Case Name: Maria Socorro Guerrero DE REYNOSO and Jose Reynoso-Gonzales, Petitioners, v. IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE, Respondent
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 1980-09-11
Citations: 627 F.2d 958
Docket Number: No. 79-7226
Parties: Maria Socorro Guerrero DE REYNOSO and Jose Reynoso-Gonzales, Petitioners, v. IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE, Respondent.
Judges: Before GOODWIN and PREGERSON, Circuit Judges, and SCHWARZER, District Judge.
Reporter: Federal Reporter 2d Series
Volume: 627
Pages: 958–963

Head Matter:
Maria Socorro Guerrero DE REYNOSO and Jose Reynoso-Gonzales, Petitioners, v. IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE, Respondent.
No. 79-7226.
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
Argued and Submitted June 2, 1980.
Decided Sept. 11, 1980.
Paul A. Schelly, Los Angeles, Cal., ar- . gued, for petitioners; Raymundo Q. Campos, Vivero & Campos, Los Angeles, Cal., on brief.
Eva S. Halbreich, Los Angeles, Cal., for respondent.
Before GOODWIN and PREGERSON, Circuit Judges, and SCHWARZER, District Judge.
The Honorable William W. Schwarzer, United States District Judge for the Northern District of California, sitting by designation.

Opinion:
GOODWIN, Circuit Judge.
The only issue in this petition for review of an order denying suspension of deportation is whether the Board of Immigration Appeals abused its discretion under 8 U.S.C. § 1254 in denying relief. We have examined the case in the light of this court's recent en banc decisions in Wang v. Immigration & Naturalization Service, 622 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1980); and Villena v. Immigration & Naturalization Service, 622 F.2d 1352 (9th Cir. 1980). We are unable to find an abuse of discretion.
Like the petitioners in Wang, the petitioners here have lived illegally for several years in the United States without generating any other reason to believe that they are not of good moral character. They have accumulated a modest collection of personal property, and by thrift and industry have improved their standard of living over that which they probably would have enjoyed in their native Mexico.
Unlike the Wangs, these petitioners have no United States citizen children or other citizen dependents. They do have some relatives who reside in the United States including Jose's parents whom they help with their support. The only real hardship caused by repatriation in this case, however, would be the change in the personal standard of living that occurs any time a person without substantial wealth or property is forced to move from the United States to Mexico.
In this case, there is nothing to distinguish the hardship of these petitioners from that of any of the thousands of other Mexican nationals who annually enter the United States illegally and who then accumulate seven years of good time in this country. The resulting changes in their standard of living and the resulting widening disparity between their standard of living here and that which remains the lot of their fellow countrymen who continue the struggle for existence in Mexico do not, per se, create extreme hardships. It is the disparity between the standards of living in the two adjoining countries which provides the magnet for the illegal immigration which flows steadily northward. If this court were to grant relief in this case we would be holding that the hardship involved in returning to a former, lower material standard of living automatically requires a remand in every deportation case that fits the residential and character requirements of § 1254. We are satisfied that Congress did not intend, in granting discretion to the Attorney General, to burden that officer with the numbers of hearings that would be required if the discretion conferred by the statute were to be as limited as the petitioners' contentions would limit it.
Congress could, if it saw fit, amend 8 U.S.C. § 1254 to make seven years of residence and good conduct a statutory bar to deportation. Congress has not done so.
After affirming the order denying suspension of deportation, the Board of Immigration Appeals granted both petitioners 30 days within which to depart voluntarily. We renew that grant. See Khalil v. District Director of U. S. Imm. & Nat. Serv., 457 F.2d 1276, 1278 (9th Cir. 1972). Therefore, the 30-day voluntary departure period shall begin to run on the date this opinion is filed.
Affirmed.