Case Name: STRANAHAN HOUSE, INC., a Florida not-for-profit corporation, and Friends of the Park at Stranahan House, Inc., a Florida not-for-profit corporation, Petitioners, v. CITY OF FORT LAUDERDALE, a Florida municipal corporation, and Coolidge-South Markets Equities, L.P., a Foreign Limited Partnership, Respondents
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 2005-12-07
Citations: 932 So. 2d 297
Docket Number: No. 4D05-1515
Parties: STRANAHAN HOUSE, INC., a Florida not-for-profit corporation, and Friends of the Park at Stranahan House, Inc., a Florida not-for-profit corporation, Petitioners, v. CITY OF FORT LAUDERDALE, a Florida municipal corporation, and Coolidge-South Markets Equities, L.P., a Foreign Limited Partnership, Respondents.
Judges: WARNER, KLEIN and GROSS, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 932
Pages: 297–297

Head Matter:
STRANAHAN HOUSE, INC., a Florida not-for-profit corporation, and Friends of the Park at Stranahan House, Inc., a Florida not-for-profit corporation, Petitioners, v. CITY OF FORT LAUDERDALE, a Florida municipal corporation, and Coolidge-South Markets Equities, L.P., a Foreign Limited Partnership, Respondents.
No. 4D05-1515.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
Dec. 7, 2005.
W. Tucker Gibbs of W. Tucker Gibbs, P.A., Coconut Grove, Kendall Coffey, and Mark Journey of Coffey & Wright, L.L.P, Miami, for petitioners.
Robert H. Schwartz and Alain E. Boi-leau of Adorno & Yoss, LLP, Fort Lauder-dale, for respondent City of Fort Lauder-dale.
Amy Brigham Boulris of Brigham Moore, LLP, Miami, Jack J. Aiello, and Robert Hackleman of Gunster, Yoakley & Stewart, P.A., West Palm Beach, for respondent Coolidge-South Markets Equities, L.P.
Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General, Tallahassee, and David J. Glantz, Assistant Attorney General, Fort Lauderdale, for respondent Robert Lance Andrews.

Opinion:
PER CURIAM.
We deny the petition for writ of prohibition seeking removal of the trial judge. Taken in context, the trial court's comments at the hearing on the motion to transfer were merely the judge thinking out loud about the relationship between an earlier case, involving a settlement in an eminent domain proceeding, and this case, which is a petition for certiorari seeking to quash the City of Fort Lauderdale's approval of the settlement in the first case. The trial judge's presiding over the certio-rari petition here is similar to a judge who hears a rule 1.540(b) motion seeking to undo a settlement and final judgment based on fraud. The trial court's approval of the settlement in the first case does not disqualify it from presiding over the certio-rari petition.
WARNER, KLEIN and GROSS, JJ., concur.