Case Name: Celia DENOFRE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. TRANSPORTATION INSURANCE RATING BUREAU, Defendant-Appellee
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 1976-03-26
Citations: 532 F.2d 43
Docket Number: No. 75-1507
Parties: Celia DENOFRE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. TRANSPORTATION INSURANCE RATING BUREAU, Defendant-Appellee.
Judges: Before SWYGERT and CUMMINGS, Circuit Judges, and EAST, Senior District Judge.
Reporter: Federal Reporter 2d Series
Volume: 532
Pages: 43–46

Head Matter:
Celia DENOFRE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. TRANSPORTATION INSURANCE RATING BUREAU, Defendant-Appellee.
No. 75-1507.
United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.
Argued Jan. 13, 1976.
Decided March 26, 1976.
Irving M. King, Chicago, Ill., for plaintiff-appellant.
Kalvin M. Grove, Chicago, Ill., for defendant-appellee.
Before SWYGERT and CUMMINGS, Circuit Judges, and EAST, Senior District Judge.
Honorable William G. East, Senior United States District Judge for the District of Oregon, sitting by designation.

Opinion:
PER CURIAM.
The plaintiff-appellant (Denofre) appeals from the Judgment of Dismissal of her cause entered by the District Court on March 3, 1975 following the granting of the defendant-appellee's (Bureau) Rule 41(b) motion to dismiss. We vacate the Judgment of Dismissal and remand.
In view of our ultimate disposition of this appeal, we deem it unnecessary to give a narrative of the evidence adduced in support of Denofre's alleged cause, except to say that Denofre was under the employment of the Bureau and was discharged from her employment.
Denofre seeks redress from alleged violation of various provisions of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. § 2000(e), et seq.) in that her:
(1) various changes of tasks and ultimate discharge from employment were in retaliation for her filing of charges of sex discrimination against the Bureau; and
(2) salary and other terms and conditions of her employment provided by the Bureau were inferior to those provided for male employees in substantially equivalent positions.
Denofre further seeks redress for Bureau's alleged breach of her contract of employment.
We believe the single issue on appeal is: Did the District Court substantially comply with the making of findings of fact and conclusions of law requirement of Rule 52(a) as necessitated by Rule 41(b)?
The Bureau joined issue with Denofre's complaint and the cause was tried to the District Court sitting without a jury. At the close of Denofre's presentation of her case in chief, the Bureau moved pursuant to Rule 41(b) for dismissal of the cause. The District Court declined to render any judgment until the close of all the evidence. At the close of all the evidence on behalf of each party, the Bureau renewed its earlier motion to dismiss, which was granted.
We are satisfied from our perusal of the evidentiary record submitted that the evidence of the parties in support of their respective positions was in conflict and the cause was required to be submitted to the District Court on its merits.
We agree that in reviewing the findings of fact entered by a District Court in support of its conclusions of law and ultimate judgment, this court is bound in its review by the "clearly erroneous" test under Rule 52(a). Zenith Corp. v. Hazeltine, 395 U.S. 100, 89 S.Ct. 1562, 23 L.Ed.2d 129 (1969). However, the difficulty we face is determining whether the District Court en- - tered any findings of specific evidentiary and ultimate facts which can be judiciously reviewed under the clearly erroneous rule in light of the evidence in the case.
The following oral statements entered by the District Court immediately upon the renewal of Bureau's Rule 41(b) motion are the only ones we glean from the record which constitute any semblance of findings of specific evidentiary or ultimate fact:
"The court finds that there is no violation or any discrimination on the basis of sex [more properly a conclusion of law], and the court further finds that the fact that she filed these complaints, she was not fired for those reasons, she was fired because her employer thought, apparently, that having hired a woman in the first place, having gone to some efforts to get her to come, having paid her substantially more than her predecessor of twenty-three years had been paid when she came there, and taking into consideration his statement that he will take into consideration her demand for a raise, that her services were unsatisfactory regardless of the fact that she is a woman, regardless of the fact that she made complaints to E.O.C., and for that reason your motion to dismiss at the end of all of the evidence is granted."
Thereafter Denofre moved for reconsideration, and the District Court entered its written order of denial stating:
"After reviewing all matters of record, I affirm my conclusion that Plaintiff failed to demonstrate at trial that her discharge from Defendant's employ was either the result of unlawful discrimination or an actionable breach of contract. In short, she simply did not present persuasive, credible evidence in support of her charges."
Rule 41(b) requires the District Court, rendering judgment on the merits against a plaintiff on a motion to dismiss, to "make findings as provided in Rule 52(a)." Rule 52(a) provides in such a situation that the District Court "shall find the facts specially and state separately its conclusions of law thereon, . .
We hold that substantial compliance with the fact-finding requirements of Rule 52(a) necessitates that the findings of fact on the merits include as many of the subsidiary facts as are necessary to disclose to the reviewing court the steps by which the trial court reached its ultimate conclusion on each factual issue. 9 Wright and Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2579, at 710, n. 31, citing Dearborn Nat. Cas. Co. v. Consumers Petroleum Co., 164 F.2d 332, 333 (7th Cir. 1947). Cf. United States v. Shaheen, 445 F.2d 6, 10 (7th Cir. 1971).
The only findings of fact in anywise made and entered by the District Court were those as expressed in the foregoing oral statement and written order of denial of Denofre's motion to reconsider which fail to disclose to us the steps .by which the District Court reached its ultimate conclusion on each factual issue.
We conclude that the District Court did not substantially comply with the findings of fact and conclusions of law requirements of Rule 52(a) as necessitated by Rule 41(b).
The Judgment of Dismissal entered by thé District Court is vacated and the cause is remanded to the District Court for the making and entering of findings of fact and conclusions of law upon the evidentiary record as now made, or further properly extended and amplified, in conformity with Rule 52(a).
JUDGMENT VACATED AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.