Case Name: JOHN B. SIMPSON, Administrator, etc., of GEORGE B. SIMPSON, Deceased, Respondent, v. ALEXANDER McKAY and others, Appellants; ALEXANDER McKAY and ROBERT McKAY, Appellants, v. JOHN B. SIMPSON as Administrator, etc., and GEORGE McKAY, as Administrator, etc., of ANDREW McKAY, Deceased, Respondents
Court: New York Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1874-12
Citations: 10 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 316
Docket Number: 
Parties: JOHN B. SIMPSON, Administrator, etc., of GEORGE B. SIMPSON, Deceased, Respondent, v. ALEXANDER McKAY and others, Appellants. ALEXANDER McKAY and ROBERT McKAY, Appellants, v. JOHN B. SIMPSON as Administrator, etc., and GEORGE McKAY, as Administrator, etc., of ANDREW McKAY, Deceased, Respondents.
Judges: 
Reporter: Supreme Court Reports (Hun)
Volume: 10
Pages: 316–323

Head Matter:
JOHN B. SIMPSON, Administrator, etc., of GEORGE B. SIMPSON, Deceased, Respondent, v. ALEXANDER McKAY and others, Appellants. ALEXANDER McKAY and ROBERT McKAY, Appellants, v. JOHN B. SIMPSON as Administrator, etc., and GEORGE McKAY, as Administrator, etc., of ANDREW McKAY, Deceased, Respondents.
Decision—after twenty-one years—not reversed on technical grounds—party seeking review must establish error—Declarations of former owner of personal property— incompetent as to assignee.
After the expiration of twenty-ono years from the making of a decision, the court will hesitate to reverse it for technical errors.
In such case, where the party seeking a review of such decision, has first alleged its making in his complaint, and then, on affidavits stating that he could prove the contrary of the facts therein found, obtains leave of the court to strike such allegations out of his complaint, the burden rests upon him to show it to be erroneous. (Countryman, J., dissenting.)
The declarations of a former owner of personal property áre incompetent evidence for any purpose as against all others except himself and his immediate representatives. (Countryman, J.)
The first action was brought in the late Court of Chancery for the foreclosure of a mortgage, and the principal defense was that the plaintiff’s intestate was not the owner of it. Judgment directing an accounting and of foreclosure was directed, but no judgment or order was ever entered.
The second action was a cross suit brought to obtain the allowance of certain set-offs and payments upon the mortgage, the com- . plaint therein alleging the decision made in the first action ; and issue was joined" therein. Thereafter a stipulation was made by the attorneys in both suits, and an order entered, that judgment should be entered in the first suit for the sum apparently due, “ to stand as security,” without prejudice to the continuing of that suit, so far as the accounting was concerned, and that both suits be heard and decided together.
The trial took place before a referee who rejected evidence offered by the McKays, to show that the plaintiff’s intestate was not the owner of the mortgage, The McKays applied to Special Term for a modification of the order entered on the stipulation, so as to refer to the referee the issue as to the assignment of the mortgage. The Special Term struck out the allegations of the complaint in the cross suit, averring that the General Term had decreed the forech> sure, and that the mortgage had been assigned to the plaintiff’s intestate therein. The referee and parties thereafter acted upon the theory that the whole issues in each case were referred to the referee “ to hear and determine.” The referee affirmed the decision of the General Term on the main question, and rejected all the set-offs and payments which were attempted to be applied upon the judgment. From the judgment entered upon this report the McKays appealed. A very full statement of facts in this case appears in Judge Countryman’s dissenting opinion.
E. W. Paige, for the appellants.
Henry Smith, for the respondents.

Opinion:
Landon, J.:
I am of opinion that the errors of the referee in the reception of evidence discussed by my brother Countryman, were immaterial for these reasons: It sufficiently appears from the opinion
of Justice Allen, that, in 1853, the General Term decided upon the evidence taken in the original action, that Andrew McKay did transfer and deliver the bond and mortgage to George B. Simpson. That although no formal judgment can be proved to have been entered to that effect, the McKays, plaintiffs in the cross action, by their complaint, whicli they verified in 1855, only two years after the decision was made, and when they and their counsel must have remembered the fact, not only admitted, but alleged the fact to be, that such decision had been made, and manifestly brought their cross action partly because it had been made. And, although, in 1861, forty-two years after George B. Simpson's death, and upon discovering that such judgment could not be found, they obtained an order from the Special Term permitting them to strike such allegation from then- complaint, they procured such order upon affidavit that they could prove that such transfer had not been made; yet, under the circumstances, it seems to me just that such order should not be construed as opening the question of transfer further than to permit the McKays to make good their affirmation, to wit: that they could disprove the transfer; thus putting the burden upon them to impeach the decision of the General Term, which, upon the evidence, they must be held not to have done.
After the lapse of so many years from the decision of that General Term, it seems but just that Simpson should be permitted to invoke the repose of time upon its conclusiveness and freedom from technical errors. The learned counsel for the McKays insists that in some way they should be permitted to review that decision, and that they have never had the opportunity afforded them, until this appeal, to do so. Be that as it may, it seems to me that when the McKays, in 1855, commenced their cross action and swore to their complaint, they were willing to accept that decision as a finality. If they have since changed their minds, the change is too late. To review a finding twenty-one years after it is made, and reverse it for technical errors, is of very doubtful propriety.
I advise an affirmance of the judgment.
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