Case Name: STATE v. MINTON
Court: Supreme Court of South Carolina
Jurisdiction: South Carolina
Decision Date: 1883-04-21
Citations: 19 S.C. 280
Docket Number: 
Parties: STATE v. MINTON.
Judges: 
Reporter: South Carolina Reports
Volume: 19
Pages: 280–286

Head Matter:
STATE v. MINTON.
The defendant having failed to appear and plead to an indictment for misdemeanor, his recognizance may then be estreated, before trial, sentence and issue of bench warrant. Mr. Justice McIver dissenting.
Before Fraser, J., Charleston, February, 1882.
The report of the presiding judge was as follows:
This case was heard by me at the term of the Court of Sessions for Charleston county in February, 1882, and by consent of counsel the decision was reserved, to be rendered after the adjournment of the court. Ben Tomkins was arrested on a warrant duly issued, charged with larceny of live stock, under the value of $20, and conceded by the State to be a charge of misdemeanor and not felony. He was released on the usual recognizance, and Warren Minton, the respondent, was surety for his appearance to answer. It was admitted that Ben Tomkins was duly called and failed to answer when the case was called for trial. The rule in this case was issued and duly served on Warren Minton, requiring him to show cause why the recognizance should not be estreated and adjudged forfeited, and execution issued for the penalty of the same — the sum of $200. The respondent shows, for cause, that there has been no bench warrant issued for the arrest of Ben Tomkins, for sentence, and no return of non est inventus on the same by the sheriff or other proper officer.
The only question in the case submitted to me is, whether the liability of the surety on- the recognizance has been fixed by the failure to appear and answer when called, or whether it is necessary to issue a bench warrant and have a return of non est inventus before the surety becomes liable. In cases of felony there is no doubt that the liability is fixed by the failure to appéar and answer when called, because there can be no trial without the presence of the accused, at least in those cases where an arraignment is necessary. In cases of misdemeanor I think that the rule is the same, with this modification : “ If the accused once appears and pleads, it is not necessary to be present de die in diem until the case is disposed of, but he may absent himself, and his surety will be discharged if he should be arrested on a bench warrant or is delivered up by his surety to receive sentence.” This view, I think, is in accord with the doctrine as laid down by Hawkins; the book not being accessible I cannot give the page. In State v. Rowe, 8 Rich. 21, we find the following language: “ In misdemeanors the defendant’s obligation compels his appearance on the first day of the term and de die in diem until he has been discharged or has pleaded.” It is also here said “that after he has pleaded that it is sufficient if he is present to receive sentence.”
The absence of defendants and witnesses, when called in the Court of Sessions, has become a very great evil, and some means must be found to check it. If I had any doubt on a subject like this, it is my duty to put it in a position to be passed on by a tribunal which alone can settle the law in this State. It is therefore ordered and adjudged that the rule in this case be made absolute, and that the said recognizance be estreated, and is hereby adjudged forfeited, and that judgment be entered and execution be issued for the sum of $200, the penalty thereof, and costs, against Warren Minton, the respondent.
In the brief appears the statement, agreed to by counsel, “that the name of the appellant’s attorney, S. J. Lee, appears as counsel for the defendant, Ben Tomkins, on the judge’s docket.”
Respondent appealed upon the following ground:
“Because the defendant, Ben Tomkins, being under recognizance to answrer to an indictment for a misdemeanor, there was no legal impediment to his being tried, and his recognizance cannot be forfeited until he has been tried, convicted, and fails to appear for sentence of the court; and his Honor erred in not so holding.”
Mr. S. J. Lee, for appellant.
Mr. Solicitor Jervey, contra.
April 21st, 1883.

Opinion:
The opinion of the court was delivered by
Me. Chief Justice Simpson.
[Omitting the statement.] It is conceded that in misdemeanors, unlike felonies, the defendant may be tried in some cases in his absence, and as the object of the recognizance is to secure his presence so as to receive sentence, it has been unusual, if not unknown in this State before this case, for the bond to be adjudged forfeited till after conviction and failure to appear for sentence evidenced by bench warrant and a return of non.est inventus. The question, however, is not what has been the custom and practice, but what is the law on the subject. We have been unable to find any case in our own reports bearing directly on this point. In the case of State v. Rowe, 8 Rich. 21, Judge Glover, in delivering the opinion of the court, said: " In misdemeanors, the defendant's obligation compels appearance on the first day of the term, and de die in diem until he has been discharged or until he has pleaded. After he has pleaded he appears by his attorney, and his recognizance will not be estreated, although he should fail to appear at each succeeding term, provided, that after conviction he be present to receive the sentence."
But that question, was not directly involved in the case then before the court, as that was a case of felony. These remarks, therefore, though falling from the lips of a learned judge, can not be recognized as controlling authority, as they were merely obiter. Nor have we been able to find any decisions in our sister States, except in the State of Kentucky. In that State, in a recent case referred to in 2 Crim. L. Mag. 411, the case of Walker v. Commonwealth, 2 Ken. Law Rep., March, 1881, p. 197, the precise question was made and adjudged, the court holding that trial and conviction was not necessary in order to forfeit bail in a misdemeanor, and that the liability of the surety was fixed when the defendant failed to appear. As the volume of the Kentucky Reports in which this case is found is not in the library, we have not had opportunity of reading it in full, and of ascertaining the grounds upon which the decision rests; whether upon statute regulations, the terms of the recognizance or otherwise; but as reported in the magazine referred to, it is full and direct to the point, and in accordance with the remarks of Judge Glover above.
The condition of the recognizance is stated to be the same in misdemeanor as in felony, it being that the accused " shall personally appear to answer to a bill of indictment to be preferred against him, and to do and receive what shall be enjoined by the court, and not to depart without leave." This, according to its literal terms, would seem to require personal appearance both to answer (that is, to plead,) and to receive what shall be enjoined by the court, the sentence. We think that it is a sufficient indulgence to a defendant in misdemeanor that he should not be required to remain in court de die in diem after appearing and pleading, but his recognizance demands that he shall do that much in the first instance, and we can see no good reason why the court should relax his obligation and make a new contract for him. Besides, the weight of authority is against such ruling.
It is the judgment of this court that the judgment of the Circuit Court be affirmed.