Case Name: George H. BURCHETT, Jr., Appellant, v. COMMONWEALTH of Kentucky, Appellee
Court: Supreme Court of Kentucky
Jurisdiction: Kentucky
Decision Date: 2003-01-23
Citations: 98 S.W.3d 492
Docket Number: No. 2000-SC-0179-DG
Parties: George H. BURCHETT, Jr., Appellant, v. COMMONWEALTH of Kentucky, Appellee.
Judges: LAMBERT, C.J., and STUMBO, J., concur.
Reporter: South Western Reporter Third Series
Volume: 98
Pages: 492–513

Head Matter:
George H. BURCHETT, Jr., Appellant, v. COMMONWEALTH of Kentucky, Appellee.
No. 2000-SC-0179-DG.
Supreme Court of Kentucky.
Jan. 23, 2003.
Rehearing Denied March 20, 2003.
Irvin Halbleib, Jr., Louisville, Counsel for Appellant.
A.B. Chandler, III, Attorney General of Kentucky, Dennis W. Shepherd, Office of Attorney General, Criminal Appellate Division, Frankfort, Counsel for Appellee.

Opinion:
Opinion of the Court by
Justice JOHNSTONE.
As the result of a fatal automobile collision, Appellant, George Burchett, Jr., was convicted by a Green Circuit Court jury of reckless homicide, for which he received a sentence of five years' imprisonment. Burchett appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeals and that court affirmed. We granted discretionary review to consider the only issue raised on appeal: whether evidence that a defendant smoked marijuana on a daily basis is admissible to prove that he smoked marijuana on the day of the collision. For the reasons discussed below, we hold this evidence to be inadmissible; accordingly, we reverse and remand this ease to the circuit court.
On December 12,1997, Sherman Darnell was killed when his vehicle was struck by Appellant's vehicle. Mr. Darnell, traveling on highway 61 in Green County, Kentucky, had the right of way and was not required to stop at the Bloyds Crossing intersection of highway 569. Appellant, traveling on highway 569, failed to stop at the intersection and caused the collision. Although Appellant initially denied running the stop sign, brake marks conclusively indicate that he skidded through the intersection. At the time of the collision, Appellant was on his way to the Taylor County Hospital to visit his girlfriend, Melissa Grider, who had given birth to their child the previous day. Appellant and Grider worked together on the farm owned by David and Dorothy Scott. On the afternoon of the collision, Grider telephoned the Scott residence and left a message for Appellant to come to the hospital as soon as he finished work. Fearing for the health of his child, Appellant left for the hospital after he received the message. The fatal collision occurred shortly afterward, around 3:40 p.m.
Soon after the collision, police trooper Whitlock began his investigation. Trooper Whitlock found an unopened, one-half gallon bottle of vodka in Appellant's vehicle. When questioned, Appellant denied that he had consumed any alcohol that day. Appellant was then taken to Taylor County Hospital, where he was treated for his minor injuries. During his treatment and evaluation at the hospital, Appellant told the emergency room nurse that he drinks "anywhere from one-half to three-fourths of a gallon a day of vodka" and that he smokes marijuana daily, "one joint in the morning and one at night." To the nurse, Appellant denied smoking marijuana the day of the collision. But Appellant later told a lab tech that he smoked "this morning." The treating physician's notes support the lab tech's version of events. A lab test of Appellant's blood later confirmed that Appellant drank no alcohol before the collision. A drug screen of Appellant's urine sample revealed the presence of three substances: benzodiaze-pines {e.g., Valium), opiates {e.g., Tylenol 3), and tetrahydrocannabinol (THC) (mari juana). Unfortunately, the blood sample was insufficient to test for these drugs.
Appellant was indicted for second-degree manslaughter. This offense requires proof of a wanton mental state. One way to prove wantonness is to show that the defendant in a vehicle-homicide case was driving while intoxicated. See Estep v. Commonwealth, Ky., 957 S.W.2d 191 (1997). Consequently, the prosecutor intended to show that Appellant was under the influence of marijuana or other drugs at the time of his collision with Mr. Darnell. While Appellant did not contest admission of evidence that he smoked a marijuana cigarette the day before the collision, Appellant did contest the admission of any evidence that he had a habit of drinking alcohol or smoking marijuana everyday. Relying primarily on KRE 404(b) and KRE 403, Appellant made a motion in limine to suppress such habit evidence. Just before trial, the court ruled that evidence concerning Appellant's daily drinking would not be admitted. But the court also ruled that evidence of Appellant's daily use of marijuana was admissible.
This evidence was first introduced during the prosecution's direct examination of the emergency room nurse, who read the notes she took after assessing Appellant in the ER: "Patient states I smoke one joint in the morning and one at night." The nurse later read the physician's notes: "[Patient a]dmits to one joint this morning. Two joints daily." Later, Appellant admitted on direct examination that he told a hospital employee that he usually smoked a "joint" at night and in the morning. Appellant also admitted smoking marijuana the day before the collision and taking Tylenol 3 and Valium the day before, and the day of, the collision. Appellant testified that he has had spinal bifida since he was a child and he uses the Tylenol 3 and Valium — for which he does not have a prescription — to ease the muscle spasms in his leg and the swollen joints in his back. Appellant further admitted that he gave conflicting statements to hospital personnel about whether he smoked marijuana the morning of the collision. But despite his admitted daily marijuana usage, and his conflicting statements at the hospital, at trial he denied that he smoked marijuana the morning of the collision.
Appellant explained that he accompanied his girlfriend to the hospital to induce labor at 5:00 a.m. on December 11. He smoked marijuana while she drove. He stayed at the hospital all day, save one trip to Wal-Mart for baby clothes, and spent the night at the hospital. The next day, the day of the collision, he left the hospital around 6:30 a.m. to go directly to work. He later testified that if he had marijuana that morning, he probably would have smoked it, but he did not. Concerning his inconsistent statements, Appellant testified: "I told somebody that I had smoked some weed earlier [the morning of the collision] but it was the day before. It was on the 11th when I smoked the weed because I didn't have none [on the 12th]." On cross-examination the prosecutor explored Appellant's marijuana use in depth, asking questions like: "[At what age] did you start smoking?" "What's your normal consumption?" The prosecutor finally concluded: "You're just pretty much a one joint morning [sic] and one joint at night, that's just your habit."
The jury was instructed on second-degree manslaughter and reckless homicide. Appellant was convicted of the lesser offense, reckless homicide. He appealed to the Court of Appeals, and now this Court, decrying the admission of evidence of his daily marijuana use. Appellant argues that the evidence was habit evidence, which has been inadmissible in Kentucky courts for at least a century. See Chesapeake & O. Ry. Co. v. Riddle's Adm'x, Ky., 72 S.W. 22 (1903).
In Louisville & N.R. Co. v. Taylor's Adm'r, Ky., 104 S.W. 776 (1907), it was held: "[Njeither side can give in evidence what the custom or practice of either of the parties is. The question is not what they were accustomed to do, but what they did at the time in controversy." This reasoning was subsequently affirmed decades later in Cincinnati, N.O. & T.P. Ry. Co. v. Hare's Adm'x, 297 Ky. 5, 178 S.W.2d 835 (1944), overruled on other grounds, Louisville & N.R. Co. v. Fisher, 357 S.W.2d 683 (1962). In 1990, the General Assembly sought to permit habit evidence when it enacted KRS 422A.0406, which would have created a state counterpaiT to the federal rale permitting habit evidence. See FRE 406. But KRS 422A.0406 was subject to the approval of this Court and, consistent with our longstanding case law, we rejected that legislation, which was subsequently repealed. 1992 Ky. Acts, ch. 324, § 30. This judicial aversion to habit evidence lead Professor Lawson to accurately remark: "The appeals courts of Kentucky have not looked with favor upon evidence of habit. Such evidence has consistently been declared to be inadmissible under Kentucky law." Robert G. Lawson, The Kentucky Evidence Law Handbook, § 2.35, at 116 (3d ed. Michie 1993). Indeed, as recently as 1994, this Court approved of the reasoning in Louisville & N.R. Co. See Johnson v. Commonwealth, Ky., 885 S.W.2d 951 (1994).
Despite the unanimity of our past decisions, we consider the issue anew. Defining the subject matter is a natural starting point, though, as discussed in the concurring opinion, that is no mean feat. In his treatise on the law of evidence, McCormick attempted the task, both defining "habit" and distinguishing it from "character":
Character and habit are close akin. Character is a generalized description of one's disposition, or of one's disposition in respect to a general trait, such as honesty, temperance, or peacefulness. "Habit," in modern usage, both lay and psychological, is more specific. It describes one's regular response to a repeated specific situation. If we speak of character for care, we think of the person's tendency to act prudently in all the varying situations of life, in business, family life, in handling automobiles and in walking across the street. A habit, on the other hand, is the person's regular practice of meeting a particular kind of situation with a specific type of conduct, such as the habit of going down a particular stairway two stairs at a time, or of giving the hand-signal for a left turn, or of alighting from railway cars while they are moving. The doing of habitual acts may become semi-automatic.
FRE 406 Advisory Committee's Note (1972) (quoting McCormick, Evidence, § 162, at 340 [now see John W. Strong, 1 McCormick on Evidence, § 195, at 584-85 (5th ed. West 1999) ]). The admissibility of character evidence in Kentucky is governed by KRE 404(a) and such evidence is generally inadmissible, unless some exception permits it. Habit evidence is viewed as more reliable than character evidence by those jurisdictions that admit habit evidence. The federal courts apply FRE 406, which reads:
Evidence of the habit of a person or of the routine practice of an organization, whether corroborated or not and regardless of the presence of eyewitnesses, is relevant to prove that the conduct of the person or organization on a particular occasion was in conformity with the habit or routine practice.
Most states have adopted a version of FRE 406, either by rule or by statute. Kentucky is one of the few jurisdictions in the United States that does not currently admit such evidence. Instead of unquestioningly following our sister jurisdictions, we examine the soundness of the rule and the ramifications of adopting it.
While habit evidence has an intuitive appeal, close scrutiny reveals numerous difficulties with its use. These difficulties do more than suggest that the correct course is not to allow such evidence. The most glaring problem is that the introduction of habit evidence violates KRE 403. Questions of admissibility start with KRE 401, which permits evidence "having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." Evidence that a person had a "regular" or "routine" practice of performing some action would meet the requirement of KRE 401. And all relevant evidence, including evidence of a routine practice, is admissible, unless otherwise prohibited. See KRE 402. But "relevant[] evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by [1] the danger of undue prejudice, [2] confusion of the issues, . or by [3] considerations of undue delay, ." See KRE 403. Habit evidence implicates all three of these impermissible results.
It is easy to recognize the prejudice to the defendant if the prosecutor is permitted to attach the label of "habit" to his actions. E.g., John Doe has the "habit" of watching pornographic videos after work in front of his minor daughters. Or, John Doe has the "habit" of beating his wife on the weekends. Simply characterizing the defendant's actions as a "habit" attaches excessive significance in the minds of jurors, as Wright and Graham noted: "Even if the court thought that the specific instances of conduct had some probative worth so as to be admissible on another ground, e.g., Rule 404(b), the court may feel that permitting the label 'habit' to be attached to the evidence may tend to unfairly enhance its value in the eyes of the jury." 23 Wright and Graham, Federal Practice and Procedure: Evidence, § 5273 (1980). The label becomes a scarlet letter. Because of that, courts have correctly been "reluctant to admit evidence that a person is a 'habitual drunk' or has a habit of reckless driving [or smoking a joint every morning] [because] such evidence may be more prejudicial than probative with respect to the issues in the case." Id. In this case, the prosecutor used the term in just this inflammatory manner when he declared: "You're just pretty much a one joint morning [sic] and one joint at night, that's just your habit."
Confusion of the issues and delay are additional unwanted, but unavoidable, byproducts of habit evidence. In deciding whether certain conduct constitutes habit, "courts consider three factors: (1) the degree to which the conduct is reflexive or semi-automatic as opposed to volitional; (2) the specificity or particularity of the conduct; and (3) the regularity or numer-osity of the examples of the conduct." United States v. Angwin, 271 F.3d 786 (9th Cir.2001) (internal citations omitted). In Wilson v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 561 F.2d 494 (4th Cir.1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1020, 98 S.Ct. 744, 54 L.Ed.2d 768 (1978), the Fourth Circuit clarified this last factor: "[N]o finding is supportable under [FRE] 406[] which fails to examine critically the 'ratio of reactions to situations.' Necessarily, as we have seen, regularity of conduct . requires some comparison of the number of instances in which any such conduct occurs with the number in which no such conduct took place." (Footnote omitted). The Advisory Committee under scored the idea that "adequacy of sampling and uniformity of response are key factors" for measuring the sufficiency of the evidence. Advisory Committee Notes, FRE 406.
But proof of these occurrences requires numerous collateral inquiries, which leads to delay and jury confusion unacceptable under KRE 403. The original draft of FRE 406 provided that habit could be proven by testimony in the form of an opinion or by specific instances of conduct sufficient to show the habit existed. Congress chose instead to permit courts to develop methods of proof on a case-by-case basis. 2 Stephen A. Saltzburg, Michael M. Martin & Daniel J. Capra, Federal Rules of Evidence Manual, § 406.02[5] (8th ed.2002). As Professors Saltzburg, et. ah, concluded, opinion testimony is still the best way to prove a habit:
[T]he best proof of a habit is that someone acted in a particular way at specific and frequent instances, and also that the person did not act otherwise at other similar instances. Probably the best testimony will be by a witness who has personal knowledge of the conduct of the relevant actor on numerous separate occasions.
Id. But this sort of collateral-issue testimony can only delay court proceedings and confuse the issue, as the following observations demonstrate:
So, assuming the [habit] evidence in question to be relevant, I think it should be held incompetent . because its probative force does not outweigh the inconvenience of a multitude of collateral issues, not suggested by the pleadings, the trial of which would take much time, tend to create confusion and do little good . Habit is an inference from many acts, each of which presents an issue to be tried, and necessarily involves direct, and naturally invites cross-examination. The circumstances surrounding each act present another issue, and thus many collateral issues would be involved which would not only consume much time, but would tend to distract the jury and lead them away from the main issue to be decided.
Levin v. United States, 338 F.2d 265, 271 (C.A.D.C.1964) (quoting Zucker v. Whitridge, 205 N.Y. 50, 98 N.E. 209, 213 (App.1912)); see also Simplex, Inc. v. Diversified Energy Systems, Inc., 847 F.2d 1290 (7th Cir.1988); Wright and Graham, § 5272 ("[S]ince habit can only be proved by inquiry into instances of alleged habitual conduct, expanding the admissibility of habit evidence would . lead[ ] to costly collateral inquiries into whether the instances offered to support the habit had indeed taken place.") Even in cases where the habit evidence is ultimately excluded, the attorneys must still prepare the evidence and the judge must still examine it.
This kind of extensive "habit" testimony occurred in Perrin v. Anderson, 784 F.2d 1040 (10th Cir.1986). Perrin was killed by two police officers after they attempted to question him about an automobile accident. According to the officers, Perrin attacked them during the questioning. The defendant-officers made an offer of proof that other police officers would testify about numerous violent encounters instigated by Perrin against these officers. Ultimately, four officers were permitted to testify about five such incidents. The Tenth Circuit agreed with the trial court that this evidence was properly admitted as evidence of habit tending to prove that Perrin was the first aggressor. Aside from the fact that the testimony of these officers appears to be impermissible character evidence and not evidence of habit, it is clear that to establish the "habit," four witnesses were examined and cross-examined. Though not discussed in the Court of Ap peals' decision, it is highly probable that plaintiffs counsel was permitted to cross-examine the officers about the details of those encounters in order to establish how they were different from the one in question. All of this testimony about habit could have easily distracted the jury from the central issue in the case: Did Perrin attack the police officers and threaten their lives on that particular day?
In the present case, even though Appellant testified about his own habit, there were numerous collateral evidentiary issues related to his marijuana use that were not explored, but likely could have been. These issues could easily have involved other witnesses. Appellant testified that he slept at the hospital the night before the collision and he drove directly to work the next morning. Even if he smoked marijuana "every" morning — a statement that is likely not literally true— he could not smoke it if he did not have any. How much evidence could Appellant introduce that he never kept marijuana in his truck but only at his home? Or that when he spent the night away from home, he did not smoke marijuana in the morning? Could Appellant offer evidence that he did not have marijuana when other important family events occurred, like the death of a parent or sibling? Or that he typically ran out of marijuana on a particular day of the week? Or that he met his supplier on a typical day? This is the type of evidence that delays trials and confuses jurors — an exorbitant price to pay for evidence that fails to even address the critical issue.
Another difficulty that plagues the use of habit evidence is the inexorable tendency for courts to require less and less proof of the habit. Appellant testified that he typically smoked marijuana everyday. If this statement were true, it would be simple to calculate the ratio of reactions to situations — one. But few cases are likely to have such a unitary ratio. This begs the question concerning how many instances of a practice and what ratio of reactions to situations is sufficient to establish proof of a habit. Judges and scholars have yet to offer good answers to this question. Perhaps evidence of four instances would be enough to conclude that the defendant had a habit. See Whittemore v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 65 Cal.App.2d 737, 151 P.2d 670, 678 (1944) (evidence that alleged pilot of crashed aircraft was pilot on four previous flights admitted to show habit) (cited with approval in Advisory Committee notes); see also Chomicki v. Wittekind, 128 Wis.2d 188, 381 N.W.2d 561, 565 (App.1985) (Testimony of four female tenants that landlord made sexual advances held sufficient to establish habit. Significantly, the court made no determination of how many female tenants landlord dealt with, i.e., no attempt was made to determine the ratio of reactions to situations.); Wright and Graham, § 5273 ("... the standard of frequency for the admissibility of habit evidence . appears to be weakening"). Indeed, one court has even divined a habit from a single act. See French v. Sorano, 74 Wis.2d 460, 247 N.W.2d 182, 186 (1976) (one instance of person hiding money in car sufficient to demonstrate a habit). The tendency of courts to go down this judicial slippery slope further attenuates the efficacy of this already dubious evidence.
Of course one of the most compelling reasons to exclude habit evidence is presented by the facts of this case. Appellant stated that, in addition to smoking marijuana daily, it was his normal routine to drink one-half to three-quarters of a gallon of vodka daily. If habit evidence were admissible, Appellant's drinking practice would have been admissible as substantive evidence that Appellant had likely been drinking on the day of the collision. That evidence would undoubtedly weigh heavily on the minds of the jurors. But that evidence would have been utterly false. In fact, Appellant did not drink any alcohol that day, as was confirmed by the blood alcohol test, which was the only reason the evidence of Appellant's drinking "habit" was excluded. Unfortunately for Appellant, his blood sample could not be tested and the drug test results could not corroborate his testimony that he did not smoke marijuana that morning, so evidence of his daily smoking was admitted. This scenario ferrets out the dangerous non sequitur that the habit evidence rule encourages: because a defendant regularly performs a particular act, he also did so on this particular occasion. In light of these difficulties, this Court chooses to avoid the introduction of such specious evidence into the courtrooms of this Commonwealth.
Having no proper basis for admission, the evidence of Appellant's marijuana use should have been excluded. This error by the trial court was not harmless. Accordingly, we reverse and remand this case to the Green Circuit Court for a new trial consistent with this Opinion.
LAMBERT, C.J., and STUMBO, J., concur.
KELLER, J., concurs in result only by separate opinion.
COOPER, J., dissents by separate opinion, with GRAVES and WINTERSHEIMER, JJ" joining that dissent.