Case Name: Glover v. Henry
Court: Arkansas Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Arkansas
Decision Date: 1959-11-02
Citations: 231 Ark. 111
Docket Number: 5-2020
Parties: Glover v. Henry.
Judges: Johnson, J., dissents.
Reporter: Arkansas Reports
Volume: 231
Pages: 111–127

Head Matter:
Glover v. Henry.
5-2020
328 S. W. 2d 382
Opinion delivered November 2, 1959.
Warren & Bullion, for appellant.
Frank Holt, Prosecuting Attorney, Bruce Bennett, Atty. General, Howard Cockrill, Ilerschel H. Friday, Jr., for appellee.

Opinion:
George Rose Smith, J.
This is a suit by the appellant, as a taxpayer and school teacher, for a declaratory judgment fixing the interpretation to be placed upon two recent statutes affecting the public schools, Act 248 of 1959 and Act 9 of the 1958 special session. The appellees, the members of the County Board of Election Commissioners and of the Little Rock School Board, reduced the issues to questions of law by demurring to the complaint. The chancellor entered a decree construing both statutes in a manner contrary to the plaintiff's contentions, and she has appealed.
The controversy as to Act 248 may be disposed of in two paragraphs. The title states that this act is to require that the annual school election be held on the last Saturday in September, but the body of the act provides that the election is to be held on the first Tuesday in December. The legislative journals show that the conflict arose in this way: The act was introduced as a Senate bill to change the election date to the last Saturday in September. Senate Journal of 1959, p. 70. The House, without changing the title, amended the text of the bill to fix the date as the first Tuesday in December. House Journal, p. 868. The Senate concurred in the amendment, Senate Journal, p. 1667, and thus the bill as approved by both houses contained the variance between title and text.
The appellant contends that this conflict renders the act void and hence leaves the election date to be determined by prior laws. The chancellor was right in rejecting this contention. The title of an act may be considered in arriving at the legislative intention, but the title "is still no part of the act and is not controlling in its construction." Special School Dist. No. 33 v. Howard, 124 Ark. 475, 187 S. W. 444. We have accordingly held, in a case closely similar to this one, that it is necessary to disregard words in the title which the legislature neglected to change when the corresponding language in the body of the measure was deleted by amendment. Morgan v. Hattendorf, 210 Ark. 495, 197 S. W. 2d 477. That principle is controlling in the case at bar; the chancellor's construction of Act 248 is therefore affirmed.
The remaining issues arise under Act 9 of the 1958 special session. The parties have not questioned the constitutionality of this act, and ordinarily we would not consider that issue, in view of the familiar rule that points not properly raised are deemed to have been waived. Campbell v. Beaver Bayou Dr. Dist., 215 Ark. 187, 219 S. W. 2d 934; Latham v. Hudson, 226 Ark. 673, 292 S. W. 2d 252. Here, however, the appellant in her capacity as a taxpayer represents the general public, and we have recognized the fact that persons acting in a representative capacity do not have an unlimited right to control the litigation, as is normally true in purely private cases. Pafford v. Hall, 217 Ark. 734, 233 S. W. 2d 72. Since the validity of Act 9 is undoubtedly a matter of public interest we deem it better to express our view on this point than to leave this important question open to doubt.
Act 9 establishes a procedure for the recall of school directors and provides in § 8 that vacancies created under the act are to be filled by the county board of education. The constitutional question is whether the vesting of the appointive power in the county board of education rather than in the governor violates this language in constitutional amendment No. 29: "Vacancies in the office of United States Senator, and in all elective state, district, circuit, county, and township offices except those of Lieutenant Governor, Member of the General Assembly and Representative in Congress of the United States, shall be filled by appointment by the Governor."
The difficulty is that of determining the scope of the word "district" in the enumeration of elective officers. It is obvious that the word was intended to refer to the offices of prosecuting attorney and chancellor, for their districts fall between the state and the county in geographical area, and the word district is so placed in the enumeration. The question is whether the term "district" was chosen not only as a means of referring to prosecuting attorneys and chancellors but also as a means of referring to school directors, who are elected by school districts.
Our study of the amendment convinces us that there can be no reasonable doubt of the fact that school directors do not come within the scope of the amendment. No less than three pertinent considerations point compellingly to this conclusion.
First, a familiar and sensible rule of constitutional interpretation requires that the word district be read in the light of its context. The amendment refers to all elective state, district, circuit, county, and township offices. This enumeration, extending from the state constitutional officers down to the township justice of the peace, encompasses those public officers who are mentioned elsewhere in the constitution and who exercise in some measure the state's governmental powers. The office of school director does not fit at all harmoniously into the enumeration. This office is not a part of the constitutional scheme. It is a subordinate administrative position, created by statute only, and exercises only the limited powers possessed by the school district. See Schmutz v. Special Sch. Dist. of Little Rock, 78 Ark. 118, 95 S. W. 438. It is not reasonable to suppose that the word district was selected for the purpose of bringing into the enumeration an office that differs sharply from all the others listed.
Secondly, § 4 of Amendment 29 contemplates that the successors to the governor's appointees will be elected at the general election and will take office on the following January first. The constitution has always provided that elective state, district, circuit, county, and township officers be elected at the general election, Schedule, § 3, and Art. 3, § 8; so Amendment 29 creates a workable plan for filling vacancies in these offices. On the other hand, school directors have never been elected at the general election. From 1875 to 1931 they were selected at an annual meeting of the patrons of the district, held on the third Saturday in May. C. & M. Dig., § 8909. By Act 169 of 1931, § 81, the date was changed to the first Tuesday in March, and by Act 30 of 1935, § 3, which was in force when Amendment 29 was adopted, the school election date was fixed as the third Saturday in March. It is wholly impossible to apply the provisions of § 4 of Amendment 29 to, the office of school director, owing to the fact that the school board members are not selected at the general election.
Thirdly, in construing a constitutional amendment it is helpful to determine what changes the amendment was intended to make in the existing law. Bradley v. Hall, 220 Ark. 925, 251 S. W. 2d 470. Amendment 29 provides that the governor shall fill vacancies in the office of United States senator and in all elective state, district, circuit, county, and township offices except lieutenant governor, member of the legislature, and member of Congress. It is significant that these provisions made no substantial change in the law as it already existed, for the governor had the power to fill vacancies in the office of United States senator (Pope's Dig., § 11807) and in the designated elective offices (Const., Art. 6, § 23) with the exception of the lieutenant governor (Amendment 6, § 5), member of the legislature (Const., Art. 5, § 6), and member of Congress (Pope's Dig., § 4676). Thus the purpose of Amendment 29 was not to create a new appointive power in the chief executive; it was to reaffirm the existing law as á basis for the operation of the other provisions in the amendment. Vacancies upon school boards were not filled by the governor when the amendment was adopted, Pope's Dig. § 11524, and we find it impossible to believe that the word district was inserted in the amendment for the purpose of creating a new power of appointment pertaining to school directors only. Had that been the intention of the draftsman he could easily have inserted the phrase "school district" in the enumeration, be tween county and township. The absence of any such reference to school districts convinces us that they were not meant to come within the scope of the amendment.
Turning from the constitutional question the other issue is that of determining whether, under Act 9, a person appointed to succeed a recalled school board member serves (a) for the entire unexpired term of the recalled member or (b) only until the next regular annual school election. The chancellor adopted the latter view.
The pertinent facts are recited in the complaint and admitted by the demurrer. In the spring of 1959 three of the six members of the Little Rock School Board were recalled at a special election conducted under the provisions of Act 9. In accordance with the act Mackey was appointed to succeed one recalled member, Rowland, whose term would have expired in 1959; McDonald was appointed to succeed another recalled member, Laster, whose term would have expired in 1960; and Cottrell was appointed to succeed the third recalled member, McKinley, whose term would have expired in 1961. Upon the first branch of this case we have already held that a school election must be held on the first Tuesday in December of 1959. It is conceded that a successor to Mackey must be chosen at that election, for the unexpired term being filled by Mackey expires in 1959. The disputed question is whether the other two appointees are to remain in office until the expiration of their predecessors' terms or only until the positions can be filled by popular vote at the annual school election. The answer to this question must be found in the provisions of Act 9.
This act (with a minor amendment contained in Act 19 of 1959) is the only statute having to do with the recall of school board members. The first six sections of the act establish a procedure by which the electors of any school district may petition for an election to determine whether one or more school board members are to be recalled by majority vote. The act provides for the appointment of persons to succeed recalled board mem bers, but it contains no explicit language governing the duration of the appointee's term of office. The solution to that inquiry must be discovered in these three sections of the act:
"Section 7. In the event that a majority of the qualified electors voting at the election shall vote in favor of removing the subject school board member or members, a vacancy or vacancies are hereby declared to exist.
"Section 8. Vacancies occurring under the provisions of this act shall be filled by the County Board of Education. Not more than one election for recall shall be held under the provisions hereof in any one school year. Persons appointed to fill the vacancies hereunder may also be recalled under the provisions of this act.
"Section 9. All laws and parts of laws in conflict herewith are hereby repealed except Act 30, Ark. Acts of 1935, § 4 (Ark. Stats, (1947) § 80-504), pertaining to vacancies occurring other than under the terms of this act.''
After studying the act carefully and long we are of the opinion that § 8 contains the only clear and reliable guide to the legislative intention. That is the only section in which the lawmakers turned their attention to the matter of filling vacancies created by a recall election. On that subject two pertinent, unequivocal declarations are made: First, not more than one recall election shall be held in any one school year. Secondly, persons appointed to fill vacancies arising under the act may also be recalled under its provisions.
It can be demonstrated with complete certainty that the second declaration becomes completely meaningless if an appointee is to serve only until the next annual school election. Since only one recall election can be held within a year, it follows that an appointee must serve for more than a year in order to be subject to recall, as the act declares him to be. But, if we adopt the appellees' contention that an appointee serves only until the next annual school election, it would be impossible for any appointee ever to serve more than a year and thus be subject to recall, for an annual school election must always be held within a year after the first recall election. Hence the legislative assertion that appointees are subject to recall becomes mere surplusage under the appellees' construction of the act.
On the other hand, the provision is meaningful and effective if the view is taken that an appointed board member serves until the end of his predecessor's term. It is a familiar rule of law that we must, if possible, give effect to all the language that the legislature sees fit to insert in a statute. We are not at liberty to reduce any section or sentence to a nullity if some meaning and some effect can be given to the wording of the law. Cypress Creek Dr. Dist. v. Wolfe, 109 Ark. 60, 158 S. W. 960. Unless we are to strike out, arbitrarily, the legislature's explicit command that appointees are subject to recall under the terms of the act, there is no logical or defensible basis for saying that the lawmakers did not intend for such appointees to serve beyond the date of the next annual school election.
The appellees, tacitly conceding the force of the appellant's argument under § 8 of the act, suggest that a contrary legislative intention may be found in § 9. That section provides that all laws conflicting with Act 9 are repealed, with the exception of § 4 of Act 30 of 1935, "pertaining to vacancies occurring other than under the terms of this act." The cited section of the 1935 statute provides, with respect to school boards in general, that vacancies shall be filled by the remaining directors or, in certain cases, by the county judge, and that all directors so appointed shall serve only until the next annual school election.
We are unable to find, in the legislature's reference to the 1935 statute, any indication that its provisions were being embodied in the 1958 law; indeed, counsel frankly concede that this interpretation can be reached only if one strikes out some of the words in § 9 and substitutes others of his own choosing. No principle of statutory construction calls for that action on our part. Section 9 of the act, as worded by the legislature, has a meaning not difficult to ascertain. The lawmakers evidently believed that the 1935 act should be expressly protected against the possibility of an implied repeal — a possibility that came about because Act 9 provided a new and different method for filling vacancies on the school board. But in preserving the older law the legislature took occasion to point out that it pertained "to vacancies occurring other than under the terms of" Act 9. To say that the 1935 statute applies to vacancies arising under Act 9 would be to proceed in the teeth of the lawmakers' express declaration to the contrary.
With respect to Act 9 the decree is reversed and the cause remanded with directions to overrule the appellees' demurrer.
Johnson, J., dissents.