Case Name: MUSSELMAN v. GOVERNOR (ON REHEARING)
Court: Michigan Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1996-02-12
Citations: 450 Mich. 574
Docket Number: Docket Nos. 97322, 97915
Parties: MUSSELMAN v GOVERNOR (ON REHEARING)
Judges: Levin, J., concurred with Riley, J.
Reporter: Michigan Reports
Volume: 450
Pages: 574–587

Head Matter:
MUSSELMAN v GOVERNOR (ON REHEARING)
Docket Nos. 97322, 97915.
Argued October 11, 1995
(Calendar No. 7).
Decided February 12, 1996.
Ann Musselman and other current and retired members of the Public School Employees Retirement System sought mandamus in the Court of Appeals to compel prefunding of health care benefits for the 1991-92 fiscal year. The Court of Appeals, Reilly, P.J., and Corrigan, J. (Cavanagh, J., concurring), denied the petition, ruling that it was without authority to order the relief requested (Docket No. 142142). The plaintiffs again sought mandamus to compel prefunding for the 1992-93 fiscal year, which the Court, Reilly, P.J., and Hood and Corrigan, JJ., denied (Docket No. 166792). The plaintiffs appealed.
The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Boyle, joined by Chief Justice Brickley, and Justices Cavanagh and Mallett held that although failure to prefund retirement health care benefits for members of the Public School Employees Retirement System violates Const 1963, art 9, § 24, mandamus must be denied because the Supreme Court has no authority to order the Governor or the Legislature to appropriate funds under these circumstances. Justice Riley, joined by Justice Levin, concurring in part and dissenting in part, stated that because financial benefits do not include health benefits for purposes of Const 1963, art 9, §24, the funds were not constitutionally dedicated under Const 1963, art 9, § 24 and could be cut by the Governor under Const 1963, art 5, § 20. The plaintiffs should be denied relief. Justice Weaver took no part in the decision of the case. 448 Mich 503 (1995).
On rehearing, in separate opinions, the Supreme Court denied mandamus.
Chief Justice Brickley, writing separately, joined the rationale and result of the opinion of Justice Boyle only to the extent that it denies the request for mandamus.
Justice Riley, joined by Justice Levin, continued to adhere to the views expressed in her original opinion in this case. 448 Mich 524-533.
Justice Weaver, writing separately, concurred with Justice Riley and further stated that health care benefits were not contemplated by the drafters of Const 1963, art 9, § 24. The Legislature’s decisions first to offer health care benefits to retirees and later to prefund those benefits cannot legitimately be construed as creating a constitutional mandate for prefunding. The Legislature cannot amend the constitution simply by adopting legislation that incorporates language from a constitutionally mandated provision. Health care benefits are not included within the "accrued financial benefits” of Const 1963, art 9, §24, and the plaintiffs’ request for relief should be denied.
Justice Boyle, joined by Justices Cavanagh and Mallett, writing separately, stated that the temporary injunction granted by the Supreme Court to prevent the impending transfer of $139.5 million from the Michigan Public School Employees Retirement System to local school districts should be extended until further order of the Court. The parties should be invited to submit additional briefing regarding the effect of Proposal a and the appropriateness of making the injunction permanent or, alternatively, transferring the fund to the local districts with the restrictions intact.
Proposal a shifted the full cost of retirement for public school employees from the state to local school districts, with the local districts now responsible for all mpseks retirement contributions, including health benefits. The constitution requires prefunding of pension benefits unconditionally promised, and while the Supreme Court does not have the authority to require the Legislature to appropriate funds for retirement health care benefits, it has the authority to enjoin dispersal of the $139.5 million in the mpsers health reserve account to pay for unfunded health care obligations. Preventing dispersal of the fund does not necessarily mean that the fund could not be transferred to local districts, which are now responsible for health benefits, to pay for health care obligations that arose during the period those monies were set aside.
White, Przybylowicz, Schneider & Baird, P.C. (by Karen Bush Schneider, James A. White, Suzanne Krumholz Clark, and Jeffrey C. Murphy), for the plaintiffs.
Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Thomas L. Casey, Solicitor General, and Susan I. Leffler and Michael J. Moquin, Assistant Attorneys General, for defendants-appellees.
Amici Curiae:
Graham K. Crabtree, Assistant Senate Majority Counsel, Alfred H. Hall, Senate Majority Counsel, Judith M. Barton, Chief Policy and Legal Counsel, and Laura A. Chappelle, Attorney, for Dick Posthumus, Paul Hillegonds, Harry Gast, Donald Gilmer, Dan DeGrow, and Glenn Oxender.
Howard & Howard Attorneys, P.C. (by Donald F. Tucker, Wade E. Haddad, and Ellen M. Harvath), for Michigan Association of Retired School Personnel.
Jack Timmony, Assistant Corporation Counsel, for the City of Detroit Law Department.
Cohl, Stoker & Toskey, P.C. (by Peter A. Cohl and David M. Foy), for Michigan Association of Counties, Michigan Townships Association, and Michigan Municipal League.
Michael J. VanOverbeke for the City of Detroit Employees Benefit Plan.
Varnum, Riddering, Schmidt & Howlett (by John Patrick White) for Ferris State University, Eastern Michigan University, Western Michigan University, Michigan Technological University, and Northern Michigan University.

Opinion:
ON REHEARING
Brickley, C.J.
(concurring in part and dissenting in part). With the benefit of rehearing and reconsideration of the merits of this significant case, I find that I cannot, as I did in this Court's original offering, join the opinion of Justice Boyle to the extent that it finds it necessary to interpret the meaning of "financial benefits" as the term applies to Const 1963, art 9, § 24.
That opinion concludes, as did the Court of Appeals, that there is no legally acceptable remedy by which the executive or legislative branch can be compelled to appropriate funds in order to comply with art 9, § 24 of the Michigan Constitution, regardless of the construction given to the term "financial benefits."
It is a well-accepted principle of constitutional jurisprudence that courts do not engage in constitutional interpretation that is unnecessary to the disposition of the case at hand. The relief sought by the instant plaintiffs—a mandamus compelling the Legislature to appropriate sufficient resources to prefund their pension benefits as provided in art 9, § 24, is not advanced by the outcome of the debate over whether the framers of our state constitution intended the words "financial benefits" to include the health care benefits that have been added to the plaintiff's pension plan.
Accordingly, I join the rationale and result of the opinion of Justice Boyle, only to the extent that it denies the request for mandamus.
Riley, J.
I continue to adhere to the views expressed in my opinion of April 25, 1995. 448 Mich 503, 524-533; 533 NW2d 237 (1995).
Levin, J., concurred with Riley, J.
One aspect of the plaintiffs' request for relief that would not intrude on the prerogatives of the executive and legislative branches is that the state be enjoined from transferring those funds that remain in the health benefits fund, MCL 38.1334; MSA 15.893(144)—a fund that was a subject of our stay order at the time rehearing was granted. See Kosa v State Treasurer, 408 Mich 356; 292 NW2d 452 (1980). Those funds represent less than ten percent of the predicted amounts needed to carry out the plaintiffs' requested relief. In my view, that does not alter the conclusion that plaintiffs' request for relief is substantially unavailable regardless of the constitutional interpretation of the term "financial benefits." For the same reason, I would vacate the temporary stay.
"[F]ew principles of judicial interpretation are more firmly pounded than this: a court does not grapple with a constitutional issue except as a last resort." Taylor v Auditor General, 360 Mich 146, 154; 103 NW2d 769 (1960).