Case Name: Geo. Dean, alias D. B. Dean, v. The State
Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1904-11-02
Citations: 47 Tex. Crim. 243
Docket Number: No. 2931
Parties: Geo. Dean, alias D. B. Dean, v. The State.
Judges: 
Reporter: Texas Criminal Reports
Volume: 47
Pages: 243–250

Head Matter:
Geo. Dean, alias D. B. Dean, v. The State.
No. 2931.
Decided November 2, 1904.
1. —Murder—Continuance—Second Application.
Where upon a contest over a second application for continuance, it is shown that the absent witnesses would not have testified as appellant insisted, had they been present, there was no error in overruling the application.
2. —Same—Evidence—Impeaching Witness.
Where upon trial, the State’s witness contradicted his testimony taken at the inquest, and upon cross-examination admitted that he did so, there was no error in refusing to admit the written testimony of the witness at said inquest. Following Walker v. State, 17 Texas Grim. App., 16. It is only where there is a denial, direct or qualified by the witness of his former statement that proof of same can be introduced. Following Rodrigues v. State, 23 Texas Grim. Rep., 503; Hyden v. State, 31 Texas Grim. Rep., 401.
3. —Same—Party Cannot Corroborate his Witness When Not Attacked.
A party cannot corroborate his own witness, by showing that his testimony before the coroner’s inquest and before the grand jury was the same as on the trial, the credibility of the witness not being attacked.
4. —Same—Argument of Counsel.
Where in a trial for murder, the defendant did not tender to the court a special charge, asking the jury to disregard the objectionable statement of State’s counsel in his address to the jury, the same will not be considered.
5. —Same—Charge of the Court—Defense of Property.
Where the evidence showed that the deceased was not in the act of taking the horse over which the dispute arose, when defendant shot him, there was no error in failing to charge on defense of property under article 680, Penal Code.
6. —Same—Charge of the Court—Manslaughter.
Where the evidence did not raise the issue of manslaughter, but rather raised the issue of self-defense, and the court charged both on self-defense and marL slaughter, there was no error even if the latter charge did not instruct the jury directly, but indirectly, that they could look to the facts and circumstances in evidence which might shed light upon the provocation at the time of the homicide producing adequate cause.
Appeal from the District Court of Smith. Tried below before Hon. B. W. Simpson.
Appeal from a conviction of murder in the second degree; penalty, twelve years imprisonment in the penitentiary.
The opinion states the case.
T. 0. Woldert, for appellant.
Where testimony of a witness taken before an inquest proceeding, or at an examining trial, is totally at variance with his evidence on the final trial, such written testimony is admissible for the purpose of impeaching the .witness. Jackson v. State, 33 Texas Crim. Rep., 281.
Where the testimony of a witness is attacked by the contradictory testimony of another witness and his credibility thereby assailed, he may corroborate his present testimony by testifying that he had so testified before the grand jury. Joe Goode v. State, 32 Texas Crim. Rep., 505; Weaver v. State, 65 S. W. Rep., 534.
The court erred in not setting the verdict aside because of the intemperate, improper and vehement remarks of counsel for the State in closing the argument as follows: “Ho wonder we have mob law in this State, when counsel for defendant came in here and made such a speech as Woldert made.” Howell v. State, 57 S. W. Rep., 835; Lilley v. State, 22 Texas Crim. App., 1.
Where it may not justify the taking of human life, an attack on one’s property, or property in one’s possession, is justly regarded as a great provocation and constituting adequate cause, and especially so when accompanied with such aggravating circumstances as might well be calculated to arouse the passion and resentment of a person of ordinary courage and spirit; and to such state of case the charge of the court should certainly apply the law of manslaughter more specially than in the general terms of the statute. Logan Milrainey v. State, 33 Texas Crim. Rep., 577; Ledbetter v. State, 26 Texas Crim. App., 22; Manly v. State, 26 Texas Crim. App., 274; Brookin v. State, 27 Texas Crim. App., 701; Oman v. State, 24 Texas Crim. App., 495.
On the proposition of adequate cause, the appellant in his motion for rehearing cited: Miles v. State, 18 Texas Crim. App., 156; Johnson v. State, 22 id., 206; Howard v. State, 23 id., 265; Bracken v. State, 29 id., 362.
Howard Martin, Assistant Attorney-General, for the State.

Opinion:
BROOKS, Judge.
Appellant was convicted of murder in the second degree, and his punishment assessed at confinement in the penitentiary for a term of twelve years. The former appeal of this case is reported in 8 Texas Ct. Rep., 958.
Bill number 1 complains of the court's refusal to grant appellant's second application for continuance. We find in the record a strong contest filed by the State to said motion. In the light of the State's contest we think the court did not err in overruling the same, since the contest shows that said witnesses would not have testified as appellant insists in his motion had they been present.
The second hill complains of the failure of the court to permit appellant to introduce in evidence Chilton Brown's testimony taken at the inquest. The bill shows that Brown was a State's witness and testified different from his testimony at the inquest. The inquest testimony was favorable to defendant. The court approved the bill with the following qualification: "The attorney for the defendant took the inquest testimony of the witness and asked him if he did not swear as it was therein written in the inquest trial, reading his testimony over to him. Witness answered that he did. Then counsel. offered the original testimony as set out in the bill, and the court sustained the State's objection, because witness had admitted that he had so testified and did not attempt to deny it. There was no error in the ruling of the court. When a witness confesses to have made contradictory statements and admits what they were, evidence as to said contradiction is not admissible. Walker v. State, 17 Texas Crim. App., 16. It is only where there is a denial, direct or qualified by the witness of his former statement that proof of said former statement can be introduced. Rodriquez v. State, 23 Texas Crim. Rep., 503; Hyden v. State, 31 Texas Crim. Rep., 401.
The third bill complains of the action of the court refusing to permit appellant to corroborate his witness, Ella Lacy, by showing that her testimony before the coroner's inquest and before the grand jury was the same as on this trial. The court qualifies this bill with the statement that the court excluded the testimony because it was an attempt to corroborate his witness without her credibility being in any manner attacked by the State. There was no error in the ruling of the court in excluding the testimony.
The fourth bill complains of the following argument of the 'county attorney made to the jury: "No wonder we have mob law in this State, when counsel for defendant come in here and make such speech as Woldert (attorney for defendant) made. Defendant then and there ex cepted to the language of said attorney. Whereupon the court told the jury not to regard the observation of said county attorney. To which language of the county attorney defendant excepted. The bill is approved with this statement: That the county attorney, when he made the statement above, was answering a proposition of law relative to defendant's, right, which he (county attorney) contended was fallacious and dangerous." Defendant's attorney asked no special charge instructing the jury to disregard the statement. The bill does not show what language the county attorney alluded to that appellant's counsel had used. We cannot say it was not a pertinent retort to the language he used. At any rate, he did not tender to the court a special charge, asking the jury to disregard the statement. We cannot say there was error in the ruling of the court.
Bill number 5 complains of the argument of the county attorney, who was assisting the district attorney in using the following language: "Gentlemen of the Jury—why, even if the theory of Woldert (defendant's attorney) is true, defendant had no right to keep that horse in his lot against the consent of the deceased. Heard had a right to go and get him. If his theory is true, defendant came by him in an illegal transaction. -It was a gambling contract and could not be enforced." We find no special charge asked by appellant instructing the jury to disregard this argument. Furthermore we do not see how or in what manner it could or did injure the rights of defendant. The evidence seems to support the county attorney's statement that the horse had been won in a gambling transaction.
Appellant insists in his motion for new trial, among other things, that the court should have charged Article 680, Penal Code, which authorizes the defense of property. The evidence in this case does not raise this issue, since deceased at the time he was shot was not in the act of taking the horse. Deceased had merely informed appellant that he was going to take the horse. The various other errors assigned are not well taken. The charge of the court is practically the same as that given on the former trial. There is no error in the record. The judgment is affirmed.
Affirmed.