Case Name: James Crow and John J. Kenney agt. Garret Becker and Stephen D. Haight
Court: New York Superior Court
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1867-05
Citations: 33 How. Pr. 208
Docket Number: 
Parties: James Crow and John J. Kenney agt. Garret Becker and Stephen D. Haight.
Judges: 
Reporter: Howard's Practice Reports
Volume: 33
Pages: 208–229

Head Matter:
NEW YORK, SUPERIOR COURT.
James Crow and John J. Kenney agt. Garret Becker and Stephen D. Haight.
Where in an action to recover the balance of the contract price of work done on a building, the issues tried were, 1st. Whether a sum was paid by the defendants to the plaintiff, exceeding the work actually done by him;
2d. Whether the defendant sustained damage by the unworkmanlike and unskill ful performance of such work;
3d. Whether such work was not completed within the time agreed on; and,
4th. Whether the defendant sustained damage by the abandonment of such work ■ by the plaintiff?
And it appearing on the trial before a jury, that the contract price for the whole work was to be $1,500: The Court asked the witness (one of the defendants) under examination, the following question : Q. “ $1,500 would be a contract for a rough job ?” Defendants’ counsel objected, and. excepted to this question. A. Yes, sir. By the Court. “$1,500 for a building of this dimension is little enough.” Defendants’ counsel excepted to this remark:
JTeld, on a motion for a new trial, that these'exeeptions were well taken, and enti- ' tied the defendants to a new trial, with costs to abide the event. (Joses, J.
General Term, May, 1867.
Before Bobebtson, Oh. J., Babboub and Jobes, Justices.
Appeal from a judgment rendered at special term, and an order denying a motion for a new trial.
Bobebt ¡N. Waite, for plaintiffs, respondents.
TMs action was brought to recover a balance due to the plaintiffs for performing certain mason work, and furnishing materials, under a contract dated September 12th, 1860, which work was to be finished according to certain plans and specifications, given in evidence. The case, as settled by the judge who tried the cause, contains four exceptions. One of them only, relates to the rejection of evidence.
I. On the trial, the learned judge asked a witness under examination, the following question: “ 11,500 would be a contract for a rough job To which the witness answered: “ Tes, sir.” This question was objected to by defendants’ counsel, and an exception taken.
The question which the judge propounded to the witness, seems obnoxious to no legal objection. It was pertinent to the issue, to inquire in respect to the character of the work •to be performed, and one of the points in controversy before the jury was, whether the contract contemplated a superior or a rough job of work. The contract was silent as to the quality of the work, and referred simply to certain plans and specifications, which were given in evidence, and the times that the payments should be made. The question objected to, might have been put by counsel on either side, with perfect propriety, and the fact that it was put by the judge, cannot make it any the less legitimate. The real objection, if any could have been taken to it, should have been that the question was leading, but no court ever reversed a judgment on error or appeal, because a leading question was put to a witness. It is always within the discretion of the court to permit such questions to be put by a party to his own witness, when the interests of justice or of truth seem to require it; and surely the judge can exercise the same discretion himself, which he can depute to another. It is, therefore, submitted to the court that the objection thus considered is badly taken.
II. The learned judge, after the question referred to in the first point had been answered affirmatively by the witness, remarked that “ $1,500 for a building of this dimension, is little enough.” This remark of the judge, is the subject of the second exception.
The above remark of the learned judge had no influence whatever on the verdict of the jury, and cannot be made the subject of objection here. To say the most, it was an unnecessary observation, and without influence upon the trial or its results. The contract price of the building was $1,500, and there was no dispute on either side in respect to that fact. When, therefore, the remark was made by the judge, that $1,500 was little enough for such a building, it neither stated anything for or against the sum mentioned in the contract, for it conceded that to be right. It simply expressed the opinion of the judge, that the contract had been taken at a moderate price; or in other words, that the sum agreed upon was reasonable; how then can such a remark be any reason for setting aside a verdict, or ordering a new trial ? The jury were not instructed to go against the contract or the contract price, nor asked to allow the contractor more than his agreement called for. It is submitted, therefore, on this second exception, that for a judge in the trial of a cause, to remark incidentally that the price mentioned in a contract for the performance of labor is reasonable, never has been, nor never will be, esteemed good cause for setting aside a verdict. This is authoratively settled to be the law, by the court of appeals, in Althorf agt. Wolf (22 N. Y. R . 355).
The court held that it was not error for the judge to intimate an opinion on a question of fact, if the determination of it was left by him to the jury. The point had been decided in the same way by the court of common pleas. (2 Hilton, 314.) To the same effect is the case of People agt. Stephens (19 N. Y. R. 571). The learned judge who delivered the opinion, said: “ The counsel also objected to the comments of the judge in reference to the letter, in his charge to the jury. The remarks of the learned judge were certainly very strong, but they were mere comments upon the weight of evidence, and as such, they are not the subject of review on a writ of error. The jury were properly instructed that they were the sole judges upon all questions of fact, as to which they should adopt their own conclusions.
HI. One of the witnesses for the defense testified that he had given a certain paper to the plaintiff. He was asked by the defendants’ counsel to state the contents of the paper. To this the counsel for the plaintiff objected, giving as a reason for objecting to the contents of the paper, being proved, that no notice had been given to him or his client, to produce the paper in court. ^
The judge sustained the objection, and refused to permit the contents of the paper to be stated. To this ruling of "the judge, an exception was taken.
The rule of law upon this subject is elementary, and laid down in almost every treatise on practice and evidence. In 1 MoneWs Practice, 522, he states what the rule is, that where any paper which is in the possession of the opposite party, is necessary to be produced on the trial, notice must be given to the party in whose possession it is, or to his attorney, to produce it; and if he neglect to do so, parol evidence may be given of its contents. Ho notice to produce the paper demanded, was ever given to the plaintiff or his attorney, and as the paper was not in court, the learned judge properly refused to receive parol evidence of its contents. There was, therefore, no error in the ruling on this point. _
IV. The learned judge in his charge to the jury, said that “ it would seem as though the price named in the contract ($1,500), would not call for a very superior class of work.” This remark was objected to by the counsel for the defendants, and an exception was allowed.
It will be perceived that this exception involves no question of law, but is an objection to an abstract opinion expressed by the judge on a question of fact. It was not given as a direction to the jury, that they were to disregard the agreement made by the parties themselves, or that they were to be bound by any judgment he, the judge, entertained in respect to the facts in controversy. A judge has a legal right to state his opinion upon any controverted facts which are involved in any issue being tried before him. He must, however, be careful to let it be distinctly understood that his opinion in regard of such facts is not to be binding upon the jury, but that they, the jurors, are to be the exclusive judges thereof. This the judge in this ease was careful to do, for he left the facts in the fullest and most ample manner to the jury, asking them to carefully examine the testimony upon both sides, and after having done so, to render such a verdict as was in full accordance with their own judgments. The authorities on point II, apply to this.
Alexander H. Reavey, for defendants, appellants.
This appeal is taken from a judgment docketed on June 2,1866, against the appellant and in favor of the respondent, for the sum of $529.30; and also from an order dated April 24, 1866, denying a motion for a new trial.
I. The verdict is against the weight of evidence.
There can be no doubt but that the court at general term may examine the evidence at large, overrule the conclusions of fact to which the jury have arrived, and order a new trial upon the whole case. (Macy agt. Wheeler, 18 Abb. R. 73; Jackson agt. Sternberg, 1 Caines, 163; 1 Graham & Waterman on New Trials, 375.)
H. The court erred in sustaining the objection to the fol lowing question: “ In consequence of Mr. Grow not having the work completed by the 15th of October, how much did you lose on your contract with Mr. Jones ?”
III. The court erred in putting the question, <c $1,500 would be a contract for a rough job ?”
It is submitted that the exception thereto was well taken. The question was not pertinent, and was calculated to mislead and prejudice the jury against the appellant.
IV. -The court erred in making the following comment: “ $1,500 for a building of this dimension, is little enough.”
It is submitted that the exception thereto was well taken.
V. The court erred in excluding the question : In consequence of the delay of Mr. Grow to complete the work at the time agreed upon, what amount of damage did you sustain?
It is submitted that this question was proper.' It was put to prove and establish one of the very issues upon which the jury had to pass in determining the case.
VI. The court erred in excluding the question: Were you acquainted with the value of rentals in that vicinity during May, 1860 ? and also the defendants’ offer to show the loss of rent on the building from October 15th to 6th December.
By this question and offer, it was intended to establish an issue presented by the pleadings in the case.
VII. The court erred in excluding the question: State the contents of that paper ?
It was intended to prove that notice had been served upon the respondent, to the effect that the defendant would employ others to complete the work under the contract, and the amounts paid therefor would be charged to the respondent. Before this question had been propounded, the respondent upon his cross-examination, had denied having received sijch a notice. Besides, the respondent was apprised by the defendants’ pleading, that such fact would be proved, and, therefore, it was not necessary to serve notice requiring the production of such notice. (Forward agt. Harris, 30 Barb. R. 338, 343; People agt. Holbrook, 13 Johns. 90 ; Hardin agt. Kretsinger, 17 Id. 293 ; People agt. Smith, 20 Id. 63 ; Story agt. Patten, 3 Wend. 486; Wilson agt. Gale, 4 Id. 623; Hammond agt. Hopping, Id. 505; Edwards agt. Bonneau, 1 Sandf. 610 ; 1 Greenl. on Evidence, § 561, p. 694 ; Norris agt. Freeman, 3 Wils. 38; 1 Gra. & Wat. New Trials, p. 374.)
VIII. The court erred in charging the jury as follows : ■ “ It would seem as though the price named in the contract ($1,500), would not call for a very superior class of work.”
This was not the issue that the jury were called upon to decide; their attention was diverted from the true issue, and was calculated to prejudice the appellants’ rights. (Harding agt. Barney, 7 Bosw. 353; Harris agt. Wilson, 1 Wend. 511; Hollister agt. Johnson 4 Id. 639 ; 1 Graham & Waterman on New Trials, 27, 310 ; N. Y. Fire Ins. Co. agt. Walden, 12 Johns. 513 ; Tufts agt. Seabury, 13 Pick. 140 ; 3 Graham & Waterman on New Trials, 724, 729 and 774.)
In Benham agt. Cary (11 Wend. 83), and West agt. Anderson (9 Conn. R. 107), the court says : “ Where the charge of the court has a tendency to make an erroneous impression upon the jury, and to mislead them in their views, a new trial will be granted.”
Beference is respectfully requested to the subject entitled “ General Bemarks,” in 3 Graham & Waterman on New Trials (pp. 706, 707 and 708).
IX. The court erred in not charging the jury upon the law applicable to the facts proved, and for this reason a new trial should be granted. (1 Graham & Waterman on New Trials, 273 ; 3 Id. 708, 709, 718; Morrison agt. Muspratt, 12 Moore, 231; Calbreath agt. Gracy, 1 Wash. C. C. R. 198.)
X. It is respectfully submitted that the judgment and order appealed from should be reversed.

Opinion:
By the court, Robertson, Ch. J.
Four defenses were made by the answer in this case, and of course there were as many issues to be tried by the jury. 1. Whether a sum was paid by the defendants to the plaintiff, exceeding the work actually done by him. 2. Whether the defendants sustained damage by the unworkmanlike and unskillful performance of such work. 3. Whether such work was not completed within the time agreed on; and, 4. Whether the defendants sustained damage by the abandonment of such work by the plaintiff.
All of such issues are presumed to have been passed upon by the jury, unless expressly withdrawn from their consideration, and every such evidence which might influence them in deciding any of such issues improperly, being illegal, should be excluded, if objected to.
In this case, a question was put to a "witness (the defendant Becker), whether the price to be paid was " that on a contract for a rough job ?" To which the defendants' counsel objected, and excepted touts admission. This question evidently might have had its effect on the jury, for even the learned justice before whom the action was tried, remarked to them, " that the price named in the contract did not call for a very superior class of workand the jury might have been induced to think from the admission of the evidence, that they were authorized to determine the class of work from the price paid, and were to be governed by that.
It is true, the judge in charging the jury, confined his remarks otherwise to the question of abandonment.
But he did not exclude from their consideration the other defenses in the action, in determining on which the jury might-have been governed by the improper evidence already admitted, as the judge evidently was.
I do not deem it necessary in this case, to discuss the question, whether, on a motion for a new trial on a case, for misdirection of the judge, it is essential that an exception should have been taken to his charge on the trial, on the point objected to on the hearing. Although Archer agt. Hubbell (4 Wend. 514), seems to-be decisive of it in the supreme court, sustained as it is by People agt. Holmes (5 Wend. 193), and Hastings agt. McKinley (3 Code R. 10), this court seems in Cook agt. Hill (3 Sandf. 341), and Stoddard agt. Long Island R. R. Co. (5 Id. 180), to have held differently; but it seems also to have been governed by the consideration that upon the whole case, the party succeeding was entitled to recover.
But for the error in admitting the testimony in answer to the question, whose admission was objected to, the defendant is entitled to a new trial, with costs to abide the event.