Case Name: Celestine Mullins, Resp't, v. Charles T. Chickering et al., App'lts
Court: New York Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1888-10-16
Citations: 18 N.Y. St. Rep. 606
Docket Number: 
Parties: Celestine Mullins, Resp’t, v. Charles T. Chickering et al., App’lts.
Judges: 
Reporter: New York State Reporter
Volume: 18
Pages: 606–611

Head Matter:
Celestine Mullins, Resp’t, v. Charles T. Chickering et al., App’lts.
(Court of Appeals,
Filed October 16, 1888.)
1. Conversion—Defense interposed bt bailees.
The plaintiff placed the piano in question, in the possession of the defendants, to be kept by them for her, and return upon her demand. The executors of the plaintiff’s husband, claimed title to the property, as having belonged to their testator, and demanded it of the defendants They chose to submit to the demand and delivered the piano to said executors. Thereafter, this action for conversion was commenced, and defendants were permitted to raise the question of the ownership of the executors by supplemental answer. Meld, that the defendants had a right to set up as a defense the jus tertii and defend it if they could upon the title of the testator, which had' passed to the executors, since before the action was tried they had submitted to that title, and delivered the property to those who claimed to be owners. They had taken upon themselves the risk of that title, but could defend upon it, and justify under it. They had a right to defend their surrender upon that title. Daneorth and Gray, JJ , dis senting.
2. Same—Evidence—Competency oe—When one derives title from: DECEASED PERSON—CODE OlVIL PRO., § 829.
Defendants having chosen to hold under the intestate, and derive their title and interest, and all their right to the property or its possession from, and under the deceased, came within the description of the Code CivÚ Pro., §829: “A person deriving his title or interest from, through or under a deceased person * * * by assignment or otherwise.” Against them, the plaintiff could not testify in her own behalf to any personal transactions between herself or her husband Daneorth and Gray, JJ., dissenting.
2. Same—Admissibility oe evidence—Code Civ. Pro., § 829.
The proof shows that the testator bought and paid for the paino with his own money. Plaintiff was allowed to swear that he gave it to her. Her testimony was objected to as being in violtaion of the Code Civ. Pro., § 829, but was admitted. Meld, error, for which the judgment should be reversed. Daneorth and Gray, JJ., dissenting.
Appeal from a judgment of the general term of the court -of common pleas for the city and county of New York, affirming a judgment entered upon a verdict of the jury at the trial term of said court, and also affirming an order denying a motion for a new trial made upon the minutes and exceptions taken.
In February, 1864, one John Mullins (now deceased), and then the husband of the plaintiff purchased of the defend-1 ants a piano for which he paid his own money. In November, 1881, John Mullins, died leaving a widow (the plaintiff), and three children by a former marriage. He left a will in which Mulligan and Murphy were named as executors. Soon after the death of Mullin, the executors made an inventory of his estate, in which they included this piano. The plaintiff at that time claimed to own it. Soon after the inventory was made the plaintiff had the piano taken to the defendants’ storage room for storage. The next day after the piano was taken to the defendants, the defendants received a written notice from the executors that the piano belonged to the estate of Mullins, and directing the defendants not to deliver the piano to any person except upon their written order. The piano remained in the possession of the defendants until April, 1883, when they delivered it to the executors upon their written demand. The piano was sold by the executors at public sale for $172.80. The proceeds were put into the estate, and the estate settled upon an accounting before the surrogate, and the plaintiff received her portion of the estate. . She knew that the piano was in the inventory and never made any claim of the executors for it. After it was delivered to the executors by the defendants, the plaintiff without making any demand from the defendants commenced this action for the conversion of the piano, alleging that she was the owner of the piano. After the commencement of this action, and after the plaintiff knew that the executors had taken the piano and sold it, and put the proceeds into the estate and accounted therefor, the plaintiff for a valuable consideration settled all claims against the executors and against the estate and gave a general release under sale. Upon the trial the plaintiff had a verdict for $519.75. The counsel for defendants moved for a new trial, upon the minutes and upon exceptions taken and upon the grounds that the damages were excessive, which motion was denied,
Thomas H. Swift, for app’lts; Paul Fuller, for resp’t.

Opinion:
Finch, J.
The defendants were bailees of the plaintiff. She placed the piano in their possession to keep for her and return upon her demand. They were not at liberty to dispute her title except in one emergency and at one peril. The executors of the husband claimed title to the property as having belonged to the testator, and demanded it of the defendants. They chose to submit to the demand and delivered the piano to the executors. By so doing they made themselves parties to the controversy, and when called on to return the property to the plaintiff their refusal exposed them to an action for conversion which has gone against them. They had, however, the right to set up as a defense the jus tertii, and defend if they could upon the title of the testator which had passed to the executors, since before this action was tried, they had submitted to that title, and delivered the property to those who claimed to be owners (W. Trans. Co. v. Barber, 56 N.Y., 544), and had been per mitted to raise that question by the supplemental answer. They had taken upon themselves the risk of that title, but could defend upon and justify under it. They chose to hold under the intestate and to derive their title and interest and all their right to the property or its possession from and under the deceased, and had a right to defend their surrender upon that title. They came, consequently, within the description of section 829 of the Code of Civil Procedure as "a person deriving his title or interest from, through or under a deceased person, by assignment or otherwise." Against them, therefore, the plaintiff could not testify in her own behalf to any personal transactions between herself and her husband. She did so testify. The proof showed that he bought and paid for the piano with his own money. That established title in him. She met the emergency by swearing that he,' the owner, gave it to her. That proof was objected to on two grounds; as in violation of section 829, and as a conclusion of law. The first objection at least was good. A critical and close construction of the record might justify a ruling that the objection came too late and that a motion to strike out the evidence was needed.
But the respondent makes no such point. Her counsel assume that the objection was fairly and properly taken, but resist it as unsound. We ought not, therefore, to indulge in a severity of criticism which the silence of the respondent indicates would not be justified by what actually occurred, and the record shows notice of an objection given in advance, and repeated in detail, when the character of the evidence became apparent.
For this error the judgment should be reversed and a new trial granted, costs to abide event.
Andrews, Earl and Peckham, JJ., concur; Danforth, J., reads for affirmance; Gray, J., concurs, Huger, Oh. J., not voting.