Case Name: J.R. LOGGING and Mississippi Forest Related Workers Compensation, Appellants, v. Donald HALFORD, Appellee
Court: Mississippi Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Mississippi
Decision Date: 2000-05-09
Citations: 765 So. 2d 580
Docket Number: No. 1999-WC-00335-COA
Parties: J.R. LOGGING and Mississippi Forest Related Workers Compensation, Appellants, v. Donald HALFORD, Appellee.
Judges: McMILLIN, C.J., KING, P.J., BRIDGES, IRVING, LEE, MOORE, AND THOMAS, JJ., CONCUR. SOUTHWICK, P.J., CONCURS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION JOINED BY McMILLIN, C.J., AND THOMAS, J.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 765
Pages: 580–589

Head Matter:
J.R. LOGGING and Mississippi Forest Related Workers Compensation, Appellants, v. Donald HALFORD, Appellee.
No. 1999-WC-00335-COA.
Court of Appeals of Mississippi.
May 9, 2000.
Rehearing Denied Aug. 22, 2000.
Joseph W. McDowell, Ridgeland, Attorney for Appellants.
Mark R. Holmes, McComb, Attorney for Appellee.

Opinion:
PAYNE, J.,
for the Court:
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶ 1. This appeal involves a workers' compensation claim. Appellee Donald Halford suffered two work-related injuries: the first injury occurred December 1, 1994, and the second occurred May 5, 1995. Halford settled his two claims with his employer/earrier, the appellants, on December 20, 1995. On December 4, 1996, Halford filed a petition to re-open his claim alleging a mistake of fact; appellants denied this was the case. A hearing on this petition was held January 21, 1997, and the administrative law judge denied Halford's petition on February 21,1997.
¶ 2. From the administrative law judge's decision, Halford filed a petition with the Commission for review on March 6, 1997. In September, the Full Commission held a hearing at which time they affirmed the administrative law judge, denying Hal-ford's right to reopen the claims.
¶ 3. Halford then filed a notice of appeal to the Copiah County Circuit Court. Honorable Lamar Pickard entered an order January 20, 1999, reversing the Commission claiming the Commission's finding was clearly erroneous and granting Halford's petition to reopen his claim.
¶ 4. From the decision of the circuit court, the employer/earrier now appeals. We reverse the circuit court and affirm the administrative law judge and the Commission, both of which denied Halford's right to reopen his claim.
FACTS
¶ 5. Donald Halford was employed as a chainsaw operator for J.R. Logging. In December 1994, Halford suffered an injury to his left arm, shoulder and index finger. In May 1995, Halford suffered a second injury, this time to his left forearm. With both injuries, the employer/earrier paid temporary total worker's compensation benefits to Halford.
¶ 6. Orthopedic surgeon Dr. B. Thomas Jeffcoat found Halford to be fifteen percent permanently disabled in his left arm due to the December 1994 injury. Dr. Jeffcoat released Halford to return to work on March 27, 1995, placing no restriction upon Halford's employment. In May 1995, just before Halford's second injury, Dr. Jeffcoat found Halford to have reached maximum medical improvement regarding the first injury.
¶ 7. With the second injury, which occurred in May 1995, Dr. William C. Warner deemed Halford had reached maximum medical improvement in September 1995, and in October Dr. Warner advised Halford he could return to his job and do light duty work. In November 1995, Dr. Warner determined that Halford had reached maximum medical improvement with a ten percent permanent disability to the body as a whole, further restricting Halford to lifting twenty pounds on the left arm.
¶ 8. In December 1995, Halford and his wife met with the employer/carrier's attorney and with a representative from the Mississippi Workers' Compensation Com mission to review settlement documents. Without an attorney to represent them, both Halford and his wife were given an explanation of the settlement as written, and upon their acknowledging that they understood the details of the settlement, Halford signed the petition for a 9(i) final compromise settlement. Workers' Compensation Commission Chairperson Claire Porter entered an Order Approving Settlement in December 1995 for a total lump sum payment of $8,125.31 with a credit for $1,000.04 for permanent partial disability benefits previously advanced. At the time of this order, Halford also was required to and did sign a Full, Final and Absolute Release and Settlement of Claims and Covenant Not to Sue.
¶ 9. This appeal comes following Hal-ford's Petition to Reopen Claim, which alleged a mistake of fact. The particular mistake of fact Halford alleges is that the employer/carrier failed to provide numerous medical reports to the Commissioner or to Halford and failed to explain the contents of any physicians's reports to Halford. Additionally, Halford argues he was not explained the difference between a ten percent disability to one arm as compared to a ten percent disability to the whole body, and this affected the amount he was awarded.
¶ 10. At a hearing on this matter, Hal-ford's illiteracy was explained to all parties involved. Halford contends that he was not given opportunity or time for his literate wife to read and explain the papers to him and, consequently, neither Halford nor his wife was able to understand the settlement details. The attorney for the carrier and the representative from the third party administrator dispute such allegation stating they fully explained to Halford and his wife details of the settlement and that both Halford and his wife signed the petition for settlement and both acknowledged they understood the details of the agreement. The record of Halford's testimony before the Commission also shows Halford had two prior claims with the Commission for work-related injuries. In this testimony, Halford concedes he "is no stranger to this process."
ARGUMENT AND DISCUSSION OF THE LAW
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶ 11. Appellant J.R. Logging, the employer/carrier, raises two issues in this appeal. First, J.R. Logging questions whether the trial court applied an improper scope of review of the discretionary administrative decision of the Mississippi Workers' Compensation Commission. Second, J.R. Logging questions whether or not the trial court erred in reversing the decision of the Commission not to reopen which was based upon substantial evidence and, therefore, whether or not the claimant's Petition to Re-Open Claim should have been denied.
¶ 12. "The standard of review in workers' compensation cases has clearly been established in our prior holdings. The Workers' Compensation Commission sits as, the 'ultimate finder of facts' in deciding compensation cases, and therefore, 'its findings are subject to normal, deferential standards upon review.'" Pilate v. Int'l Plastics Corp., 727 So.2d 771 (¶ 12) (Miss.Ct.App.1999) (citing Natchez Equip. Co., Inc. v. Gibbs, 623 So.2d 270 (Miss.1993)).
¶ 13. 'We hold that judicial review of findings of the Commission extends to a determination of whether they are clearly erroneous. And a finding is clearly erroneous when, although there is some slight evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made by the Commission in its findings of fact and in its application of the Act." Evans v. Continental Grain Co., 372 So.2d 265, 269 (Miss.1979).
¶ 14. We find the circuit court did not follow the appropriate standard of review that is enunciated above. Had the circuit court weighed the evidence, it would have found substantial evidence did exist to support the finding of the administrative law judge and the Commission. The judgment of the Copiah County Circuit Court is reversed.
ANALYSIS OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED
I. WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS APPLICATION OF AN IMPROPER SCOPE OF REVIEW OF THE DISCRETIONARY ADMINISTRATIVE DECISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION.
¶ 15. J.R. Logging argues the Copiah County Circuit Court applied an improper scope of review of the Mississippi Workers' Compensation Commission's decision. As described in the aforementioned standard, the Commission's findings are subject to "normal, deferential standards upon review" and we will not reverse unless we find the Commission's decision to be clearly erroneous in light of a mistake in finding of fact. Pilate, 727 So.2d at (¶ 12). "As the trier of fact, it is presumed that the Commission made proper determinations as to which evidence was credible and which was not. Unless the Commission's decision was arbitrary and capricious, we will not tamper with the Commission findings." Fleming Enter., Inc. v. Henderson, 741 So.2d 309 (¶ 16) (Miss.Ct.App.1999) (citations omitted). "The Court of Appeals will not overturn a decision of the Workers' Compensation Commission unless it is based on a misapplication of law or it is unsupported by the clear facts presented in the case." A.F. Leis Co. v. Harrell, 743 So.2d 1059 (¶ 7) (Miss.Ct.App.1999) (citations omitted).
¶ 16. We find no evidence of arbitrary or capricious behavior on the part of the Commission, nor do we find the Commission misapplied the law to the facts of this case. Reviewing the circuit court's reasoning for reversing the Commission and as stated further in this opinion, we find the circuit court erred when it failed to properly apply the "clearly erroneous" standard. For this reason and for reasons stated further in this opinion, we reverse the circuit court.
II. WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REVERSING THE DECISION OF THE COMMISSION WHICH WAS BASED UPON SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE AND, THEREFORE, WHETHER OR NOT THE CLAIMANT'S PETITION TO RE-OPEN CLAIM SHOULD BE DENIED.
¶ 17. The statutory authority for the Commission to consider whether or not it should reopen a case is found in Section 71-3-53 of the Mississippi Code Annotated.
The Workers' Compensation Commis.sion [may] entertain an application to reopen or reinstate a claim under limited circumstances. The statute provides that the Commission may reopen and review a compensation case "[1] on the ground of a change in conditions or [2] because of a mistake in a determination of fact...." Moreover, the right to reopen a claim in such a situation is within the discretion of the Commission, and the burden is upon the party alleging a change in the claimant's medical condition to prove that change by a preponderance of the evidence.
Pennington v. U.S. Gypsum Co. and USG Interiors, Inc., 722 So.2d 162 (¶ 12) (Miss.Ct.App.1998) (from Dunn, Mississippi WoRkmen's Compensation § 336 (3d ed.1990)).
¶ 18. Additionally, noted treatises are also cited in Mississippi case law regarding the Commission's authority to reopen a case. In Bailey Lumber Co. v. Mason, 401 So.2d 696 (Miss.1981), the supreme court expanded the statutory test whereby a case can be reopened, citing 3 Larson, The Law op Wohkmen's Compensation § 581.52:
A number of statutes have extended the power of reopening beyond change of condition by express statute. Such statutes sometimes specify additional grounds such as mistake, or particular mistakes . the concept of "mistake" requires careful interpretation. It is clear that an allegation of mistake should not be allowed to become a backdoor route to re-trying a case because one party thinks he can make a better showing on the second attempt . The kind of mistake that will warrant reopening is ordinarily a mistake on the part of the fact finder, not on part of one of the witnesses.
Bailey Lumber Co., 401 So.2d at 704 (emphasis added).
¶ 19. "As pointed out by Mr. Dunn in his Mississippi WoRkmen's Compensation, section 336, (2d ed.1967), the commission has continuing jurisdiction, within limits, to reopen a case in the doing of which it will not be reversed unless its discretion has been abused." Bennett v. United Parcel Service, 382 So.2d 469, 472 (Miss.1980).
¶20. Considering the aforementioned instances whereby the Commission may reopen a case, Halford argued a mistake of fact occurred. In his prior appeal to the Commission and in defense to this appeal, Halford alleges that twenty-three of his medical reports were not made available to the Commissioner for her consideration in approving the settlement. However, Halford does not state what information is contained in these reports, nor does he show how these reports could have changed the outcome of the settlement had they been included in the Commission's portfolio of information. As stated above in Larson, this alleged mistake should not be used as a means to retry one's case, and we will not allow such to constitute cause to reopen Halford's case.
¶21. We recognize the Commission is the finder of fact and that reversal is warranted only if we find the Commission to have been clearly erroneous or to have abused its discretion. Since the Commission did have substantial evidence before it to make an informed decision, we find the Commission did not abuse its discretion and was not clearly erroneous in its decision not to reopen Halford's case.
¶ 22. Halford cites Bailey Lumber Co. v. Mason, 401 So.2d 696 (Miss.1981) in support of his contention the Commission did not have all information before it necessary to make an informed decision. In Bailey, the facts are somewhat similar to Halford's case. George Mason, the injured, had a fourth grade education and was illiterate, was not represented by an attorney through his ordeal, had incurred debts and was in dire need of money at the time he settled his claim, and alleged on appeal that the attorneys had taken advantage of his ignorance, misleading him into believe the "deal" he got was quite favorable. The Bailey court allowed Mason to reopen his claim, finding there had been a "misrepresentation of facts" and that the carrier had overreached, taking unfair advantage of Mason.
¶ 23. Halford claims he was taken advantage of the same as Mason was in Bailey and, thus, is entitled to have his case reopened. However, in contrast to Bailey, we can find no such misconduct or failure of the Commission to consider a full and detailed account of Halford's physical and occupational capabilities whereby they could make an educated decision regarding his settlement.
¶ 24. In reviewing the documentation provided in excerpts and the record on this matter, we find that both the administrative law judge and the Commission were fully informed as to Halford's medical condition and work capabilities and used discretion to make a justiciable decision. As the aforementioned standards warrant, we will not reverse the administrative law judge but for an abuse of discretion, which we do not find.
¶25. The Copiah County Circuit Court erred in reversing the Commission as the administrative law judge had discretion whether or not to reopen the case, and substantial evidence existed in support of the Commission's finding.
CONCLUSION
¶ 26. "If the Commission's finding of fact and order are supported by substantial evidence, then we are bound by them even though we as fact finder would have been convinced otherwise. We will exercise de novo review on matters of law." Spann v. Wal-Mart Stores, 700 So.2d 308 (¶ 12) (Miss.1997).
¶ 27. In our review of all the information that was before the Commission, we find such data provided substantial facts to support the Commission's finding and that the correct legal standard was applied. In reviewing the circuit court's application of the "clearly erroneous" standard, we find such standard was applied incorrectly. As well, in reviewing the Commission's finding for its validity, we find the circuit court abused its discretion in reversing the finding of the Commission, and we now reverse the circuit court and affirm the Commission's finding.
¶ 28. THE JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT OF COPIAH COUNTY IS REVERSED AND RENDERED AND THE JUDGMENT OF THE MISSISSIPPI WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION IS REINSTATED. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED AGAINST APPELLEE.
McMILLIN, C.J., KING, P.J., BRIDGES, IRVING, LEE, MOORE, AND THOMAS, JJ., CONCUR. SOUTHWICK, P.J., CONCURS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION JOINED BY McMILLIN, C.J., AND THOMAS, J.
. Specifications of this type of settlement are described in Miss.Code Ann. § 71-3-29.