Case Name: JOHN CHAPMAN, Respondent, v. BETSEY RODGERS and REBECCA C. SWARTWOUT, Impleaded, with others, Appellants
Court: New York Supreme Court, General Term
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1877-11
Citations: 19 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 342
Docket Number: 
Parties: JOHN CHAPMAN, Respondent, v. BETSEY RODGERS and REBECCA C. SWARTWOUT, Impleaded, with others, Appellants.
Judges: Present — Learned, P. J., Bocees and Boardman, JJ.
Reporter: Supreme Court Reports (Hun)
Volume: 19
Pages: 342–348

Head Matter:
JOHN CHAPMAN, Respondent, v. BETSEY RODGERS and REBECCA C. SWARTWOUT, Impleaded, with others, Appellants.
Will — action to determine validity of — all the witnesses must he called,.]
The complaint alleged that one Rodgers died, leaving a will by which he devised certain real estate to his son, J. Rodgers, subject to an estate for life therein of his widow, and to the payment of certain legacies ; that J. Rodgers paid the legacies, bought the life estate, entered into possession of the land, and subsequently conveyed the same to the plaintiff, who is now in possession thereof; that, after the death of the widow, a sister of J. Rodgers, one of the defendants herein, claimed that the devise to him was void, for the reason that he was one of the two subscribing witnesses to the will, and that she was entitled to an undivided one-sixth of the land. The plaintiff asked that his title be declared valid, and that if this were not done, that a partition and sale of the premises might be had.
Held, that the action was one in equity, to establish the validity of a will of real estate conclusively as against all the heirs, and that the rule in such cases was tliat all tlie witnesses thereto must be called and examined, except in the event of death, insanity or absence, or unless the heir waived his right, and that the court below erred in this case in holding that it was sufficient to call and examine one witness only. (Bookes, J., dissented.)
Appear by defendants above named, from - a judgment in favor of the plaintiff, entered on tlie decision of the court at tbe Saratoga Special Term.
Tlie complaint alleges tliat one Benjamin Rodgers died seized of certain land, having first made his will, of which a copy is sot forth. By that will all the property, real and personal, is given to Joseph Rodgers, subject to a life estate to testator’s widow, and Joseph is required to pay certain legacies. The complaint further alleges the payment of the legacies by Joseph and also the payment by him of a mortgage upon the land, and his purchase of the life estate; and further, that Joseph went into possession of the land, and subsequently conveyed the same to the plaintiff, who went into, and still is in possession. It avers that Betsey Rodgers claims that the will is invalid because Joseph Rodgers was a subscribing witness, and that she claims that she is entitled to one-sixth of the land. It avers that an actual partition cannot be made. It demands that the plaintiff’s title be declared valid as against all the defendants, and that if the title is not held valid that sale and partition be made. In that case it asks that the mortgage and debts paid by Joseph and the improvements on the property be declared to be a prior lien to the interests of the heirs.
The will of Benjamin Rodgers was attested by two witnesses, Joseph Rodgers, above named, the devisee therein, and one Austin P. Graham. Against defendants’ objection the plaintiff was allowed to prove the will on the trial of this action, by the evidence of Austin P. Graham alone.
i?. 0. Jones, for the appellant.
J. S, Coon, for the' respondent.

Opinion:
Learned, P. J..
I do not think that this action can be maintained under section 2 of chapter 238, Laws of 1853, because the plaintiff is not an heir, nor is he the grantee of a person claiming by descent, nor does he allege the invalidity of the will.
Nor does section 1 of that act apply, because that section limits the action by these words : In like manner as the validity of any
deed conveying or purporting to convey lands might be determined." And, as a general rule, an action would not lie by a person in possession against one who merely claimed that a deed was invalid to establish its validity. And, as.,I think, this is not an action brought under 2 Revised Statutes (m. p. 312, § 1, and seg.), a proceeding to compel the determination of claims, etc. The allegations of the complaint do not correspond with the requirements of the statute, and .the relief demanded is not that which is there authorized. (Bailey v. Briggs, 56 N. Y., 414.)
As an action of partition, the defect is that the plaintiff is in possession and claims adversely to the defendant.
This action, however, seems to have been brought and. tried as an action to establish the validity of a will of real estate. All of the heirs were made defendants. Actions of that nature have been sustained in equity. (1 Story Eq., § 1441, cases cited arguendo; Bailey v. Briggs, ut supra; and see page 415.) The plaintiff seeks, as by a bill of peace, to have the will declared to be valid, The judgment of the court below was that the will was a valid and subsisting will of real estate.
The question, then, of the validity of the will does not arise incidentally, but is the sole issue and the matter to be established. In such cases as this the courts of equity used formerly to direct an issue demismit ml non. But whether tried before a jury or before the court, the rule was that all the witnesses to the will must be examined; except in cases of necessity, such as death, insanity or absence abroad, or unless the heir waived his right. (Bootle v. Blundell, 19 Ves., 494.) In that case Lord Eldon says that this is not a technical rule. The court " before an heir shall be deprived of the opportunity, which the law gives him, by repeated ejectment to try again and again the validity of the will expects that all the witnesses shall be examined on one side or the other." The same rule is repeated several times in the ojainion.
In Tatham v. Wright (2 Russ & My., 1), Lord Brougham recognizes the same rule. In harmony with this rule of equity are the provisions of the statutes requiring the production of at least two witnesses upon probate before the surrogate, and of all if required. (Laws of 1837, chap. 460, § 10, 11, 12, 17.)
It has undoubtedly been held that, on the trial of other issues, where it becomes necessary to give a will in evidence, it is not necessary to call both witnesses. Such a trial does not establish conclusively the validity of the will against all the heirs. But where the object of the action, as in this case, is to establish a will, forever and conclusively against all the heirs, the rule requiring the production of all the witnesses must prevail unless waived by the heirs.
And this is reasonable. For if the statute requires the production of all the witnesses on probate before the surrogate, why should not all be produced in an action like this, which is conclusive even as respects real estate ? To hold otherwise would be to evade the provisions of 2 Revised Statutes (m. p. 65, § 45). It appeared as a fact on this trial, that the plaintiff had been a witness and had given evidence on the probate of this will before the surrogate.
If the defendant, being in possession, should be sued in ejectment by Betsey Rodgers, and on the trial of that action this will, proved by only one witness, should be offered in evidence, a differ-•mt question may arise. "W e therefore make no decision as to the validity of the devise to Joseph Rodgers. "We hold only that, in such an action as this, all the witnesses must be called except as above explained.
Judgment reversed and new trial granted, costs to abide event.