Case Name: WAGNER, NUGENT, JOHNSON, ROTH, ROMANO, ERIKSON & KUPFER, P.A., etc., et al., Petitioners, v. John H. FLANAGAN, Jr., Respondent
Court: Florida Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1993-11-10
Citations: 629 So. 2d 113
Docket Number: No. 79828
Parties: WAGNER, NUGENT, JOHNSON, ROTH, ROMANO, ERIKSON & KUPFER, P.A., etc., et al., Petitioners, v. John H. FLANAGAN, Jr., Respondent.
Judges: OVERTON, MCDONALD, GRIMES and HARDING, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 629
Pages: 113–117

Head Matter:
WAGNER, NUGENT, JOHNSON, ROTH, ROMANO, ERIKSON & KUPFER, P.A., etc., et al., Petitioners, v. John H. FLANAGAN, Jr., Respondent.
No. 79828.
Supreme Court of Florida.
Nov. 10, 1993.
Rehearing Denied Jan. 5, 1994.
Mershon, Sawyer, Johnston, Dunwoody & Cole, West Palm Beach, FL, Williams & Connolly, Washington, DC, Peterson & Bernard, and Larry Klein and Jane Kreusler- Walsh, Klein & Walsh, P.A., West Palm Beach, FL, for petitioners.
Stuart H. Sobel, Sobel & Sobel, P.A., Miami, FL, for respondent.

Opinion:
PER CURIAM.
We have for review Flanagan v. Wagner, Nugent, Johnson, Roth, Romano, Eriksen & Kupfer, P.A., 594 So.2d 776 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992), based on conflict with Gallizzi v. Williams, 218 So.2d 499 (Fla. 2d DCA 1969). We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const. We quash Flanagan.
When JFK Medical Center of West Palm Beach (JFK) was in the process of filing a claim with its insurer under a directors' liability policy for allegedly fraudulent acts committed by JFK's directors, JFK's lawyer sent a letter to the insurer's lawyer commenting on a separate fraud committed by construction contractor Flanagan:
The documents indicate a minimum loss in the years 1984-1987 of approximately $2,000,000. This, however, does not include losses occurring in the construction fraud.... In order to finalize this figure, we will probably have to subpoena records from John Flanagan, the contractor. [Tjhis part of the loss will approximate $10,000,000. We do not believe these losses were a part of the conspiracy, but rather were a separate fraud by John Flanagan and other individuals in the hospital.
Flanagan did not learn of the letter, which was dated February 1988, until November 1988, and subsequently filed a complaint for defamation in October 1990 against JFK's lawyer, his law firm, and JFK. The trial court ruled the complaint barred by the two-year statute of limitations contained in section 95.11, Florida Statutes (1987). The distinct court reversed, holding that the statute of limitations period for defamation does not begin to run until the libel or slander is discovered or reasonably should have been discovered. The court noted conflicting language in Gallizzi, wherein the district court stated that a "[cjause of action in slander accrues at the time of the alleged publication." 218 So.2d at 500.
Flanagan argues that where the defamation is private, not public, the limitations period should run from the time of discovery, not publication. A publication rule for private defamation, he contends, would be unfair because it would deprive a plaintiff of relief when he or she could not have known of the wrong. Flanagan relies on the following broad language from Creviston v. General Motors Corp., 225 So.2d 331 (Fla.1969), for support:
From the standpoint of legal principles, the holdings in the cases [from this Court and the United States Supreme Court] above discussed appear to crystallize in favor of the application of the blameless ignorance doctrine in those instances where the injured plaintiff was unaware or had no reason to know that an invasion of his legal rights has occurred. In reality, such a doctrine is merely a recognition of the fundamental principle that regardless of the underlying nature of a cause of action, the accrual of the same must coincide with the aggrieved party's discovery or duty to discover the act constituting an invasion of his legal rights.
Id. at 334.
We find Creviston, a breach of implied warranty case, inapplicable to the present case by its own terms:
Our holding is limited solely to the matter of the commencement of the running of the three years statute of limitations in the factual posture of this case and is not otherwise extended.
Id. at 334. We find the present case controlled by the plain language of applicable statutes.
The legislature has established unequivocal guidelines governing the statute of limitations for defamation suits and has decided on a two-year period:
95.11 Limitations other than for the recovery of real property. — Actions other than for recovery of real property shall be commenced as follows:
(4) WITHIN TWO YEARS.—
(g) An action for libel or slander.
Section 95.11, Fla.Stat. (1987). The period begins to run from the time the cause of action accrues:
95.031 Computation of time. — Except as provided . elsewhere in these statutes, the time within which an action shall be begun under any statute of limitations runs from the time the cause of action accrues.
Section 95.031, Fla.Stat. (1987). A cause of action for defamation accrues on publication:
770.07 Cause of action, time of accrual. — The cause of action for damages founded upon a single publication or exhibition or utterance . shall be deemed to have accrued at the time of the first publication or exhibition or utterance thereof in this state.
Section 770.07, Fla.Stat. (1987). Although chapter 770 primarily addresses media defendants, we note the chapter is broadly titled Civil Actions for Libel. We hold the above statute applicable to all civil litigants, both public and private, in defamation actions. To rule otherwise would allow potentially endless liability since Florida Statutes contains no statute of repose for this particular tort. We doubt the legislature would have intended this.
Based on the foregoing, we approve Galliz-zi, quash Flanagan, and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
OVERTON, MCDONALD, GRIMES and HARDING, JJ., concur.
BARKETT, C.J., and KOGAN, J., concur with opinions.
SHAW, J., dissents with an opinion.