Case Name: TAFT v. SMITH, GRAY & CO.
Court: New York Appellate Term
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1912-04-22
Citations: 134 N.Y.S. 1011
Docket Number: 
Parties: TAFT v. SMITH, GRAY & CO.
Judges: 
Reporter: West's New York Supplement
Volume: 134
Pages: 1011–1018

Head Matter:
TAFT v. SMITH, GRAY & CO.
(Supreme Court, Appellate Term.
April 22, 1912.)
1. Trover and Conversion (§ 44 )—Damages—Determination of Value.
The rule of damages for the conversion of property is its value at the time and place of the conversion, and where it has only a speculative value, the damage may be ascertained by evidence of the nature of the article, whether it can.be reproduced, its utility to its owner, and, in the absence of other evidence, the owner’s estimate of its value.
[Ed. -Note.—For other cases, see Trover and Conversion, Cent. Dig. §§ 260, 261; Dec. Dig. § 44.*]
2. Trover and Conversion (§ 66*)—Damages—Question for Jury.
Where property converted is of such a nature that its value cannot be definitely ascertained, the question of estimating the value to the owner rests in the discretion of the jury, subject to the limitation that their verdict must not be inadequate or excessive.
[Ed. Note.-—For other cases, see Trover and Conversion, Cent. Dig. 5§ 288-294; Dec. Dig. § 66. ]
3. Literary Property (§ 3*)—Right of Property—Subject—Unpublished Manuscript.
The author or compiler of an unpublished manuscript has a property right in it, which not only attaches to the physical or corporeal substance, but includes the incorporeal right to the exclusive use of its contents.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Literary Property, Cent. Dig. § 2; Dec. Dig. § 3.*]
4. Trover and Conversion (§ 62*)—Damages—Excessive.
Where a clothing salesman had collected in a book the names of people whom he had waited on for a period of 20 years and with whom he was acquainted, $500 was fair compensation for its conversion by his employer.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Trover and Conversion, Dec. Dig. § 62.*]
Hotchkiss, J., dissenting. ■
Appeal from City Court of New York, Trial Term.
Conversion by Charles C. Taft against Smith, Gray & Co. From a judgment for plaintiff, and an order denying a motion for new trial, defendants appeal. Affirmed.
Argued January term, 1912, before. SEABURY, GERARD, and HOTCHKISS, JJ.
Jones, McKinny 8c Steinbrinlc, of Brooklyn (Meier Steinbrinlc, of counsel), for appellants.
Gerson C. Young, of New York City, and Joseph J. Schwartz, of Brooklyn, f'or respondent.
For other cases see same topic & § number in Dec. & Am. Digs. 1907 to date, & Rep’r Indexes
For other cases see same topic & § number in Dec. & Am. Digs. 1907 to date, & Rep’r Indexes

Opinion:
SEABURY, J.
I concur in the view expressed in the opinion of Mr. Justice HOTCHKISS that the proof of demand was sufficient. I do not concur in the view that the evidence of damage is insufficient to' sustain the award which the jury made to the plaintiff. The manuscript "See You" book, which was the subject of the conversion, had no market or other definite provable value. It was, however, of value to the plaintiff. The fact that the value is speculative or difficult of ascertainment does not preclude a substantial recovery. The law is always adequate to meet difficult situations, and in such cases permits proof of collateral matters which tend to throw light upon the value of the thing converted, and then leaves to the good judgment of the jury the duty of estimating the sum which will constitute fair compensation. These collateral matters justify a consideration of the nature of the thing itself, whether or not it can be reproduced, and its utility to the owner, and, if the value of its use cannot be otherwise determined, the owner may give his estimate of its value to him.
The general rule of damages, when property-is converted, is the value of the thing converted at the time and place of the conversion, with interest. McIntyre v. Whitney, 139 App. Div. 557, 124 N. Y. Supp. 234, affirmed 201 N. Y. 526, 94 N. E. 1096. If the thing converted has no market value, the- actual value to the owner is the just and accepted rule. Lovell v. Shea, 18 N. Y. Supp. 193. Thus, where the action was for the conversion of a solicitor's docket and papers, containing evidence of bills of costs against certain- parties, the measure of damage was held to be the value of the documents to the owner. Doyle v. Eccles, 17 Up. Can. C. P. 644. The same rule applies for the conversion of a set of vouchers, accompanied by an affidavit of their correctness. Drake v. Auerbach, 37 Minn. 505, 35 N. W. 367. So, also, where plaintiff sued to recover the value of sheet music, which had been annotated and transposed by the plaintiff's husband, and which the plaintiff had left in the custody of a storage warehouseman, it was field proper "to allow plaintiff to introduce evidence tending to show that the sheet music had a special value to her husband, because of annotations and transpositions inscribed thereon by him." Leoncini v. Post (Com. PL) 13 N. Y. Supp. 825. In an action to recover damages for the conversion of a picture, which had no market value, the court refused to disturb a judgment for the plaintiff, based on the owner's estimate of the value of the article. Frankinstein v. Thomas, 4 Daly, 256.
In some cases, this value to the owner may be simply the cost of reproduction, and in such cases the cost of reproduction, is the correct measure of damage to be applied. Thus, in an action for the conversion of abstracts of title and searches, the cost of procuring other similar searches is recoverable. Watson v. Cowdrey, 23 Hun, 169. The same rule was applied in an action to recover for the conversion of .certain electrotype plates (Heald v. MacGowan, 5 N. Y. Supp. 450) and stereotyped book plates (Lovell v. Shea, 18 N. Y. Supp. 193). When reproduction of the thing converted is not possible and the thing itself is of such a nature that its value cannot be definitely ascertained, the question of estimating the value to the owner rests necessarily in tfie discretion of the jury, subject to the limitation that their verdict must not be inadequate or excessive.
The plaintiff had a right of property in the "Seé You" manuscript. It was the product of his labor, and had never been published, and consequently the right of property existed in it. It was an unpublished manuscript, and, as such, within the protection of the law which recognizes literary property. That law includes within its protection maps, charts, musical compositions, engravings, photographs, paintings, catalogues, trade lists, and any other thing of a similar nature, regardless of its precise form. After publication the law does not protect the right of an author or compiler, except under the copyright law; but before publication the right of the producer is absolute, and the protection which the law affords ample. Jeffreys v. Boosey, 4 H. L. C. 962; Wheaton & Donaldson v. Peters, 8 Pet. 591, 657, 8 L. Ed. 1055; Palmer v. De Witt, 47 N. Y. 540, 7 Am. Rep. 480. The author or compiler of a manuscript has a property right in it. This property right not only attaches to the physical or corporeal substance whicfi composes the manuscript, but includes the incorporeal right to the exclusive use of its contents. In Spicer v. Waters, 65 Barb. 227, the court, after stating the general rule as to damages in conversion, points out that this rule is subject to modification in certain cases, and says that:
"When the property has no market value, such as paintings, manuscripts, etc,, the damages are in the discretion of the jury."
In Press Pub. Co. v. Monroe, 73 Fed. 196, 19 C. C. A. 429, 51 L. R. A. 353, the plaintiff had -written a poem to be delivered at the World's Columbian Exposition, and before it was published the defendant obtained a copy of it and published it in its newspaper. The publication was shown to have been made in wanton disregard of the plaintiff's rights. The plaintiff recovered a verdict for $5,000, which was affirmed on appeal; the court holding that, although there was no proof of actual damage, exemplary damages might be recovered. In Wood v. Cunard Steamship Co., 192 Fed. 293, 112 C. C. A. 551, plaintiff sued for the loss of a trunk which contained the manuscript of a manual on Greek Grammar which he had written. He was awarded $5,000 for the loss of the manuscript. On appeal the decree was modified, and the court fixed $500 as a fair award for the lost manuscript. In its opinion the court conceded that this assessment of value was, "as a jury's frequently is, somewhat arbitrary." The case arose in admiralty, and the court itself fixed the value saying:
"The case in this respect is sui generis. The lost manuscript is unique in its isolation. There is nothing with which to compare it. In these circumstances, believing that there are certain limits in each direction beyond which we should not go, we deem it for the best interests of the parties that the amount of the recovery should be fixed without further expense to the litigants, and we fix $500 as a fair award for the lost manuscript."
No definite standard can be applied in determining the value of a manuscript. Estimating the value of labor or time spent in its production furnishes no sufficient criterion of value. The plaintiff i.n this case produced the best proof that the nature of the case was susceptible of. He showed how he had compiled his manuscript "See You" book, the use that he made of it, and that his earning power was increased by its use. It also appeared that it could not be reproduced, and that some of his customers actually made purchases from his employers. This was all that he was required to do, and in view of the fact that the manuscript book had no market value and could not be reproduced, it furnished a sufficient basis to enable the jury to render their verdict. The book contained the names of those who entertained a kind of good will to the plaintiff, and the possession of such a list would, it seems to me, other things being equal, make him a more desirable employé for an employer who dealt with the class represented by the names inscribed in the "See You" book.
The award of $500 seems to me to have been fair compensation for the plaintiff's loss, and to have been a judicious estimate of the value of this manuscript to the plaintiff.
For these reasons, the judgment should be affirmed, with costs.
GERARD, J., concurs.