Case Name: Illinois Steel Company, Respondent, vs. Bilot and wife, Appellants
Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Wisconsin
Decision Date: 1901-03-19
Citations: 109 Wis. 418
Docket Number: 
Parties: Illinois Steel Company, Respondent, vs. Bilot and wife, Appellants.
Judges: BaRdeeN, J., took no part.
Reporter: Wisconsin Reports
Volume: 109
Pages: 418–449

Head Matter:
Illinois Steel Company, Respondent, vs. Bilot and wife, Appellants.
December 10, 1900
March 19, 1901.
Waters: Title to lake bed: Patents, when void: Public trust: Adverse possession: Artificial filling: Ejectment: Riparian rights: Elements of actual possession: Statutes construed: Usual improvement: Hunting and fishing.
,1. Land covered by the waters of lakes or ponds, or by water partaking of like character as regards public rights, though in form conveyed by a federal or state patent, is vested in the state the same after such conveyance as before, such conveyance, as to such land, being absolutely void.
2. The title to land of the character mentioned, in the territory out of which the state of Wisconsin was formed, prior to such formation, was in the United States in trust to preserve to the people of prospective states the enjoyment of the'waters covering the same to the line of ordinary high-water mark, to the same extent as tidal waters are enjoyable by the rules of the common law. When this state was admitted into the Union such trust as to such land within the boundaries devolved upon it and there remains, for it is powerless to divest itself of the trust so far as its preservation is necessary to maintain in all its, integrity the character of such waters.
The presumption as regards land covered by water of the character above indicated is that the trust mentioned attached thereto before the government survey was made, and that the extension of such survey over and the conveyance of such land in form was void; or that a trust of a like character attached to the land by reason of the shore line being extended by erosion.
-4 No title can be obtained, by adverse possession for twenty years, to land held by the state in any capacity.
5. The title to land held by the state in trust to preserve to the people . thereof the enjoyment of lakes and ponds does not change by artificial filling so as to raise the surface above the level of the water.
■6. Adverse possession of land covered by water, which is the subject of private ownership, may be acquired by any means which actually and notoriously exclude the true owner therefrom, effectually disseising him thereof. Other means than physical exclusion by residence thereon or by inclosing the same will accomplish it.
'7. The mere ownership of the shore, where title stops at the water’s edge by reason of the public character of such water, does not entitle one to maintain ejectment to obtain possession of land beyond the water’s edge.
8. Private interests in land, if there be any below the line of ordinary high-water mark of public waters, is prima faoie incident to the ownership of the shore, and if title to the latter be divested from one by adverse possession, the interests which are incidental thereto pass with it.
•On. motion for rehearing:
9. A prima faoie paper title in plaintiff, established in an action of ejectment, does not entitle him to recover as a matter of law in the face of evidence tending to show that the premises in controversy are not subject to private ownership because of being part of the bed of a lake.
10. Though the government survey and plat of premises in controversy shows them to be upland,' and the mapping thereof into lots and blocks by a person claiming to be the owner indicates the same, the physical situation, as to whether such premises are or are not. a part of' the bed of a lake, will prevail.
11. It is not necessary that a particular locality should be wholly covered by water constantly, or be covered sufficiently to be susceptible of navigation, to give thereto the character of a lake bed as regards title thereto. If-a body of water is not a river, yet is reasonably constant in character, it is a pond or lake, and the limits thereof are the natural shore though water does not constantly stand at that point.
12. If a plaintiff in ejectment establishes prima facie paper title to the locus in quo, he is not entitled to recover as a matter of law in the face of evidence tending to show that the premises are submerged by water and are appurtenant to a shore the title to which has been divested from the true owner, so called, by adverse possession.
13. The elements of actual possession necessary to draw to it constructive possession, when an adverse claim to real estate is founded on color of title under sec. 4211, Stats. 1898, are the same as actual occupancy under sec. 4213, as construed by sec. 4214, though the evidence deemed sufficient to establish occupancy under the latter sections may not be so deemed under the former, the circumstance of color of title being of itself significant as to the nature of the possession.
14. The only substantial difference between adverse possession under sec. 4211, Stats. 1898, and such possession under sec. 4214, is that, under the former actual possession is extended by construction to the limits of the land described in the paper conveyance or judgment constituting the basis of color of title, while under the latter the adverse claim is limited by the actual adverse occupancy.
15. When unexplained actual occupancy for the requisite length of time has been clearly established, either under sec. 4211, Stats. 1898, or ' secs. 4213, 4214, the presumption of seisin in the true owner within such time disappears, and the presumption that the requisites of adverse possession have been complied with by the occupant arises under sec. 4210.
16. No particular kind of inclosure, nor any inclosure, is required to establish adverse possession as a matter of fact under sec. 4214, Stats. 1898; but if such an inclosure is relied upon to establish such possession as a matter of law, it must be of a substantial character, though not necessarily artificial, so as to be effective as a protec tion against outside interference in adapting tlie premises to some suitable use.
17. If a usual improvement is relied upon to establish adverse possession, an inclosure of any .character, partly or wholly marking the boundary claimed, or any other method of clearly defining such boundary, accompanied with circumstances satisfactory to a jury to establish the essential facts, is sufficient.
18. A usual improvement, within the meaning of sec. 4214, Stats. 1898, does not require improvement of the land in value, but any actual use thereof to which it is adapted and to which the owner or one claiming to be the owner might reasonably devote it. Occupation of a locality for a burial lot, or some other purpose that would partially or wholly destroy its value, may he as effective an improvement as any other, according to the circumstances.
19. What will constitute actual possession in the sense of being a usual improvement of real estate within the meaning of sec. 4214, Stats. 1898, varies according to the character of the land, its location, . and all circumstances bearing on the question. That there must he a usual improvement, where that is relied upon, is a matter of law; what is such an improvement is a matter of fact.
20. Continued, exclusive, notorious use of premises covered by water for the purpose of hunting and fishing, with other circumstances, may tend to establish adverse occupancy so as to cany a case to the jury, under proper instructions, to say whether there was such an occupancy as to constitute disseisin of the true owner.
21. Actual occupancy of premises, so as to indicate at every instant of time, by mere observation, the extent of the hostile use, is not necessary to satisfy sec. 4214, Stats. 1898. It need be only such continuous, exclusive, hostile use as in the judgment of the jury, under all the circumstances, is sufficient to notify the true owner, actually or constructively, of the invasion of his rights and the actual extent thereof.
[Syllabus by MARSHALL, J.]
Appeal from a judgment of the superior court of Milwaukee county: J. C.' Lijdwig, Judge.
Reversed.
Action in ejectment. The complaint was in the usual form. The answer contained a plea of the twenty-year statute of limitations. Sec. 4207, Stats. 1898. The defense thus pleaded was the one relied upon on the trial. To maintain plaintiff’s case evidence was produced showing jprwna facie record title in itself of a portion of two lots in fractional section 33, township 7, range 22 E., and competent evidence that such portion includes the premises in dispute.
The evidence on the part of defendants was to the following effect. In 1812, theretofore, and thereafter, except, as artificially changed, the territory called “Jones Island,1” which includes the premises in controversy, was covered by the waters of Lake Michigan. The water was quite shallow in many places and in others was as much as nine feet deep. A man by the name of Truher, at the time specifically-stated, had a house on the submerged territory, supported in some way in the shallows or resting on a piece of made-land. Just how that was does not cleárly appear. He pretended to exercise dominion over the entire territory, and, so pretending, he prevented any person from locating thereon without his permission. He sold his house and claim of title to one Jacob Muza in 1872, making no paper-transfer of the property, however. There were then about nine settlers on the island. He made a verbal transfer of the house and authorized his grantee thereof to exercise the same control that he had over the entire territory. Muza took possession of the house and such possession of the territory as was practicable under the circumstances, and continuously thereafter asserted dominion over the same, and enforced his claims by preventing any person, from locating thereon without his permission. Evidence was given showing the .precise condition of the territory in 1872, theretofore, and thereafter,' except as artificially-changed, as follows:
Muza testified that when Truher gave him the property it was all submerged by water and mud as deep as over his head; that when he gave defendant permission to locate, the particular place allotted to .him was covered by water-so that it was of no use until artificially raised above the-level of the water. A witness, Jones, testified that the en tire territory was covered by water in 1855; that sail 'and fishing boats used to go right through what is now the center of the island; that it was all submerged with water, but that it was deeper sometimes than at others. One Zelin testified that the premises claimed by defendant, before they were filled, were covered with water from four to eight feet deep; that defendant was three or four years filling up the property, and that some paft of the territory is still covered by water. Witness Kunka testified that he built a house on the island, by permission of Muza, in 1872; that he bought thirty feet from Muza’s house; that the'whole territory was then covered with water from four to ten feet deep; that it was all marsh and water till filled. Defendant testifies that Muza pointed out to him the place which he might occupy, and that he commenced filling up some thirteen years before the commencement of the action; that when he commenced to make the fill it was all covered with water to a depth of several feet; that he got a small piece of filled territory of one Zelin, and that he worked out from that in filling what Muza permitted him to occupy; that he commenced filling his lot as soon as he got permission from Muza, and soon after built a house thereon, which he occupied thereafter all of the time down to the commencement of the action.
At the close of the evidence the court directed- a verdict in plaintiff’s favor in accordance with the prayer of the complaint. A judgment was accordingly entered establishing title in fee to the property in plaintiff, with all the incidents of such a title, and according to the statute in such cases.
Eor the appellants there was a brief by Fiebiny & Killi-lea and M. C. Krause, and oral argument by O. J. Fiebiny.
For the respondent there was a brief Van DyTce & Vam, DyTce db Carter, and oral argument by W. F. Carter.
To the point that adverse possession was not established, they cited St. Croix L. & L. Co. v. Ritehie, 78 Wis. 492; Ta/ylor v. Rountree, 28 Wis. 391; Ladd v. Hildebramt, 27 Wis. 135; Austin v. Holt, 32 Wis. 478; Mission of the I. V. v. Cronin, 143 N. T. 524; Wheeler v. Sainóla, 54 N. Y. 377; Thompson v. Burhans, 61 N. Y. 52; Miller v. Long Island R. Co. 71 N. Y. 380; Thompson v. Burhans, 79 N. Y. 93; Anderson, Law Diet. Impeove and ImprovedLaNds; Cent. Diet.; Bartlett, Diet, of Americanisms, 309, 310; Webst. Diet.; 10 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, 241, 242; Ross v. Smith, 1 Barn. & Adol. 911; Cla/rk v. Phelps, 4' Cow. 190; Newell, Ejectment, 697, sec. 1; id. 707, sec. 10; id. 715, 716, sec. 20; Wood, Limitations, §§ 257-259; Price v. Brown, 101 N. Y. 669; Ely v. Brown, 183 Ill. 525; Roberts v. Baumgarten, 1Í0 N. Y. 380; Roe v. Strong, 119 N. Y. 322; Jaclcson v. Wood-ruff, 1 Cow. 277; Jaeleson v. Schoonmdker, 2 Johns. 230; Barr v. Potter, 57 Ky. 478.

Opinion:
The following opinion was filed January 8, 1901:
Marshall, J.
We understand the statement which appears in the record, as to the proof of title upon which plaintiff rested its claim and secured the judgment appealed from, to mean this: A record was exhibited which purported to show that the United States or the state of Wisconsin, most likely the former, prior to 1872, made a patent, in form conveying to private ownership a certain government subdivision of land within and according to the public land survey; that such title as was thus acquired was by mesne conveyances vested in plaintiff before the commencement of this action; and that the premises in controversy are within the boundaries, of such government subdivision according to such survey. That proof made out a prima facie title. The case seems to have been tried and decided upon the theory that it was sufficient to entitle plaintiff to recover unless defendants were able to show a better title by adverse possession.
The learned counsel for respondent, evidently assuming that the actual possession of lands submerged by water, necessary to satisfy the requisites of adverse possession so as to gain title in that way, is difficult if not impossible, encouraged defendants' witnesses to make it appear as clearly as possible that when the adverse possession in controversy commenced, and for a long time thereafter reaching up to within about thirteen years of the time of the commencement of the action, the particular land in question was covered by water from three to nine feet deep; that such was its condition when appellants took possession thereof; and that there had been no change in that regard except by .artificial filling.
There is evidence tending to show that there was some dry land within the territory over which Muza assumed dominion in 1872. But the indications are that the greater - part of such territory was then covered by the waters of Lake Michigan or of an arm of the lake partaking of its character, or by some expanse of water governed'by the law relating to the title to the beds of lakes and ponds, and that "the premises in question were formerly a part of .such submerged land. Now, if such indicated facts are the truth of the matter, the land belongs to. the state of "Wisconsin regardless of whether the United States or the state has in form transferred it to private ownership. The law in that regard is too well settled to warrant any discussion of it here. This court has been over the whole subject many times in recent years. The title to the beds of all lakes and ponds, and of rivers navigable in fact as well, up to the line •of ordinary high-water mark, within the boundaries of the state', became vested in it at the instant of its admission into the Union, in trust to hold the same so as to preserve to the people forever the enjoyment of the waters of such lakes, ponds, and rivers, to the same extent that the public are entitled to enjoy tidal waters at the common law. , A patent from the United States, so far as it purports to cover any of such lands, whether made before the state was admitted into the Union or thereafter, is ineffectual. It has been so repeatedly held. A government patent of land bordering on a lake or pond, regardless of the boundaries thereof according to the government survey, does not convey title to the lands below the line of ordinary high-water mark. The United States never had title, in the Northwest Territory out of which this state was carved, to the beds of lakes, ponds, and navigable rivers, except in trust for public purposes ; and its trust in that regard was transferred to the state, and must there continue forever, so far as necessary to the enjoyment thereof by the people of this commonwealth. Whatever concession the state may make without violating the essentials of the trust, it has been held, can properly be made to riparian proprietors. Under that, by long-established judicial policy, which has become a rule of property, a qualified title to submerged lands of rivers-navigable in fact has been conceded to the owners of the shores. Otherwise the title to lands under all public waters is in'the state, and it is powerless to change it'. It cannot transfer such title by grant or otherwise, nor can title thereto' be obtained by adverse possession, at least unless such adverse possession shall continue for the term of forty years. Hence we must presume from the evidence that the title to the land in dispute is where the evidence tends to show it is. We should say in passing that the term " qualified title " as above used refers to that interest in the beds of navigable streams-which has passed to private ownership according to the uniform holdings of this court,— a full title, subject to the public rights which were incident to the lands forming such beds at the time of the creation of the trust above mentioned. No private ownership has been conceded which displaces or materially affects such public rights. As to them the state has not abdicated and cannot abdicate its trust.
There is no need of enlarging on this matter. As before indicated, this court has in recent years several times declared the law as here stated, grounding such declaration upon indisputable principles and the law as laid down on the subject by the supreme court of the United States. McLennan v. Prentice, 85 Wis. 427; Priewe v. Wis. State L. & I. Co. 93 Wis. 534; Ne-pee-nauk Club v. Wilson, 96 Wis. 290; Willow River Club v. Wade, 100 Wis. 86; Pewaukee v. Savoy, 103 Wis. 271; Barney v. Keokuk, 94 U. S. 324; Railroad Co. v. Schurmeir, 7 Wall. 272; Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U. S. 387; Yates v. Milwaukee, 10 Wall. 497.
So plaintiff's prima faeie title was overcome-by the evidence tending to show that the premises in question were naturally a part of the bed of Lake Michigan, or some arm or bay thereof, .or some body of water having the incidents, of a lake; and the verdict should not have been directed in plaintiff's favor. If the fact be that sucb is the natural character of the land, plaintiff cannot maintain ejectment therefor in any event, even if it shall establish ownership of the natural shore, though, of course, in such circumstance, it would not be without remedy for any wrong to it not common to the public. Austin v. Rutland R. Co. 45 Vt. 215; Coburn v. Ames, 52 Cal. 385; Gray v. Bartlett, 20 Pick. 186; Stockham v. Browning, 18 N. J. Eq. 390.
What has been said regarding plaintiff's title requires a reversal of the judgment in any event, for it can only recover on the strength of its own title, not on the weakness of Bilot's. However, it is deemed best to correct some. erroneous ideas that seem to have influenced the direction of the verdict as bearing on appellant's claim of title. If it shall finally turn out that the premises in question were not originally a part of the bed of Lake Michigan, nor of any expanse of water partaking of the character of a lake a,s regards the title to the bed thereof, but were part of the bed of navigable waters of such a character that a qualified title thereto passed to the owner of the shore as an incidentthereof, then they are subject to the law of adverse possession. And if in such circumstances Muza, under whom Bilot claims, maintained from 1872 until Bilot took possession of the premises a condition which disseised .the true owner, and Bilot continued that condition so as to cover the full period of twenty yea^s, his title is governed by the principles declared in Illinois S. Co. v. Budzisz, 106 Wis. 499, and the settled law on the subject.
It is not true, as seems to have been supposed, that adverse possession of the premises was impossible while they were covered by water. Notwithstanding' such condition the true owner may have been disseised, and that was all that was necessary to start the limitation period running. Any act or acts sufficient to destroy the true owner's dominion over the property, whatever its character, is a dis-seisin, within the meaning of the limitation statute. 3 Washb. Real Prop. *495. Physical exclusion by an inclosure' of the property of some kind is by no means necessary; neither are the requisites of sec. 4212, Stats. 1898, essential. Wilson v. Henry, 40 Wis. 594; Lampman v. Van Alstyne, 94 Wis. 417. It has been held that evidence of the mere taking of seaweed to the exclusion of all others is sufficient proof of disseisin to carry a case to the jury on that subject. Hast Hampton v. Kirk, 84 N. Y. 215. Actual, visible, hostile appropriation of the premises to the exclusion of the true owner in any way satisfies all the requisites of disseisin, and that condition may be created by any means that entirely exclude the true owner from the property. It does not require constant residence of the appropriator on the property. Private interest in submerged land of the character we are discussing, prima facie at least, exists only as an incident of title to the bank or shore. He who is in. actual possession of that is constructively in possession of everything that is incident thereto. If possession of the former ripens into title, the title to the latter goes with it. Gould, "Waters, § 3Y, and cases cited in the notes.
Applying the principles last stated to the evidence as to defendants' title, it is easily seen that the case in that respect should have been submitted to the jury even upon the trial court's theory as to plaintiff's title. There was evidence tending to show that for more than twenty years before the commencement of this action the person holding prima faoie government title had been, in the right now claimed by Biloi, disseised thereof. There is evidence tending to show that Muza, from 1872 till Bilot commenced the artificial change of the property, exercised such dominion over the same as to prevent any person from enjoying it in any way except by his permission. Such evidence ténds to show more than a mere claim of dominion. That clearly would be insufficient. It shows .that there were physical acts of prohibition, so that Muza's claim was notorious, recognized, and submitted to, and that such acts were accompanied by actual occupation and enjoyment of the beach or dry land adjoining, if -there was any. In the face of such evidence, plaintiff was not, in any phase of the case, entitled to the direction of a verdict, but the cause should have been submitted to the jury under proper instructions.
It is hoped that on the next trial of this case all the facts will be clearly brought out in the light of all the legal principles applicable thereto, and that such principles will be kept clearly in view; also that the precise location of the property in dispute will be shown, so that it can be identified with reference to the original shore line and the present shore line. That there was a failure, upon the trial we have reviewed, in respect to the matters referred to, is most clear. That has rendered it impracticable for us to lay out a definite line for future guidance in the case. The assumption that plaintiff's' title was good originally, merely because it came from the government, and the assumption that, merely be cause the land was submerged, it could not be held adversely, and the further assumption that actual possession was necessary independent of actual possession of the shore, all seem to have had influence with the trial court.
By the Oourt.— The judgment of the superior court is reversed, and the cause remanded for a new trial.
BaRdeeN, J., took no part.