Case Name: STATE of North Dakota, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Brian Raymond FERRIE, Defendant and Appellee; State of North Dakota, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Liyandza Charles Williams, Defendant
Court: North Dakota Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: North Dakota
Decision Date: 2008-09-23
Citations: 755 N.W.2d 890
Docket Number: Nos. 20070370, 20070371
Parties: STATE of North Dakota, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Brian Raymond FERRIE, Defendant and Appellee. State of North Dakota, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Liyandza Charles Williams, Defendant.
Judges: [¶ 15] GERALD W. VANDE WALLE, C.J., and DALE V. SANDSTROM, J., concur.
Reporter: North Western Reporter 2d
Volume: 755
Pages: 890–899

Head Matter:
2008 ND 170
STATE of North Dakota, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Brian Raymond FERRIE, Defendant and Appellee. State of North Dakota, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Liyandza Charles Williams, Defendant.
Nos. 20070370, 20070371.
Supreme Court of North Dakota.
Sept. 23, 2008.
Carmell F. Mattison (argued) and Thomas H. Falck, Jr. (on brief), Assistant State’s Attorneys, Grand Forks, N.D., for plaintiff and appellant.
John A. Thelen, Spaeth Thelen & Richards, Grand Forks, N.D., for defendant and appellee Brian Raymond Ferrie; submitted on brief.
Liyandza C. Williams, defendant; no appearance.

Opinion:
SANDSTROM, Justice.
[¶ 1] The State appeals from district court orders dismissing the cases against Brian Ferrie and Liyandza Williams. We conclude the district court erred in dismissing the cases under N.D.R.Crim.P. 48(b), and we vacate the court's orders.
I
[¶ 2] On November 24, 2007, Ferrie was arrested for driving under the influence, possession of drug paraphernalia, and possession of a controlled substance. Ferrie posted bond and was given notice to appear in court on December 7, 2007. On December 2, 2007, Williams was arrested for criminal trespass. Williams posted bond and was given notice to appear in court on December 7, 2007.
[¶ 3] Ferrie and Williams appeared in court on December 7, 2007, and the court dismissed the cases for failure to prosecute because the State had not filed any charging documents in either case. The court subsequently entered orders dismissing the cases with prejudice, because "[t]he State failed to file the charging documents or take any action to prosecute the case."
[¶ 4] The district court generally has jurisdiction to hear criminal eases under N.D. Const, art. VI, § 8, and N.D.C.C. § 27-05-06(1), but in this case the issue is whether the court could dismiss a criminal action under N.D.R.Crim.P. 48(b) when a charging document has not been filed. This Court has jurisdiction under N.D. Const, art. VI, § 2 and 6, and N.D.C.C. § 29-28-07(1). See City of Jamestown v. Snellman, 1998 ND 200, ¶ 5, 586 N.W.2d 494 (holding the State may appeal orders of dismissal that have the same effect as orders quashing an information); State v. Howe, 247 N.W.2d 647, 652 (N.D.1976) (the dismissal of a case is appealable if the order has the same effect as an order quashing an information). The appeals were timely under N.D.R.App.P. 4(b)(1)(B).
II
[¶ 5] The State argues the district court erred in dismissing the cases with prejudice because a dismissal with prejudice should be used only in extreme circumstances, the court did not give the State notice of its intent to dismiss and an opportunity to respond, and the delay in filing the information was not an unnecessary delay as N.D.R.Crim.P. 48 requires.
[¶ 6] We review a district court's decision to dismiss a criminal case with prejudice for an abuse of discretion. State v. Tweeten, 2004 ND 90, ¶ 7, 679 N.W.2d 287. A court abuses its discretion when it acts in an arbitrary, unreasonable, or unconscionable manner. Id.
[¶ 7] The district court must have a sufficient legal basis to dismiss a criminal charge. See State v. Stuart, 544 N.W.2d 158, 162 (N.D.1996). In this case, the court dismissed the cases under N.D.R.Crim.P. 48(b) because the State had failed to file any charging documents at the time of the initial appearance. Rule 48(b), N.D.R.Crim.P., gives the court the authority to dismiss a criminal case in certain circumstances:
The court may dismiss an indictment, information or complaint if unnecessary delay occurs in:
(1) presenting a charge to a grand jury;
(2) filing an information or complaint against a defendant who has been arrested or for whose arrest a warrant has been issued; or
(3) bringing a defendant to trial.
[¶ 8] When we interpret court rules, we apply the rules of statutory construction and look at the language of the rule first to determine the meaning. Ols- rud v. Bismarck-Mandan Orchestral Ass'n, 2007 ND 91, ¶ 12, 733 N.W.2d 256. Words are given their plain, ordinary, and commonly understood meaning. Id. Rules are construed as a whole, giving meaning to each word and phrase, if possible. Id.
[¶ 9] Rule 48(b), N.D.R.Crim.P., is a codification of the court's power to dismiss a case for want of prosecution, and it acts as a vehicle for enforcing an individual's Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial. N.D.R.Crim.P. 48, explanatory note. Rule 48, N.D.R.Crim.P., states, "[t]he court may dismiss an indictment, information or complaint . [,] " and gives the court authority to dismiss an information or complaint if the prosecution unnecessarily delays filing the information or complaint; however, it requires that an actual indictment, information, or complaint is filed before the rule can be applied. Cf. People v. Fysekis, 164 Misc.2d 627, 625 N.Y.S.2d 861, 865 (1995) (no basis to dismiss an action where there is no accusatory instrument before the court). The prosecution has discretion in deciding whether a criminal charge is proper and whether to initiate prosecution. See N.D.C.C. § 11-16-01; Olsen v. Koppy, 1999 ND 87, ¶ 18, 593 N.W.2d 762. The prosecution is initiated and a case is pending when a complaint, information, or indictment is filed. See N.D.R.Crim.P. 3(a) (a complaint is the initial charging document for all criminal offenses); N.D.R.Crim.P. 7(a) (all felony prosecutions must be by indictment or information, and all misdemeanor prosecutions must be by indictment, information, or complaint). Before the court can dismiss an indictment, information, or complaint under N.D.R.Crim.P. 48(b), a charging document must be filed initiating the prosecution. A court, of course, may release a person from custody even if no charging document has been filed. See N.D.C.C. § 29-06-25; Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 114, 95 S.Ct. 854, 43 L.Ed.2d 54 (1975).
[¶ 10] Given the plain language of the rule, we conclude N.D.R.Crim.P. 48(b) requires the court to have an information or complaint to dismiss, and only once an information or complaint is filed and the proceedings are initiated can the court dismiss the case if there has been an unnecessary delay in the filing of the information or complaint. Furthermore, the court can dismiss under N.D.R.Crim.P. 48(b) only "with caution and after a forewarning to prosecutors of the consequence of dismissal." Snellman, 1998 ND 200, ¶ 11, 586 N.W.2d 494. The court must give the parties notice of its intent to dismiss and an opportunity to respond. Id. at ¶ 12-14.
[¶ 11] In this case, the district court records for William's and Feme's cases include a sign-in sheet for each defendant from the initial appearance and the court's orders of dismissal; however, an indictment, information, or complaint was not filed for either Williams or Ferrie. Rule 48(b), N.D.R.Crim.P., does not apply because the court did not have an indictment, information, or complaint to dismiss. Furthermore, the district court did not notify the State of its intent to dismiss for failure to file an information. We conclude the district court abused its discretion in ordering the matters be dismissed under N.D.R.Crim.P. 48(b).
[¶ 12] Instead of dismissing the cases, the district court could have discharged each defendant's bond and released the defendants because there were not any charges pending. After charging documents are filed, the court could give the State notice that it may dismiss the cases with prejudice because there was an unnecessary delay in filing the informations or complaints. We recognize this places a burden on a defendant because the defen dant must show up at the initial appearance, may be released if an information or complaint has not been filed, and may be left not knowing what will happen or whether he will be arrested when the charging documents are filed.
[¶ 13] District courts have broad discretion in deciding when sanctions are appropriate and what sanctions are appropriate, and the court should consider alternative sanctions before dismissing a case. Snellman, 1998 ND 200, ¶ 9, 586 N.W.2d 494. Alternative sanctions may be appropriate in cases such as this. Although we conclude the district court erred in dismissing these cases under N.D.R.Crim.P. 48(b), if the State follows a consistent, ongoing pattern of not having the charging documents filed before the initial appearance, a different result may be appropriate in the future. See State v. Touche, 549 N.W.2d 193, 195 (N.D.1996); Madison v. North Dakota Dep't of Transp., 503 N.W.2d 243, 246-47 (N.D.1993) (a systemic disregard of the law, if it becomes commonplace, may warrant reversal if the conduct is potentially prejudicial to the accused).
Ill
[¶ 14] We conclude the district court abused its discretion in dismissing the cases against Ferrie and Williams under N.D.R.Crim.P. 48(b), and we vacate the court's orders.
[¶ 15] GERALD W. VANDE WALLE, C.J., and DALE V. SANDSTROM, J., concur.