Case Name: William J. Albert, and Emily J., his wife, vs. William Winn, James Ross, et al.
Court: Court of Appeals of Maryland
Jurisdiction: Maryland
Decision Date: 1849-06
Citations: 7 Gill 446
Docket Number: 
Parties: William J. Albert, and Emily J., his wife, vs. William Winn, James Ross, et al.
Judges: The cause was argued before Dórsey, C. J., Magruder, Martin and Frick:, J.
Reporter: Reports of cases argued and determined in the Court of Appeals of Maryland
Volume: 7
Pages: 446–487

Head Matter:
June Term, 1849.
William J. Albert, and Emily J., his wife, vs. William Winn, James Ross, et al.
A bill was filed in chancery on the 14th of September 1846, by the creditors of J, alleging his insolvent condition, and that he designed to give an undue preference to certain of his creditors, especially A and wife. Upon this bill an injunction was granted, restraining J from giving, and A and wife from receiving, any such preference. On the 29th of the same month, A and wife filed a bill on the equity side of Baltimore county court, alleging J’s indebtedness to them on account of his misapplication of certain trust funds belonging to the wife of A, and his promise to secure them by a conveyance of certain real estate, which he had failed to do, and praying that he might be decreed to pay them the sum thus due under the trust. J answered this bill, admitting its averments, and on the 31st of October following, a decree was passed by Baltimore county court, directing J to bring into court the amount ascertained and admitted to bo due to the complainants. Held :
That the original bill of the 14th of September, drew to the court of chancery the whole litigation in regard to the distribution of J’s estate; that the proceedings of A and wife, in. Baltimore county court, were in violation of the chancellor’s injunction, and that it was competent for the court of chancery to restrain, by injunction, the execution of this decree, and treat the whole proceeding in said'county court as a nullity.
The case of Ellieott Vs. V. S. Insurance Company, ante 307, is distinguished from this case, and is not in-conflict with it.
The appropriate remedy for A and wife was, in chancery, on the original bill, that court having ample power to afford them the relief which they sought in another form, in another court of concurrent jurisdiction.
In this case the court decided, that a deed conveying all the grantor’s pro. perty to certain trustees, in trust: 1st. To defray the expenses attending the execution of the trust. 2nd. To the payment of the several creditors named in the schedule annexed to the deed. 3rd. To the payment of the claims of such creditors as shall, on or before a given day, execute and deliver to the trustees full and absolute releases and acquittances of such claims; and 4th. If any surplus shall remain, to apply the same to the satisfaction of the claims of all other" creditors of the grantor, without distinction or priority, was fraudulent and void, both at common law, and under the statute of the 13fft of Elizabeth. — [See note at the end of the case.]
Upon review of all the authorities, it was the opinion of the court in this case, that a deed which does not fairly devote the property of the debtor, in desperate circumstances, to the payment of his creditors, but prescribes to them the terms upon which they shall receive part payment, is, in law, fraudulent and void.
Where a conveyance is good in part and' bad in part, as against the provisions of a statute, it is void in toto, although there be no fraud intended.
Appeal from the Court of Chancery.
On the 14th of September 1846, Johns Hopkins and others, creditors of Samuel Jones, filed a bill in chancery against said Jones, the appellants, Albert and wife, and one- Michael S. Norman, alleging that Jones who had been trading under the name of Talbot Jones Sp Co., was indebted to the complainants and others, in the large sum of $200,000, whilst the whole of his assets did not amount to more than $100,000; that being thus hopelessly insolvent,-and knowing himself to be so, and having no reasonable expectation of being exempt from liability or execution, on account of his debts, without applying for the benefit of the' insolvent laws, and designing and threatening to prefer certain of his creditors, his near relations, said Jones was about to transfer a large portion of his property to his brother-in-law, and sister, (Albert and wife,) and to said Nbrman, also his brother-in-law, with the intent thereby to give them an undue and improper preference over the rest of his creditors. That complainants being about to institute suit against Jones, to compel him to apply for the benefit of the insolvent laws, he had changed his residence, that he might the longer delay his creditors, and better secure to his favorite creditors,- the preferences which he contemplated. The bill then proceeds to state,- of what the property and effects of said Jones consisted, and prays that a receiver may be appointed, to take charge of the same, until a trustee in insolvency should be appointed, and for an injunction to restrain said Jones “from conveying, assigning or transferring, any of his property or effects, rights or credits, to the said Albert and wife, and Norman, to secure or pay the debt due to'them, in preference to the rest of his creditors, and to restrain the said Albert and wife and Norman, from receiving any such preference.”
Exhibits of the indebtedness of Jones, being filed with the bill, it was on the same day submitted by the register, to Cornelius McLean a solicitor in chancery, (the chancellor himself being absent,) who endorsed thereon as follows: “I have read this bill and think that an injunction ought to issue.— Cornelius McLean, solicitor.”
The injunction was then issued as prayed, and served upon the defendants; and the granting thereof was approved by the chancellor, (Bland,) on the 8th of October 1846, by order, endorsed upon the bill.
On the 29th of September 1846, the said Albert, and Emily his wife, filed a bill on the equity side of Baltimore county court, against said Samuel Jones, alleging that complainant, Emily, was cestui que trust, under the will of her late father Talbot Jones, of a large amount of stocks and other property; which the said Samuel held as trustee for her use/ a largo portion of which property he had appropriated to his own use; that the amount of this trust fund for which said Samuel was ¡responsible to complainant, was $24,319.34. That in November last, complainants applied to said Samuel to replace this trust fund, or to substitute for it property of equal value, and that he then promised and pledged himself, to grant and convey to your oratrix Emily, certain property known as the “ Wheat-field, Inn” which conveyance has never been made. This bill then prays that said Samuel Jones, may be decreed to pay to the complainants the sum of money thus due to them under said trust, and misapplied by him to his own purposes. On this bill a subpoena was issued and served upon the defendant, and made returnable on the 1st of October then next, on which day Jones appeared by counsel, but failing to answer, an interlocutory decree, under the act of Assembly, was passed on the 6th of October, and on the same day a commission to take testimony was issued, under which various testimony in relation to the trust fund and the amount thereof, was taken, and returned on the Sth of the same month.
On the 22nd of the same month, (October 1846,) the same parties, Albert and wife, filed a second bill in the same court, against the same defendant, Jones, of the same import as the first, respecting the debt due on the trust fund; and further charging, that said Jones, being largely indebted, is about to convey to trustees, for the benefit oí' such of his creditors as will give him releases of their claims, all his property, including the “ Wheatfield Inn ” upon which complainants claim an equitable lien for the reasons stated in their former Bill. This bill then prays for an injunction restraining said Jones from conveying to any person or persons whatever his property and effects, and especially the 11 £ Wheatfield Inn.” An injunction was, on the same day, issued as prayed, which was afterwards, on the 26th. of the same month, by agreement, modified, so as to affect only the “ Wheatfield Inn” property.
On the 30th of the same month, (October 1846,) Jones answered the first bill of Albert and wife, admitting his indebtedness to the complainant, his sister Emily, and his appropriation of her trust money, and his promise to reinstate the same by a conveyance of the “Wheatjield Inn;” and further staling, that since the filing of this bill he had conveyed all his property, except said £‘ Wheatjield Inn” to James Ross and William Winn, “ for the general benefit of his creditors.” The court, (Le Grand, J.,) on the next day, (31st of October 1846,) passed a decree, directing Jones to bring into court forthwith, the sum of $24,319.34, to be paid to complainants, for the use and benefit of the said Emily J. Albert, and the other cestuis que trusts mentioned in the will of Talbot Jones, deceased.
On the 4th of November following, Winn and Ross filed their petition, praying the court to strike out the above decree, and that they might be made parties defendants to the bill. This petition states, that Jones, on the 26th of October last, conveyed by deed, all his property, except the “ Wheatjield Inn,” to the petitioners, for the benefit of his creditors generally, and had covenanted to convey that property also, as soon as the injunction forbidding him to do so should be dissolved, and therefore the petitioners are interested in the object of said bill. This petition also discloses die fact of the filing of the bill in chancery, of the 14th of September 1846, by Johns Hopkins, and others, creditors of said Jones, and the granting of the injunction thereon, and charges, that the bill in this case was filed, and the proceedings thereunder were had with a fraudulent intent and design to evade said injunction of the court of chancery, the existence of which was purposely concealed by the parties, from the knowledge of this court. It further states, that Jones expressly agreed, on the 28th of October, with the solicitor of your petitioner, that his answer should not be filed before the ensuing Saturday morning, at 1 o’clock, and that this delay was asked and granted for the avowed purpose of enabling your petitioners to obtain a copy of the deed executed by Jones to them, in order that it might be made the foundation of an application by them to be made parties defendants therein.
Jones, by his answer to this petition, denies all fraud or concealment, and in regard to the agreement respecting the filing of his •answer, states, that he considered the delay asked for, was merely for the purpose of procuring a copy of the deed to be filed with his answer, and having afterwards learned from Mr. Glenn, one of his counsel, that this was unnecessary, he filed his answer, simply stating the fact, that he had made the deed. The complainants, Albert and imfe, also deny all fraud and concealment, and aver their entire ignorance of any agreement or understanding respecting the filing of Jones’ answer.
On the 19th of December 1846, the court, (Le Grand, J.,) passed an order, dismissing this petition, and delivered the following opinion:
“The petition states, that the petitioners are trustees, under a deed executed by Jones for the benefit of his creditors, and asks that the decree heretofore passed in the cause may be opened, and the petitioners made parties thereto. The bill was filed on the 29th September last. It alleges in substance, that by the last will and testament of Talbot Jones, deceased, (father of the complainant, Emily J.,) a trust was created in her behalf, and that the defendant Jones, as surviving trustee of the said Emily, used for his own purposes the trust fund, and that he promised after the application of the fund to his own purposes, to secure the same to the complainants, by the conveyance of a certain property in the city of Baltimore, known as the “ Wheatfteld Inn” but he has never made such conveyance in compliance with said promise. The bill then prays, as for relief, that the court will decree the payment by Jones, of the amount so misapplied to his own uses, which is set out and declared in the bill. There is no prayer for the specific performance of the alleged contract of Jones, to convey the “Wheatfteld Inn.” Subsequently an interlocutory decree was passed, and testimony taken under it. On the 30th of October, Jones filed his answer, in which he admits the bequests as contained in the will of his father, and stated in the bill, and that “he used the stocks and moneys as alleged in said bill, belonging to the said Emily, and so held by him in trust,” he also admits the agreement to convey the “Wheal-field Inn” as stated in the bill, and he submits to such decree in the premises, as this court may make. On the 31st of October, this court signed a decree. On the 4th November, on the petition of the petitioners, Moss and Winn, this court passed an order suspending said decree, until its further order. By the petition and accompanying copy of the bill, it appears that Johns Hopkins and otjier creditors of Jones, filed their bill in the court of chancery, on which an injunction issued, enjoining and prohibiting the said Jones from conveying, assigning or transferring any portion of his property or effects tp the said William Albert, or Emily his wife, or to any other of the creditors of Jones, or to any one in trust for them, to secure or pay the debts due from Jones to them, «fee. This bill was filed on th,e 8th October 1846. On the 22nd October, on another bill, this court enjoined Jones from conveying his property to any one. On this state of the case, counsel have argued many questions, which, with all respect for their opinions, do not appear to the mind of the court, to be involved in the proceeding. Jt will be time enough to consider them when they properly arise. Jt is insisted by counsel for petitioners, that owing to the fraud and concealments of the complainants and defendants, this court was not informed of the interest of the petitioners in this proceeding, and this allegation yests upon the fact of an arrangement having been entered into by the defendant Jones, and one of the counsel of the petitioners, that he, Jones, would not file his answer before a certain day. So far as the complainants are concerned, they not only deny all fraud and concealment, but aver they were ignorant of any such agreement or understanding, and there is not apartide of testimony to show the contrary. Jones also denies fraud, and shows what he considered the meaning and purport of the agreement. On these facts, there might possibly be made out a case of mistake, but not of fraud.
It has also been contended, that this proceeding has been in violation of the injunction issued by the chancellor; if this be so, this court is unable to perceive the fact. ' The injunction only prohibited Jones from giving, and the complainants from receiving from him a conveyance of any of his property, &c. There has been no such conveyance by Jones; all that has been done by the complainants, is the prosecution of a suit? commenced before the high court of chancery was applied to by the creditors of Jones. How this can be considered an infraction of the injunction, it is impossible to perceive. It might,however, be a very serious question, whether these petitioners have not violated that injunction by taking the deed from Jones before the injunction was .dissolved; and if they have, then it is manifest they have no standing under that deed in any court: but as this question is not necessarily involved in this case, the court will avoid the expression of any opinion in regard to it. Did however the court consider the other creditors of Jones entitled to b.e made parties to this suit, it would be compelled to consider and decide on the validity of the deed to Jones; but regarding the proceedings as but an ordinary one, in which the cestui que trusts are only seeking to compel the trustee to make good the funds which he has misapplied, it is difficult to perceive what other parties have to do with it.. The amount of the debt is alleged in the bill, and is admitted, as is also the misapplication of the trust fund, in the answer. Had a spit been instituted at law, on a matter perfectly cognizable by it, for instance, on a promissory note, the defendant admitting his handwriting, how would such court receive the opposition to the rendition of a verdict by a jury, for the amount of the note, on the ground, that the defendant had other creditors, and that he was unable to pay all the full amount dpetoth.em? Would such a defence, either from the defendant, or froni third parties, be listened to ? To such a question no answer is required, for it answers itself. The judgment would be entered up on the verdict, and those who thought they could deprive it of its efficiency, would have to institute proceedings to that end. To the mind of the court, this case involves precisely the same question. — If Jones ever becomes an applicant for the benefit, of the insolvent laws, his permanent trustee may, if he thinks he can do so successfully, call these complainants to an account, on the ground that they have received an undue and improper preference; but until such an event occurs, this court knows of no right in one creditor to object to another obtaining a decree or judgment in the regular course of judicial proceeding. But it has been sup posed and so argued, that this decree has not been obtained regularly, that is to say, the case was never submitted. The answer admits all the facts in the bill, for which the bill prays a decree, and submits to the court to pass such a decree as it deems proper. If such a proceeding requires to be set down for hearing, then at least one-half the decrees passed by this court are erroneous. But the practice has been uniformly different. Where there is no denial of the equity stated by the bill, and submission to a decree in the answer, the court has always, so far as I know, and from inquiry have been informed, considered the case ready for decree. Such the court considered this case to be, and dealt with it accordingly. The decree has been drawn up inartificially, and requires some slight reformation, which will be made nunc pro tunc. It was in the bosom of the court from the day it was signed, the court having promised Mr. Dulany so to consider it on the day it was signed. Entertaining these views, it is thereupon oidered, this 19th day of December A. D. 1846, that the petition of Ross and Winn be, and the same is hereby dismissed with costs.”
On the 13th of January 1847, Winn and Ross, and the complainants in the original suit of Hopkins and others, of the 14th of September 1846, filed their bill in chancery against Albert and wife, Jones and others, stating the object of the original suit, and the injunction thereon, and the subsequent proceedings of Albert and wife in Baltimore county court, resulting in the decree of that court, of the 31st of October 1846, and seeking to set aside the same as fraudulent and void against the complainants, and to stay, by injunction of the court of chancery, execution thereof, against any property of Jones. This bill sets forth the deed of Jones conveying to Winn and Ross all his property, for the benefit of his creditors, and avers, that the same is valid and operative, and vests the title of all oí Jones’ property in said trustees. It avers, that the decree of Baltimore county court was fraudulently obtained, and designed and contrived, to give to the parties obtaining it, an undue and improper preference over the rest of the creditors of Jones. It prays, that the “ Wheatfield Inn,” as well as the rest of the property of said Jones, may be declared charged, in the hands of the trustees, with the payment of the debts, as expressed in the deed, and that the trustee may be permitted to account for the trust property under the direction of this court, which the bill asks shall assume jurisdiction over the whole subject, with a view to the distribution of the estate amongst the creditors, upon just and equitable principles. It also states, that Jones had applied for the benefit of the insolvent laws, on the 11th of January 1847, and that a provisional trustee had been appointed.
The deed of Jones to Winn and Ross, is filed with this bill as an exhibit. It is dated the 26th of October 1846, and convejrs to the grantees, “all the property, estate and effects whatsoever,” of the grantor, except the “Wheatfield Inn,” intrust, to sell the same, and apply the proceeds as follows: “First, to defray the costs and' charges attending the execution of this trust, including a commission of eight per cent on the amount collected, to be retained by the trustees for their trouble in executing this trust.” “Secondly, to the payment to the several creditors named in the schedule hereunto annexed, of the sums of money thereby admitted to be due to them respectively, the aggregate of said sums amounting to $4801.33;” and “thirdly, to the payment of the claims of such of the creditors of the said Samuel Jones, Jr., (whether contracted by him in the prosecution of his aforesaid trade, or otherwise,) as shall, on or before the first day of January next, execute and deliver to the said trustees, full and absolute releases and acquittances to the said Samuel Jones, Jr., of and from the aforesaid claims, and if the proceeds of the aforesaid funds, remaining after satisfaction of the preceding trusts, shall prove unequal to the payment in full of the claims of the creditors releasing as aforesaid,, then the same proceeds shall be distributed amongst such creditors so releasing, ratably and proportionably to the amounts of their respective claims, and if any surplus shall remain, after satisfying the aforesaid creditors, then, fourthly, to apply the same surplus to the payment and satisfaction of the claims of all the creditors of the said Samuel Jones, Jr., without any distinction or priority whatever.” It also contains a covenant on the part of Jones, that, whenever the injunction restraining the transfer of the “ Wheatñeld Inn” shall be dissolved, he will convey the said property to the same parties, “to be held by them upon the same trusts, and with the like powers, as the estate and property hereby conveyed.”
An injunction restraining further execution of the decree in jBaltimore county court, was then issued as prayed.
The answers of Jones, and of Albert and wife, to this bill, deny all fraudulent combination charged in relation to the proceedings in Baltimore county court, and aver that the decree of that court is valid and effectual, as a decree of a court of competent jurisdiction, fairly and bona fide rendered, and that it can only be annulled, if there be error in it, upon appeal to a superior tribunal. The answer of Albert and wife, also denies the validity of the deed executed by Jones to Winn and Boss, on the 26th of October 1846.
On the 18th of January 1847, Albert and wife filed their answer to the original bill of Johns Hopkins, and others, alleging the same facts in defence, as they had before averred in their bill of complaint in Baltimore county court.
On the 28th of April 1847, the complainants, Winn and Ross, filed their petition in the cause, stating, that since the filing of their original bill on the 13th of January 1847, they had been appointed permanent trustees of said Jones, and praying leave by an amended or supplemental bill, to set out their title as such permanent trustees.
This petition was resisted by the defendants, but the chancellor, (Johnson,) on the 30th of April 1S47, passed an order, permitting a supplemental bill to be filed without prejudice to the injunction already issued, but with liberty to the defendants, after filing their answer to such supplemental bill, to move for a dissolution of the injunction upon five days’ notice.
A supplemental bill was accordingly filed, and upon the coming in of the answers, a motion was made to dissolve the injunction, upon the hearing of which motion on the 1st of December 1847, the chancellor passed an order continuing the same until final hearing, or further order.
From this order the defendants, Albert and wife, appealed to this court.
The two opinions of the chancellor (Johnso'n,) in this case, ©ne delivered upon the application for leave to fileasupplemental bill, and the other upon the motion to dissolve the injunction, will be found reported in the 2nd vol. Maryland Chancery Decisions, 42.
The cause was argued before Dórsey, C. J., Magruder, Martin and Frick:, J.
By Donaldson and Nelson, for the appellants,' and
By Alexander and Dulaney, for the appellees.

Opinion:
Magruder J.,
dissented and delivered the following opinion :
In determining any question which can properly arise upon this appeal, it is certainly not necessary to inquire what would llave been the equities' of these parties, and in what forum these equities must have been adjusted, if Samuel Jones, one of the appellants, had not become an applicant for the benefit ©four insolvent laws: Although if no such appl ication had been made, or if, notwithstanding such application, such of the insolvent's creditors as had judgments or liens upon his property, were still at liberty to proceed, in our courts, as they might have proceeded, had no such application been made, the law ©r equity of their case might be very different, yet then, as well as now, we should be met, in limine, with (he question: Whence the power or jurisdiction of our court of chancery, to interfere, by its injunction, with the decrees of other equity courts, possessing in the premises ail its equity jurisdiction 1
"The maxim," says chancellor Sanford, (1 Hopkins 79,) "that every right has' its remedy, and that where the law does not give redress, equity will afford relief, however just in theory, is subordinate to positive institutions and cannot be applied, either to subvert established rules of law,-or give to the court a jurisdiction hitherto unknown." Again, p. 85: "The maxim which teaches, that a judge should amplify his own jurisdiction, has no place in our institutions. The utility of this court, (chancery,) so important in the general structure of our system, will be best consulted and preserved, by preserving its jurisdic tion within the limits that are now established." Is the power to grant the injunction, which was granted in this case, within those limits ?
There was a time, when the jurisdiction of chancery to give relief, even after a judgment at law, was gravely questioned. It has, however, been long settled, both here and in England, that injunctions might be issued for such purpose. But can such relief be had in all cases ? Not if there was always in the case, a prompt and adequate remedy at law; nor for a matter of which the defendant might have availed himself at law, 1 John. Ch. Rep., 51. In Matthews vs. Joer, 9 Wheaton, it was said: "A question decided at law, cannot be reviewed in a court of equity, without tile suggestion of some equitable circumstance, of which the party could not avail himself at law. Were a court of equity, in a case of concurrent jurisdiction, to try a cause already tried at law, without the addition of any equitable circumstance,to give jurisdiction, it would act as an appellate court, to affirm or reverse a judgment already rendered, on the same circumstances by a competent tribunal." See also 2 Hen. & Mumford, p. 146, and 1 Johnson's Ch. Rep., p. 95.
But upon what ground can the chancery court, meddle with a decree and proceedings in a case in the county court, as a court of equity ? It must not be said that it possesses this power, because it always had concurrent jurisdiction with the county court, and having first got possession of this case, therefore it has a right to-act upon the whole subject? This is not sustained by the record. The bill upon which the assertion is made to rest, if indeed it was properly before us, was to prevent Jones from conveying to the other defendants therein named, any of his property, thereby giving an undue preference-to them: and asking, too, for a receiver. This surely is not the commencement of a suit, which impeaches a decree of another court, and asks the chancellor to take jurisdiction of a trust. But if, in truth, the first bill gave to the chancery court all the jurisdiction which we are told it thereby acquired, is a second injunction- the proper remedy for a breach of the first ? The complainants ought to have sought relief in the first suit, before the application of the insolvent, it must have all the by applying for an attachment of contempt, and not by a second original bill, which surely is no supplement to the first.
But even if every thing thus far insisted upon be admitted, of what advantage will it be to the appellees? It must be granted, that when two courts have concurrent jurisdiction, the plaintiff ought not at the same time to proceed in both courts, for the same thing. If he should, and the suits be pending in courts of common law, the defendant may plead in the second suit, the pendency of the former action, and thereby defeat the second action. In equity, however, it is quite different. If the complainant has two suits pending against the same defendant for the same thing, the court upon application will put him to his election, and oblige him to dismiss, not his first suit, hut the one or the other.
Equally groundless is the notion, that the complainants here have a right to object, that the defendants are the complainants in the county court. The complainant ought, indeed to confine himself to one court, but the defendants, if they have a cause of action, (especially if it be not against the same complainants, as is the case here,) may select any court, whether of law or equity, which has jurisdiction. Here the controversy in the county court, is not with the same persons, or for the same thing; the decree, in either case, would not be evidence in the other; the rights of no stranger to the suit would be prejudiced by such decree, but as this court has often said, such a decree is fraudulent and void, as to all such parties.
But the obyious answer to all that has been said in this case, upon the subject of concurrent jurisdiction, is, that the debtor has elected to ask the relief which our insolvent laws offered to him. Upon this application being made, and the trustees being appointed, the act of 1805, chap. 110, says, the county court shall direct the trustee to sell and convey the property conveyed to him, as they, (the county court,) shall think most for the advantage of the creditors, and the produce shall be distributed among the creditors, after satisfying all incumbrances, judgments and liens. For this court's exposition of this law, see the case of Alexander vs. Ghiselin, 5 Gill, 138.
The appointment of permanent trustees, being made known to the chancellor, by the last bill of the appellees, there could exist no ground for the continuance of this injunction, and no reason for asking a continuance of it, as the complainants in the suit in the county court, could not proceed at law to execute their decree, and the court which passed it, and which, ip virtue of the debtor's application, has the exclusive administration of all his assets, could of course hinder any proceedings under a ft. fa.
The complainants in their several bills of complaint, assume that the deed of trust, which several of Jones creditors obtained from him, may be impeached by others of the creditors. As yet however, none of the creditors whose right it is, have thought proper to impeach this deed. Surely no law gives to the chancellor the power ex officio, to declare it either void or valid. In answer to a remark once made to Lord Redesdale, (1 Sch. & Lef., 204,) that great injustice had been done to the complainant, he very correctly said: ££lt is not sufficient to sfipw that injustice has been done, but that it has been done under circumstances which authorise the court to interfere."' Who having the right to do it, has asked the chancery court to declare this deed of trust to be fraudulent ? A deed, though it be actually fraudulent as to creditors, can never be adjudged to be so, until it is impeached in a proper form, in a proper place, at a proper time, and by proper persons. A court has no more right to assume jurisdiction, than to decline to exercise that which the Constitution and laws give to it.
• Whenever this deed of trust is to be impeached, who are to impeach it? Unquestionably, this is among the duties of those whose duty it is to qollect, sue for and distribute the funds, answerable for the insolvent's debts. Are they before us? Yes, in three distinct characters; and in all of these characters they pray the court to adjudge this deed to be, (not void, but) valid. Upon such a bill, in the absence of many of those, who are interested in the result, can the court entertain the question, and undertake to decide that the deed is fraudulent or valid ? Can these parties give to the court jurisdiction, which the law denies to it? As trustees appointed by the court, on the application of the insolvent, it seems to be their duty to impeach the deed, if it is to be impeached at all; but, as the trustees named in the deed of trust, it is their duty to attempt to uphold it. They have their own reasons, it would appear, for preferring to discharge the latter, and, of course, for violating the former duty; and they turn away from the court, by which they were appointed, to which alone, as trustees of the insolvent, they have to render any account, by which alone they may at any time be removed for misconduct, and pray a court, which can exercise no control over them, in that character, to take jurisdiction, and to counsel them in the execution ihe trust. Can this be endured ?
It must be seen, that I do not regard this case as presenting a mere question of meum or tuwm, in which the parties litigant, alone, have an interest. It may bo good or bad policy to giv,e to debtors, in failing circumstances, a right to prefer one creditor to another. This, however, is a question to be decided by the legislature, and the safety and welfare of this community require, that the judiciary be prevented from meddling with it. The Court of Appeals never can be a court deeply read in chancery law ? The utility of an appeal from chancery to that tribunal, consists, in a great measure in this, that thereby all the extension of its jurisdiction, under the pretence of carrying out some of those "maxims of equity .' ' which in olden times were adopted by that court, (and which will admit of an interpretation, which will enable it, to render other courts, and even the legislature, useless,) may not be extended. A distinguished chancellor of New York, speaking of a power attempted to be given to his court, and not more to be dreaded than this, remarks : — "Should this court take cognizance of these cases, they would form a chapter of jurisdiction far more ample than any one which it now possesses; and the assumption would be a bolder stride of power than was ever made by the English chancery in any age. ' ' The chancellor once had the power which it is thought he may exercise in this case, but it was deemed wise to take it from that officer, and confide it, we have been told by this court, to others exclusively. We must all be content to do as much of the State's work, as it is made our duty to do, and to do no more. It is denied that the chancellor has any right to decide an)? of the questions, which, in this case, it seems, were put to him. At a proper time I opposed the doctrine, that the powers of the county court, confided to it by our insolvent laws, are to be exercised, subject to no right of appeal to this court. — (See ante, 164.) Such, however, is the law of this court, as far as its own decision can settle it; — and if this court has no appellate jurisdiction in such cases, I cannot admit that it has a right, in this indirect mode, to counsel, or it may be, instruct, the county court, what securities are good and what are void, what constitutes a part of the trust fund; what debts are to be paid by order of the county court.
It is a new idea to me, that in a case in which two courts possess co-ordinate jurisdiction, either has a right to determine, under any circumstances, whether the other can rightfully exercise jurisdiction.
It is possible that the law of this case might be in some respects different, if the trustees appointed by the court, and those named in the deed, had not been the same persons, and other views of the case might be taken, if these two classes of trustees could appear to a suit, the one as complainant, the other as defendants. But this case presents no opportunity for such discussions. They are the same persons; the property conveyed by the deed of trust is answerable, at all events, /or some of the debts due by the insolvent. If that court can be ousted of any portion of its exclusive jurisdiction, how can it be said that the legislature of Maryland is one of those departments of governments, with whose powers the judiciary cannot meddle? If we look at our insolvent system, we shall find that the county court is to limit the time for creditors to bring in their claims, to direct issues on contested claims, and is vested exclusively, with other powers, without which the trust fund, and amount of indebtedness, cannot be ascertained. Now if the county court possesses all those powers, and the chancery court may, by injunction, restrain that court in the exercise of them, because it is imagined to have obtained jurisdiction over the whole subject by reason of some proceeding instituted in it powers given to the county court, or it is in the situation in which it sometimes supposes other courts to be, and thereby furnishes itself with a pretext for interfering with other courts. It cannot afford complete and adequate relief. The power of the county court, to adjudge the decree to be void or valid, surely cannot be questioned in a court, which decided in the case of Carter and wife vs. Dennison, ante, 157, that its decision, be it right or wrong, could not be questioned elsewhere, — its decision, that the mortgaged premises were answerable for a portion and but a portion, of the debt, notwithstanding the transaction was tainted with usury.
The question on which the two courts below seem so widely to have differed, (which had jurisdiction first,) according to my understanding of chancery law, is one of very little importance. That court never dismisses a bill because of the pendency at the same time of another bill between the same or different parties. If there be found, two suits, both of which ought not to be pending at the same time, it may be said of that court, (it is otherwise in a court of common law,) that it never inquires which was first instituted. Most of the cases with which the books furnishes us, relate to cases, both of them pending in the same court; yet the defendant can never insist, that the one which was brought the last should be dismissed, The court of chancery never can put the complainant to his election, and insist that he dismiss a suit elsewhere, unless if the two suits were pending in that court, it could pass an order, that he elect which of the two suits he will dismiss. It can only enforce the order, by dismissing the suit in its own court, if the complainants refuses or omits to dismiss the suit pending elsewhere.
Much that has been said in this case might have been left unsaid, if it had not been taken for granted, that the mode of proceeding in equity was the same as that at, common law. The fact is, that chancery is constantly acting in direct opposition to this, supposed to be, one of its established rules of practice. In the case of a creditor's bill, as soon as a decree has been made directing an account, all the creditors — those who had suits pending before the bill was filed, and those who instituted them after the filing of the bill — may be restrained from proceeding at law. 1 Story, sect. 549. So when a party to a suit at law, asks for a discovery to enable him to try the action- at law,- chancery will not only enable him to obtain the discovery, but will frequently go on to give him relief, and thus oust the court of law of its jurisdiction. 1 Story, sect. 64. As yet there is no law known in chancery like that which it is contended required the appellants, or any of them, to file in chancery the bill which the record tells us was filed- in the county court.
I can discover no ground for a continuance of this injunction. I certainly can discover no propriety in any case, of deciding any question which is not properly before the court.
With respect to very much that has been said in the course of this discussion, my answer to it is, "l am not called upon to say, that this is not a proper subject for the interposition of the legislature. The argument that justice requires some new remedy in these cases, is an argument addressed to- the legislature, and not to the courts of either law or equity."