Case Name: TURNBERRY ISLE RESORT AND CLUB, Appellant, v. Madoc D. FERNANDEZ, et al., Appellees
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1996-01-17
Citations: 666 So. 2d 254
Docket Number: No. 94-685
Parties: TURNBERRY ISLE RESORT AND CLUB, Appellant, v. Madoc D. FERNANDEZ, et al., Appellees.
Judges: Before NESBITT, BASKIN and GREEN, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 666
Pages: 254–258

Head Matter:
TURNBERRY ISLE RESORT AND CLUB, Appellant, v. Madoc D. FERNANDEZ, et al., Appellees.
No. 94-685.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
Jan. 17, 1996.
Fisher & Phillips and Christopher D. Robinson, Ft. Lauderdale, for appellant.
John D. Maher, Tallahassee, for appellees.
Before NESBITT, BASKIN and GREEN, JJ.

Opinion:
NESBITT, Judge.
Turnberry Isle Resort and Club appeals from a final order of the Florida Unemployment Appeals Commission in favor of Madoc Fernandez. We reverse.
Fernandez, the claimant below, filed for unemployment compensation benefits on June 27, 1993. Fernandez had been unemployed since his employment with Turnberry ended in May, 1992. He received weekly unemployment benefits of $122.00 during the next year, from June 1993 through June 1994. The record shows that Fernandez did not work during that benefit year. At the end of that benefit year, Fernandez received a determination from the Florida Department of Labor Unemployment Compensation Division (Division) stating that he was ineligible to receive further unemployment compensation benefits because he had not performed services earning three times his weekly benefit amount since he originally filed his claim for benefits. Fernandez was required to earn $366.00 to meet the requali-fying requirement.
One month after being notified of his ineligibility, Fernandez worked at moving and assembling a piano, for which he was paid $230.00. Two weeks later he performed landscaping and pool cleaning services, for which he was paid $150.00, $40.00 of which was for pool chemicals. When Fernandez reapplied for unemployment benefits, claiming that he had met the requalifying requirement by earning a total of $380.00, the Division issued a determination that Fernandez had met the requalifying terms, and reinstated his unemployment benefits. Turnberry appealed, and after a formal hearing the claims officer ruled in Fernandez's favor. The Unemployment Appeals Commission affirmed, and Turnberry now appeals that af-firmance.
Section 443.091(2), Florida Statutes (1993), provides in part:
No individual may receive benefits in a benefit year unless, subsequent to the beginning of the next preceding benefit year during which he received benefits, he performed service, whether or not in employment as defined in s. 443.036, and earned remuneration for such service in an amount equal to not less than 3 times his weekly benefit amount as determined for his current benefit year, (emphasis added).
At issue is whether the "remuneration" referred to in section 443.091(2) includes materials and supplies such that Fernandez can claim that the $40.00 he spent on pool chemicals, out of the $150.00 he was paid for the job, can be considered part of the total remuneration necessary for determining his eligibility for unemployment benefits.
"Remuneration" is not defined within Chapter 443. Under the doctrine of noscitur a sociis the meaning of statutory terms, and the legislative intent behind them, may be discovered by referring to words associated with them in the statute. Cepcot Corp. v. Department of Bus. and Prof. Regulation, 658 So.2d 1092, 1095 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995). Here, an individual seeking benefits must earn "remuneration for such service " performed within the allotted time frames. To "remunerate" is defined as, "to pay an equivalent to (a person) for a service, loss, or expense." Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1921 (1986) (emphasis added). Clearly, the legislature chose to define the remuneration a claimant needed to earn by referring to the service performed and not the expenses incurred. Had it chosen to do so, it could have included remuneration for service and expenses, however, it stopped at service.
We acknowledge that an agency's interpretation of a statute, with which it is legislatively charged with administering, shall be accorded great weight and should not be overturned unless clearly erroneous, arbitrary, or unreasonable. Cargill, Inc. v. Hill, 503 So.2d 1340, 1342 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987) (quoting Department of Ins. v. Southeast Volusia Hosp. Dish, 438 So.2d 815 (Fla.1983), appeal dismissed, 466 U.S. 901, 104 S.Ct. 1673, 80 L.Ed.2d 149 (1984); 76 Am. Jur.2d Unemployment Compensation § 17 (1992).
An agency's construction of a statute, however, must have some nexus to the context of the statute. Cepcot Corp., 658 So.2d at 1095. Although chapter 443 should be accorded a liberal interpretation to fulfill its beneficent purpose, there is neither reason nor policy expressed in the language of the statute to support the view that reimbursement for supplies should be considered remuneration for service performed. A rule of liberal construction may not be employed to support a conclusion that has no basis either in the statute, rules of the commission, sound business practice, or common sense.
The dissent has read section 443.091(2) out of context. It points only to a connecting clause of that sentence which in part provides for benefits "whether or not employed as defined in s. 443.036." The fallacy in that observation is the neglected aspect of the statute. It fails to recognize that the clause must be read in conjunction with that which follows which explicitly provides: "and earns remuneration for such service_" The dissent reads the statute in the disjunctive while it plainly provides for benefits to be calculated based upon "earned remuneration." The statute must be read in the conjunctive.
Finally, the $150.00 that claimant aggregated in order to attain the threshold amount was not paid, as the dissent suggests, "without differentiation as to any cost incurred." Instead, from the claimant's own testimony in his case-in-ehief, he testified he received $110.00 for his service and $40.00 for reimbursement of "pool supplies."
Reversed.
GREEN, J., concurs.
. Contrary to the dissent's suggestion, the statute itself, by using the phrase "earned remuneration for such service," has provided for "net remuneration."
. Dickerson, Inc. v. McCleary, 498 So.2d 651 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986), cited by the dissent, strongly supports, rather than contradicts, our position. That case involved an employer appealing from a workers' compensation order awarding the claimant benefits at an average weekly wage based on the total of his hourly wage and equipment rental payments paid to him by his employer. The court noted the deputy's factual determination that under the employee's agreement, his employer would pay him $5.00 per hour for labor and $10.00 per hour for the use of his equipment. The statutory definition of "wages" referred to "service rendered." In holding for the employer the court noted, "The term labor' clearly equates with 'service' under the statute . and not with a payment found to have been made for use of equipment, i.e., property." Id. at 652 (emphasis added). Similarly, in the instant case, the remuneration earned does not include amounts found to have been paid for the purchase of pool supplies.