Case Name: CASTLEWOOD INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION, etc., et al., Petitioners, v. Dianne LaFLEUR and Edward LaFleur, Respondents
Court: Florida Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1975-10-29
Citations: 322 So. 2d 520
Docket Number: No. 45640
Parties: CASTLEWOOD INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION, etc., et al., Petitioners, v. Dianne LaFLEUR and Edward LaFleur, Respondents.
Judges: ADKINS, C. J., ROBERTS, J., and CHAPPELL and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges, concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 322
Pages: 520–524

Head Matter:
CASTLEWOOD INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION, etc., et al., Petitioners, v. Dianne LaFLEUR and Edward LaFleur, Respondents.
No. 45640.
Supreme Court of Florida.
Oct. 29, 1975.
Rehearing Denied Jan. 22, 1976.
Thomas E. Scott, Jr., of Bradford, Williams, McKay, Kimbrell, Hamann & Jennings, Miami, for petitioners.
Irma V. Hernandez, of Sepler & Suss-man, Hialeah, for respondents.
Editor’s Note: The decision in Blackhawk Heating & Plumbing Co., Inc. v. Data Lease Finnacial Corp., published in the advance sheets at this citation (322 So.2d 520) was withdrawn from the bound volume at the request of the Supreme Court and will be republished.

Opinion:
ENGLAND, Justice.
By petition for a writ of certiorari brought under Fla.Const. art. V, § 3(b)(3), we are asked to review a decision of the Third District Court of Appeal, reported at 294 So.2d 21, which is allegedly in conflict with prior appellate decisions of Florida. The requisite conflict exists between the decision below and Cloud v. Fallís, 110 So.2d 669 (Fla.1959), and certiorari is granted.
On the merits, we find that the district court erroneously reversed the trial court's order directing a new trial on the issue of punitive damages, by failing to apply the rule of law enunciated in Cloud. For that reason we vacate the decision below and direct the court to reinstate the: trial court's order requiring a new trial on that issue.
This matter was tried on a complaint which alleged intentional assault and battery, negligence, and wanton and willful misconduct by the individual defendant, Holland, in the course of his employment for the corporate defendant Castlewood. The latter allegation would form the basis for imposing punitive damages if appropriate evidence were adduced, and there is no controversy between the parties as to the legality of having submitted that issue to the jury in this case. The basic facts giving rise to the controversy, which are set forth in the opinion below, are unnecessary for our determination. In this Court the sole controversy is whether the trial court was correct in granting a motion for new trial on the issue of punitive damages after the jury had awarded both compensatory and punitive damages against the defendants.
At the close of defendant's case the trial judge charged the jury, in accordance with the requests of the parties, on the legal requirements for liability and for damages. In this there was admittedly no error. On his own, however, the trial judge also charged the jury as to the legal definition of "gross negligence", although that issue was not an element of the case. The jury charges were presented in "standard" sequence, based on the numerical chronology of Standard Jury Instructions as adopted by this Court in 198 So.2d 319 (Fla.1967). The sequence of instructions was a definition of mere negligence, a definition of gross negligence, an explanation of the damages recoverable for negligence, a definition of willful and wanton negligence, and an explanation of the damages recoverable for that conduct.
After jury verdicts had been received, a hearing was held on defendants' motion and the court ordered a new trial on the issue of punitive damages. The order states that harmful error was committed by giving two gross negligence charges to the jury, and that defendants did not have a fair trial on that issue. The Third District Court of Appeal disagreed and reversed the order, stating they did not believe the jury was confused. In that, the district court erred.
Since at least 1962, it has been the law of Florida that a trial court's discretion to grant a new trial is "of such firmness that it would not be disturbed except on clear showing of abuse . . . ." Cloud v. Fallis, 110 So.2d 669, 672 (Fla.1959). A heavy burden rests on appellants who seek to overturn such a ruling, and any abuse of discretion must be patent from the record. See Hendricks v. Dailey, 208 So.2d 101, 103 (Fla.1968); Russo v. Clark, 147 So.2d 1, 3-4 (Fla.1962). The required showing is more difficult in this case because, unlike other cases, the prejudicial error which required a new trial was injected into the case by the judge himself. Under these circumstances his view of the need for corrective action should be accorded additional weight.
In this case there is no suggestion of abuse by the district court, and our independent review of the record discloses none. Mere disagreement from an appellate perspective is insufficient as a matter of law to overturn a trial court on the need for a new trial. The trial judge "was in a much better position than an appellate court to pass on the ultimate correctness of the jury's verdict." Pyms v. Meranda, 98 So.2d 341, 343 (Fla.1957).
The opinion below is vacated, and the Third District Court of Appeal is directed to reinstate the trial court's order for a new trial on the issue of punitive damages.
ADKINS, C. J., ROBERTS, J., and CHAPPELL and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges, concur.
OVERTON, J., concurs with an opinion.
. As a basis for our jurisdiction petitioner has alleged that the opinion below conflicts with established principles of Florida law which recognize three levels of negligent conduct, and which distinguish between second level "gross negligence" and third level "willful and wanton negligence". E. g., Carraway v. Revell, 116 So.2d 16 (Fla.1959); Florida Southern Ry. v. Hirst, 30 Fla. 1, 11 So. 506 (1892). No conflict is present because the district court only ruled that the jury was not confused beyond understanding by the trial court's charges on gross negligence.
. Indeed, a stronger showing is required to upset an order granting a trial than is required for an order denying a new trial. Cloud v. Fallis, 110 So.2d 669, 673 (Fla.1959).
. This is equally true whether error arises during the conduct of the trial or out of the judge's charges to the jury. Charges to a jury are the legal heartbeat of the case, being all that the jury has by which to assess the facts. Rodriguez v. Gonzalez, 157 So.2d 848, 851 (2d Dist.Ct.App.Fla.1963), cert. denied, 165 So.2d 463 (Fla.1964). It is virtually impossible for an appellate court to know whether a jury was misled or confused by an admixture of erroneous and proper jury charges. Cf., McCullum v. Florida Power & Light Co., 125 So.2d 754, 755 (3d Dist.Ct.App.Fla.1961), aff'd, 140 So.2d 569 (Fla.1962).