Case Name: National Bank of Auburn, Resp't, v. Edwin R. Dillingham, Impleaded, etc., App'lt
Court: New York Supreme Court, General Term
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1895-04-12
Citations: 68 N.Y. St. Rep. 147
Docket Number: 
Parties: National Bank of Auburn, Resp’t, v. Edwin R. Dillingham, Impleaded, etc., App’lt.
Judges: 
Reporter: New York State Reporter
Volume: 68
Pages: 147–149

Head Matter:
National Bank of Auburn, Resp’t, v. Edwin R. Dillingham, Impleaded, etc., App’lt.
(Supreme Court, General Term, Fifth Department,
Filed April 12, 1895.)
Corporations — Directors—Liability.
The provisions of section 24, chapter 688 of 1892, which renders the directors liable for the corporate debts in excess of the paid-up capital, relates only to the creditors whose debt is thus created, and the other creditors are not necessary parties to an action to enforce such liability.
Appeal from an interlocutory judgment, overruling a demurrer to the complaint.
Nelson S. Spencer, for app’lt; Charles I. Avery, for resp’t.

Opinion:
Per Curiam.
— Interlocutory judgment affirmed on opinion of Rumsey, J., at special term, with leave to the defendant to answer within twenty days on payment of the costs of the demurrer and of this appeal. Certificate allowed for appeal to the court of appeals.
The opinion of Mr. Justice Rumsey, as special term, is as follows :
This is an action brought under section 24 of the stock-corporatian law (chapter 688, Laws 1892), to enforce against the defendants the liability created by that section. The complaint alleges, substantially, that the Auburn Woolen Company was a corporation organized under the laws of the state of New York, of which the defendants were some of the directors, and that the company was organized under the manufacturing corporations act, passed the 17th of February, 1848. The complaint further alleges that at certain times, therein more particularly stated, the Auburn Woolen Company borrowed from the plaintiff, upon promissory notes, the sum of $20,000, and that at the time of making the several loans stated in the complaint, the total indebtedness of the Auburn Woolen Company, not secured by mortgage, exceeded the amount of the paid-up capital stock of the company. It is further alleged in the complaint that each of the defendants consented to the creation of the said debt to the plaintiff, and judg- ' inent is demanded against the defendants for the sum of $20,000. The defendant Dillingham demurs to the complaint upon the ground, among others, that there is a defect of parties plaintiff and defendant in that the creditors of the Auburn Woolen Company, other than the plaintiff, are not made either parties defendant or parties plaintiff.
Upon the argument some technical defects were suggested, by reason of which it was claimed that the demurrer should be over ruled, but as the conclusion has been readied, upon the merits of the case, that the demurrer is not well taken, those technical defects will not be considered. As stated, the action is brought under section 24 of the stock-corporation law. That part of the section relied on reads as follows : " No stock corporation shall create any debt, if thereby its total indebtedness not secured by mortgage shall exceed the amount of its paid-up capital stock, and'the directors creating or consenting to the creation of any such debt shall be personally liable therefor to the creditors of the corporation." The law created by this statute is unquestionably a contract, and not a penal, liability. Patterson v. Robinson, 36 Hun, 622 ; 37 id. 341. The liability is created by this section, and the extent and nature of it must be found by considering the words of the section. It is confined, as is quite clear, to the directors who create, or consent to the creation, of the prohibited debt. Such directors are made personally liable " therefor." The word " therefor " refers necessarily to the previous words, " any such debt," and the liability is necessarily only for the' particular debt, and not for anything more. This seems to be perfectly clear from the reading of the statute. The statute says that the liability is to the creditors of the corporation, and it is claimed by the defendant that these words of the statute have the effect to add to the security of all the creditors of the corporation the amount of the particular debt for which the particular directors who consent to its creation are personally liable. I do not think that these words can be construed to extend the liability of the directors so far. Their responsibility is for the debt, and for nothing more, and the words, " to the creditors of the corporation," can only be construed as descriptive of the person to whom the particular debt • is owing, In the case of Patterson v. Robinson, supra, the same question was presented under the lay-" of 1848, and the court, in that case, held that the section should be construed as though it had read : " To the creditors of the company to whom such excess is owing." While that section reads differently fi'om the section under consideration, the nature of the liability is the same, substantially, and that case should be deemed a controlling authority upon that point. The defendant, in support of his demurrer, cites the case of Anderson v. Speers, 21 Hun, 568. That case was under consideration in the case of Patterson v. Robinson, supra, and it was urged upon the general term as a, controlling authority upon the point here presented, but the general term of the third department declined to follow it. Subsequently in the cases of Lovelace v. Doran and Lovelace v. Doran & Wright Company, the same questions presented here were presented to the court. Judge Churchill decided those cases at special term, and held that the case of Anderson v. Speers was practically overruled by the case of Patterson v. Robinson, and, following the latter case, decided that in these actions it was not necessary that all the creditors of the corporation should be made parties. Those two cases were subsequently affirmed by the general term of the fourth department, upon the authority of Patterson v. Robinson, 37 Hun, 341. By the concurrence of authority of the two general terms I feel that the court here is bound, and that the demurrer must be overruled. '
Judgment is accordingly ordered for the plaintiff upon the demurrer, with leave to the defendant to withdraw his demurrer and answer, on payment of costs.