Case Name: In re MARRIAGE OF STEPHEN W. O'NEILL, Appellant, and CAROLE SUE O'NEILL, Appellee
Court: Illinois Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Illinois
Decision Date: 1990-10-18
Citations: 138 Ill. 2d 487
Docket Number: No. 69102
Parties: In re MARRIAGE OF STEPHEN W. O’NEILL, Appellant, and CAROLE SUE O’NEILL, Appellee.
Judges: 
Reporter: Illinois Reports, Second Series
Volume: 138
Pages: 487–509

Head Matter:
(No. 69102.
In re MARRIAGE OF STEPHEN W. O’NEILL, Appellant, and CAROLE SUE O’NEILL, Appellee.
Opinion filed October 18, 1990.
Rehearing denied November 30, 1990.
STAMOS, J., joined by MILLER, J., dissenting..
Duane D. Young and Mark Rabin, of Long, Rabin & Young, Ltd., of Springfield, for appellant.
Charles J. Gramlich and Mary Jo Egizii, of Springfield, for appellee.

Opinion:
JUSTICE CLARK
delivered the opinion of the court:
The central issue in this case is whether a trial court, when dividing marital property in a proceeding for dissolution of marriage, should consider dissipation of marital assets which occurred throughout the duration of the marriage, or should the trial court only consider dissipation which occurred during the time when the marriage was undergoing an irreconcilable breakdown.
On October 22, 1987, appellant, Stephen O'Neill, filed in the circuit court of Sangamon County a petition for dissolution of his marriage to appellee, Carole Sue O'Neill. On May 25, 1988, the circuit court granted the petition pursuant to section 401(a)(2) of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 40, par. 401(a)(2)), on the grounds that irreconcilable differences between the parties caused an irretrievable breakdown of the marriage which further efforts at reconciliation would be unable to rectify. In its judgment of dissolution, the circuit court distributed the marital property and marital debts equally between Stephen and Carole.
According to the testimony of both Stephen and Carole, Stephen was arrested and charged with attempted rape in November 1983, almost four years before Stephen filed his petition for dissolution of marriage. At this time, Stephen told his wife that he was innocent of the charge. Carole believed him and arranged for an appointment with an attorney, Michael Metnick, for Stephen's defense. Metnick met with both Carole and Stephen and agreed to represent Stephen for $5,000. Metnick recommended that the O'Neills also retain another attorney, whose fee was $10,000. Although both Stephen and Carole were concerned about the expenses involved, they paid the additional $10,000 because they agreed that it was important for Stephen to have the best possible defense. The O'Neills paid the $15,000 in attorney fees from their joint savings, insurance money received as a result of an auto accident, and a loan of $7,000 they received from Carole's father. Carole was present at all the meetings between Stephen and his attorneys, and she was aware of the evidence and the trial strategy Stephen's attorneys would use in the case.
In July 1984, Stephen was found guilty of the charge of attempted rape and was sentenced to four years' probation and 500 hours of public service. As a result of his charge and conviction, Stephen was fired from his job with the United States Postal Service. During the next few years, Stephen collected unemployment benefits and worked at various odd jobs, earning far less than he had been earning while working with the Postal Service.
Shortly after Stephen's arrest in November 1983, the O'Neills began receiving marriage counselling. There was very little evidence at trial concerning the condition of their marriage before the arrest. Carole did not testify as to the condition of their marriage before November 1983, while Stephen simply described it as "just an average marriage, I guess."
In the spring of 1985, during one of these marriage counselling sessions, Stephen confessed for the first time to Carole that he had committed the attempted rape for which he had been convicted in 1984. Until this confession, Stephen had always told his wife that he was innocent of the charge and she had believed him. Although the O'Neills' marital problems persisted, they continued living together for approximately IV2 more years after the confession. In December 1986, Stephen moved out of the marital residence.
Carole testified that her agreement to spend the $15,000 in attorney fees rested on her belief in her husband's claim that he was innocent of the charge of attempted rape. However, in response to the trial judge's question of whether she "believe[d] that [she] would have spent that money if [she] knew at the time of his guilt," Carole stated that "I have given that a lot of thought, and I honestly don't know."
Carole argued that the $15,000 spent on attorney fees constituted dissipation of marital assets chargeable to Stephen. According to Carole, in dividing marital property during a proceeding for dissolution of marriage, courts should consider dissipation which occurred throughout the course of a marriage. The $15,000 expenditure, Carole claimed, constituted Stephen's dissipation of marital assets because it was necessitated by Stephen's wrongful actions in attempting a rape. Carole also argued that Stephen should be charged with dissipation because, to induce Carole to authorize the spending of the $15,000, Stephen defrauded his wife in claiming that he was innocent.
Stephen attempted to refute Carole's dissipation claim by arguing that case law defines dissipation as " ' "use of marital property for the sole benefit of one of the spouses for a purpose unrelated to the marriage at a time that the marriage is undergoing an irreconcilable breakdown" ' " (In re Marriage of Petrovich (1987), 154 Ill. App. 3d 881, 886, quoting In re Marriage of Smith (1984), 128 Ill. App. 3d 1017, 1019). The $15,000 expenditure for attorney fees, according to Stephen, was incurred at a time before the O'Neills' marriage had undergone an irreconcilable breakdown. (Carole does not dispute Stephen's claim that the expenditure occurred before the marriage had undergone an irreconcilable breakdown.) Stephen further argued that Carole acquiesced to the $15,000 expenditure at the time it was made and never asked for reimbursement after Stephen's confession. Finally, Stephen argued that Carole could not claim to have been defrauded because Carole's own testimony indicated that she did not know if she would have authorized the expenditure had she known Stephen was guilty.
The trial court held that the $15,000 expenditure did not constitute dissipation by Stephen. The trial court explained:
"The Court is inclined to agree with the wife's argument that a spouse does not make a knowing expenditure of funds for attorney's fees when the guilty husband maintains his innocence. However, the Court cannot find an actual dissipation of marital assets in this case because when the wife was asked if she would have spent those funds if she had the full knowledge necessary to make the decision, that is if she knew that he was guilty, she did not know if she would have made the expenditure or not. The Court appreciates the witness' candor but, without a clear statement that the funds would not have been authorized by her if she had known the true circumstances, the Court cannot find that a dissipation has occurred."
The fact that the trial court considered whether dissipation actually occurred in this case indicates that the trial court accepted Carole's argument that courts, in distributing marital property, should consider dissipation which occurred throughout a marriage, rather than simply dissipation which occurred after an irreconcilable breakdown.
The appellate court similarly held that a court may consider dissipation that occurred throughout a marriage, but reversed the trial court's finding that dissipation did not occur in this case. (185 Ill. App. 3d 566, 568-69.) According to the appellate court, the rule that dissipation can only occur after an irreconcilable marital breakdown is not supported by the language of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (the Act) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 40, par. 101 et seq.). The appellate court noted that the Act, in stating that courts are to consider the "contribution or dissipation of each party" (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 40, par. 503(d)(1)) when dividing marital property, does not indicate that the time during which dissipation can occur should be limited to the time when a marriage is undergoing an irreconcilable breakdown. Furthermore, according to the appellate court, nothing in the legislative history of the Act supports the "irreconcilable breakdown" rule. Finally, the appellate court stated that none of the cases applying the "irreconcilable breakdown" rule had presented any analysis to support such a rule. (185 Ill. App. 3d at 568-69.) The appellate court therefore held that courts in dissolution of marriage proceedings should consider dissipation which occurred throughout the duration of a marriage. (185 Ill. App. 3d at 568.) We granted Stephen's petition for leave to appeal (107 Ill. 2d R. 315(a)).
Stephen argues that the appellate court was incorrect in holding that courts, in dividing marital property in dissolution of marriage proceedings, may consider dissipation which occurred throughout the course of a marriage. Stephen also argues that even if the appellate court was correct on this first point, the appellate court erred in finding that the $15,000 expenditure for attorney fees at. issue in this case constituted dissipation.
Section 503 of the Act sets forth the factors which a court must consider when distributing marital property. Subsection (c) of section 503 as it was originally enacted in 1977 provided that, among the factors to be considered in distributing marital property, was:
"(1) the contribution or dissipation of each party in the acquisition, preservation, or depreciation or appreciation in value, of the marital and non-marital property, including the contribution of a spouse as a homemaker or to the family unit." Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 40, par. 503(c).
One of the first appellate cases construing section 503(c) of the Act was Klingberg v. Klingberg (1979), 68 Ill. App. 3d 513. In Klingberg, the court held that the trial court's finding that the respondent did not dissipate marital assets was contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence because the evidence indicated that the respondent "use[d] marital property for his sole benefit and for a purpose unrelated to the marriage, at a time that the marriage was undergoing an irreconcilable breakdown." (Klingberg, 68 Ill. App. 3d at 517.) Other appellate court decisions subsequently cited Klingberg in concluding that the term "dissipation" as used in section 503(c) of the Act as originally enacted meant a spouse's use of marital property for the spouse's own benefit and for a purpose unrelated to the marriage at a time when the marriage was undergoing an irreconcilable breakdown. See In re Marriage of Hellwig (1981), 100 Ill. App. 3d 452, 462; In re Marriage of Schriner (1980), 88 Ill. App. 3d 380, 385.
On January 1, 1982, section 503 was amended to add a new paragraph pertaining to common ownership of property. This new paragraph became subsection (c), and the language of former subsection (c) became subsection (d). (See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 40, par. 503(d) (as amended by Pub. Act 82 — 668, eff. January 1, 1982).) Soon thereafter, the appellate court in In re Marriage of Block (1982), 110 Ill. App. 3d 864, 870, again interpreted the term "dissipation" as used in the recently amended Act as meaning a spouse's use of "marital property for the [spouse's] own benefit and for a purpose unrelated to the marriage at a time in which the marriage is undergoing an irreconcilable breakdown."
On August 19, 1983, section 503 was again substantially amended. (See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 40, par. 503 (as amended by Pub. Act 83 — 129, eff. August 19, 1983).) These amendments were a response by the General Assembly to remedy what it perceived to be this court's incorrect holding in In re Marriage of Smith (1981), 86 Ill. 2d 518, 529, that section 503 was intended to create a rule that "where a spouse who holds nonmarital property causes it to be commingled with marital property, or with nonmarital property of the other, * the commingled property is presumed to be marital property." (See Ill. Ann. Stat., ch. 40, par. 503, Supplement to Historical & Practice Notes, at 61 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1990).) However, the language of subsection (d) pertaining to contribution and dissipation of marital assets remained unchanged. See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 40, par. 503(d) (as amended by Pub. Act 83 — 129, eff. August 19,1983).
The appellate court, until the decision in this case, continued to interpret the term "dissipation" as pertaining only to the improper use of marital assets after a marriage has begun an irreconcilable breakdown. (See, e.g., In re Marriage of Click (1988), 169 Ill. App. 3d 48, 55; In re Marriage of Partyka (1987), 158 Ill. App. 3d 545, 549; In re Marriage of Aslaksen (1986), 148 Ill. App. 3d 784, 788; In re Marriage of Aud (1986), 142 Ill. App. 3d 320, 331.) During this time, the General Assembly continued to amend section 503. (See, e.g., Pub. Act 83 — 563, eff. January 1, 1984 (amending Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 40, par. 503; adding subsection which empowers courts to make judgments affecting marital property).) Nevertheless, the General Assembly has left the language of subsection (d) unchanged. See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 40, par. 503(d).
It is a well-established principle of statutory construction that "where terms used in [a] statute have acquired a settled meaning through judicial construction and are retained in subsequent amendments or re-enactments of the statute, they are to be understood and interpreted in the same sense theretofore attributed to them by the court unless a contrary intention of the legislature is made clear." (People ex rel. Nelson v. Wiersema State Bank (1935), 361 Ill. 75, 78-79; see also People v. Badoud (1988), 122 Ill. 2d 50, 55-56; Gaither v. Lager (1954), 2 Ill. 2d 293, 301; 2A N. Singer, Sutherland on Statutory Construction §49.10, at 400-01 (Sands 4th ed. 1986).) This rule is based upon the view that "the judicial construction [of a statute] becomes a part of the law, and it is presumed that the legislature in passing the law knew [of] such construction of the words in the prior enactment." Wiersema State Bank, 361 Ill. at 79.
A related principle of statutory construction is that "[w]here the legislature chooses not to amend a statute after a judicial construction, it will be presumed that it has acquiesced in the court's statement of the legislative intent." Miller v. Lockett (1983), 98 Ill. 2d 478, 483; see also People ex rel. Boylan v. Illinois Central Gulf R. R. Co. (1978), 72 Ill. 2d 387, 393; People v. Hairston (1970), 46 Ill. 2d 348, 353.
These principles, when applied to section 503 of the Act, compel us to conclude that the General Assembly intended for the term "dissipation" to refer only to a spouse's improper use of marital property during the time in which the marriage is undergoing an irreconcilable breakdown. These principles of statutory construction are particularly relevant here where the General Assembly has repeatedly amended section 503 and, in one instance, actually changed section 503 to remedy what it perceived to be an improper judicial construction of the statute. (See Ill. Ann. Stat., ch. 40, par. 503, Supplement to Historical & Practice Notes, at 61 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1990).) Because the General Assembly has retained the identical language pertaining to dissipation that was used when the statute was originally enacted, rather than changing the language in response to the judiciary's construction of the statute (as the General Assembly did in response to this court's construction of section 503 in Smith, 86 Ill. 2d 518), we conclude that the numerous judicial decisions limiting dissipation to the time during which a marriage is undergoing an irreconcilable break down properly ascertained the General Assembly's intent.
We therefore hold that the term "dissipation," as used in section 503(d)(1) of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act, refers to the "use of marital property for the sole benefit of one of the spouses for a purpose unrelated to the marriage at a time that the marriage is undergoing an irreconcilable breakdown." (In re Marriage of Petrovich (1987), 154 Ill. App. 3d 881, 886.) Accordingly, because there is no claim here that the $15,000 expenditure for attorney fees occurred during the time that the O'Neills' marriage was undergoing an irreconcilable breakdown, that expenditure did not constitute dissipation of marital assets.
For the reasons stated herein, we reverse the judgement of the appellate court, and affirm the circuit court's finding that the $15,000 expenditure for attorney fees did not constitute dissipation.
Appellate court reversed; circuit court affirmed.