Case Name: The People of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. James Earl McCloskey, Defendant-Appellee
Court: Illinois Appellate Court
Jurisdiction: Illinois
Decision Date: 1971-05-24
Citations: 2 Ill. App. 3d 892
Docket Number: No. 70-190
Parties: The People of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. James Earl McCloskey, Defendant-Appellee.
Judges: 
Reporter: Illinois Appellate Court Reports, Third Series
Volume: 2
Pages: 892–901

Head Matter:
The People of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. James Earl McCloskey, Defendant-Appellee.
(No. 70-190;
Second District
— Original Opinion, May 24, 1971;
Supplemental Opinion, September 14, 1971;
Additional Supplemental Opinion, December 21, 1971.
E. Roger Horsky and Ralph Ruebner, of Defender Project, of Elgin, for appellant.
William Ketcham, State’s Attorney, of Geneva, (W. Ben Morgan, and Leo Wotan, Jr., Assistant State’s Attorneys, of Elgin, of counsel,) for the People.

Opinion:
ORIGINAL OPINION
Mr. PRESIDING JUSTICE THOMAS J. MORAN
delivered the opinion of the court:
Defendant was convicted of the possession and sale of narcotics. On appeal, he contends that (1) the court erred in refusing to permit him to elicit a witness' place of residence on cross-examination; (2) certain testimony was admitted without a proper admonishment to the jury; (3) the court improperly refused defendant's entrapment instruction; (4) the court permitted the prosecutor to make a prejudicial statement in his closing argument; (5) the court failed to instruct the jury on the mental state required for conviction; and (6) the sentence imposed is excessive and tantamount to cruel and unusual punishment.
Three Illinois Bureau of Investigation agents and an Aurora policeman conducted a controlled purchase of marijuana from defendant. One agent drove an unmarked automobile to defendant's place of employment. There, the agent, who used the name "Steve" and who was shabbily dressed and wearing a goatee, met a man named Dormer from whom he had previously purchased narcotics. This man was unaware of "Steve's" identity. Defendant, who was unknown to the agent, then arrived. Dormer refused to introduce the two. All three left in the agent's car and drove to a supermarket parking lot where the agent gave Dormer $50 in pre-recorded funds. Dormer added $10 of his own and handed the money to defendant who left the vehicle, disappeared from sight, and returned shortly with two bags of marijuana. The agent complained that he had not received $50 worth of the narcotic; defendant agreed, again left the automobile and came back with more marijuana. The three returned to the factory and separated.
The other two IBI agents and the Aurora policeman had followed the undercover agent to the factory. When "Steve", Dormer, and defendant left the factory to obtain the marijuana, one IBI agent and the Aurora policeman followed. The other IBI agent, Pariser, remained near the factory. Agent Pariser s only other connection with the case was that he witnessed the serial numbers of the pre-recorded money which was never recovered.
During its case-in-chief, the State introduced the testimony of the three IBI agents and the Aurora policeman, Agent Pariser being the last to testify. The defendant did not cross-examine the Aurora policeman or the IBI agent who followed the defendant to the parking lot where the transaction took place. He did examine the IBI agent who' made the purchase, but at no time did he request his home address. When Pariser was offered for examination, he was asked to spell his last name, his first name, whether it was his real name and then he was asked his residence address. The State's objection to the last question was sustained. Defendant moved for a mistrial based upon Smith v. Illinois (1968), 390 U.S. 129, 19 L.Ed.2d 956, 88 S.Ct. 748, and People v. Gonzales (1970), 120 Ill.App.2d 406; app. den. 43 Ill.2d 397. This motion was denied.
Without the presence of the jury, the State attempted to make a record concerning the personal safety of Pariser. Suffice to say that the record on this point was insufficient and will not be considered in determination of the appeal.
Defendant's first contention is based upon the Smith case. There the Court, at pp. 130-131, stated:
" [Ojnly this witness and the petitioner testified to the crucial events inside the restaurant, and the petitioner's version of those events was entirely different. The only real question at the trial, therefore, was the relative credibility of the petitioner and this prosecution witness.
In the present case there was not, to be sure, a complete denial of all right of cross-examination. But the petitioner was denied the right to ask the principal prosecution witness either his name or where he lived, although the witness admitted that the name he had first given was false. Yet when the credibility of a witness is in issue, the very starting point in 'exposing falsehood and bringing out the truth' through cross-examination must necessarily be to ask the witness who he is and where he lives. The witness' name and address open countless avenues of in-court examination and out-of-court investigation. To forbid this most rudimentary inquiry at the threshold is effectively to emasculate the right of cross-examination itself."
Subsequent Federal and Illinois cases have considered Smith. In United States v. Teller (7thCir. 1969), 412 F.2d 374, 380, the witness, Washington, during cross-examination, was asked "his present address"; the government objected and the objection was sustained by the court. On appeal, defense argued that failure to give the present address was a flagrant abuse of his right to cross-examination, even though the witness testified that he was staying at a motel at the government's expense at the time of trial. He further testified to where he lived 4 months before trial, to all of his past history on the use of narcotics, to living with a woman and to burglary and arson convictions. The court said:
« # We think that neither Alford v. United States, 282 U.S. 687, 75 L.Ed. 624, 51 S.Ct. 218 nor Smith v. Illinois, 390 U.S. 129, 19 L.Ed.2d 956, 88 S.Ct. 748 requires a reversal of this conviction. Smith does not per se require a new trial merely because the district court sustained an objection to a question seeking to elicit Washington's address. Smith requires a reversal only where the lack of a witness's name and address denies the defendant an opportunity to effectively cross-examine a witness. When this happens, a defendant is denied his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation. However, the initial question is whether the defendant was denied effective cross-examination. It is clear from the recital of Washington's testimony that the district court did not unduly limit cross-examination of Washington's past record."
Similarly, United States v. Lawler (7th Cir. 1969), 413 F.2d 622, 627; United States v. Lee (7th Cir. 1969), 413 F.2d 910, 915; and United States v. Marti, (2d Cir. 1970), 421 F.2d 1263, 1265-1266, interpret Smith as requiring reversal where there is a prejudicial denial of effective cross-examination of a witness whose credibility is in question.
The crux of Smith was the informer's credibility versus defendant's. In the case at bar, the contribution of agent Pariser's testimony was minute. Pariser remained at the plant and saw absolutely no part of the sale. The prerecorded money he witnessed was apparently not recovered and not introduced at the trial. In this light, we find no prejudicial denial of effective cross-examination of a witness whose credibility is in issue.
There is no merit to defendant's argument that evidence of subsequent offenses was admitted without the jury having been admonished that such evidence could only be considered for the purpose of identifying defendant. We do not deem it to be of value to reproduce verbatim the purportedly objectionable testimony; it is sufficient to say that in the various instances, either no reference was made to criminal conduct, no objection was made by defendant, or, upon objection, the testimony was stricken.
Defendant's contention that the tendered instruction on entrapment should have been given is also without merit. Instructions are properly given on very slight evidence regarding a theory. (People v. Kalpak (1957), 10 Ill.2d 411, 425.) Entrapment arises when the defendant commits a crime which he would not have committed, but for the actions of the authorities. The intent that a crime be committed must arise in the mind of the police, not the accused. It is proper for the police to provide opportunity for the crime to be committed and to use artifice to catch the criminal. People v. Outten (1958), 13 Ill.2d 21, 23-24.
We find this case barren of evidence of entrapment. Dormer, the go between, had no idea "Steve" was an undercover agent; "Steve" had never met or heard of defendant; there was no testimony of Dormer's conversation with defendant; and, finally, defendant readily took part in the crime, returned for more marijuana and exhibited a working knowledge of the narcotics trade. The sole indication of entrapment was the self-serving statement of defendant that, on previous occasions, Dormer had asked for narcotics for a man named Steve. This statement, without any connection to the agent, does not constitute "very slight evidence."
Defendant claims that the following statement, made without objection by defense counsel, requires reversal:
"You heard his [defendant's] testimony on the witness stand that he didn't know — he didn't know where he got this marijuana, that he had his sunglasses on. I submit to you that we witnessed perjury today in that statement made by that defendant from that chair right there."
Defendant cites People v. Weinstein (1966), 35 Ill.2d 467; People v. Provo (1951), 409 Ill. 63; People v. Hopkins (1970), 124 Ill.App.2d 415; and American Bar Association, Standards Relating to the Prosecution Function and the Defense Function, Sec. 5.8 (Tentative Draft March, 1970), which hold that comments on the falsity of the testimony are unprofessional conduct. According to defendant, these are authorities for the proposition that this quoted statement was an error of a nature requiring reversal even though no objection was made in the trial court.
While the standard referred to above, with which we agree, holds that such a remark is improper, under Illinois law no reversible error was made. In People v. Weaver (1959), 18 Ill.2d 108, the prosecutor said, "[L]adies and gentlemen, on that testimony of John Alfred Weaver I have never heard such lying in all my life." In People v. Zayas (1968), 102 Ill.App.2d 166, the State's Attorney argued, "the only thing that I can understand is how it could be so diametricaUy opposed is that the defendant is completely perjuring himself and made up the whole story." In both cases the court found the remarks not to be prejudicial. Accordingly, here, we conclude no reversible error occurred. See also, People v. Sinclair (1963), 27 Ill.2d 505; People v. Winstead (1967), 90 Ill.App.2d 167.
In a supplemental brief, identical to the one filed in People o. Keating, Gen. No. 70-189, ante at — , defense counsel contends error in the omission of the element of knowledge from any of the instructions. This point was not raised at any time in the trial court. Additionally, during closing argument counsel admitted defendant's guilt in the possession of marijuana. Therefore, we adopt in toto, our remarks on this point set forth in Keating, filed this date.
Finally, defendant contends that his 10 to 25 year sentence is excessive and tantamount to cruel and unusual punishment. A sentence within the maximum and minimum set by tire legislature cannot be considered cruel and unusual. People v. Calcaterra (1966), 33 Ill.2d 541, 548, cert, denied, 385 U.S. 7, 17 L.Ed.2d 8, 87 S.Ct. 65 concerns a maximum sentence and People v. Gonzales (1963), 25 Ill. 235, cert, denied, 372 U.S. 932, 9 L.Ed.2d 728, 83 S.Ct. 740, relates to the minimum sentence prescribed for the offense herein.
In appropriate cases, this court is empowered to reduce the sentence imposed by the trial court. Herein, the defendant, 19 years old and single, was shown to be familiar with crime, yet after hearings in aggravation and mitigation, the State's Attorney recommended a term of 10 years to 10 years and a day. While the trial court need not heed such recommendation, this court will take the same into consideration, along with the facts of the case, when contemplating a reduction of sentence.
We are of the opinion that in this instance, justice will best be served by reducing defendant's maximum sentence to 15 years.
Judgment affirmed as modified.
SEIDENFELD and GUILD, JJ., concur.