Case Name: THE FLORIDA BAR, Complainant, v. David A. DANCU, Respondent
Court: Florida Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1986-06-05
Citations: 490 So. 2d 40
Docket Number: No. 66547
Parties: THE FLORIDA BAR, Complainant, v. David A. DANCU, Respondent.
Judges: ADKINS, Acting C.J., and OVERTON and McDONALD, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 490
Pages: 40–43

Head Matter:
THE FLORIDA BAR, Complainant, v. David A. DANCU, Respondent.
No. 66547.
Supreme Court of Florida.
June 5, 1986.
Rehearing Denied July 16, 1986.
John F. Harkness, Jr., Executive Director and John T. Berry, Staff Counsel, Tallahassee, and Richard B. Liss, Bar Counsel, Fort Lauderdale, for complainant.
Arthur M. Wolff of Wolff and Gora, Fort Lauderdale, for respondent.

Opinion:
BARKETT, Justice.
This disciplinary proceeding against David A. Dancu, a member of The Florida Bar, is presently before us upon complaint of The Florida Bar and the referee's report. Respondent has filed a petition for review. We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 15, Fla. Const.
On January 25, 1985, respondent entered into a consent judgment for an unconditional guilty plea to various violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The Florida Bar approved respondent's plea. The consent judgment recites the following facts. Respondent successfully represented a client in obtaining the release of life insurance proceeds in the amount of $934,-520.40 from an insurance company. Despite advising his client that the money had been deposited in a trust account, he opened a money market account in his own name and deposited the insurance proceeds in that account without his client's knowledge or consent. The funds generated approximately $8,812.00 in interest while in the money market account. When respondent gave the insurance proceeds to his client, he did not include any of the interest generated by her money. The client inquired about the lack of interest, and respondent provided bank records which purported to show that the money had been held in a non-interest bearing account. Only when the client's accountant sought further information with respect to the bank records did respondent acknowledge that the money had been held in an interest-bearing money market account and refund the interest to the client.
In March 1985, a referee was appointed to preside in the disciplinary action. The referee recommended, and the Florida Bar agreed, that the respondent should be suspended for thirty days. This Court, however, rejected the referee's recommendation, remanded for reconsideration, and noted that the "agreed penalty appears to be unduly lenient."
Despite The Florida Bar's adherence to its prior recommendation of a thirty day suspension, the referee now recommends the following penalty:
1. A suspension from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months and continuing thereafter until proof of rehabilitation.
2. As part of the proof of rehabilitation, successful passage of the ethics portion of the Multistate Bar Examination.
3. Taxation of costs in the amount of Four Hundred Forty Nine Dollars and Fifty One Cents (449.51) against Respondent, with execution to issue and with interest at a rate of twelve per cent (12%) to accrue on all costs not paid within thirty (30) days of the Supreme Court's Final Order in this cause, unless the time for payment is extended by the Board of Governors of The Florida Bar.
The single most important concern of this Court in defining and regulating the practice of law is the protection of the public from incompetent, unethical, and irresponsible representation. The Florida Bar v. Moses, 380 So.2d 412, 417 (Fla.1980). The very nature of the practice of law requires that clients place their lives, their money, and their causes in the hands of their lawyers with a degree of blind trust that is paralleled in very few other economic relationships. Our primary purpose in the disciplinary process is to assure that the public can repose this trust with confidence. The direct violation of this trust by stealing a client's money, compounded by lying about it, mandates a punishment commensurate with such abuse. The misconduct in the instant case clearly supports the referee's recommendations of six months suspension and proof of rehabilitation including passage of the ethics portion of the Multistate Bar Examination. Accordingly, we adopt the referee's recommendations.
Respondent is suspended from the practice of law effective thirty days from the release of this opinion. Judgment is hereby entered against respondent for costs in the amount of $449.51, for which sum let execution issue.
It is so ordered.
ADKINS, Acting C.J., and OVERTON and McDONALD, JJ., concur.
EHRLICH, J., concurs specially with an opinion.