Case Name: Honesto ALEGRE et al., Appellants, v. Larry C. SHURKEY et al., Appellees
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1981-04-06
Citations: 396 So. 2d 247
Docket Number: No. UU-433
Parties: Honesto ALEGRE et al., Appellants, v. Larry C. SHURKEY et al., Appellees.
Judges: SHIVERS, J., concurs. ERVIN, J., concurs in part and dissents in part.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 396
Pages: 247–252

Head Matter:
Honesto ALEGRE et al., Appellants, v. Larry C. SHURKEY et al., Appellees.
No. UU-433.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
April 6, 1981.
Chalmers H. Barnes, of Barnes & Barnes, Jacksonville, for appellants.
Emory P. Cain, Jacksonville, for appel-lees.

Opinion:
SMITH, Judge.
The trial court dismissed appellants' complaint, for failure to state a cause of action, in which they sought damages for injuries received by their daughter in falling from a type of playground equipment known as "monkey bars" placed by appellees upon their property, and which was being used by appellants' minor child with the implied permission of appellees, since the child was in the yard playing with appellees' child.
The complaint is in two counts, the first seeking recovery upon a theory of negli gence in allowing the ground surface under the monkey bars to become hard-packed, and in failing to provide some cushioning surface for the prevention of injuries to children who might fall while playing on the monkey bars. The second count alleges substantially the same facts, but adds additional allegations based upon the attractive nuisance doctrine. Both counts contain essentially the same allegations with respect to the negligence of appellees. Paragraph 5 of count one provides:
5. Defendants Shurkey were negligent by failing to provide a surface under the monkey bars which could possibly have absorbed the impact of a child falling from a height of six to seven feet. Defendants knew or should have known that a packed earth surface presents a serious hazard for children who might fall while playing on the monkey bars. Defendants knew or should have known that falls from this type of playground equipment are a regular occurrence and defendants should therefore have provided some cushioning surface underneath the monkey bars.
As to Count One, appellants' argument focuses primarily, upon a decision from the New York courts, Hunt v. Board of Education of Schenectady, 43 App.Div.2d 397, 352 N.Y.S.2d 237 (1974), in which the appellate court reversed the trial court's dismissal of the complaint, holding that a jury question was presented on the issue of whether or not the defendant school was negligent in placing a set of "monkey bars" over an artificially hardened, "black top" surface. However, we consider that the facts in this case are distinguishable from those in Hunt, and moreover, we further conclude that a determination of this question in Florida is controlled by Hillman v. Greater Miami Hebrew Academy, 72 So.2d 668 (Fla.1954).
In Hillman, the injured child was playing on monkey bars constructed on the playground of a private school. The plaintiffs contended that the monkey bar equipment in question was negligently maintained, in that it was constructed so that it extended over the trunk of a coconut palm tree, and that the defendant had failed to keep it supervised by one competent to look after children of tender age to prevent them from falling from it. In affirming dismissal of the complaint for failure to state a cause of action, the court said (Id. at 669):
The vice of the complaint in question consisted in the fact that it sought to make appellee an insurer of the safety of minor children who used its playground equipment while the law contemplates that it furnish them a reasonably safe place to play commensurate with their knowledge and impulses. There is no allegation in the amended complaint that the monkey bar contained latent defects, that it was negligently constructed or operated or that there was any present danger that one of tender years could not readily comprehend. It was approved standard playground equipment and no amount of superintendence would have prevented the accident, (citations omitted)
We consider that the facts alleged in Hillman present an even stronger case than this one, and the trial judge correctly held that Count One was insufficient to state a cause of action. See also Elmore v. Sones, 140 So.2d 59 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1962); and Solomon v. City of North Miami Beach, 256 So.2d 399 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1972).
As to Count Two, the dismissal was correct because the complaint does not specifically allege, nor can it reasonably be inferred from facts pleaded, that the monkey bars presented an inherently dangerous condition, or a trap without which the attractive nuisance theory does not apply. See Edwards v. Maule Industries, Inc., 147 So.2d 5 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1962).
AFFIRMED.
SHIVERS, J., concurs. ERVIN, J., concurs in part and dissents in part.