Case Name: Joseph B. KLING, Jr., Plaintiff-Appellee, v. U. S. FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY and T. Frank Smith, Defendants-Appellants
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1962-05-21
Citations: 146 So. 2d 635
Docket Number: No. 5564
Parties: Joseph B. KLING, Jr., Plaintiff-Appellee, v. U. S. FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY and T. Frank Smith, Defendants-Appellants.
Judges: Before ELLIS and HERGET, JJ., and MILLER, J. pro tem.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 146
Pages: 635–642

Head Matter:
Joseph B. KLING, Jr., Plaintiff-Appellee, v. U. S. FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY and T. Frank Smith, Defendants-Appellants.
No. 5564.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana. First Circuit.
May 21, 1962.
On Rehearing Nov. 9, 1962.
Taylor, Porter, Brooks, Fuller & Phillips, by Tom Phillips and Wm. A. Norfolk, Baton Rouge, for appellants.
Durrett, Hardin, Hunter, Dameron & Fritchie by Calvin E. Hardin, Jr., Baton Rouge, for appellee.
Before ELLIS and HERGET, JJ., and MILLER, J. pro tem.

Opinion:
MILLER, Judge pro tem.
This is an action for damages arising out of a fight between two dogs, one, a Boxer and the other, a Toy Terrier. The encounter resulted in the death of the Toy Terrier, whose owner, J. B. Kling, Jr., is suing the owner of the Boxer, T. Frank Smith and Smith's insurer, U. S. Fire Insurance Company, in tort for damages. The trial court gave judgment for the plaintiff in the amount of $555.00 and the defendants have appealed.
The facts surrounding the incident itself are not in dispute. Plaintiff and defendant lived in the same general neighborhood in the City of Baton Rouge. The plaintiff owned a 9 pound Toy Terrier dog named "Penny" and the defendant owned a 75 pound Boxer named "Mike". The only eye witness to a portion of the fracas was one Elnora Lewis, a domestic servant who worked for a neighbor of both the plaintiff and defendant.
On January 25, 1960, while Mrs. Lewis was hanging up clothes, she heard some dogs barking. Upon investigation she discovered the defendant's Boxer chasing the plaintiff's Toy Terrier. She first thought they were playing but when she saw the Boxer grab the Toy Terrier and commence shaking him, she ran next door for help. The fight was stopped and the Toy Terrier was taken to the Veterinarian in serious condition suffering from lacerations, a hemorrhage in the lung and a ruptured spleen. The Toy Terrier died during the night.
In his petition the plaintiff alleged that defendant knowingly harbored a vicious and dangerous dog. Defendant denied these allegations and in the alternative entered special pleas of assumption of risk and contributory negligence based upon plaintiff's allowing his small dog to run. at large in a neighborhood of dogs.
Was the Boxer a vicious and dangerous animal, and if so, did his owner, the-defendant, have knowledge of these dangerous propensities? In an effort to answer this double-barrelled question and' thus establish negligence on the part of defendant, plaintiff offers four incidents-occurring prior to the instant one which he contends support an affirmative answer to these questions.
Incident Number 1. Mrs. Robert C.. Cox, a neighbor, testified that the defendant's Boxer chased and caught her tomcat. When Mrs. Cox came upon the scene, the Boxer was lying on the ground with the cat in its mouth. Mrs. Cox, with a hammer in one hand, broom in the other and "screaming like a banshee" routed the Boxer and recovered her cat. Regarding the cat's condition, Mrs. Cox had this to say, "He was not badly injured, strange to say, but he was sore and shook for several days, but he recovered." Mrs-Cox declined Mr. Smith's offer of veterinary assistance.
Incident Number 2. A small child in the neighborhood reported to Mr. Smith that his Boxer had killed one of her kittens. Upon investigating the matter, the defendant learned that the kitten was killed at a time when his dog was in a Veterinarian's Kennel being kept while the defendant was on a vacation. Furthermore, the defendant showed his dog to the girl who stated that this was not the one that had killed her kitten.
Incident Number 3. The defendant received a report from a neighbor, Mrs. Blackmon, to the effect that her child had been bitten by his Boxer. Mr. Smith's investigation revealed that the child had been sitting on top of the dog's head trying to take something from the dog's mouth. ' Mr. Smith testified that he believed the mark made on the Blackmon child was made by a protrusion of the dog's collar. Suffice it to say that the bite, if it was a bite, was only a scratch. No member of the Blackmon family appeared in court to testify.
Incident Number 4. While investigating the Blackmon incident, defendant "heard" that his Boxer was accused of biting a child of Mr. Ted C. McCullough, Jr., also a neighbor. Mr. McCullough testified that he did not see the dog bite the child and upon defendant's investigation he was advised that if the dog did bite the child the dog must have been protecting himself as apparently the children in the neighborhood had been playing with the dog at the time. At any rate, the skin was not broken and apparently the matter was not considered serious by the McCullough's as they had never notified the defendant of the incident.
Against the background of these four incidents we must consider the present state of the law in Louisiana in this area of concern. Briefly stated, to charge the owner of a domesticated animal with negligence it must be shown that the owner had previous knowledge of the vicious propensities of the animal. The vast majority of these cases involve injuries sustained by persons as a result of the attacks or actions of animals. Most of the incidents involved dogs and persons, children in particular. The only case cited by either counsel involving animals, was the case of Daspit v. Gallet, La.App., 69 So.2d 532, involving an alleged fight between two bulls. However, the finding in this case does not offer much help since the court concluded that the evidence was not sufficient to establish that the broken leg was caused by the actions of the defendant's bull. We don't have the same situation here because the defendant concedes that his Boxer killed the Toy Terrier.
In the very recent case of Espinosa v. Hill, La.App., 138 So.2d 12, this court sitting in another panel, gave an accurate summary of the Louisiana law in quoting from the case of Marsh v. Snyder, La.App., 113 So.2d 5, as follows:
" 'At common law, the theory that the owner of a domestic animal did not have any property rights therein was perhaps the basis for escaping liability for damages caused by the animal. Later the common law adopted the doctrine of scienter. Under this theory the defendant was liable in tort, if previous to the plaintiff's injury, he harbored an animal knowing it to be vicious. The jurisprudence emanating from a majority of American states has adopted the doctrine of scienter.
" 'The common law doctrine of scienter has been used by the civil courts in Louisiana only to the extent of establishing the fault or negligence of the owner of the animal. The jurisprudence relative to the liability of the owner or harborer of a vicious dog which injures someone is predicated on Article 2321 of the Civil Code of 1870, LSA. In connection with the rationale thereof, the judges have applied Article 2315 providing for liability for fault and Article 2316 providing for liability for negligence. A casual reading of the first line of Article 2321 reveals that it is couched in the most absolute terminology, to-wit: "The owner of an animal is answerable for the damages he has caused." This edict would, of itself, lead one to believe that liability of the owner of the animal could be incurred without fault. However in construing Article 2321 together with Articles 2315 and 2316, the appellate courts of this state have read the requirement of fault or negligence into Article 2321.
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" 'Animal mansuetae naturae are animals which have been domesticated by man for centuries, such as horses, sheep, goats, cows, and dogs; and they have come to be regarded as inherently safe. However, if they should become vicious or have by their previous history manifested a vicious temperament then the owner or har-borer thereof retains the animal at his peril.
" 'The burden of proving freedom from fault is placed upon the owner or harborer of the animal in a majority of the cases decided by the appellate courts of this state.' (Emphasis ours.)"
The concluding paragraph of this quote which places the burden of showing freedom from fault upon the defendant animal owner, requires some elaboration, particularly in a case involving animal against animal.
One must begin with the general principle that in all cases the plaintiff bears the burden of proving his claim by a preponderance of the evidence. In a case such as this, the plaintiff is and should be required to present a prima facia case of dangerous and vicious propensities in the animal in question. Once this has been established, then the burden of proving freedom from fault shifts to the animal owner who must then show that either (1) his domesticated animal is not a vicious and dangerous animal, or (2) if he is vicious and dangerous the defendant had no such knowledge prior to the incident forming the subject matter of the suit.
In the instant case, the trial court gave no written reasons for attaching liability to the defendant. Of necessity, we must conclude the trial judge found that the Boxer had exhibited vicious and dangerous propensities and that this was within the knowledge of the defendant prior to the instant occurrence. We disagree with the trial court in this finding.
The testimony regarding each of the four incidents previously discussed, establishes that defendant, Mr. Smith, had knowledge of these incidents and moreover had investigated each thoroughly. His good faith in this respect is particularly noted by his investigation of the McCullough incident, even though the Mc-Culloughs had never reported it to him. As to incident number 1, can it be said that a dog's inclination to chase and shake cats indicates "vicious and dangerous" propensities in the animal? We think not, particularly when we find that the dog did no physical injury to the cat after catching him. Incident number 2, involving the child's dead kitten, may be dismissed in view of defendant's uncontroverted testimony that the dog was locked up in the kennel at the time and also that the child said that the Boxer was not the culprit. Incidents 3 and 4 involving the McCullough and Blackmon children indicate that on each account the children were playing with the Boxer, in one case sitting upon the dog's head and attempting to remove something from its mouth. In neither case was there any significant injury — none which could not have been easily sustained through playfulness on the part of this large dog. Even as to the subject incident, we must note that there is no evidence to show how the fight started.
Having concluded that the Boxer was not a vicious and dangerous animal, all other considerations are moot. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is reversed and the plaintiff's suit is dismissed at his cost.
Reversed.