Case Name: Mrs. M. J. Jackson, Administratrix, vs. Wm. C. Michie and Robert Murdock
Court: Louisiana Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1881-05
Citations: 33 La. Ann. 723
Docket Number: No. 7792
Parties: Mrs. M. J. Jackson, Administratrix, vs. Wm. C. Michie and Robert Murdock.
Judges: 
Reporter: Louisiana Annual Reports
Volume: 33
Pages: 723–731

Head Matter:
No. 7792.
Mrs. M. J. Jackson, Administratrix, vs. Wm. C. Michie and Robert Murdock.
On the Motion to Dismiss.
Two appeals having been granted to the same appellant, the appellee moved the dismissal of both.: of the first appeal, for alleged irregularities, and of the second,, on the ground that the first order having once been granted and a bond thereunder filed by appellant, the lower court was divested of jurisdiction and had no authority to issue the second order. JECeld that, if the first order of appeal was illegal, the lower court was not divested of its jurisdiction over the case and could legally issue the second order.
It has never been held in Louisiana that a party must move for a new trial in a jury case, as a condition precedent to his appeal, though it is, as a general rule, proper that he should do so.
To take away the right of appeal, there must bo an unconditional, voluntary and absolute acquiescence in the judgment rendered, on the part of the appellant.
On the Merits.
The tenant of a predial estate cannot claim an abatement of the rent, under Article 2743, C. 0., on account of an overflow of the Mississippi River. Such an event is not one of the accidents of extraordinary nature that could not have been foreseen by the parties. Decision in 16 An., 162, affirmed.
The surety is only discharged by a prolongation of .the term o£ payment granted the debtor, when it is granted by a party having the legal authority to do so. The administratrix of a succession lias no such authority 5 and the fact that she was also widow in community does not give her any additional power in that respect.
An issue which was not raised in the lower Court and is made for the first time in the brief of Counsel in this Court, shall not be noticed or passed upon.
APPEAL from the Thirteenth Judicial District Court, parish of Temsas. Hough, J.
Wade It. Young for Plaintiff, Appellee and Appellant.
Kennard, Howe & Prentiss, Thomas P. Clinton and Reeve Lewis for Defendant Murdock, Appellee and Appellant:
3?ixSt — The appeal of plaintiff should be dismissed, because she asked for an order which did not give time to cite the appellees, in disregard of § 4, Act No. 45, 1870, Extra Session, p. 100. The fault is imputed to her, because she asked for an improper day. Citizens’ Bank vs. Buty, 26 An. 748; Given vs. Clark, 12 La. 480; Hempkin vs. Averett, id. 483.
Second — -And plaintiff's appeal should also be dismissed because she opposed the motion for a new trial, acquiesced in the judgment and made no motion for a new trial in a jury case. Barnwell vs. Herman, 6 M. 928; Lambeth vs. McMurray, 15 La. 466; Wright vs. Ferriu, 10 An. 91.
Third — As to the merits of the cause and on behalf of the defendant and appellant Murdock. It is elementary that suretyship is stHctissimi jwt'is, and cannot be extended from one time to another. Mouton vs. Noble, 1 An. 192 5 Adío vs. Metoyer, id. 254 j HcMichael vs. Gillespie, 7 Bob. 13; Bev. C. C. 3063.
Extension of time by creditor to principal debtor, without consent of surety, discharges the latter. Bev. C. C. 3063, Gosserand vs. Lacour, 8 An. 75; Projet of Amendments, p. 356.
Fourth — The facts of tho case show (a) that plaintiff was administering as widow in community, owning ono-half of the plantation and entitled to the usufruct of the other half; (bj that she had a right to lease one-half as owner, and the other half as usufructuary entitled to civil fruits. C. C. 533, 544, 545 5 (c) that she made the lease without order of the Court; (d)that she was not required by order of court or any law to take surety; (e) that extensions were granted to Mickie, the principal, without consent of Murdock, the surety; (f) that plaintiff has never proved any such assent, 1 An. 254; and (g) that plaintiff in taking her judgment waived her privilege on Mickie’s property seized in the suit, and which Mickie had bonded for $1409. Transcript, p. 9.
Fifth — On these facts tbe following points are made:
(a). That plaintiff, as owner and usufructuary, no debts or minor heirs being shown, had tho power to grant, and did grant, the extensions, and so discharged appellant, Murdock. C. C. 544, 545; 8 An. 75.
(b). There was really no need of her formal appointment as administratrix. Burton vs. Brugier, 30 An. 482.
(c). It would be contrary to equity for plaintiff, presumably of her own volition and for her own purposes to grant the extensions, and then claim she had no xiower to do so.
(d). There is no question here of her power to alienate the land. It is a question of dealing with the civil fruits which were her own.
(e). But looking at her strictly as administratrix, it is an error to say tho succession of Jackson is a being that dwells apart, impeccable, infallible, taking advantage of every good bargain which plaintiff may make as to civil lruits, and repudiating such as plaintiff may choose to repudiate. And such theory is refuted in the following cases:
Turnbull vs. Freret, 5 N. S. 795; Sloan vs. Stevenson, 24 An. 279; Haile vs. McGehee, 29 An. 350; Succession of Marr, 23 An. 718.
(f). No error or fraud in the extensions is pleaded or proved by plaintiff. If loss occurs to the estate, she is responsible on her bond. 29 An. 350; 24 An. 279;
(g). The cases cited by plaintiff, analyzed, and shown to be not against the contention of appellant, Murdock, and where they seem to be expressions shown to be mere dicta, or careless utterances, which this Court is asked to correct.
(h). The defendant Murdock is discharged by act of plaintiff in relinquishing the security she had by seizure in this cause.
Penn vs. Collins, 5 Bob. 213; Bev. C. C. 3061.
(i). Plaintiff has no right to have the judgment amended, because she asked for no new trial; because it cannot be amended as between plaintiff and Michie, for both aro appellees; it cannot be amended as to Murdock, for this would be to give a greater judgment against him than against his principal. Bev. C. C. 3037; Gustine vs. Union Bank, 10 Bob. 412; and, finally, the verdict should stand, unless founded on some error of law. 10 An. 02. Our contention is that the verdict and judgment are erroneous in toto, and should be set aside as such; hut in no event should the judgment he increased.

Opinion:
The opinion of the Court was delivered by
Todd, J.
The plaintiff sues the defendants, the first as principal and the second as surety, to recover the sum of $10,282 60 with interest, alleged to be the balance owing for the rent of the Aubrey plantation, in the parish of Tensas, for the years 1876, 1877 and 1878.
The demand sued on is evidenced b.y a written contract of lease and three promissory notes, signed by the defendant Michie, and by a writing indorsed on the contract of lease and signed by the defendant, Murdock, in the following words:
" I hereby bind myself as security for the above and foregoing lease without agreeing to sign or indorse the notes mentioned therein."
The lease was approved by the parish judge of said parish in an order rendered on the 28th of January, 1876, the contract being dated the 8th of December, 1875, and the plantation leased belonged to the succession of D. P. Jackson, deceased, of which the plaintiff was the administratrix.
The lessor's privilege was also claimed on the crops and movable property on the premises; and a writ of provisional .seizure issued and was executed against the same.
The rent for the year 1878 was not due at the inception of the suit, and an exception against this part of the demand, amounting to $5000, was sustained, and the suit to that extent dismissed.
The defendant, Michie, answered, first, by a general denial, and further claimed in compensation and reconvention amounts aggregating $7600, based on the following causes or considerations:
Amount expended in repairing plantation buildings, alleged to have been damaged by the lessor during the interval between the commencement of the lease, under the contract, and the time when the lessee was enabled to take possession, and for use of plantation mules during that interval; damages resulting from the loss of mules by death, and which, the lessor failed to replace, and damages resulting from the overflow of the land.
The defendant, Murdock, answered, and averred his discharge from all liability for the debt, by reason of prolongations of the terms of payment granted to Michie, his principal, by the plaintiff, witho.ut his-knowledge and consent.
The case was tried before a jury, who returned a verdict in favor of plaintiff for $3770, for which judgment was rendered in solido against the defendants.
From this judgment appeals were taken by both defendants and by plaintiff. The defendant Michie subsequently abandoned his appeal by a formal withdrawal of the same before the execution of an appeal bond.
On Motion to Dismiss.
There is a motion to dismiss the plaintiff's appeal, which is the first question for our consideration.
' The plaintiff, in fact, applied for and obtained two orders' of appeal, executed two appeal bonds, and filed in this Court two transcripts.
The first appeal was taken on the 24th of January, 1880, and made returnable on the 9th of February, 1880. The second order of appeal was taken on the 3d of May, 1880, returnable on the 2d Monday of February, 1881.
The defendants moved to dismiss the first appeal on the following grounds:
1. That there was not allowed sufficient time by the order to cite the appellees, and it was, therefore, illegal.
2. That tbe plaintiff had acquiesced in the judgment.
And the dismissal of the second appeal was claimed for the reason that one appeal having been granted and the appeal bond executed, the District Court was without jurisdiction to grant the second appeal.
If the first order of appeal was illegal, as alleged, the jurisdiction of the District Court was not divested over the matter of the appeal by the rendition of such order and the execution of the appeal bond under it. It is true that the order of appeal and the execution of the appeal bond in accordance therewith, as a general rule divests the .inferior court of jurisdiction; but this contemplates a valid and legal order, and the giving of a bond under such order. If the order be illegally or irregularly rendered, the judge may correct such error by granting another order in conformity to law, notwithstanding the appellant may have' given bond and brought up his appeal under the first order. The matter resolves itself into this: The first order of appeal was either legal or it was not. If legal, the proceedings under it are regular and legal, and the appeal should be maintained. If the order was illegal, then the granting of it did not divest the judge a quo of jurisdiction, but he could properly disregard it as a nullity and cure the irregularity by a subse quent order, as he did do; and the appeal under such subsequent order should be maintained, that is, if no other cause of dismissal is shown.
In the case of Bates vs. Weathersby, 2 An. 484, where two orders of appeal had been granted, two appeal bonds executed and two transcripts sent up, as in this case, the Court said: "It (the first order) was irregularly taken, and the inferior court had not, by the first order given, divested itself of jurisdiction of the cause, but still retained full authority to grant a second order which would be available to the parties and enable them to be heard in this Court." See, also, 10 An. 488; Evans et al. vs. Sauvinet (N. R.) O. B. 42, 638; 32 An. 814.
Nor do the circumstances relied on to support the charge of acquiescence on the part of the plaintiff in the judgment of the lower court constitute such proof of acquiescence as to debar him from his appeal.
These are, that the appellant did not move for a new trial, but opposed the motion for a new trial when made by the defendants. It has never been held that a party must move for a new trial in a jury case as a condition precedent to his appeal, though it is as a general rule proper that he should do so. Nor does the record show that the plaintiff opposed the granting of a new trial moved for by the defendants. There was such a motion made by the defendants, tried and overruled. We know as a matter of practice, that such motions are often made pro forma and overruled by the judge instanter, and without discussion. Be that as it may, to take away the right of appeal there must be an unconditional, voluntary and absolute acquiescence in the judgment rendered, on the part of the appellant, and the evidence fails to satisfy us that there was such acquiescence in this instance. It Aoubtless often happens that a plaintiff, in whose favor a verdict is rendered, though it does not give him all that he thinks he is entitled to, is willing to acquiesce therein and receive what it gives him, if the defendant is acquiescent also and willing to pay the amount awarded thereby; but such conditional acquiescence in a verdict does not deprive him of the right of appeal, if he finds that the defendant, instead of paying the debt, resorts to an appeal himself as a further means of resisting its payment.
And, besides, no act of the plaintiff, done after the judgment was rendered and signed, and it is only then that there is a judgment, looking in the least to an acquiescence in it, is pretended to be shown in this case.
An appeal is an important right, which should never be denied, unless its forfeiture or abandonment is conclusively shown.
The motion to dismiss is, therefore, denied.