Case Name: The State of Iowa v. Tweedy
Court: Iowa Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Iowa
Decision Date: 1860-12-26
Citations: 11 Iowa 350
Docket Number: 
Parties: The State of Iowa v. Tweedy.
Judges: 
Reporter: Iowa Reports
Volume: 11
Pages: 350–360

Head Matter:
The State of Iowa v. Tweedy.
1. Second Trial: acquittal. The defendant was indicted for murder in the second degree and was tried and convicted of manslaughter. On appeal to the Supreme Court the judgment was reversed and the cause was remanded. Held, that the conviction of manslaughter was an acquittal on the charge of murder in the second degree, and that the defendant could not he again placed on trial upon that charge.
2. Same. When the defendant was placed upon trial the second time upon a charge of murder in the second degree, having been once acquitted, and was convicted of manslaughter, it was held that the Supreme Court will not presume that he was not prejudiced by evidence received and instructions given touching the charge of murder.
3. Declarations in extremis : written and pakol. When declarations in extremis are reduced t.o writing and signed by the person making them, the writing, if in existence, must be produced as evidence of such declarations; but when the writing contained only the oral statements of t.ho party making the declarations, parol evidence of such statement may be received after the absence of the writing is accounted for.
4. Same. When declarations in extremis are made at different times, one of -which is reduced to writing, and they cover different grounds and refer to different matters, both may be admitted in evidence.
6. Instructions. A judgment will not be reversed because instruo tions given by the court to the jury, which were correct as abstract propositions, should have been modified under the circumstances of the case, when it appears that appellant did not ask for any such modification.
Appeal from Van Burén District Court.
Wednesday, December 26.
Indictment for murder in the second degree. Defendant was tried, found guilty of manslaughter, and appealed to this court. The cause was reversed and remanded, and upon a second trial he was found guilty of the same offense, from which ho again appeals. Eor the facts, and errors assigned, see the opinion.
Rankin $ Miller and J. C. Hall for the appellant.
I. The court erred in refusing to give the following instruction asked by plaintiff: “ The defendant Andrew Tweedy, stands indicted for murder in the second degree, but inasmuch as he has once been tried and acquitted of murder in that degree, he can only now be tried for manslaughter, and the jury can only consider this case as a charge of manslaughter.” The People v. Gilmore, 4 Calf. 376; Hart v. The State, 25 Miss. 378; The Slate v. Slaughter, 6 Humph. 410,
. II. The court erred in giving without modification the following instructions : “If two men fight on a sudden without forethought, and one in hot blood kill the other, it is manslaughter.” Fighting is not always voluntary, and the court should have instructed the jury as to killing in self-defense. Whar. Am. Or. L. 939; The State v. Yarborough, 1 Ilawkes 260.
III. The court erred in admitting two setts of dying declarations, one in parol and the other in writing. Whar. Am. L. Or. L. (4th ed.) par. 679; referring to Yin. Abr. 39 > 1 Greenl. Ev. 161; Rex v. Reason, et al, 1 Str. 499 ; 1 Chit. Cr. Law 463, (margin. 569;) The State v. Cameron, 2 Ohand. (Wis.) 172. The American authorities are uniform on tho subject.
S. A. Rice, Attorney General, for the State.
I. What evidence may have been produced in order tQ satisfy the com t that the declarations of the deceased, both oral and written, should be admitted, does not appear of record. These facts being addressed to the court, and there being nothing showing any error, the ruling below will be affirmed. 1 Greenl. Ev. sec. 160; 2 Starkie Ev. 262.
As to the propriety of admitting both the oral and written declarations, see 1 Greenl. Ev. section 161, Roxy. Gray, 7 G.& R. 230; 2 Starkie Ev. 262.
II.. The court did not err in refusing to instruct (he jury that tho former conviction of manslaughter was an acquittal as to murder in the second degree, and that the defendant could be tried only for manslaughter. United Slates v. Harding, 1 Wallace Jr. 147; Wheat. Am. Cr. L. 251 ; Morris v. The State, 1 Blackf. 87; The State v. Stanton, 1 Ire. 424; 2 Hill S. C. 239; People v. Morrison, 1 Park. 625.
III. Conceding that the instruction should have been given, tho refusal to give it was an error of which the defendant can not complain, as ho was not thereby prejudiced. 1 Arch. Cr. Pr. & PI. 173; 1 Chit. Cr. L. 638; Slaughter v. The State, 6 Humph. 414.

Opinion:
Wrigiit, J.
The points relied upon by counsel to reverse this case will bo noticed in their order.
The defendant asked the court to instruct tho jury, "That inasmuch as lie has once been tried and acquitted of murder in the second degree, he can only now be tried for manslaughter, and tho jury can only consider this case as a charge of manslaughter;" which instruction was refused.
The question here made involves an inquiry into the effect of the first verdict and tho subsequent reversal of the judgment thereon. For the defendant it is claimed that the legal effect of the first verdict was a finding of " not guilty " as to the crime of murder in the second degree, and that he could not again be put upon his trial therefor. This is denied by the State, it being further insisted, however, that as defendant was on the second trial found guilty: of manslaughter, the refusal worked him no prejudice, and he can not therefore complain.
Our law provides that in criminal cases, the defendant may be found guilty of any offense, the commission- of which is necessarily included in that with which he is charged in the indictment. (Code, section 3039.) Under this indictment, therefore, the jury could properly find the prisoner guilty of manslaughter. This was the finding on the first trial, but the verdict was silent as to the charge made. On a second trial could he be tried for murder in the second degree ?
Upon this subject the authorities are not uniform; but we arc inclined to the opinion, and so hold, that upon principle, as well as the weight of authority, he could not be thus tried.
The language of our constitution (sections 12, Art. 1,) is, "No person shall, .after acquittal, be tried for the same offense." If after a verdict of manslaughter, under 'an indictment for murder in the second degree, the prisoner can be again tried for the higher offense, we do not see why this would not be trying him for an offense of which he had been acquitted. To this, it is no satisfactory answer to say that the verdict was silent and did not acquit him in words of the higher offense. But what, we ask, is its meaning, its import, its effect? What did the jury mean ? Did not the court understand, and did not every reasonable mind understand when that verdict was rendered, that the prisoner was acquitted of the offense of murder in the second degree? Did not the jury so intend and so say by their verdict, just as clearly as if in words they had so expressed it? Sup pose the verdict had remained undisturbed, could not the prisoner , have successfully pleaded it in bar of a second prosecution for the same offense? If so, why? Because the verdict in words found him "not guilty"? Certainly not, but because the verdict as found, necessarily and from its very terms, included an acquittal of the higher offense.
When the prisoner moved for a new trial and appealed to this court, he sought to be relieved of a judgment against him of manslaughter. We had no complaint to make that the jury had not convicted him of the offense of murder. If, however, he might properly be subjected to a second trial for murder,, then he is compelled to submit to a verdict which he may deem ever so erroneous, lest by disturbing it, when insisting on his legal rights,.he may place himself again in jeopardy. When a jury has once returned a verdict of "guilty" as to the lower offense, the prisoner should not,in our opinion, be placed in a position of additional hazard by 'attempting to be relieved of the erroneous judgment. It is settled upon authority that if he obtains a new trial he may be again tried for the offense of which he was convicted. It is a very different thing, however,. when it is sought to try him for an offense of which he was not convicted, and which was not necessarily in the verdict of guilty.
In answering the objection on the part of the prosecution,' that a new trial should not be given a prisoner, because he could not, (under the authority of United States v. Gilbert, 2 Sumner 37,)' be again put in jeopardy, McLean, J., uses the following pointed argument r " The prisoner is found guilty by the jury, and whether, right or wrong, must stand convicted. He claims under the constitution, a fair and impartial trial, and he shows gross prejudice against him by. the jury, who have convicted on testimony wholly insufficient ; but he is answered that the constitution protects him from being put in jeopardy a second time for the same offense and that a new trial would violate this provision. In other words, the constitution guaranties the right of being hung, to protect him from the danger of a second trial Whatever may be said theoretically of this constitutional protection, practically the subject of it can have no very strong reason to appreciate it." (United States v. Keen, 1 McLean 489.) So in this case, the rule is not very humane, to say the least of it, which says to the prisoner, you must abide the verdict, however unjust or erroneous, or if you do not we will give you a new trial and re-try you for an offense of which the jury have acquitted you.