Case Name: United States v. Richard H. White
Court: United States Circuit Court of the District of Columbia
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 1836-11
Citations: 5 Cranch 38
Docket Number: 
Parties: United States v. Richard H. White.
Judges: 
Reporter: Reports of cases argued and determined in the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia (District of Columbia - reported by Mackey)
Volume: 5
Pages: 38–62

Head Matter:
United States v. Richard H. White.
The Court will not quash an indictment because it appears upon the record that the indictment was not found within two years after the offence committed, for that would deprive the United States of the right to reply that the defendant was a person fleeing from justice; or to show it in evidence on the trial. The defendant may avail himself of the limitation either by special plea or by evidence .upon the general issue.
The Court, at the suggestion of either party, will order some of the witnesses to he taken out of Court, and kept by the marshal, while other witnesses are under examination ; but will not order them to be kept apart from each other.
When a witness is objected to on the ground of his disbelief of a God, and of a future state of rewards and punishments, he is not to be examined on oath respecting his religious sentiments; but will be permitted to explain them; and if he then declares that he believes in a future state of existence, and of a Supreme Being who will punish him, either in this world or the next, for his evil deeds ; and if it appears in evidence that he has so declared, before the trial; and that he sent his children to the Sunday-school, and his wife and children regularly to church, the Court will permit him to be examined as a witness, leaving his credibility to the jury.
The Court will not permit the declarations of another defendant, charged with the same offence in a separate indictment, to be given in evidence against this defendant, such declarations having been made after the supposed accomplishment of the common purpose.
If a witness be cross-examined upon a collateral matter, evidence will not be admitted to disprove that matter, in order to discredit the witness.
The only question as to the character of a witness, proper to be asked, is, “ Are you acquainted with the general reputation of the witness as to veracity ? And from your knowledge of that general reputation, would you believe him upon his oath ? ”
Evidence of the general bad character of the witness will not be permitted to be given to impeach his credibility.
A person may flee from justice although no process was issued against him.
The statute of limitations runs in favor of the offender, although it was not known to the United States or any of then- officers of justice, that he was the person who committed the offence.
The departure of the offender from the vicinity of the place wherein the offence was committed, to his usual residence in-another part of the United States, for the purpose of avoiding punishment for that, or any other offence, is a fleeing from justice, and the statute of limitations is no bar to the prosecution, unless, within two years, he returned to the place wherein the offence was committed, and his return was so open and public, and under such circumstances, that opportunity was afforded, by the use of ordinary diligence and due means, to have arrested him, and that two years- and more have elapsed since that period to the time of finding the indictment. Qumre ?
According to the practice of this Court, when a new trial is granted, the cause is not to be tried again at the same term, unless by consent of parties and leave of the Court; but this rule does not apply to cases where the jury has been discharged because they could not agree upon a verdict.
If the defendant was not present, nor aiding or abetting at the act, although he was concerned in the design to commit the offence, he is only liable as accessory before the fact.
A verdict finding the defendant “not guilty, upon the plea of limitations, more than two years having elapsed from the committing of the offence to the finding of the indictment,” is argumentative, and therefore bad.
This was an indictment against Richard H. White for burning the treasury buildings of the United States.
The indictment contained three counts. The first charged that the defendant, at, &c., on the 30th of March, 1833, with force and arms, “ a certain public building, called the Treasury Office of the United States, situate in the city of Washington, in the county and district aforesaid, one of the cities of the District of Columbia, being one of the public buildings in the said city of said district, belonging to the United States, did maliciously and wilfully burn ; against the form of the statute,” &c.
The second count charged, that the defendant, on the day and year aforesaid, at, &c., with force and arms, “ on the night of the said day, a certain house called the Treasury Office of the United States, in which certain persons, the clerks and watchmen in the employment of the United States, did reside and lodge, belonging to the United States, situate in the said county and district, feloniously, wilfully, and maliciously, did set fire to, and burn and consume, against the peace and government of the United States.”
The third count charged, that the defendant, on the day and year aforesaid, at, &c., with force and arms, “ on the site of a certain needful building belonging to the United States', being the Treasury Office of the United States, the site whereof was ceded to the United States, and under their jurisdiction, being in the county and district aforesaid, a certain dwelling-house, wilfully and maliciously did burn, against the form of the statute,” &c.
The indictment was not found until the 30th of March, 1836. The first count was upon the Act of Congress of the 2d of March, 1831, [4 Stat. at Large, 448,] “ for the punishment of crimes in the District of Columbia,” the first section of which enacts that every person who shall be convicted, in any court in the District, of Columbia, of any of the offences therein named, one of which is “ arson,” shall be sentenced to suffer imprisonment and labor, for the time and times thereinafter prescribed in the penitentiary of the District of Columbia. And by the third section it is enacted, that every person duly convicted of the crime “ of maliciously, wilfully, or fraudulently burning any dwelling-house,” “ or of maliciously and wilfully burning ' any of the public buildings in the cities, towns, or counties of the District of Columbia, belonging to the United States,” “shall be sentenced to suffer imprisonment and labor, for a period of not less than one nor more than ten years, for the first offence.”
The second count was at common law. The third count was upon the first section of the Act of Congress of March 3, 1825, c. 67. [4 Stat. at Large, 115.]
Mr. W. L. Brent, for the defendant,
moved the Court to quash the indictment, because it appeared upon the record that more than two years had elapsed between the committing of the offence and the finding of the indictment. And by the Act of Congress of the 30th of April, 1790, [1 Stat. at Large, 112,] “ for the punishment of certain crimes against the United States,” it is enacted “that no person or persons shall be prosecuted, tried, or punished, for treason, or other capital offence aforesaid, wilful murder or forgery excepted; unless the indictment for the same shall be found by a grand jury within three years next after the treason, or capital offence aforesaid, shall be done or committed; nor shall any person be prosecuted, tried, or punished, for any offence not capital, nor for any fine or forfeiture under any penal statute, unless the indictment or information for the same shall be found or instituted within two years from the time of committing the offence, or incurring the fine or forfeiture aforesaid : Provided, that nothing herein contained shall extend to any person or persons fleeing from justice.”
The Couet (nem. con) refused to quash the indictment; because, until the facts shall appear upon the trial, it cannot appear that the defendant was not a person fleeing from justice, and therefore not entitled to the benefit of the limitation of time; and if he is entitled to its benefit he may have it upon plea, or upon evidence under the general issue.
Mr. Brent then moved that sundry witnesses on the part of the United States should be taken out of court, and kept separate from each.other during the examination of the others.
The Court (nem. con.) ordered the marshal to keep them out of court, but refused to order them to be kept separate from each other.
Mr. Brent then objected to-one William Hicks, as a witness, upon the ground that he does not believe in the existence of a God, and a future state of rewards and punishments, and cited Roscoe on Evidence, 96, 97, (Amer. Ed.) to show that the witness cannot himself be examined as to his belief.
Mr. Key, Attorney for the United States, cited Starkie on Evidence, part 2,' p. 123, and Roscoe, 97, 98.
Mrs. Harker was then called by the defendant’s counsel, and testified that some years ago she had several conversations with Hicks, at her boarding-house in New York, in which he said he did not believe in the existencé of a God, nor of a future state of punishment.
The Court, (nem. con.) permitted Hicks to state what his opinions were. He then stated that he always had believed in the existence of a Supreme Being, and that he will punish him, in this world or the next, for his evil deeds ; that he does now believe in a future state of existence; that he sends his children regularly to the Sunday-school, and his wife and- children to church. Upon being asked whether he had disclosed these sentiments to any of the witnesses, he said that he did not know that he had.
Mr. Merritt, a police officer of New York, testified, that having heard that Hicks’s testimony would be objected to on account of his religious opinions, without disclosing his object to Hicks, he asked him his opinion, when Hicks stated that he believed in the existence of a God, and a future state of punishment.
The Court permitted him to be sworn.
Mr. J. R. Key, for the United States,
offered in evidence against the defendant, Richard H. White, the admissions of Henry H. White, who stands charged with the same offence, in a separate indictment, evidence having been offered tending to prove that both were in the city of Washington the day preceding the burning of the Treasury building, that both went away together in the evening, and that the defendant had told Henry to say nothing of burning the Treasury.
Mr. Key cited Starkie on Evidence, part 4, p. 1302.
Mr. Brent, for the defendant, denied that the doctrine of Starkie applied to declarations made after the thing was done, but only to declarations made in prosecution of the common purpose, in fieri, as part of the res gestes. Roscoe, 306 ; Starkie, part 2, p. 46, 47, 48.
The Court, (Thruston, J., contrá,) refused to permit the declarations of Henry H. White, made after the supposed accomplishment of the common purpose, to be given in evidence against Richard (the defendant,) in this trial, they having been indicted separately, and not charged with a conspiracy.
The witness, Fisk, having, upon cross-examination by Mr. Brent, denied that upon the trial of one Drew in Pennsylvania, he had sworn that he did not know Finch, Mr. Brent now called a witness (Mr. Blaney,) to prove that Fisk did so testify on that trial, in order to discredit him by this contradiction or falsehood.
Mr. J. R. Key, for the United States, objected that the cross-examination was upon a collateral matter, and that it is not competent for the party thus cross-examining a witness, to bring other witnesses to. contradict him on such collateral matter. Starkie, part 2, p. 134, 138, 140, 141, 144, 145 ; 1 Chitty, Cr. L. 622 ; Harris v. Tibbet, 2 Campbell, 637.
Mr. Brent, contrá, cited Starkie, part 2, p. 145.

Opinion:
The CouRT,
(Thruston, J.,
absent,) refused to permit the defendant's counsel to bring evidence to prove that Fisk perjured himself on the trial of- Drew by swearing that he did not know Finch; and to contradict his assertion, upon cross-examination in this cause, that he did not at-that time know him; it being a collateral matter brought out by the cross-examination.
The Court also said that the only question as to the character of the witness, proper to be asked, is, " Are you acquainted with the general reputation of the witness as to veracity; and from your knowledge of that general reputation would you believe him upon his oath ? "
The Court refused to permit evidence to be given of the general bad character of the witness.
Mr. R. J. Brent, for the defendant, prayed the Court to instruct the jury " that there is no evidence before the jury that the defendant fled from justice ; or that if the Court should be of opinion that there is some evidence of that fact, then to charge the jury that if they should be of opinion from the evidence that the defendant did not flee from the United States, or conceal himself to avoid process, he is entitled to the benefit of the limitation of the statute."
The defendant's counsel contended that " fleeing from justice " meant fleeing from process. That no person can be said to flee from justice until process has been issued against him; and that such is the meaning of the Constitution of the United States, Art. 4, § 2, and of the Act of Congress of the 12th of February, 1793, [1 Stat. at Large, 302,] and of the Act of March-3, 1801, § 6. [2 lb. 115.] He might have been arrested as well in one district of the United States as another; so that mere removal from one district to another cannot be called fleeing from justice, unless it be done with intent to evade process. Act of Congress, 24th Sept. 1789, § 33. [1 lb. 91.] Besides, he appeared openly and publicly in this city in March, 1834. Fowler v. Hunt, 10 Johns. 464.
It is not necessary that the United States should have known that the defendant committed the offence, to entitle him to the benefit of the limitation.
Mr. Key, contra:, contended that the defendant could not avail himself of the limitation unless the United States knew that he had committed the offence, or had the means of knowing it, as in Watkins's case, where the means of knowing the fraud were in the treasury department.
If the defendant once fled from justice he is forever barred of the benefit of the statute. Hysinger v, Battgells, 3 Gill & Johns. 158.
Mr. Brent, in reply, contended, that Although he might have fled at first, if he afterwards returned and appeared so publicly in Washington that he might have been arrested, the statute began to run in his favor from the time of such return. Faw v. Roberdeau, 3 Cranch, 176.
The Couet refused to give the instruction as prayed, but instructed them that if they " believe from the evidence that the departure, from this district, by the traverser, on the evening of the 30th of March, 1833, or at any time afterwards within two years thereafter, was for the purpose,or with the view to avoid punishment for the offence of burning the Treasury building, or for any other offence, this was fleeing from justice, and the statute of limitations is no bar ; unless the jury should also believe the said prisoner afterwards returned to the county of Washington, and that his return was so open and public, and under such circumstances, that opportunity was afforded by the use of ordinary diligence and due means, to have arrested him; and that two years and more have elapsed from that period to the time of finding of the indictment in this case."