Case Name: John Clendining and John Adams against John B. Church
Court: New York Supreme Court of Judicature
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1805-08
Citations: 3 Cai. 141
Docket Number: 
Parties: John Clendining and John Adams against John B. Church.
Judges: 
Reporter: Caines' Reports
Volume: 3
Pages: 141–150

Head Matter:
John Clendining and John Adams against John B. Church.
ALBANY,
August, 1805.
Neither a want of averring interest, nor the words of the insurance being “ policy to be “ proof of inter- “ est,” are of themselves evidence of a wager policy. On a wager policy, to entitle the as sured to recover, the lost must be absolutely total; a technical total gives no right.
THIS was an action on a policy of insurance on the schooner Neptune, from Wilmington, North-Carolina, to Kingston, Jamaica. At the foot of the instrument, was a written memorandum in these words: “ Warranting no- “ thing; policy to be proof of interest, and no insufficiency “ of papers to be of detriment to the insured.” The declaration contained no averment of interest in any one.
At the trial, it appeared that the vessel, when pursuing the voyage insured, was captured by a Spanish privateer, and, on being chased the nest day by a British armed vessel, was run, by the prize-master, upon the rocks off the Island of Cuba» That while she lay there, she was boarded and retaken by the boats of the British, who got her off, after being much, injured in her bottom, and losing her and cables and keel. That they then carried her to Jamaica, where she was libelled and restored, on payment of one eighth of her value for salvage, but on being hove down to ]De examined, was found to be so much damaged, that to repair her wouxd cost more than the amount of the msur-rance, by which she was fully covered. In consequence of this, the captain, who was also owner, sold her for £120, Jamaica currency, to Messrs. Curry and Co. who repaired her, but what it cost did not appear. No evidence of abandonment was offered.
On this testimony the plaintiffs rested their cause, and the counsel for the defendant moved for a nonsuit, because, as it was a wager-policy, and the Neptune did arrive, a loss had not happened; and allowing it to be an interest-policy, on which the plaintiffs might, notwithstanding the restoration, recover an average loss,' yet there was not any proof adduced to shew its amount. The judge inclining to this opinion, ordered the plaintiff to be called, and as he did not answer, granted the nonsuit.
Application was now made to set it aside on the following grounds: 1st. That the capture by the Spanish privateer made the loss total, and entitled the plaintiffs to recover. 2d. That if it was an interest-policy, the plaintiffs were entitled to recover for a partial loss, the amount of which should have been submitted -to the j ury.
Riker, in support of the motion.
On a wager-policy, as there is no partial loss, a capture, though but for five minutes, creates a total one. On this subject the English decisions are not many, and those difficult to be reconciled. The first to which it will be necessary to call the attention of the court is Depaba v. Ludlow, Com. Rep. 361. In that case the vessel was, after capture, retaken; but the mere interruption of the voyage was held to give a right to recover. The same principle is found in Pond v. King, 1 Wils. 191. On a policy for time, the vessel was taken, retaken, and restored on salvage; yet the loss was ruled to be total. In Whitehead v. Bance, Marsh. 426, a similar decision was made. Pole v. Fitzgerald, Willes, 641, does not apply. That was not a case of capture, and the question here is, does a capture make a total loss ? On a wager, a capture gives a vested right, which subsequent restoration cannot defeat. On an interest policy, the rule is different, because it is a contract of indemnity, founded on property ; the restoration therefore, may affect the claim for a total loss, and make it only an average. No such reasoning can apply to a wager. On the second point, it is to be observe ed, that the words “ interest or no interest," do not necessarily make a wager policy. 1 Marsh. 99. That the present was a wager policy is not inferable, from there being no averment of interest in any one. It is not essential to aver interest, in an action on an interest policy. 2 Marsh. 591, citing Crawfurd v. Hunter, 8 D. & E. 13, where that point was settled on demurrer to the 4th count of the declaration. This then might have been an interest policy; the facts therefore, ought to have been submitted to the jury to determine the extent of the partial loss, as they, in themselves, afforded a means of ascertaining the amount.
Pendleton and Hoffman, contra.
The true principle on which wager-policies turn is, has there been a total loss of the' voyage ? Spencer v. Franco, Park 75. If not, a mere capture, which neither defeats the voyage, nor alters the property, gives no right of recovery. Dean v. Dicker, 2 Stra. 1250, acknowledges the same position. Lee, C. J. says, that had the ship been recaptured before carried infra prxsidia, the decision, which was in favor of the plaintiff, might have been otherwise. In Depaba v. Ludlow, the voyage was defeated by the interruption. So in Pond v. King, the insurance was for time, and the cruise totally lost. The same principle is recognised in Witherspoon v. Banks, Marsh. 406. We admit that in this country, actions on wager policies inay be maintained, and that if this be a wager policy, it was not necessary to abandon ; but if this be not a wager policy, then we contend the nonsuit ought to stand. The facts could not warrant referring the case to the jury. They had no criterion to estimate an average, and could not be allowed without a datum, to go by, to settle one by guess. Crawfurd v. Hunter, is not applicable to the case before the court. In that case the count demurred to, had words tantamount to an averment of interest. But whatever may be the English decisions on this point, our policies have a clause which renders it necessary. The underwriter contracts to pay only after proof of loss and interest. Against this maybe urged the memorandum. If so, then it is a wager policy, and within the arguments used on the first point, They are fully established by the decision in Pole v. Fitzgerald., which overturned the cases referred to by the opposite side, and established that on a wager policy, there could be no technical total loss. It is not requisite that the ship should actually perish. If she arrive at a port, not that of her destination, it gives a right to recover ; but when she does arrive there, a total loss cannot have happened, though a capture may have intervened.
Riker in reply.
The only reason why interest was ever thought necessary to be averred in a British policy, was to take it out of the 19 G. 2. c. 37, against wagering insurances. Therefore, where the contract is upon foreign property, no averment of interest is required, Nantes v. Thompson, 2 East 385. The determination in Franco v. Spencer, turned on die evidence not maintaining the count. The declaration stated a capture by enemies; and it was proved that at the time when the vessel was taken, preliminaries of peace were signed, so that there was, in fact, no enemy existing. To protect the insured against a capture ón a wager policy, the same words are used as in one on interest; on both, therefore, the construction must be the same.

Opinion:
Per curiam, delivered by
Kent, C. J.
This must be considered in the light of a wager-policy. The words " Policy to be proof of interest," are not considered as being of themselves evidence of a wager-policy, 2 East, 390, although the statute of 19, G. 2. seems to prohibit policies with such clauses inserted, on the ground of their being wagers. Nor is the want in the declaration of an averment of interest in the plaintiffs, either in their own right or as trustees, to be considered as decisive evidence of no interest, since it has been ruled in the case of Nantes v. Thompson, 2 East 392, that such an averment is not requisite even in an interest-policy. But these circumstances taken in connection with a fact stated in the present case, that tíic captain was owner of the vessel, will determine the na-tore of die policy, especially as no agency or trust is any where pretended by the plaintiffs.
Assuming it then as a fact, that this is a wager-policy, the question is, whether the capture by the Spanish privateer amounted to a total loss ?
This was a bet upon the arrival of the vessel at Kingston in Jamaica. The perils which may have happened to the vessel on the voyage, are immaterial, provided she performed her voyage, for that determines the bet in favor of the insurer. It is stated that the vessel did arrive at Jamaica, and as no question is made about the particular port at which she arrived, we may intend that she arrived at Kingston. The intermediate capture was immaterial, as the voyage was performed before suit brought. This point does not, however, appear to be well settled in the books. Some of the cases, and particularly that of Dean v. Dicker, 2 Stra. 1250, go to prove, that even upon a wager policy, if the ship be taken, it is a total loss, however illegal the capture may be, and although the ship be taken or restored. Marshall, 424. But from what fell from Lord Mansfield, when speaking of the case of Pole v. Fitzgerald, in Goss v. Withers, 2 Burr. 695, and from what was observed by him, and the other judges of K. B. in Kulen Kemp. v. Vigne, 1 D. & E. 308, 310, the inference would rather seem to be, that a temporary capture, with a subsequent recovery and final arrival' at the port of destination, was not a total loss in the case of a wager-policy. This to me, appears to be the most advisable rule.
A temporary capture, in the case of an interest-policy, is a total loss only at the election of the insured, and unless he abandon pending the capture, he cannot make it a total loss. It is, therefore, not an absolute total loss, but a total loss at the election of the party. But in wager-policies, the loss should be absolutely and finally total, for otherwise a temporary embargo of only a day, without any other interruption of the voyage, would be a total loss, although the vessel should have arrived in safety. I the more readily adopt this opinion, because wager-policies ought not to be encouraged, and it is not pleasant that the time of the court should be occupied in discussing them.
Nantes v. Thompson. Com. 361. 1. Wils. 2. Str. 1250. Willes Rep. 641. 2 Burr. 695. 1 D. & E. 304.