Case Name: Broward WILLIAMS, as Treasurer and ex officio Insurance Commissioner of the State of Florida, Appellant, v. Lou Verda Bryant NEWTON, Appellee
Court: Florida Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1970-05-20
Citations: 236 So. 2d 98
Docket Number: No. 38406
Parties: Broward WILLIAMS, as Treasurer and ex officio Insurance Commissioner of the State of Florida, Appellant, v. Lou Verda Bryant NEWTON, Appellee.
Judges: ERVIN, C. J., and ROBERTS, THOR-NAL and CARLTON, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 236
Pages: 98–108

Head Matter:
Broward WILLIAMS, as Treasurer and ex officio Insurance Commissioner of the State of Florida, Appellant, v. Lou Verda Bryant NEWTON, Appellee.
No. 38406.
Supreme Court of Florida.
May 20, 1970.
Rehearing Denied June 26, 1970.
Earl Faircloth, Atty. Gen., Stephen Marc Slepin, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Robert J. Kelly, Gen. Counsel, for appellant.
Charles N. Prather, Exec. Atty., Orlando, and James M. Barclay, Maitland, Staff Atty., Legal Aid Attys., for appellee.

Opinion:
BOYD, Justice.
This cause is before us on appeal from the judgment of the Circuit Court, Orange County, holding certain provisions of Florida Statutes Chapter 324, F.S.A., the Financial Responsibility Law, unconstitutional. The judgment of the trial court passed directly on the validity of a state statute, giving this Court jurisdiction under § 4, Article V of the Florida Constitution, F.S.A.
Appellee Newton was involved in an automobile accident on May 22, 1968. On August 12, 1968, appellant notified her of the requirement under Florida Statutes Chapter 324, F.S.A. that she show proof of financial responsibility and unless she complied her driver's license and/or motor vehicle tags and registration privileges would be suspended on September 16, 1968. Upon appellee's failure to comply, appellant, on September 26, 1968, ordered suspension of appellee's driving privileges. Appellee did not yield up her motor vehicle registration or request a hearing pursuant to Florida Statutes § 324.042, F.S.A. Instead she filed an action for injunctive and declaratory relief stating that because of her limited financial ability she was and is unable to comply with Chapter 324 in the procurement of insurance, posting bond or becoming self-insured. Appellee contended that Act violated the due process and equal protection clauses of the United States and Florida Constitutions, in that it allows suspension of drivers' licenses without a hearing on the question of culpability and treats all owners and operators of vehicles involved in an accident alike, regardless of fault.
The trial court in declaring Florida Statutes § 324.051, F.S.A. unconstitutional, held:
" [Wjithout precise regard to the language in Section 324.011, the provisions of Section 324.051 are unconstitutional in that the classification of persons subject to the Act bears no reasonable relation to the broad subject matter of the legislation. Section 324.051 puts the non-negligent, non-liable, 'uninsured' motorist or owner into the same category with the negligent, liable, 'uninsured' operator or owner. Such a classification cannot reasonably be said to promote safety or to provide financial security for those entitled to be recompensed by negligent owners or operators."
The lower court also held:
"The administrative remedies allowed and provided by the Act are contrary to the intent of the Statute and unconstitutionally deny the Defendant the equal protection of the law."
Petitioner was ordered to restore respondent's driver's license, registration plates, etc., and to hold a hearing in accord with Florida Statutes § 120.22 and § 120.23, F.S.A. of the Administrative Procedure Act.
Florida Financial Responsibility Law, like that of many other states, requires compliance only after an owner or operator of a motor vehicle is involved in an accident. The Legislature could have required financial responsibility as a condition precedent to the operation of a motor vehicle on the highways of this State, as do the laws of some states. The financial responsibility laws of a number of states require compliance only after failure to satisfy a judgment resulting from the accident. Florida's law is not of this type.
There is no question that the Legislature has the power to enact Chapter 324 requiring proof of financial responsibility after involvement in an accident. The lower court's basic objection to the Act is the unfairness of treating all owners and operators involved in an accident alike, regardless of fault and requiring all to show proof of financial responsibility. The holding is that the lack of classification separating those at fault from those not at fault offends equal protection of the law and the failure to provide a pre-suspension hearing to determine fault denies due process of law.
The lower court found that the provisions of Florida Statute § 324.051(2) (a), F.S.A. are inconsistent with the intent of the Act set out in Florida Statute § 324.011, F.S.A. Section 324.051(2) (a) provides in pertinent part as follows:
"Thirty days after receipt of notice of any accident involving a motor vehicle within this state which has resulted in bodily injury or death to any person, or total damage of fifty dollars or more to property, the commissioner shall suspend the licenses of the operators and all registrations of the owners of the vehicles involved in such accident and in case of a nonresident owner or operator, shall suspend such nonresident's operating privilege in this state, unless such operator or owner shall prior to the expiration of such thirty days be found by the commissioner to be exempt from the operation of this chapter, based upon evidence in his files satisfactory to him that:
"1. No injury was caused to the person or property of anyone other than such operator or owner, or
"2. The motor vehicle was legally parked at the time of such accident, or
"3. The motor vehicle was owned by the United States government, this state, any political subdivision of this state or any municipality therein, or
"4. Such operator or owner had been finally adjudicated not to be liable by a court of competent jurisdiction, or
"5. Such operator or owner had secured a duly acknowledged written agreement providing for release from liability by all parties injured as the result of said accident and had complied with one of the provisions of § 324.031, or
"6. Such operator or owner has deposited with the state treasurer security to conform with § 324.061 and has complied with one of the provisions of § 324.031."
Under Florida Statute § 324.051(2) (b), F.S.A., the above-quoted section only applies to uninsured operators or owners. The commission by regulation adopted pursuant to Florida Statute § 324.042, F.S.A., has provided for a hearing limited to the exemptions set forth in Florida Statute § 324.051(2), F.S.A.
We do not agree that the Act violates the constitutional guarantees of equal protection or due process. All owners and operators of motor vehicles are treated alike. The failure to classify those at fault in causing an accident into a group apart from those not at fault may seem "unfair," particularly to the innocent motorist, but it is not unconstitutional. Determination of the question of fault in an accident may be a long involved process through the courts. In the interim the Legislature has seen fit to require that all uninsured motorists involved in the accident obtain insurance or otherwise prove financial responsibility. The result is to protect accident victims regardless of the eventual outcome of proceedings determining fault, and to protect the driving public against other uninsured accidents involving those operators or owners occurring in the interim. The fact that the owner or operator not at fault in an accident is required to obtain insurance does not constitute the imposition of a "penalty" on the innocent motorist. Insurance is for the benefit of the owner and operator as well as the public.
Appellee's contention that Florida's Financial Responsibility Law denied equal protection to the poor or indigent, is without merit. This contention has been universally rejected in other jurisdictions having acts similar to Florida. In Hadden v. Aitken the Nebraska Supreme Court stated :
"Financial responsibility laws such as this do not unconstitutionally discriminate against the poor. Those damaged by the negligence of indigent drivers may be indigent also, and as little able as the drivers to bear the cost of such negligence. The fallacy of the argument that the law favored the rich over the poor 'lies in the failure to distinguish between equality of opportunity and ability to take advantage of the opportunity which is offered to all. The equality of the Constitution is the equality of right, and not of enjoyment.' Those who cannot afford to possess automobiles are as little able to enjoy the opportunity of driving on the public highways as those who cannot afford insurance or security."
The operation of financial responsibility laws requiring compliance after an accident by all owners and operators, regardless of fault has also been upheld. In Ballow v. Reeves the Kentucky Court stated:
"The question of negligence has nothing to do with the matter. The requirement of financial responsibility does not in any sense pre-determine the question of liability, which could only be decided in a judicial proceeding. It simply furnishes an added protection to the public and better assures the safety of our highways, and is not dependent upon the operator's skill or lack of it. The statute is not unreasonable in failing to require a showing of negligence prior to suspension of the license."
In a leading case on the subject, Rosenblum v. Griffin, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire held:
"From a practical standpoint, if there is fault for an accident, it is reasonable that suspension should follow, and immediately. But provisional finding of fault is indecisive and much less is a charge or claim of fault. The determination of a contested claim of fault is usually after a substantial length of time subsequent to the accident. The devel opment of the legislation in meeting the problem of prospective liability, either probable or possible, for an accident, has led to the final policy of ignoring it as a test of suspension.
"It may with reason be thought unjust that unless an operator is actually at fault for an accident, either he or the owner, if not the operator, should lose his license. But though the act thus produces hardship, it establishes conditions which are definite and conclusive in meeting the need of prompt action."
The contention that Chapter 324, in failing to provide for a pre-suspension hearing on the question of fault violates due process, was considered and rejected by this Court in Larson v. Warren, wherein we stated:
"Cases are legion which hold that when the public interest requires, the legislature may provide for summary action subject to later hearing or judicial review."
In Thornhill v. Kirkman, this Court followed the weight of authority holding that a driver's license is a "privilege" subject to summary regulation.
The function of the judiciary in passing on the validity of a legislative enactment has been defined in a number of cases. The wisdom, propriety, utility and expediency of legislation are for the Legislature to determine and not the courts. The lower court in its opinion has come perilously close to passing on the wisdom and expediency of the legislation under consideration.
The automobile is a dangerous instrumentality as the ever mounting death and destruction on the highways attest. Its operation is a privilege subject to regulation for protection of the public against irresponsible owners and operators. The event which triggers the Florida Financial Responsibility Act is the occurrence of an accident resulting in bodily injury or property damage of $50 or more. Fault is not a consideration. The Legislature in its wisdom has determined that this event, an accident, rather than some other, will bring the Act into operation. The exemptions allowed in § 324.051(2) (a) do not change the character of the Act as operating initially without regard to fault.
Respondent has failed to show that Chapter 324 violates any constitutional provision. Her contentions hinge on a basic misunderstanding of the Act's operation and boil down to a charge of "unfairness." This has never been sufficient to defeat an enactment of Legislature for a proper purpose under the police power. In Larson, supra, we stated :
"Section 324.031, Florida Statutes, F.S. A., contains means for establishing financial responsibility; it affects every automobile owner alike and is not shown to be unreasonable or arbitrary exercise of the police power. In every assault on an act like that before us it is the duty of the one who assaults it to show how it affects him in a different way from what it does other automobile owners; that it is arbitrary and unreasonable and is discriminatory as to classes and individuals. Appellees have failed completely to carry this burden. They could have saved themselves all the trouble and expense of this lawsuit by complying with the plain provisions of the act."
Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is quashed and the cause remanded for further proceedings consistent herewith.
It is so ordered.
ERVIN, C. J., and ROBERTS, THOR-NAL and CARLTON, JJ., concur.
DREW, J., dissents with opinion.
ADKINS, J., dissents and concurs with DREW, J.
. 35 A.L.R.2d 1011, 1021 (1954).
. Id. at 1016; 39 A.L.R. 1028, supplemented by 69 A.L.R. 397 (1930).
. 35 A.L.R.2d 1011, 1017 (1954).
. "[T]o promote safety, and provide financial security by such owners and operators whose responsibility it is to recompense others for injury to person or property caused by the operation of a motor vehicle, so it is required herein that the owner and operator of a motor vehicle involved in an accident shall respond for such damages and show proof of financial ability to respond for damages in future accidents as a requisite to his future exercise of such privileges."
. 156 Neb. 215, 224, 55 N.W.26 620, 624 (1952).
. 238 S.W.2d 141, 142 (Ky.1951).
. 89 N.H. 314, 317, 197 A. 701, 704 (1938).
. 132 So.2d 177, 181 (Fla.1961).
. 62 So.2d 740 (Fla.1953).
. See e. g., Adams v. Sutton, 212 So.2d 1, 3 (Fla.1968).
. Watson v. Buck, 313 U.S. 387, 403, 61 S.Ct. 962, 968, 85 L.Ed. 1416 (1940): "Nor is it within our province to scrutinize tlie act in order to determine whether we believe it to be fair or unfair, conducive to good or evil for the people of Florida, or capable of protecting or defeating the public interest of the state. These questions were for the legislature of Florida and it has decided them."
.132 So.2d 177, 182 (Fla.1961).