Case Name: JANE R. ENDSLEY et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. HARRISBURG MEDICAL CENTER, Defendant-Appellee
Court: Illinois Appellate Court
Jurisdiction: Illinois
Decision Date: 1991-03-01
Citations: 209 Ill. App. 3d 908
Docket Number: No. 5-88-0430
Parties: JANE R. ENDSLEY et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. HARRISBURG MEDICAL CENTER, Defendant-Appellee.
Judges: 
Reporter: Illinois Appellate Court Reports, Third Series
Volume: 209
Pages: 908–913

Head Matter:
JANE R. ENDSLEY et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. HARRISBURG MEDICAL CENTER, Defendant-Appellee.
Fifth District
No. 5-88-0430
Opinion filed March 1, 1991.
WELCH, J., dissenting.
Donald V. Ferrell, of Jelliffe, Ferrell & Morris, of Harrisburg, for appellants.
John Speroni, of Garrison & Speroni, of Marion, for appellee.

Opinion:
JUSTICE GOLDENHE RSH
delivered the opinion of the court:
Plaintiffs, Jane R. Endsley (hereafter plaintiff) and William R. Endsley, appeal from the order of the circuit court of Saline County granting the motion to dismiss of defendant, Harrisburg Medical Center. In this cause, plaintiffs argue that the circuit court improperly granted defendant's motion to dismiss. We reverse.
On February 15, 1985, plaintiff slipped and fell on defendant's property. Plaintiff was an employee of Southeastern Illinois College. By agreement between the college and defendant, plaintiff, a nursing instructor, was teaching classes on the premises. Defendant directed people to walk from the hospital to another building utilized for nursing instruction via a particular path. It was on this path that plaintiff slipped and fell. Plaintiff alleges the path was rough, uneven, and unnatural due to alternating freezing and thawing of snow and ice. Specifically, plaintiff's third amended complaint alleged in paragraph 5 that:
"[Defendant directed persons, including the plaintiff, to walk from the hospital to and from the building utilized for the purposes of conducting classes as alleged in paragraph 3 above, resulting in a rough, uneven and unnatural surface of the ground as the result of freezing and thawing of snow and ice, and thereafter the said defendant failed when it knew, or should have known, of the unnatural condition, to clean and remove said frozen ice and snow in a roughened and uneven condition."
Plaintiff later alleged in paragraph 7 that defendant:
"(e) Negligently and carelessly invited and permitted the public, including the plaintiff, to use the premises when the defendant knew, or by the exercise of reasonable care should have known, of its dangerous condition;
(f) Negligently and carelessly directing and allowing persons lawfully upon the premises to utilize a sidewalk which resulted in an unnatural accumulation of ice and snow;
(g) Negligently and carelessly aggravated the condition of the accumulation of ice and snow by:
(1) Not completely cleaning the sidewalk;
(2) Incorrectly applying chemicals to cause snow and ice to melt; and
(3) Directing persons, including the plaintiff, to traverse an area where the condition had been aggravated by the conduct of the defendant."
The circuit court dismissed the third amended complaint.
In general, a property owner is under no obligation to remove and is not liable for injuries caused by natural accumulations of snow and ice (the natural accumulations rule). (Harkins v. System Parking, Inc. (1989), 186 Ill. App. 3d 869, 872, 542 N.E.2d 921, 923-24; Smalling v. La Salle National Bank (1982), 104 Ill. App. 3d 894, 896, 433 N.E.2d 713, 715; Hankla v. Burger Chef Systems, Inc. (1980), 93 Ill. App. 3d 909, 910, 418 N.E.2d 35, 36.) In particular, a property owner is not liable for injuries sustained in a fall on an icy sidewalk where the accumulation is natural and not caused or aggravated by the owner. (Timmons v. Turski (1981), 103 Ill. App. 3d 36, 38, 430 N.E.2d 1135, 1137; Zide v. Jewel Tea Co. (1963), 39 Ill. App. 2d 217, 188 N.E.2d 383.) Property owners may be liable, however, when ice accumulates because the owner either aggravated a natural condition (Harkins, 186 Ill. App. 3d 869, 542 N.E.2d 921) or engaged in conduct which gives rise to a new, unnatural or artificial condition. (Harkins, 186 Ill. App. 3d 869, 542 N.E.2d 921; Smalling, 104 Ill. App. 3d 894, 433 N.E.2d 713; Hankla, 93 Ill. App. 3d at 911, 418 N.E.2d at 36.) Although there is no duty to remove natural accumulations of snow and ice, if a property owner does remove it, he may be liable if he does so negligently. (Timmons, 103 Ill. App. 3d 36, 430 N.E.2d 1135; DeMario v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. (1972), 6 Ill. App. 3d 46, 284 N.E.2d 330.) The mere removal of snow which may leave a natural ice formation on the premises does not constitute negligence. Timmons, 103 Ill. App. 3d 36, 430 N.E.2d 1135.
Plaintiff first argues that private landowners should be liable for injuries caused by natural accumulations of snow and ice. Specifically, plaintiff argues that the natural accumulations rule was inappropriately extended after Graham v. City of Chicago (1931), 346 Ill. 638, 178 N.E. 911, held that a municipality is not liable for injuries caused by natural accumulations of snow and ice on its sidewalks.
The natural accumulation rule, however, is the well-settled law of this State, and that rule with its modifications was the appropriate standard for the circuit court to apply.
Plaintiff next argues that the determination of whether the accumulation was natural or unnatural is a question of fact. In Stiles v. Panorama Lanes, Inc. (1982), 107 Ill. App. 3d 896, 438 N.E.2d 241, the court held that as a matter of law icy ridges and ruts resulting solely from ordinary vehicular traffic constitute a natural accumulation of snow and ice in a parking lot used for business purposes. We distinguish Stiles and decline to follow the Third District Appellate Court case of Spirn v. Joseph (1986), 144 Ill. App. 3d 127, 493 N.E.2d 1197 (question of whether accumulation was natural or unnatural is not for the jury). As Justice Harrison insightfully wrote in dissent, it is not always clear which accumulations are natural and which are not. (Stiles, 107 Ill. App. 3d at 900, 438 N.E.2d at 244 (Harrison, J., dissenting); see also Timmons, 103 Ill. App. 3d at 38, 430 N.E.2d at 1137 (declining to determine whether compaction by motor vehicles is natural or unnatural).) The trier of fact is in a much better position than an appellate court to determine whether the accumulation is natural. Concerning Stiles, plaintiff in this cause alleged a number of negligent acts and omissions by defendant. These allegations take this cause far beyond the holding in Stiles, which is confined to "icy ridges and ruts resulting solely from ordinary vehicular traffic." (Emphasis added.) Stiles v. Panorama Lanes, Inc. (1982), 107 Ill. App. 3d 896, 897, 438 N.E.2d 241, 242.
In the case at bar, defendant selected the area for plaintiff to walk. This constitutes defendant's use of the area. Plaintiff alleges that the resultant heavy use combined with alternating freezing and thawing of snow and ice caused the area to become rutted and rough, and therefore, the character of the initial accumulation changed. Under such circumstances, the ruts and ridges may constitute unnatural accumulations of ice and snow or an aggravation of a natural condition. Plaintiff also alleges the improper application by defendant of snow-melting chemicals, another act that would aggravate a natural condition or result in an unnatural accumulation of snow and ice. Again, this is for the trier of fact to decide.
As the third amended complaint sets forth a legally recognized claim as its basis for recovery and pleads facts which bring the claim within a legally recognized cause of action, dismissal is inappropriate. A cause of action should not be dismissed on the pleadings unless it is clear that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts which will entitle him to recover. Doyle v. Shlensky (1983), 120 Ill. App. 3d 807, 811, 458 N.E.2d 1120, 1124-25.
For the foregoing reasons, the order of the circuit court of Saline County is reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.
HARRISON, J., concurs.