Case Name: LEE v. CITY OF UTICA
Court: Michigan Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1978-06-05
Citations: 83 Mich. App. 679
Docket Number: Docket No. 77-915
Parties: LEE v CITY OF UTICA
Judges: Before: D. C. Riley, P. J., and D. F. Walsh and A. C. Miller, JJ.
Reporter: Michigan appeals reports; cases decided in the Michigan Court of Appeals.
Volume: 83
Pages: 679–685

Head Matter:
LEE v CITY OF UTICA
Docket No. 77-915.
Submitted November 8, 1977, at Detroit.
Decided June 5, 1978.
Plaintiffs, Tung Gan Lee and Myong Suk Lee, were stopped while driving by defendant Sergeant Robert L. Poynter, a sergeant in the Utica Police Department. Plaintiffs filed suit in Macomb Circuit Court against Sgt. Poynter and the City of Utica alleging tha Sgt. Poynter assaulted them without justification, uttered racial epithets and engaged in other acts of brutality and harassment against plaintiffs, and seeking damages from defendants for false arrest, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, violation of plaintiffs’ civil rights and for "the tort of insult and outrage”. The trial court, Hunter D. Stair, J., granted accelerated judgment on behalf of the City of Utica on the grounds of governmental immunity. Plaintiffs appeal. Held:
A police officer engaged in making a traffic arrest is engaged "in the exercise or discharge of a governmental function”, for which the governmental body has been granted immunity from tort liability by statute.
Affirmed.
D. C. Riley, J., dissented. She would hold that the statute granting governmental bodies immunity from tort liability in the exercise of governmental functions does not extend to intentional torts of the police officer making an arrest.
Opinion op the Court
1. Torts—Statutes—Governmental Immunity—Municipal Corporations—Governmental Function—Arrest as Governmental Function.
A policeman making an arrest is engaged in an activity "in the exercise or discharge of a governmental function” under a statute granting a government agency immunity from tort liability for such activity (MCL 691.1407; MSA 3.996[107]).
References for Points in Headnotes
56 Am Jur 2d, Municipal Corporations, Counties, and other Political Subdivisions § 285.
63 Am Jur 2d, Public Officers and Employees §§ 288 et seq., 304.
72 Am Jur 2d, States, Territories, and Dependencies § 99 et seq.
Nature and status of rule as to municipal immunity from liability for torts. 60 ALR2d 1198.
57 Am Jur 2d, Municipal, School, and State Tort Liability § 298 et seq.
63 Am Jur 2d, Public Officers and Employees § 289 et seq.
Dissent by D. C. Riley, P. J.
2. Torts—Statutes—Municipal Corporations—Intentional Torts —Governmental Immunity—Governmental Function—Arrest as Governmental Function.
A statute providing governmental immunity to a municipality exercising or discharging a governmental function does not extend immunity for intentional torts committed by a police officer in making an arrest (MCL 691.1407; MSA 3.996[107]]).
LaBarge, Zatkoff & Dinning, P. C. (by Robert G. Lyons), for plaintiffs.
Joselyn, Rowe, Jamieson & Grinnan, P. C. (by Gary W. Carravas), for defendant.
Before: D. C. Riley, P. J., and D. F. Walsh and A. C. Miller, JJ.
Circuit judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.

Opinion:
D. F. Walsh, J.
The relevant facts of this case are ably reported in our colleague's dissenting opinion and are adopted here. We find no error, however, in the trial court's entry of accelerated judgment, GCR 1963, 116.1, dismissing plaintiffs' suit against the City of Utica on the grounds of governmental immunity.
The act of a policeman in making an arrest is an activity "in the exercise or discharge of a governmental function". MCL 691.1407; MSA 3.996(107). The suggestion that it might not be was expressly rejected by the majority in Thomas v Department of State Highways, 398 Mich 1, 13-14; 247 NW2d 530 (1976):
"Under the guise of 'judicial refinement', the Kav anagh/Fitzgerald opinion has sought to impose rather novel standards for governmental immunity. For example, the opinion suggests that if a police commission plans a particular type of war on crime, that is a governmental function, but if a police officer under that plan performs the traditional police function of arresting a criminal, that is not a governmental function. This certainly does not in any way correspond to the meaning the Legislature intended." (Emphasis added, footnote omitted.)
Moreover we find the case before us to be distinguishable from Kriger v South Oakland County Mutual Aid Pact, 399 Mich 835; 250 NW2d 67 (1977), relied upon in the dissenting opinion. In Kriger the police officer assailants were not involved in the governmental function of making an arrest but were engaged in an unprovoked assault.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. No costs, a public question.
A. C. Miller, J., concurred.
In the Court of Appeals opinion in Kriger v South Oakland County Mutual Aid Pact, 49 Mich App 7, 9; 211 NW2d 228 (1973) the facts were stated to be as follows:
"On August 25, 1970, a disturbance took place at Memorial Park in Royal Oak, Michigan. Police were ordered to the scene to restore order. Plaintiff, a 17-year-old amateur photographer, had been observing the altercation from a vantage point across the street. Suddenly and without provocation, three police officers assaulted and beat him, causing severe and lasting injuries. The assailants were not attempting to arrest plaintiff. The incident was recorded by newspaper photographers and TV cameramen and later published and broadcast. The officers involved could not be identified." (Emphasis added.)