Case Name: HANSEN v. HAFF, ACTING COMMISSIONER OF IMMIGRATION
Court: Supreme Court of the United States
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 1934-03-05
Citations: 291 U.S. 559
Docket Number: No. 325
Parties: HANSEN v. HAFF, ACTING COMMISSIONER OF IMMIGRATION.
Judges: 
Reporter: United States Reports
Volume: 291
Pages: 559–566

Head Matter:
HANSEN v. HAFF, ACTING COMMISSIONER OF IMMIGRATION.
No. 325.
Argued February 6, 1934.
Decided March 5, 1934.
Mr. Roger O’Donnell, with whom Mr. Stephen M. White was on the brief, for petitioner.
Assistant Attorney General Sweeney, with whom Solicitor General Biggs and Mr. Harry S. Ridgely were on the brief, for respondent.

Opinion:
Mr. Justice Roberts
delivered the opinion of the Court.
By § 3 of the Immigration Act of 1917 Congress ordained " That the following classes of aliens shall be excluded from admission into the United States: . . . prostitutes, or persons coming into the United States for the purpose of- prostitution or for any other immoral purpose." In reliance upon this mandate the petitioner, was ordered deported, and the question is whether she is within the proscribed class.
She is a citizen of Denmark, and first came here, in 1922, making her home in Los Angeles, California, where she was employed as a domestic servant. In 1924 she. became acquainted with a married man and in 1925 commenced having illicit relations with him; she did not live with him and was not supported by him, but resided where she was employed and supported herself from her own earnings, although he gave her money and clothing from time to time. In 1926 she made a trip to Denmark to visit her parents, and returned to Los Angeles in 1928, where she again took service as a domestic. . In May, 1931, she made a second visit to Denmark to see her relatives. On this occasion she was accompanied by the man with whom she had been intimate, who paid part of her expenses. He went to Europe to attend a convention in Vienna. For a portion of the time they travelled together in Europe, having illicit relations. They returned together through Canada, coming from Vancouver to Seattle, where they entered the United States, she being admitted by the authorities as a returning resident. They went to a hotel in Seattle where they registered as man and wife. Upon her arrest by immigration officers she admitted her purpose to continue the relationship of husband and wife with the man, until they should arrive in Los Angeles, but denied that it was-her intention to continue it after arrival in that city. . . .
Upon these facts, developed at the hearing before a board of inspectors, the Secretary of Labor ordered the petitioner deported. She petitioned the District Court for a writ .of habeas corpus, an order to -show cause was issued and, after hearing, the writ was denied. On appeal the Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. The case is here on certiorari
The petitioner's previous residence here and her possession of a reentry permit do not entitle her to remain in this country. Lapina v. Williams, 232 U.S. 78; Lewis v. Frick, 233 U.S. 291. She was liable to deportation at any time within five years of her entry at the Port of Seattle, if she was a member of one of the prohibited classes of aliens.
Was she a-prostitute, or person coming into the country " for the purpose of prostitution or for any other immoral purpose" within the intent of § 3 of the Act of 1917? The respondent does not contend that she is a prostitute or that her purpose in entering the United States was to practice prostitution, but he affirms that she did come for an immoral purpose as defined by the statute. We cannot adopt this conclusion.
The principle of ejusdem generis limits the connotation of the words " any other immoral purpose " to such as are of like character with prostitution, United States v. Bitty, 208 U.S. 393, 401; and extra-marital relations, short of concubináge, fall short of that -description.
Moreover, it can not be said that the petitioner's entry was for the purpose of having such relations. The respondent argues that as she had indulged in misconduct before leaving, hsid continued that misconduct while on her trip abroad and intended to continue it at least until she should arrive in Los Angeles, the Secretary of Labor was justified in disbelieving her statement that the relations would cease when she took up her residence in that city. This may be conceded; but it does not follow that her purpose in returning to the United States was to continue her irregular and improper conduct. The fact is that she was returning to her former residence, and nothing is disclosed to indicate that she did not intend, as she claimed, to resume her employment as a domestic. Her entry cannot be said to be with the purpose " only that she might live in a state of concubinage." United States v. Bitty, supra, 403. People not of good moral character, like others, travel from place to place and change their residence. But to say that because they indulge in illegal or immoral acts, they travel for that purpose, is to emphasize that which is incidental and ignore what is of primary significance. Compare Ex parte Rocha, 30 F. (2d) 823.
The Mann Act Creates the offense of transporting in interstate commerce a woman or girl " for the purpose of prostitution or debauchery, or for any other immoral purpose . . ." This court has said that act " seeks to reach and punish the movement in interstate commerce of women and girls with a view to the accomplishment of the unlawful purposes prohibited." Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 491. Accordingly it has been held that the transportation denounced must have' for its object or be a means of effecting or facilitating the sexual intercourse of the participants. If the purpose of the journey is not sexual intercourse, though that be contemplated, the statute is not violated. Welsch v. United States, 220 Fed. 764; Fisher v. United States, 266 Fed. 667; Sloan v. United States, 287 Fed. 91; Alpert v. United States, 12 F. (2d) 352; Hunter v. United States, 45 F. (2d) 55. So here, by the language of the act, the purpose of the entry is made controlling. And we think it plain that in no proper sense may the entry of the petitioner be said to have been for the purpose of immoral sexual relations.
Reversed.
Act of February 5, 1917, c. 29, 39 Stat. 874; U.S.C. Title 8, § 136.
65 F. (2d) 94.
Act of February 5, 1917, c. 29, § 19, 39 Stat. 889; TJ.S.C. Title 8, §155.
Act of June 25, 1910, c. 395, 36 Stat. 825; U.S.C. Title 18, § 397-400.