Case Name: GREENWOOD v. ROMBY et al.
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1950-11-02
Citations: 51 So. 2d 859
Docket Number: No. 7565
Parties: GREENWOOD v. ROMBY et al.
Judges: HARDY, J., dissents, adhering to' the opinion on original hearing.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 51
Pages: 859–863

Head Matter:
GREENWOOD v. ROMBY et al.
No. 7565.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Second Circuit.
Nov. 2, 1950.
On Rehearing April 5, 1951.
Rehearing Denied April 27, 1951.
Ja'ckson & Mayer, Shreveport, for appellant.
Blanchard, Goldstein, Walker & O’Quin, John A. Dykes, Shreveport, for appellee.

Opinion:
HARDY, Judge.
This is a suit for property damage sustained by an automobile owned by plaintiff. Defendant, after denying negligence and liability, reconvened for damages sustained by his automobile. After trial there was judgment in favor of plaintiff, which judgment rejected defendant's reconventional demand. Defendant has appealed and plaintiff has answered the appeal seeking an increase in the judgment.
The accident which is the 'cause of this litigation occurred at the intersection of Milam Street and Pierre Avenue in the City of Shreveport about 11:30 P. M. on June 25, 1949. A taxi cab owned by plaintiff and driven by his employee, A. A. Woods, in the course and scope of his employment, was proceeding north on Pierre Avenue and collided with defendant's automobile, which was being driven east on Milam Street, as the result of which the two vehicles sustained the damages for which the respective parties seek redress. Plaintiff alleged that defendant was operating his automobile in a careless and reckless manner, at an excessive rate of speed, against a red light, and that he further failed to keep a proper lookout and was operating a vehicle with a defective accelerator. Defendant, denying plaintiff's allegations of negligence, countered with certain 'charges of negligence against the driver of plaintiff's vehicle in proceeding at a reckless and careless rate of 'speed, failing to maintain ¡a lookout, and failure to recognize defendant's right-of-way and preemption of the intersection.
Both plaintiff and defendant testified that their respective entrances into the intersection were made on a green light signal and on this point there is a sharp conflict not only between the testimony of the principals involved but in that of the other witnesses. However, we incline to the belief that the testimony in favor of plaintiff preponderates, and, accordingly, it must be concluded as a matter of fact that the defendant, Romby, entered the intersection against a red light. This conclusion definitely establishes negligence on the part of defendant, which unquestionably was a cause of the resulting collision.
There remains for consideration the question of the existence of contributory negligence on the part of the driver.of the plaintiff's taxicab. On this point we think the testimony of the driver of plaintiffs' vehicle in itself is- sufficient to justify a conclusion. This witness testified on direct examination:
"I didn't see the Negro (defendant) in time to stop, and knew I couldn't miss him."

- "Q. When did you first see the other vehicle? A. I seen' him just before he hit me."
Despite this testimony the witness insisted that defendant was driving at a speed of around 30 miles an hour.
It is obvious in the light of the above quoted testimony that plaintiff was not keeping a proper lookout as he entered the intersection and did not see what he could and should have seen, namely, the approach of defendant's automobile and its-progress across the intersection in the path of the witness' car.
The physical facts indicate beyond question that defendant had almost cleared the intersection when his automobile was struck in the vicinity of the right rear fender and bumper by the front of plaintiff's car. This circumstance in itself is. sufficient to establish the fact that defendant had not only preempted but indeed had almost cleared the intersection. If plaintiff had been maintaining any sort of reasonable lookout he could have observed the approach of defendant's car in time to> have taken precautionary measures in the attempt to avoid an accident.
It is strenuously urged in behalf of' plaintiff that his driver had the right-of-way by reason of the green signal light,, and, as a consequence, was justified in' assuming the way to be clear and proceeding, into the intersection. Unfortunately for-this contention we do not think the law favors such a conclusion. The rule established by our jurisprudence is completely-in accord with the principle stated in Blashfield's Cyclopedia of Automobile Law- and Practice, Section 686, as follows: " traffic signal lights do not relieve a motorist of the general duty to operate his car with a careful -and prudent regard for the safety of others, -and he cannot ordinarily assume that an intersection is-clear simply .because of appearance of-green traffic signal lights."
This rule was succinctly and convincingly stated by Judge Taliaferro in Thomas v. Leonard Truck Lines, La.App., 7 So.2d 753, 755, in these words: "Because a person has the right-of-way on a road or street does not vest him with the privilege of going forward regardless of traffic conditions. A motorist's duty to be careful never ceases."
A situation very similar to the facts before us was presented in the case of Lindsay v. Shreveport Laundries, La.App., 43 So.2d 921, 922. Plaintiff was held to have been negligent by reason of his failure to observe the changing traffic light and in bringing his vehicle into the intersection either against a red light or a caution light. But we further found that defendant, who had reconvened for damages, was guilty of concurrent negligence for the reason which we expressed in these words: "True, the driver of defendant's truck did not undertake to cross the intersection until traffic was accorded the right of way. Nevertheless, since his view to his left was obscured by another truck, we think he is chargeable with the responsibility of proceeding with extreme caution until he could have made clear observation to the east along Jordan Street."
For the reasons set forth we can only conclude that the accident was the result of the concurrent negligence of both the driver of plaintiff's taxicab and the defendant.
Defendant has urged the doctrine of last clear chance, which, however, we do not perceive to be applicable under our comprehension of the facts in the instant case.
For the reasons assigned the judgment appealed from is amended to the extent of rejecting plaintiff's claims, and, as amended, is affirmed. All costs are assessed equally against plaintiff and defendant.