Case Name: Ewen T. RITCHIE, Jr. v. LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY AND CORRECTIONS
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1991-12-12
Citations: 595 So. 2d 1158
Docket Number: No. 90 CA 1196
Parties: Ewen T. RITCHIE, Jr. v. LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY AND CORRECTIONS.
Judges: Before COVINGTON, C.J., and SAVOIE and LeBLANC, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 595
Pages: 1158–1164

Head Matter:
Ewen T. RITCHIE, Jr. v. LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY AND CORRECTIONS.
No. 90 CA 1196.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, First Circuit.
Dec. 12, 1991.
Rehearing Denied March 13, 1992.
Mark V. Marinoff, Baton Rouge, for plaintiff-appellee Ewen T. Ritchie, Jr.
Wayne R. Crouch, Baton Rouge, for defendant-appellant Louisiana Dept, of Public Safety and Corrections.
Before COVINGTON, C.J., and SAVOIE and LeBLANC, JJ.

Opinion:
SAVOIE, Judge.
In this appeal, the issues before us are legal questions which are res nova in this court: (1) whether a person has ten days or thirty days in which to request an administrative hearing under LSA-R.S. 32:667; and (2) if the former, whether that period is prescriptive or preemptive.
The Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections (DPSC) suspensively appeals the judgment of the district court which ordered it to grant the plaintiff an administrative hearing following the suspension of his driving privileges. The plaintiff's license was seized in connection with his arrest for DWI on October 27, 1989, and his alleged subsequent refusal to submit to a breath test to determine his blood alcohol content. After the plaintiff requested an administrative hearing by DPSC, which was denied as untimely, he filed a petition in district court requesting such a hearing, or in the alternative, an order by the court to DPSC to grant him a restricted driver's license. In response, DPSC filed a peremptory exception raising the objection of prescription, which was denied by the district court. For the reasons hereinafter stated, we affirm the judgment.
The facts are not in dispute. Plaintiff alleged in his petition that his driving privileges were suspended in connection with a traffic arrest on October 27, 1989, and that within thirty days of that date, he mailed a written request for an administrative hearing to consider the propriety of this suspension pursuant to the provisions of LSA-R.S. 32:667 and 32:668. DPSC answered the petition, admitting that plaintiff was arrested on October 27, 1989, for DWI and that it received a request for a hearing on November 16, 1989, but asserting that plaintiffs right to a hearing under LSA-R.S. 32:667 A(2) has prescribed, as that statute allows only ten days from the date of arrest for a licensee to request an administrative hearing. The record does not contain a copy of the request by plaintiff or the denial by DPSC. However, since the issues before us are legal questions rather than factual ones, we will accept the allegations contained in the pleadings by the parties as true.
LSA-R.S. 32:667 A provides as follows:
Seizure of license; circumstances; temporary license
A. When a law enforcement officer places a person under arrest for a violation of R.S. 14:98, or a violation of a parish or municipal ordinance prohibiting the operating of a vehicle while intoxicated, and the person either refuses to submit to an approved chemical test for intoxication, or submits to such tests and such test results show a blood alcohol level of .10 percent or above by weight of alcohol in the blood, the following procedures shall apply:
(1)The officer shall seize the driver's license of the person under arrest and shall issue in its place a temporary receipt of license on a form approved by the Department of Public Safety and Corrections. Such temporary receipt shall authorize the person to whom it has been issued to operate a motor vehicle upon the public highways of this state for a period not to exceed thirty days from the date of arrest or as otherwise provided herein.
(2) The temporary receipt shall also provide and serve as notice to the person that he has not more than ten days from the date of arrest to make written request to the Department of Public Safety and Corrections for an administrative hearing in accordance with the provisions of R.S. 32:668.
(3) In a case where a person submits to an approved chemical test for intoxication but the results of the test are not immediately available, the law enforcement officer shall comply with Subparagraphs (1) and (2) herein, and the person shall have ten days from the date of arrest to make written request for an administrative hearing. If after thirty days from the date of arrest the test results have not been received or the test results show an alcohol level of less than .10 percent by weight of alcohol in the blood, then no hearing shall be held and the license shall be returned without the payment of a reinstatement fee.
B. If such written request is not made by the end of the thirty day period, the person's license shall be suspended as follows:
(2) If the person had refused to submit to the test, his driving privileges shall be suspended for one hundred and eighty days from the date of suspension on first refusal and five hundred forty-five days from the date of suspension without benefit of eligibility for a hardship license on the second and subsequent refusals occurring within five years of the first refusal.
Subsection (A)(1) provides for the issuance of a temporary receipt which autho rizes a person to operate a motor vehicle for a period of thirty days from the date of arrest. Subsection A(2) provides that the temporary receipt shall also serve as notice that the person has not more than ten days from the date of arrest to make a written request to the DPSC for an administrative hearing. Additionally, Subsection B provides that if the written request is not made in thirty days, the person's license shall be suspended for certain time periods depending on whether he or she submitted to the chemical test for intoxication.
Subsection A(2) is in direct conflict with Subsection B which allows a thirty day period for submitting a written request for a hearing. Further, LSA-R.S. 32:668 , which is referred to in Subsection A(2), provides for, as the title indicates, "Procedure following revocation or denial of license; hearing; court review; review of final order; restricted license." LSA-R.S. 32:668 provides for instances in which a license or permit has been denied or suspended and makes no reference to an administrative hearing after a temporary receipt has been issued. Additionally, LSA-R.S. 32:667 makes no reference to the temporary license being considered a suspension. The only reference in LSA-R.S. 32:667 to suspension is in Subsection B which provides for suspension after 30 days if no written receipt is given. Thus, Subsection A(2) makes a reference to an administrative hearing provided for in LSA-R.S. 32:668 which itself only refers to the administrative hearing when a person's license has been suspended. Thus, a reading of LSA-R.S. 32:667 and LSA-R.S. 32:668 together would indicate three possible time periods in which to request an administrative hearing. First, LSA-R.S. 32:667 A(2) provides for a ten day period after an arrest. Secondly, LSA-R.S. 32:667 B provides for a thirty day period following an arrest. Lastly, LSA-R.S. 32:668 provides that a person may request a hearing after the suspension of his license which is more than thirty days after an arrest according to LSA-R.S. 32:667 B.
In construing a statute an appellate court is bound to consider all parts together, giving effect to all parts, if possible, and not construing as surplusage any sentence, clause or word, if a construction can be legitimately found which will give meaning to and preserve all the words of the statute. Perkins v. State Board of Elementary and Secondary Education, 562 So.2d 930 (La.App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 565 So.2d 448 (La.1990).
Considering the conflicts and ambiguities in the statute and particularly the elusive nature of the time periods for which to request an administrative hearing, we cannot find a construction which will give meaning to all the words in the statute. Thus, we cannot say the trial court erred in overruling the exception.
Additionally, since we find no error in the trial court's ruling that the plaintiff requested the administrative hearing, we pretermit any discussion as to whether the ten day period is preemptive or prescriptive.
For the above and foregoing reasons the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. Costs in the amount of $266.81 are to be paid by the Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections.
AFFIRMED.
. LSA-R.S. 32:668
Procedure following revocation or denial of license; hearing; court review; review of final order; restricted licenses
A. Upon suspending the license or permit to drive or nonresident operating privilege of any person or upon determining that the issuance of a license or permit shall be denied to the person, the Department of Public Safety and Corrections shall immediately notify the person in writing and upon his request shall afford him an opportunity for a hearing in the same manner and under the same conditions as is provided in R.S. 32:414 for notification and hearings in the case of suspension of licenses, except that the scope of such a hearing for the purposes of this Part shall cover the following issues: .