Case Name: George B. Holloman v. John P. White et al.
Court: Supreme Court of Texas
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1874
Citations: 41 Tex. 52
Docket Number: 
Parties: George B. Holloman v. John P. White et al.
Judges: 
Reporter: Texas Reports
Volume: 41
Pages: 52–63

Head Matter:
George B. Holloman v. John P. White et al.
1. Bankrupt, homestead.—A bankrupt cannot insist upon the enforcement of a trust deed alleged to have been assigned to him with his homestead and as a muniment of its title without evidence that the trust deed had been expressly set apart to such bankrupt.
2. On Rehearing—Pleading and evidence.—The only evidence ' of bankruptcy being in the pleadings, and the admission of bankruptcy being coupled with the explanation that the trust deed as a muniment of title to the homestead had been assigned to plaintiff in the bankrupt proceedings: Held, that the plaintiff could sue and enforce the execution of such trust.
3. Merger.—Plaintiff having entered upon land under an execution sale claimed by the defendant to be void, the title conveyed by snch sale could not be insisted upon as merging the equitable estate held in the property by the owner of the debt and trust deed in a proceeding to enforce the execution of such trust deed.
Appeal from Guadalupe. Tried below before the Hon. J. J. Thornton.
On April 30, 1858, French Smith and Eliza, his wife, executed to White, as trustee, their deed to the Elm Spring tract of land to secure to F. G. Roberts payment of two promissory notes, with the usual conditions and power of sale.
On May 3, 1859, this Elm Spring tract was sold by the sheriff of Guadalupe county under sundry executions, viz, eight, against said Smith, Holloman, the appellant, becoming the purchaser.
On the same or the preceding day Rust sold the above notes and trust deed to the appellant, and made the following indorsement on the original instrument: “Satisfied in full,” or “This deed is satisfied.”
Shortly after the sheriff’s sale the said William M. Rust, at the instance of the appellant, made the following entry: “ This deed of trust was assigned to me by F. G. Roberts the 3d of May, 1859, and the amount having been fully paid in by George B. Holloman, I hereby release said trust deed of trust this June 2d, 1859. (Signed) Wm. M. Rust.” This entry was made on the margin of the record book.
In ¡November, 1868, the appellant demanded of White, the trustee and appellee, that he proceed to sell in accordance with the terms of the trust deed. This the appéllee refused, and the appellant brought this suit to compel appellee to enforce the stipulations of the said deed of trust.
White pleaded that the appellant’s acts had deprived him of all authority; that the notes and deed were indorsed “satisfied;” and that Smith and wife had renounced said trust deed and pleaded the statute of limitations in a suit then pending in Guadalupe county District Court for the enforcement of said deed of trust; and that Holloman had long been in possession of the locus in quo under his purchase from Rust and from the sheriff, and claiming the same thereunder.
The appellant then filed a general demurrer and replication, in which he set up his purchase at sheriff’s sale.
Smith and wife then intervened, pleading the statute of limitations, homestead exemption, and unlawful entry by appellant, and praying for a judgment against appellant for the rents and profits, and enjoining the appellee from selling.
A jury was waived and case submitted to the court. There was a judgment for defendants ; a motion for new trial overruled. The plaintiff appealed.
John P. White, for appellee.
The appellee presents the following points:
I. That the instrument set up in plaintiff’s petition is a mortgage with power to sell. (See 4 Kent’s Comm., p. 146; Wright v. Henderson, 12 Tex., 43; Robertson v. Paul, 16 Tex. 472; Ballard v. Anderson, 18 Tex., 377; Wootton v. Wheeler, 22 Tex., 338.)
II. If this position be correct, then the power could as well be conferred upon the mortgagee as upon a third party. (See authorities, supra.)
III. A mortgage, with or without a power to sell, is a mere incident of the debt secured. (2 Story’s Eq., § 1016; Duty v. Graham, 12 Tex., 427.) The fact that the party empowered to sell is a stranger is not believed to alter the rule; and if the grantors in the trust deed could plead limitation, so could the trustee when called upon by the cestui que trust to sell.
IV. The instrument sued on is not in fact a deed of trust, and is not subject to the rules governing trusts and parties thereto. It is simply a mortgage with power to sell. Equity will not interfere to aid the non-execution of a power. (1 Story’s Eq., §§ 169, 170.)
V. The appellant in his petition sets up title indfimself by virtue of the sheriff’s deed. Admit this, for the sake of argument, and what is the result.? Appellant holding the legal and equitable title, the latter is merged into the former, and he stands before the court asking that a trustee may sell his own property for his own benefit.
VI. As to the point made by the appellant in his bill of exceptions and assignment of errors, it is submitted that Smith and wife had a right to intervene, having a direct interest in the subject-matter of the litigation. (Sayles’ Pract., § 158; Garrett v. Gaines, 6 Tex., 435; Chandler v. Fulton, 10 Tex., 2.)
But it is objected-that they intervened after appellant and appellee had announced ready for trial. Appellant, however, does not claim that he was surprised thereby, or that delay ensued. It will be remembered that a jury was waived, and the court certainly had the discretion to permit or refuse this intervention at any time, unless it operated delay or as a surprise. (Van Bibber v. Geer, 12 Tex., 15; Graves v. Hall, 27 Tex., 148.)
VII. The appellant’s second exception is not believed to be well taken, because it was proven on behalf of the defendant by Rust that the release indorsed on the margin of the records was made at the instance of Holloman, and he should be estopped from setting it aside.
VIII. In answer to the point raised by the appellant’s third bill of exceptions and fourth assignment of errors, it is submitted that the range of cross-examination is confined to matters connected with the direct examination. As to other matters such witness becomes the witness of the party interrogating him. (1 Greenl. Ev., § 445; 14 Peters, 448, 461; 6 Watts & Serg., 75.)
John Ireland, for appellant.
In 1858 French H. Smith and his wife executed a deed of trust to defendant, White, as trustee, to secure the payment to F. G. Roberts a certain sum of money borrowed by Smith from Roberts.
Holloman became the holder and owner of the deed of trust by purchase, and in 1869 called upon White, the trustee, to sell the property to pay the debt.
White refused to sell, and this suit was brought to compel him to do so. There is alternate prayer for damage.
Smith and wife intervened, setting up various reasons why the plaintiff should not recover. A jury was waived and the case submitted to the court, who gave judgment for defendant and intervenor.
There was a motion for a new trial, which was overruled, and Holloman brings the case here by appeal and prays a reversal of the judgment.
So far as I was able to gather the reasons for the judgment, they were limitation and indorsement of Rust made on the margin of the record of the deed of trust.
Was the plaintiff’s remedy barred?
Suppose it had been a simple mortgage, with the mortgagee in possession, could the mortgagee have been turned out, no matter what length of time had elapsed without a payment of his debt ?
I think it clear that he could not. (Union Bank v. Stafford, 12 How., 327; Ang. on Lira., 487, 488; Russell v. Ely, 2 Black, 575; Dougherty v. Kercheval, 1 A. K. Marsh. Ky. Rep., 52.)
This being an express trust, and Holloman in possession all the time, there is no bar. (Hill on Trustees, 406, and note to 412; Duval v. Bibb, 3 Call, 362; 10 Gratt., Va., 231; 8 Watts, 523; Rice on Limitation, 181, 182, 268, 274, 275; Peter v. Beverly, 10 Pet., 566; Bank v. Beverly, 1 How., 135; 12 Pet., 19.)
Rust was himself an assignee. How could his indorsement on the deed affect Holloman’s rights a month after Holloman had bought Rust’s interest? (Many v. Jagger, 1 Blatch., 372; Ring v. Gray, 6 B. Monr., Ky., 368; 1 Hale’s Eq., 443; Brown v. Cram, 1 New Hamp., 169; Marsh v. Rice, 1 New Hamp., 167; Peltz v. Clarke, 5 Pet., 483; Tucker v. Keeler, 4 Verm., 161.)
When Smith intervened he became the active party, and is not entitled to the aid of a court of equity so long as he fails to do equity. (Coats v. Roberts, 2 Philadelphia Leg. Int., 244, 379; Patton v. King, 26 Tex., 684.)
Holloman had a right to redeem, and his payment to Rust amounted to an equitable assignment "to him. (Hinds v. Ballian, 44 New Hamp., 619; Liveth v. Pratt, 53 Me., 147; Wash. on Real Prop., 2, 126; 2 Zabriskie, 543.)
Upon what ground can the action of the court in refusing to allow Holloman to testify be sustained? (Jackson v. Varick, 7 Cow. Rep., 239; Stark. Ev., 160.)

Opinion:
McAdoo, J.
This cause seems to have been instituted by the appellant as a means of strengthening his title to the land, which was involved in the cause of Holloman v. F. Smith and Wife, (No. 214.)
It is a proceeding to compel John P. White to execute a deed of trust by sale which had been imposed by Smith and wife on the same property in 1858, White being the trustee named in the deed of trust. This deed was executed by Smith and wife to secure debts due to other parties. The appellee had, by purchase from Rust, become the owner of the debts thus secured, and the deed of trust had been transferred to him.
In this suit, on the day the case was called for trial, Smith and wife intervened, pleading the statute of limitations against the debts so secured, wrongful holding of the property in controversy, a plea of payment of the debts and of tender of payment, and that the appellant had been discharged in bankruptcy, and had therefore no right to maintain suit for said debts.
The appellant denied every allegation of the appellee except that of his bankruptcy, and to that allegation he pleads that the property in controversy had been set aside to him by A. M. Jackson, his assignee in bankruptcy, and together therewith the debts and deed of trust embraced in this suit, as entering into and affecting his title thereto, the appellee, French Smith, being notoriously insolvent at the time.
One of the notes secured by the deed of trust was not barred by limitation when this suit was instituted. The proof failed entirely to show that any of the debts had been paid; the proof failed to show a legal tender of the amounts due. The proof, we think, amply showed the purchase and payment for the mortgage debts by the appellant.
The deed of trust was a proper charge on the estate, being complete in its terms and in its execution. And we think the appellant would have been entitled to the relief sought but for the plea of his bankruptcy.
He admitted the fact of his bankruptcy. His plea that the deed of trust had been assigned to him, as he alleges in his answer, we think, would have availed him, if it had been followed up by the proof. But we have looked in vain in the statement of facts for proof on that subject. Without such proof it is clear he could maintain n'o suit upon the debts or mortgage, they having passed to his creditors on his being adjudged a bankrupt.
Inasmuch as the cause must be affirmed, because the proof shows no cause of action on the part of the appellant, it will be unnecessary to notice the several assignments of error relied on by the appellant for a reversal of the judgment.
The judgment of the District Court is affirmed.
Opinion rendered October 14, 1873.
On Rehearing.