Case Name: DELMAT CORPORATION, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, v. MARIE KAHN, DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT
Court: New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New Jersey
Decision Date: 1977-02-09
Citations: 147 N.J. Super. 293
Docket Number: 
Parties: DELMAT CORPORATION, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, v. MARIE KAHN, DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT.
Judges: 
Reporter: New Jersey Superior Court Reports
Volume: 147
Pages: 293–303

Head Matter:
DELMAT CORPORATION, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, v. MARIE KAHN, DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT.
Superior Court of New Jersey Appellate Division
Submitted January 11, 1977
Decided February 9, 1977.
Before Judges Lynch, Milmed and Antell.
Mr. Walter R. Cohn, attorney for appellant (Mr. Norman A. Feinstein on the brief).
Ms. Joan Pransky, Essex County Legal Services (Mr. Robert L. Doris, Jr., Director), attorney for respondent (Ms. Pransky, Mr. James A. Tarella and Mr. John D. Atlas, on the brief).

Opinion:
The opinion of the court was delivered by
Milmed, J. A. D.
Plaintiff, owner of the nine-family apartment building at 433 William Street in East Orange, appeals from the dismissal of its complaint which sought possession of an apartment occupied by defendant in the building.
The facts may be briefly summarized. In November 1973 the parties entered into an oral month-to-month tenancy and defendant-tenant paid to plaintiff-landlord a security deposit of $220. Plaintiff failed to comply with the 1973 amendment to N. J. S. A. 46:8-19. Thereafter, in aceord anee with the provisions of that statute, defendant notified plaintiff that the security-money was to be applied on account of the January 1975 rent for the apartment. Subsequently, plaintiff served defendant with a notice that on March 1, 1975 she (defendant) was to quit and vacate the apartment which she occupied, but that if she remained in possession after that date, she would be required to pay to plaintiff a security deposit in the amount of $367.50. Defendant was thereafter served with another notice, this one dated April 14, 1975, that she was to quit and vacate the premises on June 1, 1975 and that her "present tenancy" was
terminated because you have failed to pay to landlord, security deposit in the amount of $367.50 after you were served with a valid notice to quit, with a reasonable change in the terms of your tenancy — that being the payment of security deposit.
The trial judge held that the landlord's demand for the further security deposit was unreasonable and unwarranted. We agree. N. J. S. A. 2A:18-61.1, N. J. S. A. 46:8-19.
As pointed out by this court in Saracino v. Capital Properties Associates, Inc., 50 N. J. Super. 81 (App. Div. 1958):
Although the authorities are in- disagreement over the nature of a month-to-month tenancy, see 51 C. J. S. Landlord and Tenant § 145, pp. 746-747; 2 Harper and James, Law of Torts (1956), § 27.16, p. 1507, n. 6; 1 American Law of Real Property (1952), § 3.23, p. 221 et seq., New Jersey follows the view that such a tenancy is a continuing one and not a new relationship for each month. Barwick v. Gendel Realty Co., 11 N. J. Super. 6, 9 (App. Div. 1950); cf. Jador Service Co. v. Werbel, 140 N. J. Eq. 188 (E. & A. 1947). [at 87]
See also, Stamboulos v. McKee, 134 N. J. Super. 567, 570 (App. Div. 1975).
Plaintiff urges that we east aside this judicial approach to a month-to-month tenancy in this case in favor of a "rule" which would provide "that a month-to-month tenancy expires at the end of each month and is renewed on the first day of the succeeding month." We discern no compelling reason for doing so. The above quoted view, expressed in Saracino and reiterated in Stamboulos, is eminently sound. Furthermore, the 1973 amendment to N. J. S. A. 46:8-19 specifically provides in circumstances such as are here present that after notifying the landlord that the "security money be applied on account of rent payment due or to become due from the tenant, thereafter the tenant shall be without obligation to make any further security deposit during the term of his lease and the person receiving the money so deposited [the landlord] shall not be entitled to make further demand for a security deposit." We are satisfied that the term "lease" as used in the statute is intended to cover both written and parol leases, in short, "[a]ny agreement which gives rise to [a] relationship of landlord and tenant." Black's Law Dictionary (rev. 4 ed. 1968), at 1035, 1036.
Beyond this, "good cause" for eviction under N. J. S. A. 2A:18-61.1 has not been shown. See also N. J. S. A. 2A:42-10.10(a) and (d). The dissent questions the "fairness" of our reference to this latter statute, stating, in part: "This is the 'Reprisal' Act, and the question of whether this action was taken by the landlord as a form of reprisal was never even suggested in the county district court, by the court or by defendant, who was represented by counsel." Our col league overlooks several things. N. J. S. A. 2A:42-10.10 et seq., L. 1970, c. 210, clearly affects the rights and duties of the landlord and tenant in this case. That Act by its terms applies "to all rental premises or units used for dwelling purposes except owner-occupied premises with not more than two rental units." N. J. S. A. 2A:42-10.13. We note specifically the following pertinent provisions of the 1970 legislation:
1. No landlord of premises or units to which this act is applicable shall serve a notice to quit upon any tenant or institute any action against a tenant to recover possession of premises, whether by summary dispossess proceedings, civil action for the possession of land, or otherwise:
a. As a reprisal for the tenant's efforts to secure or enforce any rights under the lease or contract, or under the laws of the State of New Jersey or its governmental subdivisons, or of the United States; or
* sh
d. On account of the tenant's failure or refusal to comply with the terms of the tenancy as altered by the landlord, if the landlord shall have altered substantially the terms of the tenancy as a reprisal for any actions of the tenant set forth in subsection a, b, and c of section 1 of this act. Substantial alteration shall include the refusal to renew a lease or to continue a tenancy of the tenant without cause. [N. J. S. A. 2A:42-10.10 (a) and (d)].
* =r *
3. In any action or proceeding instituted by or against a tenant, the receipt by the tenant of a notice to quit or any substantial alteration of the terms of the tenancy without cause after:
a. The tenant attempts to secure or enforce any rights under the lease or contract, or under the laws of the State of New Jersey, or its governmental subdivisions, or of the United States; '
* & *
d. shall create a rebuttable presumption that such notice or alteration is a reprisal against the tenant for making such attempt, report, complaint *•*'*. [N. J. S. A. 2A:42-10.12]
Appellant landlord clearly understands the basis for the decision of the trial judge. In the brief submitted on its behalf on this appeal, counsel points out, among other things:
The Court below recognized that a month-to-month residential tenancy can be terminated provided that good cause exists and can be proven (T 10. 7-14). However, it held that in view of the par ticular factual situation and the security deposit law, N. J. S. A. 46:8-19, plaintiff-landlord's demand for a security deposit was unreasonable (T. 7.11-22). Consequently, it ruled that the tenancy was not terminated (T 9.22-25).
Whether the trial judge used the word "reprisal" or not is of no consequence. He was not functioning in a vacuum. He knew, as did both parties, that the landlord's demand for the further security deposit followed swiftly at the heels of the tenant's notice to the landlord to apply her $220 security deposit on account of the January 1975 rent for the apartment. Counsel for the landlord, reciting to the trial judge "the facts which we stipulate," included the following:
Mil. COHN: The tenant paid a security deposit of $220.00 when she — In November of 1973. The tenant sent a notice to the landlord subsequent to that time, saying that the landlord had not complied with the security deposit law, and this security deposit was applied to rent for January, 1975, and that pursuant to the statute in accordance with the allegation of the tenant, and in addition, the tenant paid $25.00 to the landlord in January of 1975, thus paying her rent at that time. There were no further actions by the landlord or the tenant with respect to the tenancy until the service of the two (2) notices which have been marked in evidence.
The landlord here was prohibited from serving upon the tenant the notices to quit, and from instituting this action for possession, by reason of the tenant's failure (or refusal) to comply with the terms of the tenancy, altered by the landlord as a reprisal for the tenant's efforts to enforce her rights under N. J. S. A. 46:8-19. N. J. S. A. 2A:4-2-10.10 (a) and (d). The rebuttable presumption that such notices to quit and alteration of the terms of the tenancy without cause constituted a reprisal, N. J. S. A. 2A:42-10.12 (d), was clearly not overcome by the landlord.
Beyond this, if the landlord were permitted to immediately make a new demand for a security deposit after the tenant had pursued her remedy under the 1973 amendment to N. J. S. A. 46:8-19 with respect to the old security deposit, the sanction provided by that statute would be meaningless. In the circumstances, the trial judge properly concluded that "[i]n the face of" N. J. S. A. 46:8-19, the requirement that the tenant pay a security deposit of $367.50 if she were to remain in possession of the apartment, was "unconscionable and unreasonable." The complaint was properly dismissed.
Affirmed.
L. 1973, c. 195, § 1, the amendment reading as follows:
In the event the person receiving a security deposit fails to notify the tenant of the name and address of the hanking institu tion or savings and loan association in which the deposit of such security is made, and the amount thereof, within 30 days after receipt of same from the tenant, the tenant may give written notice to the person receiving the same that such security money be applied on account of rent payment or payments due or to become due from the tenant, and thereafter the tenant shall be without obligation to make any further security deposit during the term of his lease and the person receiving the money so deposited shall not be entitled to make further demand for a security deposit.
Defendant also paid an additional $25 to supplement the deposit, since the monthly rent at the time was $245.
See n. 1.
Tke trial judge found that the landlord's demand for the security deposit was "unconscionable and unreasonable."
" thereafter the tenant shall be without obligation to make any further security deposit during the term of his lease and the person receiving the money so deposited shall not he entitled to make further demand for a security deposit." (Emphasis supplied)