Case Name: James C. Birge, Resp't, v. The Berlin Iron Bridge Co. et al., App'lts
Court: New York Supreme Court, General Term
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1891-11-30
Citations: 42 N.Y. St. Rep. 52
Docket Number: 
Parties: James C. Birge, Resp’t, v. The Berlin Iron Bridge Co. et al., App’lts.
Judges: 
Reporter: New York State Reporter
Volume: 42
Pages: 52–59

Head Matter:
James C. Birge, Resp’t, v. The Berlin Iron Bridge Co. et al., App’lts.
(Supreme Court, General Term, Third Department,
Filed November 30, 1891.)
1. Towns—Bridges—Power of town to raise money.
If a town does not wish, to borrow money in the first instance to build a bridge in an emergency, it need not apply to the board of supervisors, but may by its own vote authorize the raising and appropriating of the money.
S, Same.
A special town meeting was called for the purpose of raising and appropriating money to maintain a bridge. At the meeting a resolution was offered to apply to the board of supervisors for an act to authorize the borrowing of money for that purpose. The meeting proceeded to ballot, using printed ballots, but before balloting was finished the resolution was passed viva voce. The ballots cast showed a large majority “ for the resolution.” Held, that in view of the fact that the call showed the purpose of the meeting to be the raising of money, and that the ballots were printed, it could not properly be claimed tliat the balloting was upon the resolution offered at the meeting; that by the ballot taken the commissioner of highways was authorized to make a contract .for the construction of the bridge.
(Mayham, J.,“dissents.)
Appeal from an order made at special term, denying the motion of the defendants to set aside and vacate an injunction granted by a justice of this court, during the pendency of the action.
The action was brought by a taxpayer of the town of Oswegat•chie against the defendant, the Berlin "Iron Bridge Company, to restrain it from constructing a bridge under a contract made with the defendant Joseph Wagner as commissioner of highways of that town, alleged to have been made in pursuance of authority given at a special town meeting of that town.
The complaint among other things charges that the defendant Wagner claims to have entered into a contract, as commissioner of highways, with the Iron Bridge Company to tear down the old bridge at Eel Weir Rapids in the town of Oswegatchie and construct a new bridge in its place for the sum of $9,200. It also charged that Wagner had no right to enter into such contract and that it was entered into for the purpose of cheating and defrauding the taxpayers of the town. It also set out what is claimed by the plaintiff to have been the action of the special town meeting.
Upon the complaints and affidavits of several persons purporting to set forth what occurred at the special town meeting, a temporary injunction was granted. The defendants answered separately and thereafter moved upon the answers and affidavits at a special term to vacate the temporary injunction, which motion was denied, and from the order denying the same the defendants appeal.
A. D. Wales, for Iron Company : Georqe R. Malbv, for Wagner : D. ifagone, for resp’t.

Opinion:
Landon, J.
The petition of the eighteen electors and freeholders of the town requesting the town cleric to call the special town meeting "pursuant to chap. 259, Laws 1886, for the purpose of raising and appropriating the necessary money to maintain the bridge," the call of the town cleric in pursuance thereof specifying the same purpose, and stating that " a resolution will be offered at said special town meeting to raise a sum not exceeding $10,000," the form of the ballots used in voting, being either " for " or " against " " the resolution to raise $10,000, or so much thereof as may be required to build the Eel Weir bridge," the fact that the ballots were printed, indicate too clearly, I think, to be misunderstood that the purpose of the meeting was to vote upon the question of appropriating a sum not exceeding $10,000 to maintain the bridge, and that it was understood that the resolution was as indicated in the call of the town clerk.
The plaintiff's affidavit is to the effect that before balloting commenced the resolution was offered to apply to the board of supervisors for an act authorizing the borrowing of money to build the bridge and appointing commissioners to construct it; that some discussion followed, and was closed by the remark of Mr. Wilson that it was better to ascertain whether the people desired the bridge to be built and to make an appropriation for it before commissioners should be appointed. Wilson then moved that the meeting proceed to ballot; that thereupon the meeting did proceed to bal lot, using the printed ballots, which of course had been already prepared. The polls opened at one o'clock, and the balloting con • tinned until half-past three, when it was on motion suspended and the resolution respecting the application to the supervisors Was amended and adopted by a viva voce vote. The plaintiff does not state whether the balloting was resumed ; the polls closed at four o'clock. Now, on the plaintiff's statement and its corroboration by the affidavit of the learned counsel, it is apparent that the balloting was upon the resolution indicated both in the town clerk's notice and in the ballots themselves; and Mr. Wilson's motion obviously referred to it, and was not upon the resolution to apply to the supervisors. If it is true that no other written resolution was offered except the one to apply to the supervisors, the inference that the balloting must have been upon that resolution or not upon any, is plainly erroneous. The balloting was nearly if not wholly finished before the meeting took the viva voce vote on the written resolution, and no other -vote was taken upon it. Such being the case, the commissioner of highways was authorized to make the contract with the defendant, as we held in Berlin Iron Bridge Co. v. Wagner, 57 Hun, 346; 32 St. Rep., 407. The charge of fraud in making that contract is not supported. The subsequent action of the board of supervisors could not impair the contract or deprive the defendant of his right to proceed under it. Hence the order denying motion to vacate the injunction should be reversed.
The power of the electors at such special town meeting to make an appropriation of $10,000 is again questioned, notwithstanding our decision above cited, but as it is alleged that that case was collusively agreed upon1 in the interest of this defendant, it is proper to re-examine the question.
Referring to the opinion in 57 Hun, 346, it may be added to what is there said, that the $250 to be raised under the Revised Statutes is to be raised upon the commissioner of highways delivering a statement to that effect to the supervisor ; the $250 additional provided for by chapter 274, Laws of 1832, the commissioner of highways must apply for in open town meeting; the additional $750, authorized by chapter 615, Laws 1857, he must apply for in like manner. The " open town meeting " means the annual town meeting. Special town meetings as authorized by 1 R. S., 341, § 7, before the. amendment made by chapter 259, Laws 1886, under which amendment this special town meeting was expressly called, were not authorized to be held for the purpose of voting upon " the question of raising and appropriating moneys for the construction and maintenance of any bridge or bridges."
The methods already existing provided for raising the sums above specified. This amendment contemplated additional moneys to meet emergencies. It would be idle to authorize a special town meeting to vote upon such a question if the vote was inefficient. And it may be added that such a power harmonizes with our system of local self government. It is much better that those who vote the debt should pay it than foist it upon posterity by means of a loan to be authorized by the board of supervisors pursuant to chap. 482, Laws of 1875, and amendatory acts, especially chap. 451, Laws of 1885, under which the board of supervisors in this case assumed to act. If the town do not wish to borrow the money in the first instance, it need not apply to the board of supervisors. It can, by its own vote, authorize the raising and appropriating of the money. The powers given to the board of supervisors to authorize and provide for the erection of bridges do not take away the powers vested in the commissioner of highways for that purpose. Huggans v. Riley, 125 N. Y., 88; 84 St. Rep., 458. And it is manifest that the authority vested in the board of supervisors to enable the- town to borrow money to build a bridge, or to pay the debt it has already incurred in building it, does not conflict with the power vested in the town to provide for building it by its highway commissioner without borrowing, or for paying for it after it has been built in the ordinary way of paying town charges. I think the subsequent proceedings which resulted in an act of the board of supervisors, the appointment of commissioners and a contract for' the building this bridge by the King Bridge Company were regular, but were taken under a misapprehension as to the validity, of the contract with the Berlin Company.' I advise, therefore, that the reversal of this order be without prejudice to any remedy the King Company may be advised to damages.
Learned, P. J., concurs.