Case Name: In the Matter of Clara C., Appellant, v. William L., Respondent
Court: New York Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 2001-05-03
Citations: 96 N.Y.2d 244
Docket Number: 
Parties: In the Matter of Clara C., Appellant, v William L., Respondent.
Judges: 
Reporter: New York Reports
Volume: 96
Pages: 244–262

Head Matter:
[750 NE2d 1068, 727 NYS2d 20]
In the Matter of Clara C., Appellant, v William L., Respondent.
Argued March 21, 2001;
decided May 3, 2001
POINTS OF COUNSEL
Butterman, Kahn & Gardner, L. L. P., New York City (Jay R. Butterman and Howard A. Gardner of counsel), for appellant.
I. Family Court Act § 516 is unconstitutional. (Levy v Louisiana, 391 US 68; Weber v Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 US 164; Gomez v Perez, 409 US 535; Matter of Storm v None, 57 Misc 2d 342; Matter of Brescia v Fitts, 56 NY2d 132; Corcella v Corcella, 228 AD2d 637; Matter of Shan F. v Francis F., 88 Misc 2d 165; McMains v McMains, 15 NY2d 283; Williams v Lambert, 902 F Supp 460; Matter of Commissioner of Social Servs. of City of N. Y. v Ruben O., 80 NY2d 409.) II. The Family Court erred in refusing to consider the child’s need for increased support. (Avildsen v Prystay, 171 AD2d 13, 79 NY2d 841; Matter of Boden v Boden, 42 NY2d 210.)
Children’s Law Center, Brooklyn (Barbara H. Dildine of counsel), Law Guardian.
I. Family Court Act § 516 is unconstitutional on its face in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the New York State Constitution because it forecloses to certain children born out of wedlock the right to modification of child support based upon their needs, a benefit to which all marital children and most nonmarital children are entitled. (Bacon v Bacon, 46 NY2d 477; Matter of Department of Social Servs. v Thomas J. S., 100 AD2d 119; Schaschlo v Taishoff, 2 NY2d 408; Matter of Storm v None, 57 Misc 2d 342; Mills v Habluetzel, 456 US 91; Matter of L. Pamela P. v Frank S., 59 NY2d 1; Matter of Weinberg v Omar E., 106 AD2d 448; Matter of Commissioner of Social Servs. of City of N. Y. v Wilmer W., 125 Misc 2d 905; Richard B. v Sandra B. B., 162 Misc 2d 123; Albany County Dept. of Social Servs. v John T., 170 Misc 2d 506.) II. Family Court Act § 516 is unconstitutional as applied to the facts of this case because its application denied equal protection of the child support laws. (Pickett v Brown, 462 US 1; Matter of Carmen V. v Bruce R., 115 Misc 2d 377; Matter of Reid v White, 112 Misc 2d 294; Little v Streater, 452 US 1; Matter of Department of Social Servs. v Thomas J. S., 100 AD2d 119; Matter of Kingston v Vadala, 150 Misc 2d 52; Matter of Brescia v Fitts, 56 NY2d 132; Matter of Boden v Boden, 42 NY2d 210; Andre v Warren, 248 AD2d 271; Matter of Michelle W. v Forrest James P., 218 AD2d 175.) III. The agreement made between the parties in 1987 pursuant to Family Court Act § 516 was invalid as a matter of law where (a) the court failed to comply with the mandatory judicial review procedure, and (b) no inquiry was conducted, despite the court’s knowledge of the existence of an HLA blood test indicating by a probability of 99.99% that respondent was the child’s father, to determine whether the parties were engaging in a subterfuge which acted to deny the child the full measure of financial support to which he would have been entitled had an order of paternity been made. (Matter of Michelle W. v Forrest James P., 218 AD2d 175; Matter of Cady v Beech, 65 Misc 2d 606; Matter of Storm v None, 57 Misc 2d 342; Avildsen v Prystay, 171 AD2d 13, 79 NY2d 841; Matter of Carmen V. v Bruce R., 115 Misc 2d 377; Andre v Warren, 248 AD2d 271; Matter of Kingston v Vadala, 150 Misc 2d 52; Matter of ABC v XYZ, 50 Misc 2d 792; Matter of James J. v Valerie M., 98 Misc 2d 785; Matter of Marytherese M. v Lee W., 213 AD2d 647.)
Cohen Hennessey & Bienstock, P. C., New York City (Harriet Newman Cohen, Peter Bienstock and Bonnie E. Rabin of counsel), for respondent.
I. Family Court Act § 516 is constitutional. (Bacon v Bacon, 46 NY2d 477; Matter of Commissioner of Social Servs. of City of N. Y. v Ruben O., 80 NY2d 409; Avilsen v Prystay, 171 AD2d 13, 79 NY2d 841; People v Hobson, 39 NY2d 479; People v Damiano, 87 NY2d 477; Matter of Richard W. v Roberta Y., 240 AD2d 812, 90 NY2d 809; Matter of Ettore I. v Angela D., 127 AD2d 6; Matter of Anton W. v Nadine V., 157 Misc 2d 467; Wilson v Lumb, 181 Misc 2d 1033; Andre v Warren, 248 AD2d 271.) II. As an independent basis for affirmance, appellant’s claim is barred by equitable estoppel. (Matter of Peter BB. v Robin CC., 256 AD2d 889; Matter of Sharon GG. v Duane HH., 95 AD2d 466, 63 NY2d 859; Matter of Richard W. v Roberta Y., 240 AD2d 812, 90 NY2d 809.) III. Family Court’s factual findings are beyond this Court’s scope of review and, in any event, were well supported by the evidence. (Sage v Fairchild-Swearingen Corp., 70 NY2d 579; Ast v State of New York, 66 NY2d 998; Humphrey v State of New York, 60 NY2d 742; Jacob & Youngs v Kent, 230 NY 239; Avildsen v Prystay, 171 AD2d 13, 79 NY2d 841; Hallock v State of New York, 64 NY2d 224; Matter of Rebell v Trask, 220 AD2d 594; Matter of Michelle W. v Forrest James P., 218 AD2d 175; Andre v Warren, 248 AD2d 271; Matter of Cady v Beech, 65 Misc 2d 606.) sociales and another, defendants and third-party plaintififsappellants in the first above-entitled action. Plaintiffs claim with respect to Labor Law § 240 (1) should be dismissed because plaintiff did not sustain personal injuries caused by the failure of a safety device that protects workers at an elevated work site or protects workers from materials or loads being hoisted or secured at a height. (Zimmer v Chemung County Performing Arts, 65 NY2d 513; Rocovich v Consolidated Edison Co., 78 NY2d 509; Bland v Manocherian, 66 NY2d 452; Izrailev v Ficarra Furniture, 70 NY2d 813; Ross v Curtis-Palmer Hydro-Elec. Co., 81 NY2d 494; Rodriguez v Tietz Ctr. for Nursing Care, 197 AD2d 565, 84 NY2d 841; Misseritti v Mark IV Constr. Co., 209 AD2d 931, 86 NY2d 487; Nieves v Five Boro Air Conditioning & Refrig. Corp., 93 NY2d 914; Brink v Yeshiva Univ., 259 AD2d 265; Sasso v NYMED, Inc., 238 AD2d 799.)

Opinion:
OPINION OF THE COURT
Ciparick, J.
In this paternity proceeding, we are called upon to decide whether a putative father can invoke Family Court Act § 516 to bar a mother from seeking additional child support, where the parties entered into a support agreement that was approved by the court without regard for the child's needs. Under the facts presented here, we conclude that he cannot.
In 1983, petitioner Clara C., then a college student, gave birth to her son, Thomas L. C. In 1986, she commenced a paternity proceeding against her former professor, respondent William L. Although blood tests revealed a 99.9% probability of paternity, the parties entered into a settlement agreement pursuant to Family Court Act § 516. Without admitting paternity, William agreed, among other things, to pay monthly child support of $275 until Thomas's 21st birthday, and to maintain a life insurance policy as security for those payments in the event of his own death. In exchange, Clara agreed to dismissal of the pending paternity proceeding with prejudice and to forbear bringing any future paternity or support proceedings, provided that William satisfied the terms of the agreement.
After executing the agreement, the parties, along with the Department of Social Services, appeared before Family Court for approval of the agreement pursuant to section 516 (a). Although Clara and William were represented by counsel, no law guardian had been appointed to represent Thomas. The court asked counsel whether the "matter was settled by the at torneys" and whether an order of filiation had been made, to which William's attorney replied, "This is compromising the entire deal, the paternity and the support. That's what [section] 516 is." The court then marked the case "settled" without further inquiry. When counsel asked the court to probe further into whether the parties read the agreement and considered it to be fair and acceptable, the court refused, stating "I assume if your clients [are] in this court and you represent them it is settled."
Ten years later, Clara commenced the instant proceeding for a declaration of paternity and an order increasing Thomas's support to meet his current educational needs. On William's motion, the Hearing Examiner dismissed the proceeding, concluding that it was barred by the terms of the section 516 agreement. Clara objected to the Hearing Examiner's determination, arguing that the agreement was unenforceable because William failed to comply with its terms. Alternatively, she maintained that section 516 violates equal protection because, unlike marital children, nonmarital children whose mothers have entered into section 516 agreements are precluded from seeking additional child support. Before considering Clara's objections, Family Court appointed a law guardian to represent Thomas. The law guardian adopted the constitutional argument and added that the agreement was invalid because the court failed to determine whether adequate provision had been made for Thomas.
Family Court denied the objections to the Hearing Examiner's order and upheld dismissal of the petition. Among other things, the court rejected Clara's claim that William failed to comply with the agreement, concluding that any noncompliance was immaterial (181 Misc 2d 241, 247). Moreover, although the court recognized that a "more thorough review of the [a]greement's adequacy might be deemed salutary" (id., at 248), it refused to invalidate the agreement on this basis, noting that any attempt to undo the 12-year-old agreement would undermine the strong policy favoring the finality of settlements. Finally, the court upheld the constitutionality of section 516 and concluded that appellate courts have consistently enforced such agreements. The Appellate Division affirmed "for reasons stated" by Family Court (274 AD2d 583). We now reverse.
Family Court Act § 516 allows a mother and a putative father of a nonmarital child to settle a paternity proceeding by entering into a binding support agreement that waives future support. It provides, in pertinent part:
"(a) An agreement or compromise made by the mother or by some authorized person on behalf of either the mother or child concerning the support of either is binding upon the mother and child only when the court determines that adequate provision has been made and is fully secured and approves said agreement or compromise.
"(c) The complete performance of the agreement or compromise, when so approved, bars other remedies of the mother or child for the support and education of the child" (emphasis added).
The language of the statute is clear: a support agreement will be enforced "only when" a court has reviewed the agreement and determined that adequate support for the child has been made (Family Ct Act § 516 [a]).
This requirement reflects a longstanding legislative policy of protecting the welfare of children born out of wedlock. Section 516 (L 1962, ch 686) replaced Domestic Relations Law former § 121 (L 1925, ch 255). Prior to the enactment of section 121, settlements for the support of nonmarital children were commonly made by local welfare officials and required no court approval. Concerned that these settlements were inadequate to support the child, the Legislature amended the law to require judicial approval of certain settlements before releasing the father from his obligations (see, Mem of Women's City Club of New York, Bill Jacket, L 1925, ch 255, at 9-10).
Section 516 (a), like its predecessor, provides that a compromise agreement is not binding on the parties unless a court approves it and determines that adequate provision for the child's support has been made. The purpose of this requirement is to ensure that the needs of nonmarital children are adequately met and are not contracted away by their mothers, whose interests may not always coincide with those of their children (see, Avildsen v Prystay, 171 AD2d 13, 14-15, appeal dismissed 79 NY2d 841; Sobie, New York Family Court Practice § 7.19, at 380 [10 West's New York Practice Series 1996]; 1 Vitek, Disputed Paternity Proceedings § 2.05 [4] [a], at 2-88 [5th ed]). Indeed, judicial scrutiny prevents overreaching by the parties and safeguards the interests of children who, like Thomas, may not be represented by a law guardian. While section 516 prescribes no particular inquiry for determining the adequacy of support, courts have generally considered the parties' financial positions, the child's support and educational needs throughout childhood and the interests of the State (see generally, Andre v Warren, 248 AD2d 271, 271-272; Matter of Michelle W. v Forrest James P., 218 AD2d 175, 178; Matter of Carmen V. v Bruce R., 115 Misc 2d 377, 379-380). Regardless of the inquiry used, a court must determine the fairness and adequacy of a proposed agreement before approving it (Family Ct Act § 516 [a]). Absent judicial review and approval, the agreement will not be enforced to preclude a later modification of support (id.).
Here, Family Court's perfunctory approval of the agreement, without any determination as to its adequacy, failed to satisfy the requirements of section 516. Nothing in the record indicates that the court considered the parties' financial situation or whether the agreed-upon amount of support adequately met Thomas's needs throughout childhood. To the contrary, when counsel asked the court to inquire whether the parties considered the agreement to be fair, the court refused, stating only that the matter was "settled." Although Clara voiced no objection to the agreement for over 10 years, her failure to object does not justify enforcement of an agreement that was approved without any determination that adequate provision had been made for the child. Because the court made no determination as to the adequacy of the support, the agreement fails to conform to section 516. Thus, William may not invoke the statute to bar the instant proceeding for a declaration of paternity and an increased support order to meet Thomas's ongoing educational needs.
Having determined that the agreement here does not comply with the requirements of section 516, we have no occasion to consider the constitutionality of that section. Moreover, we do not pass upon the continuing viability of Bacon v Bacon (46 NY2d 477), decided nearly a quarter-century ago. We are bound by principles of judicial restraint not to decide constitutional questions "unless their disposition is necessary to the appeal" (People v Carcel, 3 NY2d 327, 330; see also, Matter of Cipolla v Golisano, 84 NY2d 450, 455; Peters v New York City Hous. Auth., 307 NY 519, 527-528). Because a compelling non-constitutional ground resolves this appeal, we refrain, at this time, from addressing the constitutional issues raised.
Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should be reversed, with costs, and the matter remitted to Family Court for further proceedings in accordance with the opinion herein. The certified question should not be answered upon the ground that it is unnecessary.
Other jurisdictions have similarly required judicial scrutiny and approval of such agreements (see, e.g., Willerton v Bassham, 111 Nev 10, 22, 889 P2d 823, 830-831; Tuer v Niedoliwka, 92 Mich App 694, 700, 285 NW2d 424, 427; Fox v Hohenshelt, 19 Ore App 617, 628-629, 528 P2d 1376, 1381).