Case Name: SIMPSON v. SIMPSON
Court: Florida Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1953-03-17
Citations: 63 So. 2d 764
Docket Number: 
Parties: SIMPSON v. SIMPSON.
Judges: TERRELL, SEBRING, HOBSON, MATHEWS and DREW, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 63
Pages: 764–767

Head Matter:
SIMPSON v. SIMPSON.
Supreme Court of Florida, en Banc.
March 17, 1953.
Carey & Harrison, St. Petersburg, for appellant.
Bussey & Simmons, St. Petersburg, for appellee.

Opinion:
ROBERTS, Chief Justice.
The principal question here presented may be stated as follows: Where the husband petitions for a reduction of the amounts allowed in a former decree for alimony and child support, is the wife entitled to suit money, including a reasonable attorney's fee, under the provisions of Section 65.16, Florida Statutes, F.S.A.? It is our opinion that Section 65.16 should be so interpreted. This is so because when the wife defends such a petition, she is, in effect, litigating to enforce that portion of the former decree which by his petition he seeks to take away from her. This court has heretofore held, in Selinsky v. Selinsky, Fla., 62 So.2d 24, 26 that the services rendered by an attorney on behalf of a wife in resisting the husband's counterclaim seeking to have the court modify its former decree by eliminating therefrom the provisions respecting alimony "constitutes services for the purpose of enforcing the original decree or ordqr for alimony." Similarly, when the husband petitions for a reduction, the wife must employ an attorney to defend against his claim for a reduction, and his services are, as in the Selinsky case, "for the purpose of enforcing .the original decree or order for alimony."
It is our opinion, then, that the word "enforcing" in Section 65.16 should be given a broad and liberal interpretation so that the wife may be provided with suit money to defend against any attack upon a former decree made by the husband, whether such attack be for the purpose of eliminating entirely or merely reducing the amounts therein awarded for alimony and child support, since her defensive litigation is for the sole purpose of enforcing a compliance with the decree as originally entered. Any other interpretation would permit a husband to harass an indigent wife by filing multiple petitions for modification of a former decree, which she-would be Unable to defend unless awarded suit money by the court.
Clearly, the statute will not be applied to give suit money to a wife who attacks a former decree by applying 'for a modification thereof. And, in any case, the matter of attorney's fees is addressed to the sound judicial discretion of the trial court; it must be reasonable and "as from the circumstances of the parties and the nature of the case shall be fit, equitable and just."
The questions presented on the cross-appeal have been carefully considered, and no error has been found. See the dissenting opinion by Mr. Justice THOMAS for a full discussion of this matter.
For the reasons stated, that portion of the decree denying to the wife a reasonable amount for the services of her attorney in resisting the husband's petition for modification of the decree is reversed. That portion of the decree attacked on the cross-appeal is affirmed, for the reasons stated in the dissenting opinion by Mr. Justice THOMAS.
Affirmed in part and reversed in part.
TERRELL, SEBRING, HOBSON, MATHEWS and DREW, JJ., concur.
THOMAS, J., dissenting.