Case Name: Succession of DIELMANN
Court: Louisiana Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1907-01-07
Citations: 119 La. 101
Docket Number: No. 16,379
Parties: Succession of DIELMANN.
Judges: 
Reporter: Louisiana Reports
Volume: 119
Pages: 101–117

Head Matter:
(43 South. 972.)
No. 16,379.
Succession of DIELMANN.
(Jan. 7, 1907.
On the Merits, April 29, 1907.)
1. Appeal — Proceedings fob Transfer of Cause — Order of Appeal.
The motion to dismiss the appeal is not sustained.
There was an order of appeal fixing the amount of the bond of appeal.
A certified copy of this order was filed in due time.
2. Husband and Wife — Community Property-Rights of Survivor.
A widow in community ruled the liquidators of a bank to show cause why they should not turn over to her, as usufructuary, certain funds in their hands representing proceeds of stock which had been converted into money by the liquidation of the bank. The heirs were made parties, as was also the husband of one of the heirs who had died, leaving him as her universal legatee.
The rule was resisted by several of the defendants. It was claimed that the widow must furnish security under article 558 of the Civil Code, and, failing to do so, the fund must be invested in other bonds or stock under articles 563 and 564 of the Civil Code.
The widow had withdrawn a portion of the funds before the issuing of the rule. She had also acquired the right, title, and interest of several of the heirs. It was claimed that, by receiving and using those funds in the purchase of the shares of certain heirs, she had renounced and extinguished her usufruct, and had thrown herself into relations of joint ownership with the respondents, which entitled them to a partition ; that the purchase by the widow of these shares was really to that extent a partition between herself and the vendors of the shares as favored children, excluding respondents from the benefit of a like partition.
Held, the provisions of article 558, as to the furnishing of security by the usufructuary, do not refer to the usufruct of the surviving spouse under the usufruct laws of 1844. The usufructuary takes that usufruct without the obligation of giving security. The exemption from giving security extends over the entire share of the deceased, including moneys then on hand. When stocks or notes are converted into money through the maturing of the notes or the liquidation of the corporations in which such stock is owned, the usufructuary holds those proceeds without giving security, just as if they had been money at the opening of the succession. The usufructuary cannot be compelled by the heirs to invest them into bonds or notes under articles 563 and 564 of the Civil Code.
3. Samf — Purchase of Interest of Heirs.
The purchase by the widow of the shares of certain heirs of their father substituted for the widow’s usufructuary rights in such shares a right of ownership therein, but such purchase cannot be invoked as a “renunciation” of her rights. By purchase she did not “forfeit” her usufructuary rights; nor can such purchase be held to be a “partial partition” between herself and the owners of the shares so purchased.
4. Set-Off and Counterclaim — Subject-Matter — Claims from Same Subject-Matter — Partition .
Defendant in the rule referred to cannot in-graft thereon an action for a partition.
(Syllabus by the Court.)
Appeal from Civil District Court, Parish of Orleans; Fred Durieve King, Judge.
In the matter of the succession of Philip W. Dielmann against the liquidators of the Germania Savings Bank and others. From the judgment, an appeal is taken.
Affirmed.
Thomas Gilmore and Joseph Clohesy Gilmore, for appellant Simon J. Reems. James Barkley Rosser, Jr., for appellee Mrs. Mary M. Dielmann. Buck, Walshe & Buck, for appellees liquidators of Germania Savings Bank & Trust Co.

Opinion:
On Motion to Dismiss the Appeal.
BREAUX, C. J.
Before considering the grounds urged by appellee for dismissing the appeal, we deem it in place to state that the judgments appealed from were rendered, and thereafter motions for appeal — suspensive and devolutive — were presented by appellants.
The suspensive appeal is not before us; it having been denied by the court a qua.
The devolutive appeal was perfected by furnishing the required bond.
The grounds of appellee for dismissing the appeal are that there was no order of appeal ; in the second place, that Simon J. Reems, one of the appellants, is without legal interest.
Recurring to the first ground, to wit, no order of appeal, we begin by stating that there was an order of appeal. Motion for this order was made in open court, and by the court granted.
The principal objection of appellee in this connection is that the order of appeal is not dated, and that it was not signed by the judge.
At the time that this motion to dismiss the appeal was offered to be filed in the presence of the appellee's counsel, appellant's counsel offered a copy of the minutes, showing that the order was properly entered on the 21st day of October, 1906. That is a date, and .all that the rules of practice require.
By consulting the transcript, we find that it shows that the order of appeal was granted.
The motion above referred to as having been offered and filed at the time that the motion to dismiss was filed in this court was for the purpose on the part of the appellant of supplementing that which appeared to have been done as stated in the transcript.
It was not as clearly shown in the transcript as it should have been that the order of appeal had been dated on the day that it was granted. The copy to which we have just referred laid at rest all question upon the subject.
The appellée's contention is further that this order of appeal was not signed. Such an order does not require the signature of the judge. It was different in the Conery Case, 115 La. 807, 40 South. 173, for in that case the proceedings were at chambers.
The minutes must be considered as setting forth properly and correctly the action of the court in matter of the appeal. The minutes prove the verity of the proceedings. They are evidence of the highest rank. State of Louisiana v. Euzebe, 42 La. Ann. 727, 7 South. 784.
It follows that the order properly shows what was the action of the judge of the district court in matter of the appeal. There can be no possible good objection to this order.
We have seen that the asserted want of interest in appellant Reems is the other ground in the application for dismissing the appeal. This court will not anticipate issues in order to ascertain whether or not an appellant has or has not an interest. It does not appear on the face of the papers that the appellant is absolutely without interest. He was a party to the proceedings originally and was condemned by the judgment from which he appeals.
In principle every decision is, or should be, appealable. The appeal is a right of the person who has lost and who wishes to have the judgment reversed, annulled, or amended in some particular. The right should never be denied save for good reasons. As relates to interest, it certainly should not be denied to an appellant who alleges that he is entitled to relief from a judgment in which he appears as one of the parties east.
There is no substantial error in matter of the proceedings, and without such error there is no good ground to dismiss the appeal. We must therefore decline to dismiss the appeal at this time, particularly on any such ground as want of Interest, an issue which belongs to the merits, and which we are not called upon to decide before we will have examined into the merits of the case.
For reasons assigned, the motion to dismiss the appeal is overruled.