Case Name: STATE of Florida, Petitioner, v. Surapo S. SORAKRAI, Respondent
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1989-04-26
Citations: 543 So. 2d 294
Docket Number: No. 88-03166
Parties: STATE of Florida, Petitioner, v. Surapo S. SORAKRAI, Respondent.
Judges: PARKER, J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 543
Pages: 294–296

Head Matter:
STATE of Florida, Petitioner, v. Surapo S. SORAKRAI, Respondent.
No. 88-03166.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
April 26, 1989.
James T. Russell, State Atty., Sixth Judicial Circuit, and Karen McHugh, Asst. State Atty., Clearwater, for petitioner.
James F. Manderscheid, St. Petersburg, for respondent.

Opinion:
FRANK, Acting Chief Judge.
The state has petitioned for a writ of certiorari challenging two non-final orders entered by the trial court in the current prosecution of Sorakrai for lewd and lascivious conduct alleged to be violative of section 800.04(2), Florida Statutes (1987). That aspect of the order granting "Defense Motion in Limine Number 1" is asserted by the state to be a departure from the essential requirements of law because it will permit Sorakrai to defend on the ground that he possessed a bona fide belief that the victim was sixteen years of age or older. The second in limine order bars the state from adducing testimony that Sorak-rai videotaped a sexual encounter with the victim. We have considered the contentions urged in the state's petition and So-rakrai's response and find a departure from the essential requirements of law only in that portion of the order sanctioning Sorakrai's defense grounded upon a claimed good faith belief as to the victim's age. To that limited extent, we grant the petition. See State v. Pettis, 520 So.2d 250 (Fla.1988).
It is alleged in the information that So-rakrai, on three separate occasions, engaged in sexual intercourse with a thirteen year old girl. It is not disputed that the sexual episodes were consensual and there is indication in the record that the girl was allowed entry into a bar where Sorakrai, a musician, was employed, that she drank alcoholic beverages, and that she "walks, talks, [and] looks older" than her true age.
During our consideration of this matter, it did not escape our attention that the trial court, in spite of section 800.04's interdiction of unchastity and consent as defenses to the crimes proscribed in that section, has approved the admissibility of evidence of consent as a part of Sorakrai's defense. Extensive comment is not required in exposition of the reality that if the jury hears testimony indicating the victim's consent to a criminal conversation with Sorakrai, that testimony will be nothing less than a significant portion of Sorak-rai's defense — contrary to the statute's unmistakable prohibition. We suggest that the trial court reconsider its ruling.
Chapter 800 does not, however, expressly bar a defense based upon the charged person's belief that the partner in the sexual event is sixteen or beyond that age. Nonetheless, we are persuaded that neither ignorance, misrepresentation, nor belief that the victim is sixteen years or older is available to a defendant charged with the violation of section 800.04(2). That section renders a person who "[c]om-mits an act defined as sexual battery under s. 794.011(1)(h) upon any child under the age of 16 years," guilty of a second degree felony.
The felonies charged against Sorakrai fall "within the category of crimes ¾ which, on grounds of public policy, certain acts are made punishable without proof that the defendant understands the facts that give character to his act' . and proof of an intent is not indispensable to conviction." Simmons v. State, 10 So.2d 436, 438 (Fla.1942); Hendricks v. State, 360 So. 2d 1119 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978). The principle has long endured in Florida that when a statute condemns an act as criminal without specifically embodying the element of intent, "it is not necessary for the State to prove that the commission of such act was accompanied by criminal intent." State v. Medlin, 273 So.2d 394, 396 (Fla.1973). The state meets its burden in a matter of this kind through proof that the act was committed with a person under the age of sixteen.
The offense identified in section 800.04(2) acquires its substantive components from the definition of sexual battery found in section 794.011(1)(h) which, in relevant part, states that: "The term 'sexual battery' means oral, anal, or vaginal penetration by, or union with, the sexual organ of another or the anal or vaginal penetration of another by any other object...."
In fleshing out chapter 794 in order fully to codify the elenients of the crime formerly known as statutory rape, the legislature provided in section 794.021 that:
When, in this chapter, the criminality of conduct depends upon the victim's being below a certain specified age, ignorance of the age is no defense. Neither shall misrepresentation of age by such person nor a bona fide belief that such person is over the specified age be a defense.
Because of the apparent dependence of section 800.04(2) upon section 794.011(1)(h), it is our view that the legislature intended section 794.021 to be operative in the implementation of section 800.04(2). It is manifest from the result reached in State v. Lanier, 464 So.2d 1192 (Fla.1985), that the supreme court perceived sexual intercourse with an underage female, condemned in section 800.04, to be criminal behavior notwithstanding the absence of chastity and the presence of consent. It is our judgment that conduct violative of section 800.-04 carries with it the same concept of "strict liability" that has traditionally characterized "statutory rape." Simmons. Thus, we are persuaded that section 794.-021 forecloses Sorakrai from a defense based upon the victim's misrepresentation of her age or a bona fide belief that she was sixteen years or older.
Accordingly, we grant the petition and quash the order we have reviewed.
PARKER, J., concurs.
HALL, J., dissents with opinion.