Case Name: Lewis E. WADSWORTH, III, Appellant, v. FIRST UNION NATIONAL BANK OF FLORIDA, et al., Appellees
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1990-08-02
Citations: 564 So. 2d 634
Docket Number: No. 89-272
Parties: Lewis E. WADSWORTH, III, Appellant, v. FIRST UNION NATIONAL BANK OF FLORIDA, et al., Appellees.
Judges: DANIEL, C.J., and COBB, HARRIS and GRIFFIN, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 564
Pages: 634–639

Head Matter:
Lewis E. WADSWORTH, III, Appellant, v. FIRST UNION NATIONAL BANK OF FLORIDA, et al., Appellees.
No. 89-272.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
Aug. 2, 1990.
Jason G. Reynolds of Coble, Barkin, Rot-hert, Gordon, Morris, Lewis & Reynolds, P.A., Daytona Beach, for appellant.
William S. Belcher of Belcher & Fleece, P.A., St. Petersburg, and Hamilton D. Up-church of Upchurch, Bailey & Upchurch, P.A., St. Augustine, for appellees.

Opinion:
ON MOTION FOR REHEARING EN BANC
DAUKSCH, Judge.
We withdraw our prior opinion in this case and issue this opinion in its stead.
This is an appeal from an order in a probate case which determined that the decedent's domicile at death did not pass as homestead property. We affirm.
Article X, section 4(c), Florida Constitution provides:
(c) The homestead shall not be subject to devise if the owner is survived by spouse or minor child, except the homestead may be devised to the owner's spouse if there be no minor child. The owner of homestead real estate, joined by the spouse if married, may alienate the homestead by mortgage, sale or gift and, if married, may by deed transfer the title to an estate by the entirety with the spouse. If the owner or spouse is incompetent, the method of alienation or encumbrance shall be as provided by law.
Additionally sections 732.401 and 732.-4015, Florida Statutes (1987) provide statutory support for the above constitutional provision.
732.401 Descent of homestead.—
(1) If not devised as permitted by law and the Florida Constitution, the homestead shall descend in the same manner as other intestate property; but if the decedent is survived by a spouse and lineal descendants, the surviving spouse shall take a life estate in the homestead, with a vested remainder to the lineal descendants in being at the time of the decedent's death.
(2) If the decedent was domiciled in Florida and resided on real property that the decedent and the surviving spouse owned as tenants by the entirety, the real property shall not be homestead property.
732.4015 Devise of homestead. — As provided by the Florida Constitution, the homestead shall not be subject to devise if the owner is survived by a spouse or minor child, except that the homestead may be devised to the owner's spouse if there is no minor child.
The pertinent facts are that the decedent, Lewis E. Wadsworth, II, married Sonia M. Wadsworth after entering into an antenup-tial agreement. Lewis and Sonia agreed that Sonia would receive no homestead rights in the subject property. She waived her constitutional homestead rights.
After the will was admitted to probate the two adult children (there were no minor children) sought to have the court set aside the property as homestead so they could take it as lineal descendants and so that it did not pass under the residuary clause in the will. They argue that because decedent was survived by a spouse that the constitution forbids the devise of homestead property and thus the will cannot devise the property. Because there was no specific devise of the property, it would fall into the residuary clause and go to the named residuary devisees.
Appellees, the personal representatives of the estate, argue that because the widow had relinquished her homestead rights and because there were no minor children that the property does not pass as homestead under the constitution or the cited statutes. They argue that the waiver of rights was the legal equivalent of the prior death of the wife and cite Hulsh v. Hulsh, 431 So.2d 658 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983). The court in Hulsh said the waiver was the "functional equivalent of death" of the wife. Thus, because there was no surviving wife or minor children the property properly went under the will.
Because section 732.401, above set out, defines how homestead property descends, the appellants have an interest to have the property pass as homestead. They are the first lineal descendants and receive the fee interest in the property after the widow's life estate.
Section 732.702(1), Florida Statutes permits a surviving spouse to waive her home stead rights, if done in writing, either before or after marriage. No constitutional or other attack has been made against this statute and we can determine no reason to not apply it here. When Sonia waived her homestead rights she did so for all purposes and no one can claim a right through her.
Appellants urge that section 732.401 somehow vests some rights in them. We disagree. It is the constitution which primarily controls here and Article X, section 4(c) is designed to protect two classes of persons only: surviving spouses and minor children. Appellants are neither of these, they are adult children. In In Re Estate of McGinty, 258 So.2d 450 (Fla.1971) it was held by our supreme court that "The class of persons designated as 'minor children' is substantially different from and inconsistent with, 'lineal descendants.' " [emphasis supplied].
Because the statute permits the surviving spouse to waive her constitutional right, and she did so, it was waived. Estate of De Garcia v. Garcia, 399 So.2d 486 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981). When decedent died with no one there to assert a homestead right the property could pass by devise and it did under the residuary clause of the will. See also City National Bank of Florida v. Tascher, 557 So.2d 615 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990).
We certify the following question of great public importance to the Supreme Court of Florida:
CAN A SPOUSE WAIVE HER RIGHTS TO HOMESTEAD PROPERTY SO AS TO PERMIT DEVISE BY THE OWNER OF THE HOMESTEAD PROPERTY?
AFFIRMED.
DANIEL, C.J., and COBB, HARRIS and GRIFFIN, JJ., concur.
COWART, J., dissents with opinion in which GOSHORN, and PETERSON, JJ., concur. W. SHARP, J., did not participate.
. (1) The right of election of a surviving spouse, the rights of the surviving spouse as intestate successor or as a pretermitted spouse, and the rights of the surviving spouse to homestead, exempt property, and family allowance, or any of them, may be waived, wholly or partly, before or after marriage, by a written contract, agreement, or waiver, signed by the waiving party. Unless it provides to the contrary, a waiver of 'all rights,' or equivalent language, in the property or estate of a present or prospective spouse, or a complete property settlement entered into after, or in anticipation of, separation, dissolution of marriage, or divorce, is a waiver of all rights to elective share, intestate share, pretermitted share, homestead property, exempt property, and family allowance by each spouse in the property of the other and a renunciation by each of all benefits that would otherwise pass to either from the other by intestate succession or by the provisions of any will executed before the waiver or property settlement.