Case Name: Phillips Sheet & Tin Plate Co. v. Griffith, Admx.
Court: Supreme Court of Ohio
Jurisdiction: Ohio
Decision Date: 1918-04-02
Citations: 98 Ohio St. 73
Docket Number: No. 15516
Parties: Phillips Sheet & Tin Plate Co. v. Griffith, Admx.
Judges: Wanamaker, Newman, Matthias and Johnson, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Ohio State Reports, New Service
Volume: 98
Pages: 73–76

Head Matter:
Phillips Sheet & Tin Plate Co. v. Griffith, Admx.
Mobs — Judgment against county — Action against corporation not barred, when — Armed guards kill mother.
(No. 15516
Decided April 2, 1918.)
Error to the Court of Appeals of Jefferson county.
Edith M. Griffith, as administratrix of the estate of George A. Griffith, deceased, brought an action in the court of common pleas of Jefferson county against the Phillips Sheet & Tin Plate Company, alleging that during a strike at the defendant company’s tin mill in the city of Steubenville a riot occurred on the streets of that city, and in that riot her intestate, George A. Griffith, was shot and killed by an employe of the defendant company; that the death of said George A. Griffith was caused by the wrongful act of the defendant company in arming their employes with guns, the firing of which caused the death of said Griffith.
The Phillips Sheet & Tin Plate Company answered, and by way of second defense pleaded that the plaintiff prior to the bringing of this suit had maintained an action against Jefferson county, Ohio, under provisions of Section 62?8 et seq., General Code, to recover damages for the death of her intestate from injuries received from lynching by the mob in said riot, and in that case had recovered a judgment which was afterwards satisfied by the county.
Plaintiff demurred to this second defense, which demurrer the court of common pleas overruled. Plaintiff not desiring to plead further, judgment was entered upon the ruling on said demurrer, and error was thereupon prosecuted to the court of appeals. The court of appeals, on consideration of the error complained of, sustained the demurrer to said second defense, therebjr overruling and reversing the judgment of the court of common pleas.
Error is now prosecuted to this court to determine the question, and the sole question, as to whether or not that defense is a valid bar to the action against the Phillips Sheet & Tin Plate Company.
Mr. J. C. Bigger, for plaintiff in error.
Mr. W. R. Alban, for defendant in error.

Opinion:
By the Court.
It is conceded that under the common law the plaintiff had a cause of action against the defendant company for any wrongful act by its servants, agents, or employes, causing the death of her intestate, George A. Griffith.
Did Section 6278 et seq., General Code, in any wise affect that common-law right or remedy? These sections were passed in 1898 obedient to a popular demand that some further remedy be provided by law for persons sustaining injury or death by the violence of mob law. Clearly these were remedial statutes, and as such should be liberally construed in favor of those who were given the remedy.
The question here is, Did plaintiffs election to sue Jefferson county under this statute cause her to lose her common-law rights to sue The Phillips Company? Is her election of one remedy the rejection of all other remedies?
The question naturally presents itself, Is it so written in the statute? If the plaintiff is entitled to a liberal construction of the statute in her favor, she is also entitled to have the statute applied as it is written. There is nothing written in this statute, nor any section thereof, in any wise affecting any other civil remedy at common law, or otherwise, and the only way that such common-law remedy could be denied would be by writing such denial into the statute. The legislature did not do it. This court has neither power nor right to do it.
It is a fundamental rule that when a new remedy for a violation of any right is provided it is cumulative, unless there be express denial, or denial by necessary implication, of the exercise of any other right or remedy.
Moreover this statute is of a penal or nature. It is really a punishment inflicted upon the county for the injury or death inflicted upon one who was entitled to the protection of the law in that county.
The issues in a case under the statute are few and simple and wholly different from what they are in the case under the common law. In the case against The Phillips Company the issue was wrongful assault by the company, its officers, agents, or employes, the same kind of issue you would have in any prosecution for criminal assault in which the action is one for damages only. The legislature, however, realizing that in case's of mobs the defendants are generally unknown, or irresponsible financially, proceeded to afford to the wronged parties some remedy in addition to the rights and remedies that then existed at common law.
It is elementary in joint liability, either under contract or in tort, that where there is a full satisfaction by one joint obligor, the same works a release as to all other obligors.
Now in this case suppose The Phillips Company were sued jointly with Jefferson county, clearly such petition would be demurrable. While each is liable, each is liable on an entirely different state of facts, in different causes of action; and hence the satisfaction of either's liability is not a bar to the liability of the other.
Judgment affirmed.
Wanamaker, Newman, Matthias and Johnson, JJ., concur.