Case Name: GREENBERG v. GERMAN AMERICAN INS. CO.
Court: Oregon Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Oregon
Decision Date: 1916-10-24
Citations: 83 Or. 662
Docket Number: 
Parties: GREENBERG v. GERMAN AMERICAN INS. CO.
Judges: Mr. Chief Justice Moore and Mr. Justice Benson concur.
Reporter: Oregon Reports
Volume: 83
Pages: 662–672

Head Matter:
Argued September 28,
reversed and remanded October 24, 1916.
Argued on rehearing March 13, former opinion sustained March 20, 1917.
■Second petition for rehearing denied April 10, 1917.
GREENBERG v. GERMAN AMERICAN INS. CO.
(160 Pac. 536; 163 Pac. 820.)
Pleading — Amendment of Complaint.
1. Where the original complaint was supplanted by an amended complaint on which the action was tried, the original complaint cannot be considered in aid of plaintiff’s case.
Appeal and Error — Adequacy of Complaint — Questioning in Supreme Court.
2. The adequacy of plaintiff’s statement of his cause of action in his complaint may be questioned for the first time in the Supreme Court.
Pleading — Denial of Answer — Effect.
3. An averment of defendant’s answer, denied by plaintiff’s reply, is of no eflfeet by way of aider to the defects of the complaint.
Pleading — Conclusions—Contract to Insure — Breach.
4. In an action for damages resulting from breaeh of an alleged executory contract to insure property, plaintiff’s amended complaint, averring that the policy tendered by defendant “did not conform to the oral contract between the parties, and was not a complete performance of the said oral contract,” was insufficient, pleading a mere conclusion of law and stating no fact; plaintiff should have disclosed the terms of the oral contract for insurance, and also, a policy having been issued, should have set forth the terms of the instrument, that the court might have been able to judge whether or not it was a fulfillment of the oral contract.
Insurance — Contract to Insure — Breach—Pleading.
5. In an action for breach of an executory oral contract to insure property, the amended complaint, stating that plaintiff accepted the policy issued by defendant through his ignorance of its legal effect, was insufficient to state a cause of action, since ignorance of the law will excuse no one.
ON REHEARING-.
Insurance — Fire Policy — Acceptance.
6. Wh.ere insured accepted a fire policy which was not in accordance with the oral contract for insurance, he cannot, having retained it without objection, contend that the true contract should be found in the oral agreement, for it was supplanted by the written policy, and insured had no option to rely either on the policy or the oral agreement as he desired.
[As to delivery and acceptance of policies of insurance, see note, in 138 Am. St. Rep. 29.]
Insurance-^Fire Policies — Actions—Defenses.
7. Where the policy issued pursuant to an oral agreement as to insurance did not follow the agreement, and it was alleged that the policy which should have been issued would have been subject to Laws of 1911, page 279, the insured cannot in an action to recover on the oral agreement independent of the policy recover where suit was not brought within the time limited by such law.
From Multnomah: William N. Gatens, Judge.
Action by William Greenberg against the German American Insurance Company, a corporation. From a judgment in favor of plaintiff, defendant appeals.
Reversed and Remanded.
On Rehearing Opinion Sustained.
Department 2. Statement by Mr. Justice Burnett.
This is an action for damages resulting from the breach of an alleged executory oral contract for insurance of property. An original complaint which appears in the abstract of record was superseded by an amended complaint upon which the action was tried. It alleges the plaintiff’s ownership of the stock of goods in question, the corporate character of the defendant, states the oral agreement of the defendant to issue a policy insuring the property for $2,000 and containing certain conditions relating to further insurance and hypothecation of the merchandise all to be evidenced by proper notations on the first page of the instrument. It avers that the goods were damaged by fire prior to the delivery of the policy. These allegations then follow:
“That thereafter said defendant, under the pretense of fulfilling said oral contract to insure, delivered to plaintiff its written policy of insurance, but that the said policy so delivered as aforesaid was not delivered until after said damage by loss of fire, and did not conform to the oral contract between the parties and was not a complete performance of the said oral contract; that because of the fraudulent failure of the defendant to incorporate in or endorse upon or add to said written policy the necessary provisions relating to the matter set forth in the 5th paragraph of. this complaint, the said policy so delivered as aforesaid was utterly void and so known to be by the said defendant; * * that plaintiff believed as a matter of law that the policy so issued as aforesaid was a complete and legal performance of the said oral contract by said defendant, for the reason that he believed that under the settled rule of law the defendant would he held to have waived said breaches of the said conditions of said policy, by accepting and retaining said premium with knowledge of the said facts so stated to said agent under the law. And that, therefore, plaintiff believing as a matter of law that said oral contract had been fully complied with, made proofs of loss under the said policy and brought suit thereon to recover his said loss; that thereafter plaintiff discovered that under the construction of Chapter 175, Laws of 1911, by the Supreme Court of this state, and under its construction of the conditions set forth in said statute, and which were incorporated in said p.olicy so delivered as aforesaid, proof of the agent’s knowledge of said facts could not be shown and that said policy was therefore void and not a complete performance by defendant of said oral contract; and that thereupon plaintiff voluntarily dismissed the said action; * * The plaintiff hereby elects to proceed not in equity for the specific performance of said oral contract and for damages, but proceeds at law in this action to recover damages sustained by him for breach of the said oral contract to issue a policy of insurance as aforesaid.”
The answer denied most of the amended complaint especially the part concerning the conditions to be incorporated into the contract of insurance and set up various affirmative defenses which in turn were traversed by the reply.
From a judgment on a verdict in favor of the plaintiff the defendant appeals.
Reversed and Remanded.
Opinion Sustained on Rehearing.
For appellant there was a brief over the name of Messrs. Veazie, McCourt & Veazie, with an oral argument by Mr. John McCourt.
For respondent there was a brief over the name of Messrs. Giltner & Sewall, with an oral argument by Mr. R. R. Giltner.
Authorities discussing the question of validity of oral contract of insurance are collected in a note in 22 Ii. R. A. 768. Reporter.

Opinion:
Mr. Justice Burnett
delivered the opinion of the court.
It is unnecessary to consider any of the affirmative defenses. It is enough to give our attention to the sufficiency of the complaint upon which the action was tried. The original was supplanted by the new pleading of the plaintiff and cannot be considered in aid of his case: Wells v. Applegate, 12 Or. 208 (6 Pac. 770); Slemmons v. Thompson, 23 Or. 215, 220 (31 Pac. 514); Hume v. Woodruff, 26 Or. 373 (38 Pac. 191); Condon Nat. Bank v. Rogers, 60 Or. 189 (18 Pac. 846, Ann. Cas. 1914A, 101). The adequacy of the plaintiff's statement of his cause of action may be questioned for the first time in the supreme court: Howard v. Horticultural Fire Relief, 77 Or. 349 (150 Pac. 270, 151 Pac. 476). If he would prevail in this form of action he must not only disclose the terms of the oral contract for insurance, but also, in cases where a policy has been actually issued, set forth the terms of that instrument so that the court may be able to judge whether or not it is a fulfillment of the alleged oral contract. It is true that the defendant appends to its answer as an exhibit a copy of what it alleges was a policy delivered to and accepted by the plaintiff as the contract between the parties and which differs in some respects from the oral contract stated by the plaintiff. This averment of the answer, however, is denied by the reply and hence is of no effect by way of aider to the defects in the complaint. It suffices not to aver, as in the amended complaint, that the policy tendered ' ' did not conform to the oral contract between the parties and was not a complete performance of said oral contract." This is a mere conclusion of law and states no fact.
Again, it does not avail plaintiff to state his belief about the legal effect of the policy that was issued. Ignorance of the law will not excuse anyone. The principle is fully discussed in an opinion by Mr. Justice Wolverton in Scott v. Ford, 45 Or. 531 (78 Pac. 742, 80 Pac. 899, 68 L. R. A. 469). In Utermehle v. Norment, 197 U. S. 40 (49 L. Ed. 655, 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 291, 3 Ann. Cas. 520, 524), it is said:
"It has been held from the earliest days, in both the federal and state courts, that a mistake of law, pure and simple, without the addition of any circumstances of fraud or misrepresentation, constitutes no basis for relief at law or in equity, and forms no excuse in favor of the party asserting that he made such mistake. Hunt v. Rhodes, 1 Pet. (U. S.) 1, 15 (7 L. Ed. 27); United States Bank v. Daniel, 12 Pet. (U. S.) 32, 55 (9 L. Ed. 989, 998); United States v. Hodson, 10 Wall. (U. S.) 395, 409 (19 L. Ed. 937, 940); Lamborn v. Dickinson County Commrs., 97 U. S. 181, 185 (24 L. Ed. 926); Snell v. Atlantic F. & M. Ins. Co., 98 U. S. 85, 90, 92 (25 L. Ed. 52); Allen v. Galloway, 30 Fed. 466, where Hammond, J., in reviewing the decisions of this court, says: 'Whatever rule may prevail elsewhere, there can be, in the equity courts of the United States, no relief from a mistake of law.' Drake v. Wild, 70 Vt. 52, 59 (39 Atl. 248). In that case the court said (p. 59): 'That ignorance of the law does not excuse a wrong done or a right withheld; that relief from liabilities under the law, arising from a known state of facts, will be denied. But to these general rules there are exceptions, as where there is a mistake of law caused by fraud, imposition, or misrepresentation. We think it will be found that in most of the cases cited in these notes, and in Pomeroy, the party seeking relief was led into error by the action of the other party to a transaction, as in contracts and releases.' Light v. Light, 21 Pa. St. 407, 412; Storrs v. Barker, 6 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 166 (10 Am. Dec. 316); Whitwell v. Winslow, 134 Mass. 343, 345; Alabama, etc. Ry. Co. v. Jones, 73 Miss. 110 (55 Am. St. Rep. 488, note, 19 South. 105)."
The complaint under consideration does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.
Whether by commencing action upon the policy and afterwards abandoning the same the plaintiff has failed to avail himself of the right of prompt rescission within the doctrine of Scott v. Walton, 32 Or. 460 (52 Pac. 180), or whether he has sufficiently pleaded a mistake in the contract within the doctrine of Hughey v. Smith, 65 Or. 323 (133 Pac. 68), or whether he has stated a ease of fraud against the plaintiff within the rule of pleading laid down in Anderson v. Adams, 43 Or. 621, 627 (74 Pac. 215), are questions which do not require consideration at this time. The judgment of the Circuit Court is reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings. Reversed and Remanded.
Opinion Sustained on Rehearing.
Mr. Chief Justice Moore and Mr. Justice Benson concur.
Mr. Justice Bean withhold his assent.