Case Name: UNITED STATES EX REL. ARANT v. LANE
Court: Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia
Jurisdiction: District of Columbia
Decision Date: 1918-02-04
Citations: 47 App. D.C. 336
Docket Number: No. 2853
Parties: UNITED STATES EX REL. ARANT v. LANE.
Judges: 
Reporter: Reports of Cases Adjudged in the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia
Volume: 47
Pages: 336–340

Head Matter:
UNITED STATES EX REL. ARANT v. LANE.
Public Officer; Removal; Mandamus; Laches.
An unexcused delay of twenty months by the superintendent of a national park, in seeking' reinstatement by mandamus, after removal from office under circumstances precluding expectation of restoration, is such laches as will justify denial of the relief sought.
No. 2853.
Submitted January 8, 1918.
Decided February 4, 1918.
Hearing on an appeal from an order of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia denying a writ of mandamus to compel the Secretary of the Interior to restore the petitioner to office.
Affirmed.
The Court in the opinion stated the facts as follows:
Relator William F. Arant was appointed superintendent of Crater Lake National Park June 25, 1903. On June 1, 1913, the Secretary of the Interior of the United States requested relator to resign. To this request relator replied that he was within the classified civil service of the United States, and protested against his removal until charges had been preferred against him in writing and he had been given an opportunity to answer the same. In response to this communication, the Secretary telegraphed him as follows: “Answering letter lYth you are hereby removed from position superintendent Crater Lake Park, effective close June 30. Transfer property new Supt. Steel July 1.” Further unimportant communications passed, when, on July 20, 1913, the United States marshal for the district of Oregon, acting under orders from Washington, ejected relator from office and turned the office over to his successor Steel.
Note. — Authorities discussing the question of right to mandamus to restore to office one who has been illegally removed therefrom are collated in a note in 19 L.R.A. (N.S.) 49, 66.
About twenty months thereafter, relator filed a petition in the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia praying that a writ of mandamus issue, requiring respondent Secretary to vacate his order and to restore him to his office. From an order denying the writ this appeal was taken.
3Z>. Samuel Madclox and Mr. II.. Prescott Gatl&y, for the appellant, in their brief cited:
Abraham v. Ordumy, 358 II. S. 436; Barbour v. Moore, 30 App. T). C. 30; Bend v. Hoyt, 13 Pet. 293 ; Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 343 U. S. 457; Hobbs v. McLean, 117 II. S. 567; Kalb fus v. Sic! dons, 42 App. I). C. 310; Kehn v. United Slates, 177 II. S. 290; Maxwell v. Moore, 22 How. 185 ; Montclair v. Eamsdell, 107 U. S. 147; Market Go. v. Hoffman, 101 U. S. 132; Pirie v. Chicago T. cG T. Co. 182 LT. S. 438; Speed v. Common Council, <Cr., 22 L.R.A. 842; St. Paul, &c., 1Í. Co. v. Phelps, 137 U. S. 528; United States ex rel. Taylor v. Taft, 24 App. D. C. 95 ; United Stales v. Gooding, 33 Wheat. 400; Welirman v. Conklin, 155 II. S. 314; Wilson v. New, 243 LT. S. 333; Yturbicle v. United Stales, 22 How. 290.
Mr. Presión O. West, Mr. C. D. Mahaffie, Mr. 0. Edward Wright, and Air. Charles Warren, for the appellee, in their brief cited:
Arends v. Kansas City, 57 Kan. 350; Bird v. United Stales, 187 P. S. 118; Bostwick v. Fire Dept. 49 Hich. 513; Oarr v. Gordon. 82 Fed. 373; Ohinn v. Trastees, 32 Ohio St. 236; Church of the Holy Trinity v. United Stales, 143 TJ. S. 57; Eggleston v. Kent, 50 .Mich. 147; Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 Í7, S. 197; Heydenfeldi v. Daney Gold, etc., Go. 93 U. S. 634; Lau Ow Bar v. United Stales, 343 li. S. 457; Morgan v. Munn. 84 Fed. 551; Oates v. National Bank, 100 U. S. 239; People, ex rel. Connolly v. Board of Education, 99 N. T. Snpp. 737; People ex rel. Millard v. Chapin, 104 N. Y. 96; Schidlheis v. .Chicago, 240 111. 167 ; Stale e.r rel. timber v. Knight. 31 S. 0. 81; State ex red. McCabe v. Police, Board, 107 La. 102; Stone v. Board, 164 Ky. 040; Slude.bake.v v. Perry, 184 17. S. 258; Taylor y. Conn-oilmen, 57 N. J. L. 376; Taylor v. Kerch.eval, 82 Fed. 497;. United States v. Kirby, 7 Wall. 482; United States ex rel. Taylor v. Taft, 24 App. I). C. 95.

Opinion:
Mr. Justice Van Orsdkl
delivered tlie opinion of the Court:
llelator bases his right to reinstatement upon the failure, of respondent Secretary of the Interior to comply with the provisions of sec. 6 of the. Act of Congress of August 24, 1912 (37 Stat. at L. 555, chap. 389, Comp. Stat. 1916, sec. 3287), which, among other things, provides:. "That no person in the classified civil service of the United States shall be removed therefrom except for such cause as will promote tlio efficiency of said service and for reasons given in writing, and the person whose removal, is sought shall have notice of the same and of any charges preferred against him, and be furnished with a copy thereof, and also be allowed a reasonable time for personally answering the same in writing; and affidavits in support thereof; but no examination of witnesses nor any trial or hearing shall be required except in tbe discretion of the officer making the removal."
The appeal can be disposed of without reference to the status of relator under the Civil Service Act. While it is true that mandamus is a statutory proceeding, and no longer regarded as a prerogative writ, it "is an extraordinary remedial process which is awarded, not as a matter of right,' but in the exercise of a sound judicial discretion. "x' 'x' Although classed as a legal remedy, its issuance is largely controlled by equitable principles. Duncan Townsite, Co. v. Lane (U. S. Adv. Ops. 1917-18, p, 83) 245 U. S. 308, 62 L. ed. — , 38 Sup. Ct. Rep. 99. It follows, therefore, that the court to which the application is made, in the exercise of sound judicial discretion, will not necessarily be governed by the letter oí the Statute of Limitations in granting or refusing the writ. People ex rel. Mil lard v. Chapin, 104 N. Y. 96, 102, 10 N. E. 141; State ex rel. Gruber v. Knight, 31 S. C. 81, 84, 9 S. E. 692.
In applying for relief, relator offers no excuse for bis long delay. lie was removed under circumstances which conclusively precluded any reasonable expectation of restoration. True, he avers that "from the time of his unlawful removal from said position as aforesaid, relator has made every reasonable effort- to have his rights in the premises accorded him, and to be restored to the office of superintendent- as aforesaid, but without avail. By and through his attorneys, relator has formally requested of said defendant that he restore him, the said relator, to the office; of superintendent, as aforesaid, but said defendant declined and refused and still refuses to comply with such request." Not only is this averment denied in the return, but it fails to show that relator was deterred from-applying to the court by any action of respondent which reasonably could have led him to believe that his request for restoration to the office; would he; granted.
On the1 other, hanel, his successor qualified, and for almost two years pen-formed the; duties of the office and drew the salary and allowance's appropriated by Congress, while relator sat by inactive1, except to protest and transmit his bills for salary to the Secretary. It is reasonable to assume that new conditions arose from time to time in conducting the park, calling for changes of policy in its superintendence, to the extent possibly of requiring that the; officer in charge possess elilferent and additional qualilieations than formerly had been exacted, all of which suggests the necessity of promptness in challenging the action e)f the; Secretary. The administration of the affairs of the government are of too vital importance to flu; public to be interrupted by the application of extraordinary remedies to assuage the protracted grievances of an official who may have been discharged without a technical compliance with the rulos of procedure authorizing his dismissal from office. If a discharged official were reinstated under the circumstances of this case, it might result in his immediate discharge; by the men; filing of reasons in writing upon which he would not even be entitled to a hearing. Hence, long delayed action could only be accounted for on the theory that it would enable a deposed official to accumulate a large salary account for services which he had not performed. Under such circumstances, every rule of public policy demands promptness in asserting claims for relief.
We think relator's complaint comes too late. The rule as to laches -where one seeks restoration to office through the agency of mandamus is well stated in People ex rel. Connolly v. Board of Education, 114 App. Div. 1, 99 N. Y. Supp. 739, as follows : "1 am of the opinion that the motion for a peremptory writ of mandamus should have been denied. A delay of nearly sixteen months in the absence of any explanation constitutes such laches on the part of the relator that lie was not entitled to the relief sought, even though he would have had a legal right to be reinstated had he promptly made liis application. In People ex rel. Young v. Collis, 6 App. Div. 467, 31 N. Y. Supp. 698, it ivas held, where an honorably discharged veteran claimed to have been improperly removed from his position, that he was guilty of laches, inasmuch as he had allowed more than four months to elapse before applying for a mandamus to compel his reinstatement. In People ex rel. Croft v. Keating, 49 App. Div. 123, 63 N. Y. Supp. 71, it ivas held that the failure of a veteran to institute a mandamus proceeding until nine months after his removal was fatal, unless satisfactorily explained. The Collis Case ivas cited with approval in People ex rel. Miller v. Sturgis, 82 App. Div. 580, 81 N. Y. Supp. 816, whore an order directing the issuance of a peremptory writ of mandamus 'to restore the relator to a position in the fire department was reversed upon the ground that the relator ivas guilty of laches; he having waited for a year and five months before instituting the proceeding, and no excuse being presented for the delay."
The judgment is affirmed, with costs. Affirmed.
A motion for a writ of error to the Supreme Court of the United States was denied on February 10, 1918.
A writ of error was allowed by the Supreme Court of the United States on April 24, 1918.