Case Name: Timothy Lanier ALLEN, Petitioner-Appellant, v. R.C. LEE, Warden, Central Prison, Raleigh, North Carolina, Respondent-Appellee
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 2004-04-28
Citations: 366 F.3d 319
Docket Number: No. 02-5
Parties: Timothy Lanier ALLEN, Petitioner-Appellant, v. R.C. LEE, Warden, Central Prison, Raleigh, North Carolina, Respondent-Appellee.
Judges: Before WILKINS, Chief Judge, and WIDENER, WILKINSON, NIEMEYER, LUTTIG, WILLIAMS, MICHAEL, MOTZ, TRAXLER, KING, GREGORY, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.
Reporter: Federal Reporter 3d Series
Volume: 366
Pages: 319–363

Head Matter:
Timothy Lanier ALLEN, Petitioner-Appellant, v. R.C. LEE, Warden, Central Prison, Raleigh, North Carolina, Respondent-Appellee.
No. 02-5.
United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.
Argued: June 4, 2003.
Decided: April 28, 2004.
ARGUED: John Richard Rittelmeyer, Hartzell & Whiteman, L.L.P., Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellant. Jonathan Porter Babb, Sr., Special Deputy Attorney General, Steven Franklin Bryant, Assistant Attorney General, North Carolina Department of Justice, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Gretchen M. Engel, Center for Death Penalty Litigation, Inc., Durham, North Carolina, for Appellant. Roy Cooper, Attorney General of North Carolina, North Carolina Department of Justice, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Before WILKINS, Chief Judge, and WIDENER, WILKINSON, NIEMEYER, LUTTIG, WILLIAMS, MICHAEL, MOTZ, TRAXLER, KING, GREGORY, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.
Judge WIDENER heard oral argument in this case but later recused himself and did not participate in the decision. Judge DUNCAN did not participate in this case.

Opinion:
OPINION ON REHEARING EN BANC
PER CURIAM,
announcing the judgment of the court:
Timothy Lanier Allen was' convicted of first-degree murder in a North Carolina court and sentenced to death. Following exhaustion of his rights of review in the North Carolina courts, Allen filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the district court. The district court denied all relief and certified the appealability of several issues. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c).
On appeal, Allen contends (1) that the short-form indictment used by the State was unconstitutional; (2) that the prosecution withheld, in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), jail records that indicated Allen was receiving daily doses of anti-withdrawal medication; (3) that the error in the jury verdict form and jury instructions during the sentencing phase of Allen's trial, which the North Carolina Supreme Court had found to be error but harmless error under McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433, 110 S.Ct. 1227, 108 L.Ed.2d 369 (1990), was in fact not harmless error; and (4) that Allen made a prima facie showing that his rights under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986) (prohibiting the prosecution from using peremptory challenges in a racially discriminatory matter), were violated during jury selection in his State trial and that a Batson hearing should be held. Having heard this appeal en banc, the court decides as follows on each of these issues:
For the reasons given in Parts I-IV of the opinion written for the court by Judge Gregory, the court denies a certificate of appealability with respect to Allen's first claim and dismisses that claim, and the court affirms the district court with respect to the second claim. Chief Judge Wilkins and Judges Wilkinson, Niemeyer, Williams, Michael, Motz, Traxler, King, and Shedd join in Parts I-IV. Judge Lut-tig wrote a separate opinion concurring in the judgment on these two claims.
For the reasons given in Part V of the opinion written for the court by Judge Niemeyer, the court affirms the district court on Allen's Batson claim. Chief Judge Wilkins and Judges Wilkinson, Williams, Traxler, and Shedd join in Part V. Judge Luttig wrote a separate opinion concurring in the judgment on this claim. Judge Gregory wrote a separate opinion, dissenting from Part V, in which Judges Michael, Motz, and King join.
With respect to Allen's claim under McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433, 110 S.Ct. 1227, 108 L.Ed.2d 369 (1990), the court concludes that the district court erred in rejecting the claim. In State v. Allen, 331 N.C. 746, 417 S.E.2d 227 (1992), the North Carolina Supreme Court held that the North Carolina trial court's instructions on unanimity given to the jury during the sentencing phase was "error pursuant to McKoy " but that the error was "harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 228. The court holds that the North Carolina Supreme Court's conclusion that the McKoy error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt resulted in a decision that was contrary to or involved an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law as determined by the Supreme Court, see 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), and that the error was not harmless under Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 123 L.Ed.2d 353 (1993). For this reason, the court vacates Allen's death sentence and remands this case to the district court with instructions to issue a writ of habeas corpus releasing Allen from a sentence of death, unless the State of North Carolina commences proceedings to resentence him within a reasonable time. Chief Judge Wilkins and Judges Michael, Motz, Trader, King, Gregory, and Shedd concur in this judgment on the McKoy claim, and Judges Wilkinson, Niemeyer, Luttig, and Williams dissent from the judgment. Chief Judge Wilkins wrote an opinion concurring in this judgment, in which Judge Motz joins. Judge Trader wrote an opinion concurring in this judgment, in which Judge Shedd joins. Judge Gregory wrote an opinion concurring in this judgment, in. which Chief Judge Wilkins and Judges Michael, Motz, and King join. Judge Niemeyer wrote an opinion dissenting from this judgment, in which Judge Wilkinson joins. Judge Luttig wrote an opinion dissenting from this judgment. And Judge Williams wrote an opinion dissenting from this judgment.
GREGORY, Circuit Judge,
writing for the court in Parts I through IV:
I
Timothy Lanier Allen, an African American, was tried and convicted of first-degree murder for killing Raymond E. Wor-ley, a Caucasian North Carolina State Highway Patrol officer. At trial, the State used eleven of thirteen peremptory challenges against otherwise qualified African American members of the venire. Seven African Americans were seated on the jury, one of whom was later removed for cause during the trial. Allen's fate was finally decided by a jury of six African Americans and six Caucasians.
At sentencing, the jury was instructed, in part, that they should "unanimously" find from the evidence whether one or more mitigating circumstances were present. The jury unanimously found the existence of three mitigating circumstances, but concluded that these mitigating circumstances were insufficient to outweigh the aggravating circumstances, and therefore recommended the imposition of a death sentence. After reading the verdict, the court polled each juror. The court reread the jury instructions requiring unanimity, and subsequently asked each juror if the jury's answers were "still your answers" and if each juror "still assent[ed] thereto." The jurors affirmed their recommendation of the death sentence, which the court imposed.
Allen appealed his conviction to the Supreme Court of North Carolina, which found no error in either the guilt or sentencing phases of Allen's trial. Allen subsequently appealed that decision to the Supreme Court of the United States, which vacated Allen's death sentence and remanded the case for consideration in light of McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433, 110 S.Ct. 1227, 108 L.Ed.2d 369 (1990) (holding that North Carolina's capital murder jury instruction requiring unanimity in finding mitigating circumstances was unconstitutional). On remand, the North Carolina Supreme Court found that the McKoy error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and reinstated the sentence. Primarily contending that the McKoy error should not be subject to harmless error analysis, Allen again appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States, which denied certiorari.
Allen then filed a habeas petition and a motion under Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e) in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina. The district court granted summary judgment for the government on Allen's petition for writ of habeas corpus, denied the Rule 59(e) motion, and granted a certificate of appeal-ability on six claims. Allen now appeals three of the claims for which a certificate was granted and one claim for which certification was denied.
II
We review a district court's decision to grant or deny habeas relief de novo. Booth-El v. Nuth, 288 F.3d 571, 575 (4th Cir.2002); Spicer v. Roxbury Corr. Inst., 194 F.3d 547, 555 (4th Cir.1999). On a claim for which the district court has not already granted a certificate of appealability, we must first determine whether "the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right." 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c); Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 483, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000). To make such a showing, Allen must demonstrate that "reasonable jurists could debate whether . the petition should have been resolved in a different manner or that the issues presented were'adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.' " Slack, 529 U.S. at 484, 120 S.Ct. 1595 (quoting Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 893 & n. 4, 103 S.Ct. 3383, 77 L.Ed.2d 1090 (1983)). Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), once a certificate of appealability has issued, we may only grant habeas corpus relief if we find that the state court's decision "was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1); Frye v. Lee, 235 F.3d 897, 903 (4th Cir.2000) (citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 402-03, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000)). Interpreting the "unreasonable application" clause, the Supreme Court has made clear that a federal court may " 'grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle . but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts' of petitioner's case." Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 123 S.Ct. 2527, 2534-35, 156 L.Ed.2d 471 (2003) (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. at 413, 120 S.Ct. 1495). That is, "a federal court may grant relief when a state court has misapplied a 'governing legal principle' to 'a set of facts different from those of the case in which the principle was announced.' " Id. at 2535 (quoting Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 123 S.Ct. 1166, 1175, 155 L.Ed.2d 144 (2003)).
Ill
In this appeal, Allen first asserts that the short-form indictment failed to allege each element of the crime of first-degree murder and any aggravating circumstance supporting the death sentence. He contends that these defects render his first-degree murder conviction and death sentence invalid under Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 119 S.Ct. 1215, 143 L.Ed.2d 311 (1999), and Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000). The district court denied Allen a certificate of appealability on this issue. As noted above, our first inquiry in reviewing this denial entails determining whether Allen "has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right." 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c); Slack, 529 U.S. at 483, 120 S.Ct. 1595.
A short-form indictment alleging elements of common law murder is sufficient to inform the defendant of the charge against him, and thus satisfies the requirements of the Sixth Amendment and the Due Process Clause. See, e.g., Hartman v. Lee, 283 F.3d 190, 192 (4th Cir.2002) (considering a challenge to a short-form indictment that is materially indistinguishable from that used in Allen's case). Because the short-form indictment does not raise a substantial constitutional question upon which reasonable jurists could disagree, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss this claim.
IV
Next, Allen asserts that the prosecution violated his rights under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), by concealing jail records indicating that he was given substantial daily doses of anti-withdrawal medication during the week following the crime. Because the district court has issued a certificate of appealability, we proceed directly to the merits of Allen's claim.
In Brady, the Supreme Court held that "suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution." Id. at 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194. "Materiality under Brady means that 'there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.' " Fullwood v. Lee, 290 F.3d 663, 687 (4th Cir.2002) (quoting United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985)).
In Allen's case, the jail records are not material to a Brady challenge because Allen testified at trial that he was neither under the influence of illegal drugs nor experiencing withdrawal at the time of the murder. Thus, even if Allen had received anti-withdrawal medication, his own testimony nullifies what, if any, probative value the jail records would have as to guilt or punishment. Moreover, even if the records were material, Allen would not be entitled to relief under Brady if "the information sought is otherwise reasonably available." Barnes v. Thompson, 58 F.3d 971, 976 (4th Cir.1995). That is, " 'where the exculpatory information is not only available to the defendant but also lies in a source where a reasonable defendant would have looked, a defendant is not entitled to the benefit of the Brady doctrine.' " Id. at 975 (quoting United States v. Wilson, 901 F.2d 378, 381 (4th Cir.1990)). Because Allen had personal knowledge of any medications he might have received,- his Brady claim is without merit. We therefore affirm the ruling of the district court.
NIEMEYER, Circuit Judge,
writing for the court in this Part V:
V
Allen also contends that the State's use of peremptory challenges during jury selection was tainted with racial bias, in violation of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986), and that he is entitled to have his conviction and sentence vacated unless the State proffers race-neutral explanations for its conduct during jury selection almost twenty years ago. Allen is an African-American, and Trooper Worley, whom he was convicted of murdering, was white.
During jury selection, 65 venirepersons were called for consideration as potential jurors, of which 24 were African-Americans. The State exercised 13 peremptory challenges in selecting the trial jury panel and two alternates, leaving unused three challenges available to it. During the process, the State accepted 7 African-Americans and exercised peremptory challenges against 11 African-Americans. The jury as empaneled consisted of seven African-Americans and five whites, and the two alternates were white. Later during the trial when one of the African-Americans on the jury was excused, the court replaced her with the first alternate so that the case was ultimately decided by a jury of six African-Americans and six whites.
The record of the trial indicates that the jury-selection process was careful, deliberate and rational, and all of the questioning by the attorneys and the rulings by the court focused on the appropriate criteria for picking a fair and impartial jury. The process began by seating 12 venirepersons in the jury box on November 4, 1985, and having the lawyers question those jurors as a group and individually. The original panel, selected at random, consisted of five African-Americans and seven whites. As each juror was excused either for cause or as the result of a peremptory challenge, another venireperson was placed in that juror's seat. For the next six to seven court days, the jurors were questioned, replaced, and new jurors questioned. At the end of the process, the jury panel consisted of seven African-Americans and five whites. There is no evidence in the approximately 1,000 pages of transcript covering jury selection that suggests any race-based questions, motives, or conduct. And no suggestion was made by either party during or after jury selection that the other was striking jurors based on race. At the end of jury selection, the court repeatedly asked counsel if the process was appropriate and whether there were any problems: "Before we impanel the jury I wanted to make certain after conferring with all lawyers that there was nothing that needed to be brought to my attention or if there was any problem that existed." Counsel for Allen stated, "We know of nothing, Your Honor, except I would say this .," and counsel then raised an objection about the prosecution's placement of evidence on the table. After that was addressed, the court again asked counsel, "Is there anything that needs to go on the record before the jury is impan eled for the defense?" Counsel for the defense responded, "No, Your Honor."
Allen made no objection during the entire week-long jury selection process that the State discriminated against African-Americans in exercising peremptory challenges, and he evidently saw no reason to undertake to make out a prima facie showing of discrimination that would have permitted the State "to come forward with a neutral explanation for challenging black jurors" and the court to remedy any problem. Batson, 476 U.S. at 97, 106 S.Ct. 1712. Even though the Batson case had not yet been decided by the Supreme Court, it was pending in that Court, and the State asserts that the parties were aware of that fact.
For the first time on direct appeal, however, Allen contended that the State's exercise of peremptory challenges against nine of eleven African-American jurors denied him equal protection. Noting an absence of any explanation in the record for the State's use of its peremptory challenges, Allen made a statistical argument to the North Carolina Supreme Court as follows:
In this case, 65 prospective jurors were examined, including the examination of alternates: 37 whites, 24 blacks, 1 Indian, and three whose race is unknown. Of these, 14 were selected and 51 were excused: 22 by the Court for cause; 16 by the defendant peremptorily; and 13 by the prosecution peremptorily. Of the 13 jurors excused by the State, all but two were black. The final panel consisted of seven black and five white jurors, with two white alternates. During trial, the trial court removed the black juror in seat number 10 (Mrs. Johnson) and replaced her with the first alternate.
Allen asserted that these statistics and the voir dire of the jury created a prima facie case, but he pointed to no evidence from the voir dire to support this assertion.
The State argued to the North Carolina Supreme Court that Allen knew of the Batson argument during trial and did not make any objection. The State claimed that by raising the issue two years later for the first time on appeal, Allen was "sandbagging" the State, depriving it of the fresh recollections of its jury selection strategy that would have accompanied a contemporaneous objection by Allen:
The defendant contends that he is entitled to raise this issue on appeal even though he failed to object at trial. If there ever was a case of "sandbagging," this is it. If you do not object to the peremptory excusing of jurors until two years later, then only the cold record is available for the use of the peremptory challenges. The District Attorney has no opportunity to explain why he did not like any of the jurors he excused. The District Attorney probably does not keep notes of why he excused particular jurors, so if a hearing was held, he would have no knowledge of a particular juror since he has tried hundreds of cases since that time.
Additionally, the State argued that the statistics did not make out a prima facie case. It pointed out that "[o]f the 15 black veniremen tendered to the State, it accepted 7, or 47%"; that the jury as selected consisted of 58% African-Americans; and that at that time the population of Halifax County, from which the jury was drawn, was 48% African-American. The State also made an effort to reconstruct the reasons for its exercise of the peremptory challenges against African-Americans, noting that one important consideration given was whether any potential juror had a son because such a juror would empathize with Allen and his mother. The record of voir dire supports the State's assertion. The State further claimed that almost all of the African-Americans stricken "met the same pattern." Thus, with respect to juror Jacqueline Davis, who the dissenters have suggested was stricken because of race, the State pointed out to the North Carolina Supreme Court that Davis had a son. Tr. at 353. Davis also knew one of the defense attorneys, who was a customer at the Davis store and to whom she referred as "Steve."
The North Carolina Supreme Court rejected the Batson challenge based on the facts that (1) "the State accepted seven of the seventeen black veniremen tendered" and (2) "the majority of the jury which tried the defendant was black." State v. Allen, 323 N.C. 208, 372 S.E.2d 855, 862 (1988). The court concluded that in the circumstances where the State "accepted seven or forty-one percent" of the African-American members of the venire, an "inference" of racial motivation did not arise, and the defendant failed to make a prima facie case that the State's peremptory challenges were racially motivated. Id. Allen did not appeal this ruling to the United States Supreme Court in his petition for a writ of certiorari.
In his petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed in this case, Allen again raised the Batson issue, proffering only statistical evidence. After examining the record and the North Carolina Supreme Court's disposition of the Batson claim based on the record, the district court concluded:
Examining this claim based upon the clearly established federal law existing in 1988, this court finds that the North Carolina Supreme Court's adjudication of this claim is neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of Batson. Batson did not establish a mathematical formula to be applied but rather instructed that the trial courts were to consider "all relevant circumstances" surrounding the jury selection process. [Citation omitted]. Allen has failed to establish that the North Carolina Supreme Court's adjudication of this claim was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, Batson.
On this record, we affirm. First, we conclude that Allen did not adequately preserve his Batson objection. In July 1985, Allen filed a motion to increase the number of peremptory challenges available to him on five grounds, one of which was that the prosecutor had in the past assertedly exhibited a "propensity toward excluding blacks from trial juries by use of his peremptory challenges." Just prior to the beginning of jury selection on November 4, 1985, the trial court denied Allen's motion. After the jury selection process resulted in a jury that was 58% African-American, Allen did not renew his anticipatory Batson objection. Were these the only facts before us, Allen's case would be meaningfully indistinguishable from Ford v. Georgia, 498 U.S. 411, 111 S.Ct. 850, 112 L.Ed.2d 935 (1991), where the Supreme Court held that a pretrial motion relating to the State's use of peremptory challenges was sufficient to raise a Batson objection. In this case, however, the trial judge began jury selection by denying Allen's motion that was based, in part, on concern for the prosecutor's anticipated use of peremptory challenges and concluded jury selection by twice inviting Allen to voice any concerns with the actual jury selection process. The judge stated, "Before we impanel the jury I wanted to make certain after conferring with all lawyers that there was nothing that needed to be brought to my attention or if there was any problem that existed." After Allen's counsel voiced an objection to the courtroom placement of certain evidence, the judge again asked, "Is there anything that needs to go on the record before the jury is impaneled for the defense?" Allen's counsel responded, "No, Your Honor." Thus, even though Allen's July 1985 motion might otherwise have been sufficient to raise a Batson objection under the holding of Ford, Allen's silence after the trial judge's repeated calls for objections after the actual jury selection amounted to an abandonment of his anticipatory Batson objection. It would be an odd result to allow a defendant who twice rejected a trial judge's explicit invitation to object contemporaneously to the jury selection process to exploit the faded memory of the prosecutors by raising such an objection years later.
In reaching this conclusion, it is important to clarify that Allen's Batson claim was not procedurally defaulted under any North Carolina or federal law. Rather, he is denied any remedy on this claim because he expressly relinquished his right to a remedy at trial by, in effect, consenting to be tried by the jury as constituted. He cannot rescind that consent now.
But even if Allen had preserved his objection, the burden of establishing a prima facie case under Batson falls on the defendant, see Batson, 476 U.S. at 96-97, 106 S.Ct. 1712, and based on the record in this case, we conclude that Allen never carried that burden. We therefore agree with the district court's conclusion that the North Carolina Supreme Court's decision to reject Allen's Batson claim raised for the first time on appeal was not an "unreasonable application" of Batson. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).
Of course, the standard that Allen must now meet is not whether the North Carolina Supreme Court was right. That issue was available to him on direct review to the Supreme Court. The standard on collateral review of a State decision challenged through federal habeas corpus requires that the federal court deny the writ unless the State's adjudication of the particular issue "resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). In determining whether an application of Federal law is unreasonable, the Supreme Court in Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 410-11, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000), stated:
[A]n unreasonable application of federal law is different from an incorrect application of federal law.... Congress specifically used the word "unreasonable," and not a term like "erroneous" or "incorrect." Under § 2254(d)(l)'s "unreasonable application" clause, then, a federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be unreasonable.
In Batson, the Supreme Court articulated the "evidentiary burden placed on a criminal defendant who claims that he has been denied equal protection through the State's use of peremptory challenges to exclude members of his race from the petit jury." 476 U.S. at 82, 106 S.Ct. 1712. To carry his burden, a defendant must show (1) that "he is a member of a cognizable racial group"; (2) that the "prosecutor has exercised peremptory challenges to remove from the venire members of the defendant's race"; and (3) that "these facts and any other relevant circumstances raise an inference that the prosecutor used [the peremptory challenges] to exclude the veniremen from the petit jury on account of their race." Id. at 96, 106 S.Ct. 1712; see also Keel v. French, 162 F.3d 263, 271 (4th Cir.1998), cert. denied, 527 U.S. 1011, 119 S.Ct. 2353, 144 L.Ed.2d 249 (1999). Only after the defendant makes a showing sufficient to raise an "inference of purposeful discrimination" is the State required "to come forward with a neutral explanation for challenging black jurors." Batson, 476 U.S. at 96-97, 106 S.Ct. 1712.
In this case, the only facts that Allen identified to support an inference of purposeful discrimination were raw statistics about the racial make-up of the venire and those excluded from the jury through peremptory challenges. He has presented no other circumstantial facts that "raise an inference" that the State was discriminating against African-Americans in exercising its peremptory challenges. Indeed, the State has pointed out that its voir dire of the venire was the same for African-Americans as it was for whites, and it points out that the circumstances revealed by answers to its voir dire as to each juror justified its exercise of peremptory challenges on racially neutral grounds.
Moreover, the only "pattern" that we can discern from the raw statistics that Allen has produced suggests that the State did not exercise its peremptory challenges on the basis of race. We know, for instance, that with respect to Seat 1, Seat 4, and Seat 8, on which the State exercised a majority of its peremptory challenges to African-Americans, the State ultimately accepted an African-American to sit on the jury in each of those seats. Indeed, with respect to Seat 10, after the State exercised a peremptory challenge against a white and after Allen exercised peremptory challenges against two whites, the State accepted the first African-American slotted for that seat. When the first person seated in Seat 7 was an African-American, the State accepted the juror. On Seat 2, after a white was challenged for cause, the State accepted the replacement African-American. On Seat 6, when the State exercised a peremptory challenge against a white, an African-American replaced the white and the State accepted the juror. In accepting these African-American jurors, the State left unused peremptory .challenges that were available to it. Only on Seat 3 did the State's exercise of a peremptory challenge result in the race of a juror changing from African-American to white. We conclude that this "pattern" supports an inference that discrimination against African-Americans was not a reason for the State's exercise of peremptory challenges. Concluding that the State was using peremptory challenges to fashion a jury with fewer African-Americans on it necessarily ascribes the highest degree of ineptitude to the State, for its efforts resulted in a jury being empaneled that had more African-Americans on it than if it had exercised no challenges at all. In the absence of any other circumstantial evidence, we cannot conclude that Allen carried his burden of making a prima facie showing. More relevant to the inquiry now, Allen has failed to establish that the North Carolina Supreme Court's application of Batson on this record was an unreasonable one. Therefore, we conclude that the district court correctly rejected Allen's Batson challenge.
The dissenting opinion faults the North Carolina Supreme Court for considering the statistical make-up of the impaneled jury in determining whether a Batson violation occurred and for failing to consider any of Allen's evidence of discrimination. Post at 357-358. It asserts that the North Carolina Supreme Court "should have focused on those members of the venire who were excluded from the jury." Id. at 358. It then reiterates Allen's statistical argument and concludes that "Allen's evidence of discrimination is compelling." Id. To support this conclusion, the dissenters recite Allen's evidence in its entirety:
Out of 66 prospective jurors on the veni-re, 38 (57.5%) were Caucasian, 24 (36.3%) were African American, and 4(6%) were of another race. (J.A. at 57.) The prosecution used 84.6% of its peremptory challenges to exclude African Americans from the jury, even though African Americans only represented 36.3% of the venire presented.
Id.
The use of these raw statistics, however, is both selective and uninformative. For example, the statistics as used do not account for the fact that the State exercised its peremptory challenges in a selective manner that reshaped the original panel seated, which had five African-Americans, into a jury of seven African-Americans. As already noted, most of the State's peremptory challenges were exercised on the selection of jurors to fill three seats, and the State ultimately accepted an African-American in each of those seats. We suggest that selective statistics just as well demonstrate the opposite inference. For example, the percentage of African-Americans accepted by the State and seated on the jury — 58% (7 of 12) — exceeded the percentage of African-Americans on the venire — 37% (24 of 65) — and exceeded the percentage of African-Americans in the county — 48%.
Though statistics are not utterly bereft of analytical value, they are, at best, manipulable and untrustworthy absent a holistic view of the circumstances to which they apply. The statistics relied upon by Allen, and upon which the dissenters command a "focus," do not tell the whole story or even an accurate story in this case. As we have already described in greater detail, the majority of the State's peremptory challenges against African-American venire-persons were exercised with respect to seats for which the State ultimately accepted an African-American juror. And there was only one seat on which the race changed from African-American to white as a result of the State's peremptory challenge. The end result was that from a venire consisting of 37% African-Americans, the State accepted a jury 'of 58% African-Americans.
Perhaps out of concern that the statistical evidence proves nothing, the dissenting opinion engages in its own factfinding, comparing the circumstances of venireper-son Jacqueline Davis, an African-American, with those of venireperson Mildred Thorne, who was white. Davis was peremptorily stricken by the State and Thorne was not. The dissent concludes that because both Davis and Thorne knew defense counsel and both seemed to respond similarly to questions about the death penalty, there was nothing to justify the State's treating them differently for purposes of exercising peremptory challenges. This comparison led the dissenters to conclude that the "decision to keep Juror Thorne is particularly suspect when compared to the prosecutor's decision to strike Juror Davis." Post at 358 n. 3. The dissenting opinion then dresses up this "suspicion" into a factual "finding that the prosecution struck some jurors on the basis of race." Id.
As a preliminary matter, we note that the comparison of these two particular jurors was not urged by the litigants but was initiated by the dissenters on the cold record. In fact, the dissenting opinion's comparison derogates from Allen's strenuous argument in his reply brief that "this Court cannot evaluate" the State's reasons for dismissing jurors "on a cold record," and that any attempt to do so would be "speculation." Indeed, an examination of the comparison suggests that only speculation supports the dissenting opinion's conclusions. First, it must be recognized that the State's reasons for exercising peremp tory challenges were never elicited on the record because no objection was ever made. The dissenting opinion never acknowledges the possibility of race-neutral factors on which the State could have legitimately relied. But even based on the record, it fails to acknowledge the State's reconstruction of its reasons on its direct appeal to the North Carolina Supreme Court. In its explanation to that court, the State observed that juror Davis had a son, see Tr. at 353, making her a person who might be empathetic to Allen and his mother. The State pointed out that this mother-son relationship was an important consideration that formed its decisions to exercise peremptory challenges. Although Juror Thorne had a daughter, she did not have a son. Finally, the dissenting opinion does not consider the fact that even though the State exercised a peremptory challenge to strike Davis, it ultimately accepted an African-American as the juror in her seat.
The dissenting opinion's comparison of two jurors, totally out of context and without the data necessary to make an informed comparison, amounts only to speculation and implicitly confirms that, without the aid of such speculation, Allen has not otherwise presented evidence sufficient to raise an inference of race-based discrimination. Without any evidence of improper statements or questions, the statistical evidence considered more fully can hardly be found to evidence a pattern of the State exercising peremptory challenges to eliminate African-Americans from the jury.
In sum, while we need not resolve whether the North Carolina Supreme Court "got it right" in concluding that Allen failed to make a prima facie showing, there can be little doubt that its application of the Batson principles cannot be found to be an unreasonable one on this record. We therefore affirm the district court's dismissal of Allen's Batson claim.
Allen also argues that the state violated his rights under Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 79 S.Ct. 1173, 3 L.Ed.2d 1217 (1959), when the prosecutor failed to correct the testimony of Dr. William Brown, who testified that Allen was never given any anti-withdrawal medication. The North Carolina court found this claim procedurally barred because it was not raised in Allen's first Motion for Appropriate Relief. We find this claim procedurally defaulted because Allen failed tq make a showing of cause and prejudice or actual innocence to establish a fundamental miscarriage of justice. See Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 338-39, 112 S.Ct. 2514, 120 L.Ed.2d 269 (1992). Furthermore, even if the claim was not procedurally defaulted, Allen's assertion would still fail because Dr. Brown only testified that he had not given Allen any medication, not that Allen never received any medication.