Case Name: Henry McClure, Plaintiff in Error, v. Jacob Engelhardt, Defendant in Error
Court: Illinois Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Illinois
Decision Date: 1855-11
Citations: 17 Ill. 47
Docket Number: 
Parties: Henry McClure, Plaintiff in Error, v. Jacob Engelhardt, Defendant in Error.
Judges: 
Reporter: Illinois Reports
Volume: 17
Pages: 47–52

Head Matter:
Henry McClure, Plaintiff in Error, v. Jacob Engelhardt, Defendant in Error.
ERROR TO ST. CLAIR.
The levy of an execution upon land in a different county from, that in which the judgment was rendered, will operate as a lien; and a sale under it, would perfect the title, by relation back to the levy.
If a certificate of a levy upon execution from a foreign county is not filed in the recorder’s office, the levy will not take effect as a lien ; and creditors or purchasers without notice, intervening between the levy and sale, may hold against the levy. But if a certificate of sale is filed, it will operate as a constructive notice from that date; and will pass to the purchaser all the interest of the judgment debtor.
In ejectment a defendant who holds under the same grantor with the plaintiff, cannot deny title in him, or set up an adverse title in himself or another.
A certificate of sale of lands is assignable, and title may pass under an assignment of it so defective as would not enable the holder to compel the officer to execute a deed, yet if he does execute one, it will be good.
This was an action of ejectment instituted by McClure against Engelhardt for the recovery of the north-west quarter of the south-west quarter, and south-east quarter of north-east quarter of Section 5, in T. 2 N., R. 7 W., in St. Clair county. Plea, general issue. It was tried by the court at April term, 1849. The court found for the defendant and rendered judgment against the plaintiff for costs. The plaintiff proved on the trial that the lands in question were entered at the proper land office on the 16th day of January, 1839, by William Cobb, and on the 8th of January, 1840, Cobb and wife conveyed the land by deed in fee simple to Jefferson Shores. The plaintiff then proved by a transcript from the Madison Circuit Court, that on the 7th day of October, A. D. 1841, Hiram Chandler recovered a judgment against Thomas J. Shores, impleaded, &c., for $253.10 debt and damages and costs. On the 30th December, 1841, an execution on the said judgment was issued to the sheriff of St. Clair county, and returned by him—that on the 8th of January, 1842, he had levied the same on the lands in question, and afterwards made no sale for want of bidders. On the 30th day of November, 1842, a venditioni exponas was issued to the sheriff of St. Clair, upon which he returned that he had sold the lands in question, on 4th of February, 1843, to Samuel G. Bailey, attorney for plaintiff, in due form of law for $246, and had filed a certificate of the sale in the recorder’s office on 7th February, 1843. To admitting this record of judicial proceedings, defendant objected and excepted. Plaintiff then introduced the certificate of sale, filed in the recorder’s office on the 7th day of February, 1843. The plaintiff then introduced a deed from the sheriff of St. Clair to him as assignee of said certificate under said judicial sale, dated September, 24th, 1847. The plaintiff then proved by one Hopkins, the officer who made the levy aforesaid, that he knew Jefferson Shores, who resided on the lot claimed by Engelhardt—that when witness got the execution against Thomas J. Shores, he went to the house of Jefferson Shores, by whom witness was told that his (Shores) proper name was Thomas Jefferson Shores. Hopkins further testified that Shores lived on the tract claimed by Engelhardt at the time of the levy of the execution aforesaid, and was present at Belleville at the time of the sale of said land under said execution, and that Engelhardt lived there at the time of the commencement of this ejectment suit. The defendant then proved by Hay, the recorder of St. Clair, that no certificate of the levy of the execution in question had ever been filed in his office, he having made diligent search; that he could not tell whether the letter “ h ” on the endorsement of the certificate of sale in said case was made by him (Hay) or not. The defendant then offered in evidence the original certificate of sale, given by the sheriff of St. Clair, to Bailey, attorney, for Hiram Chandler, plaintiff in execution, and proved by the sheriff that the transfer or assignment on the back of the same was the only assignment of said certificate ever produced to him, and was the one upon which he executed the sheriff’s deed to plaintiff. The plaintiff then introduced a deed from De Wolf & Chickering to Shores for said north-west quarter of south-west quarter of sec. 5, dated Oct. 20,1843, and recorded in St.Clair the 23d of the same month; to which defendant excepted. The plaintiff then introduced a deed from Shores and wife to Engelhardt, for the last described tract, dated October 20th, 1843, and recorded on the 23d of the same month. Plaintiff then proved by a witness, that at the time of the sale of the above tract by Shores to Engelhardt, that Shores moved out of the house and Engelhardt the same or the following day moved in and took possession of the premises. Plaintiff below moved for a new trial, because the finding was contrary to law—contrary to evidence—and the court had admitted improper evidence, which motion was overruled.
The case is brought here by writ of error, and plaintiff assigns for error, that improper evidence was admitted on behalf of defendant below and in refusing to grant a new trial.
W. H. Underwood and P. Eouke, for Plaintiff in Error.
G. Koerner and G. Trumbull, for Defendant in Error.

Opinion:
Scates, C. J.
At the time of the levy of this execution, Shores appears to have been in possession of the premises, and owned an equity of redemption—both of which were subject to levy and sale under it. Acts 1841, 171, Sec. 7; Rev. Stat. 1845, p. 300, Sec. 1. Switzer et al. v. Skiles et al., 3 Gil. R. 532, 533; Turney et al. v. Saunders et al., 4 Scam. R. 532; Jackson ex dem. Stone v. Scott, 18 John. R. 94; Jackson v. Parker, 9 Cow. R. 80, 84, 85.
Judgments were not liens upon lands at the common law, because lands were not liable to sale, but levies were liens, upon such property as was liable to be taken and sold. By statute, the delivery of execution to the officer was made to operate as alien. We have modified the English rule, by subjecting the land to sale, creating a judgment lien on that in the same county of the judgment, and adopting the English statute in relation to liens on personalty by delivery of the execution.
Lands in foreign counties to the judgment were subject to levy and sale, although the judgment itself did not operate as a lien. Without assuming that the delivery of the execution to the officer of a foreign county, would, by analogy, operate as a lien on the land, like the personalty, because it was liable to be taken. We cannot question but that the levy would so operate from its date, and a sale in pursuance of such levy would perfect the title by relation back to the levy. Fair purchasers were liable to be overreached by these semi-secret liens, without any official mode of notice or of obtaining it.
To remedy this evil, the legislature provided that the certificate of levy and sale, should each be filed in the recorder's office of the county where the lands lay, and so also of levies of attachments. Rev. Stat. 1845, p. 302, Sec. 12, p. 305, Secs. 25, 26, 27; (see act 1841, p. 170, Sec. 4,) and in each case to take effect as alien from such filing, as to creditors and bona fide purchasers, without notice.
The certificate of levy in this case was not filed, and therefore took no effect as a lien by constructive notice, and creditors and subsequent purchasers, without actual notice, might have held the land against this levy. But no such right intervened between the levy and sale. The certificate of sale was filed, and was constructive notice from that day. This was before any conveyance back to the judgment debtor by his mortgagees, and is sufficient to pass to the purchaser all the interest of the judgment debtor, and with notice of the levy and judgment as well as of the sale. We cannot construe the statute requiring the filing of the certificate of levy, as defeating the title acquired by the sale and certificate duly filed on account of a failure to make the levy a lien by recording it,
The only effect of the failure would be to subject the levy to be set aside, and a subsequent sale defeated, by an innocent intervening creditor or purchaser. But if none such intervene, the levy is not void, but is good to support the sale, and when that is duly made and certificate filed, it will take effect as an independent notice, and connection with the judgment through the unrecorded levy, as if the levy had never been required to he recorded. Such is the title set up and shown here, which appears to ns sufficient to entitle the plaintiff to a verdict and judgment in this case, for anything shown in proof in this record.
It is contended that defendant claims under the same grantor, Shores., and. is therefore estopped to deny title in him, or set up an adverse title in himself, or third person. So the rule is laid down, 1 Greenl. Ev. p. 306, Sec. 307; Bancroft v. White, 1 Cains Rep. 190, and note a; Jackson ex dem. Masten v. Bush, 10 John. R. 223; Jackson ex dem. Bowne v. Hinman, id. 292; Ferguson v. Miles, 3 Gil. R. 365; McConnell v. Johnson, 2 Scam. R. 528. But the fact seems to have been overlooked by the plaintiff, that he, and not the defendant, claimed title for defendant, and deduced it from Shores. Defendant offered to show title in the mortgagees, and there rested the question, contenting himself upon objections to plaintiff's title, and without setting up any in himself. We should, therefore, notice one or two.more objections to plaintiff's title.
It is said the judgment was against one man, and the execution was levied upon the property of another. The answer is, that the evidence of identity is sufficient and satisfactory.
Again, that the sale was to Bailey, the attorney of the judgment creditor, and the certificate of purchase was assigned by the latter. The proofs and circumstances satisfy us abundantly, that the purchase was for and by the creditor, through his attorney of record. Upon these proofs the court would not feel authorized to render a judgment against Bailey as a purchaser, and compel him to pay the creditor for this land. This certificate was assignable by the statute.
The title might well pass, under such a defective assignment as would not enable the holder to compel the officer to execute a deed; yet he may do so, and it will be good. It is not a question in which the judgment debtor has any interest; having neglected to redeem, his title has passed; and, as to him, it is not material as to whom it is conveyed. Wiley et al. v. Bean et al., 1 Gil. R. 305. See Garrett v. Wiggins, 1 Scam. R. 335; Voorhees v. The Bank U. States, 10 Pet. R. 478.
It was contended that this doctrine would enable sheriffs to convey the land to whom they pleased, in fraud of those having right. When such an attempt is made, and shown to the court, a proper remedy and corrective will be found and applied. This does not present such an one. A very simple punctuation after the word attorney, will make it read plainly as the parties understood and acted upon it; that is, that the land was struck off to S. G. Bailey, attorney, for plaintiff in execution. Accordingly he passed over the certificate to his client, as purchaser, and he assigned it to the plaintiff here, to whom the sheriff conveyed.
If the defendant has any title, he should have presented it. So far as any appears in the record, we are of opinion with the plaintiff.
Judgment reversed and cause remanded for new trial.
Judgment reversed.