Case Name: STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Larry Lamar GAINES, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1999-01-06
Citations: 731 So. 2d 7
Docket Number: No. 98-2789
Parties: STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Larry Lamar GAINES, Appellee.
Judges: DELL and GUNTHER, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 731
Pages: 7–9

Head Matter:
STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Larry Lamar GAINES, Appellee.
No. 98-2789
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
Jan. 6, 1999.
Opinion Denying Rehearing, March 31,1999.
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Douglas J. Glaid, Assistant Attorney General, Fort Lauder-dale, for appellant.
Richard L. Jorandby, Public Defender, and Bernard S. Fernandez, Assistant Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appel-lee.

Opinion:
ORDER ON MOTION TO DISMISS APPEAL
KLEIN, J.
After the state presented its case, appellee moved for the first time to suppress evidence on the ground it was illegally obtained. The trial court granted the motion, and after the state announced that it had no other evidence on which it could prove its case, the trial court entered an order dismissing the case. The state is appealing that order, arguing that the trial court erred in suppressing the evidence. Appellee has moved to dismiss the appeal on the ground that any error in the suppression is moot because, having been in jeopardy, he cannot be retried. We grant the motion.
Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.190(h)(4) provides:
Time for Filing. The motion to suppress shall be made before trial unless opportunity therefor did not exist or the defendant was not aware of the grounds for the motion, but the court may entertain the motion or an appropriate objection at the trial.
As our supreme court explained in Savoie v. State, 422 So.2d 308, 312 (Fla. 1982):
In exercising the discretionary authority granted by the rule to decide whether to hear a motion to suppress made during the course of a trial, the judge must balance the rights of the defendant to due process and effective assistance of counsel with the rights of the state to have an opportunity to appeal an adverse ruling on the motion to suppress.
When the court grants a motion to suppress prior to trial, the state may appeal. Rule 9.140(c)(1)(B). When the motion to suppress or objection to evidence is granted during the trial, however, the state is foreclosed from appealing because of double jeopardy. Savoie and State v. Livingston, 681 So.2d 762 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996).
It appears from reading the transcript in this case that the state was not aware, when the trial court agreed to hear the motion to suppress during trial, that the state would be foreclosed from taking an appeal if the court granted the motion to suppress. If the state had wanted to preserve its right to take an appeal, it should have argued to the trial court that it should exercise its discretion not to consider the motion to suppress unless the defendant would agree to a mistrial, in the event the motion was granted.
The third district explained in State v. Zamora, 538 So.2d 95, 96 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989) that:
[Wjhere a mistrial is granted at the defendant's request, reprosecution is not barred on double jeopardy grounds absent a showing of intentional prosecuto-rial bad faith or judicial conduct designed to produce the mistrial. Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 102 S.Ct. 2083, 72 L.Ed.2d 416 (1982); Keen v. State, 504 So.2d 396 (Fla. 1987); State v. Hutchens, 517 So.2d 27 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987).
In State v. Stevens, 563 So.2d 188, 189 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990), the court construed footnote one in Savoie, which we quoted above, as follows:
A fair reading of the footnote is that by obtaining the defendant's consent to a mistrial prior to ruling on the merits of the motion to suppress, the trial court could overcome the objections of the state regarding loss of right to appellate review resulting from the defense's waiting until trial to make the motion.
In the present case, the suppression was not conditioned on the defendant agreeing to a mistrial, and we thus have no alternative but to dismiss the appeal.
DELL and GUNTHER, JJ., concur.
The state could retain the right to appeal if the defendant consented, pri- or to the hearing on the motion, to a mistrial in the event the trial court suppresses the evidence.
. There is no provision in our rules for a dismissal under these circumstances. This order should have granted defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal.