Case Name: THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. NORMAN J. DOLLY, Defendant and Appellant
Court: Supreme Court of California
Jurisdiction: California
Decision Date: 2007-02-01
Citations: 40 Cal. 4th 458
Docket Number: No. S134505
Parties: THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. NORMAN J. DOLLY, Defendant and Appellant.
Judges: 
Reporter: California Reports
Volume: 40
Pages: 458–482

Head Matter:
[No. S134505.
Feb. 1, 2007.]
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. NORMAN J. DOLLY, Defendant and Appellant.
Counsel
George L. Schraer, under appointment by the Supreme Court, and Sally P. Brajevich, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Assistant Attorney General, Marc J. Nolan, Donald DeNicola, Mary Sanchez and Peggie Bradford Tarwater, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

Opinion:
Opinion
BAXTER, J.
In People v. Wells (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1078 [45 Cal.Rptr.3d 8, 136 P.3d 810] (Wells), we held that an anonymous phone tip reporting a possibly intoxicated driver in a vehicle " 'weaving all over the roadway' " and accurately describing the vehicle and its location was sufficient to justify an investigatory detention, even though police, upon encountering the vehicle, were able to corroborate only the innocent details of the tip. (Id. at p. 1081.) In this case, we consider whether an anonymous 911 tip contemporaneously reporting an assault with a firearm and accurately describing the perpetrator, his vehicle, and its location is likewise sufficient to justify an investigatory detention. We conclude that the Fourth Amendment does not bar the police from taking necessary action to protect public safety in the circumstances of this case. We therefore affirm the Court of Appeal, which upheld the denial of the motion to suppress the loaded revolver found in defendant's vehicle.
Background
Defendant Norman J. Dolly was convicted after a jury trial of being a felon in possession of a firearm and, after a bench trial, was found to have suffered a prior strike conviction within the meaning of the three strikes law. He was sentenced to four years in prison. The court also found defendant had violated probation and sentenced him to a consecutive eight-month term.
In this appeal, defendant challenges the denial of his motion to suppress the firearm and all statements he made concerning the firearm. The evidence at the hearing on the suppression motion revealed the following:
At 3:16 p.m. on April 17, 2002, an unidentified man placed a call to 911. The call was received by the California Highway Patrol and then transferred to the Los Angeles Police Department. The caller reported that a light-skinned African-American male had "just pulled a gun" on him and had mentioned a gang name. The caller said he felt the perpetrator "was gonna shoot me right there at that minute." According to the caller, the perpetrator had a bandage over his left hand, as though it had been broken, and was in the driver's seat of a gray Nissan Maxima parked on the north side of Jefferson Boulevard at Ninth Avenue, near the recycling center. When asked whether he wanted to talk to the police when they arrived, the caller said, "No, no, I don't. I sure don't. Because if they find out I'm snitching, they're going to kill me around here." The call ended at 3:18 p.m.
At 3:20 p.m., the tipster-victim made a second call to 911. Identifying himself as "Drew," he said that he had just driven by the Nissan Maxima again and wanted to correct his description of the vehicle. It was black, not gray.
Around 3:20 p.m., Los Angeles Police Officer Frank Dominguez and his partner, Officer Goldstein, received a radio call about a man with a gun at Jefferson Boulevard and Ninth Avenue. The perpetrator was described as a light-skinned African-American male with a cast on his arm, in a possibly gray Nissan Maxima on the north side of Jefferson, and was said to have threatened the 911 caller with a gun. Two or three minutes later, the officers arrived at the scene and spotted a black Nissan Maxima parked on the north side of Jefferson, just east of Ninth. There were three people in the car. Defendant, who was sitting in the driver's seat, matched the description provided in the radio dispatch. He also had a cast on his left arm.
Officer Dominguez ordered defendant to exit the vehicle and lie down in the street with his hands at his side. He also ordered the two passengers out of the vehicle. Neither of them was wearing a cast. A loaded .38-caliber blue steel revolver was found underneath the front passenger seat. (At trial, Detective Delicia Hernandez testified that defendant, during a postarrest interview, had admitted owning and possessing the revolver.)
Following the hearing, the superior court denied the motion to suppress, finding (1) that defendant's Fourth Amendment rights were not implicated because he was on probation subject to a search condition, and (2) that the officers had reasonable suspicion defendant had committed a firearms offense before effecting the stop.
A divided panel of the Court of Appeal affirmed in an opinion published in part. The panel ruled first that the detention and search could not be justified by the probation search condition "since the responding officers were not aware of [defendant's probation status or condition," citing People v. Hester (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 376, 402-405 [14 Cal.Rptr.3d 377], and People v. Bowers (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 1261, 1270-1271 [13 Cal.Rptr.3d 15]. The Court of Appeal majority found instead that the detention and search were justified by reasonable suspicion that defendant had threatened the anonymous 911 caller with a gun. The dissenting justice, relying on the absence of police corroboration of the criminality alleged in the anonymous tip, would have granted the motion to suppress.
We granted review on the limited issue of whether the anonymous tip was sufficient to justify defendant's detention.
Discussion
An investigatory detention of an individual in a vehicle is permissible under the Fourth Amendment if supported by reasonable suspicion that the individual has violated the law. (Ornelas v. United States (1996) 517 U.S. 690, 693 [134 L.Ed.2d 911, 116 S.Ct. 1657].) A peace officer may also search the passenger compartment of the vehicle, limited to those areas in which a weapon may be placed or hidden, if the officer possesses a reasonable belief the suspect is dangerous and may gain immediate control of a weapon. (Michigan v. Long (1983) 463 U.S. 1032, 1049 [77 L.Ed.2d 1201, 103 S.Ct. 3469].) In this case, defendant does not dispute that the officers were entitled to search the passenger compartment if reasonable suspicion justified the initial detention. He argues only that the anonymous 911 call did not supply reasonable suspicion to effect the detention.
"The guiding principle in determining the propriety of an investigatory detention is 'the reasonableness in all the circumstances of the particular governmental invasion of a citizen's personal security.' [Citations.] In mating our determination, we examine 'the totality of the circumstances' in each case." (Wells, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 1083; see also People v. Souza (1994) 9 Cal.4th 224, 227, 230 [36 Cal.Rptr.2d 569, 885 P.2d 982].) "Reasonable suspicion is a lesser standard than probable cause, and can arise from less reliable information than required for probable cause, including an anonymous tip." (Wells, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 1083.)
Indeed, we recently justified a detention based on an anonymous tip in Wells. There, an anonymous caller reported a 1980's-model blue van traveling northbound on Highway 99 north of Bakersfield and weaving all over the roadway. Two or three minutes after receiving the dispatch report, a California Highway Patrol officer spotted a blue van traveling northbound on Highway 99, activated his patrol car lights, and stopped the van to investigate whether the driver was impaired. The officer had seen nothing to indicate the motorist was intoxicated but, after conducting an investigation at the scene, arrested the motorist for driving under the influence. (Wells, supra, 38 Cal.4th at pp. 1081, 1083.)
In upholding the detention, we observed that "a citizen's tip may itself create a reasonable suspicion sufficient to justify a temporary vehicle stop or detention, especially if the circumstances are deemed exigent by reason of possible reckless driving or similar threats to public safety" (Wells, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 1083), and distinguished the United States Supreme Court's decision in Florida v. J. L. (2000) 529 U.S. 266 [146 L.Ed.2d 254, 120 S.Ct. 1375] (J. L.), which invalidated a detention based on an anonymous phoned-in tip that a young African-American man in a plaid shirt standing at a particular bus stop had a concealed weapon. "The high court held the tip insufficient to justify a brief detention and patdown search, absent some independent corroboration of the reliability of the tip and tipster's assertion of illegal conduct. [Citation.] As the court stated, '[a]ll the police had to go on in this case was the bare report of an unknown, unaccountable informant who neither explained how he knew about the gun nor supplied any basis for believing he had inside information about J. L.' " (Wells, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 1084.) At the same time, however, we noted that the J. L. court acknowledged the possibility that exigent circumstances, such as a report of someone carrying a bomb, might justify a stop and search "even without a showing of reliability." (J. L., supra, 529 U.S. at p. 273; see Wells, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 1084.)
After balancing the public interest in safety and the individual's right to personal security free from arbitrary interference by law enforcement officers (see People v. Thompson (2006) 38 Cal.4th 811, 827 [43 Cal.Rptr.3d 750, 135 P.3d 3]), we determined in Wells that the relative urgency presented by drunk or erratic drivers could justify an investigatory detention based on an anonymous tip despite the absence of corroborating evidence of illegal activity. A tip's reliability, we observed, need not depend exclusively on its ability to predict the suspect's future behavior (see, e.g., Alabama v. White (1990) 496 U.S. 325, 332 [110 L.Ed.2d 301, 110 S.Ct. 2412] (White)) or the officer's ability to corroborate present illegal activity (see, e.g., People v. Butler (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 150, 162 [4 Cal.Rptr.3d 1]). Rather, the tip's reliability depends upon an assessment of "the totality of the circumstances in a given case." (Wells, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 1088; accord, U.S. v. Perkins (4th Cir. 2004) 363 F.3d 317, 325 ["A rigid rule demanding the presence of predictive information is thus unjustified by White and J. L, and it would be wholly inconsistent with the flexible nature of reasonable suspicion analysis"].)
Accordingly, Wells relied on the totality of the circumstances in distinguishing J. L. We explained first that a report of a possibly intoxicated driver weaving all over the roadway posed "a far more grave and immediate risk to the public than a report of mere passive gun possession." (Wells, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 1087.) " '[A]n anonymous report of an erratic or drunk driver on the highway presents a qualitatively different level of danger, and concomitantly greater urgency for prompt action. In the case of a concealed gun, the possession itself might be legal, and the police could, in any event, surreptitiously observe the individual for a reasonable period of time without running the risk of death or injury with every passing moment. An officer in pursuit of a reportedly drunk driver on a freeway does not enjoy such a luxury.' " (Id. at p. 1086, quoting State v. Boyea (2000) 171 Vt. 401 [765 A.2d 862, 867].)
We said next that "doubts regarding the tipster's reliability and sincerity are significantly reduced in the setting of a phoned-in report regarding a contemporaneous event of reckless driving presumably viewed by the caller. Instances of harassment presumably would be quite rare." (Wells, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 1087.) Indeed, "the relatively precise and accurate description given by the tipster in the present case regarding the vehicle type, color, location, and direction of travel, all confirmed by the investigating officer within minutes of receiving the report, enhanced the reliability of the tip." (Id. at p. 1088.) Based on that level of detail and the officer's ability to corroborate it, we inferred that the observation of reckless driving must have come from a passing motorist. (Ibid.) In light of the tip's detailed and contemporaneous description, the officer's ability promptly to corroborate its innocent details, and the danger posed by a motorist under the influence, we were "convinced" in Wells "that the officer's traffic stop was justified by reasonable suspicion of criminal activity." (Ibid.)
Consideration of these (and other factors) convinces us that the detention should be upheld in this case.
First, defendant's conduct in pointing a revolver at the caller in an apparent threat to shoot him posed a grave and immediate risk not only to the caller but also to anyone nearby. (U.S. v. Holloway (11th Cir. 2002) 290 F.3d 1331, 1339 (Holloway) [anonymous 911 call reporting gunshots and arguing "involved a serious threat to human life"].) "[A]llegations of the threatening use of a weapon, made by [a] person claiming to be an eyewitness to the threats, required immediate police action" and "is materially distinguishable from the anonymous tip at issue in Florida v. J. L.," which involved only an allegation of a concealed weapon. (Ray v. Village of Woodridge (N.D.Ill. 2002) 221 F.Supp.2d 906, 914; see also U.S. v. Nelson (3d Cir. 2002) 284 F.3d 472, 483 ["the critical element alleged in the tip was not the mere presence of a gun, but the fact that violent crimes were in the process of being committed"].) An allegation concerning the possession of a concealed weapon, "without more" (J. L., supra, 529 U.S. at p. 268), does not present an emergency situation involving an immediate danger to human life. (Holloway, supra, 290 F.3d at pp. 1338-1339; accord, People v. Jordan (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 544, 562-564 [17 Cal.Rptr.3d 157] [anonymous tip that suspect possessed a concealed weapon insufficient to justify detention]; People v. Saldana (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 170, 175 [123 Cal.Rptr.2d 763] [same].)
Defendant's suggestion that the emergency had ended in this case because the 911 call was "a report of an assault that had been completed, not one that is occurring" is not persuasive. In U.S. v. Terry-Crespo (9th Cir. 2004) 356 F.3d 1170 (Terry-Crespo), for example, the Ninth Circuit found that a 911 caller's report describing a threat with a .45-caliber handgun a few minutes earlier constituted "a contemporaneous emergency event," even though the tipster was a mile and a half away by the time the police arrived at the scene. (Id. at p. 1176.) In this case, the caller was still in the area, inasmuch as he had just driven by defendant's vehicle to verify its color, and cannot be said to have reached a place of safety as long as defendant remained at large and had use of his vehicle. In this context, defendant remained "extremely mobile, and potentially highly dangerous" to the tipster-victim and potentially to others in the area (U.S. v. Wheat (8th Cir. 2001) 278 F.3d 722, 737)—regardless of whether the tipster-victim subjectively apprehended the danger.
Indeed, defendant concedes that "an imminent threat to kill constitute^] an emergency situation" justifying a stop even when the intended victim is elsewhere, yet fails to distinguish the circumstances here. In our view, the interest in protecting human life, even if insufficient in this case to dispense entirely with the need to demonstrate the anonymous tip's reliability (see J. L., supra, 529 U.S. at p. 273), is nonetheless an important factor to consider in assessing the requisite level of reliability. (Wells, supra, 38 Cal.4th at pp. 1084, 1087.)
Second, there is no reason to think that anonymous phoned-in tips concerning contemporaneous threats with a firearm are any more likely to be hoaxes than are anonymous phoned-in tips concerning a contemporaneous event of reckless driving. (Compare Terry-Crespo, supra, 356 F.3d at p. 1177, with Wells, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 1087.) Indeed, the call here bore stronger indicia of reliability than did the call in Wells. Unlike Wells, where the record was "silent" as to the circumstances leading to the call or the call itself (id. at p. 1081), this case involves a 911 call that was taped. "911 calls are the predominant means of communicating emergency situations" and "are distinctive in that they concern contemporaneous emergency events, not general criminal behavior. . If law enforcement could not rely on information conveyed by anonymous 911 callers, their ability to respond effectively to emergency situations would be significantly curtailed." (Holloway, supra, 290 F.3d at p. 1339; see Terry-Crespo, supra, 356 F.3d at p. 1176 [911 calls are "entitled to greater reliability than a tip concerning general criminality because the police must take 911 emergency calls seriously and respond with dispatch"]; State v. Golotta (2003) 178 N.J. 205 [837 A.2d 359, 366] [an anonymous tip placed and processed via the 911 system "carries enhanced reliability not found in other contexts"].)
Furthermore, "[m]erely calling 911 and having a recorded telephone conversation risks the possibility that the police could trace the call or identify [the caller] by his voice." (Terry-Crespo, supra, 356 F.3d at p. 1176.) Although defendant is certainly correct that it may be difficult for the authorities to locate a 911 caller solely by voice, the victim of a hoax is likely to recognize the harassing caller's voice, thus creating a reasonable possibility of prosecution for a false report. (See Pen. Code, § 148.5, subd. (c).) Therefore, we see no inherent reason to discount anonymous 911 calls reporting contemporaneous violent conduct observed firsthand merely because of the theoretical possibility the caller may be motivated to make a false report because of a vendetta. (See U.S. v. Wheat, supra, 278 F.3d at p. 735 ["the risk of false tips is slight compared to the risk of not allowing the police immediately to conduct an investigatory stop"]; see generally Hagberg v. California Federal Bank (2004) 32 Cal.4th 350, 372 [7 Cal.Rptr.3d 803, 81 P.3d 244] ["We note the absence of any indication that such malicious communications present a widespread problem"].)
"There is the equal danger, moreover, that according no weight to 'anonymous' tips in the reasonable suspicion calculus will undermine the ability of concerned residents to report illegal activity and to thereby make their neighborhoods more safe. Residents of neighborhoods are in the best position to monitor activity on the streets. But residents, also fearful of the consequences, may not always wish to identify themselves and volunteer their names. According no weight as a matter of law to such 'anonymous' tips would only discourage concerned residents from even calling the police, would burden the rights of ordinary citizens to live in their neighborhoods without fear and intimidation, and would render citizens helpless in their efforts to restore safety and sanctity to their homes and communities." (U.S. v. Perkins, supra, 363 F.3d at p. 326.)
Third, the tipster-victim provided a firsthand, contemporaneous description of the crime as well as an accurate and complete description of the perpetrator and his location, the details of which were confirmed within minutes by the police when they arrived. (U.S. v. Perkins, supra, 363 F.3d at p. 322 ["The tipster's basis of knowledge—a contemporaneous viewing of the suspicious activity—enhanced the tip's reliability"]; People v. Polander (Colo. 2001) 41 P.3d 698, 702.) It has long been clear that "a primary determinant of a tipster's reliability is the basis of his knowledge." (U.S. v. Wheat, supra, 278 F.3d at p. 734; see Illinois v. Gates (1983) 462 U.S. 213, 234 [76 L.Ed.2d 527, 103 S.Ct. 2317] ["even if we entertain some doubt as to an informant's motives, his explicit and detailed description of alleged wrongdoing, along with a statement that the event was observed firsthand, entitles his tip to greater weight than might otherwise be the case"].) This case is thus unlike J. L., in which the informant "neither explained how he knew about the [concealed] gun nor supplied any basis for believing he had inside information" (J. L., supra, 529 U.S. at p. 271) and in which the record did not reveal when the caller discovered the suspect had a concealed weapon or how soon the police responded to the call (id. at p. 268). The police "may ascribe greater reliability to a tip, even an anonymous one, where an informant 'was reporting what he had observed moments ago,' not stale or second-hand information." (Terry-Crespo, supra, 356 F.3d at p. 1177.) The record here is stronger even than that in Wells, in which we inferred that the tip of reckless driving must have come from a passing motorist. (Wells, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 1088; see also id. at p. 1092 (dis. opn. of Werdegar, J.).) The tip's reliability was further enhanced by the tipster-victim's second call to 911, in which he said that he had just driven by the scene and reported that the Nissan Maxima in which defendant was sitting was black, not gray. (State v. Williams, supra, 623 N.W.2d at p. 114.) Defendant does not deny that the tip here "was sufficiently copious and precise." (U.S. v. Wheat, supra, 278 F.3d at p. 732.)
Fourth, the caller supplied a plausible explanation for wanting to remain anonymous. He noted that defendant had uttered a gang name, worried that "I don't have anyone to defend me from all this gang shit," and explained that "if they find out I'm snitching, they're going to kill me around here." That the tipster "may be understandably reticent to give identifying information for fear of retaliation or danger" reduces the significance of his anonymity in analyzing the reliability of his report. (Holloway, supra, 290 F.3d at p. 1339.) Defendant's contention that nothing in the record showed that the tipster-victim had a basis for fearing retaliation "due to ongoing contact with [defendant]," even if true, does not affect the analysis.
Defendant relies on a handful of out-of-state decisions in urging us to deem this detention unlawful, but the cases are easily distinguished. In People v. Folk (2001) 284 A.D.2d 476 [727 N.Y.S.2d 131] and People v. Ballard (2001) 279 A.D.2d 529 [719 N.Y.S.2d 267], for example, the anonymous tipster reported only that the defendant had a concealed weapon. Both cases quoted J. L. in pointing out that the informant " 'neither explained how he knew about the gun nor supplied any basis for believing he had inside information about [the defendant]' " and that the report did not show " 'that the tipster ha[d] knowledge of concealed criminal activity.' " (Folk, supra, 727 N.Y.S.2d at p. 132; Ballard, supra, 719 N.Y.S.2d at p. 268; see also U.S. v. Blackshaw (N.D. Ohio 2005) 367 F.Supp.2d 1165, 1172 ["At most, the anonymous call provided a clothing description, a vehicle description, an approximate location, and report of a handgun"]; U.S. v. Person (E.D.N.Y. 2001) 134 F.Supp.2d 517, 527 ["imminent danger would warrant a stop based on an unverified anonymous tip," but "[t]he tip here involved little more than a general description and the allegation of gun possession"]; People v. Carlson (2000) 313 Ill.App.3d 447 [246 Ill.Dec. 207, 729 N.E.2d 858, 859] [the tip provided the defendant's location and stated merely that he "might have a gun"]; State v. Hopkins (2005) 128 Wn.App. 855 [117 P.3d 377, 381] [the tip "contained inaccurate information about Hopkins' height, weight, and age" and reported only "that a minor was 'scratching his leg' with 'what appeared to be a gun,' and that he 'thinks' the gun is in Hopkins' right pocket"].) Unlike J. L, the tip here involved the visible and threatening use of the weapon and supplied the basis for the tipster's knowledge. (Ray v. Village of Woodridge, supra, 221 F.Supp.2d at p. 914; see Scott v. Com. (1995) 20 Va.App. 725 [460 S.E.2d 610, 612-613, 12 Va.LawRep. 127].)
We likewise decline to follow People v. Braun (2002) 299 A.D.2d 246 [750 N.Y.S.2d 58], which involved an anonymous tip of a recent burglary, or People v. Moore (2006) 6 N.Y.3d 496 [814 N.Y.S.2d 567, 847 N.E.2d 1141], which involved an anonymous tip of a dispute involving a gun, because both courts interpreted J. L. as barring reliance on an anonymous tip unless the tip "contains predictive information—such as information suggestive of criminal behavior—so that the police can test the reliability of the tip" (Moore, supra, 814 N.Y.S.2d at p. 569) or is corroborated by the officer's direct observation "of conduct or other circumstances suggestive of criminal activity" (Braun, supra, 750 N.Y.S.2d at p. 59). (See also U.S. v. Person, supra, 134 F.Supp.2d at p. 525 ["reasonable suspicion can be based on either a corroborated anonymous tip which verifies predicted future events, as in White, or on a tip involving a present situation, which the police independently corroborate"].) These cases are contrary to Wells, which eschewed such rigid categories in favor of an approach that assesses reliability under the totality of the circumstances. (Wells, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 1083; J. L, supra, 529 U.S. at p. 274 (conc. opn. of Kennedy, J.) ["there are many indicia of reliability respecting anonymous tips"]; see generally People v. Souza, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 230 [case law has "stressed the importance of taking into account 'the totality of the circumstances' in determining the propriety of an investigative stop"].) Tellingly, neither Moore nor Braun even contains the phrase "totality of the circumstances."
"[T]here are situations in which an anonymous tip, suitably corroborated, exhibits 'sufficient indicia of reliability to provide reasonable suspicion to make the investigatory stop.' " (J. L., supra, 529 U.S. at p. 270.) As the high court has explained, however, the tip must be "reliable in its assertion of illegality, not just in its tendency to identify a determinate person." (Id. at p. 272.) In this case, the 911 call was a firsthand report of violent criminal conduct requiring an immediate response to protect public safety. The call was recorded, eliminating the possibility of after-the-fact police fabrication and allowing after-the-fact review (albeit limited) of the caller's sincerity. The report was fresh, detailed, and accurate, and its description of defendant and his location was corroborated by the police within minutes. Under the totality of the circumstances, we find there was sufficient indicia that the 911 caller was able to see the criminal conduct he was reporting, that he was reporting it truthfully and accurately, and thus that the tip was sufficiently reliable to justify the limited intervention of an investigatory detention, which led to discovery of the loaded revolver. The superior court did not err in denying the motion to suppress.
Disposition
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is affirmed.
George, C. J., Chin, J., and Corrigan, J., concurred.
Defendant also challenges the trial court's implied finding that Officer Dominguez was aware the 911 caller had been threatened with the gun, pointing out that the tape of the radio dispatch did not include the word "threat." The challenge lacks merit. As defendant concedes, the radio broadcast included a number of police codes, any of which may have communicated the fact of the threat. Moreover, defendant has not shown that the taped broadcast constituted the totality of the communications received by the patrol officers. Consequently, he has not refuted Officer Dominguez's direct testimony that he was aware, prior to the stop, the caller had been threatened with the gun. Finally, because defendant never argued below that the officers lacked knowledge of the contents of the 911 call, thereby denying the People the opportunity to offer contrary evidence, he has forfeited any challenge to the use of the caller's statements. (Evid. Code, § 353; Anthony v. City of New York (2d Cir. 2003) 339 F.3d 129, 136, fn. 3.) Indeed, it was defendant who offered the tape of the 911 call at the suppression hearing, without requesting any limitation on its use, and relied on its contents.
The fact that the call here was taped provides two additional safeguards against arbitrary police action. As defendant concedes, the existence of the tape eliminates "the specter of after-the-fact, police fabrication of an 'anonymous informant.' " (Terry-Crespo, supra, 356 F.3d at p. 1175; accord, Commonwealth v. Lyons (1990) 409 Mass. 16 [564 N.E.2d 390, 392].) The tape also offers a reviewing court the opportunity to discover whether anything about the caller's tone, demeanor, or actual words suggested that the report was fabricated. (State v. Williams (2001) 2001 WI 21 [241 Wis.2d 631, 623 N.W.2d 106, 115].) We have listened to the 911 call and have found nothing in it that casts doubt on the tipster-victim's veracity.
The unreasonable consequences of defendant's position—i.e., that an anonymous tip uncorroborated by the officer's observation of illegal activity or predicted behavior can never justify a detention—were demonstrated at oral argument. Defense counsel contended that the police would be unable to effect a stop of a vehicle in response to a tip that the driver had just abducted a young child from a nearby playground if the caller refused to disclose his or her identity. Under defendant's approach, the police could do no more than follow the vehicle and watch helplessly as the driver entered the garage and closed the door.
Defendant relies also on People v. Jordan, supra, 121 Cal.App.4th 544, which he characterizes as "unusually, even eerily, similar" to this case. He is very much mistaken. In Jordan, unlike here, the responding officers knew only that the defendant " '[p]ossibly' " had a concealed handgun. (Id. at p. 550; see id. at pp. 559-560 & fn. 8.) In Jordan, unlike here, the record did not indicate how much time elapsed between the end of the telephone call and the radio transmission of the information to the officers. (Id. at p. 558, fn. 7; see also J. L., supra, 529 U.S. at p. 268 [noting a similar deficiency in the record].) In Jordan, unlike here, the tipster did not disclose how he knew the defendant had a concealed weapon, nor did he say "whether he personally saw the gun, inferred its presence from other facts he observed, inferred its presence from [Jordan]'s reputation, or received the information from another individual" or even "when he acquired the information." (Jordan, supra, at pp. 559, 560.) In Jordan, unlike here, there was no explanation offered as to why the caller wanted to remain anonymous. And in Jordan, unlike here, the level of danger was "comparable to the level of danger shown by the facts described in Florida v. J. L." (Jordan, supra, at p. 563.) Based on these circumstances, the Court of Appeal found only one factor on which to distinguish J. L.—i.e., the fact the anonymous tip was recorded and transcribed—but otherwise found "no principled way to distinguish this case" and concluded "that the opinion in Florida v. J. L. dictates the result." (Jordan, supra, at p. 562.)