Case Name: Miguel TITO, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1992-01-22
Citations: 593 So. 2d 284
Docket Number: No. 90-01760
Parties: Miguel TITO, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: SCHOONOVER, C.J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 593
Pages: 284–287

Head Matter:
Miguel TITO, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. 90-01760.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
Jan. 22, 1992.
James Marion Moorman, Public Defender, and Deborah K. Brueckheimer, Asst. Public Defender, Bartow, for appellant.
Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Davis G. Anderson, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., Tampa, for appellee.

Opinion:
DANAHY, Judge.
The sole issue on this appeal is whether the trial court erred in sentencing the appellant in three cases, Nos. 88-11577 (Case 1), 89-18723 (Case 2), and 90-4018 (Case 3). The trial court sentenced the appellant in Case 1 to an upward departure sentence of five years imprisonment and in Case 2 to an upward departure sentence of five years imprisonment consecutive to the sentence in Case 1. In Case 3 the trial court declared the appellant a habitual felony offender and imposed a ten-year term of probation in that case consecutive to the sentence in Case 2. We reverse these sentences and remand for resentencing consistent with this opinion.
Case 1 is a prosecution for possession of cocaine on August 11, 1988. After the appellant pled guilty to this offense, adjudication was withheld and he was placed on probation for one year. He violated this probation by committing the offenses of burglary of a conveyance and petit theft on November 15, 1989. He entered pleas of guilty to those charges. On January 23, 1990, the appellant was adjudicated guilty in Case 1 and in Case 2. He was placed on concurrent terms of community control.
The appellant violated his community control by committing the offense of burglary of a conveyance on March 10, 1990. He was charged with this offense in Case 3 and found guilty after a nonjury trial. Following that verdict, the trial court imposed the upward departure sentence of five years in Case 1, the consecutive upward departure sentence of five years in Case 2, and the habitual felony offender sentence of ten years probation in Case 3, consecutive to the sentence in Case 2.
We reverse the departure sentences in Case 1 and Case 2 because we believe the Florida Supreme Court has now made it clear that upon violation of probation or community control a trial court may not impose a sentence exceeding the one cell upward increase permitted by Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure 3.701(d)(14) and that no further departure upon violation of probation or community control is allowed except for valid reasons which existed at the time the defendant was placed on probation or community control. See State v. Johnson, 585 So.2d 272 (Fla.1991); Williams v. State, 581 So.2d 144 (Fla.1991). In determining the one cell bump-up in Case 1 and Case 2, the trial court must use the original guidelines scoresheet in each of those cases. Manuel v. State, 582 So.2d 823 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991); Harris v. State, 574 So.2d 1211 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991). The trial court must use the original scoresheet in each of these cases notwithstanding the fact that it is resentencing in these cases at the same time it is imposing an original sentence in another case. Although these events may occur at the same time, we view them as separate events for guidelines sentencing purposes. See True v. State, 564 So.2d 1104 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990) (opinion on motion for clarification).
With respect to the habitual felony offender sentence in Case 3, that sentence is improper because the statutory requirement of two prior convictions was not met. § 775.084(1), Fla.Stat. (1989). As noted above, the appellant was adjudicated guilty in Case 1 and Case 2 on the same date. We believe that the word "conviction" as used in the habitual felony offender statute should be given its usual meaning of an adjudication of guilt, unless the circumstances of section 775.084(2) apply. See Harrison v. State, 585 So.2d 393 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991). We do not believe that subsection (2) applies in this case. Accordingly, the appellant's convictions in Case 1 and Case 2 occurred on the same date and count as one conviction for purposes of the habitual felony offender statute. Marion v. State, 586 So.2d 67 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991); Troup v. State, 574 So.2d 271 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991); Walker v. State, 567 So.2d 546 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990).
We note that a one cell bump-up in Case 1 based on the sentencing guidelines score-sheet in that case produces a permitted range up to three and one-half years incarceration. A one cell bump-up in Case 2, based on the sentencing guidelines score-sheet for that case, also results in a permitted range up to three and one-half years incarceration. The sentencing guidelines scoresheet prepared for Case 3 produces a permitted range up to three and one-half years.
We reverse the sentences in these three cases and remand to the trial court for resentencing within the guidelines recommended or permitted range in each case.
Reversed and remanded for resentenc-ing.
SCHOONOVER, C.J., concurs.
PARKER, J., concurs in part; dissents in part with opinion.
. It would appear that the trial court has the option of making the sentences in these three cases consecutive. Section 921.16, Florida Statutes (1989), provides that sentences of imprisonment for offenses not charged in the same indictment, information, or affidavit shall be served consecutively unless the court directs that two or more of the sentences be served concurrently.