Case Name: Sigmund M. Mundt, as Administrator de bonis non of Martin M. Mundt, Deceased, Appellant, v. Gertrude Glokner, Respondent
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1897-12
Citations: 24 A.D. 110
Docket Number: 
Parties: Sigmund M. Mundt, as Administrator de bonis non of Martin M. Mundt, Deceased, Appellant, v. Gertrude Glokner, Respondent.
Judges: 
Reporter: Appellate Division Reports
Volume: 24
Pages: 110–116

Head Matter:
Sigmund M. Mundt, as Administrator de bonis non of Martin M. Mundt, Deceased, Appellant, v. Gertrude Glokner, Respondent.
Survival, of a cause of action based on negligence — when brought by an administrator it may, on his death, be continued by his successor in that office.
The right to maintain an action to recover for a wrongful act, neglect or default, resulting in the death of an intestate, is. by section 1902 of the Code of Civil Procedure, given to his administrator, and the latter section, when construed in connection with section 1903 of the same Code, providing that damages, when recovered in such an action, must be distributed by the administrator as if they were unbequeathed assets, indicates that the next of kin have no legal title to the cause of action. Hence, upon the death of an administrator, by whom the action has been duly instituted, who is also the father of the intestate and the person beneficially interested in the cause of action, the action may be continued by the administrator de bonis non of the intestate.
Van Brunt, P. J., and O’Brien, J., dissented.
Appeal by Sigmund M. Mundt, as administrator de bonis non of Martin M. Mundt, deceased, from a judgment of the Supreme Court in favor of the defendant, entered in the office of the clerk of the county of New York on the 19th day of April, 1897, upon the dismissal of the coinplaint upon the merits by direction of the court after a trial at the New York Trial Term ; also from an order entered in said clerk’s office on the 5th day of April, 1897, denying the plaintiff’s motion to set aside the direction of the court dismissing the complaint; also from an order entered in said clerk’s office on the 2d day of February, 1897, granting the defendant’s motion for leave to serve a supplemental answer, and also from an order entered in said clerk’s office on the 16th day of April, 1897, charging costs against the plaintiff personally.
A. Steckler, for the appellant.
M. B. Clarke, for the respondent.

Opinion:
Patterson, J.:
This action was originally brought by Edward M. Mundt, as administrator, to recover damages under the statute for the death of his intestate, alleged to have been caused by the negligence or fault of the defendant. It appeared in evidence that Edward M. Mundt was also the father of the deceased, and it was assumed that any recovery in the action would, of necessity, belong to him exclusively under the Statute of Distributions. Edward M. Mundt died, and the action was, by order, revived in the name of the present plaintiff as " administrator de bonis non, etc., of the decedent. The learned judge at the trial held the action to be altogether in tort — as it doubtless is — and that, the father being the only person who would be benefited under the statute by a recovery, the ordinary rule should apply, that, in actions to recover for wrongs to the person, the cause of action determines at the death, before judgment, of either the plaintiff or the defendant.
The decision of the question involved in this case does not depend solely upon the construction to be given to the words "next of bin," as they are used in section 1903 of the Code of Civil Procedure. By section 1902 of that Code the right to maintain an action to recover damages for a wrongful act, neglect or default, occasioning the death of a person under the circumstances mentioned in that section, is given to the executor or administrator of the deceased, and no one else owns that cause of action. No person as next of kin has any standing in court. It is purely a cause of action and right to sue conferred upon a representative, and it never has been anything other than that. Section 1903 of the Code provides that the damages recovered in such an action are exclusively for the benefit of the decedent's husband or wife and next of kin, and when they are collected they must be distributed by the plaintiff as if they were unbequeathed assets left in his hands after the payment, of all debts and expenses of administration. This section has been construed to mean that the cause of action given by it is not general assets of the intestate, is not subject to the payment of debts or the ordinary rules applicable to the settlement or administration of the estates of deceased persons. (Stuber v. McEntee, 142 N. Y. 200.) But the amount of a recovery is, nevertheless, something which goes to an executor or administrator as such, and is to be disposed of by him as such, but only in the particular way pointed out by the statute. In a few words, the cause of action is created by the statute, and by that alone. It never existed before the statute of 1847. The next of kin have no control of the action, and have no legal title to the cause of action. The executor or administrator is the real party in interest, and thus having the right of action he is authorized to proceed with that action and carry it to judgment, and, in case of a recovery, when he collects it or realizes it, to distribute it among those entitled under the statute. As said before, the cause of action is conferred upon the representative, and that cause of action becomes fixed in the representative; is to be enforced by him, and the death of any one particular person who answers the description of next of kin at the time the action is brought does not destroy that cause of action which is conferred on a representative only, who, when the action ripens into judgment, the proceeds of which are recovered, then makes distribution according to the statute. If an administrator personally entitled only to a share of the recovery were to die, it would not be contended that the cause of action became extinct. The beneficiaries of the recovery, when not the husband or wife, are " the next of kin " entitled to undistributed assets. Who could bar the right of action by release? That question has been authoritatively answered. " The claim before suit cannot be barred or released except by some person who has authority to bring the action at the time, and who, in a legal sense, represents the right of action." (Stuber v. McEntee, supra, 203.) All the right to the cause of action vests, as said before, in the representative. The statute has made the cause of action a property"right of the executor or administrator. The liability of the defendant is one to the intestate's estate, not a property right of the intestate himself. A recovery, when collected, is to be disposed of as undistributed assets. The question of the survival of the cause of action was not properly disposed of in the court below, and for that reason the judgment should be reversed and a new trial ordered, with costs to appellant to abide the event.
Williams and Ingraham, JJ., concurred; Van Brunt, P. J., and O'Brien, J., dissented.