Case Name: Hugh SAWYER, as guardian ad litem and administrator ad litem, Appellant, v. MARCO ISLAND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, a Florida corporation, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1974-10-23
Citations: 301 So. 2d 820
Docket Number: No. 73-199
Parties: Hugh SAWYER, as guardian ad litem and administrator ad litem, Appellant, v. MARCO ISLAND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, a Florida corporation, Appellee.
Judges: McNULTY, C. J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 301
Pages: 820–823

Head Matter:
Hugh SAWYER, as guardian ad litem and administrator ad litem, Appellant, v. MARCO ISLAND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, a Florida corporation, Appellee.
No. 73-199.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
Oct. 23, 1974.
Hugh Sawyer, Naples, for appellant.
Williams, Salomon, Kanner & Damian, Miami, for appellee.

Opinion:
GRIMES, Judge.
We had originally intended to affirm this case without opinion referring only to the case of Pierce & Stevenson v. Jones, 1933, 109 Fla. 517, 147 So. 842, as authority for the decision. In view of the dissenting opinion, we believe it would be helpful to add some additional comments.
Marco Island Development Corporation brought this suit to quiet the title to thirty-six lots within its subdivision. Defaults were taken against the majority of the lot-owners. Thereafter, Mr. Sawyer was appointed guardian ad litem to represent such of thesé defendants who may have been incompetent or deceased and attorney pursuant to the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act. As such, he contacted many of these defendants and was able to determine that none of them were deceased, incompetent or in the military service. At that point, he had no further responsibility to those persons.
However, Mr. Sawyer was unable to locate the owners of approximately half the lots, and on behalf of these persons he filed general denials as well as a number of affirmative defenses. When Marco Island's motion for summary judgment came on for hearing, the material allegations of the complaint were supported by affidavit which stated that no payments had been made on any of the contracts for more than a year. There were no countervailing affidavits or depositions in support of the denials or affirmative defenses. Hence, the only viable issue which remained was whether Marco Island had a right to quiet the title while also retaining the payments previously made on the lots, and this was only because the'facts which posed this issue were apparent from the face of the complaint and the affidavit.
The dissenting opinion correctly states that the various decisions of the Florida courts on this point are not easily harmonized. However, the closest case in point is Pierce & Stevenson v. Jones, supra, in which the Taylor case quoted by Judge Mann is distinguished. We see a substantial difference between the unjust enrichment which would result if a large deposit were forfeited within a short period of time and a situation where a vendor has removed his property from the market for several years while the vendee abandons the contract by ceasing to make further payments for which he wasn't liable in the first place. Cf. C. O. Condominiums, Inc. v. Dickinson, Fla.App.2d, 1974, 301 So.2d 106. Moreover, none of the persons represented by the guardian ad litem in this case had made payments in excess of 25% of the purchase price and most of them had paid much less.
In short, it may be that the Supreme Court should readdress itself to the question, but this is not the case in which it should be accomplished.
McNULTY, C. J., concurs.
MANN (Ret.), J., concurs in part, dissents in part with opinion.
. Jerome Posehel, who is mentioned in the dissent, was located by the guardian and determined to be alive, competent and not serving in the military service.