Case Name: Robert S. Holland v. Mary Ellen Nimitz et al.
Court: Supreme Court of Texas
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1922-03-15
Citations: 111 Tex. 419
Docket Number: No. 3452
Parties: Robert S. Holland v. Mary Ellen Nimitz et al.
Judges: 
Reporter: Texas Reports
Volume: 111
Pages: 419–433

Head Matter:
Robert S. Holland v. Mary Ellen Nimitz et al.
No. 3452.
Decided March 15, 1922.
(232 S. W., 298; 239 S. W., 185.)
1. —Evidence—Statute—Transactions with Decedent — Will.
In an action for probating a will an heir contesting its validity cannot be permitted to testify to opinion as to sanity of testator, though restricting such opinion, by the form of the question and answer, to results of observation of acts, conduct and physical condition of the testator, and not basing it on conversations with or statements made by him. Opinion based on such matters is still testimony of a party as to transactions with testator, within the terms and meaning of article 3690, Revised Statutes, 1911, forbidding same. (Pp. 423-425).-
2. —Jurisdiction of Supreme Court — Statute—Conflicting Decisions.
Where the Supreme Court acquires jurisdiction over a case reversed and remanded by reason of rulings on the effect of a statute or of conflicting decisions, its jurisdiction is not limited, by the Act of March 15, 1917, to determination of the question which gave it jurisdiction. It is the case, not merely the question, which it is to decide; and it has power to determine any question properly presented which is necessary to a determination of the correctness of the judgment involved. (P. 430).
3. —Same—Statutes and Decisions Thereon Reviewed.
Reviewing the legislation in regard to the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and the decisions under the various statutes (Constitution, Amend-, ment adopted September 22, 1891; Act of April 13, 1892; Laws, 22d Leg., p. 19, and rulings thereunder: City of Austin v. Nalle, 85 Texas, 538; Texas & P. Ry. Co. v. Webb, 102 Texas, 215; Wheeler v. Tyler Southeastern Ry. Co., 91 Texas, 356; Act of March 28, 1913, Laws, 33d Leg., p. 107, and rulings in Browder v. Memphis Ind. Sch. Dist., 107 Texas, 536; Texas City Transp. Co. v. Winters, 224 S. W., 1087; Act of March 15, 1917, Laws, 35th Leg., p. 140; Decker v. Kirlicks, 110 Texas, 95; Southern Pac. Co. v. Walters, 110 Texas, 497) it is held that the Act of 1917, like that of 1892, and unlike that of 1913, did not restrict the power of the Supreme Court, on writ of error, to determining the questions only on which the jurisdiction was obtained. (Pp. 425-431).
4. —Same—Error Not Assigned in Supreme Court.
While the Supreme Court will not consider even fundamental error not assigned by the plaintiff in error, it will necessarily consider all questions properly presented by the party prevailing in the Court of Civil Appeals, or fundamental error against him not so presented, though not assigned in the Supreme Court, where a decision of such questions is necessary in order to determine whether the judgment rendered by such appellate court was correct. (Pp. 431, 432).
6. — Supreme Court — Jurisdiction.
Where jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is obtained under either of subdivision 1 to 5 of section 1 of the Act of March 15, 1917, the case, and not the particular question is before the court. And the same is true in cases under subdivision 6 (cases important to the jurisprudence of the State) except in cases in which the Supreme Court, in the discretion given it by that paragraph, grants the writ “ for the purpose of revising the decision upon such question alone.” (Pp. 429, 431).
6. —Evidence—Immaterial Testimony.
Where the issue on contested probate o£ a will is only as to testamentary capacity and undue influence upon the testator, evidence offered by the contestant that the proponent’s wife was unkind to and neglected the testator was immaterial to the issues involved and its exclusion was no ground for reversal. (P. 431).
7. —Evidence—Statute—Transactions with Decedent — Will.
On the issue of undue influence over the testatrix by the devisee, proponent of a will for probate, his testimony that he did not at any time say anything to testatrix with reference to making a will was improperly admitted. The statute, article 3690, prohibits negative as well as positive testimony by a party as to transactions with deceased. (Pp. 432, 433).
8. —Same—Cases Discussed.
McCampbell v. Henderson, 50 Texas, 613; Johnson v. Lockhart, 40 S. W., 641; Edelstein v. Brown, 95 S. W., 1128; folowed. Adam v. Sanger, 77 S. W., 954, disapproved, and refusal of writ of error explained. (P. 433).
Error to the Court of Civil Appeals for tne Third District, in an appeal from Tom Green County.
Robert S. Holland applied for probate of the will of his mother. It was contested by Mrs. Nimitz and others, co-heirs of decedent. The will was admitted to probate in the County Court, and, on appeal by contestants, in the District Court. Contestants prosecuted appeal on which the Court of Civil Appeals rendered judgment reversing1 and remanding the case (217 S. W., 244) and Holland obtained writ of error. The case being referred to the Commission of Appeals, Section A, was by them recommended for affirmance;' and this was adopted as the judgment of the Supreme Court. On motion for rehearing there the judgment of reversal and remand is affirmed, but on other grounds than those assigned by the Court of Civil Appeals and, in part, from those of the Commission.
Critz & Woodward and Blanks, Collins & Jackson for plaintiff in error, with whom Mr. J. T. Thomson was on brief in the Court of Civil Appeals.
The court did not err in refusing to permit Mrs. Mamie Nimitz to state that, in her opinion, her mother was mentally incompetent at the time of the execution of her will, for the reason that such witness, being one of the contestants of the will, was prohibited by the terms of Article 3690 from testifying. Brown v. Mitchell, 75 Texas, 9; Lewis v. Aylott, 45 Texas, 201; Clark v. Briley, 193 S. W., 419; Leahy v. Timon, 204 S. W., 1029; Trowbridge v. Stone, Admtr., 26 S. E., 365; Esyaman’s Will, (N. Y.) 20 N. E., 617; Davis v. Tarver, 65 Ala., 98; Brainard v. Brainard (Ill.) 103 N. E., 50; Campbell v. Akarman, 83 Atl., 881; Holcomb v. Holcomb, 95 N. Y., 316.
The terms of Article 3690, excluding the evidence of an interested witness as to statements made by or transactions with a deceased person, are sufficiently comprehensive to exclude the opinion of such a witness as to the sanity or insanity of the testator, although predicated alone upon his observation of the acts, conduct and general appearance of such person.
Mrs. Holland was not a party to the suit and there were no pleadings which could warrant the introduction of any evidence showing or tending to show that she had conspired or confederated with her husband or anyone else to improperly influence her mother-in-law, and we respectfully submit that under such a condition of the record it would have been highly improper for the court to have permitted any attack upon Mrs. Holland or the introduction of any evidence which would reflect upon her treatment of her deceased mother-in-law.
Complaint is made of the action of the court in permitting the proponent to testify that he never said anything to his mother with reference to making a will. We understand the rule to be that such negative testimony is not held to fall within the terms' of Art. 3690. Mast v. Tibbles, 60 Texas, 305; Potter v. Wheat, 53 Texas, 401; Adam v. Sanger, 77 S. W., 954.
The following authorities support the proposition that where there is no evidence of the mental incapacity of a testator, except the opinions of witnesses, whether they be experts or non-experts, and the subscribing witnesses, attending physician, and intimate acquaintances, who came in daily contract with the testator, all testify that he was of sound mind, no issue is presented for the jury, and a verdict should be instructed for the proponents of the will. In Re Bartels Estate, 164 S. W., 859; Navarro v. Garcia, 172 S. W., 723; Hahn v. Hammerstein (Mo.) 198 S. W., 833; Winn v. Grier, (Mo.) 117 S. W., 48; Blackman v. Andrews, 114 N. W., 218; Wilcoxon v. Wilcoxon, 46 N. E., 369; Byrne v. Byrne, (Mo.) 181 S. W., 391; Cyc. Vol. 40, p. 1321; Burley v. McGough, 3 N. E. 738; Alexander on Wills, p. 512; In Re Watson, 31 La. Ann., 757; Dobie v. Armstrong, 55 N. E., 302; Ivison v. Ivison., 80 N. Y. Supp., 1011; In Re Richmonds Estate, 55 Atl., 970; Ward v. Brown, 44 S. E., 488; Artrip v. Rasnake, 31 S. E., 4; Dec. Dig. Vol. 8, Nos. 553-568, and 571, (2);
Wright (6 Harris, for defendant in error.
Mrs. Mamie Nimitz, testified that she was the daughter of the deceased, Mrs. Susan E. Holland, and that she had known her mother all her life and beta with her a great part of her life, and was with her during her last illness, and saw her on or" about the 10th day of July, 1914, and date of the making of the alleged will, and had seen her and stayed with her a large part of the time from the time she came to San Angelo until the date of her death, by which facts alone she qualifies herself to give an opinion as to her mother’s sanity or insanity at the time of the making of the alleged will. Ami it was not necessary for her to state any further facts upon which she based her opinion. Con. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Lathrop, 111 U. S., 612; Jordan v. State, 141 S. W., 790; Maxey v. State, 145 S. W., 957; In Re, Rawlings Will case, Ann. Cas. 1918-A, 948; T. & P. Ry. Co. v. Hughes, 192 S. W., 1094; Rogers v. Cunningham (Ark.), 178 S. W., 414; Lanham v. Lanham, 146 S. W., 637.
Even in a suit by or against executors or administrators as such, a party to the suit, having qualified by showing a long intimacy with the deceased, may testify as to the witness’ opinion, as to the insanity or sanity of the deceased, and in so doing may use all the knowledge possessed by the witness, both by observation and by statements, acts and conduct of the deceased within the knowledge of the witness. Smith v. Guerre, 159 S. W., 417; In Re Will of Brown, 35 N. W., 726; Schultz v. Culbertson, 103 N. W., 234.
A witness interested in a suit against executor or administrator may testify, independent of any statements made by the testatrix, but merely from observation, what the witness’ opinion is as to the sanity or insanity of said testatrix, notwithstanding the witness is a party contestant to a suit with an administrator. Estate of Goldthorp, 94 Iowa, 336, 58 Am. St., 400; Severin v. Zack, 55 Iowa, 28; Parsons v. Parsons, 66 Iowa, 754; Meeker v. Meeker, 74 Iowa, 352; 7 Am. State Rep., 498; Sim v. Russell, 90 Iowa, 656; Denning v. Butcher, 91 Iowa, 425.
Any circumstances, we take it, of ill treatment, either by Robert Holland or his wife, would be a circumstance tending to show the will to be unnatural, and that fact of itself is a circumstance tending to prove insanity and undue influence.
The court erred in permitting counsel for proponent, over the objection of contestants, to propound the following question to R. S. Holland, viz.: “Did you at any time say anything to your mother with reference to the making of a will?” And also in permitting said witness to reply thereto as follows: “No, sir, I did not.”
We also want to submit in this argment to the court for what it may be worth, that Article 3590 of the Statute does not apply to this case, and for authority, we refer the court to the case of Grelle v. Grelle, decided by this court on October 16, 1918; Simon v. Middleton, 51 Texas Civil Appeals, 531. Yery frankly, we are not much of the opinion that this ease applies. That, however, may not be the opinion of .this court.

Opinion:
Opinion op Commission op Appeals, Section A.
Mr. Judge SPENCER
delivered the opinion of the court.
This was a proceeding by defendants in error to contest the probating of the will of Mrs. Susan E. Holland. The will was admitted to probate in the County Court of Tom Green County, and the same result followed in the District Court of that county.
Upon appeal, the honorable Court of Civil Appeals reversed and remanded the cause, for the reason that the trial court refused to permit Mrs. Nimitz, a daughter and heir of the executrix to testify; that independently of any statement made by testatrix or transaction with her, but merely from observation of decedents acts, conduct and mental and physical condition, she was of opinion that testatrix was insane at the time of making the will. 217 S. W., 245.
The trial court excluded the proffered testimony, because in its opinion it was inhibited by Article 3690, Revised Civil Statutes, 1911. That Article reads:
"In actions by or against executors, administrators or guardians, in which judgment may be rendered for or against them as such, neither party shall be allowed to testify against the others as to any transaction with, or statement by, the testator, intestate or ward, unless called to testify thereto by the opposite party; and the provisions of this article shall extend to and include all actions by or against the heirs or legal representatives of a decedent arising out of any transaction with such decedent."
In our opinion the evidence was inadmissible. The validity of the will depends upon the sanity of testatrix at the time she executed it. Mrs. Nimitz was a party to the proceeding resisting the probate of the will and interested in establishing the insanity of testatrix. The question is thus narrowed to the single proposition: Is the opinion, as to the sanity of testatrix, based not upon any conversation had with her, or statement by her, but solely upon observations of her acts and conduct and physical and mental condition, a transaction with decedent within the meaning of the Statute.
We think that it is. The words "transaction with," as used in statutes similar to ours relating to the admissibility of transactions with decedents have often received judicial interpretation and have been held to include every method by which one person can derive impressions or information from the conduct, condition or language of another. Holland v. Holland, 90 N. Y. Supp. 208; 98 Apps. Div. 366; Holcomb v. Holcomb, 95 N. Y. 316. The Supreme Court of this State in Leahy et al. v. Timón et al. has definitely and pointedly decided that heirs of a decedent, whose will they are interested in setting aside, are prohibited by the terms of the Statute from testifying as to statements by testatrix tending to establish testatrix's mental capacity at the time of making the will. 110 Texas, 73, 215 S. W., 951. •
There is just as much or more reason for prohibiting an opinion by an heir based upon observations as to acts or conduct of a party whose sanity is called in question, as there is to prohibit an opinion based upon statements made by such party. The statements of a person are a part of his acts and conduct, and an index thereto. Specific acts or conduct are often indicative of mental condition but not necessarily so. The acts or conduct testified to in a given case as a basis of insanity would be susceptible of explanation or subject to contradiction by the person whose sanity is questioned, if that person were living. The object of the Statute was to prohibit the interested heirs and legal representatives from testifying to any facts, or opinions, based upon observations, arising out of any transaction with the decedent which the decedent could, if living, contradict or explain. Death having sealed the lips of one of the parties; the law for reasons, founded upon public policy, seals the lips of the other.
The intent and purpose of the Statute was to exclude just the character of testimony as was excluded by the trial court in this case. That intent and purpose can be carried out by giving to the expression "any transaction with the decedent" that construction which is usually given to it by courts construing similar statutes. Any other construction would do violence to the manifest intent of the lawmaking body.
The construction we have given the Statute is borne out, and this case is ruled, we think, by the decision of the Supreme Court in Park v. Caudle, 58 Texas, 214. In that case the witness Caudle was permitted, over objections, to testify that Joel D. Parks executed and delivered a certain deed to William A. Park, and also as to what passed between Parks and Park at the time explanatory of the transaction. Caudle was not interested therein at the time, but subsequently became so. The court held that it was error to permit him to testify as to the execution of the deed or as to what passed between Parks and Park, or as to any statements made at the time by Parks and Park in the presence of each other. That was a case in which the witness was testifying as to what he observed ; or in other words, his testimony had reference to the act and conduct of the decedent during the latter's life time, and the Supreme Court held that the words of the Statute were sufficiently broad to exclude such testimony. With equal reason, we think that the Statute also excludes the proffered testimony in this case.
The Court of Civil Appeals sustained defendant in error's assignment to the effect that the trial court erred- in refusing to permit Mrs. Nimitz to testify that when her mother was brought to San Angelo during her last illness, no preparations had been made to take care of her at plaintiff in error's house where she was taken, and that plaintiff in error's wife was unkind to her and neglected her.
This testimony is not inhibited by Article 3690. We do not pass upon its admissibility otherwise, however, as it is not such an error as we are called upon to review; but only refer to it as a reason for recommending an affirmance of the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals reversing and remanding the cause.
We recommend, therefore, that the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals reversing and remanding the cause he affirmed.
Supreme Court, per curiam.
The judgment recommended in the report of the Commission of Appeals is adopted and will be entered as the judgment of the Supreme Court.
We approve the holding of the Commission of Appeals on the question... .discussed in its opinion.