Case Name: Larry Joe JOHNSON, Sr., Petitioner, v. Harry K. SINGLETARY, Respondent
Court: Florida Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1993-01-29
Citations: 612 So. 2d 575
Docket Number: No. 81121
Parties: Larry Joe JOHNSON, Sr., Petitioner, v. Harry K. SINGLETARY, Respondent.
Judges: OVERTON, McDonald, GRIMES and HARDING, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 612
Pages: 575–581

Head Matter:
Larry Joe JOHNSON, Sr., Petitioner, v. Harry K. SINGLETARY, Respondent.
No. 81121.
Supreme Court of Florida.
Jan. 29, 1993.
Steven L. Seliger, Quincy, and Larry Helm Spalding, Capital Collateral Representative, Martin J. McClain, Chief Asst. Capital Collateral Representative, and Gail E. Anderson, Asst. Capital Collateral Representative, Tallahassee, for petitioner.
Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen. and Carolyn M. Snurkowski and Mark S. Men-ser, Asst. Attys. Gen., Tallahassee, for respondent.

Opinion:
PER CURIAM.
Larry Joe Johnson, a prisoner under sentence of death and the governor's death warrant, petitions this Court for writ of habeas corpus, extraordinary relief, a stay of execution, and oral argument. We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(1), (9), Fla. Const.
The facts of Johnson's crime and the procedural history of this case are recited in the prior opinions of this Court and the federal courts. Johnson v. Dugger, 932 F.2d 1360 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 427, 116 L.Ed.2d 446 (1991); Johnson v. Wainwright, 778 F.2d 623 (11th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 872, 108 S.Ct. 201, 98 L.Ed.2d 152 (1987); Johnson v. Dugger, 520 So.2d 565 (Fla.1988); Johnson v. Wainwright, 463 So.2d 207 (Fla.1985); Johnson v. State, 442 So.2d 185 (Fla.1983) (direct appeal), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 963, 104 S.Ct. 2182, 80 L.Ed.2d 563 (1984).
Petitioner has raised only one issue meriting any discussion. In Sochor v. Florida, — U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 2114, 119 L.Ed.2d 326 (1992), the United States Supreme Court held that
there is Eighth Amendment error when the sentencer weighs an "invalid" aggravating circumstance in reaching the ultimate decision to impose a death sentence.
— U.S. at-, 112 S.Ct. at 2119. Because the Florida penalty-phase jury is a co-sentencer under Florida law, id.; Espinosa v. Florida, — U.S. -, -, 112 S.Ct. 2926, 2928, 120 L.Ed.2d 854 (1992), the Eighth Amendment prohibition applies with equal vigor to what the jury actually weighs in its deliberations. However, since Florida juries do not issue findings as to aggravating and mitigating factors, the courts are required to presume that unsupported factors did not weigh with the jury, provided the jury was properly instructed. Put another way,
a jury is unlikely to disregard a theory flawed in law, [but] it is indeed likely to disregard an option simply unsupported by evidence.
Sochor, — U.S. at -, 112 S.Ct. at 2122.
In Espinosa the Supreme Court held invalid a standard jury instruction on the aggravating factor of heinous, atrocious, or cruel. The improper instruction had defined the factor as "especially wicked, evil, atrocious or cruel." Espinosa, — U.S. at -, 112 S.Ct. at 2927. Thus, under Sochor and Espinosa, an error would exist if the jury was instructed improperly on the heinous, atrocious or cruel factor, whether or not the trial court in its written findings found the same factor to be present. Conversely, no error is present if the jury was properly instructed, even though the heinous, atrocious, or cruel factor could not have existed as a matter of law.
Johnson contends that his penalty-phase jury was instructed contrary to the precepts of Espinosa and Sochor, in part because the trial court later found the heinous, atrocious, or cruel factor inapplicable here. We find that this claim is procedurally barred for Johnson's failure to object to the instruction based on vagueness or other constitutional defect. Kennedy v. Singletary, 602 So.2d 1285 (Fla.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 2, 120 L.Ed.2d 931 (1992).
Johnson also devotes some argument to the holding in Richmond v. Lewis, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 528, 121 L.Ed.2d 411 (1992), regarding the judicial adoption of narrowing constructions of aggravating factors. On this point, it is clear that Florida has adopted a narrowing construction of its heinous, atrocious, or cruel factor, e.g., Richardson v. State, 604 So.2d 1107, 1109 (Fla.1992), that has tracked the language cited as acceptable in Sochor, — U.S. at -, 112 S.Ct. at 2121. This is all that Richmond requires. We therefore will not presume to hold the narrowing language invalid at this juncture.
Finally, Johnson's petition mentioned the then-pending case of Lockhart v. Fretwell, — U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 1935, 118 L.Ed.2d 542 (1992) (granting certiorari), as a possible grounds for relief. We find that the recent opinion in Lockhart v. Fretwell, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 838, 122 L.Ed.2d 180 (1993), provides no basis for relief.
For the foregoing reasons, we deny the motion that this case be set for oral argument and find that Johnson is entitled to none of the requested relief. The petition for habeas corpus is denied. No petition for rehearing will be entertained.
It is so ordered.
OVERTON, McDonald, GRIMES and HARDING, JJ., concur.
BARKETT, C.J., concurs in result only with an opinion.
SHAW, J., concurs in result only.
KOGAN, J., concurs specially with an opinion, in which BARKETT, C.J., and SHAW, J., concur.
. The other issues raised are unquestionably procedurally barred. They are: (1) that Florida's statute setting forth aggravating factors is unconstitutionally vague; (2) that the jury's recommendation was tainted by the consideration of other invalid aggravating factors, including the "witness elimination" factor; and (3) that Johnson's penalty was automatically aggravated in violation of the Constitution.
. Of course, we do not hold that trial courts are required to instruct on every aggravating factor. The trial court has discretion not to instruct on factors clearly unsupported by any evidence, and there may be some cases in which it would be inappropriate to do so.
. Johnson argued only that the factor of heinous, atrocious, or cruel was not supported by the evidence and therefore that the jury should be instructed that it did not exist.