Case Name: SILAS R. WILCOX v. ISAAC S. MOON
Court: Vermont Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Vermont
Decision Date: 1889-02
Citations: 61 Vt. 484
Docket Number: 
Parties: SILAS R. WILCOX v. ISAAC S. MOON.
Judges: 
Reporter: Vermont Reports
Volume: 61
Pages: 484–487

Head Matter:
SILAS R. WILCOX v. ISAAC S. MOON.
Libel. Innuendo. Motion in Arrest. Harmless LJn'or.
1. The language in the alleged libellous communication must be susceptible ■ of the meaning put upon it by the innuendo, in view of tbe other facts-stated in the declaration.
2'. Tin alleged libel was contained in a letter sent to the plaintiff’s wife,. which contained this language: “Do you know that the name of the hostler and yourself are coupled together and handled quite extensively all through the village, and claimed that you are intimate together ? And some shake their heads, and say it looks strange that he should ex-. change with his hostler.” Held, that, in view of the averments in the declaration, this language supported the innuendo ibat the-defendant thereby intended to charge the plaintiff with committing the crime of adultery with the wife of his hostler.
3. When the verdict of the jury shows that no harm can have accrued to a • party by reason of the charge of the court upon a particular point, no> • error can be assigned in that respect.
This was an action for libel. Plea, the general issue. Trial by jury at the February Term, 1889, Taft, J., presiding. Verdict for the plaintiff for one cent actual damages, and $333-exemplary damages.
The testimony of the plaintiff tended to-show that the alleged' libel was contained in a letter, written by the defendant, and! sent through the postoffice in Bennington to the plaintiff’s wife. The plaintiff took the letter from the office himself, it being-sealed, carried it home to his wife, who opened it, and'they then read it together. The plaintiff afterwards showed it*to several persons in the village of Bennington, but there was no evidence - that the plaintiff’s wife ever showed the letter to anyone except, the plaintiff. ■
At the conclusion of the plaintiff’s testimony-the defendant, moved the court to order a verdict in his favor, for-that the-declaration was insufficient in that the language of the alleuyd libel was not susceptible of the meaning put upon it by tin- innuendoes in the plaintiff’s declaration. The court, however, held. •that that part of the letter referring to exchange between the plaintiff and Marsh, and to the wife of Marsh, was susceptible of the meaning attributed to it by the innuendoes, and overruled the motion.
The court in charging the jury told them, that, in estimating ■the damages, they could consider the character and reputation of the plaintiff, to which the defendant excepted on the ground that, if there was any damage to his reputation, it had been ■caused by the acts of the plaintiff himself in showing the letter.
After verdict the defendant moved in arrest of judgment for *'the reason that the words charged in the declaration are not ; susceptible of the meaning given them, and did not impute the ■crime of adulteiy. Motion overruled, and judgment for the plaintiff on the verdict. Exceptions by the defendant.
The nature of the exception as to the sufficiency of the declaration appears in the opinion.
J. G. Baker, for the defendant.
An innuendo cannot extend beyond its natural meaning, the .•alleged libellous language, as 'considered in connection with the prefatory averments and the colloquium. There is nothing in •the language contained in this letter which is susceptible of the ■construction that the plaintiff has put upon it, viz., that the •writer intended to charge the plaintiff with the crime of adultery.
The charge of the cpurt pn the subject of damages was erroneous. If the character of the plaintiff has been injured by his ■ own act in exhibiting the letter, he should not be allowed to •■thereby enhance his damages at the expense of the defendant. GLloyd v. Jones, 60 Yt. 288.
Waterman, Martin & Hitt and W. B. Sheldon, for the plaintiff.
Where the alleged libellous words are susceptible of two ■meanings, is for the jury to say in which sense they were used. The jury in this ease must have found that the language was ¿used in the sense ascribed to it by the plaintiff, and this finding is conclusive, unless the language is not capable of that meaning, as in this case it clearly is. -1 Stark, on Sland. 60; 1 Chit. PI. 673; T'ownsh. on Sland. 169; Gates v. Bowker, 18 Yt. 23-
If the court below erred in its instruction to the jury on the question of damages, as we insist it did not, the defendant has-suffered nothing, since the jury found that there were no actual; damages.

Opinion:
The opinion of the court was delivered by
Boss, J.
1. The defendant's motion, at the close of the testimony, that the court order a verdict in his favor, and liis--motion in arrest of judgment, raise the same question ; the sufficiency of the declaration to sustain a judgment on the verdict for the plaintiff. As contended for the defendant, the alleged, libellous language is to be read in connection with the facts-stated in the antecedent averments, and the colloquium, applying the language, used to these facts. If the language used,, when so applied, does reasonably carry the meaning charged in the innuendo, the innuendo adds nothing. The office of theiunuendo is to point to a meaning which the language used may properly and naturally have, when applied to the facts set forth in the averments. So far as necessary to be considered in connection with the question raised, the antecedent averments allege that, at the time of publishing the alleged libellous communication, and at the time referred to in such communication, the plaintiff had a hostler in his employment; that he and his hostler were both married men, living and cohabiting with-their respective wives; and the colloquiumavers that the libellous communication, so far as relates to this question, was of and concerning-the plaintiff and his wife, and of and concerning the hostler and. his wife; and that the libellous communication was published to-the wife of the plaintiff. The claimed libellous language, so far-as relates to this question is, " Do you know that the name of' the hostler and yourself are coupled together and handled quite extensively all through the village, and claimed that you two are intimate together ? And some shake their heads, and say ifc-, looks strange that he should exchange with his hostler." Then the writer says he did not believe at the first, "but I have listened, I have watched, I have seen, therefore I speak from knowledge." The innuendo is that the writer intended to charge the plaintiff, by using the language quoted, when applied to the facts averred, with having committed adultery with the wife of his hostler. We think the language quoted, especially when used in connection with the preceding questions, and in connection with the facts alleged in the antecedent averments and colloquium, may reasonably and naturally import that the plaintiff had been criminally intimate with the wife of his hostler. Hence we think that the County Court did not err in refusing these motions.
2. That portion of the charge excepted to, if erroneous, evidently did not harm the defendant, inasmuch as the jury found the actual damages sustained by the plaintiff to be nominal. Hence the defendant can take no benefit from this exception! We therefore have not considered whether, under the special circumstances of this'case, the exception was well or illy taken.
The judgment of the County Court is affirmed.