Case Name: DONALD D. DONOVAN AND GABY DONOVAN, PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS, v. JOHN M. GABRIEL AND JACK GRUBER, PARTNERS t/a EAST RIDGEWOOD COMPANY, AND THE BOROUGH OF PARAMUS, A MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, AND ALFRED A. THATCHER, BUILDING INSPECTOR, DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS
Court: New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New Jersey
Decision Date: 1959-10-27
Citations: 57 N.J. Super. 542
Docket Number: 
Parties: DONALD D. DONOVAN AND GABY DONOVAN, PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS, v. JOHN M. GABRIEL AND JACK GRUBER, PARTNERS t/a EAST RIDGEWOOD COMPANY, AND THE BOROUGH OF PARAMUS, A MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, AND ALFRED A. THATCHER, BUILDING INSPECTOR, DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS.
Judges: 
Reporter: New Jersey Superior Court Reports
Volume: 57
Pages: 542–556

Head Matter:
DONALD D. DONOVAN AND GABY DONOVAN, PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS, v. JOHN M. GABRIEL AND JACK GRUBER, PARTNERS t/a EAST RIDGEWOOD COMPANY, AND THE BOROUGH OF PARAMUS, A MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, AND ALFRED A. THATCHER, BUILDING INSPECTOR, DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS.
Superior Court of New Jersey Appellate Division
Argued October 13, 1959
Decided October 27, 1959.
Before Judges Goldmann, Freund and Haneman.
Mr. Warren Dixon, Jr., argued the cause for appellants.
Mr. Michael A. Dwyer argued the cause for respondents Gabriel and Gruber (Mr. Samuel M. Lyon, Jr., of counsel).

Opinion:
The opinion of the court was delivered by
Haneman, J. A. D.
Plaintiffs appeal from a judgment determining that defendants John M. Gabriel and Jack Gruber, partners trading as East Ridgewood Company (Gabriel and Gruber), have a nonconforming use on certain lands in the Borough of Paramus and that a building permit issued to them as owners of said lands is valid.
Gabriel and Gruber are the owners of a parcel of land located at the corner of the intersection of Ridgewood Avenue and Paramus Road in Paramus. Plaintiffs are the owners of a contiguous parcel of land on Paramus Road lying to the south thereof.
In 1930 the Gabriel and Gruber property was owned by James Turner Ackerman and Clara Ackerman as tenants by the entirety. In that year the Ackermans constructed a gasoline service station and auto body repair shop on a portion of their premises at the corner of the intersection of the streets above referred to, of the dimensions of approximately 125 feet by 150 feet. This portion of the Ackerman tract admittedly has been used continuously for those purposes from 1930 to at least 1952.
Plaintiffs obtained title to their lands in 1937 and have used the same continuously from that year for residential purposes, having expended considerable sums thereon for improvements and beautification.
The Borough of Paramus adopted a zoning ordinance in 1946. Under the terms thereof the lands of plaintiffs and of the Ackermans were included in a one-family residential zone. In 1955 the borough adopted a revision of said 1946 ordinance which continued to restrict the lands of plaintiffs and the Ackermans for residential purposes. There is no dispute that-in 1946 the operation of a gasoline service station and auto body repair shop was a legal nonconforming use. Plaintiffs, however, contend that in 1952 the gasoline service station feature of the use was abandoned.
James Turner Ackerman died in 1952 at the age of 92 years and his widow died in 1954 at the age of 86 years. In the settlement of her estate in 1955 the entire Ackerman tract, including the portion with which we are now concerned, was sold and conveyed to Gabriel and Gruber. Some time subsequent to the acquisition of title by Gabriel and Gruber, the service station building, which had been vandalized by some juveniles, was boarded up at the direction of the building inspector.
Shortly after the acquisition of title, Gabriel and Gruber made application to the Paramus Zoning Board of Adjust ment for a variance, seeking to construct a supermarket on the tract owned by them. Plaintiffs were instrumental in obtaining 500 signatures from persons living in the vicinity to a petition objecting to this variance, and thereafter in persuading the borough council to deny it.
Application was then made on behalf of Gabriel and Gruber for leave to construct a now gasoline service station. Plaintiffs again spearheaded a movement to object to the issuance of a building permit for this purpose, and were successful in preventing the issuance thereof.
Thereafter, in April 1957, Daniel P. Lieblich, Esquire, counsel for defendants Gabriel and Gruber, conferred with the borough clerk and the borough building inspector concerning the obtaining of a certificate of occupancy of the building in the condition in which it then existed, for use as a gasoline service station and auto body repair shop. He was advised by the building inspector that no certificate of occupancy would be issued unless and until various items of repair had been made to the premises, and that application should be made for a building permit in order to make such repairs to the premises. The building inspector also suggested that a new curb line be constructed along the southerly line of East Kidgewood Avenue. Lieblich thereupon prepared an application for a building permit, which read, in part, under the title "Zoning Data":
"13. Tí' an existing structure, what is its present use? Repairing, storage & servicing of autos. Will there be any change of use? No."
The application, having been signed by Gabriel and Gruber, was forwarded by Lieblich to the building inspector, with a covering letter, which road, in part:
"It is my understanding that the following work is to be accomplished under the building permit:
Electrical wiring repaired, or replaced, ceiling in one room to be secured, partitions replaced where necessary, securing of two lintels, repairing of broken windows, replacement of heating system, and checking of the sanitary facilities. Additionally, in accordance with your suggestions, a curb line will be constructed along the southerly side of East Ridgewood Avenue to brake the traffic in accordance with the suggestion advanced heretofore by Tremareo Corporation for this plot.
It is my further understanding that when these repairs are completed you will issue a certificate of occupancy and my client will immediately thereafter be enabled to use these premises for the repairing, storage and servicing of automobiles. I shall appreciate it if you will confirm the last statement. You may do so returning to me the copy of the letter indicating your approval thereon."
The building permit was thereupon issued on November 27, 1957. Donald D. Donovan concededly had knowledge of the issuance within three weeks thereafter.
Plaintiffs filed suit in lieu of prerogative writs on June 11, 1958, seeking the revocation of the permit upon the ground that the nonconforming use of the premises for a gasoline service station had been abandoned.
Defendants Gabriel and Gruber contend, inter alia, that this action was not brought within time under B. B. 4:88-15, since suit was instituted- more than 45 days after the issuance of the building permit. Plaintiffs argue, in answer thereto, that the building permit was a nullity, as it was issued pursuant to a false representation material to the issuance thereof. The alleged misrepresentation is the answer to question 13 on the application quoted above.
The facts disclose that the building inspector knew that the building was vacant and boarded up at the time of the application for a permit. The question appears under the title "Zoning Data" and plainly seeks information referable to the provisions of the zoning ordinance. It has always been the contention of Gabriel and Gruber that the use of the premises for a gasoline service station has continued from 1930 to date, without abandonment, even though the building was vacant and boarded up. The word "use" should here be considered a word of art employed in the sense recognized in zoning problems. The building inspector was plainly not misled, as he had personal and intimate knowledge of the physical condition of the premises. Additionally, it appears from Donovan's testimony that an opinion was requested from the municipal counsel as to the validity of the application of Gabriel and Gruber, since it concerned a nonconforming use of the premises, and that counsel advised that the building inspector was obliged to issue the permit. The question of the continued use is a disputed issue. It was, of necessity, involved in plaintiffs' prior objection to the construction of a new station.
We have no doubt of the good faith of the building inspector and that he was not misled by the answer in the application adverted to by plaintiffs. Whether the building inspector's view of the circumstances was sound or not, it was not unreasonable. He reached the same conclusion subsequently reached by the trial court. Cf. Jantausch v. Borough of Verona, 41 N. J. Super. 89, 95 (Law Div. 1956).
Allowing plaintiffs the most favorable possible view of the facts, the granting of the permit was a mistaken action on the part of the building inspect or within the purview of his jurisdiction. The permit was therefore not ullra vires and void as being obtained by fraud. Marini v. Borough of Wanaque, 37 N. J. Super. 32 (App. Div. 1955).
Plaintiffs further argue that the interests of justice require an enlargement of the period within which to file suit and hence that their suit was filed in time. They cite B. B. 4:88-15(c), which reads:
"(c) Where it is manifest that the interests of justice require, the court may enlarge the period of time provided for in paragraph (a) or (b) of this rule."
The testimony discloses, in that connection, that Donald D. Donovan admitted that he knew of the issuance of the permit within two or three weeks after it had actually been issued. He testified that after he learned of the issuance he appeared before the Mayor and Council of the borough in order to object to the issuance. He "constantly thought that they [Mayor and Council] would eliminate this sort of thing, but you know, after all, it is an expense to fight this thing and apparently I am the only one fighting it." He further testified that he had luncheon three or four times with Gabriel and advised him that he "didn't want to knock his brains out, and if [there were] anything [that] he could do [in order] to upgrade the property [he] was for it, so that is why possibly [he] held off because Gabriel promised me that he would try to upgrade it." Thereafter, when he learned that Gabriel would not "come to terms," he advised Gabriel that "you have a fight." Nowhere does it appear in the testimony when these luncheon conferences with Gabriel occurred nor when plaintiffs first became satisfied that Gabriel and Gruber intended to continue the operation of the premises as a gasoline service station. Donovan was patently dilatory in filing his suit. He does not contend that he failed to file suit within 45 days because of any fraudulent action on the part of Gabriel or Gruber, nor upon any conduct which misled him to sleep on his rights.
In Robbins v. Jersey City, 23 N. J. 229, 238 (1957), the court said:
"The general proposition that exceptions to the time limitations imposed upon the in-lieu procedure should be but exceptionally condoned, and only in the most persuasive circumstances, remains the same. Consider R. R. 1:27B(d). See the provocative editorial note at 10 Rutgers L. Rev. 673 (1956). The attainment of substantial justice in particular cases should not be interpreted as dilution of the principle. For example, the fact that plaintiffs have also sought injunctive relief in the instant matter does not persuade us that the 30-day limitation should not be applicable. Compare Thornton v. Village of Ridgewood, 17 N. J. 499, 508—510 (1955)."
Although Robbins was decided prior to the adoption of R. R. 4:88-15(c), we conceive that the reasoning of the foregoing quotation is apt and applicable to that rule. Plaintiffs should not be permitted to exculpate and excuse their dilatory and tardy conduct under the excuse of "interests of justice." Although Gabriel and Gruber apparently did not proceed with their renovations during the six months intervening between the issuance of the permit and the filing of suit, this is not to say that they did not proceed with any preliminary negotiations concerning the premises. The test for the enlargement of time is not solely the conduct of the defendant in the expenditure of money or the incurring of obligations. The test is, as well, the conduct of the plaintiff who seeks to take advantage of the exception of the general ruLe. So-called justice to a plaintiff might well result in injustice to a defendant. The justice referred to in the rule applies to both parties.
We find here no valid excuse for plaintiffs' delay of almost six months in bringing suit nor any persuasive circumstances which would lead us to condone plaintiffs' delay.
We conclude, therefore, that suit was filed out of time and relief should have been denied for that reason. In the light of this determination it is unnecessary to consider the appeal on the other grounds argued.
Affirmed.