Case Name: AUTOMATED DATATRON, INC. v. Kenneth H. WOODCOCK, Appellant
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 1981-07-08
Citations: 659 F.2d 1168
Docket Number: No. 80-1827
Parties: AUTOMATED DATATRON, INC. v. Kenneth H. WOODCOCK, Appellant.
Judges: Before McGOWAN, MacKINNON and GINSBURG, Circuit Judges.
Reporter: Federal Reporter 2d Series
Volume: 659
Pages: 1168–1173

Head Matter:
AUTOMATED DATATRON, INC. v. Kenneth H. WOODCOCK, Appellant.
No. 80-1827.
United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit.
Argued May 22, 1981.
Decided July 8, 1981.
Thomas L. Heeney, Rockville, Md., with whom Robert C. Heeney, Rockville, Md., was on the brief, for appellant.
Amy Robertson Goldson, Washington, D. C., for appellee. Gary David Gayton, Washington, D. C., also entered an appearance for appellee.
Before McGOWAN, MacKINNON and GINSBURG, Circuit Judges.

Opinion:
Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge GINSBURG.
Dissenting opinion filed by Circuit Judge MacKINNON.
GINSBURG, Circuit Judge:
This appeal presents the question whether the district court abused its discretion in dismissing, in June 1980, a count of the defendant's counterclaim because the defendant failed to comply with the trial court's December 1979 order to join as a defendant to the counterclaim a party needed for just adjudication. We conclude that, in the particular circumstances presented, further tolerance on the part of the district judge was not required. The court had earlier reminded the defendant of his obligation to comply promptly with the joinder order; no reason other than oversight was supplied for the prolonged noncompliance; the court directed the dismissal when, approximately two weeks short of the rescheduled trial date, the requisite preparatory step had not yet been taken. While even at that late stage a less drastic sanction might have been entertained, the district court's action did not constitute an excessive exercise of authority. To prevent litigation delay and waste of scarce judicial resources, a trial judge must be equipped to call time on a party who had ample opportunity, prior to the eve of trial, to follow the court's clear instruction.
I
Automated Datatron, Inc. (ADI), filed this action in 1978 alleging that Woodcock, a former employee, had breached his fiduciary duty to ADI. Woodcock counterclaimed, asserting that ADI owed him money on the basis of a "Stock Agreement" signed by Charles E. Marks, ADI's sole shareholder. Nearly a year later, on October 19, 1979, the district court requested Woodcock to consider promptly whether he wished to join Marks as an adverse party on the counterclaim. The district judge suggested five days to resolve the question, and reminded both parties that she was looking toward a trial date of December 10. App. 32, 37. At Woodcock's request, she extended the time to a week, until October 26, but again cautioned that "the more time I give you, please be aware the less chance it is that you will go to trial on the date that we had scheduled." App. 38-39.
Woodcock determined in timely fashion that he did not intend to join Marks and so informed the court. On December 4, 1979, in response to ADI's motion, the court ruled that Marks was a party needed for just adjudication under Rule 19, whose joinder would not strip the court of diversity jurisdiction because Woodcock's counterclaim was compulsory and therefore required no independent jurisdictional base. 84 F.R.D. 408 (D.D.C.1979). Accordingly, the court ordered Woodcock to join Marks as a party. App. 52.
Six days later, at a further hearing, the court specifically inquired whether Woodcock had joined Marks. Woodcock's counsel responded that Marks had not yet been joined, but that counsel would "file the appropriate pleadings." App. 65. At that hearing, the court set a trial date of June 23, 1980, then over six months away. App. 67.
Six months later, with the trial date in sight, Woodcock had still not joined Marks as a party. The district judge, considering ADI's motion for summary judgment on count III of the counterclaim, observed that despite the December 4, 1979, order that Woodcock join Marks, "for reasons best known to defendant and his counsel he has not done so in the intervening six months." App. 73. Finding no excuse for the failure to join Marks, the district judge, on June 6, 1980, dismissed count III of the counterclaim. App. 74.
Woodcock moved for reconsideration of the June 6 order and for a continuance. On June 17, the district court denied the motion. App. 75-76. Since steps "to insure the proper litigation of [the] counterclaim were fully within the control of defendant," the district judge concluded that "the interests of justice would not be served by any further delay of the trial." App. 75. On the day trial was scheduled to open, the parties settled their remaining claims. App. 82-86.
II
A district court has power to dismiss an action or a counterclaim involuntarily because of a party's failure to comply with court orders or rules designed to ensure orderly prosecution of the claim. Link v. Wabash R.R., 370 U.S. 626, 82 S.Ct. 1386, 8 L.Ed.2d 734 (1962); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(b). Woodcock points out that this court and others have been reluctant to approve exercise of that power at a pretrial stage when measures less final and definitive than dismissal are available. See, e. g., Butler v. Pearson, 636 F.2d 526 (D.C.Cir.1980).
But the conspicuous disregard of the trial court's order in this case persisted beyond the pretrial discovery and preparatory stage into the month scheduled for trial. The district judge repeatedly called to the parties' attention her concern to use her courtroom efficiently and her determination to assure that a trial, already rescheduled once, would not be postponed again. Counsel's prolonged failure to carry out the court's instruction prevented the trial judge from adhering to a schedule planned months in advance. As the First Circuit observed in affirming the district court's dismissal of a case with prejudice when counsel's postponements thwarted commencement of trial on a rescheduled date:
Court calendars and trial assignments are not made to accommodate attorneys; it is the interest of the litigants in the orderly processing and trial of cases that is paramount. While we realize that the sins of the attorney are being visited upon the plaintiff, we must also recognize that the wheels of justice which now turn ever more slowly for civil cases would grind to a halt if delays such as the one requested were to be allowed.
Pease v. Peters, 550 F.2d 698, 701 (1st Cir. 1977).
We underscore that no reason other than inadvertence or oversight is advanced for the failure to join Marks in the six months following the court's reminder to counsel to attend to the joinder. No special circumstances were presented that might explain, even if they would not wholly excuse, the neglect. Compliance with the order called for no heavy investment of time or expense.
If district court judges are to discharge their heavy responsibilities effectively, their power to dismiss, in situations such as the one before us, must be more than theoretical. We hold that it was not an abuse of discretion to rule that two weeks short of trial was too late for the filing and service of a pleading adding a party when the court had directed the litigant to take that action half a year earlier.
Affirmed.
. Both Marks and Woodcock were Maryland citizens.
. On June 6, the date that the district court dismissed the counterclaim, it was too late for Woodcock to join Marks without upsetting the June 23 trial date. Under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(a), Marks would have had twenty days from the time he was served in which to answer the counterclaim.