Case Name: Morrow's Adm'r v. Peyton's Adm'r and Others
Court: Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia
Jurisdiction: Virginia
Decision Date: 1837-02
Citations: 8 Leigh 54
Docket Number: 
Parties: *Morrow’s Adm’r v. Peyton’s Adm’r and Others.
Judges: 
Reporter: Virginia Reports
Volume: 35
Pages: 834–843

Head Matter:
*Morrow’s Adm’r v. Peyton’s Adm’r and Others.
February, 1837,
Richmond.
Co-administrators — Joint Bond — Liability on. — Where two administrators execute a joint administration bond, each is a surety for the other; and if one commit a devastavit, the other is chargeable, but only as surety, and pari passu with the other sureties in the bond: dissentiente Brooke, J., who held, that for a devastavit by one administrator. the other is not responsible either as principal or surety.
Administrators — Same Person Administrator of Debtor and Creditor Estate — Liability of Sureties. —Where the estate of one decedent is indebted to that of another, and the same person is administrator of both, and wastes assets of the debtor estate, which he was bound, but has failed, to pay over to the creditor estate, the sureties for his due administration of the creditor estate are liable for such default and devastavit.
Same —Official Bond — Form- Material Defect. — After tlie death of an executor who had qualified as such, the court grants administration of the testator’s unadministered estate, hut the hond taken from the administrator Is In the form of a bond for administration de bonis non of an intestate, not in the form of a bond for administration de bonis nonfvith the will annexed of a testator: Veld, the bond is void.
Administrators — What Constitutes a Payment by - Case at Bar. — An administrator makes a verbal promise to pay the agent employed to collect a debt from the estate, that If he will pay the amount to his principal, the administrator will repay to him with interest: tlie agent accordingly pays his principal the debt, and the administrator after-wards refunds to the agent the sum paid, with interest: Held, the payment by the agent was a payment by the administrator, for which he is entitled to credit at the date thereof, whatever be the time at which the amount was repaid to the agent.
John Morrow died intestate in the latter part oí the year 1819, and Robert Worthing-ton and John T. Cookus obtained letters of administration on his estate from the court of Jefferson county. They entered into bond, together with William Butler, Daniel Buckles, John Downey and William Grove, the obligors binding themselves and each of them, their and each of their heirs, executors and administrators, jointly and severally. The bond is in the penalty of 12,000 dollars, with condition “that if the above bound Robert Worthington and John T. Cookus, ^administrators of all and singular the goods, chattels and credits of John Morrow deceased, do make or cause to be made a true and perfect inventory of all and singular the goods, chattels and credits of the said deceased &c. and the same goods &c. of the said deceased do well and truly administer &c. then this obligation to be void and of no effect, or else to remain in full force and virtue.” This bond bears date the 27th day of December 1819,
The intestate John Morrow had been, in his lifetime, appointed one of the executors of a certain Robert Rutherford, and qualified as such in the court of Jefferson county on the 12th day of June 1805. The other executors named in Rutherford’s will never qualified, and Morrow was, until his death, the sole acting executor. On the 15th of October 1819, at which time Morrow died, he was a creditor of his testator’s estate to the amount of 9008 dollars 90 cents, as appeared by accounts of his transactions as executor, settled before commissioners appointed by the court of Jefferson county, the last of those accounts being rendered after Morrow’s decease, by Worthington and Cookus his administrators; who had also qualified, on the 27th day of March 1820, as representatives of Robert Rutherford deceased. The order entered by the court of Jefferson county is, that “administration de bonis non with the will annexed” (of Robert Rutherford) “is granted unto Robert Worthington and John T. Cookus, they having complied with the law.” But the bond entered into by Worth-ington and Cookus is not in the form which the statute requires where administration is granted with the will annexed, 1 Rev. Code, ch. 104, § 21, p. 380, bat in the form prescribed for the bond of a common administrator de bonis non; Id. 35, p. 383. The will of Robert Rutherford, after providing in the first place for the testator’s funeral, directs, secondly, that all his just debts be paid so soon as his executors shall be enabled *to settle and discharge the same; and then, after various devises and bequests, the will contains the following clause: “And whereas it may be necessary for the payment of my just debts and the several legacies herein before bequeathed, that some part of my estate should be sold by my executors, it is my will and desire, and I do hereby empower and direct my executors or such of them as shall think proper to act, to sell and dispose of any part of mjr estate, real or personal, and to make deeds for any part thus sold by them for the purposes aforesaid.”
Worthington administrator of Morrow settled an account of his administration of that decedent’s estate, from the time of hús qualification down to the end of the year 1821, before commissioners appointed by the court of Jefferson county; by which settlement Worthington appeared to be a creditor of the estate to the amount of 221 dollars 81 cents. And Cookus the other administrator of Morrow settled, before commissioners appointed by the same court, an account of his administration from his qualification until the 24th of April 1824, at which date he appeared to be a creditor of the estate to the amount of 2038 dollars 42 cents. In neither of these accounts is there any credit to Morrow’s es.tate for any part of the debt due from Rutherford’s estate.
In 1830, William I/. Clark administrator of Susan Peyton, and also administrator of Francis A. Peyton, the said William E-Clark and Louisa his wife, and Elizabeth C. Peyton, instituted a suit in the superiour court of chancery holden at Winchester, against the said Worthington and Cookus administrators of Morrow. The bill was filed in August 1830. It sets forth, that on the 1st day of May 1830 a decree had been rendered in the said superiour court of chancery against the said Worthington and Cookus as administrators of John Morrow, and against other defendants, in a suit wherein the present complainants were also parties, by which decree the Administrator of Susan Peyton recovered the sum of 1636 dollars 29 cents, the administrator of Francis A. Peyton recovered the sum of 409 dollars 5 cents, the said William E. Clark and wife recovered the sum of 409 dollars 5 cents, 'the said Elizabeth C. Peyton recovered the sum of 5787 dollars 91 cents, and the said Elizabeth C. Peyton, for the use of James Keith, recovered the sum of 409 dollars 5 cents; for which several sums the plaintiffs respectively had issued writs of fieri facias, which had been returned no effects, and had never been satisfied either in whole or in part. The bill then charges, that the said Worthington and Cookus administrators of Morrow have abundant assets to satisfy the said executions. That the said Morrow left considerable personal property, and large and numerous debts due him, all or great part of which came to the hands of his administrators ; and in particular, they received large sums on account of a debt which they claimed as due to their intestate from Robert Rutherford’s estate. That the said administrators had disbursed large sums to the distributees of their intestate, and in payment of debts of a dignity infe-riour to that of the plaintiffs’ claim, which Worthington well knew to be a demand against his intestate as one of the sureties in the bond given by the administrators of John Peyton deceased, and for which a suit against John Peyton’s administrators was pending at the time when Worthington received the assets which are credited in his account as administrator. The bill surcharges and falsifies that account, and the account settled by the co-administrator Cookus; calls on the defendants to disclose and account for the assets of their intestate; and prays a personal decree against them, inasmuch as they have wasted the assets.
The decree and executions referred to in the bill were exhibited therewith.
*The sureties in the bond given by Worthington and Cookus as administrators of Morrow were not made parties to-the suit.
Worthington and Cookus answered separately, denying the devastavit charged in the bill, and insisting on the correctness of the accounts settled by them respectively.
The court, on the 21st December 1831, made an order that the defendants render an account of their administration before a commissioner, and answer on oath such questions touching their administration as-should be put to them by the plaintiffs or the said commissioner; that the plaintiffs have leave to surcharge and falsify the ex parte settlements made by the administrators in the court of Jefferson county; and that the commissioner state specially the mode in which the assets of said Morrow’s estate had been retained or disbursed, and what portion of the said -assets had been retained or disbursed in the payment of debts which were not of the dignity of specialty debts, and if any portion of said assets had been disbursed in the payment of specialty debts, in that event to state the said debts, and whether they were prosecuted by suit or not, and if not, at what time they were paid.
The commissioner reported three separate accounts, under this order. 1. An account of the defendants jointly, as administrators of Morrow, shewing a balance due the estate on the 1st of June 1832, of 6688 dollars 19 cents, principal and interest, with interest from that date on 3750 dollars 55 cents. 2. A separate account of Robert Worthing-ton as administrator of Morrow, shewing a balance due the estate on the 1st of June 1832, of 2258 dollars 41 cents principal and interest, with interest from that date on 1285 dollars 67 cents. 3. A separate account of John T. Cookus as administrator of Morrow, shewing a balance due the administrator on the 1st day of June 1832, of 4345 dollars 3 cents principal and interest, with interest from that date on 3087 dollars 38 cents.
*Both the plaintiffs and the defendants filed various exceptions to the commissioner’s report. The court sustained some of the exceptions of each party and overruled others, and recommitted the report to the commissioner. The . only exceptions taken to this account which it is necessary to notice, were, 1. An exception by the plaintiffs, that the commissioner had not charged the defendants with the amount received by them as administrators de bonis non of Robert Rutherford deceased, whose estate was largely indebted to that of their intestate Morrow, and appeared to be chargeable with no other debt. Upon this exception the court decided, that the defendants should be charged with any moneys in their hands as administrators of Rutherford, applicable to the payment of his debt to Morrow ; that they render before the commissioner, on oath, an account of the moneys in their hands, or in the hands of either of them, as administrators of Rutherford; and that they be charged with the amount, unless they shew others debts having priority. 2. An exception by defendants to the date of the following entry among, the debits of the joint account: “1828, October. Cash paid on account of Merritt’s debt, $629.41.” Por as muchas the said money was in truth paid on the 27th day of May 1823, instead of October 1828. Upon this exception, the court directed the commissioner to enquire whether there was any error in the date of the said payment. And then the court, proceeding to give general directions to the commissioner, ordered that the defendants receive credit for all sums paid away in discharge of simple contract debts “before the service ■of the subpoena in the case of Grayson against Clark,” (the suit which resulted in the decree referred to in the plaintiffs’ bill and exhibited therewith).
The second report returned by the commissioner contained an account of the defendants jointly, as administrators of Morrow, with an account of Robert Worthington *as administrator de bonis non* of Robert Rutherford, and a mass of documents and depositions relating to various items of account. The account of the defendants as administrators of Morrow brought down their transactions to the 1st of January 1833, at which date there appeared a balance in favour of Morrow’s estate, amounting to 3483 dollars 95 cents of principal, and 2240 dollars 29 cents of interest. The last item of credit to the estate was entered in the following terms: “By balance in the hands of Robert Worth-ington the acting administrator of Robert Rutherford deceased, on a settlement of his account with the said estate herewith returned, and which is credited in this account by direction of the court, in part discharge of a balance due from the estate •of said Rutherford to the estate of John Morrow; principal4168 dollars 27 cents, interest 2363 dollars 40 cents.” And without this credit to Morrow’s estate, the account shewed that there would have been a balance due the administrators of Morrow, on the first day of January 1833, of 684 dollars 32 cents principal, and 123 dollars 11 cents interest. In this second report of the commissioner, the item of debit for the payment on account of the Merritt debt appeared in these terms: “1823, May 27. Cash paid George Hageley amount of debt due from colo. Morrow to John Merritt, $830.” By the evidence adduced before the commissioner in relation to this item, it appeared, that on the 16th day of August 1814 John Morrow, the intestate of defendants, executed to John Merritt two notes under seal, each for the sum of 529 dollars 79 cents, the first payable on the 1st day of April 1816, and the other payable on the 1st day of April 1817. On these notes there were indorsed various receipts, of which the last four are signed “George Hageley for John Merritt;” the dates and amounts specified in the receipts being as follows: “1818, January 10. $400.-1819,
February 6. $111.67 cents. — 1828, ^October 22. Received from John T. Cookus $629.41 cents. — 1830, June 7. Received of John T. Cookus $257.12 cents. — • 1830, June 16. Received from John T. Cookus $252, in his own note payable on the 1st of October next. — 1832, June. Received from John T. Cookus administrator of John Morrow deceased $20, being the balance due on John Morrow’s two notes to John Merritt of Ohio.” The deposition of George Hage-ley was taken, and returned by the commissioner with his report. It is in the terms following: “In the spring of 1823, John Merritt requested me to collect the money due him from the estate of colo. John Morrow deceased. I accordingly called on John T. Cookus one of the administrators of said Morrow’s estate, for the payment of said notes, who had promised to pay the said notes whenever called on. When I made this call, he the said Cookus had not the money at the time. I then told him I had money to spare, and that I would pay the balance due Merritt on colo. Morrow’s notes, provided dhat he the said Cookus would refund me my money with interest thereon, when called for by me, which said Cookus agreed to do. I then, on the promise of said Cookus, paid to Isaac Reynolds of Baltimore, on the 27th of May 1823, the sum of 830 dollars, according to the instructions of said John Merritt.”
The parties filed numerous exceptions to this second report of the commissioner. Among those filed by the plaintiffs was one in these terms: “4th exception. To item ‘1823, May 27. Cash paid George Hageley amount of debt due from colo. Morrow to John Merritt, $830.’ Because there was no payment made to said Hageley, and the receipts on the bonds, signed by said Hage-ley, shew that the payments were made after the service of the subpoena in the suit of Grayson against Clark. ’’ This exception the court overruled. The defendants excepted to the manner in which the commissioner had taken the account, because he had made it a joint account, instead of separating the transactions of the administrators, and ascertaining the account with each of them severally. And the defendant John T. Cookus excepted to his being charged with any sum of money which appeared to have come to the hands of Robert Worthington from the estate of Rutherford, because the said Cookus, having received no part of that estate himself, could only be charged as surety of Worth-ington, if chargeable at all; in which case the plaintiffs were bound to convene the other sureties in the bond given for the due administration of Rutherford’s estate, that each might contribute his just proportion of any deficit which might be established against Worthington ; but as surety the said Cookus was not liable at all, the bond being void. Upon these exceptions the court said, that the questions presented by them were affected not by the nature of the bond which the defendants gave as administrators of Rutherford (though that too was joint) but by the nature of the bond which they gave as administrators of Morrow. That the condition of that bond was, that the defendants should administer the estate according to law: that they were looked upon as the principals, and those who were induced to become bound with them never contemplated their own liability as long as either principal was solvent. Therefore that the administrators must be considered as a unit, responsible for each other’s acts, and as principals bound for the balance due from either, and not as mere sureties. And the court accordingly overruled the exceptions.
Other exceptions taken by both parties were sustained. And the report being recommitted to the commissioner, to be reformed according to the opinion of the court on these last exceptions, the reformed report shewed a balance due the estate of John Morrow from his administrators, on the 1st day of January 1833, of 6123 dollars 81 cents, with interest on 3947 dollars 38 cents part thereof, from that date until paid. The court, ton the 14th of June 1833, rendered a decree against the defendants for the amount appearing due by the reformed report, as aforesaid, to be levied of the proper goods and chattels of the said defendants. And on the petition of the defendant John T. Cookus, an appeal was allowed him. "
Leigh, for appellant.
Cooke and Johnson, for appellees.
Co administrators — Joint Bond — Liability on. — Where a bond, upon which several persons are bound, by its terms, makes them responsible for each other, each one must be regarded as a principal, so far as his own acts are involved and the remaining obligors are his sureties. Thus, where two administrators execute a joint administration bond, each is liable as principal for his own acts and as surety for the acts of his companions; so if one commits a devastavit, the other is chargeable for his acts as surety. This doctrine laid down in the principal case has been again and again recognized and followed in Virginia. See, citing the principal case. Caskie v. Harrison, 76 Va. 93; Cox v. Thomas, 9 Gratt. 317, 319; Peale v. Hickle, 9 Gratt. 444; McCormick v. Wright, 79 Va. 533; foot-note to Boyd v. Boyd, 3 Gratt. 115; Sands v. Durham, 99 Va. 267, 38 S. E. Rep. 145.
See further, on this subject, monographic note on “Executors and Administrators” appended to Rosser v. Depriest, 5 Gratt. 6; monographic note on “Official Bonds” appended to Sangster v. Com., 17 Gratt. 124.
Administrators — Liability for Wrong of Co-administrators. — It is well settled that one administrator cannot be charged with the wrong of his companion, or be made further liable than for the assets which came to his hands. Frazer v. Bevill, 11 Gratt. 15, citing the principal case.
Administrators — Same Person Administrator of Debtor and Creditor Estate — Liability of Sureties.— Where the estate of one intestate is indebted to the estate of another, and the same person is administrator of both, and wastes assets of the debtor estate, which he ought to have paid over to the creditor estate, the sureties for the due administration of the creditor estate are liable for the misappropriation. The principal case is cited with approval for this rule of law in Smith v. Gregory, 26 Gratt. 260, 261, 265; Caskie v. Harrison, 76 Va. 91; Steptoe v. Harvey, 17 Gratt. 300, 301. But, the sureties for the due administration of the debtor’s estate are also liable for such waste. Morrow v. Peyton, 8 Leigh 54, 76, 77, 78; Smith v. Gregory, 26 Gratt. 260.
This rule also hold good where a person is acting in the dual character of administrator and guardian. Smith v. Gregory, 26 Gratt. 260.
Same — Same—Same—Transfer of Assets — Election.— If the same person be the personal representative of two estates, one of which is debtor to the other, he may retain out of the effects of which he is possessed as the representative of the debtor, to satisfy the debts due to him as the representative of the creditor. Green v. Thompson, 84 Va. 389, 413, 5 S. E. Rep. 507, citing the principal case with approval. See also, foot-note to Harvey v. Steptoe, 17 Gratt. 289. But, in such case, the time at which the transfer of assets should be made will depend upon the condition of the debtor estate and the estate of the administration; accordingly, the court will not shift the responsibility of one set of sureties to the other, without some act or declaration on the part of the representative indicating an intention to transfer the assets. Harvey v. Steptoe, 17 Gratt. 301, citing the principal case. In such case, transmutation of possession by operation -of law has been often repudiated in Virginia. Smith v. Gregory, 26 Gratt. 263. citing Morrow v. Peyton, 8 Leigh 54; Swope v. Chambers, 2 Gratt. 319; Harvey v. Steptoe, 17 Gratt. 289, 300, 301.
And in Board v. Cain, 28 W. Va. 770, it is said; “A fiduciary cannot transfer his mere indebtedness in one capacity to himself in another capacity, so as to exonerate his securities in the one and throw the burden upon his securities in the other. To make the transfer valid it must consist of something more than a naked liability; ilmust be substantial assets, if made by an insolvent fiduciary. (Smith v. Gregory, 26 Gratt. 248; Phillips v. Manning, 14 Eng. Ch’y R. 309, 315.) But if the fiduciary is solvent and able to pay over the funds, all that is necessary is for him, when he is ordered to pay it over, or when the law would authorize him to pay it over to a third person holding the other fiduciary character, to make his election and manifest it by some act, direction or admission. (Swope v. Chambers, 2 Gratt. 319; Myers v. Wade, 6 Rand. 444; Broadus v. Rosson, 3 Leigh 12; Morrow v. Peyton, 8 Leigh 54; Pifer’s Estate, 15 Pa. St. 533; Gottsberger v. Taylor, 19 N. Y. 150; Pratt v. Northum et al., 5 Mason 108.)” To the same effect, see the principal case cited in Gilmer v. Baker, 24 W. Va. 92.
The principles laid down above apply as well where the same person is representative of an estate 'and guardian of a beneficiary, as where the same person is representative of two estates, one of which is debtor to the other. See Harvey v. Steptoe, 17 Gratt. 301; Smith v. Gregory, 26 Gratt. 248, 260, 263, 265.
In Harvey v. Steptoe, 17 Gratt. 301, it was held that the case at bar did not fall within the reasons governing the decisions of Morrow v. Peyton, and Myers v. Wade, 6 Rand. 444.
See the principal case also cited in Perry v. Campbell, 10 W. Va. 233; Glasgow v. Lipse, 117 U. S. 327, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 761.
Statutory Bonds — Failure to Conform to Requisitions of Statute — Effect.—in Gibson v. Beckham, 16 Gratt. 321, it was held that where a court or officer lias authority or capacity to take a bond and makes a mistake by omitting some condition prescribed, or inserting a condition not authorized or illegal, unless the statute by express words, or necessary Implication, makes it wholly void, the bond is not voiii; and it may be sued on, as far as the conditions are good, as a statutory bond. Ai.i.un, P.. speaking for the court, said : Morrow v. Peyton, 8 Leigh 54. does decide the broad proposition that a bond not conforming to the requisitions of the statute was void as to all purposes. The case even supposing it should be recognized as a binding authority, would not aftect materially the present case, for here the grant was to an administrator e, t. a,, and the bond is such as the law requires in such case. In Morroe v. Peyton, after the death of an executor who had qualified, administration was committed to an administrator d. {/. n. c. t. «., but the bona was in the form prescribed for administration (i. h. n. of an intestate, instead of an administration d. 6. n. c. t. a. The form of the bond adopted did contain a condition for the benefit o1 creditors ; and creditors were suing : but the court In tlie decree says that the administration bond was void on the authority of Frazier v. Frazier, and the securities were not bound by it. Tucker, P., towards the conclusion of his opinion merely remarks on that branch of the case, that the bond was void on the same authority. The great question in that case was whether, when two administrators execute a joint administration bond, one is surety for the other. Upon this proposition the three judges differed, each delivering a separate opinion, — Brook-enmiouoh and Tucker holding the affirmative, Brooke the negative. On the other parts of the case the other judges concurred with Tucker. We have seen all that he said on the question under consideration, and it is clear that he was misled from a hasty-consideration of the case of Frazier v. Frazier (2 Leigh 647). It certainly did not decide that the bond was void or invalid for any pnrpose provided for in the condition. But the decision and opinion of Green. was carefully restricted to the case of the legatee suing, andfor whom no provision had been made. Had not the court in Morrow v. Pey-ton been misled by this mistake in the effect of the decision in Frazier v. Frazier, I do not for a moment suppose they would have decided that such a bond was void entirely and the sureties not hound by it. “ It is manifest therefore that this court in Morrow t>, Peyton, intended to place their decision on this point upon the authority of Frazier v. Frazier alone, supposing through inadvertence, and because the novel and interesting question as to the liability of the executors under the joint bond had diverted attention from the minor questions arising on the record, that Frazier v. Frazier ruled this branch of the case, f do not therefore regard Morrow v. Peyton as an authority on this proposition.” The principal case was also cited In State v. Purcell, 31 W. Va. 67, 5 S. E. Rep. 313.
See further, monographic note on “Official Bonds” appended to Sangster v. Com., 17 Gratt. 184 : monographic note on “Executors and Administrators” appended to Rosser v. Depriest, 5 Gratt. 6.
Administrators — What Constitutes Payment by.— See monographic note on “Executors and Administrators” appended to Rosser v. Depriest, 5 Gratt. 6.

Opinion:
_ BROCKENBROUGH, J.
The main ques-_ tion referred to us for decision is the extent of the liability of the administrator Cookus for the devastavit of Worthington the other administrator. They were both administrators of Morrow, and entered into one bond with four sureties, being all jointly and severally bound thereby. The question discussed here was whether Cookus was a surety equally bound with the other sureties for Worthington's separate acts, and they equally bound with him, or whether he was primarily bound as surety, and the others only secondarily bound, that is, bound only in case Cookus should prove unable to pay for Worthington's devastavit. If they were all equally bound as sureties, then the other sureties should be made parties and compelled to contribute; otherwise not.
The circuit court decided that "the two administrators are looked on as the principals, and those who are induced to become bound with them never contemplate their own liability as long as either principal is solvent; and that the administrators must be considered as a unit responsible for each other's acts, and as principals bound for the balance due from either, and not as mere sureties."
I do not think that this intimate union and identity of the two administrators is countenanced by the law, and the undertaking of the parties. The duties and obligations of administrators are very much the same with *those of executors ; and with respect to them, it has long ago been established that "one executor shall not be charged with the wrong or devastavit of his companion, and shall be no farther liable than for the assets which came to his hands." 3 Bac. Abr. 31. In a court of law, the bond which the'administrators enter into is the only evidence of the respective obligations of the administrators and their sureties, and will also govern in a court of equity, unless there be some other contract between the parties, by which the relation of the principals and sureties towards each other is varied. What, then, is the obligation of the parties by the administration bond which the statute requires them to give? We must adopt the rule reddendi singula singulis, and construe the bond distributively, with reference to the joint acts and separate acts of the administrators. The penalty of the bond binds the administrators and the sureties by name, in a certain sum, but the condition names the administrators only. The penalty binds A. B. C. and D. and the condition is that A. and B. the administrators shall well and truly administer &c. Now, so far as A. and B. jointly administer, they are both bound as principals for their joint acts, and C. and D. are bound as sureties for those joint acts. For those acts, although C. and D. are equally bound with the administrators to creditors, legatees &c. yet, as between themselves, A. and B. shall both and each reimburse to C. and D. whatever these last ma3 have paid on account of their joint mal-administration.
But how is it as to their separate administration? For A.'s separate administration, he alone is bound as principal, because he alone having received the assets, his companion is not chargeable with them by the law. Yet B. is bound by the bond for A.'s administration of all that may come to his hands, and as he is not bound as principal, it follows of course that he is bound as surety. C. and D. are likewise bound by the bond as *sureties that A. will administer well and truly all that may come to his hands. Then B. C. and D. are all bound as sureties that A. will well and truly administer those assets which may separately come to his hands. Being all three bound as sureties, they are bound equally, and each is entitled to contribution from the others, according to the principles of equity. So A. C. and D. stand in the relation of cosureties for the separate administration of B. and are entitled to contribution from each other.
So far then as Worthington received a large amount of assets, and wasted them without the concurrence of Cookus, this last is bound for such devastavit as surety only, and is entitled to contribution from the other sureties, "who ought to be made parties.
On the other questions discussed I also concur in the opinion of the president.