Case Name: COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY, Appellant, v. Steve PLOWMAN, Appellee
Court: Supreme Court of Kentucky
Jurisdiction: Kentucky
Decision Date: 2002-09-26
Citations: 86 S.W.3d 47
Docket Number: No. 2001-SC-0478-DG
Parties: COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY, Appellant, v. Steve PLOWMAN, Appellee.
Judges: LAMBERT, C.J., GRAVES and JOHNSTONE, JJ., concur.
Reporter: South Western Reporter Third Series
Volume: 86
Pages: 47–54

Head Matter:
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY, Appellant, v. Steve PLOWMAN, Appellee.
No. 2001-SC-0478-DG.
Supreme Court of Kentucky.
Sept. 26, 2002.
A.B. Chandler III, Attorney General, Vickie L. Wise, Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Appellate Division, Frankfort, Counsel for Appellant.
Elizabeth Shaw, Richmond, Counsel for Appellee.

Opinion:
WINTERSHEIMER, Justice.
This appeal is from an opinion of the Court of Appeals affirming an order of the Estill Circuit Court which dismissed a criminal indictment charging Plowman with second-degree arson.
The sole question is whether a bulldozer is a vehicle for purposes of the arson statutes, KRS 513.010 et seq.
Plowman was indicted for second-degree arson. The indictment charged that he started a fire with the intent to destroy or damage a bulldozer owned by another, contrary to KRS 513.030. After hearing oral arguments, the circuit judge granted the pre-trial motion by Plowman to dismiss the indictment. The circuit judge examined the plain meaning of the words "bulldozer" and "vehicle," and held that the bulldozer involved in the charge was not a vehicle covered by the arson statute. The Court of Appeals affirmed for the same reason but also found that the policy and purpose of the statutes as well as the doctrine of ejusdem generis supported the conclusion of the circuit judge. This Court granted discretionary review.
It is well settled that the interpretation of a statute is a matter of law. Accordingly, a reviewing court is not required to adopt the decisions of the trial court as to a matter of law, but must interpret the statute according to the plain meaning of the act and in accordance with the legislative intent. Commonwealth v. Montague, Ky., 23 S.W.3d 629 (2000). The seminal duty of a court in construing a statute is to effectuate the intent of the legislature. Commonwealth v. Harrelson, Ky., 14 S.W.3d 541 (2000).
KRS 513.030 defines second-degree arson as follows:
(1) A person is guilty of arson in the second degree when he starts a fire or causes an explosion with intent to destroy or damage a building:
(a) Of another; or
(b) Of his own or of another, to collect or facilitate the collection of insurance proceeds for such loss.
(2) In any prosecution under this section, it is a defense that:
(a) No person other than the defendant had a possessory or proprietary interest in the building, or, if other persons had such an interest, all of them consented to the defendant's conduct; and
(b) The defendant's sole intent was to destroy or damage the building for a lawful purpose.
(3) Arson in the second degree is a Class B felony.
KRS 513.010 provides for the following definition of building:
"Building," in addition to its ordinary meaning, specifically includes any dwelling, hotel, commercial structure, automobile, truck, watercraft, aircraft, trailer, sleeping car, railroad car, or other structure or vehicle, or any structure with a valid certificate of occupancy.
An unambiguous statute is to be applied without resort to any outside aids. Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Commonwealth, Revenue Cabinet, Ky., 689 S.W.2d 14 (1985). See also Gateway Construction Co. v. Wallbaum, Ky., 356 S.W.2d 247 (1962). This Court has repeatedly held that statutes must be given a literal interpretation unless they are ambiguous and if the words are not ambiguous, no statutory construction is required. See McCracken County Fiscal Court v. Graves, Ky., 885 S.W.2d 307 (1994); Commonwealth v. Shivley, Ky, 814 S.W.2d 572 (1991). KRS 446.080 provides for a liberal construction of statutes with the view to promote their objects and to carry out the intent of the legislature. All words and phrases shall be construed according to the common and approved usage of language. Cf 446.080(4). Here, the language of KRS 513.010 is clear and unambiguous when considered in its expansive content and no further interpretation is required. Although dictionary definitions can sometimes offer guidance as to statutory construction, they are not conclusive. The predominant element is the legislative intent.
We find the concurring opinion of Judge Paul Gudgel in Commonwealth v. Cross, Ky.App, 769 S.W.2d 63 (1988), particularly illustrative of the proper approach in this case.
KRS 513.010, as originally enacted in 1974, defined a "building" for purposes of the arson statutes as including, in addition to the ordinary meaning, the following property:
. structure, vehicle, watercraft or aircraft:
(a) Where any person lives; or
(b) Where people assemble for purposes of business, government, education, religion, entertainment or public transportation; or
(c) Which is used for overnight accommodation of persons.
In 1982, the legislature amended this definitional statute to provide for the current definition as set out previously in this opinion. The amended statute expanded the types of vehicles qualifying as "buildings" for purposes of the arson statutes by deleting the requirement that any such vehicle be used as a residence, meeting place or for overnight accommodation. Clearly, the legislature intended for the word building to be interpreted with an expansive view.
It is also clear that the 1982 amendment by the legislature has almost completely changed the arson statutes. For that reason, it was improper in this case for the Court of Appeals to rely on the 1974 commentary to the arson statutes to interpret its policy and purpose. The definitional statute does not place a limitation on the purpose for which the vehicle is used in order to determine if the conveyance is a vehicle.
The defining statute of the 1974 law considered arson as more of an offense against person than property. In the 1982 version of the arson law, there is not even a reference to "places where people live or assemble" as contrasted with the 1974 law. Cf. Lawson & Fortune, Kentucky Criminal Law § 12-16 (1998).
It is totally unnecessary to employ the doctrine of ejusdem generis, which is a Latin phrase indicating the same kind or class. The phrase is used as a tool of construction when a general word or phrase follows a list of specific persons or things. The general word or phrase will be interpreted to include only persons or things of the same type 'of those listed. Here, the statute in question has been legislatively expanded to include "or other structure or vehicle." The intent of the General Assembly is clear.
After considering both the plain meaning of the words and the legislative intent, we must conclude that the interpretations of the Court of Appeals and the circuit judge were in error. As a matter of law, we hold that a bulldozer is a "vehicle" within the definition of a "building" under KRS 513.010 for purposes of the arson statutes.
It is the decision of this Court that the word "vehicle" as used in KRS 513.010 and the arson statutes, includes "bulldozer." The opinion of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and this case is remanded to the circuit court in order to reinstate the indictment.
LAMBERT, C.J., GRAVES and JOHNSTONE, JJ., concur.
KELLER, J., dissents by separate opinion joined by COOPER and STUMBO, JJ.