Case Name: Catharine Brown v. Charles Farran
Court: Supreme Court of Ohio
Jurisdiction: Ohio
Decision Date: 1827-12
Citations: 3 Ohio 140
Docket Number: 
Parties: *Catharine Brown v. Charles Farran.
Judges: 
Reporter: Cases decided in the supreme court of ohio : upon the circuit at the special sessions in Columbus
Volume: 3
Pages: 131–146

Head Matter:
*Catharine Brown v. Charles Farran.
Certificate of relinquishment of dower sufficient, if it contain a substantial enumeration of the acts required by the statute, though the words be not followed. An inveterate practice for a series of years not to be departed from.
This was a bill in chancery for the assignment of dower, against a person claiming under the alienee of the husband. The wife had joined in the deed of alienation, and the case turned upon the validity of the following acknowledgment:
“ Before the undersigned, within and for the same county, personally appeared David Brown, and Catharine Brown, his wife, who being made acquainted with the contents, and being examined, separate and apart, the wife from the husband, acknowledge the above indenture to be their voluntary act and deed, for the uses and purposes therein mentioned.”
The case was adjourned here for decision from Hamilton county.
Brooks, for complainant:
The objections to the deed are:
1. It does not appear by the certificate, that the petitioner ever did either sign or seal the deed.
2-, It does not appear that she acknowledged the signing and sealing before the witnesses, or before the justice.
3. By the acknowledgment before E. Stone, it does not appear she acted without any fear or coercion of her husband.
4. E. Stone does not sign in his official character as justice of the peace.
5. He had no authority to make any other certificate than the one the law prescribed.
In order to come at the meaning of the legislature, it is natural to examine the act previous to the one under which the deed was made, providing for the execution and acknowledgment of deeds, passed in February, 1805. 1 Stat. 150. By this law, a deed would have been valid without subscribing witnesses, if duly acknowledged before a judge or justice, or it would have been valid if proved by subscribing witnesses, without any certificate of ac knowledgment. If the parties adopted the former mode, the law required the certificate should state the wife acted without coercion or compulsion of her husband. The statute of 1818 required her to act, not only without coercion, but *also without any fear of her husband ; hence it plainly appears, that the statute of 1818 was intended to guard more effectually the rights of the wife against the husband’s power than the statute of 1805. It is the sole object of section 2 of the statute of 1818 to guard the rights of the wife by the most explicit and strongest language possible, against that influence which the law always presumes the husband exercises over her. This certificate may all be true, and yet it may be also true that the wife, in the first instance, was influenced to sign the deed through fear of-her husband’s displeasure; it may also be true, from aught that appears on the certificate, that the petitioner never even saw the two first witnesses whose names appear on the deed. The law requires she shall acknowledge before two subscribing witnesses, and that the certificate should state that she declared before the justice she had so acknowledged, as appears by the word, “ did and now doth.” The legislature intended to guard against all possibility of collusion between the husband and witnesses, and justice; hence it has made one a check uj>on the other. The law requires the contents of the deed shall be made known to the wife, when separate from the husband; the certificate states, the contents were made known to David and Catharine Brown, and the presumption is they were together. Although it appears they were examined apart, it does not appear that while separate and apart from the husband the wife acknowledged anything, for the language is, “acknowledged the above indenture to be their voluntary act,” etc. But under my view of the statute, the simple fact that the certificate does not state she had acknowledged the deed before the witnesses, renders it void beyond all question.'
We have shown the most material points'of distinction between two statutes, by which it appears that of 1818 is remedial in its nature.
A statute ought to be so constructed, that if it can be prevented, no clause, sentence, or word shaft bo superfluous, void, or insignificant. 6 Bacon Abr. 380. If this certificate is valid, then the words of the statute, “ of her own free will, etc., without any fear,” etc., as well as the words “ signing and sealing,” are void and insignificant. It may be contended that the word voluntary, cures some of the defects *of the certificate, but it can not satisfy the word “ did,” as used before the words, “and now doth,” for it is in the present tense, and can not prove a voluntary acknowledgment before the witnesses. The certificate is either good, or it is absolutely void. The court can presume nothing in favor of the certificate, because the presumption of law is, that the wife can do no legal act; that she is under the dominion of her husband: every exception to this rule is either established by usage, or by statutory enactment; hence, it seems to follow, if permitted by statute to do any legal act, it must be done in the manner prescribed by that statute. The conveyance of a feme covert, except by some matter of record, is void, and not merely voidable. 2 Bl. Com. 293. It is an inflexible principle of law, never yet, as I can find, departed from, either by courts of law or equity, “ that where certain formalities are required by act of Parliament, and these are omitted, the court can not remedy the omission. “ 1 Mad. Ch. 52.” So when a bill of sale of a ship was made, as a collateral security, and the papers, etc., were delivered, but there was no recital in the bill of sale, of the registry, as is required by 25 Geo. 2, Lord Thurlow held, it could not be supplied in equity. 3 Bro. Ch. Cas. 57. There is no relief in equity, upon a promissory note, void in law, for want of a stamp. 5 Ves. 240. An amnesty deed, not according to the amnesty act, is void. 6 Ves. 745. There is the same rule of property in equity as in law ; and the same exposition of the statute law. 1 P. Wms. 109. If an affirmative statute, which is introductive of a new law, direct a thing to be done, in a certain manner, that thing shall not, even although there are no negative words, be done in any other manner. 6 Bac. Ab. 377; Plow. 206; 6 Mass. 307. Apply this principle to the present case. Our statute of 1818 is affirmative; it is introductive of a new law, clearly distinguishable from the law of 1805; it has directed the certificate shall be made in a certain manner ; yet the thing is done in another manner. When the statute 27 Hen. 8, provided jointure in lieu of dower, we find it was no bar, unless the statute was strictly pursued. 2 Bl. Com. 138. If the foregoing authorities are law, if these long-established rules, which have served as land-marks in the disposition of real property, are still binding, it does seem to me this deed can not be sustained. The defendant has *conceded most of the defects before enumerated, and has attempted to cure them by his interrogatories. But parol evidence is inadmis sible, in aid of a defective acknowledgment. In this case, “ the plaintiff offered to prove, that the feme covert had said, that if the acknowledgment was not sufficient, she would make it again, or do any other act to make it good; but the judge said, she should have appeared before the proper tribunal, and declared her consent in the manner pointed out by the laws of the country. We may regret that the unskillfulness or negligence of the scrivener, has led to this error, hut we are bound to say, ita lex scripta est, and the party must abide by the consequences of his own act.” 1 Bin. 470, 479. “ The deed of a, feme covert must be acknowledged conformably with the statute, and certified agreeably to the laws of the country where it is executed.” 1 Tyler, 42; 2 Har. & McHen. 38. And this court have decided the same point, in the case of the Lessee of Atkinson v. Dailey, 2 Ohio, 212. A lease or deed, not executed according to law, does not convey title, “ and was properly rejected.” Where a bond had been given by husband in trust, to secure to his wife five hundred pounds, in ease she survived him, on a bill brought for the wife’s dower, parol evidence to show that the bond was intended, at the time, to be in lieu of dower, and that the wife had acknowledged it to be so, can not be allowed, being within the statute of frauds and perjuries. 3 Atk. 8. You can not add anything to a written agreement to affect land by parol evidence, for it is contrary to the statute of frauds and perjuries, as well as the rule of common law. 2 Atk. 384. Parol evidence that the justice had duly examined a feme covert, was refused. 1 Taylor, 139. Parol evidence is inadmissible to prove the wife was privately examined, or even to explain a deed, unless there was a charge of fraud in obtaining it. 2 Hayw. 68; 1 Des. 345. The court can not remedy the omission, which it might do, if parol evidence were admissible.
Fox, for defendant:
The authorities on the subject of the validity of acknowledgment of deed are somewhat numerous in the United States, but as the point now to be settled is of vast importance *to the people in this section of the state, I must beg the indulgence of the court, while I cite, and extract from such of them as I have been enabled to examine. I venture to say that in all of the cases, the rule is laid down that a substantial compliance.with the statute is all that is required, and that the courts will presume many things in favor of a defective acknowledgment. In Robins’ lessee v. Bush, 1 Har. & McHen. 50, it was certified that “ Robert Grundy, and Judith his wife, which said, being by us first examined as the law requires, they both acknowleged the within written deed, and the premises therein contained, unto the within Robert Ungle,” etc. In this case the parties who claim in opposition to the deed offered to prove the deeds were obtained by fraud, and that the wife did not know the contents of'the deed; and although the provincial court instructed the jury that the indorsement on the deed, and the acknowledgment thereon, was not according to law, yet, on a bill of exceptions to this opinion, the court of appeals reversed the judgment of the provincial court.
In Webster’s lessee v. Hall, 2 Har. & McHen. 19, this objection was taken; the certificate stated that the wile, “being by us privately examined, did declare that she made the same acknowledgment free and willingly of her own accord and consent,” etc. The statute, 1 Maryland Statutes, 127, requires that the persons taking the acknowledgment, “ shall examine her privately, out of the hearing of her husband;” although these last words were entirely omitted, the acknowledgment was supported, and that, too, in a case where the statute requires “that the person or persons so examining her, shall, in a note or certificate of the taking of the said acknowledgment, certify her examination and acknowledgment thereupon,” and the statute also declares that ;n such manner “ feme coverts shall be barred and not otherwise.” This same decision was made as well in the general as in the court of appeals.
In Hoddy’s lessee v. Harryman, 3 Har. & McHen. 581, the certificate set forth, “ and at the same time came Susanna, wife of, etc., and acknowledged the land and premises to be the right, title, and estate of the said Geo. Harryman, his heirs and assigns foroverr according to the direction of an act of assembly in such cases made and provided.” This acknowledgment *was made under the [145 statute last cited, and although it does not show that any private examination was had, the court of appeals, on a writ of error, held the acknowledgment good and legal. ,
In Lessee of McIntire v. Ward, 5 Binney, 296, the magistrate did not certify that the contents of the deed were made known to the wife, although the act of Pennsylvania directs that the person taking the acknowledgment “ shall read, or otherwise make known to her the full contents of the deed,” and yet the acknowledgment was held sufficient. The court say, page 301, “No particular form is necessary. The words of the act need not bo used if its directions are substantially complied with. This court would be departing from the line of its duty, if it were studious to avoid conveyances by objections founded merely upon form.” In Shaller et al. v. Brand, 6 Binney, 435, the acknowledgment was not more certain or particular than the present one, indeed it would be difficult to find any two acknowledgments written at different times so similar in their language; it meets every objection the complainant’s counsel have made to our deed; if one is defective, the other is equally so, and the laws of Pennsylvania and Ohio, on this subject, are almost word for word the same. The remarks of Chief Justice Tilghman, page 438, on the subject of acknowledgments, are full of good sense. “We have always declared that it was sufficient if the law was substantially complied with, and on any other principle of construction, the peace of the country would be seriously affected, as the cex’tificates of acknowledgments of deeds have generally been drawn by persons who were either ignorant, or disregarded the words of the act of assembly.” Again, “It is not straining the expressions voluntary consenting thereto, too far to say> that they imply, she declared that she executed the deed voluntarily, and that is sufficient.” Yeates, 441, says: “It can not be doubted that a woman’s voluntary consent excludes all idea of coercion or compulsion. Surely the complainant’s counsel has never read this case last cited, or he would not attempt to discuss the “ question.” Again, in Lessee of Talbot, 1 Peters’ Cir. Ct. U. S. 188, an acknowledgment in almost the same words used in the case of Shaller et al. v. Brand was held sufficient. The court say, “We have attentively considered the cases of McIntosh v. *Ward, and Shaller v. Brand, and feel no hesitation in declaring our entire approbation of the fundamental principle upon which they are both decided. That principle is, that the form of the certificate is immaterial, provided the directions of the law are substantially complied with.”
In ,15 Johns. 89, the magistrate only certified that the husband and wife came before him “to acknowledge this indenture to be their act and deed," and it was held that the certificate could not be held to mean merely that the parties came merely to acknowledge, but that they actually did acknowledge, etc.
In Troup v. Haight, 1 Hopk. Ch. 267, the acknowledgment required by the statute is, “ that no such acknowledgment shall be taken unless the officer taking the same shall know or have satisfactory evidence that the person making such acknowledgment is the person described in, and who has executed such deed,” etc. The officer had merely certified that “ Samuel S. Haight, who is to me well known, personally appeared,” etc., but did not certify him to be “ the person described in, and who has executed such deed,” etc., and yet the court held it sufficient.
But there is another ground upon which this acknowledgment ought to be supported; it is the practice and usage of persons taking acknowledgments, ever since the first settlement of the Miami country. I will venture to assert that at least two-thirds of the acknowledgments taken in this county, prior to the year 1820, are no bettor than the present one, many of them much worse. The court will perceive by the list of acknowledgments certified by the recorder, that the acknowledgments from the year 1795 until 1820, taken by justices of the peace, and the judges also, are not more explicit than the present one. Even the deed given by ’Squire Stone to Dover, under whom the complainant’s husband claimed, is in every respect as defective as this deed is, and none of Mr. Stone’s certificates are more explicit. I do not think a single case can be found where Mr. Stone has certified an acknowledgment at greater length than the present one. If the community have been in an error for thirty years, it is better that error should be consecrated by the court/than that they should make a decision which would open the door for a general litigation.
*The Supreme Court of the United States, in the case of McKeen v. Delaney, 5 Cranch, 29, felt the necessity of adopting the construction given to the Pennsylvania act upon this subject, that although they believed that the words of the statute had never authorized the construction it had received, yet they would not give a different construction to the act. They say: “ The court yields the construction which would be put on the words of the act to that which the courts of the state have put on it, and on which many titles may probably depend-”
The remarks of Justice Yeates, 6 Binney, 442, upon this point, are very just and correct.
The court also, in 11 Sergeant & Rawle, 347, placed their opinion on the general inaccuracy which prevailed with justices of the peace; “for,” say they, “if the acknowledgment was void, then all deeds thus acknowledged by feme coverts would be void; and the registering of all instruments, so acknowledged, would be a nullity.”
The remarks of the chancellor in the case of Troup v. Haight, 1 Hop. 267, are 'peculiarly appropriate to this branch of the case. He says: “The most usual form has, I believe,-been that which adopts the language of the statute; but various other forms have been used; and certificates, expressed in language used in this instance, have certainly been very usual in all parts of the state. Certificates like this have been considered and treated as sufficient during twenty-seven years; and a decision that they are not valid would subvert titles to lands to a very great extent. They have been held sufficient not merely by the recording officers, but by judicial officers who have taken acknowledgments, and have composed their certificates in this form by judges of the Supreme Court, judges of the county court, masters of this court, and commissioners. This general usage, thus long continued and hitherto unquestioned, has great force, and the practical construction of the law by so many public officers, though not given upon adverse litigation, must still have much the weight of judicial decision. The construction which considers these certificates as a substantial compliance with the law is liberal, but it is not violent or unreasonable. This construction has prevailed so extensively and for so long a period, that it possesses high ^authority; and to pronounce these certificates void would be a most dangerous innovation.” In Jackson v. Guman, 2 Cowen, 567, the same point was decided, and an acknowledgment sustained for no other reason than this, that the practice of persons taking acknowledgments had given a construction to the act.
Storer, on the same side, argued upon the same grounds and authorities.
Hammond, in reply:
The argument of the defendant proceeds on the principle th'ai the laws of 1805 and 1818 are substantially the same. This illustrates the counsel’s notice of substantial eonformhy. The law of 1805 did not require the wife to acknowledge the execution in presence of witnesses. It was sufficient if the deed were executed by the wife, without witnesses, if she acknowledged its execution before the proper officer. The acknowledgment before witnesses is an additional requisite, superadded by the act of, 1818. When before the officer, under the act of 1805, she was only required to declare that the original execution was voluntarily made. A subsequent or existing repugnance was of no consequence. By the law of 1818 the privilege was secured to the wife of retracting her original voluntary execution and acknowledgment before witnesses when she came before the officer.' And by the latter law the word “fear ” is substituted for “ compulsion.” It is only to reflect a moment to determine they are words of very different import. The fear of compulsion; the fear of displeasure; the fear of giving offense.
By the act of 1805 nothing was required but a private acknowledgment of a former voluntary act, and that was the single act of executing, signing, sealing, and delivering the deed. If this were done voluntarily, and acknowledged before the officer to have been so voluntarily done, without coercion or compulsion, then the deed was obligatory. But more is required under the statute of 1818. Besides the signing, sealing, and delivering, which constitutes the execution of the deed, it must be acknowledged before witnesses, and subsequently before an officer, accompanied by a declaration *that the first acknowledgment was voluntary, and that the then acknowledgment is voluntary also.
The law of 1818 is plainly intended to introduce a new rule as to the mode of a married woman convoying her estate. It empowered her in section 6 to create an attorney and authorize him to convey. As this put her more in the power of her husband than the former law, it was deemed right to extend to her a more effective protection against the abuse of that power, and the requisites of execution are increased for that purpose.
We have seen that the law requires a separate examination- before the officer, and a separate or individual declaration by the wife, of certain acts previously done, and of certain facts, as existing at the time of the acknowledgment.- The certificate in question imports from beginning to end a joint act of the husband and wife. Lot it be taken as true, and let it be conceded that all if fairly imports took place, and nothing more, would such a state of facts be even a substantial compliance wi.tb the law of 1818, upon the principles of the defendant’s counsel himself? They appeared together before .the justice. The wife was separately made acquainted with the contents of the deed, and separately examined, which being done, the husband and wife jointly acknowledged that the indenture was their then voluntary act and deed. Nothing more can possibly be extracted from the acknowledgment as cei’tified. There can be no ground for pretending that the separate examination extended to any fact not certified. The wife was separately asked if she acknowledged the paper to be her act and deed, and she answered in the affirmative. This certainly would not be sufficient under the law of 1818, although it might be so held under that of'1805. The declaration required by the act of 1818 is, that she acknowledged the deed bef'oi’e the witnesses voluntarily and without the/ear or coex-cion of her husband, and that she now does so again acknowledge it. If she did not make this declaration, the deed was not so acknowledged as to conclude her.
The cases cited by the. defendant’s counsel all proceed upon the px’ineiple that the certificate of the officer, of itself, impox'ts that the law was complied with, though not in its very terms, in all its important and essential requisitions. If *this certificate does not import the proper facts, then the cases are in no respect similar. ]
The cases from Harris and McHenry, cited by the defendant’s counsel, are not of much importance. The fix’St was differently decided by diffex’ent courts, and upon the final appeal the decision is not reported. The second case turned upon the single omission of the words, “ out of the hearing of her husband.” The certificate was otherwise full and ample. It was adjudged sufficient, but no reason was given. The third case, though decided in favor of the validity of the certificate, was so decided after much difference of opinion, and seems to have been rested on these words, “ according to the act of assembly,” embodied in the certificate, in which there is not much force. In the same book, 3 Har. & McHen. 430» there is a directly contrary decision,
In 5 Binney, the question arose upon the fact that the certificate did not state that the contents of the deed wore made known to the wife in terms. The court decide upon the ground that the fact, though not expressly stated, is sufficiently and substantially expressed. So in 6 Binney, where the terms “ voluntarily consenting thereto,” were deemed equivalent to the requisitions of the law, the court go no farther than to decide that the terms used import a substantial compliance with the law; that is, they imported that what the law requires was, in fact, transíicted. The doctrine is the same in Peters. But in all the cases the certificates imported a more full compliance with the law than the one under consideration; under the law of 1805 this certificate might be held sufficient. That law required nothing but an original voluntary execution. But the law of 1818 required two subsequent voluntary acknowledgments; and it should appear in the certificate that the wife declared to the justice that in each acknowledgment she acted voluntarily, and that her volition was without feat' or coercion. The terms, “ to be her voluntary act and deed," can not fairly be made to comprehend the three distinct acts required by the statute, because the wife might so consider it, although it never was acknowledged before the witnesses, and although her acknowledgment proceeded from a secret fear, but from no open act of coercion on the part of the husband.
*In the laws of the states referred to by the defendant’s counsel, the term fear is not used; and the circumstances connected with its introduction into our own law in 1818 require that it should have some importance attached to it. It was intended to increase the security of the wife, by protecting her against an act performed under the impulse of fear, though not otherwise coerced, and, except as to her own secret motives, voluntary. It is a great mistake to suppose that the act of 1818 is no more than a substantial re-enactment of the then existing law. Its provisions are different, not from inadvertence, but evidently from design ; and a correspondent change was required in the fact of acknowledgment, and, consequently, in the certificate of that fact.
It is argued, that although the certificate be held defective, it must now be sustained, because most of the certificates made by justices, for a series of years, are of the same defective character. This argument is supported by authority, resting on a sort of necessity to patronize ignorance. But it is not carried quite so lar as to permit ignorance to remodel the laws of the land. It allows an apology for the inartificial performance of official duty, but goes no further. The counsel here propose to shut up the statute book, and open in its place that of the recorder. They say it matters not what the legislature required, the question must be decided by- the acts of the justice. This, I think, is going a little too far ; besides, this statute is too recent, the practice under it too short, to permit that practice to determine the rights of parties. The complainant is not to be divested of her rights, upon a presumption that she agreed to part with them, which presumption is to be deducted from the alleged ignorance of the justice of the peace. This really seems to be the true shape of the argument.

Opinion:
Opinion of the court, by
Judge Burnet :
The complainant sets up a claim of dower in a lot of ground in the city of Cincinnati, of which her husband was seized in fee during coverture, and which he sold and conveyed to the defendant for a valuable consideration, by deed bearing date December, 1818. The deed was signed and sealed by the complainant and by her husband, and attested by two subscribing witnesses.
*An acknowledgment was made at the bottom of the deed in the following words : " State of Ohio, Hamilton county, ss. Before me, the undersigned, a justice of the peace within and for said county, personally appeared David.Brown, and Catharine Brown, his wife, who having been made acquainted with the contents, and being examined separate and apart, the wife from the husband, acknowledged the above indenture to be their voluntary act and deed, for the uses and purposes therein mentioned. In witness," etc.
The deed was executed in December, 1818, after the act of 1805 was repealed by the act which took effect in May, 1818, and which was in force at the time of the execution and acknowledgment. This statute provides that the deed shall be signed and sealed by the husband and wife, and shall be acknowledged before two subscribing witnesses, who shall attest the same. ' It also provides that it shall be acknowledged before a judge, or justice of the peace, who shall examine the wife separate and apart from her husband, and shall read or otherwise make known to her the contents of such deed, and if upon such examination she shall declare that she voluntarily, and of her own free will and accord, without any fear or coercion of her husband, did, and now doth acknowledge the signing and sealing thereof, the said judge or justice shall certify the same, etc.
It is contended, on the part of the complainant, that this acknowledgment is not in conformity with the requirements of the statute, and that it does not, for that reason, bar her right of dower in the premises.
Some of the objections taken to this acknowledgment do not require to be specially reviewed ; as, for example, that the magistrate has not signed it officially, and that the signing and sealing do not appear to have been acknowledged, either before the witnesses or before the justice. To the first of these objections, it is sufficient .to say that the magistrate has described himself, in the body of the certificate, as a justice of the peace, which renders it unnecessary to add his title of office to his name.
The second objection is not strictly correct in point of fact. The signing and sealing was acknowledged before the subscribing witnesses, at the time of the execution, who have ^attested the same as the statute directs, and the instrument was acknowledged, by both husband and wife, to be their voluntary act and deed, before the magistrate, which could not be the fact, unless they had signed and sealed it; for signing and sealing are indispensably necessary to create a deed. This declaration, therefore, is a virtual and substantial acknowledgment of the signing and sealing, both of which are required, by the statute, to create a deed.
The third objection is that it does not appear from the certificate that the wife acted without any fear or coercion of her husband. It is true that those words are not contained in the certificate, but the justice certifies that she acknowledged the deed to be her voluntary act, and if voluntary, it could not have been done under the influence of fear or coercion. The term voluntary is defined to be, acting without compulsion, acting by choice, willing, of one's own accord. The declaration of the wife, then, on her separate examination, excludes the idea of fear or force. If she executed the instrument willingly, of choice, and of her own accord, as her admission before the justice imports, she could not have been under the influence of fear, much less of coercion. An act done in consequence of fear can not be done willingly and of choice. The one unavoidably excludes the other, so that the magistrate, although be has not used all the words given in the statute, has taken one which includes the substance of all the others.
The next objection is the want of a declaration that the wife did acknowledge the deed before the subscribing witnesses, and that she does acknowledge it before the j ustice. The statute does not, in terms, require such a declaration. The counsel have considered the sentence to which this objection relates as elliptical, and have supplied the omission in their own way. I am willing to admit that the passage is susceptible of the construction they have given it, though the provision would be perfectly useless, as the attestation of the subscribing witnesses furnishes evidence of the first acknowledgment, which it is their duty to hear before they affix their names to the deed. But it is subject to a more serious objection. Cases may arise in which a feme covert signs and seals a deed involuntarily, yet without objection, but with a determination not to acknowledge it before a justice. *On further information and reflection, her objections may be removed; she may become not only willing, but anxious to complete the conveyance by a full and free acknowledgment before a justice of the peace, but on the construction contended for she can not do it without affirming a deliberate falsehood. Now, it is not presumable that the act was intended to prohibit the completion of deeds under such circumstances, or to require it to be done at the expense of the truth; and yet this must be the consequence if the alleged omission in the law be supplied in the manner proposed. It does not appear distinctly from the statute what the term did relates to, whether to the acknowledgment before the witnesses to the signing and sealing, or to anything else. The sense will be complete and equally, if not more useful, by reading that she did sign and seal the deed, and now doth acknowledge the signing and sealing thereof; and this construction is favored by the consideration that no other part of the section requires a declaration from tho wife that she did sign and seal. If this be the correct reading of the elliptical clause, it is contained substantially in the certificate of the magistrate, as we have before seen.
It will not be seriously contended that the magistrate is bound to use the same language that he finds in the statute. The legislature have not undertaken to prescribe a form of acknowledgment that is to be literally pursued. If the certificate contains the substance of the law, though in the language of the officer, it is sufficient. On any other principle, it is a matter of doubt whether the records of the state contain a solitary deed with a valid acknowledgment. It is, however, safe and prudent to adopt the language of the act, with but little, if any variation, and yet it would be attended with destructive consequences to consider such an adherence as essential to the validity of an acknowledgment.
It may become a question, then, how far the magistrate may deviate from the words of the act. I would answer the inquiry by saying that his certificate must contain the substance of everything required by the law. No substantial part of the provision-can be dispensed with. It must appear expressly, or by irresistible inference from the language of the certificate, that the wife was acquainted with the nature of the deed, that she was examined apart from her husband, *that she acknowledged the deed, and admitted that it was her voluntary act, in such terms as necessarily excluded the influence of fear or coercion.
"When the legislature were providing this mode of conveying real estate, by femes covert, in lieu of the common law method, by fine, they must have had two objects in view; first, to simplify the transaction, and secondly, to protect the wives of the grantees-against the exercise of an improper influence by their husbands; and if the requirements of the law are substantially adhered to, these objects will be accomplished, although the officer does not literally pursue the language of the statute. If it would have been proper, at any time, to require such an adherence, it is certainly too late to require it now. A different practice has prevailed since the first establishment of the territorial government, which can not be corrected, without incalculable mischief, and if it had been the opinion of the court, when they were considering and deciding this case, that the words of the statute -ought to be literally copied, and that such should have been the course from the beginning, they would have resorted to the maxim, communis error facit jus, rather than encounter the consequences of shaking the title to an indefinite portion of the state. No law can require the correction of an error in its construction, which has long existed, and has been generally acquiesced in; Lord Coke says, not even Magna Charta. But I do not feel the necessity of resorting to-this maxim. The law, as to the form of the certificate, is directory, though, as to. its substance, it is imperative. The one may be varied; the other must be adhered to. It evidently appears from the certificate on this deed, that the wife was examined apart from her husband; that she was made acquainted with the contents of the deed; that she acknowledged the deed, and admitted it to be her act, and that she acknowledged it to be voluntary on her part. These statements, in substance, embrace everything required by the law, and virtually negative the existence of everything which the law was intended-to prevent. If she understood what she was doing, and, in the absence of her husband, admitted that she had done it, and that she did it voluntarily, which implies the absence of fear or coercion, her rights have had all the protection which the law intended to afford, and she *can not be permitted to revoke her deed, for any defect in form.
I am aware that the mode of conveyance by femes covert, given by our statute, is a substitute for the more difficult mode of conveying by fine in open court, evidenced by the record, and that it was intended to afford equal security to the parties concerned ; and I admit that no construction of the statute can be correct that necessarily impairs that security. The acknowledgment, therefore, must be by the wife in person, in the absence of her husband, before an officer named in the statute, and must be evidenced by his certificate on the deed itself, in an official form. This exposition of the law, while it admits some latitude of inference from what the certificate actually contains, excludes the right of resorting to parol testimony to supply an omission. If any essential part be not distinctly stated, or fáirly inferable from other facts that are stated, the defect can not be remedied, whatever may be the consequence.
In considering this case I have felt it my duty, in accordance with the views of the court, to place it principally on considerations arising from the policy and practice of the state, as far as they are sustained by the principles of law. It will be found, however, on examination, that the cases cited from New York, Pennsylvania, and Maryland, by the defendant's counsel, go the whole length of sustaining the doctrine maintained in this case.
The bill must be dismissed.