Case Name: In re PHILLIP WILLIAM FEIOCK on Habeas Corpus
Court: Court of Appeal of the State of California
Jurisdiction: California
Decision Date: 1989-10-31
Citations: 215 Cal. App. 3d 141
Docket Number: No. G003512
Parties: In re PHILLIP WILLIAM FEIOCK on Habeas Corpus.
Judges: 
Reporter: California Appellate Reports, Third Series
Volume: 215
Pages: 141–154

Head Matter:
[No. G003512.
Fourth Dist., Div. Three.
Oct. 31, 1989.]
In re PHILLIP WILLIAM FEIOCK on Habeas Corpus.
Counsel
Richard Schwartzberg, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, Ronald Y. Butler, Public Defender, Frank Scanlon, Assistant Public Defender, Richard Aronson, Richard Schwartzberg and Mark Licker, Deputy Public Defenders, for Petitioner.
No appearance for Respondent.
Cecil Hicks, District Attorney, Michael R. Capizzi, Assistant District Attorney, Maurice L. Evans, Bruce M. Patterson, David L. Himelson, William W. Bedsworth, Eric W. Snethen and E. Thomas Dunn, Jr., Deputy District Attorneys, for Real Party in Interest.

Opinion:
Opinion
WALLIN, J.
We originally granted the petition for a writ in this case. (In re Feiock (1986) 180 Cal.App.3d 649 [225 Cal.Rptr. 748].) It returns to us by way of writ of certiorari from the United States Supreme Court vacating the judgment and remanding for further proceedings. (Hicks v. Feiock (1988) 485 U.S. 624 [99 L.Ed.2d 721, 108 S.Ct. 1423].) Based upon new arguments, we deny the writ of habeas corpus.
I
The underlying facts remain the same. We reproduce them here with the necessary procedural update: "Phillip Feiock seeks relief from a judgment of contempt for failure to pay child support. His primary contention concerns the constitutionality of Code of Civil Procedure section 1209.5, which requires the court presume prima facie evidence of contempt after proof of noncompliance with a valid court order.
"Feiock was ordered to pay child support for his three children as part of a dissolution action. Thereafter, in 1983 the district attorney filed an action under the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act, which resulted in a temporary support order of $150 per month. Feiock's failure to pay anything between September of 1984 and February of 1985 resulted in a contempt action brought by the district attorney.
"At the adjudicated contempt hearing, the parties stipulated there was a valid court order requiring Feiock to pay $150 per month directly to the district attorney's office. They also agreed Feiock was present in court when the order was made. The prosecution then offered documentary evidence from its own internal records showing Feiock's poor payment history. . . . [A]n employee familiar with the record-keeping procedures testified . . . [about those documents]. Feiock's motion for [nonsuit] was denied after the judge ruled the presumption mandated by Code of Civil Procedure section 1209.5 applied. Feiock then testified, essentially trying to prove Insurability to pay the court-ordered support. Regardless, the trial judge sustained the majority of the contempt allegations." (In re Feiock, supra, 180 Cal.App.3d at pp. 651-652.)
In the prior proceedings in this court, Feiock argued that section 1209.5 created the type of mandatory presumption found violative of the due process clause in Sandstrom v. Montana (1979) 442 U.S. 510 [61 L.Ed.2d 39, 99 S.Ct. 2450] and People v. Roder (1983) 33 Cal.3d 491 [189 Cal.Rptr. 501, 658 P.2d 1302]. The district attorney argued that Martin v. Superior Court (1971) 17 Cal.App.3d 412 [95 Cal.Rptr. 110] had correctly held the section constitutional because there was a rational connection between the fact proved and the fact presumed. Based upon these arguments, we agreed with Feiock, since Martin predated Sandstrom and Roder and used a standard rejected by those cases, and since the connection between the proved facts and the presumed fact was not compelling.
After hearing the case, the United States Supreme Court remanded the cause to this court to determine whether the contempt here was civil or criminal, opining that the former does not trigger application of the due process clause to presumptions. (Hicks v. Feiock, supra, 485 U.S. 624, 637 [99 L.Ed.2d 721, 735].) In reaching this conclusion, the high court deferred to state law on two points subsumed within our holding: ability to pay is an element of the contempt rather than a defense, and the "presumption" shifts the burden of proof rather than the burden of producing evidence.
Upon this remand, we are presented with the issue whether ability to pay is an affirmative defense. Before deciding it, we discuss the threshold question whether the proceeding here was a civil or criminal contempt.
II
In a nutshell, the Supreme Court opined that a contempt is civil for federal constitutional purposes if the order of contempt ultimately entered allows the contemner to purge the contempt by performing an act completely within the contemner's control. In such circumstances the due process considerations discussed in People v. Roder, supra, 33 Cal.3d 491, are inapplicable. If the contemner does not have the power to purge the contempt, the proceedings are deemed criminal. (Hicks v. Feiock, supra, 485 U.S. 624, 638-640 [99 L.Ed.2d 721, 735-737].)
Using that standard, the proceedings here were unmistakably criminal in nature. It is true, as noted by the Supreme Court, that Feiock had a chance to pay off the arrearage of $1,650 within the 36-month probationary period at the ordered rate of $50 per month. However, there is not a hint in the order that the probation—considered a penalty by the Supreme Court— would terminate when the arrearage was paid off.
The judgment suspends 25 days of jail time over Feiock's head and requires that he pay $150 per month in current child support. By the plain terms of the judgment, that obligation continues for the entire term of the probation. The section of the preprinted judgment form providing for further hearing for modification is not checked. Feiock's penalty for disobedience of the original child support order was a 36-month certain probationary period with the prospect of 25 days in jail if he violated its terms.
There was nothing Feiock could do, per the terms of the judgment, to alter this fact. He was subjected to criminal contempt proceedings.
III
Nevertheless, the trial court correctly denied the motion for nonsuit. For many years in California ability to pay has been considered, without much analysis, to be a matter of defense in contempt proceedings. (Lyon v. Superior Court (1968) 68 Cal.2d 446, 451 [67 Cal.Rptr. 265, 439 P.2d 1]; In re McCarty (1908) 154 Cal. 534, 537 [98 P. 540]; Galland v. Galland (1872) 44 Cal. 475, 478; Lyons v. Municipal Court (1977) 75 Cal.App.3d 829, 838 [142 Cal.Rptr. 449]; Martin v. Superior Court, supra, 17 Cal.App.3d 412, 417; Sorell v. Superior Court (1967) 248 Cal.App.2d 157, 161 [56 Cal.Rptr. 222]; compare Mery v. Superior Court (1937) 9 Cal.2d 379 [70 P.2d 932]; Warner v. Superior Court (1954) 126 Cal.App.2d 821 [273 P.2d 89].)
This approach is consistent with legislative intent, constitutional law, and common sense. When this case was first before this court, the parties and the court all assumed that section 1209.5 dealt with an evidentiary presumption. It does not.
The section was enacted in response to Warner v. Superior Court, supra, 126 Cal.App.2d 821. (Rev. of 1955 Code Legislation (U. of Cal. Ext., 1955) p. 129.) Warner held that ability to pay was an element of contempt which had to be alleged in the affidavit and proved by the petitioner in contempt proceedings. The Legislature's purpose in enacting the section was to nullify Warner insofar as it made ability to pay an element.
The language of the statute strongly suggests this is true. Rather than say that "ability to pay" shall be presumed from proof of the basic facts, the section states that proof of the order, knowledge of it, and noncompliance "shall be prima facie evidence of a contempt of court." (§ 1209.5.) In other words, proof of these basic facts proves the entire contempt. Once the contempt is proved any excuse or justification, such as ability to pay, is a matter of defense. We must adhere to this plain meaning of the statute. (Planned Parenthood Affiliates v. Swoap (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 1187, 1193 [219 Cal.Rptr. 664].)
Court decisions have long upheld the constitutionality of legislation making issues such as inability to pay matters of defense. (See Martin v. Ohio (1987) 480 U.S. 228 [94 L.Ed.2d 267, 107 S.Ct. 1098]; Engle v. Isaac (1982) 456 U.S. 107, 120 [71 L.Ed.2d 783, 795-796, 102 S.Ct. 1558]; Patterson v. New York (1977) 432 U.S. 197, 201-202 [53 L.Ed.2d 281, 286-287, 97 S.Ct. 2319]; Mullaney v. Wilbur (1975) 421 U.S. 684, 691 [44 L.Ed.2d 508, 515-516, 95 S.Ct. 1881]; Leland v. Oregon (1952) 343 U.S. 790 [96 L.Ed. 1302, 72 S.Ct. 1002]; People v. Babbitt (1988) 45 Cal.3d 660, 693 [248 Cal.Rptr. 69, 755 P.2d 253]; People v. Tewksbury (1976) 15 Cal.3d 953, 963-964 [127 Cal.Rptr. 135, 544 P.2d 1335]; People v. Montalvo (1971) 4 Cal.3d 328, 333 [93 Cal.Rptr. 581, 482 P.2d 205, 49 A.L.R.3d 518].) As noted in Martin v. Ohio, supra, 480 U.S. 228, 235 [94 L.Ed.2d 267, 275], "[T]he common law rule was that affirmative defenses . . . , were matters for the defendant to prove. 'This was the rule when the Fifth Amendment was adopted, and it was the American rule when the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified.' " Thus, there is no constitutional impediment to making inability to pay an affirmative defense, at least if there is some rational basis for doing so. (Patterson v. New York, supra, 432 U.S. at p. 203, fn. 9 [53 L.Ed.2d at pp. 287-288].)
Common sense dictates that the contemner raise inability to pay. The contemner is the person in the best position to know whether inability to pay is even a consideration in the proceeding and also has the best access to evidence on the issue, particularly in cases of self-employment. Considerations of policy and convenience have led courts to sanction placement of the burden of establishing a defense on defendants under similar circumstances. (People v. Babbitt, supra, 45 Cal.3d 660, 693 [unconsciousness]; People v. Vogel (1956) 46 Cal.2d 798, 803 [299 P.2d 850] [good faith marriage in bigamy prosecution]; People v. Wells (1938) 10 Cal.2d 610, 617 [76 P.2d 493] [mitigation in homicide prosecution]; People v. Yoshimura (1979) 91 Cal.App.3d 609, 626 [154 Cal.Rptr. 314] [permit for otherwise unlawful articles]; People v. Condley (1977) 69 Cal.App.3d 999, 1013 [138 Cal.Rptr. 515] [escape due to necessity].)
Making inability to pay a matter of defense does not place too harsh a burden on the contemner. Since inability to pay goes to the heart of the contempt, the contemner's task is merely to raise the issue of his ability to pay. The petitioner's burden then remains to prove the contempt beyond a reasonable doubt, including ability to pay. (People v. Figueroa (1986) 41 Cal.3d 714, 721 [224 Cal.Rptr. 719, 715 P.2d 680]; People v. Tewksbury, supra, 15 Cal.3d 953.) It also eliminates the district attorney's concern that proof of the contempt would be unreasonably difficult if ability to pay were an element, yet minimizes the prospect that a truly indigent contemnor will end up in what is tantamount to debtor's prison.
IV
Feiock's remaining contentions are easily resolved. His assertions that the temporary support order expired by its own terms in February 1985 and that the order was vague and ambiguous may not be raised here, since he expressly did not raise those issues below. (In re Farr (1974) 36 Cal.App.3d 577 [111 Cal.Rptr. 649].)
Likewise, it appears that Feiock did not raise below his contention that the pay records from the district attorney's office were not business records falling within the exception to the hearsay rule. (Evid. Code, § 1271.) He insists the documents were prepared primarily for litigation. (See Palmer v. Hoffman (1942) 318 U.S. 109 [87 L.Ed. 645, 63 S.Ct. 477, 144 A.L.R. 719].) Even if the argument is properly before us, we reject it. Although the district attorney's office is a prosecuting agency and pay records are valuable in contempt proceedings, there was no showing in the trial court that these records were "self-serving" or "prepared specifically for litigation." (County of Sonoma v. Grant W. (1986) 187 Cal.App.3d 1439, 1452 [232 Cal.Rptr. 471].) Records of payment are classic examples of business records and are regularly maintained for all individuals paying support through the district attorney's family support division.
Lastly, Feiock argues that at the time the original order issued, there was no finding of ability to pay. This is simply not true. Although Feiock was self-employed and any income projection was somewhat tenuous, he estimated at the hearing that he would be netting approximately $1,200 per month above housing expenses. The court, while recognizing his income could change, reasonably found Feiock had the ability to pay $150 per month.
The order to show cause is discharged and the petition for writ is denied.
Scoville, P. J., concurred.
All statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure unless otherwise specified.
Section 1209.5 provides: "When a court. . . makes an order compelling a parent to furnish support. . . , proof that such order was made, filed, and served on the parent or proof that the parent was present in court at the time the order was pronounced and proof of noncompliance therewith shall be prima facie evidence of a contempt of court." The purported presumption that flowed from the proof mentioned in the section was that the parent had an ability to pay. As will be discussed, infra, the section does not create a presumption at all; rather, it makes inability to pay an affirmative defense.
The district attorney alternatively argued that under Roder "[t]he close connection and identity between the proven and presumptive facts compels the inference of Petitioner's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and it is no violation of due process to shift the burden of going forward with the evidence to the Defendant."
Those points had also been subsumed in Martin. We adopted them without discussion in deciding the issues presented by the parties: whether Roder had overruled Martin sub silentio and whether section 1209.5 comported with the mandate of Roder.
The contempt statutes do not provide for probation or any modification of it. (See, e.g., § 1218.) The Supreme Court gave cursory approval to grants of probation in contempt cases in Hicks v. Feiock, supra, 485 U.S. 624, 637, fn. 8 [99 L.Ed.2d 721, 735], However, even if we assume a court has the power to grant probation and to modify the terms of it to allow Feiock to purge, that power would rest with the court, not with Feiock. (Cf. Pen. Code, § 1203.3.)
We reach this conclusion using the Supreme Court's analysis for the civil versus criminal determination. Although binding upon us for purposes of federal constitutional law, it might be well to consider a different standard under the California Constitution to determine which California contemners should be provided greater due process rights.
With all due respect, we see two problems with the "ability to purge" approach taken by the Supreme Court. First, neither the parties nor the court knows what type of proceedings they are in until judgment is pronounced. This surely would produce innumerable logistical nightmares, not to mention due process notice problems. (See In re Liu (1969) 273 Cal.App.2d 135, 141-142 [78 Cal.Rptr. 85].) On the other hand, giving notice of the remedy sought before the fact might prevent the court from fashioning the best remedy.
More importantly, because the consequences of a "civil" contempt are potentially greater than those of a "criminal" one, the procedural protection in those cases should be the same or stronger. Child support cases provide a perfect example. In each type of proceeding, ability to pay can be an issue. But a criminal contempt conviction results in no more than a five-day jail term and a $1,000 fine for each contempt, while a civil contemner may be imprisoned indefinitely pending compliance. (§§ 1218, 1219.) Thus, the consequences of a mistake on the ability to pay issue are infinitely graver in a civil than in a criminal contempt. Pity the poor civil contemner who rots in jail, having erroneously been determined to hold the key to release!
The preferable rule in contempt proceedings might be that the more stringent due process protections apply whenever the contemner is faced with the potential for any jail time. Indeed, California courts have traditionally assumed or held that all contempts are at least quasi-criminal in nature. (See In re Coleman (1974) 12 Cal.3d 568, 572 [116 Cal.Rptr. 381, 526 P.2d 533]; City of Culver City v. Superior Court (1952) 38 Cal.2d 535, 541 [241 P.2d 258]; Martin v. Superior Court, supra, 17 Cal.App.3d 412, 416; In re Liu, supra, 273 Cal.App.2d 135, 141; cf. People v. Derner (1986) 182 Cal.App.3d 588, 592 [227 Cal.Rptr. 344].) Nonetheless, we do not announce an independent state-ground rule here. Since the contempt was criminal under either standard, we choose the most conservative analysis, that provided under the federal Constitution.
The dissent goes to great lengths to show that a number of the cases cited above do not hold that ability to pay is not an element of contempt. As we shall discuss, that analysis is unnecessary since the Legislature has spoken and said that it is not. We merely cite these cases as a historical preface to the legislation. What we said about them is true; they do assume without much analysis that ability to pay is not an element. Mery v. Superior Court, supra, 9 Cal.2d 379, and Warner v. Superior Court, supra, 126 Cal.App.2d 821, as well as Coursey v. Superior Court (1987) 194 Cal.App.3d 147, 154 [239 Cal.Rptr. 365], cited by the dissent, reached contrary results, also without much analysis. Section 1209.5 is not surplusage as the dissent suggests. It statutorily settled the elements of contempt in child support cases.
This answers the dissent's question on why People v. Roder, supra, 33 Cal.3d 491 does not apply here. In Roder the court dealt with an express statutory element which could be established by an express statutory presumption. The evil was not that it was applied to a particular class, but that it was applied at all. Here, ability to pay is just not an element; it is a defense.
The dissent holds fast to the opinion that ability to pay is somehow an element of child support contempt. It does so without explaining how this could be when the statute was enacted in response to Warner v. Superior Court, supra, 126 Cal.App.2d 821, and lists all of the traditional elements of contempt as constituting the prima facie case without mentioning ability to pay. "Elements are elements." (Conc. & dis. opn., post, p. 153.) Notwithstanding what petitioner pleaded, the finding of contempt depended only upon establishing those elements set forth in section 1209.5. (§ 1211.5 subds. (a) & (c).) With all due respect to the Judicial Council, it does not dictate our resolution of the law. (Conc. and dis. opn., post, pp. 149-150.)
The dissent implies (cone, and dis. opn., post, p. 153) we are casting aside constitutional principles to facilitate collection of child support. Not so. The foregoing authority amply supports the constitutionality of the Legislature's action. The dissent does not suggest why these cases are not applicable. Indeed, in Patterson, supra, 432 U.S. 197, our nation's highest court upheld a statutory scheme where malice was not required for a finding of murder. Such decisions are within the power of the legislative branch.
There is also some attractiveness to the district attorney's argument that the contemner should be the party to raise the issue of inability to pay since there has already been one judicial determination of ability to pay, and since the contemner has the right to seek a modification of ordered payments upon changed circumstances. However, we hesitate to make this contention the sole basis for making ability to pay a matter of affirmative defense. Ability to pay can literally change within a day-—the day the contemner hears, "You're fired." Under such circumstances it is unlikely that the potential contemner will rush right out and spend money—assuming there is any—on an attorney to seek a modification.
Feiock's counsel below made an initial comment about the vagueness of the original order. However, a careful reading of the record reveals that this purported ambiguity concerned to whom Feiock was to make his payments, a question which counsel later acknowledged had been cleared up. Counsel expressly stated that the order was not ambiguous.