Case Name: Ex parte Henry Lee LUCAS
Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1994-06-08
Citations: 877 S.W.2d 315
Docket Number: No. 71164
Parties: Ex parte Henry Lee LUCAS.
Judges: Before the court en banc.
Reporter: South Western Reporter Second Series
Volume: 877
Pages: 315–324

Head Matter:
Ex parte Henry Lee LUCAS.
No. 71164.
Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, En Banc.
June 8, 1994.
Danny D. Bums and Richard Alley, Fort Worth, for appellant.
Ken Anderson, Dist. Atty., and Paul Wom-ack, Asst. Dist. Atty., Georgetown, Robert Huttash, State’s Atty., Austin, for State.
Before the court en banc.

Opinion:
OPINION ON REMAND FROM THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
CAMPBELL, Judge.
Applicant Henry Lee Lucas was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death for the murder and sexual assault of an unidentified woman in Williamson County. On direct appeal to this Court, we affirmed. Lucas v. State, 791 S.W.2d 35 (Tex.Crim.App.1989). Applicant then filed a post-conviction application for writ of habeas corpus. We denied relief. Ex Parte Lucas, 834 S.W.2d 339 (Tex.Crim.App.1992). The United States Supreme Court subsequently granted applicant's petition for writ of certiorari, vacated our judgment, and remanded this ease for further consideration in light of Johnson v. Texas, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 2658, 125 L.Ed.2d 290 (1993). We will again deny relief.
In Johnson, the petitioner, Dorsie Lee Johnson, was found guilty of capital murder and sentenced to death. At the punishment phase of Johnson's trial, the jury was instructed on special issues one and two. On appeal, Johnson argued that, under the Eighth Amendment, the trial court should have allowed a special jury instruction at the punishment phase concerning the potentially mitigating evidence of his youth. The Supreme Court held that the trial court's refusal to allow the special instruction did not offend the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments.
The Supreme Court's Johnson decision succeeded its earlier decision in Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 109 S.Ct. 2934, 106 L.Ed.2d 256 (1989). In Penry, the petitioner, Johnny Paul Penry, provided evidence during his capital murder trial of his mental retardation and abusive childhood. The Court held that the special issues under the Texas capital sentencing scheme were insufficient, without an additional jury instruction, to allow the jury to give effect to the relevant mitigating evidence offered by Penry at his trial. The Court held, specifically, that, without an additional jury instruction, the jury in Penry's case was unable to make a "reasoned moral response" to Penry's mitigating evidence in deciding whether to impose the death penalty.
Applicant introduced "mitigating" evidence at his trial in the form of testimony from a psychologist and a psychiatrist. The psychologist, Dr. Tom Kubiszyn, testified that applicant suffered from "chronic schizophrenia of a residual type with an underlying schizotypal personality disorder." Dr. Ku-biszyn also testified concerning applicant's childhood, stating that applicant's father was a bootlegger and a double amputee who died when applicant was still young, and that applicant's mother was sexually promiscuous and inflicted physical and emotional abuse upon applicant. Dr. Kubiszyn stated that he believed the abuse inflicted upon applicant by his mother caused applicant, as an adult, to harbor strong feelings of resentment and hostility toward females. Finally, Dr. Ku-biszyn testified that applicant was of "low-average" intelligence, with an I.Q. of 84.
The psychiatrist, Dr. Jay Fogelman, corroborated much of Dr. Kubiszyn's testimony concerning applicant's psychosis and childhood. Dr. Fogelman testified that applicant suffered from "chronic schizophrenia," and had two personality disorders — a schizotypal personality and elements of a sociopathic personality. Dr. Fogelman also testified that, as a child, applicant frequently witnessed his mother undress and act provocatively in his presence, and that applicant periodically had seizures at school which caused him to be treated as an outcast.
In our initial review of this post-conviction application for relief, we held that the potentially mitigating evidence offered by applicant did not warrant a Penry-type instruction at the punishment stage of his trial. Ex Parte Lucas, 834 S.W.2d at 342. We do not believe that Johnson changes that holding. The record shows that applicant was 43 years old when he committed the instant offense. The petitioner in Johnson, in contrast, was only 19 when he committed his offense. We believe, therefore, that youth is not a factor in the instant case.
Given the facts and holding of Johnson, we conclude that our original determination, that applicant's potentially mitigating evidence did not merit an additional jury instruction at the punishment phase of his trial, is unaffected by Johnson. Therefore, we reaffirm our holding in our initial review of applicant's post-conviction application for relief.
The request for relief is DENIED.
CLINTON, BAIRD and OVERSTREET, JJ., dissent because the majority pretends the Supreme Court remanded this cause to reconsider the matter of age, all the while ignoring that it pointedly cautioned, "Penry remains the law and must be given a fair reading." 509 U.S. at -, 113 S.Ct. at 2670, 125 L.Ed.2d at 307.
MALONEY, J., not participating.
. At the time of Johnson's trial, Article 37.071(b) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure provided for a jury to consider the following special issues in determining whether to assess the death penally in a capital case:
(1)whether the conduct of the defendant that caused the death of the deceased was committed deliberately and with the reasonable expectation that the death of the deceased or another would result;
(2) whether there is a probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society; and
(3) if raised by the evidence, whether the conduct of the defendant in killing the deceased was unreasonable in response to the provocation, if any, by the deceased.