Case Name: James R. BURNS, Appellant, v. GCC BEVERAGES, INC., a Florida corporation, d/b/a Pepsi-Cola Bottlers of Jacksonville, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1985-04-11
Citations: 469 So. 2d 806
Docket Number: No. AZ-83
Parties: James R. BURNS, Appellant, v. GCC BEVERAGES, INC., a Florida corporation, d/b/a Pepsi-Cola Bottlers of Jacksonville, Appellee.
Judges: Before ERVIN, C.J., and MILLS, BOOTH, LARRY G. SMITH, SHIVERS, WENTWORTH, JOANOS, THOMPSON, WIGGINTON, NIMMONS, ZEHMER and BARFIELD, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 469
Pages: 806–812

Head Matter:
James R. BURNS, Appellant, v. GCC BEVERAGES, INC., a Florida corporation, d/b/a Pepsi-Cola Bottlers of Jacksonville, Appellee.
No. AZ-83.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
April 11, 1985.
Rehearing Denied June 12, 1985.
Gerald S. Bettman and Jack W. Bettman, Jacksonville, for appellant.
Floyd L. Matthews, Jr. and Jerry J. Wax-man, of Mathews, Osborne, McNatt, Gobel-man & Cobb, Jacksonville, for appellee.
Before ERVIN, C.J., and MILLS, BOOTH, LARRY G. SMITH, SHIVERS, WENTWORTH, JOANOS, THOMPSON, WIGGINTON, NIMMONS, ZEHMER and BARFIELD, JJ.

Opinion:
EN BANC OPINION
WIGGINTON, Judge.
This appeal is from the trial court's order granting summary judgment in favor of appellee, the defendant in a malicious prosecution action. The trial court found that appellant's arrest warrant issued by a judge raised a presumption of the existence of probable cause which was not overcome by proof of fraud or other improper means in securing the committal. After reviewing the merits of this cause, the original panel assigned to the appeal moved for en banc consideration. A majority of the court determined to order en banc consideration so that uniformity in the court's opinions may be maintained. Fla.R.App.P. 9.331(a). The parties were invited to submit briefs on this issue. Upon careful consideration of the entire cause and of the supplemental briefs, we affirm the challenged order of the trial court.
The trial court's ruling was based on the seminal case of Gallucci v. Milavic, 100 So.2d 375 (Fla.1958). In 1978, the supreme court characterized its decision in Gallucci as holding that "in a malicious prosecution suit a presumption arises from a magistrate's finding of probable cause which is conclusive, absent fraud or other corrupt means employed by the person initiating the prosecution." See Colonial Stores, Inc. v. Scarbrough, 355 So.2d 1181, 1184 (Fla.1978) (emphasis in original).
In the instant case, appellee, appellant's employer, suspecting appellant of theft of company receipts, reported the matter to the police. With the information relayed to him by appellee, and with information gleaned from interviews, the investigating officer appeared before a county judge and swore under oath that he believed appellant had committed the crime of grand theft. Based upon the officer's affidavit, the judge found and certified that there existed probable cause to believe appellant had committed the offense alleged. On the basis of that judicial finding of probable cause, the judge issued a warrant for appellant's arrest. Appellant was thereafter arrested, tried, and found by a jury to be not guilty. Appellant then filed the instant suit alleging malicious prosecution.
In challenging the court's entry of summary judgment, appellant argues that the Gallucci rule does not apply, and for that contention relies on our decision in Pinkerton v. Edwards, 425 So.2d 147 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983). In Pinkerton we found significant to the Gallucci holding the fact that the accused had appeared at the probable cause hearing, held for the purpose of determining whether he should be bound over for trial, and was given the opportunity to testify or present evidence that probable cause did not exist. Thus, we held:
[Bjecause a Gallucci probable cause hearing permits both parties to present evidence on the issue of probable cause and to have the evidence considered by a neutral and disinterested magistrate, a finding of probable cause by the magistrate creates a presumption of probable cause which serves to shield the original accuser from a suit for malicious prosecution, absent a showing of fraud or other improper behavior by the accuser. In effect, the probable cause hearing acts to transfer the responsibility for the prosecution from the accuser to the neutral and disinterested magistrate.
425 So.2d at 149 (emphasis added).
In Pinkerton the issue was whether the denial of a motion for a judgment of acquittal at the conclusion of the state's case created a presumption of probable cause so as to bar a later action for malicious prosecution. Based on the foregoing analysis of Gallucci, we held that it did not, observing that the question of probable cause was not presented to either the trial judge consider ing the motion for a judgment of acquittal or the jury considering the issue of guilt.
Absent from our Pinkerton opinion, however, is a discussion of Colonial Stores, Inc. v. Scarbrough, in which, as we have noted earlier, the supreme court restated their Gallucci rule. In so doing, though, the supreme court did not emphasize the adversarial nature of the Gallucci probable cause hearing. Instead, it appeared to concentrate solely on the significance of a "disinterested" magistrate's determination of probable cause. 355 So.2d at 1185. Indeed, in reviewing Gallucci, we note that what the supreme court found to be "significant" was the fact that during the probable cause hearing the defendant remained silent. Gallucci v. Milavic, 100 So.2d at 377. And, in summarizing its holding the court simply concluded that "probable cause was presumed from the official action." Id., at 378.
Based on our analysis of the Gal-lucci and Scarbrough decisions, we find it necessary to recede from any indication given in Pinkerton that the Gallucci presumption is predicated on the adversarial nature of the probable cause hearing. We now hold that it is the circumstance of having a neutral and detached magistrate determine the existence of probable cause, and not the presence of the accused at the hearing, which legitimizes the presumption.
Lending credence to our conclusion is Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.133, which authorizes nonadversary proceedings in which to determine probable cause for the detention of a defendant. Significantly, subparagraph (a)(1) provides that
. this proceeding shall not be required when a probable cause determination has been previously made by a magistrate and an arrest warrant issued for the specific offense for which the defendant is charged. (Emphasis added).
Moreover, subparagraph (3) states that in determining probable cause to detain the defendant, "the magistrate shall apply the standard for issuance of an arrest warrant." Finally, rule 3.120 provides:
Each state and county judge is a committing magistrate and may issue a summons to, or a warrant for the arrest of, a person against whom a complaint is made in writing and sworn to before a person authorized to administer oaths, when the complaint states facts which show that such person violated a criminal law of this state....
These rules have clearly elevated the dignity of a magistrate's finding of probable cause for issuance of an arrest warrant from circumstances such as existed in Gal-lucci, when the finding was more than likely perfunctorily made by a justice of the peace not necessarily trained in the finer points of the law, to a higher plateau of legitimacy. Consequently, an adversarial hearing is no longer critical to the integrity of a probable cause determination.
In light of rule 3.133, we hold that in a malicious prosecution suit a presumption arises from a magistrate's finding of probable cause for issuance of an arrest warrant which is conclusive, absent fraud or other corrupt means employed by the person initiating the prosecution. In the instant case, we agree with the trial court's ruling that the record contains no evidence of fraud or other improper means in securing appellant's committal. Accordingly, since appellant failed to demonstrate the presence of a genuine issue of material fact concerning the absence of probable cause, the trial court correctly entered summary judgment against him. Gallucci v. Milavic, 100 So.2d at 378.
In setting forth our rule today, we have not overlooked the supreme court's decision in Ward v. Allen, 152 Fla. 82, 11 So.2d 193 (1942), holding that proof of the issuance of an arrest warrant and the filing of an information, although tending to refute the absence of probable cause, does not conclusively establish its presence. In Scarbrough, the supreme court adhered to its decision in Ward and declined to accord presumptive effect to a prosecutor's decision to file an information, but it did not expressly revisit that part of the Ward decision pertaining to the nonconclusive effect of arrest warrants. As recognized earlier, however, the supreme court did hold that the Gallucci presumption "applied solely to a judicial determination of probable cause." Scarbrough, 355 So.2d at 1185. In light of that holding and rule 3.133, we are persuaded that the supreme court has receded from Ward insofar as it may be interpreted as not according a presumptive effect to a probable cause determination made by a magistrate in issuing an arrest warrant. However, because of the impact our decision may have on suits for malicious prosecution, we certify the following question, pursuant to Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.030(a)(2)(A)(v), as being one of great public importance:
IN A SUIT FOR MALICIOUS PROSECUTION, DOES A PRESUMPTION OF THE EXISTENCE OF PROBABLE CAUSE ARISE FROM A MAGISTRATE'S FINDING OF PROBABLE CAUSE FOR AN ARREST WARRANT, THAT PRESUMPTION BEING CONCLUSIVE ABSENT PROOF OF FRAUD OR OTHER CORRUPT MEANS EMPLOYED BY THE PERSON INITIATING THE PROSECUTION?
BOOTH, LARRY G. SMITH, JOANOS, THOMPSON, NIMMONS and BARFIELD, JJ., concur.
ERVIN, C.J., and WENTWORTH, J., concur in result.
ERVIN, C.J., concurs specially with an opinion, in which SHIVERS, J., concurs.
ZEHMER, J., concurs specially with an opinion, in which ERVIN, C.J., and MILLS, SHIVERS and WENTWORTH, JJ., concur.
. In Gallucci, a justice of the peace held a hearing to determine probable cause for prosecution at which evidence was received from the complainant. The accused appeared at the hearing but chose to remain silent and was bound over for trial. During trial a defense motion for directed verdict of not guilty was granted. A civil suit for malicious prosecution followed.
. The court in Pinkerton saw nothing in the record to support the notion that the county judge conducted a probable cause hearing or that he entered an order finding probable cause.
. Justice of the Peace Courts no longer exist. Sections 37.01 to 37.24, granting jurisdiction to those courts, were repealed by Laws 1963, c. 63-572, § 9; Laws 1972, c. 72-358, § 1; Laws 1972, c. 72-404, § 30.
. In Ward, unlike in Gallucci, the warrant was issued by a county judge on the basis of an affidavit submitted by the sheriff.
. In reaching this conclusion, we observe that Justice Thomas authored both the Ward and the Gallucci opinions.