Case Name: Amos Ponder et al., plaintiffs in error, vs. James M. Shannon et al., defendants in error
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia
Jurisdiction: Georgia
Decision Date: 1875-01
Citations: 54 Ga. 187
Docket Number: 
Parties: Amos Ponder et al., plaintiffs in error, vs. James M. Shannon et al., defendants in error.
Judges: 
Reporter: Georgia Reports
Volume: 54
Pages: 187–189

Head Matter:
Amos Ponder et al., plaintiffs in error, vs. James M. Shannon et al., defendants in error.
1. The county authorities may alter a public road at their discretion, following the mode pointed out by law, and the courts will not interfere with the exercise of that discretion, unless it be manifestly abused.
2. The alteration of an old road involves the discontinuance of that part thereof which is altered; and under a citation to alter a road, it is competent to discontinue that part of the old road which is rendered unnecessary by the alteration.
County matters. Roads and bridges. Before Judge Buchanan. Monroe Superior Court. September Term, 1874.
James M. Shannon and others petitioned the county commissioners of Monroe county to change or alter the road leading from Forsyth to Cabaniss, and to construct a bridge over the Towaliga river at the point where the new road will cross said stream. The commissioners appointed reviewers, wrho reported in favor of the alteration, as prayed for. The commissioners then caused Amos Ponder and others interested to be served with a notice to file their application for damages before May 14th, 1874. They also issued a citation, which was placed at the court-house door and published as required by statute, calling upon all persons having objections to the proposed alteration to file, the same by the day aforesaid. Numerous objections were filed, and a large mass of testimony introduced, all of which is omitted here, as there Avas certainly a sufficient amount in support of the alteration to show that the discretion of the commissioners was not manifestly abused. The alteration as reported by the revieAvers Avas ordered.
To this judgment Ponder and others excepted, and petitioned for the writ of certiorari, assigning numerous errors, all of which may be condensed into the two passed upon by the court, to-wit: that the order was not authorized by the testimony; and that, under the citation requiring those interested to show cause why such alteration should not be made, it was not competent to discontinue that part of the old road thus rendered unnecessary.
The Avrit of certiorari issued, but on the final hearing the judgment of the commissioners was affirmed.
To this ruling Ponder and others excepted.
Hammond & Berner, for plaintiffs in error.
Cabaniss & Turner, by Peeples & Howell ; W. D. Stone, for defendants.

Opinion:
McCay, Judge.
Original jurisdiction is granted by the constitution to the ordinary or county commissioners over the subject of roads, bridges, etc. The judge of the superior court may, in a proper case, by certiorari, correct the errors of all inferior judicatories. But this is only a power to correct errors, not a concurrent jurisdiction over the subject. It is eminently proper that these matters shall be in the discretion of the county authorities, chosen by the people for the purpose. The judge of the superior court can only interfere when the county authorities violate the law, but so long as they keep within their legal power, the exercise of their discretion ought not to be interfered with. They know far better what the wants of the people are, and are, within their legal power, the best judges upon the whole subject.
It is perhaps true that under a citation to alter a road it would not be competent to discontinue the road altogether. But it is obvious that every alteration of a road involves necessarily the discontinuance of the part replaced by the alteration. And we think when the discontinuance is only of the part replaced by the alteration, that it is legitimate to do this under a citation to alter. As a matter of course this should not be used as a cloak to mislead. But we see nothing of that here. Indeed, there is no formal discontinuance by the order, though we suppose that was the intent of the court. But this is just the intent that, in our judgment, is legit-mate. There is no subject upon which men differ so much as on the propriety of a new or alteration of an old road. Many years' experience satisfies me that on this subject especially, men will look at things to suit themselves, and that as to swamps and hills and levels, and even as to distance, they utterly lose themselves in their own interest or feelings. Under such circumstances it is an ungracious duty the commissioners have to perform, and one that the superior court or this court has not- the means to judge of. For my part I should not be willing to interfere, except in a very clear case.
Judgment affirmed.