Case Name: Julius B. Webster v. The Brig Andes
Court: Supreme Court of Ohio
Jurisdiction: Ohio
Decision Date: 1849-12
Citations: 18 Ohio 187
Docket Number: 
Parties: Julius B. Webster v. The Brig Andes.
Judges: 
Reporter: Cases decided in the supreme court of ohio : upon the circuit at the special sessions in Columbus
Volume: 18
Pages: 187–221

Head Matter:
Julius B. Webster v. The Brig Andes.
Under the act of 1840, authorizing proceedings against steamboats and other watercraft by name, sub-contractors and day laborers employed to perform work on such watercraft, have a lien which they may assert against the craft, in whosesoever hands she may be found.
It is immaterial at whose instance the work is done, provided the person employing the laborer has, at the time, the control of the craft, or some part of her, as contractor or sub-contractor for the building thereof.
This is a writ of error to the Court of Common Pleas of Lucas county.
The original action was assumpsit, under the act of Feb. 26, 1840, entitled “ an act providing for the collection of claims against steamboats and other watercraft, and authorizing proceedings against the same by name.”
The declaration contains the common counts for work and labor, etc., to which the defendant plead general issue.
The case came on for trial at the June term, 1848, of the court of common pleas of Lucas county; was submitted to the court without the intervention of a jury, and judgment rendered for defendant.
The facts in the case are detailed in the following bill of exceptions:
Be it remembered, that at the trial of this cause, upon the pleadings on file, at the court and term aforesaid, said cause was submitted to the said court, by the consent of parties, without the intervention of a jury.
When it appeared in evidence that at the county aforesaid, in the month of December, A. D. 1846, the plaintiff performed sixteen days labor, at the price and value of one dollar and twenty-five cents per day, in building said defendant, to wit: in planking the deck of the same, which defendant was then and there being built, and afterwards and before the commencement of this suit, was a watercraft, navigating the waters within and bordering upon the State of Ohio.
It also appeared in evidence that said labor was done in the employment of James W. De Neal, in pursuance of a contract which he then and there had entered into, to plank the deck of the said defendant aforesaid, with Joseph P. Arnold ; and that said Arnold was then and there in the possession of said defendant, and building the same, under the annexed contract, which is made a part of this bill of exceptions.
It was also in evidence that the said defendant was after-wards, and before the commencement of this suit, delivered to Lewis & Beardsley, in-the said contract named, who paid the-said Arnold in full for and upon the same ; but that the said De Neal never was paid for planking the deck of the said defendant as aforesaid ; and there was no proof that said De Neal or said plaintiff knew anything of the terms of the said contract between the said Arnold and the said Lewis & Beardsley.
It was further in evidence that after eleven days of said plaintiff’s labor had been performed, a notice was put up in the-work-shop belonging to the ship-yard of the said defendant, and also on the said defendant, and signed by the said Arnold, to the purport that hands at work on the defendant must not look to the same for pay, but to their employers.
Whereupon the court ruled, contrary to the request of the plaintiff, that the plaintiff was not entitled to recover for the said labor, or any part thereof.
Upon which ruling of the court, the said plaintiff made a motion for a new trial, which was then and there overruled. Whereupon the plaintiff excepted to the said ruling of the court, and prayed that his bill of exceptions, in that behalf, might be allowed, which is accordingly done.
The following is a copy of the contract, made part of the bill of exceptions:
Memorandum oe a-n Agreement, made and entered into at Toledo, Ohio, this 15th day of Oct., 1846, between Lewis & Beardsley, of Oswego, New York, by their agent, Simeon Eitch, jr., and Joseph P. Arnold, of Toledo, Ohio, which is as follows:
Said Arnold agrees to build, at Toledo, for said Lewis & Beardsley, a vessel. Hull of the following dimensions: one hundred and twenty (120) feet keel, 23 feet 9 inches beam, and 9 feet 6 inches hold; to be built, finished, launched and in every respect ready and complete for her rigging, with the spars stepped, by the 4th day of April, 1847. Her timbers and planking outside and inside to be of white oak and of a good quality; thickness of plank and size of timbers not to be of less dimensions than those of the schooner Ireland. Deck plank .and spars to be of white pine ; cabin, forecastle, forecastle gallery, etc.; and to be done and finished in a first rate and workmanlike manner. In fact, every thing to be done necessary for .a vessel of these dimensions, in a manner suitable and with suitable materials. The vessel to be sufficiently and well fastened and painted, and with a good and sufficient yawl boat, which is also to be painted and finished for hoisting upon davits, and the vessel finished every way ready for rigging, including all iron work about the vessel except the upper dead eyes. Cabin to be neatly and plainly finished, and the vessel to be built with reference to navigating the lakes and Welland canal, and bearing a large cargo of wheat, twelve inches dead rise or thereabouts, for and at the rate of $24 per ton, custom house measurement; and which may be paid for by said Lewis & Beardsley, or their agents, as follows: As the work progresses, they may pay in materials for building said vessel, or by paying for secure for same, at said Lewis & Beardsley’s option, not exceeding an amount which shall be $2,000 less than the whole vessel shall amount to ; but may, if required by said Arnold, equal that amount; to be paid by said 4th of April, 1847, provided said vessel shall ■be done, finished, launched, etc., as per contract; and the remaining $2,000 to be paid, $1,000, with interest, in six months .after delivery, and $1,000, which shall be in full, within fifteen months, with interest, after said delivery.
It is further understood and agreed by the parties, that said vessel, frame, and material shall remain in the possession of said Lewis Beardsley, as fast as got out or put together, as a guaranty that the said vessel shall ■ be built and finished as above. And it is further agreed that after said vessel is done and delivered, said Arnold shall have right and lien upon it, as his security that said Lewis & Beardsley, or any one representing them, shall pay the aforesaid balance of $2,000.
The rig of said vessel not being determined upon, it shall be the privilege of said Lewis & Beardsley to determine whether ■the spars be calculated for a fore and aft or brig rig, and also whether the galley shall be connected with the cabin or separate, and what kind of cut-water, color of paint, etc.
Signed, Lewis & Beardsley,
Per S. Fitch, jr.
Joseph P. Arnold.
Abbott f Dodge, for plaintiff in error.
No argument for the plaintiff was received by the reporter.
Tilden 3? Baker, for defendant.
I. The question presented by the record, and which we pro•pose to discuss, is, whether or not by the evidence submitted to the common pleas, a demand was established under the statute .authorizing a recovery against the vessel by name ? This question is one of fact, and a court in error ought not to declare the finding of the appropriate forum, for its trial, to be wrong, except in a case of manifest error or mistake, or unless some distinct legal principle has been violated. All reasonable intendments should be indulged, and a mere difference of opinion, upon a matter of fact only, is not enough to authorize the court to grant a new trial.
The statute is in derogation of the common law, and specifically limited to a prescribed state of facts. It would be against the known rules of interpretation to give it a more extended scope than its terms demand: and against right to sustain an action in which any one material fact is unproved.
Two classes of cases are provided for; one arising ex delicto and the other ex contractu. It is to the latter only, that the case refers itself. To bring it within the statute the following distinct facts must appear: 1st, that the defendant is a “ steam boat or other watercraft.” 2d, that the debt was “ contracted on account thereof.” 3d, that it was contracted “ by the master, owner, steward, consignee, or other agent,” and 4th, that it was for “ materials, supplies or labor, in the building, repairing, or equipping the same : or that it was due for wharfage, or for damages arising out of a contract for the transportation of persons or property.” These facts are material, and must be proved. And they must be proved by the one who sues: because they are affirmative propositions, and he has the means of proof if they are true: and because they are part of his case and essential to his title. In a logical as well as legal view, they are to be proved by him who asserts the rights which they confer, and who invokes the remedies to which they give rise. And whether, in this case, they have been proved, is a pure question of fact, which has already been decided. We think that decision ought not to have been reviewed at all, and that at any rate it was right.
The action was brought for “ labor in the building ” of the vessel: the labor was performed at the request of De Neal, a sub-contractor under Lewis & Beardsley: he was not a “ master, steward or consignee: ” and the case requires that the plaintiff in the court below should establish, upon the evidence there adduced, the following propositions: that the debt was “ contracted on account ” of the vessel, and that De Neal was either the “ owner or other agent ” of the owner of the vessel. Both of these propositions can, we think, be conclusively answered.
1st. The labor was not performed “on account” of the vessel. The case has been conducted as if the expression “ on account of ” was either altogether immaterial and without meaning, or, as if it related to the use made of the labor in question, and as though labor performed in the building of a vessel, was performed “ on account thereof.” Argument cannot be required to prove that the expression is a material member of the sentence: and, that the construction here supposed is not the true one, is plain from this, that besides that it is not the natural, or a,t least not the most natural, import of the words, it is, by another clause, provided that the labor which is performed “ on account thereof ” must be performed “ in the building, repairing, furnishing or equipping the same.” It is not to be supposed that these two distinct expressions mean the same thing. Nor do they. What is meant is this: that the debt was contracted “ on the credit ” of the vessel; that the vessel wras trusted; that the debt was contracted under circumstances entitling the creditor to pursue his remedy under the statute. It was not the intention that the statute should create a liability; but only that it should provide a mode in which the parties might create one. Who those parties are, the statute has plainly defined; and what it is which they are to do to create that liability is to deal on the credit of the vessel. No new element is introduced into the law of contracts; and no change is made with respect to the capacity of persons to bind themselves or their property. But a mode is provided in which a contract may be so made, that it may be enforced against the property of the owner, as well as against the owner himself, and that mode is by binding the property itself as well as the owner. Parties may so deal that the property itself may be pursued; and they may so deal that it cannot be pursued. The statutory right may be divested, and so it has been decided: there is equal reason for holding that a contract may be so formed that it shall not be acquired. To decide otherwise would be to affirm that the parties are not free; and that too at the sacrifice of an express statutory provision. This cannot be the law ; and that it is not, is further manifest by this, that the lien law, subsequently passed, makes express provision for the very case in which the debt was so contracted, as not itself to bind’ the property. . By that law, where a vessel is owned by one man, and another contracts to perform labor upon it, the under workmen and material men have a lien; but it is not a primary lien upon, or a right to sue the vessel: it is a lien on the piece in the hands of the owner, to secure a debt due from the contractor to him who has performed the labor or furnished the materials. That is a clear case where there is no right to sue the vessel; but it is only clear because it affords evidence that the vessel itself was not trusted; and where, in any other case, the same fact exists, that is, that the debt was not .contracted “on account of” the vessel, the right to sue the vessel is repelled in a manner equally decisive. We do not feel required to adduce further proof on this point, although it is not wanting. We feel warranted in the assumption that a debt, to be one which may be enforced by attachment against a vessel, must have been contracted on the credit of the vessel. It must have been contracted by some one having the power to bind the property of the owner therein; and there must have been an understanding that the vessel should be regarded as a debtor. This fact, being an essential element of the statutory liability, must be shown, and whether it is sufficiently so is a question of evidence.
There is nothing to show that Lewis & Beardsley intended to make themselves liable to any of the worknjen; and the facts warrant the conclusion that the plaintiff did not expect to look to them, nor to the vessel for his pay. It was with He Neal that he dealt, and it was He Neal whom the circumstances authorized him to regard as his debtor. His labor was performed on the credit of He Neal, and not on account of the vessel. At any rate, the court below so found; and at least it cannot be said that that finding was so clearly against the evidence as to warrant the interference of a court of error; and on this ground alone, we think we have a right to leave the circuit .decision reversed.
■2d. But it must also appear that the debt was contracted by some one whom the statute regards as authorized to act in the name and on the credit of the vessel; and our next proposition will bé that He Neal, at whose instance the labor was performed, was not so authorized. If he was, it is because he was either an owner or an agent. We shall try to show that he was neither.
1st. He was not an owner. The rules of property are not changed by the statute ; and the mode in which the title to a ship .or vessel may be acquired and lost, is indicated by the principles of the general law. The agreement before referred to was made, and the acts done in pursuance ff it were performed, with the express intention of vesting the property in Lewis & Beardsley, and that in a form so absolute and clear as to protect the subject of it against all liens and liabilities to be created or incurred by Arnold. It is certain that this intention has been accomplished, if it was capable, in law, of being effectuated in the manner adopted by the parties; and the only legal impediment which can be suggested to this, is the principie that the thing which is to be the subject of a sale or trans fer, must have an actual existence at the time of such sale or transfer, or the transaction is a contract of sale and not a sale. But this principle, though generally true, is not universally so. One exception, at least, has been established; and that is where the subject is a ship or vessel to be built of materials belonging to the contractor, and the agreement and acts of the parties denote an intention to have the property pass as the component parts are wrought out of the raw material and. put together. As the principle rests upon intention it is by evi dence that it is manifested ; and the cases which have been decided, bring the one under consideration under the operation of the principle. Woods v. Patten, 7 Eng. L. L. Reports 310; Clark v. Spence, 31 Eng. L. L. R.; Abbott on Ship. 5, and Appendix 799. At any rate, there can be no doubt that where, as in this case, there has been an actual delivery of the keel, so as to pass the property in that, all materials subsequently united to it, with the consent of the owner of such materials, follow the ownership of the keel; and this is especially and strongly so if such be the express agreement of the parties. Glover v. Austin, 6 Pickering’s R. 209.
2d. He was not an agent. It has been said that it was the intention of the members of the committee of the legislature, who framed and reported the statute under consideration, to use the words, “ or other agent,” in a broad and sweeping sense, so as to include every claim beneficial to a vessel, at whose instance soever incurred. We submit that we are not bound to accept such an issue, nor to unite in the trial of such a fact. That the terms of the statute are, in many respects, loose and vague, is not a matter resting on our assertion alone, and that it has not yet assumed a consistent shape, any one may convince himself, who will examine the conflicting dicta to which it has given rise; and if the intention thus imputed to its framers be true, it shows that the spirit of its conception was not behind that in which it is sometimes construed, and is generally attempted to be carried into execution. For there seems to be an idea that the class of persons who deal with vessels are incapable of taking care of themselves; that those who own them are persons whom the statute intends to watch without sleeping, and hunt down without mercy; and that where labor is performed about a vessel, no matter at whose instance, or under what circumstances, it makes a claim some how or other, falling within the expansive embraces of this prolific parent of queer things. But in this instance, if the law itself is to govern, it is easy to vindicate it from a fault so flagrant, and to show that broad and sweeping as it is, there are at least some cases which it does not embrace.
As there must be a rightful authority vested in him who assumes to create a burden upon the property of another, so he who has, or may be presumed to have, or may in fact have that authority, is precisely described. He may be the owner himself, or some one standing in his place ; and of the latter the statute makes the following classification: 1st, Those whose official character and relation to the owner, raise a presumption of agency, and these are “ masters, stewards and consignees;” and 2d, all other persons, not sustaining either of those characters, by what name soever known, who are in fact empowered to act for the owners. These persons are agents — they are the “ other agents ” referred to in the act. Any broader interpretation than this, would be to substitute the word person, or some other word equally sweeping ; and it would be to erase all the descriptive words employed, for the term person comprehends as well “ master, stewards and consignees,” as it does “ other agents.” No such judicial legislation is demanded by any principle of policy or justice. But the statute contains other evidence that we are not wrong. It enables the creditor to sue either the vessel or the owner, and if the sale of the vessel does not produce enough to pay the debt, to collect the balance “ on execution as upon other judgments.” Hence, where there is a right to sue the owner there is a right to sue the vessel ; if there is a right to sue the vessel it is because there is a right to sue the owner; and if the owner is not liable, how can the vessel be ? And can the owner be liable unless he has bound himself or authorized another to bind him ? There can be no election if there is but one remedy: and it would be strange if the owner were not bound to pay the debt, if he could be made to be so for the balance of a judgment founded thereon. Such results should be avoided, and they will be by holding the vessel to be liable only for debts contracted on account thereof by the owner, or by some one whom he has authorized to act for him.
The rules by which the existence, validity and extent of an agency are to be ascertained, are those furnished by the general law; for in this respect also the statute introduces no change. By these rules it is required, amongst other things, that the principal do intend to, and do in fact, delegate the power in question ; and whether he has done so, is a pure question of fact, depending upon the evidence of what he has done, and of the intention by which he was governed; and to that we recur. The agreement before referred to is itself enough to disprove the suggestion of agency; and it was repelled by no evidence of any act before or afterwards capable of establishing the fact, or calculated or intended to mislead third persons; and the position of the plaintiff below, and the circumstances under which his claim was made, were such, that he could not have been ignorant of its existence and bearing upon his own rights.
II. The above is the result of the case, upon the precise questions arising upon the evidence, and indicated by the form of the issue between the parties. But the same conclusion will be arrived at by a right discussion of it upon its statement in a more general form. Lewis & Beardsley were commercial men, largely interested in shipping. They were desirous to obtain a vessel, and to contract for the buildiing of one in such a manner as to enable them to know precisely what it would cost, and to be relieved from all care and superintendence, and from every burden but that of paying the price agreed. Arnold was by trade and occupation a ship-builder, skilled' in all the details of the business, and, by the agreement, was provided with the means for the purchase of materials and the employment of workmen. Both parties agreed to vest the property in Lewis & Beardsley, and that if they should pay the full price of the vessel, they should be relieved from all losses to result from the misfortunes, mismanagement and fraud of Arnold. They did so pay, and if any of the material men or laborers have not been paid, it is not their fault. They practiced no concealment or other fraud; they received an open and public delivery of the keel of the vessel in order to perfect their title; they had no agency in the purchase of materials or in the employment of men, and no control over them when employed; they paid agreeably to their undertaking, and had a right to suppose that Arnold had paid ; and now they are called upon to pay a second time to men whom they have not employed, and to whom they are not bound by any act done or authorized by them. The case thus stated, is a common one wherever the business of ship building is carried on; and its circumstances and reasons belong to every case in which one man is to fabricate and another to pay for and own a structure requiring material, labor and superintendence. To hold in this instance, that the agreement is not obligatory; to hold that Lewis & Beardsley are bound to pay the debts of Arnold or of De Neal, contracted'by them in the execution of their part of the agreement, would be to decide that ship builders were the only class in community not free to make lawful contracts; and it would be to destroy the business of ship building in the manner here adopted — a mode at once completely just, and equally bene ficial to owners and mechanics. 'We do not believe the law to be so; and we have the utmost confidence that the court will not so decide.
If it be said that there may be danger under such agreements, that the common laborer may not get his pay, we answer that there is the same danger in all other cases; he is not bound to work, and may take measures to secure himself; and besides the lien law provides him with a remedy equally efficient for him, and just to all the other parties. Indeed, in our judgment, that law furnishes evidence nearly conclusive, against this case. For that it affords a remedy at all, shows the absence of any other remedy; it shows that there may be cases in which one man may own a vessel, and another may contract to do work upon it, and fail to pay his workmen, and in which these workmen have rib remedy under the watercraft law. To give them such a remedy, and to place them on the same footing with house carpenters, could have been the only object entertained by the legislature in providing for them; for the provision was worse than useless, if they already had a better remedy under the watercraft law.
In Treat v. Canal Boat Etna, 16 O. R. 276, 15 Ibid. 585, two of the three judges who participated in the decision held, that until the delivery of the boat under the agreement, Treat, the builder, was the owner. From this it was concluded that Treat could not proceed under the statute, although it was admitted that the workmen might. But that case was very distinguishable from this. There the agreement contained no provision vesting the property in Griffith, Standart & Co.; and it was not delivered until completed pursuant to the agreement. Here the property Avas vested in Lewis & Beardsley, from the commencement, by the agreement itself; and the vessel was delivered before the debt accrued. Treat v. The Boat Etna, would be an authority to show that Lewis & Beardsley could not recover under the statute for advances, because the vessel was their own, and they could not sue themselves. It would be an authority also to shoAV that Arnold could recover under the statute, unless prevented by the terms of the special agreement, because his debt was contracted with the owners. But this is the extent of the decision, and no other point is conclud • ed by it or by any of the dicta of the judge founded on any fact in the case. And there is nowhere any decision or remark of the court to warrant the idea that the under workmen, or sub-contractors, or material men, who deal only with the contractor, have any right to proceed against the vessel unless the contractor himself be the owner. On the contrary, although there is no reported decision upon the point now made, yet in all the cases which have arisen under the statute, there is, in the opinion delivered, a strong implication, and in some there are express declarations, that the debt must appear to have been contracted on account of the vessel, and by the owner, or by some one standing in his place.
The case of Southwick v. The Packet Boat Clyde, 6 Black. R. 148, is, we think, a strong case for us. It decides, indeed, the very point .in question. It decides that the person who builds a boat, “ agreeably to his contract with the owner, has a lien on the boat, under the statute, for the price, whether he has paid the workmen that assisted him and were employed by him or not; hut the workmen so employed hy the contractor have no such lien for their wages.” The statute of Indiana, under which the case arose, so far as the present question is concerned, is almost in the very words of our own; and the decision is at least entitled to respectful consideration. It was remarked, indeed, by the court on the circuit, that there was this substantial difference between the two statutes: that in the Indiana statute the words “ or other agent,” are entirely omitted. But we submit that this objection is altogether aside from the point to which we cite the decision as an authority. If Arnold was an agent, the liability of the vessel, under our statute, is conceded. But in the entire absence of any evidence of an agency, he is to be viewed simply as a contractor, and Southwick v. The Packet Boat Clyde is an authority to show that in that character he possesses no authority to bind the ves sel for the payment of debts contracted by himself, and for which he alone is liable. It decides also that the contractor may proceed under the statute, and so far it would appear to be opposed to Treat v. Canal Boat Etna, if the facts were precisely the same. But the facts are not given in the report, and it is fair to presume that they were such as to show the property to have been in the purchaser, as in this case they show it to have been in Lewis & Beardsley.

Opinion:
Spalding, J.
A majority of the members of this court find no difficulty in pronouncing the law, arising upon the facts in this case, to be with the plaintiff. Indeed, it appears to us that the whole question involved in the present controversy, has been twice, virtually, decided here.
In Canal Boat Etna v. Treat, 15 Ohio Rep. 585, the late Chief Judge (Birchard), in giving the opinion of the court, that Treat, who had built the boat under a contract with Standart, Griffith & Co., had no lien thereon, after delivery, for the.contract price, says: "A transfer-by Treat to any person, or under any circumstances, without notice of those debts, or the assent, expressly or tacitly given by them, would not have prevented Standart, Griffith & Co., or the hands that labored upon the boat, in assisting to build her, from attaching and, selling her under the statute, to satisfy their claims. The object of the act .was to provide a remedy for those who otherwise might be defrauded, hindered or delayed in collecting their just claims, and to save them the inconvenience of seeking out the owners, and subjecting them to the payment of the debts contracted by their authority."
And afterwards, when the same case was reviewed by this court, Treat v. Canal Boat Etna, 16 Ohio Rep. 276, my learned associate, Judge Avery, who took no part in the first decision, when affirming the same, takes occasion to say: " But we think that a suit for materials or labor would Jie against the builder; and that it could clearly be maintained, under this statute, against the boat, in whatever hands she 'might be found. Upon this last point, neither the language nor meaning can admit of any doubt."
It will be found that, in both instances, Read, Judge, dissented. But he differed in opinion with the other judges, in this only: that he construed the statute as giving a lien upon the boat to the master builder, who contracted to deliver her, when finished, to Standart, Griffith & Co., as well as a lien to the common laborers and material men.
It is proper to remark also, that the present chief judge, who does not acquiesce in the opinion which I am instructed to pronounce, took no part in deciding the case of the boat Etna, having been of counsel for the plaintiff.
The act of 1840, upon which this suit is founded, although somewhat objectionable for- its want of precision and clearness, is nevertheless an honor to our state legislation Our statute books are filled to overflowing with enactments in aid of individual and associated wealth. Our books of reports teem with adjudications necessarily tending to " make the rich richer;" but instances are rare where the wants of him " who earns his bread by the sweat of his brow," are humanely cared for by the law-making power; or where the rights of labor have borne unquestioned competition with privileged capital, in the judicial forum.
The act which we are considering, was intended to secure to honest industry the fruits of its hard earnings, against either the fraud or failure in business of all such as might put it in requisition.
It is a statute of so highly beneficial a character, as to justify a court in giving to its construction the most liberal intendment to carry out its objects.
It provides " that steamboats and other watercraft, navigating the waters within or bordering upon this state, shall be liable for debts contracted on account thereof, by the master, owner, steward, consignee or othe? agent, for materials, sup plies, or labor, in the building, repairing, furnishing, or equipping the same," etc.
And it further provides that " any person having such demand; may proceed against the owner or owners, or master of such craft, or against the craft itself.
It surely requires no stretch of ingenuity to bring the claim of plaintiff within the intendment of this act. It does, in fact, fall naturally within its letter.
The claim is for a debt accruing to the plaintiff, for labor performed on the brig Andes, a watercraft, in the building thereof.
But it is insisted, by counsel for defendant, that the labor was not performed " on account of" the vessel, but " on account of" Arnold, who took the contract to build the vessel; and that the words in the statute are equivalent to " on the credit of; " and that where the evidence shows that credit was not given to the craft, the case is not provided for by the statute.
The construction asked for by counsel, would render the statute, in most cases, of no effect. There would not be found more than one instance in one hundred, where the individual performing labor on a vessel, or furnishing materials for her construction, would give the credit, in the first place, to the vessel herself; and if he did, where would the proof come from ?
The mechanic or material man necessarily makes his contract with some person who acts in behalf of the vessel, and has an interest in her construction. This may be the ultimate owner, the contemplated master, or " any other agentf who controls the whole or any portion of the work. It may be a contractor or a sub-contractor.
This is not, however, a sensible interpretation of the statute. The language is, that " steamboats and other watercrafts shall be liable for debts contracted on account thereof by the master, owner," etc. Is it for a moment to be supposed that the master or owner of a vessel would hire a ship-carpenter to flank the deck, or perform any other work necessary to be done in building and repairing vessels, and at the same time tell the mechanic that he is to work, not on the credit of his employer, but on the credit of the vessel itself ? The idea seems most preposterous. The plain and obvious import of this language in the statute is, that the watercrafts shall be liable for debts contracted in and about themselves, either in putting them together originally or in repairing them afterwards.
It is insisted further, that Arnold was neither one of the persons enumerated in the first section of the statute, as competent to render the vessel liable.
It would appear to the court, from an examination of the contract exhibited between Arnold and Lewis & Beardsley, that it was contemplated quite early in the transaction that some of the under contractors or day-laborers would be wronged out of their wages — for it was stipulated that " the vessel, frame and materials should remain in the possession of Lewis & Beardsley as fast as got out or put together."
And this is said to be stipulated as a guaranty that the vessel should be finished. It is more reasonable to suppose that Lewis & Beardsley felt that they were dealing with an irresponsible man, and, that they might be secure in their advancements, they stipulated for the ownership and possession of the vessel from the laying of the keel upwards; and the incautious laborers were notified in writing, that they must not look to the work of their own hands for their pay.
From their abundant caution in the matter, Lewis & Beardsley have brought themselves most clearly within the meaning of the statute, as the owners of the Andes, when the labor was performed therein by the plaintiff; and if the vessel should not sell for enough to pay the debt, they would, within our jurisdiction, be compelled to make good the deficiency.
At all events, it is adjudged by this court, a majority concurring, that for labor performed upon a watercraft in Ohio, the craft is made liable by our statute, no matter at whose instance the labor be performed, so that the contracting party have, at the time, the rightful control of the craft, or of that portion of the craft on which the work is expended. And this liability will adhere to the craft, no matter through how many hands she passes, until the debt be paid, or the lien-holder relinquish his claim.
It is said by the court in Missouri, where they have a lien law like our own, " purchasers must exercise ordinary diligence, and, knowing that boats and vessels are subject to liens, notwithstanding they are out of the possession of those entitled to the liens, they should indemnify themselves against losses which may be caused by their existence." 9 Miss. Eep. 68.
The case of Southwick v. The Packet Boat Clyde, 6 Blackford's Rep. 148, is cited by counsel for defendant, as a counter decision upon the construction of a similar statute.
We hold the decisions of a sister state in high respect, and have therefore examined the statute of Indiana with care. We find that, by the law of that state, boats and vessels are liable only for such debts as may be contracted by one of three individuals : master, owner, or consignee.
The claim of Southwick did not arise under a contract made with either of these, and the court ruled that it was not a lien. Possibly we might have brought our minds to a different conclusion under that statute.
It is claimed, also, that the plaintiff has an appropriate remedy under the act of 1843, " creating a lien in favor of mechanics and others in certain cases."
We have no doubt that he might at one time have had a concurrent remedy under this last named act. That is, he might have transmitted his account for work on the brig, to the owners at Oswego, in the State of New York, and if afterwards he could have found these owners within our jurisdiction, he might have compelled them, perhaps, to pay the amount, they being required by the law to withhold the sum due the laborer from the amount stipulated to be paid the contractors.
But it is only necessary to state' the facts in the case before the court, to show the utter folly of attempting to build an argument upon the law of 1843. That law can only be made effectual to secure the claim of mechanics where all parties live within our jurisdiction. Besides, this last statute contemplates a claim and a judgment against the person. The proceeding? under the act of 1840 are mainly in rem.
Judgment reversed.