Case Name: LENZ v. CITY OF DETROIT
Court: Michigan Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1965-07-13
Citations: 376 Mich. 156
Docket Number: Calendar No. 15, Docket No. 50,439
Parties: LENZ v. CITY OF DETROIT.
Judges: T. M. Kavanagh, C. J., and Dethmers, Kelly, and Smith, JJ., concurred with O’Hara, J.
Reporter: Michigan Reports
Volume: 376
Pages: 156–164

Head Matter:
LENZ v. CITY OF DETROIT.
Decision op the Court.
1. Municipal Corporations — Discharge op Employee — Statute op Limitations.
War veteran’s right of aetion in assumpsit against defendant city for damages for alleged illegal discharge from employment was barred by statute of limitations, where well over 6 years had elapsed from date of discharge before elaim was presented to city council (CL 1948, § 35.402; CLS 1956, § 609.13; Detroit Charter, title 6, chap 7, § 11).
2. Limitation op Actions — Tolling Statute — Discharged Public Employee — Action to Compel Reemployment.
Action by plaintiff war veteran, a discharged city employee, by way of mandamus to compel his reinstatement and certiorari to review his discharge did not toll the running of the statute of limitations (CL 1948, § 35.402; CLS 1956, § 609.13; Detroit Charter, title 6, chap 7, § 11).
3. Costs — Discharged Veteran City Employee.
No costs are allowed upon affirmance of judgment denying relief to discharged veteran city employee against defendant city but disallowing costs below.
Dissenting Opinion.
Souris, J.
4. Municipal Corporations — Discharge of War Veteran — Assumpsit — Limitation op Actions.
War veteran’s second assumpsit action against defendant city, filed afler refusal of city to pay claim presented against it within S months after Supreme Court had determined first assumpsit action was barred by reason of noncomplianee with charter provision requiring unliquidated claim to be presented to common council as a condition precedent thereto, held, not barred by statute of limitations, there having been no final ruling upon the legality of the alleged discharge which plaintiff alleged gave rise to the cause of action upon which recovery was based (CLS 1956, § 609.13; Detroit Charter, title 6, ch 7, §W-
References for Points in Headnotes
[1, 4, 8] 34 Am Jur, Limitation of Actions § 397.
38 Am Jur, Municipal Corporations § 671 et seq.
34 Am Jur, Limitation of Actions § 247 et seq.
[3.10] 20 Am Jur 2d, Costs § 34.
2 Am Jur 2d, Administrative Law § 706 et seq.
[6.11] 2 Am Jur 2d, Administrative Law § 706.
[7.12] 2 Am Jur 2d, Administrative Law § 595 et seq.
5. Courts-—Supreme Court—Mandamus—Certiorari.
Supreme Court erred in failing to proceed with determination where the record before it was full, complete, and certain in support of either mandamus or certiorari.
6. Appeal and Error—Minor Errors.
Misnaming of pleadings and other errors or defects in proceedings which do not affect the substantial rights of the parties will be disregarded by the courts in reviewing lower court proceedings (CL 1948, § 616.1; Court Bule No 1, § 3 [1945]).
7. Municipal Corporations—Veterans’ Preference Act—Administrative Due Process.
Trial court’s order directing defendant mayor to reinstate plaintiff war veteran in city employment from which he had been discharged without having been afforded administrative due process should be ordered vacated on sua sponte motion of Supreme Court and cause remanded for full hearing by the mayor as required by the veterans’ preference act (CL 1948, § 35.403; Detroit Charter, title 6, chap 7, § 11).
Separate Opinion.
Black and Adams, JJ.
8. Municipal Corporations—Discharge of Employee—Statute of Limitations.
War veteran’s right of action in assumpsit against defendant city for damages for alleged illegal discharge from employment was barred by statute of limitations, where well over 6 years had elapsed from date of discharge before claim was presented to city council (CL 1948, §35.403; CLS 1956, § 609.13; Detroit Charter, title 6, chap 7, § 11).
9. Limitation of Actions—Tolling Statute—Discharged Public Employee—Action to Compel Reemployment.
Action by plaintiff war veteran, a discharged city employee, by way of mandamus to compel his reinstatement and certiorari to review Ms discharge did not toll the running of the statute of limitations (GL 1948, § SB.402; CLS 1956, §609.13; Detroit charter, title 6, chap 7, § 11).
10. Costs—Discharged Veteran City Employee.
No costs are allowed upon affirmance of judgment denying relief to discharged veteran city employee against defendant city but disallowing costs below.
11. Appeal and Error—Minor Errors.
Misnaming of pleadings and other errors or defects in proceedings which do not affect the substantial rights of the parties will be disregarded by the courts in reviewing lower court proceedings (GL 1948, § 616.1; Court Mule No 1, § 3 [1945]).
12. Municipal Corporations—Veterans’ Preference Act—Administrative Due Process.
Trial court’s order directing defendant mayor to reinstate plaintiff war veteran in city employment from which he had been discharged without having been afforded administrative due process should be ordered vacated on sua sponte motion of Supreme Court and cause remanded for full hearing by the mayor as required by the veterans’ preference act (GL 1948, § 35.402; Detroit Charter, title 6, chap 7, § 11).
Appeal from Wayne; Huff (Eugene Snow), J., presiding.
Submitted April 8, 1965.
(Calendar No. 15, Docket No. 50,439.)
Decided July 13, 1965.
Rehearing denied October 4, 1965.
Declaration by John N. Lenz against the City of Detroit, a municipal corporation, for alleged damages for the illegal discharge from public employment. Judgment for defendant. Plaintiff appeals.
Affirmed.
Craig Thompson, for plaintiff.
Robert Reese, Corporation Counsel, John R. McKinlay, Assistant Corporation Counsel, for defendant.
See footnote 4 on page 164.—Reporter.
See footnote 4 on page 164.—Eeporter.

Opinion:
O'Hara, J.
This appeal brings up the continuing effort of John N. Lenz to obtain judicial relief from what he has alleged was an actionable denial, by the then mayor of Detroit, of administrative due process. See Lenz v. Mayor of Detroit, 338 Mich 383, decided December 29, 1953; Lenz v. Mayor of Detroit, 343 Mich 599 (certiorari denied 351 US 983 [76 S Ct 1050, 100 L ed 1497]) decided December 1, 1955, and Lenz v. City of Detroit, 361 Mich 166, decided September 16, 1960. The appeal before us presents for review a judgment that Lenz take nothing by his November 29, 1961 declaration in assumpsit. The gist of that declaration is a demand for damages caused by Detroit's alleged breach of Lenz' contract of employment with the city.
The point made in this latest action is familiar. Lenz says he has a right of action against Detroit because his discharge by the city from employment was illegal in that it was accomplished in violation of section 2 of the veterans' preference act (CL 1948, § 35.402 [Stat Ann 1961 Rev § 4.1222]). Now, as against his former failure to present claim for damages under title 6, chap 7, § 11 of the charter of Detroit and our adjudication that such presentment was a condition precedent of suit for damages by Lenz (361 Mich 166), Lenz says that he presented (January 17, 1961) his claim pursuant to said section 11; that it has been denied by the common council of Detroit, and that he is free to present that claim in the courts for meritorious determination.
We hold that the section 11 filing by Mr. Lenz of his-claim was too late and that the right of action pleaded here was barred by expiration of the regular six-year statute of limitations (CLS 1956, § 609.13 [Stat Ann 1959 Cum Supp § 27.605] ). Mr. Lenz' right to file under section 11 accrued, along with his right to seek reinstatement by constitutional writ, when the then mayor of Detroit discharged him February 6, 1950 (for the mayor's letter of discharge, see 338 Mich 390, 391). Most certainly his right to file under section 11 accrued December 29, 1953, when this Court quashed the circuit court's writ of mandamus and dismissed Lenz' then effort to have the mayor's order of discharge set aside. Yet he presented no claim, under section 11, until January 17, 1961. By that time the right of action pleaded here had become extinct.
There is a suggestion in the briefs that the proceedings instituted by Mr. Lenz, first by mandamus to compel reinstatement and then by certiorari to review his discharge, somehow tolled the running of the statute. No authority for the proposition is cited and we find none. The question is governed by the rule of General Discount Corp. v. City of Detroit, 306 Mich 458, 464. That case turned upon another tardy presentment under section 11. The ruling was that the "statute could not be tolled" when, prior to presentment under section 11, "the six-year period had already expired." We must adhere to such ruling.
The judgment of the circuit court, entered March 27, 1963, is affirmed. No costs.
T. M. Kavanagh, C. J., and Dethmers, Kelly, and Smith, JJ., concurred with O'Hara, J.
For current provisions see PA 1961, No 236, § 5813 (CLS 1961, § 600.5813 [Stat Ann 1962 Rev § 27A.5813]),