Case Name: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Michael J. KEARNS, Defendant-Appellant
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 2007-02-22
Citations: 218 F. App'x 373
Docket Number: No. 03-50198
Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Michael J. KEARNS, Defendant-Appellant.
Judges: 
Reporter: West's Federal Appendix
Volume: 218
Pages: 373–375

Head Matter:
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Michael J. KEARNS, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 03-50198
Summary Calendar.
United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.
Feb. 22, 2007.
Joseph H. Gay, Jr., Assistant U.S. Attorney, Michael Robert Hardy, U.S. Attor ney’s Office Western District of Texas, San Antonio, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Michael J. Kearns, Bastrop, TX, pro se.
Before KING, HIGGINBOTHAM, and GARZA, Circuit Judges.

Opinion:
PER CURIAM:
Michael J. Kearns appeals the revocation of his supervised release and the sentence imposed following revocation. He argues that the sentence imposed was plainly unreasonable and that the district court did not consider the sentencing factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Given that Kearns continued to violate the terms of his supervised release despite the district court's leniency and warnings and that the sentence imposed was within the three to nine months applicable guideline range for each of his violations of supervised release, Kearns has not shown that the sentence imposed by the district court was unreasonable or plainly unreasonable. See United States v. Hinson, 429 F.3d 114, 120 (5th Cir.2005), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 126 S.Ct. 1804, 164 L.Ed.2d 540 (2006). The record indicates that the district court implicitly considered the § 3553(a) factors when it imposed Kearns's sentence, including the nature and circumstances of Kearns's violations of his supervised release; Kearns's history and characteristics; and the need for a lengthy sentence to deter Kearns's continued violations of supervised release. See United States v. Gonzalez, 250 F.3d 923, 930 (5th Cir.2001).
Kearns argues that the district court failed to honor or wrongly punished him for obtaining a state court order that purported to discharge his obligation to pay the restitution ordered by the district court and that the district court made false statements that it would impose a lengthy sentence in order to make him repudiate the state court order. Kearns has not shown that the district court erred in determining that the state court order was void for lack of jurisdiction and was not entitled to full faith and credit in the district court. See Tennessee ex rel. Sizemore v. Surety Bank, 200 F.3d 373, 377 (5th Cir.2000). The district court did not err in finding that Kearns's issuance of the worthless promissory note and obtaining the state court order were part of a pattern of bad faith and continued refusal to comply with the terms of his supervised release. See United States v. Caddell, 830 F.2d 36, 39-40 (5th Cir.1987).
Kearns argues that the district court erred in denying his "motion for closure," which was based on the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The district court did not err in denying this motion as the international covenant did not create individually enforceable rights. See Wesson v. United States, 305 F.3d 343, 348 (5th Cir.2002).
Kearns argues that there was an enforceable agreement between him, the Government, and the district court that precluded the revocation of his supervised release. The record does not support this argument. The district court did not err in revoking Kearns's supervised release due to his continued violations of his supervised release. See Gonzalez, 250 F.3d at 930.
The district court's judgment is AFFIRMED. Kearns's motions for extraordinary relief, for judicial notice, for dismissal of the appeal are DENIED. His motion to waive the requirement to file record excerpts is DENIED as unnecessary.
Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.