Case Name: P. R. Russell v. The State
Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1920-03-10
Citations: 88 Tex. Crim. 512
Docket Number: No. 5702
Parties: P. R. Russell v. The State.
Judges: 
Reporter: Texas Criminal Reports
Volume: 88
Pages: 512–518

Head Matter:
P. R. Russell v. The State.
No. 5702.
Decided March 10, 1920.
Rehearing granted February 23, 1921.
1. —State Highway Law—Information—Complaint—Inoperative Statute.
Where, the first.count of the information was drawn under Section A, of Art. 820-K, Vernon’s Texas Criminal Statutes, 1918, Supplement, and charged that the defendant did then and there drive and operate a motor vehicle upon the highway in this State in a careless manner, and did not then and there show due regard for the safety and convenience of other vehicles and traffic upon said public highway, the same charged no offense, and the provision of the statute under which it is drawn is inoperative and unenforcible, insofar as it undertakes to define an offense. Following Griffin v. State, 86 Texas Crim. Rep., 498.
2. —Same—Complaint—Informtion—Danger Signal—Valid Statute.
Where, the second count of the said information was drawn under SubDivision F, Article 820-K, supra, and alleged that the defendant was then and there, while driving a motor vehicle upon a public highway in said State and county, attempting to pass another vehicle by overtaking said vehicle without then and there sounding audible and suitable signal before passing said vehicle going in the same direction, against the peace and dignity of the State, the same properly alleged an offense. It is not the passing or attempting to pass that is made criminal; it is the failure to give the signals required which is made penal; and this was sufficiently alleged in said count of the information, and sufficiently definite in the statute.
3. —Same—Insufficiency of the Evidence—Danger Signal—Motor Vehicle.
Where, upon trial of a violation of Section F, Article 820-K, Vernon’s Texas Criminal Statutes, 1918 Supplement, the proof failed to show that the defendant had knowledge of the presence of the buggy which his automobile struck on the public highway, he could not be held to be guilty of an offense under said statutes in his failure to give the signal required thereby, and the conviction cannot be sustained, and the judgment must be reversed and the cause remanded.
Appeal from the County Court of Johnson. Tried below before the Honorable O. O. Chrisman.
Appeal from a conviction of a violation of Sub-Division F, of Article 820-K, Vernon’s Texas Criminal Statutes, 1918 Supplement; penalty, a fine of $10.
The opinion states the case.
F. E. Johnson, for appellant.
Cited Wright v. State, 217 S. W. Rep., 152; Brown v. State, 49 Texas Crim. Rep., 419; Robinson v. State, 132 S. W. Rep., 944.
Alvin M. Owsley, Assistant Attorney General, for the State.
Cited Hatch v. State, 174 S. W. Rep., 1064.

Opinion:
MORROW, Judge.
The prosecution is under Article 820k, Vernon's Texas Criminal Statutes, Supplement 1918, being Section 16 of the Act of April 9, 1917, Chapter 207. The penalty attached to this statute is in the Act of May 19, 1917, First Called Session, Chapter 31, Section 45, and of the Act of October 10, 1917, Chapter 13, Section 45, the penalty prescribed being for the first offense not exceeding $100. Subdivision F of Article 820-K is as follows: "It shall be the duty of the person operating or in charge of an overtaking vehicle to sound audible and suitable signal before passing a vehicle proceeding in the same direction."
In the count in the information under this phase of the statute the following is charged: " . . . did then and there while driving a motor vehicle upon a public highway in said State and County attempt to pass another vehicle by overtaking said vehicle without then and there sounding audible and suitable signal before passing said vehicle going in the same direction."
We do not think the information is subject to the criticism addressed to it, that it charges no offense in that the statute does not denounce an attempt to pass a vehicle. The apparent purpose of the statute is to prevent accidents or injuries by requiring that the person in charge of an approaching vehicle shall give warning before passing one which he is overtaking. The facts in the instant case show that the appellant while in the act of passing a vehicle which he overtook caused his car to strike the vehicle and injure both it and some of its occupants. It occurs to us that the statute made it his duty to sound a warning before he was in a position to collide with the vehicle he was passing, and that the fact that the passing was prevented by the collision would not take the act out of the terms of the statute. The pleading might well have been made more specific by an allegation identifying the vehicle unlawfully passed. The omission, however, we think would not have been available except upon special exception.
The appellant, it seems, at the time of the collision was driving his car at night-time without lights. The absence of lights is explained by the fact that the lights were defective and went out a number of times upon the trip which the appellant was making. The fact that he chose to drive his car at night when it was in a condition that the lights would not burn would not, as a matter of law, excuse him for the failure to give the signal required by the statute.
The judgment is affirmed.
Affirmed.