Case Name: STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Paul S. OLDACK, Appellee; STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. David L. OLDACK, Appellee; STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Spencer D. BAXTER, Appellee; STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Richard A. BAXTER, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1973-06-27
Citations: 283 So. 2d 73
Docket Number: Nos. 72-97 through 72-104, 72-105 through 72-112, 72-113 through 72-120, and 72-121 through 72-128
Parties: STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Paul S. OLDACK, Appellee. STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. David L. OLDACK, Appellee. STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Spencer D. BAXTER, Appellee. STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Richard A. BAXTER, Appellee.
Judges: PIERCE (Ret.), J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 283
Pages: 73–77

Head Matter:
STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Paul S. OLDACK, Appellee. STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. David L. OLDACK, Appellee. STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Spencer D. BAXTER, Appellee. STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Richard A. BAXTER, Appellee.
Nos. 72-97 through 72-104, 72-105 through 72-112, 72-113 through 72-120, and 72-121 through 72-128.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
June 27, 1973.
On Rehearing Aug. 24, 1973.
Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Charles Corees, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., Tampa, for appellant.
W. Daniel Kearney, Asst. Public Defender, Bradenton, for appellee, Paul S. Oldack.
Robert A. Douglass, Brown, Watson & Goldstein, St. Petersburg, for appellee, Richard A. Baxter.

Opinion:
MANN, Chief Judge.
Dr. Norton and another owned Cypress Lodge, on Lake Tarpon. Several of its cabins were broken into and much of the property was taken to a house rented by one of the appellees. Several boats marked "Cypress Lodge" were in the yard, hidden from the view of passersby by a fence. Other items were inside the house. A search warrant was obtained on an affidavit which alleged that the affiant had "received information from a confidential informant whom he has previously relied upon, and whose information has proven to be trustworthy, that he with other deputy sheriffs of this County have received information from a confidential informant that" the stolen property was concealed at the described house. Evidence seized upon the warrant was suppressed.
So far there is such a clear failure to meet the standards of Aguilar v. Texas and Spinelli v. United States that the trial judge's finding of insufficiency in this paragraph of the affidavit is clearly warranted.
We may also summarily treat the suggestion that the warrant, which included a precise description of the property to be searched, is invalid because the affidavit seeking it ended in a prayer for a warrant commanding the sheriff to "search the herein described Cypress Lodge and seize" the evidence. It is clear from a reading of the affidavit that Cypress Lodge is the place from which the goods were stolen, and there is no doubt as to the premises to be searched. Further, this must have been clear to the judge who issued the warrant, because this surplus language of the affidavit is omitted from the warrant. This argument is without merit.
The affidavit also contained the averment that Dr. Norton, owner of Cypress Lodge, had viewed the premises and identified the property as that stolen from his place. This averment saves what would otherwise be an insufficient affidavit, much as that in State v. Smith was rescued from the vice of careless, conclusory, inadequately supported hearsay allegations. In the trial court the question was not ful ly argued, nor is it here. The learned trial judge was led into the discussion of whether Dr. Norton had an "open view," another of those familiar phrases which so often are substituted for careful analysis and competent legal advice in the preparation of affidavits for search warrants. The cases cited deal with the question whether a police officer was a trespasser at the place where the seized evidence came into view.
It may not matter. Dr. Norton was the owner of the stolen property, and it had been taken upon the land of another without his fault. As the Restatement says, "One is privileged to enter land in the possession of another, at a reasonable time and in a reasonable manner, for the. purpose of removing a chattel to the immediate possession of which the actor is entitled, and which has come upon the land otherwise than with the actor's consent or by his tortious conduct or contributory negligence." The comment on this section goes on to state that a demand is ordinarily necessary, but "If, however, it appears that such a demand would be futile, or that the delay which it would necessitate would subject the chattel to a danger of serious harm, entry without demand may be reasonable." We think Dr. Norton's entry without demand, for the purpose of identifying his property, without entering the house, is arguably reasonable, thus requiring application of the rule in this instance. At the time he viewed his property on the defendants' premises, Dr. Norton would seem to be no trespasser.
The prosecution persisted in arguing the validity of the search on the untenable basis of the confidential informant's contribution to the affidavit's contents and the tenuous argument that the boats in the yard were in plain view. It is not surprising that the trial judge, given no argument of law on the only theory which sustains the search, ruled as he did. Because the legal right of Dr. Norton to be where he was and to see what he saw was not argued in either the trial court or this one, and because the Restatement principle is not specifically adopted in Florida law, we remand for further proceedings at which the parties may adduce authority in support of or tending to disprove the legal basis for the search which to us seems pertinent. Our own research leads to the conclusion that one may lawfully enter another's property to reclaim his own property wrongfully taken there. The question to be considered on remand is whether there is not also a right to go upon the property for the purpose of verifying the location of the stolen property. This seems to us a logical extension of the general rule. We do afford the opportunity for argument in the trial court because what appears to us to be the disposi-tive question of law was not perceived or argued. The order is
Vacated and remanded for further proceedings.
PIERCE (Ret.), J., concurs.
LILES, J., dissents, with opinion.
. 1964, 378 U.S. 108, 84 S.Ct. 1509, 12 L.Ed.2d 723.
. 1969, 393 U.S. 410, 89 S.Ct. 584, 21 L.Ed.2d 637. See also State v. Lewis, Fla.App.2d 1969, 225 So.2d 170, which is a oase in which the affidavit furnished an adequate basis upon which the trial court could determine the reliability of the confidential informant.
. Fla.1970, 233 So.2d 396.
. Hester v. United States, 1924, 265 U.S. 57, 44 S.Ct. 445, 68 L.Ed. 898; Monnette v. United States, 5th Cir. 1962, 299 F.2d 847; Martin v. United States, 5th Cir. 1946, 155 F.2d 503; United States v. Clancy, S.D.Miss.1968, 285 F.Supp. 98.
. Restatement (Second), Torts § 198(1) (1965). See also Prosser, Law of Torts 121-123 (3rd ed. 1964); 1 Harper and James, Law of Torts § 1.17 (1956).
. Arlowski v. Foglio, 1926, 105 Conn. 342, 135 A. 397; Chambers v. Bedell, Pa.1841, 2 Watts & S. 225, 37 Am.Dec. 508.