Case Name: Elson BLANC, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. SAGEM MORPO, INC., Keith Paradise, Kathleen Vetter, Allyson Thomas, Defendants-Appellees
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 2010-10-01
Citations: 394 F. App'x 808
Docket Number: No. 09-3762-cv
Parties: Elson BLANC, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. SAGEM MORPO, INC., Keith Paradise, Kathleen Vetter, Allyson Thomas, Defendants-Appellees.
Judges: PRESENT: JON O. NEWMAN, GUIDO CALABRESI and RICHARD C. WESLEY, Circuit Judges.
Reporter: West's Federal Appendix
Volume: 394
Pages: 808–810

Head Matter:
Elson BLANC, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. SAGEM MORPO, INC., Keith Paradise, Kathleen Vetter, Allyson Thomas, Defendants-Appellees.
No. 09-3762-cv.
United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
Oct. 1, 2010.
Elson Blanc, Valley Stream, NY, pro se.
Andrew P. Marks, Gregory B. Reilly, III, Littler Mendelson, P.C., New York, NY, for Appellee.
PRESENT: JON O. NEWMAN, GUIDO CALABRESI and RICHARD C. WESLEY, Circuit Judges.

Opinion:
SUMMARY ORDER
Elson Blanc ("Appellant") appeals from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York (Garaufis, J.), granting summary judgment to the Appellees and dismissing his complaint in its entirety. Appellant commenced this action pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the New York State Human Rights Law, the New York City Human Rights Law, and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. He also alleged retaliation in violation of those statutes. We assume the parties' familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history, and the issues presented for review.
This Court reviews orders granting summary judgment de novo, and asks whether the district court properly concluded that there was no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Cronin v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 46 F.3d 196, 202-03 (2d Cir.1995). To that end, our Court is "required to resolve all ambiguities and draw all permissible factual inferences in favor of the party against whom summary judgment is sought." Terry v. Ashcroft, 336 F.3d 128, 137 (2d Cir.2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). Yet "conclusory statements or mere allegations [are] not sufficient to defeat a summary judgment motion." Davis v. New York, 316 F.3d 93, 100 (2d Cir.2002).
In order to make out a prima facie case of discrimination in violation of Title VTI, a plaintiff has the burden of establishing that: (1) he is a member of a protected class; (2) he performed the job satisfactorily or was qualified for the position; (3) an adverse employment action took place; and (4) the action occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973); Shumway v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 118 F.3d 60, 63 (2d Cir.1997). Once a plaintiff makes out a prima facie case of discrimination, the burden of production shifts to the employer to demonstrate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the adverse employment decision. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817. The burden then shifts back to the plaintiff to present evidence that the employer's proffered reason is a pretext for an impermissible motive. See id. at 804-05, 93 S.Ct. 1817.
To establish a prima facie case of retaliation under Title VTI, a plaintiff is required to show by a preponderance of the evidence that: (1) the plaintiff participated in a protected activity; (2) the defendant knew of the protected activity; (3) the plaintiff experienced an adverse employment action, as defined by the Supreme Court in Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 68, 126 S.Ct. 2405, 165 L.Ed.2d 345 (2006); and (4) a causal connection exists between the protected activity and the adverse employment action. See Terry, 336 F.3d at 140-41. Once a plaintiff makes out a prima facie case of retaliation, the burden shifts to the defendant to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the alleged retaliatory acts, at which point the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to show circumstances that would be sufficient "to permit a rational factfinder to conclude that the employer's explanation is merely a pretext for impermissible retaliation." See Cifra v. General Elec. Co., 252 F.3d 205, 216 (2d Cir.2001).
The same framework applies to discrimination and retaliation claims brought pursuant to the New York State Human Rights Law and the New York City Human Rights Law, see Cruz v. Coach Stores, Inc., 202 F.3d 560, 565 n. 1 (2d Cir.2000), and pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981, see Fincher v. Depository Trust & Clearing Corp., 604 F.3d 712, 720 (2d Cir.2010). Finally, claims brought pursuant to the New York City Human Rights Law "must be reviewed independently from and more liberally than their federal and state counterparts." See Loeffler v. Staten Island Univ. Hosp., 582 F.3d 268, 278 (2d Cir.2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Having conducted an independent and de novo review of the record in light of these principles, we affirm the district court's judgment for substantially the same reasons stated by that court in its thorough and well-reasoned memorandum opinion and order.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is hereby AFFIRMED.