Case Name: Rochelle PEGUENO, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1956-02-08
Citations: 85 So. 2d 600
Docket Number: 
Parties: Rochelle PEGUENO, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: DREW, C. J-, and TERRELL, SE-BRING, HOBSON and THORNAL, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 85
Pages: 600–605

Head Matter:
Rochelle PEGUENO, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Supreme Court of Florida. En Banc.
Feb. 8, 1956.
Rehearing Denied March 14, 1956.
Branch & Goff, Tampa, for appellant.
Richard W. Ervin, Atty. Gen,, and Bart L. Cohen, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

Opinion:
ROBERTS, Justice.
In this appeal from a judgment of conviction in a criminal case, the controlling question is whether the evidence introduced by the State in support of its charge was obtained by an unlawful search and seizure. The arresting officer who made the search was armed with a'search warrant; but for reasons not necessary here to relate the case must be decided as though the appellant was arrested and a search made of his premises without a warrant. If the arrest was lawful, then the search was lawful under the well-settled rule that a search may be made as an incident to a lawful arrest. Brown v. State, Fla. 1950, 46 So.2d 479, and cases there cited. And, in our opinion, the circumstances here were such as to justify the officer in arresting the appellant without a warrant.
The appellant was charged with a violation of Section 562.32, Fla.Stat.1953, F.S.A., which denounces the "removing, depositing or concealing" of untax-paid liquor. It is settled that "moonshine" whiskey is within the- terms of the Act. State v. Ellis, Fla.1955, 78 So.2d 729. The arresting officer was a supervisor of the State Beverage Department. He had been advised by an agent of the Federal Alcoholic Tax Unit that1 a moonshine still was in operation on the premises occupied by the appellant. He went to the premises with his informant and smelled the odor of fermenting mash. He testified that he had had experience in arresting defendants in the moonshine business; that fermenting mash has a distinct odor; that "there is nothing else in the world I have ever encountered that smells like it." It seems to us that he was well qualified as an expert in this field and that the trial judge (who tried the case without a jury) had every right to believe his testimony in this respect. He said that after he got up to the house, the defendant came out on the porch; that he told the de fendant he was an agent of the State Beverage Department and wanted to search the premises; that the defendant said, "Help yourself. Go right ahead;" that he asked the defendant how many barrels he had, and the defendant said he had "right at 100 barrels"; that after the defendant admitted he had a still, he arrested him, and that he then made a search of the premises, finding the evidence which is here claimed to have been illegally obtained.
We think that, in all of these circumstances, the arresting officer had "reasonable ground to believe that a felony has been or is being committed and reasonable ground to believe that the person to be arrested has committed or is committing it", Section 901.15(3), Fla.Stat.1953, F.S.A., so as to justify his arrest of defendant without a warrant. And since the arrest without a warrant was lawful, it follows that the search made incidental thereto was of the same character, even though the search warrant could not be relied upon at the trial in support of the search. Brown v. State, supra, 46 So.2d 479. As stated in Melton v. State, Fla., 75 So.2d 291, 295:
"The fact that at the time of such arrest the arresting officer may have in his hands an invalid search warrant will not vitiate a search made under such conditions, for the search will have been made under lawful circumstances authorizing a search as incidental to a lawful arrest without warrant, and his possession of the invalid search warrant will be without legal significance."
We are cognizant of the fact that this court has held that the odor of whiskey emanating from a truck is not sufficient to constitute probable cause that the truck is engaged in the transportation of untax-paid liquor, Byrd v. State, Fla., 80 So.2d 694, 698. But in that opinion the court, speaking through Mr. Justice Hobson on petition for rehearing, pointed out that there is a distinction between "the sufficiency as probable cause of odors of whiskey in relation to the crime of possession of untax-paid liquor, and the odor of whiskey mash in relation to the manufacture of liquor or the fermentation of mash for distillation or production of alcohol in a dwelling house", quoting United States v. Seiler, D.C.Md., 40 F.Supp. 895, 896. As shown by the Seiler case, the rule in the latter situation is that "the odor of the whiskey mash emanating from a dwelling house, detected by experienced revenue officers, was in itself probable cause for a reasonable belief that the statutes were being violated." While the Seiler case was concerned with the sufficiency of such evidence to constitute probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant, we think it also justifies a reasonable belief that the statute is being violated somewhere on the premises — although this fact alone might not justify the arrest of any person found on the premises. Cf. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 68 S.Ct. 367, 92 L.Ed. 436. But where the occupant of the premises freely admits that he is the possessor of the still from which such odors are emanating, we think the officer would be derelict in his duty if he did not arrest the offender, then and there, even though he has no warrant of arrest; and that, as an incident to such arrest, he may lawfully search the premises, without a warrant, for the contraband whiskey.
For the reasons stated, the judgment appealed from should be and it is hereby
Affirmed.
DREW, C. J-, and TERRELL, SE-BRING, HOBSON and THORNAL, JJ., concur.
THOMAS, J., dissents.