Case Name: The CITY OF PINEY POINT VILLAGE, Texas, et al., Appellants, v. HARRIS COUNTY, Texas, et al., Appellees
Court: Texas Courts of Civil Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1972-01-20
Citations: 479 S.W.2d 358
Docket Number: No. 15869
Parties: The CITY OF PINEY POINT VILLAGE, Texas, et al., Appellants, v. HARRIS COUNTY, Texas, et al., Appellees.
Judges: 
Reporter: South Western Reporter Second Series
Volume: 479
Pages: 358–374

Head Matter:
The CITY OF PINEY POINT VILLAGE, Texas, et al., Appellants, v. HARRIS COUNTY, Texas, et al., Appellees.
No. 15869.
Court of Civil Appeals of Texas, Houston (1st Dist.).
Jan. 20, 1972.
Rehearing Denied April 27, 1972.
Paul Strong, Houston, for appellant City of Piney Point.
Fred M. Lange, Hugh E. Hackney, Houston (Fulbright, Crooker & Jaworski,
Houston, of counsel), for appellants Thomas J. Bate and wife.
John Held, Lee C. Clyburn, Houston (Baker & Botts, Houston, of counsel), for appellants Percy Selden and wife.
Joe Resweber, County Atty., Edward J. Landry, John B. Reese, Asst. County Attys., Louis Paine, Jr., Thomas W. Houghton, Houston (Butler, Binion, Rice, Cook & Knapp, Houston, of counsel), for appellees.
Jo E. Shaw, Jr., City Atty. for City of Bunker Hill Village, Harman Parrott, for City of Hedwig Village. Ruth B. Bivin, individually and for Stillforest Property Owners, Jamail & Gano, Joseph D. Jamail, John Gano, Wm. J. Stradley, Houston, amici curiae.

Opinion:
BELL, Chief Justice.
Believing we were in error in our original disposition of this appeal, appellees' motion for rehearing is granted and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. Our original opinion is withdrawn and the following is substituted as the opinion of the court.
The City of Piney Point Village, herein called Piney Point, Percy Selden and wife, and Thomas J. Bate and wife, brought suit against Harris County and the members of the Commissioners Court, in their official capacities, seeking to prevent the building by Harris County of an extension of San Felipe Road within the corporate limits of Piney Point. The full extension proposed would run from South Voss Road in the City of Houston west to Memorial Drive in Piney Point. The individual plaintiffs are property owners in Piney Point whose property the County seeks to condemn. Chester Reed, Trustee, and First Continental Development Corporation, land owners on that part of the extension lying in Houston, were allowed to intervene. They take the same position as does Harris County. A declaratory judgment was sought to declare the previous attempt of Harris County to obtain exclusive control over the extension within Piney Point, through agreement, was void. Also in-junctive relief was sought by all plaintiffs.
After trial to a court without a jury the court rendered judgment for the appellees.
On August 17, 1955, the Board of Aider-men of Piney Point passed the following ordinance, which is No. 16:
AN ORDINANCE AGREEMENT BETWEEN PINEY POINT VILLAGE AND HARRIS COUNTY
ORDINANCE NO. 16
BE IT ORDAINED BY THE BOARD OF ALDERMEN OF PINEY POINT VILLAGE THAT:
WHEREAS, it is the desire of Harris County to procure the right and authority to extend San Felipe Road to a point within the town limits of Piney Point Village from its intersection of Buffalo Bayou to the intersection of Memorial Drive, and
WHEREAS, the town of Piney Point Village is willing to grant such right and authority to Harris County provided the lines of said extension are set in accordance with the plat attached to this ordinance and made a part thereof, this being necessary in order that the town of Piney Point Village may know the approximate location of the right of way lines in order to enforce its zoning ordinance relative to the abutting property owners and further provided that Harris County agrees to maintain in good condition without cost to the town of Piney Point Village this extension of San Felipe Road between Buffalo Bayou and the intersection with Memorial Drive and also agree to allow the placement of utility lines, poles, etc. within the right of way of said extension. In consideration of Harris County agreeing to the foregoing requirements as signified by their acceptance in the place provided, the town of Piney Point Village, its successors and assigns hereby grants and gives to Harris County Texas, a body corporate and politic, its successors or assigns, for a period of ten (10) years from the date hereof, with option to extend same for an additional ten (10) years the absolute right and authority to widen, to set building lines, to construct, to improve, maintain, control and take into the County Road System, all of that part of San Felipe Road, extension lying within the town limits of Piney Point Village, from its intersection with Buffalo Bayou to its intersection with Memorial Drive as shown on the tentative plat attached hereto.
Passed this 11 day of August, 1955.
(signatures)
Accepted and approved this 29th day of September, 1955.
(signatures)
At the bottom of the ordinance where it was passed was a place for the County to accept and approve. It was "Accepted and approved'' on September 29, 1955.
At the time of its passage Piney Point was a village incorporated pursuant to Articles 1133 et seq., Vernon's Ann.Civ.St. It remained a village until June, 1957, when it adopted the provisions of Articles 961 et seq. and thus became a general law city. In 1961 by Ordinance 168 Piney Point changed its name and ratified and confirmed all things done by it under its old name.
At the time of passage of the ordinance Memorial Drive was a part of the County Road System and was maintained by the County. It was removed from the system April 9, 1969, and has not since been maintained by the County. Voss Road from Westheimer Road to Buffalo Bayou, just north of the intersection of Voss and San Felipe, was in the County Road System until April 9, 1969, when it was removed. However, it was restored November 6, 1969. For some years prior to the incorporation of Piney Point the Planning Commission of the City of Houston, in its planning of a metropolitan road system, had projected this extension of San Felipe.
On November 3, 1955, Harris County set the building lines and defined the right of way. In 1959 the legislature passed what is known as Article 6674n-2, V.A.T.S. The pertinent part reads as follows:
"The right of eminent domain within the boundaries of a municipality with prior consent of the governing body of such municipality is hereby conferred upon counties of the State of Texas for the purpose of condemning and acquiring land, right of way or easement in land, private or public, except property used for cemetery purposes, where said land, right of way or easement is, in the judgment of the Commissioners Court of such county, necessary or convenient to any road which forms or will form a connecting link in the county road sys-
tem or a connecting link in a State Highway."
In 1913 the legislature passed a special road law for Harris County. Local and Special Laws of Texas, Acts of 33rd Legislature, Chapter 17, p. 64 et seq. We will notice its material terms later in this opinion.
On May 6, 1963, Harris County paid Kinkaid School $11,619.40 for land in Piney Point which was to be a part of the right of way. On September 23, 1965, Harris County exercised its option to extend its rights conferred under Ordinance 16 for ten years. This option was exercised after Piney Point Council, on September 13, 1965, had passed a motion instructing its City Attorney to write the County advising it of the necessity of taking action if it wished to extend its rights, as the option expired September 29, 1965. The letter was written. On August 4, 1967, the County bought additional land in Piney Point for right of way at a cost of $29,664.05. On June 23, 1969, Piney Point Council passed a motion directing the City Attorney to write a letter, for the Mayor's signature, notifying the County that the agreement relating to the extension into Piney Point was void. The letter was written and was received by the County July 10, 1969. As of this latter date the County had not purchased any right of way for the part of the extension lying in the City of Houston.. However, a subdivider prior to such date had built 998 feet of the extension in Piney Point so -that less than one-half of the extension in Piney Point remained to be completed. The 998 feet of road was constructed in accordance with County specifications. Also, prior to July 10, 1969, the County had spent large sums extending San Felipe from the east westward to Voss and had made financial arrangements for segments of the right of way westward from Voss to the corporate limits of Piney Point. The County, however, up to that date had not actually purchased any right of way west of Voss in the City of Houston nor had it let a contract for or commenced construction of the Extension west of Voss. After July 10, 1969, the County purchased the right of way for the extension in Houston and contracted for and completed this part of the extension in Houston. The cost was about $1,216,500.00.
In October, 1968, the County directed its engineer to proceed to secure the necessary right of way. In May, 1969, the County authorized the acquisition of right of way across the Bate and Selden property and authorized the County Attorney to institute condemnation proceedings if necessary. On March 4, 1971, the County again directed that condemnation proceedings be instituted against the Seldens and the Bates. On July 1, 1971, the Commissioners Court by an order found "that the land, right of way or easements acquired or to be acquired for the proposed extension of San Felipe Road from Voss Road to Memorial are, in the judgment of the Commissioners Court, necessary or convenient to a road or roads which form or will form a connecting link in the County Road System or a connecting link in a State Highway."
Up until August 9, 1969, Memorial Drive and Voss Road were a part of the County Road System, when they were dropped by the County. Voss Road was restored November 6, 1969, to a point from Westhei-mer Road to a point just north of San Felipe. Memorial Drive has never been restored. Westheimer, where Voss intersects, is a State highway. No part of Memorial is a County road or a State highway. Memorial connects with State Highway 6 some eight miles west of the point where it would intersect with the proposed extension. The result is that from the time Ordinance 16 was passed and accepted until April 9, 1969, the extension would connect with two County roads. From the last date until November 6, 1969, it would not connect with any County road. Since the latter date it would connect at the east with a County road (Voss) and on the westerly end with Memorial at a point where it is neither a State highway nor a County road.
Piney Point in its pleadings offered to pay the County the amount it had paid for right of way purchased in Piney Point.
The extension lies in Commissioner's Precinct 3. The Commissioner of that precinct candidly testified that on principle he was opposed to any road within an incorporated city being maintained by the county or within the County Road System. So far as he was concerned, if it could be legally done, he would be in favor of dropping the San Felipe extension as a County road after it was completed.
The evidence shows that some 8,000 automobiles would use the extension each day.
The trial court made the following conclusions of law that are material to our disposition of this appeal:
1. Ordinance No. 16 is a valid contract binding on the County and Piney Point.
2. Under such agreement Piney Point has consented to the condemnation of, and Harris County has the right to condemn, the right of way necessary for the extension of San Felipe.
3. Such agreement fully complies with Article 6674n-2.
4. Such agreement has not been breached by Harris County by failure to maintain Memorial Drive or otherwise.
5. If the City of Piney Point Village ever had the right to rescind such agreement with Harris County, which the court concluded it did not have:
(a) The City waived such right.
(b) The City is estopped from any recovery.
(c) The City has been guilty of laches and does not come into court with clean hands.
8. Whether or not Harris County was, prior to the 1959 enactment of Article 6674n-2, authorized by statute or otherwise to condemn land within the limits of the City is a moot point.
Conclusions 6, 7, 9 and 10 are not material to this appeal.
For the first time appellees emphasize the provisions of the Harris County Road Law.
We hold that Harris County by virtue of the Harris County Road Law had the authority to open, construct and control the proposed extension of San Felipe Road within the corporate limits of Piney Point.
A comprehensive special road law for Harris County was passed by the legislature in 1913. Local and Special Laws of Texas, Acts of the 33rd Legislature, Ch. 17, p. 64 et seq., herein referred to as Harris County Road Law. The material parts of that law are, in substance, as follows:
Section 1. . . . the commissioners court of Harris County shall have control (emphasis ours unless otherwise indicated) of all roads, bridges . and all works and constructions incident to its roads, bridges and drainage, that have heretofore been laid out or constructed, or that may hereafter be laid out or constructed by Harris County, or under its direction.
Section 12. This section provided for the exercise of the power of eminent domain in the same manner as authorized by railroads, where it was necessary to occupy any land for the opening, grading, construction or maintenance of, any public road of said county. While this section was repealed by Acts of the 50th Legislature, 1947, Chapter 205, p. 361, the amending Act provided "Eminent domain proceedings shall be governed by the General Statutes authorizing counties to institute and maintain such proceedings."
Section 22. This provides "the Commissioners Court shall have the right to lay out roads to a width of not more than 120 feet, provided same shall connect with main roads leading into the City of Houston."
Section 29. "Whenever in this Act, or any general law, the word 'Road' is used, the same is hereby defined to mean in so far as Harris County is concerned, all road beds, ditches, drains, bridges, culverts and every part of every road, whether inside or outside of any incorporated city or town in Harris County, or not."
Section 33. "The provisions of this Act are, and shall be, held and construed to be cumulative of all General Laws of this State, on the subject treated of in this Act, when not in conflict therewith, but in case of such conflict this Act shall control as to Harris County."
The effect of the Harris County Road Law, which was a special act, is to give the County authority to lay out and control county roads within incorporated cities or towns if they connect with main roads leading into the City of Houston. Sections 22 and 29, Harris County Road Law. The proposed extension connects with two main roads leading into the City of Houston, to wit: Voss Road and Memorial Drive. We feel the record shows they are two of the main roads and we judicially know they are. Section 33 of said law expressly provides that the provisions of the Act shall, as to Harris County, control when in conflict with any general law.
In 1955, when the County and Piney Point entered into the contract above set out, Article 1146, V.A.T.S. of 1925 was applicable to Piney Point. It was a general statute applicable to all cities within a given population bracket. It provided that the Board of Aldermen should "have exclusive control over streets and alleys within the corporate limits; provided that with the consent of the Board of Aider-men, where streets are continuations of public roads, the Commissioners Court shall have the power to construct bridges and other improvements thereon which fa cilitate the practicality of travel on said streets."
When Piney Point became a general law city, Article 1016, V.A.T.S. of 1925, became applicable. This article provides that such a city ". . . shall have the exclusive control and power over the streets, alleys, and public grounds and highways of the city or town . .
The establishment and control of public roads is primarily a function belonging to the State, and the legislature, except where restricted by the Constitution, may delegate the function to political subdivisions of the State or to such other agency or instrumentality, general or local in its scope, as it may determine. Robbins v. Limestone County, 114 Tex. 345, 268 S.W. 915. The legislature has authority to pass special or local laws authorizing counties to lay out, construct and maintain roads. Tarrant County v. Shannon, 129 Tex. 264, 104 S.W.2d 4; Dallas County v. Plowman, 99 Tex. 509, 91 S.W. 221.
We hold that under the express provisions of the Harris County Road Law, which are above noticed, Harris County may open, construct and maintain county roads within the corporate limits of cities such as Piney Point if such road connects with main roads leading into the City of Houston. We do not have before us, and therefore do not pass on, whether the same rule would apply to roads within the City of Houston. This is a special law and its provisions, where in conflict with the general law, on the same subject will control. The special law, in such case, creates an exception to the general law. Jefferson County v. Board of County and District Road Indebtedness, 143 Tex. 99, 182 S.W.2d 908; Dallas County v. Plowman, supra; City of Laredo v. Martin, 52 Tex. 548; Ex Parte Neal, 47 Tex.Cr.R. 441, 83 S.W. 831; American Canal Co. of Texas v. Dow Chemical Co., 380 S.W.2d 662 (C.C.A. — Houston, 1st writ dism'd); Gabbert v. City of Brownwood, 176 S.W. 2d 344 (C.C.A. — Eastland, writ ref.).
The Harris County Road Law may be said to be in conflict with Articles 1146 and 1016. The Road Law under the express provisions of Section 33 controls over a conflicting general law. The effect of this section has not been changed in any manner. While Articles 1146 and 1016 were re-enacted by the codification of 1925, this did not repeal the Road Law. In the chapter labeled "Final Title," Section 19 provides "That all laws, civil or, criminal, of a local nature, operating in particular counties, cities or towns, . operative when these Statutes go into effect . . . are not affected by the repealing clause of this title." The repealing clause referred to is Section 2 and it provides that all general laws not included in the codification, or which are not expressly brought forward, are repealed. This evidences a legislative intent to reaffirm the Harris County Road Law which, as we have above discussed, is controlling over the general statutes noted.
In the original Harris County Road Law, Section 12 conferred the right of eminent domain on the County in connection with the acquisition of land or rights of way for road purposes, the right to be exercised in a manner employed by railroad companies. In 1947 this section was repealed but the repealing act provided eminent domain proceedings should be governed by the general statute authorizing counties to maintain such proceedings. Article 3264a, V.A.T.S. authorizes counties to condemn property for road purposes. Tarrant County v. Shannon, supra. When this article is read in conjunction with the Harris County Road Law, we feel the right of eminent domain was conferred on Harris County to acquire property within the corporate limits of cities such as Piney Point for the construction of County roads connecting with main roads leading into the City of Houston. We find from the record that the proceedings in condemnation here involved were being prosecuted under the Harris County Road Law, Articles 3264-3271, 6789a, and 6674n-2, V.A.T. S.
There are cases such as State v. Jones, 18 Tex. 874; Norwood v. Gonzales County, 59 Tex. 218, 14 S.W. 1057; Adams v. Rockwall County, 280 S.W. 759 (Tex.Com.App.), judgment approved, and Benat v. Dallas County, 266 S.W. 539 (C.C.A.— Dallas, writ refused), that hold a county can exercise no control over city streets where there is an active city government and has no right of eminent domain for acquiring property to construct roads in cities. Those cases must be read in the light of the facts involved in each. It is noted that in each of them there was no special statute such as we have here authorizing a county to construct and control roads within a city where they connect with roads leading into another city. Each of those cases, however, beginning with State v. Jones, recognizes the authority of the legislature to confer on counties the power to control county roads within a city and to exercise the right of eminent domain to effectuate that power.
It may be rationally argued that the above construction may bring counties and cities into conflict. Any such possible conflict may be eliminated by legislative action. It is not within the province of courts to legislate.
In the light of what we have said above, we feel it was unnecessary for the Commissioners Court to have the agreement with Piney Point. Nevertheless, if consent on the part of the municipality be necessary, the above agreement constitutes consent. The ordinance when accepted by the County became a contract. Appellants urge that such a contract is invalid because it amounts to a delegation of legislative authority. They rely on the case of Bowers v. City of Taylor, 16 S.W.2d 520 (Tex.Com.App.), holdings approved. In that case the city had closed a street for a period of 15 years at a point where it crossed a railroad right-of-way. This was done pursuant to an agreement with the railroad company giving the company the exclusive use of the part closed. The court did hold this was an attempt to contract away its legislative function and the agreement was invalid. On motion for rehearing the court stated its holding was based on the fact that the contract bartered legislative powers and that it violated the constitutional inhibition against irrevocable or uncontrollable grants of privilege. In the case a private corporation was involved.
Here we have two public bodies each of which is a trustee for the public in the construction and maintenance of roads. The subject of the contract here was the opening, construction and maintenance of the San Felipe extension. It is true that the term "control" is used. We think that term is used in the sense that control was conferred on the County to the extent necessary for it to construct, maintain and take the extension into the County Road System. It was necessary to take the extension into the road system so the County could make expenditures. It is true as appellants urge that one construction to be given the term is full and absolute control. However, it is also susceptible to the construction we have above stated. Where one possible construction will invalidate an agreement and another reasonable construction will sustain it, that construction will be given which will uphold the agreement. The reason is that it is most reasonable to assume the parties intended to make a valid agreement. City of El Campo v. South Texas National Bank, 200 S.W.2d 252 (C.C.A. — San Antonio, writ ref.).
Here, too, it is noticed that the agreement provided the extension should be within the lines "set in accordance with the plat attached to this ordinance and made a part hereof . . ." This was an exercise by the City of its authority to determine the location of streets. It also evidences an intent that, the term control was used in the sense that control was given to the extent necessary to construct and maintain. The construction and maintenance of streets is a proprietary function.
The City has authority to contract with the County for the financing or improvement of roads within the City that tie into County roads. City of Breckenridge v. Stephens County, 120 Tex. 318, 40 S.W.2d 43, opinion approved; Hughes v. Harris County, 35 S.W.2d 818 (C.C.A. — Galveston, n. w. h.); Smith v. Cathey, 226 S.W. 158 (C.C.A. — Dallas, n. w. h.); Cannon v. Healy Construction Co., 242 S.W. 526 (C. C.A. — Texarkana, writ ref.). While these cases actually involved only financing of city streets that connected with county roads, we have no doubt that the language used and the rationale would authorize counties, with the consent of cities, to construct and maintain designated streets in the cities that tie into a county road, thus becoming an integral part of the county road system.
We, therefore, hold the contract was a valid one.
Appellants urge that even if the contract is valid it did not purport to give ' the County the right to condemn. It cites the case of International Bridge and Tramway Co. v. McLane, 8 Tex.Civ.App. 665, 28 S.W. 454. That was a case where the Tramway Company contended its charter authorized it to construct a bridge across the Rio Grande River at Laredo and to collect tolls. It had been authorized by an ordinance of the City of Laredo to construct the bridge and collect tolls. It asserted the right to condemn to acquire sites necessary for improvement. The court merely held the right of eminent domain was an attribute of sovereignty and the legislature had not conferred such right on corporations such as the Tramway Company.
Here, as we have previously held, the Harris County Road Law and Article 3264a have conferred the right of eminent domain on Harris County for acquiring property for road purposes.
Appellants further contend the option on the part of the County to extend its rights for the second ten year period was not timely exercised. It was not exercised within ten years after the ordinance was passed, but it was exercised within ten years after it was accepted by the County. The facts we have recited above show it was intended to be effective from the date of acceptance by the County. Appellants base their contention on the fact that the ordinance was passed in August, 1955, and gave a ten year period "from the date hereof." However, on the ordinance was a place for acceptance by the County. The County must accept before it was bound by the obligations it was to assume. It may be said there was an ambiguity as to the effective date. If this is so, all parties have, as shown by the facts recited above, construed the effective date as September 29, 1955, the date of acceptance by the County.
We also hold Piney Point was es-topped from withdrawing its consent. Before it had attempted to do so on July 10, 1969, the County had set the building lines, purchased right of way from Kinkaid School for $11,619.40 and additional right of way for $29,664.05. All this was in Piney Point. Further, a subdivider had, in Piney Point, built 998 feet of the extension under the supervision of the County and according to its specifications. Less than one-half of the extension in Piney Point remained to be constructed.
We cannot adopt appellees' construction of Article 6674n-2 that the land condemned need only be necessary or convenient to a road that is or will be a link in a county road. We construe the article tó mean that the land, right of way, or easement sought to be condemned must be a portion of the road which itself forms or will form a link in the County Road System or a State highway. After Memorial Drive was dropped from the County Road log in 1960 it ceased being a County road. This would leave the extension joining a County road at only one end. It would not constitute a link joining to county roads as contemplated by the statute. County of Jim Wells v. Cook, 410 S.W.2d 325 (C.C.A. —San Antonio, n. w. h.); State v. State Road Commission, 64 S.E.2d 28 (W.Va.Sup.); City of Independence v. Montgomery County, 140 Kan. 661, 38 P.2d 105; Bridgman v. Town of Hardwick, 67 Vt. 132, 31 A. 33.
As previously shown, we think the Harris County Road Law sufficed to confer the right to condemn.
All points not specifically discussed are overruled.
The motion for rehearing is granted and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed, Associate Justice Coleman concurring.
ON MOTION FOR REHEARING