Case Name: WALLACE IMPORTS, INC., an Arizona corporation, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Rosalie LaPorte HOWE, real party in interest, Defendant-Appellant
Court: Arizona Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Arizona
Decision Date: 1983-09-27
Citations: 138 Ariz. 217
Docket Number: 1 CA-CIV 4869
Parties: WALLACE IMPORTS, INC., an Arizona corporation, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Rosalie LaPorte HOWE, real party in interest, Defendant-Appellant.
Judges: 
Reporter: Arizona Reports
Volume: 138
Pages: 217–229

Head Matter:
673 P.2d 961
WALLACE IMPORTS, INC., an Arizona corporation, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Rosalie LaPorte HOWE, real party in interest, Defendant-Appellant.
1 CA-CIV 4869.
Court of Appeals of Arizona, Division 1, Department D.
Sept. 27, 1983.
Reconsideration Denied Nov. 1, 1983.
Lewis & Roca by Paul G. Ulrich, Richard N. Goldsmith, Michael L. Cooper, Phoenix, for plaintiff-appellee.
John D. Lewis, P.C. by John D. Lewis, Tempe, for defendant-appellant.

Opinion:
OPINION
EUBANK, Judge.
This is an appeal from the trial court's judgment resulting from a judicial review of an administrative decision pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-901 et seq. The trial court, in effect, set aside the administrative decision of the motor vehicle division, Department of Transportation (Division), which was in favor of Rosalie LaPorte Howe (Mrs. Howe), appellant, and instead entered judgment in favor of Wallace Imports (Wallace), appellee. Mrs. Howe has appealed pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-913.
Although a number of issues are raised on appeal, the first two, involving the scope of review and abuse of discretion by the trial court, are dispositive of this appeal. We are of the opinion that the trial judge ignored the scope of administrative review in this matter and thereby erred as a matter of law. Further, since the record supports the administrative decision, the trial court's judgment must be reversed and the administrative decision reinstated.
The facts found by the Division hearing officer are as follows. Mrs. Howe and James Howe purchased a Toyota automobile from Fann Toyota on March 22, 1978. (They were married the next day). Mrs. Howe paid for the automobile with her sole and separate property. On May 12, 1978, original title number D131748 for the Toyota was issued to Rosalie Howe or James Howe, as joint tenants with the right of survivorship, and each empowered and authorized the other to act "as their Attorney in-fact to assign the certificate of title by his or her signature alone, and thereby transfer, sell, mortgage, or otherwise encumber the vehicle in the same manner as though all joint owners had acted and signed." As a result of marital problems James Howe left home on May 16, 1978, taking with him clothing, personal papers, and other personal effects of Mrs. Howe and her children. (At the time of the administrative hearing an annulment of the marriage was pending and James Howe had secreted himself to avoid service of process). On May 26,1978, Mrs. Howe filed an application with the Division for a duplicate title indicating that the original title was lost. The duplicate title, number D181093, was issued on May 30, 1978. On June 5, 1978, Mrs. Howe signed an application for title under her maiden name of Rosalie LaPorte. Title number D199472 was issued to her in that name on June 6, 1978. Sometime in the late evening of June 29 or early morning hours of June 30, 1978, James Howe, without Mrs. Howe's personal consent or knowledge, took the Toyota from the driveway of Mrs. Howe's home. On the morning of June 30, James Howe took the vehicle to Wallace, presented the original certificate of title, and sold the car to Wallace for $5,500. He immediately cashed the check and "departed for points unknown." No attempt was made by Wallace to ascertain if the title presented by James Howe to Wallace was still valid.
The record of the hearing also shows that Mrs. Howe was notified on June 30 that her Toyota was at Wallace's dealership, that she called the police and personally went to the dealer and demanded that Wallace return her vehicle, that Wallace refused her demand, and that a request was made to the Division to determine the title issue. The hearing was set by the Division under the authority of A.R.S. § 28-304(D), which grants to the Division the authority to issue and cancel certificates of title. The express purpose of the hearing, had on July 21, 1978, was "to determine if cause exists to cancel Title No. D199472," the title issued to Mrs. Howe as Rosalie LaPorte on June 6, 1978.
Wallace's main contention raised in its memorandum filed with the hearing officer and at the hearing was that Mrs. Howe's sworn statement to the Division that she had "lost" the original certificate of title was untrue. Mrs. Howe was closely cross-examined on this issue at the hearing. The hearing officer found that "the evidence presented which purported to show that the original Title was not lost at the time the duplicate [title] application was signed was insufficient to substantiate the argument that the original Title was in fact not lost." The clear implication of the finding is that Mrs. Howe believed the original title was lost when she signed the application for the issuance of a duplicate title. This issue involved a credibility question which was resolved by the fact finder in favor of Mrs. Howe.
On July 25, 1978, the hearing officer ruled that title number D199472 issued to Rosalie LaPorte on June 6, 1978, was valid and the original title, number D131748, issued on May 12, 1978, with which James Howe attempted to transfer title to Wallace, was null and void.
Wallace appealed the decision to the Superior Court under the Judicial Review of Administrative Decisions Act (A.R.S. § 12-901 et seq.,) by filing its complaint requesting a trial de novo and requesting that the entire record of the Motor Vehicle Division's hearing be transmitted to the court pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-909(B). The record was transmitted and filed with the court on December 14, 1978. It includes a full transcript of the July 21st hearing. The record shows that no objection was made to the filed record or transcript by any party. Thereafter both Mrs. Howe and the State filed their answers to Wallace's complaint. Wallace then moved for "Judgment on the Pleadings" pursuant to Rule 12(c), Rules of Civil Procedure, 16 A.R.S. Such a motion is civil pretrial motion which neither comports with the Administrative Review Act, nor with A.R.S. § 12-910, the Scope of Review, which read in 1978 as follows:
A. An action to review a final administrative decision shall be heard and determined with convenient speed. The hearing and determination shall extend to all questions of law and fact presented by the entire record before the court. No new or additional evidence in support of or in opposition to a finding, order, determination or decision of the administrative agency shall be heard by the court, except in the event of a trial de novo or in cases where in the discretion of the court justice demands the admission of such evidence.
B. The trial shall be de novo if trial de novo is demanded in the complaint or answer of a defendant other than the agency and if no hearing was held by the agency or the proceedings before the agency were not stenographically reported so that a transcript might be made. When a trial de novo is available under the provisions of this section, it may be had with a jury upon demand of any party.
Mrs. Howe objected to Wallace's motion as inappropriate under former A.R.S. § 12-910 and objected to Wallace's attempt to raise a new issue of estoppel by way of its motion for judgment on the pleadings. As a part of her response, Mrs. Howe also filed a cross-motion for summary judgment based on the administrative record on appeal.
The trial court never addressed Mrs. Howe's objections but instead, treating the administrative appeal as a pretrial motion, granted Wallace's motion for judgment on the pleadings and denied Mrs. Howe's cross-motion for summary judgment. In addition, the judgment grants Wallace affirmative relief by directing the motor vehicle division to recognize the validity of Wallace's title, number D131748, the original title executed from James Howe to Wallace, and to cancel title number D199473, the title resulting from Mrs. Howe's transfer to herself in the name of Rosalie LaPorte. No findings of fact were made by the trial court. Thus, the judgment reverses the administrative decision and Mrs. Howe appeals from the judgment which grants Wallace title to the Toyota.
Mrs. Howe's first and second issues on appeal address the trial court's failure to comply with the Administrative Review Act's Scope of Review, pursuant to former A.R.S. § 12-910, supra.
Wallace's first response is that since the hearing was not stenographically reported, but instead was tape recorded and later transcribed, that Wallace was entitled to a trial de novo. In our opinion there is no merit to this argument. This argument was never timely raised by Wallace for consideration by the court. Indeed, whether or not Wallace was entitled to a trial de novo depended, in the first instance, on the sufficiency of the transcript. A.R.S. § 12-910, supra. The sufficiency of the transcript or record could only be raised by timely objection to it. Wallace did not object to it and therefore waived any objection to the transcript it might have had. Furthermore, Wallace's memorandum supporting the motion for judgment on the pleadings did not object to the sufficiency of the record. It argued instead that the facts before the court were undisputed. Of course at that point in time, the only undisputed facts before the court were those found by the hearing officer and set forth in the administrative decision.
Next, Wallace contends that even if it was not entitled to a trial de novo the facts before the superior court were undisputed, thereby allowing the court to draw its own legal conclusions. We do not disagree with this position. A.R.S. § 12-910(A), supra, provides for review by the court of all questions of law and fact presented by the entire record. 3 Arizona Appellate Handbook, § 32.3.9.2.6. Based on this position Wallace argues that the only issue before this court on appeal is whether the trial court made an erroneous legal conclusion based on the facts.
Wallace then relies on former A.R.S. § 28-313 which stated: "The certificate of title shall be valid for the life of the vehicle so long as the vehicle is owned by the original holder thereof." Wallace argues that as long as James Howe and Mrs. Howe owned the vehicle the original certificate of title would be valid. Therefore, when James Howe sold the Toyota to Wallace on June 30, the Howes were still owners and the original certificate was still valid. This conclusion is required, contends Wallace, because the legislature did not specifically resolve the question of whether a duplicate title takes precedence over a still outstanding original title. The only statutes that bear upon the question, Wallace maintains, are former A.R.S. § 28-304(B) and A.R.S. § 28-325(E), relating to placement of liens on the face of the title and providing that the title is constructive notice of liens, respectively. Therefore, Wallace concludes, the legislature must have intended that the original title takes precedence over a duplicate certificate of title. In support of this argument, Wallace cites Doherty v. Obregon, 6 Ariz.App. 401, 433 P.2d 52 (1967) and South Texas Bank v. Renteria, 523 S.W.2d 780 (Tex.Civ.App.1975).
First, we disagree with Wallace's statutory construction argument. Prior to the 1972 general election, A.R.S. § 28-313 consisted of four subsections. The first subsection involved the certificate of title, set out above, and three other subsections involved, generally, the yearly expiration of vehicle registration, the required payment of fees, the renewal of registration and the issuance of license plates. When the electors enacted the amendment to art. 9, § 11, Arizona Constitution, in the 1972 General Election, the conditional enactment of A.R.S. § 28-313, set out above, took effect thereby removing the last three subsections and leaving the first subsection as it was. The removed subsections were partly absorbed into other enactments. See, e.g., A.R.S. § 28-305(C). The legislative intent regarding A.R.S. § 28-313, prior to the 1972 election, we believe is clear: the registration on each vehicle in the state expired yearly and required the owner to obtain a new registration each year and to pay a yearly license fee, while the certificate of title did not expire but remained valid for the life of the vehicle while owned by the same owner. The 1972 election did not change the legislative intent regarding A.R.S. § 28-313. It still must be read in juxta-position with the yearly registration statutes. Thus, A.R.S. § 28-313 does not address the validity of a lost original title which is replaced by a duplicate title.
Wallace's argument regarding A.R.S. § 28-304(B) and 28-325(E) as the only statutes which bear on the title question is also questionable. Former § 28-304(B) reads:
B. The certificate of title shall contain upon the reverse side a space for the signature of the owner, and he shall sign his name in ink in the space upon receipt of the certificate. The .certificate shall also contain upon the reverse side forms for assignment of title or interest and warranty thereof by the owner, with space for notation of liens and encumbrances upon the vehicle at the time of transfer.
while former § 28-325(E) states:
E. The filing and issuance of a new certificate of title as provided in this section shall constitute constructive notice to creditors of the owner or to subsequent purchasers of all liens and encumbrances against the vehicle described therein, except those authorized by law which are dependent upon possession. If the documents referred to in this section are received and filed in the central office of the vehicle division within ten days after the date of execution thereof, the constructive notice shall date from the time of execution, but otherwise the notice shall date from the time of receipt and filing of the documents by the vehicle division as shown by its endorsement thereon.
Wallace argues that these two subsections taken together indicate the legislature's intent that the certificate of title itself shall be notice to purchasers and creditors of the status of the title to an automobile.
Neither of these subsections directly address the title question. A.R.S. § 28-304(B) provides for execution of the certificate of title by the owner, or in this case owners, while A.R.S. § 28-325(E) involves the issuance of a new title when liens and encumbrances involving a vehicle are filed with the Division. Other statutes which bear on this title question are: A.R.S. § 28-304(A), "The vehicle division shall file each application for a certificate of title and when satisfied that the application is genuine and regular, and that the applicant is entitled to a certificate, shall register the vehicle and the owner ."; A.R.S. § 28-304(D), which reads:
D. Except as provided in § 28-325 a person owning any motor vehicle, trailer or semi-trailer may, upon furnishing satisfactory proof to the superintendent of his ownership, procure a certificate of title to the vehicle, whether or not a certificate of title thereto has previously been issued. If the superintendent determines that an applicant for a certificate of title to a motor vehicle, trailer or semitrailer is not entitled thereto, he may refuse to issue a certificate or to register the vehicle, and for like reason, after notice and hearing, may revoke a registration already made, or an outstanding certificate of title. The notice shall be served in person or by registered mail.
A.R.S. § 28-314(B) which repeats the language of A.R.S. § 28-304(D) above; A.R.S. § 28-314(A) which requires the owner to surrender the certificate of title and registration to the Division when "the owner of a registered vehicle transfers or assigns his title or interest thereto"; and A.R.S. § 28-312, authorizing issuance of a duplicate title, which reads:
If any number plate, certificate of title, permit or registration card is lost, mutilated or becomes illegible, the person entitled thereto shall make immediate application for and obtain a duplicate or substitute therefor upon furnishing information satisfactory to the division.
Thus, the statutes relating to the issuance of a certificate of title are far more complex than Wallace contends. Indeed, Mr. Bick Quayle, general manager for Wallace and Mr. Bruce Wallace, owner of Wallace, both of whom testified at the administrative hearing, demonstrated that they were completely knowledgeable about the transfer of title procedure, the issuance of a duplicate title, their reliance on the Division to issue a duplicate title only when the original was lost, and their problem getting title information from the Division.
The above statutes, and others in Title 28, A.R.S., show that the legislature intended, and has created, a comprehensive system to title and register motor vehicles for transfer and tax revenue purposes. They have delegated to the Division the duty to administer the title system. As a part of the system, when motor vehicles are originally sold, certificates of title are issued and vehicles are registered. As a vehicle is sold and resold, this procedure repeats itself throughout the life of each vehicle. If a lien or encumbrance against a particular vehicle is filed with the Division, new title and registration is required and issued to reflect the lien or encumbrance. If a certificate of title is lost, a duplicate title is issued by the Division. Therefore, we must reject Wallace's statutory construction argument as unpersuasive.
Wallace's citation of Doherty v. Obregon, 6 Ariz.App. 401, 433 P.2d 52 (1967) in support of its A.R.S. § 28-304(B), 28-325(E) argument is also misdirected. In Doherty, the former owner of a pickup truck was issued the original certificate of title. He applied to the Division for a duplicate title claiming that the original was lost. In due course the duplicate title issued. He then mortgaged the vehicle and submitted the original "lost" title to the Division for recordation of the lien. The Division title check did not catch the duplication of titles. The former owner thereafter sold the pickup to a car dealer using the duplicate title which showed no lien. He then took the money and ran. The car dealer sold the pickup to the purchaser whose application for a certificate of title was refused because of the recorded lien. Thus, the fraud perpetrated by the former owner on the car dealer was discovered. The purchaser sued the car dealer for rescission of the sale which was granted by the trial court. The judgment was affirmed on appeal by Division 2 of this court. The opinion notes that the car dealer relied on the duplicate title with no encumbrance indicated on it; that A.R.S. § 28-325(B), which provides the sole method for making a lien or encumbrance effective against a subsequent purchaser without notice, requires that the lien or encumbrance be filed with the Division "accompanied by the certificate of title last issued for the vehicle;" that the court held that the statutes do not contemplate more than one title to a single vehicle and the words "title last issued," in A.R.S. § 28-325(B), were intended to mean "title issued to the last owner"; and that since the purpose of a chattel mortgage was to protect the mortgagee not in possession of the vehicle, and the car dealer had given the purchaser an implied warranty of title pursuant to former A.R.S. § 44r-213(3), rescission of the sale of the pickup was a proper remedy for the purchaser.
Implied, but not stated in Doherty, is the conclusion that the car dealer was bound by the filed lien at the Division and the notice of lien on the original certificate of title which the dealer never saw. Also implied is a conclusion that the filed lien was effective as to the duplicate title although it did not show the encumbrance as required by A.R.S. § 28-325. Finally, the opinion implies that because the "title issued to the last owner" was the fraudulent former owner of the pickup, and because he was the same person titled by the Division with both the original certificate which showed the lien and duplicate title which did not, the car dealer was charged with notice of the encumbrance and required to bear the loss.
Without approving the dicta in Doherty, the facts sub judice are distinguishable. First, we have here an original certificate of title issued to a different owner or ownership interest, Rosalie LaPorte. In Doherty the certificate of title and duplicate were issued to the same owner. Under the court's reasoning, the "title issued to the last owner" was the same person in Doherty while there is a different ownership interest here. Second, in Doherty the court was concerned with a validly filed lien or encumbrance and with protecting the mortgagee who had fully complied with the statutes. In the instant case we have no lien or encumbrance, only the question of which certificate of title should prevail. Third, rescission was requested and granted in Doherty based on former A.R.S. § 44-213(3), while validity of title is involved sub judice. The Texas case, South Texas Bank v. Renteria, 523 S.W.2d 780 (Tex.Civ.App.1975), also relied on by Wallace, involves a factual situation similar to Doherty and it is therefore not particularly enlightening.
Wallace also cites Winship v. Standard Finance Co., 40 Ariz. 382, 12 P.2d 282 (1932), where a forged certificate of title did not pass title, and Vannoy Chevrolet Co. v. Baum, 260 Iowa 1011, 151 N.W.2d 515 (1967), where a dealer misrepresented the fact that he had lost the title and obtained a duplicate title, and sold the car. The court held that the original title governed. Winship represents the historic rule that forgery passes no title. Vannoy is similar to the instant case. However, there the finder of fact found that the dealer had misrepresented the fact in order to obtain a duplicate title, while here the finder of fact found that Mrs. Howe had not misrepresented that the original title was "lost."
Wallace's next argument is that it was not obligated under law to search the motor vehicle records to determine the condition of title before purchasing the Toyota from James Howe. Wallace argues that since A.R.S. § 28-325(E) provides that the title certificate itself is constructive notice of a lien or encumbrance, the same constructive notice of title is applicable to the original certificate of title per A.R.S. § 28-313 and its prior arguments. Therefore, since only the original certificate of title tendered Wallace could charge it with constructive notice of the status of title and that notice was that James Howe or Mrs. Howe owned the car, the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed.
In support of this argument, Wallace cites cases cited in support of earlier arguments such as Doherty, and, in addition, Kearby v. Western States Securities Co., 31 Ariz. 104, 250 P. 766 (1926). As noted above, Doherty is not applicable and Kearby predates our title statutes.
Wallace does cite Pacific Finance Corporation v. Gherna, 36 Ariz. 509, 287 P. 304 (1930) for the proposition that a certificate of title is prima facie evidence of ownership. We believe this to be the law. It is also dispositive of this argument.
In Silva v. Traver, 63 Ariz. 364, 162 P.2d 615 (1945), our supreme court said:
It is conceded, and is of course the law in this state, that proof or admission of ownership is prima facie evidence that the driver of a vehicle causing damage by its negligent operation is the servant or agent of the owner and using the vehicle in the business of the owner. Baker v. Maseeh, 20 Ariz. 201, 179 Pac. 53. But "prima facie evidence," so called, is, strictly, no evidence at all. It is only a presumption of law. Barton v. Camden, 147 Va. 263, 137 S.E. 465. It has been uniformly so treated and denominated by this court. Baker v. Maseeh, supra; Lutfy v. Lockhart, 37 Ariz. 488, 295 Pac. 975. And such presumptions are mere arbitrary rules of law, to be applied in the absence of evidence. Whenever evidence contradicting a legal presumption is introduced the presumption vanishes. Seiler v. Whiting, 52 Ariz. 542, 84 Pac.(2d) 452; Flores v. Tucson Gas, Elec. L. & P. Co., 54 Ariz. 460, 97 Pac.(2d) 206.
63 Ariz. at 367-68, 162 P.2d at 616-17.
In Coffey v. Williams, 69 Ariz. 126, 210 P.2d 959 (1949), our supreme court rejected an argument similar to Wallace's that the certificate of title obtained from the state was the prima facie title and could not be rebutted in a replevin action. The court held that the title was subject to rebuttal evidence. See also Udall, Arizona Law of Evidence § 191 (1st ed. 1960). In Price v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 102 Ariz. 227, 427 P.2d 919 (1967), our supreme court upheld the sale of automobiles to buyers without certificates of title as against the financier of the dealer that held the certificates of title.
Thus, we find the law clear that a certificate of title is merely prima facie evidence of the title to a motor vehicle. In an action such as this one, such evidence may be rebutted. Here the record before the administrative hearing officer contains substantial evidence that the prima facie title was rebutted and the administrative decision, in effect, so held. On that factual basis, without more evidence, the decision should have been affirmed by the trial court. Whether or not Wallace is required to search the records of the Division when purchasing a car involves business judgment. Mr. Wallace testified that in his long career as a dealer this was the first time such a thing had happened to him. From this testimony we can only conclude that the system works reasonably well. We do note that most of the cases cited by both sides involve dealers or salesmen knowledgeable with title transfer. Here, for example, James Howe had worked for a car dealer across the street from Wallace and had discussed the sale of the Toyota with Mr. Quayle of Wallace one month before he appeared and sold the car to Wallace.
Wallace's final argument, estoppel, as noted before, was not timely raised and is deemed waived.
The judgment of the trial court is reversed and this matter is remanded to the trial court with directions to reinstate and affirm the administrative decision involved herein.
. Other issues raised at the administrative level were that Wallace was a purchaser of the Toyota in good faith and therefore entitled to title pursuant to A.R.S. § 44-2348(A) [U.C.C. § 2-403], and that Mrs. Howe's transfer to herself was invalid for lack of consideration.
. Under former A.R.S. § 12-910 (amended 1980), a trial de novo could only be had, as a matter of right, if the administrative hearing had not been stenographically reported. This was changed in 1980 to include mechanically recorded hearings. Laws 1980, Ch. 72, § 1. The hearing sub judice was mechanically recorded prior to the amendment.
. 1. Could the Maricopa County Superior Court reverse the final administrative decision of the Arizona Department of Transportation motor vehicle division determining the appellant's title to be valid and that through which the appellee claims to be null and void without a determination that the administrative decision was illegal, arbitrary, capricious or involved an abuse of discretion?
2. Was the final administrative decision of the Arizona Department of Transportation Motor Vehicle Division, deciding that the title issued to appellant on June 6, 1978 was valid and that the original title issued May 12,1978 and through which appellee claims was null and void, illegal, arbitrary, capricious or the result of an abuse of discretion?
. The 1979 amendment to this section added: "unless it has been replaced by a duplicate title pursuant to § 28-312." This codified language previously appeared only on the face of the Division's application for duplicate title form.