Case Name: THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CHRISTINE LUNDGREN, Defendant-Appellee
Court: Illinois Appellate Court
Jurisdiction: Illinois
Decision Date: 1986-11-14
Citations: 149 Ill. App. 3d 458
Docket Number: No. 3-85-0749
Parties: THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CHRISTINE LUNDGREN, Defendant-Appellee.
Judges: 
Reporter: Illinois Appellate Court Reports, Third Series
Volume: 149
Pages: 458–460

Head Matter:
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CHRISTINE LUNDGREN, Defendant-Appellee.
Third District
No. 3-85-0749
Opinion filed November 14, 1986.
STOUDER, J., dissenting.
James T. Teros, State’s Attorney, of Rock Island (Gerald P. Ursini, of State’s Attorneys Appellate Service Commission, of counsel), for the People.
Durward J. Long, Sr., and D. Jamieson Long, Jr., both of Long & Long, P.C., of Rock Island, for appellee.

Opinion:
PRESIDING JUSTICE SCOTT
delivered the opinion of the court:
On July 5, 1985, the defendant, Christine Lundgren, was issued a citation and complaint for failure to reduce speed to avoid an accident in violation of section 11 — 601(a) of article VI of the Illinois Vehicle Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 9572, par. 11-601(a)). In allowing the defendant's motion to dismiss, the court found the complaint fatally deficient for not apprising the defendant of either her speed or the applicable speed limit in compliance with section 11—610(a) of the Illi nois Vehicle Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 95½, par. 11—610(a)). The State appeals, arguing that section 11—610(a) was inapplicable to the instant section 11 — 601(a) charge.
Public Act 79—1069 (the amendment) amended section 11— 610(a) to provide that the complaint charging violations of speed regulations in article VI of the Illinois Vehicle Code shall specify the defendant's alleged speed and the maximum applicable speed. To interpret the amendment, this court may consider the legislative history to ascertain the legislative intent and give effect to unambiguous statutory language. People v. Scognamiglio (1983), 119 Ill. App. 3d 747, 457 N.E.2d 99.
We note that effective January 1, 1976, the amendment explicitly expanded the scope of section 11 — 610 to include any article VI speed regulation, and that on the date of the alleged offense the prohibition against failing to reduce speed to avoid an accident was one of the general speed restrictions set forth in section 11 — 601.
We acknowledge that a violation of section 11 — 601(a) only requires proof that the defendant drove carelessly and failed to reduce speed to avoid colliding with persons or property. (People v. Schumann (1983), 120 Ill. App. 3d 518, 458 N.E.2d 182.) However, we decline to exclude section 11—601(a) from the unambiguous legislative mandate of section 11—610(a). We find, therefore, that by not apprising the defendant of her alleged speed and the maximum speed applicable at the location of the accident, the complaint was fatally deficient. Consequently, the circuit court appropriately allowed the defendant's motion to dismiss.
Accordingly, the judgment of the circuit court of Rock Island County is affirmed.
Affirmed.
WOMBACHER, J., concurs.