Case Name: Penny J. ALEXANDER v. Bobbie Gerald ALEXANDER
Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Mississippi
Decision Date: 1986-09-10
Citations: 493 So. 2d 978
Docket Number: No. 55838
Parties: Penny J. ALEXANDER v. Bobbie Gerald ALEXANDER.
Judges: Before HAWKINS, P.J., and PRATHER and SULLIVAN, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 493
Pages: 978–982

Head Matter:
Penny J. ALEXANDER v. Bobbie Gerald ALEXANDER.
No. 55838.
Supreme Court of Mississippi.
Sept. 10, 1986.
William H. Jones, Petal, for appellant.
Jack Parsons, Parsons & Matthews, Wiggins, for appellee.
Before HAWKINS, P.J., and PRATHER and SULLIVAN, JJ.

Opinion:
PRATHER, Justice, for the Court:
This appeal questions whether a chancery court may grant a contested divorce on the ground of irreconcilable differences. Finding that no such statutory authority exists this Court reverses the Chancery Court of Stone County and remands the case for further proceedings.
I.
Penny J. Alexander filed a complaint for divorce, alimony, and property settlement against her husband, Bobbie Gerald Alexander, on the grounds of adultery, habitual cruel and inhuman treatment, and, in the alternative, irreconcilable differences. A cross-complaint was filed by the husband seeking a divorce on the same three grounds. No property settlement agreement was reached. At the conclusion of the contested trial, the chancellor granted to the wife a divorce announcing, in part, his opinion:
While clear proof of the second listed ground under Section 93-5-1 of the Mississippi Code of 1972, as amended, was presented against the defendant, the Court is of the opinion that a divorce upon the ground of irreconcilable differences is warranted under the facts of this case and should be awarded. The Court is of the opinion that alimony is not warranted because the plaintiff is well-educated, intelligent, and is employed in a good job where she now earns more than the defendant. Her situation in life is the basic reason for awarding a "no-fault" divorce instead of a divorce upon another ground.
A property settlement was also ordered by the trial judge.
Mrs. Alexander appeals to this Court asserting as error the granting of the divorce on the ground of irreconcilable differences, rather than on the ground of adultery.
II.
The Mississippi Legislature adopted irreconcilable differences as a thirteenth ground for divorce effective July 1, 1976. However, to utilize such ground, prescribed procedures were set forth in Miss.Code Ann. § 93-5-2 (Supp.1985).
Divorce from the bonds of matrimony may be granted on the ground of irreconcilable differences, but only upon the joint bill of the husband and wife or a bill of complaint where the defendant has been personally served with process or where the defendant has entered an appearance by written waiver of process. No divorce shall be granted on the ground of irreconcilable differences unless the court shall find in its decree that the parties have made adequate and sufficient provision by written agreement for the custody and maintenance of any children of that marriage and for the settlement of any property rights between the parties. The agreement may be incorporated in the decree, and such decree may be modified as other decrees for divorce. Bills for divorce on the ground of irreconcilable differences must have been on file for sixty (60) days before being heard. A joint bill of husband and wife or a bill of complaint where the defendant has been personally served with process or where the defendant has entered an appearance by written waiver of process, for divorce solely on the ground of irreconcilable differences, shall be taken as confessed and a final decree entered thereon, pro confesso, as in other cases and without proof or testimony in term time or vacation, the provisions of section 93-5-17 to the contrary notwithstanding. No divorce shall be granted on the ground of irreconcilable differences where there has been a contest or denial; provided, however, that a divorce may be granted on the grounds of irreconcilable differences where there has been a contest or denial, if the contest or denial has been withdrawn or canceled by the party filing same by leave and order of the court. Irreconcilable differences may be asserted as a sole ground for divorce or as an alternate ground for divorce with any other cause for divorce set out in section 93-5-1.
Thus, married partners who could reconcile their property matters and satisfy the chancery court as to the adequacy of their agreement regarding custody and maintenance of children could obtain a divorce on the ground of irreconcilable differences.
The appellant argues that, without such written agreement regarding property, and with a contest as to the grounds, the chancery court acted beyond statutory authority-
On the other hand, appellee argues that no contest or denial existed as to the ground of irreconcilable differences, but only as to the grounds of adultery and habitual cruel and inhuman treatment. Ap-pellee contends that to accept the appellant's interpretation would require adding language to the statute. In that case the statute would necessarily read "no divorce shall be granted on the ground of irreconcilable differences where there has been a contest or denial" [of any of the twelve alternate grounds for divorce]. The inter pretation, appellee contends, should be as the statute is written. He notes also that the property division ordered by the court was the "express intention" of parties.
It is the opinion of this Court that the express intent of the statute requires that there be no contest or denial of any ground for divorce. It further requires:
(1) the filing of a bill (complaint) for divorce for sixty (60) days before being heard,
(2) notice to the other spouse, either by joinder in the bill (complaint), personal service of process, or a written waiver of process,
(3) a written agreement by the parties prior to entry of a final decree concerning settlement of any property rights of the parties, and
(4) a written agreement by the parties prior to the final decree concerning the custody and maintenance of any children of that marriage, subject to modification and the finding by the chancery court that agreements are adequate and sufficient with regard to the children.
In the case sub judice, there was no written agreement of the parties regarding their property rights as required by the statute. This Court adopts the language of the specially concurring opinion in Gallaspy v. Gallaspy, 459 So.2d 283, 287 (Miss.1983) wherein the opinion stated:
The chancery court has no authority to grant a divorce on the grounds of irreconcilable differences unless the parties have reached [a written] agreement on all financial matters.
Additionally, the filing of a cross-complaint by appellee amounted to a contest or denial until withdrawn or canceled by leave and order of the chancery court.
This Court therefore holds that the chancery court exceeded its authority in granting a divorce on the ground of irreconcilable differences in this cause, and that this cause should be reversed and remanded to the Stone County Chancery Court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
ROY NOBLE LEE and HAWKINS, P.JJ., and DAN M. LEE, SULLIVAN and ANDERSON, JJ., concur.
ROBERTSON, J., concurring by separate written opinion.
WALKER, C.J., and GRIFFIN, J., not participating.