Case Name: PEOPLE v. GRIFFIN
Court: Michigan Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1981-08-18
Citations: 108 Mich. App. 625
Docket Number: Docket No. 47373
Parties: PEOPLE v GRIFFIN
Judges: Before: V. J. Brennan, P.J., and Bronson and Bashara, JJ.
Reporter: Michigan appeals reports; cases decided in the Michigan Court of Appeals.
Volume: 108
Pages: 625–641

Head Matter:
PEOPLE v GRIFFIN
Docket No. 47373.
Submitted January 15, 1981, at Detroit.
Decided August 18, 1981.
Leave to appeal denied, 412 Mich 878.
Jack A. Griffin was convicted of first-degree murder and assault with intent to murder, Monroe Circuit Court, James J. Kelley, J. Defendant appeals, alleging several errors in the trial court’s instructions to the jury. Held:
1. The trial court erroneously instructed the jury that the law implies malice from an unprovoked, unjustified, inexcusable killing without mitigating circumstances.
2. The trial court’s instructions on specific intent were proper.
3. There was sufficient evidence to lead a finder of fact to conclude that first-degree murder was committed.
Reversed and remanded for retrial on the original charge, at the discretion of the prosecutor.
Bronson, J., concurred in part and dissented in part. He agrees that the trial court’s instruction regarding malice was erroneous and requires reversal. Judge Bronson would find that the court’s instructions regarding intent as an element of murder were incorrect and could have confused the jury, and also that the court’s instructions could have left the jury with the impression that they could not consider lesser offenses unless they all agreed on the defendant’s innocence of the greater offense. Further, he would find that there was insufficient evidence of premeditation and deliberation to justify a conviction of first-degree murder. He would, upon remand, allow the defendant to be retried only on the charges of second-degree murder and assault with intent to commit murder.
References for Points in Headnotes
40 Am Jur 2d, Homicide § 500.
75 Am Jur 2d, Trial § 719.
40 Am Jur 2d, Homicide § 50.
40 Am Jur 2d, Homicide § 569.
40 Am Jur 2d, Homicide §§ 45, 53.
75 Am Jur 2d, Trial § 876 et seq.
75 Am Jur 2d, Trial § 643.
30 Am Jur 2d, Evidence §§ 1170-1172.
40 Am Jur 2d, Homicide §§ 44-47, 454.
Presumption of deliberation and premeditation from the circumstances attending the killing. 96 ALR2d 1435.
Presumption of deliberation and premeditation from the act of killing. 86 ALR2d 656.
Opinion op the Court
1. Homicide — Murder — Malice — Jury Instructions.
An instruction to the jury in a prosecution for murder that the law implies malice from an unprovoked, unjustified, inexcusable killing without mitigating circumstances is erroneous; malice may be inferred from the facts of a killing but this inference does not rise to the status of a legal presumption.
Partial Concurrence and Partial Dissent by Bronson, J.
2. Homicide — Murder — Malice. Malice aforethought is the intention to kill, actual or implied.
3. Criminal Law — Assault With Intent to Commit Murder.
The elements of the crime of assault with intent to commit murder are: (1) an assault; (2) with speciñc intent to murder; (3) which if successful would make the killing murder.
4. Homicide — Murder — Intent.
Murder in the ffrst degree requires the existence of a deliberate intention to take life; where a defendant was conscious of a very high risk that his acts would result in the death of another but where there was no intent to kill, he may be found guilty of second-degree murder.
5. Criminal Law — Jury Instructions — Lesser Included Offenses.
A trial court’s instruction to a jury which conditions the jury’s right to consider lesser offenses upon a ffnding of not guilty on the charged offense is erroneous.
6. Criminal Law — Jury Instructions — Defendant’s Theory of Case.
A trial court, in its jury instructions, is not obligated to give verbatim the defense’s requested instruction on its theory of the case; however, where there is evidence to support an instruction on the theory advanced, some instruction on that theory must be given.
7. Criminal Law — Evidence — Sufficiency of Evidence.
The standard for assessing a defendant’s claim of insufficient evidence on an element of the crime charged is whether there was sufficient evidence to justify a rational trier of fact in finding guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, taking the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution.
8. Homicide — Murder — Premeditation and Deliberation.
Premeditation and deliberation may be inferred from all of the surrounding circumstances of a killing; factors relevant to whether premeditation and deliberation exist in a particular case include (1) the prior relationship of the parties that would tend to show motive, (2) the acquisition of or positioning of a weapon in preparation for a homicide, (3) the circumstances of the killing itself, and (4) the killer’s post-homicide conduct.
9. Homicide — Murder — Premeditation and Deliberation.
No specific length of time is needed to satisfy the premeditation and deliberation element of ffrst-degree murder, rather, it is sufficient that the defendant had an interval of time to subject the nature of his actions to a second look; however, merely because there was time to premeditate and deliberate does not mean that premeditation and deliberation actually occurred; actual cogitation is necessary to satisfy the premeditation and deliberation element of first-degree murder.
Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Robert A. Derengoski, Solicitor General, Michael W. LaBeau, Prosecuting Attorney, and William D. Bond, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for the people.
Kim Robert Fawcett, Assistant State Appellate Defender, for defendant on appeal.
Before: V. J. Brennan, P.J., and Bronson and Bashara, JJ.

Opinion:
Bashara, J.
The majority concurs with the reasoning and result reached by Judge Bronson's holding that the trial court's instruction to the jury as to the issue of malice was erroneous and requires reversal. People v Richardson, 409 Mich 126, 142-146; 293 NW2d 332 (1980), People v Wright, 408 Mich 1, 18-23; 289 NW2d 1 (1980).
However, we specifically reject the balance of the dissenting opinion, both as to rationale and result. For the benefit of the trial judge on retrial, our review leads us to the conclusion that his instructions on specific intent elements of first-degree murder and assault with intent to murder were proper. We further find that the evidence adduced could lead a finder of fact to conclude that first-degree murder was committed.
Reversed and remanded to the trial court for retrial on the original charge, at the discretion of the prosecutor.
V. J. Brennan, P.J., concurred.