Case Name: Isidor Straus et al., Composing the Firm of R. H. Macy & Company, Appellants, v. American Publishers' Association et al., Respondents
Court: New York Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1908-12-08
Citations: 193 N.Y. 496
Docket Number: 
Parties: Isidor Straus et al., Composing the Firm of R. H. Macy & Company, Appellants, v. American Publishers’ Association et al., Respondents.
Judges: 
Reporter: New York Reports
Volume: 193
Pages: 496–503

Head Matter:
Isidor Straus et al., Composing the Firm of R. H. Macy & Company, Appellants, v. American Publishers’ Association et al., Respondents.
1. Patents and Copyrights Intended to Secure Monopolies. The object of copyright and patent statutes is to give monopolies, and contracts made to secure the protection and enjoyment of such a monopoly are not condemned as being in restraint of trade.
2. Doctrine of Bes Adjudicata Applied. Declarations of the law pronounced by this court after due deliberation are conclusive in the action in which the decision was made; so held, where the question as to rights conferred by copyright statutes is still an open one in the United States Supreme Court. (Following Straus v. American Publishersf Assn., 177 N. Y. 473; distinguishing Bobbs-Merrill Go. v. Straus, 210 U. S. 339.)
Straus v. American Publishers’ Assn., 127 App. Div. 935, affirmed.
(Argued November 12, 1908;
decided December 8, 1908.)
Appeal, by permission, from a judgment of tbe Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the first judicial department, entered October 20, 1908, affirming an interlocutory judgment in favor of defendants entered upon a decision of the court on trial at Special Term.
This action was brought to enjoin the defendants from acting under an agreement, alleged to be in unlawful restraint of trade, whereby they bound themselves to sell copyrighted and other books published by them only to booksellers who would agree to maintain a fixed retail price therefor for one year. Demurrers to the complaint were sustained at Special Term. Thereafter the judgment entered thereon was reversed by the Appellate Division and the demurrers overruled. On appeal, by permission to this court, the judgment of the Appellate Division was affirmed, but upon the sole ground that the agreement complained of related to uncopyrighted books as well as to copyrighted books. After a subsequent trial of the issues at Special Term, an interlocutory judgment was entered declaring the agreement unlawful so far as it related to nncopyrighted books and enjoining the defendants “ from interfering in any maimer whatsoever with the pur chase by the -plaintiff of uncopyrighted books at wholesale or retail.” The plaintiffs thereupon appealed to the Appellate Division from so much of the judgment as “ refuses to grant to the plaintiffs an injunction restraining any interference with their purchase or sale of copyrighted books and fails or refuses to award * * * the damages suffered by the plaintiffs in the purchase or sale of copyrighted books since May 1,1901.” In that court the interlocutory judgment was affirmed on the authority of the previous decision of the Court of Appeals.Permission to appeal from the judgment of affirmance was thereafter granted and the following question certified : “ Are the plaintiffs, under the findings of fact contained in the decision in this case, entitled, in so far as copyrighted books are concerned, to the relief demanded in the complaint, or to any relief as against the defendants in this case ? ”
Edmond E. Wise and John G. Carlisle for appellants.
Whether the views of the judge writing the prevailing opinion in the former appeal be taken as an obiter dictum, or whether they express the views of the court, it is respectfully submitted that they are based upon an erroneous conception of the extent and character of the monopoly granted by the Federal copyright statutes, as interpreted by the United States courts, and that by reason of that fact the decision of this court “ has ceased to be an authority.” (Sands v. State of New Work, 182 N. Y. 400; Bobbs-Merrill co. v. Straus, 210 U. S. 339; Stephens v. Cady, 14 How. [U. S.] 528; Stephens v. Gladding, 58 U. S. 447; A. T. Co. v. Werkmeister, 207 U. S. 72; Werkmeister v. A. L. Co., 134 Fed. Rep. 321; Palmer v. De Witt, 47 N. Y. 532; J. M. Agency v. Jewelers’ Pub. Co., 155 N. Y. 241; Drone on Copyright, 100; Holmes v. Hurst, 174 U. S. 182.)
Stephen H. Olin for respondents.
The decision of this court in the suit at bar (177 U. Y. 473) has not been questioned, criticised or doubted, nor has its authority in any way been impaired, nor is it in any way inconsistent with the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus (210 U. S. 339). (Murphy v. C. P. A. P. Co., 38 App. Div., 426; Board of Trade v. C. G. & S. Co., 198 U. S. 236; A. & N. Assn. v. O’Gorman Co., 147 Fed. Rep. 616; Park & Sons Co. v. Hartman, 153 Fed. Rep. 24; Wells v. Abraham, 146 Fed. Rep. 190; 149 Fed. Rep. 408; N. P. Co., Ltd., v. E. B. O. Co., Ltd., L. R. [1 Ch. Div. 1908] 335; Parton v. Prang, 3 Cliff. 587; Littlefield v. Perry, 21 Wall. 205; Black v. H. G. Allen Co., 56 Fed. Rep. 764, 768; Stevens v. Gladding, 17 How. (U. S.) 447; V. T. Machine Co. v. Fair, 123 Fed. Rep. 424.) The decision of this court (177 N. Y. 473) is the law of this case, and will not be departed from. (Oakley v. Aspinwall, 13 N. Y. 500; Mygatt v. Coe, 147 N. Y. 456; Hosack v. Rogers, 25 Wend. 313; Cluff v. Day, 141 N. Y. 580; Roberts v. Buckley, 145 N. Y. 229.)

Opinion:
Gray, J.
I think this judgment should be affirmed and that we should adhere to our previous decision in this case. We should not, upon the present appeal, entertain the question of the correctness of the propositions decided; but we should take them as declarations of the law, pronounced by the court after due deliberation, and conclusive in the action. The question of the extent, to which the rights conferred by the copyright statutes may be protected by contract, is still an open one in the United States Supreme Court. The case of Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, (210 U. S. 339), differs in the important fact that there was no such contract, as was in question here. The claim for protection, there, rested upon a printed notice in the book fixing its price at retail.
The object of copyright and of patent statutes is to give monopolies and that contracts made by the owners of copyrights, to secure the fullest protection in the enjoyment of the monopoly, will not be condemned by the courts, for being in unlawful restraint of trade, we have decided. Until the United States Supreme Court has pronounced differently upon such an agreement concerning the future sales of copy righted books, as is now in question, our former decision stands as the law of the case; however it may be argued that in some other action the decision of the Federal tribunal warrants a different inference as to the interpretation to be given to the copyright statute.