Case Name: Samuel Lavron ROSE, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1986-07-24
Citations: 492 So. 2d 1353
Docket Number: No. 85-1335
Parties: Samuel Lavron ROSE, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: UPCHURCH, C.J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 492
Pages: 1353–1356

Head Matter:
Samuel Lavron ROSE, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. 85-1335.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
July 24, 1986.
Rehearing Denied Sept. 4, 1986.
James B. Gibson, Public Defender, and Larry B. Henderson, Daytona Beach, for appellant.
Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and W. Brian Bayly, Asst. Atty. Gen., Daytona Beach, for appellee.

Opinion:
COBB, Judge.
It is contended on this appeal that the appellant, Samuel Lavron Rose, the defendant below, convicted of robbery, is entitled to a new trial because the state exercised its peremptory challenges on the basis of race, contrary to the provisions of State v. Neil, 457 So.2d 481 (Fla.1984). Based upon our review of the record, we disagree, and therefore affirm the conviction.
The record shows that the state exercised four peremptory challenges, and the defense moved for a mistrial on the basis that two of those challenges were directed to blacks. The defense at that point had peremptorily excused five prospective jurors whose race is not established in the record. At the time of the motion, prompted by the state's dismissal of prospective juror McMullen, the prosecutor immediately stated, prior to any ruling or comment by the court, that it was his experience that teachers do not make good jurors, and that McMullen had been excused because she was a teacher, not because she was black. The trial judge then swore in five jurors who had been accepted by both sides; their race is not established by this record. The five sworn jurors were removed from the courtroom, and McMullen remained. Defense counsel then repeated his motion for mistrial because veniremen Henderson and McMullen, both excused by the state, were black. The trial judge stated that he thought the motion was too late as to Henderson. This was potential error, because at the time the defense included the dismissal of Henderson as a basis for its mistrial motion, the last juror had not been sworn. See State v. Castillo, 486 So.2d 565 (Fla.1986).
The court then allowed further inquiry of venireman McMullen by the state, at which time it was established that she was acquainted with various individuals at an establishment known as "The Corner," frequented by the alibi witnesses of the defendant. At that point, the trial judge asked the attorneys for the law referred to at benchside conference, apparently a reference to the recent Neil case. The attorneys proceeded to argue in regard to both dismissals (McMullen and Henderson), and then a recess was taken so that the court and the attorneys could review Neil. Upon recommencement of court, defense counsel again objected to "the state's use of its peremptory challenges in the case of Mr. Gerald Henderson and Ms. McMullen (emphasis added)." Upon review of Neil, and based on legal arguments as to its application to the instant facts, the trial judge overruled the objection. At no time did he find a sufficient likelihood of discrimination which would justify an inquiry as to the state's motives. See Neil at 487. No such inquiry was made by the court — contrary to the contention of the dissent herein. Moreover, there was no ruling that the defense motion could not include Henderson. The motion was argued to the court on the basis of the two challenges and ruled upon accordingly.
As pointed out by the majority opinion in Neil:
[Ejxclusion of a number of blacks by itself is insufficient to trigger an inquiry into a party's use of peremptories. It may well be that the challenges were properly exercised but that that fact would not be apparent to someone not in attendance at the trial. The propriety of the challenge, however, might be readily apparent to the judge presiding over the voir dire. We emphasize that the trial court's decision as to whether or not an inquiry is needed is largely a matter of discretion.
Neil at 487, fn. 10. In the more recent case of Woods v. State, 490 So.2d 24 (Fla.1986), the Florida Supreme Court affirmed a conviction wherein the trial court declined to sustain an objection to the state's exercise of five out of its first ten peremptory challenges to excuse blacks. It was held that Woods failed to demonstrate a substantial likelihood that the state exercised its peremptory challenges solely on the basis of race.
Based upon Neil and Woods, we find no error in the trial court's exercise of discretion in overruling the defense objection and denying the motion for mistrial.
AFFIRMED.
UPCHURCH, C.J., concurs.
SHARP, J., dissents with opinion.
. Cf. Taylor v. State, 491 So.2d 1150 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986).