Case Name: Robert MAY, Appellant, v. FLORIDA PAROLE AND PROBATION COMMISSION, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1982-12-22
Citations: 424 So. 2d 122
Docket Number: No. AJ-470
Parties: Robert MAY, Appellant, v. FLORIDA PAROLE AND PROBATION COMMISSION, Appellee.
Judges: WIGGINTON, J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 424
Pages: 122–127

Head Matter:
Robert MAY, Appellant, v. FLORIDA PAROLE AND PROBATION COMMISSION, Appellee.
No. AJ-470.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
Dec. 22, 1982.
Robert May, in pro. per., for appellant.
Malcolm S. Greenfield, Gen. Counsel, Tallahassee, for appellee.

Opinion:
McCORD, Judge.
This appeal is from an order of the Florida Parole and Probation Commission (the Commission). We affirm.
Appellant May is serving sentences in the state prison for several felony convictions. On December 3, 1980, his presumptive parole release date (PPRD) was initially set for July 31, 1984, under the then-existing (1979) matrix guidelines established by rule of the Commission for determining such tentative release date. On May 30, 1981, while still in prison, appellant was convicted of the crime of introduction of contraband into a correctional institution and was sentenced to one year in prison to run consecutively with his previous sentences. Based on this conviction, the Commission reinter-viewed appellant, aggregated his present and previous convictions and recalculated his PPRD based on new matrix time ranges adopted by the Commission on September 10, 1981 (Rule 23-21.09, Florida Administrative Code).
Appellant contends first that the Commission's recalculation of his initial PPRD based on the 1981 guidelines violates an order issued by the Circuit Court of the Second Judicial Circuit directing the Commission to establish a new PPRD in light of appellant's latest conviction based on the 1979 matrix guidelines. This contention is without merit. The order referred to by appellant was in response to a petition for writ of mandamus which had been filed in the circuit court by appellant to compel the Commission to determine his PPRD. Before the court ruled, the Commission established appellant's PPRD, and thereafter, the court, apparently unaware of the Commission's action, granted the writ and ordered the Commission to establish his PPRD within 30 days of the order. The order is devoid of any suggestion that the establishment of appellant's PPRD was necessitated by his latest conviction or that his PPRD was to be based on the 1979 guidelines. The only logical inference to be drawn is that the order was issued because the Commission had failed to timely establish appellant's PPRD and because the court was unaware at the time of issuance of its order that the Commission had previously set appellant's PPRD. Thus, by the time the order issued, it was moot. Consequently, there is no basis for concluding that the Commission violated the court's order by failing to conduct a hearing to establish appellant's PPRD within 30 days of the order.
Appellant next contends that the Commission's setting of his new PPRD, based on the 1981 matrix guidelines, violated state and federal constitutional proscriptions against ex post facto laws in that the new PPRD was set pursuant to the rule in effect at that time rather than the rule in effect when he committed the crimes. We have previously ruled adversely to this contention in several cases. See Overfield v. Florida Parole and Probation Commission, 418 So.2d 321 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982); Britt v. Florida Parole and Probation Commission, 417 So.2d 1079 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982); Hurst v. Florida Parole and Probation Commission, 418 So.2d 444 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982); and Lopez v. Florida Parole and Probation Commission, 410 So.2d 1354 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982). As we stated in Overfield:
Without extended discussion of whether amendments to the matrix rule constitute procedural changes not subject to ex post facto considerations, or are substantive changes, we cannot agree that such amendments necessarily increase punishment and are, therefore, illegal. The matrix time range does not automatically determine time served, and the Commission in its discretion may aggravate or mitigate the matrix time, setting a release date above or below the matrix, so long as it states its reasons with particularity. [Citations ommitted.] This process is to be contrasted with that addressed in Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 101 S.Ct. 960, 67 L.Ed.2d 17 (1981), where statutory changes in gain-time credits automatically reduced, without discretionary decision-making, the time to be served.
In addition to the rationale stated in the opinions in the foregoing cases, we add that a presumptive parole release date is only presumptive. It is discretionary prologue to the Commission's final exercise of its discretion in setting an inmate's effective parole release date. Section 947.18, Florida Statutes, which was in effect at all times pertinent to this case, gives the Commission ultimate discretion to decide when to parole an inmate even though his presumptive parole release date may indicate an earlier date. See Gobie v. Florida Parole and Probation Commission, 416 So.2d 838 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982). The establishment of a presumptive parole release date by the Commission is not analogous to an inmate's accumulation of statutory gain time — the subject matter of the United States Supreme Court's opinion in Weaver.
Pursuant to Article V, Section 3(b)(4), of the Constitution of Florida, we certify that the following question passed upon by us in this cause is one of great public importance:
When, after the Florida Parole and Probation Commission has set a prisoner's presumptive parole release date, the prisoner commits another crime thereby requiring that a new presumptive parole release date be set, does the Commission violate state and federal proscriptions against ex post facto laws when, in fixing the new presumptive parole release date, it uses more stringent guidelines adopted by it after the latter crime was committed?
AFFIRMED.
WIGGINTON, J., concurs.
SHIVERS, J., dissents.