Case Name: STATE of Louisiana v. Garland NEWMAN
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1998-01-28
Citations: 707 So. 2d 122
Docket Number: No. 97-797
Parties: STATE of Louisiana v. Garland NEWMAN.
Judges: THIBODEAUX, AMY and PETERS, JJ., dissent and assign written reasons.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 707
Pages: 122–127

Head Matter:
STATE of Louisiana v. Garland NEWMAN.
No. 97-797.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Third Circuit.
Jan. 28, 1998.
■ J. Reed Walters, District Attorney, for State.
Rebel Garnett Ryland, Columbia, for Garland Newman.

Opinion:
This is a writ application from Relator, Garland Newman. Relator was convicted of driving under the influence of intoxicating beverages, second offense, which is a violation of La.R.S. 14:98. He was sentenced to ninety days in the parish jail. The sentence was suspended, and he was placed on supervised probation for one year or until his driver's license is returned, whichever is longer. Additionally, Relator was ordered- to pay a fine of $750.00 plus costs, or in default thereof, to serve a period of seventy-five days in the parish jail.
Prior to the trial on the merits, Relator filed a motion to quash, attacking the predicate DWI offense. This motion was denied by the trial court.' Although several grounds for quashing the prior DWI offense were raised at the hearing, Relator focuses on only one issue in this application. Specifically, Relator claims the trial court failed to inform him of the maximum sentence for his first DWI offense at his December 11, 1991 court proceeding at which he entered a guilty plea. He claims the conviction could not be used as a predicate offense for the purpose of obtaining a DWI, second offense, since he was not informed of the permissible range of sentences. The cases cited by Relator are predicated on a footnote in Boykin v, Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 244 n.7, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 1713 n.7, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969):
A majority of criminal convictions are obtained after a plea of guilty. If these convictions are to be insulated from attack, the trial court is best advised to conduct an on the record examination of the defendant which should include, inter alia, an attempt to satisfy itself that the defendant understands the nature of the charges, his right to a jury trial, the acts sufficient to constitute the offenses for which he is charged and the permissible range of sentences. Commonwealth ex rel. West v. Rundle, 428 Pa. 102, 105-106, 237 A.2d 196, 197-198 (1968).
Emphasis added.
The issue presently before this court is whether, under Boykin and its progeny, the trial court is required to advise the defendant of the range of penalties for the offense to which he is pleading. Although this issue is raised by collateral attack of a predicate offense in the case sub judice, this is of no moment to the resolution of the issue. On our own motion, we have considered this issue en banc. Recently, this court visited the issue in State v. Baum, 95-384 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/4/95), 663 So.2d 285, writ denied, 95-2685 (La.2/9/96), 667 So.2d 528. We noted in Baum that "the Louisiana Supreme Court has not extended the Boykin colloquy to include advice as to a defendant's possible penalties." Id. at 288. We find this is a correct statement of the law and we reaffirm our earlier holding.
The issue in this case revolves around language contained in a footnote in Boykin. The text of Boykin which references the footnote, reads:
When the judge discharges that function, he leaves a record adequate for any review that may be later sought and forestalls the spin-off of collateral proceedings that seek to probe murky memories.
Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. at 244, 89 S.Ct. at 1712-13. (Citations omitted). This language does not indicate the Supreme Court adopted or attempted to adopt the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's holding quoted in the footnote. Furthermore, the cited reference from Commonwealth ex rel. West v. Rundle, 428 Pa. 102, 237 A.2d 196 (1968) does not indicate the Pennsylvania Supreme Court required that the permissible range of sentences be given to a defendant before his plea would be valid; it only advised this procedure be followed to insulate the conviction from attack. This position is further supported by the following quote from Boykin:
Several federal constitutional rights are involved in a waiver that takes place when a plea of guilty is entered in a state criminal trial. First, is the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment and applicable to the States by reason of the Fourteenth. Second, is the right to trial by jury. Third, is the right to confront one's accusers. We cannot presume a waiver of these three important federal rights from a silent record.
Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. at 243, 89 S.Ct. at 1712. (Citations omitted).
These three rights have commonly been referred to as Boykin rights. Of special note is the fact the Court did not include in this list of rights that a defendant be advised of the permissible range of sentences before a plea can be held to be knowingly and voluntarily entered. We recognize Act 1061 of the 1997 Louisiana Legislative Session enacted Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure article 556.1, which now requires a trial court to inform the defendant of and determine that he understands the mandatory minimum and maximum penalties provided by law before accepting a plea of guilty or nolo contendere. However, this amendment was not in effect on December 11, 1991, the date of the guilty plea at issue, thus we find it is not applicable.
Accordingly, we shall not extend the Boy-kin colloquy to require the trial court to review the penalty section of the statute in question with a defendant in order to obtain a valid guilty plea. Therefore, this writ application is denied as we find the trial court did not err in' denying Relator's motion to quash the prior DWI conviction, and we affirm the trial court and this court's previous holding in State v. Baum, 95-384 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/4/95), 663 So.2d 285, writ denied, 95-2685 (La.2/9/96), 667 So.2d 528.
WRIT DENIED.
THIBODEAUX, AMY and PETERS, JJ., dissent and assign written reasons.
COOKS and WOODARD, JJ., dissent for reasons assigned by PETERS, J.