Case Name: STATE of Louisiana, Appellee, v. Ronnie Lee FAIRLEY, Appellant
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1994-05-04
Citations: 645 So. 2d 213
Docket Number: No. 25951-KA
Parties: STATE of Louisiana, Appellee, v. Ronnie Lee FAIRLEY, Appellant.
Judges: Before SEXTON and VICTORY, JJ., and LOWE, J. Pro Tem.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 645
Pages: 213–223

Head Matter:
STATE of Louisiana, Appellee, v. Ronnie Lee FAIRLEY, Appellant.
No. 25951-KA.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Second Circuit.
May 4, 1994.
Opinion on Rehearing Oct. 28, 1994.
Writ Denied Nov. 11, 1994.
Sanford and Lilly by Roy M. Lilly, Jr., Baton Rouge, for appellant.
Richard Ieyoub, Atty. Gen., Walter E. May, Jr., Dist. Atty., C. Glenn Fallin, Asst. Dist. Atty., for appellee.
Before SEXTON and VICTORY, JJ., and LOWE, J. Pro Tem.

Opinion:
|1SEXTON, Judge.
Defendant, Ronnie Lee Fairley, was tried on two counts of distribution of cocaine in violation of LSA-R.S. 40:967(A). A jury convicted him on only one count, and the trial court imposed a sentence of 17 and one-half years. Defendant appeals only his conviction, urging that the statute under which he was convicted is unconstitutionally vague and insufficient evidence to convict, and protesting the trial court's ruling on challenges to five jurors. Finding merit to defendant's claim relating to one requested jury challenge, we reverse defendant's conviction and remand for a new trial.
FACTS
In July of 1992, defendant worked with an undercover agent at Hunt Lumber Company in Castor, Louisiana, in Bienville Parish. The two worked side by side and engaged in conversations regarding the purchase of crack and "rock prostitutes." Defendant volunteered that he knew where to get crack and indicated that if the undercover agent would follow him that he would sell rock cocaine to the undercover agent. At work, on July 30, 1992, the undercover agent gave defendant $80 for the purchase of crack cocaine. Later that evening, defendant delivered four off-white rocks, appearing to be crack cocaine, to the undercover agent. The undercover agent then transferred these substances to officials of the Bienville Parish Sheriffs Office. On August 7, 1992, once again at work, defendant informed the undercover agent that "the man with the dope had arrived" and inquired of the undercover agent how much he wanted to buy. The undercover agent informed that he desired $100 worth. Defendant then left the table where the two were seated, but returned a few minutes later. Defendant went to a water fountain and placed something from his pocket into a cone cup. Defendant then approached the undercover agent and asked for the money. Afterwards, he informed the undercover agent that the crack cocaine was in the cone cup. The undercover agent secured the cup and the cocaine. The substance was once again given to a representative of the Bienville Parish Sheriffs Office. Laboratory analysis confirmed the presence of cocaine. Defendant was charged with two counts of |2distribution of cocaine in violation of LSA-R.S. 40:967(A) and was convicted by jury on only one of those two counts. He appeals his conviction.
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff originally asserted nine assignments of error. Only five are briefed. Accordingly, the remainder are considered abandoned. State v. Schwartz, 354 So.2d 1332 (La.1978); State v. Kotwitz, 549 So.2d 351 (La.App.2d Cir.1989), writ denied, 558 So.2d 1123 (La.1990); URCA Rule 2-12.4.
Assignment of Error No. 1
SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE
Although we remand this matter to the trial court for a new trial, it is appropri ate that we first address defendant's sufficiency of evidence claim. State v. Hearold, 603 So.2d 731 (La.1992). In Assignment of Error No. 1, defendant asserts that the totality of the evidence, when considered in the light most favorable to the state, does not support a conviction of any responsive verdict under LSA-R.S. 40:961(9) and LSA-R.S. 40:961(13).
After viewing the evidence presented in the light most favorable to the state, we find that there was sufficient evidence to support defendant's conviction for distribution of cocaine. The crime of distribution is the knowing and intentional distribution of a controlled dangerous substance. State v. Seay, 521 So .2d 1206 (La.App.2d Cir.1988). The testimony of a single undercover agent is sufficient to convict a defendant charged with drug distribution. State v. Daniels, 607 So.2d 620 (La.App.2d Cir.1992). In this case, the testimony and evidence amply supports defendant's conviction on one count of distribution of cocaine. Defendant's argument lacks merit.
Assignment of Error No. 7
CHALLENGE OF JURORS WALKER AND MYERS
In this assignment of error, defendant asserts that the district court erred, as a matter of law, in failing to excuse three jurors. Because we find merit to this assignment of error as it relates to juror Walker, we address it first, along with juror Johnny Myers, and omit discussion relevant to juror Roger Blewer.
|3 A defendant who has used all of his peremptory challenges is entitled to complain of any alleged error in denying challenges for cause. State v. Heard, 408 So.2d 1247 (La.1982). The trial judge is vested with broad discretion in ruling on a challenge for cause and his ruling will not be disturbed on appeal absent a showing of abuse of discretion or a clear showing of error. State v. Sugar, 408 So.2d 1329 (La.1982). If a prospective juror is able, after examination by defense counsel, to declare to the court's reasonable satisfaction that they are able to render an impartial verdict according to the law and the evidence, it would be the trial court's duty to deny a challenge for cause. State v. Claiborne, 397 So.2d 486 (La.1981). The law is clear that a relationship between the prospective juror and the participants is not necessarily a disqualifying fact. The existence of a relationship, even one of blood or marriage, is not sufficient to disqualify a juror unless it is shown that the relationship is sufficient to preclude the juror from arriving at a fair verdict. State v. Peterson, 446 So.2d 815 (La.App.2d Cir.1984). The law does not require that a jury be composed of individuals who are totally unacquainted with the defendant, the prosecuting witness, the prosecuting attorney, and the witnesses who may testify at trial. It requires that jurors be fair and unbiased. State v. Shelton, 377 So.2d 96 (La.1979). A prospective juror's statement that he will be fair and impartial is not binding on the trial court. If the revealed details of the relationship are such that bias or prejudice may be reasonably implied, a juror may be properly refused for cause. State v. Lewis, 391 So.2d 1156 (La. 1980).
Defendant argues error in the failure to grant his challenge for cause relating to this prospective juror in light of her acquaintance and relationship with assistant district attorney Fallin. Walker said that she worked for assistant district attorney Fallin for several years, as his babysitter. Upon questioning by the court, she revealed that she works for Fallin four days a week and sees him each morning. She also stated that she knew assistant district attorney Fallin's secretary. Upon further inquiry, she agreed to follow the law as instructed, which included an instruction that she could not hold it |4against the defendant if he decided not to testify. The court determined that juror Walker understood the legal principles and denied the defendant's challenge for cause.
Although Ms. Walker indicated that she would follow the law as instructed, certain facts are apparent or implied from her relationship with the assistant district attorney. She works in his home practically every day and at least a significant portion of her livelihood depends upon Fallin. Her job allows her to be a part of the everyday activities of the Fallin family due to the nature of her employment which involves a very personal part of the prosecutor's life. Because of the extensive contact that the babysitter has with a family and the amount of time that she has been in the service of assistant district attorney Fallin, it is not unreasonable to conclude that juror Walker is very close to the Fallin family, much like a relative.
In State v. Lewis, supra, the Louisiana Supreme Court reversed a conviction and remanded after finding that a challenge for cause should have been sustained against a prospective juror who had worked for the district attorney's office and had later applied for a job there after graduating from law school. There, the court, citing State v. Monroe, 366 So.2d 1345 (La.1978), noted that "a prospective juror's statement that he will be fair and impartial is not binding on the trial court. If the revealed details of the relationship are such that bias or prejudice may be reasonably implied, a juror may be properly refused for cause."
In State v. Monroe, supra, the Louisiana Supreme Court also reversed a conviction finding that it was reasonable to conclude that a prospective juror who, at the time of trial, was employed as an assistant district attorney assigned to the Career Criminal Bureau, although in the same office as the assistant district attorneys who were trying the case, would influence the jury in arriving at a verdict. The prospective juror knew nothing about the case and testified that he would be fair and impartial.
We find this ease closely analogous to the cases mentioned above. Although Ms. Walker stated that she could be fair and impartial, we believe that the relationship as it exists between the prosecuting attorney and his babysitter including the nature of |5the employment is such that it is reasonable to conclude that this relationship would influence the juror in arriving at a verdict.
Moreover, although we reverse based upon the denial of the requested challenge for cause of prospective juror Walker, we in addition note concern as to the denial of the challenge for cause relating to prospective juror Myers. He stated that he was first cousin to assistant district attorney Myers, who was assisting in this prosecution, and that he was utilizing the services of assistant district attorney Fallin's law firm on another matter. Although very little of the nature of the relationship between the cousins was elicited during further questioning, and although juror Myers, like juror Walker, stated that he could be fair and impartial, such a relationship between the prospective juror and the assistant district attorney raises a serious question as to the propriety of Myers' service on this jury. State v. Lewis, supra; State v. Monroe, supra.
Assignment of Error No. 9
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATUTE
Because we remand this matter to the trial court for a new trial, it is appropriate that we address defendant's constitutional claims relating to the statute under which he was charged. In Assignment of Error No. 9, defendant asserts that the law under which he was convicted is so vague and all inclusive that it is unconstitutional under both state and federal law.
Defendant's argument is grounded in the proposition that the definition of "distribute" contained in LSA-R.S. 40:961(13) outlaws only deliveries made "pursuant to the lawful order of a practitioner." To read the statute otherwise, he argues, renders its provisions unconstitutionally vague. Specifically, that provision reads as follows:
"Distribute" means to deliver a controlled dangerous substance whether by physical delivery, administering, subterfuge, furnishing a prescription, or by filling, packaging, labeling or compounding the substance pursuant to the lawful order of a practitioner....
LSA-R.S. 40:961(9) defines deliver and states:
|6"Deliver" or "delivery" means the transfer of a controlled dangerous substance whether or not there exists an agency relationship.
Defendant argues that the phrase "pursuant to the lawful order of a practitioner" modifies every type of activity listed in the definition of distribution, and therefore that proof that a defendant acted pursuant to such an order is an element of the crime of distribution. Because there has been no proof in this case that any of defendant's actions were conducted pursuant to a lawful order of a practitioner, defendant asserts that his conviction is in error. His argument further suggests that to read the definition of "distribute" without the above modification, in effect, makes any delivery illegal under the definition of distribution. Therefore, any lab technician, clerk of court, district attorney, or sheriffs deputy would be guilty of the crime of distribution when any transfer of cocaine was made. He suggests that this does not occur for two reasons. Either the district attorney is allowed under this statute to decide who the "bad" distributors are, or they are not guilty because they do not conduct the transfer "pursuant to a lawful order of a practitioner." Therefore he urges that the logical conclusion to be reached is that the phrase "pursuant to a lawful order of a practitioner" modifies all activity listed under the statute. To read the statute without this modification, he argues, fails to put a person of ordinary intelligence on reasonable notice that he is committing criminal activity in violation of both the state and federal constitutions.
Courts should construe statutes to give them the meaning intended by the legislature and to avoid absurd results. Lopez v. City of Shreveport, 449 So.2d 1184 (La.App.2d Cir. 1984), writ denied, 452 So.2d 175 (La.1984), reconsideration not considered, 456 So.2d 161 (La.1984). In this case, we find that a clear reading of the statute shows that the phrase "pursuant to a lawful order of a practitioner" modifies only those activities following the first use of the word "or" in the definition of distribute. The use of "or" demonstrates an intent on the part of the legislature to separate the types of activity. This conclusion is further supported when viewed in |7light of the type of examples listed in the second phrase of the statute which are clearly linked to activities associated with the use of a prescription (i.e., filling, packaging, labeling or compounding). Accordingly, defendant's argument lacks merit.
Further, we do not find merit in defendant's assertions that if the statute is read without the above modification, it becomes unconstitutionally vague, failing to place an individual on notice as to what constitutes criminal activity. It has been held that the definitions of both "distribute" and "deliver" are not unconstitutionally vague. State v. Martin, 310 So.2d 544 (La.1975); State v. Brown, 288 So.2d 339 (La.1974). Therefore, this argument likewise lacks merit.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, we reverse defendant's conviction and remand this matter to the trial court for a new trial. We find no merit to defendant's claim of insufficiency of the evidence nor the unconstitutionality of LSA-R.S. 40:961(9) and (13). Because we reverse defendant's conviction, it is unnecessary that we address defendant's remaining assignments of error relating to jury challenges.
CONVICTION REVERSED; REMANDED FOR NEW TRIAL.
Before SEXTON, NORRIS, VICTORY and WILLIAMS, JJ., and LOWE, J. Pro Tem.