Case Name: THOMPSON v. VROOMAN
Court: New York Supreme Court, General Term
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1892-12-08
Citations: 21 N.Y.S. 179
Docket Number: 
Parties: THOMPSON v. VROOMAN.
Judges: 
Reporter: West's New York Supplement
Volume: 21
Pages: 179–186

Head Matter:
THOMPSON v. VROOMAN.
(Supreme Court, General Term, Third Department.
December 8, 1892.)
1. Appeal—Review—Weight op Evidence. On questions of fact the appellate court will not reverse unless the evidence in favor of appellant greatly preponderates.
2. Action fob Convebsion—Findings—Habmless Ebbob. In an action for the wrongful appropriation of money, where plaintiff alleged facts constituting a conversion, without expressly so characterizing it, the refusal of the referee to "find that the complaint alleged a cause of action in tort, and not in contract, if erroneous, was not prejudicial, as a complaint alleging a conversion necessarily alleges a cause of action in tort.
8. Same. In such a case, where the referee found that defendant was guilty of conversion, it was harmless error to refuse to find that, “in order to maintain the action in its present form, it must affirmatively appear that defendant, has been guilty of conversion. ”
4. Same. Where, in an action for conversion, the complaint alleged'and the evidence showed that defendant received plaintiff’s money as his agent, to deposit it in bank in plaintiff’s name, and he wrongly deposited it on his own account, and subsequently "drew it out, though it was not alleged in express terms that defendant acted in a fiduciary capacity, it was not error for the referee to decline to find that defendant was in no way so acting. Mayham, P. J., dissenting.
5. Same—Evidence—Admissibility. In an action for conversion of pension money received by plaintiff, and given by him to defendant to deposit, the overruling of an objection to a question asked of plaintiff if he made an application for a pension on account of his son being killed in the army was harmless error.
6. Same—Necessity op Pbevious Demand. In such a case no demand by plaintiff is necessary before the commencement of the action.
7. Same—Evidence—Statement op Conclusion. Defendant, instead of depositing the money to plaintiff’s credit, deposited it to his own account, and subsequently drew it out of bank. Plaintiff was asked if he consented to such withdrawal of the money by defendant, to which plaintiff answered in the negative. Held, that the question was properly allowed to be answered, as calling for a fact. Mayham, P. J., dissenting.
8. Same—Evidence—Showing a Negative. In such a case, as the want of consent could only be proved in the way allowed by the referee, plaintiff was properly allowed to show a negative.
9. Stipulations—Evidence—Statement op Account. Where it is admitted in a stipulation appended to a statement of account that the latter is “correct, and a true copy of the books kept by” a certain bank, and it stipulated that the statement may be read “as original evidence, and as equal evidence with the books,” it is not necessary, before reading the statement, to lay a foundation by proving the authenticity and correctness of the books of which it purports to be a copy. Mayham, P. J., dissenting.
Appeal from judgment on report of referee.
Action by William Thompson against Cornelius P. Vrooman. From a judgment for plaintiff entered on a referee’s report, defendant appeals. Affirmed.
Plaintiff, an ignorant colored man, was awarded a pension, and, receiving his first check therefor, asked defendant’s assistance in depositing it in bank. The deposit was -made on defendant’s" account, and he gave plaintiff small sums of money as the latter needed them. The bank subsequently failed, and plaintiff brought the action for the amount of the deposit.
The complaint was as follows;
“The plaintiff complains against the defendant and alleges: That on or about the 36th day of May, 1887, the plaintiff, having received about the sum of $1,500, pension money, delivered or caused to be delivered to the defendant the sum of $1,000 thereof, with directions to defendant to place the same on deposit with the firm of H. R. Pierson & Son. bankers, in their bank in the city of Albany, H. Y., to remain there on interest for the benefit of this plaintiff. That the defendant received and agreed so to deposit the same with said firm of bankers. That at said time the defendant did deposit said money with said bankers, and, as this plaintiff supposed, in the name and to the credit of this plaintiff; but, on the contrary, as plaintiff is informed and believes to be true, said deposit was made by said defendant in the name and to the credit of said defendant. That the defendant was not the owner of, and had no interest in, said $1,000, but the same belonged to and the plaintiff was the owner thereof. That thereafter, and prior to the 5th day of October, 1888, as the plaintiff is informed and believes to be true, the said defendant, without the knowledge or consent of this plaintiff, wrongfully and unlawfully withdrew all of said money and deposit from $aid bank and said firm of bankers, and wrongfully and unlawfully appropriated and converted the same to his own use. That said money so deposited as aforesaid was of the value of $1,000. (3) That before the commencement of this action the plaintiff demanded the said $1,000 of the defendant, which he refused and still refuses to pay. Wherefore plaintiff demands judgment against the defendant for the sum of $1,000, and interest thereon. ”
Argued before MAYHAM, P. J., and PUTNAM and HERRICK, JJ.
D. S. Mayham, for appellant.
Hinman & Dugan, for respondent.
On questions of fact the appellate court will not reverse unless the evidence in favor of appellant greatly preponderates. Booth v. Simpson, (Com. Pl. N. Y.) 18 N. Y. Supp. 951; Wheatland v. Pryor, (Sup.) 14 N. Y. Supp. 533; Bank v. Crosby, (Sup.) 1 N. Y. Supp. 256; Sherwood v. Hauser, 94 N. Y. 626; Roosa v. Smith, 17 Hun, 138; Baird v. Mayor, etc., of New York, 96 N. Y. 567; Crane v. Baudouine, 55 N. Y. 256; Westerlo v. De Witt, 36 N. Y. 340; Bank v. Herrat, 19 Daily Reg. 129; Ellis v. Machine Co., 9 Daly, 78; Kozer v. Sommer, (Sup.) 19 N. Y. Supp. 449.

Opinion:
PUTNAM, J.
This action is brought for the wrongful conversion of $1,0001 The complaint alleges that on the 26th day of May, 1867, plaintiff delivered to defendant the sum of $1,000, with directions to place the same on deposit with H. R. Pierson & Son, bankers in Albany, N. Y., to remain there on interest for the benefit of plaintiff. Defendant, receiving and agreeing to so deposit said money, in fact deposited the same to his own credit. He was not the owner of, and had no interest in, said money. That the same belonged to plaintiff. That thereafter, and prior to October 5, 1888,'defendant, without the knowledge or consent of plaintiff, unlawfully withdrew said money, and unlawfully appropriated and converted the same to his own use. While the complaint does not characterize the deposit of this money by defendant in his own name as a conversión, yet it states all the facts, showing that such deposit by defendant was a wrongful appropriation of the fund. And the complaint also alleges a conversion by the wrongful withdrawing and use of the said money. Defendant, in his answer, alleges that the deposit of the said money in his own name was done with the knowledge and consent of the plaintiff, and denies any wrongful appropriation of the same.
The case presents a question of fact, which the referee has determined in favor of the plaintiff. I have examined the testimony given upon the trial and the briefs submitted by counsel with care. The evidence was conflicting, and the referee might have reached a different conclusion from that arrived at. There was testimony in the case from which he could have determined that the money in suit was deposited in the defendant's name with the consent of plaintiff, but I think there was sufficient evidence given to sustain.the referee's finding on the question presented for his decision. The rule is familiar that on questions of fact the appellate court will not reverse unless the evidence in favor of the appellant greatly preponderates. Authorities sustaining this rule are cited by respondent, and need not be discussed here. I think that this case does not present such a preponderance of evidence of the defendant as will justify a reversal of the judgment. On the contrary, if it were my duty to pass upon the testimony as an original question, I should hesitate before coming to a different conclusion from that reached by the learned referee.
Counsel for appellant suggests that the referee erred in declining, at defendant's request, to find that "the complaint alleged a cause of action in tort, not contract," and also in refusing to find that, "in order to maintain the action in its present form, it must affirmatively appear that the defendant has been guilty of conversion." These errors, if they should be deemed such, are harmless. The complaint clearly alleges a cause of action in tort, and I see no reason why the referee should characterize it. The defendant has suffered no injury by his declining to find that a complaint plainly alleging a conversion contains a cause of action in tort. Again, in his findings, the referee distinctly determines that the defendant was guilty of a conversion of the money in suit, and a refusal to repeat the finding can produce no injury. The referee did not err in declining to find that " defendant was in no way acting in a fiduciary capacity." He did find properly, on the evidence in the case, that the defendant received $1,000, as the agent of plaintiff, to deposit; hence defendant was acting in a fiduciary capacity. But it is suggested that there was no allegation in the complaint that a fiduciary relation existed. It is true that the complaint does not use-the word "fiduciary," but facts are stated showing that defendant received the money to deposit, and hence that the relation of principal and agent existed. Where an agent takes money from a principal to deposit in a bank in the principal's name, it cannot be said that the agent was "not in any way acting in a fiduciary capacity." See Flagg v. Ely, 1 Edm. Sel. Cas. 206. Hence the above request of the defendant to find was properly refused by the referee. I think the error of-the court below, if any, in overruling the objection to this question asked of plaintiff, viz., " Did you make an application for a pension on account of your son being killed in the war? " harmless. The error could not possibly produce any injury to the defendant. The statement from the books of the bank was properly received in evidence, under the stipulation. That stipulation provided that the statement might be read as original evidence; that it was correct as to the amount of deposits to the credit of defendant, and the amount drawn out by him. As we have seen, the evidence in the case is sufficient to sustain the findings of the referee that there was a wrongful deposit of the money in suit by defendant in his own name, and also a wrongful withdrawing and conversion of said fund. Hence no demand prior to the commencement of the action was necessary to be made by the plaintiff, and therefore the exception to the rulings of the referee admitting Exhibit D are not well taken.
It is insisted that the referee erred in overruling objections to the following, question asked of plaintiff, viz.:
"Did you consent that Mr, Vrooman should draw the $1,000 from H. R. Pierson & Son's bank? (Objected to.) No, sir. No, I didn't consent that he might use it. I didn't know that he had done so. 1 knew nothing about it until the bank had failed. " '
I .think the. question was properly allowed to be answered, as calling for a fact; that the case was one w'here the plaintiff could properly show a negative. It was competent for the plaintiff to establish the fact that the withdrawal of the funds by the defendant was not done with his consent. This fact could only be shown in the way allowed by the referee. See Crane v. Baudouine, 55 N. Y. 263; Huggans v. Fryer, 1 Lans. 277; People v. Tubbs, 37 N. Y. 589; Crouse v. Garlock, 45 How. Pr. 85. There are other exceptions taken not necessary to be considered. The judgment should be affirmed, with costs.
HERRICK, J., concurs.