Case Name: SOUTHERN PAC. CO. v. BURKE
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 1893-02-20
Citations: 60 F. 704
Docket Number: No. 61
Parties: SOUTHERN PAC. CO. v. BURKE.
Judges: Before PARDEE and McCORMICK, Circuit Judges, and LOCKE, District Judge.
Reporter: Federal Reporter
Volume: 60
Pages: 704–718

Head Matter:
SOUTHERN PAC. CO. v. BURKE.
(Circuit Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.
February 20, 1893.)
No. 61.
Master and Servant — Injury to Brakeman from Deeeotive Couplings— Question eor Jury.
Plaintiff, a brakeman in defendant’s employ, was required by its yard master to make a coupling between a caboose with an old-style draw-bead and a train of seven sleepers with tbe Miller coupling. On tbe train pulling out, tbe caboose became detached, and the train was backed to enable him to recouple it. He went between tbe stationary cars, but found tbe link pin fast, and, while hammering it out, the train, without signal from him, suddenly backed, and crushed' him. Tbe engineer testified that be backed on signal from tbe rear of tbe train. Tbe testimony showed that such couplings were not in their construction intended to be used together, and, in making connections with them, there was unusual danger; that they were, however, constantly used together by defendant; that plaintiff was acquainted with the company’s rule in regard to making such couplings, and was following it when hurt; that he had been switching about two years, and had made such couplings only two or three times; that, had the caboose been coupled at the head of the train, there would have been much less danger, because .the engineer could have seen and talked with the brakeman; that the pin used was a square pin, and had it been a round pin, fitting the hole, it could have been easily drawn out. Held, that the questions of negligence and contributory negligence were properly submitted to the Jury. Pardee, Circuit Judge, dissenting.
In Error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Texas.
Robert S. Burke, the defendant in error, brought his action in the circuit com’t of the United States for the eastern district of Texas, at Galveston, against the Southern Pacific Company, plaintiff in error, to recover damages for personal.injuries, alleged to have been caused by the gross negligence of the company while he was an employs of the same, by which he lost his right arm, and suffered other serious injuries, to his damage $10,000. The defendant company first filed a plea to the jurisdiction of the court, on the ground that neither the plaintiff nor defendant at the institution of the suit were resident citizens of the eastern district of Texas, which plea being overruled, the defendant company filed, und-er leave of the court, a demurrer and a general denial, and answered specially that Burke had been long in the service of the company as switchman; that he assumed all such risks as were incident to his employment; that he understood the nature and the extent of the service, and assumed all visible risks, whether ordinarily incident to the service or not, and all risks occurring through the carelessness, negligence, and unskillfulness of his coemployés in and about defendant’s business, and all patent defects in the machinery, tools, cars, and appliances used on defendant’s road; that defendant company used all proper care in procuring proper machinery and appliances, and skillful and experienced officers and laborers; that the machinery,, track, and appliances were in good order and suitable condition, and that the injury was caused by the want of care of the plaintiff, and in violation of the rules of the defendant company; and, further, specially answered that if any such injury occurred to plaintiff, as alleged, it was caused by the want of care of the coemployós in the employment of the defendant company, for which it was not liable. The defendant company also pleaded the statute of limitations for 12 months.
On the. trial of the case, the cause was submitted to the jury on the issues joined, arid on the following evidence:
“ T was at that time about 19 years of age. T was employed by the defendant company as a switchman in its yards at Del Rio, Texas. Del Rio is an end of a division of the Southern Pacific Company. It is the end of the San Antonio division. Trains arriving at Del Rio from the east change crews. At about the hour of 7:30 or 8 o’clock p. m. on this night, a train arrived at Del Rio from the east. It was an express passenger train, destined for California. As soon as this train arrived at Del Rio, and the train crew, conductor, engineer, and brakeman which had accompanied it to Del Rio left, it was turned over to Mr. Wade, the company’s yard master at Del Rio, and the yard crew. I was one of the yard crew, working' under Mr. Wade. This train consisted of an engine, a baggage and express car, seven Pullman sleeping cars, and a,t the end a caboose car, such as is used in the making up of freight trains. A caboose car is one which belongs to a. freight train; a car in which the men belonging to a freight train sleep and ride. Engineer Norton relieved the engineer who brought in the express train. We received orders from Mr. Wade, the yard master, to back tbe train in on a siding, and detach the caboose car at the rear of the train therefrom, and to attach another caboose car which was in the yards thereto. This was done. I was ordered by the yard master, Wade, to make the couplings, and to place the caboose car in the rear of the seven Pullman cars. Pullman cars have what is known as Miller couplers. They are what is known as self-couplers, having a sort of goose-neck coupler with a lateral motion, and when two cars with Miller drawheads come together they couple themselves. The caboose ear has the same drawhead as freight cars,- — a stationary drawhead. Such draw-heads • were never intended to he coupled together, as the drawheads are wholly dissimilar, and in bringing two such drawheads together for the purpose of making a coupling there is great danger of the drawheads passing- each other, and crushing the switchman. The only way the coupling can he made with reasonable safety is to take the link out of the stationary draw-head, set the pin in the stationary drawhead, put the link in the Miller drawhead, guide the link with the hand as the two cars are brought together, and put the link in the slot of the stationary drawhead. The concussion will cause the pin to drop as set in the stationary drawhead, and the coupling is made. It is an unusual thing in railroad service to- couple passenger or Pullman cars onto cars having a stationary drawhead. I had been switching at the time of the accident about two years, and I had never made such a coupling more than two or throe times. On this occasion, after the coupling between, the rear Pullman and the caboose car had been made, the signal was given to the engineer to pull out of the yard, and in pulling out of the yard the caboose car became detached from the train. I signaled the engineer to stop, which he did. I then signaled him to hack up, which he did. He knew from the signal which I gave him that the caboose car was detached from the rest of the train. He hacked up until I signaled him to stop. I then went in between the rear Pullman and the caboose car to again couple them together. I found that llie link was in the drawhead of the caboose ear; that is, in the stationary drawhead. I had to get it out and put it in the drawhead of the Miller before 1 could make the coupling. I tried to pull the pin out. Found that it was stuck fast in the hole of the caboose drawhead, and I could not pull it with both hands. I found that it was a square pin, and, being in a round hole, the motion oi‘ the train had fastened it in the drawhead so that I could not pull it out without hammering it. As quick as I could I got a rock, and began hammering' the pin so as to loosen it. This is the only way in which it could be gotten out. I was powerless to pull it out with my hands. While so engaged, the train sud denly came back without signal from me, for the purpose of making the coupling. The two drawheads passed each other, as they always do when brought together unless the switchman places the link in the drawhead of the Miller, and guides it, as the two cars come together, with his hand, into the slot of the stationary drawhead. The concussion caused the pin which was fast in the caboose drawhead -to be driven through my right hand, and so crushed it that it had to be amputated. The two cars in coming together, in consequence of the passing of the two drawheads, were brought so close together as to crush me in between the two, breaking several of my ribs, and so injuring me as to cause me months of suffering, heavy expense, and loss of employment. Had the pin been round instead of' square, I could have readily pulled it out with my hands. All of defendant’s express passenger trains at that time, destined for California, had attached to them caboose-ears. There was no reason for placing this caboose car in the rear of the seven Pullmans. It "could have been put at the head of the train just as easy; and if it had been so placed, and it had come loose, I would have been, in recoupling it, within thirty-three feet of the engineer, so as to have talked to him and he to me, and not depended on signals. The risk to any switchman in making a coupling between a car with a Miller draw-head and a caboose car, the caboose car being placed at the head of the train instead of the rear, would have been very much less. The yard master, Wade, under whom I was working, was the highest authority of the railroad company at Del Rio. He had command of all the work done in the yards in handling and making up trains. He had authority to employ and discharge all men working in the yards. What I did I did under his orders.’
(“Witness'is here shown rule No. 41, which is as follows: ‘Coupling Cars. 41. Train men and other employes are required to exercise the utmost caution to avoid injury to themselves and fellow employes, and they are especially enjoined to use great care in coupling and uncoupling cars. Coupling cars by hand is strictly prohibited in all cases where a stick can be used to guide the link. Do not go between the cars to couple them unless the draw-bars are known to be in good order. In coupling, the Miller hook on to the other styles of drawbars, first insert the link in the hook, using the pin chained to the Miller platform.’)
“And he testified: T am acquainted with that rule. I was following it to the letter when I was hurt. I was doing my best to get the link out of the stationary drawhead in which it was fastened, so as to insert the link in the hook, using the pin chained to the Miller platform. The rule says that coupling cars by hand is strictly prohibited when a stick can be used to gfiide the link. This does not apply to making a coupling between a Miller drawhead and a stationary drawhead. In such a case you cannot guide the link with a stick. You have to guide it with your hand so as to insert the link in the slot of the stationary drawhead; otherwise, you will never make the coupling. I gave no signal to back the train when I was hurt, and no warning was given to me that the train was coming back until I was crushed between the two cars. The signal may have been given by Mr. Wade. He was back near where I was. I had been in railroad service when I was hurt since I was seventeen years of age, and had always given satisfaction as a switch-man. My health was very seriously affected by the crushing that I got between the two cars when they came together. I am not as able-bodied and strong as I was when I was hurt. I was earning about $75 per month when I was hurt. Since I got about I have tried to learn telegraphy, and I can render fair service as a telegraph station agent at a small station; but in doing telegraph work in a general office, when both hands are required, I am unequal to the task, as I can only use one hand, and that the left hand.’
“Plaintiff reads in evidence the statute of the state of Texas, as follows: ‘Art. 4233. In forming a passenger train, baggage or freight or merchandise or lumber cars shall not be xfiaced in the rear of passenger cars; and if they or any of them, shall be so placed and any accident happen to life or limb, the officer or agent who so directed, or knowingly suffered such an arrangement, and the conductor and engineer of the train shall each and all be held guilty of intentionally causing the injury and be punished accordingly.’ “Defendant’s witness Norton testified as follows: ‘I was Employed on the night that Burke was hurt as engineer for defendant’s company in the yards at Del Rio, Texas.,* I worked under the orders of the defendant’s yard master, Wade. When a train came from the east, it was taken in charge by Yard Master Wade and his crew, the train crew lea.ving it at Del Rio. The yard master has charge of everything in the yards while trains are being handled and made up. He takes the place of the conductor that brought in tire train, and no orders were followed except his. When the express passenger train came in on this night, I received orders from Wade (yard master) to back the train into the yards for the purpose of disconnecting the caboose car at the rear of the train, and attaching another caboose to the train in its place. The train was backed into the yards, the caboose disconnected, and another caboose attached. I received a signal to pull out. As I was pulling out I received a. signal to stop, and another to back, and then to stop; all of which I obeyed. I understood from the signal that the caboose at the rear had become detached from the train, which was a long train of Pullman cars, seven or more. After standing still a few minutes. I got a signal, coming from toward the rear of the train, to back again for the purpose of making the coupling. This 1 did, which resulted in the injuries to Burke. There was no reason for placing the caboose at the .rear of the train. It could have just as well been placed next to the engine, instead of at the rear of a passenger car; and, if it had been so placed, the risk to a switchman in making a coupling would have been greatly decreased. This would have placed the switchman the distance of the tender and one car length from me, — say about thirty-three feet,- — which would have enabled him to have talked to mo, and I would have taken my signals by words of mouth from him instead of from the rear of a long train of passenger cars at night by lantern. It was the custom of the Southern Pacific Company to send a caboose car along with each of its express passenger trains, anil the cabooses were always placed in the rear of the passenger cars. The caboose car could have been placed at the head of the train with more ease than in the rear. The placing of it in the rear of seven passenger cars was done by orders of Yard Master Wade. There is a rule of the company which prohibits freight cars from being placed in the rear of passenger cars. Caboose cars are cars used on freight trains for the use of the train crows. They have the same drawheads as freight cars, — stationary drawheads,— but have the same trucks as are used on passenger cars.’ ”
—Which was all the evidence in the cause; and, the same being submitted to the jury, defendant (plaintiff in error here), by its counsel, requested the judge to instruct the jury to find a verdict for the defendant, which instruction was refused, whereupon defendant then and there excepted.
The jury found a verdict for the plaintiff in the sum of $10,000, for which amount judgment was rendered against the defendant company. After vainly moving for a new trial, the defendant company sued out this writ of error, and brought the case to this court for review; making nine assignments of error, which may be summed up in the complaint that the evidence adduced on the trial was insufficient to warant a verdict for the plain! iff, and that the court erred in refusing to instruct the jury to find a verdict for the defendant.
T. N. Waul, for plaintiff in error.
Wheeler & Rhodes, for defendant in error.
Before PARDEE and McCORMICK, Circuit Judges, and LOCKE, District Judge.

Opinion:
LOCKE, District Judge
(after stating the facts as above). The substance of the error assigned herein is that the court overruled defendant's demurrer to plaintiff's petition, and refused to instruct the jury to find a verdict for the defendant, and left the question of negligence on the part of the defendant or contributory negli gence on the part of the plaintiff for their consideration. In Railroad Co. v. Cox, 145 U. S. 593, 12 Sup. Ct. 905, Chief Justice Fuller says:
"The case should not be withdrawn from the jury unless the conclusion followed, as a matter of law, that no recovery could be had upon any' view which could be properly taken of the facts the evidence tended to establish."
It is for the judge to say whether any facts have been established by sufficient evidence from which negligence can be reasonably inferred, and it is for the jury to say whether from those facts, when submitted to them, negligence ought to be inferred. Randall v. Railroad Co., 109 U. S. 478, 3 Sup. Ct. 322. The judge below found that the facts were established from which negligence might be inferred, and the jury has said that negligence ought to be inferred from them; and we have only to inquire whether the judge erred in so submitting the question, or, in other words, whether, in any view which' could be taken of the facts, as a matter of law recovery could be had. The facts are plainly and distinctly stated in the testimony, and it but remains to apply them to the law. It has been repeatedly declared by the supreme court that while employés must assume the risk incident to the positions which they accept, and to the negligence of fellow servants, to a certain extent, yet the servant does not assume risks arising from want of skillful colabor-ers, or defective machinery. In Hough v. Railroad Co., 100 U. S. 213, Justice Harlan says:
"The obligation still remains to provide and maintain in suitable condition the machinery and apparátus to be used by its employés; an obligation the more important, and the degree of diligence in its performance the greater, in proportion to the dangers which may be encountered."
—Citing and approving Ford v. Railroad Co., 110 Mass. 241, where such doctrine is declared at more extended length. In Railroad Co. v. Herbert, 116 U. S. 642, 6 Sup. Ct. 590, Justice Field, in expressing the same idea, says:
"The servant does not undertake to incur the risks arising from the want of sufficient and skillful colaborers, or from defective machinery or instruments with which he is to work. His contract implies that, in regard to these matters, his employer will make adequate provisions that no danger shall ensue to him. This doctrine has been so frequently asserted by courts of the highest character that it can hardly be considered as any longer open to serious question."
Railroad Co. v. McDade, 135 U. S. 555, 10 Sup. Ct. 1044.
In this case the testimony was that the couplings were not in their construction intended to be used together, and in making con-° nections with them there was unusual danger; that they were, though; habitually and constantly used together by defendant company; that plaintiff was acquainted with the company's rule in regard to making such couplings, and was following it to the letter when he was hurt;, that he had been switching about two years, but had never had to make such couplings more than two or three times; that the pin used was a square or flat pin, and that had it been a round pin, fitting the hole in which it was used, he could have drawn it out with his hands, but, as it was, when he found it jammed he was compelled to. get a rock and attempt to drive it out, when he was injured by the backing train. The defendant introduced no evidence that the pin used was not a pin regularly furnished for such purpose, or that any more suitable one was provided, and we consider that an inference favorable to plaintiffs claim might reasonably be drawn from such testimony, standing uncon-tradicted and unexplained. Whether or not the character of the coupling and pin was faulty, and known to be so by defendant or defendant's officers, so that negligence might be inferred from their use, was certainly not a question of law upon which the court should pass; and whether the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence in going and remaining between the cars, while endeavoring to obey the commands of his superiors, could only be decided as a question of fact. Railroad Co. v. Stout, 17 Wall. 657; Railroad Co. v. McDade, 135 U. S. 555, 10 Sup. Ct. 1044.
In Kane v. Railway Co., 128 U. S. 91, 9 Sup. Ct. 16, a case in which the question of contributory negligence had been withdrawn from the jury, and a verdict for the company directed, which was held to be error, the question was whether the plaintiff, in attempting to pass over cars when he knew that a step was missing from one of them, on account of which fault he fell, and was injured, was in so doing guilty of contributory negligence so as to justify the court in withdrawing the question from the jury and directing a verdict for the defendants. The supreme court held, in effect, that in the case of an employé not abandoning his station and duty upon the discovery of an insufficiency of appliance or apparatus, but remaining and attempting to do the best he could, the entire surrounding circumstances should be submitted to the jury for them to determine whether or not he was so guilty of contributory negligence as to forfeit his right to recover. Tins we consider a safe and reasonable rule, and one which may be applied to this ca$e, and that the question was properly submitted to the jury whether, under the circumstances, the plaintiff, in remaining and endeavoring to complete the coupling, although he found the square pin jammed in a round hole, was so guilty of contributory negligence as to prevent a recovery.
In Jones v. Railroad Co., 128 U. S. 444, 9 Sup. Ct. 118, Justice Miller, in speaking of the questions of negligence on the part of defendant and contributory negligence of the plaintiff, says:
"But we think these are questions for the jury to determine. We see no reason, so long as the jury system is the law of the land, and the jury is made the tribunal to decide disputed questions of fact, why it should not decide such questions as these as well as others."
In Railroad Co. v. Cox, supra, when the same question — the defect of coupling apparatus and the use of the square pin in a round hole — was under consideration, Chief Justice Fuller says:
"We think the evidence given in the record tended to establish that the coupling apparatus and the track were in an unsafe and dangerous condition; that the injury hapi>ened in consequence; and that those defects were such as must have been known to the defendants under proper inspection, and unless they were negligently ignorant."
In this case we think there was testimony which, uncontradicted as it was, tended to show that the appliances furnished for the coupling of the cars were insufficient, and rendered such duty unusuañy and unnecessarily dangerous, and in the performance of his duty, and on account of the fault of such appliances, plaintiff was injured; and whether or not such was the case was properly submitted to the jury. We therefore find no error in the record, ] and the judgment below is affirmed, with costs, and it is so ordered.