Case Name: In the Matter of H.M., Appellant, v. E.T., Respondent
Court: New York Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 2010-05-04
Citations: 14 N.Y.3d 521
Docket Number: 
Parties: In the Matter of H.M., Appellant, v E.T., Respondent.
Judges: 
Reporter: New York Reports
Volume: 14
Pages: 521–534

Head Matter:
[930 NE2d 206, 904 NYS2d 285]
In the Matter of H.M., Appellant, v E.T., Respondent.
Argued February 17, 2010;
decided May 4, 2010
POINTS OF COUNSEL
Proskauer Rose LLP, New York City (Peter J.W. Sherwin, Kenneth E. Aldous, Justin F. Heinrich and Nicole Haff of counsel), for appellant.
I. The Family Court has subject matter jurisdiction to determine whether a woman owes a duty of child support. (Matter of Fry v Village of Tarrytown, 89 NY2d 714; Matter of Johna M.S. v Russell E.S., 10 NY3d 364; Matter of Roy v Roy, 109 AD2d 150; Matter of Strom v Lomtevas, 28 AD3d 779; Matter of Tall Trees Constr. Corp. v Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Town of Huntington, 97 NY2d 86; People v Finnegan, 85 NY2d 53; Reddington v Staten Is. Univ. Hosp., 11 NY3d 80; Matter of Karin T. v Michael T, 127 Misc 2d 14; Matter of Carol Y. v David M., 150 AD2d 783; Matter of Lentz, 247 App Div 31.) II. An emotional bond between child and putative parent is not required to satisfy the reliance element of equitable estoppel in the child support context. (Matter of Shondel J. v Mark D., 7 NY3d 320; Matter of Charles v Charles, 296 AD2d 547; Holtslander v Whalen & Sons, 69 NY2d 1016; Matter of Duchnowski, 31 NY2d 991; Matter of Napolitano [Motor Veh. Acc. Indem. Corp.], 21 NY2d 281; Matter of Hunter, 4 NY3d 260; M.S. v K.T., 177 Misc 2d 772; Laura G. v Peter G, 15 Misc 3d 164, affd sub nom. Laura WW. v Peter WW., 51 AD3d 211; Wener v Wener, 35 AD2d 50; Gursky v Gursky, 39 Misc 2d 1083; Maas v Cornell Univ., 94 NY2d 87.)
Nixon Peabody LLP, Rochester (David H. Tennant and Erik A. Goergen of counsel), for respondent.
I. Family Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to hear H.M.’s claim. II. H.M. has not raised, much less established, an equal protection violation. III. H.M.’s petition fails to allege an essential element in any claim that seeks to impose child support obligations based on equitable principles: detrimental reliance by the child. (Feyler v Mortimer, 299 NY 309; Commissioner of Pub. Welfare v Koehler, 284 NY 260; Matter of Spencer v Spencer, 10 NY3d 60; Matter of Shondel J. v Mark D., 7 NY3d 320.)
Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe LLP, New York City (Matthew L. Craner, Lisa M. Cirando and Scott Roehm of counsel), for New York County Lawyers’ Association, amicus curiae.
I. Not allowing this case to proceed in Family Court would frustrate the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act’s very purpose. (Vazquez v Vazquez, 26 AD2d 701; Matter of Child Support Enforcement Unit v John M., 183 Misc 2d 468, 283 AD2d 40.) II. The majority’s decision below deprives H.M., Baby R., and anyone else seeking child support against a woman, of Family Court’s unique resources and expertise. (Matter of Fusco v Roth, 100 Misc 2d 288; Matter of Reid v White, 112 Misc 2d 294; Matter of Child Support Enforcement Unit v John M., 283 AD2d 40; Matter of Powers v Powers, 86 NY2d 63.) III. The Appellate Division majority’s interpretation of Family Court Act article 5 as applying only to men renders the statute unconstitutional. (Orr v Orr, 440 US 268; Craig v Boren, 429 US 190; People v Felix, 58 NY2d 156; Kolmer-Marcus, Inc. v Winer, 32 AD2d 763, 26 NY2d 795; People v Liberta, 64 NY2d 152; Matter of Shondel J. v Mark D., 7 NY3d 320; Anonymous v Anonymous, 151 AD2d 330; Anonymous v Anonymous, 41 Misc 2d 886; Gursky v Gursky, 39 Misc 2d 1083.)
Carmelyn P. Malalis, New York City, for New York City Bar Association, amicus curiae.
I. Children conceived with assisted reproductive technology should be ensured a legal forum and remedy to secure support from their intended second parents. (Matter of L. Pamela P. v Frank S., 59 NY2d 1; Matter of Sebastian, 25 Misc 3d 567; Matter of Michael, 166 Misc 2d 973; Perry Rogers v Fasano, 276 AD2d 67; Troxel v Granville, 530 US 57; Kansas v United States, 214 F3d 1196; Matter of Spencer v Spencer, 10 NY3d 60; Anonymous v Anonymous, 41 Misc 2d 886; Gursky v Gursky, 39 Misc 2d 1083; Laura WW. v Peter WW., 51 AD3d 211.) II. The doctrine of equitable estoppel applies to preclude a person who caused a child to be born with promises of support from disclaiming financial obligations to the child. (Matter of Shondel J v Mark D., 7 NY3d 320; Nassau Trust Co. v Montrose Concrete Prods. Corp., 56 NY2d 175; Matter of Baby Boy C, 84 NY2d 91; Matter of Ettore I. v Angela D., 127 AD2d 6; Matter of Westchester County Dept. of Social Servs. v Robert W.R., 25 AD3d 62; Matter of Sharon GG. v Duane HH., 95 AD2d 466, 63 NY2d 859; Matter of Montelone v Antia, 60 AD2d 603; Laura WW. v Peter WW., 51 AD3d 211; Matter of Vernon J. v Sandra M., 36 AD3d 912; Matter of Griffin v Marshall, 294 AD2d 438.) III. The Family Court has subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate a woman liable for support of a child she intentionally caused to be brought into the world. (Schaschlo v Taishoff, 2 NY2d 408; Matter of Dutchess County Dept. of Social Servs. v Day, 96 NY2d 149; Matter of Spencer v Spencer, 10 NY3d 60; Matter of Aaron J., 80 NY2d 402; Matter of Commissioner of Social Servs. of Franklin County v Bernard B., 87 NY2d 61; Matter of Westchester County Dept. of Social Servs. v Robert W.R., 25 AD3d 62; Matter of Rachelle L. v Bruce M., 89 AD2d 765; Matter of Lisa M. UU. v Mario D. VV., 78 AD2d 711; Matter of Carter v Carter, 58 AD2d 438; Califano v Westcott, 443 US 76.) IV As held by the Second Department and conceded by E.T., the Supreme Court has concurrent jurisdiction to hear claims for support brought against a woman. (Sohn v Calderon, 78 NY2d 755; Thrasher v United States Liab. Ins. Co., 19 NY2d 159; Vazquez v Vazquez, 26 AD2d 701; Kagen v Kagen, 21 NY2d 532; Doe v New York City Bd. of Health, 5 Misc 3d 424; Matter of Strom v Lomtevas, 28 AD3d 779; Matter of Child Support Enforcement Unit v John M., 183 Misc 2d 468, 283 AD2d 40.)

Opinion:
OPINION OF THE COURT
Ciparick, J.
This appeal presents the issue whether Family Court has subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate a support petition brought pursuant to the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA) (Family Ct Act art 5-B) by a biological parent seeking child support from her former same-sex partner. We hold that Family Court possesses subject matter jurisdiction to hear such a petition.
H.M. seeks child support from E.T. According to H.M.'s allegations, which we must take as true for present purposes, the parties were involved in a romantic relationship in New York from 1989 through 1995, and cohabited during much, if not all, of that period. During the first year of their relationship, they planned to conceive and raise a child together, discussing, among other things, available methods of conception, child-rearing practices, and whether the child would be raised as a sibling of E.T.'s children from a prior relationship. In 1993, after many failed attempts, H.M. became pregnant by artificial insemination. E.T. performed the procedure by which H.M. was inseminated.
H.M. gave birth to a son in September 1994. E.T. was present at the delivery and cut the umbilical cord, and the parties shared the expenses associated with the conception and birth of the child. After the child's birth, both parties participated in his care. However, four months after the child was born, E.T. ended the relationship. H.M., a Canadian citizen, moved into her parents' residence in Montreal with the child. An attempted reconciliation in 1997 failed, although E.T. continued to provide H.M. with gifts for the child and monetary contributions for the child's care at unspecified times after the parties' separation.
In 2006, H.M. filed an application in Ontario, Canada, seeking a declaration of parentage and an order of child support establishing monthly payments retroactive to the child's birth. Pursuant to the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act, H.M.'s application was transferred to Family Court, Rockland County.
At an appearance before a Family Court Support Magistrate, E.T. moved to dismiss the petition on jurisdictional grounds. The Support Magistrate dismissed the petition, agreeing with E.T. that no legal basis for jurisdiction existed. H.M. filed written objections to the Support Magistrate's order, and Family Court subsequently reversed the order of dismissal and ordered a hearing to determine whether E.T. should be equitably estopped from denying parentage and support obligations (16 Misc 3d 1136[A], 2007 NY Slip Op 51711[U]).
E.T. appealed. The Appellate Division, with two Justices dissenting, reversed and reinstated the Support Magistrate's order dismissing the petition for lack of subject matter jurisdiction (see Matter of H.M. v E.T., 65 AD3d 119 [2d Dept 2009]).
H.M. appeals as of right pursuant to CPLR 5601 (a) from the Appellate Division order reinstating the Support Magistrate's order of dismissal, and we now reverse.
In 1996, the United States Congress required each state to enact the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act, to ensure uniformity in interstate actions for the establishment, enforcement, and modification of spousal and child support orders (see 42 USC § 666 [f]; Matter of Spencer v Spencer, 10 NY3d 60, 65 [2008]). New York adopted UIFSA in 1997, designating Family Court as our UIFSA "tribunal" (see Family Ct Act § 580-102 ["The family court is the tribunal of this state"]). With respect to the law to be applied by Family Court, UIFSA states that
"[e]xcept as otherwise provided by this article, a responding tribunal of this state:
"(1) shall apply the procedural and substantive law, including the rules on choice of law, generally applicable to similar proceedings originating in this state and may exercise all powers and provide all remedies available in those proceedings-, and
"(2) shall determine the duty of support and the amount payable in accordance with the law and support guidelines of this state" (Family Ct Act § 580-303 [emphasis added]).
Article VI of the State Constitution establishes "[t]he family court of the state of New York" (NY Const, art VI, § 13 [a]). We have previously explained that Family Court is a court of limited jurisdiction, constrained to exercise only those powers granted to it by the State Constitution or by statute (see Matter of Johna M.S. v Russell E.S., 10 NY3d 364, 366 [2008]). Thus, in addition to establishing Family Court, the Constitution enumerates the powers thereof. Among the "classes of actions and proceedings" over which the Constitution grants Family Court jurisdiction are proceedings to determine "the support of dependents except for support incidental to actions and proceedings in this state for marital separation, divorce, annulment of marriage or dissolution of marriage" (NY Const, art VI, § 13 [b] [4]). Article 4 of the Family Court Act more specifically defines Family Court's role with respect to support.
Specifically, of particular relevance here, article 4 of the Family Court Act, entitled "Support Proceedings," provides, among other things, that
"the parents of a child under the age of twenty-one years are chargeable with the support of such child and, if possessed of sufficient means or able to earn such means, shall be required to pay for child support a fair and reasonable sum as the court may determine" (Family Ct Act § 413 [1] [a] [emphasis added]).
Family Court indisputably has jurisdiction to determine whether an individual parent—regardless of gender—is responsible for the support of a child (see Family Ct Act § 413 [1] [a]). Moreover, statutory jurisdiction—as Family Court has—carries with it such ancillary jurisdiction as is necessary to fulfill the court's core function (see Higgins v Sharp, 164 NY 4, 8 [1900]; see also Loomis v Loomis, 288 NY 222, 224 [1942]). Thus, because Family Court unquestionably has the subject matter jurisdiction to ascertain the support obligations of a female parent, Family Court also has the inherent authority to ascertain in certain cases whether a female respondent is, in fact, a child's parent.
Article 4 of the Family Court Act establishes the public policy of the State in favor of obligating individuals, regardless of gender, to provide support for their children. The dissent argues that such relief can be afforded only in Supreme Court, a court of original trial jurisdiction. However, as the two dissenting Justices below found, Family Court and Supreme Court have coextensive authority—concurrent jurisdiction—in relation to child support matters. The Domestic Relations Law and the Family Court Act are identical in the establishment of statewide child support guidelines applicable to all child support proceedings, whether brought initially in Family Court or brought in Supreme Court as ancillary to a matrimonial action or custody proceeding. Moreover, under the guidelines adopted in New York as the Child Support Standards Act (L 1989, ch 567), both parents have an obligation to contribute to the economic well-being of their children. The relevant coextensive statutes— Family Court Act § 413 and Domestic Relations Law § 240—are capable of being enforced in a fashion that does not disadvantage a litigant in Family Court.
In short, because H.M. asserts that E.T. is the child's parent, and is therefore chargeable with the child's support, this case is within the Family Court's article 4 jurisdiction. We have no occasion to decide whether it is also, as the Family Court and the Appellate Division dissent concluded, within that court's article 5 jurisdiction. Nor do we decide the merits of H.M.'s support claim.
Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should be reversed, with costs, and the case remitted to the Appellate Division for consideration of questions raised but not determined on the appeal to that court.
Smith, J. (concurring in Debra H. v Janice R. and Matter of H.M. v E.T.).