Case Name: PHILLIPS v. EMPLOYMENT SECURITY COMMISSION
Court: Michigan Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1964-06-01
Citations: 373 Mich. 210
Docket Number: Calendar No. 38, Docket No. 50,006
Parties: PHILLIPS v. EMPLOYMENT SECURITY COMMISSION.
Judges: DethmepvS, Smith, and O’Hara, JJ., concurred in result.
Reporter: Michigan Reports
Volume: 373
Pages: 210–221

Head Matter:
PHILLIPS v. EMPLOYMENT SECURITY COMMISSION.
1. Unemployment Compensation' — Taxicab Operator — Licenses— Disqualification foe Benefits.
The fact that taxicab driver lost license to operate a taxicab because of violations of conditions upon which license was granted, and thereby was unable to continue driving, justified finding by the employment security commission that he was disqualified for unemployment compensation benefits (CLS 1901, §§ 421.28, 421.29).
2. Costs — Public Question — Unemployment Compensation.
No costs are allowed in taxicab operator’s proceeding to obtain unemployment compensation benefits, where public question was involved.
Kavanagh, C. J., and Black and Souris, JJ., dissenting.
References for Points in Headnotes
48 Am Jur, Social Security, Unemployment Insurance, and Retirement Funds §§ 34, 38.
14 Am Jur, Costs § 91.
Appeal from Wayne; Baum (Victor J.), J.
Submitted October 11, 1963.
(Calendar No. 38, Docket No. 50,006.)
Decided June 1, 1964.
Rehearing denied July 8, 1964.
Jefferson Clay presented his claim for unemployment compensation benefits which was granted. Certiorari by Eunice Phillips, employer, against the Michigan Employment Security Commission, its Appeal Board, and Jefferson Clay, challenging the award. Judgment for defendants, upholding deter mination and decision of board. Plaintiff appeals.
[Reversed.
Stewart & Phillips (Thomas H. Stewart, of counsel), for plaintiff.
Weller, Summer & Feder (Morris Weller, of counsel), for defendant Clay.

Opinion:
Kelly, J.
The defendant-appellee Jefferson Clay drove a taxicab for tbe plaintiff-appellant, Eunice Phillips, until his license to drive was revoked by the secretary of State.
Clay's application for unemployment compensation benefits was denied by the Michigan employment security commission after a finding that he was unavailable for his customary work. The commission modified this finding and determined that appellee Clay's separation from his job was for misconduct in connection with the work.
The referee modified the commission's finding by ruling that Clay was unavailable for his customary work but that he was not guilty of misconduct in connection with his work. The claimant appealed, and the appeal board held that claimant was not disqualified for benefits.
The employer appealed to the circuit court and from a judgment affirming the decision of the appeal board this appeal is taken by the plaintiff-employer.
The trial court, in affirming the Michigan employment security commission appeal board, stated:
"For a person to come within this provision, there must be a desire on his part to leave work. His leaving of work must be voluntary in this sense: It is not enough that his physical conduct in leaving work be volitional. For there to be a voluntary leaving of work, the man must act out of his own desire and without any external compulsion. In this case there was external compulsion. This man was compelled by the law to cease employment. He could only continue to drive his cab if he violated the law. There is nothing to show that he had the remotest or the least desire or inclination to leave his job as a cab driver. The entire record makes it clear that he was compelled to do so by reason of legal authorities having deprived him of his license to drive.
"There is nothing in the facts before us to suggest that Clay deliberately and of his own desire gave up his driver's license.
"There is nothing in this case to show that at any time Clay behaved in such a way as to deliberately and by his own desire bring about a loss of his driver's license. In fact, one has reason to believe that it was very much against his wishes and desires that he lost his driver's license. It cannot be said that immediately before he received each traffic ticket he knew that his contemplated conduct would cost him his license and his job and that he pursued such conduct nevertheless."
We disagree with the trial court. By his own actions defendant Clay deliberately committed those acts that resulted in his losing his driver's license.
In Bell v. Employment Security Commission, 359 Mich 649, 652, this Court said:
"We may concede that no man in his right mind would Intend' to fall asleep while on duty in a boiler room. But also we must hold that a man intends the normal consequences of his acts."
Clay's license to operate the taxicab was granted by the State and accepted by the licensee subject to all reasonable conditions imposed by the State in granting the license. See People v. Thompson, 259 Mich 109, wherein we said (pp 123, 120):
"In accepting' the license from the State, one must also accept all reasonable conditions imposed by tbe State in granting tbe license. Tbe State bas seen fit to impose as sucb conditions tbe various provisions embodied in section 30. These provisions are not only humanitarian, but obviously contribute to the mutual welfare and safety of all users of tbe highways."
" 'When a statute does not make intent an element of the offense, but commands an act to be done or omitted which, in tbe absence of tbe statute, might have been done or omitted without culpability, ignorance of tbe fact, or state of things contemplated by tbe statute, will not excuse its violation.' "
Tbe judgment of the lower court and tbe decision of tbe appeal board are reversed, and the determination of tbe commission bolding claimant disqualified for benefits is reinstated.
Reversed. No costs, a public question being involved.
DethmepvS, Smith, and O'Hara, JJ., concurred in result.
For sections of statute requiring availability and enumerating reasons for disaualifieation, see CLS 1961, §421.28, 421.29 (Stat Ann 1960 Bev § 17.530, 17.531).—Bepokteb.