Case Name: Ljubo SKRBIC, Appellant, v. QCRC ASSOCIATES CORP., et al., Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 2000-03-15
Citations: 761 So. 2d 349
Docket Number: No. 3D99-195
Parties: Ljubo SKRBIC, Appellant, v. QCRC ASSOCIATES CORP., et al., Appellee.
Judges: Before JORGENSON, COPE, and LEVY, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 761
Pages: 349–354

Head Matter:
Ljubo SKRBIC, Appellant, v. QCRC ASSOCIATES CORP., et al., Appellee.
No. 3D99-195.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
March 15, 2000.
Rehearing Denied July 26, 2000.
Arthur Joel Berger, Miami, for appellant.
Cole White & Billbrough and G. Bart Billbrough, Miami, for appellee.
Before JORGENSON, COPE, and LEVY, JJ.

Opinion:
LEVY, Judge.
Appellant appeals from an Order finding that he did not show good cause for failing to perfect service of process within the time period prescribed by Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.070® and dismissing his Complaint with prejudice. We agree with the trial court's finding that appellant failed to show good cause for his failure to serve defendants within the appropriate time period. However, because of the recent amendment to Rule 1.070®, we remand to the trial court for the purpose of making a finding as to whether or not there was "excusable neglect" on the part of appellant which would excuse his failure to serve process within the 120-day period required by the Rule. See Amendment to Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.0700)-Time Limit for Service, 746 So.2d 1084 (Fla.1999); Almeida v. FMC Corp., 740 So.2d 557 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999).
On October 16, 1997, appellant filed a Complaint against defendants, Quality Car Rental (the owner of the vehicle), Carlos Fidalgo and Leyda Ferguson (the directors of Quality Car Rental) and Yusuf Yildrim (the driver of the vehicle) (collectively "Appellees"), seeking damages for injuries sustained in an automobile accident that occurred on October 16, 1993. On or about November 25, 1997, appellee, Quality Car Rental, filed a "Notice of Stay Pursuant to Florida Law" which declared that its insurer was insolvent and noted that, because the jurisdiction of Florida Insurance Guarantee Association (FIGA) was triggered, the action is stayed for up to six months pursuant to section 631.67, Florida Statute. Attached with the No tice, Quality Car Rental also filed an insolvency order from the Supreme Court of New York dated November 20,1997.
Appellant did not attempt (and has to this date never attempted) to serve the Complaint during this period. On October 27, 1998, appellees moved to dismiss the Complaint for failure to serve the appel-lees within the 120-day period prescribed in Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.070(j). A hearing on the motion was held on December 4, 1998. The trial court, finding that appellant did not show good cause for failing to serve process within the 120 days, entered an Order granting the Motion to Dismiss with prejudice. This appeal ensued.
Appellant first argues that, pursuant to Rule 1.070(j), the Complaint must be served within the first 120 days immediately following the filing of the Complaint and that any event that interrupts that specific period, and thereby makes it impossible for the plaintiff to serve defendants within those first 120 days, is automatic good cause sufficient to avoid a dismissal. Accordingly, appellant argues, once the initial 120-day period was interrupted by the filing of the "Notice of Stay," making it impossible for appellant to serve the Complaint within the said initial 120-day period, good cause was automatically shown. We find such an interpretation of the Rule to be illogical, because it would clearly lead to results contrary to the intent of the Rule. See Nationsbank, N.A. v. Ziner, 726 So.2d 364, 366 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999) ("The purpose of Rule 1.070(j) is to prevent a plaintiff from filing a suit and then taking no action whatsoever to proceed on the claim.").
Where, as in the instant case, the plaintiff cannot serve the defendants within the first 120 days following the filing of the Complaint, we find that the 120-day period is tolled until such time as the case may proceed, whether by operation of law or trial court Order. Accordingly, we hold that at the conclusion of the six-month stay, the 120-day period again began to run. Since, in the instant case, 40 days passed between the filing of the Complaint and the filing of the "Notice of Stay", the appellant had 80 days remaining within which to serve the appellees after the stay was lifted by operation of law. Although we recognize that the language of the Rule does not provide for any tolling periods, treating a FIGA "Notice of Stay" as a tolling period is, for the reasons explained above, the most logical and sensible approach to the question. Since appellant did not serve a copy of the Complaint on any of the appellees at any time between the filing of the Complaint on October 16, 1997, and the date of the hearing on appel-lees' Motion to Dismiss on December 4, 1998, a period of almost 14 months (of which only six months was excused because of the FIGA "Notice of Stay"), we find that the trial court was eminently justified in making the finding that the appellant did not show good cause for failing to serve process within the 120 days as required by Rule 1.070(j) as it was in effect at that time.
At the time of the December, 1998, hearing, Rule 1.070(j) provided:
If service of the initial process and initial pleading is not made upon a defendant within 120 days after filing of the initial pleading and the party on whose behalf service is required does not show good cause why service was not made within that time, the action shall be dismissed without prejudice or that defendant dropped as a party on the court's own initiative after notice or on motion.
Fla. R. Civ. Pro. 1.070(j)(1998)(emphasis supplied). In March, 1999, while this case was on appeal, the Supreme Court amended Rule 1.070(j). Amendment to Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.070(j)-Time Limit for Service, 746 So.2d 1084, (Fla. 1999). The new version of the Rule provides:
If service of the initial process and initial pleading is not made upon a defendant within 120 days after filing of the initial pleading the court, on its own initiative after notice or on motion, shall direct that service be effected within a specified time or shall dismiss the action without prejudice or drop that defendant as a party; provided that if the plaintiff shows good cause or excusable neglect for the failure, the court shall extend the time for service for an appropriate period.
Amendment to Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.070(j), 746 So.2d 1084,(emphasis supplied). At the time of the December 1998 hearing, the amended version of the Rule was not available to the trial judge. In Amendment to Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.070(j)-Time Limit for Service, 746 So.2d 1084, (Fla.1999), the Supreme Court held that "the amendment shall apply to all civil cases commenced after the date of this opinion and, insofar as just and practicable, to all civil cases pending as of the date of this opinion." Therefore, the instant case was "in the pipeline" at the time of the amendment and the parties are entitled to findings under the amended Rule. Accordingly, we remand this case to the trial court for the purpose of making a finding as to whether or not there was "excusable neglect" on the part of the appellant that would excuse his failure to serve process within the above-described 120-day period.
JORGENSON, J" concurs.
. We note that the Amended Complaint, upon which we are now traveling, was filed on the very last day permissible under the four-year statute of limitations.
. Section 631.67, Florida Statutes provides that:
[a]ll proceedings in which the insolvent insurer is a party or is obligated to defend a party in any court or before any quasi-judicial body or administrative board in this state shall be stayed for 6 months, or such additional period from the date the insolvency is adjudicated, by a court of competent jurisdiction to permit proper defense by the association of all pending causes of action as to any covered claims; provided that such stay may be extended for a period of time greater than 6 months upon proper application to a court of competent jurisdiction.
§ 631.67, Fla. Slat (1999).