Case Name: Christie A. GREEN; Dawn Wyland; Eric Meyer; Rae J. Waters; The Professional Group Public Consulting, Inc., an Arizona corporation, Plaintiffs/Appellants, v. Gale GARRIOTT, in his official capacity as Director of the Arizona Department of Revenue, Defendant/Appellee. Stella Gomez; Cecilia Hernandez; Stefanie Ortega; Kerin Zimmerman; Arizona School Choice Trust, Inc., a private nonprofit corporation, Intervenor-Defendants, Appellees
Court: Arizona Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Arizona
Decision Date: 2009-03-12
Citations: 221 Ariz. 404
Docket Number: No. 1 CA-CV 07-0424
Parties: Christie A. GREEN; Dawn Wyland; Eric Meyer; Rae J. Waters; The Professional Group Public Consulting, Inc., an Arizona corporation, Plaintiffs/Appellants, v. Gale GARRIOTT, in his official capacity as Director of the Arizona Department of Revenue, Defendant/Appellee. Stella Gomez; Cecilia Hernandez; Stefanie Ortega; Kerin Zimmerman; Arizona School Choice Trust, Inc., a private nonprofit corporation, Intervenor-Defen-dants, Appellees.
Judges: CONCURRING: PATRICIA K. NORRIS, Presiding Judge.
Reporter: Arizona Reports
Volume: 221
Pages: 404–427

Head Matter:
212 P.3d 96
Christie A. GREEN; Dawn Wyland; Eric Meyer; Rae J. Waters; The Professional Group Public Consulting, Inc., an Arizona corporation, Plaintiffs/Appellants, v. Gale GARRIOTT, in his official capacity as Director of the Arizona Department of Revenue, Defendant/Appellee. Stella Gomez; Cecilia Hernandez; Stefanie Ortega; Kerin Zimmerman; Arizona School Choice Trust, Inc., a private nonprofit corporation, Intervenor-Defen-dants, Appellees.
No. 1 CA-CV 07-0424.
Court of Appeals of Arizona, Division 1, Department E.
March 12, 2009.
As Amended April 15, 2009.
Sacks Tierney P.A. By Marvin S. Cohen, Scottsdale, and Arizona School Boards Association By Christopher P. Thomas, and Arizona Center for Law in the Public Interest By Timothy M. Hogan, Phoenix, Attorneys for Appellants.
Terry Goddard, Attorney General By Michael F. Kempner, Assistant Attorney General, Phoenix, Attorneys for Appellee.
Institute for Justice Arizona Chapter By Timothy D. Keller, Jennifer M. Perkins, Tempe, and Institute for Justice By William M. Mellor, Clark M. Neily, III, Arlington, VA, and Thomas A. Zlaket PLLC By Thomas A. Zlaket, Tucson, Attorneys for Appellee-Intervenors.
Alliance Defense Fund By Benjamin W. Bull, Gary S. McCaleb, Bryon J. Babione, Scottsdale, Attorneys for Amicus Curiae School Choice Arizona, Inc.

Opinion:
OPINION
GEMMILL, Judge.
¶ 1 In this appeal we address whether Arizona Revised Statutes ("A.R.S.") section 43-1183 (Supp.2008), establishing a state income tax credit for scholarship contributions by corporations, contravenes the United States and Arizona Constitutions. For the reasons that follow, we hold that A.R.S. § 43-1183 passes constitutional muster.
A.R.S. § 43-1183
¶ 2 A.R.S. § 43-1183 establishes a dollar-for-dollar tax credit that is available to any corporation paying Arizona corporate income taxes. The tax credit is given "for the amount of voluntary cash eonti'ibutions made by the taxpayer during the taxable year to a school tuition organization." A.R.S. § 43-1183(A). A "school tuition organization" ("STO") is defined as:
[A] charitable organization in this state that both:
(a) Is exempt from federal taxation under § 501(c)(3) of the internal revenue code and that allocates ninety per cent of its annual revenue for educational scholarships or tuition grants to children to allow them to attend any qualified school of their parents' choice.
(b) Provides educational scholarships or tuition grants to students without limiting availability to only students of one school.
AR.S. § 43-1183(Q)(2).
¶ 3 To obtain the tax credit, the corporate taxpayer must, before making a contribution, notify the STO of the total amount of contributions that the taxpayer intends to make to the STO. AR.S. § 43-1183(D). Before accepting the taxpayer's contribution, the STO must request pre-approval from the Arizona Department of Revenue ("Department") for the amount of the proposed contribution. Id. The Department then has twenty days to pre-approve or deny the proposed contribution. Id. If the Department approves the contribution, then the STO must notify the corporate taxpayer of the pre-approval, and the taxpayer has ten days after receiving-notice of the pre-approval to make the contribution to the STO selected by the taxpayer. Id.
¶ 4 The Department is required to permit "the tax credits on a first come, first served basis." A.R.S. § 43-1183(0(3). The Department is not permitted to allow tax credits "that exceed in the aggregate, a combined total of ten million dollars in any fiscal year," with the tax credit cap to be increased annually by twenty per cent. A.R.S. § 43-1183(C)(1). A tax credit is not permitted "if the taxpayer designates the taxpayer's contribution to the school tuition organization for the direct benefit of any specific student." A.R.S. § 43-1183(1).
¶ 5 Under the corporate tax credit program, STOs are required to use at least ninety per cent of the contributions they receive to provide educational scholarships or tuition grants. A.R.S. § 43-1183(J). STOs are only permitted to provide educational scholarships or tuition grants to students whose "family income does not exceed one hundred eighty-five per cent of the income limit required to qualify a child for reduced price lunches under the national school lunch and child nutrition acts." Id.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶ 6 On September 19, 2006, Christie A. Green, Dawn Wyland, Eric Meyer, Rae J. Waters, and The Professional Group Public Consulting Inc. ("Appellants"), filed a complaint against Gale Garriott, in his official capacity as Director of the Arizona Department of Revenue, seeking a declaration that A.R.S. § 43-1183 is unconstitutional plus in-junctive relief enjoining the administration of § 43-1183. Stella Gomez, Cecilia Hernandez, Stefanie Ortega, Kerin Zimmerman, and Arizona School Choice Trust, Inc., moved to intervene as Defendants, and the superior court granted their motion.
¶ 7 Appellees moved to dismiss Appellants' complaint under Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. On March 5, 2007, the trial court granted Appellees' motion.
¶ 8 Appellants timely appealed and we have jurisdiction pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-2101(B) (2003).
ANALYSIS
¶ 9 "In reviewing motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim, we assume that the allegations in the complaint are true and determine if the plaintiff is entitled to relief under any theory of law." Sensing v. Harris, 217 Ariz. 261, 262, ¶ 2, 172 P.3d 856, 857 (App.2007). We apply a de novo standard of review to issues of statutory interpretation. City of Phoenix v. Harnish, 214 Ariz. 158, 161, ¶ 6, 150 P.3d 245, 248 (App.2006).
¶ 10 Appellants urge four bases for finding A.R.S. § 43-1183 unconstitutional, arguing that the tax credit violates: (1) the Establishment Clause of the United States Constitution; (2) Article 2, Section 12, of the Arizona Constitution; (3) Article 9, Section 10, of the Arizona Constitution; and (4) Sections 20 and 26 of the Arizona Enabling Act, Act of June 20, 1910, ch. 310, 36 Stat. 557. We address each of these arguments in turn.
Establishment Clause
¶ 11 The Establishment Clause of the United States Constitution states that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion." U.S. Const. amend I.
¶ 12 In Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13, 91 S.Ct. 2105, 29 L.Ed.2d 745 (1971), the United States Supreme Court adopted a three-part test to determine the viability of statutes juxtaposed against the Establishment Clause: "First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; finally, the statute must not foster 'an excessive government entanglement with religion.' " (Citation omitted).
Purpose
¶ 13 We need not speculate as to the purpose of § 43-1183, as our legislature included an express purpose: "Pursuant to § 43-223, Arizona Revised Statutes, the legislature enacts § 43-1183, Arizona Revised Statutes, as added by this act, to encourage businesses to direct a portion of their taxes by contributing to school tuition organizations in arder to improve education by raising tuition scholarships for children in this state." 2006 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 14, § 6 (emphasis added).
¶ 14 Appellants argue that this is not a valid secular purpose, as § 43-1183 is "not restricted, as the Zelman program was, to students whose public school options are inadequate, nor is it restricted to students whose parents are without the means to afford payment of private school tuition." We reject this assertion.
¶ 15 First, the Zelman court did not rest its finding of constitutionality with respect to the Cleveland statute on the basis that its beneficiaries were lower-income families with inadequate choices — the secular purpose of the Ohio statute was not even in dispute. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 649, 122 S.Ct. 2460.
¶ 16 Second, our legislature may act in the absence of the restrictive features identified by Appellants. A system of education, which includes both private and public institutions, stands to gain much by the presence of competition. See Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 395, 103 S.Ct. 3062, 77 L.Ed.2d 721 (1983) ("[Pjrivate schools may serve as a benchmark for public schools, in a manner analogous to the 'TVA yardstick' for private power companies."); Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 262, 97 S.Ct. 2593, 53 L.Ed.2d 714 (1977) (Powell, J., concurring in part, concurring in judgment in part, and dissenting in part) ("Parochial schools . often afford wholesome competition with our public schools; and in some States they relieve substantially the tax burden incident to the operation of public schools. The State has, moreover, a legitimate interest in facilitating education of the highest quality for all children within its boundaries, whatever school their parents have chosen for them."), overruled on other grounds by Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 120 S.Ct. 2530, 147 L.Ed.2d 660 (2000).
¶ 17 Finally, the program adopted by our legislature limits scholarship recipients "to children whose family income does not exceed one hundred eighty-five per cent of the income limit required to qualify a child for reduced price lunches under the national school lunch and child nutrition acts." A.R.S. § 43-1183(J). While this qualification does not limit the scholarship recipients to only the very lowest-income families, it evidences a clear desire on the part of our legislature to provide an educational choice to parents who probably could not otherwise afford to send their children to a private school. Cf. Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 395, 103 S.Ct. 3062, 77 L.Ed.2d 721 (1983) ("An educated populace is essential to the political and economic health of any community, and a state's efforts to assist parents in meeting the rising cost of educational expenses plainly serves this secular purpose of ensuring that the state's citizenry is well-educated."); Kotterman v. Killian, 193 Adz. 273, 278, ¶ 8, 972 P.2d 606, 611 (1999) ("[Private schools] also further the objective of making quality education available to all children within a state.").
¶ 18 We conclude, therefore, that the first prong of Lemon is satisfied. See Mueller, 463 U.S. at 395, 103 S.Ct. 3062 ("A state's decision to defray the cost of educational expenses incurred by parents — regardless of the type of schools their children attend— evidences a purpose that is both secular and understandable.").
Effect
¶ 19 The central inquiry in Zelman— whether the Ohio statute had the "effect" of advancing religion — was whether the program was one that provided "aid directly to religious schools" or was one "of true private choice." Zelman, 536 U.S. at 649, 122 S.Ct. 2460. Programs of true private choice do not offend the Establishment Clause: "Three times we have confronted Establishment Clause challenges to neutral government programs that provide aid directly to a broad class of individuals, who, in turn, direct the aid to religious schools or institutions of their own choosing. Three times we have rejected such challenges." Id. Zelman became the fourth.
¶ 20 Our inquiry thus becomes whether § 43-1183 provides for true private choice. "To answer that question, our decisions have drawn a consistent distinction between government programs that provide aid directly to religious schools, and programs of true private choice, in which government aid reaches religious schools only as a result of the genuine and independent choices of private individuals." Zelman, 536 U.S. at 649, 122 S.Ct. 2460 (citations omitted).
¶ 21 The corporate tax credit program does not provide aid directly to religious schools. There are two distinct levels of private choice that "direct the aid to religious schools or institutions of their own choosing." Id. The first level of private choice comes directly from the taxpayer. The corporate taxpayer must decide, initially, whether to make a contribution to an STO. This decision is not coerced by the State. Indeed, there is no ultimate financial advantage to the corporate taxpayer in contributing to an STO. If the corporate taxpayer decides to contribute to an STO, it must then select a particular STO. Again, the State is not involved with the selection by the taxpayer of a particular STO. After deciding to contribute to an STO and then selecting a particular STO, the taxpayer must then determine the amount of contribution it intends to make to the STO.
¶ 22 After this series of independent choices, there is yet a second level of private choice: the scholarship recipient and his or her parents. Parents of children who qualify under the program select a school of their choice for their children to attend. Upon selecting a school, the parents then apply for a scholarship or tuition grant from a qualified STO to be applied to the particular school of their choosing. The State is not involved in encouraging parents to choose a sectarian school over a non-sectarian school. Sectarian schools receive aid only after parents, and not the State, have selected sectarian schools to educate their children. The "primary beneficiaries" of the program are the scholarship recipients, not sectarian schools. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 651, 122 S.Ct. 2460; see also Kotteman, 193 Ariz. at 283, ¶ 26, 972 P.2d at 616 ("The primary beneficiaries of this credit are taxpayers who contribute to the STOs, parents who might otherwise be deprived of an opportunity to make meaningful decisions about their children's educations, and the students themselves. We realize, of course, that the benefits do not end there. The ripple effects can, when viewed through a wide-angle lens, radiate to infinity. But while direct subsidies to sectarian schools may affront the Constitution, 'the Establishment Clause is not violated every time money previously in the possession of a State is conveyed to a religious institution.' ") (quoting Witters v. Wash. Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 486, 106 S.Ct. 748, 88 L.Ed.2d 846 (1986)); Jackson v. Benson, 218 Wis.2d 835, 578 N.W.2d 602, 618 (1998) ("In our assessment, the importance of our inquiry here is not to ascertain the path upon which public funds travel under the amended program, but rather to determine who ultimately chooses that path. As with the programs in Mueller and Witters, not one cent flows from the State to a sectarian private school under the amended MPCP except as a result of the necessary and intervening choices of individual parents.").
¶ 23 In addition to private choice, the Supreme Court in Mueller, Witters, Zobrest, and most recently in Zelman, emphasized the importance of neutrality in examining the effect a statute has in advancing or inhibiting religion. As the court stated in Zelman, when a program is "neutral with respect to religion and provides assistance directly to a broad class of citizens who, in turn, direct government aid to religious schools wholly as a result of their own genuine and independent private choice, the program is not readily subject to challenge under the Establishment Clause." Zelman, 536 U.S. at 652, 122 5. Ct. 2460.
¶ 24 Section 43-1183 is neutral with respect to religion. The statute makes no distinction between sectarian and non-sectarian schools or STOs. This statute is just one of many undertakings by our legislature to provide parents with viable alternatives beyond the traditional public school education. See, e.g., A.R.S. § 15-181 (2002) (creating charter schools "as alternatives to traditional public schools"); A.R.S. § 15-802 (Supp.2008) (authorizing education for home-schooling); A.R.S. § 43-1089 (2006) (providing a personal income tax credit for contributions made to STOs). The tax credit is available to corporate taxpayers without reference to religion. Scholarships created by § 43-1183 are available for students to attend any private school, whether sectarian or otherwise. There is no "financial incentive" for corporate taxpayers to contribute to sectarian STOs, nor is there any such incentive for students to attend religious over non-religious private schools. Witters, 474 U.S. at 488, 106 S.Ct. 748 (stating, in the context of the second prong of Lemon, that a Washington program "is in no way skewed towards religion" and "creates no financial incentive for students to undertake sectarian education"). "Such incentives '[are] not present . where the aid is allocated on the basis of neutral, secular criteria that neither favor nor disfavor religion, and is made available to both religious and secular beneficiaries on a nondiseriminatory basis.' " Zelman, 536 U.S. at 653-54, 122 S.Ct. 2460 (quoting Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 231, 117 S.Ct. 1997, 138 L.Ed.2d 391 (1997)).
¶ 25 In the same vein, Appellants also allege that religious STOs are responsible for distributing more than 70% of the scholarships available through this scholarship program. Mere statistical figures, however, are insufficient for the purpose of demonstrating that a statute has the effect of advancing or inhibiting religion. In Zelman, the Supreme Court refused to give any constitutional weight to the statistical figure of 96%, which represented the total percentage of scholarship recipients in the Cleveland program who chose sectarian schools. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 658, 122 S.Ct. 2460; see also Mueller, 463 U.S. at 400-01, 103 S.Ct. 3062 (rejecting invitation to attach significance to figure that 96% of parents taking tax deductions for tuition expenses did so based upon paying tuition at religious schools). Regardless of whether religious STOs are distributing more than 70% of the scholarships available, such a statistic does not alter the layers of private choice that insulate § 43-1183 from constitutional infirmity. Indeed, Appellants overlook that the 70% figure has nothing to do with State action and is attributable solely to the intervention of private choices: corporations selecting a particular STO, and par ents choosing to send their children to sectarian schools. Such private choices are the hallmarks of a constitutionally permissible program. See discussion, supra ¶ 20-22.
¶ 26 Appellants also argue that § 43-1183 violates the Establishment Clause because it permits STOs and sectarian schools to award scholarships "on a religiously discriminatory basis." Under § 43 — 1183(Q), a "qualified school" is one "that does not dis-' criminate on the basis of race, color, handicap, familial status or national origin," and STOs are defined with reference to being "exempt from federal taxation under § 501(c)(3) of the internal revenue code." A.R.S. § 43-1183(Q)(l)(a), (2)(a). Under § 43-1183, therefore, qualified schools and STOs are not prohibited from discriminating on the basis of religion.
¶ 27 We first note that § 43-1089, which was upheld by our supreme court in Kotterman, contains the same definitions for STOs and qualified schools. A.R.S. § 43-1089(G)(2), (3). Also, any religious discrimination that may take place under § 43-1183 is performed by the qualified schools in admitting their students and by the STOs in administering the scholarship funds — not by the State of Aizona. "Por a law to have forbidden 'effects' under Lemon, it must be fair to say that the government itself has advanced religion through its own activities and influence." Corp. of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 337, 107 S.Ct. 2862, 97 L.Ed.2d 273 (1987). The numerous levels of private choice that exist under the challenged program insulate the State from becoming the actor engaged in any religious discrimination. "Because the program ensure[s] that parents [are] the ones to select a religious school as the best learning environment for their . child[ren], the circuit between government and religion [is] broken, and the Establishment Clause [is] not implicated." Zelman, 536 U.S. at 652, 122 S.Ct. 2460; see also Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 809-11, 120 S.Ct. 2530 (plurality opinion) ("If the religious, irreligious, and areligious are all alike eligible for governmental aid, no one would conclude that any indoctrination that any particular recipient conducts has been done at the behest of the government____ For if numerous private choices, rather than the single choice of a government, determine the distribution of aid pursuant to neutral eligibility criteria, then a government cannot, or at least cannot easily, grant special favors that might lead to a religious establishment.").
¶ 28 Given the neutrality of the statute, and the multiple layers of private choice that stand between the legislature's decision to provide a corporate tax credit and the eventual acceptance of scholarship funds by sectarian schools, we do not believe the Establishment Clause has been violated. See Zelman, 536 U.S. at 652, 122 S.Ct. 2460.
Entanglement
¶ 29 Section 43-1183 presents no problems of "excessive government entanglement with religion." Lemon, 403 U.S. at 613, 91 S.Ct. 2105 (citation omitted). While the Department does pre-approve intended contributions, there are no criteria for approval that would require the Department to become involved with the religious or non-religious nature of STOs or private schools. Rather, the Department's involvement is merely administerial in nature, ensuring that the statute itself is followed.
¶ 30 For example, the Department is charged with ensuring that the annual "tax credit.cap" for contributions does not exceed the allotted aggregate amount. A.R.S. § 43-1183(C)(1). Thus, as part of the pre-approval process, the Department must ensure that the intended contribution will not exceed the tax credit cap. Likewise, STOs must report certain information to the Department by June 30 of each year. A.R.S. § 43-1183(0). However, the information is statistical in nature, to ensure that STOs are complying with the requirements of § 43-1183. Thus, there is no "comprehensive, discriminating, and continuing state surveillance" that would run afoul of the Establishment Clause. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 619, 91 S.Ct. 2105. "[RJoutine regulatory interaction which involves no inquiries into religious doctrine, no delegation of state power to a religious body, and no 'detailed monitoring and close administrative contact' between secular and religious bodies, does not of itself violate the nonentanglement command." Hernandez v. Comm'r, 490 U.S. 680, 696-97, 109 S.Ct. 2136, 104 L.Ed.2d 766 (1989) (citations omitted).
¶ 31 In sum, A.R.S. § 43-1183 satisfies the dictates of the Establishment Clause. It has a valid, secular purpose and is neutral towards religion. Section 43-1183 provides tax credits to corporations without reference to religion. It also provides benefits directly to a wide spectrum of individual scholarship recipients, defined only by financial need and prior school attendance. A.R.S. § 43-1183(J). It permits corporate taxpayers to make contributions to STOs based on the genuine choice of the taxpayer. Section 43-1183 also permits parents and students to exercise free choice among various secular and religious educational options. Therefore, a program of true private choice is created. Lastly, § 43-1183 does not create excessive government entanglement with religion. Accordingly, we hold that A.R.S. § 43-1183 does not offend the Establishment Clause.
Article 2, Section 12 & Article 9, Section 10
¶ 32 Appellants next argue that § 43-1183 violates Article 2, Section 12, and Article 9, Section 10, of the Arizona Constitution.
¶ 33 Article 2, Section 12 states in part: "No public money or property shall be appropriated for or applied to any religious worship, exercise, or instruction, or to the support of any religious establishment." Article 9, Section 10 provides: "No tax shall be laid or appropriation of public money made in aid of any church, or private or sectarian school, or any public service corporation."
¶34 In Kotterman, 193 Ariz. at 284-88, ¶ 32-50, 972 P.2d at 617-21, our supreme court addressed the constitutionality of an analogous statute under Article 2, Section 12, and Article 9, Section 10. At issue in that case was a statute that permitted individual taxpayers to take a state tax credit for contributions made to STOs. A.R.S. § 43-1089.
¶ 35 In dismissing the challenges to Article 2, Section 12, and Article 9, Section 10, our supreme court stated:
We have already concluded that this tax credit is not an appropriation of public money. Likewise, no tax has been laid here. To the contrary, this "measure reduces the tax liability of those choosing to donate to STOs. We cannot say that the legislature has somehow imposed a tax by declining to collect potential revenue from its citizens. Nor does this credit amount to the laying of a tax by causing an increase in the tax liability of those not taking advantage of it. Such a construction tortures the plain meaning of the constitutional text. In addition, if we were to conclude that this credit amounts to the laying of a tax, we would be hard pressed to identify the citizens on whom it is assessed. Because we see no constitutional difference between a credit and a deduction, we would also be forced to rule that deductions for charitable contributions to private schools were unconstitutional because they too, would amount to the laying of a tax. This we decline to do.
Kotterman, 193 Ariz. at 288, ¶ 50, 972 P.2d at 621.
¶ 36 Section 43-1089 is significantly analogous to the statute at issue in this appeal. Indeed, Appellants concede that this ease is "similar in many respects" to the individual income tax credit statute upheld in Kotterman. The main thrust of Appellants' argument is that Kotterman "[i]s patently incorrect and should be overruled." But we do not, of course, have the authority to overrule or disregard our supreme court. Bade v. Ariz. Dep't of Transp., 150 Ariz. 203, 205, 722 P.2d 371, 373 (App.1986). Because Kotterman has addressed and resolved these particular issues, we will not revisit them.
¶ 37 Appellants, however, argue Kotterman does not resolve their contention that § 43-1183 improperly lays a tax in violation of Article 9, Section 10, because the legislature has "definitively resolved" the issue in its purpose statement: "Pursuant to §. 43-223, Arizona Revised Statutes, the legislature enacts § 43-1183, Arizona Revised Statutes, as added by this act, to encourage businesses to direct a portion of their taxes by contributing to school tuition organizations in order to improve education by raising tuition scholarships for children in this state." (Emphasis added.)
¶ 38 We are not persuaded that the use of the term "taxes" by our legislature in its purpose statement transforms the effect of the statute into something it is not — the laying of a tax. To hold otherwise would elevate the purpose statement above the level of the actual text of the statute. This is an approach we are obligated to reject. See Cronin v. Sheldon, 195 Ariz. 531, 538, ¶ 29-30, 991 P.2d 231, 238 (1999) ("To the contrary, the constitutionality of the EPA is not dependent on the preamble because the preamble is not statutory text.... The preamble is devoid of operative effect") (citations omitted); Foremost Life Ins. Co. v. Trimble, 119 Ariz. 222, 226, 580 P.2d 360, 364 (App.1978) ("To the extent that there is any conflict between these two sections, we hold that § 20-1602 is clear and unambiguous, and must be considered as controlling over § 20-1601, which constitutes the purpose or policy section of Article 10.").
¶ 39 Appellants also argue that the tax credit cap contained in A.R.S. § 43-1183(C) is evidence of our legislature having viewed § 43-1183 as the laying of a tax. The legislature is free to place a limit on the total amount of corporate tax credits that will be granted in any given year or to omit a cap altogether. The fact that the legislature has limited the maximum amount of tax credits per year does not, in our view, signal that the legislature has "somehow imposed a tax by declining to collect potential revenue from its citizens." Kotterman, 193 Ariz. at 288, ¶ 50, 972 P.2d at 621. Additionally, Appellants' argument ignores the tax credit cap within A.R.S. § 43-1089, the statutory provision upheld in Kotterman. While § 43-1089 does not have a total maximum dollar amount of allowable tax credit as contained in § 43-1183(C), § 43-1089(A) limits the amount individual taxpayers may credit against their taxes. We are confident that the legislature, based upon previous tax returns and projected future filings, has reasonable estimates of the revenue that will not be collected as the result of these tax credits: Therefore, the individual tax credit limitations in § 43-1089 provide an overall limit on the impact of the individual credits that is analogous to the precise limit provided in § 43-1183(C). And our supreme court has affirmed the constitutionality of § 43-1089.
¶ 40 We therefore hold that § 43-1183 does not violate Article 2, Section 12 or Article 9, Section 10 of the Arizona Constitution.
Arizona Enabling Act
¶ 41 Lastly, Appellants argue that our legislature, by enacting § 43-1183, "violated its fundamental constitutional responsibility toward Arizona's public schools." Appellants premise this argument upon Arizona's Enabling Act. Specifically, Appellants argue that § 43-1183 violates Sections 20 and 26 of the Arizona Enabling Act.
¶ 42 Section 20 states: "That provisions shall be made for the establishment and maintenance of a system of public schools which shall be open to all the children of said State and free from sectarian control; and that said schools shall always be conducted in English." A.R.S. Enab. Act, § 20 (2001). Section 26 provides that schools "provided for in this Act shall forever remain under the exclusive control of the said State, and no part of the proceeds arising from the sale or disposal of any lands granted herein for educational purposes shall be used for the support of any sectarian or denominational school, college, or university." A.R.S. Enab. Act, § 26 (2001).
¶ 43 We reject Appellant's argument. Nothing contained in § 43-1183, nor in its operation, prohibits the "establishment and maintenance of a system of public schools." Nor does § 43-1183 affect whether public schools are open to all children of Arizona. Likewise, § 43-1183 does not commandeer the public school system away from the "exclusive control" of the State of Arizona, nor does it transform the public school system into a system of sectarian control. Section 43-1183 creates a corporate tax credit program that assists parents with additional educational choices for their children. The corporate tax credit dollars have not been earmarked and, indeed, cannot be earmarked until falling into the sovereign purse of the State. See Kotterman, 193 Ariz. at 285, ¶ 40, 972 P.2d at 618 ("For us to agree that a tax credit constitutes public money would require a finding that state ownership springs into existence at the point where taxable income is first determined, if not before. The tax on that amount would then instantly become public money. We believe that such a conclusion is both artificial and premature. It is far more reasonable to say that funds remain in the taxpayer's ownership at least until final calculation of the amount actually owed to the government, and upon which the state has a legal claim.") (footnotes omitted). Thus, § 43-1183 does not create a situation where our legislature is siphoning funds from the public school system in order to provide for private, sectarian schools, as the tax credit dollars never enter the general fund.
¶ 44 Appellants argue that because our legislature has created a corporate tax credit program that provides educational scholarships and grants for children to attend nonpublic schools, and because these scholarships and grants do not cover the entire cost of tuition, only "children whose families can afford to supplement Program scholarship grants with funds to meet the substantial additional costs of sending them to those schools" will be able to attend. Thus, Appellants contend, § 43-1183 expends State resources on a system of schooling that is not open to all of Arizona's children. We reject Appellants' underlying assumption: that § 43-1183 expends State resources. See ¶ 35 supra. Appellants' argument also overlooks the directive given by the Enabling Act and our Constitution, which is directed toward the legislature's shepherding of the public school system. These provisions speak only to maintaining an open and free public school system. They do not touch on tax credit programs that provide for educational opportunities in non-public schools.
CONCLUSION
¶ 45 Section 43-1183 does not violate the Establishment Clause of the United States Constitution. Section 43-1183 has a valid, secular purpose; it does not have the effect of either advancing or inhibiting religion, because it is neutral towards religion and provides for genuine private choice; and § 43-1183 does not involve excessive governmental entanglement. Based upon our supreme court's analysis and holding in Kotterman, § 43-1183 is not violative of Article 2, Section 12, nor Article 9, Section 10. The Arizona Enabling Act does not prohibit the program instituted by § 43-1183.
¶ 46 We therefore affirm the judgment of the trial court dismissing Appellants' complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
CONCURRING: PATRICIA K. NORRIS, Presiding Judge.
. In a separate opinion involving the parties to this appeal, we addressed the applicability of A.R.S. § 12-1841 (Supp.2008). See DeVries v. State, 219 Ariz. 314, 198 P.3d 580 (App.2008). That opinion did not address the substantive issues we resolve herein.
. The dissent argues that because Appellants attached various documents to their response to Appellees' motion to dismiss, the trial court should have treated the motion as one for summary judgment. See infra ¶ 50. The only documents attached, however, were copies of briefs filed before the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit from a separate case. From the trial court's minute entry, it is clear that the court treated Appellees' motion as one for a failure to stale a claim. The trial court did not reference the documents Appellants attached and, based upon the court's analysis, it is apparent that the court did not consider Appellants' attachments in rendering its decision. Further, Appellants do not argue that the trial court erred by not treating the proceeding as one for summary judgment. Accordingly, on this record we do not believe the mere attachment of these documents from a separate case to Appellees' response to the motion to dismiss converted the proceeding into one for summary judgment. See Dube v. Likins, 216 Ariz. 406, 417 n. 2, 11 34, 167 P.3d 93, 104 n. 2 (App.2007) (noting that attachments to motion to dismiss neither added nor subtracted from the deficiency of the pleadings and stating that "neither party argues the court erred in not treating the motion to dismiss as a motion for summary judgment. We thus review the trial court's judgment as a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6)."). And even if we treated the motion to dismiss as one for summary judgment, our conclusions would not be altered.
. Even though the plain language of the Establishment Clause addresses only the federal government ("Congress"), the United States Supreme Court has determined that it equally applies to the individual states via the Fourteenth Amendment. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15, 67 S.Ct. 504, 91 L.Ed. 711 (1947). But see Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 45-46, 124 S.Ct. 2301, 159 L.Ed.2d 98 (2004) (Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing that "the Establishment Clause is a federalism provision, which, for this reason, resists incorporation" through the Fourteenth Amendment).
. Appellants argue that Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 122 S.Ct. 2460, 153 L.Ed.2d 604 (2002), puts forth a new test for "state programs that provide subsidies for tuition at religious schools." However, a close reading of Zelman indicates that the Supreme Court was simply applying the Lemon test to the Ohio school voucher program. While we believe Zel- man is controlling, we do not believe it pronounced a "new and separate test."
There was no dispute in Zelman surrounding the Ohio statute's secular purpose. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 649, 122 S.Ct. 2460. Nor was there an issue concerning excessive entanglement. The sole issue in Zelman concerning the Lemon test was "whether the Ohio program nonetheless has the forbidden 'effect' of advancing or inhibiting religion." Id. This, of course, is the second part of the Lemon test. The Zelman court went on to discuss neutrality and private choice in the context of the second prong of Lemon.
Even if we interpreted Zelman as pronouncing a separate test from Lemon, an approach we need not take, § 43-1183 nonetheless satisfies Zelman: it has a "valid secular purpose," is "neutral with respect to religion," and permits the exercise of "true private choice." Id. at 649, 662, 122 S.Ct. 2460.
. Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 113 S.Ct. 2462, 125 L.Ed.2d 1 (1993).
. We recognize that in Zelman, 536 U.S. at 645, 122 S.Ct. 2460, the Ohio statute at issue did not permit schools to discriminate on the basis of religion. We do not believe, however, that this feature of the Ohio statute was dispositive to the Court's holding. A review of the Court's analysis as a whole reveals that, in addressing the primary effect of the statute, the Court focused on the aggregate of the following features of the Ohio statute: it provided benefits directly to a wide spectrum of individuals, defined only by financial need and residence, id. at 662, 122 S.Ct. 2460; it permitted genuine choice, id.; it was only one of many undertakings by the State of Ohio to provide educational opportunities, id. at 647, 122 S.Ct. 2460; it permitted participation of both religious and non-religious schools, id. at 645, 122 S.Ct. 2460; and there was no incentive towards religious schools, id. at 650, 122 S.Ct. 2460. Such inquires are the hallmarks of not only Zelman, but Mueller, Witters, and Zobrest— the very cornerstones of Zelman. We do not believe the discriminatory bar of the Ohio statute, in and of itself, controlled the outcome in Zelman. The Supreme Court analyzed the statute in its entirety to conclude that the statute passed constitutional muster. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 662-63, 122 S.Ct. 2460. We do the same here, and viewed as an integrated whole, § 43-1183 does not have the effect of advancing religion.
. "A policeman protects a Catholic, of course— but not because he is a Catholic; it is because he is a man and a member of our society. The fireman protects the Church school — but not because it is a Church school; it is because it is property, part of the assets of our society. Neither the fireman nor the policeman has to ask before he renders aid 'Is this man or building identified with the Catholic Church.' " Everson, 330 U.S. at 25, 67 S.Ct. 504 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
. Appellants advance a number of arguments against the reasoning of Kotterman, including: (1) the history and purpose of Article 2, Section 12 and Article 9, Section 10; (2) that a tax is laid in violation of Article 9, Section 10; (3) Section 43-1183 aids sectarian schools in violation of Article 9, Section 10; and (4) that § 43-1183 involves "public money." Kotterman addressed and dismissed all of these arguments. Kotterman, 193 Ariz. at 287-92, ¶ 53-71, 972 P.2d at 621-25 (rejecting argument based on framers intent and history of Article 2, Section 12 and Article 9, Section 10); id. at 1150 ("Likewise, no tax has been laid here. To the contrary, this measure reduces the tax liability of those choosing to donate to STOs. We cannot say that the legislature has somehow imposed a tax by declining to collect potential revenue from its citizens."); id. at ¶ 44-46, 50 (rejecting argument that § 43-1089 supported or aided a religious establishment); id. at ¶ 33-43 (explaining the meaning of "public money or property" and concluding that § 43-1089 did not involve "public money").
. Appellants filed a supplemental citation of legal authority, citing Cain v. Horne, 218 Ariz. 301, 183 P.3d 1269 (App.2008) (review granted October 28, 2008), in support of the proposition that § 43-1183 violates Article 9, Section 10 of the Arizona Constitution. Because the statute at issue in Cain — a true school voucher program— differs significantly from the statute at issue before this court, the analysis in Cain is not applicable here and we need not address its reasoning.
. Our dissenling colleague agrees with us on all points except the Establishment Clause issue. We respectfully disagree with his Establishment Clause analysis.