Case Name: STEEN v. STATE
Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1922-06-07
Citations: 242 S.W. 1047
Docket Number: No. 6965
Parties: STEEN v. STATE.
Judges: 
Reporter: South Western Reporter
Volume: 242
Pages: 1047–1049

Head Matter:
STEEN v. STATE.
(No. 6965.)
(Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
June 7, 1922.)
1. Criminal law 65 — Legal “jeopardy” defined.
A person is in legal jeopardy when put Upon trial 'before a court of competent jurisdiction, the jury impaneled and sworn, the indictment or information read to the jury, and the plea of accused heard.
[Ed. Note. — For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, Jeopardy (In Criminal Law).]
2. Criminal law <®=26l (I) — Arraignment to fix identity of accused.
Under Code Cr. Proe. 1911, art. 556, the arraignment of accused is for the purpose of reading the indictment to him, and hearing his plea thereto, and to fix the identity of accused.
3. Criminal law <⅜»264 — Not necessary that arraignment be in presence of jury.
It is not necessary that the arraignment of accused he in the presence of the jury.
4. Criminal law <©=^261 (2) — Arraignment need not be repeated at subsequent trials.
After accused has been once arraigned it is not necessary that it be repeated at subsequent trials.
5. Criminal law <§=» 171 — Arraignment not joining of issue between accused and state so as to constitute jeopardy.
The arraignment of accused does not amount to the joining of an issue between him and the state as to constitute jeopardy.
6. Criminal law <S=^I68 — Lack of requisites, rendering judgment void, makes plea of jeopardy ineffective.
The lack of any fundamental requisite in a felony trial which would render void the judgment would also make ineffective a plea of jeopardy based on such proceeding.
7. Criminal law <®=oi72 — No legal plea of jeopardy sufficient until charge against accused has been submitted to jury of 12 men.
There can be no legal plea of jeopardy in a felony case until such case has in some sufficient way been committed to a jury of 12 men, under Const, art. 5, § 13.
8. Criminal law <§=»168 — Disposition of case by court not basis for plea of jeopardy.
The trial court has no power to make final disposition of a felony case by its own act or motion, and its dismissal would not prevent a subsequent reindietment and trial, and hence an attempted judgment of conviction or acquittal entered by the court could not be interposed or made the basis of a plea of jeopardy on former conviction or acquittal.
9. Criminal law <®=ol82 — Plea of former jeopardy held insufficient.
In a prosecution1 for murder, where, after accused had been arraigned, six jurors were selected and sworn, and the fifth juror when selected was known to be under indictment for felony, and, the question of his disqualification under Code Cr. Proc. 1911, arts. 692, 695, being raised; court discharged the six jurors selected and continued case until next term, held, that plea of former jeopardy by accused was properly stricken from the record.
10.Homicide <S=>250 — Evidence held sufficient to support conviction for murder.
Evidence considered, and held sufficient to support conviction for murder.
Appeal from District Court, Bexar County; S. C. Tayloe, Judge.
John Steen was convicted of murder, and he appeals.
Affirmed.
See, also, 88 Tex. Cr. R. 256, 225 S. W. 529.
Chambers, Watson & Johnson, Horace E. Wilson, and M. W. Terrell, all of San Antonio, for appellant.
D. A. McAskill, Dist. Atty., and W. S. Anthony, Asst. Dist. Atty., both of San Antonio, and It. G. Storey, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.

Opinion:
LATTIMORE, J.
Appellant was convicted in the district court of Bexar county of murder, and his punishment fixed at confinement in the penitentiary for life.
The first and chief contention of appellant is that the trial court erred in sustaining the state's demurrer to appellant's plea of former jeopardy, and in declining to have said plea submitted to the jury. If such plea showed on its face tha't same consisted of a matter not legally sufficient to constitute jeopardy, there would be no error. If otherwise, the action of the trial court in declining to hear evidence might be unwarranted. From the bill of exceptions presenting this matter we learn that this cause was set for trial in the court below on June 6, 1921, and a special venire ordered. It is not clear from the recitals in said bill whether appellant was arraigned on said day or not, but this does not appear to be material further than is necessary to understand this opinion. It is stated that, after being duly arraigned, six jurors were separately selected and sworn to try this case. The fifth juró!, when accepted, was known to be under a felony indictment. After, the selection of the sixth juror, doubt arising in the mind of the state as to the legality of a jury on which sat one under indictment for a felony, even when both parties to the case had agreed to waive such disqualification, the question was raised and presented to the trial court, who concluded that the presence of said juror would of necessity make an illegal jury under articles 692 and 695 of our Code of Criminal Procedure. The trial court offered to the appellant the opportunity to disqualify or excuse said juror, but the appellant declined either to object or agree to excuse, or to any other action in the premises except to proceed to get a full panel and go on with the trial. The court discharged the six men already selected upon the jury, and entered an order continuing the cause for the term. At the next term when the case was called, a plea of jeopardy was presented to the court, setting up the facts just set forth, and, as stated above, the state demurred to the sufficiency of said plea, and said demurrer was sustained, and appellant was not allowed to present said plea to the jury or introduce any testimony in support thereof, but said plea was stricken from the record. Admitting the truth of the facts stated in said plea, could jeopardy be based thereon?
"Jeopardy" has been often defined by the courts and text-writers. Mr. Cooley's statement of what constitutes jeopardy, approved in Powell v. State, 17 Tex. App. 350, and many later Texas decisions down to Hippie v. State, 80 Tex. Cr. R. 531, 191 S. W. 1155, L. R. A. 1917D, 1141, is as follows:
"A person is in legal jeopardy when he is put upon trial, before a court of competent jurisdiction, upon indictment or information which is sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction, and a jury has been charged with his deliverance. And a jury is said to be thus charged when they have been impaneled and sworn. The defendant then becomes entitled to a verdict which shall constitute a bar to a new prosecution; and he cannot be deprived of this bar by a nolle prose-qui entered by the prosecuting officer against his will, or by a discharge of the jury and continuance of the cause." Cooley's Const. Lim. (15th Ed.) 404.
Under the authorities we are of opinion that it should be stated as part of the definition of "jeopardy" that one is not "put upon trial" until the indictment or information is read to the jury and the plea of the accused is heard. Yerger v. State (Tex. Cr. App.) 41 S. W. 621; Mays v. State, 51 Tex. Cr. R. 32, 101 S. W. 233; Sedgwick v. State, 57 Tex. Cr. R. 420, 123 S. W. 702. In the Yerger Case, supra, Judge Hurt, in his terse, lucid manner, remarks;
"The trial was before a court of competent jurisdiction, the jury was impaneled and sworn, the indictment read to the jury, but the accused did not plead to the indictment. The question is: Did jeopardy attach? We answer in the negative. We know of no authority holding, under this state of case, that jeopardy would attach."
The arraignment of the accused is stated in article 556, C. C. P., to be for the purpose of reading to the defendant the indictment against him and hearing his plea thereto.
"The principal office of the arraignment is to fix the personal identity of the accused." Hendrick v. State, 6 Tex. 341.
"It has. .never .been held that the arraignment per se, as a prescribed method of procedure in capital cases, was a sine qua non to the conviction." Wilson *r. State, 17 Tex. App. 536.
It is not necessary that the arraignment be in the presence of the jury. Smith v. State, 1 Tex. App. 414; Sims v. State, 36 Tex. Cr. R. 163, 36 S. W. 256. After arraignment once, at subsequent trials it is not necessary that it be repeated. Shaw v. State, 32 Tex. Cr. R. 155, 22 S. W. 588; Sims v. State, 36 Tex. Cr. R. 154, 36 S. W. 256; Myers v. State, 37 Tex. Cr. R. 331, 39 S. W. 938. This much is stated as leading to our conclusion that the arraignment of the defendant does not amount to the joining of an issue between him and the state before a jury such as is contemplated by the authorities' in their definition and announcement of what constitutes jeopardy.
It may also be safely asserted that lack of any fundamental requisite in a felony trial, which would render void the judgment or attempted judgment, would also make ineffective a plea of jeopardy based on such proceeding. Huey v. State, 88 Tex. Cr. R. 377, 227 S. W. 186, 12 A. L. R. 1003. This was a case in which the twelve men who tried Mr. Huey at a former time were not sworn, and a conviction was reversed, holding that for lack of being sworn the jury was illegal, and the judgment void. Upon another trial and conviction this court held on appeal that jeopardy could not be interposed on behalf of Mr. Huey because the first trial was not had before a legal jury, and we quoted from Kepner v. United States, 195 U. S. 100, 24 Sup. Ct. 797, 49 L. Ed. 114, 1 Ann. Cas. 655, as follows:
"Undoubtedly in those jurisdictions where a trial of' one accused of crime can only be to a jury, and a verdict of acquittal or conviction by a jury, no legal jeopardy can attach until a jury has been called and charged with the deliverance of the accused."
It seems to us that there can be no dispute of the proposition that in Texas there can be no legal plea of jeopardy in a felony case till such case has in some sufficient way been committed to a jury of twelve men. The trial court has no power to make a final disposition of a felony ease by his own act or motion. His dismissal of the case could not prevent a subsequent reindictment and trial. An attempted judgment of conviction or acquittal entered by the court himself could not be interposed or made the basis of a plea of jeopardy or former conviction or acquittal. Under all of our law and constitutional requirements, there can be no final disposition of a felony case by court proceeding except where its settlement has been legally placed in the hands of a jury. Under our Constitution a felony case can be tried before none other save a jury composed of twelve men. Section 13, art. 5, Const. Texas. Any number of jurors less or more than 803, 106 S. W. 345, 124 Am. St. Rep. 1097. In the instant ease, had the court proceeded at the June term to a judgment upon a verdict rendered by a jury upon which sat a citizen under indictment £or a felony, this would have been but a verdict rendered by an illegal jury, and the accused could have had a new trial or a reversal for that reason. twelve cannot render a legal verdict in a felony case. Jones v. State, 52 Tex. Cr. R.
The numerous authorities cited in the able brief for appellant but support and make clear his contention that the action of the trial court in the dismissal of the six jurors at the June term was erroneous. If we grant appellant's entire contention in that regard, what then? No jury, within any construction of that word supported by any authority known to us, was charged with his deliverance. Six men alone were impaneled. They could not render a verdict in a felony ease. The jurors, in the capacity of a jury, were never impaneled. The plea of the state was not presented to said jury, nor was that of the appellant. No issue was joined between the state and the appellant befóte said jury. Appellant was never in jeopardy. This proposition seems to us to be so entirely beyond dispute as to need no further discussion.
Appellant contends that the judgment is manifestly against the weight of the evidence, and that no verdict in this case can be supported for more than manslaughter. We are not inclined to agree with this contention. A statement of the facts will be
found in our former opinion. See 88 Tex. Cr. R. 256, 225 S. W. 529.
Finding no error in the record, the judgment of the trial court will be affirmed.
<gsaFor other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes .