Case Name: In the Matter of the Habeas Corpus of William LANGLEY, Petitioner, R. B. Travers, Agent of Adult Authority, Department of Corrections, State of California and Bob Turner, Sheriff of Oklahoma County, Oklahoma, Respondents
Court: Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals
Jurisdiction: Oklahoma
Decision Date: 1958-05-21
Citations: 325 P.2d 1094
Docket Number: No. A-12586
Parties: In the Matter of the Habeas Corpus of William LANGLEY, Petitioner, R. B. Travers, Agent of Adult Authority, Department of Corrections, State of California and Bob Turner, Sheriff of Oklahoma County, Oklahoma, Respondents.
Judges: BRETT, P. J., concurs.
Reporter: Pacific Reporter 2d
Volume: 325
Pages: 1094–1116

Head Matter:
In the Matter of the Habeas Corpus of William LANGLEY, Petitioner, R. B. Travers, Agent of Adult Authority, Department of Corrections, State of California and Bob Turner, Sheriff of Oklahoma County, Oklahoma, Respondents.
No. A-12586.
Criminal Court of Appeals of Oklahoma.
May 21, 1958.
Hill & May, and James M. May, McAles-ter, for petitioner.
Mac Q. Williamson, Atty. Gen., Sam H. Lattimore and Owen J. Watts, Asst. Attys. Gen., Ewing C. Sadler, County Atty., and Ben Choate, Jr., Asst. County Atty., Pitts-burg County, McAlester, Old., for respondents.

Opinion:
POWELL, Judge.
This is an original habeas corpus proceeding in which petitioner, who is now being detained by the respondent, Bob Turner, Sheriff of Oklahoma County, pursuant to extradition proceedings initiated by the State of California, seeks his release from custody of that official.
With the exception of one important matter to be pointed out, we conclude from an examination of the petition, response and transcript of evidence heard by the district court of Pittsburg County, Oklahoma and admitted herein, which court previous ly denied a writ of habeas corpus, that there is no dispute as to the basic facts involved in petitioner's detention.
On November IS, 1947 petitioner was convicted in the superior court of the State of California for the crime of armed robbery, and was sentenced to serve an indeterminate sentence of five years to life in the San Quentin California State Penitentiary. On June 6, 1952 petitioner was paroled from such institution by the Adult Authority Department of Corrections of the State of California. The parole agreement signed by William A. Langley on June 5, 1952 contained some fifteen provisions concerning the parolee's conduct while on parole, the violation of any of which would make the parole subject to revocation. The parolee agreed: "I hereby waive extradition to the State of Califorma from any State in the Union and from any territory or country outside the continental United States, and also agree that I will not contest any effort to return me to the United States or to the State of California. I have read, or had read to me, the foregoing conditions of my ptio'ole, and I fully understand them and I agree to abide by and strictly follow them, and I fully understand the penalties involved should I in any manner violate the foregoing conditions (Emphasis supplied.)
Petitioner admits that he violated the parole agreement in a number of respects, one of which was on December 11, 1952 leaving California without permission of the proper authorities, and going to Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, but returning to California on December 24, 1952; that on December 31, 1952 petitioner was apprehended and arrested and taken into custody by the F.B.I. authorities on an illegal flight warrant in California and incarcerated in the San Francisco, California, city jail; that on the same day the Federal complaint was dismissed and the San Francisco Police Department held petitioner for arrival of officers from the State of Oklahoma; that on January 7, 1953 petitioner was turned over by the city jail officials of San Francisco to the Oklahoma officers to be brought back to Oklahoma to face a charge of robbery with firearms in Oklahoma County. The party immediately got on its way to Oklahoma.
On January 13, 1953 the petitioner's parole was revoked by the Adult Authority, Department of Corrections, State of California ; March 16, 1953 petitioner was tried before a jury in Oklahoma County and sentenced to serve a period of ten years in the Oklahoma State Penitentiary for the crime of robbery with firearms; February 12, 1958 petitioner was released from the Oklahoma State Penitentiary, having served his time, but a hold order having préviously been filed by the California authorities, petitioner was delivered into the custody of the sheriff of Pittsburg County to await the arrival of a California officer pursuant to a warrant of arrest issued by the Adult Authority, Department of Corrections of the State of California, and thereafter, petitioner was arrested under warrants of the Governors of the State of California and the State of Oklahoma, and peti- _ tioner, as stated, sought his release by writ of habeas corpus from the district court of Pittsburg County, which was denied. Then followed application to this court, and hearing was had and the petitioner ordered confined to the Oklahoma County jail until the matter could be determined.
On March 19, 1958 the Attorney General filed a supplemental response, attached to which was letter dated March 12, 195® from the Department of Corrections, Division of Adult Paroles, Sacramento, California, along with the original letter dated March 12, 1958 from the Special Agent in charge of the F.B.I. at San Francisco to the Division, of Adult Paroles and also letter dated March 11, 1958 from the Chief of Police of San Francisco to Division of Adult Paroles, all concerning the facts of delivery of petitioner to the Oklahoma officers.
Petitioner as grounds for release asserts in his petition, and argues in his brief: "Your petitioner maintains and contends that the surrendering of this petitioner by the authorities of the State of California to the Sheriff of Oklahoma Comity, Oklahoma, was a waiver of the State of California's jurisdiction and right to demand the return of this petitioner to the said State of California, because of the said State of California's failure to exercise their authority while petitioner was detained and confined within its jurisdiction and with knowledge that this petitioner was a parole violator at the time they voluntarily surrendered this petitioner to the Oklahoma authorities as aforesaid, for the purpose of being transported back to Oklahoma under legal process, to there answer for the crime of robbery with fire arms, as aforesaid."
The only basis in the record to support the proposition that the petitioner was ever in the custody of the State officials of California or that the Division of Adult Paroles, State of California, ever had knowledge that petitioner had been arrested in California and was being held for Oklahoma officers, is from the following unsupported statements of the petitioner at hearing in the district court of Pittsburg County, at McAlester.
Petitioner was questioned by his counsel, Mr. May, as follows:
"Q. By whom were you arrested? A. F.B.I.
"Q. What charge was you arrested on? A. They told me it was to avoid prosecution, and they turned me over to the city, they put me in jail, city, and the parole officer also.
"Q. Was that flight from Oklahoma to avoid prosecution of an alleged crime that was committed here in Oklahoma City? A. Yes.
"Q. While you were there in the county jail, whose custody were you in at that time, was it the county or city jail? A. It was the city jail, it wasn't the county jail.
"Q. The city jail of San Francisco, California? A. Yes, sir.
"Q. And you were in their custody, is that correct? A. In the city jail, yes sir."
Witness further testified that while he was in the city jail officers McGuire and Crewshank came and talked to him; that they were county officers, and wanted to know if he would sign a waiver of extradition, and that he agreed to if they would let his wife visit him and he signed the extradition waiver and was turned over to the Oklahoma officers. He said that he signed the extradition waiver before a judge and members of the court.
Witness further stated that while he was in the city jail his California parole officer by the name of Jenson visited him twice and attempted to question him about his trouble in Oklahoma and told him, "Well, they want you worse than we do and we are going to release you to them". He further said that he arrived back in Oklahoma about January 10, 1952 and that the Adult Authority Department of Corrections of the State of California placed a hold order on him, right after he arrived back in Oklahoma. On cross examination petitioner admitted the signature to the parole agreement and marked State's exhibit 1 was his, and that he signed it in order to obtain a parole.
R. B. Travers testified for the respondent and said that he was agent for the Adult Authority, Department of Corrections of the State of California. After qualification he identified Exhibit 2 as a warrant from the Governor of the State of Oklahoma on foreign requisition, authorizing the State of California to take possession, and which warrant he served on the petitioner; he also identified Exhibit 3 as agent's appointment from the Executive Department of the State of California, appointing witness as agent for California for the purpose of returning petitioner to the State of California. Also he identified Exhibit 4 as a warrant of arrest from the Adult Authority of the Department of Corrections of the State of California, issued on the 13th day of January, 1953. He further testified that petitioner's parole was revoked January 13, 1953.
Agent Travers further testified:
"Q. And as far as you know as an employee of the Adult Authority of the State of California, did the State of California have anything to do with releasing this man to the State of Oklahoma? A. As far as I know the State of California had nothing to do with the inmate in regards to his being released to the State of Oklahoma prior to the 13th day of January, 1953.
"Q. Can you as an agent or employee of the Adult Authorities of the State of California bind the Adult Authorities or the Governor of the State? A. No, I can not.
"Q. You just work? A. I just work there.
"Q. That is what Mr. Jenson does? A. Right, Mr. Jenson is just am, employee like myself." (Emphasis supplied.)
At hearing before this court a certificate of Adult Authority, Department of Corrections, showing revocation of petitioner's parole was admitted into evidence. It was further stated therein that the official minutes of the Authority showing such revocation was recorded on page 68 of Vol. 12 of the official minutes of the Authority. There was also presented for examination of this court a transcript of the additional records presented to the Governor of Oklahoma as basis for the granting of extradition writ.
The letters from the F.B.I. of San Francisco and the chief of police of San Francisco show that the F.B.I., after charges of flight to avoid state prosecution were dismissed in Federal court at San Francisco, turned petitioner over to the San Francisco chief of police to await delivery to ¡Oklahoma officers to answer a charge in 'Oklahoma, and that officer Crew-shank was the inspector in the police department of San Francisco. However, we shall not consider these letters in determination of the issues, because they are not in affidavit form.
First to be settled, is whether the record recited is sufficient to justify and support the proposition stated by petitioner as basis for issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. That is to say, did petitioner produce sufficient evidence to show that the State of California, acting through any authorized official, in fact released petitioner to the Oklahoma authorities, and if so, did such act cause that State to lose further jurisdiction over petitioner so as to prevent it from thereafter extraditing petitioner from a sister state for the purpose of completing a sentence, where immediately prior to leaving California he had been free on parole ?
In determining this the question of the burden of proof arises. The Criminal Court of Appeals has uniformly held that the burden is on the habeas corpus petitioner to prove allegations of petition. Ex parte Ryan, 75 Okl.Cr. 144, 129 P.2d 204; Ex parte Seale, 75 Okl.Cr. 183, 129 P.2d 862, certiorari denied Seale v. Hunt, 317 U.S. 696, 63 S.Ct. 436, 87 L.Ed. 557; In re Hazel, 80 Okl.Cr. 66, 157 P.2d 225.
And see Davis v. Rhyne, 181 Kan. 443, 312 P.2d 626, and Engling v. Edmondson, 175 Kan. 883, 267 P.2d 487, where that court held that in habeas corpus proceedings the burden is upon petitioner to prove the grounds upon which he relies for his release, and that the unsupported statements of a petitioner do not meet the requirements of the proof. We think this a correct statement of the law. Herein, petitioner produced no evidence to support his statements and conjectures.
We conclude from the recited testimony of petitioner and R. B. Travers, agent for the Adult Authority, Department of Corrections, State of California, that there is insufficient evidence to show that petitioner was ever in custody of any California State official or agent for the Governor of the State of California or the Adult Authority. This being so, the parole officer, where petitioner was so held in adverse custody, to gain custody as against Oklahoma, under orderly procedure would have had to have the issue determined in a court of general jurisdiction, after effort of State counsel, all of which would require some little time. He could not summarily force the city officers to deliver the prisoner without resorting to due process of law. There was no delay in the arrival of the Oklahoma officers for the return of petitioner to Oklahoma and whatever authority the parole officer actually possessed, we, under the record, discover no laches in the assertion of it.
The further proposition of petitioner, amounting to a restatement of the first, that he should be released because the State of' California did not intercede and prevent him from being extradited must fail. A municipal or corporate board acts as a board, and no agent can bind it unless he acts within the scope of his authority. The Board did not act until January 13, 1953 when petitioner's parole was revoked. He was then in Oklahoma. A hold order was immediately placed with the Oklahoma authorities. By the signing of a waiver of extradition, petitioner prevented his being held until the Governor and Adult Authority would have had official notice and would have had to act officially.
The very situation now complained of being brought about by the act of petitioner waiving extradition, he is now estopped from attempting by reason of his own acts to deprive the State of California of jurisdiction, particularly where by contract he had agreed to waive extradition.
And while it may be that the Governor and the Adult Authority, Department of Corrections of the State of California, eventually through due course of mail, learned officially of the action of petitioner appearing in court and waiving extradition to Oklahoma, such notice was apparently received too late for anything to have been done to prevent petitioner from being taken from California. There is nothing in the record to show when the notice of waiver was received by the Adult Authority of California, or when the Board met for the first time after the waiver was signed. Presumably, it was January 13, 1953, when the parole was revoked.
The further attempt of counsel for petitioner in recent supplemental brief to argue assumptions as to the statutory authority of California parole officers, and assumptions as to what was probably done, and that California lost jurisdiction over petitioner by failure of petitioner's parole officer to seek to wrest custody of petitioner from the police authorities of the City of San Francisco within the few days the parole officer was said to have had notice that petitioner was being held for Oklahoma officers, cannot be considered, as laws of other states are facts to be established by competent evidence, and courts of Oklahoma cannot take judicial notice thereof. In the absence of pleading and proof as to the laivs of a sister state, including general statutes, laws are presumed to be the same as the laws of Oklahoma. 12 O.S.A. § 484 (as amended Laws 1953, p.. 53, § 8); Allen v. Allen, 201 Okl. 442, 209 P.2d 172, 14 A.L.R.2d 216; 336 U.S. 956, 69 S.Ct. 891, 93 L.Ed. 1110; Gray v. Martin, 206 Okl. 167, 242 P.2d 698; 20 Am.Jur (Evidence) § 47, and see cumulative supplement.
We find no statutory authority in Oklahoma whereby this State would lose jurisdiction to extradite a parolee who had willingly or unwillingly left this State with the knowledge of his parole officer. See 57 O.S.1951 § 332 et seq.; 22 O.S.A. § 1141.1 et seq.
The State of California, if it had official notice, could, and it is reasonable to assume would, under the Uniform Parole Compact Act, 57 O.S.1951 § 347 et seq. or the Uniform Extradition Act, 22 O.S.A. § 1141.1 et seq., have turned petitioner over to Oklahoma for prosecution under the provisions of the Acts with right to have petitioner returned to that State. See Rider v. McLeod, Okl.Cr., 323 P.2d 741.
Such being our conclusion, it follows that petitioner being an admitted parole violator from California, in view of his signed agreement with the California authorities already quoted, and being found in this State, is subject to extradition. A careful reading of the evidence presented fails to justify any other conclusion.
See Ex parte Williams, 10 Okl. Cr. 344, 136 P. 597, 51 L.R.A.,N.S., 668; Ex parte Hamilton, 41 Okl.Cr. 322, 273 P. 286; Ohrazada v. Turner, 164 Kan. 581, 190 P.2d 413; McTigue v. Rhyne, 180 Kan. 8, 298 P.2d 228; Brewer v. Goff, 10 Cir., 138 F.2d 710, 712.
As stated by Murrah, Circuit Judge, in the case last cited:
"The only prerequisites to extradition from one state to another are, that the person sought to be extradited is substantially charged with a crime against the lazos of the demanding state, and that he is a fugitive from justice. McNichols v. Pase, 207 U.S. 100, 108, 109, 28 S.Ct. 58, 52 L.Ed. 121; Appleyard v. State of Massachusetts, supra [203 U.S. 222, 27 S.Ct. 122, 51 L.Ed. 161]; Roberts v. Reilly, supra [116 U.S. 80, 94, 6 S.Ct. 291, 29 L.Ed. 544]. Admittedly, the extradition pape'rs are in proper form, that is, he is substantially charged with having violated his parole in California, and it is well established that a parole violation is an extraditable offense within the meaning of the statute. Reed v. Colpoys, 69 App. D.C. 163, 99 F.2d 396, certiorari denied 305 U.S. 598, 59 S.Ct. 97, 83 L.Ed. 379; Ex parte Williams, 10 Okl.Cr. 344, 136 P. 597, 51 L.R.A.,N.S., 668; Ex parte McBride, 101 Cal.App. 251, 281 P. 651; People ex rel. Westbrook v. O'Neill, 378 Ill. 324, 38 N.E.2d 174.
We conclude that the papers presented to the Governor of Oklahoma herein were sufficient to justify him in issuing the 'Governor's • warrant, and for the delivery of petitioner to agent Travers for return to California. The petition must be denied for lack of evidence to support the issue raised.
Arguendo , we are constrained to nóte that even if petitioner had been voluntarily surrendered by State officers of the State of California with full 'knowledge that he was then under parole and with ünexpired judgment and sentence, that such would not, by the great weight of authority, have constituted a waiver of the right of the State of California to thereafter revoke .the parole and demand the return of petitioner to that state to there .satisfy the remainder of á prior judgment' and sentence. See Ex parte Guinn, 162 Tex.Cr.R. 293, 284 S.W.2d 721, there paragraph 2 of Section 5 of the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act (22 O.S.A. § 1141.5) is construed and is authority for this statement.
In the Guinn case the petitioner had been incarcerated in the Beckham County, Oklahoma jail under a complaint charging him with burglary and he was surrendered to the Sheriff of Potter County, Texas to answer a charge in that state, but the Oklahoma charges were not dismissed. After the Texas charges were disposed of, Oklahoma sought to return Guinn to Beck-ham County to stand trial, and he sought by writ of habeas corpus to obtain release. Prisoner set up as grounds for the writ that he could not be a fugitive since he was transported to Texas against his will, and, further, that the Oklahoma officials having voluntarily surrendered possession of his person to Texas officials before they had prosecuted him were estopped to ask for his return. The writ was denied. (The facts, it will be seen, are analogous to the facts in the Whittington and Hess cases hereinafter to be mentioned).
See also Moulthrope v. Matus, 139 Conn. 272, 93 A.2d 149, certiorari denied 345 U.S. 926, 73 S.Ct. 785, 97 L.Ed. 1357; United States ex rel. Moulthrope v. Matus, 2 Cir., 218 F.2d 466; McTigue v. Rhyne, supra, 180 Kan. 8, 298 P.2d 228.
In the McTigue case the court went so far as to hold that whether or not the demanding state relinquished its rights to recommit the alleged parole violator was a matter to be raised in courts of the demanding state, and was not a matter to be raised in habeas corpus proceedings by violator who was in custody for extradition.
Petitioner has cited a number of cases from this court that he asserts support the proposition that he advances, as follows: Ex parte Youstler, 40 Okl.Cr. 273, 268 P. 323; Adams v. Waters, 94 Okl.Cr. 428, 237 P.2d 914; Ex parte Guy, 41 Okl.Cr. 1, 269 P. 782; Ex parte Hart, 95 Okl.Cr. 269, 244 P.2d 859; Samet v. McLeod, Okl. Cr., 291 P.2d 836; Traxler v. State, 96 Okl.Cr. 231, 251 P.2d 815; Jarrett v. State, 49 Okl.Cr. 162, 292 P. 888.
It was pointed out in the recent case of Rider v. McLeod, supra, that this line of cases did not take into consideraton or construe either the Interstate Parole Compact (57 O.S.1951 § 347 et seq.) or the Uniform' Criminal Extradition Act (22 O.S.A. 1141.1) the latter act adoped in 1949 and the-prior in 1945. And criticized was the statement appearing in these cases to the effect that: "Governor's surrender of a person at liberty pending appeal from conviction to sister state waives state's jurisdiction over person and right to demand' his return as fugitive." [323 P.2d 751.], Such statement in each case was purely dicta, and therefore cannot be accepted as. authority for the point in question. What the cases really held was that a person found in this State might not raise such questions as a defense, unless, as in the-Guy case, the release amounted to a pardon.
The amazing thing is that this gratuitous, statement came about (see Ex parte Youstler supra) from a consideration of the argument unsupported by authority advanced by the Attorney General of Tennessee in the case of State v. Allen, 1840, 21 Tenn. 258 (the principal case relied' on), and not from what the court said. In fact, the case involved the forfeiture of an-, appearance bond. Jesse J. Allen had been charged before a justice of the peace in: Tennessee with murder and bound over to. the circuit court, and one Martin and W. H. Allen executed an appearance bond. In-, the meantime, Jesse J. Allen went to Alabama and was charged with murder in that state, and the Governor of Tennessee, on demand of the Governor of Alabama, sur rendered the body of Jesse J. Allen. The state sought forfeiture of the appearance bond. The court held:
"1. That it was not the imperative duty of the Governor of the State of Tennessee to have surrendered him until he was legally discharged from the operation of the laws of Tennessee.
"2. That having, however, delivered him over to the constituted authorities of Alabama, such act discharged the bail from his recognizance."
The state had made it impossible for the bondsmen to have the accused appear for trial.
We do find a case, not cited by petitioner, In re Whittington, 1917, 34 Cal.App. 344, 167 P. 404, that holds:
"One is not a fugitive from justice from the state of Texas, so as to be subject to extradition thereto, where, having been arrested in that state for an offense there committed, [but not tried] he was with permission of its authorities taken on process under extradition to the state of California, there to answer to a charge of having committed a crime, though the latter charge was later dismissed."
Cited in the Whittington case, as supporting the holding is the Kansas case of Hess v. Grimes, 1897, 5 Kan.App. 763, 48 P. 596, involving a fugitive from Woodward County, Oklahoma Territory.
The Hess case (as well as the Whitting-ton case) would be distinguishable from the within case even if in the present case the state authorities had actually delivered petitioner to the Oklahoma officers, in that petitioner herein had already been convicted and was at liberty on parole, whereas in the Hess case, Oklahoma Territory had not tried Hess, and conceivably, though this was not assigned as a reason in the Hess or the Whittington cases, because the facts did not justify, to force a trial years later (in cases where that might be true) when witnesses might have departed or be deceased, would be placing an undue burden upon the accused, and violate his constitutional right to a speedy trial. Strangely enough, like in State v. Allen, supra, the Hess case cited as authority for its holding the case of Taylor v. Taintor, 1897, 16 Wall. 366, 21 L.Ed. 287, which was, as in the Allen case, a suit involving a bond forfeiture, but unlike in Allen, where forfeiture was sustained by reason of variance in facts.
Notwithstanding the above, and the noted distinctions, it is interesting to see what other courts have had to say about the Whittington and Hess cases.
In United States ex rel. Moulthrope v. Matus, 2 Cir., 1954, 218 F.2d 466, 468, Clark, Chief Judge, with Judges Medina and Learned Hand concurring, said:
"In the course of interpretation the phrase 'fled into,' found in both the Constitution and the statutes, has been assimilated into the phrase 'fugitive from justice.' As poinetd out below and in the state court, the case of In re Whittington [supra], seems not to have been generally followed."
In the recent case of Application of Fedder, 1956, 143 Cal.App.2d 103, 299 P.2d 881, 886, the California district court of appeals with reference to the Whittington case, said:
"This case was decided in 1917, and was cited in In re Marzec, 25 Cal.2d 794, 154 P.2d 873, and in In re McBride, 101 Cal.App. 251, 281 P. 651, and distinguished in both cases. The case is clearly contrary to the weight of authority and has been criticized in-Ex parte Martin, 142 Kan. 907, 52 P.2d 1196; State ex rel. Shapiro v. Wall, 187 Minn. 246, 244 N.W. 811, 85 A.L.R. 114; People ex rel. Hutchings v. Mallen, 126 Misc. 591, 214 N. Y.S. 211, reversed 218 App.Div. 461, 218 N.Y.S. 432, affirmed 245 N.Y. 521, 157 N.E. 842; Ex parte Anthony, 198 Wash. 106, 87 P.2d 302; also in Moulthrope v. Matus, 139 Conn. 272, 93 A.2d 149, and in United States ex rel. Moulthrope v. Matus, 2 Cir., 218 F.2d 466, at page 468, the court said in reference to the Whittington case, it 'seems not to have been generally followed.' "
And in the late case of Davis v. Rhyne, supra, 1957, 181 Kan. 443, 312 P.2d 626, 629 the Supreme Court of Kansas, with reference to its Hess case and the Whit-tington case, said:
"As a matter of law, the Bless case [5 Kan.App. 763, 48 P. 596] has never been persuasive with this court. Although it was cited in the leading case of In're Whittington, supra [34 Cal. App. 344, 167 P. 404] this court said in In re Martin, 142 Kan. 907, 910, 912, 52 P.2d 1196, 1198, 1199:
" ' The Kansas case cited in that opinion [the Hess case] has little, if any, application to the case before us.
" 'The Whittington case, although frequently cited, has rarely, if ever, been followed.
⅜
"'We are not disposed to follow the reasoning and holding of In re Whit-tington, supra. It is against the great weight of authority .' "
While a few courts have followed the Whittington and Hess cases, both California and Kansas have, as we have seen, in effect repudiated or at least weakened those cases as authority for the principle stated.
As said in Brewer v. Goff, supra [138 F.2d 711], and in effect in many other cases to be found cited in the digests:
"The Constitutional provision and the procedural statutes were intended to provide a summary executive proceedings, by the use of which the closely associated states of the union could promptly aid one another in bringing to trial persons accused of crime in one state, but found in another beyond the reach of the state where the crime was committed. To this end, the courts have given the Constitution and the statute a liberal construction in order to effectuate and expedite the administration of justice in the several states."
(Citing a long-list of authorities.)
22 O.S.A. § 1141.28, Uniform Criminal Extradition Act, provides:
"The provisions of this Act [1141.1-1141.30] shall be so interpreted and construed as to effectuate its general purposes to make uniform the law of those states which enact it."
The effort seems to be to have the questions between a fugitive and a demanding state determined in a forum of the state in which the alleged law violation took place, and on the merits of the case, rather than avoidance on technicalities connected with state lines.
Further discussion of arguments advanced in briefs, in view of the conclusions reached, is not required.
Writ denied. Petitioner ordered delivered to the agent of the State of California to be transported to that State.
BRETT, P. J., concurs.
NIX, J., dissents.
.See the following cases from this court where the Uniform Extradition Act was involved, and showing limited inquiry by this court under such Act. Ex parte Beam, 96 Okl.Cr. 207, 252 P.2d 179; Ex parte Scott, 91 Okl.Cr. 345, 219 P.2d 249; Ex parte Birch, 89 Okl.Cr. 417, 209 P.2d 510; Ex parte Jackson, 97 Okl.Cr. 289, 262 P.2d 722; Ex parte Ayers, 90 Okl.Cr. 255, 213 P.2d 297; Ex parte Deere, 93 Okl.Cr. 291, 227 P.2d 420.
In the Jackson case just cited, petitioner had been charged in Arizona with murder, but was committed to the State Hospital for the Insane and the charges dismissed. Later the superintendent discharged defendant from the hospital upon the condition that he would leave' Arizona and go to Oklahoma to live with a brother. Thereafter the murder charge was refiled in Arizona and extradition proceedings instituted in Oklahoma for return of petitioner, who resisted on the ground that he came to Oklahoma under compulsion and was not a fugitive from justice. In re Whittington, 34 Cal.App. 344, 167 P. 404 was cited as authority. Jones, J., for this court, pointed out that the Whittington case expressed the minority view, and it was held that under the Uniform Extradition Act petitioner was a fugitive, and extradition granted.
. These comments of course in strict sense amount simply to dicta, but are presented in view of the voluminous briefs and argument offered by counsel, and for information.
. It is not meant to assert that under no circumstances could there be á waiver by a state of jurisdiction to thereafter extradite a prisoner who might be found in a sister state, such as the action of the Governor being construed as a pardon, or the official action of the proper board or officially designated authority. The cases cited will illustrate the weight of authority in situations set forth in such cases.
. "The Governor of this State may also surrender on demand of the Executive Authority of any other state any person in this State who is charged in the manner provided in Section 22 of this Act (1141.23) with having violated the laws of the state whose Executive Authority is making the demand, even though such. person left the demanding state involuntarily."
. Imaginable, where a demanding state had delivered an accused to a sister state without proceeding to trial on a pending charge, and there would be a delay of years so that accused's witnesses would no longer be available, or would be deceased, and accused's rights had been thus jeopardized, and he had been denied a speedy trial through no fault of his, and the demanding state would seek accused's return to stand trial, many jurisdictions no doubt would deny extradition, based squarely on the detriment done the accused. However, the denial of a speedy trial occasioned through no act of the accused, could be raised on return to the demanding state, and presumably his constitutional rights would he protected in one state as well as in another.
The principle involved was present in two opinions prepared by the writer. In the first case, Application of Cameron, 97 Okl.Cr. 81, 258 P.2d 208, petitioner was serving a life sentence, but charges were pending in Nowata County, and petitioner had over a long period of time demanded a trial or that the charges be dismissed. Mandamus was issued.
In Inverarity v. Zumwalt, 97 Okl.Cr. 294, 262 P.2d 725, petitioner was likewise in the State penitentiary and there was a complaint pending against him in Craig County in the justice court of Magistrate Zumwalt, but the warrant of arrest had never been served, and petitioner had never sought trial. That seems to have been the last thing that he wanted. He simply claimed that he had been denied a speedy trial and wanted the action dismissed without further proceedings. His petition was denied. A variance in the facts between cases can make all the dif-erence in the world as to application of the law and final outcome.