Case Name: STATE of Louisiana v. Tommy CAGE
Court: Louisiana Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1991-05-06
Citations: 583 So. 2d 1125
Docket Number: No. 87 KA 2778
Parties: STATE of Louisiana v. Tommy CAGE.
Judges: LEMMON, J., concurs and assigns reasons.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 583
Pages: 1125–1139

Head Matter:
STATE of Louisiana v. Tommy CAGE.
No. 87 KA 2778.
Supreme Court of Louisiana.
May 6, 1991.
Dissenting Opinion of Justice Dennis June 11, 1991.
Certiorari Denied Oct. 7, 1991.
See 112 S.Ct. 211.
William J. Guste, Jr., Harry F. Connick, Jack Peebles, New Orleans, for State plaintiff-appellee.
Sherry Watters, M. Craig Colwart, Professor Henry D. Gabriel, New Orleans, for defendant-appellant.
Amicus curiae, Denise LeBoeuf, New Orleans.

Opinion:
WATSON, Justice.
Defendant, Tommy Cage, was indicted by a grand jury for the first degree murder of Arthur Johnson in violation of LSA-R.S. 14:30. After trial by jury, defendant was convicted and sentenced to death. The conviction and sentence were affirmed. State v. Cage, 554 So.2d 39 (La.1989).
Defendant applied for a writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court on the ground that the reasonable doubt instruction used in the guilt phase of trial was constitutionally defective. After granting certiorari, the Supreme Court reversed the conviction and sentence, because the trial judge's instruction on reasonable doubt violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by defining reasonable doubt as "grave uncertainty," "actual substantial doubt" and lack of a "moral certainty." The case was remanded for further proceedings. Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 328, 112 L.Ed.2d 339 (1990).
ISSUES
The issues are: (1) whether the jury instruction on reasonable doubt is subject to the harmless error analysis adopted in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967); and (2) if so, whether the instruction was harmless in Cage's trial.
FACTS
On April 16, 1986 at about 11:30 a.m., Arthur Johnson and Terry Kendrick were waiting at a bus stop on the corner of Desire Street and Florida Avenue in New Orleans. Both wore medallions on gold chains. While waiting, the two men observed defendant and a companion walk past them. As the bus arrived, Kendrick attempted to board but was knocked from behind onto the steps by Cage, who tried to grab Kendrick's medallion. While the two struggled over the medallion, Cage pulled a gun. Johnson ran away when he saw the gun.
After taking Kendrick's medallion, Cage chased Johnson, waving his gun. The bus driver, Lloyd Turner, and three other eyewitnesses, Reginald Lewis, Tony Jones, and Romales Nevelles, testified that Cage then stopped, took aim, and shot Johnson in the lower back. The impact of the bullet knocked Johnson forward to the ground. Cage ran up to Johnson, stopped, and aimed the gun at him. Despite Johnson's pleas, Cage shot him in the head, took his medallion and ran into the Florida Housing Project. Johnson was pronounced dead a short time later at Charity Hospital. Cage was positively identified by Kendrick, Lewis, Jones and Nevelles from photographic lineups. At trial, Cage admitted shooting the gun, but testified that he fired the first shot "just to be shooting" and then the gun "just went off again."
During the guilt phase of the trial, the judge instructed the jury on reasonable doubt. The instruction provided, in pertinent part:
"If you entertain a reasonable doubt as to any fact or element necessary to constitute the defendant's guilt, it is your duty to give him the benefit of that doubt and return a verdict of not guilty. Even where the evidence demonstrates a probability of guilt, if it does not establish such guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, you must acquit the accused. This doubt, however, must be a reasonable one; that is one that is founded upon a real tangible substantial basis and not upon mere caprice and conjecture. It must be such a doubt as would give rise to a grave uncertainty, raised in your mind by reasons of the unsatisfactory character of the evidence or lack thereof. A reasonable doubt is not a mere possible doubt. It is an actual substantial doubt. It is a doubt that a reasonable man can seriously entertain. What is required is not an absolute or mathematical certainty, but a moral certainty." Cage, 554 So.2d at 41.
The jury found Cage guilty as charged. Following a sentencing hearing, during which the quoted instruction was not repeated, the same jury unanimously recommended a death sentence. Cage appealed, alleging that the reasonable doubt instruction was prejudicial. This Court concluded that the definitions of reasonable doubt, out of context, might have confused the jury, but, in context, the definitions did not overstate the requisite degree of uncertainty. Cage, 554 So.2d at 41. Compare U.S. v. Delibac, 925 F.2d 610 (2d Cir.1991).
The United States Supreme Court held that the instruction given by the trial judge suggested a higher grade of doubt than is required for acquittal under the reasonable doubt standard; therefore, a reasonable juror could have interpreted the instruction to find defendant guilty with less proof than is required by the Due Process Clause. The Supreme Court remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with its opinion.
HARMLESS ERROR ANALYSIS
In Chapman, the United States Supreme Court applied the harmless error analysis to a trial error which violated defendant's constitutionally guaranteed rights. To be harmless, a trial error must be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24, 87 S.Ct. at 828.
The most recent harmless error analysis was in Arizona v. Fulminante, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 1246, 113 L.Ed.2d 302 (1991). Fulminante was convicted of murdering his 11-year-old stepdaughter and sentenced to death. At trial, the state was allowed to introduce two confessions made by Fulminante. The Arizona Supreme Court held that the first confession was coerced and the prejudice of introducing that confession in evidence was not subject to a harmless error analysis. The case was remanded for a new trial without the coerced confession. Arizona v. Fulminante, 161 Ariz. 237, 778 P.2d 602 (1988). The United States Supreme Court decided that a harmless error analysis is applicable to coerced confessions, but the error in introducing Fulminante's confession was not harmless. The Arizona Supreme Court decision was affirmed.
A five person majority of the United States Supreme Court agreed that the admission of a coerced confession is a "trial error," which is subject to a harmless error analysis. Trial error occurs during the presentation of the case to the trier of fact and may be assessed in the context of the other evidence to determine whether its admission at trial is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
Structural defects in the trial mechanism are not trial errors and cannot be analyzed under a harmless error standard. Structural defects include: the complete denial of counsel, as in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963); and adjudication by a biased judge, as in Turney v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 47 S.Ct. 437, 71 L.Ed. 749 (1927). The entire conduct of a trial is affected by the absence of counsel for a criminal defendant, or the presence of a biased judge on the bench.
Other constitutional errors which are not subject to a harmless error analysis include: exclusion of members of defendant's race from a grand jury, Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 106 S.Ct. 617, 88 L.Ed.2d 598 (1986); denial of the right to self-representation at trial, McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 104 S.Ct. 944, 79 L.Ed.2d 122 (1984); violation of the right to public trial, Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 104 S.Ct. 2210, 81 L.Ed.2d 31 (1984); and seléction of a jury with racially based exclusions, Powers v. Ohio, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 1364, 113 L.Ed.2d 411 (1991). Each of these constitutional deprivations is a structural defect affecting the framework of the trial, rather than an error in the trial process.
This erroneous instruction on reasonable doubt was given by the trial judge to the jury during the guilt phase of defendant's trial. Under the distinction drawn by Chief Justice Rehnquist in Fulminante between trial errors and structural defects in the trial mechanism, the instruction is a trial error. As a trial error, the instruction is subject to a harmless error analysis.
WAS THE ERROR HARMLESS?
A trial error is harmless when a reviewing court is convinced that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24, 87 S.Ct. at 828. The state has the burden of demonstrating that the trial error did not contribute to defendant's conviction. If a reviewing court finds that the trial record establishes guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the interests of justice have been satisfied and the judgment should be affirmed. Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 106 S.Ct. 3101, 92 L.Ed.2d 460 (1986).
In Fulminante, the coerced confession was given to Anthony Sarivola, a fellow inmate acting as a paid informant for the Federal Bureau of Investigation. After Fulminante was released from prison, he also confessed to Sarivola's wife, Donna, whom he had not previously met. Although deciding that a harmless error standard applied to introduction of the coerced confession, the United States Supreme Court concluded that the state had not carried its burden of demonstrating beyond a reasonable doubt that admission of the confession did not contribute to the conviction.
The state did not carry its burden of establishing that admission of the coerced confession in Fulminante was harmless error for three reasons. First, absent the confessions, it was unlikely that Fulmi-nante would have been prosecuted, because the physical and circumstantial evidence would have been insufficient to convict. Second, the corroborating confession given to Donna Sarivola might have been unbelievable without the coerced confession. Third, admission of the coerced confession allowed the introduction of other prejudicial evidence. The court also found that the confession may have influenced the trial judge during the sentencing phase; there was a reasonable doubt that the judge would have found an aggravating circumstance as a requisite to imposing the death sentence without the coerced confession.
In this case, the erroneous reasonable doubt instruction is a trial error subject to the Chapman harmless error analysis. That analysis "mandates consideration of the entire record prior to reversing a conviction for constitutional errors that may be harmless." United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 508 n. 7, 103 S.Ct. 1974, 1980 n. 7, 76 L.Ed.2d 96, 106 n. 7 (1983).
Justice Powell summarized the harmless error doctrine in Rose v. Clark:
Accordingly, if the defendant had counsel and was tried by an impartial adjudicator, there is a strong presumption that any other errors that may have occurred are subject to harmless-error analysis. The thrust of the many constitutional rules governing the conduct of criminal trials is to ensure that those trials lead to fair and correct judgments. Where a reviewing court can find that the record developed at trial establishes guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the interest in fairness has been satisfied and the judgment should be affirmed. 478 U.S. at 579, 106 S.Ct. at 3106, 92 L.Ed.2d at 471.
Compare McCleskey v. Zant, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 1454, 113 L.Ed.2d 517 (1991), which dealt with the doctrine of abuse of the writ, but recognized that a constitutional violation in a trial does not result in a miscarriage of justice where there is absolutely no doubt about defendant's guilt and defendant cannot demonstrate that the violation caused conviction of an innocent person.
At the Cage trial, the bus driver testified that he saw defendant waving a gun in his hand while chasing Arthur Johnson. Three other eyewitnesses testified that they saw defendant shoot Johnson in the lower back as well as in the head. Defendant Cage admitted firing the gun twice, although he claimed that the second shot was accidental. There was no significant evidence which would have caused reasonable doubt. Thus, the state met its burden of demonstrating that the trial error did not contribute to defendant's conviction. Because of the overwhelming evidence establishing defendant's guilt, the erroneous reasonable doubt instruction given by the trial judge during the guilt phase of trial was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
During the sentencing phase of Cage's trial, the trial judge instructed the jury that, before a death sentence could be imposed, it must unanimously find beyond a reasonable doubt that at least one statu tory aggravating circumstance existed. The trial judge did not give an instruction regarding the meaning of reasonable doubt. The same jury that determined the issue of defendant's guilt found four aggravating circumstances and recommended the death sentence. Those aggravating circumstances were: the offender was engaged in the perpetration of armed robbery; he had been previously convicted of an unrelated armed robbery; he knowingly created a risk of death or great bodily harm to more than one person; and the offense was committed in an especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel manner.
Because the trial judge did not repeat the instruction on reasonable doubt during the sentencing phase, the jury's understanding of the phrase may have been based on the erroneous instruction given during the guilt phase of the trial. Defendant does not claim that the instruction during the sentencing phase of his trial was constitutionally defective; however, if such an argument were made, the analysis would be the same. An erroneous instruction given during the sentencing phase of a trial constitutes a trial error subject to a harmless error analysis.
At the Cage trial, eyewitnesses testified they observed defendant holding a gun in his hand while attempting to grab Terry Kendrick's gold medallion. Cage was also seen waving a gun in his hand while chasing Arthur Johnson. After being shot once, Johnson was executed while pleading with Cage for his life. Cage then took Johnson's medallion.
Ernest Brown testified that he was robbed at gunpoint by Cage on April 10, 1986. Yvette Johnson testified that she was robbed at gunpoint by Cage on April 15, 1986, and that he was convicted of first degree robbery for the offense.
Considering the entire record, there was sufficient evidence for the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of at least one of the aggravating circumstances. In contrast to Fulminante, there is no indication that the trial error had any influence on defendant's sentence. Accordingly, the trial error did not contribute to defendant's sentence and was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
CONCLUSION
The erroneous reasonable doubt instruction given by the trial judge during the guilt phase of defendant's trial is a "trial error" subject to the Chapman harmless error analysis. Viewing the record as a whole, the jury had sufficient evidence to find defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the murder of Arthur Johnson and to find the existence of a statutory aggravating circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt. The erroneous instruction by the trial judge did not contribute to defendant's conviction or sentence. Accordingly, the erroneous instruction was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The conviction and sentence of defendant are affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
LEMMON, J., concurs and assigns reasons.
CALOGERO, C.J., and DENNIS, J., dissent and assign reasons.