Case Name: Charles Benjamin NICHOLS, Appellant, v. Billy Dean McGRAW and Gerlach Motor Company of Milton, Florida, Inc., a Corporation, Appellees
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1963-04-18
Citations: 152 So. 2d 486
Docket Number: No. D-312
Parties: Charles Benjamin NICHOLS, Appellant, v. Billy Dean McGRAW and Gerlach Motor Company of Milton, Florida, Inc., a Corporation, Appellees.
Judges: WIGGINTON, J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 152
Pages: 486–496

Head Matter:
Charles Benjamin NICHOLS, Appellant, v. Billy Dean McGRAW and Gerlach Motor Company of Milton, Florida, Inc., a Corporation, Appellees.
No. D-312.
District Court of Appeal of Florida. First District.
April 18, 1963.
Rehearing Denied May 15, 1963.
William W. Henderson, Jr., of Fisher & Hepner, Pensacola, for appellant.
A. L. Johnson, Milton, and Beggs, Lane, Daniel, Middlebrooks & Gaines, Pensacola, for appellees.

Opinion:
RAWLS, Judge.
Appellant-plaintiff, Charles Benjamin Nichols, in various capacities sued appellee-defendants McGraw and Gerlach Motor Company for damages arising out of an automobile accident. After the pleadings were settled plaintiff Nichols moved for a summary final judgment against each defendant and defendant Gerlach concurrently moved for a summary final judgment in its favor. The motions were based upon the pleadings, depositions and documentary evidence presented to the trial judge. At this stage of the proceeding after setting forth all of his conclusions in a detailed memorandum opinion, the trial judge entered a summary final judgment in favor of defendant Gerlach and denied plaintiff's motion for summary judgment as to the liability of defendant McGraw.
Plaintiff now appeals from the order and summary final judgment entered by the trial court.
We will confine our discussion to that portion of the record that affects defendants Gerlach and McGraw.
The tragic occurrence giving cause to this lawsuit could well be termed a "Christmas accident." A fair appraisal of the facts as presented in the depositions and documentary evidence reflects that McGraw was an automobile salesman employed by Gerlach Motor Company at Milton, Florida. At the close of business on the night of December 23, he attended a Christmas party that the motor company gave for its employees. Shortly before 9:00 P.M. Mc-Graw departed the party, stopped by a jewelry store in Milton, bought a Christmas present for his wife and a few minutes after 9:00 P.M. proceeded towards Pensacola to deliver Christmas presents to friends. At about 9:30 P.M., McGraw attempted to pass an automobile driven by plaintiff, who was also proceeding west, and sideswiped another automobile (owned and operated by defendant Gillman) which was parked in the east bound traffic lane. This impact caused McGraw's vehicle to strick Nichols' automobile, resulting in the death of Nichols' wife and child.
The main issue confronting us is the propriety of the summary judgment entered in favor of Gerlach. To reach this issue, we must consider the complaint coupled with the proofs and determine whether same presented a material question of fact with reference to the following theories:
1. Liability of Gerlach predicated upon its ownership of the automobile driven by McGraw at the time of the accident.
2. A determination of Gerlach's liability, by reason of it permitting Mc-Graw the unrestricted use of its dealer's tag.
The main thrust of plaintiff's argument goes toward the employer-employee relationship existing between Gerlach and Mc-Graw and the use by McGraw of a demonstrator with the dealer's tag in carrying out the duties of his employment. Additional facts most favorable to plaintiff in support of his position show: McGraw was required to purchase a new automobile in order to be able to demonstrate the products stocked by his employer, and that such an arrangement was of benefit to Gerlach. To encourage its new car salesmen to purchase and operate new demonstrators, Gerlach sold such demonstrators, including the demonstrator owned and driven by McGraw, at cost and aided in arranging for the salesmen a favorable finance plan which was not available to the general public. Gerlach furnished one of its dealer's tags to McGraw for his unrestricted use, which tag was by law only available for use in Gerlach's business. It was a standard practice for Gerlach's salesmen to make night calls in selling automobiles and, therefore, McGraw was "on duty" at all times. Plaintiff views these facts as establishing liability under the principles of law applicable to (1) respondeat superior and (2) estoppel on Gerlach's part to deny ownership.
We find in Joel v. Morison an early statement by the English courts as to the liability of a master for his servant's negligent acts. There, the pedestrian plaintiff was crossing the common highway and was struck by a horse and cart which was alleged to have been negligently operated by the defendant's servant. The court in sustaining the verdict for the plaintiff stated on page 1339:
"If he [the servant] was going out of his way against his master's implied commands, when driving on the master's business, he will make his master liable; but if he was going on a frolic of his own, without being at all on his master's business, the master will not be liable."
Anderson v. Southern Cotton Oil Company is the landmark case of this jurisdiction dealing with the liability of a master for his servant's negligent acts resulting in an automobile accident. There, the employee of the defendant company used an automobile owned by it in transacting the business of the company and incidentally drove it to lunch picking up his girl friend on the way. During the course of his lunch expedition the driver had an accident and the company defended on the premise that the driver was not operating the vehicle in the course of its business. The Supreme Court, in reversing a directed verdict for the defendant, held that it was a question for the jury to determine whether the employee driver was acting within the express or implied authority of the defendant at the time of the accident. After trial of this case and on a subsequent appeal the Supreme Court applied the dangerous instrumentality doctrine holding that an automobile, being a dangerous machine when operated upon the public highways, renders its owner responsible for the manner in which it is used and his liability extends to its use by anyone with his knowledge and consent.
In Wolfe v. City of Miami the owner of the automobile was employed by the city as a foreman who supervised the working of convict laborers. The foreman entrusted his automobile (for which the city furnished gasoline, oil, repairs, and a municipal tag with which to operate same in the city's business) to a convict, and sent him after food for the other convicts whom the city was under the duty to feed. The convict had an accident in returning with the food. The court, in placing liability under these circumstances upon the city, stated the following on page 541 of 134 So.:
"Such automobile was therefore to all intents and purposes an automobile of the city of Miami which was intrusted by an authorized city employee to the negro convict
In Western Union Telegraph Company v. Michel the telegraph company employed a messenger who furnished his own motorcycle for the delivery of messages for the company. This messenger was involved in an accident while returning to the company's office after eating his lunch. In finding that the ownership of the motorcycle was not material, the Supreme Court held that if a motorcycle was being used in the business of the defendant with its knowledge and consent, it could not avoid liability for the negligent use of it. The court further held the rule is well settled that a master is responsible for the torts committed by his servant in the scope and range of his employment, and is liable for those committed in a slight deviation or departure from his business, but when the deviation or departure of a servant amounts to an abandonment of the master's business and the undertaking of an enterprise or mission of his own without the master's consent, knowledge, or approval and having no relation to the master's business, then the master cannot be held liable for torts so committed.
That the owner of a motor vehicle is not liable under any or all circumstances is evidenced by Ford Motor Company v. Floyd. There, DesChamps, an employee who was allowed the use of a company car, picked up a woman friend while returning from a business trip and carried her for the weekend to Jacksonville Beach, where they rented a cottage. On Sunday morning the woman drove the company's car to another part of town to procure ice and a newspaper. While returning to the cottage where she had left DesChamps, she was involved in a serious automobile accident resulting in the death of two people. The Supreme Court in reversing the judgment against Ford Motor Company held that no liability existed on the part of Ford in that it was clearly shown that the automobile was not being operated with its consent. The court further stated on page 602 of 188 So.:
"It is plainly apparent from the record that when the defendant DesChamps reached the city from a journey on behalf of his company that business was for the nonce completed. The continuation of his activities from that time was a junket, having no connection whatever with the business in mind at the beginning of the week when the car was placed in his control for the express purpose of tending the affairs of his employer."
In Wilson v. Burke an owner-driver leased his truck-tractor to Great Southern Trucking Company for the purpose of operating same in the company's business under its licenses and permits. The right hand door of the truck had painted upon it "Operated by Great Southern Trucking Co. I.C.C. Cer. M.C. 2900", and the truck bore a Florida Railroad and Public Utilities Commission tag on the front which had been issued by reason of Great Southern's application. The actual title to the truck was vested in - the owner-operator. The accident occurred while the truck was not being operated in the business of the company. In upholding the trial court's ruling denying the trucking company the right to introduce the title certificate to the truck and the lease papers, it appears that the Supreme Court held that the trucking company was the real owner of the truck in that it had all of the indicia of ownership including dominion thereof even though the bare legal title was not vested in it.
McAllister v. Miami Daily News involves similar allegations as found here with reference to the doctrine of respondeat superior. This case involved an accident concerning one Frutkoff, an employee of the Miami Daily News, who utilized his automobile at times in the business of his employer. There, in sustaining a directed verdict in favor of Miami Daily News the Supreme Court stated on page 614 of 17 So.2d:
" [B]ecause the evidence failed to establish that Frutkoff, at the time of the collision, was acting within the scope of his employment or was then pursuing his employment or doing anything to advance the interest of the Miami Daily News when plaintiff was injured, but the evidence established that Frutkoff at the time of the injury was operating his own automobile and engaged in a mission of his own and not that of the Miami Daily News."
In Foremost Dairies, Inc. of the South v. Godwin we find a similar situation. In the Foremost case its employee D. W. Howell utilized his automobile in the business of his employer. Foremost kept the Howell car in repair, paid for the licenses, tires, and fuel. Howell on his way to work one morning was involved in an automobile accident which resulted in a judgment against him individually and against Foremost. The Supreme Court in reversing the judgment as to Foremost found that the contributions by the company towards the operation of the automobile amounted to remuneration to Howell for the transportation he furnished to facilitate the collection of his employer's bills and accounts. The court further found that Foremost was not liable, Howell having not yet entered upon his master's business.
Analyzing the foregoing cases, it appears that the general principles of law enunciated therein stand for the following principles involving the negligent operation of a motor vehicle:
1. An owner is liable when the vehicle is operated with his knowledge and consent, which may be either express or implied. Bare legal title is not conclusive as to ownership, and under certain factual situations, a person or other legal entity may be estopped from denying ownership.
2. Where the relationship of master and servant or principal and agent, exists, the theory of respondeat superior may be applicable, and in an appropriate case the superior is liable when the vehicle, without regard to ownership, is used in the business of the superior with his consent (express or implied) for a business purpose; and that slight deviation does not take the use out of the business purpose.
As to the ownership of the automobile driven by McGraw and involved in the accident, it is not controverted that prior to the date of the accident an application for title duly executed by Gerlach as seller and McGraw as purchaser was filed with the Tax Collector of Santa Rosa County nine days prior to the accident. This record poses no question as to subterfuge— McGraw bought the car, operated same in the business of Gerlach and for his own personal use. Therefore, the real issue confronting the trial judge was whether or not McGraw while operating his automobile had abandoned the business of his master and was at the time of the accident pursuing his own personal mission. We agree with the trial judge that the record presents no disputed question of fact as to McGraw's abandonment of Gerlach's business. It is undisputed that McGraw participated in the Christmas party festivities and in the late evening left his employer's place of business and from that time was going on a frolic of his own without being at all on his master's business.
We now consider the dealer's tag and estoppel by Gerlach to deny the question of ownership. It is undisputed that Gerlach as a dealer was able to purchase and did purchase the dealer's tag in question and furnished same to McGraw for his unrestricted use on the automobile involved in the instant accident. Plaintiff urges liability as a matter of law upon Gerlach by reason of those provisions of F.S. § 320.13, F.S.A., which provide that same shall be valid for use on motor vehicles owned by the registered dealer to whom such tag was issued and while being operated in connection with such dealer's business. Linking the foregoing statute together with cases heretofore discussed, plaintiff assumes the position that Gerlach exercised such dominion over McGraw's automobile as to make Gerlach liable in the instant cause.
Defendant Gerlach insists that this court has already decided the question of liability in Lambert v. Johnson which held that the use of a dealer's tag does not, per se render the licensee liable in tort. We do not find that the Lambert case is conclusive of this point since it did not encompass any relationship bringing into play the doctrine of respondeat superior. There, the motor company gratuitously loaned a dealer's tag to the purchaser of an automobile for the convenience of the purchaser. Clearly the doctrine of respondeat superior was not existent under the factual situation presented there. We conclude that Lambert v. Johnson is not decisive in the instant situation. However, as reflected by our extensive review of the cases establishing liability under various principles of law, we find no basis for sustaining plaintiff's contentions with reference to this point. The statutes on this question do not impose a civil liability for violation thereof, nor do we find that the statutes contemplated extending liability to a dealer in such a situation as here presented.
We find no case decided in this jurisdiction which imposes liability by reason of ownership of a vehicle tag. In the Wolfe case a municipal tag was utilized on the employee's vehicle. However, that case was clearly decided on the theory that the vehicle itself was being used in the business of the city at the time of the accident, and it is our conclusion that the fact the vehicle bore the municipal tag was an element of the proof going toward whether or not the vehicle was being operated in the business of the city with its knowledge and consent.
Plaintiff refers us to two cases from other jurisdictions and urges that same should be applied in the instant cause. In Reese v. Reamore the New York Court of Appeals construing specific statutes of that jurisdiction concerning the regulation of dealer's tags held that the motor company was estopped to deny ownership of an automobile involved in an accident bearing its dealer's tag when same was being used with its knowledge and consent. We note' that the New York statutes are quite different from those in existence in Florida in that the statute construed required the dealer to follow an express administrative procedure prior to permitting any vendee to use a dealer's license plate. Other provisions of the New York statutes are at material variance with our provisions.
New Jersey followed the New York rule in Eggerding v. Bicknell. Again, we find that New Jersey in reaching its decision, construed its own statute pertaining to this subject which clearly prohibited the use of. the dealer's plates on a car transferred to the purchaser. The New Jersey case involved a novel proceeding. In that case the plaintiff alleged that Chonka Motors negligently operated the automobile bearing its dealer's tag through one Bicknell, its "agent, servant and employee". The jury returned a verdict against Bicknell and no cause of action against Chonka Motors which resulted in the finding that Bicknell was not operating the automobile as the "agent, servant and employee" of Chonka Motors. However, in a proceeding brought by plaintiff against Chonka Motors' insurer under an omnibus insurance clause, the New Jersey Supreme Court held Chonka's insurer liable on the theory that Chonka could not deny ownership of the automobile driven by Bicknell since he was using the dealer's tag owned by Chonka. So we find that the motor company was not liable to the plaintiff but that the motor company's insurer was so liable. We will not accept this as authority for imposing a rule of liability sought by the instant plaintiff.
Our conclusion is that the law of this jurisdiction imposes liability upon the owner of an automobile either by virtue of actual ownership of same, or by facts and circumstances precluding one exercising such dominion over the vehicle from denying ownership. The facts and circumstances reflected in plaintiff's record fall far short of meeting the estoppel requirement, and as reflected above the record is conclusive that the motor company did not have actual ownership of the automobile in question.
It is our conclusion that extension of liability predicated upon the illegal use of a dealer's tag is a matter of concern to the legislative branch of our government, and although we recognize that many abuses of this special license privilege may exist, we do not think it is within our province to promulgate a rule of liability or to otherwise usurp legislative authority as a means of correcting such abuses.
The other points assigned as error by plaintiff have been carefully reviewed and we find same to be without merit. The decision of the trial court is affirmed.
Affirmed.
WIGGINTON, J., concurs.
STURGIS, Acting C. J., dissents.
. See F.S. 320.13, F.S.A.1961.
. Joel v. Morison (1834) 6 Car. & P. 502, 172 Eng.Rep. 1338, 1339.
. Anderson v. Southern Cotton Oil Co., 73 Fla. 432, 74 So. 975, L.R.A.1917E, 715 (1917).
. Southern Cotton Oil Co. v. Anderson, 80 Fla. 441, 86 So. 629, 16 A.L.R. 255 (1920).
. Wolfe v. City of Miami, 103 Fla. 774, 134 So. 539, 541, 137 So. 892 (1931).
. Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Michel, 120 Fla. 511, 163 So. 86 (1935).
. Ford Motor Co. v. Floyd, 137 Fla. 301, 188 So. 601 (1939).
. Wilson v. Burke, 53 So.2d 319 (Fla. 1951).
. "Dominion" is defined by Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary as "Supreme Authority" and as a synonym to "power".
. McAllister v. Miami Daily News, 154 Fla. 370, 17 So.2d 613 (1944).
. Foremost Dairies, Inc. of the South v. Godwin, 158 Fla. 245, 26 So.2d 773 (1946).
. Lambert v. Johnson, 109 So.2d 187 (Fla.App.1st, 1959).
. Wolfe v. City of Miami, 103 Fla. 774, 134 So. 539, 137 So. 892 (1931).
. Reese v. Reamore, 292 N.Y. 292, 55 N.E.2d 35 (1944).
. Eggerding v. Bicknell, 20 N.J. 106, 118 A.2d 820 (1955).