Case Name: The LAMAR CORPORATION, a Louisiana Corporation, Successor to Lamar Advertising of Jackson, Inc., and Lamar Outdoor Advertising, Inc., Lessee v. STATE HIGHWAY COMMISSION of Mississippi
Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Mississippi
Decision Date: 1996-06-06
Citations: 684 So. 2d 601
Docket Number: No. 93-IA-00125-SCT
Parties: The LAMAR CORPORATION, a Louisiana Corporation, Successor to Lamar Advertising of Jackson, Inc., and Lamar Outdoor Advertising, Inc., Lessee v. STATE HIGHWAY COMMISSION of Mississippi.
Judges: SMITH, J., not participating.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 684
Pages: 601–608

Head Matter:
The LAMAR CORPORATION, a Louisiana Corporation, Successor to Lamar Advertising of Jackson, Inc., and Lamar Outdoor Advertising, Inc., Lessee v. STATE HIGHWAY COMMISSION of Mississippi.
No. 93-IA-00125-SCT.
Supreme Court of Mississippi.
June 6, 1996.
Rehearing Denied Sept. 19, 1996.
Mark D. Herbert, McGlinchey Stafford Lang, Jackson, for Appellant.
Michael C. Moore, Attorney General, James T. Metz, Assistant Attorney General,
Jackson, John H. Price, Jr., Barry S. Zirul-nik, Price & Zirulnik, Jackson, for Appellee.

Opinion:
BANKS, Justice,
for the Court:
Here we are called upon to address the interplay between a statute providing for relocation expenses and that calling for compensation for structures on real property acquired by the state where the owner of the structure has the right of removal but cannot remove the structure without destroying it. We conclude that the structure owner is entitled to compensation for the value of the structure. Accordingly, we reverse.
I.
This appeal arises from the January 29, 1993, Order of the Special Court of Eminent Domain, First Judicial District, Hinds County, Mississippi, which granted the State Highway Commission of Mississippi's ("Commission") motion for partial summary judgment. In that Order, the trial court judge held that an outdoor advertising structure, owned by Appellants, Lamar Outdoor Advertising, Inc., et al. ("Lamar"), was, as a matter of law, personal property and not subject to compensation in eminent domain proceedings instituted by the Commission for the condemnation of the real property upon which the outdoor advertising structure was situated.
Upon the trial court's grant of partial summary judgment, Lamar sought this Court's permission to file an interlocutory appeal as to the issue of whether Lamar was due compensation for its sign. This Court granted Lamar's request for an interlocutory appeal and thereafter, Lamar filed its Notice of Appeal. In its brief, Lamar assigned the following as error:
A. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE COMMISSION'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT BECAUSE THERE WERE DISPUTED ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT
B. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND THAT, AS A MATTER OF LAW, THE SIGN STRUCTURE WAS PART OF LAMAR'S INTEREST WHICH WAS TAKEN AND FOR WHICH JUST COMPENSATION WAS DUE
II.
The property which is the subject of this dispute is an outdoor advertising sign, a billboard, that was located on the east side of Interstate 55 South, Hinds County, approximately 0.2 miles north of the Byram exit. Because of a highway widening project of a segment of the interstate in the vicinity, the Commission condemned the real property upon which the billboard was erected, and required removal of the billboard.
The billboard was constructed by employees of Lamar Outdoor Advertising, Inc., in April, 1976, and is described as:
. 7 steel beams embedded 6 to 8 feet into the ground. Each steel beam was surrounded in the ground with 18 inches of concrete. Welded to the beams were 4 cross members made of 2' x 3' x ¾ angle iron which supported the apron and other appertances [sic] to the sign face. The actual sign face consisted of 24 changeable 2' x 14' panels.
Lamar also owned, as Lessee, a leasehold interest in the parcel of real estate which was condemned by the Commission and upon which the billboard was erected. The property had been leased for a total of seventeen years as an outdoor advertising site. The last written lease was dated April 2, 1982, with Lamar as the Lessee, and Curran's Land Management as the Lessor. The lease was for a three-year primary term, and it provided for continuous automatic renewal of successive three-year terms. At the time of the condemnation proceedings, Lamar was in the first year of its third successive renewal term. Lamar's last lease period had been automatically renewed, and the lease was in effect as of June 5, 1991, the date that the Commission filed its petition in eminent domain. According to the affidavits of Marty Elrod, General Manager of Lamar, and H.J. Curran, proprietor of Curran's Land Management, both intended to continue the lease arrangement indefinitely.
Initially, in its "Fair Market Value Offer," on August 6, 1990, the Commission offered Lamar $18,150, less $850 after taking value, for net compensation totaling $17,300. That offer was based upon the Commission's original premise that the billboard constituted real property. The Commission subsequently rescinded that offer and substituted an offer of $500 for compensation, and $3,900.80 for moving expenses associated with the removal of the sign.
The Commission took the position that the billboard was "personal property," and therefore, noncompensable in eminent domain proceedings. No compensation was offered for the billboard itself.
The trial court apparently agreed with the position taken by the Commission. On January 29, 1993, the court entered and order granting partial summary judgment and stating, inter alia, that:
6. Mississippi law does not recognize compensatory damages for personal property in eminent domain proceedings.
7. Based upon the evidence before this Court, including the terms and conditions of the lease pertaining to the billboard at issue, the sworn-to Personal Property Tax Returns made by the Lamar Corporation to the Tax Assessor for Hinds County, Mississippi, and Mississippi jurisprudence setting forth the test to be applied in determining the status of property as personalty or realty, the Court finds that there is no genuine material question of fact but that The Lamar Corporation's billboard at issue constitutes a trade fixture and personal property as a matter of law.
. [T]he billboard at issue is, as a matter of law, personal property and not subject to compensation in eminent domain proceedings.
III.
Today's appeal involves the narrow consideration of the propriety of the trial judge's grant of partial summary judgment regarding the classification of the billboard and its compensability. The summary judgment standard has been articulated as follows:
M.R.C.P. 56(e) allows summary judgment where there are no genuine issues of material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. When reviewing a decision to grant summary judgment, this Court will conduct a de novo review. Daniels v. GNB, Inc., 629 So.2d 595, 599 (Miss.1993); Short v. Columbus Rubber & Gasket Co., 535 So.2d 61, 63 (Miss.1988). Evidentiary matters are viewed in a light most favorable to the non-moving party. Morgan v. City of Ruleville, 627 So.2d 275, 277 (Miss.1993); Palmer v. Biloxi Regional Medical Center, Inc., 564 So.2d 1346,1354 (Miss.1990).
Crain v. Cleveland Lodge 1532, 641 So.2d 1186, 1188 (Miss.1994).
IV.
There is little doubt as to the legal status of this billboard as between lessor and lessee. It is a trade fixture. We need not be detained, however, by the consideration whether it is therefore "personal" as opposed to "real" property. We resolve this matter as one of elementary statutory construction. This issue may be decided by referring to the clear language of the statutes involved. Any structure which is adversely affected by an acquisition "shall be acquired" and is com-pensable "notwithstanding the right or obligation of the tenant, . to remove such" structure or improvement. Miss.Code Ann. § 43-37-11 (1972). The sign is clearly a structure under any ordinary meaning of that term. The conclusion that § 43-37-11 compels' compensation for the structure here in question, is not at odds with the right of one displaced to receive relocation expenses. Miss.Code Ann. § 43-39-7(l)(b) (1972). Both of these sections deal with the acquisition of real property. A natural construction is that § 43 — 39—7(l)(b) is confined to situations where the "personal property1' is not also a structure which cannot be moved without destruction.
Moreover, the property here involved does not become "personal property" within the meaning of the relocation section simply because it may be classified as a "trade fixture" and therefore treated as personal property for ownership purposes as between lessor and lessee. Clearly, the "notwithstanding" clause quoted above from § 43-37-11 contemplates "trade fixtures" as well as other structures in which the lessee retains ownership because of a contractual or other legal provision.
The sign is merely an improvement which the tenant, Lamar, has a right "as against the owner of the any other interest in the real property, to remove." Miss.Code Ann. § 43-37-11(2) (1972). By the explicit provision of the statute, that right of removal does not deprive it of the right to have the property "acquired" when it would be adversely affected by the acquisition of the land.
Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the circuit court and remand this matter to that court for further proceedings.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
DAN M. LEE, C.J., and McRAE, JAMES L. ROBERTS, Jr., and MILLS, JJ., concur.
PRATHER, P.J., dissents with separate written opinion joined by SULLIVAN, P.J., and PITTMAN, J.
SMITH, J., not participating.