Case Name: Jasper TISDALE, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1986-10-29
Citations: 498 So. 2d 1280
Docket Number: No. 84-1901
Parties: Jasper TISDALE, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: HERSEY, C.J., and ANSTEAD, LETTS, DELL, WALDEN, GUNTHER and STONE, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 498
Pages: 1280–1288

Head Matter:
Jasper TISDALE, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. 84-1901.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
Oct. 29, 1986.
Rehearing Denied and Stay Granted Jan. 15, 1987.
Richard L. Jorandby, Public Defender, and Louis G. Carres, Asst. Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.
Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Sarah B. Mayer, Asst. Atty. Gen., West Palm Beach, for appellee.

Opinion:
DOWNEY, Judge,
for the Court En Banc.
This case has been decided en banc, pursuant to the court's own motion, based upon the court's perception that the case is one of exceptional importance and that it is also necessary to maintain uniformity in the court's decisions.
Appellant, Jasper Tisdale, was convicted of leaving the scene of an accident involving the death of another person in violation of section 316.027(1)(2), Florida Statutes (1983). Tisdale has appealed the judgment of conviction and sentence, contending that the trial court erred in two respects: 1) in admitting the prior, out-of-court, inconsistent statement of a witness as substantive evidence at the trial; and 2) in violating the sentencing guidelines on the basis that he failed to set forth his reasons in writing and further that the oral reasons stated were insufficient to constitute clear and convincing reasons for departure.
Tisdale was charged with being the operator of an automobile that struck and killed a person on a bicycle and with leaving the scene of the accident. He denied operation of the car on the day in question, claiming the car had been stolen from him and that he spent the day drinking with friends. Two eyewitnesses to the accident led to the arrest of Tisdale; however, neither of those witnesses could identify him as the driver. Without detailing the evidence, suffice to say that there was incriminating circumstantial evidence that pointed to Tis-dale's operation of the car. The most damning evidence, however, was in the sworn statement of Mattie Davis, taken at the police station some three weeks after the accident, in which she stated that she was a passenger in the car at the time of the accident. She further stated that Tis-dale was driving faster than he should have been and, although she did not see him hit the victim, she heard the collision and saw a person flipped up in the air, who came down on the car. She stated that Tisdale kept going, then turned right and stopped, and she jumped out of his car with her baby and ran away.
At trial the state was allowed to call Mattie as a court witness because she recanted her prior statement and denied she was in the car. She explained her prior inconsistent statement, stating that the police had given her all the details of the accident and intimidated her into giving the story contained in her statement. As a result of Mattie's recantation, the court allowed the state to offer Mattie's inconsistent statement as substantive evidence over defense objection.
The evidentiary question presented by the admission of this evidence over defense objection is whether the sworn statement made by Mattie Davis in the police station some weeks after the accident was admissible as substantive evidence at a trial in which Mattie testified and recanted said statement. There appear to be two views concerning admissibility under this factual scenario. One view is that a proper construction of section 90.801(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1983), precludes admissibility of a sworn statement made in a police station setting, since that is not a "proceeding" within the meaning of the statute. This view is persuasively articulated by Judge Alan Schwartz for the Third District Court of Appeal in Delgado-Santos v. State, 471 So.2d 74 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985). The other view holds that the admissibility of such a statement depends upon the perceived reliability of its contents based upon the circumstances surrounding its preparation. This view is ably presented by the Supreme Court of Washington in State v. Smith, 97 Wash.2d 856, 651 P.2d 207 (1982). There is much to be said on behalf of each of those views; however, we believe the sounder one to be that espoused in Delgado-Santos because the analysis of the rule's background, together with the congressional dichotomy between House and Senate and the ultimate compromise giving rise to federal rule 801(d)(1)(A), seem to dictate a "bright line" construction rather than a case-by-case analysis of the circumstances surrounding the taking of the statement to determine reliability and thus admissibility. In the light of the background of the rule, keeping in mind that theretofore prior inconsistent statements were simply not admissible as substantive evidence, Martin v. United States, 528 F.2d 1157 (4th Cir.1975), and the efforts to limit the settings that were considered to offer sufficient protection to assure reliability, we believe Judge Schwartz's criticism of the case-by-case approach to this particular rule is well taken and, thus, we repeat it here:
Robinson [v. State, 455 So.2d 481 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984) ] and, even more, Smith, which the fifth district followed and which is the only decision which actually permits the admission of a police statement under 801(d)(1)(A), purport to make the question turn on the "reliability" of the contents of the particular statement and of the conditions under which it was given. In our view, the basic flaw in this conclusion is that it finds no basis in the statute. While the legislature and Congress may have been ultimately concerned with the "reliability" of a particular statement, they sought to vindicate that concern only by establishing given and objective criteria as to the circumstances, including the kind of forum, under which it was given. And it is for the legislature, not the courts, to determine not only the policy to be promoted, but the means by which that end is to be achieved. 10 Fla.Jur.2d Constitutional Law § 147 (1979). By suggesting, without statutory authority, that the determination that the existence of a proceeding can depend upon what is said before it, the Robinson-Smith test of reliability violates this basic principle.
In sum, we think that a "bright line" test is mandated by the statute: in this context, this means that a police interrogation either is or is not an "other proceeding."
471 So.2d at 79.
We hold that the prior inconsistent statement was not admissible as substantive evidence because it does not fall within the exception to the hearsay rule set forth in section 90.801(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1983), since the statement was not given at trial, hearing, or other proceeding or in a deposition; it was given at the police station. Furthermore, since the evidence in this case is not overwhelming, in view of the problems associated with the identification of Tisdale, resort to the harmless error rule is not appropriate.
The second point on appeal, having to do with the court's departure from the sentencing guidelines, is also a valid ground for reversal. However, because that point is now mooted by a reversal of the judgment of conviction we simply mention in passing that the reasons for departure should have been put in writing. State v. Boynton, 478 So.2d 351 (Fla.1985). Furthermore, several of the grounds mentioned orally were insufficient, such as lack of remorse, failure to admit guilt, and the court's belief that the guidelines' presumptive sentence was insufficient punishment.
Accordingly, the judgment and sentence appealed from are reversed and the cause is remanded for a new trial.
By aligning ourselves with Delgado-Santos we recognize that our opinion conflicts with Robinson v. State, 455 So.2d 481 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984). Furthermore, we view the evidentiary question involved as one of great public importance. Therefore, we certify to the Supreme Court of Florida the following question:
IS THE SWORN INCONSISTENT STATEMENT OF A WITNESS MADE IN A POLICE STATION ADMISSIBLE AS A STATEMENT GIVEN IN AN "OTHER PROCEEDING" SO AS TO BE ADMISSIBLE AS SUBSTANTIVE EVIDENCE, PURSUANT TO SECTION 90.-801(2)(a), FLORIDA STATUTES (1983), IN A SUBSEQUENT TRIAL OR JUDICIAL PROCEEDING AT WHICH THE WITNESS TESTIFIES AND IS SUBJECT TO CROSS EXAMINATION?
HERSEY, C.J., and ANSTEAD, LETTS, DELL, WALDEN, GUNTHER and STONE, JJ., concur.
GLICKSTEIN, J., dissents in part and concurs in part with opinion.
It should be noted, in contrast, that other provisions of the code explicitly render the court's assessment of the value of the particular item of evidence a condition of admissibility. See sec. 90.804(2)(c), Fla.Stat. (1981) ("A statement tending to expose the declarant to criminal liability and offered to exculpate the accused is inadmissible unless corroborating circumstances show the trustworthiness of the statement."); Maugeri v. State, 460 So.2d 975 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984).
In the absence of such a provision in 90.-801(2)(a), the Robinson-Smith rationale, rendering a "reliable" statement admissible although there would otherwise be no "proceeding," would amount to the enactment of a catch-all or umbrella exception for the admission of trustworthy hearsay which does not fall within any of the specific exceptions. This principle is contained in the federal rules, 804(b)(5), but was pointedly not adopted in Florida.