Case Name: Duan Lewis JACKSON v. STATE of Mississippi
Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Mississippi
Decision Date: 1994-11-10
Citations: 645 So. 2d 921
Docket Number: No. 92-KA-00557
Parties: Duan Lewis JACKSON v. STATE of Mississippi.
Judges: Before PRATHER, P.J.,- and SULLIVAN and JAMES L. ROBERTS, Jr., JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 645
Pages: 921–928

Head Matter:
Duan Lewis JACKSON v. STATE of Mississippi.
No. 92-KA-00557.
Supreme Court of Mississippi.
Nov. 10, 1994.
James H. Powell, III, Durant, for appellant.
Michael C. Moore, Atty. Gen., W. Glenn Watts, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., Jackson, for appellee.
Before PRATHER, P.J.,- and SULLIVAN and JAMES L. ROBERTS, Jr., JJ.

Opinion:
JAMES L. ROBERTS, Jr., Justice,
for the Court:
INTRODUCTION
Duan Lewis Jackson was convicted in the Holmes County Circuit Court of selling cocaine and sentenced to thirty years imprisonment. At trial, Jackson presented an alibi defense, offering a number of witnesses who testified that he had been with them at a party during the time he had allegedly sold the cocaine. Jackson appealed, assigning the following errors:
I. THE TRIAL COURT DENIED JACKSON A FAIR TRIAL BY ALLOWING THE STATE TO ELICIT IMPROPER IMPEACHMENT TESTIMONY CONCERNING CRIMES ALLEGEDLY COMMITTED BY DEFENSE WITNESS DEANDRE JOHNSON, ON AUGUST 19, 1991.
II. THE TRIAL JUDGE ERRONEOUSLY FAILED TO GRANT INSTRUCTION D-l, WHICH FULLY INSTRUCTED THE JURY ON THE DEFENSE OF ALIBI, AND THE COURT'S FAILURE TO GRANT SAID INSTRUCTION AS OFFERED, DENIED JACKSON THE RIGHT TO HAVE A JURY WHICH HAD BEEN FULLY INSTRUCTED AS TO THE LAW, CONSIDER HIS CASE.
Finding that Jackson was denied a fair trial, we reverse and remand for a new trial.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Duan Lewis Jackson was indicted on March 30, 1992, for selling cocaine in violation of Miss.Code Ann. (1972) § 41-29-139 (1972, as amended). On May 4, 1992, Jackson was convicted in the Holmes County Circuit Court and sentenced to thirty years imprisonment.
The crime for which Jackson was charged occurred on the evening of August 19, 1991. At trial, Jackson presented an alibi defense, offering a number of witnesses who testified that he had been with them at a party during the time he had allegedly sold the cocaine. One of these witnesses was DeAndre Johnson, who testified that he was with Jackson at the party on the evening Jackson allegedly made the cocaine sale and that Jackson never left the party during that evening. In rebuttal, the State recalled a police officer who testified that undercover agents had made four drug purchases from Johnson on August 19, 1991, the same evening Johnson claimed he was with Jackson at the party. The judge overruled Jackson's objection to this testimony.
A portion of an alibi instruction offered by Jackson was struck by the judge over Jackson's objection. Jackson requested the following jury instruction:
Alibi means elsewhere or in another place. In this case, the defendant is asserting the defense of alibi by saying that he could not have been selling any controlled substances at the date, time, location and to the person alleged in the indictment, because at such date and time he was attending a party at Hartwood Apartments and was never at the location alleged in the indictment.
Alibi is a legal and proper defense in law. The defendant is not required to establish the truth of the alibi to your satisfaction, but if the evidence or lack of evidence in the case raises in the minds of the jury a reasonable doubt as to whether the defendant was present and committed to the crime, then you must give him the benefit of the doubt and acquit him.
The judge stated that the second part of this instruction was not the law. Jackson's lawyer asserted that it was, and that the instruction had been taken from a "form instruction." The prosecutor suggested omitting part of the second sentence of the second paragraph. The judge agreed to this, and the instruction was granted, deleting the following: "The defendant is not required to establish the truth of the alibi to your satisfaction." The amended version was granted over Jackson's objection.
DISCUSSION OF THE ISSUES
I. THE TRIAL COURT DENIED JACKSON A FAIR TRIAL BY ALLOWING THE STATE TO ELICIT IMPROPER IMPEACHMENT TESTIMONY CONCERNING CRIMES ALLEGEDLY COMMITTED BY DEFENSE WITNESS DEANDRE JOHNSON, ON AUGUST 19, 1991.
Jackson argues that the trial judge erred in allowing the State to impeach the alibi testimony of defense witness DeAndre Johnson, through an officer's rebuttal testimony that agents had made four drug purchases from Johnson the evening of August 19, 1991. Jackson contends that such impeachment is impermissible under M.R.E. 608. Jackson asserts that the State may not call a witness to testify concerning specific instances of alleged criminal conduct on the part of another witness for impeachment purposes.
Mississippi Rule of Evidence 608 provides in part:
(b) Specific Instances of Conduct. Specific instances of the conduct of a witness, for the purpose of attacking or supporting his credibility, other than conviction of crime as provided in rule 609, may not be proved by extrinsic evidence. They may, however, in the discretion of the court, if probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness, be inquired into on cross-examination of the witness (1) concerning his character for truthfulness or untruthfulness, or (2) concerning the character for truthfulness or untruthfulness of another witness as to which character the witness being cross-examined has testified.
This Court has held that "(s)pecific instances of conduct under our Rules of Evidence may not be proved by extrinsic evidence for impeachment purposes; they may only be inquired about on cross-examination." Lewis v. State, 580 So.2d 1279, 1287 (Miss.1991) (emphasis added). See also Pinson v. State, 518 So.2d 1220, 1223 (Miss. 1988). In Pinson v. State, the defense offered testimony in a rape trial to impeach the victim's husband. The husband had testified that because of the rape, he was living apart from his wife, and was not living with any other woman. The defense offered testimony that the husband was living with another woman. This Court held that such evidence was not admissible, stating:
Specific instances of conduct under our Rules of Evidence may not be proved by extrinsic evidence for impeachment purposes; they may only be inquired about on cross-examination. (The husband) denied seeing any woman other than his wife when he was questioned about it on cross-examination. The defense may go no further.
Pinson v. State 518 So.2d at 1223.
In the case at bar, the State attempted to impeach a defense witness with extrinsic evidence of specific instances of that witness' conduct, i.e., with testimony by a police officer that Johnson sold drugs to undercover agents the same night as Jackson allegedly committed the crime for which he was being tried. Such attempts at impeachment are clearly forbidden by Rule 608(b). That rule does provide for limited exploration of a witness' conduct, but on cross-examination, not on direct examination or by rebuttal testimony of a third party.
This Court has not yet addressed the question of whether the introduction of extrinsic evidence in violation of Rule 608(b) constitutes reversible error. There is authority that such violation is reversible error. See U.S. v. Reed, 715 F.2d 870 (5th Cir.1983) (introduction of extrinsic evidence to prove misconduct which did not result in a conviction was held reversible error).
In this case, impermissible impeachment efforts were aimed at only one of the defense's numerous witnesses. Considering the testimony as a whole, we find that the Rule violation did not rise above harmless error. This Court has stated:
We are not required to reverse a case based solely upon the showing of an error in evidentiary ruling. A denial of a substantial right of the defendant must have been affected by the evidentiary ruling .
Newsom v. State, 629 So.2d 611, 612 (Miss. 1993). See also Green v. State, 614 So.2d 926, 935 (Miss.1992); M.R.E. 103(a).
Although the trial court erred in allowing improper impeachment testimony, such error, alone, was harmless under the circumstances of this case where only one of the defendant's numerous alibi witnesses was improperly impeached. Jackson was not denied a substantial right by this erroneous ruling standing alone. However, that was not the only error in this case.
II. THE TRIAL JUDGE ERRONEOUSLY FAILED TO GRANT INSTRUCTION D-l, WHICÉ FULLY • INSTRUCTED THE JURY ON THE DEFENSE OF ALIBI, AND THE COURT'S FAILURE TO GRANT SAID INSTRUCTION AS OFFERED, DENIED JACKSON THE RIGHT TO HAVE A JURY WHICH HAD BEEN FULLY INSTRUCTED AS TO THE LAW, CONSIDER HIS CASE.
Jackson argues that the judge erred in striking the portion of his jury instruction D-l which stated "The defendant is not required to establish the truth of the alibi to your satisfaction." He asserts that his requested instruction did not place any improper burden on the State, but simply fully covered the law of alibi. • Jackson contends that the instruction, as modified, had the effect of confusing the jury; the jury may have improperly believed that the defendant had an absolute duty to satisfy the jury as to the truth of his alibi defense before they could consider such defense. As the jury was not properly instructed on the defense of alibi, Jackson maintains that his conviction must be reversed.
This state's law on jury instructions has been summarized as follows:
Jury instructions are to be read together and taken as a whole with no one instruction taken out of context. A defendant is entitled to have jury instructions given which present his theory of the case; however, this entitlement is limited in that the court may refuse an instruction which incorrectly states the law, is fairly covered elsewhere in the instructions, or is without foundation in the evidence.
Heidel v. State, 587 So.2d 835, 842 (Miss. 1991) (citations omitted). First, it may be noted that the instruction as originally submitted by Jackson, was in .fact identical to instruction 102.01 in both the 1977 and 1992 Mississippi Model Jury Instructions. However, the fact that the instruction was "model" does not mean that the judge was automatically required to accept it. See, e.g. Davis v. State, 568 So.2d 277, 280 (Miss.1990) (not reversible error to reject model jury instruction, where instruction was repetitious of other instructions).
Reviewing the requirements cited above, it must be noted that Jackson was entitled to an alibi instruction, as that was his theory of the case. See Holmes v. State, 481 So.2d 319, 321 (Miss.1985); Young v. State, 451 So.2d 208, 210 (Miss.1984); Sanford v. State, 372 So.2d 276, 278 (Miss.1979). Moreover, the instruction offered correctly stated the law, and had "foundation" in the evidence, in that Jackson had numerous witnesses testify in support of his alibi. There fore, the remaining question is whether D-l, as amended, properly instructed the jury on the alibi defense; that is, whether, as the State argues, the deleted portion of the alibi instruction was "covered in other instructions" concerning the State's burden, reasonable doubt, and the presumption of innocence.
The following jury instructions were given:
C-CR-9 BURDEN OF PROOF
The burden of proving the Defendant guilty of every material element of the crime with which he is charged is upon the State of Mississippi. Before you can return a verdict of guilty, the State must prove to your satisfaction beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant is guilty.
C-CR-8 PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE
The law presumes every person charged with the commission of a crime to be innocent. This presumption places upon the State the burden of proving the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The presumption of innocence attends the Defendant and prevails unless overcome by evidence which satisfies the jury of his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The Defendant is not required to prove his innocence.
In Holmes v. State, 481 So.2d 319 (Miss. 1985), this Court reversed a burglary conviction, where the jury received no instructions on the co-defendants' alibi theory of defense. See also Young v. State, 451 So.2d 208 (Miss. 1984) (same).
In Newton v. State, 229 Miss. 267, 90 So.2d 375 (1956), this Court reversed an armed robbery conviction, where the trial judge had struck part of the defendant's alibi instruction. The defendant declined to accept the modified instruction, and the jury was apparently not instructed on an alibi defense. The original instruction read:
The Court charges the jury for the defendant, Jack Newton, that an alibi is a legal and proper defense in law, and that the defendant is not required to establish the truth of his alibi to your satisfaction, but that the evidence in support of the alibi need only exclude the possibility of the defendant's presence at the time and place of the crime, and if upon consideration of the whole evidence you think there is a probability that the defendant was not at the scene of the crime, then it is your sworn duty to find the defendant not guilty.
Newton, 229 Miss, at 273, 90 So.2d at 377. The trial judge modified this instruction by striking out the words "there is a probability." This Court stated:
We think the court was in error in striking out the quoted portion of the instruction. The appellant was entitled to have the jury instructed that if under the evidence there was a probability of his innocence he should be acquitted. The State contends that in view of other instructions given to the appellant defining reasonable doubt and instructing the jury as to the burden of the State to establish the guilt of the appellant beyond a reasonable doubt, the court committed no reversible error in modifying the instruction. Ordinarily, where the jury in other instructions has been adequately instructed as to the burden of the State to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, we would not regard as reversible error the action of the court in so modifying the instruction. In this case, however, the State's case as to the identity of the appellant rests entirely upon one witness.
Newton, 229 Miss, at 274, 90 So.2d at 378. The Court went on to explain that the testimony of the State's only witness was weak, while the testimony of the defendant's five or more witnesses was strong; the Court held that in light of the testimony, it was revers ible error for the trial court to decline to give the instruction except as modified. "(T)he appellant, in light of the testimony, was entitled to have the jury instructed that if there were a probability of his innocence the jury should acquit him." Newton, 229 Miss, at 275, 90 So.2d at 378.
The language deleted from Jackson's instruction D-l was "(T)he defendant is not required to establish the truth of the alibi to your satisfaction." Arguably, this principle is asserted by the last sentence of instruction C-CR-8 on the presumption of innocence, "(T)he defendant is not required to prove his innocence." On the other hand, the two sentences are not interchangeable. The deleted language of the alibi instruction specifically informs the jury as to the defendant's burden in presenting his alibi defense. It is not unreasonable to think the this instruction would be far more meaningful to a jury's deliberations than C-CR-8's more general instruction on the presumption of innocence.
The trial judge deleted an essential part of the alibi instruction, thus depriving Jackson of an accurate instruction on his alibi theory of defense. The omitted language of instruction D-l was not and could not be covered by general instructions on the presumption of innocence. Since the jury was not properly instructed on Jackson's alibi defense, he is entitled to a new trial.
CONCLUSION
The judge erred in permitting the state to impeach defense witness Johnson through the rebuttal testimony of an officer that Johnson had sold drugs on the evening in question to undercover agents. Such testimony was "extrinsic evidence" of specific acts of misconduct forbidden by M.R.E. 608(b). However, in consideration of the testimony as a whole and the fact that the impermissible impeachment efforts were aimed at only one of the defense's numerous alibi witnesses, this error alone was harmless. But that was not the only error in this ease.
The language omitted by the judge was crucial, to the meaning of the alibi jury instruction offered by Jackson. The deletion of an essential part of the alibi instruction, in effect, deprived Jackson of an instruction on his alibi theory of defense. As the jury was not properly instructed on Jackson's alibi defense, we must reverse and remand for a new trial.
REVERSED AND REMANDED FOR PROCEEDINGS CONSISTENT WITH THIS OPINION.
HAWKINS, C.J., PRATHER, P.J., and SULLIVAN and SMITH, JJ., concur.
McRAE, J., concurs in part II only.
BANKS, J., concurs with separate written opinion joined by DAN M. LEE, P.J.
DAN M. LEE, P.J., concurs in part and dissents in part with separate written opinion joined by BANKS and McRAE, JJ.
PITTMAN, J., not participating.
. Federal Rule of Evidence 608 has been similarly construed. U.S. v. Reed, 715 F.2d 870 (5th Cir.1983) (reversible error to permit introduction of extrinsic evidence to prove misconduct not resulting in conviction); U.S. v. Werbrouck, 589 F.2d 273 (7th Cir.1978) (impeachment efforts limited to cross-examination). Rebuttal testimony concerning specific acts of misconduct on the part of a witness was found to be "extrinsic evidence" within the meaning of Rule 608(b), and therefore inadmissible in U.S. v. Cluck, 544 F.2d 195 (5th Cir.1976). See also U.S. v. Brown, 547 F.2d 438 (8th Cir.1977), cert. den. 430 U.S. 937, 97 S.Ct. 1566, 51 L.Ed.2d 784; U.S. v. Blackshire, 538 F.2d 569 (4th Cir.1976), cert. den. 429 U.S. 840, 97 S.Ct. 113, 50 L.Ed.2d 108.
. The trial judge had rejected two submitted alibi instructions, based on his belief that there was insufficient evidence to support such alibi instructions. Holmes v. State, 481 So.2d at 321.
. The trial judge had refused another alibi instruction submitted by the defendant, on the grounds that it improperly placed upon the State the burden of proving that the alibi was untrue. This Court agreed with the trial judge that the instruction was improper. Newton, 229 Miss, at 272-273, 90 So.2d at 377.