Case Name: The State v. Pugh
Court: Supreme Court of Ohio
Jurisdiction: Ohio
Decision Date: 1885-01
Citations: 43 Ohio St. 98
Docket Number: 
Parties: The State v. Pugh.
Judges: Eollett, J., concurs in this dissenting opinion.
Reporter: Ohio State Reports, New Service
Volume: 43
Pages: 98–144

Head Matter:
The State v. Pugh.
Act of February 27, 1 885 — Local and special act — Article 2, section 27, and article 13, section 1 ,of constitution — Conferring of corporate power — Part void, when balance of act falls.
1. The act to reorganize and consolidate cities of the first grade of the second class (Columbus), and to reduce the tax-levy of said cities, passed February 27,1885 (82 Ohio h. 54), so far as it authorizes the trustees of the sinking fund to redistrict the city of Columbus into wards, and authorizes the appointment of a board of control by the council of such city, is a local and special act.
2. Such act is not in violation of section 27, article 2, of the constitution of Ohio, which ordains that, “no appointing power shall be exercised by the general assembly, except as prescribed in this constitution, and in the election of United States senators,” by reason of the authority conferred by the act upon the trustees of the sinking fund to redistrict the city of Columbus; nor is the granting of such authority to the trustees in violation of section 1 of article 18 of the constitution, which ordains that, “the general assembly shall pass no special act confei’ring corporate powers.”
3. So much of such act as grants authority to such city to appoint, through its council, a board of control, is in violation of section 1 of article 13 above quoted, in that it is the conferring of corporate powers upon such city by a special act.
4. As the act is not one simply to redislrict the city of Columbus into wards-but, as its title implies, is an act “ to reorganize and consolidate ” such city, and as it is highly improbable that the general assembly would have enacted the provisions for the redistricting of the city without the further provisions for the appointment of a board of control; and as the latter provision is unconstitutional and void, the act, so far as it provides for redistrieting the city and appointing a board of control for its government, is void.
QUO WARRANTO.
By direction of the governor of the state, the attorney-general, on behalf of the state, filed his petition in this court, by which he gave it information that the defendants, John M. Pugh, Joseph EL Outhwaite, and Isaac Eberly, together with Benjamin F. Martin and Luther Donaldson, are the trustees of the sinking fund of the city of Columbus, which is a city of the first grade of the second class, and is and was on February 27,1885, the only city in the state of the same grade and class, and the only city that can come into that grade and class before next July; that such trustees were heretofore appointed under an act passed April 16,1883 (80 OhioL. 139), and are the only persons ever appointed aud qualified as trustees of the sinking fund of the city of Columbus under such act.
The petition further alleges that the defendants, Pugh, Outhwaite, and Eberly, who comprise a majority of such trustees, have usurped and exercised, and were proceeding to exercise the powers which are specified as conferred upon them by an act of the general assembly, entitled “an act to reorganize and consolidate cities of the first grade of the second class (Columbus), and to reduce the tax levy of such cities.” These powers, are specified at leugth in the petition, which sets out the act in full.
The petition avers that the act above entitled is unconstitutional and void, and hence that the defendants are proceeding without warrant or lawful authority, and the prayer of the petition is that they be ousted and excluded from the exercise of any of the powers which the act in question purports to confer upon them. The two trustees, Martin and Donaldson, refuse to co-operate with the defendants in the attempt to execute the provisions of the act, and for that reason are not impleaded as defendants. The act is as'follows :
“An Act to reorganize and consolidate cities of the first grade of the second class (Columbus), and to reduce the tax levy of said cities.
“ Section 1. Be it enacted by the general assembly of the state of Ohio, That in cities of the first grade of the second class, it shall be the duty of the trustees of the sinking fund, heretofore appointed under an act passed April 16, 1888, entitled au act to amend sections 2715, 2716, 2721, 2722, 2724, and 2729 of the Revised Statutes of Ohio ’ (80 Ohio L. 139, 140, 141), to proceed within five days after the passage of this act, with the aid of such engineers and assistants as they may deem necessary, to redistrict such cities into as many wards as, in their opinion, may be deemed advisable, which shall be bounded by streets, alleys, avenues,’ public grounds, canals, watercourses, or corporation lines, and be composed of adjacent and compact territory; and such wards shall contain as nearly an equal number of inhabitants as may, in the opinion of such trustees, or a majority of them, be deemed practi cable; which wards shall be numbered consecutively, commencing with the number one.
“ Sec. 2. Such trustees, or a majority of them, shall cause a plat of the proposed division or redistricting to be made, showing the wards so proposed, and shall give notice that the same is open for inspection at aplace to bo named, by publication in at least one daily newspaper, published and of general circulation in the corporation. The trustees shall meet, at such times and places as may be stated in the published notice, to hear and consider any objections, complaints, or petitions that maybe presented or urged against such proposed division and redistricting; and after hearing the same, the. trustees, or a majority of them, may make such alterations therein as they may deem proper. The trustees shall cause copies of the plat to be made of the wards as finally adopted, with a description of the boundaries of the same, and shall deposit one copy, certified by such trustees, or a majority of them, with the mayor, and another with the city clerk, who shall immediately record the same in the record book of general ordinances.
“ Sec. 3. The adoption of such division and redistricting by such trustees, or a majority of them, shall be deemed complete and final, and shall operate as a repeal of any or’dinance of the council of such cities establishing the boundaries of wards therein; and such division and redistricting shall have the same force and effect as if made by ordinance of council; and the wards so established shall not again be changed before the third regular meeting of the council after the annual municipal election next after such redistricting.
“ Sec. 4. Such trustees shall designate one place of holding elections in each of said wards, which shall not be changed before the third regular meeting of council held after the first annual municipal election next after the passage of this act; and the wards so established shall not be subdivided into election precincts before such third regular meeting. Such trustees, or a majority of them, shall certify to the city clerk such designation of voting places, who shall immediately record the same in the record book of general ordinances; and such designation of voting places shall be deemed complete and final, until duly changed by the council of such cities, and shall operate as a repeal of any resolution or ordinance of the council of such cities establishing the precincts of wards, designating the voting places, or selecting or appointing judges of election therein. At the first municipal election held in such cities after the passage of this act, the judges of election, not more than two of whom shall belong to the same political organization, and the clerks of election, who shall be of opposite politics, shall be chosen by the electors of the wards present at the organization of the polls. And the mayor, in issuing his proclamation of the time and places of holding elections in such cities, shall be governed and controlled by such division and redistricting into wards, and by such designation as to places of holding elections, as fully as, though the same had been made and designated by ordinance of council.
“ Sec. 5. The expenses of such trustees, including the compensation of engineers and assistants employed, shall be paid out of the general revenue fund of such cities upon presentation of an order signed by such trustees, or a majority of them, to the city clerk, who shall issue his waiv rant for the amount'upon the treasurer, who shall pay the same, but the trustees shall serve without compensation.
“Sec. 6. At the first municipal election held in cities of the first grade of the second class next after such division and redistricting, one member of the city council shall be elected in each of the wards so constituted, by the electors thereof, those in the even numbered wards to serve for one year, and those in the odd numbered wards to serve for two years, and thereafter the successors of those whose terms expire shall be elected to serve for two years. Members of council in such cities in office at the time of such division and redistricting shall hold their offices until the members so elected shall be qualified, whereupon their offices as such councilmen [shall] cease and determine.
“ Sec. 7. At the first municipal election in such city next after such division and redistricting, one member of the board of education of such cities shall be elected in each of the wards so constituted, by the electors thereof, those in the even numbered wards to serve for one year, and those in the odd numbered wards to serve for two years, and thereafter the successors of those whose terms expire shall be elected to serve for two years. Members of the board of education in such [cities] in office at the time of such division and redistricting shall hold their offices until the members so elected shall be qualified, whereupon their offices as' members of such board of education shall cease and determine.
“ Sec. 8. The aggregate of all taxes, which the council, in cities of the first grade of the second class, may levy or order to be.levied, above the tax for county and state purposes, including the levy for general purposes, shall not exceed in any one year, eight mills; but said council shall levy, in addition thereto, such further rate, not exceeding five-eighths of one mill, as may be necessary to create a sinking fund for the payment of the principal and interest of the bonds of such cities issued for the purpose of building and maintaining trunk sewers therein. And such council may apportion such levy between the several municipal departments in such proportion to their needs as the council may deem necessary, subject, however, to the provisions and limitations, so far as the same may be applicable, of the act of April 16, 1883, entitled, ‘ an act supplementary to chapter one, division nine, of title twelve, of the Revised Statutes of Ohio, and to amend sections 2689, 3958, and -3959, of the Revised Statutes. The board of education of such cities of the first grade of the second class, shall not exceed in its estimate and levy of the amount of money necessary to be levied as a contingent fund for the continuance of the school or schools therein after the state funds are exhausted, to purchase, care, repair, and furnish school houses and build additions thereto, and for other school purposes five mills.
“ Sec. 9.- In cities of the first grade of the second class there shall be a board of control, composed of three members, not more than two of whom shall belong to the samo political party, electors of such cities, to be chosen in the first instance, by the council of such cities elected at the first annual municipal election held therein after the passage of this act, and within twenty days after the organization thereof, one of which members shall serve for one year, one for two years, and one for three years from the date of such appointment or selection, and thereafter a successor of the member of such board whose term expires shall bo chosen by the council to serve for the term of three years, and the members of such board shall serve until their successors are chosen and qualified. Vacancies in such board sháll bo filled by the council for the unexpired term.
“ Sec. 10. Each member of such board of control shall give bond, with at least three sureties to the satisfaction of the council, in the sum of twenty-five thousand dollars, conditioned for the faithful performance of his duties, which sureties shall each be required to take an oath that he is worth the amount of the bond above all liabilities.
“Sec. 11. The members of the board shall devote their entire time and attention to the duties of the office, and shall each receive, as compensation, a salary of twenty-five hundred dollars per annum.
“ Sec. 12. The board shall hold daily meetings, and a majority shall constitute a quorum for the transaction of business; the ayes and nays shall be called and entered upon a journal, upon the passage of every resolution or order of any kind, and no resolution or order shall be adopted unless two votes are recorded in its favor.
“ Sec. 13. The board shall keep a complete record of all its proceedings, and a copy from its records, certified by its clerk, shall be competent evidence in all courts; but a separate journal and record shall be kept for each of the departments under the control of the board.
“ Sec. 14. The board of control may appoint and employ such superintendents, heads, and chiefs of departments, engineers, clerks, laborers, and other persons, as may be necessary for the execution of its duties, and fix their salaries and compensation; but the salaries of such superintendents, heads, chiefs of departments, clerks, and engineers, as are appointed for a definite time, shall be fixed within limits to bo prescribed by council, and shall not be changed during the term for which they arc appointed; and any such appointees or employes, or any person holding an office or employment under any board of which said board of control may be the successor, may be removed by the board of control at any time. The appointment of heads, chiefs, or superintendents of departments shall be confirmed by council.
“ Sec. 15. The board of control shall have all the powers, perform all the duties, and have and exercise all the priv: ileges which, in other cities, are vested in and devolve upon the trustees of the water-works, the board of improvements, the park commissioners, the board of police commissioners in cities of the second grade of the second class, and the board of fire commissioners in cities of the second grade of the first class, as provided in the Revised Statutes and the amendments thereto relating to those matters, and shall bo governed by the rules proscribed by law for the government of those boards, when not inconsistent with the provisions of this act. And said board shall have all the powers, perform all the duties, and be subject to the same restrictions which arc vested in, or devolve, or are imposed upon boards of public works in cities of the first grade of the first class, as provided in the Revised Statutes by sections two thousand two hundred and thirteen (2213) to two thousand two hundred and thirty (2230), inclusive, and the amendments thereto. Members of the board of trustees of water-works, 'of the board of police commissioners, and of the board of park commissioners, in such cities of the first grade of the second class, in office when this act takes effect, shall hold their offices until ten days after the members of said board of control shall be chosen, or appointed and qualified, whereupon their offices as members of such board shall cease and determine. In cities of the first grade of the second class, no election for members of the board of trustees of water-works shall be held, nor members of such board elected, after the passage of this act, such board with respect to such cities being hereby abolished.
“Sec. 16. That section nineteen hundred and ninety-eight (1998) of the revised statutes be so amended as to read as follows :
“ Sec. 1998. In cities of the second grade of the second class, all powers and duties with respect to the appointment, regulation, government and control of the police shall, as now, be vested in and exercised by a board, consisting of the mayor, who shall be president, and four commissioners, who shall be electors and freeholders of the city, and a majority shall constitute a quorum.
“ Sec. 17. That section two thousand four hundred and seventy-seven (2477) of the Revised Statutes be so amended as to read as follows :
“ Sec. 2477. The provisions of this subdivision shall not apply to cities of the first and second grades of the first class, and cities of the first grade of the second class, except as to matters concerning which no provision i's made in the first and second subdivisions of this chapter.
“ Sec. 18. The officers of cities of the first grade of the second class, except as provided in this act, shall consist of a mayor, who shall be chosen by the electors of the corporation, a police jfidge, a prosecuting attorney of the police court, who shall also act as assistant prosecuting attorney of the county in which such cities are located, a clerk of the police court, a solicitor and a city clerk, all of whom shall be chosen in the first instance by the council of such cities, elected at the first annual municipal election held therein after the passage of this act, and within twenty days after the organization thereof, and thereafter a successor of the officer whose term expires shall be chosen by the council; the officers so chosen by council shall serve for the term of two years ; and vacancies in any such offices shall be filled for the unexpired term. All offices in cities of the first grade of the second class, heretofore created by ordinance of council, shall cease and determine at the expii’ation of ten days after the selection and qualification of said board of control.
“ Sec. 19. That section seventeen hundred and eighty-five (1785) of the revised statutes [be] so amended as to read as follows:
“ Sec. 1785. In cities of the first class and in cities of the first grade of the second class, there shall be a court, held by the police judge, which court shall be styled the police court and be a court of record.
“ Sec. 20. That section two thousand one hundred and forty-one (2141) [of the Revised Statutes], as amended April 8, 1881, be so amended as to read as follows:
“ Sec. 2141. In cities of the third grade of the first class, and in cities of the first grade of the second class, there shall be no board of health, but the board of police commissioners in cities of the third grade of the first class, and the board of control in cities of the first grade of the second class, shall exercise all the powers and perform all the duties of the boards of'health and mayors in this chapter.
“ Sec. 21. The council in cities of the first grade of the second class, shall, on the first Monday of September, in each year, select and appoint two judges of election of opposite politics, for each voting place in such cities, and the electors of the voting district shall select a third man to serve as judge of such election at the organization; the persons so appointed shall be electors and residents at'least sixty days in the ward for which they are appointed ; the mayor shall forthwith cause notice to be given to each person so appointed, and shall cause a record to be made and kept in his office of such appointments, and the persons so appointed shall act as judges of election in their proper voting districts during the period of one year ; they shall take the same oath of office, be subject to the same requirements, penalties, liabilities, and disqualifications, atid entitled to the same compensation as other judges of election; they shall designate and appoint two' clerks of election of opposite politics, who shall take an oath of office, and shall perform all the duties and be subject to all the liabilities as other clerks of eletion; and if any such judges or clerks fail to attend, at the proper time and place, such judges and clerks, and all additional judges and clerks, shall be chosen by the electors of the ward.
“ Sec. 22. That sections seventeen hundred and eighty-five (1785) nineteen hundred and ninety-eight (1998), two thousand four hundred and seventy-seven (2477), and two thousand one hundred and forty-one (2141), of the Revised Statutes, be and the same are hereby repealed; that all acts and parts of acts, inconsistent or in conflict with the provisions of this act, be and the same are hereby repealed, in so far as they may apply to cities of the first grade of the second class; and the provisions of section 2933, Revised Statutes, as amended March 6,1883, shall not apply to cities of the first grade of the second class ; and that all ordinances of such cities of the first grade of the second class, heretofore adopted, which may be in conflict or inconsistent with the provisions of this act, be and the same are hereby set aside, repealed and held for naught; provided that nothing in this act shall be so construed as to affect, in any manner, the tenure of any lands that may have been donated to such cities for park or other public purposes ; and provided, further, that nothing in this act contained shall be so construed as to affect or interfere in any manner with the term of any incumbent in office, except in cities of the first grade of the second class.
“ Sec. 23. This act shall take effect and be in force from and after its passage.”
The defendants tendered an issue of law by a demurrer to the petition, and maintain that the act under which they were proceeding is a valid and constitutional enactment.
C. T. Clarice, city solicitor. J. II. Collins, L. J. Critchfield, and S. JEIambleion, for relator.
Converse, Booth Keating, and D. C. Jones, for defendants.

Opinion:
Owen, J.
I. It is maintained in behalf of the relator that the enactment in question is in conflict with section 27, article 2, of the constitution of Ohio, which ordains that: " no appointing power shall be exercised by the general assembly, except as prescribed in this constitution, and in the election of United States senators."
The reasoning is that by this act the defendants, Pugh, Outhwaito and Eberly, and Martin and Donaldson 'are appointed by the general assembly to redistrict the city of Columbus iuto wards ; that by the designation of the provision that " it shall be the duty of the trustees of the sinking fuud heretofore appointed, under an act passed April 16, 1883, . to proceed within five days after the passage of this act . . . to redistrict," etc., the individuals who comprise the board are clothed with the duties defined by the act, and not the board itself; that the designation of " the trustees heretofore appointed " exclude any hereafter appointed, and that no successors of any present trustee can be lawfully appointed or qualified to act; that as they are the only persons ever appointed under that act, and as Columbus is the only city of the first grade of the second class in this state, and as the language " heretofore appointed" can not be rejected, but must be given its ordinary and natural import, it is as if these trustees had been designated by name.
This view is not without plausibility to support it; yet with great respect for counsel it is submitted that the construction contended for is narrow and constrained. The act under which these trustees were appointed (80 Ohio L. 139) provides that: "In cities . of the first grade of the second class, there shall be a board, designated as the trustees of the sinking-fund . to be appointed . . by the court of common pleas of the county in which said city is situated." The act under consideration employs the statutory designation of this board, and giving to the language " heretofore appointed" that liberal and reasonable construction to which it is entitled, we have no difficulty in construing this provision to have reference to that board of trustees of the sinking fund in office in the city of Columbus at the time of the taking effect of the act, and not to its members as individuals.
If we are right in this view, it follows that instead of appointing these trustee, the general assembly has simply clothed them with additional powers and duties. That this is not the exercise of the appointing power by the general assembly is how too firmly established to be called in question. State v. The Judges, 21 Ohio St. 1; Walker v. Cincinnati, 21 Ohio St. 14; State v. Covington, 29 Ohio St. 116.
II. It is further maintained that the act in question conferred on these trustees corporate powers in violation of section 1 of article 13 of the constitution, which ordains that, " the general assembly shall pass no special act conferring corporate powers."
Without considering in this connection whether this is a special act, let us inquire if it confers corporate powers upon the trustees of the sinking fund.
Their duties are to redistrict the city of Columbus into wards, designate one voting place in each ward, and perform other duties pertaining to a division of the city into wards.
What constitutes "corporate powers" depends largely upon whom the powers in question are conferred. The conferring of certain powers upon an existing corporation may bring them within the designation of " corporate powers," while conferring the same duties or functions upon individuals, or unincorporated bodies, fails to impart to them the attributes of corporate powers.
Neither the act in question nor that under which these trustees were appointed constituted them a corporate body.
Nor are they in any substantial sense municipal officers of the city of Columbus.
No reason has been shown by counsel in the argument in this case why the general assembly may not by an act divide a city into wards ; indeed, eminent counsel for the re lator conceded in argument that he found nothing in the constitution that stood in the way of such a proceeding; but contended that such a redistrieting must be by a local and special act. Unquestionably. It would seem to be legally and physically impossible for the general assembly to redistrict a city, by defined boundaries, into wards, and still preserve to the act the qualities of a general law.
If the general assembly may, by a special act, divide a city into wards, it is not easy to see why it may not (avoiding the exercise of appointing power), invest some intermediate agency Avith poAver to accomplish the same end.
"While the division of a city into wards may be preliminary, and in fact essential to its proper equipment for the exercise of the usual functions of municipal government, it is not necessarily the exercise of any of such functions. How this question would be affected by conferring upon the existing officers of a municipal corporation, by a special act, poAver. to redistrict it into wards, is not a question now before us.
We conclude that, conceding this to be a local and special act, it does not, by authorizing the trustees of the sinking fund to redistrict the city, confer upon them corporate poAvers, and is not within the inhibition of section 1, article 13, of the constitution.
Local and special legislation is not forbidden by the constitution. It plainly requires that all laws of a general nature shall have a uniform operation throughout the state, hut it does not require that all acts of the general assembly shall be of a general nature.
The view we have here expressed is supported by State v. Covington, 29 Ohio St. 102 ; State v. Powers, 38 Ohio St. 54; and State v. Baughman, 38 Ohio St. 455.
III. It is further urged in support of the proceeding'of the relator that if this court shall be of opinion that this act does not confer corporate powers upon the trustees of the sinking fund, it does clearly confer such powers upon the city of Columbus, and being a special act, it contravenes the .provision already quoted that, "the general assembly shall pass no special act conferring corporate powers."
(1). Is this a special aet relating exclusively to Columbus? It is now too late to question the validity of the plan of classification incorporated in our statutes, and which has received the repeated sanction of this court. State v. Brewster, 39 Ohio St. 653; McGill v. State, 34 Ohio St. 228; State v. Bowers, 38 Ohio St. 54; Bronson v. Oberlin, 41 Ohio St. 476. It is not to be urged against legislation, general in form, concerning cities of a designated class and grade, that but one city in the state is within the particular classification at the time of its enactment.
Nor is it fatal to the act in question that the belief or intent of the individual members of the general assembly who voted for the act was .that it should apply only to a particular city. Neither would it subject the act to the imputation that it was local and special, that, in the opinion of the general assembly, gross abuses had intruded themselves into the administration of the municipal affairs of a particular city, which seemed to call upon the general assembly to repair the wrong, for, as eminent counsel for defendants well say: "Some individual exigency, abuse, or malfeasan ce has formed the originating cause of almost, if not all, the acts of the general assembly — those of a general as well as those of a special nature." Although it is alleged in the petition and admitted by the demurrer that no other city than Columbus is within, or can, before July next, come within the class and grade contemplated by the act, yet, if any other city may, in the future, by virtue of its increase in population and the action of its municipal authorities, ripen into a city of the same class and grade, and come within the operation of the act, it is still a law of a general nature and is not invalid, even if it confer corporate powers.
On the other hand, if it is clear that no other city of the state can in the future come within its operation without doing violence to the manifest object and purpose of its enactment, and to the clear legislative intent, it is a local and special act, however strongly the form it is made to assume may suggest its general character.
It is not the form a statute is made to assume, but its operation and effect, which is to determine its constitutionality. State v. The Judges, 21 Ohio St. 11; State v. Hipp, 38 Ohio St. 199.
A thorough and thoughtful examination of the various provisions of the act in question will, it is believed, reveal, with clearness and certainty, its true character. Beginning with its title: "An act to reorganize and consolidate cities of the first grade of the second class (Columbus), and to reduce the tax levy of said cities." Although the word " Columbus " was inserted in this title with deliberation, by the hand of the general assembly, it would be unfair and illiberal to magnify the importance of, or give controlling effect to, so slight a circumstance. Yet we are not at liberty wholly to ignore it. It is one of the indices pointing — feebly it may be — to the legislative intent. " The title is framed in the same manner as the bill, and is sanctioned by the vote of both branches of the legislature; we may, therefore, consider it as explanatory of the object of the law.'' Burnet, J., in Burgett v. Burgett, 1 Ohio, 480; U. S. v. Fisher, 2 Cranch, 386; U. S. v. Palmer, 3 Wheat. 610; Commonwealth v. Slifer, 53 Pa. St. 71.
Section 1 provides : " That in cities of the first grade of the second class, it shall be the duty of the trustees of the sinking fund, heretofore appointed under an act passed April 16, 1883, . . . to proceed within five days after the passage of this act . . . to redistrict such cities."
It is admitted that no other city of the state of the designated class and grade had such a board of trustees, or could before July next. What has already been said in this opinion concerning " the trustees of the sinking fund heretofore appointed," may aid us here. While we ought not unduly to magnify the importance of this language, yet it seems too plain for argument that it was within the legislative intent that this act should apply to a city of the first grade of the second class, having, at the passage of the act, " trustees of the sinking fund." It was known that Columbus was that city. Suppose the provision had been, " that in cities of the first grade of the second class, having trustees of the sinking fund heretofore appointed, it shall be the duty of such trustees to proceed within five days after the passage of this act to redistrict such cities." .Would it be questioned by anybody that this designation would have applied exclusively to the city of Columbus as certainly as if the city had been named, oras if the designation had been "cities of the first grade of the second class having a state house therein ?" This would effectually have annulled the classification ; withdrawn every attribute of a general law, and rendered the act local and special. This is the plain legal effect of the language actually employed. Then, while no other city can, before July next, come within its grade and class, the emphatic command of the act is that it shall be enforced promptly — within five days of its passage the work shall begin. It is not necessary to contend that the act must perish if not at once enforced. If there should be slight delay and neglect ou the part of the trustees in beginning their work within the five days, there seems little doubt that mandamus would lie to enforce obedience to its requirements, if the act were valid. But the fact still remains that the legislative intent was that it should be presently and promptly enforced.
It provides (section 4) that " at the first municipal election held . . . after thepassage of this act, the judges of the . . . election shall be chosen by the electors of the wards present at the organization of the polls."
It provides (section 6) that at the first municipal election held . . . next after such subdivision and redistricting (which is to be done promptly), one member of the, city council shall be elected in each ward.
It provides (section 7) that " at the first municipal election in such city, next after such division and redistricting, one member of the board of education of such cities shall be elected in each of the wards."
It provides (section 9) that a board of control of three members shall be chosen by the council elected at the first anual election held after the passage of this act, and within twenty days after the organization thereof.
It provides (section 18) that the officers of such cities, except the mayor, shall be chosen by the council elected at the first municipal election held therein after the passage of the act. These provisions contemplate the election to be held in April, 1885, and that when the trustees have completed their work of redistrieting, their powers are exhausted. No future action by them is contemplated. If we are right in this, it seems just as clear that the act does not contemplate the future appointment and action of similar trustees in any other city. While the plan for redistricting is temporary, the powers conferred on the city are to be permanent.
It will be observed that it is logically and physically impossible that any of the foregoing provisions can ever, in the history of the state, apply to any other city than Columbus.
It is just as clear that it was not within the legislative intent that they should apply to any other city. No other city can, in all time, come within the operation of the act without the aid of a construction of its language so violent as to amount to an officious assumption of legislative power by the court construing it.
It seems too clear for serious contention, then, that this is a local and special act applying exclusively to Columbus.
(2). This brings us to the question : Does the act confer corporate powers upon, that city? If it does, then so far as it does, it must fall, as in that case it clearly violates the inhibition that " the general assembly shall pass no special act conferring corporate powers."
We are not without the light of previous adjudications of this court to aid us in determining what are corporate powers as applied to the present case. In State v. Cincinnati, 20 Ohio St. 18, it ivas held that investing a municipal cor poration with the additional powers of municipal government, of police regulation, of judicial jurisdiction, and of taxation and assessment, was the conferring of corporate powers. In this case, outlying territory was brought within the corporate limits of the city, and hence within the operation of the powers already possessed by the city.
In State v. Cincinnati, 23 Ohio St. 445, it was held that a special act assuming to confer on the city of Cincinnati the control, management, and power to make all rules for the government of " The Commercial Hospital of Cincinnati," was one conferring corporate powers, and hence unconstitutional.
State v. Mitchell, 31 Ohio St. 607, in its application to the case at bar. is instructive. White, C. J., delivering the opinion, said : " It is true, the act in question is in the form, in a sense, of a general law. But as was said in the case of The State v. The Judges, 21 Ohio St. 11, the constitutionality of an act is to be determined by its operation, and not by the mere form it may be made to assume. The act is entitled 'An act to provide for the improvement of streets and avenues in certain cities of the second class.' And by the first section it is made applicable to ' cities of the second class having' a population of over thirty-one thousand at the last federal census.' Columbus is the only city in the state having the population named at the last federal census, and the act, therefore, applies alone to that eity, and never can apply to any other. The effect of the act would have been precisely the same if the eity had been designated by name instead of by the circumlocution employed. That the act undertakes to confer corporate power upon the city can not be doubtedfor while the property owners are required to be promoters of the improvement, the authoi'ity to direct it to be made is vested in the city council, and the bonds of the .city are to be used to raise money to pay for it."
Still more instructive is the case of State v. Constantine, 42 Ohio St. 437.
In that ease the court was called upon to consider the constitutional validity of an act authorizing " cities having a population of twenty thousand and not exceeding thirty thousand five hundred by the last federal census, and that have not been advanced to cities of the second grade, second class," to elect by a vote of the electors, police commissioners, who, with the mayor, should constitute a board, invested with " all powers and duties with respect to the appointment, regulation, government, and control of the police." The act provided that no elector should at any election vote for more than two persons for such commissioners, and that any ballot containing the names of more than two persons for such office should not be counted.
The proceeding was in quo warranto to oust the members of this board from the exercise of their offices. The validity of the act was assailed upon the grounds, (1) that it abridged the constitutional'right of each voter at such election to vote for each candidate for each office, and, (2), that it was a special act conferring corporate powers. Judgment of ouster was entered. The principal opinion was delivered by Mcllvaine, J., who placed the judgment upon the first ground of objection.