Case Name: John F. Davis, Respondent, v. Henry Smith, as Substituted Trustee under the Last Will and Testament of Anna R. Kling, Deceased, Appellant
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1899-07
Citations: 42 A.D. 333
Docket Number: 
Parties: John F. Davis, Respondent, v. Henry Smith, as Substituted Trustee under the Last Will and Testament of Anna R. Kling, Deceased, Appellant.
Judges: 
Reporter: Appellate Division Reports
Volume: 42
Pages: 333–335

Head Matter:
John F. Davis, Respondent, v. Henry Smith, as Substituted Trustee under the Last Will and Testament of Anna R. Kling, Deceased, Appellant.
Contract — execution of, in the name of a corporation, by one intending to bind herself individually — the other party to the contact’ must sue' for the price specified; therein, and not on a quantum meruit for merchandise delivered thereunder.
The fact that a person, who intended to bind herself , individually to purchase certain goods, used the name of a corporation in executing the contract of purchase, does not entitle the other party to the contract, who was not misled by . the misnomer, to repudiate the contract and sue for the reasonable value of the goods furnished by him under the contract, instead of for the price expressed therein.
Appeal by the defendant, Henry Smith, as substituted trustee under the last will and testament of Anna R. Kling, deceased, from •a judgment of the County Court of Sullivan county in favor of the plaintiff, entered in the office of the clerk of the county of Sullivan on the 3d day of February, 1897, upon the verdict of a jury rendered by direction of the court, and also from an order denying the defendant’s motion for a new trial made upon the minutes.
The action was originally begun in a Justice’s Court, and plaintiff having recovered judgment therein, the defendant appealed to the County Court and demanded a new trial.
James E. Kelly, for the appellant,
John F. Anderson, for the respondent.

Opinion:
Landon, J. ;
The complaint alleges and the answer admits that the plaintiff sold and delivered to the defendant's testatrix the milk in question.. The delivery was in February and March, 1892. The plaintiff alleges that the milk was reasonably worth two and a quarter cents per quart. The defendant alleges that it was sold and delivered' under a contract covering the year from April 1,1891, to April 1, 1892, and that by the terms thereof the defendant is entitled to •credit for overpayments made to plaintiff for the milk delivered in the months previous to February and March, 1892. The General Term upon a former appeal held that the defendant's contention as to the terms of the contract was right. (77 Hun, 598.)
U pon the new trial the court, after the contract had been received in evidence, struck it out, and thus deprived the defendant of his defense. Exception was duly taken to this ruling of the court. The ground for striking it out appears to have heen that the contract was made with a corporation, and not with the defendant's testatrix. The undisputed evidence is to tlie effect that the defendant's testatrix carried on her creamery at which the plaintiff delivered the milk under the name of the Orange and Sullivan County Milk Association; that there was or had been a corporation of that name of which her late husband was the president, and that upon his death she became the owner or proprietor of the creamery and business, and continued it under the same name; that under such ñame her agent made the contract in question with the plaintiff and the other patrons of the creamery. As the plaintiff was in nowise misled by the name in which defendant's testatrix contracted with him, he cannot repudiate his contract with her after he has performed it bn his part. (Goodsell v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 130 N. Y. 430). To hold that the plaintiff can make the defendant pay for the milk at the plaintiff's price, instead of that expressed in the contract, simply because the defendant's testatrix used a corporate instead of her individual name in binding herself, when both parties understood that.she intended thereby to bind herself, would be unjust. Instead of giving effect to the intention of the parties, it would violate it. The defendant does not seek to escape the obligation of the contract. The plaintiff testifies that he signed the •contract at the office of the creamery, Mr. Stiles, the agent of the defendant's testatrix in running the creamery, presenting it for his signature, the plaintiff at the time supposing him to be such agent, and that after signing it, he delivered the milk.
For the error in striking out the contract, the judgment must be reversed, a new trial granted, costs to abide the event.
All concurred, except Putnam, J., not sitting.
Judgment reversed, and a new trial granted, costs to abide the event.