Case Name: Ricky Nolen McGINN, Appellant, v. STATE of Texas
Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1998-01-21
Citations: 961 S.W.2d 161
Docket Number: No. 72134
Parties: Ricky Nolen McGINN, Appellant, v. STATE of Texas.
Judges: in which MeCORMICK, Presiding Judge, and MEYERS, MANSFIELD, PRICE, HOLLAND and WOMACK, Judges, joined and an opinion with respect to point of error one, in which MeCORMICK, Presiding Judge, and MEYERS, PRICE and HOLLAND, Judges, joined.
Reporter: South Western Reporter Second Series
Volume: 961
Pages: 161–177

Head Matter:
Ricky Nolen McGINN, Appellant, v. STATE of Texas.
No. 72134.
Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, En Banc.
Jan. 21, 1998.
Joel Menachim Shearer, Bastrop, for appellant.
Lee Haney, Dist. Atty., Brownwood, Matthew Paul, State’s Atty., Austin, for State.

Opinion:
OPINION
KELLER, Judge,
delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to points of error two through seven,
in which MeCORMICK, Presiding Judge, and MEYERS, MANSFIELD, PRICE, HOLLAND and WOMACK, Judges, joined and an opinion with respect to point of error one, in which MeCORMICK, Presiding Judge, and MEYERS, PRICE and HOLLAND, Judges, joined.
In a trial beginning in May of 1995, appellant was convicted of the capital murder of twelve-year-old Stephanie Flanary committed on May 22, 1993 in Brown County. The jury answered the punishment issues in the State's favor, and appellant was sentenced to death. Direct appeal to this Court is automatic under Article 37.071, § 2(h). Appellant raises seven points of error on appeal. We will affirm.
1. Venue
In point of error two, appellant complains about the trial court's refusal to grant a change of venue on the basis of prejudicial pretrial publicity. He complains that some newspaper articles about his case prejudiced his ability to obtain a fair trial by referring to a murder charge of which appellant was acquitted and by referring to the fairly recent murders of two other girls in Brown county.
The standard of review for a trial court's ruling on a request for change of venue is abuse of discretion. Anderson v. State, 932 S.W.2d 502, 506 (Tex.Crim.App.1996). We will not reverse so long as the trial court's ruling "is within the realm of reasonableness given the record before it." Id. To prevail on his request, appellant "bears a heavy burden to prove the existence of such prejudice in the community that the likelihood of obtaining a fair and impartial jury trial is doubtful." Id. (quoting Narvaiz v. State, 840 S.W.2d 415, 428 (Tex.Crim.App.1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 975, 113 S.Ct. 1422, 122 L.Ed.2d 791 (1993)). The publicity involved must be "so pervasive and prejudicial as to create a reasonable probability that an impartial jury cannot be empaneled even with the most carefiil voir dire." Id. (quoting Narvaiz). Moreover, that some members of the venire are challengeable for cause due to attitudes generated by publicity does not mean that an impartial jury cannot be empaneled. Id.
In the present case, appellant offered before the trial court the testimony of several witnesses, including a former District Attorney, who stated that there was a substantial risk that appellant could not receive a fair trial. The State controverted this testimony with witnesses who testified that appellant could receive a fair trial, and defense witnesses randomly selected to test whether a fair trial could occur also provided some testimonial support for the State's position. Although the basis for excusing a prospective juror was not always clear, we discern that at least seven prospective jurors were excused because they had formed opinions based upon publicity or information they received about the case. A number of others were excused because their relationship with a party, or a relative of one, had compromised their ability to be fair and impartial. Some of the prospective jurors in both categories had spontaneously offered their views at the hearing on jury qualifications. Finally, we note that appellant did not use all of his peremptory challenges.
Appellant concedes that no facts in the record can be offered to show that the trial court abused its discretion under current law. He candidly points to Gardner v. State, 738 S.W.2d 195 (Tex.Crim.App.1987) as being strikingly similar to his case and adverse to his position: fifteen prospective jurors were excused for holding established conclusions about the defendant's guilt, conflicting testimony was offered by the State and the defense on whether the defendant could obtain a fair trial, the publicity in the case was factual in nature, and the defendant had not exhausted his peremptory challenges. Id. at 204. We agree with appellant's assessment that the trial court did not abuse his discretion under the law as it currently stands.
Appellant contends, however, that we should depart from current law and engage in speculation about what the record might have shown. He claims that he could not ask questions designed to discover prospective jurors' knowledge and opinions about his pri- or murder charge and acquittal because doing so would have informed prospective jurors who did not already know about the prior charge —destroying any remaining chance of a fair trial. He argues that we should speculate that some members of the jury may have known about the prior charge and acquittal in light of the insular nature of a small town. We are not convinced.
In a number of recent cases, we have reaffirmed the principle that the record must show a defendant's inability to obtain a fair trial. Moore v. State, 935 S.W.2d 124, 129-30 (Tex.Crim.App.1996)(the defendant produced no evidence that any member of the venire harbored unshakable prejudices against him); Penry v. State, 903 S.W.2d 715, 727 (Tex.Crim.App.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 977, 116 S.Ct. 480, 133 L.Ed.2d 408 (1995)(record must demonstrate prejudice in community making likelihood of obtaining a fair trial doubtful); Willingham v. State, 897 S.W.2d 351, 357 (Tex.Crim.App.1995)(nothing in record indicated identifiable prejudice in community); Brimage v. State, 918 S.W.2d 466, 509 (Tex.Crim.App.1994)(no evidence showed that media activity prejudiced any member of the jury against the defendant). We do not believe it necessary or appropriate to make an exception to this rule for small counties. If the requisite degree of prejudice is present, appellant should be able to demonstrate that fact on the record, regardless of the size of the locality involved. Moreover, appellant's claim that questioning about the prior murder accusation would taint the entire ve-nire is untenable in light of the statutory scheme of individual voir dire for capital eases. Defense counsel could have asked open-ended questions designed to elicit knowledge of prior accusations during individual voir dire and could have then conducted follow-up questioning where appropriate. Such a procedure would have enabled appellant to discover which prospective jurors knew about the prior accusation without informing those who did not already know. Point of error two is overruled.
2. Punishment
In point of error three, appellant contends that the trial court erred by permitting testimony of a child about an extraneous offense incident without an inquiry into her competence to testify concerning the incident. The following occurred in the punishment stage of the trial:
Q. Latasha, I'm going to ask you about something that happened around Halloween, when you were three or four years old.
Do you remember that?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Did anything unusual happen on that date?
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: We will object. That is too remote to call on a child, twelve years old, to remember something that happened back when they were three years old. The remoteness makes it inadmissible.
Also, the prejudicial effect far outweighs any ends that it might serve toward justice.
THE COURT: Overruled, counsel. You may proceed.
The State then proceeded to examine Latasha concerning an incident in which appellant sexually molested her when she was three or four years old.
Appellant concedes that defense counsel's objection was "at best, inartful." He nevertheless contends that this objection triggered the trial court's duty to inquire into the witness' competence without an explicit demand from defense counsel. We disagree.
Texas Rule of Criminal Evidence 601 states in relevant part:
Every person is competent to be a witness except as otherwise provided in these rules. The following witnesses shall be incompetent to testify in any proceeding subject to these rules:....
(2) Children. Children or other persons who, after being examined by the court, appear not to possess sufficient intellect to relate transactions with respect to which they are interrogated.
Unlike some rules, Rule 601 does not expressly require that a party request an examination by the court. See Texas Rules of Criminal Evidence 204 (hearing on judicial notice) and 705(c)(underlying facts or data upon which expert opinion is based). However, unlike the incompetency to stand trial statute, Rule 601 does not expressly impose upon the trial court the duty to conduct an inquiry on its own motion. See Article 46.02, § 2(b). Where the rule specifies a right to a hearing upon request, an objection to the substance of the testimony that would be the subject of such a hearing does not preserve error regarding the trial court's failure to conduct the hearing. Jenkins v. State, 912 S.W.2d 793, 813 (Tex.Crim.App.1993)(objec-tions to expert testimony did not preserve error on failure to conduct Rule 705 hearing in the absence of an express request). For the reasons stated below, we hold that this principle applies even if the rule, statute, or other law is silent about whether or not the party must request a hearing. That is, to complain about failing to obtain a hearing or other inquiry, the party must have requested the hearing unless the rule, statute, or other law conferring the right to a hearing provides that the trial court has a duty to sua sponte conduct one.
The general rule is that a party must request the desired relief to preserve a complaint on appeal:
In order to preserve a complaint for appellate review, a party must have presented to the trial court a timely request, objection or motion, stating the specific grounds for the ruling he desired the court to make if the specific grounds were not apparent from the context.
Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 52(a)(em-phasis added). For instance, if a trial court sustains an objection to improper jury argument, the complaining party must request an instruction to disregard to preserve error on appeal if an instruction to disregard could have cured the prejudice resulting from the argument. Sawyers v. State, 724 S.W.2d 24, 38 (Tex.Crim.App.1986). Requesting a mistrial is insufficient to preserve error under those circumstances. Id. That is so because the appropriate remedy for a curable, erroneous argument to which objection has been sustained is an instruction to disregard. Requesting other forms of relief, such as a mistrial, does not preserve error concerning the absence of an instruction to disregard. If, on the other hand, the prejudice arising from an erroneous jury argument were incurable, a defendant would be required to request a mistrial to preserve error on appeal because a mistrial would be the appropriate remedy. Cockrell v. State, 933 S.W.2d 73, 89 (Tex.Crim.App.1996).
Moreover, we have held in at least one other context that a deficient record concerning the admissibility of evidence is charged against the complaining party if he failed to request a hearing. Crane v. State, 786 S.W.2d 338, 348 (Tex.Crim.App.1990). In Crane, the defendant moved to strike in-court identification testimony, and for a mistrial in the alternative, on the ground that the State failed to disclose evidence in violation of a discovery order. Id. at 347. We overruled the defendant's contention on appeal because, while he proved that the evidence was suppressed, he failed to show that the evidence was material. Id. at 348. We held that the trial court was under no obligation to conduct a hearing absent a request by the defendant. Id. Because no hearing was requested, the record did not contain evidence to support the defendant's claim, and nothing was presented for review. Id.
The rationale in Crane applies here. There is no evidence from the record that even remotely suggests that Latasha did not have the ability to understand and recall the events in question. The only evidence in the record bearing upon that issue is Latasha's testimony that she did remember those events and her subsequent testimony describing the events in question. Appellant points to the lack of evidence in the record and ascribes error to the trial court for failing to conduct an inquiry, but the lack of evidence in the record on the witness' competence to testify is a result of appellant's failure to request such an inquiry.
Moreover, an objection to remoteness does not preserve a complaint concerning a trial court's failure to conduct a hearing because those are different'complaints. It is axiomatic that error is forfeited when the complaint on appeal differs from the complaint at trial. Burks v. State, 876 S.W.2d 877, 908 (Tex.Crim.App.1994)(arguing at trial that extraneous offenses must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt before becoming admissible does not preserve complaint on appeal that extraneous offense should not have been admitted because charges had been dropped); Butler v. State, 872 S.W.2d 227, 236 (Tex.Crim.App.1994)(arguing at trial that voluntariness was raised because Miranda warnings were discussed does not preserve complaint on appeal that statement was obtained through physical force or threats of force).
Hence, because appellant did not request an inquiry into Latasha's competence to testify, he has forfeited the right to complain about the trial court's failure to conduct such an inquiry. Point of error three is overruled.
In point of error four, appellant contends that Article 37.071, § 2(b)(1) unconstitutionally diminishes the State's burden of proof on future dangerousness by using the word "probability." We have previously decided this issue adversely to appellant's position. Robison v. State, 888 S.W.2d 473, 481 (Tex.Crim.App.1994), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1162, 115 S.Ct. 2617, 132 L.Ed.2d 859 (1995). Point of error four is overruled.
In point of error five appellant complains about the trial court's refusal to submit an instruction on the minimum number of years a prisoner must serve before becoming eligible for parole on a capital life sentence. In point of error six, he complains the trial court erred in instructing the jury not to consider or discuss any possible action by the Board of Pardons and Paroles. Appellant combines his discussion of these points in his brief. We have already held that it is not error for the trial court to refuse to instruct the jury on the minimum eligibility requirements for parole in a capital case. Broxton v. State, 909 S.W.2d 912, 918-919 (Tex.Crim.App.1995). We have also held that a trial court does not err in instructing a jury not to consider any possible action by the Board of Pardons and Paroles. Anderson, 932 S.W.2d at 507-508. Appellant presents no new arguments that would persuade us to revisit these issues. Points of error five and six are overruled.
In point of error seven, appellant complains that evidence was insufficient to support the jury's finding on the mitigation special issue, set out in Article 37.071, § 2(e). But, this Court does not conduct a sufficiency review of the mitigation special issue. Green v. State, 934 S.W.2d 92, 106-107 (Tex.Crim.App.1996). Point of error seven is overruled.
In point of error one, appellant claims that the jury's finding of a probability of future dangerousness is so against the great weight of the evidence as to be manifestly unjust. He relies upon the factual sufficiency standard announced in Clewis v. State, 922 S.W.2d 126 (Tex.Crim.App.1996) and argues that Clewis ' rationale applies equally to capital cases. He further argues that refusing to apply Clewis to capital cases would violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
We have held that the power to review evidence for its factual sufficiency is inherent in our appellate jurisdiction. Bigby v. State, 892 S.W.2d 864 (Tex.Crim.App.1994). In Clewis we held that appellate courts have the power and the duty to conduct factual suffi ciency reviews of convictions in noncapital cases. See Cleivis, generally. We have subsequently extended Clewis to convictions in capital cases. Jones v. State, 944 S.W.2d 642, 647-648 (Tex.Crim.App.1996). The question we confront today is whether Clewis should extend, in a capital case, to a punishment issue, namely the issue of future dangerousness.
An examination of all the cases cited in Clewis as support for conducting a factual sufficiency review reveals only one in which such a review may have been applied to a punishment issue. See cases cited in Clewis, 922 S.W.2d at 129 & 130 n. 6; Id. at 137, 138, 138 n. 4, 139, 140, 140 n. 7 & n. 8, 142 n. 10, 144 n. 12 (Clinton, J. concurring). In Villareal v. State, 140 Tex.Crim. 675, 146 S.W.2d 406 (Tex.Crim.App.1940), overruled on other grounds by, Mays v. State, 563 S.W.2d 260, 264 n. 5 (Tex.Crim.App.1978), this Court held that certain inadmissible, but unobjected to, evidence was insufficient to sustain a jury finding of "malice" in a murder case, in which the defendant was given the death penalty. Id. 146 S.W.2d at 409-410. We explained that "it is within the power of this court to reverse a case on the facts and it may become its duty to do so." Id. at 409. We further expounded:
[W]e have not overlooked the general rule, frequently announced, that the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony exclusively rests with the jury and the lower court. Further, this court will not pass on the sufficiency of the evidence unless there is an entire failure of proof; and that the amount of punishment is the jury's special province. However, we do find that this court has upon occasions applied such rules with a degree of laxity where, under the facts of such cases, it appeared that the conviction was unjust or that the punishment was harsh or unreasonable. We are convinced that for these questions there can be no fixed rule so firmly planted that it cannot be, under a proper state of facts, varied.
Id. at 409-410. We further held that punishment issues were also subject to such a sufficiency review:
We are not able to say that this doctrine should apply in the matter of determining guilt and deny it in consideration of the amount of punishment which a jury assesses. It is no new thing for this court to consider the competence of evidence in determining its cogency, particularly where the extreme penalty has been assessed.
Id. at 410. Under the law at the time, malice was the subject of an instruction that enabled the jury to impose punishment for murder in excess of five years if malice were found to be present. See Texas Penal Code, Article 1257b (1948); Burns v. State, 159 Tex.Crim. 183, 262 S.W.2d 406, 407 (1953). Because death was imposed in Villareal, the malice instruction, in that case, performed a function similar to the special issues submitted to juries in death penalty cases today.
But, Villareal does not necessarily support the kind of review announced by Clewis. Villareal involved a "weakness" in the State's evidence — the essential evidence supporting the finding of malice was deemed incompetent because of its inadmissible nature:
The fact that incompetent evidence has been admitted without objection renders its admission harmless, but may not always lift its forcefulness to a superlative degree, or, indeed, add materially to its cogency.
146 S.W.2d at 410. See also Franklin v. State, 147 Tex.Crim. 636, 183 S.W.2d 573, 574 (1944)(Villareal reached its conclusion "based upon the weakness of the State's testimony"). The case did not involve the existence of overwhelming contrary evidence. While the Court expressed its belief in its power to review the "facts," it did so in the context of rejecting the notion that evidence could only be reviewed on an "entire failure of proof." See Id. 146 S.W.2d at 409.
This Court's relaxation of the standard of review may simply have been a recognition that a "no evidence" standard was constitutionally inadequate. The Supreme Court recognized that same proposition in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979) :
That the Thompson [v. City of Louisville, 362 U.S. 199, 80 S.Ct. 624, 4 L.Ed.2d 654 (1960)7 "no evidence" rule is simply inadequate to protect against misapplications of the constitutional standard of reasonable doubt is readily apparent. "[A] mere modicum of evidence may satisfy a 'no evidence' standard...." Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 202 [84 S.Ct. 1676, 1686, 12 L.Ed.2d 793 (1960)] (Warren, C.J., dissenting). Any evidence that is relevant — that has any tendency to make the existence of an element of a crime slightly more probable than it would be without the evidence, cf. Fed. Rui. Evid. 401 — could be deemed a "mere modicum." But it could not seriously be argued that such a "modicum" of evidence could by itself rationally support a conviction beyond a reasonable doubt.
Id. at 320, 99 S.Ct. at 2789 (brackets and ellipsis in original). As Judge Meyers commented in his concurring opinion in Clewis, the Jackson standard, although termed "legal sufficiency" by this Court, "actually requires an assessment of 'factual sufficiency' " in that it is not a "no evidence" standard. Clewis, 922 S.W.2d at 150 (Meyers, J. concurring). Hence, Villareal's formulation of the standard for reviewing sufficiency may have simply been an expression of the standard later formulated by the Supreme Court in Jackson,
There is yet another distinction between the present case and Villareal that is relevant here. "Malice" was an issue of historical fact, but future dangerousness is, in essence, an issue of prediction. Findings of historical fact are either right or wrong at the time of trial. But, predictions are not right or wrong at the time of trial — they may be shown as accurate or inaccurate only by subsequent events. One may well be able to show that the evidence supporting a finding of a probability of future dangerousness is so deficient that no jury could rationally base a prediction thereon, and there are cases in which we have so held. Ellason v. State, 815 5.W.2d 656, 660-664 (Tex.Crim.App.1991); Beltran v. State, 728 S.W.2d 382, 390 (Tex.Crim.App.1987); Keeton v. State, 724 S.W.2d 58, 61-64 (Tex.Crim.App.1987). But once the rationality of the prediction is established, attempting to determine whether a jury's prediction of the probability of future dangerousness is nevertheless wrong or unjust because of countervailing evidence is an impossible task. Many types of evidence, such as youthfulness, are a double-edged sword, construable as either increasing or decreasing the likelihood of future violence. See Morrow v. State, 910 S.W.2d 471, 471-473 (Tex.Crim.App.1995), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 116 S.Ct. 1683, 134 L.Ed.2d 784 (1996)(evidence can be either mitigating or aggravating in context of special issues); Green v. State, 934 S.W.2d 92, 105 n. 6 (Tex.Crim.App.1996)(youth can be either mitigating or aggravating).
Moreover, a juror is not required to accord any particular circumstance mitigating relevance to the special issues. Soria v. State, 933 S.W.2d 46, 65 (Tex.Crim.App.1996); Penry, 903 S.W.2d at 766. For this reason, a Jackson review of the mitigation special issue is impossible. McFarland v. State, 928 S.W.2d 482, 499 (Tex.Crim.App.1996). Whether a particular piece of evidence is mitigating in the context of that issue is a normative judgment that is not amenable to appellate review. Id.
Similar concerns apply to an attempt to conduct a Clewis review of a finding of a probability of future dangerousness. While the future dangerousness issue is not wholly normative in nature, the issue is highly subjective because it calls for a prediction of future events rather than an assessment of events that have already occurred. Such predictions are necessarily value-laden, and whether a particular circumstance tends to increase or reduce the likelihood of future violence is a question whose answer will vary widely from one individual to the next, depending at least in part upon the individual's values and experiences.
A Jackson review of the issue is feasible because that standard views evidence in the light that supports the jury's verdict, and asks only whether circumstances are present that a rational person somewhere could find prove a probability of future dangerousness beyond a reasonable doubt. A Clewis review, on the other hand, would necessarily assign some circumstances aggravating impact and other circumstances mitigating impact. Thus, a factual sufficiency review would require this Court to make its own determination of whether a circumstance carried mitigating, aggravating, or no weight, the result being that we would substitute our own determination of whether evidence is mitigating or aggravating for that of the jury. As we explained in Clewis: "Appellate courts should only exercise their fact jurisdiction to prevent a manifestly unjust result; . those courts 'are not free to reweigh the evidence and set aside a jury verdict merely because the judges feel that a different result is more reasonable' [citations omitted]." 922 S.W.2d at 135 (ellipsis in original).
It is not possible to say that a jury's finding of a probability of future dangerousness is against the great weight of the evidence unless we assign some evidence mitigating value. Because there is no evidence that must be considered to have mitigating value, a Clewis review of the future dangerousness issue is not possible. We hold that a factual sufficiency review of a jury's determination of a probability of future dangerousness is not required by the Texas Constitution.
We turn next to appellant's contention that refusing to extend Clewis to capital cases violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. His claim is without merit. Clewis apples equally to the guilt stage of both capital and noncapital cases. As for punishment proceedings, this Court has not held that Clewis applies to any punishment issues, whether in capital or non-capital cases. Moreover, even if this Court decided to extend Clewis to some noncapital punishment issues in the future—and we express no opinion on whether that will occur— the predictive nature of the future dangerousness issue would distinguish that issue sufficiently from other issues for purposes of equal protection. Point of error one is overruled.
The judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED.
McCORMICK, P.J., filed a concurring opinion.
BAIRD, J., filed a concurring and dissenting opinion in which OVERSTREET, J., joined.
OVERSTREET, J., filed a concurring and dissenting opinion in which BAIRD, J., joined.
MANSFIELD, J., filed a concurring opinion in which WOMACK, J., joined.
. All references to articles refer to the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure unless otherwise indicated.
. Before a death sentence can be imposed, the jury must answer "yes" to the following issue:
whether there is a probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society;
Article 37.071, § 2(b)(1).
. We have, once before, conducted a factual sufficiency review of the future dangerousness special issue without deciding whether such review was appropriate. Hughes v. State, 897 S.W.2d 285, 293 (Tex.Crim.App.1994).
. The evidence — testimony by a doctor as to how the victim's injuries must have been caused— appears to have been the only evidence of malice. The evidence was also virtually the only proof of guilt, as the defendant admitted that he killed the victim, but testified that he did so in self-defense.
. Moreover, subsequent cases have often treated Villareal as involving fundamental error in the admission of evidence rather than a true sufficiency case. See Johnson v. State, 401 S.W.2d 837, 839 (Tex.Crim.App.1966); Vasquez v. State, 371 S.W.2d 389, 394 (Tex.Crim.App.1963)(on rehearing); Boatwright v. State, 169 Tex.Crim. 280, 343 S.W.2d 707, 708 (1960). One case characterized Villareal as involving charge error. Cortez v. State, 375 S.W.2d 313, 314 (Tex.Crim.App.1964). Villareal was cited in both Bigby and Clewis as supporting a factual sufficiency review, but neither case distinguished it in any fashion from the myriad of guilt-innocence cases listed for supporting a factual review. See Bigby, 892 S.W.2d at 874; Clewis, 922 S.W.2d at 130 n. 6.
. In his concurring opinion, Judge Mansfield contends that this Court already conducts a factual sufficiency review based upon factors established in Keeton. While some judges have at times treated the Keeton factors as establishing a factual sufficiency review, see e.g. Martinez v. State, 924 S.W.2d 693, 699-706 (Tex.Crim.App.1996)(Baird, J. dissenting), that approach is misguided. The Keeton factors should not be - weighed against each other to determine eviden-tiary sufficiency. Instead, those factors are simply guides to the kinds of evidence that we recognize as tending to support future dangerousness.
. The issue, required by Article 37.071, § 2(e), asks:
Whether, taking into consideration all of the evidence, including the circumstances of the offense, the defendant's character and background, and the personal moral culpability of the defendant, there is a sufficient mitigating circumstance or circumstances to warrant that a sentence of life imprisonment rather than a death sentence be imposed.