Case Name: George W. Persons, plaintiff in error, vs. Joseph B. Hill and Washington Thornton, defendants in error
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia
Jurisdiction: Georgia
Decision Date: 1864-03
Citations: 33 Ga. Supp. 141
Docket Number: 
Parties: George W. Persons, plaintiff in error, vs. Joseph B. Hill and Washington Thornton, defendants in error.
Judges: 
Reporter: Georgia Reports
Volume: 33 Suppl.
Pages: 141–148

Head Matter:
George W. Persons, plaintiff in error, vs. Joseph B. Hill and Washington Thornton, defendants in error.
An injunction against a projected canal and levee, on the ground that it interferes with or defeats benefits and advantages acquired by complainant from another levee previously built by him under contract with the feoffor of defendant ought not to be continued when the answer of defendant, and the affidavits accompanying it, show that the levee built by complainant was not constructed under said contract, or in accordance with it, or that, for want of necessary repairs, said levee utterly fails to answer the purpose for which it was constructed.
The diversion or obstruction of a water course, to the injury of another, is a private nuisance, which equity will arrest by injunction.
Courts of equity have concurrent jurisdiction with Courts of law in cases of private nuisance.
It is true that the granting or dissolving an injunction is ordinarily within the discretion of the Court below, yet where that discretion has been abused to the manifest injury of a party, it is the duty of this Court to correct it.
The right of persons to have waters, in which they have an interest, flow as they have been accustomed, is an incident of property of which they cannot be deprived by statute, even for public use, without compensation.
Motion to dissolve injunction, in Crawford Superior Court, decided by Judge O. A. Lochrane, at Chambers, on the 27th of February, 1863.
This was a bill in equity, exhibited by George W. Persons, against Joseph B. Hill and Washington Thornton, in which complainant alleged that he was the owner of a large body of land lying on and near to Flint river, in the county of Crawford, most of which was subject to inundation or overflow from said river, which was very damaging to the complainant; that it was agreed by and between complainant and Major Howard and Mr. Hargroves, who then owned lands south of complainant’s on said river, that the three owners would, at their joint and equal expense, construct a levee on the banks of said river for the mutual protection of their farms against inundations and overflows; that, pursuant to such understanding and agreement, the complainant and said Howard and Hargroves did, at great expense, construct said levee, which expense complainant would not have incurred but for the said agreement and co-operation of said Howard and Hargroves, as, without their aid and cooperation, the levee would have been comparatively valueless to the complainant; that the levee so built was about six miles long, and cost a large sum of money, and wras of great value and utility in protecting the lands of complainant, Howard and Hargroves, from the inundations and overflows aforesaid. The bill also alleged that, in order to give other and further protection to his land and to the lands of Hargroves and Howard, he had, at his own expense, built an additional levee two miles and a half long, which cost some $>10,000 00, and which answered the purpose for which it was intended. The complainant further charged in his bill that Joseph B. Hill w'as then the owner of the lands lying immediately south of complainant’s lands, as well as the lands on the east and west sides of Beaver creek, and that said Hill bought said lands with full knowledge of the contract between complainant and Hargroves and Howard aforesaid, and with full knowledge of the great cost and utility of the levee built under said contract, and with full knowledge of the utility and cost of the additional levee built by complainant, as before stated, yet that said Hill, disregarding said contract, and disregarding the complainant’s rights and interests in the premises, had commenced digging a canal or ditch thirty feet wide and four or five feet deep¿ which, when completed, will extend a distance of three thousand yards due west from the original channel of Beaver creek, leading from thence in a westerly direction, thence in a southwesterly direction, and which said .canal will run almost parallel with the lands of complainant; that the banks of the said Flint river form a natural barrier to the water flowing therein, and that the lands near the river being higher than the lands on the creek, said Hill will have to dig said canal lower in order to get the water in the creek to run into the river at the point contemplated, said contemplated point being four or five miles from the mouth of said Beaver creek, where it naturally flows into said river. The bill expressly charged that the completion of said canal would have the effect to destroy the natural bai'rier of the river banks and the levee first built, as aforesaid, through which said canal passes into the river, and thereby cause the water of the river, at and above ordinary stages of water, to flow back into said canal and against the embankment or levee on the south side of said canal, where, finding no outlet, the water will be forced by said canal and the embankment on the south upon the complainant’s lands to the extent of four or five hundred acres, then in cultivation and of great value, and render the same unfit for cultivation. The bill alleged that said Thornton was aiding Hill in digging this canal and diverting the waters of said creek, and that the completion of the work which the defendants were carrying on, and which they avowed a determination to complete, would injure the real and the saleable value of complainant’s lands many thousands of dollars, and that the damages were of a character not to be easily estimated, and that, being remediless at law, the complainant prayed, amongst other things, an injunction restraining the defendants from further prosecuting the work of digging said canal, and the embankment on the south side of the same.
The injunction was granted by Judge Lochrane, on the 27th of October, 1862.
The defendants filed their answers to the bill in which the location and ownership of the lands are admitted to be correctly stated in the bill. The answers also admit the construction of the levees for the protection of said lands from overflow, as the complainant alleges, but positively deny that such levees were constructed under any agreement or contract to which Hargroves (from whom Hill purchased) was a party, or by which he was bound in any way. The defendants admit that there was some agreement between Howard and complainant by which they were to jointly build a levee or levees, but allege that Hargroves was not a- party to the contract and was not bound by it, and notified complainant and Howard that he would not be a party to the contract as it contemplated a diversion of Beaver creek from its natural channel. The answers admit that Hargrove, believing that the construction of one of said levees would be of benefit to his land, paid the sum of $2,000 00 towards its construction.
The answers admit that the defendants are engaged in digging the canal as alleged in the bill, and that the object of the enterprise is to turn Beaver creek so as to drain the lands of defendant, Hill, an object that cannot be attained otherwise, and as said creek is not a navigable steam, the defendants insist that they have a legal right to divert the same. They also admit that they are building a strong and substantial levee, or embankment along and near the south bank of said canal as charged in the bill, which levee will extend, when completed, from a point on the river levee, on the west, out to the high lands on the east; that the object of this levee is to protect the lands of thé¡ defendant, Hill, from the overflows of the river, which breaks through the levee on the north line of complainant’s laud, and combs down through complainant’s plantation on the north and floods Hill’s plantation, thus doing him incalculable damage, by washing away his soil, and delaying and preventing the cultivation of his crops. The defendants set up in their answers that the levees built by the complainant were defectively constructed, and had been broken by freshets, and had remained unrepaired, and that complainant’s land was likely to be injured quite as much, if not more, by such defects and breakages as by the canal of which he complains. They also set up, that they were informed and believed it to be true, that the said levees had been broken for more than a year, and that complainant had avowed an intention to leave them unrepaired. The defendants admit that it will be possible for the waters from the river to back up through said canal, when completed, and to overflow a portion of complainant’s land, but how much of the land may thus be overflowed, the defendants do not know, and can form no idea, but that it would require a rise in the river to produce this result, that in the judgment of defendants, would break the levee of complainant, and thus do the same and probable greater damage to his land.
There were other matters set up in the answers, and also in affidavits that accompanied the answers, but a statement of them is deemed unnecessary to a full understanding of the questions made and decided in this case.
Upon the coming in of the answers and the affidavits which were produced with them, a motion was made at Chambers to dissolve the injunction which had been previously granted, and upon the hearing of the motion, the presiding Judge passed an order that said injunction be dissolved. The granting of this order is the error complained of.
Samuel Hall & T. D. King, for plaintiff in error.
John Peabody, contra.

Opinion:
By the Court
Lyon, J.,
delivering the opinion.
"We do not think that the complainant was entitled to a continuance of his injunction, by reason that the projected canal and levee of defendant interfered with or defeated any of the advantages or benefits acquired by complainant from the canal and levee which he had previously constructed under an agreement between himself, Hargrove and Howard, because the answer of the defendants and accompanying affidavits show that the levee constructed by complainant under that agreement, either was not made in accordance with that agreement, or from want of necessary repairs they utterly failed to protect either his own or the lauds of complainant and Howard, as they would have done if built in accordance with the agreement. Let us then look at the case as it was made and now stands by the bill and answer, independently of that agreement and the work done under it. The bill alleges that the defendant proposes to erect a canal with a levee on its south side its entire length, from the northeastern corner of his lands, along the north line thex'eof, parallel with and contiguous to the south side of complainant's land, across Beaver creek to the river; that the banks of the lands on the river are some three or four feet higher than the lands on the margin of the creek, and that the canal will have to be cut that much deeper through these lands at the point where it enters the river, so as to run the water out of the creek into the river, so that on a rising the river would cause the waters to flow back up the canal and inundate from one to three and four feet some four or five hundred acres of complainant's lands, a large portion of which, if not quite all of the same, is in cultivation and of great value; that the injury thus done cannot be arrived at. That it would injure the saleable value of the lands $30,000 00, and is irreparable; that the waters are let in upon the land through the opening to be made in the banks of the river by the canal and forced back by the levee on its south side, and that such canal and levee is now in process of erection.
The defendant admits in his answer that he is constructing a canal and levee, and that he is doing so to protect his land, fi'onx the overflows of the river, which break through the levee on the north line of complainant's land and come down through complainant's plantation on the north, and flood the plantation of defendant, doing him incalculable damage by destroying his crop, delaying his cultivation and washing away the soil; that it is possible for the waters fx'om the river to back up through his canal when completed, and so overflow a portion of complainant's land, how much he does not know, but to do this will require a rise from twelve to fifteen feet, and he believes that such a rise would break the north levee of complainant and thus overflow not only the same land, but much more besides.
Here is a plain admission of the wrong complained of, and its injury to the complainant — not a probable or contingent injui'y — but one that is certain to occur whenever the river rises to a height of from twelve to fifteen feet, which is not uncommon or improbable. The excuse offered by the defendant for this invasion of the complainant's rights, is not a good or sufficient one. It is to protect himself from overflows that break through the levee on the north side of complainant's land, etc. It is not pretended that it was a part of the agreement between complainant, Hargrove, (from whom defendant purchased) and Howard, that if the complainant did not build a levee that would protect the plantation of these persons from overflows, that then either of the parties might protect themselves by similar levees, that would back the waters on the complainant's lands, nor can such a right be implied from such agreement. The complainant, by failing to perform his part of that agreement, might subject himself to an action for the damages he thereby occasioned, but his breach of his part of the agreement will not license the other parties to divert the waters of the creek or river from their natural direction, for their protection and to the injury of complainant. Neither is the supposition that the same rise in the river that would cause an overflow of the land of complainant from the canal and levee of defendant, might break the levee on the north line of complainant's land and produce the same or worse injuries to complainant's land, a justification to the defendant for his projected wrong, for against the breakage of the levee the complainant may provide] if he does not, the consequences are with him, but against the injuries that may result from the proposed canal and levee of the defendant, he cannot protect himself. The act and injuries complained of being admitted, what is the remedy? "To divert or obstruct a water course is a private nuisance, and the books are full of cases and decisions asserting the right, and affording the remedy : " Chancellor Kent, in Gardiner vs. Newburgh, 2 John. Ch. R., 164.
Cases of a nature calling for the like remedial interpositions of Courts of equity, are the obstruction of water courses, the diversion of streams from mills, the back flowage on mills, and the pulling down of the banks of rivers and thereby exposing adjacent lands to inundation, or adjacent mills to destruction : Story's Eq. Jur., 927, and cases there cited. "It is well established that a Court of equity has concurrent jurisdic tion with the Courts of law in cases of private nuisance Waterman's Ed. on Injunctions, 268, 271, and notes; Gardiner vs. Newburgh, cited above.
This being a private nuisance, clearly admitted, as we think, the party complainant was entitled to an injunction, so far as the opening of the canal was concerned, and the judgment of the Court below dissolving the one already granted, was erroneous.
It is true that the granting or dissolving an injunction is ordinarily within the discretion of the Court below; yet, where that discretion has been abused to the manifest injury of a party, it is the duty of this Court to correct it, and such has been its practice. The defendant in the argument relied upon a statute of the State, which I have not before me, but passed, I think, in 1855 and 1856, authorizing persons to divert unnavigable streams.through their own lands.
Although the statute gives such right, it did not intend that such thing should be so done as to affect the rights of a third person. If it did, the Act for that purpose would be void, because the right of persons to have waters in which they have an interest, to flow as they have been accustomed; is an incident of property of which they cannot be deprived, even for the use of the public, without compensation. That is one of the principal questions settled in Gardiner vs. The Village of Newburgh, 2 Johnson's Chancery Reports, 164.
Let the judgment be reversed on the ground that the Court below erred in dissolving the injunction. And we direct that the injunction be so modified as to permit the defendant, Hill, to continue his embankment or levee along the line of his projected canal, so as to protect his land from inundation, if he chooses to do so.