Case Name: William K. FRAVEL, D.M.D., et al., Appellants, v. Alan HAUGHEY, et al., Appellees
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1999-02-18
Citations: 727 So. 2d 1033
Docket Number: No. 97-2718
Parties: William K. FRAVEL, D.M.D., et al., Appellants, v. Alan HAUGHEY, et al., Appellees.
Judges: GRIFFIN, C.J., GOSHORN, PETERSON and THOMPSON, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 727
Pages: 1033–1044

Head Matter:
William K. FRAVEL, D.M.D., et al., Appellants, v. Alan HAUGHEY, et al., Appellees.
No. 97-2718
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
Feb. 18, 1999.
Shelley H. Leinicke of Wicker, Smith, Tu-tan, O’Hara, McCoy, Graham, & Ford, P.A., Ft. Lauderdale, for Appellants.
Christopher M. Larmoyeux of Montgomery & Larmoyeux, West Palm Beach, and Philip M. Burlington of Caruso, Burlington, Bohn & Compiani, P.A., West Palm Beach, for Appellees.

Opinion:
EN BANC
ANTOON, J.
Alan and Joan Haughey (plaintiffs) sued William K. Fravel, D.M.D., and William K. Fravel, D.M.D., P.A. (Dr. Fravel), alleging that their daughter Emily was injured as a result of Dr. Fravel's negligent orthodontic treatment. The plaintiffs claimed Dr. Fravel negligently failed to diagnose and treat a degenerative condition in Emily's jaw known as idiopathic condyle resorption, and that this negligence resulted in permanent injury to Emily. The jury returned a verdict against Dr. Fravel and a judgment was entered accordingly. This court has sua sponte elected to consider this case en banc. See Fla. R.App. P. 9.331(a). We affirm the jury's finding of liability but remand this matter for reconsideration because the record evidence does not support the jury's award of future medical expenses.
Dr. Fravel first argues that he is entitled to receive a new trial because the trial court erred in refusing to allow his attorney to cross-examine the plaintiffs' expert using an authoritative medical text. Dr. Fravel attempted to cross-examine the expert by using an article from the Journal of Clinical Orthodontics. The plaintiffs objected, arguing that Dr. Fravel had failed to establish the proper predicate since the expert indicated that he was unfamiliar with the article. Dr. Fravel asked the trial court to take judicial notice that the article was authoritative or to allow him to "lay a foundation by other testimony." The trial court incorrectly ruled that Dr. Fravel could use the article for cross-examination only if the expert was familiar with it.
The trial court has the discretion to find a writing authoritative despite an expert's failure to recognize the writing or the author. See § 90.706, Fla. Stat. (1995). In such situations, the trial court must give the party proffering the article an opportunity to establish that the writing is authoritative through the testimony of other witnesses. See Chesterton v. Fisher, 655 So.2d 170, 171 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995). However, in this case the substance of the article was not made known to the trial court. Neither the article nor testimony establishing the predicate of authoritativeness was proffered by Dr. Frav-el. By failing to make such a proffer, Dr. Fravel waived his right to appellate review of the trial court's error. See § 90.104(l)(b), Fla. Stat. (1995).
Dr. Fravel next argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion for new trial. The motion was based on the claim that the plaintiffs' attorney had made improper comments during his closing argument including comments requesting the jury to act as the conscience of the community and accusing Dr. Fravel, his attorney, and his witnesses of committing perjury. Dr. Fravel maintained that this improper argument constituted fundamental error and thus was a valid basis for new trial. We agree that the statements made by the plaintiffs' attorney during closing argument were improper and inflammatory, but conclude that the trial court properly determined that the comments did not constitute fundamental error.
Just like with any other trial error, lawyers have a duty to object to improper comments made during closing arguments,
and the failure to raise a contemporaneous objection constitutes waiver. We recognize that this court has previously held that civil judgments may be reversed on appeal based on improper argument, even in the absence of a contemporaneous objection, when the improper comments are so extensive that they deprive a party of receiving a fair trial. See e.g., Schubert v. Allstate Ins. Co., 603 So.2d 554 (Fla. 5th DCA), rev. dismissed, 606 So.2d 1164 (Fla.1992). In doing so we have probably been more generous than other districts in determining that improper arguments can constitute fundamental error in the hope that reversals would curb bad practice. However, judging by the frequency with which this issue continues to be raised, at least in our court, these rulings have not seemed to have had the intended effect of discouraging such conduct. In fact, a . case could be made that these rulings have encouraged lawyers to allow improper argument to be submitted to the jury without objection. Unfortunately, calculating lawyers may choose to remain silent when confronted with improper argument in hopes that, if the verdict is unfavorable to their client, relief might be available in the appellate court based upon review of the improper argument. This paradox was poignantly observed by Judge Griffin in her dissent in Walt Disney World Co. v. Blalock, 640 So.2d 1156, 1159 (Fla. 5th DCA), rev. dismissed, 649 So.2d 232 (Fla.1994):
[A] party who does not object to counsel's comments in closing should not be allowed to complain of those comments on appeal. It is anomalous that the more objectionable the comment, the less the incentive to object.
Appellate courts should not assist in the execution of such tactics.
Equally puzzling is the fact that under current case law from this court, an attorney who fails to make a timely objection to improper argument waives the issue for purposes of appeal if he fails to timely move for mistrial; see e.g., Ed Ricke and Sons, Inc. v. Green, etc., 468 So.2d 908, 910 (Fla.1985); however, he may argue for the first time on appeal that the unobjected to, improper argument justifies reversal. See Blalock, 640 So.2d at 1159.
The Florida Supreme Court has defined what constitutes fundamental error in the context of final argument. In Tyus v. Apalachicola Northern Railroad Company, 130 So.2d 580, 587 (Fla.1961), citing to its earlier opinion in Seaboard Air Line Railroad Co. v. Strickland, 88 So.2d 519 (Fla.1956), the Florida Supreme Court ruled:
[W]e are committed to the rule that in the ordinary case, unless timely objection to counsel's prejudicial remarks is made, the appellate court will not reverse on review. This rule is subject to the exception that if the prejudicial conduct in its collective import is so extensive that its influence pervades the trial, gravely impairing a calm and dispassionate consideration of the evidence and the merits by the jury, a new trial should be awarded regardless of the want of objection.
(emphasis in original). It is probably fair to say that careful application of this standard will almost always result in a finding that no fundamental error occurred.
The difficulty in meeting the Tyus standard for reversal was noted in Murphy v. International Robotics Systems, Inc., 710 So.2d 587, 590 (Fla. 4th DCA), rev. granted, 722 So.2d 193 (Fla. 1998). The fourth district explained that it had never granted a new trial solely on the ground of unobjeeted to, improper closing arguments and gave notice that it would not likely do so in the future. Id. at 587. Writing for the court, Judge Klein stated that the court had "all but close[d] the door on allowing this issue to be raised for the first time on appeal." Id. at 590. Adding an historical perspective on this issue, Judge Klein noted that our supreme court has not granted a new trial solely-on the basis of unobjected to, improper argument since 1956 in Seaboard Air Line Railroad Co., 88 So.2d at 519, and that the second district has not done so in forty years. Murphy, 710 So.2d at 589. Interestingly, his research revealed that, other than the first, third, and fifth district courts of appeal in this state, no other court in this country allows improper argument to be raised for the first time on appeal in civil eases. Id. at 591.
Our reluctance to reverse on the ground of unobjected to, improper argument is not to be viewed as condoning the bad practice of law. Instead, our application of the principle of waiver simply requires trial counsel to fulfill the obligation to raise timely objections when rules governing argument are violated. When argument descends to the level of ethical violations, there are other ways to address the transgression than reversal of a jury verdict. See R. Regulating Fla. Bar 4-3.4(c), 4-3.4(e), and 4-3.5(a). In fact, if the argument submitted by adverse counsel violates the Rules Regulating the Florida Bar, an attorney has the obligation to report the violation to The Florida Bar. See R. Regulating Fla. Bar 4-8.3(a). Judges also have the duty to take appropriate action when they observe counsel engage in ethical violations. See Code of Jud. Conduct, Canon 3D(2). In considering this issue, we find it troubling that trial judges are reluctant to curb the abuse perpetrated by trial counsel in the area of improper comments made during closing arguments. As Judge Schwartz noted in Borden, Inc. v. Young, 479 So.2d 850, 851 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985), rev. denied, 488 So.2d 832 (Fla.1986):
[I]t is no longer — if it ever was — acceptable for the judiciary to act simply as a fight promoter, who supplies an arena in which parties may fight it out on unseemly terms of their own choosing, and then, on the ground that the loser has asked for what he received, obediently raise the hand of the one who emerges victorious.
Although Judge Schwartz was referring to Florida's appellate judges, trial judges possess the same duty to maintain order and decorum in judicial proceedings. See Fla. Code Jud. Conduct, Canon 3B(3). If the conduct of counsel violates the Rules Regulating the Florida Bar, judges have the obligation under Canon 3D(2) of the Code of Judicial Conduct to address such behavior by taking appropriate action. Although the code does not specify what the term "appropriate action" entails, at least in the case of lawyers who do not heed less severe judicial efforts to correct such conduct, referrals should be made to The Florida Bar.
The dissent argues that Borden stands for the proposition that an appellate court may reverse a jury verdict based on improper argument in order to compel appropriate attorney conduct even if the argument does not constitute fundamental error. We are not convinced that this is the holding of Borden, but if it is, we respectfully disagree. It must be remembered that courts exist to resolve disputes between litigants. Clients should not pay the financial and emotional price of retrial because their lawyers fail to comply with the ethical requirements of the Rules Regulating the Florida Bar. Implicit in the dissent's opinion is cynicism regarding the Bar's ability or willingness to enforce its rules through its disciplinary process. If this dim view of the Bar's ability to enforce compliance with its ethical standards is well-founded, steps should be taken to correct the disciplinary mechanism. In any event, it would be a mistake to punish litigants for the unethical conduct of their lawyers just as it would be a mistake to reward those litigants whose lawyers fail to object understanding that they will get a second "bite of the apple" on appeal if the result at trial is unfavorable to them.
Furthermore, we reject the suggestion of the dissent that appellate courts can efficiently and effectively discipline unethical lawyers through reversal of jury verdicts. Apparently the dissent would either require appellate courts 1) to automatically reverse upon determining that there had been a vio lation of the Rules Regulating the Florida Bar by the prevailing party, or 2) to review the violations on a case by ease basis to determine whether the violation was sufficiently egregious to require reversal. The first approach would come close to providing a bright line test, but a direct independent undertaking of this policing role would go well beyond the requirements of Canon 3(D)2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct and 5-H Corp. v. Padovano, 708 So.2d 244 (Fla.1997), and create a demand for significant increases in judicial resources. The second approach presents an additional problem in that it eschews the growing trend in American jurisprudence that courts establish predictability. In either case, it follows that this responsibility would exist, not just in the case of improper argument, but whenever the appellate court determines that there has been a violation of the Rules Regulating the Florida Bar. This "independent, free standing rule" would require sua sponte judicial review of the entire trial proceeding to determine the existence of a violation. Without guidance from the supreme court or the legislature, such an approach leaves to each appellate panel the discretion to determine whether an ethical violation by the prevailing party is sufficiently egregious to require reversal.
After scrutinizing the improper argument submitted in the instant case under the Tyus analysis, we hold that the trial court properly denied Dr. Fravel's motion for a new trial because the improper comments made by plaintiffs' counsel during his closing argument do not constitute fundamental error. This ruling will remand lawyers to raise timely objections when confronted with improper argument and create predictability with regard to the future disposition of similar cases by this court.
Lastly, Dr. Fravel challenges the trial court's denial of his motion for remittitur, contending the trial evidence did not support the jury's award of past and future medical expenses. We agree that the $200,000 award of future medical expenses is not supported by the record.
Section 768.74, Florida Statutes (1995), provides, in relevant part:
Remittitur and Additur.-
(1) In any action to which this part applies wherein the trier of fact determines that liability exists on the part of the defendant and a verdict is rendered which awards money damages to the plaintiff, it-shall be the responsibility of the court, upon proper motion, to review the amount of such award to determine if such amount is excessive or inadequate in light of the facts and circumstances which were presented to the trier of fact.
(2) If the court finds that the amount awarded is excessive or inadequate, it shall order a remittitur or additur, as the ease may be.
(5) In determining whether an award is excessive or inadequate in light of the facts and circumstances presented to the trier of fact and in determining the amount, if any, that such award exceeds a reasonable range of damages or is inadequate, the court shall.consider the following criteria:
(e) Whether the amount awarded is supported by the evidence and is such that it could be adduced in a logical manner by reasonable persons.
Generally, "[i]n determining whether to order a remittitur, the trial judge's discretion is exercised in the context of determining whether the jury's verdict is against the manifest weight of the evidence or was influenced by consideration of matters outside the record." Waddell v. Shoney's, Inc., 664 So.2d 1134, 1136 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995).
Here, the plaintiffs presented expert testimony regarding Emily's future medical expenses. The only testimony specifically describing the type of treatment and the cost of such treatment came from Dr. Charlotte White, an oral and maxillofacial surgeon. Dr. White stated that in the future it may be necessary for Emily to undergo a surgical procedure called a LeFort osteotomy. She estimated that this procedure would cost between $20,000 to $25,000. Dr. Goldie, an expert in the area of orthodontics, also testified that Emily might require splint therapy for the rest of her life but he did not estimate the cost of such treatment. Similarly, Dr. Yerkes, also an orthodontist, testified that Emily will need physical therapy in the future but he did not describe the type of therapy or its recommended frequency. He added that he had not formed a treatment plan for Emily and was not sure how he would treat Emily. At the conclusion of the evidence, plaintiffs' counsel argued to the jury that it should return an award of future damages for the cost of surgery, "intermittent" physical therapy, orthodontic treatment, and splints. The jury awarded $200,-000 in future medical expenses, providing that "those future damages are intended to provide compensation" for five years.
Our review of the evidence reveals that the amount awarded for Emily's future medical expenses does not bear a reasonable relationship to the damages proved at trial. Thus, the award is not supported by the evidence. See § 768.74(5)(e), Fla. Stat. (1995). Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's order denying Dr. Fravel's motion for remittitur and remand this matter for entry of an order for remittitur, or, in the alternative, if the plaintiffs do not agree with the remittitur, to order a new trial in this cause on the issue of damages. See § 768.74(4), Fla. Stat. (1995).
Judgment AFFIRMED; order denying motion for remittitur REVERSED; and cause REMANDED.
GRIFFIN, C.J., GOSHORN, PETERSON and THOMPSON, JJ., concur.
DAUKSCH, J., concurs specially, with opinion in which GOSHORN, J., concurs.
COBB, J., concurs specially, with opinion.
W. SHARP, J., dissents, with opinion.
HARRIS, J., dissents, with opinion in which W. SHARP, J., concurs.
.Admittedly we do not have complete statistics on this point. However, the frequency with which this issue is raised cannot be accurately determined by simply calculating the number of times it has been addressed in opinions of this court as suggested by the dissent.
. The comments máde by trial counsel during argument in Tyus were egregious. See 130 So.2d at 591-93 (O'Connell, J., dissenting).
. For a thoughtful and in-depth discussion regarding the issue of whether improper argument of counsel constitutes reversible error, see Larry A. Klein, Allowing Improper Argument of Counset to be Raised for the First Time on Appeal as Fundamental Error: Are Florida Courts Throwing Out the Baby With the Bath Water?, 26 Fla. St. U.L.Rev. 97(1998).
. We note that the second district has crafted a more detailed analysis of the problem. In Hagan v. Sun Bank of Mid-Florida, N.A., 666 So,2d 580, 586 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996), Judge Altenbernd described the following two-step analysis for evaluating the question of whether unobjected to, improper argument constitutes fundamental error:
First, the trial court must determine whether the error was so pervasive, inflammatory, and prejudicial as to preclude the jury's rational consideration of the case.... Second, the trial court must decide whether the error was fundamental. In essence, this is a legal decision that the error was so extreme that it could not be corrected by an instruction if an objection had been lodged, and that it so damaged the fairness of the trial that the public's interest in our system of justice justifies a new trial even when no lawyer took the steps necessary to give a party the right to demand a new trial.
In our view, careful application of the Tyus standard leads to the same result.