Case Name: David FORD, Petitioner-Appellant, v. John W. WINGO, Warden, Respondent-Appellee
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 1973-01-03
Citations: 472 F.2d 148
Docket Number: No. 72-1627
Parties: David FORD, Petitioner-Appellant, v. John W. WINGO, Warden, Respondent-Appellee.
Judges: 
Reporter: Federal Reporter 2d Series
Volume: 472
Pages: 148–149

Head Matter:
David FORD, Petitioner-Appellant, v. John W. WINGO, Warden, Respondent-Appellee.
No. 72-1627.
United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.
Jan. 3, 1973.
David Ford, pro se.
Ed W. Hancock, Atty. Gen., Jack D. Guerrant, Asst. Atty. Gen., Frankfort, Ky., on brief for respondent-appellee.
Before PHILLIPS, Chief Judge, Mc-CREE, Circuit Judge, and CECIL, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion:
PER CURIAM.
Ford was convicted of store house breaking and sentenced for a period of five years in the Kentucky State Penitentiary. He appeals the order of the District Court denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus without an evi-dentiary hearing. The petition states that he filed a motion to vacate sentence in 1971 in the Warren Circuit Court at Bowling Green, Kentucky; that the State Circuit Court overruled his motion; and that the Court of Appeals of Kentucky affirmed. The District Court correctly held that Ford has exhausted his State remedies as required by 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
In his petition for habeas corpus, Ford contends that he was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel. He claims that the attorney employed by his mother failed to call certain witnesses on his behalf and that the attorney did not discuss or plan the course of action. In his "Rebuttal" he asserts that "the representation that he received from counsel was a sham, a farce and a mockery of justice and that counsel did not present petitioner's cause in any fundamental respect." He also claims that he was convicted upon uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice.
In dismissing the petition the District Court held that the averments of petitioner are conclusory and do not state any facts requiring an evidentiary hearing. The District Court held that:
"[H]e must allege facts, not conclusions, which, if true, would demonstrate that his counsel was ineffective to the extent that his trial was a farce and mockery of justice. Giving the most generous interpretation to petitioner's allegations, such a conclusion is not lawfully possible."
We hold that the District Court did not commit reversible error in refusing to conduct an evidentiary hearing under the averments of the petition.
In his behalf on appeal, Ford avers that during the course of his trial, the State trial judge stood up from the bench and said:
"Hold it a minute . . . the defendant's past record is supposed to have some bearing because that is what we are trying him on, the past record."
This contention does not appear in the petition for writ of habeas corpus or the document which Ford filed as a rebuttal to the return. Under long settled rules this issue cannot be raised for the first time at the appeal level.
Affirmed.