Case Name: LAVERTY v. INTERURBAN ST. RY. CO.
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Term
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1906-03-12
Citations: 98 N.Y.S. 846
Docket Number: 
Parties: LAVERTY v. INTERURBAN ST. RY. CO.
Judges: Argued before SCOTT, P. J., and GIEGERICH and GREEN-BAUM, JJ.'.
Reporter: West's New York Supplement
Volume: 98
Pages: 846–848

Head Matter:
(49 Misc. Rep. 510)
LAVERTY v. INTERURBAN ST. RY. CO.
(Supreme Court, Appellate Term.
March 12, 1906.)
Carriers — Injury to Passenger — Negligence.
Where a passenger, without any signal to the conductor, attempted to alight from a car when it stopped at a point other than its usual stopping place, the starting of the car, causing her injury, was not negligence for which the company was liable.
[Ed. Note. — Eor cases in point, see vol. 9, Cent. Dig. Carriers, § 1228%.J
Appeal from City Court of New York, Trial Term.
Action by Emily Laverty against the Interurban Street Railway Company. -From a judgment in favor of plaintiff, defendant appeals.
Reversed.
Argued before SCOTT, P. J., and GIEGERICH and GREEN-BAUM, JJ.'.
Bayard H. Ames, for appellant.
Thomas J. O’Neill, for respondent.

Opinion:
GIEGERICH, J.
The action is to recover damages for personal injuries alleged to have been sustained by the plaintiff on the evening of the 13th day of April, 1903, while alighting from one of the defendant's cars. According to the plaintiff's own testimony, she started to get off the car without any signal to the conductor. She claims the car stopped, and as she was about to descend, or in the act of descending, from the rear platform, the car started suddenly, and she fell and was injured. By other evidence, which is uncontradicted, it is shown that the conductor at the time was in the car collecting fares and transfers. There is nothing to indicate that either he or the motorman knew of the plaintiff's intention to get off the car. At the close of the case the plaintiff testified: "There is the regular transfer station, and I know that, and that car stopped without notice." She does not, how" ever, state that the car had yet reached its regular stopping place. The •contrary seems to have been the fact. The witness Sinclair fairly well explained the situation, and his testimony shows, not only that the car had not yet reached its regular stopping point, but why it slowed •down, or, if we accept the testimony of the plaintiff and her witness, stopped, where it did. Sinclair testified:
"I looked out to see if it was near the stopping place at Eighth Avenue Circle, and I saw a car standing in front, and the ruotorman slowed down until the car in front would have a chance to pull up, and while coming to a slow down the car in front started, and he put on a little increased power to get to the stopping place. While he was slowing down I heard a commotion," etc.
—The commotion referred to being caused by the fall of the plaintiff and the movement and outcry of her fellow passengers and of persons on the street.
Conceding the truth of the evidence on behalf of the plaintiff (namely that the car came to a full stop and then started again suddenly), there is no proof of negligence on the part of the conductor or motorman. They were not aware of the plaintiff's purpose to descend, and the car had not yet reached its regular stopping place. We are not prepared to hold that a quick start, under such circumstances, is of itself negligence.
The judgment should be reversed, and a new trial ordered, with costs to appellant to abide the event.