Case Name: HURST v. HILL
Court: Oklahoma Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Oklahoma
Decision Date: 1911-11-18
Citations: 32 Okla. 532
Docket Number: No. 1232
Parties: HURST v. HILL.
Judges: 
Reporter: Oklahoma Reports
Volume: 32
Pages: 532–540

Head Matter:
HURST v. HILL.
No. 1232.
Opinion Filed November 18, 1911.
On Rehearing, April 2, 1912.
(122 Pac. 513.)
1. TRIAL — Action for Price — Breach, of Warranty. Where defendant testified that the person who had sold him an electric motor guaranteed it to be all right, and that he guaranteed it to plaintiff in the same way, it was error for the court to instruct the jury that, if they found at the time of the sale the motor would run, they should find for the defendant, even though in another part of his testimony the defendant had said that his vendor guaranteed the machine to run, and that he guaranteed the same to plaintiff.
2. SALES — Warranty—Construction. The reasonable construction of the warranty, as testified to by the defendant, was that there was no defect in the machine at the time of the sale, other than arose from ordinary use, that would prevent it from running and performing service, as ’ other secondhand machines of the same kind.
3. TRIAL — instructions—Exceptions. An exception to an oral instruction is sufficiently saved where it is excepted to orally, and the instructions and exceptions are both taken by the stenographer, and certified in the case-made.
(Syllabus by Rosser, C.) ■
Error from District Court, Oklahoma County; George W. Clark, Judge.
Action by J. E. Hurst against W. B. Hill. Judgment for defendant in the district court on appeal from a justice court, and plaintiff brings error.
Reversed and remanded.
Jas. L. Brown, for plaintiff in error.
X. A. Horton, for defendant in error.

Opinion:
Opinion by
ROSSER, C.
The plaintiff in error, J. E. Hurst, brought suit in a court of a justice of the peace in Oklahoma county, prior to statehood, against W. B. Hill, defendant in error, for breach of warranty in the sale by defendant to plaintiff of an electric motor. He recovered judgment before the justice of the peace, and the defendant appealed to the district court of Oklahoma county. There was there a verdict and judgment for the defendant, and the plaintiff has appealed to this court. The plaintiff alleged that he purchased a certain electric motor from defendant, and that at the time of the sale the defendant verbally warranted that the machine was in good and perfect working order, and in a good and perfect condition, and that he bought the machine, relying on the warranty. The case having originated in the justice court where there was no written answer filed, and, as the statements of counsel are not preserved in the record, the only means this court has of ascertaining what the defendant's claim is with reference to the warranty is from his evidence. The defendant himself testified that he told plaintiff that the person from whom he bought it, one Mr. Gresham, told him that it was guaranteed, and that he told plaintiff Gresham gave him a guaranty, and that he would give plaintiff the same guaranty that he received. The following extracts from his examination show exactly what his version of the matter was: Direct examination:
"Q. What did you tell him about the guarantee? A. I told him that Mr. Gresham told me that it was guaranteed, and I had an expert to examine it, and he said it was worth $150, and I could make money on it. Q. Is that all you said? A. I told him they gave me a guaranty, and I gave him the same guaranty those fellows gave me."
On cross-examination his statements were as follows:
"Q. Who did you say you bought that machine from? A. Gresham. Q. This man Gresham warranted it to you? A. Yes, sir; guaranteed it to be all right. Q. And you say to this jury you gave the same kind of warranty that you got? A. I went and got the expert to go over it, and it cost me a dollar and a half, and he went through it and examined it, and said it was as good as new. Q. That was not the questioñ. You say that you gave this man thejsamc kind of guaranty that Gresham gave you? A. Yes, sir. Q. Gresham warranted it to you to be all right, and you warranted it to be all right. A. Yes; I never used the machine at all. Q. The question is: Gresham warranted it to you, and you warranted it to this man? A. Yes."
On redirect examination the following occurred:
"Q. In answer to Judge Brown's question, you said you warranted it as you got it. What do you mean by "warranted' in that connection? A. I told him that I would give him the same kind of a warranty they gave me. They guaranteed the machine to run, and I guaranteed the same to him, gave him the same kind of guaranty they gave me."
Re-cross-examination:
"Q. They guaranteed to you that it was all right, and as good as a new machine, didn't they? A. Just as good as a new machine is what the expert told me."
Re-redirect examination:
"Q. Mr. Gresham didn't tell you that it was as good as a new machine? A. That is what the expert said. Q. After he made the examination? A. Yes, sir."
The court instructed the jury that the plaintiff claimed that he purchased the motor under verbal warranty that it was in good and perfect working condition, and that he relied upon such warranty, and paid for the machine, and that there was a breach of the warranty; and instructed that the defendant's construction of the contract of sale was that he guaranteed to plaintiff that the machine would run. The court also instructed the jury that, if they found from the evidence that at the time of the sale the motor would run, then their verdict should be for the defendant. This statement of the issues, and also the instruction of the court that if they believed the defendant's statement as to what his warranty was, and also found that at the time of the sale the machine would run, they should find for the defendant, is assigned as error by plaintiff. Neither counsel in the case has seen fit to cite any authorities upon the law of warranty. The objection to the instruction is well founded. The evidence of the defendant must be considered as a whole, and while he did say that his vendor guaranteed the motor to run, and he guaranteed it to plaintiff in the same way, that statement must be read in connection with statements several times repeated by him in his direct and cross-examination that his vendor guaranteed the motor to be all right, and he guaranteed it to plaintiff in the same way. The warranty must be given a reasonable construction, and a reasonable construction of the warranty as testified to by the defendant is that there was no defect existing in the motor at the time of the sale, aside from the fact that it was secondhand, that would prevent it from running and performing service in the same way as would any other machine. The instruction given might have been construed to mean that, if the motor started and ran even for a few minutes, there was a sufficient compliance with the warranty. This would be to "keep the word of the promise to the ear and break it to the hope."
The jury should have been instructed that the warranty as testified to by the defendant meant that there was no defect in the machine, other than arose from ordinary use, that would prevent it from running and doing the work of other secondhand machines of the same kind. See Mechem on Sales, sec. 1251; Snow v. Schomacker Mfg. Co., 69 Ala. 111, 44 Am. Rep. 509; McGraw v. Fletcher, 35 Mich. 104; Leggoe v. Mayer, 2 Pa. Super. Ct. 529.
It is urged by the defendant in error that the plaintiff cannot avail himself of the error in the instructions because the instructions were not properly excepted to. He contends that the law requires the exceptions to be noted on the margin of the instructions, and that, as the instructions in this case were given orally, there was no margin upon which the exceptions could bé noted. The authorities cited in support of the proposition are not in point, and, indeed, it would be amazing to find that such a proposition is sustained by authority. The law permits instructions to be given orally. In this case the record-shows that the instructions were given orally and the exceptions were taken orally, and both instructions and exceptions were taken by the stenographer. This was sufficient to save the exceptions, especially as the giving of the instructions over plaintiff's objection was set up in the motion for a new trial.
Other errors are assigned, but, in view of the disposition of the assignment upon the instructions, it is not necessary to consider them.
The case should be reversed and remanded for a new trial.
By the CourtIt is so ordered.