Case Name: The CITY OF NAMPA, a municipal corporation, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Thomas J. McGEE, Jr., d/b/a McGee Air Conditioning and Heating Co., and McKellip Engineering Co., Inc., an Idaho corporation, Defendants, and McKellip Engineering Co., Inc., an Idaho corporation, Defendant-Respondent; The CITY OF NAMPA, a municipal corporation, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Thomas McGEE, Jr., d/b/a McGee Air Conditioning and Heating Co., and McKellip Engineering Co., Inc., an Idaho corporation, Defendants, and Thomas McGee, Jr., d/b/a McGee Air Conditioning and Heating Co., Defendant-Appellant
Court: Idaho Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Idaho
Decision Date: 1982-12-27
Citations: 104 Idaho 63
Docket Number: Nos. 13931, 13932
Parties: The CITY OF NAMPA, a municipal corporation, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Thomas J. McGEE, Jr., d/b/a McGee Air Conditioning and Heating Co., and McKellip Engineering Co., Inc., an Idaho corporation, Defendants, and McKellip Engineering Co., Inc., an Idaho corporation, Defendant-Respondent. The CITY OF NAMPA, a municipal corporation, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Thomas McGEE, Jr., d/b/a McGee Air Conditioning and Heating Co., and McKellip Engineering Co., Inc., an Idaho corporation, Defendants, and Thomas McGee, Jr., d/b/a McGee Air Conditioning and Heating Co., Defendant-Appellant.
Judges: BAKES, C.J., and DONALDSON, J., concur.
Reporter: Idaho Reports
Volume: 104
Pages: 63–68

Head Matter:
656 P.2d 124
The CITY OF NAMPA, a municipal corporation, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Thomas J. McGEE, Jr., d/b/a McGee Air Conditioning and Heating Co., and McKellip Engineering Co., Inc., an Idaho corporation, Defendants, and McKellip Engineering Co., Inc., an Idaho corporation, Defendant-Respondent. The CITY OF NAMPA, a municipal corporation, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Thomas McGEE, Jr., d/b/a McGee Air Conditioning and Heating Co., and McKellip Engineering Co., Inc., an Idaho corporation, Defendants, and Thomas McGee, Jr., d/b/a McGee Air Conditioning and Heating Co., Defendant-Appellant.
Nos. 13931, 13932.
Supreme Court of Idaho.
Dec. 27, 1982.
Stephen W. Beane and John L. Gannon, Boise, for City of Nampa.
H.W. Rettig, Caldwell, for Thomas McGee Jr.
Jeremiah A. Quane and Brian K. Julian, Boise, for McKellip Engineering Co.

Opinion:
SHEPARD, Justice.
These are consolidated appeals from judgments in which the sole issue is the trial court's award of attorney's fees to the prevailing parties. We affirm.
Plaintiff City of Nampa brought the principal action for negligence against defendants McGee and McKellip for damages resulting from a boiler explosion. Follow ing trial, a verdict was returned finding McGee 70% negligent, City of Nampa 30% negligent, and McKellip 0% negligent. Thereafter, counsel for City of Nampa filed meticulously detailed affidavits accompanying his motion for costs and attorney fees, in which was set forth the novelty and difficulty of the questions presented in the litigation, prevailing attorney fees charges, the reasonableness of a contingent fee charge of $10,650, and concluded that a reasonable attorney's fee to be awarded to the City of Nampa "should be the sum of ($9,850.00), pursuant to I.C. § 12-121." (emphasis supplied) Thereafter, McGee filed its motion to disallow numerous items of costs and the claimed attorney's fees. After hearing thereon, the trial court issued a decision in which he, in an equally meticulous fashion, considered and ruled upon all of the contested items of costs disallowing or reducing certain of the contested costs claimed by both City of Nampa and McKellip. The ultimate decision awarded Nampa against McGee $7,350 (of its claimed $9,850) for attorney's fees and $2,923 for costs, for a total of $10,273. McKellip was awarded against Nampa $10,-000 in attorney's fees (of its claimed $18,-400) and $1,205 costs, for a total of $11,205. This appeal results wherein Nampa and McGee assert error in the award of attorney's fees.
In its brief on appeal, City of Nam-pa only argued that the trial court's award of attorney's fees against it pursuant to I.C. § 12-121 was erroneous and that attorney's fees could only be awarded pursuant to Rule 54(e)(1), i.e., when suit was brought or defended "frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation . " The instant action was filed prior to March 1, 1979 and that contention is clearly without support in view of our more recent cases of T-Craft Aero Club, Inc. v. Blough, 102 Idaho 833, 642 P.2d 70 (1982); Haskin v. Glass, 102 Idaho 785, 640 P.2d 1186 (1982); Rickel v. Board of Barber Examiners, 102 Idaho 260, 629 P.2d 656 (1981). On oral argument, both City of Nampa and McGee concede that I.R.C.P. 54(e)(1) is not controlling here, but assert that the trial court erred in awarding attorney's fees pursuant to I.C. § 12-121, in that the trial court misinterpreted the statute and concluded that he had no discretion but was required to award attorney's fees to the prevailing parties.
I.C. § 12-121 provides in pertinent part: "the judge may award reasonable attorney's fees to the prevailing . parties . " The City of Nampa and McGee seize upon one small part of the lengthy, meticulous and well-reasoned decision of the trial court, i.e., "when the parties were considering whether to bring, defend, or settle this case, the state of the law was that the prevailing party was entitled to an award of attorney's fees." It is argued that such language of the trial judge indicates that he failed to exercise discretion, that such failure was, in effect, an abuse of discretion, and therefore reversible error. We disagree.
In Lisher v. Krasselt, 96 Idaho 854, 538 P.2d 783 (1975), this Court held that where a trial judge's decision was discretionary, we will not set it aside absent a clear showing of abuse of discretion. See also, Clear v. Marvin, 86 Idaho 87, 383 P.2d 346 (1963). We find here no clear showing that the trial judge abused or failed to exercise his discretion. While that small portion of the language óf the trial judge's decision may be somewhat ambiguous, it must be noted that the argument then before him was only concerned with the application of I.R.C.P. 54(e)(1) or I.C. § 12-121. The assertion that such small portion of the trial court's decision indicates a failure to exercise discretion is untenable in light of the remainder of the decision wherein the trial court reviewed all objections to the claimed costs and attorney's fees and, clearly utilizing his discretion, disallowed some costs and substantially reduced the claimed attorney's fees. We further note the anomolous position of the City of Nampa before the trial court: Nampa sought and obtained an award of attorney's fees pursuant to I.C. § 12-121 and now on appeal argues that the same trial judge in the same action failed to exercise or abused his discretion in awarding attorney's fees to McKellip under I.C. § 12-121.
In sum, we hold there has been no clear showing that the trial court either abused its discretion or failed to exercise its discretion. Hence, the decision and judgment of the trial court is affirmed. Costs only to respondent McKellip. No attorney's fees on appeal allowed.
BAKES, C.J., and DONALDSON, J., concur.