Case Name: HOGGE v. SALT LAKE & O. RY. CO. et al.
Court: Utah Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Utah
Decision Date: 1915-08-24
Citations: 47 Utah 266
Docket Number: No. 2710
Parties: HOGGE v. SALT LAKE & O. RY. CO. et al.
Judges: STRAUP, C. J., dissents.
Reporter: Utah Reports
Volume: 47
Pages: 266–295

Head Matter:
HOGGE v. SALT LAKE & O. RY. CO. et al.
No. 2710.
Decided August 24, 1915.
On Application for Rehearing Nov. 30, 1915.
(153 Pac. 585.)
1. Electricity — Personal INJURIES — Action—Instructions. In an administratrix’s action for death of one killed by an electric shock received while working on the roof of an electric railroad’s power substation, a charge that if the railroad knew that it might be necessary for decedent to go upon the roof in doing certain work, and decedent did not know of the danger of coming iii close proximity to high-tension wires, if the railroad maintained such wires uninsulated and did not warn deceased of the danger, and he, in the prosecution of his work, received a shock from such wires from which he died, verdict should be for plaintiff, the burden being upon her to prove her case by a preponderance of the evidence, unless the jury should otherwise find that decedent knew or should- have known of the danger, or was guilty of contributory negligence, was not improper' as rendering the railroad absolute insurer of any workman engaged upon the roof, when considered with charges that the road was not such an insurer, the duty of ordinary care devolving upon the workman, that if decedent' knew of the danger and carelessly approached or touched the wires plaintiff was not entitled to recover, and that if decedent failed to exercise the care of an ordinarily prudent man, under the circumstances, plaintiff could not recover. (Page 277.)-
2. Electricity — Injuries from Negligence — Duty to Warn. Where a railroad company operating a power substation agreed with a light company that the latter should erect a contiguous substation, so that the same crew of employees might operate both, and also that the light cómpany might use one of the railroad’s substation’s walls for the wall of' the new substation, thus licensing the light company’s contractors to go upon its premises to remodel the wall, the railroad was under a nondelegable duty to warn the light company’s contractors for the necessary work of remodeling the wall, and their employees, of the danger of coming in contact with, or in close proximity to, high-tension uninsulated electric wires on the roof of the road’s substation in the immediate vicinity where work would have to be carried on, since parties maintaining electric wires carrying high-tension uninsulated currents of electricity must exercise the necessary care and prudence to prevent injury to others who have the right to be on the premises where the wires are maintained, and who are liable to come in contact with the current. (Page 279.)
3. Electricity — Injuries—Notice of Danger — Sufficiency of Evidence. In an action for death caused by decedent’s coming in close proximity to high-tension wires, receiving a shock, evidence held sufficient to justify finding that before the accident defendant railroad knew or should have known that it might become necessary for decedent, in performance of work for another the road had licensed, to work near the wires. (Page 281.)
4. Electricity — Injuries — Contributory Negligence — Question for Jury. In an action for death of a workman caused by electric shock from high-tension wires on the roof of defendant railroad’s power substation, issue of contributory negligence held for the jury under the evidence. (Page 282.)
On Application for Rehearing.
5. Electricity — Injuries—Contributory Negligencei — Evidence— Knowledge of Danger. In an action for death by electric shock, where defendant railroad attempted to prove that decedent was killed while fiddling with a high-tension- wire, and so was guilty of contributory negligence, the plaintiff attempting to disprove the defense by showing that decedent was familiar with the effects of an electric shock from the fact that he had lived in a house for some time with one crippled by a. shock, the court’s refusal, after allowing such, fact to be brought out, to permit the witness to answer whether decedent had not met the cripple at the table several times a day, was proper, as the evidence was wholly immaterial in view of the testimony already given. (Page 291.)
6. ■ Trial — Remark or Court — Propriety. In action for death caused by an electric shock, where the defense was that decedent had been killed while fiddling about a high-tension wire, and so was guilty of contributory negligence, the plaintiff attempting to disprove the defense by showing that decedent had lived for some time in a house with a person who had been crippled by shock, the remark of the court, in excluding an immaterial question as to whether decedent had met such cripple at the table several times a day, that the court did not think the evidence showed much, was not erroneous, because it was true. (Page 291.)
7. Trial— Conduct or Counsel — Contemptuous Remark or Counsel. The statement of counsel, in an altercation over the exclusion of evidence, that the court was “wishwashy,” was improper and contemptuous. (Page 291.)
Straup, C. J., dissents.
Appeal from District Court, Second District; Hon. N. J. Harris, Judge.
Action by Orenne Hogge, Administratrix, against the Salt Lake & Ogden Railway Company and others.
Judgment for plaintiff for $5,000. Defendant named appeals.
Affirmed.
Boyd, DeVine & Eceles, for appellant.
C. B. Hollingsworth and H. H. Henderson, for respondent.
RESPONDENT’S POINTS.
The land owner is responsible to invitees upon the premises who suffer injuries from a nuisance created or a hidden and concealed danger maintained on his premises, when that result was reasonably to be apprehended from the usual and ordinary method of doing the work contracted for. (Thomas v. Harrington, 54 Atl. 285, 65 L. R. A. 742.) The thing cansing the death of decedent was" not the result of any act or omission on the part of the contractor, or his subcontractor, but the negligence of appellant. The evidence is clear that the contractor and the sub-contractor failed in no duty enjoined upon them to warn the deceased of the likelihood of danger. Jackson & Levedahl even were not warned by appellant of the existing hidden' or concealed danger. They were in total ignorance that high tension wires like those in question gave off a brush, or disruptive or static discharge of electricity. The danger from this source, though present, was hidden, concealed and beyond the knowledge of the sub-contractors or their servants. The duty of making it known was upon the owner and proprietor — the appellant. (Goughtry v. Woolen Co., 56 N. Y. 124, 15 Am. Rep. 387; John Spry Lumber Go. v. Duggan, 182 Ill. 218, 54 N. E, 1002; Johnson v. Spear, 42 N. W. 1092, 15 Am. St. Rep. 298; Brannock v. Elmore, 114 Mo. 55, 121 S. ~W. 451; Beach on Contributory Negligence, 51; Stevens v. United Gas & Elec. Go., 60 Atl. 848/70 L. R. A. 119; Braun v. Buffalo Gen. Elec. Go., 94 N. E. 206, 21 Ann. Cases 370, 34 L. R. A. N. S. 1089, 118 N. Y. Supp. 1096; Hoppe v. Winona, 129 N. W. 577, 113 Minn. 252, 22 Ann. Cases 247; Dunn v. Cavanaugh, 185 Fed. 451; Giraudi v. Electric Imp. Go., 40 Pae. 108; Shank v. Great Shoshone & Twin Falls Water Co., 205 Fed. 833; Fitzgerald v. Edison Elec. Mfg. Go., 50 Atl. 161, 86 Am. St. Rep. 732; Smith v. Twin Cities B. T. Co., 112 N. W. 1001; Overall v. Louisville Elec. Li. Go., 47 S. W. 443; Gagnon v. Si. Maries Light & Power Go., 141 Pae. 88; Byerly v. Con. L. PK & I. Co., 109 S. W. 1065; Doiv v. Sunset T. & T. Go., 121 Pae. 379; Gentzkoiv v. Portland Baihvay Go., 102 Pac. 614.) This court has recently passed upon some of the matters involved in the present ease. (Speight v. Telephone Co., 107 Pae. 746; Sivan v. Salt Lake & Ogden Bailway, 41 Utah 518, 127 Pac. 267.) “The fundamental and general principle that a company like respondent, if reasonably chargeable with knowledge, or in the exercise of reasonable - prudence bound to anticipate, that people may lawfully come in close proximity to its wires either for purposes of business or pleasure, is under obligation to exercise care to keep the latter in a safe condition, is ' abundantly established. ’ ’ Citing: Con-nell v. Keokuk Electric R., etc., Co., 109 N. W. 177; Fitzgerald v. Edison Electric Illuminating Co., 50 Atl. 161, 86 Am. St. Rep. 732; McLaughlin v. Louisville Electric Light Co., 37 S. W. 851, 34 L. R. A. 812; Baríes v. Louisville Electric Light Co., 80 S. W. 814, 85 S. W. 1186.
“Contributory negligence will not in all cases, however, be imputed, as a matter of law, to a person who receives an injury from a danger simply from the fact that it might have been seen, because the nature of his duties, or the surrounding circumstances, may be such as to distract his attention to the other objects. 1 Thomp. Neg. Sec. 189; Webb v. Heintz, 97 Pac. 753. And, under such circumstances, the question is for the jury, and not for the court. Illingsworth vs. Boston Electric Light Co., 161 Mass. 583, 37 N. E. 778, 25 L. R. A. 552; Mahan vs. Newton & Boston Street Railway Co., 189 Mass. 1, 75 N. E. 59; Reagon vs. Boston Electric Light Co., 167 Mass. 406, 455 N. E. 743; Commonwealth Electric Co. vs. Rose, 214 Ill. 545, 73 N. E. 780; Knowlton vs. Light Co., 117 Iowa 451, 90 N. W. 818; Paine vs. Electric Illuminating, etc., Co., 64 App. Div. 477, 72 N. Y. Supp. 279; Stevens vs. Company, 73 N. PI. 159, 60 Atl. 848, 70 L. R. A. 119.”
It has often been said that where the injured person is dead, wider latitude should be allowed to the jury in passing on the question of contributory negligence. (Schafer v. New York, 48 N. E. 749; Noble v. N. Y. Central, 46 N. Y. Supp. 645, 55 N. E. 1098.)
STATEMENT OF FACTS.
Plaintiff, as administratrix of the estate of Lawrence Hogge, deceased, brought this action to recover damages for the death of Mr. Hogge, which occurred on the 28th day of June, 1911, at Ogden City, Utah. The defendants were the Salt Lake & Ogden Railway Company, a corporation, hereinafter referred to as “railway company,” the Merchants’ Light & Power Company, a corporation, hereinafter called "light company,” C. J. Hnmphris, and J. W. Levedahl and Lorenzo Jackson, copartners, as Levedahl & Jackson.
The facts of the case are about as follows: The railway company was, at the time of the accident which caused the death of ITogge, and for some time prior thereto had been, maintaining and operating an electrical interurban line of railroad from Salt Lake City to Ogden City. For the purpose of furnishing power to the electric line Of road the company maintained an electric power house or substation in Ogden City. The substation building was constructed of cement and brick and was approximately forty-five feet square, and it was about eighteen or twenty feet from the floor to the roof, with fire walls on all four sides. These fire .walls extended about four feet above the roof. The main line of the railway company’s electric interurban system passes on the east of the substation and about thirty feet distant therefrom. Along this line of railway there is a pole line supporting transmission wires which continually carry a high current of electricity of approximately 44,000 volts used in propelling the railway cars. The wires of this transmission line leave a pole to the east of the substation building and then continue westward to and over the roof of the building. The line consists of three No. 4. uninsulated copper wires, parallel with each other, about six feet apart, and about nine feet above the roof. On the roof, and about fifteen feet west from the east wall of the building, there is a rack built into the roof. On this rack, which extends upwards, are three insulators in a north and south line, and one wire is supported by each insulator. There is another rack with a set of horn gaps near the west edge of the roof. The transmission wires extend first from the pole situated east of the building to the rack first mentioned, and thence to the rack and horn gaps near the west edge of the building. About midway between the racks mentioned, at approximately the center of the roof, three uninsulated wires, called taps, of the same size and character as the transmission wires, project downward seven or eight feet to the roof of the building. The center tap projects straight downward, while the north and south taps ai*e drawn in so that, the distance between the wires where they pass through the roof into the substation building is about three feet instead of six, as are the wires passing over the substation roof. Three earthenware insulators, from two to two and a half feet high, and about a foot in diameter, are inserted in the roof, and the taps pass down through the centers of these insulators. To the north of, and about six feet' from, the railway company’s substation, was an alleyway. The light company, which was an electrical distributing company located in Ogden City,'had, some time prior to the accident complained of, purchased the land adjoining the alleyway on the north, and had obtained the right to close the alleyway, and had leased from the railway company the six feet of ground north of, and contiguous to, the railway company’s substation building for a period of twenty-five years for the purpose of erecting thereon, and adjoining the railway company’s substation building, a power plant or substation. Under the terms of the agreement, which is styled a “lease,” the north wall of the railway company’s substation building was to become the south wall of the light company’s substation building. The agreement, or lease, contained, among others, the following provisions:
“Whereas,, it is mutually agreed and understood, by and between the railway company and the light company, that it will be mutually advantageous to operate both of said substation buildings with one set of operators; and, whereas, in order to do so it becomes necessary that the light company build its substation building immediately adjoining the north wall of the railway company’s substation building, and that a portion of said north wall of the railway company’s substation building be removed in order to make an opening of sufficient size to give an unobstructed view from one substation building into the room of the other substation building.
“ * * * The railway company, does, * '* * by these presents, léase unto the light company the right to use the north wall of the present aforesaid building of the rail way company as tbe south wall of the contemplated substation building of the light company, together with all of the land belonging to the said railway company, being that portion of the north end of lots * * * lying immediately north of the north wall of the railway company’s substation building; together with the railway company’s interest in and to the alley hereinbefore mentioned, lying immediately north of the railway company’s substation building.
“ * * * And the light company * * * agrees, to and with the railway company, that it, the said light company, shall pay an annual rental of thirty ($30.00) dollars, as full compensation to said railway company, for the aforesaid leased premises.
"The light company further expressly covenants and agrees with the railway company, that all of the costs of remodeling the north wall of the substation building of the railway company shall be borne by the light company.
£i # * * The light company further expressly agrees, to and with the railway company, that in the remodeling of the north wall of the said company’s substation building it will hold the railway company harmless from any and all damages that might result to the railway company’s said substation building, and shall make whole said, if any, damage to the entire satisfaction of the railway company.”
This agreement was executed August 8, 1911, about forty days after the accident in question’ occurred. The evidence, however, without conflict, shows that the two companies, the railway and light companies, had decided on remodeling the wall mentioned in the contract before work thereon was commenced. Simon Bamberger, who was president and general manager of the railway company during the year 1911 and also a stockholder of the light company, was called as a witness, and testified in part as follows:
"Q. Before the Merchants’ Light & Power Company built this substation on the north end of yours, you talked it over with them about their putting the station next to yours ? A. Yes, sir. * * * There was to be an opening cut into our wall. * * * Q. And you knew that was to be done, did yon not, before there was any work done? A. Yes, I knew it was to be done. ’ ’
The light company entered into a written contract with C. J. Humphris for the erection of its substation building and the removal of a portion of the wall mentioned. Humph-ris sublet the brick and cement work to Levedahl & Jackson, and they sublet the cement work to another contractor. This cement work was completed before June 27, 1911. On that day Levedahl, Jackson, and Roy Jackson, a son of defendant Jackson, went to the railway company’s substation building, and by means of a ladder, which they placed against the north wall near the northwest corner of the building, climbed to the roof and commenced work, removing a tile coping from the north fire wall. The material thus removed was placed on the roof near the cast fire wall. On the following morning, June 28th, the defendant Jackson, together with his son Roy and the deceased, Lawrence Hogge, with hammers and crowbars, commenced taking down portions of the wall from which the coping, the day before, had been removed. The space occupied by them immediately south of the wall, as the work progressed, was from five to eight feet. The work of tearing down the wall continued until noon, when the parties temporarily ceased work to eat their lunch. The defendant Jackson, who had been working about fifteen feet west from the center of the wall, went directly to and down the ladder stationed near the northwest corner of the building.- Hogge was working near the northeast corner of the building, and Roy Jackson about midway between the northeast and the northwest corners of the building. About the time that defendant Jackson descended the ladder, Hogge left the place where he had been working and immediately thereafter came near enough to one of the high-tension wires hereinbefore mentioned so that he received a shock and was killed. His movements and what he said just prior to the time he received the shock that caused his death, so far as known, are related and described by the witnesses Roy Jackson and J. H. Emmett. Roy Jackson testified on this point in part as follows:
"The buzzing on the wires seemed to be extraordinary heavy that morning, and he made the remark that they wer.e insulated, and I said they were not.”
He also testified that at the time of the accident he was four feet from the wall and about four feet from the place where he had been working; that Hogge went around him, and he thought Hogge "was going down”; that the next thing he "noticed was two big flames in the air, and Hogge stiffened and fell backwards”; that "the flames seemed to envelope his entire body”; that "it looked to me as if he were two feet from the insulator, * * * it seemed to me I could see between him and the wire.” He further testified that the wire which gave Hogge the deadly shock "was ten or twelve feet, maybe twelve feet, south of us. ’ ’ Emmett testified that he was driving along the street a short distance from the place where these men were at work; that he.saw them quit work; that he saw "Mr. Jackson go towards the west side of the building, and Mr. Hogge was about six feet from him”; that he saw him fall; that the flame left his feet first and his head last; and that he saw it‘ shoot back to the wire.” He further testified:
"I ran around to the north of the building and hallooed for somebody to come. * * * At last somebody came out from the building, * * * and he says: ‘For God’s sake! Don’t get within six feet of the wires or it will kill you.’ ”
The alleged negligent acts and omissions of defendants set forth in the complaint are that the defendants knew, or by the exercise of reasonable care and diligence should have known, that the transmission wires hereinbefore mentioned "were continuously carrying about 40,000 volts of electricity and were uninsulated and unguarded, ■ * * # and by reason thereof were extremely dangerous to persons while working on said roof and while walking along said roof to and from their work, and rendered the place * * * dangerous and unsafe * * * in which to work”; that at said time it was well known to defendants, and each of them, said Lawrence was a young man, being only twenty years of age, and had no knowledge of electricity and had not been warned against and had no knowledge of any dangers arising, or which might arise, from standing or passing in close proximity to said wires; that defendants and each of them permitted “said wires to remain in said dangerous position and condition uninsulated and unguarded,. * * * and permitted said Lawrence Hogge to continue in said work and be on said roof where he was- as aforesaid required to be and pass in close proximity to the said wires, and failed to notify or warn him of any of the dangers hereinbefore alleged, and failed to take any steps whatever to protect him from said dangers.”
The defendant railway company filed its separate answer in which it denied the allegations of negligence contained in the complaint and denied that the deceased, Lavuenee Hogge, had permission from it to work upon the roof of the substation building, or that he was there by its permission, and denied that it “owed Mm any duty either as employer or by reason of any knowledge as to his doings upon said day (June 28, 1911) as alleged in plaintiff’s complaint or at all.” It also pleaded contributory negligence on the part of Hogge.
During the progress of the trial, the action, on motion of the plaintiff, was dismissed as to all of the defendants except the railway company.
The cause was tried to a jury and resulted in a verdict in favor of plaintiff and against the railway company in the sum of $5,000. From the judgment entered upon the verdict, the railway company prosecutes this appeal.
Swan v. Salt Lake & O. Ry. Co., 41 Utah, 518, 127 Pac. 267.

Opinion:
McCAETY, J.
(after stating the facts as above).
Counsel for appellant, with much earnestness, contend that it was never contemplated bys either the railway company or the light company that the contractors or their employees, in the performance of the work in removing a portion of the north wall of the railway company's substation building, should or would go upon the roof of the building. The position of appellant in that regard is very clearly set forth by counsel in their printed brief as follows:
"Plaintiff's intestate was the servant of a mere trespasser, an independent contractor, and he, as well as his employees, as sumed tbe risks of whatever danger might be upon the premises and were compelled by law to take said premises as they found them at their risk."
On the other hand, respondent contends that the deceased, Lawrence Hogge, was upon the premises — the roof of the substation building — as an invitee, and that appellant owed him the nondelegable duty of exercising ordinary care to keep the premises in a reasonably safe condition so that he would not be unnecessarily or unreasonably exposed to danger.
The court, among other things, charged the jury as follows (No. 9) :
"If you find from all the evidence ® ® that the defendant Salt Lake & Ogden Railway Company knew, or in the exercise of reasonable care and diligence should have known, that it might become necessary for workmen to go upon the roof of said substation in- the performance of said work, or that Avorkmen would be apt to be called upon or go upon the roof of said substation in the performance of said work, and thereby come in such close proximity to the said high-tension Avires that they Avould be apt to receive a dangerous current of electricity therefrom, and if you further find from all the evidence in this case that the deceased, Lawrence Hogge, Avas directed by said Jackson and Levedahl to go upon the said roof to do said work, and that the deceased, Lawrence Hogge, did not know of the dangers in coming in contact Avith or in close proximity to said high-tension Avires located upon the roof of said substation, and if you should further find from all of the evidence that the defendant Salt Lake & Ogden Railway Company maintained said high-tension wires uninsulated and unguarded while said work Avas being performed, and gave no warning to said Lawrence Hogge of the dangers that might arise to said Lawrence Hogge by coming in contact Avith or in close proximity to the said high-tension wires, and that the said deceased in the prosecution of said Avork or while going to or from his said work, while not knowing that it Avas dangerous to come in contact with or close proximity to the said high-tension wires, came in contact with, or in close proximity to the said high-tension wires and thereby received an electric shock from the said high-tension wires, from which he died, your verdict should be for the plaintiff. The burden is upon the plaintiff, and it is for her to prove such facts by a .preponderance of the evidence before she is entitled to recover, unless you should further find that the said Lawrence Hogge knew, or by the exercise. of ordinary care should have known, of the danger which might arise from coming in contact with or in close proximity to said high-tension wires, or unless you should further find that the said Lawrence Hogge was guilty of contributory negligence. 1 '
This instruction is assigned as error. It is contended that the giving of it made the railway company "the absolute insurer of any workmen7' engaged in remodeling the wall, who might be required to go upon the roof. - The instruction should be read and considered in connection with the balance of the charge.
The court charged the jury as follows:
"You are instructed that the defendant railway company' was not an insurer of the safety of said deceased,, and that the duty of ordinary care devolves upon all persons, and at all trnq.es, and by such care is meant such care as 'an ordinarily •prudent and careful man would exercise under like circumstances and conditions.
"You are instructed that if the deceased knew, or by the exercise, of such reasonable care; as herein- defined, should have known, that said wires were carrying such heavy current of electricity and were dangerous, and that notwithstanding such knowledge, and without any reason therefor, he carelessly or negligently approached and touched the same or went into close proximity thereto,-and the injury resulted, then the plaintiff is not entitled to recover.
"You are therefore instructed that if the deceased failed to exercise such degree of care as an ordinarily prudent man would have exercised under like circumstances and conditions, and in doing the work required to be done, or failed to exercise such care in going to and from said work, then the said deceased was guilty of contributory negligence, and would not be entitled to recover in this action."
We do not think that the instruction complained of when read and considered in connection with the foregoing portions of the charge, is susceptible of the construction contended for by counsel for appellant.
It is argued that as the deceased was working for, and under, an independent contractor, the railway company owed him no legal duty whatever to warn him of the danger of going upon the roof and in close proximity to the high-tension wires hereinbefore mentioned, and for that reason the instruction complained of is misleading and erroneous. We do not think there is any merit whatever to this contention. There can be question but what Levedahl & Jackson were independent contractors, and that the railway company exercised uo supervision or control over their employees who were engaged in tearing down and removing a portion of the north wall of the substation building. The records shows, however, that the remodeling of the wall was for the mutual benefit of the two companies. In the preamble of the contract, portions of which are set forth in the foregoing statement of facts, it is recited that:
"Whereas, it is mutually agreed and understood by and between the railway company and the light company, that it will be mutually advantageous to operate both of said substations with one set of operators; and, whereas, in order to do so it becomes necessary for the light company to build a substation building immediately adjoining the north wall of the railway company's substation building and-that a portion of said north wall be remodeled," etc.
It may be inferred' — in fact, it is the only reasonable con-illusion that can be drawn from the evidence — that the contract contains the terms and conditions under which the work of remodeling the wall was commenced and carried on. Under the contractual relations thus created, the light company and its contractors and employees were authorized to go upon the premises of the railway company for the purpose of remodeling the wall, and, in so doing, they were not trespassers, as counsel for appellant seem to contend. True, the remodeling of the wall was to be done, and the expense thereof borne, by •.the light company. This, however, did not relieve the railway company of its duty, which, was nondelegable, to warn the contractors and their employees of the danger of coming in contact with, or in close proximity to, the. high-tension wires that were in the immediate vicinity of the place where the work of remodeling the wall was to be carried on.
In 1 Thompson on Negligence, section 680, the author says:
"The relation of master and servant does not subsist between the proprietor and the servant of the contractor; and therefore those obligations which the law imposes upon the master for the, protection of one injured while in his service do not rest upon the proprietor, but' upon the contractor. On the other hand, the servant of the contractor must be deemed to be upon the premises of the proprietor by his invitation, express or implied; and therefore he owes him the same duty of guarding him against the consequences of hidden dangers on the premises that the proprietor would in any case owe to a guest, a customer, or other person coming by invitátion upon his premises."
And again (section 979) :
"It is not necessary to suggest that, where a proprietor engages an independent contractor to do work upon his premises, the contractor, while executing the work, will be there in pursuance of the invitation of the proprietor and the proprietor will be under the duty of exercising ordinary or reasonable care to the end of protecting his safety. In almost every such case there is the further implication that if a contractor brings third persons, his own employees, his partners or assistants to assist him in executing the contract, such persons are presumably upon the premises by the invitation of the owner and he owes to them the same measure of care to the end of promoting their safety that he owes to the contractor himself; and this although no contractual relation exists between the proprietor and them."
In Beacb on Contributory Negligence, section 50, the rule is stated thus:
"When 'J: the circumstances are such as to imply an invitation to go upon property, he who enters is no longer a trespasser, and the owner is bound to exercise ordinary care and prudence toward him. The invitation or license, express or implied, creates this duty." Stevens v. United Gas & E. Co., 73 N. H. 159, 60 Atl. 848, 70 L. R. A. 119; Spry Lumber Co. v. Duggan, 182 Ill. 219, 54 N. E. 1002; Gagnon v. St. Maries Light & Power Co., 26 Idaho, 87, 141 Pac. 88; 29 Cyc. 453.
It is. contended that appellant had no notice that the con tractors and their employees would, in remodeling the wall, go upon the roof of the substation building, and hence was under no legal duty to place danger signs or signals on the roof, or to otherwise warn them of the danger of coming in contact with, or in close proximity to, the uninsulated high-tension transmission wires mentioned. The president of the railway company, who was also a stockholder of the light company, testified that he "knew it (the work) was to be done." Furthermore, appellant was a party to the understanding or agreement under which the work of remodeling the wall was to be performed. Appellant therefore had notice that the work would be done. The evidence, what there is on the point, tends to show that the most practical and economical way of remodeling the wall was the one that was being followed at the time the accident occurred. The jury therefore were justified in finding that prior to the accident appellant "knew, or in the exercise of reasonable care and diligence should have known, that it might become necessary for workmen to go upon the roof of said substation in the performance of said work." This is one of the several propositions submitted to the jury by the instruction complained of.
It is settled law that parties who maintain electric wires carrying high and dangerous currents of electricity are bound to exercise the necessary care and prudence to prevent injury to others who may have the right to be on the premises where the wires are maintained and who are liable to come in contact with the hidden, silent, and deadly current with tvhich the wires are charged. Joyce on Electric Law, section 445; Perham v. Portland Gen. Elec. Co., 33 Or. 451, 53 Pac. 14, 24, 40 L. R. A. 799, 72 Am. St. Rep. 730 ; Swan v. Salt Lake & O. Ry. Co., 41 Utah, 518, 127 Pac. 267. In 2 M. A. L. 418, the rule is clearly, concisely, and, as we think, correctly stated as follows:
"Electricity is another impalpable and dangerous force, and those who make, sell, or handle it are held to the. use of the greatest care to avoid injuring those who must come and go where it is employed. Here again the rule is that care must be proportioned to the danger to he avoided."
Applying this well-established principle to the facts of this case, we cannot hold as a matter of law, that appellant was not negligent.
Appellant requested the court to direct a verdict in its favor "no cause of action." The refusal of the court to so instruct the jury is assigned as error. The contention made in support of this assignment is that the deceased was, as a matter of law, guilty of contributory negligence. The deceased, at the time of the accident, was twenty years of age, and while it may be inferred from the evidence that he knew or had reason to believe that the wires mentioned were charged with electricity, and that he, in a general way, knew of the danger of coming in contact with wires carrying heavy currents of electricity, there is no evidence whatever tending to show that he knew, or should have known, that these particular wires were carrying heavy currents. Lorenzo Jackson, the subcontractor under whom the deceased was working, testified that, while he (Jackson) "thought they were carrying electricity," he "didn't know the voltage." As stated in Fitzgerald v. Edison Elec. Ill. Co., 200 Pa. 540, 50 Atl. 161, 86 Am. St. Rep. 732:
"Wires charged with an electric current may he harmless, or they may be in the highest degree dangerous. The difference in this respect is not apparent to ordinary observation, and the public therefore, while presumed to know that danger may be present, are not bound to know its degree in any particular case."
Practically the same observation is made — the same thought expressed — in the case of Mitchell v. Raleigh Elec. Co., 129 N. C. 166, 39 S. E. 801, 55 L. R. A. 398, 85 Am. St. Rep. 735, in the following words:
"Electricity is the most deadly and dangerous power recognized as a necessary agency in developing our civilization and promoting our comfort and business affairs. It differs from all other dangerous utilities. Its association is with the most inoffensive and harmless piece of mechanism — if wire can be classified as such — in common use. In adhering to the wire, it gives no warning or knowledge of its deadly presence. Vision cannot detect it. It is without color, motion, or body. Latently, and without sound, it exists, and, being odorless, the only means of its discovery lies in the sense of feeling, communicated through the touch, which as soon as done, becomes its victim."
As hereinbefore stated, Roy Jackson, who was at work about midway between the northeast and northwest corner of the building, testified that when the deceased received the shock that caused his death he was about ten or twelve feet from where he (Jackson) was standing and about fifteen feet from the wall that was being remodeled; that it appeared to him that Hogge was "about two feet" from the insulator; that when Hogge received the shock he "stiffened and fell backwards." J. H. Emmett, who, at the time of the accident, was about 200 feet north'from the substation building and saw what occurred from the street, testified that Hogge was "about three or four feet from the insulator when he received the shock"; that he immediately went to the scene of the accident and found Hogge lying on his back, his head towards the northeast corner of the building and his feet "about three feet from the insulator"; that he "got a stick and hooked it into his clothes and rolled" him away from the wire. Lorenzo Jackson, one of the contractors under and for whom Hoggs was working, testified that he returned to the roof of the building immediately after the accident occurred, and his testimony respecting the location of the deceased with reference to the high-tension wires from which he received the shock and the position' he was in is the same as 'that given by Roy Jackson. There is a conflict in the evidence as to the extent of the danger zone of uninsulated wires carrying 40,000 volts of electricity. Respondent's evidence on this point tends to show that the danger zone extends about three feet from the wire. Appellant's evidence tends to show that it is from one to three inches only. There is, however, ample evidence to support a finding by the jury that the deceased was from two to three feet from the wire when he received the deadly current that caused his death. • There is evidence to show, and the jury were authorized in finding, that the deceased was passing around or by Roy Jackson in the act of leaving the roof of the building, and that he was, as stated, from two to three feet from the wire when he received the shock. There is absolutely no evidence whatever tending to show that when he received the shock he was in close proximity to the wire "for recreation or for exploitation of idle curiosity or for experimenting to see whether or not the wires were insulated," or was engaged in "meddling or foolhardy experiments," as contended by counsel for appellant. The evidence of Emmett, which is corroborated by the testimony of Roy Jackson, tends to show that the deceased was in the act of leaving the roof of the building, and that he was not, as claimed by appellant, "experimenting" with the wires.
We are clearly of the opinion that the court did not err in refusing to direct a verdict for appellant on the alleged ground that ITogge was, as a matter of law, guilty of conrtibu-tory negligence. The court very fully and very clearly instructed the jury on that issue. The assignment of error based thereon is therefore overruled.
Numerous- other errors are assigned, but we do not think they, or any of them, contain sufficient merit to warrant discussion.
The judgment is affirmed. Costs to respondent.