Case Name: Eric Paul DURCAN, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1980-04-01
Citations: 383 So. 2d 248
Docket Number: No. 79-1211
Parties: Eric Paul DURCAN, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: Before BARKDULL and BASKIN, JJ., and EZELL, BOYCE F., Jr. (Ret.), Associate Judge.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 383
Pages: 248–250

Head Matter:
Eric Paul DURCAN, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. 79-1211.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
April 1, 1980.
Rehearing Denied May 28, 1980.
Weiner, Robbins, Tunkey & Ross and Jeffrey S. Weiner, Miami, for appellant.
Jim Smith, Atty. Gen. and Anthony C. Musto, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.
Before BARKDULL and BASKIN, JJ., and EZELL, BOYCE F., Jr. (Ret.), Associate Judge.

Opinion:
BARKDULL, Judge.
The appellant was charged in 1975 by information with several crimes. He came on for trial, represented by private counsel. In his presence counsel waived, in open court, the defendant's right to a jury trial and the defendant executed the appropriate written waiver. Thereafter, he was convicted by the trial court without a jury, adjudicated and sentenced. An appeal of such conviction was made to this court. See: Durcan v. State, 350 So.2d 525 (Fla.3d DCA 1977). This appeal was prosecuted by private counsel on the appellant's behalf and resulted in an order of affirmance.
Some three years later the defendant filed a motion pursuant to Rules of Criminal Procedure 3.850, seeking to vacate his conviction and sentence, alleging that he had not voluntarily waived his right to a jury trial. The trial judge denied the petition and this appeal ensued.
The appellant contends that the right to jury trial is a fundamental constitutional right that could not have been waived by failure to urge it in the direct appeal from the conviction. We disagree. The courts of this State and other courts have held that constitutional rights not urged on direct appeal may be waived and will not support a subsequent collateral attack when the alleged violation of the constitutional right was known by the defendant at the time of the direct appeal.
In the instant case, it is clear that the defendant knew that he was being tried non-jury; that he executed the jury form; that he never raised a specific objection at any time in the trial proceedings; that he should have had a jury trial. Notwithstanding the fact that when the trial originally opened there was a jury present, he heard his counsel waive his right to a jury; he executed the waiver; he saw the judge discharge the jury. We hold that it now comes too late to hear that he was deprived of his constitutional right to a jury trial. Sanford v. Rubin, 237 So.2d 134 (Fla.1970); Jones v. State, 248 So.2d 517 (Fla.3d DCA 1971); Clark v. State, 336 So.2d 468 (Fla.2d DCA 1976); Ellison v. State, 349 So.2d 731 (Fla.3d DCA 1977); Pegues v. State, 361 So.2d 433 (Fla.1st DCA 1978); Clark v. State, 363 So.2d 331 (Fla.1978); Rubin v. State, 368 So.2d 69 (Fla.3d DCA 1979). Further, the trial court, in denying the Rule 1 motion, found that he had voluntarily waived his right to a jury trial at the time of the original trial proceedings. We find that the trial judge's order in this regard is amply supported by the evidence and, therefore, the appellant has made no error appear on the merits of the voluntariness of his waiver of jury trial. Swarthout v. State, 165 So.2d 773 (Fla.3d DCA 1964); Carroll v. State, 186 So.2d 834 (Fla.4th DCA 1966); Cash v. State, 207 So.2d 18 (Fla.3d DCA 1968).
Therefore, the order under review be and the same is hereby affirmed.
Affirmed.