Case Name: Clarence MOORE and Savannah Moore, Appellants, v. Mary Jean SMITH-SNAGG and Paul Snagg, et al., Appellees
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 2001-06-18
Citations: 793 So. 2d 1000
Docket Number: No. 5D01-334
Parties: Clarence MOORE and Savannah Moore, Appellants, v. Mary Jean SMITH-SNAGG and Paul Snagg, et al., Appellees.
Judges: COBB and HARRIS, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 793
Pages: 1000–1003

Head Matter:
Clarence MOORE and Savannah Moore, Appellants, v. Mary Jean SMITH-SNAGG and Paul Snagg, et al., Appellees.
No. 5D01-334.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
June 18, 2001.
Opinion on Denial of Rehearing Aug. 24, 2001.
Ronald R. Howell, Longwood, for Appellants.
Martin S. Awerbach and Michael A. Cohn, of Awerbach, Murphy & Cohn, P.A., Clearwater, for Appellee, Universal City Development Partners.
Dana P. Hoffman of Griffin, Linder, Carter & Hoffman, P.A., Orlando, for Ap-pellees, Mary Jean Smith-Snagg, Paul Snagg and Clarence Milton.

Opinion:
PER CURIAM.
This appeal challenges the trial court's denial of a post-judgment motion filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.540, said motion seeking relief on the basis of newly-discovered evidence. In the original action the plaintiffs, Clarence and Savannah Moore, sought to set aside a 1987 warranty deed which purported to transfer a remainder interest in their property to her granddaughter, Mary Jean Smith-Snagg. The Moores asserted, inter alia, that the deed was a forgery. Ultimately, the trial judge entered summary judgment in 1999 against the Moores on all counts, including that based upon forgery, and referred (erroneously) to a four-year statute of limitations. Of course, there is no statute of limitations in respect to the challenge of a forged deed, which is void ab initio. See Holland v. Hattaway, 438 So.2d 456 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983). Only the 30 year curative period prescribed by the Marketable Record Title Act has any application to a forged deed as opposed to one procured by fraud. As recently stated by Judge Warner in her opinion in Zurstrassen v. Stonier, 786 So.2d 65 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001):
We think Klaus is correct in his assertion that the forged deed is void and thus creates no legal title nor affords protection to those claiming under it. See McCoy v. Love, 382 So.2d 647, 648 (Fla.1979); Lloyd v. Chicago Title Ins. Co., 576 So.2d 310, 311 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990). See also Jamnadas v. Singh, 731 So.2d 69, 70 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999)(forged mortgage is void and a legal nullity); Southeast Bank, N.A. v. Sapp, 554 So.2d 1193, 1195 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989)(same). In Wright v. Blocker, 144 Fla. 428, 198 So. 88 (1940), relied on in McCoy, the court said of the effect of such deeds, " '[a] forged deed, in the sense defined above, is absolutely void and wholly ineffectual to pass title, even to a subsequent innocent purchaser from the grantee under such forged deed.' " Id. at 91 (quoting 16 Am Jur. 451-2).
This court summarily affirmed the 1999 summary judgment without opinion. See Moore v. Smith-Snagg, 761 So.2d 1128 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000)(Table). We can only assume that affirmance was based on an absence of supporting evidence to establish forgery since 30 years had not elapsed from the ostensible execution and recordation of the deed. That being the case, the newly discovered evidence purporting to show other forgeries by Smith-Snagg of the signatures of the Moores, which evidence was unavailable at the time of entry of summary judgment, is certainly relevant and sufficient to preclude disposition of this case, insofar as the forgery issue is concerned, by summary judgment.
The Moores are elderly and in poor health. They have petitioned this court to expedite the resolution of this matter. By this opinion, we have granted their petition. When this matter reappears in the circuit court, we direct that the trial judge do likewise.
REVERSED AND REMANDED FOR TRIAL.
COBB and HARRIS, JJ., concur.
PALMER, J., concurs in result only.
. § 712.02, Fla.Stat.