Case Name: Beres WAITE, Petitioner, v. Joyce WAITE, Respondent
Court: Florida Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1993-05-27
Citations: 618 So. 2d 1360
Docket Number: No. 79463
Parties: Beres WAITE, Petitioner, v. Joyce WAITE, Respondent.
Judges: BARKETT, C.J., and SHAW, J., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 618
Pages: 1360–1364

Head Matter:
Beres WAITE, Petitioner, v. Joyce WAITE, Respondent.
No. 79463.
Supreme Court of Florida.
May 27, 1993.
James C. Blecke, and Norman M. Waas, Parenti, Falk & Waas, P.A., Miami, for petitioner.
Kenneth R. Drake of Touby Smith De-Mahy & Drake, P.A., and Frank A. Abrams, Miami, for respondent.

Opinion:
KOGAN, Justice.
We have for review Waite v. Waite, 593 So.2d 222 (Fla. 3d DCA1991), which certified the following question of great public importance:
Whether Sturiano v. Brooks, 523 So.2d 1126 (Fla.1988), permits a claim by a former spouse for battery against the other spouse, committed during the marriage, and prior to the effective date of section 741.235, Florida Statutes (1985), where the claim is limited to the extent of insurance coverage, the spouse was convicted of attempted first degree murder stemming from the battery, and the egregious nature of the injuries demonstrates that the policy considerations enunciated in Sturiano — "fear of disruption of the family or other marital discord, or the possibility of fraud or collusion" — were not present when the battery was committed.
Waite, 593 So.2d at 231 (on denial of rehearing). We rephrase the question as follows:
Does the doctrine of interspousal immunity remain a part of Florida's common law?
We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. •
In 1984, Joyce Waite and other members of her family were attacked by her husband, who inflicted substantial injuries upon them with a machete. He subsequently was convicted of several crimes, including attempted murder. Joyce Waite divorced him. Later, she filed suit seeking a recovery of damages against a homeowner's insurance policy. On the husband's motion, the trial court dismissed the cause as being barred by the doctrine of interspousal immunity. See Raisen v. Raisen, 379 So.2d 352 (Fla.1979), modified, Sturiano v. Brooks, 523 So.2d 1126 (Fla.1988). The Third District reversed based on Sturiano.
In Sturiano, 523 So.2d at 1128, we held that the doctrine of interspousal immunity no longer is applicable when the public policy reasons for applying it do not exist. These policy reasons are judicial avoidance of acts that could disrupt the family or foster marital discord, or where there is a strong possibility of fraud or collusion between husband and wife. Based on this holding, we found in Sturiano that the doctrine did not bar a wife's claim filed against the insurer of a deceased husband when the factual claim before us arose from the same accident in which the husband died and when the claim did not exceed the limits of liability.
Since Sturiano was issued, this Court and its advisory commissions have had an opportunity to review legal issues relevant to the doctrine of interspousal immunity. As a result of that review, we now find that there no longer is a sufficient reason warranting a continued adherence to the doctrine of interspousal immunity. As we previously have held, the common law will not be altered or expanded by this Court unless demanded by public necessity or to vindicate fundamental rights. In re T.A.C.P., 609 So.2d 588, 594 (Fla.1992). Here, we find that both public necessity and fundamental rights require judicial abrogation of the doctrine.
First, we find no reason to believe that married couples are any more likely to engage in fraudulent conduct against insurers than anyone else. An otherwise meritorious claim should not be foreclosed simply because a person is married to a wrongdoer.
The fact is that when couples collude in a fraud, many devices exist to detect the deception whether or not the couples are married. Insurance companies can and do hire their own lawyers and investigators to examine suspicious claims. When testifying, the claimants are subject to impeachment and discrediting because of their own financial stake in the outcome. They are subject to the court's contempt power, to the criminal laws for perjury and various forms of fraud, to civil lawsuit, and even to the racketeering and forfeiture statutes authorizing (among other things) the seizure of property used to further their crimes. If these other devices are adequate for unmarried couples, then we believe they also must be equally adequate for those with a marriage license. See Art. I, § 2, Fla. Const.
Second, we do not believe that the types of lawsuits prohibited by the doctrine of interspousal immunity, if allowed, are likely to foster unwarranted marital discord. Under present law, for example, an abused spouse still might file criminal charges against the abuser, can sue in equity over property interests, and can file for an injunction for protection. We believe that marital disharmony will not be increased merely because of the addition of a lawsuit for the various types of personal injury at issue here.
Finally, we note that thirty-two states have abrogated the doctrine of interspousal immunity completely, Waite v. Waite, 593 So.2d 222, 225, 229-31 (Gersten, J., dissenting), leaving Florida in a shrinking minority. The doctrine also has been resoundingly rejected by the single most respected authority on American tort law. W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 122, at 902-04 (5th ed. 1984). We particularly agree with Kee-ton's observation that the very act of creating exceptions to the doctrine, as this Court repeatedly has done, renders the doctrine increasingly less justifiable. Id. at 904. We also find absolutely no evidence that fraud and collusion have been promoted or encouraged to any undue extent in the majority of states that have abrogated the doctrine, some many decades ago.
For the foregoing reasons, the result reached below is approved and the certified question as rephrased here is answered in the negative.
It is so ordered.
BARKETT, C.J., and SHAW, J., concur.
HARDING, J., concurs with an opinion in which KOGAN, J., concurs.
McDONALD, J., concurs in result only with an opinion in which OVERTON, J., concurs.
GRIMES, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with an opinion in which OVERTON, J., concurs.