Case Name: RYDER TRS, INC., Appellant, v. Patricia HIRSCH, Lisa Marie Ann Hesse, and College Park Texaco, Inc., Appellees
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 2005-03-02
Citations: 900 So. 2d 608
Docket Number: No. 4D03-1426
Parties: RYDER TRS, INC., Appellant, v. Patricia HIRSCH, Lisa Marie Ann Hesse, and College Park Texaco, Inc., Appellees.
Judges: GROSS, J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 900
Pages: 608–615

Head Matter:
RYDER TRS, INC., Appellant, v. Patricia HIRSCH, Lisa Marie Ann Hesse, and College Park Texaco, Inc., Appellees.
No. 4D03-1426.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
March 2, 2005.
Opinion Denying Rehearing, Rehearing En Banc and Certification May 11, 2005.
Jane Kreusler-Walsh of Jane Kreusler-Walsh, P.A., West Palm Beach and Roderick McGee of Ligman & Martin, P.L., Miami, for appellant.
Julie H. Littky-Rubin of Lytal, Reiter, Clark, Fountain & Williams, LLP, West Palm Beach, and Jeffrey A. Shaffer of Mintmire & Associates, Palm Beach, for appellees.

Opinion:
MAY, J.
The defendant appeals a final judgment entered on a jury verdict in an automobile accident case. We limit our opinion to the trial court's jury instruction on conversion as it relates to the dangerous instrumentality doctrine and affirm.
Art Saxon had previously rented trucks from College. Park Texaco. Rennard Su-ghrim, an employee of College Park Texaco, loaned Saxon a truck owned by Ryder without executing a formal written agreement. Under the informal arrangement, Saxon paid Sughrim weekly rent, but he stopped paying after several weeks. Nevertheless, Sughrim allowed Saxon to keep the vehicle. Saxon later used his mother's credit card'to make some of the payments. The same card was subsequently charged another $6,000 for use of the truck without the mother's knowledge. Saxon did not have a valid driver's license.
Sughrim ultimately reported the truck "lost." The officer taking the police report testified that Sughrim wanted to locate the truck or get the money from Saxon. When Sughrim later spoke to Saxon, he was advised he would be paid the money owed.
Law enforcement contacted Saxon about the truck, advised him that it had been reported missing, and indicated that he would be arrested if he drove the truck. Saxon, in turn, told his girlfriend, Lisa Marie Hesse, that if she.-used the truck and got caught, she would be arrested.
Six weeks after Sughrim reported the truck "lost," it was involved in an accident with the plaintiff. Saxon's girlfriend, Lisa Marie Hesse, was driving the truck at the time.
The plaintiff filed suit against Hesse and Ryder. Ryder asserted the truck had been stolen at the time of the accident. The plaintiff then amended the complaint to add Saxon and College Park Texaco. The plaintiff obtained defaults against Hesse and College Park and dismissed Saxon prior to trial.
At trial, Ryder requested a special jury instruction on conversion. Plaintiffs counsel objected. After a discussion on the issue, the trial court denied Ryder's request, and gave the jury a modified conversion instruction.
The jury found that Hesse was negligent, that her negligence caused plaintiffs damages, and that Saxon had not stolen or converted the truck at the time of the accident. The court entered a final judgment for the plaintiff.
Ryder argues a new trial is required because the conversion instruction was inaccurate and confusing. We agree that the instruction may not have been perfect, but it was neither inaccurate nor confusing. In Goldschmidt v. Holman, 571 So.2d 422 (Fla.1990), the supreme court stated the standard of review of a trial court's decision on a jury instruction:
Decisions regarding jury instructions are within the sound discretion of the trial court and should not be disturbed on appeal absent prejudicial error. Prejudicial error requiring a reversal of judgment or a new trial occurs only where "the error complained of has resulted in a miscarriage of justice." § 59.041, Fla. Stat. (1989). A "miscarriage of justice" arises where instructions are "reasonably calculated to confuse or mislead" the jury. Florida Power & Light Co. v. McCollum, 140 So.2d 569, 569 (Fla.1962).
Id. at 425.
"Under Florida's dangerous instrumentality doctrine, the owner of a motor vehicle is liable to third persons for injuries caused by the negligent operation or use of the motor vehicle by the person to whom the owner entrusted the vehicle." Dockery v. Enter. Rent-A-Car Co., 796 So.2d 593, 596 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001). "[T]o vitiate the owner's initial consent and deem the vehicle 'no longer on the public highways by authority of the owner,' the vehicle must be shown to have been the subject of a theft or conversion." Id. at 599. Thus, whether the Ryder truck had been converted at the time of the accident necessarily determined the defendant's liability in this case. An accurate instruction on the issue of conversion was critical.
The defense provided the court with the following proposed special instruction on the issue of conversion:
A conversion consists of an act in derogation of the Defendants [sic] possesso-ry rights, and any wrongful exercise or assumption of authority over another's goods by an unauthorized third party depriving the Defendant of the possession of the vehicle, permanently or for an indefinite time, is a conversion. The gist of a conversion has been declared to be not the acquisition of the property by the wrongdoer, but the wrongful deprivation of a person of property to the possession of which he is entitled.
Plaintiffs counsel objected to the special instruction. The trial court then took the initiative to craft an instruction, which read:
[T]he issue for your determination on Ryder TRS, Inc.'s defense of conversion or theft is whether prior to the accident, Ryder TRS had been wrongfully deprived of the use of [sic] possession of the vehicle permanently or for an indefinite period of time.
Plaintiffs counsel once again objected and argued the court should restrict the definition to language from this court's opinion in Dockery. The court acquiesced and gave the following instruction over defense objection:
The issue for your determination on Ryder TRS, Inc.'s defense of conversion or theft is whether at the time of the accident, Ryder TRS, Inc. had been wrongly deprived of the incidents of ownership of the vehicle.
The instruction here was not incorrect or inaccurate. At worst, the instruction was imprecise. A jury instruction might have been drafted that was better tailored to Ryder's defense. Indeed, the trial court's instruction appears to have been the better one. However, the instruction given, while perhaps imprecise, did not mislead or confuse the jury and no "miscarriage of justice occurred." In fact, each side explained "incidents of ownership" during closing argument.
We therefore affirm.
GROSS, J., concurs.
FARMER, C. J., concurs specially with opinion.