Case Name: Henry B. Blanchard et al., Ex'rs, App'lts, v. Susan Jefferson, Individually and as Ex'rx, Resp't
Court: New York Supreme Court, General Term
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1892-02-18
Citations: 43 N.Y. St. Rep. 799
Docket Number: 
Parties: Henry B. Blanchard et al., Ex’rs, App’lts, v. Susan Jefferson, Individually and as Ex’rx, Resp’t.
Judges: 
Reporter: New York State Reporter
Volume: 43
Pages: 799–800

Head Matter:
Henry B. Blanchard et al., Ex’rs, App’lts, v. Susan Jefferson, Individually and as Ex’rx, Resp’t.
(Supreme Court, General Term, First Department,
Filed February 18, 1892.)
1. Pleading—Complaint—Separate statement op causes.
A complaint alleged the dissolution and settlement of accounts of a partnership and that the balance found due to plaintiff’s testator remained on deposit as a loan to defendant, and that subsequently testator was. employed by defendant; that various sums were paid, and that a certain sum remained due. Meld, that the complaint stated two causes of action, one for money loaned and one for salary, and that they should be separately stated and numbered.
2. Same—Demand.
It is entirely competent, after stating two separate and distinct causes of action, for the plaintiff to allege that there was paid thereon from time to time an amount which can be specified, and that there is balance due thereon.
Appeal from order of the special term requiring the plaintiffs, to make their complaint more definite and certain.
O. M. Pinney, Jr., for app’lts; O. P. Oheever, for resp’t.

Opinion:
O'Brien, J.
The complaint alleges that the defendant and plaintiff's testator entered into a copartnership in 1874, and that the copartnership was continued until January, 1881, when it was dissolved by mutual consent, and upon the date of the dissolution the accounts between the copartners were settled and balanced, and there was due the plaintiff's testator $14,651.92 from said copartnership, and that it was agreed between the defefidant and plaintiff's testator that such balance should remain on deposit in the business and as a loan to the defendant at the legal rate of interest.
The complaint further alleges that thereafter the plaintiff's testator was employed by the defendant at a salary of $3,000 per annum, and that from time to time various amounts were paid to-plaintiff's testator on account of said salary and on account of his said deposit until 1887, since which time no payments have been made, and that there is due for and on account of said deposit and said loan the sum of $16,845.06.
Upon this motion to make the complaint more definite and certain by separately stating and numbering the facts constituting each cause of action set forth in the complaint, the order appealed from was made, requiring the plaintiff " to make the complaint more definite and certain by separately stating and numbering the facts constituting each cause of action set forth in said complaint, and alleging and stating the amount paid-by the defendant for and on account of each cause of action and the amount claimed by the plaintiffs for and by reason of each cause of action alleged in said complaint."
The question presented upon this appeal is necessarily dependent upon one or the other of two views we may take as to whether the complaint states one or two causes of action.
If the appellant's contention is correct, that but one cause of .-action is set forth, namely, an action for an accounting, then the order appealed from should not have been made.
We do not think, however, that the complaint can be so construed. It seems to us that the complaint contains two causes of action, one for an alleged balance claimed to be due upon the dissolution of the copartnership, which was deposited with the defendant as a .loan, and the other for salary claimed to be due said plaintiff's -testator on a contract of employment after the dissolution of the copartnership.
These two causes of action are independent, distinct and separable. They did not arise out of the same contract or transaction, but each arose out of separate, distinct and independent acts and contracts.
One cause of action is purely for money loaned and the other for salary under a contract of employment.
If our construction of the complaint is right, it would follow under § 483 of the Code that the facts constituting each cause of •action should be separately stated and numbered.
So much, therefore, of the. order as requires this should be -affirmed. But the remainder" of the order, which requires that the complaint should allege and state the amount paid by the defendant for and on account of each cause of action, and the amount claimed by the plaintiff for and by reason of' each cause of action alleged in said complaint, should be reversed for the reason that it is entirely competent, after stating two separate and distinct causes of action, for the plaintiff to allege that there was paid thereon from time to time an amount which can be specified,' and that "there is a balance due thereon as claimed in the complaint.
That this form of pleading is correct is shown by the facts appearing that the amounts due upon these two several causes of •action were from time to time lessened by payments made thereon "which were not appropriated by either "the debtor or creditor to either claim in particular, so that it would be impossible for the plaintiff to state just what amounts were paid on one or the other of these claims. -
It would appear that credit was given the plaintiff by the deiendant for the amount of both claims and from time to time as moneys were paid they were debited against the credit thus created and the balance held as the amount due plaintiff upon both claims.
The order appealed from should be modified accordingly, without costs to either party on this appeal.
Van Brunt, P. J., and Patterson, J., concur.