Case Name: Kennedy v. Denver, South Park & Pacific R'y Co.
Court: Colorado Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Colorado
Decision Date: 1887-10
Citations: 10 Colo. 493
Docket Number: 
Parties: Kennedy v. Denver, South Park & Pacific R’y Co.
Judges: 
Reporter: Colorado Reports
Volume: 10
Pages: 493–502

Head Matter:
Kennedy v. Denver, South Park & Pacific R’y Co.
1. Plaintiff, being clearly guilty of contributory negligence, cannot recover for an injury received from a moving railroad train, unless ■wantonness or gross negligence on the part of employees operating the train be established.
2. Where plaintiff himself shows contributory negligence and fails to establish prima facie wantonness, judgment of nonsuit may he entered.
Error to District Court, Jefferson County.
On the 27th of January, 1883, plaintiff, George O. Kennedy, while walking in the day-time upon defendant’s railroad track, was struck by the locomotive attached to a freight train and seriously injured. The train approached him from behind, and he knew nothing of its presence until struck. He was aware that his hearing was defective, but was not aware of the extent of such defect. In going upon the track at Dawson’s switch station, he looked for trains, but made no inquiry concerning them. He had previously passed over the same track, and had always recognized without difficulty the presence of trains before they came, in sight. The view was unobstructed for a distance of nine hundred feet back of the spot where plaintiff was injured. Jhst prior to the accident the whistle blew six or seven times, quick, short blasts, winding up with a long, steady blow. Shortly afterwards the engine and caboose returned to the station, bringing plaintiff. The conductor went to one Rutherford, who lived near by, for aid, and remarked that he had caught that man; promising to send a physician that evening. The vacuum air-brake was in use on the train, and the train could have been stopped in a distance of from one hundred and twenty-five to one hundred and fifty feet. This action was brought to recover damages for the injuries thus inflicted.
At the trial the court below rejected the following evidence, offered to be proved by the plaintiff’s son, and also, substantially, by one other witness: That he (the son) went to the conductor of the train the day of the injury, and told the conductor that his father, the plaintiff, had, five or ten minutes previously, started to walk along defendant’s track to Dome Rock; also that his father was deaf, or partially so, and that he asked the conductor, on account of such deafness, to look out for him, and not run over him; that this was done in the presence and hearing of the two brakemen of said train and of one Rutherford; and that the conductor then and there replied that, if the plaintiff was deaf, he had no business on the track, and would get killed or run over. The witness was permitted to state that, after the conversation alluded to, the train started up, and the conductor went into the caboose. The following rules of the defendant company for its employees were received in evidence: “Rule 37. Incases where there is any room to doubt as to the safety of proceeding from any cause,adopt the safe course.” “Rule 39. The conductor will have charge of the train, and of all persons employed on it, and is responsible for its movements while on the road, except when his directipns conflict with these regulations, or involve any risk or hazard, in either of which cases the engineer will be held alike accountable.” At the conclusion of .plaintiff’s evidence defendant moved for a nonsuit, which the court allowed, and to review the final judgment entered thereon the present writ of error was sued out.
Messrs. A. H. De France and S. E. Browne, for plaintiff in error.
Messrs. Teller and Orahood, for defendant in error.

Opinion:
Per Curiam.
The rulings challenged by the first three assignments of error were correct, and the assignments will not be discussed.
Conceding that the testimony concerning notice to the conductor, and the latter's remark, should have been received in evidence, and that the court's action in excluding the same was error, we still think there is not sufficient ground for reversal. Plaintiff was a man of mature years, of sound mind and perfect eyesight. He was in the possession of unimpaired physical activity and strength. His only defect was that of being partially deaf. Of this defect he was aware, though perhaps he did not know its extent. Without inquiry about defendant's trains, he voluntarily went upon its track, and was walking thereon when the accident occurred. It was in the day-time, and the road-bed for nine hundred feet behind him was in full view. Prior to the accident the whistle was blown six or seven times in short, sharp blasts, excepting the last, which was a prolonged blast. Plaintiff's own evidence clearly establishes contributory negligence on his part. Therefore, under a well-known legal principle, before he could recover, it became necessary for him to show gross negligence or wantonness on the part of the employees operating the train. Railroad Co. v. Holmes, 5 Colo. 197; Railroad Co. v. Cranmer, 4 Colo. 524. Aside from the fact of the accident itself, and the testimony offered, but excluded, there is nothing in the case to show that the injury was the result of such negligence or wantonness. We cannot presume that plaintiff would have offered other or further proofs had the rejected testimony been received; and, considering this testimony in connection with the other evidence,.it does not appear but that the train was operated with the care required, under all the circumstances. Had the court admitted this testimony, we are of the opinion that a prima facie case of gross negligence or wantonness, requiring a submission to the jury, would not have been made.
The judgment is affirmed.