Case Name: HALL v. RICHARDS, GOVERNOR, ET AL.
Court: Supreme Court of South Carolina
Jurisdiction: South Carolina
Decision Date: 1930-11-17
Citations: 159 S.C. 34
Docket Number: 13029
Parties: HALL v. RICHARDS, GOVERNOR, ET AL.
Judges: Mr. Justice Carter concurs.
Reporter: South Carolina Reports
Volume: 159
Pages: 34–55

Head Matter:
13029
HALL v. RICHARDS, GOVERNOR, ET AL.
(156 S. E., 12)
February, 1930.
To D. W. Robinson, Bsq., attorney for plaintiff above named:
Messrs. D. W. Robinson and D. W. Robinson, Jr., for appellant,
Messrs. Thomas & Lumpkin for the R. R. Bryan Co., respondent,
Messrs. John M. Daniel, Attorney General, Cordie Page and J. Ivey Humphrey, Assistants, for the other respondents
November 17, 1930.

Opinion:
The opinion of the Court was delivered by
Mr. Justice StabeEr.
This action was brought by the plaintiff, a citizen and taxpayer of Anderson County, against the Governor, the State Treasurer, the Joint Committee on Printing, R. R. Bryan Company, and the State Highway Commission, for the purpose of having declared null and void a contract made by the Governor and the State Treasurer, on behalf of the State, with the Bryan Company, for engraving the certificates of indebtedness proposed to be issued under the State Highway Bond Act (36 Stat., 670), approved March 14, 1929; and for the further purpose of restraining the payment to that company, on account of such contract, of any funds belonging to the State or to the Highway Commission.
The defendants demurred to the complaint upon the ground, with specifications, that it did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. The matter was heard by his Honor, Judge Ramage, who passed an order sustaining the demurrer and dismissing the complaint, and from that order this appeal is taken.
The appellant contends that the contract for engraving the certificates could be legally let only by the Joint Committee on Printing, upon competitive bids, and to the lowest responsible bidder (Sections 46 to 69 of Code, Vol. 3, 1922), while the position of the respondents is that certain provisions in Sections 1 and 4 of Article 3 of the Bond Act give to the Governor and the State Treasurer authority to let the contract and to award it in the way it was done.
After careful consideration, I am satisfied that the questions presented by the appeal are correctly disposed of by the order of the Circuit Judge, for the reasons therein stated. But, if I should be wrong in this, I think the matter has been set at rest by an Act of the Legislature (Acts of 1930, page 2150), Section 1 of which reads as follows:
"That all Acts or proceedings done and taken by the Governor and the State Treasurer in relation to the sale of $10,-000,000.00 State Highway Certificates of Indebtedness of the State of South Carolina, which were awarded and sold by said officers on March 21, 1930, to the highest bidder are hereby ratified and validated, and the Governor and the State Treasurer are hereby authorized to deliver, the said State Highway Certificates of Indebtedness in accordance with the terms of said sale."
That the Legislature could pass such an Act' is not questioned. The appellant's objections to its validity are disposed of by the decision in Wingfield v. South Carolina Tax Commission, 147 S. C., 116, 144 S. E., 846. The further suggestion that the Act is an attempt to validate merely the actual sale of the bonds is clearly without merit. At the time of the enactment of this statute, the sale had just been negotiated, but the certificates had not been delivered to purchasers, and this suit had already been instituted. It was the evident intention of the Legislature, with, these facts in mind, to set fully at rest, by the passage of the Act, any and all questions as to the validity of the bonds. And the language used, "all Acts or proceedings done and taken in relation to the sale," etc., is most apt and appropriate for that purpose. I think the Act, when properly construed, covers, validates, and confirms every step taken by the Governor and the State Treasurer, in the preparation, issuance, and sale of the certificates, including the letting of the contract in question.
The order appealed from is affirmed.
Mr. Justice Carter concurs.