Case Name: GENERAL MANAGEMENT CORPORATION v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 1943-05-24
Citations: 135 F.2d 882
Docket Number: No. 8115
Parties: GENERAL MANAGEMENT CORPORATION v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE.
Judges: Before KERNER, MINTON, Circuit Judges, and LINDLEY, District Judge.
Reporter: Federal Reporter 2d Series
Volume: 135
Pages: 882–884

Head Matter:
GENERAL MANAGEMENT CORPORATION v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE.
No. 8115.
Circuit Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.
May 24, 1943.
Rehearing Denied July 6, 1943.
Carl Meyer, Benjamin A. Ragir, Harry Thom, and Alfred M. Rogers, all of Chicago (Mayer, Meyer, Austrian & Platt, of Chicago, of counsel), for petitioner.
Samuel O. Clark, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., J. P. Wenchel and Chas. E. Lowery, Bureau of Internal Revenue, both of Washington, D. C., and Muriel S. Paul, Sewall Key, and Carlton Fox, Sp. Assts. to the Atty. Gen., for respondent.
Before KERNER, MINTON, Circuit Judges, and LINDLEY, District Judge.

Opinion:
LINDLEY, District Judge.
Petitioner questions a decision of the Tax Court declaring it a personal holding company in the taxable year 1938, for the reason that more than 80 per cent of its gross income for that year constituted "personal service corporate income" within the meaning of Section 402 of the Revenue Act of 1938, 26 U.S.C.A. Int.Rev. Code, § 501. The propriety of the decision depends wholly upon whether a contract with United Printers and Publishers, Inc., hereafter referred to as United, from which it derived $24,000, was a "personal service contract" which "designated" the person who was to perform the services, within the meaning of Section 403(e) of the Act. 26 U.S.C.A. Int. Rev.Code, § 502(e).
Petitioner is a corporation which has, for a number of years, been engaged actively in rehabilitating financially embarrassed business concerns. Grant Gillam owned 100 of its total capital issue of 200 shares; his sister, S. Margaret Gillam, 80 and Marguerite Miller, 20. From 1932 to 1938 petitioner served United, first, at the request of a creditor bankers' committee and, finally, under a contract made in February, 1937, after the bank loans had been retired, wherein it was provided, amongst other matters, that petitioner should render certain services, including specifically those of Gillam, for $2,000 per month. The agreement designated Gillam as comptroller, provided that he should . "continue to supervise the physical operations of United, its divisions and subsidiaries" and gave to him full authority over the expenditure and borrowing of money. It provided further that, if he should die or become incapacitated and no one could be obtained to take his place satisfactory to United, the latter might terminate the contract. In addition to the services to be performed by Gillam, petitioner. agreed also to furnish budgets, audits, cost accounts and various reports. In pursuance of this employment, petitioner received in 1938, $24,000 as compensation.
Under Section 403, personal service income includes amounts received under contracts under which the corporation is to furnish personal service, provided 25 per cent or more in value of the outstanding stock of the corporation is owned by an individual designated as the one to perform such service. Inasmuch as Gillam owned 50 per cent of the corporate stock, the question narrows to whether he is "designated by the contract as the one to perform such service."
Gillam, as the principal stockholder of petitioner, had for some years been a doc tor of financially embarrassed corporations and other business set-ups. He had had wide experience in solutions of problems of management, production, finance and rejuvenation of sick industrial enterprises. Beginning with 1932, as the active agent of petitioner, he had rendered curative administrative service to United, visiting and surveying its plants, its operating divisions and its production, directing its activities, its fiscal and financial policies, acting not only as "comptroller" but also as supervisory administrative head and exercising and making available his discretionary executive talents. Successful results ensuing from his service culminated in 1937 in retirement of United's bank loans, ridding it of supervision by the representatives of bank creditors, whose pressure had brought petitioner into the picture as financial director.
The bank loans having been satisfied, United voluntarily contracted with petitioner to continue to render similar service. This agreement specifically provided for discharge of supervisory functions by Gillam, saying that he should "continue" as comptroller and supervise the physical and financial operations of United, its various divisions and subsidiaries. No money was to be borrowed or paid except as approved by him. Thus he continued as the administrative, financial, fiscal and supervisory head of United. His was the voice of discretionary control. In case of his death, United was to have the option of rescission of the contract. Obviously, the evidence supported the finding that United's desire to avail itself of his constructive discretionary and advisory capacities was the inspiring motive leading to execution of the contract.
In addition to Gillam's designated services under the contract, petitioner, through employees other than Gillam, made projected budgets of United's cash needs, audited its accounts, prepared its income tax returns and made up statements of costs, balance sheets and similar reports. In actual preparation of none of these did Gillam participate. In consequence, petitioner insists, as he was not designated to perform all services rendered United, the income received from United is not within the statute. But the labor supplied by persons other than Gillam consisted, obviously, of preparation of the mechanical tools necessary to efficient discharge of his functions as administrative and controlling head. Such budgets, statements, and reports are some of the implements by which an executive or administrative agent works his way to a definite determination of corporate policy. In their preparation, discretion is not involved but, rather, physical compilation and few if any directors of policies are capable of exercising a wise discretion without their employment. They are the trowel of the mason, the plane of the carpenter, the nurse assisting the physician. The contract designated Gillam as the only agency endowed with discretion, and was made optionally contingent upon his continued ability to act. Under it, anyone included in the personnel of petitioner or found outside might supply the working tools. Their source was a factor of no importance. Clearly the court was justified in finding from this evidence that discretionary service designated to be performed by Gillam was the inspiring motive for his designation and that the makers of the tools utilized supplied only incidental aid necessary to achievement of Hie desired purpose, — administrative supervision by Gillam.
The value of labor supplied in preparing reports, audits and accounts may be an element proper to be considered in determining the question but where, as here, the evidence amply justifies the ultimate conclusion of fact that such additional service amounted to mere supply of the implements needed in performance of the administrative duties of Gillam, we think that the tax court properly refused to give determinative weight to that factor.
Petitioner insists that the contract was not the type of agreement intended by Section 403. But we think the statute speaks clearly and covers the kind of service contract here involved.
Inasmuch as it results from inclusion of $24,000 as a part of the personal service income that more than 80 per cent of the gross income of petitioner is personal service income, the decision is affirmed.