Case Name: State, ex rel. J. S. Gill et al., v. W. G. Corum, County Judge, et al.
Court: Tennessee Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Tennessee
Decision Date: 1910-09
Citations: 123 Tenn. 394
Docket Number: 
Parties: State, ex rel. J. S. Gill et al., v. W. G. Corum, County Judge, et al.
Judges: 
Reporter: Tennessee Reports
Volume: 123
Pages: 394–398

Head Matter:
State, ex rel. J. S. Gill et al., v. W. G. Corum, County Judge, et al.
(Knoxville.
September Term, 1910.)
1. APPELLATE JURISDICTION. In mandamus cases, and in all cases not expressly reserved to the supreme court, is conferred upon the court of civil appeals.
The statute (Acts 1907, ch. 82) creating the court of civil appeals confers upon that court direct appellate jurisdiction in mandamus cases, because no exception of mandamus cases is made in said statutes; for the appellate jurisdiction in all cases, not expressly reserved to the supreme court, is conferred upon the court of civil appeals. (Post, p. 396.)
Acts cited and-construed: Acts 1907, ch. 82.
2. SAME. Same. Value of property is immaterial in determining appellate jurisdiction except when a direct money decree is sought.
The supreme court has no jurisdiction of a direct appeal in a mandamus suit to compel a county to issue one hundred thousand dollars of its bonds, since the value of the property involving is immaterial for the purpose of determining the appellate jurisdiction, except in those cases wherein a direct money decree is sought as .the object or purpose of the litigation. (Post, p. 396.)
Acts cited and construed: Acts 1907, ch. 82. •
Case cited and approved: Chattanooga v. Railroad, 123 Tenn., 497, 499, 500.
3. SAME. Not conferred on supreme court where a resolution of the quarterly county court not passed in pursuance of legislative authority is impeached as involving the constitutionality of a statute, when.
The supreme court has no direct appellate jurisdiction in a mandamus suit to compel a county to issue its bonds upon the theory that the quarterly court’s rescinding its prior action, taken under express legislative authority, authorizing the issuance' of 'the bond's, involving the constitutionality of a statute; for the resolution of rescission was not passed in pursuance of legislative authority, and cannot, therefore, be regarded as a statute of the State. (Post, pp. 397, 398.)
Cases cited, distinguished, and approved: "Waterworks Co. v. Refining Co., 12.5 U. S., 18; Gaslight & Coke Co. v. Hamilton, 146 TJ. S., 258-266.
FROM GRAINGER.
Appeal from the Cliancery Court of Grainger County. Hugh G. Kyle, Chancellor.
Green & Webb and Shields, Cates & Mountcastle, for complainants.
M’Canless & Coleman and Lucky, Fowler & Andrews, for defendants.

Opinion:
Mr. Justice Green
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is a mandamus proceeding brought against certain officials of Grainger county in the chancery court to compel the issuance of $100,000 of the county's bonds. From a decree dismissing the petition, an appeal was taken to this court.
Of a mandamus proceeding, as such, this court has no jurisdiction on appeal. No exception of mandamus cases is made in the act creating and defining the jurisdiction of the court of civil appeals. Appellate jurisdiction of such cases is therefore conferred by said act on that court, along with appellate jurisdiction of all other cases not expressly reserved by the act to this court.
The jurisdiction of this court is invoked here upon the theory that the issuance of $100,000 of bonds is involved in this litigation, and it is said that this is a chancery case, "in which the amount involved, exclusive of costs, exceeds $1000."
In the case of Mayor and Alderman of Chattanooga v. Belt Railway et al., 123 Tenn., 497, 499, 500, 130 S. W., 840, the opinion in which was filed at this term, it was said:
"We have uniformly held, since the passage of the act referred to, that this provision applies only where the action is brought to recover a money judgment. . . . In short, the value of the property involved is immaterial for the purpose of determining jurisdiction, except in those cases wherein a direct money decree is sought as the end or purpose of the litigation."
Upon the authority of the above case, and the cases therein referred to, we must refuse to entertain this appeal, and an order will be entered transferring this «ause to the court of civil appeals, for lack of jurisdiction here.