Case Name: The Winch. & Strasb. R. R. Co. & al. v. Colfelt & al.
Court: Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia
Jurisdiction: Virginia
Decision Date: 1876-09
Citations: 27 Gratt. 777
Docket Number: 
Parties: *The Winch. & Strasb. R. R. Co. & al. v. Colfelt & al.
Judges: 
Reporter: Virginia Reports
Volume: 68
Pages: 697–699

Head Matter:
*The Winch. & Strasb. R. R. Co. & al. v. Colfelt & al.
September Term, 1876,
Staunton.
1. Railroad Companies — Court of Appeals — Jurisdictional Amount. — On a creditor’s bill against a railroad company, some of the debts proved are under $500, but there Is one for $1,117.60, proved before the commissioner, and the decree of the circuit court is in favor of all of them against the company. An appeal by the company brings up all of them; and this court will pass upon all.
2. Same — Judgments against — Liability ol Road and Franchises. — The road and franchises of the railroad company are liable for the payment of judgments recovered against the company.
3. Same — Same—Same—Lease of. — It appearing from the report of the commissioner that the annual rent of the railroad is $37,000, and the debts proved are but $1,286.91, the road should be leased out for the shortest period, for which a sufficient rent may be obtained to pay the debts and tbe costs of the suit. And if to accomplish this object it is necessary to lease the railroad for a term which will yield in rents a sum far exceeding the amountof the judgments, and cannot be leased, at all for a shorter term, the creditors are entitled to have it leased for the longer term.
4. Same — Parties to Creditor’s Bill. — It appearing that another railroad company is in possession of the road, it is proper to make that company a party to the suit, to ascertain her interest in it, and that company not responding or showing what its interest is, a decree for leasing the road may be made.
This was a creditor’s suit in the circuit •court of Winchester, brought by Charles Colfelt against the Winchester and Stras-burg railroad company, to subject the real ■estate of the company to satisfy judgments which he had recovered against the company. The bill was afterwards amended, •and the Baltimore and Ohio railroad company, which was stated to be in possession •of the real estate of the first-named company, under a lease was made a defendant. Both of the said companies ^'demurred to the bill; but the cause coming on to be heard on the 24th of March 1875, the court overruled the demurrers, and recommitted the report, which had been previously made by a commissioner, with directions, after giving notice for four weeks in some newspaper, &c., to take an account of all debts which were liens upon the property of the Winchester and Strasburg railroad company. And leave was given to the railroad companies to file their answers within sixty days from the rising of the court: which they failed to do.
The commissioner returned his report, stating that but two debts, which were liens on the property, were produced before him. One of these was that of the plaintiff, made up of three judgments, one in the county court of Frederick, and the other two in the circuit court of that county, amounting together, at the date of the report, to $169.91, and a debt due to John Z- 'Jenkins’ executrix upon a judgment recovered by him in his lifetime, which, at the date of the report, amounted, principal and interest, to $1,117.60. The real estate of the Winchester and Strasburg railroad company was reported at a valuation of $630,000, and its annual rental at $37,000.
The defendants excepted to the report on the ground that the debts reported were not sustained by sufficient evidence. The evidence as to all the judgments was the certificate of the clerk of the court in which it was rendered, stating the court and the term at which it was rendered, the names of the parties, the amount of the judgment, and the amount thereof which bore interest and the date of its commencement; and an execution of fieri facias which had been issued on one of Colfelt’s judgments, had been returned no effects. All the judgments had been docketed.
*The cause came on to be heard on the 17th of November 1875, when the court overruled the exceptions to the report, and fixed the amount of the debts as reported by the commissioner, and decreed that unless the Winchester and Strasburg railroad company should, within sixty days from the rising of the court, pay to Jenkins’ ex’x and Colfelt their debts — stating the amount &c., as reported by the commissioner — the sheriff of the county of Frederick should, after notice &c., offer the Winchester and Strasburg railroad and its franchises, at public rental to the highest bidder for one year from the 1st of April 1876, upon the terms &c. From this decree the defendants obtained an appeal to this court.
Andrew Hunter and Pendleton, for the appellants.
Barton & Boyd and Dandridge, for the appellees.
Court of Appeals — Jurisdictional Amount. — Where several creditors, by creditor’s bill, have obtained a decree against the common debtor, and some of the debts do not amount to $500, though they aggregate as much, those creditors whose claims are insufficient are not entitled to an appeal; the debtor, however, may appeal as against all of the creditors. See the following cases, citing the principal case: Craig v. Williams, 90 Va. 502; Williams v. Clark, 93 Va. 691, 25 S. E. Rep. 1013; Fleshman v. Fleshman, 34 W. Va. 351, 12 S. E. Rep. 716; Rymer v. Hawkins, 18 W. Va. 318. Further see, Gage v. Crockett, 27 Gratt. 735, and note; Devries v. Johnston, 27 Gratt. 805; Barton’s Ch. Pr. (2d Ed.) 1216.

Opinion:
• Anderson, J.,
delivered the opinion of the court.
The constitution of Virignia provides that the supreme court of appeals shall not have jurisdiction in civil cases where the matter in controversy, exclusive of costs, is less in value or amount than $500, except in cases enumerated. In a case decided at the present term, the court held, Judge Staples delivering the opinion, that the value or amount in controversy in the court from whose decision the appeal is taken, at the date of the judgment or decree, determines the question of jurisdiction, and that there may be cases in which the appellate court would have jurisdiction to review the decision upon the petition of the plaintiff, when it would not have jurisdiction to review it upon the petition of the defendant ; and vice versa. Umbarger *& wife v. Watts & als., 25 Gratt. 167, was a creditor's bill to subject the life estate of Watts in real estate to the satisfaction of the plaintiffs' judgments.. Neither of the plaintiffs' judgments amounted to $500, exclusive of costs. The circuit court dismissed the bill; from which decision the plaintiffs appealed to this court. It was held that the court had no jurisdiction of the case.
Judge Christian, in whose opinion the other judges concurred, says "it is clear that the claims of the appellants are several and independent of each other. They are founded upon different contracts, upon judgments at different times." 1 'If one of the creditors is aggrieved by the decree, it is to the extent that his claim is not paid, and not because other creditors are not paid. ' '
The case in hand was also'a creditor's bill to subject the real estate of the Winchester and Strasburg railroad company to lien creditors. The plaintiff Colfelt's judgments, aggregated only $169.91. John Z-Jenkins' judgment amounted to $1,117.60, which he was allowed to come in and prove before the commissioner. And the decree against the Winchester and Strasburg company was for the aggregate of all the judgments, amounting to $1,286.91; of which that company complains. If aggrieved, to what extent is it aggrieved by the decree? To the amount of Colfelt's judgments, or the aggregate of all the judgments? Clearly the latter. And the company being the party seeking the reversal of that decree, if it is erroneous, it is aggrieved to the extent of all the judgments; and this court is rightfully in possession of the case upon the petition of this appellant, and has jurisdiction to review the decision of the lower court and to reverse the decree, if found to "be erroneous as to all the judgments, the aggregate *of which being the amount which the said appellant had in controversy in this suit. And this opinion is not at all in conflict, hut perfectly consistent with Umbarger v. Watts, supra.
The court is further of opinion that the property of the Winchester and Strasburg railroad company, in the decree mentioned, was liable to satisfy the judgments of the plaintiffs, which it appearing could be satisfied in a reasonable time from rents, it was not error to decree that the same should be leased for that purpose.
But it is contended that it was error to lease the railroad, the property of said company, for so long a term as one year, to satisfy so small a debt. This objection is answered by the counsel for the appellees, by the declaration that it could not be leased at all for a shorter period than one year; and that such a decree for a short time would have been futile. To remove any difficulty on that score, the decree may be amended so as to test that matter. The appellees are certainly entitled to the satisfaction of their judgments out of this appellant's property. And if, in order to accomplish it, it is necessary to lease the railroad for a term which will yield in rents a sum far exceeding the amount of their judgments, and cannot be leased at all for a shorter term, the appellees are entitled to have it leased for the longer term. But it •ought to be made to appear first, that it could not be leased for the shorter term. The court is of opinion therefore that the •decree should be amended, so as to direct the commissioner to offer it for a term of three months; and if it cannot be leased for that term, or for an amount sufficient to satisfy the appellees' judgments and costs, including their costs in defending this appeal, that he then offer it for a term of six months; and if that is ^unavailing, then for a term of nine months; and if that is unavailing, then for a term of twelve months, as was required by the said decree.
The court is further of opinion that the appellees, plaintiffs below, having been informed that the Baltimore and Ohio railroad company had possession of the said road, upon what terms, or by what right, they were not informed, it was proper that they should have had leave to amend their bill, and to make the said last named company a party defendant, to enable it to assert and disclose any right it had, if incompatible with the relief which the plaintiff sought against the Winchester and Strasburg railroad company, and that there is no error in the judgment of the circuit court overruling the demurrer of the said Baltimore and Ohio railroad company. And the said company, not having asserted any right in the Winchester and Strasburg railroad which could be prejudiced by the decree now under review, although if such right existed it had every opportunity of asserting it, it is too late now to assert any such right, and it cannot complain of said decree.
The court is of opinion therefore to amend as hereinbefore specified said decree, and to affirm the same, with costs.
Decree amended and affirmed.