Case Name: Michael B. ARKIN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Spencer BATCHELDER, Defendant-Appellant, and The County of Calaveras, Defendant
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 2007-02-20
Citations: 220 F. App'x 736
Docket Number: No. 05-15573
Parties: Michael B. ARKIN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Spencer BATCHELDER, Defendant-Appellant, and The County of Calaveras, Defendant.
Judges: Before: REINHARDT, RYMER, and SILVERMAN, Circuit Judges.
Reporter: West's Federal Appendix
Volume: 220
Pages: 736–737

Head Matter:
Michael B. ARKIN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Spencer BATCHELDER, Defendant-Appellant, and The County of Calaveras, Defendant.
No. 05-15573.
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
Argued and Submitted Feb. 14, 2007.
Filed Feb. 20, 2007.
Kenneth M. Foley, Esq., Law Offices of Kenneth M. Foley, San Andreas, CA, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
[Ret.] Michael G. Woods, Esq., McCormick Barstow Sheppard Wayte & Carruth, LLP, Fresno, CA, for Defendant-Appellant/Defendant.
Deborah A. Byron, Esq., McCormick Barstow Sheppard Wayte & Carruth, LLP, Fresno, CA, for Defendant.
Before: REINHARDT, RYMER, and SILVERMAN, Circuit Judges.

Opinion:
MEMORANDUM
Although the question is a close one, we conclude that Michael Arkin's decision to represent County employees who complained of sexual harassment and a hostile workplace environment, and his expression of support for the employees in the form of his February 12 letter, fell within the First Amendment's ambit. See Alpha Energy Savers, Inc. v. Hansen, 381 F.3d 917, 923-24 (9th Cir.2004), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 975, 125 S.Ct. 1838, 161 L.Ed.2d 725 (2005). We also conclude that, on the unique facts of this case, the adverse employment actions that Spencer Batchelder took against Arkin in reaction to Arkin's First Amendment activity were not justified by "legitimate administrative interests" sufficient to outweigh Arkin's interests. See id. at 923; Fabiano v. Hopkins, 352 F.3d 447, 455-57 (1st Cir.2003); see also Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 388 n. 13, 107 S.Ct. 2891, 97 L.Ed.2d 315 (1987) ("[A] purely private statement on a matter of public concern will rarely, if ever, justify discharge of a public employee."). We therefore conclude that Arkin's First Amendment rights were violated.
We nevertheless reverse the district court because Batchelder is entitled to qualified immunity. Even if Batchelder's conclusion that Arkin's position created a conflict of interest sufficient to justify termination was mistaken, the mistake was a reasonable one. See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 205, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001); Fabiano, 352 F.3d at 458. Similarly, even if Batchelder erred in concluding that the superior court's ruling was erroneous and not binding on him, this error too was reasonable.
REVERSED.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.