Case Name: Tina PARROTINO, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Diana L. McFarland, Appellant, v. The CITY OF JACKSONVILLE, Florida, a Municipal Corporation, and the Office of the State Attorney, Fourth Judicial Circuit of Florida, Appellees
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1992-12-15
Citations: 612 So. 2d 586
Docket Number: No. 89-3210
Parties: Tina PARROTINO, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Diana L. McFarland, Appellant, v. The CITY OF JACKSONVILLE, Florida, a Municipal Corporation, and the Office of the State Attorney, Fourth Judicial Circuit of Florida, Appellees.
Judges: WENTWORTH, Senior Judge, concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 612
Pages: 586–597

Head Matter:
Tina PARROTINO, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Diana L. McFarland, Appellant, v. The CITY OF JACKSONVILLE, Florida, a Municipal Corporation, and the Office of the State Attorney, Fourth Judicial Circuit of Florida, Appellees.
No. 89-3210.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
Dec. 15, 1992.
Rehearing Denied Jan. 20, 1993.
Darryl D. Kendrick, Jacksonville, for appellant.
James L. Harrison, Gen. Counsel and David C. Carter, Asst. Gen. Counsel, Jacksonville, for City of Jacksonville.
Robert E. Warren of Taylor, Moseley & Joyner, Jacksonville, for Office of the State Atty.

Opinion:
ALLEN, Judge.
The appellant, as personal representative of the estate of Diana L. McFarland, challenges the dismissal of her complaint against the appellees, the City of Jacksonville and the Office of the State Attorney, Fourth Judicial Circuit. The appellant alleged in her complaint that the appellees had a duty to protect McFarland from attack by James Wilson, and that their breach of that duty proximately caused McFarland's death. In dismissing the complaint with prejudice for failure to state a cause of action, the court found that the appellees' acts and omissions were discretionary and that McFarland was a member of the general public to whom the appellees owed no duty of care. We agree that the allegations in the complaint do not establish any duty of care owed by the City of Jacksonville, but we find the facts suffi cient to allege a duty on the part of the Office of the State Attorney. Because the challenged acts of the Office of the State Attorney were operational in nature, we conclude that it enjoys no immunity from suit, and, therefore, we reverse the judgment entered in its favor.
In considering the appellees' motions to dismiss, the trial court was required to accept as true the factual allegations of the complaint. See Hochman v. Lazarus Homes Corp., 324 So.2d 205 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975). The complaint relates that McFarland terminated a personal relationship with James Wilson in the summer of 1986. Wilson, who has an extensive criminal history including acts of violence, then began to harass and threaten McFarland and' her family. Between July and November of 1986, the City of Jacksonville police were summoned three times after Wilson attacked, harassed, or threatened McFarland or her family. On each occasion, the police were provided information concerning Wilson. Wilson publicly threatened McFarland's life during one of these incidents. The police advised McFarland to make a report through the Domestic Violence Program of the Office of the State Attorney and explained that such a report was necessary before they could protect her from Wilson.
McFarland contacted the Office of the State Attorney but was told that her dispute with Wilson was a police matter. On a later visit to the Office of the State Attorney in November, McFarland made a report through the Domestic Violence Program as she had been advised to do. Upon her request for protection from Wilson, she was assured that the Office of the State Attorney would act on her behalf to obtain a restraining order and assist the police in protecting her from further harassment or violence. McFarland relied upon these assurances and did not seek other legal action or means of protection. The Office of the State Attorney subsequently misplaced or misfiled the documents relating to her difficulties with Wilson. Consequently, no court order was sought and no action was taken in McFarland's behalf.
On four occasions between December of 1986 and March of 1987, Wilson again attacked, harassed, or threatened McFarland or her family. As before, the Jacksonville police were summoned each time and provided information concerning Wilson. On one occasion, Jacksonville police officers accompanied McFarland while she retrieved items of personal property from Wilson's residence. Wilson threatened her life in the officers' presence. In May of 1987, Wilson shot and killed McFarland. Thereafter, the appellant sued the appel-lees, alleging that their negligence was the proximate cause of McFarland's death.
In determining the sufficiency of the appellant's complaint, the initial question is whether the appellees owed a duty of care to McFarland. See City of Pinellas Park v. Brown, 604 So.2d 1222 (Fla.1992); Kaisner v. Kolb, 543 So.2d 732 (Fla.1989). In Trianon Park Condominium Ass'n, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 468 So.2d 912 (Fla.1985), the court explained that governmental officials and employees responsible for the "enforcement of laws and protection of the public safety" usually owe no duty of care to an individual member of the general public. Trianon, 468 So.2d at 919-20. That is so because
there is not now, nor has there ever been, any common law duty for either a private person or a governmental entity to enforce the law for the benefit of an individual or a specific group of individuals. In addition, there is no common law duty to prevent the misconduct of third persons.
Trianon, 468 So.2d at 918.
Despite this general proposition, the court in Trianon recognized that, under certain circumstances, a governmental entity engaged in law enforcement and public safety functions will owe a duty of care to a member of the public. Specifically, if there is an underlying common law or statutory duty of care with respect to the alleged negligent conduct, a governmental entity engaged in law enforcement and public safety functions will be charged with a duty of care. Trianon, 468 So.2d at 917. For example, governmental entities en gaged in law enforcement have always owed a common law duty of care in the operation of motor vehicles and the handling of firearms in connection with their law enforcement activities. Trianon, 468 So.2d at 920.
In Everton v. Willard, 468 So.2d 936 (Fla.1985), the court recognized that while a police officer engaged in making arrests and enforcing the law will not ordinarily owe a duty of care to any particular member of the public, if a special relationship exists between an individual and a governmental entity engaged in a police function, there may be a duty of care owed to the individual. Such a special relationship exists, for example, when police accept the responsibility to protect a person who has assisted them in the arrest or prosecution of criminal defendants and that person is in danger due to his assistance. Everton, 468 So.2d at 938. As explained in the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 315(b) (1965),
There is no duty so to control the conduct of a third person as to prevent him from causing physical harm to another unless (a) a special relation exists between the actor and the third person which imposes a duty upon the actor to control the third person's conduct, or (b) a special relation exists between the actor and the other which gives to the other a right to protection.
(emphasis added).
The Jacksonville police and the Office of the State Attorney were performing law enforcement and public safety functions at all relevant times herein, so the foregoing principles concerning duties of care are applicable to them. See State, Office of the State Attorney v. Powell, 586 So.2d 1180, 1183 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991) (applying the Trianon analysis to prosecutors who, like arresting officers, are law enforcement officials). We conclude that the factual allegations in the complaint do not provide a basis for finding a common law or statutory duty owed by the Jacksonville police to McFarland. In the absence of allegations supporting such a duty, the general rule discussed in Trianon is applicable, and, thus, the trial court correctly dismissed the complaint against the City of Jacksonville.
The allegations relating to the Office of the State Attorney, however, are different. The appellant alleged that the Office of the State Attorney promised to render services to McFarland, or, more specifically, that it agreed to secure a restraining order and assist the police in protecting her from further violence. Although the promise to assist the police was somewhat nebulous, the promise to secure a restraining order was a specific undertaking to render services to McFarland. Significantly, the appellant also alleged McFarland's reliance upon these promises, her failure to seek protection elsewhere, the misplacing of the documents by the Office of the State Attorney, and McFarland's resulting death.
The common law duty alleged in the complaint is set out in the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 323 (1965);
One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render services to another which he should recognize as necessary for the protection of the other's person or things, is subject to liability to the other for physical harm resulting from his failure to exercise reasonable care to perform his undertaking, if (a) his failure to exercise such care increases the risk of such harm, or (b) the harm is suffered because of the other's reliance upon the undertaking.
This duty of care and theory of recovery is recognized and applied in Florida. See, e.g., State, Dept. of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles v. Kropff 491 So.2d 1252 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986); Blackmon v. Nelson, Hesse, Cyril, Weber & Sparrow, 419 So.2d 405 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982); Padgett v. School Bd. of Escambia County, 395 So.2d 584 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981); and Sheridan v. Greenberg, 391 So.2d 234 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981).
In Hartley v. Floyd, 512 So.2d 1022 (Fla.1st DCA), rev. denied, 518 So.2d 1275 (Fla.1987), we implicitly applied the above-quoted principles in affirming a final judgment entered against a county sheriff. There, the plaintiff's husband, James Floyd, drowned in the Gulf of Mexico after re maining afloat beside the hull of his capsized fishing boat for approximately sixty hours. Almost seventeen hours before Floyd drowned, the plaintiff telephoned the Levy County Sheriffs Office to report that her husband had not returned when expected. After the plaintiff described her husband's vehicle, the deputy promised to have someone check the boat ramp to determine whether Floyd had returned from his fishing trip. When the plaintiff called back forty minutes later, the deputy falsely advised her that the boat ramp had been checked and that her husband's vehicle was not there. In reliance upon the promises and representations of the deputy, the plaintiff made no independent effort to locate her husband for the next seven hours. After waiting that period, the plaintiff contacted a nearby Coast Guard station and a search was initiated. The overturned boat was located, but, tragically, Floyd drowned some thirty minutes before the Coast Guard arrived.
We concluded that the sheriff owed the plaintiff a duty of care in Hartley because the risk of harm or loss had been increased due to her detrimental reliance upon the deputy's gratuitous but negligent undertaking to render services. The same duty of care has been asserted in the instant case. The allegations of the complaint that the Office of the State Attorney promised to secure a restraining order and that McFarland relied upon the promise and did not seek other legal action or means of protection sufficiently assert the (a) gratuitous undertaking to protect, (b) detrimental reliance, and (c) increased risk of harm elements under § 323 of the Restatement 2d of Torts. Accordingly, we conclude that the appellant has sufficiently alleged a duty of care owed by the Office of the State Attorney to McFarland. See also City of Pinellas Park v. Brown, 604 So.2d at 1225; McCain v. Florida Power Corp., 593 So.2d 500, 503 (Fla.1992).
The allegations of the complaint in this case differ from the situation in State, Office of the State Attorney v. Powell, 586 So.2d 1180 (Fla. 2d DCA1991), because the state attorney there had not undertaken to protect the plaintiff. Nevertheless, the Second District recognized that a state attorney could have "a duty to use reasonable care in providing protection to an individual if they voluntarily undertake that responsibility." Powell, 586 So.2d at 1184.
As suggested above, the duty analysis is the same whether the defendant is a governmental entity or a private individual. If the appellant had alleged that a private attorney had promised to secure a restraining order for McFarland but negligently failed to follow through on that promise, that McFarland had relied upon the promise, and that her death was proximately caused by its breach, there would be no doubt about whether a common law duty had been alleged. The duty is not in any way limited by the defendant's status as a governmental entity, because section 768.-28(5), Florida Statutes, expressly provides that "[t]he state and its agencies and subdivisions shall be liable for tort claims in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances[.]"
The Office of the State Attorney next argues that the complaint does not sufficiently allege a causal nexus between its actions or omissions and McFarland's death. We disagree. We believe that the allegations of the complaint are sufficient to plead the existence- of a causal nexus between the alleged actions and inactions of the Office of the State Attorney and McFarland's death. Whether the appellant can prove that such a causal nexus existed is an entirely different matter, which it is inappropriate to address incident to a motion to dismiss.
Having determined that the complaint adequately alleges a cause of action, we now turn to consideration of the governmental immunity defense asserted by the Office of the State Attorney. Under the common law, prosecutors enjoyed broad immunity. But, since the enactment of section 768.28, Florida Statutes, Florida's state attorney offices have a more limited immunity. State attorney offices, like other state agencies, are entitled to the defense of governmental immunity only when the act or omission involved is discretionary in nature, rather than operational. Brown, 604 So.2d at 1226; Kaisner, 543 So.2d at 736; Commercial Carrier Corp. v. Indian River County, 371 So.2d 1010 (Fla.1979). Thus, in the case before us, we must decide whether the acts or omissions alleged to have caused McFarland's death were exercises of governmental discretion.
The discretionary function exception is based upon the premise that "it would be an improper infringement of separation of powers for the judiciary, by way of tort law, to intervene in fundamental decision-making of the executive and legislative branches of government." Kaisner, 543 So.2d at 736-37. Thus, to be "discretionary," a governmental act must involve an exercise of executive or legislative power such that the court's intervention would inappropriately entangle it in fundamental questions of policy and planning. Brown, 604 So.2d at 1226; Kaisner, 543 So.2d at 737.
The Office of the State Attorney's decision to provide assistance to McFarland was a fundamental policy determination that was clearly discretionary in nature. Also discretionary was the appellee's decision about the nature of the assistance it would provide. Although the Office of the State Attorney had authority to seek a restraining order, see e.g., section 914.24, Florida Statutes, it was not obligated to do so. If the appellee had simply refused to provide assistance at the time of McFarland's report, or had chosen at that time not to seek a restraining order, there could have been no liability for those purely discretionary, policy determinations. The appellant's allegation that the appellee promised McFarland that it would secure a restraining order to protect her is all-important.
The appellant does not challenge the wisdom of the appellee's basic policy determination, she claims that its policy was carried out in a negligent manner. Specifically, she argues that the Office of the State Attorney made its discretionary policy determination in this case when it promised to secure the restraining order for McFarland, and, thereafter, its actions in implementation of that policy were purely operational. We agree. Although efforts to secure a restraining order require knowledge and training, the commencement of the action undertaken here would not involve fundamental governmental decisionmaking. Because the appellee's challenged conduct was operational in nature, it is not entitled to the protection afforded by the doctrine of governmental immunity. See Kaisner, 543 So.2d at 738 (concluding that the decision to stop a motorist for a traffic infraction is a discretionary governmental decision, but once the decision to stop is made, the way in which the stop is handled by a law enforcement officer is an operational activity); and Hartley, 512 So.2d at 1024; ("Once Deputy Legler agreed to perform the tasks his actions thereafter ceased to be discretionary actions and became merely operational level activities which must be performed with reasonable care and for which there is no sovereign immunity.").
We affirm the judgment entered in favor of the City of Jacksonville, we reverse the judgment entered in favor of the Office of the State Attorney, and we remand this cause for further proceedings. However, because this case involves issues of great public importance, we certify the following questions to the supreme court:
1) DID A COMMON LAW DUTY OF CARE RUN FROM THE OFFICE OF THE STATE ATTORNEY TO THE VICTIM, MCFARLAND, DUE TO THE VICTIM'S RELIANCE TO HER DETRIMENT UPON THE VOLUNTARY ASSURANCES OF THE OFFICE OF THE STATE ATTORNEY THAT IT WOULD ACT ON HER BEHALF TO OBTAIN A RESTRAINING ORDER FOR THE PURPOSE OF PROTECTING HER FROM FURTHER HARASSMENT OR VIOLENCE BY JAMES WILSON?
2) IF SO, ARE THE ACTIONS AND OMISSIONS OF THE OFFICE OF THE STATE ATTORNEY IN CARRYING OUT ITS UNDERTAKING TO SECURE A RESTRAINING ORDER DISCRETIONARY ACTIVITIES FOR WHICH THE OFFICE OF THE STATE ATTORNEY IS IMMUNE FROM LIABILITY?
WENTWORTH, Senior Judge, concurs.
SMITH, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with written opinion.
. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 96 S.Ct. 984, 47 L.Ed.2d 128 (1976), discusses the common law immunity of prosecutors.
. Although Berry v. State, 400 So.2d 80 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981), contains language indicating that the common law immunity of prosecutors was not abrogated by the enactment of section 768.-28, a careful reading of the decision reveals that the omission involved there was the prosecutor's failure to prosecute a person as a multiple offender, a purely discretionary matter. The court said the following:
Our sister court addressed this issue in Weston v. State, 373 So.2d 701, 703 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979):
It is necessary to the judicial process in the enforcement of the criminal laws of the state that the state attorney be free from any apprehension that he or she may subject the state to liability for acts performed in the exercise of the discretionary duties of the office. Such acts require the exercise of basic policy evaluation, judgment and expertise in determining whether or not a charge should be made for violation of the state's criminal laws.
Berry, 400 So.2d at 84 (emphasis supplied).