Case Name: THE STATE v. BROWN
Court: Court of Appeals of Georgia
Jurisdiction: Georgia
Decision Date: 2012-03-29
Citations: 315 Ga. App. 282
Docket Number: A11A2121
Parties: THE STATE v. BROWN.
Judges: Barnes, P. J., Miller and Adams, JJ., concur. Dillard, J., concurs fully and specially. Blackwell and Boggs, JJ., dissent.
Reporter: Georgia Appeals Reports
Volume: 315
Pages: 282–291

Head Matter:
A11A2121.
THE STATE v. BROWN.
(726 SE2d 764)

Opinion:
MlKELL, Presiding Judge.
The State of Georgia appeals the grant of Dwight Brown's motion in abatement which quashed the indictment against him because it was not returned in "open court." Finding no error, we affirm.
On January 6, 2011, a Cobb County grand jury returned an indictment against Dwight Brown in a courtroom in the recently constructed Cobb County Courthouse (the "Courthouse"). At the time the indictment was returned, the Courthouse had limited accessibil ity to the public while court employees were moving into it. As a result of this limited access, Brown filed a motion in abatement contending that the indictment was defective because it was not returned in open court. Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court granted Dwight Brown's motion and quashed the indictment, holding that the indictment was fatally defective because it was not returned in open court.
At the time the indictment was returned, every exterior doorway was locked and the only entrance available to the public was a walkway, guarded by deputies, connecting the old and the new courthouses. The deputies were stationed there to ensure the integrity of the clerk's office files being transferred to the new building and as a security measure because some construction workers in the Courthouse were using knives and hammers to install carpeting.
J. Cameron Tribble, an attorney at the firm representing Brown, went to the Courthouse to observe the return of the indictment against Brown. Tribble found the doors to the Courthouse either locked or guarded by sheriffs deputies. To gain entry to the Courthouse, he was instructed to call the court administrator and obtain a personal escort across the walkway to the courtroom. He did so, and it took several minutes for the court administrator to meet him so that he might be escorted into the Courthouse. By the time Tribble was finally able to enter the courtroom, he had missed the return of Brown's indictment. The presiding judge testified that he did not intend to exclude anyone from the courtroom and that the media and sheriff s department personnel were present in the courtroom. Tribble was delayed approximately ten to fifteen minutes because he could not enter the front entrance of the Courthouse.
Following an evidentiary hearing on Brown's motion in abatement, the trial court found that because Tribble was "delayed and impaired from reaching [the courtroom]," the indictment was not returned in open court. Accordingly, the trial court granted the motion in abatement and quashed his indictment. The state appeals, arguing that there is no requirement that an indictment be returned in open court; that the indictment was returned in open court; and if the indictment were found to be not returned in open court, such error was harmless because there was no prejudice to the defendant.
The state argues that there is no law requiring an indictment to be returned in open court because neither the United States Constitution nor the Constitution of the State of Georgia addresses this issue. However, Georgia case law has long held that an indictment must be returned in open court to be valid. This requirement "must be complied with in every case," and failure to comply strictly with this rule may nullify an otherwise valid indictment. This court has held that to satisfy the "in open court" requirement, the "place of the reception of the indictment must be one where the court is being held open to the public." The rationale behind "surrounding the return of an indictment with formalities and requiring that it be returned in open court is to prevent the administration of criminal laws taking on the aspect of 'star-chamber' proceedings." Further, our Supreme Court has explained that were the "in open court" rule otherwise, "it would render it possible for a designing or revengeful foreman of a grand jury to ruin any citizen by surreptitiously filing with the clerk in his office an indictment manufactured by himself alone, upon which his fellow jurors had taken no action."
The state notes that Zugar v. State, which stands for the premise that an indictment must be returned in open court pursuant to the Fifth Amendment, relied upon a federal case that has since been abrogated. Despite any abrogation at the federal level, however, our Supreme Court has not abrogated this rule, and we are bound to follow the decisions of our Supreme Court.
In this case, the Courthouse had limited accessibility at the time the indictment was returned against Brown: the exterior doors were locked, the only entrance to the Courthouse — the catwalk — was guarded by deputies, and Tribble was required to call the court administrator in order to be escorted to the courtroom. Tribble was thereby delayed by approximately ten to fifteen minutes in reaching the courtroom, and, as a result, was not present when the indictment was returned. Because of these factors, we find that the courtroom was not open to the public at that time.
Contrary to appellant's arguments, the fact that other members of the public, including members of the media, were in the courtroom does not mean that the indictment was returned "in open court" for purpose of this analysis. In Cadle, the fact that a number of people, including defendant's attorneys, were present at the time an indictment was returned in the presiding judge's chambers adjacent to the courtroom, and not in the courtroom itself, did not alter this Court's conclusion that the indictment was not returned in open court.
Further, appellant's argument that Brown has not alleged any prejudice or injury and, accordingly, any error by the trial court is merely harmless error, is meritless. The Supreme Court of Georgia has held that any failure to return the indictment in open court "is per se injurious to the defendant." None of the cases cited by appellant involve the abandonment of the formalities surrounding the return of the indictment, and thus are inapposite to the case at hand.
Thus, under the circumstances presented here, appellant has failed to show that the trial court erred in granting the motion in abatement and quashing the indictment.
Judgment affirmed.
Barnes, P. J., Miller and Adams, JJ., concur. Dillard, J., concurs fully and specially. Blackwell and Boggs, JJ., dissent.
Brown filed a motion to dismiss appeal as moot. The motion is denied.
Zugar v. State, 194 Ga. 285, 289-290 (21 SE2d 647) (1942); Sampson v. State, 124 Ga. 776 (53 SE 332) (1906); Clinkscales v. State, 102 Ga. App. 670, 672 (1) (117 SE2d 229) (1960); Walker v. State, 310 Ga. App. 223, 230 (2) (713 SE2d 413) (2011).
(Citations omitted.) Cadle v. State, 101 Ga. App. 175, 180 (1) (113 SE2d 180) (1960).
Id. at 181 (1). Accord Zugar, supra at 288.
(Citation omitted.) Cadle, supra. Accord Zugar, supra at 290 (finding that returning an indictment "in open court" requires "the personal appearance of the grand jury in the courtroom or the place where court was being held open to the public with the judge and clerk present") (emphasis supplied).
(Citation omitted.) Clinkscales, supra at 673 (1). Accord Zugar, supra at 290 (rebuffing the idea that "technicalities and formalism" surrounding the return of an indictment serve no good purpose and must be put aside and finding that they serve to protect "the freedom, the liberty, and the dignity of men").
(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Sampson, supra at 779.
See Renigar v. United States, 172 F. 646 (4th Cir. 1909), abrogation recognized by United States v. Lennick, 18 F3d 814 (9th Cir. 1994).
Nahid v. State, 276 Ga. App. 687, 688 (3) (624 SE2d 264) (2005).
Cadle, supra at 180 (1).
Zugar, supra at 291.
See Isaacs v. State, 259 Ga. 717, 720 (2) (b) (386 SE2d 316) (1989) (Any error arising from basing an indictment against defendant on hearsay was harmless because of the jury's verdict of guilty, which demonstrated that there was probable cause to charge defendant with offenses for which he was convicted.) and Anderson v. State, 258 Ga. 70 (6) (365 SE2d 421) (1988) (Any error arising from trial court's failure to order prosecution to comply with defendant's timely request for indictment, where indictment was on file in the clerk's office, was harmless.).