Case Name: COLOMA CHARTER TOWNSHIP v. BERRIEN COUNTY; HERMAN v. BERRIEN COUNTY
Court: Michigan Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 2016-09-06
Citations: 317 Mich. App. 127
Docket Number: Docket Nos. 325226 and 325335
Parties: COLOMA CHARTER TOWNSHIP v BERRIEN COUNTY HERMAN v BERRIEN COUNTY
Judges: Before: O’CONNELL, P.J., and MARKEY and MURRAY, JJ.
Reporter: Michigan appeals reports; cases decided in the Michigan Court of Appeals.
Volume: 317
Pages: 127–170

Head Matter:
COLOMA CHARTER TOWNSHIP v BERRIEN COUNTY HERMAN v BERRIEN COUNTY
Docket Nos. 325226 and 325335.
Submitted March 8, 2016, at Grand Rapids.
Decided September 6, 2016, at 9:00 a.m.
Leave to appeal granted 501 Mich 868.
In Docket No. 325226, Coloma Charter Township brought an action in the Berrien Circuit Court in 2013 against Berrien County and the Berrien County Sheriffs Department, seeking to enjoin the county and its sheriffs department from discharging firearms from a newly constructed shooting-range building into a previ- ' ously constructed outdoor shooting range that was subject to a 2008 permanent injunction that enjoined the county from operating the outdoor shooting range because it violated township ordinances. In Docket No. 325335, Joe Herman and others (the Herman plaintiffs) brought an action in the Berrien Circuit Court in 2013 against Berrien County, seeking to enforce the 2008 permanent injunction and requesting that the court hold the county in civil and criminal contempt for violating that injunction. In 2005, the Herman plaintiffs had brought an action in the Berrien Circuit Court against Berrien County, challenging the county’s ability to locate a law enforcement training facility with outdoor shooting ranges near the Herman plaintiffs’ residences on the basis that the shooting ranges would violate various township zoning and noise ordinances. The court, Paul L. Malo-ney, J., granted the county’s summary disposition motion, holding that the county building that was used for firearms classroom training and the shooting range were exempt under MCL 46.11 of the county commissioners act (CCA), MCL 46.1 et seq., from the township ordinances. In a split decision, the Court of Appeals, O’Connell, P.J., and Murray, J. (Davis, J., dissenting), affirmed. Herman v Berrien Co, 275 Mich App 382 (2007). The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals, holding that land uses that are ancillary to a county building and not indispensable to its normal use are not covered by the grant of priority in the CCA over local regulation. Accordingly, the county’s outdoor shooting range did not have priority over the township ordinances because those land uses were not indispensable to the normal use of the county’s indoor firearms training building—which was for classroom training—that was adjacent to the outdoor shooting range. Herman v Berrien Co, 481 Mich 352 (2008). In accordance with that decision, on remand in 2008 the circuit court entered a permanent injunction enjoining the county from using the previously constructed outdoor shooting range for firearms training. On the basis of legal advice in 2013, the county constructed an open-air, pole-bam-type structure (shooting-range building) that faced the longest of the previously constructed outdoor shooting ranges and allowed law enforcement officers to fire weapons from inside the building at the targets in the outdoor shooting range. Plaintiffs then filed their separate actions in the circuit court. In August 2014, the court, John E. Dewane, J., dismissed the Herman plaintiffs’ claim of civil contempt on the basis of governmental immunity. The township moved for summary disposition of its claims, and the Herman plaintiffs joined the motion. In October 2014, the court denied the plaintiffs’ motions and granted summary disposition in favor of the county and the sheriffs department, concluding that because the shooting-range building was a necessary county building for purposes ofMCL 46.11(b) and (d) of the CCA and the outdoor shooting range was indispensable to the normal use of the shooting-range building, the county’s authority to site the shooting-range building took priority over the township’s zoning and noise ordinances. For that reason, the circuit court modified the 2008 permanent injunction to allow law enforcement officers to shoot firearms from the shooting-range building to the range for training and annual assessment purposes. The circuit court later acquitted the county of the Herman plaintiffs’ criminal contempt charge, concluding that although the proofs had established beyond a reasonable doubt that the county had been aware of the prior 2008 Supreme Court decision and that the county had violated the injunction, there was no evidence that the violation was an intentional violation of a known legal duty or that the county had imputed knowledge of the injunction through the county’s former corporate counsel, R. McKinley Elliot. Plaintiffs in both cases appealed, and the Court of Appeals ordered that the cases be consolidated.
The Court of Appeals held:
1. MCL 46.11(b) and (d) of the CCA authorize a county to site county buildings on property even if it violates or is inconsistent with local township zoning regulations. Those subsections grant counties the power to determine the site of, remove, or designate a new site for a county building and to erect the necessary buildings for jails, clerks’ offices, and other county buildings. The CCA grants counties the authority to site buildings, not land uses or activities. Ancillary land uses of a building'—such as parking lots, sidewalks, and light posts—are included in a county’s siting power because it allows the county to make normal use of the building; ancillary land uses take priority over township regulations.
2. In both cases, the circuit court erred by granting summary disposition in favor of defendants and by modifying the injunction to allow law enforcement officers to shoot firearms from the newly constructed shooting-range building into the existing outdoor shooting range. The shooting-range building was ancillary to the outdoor shooting range—as opposed to the shooting range being ancillary to the normal use of the building—because the outdoor shooting range was used as such before the 2008 permanent injunction was issued and before the shooting-range building was constructed. As stated by the Supreme Court in the prior 2008 opinion, shooting ranges are not a normal or indispensable use of a county building, and the county may not protect the nonconforming land use of the property as an outdoor shooting range by siting the shooting-range building adjacent to it.
3. In both cases, the circuit court’s order regarding attorney fees was vacated and the issue remanded because the county violated the Supreme Court’s prior decision and in turn violated MCL 46.11(b) and (d).
4. In Docket No. 325335, the circuit court correctly acquitted the county of criminal contempt.
In Docket No. 325226, the circuit court order granting summary disposition in favor of defendants was reversed and the case remanded for entry of summary disposition in favor of the township, the circuit court order modifying the permanent injunction was reversed, and the circuit court order regarding attorney fees was vacated and the issue remanded.
In Docket No. 325335, the circuit court order granting summary disposition in favor of defendants was reversed and the case remanded for entry of summary disposition in favor of the Herman plaintiffs, the circuit order modifying the permanent injunction was reversed, the circuit court order regarding attorney fees was vacated and the issue remanded, and the circuit court order acquitting the county of criminal contempt charges was affirmed.
Makkey, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part, agreed that the court did not abuse its discretion by finding the county not guilty of criminal contempt following a bench trial. In both cases, Judge Makkey disagreed with the majority’s analysis of MCL 46.11(b) and (d) of the CCA and its application to the shooting-range building. The shooting-range building is a “county building” within the meaning of MCL 46.11(b) and (d), and the county used it for the lawful purpose of necessary firearms training for county law enforcement officers. The CCA is clear and unambiguous and places only one limit on a county’s power to site and erect county buildings—specifically, a county may not use the MCL 46.11 power to site buildings if there is any other requirement of law that county buildings be located at the county seat. The discharge of the firearms and firearms training occurred within the confines of the shooting-range building, even though law enforcement officers fired at targets outside the building in the shooting range. The county’s normal use of the shooting-range building was the discharge of firearms for law enforcement training, and the adjacent outdoor shooting range was an indispensable ancillary use to the building’s normal use; outdoor firearms training was not the primary use of the property. Judge Makkey would have affirmed the circuit court’s ruling that the county’s authority under the CCA to site and erect buildings had priority over the township’s regulations with respect to the shooting-range building and also would have affirmed the circuit court’s order granting summary disposition in favor of defendants. In Docket No. 325335, Judge Makkey would have affirmed the circuit court’s order modifying the 2008 permanent injunction; the circuit court’s order was not an abuse of discretion because circumstances related to the shooting-range building and the ancillary outdoor shooting range land use had changed from when the injunction had originally been issued. Judge Makkey also would have affirmed the circuit court’s order granting the county summary disposition of the Herman plaintiffs’ civil contempt claim for attorney fees under MCL 600.1721 as compensation for the county’s violation of the permanent injunction; under the governmental tort liability act, MCL 691.1401 et seq., the county was immune from tort liability, which included the Herman plaintiffs’ claim for indemnification for attorney fees.
Docket No. 325226:
DeFrancesco & Dienes (by Scott A. Dienes), Foster, Swift, Collins & Smith, PC (by Michael D. Homier and Laura J. Genovich), and McGraw Morris, PC (by Craig R. Noland), for Coloma Charter Township.
Kreis, Enderle, Hudgins & Borsos, PC (by Thomas G. King), for Berrien County and the Berrien County Sheriffs Department.
Honigman, Miller, Schwartz & Cohn, LLP (by Christopher E. Tracy), for Landfill Management Company, Inc., and Hennessy Land Company.
Docket No. 325335:
Rhoades McKee PC (by Gregory G. Timmer, Michael C. Walton, and James R. Poll) for Joe Herman, Sue Herman, Jay Jollay, Sarah Jollay, Jerry Jollay, Neil Kreitner, Tony Peterson, Liz Peterson, Randy Bjorge, Annette Bjorge, and Tina Buck.
Kreis, Enderle, Hudgins & Borsos, PC (by Thomas G. King), for Berrien County.
Before: O’CONNELL, P.J., and MARKEY and MURRAY, JJ.

Opinion:
MURRAY, J.
These consolidated appeals are from two separate orders that (1) granted summary disposition to defendants Berrien County and Berrien County Sheriffs Department and (2) modified a permanent injunction. For the reasons set forth below, in both dockets we reverse the trial court's orders to the extent the court ruled that the county could operate the shooting range under the authority of the county commissioners act (CCA), MCL 46.1 et seq., and remand for entry of summary disposition in favor of plaintiffs. For these same reasons, we reverse the trial court's modification of the injunction and vacate and remand on the issue of attorney fees in light of our conclusion that the county acted in violation of Herman v Berrien Co, 481 Mich 352; 750 NW2d 570 (2008), and MCL 46.11(b) and (d). We affirm the trial court's ruling on criminal contempt.
These appeals are the continuation of the litigation that resulted in the Herman decision. We adopt the statement of facts and procedural history contained in Part I of Judge MARKEY's partial dissent, as well as the statement of the standard of review set forth in Part 11(A) of her opinion. Finally, we also agree with Part III(C) of her opinion addressing criminal contempt. In light of this, one can see that our disagreement only lies with respect to the trial court's ruling granting summary disposition to the county, as well as the related issues of modifying the permanent injunction and plaintiffs' request for attorney fees. We now turn to those issues.
In Herman, the Supreme Court explained that the CCA, and specifically MCL 46.11(b) and (d), authorizes a county to site county buildings even if inconsistent with local township regulations. The Court held that because a building cannot function normally without such items as a parking lot, sidewalks, and light posts, those types of ancillary uses are also permitted by statute and therefore also have priority over township zoning provisions. Id. at 368.
Despite the fact that the county constructed a new building since the issuance of Herman, this appeal is still controlled by Herman. In general, the Herman Court confirmed that since Pittsfield Charter Twp v Washtenaw Co, 468 Mich 702; 664 NW2d 193 (2003), "it has become accepted that the CCA gives counties priority over local regulations that inhibit a county's power to site and erect county buildings under the CCA." Herman, 481 Mich at 362. More specific to the siting of county buildings, the Court unequivocally held that the power given to counties is to site buildings, not to allow counties to site land uses or activities:
The CCA is an unambiguous statute. In pertinent part, it gives counties the power to "[¿determine the site of, remove, or designate a new site for a county building" and to "[e]rect the necessary buildings for jails, clerks' offices, and other county buildings . ." MCL 46.11(b) and (d). A plain reading of this language leads to the conclusion that the Legislature intended to give counties the power to "site" and "erect" "county buildings." Each time the CCA grants the power to site, it invariably relates that power to "buildings." Notably, the Legislature never semantically links the power to site with any nonbuilding activity or land use. In other words, the CCA does not give counties the power to site a county "activity" or county "land use"; rather, it always relates its grant of siting power to "buildings." This leads to the conclusion that the siting power is limited to buildings. This conclusion is supported by the contextually derived purpose of the CCA. The CCA was expressly promulgated "to define the powers and duties of the county boards of commissioners . ." Title of 1851 PA 156, as amended by 1978 PA 51. Accordingly, in [MCL 46.11], the act clearly and descriptively articulates the numerous powers it gives to counties. The power to site county activities or land uses is conspicuously absent from that list. Also, the CCA's continued use of the term "building(s)" must have significance. That term would be rendered nugatory if the CCA's power to "site" was meant to extend to other county acts, such as siting land uses, because those other acts are never listed in the CCA. In essence, if those unlisted acts were actually included in the power to site buildings, then the CCA's express inclusion of the power to site buildings would be superfluous. This cannot be. Therefore, the CCA's continued use of the term "building(s)" must place significant limitations on the meaning of the act's term "site" by omitting the power to do other acts. [Id. at 366-368 (emphasis added; first and second alterations in original).]
Consequently, the CCA provides the county with no power to site land uses or activities, only county buildings.
The Herman Court also acknowledged that "the power to site a building is worthless if the entity that sites the building cannot make normal use of the building." Id. at 368. As in Pittsfield, the Herman Court too recognized that a county could conduct ancillary land uses to make normal use of the building:
However, we are mindful that the power to site a building is worthless if the entity that sites the building cannot make normal use of the building. Just as Pittsfield recognized that the power to site a building would be "mere surplusage" if the siting entity had to comply with zoning ordinances, Pittsfield, [468 Mich] at 713, we too acknowledge that the power to site a building would be meaningless if the siting entity could not conduct ancillary land uses in order to make normal use of the building. For instance, the normal use of most county buildings would require sidewalks, parking lots, and light poles. Thus, while defining the power to "site" as being limited to buildings, we simultaneously accept that some ancillary land uses must be included in the county's siting power. [Id. (emphasis added).]
Thus, a county can site county buildings pursuant to MCL 46.11(b) and (d), and the Herman Court held that ancillary land uses fall within that siting power to allow for the normal use of the building. And, of course, the Court held that this shooting range was not an ancillary use of the building containing indoor instructional rooms. Id. at 370-371.
The problem with the building constructed in front of the existing shooting range is that it is ancillary to the use of the shooting range, as opposed to the shooting range being ancillary to the normal use of the building. See Random House Webster's College Dictionary (2003) ("ancillary" is defined as "subordinate" or "subsidiary"). Indeed, the shooting range existed long before the building and was utilized (until the courts stopped its use) without the existence of the building. The evidence shows that the shooting range was and is the main feature of this location, making the shooting-range building subordinate to, or ancillary to, the shooting range. The county's argument has the tail (a small structure) wagging the dog (the previously constructed and utilized range). See State v Stark, 354 Or 1, 11; 307 P3d 418 (2013). Or, stated differently, the county used an after-the-fact building in an attempt to statutorily shield its nonconforming land use, something the Herman Court stated was impermissible under the CCA. No matter the intentions of the county in seeking to comply with Herman, the facts reveal a belated attempt to protect a land use by siting an adjacent building. This it cannot do.
There is an additional reason why the county's position cannot prevail. As we have noted, the Herman Court concluded that "Berrien County's outdoor shooting ranges do not have priority over the township ordinances that plaintiffs rely on because they are land uses that are not indispensable to the normal use of the county building." Herman, 481 Mich at 354. Consequently, the Supreme Court has spoken: shooting ranges are not a normal or indispensable use of a county building. This decision makes sense on a num ber of different levels. The purpose of the CCA is to allow counties priority over the township zoning act (TZA), MCL 125.271 et seq., to erect buildings and ancillary items to those buildings such as parking lots, shrubs, and lighting, which are specifically adapted to support the use of the building. We find no support in the CCA that the Legislature contemplated shooting ranges as normal uses of county buildings.
For these reasons, in both dockets we reverse the trial court's orders to the extent the court ruled that the county could operate the shooting range under the authority of the CCA, and remand for entry of summary disposition in favor of plaintiffs. For these same reasons, we reverse the trial court's modification of the injunction, and vacate and remand on the issue of attorney fees in light of our conclusion that the county acted in violation of Herman and MCL 46.11(b) and (d). We affirm the trial court's ruling on criminal contempt.
As the prevailing parties, plaintiffs may tax costs. MCR 7.219(A). We do not retain jurisdiction.
O'Connell, P.J., concurred with Murray, J.
Defendants Landfill Management, Inc., and Hennessy Land Company are also parties to the appeal in Docket No. 325226.
The term "plaintiffs" refers to Coloma Charter Township (Docket No. 325226) and Joe Herman, Sue Herman, Jay Jollay, Sarah Jollay, Jerry Jollay, Neal Kreitner, Tony Peterson, Liz Peterson, Randy Bjorge, Annette Bjorge, and Tina Buck (Docket No. 325335).
Although plaintiffs cite several insightful decisions defining what is, or is not, a public building under the governmental tort liability act, MCL 691.1401 et seq., in the absence of a statutory definition, Judge Markey correctly resorts to a dictionary definition of "building."
The TZA was repealed by MCL 125.3702(1)(c) of the Michigan Zoning Enabling Act (ZEA), 2006 PA 110, MCL 125.3101 et seq. The ZEA now authorizes local zoning.