Case Name: Vincent F. MONTI v. WARWICK SCHOOL COMMITTEE
Court: Supreme Court of Rhode Island
Jurisdiction: Rhode Island
Decision Date: 1989-02-21
Citations: 554 A.2d 638
Docket Number: No. 88-11-M.P.
Parties: Vincent F. MONTI v. WARWICK SCHOOL COMMITTEE.
Judges: 
Reporter: West's Atlantic Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 554
Pages: 638–641

Head Matter:
Vincent F. MONTI v. WARWICK SCHOOL COMMITTEE.
No. 88-11-M.P.
Supreme Court of Rhode Island.
Feb. 21, 1989.
Michael St. Pierre, Revens & DeLuca, Warwick, for plaintiff.
William T. Murphy, Warwick, for defendant.

Opinion:
OPINION
KELLEHER, Justice.
We have issued a common-law writ of certiorari to review a decision of the Board of Regents for Elementary and Secondary Education affirming the refusal of the Warwick School Committee to reimburse the petitioner, Vincent F. Monti, for legal expenses he incurred in successfully defending himself against a five-count indictment charging him with second-degree sexual assault. The alleged victims were young girls who attended the primary school where the petitioner served as the principal. Hereafter we shall refer to the petitioner by his last name and to the Board of Regents as the Regents.
The single, decisive issue in this litigation is whether G.L.1956 (1985 Reenactment) § 9-l-31(a) requires the school committee to reimburse Monti for the legal expenses he incurred in contesting the criminal charges lodged against him.
A hearing officer assigned to the State Commissioner of Education's staff concluded that § 9-l-31(a) applied to both criminal and civil proceedings. The Regents, in re jecting the hearing officer's decision, concluded that the hearing officer had misconstrued the clear language of the statute. According to the Regents, the indemnification statute applied only to civil proceedings, the position maintained by the school committee since this controversy first arose. The Regents did suggest that notwithstanding the absence of any authorization in § 9-l-31(a), the school committee had the discretion to reimburse Monti. Before the committee could respond to this proposal, Monti filed this certiorari petition.
When this dispute was before the hearing officer, one of the sponsors of the indemnification legislation indicated that the legislation represented his concern about the teachers in the city of Providence who were "having problems with assaults" and "suits being brought against them for things that would happen in the school." At no time was he thinking in terms of a civil or a criminal suit. He was of the belief that a school committee should take care of the legal fees incurred by a teacher unless the teacher was found to be in the wrong or grossly negligent. The legislator was asked whether it was his intent to save harmless and indemnify any teacher or administrator from any of their acts. His response was, "That is correct." At that point counsel for the school committee moved to strike the response, and the motion was granted.
The school committee had relied to some degree upon an explanation prepared by the legislative council in regard to the extent of the indemnification provisions. The council's explanation noted that a teacher would be "protected against suits for civil damages." In Berberian v. O'Neil, 111 R.I. 354, 302 A.2d 301 (1973), we emphasized that any explanation by the staff of the legislative council regarding legislative intent is not conclusive of legislative intent but may be of some assistance in construing a statute.
This court serves as the final arbiter in disputes involving statutory construction. Lawrence v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 523 A.2d 864 (R.I.1987). In discharging this responsibility, we are required to determine and effectuate the Legislature's intent and attribute to the statute in question the meaning that is most consistent with its policies or obvious purposes. Brennan v. Kirby, 529 A.2d 633 (R.I.1987).
In its pertinent provisions § 9-l-31(a) requires, in essence, that every school committee as well as the Regents protect and save harmless any
"teacher, or any supervisor or administrator thereof from financial loss and expense, including legal fees and costs, if any, arising out of any claim, demand or suit for actions resulting in accidental bodily injury to or death of any person, or in accidental damage to or destruction of property, within or without the school building, or any other acts, including but not limited to infringement of any person's civil rights, resulting in any injury, which acts are not wanton, reckless, malicious, or grossly negligent provided such teacher, supervisor, or administrator, at the time of the acts was acting in the discharge of his (her) duties or within the scope of his (her) employment or under the direction of such school committee or the board of regents."
The critical language in this statute is the indemnification provision that necessitates the reimbursement from losses or expenses, including legal fees, arising out of "any claim, demand or suit."
The phrase "any claim, demand or suit" reminds us that Rule 12(b) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure requires that
"[ejvery defense, in law or fact, to a claim for relief in any pleading, whether a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, shall be asserted in the responsive pleading thereto if one is required, except that the following defenses may at the option of the pleader be made by motion: (6) failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted
These rules have been in effect in this jurisdiction since January 10,1966. Essentially a claim is a statement of facts upon which a plaintiff seeks monetary or equitable relief.
A "demand" may be viewed as a "claim" that has matured into a legal obligation that may be enforced by the court. Blinker v. Ludlow, 379 So.2d 999, 1001 (Fla.Dist. Ct.App.1980). "Suit" has been defined in Black's Law Dictionary 1286 (5th ed.1979), as
"[a] generic term, of comprehensive signification, referring to any proceeding by one person or persons against another or others in a court of justice in which the plaintiff pursues, in such court, the remedy which the law affords him [or her] for the redress of an injury or the enforcement of a right, whether at law or in equity."
The definition goes on to indicate that the term "suit" is "seldom applied to a criminal prosecution." Id.
The civil/criminal aspect of the term "suit" was delineated long over a century ago by the South Carolina Court of Appeals in State v. Chitty, 17 S.C.L. (1 Bail.) 379, 389 (1830), where the court noted, "It is true, that the word 'suit,' in its more extended signification, includes a public prosecution; but it is certainly not usually so understood, and no writer would so use it, without otherwise indicating his meaning."
We think it obvious that the Legislature, by limiting its reference to the indemnification of financial losses and legal expenses to those that arise out of any claim, demand, or suit intended that § 9-l-31(a) was to be applied only to civil proceedings. Further evidence of this intent can be found in the statute's exclusionary language that indicates that no indemnification will be provided for conduct that is "wanton, reckless, malicious, or grossly negligent." Those terms usually describe activities, which are considered to be criminal in nature.
Consequently the petition for certiorari is denied and dismissed. The writ previously issued is quashed, and the record of this case is remanded to the Board of Regents for Elementary and Secondary Education with our decision endorsed thereon.