Case Name: David Lee POWELL, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee
Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1989-01-11
Citations: 767 S.W.2d 759
Docket Number: No. 67630
Parties: David Lee POWELL, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.
Judges: 
Reporter: South Western Reporter Second Series
Volume: 767
Pages: 759–765

Head Matter:
David Lee POWELL, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.
No. 67630.
Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, En Banc.
Jan. 11, 1989.
Will Gray, Houston, for appellant.
Ronald Earle, Dist. Atty., Philip A. Nelson, Jr., Asst. Dist. Atty., and Robert Hut-tash, State’s Atty., Austin, for the State.

Opinion:
OPINION ON REMAND FROM THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
WHITE, Judge.
Appellant was convicted of capital murder. V.T.C.A., Penal Code Sec. 19.03(a)(1). Punishment was assessed at death. Art. 37.071(b), V.A.C.C.P. On direct appeal to this Court his conviction was affirmed. Powell v. State, 742 S.W.2d 353 (Tex.Cr.App.1987). Appellant then filed a petition for writ of certiorari which was summarily granted by the United States Supreme Court. Upon consideration, the Supreme Court vacated our judgment and remanded for "further consideration in light of Satterwhite v. Texas," 486 U.S. -, 108 S.Ct. 1792, 100 L.Ed.2d 284 (1988) (Satterwhite II). After renewed review, under the mandates of Satterwhite II, we will again affirm appellant's conviction.
An explanation of the precise procedural posture of this case is essential to our present disposition. On original submission to this Court, appellant alleged, inter alia, Estelle v. Smith error in the admission of psychiatric testimony at punishment. Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 101 S.Ct. 1866, 68 L.Ed.2d 359 (1981) (Smith). Specifically, appellant contended that it was error to admit psychiatric testimony concerning future dangerousness where such testimony was based on pre-trial competency examinations conducted without the appropriate warnings or notice. We overruled this contention, and found no error stating, "[A]t first glance, this case seems to be ruled by the Supreme Court's decision in [Smith ]. However, a thorough review of the record and a careful reading of both [Smith ] and Battie [v. Estelle, 655 F.2d 692 (5th Cir.1981)] brings us to the conclusion that the instant case is distinguishable and is a case of first impression." Powell, supra, at 357-358. We opined that where the defendant raises the defense of insanity, which is applicable to guilt-innocence as well as punishment issues, he waives his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights under Estelle v. Smith, supra concerning such psychiatric testimony. After finding no error, we gratuitously added the following harmless error argument:
Finally, we conclude that even if there was error in admitting the [psychiatric] testimony . the error was harmless.
We must conclude, as we did in Satterwhite v. State, 726 S.W.2d 81 (Tex.Cr.App.1986) that: 'the properly admitted evidence was such that the minds of an average jury would have found the State's case sufficient on the issue of the "probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society" even if [the psychiatric] testimony had not been admitted. The admission of the testimony was harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt.' [citation omitted].
Powell, supra at 359-360. Thus, our response to appellant's Smith allegation was two-fold: (1) there was no error and (2) even if error could be discerned, such was harmless under our then recent decision of Satterwhite v. State, 726 S.W.2d 81 (Tex.Cr.App.1986) (,Satterwhite I).
After being unsuccessful on direct appeal, appellant then filed a petition for writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court. In his petition appellant challenged, inter alia, both of our holdings on the Smith issue. In his first question for review, appellant challenged our core holding that a defendant waives his Fifth and Sixth Amendment Smith rights when he introduces psychiatric testimony in favor of an insanity contention. In his fifth question for review, appellant challenged our "f[a]ll back" holding that even if there was error, such was harmless under Satterwhite I. Appellant's petition was granted.
At that time, the harmless error analysis of Satterwhite I was pending review in the Supreme Court. See, Powell, supra at 370-371 (Teague, J., dissenting) (noting that the instant case should be held pending the outcome of Satterwhite I). Soon thereafter, the Supreme Court reversed Satterwhite I to hold that the Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24, 87 S.Ct. 824, 828, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967), harmless error test applies to Smith error. Satterwhite II, supra at 486 U.S. -, 108 S.Ct. 1797-98. The Court stated,
Accordingly, we hold that the Chapman v. California, [supra,] harmless error rule applies to the admission of psychiatric testimony in violation of the Sixth Amendment right set out in Estelle v. Smith.
Applying the Chapman, supra, harmless error test, we cannot agree with the Court of Criminal Appeals that the erroneous admission of Dr. Grigson's testimony was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The question . is not whether the legally admitted evidence was sufficient to support the death sentence, which we assume it was, but rather, whether the State has proved 'beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.'
After handing down Satterwhite II, the Supreme Court summarily vacated and remanded the instant case with a cursory order that it be further considered in light of Satterwhite II. Powell v. Texas, — U.S. -, 108 S.Ct. 2891, 101 L.Ed.2d 926 (1988). Thus, the Court's remand of the instant case under Satterwhite II subjects only our secondary reliance on the harmless error analysis of Satterwhite I to renewed review. See, Whan v. State, 485 S.W.2d 275, 277 (Tex.Cr.App.1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 934, 93 S.Ct. 1906, 36 L.Ed.2d 394 (1973) (reversal and remand as to specific point affects only that point). Cf. Schwerdtfeger v. State, 749 S.W.2d 781, 783 (Tex.Cr.App.1988) (Clinton, J., dissenting to refusal of appellant's petition for discretionary review) (reversal and remand on one ground does not limit lower court's authority to address grounds not 'previously addressed); Garrett v. State, 749 S.W.2d 784, 787 (Tex.Cr.App.1986); Spindler v. State, 740 S.W.2d 789, 791 (Tex.Cr.App.1987); Ware v. State, 736 S.W.2d 700, 701 (Tex.Cr.App.1987); Granviel v. State, 723 S.W.2d 141, 147 (Tex.Cr.App.1986) cert. denied, — U.S. -, 108 S.Ct. 205, 98 L.Ed.2d 156 (1987) (law of case doctrine).
Because we initially held that there was no error, the harmless error analysis of our original opinion was superfluous to the disposition and constituted nothing more than obiter dictum. However, in this dictum we utilized a harmless error standard which the Supreme Court has now denounced. Satterwhite II, supra. Thus, we withdraw that portion of our original opinion which gratuitously applied a harmless error analysis and we further disavow our prior reliance on the now overruled Satterwhite I. Our initial determination of no Smith error, as well as the remaining holdings of our original opinion, were not addressed by the Court; thus, they remain undisturbed. Consequently, appellant's conviction stands affirmed.
. Since Powell, supra, this Court has reiterated this position. Barber v. State, 757 S.W.2d 359, 365-367 (Tex.Cr.App.1988).
. The Court took the same action with other cases in which review had been granted pending the outcome of Satterwhite II. Cook v. State, — U.S. -, 109 S.Ct. 39, 102 L.Ed.2d 19 (1988); Lankford v. Idaho, — U.S. -, 108 S.Ct. 2815, 100 L.Ed.2d 917 (1988); Bennett v. Texas, — U.S. -, 108 S.Ct. 2815, 100 L.Ed.2d 917 (1988).