Case Name: STEVENS et ux. v. VANCLEVE
Court: United States Circuit Court for the District of New Jersey
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 1822-04
Citations: 23 F. Cas. 35
Docket Number: 
Parties: STEVENS et ux. v. VANCLEVE.
Judges: 
Reporter: Federal Cases
Volume: 23
Pages: 35–40

Head Matter:
Case No. 13,412. -
STEVENS et ux. v. VANCLEVE.
[4 Wash. C. C. 262.]
Circuit Court, D. New Jersey.
April Term, 1822.
Evidence — Materiality — Hearsay —Wills— Competency op Testatok — Time op Making — Presumption op Sanity — Signing.
1. Question upon the validity of a will and i-estament. The defendant's counsel offered evidence to prove that a former will, executed by the testator, had been purloined by the plaintiff. This evidence is improper, as it is not pretended that the contents of that will are to be proved, as the plaintiff relies altogether on the validity of another and subsequent will.
2. The declarations of a party to a deed or will, whether prior or subsequent to its execution, are nothing more than hearsay evidence; and nothing could be more dangerous than their admission as evidence, either to control the construction of the instrument, or to support or destroy its validity.
[Cited in Caeman v. Van Harke, 33 Kan. 338, 6 Pac. 624; Comstock v. Hadlvme Ecclesiastical Soe., 8 Conn. 264; Collagan v. Burns, 57 Me. 471; Couch v. Eastham, 27 W. Va. 803; Dickie v. Carter. 42 111. 389. Distinguished in Dinges v. Branson, 14 W. Va. 114; French v. French, Id. 507. Cited in brief in Gibson v. Gibson. 24 Mo. 228. Cited in Herster v. Herster. 122 Pa. St. 256, 16 Atl. 346. Cited in brief in Hoshauer v. Hoshauer, 20 Pa. St. 400. Cited in Kitchell v. Beach, 35 N. J. Eq. 454. Cited in brief in Kenyon v. Ashbridge, 35 Pa. St. 159.-Cited in Lewis v. Douglass, 14 R. I. 607; Linton’s Appeal, 104 Pa. St. 238: Mooney v. Olsen. 22 Kan. 76. Distinguished in Neel v. Potter, 40 Pa. St. 484. Cited in brief in Robinson v. Adams, 02 Me. 381; Robinson v. Brewster, 140 Ill. 655, 30 N. E. 683.]
3. What constitutes a sound and disposing mind or memory in a person making a will.
[Cited in brief in American Bible Soc. v. Price, 115 Ill. 625. 5 N. E. 120. Cited in Bennett v. Bennett, 50 N. J. Eq. 446, 26 Atl. 573. Cited in brief in Brinkman v. Rueggesick, 71 Mo. 553; Hovey v. Hobson, 55.Me. 269; Hovey v. Chase, 52 Me. 309. Cited in Lee’s Case, 46 N. J. Eq. 201, 18 Atl. 528; In re Pensyl’s Will, 157 Pa. St. 405. 27 Atl. 672; Reynolds v. Adams, 90 Ill. 149; Rusling v. Rusling. 36 N. J. Eq. 607: White v. Starr, 47 N. J. Eq. 258, 20 Atl. 880.]
4. The only point of time to be looked to by a jury, who are to decide upon the competency of a testator to make a will, is that when the will was executed.
[Cited iu Turner v. Hand, Case No. 14.257.]
[Cited in Craig v. Southard. 148 111. 45, 35 N. E. 361; Greer v. Greers. 9 Grat. 333; Harden v. Hays. 9 Pa. St. 103: Wilson v. Mitchell. 101 Pa. St. 503: Waddington v. Buzby. 45 N. J. Eq. 174, 16 Atl. 601; Toe v. McCord, 74 Ill. 45.]
5. What is the nature of the evidence, and how it is to be estimated, in relation to proof of the execution of a will.
6. Construction of the statute of New Jersey relative to the execution of wills.
7. The will in this case was upon strictly legal principles, signed by the testator, his hand being, with his own consent, guided by another, and the will afterwards acknowledged by him.
[Cited in Blair v. Sayre. 29 W. Va. 613. 2 S. E. 97. Cited in brief in Vandruff v. Rine-hart, 29 Pa. St. 233.]
8. The presumption of law is always in favour of the sanity of the person whose will is brought into question, at the time the will was executed; and the burthen of proof lies upon the person who asserts unsoundness of mind: unless a previous state of insanity has been established; in which case the burthen is shifted to him who claims under the will.
[Cited in brief in Farrell v. Brennan, 32 Mo. 331; Hill v.'Hill, 53 Vt. 579; Williams v. Robinson, 42 Vt. 661.]
The plaintiffs [John Stevens and wife] claim one third of the land in controversy, in right of the female plaintiff as one of the heirs of Benjamin Vancleve deceased, and one other third part under a deed from Dr. Clark and his wife, the latter being also a daughter and one of the heirs of the deceased. The defendant ÍJoseph W. Vancleve] is the son of the deceased, who claims the whole of the land under an instrument purporting to be the last will and testament of ..Benjamin Vaneleve. The cause turned altogether upon the validity of this instrument, which, it was contended by the plaintiffs’ counsel, 1. Was not executed according to the requisitions of the laws of New Jersey; and 2. That the said Benjamin Vaneleve, at the time he executed the alleged will, was not of sound and disposing mind and memory.
The following summary contains the substance of the evidence as declared in the charge to the jury: Mrs. Pharis, one of the attesting witnesses, deposed, that, on the morning of Sunday, the 24th of August, 1817, she was at the house of Benjamin Vaneleve, (who was then in bed, having been struck by the palsy some time early in the month of June preceding, which entirely disabled one half of his bodj-) and heard the defendant inform his father, that the will he had executed in the year 1814 was missing; but that he had a copy ot it, and inquired of his father if he would execute that as his will? To which his father answered, “Ves.” That upon receiving the above information, he appeared to rouse up like a person from a deep sleep, and asked, “Who has taken it?” The defendant then sent for John Pharis, and after his arrival, the defendant read over to his father the copy of the will distinctly, section by section, and asked him. at the end of each, if he understood it? To which he replied, “Yes.” He was then asked, if John Pharis should steady his hand whilst he signed his name? To which he answered, “Yes. 1 wish him to do it.” John Pharis did accordingly steady his hand, and with this assistance, he signed his name to the will. After this was done, Pharis told him that he must acknowledge the will; upon which, the testator put his finger on the seal, and the witness heard him say, “last will and testament:” — having .moved her position at the moment, she did not hear the first part of the sentence. The witness further stated it as her opinion, that Benjamin Vaneleve was, at the time, in his right mind, and understood what he was doing, and that he was capable of dictating his will. She added, that he could articulate so as that she could understand him very well when he spoke; and that he frequently, when she visited him, prior to this period, after the stroke of the palsy, inquired respecting her own health, and that of her family. She further. proved her own signature to the will, and that of the other two attesting witnesses, made in the presence of the testator, and of each other. She stated that, after the will was executed, she saw the defendant, who sat on the bed by her father, conversing with him, but that she did not attend to what was said. She saw the father’s lips move, and heard his voice.
The evidence of the two other subscribing witnesses, and also of Mary Vaneleve, a granddaughter of the testator, who resided in his family, and who was present when the will was executed, corresponds in every material circumstance with that- above detailed. Two of them heard the testator distinctly say, “I acknowledge that (his finger being placed on the seal) to be my last will and testament.” John Pharis stated, that he was asked if he acknowledged that to be his last will and testament, and that he answered “Yes, I do.” This witness further added, that the testator seemed more revived that day than he had seen him for some weeks; that he does not think that he was capable of disposing of his property by deed, or of dictating and forming a whole will at one time, being too weak for so great an effort; but that he was capable of remembering what he had done at former times, and what disposition he then wished to make of his property. That he spoke very little; only in few words at a time, and then in answer to questions; but that he understood every thing that was proposed to him, and what he was doing, as well as a man could, who was in a weak state.
In support of this testimony, the defendant examined a number of witnesses, who stated that they had seen the testator at different times, before and after his last sickness; that his memory had failed considerably as to names and persons, and recent events; but that he spoke, asked questions, particularly as to the health of those who called to see him; and that in their opinion, he was, when they saw him, of sound mind and memory. On the other side, a great number of witnesses were examined, who deposed that the memory of the testator was greatly impaired, even before the last stroke of the palsy.- That he would ask foolish questions, and inquire the names of his former acquaintances who called to see him. Upon one occasion, he inquired how a particular acquaintance of his was, and being answered that he was dead, he not long af-terwards expressed a wish to see him. At another time, he mistook one of his nieces for a granddaughter who had long- before been dead. Many similar instances of a great decay in his memory, w-ve .stated by these witnesses. That after the last stroke of the palsy, they never heard him speak, although he would sometimes make a noise, as if he desired to speak; that when they called to -see him, he lay as if in a state of insensibility, with a vacant stare, and apparently unconscious of any thing; neither speaking to, nor noticing those who addressed him, not even his own daughters. That he was entirely childish, as well as helpless, and was treated as if he had been an infant. These witnesses all concur in opinion that the testator was at no time, during his last sickness, competent to make a will, or to transact any other kind of business, and that his mind and judgment were entirely prostrated.
Some evidence was given of declarations by two of the attesting witnesses, Mr. Pharis and Stephen Johnson, contradictory of their evidence given on oath, as to the capacity of the testator to make his will; in particular, that the hand of the testator, instead of being steadied by John Pharis, was guided, and the name in fact written by him. Some of the witnesses examined for the plaintiffs sat up with the testator at different times during his sickness, and others merely called for a few minutes to see him and to inquire respecting his health.
During the trial, the defendant’s counsel offered evidence to prove that the original will, executed by the testator in 1814, when his capacity was not questioned, had been purloined by the female plaintiff.
[Originally published from the MSS. of Hon. Bushrod Washington, Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, under the supervision of Richard Peters, Jr., Esq.]

Opinion:
BY
THE COURT.
Such evidence is improper, as it is not pretended by the counsel, that they mean to prove the contents of that will, and to rest their defence upon it. On the contrary, they rely altogether, as they avow, upon the validity of the will executed on the 24th of August 1S17; and consequently the question respecting its validity cannot in any manner be fairly affected by the evidence offered in respect to the will of 1814. The only tendency of such evidence would be to prejudice the minds of the jury, and to lead them from the question which they have to decide.
The defendant's counsel also offered evidence to prove that the uniform declarations of the testator in favour of the defendant, from the year 1802, had been consistent with the disposition made of his property by the will of 1817. This was objected to, as being inapplicable to the only question in the cause, — the competency of the testator to make his will; the counsel for the" plaintiffs disavowing any intention to charge the defendant with fraud, or improper conduct in obtaining the will. Parol evidence to vary or explain a deed or will, except in a case of a latent ambiguity, or of fraud in obtaining a will, is inadmissible. 1 Johns. Eng. Ch. 231, 234 : 2 P. Wms. 214; Thomas v. Thomas, 6 Term R. 671; 1 Fonbl. Eq. 70; 2 Vern. 624; Smith v. Fenner [Case No. 13,-046]; 2 Johns. 31; 2 South. [5 N. J. Law] 655.
On the. other side it was insisted that, up-' on the question of competency, it might be very material to show that the testator had long contemplated the disposition of his property in the manner designated .by his will; as in that case, a smaller grade of memory might be requisite, than would be if such a disposition had not been previously arranged in the mind of the testator. Harrison v. Rowan [Case No. 6,142], in this court; 1 Yeates, 108; 2 Yeates, 46; 1 Hen. & M. 476, 478; 3 Hen. & M. 502, 510; 1 Bay, 335.
WASHINGTON. Circuit Justice.
The declarations of a party to a deed or will, whether prior or subsequent to its execution, are nothing more than hearsay evidence; and nothing could be more dangerous than the admission of it, either to control the con-, struction of the instrument, or to support or destroy its validity. If the evidence is offered in support of the instrument, it could only have that effect upon the supposition of a uniform consistency of those declarations, not only with the instrument itself, but with the secret intentions of the party, at all times after those declarations were made; and yet how unsafe a criterion would this be, when most men will acknowledge the frequent changes of their intentions respecting the disposition of their property by will, before they have committed them to writing. The uniform consistency of those declarations, is the chief ground upon which the whole argument in favor of the evidence is rested; and yet, if the evidence be admitted at all, the plaintiffs would be at full liberty to prove opposing declarations of the testator at other times; and thus a door would be open to an inquiry in no respect pertinent to the main subject of investigation, but mischievously calculated to . perplex and to mislead the jury. That such evidence has sometimes been given, is proved by many of the eases read by the defendant's counsel; but it would be very unsafe to consider those instances as laying down a rule of law, since, in none of them, was an objection made to the admission of the evidence, so as to submit its competency to judicial inquiry and decisions. The general rule of law is against the evidence, and no case has been cited showing an exception to it, unless when it was offered to repel a charge of fraud, or circumvention of the devisee in obtaining the will. But in this case the plaintiffs' counsel disavows any intention to impute to the defendant a charge of this sort. The evidence is therefore inadmissible.