Case Name: Jack Wayne FRIEND, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. Ronald KOLODZIECZAK, et al., Defendants-Appellants
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 1992-05-19
Citations: 965 F.2d 682
Docket Number: No. 90-16140
Parties: Jack Wayne FRIEND, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. Ronald KOLODZIECZAK, et al., Defendants-Appellants.
Judges: Before: PREGERSON, FERGUSON, and O’SCANNLAIN, Circuit Judges.
Reporter: Federal Reporter 2d Series
Volume: 965
Pages: 682–691

Head Matter:
Jack Wayne FRIEND, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. Ronald KOLODZIECZAK, et al., Defendants-Appellants.
No. 90-16140.
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
Argued and Submitted Oct. 9, 1991.
Decided May 19, 1992.
Maureen C. Brooks and Richard Reynolds, Bennett, Samuelsen, Reynolds & Al-lard, Oakland, Cal., for defendants-appellants.
Sue Ochs, Law Offices of Amitai Schwartz, San Francisco, Cal., for plaintiffs-appellees.
Before: PREGERSON, FERGUSON, and O’SCANNLAIN, Circuit Judges.

Opinion:
PREGERSON, Circuit Judge:
This appeal presents the question whether the district court properly found appellees to be "prevailing parties" for an award of attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. We have jurisdiction to review the district court's decision under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
A group of Roman Catholic jail inmates filed a class action suit against officials of Alameda County under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging violations of their constitutional right to free exercise of religion. Jack Friend is the named class representative in this suit.
Some issues were settled before trial. The only remaining free exercise claim at trial concerned the right of jail inmates to keep rosary beads and scapulars with them at all times. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Alameda County officials. The court concluded that jail policy prohibiting religious articles in prisoners' cells was permissible under the Turner standard. The court's order was, however, contingent upon submission by the officials of a revised prison manual setting forth prisoners' limited rights to possess religious articles.
DISCUSSION
A district court may award attorney's fees to the prevailing party in an action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Sablan v. Department of Fin., 856 F.2d 1317 (9th Cir.1988). We review the district court's finding of prevailing party status for clear error. Lummi Indian Tribe v. Oltman, 720 F.2d 1124, 1125 (9th Cir.1983); Sablan, 856 F.2d at 1324. "We must reverse, however, if the district court used incorrect legal standards to reach this finding." Lummi Indian Tribe, 720 F.2d at 1125.
As an initial matter, we note that a litigant need not succeed on every claim to qualify as the prevailing party. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 1939, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983). Rather, a party may recover its attorney's fees if it "succeedfs] on any significant issue in litigation which achieves some of the benefit . sought in bringing suit." Id. (quoting Nadeau v. Helgemoe, 581 F.2d 275, 278-79 (1st Cir.1978)). Moreover, the inmates may be considered prevailing parties even though they did not gain formal judicial relief. Hanrahan v. Hampton, 446 U.S. 754, 757, 100 S.Ct. 1987, 1989, 64 L.Ed.2d 670 (1980) (per curiam); Sablan, 856 F.2d at 1324; Muckleshoot Tribe v. Puget Sound Power & Light, 875 F.2d 695, 696 (9th Cir.1989). In the present case, the district court concluded that the inmates prevailed because they succeeded either completely or partially on their free exercise claims. As the district court found, Alameda County officials took actions before trial that gave the inmates benefits they sought in filing suit. The inmates also benefited from the conditional summary judgment motion.
In the absence of formal relief, we focus on whether the inmates have "established a 'clear, causal relationship between the litigation brought and the practical outcome realized.' " Sablan, 856 F.2d at 1324 (quoting Rutherford v. Pitchess, 713 F.2d 1416, 1419 (9th Cir.1983)) (emphasis in original). We apply a two-part test to resolve this question. Sablan, 856 F.2d at 1325. First, we determine whether this lawsuit actually brought about benefits initially sought by the inmate class. Id. Second, we examine whether the inmates' claims had a legal basis. Id.
We agree with the district court that the necessary causal link was established between Friend's class action and changes in jail policy. The district court found that the inmates succeeded on the issue of access to religion in a pre-trial settlement. In response to Friend's class action, jail officials agreed to hold separate Roman Catholic services and to diligently arrange and coordinate policies on prisoners' rights to practice religion. The district court concluded correctly that the pre-litigation settlement materially altered the legal relationship of the parties. This is "[t]he touchstone of the prevailing party inquiry." Texas State Teachers Assn. v. Garland Indep. Sch. Dist., 489 U.S. 782, 792-93, 109 S.Ct. 1486, 1493-94, 103 L.Ed.2d 866 (1989).
The district court also found that plaintiffs partially prevailed on their claim for inmate possession of religious articles. Before commencement of this action, the jail policy manual was silent on the rights of inmates to use religious articles. County jail officials revised the manual in response to the district court's conditional summary judgment order. The revised manual explicitly recognized an inmate's right to limited use of religious articles. The district court found, and we agree, that a causal relationship existed between the inmates' suit and the changes in jail policy.
We turn now to the second part of the test to analyze whether the inmates' claims had a legal basis. Sablan, 856 F.2d at 1327. Alameda County officials contend that the inmates' claims had no legal basis because the actions taken by the County were not constitutionally mandated.
We reject this contention. In this context, our evaluation of the merits of a litigant's claims is extremely narrow. Andrew v. Bowen, 837 F.2d 875, 877 (9th Cir.1988). Our inquiry is "strictly limited to determining whether the claims asserted are 'frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless.' " Id. at 878 (quoting Ortiz de Arroyo v. Barcelo, 765 F.2d 275, 282 (1st Cir.1985)).
Our review reveals no basis for concluding that the inmates' claims were frivolous. We agree with the district court that the inmates raised legitimate issues related to their free exercise rights. Indeed, the district court conditioned its grant of summary judgment in favor of the county officials upon revision of the prison manual precisely because the inmates' free exercise claims were colorable. The district court's finding that the inmates' claims had a legal basis was not erroneous.
CONCLUSION
We conclude that the class of Roman Catholic inmates prevailed against the Alameda North County Jail within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1988. The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
.In their initial complaint, the inmates sought improved access to religion by way of private confessions and separate Roman Catholic services. This issue was resolved before trial.
. Rosary beads are used to count prayers while praying. Scapulars are symbols of Mary, the mother of Jesus.
. In Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89, 107 S.Ct. 2254, 2261, 96 L.Ed.2d 64 (1987), the Supreme Court stated that "when a prison regulation im pinges on inmates' constitutional rights, the regulation is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests." Reasonableness is determined by a four-part test: (1) whether the regulation is rationally related to the legitimate government interest invoked to justify it; (2) whether the regulation leaves open an alternative way for prison inmates to exercise the right asserted; (3) the impact that accommodation of the asserted right will have on guards, other inmates, and prison resources; and (4) the absence of ready alternatives to the regulation. Id. at 89-90, 107 S.Ct. at 2261-62.
. Our recent decision in Romberg v. Nichols, 953 F.2d 1152 (9th Cir.1992) is consistent with our holding in this case and with Ninth Circuit precedent. Like the Rombergs, the class of inmates is a prevailing party within the meaning of § 1988 because it succeeded on a significant issue. The form of that victory is not disposi-tive.
In Romberg, the jury found that the defendant police officers were liable for violating the Rombergs' Fourth Amendment rights. The jury awarded only nominal damages of one dollar. Romberg, at 1155. The district court then granted the Rombergs' motion for attorney's fees under § 1988, and the government appealed that decision. Id. at 1155.
We held that the Rombergs were prevailing parties within the meaning of § 1988, and rejected the argument that their victory was too insignificant to justify an award of attorney's fees. Id. at 1158. Specifically, we held that the amount of damages awarded the Rombergs was not dispositive. Id. at 1158-59. Rather, the jury's finding that the police officers were liable for violating the Rombergs' Fourth Amendment rights was sufficient to establish prevailing party status under § 1988. Romberg, at 1157. ("the Rombergs prevailed on a significant issue, and they prevailed on the merits before a jury"); see Texas State Teachers Assn. v. Garland Indep. Sch. Dist., 489 U.S. 782, 792-93, 109 S.Ct. 1486, 1493-94, 103 L.Ed.2d 866 (1989) ("[t]he touchstone of the prevailing party inquiry must be the material alteration of the legal relationship of the parties").
Our holding turned on the significance of the issue on which the Rombergs prevailed, and we rejected the argument that nominal damages reflected an insignificant victory. Romberg did not change established law that formal judicial relief is not necessary to support prevailing party status under § 1988. See e.g., Maher v. Gagne, 448 U.S. 122, 129, 100 S.Ct. 2570, 2575, 65 L.Ed.2d 653 (1980) ("Nothing in . § 1988 conditions the District Court's power to award (attorney] fees . on a judicial determination that the plaintiff's rights have been violated.... [P]arties may be considered to have prevailed . without formally obtaining relief.").
. Although the dissenting opinion asserts otherwise, it is clear that distinctly Roman Catholic services were one of the benefits sought by the inmates in filing this suit. The inmates specifically complained of the lack of scheduled Roman Catholic religious services, as distinguished from the fundamentalist Protestant services that were available.
. The dissenting opinion suggests that this suit was simply a dispute between a Catholic lay minister and the Bishop, or between a Catholic lay minister and a Protestant minister, and that jail officials played no role in the absence of Catholic services. The jail conceded, however, that only a Protestant group operated in the jail after December, 1987, and that the jail captain asked the Catholics to "defer" their request to be allowed a time to conduct a Catholic service, until some indeterminate date in the future when a new chaplain would be hired. The record also indicates that Catholic Charities sent a letter to the jail captain requesting "a timeslot for a Catholic worship service" and that he responded, "I do not intend to alter the program until the Chaplain's position is filled." Thus it is undisputed that the only scheduled religious service in the jail was operated by a fundamentalist Protestant ministry, and that the Catholics' request to likewise have a scheduled service was indefinitely postponed by the jail.
.Alameda County officials argue that the attorney's fees awarded here are excessive as a matter of law. The officials do not argue that the district court calculated the fee amount improperly. Instead, they merely contend that the inmates did not achieve their goals. This argument simply restates their objection to the district court's finding that the class of inmates is a prevailing party within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1988. Because we uphold the district court's decision, we need not pursue this claim further.