Case Name: In the Matter of The Shepard Co.
Court: Supreme Court of Rhode Island
Jurisdiction: Rhode Island
Decision Date: 1975-07-30
Citations: 115 R.I. 290
Docket Number: 
Parties: In the Matter of The Shepard Co.
Judges: Present: Roberts, C. J., Paolino, Kelleher and Doris, JJ.
Reporter: Rhode Island Reports
Volume: 115
Pages: 290–303

Head Matter:
342 A.2d 918.
In the Matter of The Shepard Co.
JULY 30, 1975.
Present: Roberts, C. J., Paolino, Kelleher and Doris, JJ.

Opinion:
Doris, J.
The United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island, acting pursuant to Sup. Ct. R. 6, has. certified to this court a question of law, together with a statement of the facts relevant to the controversy in which the question arose. The present action was initiated when both General Electric Credit Corporation (hereinafter GECC) and James Talcott, Inc. (hereinafter Talcott) filed reclamation petitions in the United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island alleging that they hold valid and perfected security interests in certain assets of the -bankrupt corporation, The Shepard Company.
On or about September 8, 1972, The Shepard Company, a Rhode Island corporation, granted a security interest in certain of its assets to Talcott, and a financing statement was accepted for filing by the Rhode Island Secretary of State. On or about June 25, 1973, The Shepard Company granted another security interest in certain of its assets to GECC. Again the Rhode Island Secretary of State accepted a financing statement for filing. On September 24, 1973,. The Shepard Company was adjudicated a. bankrupt in the United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island. A Trustee in Bankruptcy was thereafter appointed.
The question certified to this court involves the legal adequacy of the financing statements offered for filing by GEOC and Talcott. The question reads as follows:
"Is a financing statement under the Rhode Island Uniform Commercial Code, accepted for filing and in fact filed with the Secretary of State upon payment of the statutory fee, G. L. 1956, Title 6A, as amended, sufficient to perfect a security interest, if:
a. It is signed by the debtor and the secured party;
b. Gives an address of the secured party from which information concerning the security interest may be obtained;
c. Gives a mailing address of the debtor;
d. Contains a statement indicating the types of collateral, which collateral in fact is not consumer goods; and
e. . Does not cover either crops or goods which are or are to become fixtures; but
f. Does not contain a statement indicating whether the collateral is consumer goods having an aggregate original purchase price of not less than three hundred dollars ($300), excluding interest, insurance and other finance charges?"
The initial issue for our consideration is whether Sup. Ct. R. 6 permits certification of questions of law by a bankruptcy judge. Sup. Ct. R. 6 provides that "this court may answer questions of law certified to it by a United States District Court Under the provisions of the Bankruptcy Act, every district court is a court of bankruptcy when its jurisdiction is properly invoked, 11 U.S.C.A. § § 1 (10), 11 (1966). As a court of bankruptcy, it is granted broad legal and equitable jurisdiction to hear and decide questions involving significant property rights. 11 U.S.C.A. §11 (1966). Even a referee is a judicial officer vested with the power to exercise the jurisdiction conferred on the courts of bankruptcy. 11 U.S.C.A. §64, 66 (1968); Bankruptcy Rule 901(7). In this situation, we see no reason to distinguish a district court and its officers when exercising bankruptcy jurisdiction from a district court and its officers when exercising more general functions. We conclude, therefore, that the terms of Sup. Ct. R. 6 encompass a question of law certified by a bankruptcy judge.
The terms of the certified question call into question the meaning and legal effect of G. L. 1956 (1969 Reenactment) §6A-9-402. The relevant portions of this statute read as follows:
"6A-9-402. Formal requisites of financing statement —Amendments.—(1) A financing statement is sufficient if it is signed by the debtor and the secured party, gives an address of the secured party from which information concerning the security interest may be obtained, gives a mailing address of the debtor and contains a statement indicating the types, or describing the items, of collateral. A financing statement may be filed before a security agreement is made or a security interest otherwise attaches. When the financing statement covers crops growing or to be grown or goods which are or are to become fixtures, the statement must also contain a description of the real estate concerned and the name of the record owner thereof. A copy of the security agreement is sufficient as a financing statement if it contains the above information and is signed by both parties.

(5) For purposes of determining whether a financing statement or security agreement shall be received for filing (see §6A-9-401(l) (c)) said financing statement or security agreement shall contain a statement indicating whether the collateral is consumer goods having an aggregate original purchase price of not less than three hundred dollars ($300) excluding interest, insurance and other finance charges, but the omission of such statement shall not affect the validity of the security interest described therein."
Where the language of a statute is free of ambiguity and conveys a definite and sensible meaning not contradicting an evident legislative purpose, this court must give literal effect to the terms of the statute. Reardon v. Hall, 104 R. I. 591, 247 A.2d 900 (1968). However, as the arguments of the parties indicate, not only are several terms of §6A-9-402 ambiguous, but the overall meaning and legal effect of the statute, and in particular of subsection 5, are far from obvious. In this situation, this court has the duty of attempting to ascertain the legislative intention by a consideration of the statute in its entirety, interpreting the language used therein in light of the overall nature and purpose of the enactment. Mason v. Bowerman Bros., Inc., 95 R. I. 425, 187 A.2d 772 (1963); Zannelli v. Di Sandro, 84 R. I. 76, 121 A.2d 652 (1956).
The petitioners in this case allege that they hold valid and perfected security interests in certain assets of the bankrupt. With various exceptions not relevant here, a financing statement must be filed to perfect a security interest. §6A-9-302(l). Part 4 of Article 9 of the Rhode Island Uniform Commercial Code covers the filing of financing statements. Section 6A-9-401 governs the place of filing, here the office of the Secretary of State of Rhode Island, and in a proviso unique to the Rhode Island Uniform Commercial Code, it also prohibits the receipt for filing of any financing statement where the collateral is consumer goods under the value of $300. Section 6A-9-402 sets out the formal requisites of a financing statement, states what constitutes a sufficient financial statement, and in a subsection found only in the Rhode Island Uniform Commercial Code, requires the inclusion of a statement indicating whether the collateral is consumer goods under the cost of $300.
The terms of the certified question make it clear that petitioners not only filed their financing statements within the. meaning of §6A-9-403(l), but also filed them in 'the proper-place under §6A-9-401(l)(c). Nor is there any question but that the financing statements satisfied the formal requisites of a financing statement set forth in §6A-9-402(l). The issue is whether the instant financing statements complied with the requirements of §6A-9~402 (5), and if not, what is the legal effect of this noncompliance.
Section 6A-9-402(5) states that a financing statement shall contain a statement indicating whether the collateral is consumer goods having an aggregate original purchase price of not less than three hundred dollars ($300) The question is whether this language was intended to require a separate formal recitation, or whether the information required by §6A-9-402(l), if inherently inconsistent with the code's definition of consumer goods (see 6A-9-109(l)), is sufficient to satisfy this subsection.
The petitioners take the position that where the status of the debtor or the description of the assets covered by the financing statement makes it impossible that the collateral be consumer goods as that term is defined by the code, §6A-9-402(5) does not require a separate formal statement. They argue that this construction of §6A-9-402(5) is mandated by the basic policy of the code to promote substance over form and " to discourage the fanatical and impossibly refined reading of such statutory requirements Comment to U.O.C., §6A-9-402 n.5.
While §6A-9-402(5) is ambiguous as to the precise nature of the requirement created therein, the unqualified command that the financing statement "shall contain a statement" and the fact that this requirement is contained in a separate subsection suggest that the Legislature envisioned an express formal recitation. Moreover, §6A-9-402(5) was adopted as a means of implementing the prohibition found in §6A-9-401(l) (c) against receiving for filing financing statements where the collateral is low-cost consumer goods. Any construction of the requirements of §6A-9-402(5) must be made with primary reference to this very specific purpose, and only secondarily in light of the more general policies of the code. An unvarying requirement of an express formal statement greatly facilitates the implementation of §6A-9-401(l)(c) by making unnecessary the potentially difficult determination of whether the terms used to identify the debtor and to describe the collateral were necessarily inconsistent with the definition of consumer goods contained in §6A-9-109(1).
The petitioners argue that in past cases other persons have been required to understand and apply the terms of the Rhode Island Commercial Code and that the Secretary of State should be treated no differently. While it is true that this court has held coreceivers to a basic knowledge of technical financial terminology, Matthews v. Arctic Tire, Inc., 106 R. I. 691, 262 A.2d 831 (1970); South County Sand & Gravel Co., Inc. v. Bituminous Pavers Co., 106 R. I. 178, 256 A.2d 514 (1969), the Legislature may choose to relieve the Secretary of State of this burden. Moreover, the subsections of §6A-9-402 at issue in these cases are notice provisions to be construed in light of the concept of notice filing. Section 6A-9-402(5), on the other hand, is not a notice provision, but rather a means to accomplish a very specific end, ensuring that no financing statements covering low-cost consumer goods are accepted for filing. This difference in purpose warrants the difference in construction.
Having concluded that petitioners failed to satisfy §6A-9-402(5), we now reach the question of the legal effect of this noncompliance. The Trustee in Bankruptcy argues that as the only purpose of filing is to obtain perfection, failure to comply with all the requirements for a financing statement must necessarily affect perfection. Other wise, the Legislature will be seen to have engaged in an exercise in futility.
This court will not ascribe to the Legislature an intention to enact legislation devoid of any purpose. Town of Scituate v. O'Rourke, 103 R. I. 499, 239 A.2d 176 (1968); Ewing v. Frank, 103 R. I. 96, 234 A.2d 840 (1967). We do not believe, however, that merely because §6A-9-402 (5) may not affect perfection, it is necesasrily inefficacious. As was noted above, the primary thrust of §6A-9-402(5) is to provide a mechanism for the implementation of §6A-9-401(1) (c). The question before us is whether the failure to comply with this method of implementation is punishable by forfeiture of perfection.
Section 6A-9-402(l) opens with the statement that a financing statement is sufficient to accomplish perfection of a security interest if it is properly signed, gives the address of the debtor, and contains a description of the collateral. It concludes with the unequivocal statement that "[a] copy of the security agreement is sufficient as a financing statement if it contains the above information and is signed by both parties." §6A-9-402(l). No suggestion is made that there might be any further requirements for sufficiency.
Section 6A-9-402(5) is not the only Rhode Island addition to this section of the uniform code. For the situation in which the collateral is crops or fixtures, the Legislature added the requirement that the financing statement include the name of the record owner. This requirement was inserted into §6A-9-402(l) and is, therefore, clearly a prerequisite to a sufficient financing statement. In striking contrast the $300 clause requirement was placed in a separate subsection which makes no mention of sufficiency.
Another major indicator of legislative intent is the purpose clause of §6A-9-402(5) which reads as follows: "For purposes of determining whether a financing statement or security agreement shall be received for filing (see §6A-9-401(1)(c))." The reader is referred to §6A-9-401(l)(c) which also speaks in terms of whether a financing statement shall be received for filing. In both clauses the emphasis is clearly placed on the narrow ministerial question of whether a financing statement should be received for filing, and not whether once received, the statement is sufficient to accomplish perfection.
Section 6A-9-402(5) also includes the following savings clause: " but the omission of such statement shall not affect the validity of the security interest described therein." The Rhode Island Uniform Commercial Code does not define "validity", and the authority cited by the parties for one interpretation or another does not appear to be conclusive of the term's meaning in the context of §6A-9-402(5). The petitioners argue, however, that whatever the legal effect of the requirement of a $300 clause, there can be no impact on the basic attachment of the security interest as this is purely a matter between the parties to the original security agreement. See Rodi Boat Co. v. Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co., 236 F.Supp. 935 (E.D.Pa.), aff'd, 339 F.2d 259 (3d Cir. 1964); Bramble Transportation, Inc. v. Sam Senter Sales, Inc., 294 A.2d 97 (Del. Super. 1971), aff'd, 294 A.2d 104 (Del. 1972); M6A-9-201 and 6A-9-204. From this premise, they conclude that unless the savings provision merely reiterates the obvious point that the omission of the statement required by §6A-9-402(5) does not affect the attachment of a security interest, the term "validity" must be equated with perfection. We find this reasoning persuasive as it is settled law in Rhode Island that every word, sentence, or provision of a statute is presumed to have been intended for some useful purpose and to have some force and effect. Merciol v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 110 R. I. 149, 290 A.2d 907 (1972). When the ambiguous term "validity" is replaced by the term "perfection", the savings clause stands as an unequivocal expression of legislative intent to enact a ministerial provision, created for the purpose of implementing the other Rhode Island addition to this area of the uniform code, §6A-9-401(1)(c); as such §6A-9-402(5) is not a condition precedent to perfection.
This conclusion is reinforced by the overall conception of §6A-9-402. This court has held that §6A-9-402 provides for "notice filing." Matthews v. Arctic Tire, Inc., supra; South County Sand & Gravel Co., Inc. v. Bituminous Pavers Co., supra. A financing statement need only provide interested parties with the information that a secured transaction has taken place and that the particulars thereof may be obtained from the named security party at the address shown. The formal requisites found in §6A-9-402(1) are designed to elicit this basic information. As was noted above, however, a statement indicating whether the collateral is low-cost consumer goods is completely unresponsive to this purpose. To make perfection turn on a requirement unrelated to notice is not only nonsensical, but in this case needless, as the purpose of §6A-9-402(5), to implement the imperative contained in §6A-9-401(1) (c), may be accomplished by simply refusing to accept a financing statement not containing a separate formal $300 clause.
We conclude, therefore, that under the Rhode Island Uniform Commercial Code, a financing statement, accepted for filing and in fact filed with the Secretary of State, is sufficient to perfect a security interest if the formal requisites of §6A-9-402(l) are satisfied, even though it does not contain a separate formal statement indicating whether the collateral is consumer goods having an aggregate original purchase price of not less than $300, excluding interest, insurance, and other charges.
Mr. Justice Joslin did not participate.