Case Name: CITY OF CAPE CANAVERAL, Appellant, v. Cuberta MOSHER, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1985-04-18
Citations: 467 So. 2d 468
Docket Number: No. 83-1728
Parties: CITY OF CAPE CANAVERAL, Appellant, v. Cuberta MOSHER, Appellee.
Judges: DAUKSCH, J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 467
Pages: 468–471

Head Matter:
CITY OF CAPE CANAVERAL, Appellant, v. Cuberta MOSHER, Appellee.
No. 83-1728.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
April 18, 1985.
Joseph W. Scott, Cape Canaveral, for appellant.
Jere E. Lober, and Lewis R. Pearce, Merritt Island, for appellee.

Opinion:
FRANK D. UPCHURCH, Jr., Judge.
The City of Cape Canaveral appeals from a summary final judgment declaring an amendment to its zoning ordinance void as applied to Mosher's property.
Briefly stated, Mosher sought a declaratory judgment holding that the city's action in amending its zoning ordinance to change the zoning of land along Long Point Road, which includes her property, from R-3 (a medium density residential district) to R-l (single family residential) in 1983 was invalid. The initial zoning classification of R-3 complied with the comprehensive land use plan adopted by the city in 1980. Mosher alleged, inter alia, that she was not given written notice of the proposed change as required, that the amendment was not in accord with the comprehensive plan, and that no relationship existed between the re-zoning of the property and the general welfare of the community. The city answered and admitted all the operative facts of the complaint, denying only that Mosher was entitled to relief.
Mosher moved for summary judgment on the above grounds and the trial court granted her motion and ruled that the amendment is void. We affirm.
Our supreme court, in rejecting any es-toppel argument to enforcement of a zoning amendment, has said that "All one who plans to use his property in accordance with existing zoning regulations is entitled to assume is that such regulations will not be altered to his detriment unless the change bears a substantial relation to the health, morals, welfare, or safety of the public." City of Miami Beach v. 8701 Collins Ave. Inc., 77 So.2d 428, 430 (Fla. 1954).
Here the following facts were established by admission of the city in its answer:
1. The re-zoned strip, including Mosh-er's land, was carved out of an existing R-3 zone.
2. Mosher did not receive notice as required by the zoning ordinance in effect at the time.
3. The new classification of Mosher's land was not in accordance with the comprehensive land use plan adopted by the city under the provisions of Chapter 163, Florida Statutes.
4. There was no relation whatever between the present (re-zoned) classification and the general welfare of the community.
There were no facts pleaded or demonstrated by affidavit or otherwise that the change bore a substantial relation to the health, morals, welfare, or safety of the public. The court was correct in concluding there was no genuine issue of material fact and in granting summary final judgment.
AFFIRMED.
DAUKSCH, J., concurs.
COWART, J., concurs specially with opinion.
. We take issue with Judge Cowart's statement in his concurrence that the majority opinion is based on a point of law different than that on which the trial court's decision was based. The trial court correctly found first that there was no genuine issue of fact (see footnote two of the concurring opinion). At that point, appellee was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.510(c). Any further findings of fact or conclusions of law by the trial court then became superfluous and any additional discussions or analysis by this court became unnecessary and meaningless.