Case Name: Theresa SCHUMAN v. James VITALE and Linda Vitale. Appeal of Carmen S. VITALE
Court: Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania
Jurisdiction: Pennsylvania
Decision Date: 1992-01-07
Citations: 144 Pa. Commw. 560
Docket Number: No. 1386 C.D. 1989
Parties: Theresa SCHUMAN v. James VITALE and Linda Vitale. Appeal of Carmen S. VITALE.
Judges: Before PALLADINO, and BYER, JJ., and SILVESTRI, Senior Judge.
Reporter: Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court Reports
Volume: 144
Pages: 560–570

Head Matter:
602 A.2d 390
Theresa SCHUMAN v. James VITALE and Linda Vitale. Appeal of Carmen S. VITALE.
Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania.
Argued Sept. 13, 1990.
Decided Jan. 7, 1992.
Reargument Denied March 9, 1992.
Frank J. Rubinate, for appellant.
Thomas M. Devlin, for appellee.
Before PALLADINO, and BYER, JJ., and SILVESTRI, Senior Judge.

Opinion:
SILVESTRI, Senior Judge.
Carmen S. Vitale (Vitale) appeals from the order of the Court of Common Pleas of Wayne County, dated June 15, 1989. The order denied and dismissed Vitale's request to pursue a cross-claim for contribution from the Department of Transportation (DOT).
This case arises from an automobile accident. Plaintiffs James and Linda Vitale filed a complaint against defendants Theresa Schuman, Ernest Williams, Carmen S. Vitale and DOT for personal injuries suffered in the accident. Carmen Vitale filed an answer and new matter. The new matter included a cross-claim under Pa.R.C.P. 2252(d) asserting: (1) that his co-defendants were solely liable to plaintiffs; (2) that his co-defendants were jointly and severally liable with him; or (3) that his co-defendants were liable to him for contribution. (R.R. p. 16.)
After conducting a pretrial conference, the trial court, by order dated September 8, 1988, bifurcated the claims between James and Linda Vitale and the defendants from those amongst the defendants themselves. (R.R. p. 20.)
After a jury was impaneled, but before trial, the plaintiffs entered into a settlement with defendants Vitale, Schuman and DOT for $174,000. The defendants contributed to the total as follows: $115,000 from Vitale; $50,000 from Schuman; and $9,000 from DOT. Two releases were prepared.
Vitale thereafter attempted to proceed with his cross-claim against DOT for contribution. The trial court dismissed Vitale's cross-claim based on Section 8324(c) of the Uniform Contribution Among Tort-feasors Act (UCATA), 42 Pa.C.S. § 8324(c), which provides:
(c) Effect of settlement. — A joint tort-feasor who enters into a settlement with the injured person is not entitled to recover contribution from another joint tortfeasor whose liability to the injured person is not extinguished by the settlement.
The trial court examined the release by which Vitale and Schuman settled with the plaintiffs and determined that since DOT's liability to the plaintiffs was not extinguished thereby, Vitale was not entitled to recover contribution from DOT. The trial court stated that it relied upon the express statutory language of Section 8324(c) of UCATA.
Vitale argues that the trial court erred in failing to consider the totality of the settlement, which was effected by the two releases. Vitale argues that the release which effected settlement between the plaintiffs and DOT is part of a "package deal" whereby the plaintiffs also released Vitale and Schuman from liability. Since all defendants were released from liability, even though by separate doc uments, Vitale contends, Vitale may seek contribution from DOT in accordance with Section 8324(c) of UCATA.
DOT contends that a reading of the release in question (that which settled the case between the plaintiffs and Vitale and Schuman) reveals no mention whatsoever of the plaintiffs' intent to discharge DOT from liability, and, therefore, Vitale's claim against DOT for contribution must fail.
We begin with a review of the rules of statutory construction. Section 1903 of the Statutory Construction Act of 1972,1 Pa.C.S. § 1903, provides that "Words and phrases shall be construed according to rules of grammar and according to their common and approved usage." Section 1921(b), 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(b), provides "When the words of a statute are clear and free from all ambiguity, the letter of it is not to be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit." We next examine UCATA with these principles in mind.
Section 8324 of UCATA provides in whole:
(a) General rule. — The right of contribution exists among joint tort-feasors.
(b) Payment required. — A joint tort-feasor is not entitled to a money judgment for contribution until he has by payment discharged the common liability or has paid more than his pro rata share thereof.
(c) Effect of settlement. — A joint tort-feasor who enters into a settlement with the injured person is not entitled to recover contribution from another joint tortfeasor whose liability to the injured person is not extinguished by the settlement.
There are no words or phrases in Section 8324(c) of UCATA which are beyond common and approved usage, except the phrase "joint tort-feasor," which is specifically defined in Section 8322, 42 Pa.C.S. § 8322. Additionally, the words of Section 8324(c) are clear and free from ambiguity.
Reading the words of Section 8324(c) as chosen by the legislature, we determine that the section means that where there are two or more joint tort-feasors and one of them settles with the injured person, such settling joint tortfeasor may not recover contribution from the other non-settling joint tort-feasors unless the settlement by the settling joint tort-feasor extinguishes the liability of the non-settling joint tort-feasor to the injured person.
That the Vitale and Schuman settlements, separately or together, did not extinguish DOT's liability to the plaintiffs is admitted by Vitale. In his brief, Vitale, after quoting Section 8324(c), writes:
Admittedly, the Vitale-Schuman release does not extinguish the liability of co-Defendant PennDOT. Standing alone, the Order denying and dismissing the cross-claim of Defendant Vitale against PennDOT would be a correct one.
In this case, settlement was effected by way of two Releases. Defendant PennDOT's liability to the Plaintiffs was extinguished by settlement through a separate Release executed at the same time, and as a "package deal".
A review of the PennDOT release, . shows that PennDOT has been released from any and all liability to the Plaintiffs. Therefore, since PennDOT's liability to the Plaintiffs has been extinguished by the settlement, PennDOT is available for contribution.
(Appellant's brief, pp. 8-9)
Vitale's argument is self-defeating. Although it is true the settlement of plaintiff's claim was effected by way of two "releases," one released only Vitale, Schuman and their insurance carriers. DOT was neither a party to this release nor was its liability extinguished by the Vitale-Schuman settlement. DOT was, as stated by Vitale, released by reason of a payment by DOT of $9,000.00 on the claim asserted against it. DOT's liability was not, as admitted by Vitale, extinguished by the Vitale-Schuman settlement. Although all three settlements occurred contemporaneously ("package deal"), Vitale fails to articulate how the payment of the separate sums by each of the three joint tort-feasors creates a right of contribution where the Vitale-Schuman settlements viewed separately or together did not extinguish the liability of DOT.
Accordingly, we determine that Section 8324(c) of UCATA requires us to conclude that since the settlement of the claim by Vitale and Schuman against themselves did not extinguish the liability of DOT, Vitale is precluded from recovery of contribution from DOT. The order of the trial court is affirmed.
ORDER
AND NOW, this 7th day of January, 1992, the order of the Court of Common Pleas of Wayne County, dated June 15, 1989, is affirmed.
This decision was reached before the conclusion of Judge BYER's service.
. The complaint alleged that James Vitale was a passenger in an automobile driven by Carmen Vitale and that on July 17, 1986 their vehicle was struck by a vehicle which was driven by Theresa Schuman and owned by Ernest Williams. The complaint further alleged that DOT negligently maintained the roadway on which the accident occurred. Linda Vitale, wife of James Vitale, claimed loss of consortium. The record reveals that Ernest Williams was dismissed with prejudice by stipulation, approved and ordered by the trial court on March 3, 1989.
. In one release, Vitale and Schuman and their insurance carriers were discharged from liability to the plaintiffs for the stated consideration of $165,000. In the second release, DOT was discharged from liability by payment of $9,000.
. This case presents a question of apparent first impression in any jurisdiction which has enacted UCATA.
. That section defines a "joint tort-feasor" as "two or more persons jointly or severally liable in tort for the same injury to persons or property, whether or not judgment has been recovered against all or some of them."