Case Name: Jonesboro, Lake City & Eastern Railroad Company v. Wright
Court: Arkansas Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Arkansas
Decision Date: 1926-03-29
Citations: 170 Ark. 815
Docket Number: 
Parties: Jonesboro, Lake City & Eastern Railroad Company v. Wright.
Judges: 
Reporter: Arkansas Reports
Volume: 170
Pages: 815–822

Head Matter:
Jonesboro, Lake City & Eastern Railroad Company v. Wright.
Opinion delivered March 29, 1926.
Eugene Sloan, for appellant.
Sam Costen and Wils Davis, for appellee.

Opinion:
Hart, J.,
(after stating the facts). It is first insisted that the judgment should be reversed because the court erred in not directing a verdict for the defendant. We cannot agree with counsel in this contention. At the outset it may be stated that the plaintiff was-a section hand, and riding home from work on one of the defendant's motor cars, and was entitled to be treated as an employee at the time the injury occurred.. St. Louis S. F. R. Co. v. Barron, 166 Ark. 641, and Arkansas Land & Lbr. Co. v. Cook, 157 Ark. 245.
It is also the settled rule of law in.this State that, where the negligent acts of two persons concur to produce an injury, the author of either negligent act is liable to the injured party for the damages sustained; Jenkins v. Midland Valley Rd. Co., 134 Ark. 1; Bona v. Thomas Auto Co., 137 Ark. 217; Arkansas Land & Lumber Co. v. Cook, 157 Ark. 245; and Johnson v. Mo. Pac. Rd. Co., 167 Ark. 660.
According to the evidence for the plaintiff, he was going home from work in a motor car of the defendant, and was still in its service, under the authorities above cited. It was the duty of the defendant to exercise ordinary care for his safety while carrying him home from work, and it was also its duty to make reasonable inspection to see if the motor car was in safe condition. In this connection it may be stated that, while the statutory duty of keeping a lookout applies only to the operation of trains, and not to motor cars operated on railway tracks, it is the duty of persons operating such cars to maintain a lookout when approaching a public crossing. Cook v. Mo. Pac. Rd. Co., 160 Ark. 523. Bearing in mind these well-settled principles of law, the jury might have found that the driver of the motor car failed in his common-law duty to keep a lookout for vehicles which he might anticipate would cross the railroad track .at a public crossing, and the jury might have found under the evidence that the driver of the motor car was guilty of negligence in this respect, which caused the accident, or that the accident was caused by the concurring negligence of the driver of the motor car and of the driver of the automobile. Therefore the evidence was legally sufficient to support the verdict.
It is next insisted that the court erred in giving instruction No. 2, which reads as follows:
"If you find from a preponderance of the evidence that, at the time of the collision and injury, the operators in charge of said motor car were running same at an excessively high and reckless rate of speed, taking into consideration the nature of the road crossing that they were approaching and all of the circumstances and conditions as they existed there at that time, then the defendant would he guilty of negligence; and if you further find that such negligence was the proximate cause of the injury, your verdict should be for the plaintiff, unless you find that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence as hereinafter defined, in which event your verdict should be for the defendant."
Special objection was made to the following: "taking into consideration the nature of the road crossing that they were approaching and all of the circumstances and conditions as they existed there at that time," and counsel for the defendant asked that this portion of the instruction be stricken out, because it permitted the jury to exercise its opinion without testimony in determining what were the circumstances and conditions existing there at the time. We do not agree with counsel in this contention. In deciding whether the driver of the motor car failed in his common-law duty to keep a lookout for approaching vehicles at the public crossing, it was proper for the .jury to take into consideration the nature of the public crossing and all of the surrounding circumstances as shown by the evidence. In no other way could they properly decide whether or not the driver of the motor car had failed in his common-law duty in the matter of keeping a lookout for vehicles approaching the public crossing.
It is next insisted that the court erred in giving instruction No. 9, which reads as follows:
"It was 'the duty of the plaintiff to exercise reasonable care for his own safetythat is, the same degree of care that an ordinarily reasonable, prudent and cautious man would have exercised under the same circumstances; and if you find from the evidence that the plaintiff failed to exercise such reasonable care for his own safety, he would be guilty of negligence, and if you find that such negligence caused or contributed to the injury, then that would be such contributory negligence as would prevent him from recovering in this case, and your verdict should be for the defendant."
Counsel for the defendant made special objection to this instruction,, because it told the jury that the plaintiff was required to exercise only reasonable care for his own safety, when it should have told the jury that it was his duty to exercise the highest degree of care for his own safety under the circumstances.
There was no error in giving this instruction. The plaintiff was being carried home on the motor car, and under the authorities cited above it was the duty of the defendant to exercise ordinary care in the operation of the motor car. In other words, whether Chandler, the driver of the motor car, was negligent or not depended upon whether he, by the exercise of ordinary care, might have seen and anticipated the approach of the Ford touring car. It was likewise the duty of the plaintiff to exercise ordinary care for his own safety. According to his testimony, he saw an automobile, and told Chandler, the driver of the motor car, to be careful. He was not required to exercise any higher degree of care for his own safety than the defendant was required to exercise in the discharge of its duty to him.
It is next insisted that the court erred in refusing to give instruction No. 1 at the request of the defendant, which reads as follows: "You are instructed that there is not sufficient evidence to show or prove that the plaintiff's injuries are such that will result in a permanent injury, and you will therefore not consider this item in arriving at the amount of damages that you may fix if-you should find that the plaintiff was damaged. ' '
There was no error in refusing to give this instruction. According to the testimony of the plaintiff, he was sixty years of age, and was confined to his bed about five months after the accident happened. One leg was crushed, one foot was mashed or knocked in, and his collar-bone was broken. His leg was broken between the knee and the ankle. He had been injured seven months at the time he testified, and there was still a depression in his head. His heel was still sore, and he was walking on crutches.
According to the testimony of Dr. F.» B. Elliott, the plaintiff was in the hospital six weeks after be was injured, and seemed to suffer a great deal. He examined the plaintiff a few days before the trial, and he seemed to be suffering- at that time. The plaintiff is too old to get a sufficient union and sufficient use of the muscles to get about like he once did. The plaintiff will be in a weakened condition, and the witness did not believe that he would ever walk without the aid of crutches. He believed that his injuries were permanent.
This testimony was sufficient to warrant the court in submitting to the jury the question of permanent injury. .
. Finally it is insisted that a verdict for $5,000 is excessive. The medical and hospital bills of the plaintiff amounted to something like $350. He was making from $2.25 to $2.50 per day, and in addition to the fact that he was permanently injured, as detailed above, it may be said that the testimony of the plaintiff and that of his physician showed that he suffered excruciating-pain for several weeks. As the plaintiff expressed it, he suffered death for four weeks. He was still, suffering-pain at the time of the trial, which was seven months after he received his injuries. His life expectancy was 13.53 years. Dr. Elliott testified that the plaintiff seemed to suffer about as much as a man could, and that this continued for a period of weeks. Under these circumstances it can not be said that the verdict of the jury is 'excessive.
It follows that the judgment will be affirmed.