Case Name: Charles Arnold SEESHOLTS, Appellant, v. Elizabeth P. BEERS, and The Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United States, Appellees
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1972-12-12
Citations: 270 So. 2d 434
Docket Number: No. 71-927
Parties: Charles Arnold SEESHOLTS, Appellant, v. Elizabeth P. BEERS, and The Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United States, Appellees.
Judges: OWEN, J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 270
Pages: 434–438

Head Matter:
Charles Arnold SEESHOLTS, Appellant, v. Elizabeth P. BEERS, and The Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United States, Appellees.
No. 71-927.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
Dec. 12, 1972.
Rehearing Denied Jan. 10, 1973.
Edward W. Starr, Sr., of Law Offices of Starr & Myers, West Palm Beach, for appellant.
Thomas J. Yeager of Nason Gildan & Yeager, West Palm Beach, for appellees.

Opinion:
CROSS, Judge.
Appellant-defendant, Charles Arnold Seesholts, appeals an order of the trial court awarding a reasonable rent to the ap-pellee-plaintiff, Elizabeth P. Beers, as a set-off to appellant's claims for mortgage payments, et cetera, in an action for partition. We reverse.
The parties to this appeal were husband and wife, but due to marital difficulties a divorce was obtained in March of 1969. The terms of the divorce decree granted the wife exclusive possession of the former marital home (held by the parties in a tenancy by the entireties, and converted by the divorce into a tenancy in common) until September of 1969. No further provisions were made concerning the property. Appellee-plaintiff, Elizabeth P. Beers (Elizabeth) voluntarily vacated the premises in September 1969, and the appellant-defendant, Charles Arnold Seesholts (Charles) began his sole possession of the home in October 1969. It is admitted by the parties that Charles was not holding adversely to Elizabeth's title and that Charles did not hold the property as a result of ouster or the equivalent thereof.
Elizabeth brought this action for partition and sought one-half of the reasonable rental value of the home while occupied by Charles as a charge to be allowed to her in the event that the home had to be sold. Charles answered, agreed that the home was indivisible, and requested' that the home be sold. He, therefore, sought as a charge to be allowed to him one-half of the following: taxes, both state and municipal, house insurance, mortgage payments, money to pay for damage to the house allegedly caused by Elizabeth, money for the various items of personal property alleged to have been owned jointly but taken from the house by Elizabeth, and the full value of various items of personal property alleged to have been owned solely by him but taken by Elizabeth. The trial court entered final judgment for partition and in addition, determined:
"3. The Court having found that the parties' claims are offsetting, the Plaintiff's claim for rents is denied and the Defendant's claim for credits due for mortgage payments, taxes, insurance and improvements is denied."
This appeal followed.
Appellant presents one question for our determination: whether the trial court erred in permitting the wife a set-off of one-half of the reasonable rental value of the home.
The rule in Florida has long been that:
". . . when one cotfenant has exclusive possession of lands owned as tenant in common with another and uses those lands for his own benefit and does 'not receive rents or profits therefrom, such cotenant is not liable or accountable to his cotenant out of possession ttnless such cotenant in exclusive possession holds adversely or as the result of ouster or the equivalent thereof. This was the rule of common law, as modified by the Statute of Ann, and as it was expressly adopted as the law of Florida in 1875 by our Supreme Court in Bird v. Bird (Fla.1875), 15 Fla. 424. The rule has persisted unchanged and has heretofore been recognized by this court. See Taylor v. Taylor (Fla.App.1960), 119 So.2d 811, 813." Coggan v. Coggan, 239 So.2d 17, 18 (Fla.1970).
Only one instance has come to our attention where this long standing rule has not been applied. In Potter v. Garrett, 52 So.2d 115 (Fla.1951), a case strikingly similar to the case sub judice, the Florida Supreme Court permitted a set-off of one-half the rental value of a house.
However, in view of the recent affirmance of the common law rule in Coggan v. Coggan, supra, we believe that Potter v. Garrett, supra, has been impliedly overruled, and that therefore it was error for the trial court to allow one-half of the reasonable rental value of the land as an offset.
Accordingly, the final judgment is reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings consistent with the views expressed herein.
Reversed and remanded.
OWEN, J., concurs.
WALDEN, J., dissents, with opinion.
. But see Taylor v. Taylor, 119 So.2d 811 (Fla.App.1960).