Case Name: PEOPLE v. SANGSTER
Court: Michigan Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1983-02-09
Citations: 123 Mich. App. 101
Docket Number: Docket No. 55036
Parties: PEOPLE v SANGSTER
Judges: Before: R. M. Maher, P.J., and Bronson and R. J. Snow, JJ.
Reporter: Michigan appeals reports; cases decided in the Michigan Court of Appeals.
Volume: 123
Pages: 101–110

Head Matter:
PEOPLE v SANGSTER
Docket No. 55036.
Submitted May 4, 1982, at Lansing.
Decided February 9, 1983.
Freddie L. Sangster was convicted of carrying a pistol in an automobile, Saginaw Circuit Court, Joseph R. McDonald, J. The Saginaw Police Department had received information that Sangster was carrying a concealed weapon. Subsequently, a Saginaw police officer, carrying a gun, approached Sangster who was sitting in his automobile and ordered that Sangster get out of the car. Sangster fled in his automobile with the officer in pursuit. The officer allegedly saw Sangster throw a gun out of the car window before he was apprehended. At the preliminary examination, the magistrate ruled that the gun that Sangster allegedly threw from the car had been obtained as a result of an illegal search and seizure and dismissed the case. The circuit court reversed the decision and remanded the case to the district court for completion of the preliminary examination. Sangster was subsequently bound over for trial and convicted. The defendant appeals, alleging that the trial court erred in: (1) failing to conduct an evidentiary hearing relying solely upon the transcript of the preliminary examination before denying his motion to suppress the weapon seized by the police; (2) initially holding that evidence of the defendant’s prior convictions would not be admissible but that the prosecution could raise the issue again during the trial and subsequently allowing admission of evidence of the defendant’s prior convictions after the defendant testified on his own behalf; and (3) refusing to instruct the jury on the lesser offense of attempted carrying of a concealed weapon. Held:
1. The defendant’s discarding of the gun and the subsequent seizure of the gun by the police were not, as a matter of law, the results of an illegal intrusion, although the issue should be analyzed by using the "fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine. The officer’s drawing of his gun upon approaching Sangster’s automobile did not transform the stop into an arrest. It is the actual intrusion on a defendant’s privacy that must be examined in an alleged violation of the Fourth Amendment, not the intent or plan of the police officer.
References for Points in Headnotes
5 Am Jur 2d, Arrest §§ 80, 81.
81 Am Jur 2d, Witnesses § 569.
79 Am Jur 2d, Weapons and Firearms §§ 9,10,' 12.
Offense of carrying concealed weapon as affected by manner of carrying or place of concealment. 43 ALR2d 492.
2. The trial court erred in deciding to permit impeachment of the defendant by evidence of his prior convictions after the defendant had testified.
3. The trial court did not err in refusing to instruct the jury on the lesser offense of attempted carrying of a concealed weapon.
Reversed and remanded.
R. M. Maher, P.J., concurred in part and dissented in part. He would direct the trial court to conduct an evidentiary hearing on the motion to suppress the weapon. He was unable to determine from the record whether the trial court erred in denying the motion to suppress. The lower court must determine whether the officer unlawfully attempted to detain or arrest the defendant. If so, the weapon was obtained as a result of unlawful police action and should be suppressed as "fruit of the poisonous tree”. He agreed that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of the defendant’s prior convictions for impeachment purposes after the defendant had testified. He believes that the trial court did not err in refusing to instruct the jury on the lesser offense of attempted carrying of a concealed weapon.
Opinion of the Court
1. Arrest — Stop — Police Protective Measures.
Protective measures undertaken by a police officer, including the officer’s drawing of a gun on approaching a car whose driver may be armed, do not transform a stop into an arrest, for purposes of the Fourth Amendment; the officer may increase the risk of being shot by leaving the gun in its holster (US Const, Am IV).
Partial Concurrence and Partial Dissent by R. M. Maher, P.J.
2. Evidence — Prior Convictions — Impeachment.
Generally, a trial court should not reserve its ruling on a motion to suppress evidence of a defendant’s prior convictions until the defendant has completed his testimony but should rule on the motion immediately.
3. Evidence — Prior Convictions — Impeachment.
A trial court in determining whether evidence of a defendant’s prior convictions should be admitted for impeachment purposes should limit impeachment to evidence of crimes that are not substantially similar to the crime charged and crimes that are significantly probative of the defendant’s credibility.
4. Weapons — Concealed Weapons — Lesser Included Offenses.
The crime of attempted carrying of a concealed weapon is not a necessarily lesser included offense of the crime of carrying a pistol in an automobile (MCL 750.227; MSA 28.424).
Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Louis J. Caruso, Solicitor General, Robert L. Kaczmarek, Prosecuting Attorney, and Kay F. Pearson, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for the people.
State Appellate Defender (by Derrick A. Carter), for defendant on appeal.
Before: R. M. Maher, P.J., and Bronson and R. J. Snow, JJ.
Circuit judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.

Opinion:
Bronson, J.
I agree with the dissent that defendant's conviction must be reversed due to the untimely decision to allow evidence of defendant's prior convictions to be used for impeachment purposes.
I write separately to state my disagreement with the dissent's treatment of the search and seizure issue. A drawn gun does not transform a stop into an arrest. In Terry v Ohio, 392 US 1; 88 S Ct 1868; 20 L Ed 2d 889 (1968), Chief Justice Warren stated:
"We are now concerned with more than the governmental interest in investigating crime; in addition, there is the more immediate interest of the police officer in taking steps to assure himself that the person with whom he is dealing is not armed with a weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against him. Certainly it would be unreasonable to require that police officers take unnecessary risks in the performance of their duties." Terry, supra, p 23.
Terry allowed significant encroachments on privacy rights in order to protect police officers in the course of their duties. To achieve this measure of protection, Terry permitted officers to "stop and frisk" a subject, under circumstances in which probable cause did not exist, without offending the Fourth Amendment. The drawing of a gun does little to add to the intrusiveness of a frisk but may add greatly to the protection afforded the officer during the stop. Protective measures, such as drawing a gun on approaching a car whose driver may be armed, do not transform a stop into an arrest; the officer may increase the risk of being shot, however, by leaving the gun in its holster. United States v Jackson, 652 F2d 244 (CA 2, 1981).
In addition, I do not think it appropriate, in Fourth Amendment analysis, to attempt to devine what a police officer would have done had a suspect not fled. It is not the planned intrusion on privacy which must be examined, it is the actual one. See Terry, supra, p 21, fn 16.
I must also disagree with the statement that "the weapon seized by the police was clearly obtained as a result" of the allegedly illegal intrusion although I do agree that the problem must be analyzed by using the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine. The trial court must ask whether the act of throwing the gun from the car was a result of the allegedly illegal action. In doing so, it cannot overlook the possibility that the discarding of the gun was the result of an unreasonable response to the situation by the defendant. This Court cannot conclude, as a matter of law, that the discarding of the gun was the fruit of the allegedly illegal stop. All questions concerning the suppresssion of evidence remain open on our remand to the trial court.
Reversed and remanded.
R. J. Snow, J., concurred.