Case Name: James HUNTLEY, III, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee
Court: Texas Courts of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1999-08-31
Citations: 4 S.W.3d 813
Docket Number: No. 01-97-01205-CR
Parties: James HUNTLEY, III, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.
Judges: Chief Justice SCHNEIDER and Justices COHEN, MIRABAL, HEDGES, and NUCHIA join this opinion.
Reporter: South Western Reporter Third Series
Volume: 4
Pages: 813–819

Head Matter:
James HUNTLEY, III, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.
No. 01-97-01205-CR.
Court of Appeals of Texas, Houston (1st Dist.).
Aug. 31, 1999.
Discretionary Review Refused Jan. 26, 2000.
Karen Clark Harpold, Houston, for Appellant.
John B. Holmes, Julie Klibert, Houston, for State.
. The Honorable Frank C. Price, former Justice, Court of Appeals, First District of Texas at Houston, participating by assignment.

Opinion:
MAJORITY OPINION ON REHEARING EN BANC
TIM TAFT, Justice.
A jury convicted James Huntley, III, of forgery, found two enhancement paragraphs true, and sentenced him to 10 years in prison. A panel of this court reversed the conviction and reformed the trial court's judgment to show acquittal on April 1, 1999. Rehearing en banc was granted on the State's motion, and the April 1 opinion is withdrawn. We substitute this opinion in its stead. We address whether the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support the conviction of forgery. We affirm.
Facts
On Sunday morning, June 8, 1997, the complainant's purse was taken by a black male in a robbery. The complainant's purse contained her checkbook, credit cards, and a cellular phone. The next morning, appellant attempted to cash one of the complainant's stolen checks. He presented an identification card and a social security card, both in the name of "James Huntley, III." The check was dated June 6, 1997, two days before the robbery, and was made payable to appellant in the amount of $465.00. The check was purportedly signed by the complainant, and it was already endorsed by appellant.
Noticing a zero balance in the complainant's account, the bank teller told appellant she needed to get the check approved. She took the check and complainant's signature card to her supervisor, who determined that the check was reported stolen and notified the police. It took the police about 20 minutes to arrive. Appellant waited for the teller to return during this time.
Legal Sufficiency
In his first point of error, appellant contends the evidence was legally insufficient to prove that appellant had the requisite intent to harm or defraud any person.
A. Standard of Review
We apply the usual standard for reviewing the legal sufficiency of the evidence. Lane v. State, 933 S.W.2d 504, 507 (Tex.Crim.App.1996). The same standard applies in both direct and circumstantial evidence cases. See Geesa v. State, 820 S.W.2d 154, 160 (Tex.Crim.App.1991).
B. Analysis
To prove the crime of forgery, the State was required to show that appellant, (1) with the intent to defraud or harm another, (2) passed (3) a writing (4) that purported to be the act of another (5) who did not authorize the act. See Williams v. State, 688 S.W.2d 486, 488 (Tex.Crim.App.1985); Wallace v. State, 813 S.W.2d 748, 751 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, no pet.). Evidence in this case showed appellant attempted to cash a check purportedly made by the complainant, who testified she did not write the check or authorize anyone to do so. Therefore, the issue is whether appellant had the intent to defraud or harm another when he passed the check.
The intent to defraud or harm another in a forgery case can be inferred if the State proves an actor has knowledge that the check is forged. Williams, 688 S.W.2d at 488. In this case, the State presented uncontroverted prima facie evidence that the check was forged: (1) the check was stolen; (2) the complainant did not write the check or authorize anyone to do so; and (3) the complainant did not know appellant or anyone who knew appellant. Thus, the only issue is whether appellant knew the check was forged. The following facts demonstrate suspicious circumstances showing appellant had this knowledge:
1. appellant is a black male who was in possession of the forged check which had been stolen less than 24 hours earlier by a black male;
2. no other stolen checks showed up after appellant's arrest, suggesting possible association between appellant and the robber;
3. appellant presented the forged check for cash to the issuing bank early Monday morning, when the bank first opened after the robbery, maximizing the chances that the check might be cashed if the complainant had not yet reported her checks stolen;
4. the amount of the check was $465, making it unlikely that appellant would have been given such a large check by a stranger, and yet appellant did not subpoena this person as a witness, to explain appellant's possession of the check;
5. the check made out to appellant was dated two days before it was stolen from the complainant, and thus two days before the check could have been presented to appellant, which should have at least alerted appellant to irregularity in its issuance as a predated check; and
6. the complainant did not know appellant, making it suspicious that appellant would be given such a large check by a stranger.
Ordinarily, we would look to the reasonableness of the explanation appellant gave for his possession and presentment of the forged check. Here, any such explanation given at the crime scene is not available because of the death of the arresting officer prior to trial. However, as the State argued legitimately in closing, appellant did not subpoena as a witness the person who purportedly wrote the check payable to him. This would have provided the jury with an explanation without which the above-listed suspicious circumstances became even more suspicious and rendered appellant's recent, personal possession of a stolen check unexplained.
There have been cases where the circumstances are suspicious enough to conclude the defendant knew the check was forged, regardless of any explanation. See, e.g., Palmer v. State, 785 S.W.2d 696, 698 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1987, no pet.) (finding defendant's lack of any relationship with payor taken in connection with his unexplained, personal, recent possession and passing of payor's stolen check was sufficient evidence to establish defendant's knowledge the check was forged, for purpose of offense of passing forged writing). This is one of those cases.
The dissenting opinion asserts this case has no "suspicious circumstances" like those that have sustained previous forgery convictions. See Griffin v. State, 908 S.W.2d 624, 627 (Tex.App.-Beaumont 1995, no pet.) (listing examples of suspicious circumstances which sustained forgery convictions). Although not identical to the specific examples listed in Griffin, the suspicious circumstances in this case, when viewed in their totality, would enable a rational jury to conclude that appellant knew the check was forged; hence, his intent to defraud or harm another could be inferred. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we hold the evidence is legally sufficient and the jury could have found, beyond a reason able doubt, that appellant was guilty of forgery.
We overrule appellant's first point of error.
Factual Sufficiency
In his second point of error, appellant contends that the evidence was factually insufficient to prove that appellant had the requisite intent to harm or defraud any person.
A. Standard of Review
We apply the usual standard for reviewing the factual sufficiency of the evidence. Clewis v. State, 922 S.W.2d 126, 134 (Tex.Crim.App.1996).
B. Analysis
Appellant did not present any evidence at trial, therefore we consider only evidence presented by the State. Appellant presented two forms of identification when he attempted to cash the check, and he did not flee while waiting in the bank. These facts, the dissent claims, suggest appellant did not know the check was forged. However, there are other possible explanations for these facts, rendering conclusions about appellant's behavior speculative. Viewing all evidence in this case without the prism of "in the light most favorable to the prosecution," we hold the verdict is not so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and unjust Id. Therefore, the evidence was factually sufficient.
We overrule appellant's second point of error.
Conclusion
We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Chief Justice SCHNEIDER and Justices COHEN, MIRABAL, HEDGES, and NUCHIA join this opinion.
Justices O'CONNOR, WILSON, ANDELL, and PRICE, dissenting.
. Although there was a false explanation by Palmer's companion, that explanation did not play a part in the court's reasoning. It is noteworthy that Palmer did not appear nervous during the time the check was being verified even though a uniformed police officer stood nearby on duty as a security guard. Id. at 697.
. The dissenting opinion asserts this case is controlled by Crittenden v. State, 671 S.W.2d 527, 528 (Tex.Crim.App.1984). We note that Crittenden was also cited in the dissenting opinion of another Court of Criminal Appeals case very similar to this case. See Williams v. State, 688 S.W.2d at 488-89, 492. We also note that Crittenden presented a witness at trial that corroborated his explanation given to the arresting officers. See Crittenden, 671 S.W.2d at 527-28.