Case Name: PEOPLE v. KING
Court: Michigan Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1979-12-05
Citations: 94 Mich. App. 53
Docket Number: Docket No. 77-3055
Parties: PEOPLE v KING
Judges: Before: N. J. Kaufman, P.J., and D. C. Riley and J. X. Theiler, JJ.
Reporter: Michigan appeals reports; cases decided in the Michigan Court of Appeals.
Volume: 94
Pages: 53–58

Head Matter:
PEOPLE v KING
Docket No. 77-3055.
Submitted June 21, 1979, at Detroit.
Decided December 5, 1979.
Leave to appeal applied for.
Thomas P. King was convicted of first-degree felony murder, Recorder’s Court of Detroit, Geraldine B. Ford, J. Defendant appeals, alleging that there was insufficient evidence at the preliminary examination to bind him over on an open charge of murder, that the evidence at trial was insufficient for the jury to conclude that the victim was killed in the course of a robbery, and that the trial court erred in its instructions to the jury in regards to malice. Held:
1. The evidence presented at the preliminary examination was sufficient to enable the magistrate to bind the defendant over on the open murder charge, and that evidence, plus additional evidence presented at trial, was sufficient to allow the jury to infer that the killing occurred during the perpetration of a robbery.
2. The trial court’s instruction to the jury essentially removed the element of malice from the jury’s consideration. The defendant’s conviction of first-degree felony murder must therefore be reversed.
Reversed and remanded.
N. J. Kaufman, P.J., agreed with the majority on the issues of the sufficiency of the evidence. As to the jury instructions, however, he would hold that while it is advisable for a trial court to instruct on malice in a felony murder trial, the failure to do so does not automatically require reversal of a felony murder conviction such as this where the element of malice can be inferred from the fact that the killing occurred during the commission of the robbery. He would affirm.
References for Points in Heabnotes
40 Am Jur 2d, Homicide §§ 483, 499, 500.
40 Am Jur 2d, Homicide §§ 425, 442.
40 Am Jur 2d, Homicide §§ 499, 500, 509.
Opinion of the Court
1. Homicide — Murder — Felony Murder — Instructions to Jury — Malice.
An instruction to a jury in a murder trial which essentially removed the element of malice from the jury’s consideration where the evidence indicated that the defendant killed the victim in the course of a robbery was error mandating reversal of the defendant’s conviction of first-degree felony murder.
Dissent by N. J. Kaufman, P.J.
2. Homicide — Murder — Felony Murder — Evidence — Sufficiency of Evidence.
Evidence presented at a preliminary examination that a defendant was armed, that he called a cab, and was seen driving a cab moments before the cab driver emerged from the cab fatally wounded and claiming to have been robbed was sufficient to enable the magistrate to bind over the defendant for trial on an open charge of murder; this evidence, plus evidence at trial that money may have been taken from the victim’s money box, that defendant’s thumb print was on the box, and that the victim’s tape deck was missing following the crime was sufficient to allow the jury to conclude that the killing occurred during the course of a robbery.
3. Homicide — Murder — Felony Murder •— Instructions to Jury — Malice.
An instruction to the jury on malice is advisable in a felony murder case; however, failure to instruct on malice does not mandate reversal of a defendant’s conviction where the element of malice can be inferred from the fact that the killing occurred during the perpetration of a robbery.
Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Robert A. Derengoski, Solicitor General, William L. Cabalan, Prosecuting Attorney, Edward R. Wilson, Principal Attorney, Appeals, and Paul G. Bruno, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for the people.
Bernstein, Rabinovitz & Weitzman, P.C., for defendant.
Before: N. J. Kaufman, P.J., and D. C. Riley and J. X. Theiler, JJ.
Circuit judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.

Opinion:
D. C. Riley, J.
We adopt the facts as set forth in Judge Kaufman's dissenting opinion and agree that there was sufficient evidence presented at the preliminary examination to bind defendant over on a charge of murder and, at trial, to convict defendant of that charge.
However, we part company with his dissent on the issue of the court's instruction on felony-murder. Under the facts of this case, reversal is mandated. See People v Wilder, 82 Mich App 358; 266 NW2d 847 (1978), People v Till, 80 Mich App 16; 263 NW2d 586 (1977), People v Fountain, 71 Mich App 491; 248 NW2d 589 (1976).
Reversed and remanded for a new trial.
J. X. Theiler, J., concurred.