Case Name: Jones et al. v. City of Decatur et al.
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia
Jurisdiction: Georgia
Decision Date: 1940-03-13
Citations: 189 Ga. 732
Docket Number: No. 13037
Parties: Jones et al. v. City of Decatur et al.
Judges: All the Justices concwr.
Reporter: Georgia Reports
Volume: 189
Pages: 732–733

Head Matter:
Jones et al. v. City of Decatur et al.
No. 13037.
March 13, 1940.

Opinion:
Atkinson, Presiding Justice.
1. By an amendment to the charter of the City of Decatur it was provided: "That the commissioners of the City of Decatur shall have full power and authority in their discretion, and they are hereby given such authority, to close up and abolish any street, road, or alley, or any part of a street, road, or alley in said city; provided, however, said city shall be liable for damages to any property right of any person occasioned by the exercise of the powers therein granted." Ga. L. 1931, p. 736. In pursuance of the amendment to the charter the city commissioners adopted an ordinance declaring "that the said Drexel Avenue crossing from the south side of Howard Avenue, as extended, to the north side of West College Avenue be and the same is hereby closed up and abolished as to all vehicular traffic."
Held, that the ordinance was authorized by the charter amendment. The ordinance in question differs from that involved in Coker v. Atlanta, Knoxville & Northern Railway Co., 123 Ga. 483 (51 S. E. 481), which was held to be unauthorized by the charter.
2. Neither the charter amendment nor the ordinance is violative of the due-process of law clauses in the State and Federal constitutions. Lee County v. Smithville, 154 Ga. 550, 556 (115 S. E. 107), and cit. See Marietta Chair Co. v. Henderson, 121 Ga. 399, 403 (49.S. E. 312, 104 Am. St. R. 156, 2 Ann. Cas. 83), and cit.
3. The fact that the ordinance closing the crossing to vehicular traffic may have been induced in part-upon consideration of the furnishing by the railroad company of certain dirt to improve Howard Avenue and certain right of wa.y may have been furnished by an individual for widening that street, and that the closing of the crossing will operate to some inconvenience of the plaintiffs and general public, and' depress the market value of their properties, is not (in the absence of fraud or insolvency of the city) cause for injunction to prevent closing of the crossing. Marietta Chair Co. v. Henderson, supra; Pacific States Box &c. Co. v. White, 296 U. S. 176, 185 (56 Sup. Ct. 159, 80 L. ed. 138); Wells v. Atlanta, 43 Ga. 67; Mathews v. Darby, 165 Ga. 509 (141 S. E. 304) ; Murphy v. Chicago &c. Ry. Co., 247 Ill. 614 (93 N. E. 381).
4. Under the pleadings and the evidence the judge did not err in refusing-an injunction. Judgment affirmed.
All the Justices concwr.
Young II. Fraser and T. E. Whitaker, for plaintiffs.
B. H. Burgess and Neely, Marshall & Greene, for defendants.