Case Name: ERWIN et al. v. STEELE
Court: Texas Courts of Civil Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1950-03-10
Citations: 228 S.W.2d 882
Docket Number: No. 14156
Parties: ERWIN et al. v. STEELE.
Judges: CRAMER, J., dissents.
Reporter: South Western Reporter Second Series
Volume: 228
Pages: 882–889

Head Matter:
ERWIN et al. v. STEELE.
No. 14156.
Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. Dallas.
March 10, 1950.
Rehearing Denied April 7, 1950.
Louis Wilson, Dallas, for appellants.
John B. Stigall, Jr., Dallas for appellee.

Opinion:
BOND, Chief Justice.
Appellant Mrs. Edward Erwin, plaintiff in the court below, joined by her husband John S. Erwin, instituted this suit against Dorman F. Steele, individually and as independent executor of the estate of Florence' R. Steele, deceased, the defendant in the court below, for liquid assets and" securities owned and possessed by the deceased in the sum of $10,062.70 and community personal property siibject to division and partition between appellant and appellee in accounting of said estate.' The rights of each of the parties in this suit are controlled by the provisions of the joint and mutual will of Mrs. Florence R. 'Steele, deceased, and her husband Dorman F. Steele.
The cause was tried to a jury and at the conclusion of plaintiff's testimony, on motion of the defendant, the court peremptorily instructed the jury to find in favor of the defendant. Accordingly, on the verdict, judgment was entered that plaintiff recover nothing by her suit; and all costs taxed against said plaintiff.
The court made findings of fact supported by evidence that Mrs. Florence R. Steele, wif.e of Dorman F. Steele .and sister of Mrs. Edward Erwin, died testate on or about December 23, 1947 and left an estate consisting of real estate (homestead) of an: appraised value of $9,500 and household furnishings, jewelry, family pictures, etc., of the value of $1,500, money in the bank in her own name in the sum of $10,-062.70, and a community one-half interest in cash deposited in banks in name of her husband in the sum of $24,424.28, U. S. Saving's bonds of the present value of $11,-146.50, one (1942) Mercury automobile of the value of $800, one (1943) Chrysler automobile of the value of $1,400,. fifty-three shares of corporation stock certify cates of the value of $125, and accounts receivable of $6,795.05, aggregating- (personal property) $56,253.51. There was no real estate at the time of the execution of the will and death of Mrs. Steele other than the said homestead.
.The introductory clause of'the'will .recites that in making the disposition of their property while "being of sound and disposing mind and memory," the testators were "desirous of arranging their worldly affairs"; and after providing for their burial in keeping with their station in life and religious belief and the appointment of the survivor as executor of the estate, the will provides (italics supplied for emphasis) as follows: "2. We desire, upon the death of either of us, to give, devise and bequeath to the survivor all the property, of every kind and description, real or mixed, wherever situated, of which the deceased may die possessed, 3. If Dorman F. Steele survives Florence R. Steele, it is hereby understood that Mrs. Edward Erwin, her sister, shall inherit her personal belongings, such as two diamond rings, family pictures and other personal belongings."
The .foregoing sections of the will control the rights of the parties. Under section 3 the plaintiff claims all of the personal property belonging to her sister at the time of her death and one-half of. the undivided community personal property as being the "personal belongings" of the deceased; and claims' that under section 2, the surviving husband is only entitled to the real estate (homestead) and one-half of the community personal property which did not pass by the terms of the will;— the testators had no children. The primary question is: Does the expression in the will "that Mrs. Edward Erwin shall inherit her (testatrix') personal belongings," such as two diamond rings, family pictures and other personal belongings" come under the rule of ejusdem generis?
The term "ejusdem generis" is a primary rule of construction.. Where words of general nature follow, or" are used in connection with the designation of particular objects or classes - of persons or things, the meaning of the general words will' be' restricted- to' the particular designation. "General words are not to be construed in their widest meaning or extent, but are to be treated- as limited and applying only to persons or things of the same kind or class as - those expressly mentioned." Stanford v. Butler, Tex.Sup., 181 S.W.2d 269, 272, 153 A.L.R. 1054. Farmers' & Mechanics' Nat. Bank v. Hanks, 104 Tex. 320, 137 S.W. 1120, Ann.Cas. 1914B, 368. The rule in varying language is stated in Schouler on Wills, 5th Ed., Vol. 1, pp. 590, 591, as follows: "Consistently with this general regard to language, technical words employed in a will are presumed to have been used in their settled legal- meaning unless the contrary is manifest. And if a testator has used technical language which brings his case within some precise rule of law, that rule must take effect. But technical .words are liable to other explanatory and qualifying expressions in the context which disclose the testator's actual intention; and where a different meaning is fairly deducible from the whole will, the technical sense must yield to the apparent intention. In short, the testator's intention as gathered from the will shall prevail against the technical meaning of words or phrases, so far as may consist, at least, with the rules of sound policy, and however imperfectly such intention was in a technical sense expressed." The rule of ejusdem generis is frequently employed to restrict an otherwise general -bequest. Its application as an. indication of intent is general in any situation, whether in a will, a deed, a contract,-a statute, or involving any enumeration.
In Gallagher v. McKeague, 125 Wis. 116, 103 N.W. 233, 110 Am.St.Rep. 821, where the words used were "All the household furniture and effects," — analog ous to "belongings," it was held that while "effects" is of very general significance, and by all the authorities is equivalent, at least, to personal property, yet, when used along with "household," it is applicable only to property which can be classed as part of the household. And in Re Lippincott's Estate, 173 Pa. 368, 34 A. 58, 59, the court held that a' bequest of "all my jewelry, wearing apparel, and personal effects" does not carry with it the testator's household furniture. And in Re Gabler's Will, 140 Misc. 581, 251 N.Y.S. 211, 214, where a will gave "all my household furniture, furnishings and effects, jewelry and all personal effects and belongings," it was held not to include savings bank account. On extensive research, authorities on the question may be greatly multiplied to show that the general words, — effects, goods, belongings, and estates, following or in connection with specific designated articles, are to be construed as limiting and applying to persons or things of the same kind or class as designated. Page on Wills, Lifetime Ed. Vol. 3, p. 7, secs. 945 et seq.; 80 A.L.R. 941 et seq. So, where the will of Mr. and Mrs. Steele enumerated the particular kinds of chattels and coupled with same the words "personal belongings," the generality of this expression is to be restricted to such species of property as therein mentioned, viz.: "diamond rings, family pictures and other personal belongings" ; and not to include money in the bank, stocks and bonds, aggregating in excess of $50,000. Then, too,- the phrase "such as" is as a similitude, classifying articles of the kinds named, which are like or similar to those used in the will. "Such" is defined by Webster as "having the particular quality or character specified; certain; representing the object as already particularized in terms which are not mentioned"; as of like kind, similar, equivalent to, "of that kind." Travers v. .Wallace, 93 Md. 507, 49 A. 415. The synonyms of "such as," are alike, similar, of the like kind; "such" representing the object as already particularized in terms which are not mentioned, being a descriptive and relative word, referring to the specific articles mentioned. Strawberry Hill Land Corporation v. Starbuck, 124 Va. 71, 97 S.E. 362. The personal belongings "such as" the articles mentioned, restricts further the meaning of the bequest.
In construing this will, the testator's intention is given our first concern; intention becomes construction. Bittner v. Bittner, Tex.Com.App., 45 S.W.2d 148. The introductory clause of the will reciting that in making the will the testators- were desirous of arranging their "worldly affairs," implied that they were making disposition of all temporal things which they or either of them possessed. While the introductory clause does not signify any particular property, or species of property, yet it does express the intent of the parties to make 'disposition of all their property, — leaving no intestacy.
In section 2, the one surviving, whether the wife or the husband, is bequeathed "all of the property, of every kind and description, real or mixed, where-ever situated, of which the deceased may die possessed." There is listed in this estate no property that could be denominated "mixed property," if, in fact, the testators knew the legalistic meaning of such term, which, in some jurisdictions, is denominated "property that is neither real nor personal"; but, in this state, there are only two species of property known in law. They are denominated as "real" property and "personal" property.
In a broad and general sense, "personal property" includes everything that is the subject of ownership not coming under the denomination of real estate. Black's Law Dictionary. "Estate or property that is not real, consisting in general of things temporary or movable." Webster's New International Dictionary.
"Tangible or corporeal property is either realty or personalty, the word 'real' describing land and that which is annexed thereto, and the term 'personal' having reference to chattels, evidences of debt and choses in action." 33 Tex.Jur., p. 937, sec. 4.
"Although popularly the term 'personal property' is used in a somewhat restricted sense to include only goods and chattels, tangible things, the subjects of personal use, in its broad and general sense it includes everything which is the subject of ownership not coming under the denomination of real estate." SO Cor.Jur. 760, sec. 36.
"A bequest of 'personal property' includes every form of personal property from whatever source it may be derived; that is, everything except real property." Page on Wills, Vol. 3, Lifetime Ed., p. 44, sec. 964.
It will be seen that at the time the testators made the will and at the time of the death of Mrs. Steele, the testators had no such thing as "mixed property"; only a homestead as "real" property; the greater amount was "personal" property. Thus it could not reasonably be said that in arranging the disposition of their "worldly affairs" the testators intended that the parenthetical expression "real or mixed" should be a limitation upon the bequest to the survivor, or leave the bulk of their property intestate. In construing the will from its four corners, we are of the opinion that the words "real or mixed" in section 2, bequeathing to the survivor "all the property, of every kind and description wherever situated," do not exclude from the bequest their personal property; nor did the testators intend that the survivor should take only the homestead. If, indeed, it can be said that the parenthetical phrase "real or mixed" is a limitation to the bequest to the survivor, and the survivor takes only the real estate under the will; and that the personal property, which was the greatest portion of their estate, did not pass to the survivor; nevertheless, the survivor (no children surviving) takes all of the community, real and personal, unless it can be said that such community was bequeathed by the subsequent provision of the will to Mrs. Erwin. It therefore follows that if the general words bequeathing to Mrs. Erwin all of the deceased's "personal belongings," used in the restricted sense, only intended to embrace the articles named and of like personal nature which had an enduring personal value derived by the deceased from gifts, association and personal use, then the trial court correctly sustained defendant's motion for judgment in favor of the defendant.
We have considered the other assignments to the action of the trial court in refusing extraneous evidence to construe the will, they are severally overruled, and judgment affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
CRAMER, J., dissents.