Case Name: The Iroquois Furnace Company v. James McCrea
Court: Illinois Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Illinois
Decision Date: 1901-06-19
Citations: 191 Ill. 340
Docket Number: 
Parties: The Iroquois Furnace Company v. James McCrea.
Judges: 
Reporter: Illinois Reports
Volume: 191
Pages: 340–351

Head Matter:
The Iroquois Furnace Company v. James McCrea.
Opinion filed June 19, 1901
Rehearing denied October 9, 1901.
1. Evidence—when photograph is properly denied admission. In a personal injury case a photograph is properly denied admission where it is not shown to be a correct representation of the place of injury as it was prior to or at the time of the injury.
2. Same—when evidence of in sufficient light for work is proper. In an action for injuries received by a servant in falling from a dump pile on a dark night, evidence that all the torches and lights furnished by the master were in use is properly admitted as bearing upon due care by the plaintiff, even though such evidence could not be considered on the question of defendant’s negligence, owing to there being no allegations of negligence in that regard.
3. Trial—what a proper examination of jurors upon their voir dire. If an attorney for a certain casualty company is present with the attorneys for the defendant in a personal injury case it is proper to permit plaintiff’s counsel, for the purpose of enabling them to exercise their right to peremptory challenge at least, to question certain jurors upon their voir dire, as to their interest in such casualty company.
Wilkin, C. J., and Cartwright, J., dissenting.
Iroquois Furnace Co. v. McCrea, 91 Ill. App. 337, affirmed.
Appeal from the Appellate Court for the First District;—heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. E. F. Dunne, Judge, presiding.
The following statement of facts in this case is made by the Appellate Court:
“This is an action to recover damages for personal injuries sustained by appellee, as is charged, through negligence of appellant. Appellee was employed as night foreman of appellant, a corporation engaged in conducting an iron foundry. The'work of appellee consisted in part in superintending the removal of cinders and refuse from the furnaces to a dump-pile. The evidence tends to show that this dump-pile was from time to time reduced by removal of wagon loads of the cinders and refuse from it during the daytime. Such removals left the pile with a sloping surface, sloping from its top usually at an angle of about sixty degrees. Just prior to the injury in question there had been an unusual amount of the contents of the pile removed during the daytime, which resulted in leaving the pile with a sharp edge, presenting a perpendicular wall of about nine feet, instead of a sloping bank. This change was made by daytime, and there is evidence tending to show that it was effected within a day or two prior to the injury. There is no evidence that appellee was informed, when he came on for his night work, of these changes which had been made in the daytime. Appellee testified that he was unaware of the change. Upon the night of the injury it became the duty of appellee to direct one Flynn, an extra man employed by the appellant, to work wheeling cinders from the furnaces to the dump. Flynn came to appellee and stated that it was too dark to work without a light. Appellee started to go with Flynn to see if it was practicable to work about the dump without a light. The appellant company furnished torches to its employees, but at this time all the torches were in use, and there was none which appellee could take for his own use, or to furnish to Flynn, without depriving some other workman of his light. Appellee and Flynn went without a torch or other light toward the dump-pile, and, as they proceeded in the dark, appellee fell over the edge of a sharp declivity, and was injured. The injury consisted of a broken leg, which united, leaving the ankle enlarged and stiffened. The evidence tended to show a permanent lameness.”
The trial in the circuit court resulted in verdict and judgment in favor of appellee for $5000.00. From this judgment an appeal was taken to the Appellate Court, and the Appellate Court has affirmed the judgment of the circuit court. The present appeal is prosecuted from such judgment of affirmance.
Wall & Ross, (Percy Werner, of counsel,) for appellant.
King & Gross, (Andrew J. Hirschl, of counsel,) for appellee.

Opinion:
Per Curiam:
The questions whether the appellant was guilty of negligence which produced the injury, and whether the appellee was guilty of contributory negligence, and whether or not the damages assessed were excessive, are all questions of fact. These, and all the other questions of fact in the case, are settled by the judgments of the lower courts.
In disposing- of the other questions involved, the Appellate Court, in its decision, expressed the following views:
"We are of opinion that the action of appellee cannot be said to constitute negligence per se.
"The evidence as to demanding more torches from the assistant superintendent was not objected to, and evidence of the fact, that there was no light and no torch not in use when appellee went out with Flynn, was competent, not to establish negligence of appellant in failing to furnish one, for such negligence was not pleaded, but as bearing upon the reasonable care of appellee.
"The court did not err in excluding the photograph offered in evidence, for it did not appear that it .was a correct representation of the dump-pile, as it was at or prior to the time of the injury. If it were desired to present a photograph of the boilers only, one should have been prepared, which was not likely to mislead, by showing also the dump-pile as it was a year after the time in question.
"The following instruction was presented to the court by counsel for appellant:
" 'The court instructs you that, if you believe from the evidence, that the plaintiff knew of the removal of the dirt and debris from the dump-pile, or by the exercise of ordinary care could have known of the removal of dirt and debris from the dump-pile, and if the jury also believe from the evidence that the plaintiff failed to exercise ordinary care in going out to the place where he was injured in the night time, then your verdict must be for the defendant.'
"The court modified this instruction by inserting the words, 'at or near the place where plaintiff fell' after the words 'dump-pile.' This modification is complained of as error. The instruction taken altogether stated a correct proposition as tendered, and it was equally correct as modified. We are of opinion that the modification did not impose upon it any limitations which were prejudicial to appellant. Without its last hypothesis the instruction would iu either case, as tendered or as modified, be bad. It would not follow, because appellee knew of some removals from the pile which always left it with a gradually sloping bank, that, therefore, he was to be charged with notice of a new departure, by which the slope was changed into a sheer descent of nine feet. The words 'at or near the place where plaintiff fell' would, in their natural and reasonable application, cover any evidence which was introduced showing any knowledge of appellee of prior removals.
"The following instruction also was tendered by counsel for appellant:
" 'The court instructs you, that there are no allegations in the declaration that the defendant was guilty of negligence in failing to furnish the plaintiff lights at the time and place where he was injured, and, therefore, you will disregard all testimouy pertaining to the question of lights, and, unless you find the defendant is guilty of negligence as charged in the declaration, your verdict must be for the defendant. '
"The court modified this instruction so that it read as follows:
" 'The court instructs you there are no allegations in the declaration that the defendant was guilty of negligence in failing to furnish the plaintiff lights at the time and place he was injured; and therefore, you should not find the defendant guilty of negligence in regard to the furnishing of light or base your verdict upon any claimed want of light or torches, and unless you find the defendant is guilty of negligence as charged in the declaration, your verdict must be for the defendant. '
"This modification is assigned as error. We are of opinion that the instruction as tendered was bad, and that the modification by the court made it a proper instruction. The evidence referred to was competent to be considered upon the question of the care exercised by appellee. It was not competent as showing negligence of appellant, for such negligence was not alleged, and to that extent the instruction as modified properly excluded it.
"It is complained that the court erred in permitting counsel for appellee to question certain jurors upon their voir dire as to their interest in the Union Casualty Company. It appears that an attorney, representing that company, was present with the attorneys for appellant at the trial. The question was proper at least for the purpose of enabling counsel to exercise their right of peremptory challenge, if for no other purpose. (O'Hare v. Chicago, Madison and Northern Railroad Co. 139 Ill. 151; American Bridge Works v. Pereira, 79 Ill. App. 90, and cases therein cited.) The judgment is affirmed."
We concur in the views above expressed by the Appellate Court, and in the conclusion reached by them.
Accordingly, the judgment of the Appellate Court is affirmed.
judgment affirmed.