Case Name: Marcus Cole CARPENTER, Petitioner-Appellant, v. James A. YATES, Respondent-Appellee
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 2010-01-08
Citations: 361 F. App'x 868
Docket Number: No. 07-56214
Parties: Marcus Cole CARPENTER, Petitioner-Appellant, v. James A. YATES, Respondent-Appellee.
Judges: Before: GOODWIN, WALLACE, and FISHER, Circuit Judges.
Reporter: West's Federal Appendix
Volume: 361
Pages: 868–870

Head Matter:
Marcus Cole CARPENTER, Petitioner-Appellant, v. James A. YATES, Respondent-Appellee.
No. 07-56214.
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
Submitted Dec. 15, 2009.
Filed Jan. 8, 2010.
Marcus Cole Carpenter, Coalinga, CA, pro se.
Lynne G. Mcginnis, Esquire, AGCA-Of-fice of The California Attorney General, San Diego, CA, for Respondent-Appellee.
Before: GOODWIN, WALLACE, and FISHER, Circuit Judges.
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

Opinion:
MEMORANDUM
California state prisoner Marcus Cole Carpenter appeals from the district court's order denying his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas petition. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253, and we affirm.
Carpenter contends that at trial, the court improperly admitted statements that the robbery victim had made to responding paramedics and police officers, in violation of his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation.
The state court's determination that the victim's statements to paramedics were admissible was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). The record reflects that the purpose of the paramedics' questions was to address the victim's ongoing medical emergency, rather than to assist law enforcement, and that the questioning took place in a chaotic environment that lacked any "level of formality." Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 827, 126 S.Ct. 2266, 165 L.Ed.2d 224 (2006).
Further, it was not an unreasonable determination of the facts for the state court to hold that police legitimately believed that there was an ongoing emergency at the time they questioned the victim. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). The record reflects that until the officers confirmed that there were no other victims, the primary purpose of the questioning was to enable the police to meet an ongoing emergency. See Davis, 547 U.S. at 822, 126 S.Ct. 2266.
Additionally, the state court's determination that the victim's statements to police officers were admissible was not an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). In light of the circumstances and the ongoing emergency, the statements were not testimonial. See Davis, 547 U.S. at 822, 126 S.Ct. 2266.
Finally, we agree with the district court that even if Ramirez's statements were erroneously admitted, the error did not have a "substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining" the court's judgment. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637-38, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 123 L.Ed.2d 353 (1993). As the state court explained, a substantial amount of other evidence supported Carpenter's conviction.
AFFIRMED.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.