Case Name: Eric NATION, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1996-02-20
Citations: 668 So. 2d 284
Docket Number: No. 94-3748
Parties: Eric NATION, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: LAWRENCE, J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 668
Pages: 284–287

Head Matter:
Eric NATION, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. 94-3748.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
Feb. 20, 1996.
Nancy A. Daniels, Public Defender; David P. Gauldin, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General; Daniel A. David, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.

Opinion:
MICKLE, Judge.
In this direct criminal appeal, the appellant seeks review of his conviction and sentencing order. We affirm his conviction and sentence and remand with instructions for the lower court to enter a written sentencing order.
The state charged him in Count I with attempted first-degree murder with the use of a weapon (striking the victim with an automobile), and in Count II with armed robbery, during the course of which the appellant "carried a deadly weapon, to-wit: the automobile." Defense counsel moved to dismiss Count II of the amended information on the grounds that because it is physically impossible for anyone literally to carry an automobile in the course of committing a robbery, the state had failed to allege a violation of the applicable statute, section 812.13(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1993). The trial court concluded that the word "carry" must be logically interpreted so that, if the evidence demonstrated that an automobile had been used as a weapon in the course of the robbery, the statutory requirements were met. Accordingly, the trial court denied the motion to dismiss.
Reserving the right to appeal the denial of his motion to dismiss, the appellant subsequently entered into a plea agreement, pursuant to which he pled no contest to the lesser-included offense of aggravated battery in Count I, and armed robbery in Count II. He received a guidelines sentence in accordance with the plea agreement. The record establishes that the appellant and his co-defendants used an automobile to run down the victim, seriously injuring the victim. The victim's wallet was taken as he lay at the side of the road.
In Issue I on appeal, the appellant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss as to Count II. We have addressed this identical issue in a recent opinion involving a co-defendant and have found the appellant's argument to be without merit. Jackson v. State, 662 So.2d 1369 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995). Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court correctly denied the appellant's motion to dismiss Count II.
In Issue II, the appellant contends that the trial court erred in failing to set forth specific written findings regarding his suitability for adult sanctions pursuant to section 39.059, Florida Statutes. The appellant asserts that we must vacate the sentence and remand the case for the lower tribunal to consider the suitability of adult sanctions, to make specific findings, and to enter a written order. The appellant was 17 years old in January 1994 when he committed the crime at issue. Section 39.059(7)(d), Florida Statutes (1993), formerly required the trial court to make specific written findings of fact relating to the criteria set forth in statutory subsection (7)(e), by providing in pertinent part:
(d) Any decision to impose adult sanctions shall be in writing and in conformity with each of the above criteria. The court shall render a specific finding of fact and the reasons for the decision to impose adult sanctions.
(Emphasis added.) The above provision was amended effective October 1, 1994, after the appellant committed his crime but before he was sentenced. Ch. 94-209, § 51, at 1307, and 150, at 1384, Laws of Fla. The amended statute provides:
(d) Any decision to impose adult sanctions must be in writing, but is presumed appropriate, and the court is not required to set forth specific findings or enumerate the criteria in this subsection as any basis for its decision to impose adult sanctions.
(Emphasis added.) In Thomas v. State, 662 So.2d 1334 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995), we held that, being procedural, the amendment was properly applied retroactively to the disposition hearing of Thomas, a juvenile who had committed his offense prior to the effective date of the amendment but was sentenced after-wards. In accordance with Thomas, we conclude that the trial court did not err in failing either to set forth specific findings or to enumerate the statutory criteria for its decision to impose adult sanctions. Nevertheless, we hold, and the state concedes, that the case must be remanded for entry of a written order. Even under the amended statute, "[a]ny decision to impose adult sanctions must be in writing." § 39.059(7)(d), Fla.Stat. (Supp.1994). A written nunc pro tunc sentencing order will satisfy the requirements of the statute. Therefore, no new sentencing hearing is required, nor need the appellant be physically present in court for the merely clerical or ministerial function of entering a written order conforming to the oral pronouncement of the court. Davis v. State, 387 So.2d 490 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980).
AFFIRMING the conviction and sentence and REMANDING with instructions to enter a written sentencing order.
LAWRENCE, J., concurs.
ERVIN, J., specially concurs with written opinion.