Case Name: STONE MAN, INC. v. GREEN et al.
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia
Jurisdiction: Georgia
Decision Date: 1995-10-23
Citations: 265 Ga. 877
Docket Number: S95A1279
Parties: STONE MAN, INC. v. GREEN et al.
Judges: All the Justices concur, except Sears and Hunstein, JJ., who dissent.
Reporter: Georgia Reports
Volume: 265
Pages: 877–883

Head Matter:
S95A1279.
STONE MAN, INC. v. GREEN et al.
(463 SE2d 1)

Opinion:
Carley, Justice.
In a previous nuisance action, appellees (Landowners) sought to have The Stone Man, Inc.'s (Stone Man) quarry closed. Although the jury found the quarry to be a nuisance, the trial court granted Landowners only a partial injunction which allowed Stone Man to continue operation of the quarry with some restrictions. This grant of partial injunctive relief was affirmed on appeal. Stone Man, Inc. v. Green, 263 Ga. 470 (435 SE2d 205) (1993) (Stone Man I).
Landowners then brought this nuisance action, seeking to recover for damages resulting from Stone Man's subsequent operation of the quarry. According to the allegations of the complaint, Landowners were entitled to recover such damages because the trial court's re strictions allowed the quarry to continue operating at substantially the same level as the jury in the previous action had found to be a nuisance. Stone Man answered and moved to dismiss based upon the doctrine of res judicata. The trial court denied the motion, but granted a certificate of immediate review. The Court of Appeals denied Stone Man's application for an interlocutory appeal and we granted Stone Man's petition for certiorari.
Although a plaintiff seeks injunctive relief in an original action and then seeks damages in a subsequent action, the doctrine of res judicata or estoppel by judgment will apply if the issues are identical. McBride v. Chilivis, 149 Ga. App. 603, 604-605 (255 SE2d 80) (1979). The issue of whether Stone Man's operation of the quarry constituted a nuisance was raised in Landowners' previous action. In that litigation, Landowners contended that the quarry was a nuisance per se and that its operation should be entirely discontinued. However, the trial court found that the quarry was only a nuisance per accidens and, having so found, it was authorized "to enjoin only those parts of the operation which constitute[d] the nuisance rather than the entire enterprise." (Emphasis supplied.) Stone Man I, supra at 472 (3). Indeed, the trial court did identify "specific aspects of the operation which constitute[d] the nuisance and fashion[ed] remedies which address [ed] those problems without making continued operation impossible." (Emphasis supplied.) Stone Man I, supra at 472 (3).
The trial court's ruling affirmed in Stone Man I is a final judicial determination that operation of the quarry in accordance with the imposed limitations does not constitute an actionable nuisance. Accordingly, Landowners
are precluded from asserting any claim that, without change in the controlling facts on which the decree rested, and without violation of that decree by the defendant, they may yet make proof of injury and recover damages therefor.
Guttinger v. Calaveras Cement Co., 325 P2d 145, 147 (Cal. App. 1958). Accord Bodeneck v. Cater's Motor Freight Sys., 86 P2d 766, 768-769 (Wash. 1939); McGrane v. New York El. R. Co., 73 NYS 498, 500-501 (1901). Compare City of Miami v. City of Coral Gables, 233 S2d 7, 9 (Fla. 1970). Therefore, the trial court erred in denying Stone Man's motion to dismiss Landowners' claim for damages based upon allegations that operation of the quarry in compliance with the restrictions constitutes an actionable nuisance.
However, Landowners would be entitled to recover any damages resulting from Stone Man's violation of the partial injunction or to seek a modification of its terms upon proof of changed circumstances. Guttinger v. Calaveras Cement Co., supra at 147; DeKalb County v. Bolick, 249 Ga. 843, 844 (1) (295 SE2d 92) (1982). See Dunn v. Payne, 205 Ga. App. 440, 441-442 (1) (422 SE2d 291) (1992). It appears that, after Stone Man filed its application for interlocutory appeal, Landowners amended their complaint to seek these forms of available relief. Therefore, we remand the case to the trial court for consideration of Landowners' amendment to their complaint. See Trust Co. Bank v. C & S Trust Co., 260 Ga. 124, 127 (3) (390 SE2d 589) (1990); Wal-drop v. Bettis, 223 Ga. 715, 717 (2) (157 SE2d 870) (1967).
Judgment reversed and case remanded.
All the Justices concur, except Sears and Hunstein, JJ., who dissent.