Case Name: Roy Alton LANE, Petitioner-Appellant, v. ATTORNEY GENERAL OF the UNITED STATES, Respondent-Appellee
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 1974-04-04
Citations: 492 F.2d 121
Docket Number: No. 72-1747
Parties: Roy Alton LANE, Petitioner-Appellant, v. ATTORNEY GENERAL OF the UNITED STATES, Respondent-Appellee.
Judges: 
Reporter: Federal Reporter 2d Series
Volume: 492
Pages: 121–123

Head Matter:
Roy Alton LANE, Petitioner-Appellant, v. ATTORNEY GENERAL OF the UNITED STATES, Respondent-Appellee.
No. 72-1747.
United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.
April 4, 1974.
William A. Clineburg, Jr., Atlanta, Ga. (Court-appointed), for petitioner-appellant.
John W. Stokes, Jr., U. S. Atty., P. Bruce Kirwan, William P. Gaffney, Asst. U. S. Attys., Atlanta, Ga., for respondent-appellee.
Before RIVES, THORNBERRY and GOLDBERG, Circuit Judges.

Opinion:
PER CURIAM:
In an opinion issued April 26, 1973, 5 Cir., 477 F.2d 847, we reversed the district court's order denying appellant's petition for writ of habeas corpus. Relying on this Court's decision in Cottle v. Wainwright, 5 Cir. 1973, 477 F.2d 269, we held that the "constitutional principle . of 'equal protection of the laws,' mandates the appointment of counsel . . . where, as here, the authority revoking parole permits more affluent parolees to appear with retained counsel." We expressly pretermitted "any discussion of the question of whether due process requires the appointment of counsel for indigents facing revocation of parole." (emphasis added).
Subsequent to our original opinion in this case, the Supreme Court in Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 1973, 411 U.S. 778, 93 S.Ct. 1756, 36 L.Ed.2d 656, held that, although due process does not require that counsel be provided for indigents in all probation revocation cases, the body conducting the proceedings must determine the need for counsel in each individual case. The state should provide counsel when the indigent probationer or parolee may have difficulty in presenting his version of disputed facts without the examination or cross-examination of witnesses or the presentation of complicated documentary evidence. The Court in Scar-pelli set forth the following "general guidelines":
Presumptively, it may be said that counsel should be provided in cases where, after being informed of his right to request counsel, the probationer or parolee makes such a request, based on a timely and colorable claim (i) that he has not committed the alleged violation of the conditions upon which he is at liberty; or (ii) that, even if the violation is a matter of public record or is uncontested, there are substantial reasons which justified or mitigated the violation and make revocation inappropriate and that the reasons are complex or otherwise difficult to develop or present. In passing on a request for _ the appointment of counsel, the responsible agency also should consider, especially in doubtful cases, whether the probationer appears to be capable of speaking effectively for himself.
In every case in which a request for counsel at a preliminary or final hearing is refused, the grounds for refusal should be stated succinctly in the record.
411 U.S. at 790-791.
Several months after its decision in Scarpelli, the Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the Fifth Circuit in Cottle v. Wainwright, supra, and remanded the case for further consideration in light of Scarpelli. Wainwright v. Cottle, 1973, 414 U.S. 895, 94 S.Ct. 221, 38 L.Ed.2d 138. In view of the strong reliance in our original opinion in this case on the Fifth Circuit decision in Cottle, the Supreme Court's mandate compels us to reset our course in the case sub judice.
Our decision of April 26, 1973, in the case sub judice, 477 F.2d 847, is hereby vacated. The order of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia, denying appellant's petition for writ of habeas corpus, is reversed, and the case is remanded to the district court for consideration in light of Gag-non v. Scarpelli, supra.
Reversed and remanded.
. This Court on its own motion took the case for rehearing en banc, 488 F.2d 534; but in an order issued February 22, 1974, the en banc Court remanded the case to this panel for disposition. 489 F.2d 1274.