Case Name: Elliott BUCHMAN, etc., Petitioner, v. SEABOARD COAST LINE RAILROAD COMPANY, Respondent
Court: Florida Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1980-02-21
Citations: 381 So. 2d 229
Docket Number: No. 54394
Parties: Elliott BUCHMAN, etc., Petitioner, v. SEABOARD COAST LINE RAILROAD COMPANY, Respondent.
Judges: ENGLAND, C. J., and ADKINS, BOYD and OVERTON, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 381
Pages: 229–231

Head Matter:
Elliott BUCHMAN, etc., Petitioner, v. SEABOARD COAST LINE RAILROAD COMPANY, Respondent.
No. 54394.
Supreme Court of Florida.
Feb. 21, 1980.
Rehearing Denied April 14, 1980.
Walter H. Beckham, Jr. and Joel D. Eaton, of Podhurst, Orseck & Parks, Miami, and the Law Offices of Wagner, Cunningham, Vaughan, Hapner & Genders, Tampa, for petitioner.
George D. Lynn, Jr. and Stephen C. Chumbris, of Harrison, Greene, Mann, Rowe, Stanton & Mastry, St. Petersburg, for respondent.
Robert J. Beckham, of Beckham, McAli-ley & Proenza, Jacksonville, for Academy of Florida Trial Lawyers, amicus curiae.
DuBose Ausley and William M. Smith, of Ausley, McMullen, McGehee, Carothers & Proctor, Tallahassee, for Florida Railroad Ass’n, amicus curiae.

Opinion:
McDonald, justice.
This Court has granted certiorari under article V, section 3(b)(3), Florida Constitution. There is apparent conflict on the issue of admissibility of expert testimony as defined in Seaboard Coast Line Railroad Co. v. Hill, 250 So.2d 311 (Fla. 4th DCA 1971), writ discharged 270 So.2d 359 (Fla.1972), and Public Health Foundation v. Cole, 352 So.2d 877 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977), cert. denied 361 So.2d 834 (Fla.1978).
The facts of this case are stated in the opinion of the Second District Court of Appeal, 358 So.2d 836 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978), and are not repeated here. Although other issues were discussed by the District Court, the sole basis for reversal was the admissibility of expert testimony. Our discussion is therefore limited to that issue.
At the outset it is observed that the trial judge was most careful in his consideration of the expert testimony in dispute. We are reminded that in the absence of a clear showing of error a trial judge's determination of admissibility should not be disturbed on review. Seaboard Air Line Railroad Co. v. Lake Region Packing Assn., 211 So.2d 25 (Fla. 4th DCA 1968), cert. denied 221 So.2d 748 (Fla.1968); Myers v. Korbly, 103 So.2d 215 (Fla. 2d DCA 1958).
There are two elements to be considered when admitting expert testimony. First, the subject must be beyond the common understanding of the average layman. Second, the witness must have such knowledge as "will probably aid the trier of facts in its search for truth." Mills v. Redwing Carriers, Inc., 127 So.2d 453, 456 (Fla. 2d DCA 1961).
The district court, relying on Seaboard Coast Line Railroad Co. v. Kubalski, 323 So.2d 32 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975), ruled that the testimony of three experts invaded the province of the jury and should not have been admitted. Kubalski concerned the death of a motorist whose pickup truck was struck by a train while stopped on a railroad track because of traffic backed up from a red light. In Kubalski, the district court reversed and remanded on the basis of improperly admitted expert testimony. On the other hand, the admission of expert testimony concerning an automobile-train collision had been upheld in Seaboard Coast Line Railroad Co. v. Hill, 250 So.2d 311 (Fla. 4th DCA 1971).
The Fourth District Court of Appeal reconciled its rulings in Kubalski and Hill by stating:
In Hill there were extraordinary circumstances and the expert was allowed to opine as to how these unusual circumstances would affect the human response. In Kubalski there were no unusual circumstances to warrant any inroads upon the province of the jury to decide what the reasonable man should do or would do in that situation.
Public Health Foundation v. Cole, 352 So.2d 877, 879 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977).
In our opinion, the instant case contains enough "unusual" circumstances to support the trial judge's admission of expert testimony. It was within his discretion to find that the Twin Lakes Boulevard intersection with both the Seaboard tracks and Busch Boulevard, coupled with the conditions inside Mrs. Buchman's car, presented such a deceptive quality in the environment as to warrant the admission of expert testimony. The experts involved did not invade the province of the jury by -testifying about this complicated intersection. Rather, their testimony offered assistance to the jury as to reaction times, as to audibility of the train whistle, and as to how the crossing measured up to minimum design standards.
For the reasons set out above, the district court's decision reversing the judgment against Seaboard on grounds that the expert testimony was inappropriate is quashed, and the judgment of the trial court is reinstated.
ENGLAND, C. J., and ADKINS, BOYD and OVERTON, JJ., concur.
ALDERMAN, J., dissents with an opinion.
SUNDBERG, J., dissents.