Case Name: GULYAS v. GULYAS
Court: Michigan Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1977-04-19
Citations: 75 Mich. App. 138
Docket Number: Docket No. 28160
Parties: GULYAS v GULYAS
Judges: Before: D. E. Holbrook, Jr., P. J., and N. J. Kaufman and D. C. Riley, JJ.
Reporter: Michigan appeals reports; cases decided in the Michigan Court of Appeals.
Volume: 75
Pages: 138–153

Head Matter:
GULYAS v GULYAS
Opinion of D. E. Holbrook, Jr., P. J.
1. Infants — Statutes—Child Custody Orders — Appeal and Error —-Weight of Evidence — Abuse of Discretion — Clear Error.
All orders and judgments of a circuit court concerning child custody disputes should be affirmed on appeal unless the trial judge has made findings of fact against the great weight of the evidence or committed a palpable abuse of discretion or a clear legal error on a major issue (MCLA 722.28; MSA 25.312[8]).
Opinion of N. J. Kaufman, J.
2. Appeal and Error — Dependent Children — Custody Appeals— Rehearing Orders — Abdicating Responsibility — Abuse of Discretion.
The Court of Appeals examines child custody appeals within the context of the circumstances developed below; it may neither reshape custody orders to suit its own brand of appellate justice, nor abdicate its judicial responsibility to determine the child’s best interests by casually affixing the label "no abuse of discretion” to a clearly improper result.
3. Infants — Child Custody — Expression of Preference — Courts— Discretion.
The difficult task of garnering truthful information from a child of tender years concerning his or her preference in a child custody dispute is generally best left to the discretion of the trial judge who is dealing directly with the parties and the child.
4. Infants — Custody—In Camera Conversations — Stipulations— Record — Preserving Question.
Failure of a trial court to disclose on the record the content of an in camera conversation between the judge and a child who was the subject of a custody petition was not reversible error where the parties had stipulated to the private conversation out of their presence, and neither party objected at trial, nor on appeal, to the judge’s failure to disclose the contents of the discussion.
References for Points in Headnotes
[1, 2, 5] 4 Am Jur 2d, Appeal and Error § 136.
[3, 5-7] 42 Am Jur 2d, Infants §§ 44-47.
[4, 7] 5 Am Jur 2d, Appeal and Error § 550.
[8] 42 Am Jur 2d, Infants §§ 42, 47, 51.
Dissent by D. C. Riley, J.
5. Appeal and Error- — Record—Infants—Custody—In Camera Conversations — Preference—Appeal and Error.
Failure of a trial court to provide the Court of Appeals with a substantive account of an in camera interview with a child concerning her preference in a custody action effectively frustrates meaningful appellate review of the court’s decision and hence constitutes clear error on a major legal issue.
6. Infants — Custody—Expression of Preference — Best Interests of Child — Record.
A trial court is obligated to relay a recorded summary of a child’s expression of preference in a custody action where the court chooses to determine the child’s preference out of the presence of the parties to assist it in deciding a close question of the child’s best interests.
7. Appeal and Error — Infants—Custody—Expression of Preference — Record Error — Preserving Question — De Novo Review.
It is unwise to adopt a rule requiring a recorded objection or motion at trial to preserve for appeal a claim that a trial court erred in failing to record an in camera expression of preference by a child who was the subject of a custody action; it is incumbent upon a trial court to specify for the appellate record with some precision the subsidiary facts on which its ultimate conclusion of custody rests so that the Court of Appeals may make its de novo review.
8. Parent and Child — Infants—Custody—t-Fitness of Parents— Courts — Personal Philosophy — Work Ethic — Best Interests of Child — Women’s Role.
A trial court deciding the relative "moral fitness” of the supplicants in a child custody dispute should not use the term as a means of imposing on them its personal philosophical beliefs regarding the work ethic; nor should a court use "the best interests of the child” as a screen with which to hide outmoded notions of a woman’s role being near ¿hearth and home.
Appeal from Wayne, George T. Martin, J.
Submitted October 14, 1976, at Detroit.
(Docket No. 28160.)
Decided April 19, 1977.
Leave to appeal applied for.
Petition by Esther Gulyas for custody of her and the defendant Kenneth S. Gulyas’ six-year-old child. Order awarding custody to the defendant. Plaintiff appeals by leave granted.
Affirmed.
Lippitt, Perlove, Varga & Zack (by Warren J. Perlove and Leslie C. Schefman), for plaintiff.
Paul C. Perovich, for defendant.
Before: D. E. Holbrook, Jr., P. J., and N. J. Kaufman and D. C. Riley, JJ.

Opinion:
D. E. Holbrook, Jr., P. J.
Plaintiff appeals from the opinion and order of the trial court awarding custody of the parties' 6-year-old daughter to the defendant, pursuant to the provisions of the child custody act of 1970.
It is well settled that, with respect to child custody disputes, all orders and judgments of the circuit court should be affirmed on appeal unless the trial judge made findings of fact against the great weight of evidence or committed a palpable abuse of discretion or a clear legal error on a major issue. MCLA 722.28; MSA 25.312(8).
MCLA 722.25; MSA 25.312(5) provides in pertinent part as follows: "When the dispute is between the parents the best interests of the child shall control."
MCLA 722.23; MSA 25.312(3) defines "best interests of the child" to mean "the sum total of the following findings to be considered, evaluated and determined by the court: ". The section thereafter enumerates nine specific factors which the court shall consider together with a final factor which reads: "(j) any other factor considered by the court to be relative to a particular child custody dispute."
In reviewing the trial court's findings with regard to the factors to be considered the trial judge found the competing parties to be equal with respect to subprovisions (a), (c), (f), (g) and (h). The court further found that the evidence weighed in the defendant-father's favor as to subprovisions (b), (d) and (e). The court's findings with respect to (b), (d) and (e) read as follows:
"2. Both parties have the capacity to give love and affection to the child but the wife's career and need for obtaining a better livelihood heretofore has diminished her manifested ability to care for the child other than in Day Care homes. Her disposition towards the child is shown by her testimony that she would give up her job if she were awarded the child. Whether she actually would do so is a question. Heretofore she obviously felt that her job would not interfere with the child's care.
"4. The child was with the husband after the wife left and cared for by his mother. For five months, the child was in New York. Since October 2, 1975, the child has been with the father in Michigan. She has been attending a private school in Michigan, and has received care from the husband's mother with whom they live. There is a desirability of maintaining continuity of stable home life for the child. Her present residence appears to provide a stable and satisfactory environment.
"5. The permanence of the husband's home as a family unit appears to be slightly better than that of the wife. The wife's employment is subject to transfer to another city, albeit she testified she can refuse to accept a transfer. Previously, she accepted a transfer."
The court also took into consideration the reasonable preference of the child which is borne out by the following statement in the court's written opinion:
"The reasonable preference of the child was disclosed to the court in a private interview with the child on January 15, 1975 by stipulation of the attorneys. Without wishing to lessen either parent's love for the child by divulging the child's preference, the court is taking the child's preference into consideration."
Other factors considered by the court to be relevant appear in the court's opinion as follows:
"As to other factors of consideration, this court is of the opinion that the mother of the child is an energetic and ambitious career woman. She testified as to her work hours. She allegedly is a supervisor of seventeen offices in Buffalo and surrounding area while her new husband travels about the state of New York in a supervisory capacity also for H & R Block. This court is of the opinion that the father of the child is perhaps less ambitious than the mother, but is more of a homebody.
"In summary, a totalling of the evaluations of the factors set forth in the Child Custody Act is convincing that the best interests of the child, Tiffany, would be served by awarding her custody to her father, with the right of reasonable visitation accorded to the mother."
Having reviewed the transcript testimony taken in these proceedings and comparing same to the trial court's findings we are unable to say that the trial judge made findings of fact against the great weight of evidence, committed a palpable abuse of discretion or clearly legally erred on a major issue. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. Costs to appellee.