Case Name: BARRETT et al. v. HAMBY
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia
Jurisdiction: Georgia
Decision Date: 1975-09-16
Citations: 235 Ga. 262
Docket Number: 30015
Parties: BARRETT et al. v. HAMBY.
Judges: All the Justices concur, except Jordan and Ingram, JJ., who dissent.
Reporter: Georgia Reports
Volume: 235
Pages: 262–270

Head Matter:
30015.
BARRETT et al. v. HAMBY.

Opinion:
Hall, Justice.
In this appeal we affirm the judgment of the Superior Court of Cobb County which ruled that the county's zoning of the Hamby property constituted an unconstitutional taking of that property without just compensation.
The zoning giving rise to this dispute is designated R-20 under the Cobb County Zoning Ordinance. R-20 property may be used for little else than free standing single family homes on half-acre lots. The property measures some 26 1/2 acres and is owned by the estate of Mack C. Hamby. The estate's executor applied for rezoning to classification PSC — planned shopping center. After notice, a public hearing was held before the Cobb County Board of Commissioners at which proponents and opponents of the rezoning appeared. The application was subsequently denied. The executor then filed a complaint in equity in Cobb Superior Court alleging that R-20 classification deprived him of his property under Art. I, Sec. I, Par. Ill of the Georgia Constitution of 1945 (Code Ann. § 2-103) and the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Following an evidentiary hearing, the court agreed with the executor that the R-20 designation was unconstitutional as to the Hamby property, and ordered the board to reclassify the property consistent with the owner's constitutional rights. The board brings this appeal.
The uncontested evidence before the superior court was that the Hamby property was bordered on the north by commercially zoned land; there was no natural boundary dividing the Hamby property from the commercial land; there was a half-acre cemetery in roughly the central portion of the property; the property was located at the intersection of Sandy Plains Road and East Piedmont Road; diagonally across the intersection from the property was the Sprayberry High School enrolling some 2,290 students; prior to the hearing before the board, the Cobb County Planning Commission had recommended that the classification be changed from R-20 to PSC.
In favor of the requested rezoning, the following evidence was presented by the executor. He testified that he had received numerous offers from prospective purchasers who desired the land for commercial purposes and none from residential developers. Carl J. Tschappat, president of an economic analysis and land planning firm, testified that he had analyzed this land for a prospective commercial purchaser; that the traffic count through the adjoining intersection was some 18,000 vehicles daily; that the property as residential land was not competitive with nearby residential developments because of the heavy traffic and lack of trees; that traffic maneuvers into and out of numerous residential driveways would be dangerous, whereas a commercial development could consolidate its traffic routes; that residential traffic would increase the traffic flow at the same time the school generated its maximum traffic flow, whereas commercial use with businesses which opened , later and closed later than the school would spread the traffic load; that these same considerations argued against multi-family or apartment usage for the property; that the property's low visibility from long distance driving routes made it undesirable for an office park; that the property would have a good prognosis as a shopping center; that the highest and best use of the land was commercial; that nearby wooded subdivision lots were priced at approximately $5,000 to $8,000 and that this land would not be able to command a comparable price in a similar use because of its residential disadvantages. Mr. Charles Wilson, a real estate broker, then testified that he would not attempt to develop this property for residential use because of the cemetery, the traffic, the nearness of the school and the absence of trees; that its best use was commercial; and that "there are hundreds of [residential] lots that are fully developed within a mile of this area that are much, much more desirable than this could ever be made"; that he would not pay $2,000 per lot for this land for residences, whereas for commercial use this tract was more desirable than one estimated at $35,000 an acre. Mr. Leak, the Cobb County Zoning Administrator, testified that he recommended to the Planning Commission that they approve the rezoning application; that he concluded the best use was as a shopping center; and that there were no public utility problems envisioned for commercial development.
The board then presented its evidence, which consisted of a transcript of the earlier hearing before the board, and the live testimony of Mr. Louis Smith, a Cobb County planner. Mr. Smith testified that the future land use map for Cobb County, which constitutes a policy guide but has no legal force, was before the board at the hearing, and on that map the planned use for the instant property is residential. The supporting reasoning was, "We felt at the time because of the undeveloped portion of the commercial zoning in the immediate vicinity,... that was adequate to meet the demand for the future. So we left the other portion single family residential, which is the present zoning category." He further testified that he felt that schools and commercial developments were not compatible; however, he made plain that Sprayberry High was not concerned with children walking to school but was concerned with traffic generated by students driving their own cars. This witness further conceded that the Hamby property had features which would make it difficult to market as residential land.
The transcript of the hearing before the board, introduced in the superior court proceeding, indicated that some 27 surrounding landowners signed a petition approving the proposed rezoning while a few objected to it. Two persons spoke against the rezoning on grounds that commercial development would increase congestion and detract from the residential atmosphere of the community. One Sprayberry student spoke against it on grounds that a shopping center would be a "distraction" to the students. One of the adult opponents said "We have 1,093 signatures against this proposal," but we note that the record does not indicate who these 1,093 persons are or what right they have to have their opinions considered in this matter. It appeared that the Sprayberry School officials had voiced a concern that commercial development would further congest the arteries by which the faculty and students drove their cars to school.
At the conclusion of the evidence the superior court ruled with the executor and voided the R-20 zoning.
The board's argument here on appeal is that zoning is a legislative matter and judicial review is not appropriate unless the zoning decision, as in Tuggle v. Manning, 224 Ga. 29 (159 SE2d 703), approaches total deprivation of use of the land. The board additionally argues that the owner's economic considerations should not control, and that the action of the board here should be upheld because motivated by concern for the community's safety, morality and welfare.
We agree that zoning is a quasi-legislative matter (Olley Valley Estates v. Fussell, 232 Ga. 779, 781 (208 SE2d 801)). However, zoning is subject to the constitutional prohibition against taking private property without just compensation. Tuggle v. Manning, supra; Glynn County Comrs. v. Cato, 183 Ga. 111 (187 SE 636); City of Thomson v. Davis, 92 Ga. App. 216, 220 (88 SE2d 300). For example, a sister state has ruled on similar facts that a zoning ordinance restricting an area to residential use is void as to property located in the area but so situated in relation to a commercial zone as to be peculiarly unattractive, if at all salable, for residential uses. Krom v. City of Elmhurst, 8 Ill. 2d 104 (133 NE2d 1). As the individual's right to the unfettered use of his property confronts the police power under which zoning is done, the balance the law strikes is that a zoning classification may only be justified if it bears a substantial relation to the public health, safety, morality or general welfare. Lacking such justification, the zoning may be set aside as arbitrary or unreasonable. Nectow v. Cambridge, 277 U. S. 183, 188 (1928); City of Thomson v. Davis, supra, p. 221.
As these critical interests are balanced, if the zoning regulation results in relatively little gain or benefit to the public while inflicting serious injury or loss on the owner, such regulation is confiscatory and void. City of Jackson v. Bridges, 243 Miss. 646 (139 S2d 660); Weitling v. DuPage County, 26 Ill. 2d 196 (186 NE2d 291). Moreover, we specifically rule that for such unlawful confiscation to occur, requiring that the zoning be voided, it is not necessary that the property be totally useless for the purposes classified. Accord, Weitling v. DuPage County, supra. It suffices to void it that the damage to the owner is significant and is not justified by the benefit to the public. See generally 8 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations § 25.42 — 25.45 (1965); 1 Rathkopf, The Law of Zoning & Planning, Chs. 5 & 6 (1974).
The executor has amply proved loss by the R-20 designation and the refusal to rezone. As we search the record here for a countervailing benefit to the public, we find none of substance. Plainly, a commercial development of this land can pose absolutely no threat to the community's "safety" or "morality." As we consider its "welfare," we find merely the board's policy determination that the county already has enough commercially zoned property. Such an attempted justification, though it is relevant (see Code Ann. § 69-802), cannot alone suffice; it completely fails to scrutinize the merits of the land in question and the impact of the decision upon the landowner's property rights. This alleged community welfare interest is too vague and thus weighs too lightly in the balance to offset the owner's substantial injury by the R-20 designation. Neither is the asserted interest of the school officials in minimizing traffic an adequate justification on these facts for depriving this property of a great portion of its value.
In determining whether the zoning is justified, we must reject the board's argument that its construction, if done in good faith, is conclusive on the issue of what will serve the community's interest. See City of Columbus v. Stubbs, 223 Ga. 765, 767 (158 SE2d 392). Instead, we require that the board justify its determination, and sufficient justification here is missing. See Morrow v. City of Atlanta, 162 Ga. 228 (133 SE 345); Smith v. City of Atlanta, 161 Ga. 769 (132 SE 66).
Submitted June 4, 1975
Decided September 16, 1975
Rehearing denied September 30, 1975.
Ben F. Smith, for appellants.
Jean E. Johnson, Jr., for appellee.
Consequently, the superior court did not err in voiding the zoning and ordering the board to reconsider the matter and zone the property appropriately. The superior court did not arrogate to itself the power to give this property any particular zoning classification. It merely ruled correctly that the R-20 classification invaded the owner's constitutional rights.
Judgment affirmed.
All the Justices concur, except Jordan and Ingram, JJ., who dissent.
Though following its pronouncement in Nectow of a "substantial" relation test the Supreme Court has not further construed this term, it appears that "substantial" is more or less synonymous with "reasonable" (because the reasonableness of zoning on all the facts is the ultimate enquiry), and is clearly more than "any" evidence. See Nectow, supra, p. 187; 1 Rathkopf, The Law of Zoning and Planning, Ch. 5, p. 5-1 (1974); 8 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, § 25.42—25.44 (3d Ed. 1965); 1 Anderson, American Law of Zoning § 2.22 (1968); 3 Anderson, § 21.17.