Case Name: PEOPLE v. BROWN
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1906-01-03
Citations: 96 N.Y.S. 957
Docket Number: 
Parties: PEOPLE v. BROWN.
Judges: 
Reporter: West's New York Supplement
Volume: 96
Pages: 957–965

Head Matter:
(110 App. Div. 490)
PEOPLE v. BROWN.
(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Fourth Department.
January 3, 1906.)
1. Abson—Evidence—Previous Fires.
In a prosecution for arson, alleged to have been committed with intent to secure insurance money, admissions made by defendant to an insurance adjuster that he had had fires in other buildings than the one in question were inadmissible.
[Ed. Note.—For cases in point, see vol. 4, Cent. Dig. Arson, § 69.]
2. Criminal Law—Evidence—Admissibility.
Such evidence having been admitted, it was error to exclude evidence offered by defendant that one of the other fires referred to was in a building occupied by defendant’s brother.
[Ed. Note.—For cases in point, see vol. 14, Cent. Dig. Criminal Law, § 861.]
3. Arson—Evidence—Admissibility.
In a prosecution for arson, alleged to have been committed with intent to secure insurance money, testimony of the chief of the fire department that he had had a man watching the building at night for about a week after the fire was inadmissible.
[Ed. Note.—For cases in point, see vol. 14, Cent. Dig. Criminal Law, §§ 1036-1038.]
4. Criminal Law—Evidence—Expert Testimony—Opinions as to Physical
Conditions.
In a prosecution for arson, alleged to have been committed with intent to secure insurance money, an opinion of the chief of the fire department that certain conditions produced in the building by the opening of doors and windows would create a “nice kind of a draft” was on a subject not proper for expert evidence, and was inadmissible.
[Ed. Note.—For cases in point, see vol. 14, Cent. Dig. Criminal Law, § 1059.]
5. Witnesses—Impeachment—Contradictory Statements.
In a prosecution for arson, alleged to have been committed with intent to secure insurance money, declarations, made 10 days after the fire, by a witness who had testified on the trial that he had used a brush and oil on the floor, to the effect that the oil placed on the floor was put there “for a purpose,” did not contradict the witness, nor affect his credibility, and were improperly admitted.
[Ed. Note.—For cases in point, see vol. 50, Cent. Dig. Witnesses, § 1247.]
6. Arson—Evidence—Admissibility.
In a prosecution for arson , alleged to have been committed with intent to secure insurance money, evidence of a demand upon defendant to allow an examination of his goods and his refusal so to do was inadmissible.
7. Criminal Law—Appeal—Harmless Error.
Errors committed in a criminal trial should not be disregarded, and the judgment affirmed on appeal, unless such errors were harmless and could by no possibility have prejudiced defendant.
[Ed. Note.-=-For cases in point, see vol. 15, Cent. Dig. Criminal Law, §§ 3090-3099.]
Spring, J., dissenting.
Appeal from Trial Term, Herkimer County.
Burt C. Brown was convicted of arson in the third degree, and appeals.
Reversed.
Argued before McLENNAN, P. J., and SPRING, WILLIAMS, HISCOCK, and NASH, JJ.
H. A. De Coster and A. M. Mills, for appellant.
George W. Ward, Dist. Atty., for the People.

Opinion:
WILLIAMS, J.
The judgment should be reversed, the verdict set aside, and a new trial granted.
The indictment was filed December 7, 1903, and charged the crime as having been committed November 19, 1903, at Little Palls, N. Y. The building burned was owned by one Conyne and occupied by the defendant as a furniture store. It contained a stock of goods owned by defendant. The building was insured for $9,500, and the goods for $13,000. The intent alleged was to destroy the property and to secure the insurance money. The trial commenced March 17, 1905, and continued until March 24, 1905, when the verdict was rendered. A motion for a new trial was made upon the minutes of the court, upon the ground that the verdict was contrary to the evidence and the law, and upon exceptions to the admission and rejection of evidence and to the charge. This motion was denied.
While the record may not show the facts, still it was stated upon the argument that the defendant Jones had been tried and convicted, and was serving his term in state prison, the case having been affirmed by this court and the Court of Appeals, and that two prior trials of this defendant had been had, resulting in disagreement of the juries. The court, in the course of the charge, referred to the former trials that had taken place. We have examined and considered the evidence contained in this record, and conclude that the verdict was not, within well-established rules, so contrary to or against the weight of the evidence as to require the reversal of the judgment for that reason. -The questions of fact were close, however, as appear not only from an ex- animation of the record, but from the fact that on two former trials the juries were unable to agree upon a verdict of guilty. This being so, we are called upon to consider carefully the exceptions taken during the trial, with a view to determining whether the rights of the defendant were fully protected, or whether his conviction was, or may have been, brought about by reason of error committed by the court in the conduct of the trial. Our attention is called to various alleged errors, which we will consider.
I. For some years prior to 1901 the defendant resided and carried on business at Fulton, Oswego county, and the defendant Jones was in his employ there. In 1901 the defendant removed to Syracuse, and carried on business there for about a year, and the defendant Jones was in his employ there also. He then removed to Little Falls, and went into business there, and so continued until the fire in question took place, and the defendant Jones was in his employ at that place. There was a fire in defendant's store at Little Falls, November 10, 1903, only a few days before the fire in question, but it was extinguished before a great deal of damage was done. An insurance adjuster came to Little Falls, November 17, 1903, and had a talk with defendant, and early in the trial this adjuster was called as a witness for the people, and gave the following evidence under defendant's objection and exception:
"I asked Mr. Brown if he was the man who had a fire at Syracuse. He replied, 'Tes.' I asked him if he was the man who had a fire at Baldwins-ville. He replied, 'Yes,' but that his brother occupied that building. I asked him if he was the man who had a fire at Fulton, and he replied, 'Tes.' "
After this evidence had been given, defendant moved to strike it out, and the motion was denied, with exception. Other evidence was given by the witness relating to the loss of November 10, 1903, but was in no way connected with the evidence so objected to. Later in the trial the defendant called his brother, and offered to show by him that when the fire at Baldwinsville took place he occupied the building. This was objected to by the district attorney, and the objection sustained, with exception. It can hardly be doubted that the reception of this evidence, and the refusal to strike it out, was erroneous, especially in view of the refusal to allow the defendant to make an explanation by his brother, favorable to himself, as to the Baldwinsville fire. The people were permitted by this evidence to show that the defendant, during the two years prior to the time of the fire in question, had had fires at Fulton, at Baldwinsville and at Syracuse, in addition to the fire at Little Falls. These fires were shown by the most satisfactory evidence possible, the admissions of the defendant himself, which he could not controvert unless he went upon the stand as a witness himself, and he was not permitted to prove by his brother that one of these fires was not his. It was not offered to prove by the brother that the Baldwinsville fire was not incendiary, but that it was not defendant's fire at all, it was his brother's, and this even was refused.
There is no theory upon which this evidence was admissible, unless it was upon the question of motive or intent to commit the crime in question. We are unable to see how it was material for any such purpose. The transaction between these parties, including the conversa tion with reference to his loss in the fire of November 10, 1903, may-have been competent in the case. It was not objected to anyway. But the evidence which was objected to was not competent, merely because the transaction generally and the other conversation was. It did not creep in incidentally, as is now claimed. Its reception was persistently objected to, and a struggle was made to have it striken out after it had been admitted. The' district attorney insisted upon its reception and retention, and the court ruled with him. The evidence had no proper bearing upon the question of motive or intent. It was very dangerous evidence in the case. It was not harmless, as now claimed. It must have had a serious effect upon the minds of the jury, and may well have induced a verdict of guilty, which would not otherwise have resulted. In a close case like this, jurors were liable to reason that the defendant had recently had so many fires in his buildings that he must have been responsible for them, and very likely was liable for this fire in question. The jury would necessarily regard this evidence as important, because of the struggle to get it in the case and to keep it out. No instruction was given by the court limiting the effect to be given to if. On the contrary, in the charge they were instructed that they should carefully consider all the evidence in the case, and base their verdict on such evidence. What use the district attorney made of this evidence in his address to the jury does not appear. He had a right to call the attention of the jury to the fact that the defendant had had all these former fires in his buildings,, as circumstances in the case, because the evidence was admitted and retained without any limitation as to its effect, or any instruction to the jury as to the force they should give to it. We cannot say that the jury did not conclude that the defendant was guilty of this fire by reason, among other considerations, of the fact that he had had so many fires in his buildings-before. It is said that this evidence was given in the Jones Case, and yet there was an affirmance in that case by this Court and the Court of Appeals. In that case the evidence came into the case by way of the cross-examination of this defendant, who was a witness there. In this case the defendant was not a witness, and this evidence was not given to affect his credibility as a witness, but as direct' evidence of defendant's guilt.
2. The people were allowed to show by the chief of the fire department that from the time of the fire, November 19th, until November 20th, he had one of his.men watching the premises at night. This was objected to and exception taken. It was incompetent evidence against the defendant. It was in effect giving the action of the chief as indicating his opinion that the fire was suspicious and the premises needed watching to prevent a further fire. This evidence was objected to and exception taken. . The people were allowed also to give the opinion of the chief as to the effect of certain conditions in the building, produced by opening doors and windows, that it would create a "nice kind of a draft." It was not a proper subject for expert evidence, and the chief was no more of an expert than the jurors themselves. The jurors were in effect allowed to rely upon the opinion of the chief, instead of using their own judgment, based upon the con ditions proven to exist in the building. This evidence was given under objection and exception.
3. The people were allowed to prove the declarations made by defendant's witness Moran, 10 days after the fire of November 10, 1903, that the oil on the floor of the workshop of defendant was put there "for a purpose." It was given under the claim that it was proper as affecting Moran's credibility. It did not, however, tend to contradict what he had sworn to on the trial—that he had used a brush and oil in sweeping the floor. This remark was prejudicial to the defendant, and was improperly received as evidence under objection and exception.
4. The admission of evidence with reference to the demand upon the defendant to allow an examination of his goods and his refusal, and the exclusion of evidence by defendant's wife as to directions given by her to Jones as to where he should send the telegram to defendant in Rochester, were errors of minor consequence, under objection and exception, but should be considered with the other more serious ones as calling for a reversal of the judgment.
Other rulings are suggested by counsel as erroneous, but they call for no particular consideration in this opinion. The rule is well settled that errors committed in a criminal trial should not be disregarded, and the judgment affirmed on appeal, unless it can be said such errors were harmless, and could by no possibility have prejudiced the defendant. Stokes v. People, 53 N. Y. 164, 13 Am. Rep. 492 ; People v. Koerner, 154 N. Y. 355, 48 N. E. 730 ; People v. Wennerholm, 166 N. Y. 567, 60 N. E. 259.
Under this rule we should reverse this judgment and grant a new trial, for the errors hereinbefore referred to. All concur, except HISCOCK, J., who concurs on first two grounds stated in the opinion, and SPRING, J., who dissents.