Case Name: Joseph AMIKER and Bobbie Amiker v. DRUGS FOR LESS, INC., and Stan Mixon
Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Mississippi
Decision Date: 2000-08-17
Citations: 796 So. 2d 942
Docket Number: Nos. 97-CA-01493-SCT, 97-CA-01535-SCT
Parties: Joseph AMIKER and Bobbie Amiker v. DRUGS FOR LESS, INC., and Stan Mixon.
Judges: PRATHER, C.J., PITTMAN, P.J., WALLER, COBB AND DIAZ, JJ., CONCUR. McRAE, J., SPECIALLY CONCURS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION JOINED BY DIAZ, J. MILLS, J., DISSENTS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION JOINED BY SMITH, J.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 796
Pages: 942–955

Head Matter:
Joseph AMIKER and Bobbie Amiker v. DRUGS FOR LESS, INC., and Stan Mixon.
Nos. 97-CA-01493-SCT, 97-CA-01535-SCT.
Supreme Court of Mississippi.
Aug. 17, 2000.
Rehearing Denied Oct. 11, 2001.
Barry W. Gilmer, Jackson, Attorney for Appellants.
Walter T. Johnson, Jackson, Attorney for Appellee.

Opinion:
BANKS, Presiding Justice,
for the Court:
¶ 1. This case arises from a claim of misfilled prescriptions by a pharmacist and his pharmacy employer. These appeals are from an order by a successor judge which reversed in part the order of the original judge granting a new trial and ordering sanctions for discovery abuse. Because we find that the successor judge was in no better position to decide the issues in this case than the original judge, we reverse and remand.
I.
¶ 2. Joseph and Bobbie Amiker claim that Stan Mixon, while employed as a pharmacist with Drugs For Less, Inc. in Jackson, Mississippi, misfilled Joseph Am-iker's prescriptions. Between October 3, 1992, and April 22, 1993, anti-depressants were allegedly erroneously substituted for the prescribed hypertension and heart medications. The Amikers claim that as a direct result Joseph's blood pressure elevated, and he suffered a stroke which rendered him permanently disabled. In April 1994 the Amikers filed their complaint in the Circuit court of the First Judicial District of Hinds County seeking recovery of damages from Mixon and Drugs For Less for their alleged negligence. Both Mixon and Drugs For Less were simultaneously represented by the same attorneys throughout all aspects of this litigation. At the conclusion of the trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of both Mixon and Drugs For Less.
¶ 3. The present assignments of error do not concern the issue of whether Mixon or Drugs For Less did, in fact, negligently misfill Joseph Amiker's prescriptions. Rather, this case on appeal concerns apparent discovery violations committed by Mixon and Drugs For Less. The Amikers allege numerous violations which unfairly-impeded their efforts to prove negligence. Two of the alleged violations are of primary concern. The Amikers allege that Drugs For Less deliberately withheld information concerning the limits of its liability insurance coverage, perpetuating the Amikers' belief that the policy's coverage was $1 million when, in fact, it was in excess of $30 million. This revelation only came about through an in-camera examination by the trial judge, Circuit Judge William F. Coleman, of Drugs For Less's files. Second, and more importantly, not until the fourth day of trial did Drugs For Less produce evidence of prior claims of negligence in filling prescriptions even though Drug For Less had been repeatedly ordered to do so by the court. After the jury returned its verdict and final judgment was entered, the Amikers filed their Motion for a Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict and Motion for a New Trial and renewed an earlier Motion for Sanctions, all of which were based on these alleged discovery violations. The trial court entered an Opinion and Order on these motions which we quote in part:
[DJiscovery violations by the defense occurred from the initial beginning of the discovery and continued through the actual trial, despite repeated orders from the court to furnish specific discovery matters.... In this case, the defense attorneys were aware of the court's rulings, but failed to respond.
There is no question that Drugs for Less disobeyed this court's order to produce discovery. By way of explanation for their failure when brought into court by court order, the defendant's employees began a round robin finger-pointing scenario contending the insurance claims service were [sic] expected to produce the discovery. The employees of the claims service in turn pointed back to the defendants' employees. Even though this establishes no valid excuse for discovery violation, the close relationship of defendant Drugs for Less with the claims service and the insurance agent completely eliminates this from consideration. The testimony of the employees reveals an attitude of "Drugs for Less is in the business of producing sales and not producing discovery." The failure to furnish timely discovery clearly deprive[d] plaintiffs of the opportunity to evaluate and develop evidences not produced until well into the trial and only after orders from the court requiring individual employees of the defendant to be present in court to furnish this information. This failure on the part of Drugs for Less requires that the Motion for New Trial be granted.
Plaintiffs also moved for sanctions against defendant Drugs for Less for these discovery violations. Clearly, plaintiffs are entitled to sanctions. The issue is the extent of the sanctions.
. [T]he defendant Drugs for Less was well aware of this Court's order to produce records of prescription misfill-ing claims and failed to do so. In addition, Drugs for Less deliberately refused to furnish applicable insurance policies after being ordered to do so. Although having no bearing on the liability issue of this case, this discovery violation reveals a total disregard for the discovery rules and this court's authority. The failure to furnish the policies is especially egregious by the fact that the defendants were aware that the plaintiffs' attorneys had received a copy of the primary coverage policy, and relying on that information had made settlement offers for the policy limits. It is quite clear that at all times the defendants knew that not one, but several policies were in existence that placed coverage well above the primary coverage. The first time plaintiffs' attorneys were aware of this information was when advised by this court in open court at a point well into the trial. The court became aware of this fact while making an in camera inspection during the trial of the defense attorneys' file on an unrelated discovery matter.
The willful and deliberate violation has prejudiced plaintiffs by delay and expense. In addition, the defendant has caused significant problems with court administration-waste of the court's time weeks trial time on the court's docket and disregard for this court's authority.
These discovery violations must fall at the feet of Drugs for Less. The actions of the individual defendant, Stan Mixon, although participating to a small degree in the violations, does not rise to the necessary height of willfulness.
Therefore, judgment of liability will be entered in favor of the plaintiffs against Drugs for Less only.
Thus, the trial court (1) set aside the judgment based on the jury verdict, (2) granted a judgment of liability against Drugs for Less, (3) granted the Amikers a new trial against Mixon as to liability and damages and against Drugs for Less as to damages only, and (4) awarded the Amikers reasonable and necessary attorney's fees of $51,542.94 against Drugs For Less.
¶ 4. Mixon and Drugs For Less then filed a Motion to Reconsider this Order in December 1996. Judge Coleman denied this motion. They subsequently petitioned this Court for Permission to Perfect an Appeal from the Order granting the Amik-ers a new trial and imposing sanctions upon Drug For Less. These petitions were denied on May 16, 1997. While the Petitions for Permission to Appeal were pending, Judge Coleman retired. Circuit Judge W. Swan Yerger was appointed to fill the vacancy created by Judge Coleman's retirement and was assigned this case.
¶ 5. On July 7, 1997, Mixon filed his second Motion to Reconsider. Drugs For Less filed its second Motion to Reconsider on July 16, 1997. The hearing on these motions was held on August 20, 1997. At the conclusion of the hearing, Judge Yer-ger rendered his Opinion and Order which vacated Judge Coleman's 1996 Orders. Judge Yerger's Order granted the Amik-ers a new trial as to Drugs For Less but did not impose a judgment of liability as Judge Coleman had done. Furthermore, the Final Judgment in favor of Stan Mixon was reinstated and certified as final judgment pursuant to M.R.C.P. 54(b). The trial court also ordered Drugs For Less to pay the Amikers' reasonable attorney's fees and expenses in the sum of $51,542.94 in accordance with Judge Coleman's earlier order imposing the same as an additional sanction.
¶ 6. Subsequently, the Amikers filed their Notice of Appeal from the Final Judgment entered in favor of Stan Mixon. In addition, the Amikers filed their Petition for Permission to Appeal with this Court which was granted on December 10, 1998. On February 17, 1999, the Amikers' interlocutory appeal from the Opinion and Order entered against Drugs For Less was consolidated with their appeal from the Final Judgment entered in favor of Stan Mixon.
II.
¶ 7. The pertinent issues here are questions of law. Our standard of review is de novo in passing on questions of law. In re Bodman, 674 So.2d 1245, 1247 (Miss.1996); Rea v. Breakers Ass'n, Inc., 674 So.2d 496, 499 (Miss.1996); Harrison County v. City of Gulfport, 557 So.2d 780, 784 (Miss.1990); Cole v. National Life Ins. Co., 549 So.2d 1301, 1303 (Miss.1989).
III.
¶ 8. The Amikers' first assignment of error, in essence, claims that a successor judge does not possess the power to vacate an initial judge's order granting a new trial and issuing sanctions for discovery violations which came to light in the trial. We first examine the question whether vacating the order granting a new trial as to Stan Mixon was proper.
¶ 9. Rule 63(b) of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure states:
If for any reason the judge before whom an action has been tried is unable to perform the duties to be performed by the court after a verdict is returned . then any other judge regularly sitting in or assigned under law to the court in which the action was tried may perform those duties....
¶ 10. Our holdings in Mauck v. Columbus Hotel Co., 741 So.2d 259 (Miss.1999) and Love v. Barnett, 611 So.2d 205 (Miss.1992) provide some guidance on this issue, but we must look at the position of the successor judge in this case.
¶ 11. In Mauck, in upholding'the successor chancellor's authority to vacate the initial chancellor's pretrial order denying motions to dismiss or, alternatively, for summary judgment, we stated that "[a]s a general rule, a successor judge is precluded from correcting errors of law made by his predecessor or changing the latter's judgment or order on the merits, but this rule does not apply where the order or judgment is not of a final character." Mauck, 741 So.2d at 268 (quoting 48A C.J.S. Judges § 68, at 654 (1981))(emphasis added). We went on to state that Chancellor Colom not only had the authority to vacate Chancellor's Brand ruling but was also "duty bound to apply the law to the record then before the court, regardless of any prior ruling...." Mauck, 741 So.2d at 268-69.
¶ 12. This case does not present the situation which we faced in Mauck. There, the first judge denied a pretrial motion to dismiss or for summary judgment. Obviously, such a ruling was subject to change at the time that the case was finally submitted, even if no facts had changed. The standard for granting a motion to dismiss or one for summary judgment is simply different from the standard to be applied by a judge rendering judgment at the time that the case is finally submitted.
¶ 13. The different standard is not the only distinction, however. A judgment of dismissal or summary judgment is based upon the application of legal principles to undisputed facts. In such circumstances a successor judge is in a position equivalent to that of the original judge. There is usually no abuse of discretion under Rule 63(b) in making a different call. That call does not involve consideration of the testimonial evidence from the stand point of making credibility choices with regard to witnesses. By definition the material facts are not in dispute. Where, however, a new trial is at issue, the facts must be in dispute; otherwise there would be no reason for a new trial.
¶ 14. More relevant to the present case is our decision in Love v. Barnett, 611 So.2d 205 (Miss.1992). There, we held that a successor judge who did not have access to a transcript of the previous hearing, did not conduct an additional hearing and did not gain the consent of both parties could not modify the bench ruling of the initial judge. Id. at 208. Accordingly, we found the modifications by the successor chancellor to be arbitrary and capricious based on the fact that he did not review the transcript of the case, conduct an additional evidentiary hearing or gain the consent of both parties. Id.
¶ 15. In the present case, Drugs For Less and Mixon filed Motions to Reconsider in response to Judge Coleman's June 19, 1996, and December 10, 1996, orders for a new trial. Judge Coleman denied those motions. Both then petitioned this Court for leave to take an interlocutory appeal to this Court. Those petitions were denied. While those petitions were pending, Judge Coleman retired, and Judge Yerger was appointed to fill the vacancy. After this Court denied the Petitions for Interlocutory Appeal, Drugs for Less and Mixon then filed a second Motion to Reconsider, this time with Judge Yerger presiding. Judge Yerger vacated Judge Coleman's order and made his own ruling on the motions. That ruling reinstated the jury verdict in favor of Mixon and granted a new trial as to Drugs For Less. However, Judge Yerger did not impose a judgment of liability against Drugs For Less as a sanction for its egregious discovery violation. Instead, he found it suitable to order Drugs For Less to pay the Amikers' reasonable attorney's fees and expenses and court costs.
¶ 16. It has long been recognized that the trial judge is in the best position to view the trial. "The trial judge who hears the witnesses live, observes their demean- or and in general smells the smoke of the battle is by his very position far better equipped to make findings of fact which will have the reliability that we need and desire." Gavin v. State, 473 So.2d 952, 955 (Miss.1985). Using a cold, printed record of a case, if that, a successor judge sits in an inferior position to the judge who presided over the trial of the case.
¶ 17. Where the presiding trial judge grants a new trial, not specifically and solely based on a particular legal error such that we can say that the judge's view of the credibility of the witnesses played no part in the decision, a successor judge is in no position to review and change that order. To do so would be an abuse of the discretion granted the successor judge under M.R.C.P. 63.
¶ 18. "It has been said that on such a motion [for a new trial] the court sits as a thirteenth juror. The motion, however, is addressed to the discretion of the court, which should be exercised with caution, and the power to grant a new trial should be invoked only in exceptional cases in which the evidence preponderates heavily against the verdict." United States v. Sinclair, 438 F.2d 50, 51 n. 1 (5th Cir.1971) (quoting Wright, Federal Practice & Procedure: Criminal § 553, at 487).
¶ 19. Of course, when the original judge is not available someone must go forward with the trial. Our rules contemplate such an occurrence. M.R.C.P. 63. With respect to a prior order granting a new trial, based, at least in part, on observations made during trial, however, deference should be given to the judge who observed the evidence as it was presented. "[0]n the motion for a new trial the presiding judge of that court, who had heard the testimony and observed the demeanor of the witnesses on the stand, was better qualified to pass on that question.... " Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Humphries, 170 Miss. 840, 155 So. 421, 424 (1934).
¶ 20. In a case similar to the case at bar, the Georgia Supreme Court held that it was an abuse of discretion for a successor judge to retract a predecessor's grant of a new trial. Head v. CSX Transp., Inc., 271 Ga. 670, 524 S.E.2d 215, 218 (1999)("[T]he scope within which the discretion may be exercised, in the consideration of the evidence, by a judge who did not preside at the trial is not as extensive as in the case of the judge who heard and observed the witnesses and who, in a sense, is to be considered the thirteenth member of the jury.")(quoting Throgmorton v. Trammell, 90 Ga.App. 433, 83 S.E.2d 256, 258 (1954)).
¶ 21. If we allowed a successor judge to change a decision granting a new trial, we would invest power in one in no better position than this Court to do what this Court does not do. This Court justifiably refuses to review grants of a new trial based in part on the superior position of the trial court to decide such matters. Dorr v. Watson, 28 Miss. 383, 395 (1854)("The granting a new trial rests in a great measure upon the sound discretion of the court below, to be exercised under all the circumstances of the case with reference to settled legal rules as well as the justice of the particular case. If a new trial be refused, a strong case must be shown to authorize the appellate court to say that it was error; and so, if it be granted, it must be manifest that it was improperly granted."). See also Rayner v. Lindsey, 243 Miss. 824, 832-33, 138 So.2d 902, 905-06 (1962). Surely, a successor trial judge is in no better position than this Court.
¶ 22. Judge Yerger was the lawful successor to Judge Coleman and the only judge in a position to hear the merits of the second Motion to Reconsider. However, this did not give Judge Yerger unbridled discretion. Accordingly, we hold that a successor judge does not possess the power to vacate an initial judge's order granting a new trial where, as here, the successor judge sits in an inferior position to the first judge.
IY.
¶ 23. The Amikers' final assignment of error concerns whether Judge Yerger abused his discretion in determining the sanctions to be imposed against Drug For Less for its discovery violations. The Am-ikers claim that the granting of a new trial is not a sanction but rather simply the granting of their Motion for a New Trial based on the discovery violations. In other words, Judge Yerger's order granting a new trial is not a sanction against Drugs For Less. The Amikers also contend that Judge Yerger's order that Drugs For Less pay the Amikers' attorney's fees and expenses of litigation, which totaled $51,524.94, is not a sanction. The only sanction imposed upon Drugs For Less, the Amikers argue, is the order to pay the expenses incurred by Hinds County in impaneling two separate juries. M.R.C.P. 37(b) prescribes sanctions for the failure to make or cooperate in discovery.
¶ 24. The decision to impose sanctions for discovery abuse is vested in the trial court's discretion. White v. White, 509 So.2d 205, 207 (Miss.1987). The provisions for imposing sanctions are designed to give the court great latitude. Id. at 207. The power to dismiss is inherent in any court of law or equity, being a means necessary to the orderly expedition of justice and the court's control of its own docket. Palmer v. Biloxi Reg'l Med. Ctr., 564 So.2d 1346, 1367 (Miss.1990). When this Court reviews a decision that is within the trial court's discretion, it first asks if the court below applied the correct legal standard. Burkett v. Burkett, 537 So.2d 443, 446 (Miss.1989). If the trial court applied the right standard, then this Court considers whether the decision was one of several reasonable ones which could have been made. Id. This Court will affirm a trial court's decision unless there is a "definite and firm conviction that the court below committed a clear error of judgment in the conclusion it reached upon weighing of relevant factors." Cooper v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 568 So.2d 687, 692 (Miss.1990).
¶ 25. Rule 37(b) of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure governs when and what sanctions a trial court may impose upon a party who has failed to comply with orders regarding discovery. Further, Rule 37(e) generally authorizes the trial judge to issue sanctions appropriate to the transgression. It reads in part:
In addition to the application of those sanctions, specified in . other provisions of this rule, the court may impose upon any party or counsel such sanctions as are just....
M.R.C.P. 37(e).
¶ 26. The Amikers' principal concern is Judge Yerger's decision not to impose a judgment of liability upon Drugs For Less as a sanction for its discovery violations. Judge Coleman's order had imposed a judgment of liability.
¶ 27. Consistent with our foregoing reasoning concerning the grant of new trial, we conclude that Judge Yerger was in no superior position to grant sanctions different from Judge Coleman's order. Greater sanctions than what Judge Coleman awarded were available and considered, but Judge Coleman chose to only assign Lability to Drugs for Less, award attorney's fees to the Amikers and grant a new trial. Being mindful that it was Judge Coleman who "smelled the smoke of th[is] battle," Judge Yerger had no authority to vacate Judge Coleman's orders in this regard. Judge Yerger merely supplanted Judge Coleman's discretion with his own. While nominally accepting the facts found by Judge Coleman, Judge Yer-ger engaged in some fact finding of his own and obviously he weighed facts to reach his ultimate conclusion. This he was not in a position to do. Judge Coleman's decision is free from facial legal- error, whether his discretion was abused is a decision to be made at the proper time by this Court.
CONCLUSION
¶ 28. For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the Order of Judge Yerger, we reinstate Judge Coleman's June 19 and December 10, 1996, orders and we remand this case to the Hinds County Circuit Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion and Judge Coleman's Orders.
¶ 29. REVERSED AND REMANDED.
PRATHER, C.J., PITTMAN, P.J., WALLER, COBB AND DIAZ, JJ., CONCUR. McRAE, J., SPECIALLY CONCURS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION JOINED BY DIAZ, J. MILLS, J., DISSENTS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION JOINED BY SMITH, J.