Case Name: Keith BRENNAN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1999-07-08
Citations: 754 So. 2d 1
Docket Number: No. 90,279
Parties: Keith BRENNAN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: SHAW and PARIENTE, JJ„ and KOGAN, Senior Justice, concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 754
Pages: 1–25

Head Matter:
Keith BRENNAN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. 90,279.
Supreme Court of Florida.
July 8, 1999.
Rehearings Denied Oct. 21, 1999 and Jan. 18, 2000.
J.L. “Ray” LeGrande of LeGrande & LeGrande, P.A., Fort Myers, Florida, for Appellant.
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, and Carol M. Dittmar, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, Florida, for Appellee.

Opinion:
PER CURIAM.
We have on appeal the judgment and sentence of the trial court imposing the death penalty upon Keith Brennan, who was sixteen years old at the time of the crime. We have jurisdiction pursuant to article V, section 3(b)(1) of the Florida Constitution. For the reasons expressed below, we affirm the conviction and sentences imposed upon Brennan, with the exception that the death penalty is vacated and his sentence reduced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. We have affirmed the conviction and death sentence for Brennan's codefendant, Joshua Nelson. See Nelson v. State, 748 So.2d 237 (Fla.1999).
I. FACTS
The evidence presented at trial, viewed in the light most favorable to the State, established the following facts. Brennan, age sixteen, and Nelson, age eighteen, wanted to leave Cape Coral and travel to Fort Lauderdale. The two devised a plan to steal Tommy Owens' car. On March 10, 1995, Brennan and Nelson lured Owens out of his car and Nelson hit Owens with a baseball bat. After a number of hits, Owens eventually fell to the ground. Brennan attempted to slice Owens' throat with a box cutter. Brennan and Nelson also continued to strike Owens a number of times with the bat. The two eventually dragged Owens' body to nearby bushes where Owens later died.
Brennan and Nelson picked up Tina and Misty Porth, and the four left Cape Coral in Owens' car. After stopping in Daytona Beach, the four proceeded to leave the state, eventually ending up in New Jersey. At different times during the trip, Brennan and Nelson informed Tina and Misty that they had murdered Owens. Tina and Misty both testified at trial.
Brennan and Nelson were apprehended in New Jersey. Brennan was charged with first-degree premeditated murder, first-degree felony murder, and robbery with a deadly weapon. Brennan gave a taped confession of his account of the murder, in which he admitted his involvement in the murder but denied that there had been any prior plan to kill Owens. The taped confession was played to the jury. Brennan was found guilty on all three counts.
At the time of the crime, Brennan was a sophomore in high school. He had no significant history of prior criminal activity, and his juvenile records showed only prior crimes against property. His code-fendant was eighteen. Professionals who treated Brennan and his family members described him as a follower.
During the penalty phase, Brennan presented evidence that he was two years of age when his mother committed suicide. Prior to her death, his mother was confined to a mental institution and suffered from severe mental depression. When Brennan was approximately eight years of age, he was sexually abused by an older brother for a period of six months. He was small in stature, suffered from a speech impediment, and was often "picked on" by others. In 1993, he received inpatient treatment for drug and alcohol addiction. Brennan had been using LSD the night before the homicide.
After hearing all the evidence, the jury recommended death by a vote of eight to four. The trial judge found four aggrava-tors: (1) the capital felony was committed in the course of a robbery; (2) the capital felony was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel (HAC); (3) the capital felony was committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner without any pretense of legal or moral justification (CCP); and (4) the capital felony was committed for the purpose of avoiding arrest. The judge also considered six statutory mitigators and twenty-five nonstatutory mitigators. The statutory mitigator of age (sixteen) was given great weight and the statutory mitigator of no significant criminal history was given moderate weight. The judge concluded that Brennan had failed to establish the statutory mitigators of (1) extreme emotional disturbance, (2) accomplice with minor participation, (3) acting under the domination of another person, and (4) limited capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct. The trial judge weighed each of the nonstatutory miti-gators that were established.
While giving significant weight to Brennan's young age and moderate weight to his lack of significant criminal history, the trial court concluded that Brennan had "nonetheless wielded a baseball bat and box cutter to murder another young man." In the end, the trial court followed the jury's recommendation and imposed the death penalty for the first-degree murder charge. The trial judge sentenced Brennan to 160 months imprisonment on the robbery charge. Brennan now appeals, raising fourteen guilt and penalty phase issues.
II. GUILT PHASE ISSUES
Brennan raises five guilt phase issues: (1) the trial court improperly permitted the testimony of a critical witness who was incapacitated; (2) the trial court erred by giving the State advice on trial strategy; (3) the trial court erred in permitting the State to utilize a substitute medical examiner to introduce evidence; (4) the trial court violated Brennan's right to confrontation by admitting a nontestifying code-fendant's out-of-court statement; and (5) the trial court erred by failing to properly determine the admissibility of testimony by the State's DNA expert.
In the first and second guilt phase issues, Brennan asserts that the trial court erred in admitting the testimony of a witness who was incapacitated and by giving the State advice on trial strategy regarding this witness. Dr. William Ross Maples, a forensic anthropologist, was called by the State to testify in order to establish that the dental remains found at the crime scene matched Owens' dental records. At the time of the trial, Dr. Maples had been diagnosed with terminal brain cancer. This condition occasionally affected his ability to recall information. Dr. Maples had testified normally months earlier in the Nelson trial; however, during Brennan's trial, Dr. Maples misidentified the dental records in question as belonging to Brennan. As a result, the State requested a recess to discuss Dr. Maples' condition, with the court.
The parties met with the trial court to discuss how the examination of Dr. Maples should proceed in light of his condition. During the discussion, the trial court acknowledged that Dr. Maples was "definitely incapacitated." Counsel for Brennan also stated that Dr. Maples "may be incompetent to testify." The parties discussed the possibility of introducing Dr. Maples' testimony from the previous Nelson trial or his deposition in this case. Counsel for Brennan pointed out that Brennan was not a party to the Nelson trial and that there was inadmissible testimony in Dr. Maples' deposition. The trial court and both parties agreed that it would be best for the State to continue questioning Dr. Maples. Thereafter, the trial court stated:
THE COURT: I think you're [the State] gonna have to ask him about that, you know, you identified this x-ray as Keith Brennan, you know, without letting him know. You know, is that correct, I mean, is this x-ray of Keith Brennan, and see what he says.... On the other hand, if you [the State] can say something, you have some physical difficulties now....
After the recess, Dr. Maples identified the dental records as belonging to Owens without objection.
Brennan now asserts that it was error for the trial court to permit Dr. Maples to testify because he was incapacitated. Further, Brennan alleges that the trial court erred by giving the State advice on how to proceed in questioning Dr. Maples. We find that these issues were not preserved for appeal as Brennan's counsel both agreed to the procedure followed by the trial court and failed to make contemporaneous objections at trial either to the trial court's comments or to Dr. Maples' testimony. See generally J.B. v. State, 705 So.2d 1376, 1378 (Fla.1998) (stating that except in cases involving fundamental errors, "to raise an error on appeal, a contemporaneous objection must be made at the trial level when the alleged error occurred").
In his third issue, Brennan alleges that the trial court erred in permitting Dr. Carol Huser, a medical examiner who had not performed Owens' autopsy, to testify as to Owens' cause of death. Whether a witness is qualified to express an expert opinion is a matter within the discretion of the trial judge, and this ruling will not be reversed absent a clear showing of error. See Ramirez v. State, 542 So,2d 352, 355 (Fla.1989). We find this case to be similar to Geralds v. State, 674 So.2d 96, 100 (Fla.1996), where this Court held that the trial judge did not err in permitting a medical expert to testify as to the victim's cause of death, despite the fact that the expert did not perform the autopsy. In that case, we focused on the fact that the substitute examiner developed independent conclusions using objective evidence. See id. In the present case] Dr. Huser testified that in reaching her conclusions she reviewed, among other things, the autopsy report, a report by Dr. Maples, depositions, photographs, and dental records. Therefore, because Dr. Huser made independent conclusions using objective evidence, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in permitting her to testify.
Brennan also claims error regarding the authenticity of the documents upon which Dr. Huser relied. However, this claim is not preserved for appellate review as no objection was raised at trial regarding the authenticity of the documents. See generally J.B., 705 So.2d at 1378.
In issue four, Brennan asserts that the trial court violated his right to confrontation by admitting statements code-fendant Joshua Nelson made to other witnesses in Brennan's presence. During trial, Misty Porth testified that "they," meaning Nelson and Brennan, said "don't worry about it" when she questioned them regarding Owens' whereabouts on the night of the murder and that Brennan himself later admitted that he committed the murder. She also testified that on another occasion, when she and her sister questioned Nelson about the details of the crime, Nelson refused to answer until Brennan was present, and when Brennan joined them, they all four discussed the crime.
We discussed this issue in Nelson v. State, 748 So.2d 237 (Fla.1999), where Nelson claimed that the trial court erred in admitting against him statements attributed to Brennan. As we explained, Brennan's silence in the face of Nelson's statements regarding their involvement in the murder amounts to an admission by acquiescence. See Nelson; Farina v. State, 679 So.2d 1151, 1157 (Fla.1996), receded from on other grounds by Franqui v. State, 699 So.2d 1312, 1320 (Fla.1997); Privett v. State, 417 So.2d 805, 806-07 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982). Thus, the statements were properly admitted against Brennan. In addition, we note that Brennan himself made many of the inculpatory statements that were introduced against him.
In issue five, Brennan claims that the trial court erred by failing to properly determine the admissibility of testimony by the State's DNA expert. The identical issue was also discussed in depth in Nelson, wherein we explained that the trial court erred in admitting this testimony under Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C.Cir.1923), without first establishing that the expert's source for calculation was generally accepted in the scientific community. However, we explained that the error was not reversible, in light of the fact that the error was helpful to Nelson and in light of the overwhelming evidence of guilt. That analysis applies equally in this case. Brennan never denied his involvement in the murder of Owens. Therefore, we find no reversible error on this point.
Based on the foregoing, we find no reversible error as to the guilt phase issues. Further, after reviewing all of the evidence in the record, we find that there is competent, substantial evidence to support Brennan's convictions of first-degree premeditated murder, first-degree felony murder, and robbery with a deadly weapon. We turn next to the penalty phase issues.
III. PENALTY PHASE ISSUES
Although Brennan raises nine penalty phase issues, one penalty phase issue is dispositive. For the reasons that follow, we conclude that the imposition of the death sentence on Brennan, for a crime committed when he was sixteen years of age, constitutes cruel or unusual punishment in violation of article I, section 17 of the Florida Constitution. In reaching this conclusion, we are guided by our decision in Allen v. State, 636 So.2d 494 (Fla.1994).
In Allen, this Court found the death penalty to be unconstitutional under article I, section 17 of the Florida Constitution if imposed upon one who was under the age of sixteen at the time of the crime. Our reasoning in that case was straightforward:
[M]ore than half a century has elapsed since Florida last executed one who was less than sixteen years of age at the time of committing an offense. In the intervening years, only two death penalties have been imposed on such persons, and both of these later were overturned.
There may be a variety of reasons for this scarcity of death penalties imposed on persons less than sixteen years of age. There may be public sentiment against death penalties in these cases, or prosecutors may simply be convinced that juries would not recommend death or the judge would not impose it. We need not conduct a straw poll on this question, in any event. Whatever the reasons, the relevant fact we must confront is that death almost never is imposed on defendants of Allen's age.
In sum, the death penalty is either cruel or unusual if imposed upon one who was under the age of sixteen when committing the crime; and death thus is prohibited by article I, section 17 of the Florida Constitution. Tillman v. State, 591 So.2d 167, 169 n. 2 (Fla.1991). We cannot countenance a rule that would result in some young juveniles being executed while the vast majority of others are not, even where the crimes are similar. Art. I, Sec. 17, Fla. Const.
636 So.2d at 497 (emphasis supplied) (footnotes omitted).
We further rejected the State's argument that the execution of young juveniles was no different than the execution of women because both seldom happen:
Nothing in the Constitution prohibits any court from taking notice of the peculiar condition and historical treatment of the very young. The law itself for centuries has recognized that children are not as responsible for their acts as are adults — a conclusion also supported by the scarcity of death penalties imposed on the very young in this country.
Id. at 497 n. 6.
In reaching our decision in Allen, we relied on article I, section 17 of the Florida Constitution, and not on either the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution or the United States Supreme Court's decision in Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 838, 108 S.Ct. 2687, 101 L.Ed.2d 702 (1988), which held that execution of a defendant who was fifteen at the time of the crime was prohibited by the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution.
Brennan asserts that our reasoning in Allen compels the same result here. We agree. In this case, the defendant presented the trial court with unrefuted data that at least since 1972, more than a quarter of a century ago, no individual under the age of seventeen at the time of the crime has been executed in Florida. In fact, our research reveals that the last reported case where the death penalty was imposed and carried out on a sixteen-year-old defendant was Clay v. State, 143 Fla. 204, 196 So. 462 (1940), over fifty-five years ago. Since 1972, the death penalty has been imposed on only four defendants, other than Brennan, who were sixteen at the time of the crime. For each of the three defendants whose appeals have already been decided, the death sentence was vacated. See Farina v. State, 680 So.2d 392, 398-99 (Fla.1996); Morgan v. State, 639 So.2d 6, 8 (Fla.1994); Brown v. State, 367 So.2d 616, 625 (Fla.1979). This case is virtually identical to Allen both because of the infrequency of the imposition of the death penalty on juveniles age sixteen at the time of the crime and because, since 1972, each death sentence imposed on a defendant who was sixteen at the time of the crime has been overturned by this Court. Thus, we agree that our decision in Allen interpreting the Florida Constitution compels the finding that the death penalty is cruel or unusual if imposed on a defendant under the age of seventeen.
Although not binding on our state constitutional analysis, we are mindful that in the plurality opinion of Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 380, 109 S.Ct. 2969, 106 L.Ed.2d 306 (1989), five members of the United States Supreme Court held that it was not per se cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment to impose the death penalty on an individual sixteen or seventeen years of age at the time of the crime. Thus, the Court re fused to categorically declare eighteen as the minimum age under the United States Constitution for execution to be a constitutional sentence. See id. at 380, 109 S.Ct. 2969.
However, there is an important aspect of the Stanford opinion that further supports our determination that the imposition of the death penalty in this case would be unconstitutional under both the Florida and United States Constitutions. The plurality in Stanford concluded that the constitutionality of capital punishment statutes depends not on the general state laws defining ages of legal disability, but on the "individualized consideration" given to the defendant's circumstances. Id. at 375, 109 S.Ct. 2969. In order for the death penalty to have been constitutionally imposed on a defendant, the Court concluded that one of the "individualized mitigating factors that sentencers must be permitted to consider is the defendant's age." Id. The majority then observed that "the determinations required by juvenile transfer statutes to certify a juvenile for trial as an adult ensure individualized consideration of the maturity and moral responsibility of 16-and 17-year-old offenders before they are even held to stand trial as adults." Id. (emphasis supplied). The Kentucky and Missouri statutes under consideration in Stanford specifically required a court to give individualized consideration of sixteen- and seventeen-year-old juvenile defendants before determining whether they should be transferred from juvenile court to stand trial as adults. 492 U.S. at 375-76 n. 6, 109 S.Ct. 2969. The Kentucky statute additionally specified a minimum age for the death penalty at sixteen. See id.
Unlike the state statutes cited with approval in Stanford, the Florida statute neither sets a minimum age for the death penalty nor sets forth criteria to "ensure individualized consideration of the maturity and moral responsibility," id. at 376,109 S.Ct. 2969, of those under eighteen before the child can be tried as an adult and sentenced to death. Section 985.225(l)(a), Florida Statutes (1997), provides that a child of any age may be indicted for a capital crime and, when indicted, "must be tried and handled in every respect as an adult . on the offense punishable by death or by life imprisonment." Section 985.225(3) further provides that "[i]f the child is found to have committed the offense punishable by death or by life imprisonment, the child shall be sentenced as an adult."
The Legislature's failure to impose a minimum age, the legislative mandate that a child of any age indicted for a capital crime shall be subject to the death penalty, and the failure to set up a system through our juvenile transfer statutes that "ensure[s] individualized consideration of the maturity and moral responsibility" render our statutory scheme suspect under the federal constitution and the reasoning of Stanford as it applies to sixteen-year-old offenders. 492 U.S. at 375, 109 S.Ct. 2969. This also distinguishes our statutory scheme from the Virginia statute recently upheld as constitutional by the Virginia Supreme Court. See Jackson v. Commonwealth, 255 Va. 625, 499 S.E.2d 538 (1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1067, 119 S.Ct. 796, 142 L.Ed.2d 658 (1999). The Virginia statute authorized transfer of juveniles over fourteen, provided for transfer hearings and "address[edj the prosecution and punishment of juveniles in as much detail as the Kentucky and Missouri statutes" in Stanford. Jackson, 499 S.E.2d at 552.
If given literal effect, our statutory scheme would unconstitutionally authorize the imposition of the death penalty on a child of any age. However, it is uncontro-verted that imposing the death penalty on a defendant who was fifteen or younger at the time of the crime is unconstitutional. See Allen, 636 So.2d at 497; Thompson, 487 U.S. at 838, 108 S.Ct. 2687. While we have great respect for the legislative voice, it is the obligation of this Court to decide the question of whether a punishment proscribed by the legislature is unconstitutionally cruel or unusual by applying constitutional, not legislative, standards.
Justice Wells' dissent asserts that the Court has taken a "lone position" in our decision holding the death penalty unconstitutional under our Constitution as applied to sixteen-year-old defendants. Concurring in part, dissenting in part opinion of Wells, J., at 22. We are compelled to point out that, of the thirty-nine states whose statutes authorize the death penalty, fifteen states explicitly prohibit execution of sixteen-year-old defendants. See Concurring in part, dissenting in part opinion of Harding, C.J., note 25 at 19. In the remaining twenty-four states, only six state supreme courts have considered the constitutionality of executing defendants of that age. Apparently none of the states considering the issue except Arizona decided the constitutional question based on their state's constitutional protections. Of those, Alabama, Arizona, Nevada, South Carolina, and Virginia, have upheld the imposition of the death penalty as applied to a defendant who was sixteen at the time of the crime. To the contrary, the Su preme Court of Washington in State v. Furman, 122 Wash.2d 440, 858 P.2d 1092, 1102-03 (1993), held its death penalty statute unconstitutional as applied to juveniles under the age of eighteen, although the Washington state statute provided that a child of any age could be tried and sentenced as an adult.
Finally, in Florida, we have repeatedly stated that the ultimate punishment of death is reserved for the most aggravated and indefensible of crimes committed by the most culpable of offenders. See, e.g., Urbin v. State, 714 So.2d 411, 416 (Fla.1998); State v. Dixon, 283 So.2d 1, 8 (Fla.1973). In addition, this Court is constitutionally required to perform a proportionality analysis:
Our proportionality review requires us to "consider the totality of circumstances in a case, and to compare it with other capital cases. It is not a comparison between the number of aggravating and mitigating circumstances." Porter v. State, 564 So.2d 1060, 1064 (Fla.1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1110, 111 S.Ct. 1024, 112 L.Ed.2d 1106 (1991). In reaching this decision, we are also mindful that "[djeath is a unique punishment in its finality and in its total rejection of the possibility of rehabilitation." State v. Dixon, 283 So.2d 1, 7 (Fla.1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 943, 94 S.Ct. 1950, 40 L.Ed.2d.295 (1974). Consequently, its application is reserved only for those cases where the most aggravating and least mitigating circumstances exist. Id.; Kramer v. State, 619 So.2d 274, 278 (Fla.1993)
Terry v. State, 668 So.2d 954, 965 (Fla.1996). Thus, as the State acknowledges, this proportionality review requires us to compare similar defendants, facts and sentences. See Tillman v. State, 591 So.2d 167, 169 (Fla.1991). The difficulty in conducting a proper proportionality analysis in this case, because the death penalty has not been upheld for any other defendant who was sixteen years old at the time of the crime, highlights the inherent problems in upholding the death penalty under these circumstances.
The State urges that we should find that the imposition of the death sentence constitutional and also proportional because we have upheld the death penalty in other cases involving similar circumstances, citing to cases such as Sliney v. State, 699 So.2d 662 (Fla.1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1129, 118 S.Ct. 1079, 140 L.Ed.2d 137 (1998); Walls v. State, 641 So.2d 381 (Fla.1994), and Hayes v. State, 581 So.2d 121 (Fla.1991). However, the very cases that the State points to as involving similar circumstances involve adults, not sixteen-year-old juveniles. The only common thread is the brutal and senseless nature of the murders.
These cases demonstrate the dilemma posed by Allen: that death is almost never imposed on defendants who are Brennan's age and when the death sentence has been imposed, the death sentence has been subsequently vacated. There is n'o doubt that the murder in this case is a deplorable crime and one for which the defendant should spend the rest of his life in prison. However, we cannot impose the death penalty on this defendant who was sixteen at the time of the crime, consistent with our case law and our Constitution. See Allen, 636 So.2d at 497.
Accordingly, the death sentence is vacated and reduced to life imprisonment without a possibility of parole.
It is so ordered.
SHAW and PARIENTE, JJ" and KOGAN, Senior Justice, concur.
ANSTEAD, J., concurs specially with an opinion, in which KOGAN, Senior Justice, concurs.
HARDING, C.J., concurs in part and dissents in part with an opinion, in which WELLS, J., and OVERTON, Senior Justice, concur.
WELLS, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with an opinion.
. Although finding that the murder was cold and calculated, the trial court found and gave "some weight" to the fact that victim had committed sexual battery on Brennan's girlfriend, thus evidencing "emotional reasons" for the crime.
. The following nonstatutory mitigators were presented during the penalty phase (weight assigned to each in parentheses): (1) Brennan offered to plead to the charges in return for a life sentence (some weight), (2) proportionality (some weight), (3) Brennan's mother committed suicide when he was two years old (little weight), (4) positive personality traits, rehabilitation potential (not established), (5) relative involvement (little weight), (6) character as testified to by members of his family (not established), (7) drug abuse problems (moderate weight), (8) sexually abused as a child by his older brother (little weight), (9) difficult childhood (little weight), (10) Brennan's behavior at trial was acceptable (some weight), (11) dysfunctional family (little weight), (12) gave a voluntary statement following arrest (some weight), (13) using LSD the night before the homicide was committed (moderate weight), (14) apprehension, perceived his own demise at the hands of Nelson if he did not follow his instructions (little weight), (15) completed Southwest Florida Addiction Services program (not established), (16) influence of the older Nelson in the offense (little weight), (17) alcohol abuse (moderate weight), (18) not known, prior to this case, to be a violent person (some weight), (19) personality disorder (some weight), (20) childhood trauma (little weight), (21) psychological stress (some weight), (22) questions regarding roles of Brennan and Nelson (little weight), (23) above average intelligence (not established), (24) step-mother testified he was a good son (little weight), (25) victim had committed sexual battery on the girlfriend of Brennan, Tina Porth (some weight), (26) lack of childhood development, small in stature, taken advantage by others (little weight), (27) emotional reasons for crime rather than cold calculation (some weight), (28) very young, sixteen years of age at time of killing (some weight), and (29) was a follower rather than a leader (little weight).
. (1) the trial court erred by giving a vague jury instruction on HAC; (2) the trial court permitted the State to introduce evidence at the Spencer hearing in violation of discovery principles; (3) the trial court erred by weighing HAC; (4) the trial court determined that HAC existed through a process of improper doubling; (5) the trial court erred by-weighing CCP; (6) the trial court erred by weighing the avoidance of arrest aggravator; (7) the court erred by weighing the during the commission of a robbery aggravator; (8) it is cruel and unusual punishment to impose the, death penalty on a sixteen-year-old; and (9) the death penalty is disproportionate.
. In its motion for rehearing, the State contends for the first time in this appeal that this Court must construe article I, section 17 consistent with the amendment to that section approved on November 3, 1998. That amendment changes the language of the constitutional prohibition from "cruel or unusual" to "cruel and unusual," mandates that this prohibition "shall be construed in conformity with the United States Supreme Court" precedent and provides that the section applies retroactively. Motions for rehearing may only be used to apprise a court of "the points of law or fact that the court has ' overlooked or misapprehended." Fla.R.App.P. 9.330(a). This argument is an entirely new issue neither raised nor briefed on appeal. See Polyglycoat Corp. v. Hirsch Distributors Inc., 442 So.2d 958, 960 (Fla.4th DCA 1983). Further, this Court is presently considering the validity of this amendment in Armstrong v. Harris, No. 95,223 (Fla. certificate filed March 31, 1999), which was orally argued before the Court on September 2, 1999. Lastly, we have serious questions whether an amendment, which would adversely affect the substantive law in effect at the time of the original crime, could be applied retroactively without violating the United States Constitution's prohibition against ex post facto laws. See, e.g., Gwong v. Singletary, 683 So.2d 109, 112 (Fla.1996); State v. Lavazzoli, 434 So.2d 321, 323 (Fla.1983).
. The majority in Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 838, 108 S.Ct. 2687, 101 L.Ed.2d 702 (1988), refused to "draw a line" that would prohibit the execution of any person under the age of eighteen. However, as Justice O'Connor noted in her special concurrence, every member of the United States Supreme Court participating in Thompson agreed that "there is some age below which a .juvenile's crimes can never be constitutionally punished by death." Id. at 848, 108 S.Ct. 2687 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
. The State points out on rehearing that a death sentence has also been imposed for the murder conviction of Roderrick Ferrell, who was sixteen at the time of the crime. That case has not yet been considered by this Court. See Ferrell v. State, No.93,127 (Fla. notice of appeal filed June 2, 1998).
. In Farina v. State, 680 So.2d 392, 399 (Fla.1996), we reversed the imposition of the death penalty on other grounds and declined to reach the constitutionality of executing defendants who were sixteen at the time of the crime. The death penalty was reimposed on Farina on remand, but that case has not yet been considered by this Court. See Farina v. State, No. 93,907 (Fla.notice of appeal filed Sept. 14, 1998).
. After the death penalty was imposed during the first trial and two retrials, Morgan's death penalty was ultimately reduced to life imprisonment. See Morgan v. State, 639 So.2d 6, 9 (Fla.1994); Morgan v. State, 537 So.2d 973, 974 (Fla.1989); Morgan v. State, 453 So.2d 394, 395 (Fla.1984); Morgan v. State, 392 So.2d 1315, 1316 n. 1 (Fla.1981).
. Only four members of the nine-person United States Supreme Court agreed with all parts of Justice Scalia's five-part opinion in See Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 109 S.Ct. 2969, 106 L.Ed.2d 306 (1989); thus, the opinion is described as a plurality opinion. Part I of Stanford described the procedural history of the case. Part II enunciated the standard for determining whether the punishment in question violated the Eighth Amendment. Part III held that the petitioners had failed to meet their burden of establishing that there was a national consensus against executing sixteen and seventeen-year-olds. Part IV-A dismissed as unpersuasive the fact that few offenders under eighteen had been sentenced to death. Part IV-B rejected the proposition that general age-based state statutory schemes are relevant to the issue. Part V declined to consider public opinion polls and socioscientific evidence regarding the lack of deterrent effect of such a punishment on sixteen and seventeen-year olds. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White, O'Connor, and Kennedy concurred as to Parts I, II, III, and IV-A. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White and Kennedy also concurred as to Parts IV-B and V.
Justice O'Connor concurred in part but disagreed with Part IV-B and V, authoring a separate concurring opinion. See id. at 380-82, 109 S.Ct. 2969. Justice Brennan authored a dissent in which Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens joined, using the same reasoning employed by Justice Stevens in the majority opinion in Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 108 S.Ct. 2687, 101 L.Ed.2d 702 (1988), holding that it is unconstitutional to execute defendants who were fifteen at the time of the crime. See id. at 382-405, 109 S.Ct. 2969 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
. The plurality in Stanford limited its focus to "American conceptions of decency that are dispositive" for the purpose of establishing the "first Eighth Amendment prerequisite, that the practice is accepted among our people." 492 U.S. at 369 n. 1, 109 S.Ct. 2969. The dissent surveyed the position of the American Bar Association and other national and international organizations. See id. at 388, 109 S.Ct. 2969 (Brennan, J., dissenting). It noted that over 50 countries, including nearly all in Western Europe, have formally abolished the death penalty or have limited its use to exceptional crimes such as treason. See id. at 389, 109 S.Ct. 2969. Of the nations that retain capital punishment, 65 prohibit the execution of juveniles. See id. At the time of the Stanford decision, only eight executions of juveniles had been recorded since 1979, with three of these taking place in the United States and the remaining five in Pakistan, Bangladesh, Rwanda, and Barbados. See id.
. In the Stanford plurality opinion, Part IVB rejected the argument that state laws setting eighteen as the legal age for engaging in various activities were relevant to whether a state is prohibited by the United States Constitution from executing an individual under eighteen. 492 U.S. at 374-75, 109 S.Ct. 2969. On the other hand, in Thompson v. Oklahoma, the plurality opinion found legislative enactments, including statutes setting forth the rights and duties of children as compared to adults, to be relevant in Eighth Amendment analysis. 487 U.S. at 822-23, 108 S.Ct. 2687. The only way to understand this reversal in reasoning is to consider the author of each opinion. Justice Scalia, who dissented in Thompson, wrote the majority in Stanford. Justice O'Connor was the swing vole in each case but never fully espoused the author's reasoning in either. In Stanford, she specifically identified "age-based statutory classifications as 'relevant to the Eighth Amendment proportionality analysis.' " 492 U.S. at 382, 109 S.Ct. 2969 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part). In Justice O'Connor's opinion, the Court's constitutional analysis should include consideration of "state statutes that distinguish juveniles from adults for a variety of other purposes." Id.
. See Ex Parte Hart, 612 So.2d 536 (Ala.1992); State v. Jackson, 186 Ariz. 20, 918 P.2d 1038 (1996); Domingues v. State, 114 Nev. 783, 961 P.2d 1279 (1998), petition for cert. filed, No. 98-8327 (U.S. Mar. 1, 1999); State v. Conyers, 326 S.C. 263, 487 S.E.2d 181 (1997); Jackson v. Commonwealth, 255 Va. 625, 499 S.E.2d 538 (1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1067, 119 S.Ct. 796, 142 L.Ed.2d 658 (1999). In Jackson, the Arizona Supreme Court relied on the United States Supreme Court decision in Stanford, noting that their state constitutional prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment was identical to the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution, and that no party had argued for a different interpretation. Jackson, 918 P.2d at 1043. In Conyers, the South Carolina Supreme Court held that the issue had not been preserved, and also relied on Stanford without any analysis under its state constitution. Conyers, 487 S.E.2d at 183. In its decision, the Virginia Supreme Court noted that its juvenile transfer statute, which only allowed transfer of juveniles over fourteen, provided as much detail as the similar statutes upheld in Stanford. See Jackson, 499 S.E.2d at 552. In Ex Parte Hart, 612 So.2d at 537, the Alabama Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals' conclusion, without discussion, that the imposition of the death penalty on a defendant sixteen at the time of the crime is constitutional. See Hart v. State, 612 So.2d 520, 535 (Ala.Crim.App. 1992). Finally, in Domingues, the Nevada Supreme Court dealt with and rejected the "single issue" of whether Nevada's death penalty statute was "Superseded by an international treaty ratified by the United States, which prohibits the execution of individuals who committed capital offenses while under the age of eighteen." 961 P.2d at 1279.
. The Washington state statute, like Florida's statute, did not impose a minimum age on transfer. However, unlike Florida's statute, the Washington statute did impose transfer criteria. See State v. Furman, 858 P.2d at 1102. The Washington Supreme Court reasoned that it
[could not] rewrite the juvenile court statute or the death penalty statute to expressly preclude imposition of the death penalty for crimes committed by persons who are under age 16 and thus exempt from the death penalty under Thompson. Nor is there any provision in either statute that could be severed in order to achieve that result. The statutes therefore cannot be construed to authorize imposition of the death penalty for crimes committed by juveniles. Absent such authorization, appellant's death sentence cannot stand.
Id. at 1103 (footnote omitted). We decline to follow this reasoning in deciding the constitutionality of Florida's death penalty.