Case Name: Andrew Lamar LEE, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1994-09-29
Citations: 642 So. 2d 1190
Docket Number: No. 93-264
Parties: Andrew Lamar LEE, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: BOOTH, J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 642
Pages: 1190–1192

Head Matter:
Andrew Lamar LEE, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. 93-264.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
Sept. 29, 1994.
Nancy A. Daniels, Public Defender, P. Douglas Brinkmeyer Asst. Public Defender, Tallahassee, for appellant.
Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., Richard Parker, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, for appellee.

Opinion:
MICKLE, Judge.
Andrew Lamar Lee appeals from habitual felony offender sentences imposed after his plea of guilty to one count of sexual battery with a deadly weapon and one count of burglary of a dwelling. Lee argues two points on appeal: (1) that despite his receipt of the state's notice of habitualization prior to entry of his plea, the sentences must be reversed because the trial court did not personally advise him of the collateral consequences of habitualization, as mandated in Ashley v. State, 614 So.2d 486 (Fla.1992), and (2) that the court erred in sentencing him as a habitual offender for sexual battery because this offense is a life felony for which no habitual-ized sanction is authorized.
We affirm on point one for the reasons set forth in Heatley v. State, 636 So.2d 153 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994).
We must reverse on the second point because the record reflects that Lee entered a plea to sexual battery, a life felony with respect to which a habitual offender sentence is invalid. The state concedes error on this point. See Lamont v. State, 610 So.2d 435 (Fla.1992) (life felonies are not within the scope of the habitual offender statute); Lambert v. State, 630 So.2d 230 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994) (sexual battery). We reject Lee's request that his sentence be remanded for imposition of a guidelines sentence. Inasmuch as it appears Lee entered a plea on the assumption that he would qualify as a habitual offender, he "should not be permitted to renege on a portion of his agreement with impunity." See Barrett v. State, 622 So.2d 1371, 1372 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993). Rather than vacating the sentence at this level, we remand with the following directions. The trial court shall extend the state the opportunity either to (1) accept the plea with the sentence imposed without the habitual offender status, i.e., vacate only the illegal habitual offender sentence for sexual battery, while having the judgment stand, and allow Lee to be resentenced on this charge, or (2) withdraw from the plea agreement — thus vacating both of the judgments and sentences — and reinstate the original charges and proceed to trial. See Boatwright v. State, 637 So.2d 353 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993) and the eases cited therein.
REVERSED and REMANDED with directions.
BOOTH, J., concurs.
BENTON, J., concurs and dissents with written opinion.
. Lee was originally charged with one count of armed burglary, two counts of sexual battery with a deadly weapon, and one count of robbery with a deadly weapon.