Case Name: Walter Travers Daniel, Appellant, v. The Manhattan Life Insurance Company of New York, Appellant. (Action No. 2.)
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1907-01-11
Citations: 116 A.D. 780
Docket Number: 
Parties: Walter Travers Daniel, Appellant, v. The Manhattan Life Insurance Company of New York, Appellant. (Action No. 2.)
Judges: 
Reporter: Appellate Division Reports
Volume: 116
Pages: 780–786

Head Matter:
Walter Travers Daniel, Appellant, v. The Manhattan Life Insurance Company of New York, Appellant. (Action No. 2.)
Second Department,
January 11, 1907.
Master and servant — employment terminable on notice extended for definite period — authority of conflicting clauses in contract. -
Although an original contract of employment having no fixed term is terminable by a notice of thirty days, yet if such contract is extended by written indorsements stating that.it is extended to cover the period of one year from certain specified dates, the extension is inconsistent with the original right to terminate - the contract. The two cannot exist together, and the contract, is enforcible by the employee for the period of extension..
Jenks, J., dissented,, with opinion.
Appeal by the defendant, The’Manhattan Life Insurance Company of "Hew York, from a judgment of the Supreme- Court in favor of the plaintiff, entered in the office of the clerk of -the county of Kings on the-23d day of January, 1906, upon the verdict of a jury for $2,750, and-also from an order entered in said clerk’s office on the 26th day of January, 1906, denying- the- defendant’s motion for a new trial made upon the minutes.
Also an appeal by the plaintiff, Walter Travers Daniel, from^the same judgment for insufficiency of damages, and also- from an order entered in said clerk’s office on the 29th day of January, 1906, denying the plaintiff’s motion for a new trial.
The action was for damages for breach of a written contract of employment of the plaintiff by the defendant to solicit insurance, dated February 15th, 1894.
The contract contained no fixed term of employment, but was by its terms terminable by either party by a notice" of 30 days.
. It was afterwards amended in writing several times, and the plaintiff continued in the employment until discharged on April 6th, 1900, by a notice of 30 days.
An amendment of February 15th, 1897, provided that “ The contract between the parties hereto dated February 15th, 1894, is hereby extended from the 1st day of 'Mar., 1897, to the first day of Mar., 1898, subject to the following modifications ”; and then followed certain amendments in respect of plaintiff’s compensation and making his agency exclusive.
An amendment of February 17th, 1898, provided “ that the amendments to said contract contained in that certain agreement in writing dated New York, February 17,1897, is hereby extended to cover the period of one year, viz., from March 1st, 1898, to March 1st, 1899.”
On March 1st, 1899, the parties added the following to the last amendment given above, viz.: “ The amendments to said contract and the said contract so amended is by mutual agreement extended until March 1, 1900.”
Finally on February 24th, 1900, the parties made the following agreement of extension:
“ The contract between the parties dated February 15th, 1894, as amended by written amendment dated February 15th, 1897; also by one dated June 22, 1898; also by one dated May 1st, 1899 ; also by one dated February 17th, 1896, which latter shall take the place of the agreement to' pay fifteen per cent (15$), advance contained in the contract; also by one dated May 18th, 1894; is hereby extended, as is .also the amendment of February 15tli, 1897, for one year after March 1st, 1900, all other amendments having lapsed.”
George W. McKenzie, for the plaintiff.
Edward S. Rapallo, for the defendant.

Opinion:
Gaynor, J.:
The duration of the plaintiff's employment was fixed by a clause in the original agreement that either party might terminate the agreement by a notice of 30 days. Three several times that agreement as theretofore amended was in terms " extended " from the first day of March in one year to the samé day in the following year, the final agreement of extension "being dated February 24th, 1900, and providing that the said agreement as amended (all of the amendments being enumerated) "is hereby extended for one year after March 1st, 1900."
The duration thus fixed was different to that first fixed; it is inconsistent with it; both cannot exist together. -If the contract was to continue to be terminable by either side at will oil a notice of 30 days, what was the meaning of extending it for a year? If the contract could still be terminated at will -— if that was the intention — the words of extension for a fixed period were used to mean nothing.
The contract was extended a year from March 1st, 1900, and the defendant is liable for damages for discharging the plaintiff before the year was up.
The judgment should be affirmed.
Hirschberg, P. J., Hooker and Miller, JJ., concurred; Jenks, J., read for reversal.