Case Name: Jewel HORNSBY, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Edward RAY et al., Defendants and Appellants and Appellees
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1976-01-22
Citations: 327 So. 2d 146
Docket Number: No. 5088
Parties: Jewel HORNSBY, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Edward RAY et al., Defendants and Appellants and Appellees.
Judges: Before HOOD, CULPEPPER, DO-MENGEAUX, GUIDRY and PAVY, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 327
Pages: 146–154

Head Matter:
Jewel HORNSBY, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Edward RAY et al., Defendants and Appellants and Appellees.
No. 5088.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Third Circuit.
Jan. 22, 1976.
Concurring Opinion Jan. 26, 1976.
Rehearing Denied March 4, 1976.
Writs Refused April 27, 1976.
Olivier & Brinkhaus by Armand J. Brinkhaus, Sunset, Walter Hunter, Jr., Alexandria, for defendants and appellants and appellees.
Dubuisson, Brinkhaus, Guglielmo & Dauzat by James T. Guglielmo, Opelousas, for plaintiff-appellee.
Voorhies & Labbé by Mark Bienvenu, Lafayette, for defendant-appellee.
Before HOOD, CULPEPPER, DO-MENGEAUX, GUIDRY and PAVY, JJ.

Opinion:
CULPEPPER, Judge.
This is a tort action for damages for personal injuries. The plaintiff, Mrs. Jewel Hornsby, was working as a nurses' aide at the Headstart Center in the town of Sunset, Louisiana. A rotten portion of the floor gave way when she stepped on it. Her right leg went through the broken floor, causing the injuries for which damages are sought. The defendants are: (1) Mr. Edward Ray, in his capacity as owner and lessor of the building; (2) Rockwood Insurance Company, liability insurer of the executive officers of Tri-Parish Progress, Inc., which was plaintiff's employer and the lessee of the building. The employer's workmen's compensation insurer, Continental Casualty Company, intervened seeking reimbursement for compensation benefits paid to plaintiff. Mr. Ray, as owner-lessor of the building, filed a third party demand against Tri-Parish for indemnity or contribution.
The district judge held that as owner and lessor of the building, Mr.. Ray was liable to the plaintiff for damages in the sum of $36,558. He held that Rockwood Insurance Company, as liability insurer of Mrs. Betty Bryant, an executive officer of Tri-Parish Progress, Inc., was jointly liable with Ray to plaintiff to the extent of its coverage in the sum of $10,000. The intervention of the workmen's compensation insurer for reimbursement in the sum of $16,477 was recognized. All other claims and demands were rejected. The defendants, Edward Ray and Rockwood Insurance Company, appealed. Plaintiff answered the appeal, seeking an increase in the award.
The issues on appeal are: (1) Is Edward Ray liable as owner-lessor of the building, absent an agreement whereby Tri-Parish, as lessee, assumed responsibility? (2) Did the lessee, Tri-Parish, assume responsibility for the condition of the premises? (3) Is Rockwood Insurance Company liable as insurer of Mrs. Betty Bryant, an executive officer of Tri-Parish?
The accident occurred on April 14, 1970 in a building in Sunset being utilized as a "Headstart Center". Mrs. Hornsby was entering the back door of the structure and had taken one or two steps inside the building when a wide, rotten board in the floor gave way and her right leg slipped through to the ground below.
At the time of the injury, Mrs. Hornsby was employed as a "nurse's aide" in the Headstart program. Her employer was Tri-Parish Progress, Inc., a Federal government-sponsored organization which operated under the auspices of the Office of Economic Opportunity and later the Department of Health, Education and Welfare. This organization operated in a three-parish area. Mr. Peter Vallot was its executive director. He was in charge of its general over-all administration and was especially concerned in its fiscal aspects. Subordinate to him was Mrs. Betty Bryant, who was the director of Headstart for St. Landry Parish. The defendant-appellant, Rockwood Insurance Company, insured Mrs. Bryant as an executive officer of Tri-Parish.
The building, which was about ten years old, had been leased as a Headstart Center since the program started. The leased premises were owned by Mr. Edward Ray, who was also a member of the Board of Directors of Tri-Parish. Several successive leases had been in effect over the years. The lease in effect at the time of Mrs. Hornsby's injuries was written and dated September 8, 1969 for a term of eight months at a rental of $100 per month. The written lease contained no provision whereby the lessee assumed responsibility for the condition of the premises.
Several months after this lease had been in effect, Mr. Ray discovered that under certain Federal regulations he could not continue to lease the building to this organization of whose Board of Directors he was a member. He requested that the lease be terminated and Ray contends that he and the Board of Directors finally agreed that since no other building was available, and the school year was almost ended, the Headstart Center could remain in the building, but the lessee agreed to assume all responsibility for the condition of the premises. Tri-Parish did remain in the building and thereafter Mrs. Hornsby's injuries occurred.
RAY'S LIABILITY AS OWNER
The first issue is whether Ray is liable as owner of the building, absent a contract whereby the lessee assumed responsibility for its condition. Applicable here is LSA-C.C. Article 2322, which provides:
"The owner of a building is answerable for the damage occasioned by its ruin, when this is caused by neglect to repair it, or when it is the result of a vice in its original construction."
As used in Article 2322, "ruin" has reference to actual fall or collapse of a building or one of its substantial component parts, and the owner is liable "to anyone lawfully on the premises. Davis v. Royal-Globe Insurance Company, 257 La. 523, 242 So.2d 839 (S.Ct.1970). A wooden front step has been held to be such a substantial component part and it is of no consequence under this article that the owner neither knew nor should have known of the defect. Crawford v. Wheless, 265 So.2d 661 (2d Cir. 1972). In the present case, the floor of the building is certainly a "substantial component part". Clearly, Mr. Ray is liable under Article 2322 for damages for the defective floor, absent an agreement whereby the lessee assumed responsibility.
LESSEE'S ASSUMPTION OF ' RESPONSIBILITY FOR PREMISES
LSA-R.S. 9:3221 provides:
"The owner of premises leased under a contract whereby the lessee assumes responsibility for their condition is not liable for injury caused by any defect therein to the lessee or anyone on the premises who derives his right to be thereon from the lessee, unless the owner knew or should have known of the defect or had received notice thereof and failed to remedy it within a reasonable time."
The testimony is overwhelming that after Mr. Ray became aware of his conflict of interest in renting the building and concurrently serving on the Board, the existing lease was changed and a new contract was made. Mr. Ray wanted Tri-Parish out of his building, so that he could continue serving on the Board. He felt he could be of greater benefit to the organization as a director than as a lessor. However, because the fiscal year was almost at an end, and because he did not wish to force TriParish to abandon the building when another would be difficult to find, he agreed to allow them to remain until another suitable structure could be found, provided the lessee assumed all responsibility for the condition of the premises. The Board of Directors of Tri-Parish agreed to this condition. Several members of the Board and the Secretary of the Headstart program so testified. There is no testimony to the contrary.
Corroborating the fact that the lessee assumed responsibility for the condition of the premises, is a resolution adopted by the Board of Directors of Tri-Parish after plaintiff's accident, that Tri-Parish accept responsibility for any damages sought in plaintiff's suit. We do not give effect to this resolution as a contract to indemnify Ray, but it is corroborative of the Board's previous action in assuming responsibility for the premises.
We note here that the original lease was written but the modification thereof was oral. Nevertheless, our law recognizes that any contract may be later modified, abrogated or revoked by consent of the parties. Priscock v. Boyd, 199 So. 2d 373 (2d Cir. 1967). And a written contract may be modified by oral agreement, provided the original contract was not required to be in writing. WWOM, Inc. v. Grapes, 181 So.2d 289 (4th Cir. 1965).
An agreement for the lessee to assume liability is allowed by LSA-R.S. 9:3221. Hebert v. Valenti, 235 So.2d 193 (4th Cir. 1970). And it may be either oral or written. Phillips v. Cohen, 183 So.2d 473 (4th Cir. 1966). The written lease involved here contained no agreement that the lessee assume responsibility for the condition of the premises. However, the subsequent oral agreement modified that written contract and became a binding part of it.
The evidence does not show that Mr. Ray either knew or should have known of the defect in the floor. The testimony is in conflict as to whether Ray visited the Center. But he was not notified when repairs were needed and particularly had never been notified of this particular defect. The evidence was conclusive, though not uncontradicted, that the defect in the floor was a latent one. Several witnesses stated that they had never noticed the floor shaking or being weak. Only one witness stated she had noticed the weak floor prior to the accident.
We conclude that under LSA-R.S. 9:3221, the lessee assumed responsibility for the condition of the premises, and that the owner, Mr. Ray, is not liable for the injuries to plaintiff. Having decided Ray is not liable, it is unnecessary for us to consider his third party demand against Tri-Parish for indemnity or contribution.
ROCKWOOD'S LIABILITY AS INSURER OF MRS. BRYANT
The next issue is whether Rock-wood Insurance Company is liable as insurer of Mrs. Betty Bryant, an executive officer of Tri-Parish. Mrs. Bryant was the St. Landry Parish Director of Head-start, one of the programs of Tri-Parish. As such, she was responsible for the total conduct and administration of the head-start program in the parish. She had 16 centers under her supervision. One hundred and eighty-six employees were under her direct control, including social workers, teachers, teachers' aides, nurses, nurses' aides, janitors, cooks and cooks' aides.
The liability of executive officers was discussed at length by our Supreme Court in Canter v. Koehring, 283 So.2d 716 (S. Ct.1973). There the court said that in or der to hold an executive officer of an organization liable for personal injuries the following criteria must be met:
"1. The principal or employer owes a duty of care to the third party (which in this sense includes a co-employee), breach of which has caused the damage for which recovery is sought.
"2. This duty is delegated by the principal or employer to the defendant.
"3. The defendant officer, agent, or employee has breached this duty through personal (as contrasted with technical or vicarious) fault. The breach occurs when the defendant has failed to discharge the obligation with the degree of care required by ordinary prudence under the same or similar circumstances— whether such failure be due to malfeasance, misfeasance, or nonfeasance, including when the failure results from not acting upon actual knowledge of the risk to others as well as from a lack of ordinary care in discovering and avoiding such risk of harm which has resulted from the breach of the duty.
"4. With regard to the personal (as contrasted with technical or vicarious) fault, personal liability cannot be imposed upon the officer, agent, or employee simply because of his general administrative responsibility for performance of some function of the employment. He must have a personal duty towards the injured plaintiff, breach of which specifically has caused the plaintiff's damages. If the defendant's general responsibility has been delegated with due care to some responsible subordinate or subordinates, he is not himself personally at fault and liable for the negligent performance of this responsibility unless he personally knows or personally should know of its non-performance or mal-performance and has nevertheless failed to cure the risk of harm."
In the present case, the employer, TriParish, did owe a duty of care to the plaintiff. It was required to keep the premises reasonably safe for the children and employees as well as others lawfully on the premises.
The second criteria of Canter is also present. The duty of looking after safety in the Headstart Centers in St. Landry Parish was delegated by Tri-Parish to Betty Bryant. Although she stated it was not in her "job description", she admitted safety was one of her duties.
However, the third and fourth criteria are not met. Mrs. Bryant had no personal duty toward plaintiff. And she had delegated to responsible subordinates the duty to keep the premises safe. She testified that she delegated the responsibility to fire and health inspectors and to supervisors of each center. The supervisor of each center was required to see that needed repairs were made. There is no evidence that Mrs. Bryant was negligent in delegating these responsibilities.
Mrs. Bryant was in charge of the general over-all administration of the program in St. Landry Parish. She reasonably relied on the persons to whom she delegated these duties, for she was unable to perform all of them herself. Reliance on fire and health inspectors was not negligent. Re-ndía Henry, to whom responsibility was delegated at the center here involved, was competent to perform her safety duties. She was head teacher at the school. And though she had had no special training in safety inspection procedure, the duty delegated her was only one of ordinary care. There were no Federally promulgated guidelines. As Mrs. Bryant testified, she did expect Mrs. Henry "to keep her eyes open" for hazards. Meetings were held at least twice a week with supervisors as a follow-up procedure, and the supervisors were required to submit weekly reports.
Mrs. Henry was certainly a proper person to whom to delegate the duty to inspect for safety. There was no money in the program to hire a special person to in spect buildings, and there was apparently no one with any greater authority or ability than she possessed. She admitted her duties included inspection and safety. Further, she performed these duties diligently and efficiently, for immediately after she learned of the defective condition of the floor she warned others of it, and she called a carpenter to repair it.
Mrs. Bryant was not negligent in delegating her duties for safety. Once she had reasonably delegated these duties, the only responsibility remaining was to see that defects of which she knew or should have known were repaired. Canter v. Koehring, supra. There is no evidence that Betty Bryant either knew or should have known of the defective floor. Bertha Mae Dixon was the only person who had noticed the floor was in need of repair. No other witnesses had noticed the defect, although several had walked over the area many times. The plaintiff herself testified she had been over the area at least a dozen times prior to the accident and it just appeared to be an "old clean floor".
We conclude that under the criteria of the Canter case, Mrs. Bryant was not negligent. See also Lyle v. National Surety Corporation, 304 So.2d 743 (3rd Cir. 1974), where a similar result was reached.
Because we find no negligence on the part of Betty Bryant, it is unnecessary to consider the policy exclusion defenses urged by her defendant insurer.
For the reasons assigned, the judgment appealed is reversed and set aside. Judgment is now rendered in favor of the defendants-appellants, Edward Ray and Rockwood Insurance Company, dismissing plaintiff's suit. All costs in the trial and appellate courts are assessed against the plaintiff.
Reversed and rendered.
PAVY, J., concurs and assigns reasons.
DOMENGEAUX, J., dissents and assigns written reasons.