Case Name: WIDEMAN v. HINES, DIRECTOR GENERAL
Court: Supreme Court of South Carolina
Jurisdiction: South Carolina
Decision Date: 1921-10-10
Citations: 117 S.C. 516
Docket Number: 10741
Parties: WIDEMAN v. HINES, DIRECTOR GENERAL
Judges: Mr. Ci-iiee Justice Gary and Mr. Justice Fraser concur.
Reporter: South Carolina Reports
Volume: 117
Pages: 516–535

Head Matter:
10741
WIDEMAN v. HINES, DIRECTOR GENERAL
(109 S. E. 123)
1. Railroads—Negligence Held Question for Jury.—In an action for the death of a passenger in an automobile struck by a train, where there was evidence that the driver looked before attempting ■ to cross, that his view was obscured, and that the defendant did not give the statutory signals, the determination as to who was negligent was for the jury.
2. Railroads—Om'ission of Statutory Signals Negligence.-—-The failure to give the statutory signals of the approach of a train to a crossing is negligence per se.
3. Negligence—Question for Jury on Conflicting Evidence.—Where the evidence is conflicting, the issues of negligence and contributory negligence are for the jury.
4. Railroads—Charges as to Signals Held Proper.—In an action for death at a crossing, the Court properly read to the jury the statute (Civ. Code 1912, §§ 3222, 3230) requiring signals and imposing liability for negl'ect to give signals, unless decedent was guilty of gross or willful negligence or violation of law contributing to the injury.
5. Trial—Instruction as to Railroad’s Liability for Death Resulting From Failure to Give Statutory Signals Not Reversible, in View of Whole Charge.—In an action for death of passenger in an automobile struck by a train at a crossing, where the Court fully-charged as to the burden of proof and effect of defendant’s negligence, and plaintiff's contributory negligence, and read them the crossing statutes (Civ. Code 1912, §§ 3222, 3230) under which defendant was liable if.it failed to give the statutory signals, unless decedent was guilty of gross and willful negligence or violation of law contributing to the injury, instructions that, if defendant’s failure to give the statutory signals was the proximate cause of the injury, plaintiff could recover, unless decedent was guilty of want of slight care, and that the failure to give such signals was some evidence of willfulness and wantonness, were not reversible error.
6. Appeal and Error—Points Not Made in Circuit Court Cannot be Considered by Supreme Court.—Points not made in the Circuit Court cannot be considered by the Supreme Court.
Before Sease, J., Greenwood, April, 1920.
Affirmed.
Action by Jane Wideman as Administratrix of J. N. Wideman, deceased, against Walker D. Hines, Director General of Railroads. From judgment for plaintiff defendant appeals.
The portions of the Judges charge to which defendant excepted were as follows :
“If you find that the defendant failed to give the statutory signals, and that that was the proximate cause of the alleged injury and damage, the plaintiff will be entitled to recover unless you find that those in charge of the operation of the automobile were guilty of want of slight care.”
And—“I should charge you that the failure to give the statutory signals is some evidence of willfulness and wantonness.”
Messrs. Grier, Park & Nicholson, for appellant,
cite: Plaintiff must show negligence or willfulness by defendant and that the injury was a result of such negligence or willfulness: 21 S. C. 466; 78 S. C., 193; 90 S. C„ 42; 81 S. C., 193; 81 S. C., 100; 33 S. C., 198. Duty upon every capable person when about to cross a railroad track: 94 S. C., 145; 72 S. C., 389; 76 S. C., 368. Where it appears from undisputed testimony that deceased by the use of ordinary care in looking and listening would have avoided collision a verdict for defendant should have been directed: 94 S. C., 145; 72 S. C., 389; 76 S. C., 368; 78 S. C., 379; 81 a C, 193; 113 U S., 615; 95 U. a, 161; 97 U. a, 697; 150 U. S., 245. Duty to stop, look and listen where view is obstructed: 21 R R. A. (N. S.) 794; Ann. Cas. 1913-B, 697 and Note 681., Where testimony is opposed to'well established and unquestioned laws of nature, and scientific facts it will be disregarded: 28 R. R. A. '(N. S.) 648; Elliott Evid. Par, 39. Judge cannot instruct jury that there is evidence of any particular fact, nor state the force and effect that should be given to any particular fact: 90 S. C., 266; 105 S. C., 128; 87 S. C., 193; 83 S. C„ 56. Suit against Director General is in effect a suit against the Government: 26 R. C. R. Sec. 63, p. 1458; Sec. 66 p. 1461-2; 188 U. S. 400. If Federal Control Act (Act March 21, 1918, Sec. 10) does not authorise suit Court has no jurisdiction: 254 Fed. 875; 254 Fed. 881; 263 Fed. 211. Crossing statute does not create a “common carrier liability: 1 Civ. Code 1912, Sec. 3230. Failure to give statutory signals as evidence of willfulness: 90 S. C. 266; 93 S. C, 51; 97 S. C„ 72; 99 S. C., 277; 101 S. C., 8; 105 S. C„ 128; 106 S. C., 393; 87 S. C., 193; 91 S. C., 216: 83 S. C., 56; 83 S. C„ 328.
Messrs. Tillman & Mays, for respondent,
cite: Fads and circumstances here different from those in Cable'case: 94 S. C., 144; but similar to the Callison case: 105 S. C., 128. Points not raised on circuit will not be considered on appeal: 54 S. C., 345; 92 S. C., 170; 67 S. C., 551. Crossing statute binding on Director General: 173 N. W. 440; 174 N. Y. S., 60.
October 10, 1921.

Opinion:
The opinion of the Court was delivered by
Mr. Justice Watts.
This is an appeal from judgment rendered and entered for $5,000. Plaintiff's intestate was killed at a crossing collision with one of the trains of C. & W. C. Railway Company, operated by the defendant. The verdict of the jury was for actual damages. The exceptions, five in number, can be considered under the following heads:
Was it error on the part of his Honor in refusing to direct a verdict as moved for by the defendant? In making the motion defendant relied, in a large measure, on the case of Cable Piano Co. v. Southern Ry. Co. 94 S. C., 144, 77 S. E., 868. The facts of this case are very different from the facts of that case. In that case no other inference could be drawn than that it was the failure of the driver to look. This was the sole cause of the injury. In this case there was conflict of evidence, and that presents an entirely different situation. There is plenty of evidence that the driver of the car looked, and his view was cut off by the way the public road ran, and the way the railroad ran, and that his view was obstructed by a ridge and the contour of the land and weeds and bushes. There was evidence that the railroad did not give the statutory signals; this was negligence per se. There was evidence to be submitted to the jury for their proper determination as to who was negligent.
The plaintiffs by evidence showed defendant was negligent; the defendant introduced evidence showing plaintiff's intestate was. This Court nor the Circuit Court is called upon to decide such issues when there is a conflict of evidence, and more than one inference can be drawn. The jury is the one to decide such issues. Cable Piano Co. v. Railway, was decided upon the particular facts of that case; so was Callison v. Railway, 106 S. C., 123, 90 S. E., 260; and every other case will be so decided. His Honor committed no error in refusing to direct a verdict.
Did his Honor restrict the defense to a want of slight care in his charge, and did he commit an error in his charge with reference to statutory signals, as complained of in exceptions 2 and 3 ? The charge taken as a whole could not have prejudiced the defendant as complained of. He read to the jury the statute (Civ. Code, § 3222, 3230) in reference to crossings. This was a compliance of law as decided in Mercer v. Railway, 44 S. E., 250. His charge was full and clear, and did not deprive the defendant of the defense relied on, and he did not invade the province of the jury by a charge on fact or intimation that was prejudicial as to the force or effect of the evidence. He fully charged the law, and left to the jury to find the facts, uninfluenced in any way as to what he thought. The attention of the Court below was not called to the questions relied on in Exceptions 4 and 5. The points were not made in Circuit Court, and cannot be considered by us, but we will say in passing there.was no merit in them.
All exceptions are overruled, and judgment affirmed.
Mr. Ci-iiee Justice Gary and Mr. Justice Fraser concur.