Case Name: Robert Lee STEVENSON v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee
Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1995-03-08
Citations: 895 S.W.2d 694
Docket Number: No. 017-94
Parties: Robert Lee STEVENSON v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.
Judges: WHITE, J., dissents.
Reporter: South Western Reporter Second Series
Volume: 895
Pages: 694–700

Head Matter:
Robert Lee STEVENSON v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.
No. 017-94.
Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, En Banc.
March 8, 1995.
John H. Hagler (on appeal only), Dallas, for appellant.
John Vance, Dist. Atty. & Lori L. Ordiway, Colleen Sullivan & Charlie Allan, Asst. Dist. Attys., Dallas, Robert Huttash, State’s Atty., Austin, for State.

Opinion:
OPINION ON APPELLANT'S PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW
MEYERS, Judge.
A jury convicted Appellant of driving while intoxicated. The court assessed punishment at confinement for sixty days, probated for two years, and the court imposed a $250 fine. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Stevenson v. State, No. 05-92-1059-CR, 1993 WL 407284 (Tex.App.—Dallas, delivered October 14, 1993). We granted Appellant's petition for discretionary review to determine whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding the intoxilyzer test results were admissible under Article 6701Z-5, § 3, V.A.C.S., without regard to whether the test results were hearsay.
Officer Champon was a technical supervisor whose duties included maintaining and calibrating the intoxilyzers, preparing the solutions used in the intoxilyzers, providing expert testimony, and serving as a custodian of the reports generated by the intoxilyzers. Champon testified that police officer Drake was certified by the Texas Department of Public Safety to administer intoxilyzer tests and that the intoxilyzer used to test Appel lant was certified, maintenance checks were performed on the intoxilyzer several weeks before and several days after Appellant's breath test, and the intoxilyzer required no maintenance on either occasion. Champon testified that the intoxilyzer was operating properly when Appellant was tested and that police officer Drake administered the intoxi-lyzer tests on Appellant. Drake did not testify. The trial court overruled Appellant's hearsay objection to Appellant's intoxilyzer test record, State's exhibit number three, that was printed out by the intoxilyzer. The court observed that it was a business record. Champon testified from State's exhibit number three that Appellant's intoxilyzer tests showed he had alcohol concentrations of 0.134 and 0.123 grams of alcohol per 210 liters of breath.
On appeal Appellant contended the test results were hearsay, not subject to the business records exception of Tex.R.Crim.Evid. 803(6), relying on Cole v. State, 839 S.W.2d 798 (Tex.Cr.App.1990). The Court of Appeals did not reach Appellant's argument under Cole and Rule 803(6) because the court held the record of the test results was admissible under Article 6701Z-5, § 3, V.A.C.S. The Court of Appeals held that the Texas Legislature enacted Art. 6701Í-5, § 3, as a specific statute governing the admissibility of intoxilyzer test results. According to the Court of Appeals, Art. 6701Z-5, § 3, sets out the necessary predicate for admission of in-toxilyzer results, citing Gifford v. State, 793 S.W.2d 48, 49 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1990), pet. dism'd as improvidently granted, 810 S.W.2d 225 (Tex.Cr.App.1991). The court observed that for intoxilyzer results to be admissible under the statute, the State must show: (1) the machine functioned properly on the day of the test as evidenced by the running of a reference sample through the machine; (2) the existence of periodic supervision over the machine and operation by one who understands the scientific theory of the machine; and (3) proof of the results of the test by a witness or witnesses qualified to translate and interpret the results so as to eliminate hearsay. As support for this three-part test the court relied on Harrell v. State, 725 S.W.2d 208, 209-10 (Tex.Cr.App.1986), and May v. State, 784 S.W.2d 494, 498 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1990, pet. refd). The court then reviewed the evidence at trial and determined the State laid a sufficient predicate for the admission of Appellant's intoxilyzer test printout under the statute.
Appellant argues that Art. 6701Z-5, § 3, simply provides that intoxilyzer results are admissible if the proper predicate is laid and that the statute does not dispense with the rules of evidence. Appellant contends the statute does not provide for the admission of hearsay testimony to prove the test results, citing May. Appellant asserts the record of the test results constituted hearsay under Rule 802 and was not admissible as a business record under Cole. Appellant also maintains under the third prong of the Harrell test that proof of the test results cannot be established by hearsay. Appellant claims that because the officer who administered the intoxilyzer test did not testify, the only evidence of the test results was the test record, which was hearsay. Appellant concludes that Art. 6701Z-5, § 3, did not dispense with the hearsay rule.
The State agrees with the Court of Appeals' holding and refers to another court's holding, that the statute provides for the admissibility of intoxilyzer results, in Shannon v. State, 800 S.W.2d 896, 901 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 1990, pet. ref'd). The State points out that in Harrell this Court noted that the supervisor of the intoxilyzer who had not administered the intoxilyzer test was a proper person to satisfy the last two prongs of the test for admission under Art. 6701Z-5, § 3. Harrell, 725 S.W.2d at 210. The State urges that Rule 803(6) should not override the clear and unambiguous legislative provision of Art. 670R-5, § 3.
We agree with Appellant that Art. 6701Z-5, § 3, does not provide for blanket admissibility of evidence of breath test results in eases of driving while intoxicated regardless of the form in which the evidence is presented. Cf. Allridge v. State, 762 S.W.2d 146, 153-54 (Tex.Crim.App.1988) (holding in capital murder prosecution that Tex. Penal Code § 19.06, which calls for admission of testimony of "relevant facts and circumstances surrounding the killing and previous relationship existing between the accused and deceased ." did not extend the rules of evidence to admit otherwise inadmissible hearsay); accord Love v. State, 581 S.W.2d 679 (Tex.Crim.App.1979). The statute recognizes the scientific reliability of breath tests when performed in accordance with section 3(b), (c). Cf. Slagle v. State, 570 S.W.2d 916, 920-21 (Tex.Cr.App. [Panel Op.] 1978) (Because Art. 670H-5, § 3, provides for the admissibility of breath test results, the State does not need to establish as part of its predicate that the breath test examination is a scientifically reliable test before the results are introduced as long as the predicate provided for in Art. 6701Z-5 is satisfied).
The State argues that Harrell authorizes an intoxilyzer supervisor who did not administer the intoxilyzer test to testify about the last two prongs of the predicate discussed in Harrell, but this does not resolve the issue of whether Art. 6701Z-5, § 3, dispensed with the hearsay rule. In Harrell this Court recited the predicate for admissibility of a breath test, including "proof of the result of the test by a witness or witnesses qualified to translate and interpret such result so as to eliminate hearsay." Harrell, 725 S.W.2d at 209. This predicate requirement originated in Hill, wherein this Court required "[p]roof by a witness who was qualified to calculate and translate the reading of the machine into the percentage of alcohol in the blood; that is, one who could eliminate the hearsay evidence mentioned earlier." Hill, Tex.Crim. 313, 256 S.W.2d at 96. The hearsay evidence previously mentioned in Hill concerned a chart used by the operator of the breath testing machine to translate the number generated by the machine into a percentage of alcohol in the blood. The operator did not understand the formula which was to be used in making the calculation, and he relied on a chart which came with the machine. This Court found that the chart was hearsay. From Hill through Harrell this Court has recognized that the rule against hearsay could render breath test evidence inadmissible.
Because Art. 6701Z-5, § 3, codified existing case law, and this Court has consistently recognized that the rule against hearsay could render breath test evidence inadmissible, the statute does not abrogate the hearsay rale. The Court of Appeals must determine whether the complained of evidence was objectionable as hearsay. The Court of Appeals' judgment is vacated, and this case is remanded to that court for further consideration consistent with this opinion.
WHITE, J., dissents.
. Appellant actually cites Rule 803(8) as being the business records exception to the hearsay rule, as does the State and the court of appeals below. A quick reading of the rules of evidence make it clear that 803(6) is the business records exception, not 803(8). Rather Rule 803(8) is the "public records exception." However, in their analysis it is clear that the parties refer to the business records exception, and merely misnum-ber the rule. For clarity we therefore cite to 803(6) when discussing the business records exception, regardless of how the parties referred to it in their briefs.
. Article 6701Z-5, § 3, prior to its amendment effective September 1, 1994, provided in pertinent part:
(a)Upon the trial of any criminal action or proceeding arising out of an offense under Subdivision (2), Subsection (a), Section 19.05, Penal Code, or an offense under Article 67011-1, Revised Statutes, evidence of the alcohol concentration or presence of a controlled substance or drug as shown by analysis of a specimen of the person's blood, breath, urine, or any other bodily substances taken at the request or order of a peace officer, shall be admissible.
(b) Analysis of a specimen of the person's breath, to be considered valid under the provisions of this section, must be performed according to rules of the Texas Department of Public Safety and by an individual possessing a valid certificate issued by the Texas Department of Public Safety for this purpose. The Texas Department of Public Safety is authorized to establish rules approving satisfactory techniques or methods, to ascertain the qualifications and competence of individuals to conduct such analysis, and to issue certificates certifying such fact. These certificates shall be subject to termination or revocation, for cause, at the discretion of the Texas Department of Public Safety.
(c) . Breath specimens taken at the request or order of a peace officer must be taken and analysis made under such conditions as may be prescribed by the Texas Department of Public Safety, and by such persons as the Texas Department of Public Safety has certified to be qualified.
. For example, this Court has observed:
It should be noted that the statute [Art. 6701Z — 5] actually did no more than codify existing case law that had developed on the issue of the admissibility of breathalyzer evidence. See 7 Houston L.R. 508 (1970). The use of breath testing evidence to prove intoxication was first approved by this Court in the case of McKay v. State, 155 Tex.Cr.R. 416, 235 S.W.2d 173 (1950) and it continues to be admissible evidence provided the proper predicate is shown. See also Hill v. State, 158 Tex.Cr.R. 313, 256 S.W.2d 93 (1953).
Langford v. State, 532 S.W.2d 91, 95 (Tex.Cr.App.1976).