Case Name: William Addison v. Benjamin F. Hard
Court: North Carolina Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: South Carolina
Decision Date: 1830-02
Citations: 1 Bail. 431
Docket Number: 
Parties: William Addison v. Benjamin F. Hard.
Judges: 
Reporter: South Carolina Law Reports
Volume: 17
Pages: 431–436

Head Matter:
William Addison v. Benjamin F. Hard.
Charleston,
Feb. 1830.
By the act of 1799, 2 Faust. 289, the proprietor of a ferry forfeits thel-ight to demand or receive the tolls allowed by law, unless he keeps the rates of toll fixed up in some conspicuous place. Where, however, a person has been in the habit of crossing a ferry without paying, but there is no evidence of his ever having objected to the rates not being fixed up, the jury, in an action against him for the toll, may presume, that he knew the rates and contracted to pay them; and a verdict for the plaintiff will not be disturbed. Richardson, J. dissenting on the last point.
Tried before Mr. Justice O’Neall, at Walterborough, Spring Term, 1829.
Assumpsit upon an account for tolls incurred by the defendant at the Jacksonborough ferry, of which the plaintiff was proprietor. The account was admitted by the defendant, but the plaintiff’s right to recover was resisted, on the ground, that by the provisions of the act of 1799, 2 Faust, 289, he had forfeited his right to the toll, in consequence of having neglected to “ keep fixed up in some conspicuous place,” the rates of toll established by law. The act, after requiring that the rates of toll of ferries, bridges, &c. shall be fixed up in some conspicuous place, provides, that “ if any person or persons, their heirs or assigns, in whom public ferries, toll-bridges, or causeways, have been, or hereafter shall be vested, shall neglect, or refuse to keep fixed up their several rates, as established by law, such keeper, or keepers of a public ferry, toll-bridge, or causeway, shall forfeit all such toll as they would have been intitled to receive.” It was fully ascertained by the evidence, that the plaintiff, in this action, had not kept the rates of toll fixed up, as required by the act, during the period comprised in the account; but there was no evidence, that the defendant had, at any time, during the same period, complained of the omission, or alleged ignorance of the rates.
It was contended for the plaintiff, that the forfeiture, provided by the act, did not enure to the benefit of the defendant, but to the public. Such was the technical import and effect of the word forfeit; and there was nothing in the connexion in which it was used in the act, to alter the ordinary legal import of the j.erm_ The language of the act is, “ shall forfeit all such toll not the right to demand or receive the rates allowed by law. Besides which, the same section went on to provide, that if the proprietor of a ferry, &c. should demand or receive greater rates of toll, than he was intitled to by law, he should forfeit treble such rates, to be recovered by warrant and execution from any justice of the peace; which latter provision evidently applied to both the classes of forfeitures created by that section of the act. If it were conceded, that the defendant could derive any benefit from the forfeiture, it could only be in the character of informer; and he could not be intitled to that character, except by instituting proceedings for the recovery of the forfeiture in the mode prescribed by the act. Without instituting such proceedings, the act could, under no circumstances, avail as a defence to the present action.
The presiding Judge was of opinion, and so instructed the jury, that the intention of the Legislature, in the enactment in question, was to apprize persons passing a ferry, &c. of the rates of toll, to which the law subjected them, and thus to guard against imposition; and if this end was attained to the satisfaction of the parties, by any other means, the act would not apply. If the defendant had paid the rates of toll allowed by law, he certainly could not recover them back; so if, knowing them, he had contracted to pay them, on condition of being allowed to pass the ferry on credit, the act would afford him no defence to this action. There was no evidence, indeed, that defendant knew the rates of toll, or that he had contracted to pay them : but on the other hand, it was admitted that he had made use of the ferry for a long time, and had incurred tolls to a large amount; and there was no evidence that he had ever objected to the rates not being fixed up, nor was there any pretence that he was ignorant of the rates. The conclusion seemed to be inevitable, that the defendant would not have been allowed to use the ferry, for so long a time, without having obtained credit, or in other words, promised to pay the toll — for doubtless if he had made the objection, the plaintiff would have obviated it by fixing up the rates.
The jury found for the plaintiff; and the defendant moved to set aside their verdict on the ground of misdirection.
Clarke, for the motion.
Contended, that the construction, given to the act by the presiding Judge amounted, in effect, to its absolute repeal; and was, therefore, inadmissible. As to the question made upon the effect of the forfeiture, and whether the defendant was intitled to the benefit of it, the intention of the Legislature, that it should enure to his benefit, was too plain to be mistaken. No one, indeed, but himself, could take advantage of it. This point was conceded in the case of Frazier v. Drayton, 2 N. & M. 471, which may be regarded as having settled the question.
J. D. Edwards, contra.
The opinion delivered in Frazier v. Drayton is in exact conformity to the charge of the presiding Judge in this case. If it is authority on the one point, it is so also on the other, and is conclusive against the present motion.

Opinion:
Colcock, J.
In this case we concur with the presiding Judge in the view which he has taken, both of the-law and of the facts. No doubt can exist as to the object of the law; but whilst the Legislature was affording to the citizens of the country a shield to protect them from the imposition of ferry-owners, they could not intend, that it should be converted into an engine by which the citizen might injure these public agents. We do not hear of any objections made by the defendant in his frequent passings over this ferry, of the want of information as to the rates of ferriage. Had he made this a ground of objection at first, can it be doubted that the ferryman would have complied with the act? The presumption, on which the Judge and' the jury have relied, is an irresistible one, that there was a private contract between the parties, and that the defendant obtained a credit; and in relation to these points, there can be but one opinion of the verdict. What would be the conduct of a person who considered himself aggrieved by a violation of the act, in not putting up the rates of toll? Would he not immediately complain; and particularly if he was compelled to cross the ferry frequently ? Had the defendant done so, and relied on the protection the law afforded him, he might have refused to pay; and he then could not have been compelled to- do so. In the case of Frazier v. Drayton, 2 N. & M. 471, the rates had been put up, aud therefore the plaintiff was not put to the necessity of relying on either presumption, or direct proof of a con tract to pass on credit. But in that case the Court did not rely 1 on that fact alone ; and if there had been no proof that the rate* ^ac* been Put UP' tbe decision would have been the same.
Again: What is meant by admitting the account? or, why was it admitted? I take it, that by admitting the account, the defendant admitted the services had been performed, and that the charges were made according to law. This is giving up the case; for after a verdict by which justice has been obviously advanced, I would never set it aside upon a mere legal objection, which can be avoided by any rational presumption. And why the account was admitted I think is obvious: some explanatory evidence might have been given, if witnesses, or any witness had been called to prove it. The motion must therefore be dismissed.