Case Name: Terrance E. McCLOUD, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1999-01-08
Citations: 741 So. 2d 512
Docket Number: No. 97-2011
Parties: Terrance E. McCLOUD, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: COBB and ANTOON, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 741
Pages: 512–517

Head Matter:
Terrance E. McCLOUD, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. 97-2011.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
Jan. 8, 1999.
Opinion Denying Rehearing En Banc Sept. 24, 1999.
James B. Gibson, Public Defender, and Susan A. Fagan, Assistant Public Defender, Daytona Beach, for Appellant.
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Jennifer Meek, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellee. .

Opinion:
ON MOTION FOR REHEARING, OR, ALTERNATIVELY, FOR CERTIFICATION
GRIFFIN, C.J.
We grant the state's motion for rehearing and withdraw our prior opinion. We have reconsidered our opinion in light of the decision of the Second District Court of Appeal in Lowman v. State, 720 So.2d 1105 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998) and the decision of the First District Court of Appeal in Bradford v. State, 23 Fla. L. Weekly D2577, 722 So.2d 858 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998). We have decided to accept the view of the Bowman court that all issues pertaining to the assessment of points on the scoresheet are to be determined by the court, not the jury, and that the defendant is not constitutionally entitled to have a jury make the predicate factual determination for the scoring of penetration.
For some aspects of the scoring of points, the issue is not difficult. It is obviously most appropriate for the court to determine the defendant's prior criminal record. It is also logical that the court would best be able to ascribe a seriousness level to victim injury. We see as somewhat different, however, the question whether penetration has occurred in a sexual battery case. This involves not so much a legal judgment as a finding of a pure question of fact pertaining to the offense itself. In Lowman, the appellate court was faced with apparently clear and undisputed evidence of penetration which the lower court could simply recognize and score. We were presented with a more difficult case where proof of penetration was not required for conviction and the evidence of penetration versus mere union was in conflict. In such a situation, it is counterintuitive to say that the court may weigh the evidence and determine the nature of the defendant's offense; hence, our prior opinion. Upon reflection, however, we recognize, as did Lowman, that no distinction is made in the statute or rule between point assessment for penetration and all other aspects of scoresheet point assessment. The Bradford court did not even find it objectionable for the court to score points for possession of a firearm during the commission of the offense, even though the jury made no finding that the defendant had done so. We are doubtful about this method of adjudication in a criminal case, especially given the proliferation of point assessment categories but, at least as to the category of "victim injury," we will not recognize a special requirement of a jury finding to support a point assessment for penetration. Consistent with Lowman, we will allow this to be determined by the court. The judgment and sentence are affirmed.
Motion GRANTED; Judgment and Sentence AFFIRMED.
COBB and ANTOON, JJ., concur.