Case Name: STATE OF OREGON, Appellant, v. WILLIAM DEAN CARTER, Respondent; STATE OF OREGON, Appellant, v. MARION CLAY DAWSON, Respondent
Court: Oregon Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Oregon
Decision Date: 1978-05-08
Citations: 34 Or. App. 21
Docket Number: No. C 76-10-14543, CA 7902; No. C 76-10-14544, CA 7903
Parties: STATE OF OREGON, Appellant, v. WILLIAM DEAN CARTER, Respondent. STATE OF OREGON, Appellant, v. MARION CLAY DAWSON, Respondent.
Judges: SCHWAB, C. J.
Reporter: Oregon Reports, Court of Appeals
Volume: 34
Pages: 21–45

Head Matter:
Argued October 17, 1977.
Resubmitted in banc on record and briefs February 23,
remanded with instructions May 8,
reconsideration denied July 26,
petition for review allowed December 19, 1978
STATE OF OREGON, Appellant, v. WILLIAM DEAN CARTER, Respondent. STATE OF OREGON, Appellant, v. MARION CLAY DAWSON, Respondent.
(No. C 76-10-14543, CA 7902)
(No. C 76-10-14544, CA 7903)
(Cases consolidated)
578 P2d 790
John W. Burgess, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, argued the cause for appellant. With him on the brief were James A. Redden, Attorney General, and W. Michael Gillette, Solicitor General, Salem.
No appearance for respondent Carter.
Chris P. Ledwidge, Portland, argued the cause and filed the brief for respondent Dawson.
SCHWAB, C. J.

Opinion:
SCHWAB, C. J.
This is an appeal by the state from an order suppressing evidence. The issues presented involve the validity of the stop of an automobile in which defendants were riding, and the intrusiveness of the stop. These issues, in light of the trial court's findings, require us to reconsider the meaning of an often-used but never-defined term: a "pretext" stop.
I. The Facts
The record presents some problems, noted below. The following facts seem to be agreed upon, or at least not seriously contested.
The morning of October 14, 1976, Officer Miller was informed that some juveniles were suspects in recent burglaries and that they might be camped near a utility installation. That afternoon as he was driving near the utility installation, he saw a car with two young men inside pulled over, apparently picking up a hitchhiker. According to Officer Miller's subsequent report, he immediately decided to "check out the occupants of the vehicle" because of the reported burglaries.
Officer Miller followed the car for a considerable distance, apparently about three miles. When the posted speed limit dropped from 40 to 30 miles per hour, Miller "paced" the car for about five blocks at 40. Officer Miller turned on his overhead lights and stopped the car.
The driver, defendant Carter, got out and met Officer Miller between their two vehicles. The officer asked him for his operator's license and vehicle registration. Carter gave Miller both documents. The passenger, defendant Dawson, also got out and Miller asked him for identification. Dawson complied. During the exchange between them, Dawson told the officer that the car belonged to his father. Subsequently, Officer Miller looked into the car. He saw a hand-rolled cigarette in the ashtray, green vegetable flakes, stems and seeds on the floor and a package of cigarette papers on the front seat. This led to a thorough search of the car during which officers found about 20 pounds of marihuana in the trunk.
There are conflicts and gaps in the record about what transpired between the time Officer Miller asked defendants for identification and the time he made the plain-view observation of marihuana and related paraphernalia. At one point during the suppression hearing, the officer testified that he looked into the Carter/Dawson vehicle shortly after asking them for identification — a possible implication of this testimony being that he saw marihuana in plain view at that time.
Officer Miller's written report, introduced at the suppression hearing, tells a different story. It recites that after obtaining drivers' licenses and vehicle registration, the officer returned to his patrol car to make a "records check" by radio on Carter, Dawson and their vehicle. Miller learned, as his written report puts it, "Both subjects were clear and the vehicle was clear." However, Miller wanted to make further inquiry because the radio report indicated the car was registered to the A-l Maintenance Company, not in the name of Dawson's father as Dawson had implied. This testimony is difficult to understand; it seems obvious that Miller would have known who the registered owner was as soon as he saw the vehicle registration, which was before he ran the "records check."
Officer Miller's written report continues, stating that after receiving the radio report, he again approached the defendants, who were standing outside their car, apparently near the rear of the passenger side. Officer Miller asked, "Is there anything in the car that shouldn't be there?" or words to that effect. The defendants replied in the negative. The officer next asked permission to look inside the car. Defendants consented. Officer Miller then made the plain-view observations described above. The importance of these various versions of the facts of this plain-view observation is explained in Part IV, infra.
II. The Issues
There is some disagreement over the issues framed in the trial court. It is, of course, the obligation of the litigants to frame the issues in the trial court at the suppression hearing. State v. Miller, 269 Or 328, 330-32, 524 P2d 1399 (1974), citing State v. Johnson/Imel, 16 Or App 560, 519 P2d 1053, rev den (1974), with approval. And the appellate courts cannot reach issues that were not raised by the parties in the trial court. State v. Hickmann, 273 Or 358, 540 P2d 1406 (1975).
As we interpret the record, the defendants conceded that Officer Miller had probable cause to search further after seeing what he had probable cause to believe was marihuana and related paraphernalia. Defendants' primary argument was that this plain-view observation was invalid because Officer Miller's stop of their car was invalid. The state's primary argument was that the stop was justified as a Terrytype stop to investigate the recent burglaries. The state alternatively relied upon the speeding infraction as a justification for the stop. The defendants responded that the traffic infraction was merely a "pretext" to stop and alternatively that if the infraction justified the stop, what followed was too intrusive.
Contrary to the suggestion in Judge Thornton's separate opinion, this case was not treated in the trial court as a consent-search case. The thrust of the state's argument to the trial court was that it relied on plain view of contraband to justify a subsequent search rather than consent to search. Nor did the state ever argue in the trial court — although admittedly it could have — that Dawson's bloodshot eyes, etc., gave Officer Miller grounds to make inquiry beyond that properly incident to stop for exceeding a posted speed.
We turn to the issues as framed by the parties in the trial court: the validity of the stop and the intrusiveness of the stop.
III. The Stop
The trial court rejected the state's Terry contention, concluding the facts do not indicate any reasonable suspicion that the occupants of the car had any connection with criminal activity. The trial court was correct. State v. Valdez, 277 Or 621, 561 P2d 1006 (1977).
The trial court found Miller's testimony that defendants were speeding credible, but concluded the traffic infraction was merely a "pretext" for stopping defendants' car in order to conduct the questioning which led to the discovery of the marihuana:
" [Officer Miller] was very straightforward and very candid in his testimony. In listening to him, I couldn't help but feel that he stopped the car, not because they were going 10 miles over the 30 miles an hour speed limit, but for other reasons. "
There is abundant evidence to support the trial court's latter finding. Officer Miller testified that defendants' car was traveling at the speed of traffic, was not being driven erratically, and that it was not unusual for cars to travel at 35 to 40 miles per hour in that area. There was no evidence that Miller said anything to defendants about having stopped them for speeding between the original stop and their subsequent arrest for criminal activity in drugs. It was only after the arrest on drug charges that Miller issued a citation to Carter for violation of the basic rule.
The trial court's findings compel confronting the law of "pretext" stops. Many cases using that term are collected in Annotation, 10 ALR3d 314 (1966). In some cases the term is apparently used to mean that the stopped driver had, in fact, committed no traffic offense. We have held a stop on such facts invalid without using the label "pretext." State v. Johnson, Wesson, 26 Or App 599, 554 P2d 194 (1976). But in most cases "pretext" is used when: (1) the stopped driver had, in fact, committed a traffic offense, usually minor in nature; and (2) the stopping officer had some additional reason, suspicion or ulterior motive — not sufficient standing alone — for making the stop. On such facts, many cases hold the stop to be invalid as a "pretext."
We think the question comes down to whether the proper test is objective or subjective. The trial court's findings, paraphrased, are that there was an objectively reasonable basis for stopping defendants' car (speeding), but that Officer Miller's subjective reason for doing so was something different. Is the objective reason or the subjective reason controlling?
In Oregon, the slate is remarkably sketchy and inconclusive. The Supreme Court upheld a pretext stop in an old case, State v. Christensen, 151 Or 529, 51 P2d 835 (1935). An officer following a suspected bootlegger stopped him when he drove 27 miles per hour in a 25 mph zone. The Supreme Court saw nothing troublesome about the stop since a traffic violation had actually occurred. Evidence resulting from the officer's observations after the stop was held to be admissible.
The Supreme Court also upheld what it seems to have assumed was a pretext stop and arrest in State v. Allen, 248 Or 376, 434 P2d 740 (1967). "It is obvious from the record that the police were primarily interested in the defendant as a burglary suspect and that the traffic charge was used to obtain some measure of control over the defendant while the burglary investigation proceeded 248 Or at 383-84.
More recently, the Supreme Court in dicta expressed a more critical attitude toward pretext stops and arrests in State v. Florance, 270 Or 169, 187-88, 527 P2d 1202 (1974). Among other things, the court stated that "a different result [from upholding a search] might well follow if such a search were made after a so-called 'pretext arrest' for the violation of a minor traffic ordinance." 270 Or at 187. The facts in Florance, however, did not raise any pretext issue, and the court's language may only be a recitation of what it thought to be accepted wisdom.
The most recent Supreme Court word on the subject is State v. Valdez, supra, which can be interpreted as containing conflicting implications. The case involved a police stop for a trivial traffic offense; the actual purpose of the stop was to get a closer look at some suspicious characters. The Supreme .Court held the stop invalid on statutory grounds, ORS 131.615, concluding that there was not sufficient reasonable suspicion of connection with criminal activity. The Supreme Court stated that the stop rules of Terry and ORS 131.615 were
" an objective test : In other words, the test should be what a reasonable officer would think in this situation and not what this particular arresting officer thought." 277 Or at 626.
This can be read as rejection of the concept of a stop's being invalid as a pretext. However, the Supreme Court also said: "One officer testified that prior to stopping the vehicle he observed the driver of the vehicle fail to turn on his signal for a left turn, but he specifically said that that was not why he stopped the vehicle." 277 Or at 624. This can be read as reliance on one officer's subjective state of mind.
While it may be argued that Valdez, because it invalidated a stop, implicitly held a pretext traffic stop to be impermissible, it is unlikely the Supreme Court would treat such a major issue sub silentio or in a single sentence, particularly in the course of an otherwise methodically explicit opinion. We can only conclude Valdez did not directly consider the pretext problem.
Decisions of the Court of Appeals point in different directions. In State v. Jackson, 27 Or App 879, 557 P2d 691 (1976), rev den (1977), and State v. Huss, 23 Or App 118, 541 P2d 498, rev den (1975), we upheld stops for driving with expired license plates; but both decisions state that the stops were not merely a pretext for an exploratory search, at least implying that a pretext finding would have changed the result. Yet, State v. Sell, 9 Or App 299, 496 P2d 44, rev den (1972), upholds a stop for going 30 miles per hour in a 25 mph zone under circumstances strongly suggesting a pretext, i.e., subjective reason for the stop other than speeding.
Prior Oregon cases on stops do not coherently adopt either an objective test or a subjective test. There is greater consistency in the law governing arrests and searches. In Oregon, it is reasonably well settled that arrests and searches are judged by a reasonable-person objective standard; the fact that a police officer articulates his subjective reason for arresting or searching that happens to be invalid is irrelevant if a court later concludes that a reasonable person, viewing the facts objectively, would have had probable cause to arrest or search. State v. Cloman, 254 Or 1, 456 P2d 67 (1969); State v. Brewton, 19 Or App 899, 529 P2d 967 (1974), rev den, cert den 423 US 851 (1975); State v. Holmes, 17 Or App 464, 522 P2d 900 (1974); State v. Childers, 13 Or App 622, 511 P2d 447, rev den (1973); State v. Temple, 7 Or App 91, 488 P2d 1380, rev den (1971), cert den 406 US 973 (1972); State v. Keith, 2 Or App 133, 465 P2d 724, rev den (1970).
Given that arrests and searches are judged by an objective standard, we see no persuasive reason to evaluate stops by a different standard. The major thrust of the Supreme Court's decision in State v. Valdez, supra, applies an objective standard to stops. We therefore conclude and hold that stops are to be tested solely by whether the facts perceived by the stopping officer constitute objective cause for the stop; the stopping officer's subjective reasons have nothing to do with the legality of a stop.
This rule does not abolish the adversary system. As stated in Part II, supra, it remains the obligation of the parties to frame the issues at a suppression hearing and the courts are not free to construct an objective theory to hold a stop valid or invalid that has nothing to do with the contentions of the parties. An officer who made a stop must still state what he perceived and reasonably believed the facts to be. The officer may also state what conclusions his subjective reasoning process led him to, i.e., his own conclusion about his legal authority. But it remains the obligation of the judiciary to reach the ultimate legal conclusion about the officer's legal authority; and in so doing we may consider the parties' arguments about what a reasonable officer objectively could have concluded, not just arguments about what the particular officer subjectively did conclude.
In this case, the state contended in the trial court that there was a reasonable and objective basis for the stop — speeding. We agree, and hold the stop was valid.
IV. The Intrusiveness of the Stop
Two bodies of law are germane to what an officer may do after making a traffic stop in Oregon. One is constitutional. An officer may, constitutionally, search the person of the driver incident to custodial arrest, State v. Florance, supra, but assuming State v. Krogness, 238 Or 135, 388 P2d 120, cert den 377 US 992 (1964), is still good law, may not, constitutionally, search the interior of the vehicle based solely on a stop for a traffic offense.
Moreover, constitutional law provides that a stop can be no more intrusive than necessarily required by the objective reason giving rise to the stop. State v. Evans, 16 Or App 189, 517 P2d 1225, rev den (1974). ORS 131.615 appears to codify the constitutional limitation:

"(2) The detention and inquiry shall be conducted in the vicinity of the stop and for no longer than a reasonable time.
"(3) The inquiry shall be considered reasonable only if limited to the immediate circumstances that aroused the officer's suspicion."
Detention and inquiry beyond the time, place and subject-matter limits codified in ORS 131.615 — all components of what we call "intrusiveness"— constitute an invalid "random intervention into the liberty and privacy of a person." State v. Evans, 16 Or App at 197.
The other relevant body of law is solely statutory. ORS 484.435 provides:
"(1) Searches and seizures otherwise authorized by law incidental to an arrest shall not be authorized if the arrest is on a charge of committing a Class B, C or D traffic infraction unless the arrest is a full custody arrest in which the person arrested is to be lodged in jail, and the decision to place the person arrested under full custody arrest is based upon specific articulable facts justifying his being lodged in jail rather than being given a traffic citation as provided in this chapter and released.
"(2) Nothing in subsection (1) of this section shall be construed to forbid a frisk for dangerous or deadly weapons authorized under ORS 131.605 to 131.625."
ORS 484.435(1) expresses a legislative preference for issuance of citations in lieu of custodial arrests and enacts a legislative limitation on searches of motorists stopped for traffic offenses that is arguably more restrictive than the Oregon Supreme Court's rule in State v. Florance, supra. ORS 484.435(2), in using the term "Frisk" — a term of art normally associated with Terry-type stops — indicates the legislature may have been as uncertain as we are, see n 4, supra, about the most appropriate analysis and analogy in a traffic-stop situation.
The constitutional and statutory law blends into a single rule: Traffic stops should be the minimum possible intrusion on Oregon motorists, and not an excuse to begin questioning, searching or investigating that is unrelated to the traffic reason for the stop.
The alternative possible interpretations of this record illustrate the rule. One possibility — supported by part of Officer Miller's testimony at the suppression hearing — is that he made a plain-view observation of marihuana in the course of stopping defendants for speeding, or requesting drivers' licenses and registration, or while making inquiry relating to the speeding infraction. If these are the facts, Officer Miller was authorized to inquire and search further. The other possibility — supported by Officer Miller's written report — is that after the "records check" came back "clear," he began a series of inquiries that were not related to the traffic infraction: "Do you have anything in the car that shouldn't be there? Can I look into the car?" If these are the facts, and it was only after this irrelevant questioning that Officer Miller observed marihuana, his observation was tainted by the unreasonable intrusiveness of the stop.
Simply stated, when the "records check" came back "clear," Officer Miller could do no more than write a citation and send defendants on their way. He could not begin questioning or an investigation that had nothing to do with the objective reason for the stop (speeding). If he did so, the officer extended the duration of the stop without legally sufficient articulated cause.
The distinction between the two possible interpretations of the record may be subtle, but constitutional and statutory policy requires that it be accorded legal significance to prevent every traffic stop from becoming a possible excuse for a general investigatory detention. Otherwise, every motorist stopped for a traffic offense could be detained and asked questions such as: "What were you doing last Saturday evening?" Judge Tanzer's separate opinion would apparently permit such an investigatory detention. We do not.
As we interpret the record, the trial court recognized the intrusiveness rule we articulate, but never made relevant findings of fact because of its conclusion the stop was invalid. We have noted the record is capable of different interpretations on the intrusiveness issue. We remand for findings on this issue. State v. Johnson/Imel, 16 Or App 560, 519 P2d 1053, rev den (1974).
Remanded with instructions.
About this same time, the exact sequence of events not being clear from the record, a young woman got out of her car, said she had been hitchhiking, had been picked up near the utility installation and asked permission to leave. After checking her identification, Officer Miller permitted her to leave.
The record contains no explanation of why Officer Miller thought the question he asked would clear up his concern about the registered owner of the vehicle.
Terry v. Ohio, 392 US 1, 88 S Ct 1868, 20 L Ed 2d 889 (1968).
Judge Tanzer's separate opinion argues we err in applying the "stop" rules of Terry v. Ohio, supra, and ORS 131.615 when defendants had committed an offense (speeding) in the officer's presence. Our first answer is that it would not seem significant whether we evaluate the stop of a motorist who has committed a traffic offense based on the law of arrests or on the law of stops, given that we apply the same objective test to Em arrest and to a stop.
Our further answer is that the normal, routine stop of a motorist who has committed a traffic offense for the purpose of issuance of a citation does not fit comfortably into any constitutional pigeonhole. It is not exactly a Terry-type stop, nor is it an arrest, at least of the custodial type. Analysis is further complicated by the Oregon treatment of most traffic offenses as civil, not criminal in nature. See Brown v. Multnomah County Dist. Ct., 280 Or 95, 570 P2d 52 (1977).
The reality, however, that routine traffic stops are not easily labeled is not a persuasive reason for failing to accord Oregon motorists the minimum protections that surround Terry-type stops.