Case Name: Cheryl A. DILLER, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1998-03-27
Citations: 711 So. 2d 54
Docket Number: No. 97-919
Parties: Cheryl A. DILLER, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: GRIFFIN, C.J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 711
Pages: 54–56

Head Matter:
Cheryl A. DILLER, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. 97-919.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
March 27, 1998.
Rehearing Denied May 21, 1998.
James B. Gibson, Public Defender, and Nancy Ryan, Assistant Public Defender,Day-tona Beach, for Appellant.
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, ' Tallahassee, and Allison Leigh Morris, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellee.

Opinion:
HARRIS, Judge.
Diller was on community control/probation on two eases: one, delivery of cocaine and two, delivery of cocaine, trafficking in cocaine and conspiracy to traffic. She had once before pled guilty to violating her probation only to be returned to community control/probation. She now appeals her prison sentence for again violating the conditions of her community eontrol/probation.
Diller was violated this second time for, among other reasons, failing to file her monthly reports for July and August, 1996. Even though she challenges the other reason for her violation, she concedes for the purpose of this appeal that she did not file the two monthly reports. She contends that the failure to file the reports is not a substantial violation which would warrant terminating her community eontrol/probation and sending her to prison. We disagree and affirm.
Her contention primarily is that the judge used the wrong standard in determining that a substantial violation had occurred because he stated that to him all violations were material. It was the judge's position that since probation is a matter of grace and not of right then all violations of conditions of probation are material. The trial judge is not alone in this thinking. The court in Robinson v. State, 442 So.2d 284, 286 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988), stated the trial court's authority in this way:
Probation is a matter of grace rather than right. The trial judge has broad discretionary power to grant as well as revoke probation.
We agree that if a condition of probation is valid, then the trial judge should have the discretion to consider the violation of such condition to be material. That is particularly true of the requirement to file monthly reports. It is through these reports that continuing supervision over one on probation is maintained. If the court can not insist that these reports be filed, then probation ceases to be a viable alternative to incarceration.
Although section 948.06(4), Florida Statutes (1995) refers to a violation being "material," it does not change the law that it is the trial judge, at least in the first instance, that should make that determination. In Griffin v. State, 603 So.2d 48, 50 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992), the court held: "A trial judge who has prescribed probation . is authorized to exercise discretion in deciding whether the violation justifies a revocation of probation." We find the trial judge herein exercised his discretion reasonably.
AFFIRMED.
GRIFFIN, C.J., concurs.
W. SHARP, J., dissents, with opinion.
. The probation officer testified that not only had Diller totally failed to file her July and August reports, she was late in filing her June report and also had not filed reports for April and May.