Case Name: Budkiewicz v. Elgin, Joliet and Eastern Railway Company
Court: Supreme Court of Indiana
Jurisdiction: Indiana
Decision Date: 1958-06-10
Citations: 238 Ind. 535
Docket Number: No. 29,562
Parties: Budkiewicz v. Elgin, Joliet and Eastern Railway Company.
Judges: Landis, J., concurs.
Reporter: Indiana Reports
Volume: 238
Pages: 535–556

Head Matter:
Budkiewicz v. Elgin, Joliet and Eastern Railway Company.
[No. 29,562.
Filed June 10, 1958.
Rehearing denied-October 15, 1958.]
Jay E. Darlington, of Hammond, for appellant.
Glenn D. Peters, Peters, Highland & McHie, of Hammond, Harlan L. Hackbert, and Stevenson, Conaghan, Velde & Hackbert, of counsel, of Chicago, Illinois, for appellee.

Opinion:
Emmert, J.
This appeal is here by reason of four judges of the Appellate Court failing to concur. Section 4-209, Burns' 1946 Replacement. It is from a judgment entered for appellee because appellant refused to amend his complaint after a demurrer for want of facts had been sustained thereto.
The complaint is for personal injuries sustained by appellant when his automobile collided with a freight train operated by appellee at a place where the railroad crossed Indiana Highway No. 149 at grade. The crossing was unlighted, not protected by gates, flasher lights or any other mechanical warning device, but there was a cross arm sign at the crossing. Rhetorical paragraph 4 of the complaint charged:
"4. On October 20, 1953, in the evening after dark, plaintiff was returning home from work, driving his 1951 Pontiac automobile. He was going north on said Highway 149, approaching said crossing from the south. His automobile collided with: one of defendant's cars standing on this crossing. This collision was a direct and proximate-result of defendant's negligence (that is to say, the failure of its said employees to use that degree of care which an ordinary prudent person'would use under like circumstances) in the following - respects: . -
(a) Defendant had created a situation at this crossing at that particular time which in fact made the crossing extra hazardous-at-that-time by giving a false and deceptive appearance of safety, which was likely to arid did deceive and entrap an approaching motorist using ordinary care such as plaintiff. More particularly; it was a dark night. This was a two-lane black top highway. It had recently been covered with a fresh coating of blacktop. •' Defendant placed a black tank car across this highway at this crossing. The nature- of the tank car was such that its black tank body was suspended several feet above the surface of the highway at the crossing, and there was considerable open space beneath and at the ends of the tank. This, in conjunction with the black top highway, created a false appearance and illusion to the approaching motorist in plaintiff's situation that the crossing was open and that there was only a black highway extending ahead of him across and beyond the crossing. In this situation which in fact existed at this crossing that night, a person using ordinary care in the position of defendant's train crew would have known that motorists using ordinary care such as plaintiff were in danger of being deceived and entrapped into colliding with this tank car, and would have used care to prevent this deceptive situation, either by not placing this particular black car in this position relative to the highway, or by placing some kind of temporary warning at the crossing by means of a light or crew member, or any other means sufficient to warn the motorist of this hidden danger confronting him. This train crew then and there knew, or in the exercise of ordinary care should have known, all the facts above set forth in this paragraph, but nevertheless they neglected and failed to do anything to warn plaintiff of this particular peril that night. As plaintiff approached this crossing that night, he had his car equipped with good and adequate headlights and brakes, he was alert and keeping a look-out and was using ordinary care for his own safety. But nevertheless, by reason of the aforesaid situation and said negligence of the defendant, he was unable to see this tank car in time to avoid colliding with it, and was caused to collide with it."
The complaint is hardly to be commended as a model of succinct' pleading of facts under the Code, but on the other hand the appellee did not file any motion to require it to be made more specific. If such a motion had been filed and overruled and then followed by a demurrer for want of facts, the sufficiency of the complaint would be determined from the facts stated in the complaint. Neal v. Baker (1926), 198 Ind. 393, 400, 153 N. E. 768; Enterprise, etc. Pub. Co. v. Craig (1924), 195 Ind. 302, 306, 144 N. E. 542; Terre Haute, etc. Traction Co. v. Phillips (1921), 191 Ind. 374, 380, 381, 132 N. E. 740.
The rule is well settled in this state that where there has been no. motion to require the complaint be made more specific, and its sufficiency is attacked by a demurrer, the complaint is liberally construed to sustain its validity. Lincoln Operating Co. v. Gillis (1953), 232 Ind. 551, 558, 114 N. E. 2d 873; Rochester Bridge Co. v. McNeill (1919), 188 Ind. 432, 439, 122 N. E. 662.
The memorandum to the demurrer alleged that the complaint failed to charge actionable negligence.
Actionable negligence has three essential elements: (1) a duty imposed by law to do or not to do a certain act; (2) a violation of that duty by an act or omission to act which constitutes a breach of that duty; and (3) injury proximately caused by such breach of duty. Terre Haute, etc. Traction Co. v. Phillips (1921), 191 Ind. 374, 382, 132 N. E. 740, supra; Elder, Receiver v. Rutledge, Admx. (1940), 217 Ind. 459, 464, 27 N. E. 2d 358; Indianapolis Abattoir Co. v. Neidlinger (1910), 174 Ind. 400, 403, 92 N. E. 169. Section 10-3904, Burns' 1956 Replacement, creates a duty on a railroad not to permit a freight train to remain standing across a public highway. In view of the rule that we construe a complaint to sustain it, we must hold that it charged more than a momentary stopping, or blocking of the highway for a reasonable time. The statute was enacted for the benefit of the public using the highways, not only to keep traffic moving, but to protect travelers from this kind of an obstruction in the highway. See Central Indiana R. Co. v. Wishard (1917), 186 Ind. 262, 272, 114 N. E. 970. A violation of this statute is negligence per se. A plaintiff may be guilty of contributory negligence in colliding with such an obstruction, but that is another matter to be considered later. The complaint charged facts which, as against a demurrer, showed a violation of this statute, and it was not necessary to name the statute breached, or charge the omissions in the exact language of the statute. "We take judicial notice of our statutes. The complaint here alleged facts which were a breach of the duties put upon appellant by the statute. This was a sufficient allegation of negligent conduct. Penn Co. v. Fertig (1904), 34 Ind. App. 459, 70 N. E. 834, supra, 45 C. J. 1092, 65 C. J. S. 886, §187. The facts constituting the breach of the statute were specifically alleged and so certain that the nature of the charge was apparent." Corey v. Smith (1954), 233 Ind. 452, 456, 120 N. E. 2d 410. When the cause is tried, the evidence may show that the appellee did not violate §10-3904, Burns' 1956 Replacement, but we are not at:liberty to hold this now as a matter of law on the complaint now before us.
The memorandum to the demurrer also charged that it affirmatively appeared from the complaint that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence. Freedom from contributory negligence need not be alleged in a complaint, for contributory - negligence is a matter of defense. Section 2-1025, Burns' 1946 Replacement. Contributory negligence -must affirmatively appear from the face of the complaint as a matter of law before a demurrer may be sustained for that cause. Lindley v. Sink (1940), 218 Ind. 1, 30 N. E. 2d 456; Cleveland, etc. R. Co. v. Markle (1918), 187 Ind. 553, 119 N. E. 371; Chicago, etc. R. Co. v. Barnes (1918), 68 Ind. App. 354, 358, 119 N. E. 26; Cole v. Searfoss (1912), 49 Ind. App. 334, 339, 97 N. E. 345. We fail to find the complaint affirmatively shows appellant was guilty of contributory negligence;
Until appellant had notice to the contrary, he had the right to assume that the appellee would use due care in' its use of the crossing. Elgin Dairy Co. v. Shepherd (1915), 183 Ind. 466, 474, 108 N. E. 234, 109 N. E. 353. The complaint charged the night was "dark." To sustain the complaint, we have the right to infer visibility was very limited. Since Opple v. Ray (1935), 208 Ind. 450, 459, 195 N. E. 81, there is no absolute rule that the driver of a .car is bound to see every object of danger in or on the highway at night. In view of the rule that the driver may assume others will use due care until he has notice to the contrary, he is not bound as a matter of law to drive at such reduced speed that at all times he could stop within his clear view ahead. If that were the rule, every driver at night would be guilty of negligence. The complaint averred plaintiff "had his car equipped with good'-'arid adequate headlights and brakes, he was alert and'-keeping a look-out and was using ordinary-care for Ms own safety." The crossing was unlighted, without1'automatic signals, and the tank car was black and stopped across a black top highway. On this state of thé record we cannot hold as a matter of law that he was guilty of contributory negligence.
This' is not the case where a train'had lawfully entered upon a crossing, and was proceeding to move the remaining cars across when a traveler ran into the train. In such a case, the railroad has the legal right to complete the crossing, and breaches no legal duty owed the traveler; therefore, it is not guilty' of any negligence. This was the holding in New York Central R. R. Co. v. Casey (1938), 214 Ind. 464, 14 N. E. 2d 714.
It would unduly extend this opinion to give a full analysis of the cases relied on by appellee to sustain the judgment, but we do not feel they are conclusive on the issues to be decided in the appeal at bar. In both Pennsylvania Railroad Co. v. Huss (1932), 96 Ind. App. 71, 180 N. E. 919 and C. C. C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Gillespie (1930), 96 Ind. App. 535, 173 N. E. 708, there had been a trial. Both were properly criticized, and in effect overruled as to contributory negligence as a matter of law in Opple v. Ray (1935), 208 Ind. 450, 457, 195 N. E. 81, supra.
In Morley v. C. C. C. & St. L. R. R. Co. (1935), 100 Ind. App. 515, 194 N. E. 806, the complaint disclosed the train was in motion across the crossing when the collision took place, and the complaint did not charge a failure to give signals of its approach, a negligent speed, blocking the crossing an unreasonable length of time, or running an unguarded cut of cars over the crossing. The complaint failed to show the breach of any duty owed the plaintiff; hence there was no actionable negligence charged. In New York Central Railroad Co. v. Gardner (1940), 107 Ind. App. 366, 24 N. E. 2d 811, the collision occurred as the train was in motion and proceeding over the crossing.
In Killion v. Chi., Milw., St. Paul & Pac. R. R. (1940), 107 Ind. App. 527, 25 N. E. 2d 647, the discussion as to whjr the court affirmed the judgment is inadequate, and fails to take into consideration the law on sustaining a complaint when first attacked by a demurrer. In Pitcairn v. Honn (1941), 109 Ind. App. 428, 32 N. E. 2d 733, the evidence on the trial disclosed the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law. There was no train stopped on the crossing in Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Rizzo (1949), 119 Ind. App. 505, 86 N. E. 2d 91, 87 N. E. 2d 885, and the appeal was after a trial. In Carmichael v. B. & O. R. Co. (1951), 121 Ind. App. 463, 98 N. E. 2d 698, the car was driven into the side of a moving train. The result is correct, but the court was unwarranted in holding the complaint affirmatively disclosed contributory negligence as a matter of law.
In New York Central R. R. Co. v. Casey (1938), 214 Ind. 464, 14 N. E. 2d 714, supra; Dyer, Admr. v. New York Central R. R. Co. (1938), 214 Ind. 695, 17 N. E. 2d 839, and New York Central R. R. Co. v. Dyer, Admr. (1938), 214 Ind. 708, 14 N. E. 2d 718, each automobile involved was driven into the side of a moving train as it was proceeding over the crossing. There was no breach of duty by the railroad in any of these three New York Central cases, and no negligence proved.
None of the above opinions relied on by appellee persuade us that the complaint at bar failed to charge actionable negligence, or that it affirmatively disclosed appellant was guilty of contributory negligence.
Judgment reversed with instructions to the trial court to overrule the demurrer to the complaint.
Landis, J., concurs.
Arterburn, J., concurs specially with separate opinion.
Achor, J., dissents with opinion in which Bobbitt, C. J., concurs.
. "This can only mean that where a proper motion to make the pleading more specific by setting out the facts is duly made, and is overruled, the pleading must be regarded as already stating specifically the facts relied on to support the conclusions to which such motion was addressed." Terre Haute, etc., Traction Co. v. Phillips (1921), 191 Ind. 374, 380, 381, 132 N. E. 740.
"Appellant's motion to make the complaint more specific by setting out the facts relied on to support each of several alleged conclusions therein having been overruled, the sufficiency of the complaint to withstand a demurrer must be determined from the facts stated, without support from any such alleged conclusions which were not drawn from facts fully pleaded and set out in it. Terre Haute, etc., Traction Co. v. Phillips (1921), 191 Ind. 374, 132 N. E. 740." Enterprise, etc., Pub. Co. v. Craig (1924), 195 Ind. 302, 306, 144 N. E. 542.
. "In construing a complaint where a demurrer is interposed, it will be deemed sufficient whenever the necessary allegations can be fairly gathered from all the averments, even though stated illogically and by way of argument, and all facts will be deemed stated that can be implied from the allegations made by fair and reasonable intendment, and facts so impliedly averred will be given the same force as if directly stated. Domestic Block Coal Co. v. DeArmey (1913), 179 Ind. 592, 100 N. E. 675, 102 N. E. 99; Agar v. State (1911), 176 Ind. 234, 94 N. E. 819; Valparaiso Lighting Co. v. Tyler (1911), 177 Ind. 278, 96 N. E. 768; Richmond Light, etc., Co. v. Rau (1915), 184 Ind. 117, 110 N. E. 666." Fauvre Coal Co. v. Kushner (1919), 188 Ind. 314, 325, 123 N. E. 409.
"Under the present liberal rules of pleading, it will be unnecessary for us to analyze the complaint in this particular, for the demurrer admits not only the facts directly and specifically alleged in the complaint but also all facts that can be implied from other allegations by reasonable and fair intendment. Domestic Block Coal Co. v. DeArmey (1913), 179 Ind. 592, 100 N. E. 675, 102 N. E. 99; Vandalia Coal Co. v. Coakley (1915), 184 Ind. 661, 111 N. E. 426." Rochester Bridge Co. v. McNeill (1919), 188 Ind 432, 439, 122 N. E. 662.
. "Whoever, being a conductor or other person having-charge of, or running a railroad train, carrying, or used for carrying, freight, permits or suffers the same or any car or locomotive engine composing the same to remain standing across any public highway, street, alley or farm crossing, or who, whenever it becomes necessary to stop such train across any public highway, street, alley or farm crossing fails or neglects to leave a space of sixty [60] feet across such public kighwa/y, street, alley or farm crossing shall be fined not more than twenty dollars [$20.00] nor less than three dollars [$3.00]." (Italics added.) [Acts 1905, ch. 169, §666, p. 584.] Section 10-3904, Burns' 1956 Replacement.