Case Name: The People of the State of New York, Appellant-Respondent, v. William Cona et al., Respondents, and Raymond Melnick et al., Appellants
Court: New York Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1979-12-13
Citations: 49 N.Y.2d 26
Docket Number: 
Parties: The People of the State of New York, Appellant-Respondent, v William Cona et al., Respondents, and Raymond Melnick et al., Appellants.
Judges: 
Reporter: New York Reports
Volume: 49
Pages: 26–47

Head Matter:
The People of the State of New York, Appellant-Respondent, v William Cona et al., Respondents, and Raymond Melnick et al., Appellants.
Argued September 4,1979;
decided December 13, 1979
POINTS OF COUNSEL
Eugene Gold, District Attorney (Richard C. Laskey of counsel), for the People of the State of New York, appellant.
I. The determination by the court below that the issue of whether or not Buchalski was an accomplice after January 10, 1972, was preserved as a question of law, is reversible error. (People v Belge, 41 NY2d 60; People v Williams, 31 NY2d 151; People v Mackell, 40 NY2d 59; People v Vidal, 26 NY2d 249; People v Gates, 24 NY2d 666; People v Morhouse, 21 NY2d 66; People v Watson, 57 AD2d 143.) II. The guilt of each respondent was proved by legally sufficient evidence. (People v Baker, 46 AD2d 377; People v Fielding; 39 NY2d 607; People v Swift, 161 Misc 851, 251 App Div 808, 277 NY 618; People v La Magna, 37 AD2d 598; People v Basch, 36 NY2d 154; People v Clougher, 246 NY 106; People v De Masco, 240 NY 170; People v Brooks, 34 NY2d 475; People v Beaudet, 32 NY2d 371.)
William Sonenshine and Joseph Fallek for Raymond Mel-nick and others, appellants.
I. The proof offered upon the trial was not sufficient in law to meet the required statutory standard of corroboration of the accomplice testimony. (People v Dixon, 231 NY 111; People v Sabella, 35 NY2d 158; People v Daniels, 37 NY2d 624; People v Wheatman, 31 NY2d 12; People v Wasserman, 46 AD2d 915; People v O'Farrell, 175 NY 323; People v Kohut, 30 NY2d 183; People v Gioia, 286 App Div 528; People v Diaz, 19 NY2d 547.) II. The court’s two- day charge was too long, confusing, incorrect and unfair. (People v Carroll, 37 AD2d 1015; People v Tisdale, 18 AD2d 274; People v Kresel, 243 App Div 137; People v Miles, 48 AD2d 706; People v Clayborn, 50 AD2d 952; Bruton v United States, 391 US 123; Jackson v Denno, 378 US 368; Frazier v Cupp, 394 US 731; Matter of Kelly v Murphy, 20 NY2d 205; People v Court, 52 AD2d 891.) III. The trial court’s allowing evidence of uncharged crimes deprived appellants Fortuna and Bergold of a fair trial. (People v Rivera, 26 NY2d 304; People v Bennett, 35 AD2d 944, 29 NY2d 462; People v Sher, 24 NY2d 454; People v McKinney, 24 NY2d 180.)
William Sonenshine and Joseph Fallek for Richard White, appellant.
I. The proof offered upon the trial was not sufficient in law to meet the required statutory standard of corroboration of the accomplice testimony. (People v Dixon, 231 NY 111; People v Sabella, 35 NY2d 158; People v Daniels, 37 NY2d 624; People v Wheatman, 31 NY2d 12; People v Wasserman, 46 AD2d 915; People v O'Farrell, 175 NY 323.) II. Appellant White was improperly convicted of the various crimes herein solely upon the basis of tape-recorded conversations without any additional proof that the offenses charged were committed. (People v Jennings, 40 AD2d 357; People v Epton, 19 NY2d 496; People v Silverman, 281 NY 457; People v Fitzgerald, 288 NY 58; People v Phelps, 13 AD2d 675; People v Insogna, 28 AD2d 771.)
Stanley M. Meyer for William Cona and another, respondents.
I. The court below did not exceed its power in holding that the evidence at trial was insufficient. (People v Wagner, 71 App Div 399; People v Atwater, 191 App Div 345, 229 NY 303.) II. The extraordinary length of the court’s charge with respect to marshaling the evidence deprived respondents, Cona and Auletta, of a fair trial. (People v Ramsey, 40 AD2d 837; People v Jackson, 39 AD2d 557; People v Kresel, 243 App Div 137; Bruton v United States, 391 US 123.) III. The evidence against respondents, Cona and Auletta, was insufficient to sustain their conviction. The court below correctly reached that conclusion. (People v Dixon, 231 NY 111; People v Wasserman, 46 AD2d 915; People v O'Farrell, 175 NY 323; People v Ruberto, 10 NY2d 428, 371 US 842; People v Watford, 19 AD2d 731; People v Wheatman, 31 NY2d 12; People v Fiore, 12 NY2d 188; People v Nitzberg, 287 NY 183, 754; People v Dingle, 70 Misc 2d 840.) IV. The sentences were excessive.
William Sonenshine and Joseph Fallek for Melvin Brown and others, respondents.
I. The court below acted within its statutory powers in determining that the sufficiency of the trial evidence presented an issue of law. (People v Wagner, 71 App Div 399; People v Atwater, 191 App Div 345, 229 NY 303.) II. The court below correctly decided that the trial evidence was insufficient in law to sustain the convictions of respondents. (People v Dixon, 231 NY 111; People v Sabella, 35 NY2d 158; People v Daniels, 37 NY2d 624; People v Wheatman, 31 NY2d 12; People v Wasserman, 46 AD2d 915; People v O’Farrell, 175 NY 323; Bruton v United States, 391 US 123; People v De Lucia, 20 NY2d 275.) III. There was no nonaccomplice proof tending to connect respondents Zummo or Mattina to the crimes charged; and the court improperly failed to instruct the jury that O’Brien, whose testimony was the only purported corroboration offered against these respondents, was an accomplice as a matter of law. (People v Beaudet, 32 NY2d 371; People v Jenner, 29 NY2d 695; People v Di Sessa, 42 AD2d 952; United States v Sansone, 231 F2d 887, 351 US 987; People v Ozarowski, 38 NY2d 481; United States v Torres, 503 F2d 1120; People v Sabella, 35 NY2d 158; People v O’Farrell, 175 NY 323.) IV. The court’s two-day charge was unduly lengthy, confusing, incorrect and unfair. (People v Carroll, 37 AD2d 1015; People v Tisdale, 18 AD2d 274; People v Kresel, 243 App Div 137; People v Miles, 48 AD2d 706; People V Clayborn, 50 AD2d 952; Bruton v United States, 391 US 123; Jackson v Denno, 378 US 368; Frazier v Cupp, 394 US 731; Matter of Kelly v Murphy, 20 NY2d 205; People v Court, 52 AD2d 891.)
Eugene Gold, District Attorney (Richard C. Laskey of counsel), for the People of the State of New York, respondent.
I. The issue of whether or not corroboration was required for Buchalski’s testimony concerning events which occurred after he became an undercover agent has not been preserved for review by this court. (People v Lagana, 36 NY2d 71; People v Vidal, 26 NY2d 249; People v Gates, 24 NY2d 666; People v Daniels, 37 NY2d 624; People v Morhouse, 21 NY2d 66; People v Watson, 57 AD2d 143, 45 NY2d 867; People v Spiegel, 60 AD2d 210.) II. CPL 60.22 does not require that Buchalski’s testimony concerning events occurring after January 10, 1972 be corroborated. (People v Pomerantz, 46 NY2d 240; People v Brooks, 34 NY2d 475; People v Swift, 161 Misc 851, 251 App Div 808, 277 NY 618; People v Beaudet, 32 NY2d 371; United States v Becker, 62 F2d 1007; United States v Brown, 454 F2d 397; People v Roth, 30 NY2d 99; People v Lulinski, 41 AD2d 940; People v Savvides, 1 NY2d 554.) III. The guilt of each appellant was supported by corroborative evidence sufficient to satisfy the requirements of CPL 60.22 (subd 1). (People v Daniels, 37 NY2d 624; People v Kress, 284 NY 452; People v Dixon, 231 NY 111; People v Morhouse, 21 NY2d 66; People v Harris, 52 AD2d 672; People v Duffy, 160 App Div 385, 212 NY 57; People v Kirkpatrick, 32 NY2d 17; People v Corbisiero, 290 NY 191; People v Farina, 290 NY 272; Cramton v Ohio, 402 US 183.) IV. Appellants received a fair trial. (Capriola v United States, 61 F2d 5; Lutwak v United States, 344 US 604; People v Kresel, 243 App Div 137; People v Bell, 45 AD2d 362, 38 NY2d 116; People v Ozarowski, 38 NY2d 481; People v Baker, 46 AD2d 377; People v Fielding, 39 NY2d 607; People v Swift, 161 Misc 851, 251 App Div 808, 277 NY 618; People v La Magna, 37 AD2d 598; People v De Masco, 240 NY 170.)
John F. Keenan, Deputy Attorney-General as Special State Prosecutor (Thomas A. Duffy, Jr., and Mark M. Baker of counsel), amicus curiae.
I. The right to contest, on the law, whether a particular witness should have been charged to the jury as an accomplice, and thereafter, by necessity, whether his testimony was sufficiently corroborated, must be preserved by a specific exception and cannot be raised in and of itself, in the absence of any litigated controversy on the question, as part of a general challenge to the sufficiency of the trial evidence. (People v Daniels, 37 NY2d 624; People v Robinson, 36 NY2d 224; People v Weis, 32 AD2d 856, 397 US 1047; People v Watson, 57 AD2d 143; People v Spiegel, 60 AD2d 210; People v Nixon, 248 NY 182; People v Thomas, 36 NY2d 514; Martin v City of Cohoes, 37 NY2d 162; People v Mayhew, 150 NY 346; People v Blank, 283 NY 526; People v Johnson, 46 AD2d 55.) II. Independent evidence gathered by a former coconspirator after that point at which he is "turned” is not evidence of- an accomplice but that of a valid police agent acting in an official role. Such is even more so the case in regard to taped admissions of former cohorts which are later procured and which relate to events occurring after the informant had been so turned. (People v Jackson, 69 Misc 2d 793; People v Swift, 161 Misc 851, 251 App Div 808, 277 NY 618; People v Rastelli, 37 NY2d 240, 423 US 995; United States v Sansone, 231 F2d 887, 351 US 987; People v Goldfeld, 60 AD2d 1.)

Opinion:
OPINION OF THE COURT
Gabrielli, J.
This case requires us to determine whether the testimony of an admitted accomplice may artificially be divided into testimony concerning events which occurred before the witness became an accomplice and testimony about incidents which took place after the witness became an accomplice, so that the prior testimony can serve as corroboration for the latter testimony. The accomplice corroboration rule cannot be so readily evaded, for an accomplice simply cannot corroborate his own testimony. Any other result would serve only to eviscerate the accomplice corroboration requirement imposed by CPL 60.22 (subd 1).
The prosecutions involved in this appeal are based on a scheme devised by several New York City police officers to obtain funds from gamblers in return for a guarantee that the operations of those gamblers would not be curtailed by police interference. Following an extensive jury trial, each defendant involved in this appeal was convicted of one count of bribe receiving, one count of receiving a reward for official misconduct, two counts of conspiracy, and one count of official misconduct. On an appeal by the convicted defendants, the Appellate Division affirmed the convictions of defendants Mel-nick, White, Bergold and Fortuna. The convictions of defendants Reitano, Maroney, Brown, Conti, Carter, Cona, Auletta, Zummo, Mattina, Callis and Greene, however, were reversed by the Appellate Division on the ground that the evidence of those defendants' guilt was comprised solely of uncorroborated accomplice testimony. For the reasons discussed below, we conclude that the order of the Appellate Division should be modified by reinstating the convictions of defendants Reitano, Maroney, Brown, Conti, Carter, Cona and Auletta, and otherwise affirmed.
The convictions of defendants Reitano, Maroney, Brown, Conti, Carter, Cona and Auletta were based on the uncorroborated testimony of Police Officer Buchalski, originally a conceded member of the conspiracy who eventually became a police agent. The Appellate Division concluded that these convictions could not stand due to the absence of corroboration other than Buchalski's own testimony. Due to our limited powers of review we may not reach this issue. To create and preserve a question of law amenable to appellate review, a defendant in a criminal case normally must raise that issue before the court of original jurisdiction (CPL 470.05, subd 2; compare People v Michael, 48 NY2d 1, with People v Robinson, 36 NY2d 224). In the instant case, no objection was made to that portion of the court's charge which dealt with the application of the accomplice corroboration rule to Buchalski's testimony concerning these defendants; hence, under settled rules of law and statutory construction, these defendants failed to preserve a question of law as to the correctness of that portion of the charge.
Unlike the Court of Appeals, the Appellate Division as an intermediate court of review has broad power to review questions of fact and discretion as well as questions of law (see CPL 470.15, 470.30). Hence, the Appellate Division, if it deems it appropriate, may exercise its discretionary power to review alleged errors even in the absence of that timely objection which is necessary to create a question of law. Where the Appellate Division exercises this discretion, however, and reverses a conviction on the basis of an issue not preserved, its order is then grounded at least in part upon the exercise of that discretion and is thus not appealable to this court (see People v Johnson, 47 NY2d 124; People v Williams, 31 NY2d 151).
In the instant case, the Appellate Division reviewed defendants' claim of error with respect to the accomplice corroboration charge given concerning Buchalski's testimony, despite the defendants' failure to timely object to that portion of the charge. Had the Appellate Division's decision to review this claim been based on an exercise of discretion, we would have been compelled to dismiss the appeal insofar as it pertains to the Appellate Division reversal of the convictions of these defendants. As it is, however, the Appellate Division erroneously concluded as a matter of law that a question of law was preserved with respect to the corroboration of Buchalski's testimony despite defendants' failure to object. Hence, the Appellate Division order was actually based on a determination of law, albeit an erroneous one, and is thus not subject to dismissal. Our power to review, however, is limited to that question of law, and after concluding that the Appellate Division erred in determining that a question of law was presented, our review must stop at that point and we must remit the matter to the Appellate Division for that court to determine whether it would be appropriate to exercise its broader review power.
A different situation exists, however, with respect to defendants Zummo and Mattina. Their convictions were based upon the uncorroborated testimony of Police Officer O'Brien. O'Brien's initial contacts with this criminal enterprise arose in the course of his activities as an undercover police agent assigned to investigate possible police corruption. Had he remained faithful to his duty, there would of course be no need to corroborate his testimony. This is so because an undercover police agent is simply not an accomplice, due to the absence of any criminal intent. As it is, however, O'Brien eventually succumbed to temptation, eschewed his obligations as an undercover agent, and became an active and actual member of the conspiracy. Although the trial court charged the jury that O'Brien was an accomplice as a matter of law after this conversion and that his testimony concerning incidents which occurred while he was an accomplice must be corroborated, the court refused to charge that O'Brien's testimony about prior events was also subject to the corroboration requirement. By timely requesting such a charge, these defendants created a question of law amenable to appellate review; hence the determination of the Appellate Division as to these defendants was made on the law alone and is subject to our review. For the reasons discussed below, we conclude that the Appellate Division correctly set aside the convictions of defendants Zummo and Mattina.
An accomplice is "a witness in a criminal action who, according to evidence adduced in such action, may reasonably be considered to have participated in: (a) The offense charged; or (b) An offense based upon the same or some of the same facts or conduct which constitute the offense charged" (CPL 60.22, subd 2). The prosecutions underlying this appeal were premised upon the defendants' participation in an ongoing criminal enterprise pursuant to which police officers solicited bribes from gamblers on a regular basis in return for "protection" from police interference with the gamblers' operations. It is conceded that O'Brien fully participated in this scheme for a considerable period of time following his abandonment of his duties as an undercover agent. Hence, at the very least, he necessarily participated in "[a]n offense based upon the same or some of the same facts or conduct which constitute the offense charged". Having reached this conclusion, we must hold that, in accord with the plain language of the law, the defendants could not be convicted on the basis of O'Brien's uncorroborated testimony. There exists no justification for distinguishing between testimony pertaining to different periods of time as a basis for application of the accomplice corroboration rule. The effect of a contrary decision would be to make it possible to avoid the accomplice corroboration rule in any situation in which an admitted accomplice did not participate in all of the crimes for which the defendants are tried. In such a case, the testimony of the accomplice concerning incidents which he observed but in which he did not participate, under the approach urged by the People, would not be subject to the corroboration requirement and could indeed serve as corroboration for the witness' other testimony. So viewed, the result in such a case would be that which the accomplice rule was specifically designed to avoid: "conviction [based] solely upon the testimony of persons who are in some way criminally implicated in the general conduct or factual transaction on trial" (Denzer, Practice Commentary, McKinney's Cons Laws of NY, Book 11A, CPL 60.22, pp 194-195).
The accomplice corroboration rule is premised upon a legislative determination that the testimony, of individuals who may themselves be criminally liable is inherently suspect. This is deemed to be true because such individuals may be subject to pressures impelling them to color testimony in order to protect themselves by belittling the actual extent of their involvement in the criminal enterprise at the expense of others. In a similar vein, a person who agrees to turn State's evidence may believe it to be in his best interests to embellish the truth when testifying about the defendants in order to secure the approval of officials who have the authority to prosecute the accomplice should they not be satisfied with his cooperation. In short, the accomplice corroboration rule entails a legislative recognition that, as a result of these various pressures, both real and imagined, to which an informant may be subject, such testimony is somewhat suspect. At the same time, such testimony is often a necessary predicate for successful criminal prosecutions. Whatever the wisdom of the solution the Legislature has developed in order to resolve this dilemma, the rule is plain and must be properly applied by the courts.
The dissenting opinion is impliedly premised on the perception that a person who is subject to criminal liability for some but not all of the crimes committed in the course of an ongoing criminal enterprise will be less inclined to color the truth in testifying about those incidents for which he cannot be liable. This view is unrealistic in the extreme, for the desire of the witness to diminish his own potential criminal liability and to please the prosecutor will inevitably affect his entire testimony, since it is the result of the entire prosecution which will be of concern to the informant. More importantly, even if the dissenters' premise were true, it would be irrelevant. The basis for the accomplice corroboration rule, quite simply, is mistrust of an informant's testimony about matters relevant to his potential criminal liability. Thus, the rule requires corroboration from some source other than the informant himself, in order to support a conviction based upon the informant's testimony. The fact that part of an informant's testimony may not be concerned with matters for which he himself is criminally liable in no way militates against the suspect nature of his testimony taken as a whole. The type of bootstrapping which the dissent would endorse in this case is in clear conflict with the purpose and intent of the accomplice corroboration rule, since it would result in convictions based solely upon the testimony of an accomplice. Any change in this rule should come from the Legislature, not the courts.
In conclusion, we note that our decision today warrants none of the spectres of "shackling the forces of law enforce ment" or "depriving] law enforcement of a vital and necessary investigative technique" envisaged by the dissenters. The "use of the turncoat conspirator" will continue to be fully available. We require only that the evidence thereby produced be supported by corroborative evidence tending to connect the defendant with the commission of the crime. It should be emphasized, moreover, that the accomplice corroboration rule obviously is not applicable to the testimony of all or even most undercover police agents; corroboration is necessary only with respect to the testimony of those prosecution witnesses who actually were accomplices. This is not a crippling requirement and serves to assure the reliability of evidence furnished by. a witness who must be perceived as possibly laboring under considerable inducements to favor the prosecution.
Turning to the remaining issues raised on this appeal, we find that the convictions of defendants Melnick, White, Bergold and Fortuna were properly affirmed by the Appellate Division, for the reasons stated in the majority opinion at the Appellate Division. As to defendants Callis and Greene, we agree with the Appellate Division that there is insufficient evidence in the record to corroborate the accomplice testimony implicating those defendants. We find the other contentions raised by defendants to be without merit.
Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should be modified by reinstating the convictions of defendants Reitano, Maroney, Brown, Conti, Carter, Cona and Auletta and the case as to those defendants should be remitted to the Appellate Division for that court to determine whether to exercise its discretionary power to review defendants' accomplice corroboration claim in the absence of any timely objection, and, as so modified, should be affirmed.
. Tape recordings of various conversations allegedly entered into between Buchalski and these defendants were also admitted into evidence. Since the only evidence showing that the voices on the tapes were those of these defendants, however, was the uncorroborated testimony of Buchalski, the tapes may not serve as corroboration of Buchalski's other testimony. This is to be contrasted to the situation of defendants White and Melnick, who admitted that the voices on the tapes were theirs. By so. stating, they themselves supplied the necessary corroboration.
. It has been suggested that this issue was preserved for appellate review because of a motion to dismiss for insufficient evidence. Our examination of the record, however, persuades us that this motion, although formally made on behalf of all defendants, was not specifically directed at the failure to require corroboration for Buchalski's testimony about these defendants. Conspicuous by its absence is any suggestion that the People's proof as to these seven defendants was insufficient due to the failure to corroborate Buchalski's testimony. Indeed, in furtherance of a legal argument not relevant to this appeal, the defendants argued strenuously that Buchalski should not be considered an accomplice after he agreed to serve as a police agent. At any rate, the failure to specify the lack of corroboration for Buchalski's testimony as a basis for the motion to dismiss the case against these seven defendants precludes later use of that motion as a vehicle for creating a question of law on this point (see People v Spiegel, 48 NY2d 647, 648).
. We note that a timely motion was made to dismiss the charges against these defendants due to the lack of corroboration for the accomplice testimony upon which the case against them was based.