Case Name: GILBERT v. GLOBE & RUTGERS FIRE INS. CO.
Court: Oregon Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Oregon
Decision Date: 1918-09-17
Citations: 91 Or. 59
Docket Number: 
Parties: GILBERT v. GLOBE & RUTGERS FIRE INS. CO.
Judges: McBride, C. J., and Harris and Bean, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Oregon Reports
Volume: 91
Pages: 59–87

Head Matter:
Argued April 23, reargued July 16,
reversed and dismissed September 17, 1918,
rehearing denied February 11, 1919.
GILBERT v. GLOBE & RUTGERS FIRE INS. CO.
(174 Pac. 1161; 178 Pac. 358.)
Insurance — Time to Sue.
1. If insurer was estopped to plead time limitation by its promises to pay policy, the estoppel was removed when insured was notified that insurer denied liability and would contest, and upon receipt of such notice insured had a reasonable time in which to commence aetion.
Insurance — Time to Sue.
2. Insured’s estoppel to plead policy time limitation being removed by its notifying insured that it denied liability, insured’s suit was not brought within a reasonable time, where it was not brought until two years and eight months after such notification.
Insurance — Garnishment—Time Limitation in Policy.
3. Where policy required aetion thereon to be brought within one year of loss, the faet that insurer was garnished by creditor of insured pending settlement of loss, and refused to settle loss while garnishment proceeding was pending, did not amount to waiver of time limitation in policy.
[As to limitation of actions on fire insurance policies, see note in 28 Am. St. Rep. 583.]
ON REHEARING.
Insurance — Time Limitation of Policy — Estoppel to Plead — Nullification.
4. Where holder of fire policy, requiring action within year of loss, failed to commence aetion against insurer within 12 months after being notified insurer repudiated claim, his action was barred; any estoppel of insurer to plead time limitation effected by promises to pay policy having been nullified.
From Marion: Percy R. Kelly, Judge.
In Bano.
On June 14, 1912, for value, the defendant executed to plaintiff its certain standard fire insurance policy for $1,200 on a beach cottage in Gearhart Park. On October 2, 1912, while the policy was in force, the property was totally destroyed by fire. The defendant was promptly notified of the loss and about October 16, 1912, the plaintiff with T. C. Shankland as the adjuster of the defendant and at his request made a trip to Gearhart for the purpose of adjusting* the loss. Shankland fixed the amount of the loss at $1,531, and thereafter they returned together to Portland. The claim was never paid and outside of some personal interviews with the agent of the company and the writing of some letters to the home office insisting upon payment, nothing further was done by the plaintiff prior to the commencement of this action. Pending the adjustment of the loss, the representative of the Astoria Box and Lumber Company had a conference with Shankland, after which that company commenced an action against the plaintiff upon an alleged claim of about $500, sued out a writ of attachment and caused a garnishee process to be served upon the defendant to secure the claim.
Plaintiff commenced this action on June 29, 1916. The policy provides that in the event of loss the insured “within sixty days after the fire, unless such time is extended in writing by the company, shall render a statement to the company signed and sworn to by said insured,” as to certain matters and things therein required. It also provides:
“No suit or action on this policy for the recovery of any claim shall be sustainable in any court of law or equity until after the full compliance by the insured with all the foregoing requirements, nor unless commenced within twelve months next after the fire.”
In his complaint the plaintiff alleges that he kept and performed all of the terms and conditions of the policy by him to be kept and performed; that.after the garnishee process was served he demanded of defendant that it pay the amount of the policy; that “said demand was repeatedly made and said defendant herein represented that said payment would be made and said loss fully adjusted and settled as soon as said pretended garnishment proceedings had been determined and disposed of”; that “said representations and promises on the part of defendant in reference to said settlement of said loss were continued until after one year had elapsed from the date of said fire as herein set forth and alleged, and then, and after that date said company refused to make settlement of said loss or any part of said $1,200 absolutely”; that such representations and promises were made to deceive the plaintiff and that by reason thereof he did not commence his action “upon said policy within the time limit therein, to wit: one year; and said plaintiff believed said representations to be true and relying thereon, was induced thereby not to bring said action within said time aforesaid”; that such representations were false and fraudulent and were made without any purpose or intent of complying therewith and to deceive and mislead the plaintiff; that he relied thereon “and on account of said representations and said conduct defendant ought not now to be permitted to say that this action was not commenced within the time limited by said policy.”
To the complaint the defendant filed an amended answer, denying any and all of its material allega tions, except as to the issuance of the policy, and, among other grounds of defense and for a further and separate answer, alleged that the “proof of loss” was not made within sixty days after the fire, as provided for in the policy, and that the action was not commenced within the time specified by the terms of the policy.
To this answer the plaintiff filed a further and separate reply in which he alleged facts tending to show that the defendant was estopped to claim that “proof of loss” was not made within sixty days or to plead the time limitation in the policy, for the reasons that ‘ ‘ said representations and promises on the part of defendant in reference to said settlement of said loss were continued until after one year had elapsed from the date of said fire, as set forth and alleged in plaintiff’s complaint, and then, and not until then, said company refused to make settlement for said loss or any part thereof.”
A trial was had and the jury returned a verdict for the full amount of the policy, upon which judgment was entered and from which this appeal is taken.
Reversed and Dismissed.
For appellant there was a brief over the name of Messrs. Veazie, McCourt $ Veazie, with an oral argument by Mr. J. G. Veazie.
For respondent there was a brief with oral arguments by Mr. Carey F. Martin and Mr. Walter G. Winslow.
For authorities passing on the question of stipulation limiting time for suit on insurance policy, when begins to run, see notes in 47 L. R. A. 966; 48 L. R. A. (N. S.) 906. Reporter.

Opinion:
JOHNS, J.
We have twice carefully read the record. The plaintiff met the adjuster of the defendant at the scene of the fire, for the purpose of investigating and adjusting the amount of the loss, in going to and from which place he traveled 250 miles. It is very apparent from the record that the sole and only object of the plaintiff in meeting the adjuster at Gearhart was to ascertain and determine the amount of the loss, with a view of making the necessary proofs; otherwise, he would not have gone to the expense and trouble of making the trip.
The policy was for $1,200; the adjuster found that the loss was $1,531, hence the amount of the loss was adjusted. It is maintained that the plaintiff did not make any actual "proof of loss" as required by the terms and conditions of the policy. There is no evidence that the plaintiff ever requested or that the defendant ever furnished him any blanks for his "proof of loss." Fair dealing and business courtesy required that the defendant should aid and assist, rather than mislead and deceive him in the making of his "proof of loss," and it is very clear that the adjuster, Shankland, was far more interested in having the garnishee process of the Astoria Box and Lumber Company served on the defendant than he was in aiding and assisting the plaintiff; otherwise, there never would have been any question about such proof. But under the view that we have taken of this case, all such considerations become immaterial. The testimony shows that the plaintiff read over and knew the terms and conditions of the policy at the time of its receipt and it expressly provides that any action must be brought "within twelve months next after the fire." The fire occurred on October 2, 1912; this action was commenced on June 29,1916. The authorities are uniform in holding that a time limitation in which such an action shall be brought is valid if the time is reasonable, and that a twelve months' limitation is reasonable.
The plaintiff alleges in his complaint that one year after the fire the defendant "then refused to make said settlement for said loss, or any part of said sum of $1,200 absolutely"; and that "relying upon the alleged promises and by reason thereof, he did not bring his action within the twelve months; that the defendant ought not now to be permitted to say that this action was not commenced within the time limited by said policy." In substance, he makes the same allegations in his reply and as a witness he testifies to a conversation with the adjuster, Shankland, in the fall of 1913, in which the adjuster told him that he did not have any right to bring action, that he had lost his right if he ever had one; and also that up to the time of that conversation with Shankland in Portland in October, 1913, he relied upon the promises of the defendant that the policy would be paid when the garnishment proceedings were adjusted. Hence the plaintiff alleges in both his complaint and reply, and as a witness testifies, that at or about the time the year expired, he knew and was advised by the company that it denied all liability and would contest his claim, yet he did not commence his- action until at least two years and eight months after he received that information. In the face of such allegations and proof, we are of the opinion that when he acquired such knowledge he could not thereafter rely, and did not rely, upon such alleged promises or representations of the company. The plaintiff has not shown or alleged any excuse or reason for not bringing his action within a reasonable time after he received the information, on or about October 2, 1913, that his claim would be contested, or why he delayed bringing his action until June 29,1916.
Assuming that the defendant was estopped to plead the time limitation, the estoppel was removed when the plaintiff was notified that the defendant denied liability and would contest his claim, and upon receipt of such notice the plaintiff then had a reasonable time within which to commence his action: David v. Oakland Home Ins. Co., 11 Wash. 181 (39 Pac. 443); Phillips v. Union Central Life Ins. Co., 101 Fed. 33. The action was commenced on June 29, 1916, and under the facts disclosed by the record we hold as a matter of law that it was not commenced within a reasonable time after the defendant notified the plaintiff that it would contest his claim and deny liability, and for such reason the court should have directed the jury to return a verdict for the defendant. This decision is founded upon a contract and is not in conflict with, and is to be distinguished from, the opinion of Mr. Justice Benson in the case of Hood v. Seachrest, 89 Or. 457 (174 Pac. 734), which was founded upon the statute.
It is also shown by the record that the garnishee process was still pending at the time the action herein was commenced, and under the authority of Ripley v. Aetna Ins. Co., 30 N. Y. 136 (86 Am. Dec. 362), the fact that the defendant had been garnished and that by reason thereof it would not settle the loss while that pi'ocess was pending did not amount to a waiver of the time limitation in the policy, and the defendant would not be estopped. The judgment of the Circuit Court is reversed and the action is dismissed.
.Beversed and Dismissed.
Rehering denied February 11, 1919.