Case Name: Peter Mulder against Peter Cravat
Court: South Carolina Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: South Carolina
Decision Date: 1802
Citations: 2 Bay 370
Docket Number: 
Parties: Peter Mulder against Peter Cravat.
Judges: Present, Grimre, Waties, Bay, Johnson, Trezevant and BRevard.
Reporter: South Carolina Law Reports
Volume: 2
Pages: 370–374

Head Matter:
Peter Mulder against Peter Cravat.
Charleston District,
1802.
■. , , .Awards and - umpirages are not to be set aside unless o°ro°misbeha-a¡ biiratorsthe Exeeptoniym cases of gross errors or mistakes, courts •will always tband too Sceiy^so as to «¡treat the ends ot the reference, hut will lend every aid to into* exec™ tl0n-
MOTION to confirm an umpirage set aside by the cir-j . 1 cuit court for Charleston district,
. , . r , . I his was an appeal from the decision or the circuit court of Charleston district. It appeared that the parties had, by a ru^e °f court, submitted their matters in dispute to the de-cjsion Gf two arbitrators, to wit, fames Miller and facob * 1 ■' u Abrahams, with liberty, in case of difference, of choosing an . . ’ , umpire. Upon inspecting the accounrs between the parties, ibe arbitrators did differ, and they chose.Seth Lothrop the umpire, who accordingly made his umpirage from the accounts and the testimony submitted to him. A motion was J afterwards made in the circuit court in . Charleston district .... . ... , , , to set aside this umpirage, which was done by that court. The present was, therefore, a motion to rescind the order of that court, and to confirm the umpirage made by Mr,' Lothrop.
• The grounds upon which the umpirage was set aside were, first, an affidavit made by Abrahams, one of the referees, that Mr. Lothrop, the umpire, had admitted a sum of money, one hundred and eighteen dollars, to have been paid by the plaintiff to the defendant, upon comparing the accounts between the parties in dispute ; and, secondly, on the oath of the party himself, which, it was urged, was inadmissible testimony, by the well known rules of law.
In support of the present motion, it was urged by Mr. Sagood,
that collusion and fraud were the only grounds upon
which an award could be set aside at this day, and for that purpose quoted 3 Atk. 529. 2 JEsp. 577. 4 Term Rep. 589. 1 Bos. &? Pull. 91. 1 Vez. jun. 369.
That in this case there did not appear to be any thing like collusion or fraud, or any misbehaviour on the part of the umpire ; who, on the contrary, appears to have acted according to the best of his judgment, and with sound discretion, too, in forming his opinion upon the best evidence the nature of the thing offered. That in these kind of references, the arbitrators are not bound down by the strict rules of law and evidence, which govern courts of justice, They have a right to draw their information from the best sources it can be procured, and to judge of the whole of the circumstances, according to just and equitable principles, so as to put an end to the dispute between the parties ; which is one of the great objects of all references and arbi-trations. It is laid down, that by choosing private judges, the parties have placed the dispute beyond the reach of law; and the courts ought not to examine too nicely or minutely into their conduct, unless for corruption, misbehaviour, or going beyond their powers; as every person is left to his own discretion in the choice of these judges, neither party ought, after an award is made, to be permitted to come in and allege, as a ground for setting it aside, the want of honesty or understanding, or that they have not done him justice ; because, he has precluded himself from making these objections, by his own choice, and by his own assent. And in every case where a power is given to the arbitrators, in case of disagreement, to choose an umpire, the parties are as much bound by the umpirage of such person, as if he had been chosen by the parties themselves.
2 Vex. jun. 22; *
In opposition to this motion, it was not denied, but that arbitrators had great powers as to the matters submitted to their consideration, and that an ample field was open to them for the exercise of discretion; but still they were bound and restricted by the plain rules of law, and the obvious principles of justice ; and if they violated these, although there might be no room for accusing them with fraud or misbehaviour, yet mistakes both of law and fact ought to be rectified. In the present’instance, the oath of the party was admitted to prove his account, which was contrary to the plain rule of law, that no man shall be an evidence in his own cause : in this respect, therefore, it was said, that a plain rule of law had been violated, and that the court was bound, whenever that was apparent, to rectify it by setting aside the umpirage, and leaving the parties in the situation in which the rule of reference found them.

Opinion:
The Judges observed on this occasion, that motions for setting aside awards and umpirages, had become very frequent and common of late ; almost every man who was dissatisfied with an award, seemed to endeavour to get rid of it by some means or other, if possible. It therefore became the duty of the court, not to lend-too easy an ear to complaints of this kind, or to set afloat decisions which had been made by judges of the parties' own choosing. Every man, who went into a court of justice in the prosecution or defence of a right, must know, that his case there will be governed by the strict rules of law. But whenever he consents to withdraw it from such court, and submit to one of those domestic tribunals composed of private individuals, who were not law characters, he consents that his case shall be*no longer bound by the rigid rules of law and evidence, which prevail in a court of justice.
The individual referees, by his own nomination, become judges, jurors and chancellors in the case, and possess all the powers which come within the province, or compass of these respective functionaries ; and unless they violate the principles assigned to each, and every of these great branches of law and equity, their decisions ought to be supported and maintained. The great principle, therefore, laid down by Lord Hardwicke, 3 Atk. 529. and which is supported by all the other authorities above quoted, is the best general rule which can be adopted: " That the only ground " to impeach an award, is collusion, or great misbehaviour " in the arbitrators ; for, otherwise, being made by judges of & the parties' own choosing, it is binding and final on all the " parties; and unless it was so, no person would ever con- " sent to act as an arbitrator." But as all men are liable to mistakes and errors, this general rule must be subject to those exceptions. If, therefore, any great or' palpable error, or-gross mistake has been committed by arbitrators or an umpire, that may be a ground for opening such award or umpirage. But the mistake must be plain and gross, to set •aside the award. Loft, 554. A mere mistake in point of law, or error in judgment on the part of an arbitrator, does not appear to be grounds for impeaching an award or umpL .rage. Lord Mansfeld says, that awards are not to be scanned with critical niceties, as they, are made by judges of the parties' own choosing, and that much greater latitude and less strictness, are exercised now in construing awards than formerly; they are to be construed liberally and fa-vourably ; so that they may take their eifect, rather than be defeated. 1 Burr. 277. Now to apply the foregoing case with these principles. The reasons assigned for setting aside this umpirage, are that the umpire had admitted 118 dollars to have been paid by the plaintiff to the defendant, upon no other testimony than the comparing their accounts, and the oath of the party. As to the comparison of accounts, had not the umpire, Mr. Lothrop, a right to examine them, and judge of them ? That was the very thing he was chosen by the arbitrators for; and of which, he was to judge and determine'; and not a single error has been pointed out, nor any mistake shewn in the transaction. But it was said, he admitted the oath of the party. This was, perhaps, the best evidence which could be got upon the occasion, to satisfy his judgment or conscience that he was right in his determination. And is not this admitted every day in the court of equity, and in cases in the summary jurisdiction of this court, in default of every other kind of testimony, and in small and mean causes before justices of the peace ? And shall arbitrators be circumscribed within narrower limits than any of these tribunals on this point ? The policy of arbitraments and awards is against such a rigid construction. Indeed, if such critical niceties were to be observed, it would entirely defeat the end and design of awards.
Upon the whole, to revert back to the general rule on this subject, no misbehaviour has ueen suggested, and no gross error has been pointed out in this umpirage; and these are the only legal grounds for setting it aside.
It was therefore ordered, that the decision of the circuit court be set aside, and that the umpirage stand confirmed.
Present, Grimre, Waties, Bay, Johnson, Trezevant and BRevard.