Case Name: Alejandro GARZA, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee
Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1981-03-25
Citations: 633 S.W.2d 508
Docket Number: No. 60426
Parties: Alejandro GARZA, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.
Judges: Before ONION, P. J., and ROBERTS and ODOM, JJ.
Reporter: South Western Reporter Second Series
Volume: 633
Pages: 508–520

Head Matter:
Alejandro GARZA, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.
No. 60426.
Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, Panel 1.
March 25, 1981.
On Rehearing May 26, 1982.
Ernesto Acevedo, Jr., San Antonio, for appellant.
Bill M. White, Dist. Atty., Wayne Hampton, Teófilo C. Chapa and Anton Paul Ha-jek, III, Asst. Dist. Attys., San Antonio, Robert Huttash, State’s Atty., Alfred Walker, Asst. State’s Atty., Austin, for the State.
Before ONION, P. J., and ROBERTS and ODOM, JJ.

Opinion:
OPINION
ODOM, Judge.
This is an appeal from a conviction for attempted burglary. Punishment, enhanced by allegation and proof of two prior felony convictions, is life.
In his first ground of error appellant contends it was error for the trial court not to suppress the in-court identification by witnesses Rosado and Garcia. After a hearing on the motion to suppress, the trial court denied the motion, and subsequently both witnesses identified appellant before the jury as the individual they saw break a window of the premises where the burglary was attempted.
Our review of the testimony heard at the motion to suppress shows that Ms. Garcia heard glass breaking next door to where she lived. Ms. Rosado, whose residence was the object of the offense, was at Ms. Garcia's home at the time. Both ladies stepped outside and saw two forms on the porch of Rosado's house. They yelled at the two would-be burglars, asking what they were doing, whereupon the intruders walked from the scene. Ms. Garcia followed them a short distance to see what direction they were going, then returned to the house.
Within minutes the police arrived. The two witnesses gave a general description of the persons they had seen: thin, not too tall and not too short, in their late teens or early twenties, both dressed in dark shirts, one in dark pants and the other in light pants. Two officers went in the direction that the witnesses had seen the offenders depart, while a third officer interviewed the witnesses at the scene. Within minutes appellant and his companion were stopped a few blocks from the scene because they matched the general description given by the witnesses, and were immediately returned to the scene for possible identification. Before they arrived at the scene, however, the officer told them that two suspects were being brought back, and asked them if they were sure about the age of-the suspects. Garcia testified they told the officer they could not say the age for sure because they did not get a clear view of the offenders and that they were unable to give a positive identification.
When appellant and his companion were brought to the scene, Garcia and Rosado positively identified them as the persons they had seen attempting the burglary. They also testified, however, that they identified them on the basis of the clothing they were wearing, and admitted they had not been able to see their faces.
Each case must be judged on its own facts. Sutton v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 495 S.W.2d 912, 916. The record convinces us that Rosado and Garcia were not able to identify appellant at trial on the basis of their observations of the individuals at the time of the offense. At best the evidence shows that when appellant was brought to the scene of the offense, he was identified on the basis of the clothing he was wearing, and that any identification in court was on the basis of the witnesses' observations of him after his arrest, and not at the time of the offense.
Although it is true that the fact that a witness is not positive of his identification goes to the weight of his testimony, not to its admissibility, Valenciano v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 511 S.W.2d 297, this case does not present an incident in which less than positive identification was introduced. In her testimony before the jury Ms. Rosado was positive that appellant was one of the men she saw committing the offense:
"Q. Can you positively tell us whether or not Mr. Garza was, in fact, standing by that window at 416 E. Carson?
"A. Yes, he was, and the other man, too, both holding onto the window, and glass falling on the ground. That's when I hollered at them to stop breaking those windows, that I lived there."
Despite the uncertainty of the identification demonstrated earlier in this opinion, the trial court denied the motion to suppress the in-court identification of appellant, and permitted Rosado to make this positive identification. The positive identification of appellant as the person seen committing the offense was patently unreliable, as demonstrated by the witness' testimony at the hearing on the motion to suppress, and it should not have been admitted.
We hold it was reversible error to deny the motion to suppress, to admit the in-court identification.
The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded.
Before the Court en banc.
. We here set out excerpts from the record that clearly demonstrate these facts. Rosado testified:
"Q. When did you first see Alejandro Garza?
"A. Well, I saw him when he was breaking the windows, but I didn't see his face, like I told you. Then the first time I saw his face was when they brought them back. I could see that they had the same clothes on.
"Q. So you don't know for a fact if Mr. Alejandro Garza did, in fact, break that window; is that right?
"A. Well, yes. I didn't see his face, like I told you. The first time I saw him, I just saw him from the back, and when he walked away, because both of them, they had their hands hanging like that when they walked away.
"Q. OK. Now when you first saw Alejandro Garza that night, where was he?
"A. The first time?
"Q. Yes.
"A. Breaking the windows.
"Q. Well, it could have been someone else with the same type of clothes; couldn't it?
"A. I don't know.
"Q. Because you didn't see the face; did you?
"A. No, I didn't see the face....
*
"Q. OK. Now let me ask you this. You gave a description earlier. What was the description of the clothing you said you saw on two men?
"A. One had white pants and a dark shirt, and the other one had dark pants and a dark shirt.
"Q. OK, and you are sure about that now?
"A. Yes.
"Q. OK, let me ask you this. Did you, yourself, give any physical description to the officers?
"A. All I did was I told them how they were dressed, and that they looked slim.
*
"Q. OK. Now is your identification based upon the fact that the police officers brought Mr. Garza back and Mr. Honeycutt back to the scene for you to get another look at them?
"A. Well, they brought them back for us to look at them.
"Q. And is your identification based upon that fact, that that's who you are claiming they were, the men, when they were brought back to you?
"A. All I can tell you is the men they brought back had the same description, clothing, we gave them.
"Q. OK, but you honestly can't say they were the same two men that were at the window?
"A. Because I couldn't see their faces very well.
"Q. OK, but they had similar clothing? That's all you are saying; is that correct?
"A. Yes.
"Q. But your identification at the scene is based upon—
"A. Their clothing.
"Q. The two gentlemen being brought back by the police officers; is that correct? Could you answer that?
"A. Well, they brought the same men with the same description we gave them, of clothing.

Q. OK. In other words, you are saying, 'These are the same two men I saw,' you told the officers, just based solely on the clothing, that it was similar?
"A. The same clothes and the same description I gave them, that they looked slim.
"Q. OK. Based upon the two men being brought back by the officers; right?
"A. Uh huh."