Case Name: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Rodney Leroy BOYD, Defendant-Appellant
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 2005-02-02
Citations: 122 F. App'x 782
Docket Number: No. 04-50636
Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Rodney Leroy BOYD, Defendant-Appellant.
Judges: Before DAVIS, SMITH and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.
Reporter: West's Federal Appendix
Volume: 122
Pages: 782–783

Head Matter:
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Rodney Leroy BOYD, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 04-50636.
Summary Calendar.
United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.
Decided Feb. 2, 2005.
Joseph H. Gay, Jr., Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office Western District of Texas, San Antonio, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
M. Carolyn Fuentes, Federal Public Defender’s Office Western District of Texas, San Antonio, TX, for Defendant-Appellant.
Before DAVIS, SMITH and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.

Opinion:
PER CURIAM:
Rodney Leroy Boyd pleaded guilty before a magistrate judge to possession with intent to distribute 1,000 or more kilograms of a mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of marijuana. The district court accepted his guilty plea and sentenced him to 121 months of imprisonment, five years of supervised release, and a $100 special assessment.
Boyd argues that his guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary because the magistrate judge did not properly inform him at the plea hearing of his rights to present evidence and to testify on his own behalf, and thus he was not fully aware of his right to present a defense. He contends that his lack of knowledge of his right to present a defense was evidenced by his hesitation upon being asked by the magistrate judge at the plea hearing whether his plea was voluntary and by his assertion of a duress defense at sentencing.
Under Fed.R.CrimP. 11(b)(1)(E), the court must inform a defendant that he has the right at trial to testify and present evidence. Although the magistrate judge did not inform Boyd that he was waiving these specific rights, the admonishment was implicit in the magistrate judge's discussion of the other rights being waived by Boyd. See United States v. Bachynsky, 949 F.2d 722, 725-26 (5th Cir.1991). Furthermore, Boyd's request to speak to counsel before answering that his plea was voluntary merely suggests that his answer was informed, and neither Boyd nor his counsel made any request to withdraw his guilty plea or questioned the guilty plea's voluntariness after Boyd asserted at sentencing that he had committed the offense under duress.
Accordingly, there is no indication in the record that there was a reasonable probability that, but for the magistrate judge's failure to inform Boyd of this right to present evidence and testify at trial, Boyd would not have entered a guilty plea. See United States v. Dominguez Benitez, — U.S. -, -, 124 S.Ct. 2333, 2340, 159 L.Ed.2d 157 (2004). Any error by the magistrate judge did not affect Boyd's substantial rights, and thus there is no plain error. See United States v. Vonn, 535 U.S. 55, 59, 122 S.Ct. 1043, 152 L.Ed.2d 90 (2002).
AFFIRMED.
Pursuant to 5th Cir R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.