Case Name: Thomas Harrison PROVENZANO, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1999-07-01
Citations: 739 So. 2d 1150
Docket Number: No. 95,849
Parties: Thomas Harrison PROVENZANO, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: HARDING, C.J., and WELLS and QUINCE, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 739
Pages: 1150–1163

Head Matter:
Thomas Harrison PROVENZANO, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. 95,849.
Supreme Court of Florida.
July 1, 1999.
John W. Moser, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel — Middle Region, Michael P. Reiter, Chief Assistant CCRC — Middle Region, Mark S. Gruber, Assistant CCRC — Middle Region, and Martin J. McClain, Special Assistant CCRC- — Middle Region, Tampa, Florida, for Appellant.
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, and Carol M. Dittmar and Katherine V. Blanco, Assistant Attorneys General, Tampa, Florida, for Appellee.

Opinion:
PER CURIAM.
Thomas Harrison Provenzano, a prisoner under sentence of death, appeals the circuit court's denial of various motions, including the denial of his third motion for postconviction relief. We have jurisdiction pursuant to article V, section 3(b)(1) of the Florida Constitution.
Provenzano was convicted of the first-degree murder of a bailiff in the Orange County Courthouse and the attempted murder of another bailiff and a corrections officer. The facts of the crime are set forth in Provenzano v. State, 497 So.2d 1177 (Fla.1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1024, 107 S.Ct. 1912, 95 L.Ed.2d 518 (1987). At trial, the jury recommended the death penalty by a vote of seven to five. The judge imposed the death sentence, finding five aggravating circumstances: (1) the defendant had been previously convicted of a violent felony (the contemporaneous attempted murders); (2) in committing the murder, the defendant knowingly created a great risk of death to many persons; (3) the murder wás committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest or effecting an escape from custody; (4) the murder was committed to disrupt or hinder the lawful exercise of a governmental function or the enforcement of laws; and (5) the murder was committed in a cold, calculated and premeditated manner without any pretense of moral or legal justification. The judge found one statutory mitigating circumstance: the defendant had no significant history of prior criminal behavior. On appeal, this Court affirmed Provenza-no's convictions and affirmed the sentences imposed, including the death penalty.
After the governor signed Provenzano's first death warrant on March 7, 1989, Pro- venzano filed his first motion for postcon-viction relief pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850, which was summarily denied by the circuit court. Pro-venzano appealed the denial of the rule 3.850 motion and filed a petition for habeas corpus in this Court. In order to give the matter full consideration, this Court entered an order staying Provenzano's execution. Subsequently, this Court affirmed the denial of the rule 3.850 motion and rejected the petition for habeas corpus. See Provenzano v. Dugger, 561 So.2d 541 (Fla.1990). This Court found all but one of the issues raised in the appeal to be either procedurally barred or without merit. However, this Court held that Provenzano was entitled to disclosure of those portions of the state attorney's file covered by chapter 119 of the Florida Statutes. Pro-venzano was given sixty days from disclosure to file a new rule 3.850 motion asserting any Brady claims arising from the contents of the file.
After disclosure of the file, Provenzano filed a second rule 3.850 motion. The trial court summarily denied the motion and this Court affirmed the denial. See Provenzano v. State, 616 So.2d 428 (Fla.1993). This Court held that all of the issues were either procedurally barred or without merit.
Provenzano filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida. The district court found that all of Provenzano's claims were either procedurally barred or without merit and thus denied habeas relief. See Provenzano v. Singletary, 3 F.Supp.2d 1353 (M.D.Fla.1997). The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of habeas relief. See Provenzano v. Singletary, 148 F.3d 1327 (11th Cir.1998).
The governor signed Provenzano's second death warrant on June 9, 1999. The execution is scheduled for July 7, 1999. This Court ordered that any further proceedings in this case be expedited. On June 23, 1999, the circuit court held a preliminary hearing to consider Provenza-no's most recent 3.850 motion. In a very comprehensive and well-reasoned order, the circuit court subsequently denied Pro-venzano's 3.850 motion. The circuit court also denied several other motions by Pro-venzano. He appeals the denial of these motions to this Court.
In his most recent rule 3.850 motion, Provenzano raises eight claims. In his first claim, Provenzano alleges the circuit court erred in failing to grant him a full and fair hearing on his postconviction motion. In Kennedy v. State, 547 So.2d 912, 913 (Fla.1989), this Court stated that "[a] motion for posteonviction relief can be denied without an evidentiary hearing when the motion and the record conclusively demonstrate that the movant is entitled to no relief." Therefore, it is necessary to address each of Provenzano's claims to determine whether they are legally sufficient to require an evidentiary hearing. See Provenzano, 561 So.2d at 543-44.
We address Provenzano's second and third claims together. In his second claim, Provenzano contends that documents have been withheld by the State in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963). In his third claim, Provenzano argues that his access to files and records in the possession of the Department of Corrections (DOC) have been withheld in violation of chapter 119, Florida Statutes. We agree with the circuit court that Provenzano is not entitled to relief on either of these assertions. Regarding Provenzano's Brady claim, we find that Provenzano has failed to meet the first prong of the Brady test as articulated by this Court in Buenoano v. State, 708 So.2d 941, 948 (Fla.1998) ("Buenoano must establish that: (1) the State possessed evidence favorable to her."). The record and motion conclusively demonstrate that Pro-venzano has failed to establish that the State possessed evidence favorable to him. Regarding Provenzano's public records claim, we find that the record conclusively establishes that Provenzano is entitled to no relief.
In claim four, Provenzano argues that Florida's electric chair in its present condition constitutes cruel or unusual punishment or both. Provenzano contends that the chair's electrical circuitry has malfunctioned in the four executions since our decision in Jones v. State, 701 So.2d 76 (Fla.1997), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 118 S.Ct. 1297, 140 L.Ed.2d 335 (1998), causing the inmates being electrocuted to suffer because death was not instantaneous, contrary to Jones, in which we affirmed a circuit court's finding after evidentiary hearings that Florida's electric chair is "in excellent condition." Id. at 77. Provenza-no maintains that the circuit court in Jones relied upon false evidence in that work had been done on the electric chair that was not presented in the Jones evidentiary hearings. Provenzano also alleges that the DOC's protocol for executions is flawed and is not being followed, based on newly discovered evidence of reports by electrical engineers contracting with DOC to work on the electric chair.
The circuit court below rejected Proven-zano's electric chair claim, finding the bulk of the claim to have been decided adversely to Provenzano in Jones. The circuit court further dismissed Provenzano's claim of newly discovered evidence, finding that "the fact that DOC has engaged in an active testing and maintenance procedures following the Medina execution and following the Jones hearing establishes that DOC is attempting to maintain the reliability of the electric chair and its components and ensure that no future problems occur during the execution by electrocution process." Finally, the circuit court dismissed Provenzano's claim regarding DOC's protocol for executions, noting that the electrical engineer's report cited by Provenzano explained that variations are normal due to the size differences of particular inmates.
As to Provenzano's electric-chair claims, we find no error in the circuit court's reliance upon our decision in Jones. In 1998, DOC conducted four executions subsequent to our decision in Jones. Prior to each of these executions, the inmate who was under warrant claimed that the electric chair was cruel or unusual punishment in that apparent malfunctions had caused inmates to suffer during previous executions because death was not instantaneous. We found no merit in these similar claims or in the related claim of death row inmate Eduardo Lopez. See Lopez v. Singletary, 719 So.2d 287 (Fla.1998) (order), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 119 S.Ct. 892, 142 L.Ed.2d 790 (1999); Remeta v. Singletary, 717 So.2d 536 (Fla.1998) (order); Buenoano v. State, 717 So.2d 529 (Fla.1998) (order); Stano v. Singletary, 692 So.2d 180 (Fla.1997); Jones, 701 So.2d at 80. As to the claim concerning work performed on the electric chair since the most recent executions, we affirm the circuit court's decision that there is an insufficient basis alleged to overcome the presumption that members of the executive branch will properly perform their duties in carrying out the next execution. See Buenoano v. State, 565 So.2d 309, 311 (Fla.1990). We therefore reject Provenzano's claims as to the condition and operation of the electric chair. We do not reach any claim as to what might occur in future executions because we find such claims to be speculative.
Once again, we are troubled that there is an indication that DOC has not followed the protocol established for the appropriate functioning of the electric chair and carrying out of the death penalty. In Remeta, No. 92,679, 717 So.2d 536, this Court entered an order requiring DOC to follow the previously published protocol ("Execution Day Procedures" and "Testing Procedures for Electric Chair," attached as appendices to this opinion) for carry ing out executions. Despite questions raised regarding whether the protocol has been followed, there has been no showing that any of the last four executions caused "unnecessary and wanton pain" or involved "torture or a lingering death." Jones, 701 So .2d at 79. Based upon that, and the State's continued representation that the protocol will immediately render any inmate being executed incapable of experiencing unnecessary and wanton pain, we decline to stay this execution.
However, we deem it appropriate that the results of any and all tests and any other records generated relating to the operation and functioning of the electric chair be promptly submitted to this Court, the Attorney General's Office, the regional offices of the Capital Collateral Regional Counsel (CCRC), and the capital cases statewide registry of attorneys; on an ongoing basis. By this, we contemplate an open file policy relating to any information regarding the operation and functioning of the electric chair. In light of the recent history regarding the execution of persons sentenced to death, we further direct DOC to certify prior to the execution of Provenzano and all other inmates under death warrant that the electric chair is able to perform consistent with the "Execution Day Procedures" and "Testing Procedures for Electric Chair." DOC must send copies of this certification to the Attorney General's Office and the attorney representing the inmate under death warrant.
In his fifth claim, Provenzano asserts that he is being denied his constitutional right to due process to receive effective representation. To support this claim, counsel from CCRC-Middle note that they were appointed June 18, 1999, as Proven-zano's collateral counsel. However, in a hearing regarding Provenzano's motion for determination of counsel, private attorney Terri Backhus, who recently represented Provenzano in his federal habeas claim, indicated her willingness to assist CCRC in these proceedings. In addition, attorney Martin McClain, who presented oral argument before the Court in this matter, previously represented Provenzano in an earlier 3.850 proceeding. CCRC has failed to support its plea for more time with any specific issue which may be a viable claim for relief. Therefore, we agree with the circuit court that there is no merit to this claim.
In claim six, collateral counsel alleges that Provenzano is incompetent to proceed in his postconviction proceedings. We conclude that the circuit court did not err in denying relief on this claim. In Carter v. State, 706 So.2d 873, 875 (Fla.1997), this Court stated that "a judicial determination of competency is required when there are reasonable grounds to believe that a capital defendant is incompetent to proceed in postconviction proceedings in which factual matters are at issue, the development or resolution of which require the defendant's input." (Emphasis added.) Thus, Provenzano is only entitled to a competency determination if any factual matters are at issue. Collateral counsel claims that he needs Provenzano's assistance in developing (1) the extent of the abuse that Provenzano suffered as a child, (2) the extent of Provenzano's head injuries which cause headaches or dizziness, and (3) the adequacy of trial counsel's representation. All three of these issues are procedurally barred. The first two presumably relate to mitigation, which should have been argued on direct appeal. The third relates to ineffective assistance of trial counsel, which should have been raised in Provenzano's first rule 3.850 motion. Hence, Provenzano has failed to meet the Carter test because there are no factual matters at issue. Therefore, we agree with the circuit court that Provenza-no is not entitled to a competency hearing.
Provenzano argues in claim seven that the trial court failed to utilize its discretionary authority and trial counsel failed to request an individualized sequestered voir dire in light of the extensive publicity in this case. We agree with the circuit court that Provenzano is not entitled to relief on this claim, as this claim is procedurally barred. See Smith v. State, 445 So.2d 323, 325 (Fla.1983) ("Issues which either were or could have been litigated at trial and upon direct appeal are not cognizable through collateral attack."); Lambrix v. Singletary, 641 So.2d 847, 848-49 (Fla.1994) ("Because ineffective assistance of counsel claims have been considered and rejected in a previous petition, Lambrix is procedurally barred from raising such claims again in a subsequent ha-beas petition.") (citing Aldridge v. State, 503 So.2d 1257, 1258 (Fla.1987), for the proposition that "a defendant [is] procedurally barred from raising an ineffective assistance of counsel claim when such a claim has been raised previously even though the current claim is based on a different issue").
Based on the foregoing, we find that the trial court did not err in summarily denying Provenzano's 3.850 motion. No evi-dentiary hearing was warranted in this case where the motion and the record conclusively demonstrate that Provenzano is entitled to no relief. See Kennedy, 547 So.2d at 913-14.
Finally, in claim eight, Provenzano maintains that the trial court erred in denying his motion for counsel to present a clemency application to the governor. We conclude that the trial court did not err in denying this request. Provenzano has already had a clemency hearing before Governor Martinez and the Clemency Board in 1987. Provenzano was represented by counsel at that hearing and the Clemency Board granted him no relief. In the recent death warrant, Governor Bush attested to the fact that "it has been determined that Executive Clemency, as authorized by Article IV, Section 8(a), Florida Constitution, is not appropriate." In Bundy v. State, 497 So.2d 1209, 1211 (Fla.1986), this Court rejected a similar argument:
In the final claim raised under his 3.850 motion, appellant contends that he must be allowed time to prepare and present an application for executive clemency before sentence may be carried out in this case. In the death warrant authorizing appellant's execution, the governor attests to the fact that "it has been determined that Executive Clemency, as authorized by Article IV, Section 8(a), Florida Constitution, is not appropriate." It is hot our prerogative to second-guess the application of this exclusive executive function. First, the principle of separation of powers requires the judiciary to adopt an extremely cautious approach in analyzing questions involving this admitted matter of executive grace. Sullivan v. Askew, 348 So.2d 312 (Fla.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 878, 98 S.Ct. 232, 54 L.Ed.2d 159 (1977). As noted in In re Advisory Opinion of the Governor, 334 So.2d 561, 562-63 (Fla.1976), "[t]his Court has always viewed the pardon powers expressed in the Constitution as being peculiarly within the domain of the executive branch of government." See also Ex Parte White, 131 Fla. 83, 178 So. 876 (1938).
As in Bundy, Provenzano has requested counsel for a second clemency hearing. Thus, we find no merit to this issue.
Accordingly, we affirm the circuit court's denial of the various motions filed in this case, including the denial of Provenzano's motion for posteonviction relief. No motion for rehearing will be permitted.
It is so ordered.
HARDING, C.J., and WELLS and QUINCE, JJ., concur.
PARIENTE, J.,concurs with an opinion, in which LEWIS, J., concurs.
LEWIS, J., concurs specially with an opinion, in which PARIENTE, J., concurs.
ANSTEAD, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with an opinion, in which SHAW, J., concurs.
. The "Execution Day Procedures" document and the "Testing Procedures for Electric Chair" document were previously produced pursuant to a public records request. Information which was exempt from production has been redacted from the "Execution Day Procedures" document.