Case Name: ORDER OF RAILROAD TELEGRAPHERS et al. v. CHICAGO & NORTH WESTERN RAILWAY CO.
Court: Supreme Court of the United States
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 1960-04-18
Citations: 362 U.S. 330
Docket Number: No. 100
Parties: ORDER OF RAILROAD TELEGRAPHERS et al. v. CHICAGO & NORTH WESTERN RAILWAY CO.
Judges: with whom Mr. Justice Frankfurter, Mr. Justice Clark and Mr. Justice Stewart join,
Reporter: United States Reports
Volume: 362
Pages: 330–364

Head Matter:
ORDER OF RAILROAD TELEGRAPHERS et al. v. CHICAGO & NORTH WESTERN RAILWAY CO.
No. 100.
Argued March 1-2, 1960.
Decided April 18, 1960.
Lester P. Schoene argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the brief were Alex Elson, Brainerd Currie and Philip B. Kurland.
Carl McGowan argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was Jordan Jay Hillman.
Solicitor General Rankin, Acting Assistant Attorney General Bicks and Charles H. Weston filed a brief for the National Mediation Board, as amicus curiae.
Clarence M. Mulholland, Edward J. Hickey, Jr. and James L. Highsaw, Jr. filed a brief for the Railway Labor Executives’ Association, as amicus curiae, urging reversal.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed by Austin L. Roberts, Jr. for the National Association of Railroad and Utilities Commissioners, and by Walter J. Cummings, Jr. for the Bureau of Information of Eastern Railways et al.

Opinion:
Mr. Justice Black
delivered the opinion of the Court.
According to the verified complaint filed in a United States District Court in Illinois by the respondent, Chicago & North Western Railway Company, against the petitioners, the Order of Railroad Telegraphers and its officials, "This is an action for injunction to restrain and enjoin the calling and carrying out of a wrongful and unlawful strike or work stoppage on plaintiff's railroad." Section 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act provides, however, that "No court of the United States shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining order or temporary or permanent injunction in any case involving or growing out of any labor dispute to prohibit any person or persons . . . from . (a) Ceasing or refusing to perform any work or to remain in any relation of employment; ." The main question in this case then was, and still is, whether this prohibition of the Norris-LaGuardia Act bars an injunction in the circumstances of this case.
Respondent railroad, owning and operating a rail system of over 9,000 miles in the States of Illinois, Wis consin, Iowa, Minnesota, Michigan, Nebraska, South Dakota, North Dakota, and Wyoming, is an integral part of the nationwide railway system important to the transportation of passengers and freight in interstate commerce. When the railroad began operations, about 100 years ago, traffic was such that railroad stations were established about 7 to 10 miles apart. Trucks, automobiles, airplanes, barges, pipelines and modern roads have reduced the amount of railroad traffic so that the work now performed at many of these stations by agents is less than one hour during a normal eight-hour day. Maintenance of so many agencies where company employees do so little work, the complaint alleges, is wasteful and consequently in 1957 the railroad filed petitions with the public utility commissions in four of the nine States in which it operated asking permission to institute a "Central Agency Plan whereby certain stations would be made central agencies . . ." and others abolished. The plan would necessarily result in loss of jobs for some of the station agents and telegraphers, members of the petitioner union. A few weeks after the state proceedings were filed and before any decision had been made, the petitioner union, the duly recognized, certified and acting collective bargaining agent for the railroad's employees, notified the railroad under § 6 of the Railway Labor Act, 45 U. S. C. § 156, that it wanted to negotiate with the railroad to amend the current bargaining agreement by adding the following rule:
"No position in existence on December 3, 1957, will be abolished or discontinued except by agreement between the carrier and the organization."
The railroad took the position, according to its complaint, that this request did not constitute a "labor dispute under the Railway Labor Act," that it did not raise a bargain-able issue, and that the union had no right to protest or to seek relief except by appearing before the state public utility commissions which had power to determine whether station agencies could be discontinued, a power which private parties could not thwart by entering into a bargaining agreement. The respondent added that maintenance of the unnecessary agencies was offensive to the national transportation policy Congress adopted in the Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U. S. C. § 1-27, and that the duties that Act imposed on railroads could not be contracted away.
The union contended that the District Court was without jurisdiction to grant injunctive relief under the provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act because this case involved a labor dispute, and that the railroad had refused to negotiate in good faith on the proposed change in the agreement in violation of § 2, First, of the Railway Labor Act, 45 U. S. C. § 152, First, which requires the railroad to exert every reasonable effort to make and maintain agreements concerning rates of pay, rules and working conditions. Therefore, the union argued, an injunction in federal court is barred if for no other reason because of § 8 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act which provides:
"No restraining order or injunctive relief shall be granted to any complainant who has failed to comply with any obligation imposed by law which is involved in the labor dispute in question, or who has failed to make every reasonable effort to settle such dispute either by negotiation or with the aid of any available governmental machinery of mediation or voluntary arbitration." 29 U. S. C. § 108.
See Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Toledo, P. & W. R. Co., 321 U. S. 50.
After hearings, the District Court found, so far as is relevant here, that the railroad "refused to negotiate, confer, mediate or otherwise treat with defendant Teleg raphers on the proposed change in agreement set forth in the Section 6 notice," although the railroad "did show willingness to negotiate upon the central agency plan, including a possibility concerning severance pay"; that the proposed contract change referred to in the § 6 notice "relates to the length or term of employment as well as stabilization of employment" and that collective bargaining as to the length or term of employment is commonplace ; that "The dispute giving rise to the proposed strike is a major dispute and not a minor grievance under the Railway Labor Act, and no issue involved therein is properly referable to the National Railroad Adjustment Board"; and that the contract change proposed in the § 6 notice related to "rates of pay, rules and working conditions," and was therefore a bargainable issue under the Railway Labor Act. On its findings and conclusions of law, the District Court granted temporary relief but declined to grant a permanent injunction on the ground that it was without jurisdiction to do so.
On appeal the Court of Appeals did grant a permanent injunction upon its decision that "The District Court's finding that the proposed contract change related to 'rates of pay, rules, or working conditions,' and was thus a bar-gainable issue under the Railway Labor Act, is clearly erroneous." It held that the Norris-LaGuardia Act did not apply to bar an injunction against this strike and we granted certiorari, 361 U. S. 809, to consider this important question.
We hold, with the District Court, that this case involves or grows out of a labor dispute within the meaning of the Norris-LaGuardia Act and that the District Court was without jurisdiction permanently to enjoin the strike.
Section 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act specifically withdraws jurisdiction from a District Court to prohibit any person or persons from "[c] easing or refusing to perform any work or to remain in any relation of employment" "in any case involving or growing out of any labor dispute" as "herein defined." Section 13 (c) of the Act defines a labor dispute as including,
"any controversy concerning terms or conditions of employment, or concerning the association or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of employment, regardless of whether or not the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer and employee."
Unless the literal language of this definition is to be ignored, it squarely covers this controversy. Congress made the definition broad because it wanted it to be broad. There are few pieces of legislation where the congressional hearings, committee reports, and the language in the legislation itself more clearly point to the necessity for giving an Act a construction that will protect the congressional policy the Act adopted. Section 2 of this Act specifies the public policy to be taken into consideration in interpreting the Act's language and in determining the jurisdiction and authority of federal courts; it is one of freedom of association, organization, representation and negotiation on the part of workers. The hearings and committee reports reveal that Congress attempted to write its bill in unmistakable language because it believed previous measures looking toward the same policy against non judicial intervention in labor disputes had been given unduly limited constructions by the courts.
Plainly the controversy here relates to an effort on the part of the union to change the "terms" of an existing collective bargaining agreement. The change desired just as plainly referred to "conditions of employment" of the railroad's employees who are represented by the union. The employment of many of these station agents inescapably hangs on the number of railroad stations that will be either completely abandoned or consolidated with other stations. And, in the collective bargaining world today, there is nothing strange about agreements that affect the permanency of employment. The District Court's finding that "[c]ollective bargaining as to the length or term of employment is commonplace," is not challenged.
We cannot agree with the Court of Appeals that the union's effort to negotiate about the job security of its members "represents an attempt to usurp legitimate managerial prerogative in the exercise of business judgment with respect to the most economical and efficient conduct of its operations." The Railway Labor Act and the Interstate Commerce Act recognize that stable and fair terms and conditions of railroad employment are essential to a well-functioning national transportation system. The Railway Labor Act safeguards an opportunity for employees to obtain contracts through collective rather than individualistic bargaining. Where combinations and consolidations of railroads might adversely affect the interests of employees, Congress in the Interstate Commerce Act has expressly required that before approving such consolidations the Interstate Commerce Commission "shall require a fair and equitable arrangement to protect the interests of the railroad employees affected." It requires the Commission to do this by including "terms and conditions" which provide that for a term of years after a consolidation employees shall not be "in a worse position with respect to their employment" than they would otherwise have been. (Emphasis supplied.)
In 1942 this Court held that when a railroad abandons a portion of its lines, the Interstate Commerce Commission has power to include conditions for the protection of displaced workers in deciding what "the public convenience and necessity may require." We so construed the Interstate Commerce Act specifically on the basis that imposition of such conditions "might strengthen the national system through their effect, on the morale and stability of railway workers generally." Interstate Commerce Comm'n v. Railway L. Exec. Assn., 315 U. S. 373, 378, citing United States v. Lowden, 308 U. S. 225. The brief for the railroad associations there called our attention to testimony previously given to Congress that as early as 1936 railroads representing 85% of the mileage of the country had made collective bargaining agreements with their employees to provide a schedule of benefits for workers who might be displaced or adversely affected by coordinations or mergers. In ah effort to prevent a disruption and stoppage of interstate commerce, the trend of legislation affecting railroads and railroad employees has been to broaden, not narrow, the scope of subjects about which workers and railroads may or must negotiate and bargain collectively. Furthermore, the whole idea of what is bargainable has been greatly affected by the practices and customs of the railroads and their employees themselves. It is too late now to argue that employees can have no collective voice to influence railroads to act in a way that will preserve the interests of the employees as well as the interests of the railroad and the public at large.
The railroad has argued throughout the proceedings that the union's strike here may be enjoined, regardless of Norris-LaGuardia, because its effort to bargain about the consolidation and abandonment of railroad stations is unlawful. It is true that in a series of cases where collective bargaining agents stepped outside their legal duties and violated the Act which called them into being, we held that they could be enjoined. None of these cases, however, enjoined conduct which the Norris-LaGuardia Act withdrew from the injunctive power of the federal courts except the Chicago River case which held that a strike could be enjoined to prevent a plain violation of a basic command of the Railway Labor Act "adopted as a part of a pattern of labor legislation." 353 U. S. 30, 42. The Court there regarded as inapposite those cases in which it was held that the Norris-LaGuardia Act's ban on federal injunctions is not lifted because the conduct of the union is unlawful under some other, nonlabor statute. Here, far from violating the Railway Labor Act, the union's effort to negotiate its controversy with the railroad was in obedience to the Act's command that employees as well as railroads exert every reasonable effort to settle all disputes "concerning rates of pay, rules, and working conditions." 45 U. S. C. § 152, First. Moreover, neither the respondent nor anyone else points to any other specific legal command that the union violated here by attempting to bring about a change in its collective bargaining agreement. It would stretch credulity too far to say that the Railway Labor Act, designed to protect railroad workers, was somehow violated by the union acting precisely in accordance with that Act's purpose to obtain stability and permanence in employment for workers. There is no express provision of law, and certainly we can infer none from the Interstate Commerce Act, making it unlawful for unions to want to discuss with railroads actions that may vitally and adversely affect the security, seniority and stability of railroad jobs. And for a number of reasons the state public utility proceedings, invoked by the railroad to obtain approval of consolidation or abandonment of stations, could not stamp illegality on the union's effort to negotiate this whole question with the railroad. The union merely asked for a contractual right to bargain with the railroad about any voluntary steps it might take to abandon stations or to seek permission to abandon stations and thus abolish jobs. Nothing the union requested would require the railroad to violate any valid law or the valid order of any public agency. There is no testimony and there are no findings that this union has set itself up in defiance of any state mandatory order. In fact, there was no state order of any kind at the time the union first asked to negotiate about the proposed contractual change. Even if a Norris-LaGuardia "labor dispute" could not arise out of an unlawful bargaining demand, but see Afran Transp. Co. v. National Maritime Union, 169 F. Supp. 416, 1959 Am. Mar. Cas. 326, the union's proposal here was not unlawful.
The union contends that, whether the state rulings were mandatory or permissive, the States are without authority to order an abandonment of stations that would conflict with collective bargaining agreements made or to be made between the railroad and the union. Whether this contention is valid or not we need not decide since there is no such conflict before us. And the District Court expressly refused to find that the union's proposal was prompted by the railroad's action in seeking state authority to put its Central Agency Plan into effect. Instead, the District Court specifically found that the dispute grew out of the failure of the parties to reach an agreement on the contract change proposed by the union.
Only a word need be said about the railroad's contention that' the dispute here with the union was a minor one relating to an interpretation of its contract and therefore one that the Railway Labor Act requires to be heard by the National Railroad Adjustment Board. We have held that a strike over a "minor dispute" may be enjoined in order to enforce compliance with the Railway Labor Act's requirement that minor disputes be heard by the Adjustment Board. Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Chicago River & I. R. Co., 353 U. S. 30. But it is impossible to classify as a minor dispute this dispute relating to a major change, affecting jobs, in an existing collective bargaining agreement, rather than to mere infractions or interpretations of the provisions of that agreement. Particularly since the collective bargaining agreement which the union sought to change was a result of mediation under the Railway Labor Act, this is the type of major dispute that is not governed by the Adjustment Board.
In concluding that the injunction ordered by the Court of Appeals is forbidden by the Norris-LaGuardia Act, we have taken due account of the railroad's argument that the operation of unnecessary stations, services and lines is wasteful and thus runs counter to the congressional policy, expressed in the Interstate Commerce Act, to foster an efficient national railroad system. In other legislation, however, like the Railway Labor and Norris-LaGuardia Acts, Congress has acted on the assumption that collective bargaining by employees will also foster an efficient national railroad service. It passed such Acts with knowledge that collective bargaining might sometimes increase the expense of railroad operations because of increased wages and better working conditions. It goes without saying,, therefore, that added railroad expenditures for employees cannot always be classified as "wasteful." It may be, as some people think, that Congress was unwise in curtailing the jurisdiction of federal courts in railroad disputes as it did in the Norris-LaGuardia Act. Arguments have even been presented here pointing to the financial debilitation of the respondent Chicago & North Western Railroad and to the absolute necessity for the abandonment of railroad stations. These arguments, however, are addressed to the wrong forum. If the scope of the Norris-LaGuardia Act is to be cut down in order to prevent "waste" by the railroads, Congress should be the body to do so. Such action is beyond the judicial province and we decline to take it.
There are other subsidiary questions raised with reference to the validity of a second 30-day restraining order issued by the district judge and an injunction pending appeal under Rule 62 (c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. But since we have determined the main controversy between the parties, we think it inadvisable to decide either of these questions now. We intimate no opinion concerning either at this time.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed and that of the District Court is affirmed insofar as it held that the court was without jurisdiction under the Norris-LaGuardia Act to enter the injunction.
It is so ordered.
47 Stat. 70, 29 U. S. C. § 104. (Emphasis supplied.)
See Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Chicago River & I. R. Co., 353 U. S. 30.
Chicago & N.W. R. Co. v. Order of Railroad Telegraphers, 264 F. 2d 254, at 260.
Ibid. See Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. New York Central R. Co., 246 F. 2d 114. But see Bull Steamship Co. v. Seafarers' International Union, 250 F. 2d 326.
At the time of the District Court's decision, two States (South Dakota and Iowa) of the four in which the railroad had sought permission to institute its Central Agency Plan (the other two were Minnesota and Wisconsin) had granted permission and the plan was promptly placed in effect. Since then, we are given to understand, the commissions in the remaining two States have issued orders approving the plan.
Compare Marine Cooks & Stewards v. Panama Steamship Co., post, p. 365, decided this day.
29 U. S. C. § 104.
29 U. S. C. § 113 (c).
29 U. S. C. § 102.
See Allen Bradley Co. v. Local Union No. 3, 325 U. S. 797, 805; United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U. S. 219, 230-236; Milk Wagon Drivers' Union v. Lake Valley Farm Products, Inc., 311 U. S. 91, 102-103.
264 F. 2d, at 259.
49 U. S. C. § 5 (2)(f). And see § 5 (2)(c).
49 U.S.C. § 5 (2) (f)
Hearings before the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on H. R. 2531, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. 216-217.
Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Chicago River & I. R. Co., 353 U. S. 30; Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Howard, 343 U. S. 768; Graham v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen, 338 U. S. 232; Tunstall v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen, 323 U. S. 210; Virginian R. Co. v. System Federation No. 40, 300 U. S. 515. See also Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U. S. 448, 457-459. And see Steele v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 323 U. S. 192.
The Court cited the following cases to show that unlawfulness under nonlabor legislation did not remove the restrictions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act upon the jurisdiction of federal courts: Milk Wagon Drivers' Union v. Lake Valley Farm Products, Inc., 311 U. S. 91, 103 (alleged violations of Sherman Act); East Texas Motor Freight Lines v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 163 F. 2d 10, 12 (violation of Interstate Commerce Act and Motor Carrier Act).
Of course, a holding here that mere unlawfulness under any law is enough to remove the strictures of the Norris-LaGuardia Act would require a modification or abandonment of our statement that "For us to hold, in the face of this legislation [the Clayton and Norris-LaGuardia Acts], that the federal courts have jurisdiction to grant injunctions in cases growing out of labor disputes, merely because alleged violations of the Sherman Act are involved, would run counter to the plain mandate of the [Norris-LaGuardia] Act and would reverse the declared purpose of Congress." Milk Wagon Drivers' Union v. Lake Valley Farm Products, Inc., 311 U. S. 91, 103. See also Lee Way Motor Freight v. Keystone Freight Lines, 126 F. 2d 931, 934.
Moreover, this railroad operates in nine States; it has instituted proceedings in the state regulatory commissions of four only and at the time of the District Court's decision, only two of these had rendered decisions. Yet the union's proposal was to negotiate for a clause which would apply to respondent's entire system. The railroad's refusal to bargain was not limited, however, to operations in the four States in which proceedings had begun. And even assuming that the order of one State, South Dakota, was mandatory and that this fact is of importance, it would not relieve the railroad from any duty it had to bargain on the proposed contract change in the eight other States involved.