Case Name: Martin Dooly, plaintiff in error, vs. James P. Isbell, defendant in error
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia
Jurisdiction: Georgia
Decision Date: 1869-06
Citations: 39 Ga. 342
Docket Number: 
Parties: Martin Dooly, plaintiff in error, vs. James P. Isbell, defendant in error.
Judges: Brown, C. J., concurred, but furnished no opinion.
Reporter: Georgia Reports
Volume: 39
Pages: 342–347

Head Matter:
Martin Dooly, plaintiff in error, vs. James P. Isbell, defendant in error.
Where on the trial of a claim case it appeared that the levy was made on the 4th of November, 1868, on a ft. fa. issued upon the 13th of November, 1861, and the claimant showed title from the defendant in ft. fa. and possession more than four years before the levy, and there was no evidence that claimant had notice, at the time of the purchase, of the existence of the judgment: Held, that the land was discharged from the lien of the judgment, and that the verdict of the jury finding thelland not subject, will not be disturbed. Warner, J., dissenting.
Claim. Homestead. Prescriptive title. Decided by Judge Parrott. Whitfield Superior Court. April Term, 1869.
Ou the 29th of October, 1861, Dooly obtained a judgment against one Forsyth, upon which a fi. fa. was issued on the 13th of November, 1861. On the 4th of November, 1868, this fi. fa. was levied upon a lot of land in said county, as Forsyth’s property. Isbell, as trustee for his children, claimed the land.
On the trial of the claim, Dooly’s attorneys showed that Forsyth had had possession of said land as his own, after the date of the judgment, and closed. Isbell’s attorneys read in evidence a deed, whereby, on the 3d of March, 1863, Forsyth conveyed said land to Isbell, as such trustee. They then tendered an exemplification of a record, showing that said land had been set apart as a homestead for said Isbell, as such trustee. This was objected to because it was irrelevant, and because it was made after the lien of Dooly on the land had attached. The objections were overruled, and the record was read.
“There being no dispute about the facts, and the question being simply one of law, as to what effect was to be given to the proceeding setting apart this lot to the claimant, as trustee, the jury, under the instructions of the Court, found that the property was not subject.”
Counsel for Dooly say that the Court erred in admitting said evidence, and in his said instructions to the jury.
E. P. Edwards, Dawson A. Walker, W. K. Moore, for plaintiff in error,
cited 1st section of Art. VII Constitution of 1868, and the Act of October 3d, 1868, in comparison with Act of December 11th, 1841, Cobb’s N. D., 389, and the Act of 1843, Ib. 390, Code, section 2013; Maxey, Jordan & Co., vs. Loyal, 38 Ga. R.; 1st Kelley R., 193, and Code, section 1944.
J. A. R. Hanks, for defendant,
cited 14th Ga. R., 454, as to proper construction of said Act of 1868, and said clause of the Constitution, and Ogden vs. Saunders, 12, Wheat. R., 351-3, Bronson vs. Kenzie, 1st Howard’s R., 315, Van Hoffman vs. the City of Quincey, 4th Wallace’ R., 553, and Cutts & Johnson vs. Hardee, 38th Ga. R., to show that the Act of 1868 was constitutional.

Opinion:
McCay, J.
The argument of this case at the hearing, was mainly in the constitutionality and construction of Article VII of the Constitution of 1868, but if the verdict of the jury is right in the case, it ought to stand, even if the homestead provis ion of the Constitution does not apply, as between these parties. Whether it does apply or not, we do not decide.
The verdict of the jury is sustainable on the ground decided by this Court, at this term, in the case of Nathan Chapman vs. Warren Akin, from Bartow county. The plaintiff in the fi. fa. did not make his levy within the time prescribed by the Code, section 3525, after the property had gone into the possession of an innocent bona fide holder. The evidence shows that the property was bought by Isbell, on the 3d of March, 18.63, and the evidence does not show that he had any notice of this fi,. fa. The levy was made November 4th, 1868. The law, it is true, carries the lien of the judgment over upon the property of the defendant into the hands of an innocent bona fide holder, but it is upon the condition that he asserts it in four years after the transfer.
We held, in the case of Chapman vs. Akin, at this term, that this was not a statute of limitations, but a condition put by law, upon the plaintiff's lien, like the duty to record a mortgage, or to enter a mechanic's lien, and that if the plaintiff fail to comply with the condition, as against an innocent purchaser, the lien is gone. What is the difference in principle between this case and the case of a mortgage ? In case of a mortgage, the lien exists by the contract; it is not good against subsequent purchasers without notice, unless it is recorded ; and it is wholly immaterial why it is not -recorded ; neither death nor accident, nor war, nor minority, nor marriage excuses. There must he either record or. notice, to make the mortgage good against an innocent purchaser. So too of a judgment lien against an innocent purchaser without notice; it must be levied in four years; that is the condition on which it is permitted to follow property into the hands of third persons. And that condition must be performed. That the plaintiff in fi. fa. has been prevented by accident, by the act of God, as death, by minority, by war, by marriage, or by any hindrance, except one put in his way by the claimant himself, is no excuse. The claimant is himself, an innocent purchaser, and is entitled to protection if the plaintiff does not perform the conditions upon which the law permits him to pursue property in possession of defendant, at the date of the judgment, over into the hands of innocent purchasers.
Judgment affirmed.
Brown, C. J., concurred, but furnished no opinion.