Case Name: ATLANTA TITLE & TRUST CO. v. ERICKSON
Court: Court of Appeals of Georgia
Jurisdiction: Georgia
Decision Date: 1942-07-16
Citations: 67 Ga. App. 891
Docket Number: 29365
Parties: ATLANTA TITLE & TRUST CO. v. ERICKSON.
Judges: MacIntyre, J., concurs.
Reporter: Georgia Appeals Reports
Volume: 67
Pages: 891–898

Head Matter:
29365.
ATLANTA TITLE & TRUST CO. v. ERICKSON.
Decided July 16, 1942.
Rehearing denied July 30, 1942.
Tye, Thomson & Tye, B. A. Edmondson Jr., for plaintiff in error.
Hoiuard, Tiller & Howard, A. O. Corlett, contra.

Opinion:
Gardner, J.
(After stating the foregoing facts.) In an executory contract for the sale of real property where the seller agrees to furnish "a good and marketable title to said property," this is the kind of title which the law implies shall be given even though no kind of title is mentioned in the contract. In Horne v. Rodgers, 113 Ga. 224, 229 (38 S. E. 768), Chief Justice Simmons, speaking for the court, dealt with this principle very clearly and simply, quoting with approval the following statement: "His [purchaser's] right to an indisputable title, clear of defects and encumbrances, does not depend upon the agreement of the parties, but is given by law. . . A good title means not merely a title valid, in fact, but a marketable title which can again be sold to a reasonable purchaser or mortgaged to a person of reasonable prudence as a security for the loan of money." (Italics ours.) See Winer v. Flournoy Realty Co., 27 Ga. App. 87 (2) (107 S. E. 398). Therefore it is not a question only of having a valid title in fact, but it is more than this; it must be a valid title in fact which is merchantable and which can be sold to a reasonable purchaser, or mortgaged or transferred to a person of reasonable prudence as security for a loan.
So far as this ease is concerned, even if we concede that the Supreme Court, the only tribunal with jurisdiction to pass on questions involving title to land, would in our opinion hereafter hold that the title is valid, in view of all the facts of this record, still we do not think that, under the several questions with reference to the title here concerned, this court can hold as a matter of law that the title now is such that the property could be sold to a reasonable purchaser or that a person of reasonable prudence would accept the title as security for a loan. There are involved: (a) the proper construction of the will; (b) a contingent remainder to the testator's grandchildren; (c) estoppel; (d) the power of the executrix under the will to execute a security deed with power of sale; (e) the authority of the court to grant an order to convey property as security for a loan; (f) whether terms of order were complied with; (g) the question of selling or encumbering without a court order; (h) a year's support. Also, there is expert testimony to the effect that the title rests under the shadow of a cloud. It seems clear to us that the fact-finding tribunal was authorized to find that even though the title may be valid, it is not a good and merchantable title. We do not mean to hold that the title is not valid. We do hold that the evidence as a matter of law does not demand a finding that the plaintiff in error has a valid and merchantable title, for the reasons we have assigned.
Judgment affirmed.
MacIntyre, J., concurs.