Case Name: Langford v. The State
Court: Supreme Court of Texas
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1852
Citations: 8 Tex. 115
Docket Number: 
Parties: Langford v. The State.
Judges: 
Reporter: Texas Reports
Volume: 8
Pages: 58–59

Head Matter:
Langford v. The State.
‘Where one person has the general and another a special property in a thing stolen, the indict-monfc may allege tho property to be in either. (Note 23.)
In order to sustain a conviction under tho 27th section of the act of 1848, (Hart. Big., art. fí23,) it must have been proved that the property stolen was of the value of twenty dollars.
'Where tho defendant was convicted of stealing a slave, the jury assessing the punishment at confinement in tho penitentiary for one year, the court on appeal said that the indictment appeared to have been found and the conviction had under the 27th section of the act of 18-18, and reversed the judgment because the slave had not been proved to be of the value of twenty dollars, as required by that section.
Appeal from Grayson. The appellant was indicted at the Fall Term, 1849, of the District Court, charged with having stolen a negro woman, the property of one John Carpenter, of the value of five hundred dollars. The jury returned a verdict of “guilty,” and assessed tlie punishment at imprisonment in the penitentiary for one year. The defendant moved in arrest of judgment, which motion tlie court overruled and gave judgment on the verdict. The defendant appealed.
It was in proof that the negro was the property of John Carpenter, but that at tlie time of the alleged larceny she was in possession of one Carter, under a •contract of hiring. There was no evidence adduced touching the value of the negro.
Tlie grounds of error relied on were—
1st. That, (lie ownership of the negro should have been averred to be in the ¡hirer. Carter, who was in possession at tlie time of the alleged larceny.
2d. Tlie omission to prove that the negro was of any value.
J. T. Mills, for plaintiff in error.

Opinion:
Wheeler, J.
Tlie first objection to tlie judgment is not tenable. The rule is, that whore one person lias the general and another a special property in llie thing, the property may be averred in tlie indictment to be in either. (Whart. Am. Cr. L., 404.)
But thc> remaining objection is fatal (o the judgment.
The indictment appears to have been framed and the conviction had under tlie 27th section of the. act of 3848, (Hart. Dig., art. 523.) In order to support tlie conviction under that section it must have been proved that tlie property -stolen was of the value of twenty dollars, tíuch proof was not made. The judgment must consequently be reversed and the case remanded for a new trial.
Note 23. — Billard v. The State, 30 T., 367; Moseley v. The State, 42 T., 78; Cox v. The State, 43 T., 101.
Judgment reversed.