Case Name: Frank James SKINNER a/k/a Frank Gene Skinner, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee
Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1992-04-01
Citations: 837 S.W.2d 633
Docket Number: No. 206-91
Parties: Frank James SKINNER a/k/a Frank Gene Skinner, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.
Judges: BENAVIDES, J., concurs in result.
Reporter: South Western Reporter Second Series
Volume: 837
Pages: 633–637

Head Matter:
Frank James SKINNER a/k/a Frank Gene Skinner, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.
No. 206-91.
Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, En Banc.
April 1, 1992.
Rehearing Denied Sept. 30, 1992.
Concurring Opinion of Judge Clinton on Denial of Rehearing Sept. 30, 1992.
Bruce W. Weathers, El Paso, for appellant.
Steve W. Simmons, Dist. Atty., Regina Arditti, Asst. Dist. Atty., El Paso, and Robert Huttash, State’s Atty., Austin, for the State.

Opinion:
OPINION ON APPELLANT'S PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW
BAIRD, Judge.
Appellant was convicted by a jury of delivery of a controlled substance. The trial judge assessed punishment at twenty years confinement. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Skinner v. State, 799 S.W.2d 402 (Tex.App. — El Paso 1990). We granted appellant's petition for discretionary review. We will affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
I.
A recitation of the pertinent facts is necessary to address appellant's questions for review. Appellant's two count indictment alleged the offense of delivery of a controlled substance by actual transfer and constructive transfer. Five witnesses testified at appellant's trial: Darius Neyland, Jose Castro, John Rudd, Rudolfo Martinez and appellant. The trial judge charged the jury only on the theory of constructive transfer alleged in Count II. After the jury retired to deliberate, appellant moved for an instructed verdict, contending the evidence was insufficient to establish the offense of delivery of a controlled substance by constructive transfer. The trial judge denied the motion and the jury convicted appellant.
Appellant, in his designation of record on appeal, requested a transcription of his own testimony and the testimony of Darius Neyland. See, Tex.R.App.P. 50(b). On direct appeal, appellant's sole point of error challenged the sufficiency of the evidence to support the conviction. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction holding that by providing only a "partial" statement of facts appellant
failed to present this Court with a complete record of the evidentiary aspect of his trial, Appellant has failed to preserve any of his contentions concerning the adequacy of the evidence to sustain his conviction. Beck v. State, 583 S.W.2d 338 (Tex.Cr.App.1979).
Skinner, 799 S.W.2d at 403.
Appellant's petition for discretionary review was granted on May 8, 1991. On June 13, 1991 we granted appellant's motion for leave to file a supplemental statement of facts and on June 26, 1991 we received a transcription of the testimony of Jose Castro and John Rudd. However, the testimony of Rudolfo Martinez is still lacking from the record before us.
II.
Appellant's first question for review presents a question recently considered by this Court, namely may a defendant challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction with only a partial statement of facts. We answered the question in the negative, holding that an appellate court cannot determine the merits of a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence without a review of the entire record of the trial before the fact finder. Greenwood v. State, 823 S.W.2d 660, 661 (Tex.Cr.App.1992). In O'Neal v. State, 826 S.W.2d 172 (Tex.Cr.App.1992) we held: "[a] defendant who wishes to raise a sufficiency issue on appeal has the burden of ensuring that the entire record of the trial before the fact finder is before the appellate court, and may not request a partial statement of facts and rely on the presumption of Rule 53(d)." O'Neal, 826 S.W.2d at 173.
As previously noted, although the appellate record has been supplemented, the statement of facts lacks the testimony of Rudolfo Martinez. Therefore, the record before us is not the entire record of the trial before the fact finder. Accordingly, appellant's question for review is overruled.
III.
Appellant's second question for review asks: "Does this Court's opinion in Beck v. State [588 S.W.2d 338 (Tex.Cr.App.1979) ], apply to an indigent defendant?" The record reflects that appellant filed a "Motion for Free Statement of Facts" and the court reporter was ordered to prepare the statement of facts "at no charge to the Defendant." Appellant originally requested the court "reporter transcribe the entire proceedings in this cause_" However, appellant subsequently filed an "Amended Request for Preparation of Statement of Facts" which "specifically requested that the [court] reporter transcribe the matters and proceedings set forth in the Designation of Record." As previously noted, appellant designated only his own testimony and the testimony of Darius Neyland.
It is apparent from the record that appellant's decision to bring forth only a partial statement of facts is unrelated to his indigent status. Therefore, our decision to grant appellant's second question for review was improvident. Accordingly, appellant's second question for review is dismissed.
IV.
Appellant's third question for review asks: "Does the application of Beck v. State to the instant situation conflict with Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 53(c) and Robinson v. State, [661 S.W.2d 279 (Tex.App. — Corpus Christi 1983, no pet.) ]?" We believe the more timely question to be: Does the application of Greenwood conflict with Rule 53(c)? We answer the question in the negative.
Tex.R.App.P. 53(c) provides:
All matters not essential to the decision of the questions presented on appeal shall be omitted. Formal parts of all exhibits and more than one copy of any document appearing in the statement of facts shall be excluded. All documents shall be abridged by omitting all irrelevant and formal portions thereof.
In Greenwood, we held that the entire statement of facts was essential for an appellate court to review a sufficiency of the evidence claim.
. In its sufficiency review, a reviewing court bears the responsibility of reviewing the entire record in the light most favorable to the prosecution to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. [Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318, 99 S.Ct. 2781 [2788], 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979) ] This constitutional mandate is predicated upon the ability of the reviewing court to consider all the relevant evidence in a given case. The presentation of only a partial record makes such a consideration impossible. Because the reviewing court must consider all relevant record evidence and Rule 50(d) requires that the complaining party present sufficient portions of the record to demonstrate error of a reversible nature, the entire record of the trial before the fact finder is necessary to show error when an appellant raises a sufficiency point of error. [O'Neal v. State, 811 S.W.2d 219, 221 (Tex.App. — Dallas, 1991, pet. granted)]_
*
. We hold that without an agreed or complete statement of facts, an appellate court cannot consider the "facts" of the case to determine whether or not sufficient evidence exists to support the conviction.
Greenwood, 823 S.W.2d at 661.
We find no conflict between Rule 53(c) and Greenwood. Simply stated, the appellate record must contain all matters essential to resolution of the points of error raised on appeal. In that regard, the entire record of the trial before the fact finder is essential for an appellate court to resolve a point of error challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to support the conviction. Appellant's third question for review is overruled.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.
BENAVIDES, J., concurs in result.
CLINTON, J., dissents.
. Specifically, appellant contended in his point of error:
THE TRIAL JUDGE ERRED IN FAILING TO GRANT APPELLANTS MOTION FOR DIRECTED VERDICT, FOR THE REASON THAT THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE OF A CONSTRUCTIVE TRANSFER.
. Specifically, appellant's first question asks:
Does this Court's opinion in Beck v. State bar review of a sufficiency of evidence point as to one element of the offense where the partial statement of facts presented to the Court of Appeals contains sufficient information for the Court to consider and dispose of the single issue raised on appeal?
. The decision in Robinson is not controlling because its holding was limited to the "policy of [the Corpus Christi Court of Appeals] on certain matters pertaining to criminal appeals." Robinson v. State, 661 S.W.2d 279, 281 (Tex.App.— Corpus Christi 1983).