Case Name: Best, Respondent, vs. Gunther, imp., Appellant
Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Wisconsin
Decision Date: 1905-10-03
Citations: 125 Wis. 518
Docket Number: 
Parties: Best, Respondent, vs. Gunther, imp., Appellant.
Judges: 
Reporter: Wisconsin Reports
Volume: 125
Pages: 518–527

Head Matter:
Best, Respondent, vs. Gunther, imp., Appellant.
May 4
October 3, 1905.
Powers of attorney: Revocation: Recording: Statutes: Mortgages.
1. At common law the revocation of the authority conferred hy a power of attorney, to he effectual, must be brought to the personal notice of the agent.
2. A power of attorney to convey or mortgage real estate i's not included within the term “conveyance” as defined hy sec. 2242, Stats. 1898, and is therefore not affected by the terms used in eh. 100, Stats. 1898, declaring the effect of recording conveyances of real estate, and which were enacted for the purpose of protecting subsequent purchasers in good faith, for a valuable consideration.
3. A power of attorney to convey or mortgage real estate not being within the statutory provisions declaring the effect of recording conveyances of real estate, the fact that after such a power was recorded a revocation thereof was also recorded, is field not to terminate the power in the absence of actual notice to the agent, and a mortgage, executed after such revocation by virtue of such power, is valid and effectual to bind the principal’s land.
4. Such power is not affected by the provisions of secs. 2237, 2246, Stats. 1898 (declaring that an instrument containing a power to convey land may be recorded, and, when so recorded, shall not be deemed revoked by any act of the party who executed it unless the instrument of revocation be also recorded in the same office), since such sections contain nothing to the effect that such recording is necessary to give validity, and it is not prescribed that the recording of the instrument of revocation shall take the place of actual notice to the agent.
5. Under secs. 2237, 2246, Stats. 1898, a common-law revocation of a recorded power of attorney is ineffectual unless the instrument of revocation is also recorded in the same office.
Cassoday, C. J., dissents.
Appeal from a judgment of tbe circuit court for Wauke-sha county: Jakes J. Dice, Circuit Judge.
Affirmed.
Action to foreclose a mortgage upon real estate. It appears that the defendants, Arthur W. Gunther and Mary T. Gunther, are husband and wife, and that at the time in question Mary T. Gunther owned the real estate involved in this litigation. There is no dispute but that on November 21, 1898, she executed a general power of attorney to sell, to convey, and to mortgage her real estate, in favor of her husband, Arthur W. Gunther, giving and granting to him as full power and authority to do everything necessary for such purposes as she could exercise if she acted personally in the matter. This power was executed in the form to entitle it to record, and on December 1, 1898, it was recorded in the office of the register of deeds for Waukesha county, where the real estate affected is situated. It also appears that on August 11, 1899, the defendant Mary T. Gunther executed an instrument purporting to revoke the power of attorney granted to her husband, and on the following day she caused the same to be recorded in the office of the register of deeds for Waukesha county. Arthur W. Gunther was at no time personally notified that his wife had revoked the agency created by the power of attorney, nor was the plaintiff in any manner informed, before the mortgage in question was executed, that she had revoked or intended to revoke it. On November 14, 1900, the defendant Arthur W. Gunther, as attorney of Mary T. Gunther, and in his^proper person, made and executed and delivered to the plaintiff a note and mortgage to secure the sum of $2,000 with interest, which mortgage covered the real estate of Mary T. Gunther in Waukesha county, and was recorded in such county November 16, 1900. There was default in payment of interest and the principal under the terms of the note and mortgage and this action was commenced. The court awarded judgment to plaintiff for the amount due, with costs and solicitor’s fees, and directed a sale of the premises covered by the mortgage in case the amount due on the judgment could not be paid as directed, and for personal judgment against Mary T. and Arthur W. Gunther in case of a deficiency after applying the amount realized on such sale. Other facts of record in the case are not material to the disposition of rights of the parties on this appeal and need not be stated. This is an appeal from the judgment.
Eor the appellant there were briefs by Frame & Blackstone and Bitsher, Montgomery & Hart, and oral argument by H. J. Frame.
Eor the respondent there were briefs by F. W. Houghton and W. B. Neeley and oral argument by Mr. Houghton.

Opinion:
The following opinion was filed June 23, 1905:
SiebecKeb, J.
The question presented is whether the recording of the instrument signed by Mary T. Gunther, purporting to revoke the power granted to her husband to convey her lands, operated to terminate this agency. The common law required that a revocation of such authority be brought to the personal notice of the agent. Kelly v. Phelps, 57 Wis. 425, 15 N. W. 385; Walker v. Denison, 86 Ill. 142. It is not claimed that, at the time he executed the mortgage here involved, Arthur W. Gunther had been actually notified that his authority under the letter of attorney had been revoked, nor is it claimed that plaintiff had actual notice that the defendant Mary T. Gunther had taken any steps to revoke it. It is urged that the statutes providing that letters of attorney and other instruments containing a power to convey lands as agents or attorneys for the owner may be recorded in the office of tbe register of deeds of tbe county wherein tbe lands to wbicb tbey relate are situated, and that tbe authority granted by such a letter or other' instrument shall not be deemed revoked by any act of the party who executed it unless the instrument containing such revocation be also recorded in the same office, are an abrogation of the common-law rule, and that the recording of an instrument of revocation in itself effects a termination of the agency and serves as a notice to all persons. This contention is, however, not justified by the terms of the recording statutes. The extent to which the recording of instruments, under the statutes, shall be deemed notice thereof is specified by these enactments, and they contain no provisions declaring expressly or by implication that the recording of these instruments shall be deemed an abrogation of the common-law rule which requires the giving of notice to terminate the authority granted by them. Sec. 2242, Utats. 1898, defining what the term "conveyance," as affecting title to land, shall be construed to embrace, clearly indicates that a letter of attorney and an instrument revoking the authority conferred thereby are not included within the terms used in this chapter, and they can therefore not be affected by the provisions of.the statutes which declare the effect of recording conveyances of real estate, and which were enacted for the purpose of protecting subsequent purchasers in good faith and for a valuable consideration. Fallass v. Pierce, 30 Wis. 443; Gilbert v. Jess, 31 Wis. 110; Pringle v. Dunn, 37 Wis. 449; Girardin v. Lampe, 58 Wis. 267, 16 N. W. 614; Edwards v. McKernan, 55 M6ich. 520, 22 N. W. 20; Bailey v. Galpin, 40 Minn. 319, 41 N. W. 1054.
, The context of secs. 2237, 2246, Stats. 1898, providing that letters of attorney and other instruments containing powers to convey lands may be recorded as therein prescribed, and when- so recorded shall not be deemed revoked by any act of the party who executed them unless the instrument of revocation be also recorded in the same office, contains nothing to the effect that such recording is necessary to give them validity, and it is not prescribed that the recording of the instrument of revocation shall take the place of the actual notice to the agent required at common law to terminate it. The case of Arnold v. Stevenson, 2 Nev. 234, is relied on as authority to the effect that the recording of the instrument of revocátion operates, under the statute, as a notice to the agent and all persons dealing with him that the authority is terminated. The decision cannot serve as an authority for the construction of our statute, for the reason that the Nevada statute on the subject expressly provides that the recording of the instrument shall "import notice to all persons of the contents thereof," and, as above stated, our statute contains no such provision. It is manifest that, since the statute does not operate to give such notice, it is necessary to comply with all the requirements of the common law for revoking the authority granted by a letter of attorney or other instrument containing a power to convey land; but, when such instrument has been recorded, a common-law revocation shall be ineffectual unless the instrument of revocation shall also be recorded in the same office. Applying this rule to the facts of the case, we must hold that Arthur W. Gunther had power to execute the mortgage which plaintiff now seeks to foreclose,, and that the judgment appealed from was properly awarded. No other question arises for consideration.
By the Court.• — Judgment affirmed.
A motion for a rehearing was denied, and the following-opinion filed October 3, 1905 :