Case Name: Michael L. GREFKOWICZ and Deborah J. GREFKOWICZ, Appellants, v. METROPOLITAN DADE COUNTY, a political subdivision of the State of Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1980-10-14
Citations: 389 So. 2d 1041
Docket Number: No. 79-1189
Parties: Michael L. GREFKOWICZ and Deborah J. GREFKOWICZ, Appellants, v. METROPOLITAN DADE COUNTY, a political subdivision of the State of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: Before BARKDULL, SCHWARTZ and BASKIN, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 389
Pages: 1041–1043

Head Matter:
Michael L. GREFKOWICZ and Deborah J. GREFKOWICZ, Appellants, v. METROPOLITAN DADE COUNTY, a political subdivision of the State of Florida, Appellee.
No. 79-1189.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
Oct. 14, 1980.
Rehearing Denied Nov. 19, 1980.
Nicholas R. Friedman, Miami, for appellants.
Robert A. Ginsburg, County Atty. and Stanley B. Price, Asst. County Atty., for appellee.
Leonard Helfand, Miami, for Florida Dept, of Health and Rehabilitative Services as amicus curiae.
Before BARKDULL, SCHWARTZ and BASKIN, JJ.

Opinion:
BASKIN, Judge.
In a de novo hearing, the Board of County Commissioners of Dade County (hereinafter referred to as the Board) reversed the Zoning Appeals Board and denied the Gref-kowiczes' zoning application for an unusual use of a residence as a home for the elderly and for a parking variance. The Grefkow-iczes then filed a notice in the circuit court for a de novo hearing on the zoning application pursuant to Section 163.250, Florida Statutes (1977). The circuit court refused to grant a de novo hearing, but instead entertained the matter as an appeal and determined that the Board had substantial competent evidence to support its denial of the zoning application.
The Grefkowiczes appealed, claiming error on two counts; first, that the circuit court should have conducted a de novo hearing, and second, that there was no substantial competent evidence to support the Board's decision. We find no merit in either argument.
The provisions of Section 163.250, Florida Statutes (1977) do not apply unless there is an enactment by the Board of County Commissioners electing to be bound by the provisions of Chapter 163, Florida Statutes. § 163.175, Fla.Stat. (1977). Since no ordinance was passed and since there was no other authorization for a de novo review, there was no error in the circuit court's denial of the Grefkowiczes' motion. Orange County v. City of Apopka, 299 So.2d 652, modified on rehearing, 299 So.2d 656 (Fla. 4th DCA 1974); City of Apopka v. Orange County, 299 So.2d 657, modified on rehearing, 299 So.2d 660 (Fla. 4th DCA 1974).
Concerning appellants' second point on appeal, we hold that the evidence supports the Board in its conclusion that the unusual use would not be compatible with the neighborhood. The testimony presented by the neighboring property owners and that presented by the Grefkowiczes themselves showed that the Grefkowiczes intended to use a strictly residential property for a commercial purpose. That testimony provided substantial, competent evidence that the use would not be compatible with the neighborhood. See: Board of County Commissioners v. Lowas, 348 So.2d 13 (Fla.3d DCA 1977); Code of Metropolitan Dade County, F1. (1978) § 33-311(d).
In so holding, we are not unmindful of the holding of City of Apopka v. Orange County, supra, that "[t]he objections of a large number of residents of the affected neighborhood are not a sound basis for the denial of a permit." In this case, just as was contemplated by City of Apopka v. Orange County, supra, the testimony of the aggrieved property owners disclosed facts which could properly be considered.
For these reasons, the circuit court's decision affirming the Board is affirmed.