Case Name: DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, Petitioner, v. Kelvin M. JACKSON, Respondent; Department of Revenue, Petitioner, v. Morgan P. Tillery, Respondent
Court: Florida Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 2003-04-24
Citations: 846 So. 2d 486
Docket Number: Nos. SC01-913, SC01-914
Parties: DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, Petitioner, v. Kelvin M. JACKSON, Respondent. Department of Revenue, Petitioner, v. Morgan P. Tillery, Respondent.
Judges: ANSTEAD, C.J., QUINCE, J., and SHAW, Senior Justice, concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 846
Pages: 486–501

Head Matter:
DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, Petitioner, v. Kelvin M. JACKSON, Respondent. Department of Revenue, Petitioner, v. Morgan P. Tillery, Respondent.
Nos. SC01-913, SC01-914.
Supreme Court of Florida.
April 24, 2003.
Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General, and William H. Branch, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, FL, for Petitioner.
R. Mitchell Prugh of Middleton & Prugh, P.A., Melrose, FL, for Respondents.

Opinion:
LEWIS, J.
We have for review Department of Revenue v. Jackson, 780 So.2d 342 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001), in which the court certified its holding to be in conflict with the decision of the Fourth District Court of Appeal in Mascola v. Lusskin, 727 So.2d 328 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999). We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const.
Facts and Procedural History
The facts of these consolidated cases are virtually identical. In each, the father was initially ordered to pay child support with the payment having been later increased to address support payment arrearages. After entry of these support orders, each father was incarcerated for a crime unrelated to the support obligation, at which time the father filed a petition seeking the suspension or abatement of his child support obligation until his release from prison. The petitions were based upon allegations of the father's present inability to satisfy support obligations as a result of incarceration.
In each case, the trial court noted the interdistrict conflict with regard to the basic issue, but determined, as it was required to do, that the petition should be granted based upon the decision of the Fifth District Court of Appeal in Pickett v. Pickett, 709 So.2d 182 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998). The Department of Revenue (Department) timely appealed each order, and requested that the Fifth District Court of Appeal reconsider its Pickett holding in light of the Fourth District's Mascóla decision. The Fifth District declined, stating: "Although this panel might decide these cases differently than did the Pickett panel, we elect to adhere to the rule of Pickett and certify that our decisions are in conflict with Mascola." Dep't of Revenue v. Jackson, 780 So.2d at 343. The Department has sought review in connection with the certified conflict, which requires this Court to determine whether a court should permit a parent to have a preexisting support obligation modified or suspended based upon an inability to fulfill the financial support obligation during a period of imprisonment.
Analysis
As the Fifth District recognized in its opinion below, two conflicting views have emerged from the decisions of the Florida district courts of appeal on the issue of the modification of child support payment obligations of persons while incarcerated based upon a diminution of income. In the instant action, the Fifth District determined that modification is appropriate and it should continue to adhere to its prior holding in Pickett v. Pickett rather than adopt the Fourth District's analysis outlined in Mascola v. Lusskin. See Jackson, 780 So.2d at 343. In Pickett, the district court held that the trial court erred in imputing income for purposes of calculating child support to a father who was scheduled for sentencing on federal criminal charges, where there- was "no showing that the husband had the capability while he was in prison to earn the amount imputed to him." Pickett, 709 So.2d at 183 (quoting Waugh v. Waugh, 679 So.2d 1, 3 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996)). The court in Pickett remanded the case to the trial court for consideration under the principles enunciated by the Second District in its Waugh decision. See id.
In Waugh, the Second District reversed the terms of an original support decree that was entered by the trial court while the father was incarcerated. See Waugh, 679 So.2d at 3. The trial court had imputed the father's preincarceration income for purposes of calculating his child support payments. See id. The Second District deemed the income attribution erroneous because there was no showing that the father had the capability to actually earn the imputed amount while incarcerated. See id. Thus, while Waugh held only that a support decree entered when the father is in prison must include in its calculations the father's present ability to pay, the court in Pickett extended this reasoning and applied it to circumstances where a support decree had been entered prior to the obligor's incarceration, and modification was sought after the party had been imprisoned. See Pickett, 709 So.2d at 183.
In stark contrast to the decision of the court in Pickett, the Fourth District arrived at a contrary holding in Mascola v. Lusskin, 727 So.2d at 329. The Mascóla court held that "child support obligations may not be modified where the current decrease in income results because the payor has been convicted for attempting to kill the mother in order to eliminate the support obligation." Id. at 333. Although the direct holding was expressed in terms limited to the specific facts, the reasoning of the court was constructed with broad statements directed to the principle that the commission of any crime is a voluntary action which the obligor knows may result in incarceration and unemployment, and any modification petition based upon this direct consequence should be rejected. See id. at 332. Although the Fourth District noted the conflict with extant Florida decisions to the contrary, it reasoned that the child support payments should not be modified based on the father's decreased income resulting from voluntary conduct which resulted in incarceration. See id. at 333. While the holding was expressed extremely narrowly, application of the underlying reasoning adopted by the Fourth District would produce far-reaching results. We granted review of the instant case to resolve the conflict between these decisions rendered by District Courts of Appeal, and now conclude that we must quash the decision under review and remand with instructions.
Section 61.13, Florida Statutes (2001), provides a court that has entered an order requiring a parent to pay child support with continuing jurisdiction to modify the original order upon a showing of necessity to further the supported child's best interest, when the child reaches the age of majority, or if there is a substantial change in the circumstances of the parties. See § 61.13(l)(a), Fla. Stat. (2001). Section 61.14, Florida Statutes (2001), contemplates that either party in the original action may seek modification of an order requiring the payment of support "as equity requires." See § 61.14(l)(a), Fla. Stat. (2001). It further provides that "any unpaid payment or installment of support which has accrued up to the time either party files a motion with the court to alter or modify the support order" may not be reduced by the court. § 61.14(6)(a)(3), Fla. Stat. (2001). However, any unpaid amount that accrues after the filing of a petition to modify may be reduced upon entry of an order on the petition. See id. Moreover, although section 61.30, Florida Statutes (2001), provides presumptive amounts for child support payments based on the supporting parent's monthly income and the number of children, the trial court is vested with discretion to vary the support amount after considering all relevant factors, including, but not limited to, the needs of the child, age, station in life, standard of living, and the financial status and ability of each parent. See § 61.30(l)(a), Fla. Stat. (2001).
This statutory framework provides the parameters within which the resolution of the current conflict must be reconciled. Florida simply does not permit a retroactive reduction of accrued amounts due for support, even if such an approach were in the best interests of both the child in having some amount, albeit smaller, actually paid, and the obligor parent in making a manageable payment rather than being faced with the often unattainable and unrealistic expectation to satisfy large vested arrearages. Recognizing the competing policies and divergent circumstances presented in this arena, we must find an answer that is predicated upon the fundamental goal of solving the human problem before us, rather than exacerbating an already difficult situation.
The instant action requires that this Court consider and address a purported internal conceptual conflict between the provisions in section 61.13 that provide a basis for the trial court to modify a child support decree when it is necessary to the child's best interests, and those which allow modification when there is a substantial change in the parties' circumstances. It is abundantly clear that a substantial change in circumstances, such as the incarceration of an obligor, certainly may not produce a result that is in a child's best interests. Although the public policy considerations underpinning the arguments on either side have some compelling components, in the instant situation we believe that the child's interest in receiving his or her support monies must generally supersede the obligor parent's substantial change in circumstance resulting from incarceration. The full and timely remitting of child support payments is certainly in the best interests of the supported child. Therefore, any abatement or waiver of support payments owed to the child would certainly harm the interests of the child. See Imami v. Imami, 584 So.2d 596, 598 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991) ("[C]hild support is a right which belongs to the child."); see also Cole v. Cole, 70 Ohio App.3d 188, 590 N.E.2d 862, 865 (1990) ("While [the parent] is incarcerated, the needs of his children are not diminished.... The only person to benefit if support is suspended would be [the parent].").
Notwithstanding this logic, practical considerations weigh heavily here, and cannot be simply ignored. It is clear that a substantial change in circumstances will almost always occur when a parent becomes incarcerated and, as a result, is separated from the capacity to earn income. There are situations where earned income may not be a critical factor, but those cases are not the norm and our decision today is not directed to such circumstances. Moreover, a parent newly released from prison will, more likely than not, be without the means or ability to finance or satisfy a large accrued child support debt. Indeed, it is quite possible that he or she could never meet both the current payments and the debt that accrued during his or her imprisonment. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Barker, 600 N.W.2d 321, 323-24 (Iowa 1999) (holding that an incarcerated mother's reduction in income while in prison justifies a modification of support payments that takes into account inability for future payment of accumulating debt). The key is to find that structure that will most benefit the child entitled to support through a plan designed for realistic payments. Payments actually made are, most assuredly, more important than mere paper judgments. We find that the result attained by the New Jersey Superior Court in Halliwell v. Halliwell, 326 N.J.Super. 442, 741 A.2d 638 (App.Div.1999), is a just and fair approach for the resolution of the issues presented today. To be sure, this approach may not have the answer to absolutely all human situations, but it does provide a practical solution which recognizes the realities of child support and incarcerated parents.
The court in Halliwell, considering the question of whether incarcerated parents should be entitled to modify their child support payments, reasoned that the trial court should defer consideration of an incarcerated parent's motion for modification until the parent is released from custody. See id. at 646. Upon the parent's release, the trial court should then consider the motion in light of the contemporary circumstances of all the parties involved and enter a judgment appropriate at that time. See id. Importantly, under New Jersey's equivalent of section 61.14, this method eliminates the problem of vesting ever-increasing arrearage amounts because any payments accruing after the motion is filed may be modified, based upon the circumstances revealed at the hearing after the obligor's release from prison. See id. This provides flexibility for the court to address all issues and construct a judgment that will both recognize the support obligation and provide a realistic plan for payment.
We conclude that the New Jersey court's logic and course of action is well-founded, and that it recognizes and accommodates the competing concerns and interests presented in this case. Therefore, pursuant to section 61.14(l)(a), a parent seeking modification of child support payments because he or she is unable to pay the installments due to incarceration may file a petition to modify with the trial court that entered the original child support order. Thereafter, the trial court shall hold the petition in abeyance and place the matter on its inactive calendar for the term of the obligor parent's incarceration. During this time, the petition is not subject to dismissal for failure to prosecute, and the relationship of the incarceration to support is good cause to delay activity. The support installments, although still outstanding according to the original payment schedule, do not accrue as a vested interest of the child to be reduced to judgment which cannot be altered. While the petition remains on the inactive calendar, the matter is not subject to the guidelines for proper disposition of cases provided in the Florida Rules of Judicial Administration. See Fla. R. Jud. Admin. 2.085(d)(1)(C).
Upon the obligor's release, any party to the initial support arrangement may bring the original petition for modification to the trial court's attention for resolution. At that time, the trial court shall conduct a hearing on the matter. In reaching a conclusion with regard to the resolution of support matters, the trial court should consider all current facts and equitable factors to determine a realistic plan for the payment of meaningful support, both past and future. The amount of child support which has accumulated after the fifing of the incarcerated parent's petition for modification generally should not be reduced. Rather, after the obligor's release from custody, the trial court should structure a schedule of prospective payments that, while possibly less than the payments originally decreed, is designed to enhance the probability that full reimbursement of the underlying amount will occur at some future time. In structuring the payment plan, the trial court should consider the contemporary circumstances of all parties concerned, while ultimately serving the best interests of the child in having all amounts ultimately paid in full if possible. To this end, the trial court should weigh the factors fisted in section 61.30(l)(a), the length of the obligor's incarceration, the obligor's present and future employment possibilities, and the total outstanding unpaid amount, as well as any additional considerations touching upon the obligor's attempt, if any, to evade his or her child support obligations.
We reiterate that, in structuring the payment plan, the court must always be directed to designing an order that is in the best interests of the child, both technically and practically. Therefore, any accruals which vested prior to fifing the petition to modify remain and clearly must be paid in full. See Shufflebarger v. Shufflebarger, 460 So.2d 982, 985 (Fla. Sd DCA 1984) ("Unpaid child support is a vested right not subject to modification."). Likewise, the total child support amounts which continue to increase after the fifing of the obligor parent's petition generally should not be reduced, but may be restructured. Additionally, the court may modify the obligor's current child support obligations, along with adjusting the amount of the obligor's future payments of the unpaid support that has accumulated after the petition to modify was filed. See McArthur v. McArthur, 106 So.2d 73, 76 (Fla.1958) (holding that orders modifying child support payments that are effective as of the date of fifing of the petition to modify, or anytime subsequent thereto, are not retroactive solely because they refer back to the date of fifing). It is quite possible that the obligor's payments toward the amounts accumulated after the petition to modify was filed will continue beyond the time that the child support obligations would otherwise naturally terminate, for instance when the child reaches the age of majority. See § 61.13(l)(a), Fla. Stat. (2001). However, because the amount of the accumulated support payments adjudicated in connection with the petition for modification will have become due, the trial court may require the obligor to continue making payments toward his debt. See Friedman v. Friedman, 508 So.2d 781 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987).
The above policy will result in the most equitable and fair outcome for all concerned. Parents have a legal duty to support their children. See § 61.09, Fla. Stat. (2001); see also, e.g., Cronebaugh v. Van Dyke, 415 So.2d 738, 741 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982) ("A minor child has a legal right to support from both parents in keeping with its needs and the parents' ability."). The paramount concern in this situation is to act in the best interests of the supported child. Cf. Overbey v. Overbey, 698 So.2d 811, 814-15 (Fla.1997) (holding that a motion to modify child support centers around a finding of the child's best interest). Undeniably, the child's interests are not served where the obligor parent is unable to fulfill his or her support obligations because there is no income while in prison. Under such circumstances, the child faces the hardship of simply not receiving the money he or she needs, regardless of whether the trial court modifies the incarcerated parent's obligations. After the parent is released, however, the child is in a much better position if there is at least the possibility that not only will current support payments resume, but payment for an accumulated amount will be met — even if under a restructured payment plan. To the contrary, if we permit trial courts to suspend an incarcerated parent's obligation to pay child support, the supported child will never receive the benefit of the support payments to which the child was entitled. Therefore, the child's interests are certainly best served when courts do not modify an obligor parent's child support payments simply because of the parent's incarceration.
Nevertheless, this Court is not unaware of the practical realities facing an obligor parent who is recently released from prison. We recognize that if support payments simply accumulate and become judgments for vested arrearages, the flexibility necessary for attempting to secure actual future payments may be inhibited or entirely lost. Aside from any other debts which may have accrued, the child support arrearages and current support payments may be quite significant. Further, former inmates often experience difficulty in finding meaningful employment. However, such difficulties do not diminish a parent's duty to support his or her child, nor do they outweigh the burdens faced by a minor child who must do without monetary support from the incarcerated parent. Our primary concern is that the child receives the support to which he or she is entitled. Of secondary concern are the parent's difficulties — largely self-inflicted — resulting from incarceration due to criminal conduct unrelated to the support obligations. Additionally, our opinion today should not be construed as changing the current law governing the modification of child support payments of parents incarcerated for criminal contempt charges stemming from refusal to fulfill those support payments initially. See Betancourt v. Sanders, 629 So.2d 272 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993) (holding that an order for child support cannot be modified based upon a motion for contempt); Dep't of Health & Rehab. Servs. v. Porbansky, 569 So.2d 815 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990) (same). Nor do we consider all conduct which results in incarceration as being of equal weight in the ultimate equation. Loss of freedom and the capacity to earn due to an attempt to eliminate either a parent or children to avoid support obligations may certainly be considered as a factor weighing against modification.
The ability to craft equitable and realistic payment schedules for obligors upon their release from incarceration does not exist under Justice Harding's preferred resolution of this action. The remedy Justice Harding suggests is illusory and is no remedy at all. Indeed, if arrearages "accumulate and vest as a matter of law" while obligors are incarcerated, as Justice Harding would establish, the sums owed would be irreversibly fixed, thus completely preventing trial courts from fashioning "the appropriate remedy for the payment of arrearage and future support as circum stances require" upon release of the parent from imprisonment. Concurring in part and dissenting in part op. at 501. Therefore, we conclude that the more just approach is to hold the petition to modify in abeyance until a time when a thorough evaluation of the obligor's ability to pay may be conducted, and a farsighted plan for payment may be established.
Secondly, Justice Harding's suggestion that the approach we adopt today in some way burdens the trial court is a hollow argument without substance. We have been presented no basis as to how a trial judge would be burdened by simply permitting a written petition to remain in a court file located in the clerk's office requiring no work or action on the part of anyone and independently we are unaware of any such burden. The filing of a petition requires no logistics or anything from a trial judge until the matter is scheduled for a hearing by the parties. The simple filing of a petition in a court file neither burdens the trial judge, nor does it even implicate logistics.
We believe that the procedures specified herein for permitting the extension of the time for payment of the child support, while the total debt for child support remains undiminished, strike the appropriate balance. It is essential that an obligor parent not be so discouraged by what he or she perceives as an insurmountable child support debt that he or she is tempted to forego paying both past amounts and the current support. Such an abandonment would only result in contempt charges filed against the obligor which could affect his or her credit report, result in additional financial hardship, or cause a return to incarceration. See § 38.23; § 61.14(6)(b)(l)d, (6)(d), Fla. Stat. (2001); see also Russell v. Russell, 559 So.2d 675, 676 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990) (holding that incarceration for civil contempt of court order to pay child support obligations must be based on a finding of the obligor's present ability to pay). The vicious circle of debt and crime must be broken. Therefore, we believe that consideration of all factors and making provision for extending the payment plan for child support amounts over a length of time to be determined by the trial court, even if the payments for past support during minority must continue beyond the child's age of majority, is the proper solution to the practical realities of this case. Our view is most closely aligned with that of the Mas-cola court, but we provide exceptions and a mechanism that will afford trial courts the ability to address accumulating support obligations without the problems associated with the vesting of interests in the increasing amounts and corresponding judgments.
For the foregoing reasons, we quash the decision of the Fifth District Court of Appeal in Department of Revenue v. Jackson, 780 So.2d 342 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001), and approve the Fourth District's holding in Mascola v. Lusskin, 727 So.2d 328 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999), to the extent that it provides that an incarcerated parent may not automatically have his or her child support payment obligations modified based solely on a reduction in income resulting from incarceration. We reject the per se rale that would permit incarceration to be utilized as a basis to modify support, which would be tantamount to authorizing a suspension or abatement of support obligations in disguise and provide the alternative — a flexible procedure designed to encourage and accommodate the payment of support obligations.
It is so ordered.
ANSTEAD, C.J., QUINCE, J., and SHAW, Senior Justice, concur.
WELLS, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with an opinion.
PARIENTE, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with an opinion.
HARDING, Senior Justice, concurs in part and dissents in part with an opinion, in which WELLS, J., concurs.
. We specifically note, however, that where an incarcerated obligor owns assets or otherwise has the financial ability to pay at the time he or she files the petition to modify his or her support obligations, trial judges may reduce child support arrearages to judgments to provide that the support obligations may be satisfied from these assets.