Case Name: BUSHTIS v. CATSKILL CEMENT CO.
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1908-11-25
Citations: 113 N.Y.S. 294
Docket Number: 
Parties: BUSHTIS v. CATSKILL CEMENT CO.
Judges: 
Reporter: West's New York Supplement
Volume: 113
Pages: 294–305

Head Matter:
(128 App. Div. 780.)
BUSHTIS v. CATSKILL CEMENT CO.
(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third. Department.
November 25, 1908.)
1. Master and Servant (§ 204 )—Assumption of Risk.
Defendant operated a cement mill, and plaintiff was employed in the clay room. Into this room clay was brought by an elevated railroad and dumped upon the floor. Near the place where the clay was dumped there was an opening in the floor, a little over 2 feet long and about 16 inches wide, and underneath this opening a box led down to a couple of iron rollers used for grinding the clay. A short distance from this opening was an elevator used to carry the clay to a drier after it was pulverized by the rollers. The opening in the floor was unguarded, and plaintiff, who had been employed at the work for about two years before he was injured and was shoveling the clay into the opening in the floor leading to the rollers, was injured by the falling of a lump of clay from the elevator, which hit him on the head, knocking him down and causing him to fall through the opening upon the rollers. Held, that plaintiff assumed the risk of falling into the opening in the floor, and his assumption of the risk is not affected by Factory Act (Laws 1897, p. 480, c. 415) § 81, making the failure of the defendant to guard the opening a criminal offense.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Master and Servant, Cent. Dig. § 545; Dec. Dig. § 204.*]
2. Master and Servant (§ 14*) — Master’s Liability for Injuries—Statutory Provisions.
Factory Act (Laws 1897, p. 480, c. 415) § 81, making it necessary for a master to protect openings and other dangerous places by guards, is an extension of the common-law liability, and therefore is to be construed strictly, in the light of public policy.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Master and Servant, Dec. Dig. § 14.*]
3. Master and Servant (§ 204 )—Master’s Liability for Injuries—Statutory Provisions.
Where the Legislature by statute extends the common-law liability of a master, the presumption will be that the limit of that extension is expressed in the statute itself, and the amendment of the factory act (Pen. Code, § 384?, amended by Laws 1897, p. 505, c. 416, § 3), which made a failure to comply with its provisions a crime, but which does not provide that an employé was not to be deemed to have assumed the risk inherent to any defect which in itself is a violation of the act, will not be construed as doing away with the employe’s assumption of the risk.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Master and Servant, Cent. Dig. § 545; Dec. Dig. § 204.*]
4. Master and Servant (§ 288*)—Actions fob Injuries—Questions for Jury —Assumption of Risk.
Employer’s Liability Act (Laws 1902, p. 1750, c. 600) § 3, providing that the question of assumption of risk shall be for the jury, does not apply to an action brought by a servant, where no notice of the time, place, and cause of the injury is alleged in the complaint to have been given, as provided for in section 2 (page 1749) of that act.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Master and Servant, Dec. Dig. § 288.*]
Kellogg, X, dissenting.
Appeal from Trial Term, Greene County.
Action by Joseph Bushtis against the Catskill Cement Company for injuries to plaintiff while in the employ of defendant. No notice of the time, place, and cause of plaintiff’s injury was alleged in the complaint or proved to have been given, and section 2 of. Laws 1902, p. 1749, c. 600, known as the “Employer’s Liability Act,” provides that no action for injury “under this act” shall be maintained unless such notice js given to the employer. From a judgment dismissing the complaint, plaintiff appealed.
Affirmed.
Appeal by plaintiff from a judgment entered in the clerk’s office of the county of Greene, 6th of May, 1908, dismissing plaintiff’s complaint.
The defendant was operating a cement mill in the village of Catskill. In its factory is what is known as the “clay room.” Into this room clay is brought upon an elevated railroad structure and dumped from the cars upon the floor. This railroad is about 12 feet above the surface of the floor. As the clay is dumped upon the floor, as one load falls upon another, the pile of clay at the bottom is necessarily enlarged, so that it extends at times 11 or 12 feet to either side of the central point below where the car is dumped. Southwesterly of this place of dumping is the clay machine. That clay machine consists of a couple of iron rollers set about 10 or 12 inches below the floor, which rollers are set close together and are turned so they revolve toward each other. The iron rollers have small iron bars set at intervals around the circumference. The clay machine is used for grinding and disintegrating the clay as it comes into the mill in its natural state. Around the iron rollers of the clay machine is an iron box, which extends from the surface of the floor down to the rollers, which are located about 10 or 12 inches below the floor. The iron box is about 2 feet 2 inches long and about 16 inches wide. The opening in the floor to this clay machine was unguarded. Immediately west of the clay machine is an elevator. This elevator consists of cast-iron buckets riveted between two strands of chains. These chains are about 10 inches apart, and pass over sprocket wheels at the top and under sprocket wheels at the bottom. The buckets of the elevator are 5 inches wide by 8 inches long and 4 inches deep. The elevator runs through an opening in the floor upwards at right angles with the floor to a height of about 10 or 12 feet above the floor. The buckets of the elevator carry the pulverized clay crushed with the clay machine to the height of about 10 or 12 feet and then dump the crush ed clay into a shute leading into the drier. The duty of the man employed at the clay machine is to shovel or dump clay into the clay machine, and he stands on the northerly side of the clay machine, between the clay machine and the clay dumped by the cars. The pile of clay brdught in and dumped by the cars varies in height. When up to the bottom of the track it is about 10 or 12 feet high, and at times the base of the pile would be within 10 or 12 inches of the clay machine. There was no boxing around the elevator to prevent lumps of clay from getting into the bucket of the elevator at the time the plaintiff was hurt.
This plaintiff was a common laborer. He had been employed at this work for about two years, and he had shoveled the clay from the pile of clay in the clay room into the opening in the floor leading down to the clay machine. Upon the day in question it is claimed that a lump of clay rolled into the elevator shaft, was carried up in the bucket, and fell off, hitting the plaintiff upon the head. By the force of the blow he was knocked down, and fell into this clay machine, by which he was injured, and it is for these injuries that he has brought this action. Upon the trial the plaintiff was nonsuited, upon the ground that the risk was open and visible, and was assumed by the plaintiff. Judgment was entered upon this nonsuit, and from this judgment this appeal is taken.
Argued before SMITH, P. J., and CHESTER, KELLOGG, COCHRANE, and SEWELL, JJ.
Duntz & Herzberg, for appellant.
Osborn, Bloodgood & Wilbur (F. H. Osborn, of counsel), for respondent.
For other oases see same topic & § number in Dec. & Am. Digs. 1907 to date, & Rep'r Indexes
For other oases see same topic & § number in Dec. & Am. Digs. 1907 to date, & Rep’r Indexes

Opinion:
SMITH, P. J.
It is difficult to see how reasonable prudence could have dictated to the defendant .additional guards to its machinery. The opening in the floor leading to the clay machine could not have been guarded, because there was continual necessity of an open way into which the clay could be thrown into the machine. It is suggested that a rail might be put up to prevent the man there at work from fading in. It would require extraordinary foresight, however, to anticipate that a man with a thorough knowledge of the existence of the opening should be stepping into the machine, or that a lump of clay should in this mysterious way have been carried up by the elevator buckets and fallen upon him, knocking him into the machine. Moreover, the size of the buckets in the elevator would seem almost to negative the possibility of an accident occurring in this way, so that it would require great liberality in the courts to allow a verdict to stand upon the ground that the defendant was guilty of negligence in failing to provide guards either for the clay machine or for the elevator.
Assuming, however, that negligence might have been found in the defendant, if there be any survival of the law of assumed risk, the defendant must here be able to claim the benefit of that law. For two years this plaintiff had had a specific knowledge of the exact situation. It is true that the pile of clay sometimes crowded him near to this opening in the floor into which the clay was thrown into the clay machine. What danger was involved therein was known better to him than to any other man. To charge the defendant with liability for a defect of which he had the better knowledge would be to require the defendant to take better care of the plaintiff than the plaintiff is required to take of himself.
While it is difficult to see how the defendant could have guarded the clay machine, which was required to be kept open that the clay might be fed to it, it is contended that under the factory act (Laws 1897, p. 480, c. 415, § 81) the defendant has been guilty of negligence in failing to protect it by guards, and that a plaintiff with knowledge of the danger does not assume a risk from a defect which is in violation of a commandment of the factory act. This contention would seem to be answered by the decision of the Court of Appeals in Knisely v. Pratt, 148 N. Y. 372, 42 N. E. 986, 32 L. R. A. 367. In that case it was expressly held that such a risk might be assumed. The contention of the plaintiff's counsel, however, is that since the decision of that case the factory act has been amended, so as to make a failure to comply with its provisions a crime; and it is argued that-it is against public policy to hold that a risk may be assumed which arises from a defect the allowance of which is criminal on the part of the defendant. It will be borne in mind, however, that this statute is an extension of the common-law liability, and therefore, under well-settled rules of statutory construction, is to be construed strictly. In determining rules of common-law liability, courts very properly determine them in the light of public policy. Generally speaking, however, the public policy of the state is to be defined by the Legislature, and not by the courts. Where the Legislature, therefore, extends a common-law liability of a master, the presumption will be assumed that the limit of that extension is expressed in the statute itself. The amendment of the factory act (Laws 1897, p. 505, c. 416) which made a failure to comply with its provisions a crime, might have gone further, and have provided that an employé was not to be deemed to have assumed the risk inherent in any defect which in itself is a violation of the act. But this provision was not included in the statute, and because it was not included in the statute, and because the statute is one extending a common-law liability, I do not agree that this court should by judicial legislation extend the common-law liability of the master beyond the point to which it is extended by the statute itself. It is the right of the courts to interpret the laws and of the Legislature to enact them, and where the Legislature has assumed to act upon a question it is in rare cases that the courts should give effect to their enactment beyond what the Legislature itself has chosen to indicate.
Again, it is contended that, although this is a common-law action, the third section of the employer's liability act (Laws 1902, p. 1750, c. 600) applies, and that under that section the question of assumption of risk was for the jury, and not for the court. In O'Neil v. Karr, 110 App. Div. 571, 97 N. Y. Supp. 148, however, this court held other-wise. That case went back for a new trial. Upon the new trial the plaintiff was nonsuited in accordance with the judgment of this court. Upon appeal from that judgment we affirmed the nonsuit, and the Court of Appeals affirmed our judgment without opinion. It is claimed that, because our judgment was affirmed in the Court of Appeals without opinion, there probably were other questions upon which the case was decided. I have examined the record upon the second appeal in our court, and the appellant's brief consists of a single page, and states that the case is substantially as it was upon the first trial, and that, as,the controlling question was there determined against the appellant, his only request was that there should be a dissent, that he might take the question to the Court of Appeals. An examination of the facts of that case shows clearly that it was impossible to justify the nonsuit therein granted, except upon the construction given to the employer's liability act (Laws 1902, p. 1748, c. 600) in our decision of the case. Moreover, the case of Ward v. Manhattan Ry. Co., in the First Department, reported in 95 App. Div. 437, 88 N. Y. Supp. 758, has been expressly overruled by the First Department itself in the case of Curran v. Manhattan Ry. Co., 118 App. Div. 347, 103 N. Y. Supp. 351, and that department is now in accord with the Third Department upon the construction of section 3 of the employer's liability act.
In the case at bat the accident was an unusual one, not reasonably to be anticipated. Any attempt at guarding the machinery which caused the accident would have been to a greater or less extent an impediment to the work that was necessary to be done. The danger of getting into the hole in the floor, and thereby into the machinery, was so apparent that a child might see it.
The judgment, therefore, was properly directed, and should be affirmed.
Judgment affirmed, with costs. All concur, except JOHN M. KELLOGG, J., dissenting in opinion. (dissenting). The plaintiff is a Russian,