Case Name: Larry Williams WHITSEY, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee
Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1989-05-10
Citations: 796 S.W.2d 707
Docket Number: No. 1121-87
Parties: Larry Williams WHITSEY, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.
Judges: CAMPBELL, J., concurs in the result.
Reporter: South Western Reporter Second Series
Volume: 796
Pages: 707–749

Head Matter:
Larry Williams WHITSEY, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.
No. 1121-87.
Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, En Banc.
May 10, 1989.
Rehearing Granted Nov. 8, 1989.
On Rehearing Sept. 19, 1990.
Stanley G. Schneider, Houston, for appellant.
John B. Holmes, Jr., Dist. Atty. and Kathlyn Giannaula and Bob Stabe, Asst. Dist. Attys., Houston, Robert Huttash, State’s Atty., Austin, for the State.

Opinion:
OPINION ON APPELLANT'S PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW
MILLER, Judge.
Appellant was convicted by a jury of the offense of burglary of a habitation with intent to commit sexual assault. V.T.C.A. Penal Code, § 30.02(a)(1). The trial court assessed punishment at 99 years imprisonment in the Texas Department of Corrections. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals abated appellant's appeal and ordered the trial court to conduct a hearing on the Batson issue raised by appellant on appeal. Upon receipt of the transcript of the Batson hearing, the Court of Appeals addressed appellant's points of error and affirmed his conviction in an unpublished opinion. Whitsey v. State, No. C14-85-530-CR, 1987 WL 15052, delivered July 30, 1987. Appellant then petitioned this Court for discretionary review. We originally denied appellant's petition but granted his motion for rehearing on the Batson issue. We will reverse the judgments of the trial court and the Court of Appeals.
After the voir dire of the jury panel was completed, but before the jury was sworn, appellant's counsel objected to the jury on the ground that the prosecutor had used his peremptory challenges to exclude blacks from the jury and that denied appellant "his right to a fair cross-section of the community''. Appellant's counsel stated for the record that there were seven blacks in the first forty venirepersons, that the first black veniremember was struck for cause, that the remaining six blacks on the venire were struck peremptorily by the State, and that the State used six of its ten peremptory challenges to strike the blacks from the jury panel. Counsel then also objected that appellant was being denied his due process. The trial court overruled appellant's objections and swore in the jury.
After appellant's conviction on March 11, 1985, he filed a motion for new trial and an amended motion for new trial in which he alleged he was not tried by a jury of his peers because the prosecutor's strikes were racially motivated (a Batson claim), and that the prosecutor used peremptory challenges to systematically exclude blacks from jury panels (a claim based on Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 85 S.Ct. 824, 13 L.Ed.2d 759 (1965)). A hearing was held on appellant's amended motion for new trial on May 30, 1985. At the hearing, appellant's counsel attempted to question the prosecutor about his reasons for striking the blacks from appellant's jury panel. The State's attorney at the hearing objected to any inquiry as to the prosecutor's "individual reasoning process in this case" on the basis of Swain, supra, and the trial court sustained that objection thereby preventing appellant from determining why the prosecutor struck the black venireper-sons in his trial. The trial judge, however, allowed appellant's counsel to question the prosecutor about his use of peremptory challenges in other cases and Harris County prosecutors' use of peremptory challenges in general in the past. At the conclusion of the hearing, appellant's counsel argued to the court that the present state of the law allowed him to question an individual prosecutor as to his use of peremptory challenges in a particular trial to determine whether a defendant was denied a fair trial. The State waived any argument, and the trial judge denied the amended motion for new trial. Appellant's counsel gave notice of appeal.
The Fourteenth Court of Appeals abated the appeal on March 26, 1987, and ordered the trial court to conduct a hearing "to provide the prosecutor with an opportunity to rebut appellant's prima facie showing of purposeful discrimination", i.e., a Batson hearing. In its order, the Court of Appeals concluded appellant established a prima facie showing of purposeful discrimination in the motion for new trial hearing. The Court of Appeals concluded, however, that the prosecutor was not afforded the opportunity to rebut appellant's prima facie case and offer racially neutral reasons for the exercise of the peremptory challenges against the black venirepersons. Nor was the Court of Appeals satisfied that appellant could not present evidence rebutting any neutral explanations offered by the State. Thus, the Court of Appeals ordered the trial court to conduct a Batson hearing and held the appeal in abeyance pending the filing of the statement of facts from the hearing and the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the trial judge.
We first note that the record supports the Court of Appeals' decision that appellant established in the motion for new trial hearing a prima facie showing of purposeful discrimination by the prosecutor in his exercise of peremptory challenges. The record reflects that appellant is a black man and that no blacks served on appellant's jury. Also, of the seven black persons that were on the jury panel, one was struck for cause and the remaining six were peremptorily struck by the prosecutor. At the hearing on the motion for new trial, the prosecutor testified that he questioned only one of the six black members of the jury panel, who was struck for cause, but he had conducted a general voir dire of the panel and did not ask many questions of individual venirepersons. An inference of discriminatory purpose in the prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges is supported by the totality of these facts.
After the Batson hearing on June 5, 1987, the trial judge entered the following findings of fact and conclusions of law:
"1. The Complainant was black, but the State's only two identification witnesses were white police officers.
2. The only black jury question by either State of (sic) Defense related to that juror's friendship with several police officers.
3. Prosecutor Stabe did not ask any questions of any of the six black jurors, nor did he question individually any of the other jurors on the panel.
4. Prosecutor Stabe did not have an independent recollection as to the basis of his strikes at the time of the hearing of a Motion of New Trial in May of 1985.
5. Prosecutor Stabe spent six to eight hours refreshing his memory from the actual voir dire and the Motion for New Trial hearing to develop his explanations for his strikes.
6. Prosecutor Stabe used ethnic, religious and job related stereotypes as a basis for his 'neutral explanation.'
7. Prosecutor Stabe, during the jury selection, identified each of the six black jurors on his information sheet by writing the letters 'B' (sic) above their names.
8. The Assistant District Attorney Bob Stabe represented the State of Texas in the trial of [appellant].
9. That Bob Stabe exercised all ten of his peremptory challenges afforded him by Article 35.15(b) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure.
10. That Bob Stabe exercised a peremptory challenge on venireperson number 3, John Wesley Wauson, a white male, because he was an attorney and stated that in his opinion the State's burden of proof was a difficult burden.
11. That Bob Stabe exercised a peremptory challenge on venireperson number seven, Gloria Wright Mitchell, a black female, because she engaged in a dialogue with the defense attorney, nodded with the statements of the defense attorney, and, in Bob Stabe's mind, appeared to have a problem with the credibility of police officers in general.
12. That Bob Stabe exercised a peremptory challenge on venireperson number eight, Sherry Lynn Ramsey, a black female, because of her age of twenty-four years and because her husband was employed as a nurses' assistant.
13. That Bob Stabe exercised a peremptory challenge on venireperson number twenty-four, Maurine Anita Fuller, a black female, because of her occupation as a teacher and that in Mr. Stabe's opinion teachers tend to be liberal and forgiving.
14. That Bob Stabe exercised a peremptory challenge on venireperson number thirty, Carol L. Mireles, a white female because of her occupation as a teacher.
15. That Bob Stabe exercised a peremptory challenge on venireperson number thirty-two, Glenda Kaye Johnson, a black female, because of her religious preference, namely, Pentacostal. In Mr. Stabe's opinion those of the Pentacostal faith tend to look to their religion to make decisions and sometimes feel that they speak in tongues, therefore, becoming a fringe religious group.
16. That Bob Stabe exercised a peremptory challenge on venireperson number thirty-five, Willie Lee Hunt, a black male, because of his religious preference, namely, Church of God, and because of an unanswered question on his jury information card. Specifically, Mr. Stabe testified that he has never heard of the Church of God religion and is unaware of how those beliefs may influence a decision by Mr. Hunt.
17. That Bob Stabe exercised a peremptory challenge on venireperson number thirty-six, Virgil James Thompson, a white-male, because of his occupation as a hair-stylist, his length of time on the job of three months, and that, in Mr. Stabe's mind, he appeared to be homosexual.
18. That Bob Stabe exercised a peremptory challenge on venireperson number thirty-eight, Edward H. Rosen, a white male, because of his being of the Jewish faith and from Baltimore, Maryland, both traits indicating a liberal nature.
19. That Bob Stabe exercised a peremptory challenge on venireperson number thirty-nine, Reginald Bernard Ardoin, a black male, because of his age of 21 years and because he appeared to be illiterate in that he could not spell his religious preference of Baptist nor his place of birth.
20. That the crime that [appellant] was accused of committing was not interracial.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Based on the foregoing findings of fact, the Court has arrived at the following conclusions of law;
1. That the State, through his Assistant District Attorney, Bob Stabe, stated he had neutral reasons for the exercise of six peremptory strikes on the six black venirepersons, and
2. That the appellant did not rebut the State's explanations.
3. That the appellant did not prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Bob Stabe engaged in purposeful discrimination in the selection of the petit jury through the use of his peremptory challenges."
The trial judge then concluded that appellant was not denied the equal protection of the law by the prosecutor's use of his peremptory challenges.
Upon receipt of the transcript and the statement of facts from the Batson hearing, the Court of Appeals addressed appellant's three points of error; however, only the disposition of the first point of error concerns us here. The court of appeals concluded that the findings of the trial court, that the reasons for the peremptory challenges were racially neutral and that the prosecutor did not purposefully discriminate against appellant, were not clearly erroneous and, therefore, overruled appellant's first point of error. Whitsey, supra, slip opinion at p. 2. The Court of Appeals stated:
Appellant contends that ethnic, religious and job-related stereotyping cannot be a neutral explanation. We do not perceive it to be our function to judicially weigh reasons for peremptory strikes other than those that are constitutionally precluded. The very nature of peremptory strikes is to afford both sides the leeway to eliminate prospective jurors from the trial that they perceive as adverse to their respective interests. For us to interfere with this process, other than when it constitutes specific discrimination as ennunciated (sic) by the Supreme Court, would be destructive of our system of peremptory challenges in criminal cases. If this area of constitutional examination as to peremptory challenges is to be further broadened to include occupational, political, and religious areas, the Supreme Court must make that expansion. We do not construe Batson and prior decisions to have made such an extension. Further, we believe that an unlimited broadening of such inquiry would be fatal to the peremptory challenge system so long entreached (sic) in our jurisprudence.
We do not agree with the Court of Appeals' opinion.
We initially note that the Court of Appeals applied the wrong standard for review of the trial judge's findings. In Keeton v. State, 749 S.W.2d 861 (Tex.Cr.App.1988) (Opinion Following Abatement) (Hereinafter cited as Keeton II), wherein we thoroughly discussed the Batson decision and its progeny, we specifically rejected the "clearly erroneous" standard. Kee-ton II, at 870. Instead, we considered the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial judge's rulings and determined whether the record supported the findings of the trial judge. If there is sufficient evidence to support the trial judge's finding of no purposeful discrimination, the findings will not be disturbed on appeal. In Keeton II the finding of the trial judge that the prosecutor's strikes were not based solely on the juror's race was amply supported by the record at trial and at the Batson hearing. See Keeton II at 870. The Court of Appeals erred in the instant case by applying a clearly erroneous standard in overruling appellant's point of error.
Furthermore, the Court of Appeals is incorrect in its perception of its role as an appellate court when presented with a Batson issue. The Court of Appeals apparently finds that it is appropriate to interfere with the peremptory challenge system only when the exercise of a strike is "constitutionally precluded", and that otherwise we should not question the rationale for the strike of a prospective juror. From the language of the Court of Appeals' opinion, it appears that the Court would only review the exercise of a peremptory challenge where there is a blatant constitutional violation, such as where a prosecutor states "I struck that prospective juror because he is black." Limiting our review to the exercise of such a challenge ignores the reality that the peremptory challenge system permits discrimination by those "who are of a mind to discriminate." As Justice Marshall stated in his concurring opinion in Batson, 106 S.Ct. at 1728:
[I]t is even possible that an attorney may lie to himself in an effort to convince himself that his motives are legal, [citation omitted] A prosecutor's own conscious or unconscious racism may lead him easily to the conclusion that a prospective black juror is 'sullen,' or 'distant,' a characterization that would not have come to his mind if a white juror had acted identically. A judge's own conscious or unconscious racism may lead him to accept such an explanation as well supported.
See e.g. Daniels v. State, 768 S.W.2d 314 (Tex.App.-Tyler 1988), pet. refused March 1, 1989. Moreover, the Court of Appeals refused to accept appellant's contention that ethnic, religious and job-related stereotyping cannot be neutral explanations for striking black veniremembers and concluded that the Batson decision did not countenance such an inquiry. We do not interpret Batson, supra, to be limited to review of constitutionally precluded rationales for exercise of peremptory challenges. Implicit in the Batson decision, so as to promote equal protection of the law, is the provision that we must examine every reason given by the prosecutor for the strike of a black veniremember within the circumstances of that particular case to determine whether the "neutral explanation" for the strike is really a pretext for a racially-motivated peremptory challenge. Thus, we are not limited to reviewing constitutionally precluded strikes, as the Court of Appeals concludes, but we are required to review the rationale for each strike which an appellant prima facially establishes is racially-motivated in spite of the seemingly neutral rationale offered by the prosecutor.
After reviewing the record in this cause, we do not find that the findings and conclusions of the trial judge and the holding of the Court of Appeals are supported by the record. Although the prosecutor's explanations for the exercise of his peremptory challenges are racially neutral on their face, the evidence presented by appellant in rebuttal at both the motion for new trial hearing and the Batson hearing weighs against a finding that these explanations were actually racially neutral.
As stated by the Supreme Court in Batson, supra, the prosecutor must "articulate a neutral explanation related to the particular case to be tried." Batson, 106 S.Ct. at 1723. That requirement, however, is not sufficient to overcome appellant's prima facie showing of purposeful discrimination. The prosecutor must give "clear and reasonably specific" explanations of "legitimate reasons" for his use of peremptory challenges. Batson, 106 S.Ct. at 1722-1724 and n. 20. Such a requirement mandates that the trial judge evaluate the reasons given by the prosecutor in light of the circumstances of that trial to determine whether the explanations are merely a pretext. In Keeton II, we discussed a nonexclusive list of factors which weigh against the legitimacy of a race-neutral explanation. The presence of any one of these factors tends to show that the State's reasons are not actually supported by the record or are an impermissible pretext. Those factors, which we employ in our analysis today, are:
1. The reason given for the peremptory challenge is not related to the facts of the case;
2. there was a lack of questioning to the challenged juror or a lack of meaningful questions;
3. Disparate treatment — persons with the same or similar characteristics as the challenged juror were not struck;
4. Disparate examination of members of the venire, i.e., questioning a challenged juror so as to evoke a certain response without asking the same question of other panel members; and
5. an explanation based on a group bias where the group trait is not shown to apply to the challenged juror specifically.
See Keeton II at 866, citing Slappy v. State, 503 So.2d 350 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1987), affirmed 522 So.2d 18 (Fla.1988).
The record from the Batson hearing indicates that both the complainant and appellant were black and that there were seven blacks on appellant's jury panel. There were ten persons on the jury panel who had friends or relatives in law enforcement. Of these ten people, who the prosecutor conceded generally make good state's jurors, only two were black, and both these persons were struck by the State. Appellant's attorney struck five of these people (all white), and the three remaining served as jurors. Upon reviewing the voir dire transcript, the prosecutor recalled his reasoning for striking Gloria Mitchell, one of the blacks struck from the panel, and stated that he struck her because she seemed to nod in agreement with what appellant's attorney stated during voir dire, and also because:
The conversation or the questioning between [appellant's counsel] and Mrs. Mitchell dealt with any friends or relatives that Ms. Mitchell had in law enforcement, and Ms. Mitchell indicated that she had friends in the Houston Police Department vice division and also Department of Public Safety. [Appellant's counsel] asked on two different occasions whether that would influence her or whether, I believe, a police officer, a witness that was not a police officer, and my recollection of what bothered me about Ms. Mitchell is her answers were not just no but were, "Oh, no." And I don't recall the wording of the second answer but the tone of the answers as best I recall were such that it would be the last thing in her mind that she would ever think of believing a police officer than a nonpolice officer witness. In my jury selection I had two Houston police officer witnesses that were critical to the case and it bothered me in that Ms. Mitchell may have for some reason, because of her experience with Houston police officers at vice, may have reasons not to believe police officers based on the general tone and answers to questions of [appellant's counsel.]
The prosecutor admitted that the only notes he had taken on the juror information sheets regarding Mitchell and Glenda Johnson, the other black venireperson with friends in law enforcement who was struck for religious reasons (see discussion below), were "pro-state notes" and the letter "B" indicating that these venirepersons were black.
The prosecutor also testified that he struck certain venirepersons because of their religious background. On the juror information sheets the prosecutor circled, so as to note its significance, the religious preference of only two of the venireper-sons, both of whom were white. One of these two prospective jurors, a Quaker, was not struck for religious reasons but was struck for cause. The other venireper-son, a member of the Jewish faith, was peremptorily struck by the State because the prosecutor opined that he was liberal. As to the black venirepersons who were peremptorily challenged because of their religious preference, the prosecutor made no notes or circles on their juror information sheets regarding their religion, but he did indicate their race with a "B", denoting they were black.
The prosecutor also stated that he struck prospective jurors because of their occupation. The prosecutor peremptorily challenged two women, a hispanic and a black, because they were teachers, and the prosecutor stated that in his opinion teachers tend to be liberal and forgiving. The prosecutor noted the occupation of each woman on the juror information sheets by circling it. When questioned by appellant's counsel as to why he struck the black teacher, the prosecutor stated "First off, [this prospective juror] was a black female and I struck [her] primarily because she was a teacher." The prosecutor also indicated her race on the juror information sheet with the designation "B", as he did with a third prospective black juror who was struck because of her husband's occupation and her age. This juror's husband was employed as a nurse's assistant. As the prosecutor explained that he tends to strike nurses from jury panels because they tend to be liberal, the trial judge interrupted him and the following dialogue occurred:
THE COURT: Nurses are liberals?
THE WITNESS (prosecutor): On certain cases I might keep a nurse, Your Honor, but in general I tend to strike nurses, yes.
THE COURT: Nurses, you think, would be liberal in a case where a person's charged with burglary with intent to commit sexual assault?
THE WITNESS: On a case such as this, well, on child abuse cases I tend to keep a nurse and, in fact, teachers also on those kind of cases. On cases such as this, in general my feeling is while this was a rape case that nurses in general tend to be on the liberal side.
THE COURT: You don't think nurses side with victims of rape, sexual assault? I'm just asking your opinion.
THE WITNESS: In some cases, yes, sir. In this case I didn't have much of an opportunity to have any individual questioning on voir dire and the question was a problem that arose in by mind with [the prospective juror], it was not that she was a nurse but her husband had only been at the job six months and was a male and as typically in the past been a female profession and my opinion was that she may have too much of a social worker's type philosophy or attitude that might be conveyed to her, I think — I still kind of believe that husbands' ideas in general conveyed to their wives probably more so than vice versa. That was my feeling.
THE COURT: Okay....
The prosecutor's notes on this prospective juror consisted only of the letter "B", indicating the race of the juror, and nothing was marked or circled as to the juror's age or her husband's occupation.
Finally, the prosecutor testified at the Batson hearing that he struck two black jurors, including the prospective juror mentioned above, because of their age. Again, the prosecutor made no specific notations on the juror information sheets regarding these two individuals except to note their race with the letter "B". The prosecutor stated that he struck Sherry Ramsey, the venireperson discussed in the preceding paragraph, because her age, 24, was the approximate age of appellant. The prosecutor, however, did not strike six other white veniremen who were also the approximate age of appellant. Those six persons, who ranged in age from 25 to 28 years, served on appellant's jury.
Several of the factors discussed in Kee-ton II and Slappy, supra, which weigh against the legitimacy of a race-neutral explanation, are present in this cause. As noted in Keeton II, these factors may be used as evidence to show that the State's neutral explanations are merely a sham. In analyzing this evidence, we first note that the record reflects that the prosecutor did not ask any questions of the blacks on the jury panel whom he struck even though there were items on the jury information sheets relating to those jurors which either concerned him or had been deleted.
The prosecutor's peremptory challenges exercised against certain black venireper-sons were based on reasons equally applicable to white veniremembers who were not challenged by the prosecutor. The State struck two blacks from the venire because they were close in age to appellant but did not strike any of the six white venirepersons who were also close in age to appellant. Additionally, there were eleven venirepersons who had friends in law enforcement, only two of whom were black, and they were the only "friends" of law enforcement struck by the State.
The prosecutor's reasoning for striking one black female who was a teacher was based on a group bias not shown to apply to the challenged juror. The prosecutor opined that this prospective juror was "liberal" because of her occupation. The prosecutor also stated that he struck another black female because he believed she was liberal because of her husband's occupation as a nurse's assistant. The prosecutor, however, did not ask any questions of either juror which he peremptorily challenged; nor did these jurors respond to any questions by defense counsel. The record of the voir dire is devoid of any testimony which indicates that these two black prospective jurors were "liberal" because of their occupation. This reason appears to be a classic example of "an explanation based on a group bias where the group trait is not shown to apply to the challenged juror specifically." Keeton II at 866.
Although the prosecutor articulated nondiscriminatory reasons for striking the blacks from the venire, the trial judge cannot merely accept those explanations at face value and end the Batson inquiry. The trial judge must determine whether these facially neutral explanations are contrived to avoid admitting acts of discrimination. See Keeton II at 868, wherein we approved the analysis in State v. Antwine, 743 S.W.2d 51 (Mo.1987). The facts of the case, the circumstances of the voir dire, and the testimony at the motion for new trial hearing and the Batson hearing are relevant to this determination. Besides the rebuttal evidence presented by appellant, his counsel established on cross-examination of the prosecutor at the Bat-son hearing that since the Court of Appeals' order on March 26, 1987, abating the appeal, the prosecutor had spent six to eight hours reviewing the voir dire transcript and that is when he came up with his explanations for his voir dire strikes.
From this review of the record, we determine that the trial judge's findings concerning the prosecutor's explanations for the exercise of his peremptory challenges against the black venirepersons are not supported by the record and that the prosecutor's explanations are insufficient as a matter of law to rebut appellant's prima facie showing of racial discrimination in the selection of his jury. We recognize that a finding of purposeful discrimination is a finding of fact based largely upon the trial judge's evaluation of credibility and that a reviewing court should accord such a finding great deference. Considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial judge's findings, however, and in light of the entire record, we cannot accord the trial judge's findings such deference in this cause.
We conclude that appellant has established that the prosecutor exercised peremptory challenges based solely on race. The exclusion of even one member of appellant's race from the jury panel for racial reasons invalidates the entire jury selection process. Having been denied due process in the jury selection process, appellant is therefore entitled to a new trial.
Accordingly, we reverse the judgments of the Court of Appeals and the trial court and remand this cause to the trial court so that appellant may have a new trial.
CAMPBELL, J., concurs in the result.
. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986).
. The Batson case had not been decided at the time of this hearing on the amended motion for new trial. Appellant's amended motion for new trial, therefore, did not specifically cite the Bat-son case, but the record indicates appellant's counsel anticipated such a holding, as the Bat-son case was granted certiorari during these hearings, and formed his objections in compliance therewith. Appellant's motion also did not cite Swain, supra, but was phrased in language from that case.
. Since appellant's case was pending on direct review at the time the Batson case was decided, the Batson decision is applicable to it. See Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 107 S.Ct. 708, 93 L.Ed.2d 649 (1987).
. Although the Court of Appeals made the right decision regarding appellant's prima facie showing of purposeful discrimination, the proper procedure is for the trial court to decide whether appellant made such a showing. DeBlanc v. State, 732 S.W.2d 640 (Tex.Cr.App.1987).
. Batson, 106 S.Ct. at 1723, citing Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559, 73 S.Ct. 891, 97 L.Ed. 1244 (1953).
. The prosecutor did not object, however, to the amount of time, or lack thereof, for voir dire. The reason for the short voir dire is not clear in the record. A trial judge may impose reasonable restrictions on the exercise of voir dire examination. Ratliff v. State, 690 S.W.2d 597 (Tex.Cr.App.1985).
. See Keeton II at n. 1.
. See note one of Judge Teague's concurring opinion in Keeton II at 871.