Case Name: Nils Berglund, Appellant, v Luckenbach Steamship Company, Respondent
Court: Washington Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Washington
Decision Date: 1928-04-09
Citations: 147 Wash. 416
Docket Number: No. 20943
Parties: Nils Berglund, Appellant, v Luckenbach Steamship Company, Respondent.
Judges: 
Reporter: Washington Reports
Volume: 147
Pages: 416–419

Head Matter:
[No. 20943.
Department One.
April 9, 1928.]
Nils Berglund, Appellant, v Luckenbach Steamship Company, Respondent.
Wm. Martin, for appellant.
Suffer, Sayden, Merritt, Summers & Bucey, for respondent.
Reported in 266 Pac. 141.

Opinion:
Mitchell, J.
Nils Berglund, an experienced longshoreman, was injured while replacing hatch boards on one of the vessels of the Luckenbach Steamship Company, in Seattle. His complaint was that his injuries were caused by the negligence of the steamship company. Upon the trial of the case, at the conclusion of the evidence on behalf of the plaintiff, the court directed a verdict for the defendant. The plaintiff has appealed from a judgment on the verdict. ; -:
The substance of the charge of negligence against the respondent was that respondent provided a hatch cover which was short and defective, dangerous and unfit to be used as a hatch cover upon said hatch, and in
" . . . negligently placing the said hatch where said hatch cover was not sufficiently long to reach from one- end bearing crossbeam to the other . . . and in negligently leaving the said hatch cover upon the hatch while supported only under one end and the center."
It was further alleged that, while engaged in his work, he stepped upon the unsupported end of one of the hatch covers or boards and dropped down through the hatchway and was injured.
His proof, however, showed that the hatch board was not in place nor supposed' to be in place, and that he knew it at the time he stepped on it. After stowing cargo, he was directed to assist in replacing the hatch cover. In doing so, they first set in proper places the framework of the hatch, consisting of a king-beam and crossbeams to receive the covers or boards that fit into the different sections of the frame. There were eighteen boards to cover the hatch, which boards, in a sling load of two tiers, were then brought on deck and dropped temporarily across the crossbeams, for the convenience of the workmen in putting them in their permanent places. There was nothing unusual about placing or dropping tbe boards in tbat way; tbe appellant had seen it done tbat way on other occasions. After tbe sling was removed from tbe boards, tbe appellant and bis working partner distributed and placed tbe boards, about nine feet long, into tbeir proper permanent places. Tbe batch was divided into six sections, three on either side of tbe main king-beam, running fore and aft. Tbe boards were numbered so as to indicate tbe particular places and sections into which they fit. They varied, in lengths so tbat, in placing them, tbe workmen were at times compelled to replace them.
Tn doing tbe work, they took tbe boards, one at a time, alternately from tbe tiers, passed safely around ' tbe sides of tbe tiers until, upon removing next to tbe last board, tbe appellant, with tbe board obstructing bis view, walked forward, not on tbe side as theretofore, but on tbe last board of tbe tier until be reached the unsupported end of tbat board, whereupon it tilted, causing him to fall into the bold. There was nothing about the situation to deceive or mislead tbe common mind, nothing intricate or involved. Just two tiers of boards, of somewhát uneven lengths, piled on tbe beams of tbe batch. They laid tbe boards so as to cover tbe batch as tbeir work progressed until, finally deserting that plan, appellant walked upon a loose •board tbat be knew, or could see, was not in place. There was no proof tending to show tbat it was negligent- to land tbe sling load of boards temporarily across the batch beams, nor to leave the last, or any other, board in its temporary position while other boards were being put in proper places. This is not a case of presumed negligence, as contended for by the appellant, because it clearly appears by tbe proof that the injury is not inexplicable, except as the result of negligence on the part of the respondent. On the con trary, tbe accident and injury are clearly traceable to appellant's own negligence and carelessness.. It must be so beld as a matter of law.
Affirmed.
Mackintosh, C. J., French, and Parker, JJ., concur