Case Name: Peggy V. ODOM, Appellant, v. David J. STEIGERWALD, Respondent
Court: Supreme Court of South Carolina
Jurisdiction: South Carolina
Decision Date: 1973-05-08
Citations: 260 S.C. 422
Docket Number: 19621
Parties: Peggy V. ODOM, Appellant, v. David J. STEIGERWALD, Respondent
Judges: Moss, C. J., and Lewis and Brailsford, JJ., concur.
Reporter: South Carolina Reports
Volume: 260
Pages: 422–435

Head Matter:
19621
Peggy V. ODOM, Appellant, v. David J. STEIGERWALD, Respondent
(196 S. E. (2d) 635)
Messrs. Gaddy and Davenport, of Greenville, for Appellant,
Messrs. Leatherwood, Walker, Todd & Mann, of Green-ville, for Respondent,
Messrs. Gaddy & Davenport, of Greenville, for Appellant, in Reply.
May 8, 1973.

Opinion:
Littlejohn, Justice:
The plaintiff, Peggy V. Odom, brought this action to recover damages for personal injuries sustained in an intersection collision between a pick-up truck, which she was driving, and an automobile owned by David J. Steigerwald and driven by his son, young David G. Steigerwald.
The complaint alleges that the plaintiff's injuries were proximately caused by the negligence, carelessness, willfulness and wantonness of young Steigerwald in (1) driving the automobile from a side street, controlled by a stop sign, into a through street on which the plaintiff was traveling, without yielding the right of way; (2) failing to keep a proper lookout, and (3) failing to apply his brakes so as to avoid the collision.
The defendant interposed a general denial and plead the defense of contributory negligence, willfulness and wantonness.
At the conclusion of all evidence, the plaintiff moved for a directed verdict on the issue of liability; the motion was denied. Thereafter, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendant. Plaintiff moved for a new trial on the grounds that there was no evidence to support the verdict, that the evidence established the proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries was the failure to yield the right of way by the defendant, and that the evidence did not establish any careless, reckless, willful or wanton acts on the part of the plaintiff which could support the plea of contributory negligence. The motion was denied.
The plaintiff now appeals and alleges error on the part of the trial judge in failing to direct a verdict on the issue of liability and in failing to grant the motion for a new trial. In essence, the plaintiff contends that the only reasonable inferences to be drawn from the whole of the testimony are that the defendant's improper driving conduct proximately caused the collision and that the defendant has failed to prove contributory negligence. If the trial judge erred in failing to grant the motion for a directed verdict on the liability issue, he could correct the mistake only by granting a new trial outright. Accordingly, we think that plaintiff sought the only relief available to her. See South Carolina Elec. & Gas Co. v. Aetna Ins. Co., 233 S. C. 557, 106 S. E. (2d) 276 (1958).
On a clear day in December 1970, the pick-up truck, which plaintiff was driving, was traveling along Hudson Road in a southerly direction. The automobile of defendant, driven by young Steigerwald, was proceeding in an easterly direction along St. Augustine Street, which makes a "T" intersection with Hudson Road. Hudson Road is the favored, or through, street and vehicular traffic entering Hudson Road from St. Augustine Street is required to honor a "Stop" sign before entering the favored street. Young Steigerwald was attempting to enter the through street from plaintiff's right. Vehicles approaching the intersection from the north, such as plaintiff's, are obscured from view until clearing a hill crest approximately 200 or 300 feet from the intersection. The collision occurred after young Steigerwald undisputedly stopped at the "Stop" sign as required, and then pulled out directly into the plaintiff's lane. The collision occurred in plaintiff's lane of traffic as the front of the plaintiff's pick-up truck struck the left front fender of young Steigerwald's car.
It is the plaintiff's testimony that she observed the vehicle of young Steigerwald stopped at the "Stop" sign, and that as she approached the intersection about two car lengths away, he pulled out in front of her and into her path of travel. She testified that she applied her brakes as hard as she could, but was unable to stop before colliding.
It is the testimony of young Steigerwald that when he approached the intersection he was behind other vehicles, which had stopped, and as these vehicles entered the through street, he pulled up to the "stop" sign. He further testified to the effect that upon stopping, he saw several vehicles approaching from his right; that he then looked left and saw no approaching traffic; that he looked back right and as the last vehicle, approaching from his right, cleared the intersection, he pulled out to cross the plaintiff's lane of travel in order to fall in behind and follow the last car passing from his right. He testified:
"I was sitting there for a long time, I might have looked left, and right, but mainly I was just watching those cars coming by to my right.
"Well, when I started pulling out, I saw her coming down the hill just before she applied her brakes, and I attempted to apply my brakes and stop, but I don't recall if I stopped or not. But I was already in the lane, and she couldn't move into the other lane because of the car I was following, that was coming in the opposite direction, and she hit me."
The testimony of the investigating patrolman was to the effect that the plaintiff's pick-up truck left skid marks of SO feet to, the point of impact and came to rest 31 feet past the point of impact, and that the forward portion of both vehicles had severe damages.
It cannot be seriously argued that young Steigerwald's conduct was not negligent and that such negligence did not proximately cause the collision. Whether or not it can be said that the plaintiff was free of contributory negligence, as a mattter of law, is a close question. However, we think that the only reasonable inference to be drawn from the whole of the testimony is that the real, the more immediate and efficient, cause of the collision involved in this case was the improper driving conduct of young Steigerwald.
The defendant's whole defense is based on the contention that the plaintiff was traveling at an excessive rate of speed and that such speed was a proximate concurring cause of the collision. It is fundamental that before the negligence of a plaintiff will defeat recovery, it must be made to appear that such negligence contributed to the injury as a proximate cause. Clyde v. Southern Public Utilities Co., 109 S. C. 290, 96 S. E. 116 (1918). It is without legal significance that speed was a contributing factor in placing the pick-up truck at a particular location on Hudson Road when the emergency arose, because the plaintiff had the legal right to occupy that portion of the street. See Horton v. Greyhound Corp., 241 S. C. 430, 128 S. E. (2d) 776 (1962). Proximate cause is an often defined legal concept. See 14 South Carolina Digest, Negligence Key, No. 56 (1952, Supp. 1972). We find no definition better than as articulated by the Court in Ballenger v. Southern Worsted Corp., 209 S. C. 463, 40 S. E. (2d) 681 (1947):
". . . [Pjroximate cause of the law is not necessarily the proximate cause of the logician. Legal proximate cause is determined upon mixed considerations of logic, common sense and experience, policy, and precedent."
We quote with approval from Bodie v. Charleston & W. C. R. Co., 61 S. C. 468, 39 S. E. 715 (1901) :
"A want of ordinary care may be said to contribute proximately to an injury when it is an active and efficient cause of the injury in any degree, however slight, and not the mere condition or occasion of it. But it is not a proximate cause of injury when the negligence of the person inflicting it is a more immediate, efficient cause."
See also Seay v. Southern Railway Carolina Division, 205 S. C. 162, 31 S. E. (2d) 133 (1944).
In the trial of this case, there were initially two issues to be determined: First, was young Steigerwald negligent? And, if so, secondly, was that negligence a proximate cause of injury to the plaintiff? These two questions should have been answered in the affirmative as a matter of law. It then became necessary to determine: Was the plaintiff negligent? If the plaintiff was not negligent, there could, of course, be no contributory negligence. Even if it was determined that the plaintiff was negligent, there was still one additional question to be answered before the plaintiff would be barred of recovery, and that question was: Did plaintiff's negligence contribute as a proximate cause?
As indicated hereinabove, as a matter of law, we think that young Steigerwald was at least negligent and that his improper driving conduct was a proximate cause of the collision.
Assuming, without so deciding, that the plaintiff was driving at an excessive rate of speed and was negligent, we think, as a matter of law, that such was not a contributing proximate cause. The real cause, the more immediate and efficient cause, was the improper driving conduct of young Steigerwald. By driving his car directly into the path of plaintiff's vehicle when plaintiff was obviously so close to the intersection, young Steigerwald created a trap from which plaintiff could not escape.
The lower court should have granted the motion for a directed verdict on the issue of liability and submitted to the jury the question of damages. In failing to grant the motion for a directed verdict, and in failing to grant the motion for a new trial, we think he erred. Our statutes and rules do not authorize a new trial on the issue of damages only and, accordingly, a new trial generally shall be held. See South Carolina Elec. & Gas Co., supra. When a retrial is conducted, the evidence is never identically the same, but if the second trial warrants the same inferences, it will be the duty of the trial judge, upon appropriate motion to submit only the damages issue to the jury.
Reversed and remanded.
Moss, C. J., and Lewis and Brailsford, JJ., concur.
Bussey, J., dissents.