Case Name: McAllister v. MAGNOLIA PETROLEUM CO.
Court: Supreme Court of the United States
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 1958-06-23
Citations: 357 U.S. 221
Docket Number: No. 83
Parties: McAllister v. MAGNOLIA PETROLEUM CO.
Judges: with whom Mr. Justice Frankfurter and Mr. Justice Harlan join,
Reporter: United States Reports
Volume: 357
Pages: 221–234

Head Matter:
McAllister v. MAGNOLIA PETROLEUM CO.
No. 83.
Argued April 1, 1958.
Decided June 23, 1958.
Arthur J. Mandell argued the cause and filed a brief for petitioner.
Frank C. Bolton, Jr. argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Charles B. Wallace and Jack E. Earnest.

Opinion:
Mr. Chief Justice Warren
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question in this case is whether a state court' may apply its two-year statute of limitations to bar an unseaworthiness action that is joined with an action for negligence under the Jones Act.
Petitioner was a member of the crew of a vessel owned and operated by respondent. His back was injured Oct. 19, 1950, when he slipped and fell down a stairway leading from the lounge to the galley. He reported the injury, and the ship's log book supports his allegation that the steps were wet. At the termination of the voyage petitioner consulted a doctor about the pain and stiffness in his back. Intermittent medical attention failed to arrest a deteriorating condition. In March 1953, a specialist in orthopedics diagnosed the difficulty as ruptured discs between the vertebrae. By July 6, 1953, petitioner could no longer perform his duties aboard respondent's vessel, and on that date he entered a United States Public Health Marine Hospital as an injured seaman. After his discharge he consulted an attorney and this state-court action was filed Aug. 27, 1953, in the District Court of Dallas County, Texas.
Petitioner claimed damages under the Jones Act for negligence and under the general maritime law for unseaworthiness. He also asked for maintenance and cure under the general maritime law. He alleged that the portholes and deck at the head of the stairs were not watertight, that they allowed water to accumulate on the stairs, and that this condition was the proximate cause of his fall. Respondent's answer denied the allegations of negligence and unseaworthiness, and averred that petitioner's claims were barred by the pertinent statutes of limitations and by laches. The trial court ruled that the actions were not barred, and after hearing evidence submitted all three claims to the jury. The jury returned special verdicts importing the following findings: Petitioner was injured while attempting to walk down the stairs in question; the portholes and deck above and near the stairs were not watertight; these defects were not due to the negligence of respondents; and the condition did not make the vessel unseaworthy. Pursuant to these findings, the trial court entered judgment for respondent on the Jones Act and unseaworthiness counts, and awarded petitioner $6,258 for maintenance and cure.
Both parties appealed to the Texas Court of Civil Appeals. Respondent sought to overturn the award for maintenance and cure, but the trial court's decision in that respect was affirmed and that portion of the case is not before us. Petitioner took no appeal from the judgment so far as it concerned his claim under the Jones Act, so that portion of the case is also outside the scope of our review. Limiting his appeal to the unseaworthiness aspect of his case, petitioner assigned errors in admitting .evidence and in instructing the jury. The Court of Civil Appeals found it unnecessary to rule upon these questions, for in its opinion the unseaworthiness action was barred by the two-year Texas statute of limitations pertaining to actions for personal injuries. 290 S. W. 2d 313. The Texas Supreme Court refused petitioner's application for writ of error. In view of the importance of this ruling for maritime personal injury litigation in the state courts, we granted petitioner's motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, and granted certiorari. 352 U. S. 1000.
"6. Action for injury to the person of another." Vernon's Ann. Rev. Civ. Stat., Art. 5526.
In the view we take of this case it is unnecessary for us to decide the broad question of whether a state court is free to apply its own statutes of limitation to an admiralty right of action for which no special limitation is prescribed, or whether it is bound to determine the timeliness of such actions by the admiralty doctrine of laches. For the reasons stated hereafter, we simply hold that where an action for unseaworthiness is combined with an action under the Jones Act a court cannot apply to the former a shorter period of limitations than Congress has prescribed for the latter. We think this is so whether the action is at law or in admiralty, in the state or the federal courts.
The appropriate period of limitations for this action must be determined with an eye to the practicalities of admiralty personal injury litigation. When a seaman is injured he has three means of recovery against his employer: (1) maintenance and cure, (2) negligence under the Jones Act, and (3) unseaworthiness.' Without elaborating on the nature of these three actions, it is sufficient to say that they are so varied in their elements of proof, type of defenses, and extent of recovery that a seaman will rarely forego his right to sue for all three. But if the seaman is to sue for both unseaworthiness and Jones Act negligence, he must do so in a single proceed ing. That is a consequence of this Court's decision in Baltimore S. S. Co. v. Phillips, 274 U. S. 316, which held that these claims were but alternative "grounds" of recovery for a single cause of action. A judgment in the seaman's libel for unseaworthiness was held to be a complete "bar" to his subsequent action for the same injuries under the Jones Act.
Since the seaman must sue for both unseaworthiness and Jones Act negligence in order to make full utilization of his remedies for personal injury, and since that can be accomplished only in a single proceeding, a time limitation on the unseaworthiness claim effects in substance a similar limitation on the right of action under the Jones Act. Congress has provided that a seaman shall have three years to bring his action under the Jones Act. A state court cannot reduce that time by applying its own statute of limitations to such an action. Engel v. Davenport, 271 U. S. 33; cf. Cox v. Roth, 348 U. S. 207. As an essential corollary of that proposition, it may not qualify the seaman's Jones Act right by affixing a shorter limitation to his concurrent right of action'for unseaworthiness. To be sure, the seaman's right of action under the Jones Act is not extinguished when a State imposes a two-year limitation on the right to sue for unseaworthiness for the same injury. But in view of the practical necessity of combining both claims in a single action, Baltimore S. S. Co. v. Phillips, supra, the unseaworthiness limitation effectively diminishes the time within which the seaman must commence his action under the Jones Act. The result falls short of affording seamen "the full benefit of federal law," Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co., 317 U. S. 239, 243, to which they are entitled when state courts undertake to adjudicate claims under the federal maritime law.
Because the state court thought petitioner's action was barred by the statute of limitations, it had no occasion to consider the assignment of error in connection with the trial judge's instructions on unseaworthiness. The parties have argued the matter, and in furtherance of what we deem to be sound judicial administration, Weyerhaeuser S. S. Co. v. Nacirema Operating Co., 355 U. S. 563, 569, we rule on the question at this time. We think that the charges set out in the margin were erroneous. They carried the incorrect implication that petitioner could recover for unseaworthiness only if the defect was of such quality that it rendered the whole vessel unfit for the purpose for which it was intended. It is well settled that "the vessel and owner are liable to indemnify a seaman for injury caused by unseaworthiness of the vessel or its appurtenant appliance's and equipment . . . ." Mahnich v. Southern S. S. Co., 321 U. S. 96, 99.
The judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals of Texas is vacated, and the cause is remanded to it for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
46 U. S. C. § 688.
Recent authorities have effectively disposed of suggestions in earlier cases that an injured seaman can be required to exercise an election between his remedies for negligence under the Jones Act. and for unseaworthiness. McCarthy v. American Eastern Corp., 175 F. 2d 724 (C. A. 3d Cir.); Balado v. Lykes Bros. S. S. Co., 179 F. 2d 943 (C. A. 2d Cir.); Williams v. Tide Water Asso. Oil Co., 227 F. 2d 791 (C. A. 9th Cir.). Cf. Pope & Talbot, Inc., v. Hawn, 346 U. S. 406. See Gilmore and Black, The Law of Admiralty, § 6-23 through 6-25.
Because of its negative findings on unseaworthiness and negligence, the jury made no finding on whether the condition of the portholes and deck was the proximate cause of petitioner's fall. The jury did find that petitioner was not contributorily negligent, and that it would require $32,500 to compensate him for loss of earnings, diminished earning capacity, past and future medical expenses, and pain and suffering.
"There shall be commenced and prosecuted within two years after the cause of action shall have accrued, and not afterward, all actions °or suits in court of the following description:
The question of which limitation a state court must apply was reserved in Engel v. Davenport, 271 U. S. 33, 36. Lower courts are divided on the related question of which principles govern the limitation of admiralty actions on the law side of the federal court. Compare Henderson v. Cargill, Inc., 128 F. Supp. 119; Apika v. Pennsylvania Whsg. & Safe Deposit Co., 74 F. Supp. 819, 101 F. Supp. 575; Untersinger v. Keystone Tankship Corp., 1948 A. M. C. 1899; with Bonam v. Southern Menhaden Corp., 284 F. 360; Oroz v. American President Lines, 154 F. Supp. 241.
See 46 U. S. C. § 688, which incorporates the statute of limitations under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, 45 U. S. C. § 56. When the Jones Act was adopted in 1920 the period of limitations for the FELA was two years. Some authorities have suggested that the Act of Aug. 11, 1939, 53 Stat. 1404, which extended the FELA period to three years, did not effect a similar extension for the Jones Act. E. g., 3 Benedict, Admiralty (6th ed., Knauth, 1940), §469. The contrary must now be taken to have been established. See Cox v. Roth, 348 U. S. 207, 210; Pope v. McCrady Rodgers Co., 164 F. 2d 591, 592; Streeter v. Great Lakes Transit Corp., 49 F. Supp. 466; Gahling v. Colabee S. S. Co., 37 F. Supp. 759; Royle v. Standard Fruit & Steamship Co., 269 App. Div. 762, 54 N. Y. S. 2d 778.
Cf. Le Gate v. The Panamolga, 221 F. 2d 689 (C. A. 2d Cir.). In that case, a longshoreman brought a libel claiming damages for personal injuries caused by negligence or unseaworthiness. The District Court held both claims barred by laches. He was reversed as to un seaworthiness. The Court of Appeals held that if the negligence count were the only basis of liability the District Court would have been correct in holding it barred by laches. However, since libellant was going to have a trial on his unseaworthiness claim, the court thought it a "harsh result" to limit the scope of his suit. The cause was remanded for the District Court to reconsider the question of laches on the negligence count and respondent was given the burden of showing prejudice from inexcusable delay. And see Cross v. Allen, 141 U. S. 528 (laches will not bar suit in equity to foreclose mortgage so long as statute of limitations has not run on underlying debt); United States v. Mack, 295 U. S. 480, 489 ("Laches within the term of the statute of limitations is no defense at law.").
"Special Issue No. 3 [and 14]. Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that the portholes or windows in question [or the "deck above the galley"] not being in a watertight condition, if you have so found in answer to special issue No. 2 [or No. 13], made the crew ship in question 'unseaworthy,' as defined herein?
"You are instructed that the term 'unseaworthy/ as used herein, means that a vessel with its appliances and fittings is not reasonably fit for the purposes for which it is being used."
The jurors were puzzled over the meaning of this charge. A short time after retiring to the juryroom they made the following inquiry of the trial judge: "In special issue 3 is the term unseaworthy referring to the vessel as a whole, or the three windows on the port side?" Plaintiff thereupon requested the trial judge to instruct the jury that the term meant that "the portholes and their fittings are not fit for the purpose for which such portholes are used." The court declined to instruct the jury further and answered their request by referring them to the definition in his charge, presumably the one quoted in note 8, supra.