Case Name: Barry JOHNSON, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 2005-12-07
Citations: 917 So. 2d 226
Docket Number: No. 3D02-982
Parties: Barry JOHNSON, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: Before GERSTEN, RAMIREZ, and SHEPHERD, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 917
Pages: 226–235

Head Matter:
Barry JOHNSON, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. 3D02-982.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
Dec. 7, 2005.
Bennett H. Brummer, Public Defender, and John Eddy Morrison, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant.
Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General and Erin Kinney, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
Before GERSTEN, RAMIREZ, and SHEPHERD, JJ.

Opinion:
Barry Johnson ("Johnson") appeals his judgment and convictions for armed robbery, burglary with assault, and attempted first degree murder with a firearm. We affirm.
Johnson entered a Discount Auto Parts store, approached the store clerk and asked for change. Once the clerk opened the register, Johnson pulled out his gun and demanded all of the money. The store's armed security guard observed Johnson holding up the store and approached Johnson with his gun drawn. Johnson exchanged shots with the guard and fled the store into a residential neighborhood. A teenager, who lived in the neighborhood, saw a man walk by his house holding a gun and enter a stopped get-away car at the end of the block.
The police arrived shortly after the robbery and located a blood trail in the parking lot. The blood trail began where the store clerks and security guard observed the robber flee and ended where the teenager saw the armed man enter the getaway car. The police collected the DNA evidence, which the crime lab later matched to Johnson's DNA. The two store clerks identified Johnson as the robber at the hospital, where he was being treated for a gunshot wound.
Markeisha Jackson ("Jackson"), also testified that Johnson propositioned her to accompany him to the hospital and lie about the circumstances surrounding his shooting. In exchange, Johnson offered to pay Jackson for her time. Jackson admitted on cross-examination that she was angry at Johnson because he never paid her. The jury found Johnson guilty on all counts. This appeal follows.
Johnson raises two issues on appeal. First, Johnson contends that the trial court erred by refusing to appoint him conflict-free counsel when the State called Jackson as a State witness. Defense counsel had previously represented Jackson on an unrelated matter. Second, Johnson contends that the prosecutor's comments during closing argument deprived him of a fair trial. We disagree on both issues.
The trial court did not err by refusing to allow defense counsel to withdraw due to a conflict of interest. In order to show that a Sixth Amendment violation has occurred, a defendant must demonstrate that an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer's performance. Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 348, 100 S.Ct. 1708, 64 L.Ed.2d 333 (1980); Hunter v. State, 817 So.2d 786 (Fla.2002). Generally, conflict of interest issues arise when counsel dually represents two defendants on the same matter, or the witness being called is a victim in the case. Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 355 n. 3, 100 S.Ct. 1708; Rodriguez v. State, 767 So.2d 621 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000); Burnside v. State, 656 So.2d 241 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995). Here, defense counsel represented the wit ness, Jackson for a probation violation on a completely unrelated manner, and Jackson was not a victim in this case.
Further, to show an actual conflict, a defendant must identify specific evidence in the record that suggests his interests were compromised. Hunter, 817 So.2d at 792. Here, counsel contends that a conflict existed because it was impossible to cross-examine Jackson effectively without implicating her as an accomplice and revealing confidential information. The record, however, reveals that defense counsel thoroughly cross-examined Jackson and did not reveal any confidential information. Accordingly, the defense failed to demonstrate that an actual conflict of interest existed. Martin v. State, 761 So.2d 475 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000).
Additionally, Johnson contends that the State's closing argument deprived Johnson of a fair trial. We disagree. All of the statements that Johnson contends were prejudicial error, including the unob-jected-to comments, arose in the State's rebuttal closing argument. Viewing the comments in the context in which they were made, we deem the prosecutor's response as permissible comments on the evidence and a fair reply tailored to respond to the defense's closing argument. See Stancle v. State, 854 So.2d 228 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003); Mitchell v. State, 771 So.2d 596 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000); Vazquez v. State, 635 So.2d 1088 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994).
It is well established that counsel is afforded wide latitude in making arguments to the jury, especially in response to opposing counsel's improper comments. Schwarck v. State, 568 So.2d 1326 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990). Viewed in context of the entire closing, the prosecutor's comments, even if erroneous, were not a determining factor in the jury's determination of guilt. Doorbal v. State, 837 So.2d 940, 958 (Fla.2003).
Simply put, none of the prosecutor's comments individually or collectively rise to the level of requiring a reversal. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's decision.
Affirmed.
GERSTEN and SHEPHERD, JJ" concur.