Case Name: Cottrill vs. Cramer and others
Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Wisconsin
Decision Date: 1876-08
Citations: 40 Wis. 555
Docket Number: 
Parties: Cottrill vs. Cramer and others.
Judges: 
Reporter: Wisconsin Reports
Volume: 40
Pages: 555–560

Head Matter:
Cottrill vs. Cramer and others.
Sham, or frivolous pleading.
1. On appeal from an order striking- out a demurrer as frivolous, this court does not inquire whether the demurrer was well taken, but merely whether it should be held manifestly untenable upon a bare inspection of the pleadings, without argument or research.
2. The demurrer in this case held not frivolous.
8. An answer or defense should not be treated as sham, irrelevant or frivolous unless the mere reading of the pleadings is sufficient to disclose, without deliberation and beyond do:.bt, that such is its character.
APPEAL Rom the Circuit Court for Milwaukee County.
Action for a libel. The complaint contains, first, certain averments as to the plaintiff’s professional character and practice as an attorney-at-law, the extent of his acquaintance in this state, and particularly in the city of Milwaukee, and his appointment by the justices of this court as one of the revisers of the statutes of this state. It then alleges that the defendants are the publishers and proprietors of the “Evening "Wisconsin,” a newspaper published daily in the city of Milwaukee, and having an extensive circulation in that city and in this state. It then avers that on the 6th of November, 1875, defendants, with intent to expose the plaintiff to public hatred, contempt and ridicule, published in said newspaper “ a certain false, scandalous, malicious and defamatory libel,” which is set out, with proper innuendoes. It is then further averred that by means of said alleged libel, the plaintiff “ has sustained damage and injury, and he therefore demands judgment against the defendants for the sum of $25,000, or such other sum as the jury or court shall assess,” by reason of said alleged libel.
The defendants demurred to the complaint upon all the grounds of demui’rer, except one, defined in -the statute (Tay. Stats., 1437-8, § 5), and upon the further ground “that the communication set forth in the complaint is a privileged communication, and is only a fair criticism by a public journal upon the public speeches of the plaintiff.”
The circuit court, on motion, ordered the demurrer to be stricken out as frivolous, with leave to answer, upon terms. From this order the defendants appealed.
John, J. Orton, for the appellants,
contended that the pub lication was not libelous on its face; that it was privileged, as a fair criticism by a public journal on the plaintiff’s political speeches; that express malice and special damages were not alleged in the complaint; and that, in the absence of such allegations, .no cause of action was stated. In support of these views lie cited 5 B. & Ad., 645; 2 A. & E., 2; Vicars v. Wil-cocks, 8 East, 1; Miller v. David, L. E., 9 0. P., 118; Davis v. Dimean, L. E., 9 0. P., 396; draft v.Boite, 1 Saund., 243a; Caldwell v. Raymond, 2 Abb. Pr., 193; Carr v. Hood, 1 Campb., 354-8; Woodward v. Lander, 6 0. & P., 548; Todd v. Hawkins, 8 id., 88; Townsbend on Slander, etc., §§ 335-7, 254-5, 258, 260; 1 Euss. on Crimes, 345. To the point that the question whether the communication was privileged was properly raised by the demurrer, he cited Noonan v. Orton, 32 "Wis., 112; Fry v. Bennett, 5 Sandf. S. C., 72; Hilliard on Torts, 383, and cases cited. And to the point that the demurrer does not admit the intent charged in the innuendoes, he cited Townsliend on Slander, § 362; Fry v. Bennett, supra.
The cause was submitted for the respondent on the brief of Alfred L. Cary,
who contended, 1. That the publication alleged was clearly libelous. 2. That most of the grounds of demurrer alleged, viz., want of jurisdiction in the court, want of capacity in the plaintiff to sue, defect of parties, and improper joinder of causes of action, were obviously frivolous, and were wholly abandoned here in the argument; and that the bad faith and frivolousness of the demurrer were shown by the statement of those grounds. 3. That the complaint states a good cause of action. E. S., ch. 125, sec. 26; Tay. Stats., 1443, §28; 1 Hilliard on Torts, 309; Noonm% v. Orton, 32 Wis., 106. 4. That the question whether a libelous communication is privileged, cannot arise upon a demurrer.

Opinion:
Cole, J.
This is an appeal from an order striking out a demurrer as frivolous, and allowing the defendants to answer upon the terms stated in the order. The case has been argued in this court as though the real question before us was, whether the demurrer to the complaint was well taken. But it is obvious that that question is not raised by the appeal. The question is as to the character of the demurrer, and whether it can be said to be frivolous under the decisions of this court. A frivolous demurrer Ras been defined to be one which, is so clearly untenable, or its insufiiciency so manifest upon a bare inspection of the pleadings, that its character may be determined without argument or research, Farmers' & Millers' Bank v. Sawyer, 7 Wis., 379; Walton v. Goodnow, 13 id., 661; Ferguson v. Troop, 16 id., 572; Sage v. McLean, 37 id., 357. Applying this rule to the case before us, it is manifest that the demurrer is not frivolous. Whether it would or should be held good on the merits, is another question, and one upon which we are not called upon to express an opinion at this time.
By the Ooumt.— The order of the circuit court is reversed, and the cause is remanded for further proceedings.