Case Name: Chambers Estate
Court: Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
Jurisdiction: Pennsylvania
Decision Date: 1970-03-25
Citations: 438 Pa. 22
Docket Number: Appeal, No. 208
Parties: Chambers Estate.
Judges: Before Bell, O. J., Jones, Cohen, Eagen, O’Brien, Roberts and Pomeroy, JJ.
Reporter: Pennsylvania State Reports
Volume: 438
Pages: 22–37

Head Matter:
Chambers Estate.
Argued October 9, 1969.
Before Bell, O. J., Jones, Cohen, Eagen, O’Brien, Roberts and Pomeroy, JJ.
Stephen I. Riehman, with him Greenlee, Riehman, Derrico & Posa, for appellant.
Jonathan Allison, with him Schmidt, Allison & Townsend, for appellee.
March 25, 1970:

Opinion:
Opinion by
Mr. Justice Jones,
James B. Chambers (testator) left a will creating a trust, the income of which was to be paid to his daughter, Hazel McGill, for her life. After Hazel's death, the income was to be distributed as follows: "Upon her death I direct the income to be paid to her children, if any, and for and during their lives."
This appeal requires a determination of the circumstances, if any, under which testator's grandchild, who was adopted after testator's death, may share in the bequest to the "children" of testator's daughter.
On December 6, 1929, Hazel, who had been married for twelve years but could have no children of her own, adopted a son, Paul McGill. Hazel's father, James B. Chambers, executed his will on December 12, 1930, including the bequest to Hazel's "children, if any." Paul McGill died from an accident in September, 1931, and on May 6, 1933, the testator died. The appellant, William McGill, was adopted by Hazel on October 19, 1937. Until her death on May 2, 1966, the trust income was distributed to the appellant's mother, Hazel McGill, and, after her death, the sum of $625, representing unpaid accrued income from the trust up to June 1, 1966, was paid to the appellant. Thereafter, the appellant obtained a citation from the Orphans' Court requiring the trustee to show cause why the future trust income should not be paid to him. After a hearing, appellant's petition was dismissed. From that decree appellant took this appeal.
Under the Wills Act of 1947, P. L. 89, §22, 20 P.S. §180.22, the will of any person who died prior to January 1, 1948, is governed by the Wills Act of 1917. The presently pertinent portion of the 1917 Act reads as follows: "Whenever in any will a bequest or devise shall be made to the child or children of any person other than the testator, without naming such child or children, such bequest or devise shall be construed to include any adopted child or children of such other person who were adopted before the date of the will, unless a contrary intention shall appear by the will " Act of June 7, 1917, P. L. 403, §16(b), 20 P.S. Ch. 2, App. §228 (emphasis added).
Although the section does not explicitly pertain to after-adopted children, this Court has stated that the effect of this rule of construction is to exclude from a bequest to "children" of a person other than the testator, a child who was adopted after the will was executed. Holton Estate, 399 Pa. 241, 247, 159 A. 2d 883, 886 (1960). However, artificial rules of testamentary construction have been legislatively and judicially created merely to aid in what is always the primary goal— to ascertain and to give effect to the testamentary purposes of the testator. Therefore, where the testator's actual intent can be ascertained, such intent must prevail over any artificially-deduced "intent" which the rules of construction might dictate. Id. at 244, 159 A. 2d at 885. We will only resort to such rules of construction if the will is unclear or the testator's actual intent is uncertain. Houston Estate, 414 Pa. 579, 586, 201 A. 2d 592, 595 (1964).
The intent of the testator may be gathered from a consideration of four items: the language of the will itself, the scheme of distribution, the factual situation as of the date of execution of the will, and the existing factual situation. Id. (and cases cited therein). In the case at bar, unimpeached and uncontradicted evidence was presented at the hearing which indicated: that Hazel McGill could not have children and, therefore, adopted Paul; that this fact was common knowledge in the community of about 1,300 people; that the testator was a leading figure in the area and was well aware of local affairs; that the testator was very close to his daughter, Hazel, and doted upon his adopted grandson, Paul; and that the testator did, in fact, know that Paul had been adopted and that Hazel could bear no children of her own. In short, the appellant's evidence clearly established that when James B. Chambers executed his will he knew that Hazel could have no children and that she had adopted Paul. The appellee presented no evidence bearing on this question.
We return, now, to the will itself wherein a bequest is made to Hazel's "children." Because of the factual situation in 1930, when the will was written, the only natural interpretation that could conceivably be given this bequest is that the testator intended to provide for his adopted grandson, Paul McGill, and for any other children adopted by Hazel in the future. Any other explanation would not only be absurd under the facts of this case, but would render the bequest nugatory. A testator is presumed not to have included mere surplusage in his will. Benedum Estate, 427 Pa. 408, 415-16, 235 A. 2d 129, 133 (1967). By his use of the plural noun, "children," the testator evidenced an intent to include in his bequest any child or children which Hazel might have in addition to the one child, Paul, who had already been adopted. Since the testator knew that Hazel could only have additional children by adoption, he must have intended to provide for these children. The provision for Hazel's "children" makes utterly no sense unless it was intended to include after-adopted children.
The court below relied upon the following language from Holton Estate, 399 Pa. 241, 247, 159 A. 2d 883, 886 (1960), as dispositive of the instant case: "An examination of this statute clearly reveals the legislative intent: to include within the term 'child' or 'children' of a person other than the testator an adopted 'child' or 'children' provided, however, that such adoption took place before the execution of the will, and to exclude such adopted child or children if the adoption took place after the execution of the will." However, we made it perfectly clear in that case that a prerequisite to the application of the quoted rule is the absence of any indication of what was the testator's actual intent. In Holton Estate, we found no such indication on the following facts: the will provided for the testator's son, Howard, and for Howard's children; Howard's wife, not Howard, was incapable of having children; and, no children were adopted by Howard until almost four years after the testator's death. On those facts, it would be equally plausible to either find that the testator did or that he did not intend to include adopted children in his will. Accordingly, we were forced to resort to the legislative rule of construction in the Act of 1917.
Fortunately, in the case at bar we have ample evidence from which to ascertain the testator's actual intent. There are three factors present in the instant case which require us to reach a different result from the Holton case. First, as the testator knew, Hazel herself was incapable of bearing natural children, not, as in Holton, her spouse. Second, Hazel had already adopted one son at the time that the will was executed. Third, Hazel and her father had a very close relationship, and she and her son spent a great deal of time with the testator. All these facts make it clear that the testator in the instant case was a concerned and devoted father and grandfather who wished to provide for Hazel's children, regardless of any legal distinctions drawn between relationship by adoption and relationship by blood. William James McGill is entitled to take under his grandfather's will as one of Hazel McGill's "children:"
Decree reversed; costs on the estate.
Among the many witnesses who testified to these facts, either by sworn affidavit or by testimony, were: Kay Ghrist, a close friend of Hazel and James McGill; A. M. Struzka, Sr., a former employee of the testator; John MeKain, a close friend of the testator; Virginia Dickinson, a close friend of both Hazel McGill and the testator; and Maude Braiden, the testator's widow.
The appellee has objected to the evidence as being hearsay and, therefore, inadmissible. Certain portions of some of the affidavits consisted of statements by the declarant as to what he had been told by another. We have, of course, excluded these sections from our consideration. However, the crux of most of these statements was to the effect that it was a matter of common knowledge throughout this small community that Hazel had adopted Paul and that she could have no children of her own. To this extent, the statements were merely stating a known fact and did not constitute hearsay. We also note that some of the testimony explicitly stated the fact that James B. Chambers knew of Hazel's condition. This, too, would not be hearsay.
In Holton, it was possible that Howard might remarry and then have natural children.
Cf. Fownes Trust, 421 Pa. 476, 481-82, 220 A. 2d 8, 11-12 (1966) (dissenting opinion).