Case Name: Jonathan B. WOODS and Kerrie Woods, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Taylor BEAN & Whitaker Mortgage Corporation, Defendant-Appellee
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 2015-12-16
Citations: 623 F. App'x 514
Docket Number: No. 12-17483
Parties: Jonathan B. WOODS and Kerrie Woods, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Taylor BEAN & Whitaker Mortgage Corporation, Defendant-Appellee.
Judges: Before: WALLACE, RAWLINSON, and IKUTA, Circuit Judges.
Reporter: West's Federal Appendix
Volume: 623
Pages: 514–515

Head Matter:
Jonathan B. WOODS and Kerrie Woods, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Taylor BEAN & Whitaker Mortgage Corporation, Defendant-Appellee.
No. 12-17483.
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
Submitted Dec. 9, 2015.
Filed Dec. 16, 2015.
Jonathan B. Woods, Gilbert, AZ, pro se.
Kerrie Woods, Gilbert, AZ, pro se.
Amy Denton Harris, Esq., Edward J. Peterson, III, Esq., Stichter Riedel Blain & Prosser PA, Tampa, FL, for Defendant-Appellee.
Before: WALLACE, RAWLINSON, and IKUTA, Circuit Judges.
Hie panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

Opinion:
MEMORANDUM
Jonathan B. Woods and Kerrie Woods appeal pro se from the district court's dismissal of their diversity action arising out of foreclosure proceedings. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Cervantes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 656 F.3d 1034, 1040 (9th Cir.2011). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Plaintiffs' claims against BAC Home Loans Servicing LP and Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems Incorporated because "Arizona's non-judicial foreclosure statutes do not require the beneficiary to prove its authority or 'show the note' before the trustee may commence a nonjudicial foreclosure." Hogan v. Wash. Mut. Bank, N.A., 230 Ariz. 584, 277 P.3d 781, 783-84 (2012) (en banc).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiffs' leave to amend because it had previously granted the Plaintiffs' motion for leave to file an amended complaint. See, e.g., Gonzalez v. Planned Parenthood of L.A., 759 F.3d 1112, 1114, 1116 (9th Cir.2014) (setting forth the standard of review and explaining that "the district court's discretion in denying amendment is 'particularly broad' when it has previously given leave to amend").
AFFIRMED.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.