Case Name: In Re Fazende & Seixas, Praying for a Monition
Court: Louisiana Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1883-12
Citations: 35 La. Ann. 1145
Docket Number: No. 8857
Parties: In Re Fazende & Seixas, Praying for a Monition.
Judges: 
Reporter: Louisiana Annual Reports
Volume: 35
Pages: 1145–1148

Head Matter:
No. 8857.
In Re Fazende & Seixas, Praying for a Monition.
On Motion to Dismiss.
Although a tran cript contain neither note of evidence, statement of facts, bill of exceptions or assignment of error, the appeal will not be dismissed, if the clerk’s certificate is complete and declares that it contains “ all the testimony adduced.” In such, case, the court, without assignment, may inquire if there is error apparent on the face of the record.
On the Merits.
An opponent in a monition proceeding, is in no oase required to make an antecedent tender as a condition precedent to opposing confirmation of sale.
Where he has engrafted on his opposition a petitory action, although ¿he exception of want of tender may avail to dismiss the latter action, it should be restrained in its effect to this extent, and should not operate as a dismissal of the opposition.
APPEAL from the Civil District Court for the Parish of Orleans. Bightor, J.
J. J. Barnett for Opponent and Appellant:
1. Plea of want of tender, as a prerequisite to the opposition of a monition, which opposition involves a petitory action, cannot be made by a warrantor after the applicant for monition has joined issue with the opponent, and from his answer, it appears that the tender would be a vain thing. 8 La. 252 ; C. P. 333, 336, 345, 346.
If such a plea be sustained at all, it should only have effect as to the warrantor excepting.
2. Where there is a plea of the kind, it should be made to appear that something, and what did enure to opponents’ benefit, and should be tendered. The burden of proof is on ex-ceptor. 30 An. 310.
3. "When an execution sale, not advertised for the term required by law, is alleged ‘to have been made, “also by consent of parties,” such sale is not a “judicial sale.” 2 An. 174; 3 An. 192; 16 An. 167.
4. If there be no consent, and failure of advertisement, as aforesaid; tbe resulting nullity is absolute. 1 R. 331; 2 R. 326; 5 La. 486.
5. Where such nullity is absolute, tender antecedent to the petitory action is unnecessary; defendant may urge his claims by reconvention. 33 An. 750-773.
6. A petitory action may be engrafted upon an opposition to monition; the opposition to monition is a provoked suit; and where in opposing, it is essential to allege ownership, and incidentally to claim property illegally divested, no preliminary tender is necessary, 13 La. 560; 34 An. 257.
7. In a petitory action it may be decreed that plaintiff only have possession upon reimbursing to defendant whatever amounts enured to his benefit. 2 La. 326; 3 La. 541; 30 An. 310; 34 An. 257.
8. If a petitory action cumulated with, an opposition to monition be dismissed for want of tender antecedent to the suit on opposition, or because such action could not be cumulated with the opposition; proper judgment is one of “non suit,” with reservation of rights as to that portion of the opposition which claims ownership; and reference for trial of the simple opposition to monition.
E. H. Farrar, A. G. Brice and H. G. Morgan for the Appellees.

Opinion:
On Motion to Dismiss.
The opinion of the Court was delivered by
Fenner, J.
The motion is based on the ground that there is "no note of evidence, no bill of exceptions and no statement of facts in the record," and that appellant has not, within ten days after bringing up of the record, filed any written assignment of error.
' The certificate of the clerk attached to the record is full to the effect that the transcript contains " a true, correct and complete transcript of all the proceedings had, documents filed, testimony and evidence "adduced upon the trial of the cause."
We think that this destroys the motion.
We consider that Articles 896 and 897 of the Code of Practice are to be construed together, and that the conditions expressed in the beginning of Art. 896 in the words "if, therefore, the copy of the record brought up be not duly certified by the clerk of the lower court as containing all the testimony adduced," extends to and covers all the provisions of both Articles. We hold the meaning and effect of the two Articles to be, that, in fits'absence of such certificate, the Supreme Court can judge of the cause only: 1, on a statement of facts; 2, on a bill of exception; 3, on a special verdict, or, in absence of all these; 4, on assignment of error on face of the record filed within the ten days.
If, on the contrary, the transcript presents such a certificate, then the provisions of those Articles have no application, and the Court will entertain the appeal. Reeves vs. Gordon, 5 La. 288; Erwin vs. Orillon, 6 La. 205; State vs. Giffen, 15 An. 420; Bossier vs. Carradine, 18 Id. 261; Cammack vs. Gordon, 20 Id. 213.
The motion to dismiss is, therefore, denied.