Case Name: LINE DRIVERS, PICKUP AND DELIVERY LOCAL UNION NO. 81, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ROADWAY EXPRESS INCORPORATED, Defendant-Appellee
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 1998-08-06
Citations: 152 F.3d 1098
Docket Number: No. 97-35582
Parties: LINE DRIVERS, PICKUP AND DELIVERY LOCAL UNION NO. 81, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ROADWAY EXPRESS INCORPORATED, Defendant-Appellee.
Judges: Before: ALARCON, FERGUSON, and BRUNETTI, Circuit Judges.
Reporter: Federal Reporter 3d Series
Volume: 152
Pages: 1098–1102

Head Matter:
LINE DRIVERS, PICKUP AND DELIVERY LOCAL UNION NO. 81, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ROADWAY EXPRESS INCORPORATED, Defendant-Appellee.
No. 97-35582.
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
Argued and Submitted July 9, 1998.
Decided Aug. 6, 1998.
Darrell L. Cornelius, Portland, Oregon, for plaintiff-appellant.
Craig A. Crispin, Crispin & Associates, Portland, Oregon, for defendant-appellee.
Before: ALARCON, FERGUSON, and BRUNETTI, Circuit Judges.

Opinion:
Opinion by Judge BRUNETTI; Dissent by Judge FERGUSON.
BRUNETTI, Circuit Judge:
Appellant Line Drivers, Pickup and Delivery Local Union No. 81 (the Union) contends that the district court erred in granting summary judgment enforcing an arbitration award in favor of appellee Roadway Express, Inc. (the Employer). We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
I.
We review de novo the district court's grant of summary judgment confirming an arbitration award. Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n Local Union No. 359 v. Madison Indus., Inc., 84 F.3d 1186, 1190 (9th Cir.1996). However, judicial review of an arbitration award is "limited and highly deferential." Id. So long as an arbitrator's award "draws its essence from the collective bargaining agreement" and "represents a plausible interpretation of the contract," the court is bound to enforce it. United Food & Commercial Workers Union, Local 1119, AFL-CIO v. United Markets, Inc., 784 F.2d 1413, 1415 (9th Cir.1986).
"A reviewing court is bound — under all except the most limited circumstances — to defer to the decision of [the arbitrator], even if . that . decision finds the facts and states the law erroneously." SFIC Properties, Inc. v. Int'l Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, Dist. Lodge 94, Local Lodge 311, 103 F.3d 923, 924-25 (9th Cir.1996). "If, on its face, the award represents a plausible interpretation of the contract, judicial inquiry ceases and the award must be enforced." Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n Local No. 359, AFL-CIO v. Arizona Mechanical & Stainless, Inc., 863 F.2d 647, 653 (9th Cir.1988).
An award may also be upheld if it is based on the arbitrator's understanding of industry practices. SFIC, 103 F.3d at 925. An arbitrator is "not confined to the express terms of the contract"; he may also consider the "industrial common law" which "is equally a part of the collective bargaining agreement although not expressed in it." Id. "The arbitrator's finding is not beyond the essence of the contract if it is derived from the arbitrator's unique expertise." Id.
II.
The relevant fact's in this case are undisputed. On June 19,1996, Roger Bowman, an employee of Roadway Express, was physically assaulted by several of his coworkers. Bowman did not report the incident to any management or supervisory personnel until November 25,1996, when he told his manager Dennis Brown of the assault, and expressed concerns for his safety. Brown told Bowman to submit a sworn affidavit regarding the incident, which he did on December 4,1996. That same day, all of the employees involved in the incident, except .Bowman, were discharged pursuant to the terms of their collective bargaining agreement (CBA).
On December 12,1996, the Union filed two grievances on behalf of the discharged employees, challenging the discharges both on the merits and on timeliness grounds under the CBA. Two CBA Grievance Committees issued oral, unanimous decisions upholding the discharges.
The Union then ified two suits seeking to have the decisions of the Grievance Committees vacated, which suits were consolidated into the present action. The district court granted summary judgment for the Employer, finding that the Grievance Committees' interpretations of the CBA were plausible. The Union now appeals that decision.
III.
The provision of the CBA in question here is Article 46, Section 2(b), which provides as follows:
Discharge or suspension must be by proper written notice to the employee and the Union affected within ten (10) days exclusive of Saturday, Sunday and holidays of the occurrence of the violation claimed by the Employer as the basis for discharge or suspension, except where dishonesty is involved. In cases where dishonesty is involved the discharge or suspension notice must be within twenty (20) calendar days of the Employer obtaining verifiable evidence of the alleged dishonesty.
The sole issue before us is whether the district court erred in holding that the CBA Grievance Committees properly construed the term "occurrence" in Article 46, Section 2(b) as requiring the Employer's knowledge of the incident. We agree with the district court that this was a plausible, commonsense reading of the provision, given that the Employer could not have possibly disciplined the employees who participated in the assault before it had knowledge of the misconduct. Once the Employer learned of the incident, it acted expeditiously to discipline the offending employees within the allotted ten days.
The Union argues that the language of the CBA requires the Employer to give notice of discipline within ten days of the actual misconduct, regardless of when the Employer learns of the incident. While the provision at issue certainly could be read this way, it is not the job of courts to second-guess arbitrators so long as their understanding of the CBA draws its essence from the contract. See United Markets, 784 F.2d at 1415.
Moreover, under the Union's reading of the CBA, those employees who manage to conceal their misconduct beyond the ten-day period will be unjustly rewarded for covering up their actions. Thus, it is easy to see how the arbitrators, based on their expertise, rejected this interpretation. We do not believe this case presents one of "those egregious cases in which . the arbitrator's award ignored the plain language of the contract" or the arbitrator "`manifestly disregarded' the contours of the bargain expressed in outline by the collective bargaining agreement." See Stead, 886 F.2d at 1205 n. 6.
Because the Grievance Committees' decisions were entirely plausible and reasonable under the circumstances, they must be enforced.
AFFIRMED.
. The Grievance Committees did not express the grounds for their decisions. See Stead Motors of Walnut Creek v. Automotive Machinists Lodge No. 1173, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, 886 F.2d 1200, 1206 (9th Cir.1989) (citation omitted) (stating that arbitrators have no obligation to give their reasons for an award). However, in a later arbitration proceeding against another worker involved in the attack on Bowman,. the Grievance Committee expressly found for the discharged employee on the basis that he was given notice of his discharge more than ten days after the Employer received knowledge of the incident.