Case Name: Squire Andrews, plaintiff in error, vs. The Mayor and Council of Atlanta, defendant in error
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia
Jurisdiction: Georgia
Decision Date: 1872-01
Citations: 45 Ga. 154
Docket Number: 
Parties: Squire Andrews, plaintiff in error, vs. The Mayor and Council of Atlanta, defendant in error.
Judges: 
Reporter: Georgia Reports
Volume: 45
Pages: 154–155

Head Matter:
Squire Andrews, plaintiff in error, vs. The Mayor and Council of Atlanta, defendant in error.
(By two judges.) — 1. A policeman, sworn in by the Mayor of Atlanta, and performing the duties of policeman, though he may not have been elected as prescribed by the Act of Incorporation, is an officer de facto.
2. Where a person is presented, under the city ordinances, for obstructing such an officer in the discharge of his duties, and convicted, and the evidence on the part of the prosecution fully sustained the conviction, this Court will not, as a general rule, interfere. 12th March, 1872.
Municipal Corporations. Officers defacto. Before Judge Hopkins. Fulton Superior Court. April Term, 1871.
Andrews was charged before the Mayor and Council of Atlanta “with interfering with an officer on the 27th day of June, 1871.” What he did is unnecessary; suffice it to say there was sufficient evidence of interference to support a judg ment of guilty. Belcher was the man interfered with. It was admitted that Belcher was only policeman for Schofield’s rolling-mill yard, and kept there by Schofield to keep peace and order; that he was selected, employed and paid by Schofield, but sworn in by the Mayor of Atlanta, but was never elected as a policeman of Atlanta by the Mayor and Council by ballot or otherwise as the city law requires. He was undertaking to remove from the yard a person whom Schofield ordered off aud who refused to go. It seems to have been conceded that said mill was in the city. Andrew’s counsel insisted that he was not guilty, because Belcher was not an officer of the city; that there was no charge of interfering with Belcher “while in discharge of his lawful duty,” and that the evidence was too weak for conviction. He was convicted and sentenced. A certiorari complaining that said conviction was wrong, for the reasons above suggested, was refused. That refusal is assigned as error.
Thrasher & Thrasher, for plaintiff in error.
W. T. Newman, City Attorney, for defendant.
Belcher was defacto officer; 7 John’s R., 549; 5 Ga. R., 244; 30th, 426.

Opinion:
Montgomery, Judge.
Nothing need be added to the judgment in this case as pronounced from the bench. (See head notes.)
Judgment affirmed.