Case Name: Melvyn A. JOHNSON, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES, Appellee
Court: District of Columbia Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: District of Columbia
Decision Date: 1994-02-03
Citations: 636 A.2d 978
Docket Number: Nos. 90-CF-566, 91-CO-1406
Parties: Melvyn A. JOHNSON, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES, Appellee.
Judges: Before TERRY, STEADMAN and SULLIVAN, Associate Judges.
Reporter: West's Atlantic Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 636
Pages: 978–985

Head Matter:
Melvyn A. JOHNSON, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES, Appellee.
Nos. 90-CF-566, 91-CO-1406.
District of Columbia Court of Appeals.
Argued March 24, 1993.
Decided Feb. 3, 1994.
Michael L. Spekter, Washington, DC, appointed by this court, for appellant.
Kathleen S. Davies, Asst. U.S. Atty., with whom Jay B. Stephens, U.S. Atty. at the time the brief was filed, and John R. Fisher and Thomas C. Black, Asst. U.S. Attys., Washington, DC, were on the brief, for ap-pellee.
Before TERRY, STEADMAN and SULLIVAN, Associate Judges.

Opinion:
PER CURIAM:
This is an appeal from appellant's conviction following a non-jury trial for possession with intent to distribute heroin, in violation of D.C.Code § 33-541(a)(l) (1993 Supp.), and from the denial of his motion for a new trial. Although appellant presents us with numerous issues on appeal, only one issue requires plenary discussion, namely, whether the trial court committed reversible error by considering appellant's potential punishment in concluding that he was not a credible witness. We hold that the court did not and accordingly affirm.
I.
The government's evidence at trial showed that Detective Gary O'Neal was on duty at approximately 7:00 p.m. on August 22, 1989, in an alley behind 146 "L" Street, Southeast, an area described as an "open air drug distribution center." Detective O'Neal observed appellant standing in a walkway holding several blue ziplock packets of white powder in the palm of his outstretched hand while a female, later identified as Ms. Robin Lyles, reached within one inch of appellant's hand. Suspecting a drug transaction, although he could not determine whether Lyles was moving her hand toward or away from appellant's hand, Detective O'Neal identified himself and demanded that appellant and Lyles emerge from the walkway. Lyles fled and appellant dropped his hand to his side. Detective O'Neal struggled with appellant and eventually recovered from appellant's hand nine packets of powder which field-tested positive for heroin. Officer Kemper Agee then searched appellant and found one packet of a white substance that tested positive for crack cocaine and $74.00 in cash in a bicycle pouch which was strapped around appellant's waist.
Officer David Stroud was qualified as an expert in street trafficking and packaging of illicit drugs. He testified that the nine packets of heroin had a street value of $180.00 as packaged, but the same quantity of heroin could be purchased in bulk for $60.00. He also testified that the quantity, variety, and value of the drugs were more consistent with distribution than with personal use. Further, Officer Stroud opined that the maximum amount of heroin an addict would use in a day would be six packets; and that a heroin addict would buy no more than two bags of heroin at one time.
Appellant was the sole defense witness. He testified that he was a heroin addict and that he had purchased the drugs from Ms. Lyles in exchange for his girlfriend's camcorder; further, he said that he intended to use all of the drugs within twenty-four hours. Moreover, he testified that he had two prior convictions for distribution of drugs, had been sentenced under the addict exception, had previously participated in drug programs, and had been hospitalized because of his long-standing drug addiction.
In rendering its decision finding appellant guilty of possession with intent to distribute heroin, the trial court stated:
I have been sitting here wondering why Mr. Johnson would go to trial in this case and the minute I hear about his prior record I say, uh-huh, he wants to avoid a mandatory minimum.
I don't believe we've got any real doubt. I think I am entitled to take into account the defendant's desire to avoid the mandatory minimum sentence in evaluating his credibility. That does not substitute evidence but it does give him a very powerful motivation not to tell the truth on this specific narrow point of intent to distribute.
Following appellant's conviction and the trial court's imposition of the mandatory-minimum sentence, this appeal ensued.
II.
Appellant contends that the trial court, sitting as the trier of fact, was bound by the same prohibition as a jury not to consider potential punishment in assessing his credibility as a witness. It is, of course, true that as a general principle, "the jury is to determine guilt or innocence on the evidence before it and should not consider the possibilities of punishment in its deliberations ." Brown v. United States, 554 A.2d 1157, 1160 (D.C.1989) and cases cited therein; see also Criminal Jury Instructions for the District of Columbia, No. 2.74 (4th ed. 1993). The reason for such a general principle is, at bottom, one of relevance. The jury's role is that of the determiner of guilt or innocence, an issue upon which the possible punishment for the crime casts no light whatever. As the court said in United States v. Patrick, 161 U.S.App.D.C. 231, 234, 494 F.2d 1150, 1153 (1974): "[T]he jury's only function is to assess guilt or innocence on the basis of their independent view of the evidence. Sentencing decisions, on the other hand, are within the exclusive province of the court...." The court then went on to quote from Miller v. United States, 37 App.D.C. 138, 143 (1911):
it is error for the court to put before the jury any considerations outside the evidence that may influence them, and lead to a verdict not otherwise possible of attainment. The deliberations of the jury should revolve around the evidence before them, and should be uninfluenced by other considerations or suggestions.
But the situation in the case before us was different. The defendant had taken the stand and testified. His credibility was at issue, to be determined by the finder of fact. Plainly, anything that might sway the truthfulness of his testimony was a relevant fact, including the prospect of incarceration. As has been well-established for many years, the bias of a witness is "always relevant." Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316, 94 S.Ct. 1105, 1110, 39 L.Ed.2d 347 (1974); Springer v. United States, 388 A.2d 846, 855 (D.C.1978) ("The exposure of bias or partiality as a motivational factor may be . a crucial determinant in the jury's assessment of the trustworthiness of a witness. Thus, 'bias is always a proper subject of cross-examination,' " quoting Hyman v. United States, 342 A.2d 43, 44 (D.C.1975)). Cf. Criminal Jury Instructions for the District of Columbia, No. 2.28 (4th ed. 1993) (in weighing defendant's testimony, jury "may consider the fact that the defendant has a vital interest in the outcome of this trial"). The nature of the punishment faced by the defendant is thus a relevant fact in assessing his motive to lie: a potential $10 fine is different from the prospect of a death penalty.
Therefore, if a jury were not to be told of the precise punishment potentially faced by the defendant, the reason would not be that of the general proscription against such evidence. Bather, it would presumably be based on a determination that, although relevant, its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, under the principle that applies to any evi-dentiary decision in jury trials. See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Cooper, 483 A.2d 317, 323 (D.C.1984); Fed.R.Evid. 403.
However, here we are dealing with a bench trial. It is standard doctrine that in such circumstances, a trial judge is presumed to know of the proper use of evidence. See, e.g., Moore v. United States, 609 A.2d 1133, 1136 (D.C.1992) (acknowledging "the well-recognized 'presumption that a trial judge, in deciding a case without a jury, will disregard any inadmissible evidence and any improper argument,' " citing Singletary v. United States, 519 A.2d 701, 702 (D.C.1987)). There can be no real concern that a trial judge will use the evidence of the length of punishment to which a defendant is subject in any improper way in his deliberations. Here, it is plain that the trial judge considered it only as to the defendant's credibility.
In this posture, we see no need to determine whether the evidence would, of necessity, be excludable in a jury trial as unduly prejudicial. It would be a feckless procedure, on some principle of total equivalency, to require a trial court upon each proffer of clearly relevant and otherwise admissible evidence in a bench trial to engage in the hypothetical process of determining whether, in a jury trial, that evidence would be excluded under the principle of outweighing prejudice or any of the other doctrines controlling the presentation of evidence to juries, such as confusion of the issues, misleading nature, undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence, and to require an appellate court to review this hypothetical determination. We know of no authority to this effect and none is cited to us. We decline to adopt such a rule here.
Accordingly, the judgment appealed from is
Affirmed.
. Appellant's claims of insufficient evidence to sustain his conviction, ineffective assistance of counsel, and error on the part of the trial court in admitting expert testimony are without merit.
. The addict exception is codified at D.C.Code § 33 — 541(c)(2) (1993 Supp.) which provides in pertinent part as follows:
[T|he court may, in its discretion, waive the mandatory-minimum sentencing provisions . when sentencing a person who has not been previously convicted . for knowingly or intentionally . distributing, or possessing with intent to . distribute a controlled substance . if the court determines that the person was an addict at the time of the violation ., and that such person . distributed or possessed with intent to . distribute a controlled substance . for the primary purpose of enabling the offender to obtain a narcotic drag or abusive drug which he required for his personal use because of his addiction to a narcotic drag or an abusive drag.
. Instruction 2.74 states:
The question of possible punishment of the defendant in the event of conviction is no concern of [the jury] and should not enter into or influence your deliberations in any way. The duty of imposing sentence in the event of conviction rests exclusively with me. You should weigh the evidence in the case and determine the guilt or innocence of the defendant solely upon the basis of such evidence, without any consideration of the matter of punishment.
. A portion of Springer not pertinent here has been overruled. See Bassil v. United States, 517 A.2d 714, 717 n. 5 (D.C.1986).
. The following colloquy during closing argument shows the trial court's awareness of the proscription against a factfinder's indiscriminate consideration of punishment.
THE COURT: Let me ask you this question, Mr. Klingenstein, before I hear from Ms. Bo-recki. If this case were tried to a jury would you be free to argue to the jury that they should disbelieve the defendant because of his motivation to avoid [a] mandatory minimum, having been disqualified by his prior record from the addict exception? Would you be permitted to argue that to the jury in light of the fact that we tell the jury not to take punishment into account?
MR. KLINGENSTEIN: Your Honor, I might be able to argue that but I would not. I'm not confident enough standing here that I could argue that and I would not.
THE COURT: I don't know. I mean, it's an obvious factor that leaps to mind for the Court but I don't know that I should consider it if the jury couldn't consider it and I'm not at all sure that you would be free to make that argument to a jury.

MS. BORECKI: With regard to the last point, Your Honor, I would simply note that the Court is the trier of facts in this case, as obviously, with a jury. And it would appear to me in answering your question that it would be improper for the Court to take all that into consideration with regard — that is the potential punishment.
Thus, we do not understand the trial judge to have operated from any firm conclusion that in a jury trial, the evidence of the mandatory minimum would necessarily have been excluded by him, despite the government's contrary premise in its scanty discussion of the issue in its brief.
.More precisely, the inquiry would be whether, on the specific facts here, a trial court would abuse its discretion in determining that the probative value of the information was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.
. The hypothetical nature of such an inquiry is further highlighted by the realistic situation that a bench trial may well involve a different dynamic and process from a jury trial of the same offense. A defendant opting for a bench trial simply must take these differences into account. We do not deal here with a question of the use in a bench trial of evidence that would clearly be prohibited by some inflexible evidentiary rule in a jury trial.