Case Name: McCABE v. BRAINARD
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1897-04-10
Citations: 44 N.Y.S. 964
Docket Number: 
Parties: McCABE v. BRAINARD.
Judges: 
Reporter: West's New York Supplement
Volume: 44
Pages: 964–969

Head Matter:
McCABE v. BRAINARD.
(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Fourth Department.
April 10, 1897.)
Master and Servant—Injuries to Servant—Liability oe the Master.
Plaintiff was injured while alighting from a, wagon provided by her employer (defendant) to carry her to and from her work. There was a conflict of evidence as to whether the accident was caused by the negligence of the driver or by the breaking of the wagon step. The court charged that if, while plaintiff was alighting, the step gave way, by reason of defects which reasonable inspection would have disclosed, the fact that there was a movement of the horse which contributed to the accident would not relieve defendant, and refused to charge that plaintiff could not recover if the proximate cause of the accident was the negligence of a co-employe (the driver). Held, that the action of the court was erroneous in not distinctly charging that, if the accident was caused by the negligence of the driver, plaintiff could not recover, and that, if the weakness of the step and the negligence of the driver concurred in causing the accident, defendant was not liable unless the accident would not have happened except for the weakness of the step.
Ward, J., dissenting.
Appeal from trial term.
Action by Bridget McCabe against Ira D. Brainard for personal injury. From a judgment entered on a verdict in favor of plaintiff, and from an order denying a motion for a new trial, made on the minutes, defendant appeals. Reversed.
The facts are stated by Mr. Justice WARD as follows:
The action was to recover damages for negligence alleged against the defendant, which resulted in personal injuries to the plaintiff. The plaintiff and defendant resided in the village of Waterville, Oneida county. The defendant was engaged in hop raising, banking, and other business. He had a farm, situate about a mile from the village, upon which he raised hops, and in the spring of the year he employed quite a number of persons to tie the hop vines upon the poles, who were called “hop tiers.” He had "wagons built for the purpose of carrying these hop tiers from the village to his farm to perform their work, and to return them home. A few days prior to May 27, 1893, the defendant, through his foreman and general manager of the hop business upon ■this farm, and in connection therewith, employed the plaintiff at a dollar a day to tie hops, and agreed to carry her each morning to her work, and return her in the evening, in a wagon to be provided. The defendant had a one-horse wagon, used for that purpose, with a wagon box, and with three seats upon it; two seats running lengthwise on either side of the box, and a third seat crossing in front. The side seats were held in place by crosspieces on the top of each end of the wagon box. To get in and out of the wagon, two steps were provided in the rear; the first being an extension of the bottom boards of the wagon and on a level with them, and the second step being about 19 inches below the first step, and 17 or 18 inches from the ground; and this lower step was secured to the wagon, the plaintiff claimed, by three braces, one at each end of the lower step, passing up and connecting with the end of the bottom boards that formed the first step. Another brace, passing from the center of the low'er step, passed up and connected and passed through the bottom boards inside of the wagon box. The defendant claimed that this lower .step was supported by five braces; three connected with the wagon about as described above, and two outside braces, passing up from the rear end of the lower step, and connecting with the top of the hind board of the wagon. On the 27th" of May, 1893, the plaintiff’s testimony tended to show that she went to work, got into this wagon in the morning; went to the farm, and returned in the same wagon with other employes of the defendant, and upon reaching her home in the village attempted to alight from the wagon, and in doing so, when her foot struck the lower step, it gave way under her weight, and she was precipitated to the ground, and severely injured in one of her limbs; that she used proper care in attempting to alight, and that her injury was caused by the giving way of the step and her falling as stated. Several witnesses gave testimony tending to show that one of the braces gave way to this lower step; that there were no washers under the nut or head of the brace bolt on top of the bottom boards; that the place where the bolt went through was worn, and the bolt pulled through, thus causing the step to give way; and that the wood of the bottom board where the braces connected was worn and dozy; it was only one thickness of board, about one inch in thickness; that the bolt got loose and the step swayed. And the driver of the wagon testified that he called the attention of the defendant’s foreman to the condition of the step prior to the hitching up of the wagon on the evening of the accident, and before the plaintiff was injured. The plaintiff’s witnesses sustained her claim that there were but three braces to the steps; that there was no end board in the hind part of the wagon at the time of the accident; and that the horse attached to the wagon did not start, so as to cause the accident. The defendant’s witnesses gave evidence as to the five braces; that the wagon was in sound condition; that the step was secure and safe, and that the accident was caused by the starting of the horse as the plaintiff was about to alight from the wagon, throwing her headlong, and she sustained her injuries from that cause. The evidence upon the principal question in the case is irreconcilable, but the jury have settled it in favor of the plaintiff. The evidence was sufficient to go to the jury as to the plaintiff’s case. Exceptions were taken upon the trial, and the facts bearing upon them will be stated in the opinion of the court.
Argued before HARDIN, P. J., and FOLLETT, ADAMS, GREEN, and WARD, JJ.
Thomas S. Jones, for appellant.
L. D. Edwards, for respondent.

Opinion:
FOLLETT, J.
This action was begun March 4, 1895, to recover damages for a personal injury, caused, it is alleged, by the negligence of the defendant and of his employés. The defendant is a grower of hops, having yards in the vicinity of Waterville, N. Y.; and! in May, 1893, the plaintiff was one of several persons engaged in tying hops in one of the defendant's yards. It was part of the contract of hiring that defendant should carry the tiers from their residences to the yards in the morning, and from the yards to their residences in the evening. For the purpose of carrying the laborers, the defendant had a one-horse lumber wagon, with seats on both sides; and at the rear end of the wagon were two steps, fastened to the under side of the box and to the end board, to enable the employés to enter and leave the wagon. On the conclusion of work on the 27th of May, 1893, several tiers, and among them the plaintiff, entered this wagon by these steps at the yard, and were taken to their homes. This wagon stopped in front of the plaintiff's home, to permit her to alight, and on leaving the wagon she fell, and was injured.
The plaintiff alleges in her complaint that the steps were insecurely fastened, and that, as she attempted to alight, the lower step gave way, and she was thrown, the horse started, and she was dragged several feet on the ground, and was injured. On the trial two principal questions of fact were litigated: (1) Whether the lower step gave way; (2) whether she was thrown to the ground by the driver permitting the horse to start while plaintiff was in the act oí alighting. If the accident was caused by the act of the driver, the negligence was that of plaintiff's fellow servant, and she cannot recover. As before stated, the plaintiff alleged in her verified complaint that the horse started, and dragged her several feet on the ground; but on the trial she withdrew from this position, and testified that, so far as she knew, the horse did not start. The driver, who had' been discharged from the defendant's service, testified that the horse did not move; but two of the plaintiff's witnesses,—Bridget Landers and Lena Finn,—and Clayton M. McLean, one of the defendant's witnesses, testified that the horse started or moved forward as the plaintiff was in the act of alighting, and she was thrown to the ground. These witnesses were in the wagon at the time, and were in a situation to know what the fact was. The court, in delivering its charge, correctly instructed the jury that, in case they found that the accident was caused by the negligence of the driver of the wagon, the plaintiff cannot recover. After the conclusion of the charge, the counsel preferred various requests, and at folio 255 the counsel for the plaintiff said:
"There was something in the charge which I understood to be something in this sense: that if the horse started while the plaintiff was riding, that this plaintiff cannot recover. In pretty near that— The Court: I did not so intend to charge. Mr. Searle: Then, in order that our position may be clearly expressed, I ask your honor to charge in that, respect in this way: that if the plaintiff's foot, when she was alighting, was upon the lower step, and the steps gave way by reason of a defect, which reasonable inspection would have disclosed, then the fact that there was a movement of the horse which contributed to the breaking—to the injury—defendant would not thereby be relieved. The Court: I- so charge. (To this instruction the defendant excepted.) Mr. Searle: In reference to some of the requests of counsel that the negligence of a co-employé contributing to an injury, where the injury would have happened by reason of some defect of machinery or appliance which reasonable care would have disclosed, does not relieve the defendant of negligence. The Court: I cannot see where that question is in this case. Mr. Searle: Well, it is only to this point: It may be found by the jury that the woman's foot was upon the step at the time there was a movement of the wagon, and that the two movements—that is, the giving way of the step and the movement of the horse—may have caused or contributed to the injury. The Court: I do not know and you do not know whether the jury— You do not know what the jury will find, but they may find that in her falling out or getting out, that the push or the movement of the horse's sent the wagon ahead. I won't charge that."
Again, the counsel for the defendant requested the court to charge:
"That the plaintiff cannot recover in this action if the negligence which was the proximate cause of the accident is found to be the negligence of a co-employé. The Court: I refuse to charge in that way."
I think the jury was not properly and clearly instructed in respect to the rule of nonliability of an employer for an accident to one employé caused by the negligence of a co-employé. The jury should have been distinctly instructed that if the accident, was caused by the negligence of the driver in permitting the horse to start while the plaintiff was in the act of alighting, she could not recover; and that, if the accident were caused by the weakness of the step and the negligence of the driver, the defendant was not liable unless they found that the injury would not have been sustained but for the weakness of the step.
The judgment and order should be reversed, and a new trial granted, with costs to abide the event.
ADAMS and GREEN, JJ., concur.