Case Name: STATE of Arkansas v. C. R. GEORGE
Court: Arkansas Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Arkansas
Decision Date: 1971-06-21
Citations: 250 Ark. 968
Docket Number: 5-5671
Parties: STATE of Arkansas v. C. R. GEORGE
Judges: Bryd, J., not participating.
Reporter: Arkansas Reports
Volume: 250
Pages: 968–971-F

Head Matter:
STATE of Arkansas v. C. R. GEORGE
5-5671
470 S. W. 2d 93
Opinion delivered June 21, 1971
[Rehearing denied September 20, 19711
Alex Streett, for petitioner.
Nathan Gordon, for respondent.

Opinion:
Lyle Brown, Justice.
The sole question is whether a special circuit judge can be elected pursuant to Ark. Const., art. 7, § 21, for the purpose of selecting jury commissioners and impaneling a grand jury in a situation where the presiding judge is obviously disqualified. When the regular circuit judge of the Pope County Circuit Court, Hon. Russell C. Roberts, was notified that the prosecuting attorney desired the impaneling of a grand jury for the purpose of investigating certain activities of the trial judge, the latter, purporting to act under art. 7, § 21, disqualified himself and called for an election by the attorneys in attendance upon the court. Respondent C. R. George was elected. At the behest of the prosecuting attorney we granted a temporary writ of prohibition suspending C. R. George's plan to proceed in the special matter for which he was elected. We are now asked to make that writ permanent. The prosecutor contends that art. 7, § 21 does not authorize the procedure of electing a special judge in the instant situation. That provision in our constitution is as follows:
Whenever the office of judge of the circuit court of any county is vacant at the commencement of a term of such court, or the judge of said court shall fail to attend, the regular practicing attorneys in attendance on said court may meet at 10 o'clock a.m. on the second day of the term, and elect a judge to preside at such court, or until the regular judge shall appear; and if the judge of said court shall become sick or die or unable to continue to hold such court after its term shall have commenced, or shall from any cause be disqualified from presiding at the trial of any cause then pending therein, then the regular practicing attorneys in attendance on said court may in like man ner, on notice from the judge or clerk of said court, elect a judge to preside at such court or to try said causes, and the attorney so elected shall have the same power and authority in said court as the regular judge would have had if present and presiding; but this authority shall cease at the close of the term at which the election shall be made. The proceeding shall be entered at large upon the record. The special judge shall be learned in law and a resident of the State.
Our analysis of Section 21 leads us to conclude that its purpose is to take care of emergency situations to avoid delay in the trial of pending causes which are about to be reached on the docket or which in fact have been reached. It is first provided that if the regular judge is absent at the commencement of a term, the practicing attorneys in attendance upon the court may on the second day of court elect a special judge to preside until the regular judge appears. Secondly, after the term has begun (which was the situation in this instance) and the regular judge is physically unable to continue court, or if for any reason he is disqualified in any cause then pending, the attorneys may elect a judge "to preside at such court or to try said causes." We think a sensible interpretation of Section 21 when applied to causes which arise after the commencement of the term is that a special judge may be elected to try only those causes which are pending at the time of the election. We cannot believe that the calling of a grand jury was intended to come under the phraseology "pending causes of action."
In State v. Stevenson, 89 Ark. 31, 116 S. W. 202 (1909), this court said that Section 21 was "merely provided to keep the circuit courts going by special judges," and that the exclusive function of those special judges is to "hold sessions of court" and to try those matters pending at the time of their appointment and until they are lawfully succeeded. It is pointed out that there are many duties of the court besides the trying of cases and that Section 21 does not confer any of those numerous functions on a special judge.
We refer again to the phrase "pending causes"— what was pending before the Pope Circuit Court at the time respondent assumed the office of special judge? The regular judge had taken notice of the fact that the prosecuting attorney had filed a petition with the supreme court requesting the assignment of a special judge for the purpose of impaneling a grand jury. A copy of the petition was placed on file by the circuit judge with the circuit clerk of Pope County. Thereupon the regular judge took notice of the filing of the petition and declared himself disqualified. The filing of that petition did not create a "pending cause" as that term is commonly used in legal parlance; it did not create any semblance of an adversary proceeding. It did not create a "case pending in the circuit court" within the universally accepted meaning of the phrase. See Cruson v. Whitley, 19 Ark. 99 (1857).
Our interpretation of Section 21 is reinforced by the language of the section which immediately follows it in the 1874 constitution. After providing for the election of special judges in Section 21, the drafters then provided for the exchange of regular judges in Section 22, which provides:
The judges of the circuit courts may temporarily exchange circuits or hold courts for each other under such regulations as may be prescribed by law.
That section is worded so that the procedure of exchange of circuits is a permissible but not the exclusive method by which a judge may be selected to preside over a circuit court; it allows the Legislature to regulate the exchange of circuits. Accordingly, the Legislature provided in Ark. Stat. Ann. § 22-142 (Supp. 1969) for the assignment of a judge by the chief justice of our supreme court. Section 22-142 is in harmony with our holding in Knox v. Beirne, 4 Ark. 460 (1842). That case approved an almost identical provision in the Constitution of 1836 relative to judges being sent into other districts. Thus the exchange of circuits upon agreement of the circuit judges or the appointment by the chief justice is open as an alternative method of selecting a judge to preside over the impaneling of a grand jury in Pope County Circuit Court to inquire into the activities of Judge Russell C. Roberts.
Writ granted.
Bryd, J., not participating.
William S. Arnold, Special Justice, joins in the opinion.