Case Name: Junie HORNE, Petitioner, v. VIC POTAMKIN CHEVROLET, INC., Respondent
Court: Florida Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1988-09-01
Citations: 533 So. 2d 261
Docket Number: No. 70499
Parties: Junie HORNE, Petitioner, v. VIC POTAMKIN CHEVROLET, INC., Respondent.
Judges: EHRLICH, C.J., and OVERTON, McDONALD and GRIMES, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 533
Pages: 261–265

Head Matter:
Junie HORNE, Petitioner, v. VIC POTAMKIN CHEVROLET, INC., Respondent.
No. 70499.
Supreme Court of Florida.
Sept. 1, 1988.
Patrice A. Talisman of Daniels & Hicks, P.A., and Dennis Webb of Henry T. Courtney, P.A., Miami, for petitioner.
Richard A. Sherman and Rosemary B. Wilder of the Law Offices of Richard A. Sherman, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, for respondent.
J. Robert McClure, Jr., William C. Owen and Mary E. Haskins of Carlton, Fields, Ward, Emmanuel, Smith, Cutler & Kent, P.A., Tallahassee, amicus curiae for Florida Auto. Dealers Ass’n.

Opinion:
SHAW, Justice.
We review Vic Potamkin Chevrolet, Inc. v. Horne, 505 So.2d 560 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987), to answer a certified question of great public importance.
SHOULD FLORIDA ADOPT SECTION 390 OF THE RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE LAW OF TORTS, AND, IF SO, SHOULD THE SECTION BE CONSTRUED SO AS TO EXTEND LIABILITY TO A SELLER OF A CHATTEL AS WELL?
Id. at 563-64. We have jurisdiction. Art. V, 3(b)(4), Fla. Const.
The facts of the case are set out in full in the decision below. For our purposes, it is enough to say that respondent automobile dealer sold a car and allowed the purchaser to drive away with the car even though its agent salesman knew that the purchaser was an incompetent driver. Shortly after leaving the dealership, the purchaser was involved in a single-car accident which injured her passenger, petitioner Horne. The issue before us is whether under these circumstances the seller of a motor vehicle is liable under a theory of negligent en-trustment. We narrow the certified question to the facts of the case and hold that there is no liability.
It is uncontroverted that the sale of the automobile in question was completed and that respondent automobile dealer was not the owner of the car at the time of the accident. Section 319.22(2), Florida Statutes (1981), provides in pertinent part that the seller of a motor vehicle
who has made a bona fide sale or transfer . and has delivered possession thereof to a purchaser shall not, by reason of any of the provisions of this law, be deemed the owner or coowner of such vehicle, so as to be subject to civil liability for the operation of such vehicle....
A bona fide sale or transfer is customarily accomplished by delivery of a properly endorsed certificate of title to either the new owner or the Department of Motor Vehicles, or by placing in the mail to the Department a properly endorsed certificate of title or a notice of the sale in the form prescribed by the Department. Case law applying this statute holds that if the terms of the statute are complied with, there is no liability on the part of the seller for injuries suffered because of the negligent operation of the vehicle by the purchaser. Rutherford v. Allen Parker Co., 67 So.2d 763 (Fla.1953); Whalen v. Hill, 219 So.2d 727 (Fla. 3d DCA 1969). Further, the same rule applies if the beneficial ownership of the vehicle has been transferred even if legal title has not yet been formally transferred in accordance with the statute. Palmer v. R.S. Evans, Jacksonville, Inc., 81 So.2d 635 (Fla.1955).
It is clear from the above that under existing law there is no liability on the part of the seller of a motor vehicle where beneficial ownership or legal title, together with possession, have been transferred to a purchaser and injuries occur because of the negligence of the purchaser in operating the vehicle. In short, transfer of ownership cuts off liability on the part of the former owner. Petitioner urges that we focus on the act of selling rather than the transfer of legal title as beneficial ownership, and that we adopt the Restatement (Second) of Torts section 390 (1966) to the extent that it imposes liability on the seller of an automobile who knows that the purchaser is incompetent and intends to operate the vehicle. We decline to do so for three interrelated reasons. First, we are not persuaded that it would be possible for the courts to circumscribe the cause of action to instances where the seller becomes aware of the purchaser's incompetency as an incidental by-product of the normal sales routine. Stripped from this mooring, the terms "with knowledge" and "knowingly" would become an added source of litigation placing a new and uncertain burden on commerce and ordinary business relationships. Sellers would find it necessary to protect themselves from liability by inquiring into and verifying the competency of the purchaser to operate the vehicle. Such a rule would be inconsistent with the proposition that "[a] basic function of the law is to foster certainty in business relationships, not to create uncertainty by establishing ambivalent criteria for the construction of those relationships." Muller v. Stromberg Carlson Cory., 427 So.2d 266, 270 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983). Second, except for minor changes not pertinent here, section 319.22(2) has been the law since the enactment of chapter 23658, section 3, Laws of Florida (1947). Although the courts have consistently applied the statute to bar liability of former owners since its enactment, the legislature has chosen not to amend the statute, indicating that Rutherford and progeny accurately reflect legislative intent. It would be improper at this late date for the courts to discover a contrary intent. Third, even if we assume as petitioner urges that a new public policy is called for, it is highly desirable that this new policy be developed by the legislature rather than the courts. As the district court below recognized, the proposed change is one with broad implications which requires input from the various interests involved and a societal consensus. As we recognized in Shands Teaching Hospital and Clinics, Inc. v. Smith, 497 So.2d 644, 646 (Fla.1986), "of the three branches of government, the judiciary is the least capable of receiving public input and resolving broad public policy questions based on a societal consensus." Moreover, by enacting section 319.22(2), the legislature has evidenced its intent to bar a cause of action against the seller once ownership, and possession of a motor vehicle is transferred to the purchaser. Under these circumstances, "the legislature is best equipped to resolve the competing considerations implicated by such a cause of action." Bankston v. Brennan, 507 So.2d 1385, 1387 (Fla.1987).
In refusing to apply the negligent en-trustment doctrine to the sale of an automobile, we are mindful of the comments that accompany the Restatement (Second) of Torts section 390 (1966) which leave little doubt that the section is meant to apply to sellers, lessors, donors or lenders, and to all kinds of bailors. Despite this clear intent, only California and Alaska have found the seller of an automobile liable under the theory of negligent entrustment. Colorado, Georgia, Illinois, Kansas, Tennessee, and Texas have either avoided addressing the issue or refused to apply the doctrine to automobile sales. We are unable to read into the laws of Florida a legislative intent to hold the seller of an automobile liable for negligent sale of the vehicle. In matter of fact, it appears that the Florida Legislature has chosen to restrict liability to automobile owners in possession (beneficial or legal). We have not been convinced that there is reason for or wisdom in changing this bright line approach.
We approve the decision below and answer the rephrased question in the negative.
It is so ordered.
EHRLICH, C.J., and OVERTON, McDONALD and GRIMES, JJ., concur.
KOGAN, J., dissents with an opinion, in which BARKETT, J., concurs.
. The dissenters below narrowed the question to:
IS A SELLER OF AN AUTOMOBILE NEGLIGENT UNDER SECTION 390 OF RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS (1966) WHEN IT KNOWINGLY SELLS A CAR TO A DRIVER WHO, AFTER DEMONSTRATING DRIVING INCOMPETENCE, NEVERTHELESS INTENDS TO DRIVE THE VEHICLE?
Vic Potamkin Chevrolet, Inc., 505 So.2d at 566. We adopt this phrasing of the issue and answer in the negative.
. The 1987 Survey of Florida Law, 12 Nova L.Rev. 939 (1988).