Case Name: Micajah B. Highsmith, et al. v. Mastin Ussery, et al.
Court: Supreme Court of Texas
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1860-10
Citations: 25 Supp. Tex. 96
Docket Number: 
Parties: Micajah B. Highsmith, et al. v. Mastin Ussery, et al.
Judges: 
Reporter: Texas Reports
Volume: 25 Supp.
Pages: 96–109

Head Matter:
Micajah B. Highsmith, et al. v. Mastin Ussery, et al.
The 14th section of the act of limitations, of the 5th February, 1841, says, “Peaceable possession, within the scope of this act, is such as is continuous, and not interrupted by adverse suit to recover the estate.” (Paschal’s Dig., Art. 4621, Note 1030, p. 766.)
That the bringing a suit, which was dismissed for the want of prosecution, does not interrupt the statute, was decided by this court in Shields v. Boone, 22 Tex., 193; and the principle is here affirmed.
The act of the 16th January, 1843, reads as follows:
“From and after the passage of this act, the property.of all such persons as are now in the army of Texas, or as may hereafter be mustered into the service of the republic, by virtue of the law of the land, shall not be liable to forced sales, so long as he or they may remain in said service.” (Paschal’s Dig., Art. 3800; Hart. Dig., Art. 1349.) This statute is not repugnant to the Constitution of the United States, nor of the articles of annexation, nor of the State constitution; has never been repealed; and is, therefore, in force.
The war power, in the 1st article, sec. 11, of the Constitution of the United States; and of the President’s power over the militia, article 2, sec. 2; and of the Governor’s power, under the State" constitution, article 6, section 4 quoted. These provisions of the two constitutions harmonize, and show that it is contemplated that the militia of the State may be called into the service of the United States, and compose a part of its army, under the control of the President; and that, under certain circumstances, they may be called out by the Governor, and compose an army of the State, and be commanded by the Governor.
But when Highsmith was engaged in the service of the United States, as a twelve-months’ volunteer, in 1848, he was not within the purview of this law. The fact that he was commissioned by the Governor made no difference ; for that was- only the exercise of a right reserved to the States, to commission its own militia when called into the service of the United States. Nor does the fact that he was serving in Texas make any difference; he might have been ordered elsewhere.”
Appeal from Guadaloupe. The case was tried before William B. Leigh, Esq., chosen as special judge, under the cónstitution, because of the interest of Hon. A. W. Terrell, one of the district judges.
The plaintiffs below sued Ussery and others, who were purchasers under him, to recover a league of land, which had been granted to their ancestor, Samuel Highsmith.
The defendants plead not guilty, and the “general denial ” known to the Texas system: the limitation of .three years, and of five years, and the suggestion of improvements.
There were various amendments to the petition, one of which sought to cancel a sheriff’s deed, on which the case mainly turned. The verdict and judgment were for the defendant. The plaintiffs’ first hill of exceptions showed an offer to prove the institution of sundry suits, by which it was contended the running of the statute of limitations was interrupted. All these suits had been dismissed for want of prosecution, and were, therefore, excluded by the judge. The second bill of exceptions gives the whole merits of the ease, and it is, therefore, here printed, in these words: ,
“Be it remembered, that, at said term of said court, the above case having been called for trial, it was admitted by the parties, that the league of land in controversy was granted to Samuel Highsmith, as a colonist of Green He Witt, in the year 1831, during the existence of the mar riage of said Samuel Highsmith' and Teresa Highsmith, one of the plaintiffs; and the plaintiffs adduced evidence that the said Samuel Highsmith departed this life sometime in the early part of January, in the year 1849, leaving the plaintiff, Teresa Highsmith, his widow, and the other plaintiff, his sole heirs.
Afterwards, defendants introduced in evidence a certified transcript of a judgment and execution and levy on the land in controversy, and return on said execution, which transcript is of the proceedings of the case of Robert Lockhart & Co. v. Samuel Highsmith, in the District Court of Harris county. Defendants also introduced in evidence a deed, executed on the 3d day of October, 1848, by Samuel K. Helson, sheriff of Guadaloupe county, purporting to convey the land in controversy to Robert Lock-hart, by virtue of a sale of said land, under said judgment and execution, on the said 3d day of October, 1848. At the time of the introduction of said sheriff’s deed in evidence, the plaintiffs gave notice that, in their rebutting testimony, they would offer evidence to prove that said deed, and the sale of said land recited therein, were null and void, being in contravention of law; and afterwards, in rebuttal, the plaintiffs offered to give testimony in evidence, as follows, to wit: That, by virtue of an act of the Congress of the United States, approved the 13th day of May, 1846, the Secretary of War, William L. Marcy, did, on the 16th day of July, 1847, issue a requisition to the Governor of the State of Texas, to call out an additional military force for the protection of the Texas frontier; that, by virtue of said requisition, Samuel Highsmith was called into the service of the United States, by the Governor of the State of Texas, as one of the Texas rangers, and was regularly mustered into service, on the 10th day of May, 1847, and remained in service, being re-paustered on the 15th day of May, 1848, immediately upon his discharge, and was finally discharged on the 26th day of December, 1848; that during the said time he remained in service as captain in the first regiment of Texas mounted volunteers, and that during said space of time, from the 10th day of May, 1847, to the 26th day of December, 1848, the said Samuel Highsmith, as captain as aforesaid, was in active service upon the frontier of the State of Texas; and that said Highsmith held the office of captain in said service, during said space of time, by virtue of a commission issued by the Governor of the State of Texas. This testimony was offered by the plaintiffs in rebuttal, to prove that the sale of said land in controversy, recited in said sheriff’s deed as having been made on the 3d day of October, 1848, during the time said Highsmith was in service as aforesaid, was illegal and void, being in contravention of the statute passed by the Congress of the Republic of Texas, on the 16th day of January, 1843. (Hart. Dig., Art. 1349.) Defendants moved the court to exclude said testimony from the jury, and to refuse to permit the same to be given in evidence, on the grounds—
1. That said statute was not in force at the time of said sale; and
2. That the service disclosed by said testimony, so offered to be given by plaintiffs, was the service of the Hnited States, and not of the State of Texas.
The court ruled that said testimony, so offered to be given by the plaintiffs, could not go to the jury, because the military service disclosed thereby was the service of the Hnited States, and not of the State of Texas; to which ruling of the court plaintiffs excepted, and pray the court to sign and seal this their bill of exceptions; and it is so done.”
This evidence having been excluded, the verdict and judgment were for the defendants. The case thus really turned upon the fact, that the sale by the sheriff divested Highsmith of his title, and rendered the consideration of the statute of limitations secondary, if not unnecessary.
Chandler Turner and Phil. Claiborne, for appellants.—
The land in controversy was sold by virtue of an execution, and the judgment upon which the same was issued is admitted to be valid, and that the defendants have good title in case the sale was not inhibited by the laws of the land, on the ground that Highsmith was engaged in the service of the State as a soldier, having been mustered into service by a law of the land; and appellants rely upon the exemption as contained in Art. 1349 of Hart. Dig., and Art. 1267 of same book.
The bill of exceptions shows the character of the service in which the grantor (Highsmith) was engaged, and in case the articles referred to are not repealed, and High-smith was engaged in the service of Texas at the time of the sale, then the sale was void, and the plaintiffs are entitled to recover, unless barred by the statute of limitations. And inasmuch as some of the heirs still appear to be minors, the case will be sent back for a new trial, if the statute of limitations is a good defence as to part of them: and it is not believed to be necessary to discuss this question further. But it will be seen, that a suit was instituted by the executrix of Highsmith’s estate, in 1854, April 17. The sale was made October, 1848. At this time, then, the defendants cannot have claimed by prescription of five years, as the possession under Boone was taken in 1850.
This suit was an interruption, under the statute, (Hart. Dig., Art. 2390,) of the peaceable possession, and gave public notice of the claim of the heirs of Samuel High-smith.
Then there was such an interruption as will stop the running of the statute. The statute ceases to run as soon as the suit is commenced.
The subsequent disposition of the case cannot relate back, and destroy the effect which the commencement of the suit had, under the article referred to; as the bill of exceptions shows that such suit was adverse, and brought to recover the same.
This is the only mode known to our law hy which the possession spoken of in the statute can he interrupted. The statute referred to has repealed, so to speak, all other modes of interrupting the running of the statute.
The character of the judgment rendered in the case is then of no importance, and the running of the statute thus having been interrupted, we submit, that we are without any statutory provision declaring when the statute would again begin to run; and if we are to resort to analogies, then the least possible time prescribed had not expired, as this suit was, in fact, brought within twelve months after the dismissal; and if it could be a case coming within Hart. Dig., Art. 3224, then this suit is in time; but we hardly think that it comes within that provision of the law. The constitution of this State, it seems, prohibits repeal by implication. (See art. 13, sec. 3 of Schedule of Texas.)
It is said that the law, as contained in Art. 1349 of Hartley, is repealed. If so, how is the repeal brought about? By express repeal? Hor is it because the reason of the law had ceased. We are unable to see why the same reasons do not now exist for the exemption as did at the date of ■the act.
It cannot be repealed in consequence of its incompatibility with any law of Congress.
That Highsmith was mustered into service by virtue of a law of the land will not he successfully controverted; whether such mustering in was by virtue of a law of Texas, or by virtue of a law of Congress, or both, still it was a law of the land.
The appellee relies upon the case of 3 Kel. Ga. R., as authority in his favor, and conclusive upon the plaintiffs: It is the case of McCartha & White v. Loweth, 3. Kel., 397. .The counsel argued at length to show the inapplicability.
The articles of annexation are a part of the law of the land, and it is in virtue thereof that the services were secured to the State, and this compact was to secure to Texas certain protection, and not to the United States.
We submit that this view of the case is most consonant with the whole history of this service, taken in connection with the articles of annexation and the legislation and course pursued both by the Federal and State authorities. We respectfully submit that this case be reversed and remanded.
John Ireland, for appellees.
—There are two bills of exceptions,- and I suppose they present the only two points to be insisted upon before the court for a reversal of the cause.
The defendants did not pretend to bring it within the statute, which allows a plaintiff, when unsuccessful, to bring a new action within twelve months, but claimed the right solely upon the statute, Hart. Dig., Art. 2390; Paschal’s Dig., Art. 4621, which makes the institution of a suit an interruption of peaceable adverse possession. This clause in our statute is only declaratory of the common law to the extent it goes. For at common law. the bringing of a suit was an interruption, and there were other circumstances at commoy law that would interrupt the peaceable adverse possession, such as an entry by the rightful owner, &c.; but our statute was designed to define clearly what would amount to an interruption, and so cut off everything but an actual suit. Our statutes must be construed together, and the general legislation upon the subcjet of title to real estate must be resorted to for the purpose of ascertaining what the following clause means:
“Peaceable possession, within the scope of this act, is such as is continuous, and not interrupted by adverse suit to recover the estate.” (Art. 2390, Hart. Dig.) This is a portion of the act of 5th February, 1841.
(Mr. Ireland argued from the analogy of a second suit to try title, Hart. Dig., Art. 3226.)
A voluntary abandonment of a suit is no interruption of the statute. (Ang. on Lim., 2d ed., p. 346; Richards v. Md. Ins. Co., 3 Cond. R. S. C. U. S., 127.)
It is admitted that the judgment against Highsmith is a valid judgment, and it is, I believe, further admitted, that, if Highsmith’s property were liable to forced sale at the date of the levy and sale, his title, and consequently the plaintiffs’, was divested by that sale. To avoid this sale, it is contended that Highsmith was in the service of his country in a military capacity. Highsmith was in the service of the United States, having been called out as a volunteer during the Mexican war, and was acting as what was known as a Texas ranger, under the General Government, at the time this league of land was sold. In Hart. Dig., Art. 1267, the following law appears, and I suppose it was under this and similar laws that the plaintiffs sought to introduce proof that Highsmith was in the service of the United States:
“Be it further ordained and decreed, That the following persons and their property shall he privileged from arrest, attachment, execution, embargo, and sequestration, in all civil cases, to wit: all officers and soldiers, commissioned or enlisted in the regular army of Texas, or in the navy, for the time being; all public agents to foreign countries; all members and officers of the general council, and of the provisional government, while in attendance upon their official duties; and all members of the late volunteer army, until they return their respective homes.”
This act bears date 22d January, 1836.
On the 16th day of January, 1843, the Congress of the republic enacted a similar law to the above, and differing in no essential feature from the act of 1836. (Hart. Dig., Art. 1349.)
How, I apprehend that the reason which moved the legislature to enact this law was the perilous condition of the country at that time, the sparseness of the population, and the great difficulty in getting men to take the field in defense of a then infant and struggling republic.
I also think it was repealed by an entire -reorganization of the militia after annexation in 1846. (Hart. Dig., Art. 2467.)
The legislature then had the entire subject of the militia under consideration, and we nowhere find in any act, after annexation, this exemption in favor of persons in the service of the country. (The State v. Horan, 11 Tex., 144.)
But admit, for argument, that the old statute of the republic is still in force, and would exempt persons and property when in the actual service of the State: it could not apply to this case, for the offer was to prove that High-smith was in the service of the Hnited States. There are certain contingencies in which a State may keep, or have, an army, in case of “invasion or rebellion.” It is respectfully submitted, that, if the old statutes of the republic can be considered in force for any purpose after annexation, and after a reorganization of the militia, they could only apply to a person in the service of the State of Texas, and that one in the service of the Hnited States is not protected by it.
The case of McCartha & White v. Lowther & Parrish, 3 Kel. Ga. R, 397, is in all respects like the present; that, too, supposing the acts of 1836 and 1843 to be now in force, settles the law of this case.
There is another feature in this case, not yet touched upon. Would not a law, such as the plaintiffs attempt to set up, exempting Highsmith from the operation of the execution law, be in conflict with the Constitution of the Hnited States ? Iam aware that numerous and respectable authorities are to the point, that, if a statute is in force at the time the contract is made, it could not in any way violate the obligation of the contract, within the meaning of the Constitution; but I apprehend that as respectable, and perhaps as numerous, authorities can be produced which repudiate the distinction. If this latter view be correct, in the opinion of this court, the statute of 1843 certainly conflicted with the latter clause of the 10th sec. 1st art. Constitution United States; for it would postpone the collection of the debt at the will of the debtor. (Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat. R., 284, 324-5, 336-9; Ib., 341, 342-3; 2 Pars, on Cont., 537.)

Opinion:
Roberts, J.
—That the running of the statute of limitations was not stopped by the previous suit, brought and dismissed for the want of prosecution, was decided by this court in Shields v. Boone, 22 Tex., 193.
Although some of the defendants have not shown such possession as would sustain the plea of the statute of limitations, they have shown a good title in Boone, under whom the rest hold, provided the sheriff's sale to Lockhart, the vendor of Boone, was valid.
The objection to that sale is presented in the bill of exceptions, taken by the appellants, to the exclusion of their testimony by the court, by which they proposed to prove, "that by an act of Congress of the United States, approved the 13th of May, 1846, the Secretary of War, William L. Marcy, did, on the 16th day of July, 1847, issue a requisition to the Governor of the State of Texas to call out an additional military force for the protection of the Texas frontier. That by virtue of said requisition, Samuel Highsmith was called into the service of the United States, by the Governor of the State of Texas, as one of the Texas rangers, and was regularly mustered into service, on the 10th day of May, 1847, and remained in service, being re-mustered on the 15th day of May, 1848, immedi ately upon his discharge, and was finally discharged on the 26th day of December, 1848. That during the said time he remained in service as captain in the 1st regiment of Texas mounted volunteers, and that during said space of time, from the 10th of May 1847, to the 26th day of December, 1848, the said Samuel Highsmith, as captain as aforesaid, was in active service upon the frontier of the State of Texas,"and that said Highsmith held the office of captain in said service, during said space of time, by virtue of a commission issued by the Governor of the State of Texas." It was shown on the trial, that the league of land in controversy was sold 'as the property of Highsmith, during the time of his said service, and the sheriff's deed therefor executed to Lockhart, the purchaser, on the 3d day of October, 1848, in satisfaction of a judgment rendered upon a note executed in 1847. It is contended that these facts rendered the sheriff's sale invalid, by force of a law of the republic enacted in 1843, as follows, to wit:
" That from and after the passage of this act, the property of all such persons as are now in the army of Texas, " or as may hereafter be mustered into the service of the republic, by virtue of the law of the land, shall not be liable to forced sales, so long as he or they may remain in service." (Art. 1349, Hart. Dig.)
By the constitution, of the State of Texas, adopted since the passage of this law, it is provided, that "all laws and parts of laws, now in force in the republic of Texas, which are not repugnant to the Constitution of the Hnited States, to the joint resolution for annexing Texas to the Hnited States, or to the provisions of this constitution, shall continue and remain in force, as the laws of this State, until they expire by their own limitation, or shall be altered or repealed by the legislature' thereof." (Art. 13, sec. 3, Con.; Paschal's Dig., 72.)
Tiffs law of 1843 is not repugnant to the joint resolutions for annexing Texas to the Hnited States, or to the provis ions of the constitution of the State of Texas, and has neither been altered nor repealed by the legislature thereof; and therefore it is in force so far, and only so far, as it is not repugnant to the Constitution of the United States.
The Constitution of the United States provides, that "the Congress shall have°power" "to declare war;" "to raise and support armies;" "to make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces;" "to provide for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrections, and repel invasions;" "to provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia, and for governing such part of them as may he employed in the service of the United States, reserving to the States respectively the appointment of the officers, and the authority of training the militia, according to the discipline prescribed by Congress." (Art. 1, § 8, Con. U. S.) It provides further, that "the President shall be commander-in-chief of the army and navy of the United States, and of the militia of the several States when called into the 'actual service of the United States." (Art. 2, § 2, Con. U. S.) Also, it is provided, that "no State shall, without the consent of Congress," "keep troops or ships of war in time of peace," " or engage in war, unless actually invaded, or in such imminent danger as will not admit of delay." (Art. 1, § 9, Con. U. S.)
The"constitution of this State provides, that "the Governor shall be commander-in-chief of the army and navy of this State, and of the militia, except when they shall he called into the service of the United States." (Art. 5, § 6.) Also, that "the Governor shall have power to call forth the militia to execute the laws of the State, to suppress insurrections, and repel invasions." (Art. 6, § 4, Tex. Con.)
These provisions of the Constitution of the United States and of this State stand in harmony with each other, and show that it is contemplated that the militia of the State may be called into the service of the United States, and compose a part of its army, under the control of the President; .and that, under circumstances and for certain objects, the militia of the State may be called into the service of the State, and compose its army, under the command of the Governor of the State.
The law of 1843, upon which appellant relies, may be applicable to persons engaged in the military service of the State and under the command of the Governor.
The facts proposed to be proved in this case do not present such a case. On the contrary, they show that Samuel Highsmith was engaged in the service of the United States. Uor do the facts stated, that he was commissioned as captain by the Governor, and performed service upon the frontier within the State of Texas, make it any less the service of Ihe United States, under the control of the President; for his being commissioned by the Governor was only the exercise of a right reserved by the State to appoint the officers of her militia that may he called into the service of the United States. And his service within Texas was accidental, and might have been required by the President to have been performed in Hew Mexico or Arkansas, as well as in Texas.
In one sense, it is true, he may be said to have been in the military service of Texas, in her connected capacity with the other States of the Union. But, in the same sense, every officer and soldier of the regular army and of the militia of every other State, while in the service of the United States, would have been equally in the military service of Texas. Had this law of 1848 been passed in 1846, after annexation, (using the word State instead of republic,) it certainly could not have been construed to embrace in its provisions the regular soldiers and militia of other States engaged in the service of the United States. We cannot give it any broader scope by its being passed before annexation, than if passed after-wards.
If it be permissible to look to the extrinsic causes which prompted its enactment in 1843, however much they may be still applicable equally to the military service of the State, upon the emergencies which authorize the State to raise and control an army, they are not applicable to the military service of the United States. (McOartha & White v. Lowther & Parrish, 3 Kel. Ga. B., 403.)
Highsmith was not "mustered into the service of the State (republic) of Texas," and, therefore, his property was not "exempt from forced sale."
We think the court did not err in excluding the evidence offered. •
Judgment affirmed.