Case Name: Michael Lee CONNELL v. Vergie Dell CONNELL
Court: Louisiana Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1976-04-13
Citations: 331 So. 2d 4
Docket Number: No. 56941
Parties: Michael Lee CONNELL v. Vergie Dell CONNELL.
Judges: SUMMERS, J., concurs in part and .dissents in part (with reasons).
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 331
Pages: 4–11

Head Matter:
Michael Lee CONNELL v. Vergie Dell CONNELL.
No. 56941.
Supreme Court of Louisiana.
April 13, 1976.
William L. McLeod, Jr., McLeod & Dow, Lake Charles, for defendant-applicant.
Philip R. Riegel, Jr., Sydney J. Parlongue, New Orleans, for plaintiff-respondent.

Opinion:
PER CURIAM.
Michael L. Connell was first married to Gisela Alexander. They were divorced on May S, 1970. By the decree he was ordered to pay $1,200 monthly for the support of his wife and four minor children, issue of the marriage. This alimony and child support award was later reduced to $1,000 monthly, plus the income tax due thereon.
Connell was married a second time to Vergie Dell on June 20, 1970. By a suit filed January 24, 1972 and a decree of April 7, 1972 he was separated from bed and board from his second wife. No children were born of this union. Then, on December 21, 1973, Connell sued for a partition in kind, or, alternatively, by licitation, of all the property belonging to the community of acquets and gains theretofore existing between himself and Vergie Dell.
A partition, liquidation and accounting was ordered by the trial court, resulting in a settlement balance due in favor of Vergie Dell in the amount of $21,798.16, with costs taxed to the community. On appeal by the husband to the Third Circuit, the judgment was reversed and the case was remanded to the trial court for the receipt of additional evidence and for judgment in accordance with the views expressed by the court of appeal. 316 So.2d 421.
Writs were granted on the application of the wife. 321 So.2d 362, La.
I.
It is the wife Vergie Dell's contention that her husband's payments of $27,946.45, as alimony and child support to his first wife from his earnings during the second marriage, are chargeable solely to the husband's half interest in the community of acquets and gains existing as a result of the second marriage; that is, in the partition, liquidation and settlement of the community the amounts paid as alimony and child support to the first wife during the second marriage should be charged entirely against the husband's one-half of the community.
The answer to this question is furnished by the rationale of our decision in Fazzio v. Krieger, 226 La. 511, 76 So.2d 713 (1954). There, as the court of appeal noted, we held that the obligation of a husband to support his first family is an obligation existing during the second marriage; it is not an antenuptial debt which must under Article 2403 be acquitted from his individual effects.
Thus, the support payments are for an obligation of the husband, imposed by law (not by contract nor by alimony judgment recognizing it and fixing its amount) and which month by month arises during the second community. Therefore, they are properly dischargeable from common funds, Civil Code Article 2403, without any necessity for the husband to account to his second wife from his share of the community assets, after dissolution of the second community, for such payments made from community funds.
The payment of these obligations, which came into existence during the existence of the second community and were thus properly dischargeable from community funds, is to be contrasted with the payment of antenuptial debts, contractual or otherwise, such as are founded upon contractual obligations preexisting the second marriage. These latter, while initially payable from the community since it forms part of the husband's patrimony, are subject to reimbursement to the wife at the termination of the second community. Creech v. Capitol Mack, 287 So.2d 497 (La.1974).
Nor is the wife entitled to an accounting or reward from the husband for one-half the value of the increase or improvement of the husband's separate property by virtue of the alimony and support payments made with community funds, because no showing is made that these payments resulted in an increase or amelioration of the value of the husband's separate property as required by Article 2408 of the Civil Code.
II.
Prior to his second marriage Con-nell acquired four life insurance policies insuring his life. By terms of the policies the insured was granted the right to change beneficiaries. His first wife or his children were named beneficiaries in all four policies. After his second marriage, Connell changed the beneficiaries and in some instances named Vergie Dell as beneficiary. During the existence of this second community regime, Connell paid premiums on these policies with community funds. The trial judge found that a total of $4,330.55 was paid as premiums out of funds belonging to the second community. He then decreed that Connell must reimburse the community the full amount of those payments.
The Court of Appeal reversed this ruling, holding that the community was not entitled to reimbursement for the amount paid as premiums on the policies during the existence of the community regime. It held, instead, that the measure of reimbursement to which the community was entitled from the husband's separate estate was the enhancement in value (cash surrender value) of the policies resulting from premium payments made with community funds. Butler v. Butler, 228 So.2d 339 (La.App.1969) and Broyles v. Broyles, 215 So. 2d 526 (La.App.1968) were relied upon to support its holding.
The wife Vergie Dell contends that the holding of the Court of Appeal in the instant case should be reversed on this issue because the decision here and in the Butler and Broyles cases are contrary to decisions of this Court in Succession of Lewis, 192 La. 734, 189 So. 118 (1939); Succession of Verneuille, 120 La. 605, 45 So. 520 (1908) and In re Moseman, 38 La.Ann. 219 (1886).
Decisions of this Court, and of the Court of Appeal in Succession of McLellan, 144 So.2d 291 (La.App.1962), prior to the decision in Broyles v. Broyles in 1968, held that after dissolution the community was entitled to reimbursement from the separate estate of the husband for the amount of the premiums paid with community funds on policies belonging to the separate estate of one of the spouses.
However, recently in T. L. James & Co., Inc., et al. v. Montgomery, et al., 332 So.2d 834 (La., 1975) rehearing granted on other grounds, the rule of Butler v. Butler was recognized and approved in these words:
"As already noted, this insurance policy (a group life policy) was acquired before decedent's marriage to his second wife, and thus was part of his separate estate. No restitution is due the community for the premiums paid by decedent. In such a case, a community claim is supportable only when the cash value of the policy has increased during the community's existence and then only for one-half the extent of the increase in value. The policy before us is a term insurance policy, which never had a cash surrender value. Therefore, no accounting is due the community. Butler v. Butler, 228 So.2d 339 (La.App.1969)." (parentheses added)
With the jurisprudence in this state, the Court now adheres to its decision of December 8, 1975 in the T. L. James case on this issue. Accordingly, the holding of the Court of Appeal on this question is affirmed. This result is in harmony with the principle announced in Article 2408 of the Civil Code. That article recites that when the separate -property of either husband or wife has been increased or improved during the marriage, the other spouse, or his or her heirs, shall be entitled to the reward of one-half of the value of the increase or amelioration, if it be proved that the increase or amelioration be the result of the common labor, expense or industry; but there shall be no reward due, if it be proved that the increase is due only to the ordinary course of things, to the rise in value of property, or the chances of trade.
Although it is well-known that the law as it applies to life insurance is sui generis in this State, and the Civil Code does not purport to comprehend that subject, the Court can discern nothing incompatible with that fact when it accepts and applies a principle embodied in the Civil Code to bring about consistency in dealing with problems of community property when life insurance is involved.
Since, as the Court of Appeal found, the record does not satisfactorily establish the enhancement in value of the policies during the existence of the second community, and three of the policies appear to have cash surrender values at the time of the dissolution of the community, the case is remanded to the trial court for this determination and for judgment on this issue not inconsistent with the reasons assigned.
III.
In the application to this- Court for cer-tiorari, the third assignment of error made by the wife is based upon the allegation that the trial court and Court of Appeal both held that payment of premiums by the community for a policy of insurance which was a community asset should be charged against the wife's separate estate. It is contended in connection with this assignment of error that a policy insuring the life of the wife, purchased during the community, is a community asset, and the community funds used to pay the premiums for this policy should have been absorbed by the community. Estate of Moseman, 38 La.Ann. 219 (1886), is cited as authority for the wife's contention.
According to her testimony, prior to marriage Vergie Dell acquired a life insurance policy insuring her life for $10,000. At the time of its inception, the policy named her parents as beneficiaries. During the marriage the beneficiaries were changed, and when the community was dissolved her parents were again named beneficiaries. Premiums on this policy in the amount of $15.30 were paid with community funds during the community regime.
Vergie Dell acquired another life insurance policy insuring her life for $20,000. This policy had its inception in November 1970 during the community regime. Her parents and her husband were designated beneficiaries. Monthly premiums in the amount of $34.20 were paid with community funds during the existence of the community. After dissolution of the community only her parents were named as beneficiaries,
As to the first policy, acquired by Vergie Dell prior to her marriage, it became her separate property. Inasmuch as community funds were used to pay premiums while the community existed, Vergie Dell is responsible to the community for whatever enhancement in value the policy experienced from the use of community funds.
The second policy acquired during the existence of the community is a community asset, liable to the community for its value at the time of the dissolution of the community. No reimbursement is due the community for premiums paid on this policy.
The judgment is amended accordingly.
Since the three foregoing assignments of error are the only issues presented in the application for certiorari which this Court granted, the other issues presented by brief are not considered.
For the reasons assigned, the judgment of the Court of Appeal is amended in accordance with the reasons assigned. Otherwise, the case is remanded to the trial court for compliance with the decree and judgment of the Court of Appeal as herein amended. Assessment of costs is to await the final determination of this cause.
SUMMERS, J., concurs in part and .dissents in part (with reasons).
TATE, J., adds additional concurring reasons.