Case Name: Isabel MITCHELL, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Willie CLARK, Jr., et al., Defendants-Appellants
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1983-05-03
Citations: 431 So. 2d 817
Docket Number: No. 15175-CA
Parties: Isabel MITCHELL, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Willie CLARK, Jr., et al., Defendants-Appellants.
Judges: Before PRICE, HALL, MARVIN, JASPER E. JONES and FRED W. JONES, Jr., JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 431
Pages: 817–824

Head Matter:
Isabel MITCHELL, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Willie CLARK, Jr., et al., Defendants-Appellants.
No. 15175-CA.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Second Circuit.
May 3, 1983.
Walker, Feazel & Tooke by Barry G. Feazel and S. Judd Tooke, Shreveport, for defendants-appellants.
C. William Gerhardt, W. Orie Hunter, Jr., Clerk of Court, in pro. per., Shreveport, for plaintiff-appellee.
Before PRICE, HALL, MARVIN, JASPER E. JONES and FRED W. JONES, Jr., JJ.

Opinion:
MARVIN, Judge.
In this action between an aunt and her nephew, the defendant nephew appeals a judgment that orders record title to immovable property in his name, as the vendee in a 1958 deed, "transferred" by the clerk of court to the name of the aunt, who alleged and showed over the nephew's peremptory exception and objection, that she paid the vendor for the property and directed that her nephew be named as the vendee in the 1958 deed.
The issue is whether "testimonial proof" or parol evidence of the circumstances of the 1958 "purchase" and her continued possession and maintenance since that time should have been admitted. Defendant's exception of no cause of action and his objection at the trial to parol evidence essentially assert that plaintiff cannot legally assail the 1958 authentic act without alleging fraud or error [La.CC 2276] and that plaintiff, who never owned the property, cannot create title in herself by parol evidence [La.CC Arts. 2440, 2275]. We reverse the judgment appealed and render judgment to sustain the exception of no cause of action. CC 2440.
The trial court recognized that a "long line of cases" such as Ceromi v. Harris, 187 La. 701, 175 So. 462 (1937), have held parol evidence inadmissible to create title in one who never owned the property or to show that the vendee was in reality some person other than the person named in the act of sale. The trial court admitted parol evidence and overruled the exception of no cause, however, reasoning that "the parol evidence rule does not bind parties who did not sign the authentic act."
This holding stems from the perhaps too broad language in Cosey v. Cosey, 376 So.2d 486 (La.1979), and the trial court's failure to recognize that the rule of the Ceromi-type cases is the rule of CC Art. 2440, while the rule of the Cosey-type cases is the rule of CC 2276, which admits of some exceptions. These rules, while often used together, should not be confused because they are conceptually different.
"Although the issues are separate, the Louisiana Supreme Court often discusses them together . generally producpng] the same result, i.e., exclusion or non-exclusion of parol; however, the failure to distinguish the concepts may lead to incorrect results. " 35 La.L.R. 779, fn 3 (1975)
The distinction was noted in Barbin v. Gaspard, 15 La.Ann. 539 (1860), when the 1825 Civil Code was in effect. Art. 2276 was then 2256 and Art. 2440 was then 2415. A's administratrix alleged and sought to show that A had purchased an immovable from B and had title placed in the name of C.
"[PJlaintiff claims title . by virtue of a sale, but is without any evidence in writing . and relies on testimonial proof to establish her demand.
"Evidence of this kind is insufficient to establish title . The Civil Code declares that . testimonial proof of it shall not be admitted. Art. 2415 [now 2440]
"The plaintiff, however, seeks to bring her case within the provisions of Article 2255 [now 2276]
"... [I]t does not appear by any evidence recognized by law that [plaintiffs] ancestor ever had any title to the [immovable] in dispute.
"There is a great and material difference between the right to show fraud or simulation in the sale of immovable property . by the ancestor to the prejudice of . . forced heirs, and the right to show title in the ancestor for the purpose of increasing the amount of assets belonging to his estate. The former right may, in a certain class of cases [such as Cosey-2276-type cases], be exercised; but the latter right [such as Ceromi-2440-type cases] never can be, without the consent of the defendant ." 15 La.Ann. at pp. 539-540. Bracketed comments supplied.
Since the adoption of our Civil Code through Landry v. LeBlanc, 416 So.2d 247 (La.App. 3d Cir.1982), in circumstances such as are here presented, the rule has been that, except as provided in CC 2275, verbal or testimonial proof of title or an agreement affecting title to immovable property is simply not permitted. CC 2440.
"Both in Louisiana and at common law, statutes require transfers of immovable property to be in writing and therefore parol testimony may not be introduced to vary the terms of a written conveyance of real estate or to prove an oral agreement of sale. 29 Chas. II (1676); Arts. 2275, 2276, 2440, La.Civil Code of 1870. In Louisiana, the only situation in which the courts have allowed oral testimony to defeat the terms of a written sale of real estate is in an action for the rescission of a sale, when the vendor alleges that the conveyance was the result of error or fraud. LeBleu v. Savoie, 109 La. 680, 33 So. 729 (1903); Baker v. Baker, [209 La. 1041] 26 S.(2d) 132 (La.1946); see Cernich v. Cernich, [210 La. 421] 27 S.(2d) 266, 267 (La.1946).
"And the Louisiana Civil Code provides that a verbal conveyance of immovables may be proved only by confession under oath in answer to interrogatories, and, in those instances, only when there has been actual delivery. Arts. 2275, 2276, La.Civil Code of 1870.
"Pursuant to the codal provisions, the courts have consistently refused to admit parol proof of title in A, when A has purchased an immovable from B and has had the act of sale show that the vendee was C. Barbin v. Gaspard, 15 La.Ann. 539 (1860); Kunmengeiser v. Juncker, 28 La.Ann. 678 (1876); Hodge v. Hodge, 151 La. 612, 92 So. 134 (1922); Ceromi v. Harris, 187 La. 701, 175 So. 462 (1937).
"Similarly, when B, acting under a pa-rol mandate to purchase immovables for A, purchases in his own name with A's funds, oral testimony has been held inadmissible to show title in A. Muggah v. Greig, 2 La. 593 (1831); Hackenburg v. Gartskamp, 30 La.Ann. 898 (1878); Hanby v. Texas Co., 140 La. 189, 72 So. 933 (1916); see Art. 2992, La. Civil Code of 1870. " 21 T.L.R. 287-87 (1946). Emphasis and paragraphs supplied.
In recent years, a father has sued his daughter alleging that she, acting as his agent and with his money, had fraudulently purchased and placed immovable property in her own name. Scurto v. LeBlanc, 191 La. 136, 184 So. 567 (1938). A brother has sued his sister (Cernich, supra) and a son has sued his mother, (Ceromi, supra), each alleging that he paid the consideration for immovable property and had title placed in the female's name for some purpose. In each instance the plaintiff, who was not in the chain of title or a forced heir or spouse of one in the chain, was seeking to establish title in himself by testimonial proof. In each instance, either or both an exception of no cause of action and the objection to CC 2440 parol evidence in support of the allegations of the respective plaintiff was sustained.
The Civil Code distinction was not clearly expressed, but is further illustrated by these statements from Scurto, supra:
"It is axiomatic . . that parol evidence is inadmissible . to show that the vendee was in reality some other person than the person named in the act of sale
"The rule finds no exception in the case of purchase of real estate by an agent with funds alleged to have belonged to his principal
"The rule finds its only relaxation where the owner of real estate is influenced by fraud or error to vest his title in another . for the purpose of enabling a party to recover his immovable property or of showing the real agreement between the parties
"But parol evidence is not admissible to show that in a sale of real estate the vendee named in the act was not the real vendee, but that another person was. " 184 So. at 570-573. Emphasis supplied.
Hodge, supra, also recognized the distinction:
"It has long ago been recognized, and the rule . firmly established . that though parol evidence is admissible where fraud or error is charged to show that a sale is not real and that the immovable property still belongs to the pretended vendor, it is under no circumstance admissible . to show that the vendee was in reality some other person than the person named in the sale." 92 So. at p. 135. Emphasis supplied.
While some exceptions to the CC 2276 rule have been created by statute and by a particular case determining whether the proferred parol is "against or beyond what is contained in the act", no exception has been created to the CC 2440 rule that testimonial proof of title to immovable property is not permitted by one who is not in the chain of record title or a forced heir or spouse of one who is in the chain.
Cosey falls into the category of cases where exceptions to the CC 2276 rule have been recognized and does not govern the circumstances here presented. The CC 2440 rule applies to these circumstances and not to the Cosey circumstances. Cosey entered into a bond for deed contract in 1945 that was never recorded. He paid the last payment due on the contract in 1961, divorced his first wife and married a second wife in 1962. Later in 1962 the property under the bond for deed contract was deeded to vendees named as Cosey and his second wife and showed them as being married but once and living together. Cosey's first wife died in 1964 and Cosey died in 1976. Co-sey's son, as administrator of his estate, sued the second wife to have the property declared to have belonged to Cosey's first community. The second wife objected to parol evidence.
On rehearing, the court was quick to point out that Cosey was illiterate and did not acquiesce in the arguable implication that he was donating an interest to his second wife, that the second wife made no contribution whatever toward acquisition of the property, and that she received her "interest" through error. Cosey's son, as the forced heir of Cosey and as the administrator of his estate, was asserting Cosey's rights as a co-vendee of ostensible community property over the share in that property, if any, of the second wife.
The Cosey result could have been decided more precisely on one or more of the recognized exceptions to the CC 2276 rule. Co-sey did not squarely consider the issue whether A, who is not dealing with community property and who is not named as a co-vendee, by testimonial proof can establish title in her name to immovable property by showing that she paid for the property and had it placed in C's name for some purpose. This issue, which actually arises under the CC 2440 rule, has been squarely presented in many of the cases cited herein in circumstances that cannot be materially distinguished from those in this appeal. These eases have consistently decided that parol evidence (testimonial proof) is not permitted. CC 2440. Hodge, Ceromi, Scurto, Cernich, supra.
Gosey did not overrule these cases and should be limited to its own facts as one of the recognized exceptions to the CC 2276 rule. Cosey could not and did not repeal Art. 2440 of the Civil Code.
The judgment appealed is reversed. The defendant's exception of no cause of action is sustained, and plaintiff is ordered to file an amended petition in the district court asserting an amended cause of action within 15 days from the date this opinion becomes final or suffer dismissal of her demand. All costs here and in the trial court are assessed against plaintiff.
REVERSED, RENDERED, and REMANDED.
JASPER E. JONES, J., dissents with written reasons.
On original hearing, one judge of the three-judge panel dissented to a reversal of the trial court. A five-judge panel was constituted to hear the reargument of the appeal as required by LSA-Const. Art. 5, § 8.
. The clerk of court was made a co-defendant. Plaintiff alleged and showed that she paid the vendor $1,200 for the house and lot and had the title placed in the name of defendant because she wanted to live there and wanted her nephew to have the property when she died; that this "transfer" of the property was not valid as a donation; and that the clerk of court should put the property in her name because defendant had learned in 1981 that the property was in his name and had demanded to live there. She prayed that the clerk of court be ordered to "transfer the record owner's name" from her nephew to her.
. CC 2276 reads:
"Neither shall parol evidence be admitted against or beyond what is contained in the acts, nor on what may have been said before, or at the time of making them, or since."
.CC 2440 reads:
"All sales of immovable property shall be made by authentic act or under private signature.
"Except as provided in article 2275, every verbal sale of immovables shall be null, as well for third persons as for the contracting parties themselves, and the testimonial proof of it shall not be admitted."
CC 2275 reads:
"Every transfer of immovable property must be in writing; but if a verbal sale, or other disposition of such property, be made, it shall be good against the vendor, as well as against the vendee, who confesses it when interrogated on oath, provided actual delivery has been made of the immovable property thus sold."
. Act 5 of 1884 amending CC Art. 2239.
. See 35 La.L.R. 779 (1975).
. See cases cited in 35 La.L.R. 779-799. Neither the original nor the rehearing opinion in Cosey discussed the distinction in the concept of CC 2440 and of CC 2276, although cases referring to both rules were cited. The rehearing opinion cited CC Arts. 2236, 2238, 2276, 2301, and 2312.