Case Name: PEOPLE v. GAST (ON REMAND)
Court: Michigan Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1990-12-05
Citations: 186 Mich. App. 436
Docket Number: Docket No. 129648
Parties: PEOPLE v GAST (ON REMAND)
Judges: Before: Danhof, C.J., and Sullivan and McDonald, JJ.
Reporter: Michigan appeals reports; cases decided in the Michigan Court of Appeals.
Volume: 186
Pages: 436–444

Head Matter:
PEOPLE v GAST (ON REMAND)
Docket No. 129648.
Submitted June 7, 1990, at Lansing.
Decided December 5, 1990, at 9:01 a.m.
Leave to appeal sought.
Charles M. Gast was convicted .of second-degree criminal sexual conduct following a jury trial in the Oakland Circuit Court, Steven N. Andrews, J. The defendant appealed, claiming that the trial court erred in ruling that the testimony of two prosecution witnesses with regard to physical contact initiated by the defendant was admissible under MRE 404(b) as evidence of other similar acts. The Court of Appeals affirmed in an unpublished opinion per curiam decided January 22, 1988 (Docket No. 95879). The Supreme Court, in lieu of granting leave to appeal, remanded for reconsideration in light of People v Engleman, 434 Mich 204 (1990). 434 Mich 915 (1990).
On remand, the Court of Appeals held:
The defendant’s admission that he had hugged and touched the complainant and the prosecution witnesses put in issue the question of his intent, allowing admission of the witnesses’ testimony under MRE 404(b) as proof of that intent.
Affirmed.
McDonald, J., dissenting, stated that admission of testimony regarding other bad acts of the defendant was error because at the time the trial court made its ruling none of the exceptions offered by the prosecution with respect to admissibility under MRE 404(b) were material, i.e., in issue of the witnesses’ testimony. The ruling was made in response to the defendant’s pretrial motion in limine at which he sought to exclude the testimony, not during trial, and the prosecution introduced the testimony in its case in chief and not in rebuttal. The convictions should be reversed and separate trials conducted.
Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Gay Secor Hardy, Solicitor General, Richard Thompson, Prosecuting Attorney, Michael J. Modelski, Chief, Appellate Division, and Thomas S. Richards, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for the people.
Faintuck, Shwedel & Wolfram (by William G. Wolfram), for the defendant.

Opinion:
ON REMAND
Before: Danhof, C.J., and Sullivan and McDonald, JJ.
Danhof, C.J.
On January 22, 1988, we issued an unpublished opinion per curiam affirming defendant's jury convictions of three counts of second-degree criminal sexual conduct, MCL 750.520c(l) (a); MSA 28.788(3)(l)(a) (Docket No. 95879). We held that, since defendant had admitted hugging the complainant girls, but denied that he touched them for sexual purposes, he had put intent in issue and the trial court properly ruled that under MRE 404(b) the girls could testify in the separate trials. Judge McDonald dissented, believing that, since defendant simply denied altogether touching the girls in improper places, defendant had not put intent in issue. On May 30, 1990, our Supreme Court, in lieu of granting leave to appeal, remanded the matter to this Court for reconsideration in light of People v Engelman, 434 Mich 204; 453 NW2d 656 (1990), 434 Mich 915 (1990). We again affirm.
We find nothing in Engelman mandating a different result in our case. As we read the opinion, Engelman primarily concerned the second part of the test of People v Golochowicz, 413 Mich 298; 319 NW2d 518 (1982), for admissibility of other acts evidence under MRE 404(b); whereas our decision focused on the third part of the Golochowicz test. The Engelman Court said that the prosecution had failed to establish that one of the MRE 404(b) exceptions, or any other permissible inference, had been established. The Court expressly stated that, since it was deciding the case on the basis of the second part of the Golochowicz test, it did not need to extensively discuss the remaining parts of the test. Engelman, supra, p 224.
The instant case, on the other hand, revolved solely around the third part of the Golochowicz test, which requires that the issue or fact to be proved by the proffered evidence be material or "in issue," in that it was put in issue by the defense. The narrow dispute between our opinion and Judge McDonald's dissent concerned whether defendant's admission that he hugged and otherwise touched the girls put in issue the question of his intent. We decided that since defendant had not completely denied physical contact, but had claimed that his contact was innocent, this case was more akin to People v Vesnaugh, 128 Mich App 440; 340 NW2d 651 (1983), where the similar acts testimony was permitted, than it was to People v Major, 407 Mich 394; 285 NW2d 660 (1979), where the defendant had simply denied altogether any physical contact. We adhere to this viewpoint, and, as stated, we find nothing in Engelman which would affect our decision in this regard. Therefore, we once again affirm defendant's conviction.
Affirmed.
Sullivan, J., concurred.