Case Name: Kay L. COPPOCK, as Personal Representative of the Estate of George Hawkins, deceased, Appellant, v. Hazel H. CARLSON, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1989-04-11
Citations: 547 So. 2d 946
Docket Number: No. 88-990
Parties: Kay L. COPPOCK, as Personal Representative of the Estate of George Hawkins, deceased, Appellant, v. Hazel H. CARLSON, Appellee.
Judges: Before SCHWARTZ, C.J., and BASKIN and FERGUSON, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 547
Pages: 946–948

Head Matter:
Kay L. COPPOCK, as Personal Representative of the Estate of George Hawkins, deceased, Appellant, v. Hazel H. CARLSON, Appellee.
No. 88-990.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
April 11, 1989.
Rehearing Denied Sept. 14, 1989.
Walton, Lantaff, Schroeder & Carson and G. Bart Billbrough, Miami, for appellant.
Robert V. Shea, John K. McDonald, Miller & Gale and Richard M. Gale and Edgar Miller, Miami, for appellee.
Before SCHWARTZ, C.J., and BASKIN and FERGUSON, JJ.

Opinion:
FERGUSON, Judge.
George Hawkins died in 1987 at age 84. His last will and testament, dated January 10, 1985, was admitted to probate naming the appellant, Kay L. Coppock, personal representative and beneficiary of his entire residuary estate.
Appellee, Hazel H. Carlson, 92-year-old sister of the decedent, filed a "Petition For Revocation Of Probate." After a nonjury trial, the will was declared void based on findings that Mr. Hawkins had been subjected to undue influence and that he lacked testamentary capacity when the will was executed. Coppock appeals.
We reverse because there is no showing in the record, by substantial and competent evidence, that the will was a product of undue influence or that the decedent lacked testamentary capacity.
Undue influence in the execution of a will contemplates coercion, force, or over-persuasion, which acts to destroy a testator's free will or prevents him from exercising his own judgment. See Peters v. Florida Nat'l Bank, 155 Fla. 453, 20 So.2d 487 (Fla.1945); 1 Bowe-Parker: Page on Wills § 15.2 (1960). The standard of proof required is the greater weight of the evidence. See Cripe v. Atlantic First Nat. Bank, 422 So.2d 820 (Fla.1982).
Although Kay Coppock and Hawkins had become friends during the final three to four years of his life, there is no evidence she either enjoyed a confidential/fiduciary relationship with the decedent, or engaged in active procurement of his will. See In re Estate of Carpenter, 253 So.2d 697 (Fla.1971); Carter v. Carter, 526 So.2d 141 (Fla. 3d DCA), rev. denied, 536 So.2d 243 (1988). Coppock played no role in the decedent's management of his financial affairs. She was not present at the execution of the will. She did not recommend an attorney to draw the will or secure witnesses. Neither did she hold the document for safekeeping after execution. No proof was submitted that Coppock had any knowledge of the will's contents prior to execution, or that she gave any instructions on the will's preparation to the draftsman. Although these are not exclusive criteria to suggest active procurement, see In re Estate of Carpenter, 253 So.2d at 702, it is significant that no such evidence was presented by the petitioner for revocation.
Whether a testator had the requisite testamentary capacity is determined solely by his mental state at the time he executed the instrument. See In re Wilmott's Estate, 66 So.2d 465 (Fla.1953); T. Atkinson, Wills § 51 (2d ed. 1953). Notwithstanding testimony that Mr. Hawkins was afflicted with the normal physical debilities attendant to advanced age, and delusions about his physical prowess, there was undisputed evidence, more relevant to the question of capacity, that on January 10, 1985, he went alone to keep an appointment with his attorney, appeared of strong mind, and properly executed a new will. There is no showing that he lacked the ability to understand the nature and extent of his property, the natural objects of his bounty, or the general process of will-making. See In re Wilmott's Estate, 66 So.2d at 468; In re Estate of Edwards, 433 So.2d 1349 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983); McGovern, Kurtz and Rein, Wills, Trusts and Estates § 7.2 (1988). At another time, when asked why his sister was not named as beneficiary of his estate, Mr. Hawkins explained that he expected to outlive her and that she was financially better off than he.
George Hawkins chose to leave his money and other assets to a close friend. In the absence of substantial evidence of undue influence or lack of testamentary capacity, that choice must be respected. See Tarsagian v. Watt, 402 So.2d 471 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981) (unless the evidence clearly shows that he has been precluded from exercising free will, a testator's wishes are to be upheld).
Reversed.
SCHWARTZ, C.J., and FERGUSON, J., concur.