Case Name: Philip Goode VON EIFF and Cheryl Goode Von Eiff, Appellants, v. Leonor AZICRI and Roberto Azicri, Appellees
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1997-09-17
Citations: 699 So. 2d 772
Docket Number: No. 96-3273
Parties: Philip Goode VON EIFF and Cheryl Goode Von Eiff, Appellants, v. Leonor AZICRI and Roberto Azicri, Appellees.
Judges: Before SCHWARTZ, C.J., and GERSTEN and GREEN, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 699
Pages: 772–787

Head Matter:
Philip Goode VON EIFF and Cheryl Goode Von Eiff, Appellants, v. Leonor AZICRI and Roberto Azicri, Appellees.
No. 96-3273.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
Sept. 17, 1997.
Geiger, Kasdin, Heller, Kuperstein, Chames & Weil, and Robert Geiger and Johnathan A. Heller, Miami, for appellants.
Brenda B. Shapiro, Miami, and Robin B. LeBlane, Aventura, for appellees.
Before SCHWARTZ, C.J., and GERSTEN and GREEN, JJ.

Opinion:
GERSTEN, Judge.
Appellants, Philip and Cheryl Von Eiff, contend that the trial court abused its discretion by granting visitation to appellees, Leonor and Roberto Azicri ("grandparents"), the maternal grandparents of Philip's biological daughter. The appellants additionally claim that the visitation order is too broad, not in the best interests of the child, and that the underlying grandparent visitation statute is unconstitutional. We find the relevant statutory provision is constitutional and in the best interests of the child, but reverse and remand the order to reconsider the extent and frequency of visitation.
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Kelly Von Eiff was born to Phillip and Luisa Von Eiff on March 14, 1991. Kelly's natural mother, Luisa, died of cancer in December of 1993. Two months later, Cheryl Goode moved in with Philip and Kelly. Cheryl eventually married Philip, hereafter collectively referred to as "parents", and adopted Kelly in October of 1994. Currently, Cheryl and Philip are in the process of a divorce and Kelly is living with her adoptive mother Cheryl.
Prior to Luisa's death, the grandparents frequently saw Kelly and got along well with Philip. However, this relationship deteriorated after Cheryl moved in with Philip. The grandparents' visits with Kelly were reduced, and ceased altogether after the adoption. In response, the grandparents filed a petition to compel visitation under section 752.01(l)(a), Florida Statutes (1995).
Section 752.01(l)(a) provides for reasonable grandparent visitation rights where one or both parents of a child are deceased, and where such visitation is found to be in the child's best interests. Philip and Cheryl opposed the petition arguing that visitation was not in Kelly's best interests, and that the statute unconstitutionally infringed on their parental rights.
After an unsuccessful mediation, the parties went to trial. Trial testimony revealed, and the trial court found, that limited grandparent visitation would be in Kelly's best interests. The trial court's order allowed the grandparents to have parentally supervised Friday night dinners with Kelly for eight weeks. Additionally, after the eight week introduction, Kelly would spend the night on alternating weekends with the grandparents, with parental supervision at the option of the grandparents. Lastly, the order also provided that Kelly would spend religious holidays with her grandparents.
II
We first address the constitutionality of section 752.01(l)(a). Simply, the state has a compelling interest in protecting children after a parent has died by preserving grandparent visitation that is in the child's best interests. Because section 752.01(l)(a) is narrowly tailored toward promoting this compelling interest, we find the provision constitutional.
Florida's grandparent visitation statute, section 752.01(1), Florida Statutes (1995), provides:
(1) The court shall, upon petition filed by a grandparent of a minor child, award reasonable rights of visitation to the grandparent with respect to the child when it is in the best interest of the minor child if:
(a) One or both the parents of the child are deceased;
(b) The marriage of the parents of the child has been dissolved;
(c) A parent of the child has deserted the child;
(d) The minor child was born out of wedlock and not later determined to be a child born within wedlock as provided in § 742.091; or
(e) The minor child is living with both natural parents who are still married to each other whether or not there is a broken relationship between either or both parents of the minor child and the grandparents, and either or both parents have used their parental authority to prohibit a relationship between the minor child and the grandparents.
We stress that this case solely involves section (l)(a) of the statute where one or both of the parents are deceased. Under these circumstances, a court may award reasonable visitation rights to a grandparent only if visitation is in the best interests of the child. Factors utilized by the court in making such a determination include: the willingness of the grandparents to foster a close relationship between the child and the parents, the length and quality of any prior relationship between the grandparents and the child, the preferences of the child, and the mental and physical health of the grandparents and the child.
In examining the constitutionality of section 752.01(1)(a), we recognize the potential conflict between grandparent visitation rights and a parent's constitutional privacy rights in directing the upbringing and education of their children without undue government interference. See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 45 S.Ct. 571, 69 L.Ed. 1070 (1925). However, this rule of parental privilege is not absolute, and yields where the state shows compelling reasons to promote the best interests of the child. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 92 S.Ct. 1526, 32 L.Ed.2d 15 (1972); Padgett v. Dep't of Health and Rehabilitative Services, 577 So.2d 565 (Fla.1991); Winfield v. Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering, 477 So.2d 544 (Fla. 1985). For example, case law has established the state's compelling interest in protecting children from actual harm and the threat of harm. See Jones v. State, 640 So.2d 1084 (Fla.1994). The state also has a compelling interest in protecting children from emotional harm. See Nelson v. Nelson, 433 So.2d 1015 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983). Accordingly, the state can require that parents enroll their children in school, that they adequately feed them, clothe them, inoculate them, use child restraints in vehicles, and house them during curfews. See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 99 S.Ct. 3035, 61 L.Ed.2d 797 (1979).
While we recognize the vital importance of the parental right to make childrearing decisions, well-established precedent clearly provides that the rights and concerns of the child must ultimately control. See State ex rel. Sparks v. Reeves, 97 So.2d 18 (Fla.1957). The critical question then becomes: can it be in a child's best interests to permit grandparent visitation when one or both of the parents is deceased?
The Florida Supreme Court addressed grandparent visitation in Beagle v. Beagle, 678 So.2d 1271 (Fla.1996). The Court held that another section, section 752.01(1)(e) of the statute, unconstitutionally infringed on the privacy rights of the parents because it failed to require a showing of harm to the child who was living in an intact family.
Yet the Florida Supreme Court carefully limited its unconstitutionality finding to the "intact family" section of the statute. The Court emphasized that the "inadequacy of the best interests test in this limited circumstance does not change or modify existing principles regarding the use of that test in other family law concepts." Beagle, 678 So.2d at 1272. The Court repeatedly emphasized that its decision requiring a showing of harm in the context of an intact family did not change any other application of the best interests test. Beagle, 678 So.2d at 1277. Hence, it is manifest that the Court did not intend for the demonstrable harm requirement to extend to situations, such as the provision at issue here, which do not involve an intact family.
This makes sense because the purpose behind requiring demonstrable harm no longer applies in the absence of an intact family situation. Courts are rightfully reluctant to interfere with the sheltered structure of an intact family because of the parent's fundamental right to raise their children. Thus logically the only cases holding provisions of visitation statutes unconstitutional deal solely with intact families. See Beagle, 678 So.2d at 1271; Brooks, 454 S.E.2d at 769; Hawk, 855 S.W.2d at 573; Williams, 485 S.E.2d at 651.
However, under circumstances where families have been disrupted by death or divorce, the intact family is already compromised and the focus of the analysis shifts to the best interests of the child. See McAlister v. Shaver, 633 So.2d 494 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994)(diseontinuity of parents' relationship allows the court to determine visitation or custody based solely on the child's best interests). In these situations, the state is historically empowered to protect the interests of those injured by the disruption. See McRae v. McRae, 52 So.2d 908 (Fla.1951)(courts in dissolution proceedings have the inherent power to protect children and to do all things necessary for the administration of justice). To require an explicit finding of demonstrable harm under such circumstances would be superfluous.
The constitutionality of section 752.01(l)(a) must therefore be determined based upon a "best interests" analysis. While this is a determination that must be made on a case by case basis, we recognize the important interest in a child's relationship with his or her grandparents. Exposure to grandparents generally provides tremendous benefits to the health and welfare of children. See Ramey v. Thomas, 483 So.2d 747, 748 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986)(child's welfare is promoted in most cases by having grandparents, rather than by not having them).
Children benefit by exposure to an essential link with the past that provides them with a sense of family identity. See Christine David-Galbraith, Grandma, Grandpa, Where Are You?, 3 Elder L.J. 143 (1995). Children also benefit because their grandparents can provide an objective eye on events at home (i.e., calling attention to abuse) and offer a place of sanctuary. Additionally, research reveals that children in these relationships gain a respect for the elderly, are more secure, and are less likely to commit suicide or use drugs. Id. at 143.
At no time are the fruits of this relationship more beneficial then when a child's world is turned upside down by the death of a parent. Death centers a child in an emotional maelstrom threatening emotional development. In these situations, a child needs the stability that grandparents can provide.
Moreover, children can become innocent pawns in power struggles by their loved ones when a family is disrupted. See Cochran v. Cochran, 263 So.2d 292 (Fla. 2d DCA 1972). Allowing a parent without restraint to interfere with beneficial visitation in circumstances of death may exacerbate emotional trauma precisely when the child is most vulnerable. See Preston v. Mercieri, 133 N.H. 36, 573 A.2d 128 (1990)(abrupt termination of a meaningful relationship between the child and his grandparents would be cruel and inhumane after a parent has died).
This case provides the perfect example of a child placed in emotional jeopardy. Here, Kelly's natural mother died, and her father is divorcing her adoptive mother. Kelly, who now lives with her adoptive mother, is completely cut off from the beneficial, loving relationship she knew with her grandparents. A relationship her natural mother encouraged. Unlike united opposition in an intact family, this is not a case where the state is called upon to impose visitation over parental objections. Rather, this is a case where the state acts to insure the continuity of visitation already encouraged by a deceased parent.
In Sketo v. Brown, 559 So.2d 381 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990), the First District faced a factually similar situation. There, the father died and the paternal grandparents sought visitation rights after the relationship with the mother deteriorated. The mother contested visitation on the grounds that this interfered with her right to raise her children as she saw fit, and that the state lacked a compelling interest to require her to submit to visitation. The court held that section 752.01(l)(a) was facially constitutional because it met a sufficiently compelling state interest in protecting the welfare of children.
We agree with Sketo. A court cannot blindly adhere to the right of privacy when this would be detrimental to a child's best interests. See In re Guardianship of D.A. McW., 429 So.2d 699 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983), approved, 460 So.2d 368 (Fla.1984)(grandparent visitation allowed where abrupt termination would be detrimental to a child's welfare). The state has a compelling interest, not in mandating how parents should raise their children, but to insure that a child's needs are not overlooked in these difficult circumstances. By preserving beneficial grandparent visitation rights after a parent has died, section 752.01(1)(a) promotes the state's compelling interest in the welfare of children.
Moreover, section 752.01(l)(a) is narrowly tailored and contains inherent safeguards which protect the fundamental rights of parents. First, parents have the opportunity and the right to object to visitation and apply it to their particular circumstances. Second, the statute pertains only to grandparents. Third, the statute allows for mediation of the dispute, prior to judicial review. Fourth, since there is no presumption that grandparents are entitled to visitation, the burden rests with the grandparents to show how visitation is in the child's best interests. Additionally, the statute itemizes specific factors for the court to assess the best interests of the child and whether visitation is appropriate. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, any visitation imposed by the statute is judicially modifiable. See Ward v. Dibble, 683 So.2d 666 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996); Sketo, 559 So.2d at 381. The trial court has the authority to reduce or even completely deny visitation. See Brago v. Brago, 604 So.2d at 866.
In conclusion, section 752.01(l)(a) which allows limited visitation to grandparents after a parent has died, promotes a compelling state interest in protecting the emotional well being of children, while simultaneously safeguarding the fundamental rights of parents. Accordingly, we find this section constitutional under Article I, section 23 of the Florida Constitution.
Ill
Having determined that section 752.01(l)(a) is constitutional, we next address whether grandparent visitation is in the best interests of Kelly. In Kelly's short life her mother died, her father remarried, and is now in the process of getting a divorce from her adoptive mother. Kelly's father no longer lives in her home and she is now being cared for by her adoptive mother. From Kelly's perspective the world is constantly turning upside down.
Testimony at trial revealed that, because people close to Kelly have constantly disappeared from her life, she needs the stability that her grandparents would provide. Additional evidence also showed that Kelly has a loving relationship with her grandparents and that severing this relationship would be detrimental to her. See Dixon v. Melton, 565 So.2d 1378 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990)(visitation allowed where grandchild suffered from the frustration of grandparent visitation-by the mother). Our review of the record reveals competent, substantial evidence supporting the trial court's finding that visitation with her grandparents is in Kelly's best interests. See Dinkel v. Dinkel, 322 So.2d 22 (Fla.1975).
However, while we agree with that part of the trial court's order finding visitation proper, we find under these circumstances that the order was overly broad. Of particular concern are the provisions allowing the grandparents to mandate Kelly's religious development. The visitation order allows the grandparents extended visitation every other Friday evening for Sabbath dinner, in addition to numerous specific religious holidays. There is a wide gulf between simple visitation and religious tutelage. One of the most basic rights in determining the care and upbringing of a child is the teaching of moral standards and religious beliefs. See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. at 622, 99 S.Ct. at 3035, 61 L.Ed.2d at 797. The trial court abused its discretion by intruding too far into the parent's domain and should not have superseded the parents' objections as to how and what specific type of religious upbringing Kelly should have.
Additionally, we express severe reservations concerning whether the frequent dinners and visits are warranted when the lower court found the parents to be fit. Here, testimony revealed that frequent visits would be destructive to Kelly's normal pattern of living. Consequently, under these circumstances we find that the broad scope of the visitation order runs contrary to Kelly's best interests, and must be reversed. See Sketo, 559 So.2d at 381 (extensive visitation unreasonable and not in minor child's best interest); Fisher v. Fisher, 390 So.2d 142 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980)(visitation to grandparents upheld but order facilitating visitation by forbidding-parent to remove children from Broward County reversed).
IV
In conclusion, finding that section 752.01(l)(a) does satisfy the requirements of the Florida Constitution, we affirm that part of the order permitting visitation by the grandparents because visitation is in Kelly's best interests. However, we reverse and remand to the trial court to reconsider the extent and scope of what constitutes reasonable visitation under these circumstances. See Ward v. Dibble, 683 So.2d at 666; Sketo, 559 So.2d at 381.
Because of the important and sensitive family law issues involved, we certify the following question to the Florida Supreme Court as one of great public importance:
MAY THE STATE CONSTITUTIONALLY ALLOW REASONABLE GRANDPARENT VISITATION WHERE ONE OR BOTH PARENTS OF A CHILD ARE DECEASED AND VISITATION IS DETERMINED TO BE IN THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD?
Affirmed in part; reversed in part and remanded; question certified.
SCHWARTZ, C.J., concurs.
. All fifty states have codified similar statutes designed to preserve the. rights of grandparents to visit with their grandchildren. The majority of those state courts which have addressed this issue find these statutes constitutional. See Lehrer v. Davis, 214 Conn. 232, 571 A.2d 691 (1990); Sanchez v. Parker, 1995 WL 489146 (Del.Fam.Ct.1995); Bailey v. Menzie, 542 N.E.2d 1015 (Ind.Ct.App.1989); Spradling v. Harris, 13 Kan. App.2d 595, 778 P.2d 365 (1989); King v. King, 828 S.W.2d 630(Ky.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 941, 113 S.Ct. 378, 121 L.Ed.2d 289 (1992); Herndon v. Tuhey, 857 S.W.2d 203 (Mo.1993); Ridenour v. Ridenour, 120 N.M. 352, 901 P.2d 770 (App.), cert. denied, 120 N.M. 68, 898 P.2d 120 (1995); Campbell v. Campbell, 896 P.2d 635 (Utah.Ct.App.1995); Michael v. Hertzler, 900 P.2d 1144 (Wyo.1995).
By contrast, only a few states find grandparent visitation unconstitutional and have done so solely under circumstances involving an intact family. See Brooks v. Parkerson, 265 Ga. 189, 454 S.E.2d 769 (Ga.), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 116 S.Ct. 377, 133 L.Ed.2d 301 (1995); Hawk v. Hawk, 855 S.W.2d 573 (Tenn.1993); Williams v. Williams, 24 Va.App. 778, 485 S.E.2d 651 (1997). Interestingly, the Tennessee Supreme Court in Hawk noted that because parents in a disrupted family might be less inclined to allow visitation with their former in-laws, the state had a stronger argument for visitation to protect the child when the nuclear family was destroyed. Hawk, 855 S.W.2d at 580.
. No state allows unfettered discretion to parents. "Except in countries which lie in barbarism, the authority of the parent over the child is nowhere left absolutely . without definition and regulation." Bailey v. Menzie, 542 N.E.2d 1015, 1019 (Ind.Ct.App.1989), quoting State v. Clottu, 33 Ind. 409, 411 (Ind.1870).
. The Court specifically stated: "We emphasize again that our holding in this case is not intended to change the law in other areas of family law where the best interest of the child is utilized to make a judicial determination. In issuing this decision, we have no intent to disrupt or modify the current requirements for best interest balancing in those other areas of family law proceedings." Beagle, 678 So.2d at 1277.
. The thrust of the dissent's argument is that because Beagle found section (l)(e) unconstitutional as requiring a showing of harm in the context of an intact family, the remaining four provisions of the statute, even though dealing with completely different circumstances, must fall as well. Dissent at 784-85. A careful reading of Beagle shows quite the opposite. The Court went out of its way, on four separate occasions, to emphasize that its holding was limited to intact families. Beagle, 678 So.2d at 1271. In light of this specific language, we disagree with the dissent's contention that the demonstrable harm requirement should be extended to the remaining provisions of the statute as well.
. While the dissent correctly observes that states holding visitation statutes constitutional do not have Florida's explicit right of privacy, we more importantly point out that all states with privacy rights have enforced grandparent visitation premised solely on the best interests of the child. See Brown v. Brown, 914 P.2d 206 (Alaska 1996); In re Robert D., 151 Cal.App.3d 391, 198 Cal.Rptr. 801 (1984); Doe v. Doe, 85 Hawai'i 108, 937 P.2d 949 (App.1997); In re Marriage of Kovash, 260 Mont. 44, 858 P.2d 351 (1993).
.Section 752.01(1) was designed to protect the interests of children in disrupted families by preserving beneficial visitation. As noted by this court in Griss v. Griss, 526 So.2d 697 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988)(Pearson, J. concurring), review dismissed, 531 So.2d 1353 (Fla.1988), section 752.01(1) was intended to apply in situations where a family is disrupted by death or divorce, and the custodial parent spitefully prevents the children from visiting with their grandparents. The clear legislative intent behind this statute was to protect the interests of children to visit with their grandparents. See Griss, 526 So.2d at 700 (citing to Fla. H.R., Tape Recording of Proceedings (April 23, 1984)(tape available from , Florida House of Representatives)(floor debate on H.B. 487)).
. As noted by one court: the "tensions and conflicts that mar relations between parents and children are often absent between those very same parents and their grandchildren . visits with a grandparent are a precious part of a child's experience and there are benefits which devolve upon the grandchild from the relationship with his grandparents which he cannot derive from any other relationship." Mimkon v. Ford, 66 N.J. 426, 332 A.2d 199, 204 (1975).
. It is widely recognized that a fundamental disruption in a child's environment can significantly impair their development. "Near consensus does exist . for the principle that a child's healthy growth depends in large part upon the continuity of his personal relationships. When divorce, death of a parent, foster care, or adoption intrude on a child's family life, such continuity is inevitably interrupted . it seems reasonable . that a break in family continuity is detrimental to a child." Katharine T. Bartlett, Rethinking Parenthood as an Exclusive Status: The Need For Legal Alternatives When the Premise of the Nuclear Family Has Failed, 70 Va. L.Rev. 879, 902 (1984).
. Grandparents can alleviate much of the emotional trauma and impact associated with the disruption of a family. In fact, "studies . show that the quality and strength of support a child receives following the death of a parent may protect the child from later psychiatric disorders. Maintaining existing ties to adults outside the nuclear family may help minimize a child's sense of grief and loss following a parent's death." Catherine M. Gillman, One Big, Happy Family? In Search of a More Reasoned Approach to Grandparent Visitation in Minnesota, 97 Minn. L.Rev. 1279, 1301-2 (1995).
. As an alternative argument, the dissent contends that section 752.01(l)(a) is inapplicable because Kelly is now adopted. Dissent at 780. We agree that an adoptive parent generally stands in the same shoes as a natural parent. See § 63.172(l)(c), Fla. Stat. (1995). That is not the point here. What triggers the application of section 752.01(l)(a) is the death of a parent. Thus, regardless of the fact Kelly was subsequently adopted, this section was triggered when her natural mother died.
. The dissent attempts to dismiss Sketo by contending that it is wholly irreconcilable with existing state and federal constitutional law. Dissent at 783-84. In doing so the dissent likens beneficial visitation to such complete deprivations of parental rights as the termination of custody,.or the veto of a minor child's abortion. See In re Guardianship of D.A. McW., 460 So.2d 368 (Fla.1984); In re T.W., 551 So.2d 1186 (Fla.1989). This goes too far. The denial of custody and the abortion veto are both fundamental usurpations of parental power that completely override the ability of parents to control their children. Visitation cannot be compared to such drastic usur-pations of parental power. See In re Guardianship of D.A. McW., 429 So.2d 699 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983), approved, 460 So.2d 368 (Fla.1984). The parents retain complete control over their children. Moreover, whereas visitation is modifiable, abortion or the complete termination of parental rights is not. Unlike the circumstances in cases cited by the dissent, section 752.01(l)(a) does not involve the complete dismissal of parental control, but the preservation of control through the maintenance of visitation rights already granted by the deceased parent.
. The dissent cites a number of cases to support the contention that section 752.01(1) violates the federal constitution. Our resolution of this issue under Florida's more restrictive right of privacy makes any analysis under the federal constitution irrelevant. See Beagle, 678 So.2d at 1272.