Case Name: TILDEN GROVES HOLDING CORP., Appellant, v. ORLANDO/ORANGE COUNTY EXPRESSWAY, etc., et al., Appellees
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 2002-03-08
Citations: 816 So. 2d 658
Docket Number: No. 5D00-3618
Parties: TILDEN GROVES HOLDING CORP., Appellant, v. ORLANDO/ORANGE COUNTY EXPRESSWAY, etc., et al., Appellees.
Judges: ORFINGER, R.B., J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 816
Pages: 658–663

Head Matter:
TILDEN GROVES HOLDING CORP., Appellant, v. ORLANDO/ORANGE COUNTY EXPRESSWAY, etc., et al., Appellees.
No. 5D00-3618.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
March 8, 2002.
Rehearing Denied May 21, 2002.
Craig B. Willis of Fixel & Maguire, P.A., Tallahassee, for Appellant.
C. Ken Bishop and Richard N. Milian of Broad & Cassel, P.A., Orlando, for Appel-lees.

Opinion:
THOMPSON, C.J.
Tilden Groves Holding Corporation (Til-den Groves) appeals from a non-final order granting the Orlando/Orange County Expressway Authority's (Expressway Authority) Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.540 motion to set aside a stipulated final judgment. This court has jurisdiction pursuant to Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.130(a)(5).
The Expressway Authority filed its petition in eminent domain seeking to condemn certain real property owned by Til-den Groves. Tilden Groves leased the property to Manheim Remarketing Limited Partnership, a Florida Limited Partnership d/b/a Florida Auto Auction of Orlando and Florida Auto Auction of Orlando, Inc. (Auto Auction). Tilden Groves and the Expressway Authority stipulated to an order of taking which entitled the Expressway Authority to take possession of Tilden Groves's property rights. Auto Auction and the Expressway Authority then entered a stipulated order of taking as to Auto Auction's leasehold rights to the property. This left the value of the parties' interests to be determined. Tilden Groves and Auto Auction were represented by separate counsel from the outset of this proceeding.
Tilden Groves and the Expressway Authority reached a mediated settlement agreement that read in part:
Petitioner [Expressway Authority] will pay to Respondent, TILDEN GROVES HOLDING CORPORATION, a Florida corporation, the sum of (2,378,-350.00) two million three hundred seventy eight [thousand] three hundred fifty, in full settlement of all claims for compensation from Petitioner, including statutory interest, but excluding attorney's fees, expert's fees, costs and expenses.
That this settlement agreement and the resulting proposed Stipulated Final Judgment referenced herein are based on Petitioner's construction plans and specifications . as said plans so supplemented relate to parcel 61-152 and its remainder, being implemented by Petitioner.
A stipulated final judgment was submitted to the trial court and entered. The judgment reflected the terms of the settlement agreement. The judgment did not address Auto Auction or its interest in the property.
Several months after the judgment was entered, the Expressway Authority filed its "Motion to Require Apportionment of Funds or, in the Alternative, To Set Aside Final Judgment." The Expressway Authority contended that Auto Auction should be bound by the settlement agreement and that a portion of the monies the Expressway Authority had agreed to pay Tilden Groves should be set aside to satisfy the taking of Auto Auction's interest. The trial court granted the Expressway Authority's Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.540(b) motion. Tilden Groves appeals the order setting aside the final judgment.
Generally, the standard of review of an order entered pursuant to Rule 1.540(b) is gross abuse of discretion. See Bonizo Properties, N.V., Hanwood Investments, N.V. v. Schroeder, 528 So.2d 1304, 1305 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988) (quoting Schwab & Co. v. Breezy Bay, Inc., 360 So.2d 117 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978)). There is a more stringent standard of review, however, when the final judgment to be vacated follows a mediated settlement agreement:
[Clases settled in mediation are especially unsuited for the liberal application of a rule [Rule 1.540(b)]allowing rescission of a settlement agreement based on unilateral mistake. Mediation, like arbitration, is an alternative dispute resolution device. It is not to be engaged in casually or carelessly.
Sponga v. Warro, 698 So.2d 621, 625 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997) (emphasis in original); see also Smiles v. Young, 271 So.2d 798, 799 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973) (presuming that trial court intended to vacate settlement agreement as well as final judgment, and noting that more stringent principles of law apply in setting aside a- contract than in setting aside a judgment). In the instant case, as in Smiles, it must be presumed that the trial court also was setting aside the settle ment agreement, thus the more stringent standard of review applies.'
The Expressway Authority submits that when it negotiated this settlement, it believed it was negotiating the entire value of the property, including the rights of both Tilden Groves and Auto Auction. The language of the settlement agreement is clear, unambiguous, and completely undercuts that assertion. The Expressway Authority expressly agreed to pay Tilden Groves $ 2,378,350.00 and there was no reference to Tilden Groves then paying a portion of that amount to Auto Auction. Obviously, this was a significant mistake.
In certain instances, Florida law allows agreements to be rescinded due to unilateral mistake. See Md. Casualty Co. v. Krasnek, 174 So.2d 541, 542 (Fla.1965). This mistake, however, does not allow for that resolution. Compare BMW of North America, Inc. v. Krathen, 471 So.2d 585 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985). The order vacating the final judgment is reversed and the final judgment is reinstated.
REVERSED and REMANDED for proceedings consistent herewith.
ORFINGER, R.B., J., concurs.
SHARP, W., J., dissents, with opinion.
. Notably, another provision of the settlement agreement originally read "No additional fees, costs or compensation of any kind shall be paid by the Petitioner to or for any of the Respondents served in this cause except reasonable expert fees and costs of Respondents and no other attorney's fees shall be awarded, except that this Court shall reserve jurisdiction to award attorney's fees . " (underlining added.) The underlined portions of this provision, however, were stricken and handwritten notations were substituted. Above the first stricken portion was written "Parties to this mediation" and above the second portion was written "as to the parties to this mediation." The implication of the new language is clear — whereas the agreement as originally drafted could have allowed an interpretation that Auto Auction (as a respondent) was part of the settlement agreement, the new language emphasizes that only the Expressway Authority and Tilden Groves were parties to the settlement agreement. The fact that these two changes were made in handwriting emphasizes that when the parties entered the agreement they knew that Auto Auction and its recovery were not in issue. Thus, the Expressway Authority's later position that this mistake was the result of its attorney's misplaced reliance on the generally accepted practices of the local bar concerning the "undivided fee" rule is made untenable by the terms of the settlement agreement.
. Auto Auction did not take part in the mediation and the mediated agreement was only between the Expressway Authority and Tilden Groves.
. Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.540(b) reads:
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or a party's legal representative from a final judgment, decree, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial or rehearing; (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) that the judgment or decree is void; or (5) that the judgment or decree has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment or decree upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment or decree should have prospective application. The motion shall be made within a reasonable time, and for reasons (1), (2), and (3) not more than 1 year after the judgment, decree, order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A motion under this subdivision does not affect the finality of a judgment or decree or suspend its operation. This rule does not limit the power of a court to entertain an independent action to relieve a party from a judgment, decree, order, or proceeding or to set aside a judgment or decree for fraud upon the court.
Fla.R:Civ.P. 1.540(b) (emphasis added).
. The Expressway Authority frames the argument as such in order to make this an eminent domain issue. It is not an eminent domain issue; it is an issue of contract law.