Case Name: Thomas H. PROVENZANO, Petitioner, v. Michael W. MOORE, Respondent
Court: Florida Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1999-09-24
Citations: 744 So. 2d 413
Docket Number: No. 95973
Parties: Thomas H. PROVENZANO, Petitioner, v. Michael W. MOORE, Respondent.
Judges: HARDING, C.J., and WELLS, LEWIS, and QUINCE, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 744
Pages: 413–451

Head Matter:
Thomas H. PROVENZANO, Petitioner, v. Michael W. MOORE, Respondent.
No. 95973.
Supreme Court of Florida.
Sept. 24, 1999.
Michael P. Reiter, Chief Assistant CCRC, and Mark S. Gruber, Assistant CCRC, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel — Middle Region, Tampa, Florida; and Martin J. McClain, Special Assistant CCRC, Brooklyn, New York, for Petitioner.
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, Richard B. Martell, Chief, Capital Appeals, and Carolyn M. Snurkowski, Assistant Deputy Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, Katherine V. Blanco and Carol M. Dittmar, Assistant Attorneys General, Tampa, Florida; and Louis A. Vargas, General Counsel and Susan A. Maher, Deputy General Counsel, Department of Corrections, Tallahassee, Florida, for Respondent.

Opinion:
PER CURIAM.
Thomas H. Provenzano, at a time when he was under warrant of death, filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, a petition to invoke this Court's "all writs" jurisdiction, and a petition for extraordinary relief. In order to give this matter full consideration, this Court entered a stay of execution on July 8, 1999. This Court directed the circuit court to hold an evi-dentiary hearing regarding the functioning of the electric chair. Following that four-day hearing, the circuit court rendered findings of fact with respect to the functioning of the electric chair and concluded that the electric chair does not constitute cruel or unusual punishment. These find ings of fact are the subject of this appeal. We have jurisdiction pursuant to article V, sections 3(b)(1) and (9) of the Florida Constitution. For the reasons explained below, we affirm the circuit court's order.
During the evidentiary hearing on this matter, both parties presented several witnesses, including testimony from experts. Most of the testimony focused on alleged errors committed by the Department of Corrections (DOC) during recent executions, particularly the execution of Allen Lee Davis on July 8, 1999. At the conclusion of the hearing, the circuit court entered an order denying relief, wherein it made the following findings of fact:
(1) During the execution of Allen Lee Davis, the electric chair functioned as it was intended to function. Although the breakers and other components of the electrical circuitry are old, the electric circuitry is adequate to assure the proper functioning of the electric chair.
(2) The cycles of voltage and amperage applied in the execution of Allen Lee Davis did not deviate from the execution protocol which was previously approved by the Florida Supreme Court. The execution protocol merely states: "The automatic cycle begins with the programmed 2,300 volts, 9.5 amps, for 8 seconds . " (emphasis added). The protocol does not state the voltage and amperage levels set forth therein are the precise voltage and amperage levels that must be administered to the inmate who is being executed.
The execution protocol does not take into account the varying levels of resistance created by each and every inmate. The resistance created by each executed inmate's body, or ohms, can be determined by dividing the number of volts administered by the number of amps administered. Since the level of resistance varies from inmate to inmate, these figures must necessarily vary. The variations in these figures do not violate the execution protocol.
(3) The death of Allen Lee Davis did not result from asphyxiation caused by the mouth strap.
(4) Allen Lee Davis did not suffer any conscious pain while being electrocuted in Florida's electric chair. Rather, he suffered instantaneous and painless death once the current was applied to him.
(5) The nose bleed incurred by Allen Lee Davis began before the electrical current was applied to him, and was not caused whatsoever by the application of electrical current to Davis. This Court is unable to make a finding regarding the exact cause or situs of the initial onset of the nose bleed because that information was not determined during either of the autopsies performed on Davis' body.
(6) The post-execution photographs of Allen Lee Davis indicate that the straps used to restrain Davis' body, specifically, the mouth strap and chin strap, may have caused Davis to suffer some discomfort. However, the straps did not cause him to suffer unnecessary and wanton pain, and the mouth strap was not a part of the electrical operation of the electric chair.
(7) The use of a mouth strap to secure an inmate's head to the electric chair may be desirable, however a smaller and/or redesigned mouth strap could accomplish the same purpose without raising the same issue involved here.
(8) Execution inherently involves fear, and it may involve some degree of pain. That pain may include pain associated with affixing straps around the head and body to secure the head and body [to] the electric chair. However, any pain associated therewith is necessary to ensure that the integrity of the execution process is maintained.
The circuit court also made the following conclusion of law:
Execution by electrocution in Florida's electric chair as it exists in its present condition as applied does not constitute cruel or unusual punishment, and therefore, is not unconstitutional.
Provenzano raises four arguments regarding the circuit court's order. First, Provenzano asserts that the circuit court erred in concluding that the electric chair did not constitute cruel or unusual punishment. Provenzano alleges three different bases for this conclusion: (1) the electric chair causes pain, both in preparing for and during the electrocution, (2) the electrical circuitry has not been maintained, and (3) DOC has failed to follow protocol.
This Court recently concluded in Jones v. State, 701 So.2d 76, 79 (Fla.1997), that "[i]n order for a punishment to constitute cruel or unusual punishment, it must involve 'torture or a lingering death' or the infliction of 'unnecessary and wanton pain.' " (citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976), and Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 67 S.Ct. 374, 91 L.Ed. 422 (1947)). The record in this case reveals abundant evidence that execution by electrocution renders an inmate instantaneously unconscious, thereby making it impossible to feel pain. The record also contains evidence that the electric chair is and has been functioning properly and that the electrical circuitry is being maintained.
In Blanco v. State, 702 So.2d 1250, 1252 (Fla.1997) (quoting Jones v. State, 591 So.2d 911, 916 (Fla.1991)), this Court stated, "As long as the trial court's findings are supported by competent substantial evidence, 'this Court will not substitute its judgment for that of the trial court on questions of fact, likewise of the credibility of the witnesses as well as the weight to be given to the evidence by the trial court.' " We find that the circuit court's findings of fact are supported by competent, substantial evidence. Therefore, we again conclude, as we did in Jones, that Florida's electric chair is not cruel or unusual punishment.
We are aware that the record contains numerous references from witnesses, including State witnesses, that the execution protocol is not well written. There is also a recommendation from the circuit court for DOC to employ "a smaller and/or redesigned mouth strap." We conclude that there is competent, substantial evidence to support the circuit court's finding of fact that the execution protocol was not violated in the Davis execution. However, it may be appropriate for DOC to revisit the protocol, including the use of the mouth strap, to ensure that it is consistent with the functioning of the electric chair.
In issue two, Provenzano claims that Florida's current use of electrocution as its sole method of execution is unconstitutional because it violates the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society. This claim was rejected by this Court in Jones. See 701 So.2d at 79.
In issue three, Provenzano claims that the circuit court made numerous erroneous evidentiary rulings during the evidentiary hearing, thereby denying him a full and fair hearing. In Heath v. State, 648 So.2d 660, 664 (Fla.1994), this Court stated that "[t]he trial court has broad discretion in determining the relevance of evidence and such determination will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion." Provenza-no has not demonstrated that the circuit court abused its discretion on these evi-dentiary rulings.
In issue four, Provenzano claims that the circuit court erred when it struck additional petitioners from Provenzano's petition for relief in this case. We find no merit to this issue. The order in this case directing the circuit court to hold an evi-dentiary hearing was specific as to the parties in this case. Further, a similar motion to intervene was denied by this Court in Jones v. State, No. 90,231 (order filed July 3,1997).
Accordingly, for the reasons expressed in this opinion, we affirm the circuit court's order finding that the electric chair is not unconstitutional. No motion for rehearing will be permitted.
It is so ordered.
HARDING, C.J., and WELLS, LEWIS, and QUINCE, JJ., concur.
HARDING, C.J., concurs specially with an opinion, in which LEWIS, J., concurs.
WELLS, J., concurs with an opinion, in which QUINCE, J., concurs.
QUINCE, J., concurs specially with an opinion, in which WELLS, J., concurs.
SHAW, J., dissents with an opinion, in which ANSTEAD, J., concurs.
ANSTEAD, J., dissents with an opinion, in which SHAW, J., concurs.
PARIENTE, J., dissents with an opinion, in which ANSTEAD, J., concurs.
. Provenzano claims that the circuit court erred in ruling that the testimony of two potential witnesses (Thomas Crapps and Richard Marlell) was precluded. Provenzano also claims that the circuit court erred in sustaining the State's objections to questions concerning certain testimony from witnesses Rabbani Muhammed and A.D. Thornton.