Case Name: In re MARRIAGE OF Danny Keith BARTON and Kay Lynne Barton, Danny Keith Barton, Petitioner-Appellant/Cross-Respondent, and Kay Lynne Barton, Respondent-Respondent/Cross-Appellant
Court: Missouri Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Missouri
Decision Date: 2005-03-31
Citations: 158 S.W.3d 879
Docket Number: Nos. 25773, 25783
Parties: In re MARRIAGE OF Danny Keith BARTON and Kay Lynne Barton, Danny Keith Barton, Petitioner-Appellant/Cross-Respondent, and Kay Lynne Barton, Respondent-Respondent/Cross-Appellant.
Judges: RAHMEYER, J., concurs.
Reporter: South Western Reporter Third Series
Volume: 158
Pages: 879–901

Head Matter:
In re MARRIAGE OF Danny Keith BARTON and Kay Lynne Barton, Danny Keith Barton, Petitioner-Appellant/Cross-Respondent, and Kay Lynne Barton, Respondent-Respondent/Cross-Appellant.
Nos. 25773, 25783.
Missouri Court of Appeals, Southern District, Division One.
March 31, 2005.
Steven Privette, Willow Springs, MO, for appellant.
David G. Neal, Neal Law Firm, Eminence, MO, for respondent.

Opinion:
JAMES K. PREWITT, Judge.
The trial court dissolved the marriage of Danny Keith Barton ("Father") and Kay Lynne Barton ("Mother") and granted the parties joint legal custody of their two children, with Father awarded primary physical custody of the oldest son, Broc, born August 27, 1986, and Mother awarded primary physical custody of the youngest son, Blaz, born September 18, 1993. Father appeals the trial court's decision to split custody of the two children and the resulting "restrictive" visitation. Mother cross-appeals with four points relied on, one of which contends that the trial court erred in awarding Father principal custody of Broc. Her other issues are related to the property distribution and the trial court's alleged failure to order sanctions for Father's discovery violations.
Facts
Father and Mother were married on November 26, 1984, in Oregon County, Missouri. Broc and Blaz were the only children born of the marriage. The couple separated in January, 2001, and Father filed his petition for dissolution on January 24, 2001. Mother filed her answer and counter-petition on February 5, 2001.
On February 2, 2001, the trial court entered an order enjoining the parties from selling, transferring, disposing, destroying, or otherwise encumbering any marital assets. The order specifically directed that Mother not attempt to access the contents of any safety deposit boxes held in her name until an inventory of the contents could take place. Inventory orders for two separate safety deposit boxes were entered March 20, 2001, and April 30, 2001, respectively.
On August 24, 2001, the trial court entered a temporary custody order, awarding Father primary custody of Blaz and Mother primary custody of Broc on a Sunday-through-Friday schedule. The order also specified that Father and Mother would have custody of both children on alternating weekends. The temporary order was modified on November 30, 2001, to allow Mother additional time during the holidays with Blaz.
The hearing on the dissolution was held during October, November, and December of 2002. Following the denial of Father's motion to re-open the case for further evidence, the trial court issued its judgment for dissolution of marriage on June 16, 2003. Father and Mother were granted joint legal custody of their two children, with Father awarded primary physical custody of Broc and Mother awarded primary physical custody of Blaz. The judgment also included a child visitation schedule (detailed through 2011) for the dates "[t]he non-custodial parent shall have visitation with the child that is in the custody of the other parent[.]" The trial court found the annual income of Father and Mother to be "essentially equal," and neither party was awarded child support (or maintenance), and each was required to pay one-half of the children's medical insurance.
Throughout the course of the proceedings, each party filed various motions alleging discovery violations. The judgment made reference to rulings on three such motions that were pending. The first motion was a motion for sanctions filed by Mother on December 18, 2001, in which she complained that Father had not fully complied with all discovery requests. That motion was sustained on June 7, 2002, and the order provided that Father's pleadings were to be stricken if full compliance was not achieved in twenty days. Although full compliance did not occur within twenty days, the trial court set aside its order for sanctions on October 24, 2002, which, according to the trial court, left Mother's original motion for sanctions without final resolution. Based on the proceedings, the trial court determined that Father purposely failed to comply with Mother's discovery requests. Therefore, the court sustained Mother's motion, but decided it would not strike Father's pleadings or enter judgment by default. Rather, the court indicated "an adverse evidentiary inference" would be assigned to Father in terms of the property and debt distribution.
The second and third motions referenced in the judgment were both filed by Father on September 9, 2002. On that date, Father filed a motion for sanctions and a motion for contempt, both of which made the same allegations with regard to alleged discovery violations by Mother. The trial court denied both motions, finding them to be without merit. According to the court, Mother's "discovery responses were sent to [Father's] counsel within a reasonable time and since then she has made a practice of updating her discovery response to keep the information requested as current as possible."
Regarding the property distribution, Father was awarded two of three tracts of marital real estate, and Mother was awarded one tract, which was the marital home. Combining the real estate and personal property, but subtracting any debt assigned, Father was awarded assets of approximately $201,063. Mother, using similar calculations, was awarded assets valued at approximately $287,279, of which $181,100 was non-marital property. The value of Mother's marital property was $156,179.
This appeal follows. Additional facts necessary to the disposition of the points raised by Father and Mother will be presented in the discussion below.
Discussion
Father raises two points, and Mother raises four points in her cross-appeal. We will address them in the order presented. Father's Point I — No exceptional circumstances to justify split custody of the children
In his first point, Father contends that the trial court erred in splitting custody of the children by placing one child (Broc) with Father and the other child (Blaz) with Mother. According to Father, there were no exceptional circumstances to justify such a custody arrangement.
In its judgment, the trial court noted the following:
Each party requests that he or she be awarded the primary physical custody of the children. The Court must, therefore, according to Section 452.375.6 RSMo 2000, consider and weigh the nonexclusive factors set forth therein:
(1) Each parent believes they should have primary physical custody of the children, but because it is not possible to accommodate the wishes of both, the Court must decide which parent is best suited to raise the children. The Court, after carefully weighing the evidence, determines that [Mother] should have custody of [Blaz] and [Father] should have custody of [Broc] subject to the Child Visitation Schedule attached, which schedule is incorporated herein by reference.
(2) Considering the close proximity of the physical addresses of the parties and the willingness of the parents to participate in assuring that the children will have meaningful contact with each parent and the other sibling the order of the Court is appropriate.
(3) There have been episodes of marital conflict of varying nature during the marriage which conduct is condoned by the parties by the passage of time.
Appellate courts afford greater deference to a trial court's determination of child custody than in any other type of case. Tracy v. Tracy, 961 S.W.2d 855, 859 (Mo.App.1998). We will not interfere with the trial court's determination unless a child's welfare compels us to do so, and we may not substitute our judgment for that of the trial court so long as credible evidence supports the trial court's award. Cross v. Cross, 30 S.W.3d 233, 235 (Mo.App.2000). The trial court is vested with broad discretion in determining child custody and our principal concern is the same as the trial court's in awarding custody, in that the decision should be made in the best interests of the children. Tracy, 961 S.W.2d at 858-59.
Father is correct that, absent exceptional or unusual circumstances, Missouri courts do not support the separation of siblings or split custody. Nichols v. Beran, 980 S.W.2d 342, 348 (Mo.App.1998). However, it is also well established that the trial court has the authority to order such a custody arrangement if it is in the best interests of the children. In re Marriage of Newberry, 745 S.W.2d 796, 797 (Mo.App.1988). There is no absolute set of rules to follow when awarding child custody; each case must be examined in light of its own set of unique facts. Replogle v. Replogle, 903 S.W.2d 551, 554 (Mo. App.1995).
A split custody award assumes that both parents are "fit parents." Capehart v. Capehart, 110 S.W.3d 920, 923 (Mo.App. 2003). If either parent was unfit, the trial court would not have awarded primary physical custody of any of the children to that parent. Id. In the case before us, the testimony at trial provides a basis for a determination that both parents were fit. Nearly all witnesses, whether they were called by Father or Mother, testified that both parents were good parents. Any particular witness might testify that one parent was somewhat better than the other or that one parent had provided more overall care for the children, but there was not one witness that was able to conclude that either parent was unfit.
Under the temporary custody award, Father was awarded primary custody of Blaz and Mother was awarded primary custody of Broc. However, in the final judgment, the custody arrangement was switched, and Father awarded primary physical custody of Broc, and Mother primary physical custody of Blaz. At trial, there was much testimony that Mother and Broc had developed a cantankerous relationship and that Broc, sixteen years old at the time of trial, was having some difficulty living under Mother's roof and rules.
There was testimony that a couple of weeks before the trial began, Mother and Broc had argued about the amount of time Broc was spending at activities outside the home. Part of the discussion was also about Broc's overall attitude and anger. Broc left and walked to his Father's home, but prior to leaving he slammed a door with enough force that a mirror fell off the wall in Mother's beauty salon, which is attached to Mother's home, the marital residence. During the argument, Mother admitted to placing her hand on Broc's shoulders and pushing him toward the salon where he had knocked down the mirror.
Broc went to Father's home and did not return for four days, which, according to Mother, was a violation of the temporary custody order that was allowed by Father, as he refused to return Broc to her home. Father admitted that he did not consider it a good idea for Broc to return to Mother's home that evening because Broc was so upset, but that only the first night was a technical violation of the temporary order, because Broc was scheduled to stay with Father that weekend.
During the trial Broc was interviewed by the court, and Broc indicated there was a lot of tension between him and Mother. With respect to the relationship with his brother Blaz, Broc noted that they had a good relationship and that he might enjoy seeing Blaz more, but then also noted that the two "really get at each other" if together too much. Broc agreed with the trial judge that, given the seven-year age difference and the activities associated with someone Broc's age, Broc would not likely spend much time with his younger brother even if they did live in the same household. During the court's interview, Broc did not state a preference for living with Father or Mother.
In a hearing held on February 10, 2003, on Father's motion to re-open for additional evidence, Broc was questioned by counsel for both Father and Mother. Broc spoke about fighting with Mother on a daily basis and that it had become very stressful for both him and Mother for him to live with her. Broc also indicated that the stress affected his relationship with Blaz, in that, according to Broc, Mother did not treat Blaz as she treats Broc. Two or three weeks prior to the hearing, Broc had "basically moved in with [Father]" and was spending a little time with Mother on the weekends, which Broc understood was in violation of the temporary order. Broc told the court that he now would rather live with Father.
Mother and Father also testified at the hearing, with Mother expressing that she was upset that Broc is allowed to use a car while at Father's house. Father testified that he used the car for work because his pickup had over 200,000 miles on it and that, although the 1994 vehicle may be considered Broc's someday, the pickup was Broc's to drive, and it was the only vehicle on which Broc was listed as a driver for insurance purposes. As part of her testimony, Mother admitted that Broc told her that he wanted to live with Father. After hearing the testimony, the court determined that there was not enough evidence to support Father's motion to re-open the case for additional evidence and thus, the motion was denied.
At the trial proceedings in the fall of 2002, the testimony regarding Mother's interaction with Blaz was that the two of them have a very close relationship. Blaz' first-, second-, and third-grade teachers all testified that Blaz was always happy to see Mother when she would come to school on Mondays to check on his academic progress and when she would come to school on Wednesdays to share lunch with him, an arrangement based on the temporary custody order under which Blaz lived with Father during the week. Blaz' teachers also testified that Blaz was an excellent student, with an A average. Blaz, according to his teachers, always appeared well-adjusted, clean, and well-rested.
Given the overall facts and circumstances of the case, and the testimony at trial, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in determining that a split custody arrangement was in the best interests of the children. Father's Point I is denied.
Father's Point II — Custody award included restrictive visitation arrangement
In his second point, Father argues that the trial court erred by restricting Father and Mother's visitation with both children to alternating weekend visitation and one week in the summer. According to Father, this restrictive visitation arrangement denies the non-custodial parent and the sibling "frequent, continuing and meaningful contact" with the other child. Father suggests that adding an overnight stay during the midweek to the non-custodial parent would alleviate his concern.
In the argument portion of this point, Father contends that the trial court's alleged error here was actually that it failed to make requisite findings under § 452.375, RSMo 2000. Specifically, Father indicates that the trial court failed to make written findings specified by § 452.375.4, RSMo 2000, and § 452.375.6, RSMo 2000. Section 452.375.4, RSMo 2000, states:
The general assembly finds and declares that it is the public policy of this state that frequent, continuing and meaningful contact with both parents after the parents have separated or dissolved their marriage is in the best interest of the child, except for cases where the court specifically finds that such contact is not in the best interest of the child, and that it is the public policy of this state to encourage parents to participate in decisions affecting the health, education and welfare of their children, and to resolve disputes involving their children amicably through alternative dispute resolution. In order to effectuate these policies, the court shall determine the custody arrangement which will best assure both parents participate in such decisions and have frequent, continuing and meaningful contact with their children so long as it is in the best interests of the child.
Under § 452.375.6, RSMo 2000,
If the parties have not agreed to a custodial arrangement, or the court determines such arrangement is not in the best interest of a child, the court shall include a written finding in the judgment or order based on the public policy in subsection 4 of this section and each of the factors listed in subdivisions (1) to (8) of subsection 2 of this section detailing the specific relevant factors that made a particular arrangement in the best interest of the child. If a proposed custodial arrangement is rejected by the court, the court shall include a written finding in the judgment or order detailing the specific relevant factors resulting in the rejection of such arrangement.
The above section references subsection 4, but also the factors in subsection 2, § 452.375.2, RSMo 2000, which are as follows:
The court shall determine custody in accordance with the best interests of the child. The court shall consider all relevant factors including:
(1) The wishes of the child's parents as to custody and the proposed parenting plan submitted 'by both parties;
(2) The needs of the child for a frequent, continuing and meaningful relationship with both parents and the ability and willingness of parents to actively perform their functions as mother and father for the needs of the child;
(3) The interaction and interrelationship of the child with parents, siblings, and any other person who may significantly affect the child's best interests;
(4) Which parent is more likely to allow the child frequent, continuing and meaningful contact with the other parent;
(5) The child's adjustment to the child's home, school, and community;
(6) The mental and physical health of all individuals involved, including any history of abuse of any individuals involved. If the court finds that a pattern of domestic violence has occurred, and, if the court also finds that awarding custody to the abusive parent is in the best interest of the child, then the court shall enter written findings of fact and conclusions of law. Custody and visitation rights shall be ordered in a manner that best protects the child and the parent or other family or household member who is the victim of domestic violence from any further harm;
(7) The intention of either parent to relocate the principal residence of the child; and
(8) The wishes of a child as to the child's custodian.
As stated previously, the trial court noted the following in its judgment:
Each party requests that he or she be awarded the primary physical custody of the children. The Court must, therefore, according to Section 452.375.6 RSMo 2000, consider and weigh the nonexclusive factors set forth therein:
(1)Each parent believes they should have primary physical custody of the children, but because it is not possible to accommodate the wishes of both, the Court must decide which parent is best suited to raise the children. The Court, after carefully weighing the evidence, determines that [Mother] should have custody of [Blaz] and [Father] should have custody of [Broc] subject to the Child Visitation Schedule attached, which schedule is incorporated herein by reference.
(2) Considering the close proximity of the physical addresses of the parties and the willingness of the parents to participate in assuring that the children will have meaningful contact with each parent and the other sibling the order of the Court is appropriate.
(3) There have been episodes of marital conflict of varying nature during the marriage which conduct is condoned by the parties by the passage of time.
We agree with Mother that Father raises points in the argument section of his brief that are beyond the issues noted in the point relied on itself. The point relied on defines the scope of the issues raised for review on appeal, and our review is restricted to issues raised in the point relied on. Rea v. Moore, 74 S.W.3d 795, 799 (Mo.App.2002).
As noted in Point I, we cannot find that the trial court abused its discretion in determining that split custody was in the best interests of the children. We agree with Father, as was also indicated in the analysis of Point I, that the trial court at least implicitly found that both he and Mother are fit parents.
Given the circumstances of the case, if there was no abuse of discretion in the split custody award, we fail to see how the resulting visitation was necessarily re strictive since, as the court noted, "Mon-sidering the close proximity of the physical addresses of the parties and the willingness of the parents to participate in assuring that the children will have meaningful contact with each parent and the other sibling the order of the Court is appropriate." We agree that the custody and visitation arrangement was appropriate. Father's Point II is denied.
Mother's Point I — Award of $50,000 from safety deposit box to Mother in property distribution
In Mother's first point in her cross-appeal, she contends that the trial court erred in awarding to her $50,000 from a safety deposit box because those funds no longer existed on the last day of trial. According to Mother, she provided a full accounting for the manner in which she expended the funds, and the funds were spent on legitimate bills and expenses.
We will affirm the decision of the trial court in a dissolution case unless there is no substantial evidence to support it, it is against the weight of the evidence, it erroneously declares the law, or it erroneously applies the law. Wright v. Wright, 1 S.W.3d 52, 57 (Mo.App.1999). We will interfere with a trial court's division of property only if the division is so heavily and unduly weighted in favor of one party such that it amounts to an abuse of discretion. Barnes v. Barnes, 903 S.W.2d 211, 213 (Mo.App.1995). An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court's ruling is clearly against the logic of the circumstances before it and so arbitrary and unreasonable as to shock the sense of justice and indicate a lack of careful consideration. In re Marriage of Collins, 875 S.W.2d 643, 647 (Mo.App.1994). If reasonable persons can differ about the propriety of the trial court's actions, the trial court did not abuse its discretion. Wright, 1 S.W.3d at 57.
In terms of the proper date for valuation of property in a dissolution proceeding, the most appropriate date is considered to be the date of trial. Id. If the division of property is not in close proximity to the trial, the valuation date should be the date of the division of property. Id.
As noted earlier in this opinion, the trial court, following the filing of the petition for dissolution by Father, entered an order enjoining the parties from selling, transferring, disposing, destroying, or otherwise encumbering any marital assets. The order specifically directed that Mother not attempt to access the contents of any safety deposit boxes held in her name until an inventory of the contents could take place. Inventory orders for two separate safety deposit boxes were entered March 20, 2001, and April 30, 2001, respectively.
The box inventoried on March 20, 2001, is the one at issue here. That safety deposit box contained cash in the amount of $54,995, shares of Wal-Mart stock, and documentation related to the stock. According to the dissolution judgment, the trial court considered the cash amount inventoried at $55,000, with $50,000 awarded to Mother as part of the property distribution. All parties agree that Mother was ordered to give Father $5,000 from that amount for attorney fees.
The trial was held during the months of October, November, and December of 2002. During testimony in October 2002, Mother testified that there was approximately $10,000 left from the funds at that time, that $20,000 went to her attorney and another $20,000 went to pay bills left by Father. According to Mother, a large portion of this was to pay the mortgage for a house in Jonesboro, Arkansas the couple owned, although she admitted that the house was rented at some point and she received that income for at least part of the time period in question. Later in the trial, Mother testified there was $3,500 left, but by the last day of trial, her testimony was that the funds were completely depleted. She provided the court with documentation of the expenditures from the fund, but the ledger stops when the account had a balance of $18,000, and income generated, such as from the rental property, is not noted in the documentation.
Mother also testified regarding the beginnings of the safety deposit box, which she opened only in her name. The funds placed in the box were from what she earned from the beauty salon. Although the funds were from her earnings, she admitted that she underreported those earning to the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS"). For example, her income in 1998 was $29,463, but Mother only reported $13,559 to the IRS. In 1999, she earned a little over $27,000, but only reported $14,383. She admitted she knew the tax returns were false and were intentionally so, because she wanted more money in that safety deposit box. Mother also admitted that those false tax returns were among the documentation she provided to the court as part of the discovery process.
Mother draws our attention to § 452.315.2(1), RSMo 2000, which states:
As part of a motion for temporary maintenance or support by an independent motion accompanied by an affidavit, either party may request the court to issue an order after notice and hearing:
(1) Restraining any person from transferring, encumbering, concealing, or in any way disposing of any property except in the usual course of business or for the necessities of life and, if so restrained, requiring the person to notify the moving party of any proposed extraordinary expenditures and to account to the court for all extraordinary expenditures made after the order is issued[.]
Mother contends that all of her expenditures, except for some furniture she purchased, fell under the heading of "necessities of life."
The trial court is in a superior position to judge such factors as credibility, sincerity, and other intangibles that may not be revealed in the transcript. McCallum v. McCollum, 128 S.W.3d 62, 65-66 (Mo.App.2003). The trial court here was free to disbelieve Mother's accounting of the expenditures from this fund, particularly in light of its order enjoining her (as well as Father) from selling, transferring, disposing, destroying, or otherwise encumbering any marital assets. See id. at 68.
We cannot find here that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding the $50,000 to Mother as part of the property distribution even though she had apparently completely depleted those funds by the end of the trial. Mother's Point I is denied.
Mother's Point II — Error in setting aside the order for sanctions and not applying an adverse evidentiary inference in property distribution
In her second point, Mother contends that the trial court erred in setting aside its order for sanctions, which provided for the striking of Father's pleadings and for allowance for Mother to proceed in default. Mother alternatively asserts that, if the action setting aside the order for sanctions was not error, it was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to not follow through in its admonition of Father that the court would apply an adverse evidentiary inference to him in the determination of the division of property and debts.
The trial court's actions in setting aside the sanctions are reviewed for abuse of discretion, in that the trial court may exercise its discretion in determining its response to non-compliance with pre-trial discovery issues. Siller v. Rivituso-Siller, 129 S.W.3d 433, 436 (Mo.App.2004). In our review, we consider the totality of the circumstances and whether the challenged action resulted in prejudice or unfair surprise. Id.
Earlier we outlined the overall property distribution and repeat it here. Father was awarded two of three tracts of marital real estate, and Mother awarded one tract, which was the marital home. Combining the real estate and personal property, but subtracting any debt assigned, Father was awarded assets of approximately $201,063. Mother, using similar calculations, was awarded approximately $156,179 in marital property. Mother's property distribution included the $50,000 from the safety deposit box addressed in the previous point, which was considered marital property, and $131,100 (primarily Wal-Mart stock) that was considered non-marital property awarded to her.
The trial court indicated in its judgment that although it had set aside the sanctions, it would apply an adverse evidentia-ry inference in the property distribution. On balance, Mother received over $36,000 more in the property distribution, after accounting for the debt assigned to each party. It was not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to have considered that amount to represent the adverse evidentia-ry inference it chose to apply to Father. Given the totality of the circumstances, the trial court's actions did not result in prejudice or unfair surprise. Mother's Point II is denied.
Mother's Point III — Property division greatly favored Father
In her third point, Mother raises issues with the overall distribution of property and contends that the distribution greatly favors Father. Her overall complaint is a combination of several issues, including that the trial court erred by combining the value of Mother's marital and non-marital assets in making the property distribution and by including the $50,000 from the safety deposit box that had already been expended. The remainder of her point deals with valuations of certain property and that there was not sufficient evidence to support the valuations.
As previously noted, we will interfere with a trial court's division of property only if the division is so heavily and unduly weighted in favor of one party such that it amounts to an abuse of discretion. Barnes, 903 S.W.2d at 213. An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court's ruling is clearly against the logic of the circumstances before it and so arbitrary and unreasonable as to shock the sense of justice and indicates a lack of careful consideration. Collins, 875 S.W.2d at 647. If reasonable persons can differ about the propriety of the trial court's actions, the trial court did not abuse its discretion. Wright, 1 S.W.3d at 57. It is the duty of the trial court to consider the value of non-marital property to each spouse in its division of .marital property, as well as the economic circumstances of each spouse, the contribution of each spouse to the acquisition of property, the conduct of the parties, and custodial arrangement. Id. at 59.
First, any complaint Mother has in this point regarding the trial court's actions in awarding her the $50,000 from the safety deposit box has been addressed and will not be further discussed here. Second, as indicated in Wright, it is the trial court's duty to consider the value of non-marital property in the overall property distribution. Id. Thus, it was not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to take into account Mother's non-marital property, which consisted primarily of Wal-Mart stock worth $130,000 that had been kept in the safety deposit box with the $50,000 cash.
We next consider Mother's complaints regarding the trial court's valuation of Alton Farm Supply and the beauty salon, as well as the attribution of $20,000 of debt to Father that Mother contends lacked sufficient evidentiary support. Mother is correct that although the trial court has discretion in assigning valuations, evidence must exist to support such valuations. Wright, 1 S.W.3d at 57.
The trial court awarded Father Alton Farm Supply and valued it at $50,000, which was derived, according to the court, from a valuation of $100,000 less a business debt of $50,000. Alton Farm Supply was a business that Father and Mother had acquired from his parents. On his property distribution list submitted to the court, Father estimated the value of the business was $95,000. At trial, Father testified that the real estate was valued somewhere between $76,000 and $78,000, with a mortgage on the real estate in the $31,000 to $32,000 range. Father testified that the total debt for the real estate and lines of credit was $78,000. According to Father, the value of the business, above and beyond its debt, was $17,000. When the business was purchased, the couple paid $5,000 to purchase the goodwill of Alton Farm Supply. Thus, Father agreed that the goodwill of the business "approximately tripled."
The only evidence Father provided regarding inventory and equipment of the business was that when he and Mother purchased the business, the contract indicated that $31,500 was paid for inventory. An additional $3,000 was paid for equipment such as bins and bagging equipment, scales, and dollies. According to Father, his valuation of $95,000 for the business took into account not only the valuation of the real estate, but also "incorporate^] the existing inventory that is at the business[.]"
Mother testified that the total valuation was $192,485, when combining the real estate, inventory, equipment, and goodwill. She valued the real estate at $78,000, the inventory at $50,526.40, the equipment at $48,959, and the goodwill at $15,000. The inventory value was derived by taking the average inventory indicated on five years of tax returns. Mother's equipment value was based on the amount listed for equipment on a December 31,1999, statement of assets, liabilities, and capital. Mother provided no testimony regarding debt of the business, and although her separate valuation amounts totaled to over $192,000, she testified that she would "consider it to be reasonable to put a value on [the business] of $150,000[.]"
Mother also raises issue with the allocation of a $20,000 debt to Father. In its judgment, the trial court specified that Father "shall pay any and all debts and loans owing to his father in the approximate amount of Twenty Thousand Dollars[.]" At trial, Father testified that he and Mother had borrowed $22,000 from his father during the previous ten years. Father admitted there were no promissory notes for the loans, but that the loans were related to the business. With respect to the allocation of this debt to Father, we find there was evidence of its existence in the record and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in including it within the allocation of debt to Father.
In addition, the numbers seem to indicate that the trial court took this $20,000 debt into account when determining the total debt related to the business. The trial court noted that its valuation of Alton Farm Supply was $50,000, derived by subtracting $50,000 debt from an overall valuation of $100,000. The only other evidence of debt associated with the business was Father's testimony that total debt, including the real estate and lines of credit, was $78,000. Combining this information, there was evidence from which the trial court could have arrived at a business debt of $50,000.
We share Mother's concern, however, regarding whether the court's valuation included appropriate amounts for inventory and equipment. Mother and Father essentially agreed on the value of the real estate and on the value of the goodwill of the business, $78,000 and $15,000, respectively. Adding to those numbers the evidence before the trial court of inventory and equipment, $50,526 and $48,959, respectively, yields an overall valuation of $192,485. Subtracting the business debt of $50,000 leaves a valuation of $142,485. It is our determination that the evidence supports a resulting valuation of $142,485 for Alton Farm Supply, rather than the $50,000 as indicated by the trial court in its property distribution. Mother's share of the property distribution should increase by one-half of the amount by which the valuation increased, which would yield her an additional $46,242.50.
Mother also complains of the court's valuation of the beauty salon, which was used as her place of business and is attached to the marital home. The court valued it at $5,000. Father estimated the value to be $20,000, which was calculated based on re-establishing at a different location with the necessary inventory, equipment, and fixtures.
Mother testified that there was "nothing there except my chair and mirror, and there are a few supplies there and retail, a shampoo chair." Since the business itself does not own any real estate, Mother's valuation was just of the items in the business, which she estimated was $600.
We cannot find that the trial court abused its discretion in valuing the business at something higher than $600, but yet less than the cost of re-establishing a new business at a location other than at her home. Therefore, there was evidentia-ry support for the valuation.
Mother's Point III has merit to the extent that the evidence supported a resulting valuation of Alton Farm Supply of $142,485, rather than $50,000. Mother is entitled to one-half of that increase; therefore, Mother's share in the property distribution should be increased by $46,242.50. This change in valuation results in Mother receiving marital property of $202,421.50 arid Father receiving marital property of $247,305.50, which we believe to be fair under the circumstances.
Mother's Point IV — Error to award Father principal custody of Broc
In her final point, Mother contends that the trial court erred in awarding Father primary custody of Broc because it was against the weight of the evidence. Mother raises many issues as to why it was error for Father to receive primary physical custody of Broc, all of which relate to alleged improper inducements Father provided to Broc. Among these improper inducements were Father buying Broc his "dream car" that could only be used when Broc stayed at Father's house, purchasing a four-wheeler that could also only be used by Broc when Broc was at Father's home, and undermining Mother's authority by providing Broc refuge when Broc did not appreciate Mother's rules or discipline.
It is unnecessary for us to address Mother's point as written, based on our analysis of Father's Point I, where we found that, given the overall facts and circumstances of the case and the testimony at trial, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in determining that a split custody arrangement was in the best interests of the children. Mother's Point IV is denied.
Conclusion
The case is reversed with respect to the property distribution and remanded to the trial court with directions for it to reallocate property in a manner not inconsistent with this opinion, such that Mother receives an additional $46,242.50. See In re Marriage of Stamatiou, 798 S.W.2d 737, 742 (Mo.App.1990). In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.
RAHMEYER, J., concurs.
GARRISON, P.J., files separate opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part.