Case Name: TRI-CITY USED CARS, INC., Appellant, v. Robert L. GRIM, Jr. d/b/a Bob Grim Insurance Agency, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1990-09-13
Citations: 566 So. 2d 922
Docket Number: No. 89-2308
Parties: TRI-CITY USED CARS, INC., Appellant, v. Robert L. GRIM, Jr. d/b/a Bob Grim Insurance Agency, Appellee.
Judges: ALLEN, J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 566
Pages: 922–923

Head Matter:
TRI-CITY USED CARS, INC., Appellant, v. Robert L. GRIM, Jr. d/b/a Bob Grim Insurance Agency, Appellee.
No. 89-2308.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
Sept. 13, 1990.
William H. Hughes, III of Fuller, Johnson & Farrell, P.A., Tallahassee, for appellant.
Gordon D. Cherr of Karl, McConnaugh-hay, Roland & Maida, P.A., Tallahassee, for appellee.

Opinion:
SMITH, Judge.
In this appeal of a summary judgment, appellant, the plaintiff below, contends genuine factual issues remain. We reverse.
Appellant, Tri-City, is a used car business operating in Quincy, Florida. According to the complaint, an agent of the appellant had requested insurance coverage for "theft," among other things. After a policy had been purchased, an automobile was, according to the complaint, "stolen" from appellant's premises. Appellant made a demand for the loss, but the insurance company denied coverage. Appellant subsequently filed suit charging appellee was negligent in failing to obtain coverage for the type of happenstance which resulted in the loss of the automobile.
It is not clear from the complaint, nor subsequent pleadings, how the car was taken from the appellant. Nevertheless, it is alleged in the complaint, as originally filed and as amended, that the appellee had "specifically assured" appellant that it was purchasing coverage for "potential thefts" and that exclusion of appellant's claim for the loss of the car was "directly contrary to the assurances given to [appellant] by [ap-pellee]."
The basis of appellant's motion for summary judgment was that appellant got what he bargained for because the policy provided to appellant did cover loss as a result of "theft." The policy, however, specifically excludes losses as a result of someone causing the insured to voluntarily part with an auto "by trick or scheme or under false pretenses." Under appellee's view, although the meaning of theft under the policy does not include loss by trick, scheme or false pretenses, appellant nevertheless received coverage for "theft." It was because the policy specifically states losses due to "theft" are covered that the trial court granted summary judgment.
However, if appellant did indeed, as somewhat inartfully alleged, request coverage for the kind of occurrence which resulted in the loss of the car, then appellee would not be entitled to a summary judgment on the record as thus far developed. When a defendant moves for summary judgment, the allegations made in the complaint must be accepted as true, unless affirmatively disproved. Connell v. Sledge, 306 So.2d 194 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975). Moreover, summary judgment is appropriate only when there is no genuine issue of fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Zygmont v. Smith, 548 So.2d 902 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989). Because appellee failed to affirmatively disprove the allegation reasonably made apparent from the language of the complaint that the provision of coverage which excluded the claim was directly contrary to the assurances given by him, the appellee was not entitled to summary judgment.
Accordingly, the summary judgment is reversed and the cause is remanded for further proceedings.
ALLEN, J., concurs.
NIMMONS, J., dissents with written opinion.