Case Name: HOUSTON, E. & W. T. RY. CO. et al. v. LAVINE et ux.
Court: Texas Courts of Civil Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1923-06-27
Citations: 255 S.W. 448
Docket Number: No. 8384
Parties: HOUSTON, E. & W. T. RY. CO. et al. v. LAVINE et ux.
Judges: GRAVES, J., concurs in our disposition of this motion.
Reporter: South Western Reporter
Volume: 255
Pages: 448–458

Head Matter:
HOUSTON, E. & W. T. RY. CO. et al. v. LAVINE et ux.
(No. 8384.)
(Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. Galveston.
June 27, 1923.
Rehearing Denied Nov. 6, 1923.
Dissenting Opinion Nov. 7, 1923.)
1. Appeal and error <&wkey;l012(1) — Findings to be set aside, if based on testimony which cannot be true on any reasonable hypothesis.
While it is the duty of appellate courts to sustain findings of trial court or jury founded on sufficient credible testimony, not so as to findings based on, testimony irreconcilable or entirely out of harmony with human observation, reason, and experience; that is, if the circumstances, conditions, and physical facts are such that the testimony cannot be true on any reasonable hypothesis, the verdict and the judgment thereon should be set aside on appeal.
2. Railroads <&wkey;>348(2) — Jury’s finding of place of accident held against weight of evidence.
Testimony of plaintiff’s witnesses to fix as the place of the accident a crossing, a third of a mile from which deceased’s body was found on the railroad track, one of them testifying to seeing the accident but saying nothing about it for a week, the others (plaintiffs) as to what they found along the track, held, so out of harmony with all human observations, reason, and experience, and contradictory of the undisputed facts, that the jury’s finding, based solely on it, is so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence that it should not be permitted to stand.
3. Railroads &wkey;>350(28) — Evidence held not to show contributory negligence as matter of law.
Testimony in crossing accident case, based on safety gates being open and no signal given, that deceased did nothing to discover the approaching train, but walked on the railroad in front of the train without looking or listening, held not to show contributory negligence as matter of law.
4. Railroads <&wkey;352 — Answers to special issues in crossing accident case held not finding of contributory negligence.
Jury’s special findings in crossing accident case, based on the safety gates being open and no signal given, that deceased did nothing to ascertain the approach of the train, and that, had he exercised ordinary care at or before he went on the track he would have heard the approach of the train, held not a finding of contributory negligence.
<S=nFor other eases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes
On Motion for Rehearing.
5. Appeal and error i&wkey;1003 — Province of jury not invaded by appellate court holding against verdict that testimony is not reasonable.
Whether the testimony on which a verdict is based is under the circumstances shown, and, when measured by the common experience of men, reasonable (a question to be tested by the inherent soundness or reasonableness of the conclusion reached), is to be decided by an appellate court for itself, when presented to it; and, in determining that so tested it is not reasonable, it does not invade the province of the jury.
6. Railroads <&wkey;348(2) — Finding accident was at crossing held against evidence.
Jury’s finding that deceased was struck by the train at the crossing, one-third of a mile from which his body was found, held so against the undisputed physical facts and the great weight and preponderance of the evidence that it should not be allowed to stand.
7. Appeal and error <&wkey;1173(1) — Though brief was filed for only one appellant, held judgment being reversed as to it should be set aside as toi the other.
Where two railroad companies, the H. and the T., were sued for death claimed to have been caused at a crossing by a train owned and operated by the H. Company, the only negligence chargeable to the T. company being failure of the gates at the crossing to properly function, the judgment against both should be treated as an entirety, and, being reversed as to H. company, on the ground that the evidence did not warrant the finding that the accident occurred at the crossing, should be set aside as to the T. Company, even if it, though having appealed, did not file a brief; the liability of the T. company depending on that of the H. company.
Graves, J., dissenting in part.
(teoFor other oases see same topic ana KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes
Appeal from District Court, Harris County; W. E. Monteith, Judge.
Action by Joe Lavine and wife against the Houston, East & West Texas Railway Company and another. Judgment for plaintiffs, and defendants appeal.
Reversed and remanded.
Baker, Botts, Parker & Garwood and Garrison & Watson, all of Houston, for appellants.
Chas. O. Guynes and Bryan, Dyess & Col-gin, all of Houston, for appellees.
Writ of error granted December 5, 1923.

Opinion:
LANE, J.
This suit was instituted by Joe Lavine and wife, Hannah Lavine, against the Houston East & West Texas Railway Company and the Texas & New Orleans Railroad Company, to recover damages alleged to have been suffered by them by reason of the death of their minor son, Herman La-vine.
The plaintiffs alleged: That on or about the 8th day of July, 1921, their said son, a, boy of 14 years of age, while attempting to cross over the track of the Texas & New Orleans Railroad Company, where, the same is crossed by the Wallisville public road and Cushing street, was struck and killed by one of the defendant's trains. That the crossing in question was a public crossing, much used, and dangerous. That the defendants were negligent in the following particulars: Eirst, in failing to exercise ordinary care to see that the gates erected at said crossing were in proper condition and would close when trains were approaching and passing said crossing; second, in failing to sound the whistle and ring the bell of the engine, as the law requires; third, in not placing a watchman at said crossing: fourth, in running their train, which struck Herman La-vine, at an excessive rate of speed. They alleged that these acts of negligence, concurring with others, were the proximate cause of the death of the deceased.
The defendants answered by general demurrer, general denial, and by a plea of contributory negligence on the part of the deceased, and specially alleged, among other things, that the deceased was not Struck at the crossing, as alleged by plaintiffs, but that he was a trespasser upon defendants' premises and was struck and killed at another place than said crossing.
The cause was submitted to a jury on special issues in answer to which the jury found:
(1) That the deceased was struck and killed at the point of 'the intersection of Gushing street and the railway track, as alleged by plaintiffs.
(2) That the defendants did maintain safety gates at said crossing.
(3) That the defendants did not exercise ordinary care to see that said safety gates were closed as the train which struck deceased approached said crossing, and that such failure was the approximate cause of the death of the deceased.
(4) That the bell of the engine, which was propelling the train which ran over and killed the deceased, was not ringing as the train approached the crossing in question at the time of the accident.
(5) That the deceased, at the time, or before the time, he was struck and killed, did nothing to ascertain the approach of the train which struck him.
(6) That the failure to ring the bell was an act of negligence on the part of the employes of defendants, and that such failure was the proximate cause of said accident.
(7) That had the deceased, Herman La-vine, exercised ordinary care at or before he went upon the railway track he would have heard the approach of the train which struck him.
(8) That the damage suffered by the plain tiffs by reason of the death of their son was $2,000,
Judgment was rendered in favor of plaintiffs against defendants, jointly and severally, for the sum of $2,000, and from such judgment both defendants have appealed.
Assigning reasons for reversal of the judgment rendered, appellants, by their propositions 1, 4, and 5, substantially contend that it is shown by the great weight and preponderance of the evidence, as well as by the physical facts shown, that the deceased was not struct and killed at the Cushing street crossing, as alleged by the plaintiffs, but that he was run over and killed at a point upon the premises of the defendants upon which he was trespassing, some 2,000 feet west of said Cushing street crossing, and that it was further shown by said great weight and preponderance of the evidence and physical facts that appellants were not guilty of the negligence alleged by the plaintiffs, and therefore judgment should have been rendered for appellants. And by propositions 2 and 3 they contend, substantially that, if they are mistaken in the contention first presented, and in the event it is assumed that the testimony of Lewis Thompson, the only person who testified to seeing the collision of the train with the deceased, is true, then and in these circumstances it is shown by the undisputed evidence and the great weight and preponderance of the evidence that the deceased was guilty of an act of negligence contributing to his death in going upon the railway track in front of the train which struck and killed him, without looking or listening for the approach of said train, as was shown by the testimony of the witness Thompson and as found by the jury.
After d most careful examination and consideration of the statement of facts, we have reached the conclusion that the finding of the jury that the deceased was struck and .killed at the Cushing street crossing is so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be manifestly wrong. While it is the duty of appellate courts to sustain the findings of trial court or jury founded upon sufficient credible testimony, they' are not required to sustain findings based upon testimony which is irreconcilable or which is entirely out of harmony with human observation, reason, and experience. In other words, if the circumstances, conditions, and physical facts are such that the testimony cannot be true upon any reasonable hypothesis, the verdict of the jury and judgment rendered, based upon such testimony, should be by the appellate court set aside.
The important inquiry then is, Was Herman La vine struck and killed at'the Cushing street crossing, as alleged by the plaintiff, or was he so struck and killed some 2,200 . feet west of said crossing, and upon the in-1 i closed premises of the defendants? This inquiry is important in that, if the deceased was killed while trespassing upon the inclosed premises of the defendants, they were under no duty to keep a lookout for his safety, unless they had reason to anticipate his presence upon said premises, and under such circumstances plaintiffs could not recover, there being no allegation of discovered peril. But it was the duty of defendants to keep a lookout for persons who might be about to cross its, track at Cushing street crossing, to ring the bell and sound the whistle of their engine as the train approached said crossing, and generally to use such care to prevent the injury complained of as a person of ordinary care and prudence would have exercised under like or similar circumstances, and hence, if it be shown that the accident occurred at said public crossing and that the defendants failed to keep such lookout or to perform some one or more of the other duties mentioned, and that such failure was the proximate cause of the accident, the judgment for the plaintiffs should not be disturbed.
This brings us, then, to the further pertinent inquiries: First, was the testimony of the witness, Lewis Thompson, and the testimony of plaintiffs Joe and Hannah La-vine, relative to the point of the accident, upon which the jury found that the deceased was struck and killed at the Gushing street crossing, so out of harmony with human observations, reason, and the common experience of. all men, and so irreconcilable with the undisputed facts, as to render it insufficient to support such finding of the jury; it being shown that the engineer and fireman on the engine which struck the deceased testified that they were keeping a lookout, as they crossed Gushing street crossing,, and that their engine did not strike any one at said crossing; and it being shown that other witnesses had testified to certain facts, which, if true, would tend to show that the deceased was not struck at .said crossing, but that he was run over and killed 2,200 feet west thereof; and it being further shown, by the undisputed evidence, that the body of the deceased was found tying on the railway track of defendant some 2,200 feet or more west of said crossing on the premises of defendant; that one of his arms-. was lying across one of the rails of the track and was so crushed as to be held to the body by the leaders or ligaments only, and that one of his legs was lying across the opposite rail and was so crushed as to be held to the body by ligaments only; that his scalp was split, and that his cap was found close to where his body was found. In other words, is it not true that the great weight and prepon: derance of the evidence is so against the finding of the jury that the deceased was i struck at Gushing- street crossing as to ren der such finding manifestly wrong? We think so.
The undisputed evidence shows that the railroad track upon which the accident occurred ran practically east and west; that Cushing street crossing lies between the Englewood railway yards and the creosote plant of defendants: that the yards were east and the creosote plant west of said crossing; that the main track and four spur or side tracks passed over said crossing; that the body was found in a few minutes after the death of the deceased oh the main line track of defendants' ,2,200 feet west of said crossing, in the condition as hereinbefore described ; and that the cap worn by deceased was, found close to where the body was found.
The effect of the testimony of those who removed the body to the undertaker and who undressed it was that no parts or pieces of the body were missing.
The engineer and fireman in charge of the train in question testified that they knew no one was struck at said crossing by their engine.
As against the testimony of the witnesses mentioned and the undisputed physical facts, appellees' witness Lewis Thompson testified that, about 9 o'clock p. m. on the night of the accident, he was traveling on Cushing street going north: that when he got near the railway track he saw the deceased, who was about 10 or 15 feet in front of him and about 40 feet from the track, and who was also going north; that the deceased did nothing to discover the approaching train, but walked upon the railway track in front of the approaching train without looking or listening ; that he saw the engine strike and kill the deceased; that the train passed said crossing at a rate of speed of 25 miles per hour; that as soon as the train passed he went on home without looking to see whether or not the deceased was killed or injured, as he did not want to be bothered with him; that he did not tell his wife that any such accident had occurred, nor did he tell any one that he had seen the accident until about a weelo thereafter, and that how he came to then tell of seeing it was that he was on a street in the city of Houston and heard Joe Lavine telling about his son being killed, and that he then told Joe that he had seen the accident.
Appellee Joe Lavine testified that his son was killed on Wednesday night, and that he and his wife went down to the Cushing street crossing about 1 o'clock on Friday thereafter; that the first time he lonew his son was Mlled, on the crossing was when Leíais Thompson told Mm and that after Lewis Thompson told him that Ms son was Mlled on the crossing, he and Ms wife went down to the crossing, and that he saw some blood on a sill that supported a trestle west of and near said crossing; that it was human blood; that he knew it was human blood, because if it was animal blood it would be just like any other blood. Testifying further, he said:
"I just thought that was blood. I saw it there. I went down there looking for blood, and I saw it, and I believe it was blood. I was trying to find blood from the place he was killed."
Testifying further, he said that when he found this blood he and his wife went on up the railroad track and found a piece.of his son's jumper, a blue jumper; that he knew it was a piece from his son's jumper because his wife had made the jumper at home; that after finding this piece of jumper they went a little further and found a piece of flesh off of his son's ankle laying on the track, and a little further on they found another piece of flesh; that the pieces of flesh they found were pieces of human flesh.
Appellee Hanhah Lavine testified, with reference to finding the pieces of flesh, practically as did Joe Lavine.
As before stated the testimony of the witnesses Thompson and Lavine was the only evidence tending to show that the deceased was struck at the crossing.
If it be the theory of appellees that the deceased was caught under the pilot of the engine and dragged 2,200 feet to the point where his body was found, such cannot be sustained, for it was shown that no part of the skin of the body was broken except on the head and on the leg and arm, which were mashed by the wheels of the cars as they passed over them, and it was also shown that the cap of the deceased was found near the place where the body was found. Can any person of ordinary intelligence believe that the body could have been dragged 2,200 feet under this train without dislodging the cap from the head before it reached the point where it was found? Or that the body could have been so dragged without being mutilated?
Again, if the theory is that deceased was caught on the pilot and his body finally dropped off where it was found, then the testimony of Lavine and wife that they found parts of the body near the crossing is refuted, for if the body was lodged on the pilot. it would not have been possible that any part of the body was severed until it was dislodged from the pilot.
Having reached the conclusion that the testimony of the plaintiffs' witnesses is so .out of harmony with all human observation, reason, and experience, and contradictory of the undisputed physical facts, we have reached the further conclusion that the finding of the jury, based solely upon said testimony, is so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence that it should not be permitted to stand.
We cannot agree with the contention of appellants that if the testimony of Lewis Thompson be true that it shows that deceased was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law, or that the fifth and seventh answers of the Jury to special issues submitted was a finding that he was so guilty. Galveston-Houston Electric Co. v. Patella (Tex. Civ. App.) 222 S. W. 615; S. A. & A. P. Ry. Co. v. Votaw (Tex. Civ. App.) 81 S. W. 131.
Having reached the conclusion that the judgment is so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be manifestly wrong, as hereinbefore expressed, the same is reversed and the cause is remanded.
Reversed and remanded.