Case Name: Sybil EPPLER, Petitioner, v. TARMAC AMERICA, INC., Respondent
Court: Florida Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 2000-02-17
Citations: 752 So. 2d 592
Docket Number: No. SC91066
Parties: Sybil EPPLER, Petitioner, v. TARMAC AMERICA, INC., Respondent.
Judges: HARDING, C.J., and WELLS and ANSTEAD, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 752
Pages: 592–600

Head Matter:
Sybil EPPLER, Petitioner, v. TARMAC AMERICA, INC., Respondent.
No. SC91066.
Supreme Court of Florida.
Feb. 17, 2000.
Rehearing Denied March 21, 2000.
David R. Lewis of Foerster, Isaac and Yerkes, P.A., Jacksonville, Florida, for Petitioner.
Frank W. Hession and Robert B. Guild of Hession & Guild, Jacksonville, Florida, for Respondent.

Opinion:
SHAW, J.
We have for review Eppler v. Tarmac America, Inc., 695 So.2d 775 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997), wherein the district court certified the following question:
Does the testimony of the defendant of a sudden unexpected stop immediately after starting forward constitute sufficient evidence to overcome the presumption of negligence which attaches in a rear-end collision?
Id. at 778. We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. We answer in the affirmative as explained below and approve Eppler.
In the late afternoon of September 27, 1994, Sybil Eppler's station wagon was stopped in a line of traffic at a stoplight and Lawrence Morris's cement-mixer truck, which was owned by Tarmac America, Inc., was stopped directly behind her. At some point after the light turned green, Eppler's car was struck from behind by Morris's truck, which was moving forward at a low rate of speed. Eppler's car rolled forward and made contact with a car driven by James Richards. Richards' car was undamaged and he later drove off. Eppler also appeared uninjured, and she too drove off. The next day, however, Eppler complained that her. neck and back hurt, and she sought treatment from a chiropractor and from a psychiatrist. She sued Tarmac.
Eppler testified at trial that she was struck by Morris's truck before she had started moving forward at the stoplight. Morris, on the other hand, testified that once the light had turned green, all the vehicles in line began accelerating and then Eppler suddenly — without warning and for no reason — slammed on her brakes. At the close of all the evidence, Eppler moved for a directed verdict, and the trial court denied the motion. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Tarmac, finding no negligence on Morris's part. Eppler appealed the denial of her motion for a directed verdict and the district court affirmed, ruling that the evidence presented by Tarmac was sufficient to overcome the presumption of negligence that attaches to the driver of a rear vehicle involved in a rear-end collision:
In the instant case, the evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the defendant established an unexpected stop immediately after starting to move when the signal light changed. We, therefore, [affirm the trial court's ruling on the motion for a directed verdict].
Eppler v. Tarmac America, Inc., 695 So.2d 775, 778 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997) (on motion for rehearing).
While Eppler agrees that evidence of a sudden unexpected stop by the forward driver is sufficient to overcome the presumption of negligence that attaches to the rear driver, she contends that—viewing the testimony in the light most favorable to Tarmac—her own stop was merely sudden, not unexpected. She claims that the trial court erred in denying her motion for a directed verdict. We disagree.
The rebuttable presumption of negligence that attaches to the rear driver in a rear-end collision in Florida 'arises out of necessity in cases where the lead driver sues the rear driver. The device bears only upon the causal negligence of the rear driver:
The usefulness of the rule is obvious. A plaintiff ordinarily bears the burden of proof of all four elements of negligence—duty of care, breach of that duty, causation and damages. Yet, obtaining proof of two of those elements, breach and causation, is difficult when a plaintiff driver who has been rear-ended knows that the defendant driver rear-ended him but usually does not know why. Beginning with McNulty, therefore, the law presumed that the driver of the rear vehicle was negligent unless that driver provided a substantial and reasonable explanation as to why he was not negligent, in which case the presumption would vanish and the case could go to the jury on its merits.
Jefferies v. Amery Leasing, Inc., 698 So.2d 368, 370-871 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997) (citations omitted).
This Court in Guile v. Boggs, 174 So.2d 26 (Fla.1965), endorsed the rebutta-ble presumption established in McNulty v. Cusack, 104 So.2d 785 (Fla. 2d DCA 1958), and held that the burden is on the defendant to come forward with evidence that "fairly and reasonably tends to show" that the presumption of negligence is misplaced:
We have stated that the presumption announced in McNulty, and subsequently followed, is rebuttable. It is constructed by the law to give particular effect to a certain group of facts in the absence of further evidence. The presumption provides a prima facie case which shifts to the defendant the burden to go forward with evidence to contradict or rebut the fact presumed. When the defendant produces evidence which fairly and reasonably tends to show that the real fact is not as presumed, the impact of "the presumption is dissipated". Whether the ultimate fact has been established must then be decided by the jury from all of the evidence before it without the aid of the presumption. At this point the entire matter should be deposited with the trier of facts to reconcile the conflicts and evaluate the credibility of the witnesses and the weight of the evidence.
Guile, 174 So.2d at 28-29 (emphasis added).
In the present case, Tarmac came forward with evidence showing the following: (1) The Tarmac truck was stopped ten to eleven feet behind Eppler's auto in a line of traffic at a red light; (2) when the light turned green, all the vehicles in the line proceeded forward and were accelerating in a routine fashion; (3) the Tarmac driver, Morris, accelerated slowly with the other vehicles, shifted from first to second gear, and had been in second gear for three or four seconds when Eppler suddenly — without warning and for no reason — slammed on her brakes. Pursuant to the Guile standard, this evidence "fairly and reasonably tends to show" that the presumption of negligence on Morris's part is misplaced, for an abrupt and arbitrary stop in such a situation is not reasonably expected. In fact, it is a classic surprise.
The present "arbitrary stop" case thus differs from Tacher v. Asmus, 743 So.2d 157 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999), and other "sudden stop" cases wherein the forward driver merely stopped abruptly. In Tacher, three autos collided in a chain reaction at a stoplight. The evidence showed the following: After the light had turned green, all the vehicles were proceeding forward when the auto in front of Tacher (driven by Matthews) suddenly stopped; Tacher was unable to stop in time and his vehicle struck Matthews' auto; Matthews' auto then struck Asmus's vehicle. Matthews and Asmus sued Tacher, and the trial court granted their motion for a directed verdict. The district court affirmed.
The district court in Tacher explained that the forward driver's stop should have been reasonably expected:
We conclude that a sudden stop by a preceding driver or drivers approaching or going through a busy intersection should be reasonably expected so as to impose a duty on the drivers which follow them to operate their vehicles at a safe distance. It is not at all unusual for vehicles [proceeding] through busy intersections, for example, to have to suddenly brake for pedestrians, emergency vehicles or other drivers running a red traffic light from a cross-street. For that reason, we do not believe that the evidence of a preceding vehicles' sudden stop at a busy intersection; in this case, was sufficient to overcome the presumption of negligence on the part of appellant, Tacher.
Tacher, 743 So.2d at 158. Unlike the present case where Morris testified repeatedly that Eppler slammed on her brakes "for no reason," the district court in Tacher noted no such misconduct on the part of Matthews or Asmus. Tacher is framed as a simple "sudden stop" case.
Based on the foregoing, we agree with the decisions of both the trial and district courts below. Abrupt and arbitrary braking in bumper-to-bumper, accelerating traffic is an irresponsible and dangerous act that invites a collision. Cases involving allegations of such an act are properly submitted to the jury, for the crucible of cross-examination is well-suited for gleaning meritorious from non-meritorious claims. In the present case, the trial court properly denied Eppler's motion for a directed verdict.
We answer the certified question in the affirmative and approve Eppler on this issue. We distinguish Tacher as explained herein.
It is so ordered.
HARDING, C.J., and WELLS and ANSTEAD, JJ., concur.
PARIENTE, J., dissents with an opinion.
. The jury responded "No" to the following question on the verdict form: "Was there negligence on the part of Defendant Tarmac America, Inc. which was a legal cause of damage to plaintiff Sybil Eppler?"
. On direct examination of Morris, the following transpired:
Q. How far were you back from her....
A. Yes, at the light I was back approximately 10, 11 feet from her.
. On cross-examination of Morris by Eppler's lawyer, the following transpired:
Q. How many cars were in front of Mrs. Eppler's vehicle?
A. I would estimate three cars.
Q. You don't know for sure, though?
A. No, but I estimated it was four in front of me, so she was right in front of me.
Q. Okay. It was Mrs. Eppler's car, and then three more in front of her?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Now, when the light turned green, do you recall what occurred with regard to the three vehicles in front of Mrs. Eppler's car?
A. Traffic started off, just the way they always do.
Q. Do you have a vivid recollection in your mind as to whether or not the vehicle in front of Mrs. Eppler started off?
A. Yes, as far as I'm concerned, it did.
Q. Okay.
A. All the traffic was moving.
Q. So it's your testimony that the vehicle immediately in front of Mrs. Eppler's vehicle started off?
A. Yes, sir.
. On cross-examination of Morris, the following transpired:
Q. So it's your testimony that the vehicle immediately in front of Mrs. Eppler's vehicle started off?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. All right. And then Mrs. Eppler just slammed on brakes without any reason; is that right?
A. That's what I thought.
Q. Now, I got to make sure I understand you now. You took off in first gear, you shifted into second gear, and had- you given it any gas in second gear?
A. Somewhat, yes.
Q. And then Mrs. Eppler slammed on brakes for no apparent reason, and then you hit the brake; is that right?
A. That's right.
(Emphasis added.)
. See, e.g., Pierce v. Progressive Am. Ins. Co., 582 So.2d 712, 714 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991) ("As a matter of law, it is not a substantial and reasonable explanation by Pierce to merely say that the vehicles ahead of him . stopped abruptly."); see also Kao v. Lauredo, 617 So.2d 775, 777 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993) ("[T]he defendant testified that he was driving in a careful manner, but that plaintiff stopped in an abrupt manner_ The defendant's version of the collision is not sufficient to rebut or dissipate the presumption that his negligence was the sole proximate cause of the accident.").
. The district court in Tacher certified conflict with Eppler; Tacher is not currently before this Court.