Case Name: STEAM BOAT SEA BIRD vs. FRANCIS BEEHLER
Court: Supreme Court of Missouri
Jurisdiction: Missouri
Decision Date: 1849-10
Citations: 12 Mo. 569
Docket Number: 
Parties: STEAM BOAT SEA BIRD vs. FRANCIS BEEHLER.
Judges: 
Reporter: Missouri Reports
Volume: 12
Pages: 569–572

Head Matter:
STEAM BOAT SEA BIRD vs. FRANCIS BEEHLER.
plaintiff acquired a lien against the steam boat “Sea Bird,’5 under the statute of this State, for stores and supplies furnished her. After plaintiff’s lien accrued, suit was instituted against the owners in the. State of Louisiana. The boat attached and sold to satisfy the judgment.
Held: That this sale of the boat did not divest plaintiff’s lien.
ERROR TO ST. LOUIS CIRCUIT COURT.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
The defendant in error brought his action under the statute.to recover. $401 90, alleged to be due him on account of stores and supplies furnished the boat. The defendant pleaded, first the general issue, and second, a special plea setting forth, in substance, that after the plaintiff’s lien accrued, and before institution of this suit, the said boat had been seized by virtue of process of the commercial court of New Orleans, at which port the boat then was, and was subsequently sold at New Orleans, by the sheriff, under an order of said court, in conformity to the laws of Louisiana, to Rogers & Brothers, and at the date of said sale, the said Beehler had no lien upon said boat which was valid, or could bo enforced in Louisiana under the laws of that State, and that according to the laws of that State. The title acquired by Rogers & Brothers was a good and valid title as against the plaintiff’s lien. This plea was demurred to, and the demurrer sustained.
The plaintiff below obtained judgment: the defendant moved a new trial, which was refused and exceptions taken, and the case brought to this court by writ of error.
Crockett- & Whittlesey, for plaintiff in error..
In this case the main point presented is the effect of a judicial sale of, a steamboat in another state by virtue of its laws, upon the title of the owners and the liens,of creditors. The plaintiff in error contends, that if the facts stated in the special plea are true, that the judicial sale divests all previous liens, and passes a good and valid title to the purchaser under the judgment, execution and sale. Judgments upon attachments are to be likened to prpceedings in rem. and in admiralty. The court have so decided in the case of steamboat Rariton vs. Smith, 10 Mo. R. 527, in which the court say that “it feels itself called upon to look for a guide to that system from which the idea of proceeding in rem. had its origin, as we must suppose the general assembly, in borrowing a remedy from the maralime law, would expect the courts to look to that law for principles of decisions in cases not provided for by the statute.” They farther say, “If a judicial sale was oi'dered and made, the purchaser, under such sale, took the vessel freed, from all liens. In the case of Dobyns vs. sheriff of St. Louis, 5 Mo. R. 256 ; steam boat Geni. Brady vs. Bulslgy, 6 Mo. 558. The court decided that the lien of an attaching creditor, levied in virtue of an attachment against the owners of a boat,..took precedence of the liens upon the boat itself, upon which the boat was subsequently seized. This is in accordance with the well k;nown principle, qui prior est.in tempore petior est injure. In case of Finney et al,.vs. st. bt. Fayette, lO.Mo. R. 612, the court re-aflirm the doctrine established in the case of st, bt. Rariton vs. Smith, and decided that a judicial sale will divest the liens in whatever jurisdiction it may be decreed. The consequences of the opposite principle would be outrageous, a purchase at a judicial sale could never know when he bought a-good title and the purchase at such a sale would be nothing but gambling upon the charces o£ liens and suits in other States. The judgment of a court of admiralty jurisdiction is fina* every where, where it had jurisdictionjof the subject and is binding upon all parties—Hughes vs, Cornelius 8 Shower Rep. 232, 2 Smiths S cases 424 ; Gelston V3, Haigt 3 Wheat R. 246 ; Geyer vs. Aguilar 7 T. R. 681 ; Beering vs. Royall Ex. Ins. Co. 5 East R. 99 ; Oady vs. Bevi|, 2 East R. 472 Rose vs. Himely 4 Cranch 269, 270.
2. If the judicial sale under the laws of Louisiana passed a title voted there and paramount to the plaintiff’s lien, then the same effect must under the law, be given to it in all the other States, and the title of the Rogers will be valid every where and defeats all previous liens— see cases and authorities quoted above.
3. The plaintiff’s lien as alleged in the plea, was not valid and could not have been enforced in Louisiana. If as the boat being within her jurisdiction, was liable to the process of her courts and was liable to be dealt with according to her laws; and. having been sold under the process of her courts, the title thus acquired, hy the purchaser, is,better than the plaintiff’s lieu ; and public policy requires that such sales should be protected. A judgment in rem is conclusive against all the world, 2 Smiths L. C, 439 ; Geyer vs. Aguilar 7. T. R. 696;, Scott vs. Sherman 2.BI. R. 977 and cases cited above. Mills vs. Dryer 7,.Qrgnch 481., 487,
Goode & Clover for defendent in error.
1. The demand of the plaintiff by the express law of this State, wa^a- lien on the boat,
2. The claim under which the boat was sold in the State of Louisiana, was a mere general demand against the owners of the boat there and had by the laws of that State no priority, over other claims, was no particular lien upon the boat which was to be enforced by proceedings in rem. Though this court has decided in the case of Pinney, Lee & Co, vs. Steamboat, Eaye'tte 10 Rep. 613, that a judiciaLsale in another State founded on a claim which by the laws of that other State is named as a specific lien, will divest a lien given by the laws ofr our Stale, yet the case at bar is materially ana importantly different in the fact that the judgment was rendered.not against the boa.t but against the owners thereof and was not founded on a claim which was a lien on the boat. It is evident from the reported decisions, that were this, case pending in the State of Louisiana and the boat had been sold under similar proceedings in the State of Missouri, that the courts of that State would give effect to the plaintiff’s. claim here, upon whatground then can the courts of our own State refuse to give its,aid and assistance to its own citizens? Ohio Ins. C. vs. Edmonson, Louisiana Rep.

Opinion:
Judge Napton
delivered the opinion of the court.
To this action instituted under the provisions of our act concerning boats and vessels, the defendant pleaded, that subsequently to the lien of the plaintiff a suit was instituted by attachment in Louisiana against the owners, anda judgment obtained against the owners "with privilege on the property attached" that the boat was sold'under.the proceeding and Rogers & Co. became the purchasers.
The only question is, whether this judicial rule in Louisiana divested the plaintiff's lien. The opinion of this court in the twq cases of steamboat Raritan vs. Smith and Finney, Lee & Co. vs. S. B. Fayette, was based upon principles of public policy and supported by legal analogies. In the latter ease, the sale was made in Illinois under a law somewhat similar to our statute.
It is evident that the judicial rules in maritime proceedings, áre essentially different in their results from an ordinary sale under a'n execution upon a judgment at law. The maritime proceedings alluded to, were strictly in rem, and a sale of the vessel was made for the benefit of all whom it concerned. This is the case under our statute as it now stands. There are obvious reasons which require such sales should convey a clear title, freed from all prior incumbrances, and which have no 'applicability to sales under executions at law, whether the proceedings 'upon which the judgment founded be in rem or in personam or both in <rem and personam.
That a judicial sale of a boat or vessel, under our law as it how stands, or under the law of a sister state of a similar character, would convey a title clear of all prior liens, there can be no question; but if we carry the principle further, and hold that a sale in Louisiana.in an ordinary suit by attachment, under laws which make no provision for the application of the proceeds of such sale to the payment of any debt other than one upon which the suit was founded, and in the enforcement of Which the rule was made, we destroy the rights of our citizens who are creditors, without securing any benefit to the purchaser in Louisiana, further than an exemption from such claims as may exist in Missouri. There can be no doubt that in Louisiana such a judicial rule as is setup in the defendant's special plea, would n-ot divest liens acquired in that State, nor would it divest liens acquired in Kentucky or Ohio. The purchaser would be secure so far as Missouri creditors are concerned, but no further. Oúr citizens would be the only sufferers, and the purchaser would gain nothing except to the extent of the liens acquired here. The principles of international copiety do not inculcate such a sacrifice.
The doctrines of the maritime law in relation to judicial sales of libelled vessels, are an exception to general principles. The exception is founded not only on principles of public policy, but is entirely consistent with the most rigid justice. Such sales are not made for the benefit of any particular creditor, but for the benefit of all persons interested. Provision is made for the distribution of the proceeds, pro rata, among all who will come forward and establish their claims within a specified time. The proceeding is entirely in rem, and all the world are bound by it. But what analogy is there between such a sale as this and an ordinary sale under an ordinary execution. Such executions are solely for the benefit of the party plaintiff, and can only operate upon the title of the party defendant. A sale under these, merely conveys the title of the defendant in the execution.
The liens of strangers are not divested. If it were so, their rights must be divested by a proceeding to which they are not parties, of which they have no notice, and in the benefits of which they could not partid-1 pate if they did have notice.
We do not understand, therefore, that the prior decisions of this court are designed to embrace all judicial sales, but only such as are made here or elsewhere under proceedings analagous to those of courts of admiralty, in which any number of claimants may Unite in libelling a vessel, and in the benefits of which, not only these claimants and all others who choose may participate.
Judgment affirmed.