Case Name: Joseph Emile SHARON, Jr., et al. v. CONNECTICUT FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY et al.
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1972-06-26
Citations: 270 So. 2d 900
Docket Number: No. 8864
Parties: Joseph Emile SHARON, Jr., et al. v. CONNECTICUT FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY et al.
Judges: Before LANDRY, BLANCHE and TUCKER, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 270
Pages: 900–913

Head Matter:
Joseph Emile SHARON, Jr., et al. v. CONNECTICUT FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY et al.
No. 8864.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, First Circuit.
June 26, 1972.
On Rehearing Jan. 5, 1973.
Robert W. Smith, Seale, Smith & Phelps, Baton Rouge, for appellants.
Robert L. Freeman, Freeman & Pendley, Plaquemine, for appellees.
Before LANDRY, BLANCHE and TUCKER, JJ.

Opinion:
LANDRY, Judge.
Connecticut Fire Insurance Company (Appellant), liability insurer of the City of Plaquemine, Louisiana (City), appeals from a judgment in favor of plaintiff, Joseph Emile Sharon, Jr. (Appellee), and members of Appellee's family, in compensation for personal injuries and property damage allegedly incurred and sustained by the flooding of Appellee's home with water from the City's sanitary sewerage system. The primary issue on appeal is whether the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies in an instance of this nature. The secondary determination to be made is whether plaintiff has borne the burden of proving negligence on the part of the City. The trial court found the City negligent, but did not specify in what respect. We reverse on the finding that the doctrine of res ipsa loqui-tur is inapplicable, and on further finding that Appellee has failed to establish any negligence on the part of the City.
Appellee's home is built upon a concrete slab in an area of the City which utilizes open ditches for the drainage of surface water. The flow of drainage is from east to west through culverts under Louisiana Highway 1 and the parallel railroad right of way adjoining the highway on the west. After exiting through the outlet culverts under the highway and railroad, drainage water then flows into a system of canals maintained by the Police Jury of Iberville Parish. From these canals, the flow is into major bayous and other primary drainage facilities, none of which are under the control of the City.
The record establishes that the sewerage system is constructed as a gravity flow system, meaning that the underground conduits are installed on an incline so that water and waste deposited therein are propelled by gravity flow to a sump pit which is emptied by means of automatically controlled, electrically operated pumps. The system contains one lift station which is also operated by an automatically controlled electric pump. The lift station, however, is not situated on Appellee's street, and has no direct connection or effect upon the flow of sewerage from Ap-pellee's home into the system and from thence to the sump pit.
It is undisputed that between October 3, 1964, and March 1, 1965, Appellee's home was flooded, on four or five occasions, with sewer water containing varying amounts of human waste from the City's sanitary sewer system. In each instance the flooding occurred either during or immediately following a heavy or prolonged rain when either the streets were flooded over or there was considerable water in the open drainage ditches. On each occasion water entered the residence by leakage through the bottom of the bathroom commode. On at least one occasion, sewerage water leaked from around the bottom of the commode and rose approximately one foot in Appellee's bathtub. The leakage did not, however, occur after each heavy rain, and never occurred during dry weather.
Appellee's home was constructed by his uncle, Joseph A. Pinell, since deceased, who did the plumbing work beneath the slab as well as the carpentry work involved. The tie in line from the residence to the city main was installed by Frank E. Murphy, licensed plumber.
According to Appellee, his home flooded initially on October 3, 1964, and at least five times thereafter. Three of the flood-ings, he described as "real bad", the others being of lesser degree. On the first occasion, Appellee noted water seeping or leaking between the base of his commode and the bathroom floor. Immeaiately following this incident, Appellee and his father removed the toilet and replaced the seal at the base of the commode. After the second instance, the seal was again replaced. On no occasion did the level of the water overflow the toilet bowl. On at least one occasion the water rose approximately half-way Appellee's bathtub. Appellee noted that on two occasions water commenced pouring in after the toilet was flushed, but all other times water flowed at the base of the toilet although it had not been flushed. Appellee also noted that the flooding occurred each time after a heavy rain. On some occasions the leakage occurred when the streets were completely inundated, and on others when there was no water covering the streets but merely water in the ditches. In addition, Appellee attested to having complained to municipal officials. Appellee also testified to the damage to his residence and the inconvenience and illnesses resulting to himself and his family as a result of the flooding.
Frank E. Murphy, licensed plumber, attested to having run the sewer line from Appellee's residence to the city main. He did not perform any plumbing work inside the house. After one flooding instance, he checked the plumbing fixtures in Appellee's residence and found them satisfactory. He concluded the line was stopped up thus preventing the water from flowing out properly. He could not say, however, whether such stoppage was between Appel-lee's residence and the city mains or in the mains themselves. Murphy explained that the purpose of the seal at the base of the commode is primarily to prevent sewer gases from entering a residence, and not to retain water pressure. He also stated that if a seal were improperly installed or was in some manner defective, water would seep from the base of a toilet each time it was flushed.
Other residents of the area related similar problems. Ralph Laurent, neighbor, noted that his carport rests on a slab about four inches above street surface level. A shower located on the slab emitted sewer water approximately one foot high through the shower drain on one occasion when Appellee's home flooded. Mr. Laurent plugged the drain and ceased using the shower. He observed that the problem was eliminated, and did not occur again after the City performed some corrective drainage work in the area.
Another neighbor, Alvin P. Simoneaux, testified that in one instance when Appel-lee experienced trouble, the water rose an inch or two in Simoneaux's toilet bowl but did not overflow or cause any damage.
David John Carville, Mechanical Engineer, in the employ of the firm which designed the sewer system, testified in detail regarding the nature of the system and its method of operation. He observed that the system operated by gravity flow to the treatment plant, and was designed to accommodate waste from residences, schools, motels and similar establishments. In essence he testified that the system was constructed according to sound, acceptable engineering practices. It is not a storm sewer system intended to take care of storm surface drainage and ground water. He explained that a sanitary sewer system contemplates the infiltration of a certain amount of ground and sub-surface water because construction of a system so "tight" as to exclude all exterior moisture and ground water would be prohibitive in cost to the point of impracticality. For these reasons, design includes allowance for infiltration of water around manholes, pipe joints and other means of entry. Carville noted that if the system became inundated with water due to infiltration of ground water during heavy rains, water would exit the system at the lowest point whether it be a manhole, commode or any other type opening in the system. From the plans of the system, Carville noted that Appellee's home was constructed in one of the lowest elevations in the area.
Mr. Carville explained that the collection point or sump pit is drained into the treatment plant by means of two pumps of three and five horsepower, respectfully. The pumps are electrically run and automatically controlled by floats. The smaller pump operates at normal pit levels. Should the level rise, the larger pump comes on automatically and the smaller pump goes off. If the water rises above the capacity of the larger pump, the smaller pump again comes on to assist. As the pumps clear the pit, they operate in reverse order.
Although Mr. Carville could not state exactly the cause of Appellee's difficulty, he was of the definite opinion that had Appellee's commode had a proper seal, water would have risen in the toilet bowl and have overflowed the top of the bowl, if at all. In his opinion, a proper seal would have prevented leakage at the base of the commode. In explaining why Appellee had no difficulty when water was standing on his property and covered the street, but had trouble when there was only water in the drainage ditches, Mr. Carville explained that the sewer system was probably not filled by infiltered water by a hard, fast rain which left water standing on the ground, but then drained off properly. He pointed out that it would take a long- sustained rain for the system to become completely infiltered to such extent that water would exit at the lowest available outlet.
C. Z. Breaux, Mechanical Engineer, in general corroborated the testimony given by Carville. It was his opinion that if Ap-pellee's trouble occurred during or after heavy rains, the most likely conclusion would be that infiltration of surface water contributed to the problem. He also noted that a detailed study would be required to determine how much of such a problem was caused by inadequate surface drainage.
Two City Councilmen, Warren Hebert and D. J. McDuffie, testified in substance that upon complaint from Appellee, they visited Appellee's residence during one instance that the flooding occurred. Both stated that Henry Vadnais, Superintendent of the City Sanitation Department, told them that on one occasion when he went to investigate a complaint by Appellee, Vad-nais checked and found that the pumps were not operating.
Henry Vadnais, Superintendent, Sanitation Department of the City, denied having told either Hebert or McDuffie that the pumps failed on one occasion when Appel-lee had trouble. He stated it was not his responsibility to check the pumps, and he had never done so. He also stated that he checked the point where Appellee's line tied into the City's main and found a hole covered by a piece of tin held in place by a coating of cement. The hole was admitting ground water into the sewer system. This defect was corrected.
The City's Superintendent of Utilities, Pershing Thompson, testified the pumps were checked daily each morning, and as soon as practicable after each storm or period of extremely bad weather to determine if any storm damage had occurred. He explained that the pumps never both failed to operate at the same time except when electrical power was interrupted due to bad weather or a blown fuse. Thompson also stated that at no time within his memory had both pumps simultaneously failed due to mechanical breakdown. In addition, Thompson stated that on none of the occasions on which Appellee sustained flooding was there a power failure to Thompson's knowledge, and his log sheet showed no power failure in any such instance.
Richard L. Roe, Licensed Plumber, testified in effect that if a toilet is properly installed and its seal correctly set and applied, water will not leak around the base of the commode. He also stated that no pressure is generated in a properly working sewer system, and that the purpose of the seal is to prevent sewer gas from entering a residence and to prevent the leakage of water when a toilet is flushed. He conceded he did not know how much pressure would be required to break a properly installed seal. In his opinion, if a seal were intact and the system filled with water, pressure could build from a clogged line but the seal should hold and water should rise in the toilet bowl rather than leak out at the seal.
In relying chiefly upon the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, Appellee points out that control of the sewer system rests exclusively upon the City; that the nature of the occurrences are such that it is impossible for Appellee to know or ascertain the cause thereof, and that an explanation of the cause or causes is more readily accessible to the City than to Appellee.
It is well settled that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is not a rule of law, but rather an evidentiary principle which is determined at the conclusion of the trial. Day v. National U. S. Radiator Corporation, 241 La. 288, 128 So.2d 660.
Mere invocation of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur does not shift to defendant the burden of proving freedom from fault. In Larkin v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, 233 La. 544, 97 So.2d 389, the Supreme Court pointed out that res ipsa loquitur does not modify the rule that negligence is never presumed, and neither does it dispense plaintiff from the burden of establishing negligence. See also Morales v. Employers Liability Assurance Corporation, 202 La. 755, 12 So.2d 804.
The instances in which res ipsa loquitur are applicable were stated in Langlinais v. Geophysical Service, Inc., 237 La. 585, 111 So.2d 781, as follows:
"It is well established in the Louisiana jurisprudence that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur must be applied to a case if the accident which damaged plaintiff was caused by an agency or instrumentality within the actual or constructive control of the defendant, if the accident is of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of negligence, and if the evidence as to the true explanation of the accident is more readily accessible to the defendant than to the plaintiff."
Res ipsa loquitur is applicable when the facts suggest that the negligence of defendant is the most plausible explanation of the accident. King v. King, 253 La. 270, 217 So.2d 395, and authorities therein cited.
However, res ipsa loquitur does not apply when the proof consists of direct evidence which adequately explains the accident and which establishes the details of the negligence charged. King v. King, above. In King, above, res ipsa loquitur was held inapplicable because the record contained the testimony of two eye witnesses explaining precisely how the accident occurred. In Day, above, the Supreme Court noted that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is inapplicable where there is direct evidence as to the exact cause of the accident and its attending facts and circumstances. Day, above, held res ipsa lo-quitur inapplicable because the exact cause of the boiler explosion was established by the evidence.
Equally well established is the rule that res ipsa loquitur does not apply where the record shows the existence of more than one reasonable explanation as to the cause of the accident. In Morales, above, plaintiff sued for injuries sustained when she fell from the side door of an ambulance, allegedly due to a defective lock. The court in Morales, above, noted the accident could have resulted from plaintiff inadvertently leaning against the door handle causing the door to open. The court also observed that the portion of the ambulance occupied by plaintiff and her accompanying relatives was not within defendant's exclusive control. With regard to res ipsa loquitur, the Court, in Morales, above, noted:
"It is the duty of the plaintiff to prove negligence affirmatively; and while the inference allowed by the rule of res ipsa loquitur constitutes such proof, it is only where the circumstances leave no room for a different presumption that the rule applies. When it is shown that the accident might have happened as the result of one of two causes, the reason for the rule fails and it cannot he invoked.1' (Emphasis by the Court.)
In urging application of res ipsa loqui-tur, Appellee relies upon Metoyer v. Sewerage & Water Board of New Orleans, La.App., 100 So.2d 792, and Urban Land Co. v. City of Shreveport, 183 La. 978, 162 So. 747.
Metoyer, above, applied res ipsa loquitur to an instance wherein plaintiff sustained damage when workmen attempted to unstop a clogged sewer line by means of a high pressure hose. The Court concluded that the undertaking was completely within defendant's control; that the resulting damage would not ordinarily occur if due care were exercised, and that defendant was in a better position than plaintiff to explain the cause of the mishap. Based upon the facts in Metoyer, the Court concluded the most plausible explanation of the accident was the negligence of defend ant's employees in forcing water into the clogged pipe.
Urban Land Company, above, was before the Supreme Court on an exception of no cause of action. The Court found that the allegations of plaintiff's petition to the effect that his damage resulted from defendant's failure to properly operate the pumps in the sewer system stated a cause of action. The Court in Urban Land Company observed that if plaintiff's allegations were true, res ipsa loquitur should apply, and remanded the case for trial. We find it significant, however, that the more recent pronouncements of the Supreme Court (Day, Morales and King, for example) indicate beyond question that the determination of whether or not res ipsa loquitur applies must be deferred until the end of the trial and be decided in the light of all evidence of record. We conclude, therefore, that as regards applicability of res ipsa lo-quitur, each case must be determined in the light of its own peculiar circumstances.
The fact that one case involving damages sustained by virtue of flooding from a sanitary sewer system is found to be a proper instance for applying res ipsa loqui-tur does not mean that all cases involving such damage automatically fall within that same rule. In each such instance, the determination must be made, at the end of the trial, in the light of the facts and circumstances appearing of record.
Considering the record before us, we conclude the doctrine of res ipsa loqui-tur is inapplicable in this instance. Primarily so because the record establishes several reasonable explanations for the flooding of Appellee's residence and fails to establish which of said reasonable explanations, if any, was in fact the cause of plaintiff's damage. Moreover, the record does not establish the exact cause of the damage, and neither does it show that the instrumentality which caused the damage was under the exclusive control of the City. In this latter regard, we note that the City had no control over the lines on Appellee's property; neither did it control installation of Appellee's toilet.
The present record reflects that the cause of damage in this instance may have been any one, or a combination, of the following causes: (1) Failure of Appellee to maintain a proper seal at the base of his toilet; (2) an improper tie in of Appellee's line to the City's main; (3) the clogging of the line on Appellee's property; (4) failure of the pumps to operate either due to mechanical failure or power failure; (5) flooding of the sewer system with in-filtered subsurface water through joints in the City's mains or lines of individual property owners, and (6) flooding of the mains due to infiltered surface water entering through manholes covered by water because of intercepted drainage.
From the evidence before us, we cannot conclude that the damage was such that it could only occur because of negligence. Neither does the evidence lead to the conclusion that there is no room for a,ny presumption except that the City was negligent in some manner.
We likewise find that Appellee has failed to carry the burden of establishing the City's alleged negligence in failing to properly operate and maintain the pumps, thus causing the sewer system to become filled with infiltered water. The testimony of the City's employees, Thompson and Vadnais, clearly refutes the charge of negligence in this respect. The unequivocal testimony of these witnesses is that the pumps are checked daily and as soon as practical after any storm or inclement weather which is calculated to produce a power failure. Neither of said witnesses had knowledge of either a power or mechanical failure affecting the pumps on any occasion in question. Assuming ar-guendo, a pump failure had been established in this instance, the City would not be liable for a resulting flooding of the system unless such failure was shown to have resulted either from the City's failure to properly maintain its equipment or failure to repair a breakdown with due dispatch under the circumstances. Neither of such circumstances is disclosed by the record.
The judgment of the trial court is reversed and judgment rendered herein in favor of defendant-appellant, Connecticut Fire Insurance Company, and against plaintiff-appellee, Joseph Emile Sharon, Jr., dismissing plaintiff's suit, with prejudice; all costs of these proceedings to be paid by plaintiff, Joseph Emile Sharon, Jr.
Reversed and rendered.