Case Name: INTRACOASTAL TRANSPORTATION, INC., and Anderson Marine Construction, Inc., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. DECATUR COUNTY, GEORGIA, et al., Defendants, Department of Transportation, Defendant-Appellant
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 1973-06-29
Citations: 482 F.2d 361
Docket Number: No. 72-2700
Parties: INTRACOASTAL TRANSPORTATION, INC., and Anderson Marine Construction, Inc., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. DECATUR COUNTY, GEORGIA, et al., Defendants, Department of Transportation, Defendant-Appellant.
Judges: 
Reporter: Federal Reporter 2d Series
Volume: 482
Pages: 361–372

Head Matter:
INTRACOASTAL TRANSPORTATION, INC., and Anderson Marine Construction, Inc., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. DECATUR COUNTY, GEORGIA, et al., Defendants, Department of Transportation, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 72-2700.
United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.
June 29, 1973.
Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc Denied Aug. 28, 1973.
William B. Brown, Asst. Atty. Gen., Arthur K. Bolton, Atty. Gen., Harold N. Hill, Executive Asst. Atty. Gen., Marion O. Gordon, Asst. Atty. Gen., Atlanta, Ga., for defendant-appellant.
Ben Kirbo, Bainbridge, Ga., for plaintiffs-appellees.
Harold Lambert, Bainbridge, Ga., for Decatur County.
Before WISDOM, GEWIN and COLEMAN, Circuit Judges.

Opinion:
GEWIN, Circuit Judge:
In this admiralty action, the State of Georgia appeals pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) from the district court's denial of its motion to dismiss on the grounds of sovereign immunity. After a careful review of the applicable law, we conclude that Georgia was entitled to avail itself of the sovereign immunity defense, and therefore reverse.
The facts giving rise to the present controversy are not in dispute and may be summarized with brevity. Decatur County, Georgia, and the Georgia Department of Transportation are the alleged owners and operators of a drawbridge across the Flint River, a navigable waterway which flows through Decatur County. The appellees instituted the present action alleging that as a result of the negligent operation of the drawbridge they had suffered considerable damages. Georgia then filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of sovereign immunity asserting that it had not consented to the suit. Georgia bases its defense on the eleventh amendment to the United States Constitution.
The appellees countered that the Flint River was a navigable waterway and structures built over it were subject to federal regulation. They asserted that Georgia waived the defense of sovereign immunity by entering this federally regulated sphere of activity. The district court denied Georgia's motion to dismiss and we now review the propriety of that ruling.
We begin with the general observation that in a suit in admiralty, a state is entitled to the defense of sovereign immunity granted by the eleventh amendment. The Supreme Court has stated:
We repeat, the immunity of a state from suit in personam in the admiralty, brought by a private citizen without its consent, is clear.
The appellees argue, however, that Georgia has impliedly consented to this suit by building a bridge over a navigable waterway, which is subject to plenary control by federal statutes.
Appellees place primary reliance on Parden v. Terminal Railway of the Alabama State Docks Department. In Par- den, railroad employees sued an Alabama owned railroad under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, for injuries resulting from their employment. Alabama contended that it was entitled to sovereign immunity under the eleventh amendment. The Court rejected Alabama's claim, stating:
A State's immunity from suit by an individual without its consent has been fully recognized by the Eleventh Amendment and by subsequent decisions of this Court. But when a State leaves the sphere that is exclusively its own and enters into activities subject to congressional regulation, it subjects itself to that regulation as fully as if it were a private person or corporation.
Appellees claim that their suit against Georgia falls within the Parden waiver exception to the sovereign immunity doctrine. We cannot agree with this conclusion.
A superficial reading of the Parden decision might lead one to the conclusion which appellees wish to have us adopt. Distilled to its basic holding, Parden stands for the proposition that a State impliedly waives its sovereign immunity defense when it: (1) enters a field which is regulated by federal statute; and, (2) Congress has specifically created a remedy in private parties for the violation of the applicable federal regulatory statute.
At least one circuit has upheld a state's sovereign immunity defense even where Congress has created a private cause of action under a federal regulatory scheme. See, Employees of the Department of Public Health & Welfare v. Department of Public Health & Welfare, State of Missouri, 452 F.2d 820 (8th Cir. 1971) (en banc). The Eighth Circuit rejected a simplistic reading of the Parden decision, correctly recognizing that many policy considerations must be weighed before a State can be said to have "waived" its immunity by conducting activities subject to federal regulation. The Employees case involved an action by state hospital workers against Missouri for overtime compensation provided by the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq.
The hospital workers based their waiver claim on 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) which created a private cause of action for an employer's violation of the FLSA's applicable substantive provisions. By a 1966 amendment to the Act, Congress subjected state hospitals to the overtime provisions of the Act. 29 U.S. C. § 203(s)(4). The Eighth Circuit rejected the argument that Missouri had waived its sovereign immunity defense by operating hospitals subject to the overtime provisions of the Act and in face of the provision in the act which created a private cause of action for employees whose employers violated the overtime provisions of the Act.
Certiorari was granted and the Supreme Court in an opinion by Mr. Justice Douglas, affirmed. The Court carefully distinguished the Parden decision. Whereas in Parden, Alabama began operation of a railroad twenty years after the enactment of the Federal Employers' Liability Act, 45 U.S.C- § 51-60, the state of Missouri had operated hospitals long before the enactment of the 1966 amendment which subjected them to the FLSA's overtime provisions.
Moreover, the Court was concerned with the effect a holding of implied waiver would have on the Viability of the eleventh amendment. The Court noted that it is one thing to subject a State to suit when it enters into the rather unusual activity of operating a railroad "for profit" but quite another when the State operates a hospital which is widely recognized as a proper state function if not a compelled duty. All States operate hospitals and the burden created by holding a State amenable to private suits would have a greater impact on the financial resources of states than the particularly limited holding of Parden. This problem was accentuated by the fact that the Act provided for double recovery and attorney's fees for the successful private litigants.
Apparently the crucial factor which must have weighed most heavily in the Court's reasoning was the absence of any express intent by Congress to subject the States to private suits. In face of the express limitations on a federal court's jurisdiction by the eleventh amendment, the court refused to expand the implied waiver theory or even entertain such a sensitive constitutional issue, without at least an express congressional provision which made a State amenable to such a suit. Justice Douglas stated:
It is not easy to infer that Congress in legislating pursuant to the Commerce Clause, which has grown to vast proportions in its applications, desired silently to deprive the States of an immunity they have long enjoyed under another part of the Constitution. Thus, we cannot conclude that Congress conditioned the operation of these facilities on the forfeiture of immunity from suit in a federal forum. 411 U.S. at 285, 93 S.Ct. at 1618.

But we decline to extend Parden to cover every exercise by Congress of its commerce power, where the purpose of Congress to give force to the Supremacy Clause by lifting the sovereignty of the States and putting the States on the same footing as other employers is not clear. 411 U.S. 286, 93 S.Ct. at 1619.
Thus, the Employees decision added an additional requirement to the Parden test for determining whether a private party may successfully invoke a federal court's jurisdiction in his suit against a State. It is no longer sufficient merely to show that a State has entered a federally regulated sphere of activity and that a private cause of action is created for violating the applicable federal provision, but in addition the private litigant must show that Congress expressly provided that the private remedy is applicable to the States.
It is apparent that appellees have met the first requirement of Par-den because Georgia has entered a field of activity extensively regulated by federal statute. However a careful reading of the "Bridge Act of 1906" compels us to conclude that Congress did not create a cause of action in private parties for a violation of the Act's standards. The act is penal in nature and enforcement of its provisions is vested in the Attorney General.
We cannot concur in the result reached by the Fourth Circuit in Chesapeake Bay Bridge & Tunnel District v. Lauritzen, where the court held that the Act did create a cause of action in private parties. We feel that a careful reading of the cases relied upon will not sustain the conclusion reached by that court, particularly in view of the recent Supreme Court decision in the Employees case.
The conclusion reached today is in accord with recent pronouncements of this Court. We have previously stated that:
Further we do not deem a mere entry into an area regulated by international treaty as an automatic waiver of sovereign immunity. As long as the sovereign immunity claim does not prevent federal relief which would otherwise be attainable, we see no virtue in invoking federal jurisdiction. Here no relief is possible because no discrimination is evidenced.
The "Bridge Act of 1906" does not create a cause of action in private parties and hence sustaining the state's claim to sovereign immunity will not deny appel-lees relief to which they would otherwise be entitled.
The order of the district court is reversed, and the cause remanded to that court with directions to dismiss appel-lees' complaint against the Georgia Department of Transportation.
Reversed and remanded with directions.
. At the outset it should be noted that this appeal deals exclusively with the Georgia Department of Transportation. There is no dispute that the Department of Transportation is the alter ego of the State of Georgia. See, Tounsel v. State Highway Department, 180 Ga. 112, 116, 178 S.E. 285 (1934). The propriety of the suit against Decatur County, Georgia, is not before this court. See, County of Lincoln v. Luning, 133 U.S. 529, 530, 10 S.Ct. 363, 33 L.Ed. 766 (1890).
Thus, the dissent's conclusion that we have foreclosed all avenues of relief to the appellees is completely erroneous. We assume that on remand, appellees will be permitted to pursue whatever remedies under common law negligence are open to them against the county. In such event, as we recognize later in this opinion, the standards of care established by the Bridge Act of 1906, 33 U.S.C. § 491 et seq. may be utilized when an otherwise suable party is involved.
The appellees have placed in proper focus the issue before this court:
The sole issue before this Court is one of jurisdiction. It is Defendant's [Georgia's] contention that this Court has no jurisdiction because of sovereign immunity. It is Plaintiffs' contention that Defendant, by the operation and maintenance of a drawbridge over a navigable waterway of the United States, has waived sovereign immunity and thus the Court does have jurisdiction. The question then boils down to whether or not there has been a waiver of sovereign immunity. Appel-lees' Brief at 2-3.
We thus address ourselves to this "boiled down" issue.
. Jurisdiction is based on 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (admiralty). Apparently appellee's tug and barge had no difficulty in moving under the bridge on their trip upstream. On March 5, 1971, after receiving heavy cargo, the tug and barge arrived upstream of the bridge on their return trip. It being the rainy season, the waters of the FI it River had risen to sucli an extent t' it the tug could not pass beneath the b ;. After notice was given by the tug, t s bridge was not raised for twenty-six days because it had been paved over by the state. On oral argument counsel for both parties informed the court that the bridge had not been opened for a long time, perhaps 40 years. The court was also informed that the bridge has now been officially closed and a new bridge will be constructed.
. U.S.Const. amend. XI: "The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State."
. See, Bridge Act of 1906, 33 U.S.C. § 491 et seq., which establishes standards for bridges over navigable waters.
. Ex parte State of New York No. 1, 256 U.S. 490, 500, 41 S.Ct. 588, 590, 65 L.Ed. 1057 (1921); Ex parte Madrazzo, 32 (7 Pet.) U.S. 627, 8 L.Ed. 808 (1833).
. 377 U.S. 184, 84 S.Ct. 1207, 12 L.Ed.2d 233 (1964).
. 45 U.S.C. § 51-60.
. 377 U.S. at 196, 84 S.Ct. at 1215.
. "Our conclusion is simply that Alabama, when it began operation of an interstate railroad approximately 20 years after enactment of the FELA, necessarily consented to such suit as was authorized by that Act." 377 U.S. at 192, 84 S.Ct. at 1213.
. "Recognition of the congressional power to render a State suable under the FELA does not mean that the immunity doctrine, as embodied in the Eleventh Amendment with respect to citizens of other States . . . is here being overridden. It remains the law that a State may not he sued by an individual without its consent." 377 U.S. at 192, 84 S.Ct. at 1213. See also, Rothstein v. Wyman, 467 F.2d 226, 238 (2d Cir. 1972); Knight v. New York, 443 F.2d 415, 418 (2d Cir. 1971); Red Star Towing & Transportation Co. v. Department of Transportation of New Jersey, 423 F.2d 104, 106 (3d Cir. 1970); Daye v. Pennsylvania, 344 F.Supp. 1337, 1347 (E.D.Pa.1972); Elliot v. Volpe, 328 F.Supp. 831, 834 (D.Mass.1971); Citizen's Committee for the Hudson Valley v. Volpe, 297 F.Supp. 809, 813 (S.D.N.Y.1969); DeLong Corp. v. Oregon State Highway Comm., 233 F.Supp. 7 (D.Or.1964), aff'd, 343 F.2d 911 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 877, 86 S.Ct. 161, 15 L.Ed.2d 119 (1965).
. Employees of the Department of Public Health & Welfare, State of Missouri v. Department of Public Health & Welfare, State of Missouri, 411 U.S. 279, 93 S.Ct. 1614, 36 L.Ed.2d 251 (1973).
. See, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b).
. See also, Hickman v. Idaho State School and Hospital, 339 F.Supp. 463 (D.Idaho 1972); contra, Briggs v. Sagers, 424 F.2d 130 (10th Cir. 1970). For an excellent discussion of the Parden decision, see, Note, Private Suits Against States in the Federal Courts, 33 U.Chi.L.Rev. 331 (1966).
. See 33 U.S.C. § 495. Compare, Bass Angler Sportsman Soc. v. United States Steel Corp., 324 F.Supp. 412 (3 Districts Ala.1971) (consolidated), aff'd per curiam, 447 F.2d 1304 (5th Cir. 1971) (Rivers & Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899, 33 U.S.C. § 401 et seq. does not grant enforcement powers in private parties.)
We are aware that some inroads have been made by this Court in recognizing that a cause of action is vested in private parties by the Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899, 33 U.S.C. § 401 et seq. In Neches Canal Co. v. Miller & Vidor Lumber Co., 24 F.2d 763 (5th Cir. 1928), this Court held that a private party could enjoin another private party who had clearly violated 33 U.S.C. § 401 by building a dam over a navigable waterway without first obtaining the consent of Congress or the approval of the Army Corps of Engineers. However considering the constitutional complexion of the present suit we feel that the Neches Canal decision should properly be limited to the peculiar fact situation presented there.
The suit in Neches Canal was between private parties. None of the defendants there could assert the defense of sovereign immunity granted by the eleventh amendment. There the obstruction, a dam, was placed in the navigable waterway without a license or a permit; thus the acts of the defendants clearly violated 33 U.S.C. § 401. Of course an obvious difference is the fact that Neches Canal involved the Bridges and narbors Act of 1899 while while the present suit was instituted under the Bridges Act of 1906, 33 U.S.C. § 491 et seq.
However more importantly, the court in Neehes Canal merely utilized the applicable standards enacted by Congress to determine whether a court could properly grant the equitable relief there prayed for. The court observed that the plaintiff was an "intended beneficiary" of the congressional enactment and therefore the remedy provided by section 406, an injunction could be maintained by a private party. We receive many equitable considerations which influenced the reasoning of the court that are not present here. See generally, Tatum v. Blackstock, 319 F.2d 397 (5th Cir. 1963) (suit between private litigants).
The instant suit is for damages against a State. We conclude that under the teachings of the Parden and Employees decisions before a State can be held to have implicitly waived its eleventh amendment defense, Congress must have expressly created a remedy in private parties for the violation of the applicable federal regulatory statute. To conclude otherwise would require a finding that the Bridges Act of 1906 created a private cause of action, a statutory interpretation clearly not mandated by its provisions. Further we would have to take an additional step into the murky waters of congressional intent by assuming since Congress "intended" that the appellee be a beneficiary of the substantive prohibitions of the Bridges Act of 1906, this intended remedy is also applicable against a sov-eign State. Such "bootstrap logic" can not withstand the constitutional shield erected by the eleventh amendment.
Additionally, we discern a new approach to a private litigant's attempt to sue a state under federal regulatory acts. Many students of constitutional law often question the purpose and focus of the eleventh amendment in light of several recent court decisions which have made its provisions a shallow and meaningless command. However we are not ready to cast aside the clear meaning of that provision without definite directives from Congress to do so.
Against the unambiguous prohibitions of the eleventh amendment, we deem it constitutionally insufficient for a court merely to conclude that Congress by enacting a federal regulatory scheme implied that a state would be amenable to its provision in a suit by a private party. If Congress wishes a state to be amenable to a private suit then we think it is up to that branch to take the proper action necessary for such a result. We believe it is an improper function of the federal judiciary to whittle away at the scope of a constitutional amendment under the guise of such slogans as "common sense" or "implicit purposes." Common sense tells us that the eleventh amendment has viability today as it did in 1906. Until Congress directs us otherwise, we refuse to do by judicial fiat what is properly within Congress' power to do under the commerce clause.
. 404 F.2d 1001 (4th Cir. 1968); See also, Adams v. Harris County, Texas, 316 F.Supp. 938, 947-949 (S.D.Tex.1970); Contra, Mobile Towing Co. v. M/V Weatherly, 343 F.Supp. 276, 278 (S.D.Ala.1971).
. In denying the immunity defense, the district court in Lauritzen stated:
It is true that the federal navigation regulations do not expressly provide a cause of action for injured parties as does the FELA, [referring to Parden] but such liability is clearly implied. Even though it be conceded that the statutes pertaining to. the protection of navigable waters, 33 U.S.C. § 401 et seq., are penal in nature, it is clear that civil liability may be derived therefrom, both in favor of the United States, United States v. Perma Paving Co., 332 F.2d 754 (2 Cir. 1964), and private parties, Morania Barge No. 140, Inc. v. M. & J. Tracy, Inc., 312 F.2d 78 (2 Cir. 1962), 259 F.Supp. 633, 638 (E.D.Va.1966).
It is clear that the holding in Perma Paving is correct since obviously the defense of sovereign immunity must be denied when the United States seeks to enforce a federal regulatory statute. See, United States v. California, 297 U.S. 175, 56 S.Ct. 421, 80 L.Ed. 567 (1936); Wyandotte Transportation Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 191, 88 S.Ct. 379, 19 L.Ed.2d 407 (1967). However, Morania Barge merely stands for the proposition that the standards established in 33 U.S.C. § 401 et seq., may be used in a suit where independent jurisdiction already exists.
Such circuitous reasoning begs the question and flys in the face of the Parden decision. The conclusion that sovereign immunity has been waived can "only be warranted if exacted by the most express language, or by such overwhelming implication from the text as would leave no room for any other reasonable construetion." Murray v. Wilson Distilling Co., 213 U.S. 151, 171, 29 S.Ct. 458, 464, 53 L.Ed. 742 (1909). A statute will not be construed to limit any of the sovereign's pre-existing rights or privileges without express language to that effect. United States v. UMW, 330 U.S. 258, 272, 67 S.Ct. 677, 91 L.Ed. 884 (1947). It is apparent that Parden and Employees require more than a conclusion that a private cause of action is impliedly created, it mandates that it be created expressly against a State.
In affirming the district court's judgment in Lauritzen, the circuit court stated:
The supplication of the State, and her reception into the Federal domain, meant surrender, pro tanto and pro tempore, of State sovereignty and submission to the paramount overlordship of the United States during the tenancy.
H: *
Congressional regulation allows causes involving activities in and upon the navigable waterways of the Nation to be adjudicated in admiralty. 28 U.S.C. § 1333. Accordingly, we think liability of the Tunnel District to the Danish suitor upon the maritime tort was justiciable in the chosen instant court. 404 F.2d 1003-1004.
Georgia may have subjected itself to the overlordship of the United States when it entered this federally regulated activity, but it is unreasonable to conclude that it likewise subjected itself to suits by private parties.
. Centraal Stikstof Verkoop., N.V. v. Alabama State Docks Dept., 415 F.2d 452, 455 (5th Cir. 1969).
. Our decision is in accord with the conclusion reached by the Third Circuit in Bed Star Towing and Transportation Co. v. Department of Transportation of the State of New Jersey, 423 F.2d 104 (3d Cir. 1970).