Case Name: Charles COOPER, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee
Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1990-03-28
Citations: 791 S.W.2d 80
Docket Number: No. 211-89
Parties: Charles COOPER, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.
Judges: McCORMICK, P.J., concurs in the result.
Reporter: South Western Reporter Second Series
Volume: 791
Pages: 80–84

Head Matter:
Charles COOPER, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.
No. 211-89.
Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, En Banc.
March 28, 1990.
Rehearing Granted April 25, 1990.
On Rehearing June 6, 1990.
John F. Carrigan (court appointed on appeal only), Houston, for appellant.
John B. Holmes, Jr., Dist. Atty., Alan Curry, Helena Gentry, Kathlyn Giannaula, Asst. Dist. Attys., Houston, Robert Hut- tash, State’s Atty., Alfred Walker, First Asst. State’s Atty., Austin, for the State.

Opinion:
OPINION ON STATE'S PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW
BERCHELMANN, Judge.
Appellant was charged with burglary of a building with intent to commit theft. After trial by jury, appellant was found guilty as indicted. The jury found "true" two enhancement allegations and assessed punishment at forty-five years' confinement in the Texas Department of Corrections.
The Court of Appeals reversed appellant's conviction pursuant to the equal protection concerns articulated in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986). Cooper v. State, No. 01-88-00075-CR, 1988 WL 131823 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] delivered December 8, 1988). We granted review solely to determine whether "the First Court of Appeals erred in holding that, in spite of the fact that the jury had been sworn, the appellant's trial counsel made a timely objection to the State's use of peremptory challenges by calling the trial court's attention to the Batson problem prior to the dismissal of the venire." We will affirm.
After the jury was sworn but prior to the dismissal of the veniremembers, defense counsel filed a Batson motion. Without objection from the State regarding the timeliness of the motion, the trial court held a brief hearing during which it was determined that appellant is a Black male and that six Black veniremembers sat on the panel. None of the six served on the jury. One Black veniremember was struck for cause, the State exercised peremptory challenges to strike four of the remaining five Black veniremembers and the defense struck the last Black veniremember. When the trial court asked the prosecutor for explanations for striking four of the five Black veniremembers, the prosecutor replied that no reasons were necessary because she did not strike all the Blacks from the venire. Apparently persuaded, the trial court overruled appellant's Batson motion.
The Court of Appeals held that appellant established a prima facie showing of discrimination, and that the State failed to offer clear and reasonably specific explanations for its legitimate reasons for exercising the challenges; therefore, the trial court "was not free to overrule appellant's Batson motion in the absence of neutral explanations." Cooper, supra, slip op. at 5, citing Batson, 476 U.S. at 97, 106 S.Ct. at 1723.
This case was tried after Batson was delivered. For such cases, we have held that "a defendant may make a timely objection within the Batson lines if such objection is made after the composition of the jury is made known but before the jury is sworn and the venire panel is discharged." Henry v. State, 729 S.W.2d 732, 737 (Tex.Crim.App.1987) (emphasis in original).
In the case at bar, the jury was sworn, but the venire had yet to be dismissed when defense counsel made his Batson objection. Although not mentioned by the parties or the Court of Appeals, Tex.Code Crim.Proc.Ann. art. 35.261(a), in effect at the time of appellant's trial, contemplates that a Batson objection be made "before the court has impanelled the jury." Where a discriminatory purpose is demonstrated, "the court shall call a new array in the case." Tex. Code Crim.Proc.Ann. art. 35.-261(b).
Pursuant to the statute and our case law, appellant's objection was untimely for failure to object prior to the jury being sworn, notwithstanding the fact that the venire had yet to be dismissed. Our inquiry does not end with this determination, however, for the trial court heard the motion and held an informal Batson hearing without objection from the State. The Court of Appeals concluded that the State's failure to object to the untimeliness of the motion resulted in proper preservation of the Bat-son issue. Cooper, supra, slip op. at 3, citing Lee v. State, 747 S.W.2d 57, 58 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, pet. ref'd.).
The notion that the State can waive complaint of the timeliness of a Batson motion on appeal by failing to raise this issue at trial appears to be a rule followed exclusively in the Court of Appeals for the First District. See also Smith v. State, 734 S.W.2d 694, 697 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1987, no pet.). Of course, we have repeatedly held that in order to preserve a complaint for appellate review, a party must have registered a timely and specific objection. See, for example, Armstrong v. State, 718 S.W.2d 686, 699 (Tex.Crim.App.1985). See also Rule 52(a) Tex.R.App.P.
Given the extremely limited nature of the State's right to appeal, this rule of waiver or procedural default typically bars review of a defendant's claim. Armstrong, 718 S.W.2d at 699. But see Nickerson v. State, 782 S.W.2d 887 (Tex.Crim.App.1990) (State's failure to object to poorly drafted charge providing defendant could be found guilty as a primary actor or as a primary actor and as a party unnecessarily increased the State's burden of proof); Ortega v. State, 668 S.W.2d 701, 706-07 (Tex.Crim.App.1983) (opinion on motion for rehearing) (State's failure to object to court's poorly drafted charge providing defendant must be found guilty of fraudulently obtaining property and services in credit card abuse prosecution unnecessarily increased the State's burden of proof); Rule 52(a) Tex.R.App.P.
The State offers no authority for the proposition that only those who stand accused must abide by the rules of evidence and appellate procedure. We are not persuaded that the burden of preserving error rests solely upon the shoulders of a defendant.
Under the narrow facts of the case at bar, we agree with the Court of Appeals that appellant's Batson issue was properly before that court for review where the motion was filed prior to the dismissal of the venire, where the prosecutor failed to object to the untimeliness of the motion and where the trial court held a hearing on the motion.
The opinion of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. The State's petition for discretionary review is overruled.
McCORMICK, P.J., concurs in the result.
. Now the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division.
. As the Court of Appeals points out, one of the four veniremembers struck by the State was a double strike, in that the veniremember had been struck by both the State and the defense. We note, however, that simply because the defense exercised a peremptory challenge against the same veniremember does not wholly refute the inference of discriminatory use of other peremptory challenges.
.Given the variety of jury selection practices throughout the country, The United States Supreme Court specifically declined to instruct the state and federal courts on the procedural aspects surrounding the implementation of the Batson decision. Batson, 476 U.S. at 100, n. 24, 106 S.Ct. at 1724, n. 24.
. We are unpersuaded with the State's argument that the prosecutor's reply that she did not have to give race neutral reasons for striking four out of five Black veniremembers because she did not strike the fifth Black on the panel is tantamount to an objection to the timeliness of the Batson motion. An objection must be sufficiently specific to apprise the Court of the precise ground upon which a party is complaining. Zillender v. State, 557 S.W.2d 515 (Tex.Crim.App.1977); Rule 52(a) Tex.R.App.P.