Case Name: Robert Wayne WILLIAMS, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Ross MAGGIO, Jr., Warden and The Attorney General of the State of Louisiana, Respondents-Appellees
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 1982-06-21
Citations: 679 F.2d 381
Docket Number: No. 81-3159
Parties: Robert Wayne WILLIAMS, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Ross MAGGIO, Jr., Warden and The Attorney General of the State of Louisiana, Respondents-Appellees.
Judges: Before BROWN, CHARLES CLARK, GEE, RUBIN, GARZA, REAVLEY, POL-ITZ, RANDALL, SAM D. JOHNSON, WILLIAMS and GARWOOD, Circuit Judges.
Reporter: Federal Reporter 2d Series
Volume: 679
Pages: 381–410

Head Matter:
Robert Wayne WILLIAMS, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Ross MAGGIO, Jr., Warden and The Attorney General of the State of Louisiana, Respondents-Appellees.
No. 81-3159.
United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit. Unit A
June 21, 1982
Rehearing Denied Aug. 12, 1982.
Richard E. Shapiro, New Orleans, La., for petitioner-appellant.
Barbara B. Rutledge, Asst. Atty. Gen., New Orleans, La., John Sinquefield, Kay Kirkpatrick, Asst. Dist. Attys., Baton Rouge, La., for respondents-appellees.
Before BROWN, CHARLES CLARK, GEE, RUBIN, GARZA, REAVLEY, POL-ITZ, RANDALL, SAM D. JOHNSON, WILLIAMS and GARWOOD, Circuit Judges.
Former Fifth Circuit case, Section 9(1) of Public Law 96 — 452 — October 14, 1980.
Judge Tate did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.

Opinion:
GARZA, Circuit Judge:
We begin our consideration of this case by tracing the steps that led petitioner to this Court. Petitioner Robert Wayne Williams was tried by a jury in East Baton Rouge Parish, Louisiana, and convicted of the crime of first degree murder on April 19, 1979. The following day, the jury sentenced Williams to death. On direct appeal, petitioner's conviction and sentence were affirmed by the Louisiana Supreme Court, State v. Williams, 383 So.2d 369 (La.1980), and certiorari was denied by the United States Supreme Court. Williams v. Louisiana, 449 U.S. 1103, 101 S.Ct. 899, 66 L.Ed.2d 828 (1981). This failure to obtain relief on direct appeal led petitioner to apply for a writ of habeas corpus from the Louisiana state court. After this avenue proved equally unsuccessful, petitioner filed an application for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana. That court ruled adversely to petitioner, and so he appealed to this Court. A panel of this Court upheld the lower court decision, Williams v. Blackburn, 649 F.2d 1019 (5th Cir. 1981), but petitioner successfully petitioned for rehearing en banc. Today, for reasons expressed herein, we uphold the original panel decision and find that the death penalty was properly imposed in this case.
Before proceeding to a discussion of the specific errors complained of by petitioner, we briefly describe the sequence of events that culminated in the senseless murder of which petitioner was convicted. On January 5, 1979, Ralph Holmes and Robert Wayne Williams approached a Baton Rouge A & P Supermarket which they intended to rob. Prior to entering, they pulled ski masks over their faces to protect their identities from recognition, and Williams prepared his 12-gauge sawed-off shotgun for use. When they walked inside the store, they spotted the security guard, Willie Kelly, age 67, bagging groceries instead of performing his customary duties. The two men approached Kelly and Holmes attempted to remove the guard's pistol from its holster. He had some difficulty doing this, so Kelly made a move toward the pistol in an effort to free it and thereby aid Holmes. Williams responded to Kelly's move by firing the shotgun in the guard's face at point blank range. The resulting blast severed much of Kelly's head from his body. Police detectives on the scene observed bone fragments, blood, hair, and pieces of skin spread throughout the front of the store. After killing the guard, the two men proceeded to complete the robbery. Before fleeing the scene, however, Holmes pistol-whipped one customer, and Williams accidentally shot two more in the feet.
Six issues are raised by petitioner on rehearing en banc. He contends that: (1) his right to an impartial jury under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments was violated by the dismissal for cause of three jurors who never stated their irrevocable opposition to capital punishment; (2) his death sentence violates the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because there was insufficient evidence to support two of the three aggravating circumstances found by the jury, namely, (a) that the petitioner knowingly created a risk of death or great bodily harm to more than one person and (b) that the offense was committed in an especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel manner; (3) the Supreme Court of Louisiana violated his rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments by reviewing the evidentiary sufficiency of only one of the three aggravating circumstances found by the sentencing jury; (4) the district court erred in denying petitioner an evidentiary hearing on the allegation that he was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel at the guilt and sentencing, phases of his capital trial; (5) the district court failed to specifically scrutinize each federal constitutional claim made in the habeas petition; and (6) the comparative review of first degree murder convictions on a judicial district, rather than statewide basis, violates the Eighth Amendment and Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 92 S.Ct. 2726, 33 L.Ed.2d 346 (1972), because of its failure to ensure the fair and evenhanded administration of Louisiana's capital punishment statute.
I
The first point of appeal raised by Williams concerns the exclusion for cause of jurors who, in petitioner's estimation, never demonstrated their irrevocable opposition to capital punishment. He argues that his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment right to an impartial jury was violated by these dismissals. '
The seminal case in this area, Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 88 S.Ct. 1770, 20 L.Ed.2d 776 (1968), recognized the unconstitutionality of a death sentence imposed by a jury from which veniremen had been excused for cause simply because they expressed general objections to the death penalty or had conscientious or religious scruples against its infliction. The Court held that "[wjhatever else might be said of capital punishment, it is at least clear that its imposition by a hanging jury cannot be squared with the Constitution." Id. at 523, 88 S.Ct. at 1777. The requirements set out in Witherspoon have been echoed by a plethora of subsequent Supreme Court and Fifth Circuit cases. Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 100 S.Ct. 2521, 65 L.Ed.2d 581 (1980); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 98 S.Ct. 2954, 57 L.Ed.2d 973 (1978); Davis v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 122, 97 S.Ct. 399, 50 L.Ed.2d 339 (1976); Maxwell v. Bishop, 398 U.S. 262, 90 S.Ct. 1578, 26 L.Ed.2d 221 (1970); Boulden v. Holman, 394 U.S. 478, 89 S.Ct. 1138, 22 L.Ed.2d 433 (1969); Alderman v. Austin, 663 F.2d 558 (5th Cir. 1981); Granviel v. Estelle, 655 F.2d 673 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied,-U.S.-, 102 S.Ct. 1636, 71 L.Ed.2d 870, - U.S. -, 102 S.Ct. 1644, 71 L.Ed.2d 875 (1982); Burns v. Estelle, 592 F.2d 1297 (5th Cir. 1979). Both Courts accept the state's power to exclude veniremen from a jury on the ground
(1) that they would automatically vote against the imposition of capital punishment without regard to any evidence that might be developed at the trial of the case before them, or (2) that their attitude toward the death penalty would prevent them from making an impartial decision as to the defendant's guilt.
Witherspoon, supra, at 522-23, 88 S.Ct. at 1777 (emphasis in original). At the same time, however, they also recognize that improper exclusion of even one juror on Witherspoon grounds removes from the state the power to impose a sentence of death.
Petitioner asserts that three jurors were incorrectly excluded on the basis of their opposition to the death penalty. Close scrutiny of the voir dire examination of each juror is necessary for the resolution of this issue. Two of the jurors in question, Ms. Gooden and Mr. Martin, were interviewed together. The following excerpt of the district attorney's preliminary remarks and the jurors' responses to his inquiries about capital punishment clearly demonstrates the automatic opposition to the death penalty which justifies exclusion on Witherspoon grounds.
The State is entitled to a juror that can state that if the case is proven and the statutory requirements involving the aggravating circumstances are shown, and you don't feel that the mitigating circumstances outweigh it, that you be able to return a verdict that would carry the mandatory death penalty. Death in Louisiana is still by electrocution. You may have read that some States have passed lethal injection and this type of thing, but that hasn't been passed in Louisiana. Death is still by electrocution. So I guess my next question is, hearing this explanation and knowing that the State will request the death sentence, if you were satisfied that the State had proved its case, could you return a verdict that would require this defendant to be put to death? .
Q: Could you Mrs. Gooden?
A: (Ms. Gooden) I don't think I could.
Q: Even if I proved the case, you wouldn't want to return a verdict that would require the defendant to be put to death?
A: (Ms. Gooden) No, sir.
Q: Mr. Martin, could you return the verdict?
A: (Mr. Martin) Sir, with the degree that I hold by being an officer of the church and I'm representing God, I wouldn't want to do it.
Q: It's my understanding, of course, that all citizens would hesitate. I'm sure you would want to look at the case closely before you return a verdict that would require the defendant to be electrocuted, but it's my understanding that you Mr. Green, Mrs. Gooden and Mr. Martin, could not return a verdict that would require this defendant to be put to death....
A: (Ms. Gooden) No.
A: (Mr. Martin) No.
Trial Transcript, vol. 1, at 83-84.
Both Martin and Gooden unequivocally stated their inability to consider the death penalty in this case and thereby dis qualified themselves from jury service. Coexisting with the petitioner's right to an impartial jury, after all, is the State's right to have a jury that is willing to consider all penalties prescribed by law. A refusal to strike said jurors clearly would have infringed this right.
Next, we turn to the voir dire examination of the third juror, Ms. Brou. After the district attorney presented a similar introduction about the death penalty and the State's right to select jurors who are willing to consider all penalties, he engaged in the following colloquy with Ms. Brou:
Q: Assuming that I prove the defendant committed first degree murder and is convicted, assume I prove the statutory requirements of aggravating circumstances, which under Louisiana law make the case appropriate for the death penalty, can you return a verdict that mandates that the defendant be put to death by electrocution?
A: (Ms. Brou) I don't think I could do that.
Q: Okay. I appreciate your being honest with me. And let me ask you this. When you say I don't think I can, what you are telling me, you can't tell me positively that you can; is that correct?
A: (Ms. Brou) I know there is certain cases where you read about them and they are so hideous that you just think, oh, the death penalty would be the only good outcome, but this particular case, I don't know.
Q: As the Judge told you, this is the killing of a — Well, I don't know if the Judge said all that, but I think it is before the jury. This is the A «fe P robbery, murder that occurred on January the 5th of this year. And it is my understanding that you feel that you could not return the death penalty.
A: (Ms. Brou) Oh, let's see. I'm afraid I couldn't. I would just be thinking in terms of why can't a person like that be rehabilitated rather than exterminated.
you feel that vou could not return the death penalty? Q: So
(Ms. Brou) No. A:
Are there any circumstances which you could return a verdict that would require a defendant to be electrocuted? Q:
A: (Ms. Brou) This particular one or just in general?
Q: This particular one.
A: Any circumstances where I could do that?
Q: Yes.
A: (Ms. Brou) Well, of course, I don't know that much about the case. I always think in terms of how hideous the crime is because I don't know that much about it. I don't know. I don't think I can do it.
Trial Transcript, vol. 1, at 185-86 (emphasis added).
The prosecuting attorney immediately moved to strike Ms. Brou for cause and no objection was interposed by defense counsel. We will not speculate about trial counsel's reasons for not objecting. Perhaps he did not want Ms. Brou on the jury for other reasons. But even if he had objected, his objection would not have been well-taken.
Petitioner charges that Ms. Brou's responses fall far short of demonstrating automatic opposition to the death penalty. He attributes the absence of Witherspoon talismanic responses on the record to the State's failure to propound hard questions about opposition to the death penalty. We disagree. If one examines the underscored portion of her statement, one clearly finds that she did state that she could not return a death sentence. When the prosecutor inquired again to assure that she could not consider this penalty, Ms. Brou responded that she did not think she could do it. When this response is viewed in conjunction with her previous statement of clear opposition to the death penalty, the record of automatic opposition to the death penalty is established.
Witherspoon and its progeny do not mandate that a prospective juror aver that she would refuse to consider the death penalty in every case that could possible arise. If she knows enough about the case to know that she could not consider imposition of the death penalty regardless of what evidence might be presented, she must be excused. Ms. Brou's responses demonstrate that she would be unwilling to consider the death penalty where the crime charged was murder committed during a robbery. She does leave open the possibility that she would consider this penalty in a more "hideous" case. Her unwillingness to do so here, however, is firm.
By means of this appeal, petitioner asks this Court to narrow further the stiff requirements of Witherspoon and its progeny and, in this Court's opinion, thereby infringes the State's right to an impartial jury that is willing to consider all penalties provided by law. According to petitioner's analysis, exclusion of a venireman is impermissible unless he states in response to all questions that he absolutely refuses to consider the death penalty. An equivalent response framed in any other reasonable manner is judged to demonstrate that the individual's position is not firm. We reject such a rigid, unthinking interpretation of Witherspoon. Form will not be placed over substance.
II
Petitioner next urges this Court to find his death sentence violative of the Four teenth Amendment due process clause because of the insufficiency of evidence to support two of the three aggravating circumstances found by the jury. The jury imposed the death penalty after finding the presence of three aggravating circumstances, any one of which justified the punishment petitioner received. These three aggravating circumstances were: (1) the offender was engaged in the perpetration of armed robbery; (2) the offender knowingly created a risk of death or great bodily harm to more than one person; and (3) the offense was committed in an especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel manner.
Before embarking on a discussion of the substantive law in this section of the appeal, we examine the evolution that has produced the current Louisiana death penalty statute. Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 92 S.Ct. 2726, 33 L.Ed.2d 346 (1972), Louisiana statute permitted the jury to return any one of the following verdicts in a murder case: guilty, guilty without capital punishment, guilty of manslaughter, or not guilty. In 1973, apparently in response to the Furman decision, the legislature altered the capital punishment statute from discretionary to mandatory. The amended statute required that the penalty of death be imposed whenever an offender was found guilty of the newly defined crime of first degree murder. The Supreme Court declared this statute unconstitutional in Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 96 S.Ct. 3001, 49 L.Ed.2d 974 (1976), holding that "[t]he Louisiana procedure neither provides standards to channel jury judgments nor permits review to check the arbitrary exercise of the capital jury's de facto sentencing discretion." Id at 335, 96 S.Ct. at 3007.
The direction provided by the Supreme Court in Roberts led Louisiana to once again change its capital punishment scheme to ensure that a jury has the opportunity to consider all mitigating factors proffered as a basis for a sentence less than death. The statute also requires the jury to find at least one of a list of aggravating circumstances in order to impose a death sentence. When sitting in review of capital cases, the state Supreme Court must find the presence of at least one aggravating circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt. In addition, the court must examine all possible mitigating circumstances and compare the case with all other murder cases from the affected judicial district in order to ensure that the sentence is not disproportionate. This procedure was strictly followed in the instant case. Petitioner charges that this is not sufficient.
Petitioner contends that in light of the care of the Supreme Court to adopt narrowing constructions of aggravating circumstances, Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 96 S.Ct. 2960, 49 L.Ed.2d 913 (1976); Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 100 S.Ct. 1759, 64 L.Ed.2d 398 (1980), two of the three aggravating circumstances found by the jury cannot stand. Consequently, his argument continues, the sentence of death must fall as well. Petitioner finds support for this conclusion in Stephens v. Zant, 631 F.2d 397 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. granted, 454 U.S. 814, 102 S.Ct. 90, 70 L.Ed.2d 82 (1981), a case currently pending before the Supreme Court.
In Stephens, a panel of this Court vacated a death sentence because one aggravating circumstance found by the jury, a substantial history of serious assaultive criminal convictions, was later held unconstitutional. This action was taken despite the presence of two other valid aggravating circumstances. The Court based its decision on Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 51 S.Ct. 532, 75 L.Ed. 1117 (1931), where the Supreme Court held:
The verdict against the appellant was a general one. It did not specify the ground upon which it rested. As there were three purposes set forth in the statute, and the jury was instructed that their verdict might be given with respect to any one of them, independently considered, it is impossible to say under which clause of the statute the conviction was obtained. If any one of these clauses, which the state court has held to be separable, was invalid, it cannot be determined upon this record that the appellant was not convicted under that clause.... It follows that instead of its being permissible to hold, with the state court, that the verdict could be sustained if any one of the clauses of the statute were found to be valid, the necessary conclusion from the manner in which the case was sent to the jury is that, if any of the clauses in question is invalid under the Federal Constitution, the conviction cannot be upheld.
Id. at 368, 51 S.Ct. at 535.
The two challenged aggravating circumstances in this case do not suffer constitutional defects. In Gregg v. Georgia, supra, the Supreme Court held that a similar ag gravating circumstance in the Georgia statute was not unconstitutional on its face. The Court noted that this aggravating circumstance must simply be properly limited by an appellate court, where it serves as the basis for the death sentence. In the instant case, this aggravating circumstance, although found by the jury, was not the basis for appellate approval of the sentence. Since Louisiana law requires that only one aggravating circumstance be found in order to justify imposition of the death penalty, only one circumstance was reviewed. This aggravating circumstance has not been attacked to date in petitioner's series of challenges to his conviction and sentence.
The crucial inquiry in this and every case in which capital punishment has been ordered is whether the jury's sentencing discretion was properly channeled. E.g., Roberts v. Louisiana, supra. By statute, the jury's discretion is limited to the extent that only a few types of killings permit consideration of the death penalty. When one or more of the statutory aggravating circumstances is found, the jury must balance this against the mitigating circumstances offered by defendant. Stephens v. Zant can be distinguished on the grounds that the unconstitutionally vague aggravating circumstances which the Stephens jury found to be present was one that required the jury to understand how to determine the meaning of facts and circumstances not before them as a part of the proof of that crime. This required that the jury be properly guided as to how Georgia classified the aggravating circumstance before they could consider evidence of the other criminal convictions and the impact of this proof on the assessment of the death penalty. The vague words of the Georgia statute failed to guide or channel their discretion.
The instant case is not similarly flawed. The jury was only permitted to weigh the specific facts of the crime in arriving at their decision. The aggravating circumstance of armed robbery-murder was present and unanimously found by the jury. Under Louisiana law this means that the two questioned aggravating circumstances are not necessary to entitle the jury to consider imposition of the death penalty. The extra findings went to the gravity of his crime, not the jury's power to impose the death penalty.
Since the requisite one aggravating circumstance of murder in the course of an armed robbery is clearly present and was unanimously found by the jury, the other two circumstances are only material to deciding whether the aggravating and mitigating circumstances weighed together indicate the death penalty should be imposed. Here, the thing of significance is how the jurors perceived the weight of these actions by petitioner. The weight they assigned in determining whether the petitioner's acts were or were not outweighed by mitigating circumstncesa necessarily o be ested by how they viewed the facts they properly knew. The jury necessarily focused on what Williams had done, not on how Louisiana classified his actions, since they were not instructed on the legal meaning of the terms involved. Louisiana's classifications did not change the weights the jury assigned in any material degree. The lack of precise legal definitions, therefore, affected none of petitioner's substantial rights.
It might have been better if the trial judge had permitted the jury to consider only the aggravating circumstances that legally could be present, and if the judge had defined those circumstances for the jury in such a way that their finding that the circumstances were proven had been fully informed, perhaps it could be said that a more fully instructed jury would not have found the aggravating circumstances of heinousness and risk to more than one person to be present. This speculation is beside the mark, however, because the meaningful portions of this verdict, (1) that at least one aggravating circumstance was present and (2) that under the totality of aggravating and mitigating circumstances the death penalty should be imposed, were the product of channeled discretion and are rationally reviewable.
This Court's opinion in Stephens v. Zant, relied on so heavily by petitioner, is simply inapposite. We do not confront a facially unconstitutional aggravating circumstance and, therefore, we need not vacate the sentence given. The aggravating circumstances which were not considered and limited by the appellate court do not serve as the basis for the death sentence. We base the sentence on the one circumstance considered by the Louisiana Supreme Court. In so acting, we follow the procedure implicitly utilized in several Supreme Court cases. See, e.g. Eddings v. Oklahoma,- U.S. -, 102 S.Ct. 869, 71 L.Ed.2d 1 (1982); Gregg v. Georgia, supra.
In Gregg, the first Supreme Court case to consider the constitutionality of an aggravating circumstance very similar to one challenged here, the Court pointed out that it need not discuss two cases where this aggravating circumstance had been found because "[i]n both cases a separate statutory circumstance was also found, and the Supreme Court of Georgia did not explicitly rely on the finding of the seventh circumstance [outrageous or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman murder] when it upheld the death sentence." 428 U.S. at 201 n.53, 96 S.Ct. at 2938, n.53, 49 L.Ed.2d at 890 n.53. The Supreme Court again implied approval of the reasoning employed herein in Godfrey v. Georgia, supra, where at the same time the Court vacated a death sentence it noted, "[t]he sentences of death in this case rested exclusively on § (b)(7). Accordingly, we intimate no view as to whether or not the petitioner might constitutionally have received the same sentences on some other basis. Georgia does not, as do some states, make multiple murders an aggravating circumstance." 446 U.S. at 432 n.15, 100 S.Ct. at 1767 n.15, 64 L.Ed.2d at 409 n.15. Irregardless of the number of aggravating circumstances returned by the jury, the implication is clear that, in the absence of facial uncbnstitutionality, one may properly serve as the basis for appellate affirmation of the death sentence. The most recent Supreme Court comment on this issue is found in Eddings v. Oklahoma, supra, where after expressing "doubt that the trial judge's understanding and application of this aggravating circumstance [heinous, atrocious, or cruel murder] conformed to that degree of certainty required by our decision in Godfrey v. Georgia .," - U.S. at-, n.3, 102 S.Ct. at 873 n.3, the Court did not find this a basis for reversal of the death sentence but instead went further to find the judge's failure to consider all possible mitigating factors as the reversible error.
The Louisiana Supreme Court's review of only one aggravating circumstance was entirely proper. We find no violation of either the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendment.
Ill
Petitioner contends that the court below erred in denying him an evidentiary hearing on allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel at both the guilt and sentencing phases of his trial.
First, we examine the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel at the guilt phase of the trial. Petitioner alleges that his attorneys failed to seek suppression of certain inculpatory statements on a well recognized Fourth Amendment ground. The statements in question, which figured importantly in his conviction, were the fruits of an illegal arrest, according to petitioner; despite the fact that information leading to his arrest was obtained from a confidential informant, the affidavit contains no indication of the reliability of the informant. Petitioner errs in his assessment of the facts. The presentence report contains information from two confidential informants. The affidavit of the second confidential informant amplifies and corroborates the information received from the first. Information from these two sources provided probable cause for arrest.
Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 84 S.Ct. 1509, 12 L.Ed.2d 723 (1964), established standards for judging the sufficiency of hearsay affidavits to establish probable cause. The Court recognized that an affidavit may be based on hearsay information but specified:
. the magistrate must be informed of [1] some of the underlying circumstances from which the informant concluded that the narcotics were where he claimed they were, and [2] some of the underlying circumstances from which the officer concluded that the informant, whose identity need not be disclosed, . was "credible" or his information "reliable." Otherwise, "the inferences from the facts which lead to the complaint" will be drawn not "by a neutral and detached magistrate," as the Constitution requires, but instead, by a police officer "engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime," . or, as in this case, by an unidentified informant.
378 U.S. at 114-15, 84 S.Ct. at 1514, 12 L.Ed.2d at 729. The weakness of the affidavits in the instant case relates to the second prong of the Aguilar test. Nowhere m the affidavits is there any indication of the informants' reliability. Petitioner views this as a fatal flaw. We disagree. This Court, in United States v. Martin, 615 F.2d 318 (5th Cir. 1980), affirmed the validity of similar affidavits. The Court held that, taken together, the corroboration of the two affidavits served to establish their reliability. The Court pointed out that the usual case in which corroborative evidence validates a tip involves independent verification by police investigation. See, e.g., Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 79 S.Ct. 329, 3 L.Ed.2d 327 (1959); United States v. Squella-Avendano, 447 F.2d 575 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 985, 92 S.Ct. 450, 30 L.Ed.2d 369 (1971). While this Court has held that substantial corroboration of a tip by another confidential informant does provide evidence of reliability, these cases also reported independent governmental verification of the information. See United States v. Farese, 612 F.2d 1376 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Barham, 595 F.2d 231 (5th Cir. 1979); United States v. Scott, 555 F.2d 522, 527 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 985, 98 S.Ct. 610, 54 L.Ed.2d 478 (1977). Even in Martin, reliability was not based solely on corroboration by the confidential informant. Some weight was given to the fact that one informant's statement was against his penal interest.
In the instant case, however, corroboration alone serves to satisfy the second prong of Aguilar. The statement of one confidential informant is amplified by the other. We believe that the corroboration of details provides the reliability which the Aguilar test mandates. Therefore, petitioner had no basis for asserting his statements to police were the fruit of an illegal arrest. This claim is without merit.
Ineffective assistance of counsel at the sentencing phase of trial is also charged by petitioner. Specifically, petitioner alleges that his trial attorneys failed to conduct an adequate investigation and to prepare properly for the sentencing hearing, since they neglected to interview readily available witnesses in mitigation of punishment and to familiarize themselves with the pertinent law relating to capital sentencing proceedings in Louisiana. In this Circuit, effective assistance of counsel is determined by the standards set forth in MacKenna v. Ellis, 280 F.2d 592 (5th Cir. 1960), modified, 289 F.2d 928 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 877, 82 S.Ct. 121, 7 L.Ed.2d 78 (1961); United States v. Gray, 565 F.2d 881 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 955, 98 S.Ct. 1587, 55 L.Ed.2d 807 (1978); Herring v. Estelle, 491 F.2d 125 (5th Cir. 1974). Effective counsel does not mean "errorless counsel, and not counsel judged ineffective by hindsight, but counsel reasonably likely to render and rendering reasonably effective assistance." 280 F.2d at 599.
Petitioner asserts that the failure to call certain character witnesses demonstrates the weakness of his counsel. He attached affidavits of these witnesses to his federal habeas corpus application. The district court made the following finding about this issue: "[A] careful review of these affidavits reveals that these witnesses would not have added any new evidence to that which had already been presented at the sentencing hearing by petitioner's mother. These affidavits contain cumúlafive testimony which had previously been introduced during the trial and at the sentencing hearing." Williams, supra, at 1025. The trial transcript of this case reveals that three witnesses who knew petitioner were called at the guilt phase of the trial. The individuals had known the petitioner twelve, nine and one year, respectively. They testified about his drug usage because petitioner based his defense on the inability to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law because of intoxication. What petitioner's present counsel is really objecting to is the trial strategy employed by trial counsel. We do not elect to second guess the trial strategy decisions of competent counsel.
Petitioner next argues that trial counsel made a serious error in arguing about the admissibility of photos of the body in front of the jury. He contends that this discussion revealed the gruesome nature of the photos to the jury in graphic terms. This argument is utterly without merit. The "gruesome" facts referred to were the district attorney's remarks that it was heinous to "have your face blown off in front of the people you've worked with and the people that you know and exactly what this man did to the victim in this case." Trial Transcript, vol. 2, at 267. These comments do not introduce to the jury any information not already presented earlier in trial. Furthermore, by presenting this argument in front of the jury, petitioner's counsel had the opportunity to educate the jury about the limited definition of the aggravating circumstance of especially heinous or atrocious crime.
Petitioner's next assignment of error relates to counsel's failure to request limiting instructions on the statutory aggravating circumstances that were considered by the jury. The jury did hear the limited definition of the heinous crime circumstance, however, when counsel argued the admissibility of photos of the body. In addition, counsel presented the jury with a limited definition of both circumstances in his closing argument. Consequently, counsel's inaction does not rise to the level of ineffective assistance of counsel.
Petitioner's final argument charges counsel with failure to conduct a thorough pre-trial investigation. Counsel would have discovered many good character witnesses if he had undertaken proper pre-trial investigation, he asserts, and then would possibly have decided not to have petitioner's mother testify but would have depended on favorable testimony from members of the community. This challenge to counsel's performance attempts to do precisely that which is barred by this Court; it invites us to question counsel's trial strategy and judge his performance incompetent if it was not errorless. We decline to take this action. There is little doubt that had trial counsel employed the trial strategy proposed by petitioner, this Court would now face an effectiveness of counsel argument based thereon. Trial counsel in this case made the best of a bad case. He certainly provided reasonably effective assistance. Since we find adequate support in the record for our decision, there is no need to return this case to the court below for an evidentiary hearing. No further judicial time need be wasted on such spurious challenges.
IV
Next in this series of challenges, petitioner alleges that the district court failed to specifically scrutinize each federal constitutional claim in his habeas petition. Of his thirteen original grounds for post conviction relief, petitioner asserts that eight have never been addressed. He is incorrect. Three of these claims, numbers three, nine, and twelve, were specifically rejected by the Louisiana Supreme Court. The district court committed no error by concurring with that court's analysis. Our decision in part II of this opinion disposes of the need to discuss claims four, six, and seven, since these are predicated on the faulty assumption that Stephens v. Zant applies to this case. Claim number ten attacks the failure to adequately instruct the jury about the weight and role of mitigating circumstances. After closely examining the trial court record, we have determined that this claim is spurious. Claim eleven also concerns mitigating circumstances; here petitioner asserts that lack of statutory guidance about mitigating circumstances renders the Louisiana death penalty statute unconstitutional. This claim is likewise without merit.
V
As a final point of appeal, petitioner contends that the comparative review of first degree murder convictions on a judicial district, rather than statewide, basis violates the Eighth Amendment and Furman v. Georgia, supra, because of its failure to ensure the fair and evenhanded administration of Louisiana's capital punishment statute.
In reviewing the sentence in this case, the Louisiana Supreme Court made the following comparison of this case with other murder cases in the district:
The sentence review memoranda shows that there have been 28 murder prosecutions in East Baton Rouge Parish with eleven resulting in first degree murder convictions. Of these eleven, only three of the defendants were sentenced to death. These three cases are strikingly similar in that all three defendants were the actual killers and the crimes all arose during the perpetration of armed robberies. See State v. Williams, 383 So.2d 369 (La.1980) (No. 65,563); State v. Clark, No. 66,573, appeal pending.
Thus, a review of the sentences imposed in the same parish shows that in the cases most similar to the defendant's, the death penalty was imposed. Our review also shows a dissimilarity between the defendant's case and the other first degree murder convictions in that arguably, there are no aggravating circumstances or there were present mitigating circumstances which justified the jury's recommendation of life imprisonment.
In light of the above considerations, we are unable to conclude that the sentence imposed here is disproportionate to that imposed in similar cases.
383 So.2d at 375 (citations omitted).
Although the Supreme Court has referred to statewide reviews as commendable in the effort to ensure against an arbitrary imposition of the death penalty, it has never implied that such review is a constitutional requirement. Gregg v. Georgia, supra; Proffitt v. Florida, supra; Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 96 S.Ct. 2950, 49 L.Ed.2d 929 (1976). The review quoted above provides adequate safeguards against freakish imposition of capital punishment. Just as a venire chosen from a cross section of the community in which the crime is committed is an adequate constitutional safeguard against arbitrary imposition of verdicts and sentences, so a review of the murder convictions imposed within that venire community is sufficient to ensure against arbitrary imposition of the death penalty. We concur with the statement in the panel decision of this case that "we have heard nothing which would even hint at unconstitutionality, and wholly reject the argument." 649 F.2d at 1021.
VI
After carefully scrutinizing petitioner's many points of appeal, we conclude that each lacks merit. Certainly, we do not take lightly such a judgment where, as here, a human life hangs in the balance. Although we comply with our duty to carefully consider petitioner's claims, we refuse to step further and assist in counsel's efforts to ban the death penalty. Therefore, we decline petitioner's invitation to enter the jury room and speculate on what happened therein. Louisiana has properly narrowed juries' sentencing discretion in capital cases. The Louisiana Supreme Court conducts thorough and proper review of all cases. Chief Justice Burger, in his dissent in Eddings v. Oklahoma, supra, expressed a thought most relevant here: "It can never be less than our most painful of duties to pass on capital cases . However, there comes a time in every case when a court must 'bite the bullet.'" Id. - U.S. at -, 102 S.Ct. at 883. That time has arrived.
AFFIRMED.
. It is clear that these jurors were excluded on the basis of the first prong of Witherspoon: that they would automatically vote against imposition of the death penalty regardless of the evidence presented.
. A comparison of this case with other recent. Fifth Circuit cases in which Witherspoon error has been found permits us to judge the completeness of the prosecutor's questioning of Ms. Brou. In Burns v. Estelle, 592 F.2d 1297 (5th Cir. 1979), the prosecuting attorney asked the jurors about their opposition to the death penalty in the following language:
All right. Then will the mandatory penalty of death or imprisonment for life affect your deliberation on any issue of fact, which what you just told me it will, in other words the mandatory penalty of death or imprisonment for life will affect the deliberations on any issue of fact in this case, is that correct?
Id. at 1303 (emphasis added.) This obviously is not equivalent to asking the venireman if he would either automatically vote against the death penalty or if this attitude about the death penalty would prevent him from making an impartial decision about defendant's guilt. Such a preliminary inquiry, not followed by specific questions, provides inadequate basis for striking a juror on Witherspoon grounds.
The following discussion between prosecutor and venireman occurred in Granviel v. Estelle, 655 F.2d 673 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied,U.S.-, 102 S.Ct. 1636, 71 L.Ed.2d 870,-U.S. -, 102 S.Ct. 1644, 71 L.Ed.2d 875 (1982):
Q: (By Prosecutor) The defendant in this case is charged with capital murder. There are only two punishments for the offense of capital murder and that is either death or life in the penitentiary.
Now, do you have conscientious scruples against the infliction of the death penalty as a punishment for crime?
A: I don't know what that means.
Q: Let me ask you if you, personally sitting as a Juror, could ever vote so as to inflict the death penalty?
A: No, I don't think I could.
Q: That is a definite prejudice or feeling that you have that you would not change? You just don't feel like you would be entitled to take another person's life in that fashion.
A: (Venireman nods.)
Q: Okay, you could not?
A: No. I could not.
Id. at 684 (emphasis added). The death sentence in this case was reversed because the Court held that the venireman indicated only general scruples against the death penalty. Enough questions were not asked to determine whether he would automatically vote against the death penalty or whether his objections would prevent him from making an impartial decision as to guilt.
The instant case suffers from neither the deficiencies of Bums or Granviel. The district attorney asked a series of questions calculated to ensure that Ms. Brou was stating more than simply conscientious scruples about the death penalty.
A very recent Fifth Circuit Witherspoon challenge case, Alderman v. Austin, 663 F.2d 558 (5th Cir. 1981), treats another problem found in the voir dire of veniremen but likewise absent here. In Alderman, a death sentence was set aside because an extraneous issue introduced by the prosecutor resulted in the exclusion of potential jurors on a broader basis than that permitted by Witherspoon. The prosecutor did not limit his inquiry to an individual's opposition to the death penalty; he also asked whether each, as foreman, would be able to sign a verdict that would effect the capital punishment of a defendant. This forced veniremen to frame their answers improperly. The voir dire examination in the instant case properly limits its scope to an inquiry about opposition to the death penalty.
. La.Code Crim.Pro.Ann. art. 905.4(a), .4(d), and .4(g) (West Supp. 1981).
. La.Code Crim.Pro.Ann. art. 814 (1967).
The murder statute in effect at this time defined the crime as the killing of a human being by an offender with the specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm, or by an offender engaged in the commission of certain serious felonies (aggravated arson, aggravated burglary, aggravated kidnapping, aggravated rape, armed robbery, and simple robbery). La. Rev.Stat.Ann. § 14:30 (1951).
. La.Rev.Stat.Ann. § 14:30 (West 1974):
First degree murder is the killing of a human being:
(1) When the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm and is engaged in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of aggravated kidnapping, aggravated rape or armed robbery; or
(2) When the offender has a specific intent to kill, or to inflict great bodily harm upon a fireman or a peace officer who was engaged in the performance of his lawful duties; or
(3) Where the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm and has previously been convicted of an unrelated murder or is serving a life sentence; or
(4) When the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm upon more than one person; [or]
(5) When the offender has specific intent to commit murder and has been offered or has received anything of value for committing the murder.
For the purposes of Paragraph (2) hereof, the term peace officer shall be defined and include any constable, sheriff, deputy sheriff, local or state policeman, game warden, federal law enforcement officer, jail or prison guard, parole officer, probation officer, judge, district attorney, assistant district attorney, or district attorneys' investigator.
Whoever commits the crime of first degree murder shall be punished by death.
. La.Code Crim.Pro.Ann. art. 905.4 (West Supp. 1981):
The following shall be considered aggravating circumstances:
(a) the offender was engaged in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of aggravated rape, aggravated kidnapping, aggravated burglary, aggravated arson, aggravated escape, armed robbery, or simple robbery;
(b) the victim was a fireman or peace officer engaged in his lawful duties;
(c) the offender was previously convicted of an unrelated murder, aggravated rape, or aggravated kidnapping or has a significant prior history of criminal activity;
(d) the offender knowingly created a risk of death or great bodily harm to more than one person;
(e) the offender offered or has been offered or has given or received anything of value for the commission of the offense;
(f) the offender at the time of the commission of the offense was imprisoned after sentence for the commission of an unrelated forcible felony;
(g) the offense was committed in an especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel manner; or
(h) the victim was a witness in a prosecution against the defendant, gave material assistance to the state in any investigation or prosecution of the defendant, or was an eye witness to a crime alleged to have been committed by the defendant or possessed other material evidence against the defendant.
(i) the victim was a correctional officer or any employee of the Louisiana Department of Corrections who, in the normal course of his employment was required to come in close contact with persons incarcerated in a state prison facility, and the victim was engaged in his lawful duties at the time of the offense.
For the purposes of Subparagraph (b) herein, the term peace officer is defined to include any constable, marshal, deputy marshal, sheriff, deputy sheriff, local or state policeman, game warden, federal law enforcement officer, jail or prison guard, parole officer, probation officer, judge, attorney general, assistant attorney general, attorney general's investigator, district attorney, assistant district attorney, or district attorney's investigator.
. Ga.Code Ann. § 27-2534.1 (Supp. 1975) provides, in part:
(7) The offense of murder, rape, armed robbery, or kidnapping was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it involved torture, depravity of mind, or an aggravated battery to the victim.
Petitioner contends that this Court is precluded from holding the third aggravating circumstance valid because it is bound by the finding of the Louisiana Supreme Court that petitioner "accidentally" shot the others he injured. 383 So.2d at 371. An offender must "knowingly" create a risk of harm to more than one person in order to come within the scope of this circumstance. However, the second discharge of the gun is not relevant here. Although the basis of our decision does not mandate a determination on the presence of this circumstance, we note that whenever a sawed-off shotgun is intentionally fired around a group of persons, the risk of harm to more than one individual is created.
. The Louisiana Supreme Court found that petitioner committed the murder while engaged in the perpetration of an armed robbery.
. The affidavit, which contains information from two confidential informants, states, in relevant part:
On 1-10-79 Dets [detectives] received information from a confidential informant, who stated that he was present when 2 B/MS [black males] and 1 B/F [black female] bragged about beating a white man in the head and shooting an "Old Guard" at the A & P Food Store in Perkins Rd. in Baton Rouge. He saw in their possession, a sawed off shotgun and a large amount of currency. He identified one of the B/MS as Robert Holmes B/M, of 2216 Minnesota, BR, and the other B/M, as "Slim" of 2242 Minnesota, BR. He identified the B/F as Slim's wife. Another C.I. [confidential informant] supplied the name of "Slim" as Robert Williams B/M, of 2242 Minnesota and his wife as being Ann Sims Williams, approx, age 17 of 275 W. Harrison. He also personally knows Ralph Holmes and stated he heard the three talk about "doing" a robbery at the A & P Food Store and killing an "Old Guard."
. Of the six affidavits attached to petitioner's application for post conviction relief, five are from individuals who had known petitioner since childhood but had seen very little of him in recent years. All concluded that drugs or bad influences had brought about his criminal conduct. The other affidavit was that of his older brother, Alvin, who blamed his conduct on the use of "heavy drugs."
. MR. COVELL: Your Honor, the code provides that one aggravating circumstance is an especially heinous or atrocious crime. I think the Legislature, when they passed that law, had a test or their intent was to judge the suffering of the victim, not his appearance after death. Now, to my way of thinking, it's a terrible thing that this man is dead, but he died instantly. And it is not of import whether it was a nice, clean, 25 caliber wound or whether it was a shot gun. He did not know what happened. I therefore submit to the Court that these pictures are not relevant because they do not demonstrate or indicate an especially atrocious or heinous crime. I think what the Legislature had in mind were crimes that we hear about such as repeated rapes and murder of a small girl or that sort of thing where the victim suffered.
Trial Transcript, vol. 2, at 265-66.
. The offense was committed in an especially heinous, atrocious or cruel manner. You heard my argument to the Court. What the Legislature has in mind is — the victim, Willie Kelly, died suddenly. I doubt if he had a chance to even realize what was happening to him. The testimony was that they came in, all of a sudden he saw them. He started to make a gesture, we don't know what the gesture was, and he was dead. As I stated, it's unfortunate. It's a sickening thing that the man is dead, but he died instantly. Like I argued to the judge, and the judge agreed with me because he felt that the pictures should not be introduced into evidence. It doesn't matter if it's a little nice, clean bullet hole or if it's a shot gun blast that is disgusting and bothers other people around. He died, he died, I believe the prosecutor commented he deserved to die in a more dignified manner. If the prosecution can demonstrate one sort of murder that is dignified, I'd like to hear it.
No murder is dignified.
Trial Transcript, vol. 2, at 284 (emphasis added).
Defense counsel also presented a limited definition of the other aggravating circumstance:
Now, every sort of crime in which a weapon's involved or which a murder takes place, certainly anyone in the area is going to be in fear of their lives. I'm sure the Legislature didn't mean that in every case in which a gun was used this would apply. There would be no sense in having this.
Trial Transcript, vol. 2, at 283-84.
. The specific claims are:
(3) Petitioner's death sentence violates the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because there was insufficient evidence to support the jury's finding that (a) the offender knowingly created a risk of death or great bodily harm to more than one person; and (b) the offense was committed in an especially heinous, atrocious or cruel manner.
(4) The jury's finding that the offense was committed in an especially heinous, atrocious or cruel manner was in violation of the decision rendered in Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 100 S.Ct. 1759, 64 L.Ed.2d 398 (1980).
(6) The trial court erred in failing to provide the jury with limiting instructions on the statutory aggravating circumstances.
(7) The Louisiana Supreme Court has adopted inconsistent standards of appellate review thereby increasing the likelihood of arbitrary and capricious sentencing in death cases.
(9) The death sentence imposed upon petitioner was disproportionate and excessive under Louisiana law and the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States.
(10) The trial court erroneously instructed the jury concerning the mitigating circumstances and the role of such circumstances in determining a death sentence.
(11) The Louisiana death penalty statute is unconstitutional under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States.
(12) The trial court erred in allowing the state to present evidence of an armed robbery at petitioner's trial on the charge of first degree murder.
. Petitioner's counsel also waived number six at oral argument when he stated that error was not committed when the judge failed to give limiting instructions on the statutory aggravating circumstances. He declared that error was committed when the jury found an aggravating circumstance for which there was improper basis.
. Louisiana Supreme Court Rule 28 governs capital sentence review:
Rule 905.9.1 Capital sentence review (applicable to La.C.Cr.P. Art. 905.9)
Section 1. Review Guidelines. Every sentence of death shall be reviewed by this court to determine if it is excessive. In determining whether the sentence is excessive the court shall determine:
(a) whether the sentence was imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice or any other arbitrary factors, and
(b) whether the evidence supports the jury's finding of a statutory aggravating circumstance, and
(c) whether the sentence is disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime and the defendant.
Section 2. Transcript, Record. Whenever the death penalty is imposed a verbatim transcript of the sentencing hearing, along with the record required on appeal, if any, shall be transmitted to the court within the time and in the form, insofar as applicable, for transmitting the record for appeal.
Section 3. Uniform Capital Sentence Report; Sentence Investigation Report.
(a) Whenever the death penalty is imposed, the trial judge shall expeditiously complete and file in the record a Uniform Capital Sentence Report (see Appendix "B"). The trial court may call upon the district attorney, defense counsel and the department of probation and parole of the Department of Corrections to provide any information needed to complete the report.
(b) The trial judge shall cause a sentence investigation to be conducted and the report to be attached to the uniform capital sentence report. The investigation shall inquire into the defendant's prior delinquent and criminal activity, family situation and background, education, economic and employment status, and any other relevant matters concerning the defendant. This report shall be sealed, except as provided below.
(c) Defense counsel and the district attorney shall be furnished a copy of the completed Capital Sentence Report and of the sentence investigation report, and shall be afforded seven days to file a written opposition to their factual contents. If the opposition shows sufficient grounds, the court shall conduct a contradictory hearing to resolve any substantial factual issues raised by the reports. In all cases, the opposition, if any, shall be attached to the reports.
(d) The preparation and lodging of the record for appeal shall not be delayed pending completion of the Uniform Capital Sentence Report.
Section 4. Sentence Review Memoranda; Form; Time for Filing.
(a) In addition to the briefs required on the appeal of the guilt-determination trial, the district attorney and the defendant shall file sentence review memoranda addressed to the propriety of the sentence. The form shall conform, insofar as applicable, to that required for briefs.
(b) The district attorney shall file the memorandum on behalf of the state within the time provided for the defendant to file his brief on the appeal. The memorandum shall include:
i. a list of each first degree murder case in the district in which sentence was imposed after January 1, 1976. The list shall include the docket number, caption, crime convicted, sentence actually imposed and a synopsis of the facts in the record concerning the crime and the defendant.
ii. a synopsis of the facts in the record concerning the crime and the defendant in the instant case.
iii. any other matter relating to the guidelines in Section 1.
(c) Defense counsel shall file a memorandum on behalf of the defendant within the time for the state to file its brief on the appeal. The memorandum shall address itself to the state's memorandum and any other matter relative to the guidelines in Section 1.
Section 5. Remand for Expansion of the Record. The court may remand the matter for the development of facts relating to whether the sentence is excessive.
. We note in passing that since implementation of Louisiana's current death penalty scheme, the Louisiana Supreme Court has vacated more death sentences than it has affirmed. The sentence of death was vacated in the following cases: State v. Willie, 410 So.2d 1019 (La.1982); State v. Lindsey, 404 So.2d 466 (La. 1981); State v. Smith, 400 So.2d 587 (La. 1981); State v. Sylvester, 400 So.2d 640 (1981); State v. Williams, 392 So.2d 619 (La.1980); State v. Culberth, 390 So.2d 847 (La.1980); State v. Myles, 389 So.2d 12 (La.1980); State v. Sonnier, 380 So.2d 1 (La.1980); State v. Parker, 372 So.2d 1037 (La.1979); State v. English, 367 So.2d 815 (La.1979). We exclude from the foregoing list two cases in which the sentence was vacated but subsequently reimposed and affirmed. State v. Sonnier, 402 So.2d 650 (La. 1981); State v. Monroe, 397 So.2d 1258 (La. 1981).