Case Name: Lee W. PROCTOR, Appellant, v. CITY OF CORAL SPRINGS, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1981-03-25
Citations: 396 So. 2d 771
Docket Number: No. 79-1582
Parties: Lee W. PROCTOR, Appellant, v. CITY OF CORAL SPRINGS, Appellee.
Judges: HURLEY, J., concurs specially with opinion.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 396
Pages: 771–774

Head Matter:
Lee W. PROCTOR, Appellant, v. CITY OF CORAL SPRINGS, Appellee.
No. 79-1582.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
March 25, 1981.
Gaylord A. Wood, Jr., Fort Lauderdale, for appellant.
Paul J. McDonough, P. A., Coral Springs, for appellee.

Opinion:
GLICKSTEIN, Judge.
Section 18-5 of the City of Coral Springs, Florida, Code of Ordinances prohibited the owner or person having the use of a "commercial vehicle" from parking the vehicle for any period of time between 9:00 p. m. and 6:00 a. m., or for any period of time on Sunday, on a public right-of-way adjacent to or on private property zoned "R" or "D" unless parked in a covered garage or carport. The definition of "commercial vehicles" was based upon the State of Florida Vehicle Tax Class Codes and descriptive classifications.
On January 15, 1977, Lee Proctor owned a 8/4-ton pickup truck, which was classified as a commercial vehicle under the ordinance. While visiting friends in Coral Springs on that date, Mr. Proctor, parked his pickup truck in the friends' front yard. At 11:00 p. m. he was issued a citation, charging him with violation of the ordinance. The testimony was undisputed that the pickup truck had no commercial marking and that it was not used for commercial purposes.
A zoning ordinance will be upheld unless it is clearly shown that it has no foundation in reason and is a mere arbitrary exercise of power without reference to public health, morals, safety or welfare. City of Coral Gables v. Wood, 305 So.2d 261, 263 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974). Zoning measures designed to enhance the aesthetic appeal of a community have been recognized as a valid exercise of the police power. See e. g. Merritt v. Peters, 65 So.2d 861 (Fla.1953); City of Miami Beach v. Ocean & Inland Co., 147 Fla. 480, 3 So.2d 364 (1941); City of Coral Gables v. Wood, supra. In City of Coral Gables v. Wood, supra, the court held that a zoning ordinance aimed at preventing the unsightly appearances and diminution of property values that occurred when camper-type vehicles were parked or stored out of doors in residential areas of a community, was not arbitrary or unreasonable. Storage of the vehicles was permitted within a garage or other structure, and therefore the ordinance did not unconstitutionally deprive the owners of a right to have camper-type vehicles. More akin to the instant case was Henley v. City of Cape Coral, 292 So.2d 410 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974), where an ordinance intended to protect residential neighborhoods against the lingering presence of commercial vehicles was held not to be overbroad or unreasonable, particularly since the commercial vehicles could be garaged at residences. However, the court anticipated a situation such as the one sub judice and said "this ordinance may be unconstitutionally applied as for example to a station wagon which gives no outward sign of being used in business." Id. at 411.
Notwithstanding the general propositions of law recited above, we hold that the subject ordinance is unreasonable and unconstitutional as applied to pickup trucks. It restricts drivers of pickup trucks from visiting with friends or family by making it illegal to be parked in a residential driveway, or on the hosts' lawn, or in the street in front of the home after 9:00 p. m. even though the vehicle in question is not truly a commercial vehicle; i. e., without commercial markings of any nature and not used for commercial purposes.
Accordingly, we reverse and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
REVERSED and REMANDED.
HURLEY, J., concurs specially with opinion.
MOORE, J., dissents with opinion.