Case Name: Snyder and others against Bauchman and others
Court: Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
Jurisdiction: Pennsylvania
Decision Date: 1822-06-03
Citations: 8 Serg. & Rawle 336
Docket Number: 
Parties: Snyder and others against Bauchman and others.
Judges: 
Reporter: Reports of cases adjudged in the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania (Sergeant & Rawle)
Volume: 8
Pages: 336–341

Head Matter:
Snyder and others against Bauchman and others.
ah Courts ot record a right to lation of their practice, not in violation o íandfanífthe are the most proper judgs oftheextenl tion of?heir own rules,
A rule rcj quiring cd within^ i mited time, Bari’s tore-" ments1 of-ijusi' tices, applies a°proceeding before two jury, under 1 enaWe púr-° SherifF’°and Coroner’s faín possesavaíldrale'8
In Error,
BAUGHMAN and others, the defendants in error, hav- . ■ . ? Mg purchased certain real estate in Lancaster county, as the óf George Snyder, at Sheriff’s.sale, instituted proceedings under the Act of Assembly, passed the 6th of w </ i , April, 1802, u to enable purchasers at Sheriff’s and Coroner’s sales, to obtain possession.” John M. Patrick, who, with Philip Snyder, was in possession of the premises at the time •* . , , . 1 the precept issued, .made an affidavit that he did not come *nt0 possession, and claim to hold the premises, by, from, or under, George Snyder, the defendant in the execution'under ' u ^ 7 they were sold; and that the title was in dispute, and olaimed ■ by Philip Snyder. Philip Snyder made affidavit, that he verily believed that he was legally entitled to the premises in dispute, and that he did not claim them by, from, or under the defendant, George Snyder, as whose property the same were sold, but by a different title. They, thereupon, before the jury were sworn, prayed the justices to procee(j no further, but to take the security required by the Act of Assembly, and to send the matter to the Court, of Common Eleas for trial. After the jury had signed the inquisition, ^ut before judgment, the justices were again applied to, to take the security offered, and transmit the record to the Common Pleas. The motion, however, was overruled,’ and ju^gment given in favour of the complainants. A certiorari then issued, returnable to January Term, 1818, to remove all the proceedings in the cause, and on the 12th of June, 1819, no exceptions having been filed to the proceedings of Ihe justices, agreeably to certain rules of the Court of Common Pleas,of Lancaster county, the judgment of the justices was affirmed. The record was thereupon removed to this Court, where several exceptions were filed to the proceedings before the justices and the Court of Common Pleas, but the only one on which an opinion was expressed, was the following * .
4. “ Because the Court of Common Pleas applied two of their rules to this case, when removed by certiorari into the said Court, which had neither relation to, nor bearing upon, the subject, and which, if they had, would be illegal and unconstitutional ; and, under the supposed obligation of these rules, declined hearing the merits of the case, and affirmed the proceedings of the justices, though pregnant with errors, and without any authority to support them.”
The rules referred to were these :
“23d April, 1811. — Ruled by the Court, Franklin, President, as follows : On ail certiorari's hereafter issued to remove the judgments of justices, the particular exceptions intended to be insisted on, must be filed on or before the third day of the term to which they are returnable, and on default thereof, the judgment below shall be affirmed of course. The assignment of general errors, is insufficient and void.”
“20th September, 1816. — Ruled by the Court, that exceptions be filed on or before the third day of the adjourned Court after return day.”
Jenkins and Hopkins, in support of the certiorari, denied the power of the Court of Common Pleas, to apply the rules in question to such cases as the present. They were made after the power of the Supreme Court to remove proceedings before justices of the peace for the recovery of debts or damages, by certiorari, was taken away. Business of that kind being altogether in the hands of the Common Pleas, they perhaps had power to regulate it by such rules: but this Court haying the same power over the proceedings before the two justices, as if the record had been removed immediately by certiorari, the Common Pleas cannot, by their rules, deprive it of its superintending power. The effect of these rules is, to contravene the Act of Assembly, by depriving a party of a trial by jury, which the Act intended to secure. They were therefore void. Boas v. Nagle, 3 Serg. Ramie, 250. The case of Dubasq v. Guardians of the Poor, ought not to settle the question. It was one of a small debt recovered before an alderman, and very little argued.
But supposing the rules to be valid, and to embrace, this case, the exceptions may be considered as having been filed, for the matters in which the errors consisted, sufficiently appeared on the record. The1 rule for the assignment of-exceptions to an award, does not extend to exceptions appearing on the record. Buckley v. Durant, 1 Dali. 129.
Buchanan and Rogers, contra.
That the Court of Common Pleas had a right to make the rule in question, was expressly decided by this Court, at a time when they had power to issue certiorari’s to remove proceedings before justices. Dubosq v. Guardians of the Poor, 1 Binn. 415. All Courts of record have power to make rules for the regulation of their practice ; and in Barry v. Randolph, 3 Binn, 277, a rule requiring a party appealing from an award of arbitrators, to give notice to his opponent of the time and place of entering the appeal, and of the name of his surety, was held to be within this power, although the Act did not require it. It is plain that this case came within the rule. It is a judgment of justices, in the very words of the rule, which was never intended to be confined to the judgment of a single justice. It is a rule, not only useful, but essential to the advancement of business, and the practice has always been to consider it as extending to cases under the landlord and tenant law. But the Court of Common Pleas has itself determined the question of its application, and great regard is to be paid to the opinion of Courts in construing their own rules.

Opinion:
The opinion of the Court was delivered by
Duncan J.
'The defendants in error, or rather the respondents, have made a preliminary question, the decision of which, renders it unnecessary to give any opinion on the reasons assigned for quashing the proceedings. The objection is founded on a rule of Court of this Judicial District. [His Honour here read the rules.] If the authority of the Court was competent to make such rule, and if it embraces this case, we will not disturb the judgment of affirmance. Every Court of record has an inherent power to make rules for the transaction of its business, provided they are not contradictory to the laws of the land. Without this power it would be impossible for Courts of justice to dispatch the public bu siness. Delays would be interminable, and delay not unfrequently is the object of one of the parties. Every Court, therefore, must have stated rules to go by, and they are the properest judges of their own rules of practice. A direct and palpable violation of them will rarely occur ; if it does, it is the subject of revision in this Court. It is no infraction of the rights of any man, to require him to assign the grounds of his objection to the proceedings from which he has appealed ; and to refuse to the man a revision of these proceedings, who neglects to do so within a reasonable time, previously prescribed and made known to him, is neither hardship nor injustice. All who are conversant in the Courts of Common Pleas, will acknowledge, that it would be impracticable to decide on the numerous certiorari's with which the dockets are loaded, without adopting some such rule as this. It is not peculiar to this District, for in many of the other Districts a correspondent regulation prevails, and if it does not in all, it certainly should in all; for I have witnessed scenes, not very reputable to the administration of justice, where a whole day of the Court has been wasted in a squabble in a two penny matter, to find out what the exceptions were. The Court are not to take up a list of fifty or a hundred certiorari's, and wait the leisure and the pleasure of a party, and stop until a long striug of exceptions are made out at the bar, nor give time to the counsel to meditate and shape them on their arrival in Court, and in the meantime the Court to remain unemployed, until the errors are hunted up, on the inspection of a long and confused, and sometimes not very intelligible return of the justices, to the great inconvenience and injury of suitors, who are anxiously waiting their turn. The slowness of proceedings of Courts of justice, is frequently complained of, sometimes perhaps unreasonably ; but if this course were to be allowed, they would be dilatory beyond all endurance. For if there were no time limited, — no order prescribed by the Court, the discussion of a certiorari would be endless ; for while Courts, after they are met, were considering one set of exceptions, and about to give their judgments on them, the counsel would be employed in making up another and another batch. The Courts of Common Pleas must be entrusted with a discretionary power in- enforcing the rule. There may be cases, where the delay could be fairly accounted for* by accidents or reasons applied to the discretion of the Court. We cannoC inquire whether such existed in the present case ; for if the Court had power to make the rule, they are responsible for its exercise. The most plausible objection to this rule is, that it deprives this Court of their supervisory power, which only can be taken away by positive law. This argument at first struck me very forcibly; but on reflection, it is not so. The party has his choice of jurisdictions : He may remove by certiorari into this Court per saltern, or he may elect the Court of Common'Pleas. If he prefers their jurisdiction, he knows its rules, and is bound by them. The whole course of interlocutory proceeding, unless where regulated by statutory provisions, is the proper subject of regulation by rules of practice, which rules are the law of the Court; — time of filing declarations, pleas, entering appeals, writs in error, assigning errors* filing exceptions' to justices' proceedings returned on certiorari. These principles are fully settled in this Court, in Barry v. Randolph, 3 Binn. 277, and Vanatta v. Anderson, Ib. 417; and this direct matter decided in Dubosq v. Guardians of the Poor. The same doctrine obtains in the, English Courts, where it was decided that the Sessions may dismiss an appeal for want of ' such notice as the- practice required; and the Court said, that they were the proper, judges of a point of practice at the Sessions.
The argument would be more specious, that the rule did not embrace a judgment rendered by one justice, than to contend that it does not include a judgment rendered by two; for the words are " certioraris to remove the judgments of justices;" and it might be as well contended, that one judgment was not within the words of the rule, which are judgments, and therefore there must be two judgments to entitle a party to a certiorari. This hypercriticism would defeat the rule. It signifies every judgment of every justice. It is contended, that, if within the words, it is not within the meaning and spirit of the rule, for that the mischief arose from the number of certioraris issued, to one justice exercising his ordinary jurisdiction in the recovery of debts not exceeding one hundred'dollars, not to this extraordinary one by two justices, a thing of rare occurrence. Where the words of a law are general, or a rule of Court, which is a law to the Court, in its general terms includes the subject, it would be an unsound construction, to confine it to the most numerous class to which it might relate, and exclude all others ; and it would neither be just nor courteous to the Court of Common Pleas, to say, they did not know what they intended by their own rule ; and though the words do include it, and they say they did intend it, for this Court to say, they did not, would be a violation of all decorum. They are declared to be the most proper judges of their own rules, and to impute to them a latent intention, where they disclaim it, and where there is no obscurity in the language they have used, would be for this Court not to interpret the rule as the Court thought proper to make it, but to make a new rule.
It is urged, that the rule was complied with, the particular exceptions filed, because they are manifest on the return of the justices. Every exception must appear on the proceedings. The Court to which the return is made, does not examine the facts returned, nor go into extraneous matter. It is not an appeal, in which the proceedings are de novo. And the rule would be a dead letter, if it were an answer, that the objections appear on the return; and therefore particular exceptions were filed.
The proceedings are therefore affirmed.
Proceedings affirmed.