Case Name: STANDARD CHEMICAL CO. v. ILLINOIS CENT. R. CO. et al.
Court: Louisiana Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1911-10-16
Citations: 130 La. 148
Docket Number: No. 18,551
Parties: STANDARD CHEMICAL CO. v. ILLINOIS CENT. R. CO. et al.
Judges: 
Reporter: Louisiana Reports
Volume: 130
Pages: 147–157

Head Matter:
(57 South. 782.)
No. 18,551.
STANDARD CHEMICAL CO. v. ILLINOIS CENT. R. CO. et al.
(Oct. 16, 1911.
On Rehearing, Feb. 26, 1912.)
(Syllabus by the Court.)
1. Railroads (§ 79*) — Use of Streets — Grants of Rights by City.
A grant by a municipal corporation to a private corporation of a right of way through the public streets is a privilege personal to the grantee, and not disposable, and the privilege cannot create the relation of landlord and tenant between the grantee and one using the right of way without the consent of the grantee. If the rights of the grantee are invaded by another using his right of way, he has an action in tort, but cannot maintain an action for rent because that can arise only from the relationship of landlord and tenant.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Railroads, Dec. Dig. § 79.*]
2. Limitation of Actions (§ 30*) — Prescription — Limitations Applicable — Contract or Tort.
The plea of three years prescription applies only to cases arising from contractual relations, but the plea of one year prescription is the proper one to be applied to this case as the deprivation charged by the plaintiff is tor-' ■tious, and the latter plea is therefore sustained.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Limitation «of Actions, Gent. Dig. § 141; Dec. Dig. § 30.*]
On Rehearing.
:3. PARTIES (§ 27*) — Joinder—Defendants.
The allegation that two persons have committed identically the same tort is sufficient, •upon its face, and in the absence of evidence to the contrary, to convey the idea of co-operation and of such identity of interest- as to warrant their being joined as defendants in an action for the recovery of damages alleged to have '■been sustained as the result of the tort.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Parties, ■Cent. Dig. § 35; Dec. Dig. § 27.*]
■4. Injunction (§ 65*) — Subjects of Relief —Interference with Franchise.
The allegation that defendant has, without plaintiff’s permission, taken possession of rights of way, switch track privileges, switch tracks, and other property pertaining thereto, of which plaintiff is owner, and tortiously, wrongfully, and illegally holds such possession, to the ex-clusion of plaintiff, discloses a cause of action for the issuance of the writ of injunction for the protection of plaintiff’s property rights.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Injunction, Cent. Dig. § 134; Dec. Dig. § 65.*]
•5. Railroads (§ 79*) — Use of Streets — Grant of Rights — Interference—Remedy.
Whilst the grantee of a right of way and ^-switch track privileges on a public street has ordinarily no right of action to recover rent, ;as such, for being tortiously and wrongfully deprived of the enjoyment of such right and privileges, he may be entitled to recover damages, resulting from such deprivation, based upon the rental value of the property, and a petition alleging the tortious dispossession and deprivation and claiming such damages discloses a ■■cause of action for their recovery.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Railroads, Dec. Dig. § 79.*]
«6. Limitation of Actions (§ 32*) — Limitations Applicable — Tort — Action Ex Delicto — Prescription.
An action for damages for the alleged tor■tious, wrongful, and illegal taking and holding possession of a right of way and switch track -and other property connected therewith is an action ex delicto, and the claim for all dam■ages save those which were sustained within the year preceding the service of citation is 'barred by the prescription of one year.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Limitation of Actions, Gent. Dig. §§ 143r-145; Dec. Dig. =§ 32.*]
Appeal from Civil District Court, Parish ¡of Orleans.
Action by the Standard Chemical Company against the Illinois Central Railroad Company and another. From a judgment for defendants, plaintiff appeals.
Reversed and remanded.
Solomon Wolff, for appellant. Gustave Lemle and Hunter C. Leake (Blewett Lee and C. L. Sivley, of counsel), for appellees.

Opinion:
BREAUX, C. J.
Plaintiff sued the defendant to recover $2,500 annually for a period of 15 years on the ground that defendant has taken and usurped a privilege to run through certain streets, which privilege plaintiff claims it owns.
The facts are, as relates to this privilege, that on February 16, 1894, the city of New Orleans granted to the Southern Chemical & Fertilizing Company (the author of plaintiff) the privilege to construct and operate a switch track from Broad street to Hagan avenue, connecting there with the switch track of the Yazoo & Mississippi Yalley Railroad Company.
The Southern Chemical & Fertilizing Company subsequently conveyed the southwestern part of the square, bounded by Clark, Perdido, and Hagan streets, to the city.
On this part of the square granted there were two switches constructed by the Southern Chemical & Fertilizing Company.
In the conveyance the Southern Chemical & Fertilizing Company reserved the use of the switch tracks for a period of 20 years from the 5th day of January, 1898.
Thereafter the Standard Chemical Company, plaintiff in this case, acquired from the Southern Chemical & Fertilizing Company the rights and privileges which the Southern Chemical & Fertilizing Company had acquired from the city of New Orleans (including the roadbed and other property and privileges) located on said lots.
Plaintiff alleged that on the 24th day of October, 1906, the city approved and confirmed the transfer made by the Southern Chemical & Fertilizer Company to the plaintiff, the Standard Chemical Company, and that for adequate consideration the city gave to the plaintiff company the privilege of conducting and operating a switch track over the street before named for a period of 21 years from the 27th day of November, 1906.
Plaintiff's complaint is that the Illinois Central and the Yazoo & Mississippi Valley Railroad Companies have unlawfully taken possession of its right of way and also of the switch track privilege and of other property, and are using this property to their advantage and to the detriment of plaintiff's interest.
Plaintiff charges that these acts are wrong and tortious.
Plaintiff claims rental, and the question presented here is whether plaintiff is or is not entitled to rental.
We do not think that it is entitled to rental.
The questions presented for decision grow out of defendant's exception, which was maintained by the district court, in which defendant alleged misjoinder; no cause of action, and the prescription of one and three years.
First, as to misjoinder:
Plaintiff does not allege that defendants have a common interest of any kind. They are referred to substantially as distinct corporations, owing a common amount for rent.
Although it does not appear that there was a common interest, we will not decide the casé on that ground.- As to the rent itself as claimed, there was misjoinder. In view of the issues as presented together with other' grounds, we will not dispose of the case on the ground of misjoinder, for it is different as to the wrongful and tortious acts alleged. As to these, there was ground sufficient'to join defendants in one suit. All the different grounds lead to one conclusion, that the plaintiff has no cause of action.
We leave this point, and take up the issue raised by the plea of prescription of three years.
There is no ground upon which to maintain that prescription for the reason that there-are no contractual relations between the parties.
We have seen that plaintiff claims rent.
Were we to sustain the plea of rental due, it would be subject to.the three years prescription.
This is not possible, for such is the nature of the ease that no rent can be recovered, and therefore the prescription just mentioned cannot be of any avail to defendant.
This brings us to the consideration of the plea of one year prescription.
Plaintiff'alleged that defendants wrongfully and tortiously continued in using the property of petitoner.
As relates to this improper use, as alleged, the plea of one year prescription bars the claim, if anything be due for any act by defendant of a date one year anterior to the date the suit was brought.
The unlawful deprivation of possession of premises is subject to the prescription of one year.
Prescription runs from the day on which the injury or damage was sustained. Lizardi v. N. O. Canal & Banking Co., 25 La. Ann. 414. The plea of one year's prescription is sustained.
Defendant in the exception sustained by the district court pleaded that plaintiff al-leged no cause of action.
To the extent that the plea of prescription does not bar acts within a year prior to the suit, we will consider this exception.
We have scanned plaintiff's petition, and have not found that plaintiff owns a fee in the soil on which the roadbed is. constructed.
Although plaintiff has a privilege, as we have seen, granted by the city, it has no right to dispose of that claim. It is revo- cable. This revocability shows the restrict•ed condition of the right.
A privilege may be granted that does not grant the right to recover rent.
Plaintiff has a right to remuneration for its expenses, its work, and services as a public service corporation.
That does not give it the right to claim rental.
It has a right to a possessory or a petitory action.
They do not confer the right of collecting for rent on account of the occupancy of the ground over which it claims it had a privilege, and which it never claimed before this suit was brought.
The courts have decided that they will protect a right of way over streets by injunction.
That is not the action here.
If it be entitled to the right claimed, necessary protection will be given to the extent 'to which it is entitled.
Plaintiff has no authority to declare itself .landlord, and claim rent from its asserted tenant.
The streets are for the common use of the public.
The municipality has the right, for certain purposes, to restrict that right in part, to grant a privilege. But it remains, as before stated, subject to certain rights of the .grantor representing the public.
The municipality has it in its power to allow others to pass over the same road.
Plaintiff has not acquired such a right of •ownership as will enable it to stand in judgment in this case.
For reasons stated, it is ordered, adjudged, •and decreed that the judgment appealed from .Is affirmed at appellant's costs.