Case Name: STATE of Louisiana v. Aubrey HARRIS
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1993-02-11
Citations: 613 So. 2d 807
Docket Number: No. 92-K-2754
Parties: STATE of Louisiana v. Aubrey HARRIS.
Judges: Before CIACCIO, ARMSTRONG and WALTZER, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 613
Pages: 807–811

Head Matter:
STATE of Louisiana v. Aubrey HARRIS.
No. 92-K-2754.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fourth Circuit.
Feb. 11, 1993.
Rehearing Denied March 10, 1993.
Arcenious F. Armond, Jr., Gretna, for defendant.
Harry F. Connick, Dist. Atty., Lisa Lavie, Asst. Dist. Atty., Maurice E. Landrieu, New Orleans, for plaintiff.
Before CIACCIO, ARMSTRONG and WALTZER, JJ.

Opinion:
ORDER
CIACCIO, Judge.
Writ Granted
The State of Louisiana seeks review of the trial court's grant of defendant's motion to suppress the evidence. The issue before us is whether the suppression of evidence was proper in light of California v. Hodari D., — U.S. —, 111 S.Ct. 1547, 113 L.Ed.2d 690 (1991) and its Louisiana progeny. For the reasons stated below, we reverse the judgment of the trial court.
While on routine patrol in a marked police car near the intersection of N. Prieur and France Streets in the Fifth District in New Orleans, Police Officers Derrick Fricke and Clarence Gillard noticed two black males in front of an abandoned building during a rainstorm. One of the men, Lionel Johnson, was in a wheelchair, and the other was later identified as Aubrey Harris, defendant. This was an area known to the officers for high incidences of drug trafficking, and the officers decided to return to investigate. Upon returning to the area, the officers observed defendant walking on France Street to meet a third man, while the subject in the wheelchair remained on the corner.
Officer Gillard exited the vehicle and detained Johnson while Officer Fricke drove up to Harris and got out of the car. Upon seeing the officer, Harris immediately turned and began running back toward the corner. Officer Gillard then began running toward him, and observed Harris turn into an alleyway, pull an object out from under his shirt, and throw it up into the air. The object landed on the roof of an adjacent building.
Officer Gillard chased and apprehended Harris, placed him under arrest for trespassing and obstructing a public passage, and advised him of his rights. The officer then climbed onto the roof of the building where Harris had thrown the object, and he retrieved a .38 caliber gun. Harris was then arrested for carrying a concealed weapon and again advised of his rights. The officers searched him incident to this arrest and found three .38 caliber rounds which matched those found in the gun. All three men were placed in the police car and Harris admitted the gun was his. A computer check revealed that Harris was on parole, and Harris was re-arrested for being a convicted felon in possession of a firearm and was again advised of his rights.
Following a hearing on defendant's motion to suppress, the trial court found the gun was inadmissible as evidence as it had been unlawfully seized by the police officers.
It has long been held that property cannot be seized legally if it was abandoned pursuant to an infringement of the person's property rights. However, if property is abandoned without any prior unlawful intrusion into a citizen's right to be free from government interference, then such property may be lawfully seized. In such cases, there is no expectation of privacy and thus no violation of a person's custodial rights. State v. Belton, 441 So.2d 1195, 1199 (La.1983), cert. den. Belton v. Louisiana, 466 U.S. 953, 104 S.Ct. 2158, 80 L.Ed.2d 543 (1984).
In the present case, the defendant threw the gun up onto the roof as he was being chased by the officers.
In its application, the State argues that because he had not yet been caught by the officers and thus had not submitted to their authority when he abandoned the gun, the officers could lawfully seize the gun, citing California v. Hodari D., — U.S. —, 111 S.Ct. 1547, 113 L.Ed.2d 690 (1991)
In Hodari D., officers patrolling in a high crime neighborhood spotted a group of youths who fled on foot upon seeing the officers. One officer chased the accused and saw him toss down a small rock that the officer believed might be crack cocaine. Only then did the officer tackle Hodari D. and restrain him. The court rejected Ho-dari's argument that the officers' show of authority by arriving on the scene constituted a seizure as it did not cause Hodari to stop. Therefore, the crack cocaine was admissible because it was abandoned and lawfully recovered by police.
Louisiana courts have applied the holding of Hodari D. in cases with factual situations similar to the present case. In State v. Ganier, 591 So.2d 1328 (La.App. 4th Cir.1991), Officer Charles Posey witnessed an unknown male walking from a driveway in the Florida Housing Project toward his marked police vehicle. Upon seeing the police car, the subject turned and began to run away; Officer Posey chased the subject and saw him throw down an object which was later found to be crack cocaine. The Ganier court, applying the holding in Hodari D., found that the subject was not under seizure when he abandoned the cocaine and the officers were justified in retrieving it. In so holding the court stated:
Housing projects within the City of New Orleans are known to be high crime areas and centers for drug activity. Drug activity and crimes which it generates have become a major problem endangering innocent people and severely taxing police resources. Although an innocent individual who has nothing to hide from police might flee so that such flight would be irrational, the action of fleeing in itself is inherently suspicious and justifies an investigation by a police officer exercising common sense. This is not the case of a man merely standing on a street corner who is detained by the police simply because he is there.
State v. Ganier, 591 So.2d at 1330.
In the present case, defendant and another individual were standing in front of an abandoned building during a rainstorm in an area known to be a place for routine drug related activity. Officer Guillard testified that the location had the highest incidents of drug related activity within the Fifth District. When the officers circled the block and returned to the location, defendant had begun to walk out into the rain toward another individual. When defendant saw the police officer, he turned and began to run.
A police officer has the right to conduct an investigatory stop when he has a reasonable suspicion that a person has been, is, or is about to be engaged in criminal conduct. La.C.Cr.P. art. 215.1(A). Although flight at the sight of a police officer is by itself insufficient to justify an investigatory stop, this type of conduct may be a factor which contributes to a finding of reasonable cause to stop. That the place is known to be a high crime area is also a contributing fact upon which a police officer can rely and is relevant in a determination of reasonable suspicion. State v. Ganier, supra, at 1330.
We find that an investigatory stop was reasonable in this case where defendant was standing in front of an abandoned building in an area known for heavy drug trafficking, and subsequently walked into the rain to meet a third man. Further, we do not find the conduct of the officers in chasing the fleeing defendant to be unreasonable. Since defendant was not yet under seizure when he fled and abandoned the gun, the officers' retrieval of it was proper.
Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is reversed, the motion to suppress is denied, and the case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
ARMSTRONG, J., concurs with reasons.
WALTZER, J., dissents with reasons.