Case Name: Jeanne ENGLANDER and Paul Englander, her husband, Appellants, v. ST. FRANCIS HOSPITAL, INC., Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1987-04-07
Citations: 506 So. 2d 423
Docket Number: No. 85-2773
Parties: Jeanne ENGLANDER and Paul Englander, her husband, Appellants, v. ST. FRANCIS HOSPITAL, INC., Appellee.
Judges: Before HUBBART, NESBITT, BASKIN, DANIEL S. PEARSON, FERGUSON and JORGENSON, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 506
Pages: 423–426

Head Matter:
Jeanne ENGLANDER and Paul Englander, her husband, Appellants, v. ST. FRANCIS HOSPITAL, INC., Appellee.
No. 85-2773.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
April 7, 1987.
Joel H. Brown, Miami, for appellants.
Kubicki, Bradley, Draper, Gallagher & McGrane and Betsy E. Gallagher, Miami, for appellee.
Before HUBBART, NESBITT, BASKIN, DANIEL S. PEARSON, FERGUSON and JORGENSON, JJ.

Opinion:
ON REHEARING EN BANC
DANIEL S. PEARSON, Judge.
When the Englanders voluntarily dismissed their medical malpractice action against St. Francis Hospital, the hospital, as the alleged "prevailing party," sought to recover attorneys' fees under Section 768.-56, Florida Statutes (1983). The trial court, rejecting the plaintiffs' contention that their "voluntary dismissal was not related to the merits of the case, but rather was a strategic move to avoid jury confusion," Simmons v. Schimmel, 476 So.2d 1342, 1345 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985), denied their motion to strike the hospital's claim for attorneys' fees. The Englanders appealed, and in a two to one decision, a panel of this court ruled in their favor and reversed the trial court's order. See Englander v. St. Francis Hospital, Inc., 506 So.2d 422 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986). We now, sitting en banc, vacate the panel decision and affirm the trial court's order.
In Simmons v. Schimmel, 476 So.2d 1342, this court held that a defendant in a medical malpractice action was not a prevailing party entitled to attorneys' fees merely because the plaintiff had voluntarily dismissed the action. Instead, attempting to balance the Legislature's goal of discouraging nonmeritorious medical malpractice claims, with the general public policy of encouraging the termination of unnecessary litigation, we decided that where there was ample evidence tending to establish the defendant's liability, the defendant would not be deemed a prevailing party and would be thus not entitled to an award of attorneys' fees.
In the present case, as distinguished from Simmons, the trial court did not have before it evidence tending to establish the hospital's liability. Thus, the hospital could be deemed a prevailing party and entitled to attorneys' fees, if it showed that, had not the voluntary dismissal intervened, the case would have concluded with the entry of summary judgment in its favor. Accordingly, the trial court was eminently correct in ruling that the defendant's motion for attorneys' fees was not subject to being stricken.
Since we are affirming the order under review and remanding the case to the trial court for further proceedings on the hospital's motion for attorneys' fees, we point out that this post-dismissal hearing on the issue of entitlement to attorneys' fees is in the nature of a summary judgment hearing. At this hearing, which is to be noticed in the same manner as a summary judgment hearing, the defendant must conclusively show that there was no genuine issue of material fact as to its liability and that it would have been entitled to a judgment in its favor had the plaintiffs not dismissed the action. Because the policy of encouraging voluntary dismissals and the termination of unnecessary litigation would be severely disserved were more time and labor spent after dismissal in an effort to show that the case would or would not have resulted in judgment for the defendant, the showing is to be based on the record made and discovery completed as of the moment of the dismissal.
Affirmed and remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
HUBBART, NESBITT, BASKIN and JORGENSON, JJ., concur.
. Our basis for granting rehearing en banc is that "the case is of exceptional importance." Fla.R.App.P. 9.331(a).
. The plaintiffs did assert that their voluntary dismissal was for "strategic reasons," believing perhaps that these words from Simmons were talismanic. But "strategic reasons," as used in Simmons, simply emphasized that the reasons were unrelated to the merits of the case. Where the defendant would not have prevailed on the merits, it does not matter why the plaintiff voluntarily dismissed the action; where the defendant would have prevailed on the merits, the plaintiff's reasons for dismissal, no matter how strategic, are irrelevant. Were the presence of strategic reasons rather than the presence of a meritorious case determinative of whether a plaintiff could avoid the assessment of attorneys' fees, plaintiffs who voluntarily dismissed cases in order to avoid summary judgment against them and the corresponding imposition of attorneys' fees would, ironically, not be subject to those fees, since dismissing a case to avoid the imposition of attorneys' fees is arguably the most strategic reason of all.