Case Name: Crispin MORA, Petitioner, v. Jefferson B. SESSIONS III, Attorney General, Respondent
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 2018-01-19
Citations: 709 F. App'x 477
Docket Number: No. 16-70722
Parties: Crispin MORA, Petitioner, v. Jefferson B. SESSIONS III, Attorney General, Respondent.
Judges: Before: REINHARDT, TROTT, and. HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.
Reporter: West's Federal Appendix
Volume: 709
Pages: 477–478

Head Matter:
Crispin MORA, Petitioner, v. Jefferson B. SESSIONS III, Attorney General, Respondent.
No. 16-70722
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
Submitted January 16, 2018
Filed January 19, 2018
Gary Finn, Law Offices of Gary Finn, Indio, OA, for Petitioner.
Russell John Verby, Trial Attorney, DOJ — U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Division/Office of Immigration Litigation, Washington, DC, Chief Counsel ICE, Office of the Chief Counsel, Department of Homeland Security, San Francisco, CA, for Respondent
Before: REINHARDT, TROTT, and. HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2),

Opinion:
MEMORANDUM
Crispin Mora, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals' ("BIA") order denying his motion to reopen proceedings. Our jurisdiction is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We deny in part and dismiss in part the petition for review.
The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Mora's motion to reopen as untimely, where he filed the motion more than a year after the final order of removal, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and failed to establish that equitable tolling of the filing deadline was warranted, due to a lack of continuance or alleged notary fraud, see Avagyan v. Holder, 646 F.3d 672, 677 (9th Cir. 2011) (The court recognizes equitable tolling "during periods when a petitioner is prevented from filing because of a deception, fraud, or error, as long as the petitioner acts with due diligence in discovering the deception, fraud or error.").
Contrary to Mora's contention, the BIA did not base its sua sponte determination on the untimeliness of the motion, and we otherwise lack jurisdiction to review the BIA's discretionary denial of sua sponte reopening. See Bonilla v. Lynch, 840 F.3d 575, 588 (9th Cir. 2016); Mejia-Hernandez v. Holder, 633 F.3d 818, 823-24 (9th Cir. 2011).
Because these determinations are dis-positive, we do not reach Mora's remaining contentions.
PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED in part; DISMISSED in part.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.