Case Name: Frederick L. Durand, Appellant, v. William Curtis, Respondent
Court: New York Commission of Appeals
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1874-01
Citations: 57 N.Y. 7
Docket Number: 
Parties: Frederick L. Durand, Appellant, v. William Curtis, Respondent.
Judges: 
Reporter: New York Reports
Volume: 57
Pages: 7–16

Head Matter:
Frederick L. Durand, Appellant, v. William Curtis, Respondent.
One 0. held a lease from, plaintiff, of a store in which he was doing business; the unexpired term was over two years. He entered into a copartnership agreement with defendant for the term of one year and one month. In the preliminary negotiations it was agreed by paroi, that in consideration that Gr. should put the lease into the partnership, the rent for the whole unexpired term should be regarded as a partnership liability and as one of the debts created on account of the firm. By the written agreement it was stipulated that each partner should be equally liable for “ all debts and liabilities suffered or created by or on account of ” the firm business. Ho mention was made in this agreement of the lease. The firm continued business for about eight months and then dissolved and soon thereafter the business was assigned to another, who went into possession. In an action to recover an installment of rent, accruing more than a year after the formation of the partnership, held, (Reynolds and Johnson, CO., dissenting), that defendant was not liable; that he was not liable as assignee of the lease, for the reason that such liability, if it ever existed, continued so long only as the privity of estate continued, and ceased upon the .transfer and surrender of possession; that the rent could not be made a firm debt by paroi agreement, as such a term could not be created or assigned by paroi (3 R. S., 136, § 8), and that the agreement to pay the rent for the whole time was void, as by its terms it could not be performed within a year. (2 R. S., 136, §'2.)
(Argued September 24, 1873;
decided January term, 1874.)
Appeal from judgment of the General Term of the Supreme Court in the fourth judicial department, affirming a judgment in favor of defendant, entered upon the report of a referee.
This action was brought to charge defendant with certain installments of rent reserved in a lease from plaintiff of a store in the city of Rochester.
The referee found among other things:
That on or about the 6th day of Júne, 1865, the plaintiff demised to Edward P. Gould, Charles F. Butts and Sarah E. King, composing the firm of E. P. Gould & Co., store 110 Buffalo street, in the city of Rochester, and the fixtures, for the term of three years from the first day of April then last past, ending on the last day of March, 1868, for the yearly rent of $700, to be paid in equal monthly payments in advance; that the said E. P. Gould & Co., entered upon ■and continued in the use and occupation of said premises until about the 5th day of January, 1866, when Butts sold, assigned and transferred, in writing, to Gould all his interest in the property of the firm, and Gould assumed all the debts and obligations of said firm, so far as they affected Butts; that about the last of February thereafter, said Sarah E. King, by a paroi agreement, sold and transferred to Gould, all her interest in the business and partnership property, and said lease and premises, and Gould remained in the sole possession of the premises and property, and about the same time a new partnership was formed and entered into by paroi, between the defendant and Gould, for the. purpose of continuing and carrying on the business; that" Gould furnished and put into said- new partnership, as his share of the capital stock, the goods, merchandise and property on hand, and also said lease ; and defendant contributed an equivalent amount in money, and paid back to Gould one-half of the month’s rent of said premises, which had been paid in advance, up to the first day of April thereafter, and Curtis assumed and agreed to pay one-half of the rent thereafter to accrue upon said lease, and to become jointly liable with said Gould therefor, as a part of the partnership liabilities; that the said partnership and the joint occupation of said premises under said arrangement, commenced on the 1st day of March, 1866, and on the third day of March, articles of copartnership were drawn up and signed, in and by which the duration of the partnership was limited to one year from the first day of April then next; that said partnership continued to the 5th day of December, 1866, when Gould, in writing, assigned and transferred to defendant, all his interest in and to all the property of the firm, defendant agreeing to assume personally all the debts and obligations of the firm ; that Gould then left said premises in the sole occupation of defendant; that defendant continued to occupy said premises and carry on the business until about the 27th of December, 1866, when he sold out to one B. A. Cox, and Cox agreed to assume all the obligations of defendant under said lease; that thereupon Cox entered into the possession and occupation of the premises to carry on the business, until the first part of February, 1867, when he sold out to the firm of Hamlin, Harrison & Co., and delivered over the possession and occupation of said premises' to them, with the knowledge and assent of the plaintiff; that the rent of said premises as it accrued after the execution of said lease was fully paid to the plaintiff, by the occupants thereof, from time to time, up to the 1st day of December, 1867, prior to which Hamlin, Harrison & Co. had failed in business and abandoned said premises. Further facts appear in the dissenting opinion of Reynolds, 0.
Frederick L. Durand, appellant in person.
It was competent to show by paroi that the words “ suffered or created ” referred to a firm debt created before the articles were signed. (Agawam Bk. v. Strever, 18 N. Y., 502, 508, 509; Walrath v. Thompson, 4 Hill, 200; Haigh v. Brooks, 10 Ad. & El., 309; Blossom v. Griffin, 3 Kern., 569.) The paroi agreement, in respect to the lease, being consistent with and separable from the written articles, and antecedent thereto, was not superseded by, but may co-exist with them. (Renard v. Sampson, 12 N. Y., 566; Beach v. R. and Del. B. R. R. Co., 37 id., 461.) Defendant is liable under the partnership agreement. (Smith v. Tarlton, 2 Barb. Ch., 336; Chester v. Dickerson, 52 Barb., 350; Freeman v. Freeman, 51 id., 306; Wil. Eq. Jur., 283, and cases cited, 285; Lowry v. Tew, 3 Barb. Ch., 431.) The lease having been assumed by the members of the firm as a partnership debt for a valuable consideration, this action will líe. (Lawrence v. Fox, 20 N. Y., 268; Burr v. Burr, 24 id., 180; Van Schaick v. Third Ave. R. R. Co., 38 id., 346; Secor v. Lord, 3 Keyes, 525; Barker v. Bucklin, 2 Den., 45; Fort v. Jackson, 17 J. R., 227; Martin v. Connor, 43 Barb., 526; 2 Hilt., 3.) The referee erred in deciding that there was a surrender of the lease by operation of law or otherwise. (Taylor’s L. & T., §§ 436, 438; 2 Platt on Leases, 353, 354, and authorities cited; Woodfall’s L. and T., 346; Walton v. Cronley, 14 Wend., 64; Port v. Jackson, 17 J. R., 239; House v. Burr, 24 Barb., 525; Whitney v. Meyers, 1 Duer, 266; Damb v. Hoffman, 3 E. D. S., 361.)
James G. Cochrane for the respondent.
Plaintiff could not maintain an action on the agreement between defendant and Gould. (Garnsey v. Rogers, 47 N. Y., 233; Van Rensselaer v. Penniman, 6 Wend., 569.)

Opinion:
Earl, C.
The defendant cannot be held liable for the rent claimed as assignee merely of the lease. If he became such assignee, he had assigned the term and transferred the possession of the premises long before this rent accrued; his liability as assignee continued only so long as the privity of estate continued; and when that ceased his liability ceased. (Jacques v. Short, 20 Barb., 269; Davis v. Morris, 36 N. Y., 569; Astor v. L'Amoreux, 4 Sandf., 524; Carter v. Hammett, 18 Barb., 608.)
He can, therefore, be made liable for this rent only upon the theory that he in some form assumed to pay it. He and Gould formed a copartnership, the agreement in reference to which was reduced to writing on the 3d day of March, 1866. The partnership was to commence March 1, and continued for one year from April 1, 1866. It was provided that each partner was to put into the business, as capital, $4,000, and that each should be equally liable for " all debts and liabilities suffered or created by or on account " of the firm business. The lease was not mentioned in the written agreement; and if we look to that alone, the firm was bound to pay the rent only during the term of the partnership. Further than that, the rent was not a partnership debt. But it is claimed, on the part of the plaintiff, that during the negotiation for the formation of the partnership, it was agreed, by paroi, between Gould and defendant that, in consideration that the former would put the lease into the partnership, the rent should, for the whole term of the lease, be regarded as a partnership liability, and that hence each member of the firm became equally liable for it, under the written agreement, as one of the debts created on account of the firm business. Or, in other words, the claim is that the rent for the whole term became a firm debt, by this paroi agreement. I cannot assent to this claim. The balance of the term was for more than two years, and such a term could not be created or assigned by paroi. (2 R. S., 135, § 8.) Neither could the defendant or the firm legally agree, by paroi, to pay the rent for the whole term, as such an agreement could not, by its terms, be performed within a year. (2 R. S., 136, § 2.) No effect can, therefore, be given to the alleged paroi agreement. And as there was nothing in the written partnership agreement as to the rent, such rent did not become a partnership debt or liability. Hence, this rent was not a liability which the defendant assumed by the agreement of December 5, 1866, whereby he took the firm property and agreed to pay the firm debts.
I can, therefore, perceive no theory upon which the defendant can be held liable for the rent claimed; and the judgment must be affirmed, with costs.