Case Name: HEARD v. THE STATE
Court: Court of Appeals of Georgia
Jurisdiction: Georgia
Decision Date: 1999-02-23
Citations: 236 Ga. App. 625
Docket Number: A98A2432
Parties: HEARD v. THE STATE.
Judges: Pope, P. J, and Beasley, P. J., concur specially.
Reporter: Georgia Appeals Reports
Volume: 236
Pages: 625–629

Head Matter:
A98A2432.
HEARD v. THE STATE.
(513 SE2d 35)

Opinion:
Andrews, Judge.
Roger Heard was found guilty by a jury of possession of cocaine with, intent to distribute. Heard's sole enumeration of error on appeal is that the trial court erred in going forward with the trial at which he proceeded pro se without determining whether he voluntarily and knowingly waived his right to counsel.
After being arrested on the present offense on October 31, 1995, Heard was initially represented by retained counsel when he obtained a pretrial bond at a hearing on November 10, 1995. Heard was subsequently indicted on September 10, 1996. On November 13, 1996, Heard appeared pro se when he waived formal arraignment and pled not guilty. At that time, Heard indicated he intended to hire counsel. After Heard failed to appear for trial on May 12, 1997, his bond was forfeited and he was arrested pursuant to a bench warrant. Thereafter, the State provided Heard, acting pro se, with access to discoverable material under OCGA § 17-16-1 et seq. by mailing the material to him at the state prison on August 5, 1997, September 2, 1997, and December 2, 9, and 16, 1997. On September 10, 1997, Heard filed a pro se demand for trial pursuant to OCGA § 17-7-170 during the September 1997 term of the Fayette County Superior Court. On November 25, 1997, the trial court entered an order directing that Heard be delivered from the prison by the sheriff for a trial on January 12, 1998, a date still within the term of court beginning in September 1997.
On January 12, 1998, Heard, acting pro se, was brought to trial before a jury in the Fayette County Superior Court. Heard announced to the trial court that he was unrepresented by counsel. The trial court noted on the record that Heard had informed the court on November 13,1996, that he would hire his own counsel, that since that time he had failed to hire counsel, and that he had failed to apply for court-appointed counsel. The trial court further stated that, because Heard had entered a pro se demand for a speedy trial and indicated to the court that he was going to represent himself, the trial would go forward with Heard proceeding pro se. Heard states on appeal that he indicated prior to trial that his intention was to proceed without counsel, and the State does not contest this assertion.
The evidence in the case was closed before the 12 noon lunch break on the first day of the trial, and the jury returned a guilty verdict after deliberating for about 45 minutes. Heard made no opening statement to the jury, presented no evidence, did not cross-examine any of the State's witnesses, and made no objections during the trial.
A defendant put on trial for any offense, felony or misdemeanor, for which imprisonment is a penalty, has a constitutional right to counsel which may only be waived by voluntary and knowing action. Callaway v. State, 197 Ga. App. 606, 607 (398 SE2d 856) (1990); Rutledge v. State, 224 Ga. App. 666, 669 (482 SE2d 403) (1997). The trial judge has the duty of determining whether the defendant has voluntarily and knowingly waived the right to counsel and validly elected to exercise the alternative right to proceed pro se. McCook v. State, 178 Ga. App. 276-277 (342 SE2d 757) (1986); Burnett v. State, 182 Ga. App. 539, 540 (356 SE2d 231) (1987). "When waiver of the right to counsel rests upon the defendant's election of his alternative right of self-representation, The record should reflect a finding on the part of the trial court that the defendant has validly chosen to proceed pro se. The record should also show that this choice was made after the defendant was made aware of his right to counsel and the dangers of proceeding without counsel.' Clarke v. Zant, 247 Ga. 194, 197 (275 SE2d 49) (1981)." (Emphasis omitted.) Burnett, 182 Ga. App. at 540. "When the record is silent, waiver is never presumed and the burden is on the state to present evidence of a valid waiver." Jones v. Wharton, 253 Ga. 82, 83 (316 SE2d 749) (1984); Kirkland v. State, 202 Ga. App. 356, 357-358 (414 SE2d 502) (1991). Since the record contains nothing showing that Heard was made aware of his right to counsel or of the dangers of proceeding without counsel, we are unable to conclude that Heard validly chose to proceed pro se after voluntarily and knowingly waiving his right to counsel.
The trial transcript shows that, acting as his own counsel, Heard failed to do anything at the trial to defend himself against the charges. Although the State presented strong evidence of Heard's guilt amply sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, we cannot conclude under these circumstances that the error was harmless. See McCall v. State, 232 Ga. App. 684, 686-687 (503 SE2d 578) (1998); compare McCook, 178 Ga. App. at 277-278, and Rutledge v. State, 224 Ga. App. at 670-671.
Judgment reversed.
Pope, P. J, and Beasley, P. J., concur specially.
Fayette County Superior Court has two terms of court commencing as follows: First Monday in March and second Monday in September. OCGA § 15-6-3 (19) (A).