Case Name: Pat Wilson v. The State
Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1916-10-11
Citations: 80 Tex. Crim. 266
Docket Number: No. 4154
Parties: Pat Wilson v. The State.
Judges: 
Reporter: Texas Criminal Reports
Volume: 80
Pages: 266–272

Head Matter:
Pat Wilson v. The State.
No. 4154.
Decided October 11, 1916.
Rehearing overruled November 1, 1916.
1. —Graining—Matching Money—Indictment.
Where, upon trial of matching money, etc., at least two counts of the four counts in the indictment, which were submitted to the jury, were good upon motion to quash, there was no reversible error. Davidson, Judge, dissenting.
2. —Same—Indictment—Pleading—Rule Stated.
Where several ways are set forth in the same statute by which an offense may be committed, and all are embraced in the same definition and made punishable in the same manner, they are not distinct offenses, and they may be charged conjunctively in the same count, and where the pleader charged them in separate counts, this did not change the rule. Following Cabiness v. State, 66 Texas Grim. Rep., 409.
3. —Same—Charge of Court—Requested Charges.
Where defendant in neither requested charge nor any way connected therewith, gave any reason why they should have been given, and did not except to the refusal of the court to give them, the same can not be considered on appeal.
4. —Same—Rule Stated—Misdemeanor—Bill of Exception—Practice on Appeal.
In misdemeanor cases, the only way this court is authorized to consider complaints of the charge of the court and the refusal of special requested charges, is by bill of exceptions taken at the time to the charge of the court, giving specific reasons of the court’s ruling. Following Basques v. State, 56 Texas Grim. Rep., 329, and other cases. However, there was no error in the ruling of the court.
5. —Same—Charge of Court—Sufficiency of the Evidence.
Where, upon trial of matching money, etc., the evidence was sufficient to sustain a conviction under a proper charge of the court, there was no reversible error. Davidson, Judge, dissenting.
6. —Same—Jury and Jury Law—Other Trials—Practice on Appeal.
Where, upon appeal of matching money, etc., it appeared from the record on appeal that in the preliminary examination of the jurors of the regular panel, some of them answered in substance that while they had sat as jurors in two other cases against another person on a similar charge and had an opinion, if the facts were similar in the instant case, yet that they could disregard said opinion and try the case according to the law and the evidence, there was no error in overruling a challenge on this account to the whole panel; besides, the record showed that none of the jurors who so answered sat on uefendaht’s case. Following Edgar v. State, 59 Texas Grim. Rep., 252, and other cases.
7. —Same—Evidence—Wager For Drinks—Matching Coin.
Where one of the counts in the indictment charged defendant with matching money or coins for cold drinks, it was not necessary that the State must prove the kind of drinks for which the wager was made.
8.—Same—Sufficiency of the Evidence.
See opinion setting out the evidence which sustained a conviction for a bet or wager on a game of matching money for the drinks under a proper charge of the court. Davidson, Judge, dissenting.
Appeal from the County Court of Fisher. Tried helow before the Hon. M. A. Hopson.
Appeal from a conviction of betting or wagering on a game by matching money for the drinks; penalty, a fine of ten dollars.
The opinion states the case.
L. H. McOrea and J. C. Randall, for appellant.
On question of court’s charge in striking out certain counts in the indictment and submitting others: Pollard v. State, 33 Texas Crim. Rep., 197; Peacock v. State, 37 id., 418; Boren v. State, 33 Texas Crim. App., 38.
On question of court’s charge in failing to instruct the jury as to the meaning of cold drinks: Hale v. State, 8 Texas, 171; Bachelor v. State, 10 id., 358.
On question of new trial and charge of court: Berry v. State, 85 S. W. Rep., 14; Ellis v. State, 58 Texas Crim. Rep., 319.
On question of insufficiency of the indictment: Dancey v. State, 35 Texas Crim. Rep., 615.
G. G. McDonald, Assistant Attorney General, for the State.

Opinion:
PBENDEBGA ST, Presiding Judge.
AppellantAppellant was convicted of a petty misdemeanor and assessed the lowest fine, $10.
Among other offenses article 557, Penal Code, enacts: "If any person shall bet or wager at . , . the game of matching money or coins of any denomination for such coins, or for other things ofa value . . . he shall be fined not less than ten nor more than fifty dollars."
The indictment is in four counts; the charging part in each is, that said Wilson on or about January 30, 1916, in said county:
Then in the first: "did unlawfully bet and wager at a game of matching money and coins for such money and coins and other things of value."
In fhe second: He "did then and there unlawfully bet and wager at the game of matching money."
In the third: He "did then and there unlawfully bet and wager at a game of. matching coins for such coins."
In the fourth: He "did then and there unlawfully bet and wager at a game of matching coins for other things of value, towit, cold drinks."
We think counts 1 and 4 are undoubtedly good.
The court eliminated the second and third by giving appellant's charge instructing the jury to consider neither in making up their verdict. Clearly the two remaining counts charged different phases of the same transaction under the same statute. This is always not only proper, and expressly provided for by statute (art. 481, C. C. P.) but commendable as good criminal pleading, as this court has often said, in pleadings in both felony and misdemeanor. (White, Ann. C. C, P., sec. 403.) And where the pleading is as stated, no election between counts can be required in an indictment charging misdemeanors only. (White, idem., subdiv. 4; 1 Branch, Ann. P. C., p. 233, at the bottom of the page.) Both Judge White and Mr. Branch cite many decisions of this court so holding.
Judge White, in secs. 405 and 383, in his Ann. C. C. P., says: "Where several ways are set forth in the same statute by which an offense may be committed and all are embraced in the same definition and made punishable in the same manner, they are not distinct offenses, and they may be charged conjunctively in the same count," citing a large number of cases of this court and of the Supreme Court when it had criminal jurisdiction. This is unquestionably the law in this State. (Cabiness v. State, 66 Texas Crim. Rep., 409.) So that the pleader in this instance could have charged all these matters in one count only, and that he charged them in separate counts makes no difference.
Appellant filed with the judge several grounds of objections to his charge. He also requested some eleven special charges, all of which were refused, except the one to disregard the second and third counts above mentioned, which was given. In neither requested charge, nor in any way connected therewith, did he give any reason or statement why it should be given. This is essential in even a felony case. (Ryan v. State, 64 Texas Crim. Rep., 628, and many other cases.) Nor did he except or take any bill of exception to the judge's refusal to give his charges, or any of them. Neither did he take any bill of exceptions to the judge's charge, or any portion thereof, nor to the court's failure or refusal, if he did, to modify his charge to meet his objections. All such matters are necessary to be shown now by bills of exceptions; otherwise, they can not be considered by this court in either felony or misdemeanor cases.
It is the well settled law of this State, and has been so since the establishment of this court, "that in misdemeanor cases, the only way this court is authorized to consider complaints of the charge of the court and the refusal of special. charges requested, is, by bill of exceptions taken at' the time to the charge of the court ip. the matters attempted to be complained of, and to the refusal of the court to give the special charges requested, giving in the bill therefor the specific reasons why the court erred in giving the charge complained of, or, as the case may be, in refusing the requested charge." Basquez v. State, 56 Texas Crim. Rep., 329, 119 S. W. Rep., 861; Brunk v. State, 60 Texas Crim. Rep., 263; Hobbs v. State, 7 Texas Crim. App., 117; Campbell v. State, 3 Texas Crim. App., 33; Goode v. State, 2 Texas Crim. App., 520; Dunbar v. State, 34 Texas Crim. Rep., 596, 31 S. W. Rep., 401; Downey v. State, 33 Texas Crim. Rep., 380, 26 S. W. Rep., 627, 19 Am. St. Rep., 856; Loyd v. State, 19 Texas Crim. App., 321; Lucio t. State, 35 Texas Crim. Rep., 320, 33 S. W. Rep., 358; Martin v. State, 32 Texas Crim. Rep., 441, 24 S. W. Rep., 512; Wright v. State, 60 Texas Crim. Rep., 385, 131 S. W. Rep., 1070; Jenkins v. State, 60 Texas Crim. Rep., 465, 132 S. W. Rep., 133; Brown v. State, 73 Texas Crim. Rep., 571. It is useless to cite the large number of recent cases to the same effect. This was so before articles 737, 739 and 743, C. C. P., of the revision of 1911 were amended by the Act of April 5, 1913, page 278. As amended by this Act, this proposition is in effect emphasized. So that none pf appellant's special refused charges nor his preliminary objections to the court's charge can be considered. However, we might say we have examined all of his objections and special charges, and if we could consider them, the court's action would present no error.
The court gave a full and correct charge properly submitting every issue raised by the evidence under the indictment.
The positive, uncontradicted testimony by the State clearly established appellant's guilt. He did not testify himself, nor did he introduce any testimony.
Appellant has only two bills of exception in the record. The first, as qualified by the court, is to the effect that fourteen jurors constituted the panel. That in examining all of them, seven, naming them, answered in substance, that while they had sat as jurors in two other cases against another person—not appellant—on a charge similar to the charge in this case, the indictments being the same except against another party and at a different date, they had an opinion as to the character of verdict they should and would render in this case, on similar facts, yet they could disregard any opinion that they had, and would try this case on the facts, and evidence adduced on the trial of this case, and the law submitted them by the court. He thereupon challenged the whole panel. The court overruled his challenge. The bill further shows that not a single one of the 'seven who had so answered sat on this case. There was no error in the court's ruling. (Edgar v. State, 59 Texas Crim. Rep., 252; Engman v. State, 77 Texas Crim. Rep., 595, 180 S. W. Rep., 235; 1 Branch's Ann. P. C., p. 279.)
His other bill presents no error. It shows that the State asked a witness: "What did they pay, how much a glass?" He answered:
"Mr. Harris don't sell anything but 5-eent drinks." His objection in substance was, that the- State would have to first prove the kind of drink drunk on that occasion.
The judgment is affirmed.
Affirmed,.
DAVIDSOH, Judge.—I can not agree to this affirmance and may write later.