Case Name: BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS of the PORT OF NEW ORLEANS, an Agency of the State of Louisiana v. SPLENDOUR SHIPPING & ENTERPRISES COMPANY, Inc., et al.
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1971-12-06
Citations: 255 So. 2d 869
Docket Number: No. 4622
Parties: BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS of the PORT OF NEW ORLEANS, an Agency of the State of Louisiana v. SPLENDOUR SHIPPING & ENTERPRISES COMPANY, Inc., et al.
Judges: Before LEMMON, GULOTTA and BOUTALL, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 255
Pages: 869–876

Head Matter:
BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS of the PORT OF NEW ORLEANS, an Agency of the State of Louisiana v. SPLENDOUR SHIPPING & ENTERPRISES COMPANY, Inc., et al.
No. 4622.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fourth Circuit.
Dec. 6, 1971.
Concurring Opinion Dec. 16, 1971.
Rehearing Denied Jan. 10, 1972.
Deutsch, Kerrigan & Stiles, Cornelius G. Van Dalen, New Orleans, for plaintiff-appellee.
Chaffe, McCall, Phillips, Toler & Sarpy, Paul A. Nalty and Leon Sarpy, New Orleans, for defendants-appellants.
Before LEMMON, GULOTTA and BOUTALL, JJ.

Opinion:
GULOTTA, Judge.
The question posed for our consideration is whether the Board of Commissioners of the Port of New Orleans, hereinafter referred to as the Dock Board, is immune from liability in tort under the doctrine of sovereign immunity of the state and, therefore, not amenable to suit.
This litigation arises out of a collision involving a vessel, S/S Ocean Splendour, owned by defendant company and the Florida Avenue Bridge which spans the Inner Harbor Navigation Canal (Industrial Canal) owned by the Dock Board.
The plaintiff filed suit against Splendour for the recovery of damages to the bridge and its related appurtenances caused by the accident. The defendant answered and reconvened for damages caused to the vessel alleging that the failure of the Dock Board to properly design, construct, maintain and repair the bridge and canal constituted an obstruction and hazard to navigation thereby impeding the safe passage of vessels in the channel. An exception of no right of action was filed to the reconventional demand alleging that the Dock Board is immune from suits in tort under the sovereign immunity of the state. The exception was maintained thereby dismissing the recon-ventional demand whereupon defendant took this devolutive appeal from that judgment.
Jurisdiction of this action is vested in the state courts under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. 1333, the "savings to suitors clause".
Removal was sought by Splendour to the United States District Court to no avail and the matter was remanded to the Civil District Court.
Any immunity enjoyed by a state evolves from the 11th amendment of the United States Constitution:
"The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State."
It is conceded by Splendour that the State of Louisiana, as an entity, has the common law right of "sovereign immunity". However, appellant argues that the ultimate point as affects this appeal is whether the Dock Board is the State of Louisiana and thereby entitled to the same rights and protections of the State.
The Dock Board was created by Act 70 of 1896. Its provisions are found in Article 6, Sections 16 and 17 of the Louisiana Constitution and in LSA-R.S. 34:1-44. LSA-R.S. 34:21 sets forth the rights and powers of the board:
"The board of commissioners shall regulate the commerce and traffic of the port and harbor of New Orleans in such manner as may, in its judgment, be best for the maintenance and development thereof.
"It shall be the duty of the board to have charge of, and administer the public wharves, docks, sheds, and landings of the port of New Orleans which are owned and operated, or which may be purchased, acquired or operated by the board; to construct new wharves and other structures when necessary; to erect sheds and other structures on such wharves and landings; to place and keep these wharves and landings, sheds and other structures in good condition; to maintain proper depths of water at all such wharves and landings; to provide mechanical facilities for the use of such wharves, landings, sheds, and other structures ; to provide light,' water, police protection, and any other services for such wharves, landings, and sheds, as it may deem advisable; to finance, erect and operate all basins, locks, canals, and warehouse elevators; to charge for the use of the wharves, sheds, and other structures, for the use of all facilities administered by it, and for all services rendered by it, such fees, rates, tariffs or other charges as it may establish."
While it is well settled that the Dock Board does not enjoy immunity in contract, as the agreement to contract waives this immunity, the situation is quite different in connection with claims arising out of a tort action.
This question of tort immunity has been the concern of both federal and state courts. An analysis of the decisions from both jurisdictions indicates that there are several recent decisions which are in conflict within the federal court in this district. In Prebensen & Blakstad v. The Board of Commissioners, 241 F.Supp. 757, 758 (1965), the Court in discussing the subject of immunity, differentiated between the immunity in contract and tort and stated:
"First: Is the Board immune from tort actions? That this question must be answered in the affirmative is well supported by the decisions of the Louisiana courts. The Board has never been successfully subjected to an action in tort."
Judge Ainsworth concluded that the Board was not immune, however, in contract.
In the case of C. H. Leavell & Co. v. Board of Com'rs of Port of New Orleans, 424 F.2d 764, (5th Cir. 1970), the court held that the Dock Board as a state agency had a separate legal entity from the State of Louisiana for diversity jurisdiction purposes. The court concluded that since it was a separate entity from the state, diversity jurisdiction could be sustained. If the court in that case had concluded that the Dock Board was merely a second self of the state, then federal jurisdiction would have been lacking. The court used significant language in its opinion at page 765:
" If the Dock Board is merely a second self of the State of Louisiana, a matter to be determined according to State law, then federal jurisdiction is lacking. Central Stikstof Verkoopkantoor, N.V. v. Alabama State Docks Department, 415 F.2d 452 (5th Cir. 1969)" (emphasis ours)
Whether or not the Dock Board is a separate entity from the state and not the state is important. If it is the state, it enjoys immunity. If not, and it is a separate entity, it does not enjoy this immunity, even in tort. If the Dock Board is an agent of the state and as such is the state or the alter ego of the state, it is the state and enjoys the immunity from such suits in tort.
The state law, which is our primary concern in the instant case, as state law is controlling in this matter, appears to be less contradictory. In the case of State ex rel. Tallant v. Board of Com'rs, 161 La. 361, 108 So. 770 (1926), the Supreme Court of Louisiana concludes that the Dock Board is not a corporation but a state agency administering public property to advance the prosperity of the port.
The court in Fouchaux v. Board of Com'rs, 186 So. 103, 105 (Orl.App.1939); aff'd 193 La. 182, 190 So. 373 (1939); cert. den. 308 U.S. 554, 60 S.Ct. 112, 84 L.Ed. 466 (1939) said the Dock Board and State are one:
"As a matter of fact, the Dock Board seems to be recognized under the laws of this state as a little closer to the sovereignty than is an agency such.as a municipality, or general agent given broad general powers. This agency, the Dock Board, is in effect the State itself. It is created for the purpose of doing one thing; that is, for the construction and operation of docks and wharves at the principal port of the State." (emphasis ours)
In the case of Miller, etc. v. Board of Com'rs, 199 La. 1071, 7 So.2d 355 (1942) the supreme court held that the Board of Commissioners of the Port of New Orleans is an agency of the state and therefore not amenable to a suit in tort. See also: Lamport & Holt, Limited v. Board of Com'rs of Port of New Orleans, 137 La. 784, 69 So. 174 (1915).
Moreover, this court in the case of Board of Com'rs of Port of New Orleans v. Gypsum Transportation, Ltd., 209 So.2d 296 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1968) writs refused, 252 La. 260, 210 So.2d 505, cert. den., 393 U.S. 938, 89 S.Ct. 302, 21 L.Ed.2d 275, involving a maritime tort wherein the question of liability was raised in a reconven-tional demand, as in the present matter, held that the Dock Board is an agency of the State of Louisiana and as such is immune from suit in tort. The reconventional demand was dismissed.
We find the conclusion reached in the Gypsum case to be sound. It is our opinion that the Dock Board as an agency of the State of Louisiana enjoys immunity in tort. We note further that the Louisiana Supreme Court denied writs and the United States Supreme Court refused certiorari. A reasonable interpretation of this action is that both the Louisiana Supreme Court and the United States Supreme Court found no error in the conclusions reached in that decision.
Appellant's contention, that the symmetry of maritime law in maritime proceedings is destroyed if the state law holding the Dock Board immune in tort is applied, is without merit. A determination that the Dock Board is immune in tort without its consent does not infringe upon the application of maritime concepts and maritime principles in the proceedings in state courts under the savings to suitors clause. There is no doubt that admiralty law is to be followed in the conduct of the proceedings.
The United States Supreme Court in the case of In Re State of New York, 256 U.S. 490, 41 S.Ct. 588, 65 L.Ed. 1057 (1921) was confronted with the same contention. That court stated at pages 502 and 503, 41 S.Ct. at page 591:
"There is no substance in the contention that this result enables the state of New York to impose its local law upon the admiralty jurisdiction, to the detriment of the characteristic symmetry and uniformity of the rules of maritime law insisted upon in Workman v. New York City, 179 U.S. 552, 557-560, 21 S.Ct. 212, 45 L.Ed. 314; Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 215, 37 S.Ct. 524, 61 L.Ed. 1086, L.R.A.1918C, 451, Ann. Cas.1917E, 900; Union Fish Co. v. Erickson, 248 U.S. 308, 313, 39 S.Ct. 112, 63 L.Ed. 261; Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149, 160, 40 S.Ct. 438, 64 L.Ed. 834. The symmetry and harmony maintained in those cases consists in the uniform operation and effect of the characteristic principles and rules of the maritime law as a body of substantive law operative alike upon all who are subject to the jurisdiction of the admiralty, and binding upon other courts as well. Chelentis v. Luckenbach S. S. Co., 247 U.S. 372, 382, 384, 38 S.Ct. 501, 62 L.Ed. 1171. It is not inconsistent in principle to accord to the states, which enjoy the prerogatives of sovereignty to the extent of being exempt from litigation at the suit of individuals in all other judicial tribunals, a like exemption in the courts of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction."
The appellee raises arguments to the effect that the United States has never required the Dock Board to obtain permission for the construction, operation, or maintenance of the bridge and therefore there was never any waiver of immunity made by the Dock Board. We do not find this contention an issue in this matter and because of the views expressed herein above find no necessity to consider this argument. Furthermore, the motion to dismiss the appeal filed by appellee by reason of the fact that appellant's brief was not timely filed is also without merit. Untimeliness in the filing of briefs under our rules causes the appellant to forfeit his right to argue but does not constitute grounds for dismissal of the appeal. Accordingly, the motion to dismiss the appeal is dismissed.
The judgment of the trial court in favor of plaintiff, the Board of Commissioners of the Port of New Orleans, dismissing the reconventional demand of defendant, Splen-dour Shipping Enterprises Company, based on plaintiff's exception of no right of action is affirmed at defendant's cost.
Affirmed.
. "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction, exclusive of the courts of the States, of:
"(1) Any civil case of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction, saving to suitors in all cases all other remedies to which they are otherwise entitled.
"(2) Any prize brought into the United States and all proceedings for the condemnation of property taken as prize."
. The following Louisiana Supreme Court oases upheld suits in contract against the Dock Board. Geary v. Board of Com'rs, 139 La. 781, 72 So. 245 (1916) ; Hartwig Moss Ins. Agency v. Board of Com'rs, 206 La. 395, 19 So.2d 178 (1944) ; Leon Irwin and Co. v. Board of Com'rs of New Orleans, 176 La. 13, 145 So. 123 (1932).
. See: Hammond v. Board of Com'rs, et al., C.A. 71-83, wherein the Dock Board was held immune from suit in tort; and Principe Compania Naviera, S.A. v. Board of Commissioners of the Port of New Orleans, 333 F.Supp. 353, wherein the court came to an opposite conclusion that the Dock Board is amenable to suit in tort.
. Uniform Rules of the Courts of Appeal in and for the State of Louisiana, Rule IX, Section 11.