Case Name: State of Nebraska, appellee, v. Robert E. Williams, appellant
Court: Nebraska Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Nebraska
Decision Date: 1984-11-09
Citations: 218 Neb. 618
Docket Number: No. 83-537
Parties: State of Nebraska, appellee, v. Robert E. Williams, appellant.
Judges: Krivosha, C.J., Boslaugh, White, Caporale, Shanahan, and Grant, JJ.
Reporter: Nebraska Reports
Volume: 218
Pages: 618–625

Head Matter:
State of Nebraska, appellee, v. Robert E. Williams, appellant.
358 N.W.2d 195
Filed November 9, 1984.
No. 83-537.
Patrick W. Healey and Douglas L. Kluender, for appellant.
Paul L. Douglas, Attorney General, and J. Kirk Brown, for appellee.
Krivosha, C.J., Boslaugh, White, Caporale, Shanahan, and Grant, JJ.

Opinion:
Shanahan, J.
Robert E. Williams appeals the order of the district court for Lancaster County, Nebraska, denying relief under the Post Conviction Act, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-3001 et seq. (Reissue 1979). This is Williams' second motion for post conviction relief. A jury found Williams guilty of the first degree murders of Catherine M. Brooks and Patricia A. McGarry, and one count of first degree sexual assault. Williams was sentenced to death for each of the murders and to an indeterminate sentence for the sexual assault. See State v. Williams, 205 Neb. 56, 287 N.W.2d 18 (1979). For the jury trial and direct appeal, as well as when Williams' first motion for post conviction relief was filed, the Lancaster County public defender's office represented Williams. After the hearing on Williams' first motion, present counsel was appointed. See State v. Williams, 217 Neb. 539, 352 N.W.2d 538 (1984).
In the second motion for post conviction relief, Williams alleges a violation of his sixth amendment right guaranteed under the U.S. Constitution, namely, a denial of effective assistance of counsel. Williams contends such constitutional question could not have been raised in his first post conviction proceedings because he was still being represented by the public defender's office, the very attorneys whose assistance Williams now assails.
As alleged in the second motion for post conviction relief, the ineffective assistance of Williams' counsel falls into two categories. First, Williams asserts that his counsel did not adequately investigate, prepare, and perform regarding the jury trial. Second, Williams claims that a conflict of interest in the public defender's office denied effective assistance of counsel. Williams' motion contains the following:
Defendant was further denied effective assistance of counsel, in violation of the Sixth Amendment to the Constution [sic] of the United States, as a result of his trial attorneys having a conflict of interest at the time they represented defendant herein, which conflict was as follows:
(a) Defendant, prior to his arrest in the above matter, was the Respondent in a divorce action in the District Court of Lancaster County, Nebraska, in which Merrilee Williams was the Petitioner;
(b) That Merrilee Williams was represented in said divorce action by one Paul Conley, who was at that time also a member of the same office as defendant's trial counsel, that office being the Lancaster County Public Defender's Office;
(c) That defendant, approximately two days before the crimes alleged herein, telephoned Mr. Conley, and inquired regarding the status of the divorce proceeding, at which time defendant was informed that the divorce proceeding was completed, and defendant was divorced;
(d) That defendant was thereafter arrested for abducting Merrilee Williams, and after posting bond, became a suspect in the killings of Patricia McGarry and Catherine Brooks which occurred two days later;
(e) That defendant's trial attorneys discovered that Merrilee Williams was a critical witness for the defense in their presentation of an insanity defense for defendant, due to her knowledge of defendant's mental state at the time of the crimes alleged;
(f) Notwithstanding the fact that trial counsel was aware that Merrilee Williams' attorney was a member of the same office as defendant's attorneys, they undertook representation of defendant with the knowledge that their interests in locating and procuring the testimony of Merrilee Williams was [sic] in conflict with those of Ms. Williams, who left the State of Nebraska during the pendency of defendant's case herein;
(g) That as a result of the above-stated conflict of interest, defendant was unable to present evidence at trial which was critical to his defense;
(h) That defendant expressed concern to his trial counsel regarding this conflict of interest, but trial counsel obtained no waiver of said conflict from defendant, nor did they alert the trial court to this problem.
After examining the records and files, the trial court, without an evidentiary hearing, denied Williams' second motion. Williams contends he is entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his motion for post conviction relief.
In a proceeding under the Post Conviction Act the applicant is required to allege facts which, if proved, constitute a violation or infringement of constitutional rights and the pleading of mere conclusions of fact or of law are [sic] not sufficient to require the court to grant an evidentiary hearing.
State v. Turner, 194 Neb. 252, 257, 231 N.W.2d 345, 349 (1975). See, also, State v. Robinson, 215 Neb. 449, 339 N.W.2d 76 (1983).
We have consistently stated that "[a] court may properly deny an evidentiary hearing upon a motion to vacate a conviction filed under § 29-3001 upon a determination after an examination of the files and records of the case that the petitioner is entitled to no relief." State v. Meredith, 212 Neb. 109, 109-10, 321 N.W.2d 456, 457 (1982). See, also, State v. Miles, 202 Neb. 126, 274 N.W.2d 153 (1979); State v. Fincher, 189 Neb. 746, 204 N.W.2d 927 (1973).
Once a motion for post conviction relief has been judicially determined, any subsequent motion for such relief from the same conviction and sentence may be dismissed unless the motion affirmatively shows on its face that the basis relied upon for relief was not available at the time of the filing of the prior motion. [Citations omitted.]
State v. Ohler, 215 Neb. 401, 405, 338 N.W.2d 776, 778-79 (1983).
Concerning Williams' first motion for post conviction relief, we specifically held:
Regarding Williams' general contention that all counsel have been ineffective, we recognize that the test of effective assistance of counsel requires that a defendant's attorney perform at least as well as a lawyer with ordinary training and skill in the criminal law in his area and that counsel conscientiously protect the interests of his client. [Citation omitted.] Based on the record before us, we are satisfied that Williams had effective assistance of counsel in every proceeding against or involving him.
State v. Williams, 217 Neb. 539, 550, 352 N.W.2d 538, 544 (1984). Clearly, in disposing of Williams' first motion we have already dealt with the contention that counsel did not adequately prepare, investigate, and perform during Williams' jury trial. Denial of an evidentiary hearing on Williams' claim that his counsel did not properly prepare for or conduct the jury trial does not constitute error under the circumstances.
The gist of the remainder of Williams' motion is that his defense of insanity was undermined as the result of a conflict of interest — his counsel's apparently preferential protection of Merrilee Williams by nondisclosure of her whereabouts, to the prejudice of Williams' defense against the criminal charges.
A conflict of interest places a defense attorney in a situation inherently conducive to divided loyalties. . . . The phrase "conflict of interest" denotes a situation in which regard for one duty tends to lead to disregard of another... where a lawyer's representation of one client is rendered less effective by reason of his representation of another client.
State v. Turner, ante p. 125, 131, 354 N.W.2d 617, 621-22 (1984).
During the jury trial, two psychiatrists testified on behalf of Williams. In our opinion rendered in Williams' direct appeal, State v. Williams, 205 Neb. 56, 63, 287 N.W.2d 18, 23 (1979), we referred to the expert testimony of the psychiatrists:
Two psychiatrists for the defense testified that at the time of the crimes the defendant suffered from a paranoid state beyond that of a personality disorder. One testified that the defendant's perception of reality and his judgment were seriously impaired, but the doctor could not say the defendant did not know that what he was doing was wrong. The other doctor testified that the defendant's thinking process was distorted and that he would know his actions were wrong only if he took time to think.
As an inference in the second motion, Merrilee, although not an expert, could have testified that Williams was insane when the crimes charged were committed. See State v. Myers, 205 Neb. 867, 869, 290 N.W.2d 660, 661 (1980) ("a nonexpert with an intimate personal acquaintance may be allowed to testify as to the sanity or insanity of a defendant"). Merrilee's missing testimony is characterized as "critical" to Williams' defense of insanity, that is, the turning point in psychiatric opinions about Williams' inability to distinguish between right and wrong. Consequently, according to Williams' allegations, Merrilee's testimony about insanity would have provided a basis for psychiatric opinions more consistent with Williams' defense of insanity rather than the inconclusive opinions actually expressed by the psychiatrists testifying at trial.
As a result of Williams' second motion, there are several questions raised regarding a possible conflict of interest on the part of defense counsel. Therefore, there should have been an evidentiary hearing as an opportunity for Williams to establish his allegation that a conflict of interest denied effective assistance of counsel. See'§§ 29-3001 et seq. Refusal to grant an evidentiary hearing on the question of whether there was a conflict of interest regarding Williams' counsel was prejudicial error by the district court and requires reversal of the lower court's judgment.
Affirmed in part, and in part reversed and REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS.
Hastings, J., not participating.