Case Name: Kristin Aumann PORTER, Appellant, v. Jeremy M. PORTER, Appellee
Court: Mississippi Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Mississippi
Decision Date: 2000-07-18
Citations: 766 So. 2d 55
Docket Number: No. 1999-CA-00751-COA
Parties: Kristin Aumann PORTER, Appellant, v. Jeremy M. PORTER, Appellee.
Judges: BEFORE SOUTHWICK, P.J., BRIDGES, AND IRVING, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 766
Pages: 55–60

Head Matter:
Kristin Aumann PORTER, Appellant, v. Jeremy M. PORTER, Appellee.
No. 1999-CA-00751-COA.
Court of Appeals of Mississippi.
July 18, 2000.
Darnell L. Nicovich, Gulfport, Attorney for Appellant.
Dempsey M. Levi, Sarah E. Berry, Ocean Springs, Attorneys for Appellee.
BEFORE SOUTHWICK, P.J., BRIDGES, AND IRVING, JJ.

Opinion:
SOUTHWICK, P.J.,
for the Court:
¶ 1. The Jackson County Chancery Court granted a divorce on the grounds of irreconcilable differences. Custody of the minor son was awarded to the father. On appeal the mother argues that the custody decision was clearly erroneous, and that visitation for the mother is both inadequate and unduly restrictive. We disagree and affirm after making one clarification to visitation.
FACTS
¶2. Kristin and Jeremy Porter were married in their home state of Wisconsin in 1990. On September 13, 1994, Kodiak ("Kodi") Levi Porter was born to the couple. They moved to Jackson County, Mississippi in 1996 because of Mrs. Porter's assignment to Keesler Air Force Base. The couple separated in 1998. At the time of trial, Mrs. Porter was living at Keesler Air Force Base where she is employed as a pharmacy technician. Mr. Porter had moved to his parents' home in Wisconsin and was working as a maintenance electrician.
¶3. On February 1, 1999, the parties agreed to a divorce on the basis of irreconcilable differences. The issues still to be determined by the chancellor were the custody and support of the minor child, his medical coverage, and equitable distribution of the parties' two IRA accounts. On February 18, 1999, the chancellor entered judgment granting a divorce based on irreconcilable differences.
¶ 4. What is challenged on appeal concerns custody and visitation. After the June 5, 2000 hearing on a motion for reconsideration, the chancellor granted the parties' request for joint legal custody of the child. Mrs. Porter was to pay 14% of her adjusted gross income, or $182.70, for child support. While the child was with his mother, the father was to pay daycare costs of $62 per week instead of child support. Medical benefits were to be provided the child through his mother's enrollment in the military, but all medical expenses not covered by the military were equally divided between the parents. The mother was entitled to visitation for one weekend each month, during recess from school, during the Christmas holidays including one week before Christmas, alternating Thanksgiving holidays, during spring break from school, and via telephone on one evening each week.
DISCUSSION
I. Child Custody
¶ 5. Mrs. Porter continues to seek primary physical custody; both parties agree that joint legal custody was proper. She argues that the chancellor improperly applied controlling case law. On these excrutiatingly subjective decisions, we give great deference to the chancellor. Keeping the best interest of the child as the primary guide, we will reverse only if the chancellor was manifestly wrong, clearly erroneous, or applied an erroneous legal standard. Williams v. Williams, 656 So.2d 325, 330 (Miss.1995).
¶ 6. The Supreme Court has identified factors that are to be considered in custody decisions:
(1) age, health, and sex of the child;
(2) a determination of the parent that has had the continuity of care prior to the separation;
(3) which has the best parenting skills and which has the willingness and capacity to provide primary child care;
(4) the employment of the parent and responsibilities of that employment;
(5) physical and mental health and age of the parents;
(6) emotional ties of parent and child;
(7) moral fitness of parents;
(8) the home, school and community record of the child;
(9) the preference of the child at the age sufficient to express a preference by law;
(10) stability of home environment and employment of each parent, and other factors relevant to the parent-child relationship.
Albright v. Albright, 437 So.2d 1003, 1005 (Miss.1983).
¶ 7. The chancellor examined the Al-bright factors. On most of the factors considered, no advantage was noted for either parent. The chancellor found that Mrs. Porter had been the primary caretaker prior to the separation. He also found that both parents loved their child. The chancellor concluded that the father could offer a stabler home throughout the child's life. Mrs. Porter argues that the chancellor inaccurately assumes that her career in the Air Force includes the possibility of transfers. She testified that Keesler Air Force Base is the type of base at which members of the military are stationed for extended periods. She knew of personnel stationed at Keesler for fifteen years and did not anticipate that she would request a change.
¶8. On the other hand, Mrs. Porter states that too much weight was given to the fact that the father was living in his parents' home in a small town, with other relatives living nearby that assisted with raising the child. She acknowledges that having an extended family in close proximity may be beneficial for a child, but insists that it should not be the major factor in a custody decision. She argues that by giving weight to such a factor effectively penalizes her for clearly demonstrating her ability to maintain a successful career, live independently, and take care of her child without the assistance of other family members.
¶ 9. No undue weight was given to this factor. The chancellor concluded that Mr. Porter would maintain the opportunity for the child to have extended family relationships in Wisconsin, including with Mrs. Porter's mother. The father has the ad vantage of a member of his family taking care of the child during the day, avoiding the child being placed in daycare. Had the circumstances of the parents been reversed, the advantage under Albright also would have been reversed.
¶ 10. It is not for this Court to reweigh the evidence or act as a fact-finder. The chancellor referred to legitimate considerations. There is no penalty being imposed, only a benefit being allowed to the child. With the best interest of the child as the focus, the chancellor determined that the father's circumstances were more beneficial than were the mother's.
¶ 11. We find no clear error or application of an erroneous legal standard.
II. Restrictive Visitation
¶ 12. The mother argues that the chancellor geographically restricted her weekend visitation solely to Wisconsin. Similarly, she asserts the chancellor limited the Thanksgiving visitation to Georgia where some of her family resides. She finds both alleged restrictions to be an abuse of discretion.
¶ 13. The chancellor has broad discretion regarding visitation. Weigand v. Houghton, 730 So.2d 581, 587 (Miss. 1999). Both parents must be allowed an opportunity to maintain a healthy relationship with their child. Id. Restrictions on visitation can be placed if they are necessary to avoid harm to the child. Absent such evidence, such restrictions may be an abuse of discretion. Dunn v. Dunn, 609 So.2d 1277, 1286 (Miss.1992). Unless compelling reasons are shown, the non-custodial parent during permitted visits with his or her child should have essentially unfettered discretion regarding "the place and manner" of the visit, bounded by the visitation schedule's transfer locations and time constrictions. Cox v. Moulds, 490 So.2d 866, 870 (Miss.1986).
¶ 14. We will not quibble with either side's interpretation of the chancellor's order. The wording is at least capable of being read to restrict the mother's visitation to Wisconsin during her weekend visits and to Georgia during the Thanksgiving weekend, though we doubt that was the intent. Such restrictions would not be justified by the evidence. The chancellor required that Mrs. Porter both pick up the child and' return him in Wisconsin for her weekend visitation. She is entitled to visitation on alternating Thanksgiving holidays. Both are reasonable rules. No restrictions on where mother and son go during those visits were shown to be necessary. We hold that no such restrictions exist.
¶ 15. THE JUDGMENT OF THE JACKSON COUNTY CHANCERY COURT IS AFFIRMED. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO THE APPELLANT.
MeMILLIN, C.J., BRIDGES, IRVING, LEE, AND MOORE, JJ" CONCUR.
PAYNE, J., DISSENTS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION, JOINED BY KING, P.J., AND THOMAS, J. MYERS, J., NOT PARTICIPATING.