Case Name: Pearson, Respondent, vs. School District Number 8 of the Town of Greenfield, Milwaukee County, Wisconsin, Appellant
Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Wisconsin
Decision Date: 1911-01-31
Citations: 144 Wis. 620
Docket Number: 
Parties: Pearson, Respondent, vs. School District Number 8 of the Town of Greenfield, Milwaukee County, Wisconsin, Appellant.
Judges: WiNSlow, C. J., and Baenes, T. We concur in the foregoing.
Reporter: Wisconsin Reports
Volume: 144
Pages: 620–632

Head Matter:
Pearson, Respondent, vs. School District Number 8 of the Town of Greenfield, Milwaukee County, Wisconsin, Appellant.
January 10 —
January 31, 1911.
Schools and school districts: Oral contract with teacher: Validity.
1. A school district hoard has no power to contract with a teacher otherwise than as provided by the statute.
2. An oral contract made by a school district board with a teacher is valid in the absence of any statutory requirement that it be' in writing.
8. The provision in sec. 438, Stats. (1898), that the contract with a teacher, with a copy of the teacher’s certificate attached thereto, shall be filed with the clerk, is directory only, relating to a detail of the keeping of a record, and does not preclude the making of a valid oral contract.
Marshall, X, Winslow, C. X, and Babnes, X, dissent.
Appeal from a judgment of tbe circuit court for Milwaukee county: W. J. TurNer, Circuit Judge.
Affirmed.
This action was brought to recover damages for breach of contract. The plaintiff was a duly qualified teacher in Milwaukee county, Wisconsin, and the defendant a duly organized school district. The plaintiff’s complaint is based upon an alleged contract with the defendant to teach its school for one year and that the defendant breached the contract, in consequence of which plaintiff sustained damages. The defendant claims that the contract was void because not in writing. The jury returned the following verdict:
“(1) Did the school board at a meeting lawfully convened, at which all members were present, authorize the employment of the plaintiff as the teacher of the district school in the defendant’s district for the school year of 1907 ? A. Yes.
“(2) Did the clerk of said school district, pursuant to the authority as stated in question No. 1, make a proposition to the plaintiff to teach said district school for the school year 1907 on the same terms and conditions as contained in the written contract between the plaintiff and defendant for the year 1906 ? A. Yes.
“(3) If yon answer question No. 2 ‘Yes,’ then: Did the plaintiff accept said proposition ? A. Yes.
“(4) If you answer questions Nos. 2 and 3 in the affirmative, was said agreement reduced to writing? A. (by the court). No.
“(5) If you answer questions 2 and 3 in the affirmative, was the agreement between the parties revoked by mutual consent? A. No.
“(6) If you answer questions Nos. 2 and 3 in the affirmative, was the conduct of the plaintiff thereafter such as to justify the defendant in reasonably inferring that the plaintiff withdrew from the contract ? A. No.
“(7) If the court shall be of the opinion that the plaintiff is entitled to recover, at what sum do you assess her damages ? A. $327.52.”
The court on defendant’s motion refused to change the answers in the special verclict and ordered judgment for plaintiff. Judgment was entered accordingly, from which this appeal was taken.
The cause was submitted for the appellant on the brief of Froede & Bodenstab, and for the respondent on that of Otjen & Otjen.

Opinion:
The following opinion was filed January 31, 1911:
NeewiN, J.
The only question here is whether the contract alleged to have been made between the plaintiff and defendant is valid. That question turns upon whether sec. 438, Stats. (1898), requires the contract to be in writing. The contract by its terms was to be performed within one year from the time of making thereof. But it is argued by counsel for appellant that the district board is required to strictly follow the statute, and that it has no power to contract otherwise than as provided by the statute. This may be granted, and the question then arises whether the board in making the alleged contract did follow the statute. It is established with out dispute that it did, unless it was necessary under tbe provisions of the statute that the contract be in writing in order to bind the defendant. Counsel for appellant relies on McNolty v. Board of School Directors, 102 Wis. 261, 78 N. W. 439, to the point that "the powers of school district officers are limited, and can only be exercised as the statute provides, and the plaintiff is legally charged with notice of the extent of such powers and the manner in which they must be exercised." But the case does not reach the point here. In that case it was established that the statute had not been complied with. Here it has been strictly complied with if it was not necessary that the contract be in writing, and it is not necessary unless the statute so provides. The statute reads:
"The board shall contract with qualified teachers, specify in the contract the wages per week, month or year to be paid, and when completed file the contract, with a copy of the certificate of the teacher so employed attached thereto, with the clerk. No contract with any person not holding a diploma or certificate authorizing him to teach shall be valid; and all such contracts shall terminate if the authority to teach expire by limitation and be not renewed or be revoked." Sec. 438, Stats. (1898).
Appellant relied upon the provision, "and when completed file the contract, with a copy of the certificate of the teacher •so employed attached thereto, with the clerk," and contends that no other conclusion can be drawn from this provision than that it means that the contract must be in writing. But the statute does not say that the contract must be in writing, and the court cannot read into the statute provisions not found there for the purpose of rendering an oral contract, otherwise unobjectionable, void because not in writing, in the absence of express statutory requirement. An oral contract by a school teacher with a municipality or school district is valid in the absence of requirement that it be in writing. Roberts v. Clay City, 102 Ky. 88, 42 S. W. 909; Jackson School Tp. v. Shera, 8 Ind. App. 330, 35 N. E. 842. The provision relied upon by appellant is at best only directory. 2 Lewis's Sutherland, Stat. Constr. (2d ed.) § 611 (447); McShane v. School Dist. 70 Mo. App. 624, 628; Bladen v. Philadelphia, 60 Pa. St. 464. It is a detail respecting the keeping of a record, and not a limitation on the power to make an oral contract. If tbe legislature intended that such a contract should be void if not in writing it would have so declared, as is obvious from other statutory provisions. Statutes in this state rendering contracts void because not in writing expressly so provide. Secs. 2302, 2304, 2307, 2308, Stats. (1898). Also we find by the terms of sec. 529, Stats. (1898), respecting township system of school government, which does not apply to the instant case, an express provision that the contract shall be in writing. Sec. 432, Stats. (1898), provides that the director, treasurer, and clerk shall constitute the district board, and further provides how meetings shall he held and that no •act authorized to be done shall be valid unless voted at its meeting. Here the board did meet and vote to hire the plaintiff, who was a qualified teacher holding a diploma or certifi•cate, and specified the wages to be paid and the term of service. The plaintiff accepted the terms and assented to the proposition of the defendant. This constituted a good contract at common law, and must he upheld unless the statute changes the rule of the common law. It needs no citation of authority to the point that statutes in derogation of the common law must be strictly construed. Courts cannot by judicial construction read into statutes provisions not found there for the purpose of changing the rules of the common law.
It follows, therefore, that the contract in question was valid.
By the Court. — The judgment of the court below is affirmed.
The following opinion was filed February 15,1911: