Case Name: Susan FOWLER v. Ronald DUNSHEE and Julie Dunshee
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1987-08-26
Citations: 511 So. 2d 1323
Docket Number: No. 87-CA-175
Parties: Susan FOWLER V. Ronald DUNSHEE and Julie Dunshee.
Judges: Before CHEHARDY, C.J., and KLIEBERT and GRISBAUM, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 511
Pages: 1323–1326

Head Matter:
Susan FOWLER V. Ronald DUNSHEE and Julie Dunshee.
No. 87-CA-175.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fifth Circuit.
Aug. 26, 1987.
Dissenting Opinion Sept. 3, 1987.
Rehearing Denied Sept. 17, 1987.
Malcolm B. Robinson, Jr., The Law Offices of Malcolm B. Robinson, Jr., Metairie, for defendant-appellant.
George B. Recile, New Orleans, for plaintiff-appellee.
Before CHEHARDY, C.J., and KLIEBERT and GRISBAUM, JJ.

Opinion:
GRISBAUM, Judge.
This appeal relates to a suit for default on a promissory note. The trial court determined the obligation was a community debt and held that the wife was "personally" liable for the note signed by her husband during the existence of the community regime. We amend and, as amended, affirm.
ISSUE
The sole question presented is whether a spouse who did not incur the disputed obligation nor dispose of community assets other than for the payment of community debts is to be held liable beyond her interest in the community regime for the obligation incurred during the existence of that regime.
FACTS
On June 4, 1983, Mr. Ronald Dunshee and Ms. Susan Fowler signed an agreement in which Mr. Dunshee purchased all the assets and inventory of a business known as Driftwood Ceramics. As consideration, Mr. Dunshee was to pay Ms. Fowler $12,-000 for which he signed a promissory note dated June 6,1983, payable to her order on demand. Thereafter, demand was made to no avail, resulting in suit and this appeal.
At the time of the execution of the note, Ronald and Julie Dunshee were married. The record shows Ms. Dunshee was divorced from Mr. Dunshee by virtue of a December 13, 1985 judgment. They previously had obtained a legal separation by judgment dated November 17, 1983. Subsequently, the Dunshees reconciled, obtaining a second judgment of separation on April 29, 1985 (the petition having been filed on February 6 amid proceedings that led to the December 1985 divorce). Accordingly, when Mr. Dunshee signed the note, no legal separation had been obtained; however, Ms. Dunshee claims that the two were not "at that time" living together and further states that Mr. Dunshee, in accord with her request, had left the family home on May 29, 1983. However, as emphasized by opposing counsel at trial, in her separation petition alleging abandonment and at the trial thereof, Ms. Dunshee had asserted that her husband had left about July 22, 1983. Under cross-examination by her own counsel, Ms. Dunshee explains that she can accurately date her husband's leaving because a friend, Carolyn Ganucheau, and her family moved into the Dunshee residence on May 28 to live with her.
Finally, she recapitulates that, at the time, she knew neither that her husband was attempting to purchase Driftwood Ceramics nor that he had signed a promissory note. She also noted she never participated in the business and never benefited from it.
ANALYSIS
The trial court reasoned that, since Mr. and Ms. Dunshee were married at the time the obligation was incurred, there was a legal presumption that the obligation was a community debt. In its Reasons for Judgment, the trial court states:
There was no evidence presented to rebut the presumption other than that the defendants were physically separated and Mrs. Dunshee had no knowledge or benefits from the purchase of this business. A petition for legal separation was filed on November 14, 1984 subsequent to the signing of the purchase contract.
Likewise, no evidence was presented to show that the business was bought for some reason other than the common interest of the defendants or for the benefit of the community. Further, no evidence was presented to show that the business was purchased with Mr. Dun-shee's separate funds. Therefore, the debt is a community debt owed by both defendants jointly. C.C. Art. 2360, et seq. Mr. Dunshee was never served in these proceedings. For that procedural reason, Mrs. Dunshee alone, is cast for the total amount.
After a careful review of the record in its entirety, we find there was evidence that, upon the trial court's reasonable evaluation of credibility, furnished a legal basis for its finding. There being no manifest error, we will not disturb these findings and must agree with them.
However, we find the question whether the obligation is deemed separate or community is not dispositive in light of La.C.C. art. 2357 which in part states:
An obligation incurred by a spouse before or during the community property regime, may be satisfied after termination of the regime from the property of the former community and from the separate property of the spouse who incurred the obligation.
If a spouse disposes of property of the former community for a purpose other than the satisfaction of community obligations, he is liable for all obligations incurred by the other spouse up to the value of that community property.
By this provision the legislature has determined that pre-termination creditors may satisfy their respective obligations from property of the former community and from the separate property of the spouse who incurred the obligation. It follows that the partition of the assets of the former community between the husband and the wife, although effective as to them, cannot affect pre-dissolution creditors. It also follows that the spouse who has not incurred the obligation becomes personally liable only by disposing of assets of the former community for a purpose other than payment of community obligations. First Security Bank and Trust Co. v. Dooley, 480 So.2d 842, 845 (La.App. 2d Cir.1985); Bridgeman & Conway v. Korner Realty Co., Inc., 405 So.2d 344, 346 (La.App.4th Cir.1981). Therefore, whether the obligation incurred by Mr. Dunshee is deemed a separate or a community obligation is immaterial. The assets of the former community — not Ms. Dunshee's separate property nor Ms. Dunshee personally — are liable for the debt.
For the reasons assigned, the judgment of April 8, 1986 is hereby amended to limit Julie Dunshee's liability to the extent of her interest in the property of the former community existing between herself and Ronald Dunshee pursuant to La.C.C. art. 2357. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed. Each party to this appeal is to be held responsible for his or her own costs.
AMENDED AND AFFIRMED.
KLIEBERT, J., dissents with written reasons to follow.