Case Name: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Rafael VENEGAS-ZAMORA, Defendant-Appellant
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 2009-06-02
Citations: 332 F. App'x 395
Docket Number: No. 08-50240
Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Rafael VENEGAS-ZAMORA, Defendant-Appellant.
Judges: Before PREGERSON, GRABER, and WARDLAW, Circuit Judges.
Reporter: West's Federal Appendix
Volume: 332
Pages: 395–397

Head Matter:
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Rafael VENEGAS-ZAMORA, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 08-50240.
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
Submitted Feb. 3, 2009.
Filed June 2, 2009.
Steve Miller, Lawrence E. Spong, Office of the U.S. Attorney, San Diego, CA, for ' . Plaintiff-Appellee.
Leila Wylie Morgan, Esquire, Vincent James Brunkow, Esquire, Federal Defenders of San Diego, Inc., San Diego, CA, for Defendant-Appellant.
Before PREGERSON, GRABER, and WARDLAW, Circuit Judges.
The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

Opinion:
MEMORANDUM
Rafael Venegas-Zamora ("Venegas") appeals the seventy-month sentence imposed after his guilty-plea conviction for illegal reentry following removal in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a), and we affirm but remand to correct the judgment.
1. The district court did not err by imposing a sixteen-level sentencing enhancement for Venegas's prior conviction under California Penal Code section 288(a). See U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(l)(A)(ii) (2007). We previously have held that section 288(a) categorically constitutes a "crime of violence" under the approach set forth in Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 110 S.Ct. 2143, 109 L.Ed.2d 607 (1990). See United States v. Medina-Maella, 351 F.3d 944, 947 (9th Cir.2003); United States v. Barorn-Medina, 187 F.3d 1144, 1147 (9th Cir.1999). For the reasons explained in United States v. Medina-Villa, 567 F.3d 507, 511-16 (9th Cir.2009), our recent decision in Estrada-Espinoza v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 1147 (9th Cir.2008) (en banc), does not change this conclusion.
2. We previously have rejected Venegas's claim that the use of a prior conviction as a basis for both a sentencing enhancement and calculation of the defendant's criminal history score constitutes impermissible double counting. See United States v. Luna-Herrera, 149 F.3d 1054, 1055-56 (9th Cir.1998); see also United States v. Blanco-Gallegos, 188 F.3d 1072, 1076 (9th Cir.1999). Moreover, we recently held that United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005), and its progeny "do not undermine or even affect the reasoning on which we relied in Lunar- Herrera." United States v. Garcia-Cardenas, 555 F.3d 1049, 1050 (9th Cir.2009) (per curiam). Accordingly, we reject Venegas's challenge to § 2L1.2(b).
3. Venegas's remaining arguments— that we should limit Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 118 S.Ct. 1219, 140 L.Ed.2d 350 (1998), to its facts under the doctrine of constitutional doubt; that Almendarez-Torres has been overruled; and that 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b) is unconstitutional — are squarely foreclosed by our precedent. See United States v. Salazar-Lopez, 506 F.3d 748, 751 n. 3 (9th Cir.2007), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 128 S.Ct. 2523, 171 L.Ed.2d 803 (2008); United States v. Beng-Salazar, 452 F.3d 1088, 1091 (9th Cir.2006); United States v. Covian-Sandoval, 462 F.3d 1090, 1096-97 (9th Cir.2006).
4. Finally, although Venegas did not object to the inclusion of both § 1326(a) and § 1326(b) in his judgment, we remand to the district court in accordance with United States v. Rivera-Sanchez, 222 F.3d 1057, 1062 (9th Cir.2000), with instructions to enter a corrected judgment striking the reference to § 1326(b). See United States v. Herrera-Blanco, 232 F.3d 715, 719 (9th Cir.2000) (remanding sua sponte to delete the reference to § 1326(b)).
AFFIRMED and REMANDED.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9 th Cir. R. 36-3.