Case Name: PEOPLE v. FIORINI (ON REHEARING)
Court: Michigan Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1974-05-29
Citations: 59 Mich. App. 243
Docket Number: Docket No. 15546
Parties: PEOPLE v FIORINI (ON REHEARING)
Judges: Before: J. H. Gillis, P. J., and D. E. Holbrook and Van Valkenburg, JJ.
Reporter: Michigan appeals reports; cases decided in the Michigan Court of Appeals.
Volume: 59
Pages: 243–261

Head Matter:
PEOPLE v FIORINI (ON REHEARING)
Opinion of the Court
1. Criminal Law — Constitutional Law — Right to Speedy Trial— Attaching of Right.
The Sixth Amendment speedy-trial provision has no application until the putative defendant in some way becomes an accused; the amendment affords no protection to those not yet accused, nor does it require the government to discover, investigate, and accuse any person within any particular period of time (US Const, Am VT).
2. Criminal Law — Right to Speedy Trial — Delay in Arrest — Attaching of Right.
A delay of 43 months from the time a crime was committed to the date a complaint was filed and a warrant issued did not deny a defendant his right to a speedy trial because the right to a speedy trial attaches when a defendant is arrested and only three months had elapsed from the time of defendant’s arrest until his trial.
3. Criminal Law — Due Process — Delay in Arrest — Prejudice.
Delay in arrest does not of itself amount to a violation of due process; the defendant must show specific prejudicial effect of the delay.
4. Criminal Law — Delay in Arrest — -Witnesses—Alibi Witness— Death of Witness — Cumulative Testimony — Prejudice.
A defendant was not prejudiced by the death of an alibi witness during a delay in bringing the defendant to trial where the witness was one of twelve people who allegedly were with the defendant at a wedding anniversary celebration on the night of the crime and the testimony of that alibi witness would have been cumulative.
References for Points in Headnotes
[1, 2] 21 Am Jur 2d, Criminal Law § 241 et seq.
[3, 6-9] 5 Am Jur 2d, Arrest §§ 2, 3.
16 Am Jur 2d, Constitutional Law § 542 et seq.
21 Am Jur 2d, Criminal Law § 220.
[4] 29 Am Jur 2d, Evidence §§ 4, 186, 256, 440.
[5] 30 Am Jur 2d, Evidence § 1080.
75 Am Jur 2d, Trial § 434.
58 Am Jur, Witnesses § 862.
[10, 11] 17 Am Jur 2d, Continuance §§ 4, 27 et seq.
5. Witnesses — Credibility—Jury.
The credibility of witnesses is a matter for the jury to decide.
6. Criminal Law — Delay in Arrest — Evidence—Loss of Evidence— Police — Original Notes — Prejudice.
The loss or destruction of police records and their original notes, during a delay between the occurrence of a crime and the arrest of a defendant, may be considered when assessing the prejudice caused by the delay; however, failure of the police to retain their original notes is not always prejudicial to a defendant.
Dissent by D. E. Holbrook, J.
7. Criminal Law — Delay in Arrest — Negligence—Prejudice.
Negligence cannot excuse a governmental delay in arresting a defendant when it is coupled with a showing of prejudice, even though negligence in and of itself may be excused.
8. Criminal Law — Delay in Arrest — Reason for Delay — Length of Delay — Prejudice—Due Process.
The important considerations when determining the necessity for governmental delay in arresting a defendant are the importance of the reason for the delay, the length of the delay, and the potential for prejudice; the resolution of a due process claim based upon governmental delay in arrest or indictment requires a balancing of the reasonableness of the delay against the prejudice to the accused.
9. Criminal Law — Delay in Arrest — 43-Month Delay — Negligence —Prejudice—Witnesses—Credibility—Death of Witness— Cross-Examination — Loss of Evidence.
The conviction of a defendant who was not arrested until 43 months after the crime was committed should be reversed where the delay was due to the negligence of the prosecution in failing to pursue the cause with diligence and where the defendant was prejudiced because the recollection of his alibi witnesses had dimmed and they were less credible, one witness had died, the dimmed memories of the prosecution witnesses impaired cross-examination, and the cross-examination of police ofñcers who used a composite record and had lost their original notes taken from the scene was severely hindered.
10. Criminal Law — Continuance—Constitutional Right — Assertion of Right — Negligence—Prior Continuance.
The propriety of a criminal defendant’s motion for a continuance is tested by a four-pronged approach: (1) whether the defendent asserted a constitutional right, (2) whether he had a legitimate reason for asserting this right, (3) whether he was guilty of negligence, and (4) whether he had caused the trial to be adjourned before.
11. Criminal Law — Continuance—Discretion—Abuse of Discretion — Constitutional Right — Evidence—Witnesses—Negligence-Prior Continuances.
Denial of a criminal defendant’s motion for a continuance was an abuse of discretion where the defendant was asserting his constitutional right to present witnesses and evidence in his behalf, the right was based on an inability to procure the attendance of individuals considered to be vital witnesses, ■ defendant was not negligent in asserting his right, and he had not previously asked for a continuance.
Appeal from Wayne, Michael L. Stacey, J.
Submitted Division 1 April 8, 1974, at Detroit.
(Docket No. 15546.)
Decided May 29, 1974.
Opinion on rehearing filed March 10, 1975.
Leave to appeal applied for.
Americo J. Fiorini was convicted of armed robbery. Defendant appeals. Reversed, 53 Mich App 389 (1974).
On rehearing, conviction affirmed.
Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Robert A. Derengoski, Solicitor General, William L. Cahalan, Prosecuting Attorney, Dominick R. Carnovale, Chief, Appellate Department, Patricia J. Boyle, Principal Attorney, Research, Training and Appeals, and Thomas M. Khalil, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for the people.
Stuart M. Israel, Assistant State Appellate Defender, for defendant.
Before: J. H. Gillis, P. J., and D. E. Holbrook and Van Valkenburg, JJ.
Former circuit judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment pursuant to Const Í963, art 6, § 23 as amended in 1968.

Opinion:
On Rehearing
J. H. Gillis, P. J.
This case comes here on an application for rehearing filed by the people.
Defendant was tried before a jury on the charge of armed robbery, MCLA 750.529; MSA 28.797, in Wayne County Circuit Court and was found guilty. He was sentenced to 18 to 40 years imprisonment.
Defendant appealed as of right, alleging that he was denied due process of law, fair trial, and speedy trial because there was a delay of 43 months from the time of the commission of the offense to the date a complaint was filed and a warrant issued. This Court reversed on the basis that defendant had shown some prejudice, and the prosecution had failed to show that the delay was explainable and not deliberate and that the defendant was not unduly prejudiced thereby. People v Fiorini, 53 Mich App 389; 220 NW2d 70 (1974).
The appellee-prosecutor sought a rehearing and remand for a full and extensive hearing on the reasons for the delay, alleging further that there was no prejudice shown against defendant. Pursuant to that request, we ordered a remand to the trial judge.
A hearing was held, and the trial judge found that the delay "was not occasioned by malice, was not intentional, and was indeed, quite inadver tent". He further found that no prejudice resulted to the defendant as a result of the delay.
We grant appellee's motion for rehearing and reverse our prior decision.
I
On August 30, 1968, the Lakepointe Drugstore in Northville Township was robbed. Soon after the robbery, the police arrived and took descriptions of the assailant from Gerald Dobrusin, the owner of the store and pharmacist, and Dale Randall and Diane Penland (nee Oliver), employees of the store. Within one week, the complaining witness Dobrusin had made a positive photographic identification of defendant. Dobrusin had no further contact with the police regarding the matter until 1972.
In March of 1972, Dobrusin attended a lineup as a result of his own investigation. Dobrusin had talked with one of his pharmacist friends and discovered that a mutual friend's drugstore had been robbed. Dobrusin was given a description of the robber by his friend and, from that description, believed the perpetrator to be the same one that had robbed him some three years earlier. On his own initiative, Dobrusin attended a lineup held in connection with the second robbery and identified defendant.
Detective Frank Van Wulfen was the officer in charge of the case in 1968. Det. Van Wulfen testified that he had planned to arrange a showup, but was reassigned to the Criminal Intelligence Service of the Wayne County Sheriffs Office shortly after the robbery.
Detective Thomas Sheedy was the officer in charge of the 1972 robbery case. He testified that he came into this case in March, 1972, when Dobrusin arrived at the jail on his own initiative, told him about the 1968 robbery, and expressed a desire to view the showup. Det. Sheedy also testified that the 1968 robbery investigation had never been reassigned after Det. Van Wulfen's transfer.
Following Dobrusin's identification of the defendant at the showup, a complaint was filed and a warrant was issued in April of 1972.
Defendant claims that he was prejudiced by this delay in that one alibi witness died in the interim and at least one other was unable to recall details; his ability to impeach the people's witnesses was impeded because the event took place so long previous to arrest and trial that the witnesses were unable to remember many details; and the testifying police officers made use of a composite record of several officers' notes, the originals of which were not available and presumably had been lost.
II
The Speedy Trial Claim
The Sixth Amendment provides that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial ." US Const, Am VI. The Sixth Amendment speedy-trial provision has no application until the putative defendant in some way becomes an "accused". United States v Marion, 404 US 307, 313; 92 S Ct 455, 459; 30 L Ed 2d 468, 474 (1971). The Sixth Amendment "would seem to afford no protection to those not yet accused, nor would [it] seem to require the Government to discover, investigate, and accuse any person within any particular period of time." 404 US at 313; 92 S Ct at 459; 30 L Ed 2d at 474.
In this case, the right to a speedy trial attached when defendant was arrested. People v Grimmett, 388 Mich 590, 601-602; 202 NW2d 278, 283 (1972).
Since only three months elapsed between the time the defendant became an "accused" within the meaning of the Sixth Amendment and the trial, defendant was not denied a speedy trial as he contends.
The Due Process Claim
In People v Albert White, 27 Mich App 432, 435; 183 NW2d 606, 607 (1970), rev'd on other grounds, 387 Mich 775 (1972), this Court reiterated that mere delay in arrest does not of itself amount to a violation of due process. The Court stated:
" 'There is no constitutional right to be arrested.' Hoffa v United States, 385 US 293, 310; 87 S Ct 408; 17 L Ed 2d 374 (1966). Defendant must show specific prejudicial effect of the delay."
See also People v Noble, 18 Mich App 300, 302; 170 NW2d 916 (1969), People v Thomas Smith, 30 Mich App 34; 186 NW2d 61 (1971).
After a hearing on remand, the trial judge determined that no prejudice resulted to the defendant because of the delay. We concur.
Defendant claimed that he was prejudiced by the delay in that one alibi witness died in the interim. The death or unavailability of an alibi witness is an important factor to be considered in determining whether defendant was unduly prejudiced. Dickey v Florida, 398 US 30, 36; 90 S Ct 1564, 1568; 26 L Ed 2d 26, 31 (1970). However, it is not always prejudicial, as the Court found in United States v Lee, 413 F2d 910, 914 (CA 7, 1969). In that case, the death of two purported alibi witnesses, during a delay of approximately two years, was found not to have prejudiced the defendant.
In the case at bar, defendant's sister testified that, on the night of the robbery, defendant was present at her home at a wedding anniversary celebration. In addition to defendant, 12 other people were present. Although it is true that one alibi witness died during the delay, only two of the remaining 11 potential alibi witnesses were called by defendant. In fact, his sister testified that defendant's wife, one of the potential alibi witnesses, was vacationing at the time of her husband's trial for armed robbery.
Further, after a hearing ordered by this Court to determine whether defendant was prejudiced, the trial judge stated:
"With the exception of the testimony of defendant's sister, this court finds that the testimony of the other witnesses for the defendant was so incredible, as to be totally unworthy of belief; and that, in any event, the testimony of any additional alibi witness would have been cumulative at the very best."
Under the circumstances in this case, defendant was not prejudiced by the death of one of his alibi witnesses.
Defendant also alleged that his ability to impeach the people's witnesses was impeded because the event took place so long previous to arrest and trial that the witnesses were unable to recall many details. Defendant argues that the delay served only to prejudice the defense, while assisting the prosecution. This allegation is anomalous. A review of the record shows that the defendant cross-examined the people's witnesses, and argued the credibility of the witnesses to the jury. The credibility of the witnesses, both the people's and the defendant's, is a matter for the jury to decide. People v Petrosky, 286 Mich 397, 400; 282 NW 191, 192 (1938). The jury, mindful of the delays and their possible effect, found the defendant to be guilty. See United States v Wilson, 342 F2d 782, 783 (CA 2, 1965).
Defendant was not prejudiced in cross-examining the people's witnesses.
Finally, defendant contended that he was prejudiced because the testifying police officers made use of a composite record of several officers' notes, the originals of which were not available.
In assessing possible prejudice, the loss or destruction of police records is a matter to be taken into consideration. Dickey v Florida, supra. The Michigan Supreme Court has also stressed the importance of retention by the police of their original notes and records. People v Poe, 388 Mich 611, 620; 202 NW2d 320, 324 (1972). But every failure to keep notes does not require reversal, and so it is here. After hearing upon remand, the trial court stated:
"This court is also of the opinion that the fragmentary notes of Officer Van Wulfen which were apparently lost, were in view of the extensive cross-examination of this witness, nonprejudicial to the defendant."
We agree with the hearing judge. Defendant was not prejudiced by the loss of these notes.
Since defendant has failed to show any prejudice, we conclude that he was not denied due process of law by the delay between the occurrence of the offense and his arrest. Therefore we reverse our prior decision and affirm the conviction.
Van Valkenburg, J., concurred.