Case Name: The Illinois Central Railroad Company v. Margaret O'Keefe, Admx.
Court: Illinois Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Illinois
Decision Date: 1897-11-01
Citations: 168 Ill. 115
Docket Number: 
Parties: The Illinois Central Railroad Company v. Margaret O’Keefe, Admx.
Judges: 
Reporter: Illinois Reports
Volume: 168
Pages: 115–126

Head Matter:
The Illinois Central Railroad Company v. Margaret O’Keefe, Admx.
Opinion filed November 1, 1897.
1. Carriers—elements necessary to warrant recovery for death by collision. To warrant a recovery against a railroad, company for the negligent killing of the plaintiff’s intestate in a collision while riding upon the defendant’s train, the plaintiff must at least establish the facts that the deceased was upon the train as a passenger and that he was using due care for his safety.
2. Same—one does not become a passenger until received as such by the carrier. One does not become a passenger until he has placed himself in charge of the carrier for transportation and the carrier has expressly or impliedly accepted him for carriage, and the mere fact that he has purchased a ticket or holds a free pass does not of itself constitute him a passenger.
3. Same—what acts will not constitute one a passenger. One boarding the front platform of the baggage car of a moving train after it has left the station, intending to take passage but without the invitation or consent of any authorized agent of the railroad company, does not, by such act alone, become a passenger, although he holds a free pass over the company’s line. (CARTER, J., dissenting, holds it was a question fpr the jury.)
4. Evidence—what does not tend to show that carrier accepted person as a passenger. The fact that the engineer and conductor knew that a person, who was a few minutes afterwards negligently killed in a collision, had boarded the moving train between the engine and the baggage car, but did not know who he was or for what purpose he was there, does not tend to show that the railroad company had accepted such person as a passenger. (CARTER, J., dissenting.)
Illinois Central R. R. Co. v. O’ Keefe, 63 Ill. App. 102, reversed.
Appeal from the Appellate Court for the Fourth District;—heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Union county; the Hon. Joseph P. Robarts, Judge, presiding.
William H. Green, (James Fentress, of counsel,) for appellant:
The presumption which arises that a person on a train used for carrying passengers is, in the absence of countervailing circumstances, a passenger and rightfully there, may be rebutted; and it does not apply to one seen to go on the platform of a mail car, or of some other car not run for the accommodation or use of passengers. Ray on Negligence of Imposed Duties, 5.
If a person solicits and secures free transportation, or if he rides upon a part of the train from which passengers are excluded, or takes passage upon a train not allowed to carry passengers, knowing that this act is against the rules of the carrier and in permitting it the conductor is disobedient, he is guilty of a fraud and not entitled to a passenger’s rights. Ray on Negligence of Imposed Duties, 15.
A carrier undertakes to carry passengers safely if they place themselves under its direction in particular places prescribed for the purpose, and it will not be held liable for damages accruing to an interloper who, by fraud or unnoticed by it, hides himself where he is not liable to be discovered. Ray on Negligence of Imposed Duties, 15.
One who without permission, but with the knowledge and acquiescence of a railroad superintendent, rides upon a train which he knows no one not an employee is allowed to ride upon, is a mere licensee, to whom the company owes no duty. Ray on Negligence of Imposed Duties, 16.
Common carriers have the right to prescribe reasonable rules and regulations for the convenience, comfort and safety of themselves and passengers. Railroad Co. v. Yarwood, 15 Ill. 472.
The duty of the passenger is reciprocal. He must conform to the rules the carrier prescribes for the safety of the common enterprise. He must omit no reasonable precaution which is incumbent on him, so far as concerns the maintenance of such safety. Wharton on Negligence, chap. 9, sec. 353.
A carrier, in undertaking to carry passengers safely, undertakes to carry them safely if they place themselves under his direction in particular places prescribed for the purpose. Wharton on Negligence, sec. 354.
William A. Schwartz, (Karraker & Lingle, of counsel,) for appellee:
Proof that an injury resulting as the proximate cause of an act which, under ordinary circumstances, would not, if done with due care, have injured any one, is enough to make out a presumption of negligence. And this is held to be the rule even where no special relation, like that of passenger and carrier, exists. Railway Co. v. Cotton, 140 Ill. 494.
A passenger who goes from one car to another of a moving train to find a seat, does not, while so upon the platform, take the risk of collision with another train, and when his conduct does not contribute to any injury from such collision he may recover from the company for its negligence. Dewire v. Railroad Co. 148 Mass. 443.
Judgments of the trial court will not be reversed where the evidence of the successful party, when considered by itself, is clearly sufficient to sustain the verdict. Shevalier v. Seager, 121 Ill. 569.
Care and negligence are questions of fact for the jury. Lowry v. Lynch, 57 Ill. App. 323.
The contract of carrier and passenger may be implied from slight circumstances. Railroad Co. v. Williams, 140 Ill. 288.
Neither entry into cars upon a railroad, nor payment of fare, is essential to create the relation of carrier and passenger. Gordon v. Railroad Co. 40 Barb. 546.
Every person being carried by the express or implied consent of the carrier, upon a public conveyance usually employed in the carriage of passengers, is presumed to be lawfully upon it as a passenger, and the same vigilance must be exercised to guard him against injury when he is carried gratuitously as when he pays the usual fare. Hutchinson on Carriers, (2d ed.) sec. 566.

Opinion:
Mr. Justice Cartwright
delivered the opinion of the court:
This case was before this court on a former appeal, and the judgment appealed from was reversed. (Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. O'Keefe, 154 Ill. 508.) The case has been again tried, resulting in a verdict and judgment for $3000, and the Appellate Court has affirmed that judgment.
The facts will be found stated in the former report of the case, and will not be répeated in full in this opinion. The ground upon which defendant was charged at the trial with liability for the death of O'Keefe was, that he became a passenger on defendant's train from Anna to Carbondale, and was killed through the negligence of defendant in the collision with the other train. At the close of the evidence the defendant asked the court to instruct the jury that such evidence was not sufficient to authorize a verdict for the plaintiff, and that they should find the defendant not guilty. The instruction was refused and the defendant excepted. The contention here is, that the instruction should have been given because the evidence did not fairly and legally tend to prove that deceased was a passenger or that he was exercising ordinary care and prudence when killed, while it was necessary for the plaintiff to establish both these propositions by some affirmative evidence in order to recover.
Considering the latter of these propositions first, a reference to the opinion of the court upon the former appeal shows that the judgment was reversed for error of the court in instructing the jury, as matter of law, that it was not negligence, of itself, for O'Keefe to ride on the steps or platform of the car. It was further said that an assumption of negligence on the part of the defendant, or that the deceased was not negligent, could not be stated, under the facts of the case, as a matter of law. The evidence did not greatly differ in the two trials, and we adhere to the previous holding that on the question of negligence the case might properly have been submitted to the jury.
It was also necessary for the plaintiff to prove that the relation of passenger and carrier existed between the deceased and the defendant. This relation which was claimed to exist is a contract relation. A railroad company holds itself out as ready to receive and carry, and is bound to receive and carry, all passengers who offer themselves as such at the places provided for taking passage on its trains, and who take such passage in the cars provided for passengers. When one so presents himself the contract relation under which he acquires the rights of a passenger may be either express or maybe implied from the circumstances. If a person goes upon cars provided by the railroad company for the transportation of passengers, with the purpose of carriage as a passenger with the consent, express or implied, of the railroad company, he is presumptively a passenger. (Elliott on Railroads, sec. 1578.) Both parties must enter into and be bound by the contract. The passenger may do this by putting himself into the care of the railroad company to be transported, and the company does it by expressly or impliedly receiving him and accepting him as a passenger. The acceptance of the passenger need not be direct or express, but there must be something from which it may be fairly implied. One does not become a passenger until he has put himself in charge of the carrier and has been expressly or impliedly received as such by the carrier. (Bricker v. Railroad Co. 132 Pa. St. 1; Webster v. Fitchburg Railroad Co. 161 Mass. 298; Elliott on Railroads, sec. 1581.) Deceased was the holder of a free pass on the road, but that fact alone would not create the relation of passenger and carrier. The purchase of a ticket does not make one a passenger unless he comes under the charge of the carrier and is accepted for carriage by virtue of it. If a ticket holder should offer himself as a passenger and should be refused transportation there would be a liability for consequent damages, but it would not be a liability to him as a passenger or on account of the relation of passenger and carrier, but would be a liability for the refusal to enter into that relation and to permit him to become a passenger.
The uncontroverted evidence bearing upon the question whether O'Keefe became a passenger was as follows: He lived about three hundred yards north and fifty yards east of defendant's station at Anna. The limited vestibule train on defendant's road came from the south and stopped at the station while he was sitting at the table at home, eating breakfast. The train consisted of a baggage car, two coaches and a sleeping car. It was a solid vestibuled train, the vestibules filling the spaces between the cars, with a door at each entrance and exit to and from the platforms of the passenger coaches. These doors are opened at the stations to discharge passengers who have reached their destination and to receive those desiring to become passengers, and these are the places where passengers present themselves to take passage. While this train was at the station at Anna it was prepared for the reception of passengers who desired to be transported to other stations, by opening the doors, and passengers for Anna were discharged at the station. When the doors are closed a person on the outside can not get in, and when the business at that station had been done the doors designed for the admission of passengers were closed, and the train left the station as a solid train, closed and inaccessible up to the platform next the tender, in front of the baggage car. When the train was moving from the station O'Keefe took his hat and ran out of the door, and ran to the railroad track and south toward the approaching train. When he met the train it was going three or four miles an hour, and he climbed on the platform next the tender, at the front end of the baggage car. As he passed his house his wife saw him standing on the platform with his back against the baggage car door. The engineer and conductor saw him climb on the platform but did not see him afterward, and the conductor did not know who he was. He was not seen after his wife saw him until he was found dead, sitting on the step of the platform, holding the guardrail with one hand. When found he had a piece of paper in one hand and a pencil was lying on the ground. After leaving Anna the conductor went through the train, commencing at the north end of the first passenger coach next the baggage car and going the entire length of the train. He then came back, unlocked the door to the baggage car, and went in, as he said, to see about the person who got on the platform, and, seeing the other train approaching, he and the baggageman jumped off through the side door.
The question is whether these facts fairly tend to establish the relation of passenger and carrier between O'Keefe and the defendant, by showing that he had put himself in the care of the defendant as a passenger, and had been expressly or impliedly received and accepted as such by the defendant through any authorized agent. We think that they do not. He did not go upon the train at the station provided for the reception of passengers, and did not take any place provided for the reception, accommodation or carriage of passengers. He did not comply with any of the ordinary customs under which defendant held itself out as ready to receive and carry passengers or under which they are received or carried. It is said that he no doubt tried to open the baggage car door, and the inference intended is, that he tried to put himself in charge of defendant as a passenger, in a proper place. There is no evidence of the supposed fact, and if there were it could make no difference. It will certainly not be claimed that defendant was bound to have the baggage car door open so as to give access to its passenger coaches by way of the baggage car. But even if that were a wrong to him, he could not become a passenger by attempting to get in that door any more than if he had attempted to open one of the vestibule doors which was locked, and had failed. He had not put himself in the care of the defendant as a passenger. Of course, the fact that the engineer knew that deceased climbed upon the train would not make him a passenger, since an engineer is not authorized to act for the defendant in such a matter or to accept passengers. Nor do we think that the mere fact of the conductor knowing that some one had boarded the moving train on the platform between the tender and baggage car, and might still be there, is evidence tending to show that defendant accepted him as a passenger. The conductor did not know who he was or what he was there for,—whether as a passenger or otherwise. As conductor he performed the usual duties after leaving the station, and had not reached this platform next the tender when the accident occurred. He had done nothing in the matter one way or the other. The train was moving slowly when O'Keefe climbed on. But that fact is only material on the question of negligence on his part in boarding a moving train. The train had left the station, and there would be no difference, so far as creating a relation of passenger and carrier was concerned, whether he got on there or at some other place between stations where the train was moving slowly. Of course, he might have ridden on the platform in safety but for the collision, and so also he might on the engine or tender, or elsewhere on the train where passengers are not carried. That fact concerns only the question of negligence, and is not material on the question whether he became a passenger.
As we have concluded that there was no evidence tending to establish one necessary element for a recovery,—that the deceased was a passenger on defendant's train,—it follows that for such failure of proof the instruction asked should have been given.
The judgments of the Appellate Court and" circuit court are reversed and the cause is remanded to the circuit court.
Reversed and remanded.