Case Name: Priscilla Backers BURGESS, etc., Appellant, v. PFIZER, INC., etc., et al., Appellees
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 2008-09-03
Citations: 990 So. 2d 1140
Docket Number: Nos. 3D07-455, 3D07-754
Parties: Priscilla Backers BURGESS, etc., Appellant, v. PFIZER, INC., etc., et al., Appellees.
Judges: Before RAMIREZ and WELLS, JJ., and SCHWARTZ, Senior Judge.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 990
Pages: 1140–1152

Head Matter:
Priscilla Backers BURGESS, etc., Appellant, v. PFIZER, INC., etc., et al., Appellees.
Nos. 3D07-455, 3D07-754.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
Sept. 3, 2008.
Peter Loblack, for appellant.
Fowler White Burnett and Christopher E. Knight, and Marc J. Schleier and He-laine S. Goodner, Miami; Carlton Fields, and Edward W. Gerecke, Tampa and Wendy Lumish and Alina Alonso, Miami; Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom and Barbara Wrubel and Mark S. Cheffo, New York, for appellees.
Before RAMIREZ and WELLS, JJ., and SCHWARTZ, Senior Judge.

Opinion:
WELLS, J.
Priscilla Backers Burgess, as personal representative of the Estate of Tyrone K. Backers (herein, "Burgess"), appeals from an order dismissing this action with prejudice and imposing fees and costs jointly and severally against her and her attorney as a sanction for her attorney's malfeasance and disobedience. Pfizer and the University of Miami, defendants below, cross-appeal denial of their motion seeking to exclude the testimony of Burgess' only medical expert. We affirm, in part, the fee and cost sanction but reverse the dismissal order. We also dismiss the cross-appeal as premature.
Backers sued Pfizer and the University of Miami claiming that he had developed fulminant liver failure requiring a transplant as a consequence of ingesting Lipitor while participating in a volunteer clinical study of that drug. Burgess, Backers' mother, was appointed personal representative of his estate and substituted as plaintiff after Backers' death. After four years of litigation, during which Burgess' counsel filed numerous complaints, some containing claims in direct contravention to standing court orders, some detailing matters as extraneous as the Holocaust, the trial court entered an agreed order directing Burgess to file her sixth amended complaint clarifying her remaining claims. The agreed order expressly barred Burgess from adding any new parties or claims. Pursuant to the order, Burgess was to file the sixth amended complaint on October 30, 2006, twenty days after the court denied Burgess' motion to amend to add a punitive damages claim.
On December 4, 2006, Pfizer filed a motion to dismiss the action based on Burgess' failure to file a sixth amended complaint in compliance with the agreed order. The next day, Burgess filed a sixth amended complaint. Two days later, a re-noticed case management conference ("CMC") took place. Burgess' lawyer, Peter Lob-lack, failed to appear. Therein, Pfizer made, and the court granted, an ore tenus motion for an order to show cause within twenty days why the action should not be dismissed. Loblack was ordered to appear at a January 5, 2007, hearing on the order to show cause.
Prior to the show cause hearing, the University of Miami's counsel contacted Loblack and advised him that the sixth amended complaint contravened the agreed order by adding new claims. Burgess then served a corrected sixth amended — which would be the seventh amended — complaint which included "most of, if not all of, the improper allegations previously brought to Loblack's attention. Following the show cause hearing, the trial court sanctioned Loblack by awarding fees and costs to Pfizer and the University of Miami and entered an order stating that if defendants' motion to strike the sixth amended complaint was granted, Burgess would be sanctioned by dismissal of the action with prejudice. The trial court thereafter granted the defendants' motions to strike the most recent complaint and in an order detailing Loblack's malfeasance and disobedience, dismissed the case with prejudice. Final judgment was entered in favor of Pfizer and the University of Miami in the amount of $20,519.00 for the fees and costs they had expended, this sum to be paid by both Burgess and her attorney "jointly and severally."
Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.420(b) provides in relevant part: "Any party may move for dismissal of an action . for failure of an adverse party to comply with these rules or any order of court." "Nonetheless, not every failure to comply with a court order or rule of civil procedure will justify dismissal." Town of Manalapan v. Florida Power & Light Co., 815 So.2d 670, 672 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002).
We agree with Burgess that the instant dismissal with prejudice sanctions her too severely for her attorney's actions. As observed in Kozel v. Ostendorf 629 So.2d 817, 818 (Fla.1993), and many other cases as well, "a fíne, public reprimand, or contempt order may often be the appropriate sanction to impose on an attorney in those situations where the attorney, and not the client, is responsible for the error." See Hastings v. Estate of Hastings, 960 So.2d 798, 801 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007) ("While a trial court may, without doubt, dismiss an action as a sanction for violation of a court order, it should do so 'only in extreme circumstances.' " (quoting Clay v. City of Margate, 546 So.2d 434, 435 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989))); Cruz v. Caribbean Spring Village, 944 So.2d 1161, 1162 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006) (affirming an order vacating and setting aside a final default judgment where record did not show that the client personally contributed to the delays that resulted in the default); King v. Macaleer, 774 So.2d 68, 68 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000) (holding that dismissal was too harsh a sanction in the absence of evidence that the client was personally involved); Walicki v. Waste Mgmt., Inc., 703 So.2d 1095, 1096 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997) (reversing and remanding the case "for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether dismissal was warranted based on considerations outlined in Ko-zel")-, see also Ham v. Dunmire, 891 So.2d 492, 496 (Fla.2004) (instructing that "to ensure that a litigant is not unduly punished for failures of counsel, the trial court must consider whether dismissal with prejudice is warranted").
While the Supreme Court made clear in Dunmire, 891 So.2d at 497, that there may exist circumstances where "dismiss[al][of] a litigant's action based upon an attorney's neglect," would be proper, those circumstances are not present in the instant case. Here, defendants' counsel candidly admitted that the actions meriting sanction were those of Burgess' attorney and not Burgess herself. Defendants' counsel also conceded that, but for all of the hyperbole in Burgess' various complaints, Burgess had stated a cause of action sounding in negligence. Additionally, the prejudice suffered by Defendants was addressed in the monetary sanction imposed. Moreover, while we cannot fault the trial judge's characterization of counsel's conduct as "willful," our review of the record indicates that this willfulness was the result of at least a splash of lack of ability rather than a wholly purposeful intention to disregard the court's instructions.
Under the facts of this case, we conclude that while the trial court acted well within its authority in sanctioning counsel for the fees and costs incurred as a consequence of his dilatory and disobedient actions, the trial court acted too harshly in both imposing that sanction on Burgess and in dismissing the action with prejudice. See Samuels v. King Motor Co. of Fort Lauderdale, 782 So.2d 489, 500 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001) ("dismissal with prejudice was improper because the Plaintiffs either did state causes of action or could, with some amendment, state causes of action"); Cummings v. Warren Henry Motors, Inc., 648 So.2d 1230, 1232 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995) ("dismissal of the complaint as a sanction for violating the court's order to amend the complaint is additionally erroneous when the complaint filed states a cause of action"); see also Dunmire, 891 So.2d at 498 ("Although a trial court 'unquestionably has power to discipline counsel' for violating court orders, an action should not be dismissed when the malfeasance can be adequately addressed through the imposition of a contempt citation or lesser degree of punishment directly on counsel."); American Exp. Co. v. Hickey, 869 So.2d 694, 695 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004) ("Our review of the record suggests that dismissal with prejudice was too severe a response to the transgressions of American Express's attorney. The trial court has many options available to it in fashioning an appropriate sanction, including imposing fines, awarding attorney's fees under section 57.105, Florida Statutes (2004), finding counsel in contempt, or referring the matter to the Florida Bar. While it is essential that attorneys adhere to filing deadlines and procedural requirements, sanctions other than dismissal are appropriate in those situations when the attorney, and not the client, is responsible for the error. For the foregoing reasons, the order of dismissal is reversed."); see generally Bitterman v. Bitterman, 714 So.2d 356, 365 (Fla.1998) ("The inequitable conduct doctrine permits the award of attorney's fees where one party has exhibited egregious conduct or acted in bad faith."); Finol v. Final, 912 So.2d 627, 629 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005) ("A trial court has inherent authority to order an attorney to pay opposing counsel's fees if the attorney acts in bad faith.").
Accordingly, we affirm that part of the trial court's order imposing monetary sanctions on Burgess' counsel. However, we reverse that portion of the order imposing monetary sanctions on Burgess and dismissing the action with prejudice, and we remand this matter to permit Burgess one final chance to file an amended complaint to state a single cause of action against Pfizer and the University of Miami for negligence. We do so without prejudice to further motions for sanctions, dismissal or summary judgment if appropriate. We also dismiss the cross appeal as premature. Finally, we order Loblack to serve a copy of this opinion on Burgess and to provide the court below with proof of such service within twenty days of the date of this opinion.
SCHWARTZ, Senior Judge, concurs.
. The University of Miami subsequently joined in this request.
. Kozel, 629 So.2d at 818, lists six factors to assist in determining whether dismissal with prejudice is warranted as a sanction and notes that "[u]pon consideration of these factors, if a sanction less severe than dismissal with prejudice appears to be a viable alternative, the trial court should employ such an alternative."