Case Name: STATE ex rel. Mildred PAUL, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WELFARE of the State of Louisiana, through the State Director of Public Welfare of the State of Louisiana, et al., Defendants and Appellees
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1965-01-05
Citations: 170 So. 2d 549
Docket Number: No. 1326
Parties: STATE ex rel. Mildred PAUL, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WELFARE of the State of Louisiana, through the State Director of Public Welfare of the State of Louisiana, et al., Defendants and Appellees.
Judges: TATE, J., concurs and assigns written reasons.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 170
Pages: 549–557

Head Matter:
STATE ex rel. Mildred PAUL, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WELFARE of the State of Louisiana, through the State Director of Public Welfare of the State of Louisiana, et al., Defendants and Appellees.
No. 1326.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana. Third Circuit.
Jan. 5, 1965.
J. Vance Thompson, Alexandria, for plaintiff-appellant.
Richard L. Latimer, Baton Rouge, for de f endant-appellee.

Opinion:
HOOD, Judge.
This is a habeas corpus proceeding instituted by Mildred Paul to obtain the custody of her infant child, Timothy Paul, who by order of court has been placed in the care and control of the Louisiana Department of Public Welfare. The suit was instituted against the Department of Public Welfare and against Carl Smith, chief probation officer of Rapides Parish, Louisiana. After a hearing, judgment was rendered rejecting plaintiff's demands, and plaintiff has appealed.
Plaintiff is a 35-year-old unmarried white woman. The child whose custody is being sought was born on March 3, 1964, at the Huey P. Long Charity Hospital in Pineville, Louisiana. A few days after the child was born plaintiff was summoned to appear at a hearing scheduled to be held in the juvenile court for Rapides Parish, Louisiana, to determine her right to the custody of the child. Following that hearing, judgment was rendered by the juvenile court on March 17, 1964, placing the custody of the child temporarily with the Department of Public Welfare of the State of Louisiana. The child has been in the custody of the Department of Public Welfare continuously since that time.
This habeas corpus proceeding was instituted on July 27, 1964. A hearing was held in due course, and judgment was rendered by the trial court on August 24, 1964, decreeing "that the rule be recalled and that the judgment of March 17, 1964 remain unchanged." The trial judge assigned as reasons for that decree that "the best interest of the child would be served by leaving him in the custody of the Department of Public Welfare as the petitioner cannot properly care for the child."
Plaintiff contends that she is mentally and physically able to care for the child, and that the trial court erred in rejecting her demands for custody. Defendants contend that plaintiff is not mentally capable of caring for the child, and that it would be detrimental to the child to return him to the custody of the plaintiff. -
The evidence shows that plaintiff is in good physical health. She has a congenital motor speech defect, however, which is of such a nature that it is impossible for her to speak words or to communicate orally with anyone other than her mother, who has learned to understand what plaintiff is trying to say. Plaintiff has a very low level of intelligence, having an I.Q. of about 45 and a mental age of about 7.3 years. The experts in psychology who examined her classify her as either a low-grade moron or a high-grade imbecile. Although plaintiff testified that she went to the seventh grade in school, she is unable to read and write, other than to sign her name, and it is clear from the evidence that she would not be able to qualify for the seventh grade in any ordinary school.
Plaintiff lives in a small house with her 72-year-old mother and with two of her sisters, and both of these sisters have a lower level of intelligence than does plaintiff. Her older sister, who is 44 years of age, suffered polio while a young child and has been paralyzed on her left side since that time. This sister also has a speech defect similar to that of plaintiff, and she has an I.Q. of 31 and a mental age of between 2.8 and 4.7 years. She is definitely an imbecile. Plaintiff's younger sister is 31 years of age, and she has an I.Q. of 34 and a mental age of 5.8 years. The mother is classified as mentally dull, but she has a higher intelligence quotient than any of the daughters.
The house in which these four adults live is a small, three-room, unpainted frame house, located in a wooded rural area about 14 or 15 miles from the city of Alexandria, which they rent for $10.00 per month. The house is equipped with gas and electricity, but the water which they need is supplied by a pump located outside the house with a rubber hose leading from this pump into the building, and water is obtained inside the house by operating a nozzle on the end of this hose. The furniture or appliances in the house include four double beds, an electric washing machine, a wood stove and a gas stove. The evidence indicates that in spite of their mental limitations, plaintiff and the other occupants of the house keep the house in a a fairly clean and orderly condition, and that plaintiff generally dresses neatly.
Prior to the time plaintiff moved to this home, about four years ago, she lived with her parents and other members of the family near Columbia, Louisiana. While living there she was required by her father to work in the fields from early hours in the morning until late at night. The family apparently lived in poverty, and plaintiff had no opportunity to go anywhere. Psychologists and lay witnesses indicate that she is able to perform work in a field, such as picking vegetables and fruits, hoeing cotton and other similar types of work, without supervision. She also is able to cook and to can or preserve fruits and vegetables. She unquestionably loves the child and wants to obtain custody of it.
Neither plaintiff nor any of the other occupants of the house are employed, and they have no income or means of support other than the assistance which is given to them by the Department of Public Welfare. Although plaintiff may be capable of performing work of some menial type, none of the other members of the household are capable of holding any type of employment at all.
Dr. Ralph Ware, a psychiatrist employed at Central Louisiana State Hospital, examined plaintiff on two occasions, once shortly before the child was born and a second time after the birth of the child. Although he did not test her I.Q., he concluded that "she is a borderline mentally defected" person. He testified that she walks well, handles her hands well, knows the time of day, knows the difference between hot and cold, knows the day of the week, and she can perform common ordinary tasks at home well, such as cleaning, cooking, canning, bathing and dressing. In his opinion, plaintiff could handle the bringing up of this child. He feels there would be no danger to the child, and that plaintiff "would do the best she could" to raise him. He concedes that plaintiff could not teach the child to speak, that she could not help him with his school lessons, and that the environment is not good, but he feels that plaintiff can take care of the physical needs of the child, and that she can provide a mother's love.
Dr. Robert H. Cassell, chief of psychological services at Pinecrest State School, examined plaintiff and her two sisters on January 13, 1963. He feels that plaintiff can give the child love and affection, and could care for it as long as only routine care is required. In his opinion, however, plaintiff would not be able to function if something of a non-routine nature occurred. She, for instance, could not determine when the child was sick, what is dangerous and what is not dangerous, or when the child should be taken to a doctor. He thinks tlie probability of plaintiff being able to nurse and raise her child are poor. He feels that she might routinely nurse the baby with a bottle, but he has great concern as to whether she would be able to cope with an emergency.
Mr. Bernard Phelps, a psychologist who is serving as psychological assistant at Pinecrest State School, examined plaintiff on January 13, 1964. He feels very strongly that plaintiff is mentally incapable of taking care of the child. He testified that awarding custody of the child to plaintiff would result in "utter havoc for the child's concern, for the parent's concern, and some question as to the survival of the infant."
The lay evidence is conflicting as to whether plaintiff is or is not able to care for the child. Four neighbors or acquaintances of plaintiff testified to the effect that plaintiff is able to count money, that she dresses neatly, that she does not conduct herself in a disorderly manner, and that the home is kept reasonably clean. One of these witnesses stated that she feels that plaintiff is able to care for a child, and that she would have no hesitancy in leaving her own grandchild under plaintiff's care. A children's case worker for the Department of Public Welfare testified that the child is presently being cared for in a foster home provided by the Department of Public Welfare and that he is receiving good treatment. She also stated that the child has a tendency to upper respiratory infection, that he has been sick frequently, that it has been necessary to have him treated by a pediatrician, and that the child was hospitalized for four days on one occasion. A welfare visitor, who is employed by the Department of Public Welfare and who has visited in the home, expressed the opinion that plaintiff is not able to care for the child, and that the child is in need of protection because of the environment and the mental limitation of the mother.
On this evidence, together with the testimony of plaintiff and of her mother (plaintiff's testimony being interpreted by her mother), the trial judge rejected plaintiff's demands.
The law is settled that a mother has a right to the custody of her child as against third persons, but that this right must yield to the superior right of the state to deprive her of such custody in the event she is morally, mentally or otherwise unfit or incapable of caring for the child, or the welfare of the child requires it. State ex rel. Guinn v. Watson, 210 La. 265, 26 So.2d 740; State ex rel. Mouton v. Williams, 222 La. 457, 62 So.2d 641; State ex rel. Castille v. Cooke, et al., 183 La. 404, 164 So. 153; State ex rel. Brode v. Hatcher, 233 La. 636, 97 So.2d 422; Mouton v. St. Romain, 245 La. 839, 161 So.2d 737; State ex rel. Rothrock, et ux. v. Webber, et ux., 245 La. 901, 161 So.2d 759; State ex rel. Cockerham v. Jordan, La.App. 2 Cir., 134 So.2d 81.
The love of a mother for her child is one of the most powerful of human emotions, and in custody cases it is a most important factor to consider in determining what is best for the child's welfare. The mere fact that the defendants may be better able than the mother, financially and otherwise, to take care of the child does not warrant the court in refusing to recognize the right of the mother to the custody of her child. State ex rel. Monroe v. Ford, 164 La. 149, 113 So. 798. In a contest between a mother and a third person for the custody of a child, the mother is entitled to obtain custody unless it is shown that she is morally, mentally or otherwise unfit or incapable Of caring for the child, or that for some other reason it would be detrimental to the child's health, safety or welfare to place him under the care of the mother. State ex rel. Sevier v. Sevier, et al., 141 La. 60, 74 So. 630; and State v. Miller, supra.
The burden, of course, is on those resisting the parent's demand for custody to show that the latter is disqualified or unfit to have the custody, that the parent is incapable of caring for the child, or that it would be detrimental to the child's welfare to place him under the care of the parent. Mouton v. St. Romain, supra; State ex rel. Martin v. Garza, 217 La. 532, 46 So.2d 760; State v. Miller, supra; State v. Hatcher, supra.
Although the natural parent's right to the custody of his or her child is superior to that of another relative or stranger, courts should and will consider the mental health of the parent along with other factors in arriving at a custody award best serving the welfare of the child. State ex rel. Mouton v. Williams, supra; State ex rel. Castille v. Cooke, supra; State ex rel. Monroe v. Ford, 164 La. 149, 113 So. 798; 74 A.L.R.2d 1085.
In State ex rel. Castille v. Cooke, supra, where the mother's demand for custody was rejected because of her mental health, our Supreme Court said:
"There is no dispute as to the law governing the case. It is conceded that the mother has a superior right to the custody of her child over the grandmother and aunt, (numerous citations omitted)
"The only question presented is one of fact, i. e., whether or not the mother's mental condition is such that it would be detrimental to the mental and physical well-being of the child to permit her to live with her mother.
"The doctors agree that a person who is suffering from serious mental and nervous disorder will conceal the things they love for fear of losing them and sometimes, if the fear is very great, will destroy the object of their affection for the purpose of preventing it from being taken from them. The medical testimony convinces us that if this little girl, who is highly nervous, and, according to the doctors, who testified in behalf of the mother, susceptible to the same nervous condition that her mother suffers from, were permitted to remain in an environment created by an unbalanced mind, she would become neurotic.
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"After carefully reviewing the record, we are constrained to differ with the learned judge ad hoc and the two doctors in their view that the mother is capable of caring for her little daughter. It is our opinion that the physical and mental welfare of the child requires us to deny the mother's plea."
And in State ex rel. Mouton v. Williams, supra, where the mental health of the mother was an important factor in determining the custody of the child, the Supreme Court held:
"It is well settled in our jurisprudence that a mother has a right to the custody of her child as against third persons, but that this right must yield to the superior right of the State to deprive her of such custody and possession in the event she is morally, mentally, or otherwise unfit and the welfare of the child requires it.
*
"The medical evidence is uncon-troverted that the mother has in the past suffered attacks of a mental illness of such nature that it may recur, but the record reveals little or nothing of her actions, symptoms, and mental state when these attacks occur. There is not sufficient evidence in the record to give us a clear and complete picture of the environment of the mother's home where the child once lived and where she will again live if placed in her mother's custody. We cannot, therefore, in the present condition of the record decide this serious and vital matter, and for this reason we have concluded to remand the case for the taking of additional evidence."
In matters involving the custody of children, we particularly give great weight to the findings of the trial judge and we are reluctant to reverse his conclusions, because he has had an opportunity to observe the persons who are claiming the custody and the witnesses who testified at the trial. See State v. Jordan, supra; and Mouton v. St. Romain, La.App. 3 Cir., 153 So.2d 890 (affirmed on cert. at 245 La. 839, 161 So.2d 737).
The evidence in the instant suit convinces us that plaintiff loves her child and would be able to provide him with routine physical care. The evidence also establishes, however, that she would not be able to provide some of the training which the child must have, such as the ability to speak, or to properly care for him in case of sickness or emergencies. It would be unrealistic, of course, to assume that no illness or emergencies would occur in the raising of a child. The evidence also indicates to us that the home environment, with two mentally retarded adults besides the mother living in the same small house, would be detrimental to the physical, moral and mental welfare of the child,
Under the facts presented in the instant suit we must agree with the trial judge that plaintiff is not able, primarily because of her mental limitations, to care for the child, and that the welfare and best interest of the child would be served by allowing him to remain in the custody and care of the defendants.
We know that the plaintiff in this case loves her child, and we assume that in spite of her limitations she will experience the deep heartache which must accompany a judgment of this kind. It is with considerable regret, therefore, that we find it necessary to reject her demands. A judgment involving custody, however, is always revocable where conditions warrant its modification. If there should be a substantial improvement in plaintiff's ability to care for the child and in the home environment, then it may be that in subsequent proper proceedings a modification of the judgment will be justified.
For the reasons herein set out, the judgment appealed from is affirmed. All costs of this appeal are assessed to plaintiff-appellant.
Affirmed.
TATE, J., concurs and assigns written reasons.