Case Name: The Inhabitants of Seekonk vs. The Inhabitants of Rehoboth
Court: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
Jurisdiction: Massachusetts
Decision Date: 1851-10
Citations: 8 Cush. 371
Docket Number: 
Parties: The Inhabitants of Seekonk vs. The Inhabitants of Rehoboth.
Judges: 
Reporter: Massachusetts Reports
Volume: 62
Pages: 371–374

Head Matter:
The Inhabitants of Seekonk vs. The Inhabitants of Rehoboth.
In computing the thirty days, within which a town,liable for the support of a pauper, is required, by the Rev. Sts. c. 46, § 15, to remove him from the town in which he has received support, in order to exempt the former from liability therefor at a greater rate than one dollar a week, the day, on which notice is received that the support has been furnished, is to be excluded.
This was an action of assumpsit, to recover the sum of thirty-one dollars and sixty-nine cents, for the support of Joseph C. Barney, a pauper, whose settlement was admitted to be in the town of Rehoboth.
It was agreed, that the pauper first fell into distress and stood in need of immediate relief, on the 6th of March, 1848, and that the expenses of his support, claimed by the plaintiffs in this action, commenced on that day; that the overseers of Seekonk gave notice to the defendants by letter, dated March 7th, 1848, that they had furnished assistance to the pauper, and claimed the same of the defendants; that the letter was mailed March 8th, 1848, and was received in the post-office of Rehoboth, after seven o’clock on the evening of March 9th, 1848 ; that the defendants removed the pauper from Seekonk to Rehoboth, on the 8th of April, 1848, and before seven o’clock in the afternoon of that day.
At the return term of the action, the defendants tendered to the plaintiffs the sum of six dollars, and paid the same into court, and also offered to pay the plaintiffs’ costs up to the time of the tender.
It was agreed, that if upon the foregoing facts the plaintiffs were entitled to recover more than the amount tendered as above, judgment should be entered for the plaintiffs, for the amount sued for, deducting the amount of the tender; otherwise, judgment was to be entered for the defendants for their costs accrued subsequent to the tender to the time of final judgment.
Upon this statement of facts, the court of common pleas rendered judgment for the defendants, and the plaintiffs thereupon appealed to this court.
C. I. Reed, for the plaintiffs.
In strict justice and equity, the plaintiffs are clearly entitled to recover the full amount claimed of the defendants, in whose town the settlement of the pauper is admitted to be. Andover v. Canton, 13 Mass. 547. The defendants rely on Rev. Sts. c. 46, § 15, which provide that “ when any person shall be supported in any town, other than that in which he has his settlement, the town that is liable for his support shall not, in any case, be required to pay therefor more than at the rate of one dollar a week; provided the town that is liable for the support of the pauper shall cause him to be removed within thirty days from the Lime of receiving legal notice that such support has been furnished.” This statute is to be construed strictly against the defendants. Ware v. Wilbraham, 4 Pick. 45; Seekonk v. Attleborough, 7 Pick. 155; Webster v. Uxbridge, 13 Met. 198.
The only question in this case is whether, in computing the thirty days mentioned in the statute, the 9th of March, being the day on which the notice was received by the defendants, is to be included or excluded. And the plaintiffs contend that it should be included. See, on this point, Pugh v. Leeds, Cowp. 714; Castle v. Burditt, 3 T. R. 623 ; Ex parte Fallon, 5 T. R. 283; Glassington v. Rawlins, 3 East, 407 ; Henry v. Jones, 8 Mass. 453; Blanchard v. Hilliard, 11 Mass. 85 ; Woodbridge v. Brigham, 12 Mass. 403, and 13 Mass. 556; Presbrey v. Williams, 15 Mass. 193 ; Portland Bank v. Maine Bank, 11 Mass. 204; Bigelow v. Willson, 1 Pick. 485; Wheeler v. Bent, 4 Pick. 167; Wiggin v. Peters, 1 Met. 127. No definite rule can be drawn from these decisions, which are apparently conflicting. Each case has been decided on its own merits, and in every instance the court have so decided as to do strict justice between the parties. And that is all we ask in this case.
N. Morton and E. H Bennett, for the defendants,
relied on Bigelow v. Willson, 1 Pick. 494; Wiggin v. Peters, 1 Met. 127; Windsor v. China, 4 Greenl. 298.

Opinion:
Shaw, C. J.
The removal of a pauper, by the town of his settlement, within thirty days from the time of receiving legal notice, from the town relieving the pauper, that such support has been furnished, according to Rev. Sts. c. 46, § 15, is a strict condition precedent, which must be complied with, to exempt the town of his settlement from the payment of the actual cost of such support. Webster v. Uxbridge, 13 Met. 198.
The notice was received by the defendants on the 9th of March, and the removal was effected on the 8th of April. Whether the removal was in time turns on the controverted question, whether the day, on which the notice was to be received, is to be counted as one of the thirty. We consider it now well settled as a general rule, that when an act is to be done, within a given number of days from the date, or day of the date, or act done, the day of the date is excluded; otherwise, an act to be done in one day must be done on the same day; and as there is no fraction of a day, such stipulation must create an' obligation to do it instanter Among the numerous cases we shall cite only the two latest. Wiggin v. Peters, 1 Met. 127; Windsor v. China, 4 Greenl. 298.
According to this rule, notice having been received on the 9th of March, the 10th was the first of the term of thirty, and the 8th of April the last, including the whole of that day. Within such term of thirty days the removal was effected, and the condition of the statute complied with.
Judgment for the defendants.