Case Name: PEOPLE ex rel. HILTON BRIDGE CONSTRUCTION CO. v. ALDRIDGE
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1897-01-12
Citations: 43 N.Y.S. 99
Docket Number: 
Parties: PEOPLE ex rel. HILTON BRIDGE CONSTRUCTION CO. v. ALDRIDGE.
Judges: 
Reporter: West's New York Supplement
Volume: 43
Pages: 99–111

Head Matter:
(13 App. Div. 24.)
PEOPLE ex rel. HILTON BRIDGE CONSTRUCTION CO. v. ALDRIDGE.
(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Department.
January 12, 1897.)
1. Mandamus—Contract for Public Work —Previous Award.
Mandamus will not lie to compel the acceptance of a bid for public work where the contract has been awarded to another bidder, and such award remains in force. Herrick and Landon, JJ., dissenting.
2. Samf.—Option to Reject Bids.
Acceptance of a bid for public work cannot be compelled by mandamus where the notice calling for bids reserved an option to reject any or all bids. Herrick and Landon, JJ., dissenting.
3. Same—Adequate Remedy at Law.
The fact that a person injured by the neglect of a public officer to perform his duties has a legal remedy by action against such officer, does not preclude the issuing of a writ of mandamus to the officer at the instance of such person. Per Herrick, J.
Appeal from special term, Albany county.
Application by the Hilton Bridge Construction Company for a peremptory mandamus directing George W. Aldridge, as superintendent of public works, to award to it a certain contract. From an order denying the writ, plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.
The facts are stated by Mr. Justice HERRICK as follows:
By chapter 170 of the Laws of 1895 the superintendent of public works was authorized to take out and remove the machinery for operating lift bridges over the Erie Oanal on'Genesee street in the city of Utica, and substitute therefor other motive power and machinery, and alter the lift and permanent bridges theretofore erected. The law provides that: “The furnishing of all materials and the provisions of all work provided for in this act, shall be by contract or contracts to be let to the lowest bidder or bidders giving the security required by the superintendent of public works, except such portions thereof, as in the judgment of the superintendent of public works, and the state engineer cannot be.so done to the best interests of the state.” Part of the expense of this work was tó be borne by the state, and part by the city of Utica. On the 12th day of June, 1896, the superintendent of public works gave public notice that sealed proposals would be received at his office on the 24th day of June, 1896, for the letting of contracts, for furnishing materials, and doing the work required. Such notice provided that: “Every proposal for said work must be accompanied by a draft or a certified check upon some good banking institution of the city of New York or Albany, issued by a national or state bank in good credit within the state, payable at sight to the superintendent of public works, for the amounts expressed below as required to be deposited with the bids for the proposed work. The amount of deposit with bid for the superstructure will be $1,430; the amount of the labor bond required on execution of contract, $4,300; the amount of bond for the faithful performance of contract, on execution of contract, $7,900; the amount of deposit with bid for the substructure will be $920; the amount of labor bond required on execution of contract, $2,800; the amount of bond for faithful performance of contract, on execution of contract, $5,000.”
The relator, the Hilton Bridge Construction Company, and the Havana Bridge Works each furnished proposals to do the work, upon blanks apparently furnished by the superintendent of public works. The following is the proposal of the Hilton Bridge Construction Company, the whole of which, so far as the different items of work and material and the prices therefor, is set forth, in order that the form and manner of the proposals may be understood, to wit:
The controversy arises in this case over the items, 24 old piles, or oak piles, and 2 fixed overhead foot bridges. It will be observed that in the proposal of the Hilton Bridge Construction Company it reads, 24 oak piles, each $12.50; 2 fixed overhead foot bridges, each $1,200. In the proposal of the Havana Bridge Works, it reads, 20 old piles, $20; 2 fixed overhead foot bridges, $939.40. No point was made by either party upon the difference in the bids in the matter of piles, one being named “oak” and the other “old” piles. No one seems to have been misled. If the proposal of the Havana Bridge Works is to be construed as meaning $20 for each of the 24 old piles, and $939.40 for each overhead foot bridge, then the proposal of the Havana Bridge Works is the highest; if the bid is to be construed as $20 for all of the 24 old piles, and $939.40 for both of the overhead foot bridges, then the Havana Bridge Works is the lowest bidder. The superintendent of public works awarded the contract to the Havana Bridge Works. The Hilton Bridge Construction Company thereafter, upon a petition, procured an order to show cause at a special term of the supreme court why a writ of peremptory mandamus should not issue against the superintendent of public works directing him to let to and enter into a contract with the relator for the doing of the work and furnishing the materials in question; the petition of the relator claiming that it was the lowest bidder therefor, and that it had furnished with its proposals a certified check as required by said notice.
Upon the return of the order to show cause, an affidavit of a clerk in the office of the superintendent of public works was produced in behalf of the defendant, and a hearing was had upon the petition of the relator and upon such affidavit. In the affidavit of the clerk, he sets forth that said proposals or bids were opened during the absence of the superintendent of public works, and in the bid written on the blank proposal the Hilton Bridge Construction Company had written over the word “old” the word “oak,” so as to read “oak piles,” and on the same line thereof, in the column marked “items,” had written the word “each,” from which it would appear that the word “each” was not in the blank proposals. He further states: That he examined the bid of the Havana Bridge Works with reference to such items, and found that it read, “twenty-four old piles, $20.” That deponent thereupon caused said bids to be computed upon the basis, for the Havana Bridge Works, of $20 for each pile, and $939.40 for each overhead foot bridge. That the bids were thereafter submitted to the state engineer and surveyor, and that it was determined by him and by the superintendent of public works to telegraph to the Havana Bridge Works, in order to ascertain from them their understanding of said blank proposals,, and what was intended by said Havana Bridge Works by their said bid. Accordingly a telegram was sent reading as follows:
“Albany, N. Y., July 14, 1896.
“To Havana Bridge Works, Montour Falls, N. Y.: In your proposition on
Genesee Street bridges, Utica, is the figure for old piles twenty dollars each or for the lot; also is the figure for fixed overhead foot bridges $939.40 each, or for the two? George W. Aldridge,
“Superintendent of Public Works.”
That in response to said telegram, the following dispatch was received:
“July 15, 1896.
“Hon. George W. Aldridge, Superintendent of Public Works, Albany, N. Y.: Prices named in your telegram are totals for entire items.
_ “Havana Bridge Works.”
Subsequently a letter was received from the Havana Bridge Works confirming their telegram, and asserting that the item of $20 was for the lot of 24 old piles, and the item of $939.40 was for both of the overhead foot bridges.
The affiant also asserts that his computation of said bid on the basis of $20 for each old pile and $939.40 for each overhead foot bridge was without the authority of the superintendent of public works.
The special term denied the application for a mandamus, and in the order denying the motion it is stated that it is denied “as matter of law, not of discretion.”
Argued before PARKER, P. J., and LANDON, HERRICK, PUT-HAM, and MERWIN, JJ.
Norton Chase, for appellant.
Theodore E. Hancock, Atty. Gen. G. D. B. Hasbrouck, of counsel), for respondent.

Opinion:
MERWIN, J.
I am of the opinion that the order should be affirmed. The papers show that the contract has been awarded to the Havana Bridge Works. The question whether this was properly done should not be determined in a proceeding to which the Havana company is not a party, and has no opportunity of being heard. An award having been made, and still remaining, a writ of mandamus should not be issued to compel an award to another. It is not clear that the bid of the Havana company, as originally made, was not sufficiently definite to call for the interpretation which was finally put upon it, and made it the lower bid. Assuming, however, that the bid of the Havana company should have been rejected as too indefinite, it does not follow as matter of law that the relator was entitled to have his bid accepted. The most that the relator would be entitled to, in case the proceeding was appropriate for that purpose, would be to have the bid of the Havana company set aside, and then to require the state officers either to accept its bid or advertise anew. The state officers had, under the notice, an option to reject any or all bids. With this option outstanding, and which the state officers, in the interest of the state, would have the right, and the duty in a proper case, to exercise in case the bid of the relator was the only definite one, it cannot be said that the relator had a legal right to the contract. The basis of a mandamus is a legal right to have something done. The relator asks that the state officers be compelled to enter into a contract with it. It does not show a legal right to such contract, and therefore the motion was properly denied.
Order affirmed, with $10 costs and disbursements.
PARKER, P. J., and PUTNAM, J., concur.