Case Name: Alban MUSTAFAJ, Petitioner, v. Loretta E. LYNCH, United States Attorney General, Respondent
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 2015-06-08
Citations: 614 F. App'x 5
Docket Number: No. 14-2209
Parties: Alban MUSTAFAJ, Petitioner, v. Loretta E. LYNCH, United States Attorney General, Respondent.
Judges: PRESENT: JOSÉ A. CABRANES, B.D. PARKER, DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON, Circuit Judges.
Reporter: West's Federal Appendix
Volume: 614
Pages: 5–8

Head Matter:
Alban MUSTAFAJ, Petitioner, v. Loretta E. LYNCH, United States Attorney General, Respondent.
No. 14-2209
United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
June 8, 2015.
Sokol Braha, New York, NY, for Petitioner.
Benjamin C. Mizer, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Civil Division; Blair T. O’Connor, Assistant Director; John F. Stanton, Trial Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.
PRESENT: JOSÉ A. CABRANES, B.D. PARKER, DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON, Circuit Judges.

Opinion:
SUMMARY ORDER
Petitioner Alban Mustafaj, a native of the former Yugoslavia and citizen of Koso-vo, seeks review of a June 4, 2014, decision of the BIA affirming a September 18, 2012, decision of an Immigration Judge ("IJ") denying his application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture ("CAT"). In re Alban Mustafaj, No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (B.I.A. Jun. 4.2014), aff'g No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Sept. 18, 2012). We assume the parties' familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history in this case.
We have reviewed both the BIA's and IJ's decisions. See Yun-Zui Guan v. Gonzales, 432 F.3d 391, 394 (2d Cir.2005). The applicable standards of review are well established. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Yanqin Weng v. Holder, 562 F.3d 510, 513 (2d Cir.2009).
Mustafaj challenges the IJ's pret-ermission of his untimely asylum application, arguing that the IJ committed legal error and violated due process by determining that his credible testimony, alone, was insufficient to establish his date of entry into the United States. We generally lack jurisdiction to review this determination, but we retain jurisdiction to review colorable constitutional claims and questions of law. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(B) and (a)(3), 1252(a)(2)(D); see also Barco-Sandoval v. Gonzales, 516 F.3d 35, 40-41 (2d Cir.2008) (providing claim must be col-orable). Even where testimony is credible, the agency may require corroboration. Diallo v. INS, 232 F.3d 279, 285 (2d Cir.2000).
Mustafaj submitted evidence in an effort to establish a March 2006 entry date: a November 2005 application to open a bank account in Kosovo, airline ticket stubs that did not list the year they were used, and an affidavit from someone repeating what Mustafaj had told him. It was not error for the IJ to consider this evidence in assessing whether Mustafaj established his date of entry, and in determining that this evidence did not establish entry in or after March 2006. Id.
Mustafaj also challenges the weight the IJ accorded this documentary evidence. The weight attributed to evidence is a factual determination that we lack jurisdiction to review. Boluk v. Holder, 642 F.3d 297, 304 (2d Cir.2011).
Turning to withholding of removal, an alien is eligible for such relief if it is more likely than not that his "life or freedom would be threatened in [the country of removal] because of [his] race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion." 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A). An alien who demonstrates past persecution benefits from a presumption that his life or freedom would be threatened in the future; 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(b)(l)(i). "[Persecution is the infliction of suffering or harm upon those who differ on the basis of a protected statutory ground," and it "does not encompass mere harassment." Ivanishvili v. U.S DOJ, 433 F.3d 332, 341 (2d Cir.2006). The agency reasonably concluded that the incidents of past harm did not rise to the level of persecution.
Mustafaj's claim stems from his employment as a bodyguard for Ramush Haradi-naj, the leader of the Alliance for the Future of Kosovo, and his belief that supporters of the opposition party, the Democratic Party of Kosovo, seek to harm him. Mustafaj testified that he received threatening phone calls and letters, he was pulled over by members of the Democratic Party and was told he would have been killed if he were not with his mother, and someone shot a gun at his home. These threatening incidents, however, do not constitute past persecution. Huo Qiang Chen v. Holder, 773 F.3d 396, 406 (2d Cir.2014) ("threats of persecution, no matter how credible, do not demonstrate past persecution").
Absent a presumption based on past persecution, it was Mustafaj's burden to show that it is more likely than not that he would be persecuted on account of his political opinion if he returned to Kosovo. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(b)(2). The agency did not err in finding that Mustafaj did not meet his burden. Mustafaj testified that he quit his job as a bodyguard in 2004, and the last time he was threatened by anyone was in 2004. Although Mustafaj argues that the 2004 death of one of Haradinaj's bodyguards shows that he, too, is in danger of harm, Mustafaj testified that he did not know whether the death was an accident and he did not know why this bodyguard was killed. It is therefore not clear that Mustafaj would be subject to a similar fate simply because he had worked as a bodyguard in 2004. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(b)(2) (providing an applicant can establish eligibility for withholding of removal by demonstrating a pattern or prac-' tice of persecution of a group of similarly situated persons). In addition, the death of one of eleven of Haradinaj's bodyguards does not establish that it is "more likely than not" that Mustafaj, too, will be similarly persecuted. Id.
For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DISMISSED in part, and DENIED in remaining part. As we have completed our review, any stay of removal that the Court previously granted in this petition is VACATED, and any pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition is DISMISSED as moot. Any pending request for oral argument in this petition is DENIED in accordance with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and. Second Circuit Local Rule 34.1(b).