Case Name: MURRAY v. BEYER MEMORIAL HOSPITAL
Court: Michigan Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1980-06-30
Citations: 409 Mich. 217
Docket Number: Docket Nos. 61673, 61674
Parties: MURRAY v BEYER MEMORIAL HOSPITAL
Judges: Levin, Fitzgerald, and Blair Moody, Jr., JJ., concurred with Kavanagh, J.
Reporter: Michigan Reports
Volume: 409
Pages: 217–230

Head Matter:
MURRAY v BEYER MEMORIAL HOSPITAL
Docket Nos. 61673, 61674.
Argued January 8, 1980
(Calendar No. 7).
Decided June 30, 1980.
Ronald L. Murray and Kathleen M. Murray for themselves, and Ronald L. Murray as next friend of Kathleen J. Murray, a minor, brought an action against Beyer Memorial Hospital, operated in Ypsilanti by Peoples Community Hospital Authority, a public community hospital authority, and others. The actions were for negligence in the medical care and treatment of the child at the time of her birth in 1970. The Washtenaw Circuit Court, Ross W. Campbell, J., granted accelerated judgment for the defendant hospital on the ground of governmental immunity. The Court of Appeals, D. E. Holbrook, P.J., and V. J. Brennan and M. F. Cavanagh, JJ., affirmed in an unpublished per curiam opinion (Docket Nos. 77-3159, 77-3160). Plaintiffs appeal. In an opinion by Justice Kavanagh, joined by Justices Levin, Fitzgerald, and Moody, the Supreme Court held:
1. On December 27, 1978, after the application for leave to appeal was filed in this case, the Court decided in Parker v Highland Park, 404 Mich 183; 273 NW2d 413 (1978), that a municipally owned general hospital is no longer immune from tort liability because it is not within the definition of a "governmental function” under the governmental tort liability act. The adventitious disposition of another case while the application for leave to appeal in this case was held in abeyance by the Court should not deprive the plaintiffs of the benefit of the new rule or make available to the defendant hospital a defense which will no longer be enforced for others. The rule announced in Parker is to be applied in all cases pending on December 27, 1978 in which an express challenge to the defense of governmental immunity was made and preserved as well as prospectively to all cases started after that date.
References for Points in Headnotes
[1-6] 20 Am Jur 2d, Courts § 233.
Prospective or retroactive operation of overruling decision. 10 ALR3d 1371.
[1, 4] 40 Am Jur 2d, Hospitals and Asylums § 20.
Immunity from liability for damages in tort of state or governmental unit or agency in operating hospital. 25 ALR2d 203.
[1] 57 Am Jur 2d, Municipal, School, and State Tort Liability § 67.
[6] 20 Am Jur 2d, Courts § 183 et seq.
2. Whenever a new rule of law is promulgated some unfairness to those who relied on the old rule may be claimed. However, courts do not alter an established rule of law without thorough evaluation of the policy consideration involved; when the decision to overrule precedent is finally made, the Court is satisfied that the importance of the result reached outweighs any unfairness to those negatively affected by the decision. Applying the new rule prospectively with the exception of the case in which it was declared and cases pending on appeal in which the issue was raised and preserved is an attempt to limit any such unfairness.
3. In these cases the Court has removed a defense, not imposed a liability. A trial is still forthcoming, at which the plaintiffs will be required to prove their allegations by a preponderance of the evidence and the defendant hospital will have a full day in court, with all the safeguards of a trial remaining.
Justice Williams, concurring, agreed that, now that it is the law of this state that a municipally owned general hospital providing a public medical service for a fee is not performing a governmental function within the meaning of the immunity statute, the rule should apply to all cases pending on the date the rule was decided in which an express challenge to the defense of governmental immunity was made and preserved as well as all cases started after that date. The prospective only rule in another case concerning the liability of charitable hospitals is not entirely applicable to public hospitals. Furthermore, the law as to what constitutes governmental immunity has for some years been in a state of flux, but the opinions of the Court should have warned those public agencies which might be liable to seek protection either through insurance or legislative action.
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings.
Justice Ryan, joined by Chief Justice Coleman, dissented. He would apply Parker in a purely prospective fashion, that is, to causes of action accruing after the date of decision in that case. At the time of the occurrences in this case in 1970, the law was well settled, and had been for more than three quarters of a century, that the operation of a publicly owned hospital was a governmental function for which there was immunity from tort liability. The Legislature, just three months before, had reenacted the governmental immunity statute employing the language of art having the well settled meanings announced and adopted by the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals in case law. The defendant hospital authority was entitled to conclude in 1970 that the Court and the Legislature meant what they said about the immunity of public hospitals. Reliance by the defendant hospital, and those similarly situated, upon the immunity doctrine as historically applied was important not only as an abstract matter of assuring consistency and predictability in the law of torts, but also as a matter of fairness to the taxpayers who own and fund the public hospital authority, which was not insured for the liability to which it is now retroactively exposed.
A few of the reasons for purely prospective application of Parker are:
a. An accurate assessment of judicial lawmaking recognizes that the Court is making new law, and it ought to "legislate” with purely prospective effect, as the Legislature does.
b. As a practical matter, retroactive application of Parker will confer a cause of action upon an uncertain number of potential plaintiffs, and add a substantial burden to already overcrowded civil trial dockets.
c. In extending the new doctrine of Parker to embrace a cause of action which accrued more than nine years ago, the Court once again undermines this state’s badly damaged doctrine of stare decisis, of which the rule of purely prospective application is a logical corollary. By this action the Court proves that insurers, attorneys, the Legislature, governmental agencies, the courts, and the public were unwise to rely upon the Court’s statements on the law of governmental immunity and should not rely on future pronouncements because the Court may change the law retroactively for a period of as much as a decade.
Opinion of the Court
1. Governmental Immunity — Hospitals — Torts — Common Law.
The decision which announced that a governmental body is not immune from tort liability for medical malpractice in treating a patient at its general hospital applies to all cases pending on December 27, 1978, the date of the overruling decision, in which an express challenge to the defense of governmental immunity was made and preserved, as well as prospectively to all cases started after that date (MCL 691.1407; MSA 3.996[107]).
2. Common Law — New Rule of Law — Appeal and Error.
The adventitious disposition of one case, which removes a common-law defense to an action in tort rather than imposes a liability, while other cases were held in abeyance by the Court to await the decision whether to overrule precedent, should not deprive the other plaintiffs of the benefit of the new rule or make available to the defendants a defense which will no longer be enforced for others.
Concurring Opinion by Williams, J.
See headnote 1.
3. Governmental Immunity — Torts — Common Law.
The law as to what constitutes governmental immunity has for some years been in flux, but the opinions of the Court should have warned those public agencies which might be liable to seek protection either through insurance or legislative action.
Dissenting Opinion by Ryan, J.
4. Governmental Immunity — Hospitals — Torts — Common Law.
A public community hospital authority was entitled to conclude in 1970 that the Court and the Legislature meant what they said about the immunity of public hospitals from tort liability because the law was well settled, and had been for more than three quarters of a century, that the operation of a publicly owned hospital was a governmental function, and the Legislature had recently reenacted the governmental immunity statute employing the language of art having the well settled meanings announced and adopted in Michigan case law (MCL 691.1407; MSA 3.996[107]).
5. Common Law — New Rule of Law.
The Supreme Court, when it engages in judicial lawmaking by overruling precedent, is making new law, and it ought to “legislate” with purely prospective effect, as the Legislature does.
6. Common Law — New Rule of Law — Stare Decisis.
The rule of purely prospective application of a judicial decision which overrules precedent is a logical corollary of the doctrine of stare decisis; retroactive application of new case law, especially that effecting signiñcant change, depreciates the ends to which the doctrine of stare decisis is directed: stability, certainty, and fairness.
Sommers, Schwartz, Silver & Schwartz, P.C. (by Stanley S. Schwartz and Richard D. Toth), for plaintiffs.
Cozadd, Shangle & Smith (by B. Ward Smith and Daniel J. Andrews) for defendant Beyer Memorial Hospital.

Opinion:
Kavanagh, J.
This case involves two complaints, consolidated on appeal, for alleged negligence in the care and treatment of a child at the time of her birth on November 29, 1970. The parents' complaint was filed on November 28, 1972. The complaint on behalf of the child was filed on February 23, 1973. The defendant hospital filed a motion for summary and/or accelerated judgment on the ground that the hospital was engaged in a governmental function and was therefore immune from tort liability under MCL 691.1407; MSA 3.996(107). The circuit court granted the hospital accelerated judgment on December 3, 1975. The Court of Appeals affirmed in an unpublished per curiam opinion on June 12, 1978. Application for leave to appeal to this Court was filed on June 28, 1978.
On December 27, 1978 this Court rendered a decision in Parker v Highland Park, 404 Mich 183; 273 NW2d 413 (1978). Subsequently we granted leave to determine whether the Parker decision should be applied to this case to require reversal and remand to the circuit court for further proceedings. We hold it should, and the rule of Parker is to be applied to all cases pending on December 27, 1978 in which an express challenge to the defense of governmental immunity was made and preserved as well as all cases started after that date. See Placek v Sterling Heights, 405 Mich 638, 662-668; 275 NW2d 511 (1979); Pittman v City of Taylor, 398 Mich 41, 50; 247 NW2d 512 (1976); Daley v LaCroix, 384 Mich 4, 14; 179 NW2d 390 (1970); Bricker v Green, 313 Mich 218, 236; 21 NW2d 105 (1946).
In Parker, four Justices agreed that the activities of a municipally owned general hospital did not constitute a "governmental function" within the meaning of MCL 691.1407; MSA 3.996(107), and thus were not entitled to governmental immunity. Plaintiffs claim that the rule of Parker should apply to the instant case for several reasons: The injury involved here occurred approximately two months after the injury of Parker; they have disputed the defendant hospital's claim to immunity at every step of the proceeding; the fortuity that Parker's case attacking governmental immunity for the day-to-day operation of a hospital was decided first should not deprive plaintiff of the benefit of the rule. (See Placek, supra, 667.)
Defendant, citing Parker v Port Huron Hospital, 361 Mich 1; 105 NW2d 1 (1960), argues for the rule adopted in that case and urges that Parker v Highland Park, supra, be applied prospectively from the date the opinion was released and not cover other cases pending on that date.
We are satisfied that the adventitious disposition of Parker while we held plaintiffs' application in abeyance should not deprive plaintiffs of the benefit of the rule or make available to defendant a defense we will no longer enforce for others.
We acknowledge that whenever a new rule of law is promulgated some unfairness to those who have relied on the old rule may be claimed. Courts, however, do not alter an established rule of law without thorough evaluation of the policy considerations involved. When the decision to overrule precedent is finally made, the Court is satis fied that the importance of the result reached outweighs any unfairness to those negatively affected by the decision. Applying the ruling prospectively with the exception of that case and cases pending on appeal in which the issue was raised and preserved is an attempt to limit any such unfairness.
As Justice Moody recognized in his concurring opinion in Parker we have removed a defense, not imposed a liability.
"It also should be noted that a full trial is still forthcoming. At trial, plaintiffs will be required to prove their allegations of malpractice by a preponderance of the evidence. Defendant will have a full day in court. Therefore, though the defense of governmental immunity for public general hospitals is removed, all the safeguards of a trial remain."
Reversed and remanded. No costs, a public question.
Levin, Fitzgerald, and Blair Moody, Jr., JJ., concurred with Kavanagh, J.