Case Name: M. A. KITE COMPANY, a corporation, Appellant, v. A. C. SAMFORD, INC., a corporation, Defendant
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1961-05-04
Citations: 130 So. 2d 99
Docket Number: No. C-300
Parties: M. A. KITE COMPANY, a corporation, Appellant, v. A. C. SAMFORD, INC., a corporation, Defendant.
Judges: CARROLL, DONALD K., J., specially concurring and STURGIS, J., dissenting.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 130
Pages: 99–104

Head Matter:
M. A. KITE COMPANY, a corporation, Appellant, v. A. C. SAMFORD, INC., a corporation, Defendant.
No. C-300.
District Court of Appeal of Florida. First District
May 4, 1961.
Rehearing Denied May 29, 1961.
Raymond, Wilson & Karl, Daytona Beach, for appellant.
Cobb & Cole, Daytona Beach, for appel-lee.

Opinion:
WIGGINTON, Chief Judge.
The appellant domestic corporation, plaintiff in the trial court, seeks reversal of an interlocutory order granting motion of defendant, a foreign corporation qualified to engage in business in Florida, to dismiss the complaint on the ground of improper venue. The suit was instituted in the Circuit Court of Volusia County, Florida. Jurisdiction over defendant was obtained by service of process on its resident agent in Lake County, Florida.
The complaint is in two counts. The first count alleges that plaintiff entered into a written contract with defendant company, copy of which is attached to the complaint as an exhibit. It is alleged that under the contract plaintiff agreed to furnish all labor and materials and furnish all work in painting an administrative building being constructed by defendant under a contract with the State of Alabama. Plaintiff alleges that it fully performed all of its obligations under the sub-contract, for which it was paid in full. It is alleged that on a day specified defendant directed plaintiff to perform extra work consisting of furnishing labor and materials for repainting a part of the building under construction. Under paragraph 6 of the subcontract it was agreed that when directed plaintiff would perform such extra work as it was called upon to do by defendant, the prime contractor. It is alleged that plaintiff performed the extra work as directed by defendant, upon completion of which it submitted its bills to defendant for payment. Plaintiff alleges that defendant has refused to pay the bills so submitted, or any portion thereof, and claims judgment for the amount alleged to be owed. Count Two of the complaint is in general assumpsit for labor and materials furnished at defendant's request. Judgment on this count is also prayed in the exact amount prayed for in count one.
Paragraph 6 of the contract attached to the complaint as an exhibit provides that the sub-contractor (plaintiff) shall make all alterations, furnish the materials for and perform all extra work or omit any work owner or architect require without nullifying this agreement. The amount to be paid by the contractor (defendant) shall be determined as provided under the terms of the general contract.
An examination of the complaint reveals that the cause of action sued upon is one to recover a stated sum of money owed plaintiff by defendant for materials furnished and services rendered in accordance with the requirements of a fully executed written contract.
The applicable section of the statute relating to venue is as follows:
" in the case of companies incorporated in other states or countries, and doing business in this state, suits shall be commenced in a county or justice's district wherein such company may have an agent or other representative, or where the cause of action accrued, or where the property in litigation is situated."
It follows that plaintiff's right to maintain the action in Volusia County depends on whether the cause of action accrued in that county.
From the record before us it affirmatively appears that no provision is made in the written agreement attached as an exhibit to the complaint as to where payments to plaintiff under the contract should be made. The plaintiff is a domestic corporation whose principal place of business is located in Volusia County, Florida.
The rule governing the question here presented was clearly and unequivocally stated by the Supreme Court of this state in the Croker case. It was there held that where a contract involves the payment of money and no place of payment is expressly agreed on, it may be implied that payment is to be made where the payee resides or has an established place of business, and where payment under the contract may be made. Where there is an express promise to pay, and no place of payment is stipulated, the debtor should seek the creditor unless otherwise provided or agreed. In such cases the cause of action accrues where the default occurred, though it be in the county where the plaintiff resides, and the action may be maintained in such county for the defendant's breach.
The foregoing rule has been consistently adhered to by the Supreme Court in subsequent decisions terminating in the Williams case decided in 1944. The rule is uniformly applicable in determining the place where the cause of action accrues when the action is based upon a failure or refusal to pay money due one of the parties to an executed contract. This is true whether either or both parties to the cause of action are individuals or corporations, domestic or foreign, and regardless of where the contract was consummated or where other provisions of the contract were performed.
Under the rule above stated it is implied that the payments were to be made where the plaintiff payee maintains its principal place of business in Volusia County, and it is in that county where the cause of action accrued. It was in Volusia County that suit was instituted, and therefore the trial court erred in dismissing the complaint on the sole ground of improper venue.
We are not here concerned with where a cause of action for breach of performance under a written contract must be held to have accrued. Causes of action growing out of contractual relationships may accrue in different forums depending upon the nature of the breach which forms the gravamen of the particular action.
For illustration under the cases above cited, if a contract involves a payment of money and no place of payment is expressly agreed upon, the cause of action is held to accrue where the payee resides. On the other hand, in the Peters case relied on by appellee, it was held where a suit is brought for damages arising from the alleged breach of an express warranty, the cause of action accrues at the place where the act necessary to complete the contract is performed.
We are of the view that Volusia County is the proper venue for maintenance of the cause of action alleged in the complaint involved in this case. The order of dismissal is accordingly reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings.
CARROLL, DONALD K., J., specially concurring and STURGIS, J., dissenting.
. Sec. 46.04. F.S., F.S.A.
. Croker v. Powell, 1934, 115 Fla. 733, 156 So. 146.
. Williams v. Aeroland Oil Co., 1944, 155 Fla. 114, 20 So.2d 346; Producers Supply, Inc. v. Harz, 1942, 149 Fla. 594, 6 So.2d 375; Baruch v. W. B. Haggerty, Inc., 1939, 137 Fla. 799, 188 So. 797; 34 Fla.Jur., Venue, p. 23, § 19.
. 34 Fla.Jur., Venue, pp. 21-24, § 17-20.
. Peters v. E. O. Painter Fertilizer Co., 1917, 73 Fla. 1001, 75 So. 749.