Case Name: Austin v. Austin
Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Mississippi
Decision Date: 1924-06-16
Citations: 136 Miss. 61
Docket Number: No. 23874
Parties: Austin v. Austin.
Judges: Holden, J., concurs in above dissent.
Reporter: Mississippi Reports
Volume: 136
Pages: 61–99

Head Matter:
Austin v. Austin.
(En Banc.
June 16, 1924.)
[100 So. 591.
No. 23874.]
Husband and Wife. Neither husband nor wife can sue the other for personal tort.
Section 94 of the Constitution of 1890, and sections 2517 and 2518, Code of 1906 (Hemingway’s Code, sections 2051 and 2052), emancipating married women from the common-law disabilities of coverture, do not have the effect to remove the common-law disability of husband and wife to sue each other for a personal tort; therefore the common law stands, and neither husband nor wife can maintain such a suit.
Ethbidge and Hodden, JJ., dissenting.
Appeal from circuit court of Hinds county, First District.
Hon. W. H. Pottee, Judge.
Suit by Mrs. Yiola Austin against H. L. Austin. From a judgment for defendant, plaintiff appeals.
Affirmed.
Teat & Potter, for appellant.
The question here presented for the decision of this court is the construction of sections 2517 and 2518, Code of 1906', sections 2051 and 2052, Hemingway’s Code. The states of Alabama, New Hampshire, Connecticut, Oklahoma, Arkansas and North Carolina, all support our contention that under statutes, either identical or similar to ours, a wife may sue her husband for a tort committed upon her. The New Hampshire statute and the Mississippi statute are almost identical. Johnson v. Johnson (Ala.), 77 So. 335, 201 Ala. 41, 6 A. L. E. 1031; Brown v. Brown, 88 Conn. 42, 89 Atl. 889, 52 L. E. A. (N. S.) 185. To the same effect are the cases of Fiedler v. Fiedler (Okla.), 140 Pac. 1022, 52 L, E. A. (N. S.) 189'; Fitzpatrick v. Owen (Ark.), 186 S. W. 832,187 S. "W. 460, 124 Ark. 167, LB. A. 1917B, 774, Ann. Cas. 1918C, 772;' Prosser v. Prosser (N. C.), 102 S. E. 787; Cromivell v. Cromwell, 105 S. E. 206, 106 S. E. 149.
In the court below, opposing counsel contended that although the Mississippi statute gave the wife the right to sue and be sued with all rights and liabilities incident thereto as if she were unmarried, and in express terms gave her the right of suing her husband, this action would not lie because no cause of action arose in her favor when the tort was committed upon her. If this is true' the words of the statute are meaningle'ss because under the common law no cause of action ever arose in favor of either spouse as against the other. The theory of unity prevailing and there only being one person in the eyes of the law, and that person being the husband, of course, no cause of action would lie. But can it be said in this enlightened age and in the state which enacted the first Married Woman’s Act that this barbaric relic of antiquity still prevails.
If the wife is, in the eyes of the law, a separate being, endowed with her own identity and subject to all of the obligations imposed by law upon her, then the statute giving her a right to sue and be sued as if she were unmarried and giving her the further right in express terms to sue her husband, confers upon her the right to maintain this action.
In those cases supporting the contrary position," it is urged that it would be contrary to public policy to allow such actions to be brought; that the sanctity of the home would be invaded if the wife could sue her husband for real and fancied wrongs thereby destroying the granite pillars of civilization. Our answer to this contention is twofold: First, that this is a matter over which the courts have no concern. If the common-law fiction of unity does not prevail in Mississippi and if the legislature has decreed that the public policy of our state is that the wife may sue her husband there is nothing for the court to do but to carry out this announced public policy. The public policy of the state, of course, is fixed by the legislature, and the courts having determined the intention of the legislature are in duty bound to carry out that intention.
Our second answer to the defense of public policy is that it is no more scandalous, no more liable to destroy the sanctity of the home for the wife to sue her hasband in a civil action than it is for her to testify in the divorce courts or in the criminal courts touching the same subject-matter. It was a proud boast of the common law that there was a redress for every ■wrong. There is no question that the plaintiff in this case was greatly damaged by reason of the negligent action of the defendant. There can be no doubt that in the enlightened public mind the old theory of unity has been abolished. A mere reading of the statute will convince the mind that the legislature has given the wife the right to sue her husband. All this being true, we contend that the demurrer to the defendant’s replication should be sustained and that this case should be reversed and remanded.
Watkins, Watkins <& Eager, for appellee.
For the thorough understanding of this question, it will be necessary to review the original common law upon the subject. At common law the husband and wife were considered one person. There was a complete unity of person and of interest. ■ Marriage operated as a gift from the wife to the husband of all personal property, and the husband could do as he pleased with it; and likewise, the earnings of the wife went to the husband. See Magruder v. Steivard, 4 How. 204; Kilcrease v. Kilerease, 7 Howard, 311; Lyon v. Knott, 4 Cush. 548; Clarke v. McCreary, 12 S. & M. 347; Henderson v. Warmack, 5 . Cush. 830; Armstrong v. Armstrong, 3 George, 279.
At common law, a married woman had no right to bind herself by contract, such contract being'absolutely void. Davis v. Foye, 7 S. & M. 64. Suits for the recovery of her separate estate were brought in the name of her husband, down to 1857, when she was permitted to join with her husband but could sue alone if her husband refused to join. Winston v. McClendon, 43 Miss. 254; Blodgett v. Ebbing, 2 Cush. 245 ; 30 Corpus Juris, 495.
Mississippi Legislation. The injustice of this sitúa.tion was early apparent to the lawmakers of the state of Mississippi. The original act dealing with the subject was that of 1836, and another one was in 1846. These acts were brought forward in the Mississippi Code of 1857, sections 335>-336.
Notwithstanding this act, the wife still suffered other common-law disabilities. She could not contract with her husband and she could not bind her personal estate by engaging in business or trade. Sections 1778, 1779 and 1780, of the Code of 1871, however, contained all the provisions emancipating the wife, contained in the code of 1857, and in addition thereto provided that' she could engage in business as a feme sole, and enter into contracts with her husband.
In the Code of 1880, sections 1167, 1168' and 116'9, married women were completely emancipated, all comm on - law disabilities were removed in respect to their property, and it was provided that husband and wife might sue each other, and a married woman was permitted to dispose of her property by last will and testament.
Practically the same provision is found in chapter 61 of the Code of 1892; and the identical provisions are brought forward in chapter 35 of Hemingway’s Code of the state of Mississippi.
The 'Issue Here. Our contention is that the acts of the Mississippi legislature emancipating woman in respect to her property and property rights did not completely revolutionize the marriage status and destroy the unity of husband and wife except as specifically provided by the statute; that the statutes providing remedies for the enforcement of existing rights, such as are expressly conferred, and that the statute permitting the husband to sue the wife and the wife to sue the husband created no liability not existing at the time or created by the statute. Such statutes are in derogation of common law, and that the unity of husband and wife will not be disturbed or destroyed to any greater extent than the statutes have provided. Griffin v. Miller, 29 Ca. App. 585, 116 S. E. 339; Viguere v. Viguere (La.), 63 So. 89: Bertles v. Nunan, 92 N. Y. 152, 44 A. H. 361.
Our position is that the unity of husband and wife is not completely destroyed. The husband was not liable to the wife nor was the wife liable to the husband, at common law, because they were the same person and the law could import no obligation on the part of one to the other. Our statutes have only changed the rule, and abrogated the unity of husband and wife, in respect to her property, and given her appropriate remedies for the enforcement of her property rights. In all other respects the unity of the husband and wife prevails to the fullest extent. Section'2051 of Hemingway’s Code; Section 2052, Hemingway’s Code. While we find no de cisión from this court directly in point. Hewlett v. Rags-dale, 68 Miss. 703, is strongly analogous.
We now invite the attention of the court to the following authorities in support of the appellee’s theory of this case: 13 R. C. L., Subject “Husband and Wife,” paragraphs 443-444; Thompson- v. Thompson (Court of Appeals, D\ C.),-14 A. & E. Ann. Cases 879; Thompson v. Thompson, 218 U. S. 611, 54 L. Ed. 1180; California: Peters v. Peters, 103 Pac. 219, 23 L. R. A. (N. S.), 699; Georgia: Hyman v. Hyman, 92 S. E. 25; Iowa: Peters v. Peters, 42 Iowa, 182; Kentucky: Dishon v. Dishon, 219 S. W. 794; Maine: Abbott v. Abbott, 67 Me. 304, 24 Am. Rep. 27; Michigan: Bandfieldy. Bandfielcl, 40 L. R. A. 757; Minnesota: Strom v. Strom, 107 N. W. 1047, 116 A. S. R. 387, Note 14, A. & E'. Cas. 882; Missouri: Rogers v. Rogers, 177 S. W. 384; New York: Schultz v. Schultz, 98 N. Y. 644, and Newton v. Webber, 196 N. Y. S. 113 ; Pennsylvania: Smith v. Smith, 29 Pa. Dist. 10; Tennessee: Lillienhamp v. Rippetoe, 179 S. W. 628; Texas: Sylces v. Spear, 112 S. W. 422; Wilson v. Brown, 154 S. W. 322; Virginia: Osborn, Adm., v. Keister, 96 S. E. 315,1 A. L. R. 439; Washington: Schultz v. Christopher, 38 L. R. A. (N. S.) 780;'England: Phillips v. Barnett, 1 Q. B. I). 436; Text books: 1 Cooley on Torts (3 Ed.), 474; 2 Kinkead’s Commentaries on Torts, 868; 30' Corpus Juris, 954, par. 675.
Teat £ Potter, for appellant in reply.
An Analysis of our Law of Husband and Wife. Section 2051 provides for a full emancipation from all disability on account of coverture. Section 2052 provides that husband and wife may sue each other, section 2053 provides that dower and curtesy as heretofore known are abolished. These sections stand in a class to themselves.
Let us now carefully examine section 2051, its language and punctuation. The court will notice that the first sentence is set off by a semi-colon, “Married women are fully emancipated from all disability on account of coverture. ’ ’ This language is plain, simple and easily understood. It is a completed sentence. This language is chosen in the simplest words, and conveys an idea as definite as is possible to be stated. There is no modification or exception in this sentence. There is no limitation in this sentence. There is no duplicity in this sentence. There is no difficulty in understanding- its meaning. It will be observed that the word “fully” before the word “emancipated” was intended to mean that the unity of husband and wife was “totally” destroyed and their legal identity wholly annihilated.
Construction of Statutes. We call the attention of the court to the primary law on the construction of statutes and invoke the application of it in the construction of the chapter in our Code on “husband and wife.” 25 R. C. L., p. 961, sec. 217, p. 963, sec. 218; Love v. Taylor, 26 Miss. 567; Moore v. Rowe (Miss.), 53 So. 626; (1871) Koch v. Bridges, 45 M. 247; (1907) Yerger v. State, 91 Miss. 802, 45 So. 849; Llaivltins v. Carroll County, 50'Miss. 735; Peeler v. Peeler, 68 Miss. 141, 8 So. 392'; (1913) Abbott v. State, 106 Miss. 340, 63 So.'667; (1913) Holly Springs v. Marshall County, 104 Miss. 752, 61 So. 703.; (1915) Prather v. Googe, 108 Miss. 670, 67 So. 157; State v. J. J. Newman Limiber Co., 103 Miss. 263, 60 So. 215, 45 L. R. A. (N. S.) 858.
Expressio IJnins Est Exclusio Alterius. We especially desire to call the attention of the court to the fact that sections 2054, 2055 and 2056 of Hemingway’s Code, have expressed a modification of the Statute, section 2051. We deem this important because the legislature has interpreted section 2051 to mean that coverture has been totally destroyed. We therefore invoke the ancient rule, “Expressio unius est exclusio alterkis.” It is a general principle of interpretation that the mention of one thing implies the exclusion of another thing. 25 R. O. L., page 981, section 229, and cases cited in the notes.
Authorities of Appellee Not in Point. In no instance did the court have before it similar statutes to those in chapter 25 of Hemingway’s Code.
Argued orally by J. A. Teat, for appellant, and IF. H. Watkins, for appellee.
Headnate 1. Husband and Wife, 30 C. J., section 675.

Opinion:
Anderson, J.,
delivered the opinion of the court.
Appellant, Mrs. Viola Austin, sued the appellee, her husband, H. L. Austin, in the circuit court of Hinds county, for injuries alleged to have been received by her by reason of the negligent and reckless manner in which her said husband operated his automobile in which she was riding with him as his guest. The negligence consisted of his driving the car at an excessive rate of speed, causing it to overturn and injure appellant.
Appellee filed a special plea to appellant's declaration, sotting up1 as a defense to the cause the fact that appellant and appellee at the time of said injury, and continuously thereafter1 up to and including the time of the trial of the cause, were man and wife and living together as such. To this special plea the appellant demurred on the ground that it presented no defense under the law, which demurrer the trial court overruled, appellant declining leave to plead further, a final judgment was entered dismissing her cause, from which she prosecutes this appeal. The sole question, therefore, in the case is whether under the laws of this state a husband is liable to his wife for an injury suffered by her as the result of a tort committed by him on her person.
Appellant admits that there was no such liability at common law, but contends that there is liability in this state under section 94 of our Constitution and sections 2517 and 2518, Code of 1906 (2051 and 2052, Hemingway's Code), emancipating women from the common-law1 disability of coverture. Those provisions of the Constitution and statutes are in the following language in the order stated above:
Sec. 94. ' ' The legislature shall never create by law any distinction between the rights of men and women to acquire, own, enjoy, and dispose of property of all kinds, or their power to contract in reference thereto. Married women are hereby fully emancipated from all disability on account of coverture. But this shall not prevent the legislature from regelating contracts between husband and wife; nor shall the legislature be prevented from regulating the sale of homesteads."
2517 (2051) "Married women are fully emancipated from all disability on account of coverture; and the' common law as to the disabilities of married women and its effect on the rights of property of the wife, is totally abrogated, and marriage shall not impose any disability or incapacity on a woman as to the ownership, acquisition or disposition of property of any sort, or as to her capacity to make contracts and do all acts in reference to property which she could lawfully do if she were not married; but every woman now married, or hereafter to be married, shall have the same capacity to acquire, hold, manage, control, use, enjoy, and dispose of all property, real and personal, in possession or expectancy and to make any contract in reference to it, and to bind herself personally, and to sue and be sued, with all the rights and liabilities incident thereto, as if she were not married. ' '
2518 (2052) "Husband and wife may sue each other."
Appellee contends and the trial court so held, that said constitutional and statutory provisions made no such change in the common law; that neither expressly nor by implication do they give the wife or the husband a right of action against the other for a. personal tort.
In order to determine this question, it should be kept in mind of what the common-law disabilities' of coverture consisted. At common law a husband and wife were regarded as one person. By marriage he became the owner of all her tangible personal property as fully as if he had bought and paid for it. He became the owner of her dioses in action, provided he reduced them to possession actual or constructive during; coverture. He was entitled to possession and control and the right to receive the rents and profits of her real estate during coverture, and under certain conditions this right was enlarged to an estate for life in said rents and profits. She could not make a will nor make a contract, nor could she sue or be sued alone. The earnings of the wife went to the husband. 'All suits in her behalf had to be brought in the name of her husband. The husband had to be joined in all suits against her. There was no right of action in either the husband or the. wife for a personal tort of the other. The wife was without right of action against her husband for any wrong against her estate. The wife's disability to sue the husband was not alone for the lack of a remedy. That was merely incidental. It was for the lack of any cause of action. Therefore, in order to remove any disability of coverture affecting her right to sue, it was necessary to confer a right of action on her. Giving her a remedy to sue was not sufficient. Let us see if a right of action was conferred.
The first clause of section 94 of the Constitution prohibits the legislature from creating, any distinction between "the rights of men and women to acquire, own, enjoy, and dispose of property of all kinds or their power to contract in reference thereto." It is apparent at once that this broad language is not confined to married men and women, but the inhibition extends to all men and women whether married or single. The next clause of section 94 of the Constitution is in this language: ' ' Married women are hereby fully emancipated from all disability on account of coverture." The balance of the section could have no bearing on the question involved in this case. The language of section 2517, Code of 1906 (20'51 Hemingway's Code, to the first semicolon, is an exact re-script of the second clause of section 94 of the Constitution quoted above, following which the section undertakes to set out, in our opinion, wherein and in what respect the full emancipation granted in the first part of the section consists. It consists of the abolition of the disabilities of married women so far as property rights are concerned. By express terms of the statute she is given full right to acquire, own, and dispose of all kinds of property. And the right to make contracts and do all acts with reference to property which she could lawfully do were she not married. She is given the right to sue and to be sued as if she were single. There is nothing in the statute granting these specific rights which by any sort of construction could be made to include the right of the wife to sue the husband for a tort against her person. Section 2518, Code 0^1906, section 2052, Hemingway's Code, providing that "husband and wife may sue each other," confers on neither any right of action against the other. Its purpose was to authorize suits by husband and wife against each other where there existed a cause of action. Therefore, if any such right is conferred on the wife, it is by virtue of the second clause of section 94 of the Constitution and the first part of section 2517, Code of 1906 (2051 Hemingway's Code), in the language quoted above: Married women are fully emancipated from all disability on account of coverture." Clearly, if appellant is entitled to prevail in this case, it must be by virtue of that language.
Our Constitution and statutes on the subject were enacted for the purpose of striking down the inequalities existing between husband and wife. The intent was to put the wife on the exact equality with her husband — to emancipate her from the common-law slavery to her husband. It was not the purpose of the makers of our Constitution nor of the legislature to entirely destroy the unity of man and wife with all the incidents flowing therefrom. One of the disabilities of coverture was that neither could testify against the other. It took a statute specifically removing that disability. Section 1916:, Code 1906; Hemingway's Code, section 1576. Equality between them as to the acquisition, ownership, and disposition of property, and the right to contract and be contracted with, and sue and be sued with reference to property and contract rights were the things aimed at. At common law there was no right of action either by husband or wife against the other for a personal tort. There was absolute equality in'that respect. Therefore there was no occasion to emancipate the wife with reference to such torts, because the husband was under the same sort of disability as the wife.
If appellant's contention were sound, we would have the novel situation of the wife having a cause of action against her husband for a personal tort, while the husband would have no- such right against his wife; for there is nothing either in our Constitution or statutes which gives any such right to the husband.
The divorce courts and the criminal courts furnish ample redress to the husband and wife for such wrongs as this. The husband and wife in these times have enough grievances for the courts and scandal mongers without by a strained construction another being added by the courts. If another is to be added, it must be done by the legislature, not by the courts in the face of the great weight of authority both in numbers and reasoning. It would be hard to conceive of what good purpose would be accomplished 'by such suits'. For1 illustration: The husband and wife are living together. She recovers judgment against him for an assault and battery and collects the judgment and puts the money in bank to her credit. They continue to live together as man and wife, if the lawsuit has not separated them. Result: The money would still be available for family purposes? except what had been expended in court costs and lawyers' fees. It would be like the husband taking money out of one of his pockets and putting it back in another. Of course, the same would be true of a suit and recovery by the husband against the wife on a like cause. Secrecy will cure many troubles of the home, while publicity will only add fuel'to the flames.
Many of the authorities holding this view construed statutes substantially like our Constitution and statutes on the subject. We cite some of them: Peters v. Peters, 156 Cal. 32, 103 Pac. 219, 23 L, R. A. (N. S.) 699; 13 R. C. L. Subject "Husband and Wife," pars. 443 and 444; Thompson v. Thompson, 218 U. S. 611, 31 Sup. Ct. 111, 54 L. Ed. 1180, 30 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1153, 21 Ann. Cas. 921; Heyman v. Heyman, 19 Ga. App. 634, 92 S. E. 25; Peters v. Peters, 42 Iowa, 182; Dishon v. Dishon, 187 Ky. 497, 219 S. W. 794, 13 A. L. R. 625; Abbott v. Abbott, 67 Me. 304, 24 Am. Rep. 27; Bandfield v. Bandfield, 117 Mich. 80, 75 N. W. 287; 40 L. R. A. 757, 72 Am. St. Rep 550; Strom v. Strom, 98 Minn. 427, 107 N. W. 1047, 6 L. R. A. (N. S.) 191, 116 Am. St. Rep. 387, 14 Ann. Cas. 882; Rogers v. Rogers, 265 Mo. 200, 177 S. W. 384; Schultz v. Schultz, 89 N. T. 644; Smith v. Smith, 29 Pa. Dist. R. 10; Lillienkamp v. Rippetoe, 133 Tenn. 57, 179 S. W. 628; Sykes v. Speer (Tex. Civ. App), 112 S. W. 422; Osborn v. Keister, 123 Ya. 157, 96 S. E. 315, 1 A. L. R, 539; Schultz v. Christopher, 65 Wash. 496, 118 Pac. 629, 38 L. R. A. (N. S.) 780; Phillip v. Barnett (England), 1 Q. B. D. 436.
The courts of Alabama., Arkansas, Connecticut, New Hampshire, and Oklahoma hold to the contrary. In some of those states, however, the statutes construed were materially different in substance, from our Constitution and statutes on the subject.
Affirmed.