Case Name: J.W. HENRY v. STATE of Mississippi
Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Mississippi
Decision Date: 1986-02-05
Citations: 486 So. 2d 1209
Docket Number: No. 54719
Parties: J.W. HENRY v. STATE of Mississippi.
Judges: PATTERSON, C.J., WALKER and ROY NOBLE LEE, P.JJ., and HAWKINS and ANDERSON, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 486
Pages: 1209–1222

Head Matter:
J.W. HENRY v. STATE of Mississippi.
No. 54719.
Supreme Court of Mississippi.
Feb. 5, 1986.
Rehearing Denied May 7, 1986.
James G. Tucker III, Cook, Tucker & Sharp, Bay St. Louis, for appellant.
Bill Allain, Atty. Gen. by Henry C. Clay, III, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., Edwin Lloyd Pittman, Atty. Gen. by Gail Lowery, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., Jackson, for appellee.

Opinion:
DAN M. LEE, Justice,
for the Court:
This appeal arises out of a burglary conviction in Hancock County for which J.W. Henry was sentenced to five years imprisonment. On appeal, Henry asserts that the trial court lacked jurisdiction, and that an inculpatory statement he made should not have been admitted into evidence. Finding no reversible error, we affirm.
Beyond the substantial legal issues tendered, the prolongation of the processing and adjudication of this appeal is a matter of great concern. In the six years that have come and gone since he was convicted on this burglary, J.W. Henry has completed the service of his sentence. Although we here affirm, such laxity and delay is most disturbing.
On the afternoon of November 2, 1978, a two-door, hardtop, cream and gold Pontiac drove up to the rear of the home of Richard E. Grayson in Waveland, Mississippi. The car contained three or four young black men. Some of the young men exited the vehicle. Two stood around outside while one apparently entered the house. Moments later, Will Hines, a neighbor, approached the Grayson home and asked one of the two young men outside the house what they were doing. This conversation — and his observation of Grayson's stereo set outside the house — caused Hines to suspect that the Grayson home was being burglarized. He returned to his home and called the police.
In response to Hines's call, the police arrived and, with Hines's assistance, determined that the Grayson home had been burglarized. Hines furnished a description of the vehicle used during the commission of the burglary. In due course, the police located a vehicle matching that description and photographed it. Hines was shown this photograph and two or three photographs of other cars. He identified the photograph of the vehicle the police had located. The police determined that the vehicle belonged to Joseph Henry, a separate person having no relation to J.W. Henry except the coincidence of their last names.
Hines also told the police that the black youth with whom he had spoken was named Pookie Mercer. Mercer was arrested but denied knowing anything about the burglary. J.W. Henry was subsequently arrested pursuant to an arrest warrant about which more will be said later. The evidence that initially caused the police to suspect J.W. Henry does not appear in the record.
Henry was arrested at 4:55 p.m. on November 6, 1978. He was taken to the police station, advised of his Miranda rights, and presented with a "Waiver of Rights" form which he signed at 5:03 p.m. By 5:35 p.m., Henry had confessed to the burglary. A police officer transcribed Henry's confession, but Henry refused to sign the written statement.
The record reflects that on November 9, 1978, proceedings in this case were begun against J.W. Henry in youth court of Hancock County. The prosecutor's office was apparently of the impression that Henry was, at that time, only 17 years old. Upon discovering this error, the youth court entered an order of dismissal without prejudice.
The Grand Jury of Hancock County, on January 10, 1979, returned an indictment charging J.W. Henry and two others with the burglary of the Grayson home. Henry moved to quash the indictment and remand the case to youth court. That request was denied.
The case was called for trial in the Circuit Court of Hancock County on April 10, 1979. At trial, two police officers who had been present during the waiver of rights and interrogation of J.W. Henry stated that no coercion was used to affect the waiver, nor was Henry under any duress at that time. The police officers' recounting of the oral confession made by J.W. Henry was the primary evidence offered at trial which connected Henry to this burglary.
After hearing and considering all of the evidence, the jury returned a verdict of guilty of burglary of a dwelling, Miss.Code Ann. § 97-17-19 (1972). Henry was sentenced to a term of five years in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections.
At the outset, Henry challenges the authority of the circuit court to hear and adjudge the charge against him. Instead, he argues, jurisdiction lay in the youth court.
In support, Henry urges: (1) the only evidence in the record regarding his age at the time of the crime in the record is in the form of affidavits showing him to be 17 years old; and (2) even if he was 18, a December 10, 1975, order of the youth court of Hancock County (adjudicating him a delinquent and retaining jurisdiction for dispositional purposes) had the effect of vesting in the youth court jurisdiction over all of Henry's subsequent misadventures until he should reach the age of 20 years, supposedly as provided in the old youth court act, Miss.Code Ann. § 43-21-9 (1972).
Henry's first basis for his youth court jurisdiction theory — an absence of proof that he was 18 years old at the time of the crime — dissolves rather quickly in the face of his birth certificate which establishes Henry's date of birth as October 9, I960. The instant burglary occurred on November 2, 1978. Enough said.
Henry's second point begins with an order entered by the youth court of Hancock County on December 10, 1975. By virtue of that order, Henry was adjudged a delinquent and was placed on supervised probation. The order expressly provided that the Youth "Court retains jurisdiction of said child as authorized . [by law]."
For a determination of what jurisdiction was authorized by law, we review the statutes.
The Youth Court Act, in effect at the time, provided in Miss.Code Ann. § 43-21-9 (1972):
Where jurisdiction shall have been obtained by the Court in the case of a child, jurisdiction of such person as well as of any offenses by him committed may be retained or resumed by the Court until he becomes twenty years of age....
No doubt this statute conferred upon the youth court authority to act with respect to Henry's 1975 delinquency through and including his twentieth birthday. In Re Green, 203 So.2d 470, 472 (Miss.1967). In no way, however, does it operate to deprive the circuit court of jurisdiction to try new offenses committed beyond a juvenile offender's eighteenth birthday, though the youth court retains jurisdiction for disposi-tional purposes (including probation revocation or modification) of all matters arising out of the prior juvenile offense.
The point has been made express in an amendment to the youth court jurisdiction statute effective July 1, 1979. Miss.Code Ann. § 43-21-151(2) provides:
The youth court shall not have jurisdiction over offenses committed by a child on or after his eighteenth birthday.
The new statute only makes clear what was apparent from a common sense reading of the jurisdictional statute in effect at the time of the offense in issue.
Having due regard for all of the facts and circumstances of this case, we hold that the Circuit Court of Hancock County had full authority to hear and adjudicate all matters pertaining to and arising out of the indictment filed January 10, 1979, and charging J.W. Henry with the offense of burglary of the home of Richard E. Gray-son. The circuit court committed no error when it overruled Henry's "Motion to Quash Indictment and Remand Case to Youth Court."
Henry's second assignment of error concerns the admissibility of his confession made shortly after his arrest. Henry claims that his arrest was illegal; that the inculpatory statement he gave less than 40 minutes later was a product of that arrest; and, therefore, that the statement was inadmissible. Henry invokes the doctrine announced by the Supreme Court of the United States in Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 95 S.Ct. 2254, 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975) and fully accepted in this state in Hall v. State, 427 So.2d 957, 959-961 (Miss.1983). Applying the test as set forth in Brown we must affirm.
Before the admissibility of J.W. Henry's inculpatory statement can be considered, the circumstances surrounding his arrest must be analyzed. Henry was arrested by Officer Robert Tartavoulle pursuant to a warrant issued by an ex officio justice of the peace. The warrant was based on the affidavit of Officer Sandra Henley, who, with her partner, Tartavoulle, had been summoned to the scene of the crime. The affidavit read:
Before me Lucien M. Gex, Jr., an ex-offi-cio Justice of the Peace of the said County, Sandra F. Henley makes oath that J.W. Henry on or about the 2nd day of November, 1978, in City of Waveland of said County, did unlawfully, willfully and feloniously break and enter the dwelling house of Richard E. Grayson, 712 South Beach Blvd., Waveland, Mississippi with the felonious intent to take, steal and carry away certain personal property located therein of the property of Richard E. Grayson, being in violation of Section 97-17-19, Miss.Code 1972 annotated, and being against the peace and dignity of the State of Mississippi.
It may be that this affidavit was technically deficient. To effect an arrest for a felony, either with or without a warrant, a police officer must have (1) reasonable cause to believe a felony has been committed; and, (2) reasonable cause to believe that the person proposed to be arrested is the one who committed it. Caldwell v. State, 443 So.2d 806, 811 (Miss.1983), citing Powe v. State, 235 So.2d 920 (Miss.1970) (warrantless arrest); Rule 1.01, Uniform Criminal Rules of Circuit Court Practice (arrest with warrant). "Probable cause" means less than evidence which would justify condemnation, but more than bare suspicion. Hester v. State, 463 So.2d 1087 (Miss.1985), citing Powe, supra. Here, there is no indication that Officer Henley made her affidavit on anything more than bare suspicion.
This Court has, on occasion, allowed so-called "barebones" affidavits similar to the one here in issue. For example, in Henley v. State, 228 So.2d 602 (Miss.1969), an affidavit which "gave as the 'underlying facts and circumstances' that Cooper Road Drug Store had been burglarized on September 30, 1978, and certain bank checks had been stolen and that an informant who had previously furnished reliable information, stated that some of these checks were in the apartment of Henley." Id. at 603. (emphasis added).
It is apparent that the affidavit in the instant case provides even less information than the one in Henley. Here there is absolutely no indication in the affidavit (nor anywhere else in the record) how the officers came to suspect J.W. Henry's involvement in the burglary. The irony is that, had the officers proceeded without benefit of an arrest warrant, it is almost certain that they would have been called upon at trial to testify regarding the probable cause for arrest. It is unfortunate that the arresting officers' good faith, as indicated by their effort to secure an arrest warrant, might ultimately have been instrumental in frustrating their efforts to secure a valid arrest.
Assuming but not deciding that Henry's arrest was illegal, a question remains. Was his subsequent confession thereby rendered inadmissible? We find that it was not.
In Hall v. State, 427 So.2d 957 (Miss.1983), this Court sets forth the criteria for determining whether a confession, obtained subsequent to an illegal arrest, is admissible. We quote at length:
Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 95 S.Ct. 2254, 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975) charts our course in this case. In Brown the defendant had been arrested without probable cause and without a warrant in violation of rights secured to him under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States. Under the facts, the first statement was given within two hours of the arrest, although prior to each statement Mi-rcmcia-sufficient warnings were given. The issue, of course, was whether the confessions were "the fruit of the poisonous tree," and, thus, inadmissible. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1968).
Brown rejects absolutism in both directions. On the one hand, the mere fact that an accused is given full advice regarding his rights, as required by Miranda, cannot in every case render the confession admissible. In the words of Brown,
[t]he Miranda warnings, alone and per se, cannot always make the act sufficiently a product of free will to break, for Fourth Amendment purposes, the causal connection between the illegality and confession. 422 U.S. at 608, 95 S.Ct. at 2261, 45 L.Ed.2d at 427. (Emphasis in original)
On the other hand, Brown rejected the "but for" rule. The mere fact that a defendant confesses while in custody following an illegal arrest does not per se render the confession inadmissible. Rather, Brown, holds that
[t]he question whether a confession is the product of a free will under Wong Sun must be answered on the facts of each case. No single fact is disposi-tive. 422 U.S. at 603, 95 S.Ct. at 2261, 45 L.Ed.2d at 427.
Brown then goes on to set forth the facts that ought to be considered by the trial court when faced with such a situation. First, Brown recognizes that
[t]he Miranda warnings are an important factor to be sure, in determining whether the confession is obtained by exploitation of an illegal arrest. 422 U.S. at 603, 95 S.Ct., at 2261, 45 L.Ed.2d at 427.
Other Brown factors which ought to be considered are
(1) the temporal proximity of the arrest and the confession;
(2) the presence of intervening circumstances;
(3) the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct, i.e., the making of the illegal arrest; and
(4) any other circumstances that seem relevant.
427 So.2d at 959-960.
The weight to be given each of these factors will necessarily vary with the circumstances of each case. However, the State bears the burden of proof for each factor as well as the burden of persuasion that the factors suggesting admissibility outweigh those suggesting inadmissibility. See Penick v. State, 440 So.2d at 554; Hall v. State, 427 So.2d at 960.
Considering the Brown factors, we first note that the temporal proximity of the arrest and the confession was great. J.W. Henry was arrested at 4:55 p.m. His interrogation was concluded at 5:35 p.m. The confession following so shortly after the arrest suggests inadmissibility. Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 216-219, 99 S.Ct. 2248, 2258-2260, 60 L.Ed.2d 824, 838-840 (1979); Patterson v. State, 413 So.2d 1036, 1039 (Miss.1982); Dycus v. State, 396 So.2d 23, 26-27 (Miss.1981).
Second, we note the presence of intervening circumstances. Eight minutes following his arrest, J.W. Henry was presented by Officer Tartavoulle with a standard Miranda Warning and Waiver of Rights Form. J.W. Henry signed the form some thirty-two minutes later. The circuit court held that the warnings were properly given and that the waiver was executed without threats or coercion. This is a factor suggesting admissibility. (See, however, Dycus v. State, 396 So.2d 23, 26-27 (Miss.1981) where more substantial intervening circumstances were held insufficient to purge a confession of the taint of an illegal arrest where there was flagrant misconduct.)
Third, we find absolutely no flagrancy in the official misconduct, i.e., the making of the illegal arrest. The possibility that the arrest was illegal is itself insufficient to militate against the admissibility of a subsequent confession. Indeed, the very existence of the four point test as set forth in Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 95 S.Ct. 2254, 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975) and adopted in Hall, 427 So.2d at 959-60, presupposes the illegality of the arrest. The question is whether there was purposeful or flagrant misconduct on the part of the police. In the instant case there is no indication of such misconduct.
Any technical deficiency of her affidavit notwithstanding, the very fact that Officer Henley and her partner, Officer Robert Tartavoulle, made an effort to procure an arrest warrant prior to apprehending J.W. Henry is indicative of their good faith and desire to comply with the law. This is consistent with and suggestive of the admissibility of the subsequent confession. The case of Dycus v. State, 396 So.2d 23 (Miss.1981) has been referred as substantially analogous on its facts to the case at bar. Such a comparison is particularly inappropriate as it relates to this element of official misconduct. It is, however, informative by way of contrast.
In Dycus, the defendant testified that officers took him to the funeral home to view the bodies of his supposed victims; that "his head was pushed by the officers against the genital area of Martha (his [deceased] sister-in-law); " and "that the officers threatened to make him stay there and watch tests (autopsy, etc.) to be performed upon the bodies of the two dead females until he confessed, all of which he says made him sick and coerced him into giving the statement." Id. at 26. This is hardly analogous on its facts to the case at bar.
By way of analysis of the fourth factor, i.e., any other circumstances that seem relevant, J.W. Henry's age may be considered — he was eighteen years of age at the time of hi's arrest. This is a fact which when present may suggest inadmissibility. However, this is not a case involving a juvenile defendant, a minor in need of the special protection of the law. See, Ford v. State, 75 Miss. 101, 21 So. 524 (1897). To the contrary, in a case similar to the one under consideration, this Court held the confession of a seventeen year old, made less than an hour after his allegedly illegal arrest, to be voluntary and admissible. McLeod v. State, 229 So.2d 557 (Miss.1969). While the youth of one arrested may make him more susceptible to the coercive effects of official misconduct, such a factor is of little moment in the total absence of flagrant wrongdoing.
The only Brown factor which would indicate inadmissibility is the first, the temporal proximity between the arrest and the confession. We are convinced that even this factor is less than compelling. The Court stated in Hall that, "[a]s a matter of common sense, the coercive impact of incarceration may dissipate with time." 427 So.2d at 961. Just as self-evident is the coercive effect of prolonged incarceration. In short, the "temporal proximity factor" is a two-edged sword to be employed only with caution.
Whether a confession obtained after a technically deficient arrest is admissible should primarily turn on the presence and degree of any police misconduct involved. Finding no such misconduct in the instant case, we are of the opinion that the decision of the trial court should be affirmed.
There is a matter that remains to be addressed — a matter profoundly more disturbing than the errors alleged above. We refer to the inexcusable delay in the processing of this appeal.
The final judgment of the Circuit Court of Hancock County was entered April 10, 1979. More than four years later — on April 28, 1983, the record in this case, some 121 pages in length, was filed with the Clerk of this Court. More than two additional years have been consumed here in the briefing, arguing and decision of the case. During that time, J.W. Henry has completed the service of his sentence.
The blame for this outrage must be shared. The court reporter must bear a majority of the responsibility. There is no conceivable reason why a court reporter should take three years to prepare a 121 page transcript. No excuse, reasonable or otherwise, is suggested in the record.
Nothing in the record indicates how — or whether — the court reporter obtained extensions of time from April 18, 1979, through January 29, 1982, for the prepara tion and filing of the trial transcript. A court reporter normally has sixty days from receipt of notice of appeal (and, in cases such as this, notice that the appellant was proceeding in forma pauperis) within which to prepare and file the transcript. Miss.Code Ann. § 9-13-37 (1972). Only this Court has authority to grant a further enlargement of time. Rule 44, Miss.Sup. Ct.Rules. The record reflects no authorized order entered by this Court granting any such enlargement of time.
Almost another year elapsed before, on March 22, 1983, the circuit clerk completed the record. An additional month elapsed before the record was formally filed and this case docketed with the Clerk of this Court.
Counsel for J.W. Henry was also derelict. Although the appeal was perfected on April 18, 1979, insofar as the record reflects, counsel proceeded to do nothing for the next 33 months. When no transcript had been filed by the expiration of that time, counsel, on January 29, 1982, finally moved the circuit court to require the court reporter to complete and file the transcript.
We say all of this in the hope that those responsible for this delay and those having authority to thwart such in the future will wake up and do something.
AFFIRMED.
PATTERSON, C.J., WALKER and ROY NOBLE LEE, P.JJ., and HAWKINS and ANDERSON, JJ., concur.
HAWKINS and DAN M. LEE, JJ., specially concur.
ROBERTSON, PRATHER and SULLIVAN, JJ., dissent.
. Prior to trial, Henry moved for an order remanding the charges against him to the youth court. At the hearing on that motion, the circuit judge was presented a copy of a Motion to Dismiss which the State had filed in once parallel youth court proceedings. The birth certificate was attached to that motion and was thus before the circuit court. Indeed, the motion recites
that the said J.W. Henry is over 18 years of age, as shown by the attached birth certificate. .
The birth certificate, however, was not marked as a separate exhibit, nor was it originally a part of the record on this appeal. It has been added to the record via our granting of the State's Suggestion for Diminution of Record.