Case Name: Snodgrass et al. v. Brandenburg
Court: Supreme Court of Indiana
Jurisdiction: Indiana
Decision Date: 1904-06-03
Citations: 164 Ind. 59
Docket Number: No. 20,355
Parties: Snodgrass et al. v. Brandenburg.
Judges: 
Reporter: Indiana Reports
Volume: 164
Pages: 59–70

Head Matter:
Snodgrass et al. v. Brandenburg.
[No. 20,355.
Filed June 3, 1904.
Rehearing denied January 3, 1905.]
1. Wills. — Construction. — Estates Created. — A will providing in clause two: “I bequeath my entire estate, both real and personal, to my beloved wife,” and in clause four: “I request that at the death of my wife, that my estate that I am now seized of, be equally divided between my children,” devises a fee-simple title to such wife. p. 60.
2. Same. — Estate Devised. — Use of Word “Heirs.” — The use of the word “heirs” is not required, even in the absence of statute, to convey a fee simple by will. p. 02.
8. Same.' — Bequest of Beal and Personal Estate. — Presumption.—At the common law it is not necessary to add words of inheritance to a bequest of personal property in order to convey a transmissible interest, and where a testator has coupled his real with his personal property, the presumption is that he intended to convey as great a right in the one as in the other, p. 62.
4. Same. — Construction.—Cutting Down Estate by Subsequent Clause. —A devise in fee can not be cut down nor modified by a subsequent clause which does not clearly and distinctly manifest the testator’s intention to limit such devise, p. 63.
5. Same. — Construction.—Precatory Words. — Where a fee is devised by the terms of a will, a subsequent precatory clause can not cut such feo down to an inferior estate, p. 68.
6. Same. — Construction.—Cutting Doion Estate. — “Bequest.”—Where husband devised to his wife a fee, and in a subsequent clause stated: “I request that at the death of my wife,” the estate should go to their children, such clause did not limit such fee. p. 64.
7. Same. — Construction.—Stibseqiient Clause Cutting Down Estate.— Where a clause in a will, in terms which, standing alone, are clear, unambiguous, liable to no doubt, clouded by no obscurity, about which no one could entertain a doubt, devises a certain estate, a subsequent clause, in order to reverse that opinion, must be decisive the other way. p. 68.
Erom Shelby Circuit Court; Douglas Morris, Judge.
Action by Napoleon B. Brandenburg against Dollie Snodgrass and others to quiet title. Erom a decree for plaintiff, defendants appeal. Transferred from the Appellate Court under §133Ju Burns 1901, Acts 1901,'p. 590.
Reversed.
K. M. Hord, Ed. K. Adams, Jonas P. Walker and Elmer J. Binford, for appellants.
Albert F. Wray, Thomas H. Campbell, James F. Reed, Ephraim Marsh and William W. Cook, for appellee.

Opinion:
Gillett, J.
Appellee instituted this action against appellants to quiet title to certain real estate.- An answer and a cross-complaint were filed by appellants, both of which were adjudged insufficient on demurrer.
1. The pleadings present the question as to whether the duly probated will of William Snodgrass, deceased, gave to his widow, Sarah Snodgrass, a fee-simple title to his real estate. If so, the rulings mentioned were improper, and the cause should be reversed because of such rulings. The second, third and fourth clauses of said will afford a sufficient understanding as to the character of the instrument. Said clauses are respectively as follows: "(2) I bequeath my éntire estate, both real and personal, to my beloved wife, Sarah Snodgrass. (3) I request that as soon as convenient after my death, that my wife shall sell the personal property sufficient to pay my entire indebtedness. (4) I request that at the death of my wife, that my estate that I am now seized of, be equally divided between my children, to wit, John C., Mary A., Cora M., and Dora Snodgrass."
In determining whether a fee vests in the first taker, all of the relevant provisions of the will are to be considered. When the conclusion is finally reached, after an inspection of the four corners of the will, that it was the intent of the testator to vest a fee in the first instance, then any subsequent attempt to impose a legal estate thereon must necessarily fail, as inconsistent with the estate first devised. In this case the second clause, standing alone, plainly indicates, as a matter of interpretation, that it was the testator's purpose to- devise a fee to his wife. A case might be conceived of, however, where, notwithstanding such lan guage, there was a subsequent provision so cogent as to lead the court to conclude that it was the intention of the testator to limit the interest of the first taker to a life estate. Mulvane v. Rude (1896), 146 Ind. 476, and cases cited; Lumpkin v. Rodgers (1900), 155 Ind. 285; Fenstermaker v. Holman (1902), 158 Ind. 71. The case last cited furnishes an apt illustration of an instance where the subsequent words were so clear and decisive as to rebut the implication which a prior clause had created of an intent thereby to devise the fee.
In the final disposition of this case we start with the proposition that clause two was sufficient, when standing alone, clearly to evince the intent of the testator to devise a fee. Segregated from the other clauses of the will, we think that it may be said that the intent to devise a fee to the widow is clearly and decisively shown, and, that being true, the provision made by said clause was not subject to be taken away or cut down by the words of a subsequent clause, unless the latter clearly and distinctly rebuts the implication arising from the former clause. In the will under consideration the testator but requested that at the death of his wife his estate should be divided. At the utmost, the fourth clause of the will only served to create a doubt as to whether it was the testator's intention to limit the second clause, and in such circumstances the subsequent clause is ineffectual.
Judgment reversed, with a direction to the trial court to 'overrule the demurrer to the ánswer and the demurrer to the cross-complaint.