Case Name: STATE of Louisiana, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Louis Diaz RODRIGUEZ, Defendant-Appellant
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1990-10-10
Citations: 569 So. 2d 5
Docket Number: No. Cr89-581
Parties: STATE of Louisiana, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Louis Diaz RODRIGUEZ, Defendant-Appellant.
Judges: Before DOMENGEAUX, C.J., and FORET and KNOLL, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 569
Pages: 5–9

Head Matter:
STATE of Louisiana, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Louis Diaz RODRIGUEZ, Defendant-Appellant.
No. Cr89-581.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Third Circuit.
Oct. 10, 1990.
Rehearing Denied Nov. 26, 1990.
John Navarre, Oakdale, for defendant-appellant.
Robert Bryant, Beth Conrad, Asst. Dist. Attys., Lake Charles, for plaintiff-appellee.
Before DOMENGEAUX, C.J., and FORET and KNOLL, JJ.

Opinion:
KNOLL, Judge.
The Louisiana Supreme Court remanded this case for our reconsideration of Rodriguez's contention that the State failed to present sufficient evidence of the quantity of pure cocaine seized. See State v. Rodriguez, 558 So.2d 595 (La.1990). In particular, we were asked to reconsider our resolution of that issue in light of its recent per curiam opinion in State v. Newton, 545 So.2d 530 (La.1989). We affirm.
In State v. Newton, the Louisiana Supreme Court stated:
"La.R.S. 40:967(F) authorizes increased punishment for possession of 'cocaine or related substances as provided in Schedule 11(a)(4) of R.S. 40:964....' La.R.S. 40:964 Schedule 11(A)(4) defines the particular substance as '[c]oca leaves, cocaine, ecognine .together with its salts, isomers, derivatives or preparations, 'which [are] chemically equivalent or identical with . [coca leaves, cocaine or ecognine]_'
*
La.R.S. 40:967(F) predicates punishment upon the weight in varying amounts of 'grams . of cocaine or related substances .,' as defined in Schedule II of R.S. 40:964. In the absence of legislative intent to the contrary, we read R.S. 40:967(F) no more broadly than the definition of cocaine provided by R.S. 40:964, Schedule 11(A)(4). The defendant's punishment therefore depends upon grams of cocaine or related substances by weight and not upon the weight of the preparation or mixture containing the cocaine or related substance."
SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
Defendant contends that since drugs are "cut" with other substances to maximize profit, the State failed to offer sufficient evidence to prove that he possessed 400 or more grams of pure cocaine.
In defendant's initial appeal, we summarily found no merit to defendant's contention. In reaching that conclusion, we relied upon State v. Laino, 499 So.2d 1189 (La.App. 5th Cir.1986), and State v. Newton, 538 So.2d 752 (La.App. 5th Cir.1989), the precursor appellate decision which the Supreme Court reversed in State v. Newton above, for the proposition that "[t]he definition of 'cocaine' for the purpose of the crime of possession, is intended to encompass any preparation which contains cocaine, whether pure or cut with other material." Thus, even assuming the correctness of defendant's contention, we rejected defendant's argument on the basis of the appellate decisions in State v. Laino and State v. Newton, without detailing the evidence presented at trial. In light of the Louisiana Supreme Court's reversal of the two appellate cases relied upon by us in our earlier disposition of this issue, we now must reassess defendant's contention in light of the record developed at trial.
The standard for appellate review in determining the sufficiency of the evidence is whether after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979).
Richard Donahoe, the expert in forensic chemistry who examined the white powder seized in the case sub judice, testified for the State. Donahoe determined that the package weighed 1,047 grams. He described his testing procedure as follows:
"A . After taking the package, I take a weight of it, to begin with, to find out how much is there, since this package is quite large. Then I take either a cut, or I try to get into the package itself. It's well taped and all. And then I take a sample of it from different areas around that package, and I do a chemical test which involves just a little chemical that we call cobalt thioc-yanate which is used to do a spot test or screening. Then I take another sample and run that on the instrument I have.
Q. Those instruments that you have, what are they to determine?
A. I determine that this packet — this item contained cocaine.
Q. Do you know how many samples from the package you took, sir?
A. Roughly, four samples.
Q. From different areas of the package?
A. From different areas of the package.
Q. Were they all cocaine?
A. Yes." (Emphasis added.)
Later, on cross-examination by defense counsel, the following colloquy took place:
"Q. Okay. And, Officer, are you satisfied that this [referring to the package seized] is cocaine?
A. Yes, I am."
Defendant conjectures that "It is probable and likely that the drug was not pure. Commonly, in order to maximize profit, drugs are 'cut' with other substances." We disagree. Defendant overlooks the fact that the State proved its case-in-chief that the cocaine was "pure." Defendant did not refute this fact, nor does the record suggest that the cocaine was anything other than "pure" cocaine.
Defendant hypothesizes and makes conjectures about the composition of the cocaine seized in the present case, but points to no evidence in the record which would support his speculation. From the outset we note that defendant elicited no testimony from the State's forensic chemist that the cocaine was mixed with other legal substances. Furthermore, even though Sergeant Jerome Sigur of the Louisiana State Police was qualified by the State as an expert in the field of narcotics investigations, and testified at length about the packaging and sale of cocaine on the street, defendant never asked him to address the question of whether or not cocaine is ever sold "uncut", i.e., free of other substances. Moreover, well in advance of trial, the State granted defendant authority to scientifically test tangible objects connected with this case which was in the possession of either the Louisiana State Police or the Calcasieu Parish Sheriffs Office. Despite the State's discovery authorization and the withdrawal of the package of cocaine by defense counsel from the evidence room just prior to trial, no testimony was presented by defendant of any scientific testing which would have disproved the unrefuted State evidence that the package seized was cocaine. Therefore, we find no evidence of record which would even question that the substance at issue was anything but pure cocaine.
Further, in making this determination, we find that State v. Laino and State v. Newton are factually distinguishable. In Laino, as well as Newton, the forensic chemist specifically testified that the substance seized was not pure cocaine. In the present case, the forensic chemist made no mention of the presence of a substance other than cocaine. Likewise, as noted in the appellate decision in State v. Newton, the trial judge instructed the jury, over defense objection, that the definition of cocaine included "any preparation which contains cocaine, . whether pure or cut with other ingestible material." In the ease sub judice, unlike State v. Newton, the trial judge did not give any definition of "cocaine" to the jury in its instructions, and defendant did not raise an objection to the trial judge's choice not to define "cocaine". These factors further strengthen our conclusion that based on the facts presented herein, the Louisiana Supreme Court's decision in State v. Newton does not mandate a reversal of defendant's conviction.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, we find that the only reasonable conclusion the jury could reach in the present case was that the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was in possession of 400 or more grams of cocaine.
Therefore, this assignment of error is without merit.
DECREE
For the foregoing reasons, the defendant's conviction and sentence are affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
DOMENGEAUX, C.J., concurs and assigns reasons.
Foret, J., dissents and assigns written reasons for his dissent as to both the principal review and to Chief Judge DOMENGEAUX's concurring opinion.
. Since we dispose of defendant's contention on the grounds that the evidence was void of any hint that the cocaine was cut with other ingesti-ble material, we do not reach the question of whether the Louisiana Supreme Court decision in State v. Newton is applicable retroactively.