Case Name: STEPHENS v. STATE
Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1922-03-29
Citations: 245 S.W. 687
Docket Number: No. 6769
Parties: STEPHENS v. STATE.
Judges: 
Reporter: South Western Reporter
Volume: 245
Pages: 687–692

Head Matter:
STEPHENS v. STATE.
(No. 6769.)
(Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
March 29, 1922.
On Motion for Rehearing, Dec. 20, 1922.)
I.Jury &wkey;>148(4) — Administration of oath in usual form not error, where no juror indicated desire to affirm.
In a prosecution for murder, no ground of complaint could be based on the fact that the oath was administered to the jury in the usual form as against the assertion that possibly some juror decided to affirm and not be sworn; no objection being made by any of the jurors.
2. Witnesses <&wkey;237( I)— Question by state held not objectionable as assuming fact of shooting by defendant.
In a prosecution for murder, it was not error to permit the state to ask a witness what part of deceased’s body was toward S. “when he shot him on the front gallery there — his back or his face?” as against the objection that the question assumed as a fact that deceased was shot by defendant, it not appearing that the court’s conclusion as stated by him that the objection was groundless under the evidence, was incorrect.
3. Criminal law <&wkey;404(3) — Pistol and scabbard found in defendant’s possession soon after shooting admissible.
In a prosecution for murder, introduction in evidence of a pistol and scabbard found in defendant’s possession a few minutes after the shooting, field not error.
4. Witnesses <&wkey;255(3) — Allowing witness to refresh memory from memoranda not error.
In a prosecution for murder, it was not error to permit a physician who had examined the body of deceased to refresh his memory from a typewritten copy of memoranda taken by him at the time as to how many bullet wounds he found in the body, he having verified the correctness of the copy at the time of the shooting.
5. Criminal law <&wkey;!09l(ll) — Bill of exceptions insufficient as not showing what testimony was after objection to evidence overruled.
On an appeal from a conviction of murder, a bill of exceptions to the action of the court in allowing a physician to refresh his memory from memoranda as to the number of bullet wounds he found in deceased’s body, is insufficient, where it does not show what the testimony of the witness was after objection was overruled.
6. Homicide <&wkey; 193 — Question as to whether deceased’s daughter knew if deceased had a pistol held not error.
In a prosecution for murder, it was not error to admit testimony of a daughter of deceased, who was asked if she knew whether or not her father had a pistol, on objection that he might have bought one without her knowledge, or might have had it in the place unknown to her.
7. Criminal law <@=ol037(2) — Bills of exception to arguments of state’s attorney not necessarily prejudicial will not be considered in absence of request to disregard.
In the absence of a request for an instruction to the jury not to consider, bills of exceptions to remarks of the state’s attorney in argument in murder trials, which are not per se so inflammatory or abusive as to necessarily injure the rights of accused, present nothing for consideration on appeal'.
<S=»For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes
8. Criminal law <&wkey;1037(2) — Arguments of state’s attorney held not so injurious as to reverse, in absence of instruction to disregard.
In a prosecution for murder by' shooting, that the state’s attorney held a cartridge in his hand which had been taken from defendant’s pistol, across the nose of the bullet in which a cross-mark had been cut, and stated that a “bad murder has been committed in our county and that is enough to make any jury bring in a verdict of death,” held, not so injurious as to necessitate reversal, in the absence of request for an instruction to disregard.
9. Criminal law &wkey;>719(3) — Statements by defendant’s attorney in argument as to facts in another case not permissible.
In a prosecution for murder, it was not error to refuse to permit defendant’s counsel in argument to narrate certain facts claimed by him to have transpired during the trial of another case in another county which said attorney stated had occurred within his knowledge and experience.
10. Criminal law <&wkey;922(7) — Objection to charge raised for first time on motion for new trial, held insufficient.
An objection to the court’s charge raised for the first time on a motion for new trial is not sufficient to present any question relevant thereto.
11. Criminal law <&wkey;>l 166!/2(5) — Nonattendance of veniremen held not injurious to defendant in murder trial.
In a murder prosecution, a bill of exceptions to the court’s refusal to sustain a motion to quash the special venire on the ground that subsequent to the issuance of the venire writ, and prior to the trial, there was a tremendous fall of rain amounting to a flood, and that the number of veniremen in attendance was but a little over a third of the number drawn, held to disclose no ground for complaint, no injury to defendant being shown or even claimed.
On Motion for Rehearing.
12. Courts <&wkey;64(6) — District court at special term has same power and is governed by same procedure as at regular term.
The special term of the district court called under Code Cr. Proc. 1911, art. 94, when organized, has the same power and is governed by the same procedure as at regulai term, in view of Const, art. 5, § 8.
13. Homicide c&wkey;347 — Death penalty will not be set aside on ground that malice was implied rather than express.
In a prosecution for murder, where the jury inflicted the death penalty, the appellate court would not set aside the death > penalty on the ground that the malice shown was implied rather than express, the jury being authorized. to inflict such penalty.
(gsaJTor other cases see same tojoic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes
Appeal from District Court, Bexar County; S. G. Tayloe, Judge.
G. W. Stephens was convicted of murder, and he appeals.
Affirmed.
J. W. Conger, of San Antonio, for appellant.
D. A. McAskill, Dist. Atty., and W. S. Anthony, Asst. Dist. Atty., both of San Antonio, and R. G. Storey, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.

Opinion:
DATTIMORE, J.
Appellant was convicted in the district court of Bexar county of murder, and his punishment fixed at death.
A strong presentation is made on behalf of appellant, of the fact that the grand jury that indicted him was selected by a special judge and at a special term of the court. The same question has recently been decided liy us and with reference to the identical judge and court in Ex parte Holland, No. 6713, 238 S. W. 654, and because of the fact that the subject was fully discussed and decided adversely to appellant, we content ourselves with reference to that case for a decision on this point herein. Por the reason stated in the Ex parte Holland Case, supra, we conclude no error is shown by appellant's bills of exception Nos. 1, 2, and 3, complaining in various ways of the lower court's action in overruling his motions to quash the indictment.
By bill of exceptions No. 4, appellant complains of the fact that the oath was administered to the jury in the usual form. The complaint seems based upon some assertion that possibly some juror desired to affirm, and not be sworn. We do not think the matter tenable. Had any juror selected upon the venire panel so desired and have indicated this to the trial court, he would have been permitted to affirm. No objection having been made by any of said jurors, we must conclude that an oath in the usual form was satisfactory to them and accepted by them as binding upon their consciences.
By his bill of exeeeptions No. 5 appellant complains of the fact that the state was permitted to ask a witness this question: "What part of his body was toward Stephens when he shot him on the front gallery there — his back or his face?" The complaint is that this is an assumption of the fact that deceased was in -fact shot by appellant. The court overruled the objection, stating that diere was sufficient evidence before him to enable him to know that tho objection was groundless. We are not informed by anything in the bill of the incorrectness of the court's conclusion, and in this condition of the record no error is presented. This court's universal rule is to uphold the action of the lower court in any specific ruling, unless the bill shows its error.
When arrested, appellant was found in possession of a pistol and scabbard. Both these were offered in evidence by the state. He was arrested a few minutes after the shooting. We see no ground of objection to the introduction in evidence of said objects.
A physician who examined the body of deceased shortly after the homicide was asked how many bullet wounds he found thereon. Witness asked permission to refer to a memorandum which he had, in order to refresh his recollection. Appellant objected to the memorandum because not made by the witness. The witness stated that he made pencil notes of the number and location of the wounds at the time he examined the body, and that said pencil memorandum was made the basis of a typewritten statement thereof, this being the document now in possession of said witness, the correctness of which was verified by him after it was written and when it was returned to him on the same day or next day after the homicide. There was no error in overruling the objection and permitting the witness to refresh his recollection from a document whose correctness he had verified at or about the time of the incident. The bill of exceptions in any event would be insufficient, as it does not show what the testimony of the witness was after the objection of the appellant to his refreshing his recollection was overruled.
No error appears in bill of exceptions No. 9, wherein is presented appellant's objection to the testimony of a daughter of deceased who was asked if she knew whether or not her father had a pistol. If the witness knew the fact she was competent to testify thereto, and an objection that he may have bought one without her knowledge or may have had it in some place unknown to her, would not suffice to reject the testimony. The same hypothetical objections might be made to a statement made by any witness of facts said by him to exist within his knowledge.
The trial court did not err in overruling appellant's request for an instructed verdict. A review of the entire evidence in the case has satisfied us that, not only was the guilt of the accused sufficiently proven to take it to the jury, but that the jury's verdict in finding him guilty .is also supported and justified by the evidence.
The bill of exceptions to remark of the state's attorney to the jury in his argument, which remark, is not per se so inflammatory or abusive as to necessarily injure the rights of the accused, would pre'sent nothing for our consideration, in the absence of a request on the part of appellant that the jury be instructed not to consider steh remarks. It is shown that the state's attorney held a cartridge in his' hand which was taken from the pistol of appellant upon his arrest shortly after this homicide, across the nose of the bullet in which cartridge a cross-mark had been cut. The attorney said, "A bad murder has been corn-mitted in our county, and that is enough to make any jury bring in a verdict of death," holding up and exhibiting said cartridge. We do not believe the remark of such injurious character as to call for any action on our part, and especially in view of the fact that no request either orally or in writing was presented asking that the jury be instructed not to consider same.
The court below declined to permit appellant's counsel in his argument to narrate certain facts claimed by him to have transpired during the progress of the trial of a case in McLennan county, which said attorney stated had occurred within his knowledge and experience. We are unable to perceive any error in this. This is going beyond the ordinary rule of illustration or argument. It is permitting the attorney to become a witness and to testify to matters foreign to any issue involved, and about which he does not propose to permit cross-examination, and the truth of which could have no legitimate bearing upon the matters before the court. The court properly declined to- permit such argument.
An objection to the court's charge, raised for the first time in a motion for new trial, is not sufficient to present any question relative thereto. Such • exception should have been taken, if desired by appellant, before the argument begun, in accordance with the direction of our statutes.
Appellant presents three bills of exception to the form of the verdict, and attempting to raise the question that said verdict is not responsive to the evidence and should not have been received by the trial court. Said verdict was in the usual form assessing the death penalty, and we find nothing in either of said bills of exception calling for any discussion or consideration at our hands.
Appellant has a bill of exceptions to the refusal of the trial court to sustain his motion to quash the special venire. The recitals of said motion set forth that subsequent to the issuance of the venire writ, and prior to the day set for trial, there was a tremendous fall of rain amounting to a flood in San Antonio, arid that on the day set apart for this trial the number of veniremen in attendance at the court was but a little over one-third the number of names drawn on said list. No effort seems to have been made on behalf of appellant, by attachment or other alias process, to have said absent veniremen brought in or their absence accounted for. In this condition of the record appellant is in no condition to complain. It is not shown how the failure to have the full number of veniremen drawn, present, and available, from which to select the jury to try appellant, injured appellant. No injury 'is made apparent or even claimed by appellant as resulting fi'om the condition which he asserts prevented the absent veniremen from being present. This disposes of all of the complaints made by appellant in this record.
We see no particular good which can result from a statement of the facts. Appellant was engaged in building a house near the home of deceased, and seems to have concluded that some one was removing material and lumber from his premises. According to the state's case, he went to the home of deceased and stated to the latter's wife that he was going to have everybody in the community arrested and charged with theft of his material, but that if she would tell him who was doing it, he would make it light on her. She told him that if he wanted to make any such talk as that to make it to her husband, who was then absent. When deceased came home he went over to the building, and was heard by witnesses to say to appellant that he was not going to stand for any one to use such language as that to his wife. Immediately a shot was heard, and deceased started across away from where appellant was, stepping on the floor joist, the flooring plank not yet having been put down. He fell between the. joist, and then climbed out onto the porch floor, and other shots were fired by appellant, and deceased expired within a few minutes. Appellant came out on the porch of his unfinished house, sat down and twirled a pistol in his hand and remained substantially in this position until the officers came and arrested him. He testified to a hip pocket movement op the part 6f deceased which led him to believe his life was in danger and that in consequence he drew his pistol and began firing. The reconciliation of these matters of conflicting testimony was for the jury, and, under a charge which seems to fairly' submit every theory of the case, they have found appellant guilty and assessed his punishment at death.
Finding no error in the record, the judgment of the trial court will be affirmed.