Case Name: TEXAS & PACIFIC RY. CO. v. DAY
Court: Texas Courts of Civil Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1945-11-08
Citations: 193 S.W.2d 722
Docket Number: No. 4425
Parties: TEXAS & PACIFIC RY. CO. v. DAY.
Judges: 
Reporter: South Western Reporter Second Series
Volume: 193
Pages: 722–729

Head Matter:
TEXAS & PACIFIC RY. CO. v. DAY.
No. 4425.
Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. El Paso.
Nov. 8, 1945.
On Rehearing Feb. 7, 1946.
William L. Kerr, of Midland, and Hill D. Hudson, of Pecos (D. L. Case, M. E. Clinton, and J. T. Suggs, all of Dallas, on the brief), for appellant.
John J. Watts, of Crane (Critz, Kuyken-dall, Bauknight, Mann & Stevenson and Richard Critz, all of Austin, of counsel), for appellee.

Opinion:
PRICE, Chief Justice.
This is an appeal from the judgment of the District Court of Crane County. Bryson Day, as plaintiff, sued the Texas & Pacific Railway Company to recover damages for personal injuries alleged to have been caused through the negligence of defendant. This is a crossing accident, occurring in the city of Odessa, at what is known as the "ice factory crossing". At about 1 p. m. on the 18th day of February, 1944, the plaintiff in his automobile approached the crossing from the south. He stopped a short distance from the intersection to await the passage of a train going east, over what is known as the passing track of defendant. After the last car of the train cleared the intersection, the plaintiff started to proceed over the intersection, and his automobile was struck by a train of defendant going west on the main track, same being one of three tracks intersecting the street along which plaintiff was traveling.
The trial was by the court, with a jury. Submission was on numerous special issues. The jury returned a verdict that the train striking plaintiffs was operated at a negligent rate of speed, and such negligence was the proximate cause of the injuries; that the crossing' was extra hazardous, and defendant was guilty of negligence in not maintaining a flagman at the crossing on the occasion in question, and such negligence was a proximate cause of his injuries. That plaintiff was not guilty of contributory negligence; that they did not find by a preponderance of the evidence that the collision was not the result of .an unavoidable accident. Damages were found in the sum of Thirty-six Thousand Dollars ($36,000).
The Court received and accepted the •verdict as returned. On timely motion by •the plaintiff the Court set aside the finding .as to unavoidable accident, overruled the motion of defendant for judgment non obstante veredicto, and rendered judgment •in the sum of $36,000 against defendant.
Appellant urges five points of error. They may be summarized as follows:
The verdict as received was insufficient to warrant entry of judgment. That the issue of unavoidable accident was in the case, and the court erred in setting aside the verdict of the jury in this respect; further that under the evidence as a matter of law the plaintiff was guilty of contributory •negligence, and the court erred in overruling its motion to instruct the jury to return .a verdict in its favor, and further erred in overruling its motion for judgment non obstante veredicto. Complaint is made that the court erred in allowing plaintiff's trial amendment. It is also urged that there was error in the direction of the trial court in relation to the issues submitting damages.
There being no question as to the pleading save as to the filing of the trial .amendment, it is not deemed necessary to Rere summarize same. In view of the contention of the parties it is deemed necessary to consider the evidence to determine whether or not as a matter of law plaintiff •was guilty of contributory negligence.
The crossing on which the collision took place is referred to in the evidence as the "ice factory crossing". The street which the three tracks of appellant intersects runs north and south, the tracks running east and west. The most southerly track is called the team track. North of this is the passing track, and north of the passing track is the main track. There is a space of about ten feet between the •passing track and the main track. Perhaps there is somewhat a greatfer space between •the team and passing track. This is a much used crossing; there is testimony that a vehicle passes over same during each fifteen minutes 'of the day. The tracks divide the city of Odessa into two parts; more inhabitants live north of the track, but a substantial portion live south of same. The population of the city is about fourteen thousand. Appellant each day operates a number of trains, cars and engines across this intersection. This crossing is and was on the day of the accident, protected by flasher lights both on the north and the south side thereof. 'On the north side the flasher lights face both north and south, and when in operation they flash red lights both north and south. The flasher lights facing north on the north side of the crossing spell out the word "Stop". The flasher lights on the south face north and south, and likewise spell out the word stop on the lights facing south when in operation. These lights are activated by electrical impulse. If a train or car was on either the team or passing track within about thirty feet of either side of the crossing, the lights were activated. In case of the main track, if a train or car was within approximately a half mile of either the west or east side of the crossing the lights were activated. When one approached the crossing from the north or south, the lights being so activated, he would be faced by the flashing red light with the admonition to stop. If he entered the intersection from the south while the lights were not operating and before he completed the crossing a train or car came on either of the three tracks close enough to activate the lights, the red flasher lights on the north side facing south would be in operation and visible to him. When a train was on the team or passing track, and when its rear car had passed over the crossing for a distance of thirty feet, such train ceased to activate the lights; in case of the main ti;acl< after the rear car had cleared the crossing it ceased to activate the lights.
There was testimony that frequently freight cars were 'placed on and allowed to stand on the team and passing tracks both on the east and west side of the crossing. There was no substantial evidence that they were so placed and allowed to remain in such proximity to the crossing as to activate the lights. At the relevant time the passing track was evidently not so obstructed to the east. This is said in view of the fact that the train going east had just passed along- this track. There may have been cars on the team track. However, if such was the case they did not seem to interfere with the view of plaintiff to the east. He stated before starting his car he looked to the east, and the rear car of the train which was on the passing track had passed over the crossing some fifty or sixty yards. The only thing that it seems could have obstructed his view of the main line east was the receding train.
Plaintiff was familiar with this crossing .and the lights thereat. For something over a year he had lived south of the tracks and passed over same at least once each day.
Plaintiff's account of the accident is in -substance that on the afternoon of February 18th, about 1 p.m., he came up to the crossing from the south, intending to pro•ceed across same. When he arrived, a train proceeding slowly east on one of the tracks occupied same; that he is not clear •as to which track this train was on, but thinks it was on the team track. Other -testimony without dispute establishes it was on the passing track. He says he stopped Ris automobile a short distance south of the intersection and waited for this train to clear the crossing. When the rear car had -cleared the crossing by about fifty or sixty yards he looked to the east and saw no train approaching, and started his car, looking to the west at the same time. When he looked again to the east the train approaching from the east was so near that he could -not avoid being struck thereby. Plaintiff was under the impression that the train he saw proceeding east was on the team track. In this, under the undisputed facts, he is mistaken; it was on the passing track. He likewise said he thought that he was struck by a train on the middle, or passing -track. In this he is likewise mistaken; •the train that struck him was on the main track. He said he did not remember whether he looked for the lights or not, .and whether same were in operation. We here set out one question and answer of the -plaintiff:
"Q. In your personal experience you never observed a time that they were not on that you saw, when a train was passing? A. I am by that just like the other. If I have noticed it I have forgot all about it, bul I know the lights are supposed to come on when a train is crossing. Doesn't .anyone I know pay any attention to those lights without they see a train coming across, because they go across all the time with the light on and I see them and everybody else sees them."
Reverend Bedford, a witness for plaintiff, testified his car was stopped immediately behind plaintiff's. Neither side asked him directly as to whether the lights were flashing at the time plaintiff started across. It is rather significant that this witness' did not start his car forward in an attempt to make the crossing at the time plaintiff did. In reply to this question by counsel for the plaintiff
"Q. All right, you say 'If it had not been him it would have been you ?' " he answered: "Yes sir. I-have did that very same thing very often, being in a hurry."
We think the inference is fair that the witness meant that the lights were flashing on the south at the time plaintiff started forward. However, he may have referred only to the whistle.
A careful consideration of the testimony can lead to but one conclusion — that before plaintiff started, the lights facing south on the south side of the crossing were flashing, and he was faced with the admonition "Stop". This conclusion is compelled, we think, from the fact that the train approaching on the main track from the. east activated the lights when it was approximately within one half mile of the intersection. Plaintiff's own testimony was that from the time he started until he was struck about ten seconds elapsed. The verdict established that the train striking him was going thirty-five miles an hour. Further, if by any possible chance the train on the main track had not activated the lights before plaintiff started across, that before plaintiff reached the main track the lights facing south on the signal on the north side of the track had certainly commenced to flash.
There seems to be no doubt that on the occasion in question the lights were functioning perfectly. Mr. Pettie, an employee of defendant, who was charged with the care and maintenance of those lights, testified that they were so functioning right after the accident. At the time of the accident he was at the depot, and arrived at the scene a short time after the occurrence. He further testified that if the lights were not functioning properly they would flash all the time. There is no evidence worthy of mention that these lights were not functioning properly. It was intimated in the evidence that the lights did not always operate on the Grant Street crossing, but it seems that there was no dispute that the team and passing track on that crossing were not connected with the flasher system ; at that crossing trains passing on the team or passing track would of course not activate the lights.
A careful consideration of the testimony as a whole and the testimony of plaintiff himself compels the conclusion that he either failed to look for the warning signals or saw and ignored them.
Crossing signals that fail to function as designed are a source of danger rather than safety. On the other hand, a disregard for properly functioning signals is a source of great danger. The trains are operated in reliance on the motorist heeding such signals and governing his conduct thereby.
In this case the assertion is that the evidence established contributory negligence as a matter of law. It is hardly necessary to cite precedents on the proposition that contributory negligence is ordinarily a question of fact for the jury. We-know of no general law that makes it a penal offense for a motorist to proceed over a crossing in the face of a warning light not to do so, or for that matter, in face of a warning by flagman not to do so. The principle is that conduct not declared penal by law should not ordinarily be held by tlie courts as constituting negligence per se. However,' as stated in the case of Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Gaddis, Tex.Com.App., 208 S.W. 895, it is well settled that in this state that one who crosses a railroad track must as' a matter of law exercise some degree of care for his own safety. This decision was expressly adopted by the Supreme Court, and has since by that Court been cited with approval.
In essence there can be but little difference between a motorist disregarding the signal of a flagman not to cross and disregarding an automatic signal so warning him. No doubt on occasions one may cross an intersecting railroad track in face of a flagman's signal not to do so. These signals, whether given by flagmen or by automatic devices, should and no doubt do allow a margin of safety. In the case of St. Louis B. & M. R. Co. et al. v. Paine, Tex.Civ.App., 188 S.W. 1033, this court in somewhat analogous situation held as a matter of law that plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence.
In 56 A.L.R., at page 543, there is a very thorough annotation on the question of whether or not one who attempts to cross railroad tracks just after a train or part of a train has crossed over the crossing and is struck by a train on another track is guilty of negligence. Likewise there are a number of cases cited in the supplements to the note relative to this matter.
The case of Gulf, Colorado & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Gaddis, supra, and St. Louis B. & M. R. Co. et al. v. Paine, supra, are digested there. There is likewise cited the case of International & G. N. R. Co. v. Knight, Tex.Civ.App., 52 S.W. 640. In the latter case one struck by a train coming another direction was held not guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law, and writ of error was denied by the Supreme Court in that case. However, the facts of that case are materially different from the facts here involved.
It is true that on either the team or passing track a standing car or train within thirty feet of either side of the crossing would activate the lights; that a train on the main track in approximately Half a mile of either side of the crossing standing still would activate the lights. However, those lights were intended to warn of the approach of a train in dangerous proximity to the crossing. This the plaintiff understood. There is, as we have stated, no substantial evidence that the defendants kept these lights flashing at all times or any considerable portion of the time; no evidence that they flashed save when it was necessary to warn the public that the crossing was dangerous. That other persons on other occasions had passed over this crossing in disregard of the light, in our opinion has no bearing on the issue. These grade crossings are common throughout the entire country. In many cases, no doubt, they are what might be termed a necessary evil. The jury found here that this was an extra hazardous crossing. If there be evidence to sustain this finding (and same is not attacked), then this we think would not excuse the plaintiff from the exercise of all care. Had he heeded these warning lights he would not have received the severe injuries he did suffer. Even after he had crossed the team track and the pqssing track there was time for him to have still saved himself had he heeded the signal. It is fair to assume, we think, that as he crossed over the team track he could see there was no train approaching within dangerous distance on that track; the same when he crossed the passing track, and then the only danger indicated was from the main track, and he deliberately drove on to same in front of a passing train in the face of a warning that it was near. In attempting to make this •crossing, under the circumstances, plaintiff recklessly and carelessly speculated with 'his own safety. The cases cited below are deemed to support our finding that plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law, and can not recover. Sanchez v. San Antonio & A. P. Ry. Co., 88 Tex. 117, 30 S.W. 431; International & G. N. R. Co. v. Edwards, 100 Tex. 22, 93 S.W. 106; Gulf C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Gaddis, Tex.Com.App., 208 S.W. 895; Galveston H. & S. A. R. Co. v. Price, Tex.Com.App., 240 S.W. 524; Fort Worth & D. C. R. Co. v. Bell, Tex.Civ.App., 14 S.W.2d 856, writ refused. Additional precedents could be cited. The long and short of the matter is that in absolute disregard of signals to refrain from going upon -the track on account of the imminent approach of a train plaintiff drove thereon and -suffered the serious injuries complained of. His action amounted to contributory negligence as a matter of law. -
Our disposition of the issue of contributory negligence renders unnecessary a discussion of the other assignments. The facts in this case have been fully developed, and in our opinion they call for the reversal and rendition of the case. If there he an error in this, in our opinion the issue of unavoidable accident was in the case, and the court erred in setting aside the jury's finding on the issue. The assignment as to the trial amendment is deemed without merit, and that as to the court's •direction relative to the measure of damage fails to prevent reversible error.
It is ordered that the judgment of the -trial court be reversed and here rendered for the defendant.