Case Name: Paul H. JAMESON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ST. TAMMANY PARISH POLICE JURY, Defendant-Appellee
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1969-07-02
Citations: 225 So. 2d 720
Docket Number: No. 7745
Parties: Paul H. JAMESON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ST. TAMMANY PARISH POLICE JURY, Defendant-Appellee.
Judges: Before LANDRY, SARTAIN and MARCUS, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 225
Pages: 720–727

Head Matter:
Paul H. JAMESON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ST. TAMMANY PARISH POLICE JURY, Defendant-Appellee.
No. 7745.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana. First Circuit.
July 2, 1969.
Rehearing Denied Aug. 28, 1969.
Talley, Anthony, Hughes & Knight, by Charles M. Hughes, Bogalusa, for plaintiff-appellant.
Woodrow W. Erwin, Dist. Atty., Frank-linton, and Julian J. Rodrigue, Asst. Dist. Atty., Covington, Milling, Saal, Saunders, Benson & Woodward, by R. King Milling, New Orleans, for defendant-appellee.
Before LANDRY, SARTAIN and MARCUS, JJ.

Opinion:
MARCUS, Judge.
Paul H. Jameson, plaintiff-appellant, is the owner of Green Spring Motel located on Louisiana Highway 21 approximately one mile north of Covington. In May, 1968 Mr. Jameson acquired the property adjoining his motel and proceeded to convert the residence thereon into a restaurant. He then applied to the St. Tammany Parish Police Jury for a liquor license. After considering the application, the license was denied because the use to which Mr. Jameson intended to put his property was in direct conflict with Ordinance 231 which zoned the said property against businesses of all kinds and restricted it to residential purposes only. Pursuant to LSA-R.S. 26:104 Mr. Jameson appealed the decision of the St. Tammany Police Jury to the 22nd Judicial District Court for the Parish of St. Tammany. The Military Road Civic Association, a nonprofit corporation, intervened in these proceedings uniting with defendant in resisting plaintiff's demands. The case was tried on the merits on September 13, 1968. The Police Jury's decision denying Mr. Jameson's application for a liquor license was affirmed by judgment dated December 18, 1968. From this adverse judgment plaintiff has taken an appeal to this Court.
The main thrust of plaintiff's complaint is that Ordinance 231 is illegal as being in violation of the Enabling Act requiring that zoning be carried out in accordance with a "comprehensive plan;" and if Ordinance 231 is not in violation of the Enabling Act, it is unconstitutional as being arbitrary and discriminatory.
In 1954, the State Legislature passed Act 518 of 1954. In general terms this act authorized the legislative body of St. Tammany Parish, being the St. Tammany Police Jury, to divide the parish into districts for zoning purposes. Pursuant to this authority, the Police Jury adopted Ordinance 223 on October 29, 1956 which created and appointed members to a Zoning Commission.
On November 5, 1956, the Zoning Commission held its first organization meeting and made the following policy decisions, to wit: (1) That the entire Parish be zoned "unrestricted" until such time as petitions were presented for zoning a particular area; (2) All such changes were to be made only after petition to the Commission; (3) No building- costing more than $1000 should he commenced within the Parish unless and until a building permit be obtained. At this organization meeting, the Zoning Commission further adopted the following temporary regulations which are pertinent to this case. (1) All petitions for zoning presented to the Commission were to be duly signed by bona fide property owners of record of more than 50% of the area desired to be zoned. (2) The petitioners were required to provide a map showing the area. (3) The area was not to be unreasonably large. (4) The petition must clearly define against which type of business or industry it was desired the area be zoned.
On January 30, 1957, a petition was presented to the Zoning Commission by Philip F. Burns on behalf of the residents on what is called "Military Road" requesting the zoning of a particular area against businesses of any kind and restricting the said district to residential purposes only.
On March 3, 1957, a public hearing was held after which the Zoning Commission went into executive session and adopted the following resolution:
"That for the purpose of promoting health, safety, morals, and the welfare of the community the Zoning Commission of St. Tammany Parish recommends to the legislative body of said parish that Zoning District No. 2 be created by them. Said district to be zoned against businesses of any and all kinds, including the placing of billboards, and restricting the said District to residential purposes only "
It was stipulated that the St. Tammany Parish Zoning Commission followed the requirements as set forth in their minutes of November 5, 1956, including the filing of a map covering the land area to be zoned and a petition representing more than 50% of the land owners; and that a public hearing was held in accordance with notice of publication by the Zoning Commission before recommending Zoned District No. 2 to the St. Tammany Parish Police Jury for adoption.
On April 18, 1957 the St. Tammany Parish Police Jury adopted Ordinance 231 which established Zoned District No. 2 and zoned the entire district, which included the property involved in the present litigation, against businesses of all kinds, restricting it to residential purposes only.
At the outset a distinction must be drawn between the legal issues involved in determining the conformity of Ordinance 231 with the Enabling Act as opposed to its constitutionality. In any event, the cases are legion in this State that zoning ordinances which are adopted in conformity with an enabling act, are presumed to have been adopted by the legislative authorities for valid purposes. As stated in Sears, Roebuck & Company v. City of Alexandria:
"Another pertinent general principle of law is that zoning ordinances, adopted in accordance with the procedure set up in the enabling statute, are presumed to have been adopted by the municipal authorities for valid purposes and their discretion will not be interfered with by the courts, unless it is clearly shown that the ordinance is arbitrary, unreasonable and in violation of the enabling statute. Archer v. City of Shreveport, 85 So.2d 337 (2nd Cir.App.1956); State ex rel. Dema Realty Co. v. McDonald, 168 La. 172, 121 So. 613; State ex rel. Civello v. City of New Orleans, 154 La. 271, 97 So. 440, 33 A.L.R. 260; 58 Am.Jur. 949 Verbo Zoning, Section 16. The burden is always upon the one assailing the zoning ordinance to overcome this presumption of validity. The court will uphold the ordinance unless it is clearly shown to be incompatible with the enabling legislative act or the constitution. Doubtful cases are decided in favor of the validity of the zoning law." 155 So.2d 776, 780 (La.App.3rd Cir. 1963), Writ denied, 245 La. 83, 157 So.2d 230 (1963).
In Meyers v. City of Baton Rouge, 185 So.2d 278, 286 (La.App.1st Cir. 1966) this Court, after reviewing the jurisprudence on the presumption in favor of the validity of zoning ordinances, concluded that:
"The ordinance in question is entitled to the presumption of validity and may not be declared unconstitutional unless its nullity is clear and palpable. Considering it is an exercise of defendant's police power, it may not be set aside unless abuse of such power is shown to be manifestly arbitrary or without reason or basis to support it."
The jurisprudence as set forth above suggests only two instances in which the presumption of validity can be defeated: first, if it can be shown that the ordinance is clearly and palpably in contravention of the enabling act; and second, if it can be proved that the ordinance is arbitrary or unreasonable.
First, we will consider whether Ordinance 231 violated Act 518 of 1954 which empowered the St. Tammany Police Jury to regulate the construction and use of property within the Parish for the "purpose of promoting health, safety, morals, or the general welfare of the community ." (Act 518, Sec. 1).
In order to carry out the purposes established in Section 1 above, the Police Jury was further authorized to :
" divide the said Parish into districts of such number, shape, and area as may be deemed best suited to carry out the purposes of this act; and within such districts it may regulate . All such regulations shall be uniform throughout each district, but the regulations of one district may differ from those in other districts." (Act 518, Sec. 2).
The regulations to be established in Section 2 of the enabling act were to be made:
" in accordance with a comprehensive plan and design to lessen congestion in the public streets; to secure safety from fire, to promote health and the general welfare; to provide adequate light and air; to avoid undue concentration of population (and) shall be made with reasonable consideration, among other things to the character of the district and its peculiat suitability for particular uses, and with a view to conserving the values of buijdings and encouraging the most propejr use of land throughout such municipality." (Act 518, Sec. 3.)
It is obvious from the reading of Section 2 above that the Act contemplated the creation of zoning districts. Nowhere is found any requirement that the whole Parish be divided into districts before any single district could be created. To the contrary, the Police Jury is specifically authorized to "divide the said Parish into districts of such number, shape, and area as may be deemed best suited to carry out the purposes of this Act." Section 2 further authorizes the Police Jury to regulate within such district and provides that such regulations shall be uniform. Section 3 requires that the regulations shall be made in accordance with a "comprehensive plan" and with reasonable consideration to the character of the district. No arguments have been advanced by plaintiff-appellant that the Police Jury was not authorized to zone by districts or that the regulations established under Zoned District No. 2 were not uniform. Moreover, the undisputed evidence clearly shows that the regulations were made with reasonable consideration to the character, values and appropriate use of the land. It is contended, however, by the plaintiff-appellant that the requirement of a "comprehensive plan" has not been met, thus rendering Ordinance 231 invalid. We do not agree with appellant on this point.
A thorough reading of Act 518 of 1954 reveals that it was intended that such regulations, which govern the district, be adopted in accordance with a comprehensive plan. This brings us to the point in our inquiry as to what was contemplated by the requirement of a "comprehensive plan" in Section 3 of Act 518 of 1954. The evidence is undisputed that the land included in Zoned District No. 2 has been for many years a well established residential area. Further, it was feared that with the completion of the Pontchartrain Bridge connecting the Covington area with New Orleans there would be an influx of population from New Orleans and Jefferson Parish which would result in new commercial ventures moving into the area. Therefore, it was felt that for the good of the Parish as well as for the residential area involved that the property should be zoned residential in order to maintain the high quality of the neighborhood. The Court feels that this was accomplished by the creation of Zoned District No. 2; and by providing that Zoned District No. 2, in its entirety, be zoned residential and restricted against businesses of all kinds, the requirements of a comprehensive plan were met. Furthermore, the requirements of a comprehensive plan as set forth in Section 3 above were also met in that these regulations were designed "to lessen congestion in the public streets; to secure safety from fire; to promote health and the general welfare; to provide adequate light and air; to avoid undue concentration of population." Another point to be considered in determining whether or not regulations conform to a comprehensive plan must depend on the character of the locality for which they are designed. A comprehensive plan for zoning a large city like New Orleans would naturally have to be more complex than one required for a rural community as in the case at bar. For the foregoing reasons, we are satisfied that Ordinance 231 complies with Act 518 of 1954 and accordingly reject plaintiff-appellant's complaint in this regard.
We address ourselves next to plaintiff-appellant's contention that Ordinance 231 is unconstitutional. The test for determining the constitutionality of a zoning ordinance involves a determination of whether the ordinance is arbitrary or unreasonable. This involves a consideration of the area to which the ordinance is applied and whether there appears to be reasonable grounds for the particular restrictions imposed. The facts show that the area encompassed by Zoned District No. 2 was a geographically unique and homogeneous area which had for many years been a residential zone. The ordinance in question merely attempted to protect this established residential area. Accordingly, the Court cannot say that Ordinance 231 is in any way unreasonable or arbitrary. Furthermore, since the ordinance applies alike to all persons similarly situated, it cannot be said to violate the due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution. See State ex rel. Civello v. City of New Orleans, 154 La. 271, 97 So. 440, 33 A.L.R. 260 (1923); State ex rel. Dema Realty Co. v. Jacoby, 168 La. 751, 123 So. 314 (1929). It is also well settled that since an owner holds property subject to reasonable exercise of police power, he cannot be heard to complain in regard to a zoning ordinance, passed in legitimate exercise of such power, as taking or damaging his property without just compensation in violation of the Constitution. State ex rel. Dema Realty Co. v. Jacoby, supra. We find that Ordinance 231 represents a legitimate exercise of police power by the St. Tammany Parish Police Jury. In view of the foregoing, we conclude that Ordinance 231 in no way violates the Constitution.
For the above reasons the judgment of the lower court in confirming the decision of the St. Tammany Parish Police Jury in denying Paul H. Jameson's application for a liquor permit is affirmed by this Court at appellant's costs.
Affirmed.