Case Name: Commonwealth vs. Kenneth Ford
Court: Massachusetts Appeals Court
Jurisdiction: Massachusetts
Decision Date: 2014-11-18
Citations: 86 Mass. App. Ct. 911
Docket Number: No. 13-P-1327
Parties: Commonwealth vs. Kenneth Ford.
Judges: 
Reporter: Massachusetts Appeals Court Reports
Volume: 86
Pages: 853–854

Head Matter:
Commonwealth vs. Kenneth Ford.
No. 13-P-1327.
November 18, 2014.

Opinion:
At the close of the Commonwealth's case, the defendant moved for a required finding of not guilty. The trial judge allowed the motion to the extent that the charge was based on the theory that the defendant carried a dangerous weapon in breach of the peace, but denied it to the extent that it rested on the theory that the defendant carried a dangerous weapon "when arrested upon a warrant." Ibid. The defendant now argues that the evidence presented does not support that theory of the crime.
Nicholas G. Maclnnis for the defendant.
Kathryn E. Leary, Special Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth.
This case centers on the meaning of that portion of the statute that reads: "when arrested upon a warrant." Ibid. Our analysis of this phrase is guided by the familiar principle that "statutory language should be given effect consistent with its plain meaning and in light of the aim of the Legislature unless to do so would achieve an illogical result." Sullivan v. Brookline, 435 Mass. 353, 360 (2001). "Courts must ascertain the intent of a statute from all its parts and from the subject matter to which it relates, and must interpret the statute so as to render the legislation effective, consonant with sound reason and common sense." Twomey v. Middleborough, 468 Mass. 260, 268 (2014).
The Commonwealth suggests the discovery of the active warrant and the knife occurred close enough in time to meet the statutory requirement that the defendant carried a dangerous weapon "when arrested upon a warrant." That interpretation ignores the common sense and plain meaning of the phrase "when arrested upon a warrant," which requires that police knowledge of the warrant must precede any arrest and also be the reason for the arrest.
Here, it is undisputed that the defendant was arrested based on Romero's report that he had been robbed. There was no evidence that the defendant's outstanding warrants played any role in the decision to arrest the defendant. The detection of the knife occurred during the second of the two searches, and at a time when the defendant was already under arrest for the robbery. The police learned of active warrants at some point following his arrest. The Commonwealth presented no evidence that the police knew of those warrants when the defendant was taken into custody. While the Commonwealth is correct that a defendant can be arrested for multiple reasons, the record does not support a finding that the defendant was simultaneously arrested for the robbery and on active warrants. On these facts, no "rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt," Commonwealth v. Latimore, supra at 677 (quotation omitted), and the charge should not have been submitted to the jury.
2. Jury instructions. The defendant contends that the trial judge improperly instructed the jury that the knife in question was per se a dangerous weapon. While we need not reach that issue in light of our disposition above, we note that under the language of G. L. c. 269, § 10(b), not every knife is per se a dangerous weapon. See Commonwealth v. Miller, 22 Mass. App. Ct. 694, 694 n.l (1986) ("clear that the Legislature did not intend to encompass all knives in its enumeration of 'per se' dangerous weapons"); Commonwealth v. Higgins, 85 Mass. App. Ct. 534, 537 (2014).
Judgment reversed.
Verdict set aside.
Judgment for the defendant.