Case Name: James A. NARDULLI, t/d/b/a Vanderbilt Slag Company v. JOHN CARLO, INC., a corporation, and Firemens Fund Insurance Company, a corporation. Appeal of FIREMENS FUND INSURANCE COMPANY
Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
Jurisdiction: Pennsylvania
Decision Date: 1979-12-28
Citations: 274 Pa. Super. 34
Docket Number: No. 1220
Parties: James A. NARDULLI, t/d/b/a Vanderbilt Slag Company v. JOHN CARLO, INC., a corporation, and Firemens Fund Insurance Company, a corporation. Appeal of FIREMENS FUND INSURANCE COMPANY.
Judges: Before PRICE, HESTER and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
Reporter: Pennsylvania Superior Court Reports
Volume: 274
Pages: 34–44

Head Matter:
417 A.2d 1238
James A. NARDULLI, t/d/b/a Vanderbilt Slag Company v. JOHN CARLO, INC., a corporation, and Firemens Fund Insurance Company, a corporation. Appeal of FIREMENS FUND INSURANCE COMPANY.
Superior Court of Pennsylvania.
Argued April 9, 1979.
Filed Dec. 28, 1979.
Howard T. Gilfillan, Pittsburgh, for appellant.
George B. Stegenga, Washington, for appellees.
Before PRICE, HESTER and MONTGOMERY, JJ.

Opinion:
HESTER, Judge:
This is an appeal from an order of the Court of Common Pleas of Washington County denying appellant's petition to open judgment.
Appellees initiated this action against John Carlo, Inc., a general contractor (not a party to this appeal) and its surety, appellant. Two extensions of time were granted to Carlo's attorney to file a responsive pleading. However, no appearance being entered for the appellant, appellee took judgment by default on April 22,1977, twenty-two days after the complaint was filed.
After petition to open by appellant, the lower court refused to open the judgment reasoning that neither a meritorious defense nor a reasonable excuse for the default was presented.
Our review of the record in this case leads us to conclude that the lower court abused its discretion in refusing to open the judgment. We believe the requirements necessary to open a judgment had been met, i. e., 1) the petition to open must be filed promptly; 2) the failure to file an answer must be satisfactorily explained; and 3) a meritorious defense must be alleged. See Epstein v. Continental Bank and Trust Company, 260 Pa.Super. 522, 394 A.2d 1049 (1978).
A reasonable explanation was given by appellant's counsel as to why a responsive pleading had not been filed on behalf of appellant.
Counsel explained that he represented both the contractor and its surety (appellant). He procured from appellee extensions of time to file a responsive pleading. It was his belief that he had communicated the fact that he represented the surety to appellee's counsel. His letters, however, did not mention the . appellant. Appellee's counsel testified that this fact was never communicated to him. Thus the default was taken against appellant when no answer was filed.
We believe this failure to answer was based on a misunderstanding between counsel as distinguished from mere inadvertence or negligence.
Errors of counsel which indicate an oversight rather than a deliberate decision not to defend, have been held to constitute sufficient legal justification to open a default judgment. Tice v. Nationwide Life Insurance Company, 253 Pa.Super. 118, 384 A.2d 1257 (1978).
We are unable to arrive at any other conclusion from the within set of facts. There was no reason for appellant not to file a responsive pleading. The appellant's liability was not primary but secondary since it was a surety.
Clearly, the failure here was a result of counsel's belief that he had procured an extension of time to file an answer for both defendants. This misunderstanding should not bar appellant from its day in court.
Secondly, we believe that a sufficiently meritorious defense was alleged.
Appellant asserted that (in defense to a claim that appellee's bill for materials was not paid) appellee erroneously included sales tax in its calculations; that appellee had failed to complete its delivery contract with Lampl, Inc. (the defaulting sub-contractor), and that Lampl, Inc. guaranteed to defend, indemnify and hold appellant harmless.
In Ecumenical Enterprises v. Nadco Construction, Inc., 253 Pa.Super. 386, 385 A.2d 392 (1978), we stated:
"While we do not wish to understate the necessity of setting forth with sufficient specificity facts to constitute a meritorious defense, the lower court need not try the case on its merits when considering an equitable petition to open a default judgment (citation omitted)." Id., 253 Pa.Super. 392, 385 at A.2d 395.
Here, the defense, as alleged, was sufficiently precise and clear as to satisfy this requirement.
Finding that the three requirements for opening a default had been met (the promptness of the petition to open was not in dispute), "We must ascertain whether there are present any equitable considerations in the factual posture of the case which require that we grant a defendant against whom a judgment had been entered an opportunity to have his 'day in court' and to have the cause decided upon the merits. In doing so, we act as a court of conscience (citations omitted)." Kennedy v. Black, 271 Pa.Super. at 456, 413 A.2d at 1105 (1979 per Price, J., Hester, J., dissenting).
Several factors are present which support our belief that the judgment should be opened.
One, the judgment was taken 22 days after the complaint was received without giving notice to appellant.
Courts rightly disfavor "snap judgments." The purpose of a default judgment is to speed the cause, preventing a procrastinating defendant from impeding the plaintiff from establishing his claim. Kraynick v. Hertz, 443 Pa. 105, 277 A.2d 144 (1971).
The judgment taken here clearly defeats the purpose of a default judgment. There was no evidence that appellant was attempting to procrastinate in order to impede appellee's claim.
This court also distains judgments taken where no notice to the affected party was given. Moyer v. Americana Mobile Homes, Inc., 244 Pa.Super. 441, 368 A.2d 802 (1976).
Additionally, we note that if the judgment stands, an incongruous situation might be created. In the event that the case proceeds to trial and the contractor is exonerated, we would then have a situation where the secondary party is liable and the primary party goes free. Or, if an indemnification contract exists between the contractor and appellant, we would be faced with a situation where the contractor would be exonerated of any liability in court but would face the prospect of paying the judgment outside of court.
Finally, there is no prejudice which would fall to appellee if we open the judgment.
Order of lower court reversed and judgment entered on behalf of appellee is stricken.
PRICE, J., files a dissenting opinion.