Case Name: ZHU LIN HOU, Petitioner, v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., United States Attorney General, Respondent
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 2012-02-08
Citations: 459 F. App'x 42
Docket Number: No. 10-2719-ag
Parties: ZHU LIN HOU, Petitioner, v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., United States Attorney General, Respondent.
Judges: PRESENT: DENNIS JACOBS, Chief Judge, DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON, and DENNY CHIN, Circuit Judges.
Reporter: West's Federal Appendix
Volume: 459
Pages: 42–44

Head Matter:
ZHU LIN HOU, Petitioner, v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., United States Attorney General, Respondent.
No. 10-2719-ag.
United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
Feb. 8, 2012.
Peter S. Gordon, Forest Hills, NY, for Petitioner.
Tony West, Assistant Attorney General; Emily Anne Radford, Assistant Director; Jesse Lloyd Busen, Trial Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.
PRESENT: DENNIS JACOBS, Chief Judge, DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON, and DENNY CHIN, Circuit Judges.

Opinion:
SUMMARY ORDER
Petitioner Zhu Lin Hou, a native and citizen of the People's Republic of China, seeks review of the June 11, 2010, order of the BIA denying her motion to reopen. In re Zhu Lin Hou, No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (B.I.A. June 11, 2010). We assume the parties' familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history of the case.
The BIA's denial of Hou's motion to reopen as untimely was not an abuse of discretion. See Kaur v. BIA, 413 F.3d 232, 233 (2d Cir.2005) (per curiam). An alien may file one motion to reopen, generally no later than 90 days after the final administrative decision in the proceedings sought to be reopened. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). There is no dispute that Hou's 2009 motion was untimely because the agency issued the final administrative order in 2002. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). The time limitation does not apply to a motion to reopen if it is "based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been or dered, if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing." 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii). As the BIA concluded, Hou's practice of Falun Gong in the United States is not changed circumstances arising in China. Wei Guang Wang v. BIA, 437 F.3d 270, 273-74 (2d Cir.2006); Yuen Jin v. Mukasey, 538 F.3d 143, 155 (2d Cir.2008).
Hou undertook to show an increase in China's persecution of Falun Gong practitioners since 2008. The BIA's determination that the evidence failed to demonstrate changed circumstances in China is supported by substantial evidence. While there is evidence that repression of Falun Gong practitioners increased during the 2008 Olympics, there is also evidence that the repression has been constant since the time of Hou's hearing in 2001, and Hou submitted no evidence that any increase in repression of Falun Gong practitioners continued after the 2008 Olympics and into 2009. See Siewe v. Gonzales, 480 F.3d 160, 167 (2d Cir.2007) ("Where there are two permissible views of the evidence, the fact finder's choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous."); see also Jian Hui Shao v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 138, 169 (2d Cir.2008) (reviewing the BIA's factual findings regarding changed country conditions under the substantial evidence standard).
The evidence Hou submitted was therefore insufficient to establish a change in country conditions. Her recent practice of Falun Gong amounts at most to a change in personal circumstances. The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying her untimely motion to reopen. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a (c)(7)(C)(i), (ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), (3). Hou argues that the BIA ignored certain evidence, but the BIA explicitly addressed her background material in its decision. The BIA was not required to cite each piece of evidence because substantial evidence supports its findings. Xiao Ji Chen v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 471 F.3d 315, 338 n. 17 (2d Cir.2006).
For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. As we have completed our review, any stay of removal that the Court previously granted in this petition is VACATED, and any pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition is DISMISSED as moot. Any pending request for oral argument in this petition is DENIED in accordance with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second Circuit Local Rule 34.1(b).