Case Name: Ex parte Eddie James JOHNSON
Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1985-10-09
Citations: 697 S.W.2d 605
Docket Number: No. 69480
Parties: Ex parte Eddie James JOHNSON.
Judges: TOM G. DAVIS, J., not participating.
Reporter: South Western Reporter Second Series
Volume: 697
Pages: 605–616

Head Matter:
Ex parte Eddie James JOHNSON.
No. 69480.
Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, En Banc.
Oct. 9, 1985.
Eddie James Johnson, pro se.
John B. Holmes, Jr., Dist. Atty. and Kar-rie Key, Asst. Dist. Atty., Houston, Robert Huttash, State’s Atty., Austin, for the State.

Opinion:
OPINION
MILLER, Judge.
This is a post-conviction writ of habeas corpus brought pursuant to Art. 11.07, V.A.C.C.P. Applicant complains that his convictions for two aggravated robberies are void and requests a new trial.
The record shows that applicant was indicted in Cause No. 314983, in the 262nd District Court of Harris County, for an aggravated robbery committed on February 29, 1980. The indictment also contained an enhancement paragraph alleging that applicant had been previously convicted of felony armed robbery in Coahoma County, Mississippi. A second indictment was returned against applicant in Cause No. 314984, also in the 262nd District Court, which charged applicant with another aggravated robbery committed on April 22, 1980. The second indictment also contained an enhancement paragraph alleging the prior Mississippi felony conviction.
The judgment for Cause No. 314983 indicates that the jury found applicant guilty of aggravated robbery, and reflects that the State abandoned the enhancement paragraph. The jury assessed punishment at 50 years confinement in the Texas Department of Corrections, and a fine of $5,000.00.
The judgment for Cause No. 314983 indicates that the jury found applicant guilty of aggravated robbery, and reflects that the State abandoned the enhancement paragraph. The jury assessed punishment at 50 years confinement in the Texas Department of Corrections, and a fine of $5,000.00.
The judgment for Cause No. 314984 indicates the jury found applicant guilty of the second aggravated robbery, and further found true the enhancement allegation. Punishment was assessed at 50 years confinement in the Texas Department of Corrections, and a fine of $10,000.00.
Applicant contends that the jury's assessment of total fines in the amount of $15,000.00 in addition to terms of years as punishment is unauthorized by law and therefore the verdicts are void and any subsequent judgments and sentences based thereon are void.
In Bogany v. State, 661 S.W.2d 957 (Tex.Cr.App.1983), the defendant was convicted of aggravated robbery. On a finding of one prior conviction for enhancement, punishment was assessed by the jury at 60 years and a $10,000.00 fine. We held that Y.T.C.A. Penal Code, § 12.42(c), which provides the penalties for repeat and habitual felony offenders convicted of first degree felonies, did not authorize a fine in addition to enhancement of punishment. See also Releford v. State, 683 S.W.2d 385 (Tex.Cr.App.1984); Diaz v. State, 663 S.W.2d 114 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st] 1983). Since the verdict was unauthorized by law, the court of appeals was without authority to reform the verdict. We remanded the case for a new trial.
Applying Bogany to the instant case, the $10,000.00 fine assessed in Cause No. 314984 was not authorized by law. Since the enhancement paragraph was abandoned in Cause No. 314983, the $5000.00 fine assessed was permissible under V.T.C.A. Penal Code, § 12.32. We now turn to the proper remedy needed to correct the improper verdict in Cause No. 314984.
In prior cases, when a jury returned a verdict unauthorized by law, the judgment was rendered void, in Ex parte McIver, 586 S.W.2d 851 (Tex.Cr.App.1979), the jury found the defendant guilty of felony possession of marihuana. The jury verdict stated:
"[We] assess his punishment at 5 years confinement in the Texas Department of Corrections and hereby further assess a fine in the amount of 5.000 [sic] Dollars and we, the jury, do hereby recommend that such fine be probated for a period of 10 years."
The district judge signed an instrument which stated in part:
"It is, therefore, Considered and Adjudged by the Jury that the defendant . be punished by confinement . for a term of not more than five (5) years nor less than two (2) years, and a fine in the amount of $5,000.00 with recommendation the fine be probated."
We found that Art. 42.12, V.A.C.C.P., did not authorize the jury to assess punishment of confinement without a recommendation of probation and also a fine with a recommendation of probation. McIver, supra at 854. We held that since the verdict assessed punishment unauthorized by law, it was void at its inception, citing Smith v. State, 479 S.W.2d 680 (Tex.Cr.App.1972).
In Smith, the defendant was convicted for possession of dangerous drugs. The jury found the defendant guilty and assessed punishment at one year in jail followed by a twelve month probation period. The trial court struck the portion of the jury's verdict stating "followed by a twelve month probation period." We held that the verdict was void at its inception since the law did not authorize punishment of jail time followed by probation, and further held that the trial court did not have the authority to change the verdict by deleting the offending portion. Id. at 681.
Last, in Spaulding v. State, 687 S.W.2d 741 (Tex.Cr.App.1985), the defendant was convicted for aggravated sexual abuse. The jury assessed a $10,000.00 fine in addition to a term of years as punishment. We found that the verdict was unauthorized by law and therefore void, citing Bogany, supra. We further held that the Governor was without authority to remit or commute that portion of the sentence assessing the fine since the judgment was void at its inception. Spaulding, at 743.
The preceding cases all share a common premise and conclusion. The premise in each case is that the jury rendered a verdict that was unauthorized by law, viz: the punishment assessed was not within the universe of punishments applicable to the offense. The common conclusion reached was that the judgment based upon such a verdict was void.
The logic connecting the premise and conclusion involves the lack of a specific vehicle by which the improper verdict could be reformed. A court was permitted only to reform the judgment in a given case so that it properly reflected the true verdict reached by the jury. See Releford, supra at 387, citing Milczanowski v. State, 645 S.W.2d 445 (Tex.Cr.App.1983); Chudleigh v. State, 540 S.W.2d 314 (Tex.Cr.App.1976); Anderson v. State, 504 S.W.2d 507 (Tex.Cr.App.1974); Castaneda v. State, 491 S.W.2d 885 (Tex.Cr.App.1973); Batiste v. State, 464 S.W.2d 149 (Tex.Cr.App.1971); and Cedargreen v. State, 432 S.W.2d 524 (Tex.Cr.App.1968). Thus, when a jury rendered a verdict unauthorized by law, the only course of action available was to remand the case for a new trial. Cf. Cooper v. State, 527 S.W.2d 898 (Tex.Cr.App.1975); Saunders v. State, 511 S.W.2d 281 (Tex.Cr.App.1974); and Miller v. State, 472 S.W.2d 269 (Tex.Cr.App.1971). In this sense, a judgment and sentence were considered void since there was no way to cure the infirmity. See Spaulding, supra. See also Releford, supra at 387; and Ramirez v. State, 587 S.W.2d 144 (Tex.Cr.App.1979).
Since the previous cases were decided, however, the Legislature has enacted a new law which enlarges the authority of courts to reform judgments, thus providing a way to cure the infirmity. Senate Bill 1349, Acts, 69th Leg., effective June 11, 1985, amended Article 37.10, V.A.C.C.P., by adding paragraph (b), which provides:
"If the jury assesses punishment in a case and in the verdict assesses both punishment that is authorized by law for the offense and punishment that is not authorized by law for the offense, the court shall reform the verdict to show the punishment authorized by law and to omit the punishment not authorized by law. If the trial court is required to reform a verdict under this subsection and fails to do so, the appellate court shall reform the verdict as provided by this subsection."
Thus, under the new law, a court is authorized to reform a verdict and judgment containing unauthorized punishment, an infirmity which would have previously rendered the verdict void.
Given the verdict and judgment in the instant case was, in part, not authorized by law, we must determine whether Art. 37.-10(b) applies to Cause No. 314984.
Since the amendment does not constitute substantive law defining criminal acts or providing for penalties, it is procedural in nature. Thus, in the absence of express legislative intent to the con trary, the new law controls litigation from its effective date and applies to both pending and future actions. See Wade v. State, 572 S.W.2d 533 (Tex.Cr.App.1978), and cases cited therein at 534. See also Patterson v. State, 650 S.W.2d 453 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th] 1982). We must therefore follow the Legislature's mandate and reform that portion of the verdict unauthorized by law.
Assessment of the $10,000.00 fine against applicant in Cause No. 314984 was unauthorized. We therefore reform the verdict and judgment in that cause to delete the improper fine. Since the $5,000.00 fine assessed in Cause No. 314983 was authorized, applicant's request for relief in that case is denied. The Clerk of this Court shall send a copy of this order to the Texas Department of Corrections.
TOM G. DAVIS, J., not participating.
. Writing for this Court in Bogany, supra, Judge Odom stated:
"The controlling law did not authorize the Court of Appeals to change the verdict rendered by the jury. The verdict was unauthorized by law and . was 'void at its inception.' The verdict must be set aside."
Id., at 959.
In his concurring opinion to Bogany, Judge Teague stated:
"[The Legislature] has never seen fit to give this Court or any intermediate appellate court of this State authority to assess punishment or reduce punishment assessed by a jury where the conviction was for a non-capital felony.... [T)he intermediate appellate court and this Court are without authority to either assess a different punishment, reduce the punishment assessed, or reform the punishment assessed."
Id.
. We especially note the absence of any language directing that this amendment shall apply to cases begun, tried or indicted, etc., after a particular date. Cf. the treatment of Art. 32A.02, V.A.C.C.P. in both Acts 1977, 65th Leg., p. 1970., ch. 787, eff. July 1, 1978, and in Acts 1979, 66th Leg., p. 4, ch. 3, § 1, eff. Sept. 1, 1979.