Case Name: W. S. ALLEN et al. v. TOWN OF REIDSVILLE et al.
Court: Supreme Court of North Carolina
Jurisdiction: North Carolina
Decision Date: 1919-11-26
Citations: 178 N.C. 513
Docket Number: 
Parties: W. S. ALLEN et al. v. TOWN OF REIDSVILLE et al.
Judges: 
Reporter: North Carolina Reports
Volume: 178
Pages: 513–537

Head Matter:
W. S. ALLEN et al. v. TOWN OF REIDSVILLE et al.
(Filed 26 November, 1919.)
1. Municipal Corporations — Cities and Towns — Elections—Injunctions—Appeal and Error.
AVliere an election lias been held according to law to vote upon the question of the city selling one of its public utilities, a restraining order . theretofore sought to prevent the holding of the election, presents a moot question that the Supreme Court will not decide on appeal, there being then nothing for the judgment to operate on.
2. Elections — Fraud—Municipal Corporations — Cities and Towns — Sales— Public Utilities — Injunctions—Contracts.
Where the municipal authorities had agreed to sell one of the public utilities of the city, subject to the approval of the vote of its electors, and thereupon a suit to restrain the election is instituted, alleging fraud in the contract, and thereafter the question is approved by the voters : Held, the allegations of fraud cannot be maintained, for at that time the' proposed contract had not been entered into, and the making of the contract thereafter upon the approval of the voters cannot affect the matter, as it would make the action a new one.
3. Appeal and Error — Exceptions Abandoned — Briefs.
An exception not referred in the brief is considered as abandoned on appeal. Rule 34.
4. Appeal and Error — Injunctions—Fraud—Findings.
AVhere matters of fraud alleged as the basis of an application for an injunction are denied by the answer, and there is a finding by the judge, acquiesced in by the plaintiff, that there was no fraud, this question will not be considered on appeal.
5. Municipal Corporations — Cities and Towns — Public Utilities — Sales—Admissions — Trials—Consideration—Fraud.
In an action wherein an injunction is sought against the private sale of a, public utility by the city authorities, on the ground that the purchaser was to pay only thirty thousand dollars for it when, another offered fifty thousand dollars, the sale will not be declared void for an admitted insufficient consideration, when other allegations of the defendants set forth such facts as would show that the citizens or the business interests of the city would be equally or more benefited if sold to the one- with whom they had agreed.
6. Elections — Ballots—Related Questions — Municipal Corporations — Cities and Towns — Public Utilities — Sales—Franchise.
The question of a sale of a public utility to a certain corporation, and the granting to- it of a franchise necessary to its continued operation, if submitted upon one ballot, are questions closely related to each other, and the ballot would not be objectionable on the ground that a vote thereon would deprive the voter of his choice as to one of the propositions. In this action it is admitted that only the one proposition as to the sale was submitted.
7. Statutes — Interpretation—Legislative Purpose.
Statutes relating to the same subject-matter should be construed in connection with each other as together constituting one law, giving effect to all parts of the statute when possible; and the history of the Legislature may be considered in the effort to ascertain the uniform and consistent purpose of the Legislature.
8. Same — Municipal Corporations — Cities and Towns — Public Utilities — Public Outcry — Private Sales — Vote of People.
Before the enactment of our statute, now Rev., 2916 (6), our courts had interpreted our statute, now Rev., 2978, requiring a sale at public' outcry by municipal authorities, as not including public utilities such as parks, markets, city halls, waterworks, lighting plants, etc., held for the use of the public, and said sec. 2916 (6) was thereafter enacted, requiring that such public utilities, excluded by sec. 2978, should be submitted to the voters of the municipality, and it is Held, that these two statutes are harmonious and reconcilable, and that under the provisions, of sec. 2916 (6) it is not required that a sale of public utilities, held in trust for the citizens, and approved by the voters, be made at public outcry to the highest bidder, but may be sold privately, which, in this case, is particularly emphasized by the charter of the city in question.
9. Monopoly — Evidence—Injunction.
In this cause to restrain a private sale of a public utilities by the city authorities to an electrical power plant with a grant of a municipal franchise, there is no evidence that the purchaser would acquire a monopoly.
Clakk, O. J., dissenting.
Appeal by plaintiffs from Bryson, J., at the June Term, 1919, of Rockingham.
This is an action brought by two citizens and taxpayers of the town of Reidsville against the town of Reidsville, and the mayor and members of the board of commissioners of said town, and the Southern Public Utilities Company to restrain tbe bolding o£ an election called for tbe purpose of approving or disapproving tbe sale of tbe electric light plant of Eeidsville to tbe utilities company.
Tbe plaintiffs allege, in substance, tbe ownership of tbe electric light plant by tbe town of Eeidsville; that tbe utilities company is a subsidiary corporation of tbe Southern Power Company, and that these two companies and tbe American Tobacco Company have stockholders in common ; that tbe defendants, may and board of commissioners, were elected in May, 1917, and that tbe American Tobacco Company, through its agents and employees, was active in securing their election; that tbe said mayor and commissioners were nominated at tbe dictation and instance of tbe American Tobacco Company, and were elected in large measure by its influence, exerted through its officers, agents, and employees, about one hundred and fifty-five of whom were voters in said election; that prior to the election tbe said defendants, together with tbe said utilities company, began to conspire and collude together for tbe purpose of effecting a transfer of said light company and property to the utilities company at a gross and fraudulent undervaluation; that tbe defendants refused to furnish prospective bidders for tbe said property any definite or adequate information as to what property they proposed to sell, and what obligation, if any, they desired tbe purchasers to assume, and that they evaded advertising competitive bids in any adequate manner; that at a meeting of tbe defendant board of commissioners on 14 August, 1917, Frank Talbert and bis associates, all reputable parties, submitted a written proposal for tbe purchase of said property at a price of $50,000; that notwithstanding tbe fact that tbe bid of Talbert and bis associates was for $20,000 more than tbe offer of tbe utilities company, tbe defendants accepted the proposition of tbe utilities company to buy said plant for $30,000; that tbe terms on which Talbert and bis associates agreed to buy said property, and tbe obligations they agreed to assume, were more favorable to tbe town of Eeidsville and its citizens than those contained in tbe offer of tbe utilities company; that tbe action of tbe defendants was without any valid reason or excuse, and was arbitrary, unjust, and due to partiality to tbe untilities company and its allied corporations, and in disregard of tbe rights of tbe plaintiffs and other citizens and taxpayers; that on 11 September, 1917, tbe defendants ordered an election to be held on 23 October, 1917, for tbe purpose of enabling tbe citizens of Eeidsville to vote upon and approve or reject tbe said proposition of the utilities company; that tbe service rendered by tbe utilities company to tbe public for several years bad been unreliable and unsatisfactory; that tbe said contract with the utilities company, under tbe circumstances and conditions alleged, is a fraud upon tbe town of Eeidsville and its citizens, as well as upon tbe rights of tbe plaintiffs; that said contract attempted to be made is fraudulent and void, and if submitted by said mayor and board of commissioners to the voters at an election, will subject the town to needless and unnecessary expense; that if the defendants are allowed to proceed and consummate their scheme of selling the said property and granting a franchise to the utilities coSmpany, the plaintiffs will be irreparably damaged, and they demand judgment that a restraining order be issued to prevent the holding of said election, and that the action of the defendants in attempting to sell said property be decreed to be fraudulent and void, and that the same be set aside, and for.a permanent injunction.
A temporary restraining order was issued upon motion of the plaintiffs, returnable before Judge Iiarding on 20 October, 1917.
The defendants filed answers in -which all of the allegations of fraud, collusion, and improper conduct were specifically denied.
The defendants further allege that the town of Reidsville is largely a manufacturing community, particularly interested in the manufacture of the products of leaf tobacco, its prosperity and growth being dependent to a large extent upon such enterprises, its payroll of 1 January, 1917, being about $8,000 per week; that for the successful operation and enlargement of the different manufacturing enterprises, it was necessary to have a much larger quantity of electric power than was obtainable from the plant owned by the town of Reidsville; that in order to meet this demand and need for increased power, the Reidsville Commercial and Agricultural Association was formed; that this was a voluntary association of practically all of the business men of the community, which is now supported by the public revenue by authority of the General Assembly; that this association took up the .question of the necessity of increasing the supply of electric power; that shortly before this, the Southern Power Company had built a transmission line to Spray and Draper which passed near Reidsville, making available for the first time to the town of Reidsville the only source of hydro-electric power in this section of the State; that in considering the power question, the said association appointed committees to look into the matter to make available to the town the hydro-electric power of the Southern Power Company; that on 3 August, 1915, at a meeting of the directors of said association, together with representative citizens of the town, the manner and means of increasing the electric power was considered; that about a year thereafter the F. R. Penn branch of the American Tobacco Company, which had been engaged in the manufacture of tobacco in Reids-ville for a number of years, expressed a desire to make a large addition to. its existing plant, provided the necessary hydro-electric power could be obtained, which increased demand for power was equal to or in excess of the capacity of the electric power which the plant of the town of Eeidsville was able to furnish, and that this addition to the plant of the Penn Company would increase the payroll of the town of Eeidsville $10,000 per week; that the plant of the town of Eeidsville has the capacity of some two hundred and twenty-five horse-power, which was totally inadequate for the needs of the town, its citizens, and various enterprises; that under those conditions there was a division of opinion as to whether it was best to sell the plant or to purchase the necessary power from the Southern Power Company; that upon investigation it developed that in order to buy the power of the Southern Power Company for sale and distribution it would be necessary for the town to install and equip a transformer at a cost of approximately $30,000; that these matters continued to be the subject of discussion and agitation, not only among the members of the board of commissioners, but upon the streets of the town and the local newspapers, until finally it became the controlling and decisive issue in the election of May, 1917, at which the present board of commissioners and mayor were elected, the issue being whether the town should retain its plant, build the transformer station, and secure the power of- the Southern Power Company for sale and distribution, or whether it should sell its plant and grant a franchise to the Southern Public Utilities Company and let that company supply the needed power, and upon this issue the present board of commissioners and mayor were elected by a majority of one hundred and sixty-nine votes; that the E. P. Eichardson, Jr., Company is engaged in the manufacture of tobacco in the town of Eeidsville, and that they will have serious competition in the purchase of its leaf supply as well as in the employment of labor in the event the manufacturing enterprises of the town are substantially increased, especially will the addition- of the Penn factory tend to produce this effect, and as the defendants are advised and believe, the president of the company, and one of its largest stockholders, E. P. Eichardson, has a selfish interest in retaining the existing conditions of labor and tobacco; that the said Eichardson has been the chief actor in opposing the plan proposed by the said board of commissioners and in submitting the proposition of the said Talbert and his associates, which these defendants allege was not made in good faith.
That in passing upon the merits of the two propositions, and in declining the proposition of the plaintiffs and accepting the proposition of the Southern Public Utilities Company, they were influenced, in addition to the matters and things hereinbefore set out by the following reasons:
1. That they are advised and believed, and still believe, that the proposition accepted was better for the town of Eeidsville and its various industries, and especially so for that it would insure a more continuous, reliable, and ample supply of power at a cheaper rate.
2. That tbe proposition of tbe plaintiffs was signed by a number of individuals and one corporation. Only one of' said individuals so signing being a resident of tbe State of North Carolina, and be was known to tbe defendants to possess limited means. Tbat tbe local corporation signing same was a tobacco company, chartered in tbe State of New Jersey, and as defendants were advised and believe, said corporation bad no charter power to* engage in tbe business of furnishing light and power as proposed, and tbe proposition itself expressly stated tbat if accepted, they would organize themsplves into a corporation without indicating tbe amount of proposed capital stock or financial responsibility of tbe contemplated corporation.
3. Tbat these defendants did not then, and do not now, believe tbat ,the proposition to tbe plaintiffs was submitted in good faith with a view to have same approved by tbe people at an election, if accepted, and they were confirmed in this belief by tbe statement of R. P. Richardson, chief actor and moving spirit in same, made at tbe time of submitting tbe proposition, tbat if they accepted bis proposition be would oppose tbe approval thereof by tbe people at an election to be held for tbat purpose.
4. Tbat tbe bidders stated, in submitting their proposition, tbat if tbe same was accepted and approved at an election tbat it would require twelve months thereafter to install tbe necessary machinery and appliances, and owing to existing war conditions, these defendants did not believe tbat they would be able to purchase and install tbe machinery even in tbat time. Whereas, tbe Southern Public Utilities Company stipulated and agreed, if awarded the contract, to install and begin furnishing power within ninety days.
5. That tbe bidders’ proposition contemplated installing a large steam plant, tbe operation of which would be dependent solely upon the use of coal, and no auxiliary plant to supply light and power in case of accident, break-down, or interference of tbe main plant; whereas, tbe Southern Public Utilities Company stipulated to furnish hydro-electric power, and also to maintain an auxiliary steam plant; tbat tbe element of. uncertainty in obtaining continuous power and light generated solely from coal was emphasized by tbe fact tbat these defendants have not been able to secure coal from tbe mines sufficient, at all times, to operate this present small- plant, occasioned by tbe interruption of railroad facilities in handling coal since this country entered tbe war.
6. Tbat tbe controlling issue in tbe campaign at which these defendants were elected was as to whether or not tbe town of Reidsville should sell its plant to tbe Southern Public Utilities Company and contract with them for hydro-electric power; tbat tbe merits of this proposition were discussed in public meetings among tbe people before tbe election, and some of tbe plaintiffs made public speeches advising tbe people against tbe election of tbe present board of commissioners to prevent said sale and contract. Tbat tbe voters overwhelmingly elected tbe present board upon tbat issue, and witb tbis mandate fresb from tbe electorate, these defendants, as tbe cbosen servants of tbe people, took up and negotiated in good faitb witb tbe Southern Public Utilities Company tbe contract and sale referred to. Tbat after careful, honest, and faithful consideration of tbe matter, they sold said plant and property to, and made a contract witb, tbe Southern Public Utilities Company, subject to tbe approval thereof by tbe people in accordance witb subsection 6 of section 2916 of tbe Eevisal, as amended by tbe acts of 1917.
7. Tbat these defendants were and are in no wise interested in tbe personal animosity existing in tbe mind of tbe president of tbe E. P. Eicbardson, Jr., & Company, Inc., against tbe American Tobacco Company, arising out of tbe fact tbat they are and have been in tbe past business rivals, but were desirous of encouraging tbe development of all manufacturies, and furnishing of all necessary power for their operation, and tbe consequent increased demand for a larger number of employees at good wages.
Tbe Public Utilities Company filed a separate answer, which is substantially as hereinbefore set forth, except tbat in addition thereto it stated tbat it did not desire to go into a community where there was a division of sentiment, and offered to cancel and rescind the said proposition to sell said plant to it, and it renewed tbis offer in tbis court. •
Affidavits were filed in behalf of tbe plaintiffs and the defendants, and at tbe bearing before Judge Harding on 20 October, 1917, the restraining order theretofore issued was dissolved, and among other things be finds in said order that “tbe court is of tbe opinion, and so finds, the facts tbat there is no evidence of any corruption or fraud on tbe part of tbe defendants in entering into tbe contract set out in tbe pleading or in calling and ordering an election for tbe ratification of tbe contract by tbe said voting citizens of tbe town of Eeidsville.”
Tbe plaintiffs excepted to tbis order, and gave notice of an appeal to tbe Supreme Court, but tbe appeal was abandoned.
Tbe election was held on 23 October, 1917, and resulted in an approval by tbe voters of tbe sale to tbe utilities company, there being three hundred and ninety-two votes cast in favor of said sale and sixty-eight votes against it.
• Tbe cause again came on for bearing at June Term, 1919, and tbe plaintiffs then made tbe following admissions:
“It is admitted by tbe plaintiffs tbat an' election was duly called, at which election there was submitted to tbe voters of tbe town of Eeids-ville tbe question as- to whether or not tbe said town, through its commissioners, should make sale of tbe electric plant, appliances, and fix tures of said town to the Southern Public Utilities Company for the sum of $30,000, as provided and set forth in a certain ordinance adopted 11 September, 1917; and the said election so held was confined to this question alone; that as a result thereof 392 votes were cast in favor of said sale, and 68 votes as against the salé; that the machinery provided for the holding of said election, and the holding thereof, was such as provided by law, and that, in pursuance of said ratification of such contract by the voters, as indicated above, the commissioners of the town of Reidsville executed said contract set forth in said ordinance, and in pursuance thereof made a deed, as provided therein, to the said Southern Public Utilities Company.”
The plaintiffs moved for judgment upon the record chiefly upon the ground that the contract of sale to the utilities company was void because it was not made at public auction, and because two propositions, one to sell the plant and the other to grant a franchise, were submitted upon one ballot.
The defendants moved for judgment upon the pleadings upon the following grounds:
1. That the only relief prayed in the original complaint, and the only relief to which the plaintiffs might in any event have been entitled, was an injunction preventing the holding of an election and the consummation of the sale of the plant upon the terms and conditions set forth in the pleadings, and it appears that since the institution of the restraining order herein the election has been held and the sale consummated.
2. The replication departs from the cause of action alleged in the original complaint, and introduces a new and distinct cause of action, based upon the facts which arose subsequent to the institution of this action.
The defendants also moved for judgment upon the ground that upon the admissions of the plaintiff the contract of sale was valid and binding between the parties.
Upon an intimation of his Honor that he would grant the motion to dismiss the action, the plaintiffs offered to introduce evidence in support of the allegations of the complaint.
His Honor refused to hear the evidence, and the plaintiffs excepted.
Judgment was then entered dismissing the action, and the plaintiffs excepted and appealed.
W.'P. Bynum, R. O. Strudwiclc, W. R. Dalton, J. R. Joyce, and King & Kimball for plaintiff.
P. W. Glidewell, W. M. Jlendren, A. L. Broolcs, and J. M. Sharpe for defendant town.
Osborne, Coche & Robinson for defendant utilities company.

Opinion:
AlleN, J.,
after stating the case: This action cannot longer be maintained for the purpose for which it was instituted — to restrain the holding of the election on 23 October, 1917 — because the election has already been held. In Sasser v. Harriss, at this term, which was brought to restrain the holding of a primary election, Brown, J., says: "It appears that the primary election has long since been held, and doubtless the candidates now have been duly elected. Nothing can now be accomplished by setting aside the order of Judge Calvert. If his judgment was reversed, this Court could not now order another primary. The question has thus become merely a moot question, and there is nothing for the judgment of the Court to operate upon."
Nor can the plaintiff assail the contract between the town of Eeidsville and the utilities company on the ground of fraud, or otherwise, in this action, because there was no contract until it was approved by the voters, which was long after the commencement of the action, and "certainly the principal cause of action must exist in all cases at the time the action began. It would be unjust and absurd to bring a party into court to answer the plaintiff before he had a right to sue. The mere fact that the cause of action is introduced into a pending action cannot alter the ease, because this, in effect, makes the action a new one." Clendenin v. Turner, 96 N. C., 421.
"While courts are liberal in permitting amendments, such as are germane to a cause of action, it has been frequently held that the Court has no power to convert a pending action that cannot be maintained into a new and different action by the process of amendment. Best v. Kinston, 106 N. C., 205; Merrill v. Merrill, 92 N. C., 657; Clendenin v. Turner, 96 N. C., 416." Bennett v. R. R., 159 N. C., 345."
The judgment of the Superior Court dismissing the action must therefore be affirmed in any event, but as other questions of public interest, which ought to be settled, have been discussed, we will consider them, first eliminating extraneous matters alleged in the pleadings, which have no bearing on the legal questions presented by the appeal.
Prominent among these are the allegations of collusion between the mayor and commissioners and the utilities company to defraud the citizens of Eeidsville; that the utilities company is subsidiary to the' Southern Power Company; that the utilities company, the Southern Power Company, and the American Tobacco Company have stockholders in common; that the American Tobacco. Company nominated and elected the defendants, and other allegations of improper influences brought to bear on the defendants, dishonest motives oh their part, and fraud.
These cannot be considered because they are denied by the defendants, and the plaintiffs have not only acquiesced in the finding of Judge Harding "that there is not evidence of any corruption or fraud on the part of the defendants in entering into the contract set out in the pleadings, or in calling and ordering an election for the ratification of the contract by the said voting citizens of the town of Reidsville," but they have also-abandoned the exception taken on the trial to the refusal to permit them to introduce evidence to support the allegations of the complaint, which can only be accounted for on the theory that they conld not prove what they alleged, or, if proven, the facts would not, in their opinion, affect a contract made by the people themselves.
The exception is abandoned because not referred to in the brief. Rule 34.
Recognizing this condition of the record, the plaintiffs rely in their brief on their motion for judgment on the admissions of record, and in the pleadings, which is upon three grounds.
(1) That the purchase price of $30,000, when an offer of $50,000 had been made, is so grossly inadequate as to amount to fraud.
(2) That the election is void because two unrelated propositions were-submitted to the voters on one ballot, the sale of the electric light plant and the granting a franchise to the utilities company.
(3) That the sale is void because not made at public auction. '
There might be room for debate as to the first position of the plaintiffs if the only consideration for the contract was the amount of money to be paid in cash, but this is not so. On the contrary, the defendants considered the advantages to the community of securing hydro-electric power offered by the utilities company, instead of steam power offered by Talbott and his associates, the ability of the respective parties to-perform their contracts, the fact that the utilities company could install additions to the plant within ninety days sufficient to furnish a much needed increase of power, while Talbott and his associates had to organize a corporation to- perform their contract, and could not make the necessary additions in less than twelve months; that the expense of pumping would be less under the utilities contract, and concluded that the contract offered by the utilities company was most advantageous to the citizens and taxpayers of Reidsville.
There is, therefore, no admission that the consideration for the con- ' tract is inadequate, and as we are now dealing with a motion for judgment on the admissions of the parties, this contention of the plaintiffs cannot be sustained.
The principle that unrelated propositions ought not to be submitted to a vote on one ballot, is fully recognized, and it is of the first importance that this principle should be strictly observed as the will of the voter ought not to be coerced, and he ought not to be in the situation where he must vote for a proposition to. which he is opposed in order that he may support one he favors (see Winston v. Bank, 158 N. C., 512; Keith v. Lockhart, 171 N. C., 457; Kill v. Lenoir, 176 N. C., 572), but it would seem that the sale of an electric light plant and the grant of a franchise to the purchaser under which it could be operated are parts of one whole, and as closely related as any two questions could be (see Briggs v. Raleigh, 166 N. C., 149), and, if not, the plaintiffs hare admitted "that an election was duly called, at which election there was submitted to the voters of the town of Eeidsville the question as to whether or not the said town, through its commissioners, should make sale of the. electric plant appliances and fixtures of said town to the Southern Public Utilities Company for the sum of $30,000, as provided and set forth in a certain ordinance adopted 11 September, 1917, and the said election so held was confined to this question alone," thus showing that one and not two propositions were submitted to the voters.
The remaining question involves the power of the town of Eeidsville to sell its light plant at private sale, subject to the approval of the voters, instead of at public auction, and this requires an examination and construction of the following statutes:
Eev., 2978: "By mayor and commissioners at public sale. The mayor and commissioners of any town shall have power at all times to sell at public outcry, after thirty days notice, to the highest bidder, any property, real or personal, belonging to any such town, and apply the proceeds as they may think best."
Eev., 2916 (6) : "To grant, upon reasonable terms, franchises for .public utilities, such grants not to exceed the period of sixty years, unless renewed at the end of the period granted; also to sell or lease any waterworks, lighting plants, gas or electric, or any other public utility which may be owned by any city or town: Provided, in the event of such sale or lease it shall be approved by a majority of the qualified voters of such city or town, and also to make contracts, for a period not exceeding thirty years, for the supply of light, water, or other public commodity: Provided, this subsection shall not apply to New Hanover and Cumberland counties."
Oh. 28, Private Laws 1917, see. 1: "That the following provisions of subsection six of section two thousand nine hundred and sixteen of the Eevisal of one thousand nine hundred and five shall not apply to the town of Eeidsville, in Eockingham County, namely: 'Provided, in the event of such sale or lease it shall be approved by a majority of the qualified voters of such city or town/
"See. 2. That said town of Eeidsville may sell or lease any of its public utilities, such as lighting plants or system mentioned in said subsection : Provided, in the event such' sale or lease, which shall be approved by a majority of the votes cast in any election at which said proposition may be submitted; said election to be held under the same general rules, laws, and regulations of elections for town officers in the town of Reids-ville."
These statutes, relating as they do to the same subject, should be read in connection with each other, as together constituting one law, giving effect to all parts of the statutes if jiossible, and the history of the legislation may be considered in the effort to ascertain the uniform and consistent purpose of the Legislature. 39 Cyc., 1150.
"All statutes are presumed to be enacted by the Legislature with full knowledge of the existing condition of the law, and with reference to it. They are, therefore, to be construed as a part of a general and uniform system of jurisprudence, and their meaning and effect is to be determined :hi connection, not only with the common law and the Constitution, but also in connection with other statutes, on the same'subject, and, under certain circumstances, with statutes on cognate and even different subjects- This rule of construction, however, so far as prior statutes are concerned, is to be restricted to cases where the statute in question is really doubtful; if the statute is clear on its face, prior statutes may not be consulted to create an ambiguity." 36 Cyc., p. 1146.
Section 2978 of the Revisal, formerly section 3824 of the Code of 1883, requiring a sale at public outcry, was first enacted (ch. 112, Laws 1872-3), and it received authoritative construction in Southport v. Stanley, 125 N. C., 464, as follows:
"The reasonable construction of the statute must be that the town or city authorities can sell any personal property, or sell or lease any real, estate which belongs to the town or city as the surplus of the original acreage ceded for the town or city site, or such land as may have been subsequently acquired or purchased; but in no case can the power be extended to the sale or lease of any real estate, which, by the terms of the act of incorporation, is to be held in trust for the use of the town, or any real estate with or without the buildings on it, which is devoted to the purposes of government, including town or city hall, market houses, houses used for fire departments or for water supply, or' for public squares or parks. To enable the town or city authorities to sell such of the real estate of the town or cities as is mentioned just above, there must be a special act of the General Assembly authorizing such lease or sale."
The effect of this decision is that property of the city or town, such as parks, markets, city halls, waterworks, lighting plants, etc., held for the use of the public, are not within the provisions of Rev., 2978, and cannot be sold thereunder, and that, if sold at all, additional authority must be conferred by the General Assembly.
If there was any doubt of this being the correct view of the Southport case, it is put at rest by the unanimous opinion of the Court in Church v. Dula, 148 N. C., 266, in which. Iiolce, J., speaking for the Court, says : "This view is not affected in any way by the case of Southport v. Stanley, 125 N. C., 464, to which we were referred by plaintiff's counsel. That decision was to the effect that the general power conferred on the authorities of a town to sell and dispose of town property by section 3824 of the Code of 1883 (Rev., 2978) does not give the right to sell property held in trust for the public; for any such purpose there must be an act of the Legislature conferring special power."
Under this construction of the statute it became necessary to provide means for selling and leasing property, held for the use of the public, as frequently a sale or lease would be advantageous and would promote the public welfare, and to provide this remedy, section 2916, subsection 6, was enacted, which deals with the property, which the Court said was not embraced in section 2978, and thus understood, the two sections mean .that under section 2978 the mayor and commissioners shall have power to sell at auction any property except that held for a public use, and under section 2916, subsection 6, that they may sell property held for a public use, subject to the approval of the voters.
The two sections are consistent with each other, and in entire harmony. They were enacted at different times, for different purposes, and deal with different classes of property. The General Assembly evidently thought that in the sale of property, not held for a public use, such as a fire engine which had ceased to be of any value to the town on account of changed conditions, it was a sufficient protection to have a sale at public auction, but that when the property belonged to the other class the approval of the voters, the real owners, should be had.
There is no reason for reading into the later section that the sale shall be by public auction, in addition to submitting the question to a vote, and to do so would impose a cumbersome, confusing procedure instead of one that is intelligent and easily understood.
If the position of the plaintiffs should prevail, the governing body of the town or city would have to offer the property at public sale, at which any one could bid, who could comply with the terms of sale, and after the highest bidder is ascertained the whole question would have to be submitted to a vote, while under the other view the governing body can advertise for bids, can consider the needs of the community, the ability to perform for the present and the future, and can present to the voters a mature plan for their approval or disapproval.
The second statute, in our opinion, substitutes a vote of the people as to property held for a public use, for a public sale of other property, and the will of the people having been fairly ascertained, as the plaintiffs admit, and emphatically expressed, as to a sale of their own property there is no reason for setting it aside.
If any further authority was needed, it is conferred by chapter 28, section 2, Private Laws 1917, which enacts:
"Sec. 2. That said' town of Reidsville may sell or lease any of its public utilities, such as lighting plants or system mentioned in said subsection: Provided, in the event such sale or lease, which shall be approved by a majority of the votes cast in any election at which said proposition may be submitted; said election to he held under the same general rules, laws, and regulations of elections for town officers in the town of Reidsville."
There is some confusion in the language, but the intent is clear to give the power to the town of Reidsville to "sell or lease" its lighting plant without other restriction than the apjtroval of the people at the polls, and as the sale has been made, and has been approved by a vote of 392 for the sale, and 68. against it, there is no valid reason for disturbing it.
There is not a scintilla of evidence that the utilities company is seeking to acquire a monopoly, and, on the contrary, it offers in its answer, and renews the offer in this Court, to abandon the contract of purchase.
It has done nothing except to make an offer to purchase the lighting plant for a certain amount of money, and upon certain conditions, which the governing authorities of Reidsville have accepted, and which has been ratified by popular vote on a legal referendum.
We should assume, in the absence of a finding to the contrary, that the mayor and aldermen of Reidsville, elected when the question of a sale of the lighting plant was acutely at issue, have acted in good faith, and that the voters had sufficient intelligence to understand the proposition, which they approved by their vote, and certainly we have no authority to deny to them the right to contract in reference to their own property upon the assumption of superior wisdom and business, ability.
There are allegations of fraud in the complaint, which are denied in the answer, but no evidence to support the allegations has been introduced, and the exception to the refusal to receive such evidence has been abandoned, and is not referred to in the plaintiff's brief.
It would not, therefore, he just or according to law to base our judgment on unsupported allegations, and to make a part of our permanent records, so serious a reflection on the integrity of the mayor and aider-men of Reidsville as men and public officials without proof.
There can be nothing in the contention that two unrelated questions have been submitted to the voters, because the plaintiffs have agreed, by stipulation filed in the record, that the question of a sale of the lighting jilant was submitted, and that "the election so held was confined to this question alone."
It is also agreed that the election was "duly called," and that "the machinery provided for the holding of said election, and the holding thereof, was such as provided by law."
Affirmed.