Case Name: Causten vs. Burke
Court: Court of Appeals of Maryland
Jurisdiction: Maryland
Decision Date: 1828-06
Citations: 2 H. & G. 295
Docket Number: 
Parties: Causten vs. Burke.
Judges: The cause was argued at June term last before Buchanan, Ch. J. and Martin, Stephen, and Dorsey, J.
Reporter: Harris and Gill
Volume: 2
Pages: 295–305

Head Matter:
Causten vs. Burke.
June 1828.
One partner cannot maintain an action against his co-partners, for work and; labour done on account of the partnership.
Where the plaintiff was associated with the defendant and others, in a par» ticular concern not rendering it the duty of any of them to leave their place of residence, and at a meeting of the association, when the plaintiff was not present, it was proposed to employ him, to go to a distant place, to look after the property of the concern; the plaintiff was then sent for, accepted the employment for a fixed compensation, performed the services required, and brought an action of assumpsit against one of the partners to recover the sum' agreed to he paid him. The party sued pleaded the general issue. This agreement was held to be an undertaking on account of the concern; that the same engagement entered into with a stranger, would have been binding on the firm; and that the plaintiff as a member of that firm, must have contributed his proportionate part of the sum contracted to be paid, and, therefore, could not sustain; his action.
With respect to debts for work and labour, or other personal services, it is a rule that however special the agreement was, yet if' it was not under seal, and the terms of it have been performed on the plaintiff’s part, and the remuneration was to be in money, it is not necessary to declare specially, snd the common indebilafm count is sufficient — Pe» S-raraxH, Judge,
Appeal from Baltimore County Court. Assumpsit for work and labour, care and diligence; for goods sold and delivered; for money lent and advanced; for money had and received, and for money paid, laid out and expended. The defendant, (now appellee,) pleaded non assumpsit, and issue was joined.
1. At the trial the plaintiff, (the appellant,) prayed the court to direct the jury that if they believed from the evidence in this cause, that the defendant and others, did agree to pay to the plaintiff the sum of. $500, as a compensation for his extra services, in going to the South to attend to the security of certain property there, belonging to them and the plaintiff, and that the same was to have been paid by them without any coritribubution to said fund, on his part, and that he did go and attend, &c. that then the plaintiff is entitled to recover. Which direction the Court, [Archer, Ch. J. and Hanson, A. J.] refused to give; but instructed the jury that there was no evidence to go to the jury to establish the fact, that the agreement was with them individually. The plaintiff excepted.
2. The plaintiff to support the issue on his part, offered in evidence to the jury, by Thomas S. Schoolfield, that the plaintiff in this cause was associated with the defendant and several others, in the eity of Baltimore, in business not rendering it the duty of any of them to leave the city; that the concern had property in Savannah, Amelia Island, and elsewhere, to the south; that at a meeting at Laborde’s, the defendant, the witness, and several others of the concern, were present, one of whom prdposed they should employ the present plaintiff to go to the South after said property belonging to said concern, of which the plaintiff was a member; that it was agreed to by the persons present, and the witness sent after the plaintiff, who was not present, but who afterwards attended — that it was then proposed to the plaintiff, to go to the South after said property, and Labórele, the defendant, and the others of said concern, offered ,to give him $500, as a compensation for his services, if he would go, to yvhich the plaintiff acceded, and did go, and was absent on said business, witness believes, three or four months; that nothing was said at the time aboutpaying the plain tiff out of the joint funds of the concern, or that such fund was to be charged therewith; nothing was said about the other members of the concern being exclusively liable. The defendant then prayed the court to direct the jury, that upon this evidence the plaintiff was not entitled to recover. Which opinion and direction the court gave. The plaintiff excepted; and the verdict and judgment being against him, he appealed to this court.
The cause was argued at June term last before Buchanan, Ch. J. and Martin, Stephen, and Dorsey, J.
Mayer, for the Appellant.
1. As there is no evidence stated in the first bill of exceptions, that exception must be abandoned.
2. Upon the evidence set forth in the second bill of exceptions, the plaintiff below was entitled to recover; for although the defendant and plaintiff were with others associated in business, in relation to which the plaintiff performed the service mentioned in this exception; yet the said service was not performed by him as a partner, and the claim for it did not enter into the partnership accounts. One partner contracting with his copartner is to be considered as a stranger with respect to his other partner. Bradford v Kimberly, 3 Johns. Ch. Rep. 433. The defendant cannot take advantage of his being sued alone, not having pleaded in abatement. Van Ness v Forrest, 8 Cranch, 30.
Meredith, for the Appellee.
1. The first bill of exceptions is unaccompanied by any statement of the evidence. It cannot be connected with the second bill of exceptions, in which the evidence is set out. It is, therefore, wholly out of the case.
2. The evidence stated in the second bill of exceptions establishes a partnership.
3. One partner cannot maintain an action against his copartner for work and labour performed, or money expended on account of the partnership. In taking care of the joint property, a joint owner is taking eare of his own interest. Each partner is bound, by the nature of his contract, to devote his whole time and attention to the partnership concern. The ser» vices of the several partners may in point of fact be unequal, but the law does not undertake to measure them, and therefore, will not compensate them. Holmes v Higgins, 1 Barn. & Cress. 74, (8 Serg. & Lowb. 27.)
4. Where there is a special agreement for one partner to receive an extra compensation, if such compensation is not paid, his remedy is in chancery. Claims arising out of a partnership, as between the partners themselves, during its continuance, are cognizable alone in. a court of equity. The reason is, that the mode of administering justice in courts of equity — > the mode of proof — the mode of trial, and the mode of relief, are found far better calculated for the adjustment of differences of this description, than the remedies afforded by the nature of proceedings at law. It may, therefore, be considered as an established íule, that until dissolution, and an account liquidated by the partners, indebitatus assumpsit will not lie. Smith v Barrow, 2 T. R. 476. Harvey v Crickett, 5 Maul. & Selw. 340. Lamatere v Caze, 1 Wash. C. C. Rep. 436. Murray v Bogart, 14 Johns. Rep. 318. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to receive these $500, depends upon the state of the partnership accounts. Giving him credit for the $500, he may still he indebted, on a final settlement, in a much larger amount. Although such may be the fact, the defendant is precluded from showing it. A plea of set-off would necessarily lead to an investigation of partnership accounts utterly unfit for a court of law. And the consequence would be, that the defendant would be turned round to his remedy in equity, which would be manifestly unjust. The case of Bradford v Kimberly, 3 Johns. Ch. Rep. 433, cited by the appellant’s counsel, and Franklin v Robinson, 1 Johns. Ch. Rep. 157, are the only cases in which a partner has been held entitled to compensation for extra services, and they were both cases in chancery, where the partners were at liberty to investigate the whole accounts, and protected from being compelled to pay, if the balance was on the whole against the claimant partner.
5. But if the plaintiff has a remedy at law, he ought to have declared, not in general indebitatus assumpsit, hut on that which alone gave him the right of action — the special agreement. The rule formerly was, that where there was a special agreement, the party could not declare upon a general indebi~ tatus assumpsit. But it is now a general rule, that where the agreement is executed, the general form of declaring is sufficient. But then the plaintiff’s right of recovery must be independent of the special agreement; that is, he must have a right to recover, supposing no special agreement to have been made. If his right of action depends alone on the existence of such an agreement, he must declare upon it. Payne v Bacomb, 2 Dougl. 651. Tuttle v Mayo, 7 Johns. Rep. 132. Cooke v Munstone, 4 Bos. & Pull. 355. Now in this case if the plaintiff is entitled to recover at all, it can only he in virtue of the special agreement. The case, therefore, is completely within the exception.
Mayer, in reply.
It is sufficient to show where there is a special agreement, that the services were performed, in order to enable the party to recover. 1 Chitty’s Plead. 329, (339.) If there had been no special agreement in this case, the plaintiff might recover. It was for services out of the ordinary business of the concern, which the plaintiff performed.
Curia adv. vult.

Opinion:
Buchanan, Ch. J.
at this term, delivered the opinion of the court. The first bill of exceptions being properly abandoned by the counsel for the appellant, it is considered as out of the case.
The question arising on the second bill of exceptions, is u, question of construction.
The plaintiff and defendant, with several others, were associated together in business — they were partners in trade. If the contract, which gave rise to this action, was entered into by such of the members of the concern as were present, in their individual characters — if it was a personal contract, then the plaintiff, under the pleadings in the cause, would be entitled to recover; as there is nothing to prevent one partner from suing another on a mere private undertaking. But if the undertaking by the defendant, and the other partners present, was not merely personal, but on account of the copartnership, the plaintiff is not entitled to recover, on the general principle, that one partner cannot maintain an action against his copart iiers, for work and labour done, &c. on account of the partnership.
And we think, that the engagement by the defendant and the others of the concern who were present, to give the plaintiff $500 for going abroad on the business of the concern, in which he, as a partner, was equally interested with the other partners, was not a private, individual contract, but an undertaking on account of the concern. The same engagement entered into with a stranger would have been binding on the firm; and the present plaintiff, as a member of that firm, must have contributed his proportionate part of the sum contracted to be paid. And what is there in the mere circumstance of his being employed as the agent to transact the business required to be done, in the place of a stranger, to. give to the same terms an entirely different meaning and character, and to turn into a separate individual undertaking on the part of some of the partners, a contract, which in the case of another, would have been considered as made on account of, and binding upon the firm? We can perceive nothing. The services rendered, were for and on account of the firm — the compensation for those services to be paid by the firm, and his just proportion of that compensfftfon to be borne by the plaintiff, as one of the firm. He could not sue the firm of which he was himself a member, nor can he sustain this suit against one of his copartners for services rendered the firm.
The court are of opinion that.the judgment of the court below ought to be affirmed.