Case Name: C. E. LIGHT, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Robert P. ELLIOTT, Individually and d/b/a Lewis & Clark Marina, Defendant and Appellant, and Department of Game, Fish & Parks, a Department of the State of South Dakota, Defendant
Court: South Dakota Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: South Dakota
Decision Date: 1980-09-03
Citations: 295 N.W.2d 724
Docket Number: No. 12559
Parties: C. E. LIGHT, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Robert P. ELLIOTT, Individually and d/b/a Lewis & Clark Marina, Defendant and Appellant, and Department of Game, Fish & Parks, a Department of the State of South Dakota, Defendant.
Judges: MORGAN and FOSHEIM, JJ., concur.
Reporter: North Western Reporter 2d
Volume: 295
Pages: 724–728

Head Matter:
C. E. LIGHT, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Robert P. ELLIOTT, Individually and d/b/a Lewis & Clark Marina, Defendant and Appellant, and Department of Game, Fish & Parks, a Department of the State of South Dakota, Defendant.
No. 12559.
Supreme Court of South Dakota.
Considered on Briefs May 16, 1979.
On Reassignment Sept. 3, 1980.
John Harmelink, Yankton, for plaintiff and appellee.
James R. Feyder of Simons, Gibbs, Fey-der & Myers, Sioux Falls, for defendant and appellant.

Opinion:
DUNN, Justice (on reassignment).
Appellant Elliott appeals from a judgment of the circuit court permitting appel-lee Light to rent boat-docking facilities for the 1978 season. We reverse.
Appellant operates and manages Lewis and Clark Marina as lessee from the State of South Dakota. Appellee sought to rent marina slip space for his boat, as he had done since 1967. Appellant refused to rent him slip space, claiming appellee had not paid his previous year's bill in full, owing $5.68. Appellee contested this charge in writing, whereupon appellant made no effort to settle or close appellee's account, nor to resolve the dispute over the $5.68 charge. It is questionable whether appellant ever billed appellee for this amount after receiving written challenge of that charge.
Appellee sought and obtained a temporary injunction restraining appellant from renting this dock space to anyone other than appellee pending further court order. An interlocutory injunction was later obtained, which continued the effect of the temporary injunction throughout the pend-ency of the action on the merits.
The trial court found that the marina was a public concession controlled by the State of South Dakota, that appellant had followed precedent by giving preference to previous renters of dock space, and that appellee had rented space during the 1976 and 1977 seasons without incident. The court also found that in April of 1977, ap-pellee, an attorney, began representing a former employee of appellant in legal proceedings against him.
The court concluded that because appel-lee tendered full payment for dock space during the 1978 season, and because the dock space in question had not been committed to any other renter, appellant's refusal to rent to appellee was an unfair and discriminatory practice as defined by SDCL 20-13-1(14), and violated the protection afforded appellee by SDCL 20-13-23.
Appellee has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies and thus should not be heard by this court. SDCL 20-13-23 allows the State Commission on Human Rights the power to consider claims of discrimination in the use of public accommodations. This state commission is subject to the supervision of the director of the division of human rights. SDCL 20-13-2.1. This division is clearly considered by the legislature as an "administrative agency" and thus is governed by the Administrative Procedures Act. SDCL 1-26-1(1), as amended, and SDCL 20-13-46 and 20-13-47.
It is imperative for appellee to have presented his grievance to the State Commission on Human Rights before the trial court passed upon the merits. Failure to exhaust administrative remedies should have prompted the trial court to send the matter back for an administrative hearing. SDCL 1-26-30. We do not question the authority of the trial court to issue an injunction but, once this was done, it is required that appellee present his complaint to the commission. The failure to do so is fatal.
The judgment of the trial court is reversed.
MORGAN and FOSHEIM, JJ., concur.
WOLLMAN, C. J., concurs specially.
HENDERSON, J., dissents.
This issue was never raised before the trial court or on appeal. However, this court has generally held that where the legislature provides a remedy before an administrative agency, that the administrative agency has exclusive primary jurisdiction which precludes the parties from directly seeking adjudication in a court. Gottschalk v. Hegg, 89 S.D. 89, 228 N.W.2d 640 (1975). Also see Rowen v. LeMars Mut. Ins. Co. of Iowa, 230 N.W.2d 905 (Iowa 1975). Thus, as this involves the jurisdiction of the trial court to hear the matter in the first instance, we must consider it on appeal.