Case Name: The People v. William Rando
Court: New York Supreme Court, General Term
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1857-02
Citations: 3 Park. Crim. Rep. 335
Docket Number: 
Parties: The People v. William Rando.
Judges: 
Reporter: Parker's Criminal Reports
Volume: 3
Pages: 335–342

Head Matter:
Supreme Court. New-York General Term,
February, 1857.
Roosevelt, Davies and Peabody, Justices.
The People v. William Rando.
On the trial of an indictment for receiving stolen goods, knowing them to he stolen, it is competent for the prosecution to give in evidence a series of acts of the like character, for the purpose of showing the scienter of the accused, or to rehut any presumption of innocent mistake.
On the trial of such an indictment, it is not competent for the prisoner to proVé wlíat was said to the clerk of the defendant hy the persons who delivered the stolen property to him, at the time of the delivery, on the premises of the defendant. Peabody, J., dissenting.
. The prisoner was indicted, tried and convicted, in the New-York General Sessions, for receiving a saddle, bridle and bits, the property of Baltis M; Segee, knowing the same to have been stolen. "
The questions raised on the trial, and the exceptions taken by the prisoner’s counsel, sufficiently appear in the points made on argument, and in the opinion of the court.
Henry L. Clinton, for the defendant.
I. The court below erred in admitting the testimony of Zerfass, Brandon, Neilson, Hamilton, Felheimer, Cummings, Kerr and Nesbitt, in respect to other stolen goods, stolen from other persons than Baltis M. Segee, the prosecutor, and at a different time. Specific exceptions were taken to each and every part of the evidence of the foregoing witnesses touching this point. The law on this subject is stated in Archbold's Criminal Practice and Pleading, 480 (ed. with Wat. notes), as follows: “But the prosecutor will not be allowed to prove that at the time his goods were found in the prisoner’s possession, goods of other persons of the samé description had also been found in his possession, which had previously been stolen; for that is not proof of guilty knowledge.” Upon this point it is stated in 2 Russell on Crimes (p. 251): “ Upon an indictment for receiving stolen goods, evidence may be given of different receipts of goods stolen from the same person in order to show guilty knowledge in the receiving, at least, of such receipts as were prior to the one charged in the indictment.” The same doctrine is contained in 1 Phillips' Evidence (p. 475). All that is stated on this subject in Russell, Wharton's American Criminal Law and Phillips' Evidence, is wholly or chiefly founded on The King v. Dunn and Smith (1 Moody C. C., 146). At page 149, it is stated: “ But though this pledging, and disposing, and having in her possession the goods, extended over a great length of time, between four and five months, yet as all the property had been stolen from the same persons, and had all been brought to her by the prisoner Dunn, the learned judge thought it was admissible and proper to be left to the jury, as an ingredient to make out the guilty knowledge.” It will be seen that in none of the elementary authorities or adjudicated cases has the doctrine ever been held, that property stolen from other persons than the prosecutor is competent evidence to prove the scienter.
II. The court below erred in not allowing the witness John Thompson to prove what was stated by the persons at the time they delivered the cart load of things upon Rando’s premises in his absence, of which it was alleged the articles specified in the indictment formed part. The object of proving these statements was to show what representations induced Rando’s clerk, in his absence and without his authority, to receive upon his (Rando’s) premises these particular goods. This evidence was clearly competent on the question of scienter. The main circumstance existing against the defendant was the fact that the goods were found upon his premises, and thus, constructively at least, in his possession, so as to raise an inference unfavorable to his innocence, as in the case of an indictment for larceny, where the stolen property was found in the possession of the prisoner. Declarations made at the time of the delivery of the goods, by the persons delivering them, are clearly and palpably a part of the res gestee, and as such admissible in evidence. “ The principal points of attention are whether the circumstances and declarations offered in proof were cotemporaneous with the main fact under consideration, and whether they were so connected with it as to illustrate its character.” (1 Greenl. Ev., § 108.) “Declarations made at the time of the transaction, and expressive of its character, motive or object, are regarded as ‘ verbal acts, indicating a present purpose and intention,’ and are therefore admitted in proof, like any other material facts.” (lb.) “The declarations must be concomitant with the principal act, and so. connected with it as to be regarded as the mere result and consequence of the coexisting motives, in order to form a proper criterion for directing the judgment, which is to be formed upon the whole conduct.” (Id., § 110.) “ Words and writing appear, perhaps, more properly to be admissible as a part of the res gestee, when they accompany some act, the nature and object and motives of which are the subject of inquiry. In such cases words are receivable as original evidence, on the ground that what is said at the time affords legitimate, if not the best means of ascertaining the character of such equivocal acts as admit of explanation, from those indications of the mind which language affords.” (1 Phil. Ev., 194, 195.) “On a charge of larceny, when the proof against the prisoner is that the stolen property was found in his possession, it would be competent to show on behalf of the prisoner that a third person left the property in his care, saying that he would call for it again afterwards; for it is material in such a case to inquire under what circumstances the prisoner first had possession of the property.” (Rosc. Cr. Ev., 25.)
A. Oakey Hall (District Attorney), for the people.
I. The ruling of the court, “ that it was competent for the prosecution to prove that other stolen property than that belonging to prosecutor had been found in the prisoner’s possession,” was correct. 1. This ruling has been law passim ever since the case of Dunn and Smith (Ryan & Moody C. C. R., 146 ; 1 Gal., 842), which holds, “ that where there are several distinct acts of receiving, evidence maybe given of such receipts (at least, of all prior to that on which the prosecutor elects to proceed), for the purpose of proving the guilty knowledge in the receiving.” (See also the elaborate note by Waterman, in 3 Arch. Cr. Pr. and Pl., 477, 2 Banks & Gould’s ed.) (1.) I find nothing to the contrary in any of the books. I never heard the doctrine questioned until this case, and I never read of its being doubted since that case of People v. Trenor (Court of General Sessions, 1 City Hall Recorder, 105.) In this case, Wilson, who was with Dr. Graham and Sampson (an illustrious triumvirate of ingenious defenders), objected to proof of any stolen articles received other than those laid in the indictment. The court said: “ The defendant could not be found guilty of receiving stolen goods not laid in the indictment; nor does the public prosecutor offer the evidence for that purpose. Hp offers to produce it as a circumstance to be left to the jury.” (2i) The reason of the rule is this: Receiving stolen goods is no crime of itself. There may be innocent purchasers,' and very often there are. It is the knowledge they are stolon. If a man is in the practice of passing counterfeit money or of buying stolen goods, evidence of this rebuts any presumption of innocent possession or purchase, and raises afiirmative presumption of guilty knowledge or scienter. (3.) So in case of People v. Shotnell (3 City Hall Recorder, 96), the report says: “ It appeared that the defendant had been for a long time in the habit of receiving stolen goods of different kinds, &c.”
II. , The exceptions to exclusion of representations to defendant’s clerk, in defendant's absence, &c., &c., is cer tainly untenable. I am unaware of any exception to hearsay evidence that would vary the rule excluding it. To admit such evidence would be very dangerous. The artful representations of thieves, in collusion with a defendant, might, in this mode, be made evidence through the medium of an innocent agent of defendant.

Opinion:
By the Court, Roosevelt, J.
Where a party is indicted for the crime of knowingly receiving stolen goods, it is competent to' the prosecution to give in evidence a series of other acts of the like character, to show the knowledge or scienter of the accused, or to rebut any presumption of innocent mistake.
It is not competent to the prisoner to introduce the allegations of the persons from whom he received the stolen goods. Such permission would lead to the fraudulent manufacture of evidence without the penalty of perjury.
The exceptions taken at the trial must therefore be over- ruled, and the proceedings of the General Sessions Affirmed: