Case Name: John Fitzgerald PRINGLE, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 2001-06-27
Citations: 792 So. 2d 533
Docket Number: No. 3D99-1723
Parties: John Fitzgerald PRINGLE, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: Before GODERICH, FLETCHER, and SORONDO, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 792
Pages: 533–539

Head Matter:
John Fitzgerald PRINGLE, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. 3D99-1723.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
June 27, 2001.
Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc Denied Aug. 29, 2001.
Bennett H. Brummer, Public Defender, and J. Rafael Rodriguez, Special Assistant Public Defender, for appellant.
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, and Frank J. Ingrassia, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
Before GODERICH, FLETCHER, and SORONDO, JJ.

Opinion:
FLETCHER, Judge.
John Fitzgerald Pringle was adjudicated guilty of attempted sexual battery upon a person 12 years or older, kidnaping, and aggravated battery. Pringle has raised a series of issues in his quest for a new trial. The sole issue that needs discussion here relates to the thorny process of dealing with peremptory challenges where the non-striking party raises an objection to the strike as being based on racial grounds.
The resolution of whether a peremptory challenge is to be allowed by the trial judge where a party objects to the other side's use thereof as being racially based is to be reached in a three-step process. The first step requires the nonstriking party to make a timely objection that the peremptory challenge is based on racial grounds; to show that the venire-person is a member of a distinct racial group; then to request that the court ask the striking party to explain the reason for the strike. See Melbourne v. State, 679 So.2d 759, 764 (Fla.1996).
The second step in the process requires the proponent of the strike to come forward with a race neutral explanation. If the proponent's explanation is facially race neutral, then the court must take the third step. That is, the court must decide whether the facially race neutral explanation is or is not a pretext, given all the circumstances surrounding the strike. The trial court's focus in step three is not on the reasonableness of the explanation, but rather its genuineness. In evaluating genuineness the trial court is analyzing a subjective issue, the decision turning primarily on the trial court's assessment of the striking party's credibility — which is solely within the purview of the finder of fact. If the court finds the explanation is not pretextual the strike will be sustained. Melbourne, 679 So.2d at 764.
In the instant case the defense announced a peremptory strike of venireper-son Ducharme, at which time the prosecution stated:
"I'm going to object. That is the third white female that has been stricken."
R.231.
Although the prosecution did not request of the trial court that it ask the defense to explain the reason for the strike, the trial court anticipated the request and immediately stated to the defense:
"Will you please articulate the reason for the strike of Ms. Ducharme?"
R. 231.
As there are no ritual incantations that must be made in order to call forth the striking party's reasons, the trial court's anticipatory inquiry shifted the burden to the defense, which then provided the court with reasons that were facially race neutral.
At this juncture, because the defense's reasons were facially race neutral, it was incumbent upon the trial court to rule on the genuineness (but not the reasonableness) of the defense's explanation. In other words, the issue for the trial court to decide at this point was whether the defense, notwithstanding its apparently acceptable reasons, was actually harboring the desire to rid itself of venireperson Ducharme because she is white, because she is a woman, or both. However, when faced with the defense's explanation the trial judge responded:
"I'm not allowing the strike. I don't find that it's race neutral. She answered everybody's questions, and chose to question her [sic]. She's in communications. Actually retired. She said she is interested in serving. She has never been through the experience. She has never been the victim of a crime. She has no law enforcement in her family. I'm going to find that you have not given this Court a race neutral reason other than just [bare] speculation that she never served before, that she wouldn't make a good juror. So I'm going to seat her over your objection."
R. 231-32.
Here the trial judge erroneously stated that the asserted bases for the strike were not race neutral. This was an error in semantics. An analysis of the trial judge's statement makes it clear that she believed the defense's stated reasons were pretex-tual, notwithstanding her use of the words race neutral. Simply stated, the trial court conducted a Melbourne step S analysis of genuineness even though it was couched in the language of Melbourne step 2.
This is not the first time such an event has reached this court. In Washington v. State, 773 So.2d 1202 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000) a similar situation arose:
"During jury selection, the defendant sought to exercise a peremptory challenge on a prospective juror. The state objected and asked the court to ask defense counsel for a race and gender neutral reason for striking the juror. Counsel responded as follows:
'He affirmatively volunteered that he was on a criminal jury. Murder trial in fact. He volunteered that given the way he said it, our client does not feel satisfied with him. That's our reason for a race neutral, gender neutral reason.'
(Emphasis added). The court ruled as follows:
'The court did not note anything about the way Mr. Benjamin articulated the fact he had been on a jury previously, murder jury, previously in his words, and the court cannot find that to be a race neutral reason for the peremptory strike.'
(Emphasis added)."
Washington at 1203.
The trial court in Washington had concluded incorrectly that the proffered reason was not race and gender neutral, which in fact it was. Washington at 1203-04. Nonetheless the trial court's determination was affirmed on appeal because, even though it used race neutral language, the trial court:
"did, in fact, find a lack of genuineness in the proffered reason as required by step 3.... [T]he court . concluded that there was .nothing unusual about the way the prospective juror answered the question at issue. In other words, the judge did not believe the proffered reason was genuine."
Washington at 1204.
In Washington, this court made it clear, as we have tried to do here, that no magic words or incantations are required, and that substance must control over form. The trial court's quest is not to create a perfect script, but to assure that peremptory challenges are not used to exclude persons from jury service for improper reasons. As the trial judge is on the scene we should wisely defer to her or his assessment of credibility, affirming on appeal unless the trial judge's decision to allow or disallow the strike is clearly erroneous. Melendez v. State, 787 So.2d 918 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001). As we cannot say that the trial judge here clearly erred in denying the defense's peremptory challenge, we cannot overturn the trial results on this ground.
As we find no reversible error as to the remaining issues raised by Pringle, we affirm the convictions and sentences.
GODERICH, J., concurs.
. We have previously concluded that whites constitute a distinct racial group like any other race. Melendez v. State, 787 So.2d 918 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001). Gender based peremptory challenges are prohibited, Abshire v. State, 642 So.2d 542 (Fla.1994), and our discussion is applicable thereto.
. Which reasons were:
"She didn't talk a lot. She seemed to be— she mentioned she had never been on a jury, and I think she really wants to be on a jury, and I think she would probably easily be swayed by either side, Judge. That's my impression of her, and that's why I do not want her on." (R.231).
. The Washington trial court made the same error in semantics as did the trial court here.