Case Name: DIBBLE v. RICHARDSON et al.
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1901-10-18
Citations: 72 N.Y.S. 304
Docket Number: 
Parties: DIBBLE v. RICHARDSON et al.
Judges: 
Reporter: West's New York Supplement
Volume: 72
Pages: 304–307

Head Matter:
(64 App. Div. 520.)
DIBBLE v. RICHARDSON et al.
(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department.
October 18, 1901.)
Wills—Construction—Release of Indebtedness.
A will provided that any debt due the testator from A. at testator’s death should not be collected. The wife of A. executed a mortgage to testator, which recited that the wife was justly indebted to testator in the sum so secured. There was no evidence, in a suit by the executor to collect such debt, to show that the testator accepted such mortgage with the understanding that it was merely to secure the debt of A. to testator. ¡Held, that such debt was not released by the will.
Goodrich, P. J„ and Sewell, J„ dissenting.
Appeal from special term, Kings county.
__ Suit to_ foreclose a mortgage by John E. Dibble, as executor of the last will and testament of Mary Callahan, deceased, against Annie C. Richardson and Asa B. Richardson, coexecutor of Mary Callahan, deceased! From a decree of the special term of the supreme court in favor of the plaintiff (67 N. Y. Supp. 699), the defendants appeal.
Affirmed.
Argued before GOODRICH, P. J., and JENKS, WOODWARD, HIRtiCHBERG, and SEWELL, JJ.
Edward M. Grout, for appellants.
Everett Hasten, for respondent.

Opinion:
WOODWARD, J.
We are confronted upon this appeal with the same difficulty which apparently operated upon the court at special term,—the lack of evidence to support the plausible theory of the defendants; for, while there can be no doubt of the power of a court of equity to look behind the form of a mortgage, and, in a proper case, to hold that the mortgagor is a mere surety for the debt of another, and entitled to all the rights incident to that relation (Bank v. Roop, 80 N. Y. 591, and authorities cited), there are no presumptions in favor of suretyship, and, where the mortgage recites an indebtedness on the part of the mortgagor, evidence is required to show a different state of facts before there is any ground on which a court of equity may properly intervene. Nor is the fact that a person other than the mortgagor actually received the money to his own use conclusive upon this point. It is necessary to show that the mortgagee understood the transaction, _and that the mortgage was accepted as security for a debt owed by another. "My difficulty was and is to make a finding of fact that the defendant wife was accepted only as a surety, and not as a principal debtor, by the deceased," says the learned justice at special term, and, as we have already suggested, the same difficulty confronts us upon this appeal. The court, after admitting evidence which, to say the least, encroaches upon the inhibitions of section 829 of the Code of Civil Procedure, was unable, though apparently willing, to find evidence to support the contention of the defendants; and the record certainly discloses no fact which would warrant this court in holding that the findings, or refusals of the court to find, involved error of which the defendants may complain.
This action was brought to foreclose a mortgage for $6,000, given by the defendant Annie C. Richardson to the testator to secure a bond for the same amount given by the same defendant to the testator, and judgment for any deficiency is prayed for against the said defendant. Defendant husband is a coexecutor with the plaintiff in this action, and is joined as a defendant only because he refused to unite with the plaintiff in bringing the action. The answers of both defendants pleaded payment of the $6,000 under the provisions of the last will and testament of Mary Callahan, deceased, which provision reads as follows:
"I hereby direct and provide that, in case any sums of money should be owing to me or to my estate from Asa B. Richardson, that such sum or sums shall not be claimed from him by my executors, but shall be treated as a bequest to him, and any evidence of indebtedness from him shall be given up and canceled by my executors."
The contention of the defendants is that, while the mortgage recites that "whereas, the said Annie C. Richardson is justly indebted to the said party of the second part [the testatrix] in the sum of six thousand dollars, lawful money of the United States," etc., the real debtor was the husband of the defendant Annie C. Richardson; that the mortgage was given merely as a surety for his debt; and that, this indebtedness of the husband being canceled by the provisions of the codicil of the will of the deceased, the surety is released. We should find no difficulty in supporting this contention if there was evidence to show that the testator accepted the mortgage with the understanding that it was intended as a security for the indebtedness of the husband, but the case is barren of such evidence, and the mortgage itself declares that the defendant Annie C. Richardson is justly indebted. "The transaction shows," to use the language of the learned court at special term, "that she did not loan the money on the faith or credit of the husband, but on the bond and mortgage of the wife." There is no suggestion that the testator took any obligation from the husband; that she ever recognized him as owing to her any sum of money secured by this mortgage; and in the absence of evidence to show that the testator understood that she was lending money to the defendant Asa B. Richardson, rather than to the wife, and that the latter made and executed the bond dnd mortgage as a suret)r, no rule of equity with which we are familiar would justify a reversal of the judgment. This is clearly the doctrine in all of the cases which we have been able to find in this state (Bank v. Roop, supra, and authorities there cited), and it is consistent with rules of equity as universally applied. The intent of contracting parties is to be looked for primarily in the words and terms of the contract (Bank v. Burns, 46 N. Y. 170, 175), and in the case at bar the contract of the defendant Annie C. Richardson was to repay $6,000, for which she was "justly indebted to the said party of the second part." A provision in the codicil of a will of the testator releasing Asa B. Richardson from any indebtedness which he might be owing at the time of her death cannot be construed as releasing Annie C. Richardson from the terms of her contract, unless it is clearly established that there was an understanding on the part of the testator that the mortgage was intended to stand as surety for the indebtedness of the husband of the mortgagor. No evidence of this is to be found in the case now before us, and it follows that the judgment must be affirmed.
The judgment appealed from should be affirmed, with costs.
HIRSCHBERG and JENKS, JJ., concur.