Case Name: Bernard McCummings, Respondent, v. New York City Transit Authority, Appellant
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1992-02-20
Citations: 177 A.D.2d 24
Docket Number: 
Parties: Bernard McCummings, Respondent, v New York City Transit Authority, Appellant.
Judges: 
Reporter: Appellate Division Reports
Volume: 177
Pages: 24–55

Head Matter:
Bernard McCummings, Respondent, v New York City Transit Authority, Appellant.
First Department,
February 20, 1992
APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL
Joel A. Brenner of counsel (Jonathan Cory Scott with him on the brief; David Breitbart, attorney), for respondent.
Lawrence Heisler of counsel (Anita Isola and Lawrence A. Silver with him on the brief; Albert C. Cosenza, attorney), for appellant.

Opinion:
OPINION OF THE COURT
Milonas, J.
At approximately 8:00 p.m. on June 28, 1984, Jerome San-dusky was attacked by a number of youths in the 96th Street station of the Eighth Avenue subway line in the course of an abortive robbery attempt. Two Transit Authority police officers, Christine Mead and Manuel Rodriguez, who were on undercover patrol, heard the elderly victim's screams and came to his assistance. As the officers approached the staircase with their guns drawn, one of the culprits, Nathan Woods, evidently acting as the lookout, yelled "Yo". Two other perpetrators, Jacob Wise and plaintiff Bernard McCummings, were on top of Sandusky at the lower level, the former with a choke hold around the victim's neck and plaintiff rummaging through his pockets; some of Sandusky's belongings were strewn about the floor. The parties offered differing versions as to what transpired next. According to Officer Rodriguez, he identified himself, shouting, "Police, don't move", but both Wise and plaintiff lunged at him, thereby causing him to discharge five shots. Two of the bullets struck McCummings in the back, one severing his spine and rendering him a paraplegic.
McCummings admitted that he was engaged in robbing and beating Sandusky but claimed that after being alerted by Woods' signal, he broke off the assault and fled down the other staircase in the opposite direction. He stated that he was some 17 to 20 feet away from Officer Rodriguez when he was shot in the back. Plaintiff denied that he ever lunged at the officer. Plaintiff's medical expert testified that McCummings' spinal cord was immediately transected and that he instantly lost all weight-bearing capability, and since he was found at the bottom of the stairs that is where he was shot. Defendant offered no credible medical evidence to the contrary. Officer Rodriguez asserted that despite plaintiff's wounds, plaintiff was able to run down a stairway before collapsing. On the direct examination of Officer Rodriguez, the jury heard him testify about three prior incidents involving the use of his firearm. The shootings were found to be "justified" by the Transit Authority. Officer Rodriguez twice before shot at fleeing suspects and missed, the first time firing twice, the second time emptying his gun. On another occasion, Officer Rodriguez shot and killed a stray dog which was apparently rummaging through his garbage can.
The jury, clearly accepting McCummings' account of the incident, found that Officer Rodriguez had used excessive force against plaintiff, who had previously pleaded guilty to robbery and spent some three years incarcerated in State prison. The panel then awarded him a total of $2.5 million for past and future pain and suffering, $622,142.55 for future medical supplies and equipment and $1.2 million for future nursing and other home care services. In that regard, it should be noted that the evidence demonstrates that one of the bullets that entered from the back and transected his spine caused total paralysis from the mid-chest down, resulting, among other things, in complete and permanent loss of urinary, bowel and sexual function. On appeal, defendant New York City Transit Authority has advanced a series of contentions which have either not been preserved or do not constitute reversible error.
Defendant urges that the action should have been dismissed pursuant to Penal Law § 35.30 and the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Tennessee v Garner (471 US 1) or alternatively, that the holding in that case is not germane to the instant situation and, in any event, should not have been retroactively applied to this matter. Yet, since defense counsel not only did not object to reliance upon Tennessee v Garner (supra), but acknowledged that Garner is both controlling and retroactively applicable, defendant may not for the first time before this court endeavor to disclaim the relevance and applicability of Garner (CPLR 5501 [a] [3]; De Long v County of Erie, 60 NY2d 296, 306; Derdiarian v Felix Contr. Corp., 51 NY2d 308, 317). Similarly, the Transit Authority failed to advise the trial court that it deemed it improper to charge the jury pursuant to the standard of reasonableness of an officer's conduct as enunciated in Tennessee v Garner (supra) and defendant may not now advance such an argument on appeal (CPLR 4110-b). Defendant's assertion of qualified immunity is also precluded as not having been preserved and even on the merits is without substance inasmuch as the Transit Authority could be liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior (Frazier v State of New York, 64 NY2d 802).
In Tennessee v Garner (supra, at 11), the Supreme Court declared that "[t]he use of deadly force to prevent the escape of all felony suspects, whatever the circumstances, is constitutionally unreasonable. It is not better that all felony suspects die than that they escape. Where the suspect poses no immediate threat to the officer and no threat to others, the harm resulting from failing to apprehend him does not justify the use of deadly force to do so". Therefore, in the view of the court therein, where "the officer has probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a threat of serious physical harm, either to the officer or to others, it is not constitutionally unreasonable to prevent escape by using deadly force" (supra, at 11). One indicator cited by the court as illustrative of the danger presented by the suspect is whether he menaces the officer with a weapon.
It is significant that defendant never challenged the legal validity of any portion of the trial court's lengthy charge concerning the use of physical force by a police officer. Defense counsel merely requested that the court read to the jury the actual language of Penal Law § 35.30, as well as a specific paragraph in Tennessee v Garner (supra), notwithstanding that the statute and the Supreme Court ruling had been exhaustively explained to the members of the panel. The Transit Authority, insisting that Officer Rodriguez had no way of knowing whether or not the perpetrators were armed, appeared to believe that quoting from the subject Penal Law section and legal authority, could somehow benefit the defense's position, but, as the Trial Judge pointed out, Officer Rodriguez testified that the assailants' arms were outstretched and lunging at him without being in possession of any deadly weapons. Indeed, to the extent that the court provided an advantage to either party, it was more likely to have been to defendant than plaintiff by, for example, emphasizing that the burden of proof rested upon the plaintiff with respect to each and every element relating to the officer's use of deadly force.
Defendant also complains that the court improperly permitted the jury to consider the Transit Authority's 1982 and 1986 rules and regulations. First, it should be pointed out that defendant's attorney never protested the admission of the 1982 regulations nor ever moved that they be stricken. If anything, he acquiesced in their introduction into evidence and even affirmatively utilized these regulations in examining various witnesses both on direct and cross. Not until the precharge conference did defendant's lawyer assert that the 1982 regulations imposed a higher standard than the Penal Law or Tennessee v Garner (supra), and that they not be included in the jury instructions. Although the court denied the request, it stated that it would merely direct the panel to consider the regulations in deciding whether or not Officer Rodriguez acted with a reasonable belief that he was justified in the use of deadly force, and this is what was done. Defendant, in its appellate brief, concedes that it did not object to the admission of 1982 rules and regulations but argues disingenuously that they were only relevant as to claims subsequently dismissed (such as the allegation that the Transit Authority had negligently failed to train its officers regarding the appropriate use of deadly force) and, thus, not submitted to the jury. Yet, this is not a distinction ever put forward by defendant to the court; its only concern appeared to be with the standard for employing deadly force.
Further, contrary to defendant's contention that the 1982 regulations set more stringent requirements than otherwise mandated by statutory or case law (see, Lesser v Manhattan & Bronx Surface Tr. Operating Auth., 157 AD2d 352, which held that internal operating rules must be excluded if they compel a standard transcending reasonable care), they do no more than authorize Transit Authority officers to apply deadly physical force in response to a felony involving or threatening physical force. The 1982 regulations provide in pertinent part that: "The minimum level of force will be used whenever preventing or terminating a crime, or when arresting a person for a crime. A firearm or other deadly physical force will only be used when any other level of force is insufficient to effect police control of a felony involving physical force or imminent use of physical force against oneself or another."
Not only did the foregoing rule not impose a stricter standard but it largely follows the dictates of Penal Law § 35.30. Equally noteworthy is that Captain John Doyle of the Manhattan-Bronx Task Force and defendant's own witness, testified that the Supreme Court ruling in Tennessee v Garner (supra) actually limited the reliance upon force; therefore, the 1982 regulations had to be amended to raise the degree of care to that necessitated by Garner. Accordingly, defendant's position with regard to the 1982 regulations is simply unsupportable.
As for the 1986 regulations, which were promulgated in direct response to Tennessee v Garner (supra), the court, over the Transit Authority's objection, initially allowed their introduction during the re-cross-examination of Captain Doyle because it had concluded that defense counsel had "opened the door." Thereafter, lawyers for both parties had Captain Doyle read from and interpret the regulations. The next day, defendant unsuccessfully moved for a mistrial due to the admission of the 1986 regulations. Plaintiff's attorney agreed to withdraw them from evidence, and the court, striking from the record all reference to these rules and regulations, charged the jury that it disregard any testimony relating to the 1986 regulations (the panel was never supplied with the regulations themselves). While delivering its final instructions to the jury, the court again advised against considering any evidence that had previously been stricken. There is absolutely no basis here to find that the jury did not comply with the court's curative instructions or that the testimony involving the subject regulations was so damaging as to taint the entire trial even if the jurors had failed to follow the Judge's admonition.
The dissent's difficulty in accepting the, meaning of Tennessee v Garner (supra) is demonstrated by the implied criticism directed against the reasoning of the majority of the United States Supreme Court therein. Yet, notwithstanding the dissent's apparent dissatisfaction with Tennessee v Garner (supra), defendant not only never challenged its applicability but, instead, accepted that the ruling in that case was controlling here. Indeed, the requests for charge which were submitted to the Judge by the parties were exchanged in advance, and defendant certainly had the opportunity to present its own requests and to contest plaintiffs proposal. Yet, an examination of the precharge conference conducted by the court reveals that defendant agreed with the Judge's entire proposed jury instructions, except in one particular. Thus, the following conversation occurred between the court and the parties' counsel.
"the court: With respect to five, request five—do you have any objection if I should define—I don't know why I have to define 'serious physical injury.'
"mr. sieradzki [plaintiffs attorney]: That would only have applied had you used the language of Garner, which makes reference to serious physical harm or injury, to define that term would have some meaning. But since you're not using that term—
"the court: I will be using that term.
"mr. sieradzki: Then it should be defined. The jury has the right to know.
"the court: I will be using the term of a deadly weapon. A police officer is defending himself or believes that it's necessary to defend himself from what the officer reasonably believes the use or imminent use of deadly physical force. I will add 'or serious physical harm.'
"mr. sieradzki: Then you should define that, too.
"There is a Penal Law definition in the 1984-85 Penal Law, which you're reading to them from 3530 [sic].
"mr. kuzmack [defendant's attorney]: I would submit, your Honor, that we don't know what the Garner Court meant by 'serious physical harm.'
"mr. sieradzki: We can interpret Garner.
"If we're interpreting it in New York, for purposes of a New York trial, then you have a right to interpret a Federal Court which interprets a Tennessee statute, so that it applies to a New York statute.
"mr. breitbart [plaintiffs other attorney]: That's the definition in the New York Penal Code.
"the court: Well, that may not be the definition of 'serious physical injury' under the civil statutes of the no-fault thresh-hold civil statutes.
"mr. kuzmack: That's correct, your Honor.
"the court: It's an entirely different thing.
"mr. breitbart: We're talking about 3530 [sic], which is a penal statute.
"the court: That's true.
"mr. sieradzki: And we're using the Penal Law to define that penal statute term.
"How can you use a civil statute term to define a penal statute?
"the court: It's also defined differently now. It's in here somewhere.
"mr. sieradzki: I read it.
(Discussion off the record)
"the court: I will also charge this, referring to five.
"I will define 'serious physical injury.'
"mr. kuzmack: Respectfully except, your Honor."
Defendant's attorney did not, significantly, offer a suggestion for a possible alternative charge or even explain the precise reasons for his objection. Yet, pursuant to CPLR 4110-b: "At the close of the evidence or at such earlier time during the trial as the court reasonably directs, any party may file written requests that the court instruct the jury on the law as set forth in the requests. The court, out of the hearing of the jury, shall inform counsel of its proposed action upon the requests prior to their arguments to the jury, but the court shall instruct the jury after the arguments are completed. No party may assign as error the giving or the failure to give an instruction unless he objects thereto before the jury retires to consider its verdict stating the matter to which he objects and the grounds of his objection. Opportunity shall be given to make the objection out of the hearing of the jury."
Moreover, CPLR 5501 (a) (3) limits review by the Appellate Division to "any charge to the jury, or failure or refusal to charge as requested by the appellant, to which he objected". Thus, it is axiomatic that a purported error in a Judge's charge is not preserved for review unless it is clearly brought to the court's attention prior to the case being sent out for consideration by the jury (De Long v County of Erie, supra; Derdiarian v Felix Contr. Corp., supra), and an objection is deemed waived if it does not unambiguously and explicitly apprise the court of the alleged error and expressly request the pertinent charge sought (Moore v Leaseway Transp. Corp., 49 NY2d 720; DiSalvo v Bortle, 58 AD2d 997; see also, 4 Weinstein-Korn-Miller, NY Civ Prac ¶ 4017.01 et seq.). As the court clearly observed in Petosa v City of New York (52 AD2d 919, 920), the objection to a charge "must state the matter to which objection is being made and the grounds for such objection. A general objection is not sufficient where the correct charge might have been obtained by specifically calling to the trial court's attention the alleged error and the reason for such error". Therefore, the defense lawyer's unadorned "[rfespectfully except, your Honor" was scarcely adequate to preserve for review the single disagreement which he voiced with the court's proposed jury instructions.
Ironically, the minutes of the precharge proceedings reveal that the court spent considerable efforts to prune plaintiff's request to charge, often at defendant's request and over the expressed dissatisfaction of plaintiff's counsel. Specifically, the court granted in its entirety (except for one minor item not in issue on appeal) defendant's request to charge, stating that "[w]ith respect to defendant's request to charge, I will charge everything here". The rules of preservation serve the salutary purpose of giving fair notice to the trial court and to the adverse party of the claimed error and the proposed solution. Allowing a party to seek reversal on appeal on an unpreserved error is inherently unfair both to the jurist whose conduct is being reviewed and to the adverse party who had no meaningful way to respond to the claimed error. This is especially so where, as here, during an extensive charge conference defense counsel claimed ignorance on the law and stood mute when plaintiff's proposed charge relating to "serious physical harm" was being analyzed and negotiated. Furthermore, the court, most significantly, granted defendant's request to charge in its entirety.
Defendant's claim that the Judge erred in not reading as a whole section 35.30 of the New York Penal Law is similarly not preserved for appellate review. On several occasions, in two separate charge conferences, the court advised the attorneys that he agreed with their assessment that the case was controlled by section 35.30 of the New York Penal Law and Tennessee v Garnmer (supra). He stated that he would not read the statute but would charge its substance, as well as the holding of Tennessee v Garner (supra), and that he would "paraphrase" the statute. Defense counsel did not object to this ruling and did not specifically request the reading of the statute in his extensive request to charge. Defendant did offer his own version of the Penal Law and Tennessee v Garner (supra) in his written request to charge, and this was in fact incorporated at length into the Judge's charge to the jury. Defendant's request to read section 35.30 came for the first time after the Judge's charge and when the jury was about to deliberate. Nowhere in the record, however, is there a single objection pointing to any claimed error in the charge relating to the Penal Law section or any suggestion as to how or where the court may have gone astray. The Judge's position was that his charge was "[substantially consistent with the Penal Law Sections". Since defendant failed to point out to the court where it had erred, it must be assumed that the court was correct.
As for the criticism raised by the dissent concerning the court's charge as to what "level" of force was reasonable or excessive, it is notable that defendant did not assert this at trial. Moreover, in a Second Circuit case, Heath v Henning (854 F2d 6), cited by the dissent, the court reversed a jury verdict in favor of defendant police officers because the court had used an incorrect standard in instructing the jury on the officers' use of deadly force in effecting an arrest and remanded the matter for a new trial. According to the Second Circuit, which relied both on Tennessee v Garner (supra) and section 35.30 of the New York Penal Law, "[t]he legal standard to be applied in cases where a police officer has used deadly force against a fleeing felony suspect is one of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment" (supra, at 8), and "[t]he proper standard requires that a jury consider whether the officers acted reasonably, under the totality of the circumstances, in using deadly force to effect the arrest" (supra, at 9).
It is evident that the "level" of force which may be employed by officers is that which a jury regards as reasonable under the circumstances of the particular case. Defendant never disputed that this was an issue to be resolved by the jury at trial. The defense attorney specifically acknowledged that "the justifiableness of a shooting can only be judged by legal standards. The legal standards are 3530 [sic], the Penal Law, and Tennessee v. Garner. "
The issues which the jury had to determine are minimized by the truncated version offered by the dissent as the "central question". Throughout the trial there were two distinct and conflicting scenarios offered by the parties. According to the court, "as I see it, it is the plaintiff's claim that the shooting occurred while the plaintiff was unarmed, had already fled, had already released the victim and already fled down the stairway and was shot in the back at the bottom of the stairway. That is the plaintiff's claim On the other hand, the defendant's contention is that the shooting did not occur that way at all." Defendant's lawyer then responded, "No, your Honor. It occurred because the police officer was threatened with serious physical injury, and that he fired two shots at McCummings, and McCummings was shot while standing on the landing and that he ran down the stairs after being shot." The parties agreed that it was a clear matter of fact for the jury as to whether "the plaintiff was shot while lunging at the officer and that the officer was reasonable to believe he was in fear of his life or that deadly physical force was being used against him, or whether he was shot escaping" (stated by Mr. Kuzmack, the defense counsel).
One must discard or severely edit both fact versions developed by the testimony at trial to form the "central question" offered by the dissent, i.e., "whether an officer employed by defendant New York City Transit Authority used excessive force by shooting plaintiff McCummings in order to effect his apprehension while in immediate flight from the mugging of an elderly man." Yet, even viewing the issue as stated, the inescapable conclusion is that it still poses many questions for resolution by the jury, and, as described by the dissent in discussing the difficulties in attempting to interpret and apply the ruling of Tennessee v Garner (supra), "[t]he conclusion to be drawn is that Garner (supra) contemplates that such an assessment will be made ad hoc, based upon the facts presented", and "[ijndeed, the courts that have confronted the problem seem to have adopted this perspective." This is precisely the role that the jury fulfilled in this case.
The dissent endeavors to set up a straw man, never even suggested by defendant, to the effect that plaintiff is seeking recovery on both Fourth Amendment and tort grounds and that these doctrines are separate and distinct and mutually exclusive. Thus, almost everything involved in this case is now tainted by the "confusion" surrounding these two contradictory claims, particularly the instructions delivered to the jury regardless of whether or not actually objected to by the defense. This does not, however, prevent the dissent from recommending remand of this case for a new trial in which the jury would presumably decide whether Officer Rodriguez acted reasonably under the circumstances therein, precisely what he deems to be a matter of constitutional interpretation but which is, in reality, a question of fact. While the courts do establish constitutional standards, it is the jury which determines if the particular conduct in dispute comported with these standards. The jury is certainly not being called upon to make constitutional rulings as such. Further, since tort claims may clearly arise out of the violation of constitutional rights, there is no conflict between the two theories. They are simply different concepts, and the dissent has confused their meaning and application. The dissent, similarly, appears to perceive a potential discord between the New York State Penal Law and current judicial interpretation of the Fourth Amendment. Yet, defendant evidently does not share his concern and has never asserted this proposition. There is certainly no legal authority to support such a possibility.
The errors claimed in the charge which are raised by the defendant or sua sponte by the dissent are either nonexistent or insignificant and unpreserved. A reversal by this court would require a rejection of the jury's fact finding and its replacement with our own or penalizing the wrong party for unpreserved error. Either result would be a serious deviation from, and an abuse of, the authority which this court has on review.
Finally, as the Court of Appeals stated in Caldwell v New Jersey Steamboat Co. (47 NY 282, 286-287): "Where a legal proposition is presented for prompt decision, in such a variety of forms, with slight variations of language, it would be extraordinary if expressions could not be found which, considered separately, would not be obnoxious to criticism; but an appellate court will not seize hold of isolated portions of a charge for that purpose. If the charge, as a whole, conveyed to the jury the correct rule of law, on a given question, the judgment will not be reversed, although detached sentences may be erroneous; and if the language employed is capable of different constructions, that construction will be adopted which will lead to an affirmance of the judgment, unless it fairly appears that the jury were, or at least might have been, misled."
Consequently, the judgment of the Supreme Court, New York County (Leonard N. Cohen, J.), entered on March 8, 1990, which, following a jury trial, found in favor of plaintiff and awarded him damages in the total amount of $4,343,721.24, should be affirmed, without costs or disbursements. Order of the Supreme Court, New York County (Leonard N. Cohen, J.), entered on May 14, 1990, denying defendant's motion to set aside the verdict, is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.