Case Name: Raul MOLINA, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1983-10-04
Citations: 447 So. 2d 253
Docket Number: No. 82-870
Parties: Raul MOLINA, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: Before SCHWARTZ, C.J., and NESBITT and DANIEL S. PEARSON, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 447
Pages: 253–256

Head Matter:
Raul MOLINA, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. 82-870.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
Oct. 4, 1983.
Bennett H. Brummer, Public Defender, and Elliot H. Scherker, Asst. Public Defender, for appellant.
Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., and William P. Thomas, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.
Before SCHWARTZ, C.J., and NESBITT and DANIEL S. PEARSON, JJ.

Opinion:
NESBITT, Judge.
In the first appearance of this case, we reversed the defendant's conviction because the investigating officers stated that after interviewing two non-testifying co-defendants they arrested Molina and placed his picture in a photo lineup for identification by the victim. Molina v. State, 406 So.2d 57 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981). Relying upon our prior decision in Postell v. State, 398 So.2d 851 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981), pet. for review denied, 411 So.2d 384 (Fla.1981), this court held that that testimony inferred an identification of defendant by the co-defendants and was therefore impermissible. Because the only other evidence against Molina was a severely challengeable eyewitness identification by the victim, the court found the error to be harmful.
It appears that our previous decision was in vain because, on re-trial, the same prosecutor asked the same witness about his contact with the co-defendant, but used the word "meet" rather than "speak" in making this inquiry. The defendant promptly moved for a mistrial and, in the ensuing argument thereon, the state represented to the court that it would introduce an incul-patory statement by the defendant which had not been available at the first trial. Accordingly, the trial judge ruled that there was error but found it to be harmless.
The state concedes that there was error created by the prosecutor's question and thus the only issue is whether this error requires a second new trial. The admission which the state relies on in support of a harmless error theory was one made to the corrections officer in broken English in which Molina allegedly stated that the eyewitness could not have identified him because he had a mask over his face. On cross-examination, however, the officer indicated that the defendant had difficulty comprehending and speaking English. Thus, while at first glance the inculpatory statement would seem to provide overwhelming evidence of guilt, on closer examination, we are not satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to a conviction. For this reason, we find that a new trial is required. Tacoronte v. State, 419 So.2d 789 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982).
We will not elaborate further on the prosecutor's behavior in the present case other than to state that, true to our promise in Jackson v. State, 421 So.2d 15 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982), we direct the Florida Bar Grievance Committee's attention to this matter.
The defendant's conviction must once again be reversed and remanded — this time, hopefully for a fair trial.