Case Name: Marcus Upson v. Jacob Horn
Court: South Carolina Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: South Carolina
Decision Date: 1848-05
Citations: 3 Strob. 108
Docket Number: 
Parties: Marcus Upson v. Jacob Horn.
Judges: O’Neall, J. and Evans, J. concurred.
Reporter: South Carolina Law Reports
Volume: 34
Pages: 108–115

Head Matter:
Marcus Upson v. Jacob Horn.
On appeal from the decree of the Ordinary, ordering a sale of land for a division, upon the ground that the applicant had been permitted to serve the summons in partition on the defendant — the Court refused to disturb the decree.
A decree of the Ordinary cures any previous irregularity not positively fatal.
Constitutionally and legally, the judgment of every Court, within its jurisdiction, is res judicata,.
Before Frost, J. at Edgefield — March Term, 1848.
TRESPASS TO TRY TITLES.
The plaintiff claimed under a deed of conveyance from the Ordinary of Edgefield district, dated 7th July, 1845. The land had been sold by the sheriff, for partition among the heirs of George Horn, under an order made in the Court of Ordinary, in June, 1845. One Daniel Boon was the applicant, who had purchased the interest of one of the heirs.— He was permitted by the Ordinary to serve the summons on the parties, and had made return, on oath, of the service on the defendant, who was one of the heirs. Col. Hill, the Ordinary, testified that the defendant appeared at the return of the citation and objected to the sale, saying he had purchased the interest of some of the distributees.
On the cross examination, Col. Hill said that the defendant appeared before the order of sale. It was on the return of the summons, — thought it was not on the sale day.— Daniel Boon was offered as a witness to prove the actual appearance of the defendant. He was at variance with the defendant. The plaintiff’s attorney said he had other witnesses who could prove Horn’s presence before the Ordinary at the return of the summons. The proceedings before the Ordinary were, in several particulars, irregular and imperfect. The defendant claimed the land by many years possession— said to be twenty years and upwards.
The Circuit Judge held that Horn could only have been legally made a party to the proceedings in partition by evidence, on the record, of the service of the summons upon him; either by the return of the sheriff, or by his acknowledgment of service, in writing, on the citation. That the affidavit of the service by Daniel Boon, the applicant, indorsed on the citation, was not a legal service of the summons, by which the defendant could be concluded as a party to the proceeding; and that it was not competent to supply the want of a legal service of the summons, by parol evidence, that the defendant was present in the Ordinary’s Court, when the case was heard and the order made. And that the judgment having been without proof, on the record, of the defendant having been made a party, the order and all the proceedings, as against him, were void, for want of jurisdiction.
The plaintiff submitted to a non-suit, and moved in the Court of Appeals for a new trial, on the ground:
That his Honor, the Circuit Judge, erred in ruling that service on a defendant of a summons in partition, in the Court of Ordinary, could not be established by the return on the summons of personal service on him, made by the applicant, by the testimony of witnesses of the actual appearance in the Court of the defendant on the day when, according to the summons, he should have appeared, and by the decree of the Ordinary for partition, nor by parol evidence of any other fact; and could be established only by the return of service made by the sheriff, or the written acknowledgment of ser-vjce j^y ^ ¿efen(Jant.
1 Bail. 25.
i Bail. 512.
1N.S McC. 408.
Wardlaw, for the motion.
Griffin, contra.

Opinion:
Richardson, J.
delivered the opinion of the Court.
We need not decide finally whether Daniel Boon, a party interested in the sale of the land, was a proper person to serve the summons on the defendant to appear before the Ordinary; if the objection had been made before the decree to sell the land.
The facts are, that D. Boon did serve the summons — that Jacob Horn appeared and objected, not to the manner of the summons, but because he had'purchased the land of some of the heirs of Geo. Horn, the intestate freeholder. But the Ordinary ordered the sale, and the plaintiff, Marcus Upson, purchased the land at the public sale, made by the sheriff under the Ordinary's decree, and'took a conveyance accordingly.
The question then occurs — does not such conveyance assure the land to Upson ? or, will the Court look behind the Ordinary's decree, and hold it null and void 1 and, thereby, invalidate the title of Upson, on account of the irregular service of the original summons by D. Boon; though not objected to at the time of the decree; i. e. can the objection enure to set aside the purchase at this late day ?
In the case of Lyles v. Robinson, the Court decided that where a sum of money had been decreed by the Ordinary against the administrator, on his bond, he could not deny that he had been duly cited. In that case, on a collateral motion, made in a suit to recover the money, the Court held such decree final and conclusive, and the irregularity cured. Assuredly, then, and much less, will this Court lift the decision of the Ordinary; when it has been carried into effect, by the actual sale of the land, as in the present case; unless the irregularity be positively fatal. Non dormientibus subvenient leges, would seem the proper reply. In the case of Henry v. Ferguson, the Court unanimously held that, in a sale of land by the sheriff, they would not look beyond the judgment for irregularities. They considered the judgment authoritative, as long as it stood unreversed. Among several of our own cases, bearing on this point, see Barkley v. Scriven, where the Court say, " the purchaser is not required to look into the regularity of the proceedings in obtaining the judgment." So, also, the sale of the land, in the recent case of Ingram v. Belk, was upheld, although there was irregularity in the original writ of sci. fa. under which the land was sold. And in the more recent case of Sherman v. Barrett, the Court of Errors refused to look beyond the judgment from which is sued the process of contempt. In that case, as in the one now before the Court, the party to the proceedings moved to have them set aside, after the judgment had been obtained. —
l Bail 267.
In such cases the party having omitted to object to the supposed irregularity, when he might have objected, leaves a just inference that he acquiesced in the manner of such proceedings ; and, therefore, all objections prior to the judgment, were concluded. Is it not plain, that if such untimely objections were upheld, judgment would no longer be the final res judicata, which estops further litigation ; and reviews or new trials might be had by the device of wilful omissions of unessential points at the proper opportunity? The motion on the circuit, in the present case, went to overturn the entire decree. If it prevailed, the Ordinary would have to proceed de novo, and make another decree. Whereas constitutionally and legally, the judgment of every Court, within its jurisdiction, is res judicata. The case of Samuel Singletary v. Geo. Carter, is one of the adjudications relied upon to warrant the Circuit decision : and it will serve well to illustrate the distinction before us. John D. Singletary and Samuel Singletary had obtained judgment against George Carter. John D. Singletary was a deputy sheriff; he levied upon Carter's land — sold it, and his co-plaintiff, Samuel Singletary, purchased ; and the Court held the sale absolutely null and void, because the levy had been made by a deputy sheriff, who was one plaintiff, and the other plaintiff bought the land. — The point of the argument from this case, is that D. Boon's service of the summons is no better than Singletary's levy on Carter's land. Doubtless the adjudication in Singletary v. Carter, was sound and legal. It is wise to restrain officers from proceeding to have their own judgments satisfied through their own official levy, and by a consequent purchase by themselves. But the objection was not, as in the present case, to the judgment against Carter; it was to the subsequent levy and sale of Carter's land. Such posterior proceedings were no part of the original res judicata, and were never before the Court till the trial to decide the title of Samuel Singletary. It therefore remains to be adjudged, (if the sales had been regular, and only the original writ against Carter, served by the plaintiff, J. D. Singletary,) whether the judgment would have been set aside by reason of such stale objection to the service of the writ. The distinction is obvious; and notwithstanding the general strictures in Singletary and Carter, it may be questionable whether a judgment of record would be set aside upon the mere fact that an interested deputy sheriff had served the original writ. The cases I first cited, indicate very differently; at least after judgment. And see Chit. G. P. p. 262, and many cases cited to shew the contrary, even if the objection had been taken before the judgment. Any one may serve a process. But such are por our present consideration. To conclude, then, the distinction recognized in the cases I have first cited, is between irregularities in obtaining the judgment, which are concluded, ipso facto, i. e. by the rendition of the judgment; and such irregularities as occur after the judgment, which could not have been before considered. This was Singleta-W's case ; and be it conceded that that case has some general dicta bearing upon the one before the Court. But the adjudication proper of that case, rests upon legal principles, admissible in this case only if D. Boon's agency had occurred after instead of before the Ordinary's decree. A new trial is therefore ordered. I would not have dwelt upon the distinc-^on uPon which the case turns, and which seems to speak for itself, but because of similar attempts made to set aside former proceedings, and in this way to force a rehearing; and because all the Court may not have felt as fully as myself, the principle of judicial estoppels to past litigation, after judgment.
°w' 4 J?' 2R?593- i Bin. 145 • i Bail. 448; 3 strob. Tidd. 88; 2 Ñ. &McC.25; Plow.a,76 a.
O'Neall, J. and Evans, J. concurred.
Motion granted.