Case Name: West v. McCullough et al.
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1908-01-24
Citations: 108 N.Y.S. 493
Docket Number: 
Parties: West v. McCullough et al.
Judges: 
Reporter: West's New York Supplement
Volume: 108
Pages: 493–500

Head Matter:
West v. McCullough et al.
(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department.
January 24, 1908.)
L Husband and Wife—Property of Husband—Deposit in Bank in Names of Both—Right of Survivorship of Wife.
Where a husband opens a savings bank account in the names of himself "and wife, the wife acquires a right of survivorship in the fund, since the husband’s act alone, without delivery, and without creating a joint tenancy, evidences an intention on his part to benefit her to that extent, and the transaction is complete when the deposit is made.
2. Same—Evidence—Intention of Husband in Making Deposit.
Evidence independent of the presumption arising from a husband’s act in opening a savings bank account in the names of himself and wife held to show his intention that his wife should have the right of survivorship in the fund.
3. Same.
At common law, while a husband' could not by direct conveyance give or grant an estate to his wife, and the wife’s choses in action reduced to possession during coverture belonged to the husband, by making a deposit or taking a security in the name of himself and wife, he could create a right of survivorship in the wife, which transaction was not strictly a gift inter vivos or causa mortis, and delivery was neither necessary nor practical, as the husband retained control and the right of disposition during his life; but this rule did not rest wholly on the common-law doctrine of unity of husband and wife, and the reason for it was not destroyed by the acts removing the disabilities of married women.
4. Joint Tenancy—Pbopebty Subject to Joint Tenancy—Savings Bank Deposits.
Joint tenancies of savings bank deposits may be created, if so the parties intend, irrespective of whether the tenants be husband and wife, and in such case the right of survivorship exists.
5. Husband and Wife—Pbopebty of Husband—Deposits—Intention of Depósitos.
Where a deposit is made in a savings bank in the names of more than one person, the character of the parties’ rights depends upon the depositor’s intention, which may be determined by presumptions in the absence of other proof, and, if a person deposits his own money in the name of himself and another not his wife, the presumption is that it is done for purposes of convenience only; but, in the case of husband and wife, the husband is presumed to have intended to benefit the wife to the extent at least of conferring on her the right of survivorship.
Gaynor, J., dissenting.
Appeal from Special Term, Kings County.
Action by Sarah R. West, administratrix of Hester A. McCullough, •sometimes known as Esther A. McCullough, against the Williamsburgh Savings Bank, in which Annora L. McCullough and another, administrators with the will annexed of George W. McCullough, wére inter-pleaded. Judgment for plaintiff and said administrators, defendants, appeal. Affirmed. ■
George W. McCullough had his money deposited in the Williamsburgh Savings Bank in his sole name. He caused the account and bank book to be .changed to his wife and, himself as follows: “Hester A. McCullough and George W. McCullough.” Thereafter no deposits were added. The husband retained possession of the pass book, and also made several withdrawals. The wife made none. The husband died, and afterwards the- wife. Her administratrix brought this action against the bank to recover the balance of the said account. It caused the administrators with the will annexed of the husband to be interpleaded as defendants, as they claimed the said balance also, and paid the money into court, and in that situation the case was tried.
Argued before JENKS, HOOKER, GAYNOR, RICH, and MILLER, JJ.
John' Thomas Smith, for appellants.
Henry A. Powell, for respondent.

Opinion:
MILLER, J.
When George W. McCullough changed' the savings bank account to the names of himself and wife, he had controlling authority for believing that that act evidenced an intention on his part to benefit his wife to the extent of a right of survivorship in said fund, and that nothing remained to be done to effectuate that intention. Borst v. Spelman, 4 N. Y. 284; Sanford v. Sanford, 45 N. Y. 726, Id., 58 N. Y. 69. The rule of those cases has been regarded as settled law (Fowler v. Butterly, 78 N. Y. 68-73, 34 Am. Rep. 507; Augsbury v. Shurtliff, 180 N. Y. 138-147, 72 N. E. 927; De Puy v. Stevens, 37 App. Div. 289, 294, 55 N. Y. Supp. 810; Kelly v. Home Sav. Bank, 103 App, Div. 141-150, 92 N. Y. Supp. 578), and has squarely been held to apply to a deposit in a savings bank made by the husband in the names of himself and wife (Platt v. Grubb, 41 Hun, 447; McElroy v. Albany Sav. Bank, 8 App. Div. 46, 40 N. Y. Supp. 422; Matter of Meehan, 59 App. Div. 156, 69 N. Y. Supp. 9). The cases are discriminated' by Mr. Justice Jenks in the Meehan Case, supra, and we might well adopt his opinion in that case without further discussion; but, as we are not agreed, it may be well to observe that in determining the intention of said McCullough in the case at bar we are not limited to his act. It is undisputed that he did not make the change for the purpose of convenience, as might have been found in the Meehan Case. The wife in this case never drew on the account during the life of her husband. After changing the form of the savings bank account, said McCullough made his will, by which he gave his wife the life use of his property, remainder to his brother. Besides the small savings bank deposit, he had real estate which yielded gross receipts of $15 per month. He told his pastor—referring to the fact of having made his will—that the house should go to his brother William, and the money to his wife; that he had put the money in the bank for that purpose. That.statement, instead of contradicting, explains the will, if, indeed, any explanation were needed. Surely the testator did not intend such ill provision for his wife as the use of his small estate, and it is not too much to suppose that he relied on legal advice for the belief that, having changed the form of the savings bank account, he did not need to mention it in his will. I believe that savings bank accounts are frequently opened in this manner, especially by men of limited means, for the purpose of giving the wife the right of survivorship; and irrespective of the reasons for the rule, or whether they longer exist, it should not now be changed. But I do not think that the rule rested wholly upon the common-law doctrine of unity of husband and wife, as is said, or that the reason for it was destroyed by the acts removing the disabilities of married women. Sanford v. Sanford, supra, was first decided in 1871, and involved a note made in 1864. At common law the husband could not by direct conveyance give or grant an estate to the wife and the wife's choses in action reduced to possession during coverture belonged to the husband. But by making a deposit or taking a security in the name of himself and wife the husband could create a right of survivorship in the wife. That right, instead of being based on the general rule, was rather an exception to it. The transaction was not strictly a gift inter vivos or causa mortis, and delivery was neither necessary nor practical, as the husband retained control and the right of disposition during his life. Such right thus retained is not strictly analogous to those rights as tenant by the entirety which the husband possessed jure uxoris. The latter only, not the right of survivorship, were affected by the acts removing the disabilities of married women. Hiles v. Fisher, 144 N. Y. 306, 39 N. E. 337, 30 L. R. A. 305, 43 Am. St. Rep. 762. It may be that the husband's right to confer upon the wife this peculiar estate or interest, a right of survivorship only, simply by making a deposit or investment in their joint names, was an outgrowth of doctrines applicable to the status of husband and wife at common law. It was declared to rest upon the presumption that by doing that the husband intended to benefit the wife. -As he could not thus benefit her during their joint lives, he having the right to reduce to possession even her own choses in action, it followed that he must have intended to give her the right of survivorship, and it was decided that he could do that without the formalities necessary for a gift inter vivos or causa mortis. A rule based on human experience, acted upon for many years in the light of judicial decisions, ought still to hold good, and I am unable to perceive why an additional requirement—i. e., delivery—should be imposed simply because the wife's disabilities have been removed by statute. Sanford v. Sanford, supra, was not overruled, but its doctrine reaffirmed, in Matter of Albrecht, 136 N. Y. 91, 32 N. E. 632, 18 L. R A. 329, 32 Am. St. Rep. 700, as was pointed out by Mr. Justice Jenks in the Meehan Case, supra. The Albrecht Case did not decide that there could be no right of survivorship in choses in action payable to husband and wife, even though each had contributed equally thereto, but that in such case there was no presumption that the parties so intended. Joint tenancies of savings bank deposits may however be created, if so the parties intend, irrespective of whether the tenants be husband and wife, and in such case the right of survivorship exists. Farrelly v. Emigrant Indust. Sav. Bank, 92 App. Div. 529, 87 N. Y. Supp. 54; Kelly v. Home Sav. Bank, supra. The question, then, is one of intention, to be determined by presumptions in the absence of other proof. In case a person deposits his own money in a savings bank in the name of himself and another, not his wife, the presumption is that it was done for purposes of convenience only. Matter of Bolin, 136 N. Y. 177, 32 N. E. 626. But in the case of husband and wife the courts have said, and I think experience has shown, that the husband is presumed to have intended to benefit the wife to the extent at least of conferring upon her the right of survivorship; and, as it has uniformly been held that the husband could do that without creating a joint tenancy and without delivery, that rule should be adhered to. I think it was necessarily held in Augsbury v. Shurtliff, supra, that delivery was not necessary to confer such right of survivorship, and it is difficult to perceive how there could be a delivery, if only such right were intended to be conferred. The transaction is complete when the security is taken or the deposit is made in the joint names.
The judgment should be affirmed.
Judgment affirmed, with costs. All concur, except GAYNOR, J., who dissents.