Case Name: Tracy BOLOGNA, a/k/a Tracy Hoffman, Appellant, v. Edwin SCHLANGER, etc., et al., Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 2008-06-20
Citations: 995 So. 2d 526
Docket Number: No. 5D06-1017
Parties: Tracy BOLOGNA, a/k/a Tracy Hoffman, Appellant, v. Edwin SCHLANGER, etc., et al., Appellee.
Judges: ALVA, M.M., Associate Judge, concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 995
Pages: 526–532

Head Matter:
Tracy BOLOGNA, a/k/a Tracy Hoffman, Appellant, v. Edwin SCHLANGER, etc., et al., Appellee.
No. 5D06-1017.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
June 20, 2008.
Marlene S. Reiss, and Cayla B. Tenenb-aum, of Stephens, Lynn, Klein, Lacava, Hoffman & Puya, P.A., Miami, for Appellant.
Elizabeth C. Wheeler, of Elizabeth C. Wheeler, P.A., and Tiffany M. Faddis, of Law Office of J. Christopher Norris, Orlando, for Appellee.

Opinion:
PER CURIAM.
Tracy Bologna ["Bologna"] appeals the trial court's order dismissing her personal injury suit with prejudice for intentional and fraudulent conduct in responding to discovery. We conclude that the trial court erred in dismissing the claim without conducting an evidentiary hearing and reverse.
According to Bologna's deposition testimony, she was traveling on Apopka-Vine-land Road in Orlando when her vehicle was struck by Edwin Schlanger's ["Schlan-ger"] vehicle in March 2000. The impact spun her vehicle around and it ended up in the median. Bologna was taken to Sand Lake Hospital with complaints of back and neck pain. She then went to a chiropractor, Dr. Lynch, but within a few days, the pain worsened and she returned to the hospital. She could barely move or dress herself. Bologna then went to see Dr. Goll, an orthopedist, for severe back pain, neck pain, and her inability to lift anything. She was unable to bend and was experiencing numbness in her legs that traveled from her hips down to her knees.
Bologna had an MRI and continued to be treated by Dr. Goll, who diagnosed a herniated disk. Bologna testified that she received epidural injections from Dr. Congliaro, yet she still continued to have pain and numbness from her hips down to her knees.
Four years later, on March 4, 2004, Bologna filed suit for the injuries sustained in the 2000 accident. Her deposition was taken on September 30, 2005. Bologna testified that in October 1998, she had been involved in another motor vehicle accident but it did not result in bodily injury and did not necessitate treatment:
Defendant's Counsel: All right. So as far as any prior auto accidents the only one you recall was back in 1998 where you didn't sustain any personal injuries or seek any medical treatment; is that right?
Bologna: Yes.
She also testified that she had never experienced back pain, neck pain, or leg numbness before the March 2000 accident. At the end of her deposition, she clarified that she had previously had back spasms, but they were unlike her current back pain.
Six weeks later, Schlanger's estate filed a "Motion to Dismiss Repeated Intentional and Fraudulent Conduct in Respondent to Discovery," contending that Bologna knowingly and deliberately made perjurious statements under oath in her deposition or interrogatories to conceal information regarding prior back and neck injuries. The motion relies on records of Dr. Lynch reflecting that thirteen months after the 1998 accident, Bologna went to see Dr. Lynch, with complaints of back pain, neck pain, and numbness in her legs. Dr. Lynch's medical records noted that Bologna complained of "severe" or "very bad" lower back pain. These treatments continued for fifteen visits, the last occurring two weeks before the March 2000 accident.
After hearing arguments from both parties in February 2006, but taking no evidence, the trial court rejected the suggestion that inconsistencies in Bologna's testimony could be explained by oversights or failed memory, and found by clear and convincing evidence that Bologna committed fraud on the court by knowingly and intentionally failing to disclose her previous treatment for the same conditions for which she sought damages in the instant action. The court entered final judgment for defendant, Schlanger, after granting the motion to dismiss.
As we have recognized, a trial court has the inherent authority, within the exercise of sound judicial discretion, to dismiss an action when a plaintiff has perpetrated a fraud on the court. See Cox v. Burke, 706 So.2d 43, 46 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998). Dismissal for fraud is warranted "where 'it can be demonstrated, clearly and convincingly, that a party has sentiently set in motion some unconscionable scheme calculated to interfere with the judicial system's ability to impartially adjudicate a matter by improperly influencing the trier of fact or unfairly hampering the presentation of the opposing party's claim or defense.' " Gehrmann v. City of Orlando, 962 So.2d 1059 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007) (quoting Cox, 706 So.2d at 46).
We have tried very, very hard to explain, and to emphasize, that this power to dismiss a lawsuit for fraud is an extraordinary remedy found only in cases where a deliberate scheme to subvert the judicial process has been clearly and convincingly proved. Short of this, poor recollection, dissemblance, even lying, can be well managed through cross-examination. Gehrmann, 962 So.2d at 1062. A testimonial discrepancy is usually not enough; there should be clear and convincing evidence of a scheme calculated to evade or stymie discovery of facts central to the case. This will almost always require an evidentiary hearing. See Howard v. Risch, 959 So.2d 308, 312 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007); Myrick v. Direct Gen. Ins. Co., 932 So.2d 392 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006); Medina v. Fla. East Coast Ry., 866 So.2d 89 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004); Jacob v. Henderson, 840 So.2d 1167 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003); Simmons v. Henderson, 745 So.2d 1031 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999); Furst v. Blackman, 744 So.2d 1222 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999).
The trial court concluded, based on his review of the records of Dr. Lynch, that Bologna could not, in 2005, have misremembered the severity of her back pain in 1999 and 2000, and so she must have intended to perpetrate a fraud on the court. But there are multiple circumstances that militate against the inelucta-bility of that conclusion. Her deposition testimony was given several years after the events. She had the same treating chiropractor immediately before and after the 2000 accident, and the proximity of treatment by Dr. Lynch for both injuries may have contributed to confusion. A clear line of what pain happened when and who treated what is not so easy to recall as it is to read when Dr. Lynch's records are examined. Also, it was Bologna herself who identified Dr. Lynch in her answers to interrogatories. It is difficult to envision a scheme to conceal a prior injury that includes identifying the doctor who treated it. See Granados v. Zehr, 979 So.2d 1155 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008). There is also nothing else in the record to show the nature and extent of the problems Bologna suffered from the 1998 accident, such as whether she was unable to work. The trial court's decision was made exclusively on a comparison of the records of Dr. Lynch and the answers to very limited deposition questions. Having reviewed the same material examined by the trial court, we are unable to say that the Cox test was met. See Amato v. Intindola, 854 So.2d 812 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003).
Finally, we note that the deposition examination was very broad in scope with virtually no follow-up questions. Bologna asserts on appeal that the defense was already in possession of the records of Dr. Lynch when Bologna's deposition was taken, which would explain why the questioning on this point was so truncated. This record, as well as others, hints that there may now be a "fraud" strategy on the part of defense counsel. If a plaintiff denies a particular prior injury or treatment or pattern of pain, rather than probe in detail— which may risk the jogging of the plaintiffs memory — the questioning on this point just stops until the inevitable motion to dismiss for fraud is ruled on. As we pointed out in Cox, defense counsel's diligence or forensic skill is not the issue in a "fraud on the court" case. However, the fact that Bologna's answers to interrogatories were adequate for the defense to learn of her treatment for back pain by Dr. Lynch in 1999-2000 prior to her deposition is relevant to whether there existed a scheme to defraud. There are many questions in this case that the court cannot determine without an evidentiary hearing before the ultimate sanction of dismissal may be imposed. See Medina, 866 So.2d 89.
REVERSED and REMANDED.
ALVA, M.M., Associate Judge, concurs.
GRIFFIN, J., concurs, and concurs specially, with opinion.
THOMPSON, E.R., Senior Judge, dissents, with opinion.
. According to the records of Dr. Lynch, Bologna reported in 1999 that she had gone immediately after her October 1998 accident to Sand Lake Hospital's emergency room where she was examined and x-rayed.
. Schlanger complained that Bologna only identified Dr. Lynch in answer to interrogatory 15, which asked for the identity of physicians who treated for the accident at issue and did not list Dr. Lynch in response to interrogatory 16, asking for the identity of all medical care in the last ten years. Her counsel explained that she did not repeat the providers already identified.
. 706 So.2d at 47.