Case Name: Fort Worth & Rio Grande Railway Company v. Maggie M. Robertson et al.
Court: Supreme Court of Texas
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1910-11-02
Citations: 103 Tex. 504
Docket Number: No. 2071
Parties: Fort Worth & Rio Grande Railway Company v. Maggie M. Robertson et al.
Judges: 
Reporter: Texas Reports
Volume: 103
Pages: 504–515

Head Matter:
NOVEMBER, 1910.
Fort Worth & Rio Grande Railway Company v. Maggie M. Robertson et al.
No. 2071.
Decided November 2, 1910.
1.—Personal Injury—Death—Survival of Action—Putative Wife.
The putative wife, who had innocently and in good faith married one having a former wife living and undivorced, had no interest, on his death, in his cause of action for personal injuries, which, by the terms of article 3353a, Revised Statutes, survived in favor of his heirs and legal .representatives. (Pp. 507, 510, 511).
2. —Same—Community Property.
The rights secured by law to the wife, such as homestead, inheritance, and interest in community property, belong to the lawful and not to the putative wife. The interest acquired by the latter extends only to a half of the property acquired by the joint efforts of herself and the supposed husband, irrespective of the value of the service contributed by her; it is not community property of herself and the supposed husband by effect of article 2968, of the Revised Statutes; the right of action of the husband for personal injuries is community property of the husband and of the lawful, not of the putative wife; nor could the latter acquire an interest in such cause of action by her services in nursing him during his injury. (Pp. 507, 510-515.)
3. —Same—Case Stated.
Plaintiff sued, in her own right as surviving wife and as next friend of a minor daughter of one who had died, having a pending suit for personal injuries, to recover on that cause of action, which was not claimed to have caused his death. She had lived with him for ten years believing that she was his wife. It developed that a former wife, mother of the minor plaintiff, was living and never divorced. Held, that plaintiff could not recover either as owner of a half interest in the cause of action as being community property of herself and deceased (Rev. Stats., art. 2968) or as succeeding to the right of action of deceased, surviving to heirs and legal representatives by the statute (Rev. Stats., art. 3553a). (Pp. 507-515.)
4. —Practice in Supreme Court—Fundamental Error.
Fundamental error (omission of a necessary party) will not be considered in the Supreme Court when not made one of the grounds of application for writ of error. Scalfl v. State, 96 Texas, 559, followed. (P. 507).
Error to the Court of Civil Appeals for the Second District, in an appeal from Tarrant County.
Maggie M. Robertson and another sued the railway company and obtained judgment. Defendant appealed and the recovery was affirmed by a divided court, Judge Dunklin dissenting. Thereupon appellant obtained writ of error. The opinion of the majority of the Court of Civil Appeals and the dissenting opinion are here published, together with that of the Supreme Court, approving the dissenting opinion.
Andrews, Ball & Síreeíman and H. M. Chapman, for plaintiff in error.
Maggie M. Robertson, not being the lawful wife of John P. Robertson, deceased, had no interest in an action by him for injuries done to his person, and such action, being brought by him in his lifetime, did not survive at his death to plaintiff, Maggie M. Robertson, but only survived to his heirs and legal representatives. Rev. Stats., art. 3353a; Morgan v. Morgan, 21 S. W., 154; Holland v. Holland, 45 Texas, 588; Raines v. Wheeler, 76 Texas, 394; James v. James, 81 Texas, 378; Routh v. Routh, 57 Texas, 589; Chapman v. Chapman, 32 S. W., 564; Hayworth v. Williams, Texas Supreme An., vol. 1, No. 17, p. 278; Fitzgerald v. Western U. T. Co., 40 S. W., 421; Ritz v. City of Austin, 20 S. W., 1029; 7 Lawson, Rights, Rem. and Prac., secs. 3436 and 3437; Railway Co. v. Cook, 25 S. W., 455.
Plaintiff, Maggie M. Robertson, was the putative wife and not the lawful wife of John P. Robertson, deceased, and as such had no interest in a cause of action which abated at his death, except as to his heirs and legal representatives, but only had an interest in such property as they by their joint efforts may have acquired during the unlawful cohabitation, and the action brought by deceased in April, 1907, having been abandoned, plaintiff, Maggie M. Robertson, had no such interest in said cause of action as would authorize her to maintain this suit. Fitzgerald v. Western U. Tel. Co., 40 S. W., 421; Ritz v. City of Austin, 20 S. W., 1029; Mexican Cent. Ry. Co. v. Goodman, 48 S. W., 778; Mexican Cent. Ry. Co. v. Goodman, 55 S. W., 372.
McLean & Gg,rlocb, for defendants in error.
The law is now well settled in Texas that in case of a marriage of the character of that disclosed by the record in this case the putative wife, so long as she acts innocently, has as to the property acquired during such marriage all the rights of a lawful wife. Barkley v. Dumke, 99 Texas, 153; Morgan v. Morgan, 1 Texas Civ. App., 315; Lawson v. Lawson, 30 Texas Civ. App., 43; Allen v. Allen, 105 S. W., 54; Chapman v. Chapman, 16 Texas Civ. App., 383; Speer on the Law of Married Women, sec. 178.
The damages growing out of the Brownwood accident, in view of the" relations existing between Maggie M. Robertson and John P. Robertson, became the common, property, or the community property, or the partnership property, of the said Maggie M. Robertson and John P. Robertson. Ezell v. Dodson, 60 Texas, 331; Texas & P. Ry. Co. v. Watkin, 88 Texas, 23; International & G. N. Ry. Co. v. Leake, 64 Texas, 659; Buckley v. Buckley, 96 Pac., 1079; McKay on Com. Prop., 188-201.
The cause of action for damages growing out of the Brownwood accident to John P. Robertson, being the joint community or partnership property of the said Maggie M. Robertson and John P. Robertson, did not abate by reason of the death of John P. Robertson, but upon his death the said cause of action was jointly, owned by the said Maggie M. Robertson, in virtue of her right to a community one-half, and by the heir of John P. Robertson, for the remainder, with the right on the part of the said Maggie M. Robertson to prosecute and reduce to judgment the said chose in action as the partnership survivor. In other words, the said Maggie M. Robertson was entitled to prosecute the said suit (1) on account of her representation of a one-half interest therein accruing to her as the lawful wife of John P. Robertson, so far as the property rights in the said claim or cause of action were concerned, which was preserved to her by reason of the fact that under the statute of 1895 the death of Robertson did not affect or permit the said cause of action to abate, and in this view of the case the other interest of the ■ said John P. Robertson being represented by his lawful child, and (2) because the said cause of action was partnership property of Maggie M. Robertson and the deceased, and the plaintiff as the surviving partner of the said partnership became and was the irlegal representative” of the said claim within the meaning of the said Act of the Legislature, and entitled by virtue of her position as the survivor of the partnership to reduce the said claim to judgment as such “legal rep resentative.” Act of 24th Legislature, approved May 4, 1895, page 143; Morgan v. Morgan, 1 Texas Civ. App., 315; Lawson v. Lawson, 30 Texas Civ. App., 48; Chapman v. Chapman, 41 S. W., 535; Barkley v. Dumke, 99 Texas, 153; Lassiter v. First National Bank, 72 S. W., 1055, and authorities therein cited, holding that a surviving partner may be treated and considered the legal representative; 25 Cyc., 175; 2 Bates on Part., secs. 712 to 724.
In' construing a remedial Act of the Legislature effect "will be given to the manifest spirit, scope and intention of the law. The Act of the Texas Legislature of May 4, 1895, entitled: “An Act to provide for the survival of causes of action for personal injuries other than those resulting in death, and for the enforcement thereof,” when fairly and liberally construed to effectuate the intention underlying the passage of the said law, evidently meant that no actions of said kind upon which suits had been brought, or that might thereafter be brought, should abate by reason of the death of the injured party or the party inflicting the injuries, the mischief sought to be remedied being that prior to the passage of said law all such actions would abate. This being the leading and manifest purpose and intention of the law, subsidiary phrases used in the said law must yield to the general purpose, scope and intention of the said law. So considered, the cause of action in this case did not abate under the said law, but survived for the benefit of the parties interested therein, and could be prosecuted thereafter in like manner and with like legal effect as would a cause of action for injuries to personal property. Acts of the 24th Legislature, page 143; Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. v. Moore, 28 Texas Civ. App., 603; sec. 2, Final Title, Rev. Stats. (Sayles’), vol. 2, p. 1900; McInery v. City of Galveston, 58 Texas, 334.

Opinion:
Mr. Justice Williams
delivered the opinion of the Supreme Court.
The opinion of the majority of the Court of Civil Appeals and the dissenting opinon of Mr. Justice Dunklin will be reported along with this and will show the nature of the case and of the question which controls its decision. It is unnecessary for us to say more than that we agree with the dissenting opinion which we regard as correctly stating the law. This conclusion leads to a reversal of the judgment in favor of Mrs. Bobertson and a rendition of judgment that she take nothing.
In an argument in this court the point is made by the plaintiff in error that the judgment in favor of Annie Bobertson is fundamentally erroneous because her mother, who is among those to whom the cause of action which accrued to the deceased is made to survive, is not a party to the suit. This is not made one of the grounds in the application for the writ of error, to which this court is confined Scalfi v. The State, 96 Texas, 559.
Reversed and rendered as to Mrs. Maggie M. Robertson;
Affirmed as to Annie Robertson.