Case Name: David GRAHAM, Appellant, v. Junita L. GRAHAM, Appellee
Court: Mississippi Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Mississippi
Decision Date: 2000-08-22
Citations: 767 So. 2d 277
Docket Number: No. 1999-CA-00538-COA
Parties: David GRAHAM, Appellant, v. Junita L. GRAHAM, Appellee.
Judges: BEFORE McMILLIN, C.J., LEE, AND MOORE, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 767
Pages: 277–286

Head Matter:
David GRAHAM, Appellant, v. Junita L. GRAHAM, Appellee.
No. 1999-CA-00538-COA.
Court of Appeals of Mississippi.
Aug. 22, 2000.
J. Elmo Lang, Pascagoula, Attorney for Appellant.
BEFORE McMILLIN, C.J., LEE, AND MOORE, JJ.

Opinion:
MOORE, J.,
for the Court:
¶ 1. Appellant David Graham and Appel-lee Junita L. Graham were granted an irreconcilable differences divorce. The Jackson County Chancery Court ordered David Graham to pay Junita Graham $500 per month permanent alimony and $7,250 from his retirement account. Aggrieved, Appellant cites the following issues on appeal:
I. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY AWARDING $500 PER MONTH IN PERIODIC ALIMONY; AND
II. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY AWARDING JUNITA L. GRAHAM $7,250 FROM THE RETIREMENT FUND OF DAVID GRAHAM
We reverse and render the alimony award and affirm the award of $7,250 from David Graham's retirement account.
FACTS
¶ 2. Appellant David Graham and Appel-lee Junita L. Graham were married in March 1977. They separated in 1991 or 1992, approximately fourteen to fifteen years later. On July 8, 1998, approximately seven years after their separation, David initiated divorce proceedings. David charged Junita with desertion. Ju-nita counterclaimed, alleging habitual cruel and inhuman treatment or alternatively irreconcilable differences. Before trial, David and Junita agreed to an irreconcilable differences divorce and left disposition of the financial matters to the chancellor. Junita sought child support for their twenty-year-old daughter, settlement proceeds from David's pending asbestos lawsuits, alimony, and a portion of David's retirement account.
¶ 8. Upon hearing testimony that the parties' daughter was not in school, was working forty hours per week, and had a baby of her own, the chancellor ruled that the daughter was emancipated and denied Junita's request for child support. The chancellor noted that Junita never requested child support during the period she and David were separated. The chancellor further ruled that Junita was not entitled to any portion of settlement funds David received from his asbestos lawsuits. The chancellor awarded Junita $500 per month in permanent alimony. The chancellor added David's and Junita's retirement accounts together and then divided the total in half. Giving David credit for one-half of Junita's retirement account, the chancellor ordered David to pay $7,250 from his retirement account.
LAW AND ANALYSIS
¶4. As a threshold issue we note that Junita did not file a brief or otherwise oppose this appeal. In Jackson v. Walker, 240 So.2d 606 (Miss.1970), the court reversed and rendered a case in which the appellee failed to file an appellate brief, holding:
The failure to file this brief (by the appellee) is tantamount to a confession of error, and will be accepted as such, and the judgment of the court below will be reversed, since an answer to the appellant's brief cannot be safely made by us, without our doing that which the appellee, by its attorney, should have done, i.e., brief the appellee's side of the case. This we are not called on to do....
Id.
¶ 5. In Reddell v. Reddell, 696 So.2d 287, 288 (Miss.1997), the court, noting that the appellee failed to file a brief, stated: 'We have held that '[flailure to file a brief is tantamount to confession of error and will be accepted as such unless the reviewing court can say with confidence, after considering the record and brief of appealing party, that there was no error.' " Id. (citing Dethlefs v. Beau Maison Dev. Corp., 458 So.2d 714, 717 (Miss.1984)).
¶ 6. While failure to file a brief is tantamount to a confession of error:
Automatic reversal is not required where the appellee fails to file a brief. The appellant's argument "should at least create enough doubt in the judiciousness of the trial court's judgment that this Court cannot 'say with confidence that the case should be affirmed.' " Where the appellant's brief makes out an apparent case of error, however, this Court is not obligated to look to the record to find a way to avoid the force of the appellant's argument.
Selman v. Selman, 722 So.2d 547, 551 (Miss.1998) (internal cites omitted). With these guiding principals in mind, we consider whether David's brief makes out an apparent case of error.
I. DID THE TRIAL COURT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION BY AWARDING $500 PER MONTH IN PERIODIC ALIMONY?
¶ 7. Alimony awards are within the chancellor's discretion, and we may not reverse unless we find the chancellor committed manifest error in his findings of fact and abused his discretion. Ethridge v. Ethridge, 648 So.2d 1143, 1145-46 (Miss.1995). We will not disturb a chancellor's findings of fact if they are supported by credible evidence in the record. Id. at 1146. To determine whether to award permanent periodic alimony, the chancellor must consider the twelve factors enunciated in Armstrong v. Armstrong, 618 So.2d 1278, 1280 (Miss.1993).
¶ 8. The chancellor in the case sub judice recited the Armstrong factors in his oral ruling, but did not explain which factors justified his alimony award to Juni-ta. Junita earns approximately $33,000 per year as an electrical supervisor at Ingall's Shipyard. During the parties' seven-year separation, which Junita initiated, Junita never petitioned the court for child support or alimony. While Junita's financial statement indicates her monthly expenses exceeded her monthly income, the chancellor did not inquire into the necessity of these expenses, and Junita did not explain why she could not financially manage on $33,000 per year. In determining whether to award alimony, the "chancellor should consider the reasonable needs of the wife and the right of the husband to lead as normal a life as possible with a decent standard of living." Gray v. Gray, 562 So.2d 79, 83 (Miss.1990). Further, "[ajlimony is not a bounty to which [the wife] became entitled to receive indefinitely simply by reason of the fact that at one time she had been married to [the husband]." Beacham v. Beacham, 383 So.2d 146, 148 (Miss.1980). Junita was obviously able to manage without financial support from David given that she never petitioned for support during their lengthy separation. David's brief creates enough doubt in the judiciousness of the chancellor's judgment that we cannot say with confidence that the alimony award should be affirmed.
¶ 9. We are further disturbed that the chancellor did not consider fault in making the alimony determination. David and Ju-nita agreed to an irreconcilable differences divorce; therefore, fault was not an issue in the actual divorce proceedings. However, "[allowing evidence of fault in an alimony determination is a factor specifically listed in Armstrong. Nothing in that case indicates such a factor may only be considered in a fault-based divorce." Driste v. Driste, 738 So.2d 763, 765 (Miss.Ct.App.1998).
¶ 10. Junita left the marital domicile and procured living quarters for herself and her daughter. The supreme court has held:
"Under the law of this State, in the absence of evidence showing that [the wife] is ill, or that there was some other legitimate compelling reason requiring her to live separate and apart from her husband — [the husband] is not required to pay her alimony, separate maintenance, or to support her, so long as she wrongfully refuses to return to her conjugal duties."
Cox v. Cox, 183 So.2d 921, 924 (Miss.1966). We are aware that fault is not always an absolute bar to alimony. Hammonds v. Hammonds, 597 So.2d 653, 654 (Miss.1992) (citing Retzer v. Retzer, 578 So.2d 580, 593 (Miss.1990)). However, in cases where alimony is awarded to a spouse at fault, it is "not to enable the wife to maintain the lifestyle to which she had been accustomed, but to prevent her from destitu tion." Id. In the case sub judice, there is no evidence that Junita would be rendered destitute by denial of alimony.
¶ 11. Given that the chancellor did not inquire into Junita's reasonable need of support, and that he did not consider Juni-ta's fault for alimony purposes, we find that David made an apparent case of error on the alimony issue. We deem Junita's failure to file a brief a confession of error and hereby reverse the alimony award and render judgment in David's favor.
II. DID THE TRIAL COURT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION BY AWARDING JUNITA L. GRAHAM $7,250 FROM THE RETIREMENT FUND OF DAVID GRAHAM?
¶ 12. David argues that the chancellor should have looked at the value of his and Junita's retirement funds at the time of their separation and not at the time of the divorce; however, David cited no authority to support this assertion. The Mississippi Supreme Court "has consistently held that an unsupported assignment of error will not be considered." Ellis v. Ellis, 651 So.2d 1068, 1072 (Miss.1995). Even had David cited authority to support this assertion, there was no evidence regarding the value of the parties' respective retirement funds as of the separation date. David did not make an apparent case of error.
¶ 18. Given the concern Judge Irving raised in his separate opinion, we will ad-di'ess the merits of this issue. Judge Irving directs our attention to Godwin v. Godwin, 758 So.2d 384 (Miss.1999), a recent Mississippi Supreme Court case which is similar to the case sub judice. In Godwin, the court affirmed the chancellor's decision to consider the husband's retirement account as separate property where the husband began contributing to the account several years after an order for separate maintenance had been entered. The court stated:
It is true, of course, that neither the Legislature nor this Court has ever recognized the concept of a "legal separation" in this State's divorce law, and we do not do so in this case. However, an order for separate maintenance is recognized and is viable. Under the circumstances of this case, the order creates a point of demarcation with respect to the parties and their estates.
Id. at (¶ 6) (emphasis added).
¶ 14. The case sub judice differs from Godwin in two respects. First, the parties' respective retirement accounts were in existence before the separation; David simply asked the chancellor to consider his post-separation contributions as separate property. Second, there was no separate maintenance order in the present case. Unlike Godwin, there was no clear line of demarcation as to what date David and Junita ceased being a family unit. There is a separation date to which both parties agree; however, the parties continued to have financial ties. Specifically, Junita kept David on her medical insurance policy during the separation period, and David filed a claim on the policy after the separation. Further, there was evidence at trial that before the parties' separation, Junita had withdrawn approximately $5,000 from her retirement account to pay marital expenses during a period when she and David were both unemployed. Considering these facts, we can find no error in the chancellor's finding that the parties' retirement accounts should be equally divided. Thus, we affirm.
¶ 15. JUDGMENT OF THE JACKSON COUNTY CHANCERY COURT AWARDING JUNITA GRAHAM $500 PERIODIC PERMANENT ALIMONY IS HEREBY REVERSED AND RENDERED AND JUDGMENT AWARDING JUNITA GRAHAM $7,250 FROM DAVID GRAHAM'S RETIREMENT FUND IS AFFIRMED. COSTS OF APPEAL ARE TO BE EQUALLY DIVIDED BETWEEN APPELLANT AND AP-PELLEE.
McMILLIN, C.J., LEE, AND THOMAS, JJ., CONCUR. IRVING, J., CONCURRING IN PART, DISSENTING IN PART WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION JOINED BY KING AND SOUTHWICK, P.JJ., AND BRIDGES, J. PAYNE, J., DISSENTS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION. MYERS, J., NOT PARTICIPATING.