Case Name: Austin A. Belden v. William P. Laing and others
Court: Michigan Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1860-10-13
Citations: 8 Mich. 500
Docket Number: 
Parties: Austin A. Belden v. William P. Laing and others.
Judges: Manning and Christiancy JJ. concurred.
Reporter: Michigan Reports
Volume: 8
Pages: 500–507

Head Matter:
Austin A. Belden v. William P. Laing and others.
A plea in abatement must have tlie highest degree of certainty and precision. Every allegation necessary to make out the case covered by it, must be distinctly, and-not inferentially, set forth.
In an action of replevin a plea in abatement was interposed, setting up the pen dency of a prior suit in replevin, by virtue of the writ in which the property in controversy was taken and held by one of the defendants, who was sheriff of the county. The plea did not allege that any affidavit was attached to the. writ in the first, suit, nor that the writ commanded the sheriff to take the property in controversy. Held, that the plea was insufficient on both grounds.
In an action of replevin under the statute, anything going to show that the plain-* tiff had no right to the possession when he commenced his suit, is a complete bar to the action. As that the defendant lawfully held the property, as against the plaintiff, by virtue of a prior writ of replevin.
In replevin by one plaintiff against three defendants, plea in abatement was in. terposed, of a prior action in replevin, by two of the defendants against the plaintiff and another, by virtue of which the other defendant, as sheriff, took and detained the property. Held, that the issues in the two cases were not identical, as the possessory right of the sheriff under his writ, if valid, could not be impaired or affected, although the plaintiff in the present suit might show a perfect title as against the other defendants, the plaintiffs in the first suit.
Heard April 19th.
Decided October 13th.
Error to Shiawassee Circuit.
Replevin Tby plaintiff in error against William P. Laing Amos Gould and Ebenezer Gould. The defendants pleaded in abatement as follows:
“And the said defendants Amos Gould and Ebenezer Gould, in person, and William P. Laing, by A. & E. Gould, his attorneys, come into court and pray judgment of the said writ and declaration of the said plaintiff, and that the same may be quashed, because they say that heretofore and before the commencement of this suit, to wit, on the ninth day of March, 1859,' the said defendants Amos Gould and Ebenezer Gould, commenced a suit in replevin against the said plaintiff and one" Cranson Belden, by issuing a writ of replevin out of the Circuit Court for the county of Shiawassee, to the Sheriff of said county, which writ was duly and personally served upon said plaintiff and said Cranson Belden, and under and by virtue of which said writ, the same identical goods and chattels mentioned in said plaintiff’s writ and declaration in this cause, were seized and taken by defendant William P. Laing, said Laing then being the Sheriff of Shiawassee county, and said goods and chattels having been seized and replevied by said Laing, as such Sheriff, and being in the possession of said Laing as such Sheriff, by virtue of said writ, at the time of the commencement of this suit; which said suit so commenced in said court, against said plaintiff and said Cránson Belden, is now pending and undetermined, and that said plaintiff’s said action of replevin herein is brought against the defendants for the recovery of the goods and chattels, so as aforesaid taken, replevied and detained under and by virtue of said writ of replevin, issued as aforesaid by said Amos and Ebenezer Gould, against said plaintiff and said Cranson Belden, and this the said defendants are ready to verify; wherefore as to the unlawful detention of the said goods and chattels in the said plaintiff’s declaration mentioned, they pray judgment of the said writ and declaration of the said plaintiff, and that the same may be quashed.”
To this plea the plaintiff demurred. The Circuit Court overruled the demurrer, quashed the writ, and rendered judgment for defendants, for the value of the property replevied, and costs. Plaintiff brought error.
McCurdy c5 Paynale, for plaintiff in error,
A. <& M. Could, for defendants in error :
The plaintiff can not replevy property which has been taken from him and is held by a writ of replevin: — Comp. L. § 5041; 5 Wend. 71. The object of this action was to determine the title to the goods replevied, as between A A. Belden and these defendants; and the first action was brought, and at the time of the commencement of this suit was pending, for exactly the same purpose. The first action was properly pleaded in abatement: — Gould Pl. 282; 1 Chit. Pl. 453 ; 3 Wend. 258; 1 Mich. 254. It is no objection that the parties in the two suits were different, since the question- involved in this suit between the parties hereto was directly in issue between the same parties in the former suit: — Cath. 96; Cowp. 144; Holt, 1; Show. 75; 1 Pet. Abr. 16, case 5; 5 Wend. 71.

Opinion:
Campbell J.:
The demurrer, we think, ought to have been sustained? Whether we look at the form of the plea, or the subject matter sought to be introduced by it.
A plea in abatement must have the highest degree of certainty and precision: — 1 Chitty Pl. 395; Findley v. People, 1 Mich. 235 — and therefore every allegation necessary to make out the case covered by it must be distinctly and not inferentially- set forth. This plea would require some liberality to sustain it if put in as a plea in bar, under any system of special pleading. To say nothing of other omissions, it contains no allegation from which we can infer that the writ of replevin, under which it alleges the property to have been first taken by Laing, as Sheriff, was directed against the property levied upon. If a Sheriff, with the most regular writ, should seize property not described in his writ, he certainly could not justify under it. Neither does it appear that any affidavit, was annexed to the writ, without which the Sheriff is expressly forbidden to serve it: — Comp. L. p. 1331, §5011 These and other omissions, not perhaps so substantial, would render the plea demurrable, if a plea in abatement were proper at all.
But we think the defense, if valid, should have been offered in bar, and not in abatement. The object of our statutory replevin is to determine the right of possession at the commencement of the action, as well as title to the property for temporary or permanent purposes connected with that possession. Anything going to show that the plaintiff in replevin had no right to the possession when he commenced his suit, is a complete bar to his action. And proof that a Sheriff had taken property on a lawful writ from the plaintiff, and continued lawfully to hold it under that writ, when replevin was brought, would go to negative the plaintiff's right of possession, and, of course, defeat his suit. «The statute requires an affidavit that the plaintiff is entitled to the 'possession, that the defendant unlawfully detains the property, and that it has not been taken by any of various kinds of process enumerated; but does not in terms require anything more. These facts, if true, cover every case which, could ordinarily arise. If untrue, they go to defeat the right of action entirely, as existing at that time, not only in that suit, but in any action whatever depending on a right of possession. Such a showing is not the ordinary office of a plea in abatement, which, in respect to a former suit pending, does not deny or put in issue the cause of action, but merely objects that it is already in course of litigation.
Whether cross replevins between the same parties will lie, where no new parties are introduced, is a question entirely beside this case. It may be worthy of consideration however, whether, under a plea in abatement, if it lies, the statute provides for a return of the property, or an assessment of damages. It may be found that the provisions on this subject have a bearing on the question of pleading. We are not disposed to consider these questions any further than may be necessary in this case.
In the present case, the plea does not show any idennity of issues, and it would be impossible in the present action to try the merits of the former action. In that, the question involved was simply the title of the Goulds to possession as against the two Beldens; all the other questions of title and damages being incidental, and that being the only ground on which the action was maintainable. In the present action, the question of possessory right arises— according to the plea — not between Belden and the Goulds, but between Belden & Laing. And Laing's possessory right, if his writ was valid, could not be impaired or affected, although Belden might show a perfect title as against the Goulds. The issues are entirely different upon the right of possession, which is the only foundation of either action.
Judgment must be reversed with costs, and the defendants are required to plead' over.
Manning and Christiancy JJ. concurred.