Case Name: THE STATE v. THOMAS
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia
Jurisdiction: Georgia
Decision Date: 2002-04-15
Citations: 275 Ga. 167
Docket Number: S02A0264
Parties: THE STATE v. THOMAS.
Judges: All the Justices concur, except Hunstein and Carley, JJ, who dissent.
Reporter: Georgia Reports
Volume: 275
Pages: 167–173

Head Matter:
S02A0264.
THE STATE v. THOMAS.
(562 SE2d 501)

Opinion:
Thompson, Justice.
Defendant Michelle Thomas filed a plea of former jeopardy in this case following the grant of a motion for mistrial. The trial court granted Thomas' plea and the State appeals. We affirm.
Thomas was charged with murder, felony murder, and aggravated assault. The State presented its case in chief and rested. The next day Thomas began to present her case. She did not deny that she had caused the victim's death; however, she asserted a defense of battered women's syndrome, relying on the testimony of an expert witness.
During the State's cross-examination of the expert, the prosecutor asked, "Isn't it true that [Thomas] told you something regarding her child, that she abused her child?" Thomas objected to this question and moved for a mistrial. The trial court conducted an inquiry in which the prosecutor was given an opportunity to explain why he asked the question. After the prosecutor offered various explanations, the trial court granted a mistrial. Thereafter, finding that the prosecutor intended to goad Thomas into moving for a mistrial, the trial court granted Thomas' plea of former jeopardy.
The State concedes that the question asked of the expert witness concerning whether Thomas abused her child was "poorly phrased," and that the trial court correctly granted a mistrial in this case. It argues, however, that it should be able to retry Thomas because the prosecutor did not intentionally try to abort the trial. See Williams v. State, 268 Ga. 488 (491 SE2d 377) (1997). We disagree.
Whether the prosecutor intended to goad the defendant into moving for mistrial called for the trial court to "make a finding of fact [by] [inferring the existence or nonexistence of intent from objective facts and circumstances." Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U. S. 667, 675 (102 SC 2083, 72 LE2d 416) (1982). In this case, the trial court's finding that the prosecutor intentionally provoked a mistrial is supported by these objective facts: the prosecutor, who was a member of the bar for nine years and tried numerous felony cases, gave inconsistent, unconvincing explanations as to why he posed the question to the expert, the prosecutor did not seek curative instructions, or assert that the trial should continue; and the prosecutor stood to gain by aborting the trial because the expert's testimony was favorable to Thomas.
When the trial court sits as the factfinder, its resolution of factual issues will be upheld by the appellate court unless it is clearly erroneous. Walton v. State, 267 Ga. 713, 715, 716 (482 SE2d 330) (1997); Spradley v. State, 242 Ga. App. 340, 343 (529 SE2d 647) (2000). A trial court's findings of fact will not be deemed to be clearly erroneous if there is any evidence to support them, and this holds true even if the findings are based upon circumstantial evidence and the reasonable inferences which flow from them. Jones v. State, 249 Ga. App. 64 (3) (547 SE2d 725) (2001).
In this case, the trial court's findings were authorized by the evidence in the record and are not clearly erroneous. We must conclude, therefore, that the trial court properly granted Thomas' plea in bar on the grounds of double jeopardy.
The mere fact that the trial court said that, based on its personal knowledge of the prosecutor, it did not believe the prosecutor intended to cause a mistrial, is of no consequence. In making a decision involving more than one fact, a trial court can acknowledge that there are factors weighing against its decision; but such an acknowledgment cannot be said to undermine the court's decision. That is what the trial court did in this case. It acknowledged that the prosecutor is a person of integrity; nevertheless, based on the objective facts and circumstances, it found that the prosecutor intended to provoke a mistrial.
Judgment affirmed.
All the Justices concur, except Hunstein and Carley, JJ, who dissent.
See Wilson v. State, 233 Ga. App. 327, 330 (503 SE2d 924) (1998).