Case Name: David Samuel BRADLEY, Appellant, v. Judith Anne BRADLEY, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1977-06-28
Citations: 347 So. 2d 789
Docket Number: Nos. 76-1147 and 76-1164
Parties: David Samuel BRADLEY, Appellant, v. Judith Anne BRADLEY, Appellee.
Judges: Before HENDRY, C. J., and PEARSON and HUBBART, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 347
Pages: 789–790

Head Matter:
David Samuel BRADLEY, Appellant, v. Judith Anne BRADLEY, Appellee.
Nos. 76-1147 and 76-1164.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
June 28, 1977.
Rehearing Denied July 20, 1977.
Greene & Cooper and Robyn Greene, Miami, for appellant.
Judith Anne Bradley, in pro. per.
Before HENDRY, C. J., and PEARSON and HUBBART, JJ.

Opinion:
PER CURIAM.
Appellant takes these consolidated appeals from an order denying his petition for modification and from an order denying his petition for rehearing.
A final judgment dissolving the marriage of the parties was entered by the trial court on September 9, 1975. The final judgment awarded custody of the couple's two minor children to appellee, and required appellant to pay $850.00 a month as alimony and $300.00 a month as child support.
On February 17,1976, appellant, who had remarried shortly after the dissolution, filed a sworn petition for modification, alleging that his income had substantially diminished as of January 1,1976. This petition was denied, as was a subsequent petition for rehearing on the merits of the modification. From the denial of both the petition for modification and the petition for rehearing, these consolidated appeals follow.
We are quite cognizant of the fact, as was the chancellor, that appellant's income has substantially decreased. We are also keenly aware of appellant's contention that his current monthly gross income will almost entirely become exhausted by alimony and support payments. Nevertheless, after carefully reviewing the record, briefs and arguments of counsel, in the light of the controlling principles of law, we are of the opinion that the orders appealed from must be affirmed.
We note that in rendering her decision, the chancellor took into consideration appel-lee's physical and mental condition (which prohibited her from taking employment), the needs of both appellee and the minor children and the fact that appellant is both young and healthy with capabilities of much higher earnings. In addition, it would appear from the record that the chancellor was aware of some of appellant's business misfortunes at the time of the final judgment of dissolution, which was not appealed by appellant.
It is the function of the trial court to evaluate and weigh the testimony and evidence and once done, it is not the function of the appellate court to re-evaluate or substitute its judgment for that of the trial court, subject to the appellate court's right to reject inherently incredible and improbable testimony or evidence. Shaw v. Shaw, 334 So.2d 13 (Fla.1976). Accordingly, the orders appealed from are hereby affirmed.
Affirmed.