Case Name: CHARLES MAYNE v. THOMAS A. JONES, FRANCIS E. WEYGANT, and MICHAEL COOK
Court: Supreme Court of California
Jurisdiction: California
Decision Date: 1868
Citations: 34 Cal. 483
Docket Number: 
Parties: CHARLES MAYNE v. THOMAS A. JONES, FRANCIS E. WEYGANT, and MICHAEL COOK
Judges: 
Reporter: California Reports
Volume: 34
Pages: 483–491

Head Matter:
CHARLES MAYNE v. THOMAS A. JONES, FRANCIS E. WEYGANT, and MICHAEL COOK
Who may be Removed under Writ of Restitution.—A party and her tenants, coming into possession of lands, after an action brought to recover possession, under a prior unrecorded deed from two of the defendants in the action, of which plaintiff had no notice when the action was commenced, were properly dispossessed under a writ of restitution, issued on a judgment for plaintiff in said action.
Idem—Setting Aside Return to Writ.—A motion made to set aside the return to the writ, showing the dispossession of said party and her tenants, and to reinstate them in possession, upon a showing of said facts, under the peculiar circumstances of the case disclosed by the record, was properly denied by the Court below. (Leese v. Claris, 29 Cal. 672, cited as authority, and error in report of that case corrected.) Idem.—Where a defendant, duly served in an action brought to recover possession of lands, was in possession of a portion of the demanded premises as guardian of an infant who held an unrecorded conveyance thereof, of which plaintiff had no notice when the action was commenced : held, that such defendant, and the infant and her tenants, who entered subsequent to the commencement of the action, were properly dispossessed under a writ of restitution issued on a judgment for plaintiff in said action.
Appeal from the District Court, Twelfth Judicial District, City and County of San Francisco.
After the return of the Sheriff to the writ of restitution, issued on a judgment for plaintiff rendered in this action, showing that the plaintiff had been restored to the possession of every portion of the demanded premises, was filed, Mary Ann Cook, Michael Delany, and B. B. ¡Newman, moved in the Court below to set aside said return and to be reinstated in their possession of portions of the lands described in said judgment, the former (Mary Ann Cook) claiming to be the owner in fee of said portions, and, until evicted under said writ, to have been in possession, by herself and her tenants, and said Delany and ¡Newman claiming to have been in possession as the said tenants of said Cook. The motion was denied by the Court below, and Mary Ann Cook, Michael Delany, and B. B. ¡Newman appealed.
The other facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
W. G. Burnett, for Appellants.
The motion should have been granted. The suit of Mayne v. Jones did not, and could not, affect third parties not parties to the record nor privy to the judgment recovered therein. (Watson v. Dowling, 26 Cal. 125; Tevis v. Ellis, 25 Cal. 516; LeRoy v. Rogers, 30 Cal. 229; Jackson v. Rathbone, 3 Cow. 293; Jackson v. Van Bergin, 1 Johns. Cas. 101; 5 Cow. 418; 3 Wilson, 49; Adams on Eject. 341; Leese v. Clark, 29 Cal. 664; Fogarty v. Sparks, 22 Cal. 142; Bloom v. Burdick, 1 Hill, 130.) The infancy of Mary Ann Cook constituted no barrier to granting the motion. (Van Bramer v. Cooper, 2 Johns. 279; Oliver v. Handlet, 13 Mass. 157; Austin v. Charleston Female Seminary, 8 Met. 196; Eagle Fire Company v. Lent, 6 Paige, 635; Lind v. Beed, 2 Paige, 191.) It was not necessary for the infant, Mary Ann Cook, to appear by guardian. (Garr v. Drake, 2 Johns. 542; Williamson v. Storrs, 6 Johns. 353.) See, also, the case of Allison v. Taylor's Heirs, 3 B. Mon. 363-68, as to the scrupulous care and watchful vigilance with which Courts guard the rights of infants. As to the purchase of property by infants, see Boyden v. Boyden, 9 Met. 519; Boody v. McKeenny, 20 Me. 317; Hubbard v. Cummings, 1 Greenl. 11; Bac. Ab., Infancy, 1, 4.
Ho one but the infant himself, or his legal representatives, can avoid his voidable deed or contract. (2 Kent’s Com. 236; Van Bramer v. Cooper, 2 Johns. 279; Jackson v. Todd, 6 Johns. 257; Oliver v. Hondlittle, 13 Mass. 237.)
An infant may take upon himself the obligation of surety. (Hinely v. Margarets, 3 Barr. 428; Curtain v. Patton, 11 Serg. & Rawle, 305, 310.) May confess a judgment or suffer a decree to pass without the interposition of an attorney ad litem. (Parter’s Heirs v. Robinson, 3 Marsh. 253; Austin v. Charleston Female Seminary, 8 Met. 196, 203; Bloom v. Burdick, 1 Hill, 131, 143; Barber v. Granes, 18 Vt. 292.) May bind himself in a recognizance for another. (Pachin v. Cronach, 13 Vt. 330.) Convey his estate by deed or exchange. (Bood v. Mix, 8 Wendell, 120, 131; Eagle Fire Insurance Company v. Lent, 6 Paige, 635; Gillet v. Standly, 1 Hill, 121, 125; Darra v. Coombs, 6 Greenleaf, 189; Wheaton v. Fast, 5 Yerger, 41; Cole v. Pennoyer, 14 Illinois, 161.) May incumber his estate by mortgage or bond. (Boston Bank v. Chamberlain, 15 Mass. 222; Hubbard et al, Executors v. Cummings, 1 Greenleaf, 11; Lynn v. Budd, 2 Paige, 191; McGann v. Marshall, 9 Humphreys, 121, 126.) May bind himself by a negotiable note. (3 Wendell, 470; Reed v. Bachelder, 1 Metcalf, 550; Jefferson’s Adm’rs v. Reingold, 9 Ala. 544.) Or by the indorsement of a promissory note. (Nightingale v. Wettington, 16 Mass. 272, 274; Hardy v. Waters, 38 Maine, 450.) May bind himself to service. (12 Pickering, 110; 19 Pickering, 572.)
In Hastings v. Dollarhide, 24 Cal. 195, 207, the Court said: “ The rule is well settled that no one can take advantage of the fact of infancy except the infant himself, or his heirs or personal representatives.” As a general rule, the deed of an infant is not void, but voidable; this is the established doctrine of all modern decisions. An infant grantor can neither affirm nor disaffirm a conveyance of land during nonage until he attains the age of legal majority. (Zouch v. Parsons, 3 Burr. 1,794; see Boyden v. Boyden, 9 Metcalf, 519; Boody v. McKeenny, 23 Me. 517; Hubbard v. Greenleaf, Id. 11.) We consider the rule as given by Mr. Chancellor Kent, and adjudged in the 6 Conn., 8 Taunt., 9 Vermont, and 11 Humph., to be the rule of common law, as stated in Coke upon Litt., 51 B. p. 217.
We submit that there can be no doubt but what the judgment in the case of Mayne v. Jones could not be evidence for or against Mary Ann or Hewman in any proceeding whatever to which they may be a party, hence they cannot be affected in any manner by it. (Peterie v. Bugbee, 24 Cal. 419, 423.)
Williams §■ Thornton, for Respondent.
The evidence proves that Mary Ann Cook was never in possession until long after the suit was commenced, and it is not pretended that either Uewman or Delany were ever in possession until the action had been pending for some months. In such a case the law has been well settled by the decisions of this tribunal. (Long v. Neville, 29 Cal. 135; Leese v. Clark, 29 Cal. 671-72; Prac. Act, Sec. 263, cited and commented on in Long v. Neville; Howard v. Kennedy’s Executors, 4 Ala., N. S., 592-95; 29 Cal. 136, 671.)
Counsel for appellant seem to think that we are attributing to the judgment recovered in the action of Mayne v. Jones a conclusive effect as to Mary Ann Cook, and cites numerous authorities to show that it is not. There is no such point made by us in the cause, nor does it arise, (see 29 Cal. 672,) but we contend that the appellants were properly turned out of possession under the writ; which is a question entirely separate and apart from that of the conclusiveness of the judgment in Mayne v. Jones. (Jackson v. Tuttle, 9 Cow. 239; 4 Ala. 595.)

Opinion:
By the Court, Sawyer, J.:
It is very clear from the affidavits, that, at the time of the commencement of the suit, the appellant, Mary Ann Cook, then an infant of about seven years of age, was not in possession of the premises in dispute, or of any part of them. Without discussing the question, it is sufficient to say, we are, also, satisfied that she has presented no case that would justify the Court in this form of proceeding in restoring her to possession. The case is not like Watson v. Dowling, 26 Cal. 125, but is within the principle of Leese v. Clark, 29 Cal. 672.
We here take occasion to call attention to an error in the report of the latter case. The word " defendant" should be substituted for the word " plaintiff," in the ninth line from the bottom of page six hundred seventy-one.
Order affirmed.
[Note.—The foregoing opinion was delivered at the October Term, 1867.]
Mr. Justice Shaeier'expressed no opinion.