Case Name: Preston NAQUIN v. TITAN INDEMNITY COMPANY, Iberville Parish Sheriffs Department, and Neal Noel
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 2000-05-12
Citations: 767 So. 2d 726
Docket Number: No. 99 CA 0400
Parties: Preston NAQUIN v. TITAN INDEMNITY COMPANY, Iberville Parish Sheriffs Department, and Neal Noel.
Judges: Before: GONZALES, FITZSIMMONS, and WEIMER, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 767
Pages: 726–732

Head Matter:
Preston NAQUIN v. TITAN INDEMNITY COMPANY, Iberville Parish Sheriffs Department, and Neal Noel.
No. 99 CA 0400.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, First Circuit.
May 12, 2000.
Richard J. Fernandez, Metairie, Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellant, Preston Naquin.
Vincent P. Fornias, C. William Belsom, Jr., Baton Rouge, Counsel for Defendants/Appellees, Titan Indemnity Company, Iberville Parish Sheriffs Department, and Neal Noel.
Before: GONZALES, FITZSIMMONS, and WEIMER, JJ.

Opinion:
| .GONZALES, J.
This matter is before the court on plaintiffs appeal from a judgment of the trial court in favor of defendants, dismissing plaintiffs suit without prejudice.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff, Preston Naquin, filed suit on March 17, 1997, to recover damages allegedly sustained as a result of a motor vehicle accident which occurred on March 23, 1996. He named Neal Noel, the Iberville Parish Sheriffs Department (Sheriffs Department), and Titan Indemnity Company (Titan) as defendants. The petition alleged Mr. Naquin was a guest passenger in a vehicle which was struck in the rear by one vehicle which, in turn, was rear ended by a vehicle driven by Mr. Noel, an employee of the Sheriffs Department, who was in the course and scope of his employment. Although Mr. Naquin's counsel allegedly forwarded a courtesy copy of the suit to representatives of the Sheriffs Department and Titan, service of process on the defendants was withheld at the time suit was filed as settlement discussions were ongoing.
During March of 1998, Mr. Naquin requested the defendants be served with process. On April 23, 1998, defendants filed a motion for an extension of time within which to plead. Then, on July 21, 1998, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to the provisions of La. R.S. 13:5107(D) for Mr. Naquin's failure to timely request service. The matter was scheduled for a contradictory hearing, after which the trial court dismissed Mr. Naquin's petition as to all defendants, including Titan, without prejudice at Mr. Naquin's costs.
Mr. Naquin appeals from this adverse judgment, asserting the following assignments of error:
1. The trial court erred in dismissing the Iberville Parish Sheriffs Department, Deputy Noel, and their insurer, Titan Indemnity Company, because the version of La. R.S. 13:6107(D) in effect when defendants' motion to dismiss was urged specifically limited application of the 90-day rule for requesting service to suits filed after January 1,1998.
2. The trial court erred in dismissing suit against Titan Indemnity Company because at the time suit was filed and when service was perfected on this insurer there was no 90-day rule applicable to private parties, and under the Louisiana Direct Action Statute, La. R.S. 22:655, plaintiff has the right to proceed directly against this insurer.
|o3. Defendants should be estopped from claiming benefit of the 90-day rule for requesting service both because they acknowledged receiving copies of the suit well within 90 days of its filing, and because they lulled plaintiffs counsel into the reasonable belief that they did not expect service of the suit while good faith negotiations were ongoing.
APPLICABILITY OF LA.
R.S. 13:5107(D)
At issue on appeal is the applicability of La. R.S. 13:5107(D). When enacted by 1996 La. Acts, 1st Ex.Sess., No. 63, § 1 (Act 63), the pertinent part of the statute read as follows:
In all suits in which the state, a state agency, or political subdivision, or any officer or employee thereof is named as a party, service of citation shall be requested within ninety days of the filing of the initial pleading, which names a state, a state agency, or political subdivision or any officer or employee thereof as a party. If service is not requested by the party filing the action within that period, the action shall be dismissed without prejudice, after contradictory hearing, as to the state, state agency, or political subdivision, or any officer or employee thereof, who has not been served. When the state, a state agency, or political subdivision or any officer or employee thereof, is dismissed as a party pursuant to this Section, the filing of the action, even as against other defendants, shall not interrupt or suspend the running of prescription as to the state, state agency, or political subdivision, or any officer or employee thereof. The effect of interruption of prescription as to other persons shall not be affected thereby.
The Act further provided it became effective upon signature of the Governor. The legislation was approved on May 9, 1996, and therefore became effective that date.
By 1997 La. Acts No. 518, § 1 (Act 518), effective January 1, 1998, the legislature amended and reenacted La. R.S. 13:5107(D). The provision as amended and reenacted reads as follows:
(1) In all suits in which the state, a state agency, or political subdivision, or any officer or employee thereof is named as a party, service of citation shall be requested within ninety days of the commencement of the action or the filing of a supplemental or amended petition which initially names the state, a state agency, or political subdivision or any officer or employee thereof as a party. This requirement may be expressly waived by the defendant in such action by any written waiver.
(2) If service is not requested by the party filing the action within that period, the action shall be dismissed without prejudice, after contradictory motion as provided in Code of Civil Procedure Article 1672(C), as to the state, state agency, or political subdivision, or any officer or employee thereof, who has not been served.
(3) When the state, a state agency, or a political subdivision, or any officer or employee thereof, is dismissed as a party pursuant to this Section, the filing of the action, even as against other defendants, shall not interrupt |4or suspend the running of prescription as to the state, state agency, or political subdivision, or any officer or employee thereof; however, the effect of interruption of prescription as to other persons shall continue.
The Act further provided it would be applicable only to suits filed on and after its effective date, which was January 1, 1998. See Act 518, § 5-6.
The accident which forms the basis of this suit occurred on March 23, 1996. The effective date of La. R.S. 13:5107(D), as enacted by Act 63, was May 9, 1996. Suit was filed on March 17, 1997. The amendment and reeanactment of La. R.S. 13:5107(D), by Act 518, became effective January 1, 1998, but only as to suits filed on and after its effective date. Service of process was requested in March of 1998. Thereafter, on July 21, 1998, the defendants filed the motion to dismiss.
On the date suit was filed in this matter, La. R.S. 13:5107(D), as enacted by Act 63, had been in effect for over 10 months. Therefore, within 90 days of the filing of his petition, Mr. Naquin was required to request service of process. See Chinn v. Mitchell, 98-1060 (La.App. 1 Cir. 5/14/99), 734 So.2d 1263, writ not considered, 99-1772 (La.7/2/99), 747 So.2d 7. The subsequent amendment and reenactment of La. R.S. 13:5107(D) by Act 518 had no bearing on this suit because Act 518 only applies to cases filed on and after its effective date. Therefore, the trial court properly granted the defendants' motion to dismiss plaintiffs petition against Mr. Noel and the Sheriffs Department. We next address whether Titan may claim the benefit of the 90-day service requirement of La. R.S. 13:5107(D).
APPLICABILITY OF LA. R.S. 13:5107(D) AS TO TITAN
In assignment of error number two, Mr. Naquin argues Titan was improperly dismissed because: (1) the 90-day service requirement contained in La. R.S. 13:5107(D) does not apply to private parties, and (2) under the Direct Action Statute, La. R.S. 22:655, Titan is amenable to direct suit against it.
|sThe Louisiana Governmental Claims Act (LGCA), La. R.S. 13:5101-5112, was enacted to limit the liability of public entities. La. R.S. 13:5106(E). According to La. R.S. 13:5101(B), the LGCA "applies to any suit in contract or for injury to person or property against the state, a state agency, an officer or employee of the state or a state agency ., or a political subdivision of the state, . or against an officer or employee of a' political subdivision . " As part of the LGCA, La. R.S. 13:5107(D) addresses service and citation requirements in suits wherein the state, a state agency, political subdivision, or officers or employees thereof are named as parties. Neither La. R.S. 13:5101(B) nor La. R.S. 13:5107(B) lists the insurer of any of these entities or persons as also entitled to the benefit of the service and citation requirements set forth therein.
For most purposes, a public liability insurer stands in the shoes of its insured. Noel v. State, 284 So.2d 587, 589 (La.1973). A reason for requiring a plain tiff to request service of process within 90 days of filing suit is to put the public defendant on notice of its potential liability so that all necessary evidence related to the claim can be preserved to aid in defense of the claim. Because a public liability insurer had a duty to defend its insured, the insurer is equally concerned with the preservation of evidence regarding any claim it may ultimately be required to pay. Therefore, despite the lack of mention of insurers in La. R.S. 13:5107(D), and because there are no contrary service of process requirement contained in La. R.S. 22:655, we conclude the 90-day period within which to request service as to a public defendant also applies to requests for service as to that defendant's insurer. This court has similarly found that policy reasons dictate that the prohibition against jury trials in suits against public bodies (contained in La. R.S. 13:5105) also prohibit jury trials against their insurers. See Doe v. Board of Supervisors of Louisiana State University, 517 So.2d 488, 490-491 (La.App. 1 Cir.1987); Dean v. Terrebonne Parish Police Jury, 510 So.2d 82, 86 (La.App. 1 Cir.1987). This court has also held that the monetary limitation of liability in favor of political subdivisions | (¡contained in La. R.S. 13:5106 also benefits their insurers. See Brown v. Coregis Insurance Company, 99-0048 (La.App. 1 Cir. 2/18/00), 752 So.2d 347, 354-57.
ESTOPPEL
In assignment of error number three, Mr. Naquin contends the defendants should be estopped from claiming the benefit of the 90-day service rule in La. R.S. 13:5107(D), because they acknowledged receiving copies of the suit within 90 days of its filing, and because they lulled Mr. Na-quin's counsel into a reasonable belief that service of process was not expected while good faith negotiations were ongoing.
Proper citation is the foundation of all actions, and actual knowledge of the existence of an action is no substitute for proper service of citation. Kimball v. Kimball, 93-1364 (La.App. 1 Cir. 5/20/94), 637 So.2d 779, 781; Scullin v. Prudential Insurance Co. of America, 421 So.2d 470, 472 (La.App. 4 Cir.1982). Even if the defendants acknowledged receipt of the petition within 90 days of its filing, Mr. Naquin was not relieved of his duty to request service of process as required by law. As stated, at the time suit was filed, La. R.S. 13:5107(D) required that service be requested within 90 days of the filing. Such was not done in this case, and Mr. Naquin cannot rely on estoppel to avoid the result of his own inaction.
DECREE
For the foregoing reasons, the trial court's judgment dismissing the plaintiffs action without prejudice is AFFIRMED. Costs of the appeal are assessed to the plaintiff.
WEIMER, J., dissents with reasons.
. We note conflicting jurisprudence among the circuits regarding the applicability of Act 63 and Act 518. See Moreau v. State of Louisiana, 99-1238 (La.App. 4 Cir. 1/26/00), 752 So.2d 312; Hoyt v. Robinson, 98-1224 (La.App. 5 Cir. 3/30/99), 731 So.2d 426, writ denied, 99-1225 (La.6/18/99), 745 So.2d 24; Jamison v. Hilton, 98-447 (La.App. 3d Cir. 10/21/98), 721 So.2d 494, writ denied, 98-2916 (La.2/5/99), 730 So.2d 871. We are bound by and adhere to this court's prior holdings. See Chinn v. Mitchell, 734 So.2d at 1267-68 and Frain v. City of Baton Rouge, 97-0868 (La.App. 1 Cir. 12/29/97), 704 So.2d 1276.
. Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 1201 has recently been amended to require that "[s]ervice of the citation shall be requested on all named defendants within ninety days of commencement of the action." La. C.C.P. art. 1201(C). (Emphasis added.) However, this requirement does not apply to the present case because the amendment to La.C.C.P. art. 1201 only applies to suits filed on or after January 1, 1998. See 1997 La. Acts No. 518, § 5-6.