Case Name: Sparhawk versus The Union Passenger Railway Company; Kenton versus Same et al.
Court: Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
Jurisdiction: Pennsylvania
Decision Date: 1867-11-07
Citations: 54 Pa. 401
Docket Number: 
Parties: Sparhawk versus The Union Passenger Railway Company. Kenton versus Same et al.
Judges: Before Woodward, C. J., Thompson, Strong, Read and Agnew, JJ.
Reporter: Pennsylvania State Reports
Volume: 54
Pages: 401–454

Head Matter:
Sparhawk versus The Union Passenger Railway Company. Kenton versus Same et al.
1. A party cannot vindicate others’ rights by process in his own name, nor ■ employ civil process to punish wrongs to the public. !
2. When equity intervenes to restrain acts prejudicial to the interests of the community, it must be by bill by the attorney-general.
3. Private parties can invoke the chancery powers of the courts only for the i redress of private injuries done or threatened. •
4. Injury to property with’ reference to its reasonable use by continuous hurtful acts constitutes a nuisance, and may be the subject of equity jurisdiction, not only to redress the party by restraining the injurious acts, but in some cases to compel the wrongdoer to make amends.
5. The application for redress by injunction must establish a clear case of irreparable injury, likely to ensue from the continuance of the acts.
6. The party cannot supplement a defective case by an alleged infraction of the penal laws in the acts complained of.
7. When a private injury results from a breach of a public law, the public ■ wrong may be redressed by the private remedy, because the private remedy 1 stops the wrongdoer.
8. Running passenger cars on Sunday is a violation of the Act of 1794 and is within its penalties.
9. The remedy by injunction is preventive and is designed to stop acts which would work irreparable mischief; the right to such remedy must be ; clear, and the wrong likely to ensue distinctly established.
» 10. There is no case for equity, unless the charge be for injury to the ; enjoyment of property or other personal rights. ■
11. A charge of the violation of the Act of 1794 relating to Sunday which ¡ describes nothing but the consequences intended to be prevented by that act, J is not a case of special injury. >
12. Rest and quiet on the Sabbath day, with the right and privilege of public and private worship, undisturbed by any mere worldly employment, are what the statute was passed to protect, and a bill complaining of the deprivation of these privileges is essentially a bill to enforce a penal statute,
13. Equity will not restrain an act which is illegal merely.
14. The penal law to prevent worldly employment on the Sabbath has provided the machinery for punishing it, and to it the violation must be referred.
15. One reason why equity cannot interfere is that there is a remedy at law by statute, which must be presumed to be adequate.
16. A party who asks a decree which would bind his adversary must make out a clear case of, at least, preponderating equity.
17. To make out a case of special injury to property from nuisance, something materially affecting its capacity for ordinary use and enjoyment must bo shown.
18. The true rule in judging of injury from nuisances is, that it be such as naturally and necessarily results to all alike who come within their influence.
19. Chancery will not enjoin acts, for which damages may not be recovered at law.
20. Noises that distress and annoy physically and may affect health, are regarded as nuisances, and the ownership of property will not justify the use of it in that way.
21. Running cars on the Sabbath is not authorized by the act of incorporation of the Union Passenger Railway Company, and is ultra vires: nor have the company authority to hold or execute a mail contract. Whether these acts imperil the charter can be tried only at the suit of the Commonwealth ; a stockholder may sue for an injunction, but it will not be granted when his bill is not boná fide, but only in aid of a private bill of other plaintiffs.
February 28th and March 1st 1867.
Before Woodward, C. J., Thompson, Strong, Read and Agnew, JJ.
Appeal from the Supreme Court at Nisi Prius. In Equity.
These were two hills in equity. In the first John Sparhawk and others were the plaintiffs and The Union. Passenger Railway of Philadelphia the defendants. In the second, Levi Kenton was the plaintiff and the same company and Jacob Ridgway and others, directors of the company, were defendants.
The first bill set out the incorporation of the company with authority to construct a railway in Philadelphia for carrying passengers from the intersection of Wharton and Front streets along many streets of the city to the place of beginning.
The plaintiffs allege that they are citizens of Philadelphia, some of them pewholders in churches on the line of the railway and some of them owners and residents of dwelling-houses on the line of the railway; that the company are running their cars with horse-power and carrying passengers for hire over their railway on Sunday, in violation of the laws of this Commonwealth, and to the manifest injury of the plaintiffs and many other citizens of the said city. And the said company threaten and intend to prosecute and continue the said business for hire as aforesaid, on the next Sunday and on every Sunday thereafter ; that by reason of the said unlawful business the plaintiffs have been, are and will be deprived of their right of enjoying the Sabbath, as a day of rest and of religious exercise, free of all disturbance from merely unnecessary and unauthorized worldly employment; that they have been, are and will he thereby prevented from engaging peaceably and without interruption in the worship of Almighty God in their accustomed places of public worship or in their own residences on the Sabbath day : that the lawful peace and quiet of the said day is thereby disturbed and broken ; and that the rights of property which they possess in their said churches or places of public worship, and in their private residences, are and will continue to be thereby infringed upon, and their said churches and residences thereby deteriorated and lessened in value ; and they prayed for an injunction to restrain The Union Passenger Railway Company of Philadelphia, the defendant, its officers and servants, from running, or permitting any cars to run over any of the streets of the city of Philadelphia on the said railway, or otherwise, upon the first day of the week, commonly called Sunday; and for further relief, &c.
In the second bill the plaintiff alleged that he was a stockholder of The Union Passenger Railway Company of Philadelphia, being the holder of five shares of the capital stock and that he brings this bill, as well for himself as for such other stockholders in said company as may desire to unite with him therein ; that the defendants have recently engaged in the business of running their cars and carrying passengers for hire on and over their railway on Sunday, in violation of the laws of this Commonwealth, and propose to carry on and continue the said business on every Sunday hereafter ; that the said defendants have contracted with the United States to carry mails in or through the city of Philadelphia, on and over the several streets mentioned in their act of incorporation, or on and over some of the said streets, and in pursuance thereof are carrying said mails ; and that the said defendants have no lawful authority under their charter, or any law whatsoever, to enter into or carry out any such contract; that by reason of the said unlawful acts the charter of the said Union Passenger Railway Company has come to be imperilled, and the plaintiff and such other stockholders as may unite with him in this bill, are in danger of losing the value of his and their stock in said company and being otherwise injured; and prayed,
1. That it might he decreed that the acts of the defendants, in running their cars on Sunday for hire, and in entering into a contract for carrying the mails, are unlawful, and that such contract is invalid and void.
2. That an injunction may be issued, restraining the defendants, &c., from running or permitting to run any of their cars on Sunday, and from doing any act whatsoever under or by reason of any contract, or alleged contract, entered into by them, or any of them, for the carrying of the mails.
3. Such other and further relief, &c.
Both bills were heard at Nisi Prius upon affidavits, of which a great number were taken.
On the part of the plaintiffs the witnesses testified that the running of the cars was very annoying and disturbing to them in their churches, distracting their attention, preventing them from hearing the pulpit service ; attracting the attention of children in the Sabbath schools, and in their judgment rendering the pews and church property much less valuable; also that the quiet of private dwellings was broken by the running of the cars on the Sabbath ; that private and family devotion was disturbed, and that the value of the dwelling-houses was much diminished.
On the part of the defendants the witnesses testified that they had not been disturbed in their churches by the running of the cars ; that their running on the Sabbath is an advantage to churchgoers from distant points; that in their judgment church property was not depreciated in value, but rather enhanced by reason of the increased facilities ; that many persons rode in the cars to church; that the cars did not make so much noise as carriages, and that in their judgment it was not injurious to the morals of the community, and was conducive to the health of the citizens, in affording an opportunity of recreation to those whose circumstances would not enable them to obtain it otherwise.
At Nisi Prius preliminary injunctions were granted on the following opinion by Strong, J.:—
“ Some of the complainants in the first of these bills are members of different churches, and pewholders in church buildings, situated on the line of the defendants’ passenger railway in the city of Philadelphia. Others are residents ■ in and owners of dwelling-houses, also situated on the line of the said railway. They complain that the defendants, a corporation chartered under the laws of this Commonwealth, have engaged in the business of running cars along and over their railway, with horse-power, and in carrying passengers for hire, on the first day of the week, commonly called Sunday, in violation of the laws of the Commonwealth; and that they intend to continue the said business of running the cars on the next Sunday and every Sunday hereafter. These acts of the defendants are charged in the bill to be not only unlawful, but also prejudicial to the complainants, because they 'are thereby depi'ived of their right to enjoy the Sabbath as a day of rest and religious exercise, free from all disturbance by unnecessary and unauthorized worldly employment; because they have been, are and will be thereby prevented from engaging peaceably and without interruption in the worship of Almighty God, in their accustomed places of worship, or in their own residences, on the Sabbath day ; because the lawful peace and quiet of the said day is thereby disturbed and broken; and because their rights of property in their said churches, or places of public worship, and in their private residences, are and will continue to be infringed upon, and their churches and residences deteriorated in value. They therefore pray for an injunction to restrain the defendants from continuing to run their cars hereafter over their railway on Sundays. And they now submit affidavits and proofs, and move for a special injunction to continue until final hearing.
“ The complainant in the other bill is a stockholder in the Union Passenger Railway Company. His bill charges a similar violation of law by the defendants, and its threatened continuance. It charges, in addition, that the defendants have contracted with the United States Government, or with some of the executive departments or officers thereof, to carry the mails for the United States in and through the city of Philadelphia, on and over the streets or some o'f them, and that in pursuance of said contract they are carrying the said mails. The bill further charges that they have no lawful authority to enter into or carry out such a contract, and that by reason of such unlawful acts the charter of the company is imperilled, and the complainant is in danger of losing the value of his stock, and being otherwise injured. He therefore asks an injunction similar to that prayed for by the complainants in the first bill, and also an injunction against any action under any contract entered into by the defendants to carry the mail. In this case also there is a motion for a preliminary injunction.
“ In support of these motions a great number of affidavits have been submitted, and a very large number have likewise been presented on behalf of the defendants. Much that the affiants have sworn to ha,s no bearing upon the real questions involved in the motions. But it is certainly established that the complainants in the first bill are pewholders and worshippers in different churches along the line of the defendants’ railway, or residents and owners of dwelling-houses situated on said line, and that the defendants are engaged in running their cars over and along the said railway on the first day of the week called Sunday, and that they propose to continue so running their cars hereafter on Sunday. So far the facts are clear. They are not even disputed.
“ The facts averred in the second bill are also fully made out by the proofs, and they are not contradicted.
“ In considering whether injunctions ought to be granted, the first question to be met is, whether the acts of the defendants complained of and proved, are contrary to law. In regard to this I have no difficulty. The act of running cars over a passenger railway on the first day of the week, commonly called Sunday, and running them, as it was shown the defendants have done, and as they propose hereafter to do, is the performance on that day of what is their ordinary employment or business. It is the same business as that in which they are engaged on all other days, conducted in the same manner, namely, for hire, and for the same object, which is gain. In view of the whole course of our statutory enactments, and of the decisions of this court, I do not see how it can be doubted that it is a palpable violation of law.
“ Christianity is a part of the common law of this state. In saying this I utter no new doctrine. It was part of the common law of England long before this state was settled. There is a multitude of decisions to this effect to be found in the books, and it has been decided in England that it is an indictable offence at common law to write or speak of Christianity contemptuously or maliciously. The old common law of England is a part of the common law of this state. Our fathers brought it with them when they settled in the wilderness and founded this new Commonwealth. And there is abundant evidence that the purpose of William Penn and those who came under his auspices, was to found a Christian state. While the amplest provisions were made to secure liberty of conscience, and exemption from molestation for religious persuasion or practice in matters of faith and worship, there was the most unmistakable recognition of Christianity as a part of the law, both in 4 the laws agreed upon in England,’ on the 6th of May 1682, declared to be for ever fundamental in the government of the province, and in the 4 Charter of Privileges,’ granted by William Penn to the inhabitants of Pennsylvania, and declared to be unalterable by any law or ordinance, without the consent of the governor and six-sevenths of the Assembly met. Equally did the 4 Great Law,’ enacted at Chester, on the 7th of December 1682, proceed upon the basis that Christianity, was a part of the fundamental law of the land. I do not propose t'o go over the argument. No one has ever yet been able to raise a respectable doubt that this part of the common law of England belongs inseparably to the institutions of this state. And even if there could have been doubt, the decisions of this court have set the matter to rest. In Updegraff v. The Commonwealth, 11 S. & R. 394, it was solemnly decided that Christianity is a ■ part of our common law. In that decision all the judges of this court concurred. They were eminent judges, Tilghman, Gibson and Duncan, men whose opinions to this day command universal respect, and they fortified their judgment by an unanswerable argument.
44 But if Christianity is a part of the common law, it carries with it a civil obligation to abstain on the Lord’s day from all worldly labor and business, except works of necessity and mercy. Christianity without a Sabbath would be no Christianity. Hence even in England¶ cessation of labor and business on Sunday was early recognised by the common law as obligatory to a certain extent. It is immaterial now to what extent. But William Penn and the early settlers of this Commonwealth have left us no equivocal testimony of the extent to which they regarded the observance of the Sabbath as obligatory. The laws agreed upon in England to which I have referred, ordained that every first day of the week, called the Lord’s day, people should abstain from their common daily labor. And the ‘ Great Law’ of .December 7th 1682, in its first enactment, repeated substantially the injunction.
“ These laws, in my opinion, were declaratory of what the common law was, as introduced into this state, and the subsequent statutes enacted in 1700, 1705, 1760, 1786 and in 1794 were all in aid of the common law. They all enjoined cessation from worldly business on the first day of the week. Their avowed purpose was to prevent vice and immorality, and, as it was sometimes asserted, to protect the inhabitants of the province and state in the undisturbed worship of God, according to the dictates of their own consciences.
“ The cases I have before me, however, do not demand maintenance of the position that the acts of the defendants, of which the bills complain, are in violation of the common law. The statute of 1794 is still in force. It imposes a penalty upon any person who shall do or perform any worldly employment or business whatsoever on the Lord’s day, commonly called Sunday, works of necessity and charity only excepted. There is, however, a proviso taking out of the operation of the act certain descriptions of business, or work, no one of which is the work in which the defendants are engaged. I need not spend time to prove that when a statute imposes a penalty for doing an act, it impliedly prohibits the act, makes it illegal. If, therefore, performing worldly business on Sunday were not against common law, this Act of Assembly makes it unlawful in all but the excepted cases. And the work in which the defendants are engaged, which they propose to continue, is not embraced in any of the exceptions.
“ A large part of the argument before me in opposition to these motions was directed to show, if possible, that running street cars on passenger railways in this city on Sunday is a work of necessity, and therefore not in violation of the common law, and not prohibited by the Act of 1794. The argument was based upon numerous affidavits affirming that in the opinion of the affiants, running cars thus is necessary to enable persons residing at a distance from churches, as also the aged and infirm, to go to and return from the places where they are accustomed to worship; that it is necessary to accommodate physicians in making professional visits ; that it is necessary to afford facilities for family and social visiting, and that it is also necessary for the health and comfort of the poor, enabling them to obtain recreation and a change of air, by cheapening the means of conveyance to the rural districts. Of all these, it may he said that, at most, they are conveniences for others, and not necessities of the defendants, within the meaning of the Acts of Assembly. It is not for me, called as I am to administer the law as it is, rather than as the defendants may think it ought to be, to decide that what is but affording a facility amounts to a necessity. The legislature has not exempted from the prohibition acts which may conduce to the convenience, or contribute to supply the necessities, of individuals, or even large portions of the people. It must be presumed they considered what inconveniences would follow a prohibition of worldly labor on the Lord’s day. In view of them, as well as of the evils flowing from the absence of a prohibition of such labor, they enacted the statute of 1794. Their controlling object was to protect the community against vice and immorality. This they attempted to do by declaring illegal all worldly labor and business, except works of necessity and charity. But they did not overlook public and individual convenience. In the proviso of the act they declared how far worldly labor might be done, not necessary to the agent, but contributing to the necessities of others. The enumeration in the proviso of things allowed to be done, shows what was intended by excepting works of necessity from the prohibitory clause. If it was not meant by the act to forbid work which might be a convenience or even a necessity in some sense to others than the laborer, the proviso is entirely superfluous. It is plain, however, that when they excepted works of' necessity, they meant works of necessity to him who does them, and not to others. If this is not so, the act is without force. There is very little, if any, worldly business that does not subserve the convenience and even the necessities of some part of the community. Food, clothes, shelter and furniture are undoubted necessities. But may the agriculturist justify his ordinary worldly business on Sunday by the plea that he is thereby furnishing food for the hungry ? May the cotton-mills, woollen-mills, and clothing establishments of the country be driven, as usual, and without cessation, on the Lord’s day, because they aro thus contributing to provide clothing for those who need it? Is the business of the carpenter or cabinet-maker to move on through the seven days of the week, uninterruptedly and according to law, because others may need houses or furniture ? May the chemist keep his laboratory in full operation on. Sunday, because medicines are necessary ? All these questions, and a multitude of others of similar character, must be answered in the affirmative, if running railway cars on Sunday on city passenger railways is a work of necessity within the meaning of the exception in the Act of 1794. It may be doubted whether keeping theatres and places of public amusement open on Sundays might not be justified by the same line of argument. Many might be found, doubtless, who would affirm on oath that theatrical representations are conducive to mental and bodily health, and that such recreation as they afford is a necessity. Such a construction of the statute Avould make it but an empty sound. It Avould be losing sight entirely of the objects sought to bo secured, the observance of a day of rest for the community, thereby enabling every one to worship God according to the dictates of his conscience, without distraction, and Avithout disturbance, and thus giving a check to vice and immorality. A construction that leads to such an absurdity must be erroneous. There is no other possible interpretation, Avhich gives to the act any operation, but that which holds the works of necessity spoken of to be such as are necessary to the actor. When the thing to be determined is Avhether worldly business done by any man, and not described in the proviso, is exempt from the prohibition because a-work of necessity, the question must always be — is it necessary to him Avho does it ? The defendants do not claim that running their cars for hire on Sunday is a charity, nor even that it is necessary for them. All they assert is that it is a convenience or a necessity for others. I think the act does not alloAv them to shelter themselves under others.
“Moreover, the question is not an open one. It has been settled by the solemn decision of this court. Johnson v. The Commonwealth, 9 Harris 102, determined that running an omnibus in a city, daily and every day, is worldly employment, and not a work of necessity or charity, within the meaning of the Act of 1794, and therefore unlawful on Sunday. This case is directly in point, and, though decided by a divided court, it is the laAv of the Commonwealth, from which I am not at liberty to depart, even if I doubted the correctness of the decision, which I do not. The opinion Avas delivered by the present Chief Justice of this court, and in it he fully met and answered the argument, noAv reproduced, that running a public conveyance on Sunday is a Avork of necessity. Judges Lowrie and Knox concurred with him. No one of these judges has ever departed from the ground taken in that case. And in CommonAvealth v. Jeandelle, 2 Grant 506, my brother Thompson, another judge of this court, announced, in substance, the same doctrine. He declared that driving a public conveyance for hire, is doing worldly employment within the provisions of the Act of 1794 beyond doubt. His whole opinion is an assertion that running cars on city passenger railways on Sundays, is contrary to law. It is then beyond controversy that the conduct of these defendants, which the complainants seek to restrain, is a palpable violation of the laAvs of the CommoriAvealth. And I cannot doubt that it has been so considered by the defendants themselves. . Their conduct in seeking protection under a contract to carry the mails, before they began to run cars on Sunday, shows that such was their opinion. I have then before me, a corporation, a creature of law, to which the Commonwealth has granted very large privileges, at the expense of the public, palpably and persistently defying the laws of the state which gavo it being. To use the language of the Act of June 16th 1836, its acts are contrary to law and prejudicial to the interests of the community.
“ I come next to the question whether these complainants have shown themselves entitled to ask for the intervention of this court to restrain this illegal action of the defendants. It must be admitted that it is essential to such a right that they should show that they are sustaining a particular injury. And I think it is incumbent upon them to show that the illegal acts of the defendants interfere injuriously with their rights of property. I agree that equity will not enforce a penalty or enjoin against the commission of a crime, when it is merely a crime and not also an injury to private rights of property. But an act may be a public offence and also a private wrong. Of this there are many examples. A public nuisance is one. And when private individuals suffer an injury quite distinct from that of the public in general, in consequence of a public nuisance, they are entitled to an injunction and relief in equity, which may thus compel the wrongdoer to take active measures against allowing the injury to continue: 8 Sim. 193 ; 9 Paige 575. I am not called upon now to define minutely every class of cases in which equity will interfere. The Act of 1836 gives to this court power to ‘ restrain the commission or continuance of acts contrary to law and prejudicial to the interests of the community or the rights of individuals.’ Eor the present I assume that the rights of individuals spoken of are rights of property. Such, I think, is the meaning of the act. What rights of property, then, if any, have the complainants with which the illegal conduct of the defendants interferes injuriously ? They own and occupy dwelling-houses along the line of the defendants’ railway. They own pews in churches situate also on the line of the railway. As owners of dwelling-houses, they have a right to protection against all unlawful noise and disturbance of domestic quiet. Noise is an annoyance which may be complained of, and of which courts will take notice. The celebrated case of an injunction against ringing bells, 2 Sim. N. R. 139, is an example. My brother Thompson granted an injunction against a tinsmith at the suit of a householder disturbed by the noise of his business. It is plain that the enjoyment of real property may be seriously damaged by noise alone. Constant firing of cannon or beating of drums before a dwelling-house would render it untenantable. Now what is the nature of the enjoyment which the law secures to every owner of a dwelling-house in the Commonwealth on Sunday ? I am not inquiring whence his rights come, whether from the common law or the Act of 1794. Their origin is immaterial. It is very plain that a man has a right to a different enjoyment of his house on Sunday from that which he can claim on any other day of the week. The very purpose of the Sabbath laws, as declared in the earlier statutes, and as shown in Commonwealth v. Johnson, and in Commonwealth v. Nesbit, 10 Casey 405, was that people may devote the day to rest and to the Avorship of God. Every unlawful thing that is distracting, that disturbs such rest, is an interference Avith this purpose. A man has a right to use his house on Sunday for his OAvn devotions, and for the religious instruction of his family, undisturbed by anything that is illegal on that day. This is a legitimate use, a right of property belonging to him as a property owner. He can no more be deprived of it Avithout authority of law, than he can of any other use to which he may devote his house. Nor does it matter that it is a right which others may not prize. In the estimation of many, it is an invaluable right, a deprivation of which would' greatly diminish the Avorth of their property to them. Let those call it fanciful Avho will, it is still true that equity will protect a party in the enjoyment of his property in whatever manner he pleases, if he does not by such enjoyment invade the rights of others: Bonaparte v. The Camden and Amboy Bailroad Co., 1 Baldwin 230. That case holds that even if the object of the owner be not profit, but repose, seclusion and a resting place for himself and family, a court of equity Avill protect him in such enjoyment. In Jackson v. The Duke of Newcastle, 10 Jur. N. B. 689, it Avas held that equity has jurisdiction to prevent an injury that renders a property unsuitable for the purpose to Avhich it is applied, or which lessens considerably the enjoyment which the owner has of it. And in Bostock v. The North Staffordshire Bailway Co., 2 Jur. N. S. 248, an injunction Avas granted to prevent a regatta on a lake, Avhereby crowds would have been drawn to the neighborhood of the complainant’s property, disturbing its privacy. The language of the Vice-Chancellor is significant. Said he, ‘ If it be objectionable, if he conceive it to be injurious bo him, in interfering Avith his comfort, or even as distasteful, he (the complainant) has a right to confine the enjoyment of the defendant’s right, Avithin the essential terms of the contract by Avhich it was obtained.’ I may not feel prepared to go quite this length, but these cases show that the law recognises as a right of property a right to' repose in one’s dAvelling, and freedom from external disturbance.
“ Especially are pewholders entitled to protection in the enjoyment of their peAVS, as pews are designed to be enjoyed. PeAVS in churches are real property, recognised as such by the law. They are the subject of sale, and they often bring prices equal to the value of many small farms. An action may be maintained for disturbance of their enjoyment. But the whole value of a pew consists in the facilities it affords for joining in public worship, and for receiving the instruction given in churches. To render it unfit, in any way, for the purpose for which such property is designed or used, is its destruction, and it may amount as fully to an irreparable private wrong as is any unlawful act against which a chancellor enjoins.
“ Such being the rights of property of the complainants, Spar-hawk and others, the next question is whether the unlawful acts of the defendants interfere with these rights. On this subject the proofs leave no doubt. One of the complainants has sworn that the running of the cars past his house on Sunday so disturbs the quiet of his house as to compel him to keep the front windows closed, and, when reading aloud to his family, to abandon the front rooms. He considers that such an invasion of his enjoyment depreciates the value of his property. All the other complainants, who charge unlawful interference with the lawful enjoyment of their dwelling-houses, assert, on oath, substantially the same grievances. They are driven from the front rooms of their houses ; their meditations and their Sabbath rest are broken up; and the lawful uses to which they desire to devote their property are made impossible.
“ Equally palpable is the invasion of the rights of the other complainants, who are pewholders in churches. The eyidence shows clearly that they are disturbed in the enjoyment of their pews, to which they are entitled, and without which the pews are valueless. Their attention is distracted; they can hardly hear the preacher; they lose some of his words. In one instance a whole prayer was lost. The solemnities of a communion service were interrupted, and worship generally is very seriously hindered. The noise of running the cars, the grating of wheels on curves, the clatter of horses’ hoofs in starting, the sound of the signal bell, and the hallooing of those who wish to stop the cars for passage, seriously annoy the occupants of the pews, and lessen, if they do not destroy, that enjoyment of their property which the law accords to them. And the wrong of which they complain is a continuing one. The cars have run for weeks on Sundays, and it is proposed to continue such running hereafter. To decide that this is not a case where the defendants are acting contrary to law, and prejudicially to the rights of individuals, is more than I am able to do. Nor is this invasion of the complainants’ rights in any manner contradicted. It is no traverse of the averment of a pewowner that he is disturbed in the lawful enjoyment of his pew to assert and to prove that others are not disturbed in the enjoyment of theirs. Their pews may not be similarly situated. They themselves may not wish to pay as close attention to the church services as the complainants do. Their attention is no measure of the attention which the complainants have a right undisturbedly to give. The question before me is whether the complainants are disturbed. While it is true that no man can be compelled to any form or degree of worship, it is equally true that no man can be disturbed in that worship which he may desire to render to his Sovereign God.
“Nor are any of the numerous affidavits submitted by the defendants in conflict with the proofs that those of the complainants who are owners of houses along the line of the defendants’ railway are disturbed in the lawful enjoyment of their property. The affiants are not disturbed in their dwelling-houses. The uses to which they may wish to devote their property may not be the same. They may not wish to devote the Sabbath to meditation, and to the religious instruction of their families. But the complainants do, and therefore they are disturbed. I need not say that what may be no annoyance to one man may be an unlawful disturbance to another. In this land of religious freedom, a man may, if he pleases, regard the Sabbath as sacred, the Lord’s day, as it is called in the Act of Assembly. Another may not. One may use his house as a place for meditation, quiet and repose, a place for family instruction and devption. Another may devote his property to no such uses. They are, however, lawful uses. The first may not interfere with any lawful uses to which the others may apply their property. They may not interrupt his lawful use of his own. It is very obvious that to one desirous of devoting his house to religious uses on the Sabbath, what would be no annoyance on a week day would be a very serious one on Sunday. An outcry at the dead hour of night, or near a sick ohamber is a very different thing from a similar noise at any other time or place. So a business or a noise which would be unnoticed on a week day compels attention and positively disturbs on a Sunday. It was to this that my brother Thompson alluded when he spoke of the ‘peace of the Sabbath’ in Jeandelle’s case, a right of the public involving a corresponding duty of individuals, larger on Sunday than on any other day. The public right has a corresponding private right in the citizen.
“ Without, then, referring in detail to all the affidavits submitted, though I have read and considered them all, I entertain no doubt that the action of the defendants is not only contrary to law, but that it is a substantial and continuing invasion of the rights of property belonging to the complainants, which, unless arrested, must render such rights comparatively valueless. Why, then, should I not interpose an injunction ? Because, first, say the defendants, their act is a crime, and equity never enjoins against a commission of a crime. The objection is plausible rather than substantial. It is true that equity does not gene rally enjoin against a crime as a crime, but the books are full of cases in which an injunction has been decreed against acts injurious to individuals, though they may have also amounted to a crime against the public. I have referred to some of these cases. Others are so numerous that it would be an affectation of learning to cite them.
“ Again, it is objected that the Act of 1794 prescribes the penalty to which the defendants are subject, and that under the Act of 1806 the complainants can resort to no other remedy. The objection makes the Act of 1794 substantially a license law. It was repudiated by Judge Thompson in Jeandelle’s case, and it is a perversion of the Act of 1806. It confounds the public offence with the private injury. The Act of 1794 provides no remedy for private wrongs, and these bills do not seek to punish the public offences. ,, Even if the running of the cars on Sunday, in the prosecution of ordinary worldly business, is not illegal at common law, which I am unwilling to admit, the Act of 1794 undertakes no more than to provide a penalty for the public offence. It leaves private sufferers to seek redress in the ordinary modes accorded by judicial tribunals. It would, I think, startle the community to be told, that when an Act of Assembly prohibits storing powder in quantities, under a penalty recoverable only by the Commonwealth, a man whose property has been blown up by powder illegally stored, has no redress against the wrongdoer. Such is not the law.
“ It is further objected that an injunction ought not to issue until there has been a tidal at law. I know that, in applications to a court of equity to restrain a nuisance, if there be serious doubt in regard to the title of the complainant to the property injured, or doubt whether any nuisance exists, or whether the complainant is specially injured by it, a chancellor will refuse to act until the doubts have been settled by a trial at law. Such a trial is for his information. But what doubt is there in this case ? None in regard to the facts. The title of the complainants to their pews and dwelling-houses is not denied. The extent of their rights as property-owners is a matter of law. It cannot be submitted to a jury. The running of cars on Sunday by defendants is admitted. That this is illegal is a determination of law, and that there is a special injury to the complainants, consequent upon this breach of law, is proved, and not contradicted. What, then, is left to be submitted to a jury ? What their finding must be is a foregone conclusion. How, then, could my conscience be informed or guided by any trial at law ? The objection is therefore inapplicable to any such cases as these now before me.
“ The result of all this is that the complainants, Sparhawk and others, have, in my opinion, a clear right to my interposition to protect them in that enjoyment of their dwelling-houses and their pews, to which I have shown they are entitled by law. It may be that there is a formal error in the joinder of plaintiffs having distinct interests. If there is, it is remediable by amendment. And the very eminent counsel of the defendants, who have argued these cases with signal ability, as well as with fairness, have properly declined to avail themselves of the error, seeking only a decision upon the merits of the controversy. In the case of Sparhawk against the Union Passenger Railway Company, I shall therefore grant the injunction for which I am moved.
“ The case of Kenton against the same company and others is, if possible, still more clear. He is a stockholder, and, as such, he has a right to insist that the company shall do nothing ultra vires, or contrary to law. Such conduct imperils his interests. He may have purchased his stock with a full knowledge that the company was acting illegally, but his right is nevertheless to demand that there shall be no continuance in illegality. There is no analogy between the position of this complainant and that of the complainant in Scott v. The Atlantic and Great Western Railroad Company, to which my attention has been called. Scott was seeking to destroy the company of which he claimed to be a shareholder. This plaintiff seeks only to compel his trustees to obey the law, and act within the compass of their powers. He has a clear interest to be protected. The control of a corporation by courts of equity at the instance of a stockholder is a well-i’ecognised branch of equity jurisdiction.
“ That the acts of which this plaintiff complains are unauthorized and unlawful is not to be disputed. I have already shown that running cars on Sunday is contrary to law. It exposes the defendants at least to the imposition of a penalty. It would be a scandal were I to weigh their possible profit, gained by defiance of law, against the penalties to which they are subjecting themselves. It is also plain that they have no legal authority to carry the mails or to enter into a contract with the United States Government to carry them. If anything is settled it is this, that a corporation has no power beyond what is given by its charter.. What is not clearly given is denied. These defendants were incorporated as a passenger railway company, to transport passengers, and nothing else. By the law that gave them being, they were positively prohibited from permitting freight of any kind to pass over their railway. And, in addition to this, they were expressly subjected to the city ordinances, one of which interdicts the transportation over passenger railways of any other thing than passengers. It was therefore beyond their power to contract with the Federal Government to collect and carry the mails, and every step taken in pursuance of such an attempted contract is without right. As well might they have contracted to transport all the cannon and military stores which the Federal Government may have to pass through the city. It appears probable that the defendants sought this contract as a means to enable them to override the state law, but instead of relieving them from the obligation to cease from their ordinary worldly employment on the Lord’s day, it makes their conduct a double violation of law. In this case, therefore, as well as in the other, an injunction will be awarded.”
Afterwards the defendants put in answers. jAs to the first bill they admitted running their cars with horse-power, and carrying passengers for hire on Sunday, but denied that such running is in violation of the laws of this Commonwealth; they averred that in their cars on Sunday they have always carried to and from churches and places of worship large numbers of persons, including ministers, a large proportion of whom would otherwise, owing to distance, age, sickness or infirmity, coupled with poverty or narrow circumstances, have been wholly unable to go there; and also scholars and teachers to Sunday-school, many of whom, for like reasons, would have been deprived of the privilege of being at such school. They have, by giving these facilities, assisted to revive failing churches, and given strength to diminished congregations. They have thus enabled physicians to visit the sick, and those who need medical service to seek it at the offices of physicians, many of whom, since passenger cars have come into use, have used them constantly, have dispensed with carriages or wagons, and cannot afford to keep them for one day alone. They have enabled persons to engage in works of charity, benevolence and mercy, such as attending .at hospitals, and visiting the poor and sick on Sunday, who would but for this means have been unable to do so. They have enabled parents to visit their children, children their parents,' and members of the same family, whether sick or well, to have social intercourse, and fulfil the duties of relationship. They have enabled the sick and overworked poor to escape on this the only day in the year on which they can do 'so, from small and confined rooms, &e., to the parks, &c., by which health has been promoted and lives preserved, &c. These beneficial results have arisen from the running of the cars on Sunday, and have been increased to such an extent, and' such means of locomotion have become so statedly and universally relied upon as to make them, in the city of Philadelphia, owing to its unparallelled extent and enormous population, an undoubted necessity on said day within the meaning of the Act of April 22d 1794. They denied that the plaintiffs were, by the running of said cars, deprived of their right of enjoying the Sabbath as a day of rest and religious exercise, or disturbed thereby, or prevented from engaging peaceably and without interruption in the worship of God, either in their places of worship or at their residences, or the peace and quiet of the day unlawfully broken; that any rights of property of said plaintiffs were thereby infringed, or any of their property rendered less valuable. They averred that the cars are run on said day without bells, and make much less noise than ordinary carriages, &e.
As to the second bill, they averred that the five shares of stock of the plaintiff were purchased after the defendants had made their contract with the Post-Office Department, and after they had begun to run their cars on Sunday, and with a full knowledge of said facts, not because of the supposed value of said shares, or as a boná fide investment of the price thereof, but solely at the suggestion of John Sparhawk and others, plaintiffs in the first bill, in aid of the bill of the said Sparhawk and others, and for the same object; and that no other stockholders of said company, as respondent believes, will unite with them in said bill. They averred that running their cars on Sunday was lawful, and in support of this averment state the facts set forth in the answer to the first bill.
They averred-also that soon after the issuing of the injunction in this case, the mail contract was, with the consent of all parties thereto, cancelled and rescinded, and no such, contract is now in force ; that the plaintiff’s stock is not now and never has been in any peril, and plaintiff is in no danger of losing the value of the same; that the filing of said bill was not for the purpose of protecting said stock, but for the purpose in the first paragraph of this answer set forth and averred.
Testimony was afterwards taken on behalf of the defendants before an examiner, from ministers, physicians and others, showing mainly that the running cars on the Sabbath was necessary in attending the sick and going to places of worship, affording recreation to poor people living in badly ventilated neighborhoods, &c.
It was agreed that all of the affidavits, &c., read by either party, or presented at the argument of the motions for preliminary injunctions, should be considered as proof taken in both cases before an examiner, and that decrees pro forma be made in the cases in favor, of the plaintiffs, in accordance with the prayer of each bill, and the cases certified .into the Supreme Court in banc, the injunction granted to remain until the entry of the final decree.
The error assigned was granting the injunction.
JS. S. Miller and 6r. W. Biddle (with whom was J. O’Byrne), for appellant.
Equity will not, by injunction, enforce a penalty or enjoin against a criminal or penal act: Mayor of Hudson v. Thorne, 7 Paige 264. Equity will not enjoin an act merely because it is illegal: Solteau v. De Held, 2 Sim. & St. 153 ; White v. Cohen, 1 Drew. 312; Commonwealth v. Wellsboro’ & Tioga Railroad Co., 11 Casey 152.
The Act of June 16th 1836, § 13, Purd. 401, pi. 3, Pamph. L. 789, authorizing courts of equity to enjoin acts contrary to law, and prejudicial to the rights of individuals, did not intend to enlarge equitable jurisdiction, or create a new-test of what is a nuisance or trespass, which will authorize an injunction: Commissioners v. Long, 1 Pars. 152; Commonwealth v. Rush, 2 Harris 193; Hagner v. Heyberger, 7 W. & S. 107; Denny v. Brownson, 5 Casey ; Stockdale v. Ullery, 1 Wright 487.
There is no other head of equity under which the plaintiff can come but the head of nuisance. The plaintiff must make out a nuisance, and a private nuisance. If abstract illegality does not make or aid a nuisance, the Act of 1794 has no relevancy: Mohney v. Cook, 2 Casey 342 ; Commonwealth v. Naylor, 10 Id. 86. Our Act of 1806, § 13, Purd. 41, pl. 5, 4 Sm. L. 332, which requires that where an act is forbidden by any enactment, the remedy provided by such enactment must be pursued, strengthens this view: Commonwealth v. Jeandell, 2 Gr. Ca. 510.
A breach of the Sunday law is a public offence only, and in no sense a private one: Commonwealth v. Wolf, 3 S. & R. 49; Mohney v. Cook, 2 Casey 348 ; Scully v. Commonwealth, 11 Id. 513 ; Murray v. Commonwealth, 12 Harris 271.
It must be a nuisance to a single property ; several owners of several houses cannot join in a bill for such relief: Hudson v. Madison, 12 Sim. 416.
Substantial injury, requiring immediate relief, must be clearly shown: Owen v. Herman, 1 W. & S. 550 ; 1 Com. Dig. 180; 1 Lev. 247; 1 Sid. 34; Id. 5 Co. 73 a; Mainwaring v. Giles, 5 B. & Ald. 356 (7 E. C. L. 129) ; 6 Barb. 317; Walter v. Self, 15 Jur. 416 ; White v. Cohen, 1 Drew. 318; St. Helen’s Smelting Co. v. Tipping, 11 Jur. 787 ; Rhea v. Forsythe, 1 Wright 506.
Even if substantial injury to property requiring immediate relief be clearly shown, the court, in judging of this injury, and deciding whether it amounts to a nuisance, will always look at the advantages resulting from the act complained of: Baines v. Baker, 1 Amb. 158; Bamford v. Fernley, 9 Jur. 377; Hale v. Barlow, 4 C. B. N. S. 334; Boardman v. Treadwell, 3 Gif. 699.
Christianity is part of the common law in Pennsylvania as it was in England and no further, or in any other sense.
The common law of England as respects Sunday 'was that, while judicial proceedings on Sunday were void at common law, all other business transactions were valid until prohibited by statute: Merritt v. Earle, 31 Barb. 41, citing 3 Burr. 1597; Commonwealth v. Nesbit, 10 Casey 409; Johnson v. Commonwealth, 10 Harris 108; Rex v. Younger, 5 T. R. 449.
They cited also on the question of irreparable mischief, Earl of Ripon v. Hobart, 2 Myl. & K. 169.
As to the duty of requiring verdict in doubtful cases, where immediate action is not imperatively necessary: Cooper v. Matheys, C. C. U. S., 5 Pa. L. J. 38 ; Semple v. London B. Railway Co., 1 Eng. Railway Cas. 120 ; Commonweath v. Rush, 2 Harris 186.
As to the right to make a contract on Sunday for hiring of vehicle to visit parent: Logan v. Matthews, 6 Barr 417.
As to stockholders’ bill: Ffooks v. S. W. Railway Co., 1 Smale & Gifford (decided in 1852) pp. 162-167 ; Forrest v. Manchester Railway Co., 30 Beavan 40, decided in 1861; Rogers v. Oxford, W. & W. Railway Co., 2 De Gex & Jones 674, decided in 1858.
W. J. Me Elroy and Porter (with whom was O. S. Patterson), for appellees.
—
It is no answer to our testimony to prove that other persons have not been disturbed in their residences or churches: Soltau v. De Held, 2 Sim. New R. 133.
The appellant being a corporation, the action complained of ultra vires and the result of that action an invasion of the rights of the appellees, this court will enjoin without inquiry into the extent of the injury :• Commonwealth v. The Pittsburg and Connellsville Railroad Co., 12 Harris 159 ; Commonwealth v. Rush, 2 Id. 193; River Dun Nav. Co. v. North Midland Railway Co., 1 Eng. Railway Cas. 135.
That the action complained of is ultra vires, can readily be shown: Act of April 22d 1794, § 1, Purd. 924, pl. 3, 3 Sm. L, 177; Johnston v. Commonwealth, 10 Harris 102; Commonwealth v. Jeandell, 2 Grant’s R. 506; Commonwealth v. Erie and North East Railroad Co., 3 Casey 351; Omit v. Commonwealth, 9 Harris 434.
A pew is property: Hennessey v. The Bank, 6 W. & S. 300 ; Bates v. Sparrell, 10 Mass. 323.
An injunction will be granted where personal rights, whose immunity is guaranteed by law, are invaded : Hulseman v. Rems, 5 Wright 396 ; Ewing v. Thompson, 7 Id. 372; Kneedler v. Lane, 9 Id. 238; Kerr v. Trego, 11 Id. 292; Cronise v. Cronise, ante, p. 255.
The running of the cars on Sunday amounts to a public nuisance, and the appellees are, therefore, entitled to an injunction, upon showing a special injury: 2 Eden on Injunction 259 et seq.; Story’s Equity Jurisprudence, § 924, et seq.; Attorney-General v. Forbes, 3 Mylne & Craig 123; Sampson v. Smith, 8 Sim. 275 ; Spencer v. The Railway Co., Id. 193; Corning v. Lowere, 6 Johns. Chan. 439; Biddle v. Ash, 2 Ash. 219; Hughes v. Heiser, 1 Binn. 463; Pittsburg v. Scott, 1 Barr 319 ; Attorney-General v. Nichol, 16 Ves. 343; Fishmongers’ Company v. East India Company, 1 Dickens 163 ; Earl of Bathurst v. Burden, 2 Brown’s Chan. Cases 64; Coulson v. White, 2 Atk. 21; Jackson v. The Duke of Newcastle, 10 Jur. N. S. 689; Broadbent v. The Impe rial Gas Company, 26 Law J. (Eng.) 276; Corning v. Lowere, 6 Johns. Chan. R. 439; Beatty v. Curtz, 2 Pet. R. 566 ; Soltau v. De Held, 2 Sim. R., N. S. 133; Bostock v. The North Staffordshire Railway Company, 2 Jur. N. S. 248; Bonaparte v. The Railroad Company, 1 Bald. 205 ; Respublica v. Caldwell, 1 Dall. 150 ; Howell v. McCoy, 8 Rawle 269; Pottstown Gas Company v. Murphy, 3 Wright 257 ; Attorney-General v. Birmingham, 4 Kay & Johnson 528 ; McCallum v. Germantown Water Company, ante, p. 40 ; Holman v. The Boiling Spring Bleaching Company, 1 McCarter’s Ch. R.; Bullen v. Michel, 2 Price 399; O’Connor v. Cook, 8 Ves. 536 ; Field v. Holland, 6 Cranch 22; Dennis v: Eckhardt, 3 Grant 390; Scheetz’s Appeal, 11 Casey 88.
November 7th 1867,
As to the penalty imposed by the Act of 1794 for the commission of acts forbidden by it: it is argued upon the other side, that in the exaction of that penalty is our only remedy; that cannot be ; for it would convert the-penalty into a license Cory v. The Railway Company, 3 Eng. Railw. Cases 537; Kelly v. The Commonwealth, 11 S. & R. 345; Smith v. Shuler, 12 Id. 242; Aycinena v. Peries, 6 W. & S. 257.
As to the stockholders’ bill. — The appellee asks the aid of equity to restrict corporate action within legal corporate limits, and does not seek to restrain it in one lawful act, nor to deprive it of one legitimate source of profit. This court will not look at his motives, but only at his title : Natusch v. Irving, Gow on Partnership, App. 398 ; Colman v. The Eastern Counties Railway Company, 4 Eng. Railw. Cases 514; Attorney-General v. The Great Northern Railway Company, 2 Law Times R. 656 ; Cohen v. Wilkinson, 5 Eng. Railw. Cases 748 ; Bagshawe v. The Railway Company, 6 Id. 152; Simpson v. Westminster Palace Company, 8 Clarke’s Ap. Cases 712; Hattersley v. The Earl of Shelburne, 31 Law J. Ch. 873; Sandford v. The Railroad Company, 12 Harris 378; Mott v. The Penna. Railroad Company, 6 Casey 19 ; Gratz v. The Railroad Company, 5 Wright 447.
They also cited People v. Ruggles, 8 Johns. 290; Brill v. Flagler, 23 Wend. 354; Elliotson v. Feetham, 2 Bligh, N. C. 134; Carrington v. Taylor, 11 East 571; Rex v. Smith, 1 Strange 704 ; Church v. Railroad, 5 Barb. 79; 4 Bla. Com. 63; Coke’s 2d Inst. 220, 264; Fortescue De Laudibus, &c., 120; Selden’s note (e); Finch. Hist. of the Law; 3d Chit. Gen. Prac. 1604; Saxon Laws, fol. 2, 55, 78.

Opinion:
The opinion of the court in Sparhawk v. The Union Passenger Railway was delivered at Pittsburg, by
Thompson, J.
The law intends and generally does provide remedies for the redress of every wrong and the vindication of every right. These necessarily differ with the variety into which rights and wrongs are classed in communities of diverse pursuits and dense population. For example, in the civil department of the law, ejectment is the appropriate legal remedy for the wrongful deprivation of the possession of real estate; replevin for the recovery of chattels; assumpsit for the breach of simple contracts ; debt for money due by a specialty, covenant for the breach of contracts under seal; proceeding in equity for the specific performance of contracts, and " to restrain acts contrary to law and prejudicial to the interests of community or the rights of individuals."
He who is under the necessity of applying to courts to vindicate his rights or redress his wrongs, must employ the appropriate remedy. If he might do otherwise, the law would cease to be a rule of action, and thus cease to be law. He must have a right, to the redress sought either personally, or in a legally constituted representative capacity. He may not vindicate other people's rights by process in his own name, nor employ civil process to punish wrongs to the public. This is to be done only by public officers in the name of the public. Even when equity intervenes to restrain acts prejudicial " to the interests of the community," as it may under the Act of 1836, it must be by bill filed by the proper public officer, the Attorney-General of the Commonwealth, and not by a private party. This is fully shown in The Buck Mountain Coal Co. v. The Lehigh Coal and Navigation Co., 14 Wright 91, and many other cases. Private parties can invoke.the chancery powers of courts only for the redress of private injuries done or threatened. These are statements of very general principles, but are important to be remembered in this case.
For the redress of a private injury, therefore, we must regard this bill, and not legitimately appropriate to any other. Keeping this in mind, it seems to me that the case in hand will be relieved of much irrelevant matter, prejudicial to a dispassionate decision on its true merits.
Injury to property, with reference to its reasonable and ordinary use, by continuous hurtful acts, constitutes a nuisance undoubtedly, and may properly be the subject of equity jurisdiction, not only to redress the' injured party by restraining the injurious acts, but in some cases by compelling the wrongdoer to make amends for the injury done-. In such a case the applicant for redress by injunction must establish a clear case of " irreparable injury" likely to ensue as the consequence of the continuance of such acts. He may not supplement a defective case by an alleged infraction of the penal laws in the acts complained of: Naylor v. The Commonwealth, 10 Casey 86, and Mohney v. Cook, 2 Id. 432. In the latter of these cases, it was said in the opinion of the court, Lowrie, C. J., " that a breach of duty to the state does not necessarily involve a breach of duty to the defendant." I do not mean to deny, however, that when a private injury results from a breach of public law, the public wrong may not be redressed by the private remedy. This often occurs, but not because there is a public wrong, but because the private remedy has the effect of stopping the wrongdoer. Where the wrong is exclusively of a public nature, " the offender is answerable nowhere," as was said in Scully v. The Commonwealth, 11 Casey 513, "beyond the penalty of the law."
I fully concede that the opinion of my brother Strong at Nisi Prius, and the law and authorities referred to by him, establish very clearly, that the business of running passenger cars on the Lord's day, commonly called " Sunday," to use the language of the Act of 1794, is a violation of that act; and I agree that it is within its penalties; Johnson v. The Commonwealth, 10 Harris 103; and was what was held in The Commonwealth v. Jeandell, 2 Grant 510. Thus an important element towards the success of the complainant's application for an injunction may be regarded as established.
Looking at this as settled, the next and the most material inquiry is, has it been charged and proved that the acts complained of were prejudicial to the rights of the complainants ? It is vital that this be clearly established, or there is no authority to interfere by injunction, let the infraction of the penal laws be ever so flagrant, and when this is so in any given case, it is a consideration which ought not to influence the decision in the case in the least; if it does, just so far will there be a disregard of the rightful exercise of civil jurisdiction, and a correspondent infringement of criminal jurisdiction, vested by the laws and constitution elsewhere. The remedy by injunction is preventive, and is designed to put a stop to acts which otherwise would work irreparable mischief if not restrained. As its operation is to tie the hands of one party indissolubly, the right to such a remedy is always required to be clear, and the wrong likely to ensue distinctly established. As already said, when this remedy is sought by a private party it is only for the redress of a private injury, excepting when incidentally it may go further and redress one against the public.
The bill before us charges the defendant with doing acts which constitute a private nuisance to the complainants, or the charge is nothing which is cognisable in equity. In form the charge is scarcely free -from liability to be demurred to, but this has not been done, and the case is before us on all the merits it contains. The charge must be. of injury to property, or rather its enjoyment, or other personal rights, or it is not a case for equity. What is its nature will best appear by a citation of the charging part of it. It is as follows: " That by reason of the said unlawful business (running cars on Sunday) carried on as aforesaid by the defendants, they (the complainants) have been and are, and will be deprived of their right of enjoying the Sabbath as a day of rest and religious exercise, free of all disturbance from merely unnecessary and unauthorized worldly employment; that they have been, are, and will be thereby deprived from enjoying peaceably, and without interruption the worship of Almighty God in their accustomed places of public worship, or in their own residences on the Sabbath day ; and that the lawful peace of the said day is thereby disturbed and broken ; and the right of property which they, possessed in their said churches or places of public worship, and in their private residences are and will continue to be thereby infringed upon, and their said churches and residences deteriorated and lessened in value."
It seems to me that this is clearly hut a charge of the violation of the provisions of the Act of Assembly of 1794, which interdicts worldly employment on the Sabbath day, and that it describes nothing but the consequences which were intended to be prevented by that act. If this be so, then it is not a case of special injury, but only that which results from a public offence or wrong to all, and every one in the community alike where the act is committed. It is not possible, I think; to discover the connection between the cause of complaint and a private injury, excepting in and through the act as prohibited by the statute. And if we are to regard it as a common-law offence, the charge in the bill does no more than describe the fruits of the offence. Rest and quiet, on the Sabbath day, with the right and privilege of public and private worship, undisturbed by any mere worldly employment, are exactly what the statute was passed to protect: 10 Casey 398. The deprivation of these privileges is the sum of the complaint, and this bill is essentially, therefore, a bill to enforce by injunction a penal statute. That is not our province, especially at the suit of a private party.
If it be supposed that because an act is illegal merely, equity will interfere to restrain it, it is a misapprehension of equity jurisdiction. " If an act be illegal," said Vice-Chancellor Kindersley, in Solteau v. De Held, 2 Sim. & Stew. 153, " I am not to grant an injunction to restrain an illegal act merely because it is illegal. I could not grant an injunction to restrain a man from smuggling, which is an illegal act." Nor could he for any merely criminal or penal offence.
Injunction is a civil remedy to arrest or prevent civil abuses, when granted at the instance of a private party. Because worldly employment on Sunday is interdicted by statute and an offence, it is not a reason, any more than in the case put by the vice-chancellor, why we should interfere in equity to prevent it. The penal law that is violated is provided with the machinery for punishing it, and to it the violation must be referred. One reason why equity cannot interfere is that there is a remedy at law by statute, and we must presume it adequate, for it is what the law has provided and no more. If it could he restrained because a public nuisance, it would only he at the instance of some one authorized by the Commonwealth, and not by a private party. We need not say it could by any authority.
The proofs exhibited by the plaintiffs are like the bill, and show only the public offence, we think. It is in substance that on the Sabbath day, devotional exercises, such as reading the Scriptures, engaging in public or private worship, and giving religious instruction to children, are disturbed, especially in front parts of their dwellings, and that the enjoyment of their pews in the churches along the line of the defendants' road is interfered with, because of an inability, on account of the noise incident to the ears at the moment of passing, of distinctly hearing what the minister is saying or reading ; and also because it is difficult, as proved by one witness at least, a respectable clergyman, to make himself heard by the congregation, and for these reasons it is, the property of the complainants is claimed to he injured and rendered less valuable.
If this be taken as the uncontradicted testimony, which is far from being the case, does it do more than establish the offence of a violation of the statute — and therefore is injurious because done on the Sabbath ? That this is only so, is evident from the evidence and the facts, and that of the same acts performed on other days there is no complaint of resulting injury to the plaintiffs' property or that of anybody's else. Separated from the offence against the day, there is no complaint of injury — associated with it there is injury according to the plaintiffs. Is it not certain, therefore, that it is because of a violation of the Sunday law, that it is an injury ? Eor this there is a remedy in the penal laws, and not by proceedings in equity, if we regard the facts as we ought to do.
It is not impossible to construct a plausible argument on the theory that any violation of a penal law is, without more, a special injury; hut such an injury would he too shadowy to be the foundation -for equitable interference; and besides the penal laAV is the remedy in such a case to redress it, and equity does not interfere.
But if there he any room for doubt of this view of the case, there are other aspects in which it seems impossible to sustain the decree, and one is," supposing the plaintiffs have set forth and proved an injury from the acts of the defendants, the proof, following the bill, makes a case of injury not tangible or material, but merely speculative and mental, or spiritual only, Avhich will be shown to be damnum sine injuria, and not cognisable in courts.
Before proceeding to this, however, we ought to refer to the position of the proof, not only in its application to the clause of the hill now to he specially noticed, hut to the whole bill, to show how utterly impossible it would be for this court to determine whether it establishes what the complainants claim for it, or the opposite. In the concluding portion of the charging part of the bill, it is charged that if the cars continue to be run, producing the effect set forth in the preceding clause of it, " the rights of property which they (plaintiffs) possess in their said churches or places of worship, and in their private residences, are and will continue to be thereby infringed upon, and their said churches and residences thereby deteriorated and lessened in value." It will thus be seen that the injury which the plaintiffs complain of to their property, occasioned by the defendants running passenger cars on Sunday, is not that it in any degree affects its material structure ; or that it is rendered unsafe to be occupied or uncomfortable in its ordinary and usual purposes; or that their pews are less comfortable and convenient as seats, but that the complainants will be deprived, by the running of the cars, of the right of enjoying the Sabbath as a day of rest and worship, free from the disturbance of worldly employment, and by this means their property is injured. The deterioration of property is thus attributed to the causes specified.
If there be such an injury to property disclosed in such a charge, the answer positively denies it, and the fact of damage and deterioration also. On these questions of fact the parties are at issue. Much testimony was given yw and con on this and the general question, whether running passenger cars on Sunday would, by its attendant noise, be a general annoyance and evil, or by the facilities it would afford to aged, infirm and distant residents from churches to get to them on Sundays, and a means of health to the public in a crowded city, enabling them on Sunday to get out, be a general benefit ? On this and all material questions in the case, the witnesses were in direct conflict. Divines, medical men, business men and property-holders, were in numbers examined, and with the exception of the medical men, stood generally on opposite sides of the question; the latter, and among them some of the most eminent in the city, thought the running •of cars would be a great sanitary measure and a public benefit. Property-owners on the same street, and pew-holders in the same churches, as well as in others, were directly antagonistic to each other. Persons opposite each other on the same streets, and equally exposed to the annoyance, if any, testified to entirely opposite experience in regard to whether the cars were on Sunday an injury to property or a benefit — an annoyance, or no-more so than on other days.
Thus stood the question below, and now stands. In a «m^s^sq-circumstanced, an English chancellor would not attempt Muecsefe'' until the right was established by a trial at law, either bf' an issue to be sent to a jury, or in an action at law. He would most probably send an issue containing the disputed facts to be tried by a jury. We have not always pursued this practice ; but it is obvious that there are cases in which we must resort to it, and if ever there was a case in which it would not only be proper, but necessary, it is this case. How can we determine, in a case where it depends on the testimony of witnesses, and where they are nearly equal in numbers and directly opposite in statements, who is right and who wrong ? We know nothing but from the counsel on the opposite sides about them. They speak through written statements, and generally prepared by counsel. We could not judge of the degree of weight the affiants are entitled to. In such a trial the most intelligent man, with the best opportunity for judging, and of the utmost candor, would appear in no better light than one the very opposite of this. Any decision on such testimony as to which party was right would obviously have no better basis than that of a guess.
It lies on a party who asks for a decree, the effect of which, if granted, is to bind his adversary hand and foot, to make out a clear case, of at least preponderating equity. He has no case if his equity is doubtful. In fact a doubtful equity would be an anomaly. It must bo free from doubt, or there is no equity. He must make a case in which the chancellor may act with a good conscience. No such case is before us. We have a mass of contradictions about the very right of the plaintiffs' claim. About whether there is any injury resulting to the plaintiffs in the matter complained of. I refer to this merely to show how impossible it would be for us with any confidence, being ever so desirous of deciding, to say which party is right, even supposing the kind of injury be such as a chancellor would redress by injunction. We could not. We will not send the case to a jury, for, taking the injury, as complained of, we do not think it a case for equity. We refer to this to show that the state of the testimony is such that no decree in its present state could with any certainty be made, even supposing a case for equitable interference be presented in the bill.
The ground alluded to, immediately preceding the last point, is now to be noticed, and which I think sufficient to have prevented an injunction from being granted in the first place; and that is the question whether the injury complained of is an injury to property at all; or if it can be held to affect property, whether it.is that sort of injury from which damages can be held to spring. To make out a case of special injury to property from a nuisance —for that is what is complained of beyond doubt — something materially affecting its capacity for ordinary use and enjoyment must be shown before the act complained of will be enjoined; something demonstrable in some way, not a speculative, fanciful injury to those occupying it. This complaint is special and attaches not to all, hut only to certain persons, and there is no standard by which damages for an infraction of mere peculiarities may be measured or discovered. On this point Sir Knight Bruce, when Vice-Chancellor, in Walters v. De Selfe, 4 De G. & Sm. 222, which was a case of alleged nuisance, for which an injunction was sought, asks, " ought this inconvenience to he considered in fact as more than fanciful, more than one of mere delicacy or fastidiousness, as an inconvenience materially interfering with ordinary comfort physically of human existence, not merely according to elegant modes and habits of living, but plain, sober and simple notions among the English people ?" He affirmed the inquiry as a rule in the case. Lord Romilly, Master of the Rolls, in a late case (1867) of Crump v. Lambert, Law Rep. 3 Eq. 409, adopts it, saying, " I apprehend it is strictly correct, and it agrees with the principle of all the cases reported at common law, and is approved in St. Helen's Smelting Co. v. Tipping, 11 H. L. C. 642."
Religious meditation, and devotional exercises, are a duty and a privilege undoubtedly, but result nevertheless from sentiments not universal in their demonstrations by any means, but peculiar to individuals rather than to the whole community. Of this, like the matter referred to in the authority cited, injury to it by disturbance cannot be measured by any standard applicable to the privation of ordinary comfort. It cannot be affirmed, in regard to the devotional exercise embraced within the privilege, that it is more than a mental disturbance — an inconvenience. Human tribunals cannot tell anything about the effect of mere noise occasioned by ordinary employments on the mind. The belief is reasonable that its operations are independent of such physical facts; that it is cognisant of its own impulses and emotions under all ordinary circumstances, when in its normal condition and free from disease. This is the rule of the criminal law, and it has never been held that a disturbance from ordinary causes excuses a criminal act. It seems to me that the rule expressed in the cases referred to is the only true one in judging of injury from alleged nuisances, viz., such as naturally and necessarily result to all alike who come within their influence. Not to one on account of peculiar sentiments, feelings or tastes, if it would have no effect on another, or all others without these peculiar sentiments or tastes. Not to a sectarian if it would not be to one belonging to no church. It must be something about the effects of which all agree ; otherwise, that which might be no nuisance to the majority, might be claimed to deteriorate property by particular persons. Noises which disturb sleep, bodily rest a physical necessity, noxious gases, sickening smells, corrupted waters and the like, usually affect the mass of the community in one and the same way, and may he testified to by all possessed of their natural senses, and can be judged of by their probable effect on health and comfort, and in this way damages may be perceived and estimated. Not so of that which only affects thought or meditation. What would disturb one in his reflections might not affect another. There can be no general rule or experience as to this; it is incapable of being judged of like those things which affect health or comfort. We are not without authority on this point. Owens v. Henman, 1 W. & S. 548, was a common-law action, it is true, but this does not affect the principle. The action was for disturbing the plaintiff, a member of the " Old Presbyterian Church of Wysox," by loud noises, in singing, reading and talking, so that the plaintiff, as he alleged in his narr., was prevented from hearing the preacher or joining in the religious exercises.of the occasion. The court decided for the defendant on the demurrer, and on ei'ror it was affirmed. Sergeant, J., in delivering the opinion of the court, said, " In the first place, the injury alleged is not the ground of an action. Ho (the plaintiff) claims no right in the building, or any pew in it, which has leen invaded. There is no damage to his property, health, reputation or person. He is disturbed in listening to a sermon by noises. Could an action be brought by every person whose mind or feelings were disturbed in listening to a discourse, or any other mental exercise (and it must be the same whether in church or elsewhere) by the noises, voluntary or involuntary, of others, the field of litigation would be extended beyond endurance. The injury, however, is not of a temporal nature; it is altogether of a spiritual character for whieh no action lies. It is settled that an action on the case does not lie where there is not any temporal damage, as against a woman who pretends herself single, and inveigles a man into a marriage, whereby he is disturbed in his conscience: 1 Com. Dig. 180 ; 1 Lev. 247. Nor does it lie for refusing to administer the sacrament: 1 Sid. 34. Nor for not reading divine service to plaintiff and the tenants of his manor: 5 Co. 73. In 5 B. & A. 356, it was decided that action will not lie for disturbing the plaintiff in the occupation of a seat in the body of a church, though he had contributed to the making of the seats." To the same point is The First Baptist Church v. The Utica and Schen. Railroad Co., 5 Barb. 313, in which is cited the last-mentioned case.
I take this rule to be well settled; and out of it arises another which seems equally well settled; and that is, that chancery will not enjoin the performance of acts for which damages may not be recovered at law. On this point, in Elmshirst v. Spencer, 2 Macn. & Gord. 45, Lord Cottenham said, " The plaintiff, before he can ask for the injunction, must prove that he has sustained such a substantial injury, by such acts of the defendant, as would have entitled him to recover at law in an action for damages." This is cited as the rule by the vice-chancellor in Solteau v. De Held, supra. So in Crump v. Lambert, Law Rep. 3 Eq. 409, supra. The Master of the Rolls in that case said, "the law on that subject is, I apprehend, the same, whether it be enforced at law or by bill in equity. In any case where a plaintiff could obtain damages at law, he is entitled to an injunction to restrain the nuisance in the courts. The real question in all such cases is the question of fact, viz., whether the annoyance is such as materially interferes with the ordinary comfort of human existence. This is what is established in St. Helen's Smelting Co. v. Tipping, and that is the question which is to be tried in this case." This rule is also recognised in Walter v. Selfe, supra, and in Sim. N. R. in Ch. 151. In the latter of these the doctrine is thus stated: " There is no such thing as an equitable nuisance: equity will only interfere in a case of nuisance when the act complained of is a nuisance at law." Many additional authorities might be added to the same effect, but the principle is obvious enough without more.
If, then, the doctrine of the cases of Owen v. Henman, and The Baptist Church v. The Utica and Schenectady Railroad Co., supra, be sound law, and I find nothing which in the least conflicts with them, it seems to me to follow as a necessary result that the plaintiffs in this case are not, on their bill and proof, entitled to an injunction; for on the authority of these and many other cases, as the facts stand, they would not be entitled to an action at law for damages. It must be difficult for any one to conceive of agencies, beneficial and innoxious, administering to the health, comfort and prosperity of all who come within their influence during six days of the week, becoming on the seventh pernicious to peace and destructive to property. It is not possible to be so in the sense in which the law regards the subject, namely, in its effect and operation on the ordinary and usual comforts and customary modes of living, and physical comforts of life. Noises that distress and annoy physically, deprive of sleep, shatter the nerves, and thus affect, or which may in time affect the health, are and ought to be regarded as nuisances. The ownership of property will not justify a use of it in such a way. The owner must either govern himself by the rule of the maxim sie utere tuo ut alienum non Icedas, or the law, acting through courts of equity, may compel him to do it. On this principle, a tinsmith in Philadelphia was restrained from working at unusual hours in the morning and evening, the proof upon which the decree was founded being an injury to property, by the injury to the health of its occupiers, on account of these noises. So in Solteau v. De Held, where the ringing of the bells was restrained. The ringing was almost incessant. The proof showed the num her of times a day tbe bells were rung, and their exact size, in order to show their capacity to interfere with the comfort and health of the owners of the property complaining — the ordinary physical comforts. On this ground they were enjoined, and probably greatly to the spiritual discomfort of those who rang them. Rut the latter had to give way to the former.
Rut ours is a different case. The bill charges an injury, not physical, but mental or spiritual. One which neither deprives the body of rest, refreshment or health. That this is the nature of the complaint is most 'evident, from the fact that the disturbing causes are the same, and no greater, on Sundays than on other days, and of this there is no complaint. How are we to determine whether the mind is injuriously disturbed or not ? To some it is granted that there may bo annoyance in the passing of cars on Sundays. To others it would be but an agreeable sound. To many it would be an annoyance, because of their views of the Sabbath. Rut, as already said, that is not in this case for want of power in this form, to take cognisance of it. - st It is not possible in my judgment to establish a material injury, where alone at most the mind is disturbed without the slightest bodily effect or interference with ordinary comfort. It is but an inconvenience incident to the situation, and not the subject of an adjudication in equity.
When we speak of the rest and quiet of the Sabbath as citizens of a city, we speak of it relatively. Nobody can expect the same quiet in a city as in the country. If we build houses and churches in it, we must make allowance for the habits, customs and interests of the city. If there be noises incident to a large population, we have undertaken to put up with them. We cannot prosecute them as nuisances.
If we don't like them, we cannot stop the city to accommodate us. Progress will not be stopped to accommodate anybody's convenience. It must yield in consideration of our interests in the thousand advantages in other respects of city life. We should not attribute the fault in our own position to faults in others. There is undoubtedly more noise affecting churches and residences in a city than in a country; but this is to be expected. And courts must regard this if parties do not. If the substance of the complaint be an inconvenience, it is a matter with which, ordinarily, courts cannot interfere. In their civil jurisdiction they have nothing to do with it; and it seems to us that this is one of that kind. We have referred to the fact that there are no complaints of interruption or disturbance of religious exercises in public or private, in churches or in private residences, on secular days, along the line of this railway. We have a right to regard this as evidence that they are not disturbed by the mere running cars, and would not be, if cars were run on Sundays as on other days. We ought to presume that both public and private worship is performed on week days as well as on Sundays along that line ; the character of the complainants, and I presume their witnesses, justifies this.
Nothing, therefore, more clearly shows, I think, that it is not the private, but the public aspect of the case, which gives it its interest. With the public aspect, as already said, we have no right to interfere. The penal laws correct that. If they be not adequate, it is not our fault; nor would that justify our going beyond our legitimate sphere of action. On the argument, the great question seemed to be the rights of the Sabbath; although we were not invested with power in the proceedings before us to regard that in any but a secondary light. We could do nothing in the case unless we could discover a private injury of such a nature as to authorize us to act; and in redressing that, enable us to vindicate the Sabbath. If to the lay mind this seems refinement, to the legal it is the very alphabet of his learning. We have not been able to discover such injury in the proofs before us, and hence the incidental power to protect the Sabbath against the defendants' acts does not exist.
We know from actual observation, that cars run on the streets of the city of Pittsburg, on Sundays, without obstruction or complaint, so far as we can learn; and as a matter of history, that they are used on that day in the cities of Boston, New York, Albany, Troy, Brooklyn, Hoboken, Jersey City, in Baltimore, Nashville, Cincinnati, Washington and St. Louis. It is not easy, therefore, to be reconciled to the belief that their running in the city of Philadelphia is a nuisance and injury to private property, and not so in these cities. We can more readily believe that they are not a nuisance at all, than that these communities are less devotional or less careful of their interests than ours. If we are to hold them all equal in intelligence and morality, we must regard it as public testimony that running passenger cars is not a nuisance or becomes such by the practice of running them on that day.
Independently of these considerations, which apply to pew-holders as well as private property-holders, I am not able to see where the right is in an individual pew-holder in a church to 'proceed in his own name to enjoin a nuisance against a church to which he belongs. That the right does not exist was expressly held in the Baptist Church v. The Utica and Schen. Railroad Co., supra. It was declared in that case, " That the congregation and society worshipping there, and not the plaintiff (a pew-holder) are the persons molested. The custody and management of the real estate of a religious corporation belongs to the plaintiff as trustee." This is reasonable, and I take it to be the law. This would be an answer to the bill as to the pew-holders as it stands, but it is not necessary to adjudicate this point finally now in the view we have taken of the case.
This decision is not intended to infringe on what this court has more than once held, namely, the force of the Act of 1794, and that all worldly business not excepted in it, is liable to its penalties. We mean to hold nothing else now. Eor a. century and three-quarters, the colony and State of Pennsylvania have been content to preserve the Sabbath day from the disturbance of worldly enjoyments, and as a day of rest — a day that might be enjoyed in devotional exercises and worship, public or private, by statutory penalties only. We hold no new doctrines, therefore, in this decision, but adhere to the old uninterrupted practice in regard to it, by leaving the complainants to the provisions of the statute to attain the end in view, if it be as I suppose it is, to preserve the day from merely worldly employment, and is infringed upon by the defendants. Were we to extend equity jurisdiction to such cases as this for the reasons and on the grounds shown, we should soon probably be engaged in hearing cases against all the great leading railroads in the state coming into Philadelphia, besides every other case of threatened or alleged infraction of the Sunday law, and soon possess ourselves' of a jurisdiction beneath the weight of which no court could stand. If the penalties in the law be not deemed suificient in any given case to preserve order and the " peace of the Sabbath," the legislature must amend the laws; we cannot supply their defects. For all these reasons and others which might be given, we think the injunction granted below should be set aside and bill dismissed.
And now, November 7th 1867, decree reversed and bill dismissed at the costs of the appellees.