Case Name: HARRIET BURNHAM, Respondent, v. OLIVER T. COMFORT, Appellant
Court: New York Supreme Court, General Term
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1885-09
Citations: 44 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 216
Docket Number: 
Parties: HARRIET BURNHAM, Respondent, v. OLIVER T. COMFORT, Appellant.
Judges: HaRdiN, P. J., concurred.
Reporter: Supreme Court Reports (Hun)
Volume: 44
Pages: 216–226

Head Matter:
HARRIET BURNHAM, Respondent, v. OLIVER T. COMFORT, Appellant.
Will — devise of land — when not revolted or satisfied by. the payment by the testator of money to the devisee, although it be paid with intent so to do — ademption.
By a will, made 1863, Oliver Comfort gave a life estate in certain land to his brother Robert for life, and the remainder therein to the plaintiff, his daughter; all the rest and residue of his estate he gave to the defendant, a son. Before the making of the will he had given to his children, other than those mentioned, what he and they treated as their share in his estate then possessed by him or thereafter to be acquired, and had taken receipts therefor from them expressing such intent and purpose. In 1864 he made a similar arrangement with the plaintiff, giving her $600 and taking an unsealed receipt, signed by her in the, presence of a witness, by which she acknowledged the receipt of the said money as her part of her father’s estate up to that time, and all such other property as he might accumulate up to the time of his decease. The testator died in 1879 without having altered his will.
Upon the trial of this action, brought by the plaintiff to recover the possession of the land from the defendant, who had entered into possession thereof upon the death of the testator’s brother Robert in 1881, the court found that the $600 was paid and received with the intent that it should take the place and be in lieu of the devise of the said remainder.
Meld, that the devise was not revoked nor satisfied by the payment of the said money under the said agreement and that the plaintiff was entitled to recover. (Follett, J., dissenting.)
The doctrine of ademption applies only to legacies.
Appeal from a judgment in favor of the plaintiff, entered upon the trial of this action by the court without a jury.
In 1863 Oliver Comfort, the father of tbe parties to this action, made bis will, by wbicb he gave a life estate in the houses and lots in controversy to his brother Robert Comfort, and the remainder thereof to the plaintiff. He gave his home, farm and all the rest and residue of his estate, to the defendant and made him one of his executors. Before making such will the testator had paid to his children, other than the parties hereto, what he and they treated as their share in his estate, then possessed or thereafter to be acquired, .and they had severally given receipts therefor expressing such purpose and intent. These- other children received nothing under the will, except a share of the household furniture after their mother’s death. ♦
In 1864 the testator made a similar arrangement with the plaintiff, giving her $500 and taking from her a receipt in the words and figures following:
“Received of Oliver Comfort five hundred dollars, which money I receive as my part of my father’s estate up to this time, and all «uch other property as he may accumulate up to his decease.
“ In witness whereof I have hereunto subscribed my name.
“Dated at Southpoet, May 14, 1864.
“500.00. HARRIET BURNHAM.
“ In presence of Lawrence Lain.”
The testator paid the said money, and the plaintiff received the -same with the intent (as the learned justice found) that it should take the place and be in lieu of the devise of the remainder of the premises in controversy as contained in said will. Nevertheless the will remained unaltered during the remainder of • the testator’s life. He died in 1879. Robert Comfort, the life tenant, was in the possession of the property from 1879 until his death in 1881, when the defendant entered into the possession thereof, and refused to surrender the same on demand made by the plaintiff. The ...plaintiff, on request, refused to execute a quit-claim deed of the •premises to the defendant. This action is one of ejectment. The plaintiff claims title under the provision of the will so made in 1863, ■and admitted to probate after the testator’s death. The defendant -claims title as residuary devisee under said will in pursuance of the arrangement made between the testator and plaintiff in 1864. The court held and decided that the will was valid and that the devise to plaintiff was not revoked by anything done by the testator, nor was it adempted by the payment to the plaintiff of the $500 as-above stated. Judgment was ordered for the plaintiff, from which the defendant appealed to this court.
Smith <& Robertson, for the appellant.
Hill & Stanchfield, for the respondent.
See post, page 246.

Opinion:
BoabdmaN, J.:
If the testator had given the plaintiff a legacy of $500 instead of the devise of land stated in the will, the payment made by him May 14, 1864, to plaintiff, would have adeemed or satisfied the legacy. Ve may, therefore, pass by or disregard all authorities-founded upon satisfaction of legacies.
It cannot be treated as a case of advancement because that is allowed only in case of intestacy. (1 R. S. [Edm. ed., 105], p. *754, § 23 4 Kent's Com., pp. *418, 419 ; Thompson v. Carmichael, 3 Sandf. Ch., 120.) Here the property was wholly disposed of by will, and no right reserved therein, as in Langdon v. Astor's Exrs. (16 N. Y., 1), to qualify or modify any of its provisions. The transaction between the plaintiff and her father has no element of estoppel in favor of the defendant. The latter was in no sense a party to the-act done. He parted with nothing. His property was not affected thereby, and he did no act relying upon the acts or declarations of the plaintiff or her father. (Winegar v. Fowler, 82 N. Y., 315.) If the receipt of plaintiff may be treated as a contract with the testator, it dogs not enure to the benefit of the defendant. He was not a party to it and acquired no rights under it. All it provided for was this; that plaintiff could not claim as a matter of right any further recognition, but if her father saw fit to allow her to receive greater favors under his will, the contract did not forbid it.
The question then comes down to this, was the devise to plaintiff, satisfied by the payment of the $500, in May, 1864? There is no logical reason why a money payment ought not to satisfy a devise as well as a legacy where such was the purpose and intent of the-parties as here. But so far as authorities can be found they are hostile to such a doctrine. The case of Davys v. Boucher (3 Young & Collier [Exch.], 397, etc.) states that the principle of ademption by subsequent portion has not been applied to devises of real estate. That authority has been often recognized as correct. Bouvier, in his Law Dictionary, says " an advancement will not be considered an ademption where the devise is of real estate." In 2 Redfield on Wills, 441, Danys v. Boucher is cited with approval on this subject. So, also, in 2 Williams on Executors (5th Am. ed., 1202, or 7th London ed., 1335). The same principle is also sustained in Weston v. Johnson (48 Ind., 1), again citing Drnys v. Bouoher. Other cases are cited by respondent's counsel to the same effect, but as they are not accessible to me, I cannot verify them. The authorities are abundant to show that satisfaction applies only to legacies. (Willard on Exrs. 351; Bouv. Law Dic., Ademption; Landon v. Astor's Exrs. 16 N. Y., 1; S. C., 3 Duer, 541; 1 Roper on Legacies, 365.)
In the case under consideration the testator retained the absolute legal right to give the plaintiff the real estate in controversy notwithstanding the arrangement of May 14, 1864. If his will had been made after that date, no doubt could exist óf the validity of the devise. But the will made in 1863 continued to exist in the same form as it now is until the death of the testator in 1879, a period of fifteen years. We must presume the testator knew the consequence of such act and intended it. The will speaks as of the date of the testator's death and not of the date of its execution. The fact, that the provision for the plaintiff remained unrevoked for so many years, must be some and perhaps strong evidence of the testator's intention that plaintiff should have the land as originally given to her by the will.
Wills of real estate and wills of personal estate are now executed with the same formalities. Formerly it was otherwise, and far greater importance was attached to a will of real estate. The provisions of a will of persona: property might be anticipated, but not so in case of wills of real estate. Besides, upon proof of a will of real estate the title passes by virtue of the devise in the will contained. It is a written title of record, when the will has been probated. If such title could be attacked by parol proof of acts and declarations of the testator and others in hostility to the terms of the will, title to lands might be put in great jeopardy. Yery likely such considerations may have contributed to establish the legal principle applicable to this case, that a devise of land cannot be satisfied by the payment of money eyen where both parties to the transaction so intend. This of course does not touch contracts made between a parent and child for the benefit of and to be enforced by other children. Such contracts stand on quite a different basis.
The judgment must be affirmed, with costs.
HaRdiN, P. J., concurred.