Case Name: PEOPLE v. SPENCER; PEOPLE v. BOOKER
Court: Michigan Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1973-03-26
Citations: 45 Mich. App. 440
Docket Number: Docket No. 11883
Parties: PEOPLE v SPENCER PEOPLE v BOOKER
Judges: Before: V. J. Brennan, P. J., and Levin and O’Hara, JJ.
Reporter: Michigan appeals reports; cases decided in the Michigan Court of Appeals.
Volume: 45
Pages: 440–452

Head Matter:
PEOPLE v SPENCER PEOPLE v BOOKER
Opinion op the Court
1. Criminal Law — Instructions to Jury — Judicial Comments.
A trial judge does not commit reversible error when, in his instructions, he correctly summarizes the theory of the defense as being alibi and not particularly that the crime in question was not committed.
2. Criminal Law — Assistance op Counsel — Effective Counsel— Testimonial Hearing.
A trial court need not order a testimonial hearing upon a motion for new trial based upon a bare allegation of inadequacy of representation of counsel where the facts are not of record; he must have something more before him to justify such a "testimonial hearing” than a mere complaint.
Dissent by Levin, J.
3. Criminal Law — Assistance of Counsel — Effective Counsel— Testimonial Hearing.
Allegations in a motion for new trial that lineup identiñcations and in-court identiñcations of defendants were tainted by observation of the defendants by the identifying witnesses before the lineup, and that no objections were made by defendants’ counsel, were sufScient to require a testimonial hearing, because if the in-court identiñcations did not have an independent origin and if the failure to object was the result of a mistake by their lawyer then the defendants might be entitled to a new trial.
4. Criminal Law — Assistance of Counsel — Effective Counsel— Testimonial Hearing.
The allegations that because defendant’s trial lawyer did not question the validity of the arrest and the admissibility of evidence seized amounted to inadequate representation of counsel was sufficient to require a testimonial hearing where the record disclosed that the arrest of one of the defendants was based on questionable identiñcation by the police and witnesses and defendants ought to be able to explore the validity of such arrest in a testimonial hearing.
References for Points in Headnotes
[1] 53 Am Jür, Trial §§ 650-660.
[2-4] 53 Am Jur, Trial § 459.
Appeal from Recorder’s Court of Detroit, John R. Murphy, J.
Submitted Division 1 October 11, 1972, at Detroit.
(Docket No. 11883.)
Decided March 26, 1973.
Leave to appeal denied, 390 Mich 754.
Panel Spencer and Leslie Booker were convicted of manslaughter. Defendants appeal.
Affirmed.
Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Robert A. Derengoski, Solicitor General, William L. Cahalan, Prosecuting Attorney, Dominick R. Carnovale, Chief, Appellate Department, and Luvenia D. Dockett, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for the people.
Fred K. Persons, for defendants on appeal.
Before: V. J. Brennan, P. J., and Levin and O’Hara, JJ.
Former Supreme Court Justice, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment pursuant to Const 1963, art 6, § 23 as amended in 1968.

Opinion:
O'Hara, J.
This is an appeal of right by two defendants from a conviction of manslaughter, MCLA 750.321; MSA 28.553. There was one trial. Both defendants were represented by the same retained counsel. Other counsel represents them on appeal.
There are 12 assignments of error. One contains seven subdivisions. We have examined them all. Those we do not discuss have not been disregarded. Rather we consider them to have raised issues not preserved on appeal or to have been of insufficient substance to merit decisional discussion.
The people accepted defendants' statement of facts except for what they call "some biased opinions and matters not of record". We will endeavor to avoid the controversial areas.
This much is undisputed. Defendant Spencer's home was burglarized. A substantial amount of personal property was taken. Some time subsequent thereto Spencer contends he received an anonymous telephone call advising him that the stolen property was at 3884 Crane in Detroit and that the thiefs name was Jerry Rollins. Spencer, together with codefendant Booker and one Washington, went to a precinct police station and reported this. Spencer asked if a search warrant could be obtained. The police sergeant advised him the identity of the caller was necessary. Spencer then inquired if he could go to the specified premises, ask for Rollins, and while at the door possibly see if his television set was in the living room. The police indicated that much would be permissible, but not to "cause any difficulty". The foregoing took place around 7:30 p.m. At 9 p.m., or thereabouts, decedent who resided at 3884 Crane was killed. A pathologist testified the cause of death was shotgun wounds to the head and chest. The police were informed of the homicide and were furnished a description of several persons at, near, and behind the involved residence at the time of the shooting. They went to the Spencer residence about 1 a.m. They were admitted by Spencer's wife. While in the dining room, the police detective saw Spencer place an object later identified as a pistol on a buffet in the dining room. The detective placed Spencer under arrest, searched him permissibly for offensive weapons, and found 16 shotgun shells in his jacket pocket.
Defendant Booker was arrested the following morning. Both were charged with second-degree murder. Both were bound over on the charge of manslaughter. The second-degree murder count was dismissed by the magistrate.
There is no point in discussing the minutiae of the testimony and the conflicts therein. Various witnesses identified defendants as being at the scene of the fatal shooting. Others picked them out of a lineup at which counsel of their choice was present.
There was the usual amount of dilution of lineup identification and identification at the scene. No conflict existed as to the fact that at the scene, at the time, there was a gold Cadillac. Spencer owns a gold Cadillac. The shotgun and pistol taken from the Spencer home were admitted in evidence. Witnesses testified to having heard shotgun and pistol fire at the scene.
In substance the defense was that after defendants' visit to the police station on the night in question they went to their respective homes and did not leave. This contention was supported by testimony of the defendants and their wives. Obviously the jury rejected it.
We believe the indicia of defendants' complicity was sufficient to have justified the arrest. The proofs adduced on examination supported binding the defendants over for trial. Under our system the ultimate determination of the truth or falsity of the testimony of the various witnesses for the people and defendants was left to the jury. Absent legal error, ours is not to disturb their finding.
What are the legal errors complained of? First, it is contended that the arrests which were made without warrants were made on less than probable cause. The point is academic. Subsequent valid arrests with warrants were made.
The question as to admission of the pistol and shotgun as exhibits is not before us for review. No motion to suppress was made.
Appellate counsel argued most vigorously that the trial judge in his instructions committed reversible error when he said:
"I do not believe that [defense counsel] argued terribly much about the elements of this case, whether or not a manslaughter had been proved. I believe it is their theory that they were not present and they do not particularly say that a manslaughter was not committed. They are saying that they were not present at all at the time of the commission."
Perhaps it was not necessary for the trial judge to mention what the defense was not, rather than what it was. If it were error at all it certainly was not reversible error. As far as the proofs are concerned there can be no question that decedent was the victim of a felonious killing of some kind. There was no suggestion of a self-inflicted wound, nor an accidental shooting. No question of self defense or any other kind of justification was ever mentioned. At best or worst the trial judge simply summarized for the jury the theory of the defense and in so doing mentioned that they need not particularly question the fact that manslaughter had been committed. We cannot forego mentioning that they would have been ill circumstanced to challenge the court's statement. According to them and their witnesses they were not present and thus must have been totally unaware of what took place. We find no reversible error in the quoted excerpt of the charge.
Next, defendants claim there was a conflict of interest on the part of their trial counsel in representing them both. We can find no conflict of interest. Counsel was retained. He conducted the defense. Both defendants relied heavily on the fact that they were not and could not have been at the scene at the time of the fatality. It was a joint defense — whence the conflict? We find none.
There is an allegation of error based upon an alleged improper offer of a bargained plea to one defendant, on a charge of felonious assault in return for a dismissal of the manslaughter charge. Whatever the facts are no such bargain was even made. We cannot see how the allegation affects the outcome of the case.
Then comes the more and more frequently asserted contention of ineffective representation or assistance of counsel. This is made in this case together with the contention that since defendants asserted this error they are entitled as of right to a testimonial hearing on the issue. The principle authority cited is People v Jelks, 33 Mich App 425, 431 (1971). Particular reliance is placed on the following language from Jelks:
"A convicted person who attacks the adequacy of the representation he received at his trial must prove his claim. To the extent his claim depends on facts not of record, it is incumbent on him to make a testimonial record at the trial court level in connection with a motion for a new trial which evidentially supports his claim and which excludes reasonable hypotheses consistent with the view that his trial lawyer represented him adequately."
Quite so, and so be it. But we do not read this language to mean that every bare allegation of inadequacy of representation upon a motion for a new trial mandates that the trial court must order a "testimonial hearing". We reject the contention, and decisionally so hold. The question is thus framed for review and disposition by the Supreme Court if we are wrong. We find no conflict in this holding with recently decided Holt v State Bar Grievance Board, 388 Mich 50 (1972), authored by Mr. Justice Williams. To us that case says that an indigent defendant is entitled to the same conscientious endeavors by his appointed counsel as is the better circumstanced defendant who retains counsel of his choice. Surely this is fundamental and is the underlying concept of furnishing the indigent counsel at all. If Jelks, supra, is relevant it is only to the point that the trial judge who presided over the case was alert to any miscarriage of justice and felt he must have something more before him to justify a "testimonial hearing" than mere complaint. We agree.
The danger of a more restricted holding is to deny the advocate his hard earned prerogative and professional birthright to adopt his own trial tactics and strategy.
The trial judge at the time of the sentencing observed:
"I did not disagree with the verdict of the jury. If I disagreed with anything I disagreed with the examining magistrate that reduced the charge from murder in the second degree to manslaughter."
Under our system as constitutionally ordained and implemented by court rule, statute, and case precedent, defendants had a fair trial. We can do naught but affirm.
V. J. Brennan, P. J., concurred.