Case Name: Don D. WEBBER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Corina C. Webber BERRY, Defendant-Appellee
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1992-12-04
Citations: 609 So. 2d 1175
Docket Number: No. 24,172-CA
Parties: Don D. WEBBER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Corina C. Webber BERRY, Defendant-Appellee.
Judges: Before NORRIS, LINDSAY, HIGHTOWER, VICTORY and BROWN, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 609
Pages: 1175–1180

Head Matter:
Don D. WEBBER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Corina C. Webber BERRY, Defendant-Appellee.
No. 24,172-CA.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Second Circuit.
Dec. 4, 1992.
Comegys, Lawrence, Jones, Odom' and Spruiell by William G. Nader, Shreveport, for plaintiff-appellant.
Sockrider, Bolin & Anglin by H.F. Sockri-der, Jr., Shreveport, for defendant-appellee.
Before NORRIS, LINDSAY, HIGHTOWER, VICTORY and BROWN, JJ.

Opinion:
VICTORY, Judge.
In this case, Don D. Webber appeals a judgment which partitioned his future retirement benefits under the "fixed percentage method" set forth in Sims v. Sims, 358 So.2d 919 (La.1978). Mr. Webber contends the trial court erred as a matter of law in not applying the principles set forth in Hare v. Hodgins, 586 So.2d 118 (La.1991). Mrs. Berry answered the appeal, asserting that the value assigned to certain immovable property was too low, and that the legal interest on the sums awarded to her in the judgment should accrue from date of judicial demand, rather than from date of rendition of the judgment. We amend in part, and affirm as amended.
FACTS
Don Webber and Corina Webber Berry were married on April 5, 1971 and three years later, on March 22,1974, Mr. Webber began employment with the Bossier City Police Department. The parties' community was terminated on September 12, 1986, with the filing of their divorce suit. On September 28, 1987, the parties entered into an act of partial partition of their real estate, but did not value the properties at that time.
Mrs. Berry filed suit to partition the community on September 26, 1990. Therein she sought not only a partition of Mr. Web-ber's retirement benefits, but also a partition of all other assets, both real and movable. The case was tried on October 21 and 22, 1991 and the trial judge rendered an oral opinion at the conclusion of the trial. Mr. Webber appeals only that portion of the partition judgment involving division of his future retirement benefits, and Mrs. Berry appeals only that portion of the judgment involving the value assigned to immovable property located at 980 Stewart Road in Haughton, LA, and the legal interest on her equalizing payment.
RETIREMENT BENEFITS
Mrs. Berry's attorney stipulated pri- or to trial that Mrs. Berry has an undivided one-half community interest in only that portion of Mr. Webber's retirement benefits accruing from March 22, 1974, the beginning date of his employment with the police department, to September 12, 1986, the dissolution of the community. On appeal, Mr. Webber concedes that the Sims formula for evaluating future retirement benefits is appropriate, but submits that the Sims valuation should have been adjusted to reflect the substantial post-community increase in benefits due to his personal efforts and skill. Appellant relies primarily on the language of the Supreme Court in Hare v. Hodgins, supra at 127, 128:
Nevertheless there will be unusual cases in which a substantial part of the increased retirement benefits earned by the employee spouse after divorce will not result from a foundation provided by prior community earnings. In such cases, the partitioning court should select a more equitable method or modify the community or marital fraction rule to attribute that part of the post-divorce increase to the employee spouse separately .
In general, the partitioning court should inquire as to whether a substantial post-community increase is due to personal effort or achievement after the termination of the community that has little or no relationship with the prior community. The community should not be given credit when a substantial post-community increase to a retirement fund is due to a singular personal factor such as individual effort, education or achievement resulting in a merit raise or an extraordinary promotion or series of promotions .
On the other hand, when such an increase results from non-personal elements such as longevity raises, cost-of-living raises, forfeitures by terminated employees, and investment returners, the community should participate in that gain .
Mrs. Berry does not dispute the validity of the above quoted language, but instead insists that appellant failed to prove that his retirement fund experienced substantial post-community increases that were accredited to his personal effort, skill or education. In discussing appellant's burden of proof, appellee quotes the following from Hare v. Hodgins, supra at 128:
Because the employee spouse is generally in a position of superior knowledge and is attempting to prove the unusual or unlikely case, the burden of going forward with evidence and of persuasion on this issue properly should be assigned to the employee spouse . Moreover, since the employee spouse has the burden of production of the evidence and persuasion, cases of doubt should be resolved in favor of the community and against the employee's spouse's separate estate or subsequent marital community.
Mr. Webber urges that the trial court erred as a matter of law in not applying the principles set forth in Hare v. Hodgins, supra, decided on September 9, 1991. The instant case was tried on October 21 and 22, 1991, thus, the ruling of Hare v. Hod-gins was in effect when this case was tried and decided.
Although Mr. Webber claims in brief that the two promotions he received after the termination of the community have increased his retirement benefits due to his personal efforts and skill, he failed to introduce evidence at trial to prove his contentions. The record reveals that at the time of trial Mr. Webber held the rank of captain and enjoyed a $3,000 per month salary. Mr. Webber testified that his latest raise was on January 1, 1991 when he was promoted from Lieutenant to Captain, but he did not indicate the amount of the raise nor the basis of his promotion. The record also reveals that Mr. Webber received a $300 raise on September 1, 1991, along with all other Bossier City employees. On these facts alone, we cannot say Mr. Webber proved that any of his post-community increases in compensation were due to his personal effort or skill and unrelated to the prior community.
Counsel for appellant states in brief that Mr. Webber was employed as a sergeant with the police department on September 12, 1986 and has realized a increase in his monthly salary of $1,000 now that he holds the rank of captain. However, this court has no authority to consider on appeal alleged facts referred to in brief which were not presented at trial. Gallagher v. Gallagher, 248 La. 621, 181 So.2d 47 (1965); Capital Drilling Co. v. Graves, 496 So.2d 487 (La.App. 1st Cir.1986). Since appellant failed to prove at trial that his retirement benefits had substantially increased due to post-community personal effort and achievement unrelated to the community, the court's division of the retirement benefits under the Sims formula was correct and is affirmed.
APPRAISAL OF REAL ESTATE
In her answer to this appeal, Mrs. Berry contends the trial court erred in lowering the appraisal value of a parcel of real estate located at 980 Stewart Road. In oral reasons, the trial judge stated he had viewed two appraisals of the property, one performed by Bill Hearn as of September 28, 1987, and one performed by Randy Brossette as of September 2, 1991. Only Mr. Hearn's appraisal indicates the value of the property at the time the parties entered into an act of partial partition on September 28, 1987. The court stated that when comparing the two appraisals, Mr. Hearn apparently failed to make any adjustment for the acreage contained in the property appraised and the comparables used. For this reason, the trial court reduced Hearn's $59,500 appraisal by $6,000, an amount used by the other appraiser, Mr. Brossette, to adjust totally different com-parables from those used by Mr. Hearn.
In his appraisal of September 28, 1987 (Exhibit P-16), Mr. Hearn recited three sales of properties most similar and proximate to 980 Stewart Road to use in his sales comparison analysis. On the Uniform Residential Appraisal Report, Mr. Hearn indicated that he was using vacant land comparables, as he could find no comparable houses for comparison. (The subject house was a metal building that had been partially converted into a home.) Since this portion of the appraisal was based on land comparison only, Mr. Hearn used the Marshall and Swift publication for determining the value of the home, $38,139. Under the "Site/View" column on the report, Mr. Hearn found the subject property to be significantly inferior to his Comparable No. 1, and therefore, subtracted $7,750 from the value of that comparable. The "addendum" to the appraisal shows that Comparable No. 1 was 5.83 acres, about the same size as the parties' tract, and was considered more valuable because of its accessibility and fronting on a main asphalt road. As to Comparable No. 2, he adjusted this 1.43 acre property to reflect a $14,470 increase in value, obviously due to its inferior size. Lastly, Mr. Hearn adjusted Comparable No. 3, consisting of 14 acres, by subtracting $8,600, obviously due to its larger size as compared to the subject property.
The trial judge apparently overlooked Mr. Hearn's adjustments for size, and therefore, substituted an adjustment for size made by the other appraiser, Bros-sette, on other comparables viewed four years after dissolution of the community. This ruling was manifestly erroneous. For these reasons, Mr. Hearn's $59,500 appraisal, being the only evidence of the value of the property as of September 28, 1987, should have been accepted without modification.
INTEREST
Finally, Mrs. Berry argues the trial court erroneously awarded judicial interest from date of rendition of judgment, instead of judicial demand. We find merit in this assignment of error as well.
According to Oliver v. Oliver, 561 So.2d 908 (La.App. 2d Cir.1990), legal interest is due from date of judicial demand in a suit for accounting and settlement of the community. In Oliver, this court noted that the Second Circuit's decision in Hodson v. Hodson, 292 So.2d 831 (La.App. 2d Cir.1974), writ denied 295 So.2d 177 (La.1974), and the Fifth Circuit's decision in Fouchi v. Fouchi, 487 So.2d 496 (La.App. 5th Cir.1986), writ denied 493 So.2d 636 (La.1986) were contrary to the Louisiana Supreme Court's pronouncement in Abraham v. Abraham, 233 La. 808, 98 So.2d 197 (1957), which held that legal interest is due from date of judicial demand in a suit for accounting and settlement of the community. Although the Third Circuit in Vice v. Vice, 567 So.2d 774 (La.App. 3d Cir.1990) has recently chosen to disagree with this court's decision in Oliver, we follow our previous pronouncement and order interest to run from date of judicial demand.
Mr. Webber argues in brief that Mrs. Berry is not entitled to any interest because she did not pray for it in her petition. Although a party does not pray for interest, a judgment may and should include an award of legal interest where legal interest is authorized by code article or statute. LSA-C.C.P. Art. 862; Security Home Mortg. Corp. v. Bogues, 519 So.2d 307 (La.App. 2d Cir.1988); Rollison v. Rollison, 541 So.2d 375 (La.App. 2d Cir.1989). Legal interest is due on all sums which are the object of a judicial demand. LSA-C.C. Art. 2924.
DECREE
The trial court's division of Mr. Webber's retirement plan pursuant to the Sims formula is affirmed. The judgment is amended to increase Mrs. Berry's equalizing payment to $17,566.99. The judgment is also amended to grant Mrs. Berry legal interest on $17,566.99 from date of judicial demand until paid. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.
AMENDED, AND AS AMENDED, AFFIRMED.
BROWN, J., dissents with written reasons.
. A judgment of the supreme court becomes final and definitive when the delay for application for rehearing has expired (14 days) and no timely application therefor has been made. LSA-C.C.P. Art. 2167.
. Because Hare v. Hodgins involved a fully matured and vested retirement, all pay increases due to personal effort and merit had already occurred. However, in many cases, such as the instant case, the retirement is not yet fully matured or vested because the worker has not yet achieved retirement status, is still working, and may yet receive pay increases due to personal effort and merit. In such a case, if a partition using the Sims formula has already occurred, it would appear to be equitable to allow a modification of the partition for merit increases that occur after the partition has taken place. The Louisiana Supreme Court seems to be suggesting such a modification in Hare v. Hodgins by citing cases from other states in which jurisdiction is retained and actual division is delayed until pension payments are received. In further support of future modification, the court stated the employee spouse may request the court to "adjust" the community faction and to reallocate benefits to reflect gains attributable to the employee's personal effort and achievement. See Hare v. Hodgins, 586 So.2d 118, 128. We do not reach the issue in this case due to lack of proof.