Case Name: Story against Barrell and Gilbert
Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Connecticut
Decision Date: 1818-11
Citations: 2 Conn. 665
Docket Number: 
Parties: Story against Barrell and Gilbert.
Judges: Tuumbui.t,, Edmosd, Smith, Braisarh, Peters and Chapman, Js. were of the same opinion,
Reporter: Connecticut Reports
Volume: 2
Pages: 665–679

Head Matter:
Story against Barrell and Gilbert.
New-Haven,
November, 1818.
THIS was an action of assumpsit, describing the defendants as late copartners in trade, under the name and firm of Nathaniel Gilbert & Co. The declaration contained four counts, the second of which was general, stating, that at Norwich, on the 2d of July 1812, the defendants became indebted, as traders in company as aforesaid, to the plaintiff, in the sum of 875 dollars, for so much money, at that time, had and received to the use and benefit of the plain!iff. and in law liable to pay to him said sum ; and that being so liable, and indebted, they did, in consideration thereof, at said Norrvich, afterwards, to wit, on or about the first day of March 1817, assume upon themselves, and to the plaintiff faithfully promise, to pay to him the sum of 375 dollars, in a reasonable time thereafter, when thereto requested. The writ was dated February 14th, 1817. ^
g-rounYof10 arrest>that me pronuses ⅛ ¡m ac.ion of mdeba“tus alleged to lwve been made on a day subsequent to the date of die writ.
A partnership, consist-note against December 31st, 1811, for the pay-merit of 1074 dollars> and interest. Un tbe 2d of July 1812, C. paid to B. 375 dollars, which B. promised to indorse on C’s note, but neglected so to do. On the 20th of December 1816, 'after dissolution of the partnership of A. and B, A. gave a writing, signed with his individual name, to C., acknowledging, that he had retained in his hands the money of C. to the amount due on the note, and promising to refund-to C. such sumas, in a suit then pending on the note, the court should find to have been paid thereon. The money so retained.had been received by A., as a member of the partnership of A. and B., and for their use and benefit. The suit on the note was withdrawn. C. then brought his action of indebitatus assumpsit for money had and received, against A. and B. jointly, to recover back 375 dollars so over-paid. Held, 1. That the action was well brought; 2. That parol proof of the payment to B. of the 375 dollars, with his promise to apply it on the note, was not precluded, in this action, by the 2d section of our statute of Frauds : 3. That the writing given by in December 1816, was admissible in evidence, and properly constituted a part of the plaintiff’s case ; and that the plaintiff was not precluded from recovering back the money paid under such circumstances, on the ground that the payment, at the time, was voluntary.
On the trial at New-London, January term, 1818, before Swift, Ch. J. and Brainard and Goddard, Js., the plaintiff J _ * offered in evidence the following writing, made and signed by Gilbert only, after the dissolution of the copartnership between him and Barr til : “ I, Nathaniel Gilbert, acknowledge that I have retained in my hands of the money of Samuel Story, jun. [the plaintiff] the amount of a note, and the interest thereon, up to the 20th day of December, 1816 j which note is signed by said Story, dated December 31st, 1811, for the sum of 1073 dollars, 94 cents, on interest from date, payable to Nathaniel Gilbert & Co., and is now in suit: and whereas the said Story claims to have paid a part of said note, which has never been indorsed, I do hereby agree and promise, whenever said suit shall be finally determined, to pay said Story such sum as the court shall find to have been paid on said note, by said Story, and interest thereon to the time of the judgment of said court : and I do agree and promise to save said Story harmless against all claims the late firm of Nathaniel Gilbert & Co., may have against the said Story, by virtue of the judgment which they maj obtain on said note against him, excepting the cost which shall have accrued in said suit after this date. It is agreed by said Story, that this writing shall not be used, or exhibited in evidence, in the trial of said suit on said note. Norwich, 20th December, 1816. _ Nathaniel Gilbert.” To the admission of this writing the defendants objected, because it was the act of one of the partners alone, after the dissolution, and could not be received to affect the other partner. The court overruled the objection, and admitted the evidence.
The plaintiff also offered the testimony of Elijah Pitcher, and others, to prove, that on the 2d of July 1812,* the plaintiff paid to Barrell, one of the defendants, the sum of 375 dollars, which he then promised to indorse on the plaintiff’s; note to Nathaniel Gilbert & Co., of the 31st of December, 1811: to the admission of which, the defendants objected, on the ground that it was within the statue of Frauds and Perjuries, and did not tend to prove the issue. But the court admitted it.
The plaintiff having offered no other proof of any express promise ; it being admitted and proved, that after the dissolution of the copartnership, vi». on the 20th of December, 1816, the balance of the plaintiff’s note, of the 31st of December, 1811, was paid, by the plaintiff, to Gilbert, as one of the firm of Nathaniel Gilbert & Co., and for the use and benefit of that firm, in pursuance of Gilbert's agreement contained in the writing given by him of that date; and the action on the plaintiff’s note being withdrawn, in January 1817 ; the defendants prayed the court to instruct the jury, that these facts did not, by law, raise a promise against both the de - fendants, as alleged in the declaration. The defendants further prayed the court to instruct the jury, that although they should find the sum of 375 dollars to have been paid on the 2d of July, 1812, as claimed by the plaintiff; and although they should find, that the balance of the plaintiff’s note was paid to Gilbert, as one of the firm of Nathaniel Gilbert & Co., for the benefit of the firm, after its dissolution j yet that, by law, the plaintiff could not recover upon a joint promise against the defendants, as laid in the declaration. The court charged the jury as follows: “ The plaintiff, in this action, seeks to recover from the defendants 375 dollars, which, he says, he paid on the 2d of July 1812, to apply on a certain note, or contract, dated the 31st of December, 1811, and which the defendants neglected to apply. The plaintiff contends, that he has fully supported his claim. On the part of the defendants, it is contended, he has utterly failed to prove that the 375 dollars, ever were paid, by the plaintiff to the defendants. This is a question of fact for you to decide; but however this fact may be found, the defendants contend, that the testimony offered by the plaintiff is not admissible to support either count in the declaration, and pray the direction of the court to the jury on this point. On this point, the "ourt is of opinion, and the law is so, that the, plaintiff’s testimony is admissible evidence in support of the second count only, in the plaintiff’s declaration, being the count for money liad and received to the plaintiff’s use. The defendants contend further, that the plaintiff’s claim, as set up, even if proved, comes within the statute of Frauds, and prays the court so to instruct the jury. On this point, the court is of opinion, that the statute of Frauds has no application to bar ;he plaintiff’s right to recover in this action. The defendants further contend, that the agreement offered in evidence, by the plaintiff, and signed by Nathaniel Gilbert, dated 20th December 1816, shews, that the money due by the original contract has been paid and satisfied, by the plaintiff, and that he is now, by law, precluded from a recovery in this action ; and pray the court so to instruct the jury. On this point, the court is of opinion, that said agreement, accompanied with the other testimony offered by the defendants, does not, if found true, shew, that the plaintiff has paid and satisfied his original note, or contract, of 31st December 1811, in such manner, and under such circumstances, as to preclude his right of recovery in this action, provided he substantiates the claim set up. You will then attend carefully to the testimony, and return a verdict on one side or the other, according as you shall find. If you find for the plaintiff, your verdict will be, that the defendants did assume,” &c.
“ The. defendants also contend, that from the agreement signed by Nathaniel Gilbert alone, dated 20th December 1816, and offered in evidence by the plaintiff, it appears, that no right of action, previous to that time, could have existed in favour of the plaintiff, for the non-application of the money to be paid on the contract ; that at that time, they have proved the copartnership was dissolved ; and that no act of Nathaniel Gilbert alone, at that time, could raise a joint promise ; and that, unless the joint promise, as laid in the declaration, be proved on the trial, to have arisen, or been made, before the dissolution of the copartnership, and the jury so find, the defendants will be entitled to a verdict: and they pray the court so to instruct the jury. On this point, the court is of opinion, and the law is so, that although, if the jury find the partnership was dissolved, Nathaniel Gilbert could not, by his individual act, make a new joint contract to bind the firm j yet, as this action, in the second count, and to which the evidence applies, does not proceed on the ground of an actual express promise, if it be stated in the declaration and shewn, that the money was received by the firm during the copartnership, and that the indebtedness remains, a joint promise may be alleged and proved, at any time, while the joint indebtedness exists.”
The jury having found a verdict for the plaintiff, the defendants moved for a new trial, on the ground of a misdirection, and the admission of improper evidence. They also moved in arrest of judgment, on the ground, that the promise laid in the declaration was after the date of the writ. Both these motions were reserved, by consent of parties, for the consideration and advice of the nine Judges.
Goddard and Staples, for the defendants,
contended, 1. That the declaration was bad, because the cause of action was laid after the date of the writ. 1 Roll. Mr. 792. pi. 12. Williams v. Bentkley, Moore, 598. Venables v. Daffe, Garth. 113. Buckly v. Williamson, Cro. Elia. 325. This defect is not cured by verdict ; and is ground for a writ of error. Dickinson v. Plaisted, 7 Term Rep. 470. Cheetham v. Lewis, 3 Johns. Rep. 42. Waring v. Yates, 10 Johns. Rep. 119. 1 Chitl. Plead. 266. The promise laid on the 1st of March 1817, must now be taken to be an express promise j and it is the only promise in the declaration, of which any breach ⅛ alleged.
2. That the parol testimony of Pitcher and others ought to have been rejected, as it was offered to prove a contract or agreement made more than three years before the commencement of the suit, within the second section of the statute of Frauds. It is not a sufficient answer to say, that this action is not brought on any express contract or agreement, but «pon a promise which the law implies from certain facts : for those facts, in such case, constitute the foundation of the action ; and to admit parol evidence in support of them, after the expiration of three years, would produce all the danger of fraud and perjury, which the statute was designed to guard against.
3. That the payment to Barrell, was made voluntarily, in satisfaction of a debt; and for that reason, cannot be recovered back in indebitatus assumpsit, Marriott v, Hampton, 2 Esp. Rep. 546. S. C. 7 Term Rep. 269. 1 New Rep. 263, d. e. (Day’s edit.) The evidence, therefore, to prove such payment, was irrelevant, and ought not to have been received.
4. That the writing signed by Gilbert, after the dissolution, ought not to have been received to affect his partner ; and that the direction to the jury, to find a joint promise, was incorrect. This was, on the face óf it, the individual act of Gilbert. He had no power to bind his late partner. Mel ⅜ al. v. Sutton, 8 Esp. Rep. 108. Lansing v. Gaine and Ten Eyck, 2 Johns. Rep. 300. It does not appear, that Harrell had any thing to do with the settlement of the company concerns, after the dissolution. The joint indebtedness of Barrell and Gilbert, claimed by the plaintiff, never existed.
-Lawman and Bminard, contra,
insisted, 1. That the declaration was well enough. In an action of general indebitatus assumpsit, not brought on a written contract, the time of the promise is immaterial. 1 Chitt. Mead. 258. In this case, the facts, stated as the ground of action, and from which the law raises the promise, were before the commencement of the suit. Further, the time of the promise alleged, was before the return-day of the writ, and before the sitting of the court j which is sufficient. Pugh v. Robinson, 1 Term Rep. 116. At any rate, the defect was cured by verdict. Sorrel v. Lewin, 3 ICeb. 354. Blackall v. Eale, Carth. 389. Bemis v. Faxon, 4 Mass. Rep. 263. Mlaire v. 0aland, 2 Johns. Ca. 52. 56.
2. That the testimony of Pitcher and others was properly admitted. The 2d section of our statute, entitled “ An act for the prevention of Frauds and Perjuries,” is, in its nature, a statute of limitation, and is applicable only to an express contract or agreement^ on which the suit is brought. To make it applicable to this case, would be to declare, that the general action for money had.and received, could never be sustained, after three years from the time the right of action accrued j an idea perfectly novel.
3. That the writing signed by Gilbert, was properly admitted : first, to shew that the payment first made was not applied on the contract; secondly, to shew that there was no voluntary settlement, or, if there was, that the exception on that ground was waived ; thirdly, to repel the claim of the defendants, that the right of action was barred, as the writing contained an acknowledgment of one partner, which, though after dissolution, is sufficient to take the case out of the statute. 6 Johns, Rep. 267.
4. That the charge was right, as the law, from the facts, implies a joint promise.
1 Stat. Conn. tit. 75. s. 2. This section, which has no corresponding provisions in the English statute 29 Car. % c. 3. is as follows : “ That no suit at law or in equity shall be brought or maintained upon any contract or agreement, that shall hereafter be made, and not reduced to writing as aforesaid, but within three years next after entering into, or making the same ; or on any such contract or agreement heretofore made, [i. e. before May 1771, the timé of passing the act] but within three years next after a right of action thereon sball accrue ; or if such right of action hath already accrued, such suit shall not be brought but within three years next after the first day of June, one thousand seven hundred and seventy one : Provided, that nothing in this act contained shall extend to any act ios of book-debt.”

Opinion:
Swift, Ch. J.
In this case, it appears, that Barrell and Gilbert, the defendants, had a note against Story, the plaintiff, to be paid out of the avails of a certain vessel, when sold, on which the plaintiff claimed, that he had paid 375 dollars to Barrell. Gilbert, on the sale of the vessel, had in his hands sufficient money to pay the whole note $ and after the dissolution of his partnership with Barrell, agreed with the plaintiff to retain the amount of the note, and promised in writ- ingto reruml to Iiim such sum as it should be found he had paid to Harrell, on a trial of the note then in suit. The suit, was withdrawn, so that the plaintiff bad no opportunity to prove what he bad paid on the note to Barrell. The money received by Gilbert was for the use of himself and Barrell.
When a man pays money on an obligation, his only remedy is to prove and apply such pay ment on the obligation : and no action will lie to recover it back. No action will lie to recover back money paid, with a full knowledge of all the facts. After the dissolution of a partnership, one, partner cannot do any act, by which he can subject the other to a new liability. On these principles, no action could be sustained for the money paid to Barrell; for it was a proper payment on the note, and Gilbert could not, after the dissolution of the partnership, subject him to an action for it. The withdrawing of the suit on the note was a rightful act, on the, part of Burrell : and it could not subject him to an action for a violation of the agreement with Gilbert. But it now appears from the verdict of the jury, that the sum of 375 dollars was paid to Barrell on the note, which was never applied : it also appears, that Gilbert retained the same sum ; that by reason of the withdrawing of the suit on the note, the plaintiff had no opportunity to prove the payment to Barrell, so as to give him a right to recover the money from Gilbert; and yet Barrell and Gilbert have received both these sums on account of the same debt. Here, the condition on which the money was paid, has not been fulfilled ; the con sideration for which it was paid, lias failed ; and though. .Barrell lias done no improper act, yet as he and Gilbert have jointly received the money under these circumstances, it is against good conscience that they should retain it; and they ought, on principles of justice, to refund it.
It is also contended, that the declaration is insufficient, because the promise is alleged to have been made after the date of the writ.
Where the day is material, as in written contracts, and must be proved precisely as laid, such an objection would be fatal \ but where the, day is not material, there this objection cannot be valid. Here, the plaintiff was not hound to prove the day alleged : he might have proved any other day, and it would have been sufficient. The averring of the promise, then, on a day after the date of the declaration, does not vitiate it.
Tuumbui.t,, Edmosd, Smith, Braisarh, Peters and Chapman, Js. were of the same opinion,