Case Name: In re BENSEL et al., Board of Water Supply
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1911-12-28
Citations: 133 N.Y.S. 84
Docket Number: 
Parties: In re BENSEL et al., Board of Water Supply.
Judges: 
Reporter: West's New York Supplement
Volume: 133
Pages: 84–91

Head Matter:
In re BENSEL et al., Board of Water Supply.
(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Department.
December 28, 1911.)
1. Eminent Domain (§ 107 )—Damages—Awabd.
The damages specified in Laws 1905, c. 724, § 42, providing that any person owning property not actually taken, but which will be damaged by the taking of other property for a source for a water supply for New York City, shall be entitled to damages, should, where the fee of a part of a person’s land is condemned, be ascertained as a part of the damage of that condemnation, and an award for damages caused by the acquisition of the fee which excepted any damage which might be done to the. owner’s business was erroneous.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Eminent Domain, Cent. Dig. §§ 291, 293; Dec. Dig. § 107.*]
2. ' Eminent Domain (§ 265*)—Damages—Recommendation by Commission.
Under Laws 1905, c. 724, §§ 13, 32, respectively, providing that the commissioners of appraisal of land condemned for a water supply for New York City may recommend such sums as shall seem to them proper to be allowed as expenses and disbursements, and that fees shall not he paid until taxed in the Supreme Court in the district in which the lands are situated, the failure of the commissioners to recommend an allowance of costs and counsel fees does not deprive the court of power to grant such costs upon confirming the commissioners’ report.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Eminent Domain, Dec. Dig. § 265.*]
Betts, J., dissenting.
Appeal from Special Term, Ulster County.
In the matter of the application and petition of John A. Bensel and others, constituting the Board of Water Supply of the City of New York, to acquire real estate for the purpose of providing an additional supply of pure and wholesome water. From an order confirming the report of the Commissioners of Appraisal awarding damages to the claimants Levi E. Dumond and another, the Board appeals.
Order affirmed upon condition.
Argued before SMITH, P. J., and KELLOGG, HOUGHTON, SEWELL, and BETTS, JJ.
Archibald R. Watson (William McM. Speer, of counsel), for appellant.
Arthur A. Brown (H. T. Slosson, of counsel), for respondent.
For other cases see same topic & § nombek in Dec. & Am. bigs. 1907 to date, & Rep’r Indexes

Opinion:
SMITH, P. J.
Upon May 22, 1909, the commission was appointed which had jurisdiction of the claim in question. That commission was appointed upon a petition of the board of water supply of the city of New York for the appointment thereof "to ascertain and appraise the compensation to be made to the owners of and all persons interested in the real estate laid down on said maps as proposed to be taken or affected for the purposes indicated in said act, and to exercise and discharge all the powers and duties conferred upon commissioners^ of appraisal by said acts or the acts amendatory thereof or relating thereto." Thereafter and upon August 25, 1910, the claimants Levi E. Dumond and Nellie Dumond filed their claim. In their notice of claim it was stated that the claim did not include damages to claimant provided for under section 42 of chapter 724 of the Laws of 1905, as amended by section 8 -of chapter 725 of the Laws of 1905, or indirect damages provided by section 3 of chapter 723 of the Laws of 1905. The claimant demanded $30,000 damages, together with expenses and disbursements, including compensation for witnesses, allowance for counsel fees of 5 per cent, of the amount of the award made for said real estate, and costs. This claim was tried before the commission, and during its trial the following colloquy occurred:
"By Mr. Slosson: Q. I want you to tell the commission, as near as you can, what have been the cash receipts from your business, year by year, for the last five years. I ask this question, not for the purpose of proving damages to the business, but merely for the purpose of showing the amount of business that has been carried on at this place.
"Mr. Grogan: I object to that as incompetent on the further ground that the commission has no jurisdiction to go into that.
"Mr. Slosson: I don't ask it for the purpose of proving the value of the business.
"The Chairman: Why do you ask it?
"Mr. Slosson: Simply to show the amount of business which was done here.
"Mr. Grogan: I object to it on the further ground that the value of real estate does not depend on the amount of business done at that particular place.
"The Chairman: Objection sustained.
"Mr. Slosson: Exception.
"Mr. Grogan: If the court please, I desire to renew my motion to strike out the testimony of Mr. Garl, Frank Matthews, Delancey Matthews, and Mr. Hasbrouck, on the ground that any of the witnesses were not shown to be qualified to testify to the value of real estate at West Hurley, and on the further ground that all of the witnesses have admitted that in making up the value of the real estate they were guided entirely by estimating what the profits would be by a successful business man, and all of them "have admitted on cross-examination that they would not be guided by what the actual cost of the buildings were, or what the market value of the real estate in that community has been or was at the time the city acquired title.
"The Chairman: I have noted the peculiar features of their testimony, but I think their evidence has some value upon the question of the value of this property, and the motion is denied.
"Mr. Grogan: Exception."
After the trial before the commission, the report of the commissioners was duly made, and contained this recital:
"The amount ascertained and determined by us as aforesaid to be paid to the owners of and all persons interested in the said land for the acquisition of the fee of the premises designated on said map as parcel 916, and for all damages sustained or which may be sustained by them by reason of the acquisition, use, and occupation of the said fee for the purposes indicated in said act, is the sum of $14,000."
Upon motion of the claimant this award and appraisal were confirmed by the Special Term by the order from which this appeal is taken. In that order is included what has been called the "business proviso." That is a clause providing that the order should.not be construed as precluding the above-mentioned owner from presenting or prosecuting any claim that he might have for damages for the decrease in value of any established business owned or carried on by him, and that it should not constitute a bar to the enforcement of such claim, if any such claim he had, and that the order should not be construed as an adjudication or opinion as to the evidence of any such claim. It was further provided in the order that expenses and disbursements to the amount of $241.64, including reasonable compensation for witnesses, should be allowed, and $700 for counsel fee.
There has been no appeal from the report, or appraisal of the commissioners, and this appeal raises no question as to the amount or validity of that award. Two questions only are raised by the appellant: First. That the order should not have contained this so-called "business proviso." Secondly. That the order should not have adjudicated the costs and disbursements without a recommendation by the commissioners pursuant to sections 13 and 32 of the water supply act.
Upon the first question, the rights of the parties have been much clarified by the opinion of the Court of Appeals in People of State of New York ex rel. Burhans v. City of New York, reported in 198 N. Y. 439, 92 N. E. 18. In that case the city had proceeded to condemn the real estate of one Lasher, and compensation had been adjudicated therefor. Upon the trial before the commissioners the city had made the contention that the commissioners had no jurisdiction to determine the damage to any established business, and that contention had been sustained by the commissioners. Thereafter Lasher sought to mandamus the city to commence proceedings to determine the loss to his business under the act. That mandamus was granted at Special Term, and the order granting the same was affirmed by the Appellate Division and by the Court of Appeals. Judge Werner, among other things, in writing for the court, says:
"We think the statutes under consideration contemplate the determination oí ail such claims in the original proceedings instituted to acquire lands upon which such business was carried on, and that is the practice which the claimant herein sought to invoke. The commissioners should have taken her evidence as to damages and determined her claim in the proceedings to acquire the land upon which her business had been carried on. As that right was denied to her, she will be without remedy unless she can compel the city authorities to institute a separate proceeding for the determination of her claim. The attitude of the appellants has made that the law of this proceeding. Such application can only be enforced by mandamus, and the relator is therefore clearly entitled to the writ."
In the case cited the question arose after the award for land damage had been made and confirmed. Here the question is raised upon the application to confirm the award before the proceeding has been closed.
The award of the commissioners is "for the acquisition of the fee of the premises designated on said map as parcel 916 and for all damages sustained or which may be sustained by them by reason of the acquisition, use, and occupation of said fee for the purposes indicated in said act." This award is in terms broad enough to include damages under section 42 of the act as well as for the fee. If then this award is to be construed and its effect limited, it should, I think, be limited by the commission itself, and not by the court. This is especially so in the case at bar, where there is much evidence of at least doubtful competency if a claim for land damage only was being investigated. If it be suggested that this court may send the case back to the commission for a further report, it would seem more proper, in view of the nature of the proof offered to sustain the claim, that the commission should be instructed to take evidence of all of.the damages, direct and indirect, which follow from the acquisition of this land by the city, and that all of such damages be included in one award.
As to the other question raised upon the allowance of witness fees and counsel fee to the claimants, we think the appellants have failed to establish their claim. By section 13 of the act (chapter 724, Laws of 1905) it is provided that the commission may also recommend such sums, if any, as shall seem to them proper to be allowed to parties appearing in the proceeding as expenses and disbursements, including reasonable compensation for witnesses. It is provided in section 32:
. "Such fees and expenses (probably including these fees and expenses in question) shall not be paid until they have been taxed before a justice of the Supreme Court in the judicial district in which the lands or some part thereof are situated upon eight days notice to the corporation counsel of the city of New York."
The failure of the commissioners to recommend an allowance of costs and counsel fee, as provided by section 13, clearly does not deprive the court of the power to award such costs upon the confirmation of the report. The appellant has not included in the record the notice of motion to confirm the report. In the absence of a motion before the Special Term to correct the order made we may assume that such notice of motion gave to the corporation counsel the notice required by the statute and authorizes the judge presiding at Special Term to tax the witness fees and counsel fee at the amounts specified in the order. From these views the conclusion follows that the so-called "business proviso" should be stricken from the order. If claimants elect to abandon further claims for indirect damages and so stipulate, the order as amended may stand. If such stipulation be not filed, the matter is referred back to the same commission to take evidence as to all damages, direct and indirect, which have resulted from the acquisition by the city of the land in question and to include in its report compensation therefor.
Order modified as per opinion. All concur, except BETTS, J., dissenting in opinion.