Case Name: JOHNNY ROBERTS, INC., Appellant, v. Rachel G. OWENS, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1964-10-09
Citations: 168 So. 2d 89
Docket Number: No. 4383
Parties: JOHNNY ROBERTS, INC., Appellant, v. Rachel G. OWENS, Appellee.
Judges: ALLEN, Acting C. J., and SHANNON, J., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 168
Pages: 89–95

Head Matter:
JOHNNY ROBERTS, INC., Appellant, v. Rachel G. OWENS, Appellee.
No. 4383.
District Court of Appeal of Florida. Second District.
Oct. 9, 1964.
Rehearing Denied Oct. 26, 1964.
John W. Boult, of Shackleford, Farrior^ Stallings, Glos & Evans, Tampa, for appellant.
T. Truett Ott, of Hardee, Ott & Hamilton, Tampa, for appellee.

Opinion:
SAMPLE, WALLACE, Associate Judge.
The appellant raises two questions in this appeal, neither of which the court finds adequate to require reversal, but one of which is of sufficient importance to bench and bar alike for the court to discuss in an effort to further settle and clarify, if possible, for future guidance of those who are apparently troubled by holdings of the appellate courts of this state on the same -sub j ect.
Appellant, defendant below, charges that •counsel for the plaintiff on voir dire ex.amination deliberately injected "insurance" into the trial thereby rendering a mistrial mandatory. The following colloquy between plaintiff's counsel and a prospective juror took place:
"Mr. Ott: Mr. Bennett, what business are you in?
"Mr. Bennett: Real estate.
'"Mr. Ott: Real estate, and do you sell insurance in connection with your business ?
'"Mr. Bennett: Real estate.
'"Mr. Ott: Not insurance?
"Mr. Bennett: No.
'"Mr. Ott: Some real estate people also handle insurance, but you don't?
'"Mr. -Bennett: No, just real estate."
After the jury was selected and sworn •defendant's attorney moved for a mistrial, •out of the presence of the jury. The trial •judge denied the motion and in doing so •made the following observations, among •others :
"The Court: It zvas ptst ashed in passing, and certainly he's entitled to ask what kind of business they're in and if he's connected with any insurance •company. I don't see where it made any impression at all." (emphasis added)
As was stated by Judge Carroll in City of Niceville v. Hardy, Fla.App.1964, 160 So.2d 535, the point raised is troublesome both at the trial and appellate levels.
"The second point raised by the defendant on this appeal is always difficult for trial and appellate courts to resolve — whether the injection of the idea of insurance during the jury trial •in an action for damages was such as to raise a presumption that the jury was unduly influenced or prejudiced thereby. This problem is compounded by the fact that any diligent researcher can compile an impressive list of decisions in the reported cases in apparent support of either position on this question. This is so probably because each decision depends upon the particular circumstances of that case, not only the precise setting in which the insurance idea was injected but also the verdict reached by the jury measured in the light of the evidence and the court's instructions."
It is possible that a solution completely satisfactory to all attorneys engaged in negligence trials and the courts may never be found. Yet we are compelled to feel that a more agreeable status for this situation may be reached by bench and bar alike.
Doubt no longer exists in the jurisprudence of Florida concerning the plaintiff's right to make such inquiry— or to put it another way, to have such inquiry made. Any such doubt, if it existed, was completely dispelled by the Supreme Court in Ryan v. Noble, 1928, 95 Fla. 830, 116 So. 766. The plaintiff's right to make inquiry concerning insurance having been established by Ryan v. Noble and confirmed in later decisions, and all litigants being rightfully guaranteed a fair and impartial jury, the question then is presented: what procedure is to be followed to protect each side from possible harm in those trials where insurance is a factor to be reckoned with by counsel and the court, but not the jury?
Obviously the procedure to be followed is not adaptable to any strict rule to be promulgated by the courts and it must be handled at the trial level in a fair and practical manner in each situation as the occasion arises. Trial preferences and practices vary with individual judges just as trial tactics vary with individual trial attorneys; likewise trial practices vary, to some extent at least, in the various areas of the state. But under the modem rules of civil procedure in effect in this state today, particularly pre-trial procedure, there is no reason why trial counsel and the trial judge in each case cannot settle in advance the procedure to be followed— even to the extent, if necessary, of the form and content of the questions to be propounded. In making this suggestion we are merely reiterating the thoughts set forth by Mr. Justice Brown in his opinion in Ryan v. Noble wherein the Supreme Court not only established the first precedent for such questions on voir dire examination but also outlined the procedure for such examination — some 26 years before adoption of our present rules of civil procedure.
Trial counsel have no right to implant the thought of insurance coverage in the mind of the jury except in those situations in which an exception is allowed. (Carls Markets, Inc. v. Meyer, Fla., 69 So.2d 789; Barnett v. Butler, Fla.App., 112 So.2d 907). Counsel have only the right to elicit from prospective jurors such information as is necessary to show impartiality, or lack of it, disqualification or unfitness to serve as a juror and such further information as may be necessary to properly inform the questioning attorney whether he should exercise his right of peremptory challenge.
Plaintiff's counsel who pointblank inject the question of insurance into a trial, such as was done in this case, flirt with mistrial. Defense counsel who do not take advance precautionary steps, as was not done in this case, to forestall such point-blank injection of the question of insurance, flirt with disaster. The trial judge can only rely upon his impression of the impact of such questions and answers, if any, upon the prospective jurors and rule accordingly, which was done in this case. The ruling of the trial judge conies to this court clothed with a presumption of correctness. His observation,' quoted above, is practically conclusive since examination of the typewritten record is at best a poor substitute for physical presence in the court room with opportunity to see, hear and observe the actual occurrence, the persons involved and their reactions, if any. The situation under attack here is quite similar to the one attacked in City of Niceville v. Hardy, supra, and Lambert v. Higgins, Fla.1953, 63 So.2d 631, and here, as was the holding in those cases, we find no reversible error.
Adverting to Ryan v. Noble we point out that neither that case nor the present litigation arose as a result of a highway accident. There the injury resulted from an unloading operation from a truck; here the injury resulted from a slip-and-fall. We note this merely because of the mass of litigation presently arising from motor vehicular accidents in which this question is most frequently raised, and the current attitude in some quarters which, in effect at least, is passive toward the injection of insurance coverage in trials of negligence cases. Such attitude seems to stem from public consciousness of the necessity for, and the existence of, extensive insurance coverage in these modem times. Holders-of such attitude seem to feel the injection of insurance is inconsequential because jurors, on the whole, are thoroughly versed in the extent of insurance coverage. Yet the fact remains that cases are being tried today in which there is no insurance coverage and it is still, as always, the business of the courts to see to the proper selection of fair, impartial juries and to keep every improper influence out of all legal proceedings, and this responsibility rests jointly on the shoulders of counsel for all plaintiffs and all defendants as well.
The clarity and lucidity of Mr. Justice Brown's reasoning in Ryan v. Noble can hardly be improved upon in support of the conclusion reached by this court and we include portions of it here to re-emphasize its applicability to present day conditions.