Case Name: Francis J. Lantry, the Fire Commissioner of the City of New York, Appellant, v. Albert Mede, Respondent
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Term
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1908-03
Citations: 58 Misc. 221
Docket Number: 
Parties: Francis J. Lantry, the Fire Commissioner of the City of New York, Appellant, v. Albert Mede, Respondent.
Judges: 
Reporter: New York Miscellaneous Reports
Volume: 58
Pages: 221–225

Head Matter:
Francis J. Lantry, the Fire Commissioner of the City of New York, Appellant, v. Albert Mede, Respondent.
(Supreme Court, Appellate Term,
March, 1908.)
Municipal corporations — Powers and exercise of governmental functions— Powers of different departments and hoards — Powers of fire department.
In section 780 of the Greater New York Charter (L. 1901, eh. 4G6), making it the duty of a marshal to enter any building or premises within the city for the purpose of examining certain specified sources of danger “ or other things which in his judgment may be dangerous in causing or promoting fires,” the words “ other things,” etc., are not confined to any exact class of dangerous appurtenances but include a dumb-waiter shaft running from the basement to the roof but having no connection with the outer air above the roof; and disobedience of an order of the fire commissioner, based upon a marshal’s report, to cover such a dumb-waiter with asbestos plated with metal subjects the owmer of the building to an action to recover the prescribed penalty.
MacLean, J., dissented.
Appeal by the plaintiff from a judgment in favor of the defendant, rendered in the Municipal Court of the city of Hew York, sixth district, borough of Manhattan.
Francis K. Pendleton (Herman Stiefel and William J. Millard, of counsel), for appellant.
Ira J. Ettinger, for respondent.

Opinion:
Bischoff, J.
As I construe the statute under consideration (Greater N. Y. charter, § 780), the discretion vested in the official was not limited to matters of the very classes previously specified. The rule noscitur a sociis does not have cogent application here, since the word " other " is used in connection with things which in " the opinion " of the official were dangerous.
It cannot be said that the Legislature, 'when specifying certain things, enacted into law the fact that a marshal deemed these very things dangerous; and yet, without some such assumption, the statute cannot be taken to restrict the " otherv things — left to his opinion as to their dangerous character — to the specified matters of probable danger.
The commissioner is given discretionary powers in the matter of proceeding upon the marshal's report; and the apparent purpose of the statute is to leave much to his personal opinion relative to the manner in which things of danger should be treated, whether by removal or by remedying their defects, for the lessening of the cause of fires or for the protection of firemen and the occupants of buildings in case of fires.
Taking this section of the charter as a whole, the purpose is plain; and the meaning of the words " or other things which in his opinion may be dangerous in causing or promoting fires" is not confined to any exact class of dangerous appurtenances. " Ex antecedentibus et consequentibus fit optima interpretation Looking to the provisions of this sec-. tion of the charter which precede and follow the words in question, I have no doubt that the statute should' be interpreted to include the matter to which the commissioner's order was directed in the present case. Suth. Const., § 279; Given v. Hilton, 95 U. S. 591, 598; White v. United States, 191 id. 552; Wolsey v. Chapman, 101 id. 769; Matter of Board of Street Opening, 133 N. Y. 329.
The judgment should be reversed and a new trial ordered, with costs to appellant to abide the event.
Gildébslbeve, J., concurs.