Case Name: PEOPLE v. WESLEY
Court: Michigan Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1981-01-23
Citations: 103 Mich. App. 240
Docket Number: Docket No. 47368
Parties: PEOPLE v WESLEY
Judges: Before: M. F. Cavanagh, P.J., and M. J. Kelly and Beasley, JJ.
Reporter: Michigan appeals reports; cases decided in the Michigan Court of Appeals.
Volume: 103
Pages: 240–254

Head Matter:
PEOPLE v WESLEY
Docket No. 47368.
Submitted September 3, 1980, at Lansing. —
Decided January 23, 1981.
Leave to appeal applied for.
Joe F. Wesley, Jr., was convicted of felony murder and kidnapping. He was sentenced to prison for the felony-murder conviction and received no sentence for the kidnapping conviction, Genesee Circuit Court, Harry P. Newblatt, J. He appeals, alleging that the trial court erred in determining at a Walker hearing that his statement was voluntary, in admitting fingernail-identification evidence, in determining that his codefendant was incompetent to testify and thus denying him his right to confront witnesses, in denying his motion for a directed verdict on the charge of kidnapping, in instructing the jury on the element of asportation, and in sentencing defendant. Held:
1. The trial court’s determination, that defendant’s statement which implicated him in the crimes charged was voluntarily made, was not clearly erroneous and will not be reversed on appeal.
2. The trial court erred in admitting fingernail-identification evidence, but the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt since the proofs not touched by the taint of error were overwhelming and were such as to enable all reasonable jurors to find defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
References for Points in Headnotes
5 Am Jur 2d, Appeal and Error §§ 839 et seq., 948.
29 Am Jur 2d, Evidence §§ 831, 831.5.
29 Am Jur 2d, Evidence § 832.
5 Am Jur 2d, Appeal and Error § 786.
5 Am Jur 2d, Appeal and Error § 772.
21 Am Jur 2d, Criminal Law § 338.
81 Am Jur 2d, Witnesses § 139.
1 Am Jur 2d, Abduction and Kidnapping § 11.
Application of the felony murder doctrine where the felony relied upon is an includible offense with the homicide. 40 ALR3d 1341.
[7,10]1 Am Jur 2d, Abduction and Kidnapping § 9.
21 Am Jur 2d, Criminal Law §§ 8, 9.
Application of the felony murder doctrine where the felony relied upon is an includible offense with the homicide. 40 ALR3d 1341.
29 Am Jur 2d, Evidence § 818.
5 Am Jur 2d, Appeal and Error § 772.
29 Am Jur 2d, Evidence § 251.
3. The trial court properly determined that a codefendant was incompetent to stand trial and thus was incompetent to testify. This determination did not deny defendant his right to confront witnesses.
4. The proofs offered during trial were sufficient to allow a rational trier of facts to find defendant guilty of kidnapping beyond a reasonable doubt. The element of asportation of the victim was not shown to be incidental to the murder or to any other offense. The trial court properly denied defendant’s motion for a directed verdict on the kidnapping charge.
5. The instructions of the trial court on the element of asportation, taken as a whole, left the jury with the correct view of that requirement for conviction on the kidnapping charge.
6. The trial court properly recognized on the record that it was prohibited from sentencing defendant for both convictions, but did not expressly vacate the kidnapping conviction as required. The case is remanded for such express vacation.
Affirmed in part and remanded.
M. J. Kelly, J., concurred in the result. However, he would conclude that the fingernail-identification evidence was admissible at the trial court’s discretion and that the court’s determination of admissibility should not be set aside on appeal absent an abuse of discretion. He would also note that defendant’s conviction for felony murder should preclude his conviction for the underlying felony of kidnapping under the Double Jeopardy Clause since proof of felony murder would necessarily prove all the elements of kidnapping.
Opinion of the Court
1. Appeal — Findings of Trial Courts.
The Court of Appeals will give deference to a trial court’s findings where, upon an examination of the whole record, it does not find that the trial court’s determination was clearly erroneous, especially where the demeanor of witnesses is important as where credibility is a major factor.
2. Evidence — Polygraph Tests — Admissibility — Expert Witnesses.
Testimony by expert polygraph-examiner witnesses is insufficient to render evidence of the results of polygraph tests admissible during a trial; testimony must be offered that there is a contemporaneous general scientific recognition of the tests, and the admission of such evidence absent the establishment that reasonable certainty obtains from such tests constitutes error.
3. Evidence — Voiceprint Identification — Admissibility — Expert Witnesses.
Testimony by expert witnesses whose reputations and careers are built on their work with voiceprint identification does not provide the general scientific recognition of voiceprint evidence necessary to allow its admission.
4. Evidence — Fingernail-Identification Comparisons — Admissibility — Expert Witnesses — Appeal — Error.
Testimony by a specialist in human hair comparisons regarding a fingernail-comparison technique is insufficient to establish a general scientific recognition of the fingernail-identification procedure or the degree of certainty necessary to warrant the admission of the results of such procedure into evidence, but the admission of such testimony, while constituting error, is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and does not require reversal on appeal where proofs not tainted by the error are overwhelming and are such as to enable all reasonable jurors to find a defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
5. Criminal Law — Competency — Judicial Discretion — Right to Confront Witnesses — Appeal — Rules of Evidence.
A determination by a trial court in a criminal case that a codefendant is not competent to testify is not an abuse of its discretion, nor does it deny a defendant his right to confront witnesses, and such determination will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion (MRE 601).
6. Kidnapping — Murder — Motions — Directed Verdicts — Asportation.
A motion for a directed verdict on a kidnapping count because of a claimed lack of evidence of asportation is properly denied where, upon the evidence presented, a rational trier of facts could find that the movement of the victim was not merely incidental to, but was independent of, an underlying crime of murder and thus supplied the necessary element of asportation.
7. Kidnapping — Murder — Sentencing — Vacation of Convictions — Remand.
A trial court, upon imposing a sentence on a defendant convicted of both felony murder and the underlying felony of kidnapping, must recognize on the record that it is prohibited from sentencing the defendant for both convictions and that where the kidnapping conviction is a necessary element of the felony-murder conviction under the prosecution’s theory of the case the underlying felony conviction must be vacated, and failure to expressly so vacate requires remand for such vacation.
Concurrence by M. J. Kelly, J.
8. Evidence — Scientific Techniques — Admissibility.
Scientific evidence is admissible where a technique has gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.
9. Evidence — Relevancy — Admissibility — Judicial Discretion — Appeal.
Relevance of evidence offered for admission is a matter within a trial court’s discretion, and a determination of admissibility by a trial court will not be set aside on appeal absent an abuse of discretion.
10. Homicide — Kidnapping — Cumulative Punishments — Constitutional Law — Double Jeopardy.
The state Legislature is prohibited from imposing cumulative punishments for convictions on charges of felony murder and an underlying felony of kidnapping by the Double Jeopardy Clause of the United States Constitution where proof of the murder would necessarily prove all the elements of the underlying felony.
Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Robert A. Derengoski, Solicitor General, Robert E. Weiss, Prosecuting Attorney, and Donald A. Kuebler, Chief, Appellate Division, for the people.
Richard J. Drew, for defendant.
Before: M. F. Cavanagh, P.J., and M. J. Kelly and Beasley, JJ.

Opinion:
Per Curiam.
Defendant was convicted as charged of felony murder, MCL 750.316; MSA 28.548, and kidnapping, MCL 750.349; MSA 28.581 by a jury. He was sentenced to life in prison for felony murder and received no sentence for the kidnapping conviction. The defendant appeals as of right.
This prosecution arose from an incident in a bar parking lot in Flint. Two men approached each side of a car in which two women sat with the car windows rolled down. The men grabbed the women through the windows. One woman escaped and ran for help. The other was driven five blocks from the bar by the two men, a struggle ensued, a shot was fired, and the victim was found dead.
Defendant asserts several claims of error which he contends require reversal. We do not agree.
The trial court determined at the defendant's Walker hearing that the statement the defendant gave implicating himself was voluntary. Upon an examination of the whole record, we do not find that the court's determination was clearly erroneous and so will "give deference to the trial court's findings, especially where demeanor of the witnesses [here, two police officers and the defendant] is important, as where credibility is a major factor". People v Terlisner, 96 Mich App 423, 431; 292 NW2d 223 (1980), People v Hummel, 19 Mich App 266, 270; 172 NW2d 550 (1969).
The corpus delicti of the crime was clearly established independently of and prior to the admission of the defendant's statement into evidence. The prosecution had proven that the victim had been shot and had died prior to the admission of the statement.
Defendant next claims error in the trial judge's admission of expert evidence relating to identification of the defendant by means of a fingernail analysis and comparison. A fingernail was found in the back seat of the car where the crime oc curred. The court held a hearing out of the presence of the jury to determine the admissibility of evidence of the comparison of this fingernail with fingernail samples taken from the defendant. The admissibility of a fingernail analysis is an issue of first impression in Michigan and, indeed, in the United States.
The Supreme Court in People v Barbara, 400 Mich 352, 364; 255 NW2d 171 (1977), in discussing the admissibility of evidence of results of polygraph tests stated:
" '[Testimony [must be] offered which would indicate that there is at this time a general scientific recognition of such tests. Until it is established that reasonable certainty follows from such tests, it would be error to admit in evidence the result thereof.' People v Davis, 343 Mich 348, 370; 72 NW2d 269 (1955), quoting People v Becker, 300 Mich 562, 566; 2 NW2d 503 (1942)."
Several expert witnesses in Barbara, had had a great deal of personal experience with polygraph operation and analysis, years of personal involvement with polygraph examinations, and testified that results obtained by use of a polygraph were a respected form of evidence. But the Supreme Court held that the testimony of polygraph examiners themselves was not enough.
"While the special record before us establishes that the polygraph is accepted as reliable by polygraphers, it does not establish that polygraph analysis is accepted as reliable by the scientific community. Credentials of the witnesses, although outstanding for polygraph technicians, are not those of scientists. Therefore, unless we depart from the standard Davis/Frye [v United States, 54 US App DC 46; 293 F 1013 (1923)] test for admissibility, defendant has failed to convince us that the polygraph should be admitted into evidence at trial in our State." Id., 377.
The Court in People v Tobey, 401 Mich 141, 146; 257 NW2d 537 (1977), refused to accept voiceprint evidence despite the testimony of experts (a professor of audiology and a police officer experienced in the area of audiology who had been a student of the professor's). The Tobey Court was not persuaded that these witnesses "whose reputations and careers have been built on their voiceprint work, can be said to be impartial or disinterested".
The expert in the instant case is a civilian employee of the Michigan State Police with a specialty in human hair comparisons. This expert testified that he had read of the fingernail identification technique in five forensic journals (two were English and another was German). There were no cases cited where such a technique was admitted as evidence. In a response to questioning about the technique's general acceptance in the scientific community, the expert responded:
"I personally have talked to a number of people that I know at meetings. My boss, Lieutenant Nassar went to the meeting of the American Society of Crime Laboratory Directors which is a national meeting of all crime directors asking them to examine them, asking the same questions, and the two things arose. One is that everybody — everybody there seemed to be in general agreement within this forensic science community that fingernails were indeed unique and individual, and could be used as evidence. But that no one had ever had a case involving one."
The expert's own experience in analyzing and comparing fingernail specimens has consisted of studying his own nail clippings, those of his boss which had been collected since 1972, and those of three other individuals with a "number of samples from each". We do not find that this expert's testimony was sufficient to establish "a general scientific recognition of the fingernail identification procedure" or the "degree of certainty" from the use of the fingernail technique that would warrant admissibility. Barbara, supra.
The admission of the testimony regarding the identification of the defendant by use of the fingernail analysis and comparison was error where the evidence did not show a recognition and acceptance of the technique in the forensic community. We find, however, that this error was "harmless beyond a reasonable doubt" based on the overwhelming proofs, not touched by the taint of error, upon which all reasonable jurors could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. People v Christensen, 64 Mich App 23; 235 NW2d 50 (1975), lv den 397 Mich 839 (1976).
As to the defendant's contention that he was denied his right to confront witnesses because his codefendant was found to be incompetent to stand trial, causing the trial court to rule that he was incompetent to testify, we affirm the trial court's ruling. After testimony by an expert witness that clearly demonstrated the codefendant's incompetency to stand trial, the trial court determined that the codefendant would not have the capacity to knowingly and intelligently waive his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights against self-incrimination. Accordingly, the codefendant was not allowed to testify. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining whether the codefendant was competent to testify, MRE 601. This Court on appeal will not disturb the trial court's findings in the absence of an abuse of discretion. People v Eugene Johnson, 30 Mich App 284; 186 NW2d 94 (1971), lv den 384 Mich 838 (1971), People v Atcher, 65 Mich App 734; 238 NW2d 389 (1975), lv den 399 Mich 866 (1977).
Defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion in denying a motion for a directed verdict on the kidnapping charge because there was not sufficient "asportation" to support the charge. There was sufficient proof that defendant and his friend got into the victim's car and drove her five blocks against her will. A rational trier of facts could find the elements of kidnapping were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. MCL 750.349; MSA 28.581, People v Hampton, 407 Mich 354; 285 NW2d 284 (1979), appeal to the United States Supreme Court pending.
There was no showing that the asportation of the victim was merely incidental to the murder which occurred at the end of the five-block journey. Nor was it shown to be incidental to any other offense. People v Jones, 92 Mich App 100; 284 NW2d 501 (1979), People v Otis Adams, 34 Mich App 546; 192 NW2d 19 (1971).
The defendant charges that the instructions given to the jury on the element of asportation did not make it clear to the jury that the requisite asportation for kidnapping must be determined to be independent of any underlying crime. Although one sentence of the instruction indicates "if the underlying crime involves murder, movement incidental to that is generally sufficient to establish a valid statutory kidnapping", several sentences of the instructions clearly indicate that the asportation had to be separate from the crime of murder. Taken as a whole, we find that the instructions would leave the jury with the correct impression that asportation must be found to have been independent of the underlying offense. Jones, supra, 109.
Finally, the trial court recognized on the record that People v Wilder, 82 Mich App 358, 364; 266 NW2d 847 (1978), prohibited the court from sen tencing the defendant for convictions of both felony murder and kidnapping, the underlying felony. "[When] the latter is a necessary element of the former under the prosecution's theory of the case, [the underlying felony] must be vacated." This Court is satisfied that the trial court sentenced the defendant for the first-degree murder conviction only, however, the trial court did not expressly vacate the kidnapping conviction. We remand for an express vacation of the kidnapping charge in accordance with Wilder, supra. As to all other issues raised by defendant on appeal, we affirm.
Affirmed in part, and remanded.
People v Walker (On Rehearing), 374 Mich 331; 132 NW2d 87 (1965).