Case Name: McCABE-DUPREY TANNING CO. v. EUBANKS
Court: Oregon Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Oregon
Decision Date: 1910-08-03
Citations: 57 Or. 44
Docket Number: 
Parties: McCABE-DUPREY TANNING CO. v. EUBANKS.
Judges: 
Reporter: Oregon Reports
Volume: 57
Pages: 44–50

Head Matter:
Submitted on briefs.
Decided August 3, 1910.
McCABE-DUPREY TANNING CO. v. EUBANKS.
[102 Pac. 795 ; 110 Pac. 395.]
Time — Computation—Excluding First Day.
1. Section 549, B. & C. Comp., provides that the time within which an act is to be done shall be computed by excluding the first day and including the last. Section 549, subd. 2, requires the adverse party within five days after service of the undertaking on appeal to except to the sufficiency of the sureties. A notice of appeal was given on January 23d. On the same day an undertaxing was served and filed. Held that, in the absence of exceptions to the sufficiency of the sureties, the appeal became perfected on January 29th.
Time — Computation—Excluding Sunday.
2. Under Section 531, B. & C. Comp., providing that the time within which an act is to be done shall be computed by excluding the first day and including the last, unless the last falls on a Sunday, in which case the last day shall also be excluded, and Section 553 requiring the filing of the transcript on appeal within 30 days after the appeal is perfected, an appellant whose appeal became perfected on January 29th had until March 1st following within which to file his transcript; the first day and the last, February 28th, falling on Sunday, being excluded in computing the time.
Certiorari — Sufficiency of Petition — Motion to Quash.
3. A motion to quash the writ of review is the proper proceeding to question the sufficiency of the petition. Under Section 596, B. & C. Comp., providing that a writ of review shall be allowed by the circuit court or judge thereof or the county court or judge of the county wherein the decision sought to be reviewed was made, upon petition of the plaintiff, describing the same with convenient certainty, and setting forth the errors alleged to have been committed therein, the merits of the writ will not be heard on a motion to quash, as the proceedings can only be reviewed upon the errors alleged in the petition to have been committed.
Justices of the Peace — Judgment—Docketing in Circuit Court— Purpose.
4. The docketing of the judgment of a justice of the peace in the circuit court does not necessarily terminate the jurisdiction of the justice’s court; it being merely a proceeding whereby a creditor may secure a lien for the amount of the judgment upon the real property of the debtor.
Justices of the Peace — Judgment—Opening.
5. Section 103, B. & C. Comp., gives courts the right to vacate a judgment within one year, for mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect. Section 2237 provides that the rules in justice’s courts governing mistakes in pleading, vacating defaults, and judgments for mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect, etc., shall be as prescribed in the code of civil procedure for actions in courts of record. Held> that the right of a justice to vacate a judgment exists, regardless of the filing of the transcript in the circuit court.
Justices of the Peace — Review by Certiorari.
6. The rulings of the justice’s court, upon the sufficiency of the pleadings, can be corrected on appeal, but the writ of review only lies to review the action of the lower court when it has exceeded its jurisdiction or has exercised its functions erroneously, and is not the proper method to review erroneous rulings as to the sufficiency of pleadings.
From Josephine: Hiero K. Hanna, Judge.
This is an action by the McCabe-Duprey Tanning Co. against J. M. Eubanks, commenced in the Justice’s Court of Grants Pass District, Josephine County, Oregon, in which court judgment was rendered in favor of defendant on the pleadings. The circuit court rendered a judgment sustaining a writ of review and remanding the cause with directions to try the said action on its merits. From the judgment so entered in the circuit court, the defendant appeals. Respondent files motion to dismiss the appeal.
Motion Denied.

Opinion:
Decided July 13, 1909.
On Motion to Dismiss.
[102 Pao. 795.]
Mr. Marcus W. Robbins, for the motion.
Mr. Oliver S. Brown, contra.
Opinion by
Mr. Chief Justice Moore.
This is a motion to dismiss an appeal on the ground that the transcript was not filed within the prescribed time. The circuit court for Josephine County sustained a writ of review, and remanded the cause to the justice's court for Grants Pass district, with directions to vacate a judgment rendered therein and to try the action on its merits. To reverse the ruling of the circuit court, the defendant gave a notice of appeal, and on January 23, 1909, served and filed an undertaking therefor, to which no exception was taken to the sufficiency of the surety. The adverse party of his attorney must except to the sufficiency of the sureties on the undertaking within five days after service of said undertaking, or he shall be deemed to have waived his right thereto. Section 549, subd. 2, B. & C. Comp.
By computing time according to Section 531, B. & C. Comp., the first day, or the 23d of January, is omitted, whereby the fifth day fell on the 28th of that month, following which day the appeal became perfected: Boothe v. Scriber, 48 Or. 561 (87 Pac. 887: 90 Pac. 1002.) The first day, therefore, on which the transcript could legally be filed was January 29, 1909, and the defendant was required within thirty days therefrom to file in this court a transcript on appeal. Section 553, B. & C. Comp. The statute regulating the manner of computing time is as follows:
"The time within which an act is to be done, as provided in this code, shall be computed by excluding the first day and including the last, unless the last day fall upon a Sunday, Christmas, or other non judicial day, in which case the last day shall also be excluded."
Section 531, B. & C. Comp. According to the above rule, by excluding the first day — i. e., the 29th of January —the defendant had two days remaining in that month and 28 days in February, in order to complete the required 30 days; but as the last day, or the 28th of February, was Sunday, that day was properly excluded, and the defendant was allowed until the following day, or the 1st of March, 1909, within which to file the transcript (Boothe v. Scriber, 48 Or. 561: 87 Pac. 887: 90 Pac. 1002) ; and, as he filed it with the clerk of this court on that day, he complied with the rule announced.
This case was submitted without argument, under the proviso of-Rule 16 of the Supreme Court, 50 Or. 580 (91 Pac. VIII).
Reversed.
For appellant there was a brief over the name of Mr. Oliver S. Brown.
For respondent there was a brief over the name of Mr. Marcus W. Robbins.
The motion will therefore be denied. Denied.