of execution, Mr. Schlup tendered to the district court and now tenders to this court several affidavits and statements, mostly from present or former prisoners, purporting to be newly discovered evidence tending to establish that he was not present at the scene of the murder for which he was sentenced to death. He also renews his reliance on a videotape, offered at trial as part of an alibi defense, showing his presence in the dining room near the time of the murder. In other words, appellant says he could not have been present at the assault and is actually innocent of the crime.
I.
In his second petition, Mr. Schlu~ asserts a number of constitutional claims not raised, or raised and denied in his first petition. Thus, these allegations constitute either successive or abusive uses of the writ, 2~ U.S.C. § 2244(b), and may be considered by this court only under limited circumstances. Sawyer v. Whitley, - U.S. -, -, 112 S.Ct. 2514, 2518, 120 L.Ed.2d 269 (1992),
Unless a habeas petitioner shows cause and prejudice, see Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 97 S.Ct. 2497, 53 L.Ed.2d 594 (1977), a court may not reach the merits of: (a) successive claims which raise grounds identical to grounds heard and decided on the merits in a previous petition, Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 106 S.Ct. 2616, 91 L.Ed.2d 364 (1986); (b) new claims, not previously raised which constitute an abuse of the writ, McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 111 S.Ct. 1454, 113 L.Ed.2d 517 (1991); or (c) procedurally defaulted claims in which the petitioner failed to follow applicable state procedural rules in raising the claims. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 91 L.Ed.2d 397 (1986). These cases are premised on our concerns for the finality of state judgments of conviction, and the "significant costs of federal habeas review." McCleskey, supra, at 490-91, 111 S.Ct. at 1468; see, e.g., Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 126-128, 102 S.Ct. 1558, 1571-1572, 71 L.Ed.2d 783 (1982).
Id. (parallel citations omitted).
Mr. Schlup seeks to establish "cause and prejudice" or, in the alternative, seeks to establish his "actual innocence" of the crime as a means of obtaining federal court review of his constitutional claims. The district court reviewed and denied his cause and prejudice allegations. We agree with this result and adopt the well-reasoned opinion of the district court in this regard.
II.
A. Procedural Bar
Under a second federal habeas review of a petitioner's state court conviction, a claim of actual innocence requires a dual analysis. First, we must consider Mr. Schlup's attempt to invoke the rule announced in Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 106 S.Ct. 2616, 91 L.Ed.2d 364 (1986) that even if a petitioner cannot meet the cause and prejudice standard, a federal court may examine the merits of a constitutional claim if failure to do so would result in a miscarriage of justice. Id., at 454, 106 S.Ct. at 2627. A petitioner "may make the requi site showing by establishing that . he has a colorable claim of factual innocence." Id. The contours of this qualification were more clearly delineated by the Supreme Court in Sawyer v. Whitley, which referred to the test as the miscarriage of justice or "actual innocence" exception. Sawyer, — U.S. at -, 112 S.Ct. at 2519.
In this context, actual innocence is "not itself a constitutional claim, but instead a gateway through which a habeas petitioner must pass to have his otherwise barred constitutional claim considered on the merits." Herrera v. Collins, — U.S. -, -, 113 S.Ct. 853, 862, 122 L.Ed.2d 203 (1993). Thus, the question is: Has this appellant established "actual innocence" as defined by the Supreme Court? We think not, at least under the test this panel must apply.
Sawyer dealt with the punishment phase of the criminal proceeding as opposed to the guilt or innocence phase of the trial. Therefore, appellant argues, with some justification, that Sawyer announced only a test for analyzing the fairness of the death penalty portion of a trial. And, the Supreme Court did say, in Sawyer, with regard to guilt or innocence:
Our standard for determining actual innocence was articulated in Kuhlmann as: "[T]he prisoner must 'show a fair probability that, in light of all the evidence, including that alleged to have been illegally admitted (but with due regard to any unreliability of it) and evidence tenably claimed to have been wrongly excluded or to have become available only after the trial, the trier of the facts would have entertained a reasonable doubt of his guilt.' "
Sawyer, — U.S. at -, 112 S.Ct. at 2519, n. 5 (citations omitted).
On the other hand, Sawyer says that "actual innocence" under the death penalty phase of a ease must be determined by considering whether a "petitioner has shown by clear and convincing evidence that but for constitutional error, no reasonable juror would find him eligible for the death penalty." Id., at -, 112 S.Ct. at 2523. Says appellant, this seemingly higher (penalty) test is necessary because the amorphous concept of being actually "innocent of death" requires a more objective standard. Id., at -, 112 S.Ct. at 2519-20. In other words, in the context of guilt or innocence of the crime itself, the concept of "actual innocence" is easier to grasp. Id., at -, 112 S.Ct. at 2520. Thus, the more subjective Kuhlmann test is sufficient.
Whatever the merits of appellant's contentions, we do not write on a clean slate. We must reject appellant's argument because in this circuit "the new standard [required by Sawyer] applies equally to challenges to a conviction, not just challenges to a death sentence." McCoy v. Lockhart, 969 F.2d 649, 651 (8th Cir.1992). And, the imprimatur of this court en banc was stamped on the McCoy holding in Cornell v. Nix, 976 F.2d 376 (8th Cir.1992) (en banc), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 1820, 123 L.Ed.2d 450 (1993). Accordingly, we make our determination of whether Mr. Schlup's claim of actual innocence opens the gateway to our consideration of his constitutional claims on that basis.
Before reviewing the gateway evidence now advanced by Mr. Schlup, we consider the presence or absence of any constitutional error at the trial for which relief could be granted. The dissent contends that there was constitutional error in the form of "utter ineffectiveness of Schlup's trial counsel" and that but for this error "the jury would have received the full picture of Dade's murder, and if it were to credit the evidence, it would have no choice but to acquit." The dissent barely mentions that, although the district court found the claim of ineffective assistance to be procedurally barred, we disregarded this holding and considered the merits of this ineffective assistance claim in the appeal of Mr. Schlup's first petition for habeas relief. Schlup v. Armontrout, 941 F.2d 631, 638-42 (8th Cir.1991), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 1273, 117 L.Ed.2d 499 (1992). We found that under the test announced in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), Mr. Schlup's counsel was not ineffective at either the guilt or penalty stages of the state trial proceeding. Schlup, 941 F.2d at 639. We see no reason to change this result even if we consider the evidence Schlup now presents.
As at the first habeas, Mr. Schlup faults his counsel, Mr. Bushmann, for failing to sufficiently investigate the facts surrounding the murder of Arthur Dade. The dissent agrees. This allegation is erroneous and unfair.
There were three inmates involved in the murder. The three lawyers representing the accused worked together on parts of their investigations. Mr. Bushmann spearheaded the discovery and defense preparation. He arranged and participated in the taking of thirty-eight depositions including those of every guilt witness who testified at trial and who was directly related to the prison. It was Mr. Bushmann's persistence that confirmed the existence of the dining room videotape now used by Mr. Schlup in his effort to show actual innocence. Mr. Bushmann also determined through discovery that one hundred persons were interviewed by prison investigators and appears to have obtained, for review, the tapes or transcripts of all the statements resulting from these inquiries. The trials of the other inmates occurred pri- or to Mr. Schlup's trial and Mr. Bushmann claims to have reviewed the crucial portions of this trial testimony in preparation for Mr. Sehlup's defense. The problem does not seem to be deficiencies in trial preparation by Mr. Bushmann but, rather, the changing nature of the information presented by some of the individuals present at or near the deadly assault.
At trial, as' noted by the district court, two prison officials, who were eyewitnesses to the crime, positively identified Mr. Schlup as one of the three perpetrators of the murder. This evidence was clearly admissible and stands unrefuted except to the extent that Mr. Schlup now questions its credibility. Witnesses' credibility, however, is an issue reserved for the trial jury. It is not a matter within the province of the district court or of this court in a habeas proceeding. Federal habeas, as explained in Herrera, does not provide a forum for the retrial of a convicted felon. Herrera v. Collins, - U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 853, 860-61, 122 L.Ed.2d 203 (1993). So, even if we disregard the source of the new evidence, the eleventh-hour nature of the information, and a presentation coming almost six years after the trial; it is simpiy not possible to say that the appellant has shown by clear and convincing evidence that but for a constitutional error no reasonable jury would have found him guilty. Therefore, there is no basis for sustaining the motion for stay, Delo v. Blair, - U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 2922, 125 L.Ed.2d 751 (1993), or for reversing the district court.
Even so, we will discuss the "newly discovered" evidence presented by Mr. Schlup. This information comes in the form of written statements, affidavits, and a timed analysis of the videotape taken in the dining room. We have now heard oral argument on these matters twice.
The major thrust of Mr. Sehlup's purported showing of actual innocence involves his alibi defense. Through use of the videotape, timed on a second-by-second basis, Mr. Schlup claims that he could not have been at the murder scene. He was, he claims, in the dining room at the time.
Mr. Schlup primarily relies upon two affidavits, one from a former prisoner and one from a former employee at the institution. The latter document is dated October 26, 1993, eight days before we heard oral argument on the merits of this appeal.
John L. Green, an imnate at the Missouri Prison in Jefferson City at the time of the murder, in an affidavit dated September 7, 1993, states that he was "standing near Sergeant Flowers" at the lever box that opens the cells to unit 5A and from such position saw the murder. He further says that Sergeant Flowers directed him to call "base" to report the fight and that he immediately went into the office and made the call.
In conjunction with this new information, the affidavit of Robert Faherty, a former lieutenant at the prison, is presented. He places Mr. Schlup in his presence in a corridor to the dining hall for a two and a half to three-minute period as Mr. Sehlup proceeded from housing unit 5A, the location of the murder, to the dining hall.
The videotape is then presented to show Mr. Sehlup arriving at the dining hall first in line. According to the videotape, the corrections officers depart from the hall one minute and five seconds later, purportedly as a result of a call from "base" reporting the assault. This, Mr. Sehlup contends, shows that he had left the housing unit before the assault occurred. Since Mr. Sehlup arrived, according to Mr. Faherty's calculation, at least three and a half to four minutes after leaving the housing unit, and, the assault occurred, according to Mr. Green's statement and the videotape, one and a half to two minutes prior to his arrival at the dining room, Mr. Sehlup has an alibi. This was the same defense Mr. Bushmann attempted to establish at trial.
However, Mr. Green has made two prior statements. He told prison investigators that on February 3, 1984, the day of the murder, he was in the office at the housing unit, not next to Sergeant Flowers at the lever box some distance away, and that he did not observe the murder at all. He did state that he called "base" for help but on a different timing sequence. Of more importance is Mr. Green's testimony under oath at the Rodnie Stewart trial. Mr. Stewart was accused, along with Mr. Sehlup and Mr. O'Neal, of the crime and was tried over a year prior to Mr. Sehlup. On September 5, 1984, Mr. Green testified under oath that he was in the office, heard the words "fight-fight," "got up and . went to the door [of the office]," could see Sergeant Flowers at the lever box, saw Dade running toward the office when Dade and Stewart collided and fell to the floor. Mr. Green said he saw no actual fight take place. He then testified that he went into the office to wait for further instructions. He made no mention in his testimony of calling "base." Thus, neither of these earlier presentations fully support Mr. Green's present statement. Indeed, there are crucial differences.
Also, Mr. Faherty has testified under oath on two prior occasions. His deposition was taken by Mr. Bushmann and the lawyers for Mr. O'Neal and Mr. Stewart on June 29, 1984, and he testified at Mr. Schlup's December 1985 trial. In both instances, Mr. Faherty has Mr. Sehlup yelling out a window near the corridor to the dining room and then passing with the "first wave" of prisoners immediately into the dining room. Specifically, Mr. Faherty testified that he was temporarily on post at door T-3 located at the end of the corridor leading from the housing unit to the dining hall for only ten to fifteen seconds. At this location and during this time period, he saw Mr. Sehlup yell out the window and told Mr. Sehlup to move along toward the dining room which "he [Sehlup] did." Mr. Faherty testified that he also immediately moved to the dining room after his ten to fifteen second stop at T-3 because the dining room was really his assigned post. By all accounts, the walking time from T-3 to the entrance of the dining room is no more than twenty-five to thirty seconds.
Also of importance, in this context, is the testimony of Sergeant Peoples who was manning "base" during the relevant time period. He testified without equivocation that it was Captain Eberle, one of the officers posted near the scene of the murder, and not prisoner Green, who called "base" with news of the stabbing. Peoples testified that he immediately broadcast an alarm to prison officers, including those in the dining room who are seen responding to the call on the videotape.
Thus, in the record and in the discovery, a much different timing sequence is established, one that provided Mr. Sehlup ample time to participate in the murder and make his way to the dining hall. This was, of course, the state's theory at the trial and a theory compatible with the jury verdict.
With the recent Faherty statement, we are asked on appeal to consider evidence that the district court did not have an opportunity to pass upon. Further, Mr. Faherty testified in Mr. Schlup's trial, as indicated, so it cannot be said that his affidavit is newly discovered evidence as were the affidavits considered in Herrera. We must also observe that in a civil context dealing with a motion for summary judgment, we have held that we will not allow an affidavit in conflict with earlier sworn testimony to create an issue of fact. Camfield Tires, Inc. v. Michelin Tire Corp., 719 F.2d 1361 (8th Cir.1983). We believe that the same rule should apply in the context of habeas litigation, a civil action.
While it is evident that there are some inconsistencies between Mr. Faherty's affidavit and his trial testimony, for the most part, the affidavit simply is an effort to embellish and expand upon his testimony given under oath in Mr. Sehlup's trial. This is not the type of newly discovered evidence contemplated in Herrera, and presents an entirely different issue of whether some seven years after a trial the court should permit witnesses to come in and add to, modify, or embellish their earlier testimony. We believe that a habeas court should not permit retrial on such a basis.
The dissent also emphasizes other parts of Mr. Schlup's present version of the facts in its attempt to advance the probability that, but for his attorney's incompetence, no reasonable jury would have found Mr. Schlup guilty of the murder. Mr. Schlup purports to present eyewitnesses who either didn't see him at the assault or who now implicate another inmate, Randy Jordan.
The dissent picks and chooses from among Mr. Sehlup's several new statements and affidavits, see dissent n. 1, and finds some of them incredible because they "are too inconsistent with" the statements from some of the other newly presented eyewitnesses. The dissent also ignores or minimizes and excuses contrary statements given by some of these same individuals when the crime was investigated prior to trial. Indeed, three of the new statements credited by the dissent, in addition to the Green affidavit, those by Lamont Griffin-Bey, Donnell White and James Pierce, are inconsistent with prior interviews given during the investigation of the crime. At that time, White and Pierce denied having witnessed the murder at all. As the dissent concedes, Griffin-Bey, who now identifies Robert O'Neal and Rodnie Stewart and finds Mr. Schlup absent from the attack, stated at the time of the contemporaneous investigation that he didn't "know none of those dudes." And, later, he refused to further comment on what happened at the time of the murder.
Thus, Mr. Schlup, like Herrera, attempts to seek a federal court retrial of his state court prosecution and falls well short of showing "by clear and convincing evidence [that] no reasonable juror would find him [guilty of murder.]" Sawyer, — U.S. at -, 112 S.Ct. at 2523.
B. Due Process
The second prong of Mr. Schlup's "actual innocence" allegation requires our consideration of the claim as, itself, a constitutional violation. This requirement arises from the assumption by the Supreme Court in Herrera made for the sake of deciding that particular case, "that in a capital case a truly persuasive demonstration of 'actual innocence' made after trial would render the execution of a defendant unconstitutional, and warrant federal habeas relief if there were no state avenue open to process such a claim." Herrera, — U.S. at -, 113 S.Ct. at 869. This language is from Justice Rehnquist's opinion concurred in by Justices Sca-lia and Thomas. Justice O'Connor in her concurrence, joined by Justice Kennedy, compared and contrasted this language, with that from Justice White's concurrence and Justice Blackmun's dissent, and stated that resolution of this issue assumed by Justice Rehnquist was neither necessary nor advisable in this case. She emphasized that such "federal proceedings and relief — if they are to be had at all — are reserved for 'extraordinarily high' and 'truly persuasive demonstrations of "actual innocence" ' that cannot be presented to state authorities." Id., at -, 113 S.Ct. at 874. The decisive issue in her concurrence as well as in Justice Rehnquist's opinion, was that the petitioner had failed to make a persuasive showing of actual innocence. Justice Rehnquist stated that the showing fell short of that which would have to be made to trigger the constitutional claim which he assumed existed.
Herrera points to the resolution of Schlup's claim. As we have just discussed in part II-A, when the new evidence itself is analyzed with its inconsistencies and weaknesses, and considered together with the evidence before the jury at the trial of the case, the extraordinarily high burden is not met, and there is no truly persuasive demonstration of actual innocence.
III.
For the reasons stated above, we conclude that the motion for stay of execution should be denied and the order of the district court affirmed.
. The Honorable Jean C. Hamilton, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Missouri.
. At oral argument, the state contended that the employee was discharged. The petitioner claims he retired. We find nothing in the record either way.
. As the author of this opinion for the court, I express, separately, without the concurrence of Judge John R. Gibson, my belief that Mr. Schlup cannot, under the holding in Herrera, seek federal habeas relief based upon this "free standing" claim without first seeking executive clemency from the Governor of Missouri. It is my view that in Herrera, at least five members of the Supreme Court (Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, Scalia, and Thomas) would permit a federal habeas remedy based upon an "actual innocence" claim arising from newly discovered evidence rather than trial error (assuming such a remedy even exists when the question reserved for future consideration is answered) only "if there were no state avenue open to process such a claim." Herrera, -U.S. at -, 113 S.Ct. at 869, 874. While Schlup argues that the word "process" included in the Herrera formulation by the five member majority means a state court proceeding, such an interpretation is untenable given the extensive discussion of executive clemency in both the opinion of the Court authored by Chief Justice Rehnquist and the concurrence written by Justice O'Connor. Indeed, Justice O'Connor, in her discussion of the "assume[d]" constitutional right, points out that the reserved question "may never require resolution at all" if "the safeguards of clemency and pardon fulfill their historical mission." Id.., at -, 113 S.Ct. at 874.