Case Name: OSTERHOUDT v. OSTERHOUDT
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1900-02-09
Citations: 62 N.Y.S. 529
Docket Number: 
Parties: OSTERHOUDT v. OSTERHOUDT.
Judges: 
Reporter: West's New York Supplement
Volume: 62
Pages: 529–535

Head Matter:
OSTERHOUDT v. OSTERHOUDT.
(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department.
February 9, 1900.)
Divorce—Adultery—Custody of Children.
Where plaintiff obtained a divorce on grounds of the wife's adultery, which charge was based on the fact that she had obtained a decree of divorce in a foreign jurisdiction, and had remarried, a decree granting her the custody of the children—two' daughters, aged 11 and 7 years—will not be disturbed when it appears that the wife is a proper person for their custody, no other misconduct than her remarriage being shown, and that she has a comfortable home for them, and has long had the care and expense of their living and education, and that they are much attached to, and wish not to be separated from, her, while the husband has less means, had no home provided for the children, and had never shown a strong desire for their companionship.
Van Brunt, P. J., and Barrett, J., dissenting.
Appeal from special term, New York county.
Action by Harris P. Osterhoudt against Ella H. Osterhoudt. Judgment granted plaintiff a divorce and defendant the custody of the children. Plaintiff appeals from the order (59 N. Y. Supp. 797) granting the custody.
Affirmed.
Argued before VAN BRUNT, P. J., and BARRETT, RUMSEY. O’BRIEN, and INGRAHAM, JJ.
William M. Mullen, for appellant.
Eldon Bisbee, for respondent.

Opinion:
INGRAHAM, J.
This action was brought by plaintiff to obtain a divorce from the defendant upon the ground of her adultery. Judgment was- granted to the plaintiff dissolving the marriage, and awarding the custody of the two infant children of the marriage to the defendant, and the plaintiff appeals-from so much of the judgment as disposes of the custody of the children.
It appears that the parties to this action were married in the year 1879, and they seemed to have lived together in this city or vicinity until about the year 1895. The plaintiff is employed and resides in the city of New York, and since the fall of 1885 the defendant appears to have resided principally in Utica, N. Y., although she spent a portion of the time in the city of New York, with her husband. In February, 1897, she left the plaintiff, and since that time has resided away from him at Utica and in Bethlehem, Pa. Efforts were made by the plaintiff's brother to procure a reconciliation between the parties, which were unsuccessful, and in the latter part of the year 1897 the defendant went to the state of North Dakota, and on February 12, 1898, commenced an action in that state for a divorce from the plaintiff upon the ground that the plaintiff had failed to provide for her and her children the common necessities of life. Such proceedings were had that on June 80th judgment was entered in the district court of Morton county, in the state of North Dakota, granting the defendant an absolute divorce from the plaintiff. Subsequently the defendant returned to the state of New York, and in October, 1898, at Jersey City, in the state of New Jersey, she married one James Wilson, and since that time has lived with him as his wife; and it was the defendant's relation with Wilson upon which the plaintiff based the charge of adultery, which resulted in the judgment of divorce granted in this action. There are two children of this marriage,—one born on September 3, 1881, who was 17 years of age at the time of the trial; and the other, born in 1887, was 11 years of age at the time of the trial. Both daughters have resided with their mother (the defendant) from their birth, and to the present time they have been under the constant care of' their mother, who has always acted towards them as a devoted, mother, and to whom these daughters appear, from the testimony, to be fondly attached. The defendant has superintended their education; has, out of her private means, paid their school bills, and is continuing the education which she has thus supervised and controlled. Both daughters were examined on the trial, and testified to their strong affection for their mother, and their desire to continue to live with her. It further appears that the plaintiff has no home in New York, that he is living in a boarding house, has an income of $2,000 a year, which he has received" several years, and there is no evidence that he has any expectation of receiving any greater income; while the defendant has property of her own, has a comfortable home, and is able to amply provide for her daughters, giving them proper education and support, and giving to them the care and attention which daughters require from a mother. There was no charge of any kind against the character of the defendant, except so far as she was guilty of adultery by reason of her marriage to Wilson after she obtained a decree of divorce in the state of North Dakota. The plaintiff testified that he was served in the city of New York with the summons and complaint in the action in the state of North Dakota, but declined to appear in that action, or take any part in the proceedings there, under"advice of counsel; that, after the final separation in 1897, plaintiff made no effort in any way to protect or care for the children; made no provision for their support, education, or maintenance. Although he knew that his wife had definitely separated herself from him, and had commenced an action to obtain a divorce from him, he refused to make any provision for them during this period, allowing the mother to provide for the children,—support, educate, and maintain them. He expressly testified upon the trial that he had no reason for thinking that the mother was not a proper custodian for the children beyond the fact that she had married the second time. In the whole record the only offense charged against the defendant—the only fact from which any inference could be drawn that she was not in all respects a good woman, and the proper person to administer and care for the welfare of these two children—was that, after she had obtained a divorce in the state of North Dakota, believing that divorce to have finally dissolved the relations between herself and the plaintiff; she' contracted the second marriage. This second marriage was valid in New Jersey if the court of North "Dakota had jurisdiction, and, if valid there, would have been valid here. Moore v. Hegeman, 92 N. Y. 525. Upon these facts the question as to what course would best preserve the future interest of these children was presented to the court below, and the court had to determine, in the exercise of its judicial dis cretion, as to which, of the parents the custody of the children should be awarded, considering their future welfare. The rights of the parties to the action were subordinate to the welfare of the children. The misconduct of the defendant in contracting her second marriage depended entirely upon a legal question as to the jurisdiction of the court of the state of North Dakota to pronounce the decree of divorce. If that court had jurisdiction to grant that divorce, no one would say that the conduct of the defendant in contracting the second marriage was blameworthy, or would interfere in any way with her right to be awarded the custody of these children. Does the fact that she had made a mistake as to the legal effect of this decree, or as to the jurisdiction of the court of North Dakota to grant a divorce which would be recognized in this state, so affect her character as to justify this court in reversing the action of the court below in awarding the custody of these children to her? The children are warmly attached to her. She has devoted her life to their welfare; has provided for their support and education; and it certainly would be a cruel act, unless the welfare of the children imperatively demanded it, to deprive them of the companionship of an affectionate and loving mother, and assign them to the care of a father who has shown by his conduct that he had no very strong desire for their companionship, and where there is no evidence to show that he is able to provide a proper home for them. These facts would seem to justify the conclusion of the court below that the happiness and welfare of these two daughters would be best protected and preserved by leaving them where they both desire to be,—with the person who, from their birth, has had the charge of their maintenance, education, and support, and who has faithfully and intelligently performed her duty towards them. I think it may be said that the time has passed when courts of law are bound to recognize a right of property in children as belonging to parents, or that the father has any inherent right superior to that of the mother to the custody of their children. In this state, by the domestic relations law (chapter 272, Laws 1896), the right of a mother to the guardianship, custody, and control of the children is plainly recognized as being equal to that of the father; and while it is quite true that the willful desertion of her husband by a. married woman, without just cause, may, of itself, be sufficient to show that her character is such that it. would not be safe to intrust to her the education and care of her children, the facts of this case would not justify such a finding. It is apparent from the testimony that force would be required to compel these children to leave their mother and reside with the father, and I do not think that the court would be justified, under the circumstances, in making and enforcing such .a judgment, and in compelling these children to live with the father, when it would seem to be for their interest that the mother should continue to supply them with a mother's care, and where the father has shown no ability to properly provide them with a home and make provision for their material interests, or to supply them with the care which all young girls require. We have to determine this question upon the record which was before the court below and is now before us, and it does not appear that the defendant con- tinned in her relation with Wilson after it was adjudged that such relation was unlawful. I do not think, therefore, that we would be justified in overruling the discretion of the judge who tried the case and had the parties before him.
The judgment appealed from should be affirmed, with costs.
RUMSEY and O'BRIEN, JJ., concur.