Case Name: The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v. James Peck, Ralph Di Gia, George Willoughby, Hollis Wyman, Jr., Tom Rick, Robert Gilmore, Marcus Cohen, Dale Brothington, Albert Uhrie, Patricia Daw and Elizabeth Quigley, Appellants; The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Abraham J. Muste, Kent Larrabee, Eileen Fantino, Ralph Di Gia, Henry J. Maiden, Bayard Rustin, Helen Russell, Mary Ann McCoy, Edith Horwitz, Patricia Rusk, James Peck, Robert Fisher, Hugh Corbin, Jackson Maclow, Dale Brothington, Andrew Osgood, Michael Kovalak and Henry Babcock, Appellants
Court: New York Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1959-12-30
Citations: 7 N.Y.2d 76
Docket Number: 
Parties: The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v. James Peck, Ralph Di Gia, George Willoughby, Hollis Wyman, Jr., Tom Rick, Robert Gilmore, Marcus Cohen, Dale Brothington, Albert Uhrie, Patricia Daw and Elizabeth Quigley, Appellants. The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Abraham J. Muste, Kent Larrabee, Eileen Fantino, Ralph Di Gia, Henry J. Maiden, Bayard Rustin, Helen Russell, Mary Ann McCoy, Edith Horwitz, Patricia Rusk, James Peck, Robert Fisher, Hugh Corbin, Jackson Maclow, Dale Brothington, Andrew Osgood, Michael Kovalak and Henry Babcock, Appellants.
Judges: 
Reporter: New York Reports
Volume: 7
Pages: 76–83

Head Matter:
The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v. James Peck, Ralph Di Gia, George Willoughby, Hollis Wyman, Jr., Tom Rick, Robert Gilmore, Marcus Cohen, Dale Brothington, Albert Uhrie, Patricia Daw and Elizabeth Quigley, Appellants. The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Abraham J. Muste, Kent Larrabee, Eileen Fantino, Ralph Di Gia, Henry J. Maiden, Bayard Rustin, Helen Russell, Mary Ann McCoy, Edith Horwitz, Patricia Rusk, James Peck, Robert Fisher, Hugh Corbin, Jackson Maclow, Dale Brothington, Andrew Osgood, Michael Kovalak and Henry Babcock, Appellants.
Argued October 22, 1959;
decided December 30, 1959.
Kenneth W. Greenawalt and Harrop Freeman for appellants.
I. No clear or present danger existed, in fact, in the situations involved here. The drills or exercises of June 15, 1955 and July 20, 1956 were in respect of a purely hypothetical and theoretical bomb attack, and not in respect of any real, actual, imminent or threatened bomb attack or danger. (Lee v. Madigan, 358 U. S. 228.) II. In the situations involved here there was, in law, no clear and present danger which justified the abridgement or denial of appellants’ constitutional freedoms of religion, speech, press, peaceable assembly and petition. (Schenck v. United States, 249 U. S. 47; Whitney v. California, 274 U. S. 357; Board of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624; Thomas v. Collins, 323 U. S. 516; Bridges v. California, 314 U. S. 252; Dennis v. United States, 341 U. S. 494; Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U. S. 81; Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U. S. 304.) III. The New York State Emergency Defense Act and the alleged orders thereunder, in whole or in part, inherently and as construed and applied below against appellants, are in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution and of sections 1, 3, 8, 9 and 11 of article I of the New York State Constitution. (De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U. S. 353; Schneider v. State, 308 U. S. 147; Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296; Jamison v. Texas, 318 U. S. 413; Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U. S. 105; Board of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624; Martin v. Struthers, 319 U. S. 141; Taylor v. Mississippi, 319 U. S. 583; Douglas v. Jeannette, 319 U. S. 157; Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U. S. 158; Follett v. McCormick, 321 U. S. 573; Thomas v. Collins, 323 U. S. 516.) IV. The said act and the alleged orders, in themselves and as construed and applied below, abridged and prohibited appellants’ freedoms of religion and conscience and their free exercise thereof. (United States v. Ballard, 322 U. S. 78; Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296; Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U. S. 67; Taylor v. Mississippi, 319 U. S. 583.) V. The said act and alleged orders, in themselves and as construed and applied below, abridged the rights of defendants peaceably to assemble and to petition. (De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U. S. 353; Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U. S. 496.) VI. The said act and alleged orders, in themselves and as construed and applied below, abridged or denied appellants’ liberties of speech and press. (Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U. S. 105; Martin v. Struthers, 319 U. S. 141; Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U. S. 444; Le Baron v. Kern County Farm Labor Union, 80 F. Supp. 151; Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U. S. 1.) VII. The said act and alleged orders, in themselves and as construed and applied below, denied to appellants the equal protection of the laws and abridged their privileges and immunities. VIII. Appellants were entitled to be considered “ exempt persons ” within subdivision 1 of section 100 of the New York State Defense Emergency Act. Failure to include appellants within that exemption was discriminatory and denied them equal protection of the law as well as their freedoms of religion and conscience. (Winters v. New York, 333 U. S. 507; Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U. S. 67.) IX. The New York State Defense Emergency Act, insofar as it provides for, and also insofar as it has been construed to permit, infringement of the liberties of the people, including the freedoms of speech, press, religion, petition and assembly, is unconstitutional under Federal and State Constitutions. X. The evidence failed to establish that appellants violated and disobeyed any duly promulgated regulation or' order or any official order by a person duly authorized, as alleged. XI. Appellants were not trespassing on private property and were not engaged in practices which were immoral or inconsistent with public health, peace and safety. (Watchtower, Bible & Tract Soc. v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 297 N. Y. 339, 335 U. S. 886; People v. Thorpe, 198 Misc. 462; People v. Bohnke, 287 N. Y. 154, 316 U. S. 667; Reynolds v. United States, 98 U. S. 145.) XII. The City Magistrates’ Courts, which did not sit herein as a Court of Special Sessions, did not have jurisdiction to hear and determine the charges against appellants. Section 102 of the New York State Defense Emergency Act, in itself and as construed and applied below, violates the New York State Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution in providing that Magistrates’ Courts in the City of New York, in the first instance, shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine charges of violations constituting misdemeanors, such as the charges herein. (People v. Pray, 87 Misc. 464; People ex rel. Comaford v. Dutcher, 83 N. Y. 240; People v. Seidman, 266 App. Div. 793; People v. Citarelli, 247 App. Div. 53; People v. Schacher, 181 Misc. 769; Matter of Mosner v. Haddock, 181 Misc. 486; People v. Pershaec, 172 Misc. 324.)
Frank S. Hogan, District Attorney (Peter Preiser and Richard G. Denser of counsel), for respondent.
I. Appellants’ guilt was proved beyond a reasonable doubt. II. The New York State Defense Emergency Act is a valid exercise of legislative powers and its particular application to these appellants was not unconstitutional. (United States v. Constantine, 296 U. S. 287; United States v. Macintosh, 283 U. S. 605; Richter v. United States, 181 F. 2d 591, 340 U. S. 892; Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U. S. 160; Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U. S. 81; Matter of Viemeister, 179 N. Y. 235; People ex rel. Nechamcus v. Warden of City Prison, 144 N. Y. 529.) III. Appellants’ constitutional rights were not violated. (United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U. S. 644; Atherton v. United States, 176 F. 2d 835, 338 U. S. 938; Rase v. United States, 129 F. 2d 204; Hamilton v. Regents, 293 U. S. 245; United States v. Miller, 233 F. 2d 171; Poulos v. New Hampshire, 345 U. S. 395; Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U. S. 158; Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U. S. 569.) IV. Appellants were not engaged in an exempt activity, and failure to exempt them did not violate their rights. (Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U. S. 366.) V. The City Magistrates’ Court had exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine the misdemeanor charges herein involved. (People ex rel. Sinkler v. Terry, 108 N. Y. 1; People ex rel. Townsend v. Porter, 90 N. Y. 68; Landers v. Staten Is. R. R. Co., 53 N. Y. 450; Haggerty v. City of New York, 267 N. Y. 252; People ex rel. Comaford v. Dutcher, 83 N. Y. 240; People v. Pray, 87 Misc. 464; People v. Seidman, 266 App. Div. 793; People v. Aptaker, 19 Misc 2d 602; People v. Citarelli, 247 App. Div. 53; People v. Pershaec, 172 Misc. 324.)

Opinion:
Per Curiam.
We agree that it was not unconstitutional for the Legislature in section 102 of the State Defense Emergency Act (L. 1951, ch. 784, as amd.) to give jurisdiction over these misdemeanors to Magistrates' Courts in New York City (N. Y. Const., art. VI, § 18).
Appellants may constitutionally be compelled to take shelter during an air raid drill, a purely defensive measure within the class of nonaggressive activities recognized in Girouard v. United States (328 U. S. 61). Nor do we accept appellants' position that they were coerced into war preparation against their religious scruples. This was merely training in how to take shelter in the event of an air raid, in the nature of a lifeboat drill at sea or a fire drill in a school.
In each case, the judgment of the Appellate Part of the Court of Special Sessions of New York City should be affirmed.