Case Name: STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v. EDDIE RUIZ, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
Court: New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New Jersey
Decision Date: 1974-03-26
Citations: 127 N.J. Super. 350
Docket Number: 
Parties: STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v. EDDIE RUIZ, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
Judges: 
Reporter: New Jersey Superior Court Reports
Volume: 127
Pages: 350–364

Head Matter:
STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v. EDDIE RUIZ, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
Superior Court of New Jersey Appellate Division
Submitted January 7, 1974—
Decided March 26, 1974.
Allcorn, J. A. D., dissented in part, with opinion.
Before Judges Leonard, Allcorn and Crahay.
Mr. Stanley C. Van Ness, Public Defender, attorney for appellant (Mr. David R. Arrajj, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, of counsel and on the brief).
Mr. George F. Kugler, Jr., Attorney General of New Jersey, attorney for respondent (Mr. Robert J. Genatt, Deputy Attorney General, of counsel; Steven Leonard Strelitz, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).

Opinion:
Per Curiam:
In three indictments defendant was charged with a variety of drug offenses allegedly committed on separate dates. Following his convictions multiple sentences were imposed aggregating a term of not less than five nor more than seven years in New Jersey State Prison. His appeals therefrom are addressed to the convictions in part and the sentences in their totality and, on his motion, we have consolidated them. They will be treated separately since different arguments are addressed to each.
1. Indictment 722-71-M in its first count charged that on April 6, 1972 defendant possessed heroin, contrary to N. J. S. A. 24:21-20. The second count charged that on the same day defendant possessed heroin with intent to distribute it, contrary to N. J. S. A. 24:21-19, subd. a(l). Following a nonjury trial, defendant was found guilty of both offenses and sentenced on each count to concurrent three to five year terms in New Jersey State Prison. Defendant's motion urging essentially that both counts involved a single offense was denied, the trial court being of the opinion that the Legislature intended that the offenses were distinct and separately punishable.
The sole point of appeal addressed to the convictions under this indictment is that the court erred by imposing separate sentences. In a word, defendant argues that the charges here merged and we agree.
The record reflects that the proofs were sufficient to support the conviction of possession of heroin with intent to distribute it. While possession of heroin is a crime in and of itself, in the prosecution of this indictment, it was an essen tial element of the charge of possession with intent to distribute and must therefore be treated as an included offense. Defendant may not stand convicted of both charges. State v. Thomas, 118 N. J. Super. 377 (App. Div. 1972), certif. den. 60 N. J. 513 (1972); State v. Hill 44 N. J. Super. 110 (App. Div. 1957). Accordingly, the conviction on the first count of Indictment Ho. 722-71-M and the sentence imposed thereon are hereby vacated. The judgment of conviction on the second count is affirmed.
2. Indictment Ho. 729-71-M charged in the first count that on June 13, 1972 defendant possessed heroin with intent to distribute it contrary to N. J. S. A. 24 :21-19, subd. a(l) and in the second count that on the same day he distributed heroin contrary to N. J. S. A. 24 :21-19, subd. a(l).
This indictment was tried to a jury which found defendant guilty of both counts. He was sentenced therefor on the first count to not less than three nor more than five years in New Jersey State Prison and on the second count to not less than five nor more than seven years. It was ordered that the terms were to be served concurrently with each other and also with the sentences imposed on Indictment Ho. 722-71-M.
Originally, the only point of appeal directed to this indictment was that the trial court erred in not granting defendant's motion for a mistrial generated by allegedly improper comments by the prosecutor during his summation. Thereafter by reply brief (the point was not raised below) defendant argues that his possession conviction merged into the conviction for distribution and should be vacated.
On summation the prosecutor alluding to the heroin which had been marked into evidence, invited the jury's attention to the destructive character of the drug—" cute little package incredible how much destruction in that little package." A defense objection was interposed and the statement was withdrawn. Thereafter, reference was again made to the "little package" — "this little baby" and its potential. At the conclusion of the State's summation, defense counsel moved for a mistrial. The motion was denied, and we think properly. The allowance of mistrials resides in the discretion of trial courts and should be granted only where manifest injustice looms. State v. DiRienzo, 53 N. J. 360, 383 (1969). Our review of the challenged remarks satisfies us that while they were better left unsaid (again we have an instance of a prosecutor's zeal overriding his responsibility, State v. Farrell, 61 N. J. 99, 104 (1972)), but we do not find that in context they were of a quality which constituted meaningful prejudice to defendant. The trial judge in his final instructions to the jury was meticulous and vigorous in charging them to disregard the allegedly offensive comments. He stated —
Now, there were certain statements made in the closing statement by the Prosecutor with respect to the potential or the effects of heroin. I am instructing you to disregard them completely. That was not part of the evidence in this case. It is not something for you to consider at all. You are concerned only with the two charges that are brought against the defendant and not of the potential effects or the effects that heroin has, and I very strongly tell you to completely disregard any of those statements which dealt with the potential or the effects of heroin.
We are satisfied that the cited instruction effectively eradicated whatever prejudicial impact the prosecutor's remarks may have generated. State v. Knight, 63 N. J. 187 (1973). Whatever prejudice may have resulted from the remarks themselves or which may have remained after the court's instruction was not in our view of a quality to warrant reversal. Here, there was ample proof of defendant's guilt. Stale v. LaPorte, 62 N. J. 312 (1973).
We need not consider whether defendant's argument on the merger of offenses is timely since we are satisfied that on the record here the possession of heroin charge was separate and distinct from the distribution charge and, as such, separately punishable.
The record reflects that on the night of the offense, one Botsko — a police officer — was engaged in an undercover narcotics mission. Accompanied by an informer and attired in a manner appropriate to the milieu he was entering, he was approached by defendant on a public street. Defendant claimed that he had the 'Test dope" and that he and another had "just copped an ounce from New York." Others on the scene noticed that Botsko was carrying an automatic weapon in his pants. Botsko was apprehensive that the weapon might be a giveaway that he was a police officer. To avoid compromising his cover he removed the weapon and inquired as to how much dope might be procured for it. Botsko testified that defendant stated he would give four "bags" in exchange for the weapon. Botsko countered that he would want seven or eight bags and went on to inquire of defendant as to the cost of a single bag. Defendant stated the price to be ten dollars. Botsko gave defendant ten dollars whereupon defendant left the scene, returning in about one minute and handed him one bag containing a substance later proven to be heroin. After further unfruitful bartering for drugs in exchange for the weapon the engagement broke off. Botsko positively identified defendant in court as the person who sold the narcotics to him.
Defendant's belated assertion that the crime of possession of the bag of heroin with intent to distribute it merged into his conviction for distribution of the drug employs for its support two cases, recently decided by this Division, but unreported. We do not now regard that those decisions control and are satisfied that the Legislature intended that the act of possession with intent to distribute narcotics and the act of distributing them to be distinct offenses and separately punishable. Each activity is a separate evil which the Legislature determined to combat.
Rejecting a similar argument in State v. Booker, 86 N. J. Super. 175 (App. Div. 1965) we held:
If defendant's control had been 'fleeting and shadowy in its nature' there might be merit in this argument. However, we are not called upon to express an opinion on this point in this case because the evidence shows that defendant'ss contact with and control over the narcotics was not a mere fleeting and shadowy incident of the sale. In each of the three episodes, he had the nareoiics on his person when he offered them for sale. In short, the possession antedated and was separate and distinct from the sale, and was a separate crime. ' * fat 17cS; emphasis added]
On the record here Boolcer, supra,., to which we subscribe, is operative.
In Gore v. United States, 357 U. S. 386, 78 S. Ct. 1280, 2 L. Ed. 2d 1405 (1958) defendant, as the result of engaging in the single sale of narcotics, was convicted of violating three federal enactments. He was sentenced therefor to three consecutive custodial terms. It was held that the multiple punishment imposed was not offensive to the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy.
Justice Frankfurter, for the majority, said:
*' rpjle £aet an 0ffen(ier violates by a single transaction several regulatory controls devised by Congress as means for dealing with a social evil as deleterious as it is difficult to combat does not make the several different regulatory controls single and identic.
r of course the various enactments by Congress extending over nearly half a century constitute a network of provisions, steadily tightened and enlarged, for grappling with a powerful, subtle and elusive enemy. If the legislation reveals anything, it reveals the determination of Congress to turn the screw of the criminal machinery — detection, prosecution and punishment — tighter and tighter. The three penal laws for which petitioner was convicted have different origins both in time and in design. s-'
Possession of controlled dangerous substances is a vice unto itself and legislatively proscribed. The crime is com píete and the guilt of it established when it is proven that a person knowingly and intentionally possessed a controlled dangerous substance be it for his own use or distribution to others. A subsequent distribution encompasses an added element and brings into being a new and separate offense.
Analyzing earlier legislation, albeit in a different factual context, Justice Proctor in State v. Reed, 34 N. J. 554 (1961) succinctly addresses the issue of possession and provides the legislative rationale:
=>• Why theu was the unqualified term "possess" used? Undoubtedly, to facilitate enforcement. It is well known that it is extremely difficult to apprehend and convict drug traffickers. Illegal transfers do not take place under the eyes of the police. They are clandestine operations carefully guarded from official scrutiny. The proscription of possession, without more, facilitates the enforcement of the law against traffickers by eliminating the burden of proving a transfer. If possession is interpreted not to include possession for imminent personal use, the purpose of facilitating enforcement against traffickers would be seriously hindered. (at p. 565)
We find nothing in our current New Jersey Controlled Dangerous Substances Act, N. J. S. A. 24 :21-1 et seq. (effective 1971) which either expressly or impliedly evinces a legislative intendment to modify or otherwise dilute the viability of the concept of Reed and Booker. See State v. Siebert, 126 N. J. Super. 534 (App. Div. 1974), decided February 8, 1974.
3. In Indictment 735-71-M defendant was charged, in the third count, with aiding and abetting another to distribute heroin on June 27, 1972, contrary to N. J. S. A. 24 :21-19, subd. a (1) and 2A :85-14. The fourth count alleged that defendant and another conspired to distribute heroin, contrary to N. J. S. A. 2A :98-1 and 2 and N. J. S. A. 24 :21-24.
On September 18, 1972, pursuant to a bargained plea, defendant pled guilty to the third count. The prosecutor then reported to the court that at the time of sentence he would move to dismiss the fourth count. On October 13, 1972 defendant appeared before the court for sentencing on the convictions as entered in the three indictments here under review. No motion for dismissal was made as to the fourth count of Indictment 735-71-M and the trial court sentenced him on the third and fourth counts of it to not less than three nor more than five years in New Jersey State Prison, to be served concurrently with each other and the sentences imposed on the other indictments. Defendant did not move to correct the sentence or to enforce the bargained plea. On this appeal defendant urges that the sentence imposed on the fourth count was the product of inadvertence. The State agrees. Accordingly, we exercise our original jurisdiction R. 2:10-5, and vacate defendant's conviction and consequent sentence on the fourth count of Indictment 735-71-M.
Lastly, defendant asserts that the sentences imposed were manifestly excessive. In view of the nature of the offenses and defendant's participation in them, we are satisfied that, as modified, rather than being excessive the custodial terms were eminently appropriate and did not constitute an abuse of the trial court's sentencing discretion. State v. Yormark, 117 N. J. Super. 315 (App. Div. 1971), certif. den. 60 N. J. 138 (1972).
The judgments under review, as modified, are affirmed.
(a) § 4705(a) of the 1954 Internal Revenue Code (sale of narcotics not in pursuance of a written order).
(b) § 4704(a) of the 1954 Internal Revenue Code (sale of narcotics not in their original stamped package).
(c) § 2(c) of the Narcotics Drugs Import and Export Act (facilitation of concealment and sale of drugs).
Booker involved convictions under N. J. S. A. 24 :18-4 which provided: "It shall be unlawful for any person to manufacture, possess, have under his control, sell, prescribe, administer, dispense or compound any narcotic drug, except as authorized by this chapter." N. J. S. A. 24:21-19, subd. a(l), here involved, treats distribution and possession with intent to distribute controlled dangerous substances disjunctively and unlike our .dissenting brother, we perceive no meaningful alteration of legislative intent. State v. Spindel, 24 N. J. 395 (1957), State v. Kress, 105 N. J. Super. 514 (Law Div. 1969).
Assuming defendant had been charged with "simple" possession under N. J. S. A. 24 :21-20(a), and distribution contrary to N. J. S. A. 24 :21-19(a) (1), Booker would be fully operative. We fail to see "fleeting" possession in this record. Defendant clearly had control over heroin notwithstanding it was not on his person when he made the arrangement with Botsko. His intention to sell the heroin should not give him the windfall of "merger."