Case Name: Michael Dale MASON v. STATE of Mississippi
Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Mississippi
Decision Date: 2000-10-26
Citations: 781 So. 2d 99
Docket Number: No. 1999-KA-01163-SCT
Parties: Michael Dale MASON v. STATE of Mississippi.
Judges: PRATHER, C.J., PITTMAN, P.J, MILLS, WALLER, COBB and DIAZ, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 781
Pages: 99–109

Head Matter:
Michael Dale MASON v. STATE of Mississippi.
No. 1999-KA-01163-SCT.
Supreme Court of Mississippi.
Oct. 26, 2000.
Joseph C. Langston, Christi R. McCoy, Booneville, for appellant.
Office of the Atty. Gen. by Billy L. Gore, for appellee.

Opinion:
SMITH, Justice,
for the Court:
¶ 1. Michael Dale Mason appeals to this Court from the Circuit Court of Itawamba County of a conviction by a jury of violating Miss. Code Ann. § 63-11-30, which makes it a felony for any person below the age of twenty-one with a blood alcohol level of .02% or greater to kill or mutilate a person while negligently driving or otherwise operate a motor vehicle. Mason was sentenced to serve a term of twenty-five (25) years in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections with ten (10) of those years suspended and with five (5) years post-release supervision. From this conviction and sentence, Mason appeals.
¶ 2. After a review of the record on appeal and applicable law, we affirm Mason's conviction and sentence and the circuit court's ruling upholding the constitutionality of Miss.Code Ann. § 63-11-30.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
¶ 3. In the early morning hours of August 29, 1998, James D. Rowell (Rowell) and Michael H. Kilgore (Kilgore) were changing a tire on Rowell's van on the shoulder of Highway 78 in Itawamba County. Rowell was killed and Kilgore severely injured when the pickup truck driven by then eighteen-year-old Michael Dale Mason (Mason) left the road and struck the van. Mason's blood-alcohol content was .102%.
¶ 4. Count I of the indictment charged Mason with causing the death of Rowell while operating a motor vehicle at a time when he had a blood alcohol content of .02% or more, and Count II charged Mason with the maiming of Kilgore while operating a motor vehicle at a time when he had a blood alcohol content of .02% or more. Prior to trial Mason filed a motion to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the statute under which he was indicted, Miss. Code Ann. § 63-11-30, violates his equal protection rights as guaranteed by the United States Constitution. The circuit court denied Mason's motion to dismiss the indictment.
¶ 5. At trial, Mason denied drinking intoxicants during an outdoor camping trip that he took with several other youths the night of August 28, 1998. According to Mason, while driving home on the morning of August 29, 1998, he noticed that his truck would wobble and swerve to the right every time he hit the brakes. He testified that as he approached the area where Rowell and Kilgore were changing the flat tire, the sun was in his eyes and, being unable to slow down due to cars being both behind and beside him, he chose instead to hit his brakes.
¶ 6. Several witnesses testified for the State during its case-in-chief and two in rebuttal to Mason's claim that he had not been drinking the night prior to the accident. Tamara Miller testified that there was Southpaw beer and a cooler filled with an alcoholic punch at the party. She observed Mason drinking a beer and stated, "I know I seen him drink." Nastasha Ray testified that she was in charge of planning the birthday party for Rolon Barlow and that alcohol was present on the island where the party took place. Ray mixed up the punch at home, which included both Everclear and Schnapps in a 48-ounce cooler. She claimed that Mason knew what was in the cooler because she had told him.
¶ 7. At the close of all the evidence, Mason's renewed motion for a directed verdict and his request for peremptory instruction were denied. The jury found Mason guilty as charged in Count I of the indictment. He was sentenced to a term of twenty-five (25) years in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections with ten (10) years suspended upon conditions and with five (5) years of post-release supervision. Mason's motion for JNOV or, in the alternative, for a new trial was denied on July 1,1999.
¶ 8. Mason timely filed a notice of appeal and brings the following issue before this Court:
THE CIRCUIT COURT ERRED IN DENYING MASON'S MOTION TO DISMISS THE INDICTMENT.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶ 9. The standard of review in Mississippi for questions of law is de novo. Mississippi Transp. Com'n v. Fires, 693 So.2d 917, 920 (Miss.1997).
DISCUSSION
¶ 10. Prior to trial, Mason moved to dismiss the indictment on the basis that Miss.Code Ann. § 63-11-30 (Supp.1999) violates his constitutional rights as guaran teed by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The court denied the motion, and it is from that denial that Mason appeals.
¶ 11. Section 63-11-30 makes it unlawful for any person below the age of twenty-one to drive or otherwise operate a motor vehicle within this state with a blood-alcohol level of .02% or greater. It also makes it unlawful for any person age twenty-one or older drive or otherwise operate a motor vehicle with a blood-alcohol level of .10% or greater. Section § 63-11-30(1) provides in pertinent part:
(1) It is unlawful for any person to drive or otherwise operate a vehicle within this state who (a) is under the influence of intoxicating liquor; (b) is under the influence of any other substance which has impaired such person's ability to operate a motor vehicle; (c) has an alcohol concentration of ten one-hundredths percent (.10%) or more for persons who are above the legal age to purchase alcoholic beverages under state law, or two one-hundredths percent (.02%) or more for persons who are below the legal age to purchase alcoholic beverages under state law, in the person's blood based upon grams of alcohol per one hundred (100) milliliters of blood or grams of alcohol per two hundred ten (210) liters of breath as shown by a chemical analysis of such person's breath, blood or urine administered as authorized by this chapter....
At the time pertinent to this case Miss. Code Ann. § 63-11-30(5) read as follows:
(5) Every person who operates any motor vehicle in violation of the provisions of subsection (1) of this section and who in a negligent manner causes the death of another or mutilates, disfigures, permanently disables or destroys the tongue, eye, lip, nose or any other limb, organ or member of another shall, upon conviction, be guilty of a felony and shall be committed to the custody of the State Department of Corrections for a period of time not to exceed twenty-five (25) years.
¶ 12. By virtue of Miss.Code Ann. § 67-l-81(Supp. 2000), the legal age to purchase alcoholic beverages in this state is twenty-one years. Mason was indicted for having a blood alcohol content of "two one-hundredths (.02%) percent or more by weight volume of alcohol in his blood as shown by a chemical analysis, and . being under the age of 21 years."
¶ 13. Mason argues that from the plain terms of § 63-11-30(1), a twenty-one-year-old could commit the acts constituting the crime for the purposes set forth in the statute with absolute immunity under that statute while a twenty-year-old who did the same thing would be subject to conviction of a felony and to imprisonment for a term of as much as twenty-five years. In short, Mason maintains that the statute burdens persons under the age of twenty-one with a higher standard than their twenty-one-year-old counterparts. He claims that the statute is clearly discriminatory and unconstitutionally denies equal protection of the law to persons under the age of twenty-one and that it should therefore be declared void.
¶ 14. It is easy enough to determine that the statute in question treats individuals differently according to age. The United States Supreme Court has explained that in the absence of a suspect classification or an impingement on fundamental rights, a state statute is to be upheld against an equal protection challenge if it is "rationally related" to the achievement of legitimate governmental ends. Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320, 113 S.Ct. 2637, 2642, 125 L.Ed.2d 257 (1993)(citing F.C.G. v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 113 S.Ct. 2096, 124 L.Ed.2d 211 (1993)); Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 230, 101 S.Ct. 1074, 67 L.Ed.2d 186 (1981). Mason concedes that no fundamental right or suspect class is implicated by the statute in question. Rather, Mason urges this Court to apply the rational basis test and argues that, under this test, the discrimination between age groups is not rationally related to achieving a legitimate government interest.
¶ 15. Though this is a question of first impression for this Court, the equal protection challenge at hand has been squarely rejected by many of our sister states with like legislation. As those courts have found, we herein find that the distinction made by the challenged statute is rationally related to the legitimate governmental ends of protecting public safety and prohibiting under-age drinking and driving. Thus, we reject Mason's constitutional attack on § 63-11-30 and his claim of deprivation of equal protection rights.
¶ 16. In Barnett v. State, 270 Ga. 472, 510 S.E.2d 527 (1999), the Georgia Supreme Court rejected an equal protection challenge to OCGA § 40-6-391(k), which set forth a blood alcohol concentration standard of .02 grams for persons under the age of twenty-one and a standard of .10 grams for persons over age twenty-one. The court held that the statute bears a reasonable relationship to the legitimate state purposes of the protection of the public safety and safeguarding the physical well-being of children. Id. at 528. The court explained that the statute furthers the goal of protecting public safety by "prohibiting the operation of motor vehicles by young people who lack experience both in driving and in judging the effect of alcohol on their ability to drive, thus posing a greater threat to the public safety than older, more experienced drivers." Id. at 528. The court stated that the statute promotes the well-being of children by protecting them from the dangers of driving while intoxicated because it provides "a strong disincentive to violate alcohol consumption laws and makes it easier for young drivers who are inexperienced with alcohol to understand and accept that they are legally unable to drive if they consume virtually any amount of alcohol." Id.
¶ 17. In Collins v. State ex rel. Dep't of Pub. Safety, 991 P.2d 557 (1999), the Court of Civil Appeals of Oklahoma addressed an equal protection challenge to 47 O.S. § 754 (Supp.1997), which provides that the license of anyone under age twenty-one with any measurable quantity of alcohol in his blood or breath or that of a person age twenty-one or older with a blood alcohol concentration of .10 will be immediately revoked. The Collins court first took judicial notice of the provisions of the Federal Highway Safety Act, 23 U.S.C.A. § 101-164; 401-411 (Supp.1999), which provides for state highway safety programs designed to reduce traffic accidents and deaths, injuries and property damage. Id. at 560. The court explained:
Provisions are made specifically for alcohol traffic-safety programs with incentives to states that adopt and implement such programs to increase traffic safety. There are specific provisions of the law that deal with the operation of motor vehicles by intoxicated minors. Thus, Congress calls for an under-twenty-one age distinction in the law, when in 23 U.S.C.A. § 161(a)(3), of the Act, it states:
Requirement — A State meets the requirement of this paragraph if the State has enacted and is enforcing.a law that considers an individual under the age of 21 who has a blood alcohol concentration of 0.02 percent or greater while operating a motor vehicle in the State to be driving while intoxicat ed or driving under the influence of alcohol.
Id. at 560-61. The court stated that the enactment of age-specific statutes reveals Congressional belief that there is a heightened risk of public safety when minors drink and drive. Id. at 561. The Oklahoma court went on to cite various Oklahoma statutes dealing with sale, purchase and use of intoxicating beverages which make distinctions based on age and noted the legislature's legitimate attempt to proscribe the use of alcohol by under-age persons and particularly to prevent such persons from driving while intoxicated. Id. The court applied the rational basis test to the challenge before it and determined that the statute was rationally related to the legitimate governmental ends of prohibiting under-age drinking and driving.
¶ 18. For similar cases with like holdings, see Commonwealth v. Howard, 969 S.W.2d 700 (Ky.1998) (holding that law making it a crime for person under age twenty-one to drive with blood alcohol content of .02 or higher does not violate equal protection guarantees because of rational basis for drawing distinction based on age in that youths under age twenty-one are less mature than those over age twenty-one); State v. Ferris, 762 So.2d 601 (La. 2000) (holding that statute which declares criminal the operation of a motor vehicle by persons under the age of twenty-one with a blood alcohol content of .02 and by persons age twenty-one and older with a content of .10 survives equal protection challenge in light of governmental purpose of improving highway safety); State v. Luchan, 297 Mont. 415, 992 P.2d 840 (1999) (holding that statute which makes it unlawful for a person under age twenty-one to drive with an alcohol concentration of .02 or more survived equal protection challenge where high correlation of injury and death between underage drinking and driving provides rational basis for treating underage drivers differently); State v. Crain, 972 S.W.2d 13 (Tenn.Crim.App. 1998) (holding that law subjecting adults age eighteen to twenty-one, but not those twenty-one or over, to sanctions based on .02% blood alcohol content does not violate equal protection clauses under strict scrutiny test because of state's compelling interest in protecting public from younger drivers who have consumed alcoholic beverages, and statute is narrowly tailored to provide sanction against younger drivers who are not allowed to consume alcoholic beverages).
¶ 19. The Mississippi Legislature has enacted a like statutory scheme in an attempt to proscribe the use of alcohol by under-age persons and particularly to prevent such persons from driving while intoxicated. These statutes protect not only the under-age drivers themselves, but also the public at large. The statute under attack is part of that scheme. Miss.Code Ann. § 67-3-53 & § 67-1-71 (Supp.2000) make it unlawful to sell alcohol to persons under the age of twenty-one, and § 67-1-81 makes it unlawful for a person under age twenty-one to purchase, receive, or possess alcohol in a public place. Only persons age twenty-one and older may lawfully apply for an alcohol permit. Miss. Code Ann. § 67-1-57 & 67-3-19 (Supp. 2000). According to Miss.Code Ann. § 63-11-23 (Supp.2000), a person under age. twenty-one whose blood alcohol content is .08% may have his driver's license immediately seized, and a person age twenty-one or older whose blood alcohol content is .10% may have his license seized.
¶20. As the U.S. Supreme Court has stated, in the appellate review of a statute involving classification, the law must be upheld against an equal protection challenge if there is any reasonably con ceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification. Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 113 S.Ct. 2637, 125 L.Ed.2d 257 (1993). We conclude that the distinction made by § 63-11-30(1) is rationally related to the legitimate governmental ends of protecting public safety and prohibiting under-age drinking and driving. Mason's argument that he has been deprived of his equal protection rights is therefore rejected.
CONCLUSION
¶ 21. For these reasons the judgment of the Itawamba County Circuit Court is affirmed.
¶ 22. CONVICTION OF DUI DEATH AND SENTENCE OF TWENTY-FIVE (25) YEARS IN THE CUSTODY OF THE MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS WITH TEN (10) YEARS SUSPENDED, WITH CONDITIONS, POST-RELEASE SUPERVISION OF FIVE (5) YEARS PURSUANT TO MISS. CODE ANN., SECTION 47-7-34, AND PAYMENT OF COURT COSTS, AFFIRMED.
PRATHER, C.J., PITTMAN, P.J, MILLS, WALLER, COBB and DIAZ, JJ., concur.
McRAE, J., dissents with separate written opinion joined by BANKS, P.J.