Case Name: Jean M. AROUZA, Appellant, v. Goldin C. AROUZA, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1995-12-06
Citations: 670 So. 2d 69
Docket Number: No. 92-2675
Parties: Jean M. AROUZA, Appellant, v. Goldin C. AROUZA, Appellee.
Judges: Before BASKIN, COPE and LEVY, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 670
Pages: 69–73

Head Matter:
Jean M. AROUZA, Appellant, v. Goldin C. AROUZA, Appellee.
No. 92-2675.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
Dec. 6, 1995.
Rehearing Denied April 10, 1996.
Joe N. Unger; Caruana, Gordon and Lan-gan, Miami, for appellant.
Elser, Greene & Hodor, Miami, for appel-lee.
Before BASKIN, COPE and LEVY, JJ.

Opinion:
PER CURIAM.
A former wife appeals an order awarding attorney's fees to her former husband. We affirm because we find that the record supports the trial court's conclusion that the former wife has the ability to pay the attorney's fee award.
The underlying suit involved several post-dissolution of marriage issues, including disputes over child visitation and child support, between a former wife, Jean M. Arouza (hereinafter "former wife"), appellant herein, and her former husband, Goldin C. Arouza (hereinafter "former husband"), appellee herein. Following extensive litigation, both parties moved for attorney's fees. The trial court held an evidentiary hearing and granted the former husband's motion for fees, finding that the former wife's misconduct throughout the litigation, coupled with her demonstrated ability to pay the fee award, justified the award of fees to the former husband. The former wife now appeals the order awarding attorney's fees to the former husband.
The former wife contends, among other things, that the trial court's award of attor ney's fees must be reversed because the trial judge improperly considered her fiance's income in calculating her ability to pay the fee award. In particular, the former wife asserts that the trial judge erroneously imputed income to her based on her fiance's financial status. We disagree. Instead, we find that a review of the trial court's order, when read in its entirety, does not lead to such a conclusion.
Specifically, in speaking on its rationale for awarding fees to the former husband and on the former wife's ability to pay, the trial court provided as follows:
1. As more fully set forth in this Court's Order on Pending Motions dated April 9, 1991, the expensive and protracted litigation in this case arose as a result of the Former Wife's intentional, willful and malicious alienation of the Parties' minor child from the Former Husband with the goal of destroying any relationship that the minor child and the Former Husband might have with one another....
2. [Sjufficient evidence was presented to the Trial Court establishing that the Former Wife has the ability or will have a future capacity to pay attorney's fees and that, in fact, her own substantial attorney's fees were paid by a close male friend who this Court has previously found may have encouraged the Former Wife's willful misconduct and the Former Husband's resulting liability for attorney's fees. The Court has also considered that the Former Wife's male friend supports her in an extravagant lifestyle which obviates the necessity for her to become employed.
(Judgment Awarding Former Husband Attorney's Fees, November 10,1992) (emphasis added). The former wife relies on the second quoted paragraph in advancing her argument that the trial court improperly focused on her fiance's financial well-being in determining that she was able to pay the fee award. However, in our view, the aforementioned excerpts contain the critical language which clearly supports the trial court's ruling.
It is evident from the above-quoted language that the trial court, in awarding fees to the former husband, relied heavily on its finding that the protracted litigation stemmed from the former wife's willful and malicious misconduct throughout the litigation. With respect to the former wife's fiance, the court merely noted that the conduct of the former wife's fiance, in supporting the former wife in an extravagant lifestyle and in paying for her attorney's fees, facilitated the former wife's decision to quit her job and, furthermore, actually helped to support the former wife's willful misconduct. In fact, in its order, the court in no way indicated, or even suggested, that it was taking the fiance's income into account. Accordingly, pursuant to our review of the record, we find that the trial court did not factor in the fiance's income when determining the former wife's ability to pay.
It is well established that a court may not impute an ability to pay based upon the income of a former spouse's cohabitant. See Long v. Long, 622 So.2d 622 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993); McCall v. McCall, 616 So.2d 607 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993); Sullivan v. Sullivan, 593 So.2d 1153 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992). However, attorney's fees may be assessed in domestic cases against a party who initiates a baseless cause of action which results in meritless litigation and the unnecessary expenditure of fees, Nash v. Nash, 624 So.2d 370 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993); Ugarte v. Ugarte, 608 So.2d 838 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992), cause dismissed, 617 So.2d 322 (Fla.1993); Sutter v. Sutter, 578 So.2d 788 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991); Elenewski v. Elenewski, 528 So.2d 1354 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988), provided that "such an award is limited, as in the usual domestic situation, by that party's financial ability to respond." Elenewski, 528 So.2d at 1355; accord Meloan v. Coverdale, 525 So.2d 935 (Fla. 3d DCA), review denied, 536 So.2d 243 (Fla.1988).
In the instant case, in establishing the former wife's ability to pay, the trial court imputed income to the former wife based upon the court's accurate finding that the former wife was voluntarily unemployed. In concluding that the former wife was voluntarily unemployed, the court merely noted the obvious; to wit, that her need to work was "obviated" by her fiance's support. As the trial court correctly found, the record reflects that the former wife was employed and self-supporting before she decided to quit her job and be supported by her fiance. Consequently, although the former wife has the ability to earn an income, she has voluntarily decided to remain unemployed. It is well settled that a trial court, who has made a finding that a party is voluntarily unemployed or underemployed, may properly impute income to that party based upon that party's demonstrated earning capacity. See Polley v. Polley, 588 So.2d 638 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991); Scapin v. Scapin, 547 So.2d 1012 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989); Bradley v. Bradley, 347 So,2d 789 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977). That is exactly what the trial court has done here.
Accordingly, having found that the record contains ample evidence to support the trial court's decision to impute income to the former wife, and to support the trial court's finding regarding the former wife's ability to pay the fee awarded, we affirm the court's order awarding fees to the former husband in all respects.
Affirmed.
COPE and LEVY, JJ., concur.