Case Name: Robert B. TURKINGTON et al., Appellants, v. In the Matter of the Incorporation of the CITY OF KACHEMAK As a Municipal Corporation of the Third Class, Appellees
Court: Alaska Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Alaska
Decision Date: 1963-04-13
Citations: 380 P.2d 593
Docket Number: No. 177
Parties: Robert B. TURKINGTON et al., Appellants, v. In the Matter of the Incorporation of the CITY OF KACHEMAK As a Municipal Corporation of the Third Class, Appellees.
Judges: Before NESBETT, C. J., and DIMOND and AREND, JJ.
Reporter: Pacific Reporter 2d
Volume: 380
Pages: 593–600

Head Matter:
Robert B. TURKINGTON et al., Appellants, v. In the Matter of the Incorporation of the CITY OF KACHEMAK As a Municipal Corporation of the Third Class, Appellees.
No. 177.
Supreme Court of Alaska.
April 13, 1963.
Rehearing Denied June 3, 1963.
Quincy Benton, Homer, for appellants.
Harold J. Butcher and Robert C. Ely, Ely, Guess & Rudd, Anchorage, for appel-lees.
Before NESBETT, C. J., and DIMOND and AREND, JJ.

Opinion:
NESBETT, Chief Justice.
The matter before us grows out of proceedings had in the superior court wherein certain residents of the Homer area of Alaska were attempting to incorporate the community of Kachemak as a third class city.
After an election held pursuant to order of the court the election judges certified to the court that twenty-two persons had voted in favor of incorporation and seventeen against. Included were seven absentee ballots, five favoring incorporation and two opposing.
Before a motion for an order of incorporation could be acted upon by the court, appellants filed a "complaint of contest" asking the court to declare the election void on various grounds. The court proceeded to hear the evidence presented and in due time decided the issues against appellants. An order was then entered declaring the City of Kachemak to be incorporated as a city of the third class.
The main question raised on appeal is whether the statute providing for the incorporation of third class cities which permits nonresident property owners to vote on the question is unconstitutional.
A 1951 act of the territorial legislature states:
"The procedure for the election, ballots, trustees, certificates of results, and court order thereon shall be in accordance with the provisions of Section 16-2-3, A.C.L.A.1949, other than each permanent adult inhabitant of, as well as each ozvner of real property in, such neighborhood' or district shall be a qualified elector and entitled to vote at all of such elections." (Emphasis ours.)
Article V, section 1 of the constitution which became effective January 3, 1959 states:
"Every citizen of the United States who is at least nineteen years of age, who meets registration requirements which may be prescribed by law, and who is qualified to vote under this article, may vote in any state or local election. He shall have been, immediately preceding the election, for one year a resident of Alaska and for thirty days a resident of the election district in which he seeks to vote. He shall be able to read or speak the English language as prescribed by law, unless prevented by physical disability. Additional voting qualifications may be prescribed by law for bond issue elections of political subdivisions." (Emphasis ours.)
In view of the unequivocal wording of the constitution we must hold that the portion of the above statute which permits nonresident property owners to vote is not consistent with the constitution, and therefore did not continue in force as state law after the effective date of the constitution.
Appellee argues that section 1 merely guarantees the right to vote to persons hav ing the enumerated qualifications and is not a prohibition against broadening the right so as to permit others to vote. We are unable to reconcile that argument with the second sentence of section 1 which states, with reference to who may vote in a state or local election:
"He shall have been, immediately preceding the election, for one year a resident of Alaska and for thirty days a resident of the election district in which he seeks to vote."
The above sentence leaves no room for broadening the qualifications to permit a nonresident property owner to vote.
As far as we are aware only one jurisdiction has been confronted with this question. In Thomas v. Madden the supreme court of South Carolina held that an act of the legislature allowing nonresident property owners of a "resort community" to vote was in violation of the suffrage article of its constitution.
The next question to be decided is whether the irregularity of mailing absentee ballots to nonresident property owners and other claims of misconduct by appellants could have changed the result of the election.
The petitioners for incorporation in good faith followed the provisions of the statute when they obtained the names and addresses of all nonresident property owners from the public utility district and mailed them absentee ballots. To the best of their knowledge according to the statute these nonresidents were entitled to vote and it would have been highly irregular not to have accorded them this privilege. A total of seven absentee ballots were returned. At least some of the absentee ballots went to persons who were not property owners. Some may have been mailed to resident property owners who were temporarily absent- from the area. One nonresident property owner testified that she voted against incorporation by absentee ballot. Otherwise the evidence with respect to the absentee voting is too vague to determine any fact other than that five voted in favor of incorporation and two against. The controlling fact, in our opinion, is that, even if all of the absentee ballots were-disqualified the outcome of the election would not be changed.
Appellants obtained affidavits from three persons who were possibly nonresidents who appeared and voted at election headquarters. The affidavits did not establish whether the affiants voted for or against incorporation. With evidence so inconclusive the court is not permitted to assume that the outcome of the election would have been changed by these votes. Appellants questioned the residence of six voters who came from the Soldotna oil fields to vote. These voters claimed to be residents of the area to be incorporated who were absent from time to time only because of temporary employment in the nearby oil fields. Appellants offered no substantial proof of nonresidence of these voters. They were not subpoenaed, nor is it known how they voted.
The prevailing rule is that an election may be contested only for malcon-duct, fraud or corruption on the part of an election official sufficient to change the result of the election. The evidence in this case fails to disclose malconduct, fraud or corruption on the part of any official. On the contrary, it appears that the election officials tried their best to follow the orders, of the court and the letter of the law, to the extent that any of our laws cover elections of this nature. We shall follow the general rule that every reasonable presumption will be indulged in favor of the validity of an election.
We have reviewed the evidence with respect to appellants' other charges of misconduct on the part of election officials and conclude that the trial judge correctly ruled that none of them could have altered the outcome of the election. Appellants have not sustained their burden of showing that the alleged misconduct and irregularities could have changed the outcome of the election.
Our dissenting colleague is of the view that the courts have no jurisdiction to hear this action on the ground that after certification of the results of the election by the election judges, the superior court judge had no alternative but to perform the non-judicial act of declaring the community incorporated under the provisions of section 16-2-3 A.C.L.A.1949. Appellants could then have moved to avoid the act of incorporation under the provisions of sections 56-4-2 through 56-4 — 6 A.C.L.A.1949. This would have required an action by the attorney general instituted at the direction of the governor to question the legality of the existence of the corporation.
•In our view the proceeding was a contest of a local election which should have been heard and decided. The contest was commenced prior to the signing of the certificate of election. Since no corporation was yet in existence the quo warranto provisions contained in sections 56-4-2 through 56-4-6 A.C.L.A.1949 were not applicable.
Article V, section 3 of the constitution provides in part:
" The procedure for determining election contests, with right of appeal to the courts, shall be prescribed by law."
We agree with our colleague that the legislature has not fully implemented this provision by providing for the contest of local elections. This, in our view, is not fatal to jurisdiction to hear and decide a local contest. The constitution clearly recognizes that there shall be a right to contest elections. It also specifically provides that there shall be access to the courts to determine such contests. The fact that the legislature may not have specifically provided for any preliminary administrative determination of local election contests before resort could be had to the courts is not of grave consequence. Since no procedure had been prescribed by the legislature for getting the contest before the courts, appellants followed the procedure provided for contesting state elections. We find this to have been a reasonable method of getting the matter before the court and that the jurisdiction of the court to hear the matter is recognized by the constitution.
The judgment below is affirmed.
. S.L.A.1951, ch. 46, § 3 (AS 29.20.050).
. Article XV, § 1 of the constitution states:
"Section 1. All laws in force in the Territory of Alaska on the effective date of this constitution and consistent therewith shall continue in force until they expire by their own limitation, are amended, or repealed."
. 186 S.C. 290, 195 S.E. 539 (1938).
. In re Contest of Election of Vetsch, 245 Minn. 229, 71 N.W.2d 652, 658 (1955); see S.L.A.1960, cb. 83, § 4.91 establishing this rule as to the grounds for contesting state elections. See also Ore. Rev.Stat. § 251.035(2) and Rev.Code Wash. § 29.65.100.
.Leasure v. Beebe, 32 Del.Ch, 210, 83 A.2d 117 (1951).
. The election was held on July 25, 1961. On August 14, 1961 the court set a date for a hearing on the contest. At those times § 56-4-2 through 56-4-6 A.C.L.A. 1949 were in force. Effective January 1, 1963 § 56-4-2 through 56-4-6 A.C.L.A. 1949 were repealed by S.L.A.1962, ch. 101, § 31.02, 31.03. The relief provided for under those sections can now be obtained through the application of Civil Rule 91(a), Civil Rule 11 and AS 09.-50.310-09.50.380.
. S.L.A.1960, ch. 83, as its title indicates, is a codification and revision of the law relating to state elections. This chapter is very comprehensive, but aside from defining a local election as " ⅜ any election held by a borough, city, school district, public utility district, service area, or other local unit of government" in § 12.01(2), its provisions are almost exclusively devoted to state and national elections.
. As to state election contest the legislature has provided that any defeated candidate or ten qualified voters may contest an election by commencing an action in the superior court within ten days after completion of the state canvass. S.L.A.1960, ch. 83, § 4.91, 4.92. Section 4.93 provides that the judge shall thereupon determine the questions raised. No preliminary administrative determinations are provided for.
. The jurisdiction of the superior court to hear and determine the controversy is also provided for in S.L.A.1959. ch. 50, § 17(1) (b).