Case Name: Lindsey H. Durham, plaintiff in error, vs. William H. Roberts, defendant in error
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia
Jurisdiction: Georgia
Decision Date: 1864-03
Citations: 33 Ga. Supp. 123
Docket Number: 
Parties: Lindsey H. Durham, plaintiff in error, vs. William H. Roberts, defendant in error.
Judges: 
Reporter: Georgia Reports
Volume: 33 Suppl.
Pages: 123–129

Head Matter:
Lindsey H. Durham, plaintiff in error, vs. William H. Roberts, defendant in error.
Payment of a part of the purchase price of land to a stranger, without the knowledge or consent of the vendor, and not subsequently ratified or adoptedioy him, is not such partial payment as entitles the vendee to relief in a Court of equity.
Mere possession of land contracted for will not be deemed part performance of the contract, if such possession be obtained wrongfully by the vendee, or if it be wholly independent of the contract.
Tender, to be effectual, must be made in such funds or currency as the payee has a legal right to demand.
The fact that a vendee may sustain loss by the insolvency of a vendor is no ground for relief in a Court of equity in a case where the vendee has subjected himself to such loss by his own culpable laches, or positive infidelity to his contract.
Bill in equity in Lee Superior Court, and motion to dissolve injunction, decided by Judge Richard H. Clarke, at Chambers, on the 5th of November, 1863.
On the first day of July, 1863, Lindsey H. Durham exhibited his bill in Lee Superior Court, agaiust William H. Roberts, in which he alleges that, on the third day of November, 1860, he purchased from Roberts lot of land number eighty, and the north half of lot number eighty-one, in the second district of Lee county, containing in all three hundred three and three-quarter acres, more or less, for which he was to pay said Roberts in cash, by the first day of March, 1861, with Interest from the first of January, 1861, the sum of $3,645 00¡provided said Roberts should make to him, his heirs and assigns good and sufficient titles to said lands, and provided that the possession of said land should be retained by said Roberts until payment or satisfactory arrangements shall be made by said Durham with said Roberts; that said contract of purchase was reduced to writing and- executed in due form; that when the trade was made Roberts told complainant that the purchase money would be going to Alexander R. Lawton, of Savannah, Georgia; that by consent of said Roberts, the complainant went into possession of said land on the first day of January, 1863, and retained possession thereof from thence hitherto, except the half lot, which Roberts took back with complainant’s consent ; that at the time of the trade complainant supposed that said Roberts had only a bond for titles to said land, as he said that the money therefor would be going to said Alexander R. Lawton; that in. the spring of 1861 complainant went to Savannah to see said Lawton about getting indulgence upon said contract, when said Lawton informed him that, as administrator of Royston, deceased, he held a mortgage on said land, and if complainant would pay the interest he could have as long time to pay the debt as he wished, as it belonged to children; that this was the first he ever knew or heard of a mortgage on the land; that he then and there paid Lawton $471 75 in a draft on Lathrop & Company, which was accepted and paid at maturity, and gave Lawton his note for $3,528 20, due first January, 1862; that he returned from Savannah and informed Roberts of what he had done, and that he said it was satisfactory to him; that about the first of January, 1862, complainant went to Savannah to pay off said note to Lawton, and he would not discharge the mortgage on said land, because the mortgage included and operated upon other lands, also, whereupon complainant would not pay the note; that in February, 1863, complainant hearing that Lawton was willing to release the mortgage as to lots eighty and half of eighty-one if the purchase price thereof was paid to him, he went to Savannah again to pay the money, when Law-ton informed him that Roberts had avowed his intention to take the land back; that complainant then went to Roberts and told him that he was ready to pay for the land and take his title, and Roberts declined to consummate the trade, saying that he intended to take the land back. The complainant further charges that Roberts threatens to dispose of the land, and has bargained it away, and received $100 00 to bind the bargain, and complainant fears and charges that if not restrained, Roberts will sell the land to some innocent purchaser who has no notice of complainant’s rights in the premises, and he will be left without remedy, said Roberts being insolvent.
The bill prays a decree for specific performance, and tenders the purchase money. The bill also prays an injunction restrain ing Roberts from selling the land until the case made by the bill shall be heard.
Upon presentation of the bill to the Judge he granted the injunction upon condition that complainant should file a bond to save Roberts harmless on account of the issuing of the injunction.
William H. Roberts filed his answer to the bill, the trade about the land and its terms and stipulations as set forth in the bill, and that at the time the trade was made he told complainant that the purchase money, when collected, Avould be by him paid to Alexander R. Lawton, of SaArannah. Roberts also states that he distinctly and fully informed complainant of the mortgage held by LaAvton on the land, and that his only inducement for selling it Avas to realize cash Avith which to discharge his indebtedness to Lawton. The answer admits that complainant Avas allowed to take possession of the land, as charged, but it was upon the positive assurance on the part of complainant that the payment for the land should be surely and promptly met, and that complainant Avould hold the land as tenaut at will of Roberts if the payment was not made. The answer further states that complainant held possession of the land without paying for it until about the 16th February, 1863, Avhen Roberts resumed possession, and now holds it as owner and proprietor. The ansAver denies that Roberts ever assented to or acquiesced in any arrangement between Lawton and complainant for indulgence to the latter, or that he ever expressed himself as satisfied with any such arrangement as charged in the bill; on fhe contrary, Roberts answers that he expressly told complainant that nothing short of actual payment for the land according to the contract, or the satisfaction of the mortgage held by Lawton to the extent of the purchase money, would satisfy him. The answer denies that complainant offered to pay for the land and take a title in February, 1863, or any other time, but, on the contrary, that complainant persistently failed to pay for the land, and by subterfuges and pretexts has evaded a compliance with the terms of the contract until respondent’s patience was Avorn out. RespoDdént further states, that after Avorrying with complainant for more than íavo years, endeavoring to induce him to comply with said contract, he finally, on the 16th February, 1863, wrote complainant a note that the contract was at an end, and that if complainant would pay respondent the rent for the time he occupied the land, he, respondent, would pay him the amount which he paid to Lawton, and in the note respondent also told him that if he would pay the purchase money in specie, in thirty days, he might still have the land, to which note complainant responded that he was ready to pay for the laud in the common currency of the country, if the mortgage should be lifted from the land. The answer also states that on the tenth 'of June, 1863, respondent sold said land, with others, to John II. Pope, and received §100 00 to bind the bargain, and that Pope is and was an innocent purchaser, and bought the land believing that the contract between complainant and respondent was at an end, and had become null and void.
Upon the coming in of the answer, the defendant moved to dissolve the injunction on the ground that the bill contains no equity, and that if it does, all the facts and circumstances upon which the equity of the bill is based are distinctly met, and positively denied.
The presiding Judge granted the motion and dissolved the injunction, and that decision is complained of as error.
L. P. D. Warren, for plaintiff in error.
Strozier & Smith, contra.

Opinion:
By tfie Court
Jenkins, J.,
delivering the opinion.
This is a bill for specific performance of a contract for the sale of real estate, praying an injunction to restrain the vendor, pendente lite, from selling the land to any other party. The injunction was granted, but subsequently dissolved, on motion of defendant, after answer; and it is to the order dissolving it that exception is taken. The dissolution of the injunction is resisted on these grounds: 1st. The vendee had made a partial payment of the consideration money. 2d. That he had entered into possession of the premises. 3d. That he had tendered payment of the purchase money, and demanded a title, which had been refused. 4th. That the vendor was insolvent, by reason of which the vendee would be remediless at common law.
Partial payment, under the circumstances of this case, entitles the party making it to no favor in a Court of equity. By the contract full payment was to be made March 1st, 1861, the vendor casually remarking to the vendee that the money was to go to one Lawton, of Savannah. In the spring of 1861, instead of making payment or negotiating with vendor for an extension of the credit, the vendee went to Lawton (without authority from the vendor) and asked indulgence, which was granted upon the condition of the vendee paying interest due upon vendor's debt to Lawton. And this is the partial payment relied upon for the interposition of equity. It is true the bill contained an averment that after the transaction with Lawton the complainant communicated it to the vendor, who said it was satisfactory. But this is explicitly denied in the answer. Partial payment is sometimes relied upon to take a case of parol sale of land out of the operation of 29 Charles II, but that is not this case, for the contract was in writing. It can only avail the vendee here as evidence that time was not of the essence of the contract, and that the vendor, by accepting partial payment after the time fixed for fall payment, had waived the vendee's default and reaffirmed the contract. But no such consequences can result from the payment to a stranger without the knowledge or consent of the vendor, and not subsequently ratified or adopted by him. His casual remark, aside from the written contract, that the purchase money was going to Lawton, did not justify the vendee in ignoring the vendor, and negotiating with Lawton. .A material modification of the contract, so far from being the foundation of an equity against the vendor, it was a wrong done him.
Whether or not possession of the premises by the vendee after the contract be a ground for specific performance, and of course for inj unction pendente lite as ancillary to it, depends upon how the possession was obtained, and its true character. The mere possession of the land contracted for will not be deemed a part performance if it be obtained wrongfully by the vendee, or if it be wholly independent of the contract. So if the vendee be a tenant in possession under the vendor, for his possession is prop erly referable to his tenancy, and not to the contract: 2 Story's Equity, 763, and numerous authorities cited in note 1. In this case the contract expressly provided that the possession should remain in the vendor until the day of payment. Complainant's allegations relative to possession are very general, but the defendant's response to them is very specific. He states that subsequently to the contract complainant went into possession by his consent, and subject to his will,.and that by his will the possession had been terminated before the filing of the bill. It therefore does not at all strengthen the complainant's bill for injunction.
As to the tender of payment, the responsive statements of the answer show that no offer of payment was ever made until about the time of the filing of the bill, and that was an offer to pay in " the common currency of the country." It was the legal right of the vendor to demand payment in specie, and such payment was refused. But this is not all; more than two years had elapsed since the payment became due. During that time it was a matter of history that there was but one " common currency " in Georgia, which was, by force of circumstances, in a course of depreciation. At the time of the offer to pay, (February, 1863,) it was greatly depreciated, and rapidly declining in value.
There is, as regards time, a remarkable coincidence between the delay of payment and the depreciation of the " common currency," and equity revolts at a claim for its interposition, based upon the tardy offer, in that specific medium. As to laches, see 2 Story's Equity, 771; 2 Wheaton, 336.
The complainant relies upon the fact that he will be remediless by reason of the insolvency of the vendor unless a complete remedy, by specific performance, be given him. There are two aspects in which he may lose: 1st. He may fail to realize the anticipated gains of the purchase. 2d. He may lose the payment made to Lawton. As to the first, it may be replied that the loss, if any,'is attributable directly to his failure to comply with the contract. The insolvency of the defendant might entitle a blameless vendee to relief in a form otherwise denied him, but it cannot revive a right lost by his own culpa ble laches, ora positive infidelity to the contract. We have already remarked that complainant's payment to Lawton was a wrong done to the defendant, and he can derive no benefit from it. But it appears from the correspondence exhibited to defendant's answer, that he offered to refund to complainant the money so paid if the latter would account to him for the rent of the land whilst he occupied it by defendant's permission. We are satisfied, after careful examination of the case, that the injunction was properly dissolved, and therefore affirm the judgment.
Let the judgment be affirmed.