Case Name: ILLINOIS CENTRAL RAILROAD COMPANY v. Martha MOORE, Administratrix of the Estate of Willie B. Moore, Deceased
Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Mississippi
Decision Date: 2008-09-04
Citations: 994 So. 2d 723
Docket Number: No. 2006-IA-00884-SCT
Parties: ILLINOIS CENTRAL RAILROAD COMPANY v. Martha MOORE, Administratrix of the Estate of Willie B. Moore, Deceased.
Judges: SMITH, C.J., CARLSON, DICKINSON AND LAMAR, JJ., CONCUR. EASLEY, J., DISSENTS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION JOINED BY WALLER AND DIAZ, P.JJ., AND GRAVES, J.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 994
Pages: 723–734

Head Matter:
ILLINOIS CENTRAL RAILROAD COMPANY v. Martha MOORE, Administratrix of the Estate of Willie B. Moore, Deceased.
No. 2006-IA-00884-SCT.
Supreme Court of Mississippi.
Sept. 4, 2008.
Rehearing Denied Dec. 4, 2008.
Romney Hastings Entrekin, Richard A. Follis, Laurel, Vicki R. Leggett, Patrick H. Zachary, Hattiesburg, attorneys for appellant.
Wayne Dowdy, Magnolia, William S. Guy, McComb, attorneys for appellee.

Opinion:
RANDOLPH, Justice,
for the Court.
¶ 1. On interlocutory appeal, this Court addresses whether the Circuit Court of Amite County, Mississippi, abused its discretion in denying Illinois Central Railroad Company's ("ICRR") Motion to Dismiss the suit filed by Martha Moore ("Moore"), the administratrix of the Estate of Willie B. Moore ("Willie").
FACTS
¶ 2. Willie began his employment with ICRR in 1960. During the subsequent thirty-five years, he worked as a brakeman and conductor. On October 6, 1995, Willie suffered a fatal heart attack while attending to his duties as a conductor. On February 5, 1997, Moore filed suit in the circuit court against ICRR "for personal injury and death arising under the Federal Employers' Liability Act ., 45 U.S.C. § 51, et seq." Specifically, Moore alleged that Willie previously had been diagnosed with diabetes and cardiovascular disease, of which ICRR was or should have been aware, and that Willie:
was negligently allowed to lay and suffer without medical care or attention for an unreasonable period of time and . that [ICRR's] failure to provide medical emergency care in a reasonable timely manner and [ICRR's] assigning [Willie] to duties and assignments beyond his physical capacity caused and/or contributed to [Willie's] heart attack and his untimely death.
¶ 3. The appellate record and the general civil docket of Amite County are devoid of activity exhibiting pursuit of the suit to judgment from December 28, 1998, until October 31, 2005, more than ten years after Willie's death. The record and docket contain only four letters, in response to four separate Clerk's Motions to Dismiss for Want of Prosecution. Each Clerk's Motion to Dismiss filed between May 24, 2001, and June 1, 2005, provides that "there has been no action of record in said case during the twelve (12) months preceding the date of this motion[,]" and "[t]his case will be dismissed unless within thirty (30) days of the date of this Notice, action of record is taken, or written application is made to the Court and good cause shown why such case should not be dismissed." (Emphasis added). The letters request and advise, as follows:
We respectfully request that the above referenced matter remain on the Court's active docket. [June 4, 2001]
We respectfully request that this case remain on the Court's active docket. We have associated counsel to assist in moving this case to conclusion. If anything further is needed, please let us know. [June 6, 2002]
This is to advise that we do wish to have this case remain active on the Court's [d]ocket and we appreciate your assistance in this matter. [June 4, 2004]
We respectfully request that the above referenced matter remain and continue on the Court's docket at this time. [June 20, 2005]
ICRR was served only with the June 20, 2005, letter.
¶ 4. On March 24, 2006, ICRR filed a Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 41(d), claiming that "no action has been taken of record for over seven (7) years nor any written application made by [Moore] showing good cause as to why the case should not be dismissed.... " Moore's response in opposition to the motion to dismiss asserted that (1) on March 14, 2006, Moore, by letter, requested deposition dates for two witnesses and (2) "[a]t all times [Moore] has complied with the requirements set forth in MRCP 41(d)."
¶ 5. On April 27, 2006, more than nine years after suit was filed, the circuit court conducted a hearing. At the close of the hearing, the circuit judge stated inter alia:
[t]he Court is not going to dismiss the lawsuit. The Court is going to enter a scheduling order today....
I think the remedy of dismissal would be so unfair to the plaintiff.... [It] seems like there has been discovery done, it has been answered![ ] All of a sudden you're just going to dismiss it. There has been all of these years in between, nobody has filed a Motion to Dismiss under Rule 41.[ ]
The circuit court then entered an order denying ICRR's Motion to Dismiss. On September 9, 2006, this Court entered an order granting ICRR's Petition for Permission to Appeal from Interlocutory Order.
ISSUE
¶ 6. The dispositive issue we consider is:
(1) Whether the circuit court abused its discretion in denying ICRR's Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 41(d).
ANALYSIS
¶ 7. Preliminarily, we analyze the context in which the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure are applied, along with their purpose, in the interest of balancing justice for all parties. A "rule" is "[a]n authoritative direction for conduct." Webster's II New College Dictionary 968 (3d ed.2001) (emphasis added). The Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure:
govern procedure in the circuit courts, chancery courts, and county courts in all suits of a civil nature, whether cognizable as cases at law or in equity, subject to certain limitations enumerated in Rule 81.... These rules shall be construed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action.
Miss. R. Civ. P. 1. In other words, the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure are not mere suggestions or recommendations. Compliance is a requirement toward the end of "securing] the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action." Miss. R. Civ. P. 1. Furthermore, ensuring compliance therewith is necessary, as "[a] rule which is not enforced is no rule." Box v. State, 437 So.2d 19, 21 (Miss.1983).
¶ 8. Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 41(d)(1) provides, in part, that:
[i]n all civil actions wherein there has been no action of record during the preceding twelve months, the clerk of the court shall mail notice to the attorneys of record that such case will be dismissed by the court for want of prosecution unless within thirty days following said mailing, action of record is taken or an application in writing is made to the court and good cause shown why it should be continued as a pending case. If action of record is not taken or good cause is not shown, the court shall dismiss each such case without prejudice.
Miss. R. Civ. P. 41(d)(1) (emphasis added). "Without an explicit definition or standard, what suffices as an action of record is left to the reasonable discretion of the trial court." Cucos, Inc. v. McDaniel, 938 So.2d 238, 242 (Miss.2006). Accordingly, "[t]his Court will not disturb a trial court's ruling on a dismissal for want of prosecution unless it finds an abuse of discretion." Id. at 240 (citing Watson v. Lillard, 493 So.2d 1277, 1279 (Miss.1986)).
¶ 9. In Cucos, there was no on-the-record activity between July 20, 2001, and October 16, 2002, a period of fifteen months. On October 16, 2002, a Clerk's Motion to Dismiss for Want of Prosecution was filed. On November 13, 2002, a re sponsive letter from McDaniel to the Jackson County Circuit Clerk stated, "[pjlease accept this letter as our notice that the above entitled matter should not be dismissed pursuant to the [c]lerk's motion to dismiss. If we need to take any additional action to prevent this dismissal, please notify us immediately."
¶ 10. According to the Circuit Court of Jackson County, "[f]or some reason unknown to the [c]ourt, the [cjlerk's office failed to file the [November 13, 2002] letter in the court file to notify the [cjourt of the Plaintiffs' wish to remain on the active docket." Thus, on November 22, 2002, the circuit court filed an Order Dismissing for Want of Prosecution. In August 2004, following correspondence with Cucos, Inc., McDaniel filed a Motion to Set Aside Dismissal. McDaniel asserted that she had sent a responsive letter to the circuit clerk on November 13, 2002; that she was unaware of the dismissal until her August 2004 correspondence with Cucos, Inc.; and that the Order Dismissing for Want of Prosecution bore her name, "but with the wrong cause number on it...." Following a hearing, the circuit court entered an Order Granting Plaintiffs' Motion to Set Aside Dismissal because the circuit clerk failed to file the November 13, 2002, letter; McDaniel was not provided with a copy of the Order Dismissing for Want of Prosecution; the common local practice was that "a letter or motion . sent to the clerk asking the case to remain on the active docket" was sufficient; and McDaniel had "been pursuing efforts to schedule conferences for defense counsel to talk with Plaintiffs' treating physicians in order to facilitate settlement. As a result, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have been pursuing efforts to 'hasten the suit to judgment.' " On appeal, this Court concluded that:
[considering the totality of the trial court's findings, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in considering the McDaniels' letter in response to the Clerk's Motion to Dismiss for Want of Prosecution and the hearing it held on the issue as sufficient to prevent dismissal for want of prosecution pursuant to Miss. R. Civ. P. 41(d).
Cucos, 938 So.2d at 247 (emphasis added).
¶ 11. By contrast, in the case sub judice the only activity between December 28, 1998, and October 31, 2005, were the Clerk's Motions to Dismiss for Want of Prosecution and Moore's letters. The combination of a nearly seven-je&r delay; multiple service deficiencies as to ICRR, see Miss. R. Civ. P. 5(a); absence of clerk error prejudicing Moore; and the absence of evidence revealing that such letters met common local practice, clearly distinguishes the holding in Cucos. Secondarily, Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 7(b) provides "[a]n application to the court for an order shall be by motion which, unless made during a hearing or trial, shall be made in writing, shall state with particularity the grounds therefor, and shall set forth the relief or order sought." Miss. R. Civ. P. 7(b). Not only did Moore fail to make application by motion, but she also failed to properly serve notice on ICRR, for Moore certainly was seeking relief. See Miss. R. Civ. P. 5(a).
¶ 12. More analogous, albeit less factually offensive, is Guidry v. Pine Hills Country Club, Inc., 858 So.2d 196 (Miss.Ct.App.2003). In Guidry:
[t]he case was on the docket in Calhoun County for five years. There have been two notices of dismissal for failure to prosecute. There was never a request for a trial setting nor a request to set the motions for hearings.
In a three year period, the only actions by Guidry were to keep the case on the docket.
Id. at 199. The Court of Appeals found that "Guidry's motion to remain on the active docket does nothing to move the case closer to a judgment on the merits." Id. (emphasis added). The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's dismissal. See id.
¶ 13. We find unwritten and unapproved local customs or procedures which conflict with the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure must suffer the same demise as formal ancient writs such as "[wjrits of coram nobis, coram vobis, audi-ta querela, and bills of review and bills in the nature of a bill of review." Miss. R. Civ. P. 60(b) (abolishing such writs). See also Miss. R. Civ. P. 83(a) ("[tjhe conference of circuit, chancery and county court judges may hereafter make uniform rules and amendments thereto concerning practice in their respective courts not inconsistent with these rules.") (emphasis added). We adopt the language from the dissent in Cucos that we will not:
accept as an "action of record" . letters] the plaintiflf] sent to the Clerk which (1) d[o] nothing more than, in essence, say "don't dismiss our case," and (2) d[o] not even request that it be filed of record. If th[ese] letter[s]— which w[ere] not filed of record and which no one requested to be filed of record — compl[y] with the "action of record" portion of Rule 41(d), then why not a phone call or a passing conversation in the supermarket?
Cucos, 938 So.2d at 248 (Dickinson, J., dissenting). To condone such effortless conduct, or to grant same equivalent status to a properly noticed motion, makes a mockery of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure. To eliminate any question of what is an "application in writing" or "action of record," either a motion to avoid dismissal of the cause or an actual "action of record" must be filed.
¶ 14. A clear distinction exists between an "action of record," i.e., pleadings, discovery requests, deposition notices, etc., and an ex parte "application in writing" to the court, apart from a motion. See Miss. R. Civ. P. 7(b)(1) ("[a]n application to the court for an order shall be by motion which, unless made during a hearing or trial, shall be made in writing, shall state with particularity the grounds therefor, and shall set forth the relief or order sought."). Parties advance a case to judgment through "actions of record." Almost without exception, parties can seek relief from the court only through motions, not via ex parte letters to clerks of the court. Correspondingly, courts should speak through orders: if good cause is shown, favorably; absent good cause shown, unfavorably. Any approach to the contrary is as logical as allowing parties to request continuances, summary judgment, or a new trial by ex parte letters. Assuming arguendo such letters satisfy the Rule 41(d)(1) "application in writing" language, how is the "good cause shown" requirement met? "Because I asked for it?" Such practice violates notions of due process and circumvents the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure. There is nothing "just, speedy, and inexpensive," about permitting a party to delay taking action to obtain judgment for nearly seven years via letters merely requesting not to be dismissed, without any showing of good cause therefor, and without noticing the defendant on those letters. See Miss. R. Civ. P. 1. Given the inherent concerns regarding locating witnesses, fading memories, and increased costs to both litigants and burdening the court system, such a lengthy delay creates a strong presumption of prejudice which can be overcome only by a good cause finding. Additionally, equal protection concerns require that courts be open to litigants on the same condition as others, with like rules of evidence and modes of procedure. See Black's Law Dictionary 631 (4th ed.1968). To permit a one-sided application of Rule 41(d)(1) defies the text and spirit of our Rules.
¶ 15. Given almost seven years of inactivity, Moore's letters cannot justly be considered in compliance with Rule 41(d) as actions of record. Nor do these letters constitute "an application in writing . to the court," accompanied by "good cause shown why it should be continued as a pending case." Miss. R. Civ. P. 41(d)(1). Moore's letters made no attempt to offer good cause as to why the case should remain on the active docket. The letters were completely silent on the issue of good cause. Additionally, no "good cause shown" was offered at the hearing before the circuit court. Since Moore's "application in writing" failed to establish "good cause," and no documentary or testimonial evidence was presented at the hearing demonstrating "good cause," Rule 41(d)(1) requires that the case shall be dismissed "without prejudice." Miss. R. Civ. P. 41(d)(1).
¶ 16. Should this Court condone Moore's flouting of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure via four minimally responsive letters to separate Clerk's Motions to Dismiss for Want of Prosecution over a period of nearly seven years, trial courts would be vested with unrestricted power in Rule 41(d)(1) rulings. This Court cannot so agree. Reasonable parameters exist regarding the satisfaction of Rule 41(d)(1). Given the totality of the facts in this case, this Court concludes that Moore's letters reside well beyond any reasonable boundary. The circuit court abused its reasonable discretion in finding the letters satisfied the requirements of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure and specifically met the conditions enumerated in Rule 41(d)(1).
CONCLUSION
¶ 17. Accordingly, this Court reverses the order of the Circuit Court of Amite County, Mississippi, and grants ICRR's Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 41(d). The case is dismissed without prejudice.
¶ 18. REVERSED AND RENDERED.
SMITH, C.J., CARLSON, DICKINSON AND LAMAR, JJ., CONCUR. EASLEY, J., DISSENTS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION JOINED BY WALLER AND DIAZ, P.JJ., AND GRAVES, J.
. Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 5(a) provides, in part, that "every pleading subsequent to the original complaint unless the court otherwise orders because of numerous defendants, . every written motion other than one which may be heard ex parte, and every written notice, appearance, demand, . and similar paper shall be served upon each of the parties." Miss. R. Civ. P. 5(a) (emphasis added).
. The Motion to Dismiss alternatively sought dismissal pursuant to Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b).
. Uniform Circuit and County Court Rule 4.04(A) states, in part, that "[a]ll discovery must be completed within ninety days from service of an answer by the applicable defendant. Additional discovery time may be allowed with leave of court upon written motion setting forth good cause for the extension." U.C.C.C.R. 4.04(A). The record reflects no written motions by Moore requesting additional discovery time or setting forth good cause therefor, subsequent to March 17, 1997, the date ICRR filed its answer.
. The referenced discovery was interrogatories and requests for production of documents propounded by Moore on February 5, 1997, to which ICRR responded on April 25, 1997; ICRR's Notice of Service of Discovery on April 8, 1997, to which Moore responded on October 29, 1997; and Notice of Receipt of an unspecified original deposition filed on June 25, 1998. Thus, the last-referenced discovery occurred nearly eight years prior to the hearing.
. This is contradicted by the four separate Clerk's Motions to Dismiss for Want of Prosecution filed between May 24, 2001, and June 1, 2005.
. However, the appellate record included five letters between McDaniel, Cucos, Inc., and Dr. Chris Wiggins during that period. An October 1, 2001, letter from McDaniel to Cu-cos, Inc., related the following:
[a]s to my offers to allow you to speak with Mr. McDaniel's treating physicians, in an effort to resolve this matter, I will be glad to allow you to do so via telephonic conferences and/or personal conferences without the necessity of seeking court authority or noticing depositions.
. Attached thereto was a "Certificate of Service" upon counsel for both parties.
. Counsel for Cucos, Inc. was served with this letter.
. This Court stated in Mississippi Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co. v. Parker, 921 So.2d 260 (Miss.2005), lawyers "owe an absolute duty, as officers of the court, . to aid the trial courts to bring about fair and expeditious resolutions of the pending cases in which they are involved." Id. at 265. See also U.C.C.C.R. 2.04 ("[i]t is the duty of the movant, when a motion or other pleading is filed, . to pursue said motion to hearing and decision by the court. Failure to pursue a pretrial motion to hearing and decision before trial is deemed an abandonment of that motion.... ").
. For cases involving errors by the clerk of the court, see Cucos, 938 So.2d at 240 (failure of circuit clerk to file responsive letter and failure to furnish McDaniel with copy of the Order Dismissing for Want of Prosecution) and Walker v. Parnell, 566 So.2d 1213, 1218 (Miss.1990) ("the issue in this case deals with a mistake by the clerk. Proper Notice was not given to the Walkers or even to their last attorney of record.... ").
. A "common local practice" permitting such letters to suffice as "action of record" is questionable in light of rules declaring more is required. As such, recognizing "common local practices" which contradict the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure, see "Order Adopting the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure" (among the purposes of the Rules are "to promote . uniformity ."), risks inequitable treatment of those unfamiliar with unwritten procedures.
. See Miss. R. Civ. P. 83(b) ("[a]ll such local rules and uniform rules adopted before being effective must be submitted to the Supreme Court of Mississippi for approval.").
. A motion qualifies as both.
. See Rule 55(a) (providing example of exception).
. Applied to judicial proceedings, due process traditionally means "a course of legal proceedings according to those rules and principles which have been established in our systems of jurisprudence for the protection and enforcement of private rights." Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 733, 24 L.Ed.2d 565, 572 (1878), overruled on other grounds, Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 212, 97 S.Ct. 2569, 2584, 53 L.Ed.2d 683, 703 (1977).
. The purpose of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure is "to promote justice, uniformity, and the efficiency of the courts...." See Order Adopting the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 1 provides, in part, that "[t]hese rules shall be construed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action." Miss. R. Civ. P. 1 (emphasis added). According to the Comment to Rule 1, "[t]here probably is no provision in these rules more important than this mandate; it reflects the spirit in which the rules were conceived and written and in which they should be interpreted." Miss. R. Civ. P. 1 cmt.