Case Name: STATE of Florida, Petitioner, v. Robert HARBAUGH, Respondent
Court: Florida Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 2000-03-09
Citations: 754 So. 2d 691
Docket Number: No. SC93037
Parties: STATE of Florida, Petitioner, v. Robert HARBAUGH, Respondent.
Judges: HARDING, C.J., and WELLS, ANSTEAD and PARIENTE, JJ., concur. SHAW, J., dissents with an opinion.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 754
Pages: 691–696

Head Matter:
STATE of Florida, Petitioner, v. Robert HARBAUGH, Respondent.
No. SC93037.
Supreme Court of Florida.
March 9, 2000.
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, Celia Terenzio, Senior Assistant Attorney General, and Ettie Feistmann, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, Florida, for Petitioner.
Alan T. Lipson of Essen, Essen, Susa-neck, Canet & Lipson, P.A., Aventura, Florida, for Respondent.

Opinion:
PER CURIAM.
We have for review a district court's decision on the following question, certified to be of great public importance.
WHERE A DEFENDANT REQUESTS THAT THE JURY DETERMINE THE EXISTENCE OF PRIOR DUI CONVICTIONS IN A FELONY DUI TRIAL, SHOULD THE BIFURCATED PROCEDURE OF STATE V. RODRIGUEZ, 575 S0.2d 1262 (FLA. 1991), BE AMENDED IN LIGHT OF UNITED STATES V. GAUDIN, 515 U.S. 506, 115 S.Ct. 2310, 132 L.Ed.2d 444 (1995)?
Harbaugh v. State, 711 So.2d 77, 83 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998). We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. We answer the question in the affirmative.
In State v. Rodriguez, 575 So.2d 1262 (Fla.1991), this Court established the procedure whereby a defendant charged with felony DUI, requiring three previous con victions of misdemeanor DUI in addition to the presently charged DUI, must be tried in a bifurcated process.
We conclude that if a defendant charged with felony DUI elects to be tried by jury, the court shall conduct a jury trial on the elements of the single [present] incident of DUI at issue without allowing the jury to learn of the alleged prior [misdemeanor] DUI offenses. If the jury returns a guilty verdict as to that single incident of DUI, the trial court shall conduct a separate proceeding without a jury to determine, in accord with general principles of law, whether the defendant had been convicted of DUI on three or more prior occasions. All evidence of the prior DUI convictions must be presented in open court and with full rights of confrontation, cross-examination, and representation by counsel. The trial court must be satisfied that the existence of three or more prior DUI convictions has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt before entering a conviction for felony DUI.
Id. at 1266 (footnote omitted).
The import of the Rodriguez decision was that, absent the bifurcated process, the jury is directly confronted with evidence of defendant's prior criminal activity and the presumption of innocence is destroyed and that "[i]f the presumption of evidence is destroyed by proof of an unrelated offense, it is more easily destroyed by proof of a similar related offense." Id. at 1265 (quoting State v. Harris, 356 So.2d 315, 317 (Fla.1978)). We found support for the bifurcated process in Shargaa v. State, 102 So.2d 814 (Fla.1958), wherein we explained:
[Based on] our traditional concepts of due process in the administration of the criminal laws, the State should not be permitted merely to charge an accused with the commission of a crime and buttress its current charge with a simultaneous allegation that the accused had previously been convicted of a totally unrelated crime committed years before. It appears to us that the product of such a procedure would substantially destroy the historical presumption of innocence which clothes every defendant in a criminal case and in the mind of the average juror would in a measure place upon the accused the burden of showing himself innocent rather than upon the State the responsibility of proving him guilty.
Id. at 816. Thus, we held in Rodriguez that in the circumstance where a felony DUI charge contains an element of prior misdemeanor DUI offenses, in order to protect the defendant's presumption of innocence, due process allows a trial judge to make the determination of the existence vel non of the alleged prior misdemeanor offenses after the jury returns a guilty verdict in the present DUI charge. Rodriguez, 575 So.2d at 1266.
In so holding, we made an unarticulated constitutional tradeoff. We preserved the defendant's presumption of innocence but at the cost of the defendant's constitutional right to have the jury and not the trial judge make the ultimate finding of guilt. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970). In United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 115 S.Ct. 2310, 132 L.Ed.2d 444 (1995), the United States Supreme Court reviewed this latter issue.
In Gaudin, the Court was presented with the question of whether it is constitutional for the trial judge to refuse to submit the question of "materiality" to the jury where a defendant is criminally charged with making material false statements to a federal agency under 18 U.S.C. § 1001. Gaudin, 515 U.S. at 507, 115 S.Ct. 2310. In analyzing the issue, the Court reaffirmed its previous holding that the Due Process Clause and the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution require criminal convictions to rest upon a jury determination that the defendant is guilty of every element of the crime with which the defendant is charged. Id. at 509-10,115 S.Ct. 2310.
Examining the Rodriguez bifurcated trial process in felony DUI prosecutions in light of Gaudin, we hold that in this bifurcated process the jury, not the judge, must determine the verdict from the evidence presented in the second phase. In State v. Woodruff, 676 So.2d 975, 977-78 (Fla.1996), we held that in order to establish the crime of felony DUI there be: (1) a conviction of the current misdemeanor DUI; and (2) proof of an additional element of the existence of three or more prior misdemeanor DUI convictions. § 316.192(2)(b), Fla. Stat. Given, therefore, that every element of felony DUI must be proven to the satisfaction of the jury beyond a reasonable doubt, the jury, unless waived by the defendant, must decide the issue regarding the three prior convictions. See Gaudin, 515 U.S. at 523-24, 115 S.Ct. 2310 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). It follows then that felony DUI trials must be conducted before the jury in two stages because the concern remains about tainting the consideration of the current misdemeanor DUI with evidence concerning the past DUI.
We caution that the State may only submit a certified copy of each judgment in order to evidence a defendant's prior DUI convictions and shall not develop the facts underlying any such offense unless the defendant contests the validity thereof at trial. See State v. Vazquez, 419 So.2d 1088 at 1091 (Fla.1982); Parker, 408 So.2d 1037 at 1038. Furthermore, based on our recent decision in Brown v. State, 719 So.2d 882 (Fla.1998), the State and the trial court should accept a defendant's stipulation to three prior misdemeanor DUI convictions. As in Brown, where a defendant stipulates to the three prior DUI convictions, the State's burden of proof for that element is satisfied. Id. We likewise make clear that the defendant may not collaterally attack the prior convictions in the second phase of these trials.
Finally, we hold in accord with Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 119 S.Ct. 1827, 144 L.Ed.2d 35 (1999), that a Gaudin error is subject to harmless error review. As stated in Neder:
In a case such as this one, where a defendant did not, and apparently could not, bring forth facts contesting the omitted element, answering the question whether the jury verdict would have been the same absent the error does not fundamentally undermine the purposes of the jury trial guarantee.
. [A] court, in typical appellate-court fashion, asks whether the record contains evidence that could rationally lead to a contrary finding with respect to the omitted element. If the answer to that question is "no," holding the error harmless does not "reflec[t] a denigration of the constitutional rights involved." [Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 577, 106 S.Ct. 3101, 92 L.Ed.2d 460 (1986) ].
We therefore answer the certified question in the affirmative and remand this case to the district court for further proceedings in accord with this opinion.
We decline to address the State's argument that the district court erred in ordering a new trial on another ground. Therefore, we find no basis for disturbing the district court's decision, and it is approved.
It is so ordered.
HARDING, C.J., and WELLS, ANSTEAD and PARIENTE, JJ., concur. SHAW, J., dissents with an opinion.
. See § 316.193(2)(b), Fla. Slat. (1995).
. No person shall be "deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law...." U.S. Const, amend. V.
. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury...." U.S. Const, amend. VI.
. The Court then applied the well-settled law to the circumstance of a materiality finding necessary in the criminal false statement charge and held that the materiality of the alleged statement was an element of the offense; therefore, the jury had to determine whether the alleged statement was material in order to find the accused guilty. See Gaudin, 515 U.S. at 522-23, 115 S.Ct. 2310.
.We recognize that Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.430 provides that "after the jurors have retired to consider their verdict the court shall not recall the jurors to hear additional evidence." This rule does not apply to this bifurcated process, which contemplates two separate verdicts by the same jury.