Case Name: Eli Langford v. The Republic
Court: Supreme Court of Texas
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1843-06
Citations: 1 Dallam 588
Docket Number: No. XV
Parties: Eli Langford v. The Republic.
Judges: 
Reporter: A Digest of the Laws of Texas:  containing a full and complete compilation of the land laws; together with opinions of the Supreme court [1840-1844]
Volume: 1
Pages: 588–c632

Head Matter:
No. XV.
Eli Langford v. The Republic.
(See .)
Appeal from Red River County.
.—Langford v. Republic, p. 588.
A colonist was not entitled to a grant as head of a family unless his family was resident in Texas. Land Commissioners v. Bell, Dal., 366; Land Commissioners v. Reily, Dal., 381; Land Commissioners v. Walling, Dal., 524; Republic v. Skidmore, Dal., 581; Republic v. Inglish, Dal., 608; Johns v. Republic, Dal., 621; Grooms v. State, 1 T., 568; Republic v. Skidmore, 2 T., 261; Tichnor v. State, 2 T., 269; Lewis v. Ames, 44 T., 319, 345; Lott v. King, 79 T., 292; Hill v. Moore, 85 T., 335; Byrn v. Kleas, 15 T. C. A., 205; Union Beef Co. v. Thurman, 70 Fed. Rep., 965. An unmarried colonist, under twenty-one years of age, was not entitled to a headright grant. Lockhart v. Republic, 2 T., 127. But it will be presumed from the fact that a headright certificate was granted by the proper authority, that the grantee was the head of a family, and evidence is not admissible in a collateral proceeding to show that he was not married and that his family was not in Texas. Johnston v. Smith, 21 T., 722; Bowmer v. Hicks, 22 T., 155; Howard v. Colquhoun, 28 T., 134; Burkett v. Scarborough, 59 T., 495; Capp v. Terry, 75 T., 391; Boone v. Hulsey, 71 T., 176; Hill v. Moore, 85 T., 335; Byers v. Wallace, 87 T., 503. Grant is valid, if the grantee in good faith intended to move his family to Texas. Republic v. Young, Dal., 464; State v. Skidmore, 5 T., 469; Russell v. Randolph, 11 T., 460.

Opinion:
HEMPHILL, Chief Justice.
—The appellant brought his action to obtain a certificate for a league and labor of land; and in the special verdict of the jury it was found that he had obtained a certificate for a league and labor from the proper board of commissioners, and that the same had been rejected by the Investigating Board. That the said Langford had lived on the Attoyac in the now county of Nacogdoches in the years 1826 and 1827, and there had a family (a wife and children), together with some five or six negroes.
It was also proven that the said Langford, in the year 1833, was living in the now county of Red River, where he has ever since resided, but not with the family he had on the Attoyac. He lived with another woman named Eleanor Langford, who has obtained in her own name from the proper authorities a certificate for a league and labor of land; which said woman the said Langford disclaimed as his wife. It was also proven that Mary Langford—the same name of the wife with whom the said Langford lived in 1826 or 1827, under the colonization law of the 24th of March, 1825—obtained from the proper authorities a grant for one league of land, and that the said grant was obtained by the said Mary E. Langford in the now county of Nacogdoches, where the said E. Langford lived in 1826 and 1827.
The plaintiff also offered in court a conveyance marked (A) and filed of record in the case; by which he released and conveyed to the government any and all grant or grants of land issued to him or his wife, Mary Langford, under the colonization laws of the State of Coahuila and Texas. These facts being submitted to the court, judgment was rendered in favor of the Republic.
In whatever light the facts of this case are considered, we discover no error in the judgment of the court below. The plaintiff has effectually stripped himself of the qualifications essential to the success of his claim. His pretensions as the head of Mary Langford's family are unsubstantial, as that family has already received the quantum of land to which it was entitled under the colonization laws, and can not now be foisted into the plaintiff's service to enable him to substract a further portion of the public domain.
The attempt of the plaintiff to reconvey all lands received by him or his wife from the government imparts no additional merit to his present application. His wife had no knowledge of the act, and so far as it would operate fraudulently to her prejudice, it would doubtless be regarded nugatory. Had he been entitled by law to any interest in the lands granted to Mary Langford,—which under the circumstances might be doubted,—his release thereof to the government would have been a gratuitous exercise of liberality, without merit and certainly without a corresponding reward. The law makes no provision for releases of this description; and the judicial tribunals of the country are not authorized to award compensation íot charities, and forcibly, for illegal purposes, obtruded upon the government.
If the instrument can have any legal operation, it can affect only the interest which the plaintiff may claim, or pretend to claim, in the lands granted to his wife, as the head of the family. If his doubtful right in the said lands has been diminished, he has been estopped by his own act from urging the same. His case presents no such circumstances as to entitle him either to sympathy or relief. The questions in relation to the relative rights of the plaintiff and his wife can not be decided until they are properly brought before the court, and they will be passed without further remark.
The plaintiff can not claim as a single man, because though degraded from the dignity and deprived of the rights of the head of the family by the former authorities, he has not been divorced from the matrimonial bonds.
No argument arises in favor of the plaintiff from his cohabitation with a woman whom he repudiates as a wife; and even if she were his spouse, his application could not succeed, as she has already obtained a league of land from the government.
We are of opinion, therefore, that the judgment of the court should be affirmed, and it is hereby ordered, adjudged and decreed accordingly, and that the appellant pay all costs of suit.
Affirmed.