Case Name: Robert W. Milbank, App'lt, v. Morgan Jones, Resp't
Court: New York Superior Court General Term
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1889-06-28
Citations: 25 N.Y. St. Rep. 868
Docket Number: 
Parties: Robert W. Milbank, App’lt, v. Morgan Jones, Resp’t.
Judges: 
Reporter: New York State Reporter
Volume: 25
Pages: 868–872

Head Matter:
Robert W. Milbank, App’lt, v. Morgan Jones, Resp’t.
(New York Superior Court, General Term,
Filed June 28, 1889.)
Pleading and kroon—Answer—General denial—What mat be shown under.
In an action to recover a certain sum' of money and stock deposited "by-plaintiff with defendant, which was to be returned to plaintiff, should a certain resolution not be passed by the common council so as to take effect before a designated day, the defendant offered to show that the a leged agreement was illegal. This proof was objected to because such defense was not pleaded. Held, that the evidence was admissible, the plaintiff affirming that a trust existed. Freedman, J., dissenting.
Appeal by plaintiff from judgment entered in favor of the defendant upon the verdict of a jury, and from order denying plaintiff’s motion for a new trial.
Booraem & Hamilton {Ira Shafer, of counsel), for app’lt; John M. Jones {Joseph Fettretch, of counsel), for resp’t.

Opinion:
Sedgwick, Oh. J.
The complaint averred that on, etc.:, "The defendant above named received a trust for the plaintiff of $5,000 in cash, which said sum he has ever since continued to hold in trust for this plaintiff; that by the. terms and conditions of the said trust under which said sum of money was received by said defendant, as aforesaid, it was understood and provided, and said trust was upon the express condition that the same might be terminated by this plaintiff on or after July 10, 1866, at his election; that heretofore and on or about the day of February, 1886, this plaintiff caused due notice to be given to the defendant of his election to terminate said trust and demanded payment to him of the aforesaid sum of $5,000."
The answer denied each and every allegation of the complaint.
The plaintiff on the trial gave in evidence, a certain paper which began with a form of a resolution. Then followed "New York, June 14, 1866, received of R W. Milbank, $5,000, and also certificate for shares, etc., the said money and stock to be returned to said Milbank, in case the resolution above shall not be passed and take effect before the tenth of July next. It being understood and agreed that said Milbank shall have the right at his election in case said resolution shall pass and take effect before the said tenth of July, to purchase back the said stock, etc."' Signed Morgan Jones, and at the end was, " I assent to and join in the above understanding and agreement. R. W. Milbank."
The plaintiff examined a witness who gave testimony, intended to show that the witness in behalf of the plaintiff, demanded of the defendant in February, 1866, the $5,000.. It was also found that the resolution did not take effect before 10th of July, 1866.
It will be perceived that the plaintiff failed to make the case averred in the complaint, in point of fact. He put in evidence an agreement which was not a declaration of any trust and did not contain an express condition that the plaintiff might terminate the trust. The supposed obligation of the defendant to return the money did not rest upon! the will of the plaintiff, but upon the fact of the resolution taking effect before 10th of July, 1866.
The defendant did not point out this variance, but proceeded to make the case as, or as plaintiff might claim, it was made outside of the pleadings. It might be claimed! that after the demand the defendant held the money for the-plaintiff. The defendant then offered to show that the object of the transactions as 'shown in plaintiff's ease, was-illegal, and that it was made to secure from defendant-lobbying service. The objection to this proof, and, which was overruled by the court, was that such a defense had. not been pleaded.
I do not think that such an objection is good, when the plaintiff will recover, if he succeeded upon a case not stated in the complaint, but upon one that first appears in the evidence.
Nor do I think it should be sustained, when, whether competently or not, but, in fact, the plaintiff places himself upon a trust, specifically so called, and resulting from antecedent occurrences, although not said so to result. The plaintiff chooses to affirm that a trust existed, meaning to give the facts that would prove the.existence of the trust. The defendant should have the same kind of right to deny the existence of the trust, meaning to give in evidence the existence .of facts which would show that no trust can in fact exist.
I, therefore, think the judgment should be affirmed.