Case Name: The STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Jesus Rafael GUERRA, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1984-03-13
Citations: 455 So. 2d 1046
Docket Number: Case No. 82-2328
Parties: The STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Jesus Rafael GUERRA, Appellee.
Judges: Before HENDRY, BASKIN and JOR-GENSON, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 455
Pages: 1046–1050

Head Matter:
The STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Jesus Rafael GUERRA, Appellee.
Case No. 82-2328.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
March 13, 1984.
On Motion for Rehearing En Banc Sept. 4, 1984.
Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., and Carolyn M. Snurkowski, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Faith Mesnekoff, Legal Intern, for appellant.
Bennett H. Brummer, Public Defender, and Rory S. Stein, Asst. Public Defender, for appellant.
Before HENDRY, BASKIN and JOR-GENSON, JJ.

Opinion:
HENDRY, Judge.
The State of Florida appeals from an order granting appellee/defendant's motion to suppress an out-of-court showup identification. For reasons more fully stated below, we affirm.
The victim was robbed at gunpoint at 10:30 p.m. while employed as a clerk at a Farm Store. She told police that two men, one a young white Latin male and the other an older black male, drove up in an old green station wagon, pointed a shotgun at her and demanded money. She put all of the money from the register in a bag and the two men drove away. As they did, the victim noticed that there was no license tag on the car. She could give no further description of the assailants to the police. She was obviously extremely upset and frightened.
The information was put out over the radio at about 10:40 p.m. Approximately one half hour later, while the investigating officers were still at the Farm Store, another officer called in to report that he had just stopped an old green station wagon with no license tag. This fit the BOLO description. The victim was told that a car with two occupants matching the description had been stopped. She went with the police to the place where the car and the occupants were being detained. She immediately identified the station wagon. The defendant, the only man present obviously not a police officer, was brought over so she could see him. She identified him as the assailant and he was arrested. During her deposition, the victim testified that while employed at the Farm Store, she had been robbed five times between February and August, 1982, she kept getting the details of the various robberies confused, and she stated that she was not certain that she could make an in-court identification of the defendant.
After a hearing on the motion to suppress, the trial court entered an order which contained extensive findings of fact and conclusions of law. The court concluded, inter alia, that the showup was an unnecessarily suggestive procedure, that the victim's level of certainty was a result of the suggestive procedure, that the suggestive procedure gave rise to a substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification, and that the State did not prove by clear and convincing evidence that the in-court identification would have a source independent of the illegal pretrial confrontation.
The United States Supreme Court first enunciated its concern with the problem of eyewitness identification in a collection of cases, all decided the same day, known as the "Wade trilogy." United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 87 S.Ct. 1926, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149 (1967), found a post-indictment lineup to be a "critical stage of the prosecution" requiring the presence of counsel, and also found that an in-court identification must be based upon observations other than the suspect lineup identification. In Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 87 S.Ct. 1951, 18 L.Ed.2d 1178 (1967), the Court held that it was constitutional error to allow an in-court identification without first determining that it was not tainted by an illegal lineup but was of independent origin. In Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 87 S.Ct. 1967,18 L.Ed.2d 1199 (1967), a showup case, the Court found that a claimed violation of due process of law in the conduct of a confrontation depends on the totality of the circumstances. These three cases reflect the concern that the jury not hear eyewitness testimony about prior out-of-court identifications unless that evidence has aspects of reliability. Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 97 S.Ct. 2243, 53 L.Ed.2d 140 (1977). This theme continued in Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 384, 88 S.Ct. 967, 971, 19 L.Ed.2d 1247, 1253 (1968) (convictions based on eyewitness identification at trial following a pretrial identification will be set aside only if the identification procedure was so impermissibly suggestive as to give rise to a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification); Foster v. California, 394 U.S. 440, 89 S.Ct. 1127, 22 L.Ed.2d 402 (1969) (identification procedures found to be impermissibly suggestive); and Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 90 S.Ct. 1999, 26 L.Ed.2d 387 (1970).
Drawing on the general guidelines established in all of these cases, the Court revisited the issue of the admissibility of evidence of prior out-of-court identifications in Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 93 S.Ct. 375, 34 L.Ed.2d 401 (1972), and held that if, under the totality of the circumstances, the identification itself was reliable even though the confrontation procedure was suggestive, then evidence of the prior identification would be admissible. The identification is reliable if, when tested against a list of five factors set out by the Court, it is clear that the witness' courtroom identification rests on an independent recollection of the initial encounter with the assailant, uninfluenced by the pretrial identification. United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463, 473 n. 18,100 S.Ct. 1244,1251 n. 18, 63 L.Ed.2d 537, 547 n. 18 (1980) (n. 18, drawing together the cases from Wade to Manson). This two-step process, i.e., was the identification procedure suggestive, and, if so, was the identification still reliable (was it based upon an independent source of recollection) in spite of the suggestiveness, is now the well established procedure for determining admissibility of evidence of prior out-of-court identifications. Manson v. Brathwaite, supra, 432 U.S. at 114, 97 S.Ct. at 2253, 53 L.Ed.2d at 154 ("reliability is the linchpin in determining the admissibility of identification testimony.... The factors to be considered are set out in Biggers.... Against these factors is to be weighed the corrupting effect of the suggestive identification itself"). See also Grant v. State, 390 So.2d 341 (Fla.1980); State v. Walker, 429 So.2d 1301 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983) (identification suppressed; confrontation impermissibly suggestive); State v. Mendez, 423 So.2d 621, 622 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982) (State must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the in-court identification was made independent of the improper photographic lineup); Lauramore v. State, 422 So.2d 896 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982), pet. for rev. denied, 426 So.2d 27 (Fla.1983); State v. Cromartie, 419 So.2d 757 (Fla. 1st DCA), pet. for rev. dismissed, 422 So.2d 842 (Fla.1982); Adams v. State, 417 So.2d 826 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982).
Here, the trial court carefully analysed the facts and events in this case against the several factors set out in Neil v. Biggers, supra, and reaffirmed in Manson v. Brathwaite, supra. There is ample evidence in the record to support the findings. Consequently, the trial court's resolution of the evidence will not be disturbed on appeal. State v. Garcia, 431 So.2d 651 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983); Sarno v. State, 424 So.2d 829 (Fla. 3d DCA), pet. for rev. denied, 434 So.2d 888 (Fla.1983).
Affirmed.
. The factors to be considered in evaluating the likelihood of misidentification include the opportunity of the witness to view the criminal at the time of the crime, the witness' degree of attention, the accuracy of the witness' prior description of the criminal, the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the confrontation, and the length of time between the crime and the confrontation.