Case Name: Stacy RUSTIA, Appellant, v. PRUDENTIAL PROPERTY & CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, and Jose C. Rodriguez, Appellees
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1983-11-01
Citations: 440 So. 2d 1316
Docket Number: No. 83-81
Parties: Stacy RUSTIA, Appellant, v. PRUDENTIAL PROPERTY & CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, and Jose C. Rodriguez, Appellees.
Judges: Before HUBBART, DANIEL S. PEARSON and FERGUSON, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 440
Pages: 1316–1318

Head Matter:
Stacy RUSTIA, Appellant, v. PRUDENTIAL PROPERTY & CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, and Jose C. Rodriguez, Appellees.
No. 83-81.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
Nov. 1, 1983.
Rehearing Denied Dec. 9, 1983.
S.Peter Capua, Miami and Paul W. Hum-bert, Miami Beach, for appellant.
Wicker, Smith, Blomqvist, Tutan, O’Hara, McCoy, Graham & Lane, Miami and Richard A. Sherman, Fort Lauderdale, for ap-pellees.
Before HUBBART, DANIEL S. PEARSON and FERGUSON, JJ.

Opinion:
FERGUSON, Judge.
The trial court entered summary judgment for Prudential on a showing that the insured had breached the insurance contract by failing to cooperate with his insurer. That summary judgment was improper, even in light of Ramos v. Northwestern Mutual Insurance Co., 336 So.2d 71 (Fla.1976), which holds that failure of an insured to cooperate with his insurer will release the insurer from liability if the failure con stitutes material breach and substantially prejudices the rights of the insurer in defense of the cause. Ramos further holds that the question of whether a failure to cooperate is so substantially prejudicial as to release an insurer from its obligation is ordinarily a question of fact, but under some circumstances, particularly where the facts are admitted, it may be a question of law.
In Ramos, a case which was tried non-jury on the issue of coverage, the trial court made extensive findings of crucial facts, not the least of which were (1) the accident occurred on November 28, 1969, and the action was not initiated until August 9, 1971, (2) actual process was never made upon the insured notwithstanding valiant and persistent efforts by the plaintiff's counsel to locate the insured, (3) the insurer received no notice of the accident from its insured and the insured failed to report the accident, (4) plaintiffs counsel first notified the insurer of the accident over a month after it had occurred, and (5) the insured was concealing his whereabouts and was attempting to avoid service of process. Further, all the facts found by the court supported its determination that the breach was material and substantially prejudiced the insurer.
Ramos also holds clearly that not every failure by the insured to cooperate with his insurer will release the insurer from liability. Thus, even if there is evidence that the insured failed to cooperate, there is still an issue of fact as to whether the failure was so substantially prejudicial that release of the insurer is appropriate.
Turning to the record before us, we find a judgment in favor of the insurer which makes no findings of fact. There are no interrogatories or depositions, even of known witnesses. The single affidavit filed in support of the motion for summary judgment contains the sworn statement of the insurer's agent that the insured cannot be located. The agent concludes further that the insurer has been unable to prepare a defense. On the other hand, there is no evidence that the insurer has attempted to contact, interview, or depose any of the twelve witnesses listed in the parties' pretrial catalogs. Also, unlike in Ramos, when this action was commenced actual service of process was made upon the insured, and it cannot be conclusively presumed that the insured will not appear for trial.
In this case, the insurer has not demonstrated that as a matter of law, it has been substantially prejudiced due to its insured's failure to cooperate. Summary judgment was inappropriate. Holl v. Talcott, 191 So.2d 40 (Fla.1966).
Reversed and remanded.