Case Name: J. J. T. Wright v. A. Heffner's Executors
Court: Supreme Court of Texas
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1882-10-31
Citations: 57 Tex. 518
Docket Number: Case No. 1270
Parties: J. J. T. Wright v. A. Heffner’s Executors.
Judges: 
Reporter: Texas Reports
Volume: 57
Pages: 518–524

Head Matter:
J. J. T. Wright v. A. Heffner’s Executors.
(Case No. 1270.)
1. Executors — Power to sell without order of court — Irregularities in sale.—Under the statutes in force in 1871, executors authorized by the will to sell, had power to sell lands without any previous order of court, it not appearing that the estate owed any debts; and such sale would not be void, though not made in strict conformity with the mode prescribed for administration sales, when made under order of court.
2. Plea of failure of title—Requisites of.—Even if no title passed by the sale, the purchaser, who would make that defense to an action for the purchase money, should aver a restoration of the property, or offer to restore it, and to account for rents.
3. Same.— See the opinion in this case for circumstances under which the defense that no title passed at an executor’s sale made for affair price, for the purpose of partition, and acquiesced in by the heirs, could not avail the purchaser, after the lapse of ten years.
4 Administrator’s or executor’s sale — Vendor’s lien—Case overruled.— The failure to take a mortgage from the purchaser at a sale by au executor or administrator does not waive the vendor’s lien for the purchase money. The case of Autrey v. Whitmore, 31 Tex., 627, overruled on that point.
5. Credit.— A credit on the purchase money note growing out of a transaction with the mother of a minor legatee, in which the note of the purchaser was substituted for the legacy due the minor, was rightly disallowed. The right of the minor to demand the legacy from the executors was not affected by such a transaction.
6. Cas 3 discussed.— Autrey v. Whitmore, 31 Tex., 627, discussed.
Appeal from Morris. Tried below before the Hon. B. T. Estes.
The opinion states the nature of the suit on defense. The will of Alfred Heffner contained the following clauses: . . . “It is my wish and desire that after my demise, all my property, both real and personal, be sold to the highest bidder on a twelve months' credit, the purchaser being required to give such bond as my executors may demand, or as may be demanded by the law, for the payment of said property, and that my executors be required to have this my last will and testament recorded, and that they proceed according to law in all respects, except that it is my ’wish that they he not required to give bond, if it is lawful for the business to properly be done without it, holding my executors bound in law and equity for their acts.” . . . “I do desire that my executors, do sell my property as before specified, to wit, on credit of twelve months, with a bond for payment of the same as is required by law.”
The sale was made by the executors at public auction on the premises sold, and not at the court-house door. The note and deed bear date January 2, 1812, the latter being signed by the executors, and by the heirs, some of whom purport to sign by their guardian.
The case was tried by the court, and in the conclusions of fact filed, the court found that the vendor’s lien was reserved and relied on. The other facts of importance may be gathered from the opinion.
Article 5623, Pasch. Dig., referred to in the opinion, is as follows: “Directions in a will for the management of the estate or part thereof, or for the sale of property, must be confirmed by an order of the court, before the executor or administrator will be authorized, as against creditors, to pursue the same, where they differ from the mode of administration prescribed by this act.”
Todd & Hudgins, for appellant.
. . . III. The will confers no authority or power on the executors to sell land otherwise than as required by the probate law, and the court erred in construing the will to confer such power. . . . As an executor’s sale under the probate laws, the sale and the deed in pursuance thereof were absolutely void, and the ratification of a nullity is itself a nullity. Probate Law of 1870; 2 Pasch. Dig., arts. 5623 et seg., 5701-5716; Pasch. Dig., art. 1325; Tippets v. Mize, 30 Tex., 361; Wootten v. Dunlop, 20 Tex., 183; Brown v. Christie, 27 Tex., 73; Peters v. Caton, 6 Tex., 554; Finch v. Edmonson, 9 Tex., 504-512; Alexander v. Maverick, 18 Tex., 179-193; Neil v. Cody, 26 Tex., 286; Littlefield v. Tinsley, id., 353; Dowling v. Duke, 20 Tex., 181.
IY. In case of executor’s or administrator’s sale of land, if \the executor or administrator fails to take a mortgage as required ]iy law, he cannot enforce an implied vendor’s lien on the land; the express lien by mortgage being intended to supersede the vend/Or’s' lien which would otherwise arise. See Autrey v. Whitmore, 31 Tex., 623 (a case in point).
Y. The court should have allowed the credit of $400 claimed by appellant.
John A. Peacock, for appellees.
I. The executors were by the will vested with power to make sale independent of the probate court, they being required to take such security for the purchase money as was required by law.
II. If power was not given appellees by the will to sell as independent executors, their deed to appellant joined by their heirs passed title, unless the rights of creditors or legatees were prejudiced thereby. Pasch. Dig., art. 1324.
III. Appellant is an heir through his wife, had knowledge of the whole facts, and took such title as he contracted for. Neil v. Cody, 26 Tex., 290; Littlefield v. Tinsley, id., 354; Cooper v. Singleton, 19 Tex., 260.
IV. If Autrey v. Whitmore, 31 Tex., 627, is authority in any case, which is denied, it does not apply to this case. 1st. Because the executors were authorized to sell and did sell independent of the probate law. 2d. Because it was part of the contract of sale, assented to by all parties and. the other heirs present, that the heirs should join in the execution of the deed, which was concurred in by all the heirs not present, and also that the vendor’s lien should be retained upon the land sold. 3d. Because appellant, knowing all the facts, executed and delivered his notes and accepted the deed (never complaining until after he was sued), took such title as he contracted for, and the lien should be enforced. Ellis v. Singleton, 45 Tex., 36; Cooper v. Singleton, 19 Tex., 260; Parker Co. v. Sewell, 24 Tex., 238.
Y. The §400 credit ivas given under mistake of fact and was properly erased. O’Connell v. Duke, 29 Tex., 299.

Opinion:
Stayton, Associate Justice.
This action was brought by the executors of the will of A. Heffner, deceased, to recover upon a promissory note, executed to them by the appellant and his sureties for land which he had bought from them at a sale made by them as executors, andoalso to establish and foreclose a lien which they claimed on the land, to secure the purchase money, no mortgage having been taken as required by the statute when property of an estate is sold unde)' an order of the probate court.
There was a judgment in favor of the appellees against the appellant and one of his sureties, and against the representative of the other surety, he having died, from which only the appellant prosecutes this appeal.
The defense was failure of consideration, in that it was claimed that no title to the land for which the note Avas given passed to the appellant, by the sale made by the executors.
A. Heffner died testate in 1871, and directed that all of his property, both real and personal, should be sold at auction on a credit of twelve months by his executors, and that after the payment of his just debts the money arising from the sale should be divided, in a manner stated in his will, among his children and Avidow.
It is shoAvn that his estate was solvent; in fact it does not appear that there were any debts, and no possible injury or delay to creditors could result from carrying out the directions of the will by the executors. This presents just that state of facts under Avhich the probate court would, if called upon, have directed the executors, without further order, to carry out the directions given in the will; creditors having no rights which the interposition of the probate court was necessary to protect.
The former law provided that executors might sell property without an order of the probate court, when so directed to do by the Avill under which they were to act. Pasch. Dig., 1324.
The law in force at the time of the death of A. Heffner (Pasch. Dig., 5623-5627) contains provisions in effect similar, but provided that, as against creditors, before such powers could be exercised by an executor, the directions of a will must be confirmed by the probate court. There is nothing contained in the law which seems to contemplate that a testator's directions in his will might not be carried out without any order of the probate court when creditors could not be prejudiced thereby, and the sole purpose of sale was for the purpose of distribution among the heirs or legatees.
We are of the opinion that the executors had the power under the will to make the sale at which the appellant bought, and this without any order of the probate court, it not appearing that the estate owed any debts.
It is not believed that the mode prescribed by the law in force at the time the sale was made under which the appellant bought, for making sales in ordinary administrations, was intended to regulate sales made by executors acting under directions given in a will, to such extent that sales made by executors, but not in strict conformity with the mode prescribed for administrator or executor's sales made under the order of the court, should be void. Especially when it appears, as in this case, that a sale was fairly made for a fair price, and for the purpose of partition among the legatees, all of whom seem to have acquiesced in the sale for about ten years, and when the only party who attacks the sale is the husband of one of the legatees, to whom, by his instructions, the property by him bought was deeded.
However irregular the sale may have been, it ill becomes the purchaser thereat, who was interested in the property before sold, to complain only when he is called upon to pay the purchase money.
If the "sale had not passed the title of the estate to the purchaser, under the pleadings in this case, which only set up failure of consideration as a defense and do not offer to restore the property, nor account for its rents for about ten years during which they are presumed to have had possession of it, and which do not in any manner set up any fraud or mistake in the sale, it would be entirely unimportant; for it is the settled law of this court, that, to constitute a plea setting up a failure of title a good defense, where suit is brought for the purchase money of property sold, that the purchaser should aver a restoration or offer to restore the property.
As was said by Wheeler, Justice, in Claiborne v. Yeoman, 15 Tex., 47: " It is unnecessary to inquire in this case, whether a failure of consideration, in the matter and manner alleged, could have availed the defendant, if well pleaded. If true, as stated, that the sale of the certificate by the administrator was without authority, and the title remained in the heirs of the intestate, he should have caused the heirs to be made parties, in order that the question of title might be adjudicated: and he should at least have restored, or offered to restore, the certificate to the plaintiff, or the heirs, if entitled. It is very clear that he could not retain the property purchased at the sale, with the chances of making good his title, and at the same time refuse to pay the purchase money."
" To constitute a plea setting up such a defect of title a good defense to the action, he should have averred a return, or offer to return, or should have otherwise accounted. . . . He cannot be permitted to retain . . . and resist the payment of the note given by him as the consideration of the purchase, on the ground of the want of authority in the administratrix to sell." Perry v. Booth, 7 Tex., 497; Lemmon v. Hanley, 28 Tex., 221.
The evidence shows that eight of the eleven legatees, at or about the time of the sale, at the request of the appellant, indicated in "writing their assent to the sale made by the executors. The wife of the appellant, who was also one of the legatees, received the deed which, under his purchase, the appellant directed to be made to her for the land, and the parents or guardians of the other legatees, who were minors, have given, in so far as they could do so, the assent of the minors to the sale as made, and this in a manner which at the time was satisfactory to the appellant. Under such facts, and after such lapse of time, the plea of failure of consideration could not be sustained if no title whatever had passed by the sale of the executors.
It is claimed that the court erred in establishing and foreclosing a vendor's lien on the land sold, and we are referred to the case of Autrey v. Whitmore, 31 Tex., 627, in support of the proposition that in sales made by executors, administrators, or guardians, of land upon credit, no vendor's lien exists to secure the payment of the purchase money.
That was not the point directly before the court in the case above referred to, but the language used in the opinion may have led to the belief that such was the effect of the opinion. In so far as it may seem to indicate such a rule, it does not meet the approval of this court, and may be considered as overruled.
While it is true that in sales made under the probate laws, upon a credit, administrators and executors are required to take mortgage as well .as personal security to secure the purchase money of land sold, yet it could never have been intended that a failure of such persons to take a mortgage would place the estates represented by them in a worse condition than would be a person selling his own land upon a credit. The manifest purpose of requiring a mortgage to be taken was to evidence in an unmistakable way the existence of a lien, that persons dealing with the purchaser might have notice; and the failure to take a mortgage cannot divest the equitable lien to secure the purchase money. '.
Such was the express statutory provision enacted after the decision above referred to (Act May 27, 1873, General Laws, 115), which we regard as but a statutory declaration of that which was the law before.
The court found as a fact that the credit of $40.0 claimed by the appellant on account of a note executed by him to the mother of one of the minor legatees, was not agreed to by the executors; that it had never been paid, and that the executors could receive nothing but money in payment of the note sued upon, and therefore disallowed the credit; and we are of the opinion that there was no error in this ruling; for the execution of such a note would not bar the right of the minor to demand and receive from the executors the legacy given by the will.
The judgment is affirmed.
Affirmed.
[Opinion delivered October 31, 1882.]