Case Name: Arthur QUICK v. MURPHY OIL COMPANY, et al.
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1982-12-01
Citations: 446 So. 2d 775
Docket Number: No. 13258
Parties: Arthur QUICK v. MURPHY OIL COMPANY, et al.
Judges: Before WARD, BYRNES and KLEES, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 446
Pages: 775–780

Head Matter:
Arthur QUICK v. MURPHY OIL COMPANY, et al.
No. 13258.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fourth Circuit.
Dec. 1, 1982.
On Rehearing Jan. 25, 1984.
Writs Denied April 2, 1984.
Michael A. Fenasci, New Orleans, for plaintiff-appellant.
Linda S.A. Burke, Rene A. Curry, Jr., New Orleans, for defendants-appellees.
William S. Marshall, Jr., Alan Dean Weinberger, New Orleans, La., amicus curiae.
Before WARD, BYRNES and KLEES, JJ.

Opinion:
WARD, Judge.
Arthur Quick, a long-time employee of Murphy Oil Corporation, brought this suit in the Twenty-Fourth Judicial District Court claiming damages from sixty-six defendants for injuries which he allegedly received during his employment. Among the sixty-six defendants are his former employer, Murphy Oil Corporation, and its executive officers: M.J. Leumas, Dave Thomas, James O'Neal, Jr., John Chutz, III, Leonard King, Elliott Smith, and Camille Trahan. Quick's lawsuit alleges negligence and, alternatively, intentional torts and asks for damages for asbestosis, a lung disease, which Quick claims was caused by his intermittent exposure to asbestos during the twenty-five years he was employed by Murphy Oil Corporation. In defense, Murphy Oil Corporation and the executive officer group filed exceptions of no right and no cause of action. The Trial Judge sustained the exceptions and dismissed Quick's lawsuit against these defendants. Neither the Trial Judge's ruling nor this appeal affects the remaining defendants whom Quick has described as the Asbestos Group.
Quick appeals the Trial Court's judgment of dismissal, urging two assignments of error. Quick argues that the Trial Judge erred in retroactively applying Act 147 of 1976 which amended the Worker's Compensation Law by granting immunity to fellow employees from claims of negligence. The act permits claims against fellow employees based on intentional torts, and Quick also contends that the Trial Judge erred in sustaining the exception of no right or cause of action, arguing that the allegations set forth in his petition sufficiently state a cause of action based on intentional torts.
We do not believe that the Trial Judge erred when he held that Act 147 of 1976 bars Quick's claims of negligence. We, however, reverse the Trial Judge's ruling on the exception of no cause of action insofar as the allegations of intentional torts; we find that the allegations of Quick's petition are sufficient to state a cause of action for intentional torts.
As to the claims for negligence, Quick contends that the Trial Judge erroneously applied the amending act retroactively to a claim based on continuous tortious acts that occurred before the amendment and during his 25 years of employment, even though it is well settled that Act 147 of 1976 may not be applied to a cause of action that arose before its effective date. Green v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, 352 So.2d 366 (La.App. 4th Cir.1977), writ denied, 354 So.2d 210 (La.1978). We believe, nonetheless, that the question is not retroactive application, but is whether the cause of action arose before Act 147 of 1976.
A cause of action has been defined by the Louisiana Supreme Court as, "the state of facts which gives a party the right to judicially assert an action against a defendant." Trahan v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, 314 So.2d 350, 353 (La. 1975). Hence, a cause of action does not arise until the injury becomes known.
In a case similar to this, Smith v. Hurd, 408 So.2d 357 (La.App. 1st Cir.1976), an executive officer suit based on negligence, it was held that a widow's cause of action for wrongful death could not arise prior to her husband's death which occurred after the amendment. The First Circuit Court of Appeal rejected the argument that the claim arose when the injuries from exposure to sand and dust particles were inflicted prior to the effective date of the amendment and held that the exception of no cause of action or no right of action was properly sustained by the Trial Court.
In the instant case, Quick does not claim either that the injury manifested itself or that he contracted asbestosis before the effective date of Act 147 of 1976. The record reflects that asbestosis was discovered after Quick was examined by physicians in February of 1980, four years after Act 147 of 1976.
Because the Supreme Court's definition of a cause of action is controlling and because we agree with the First Circuit's decision in Smith v. Hurd, supra, we find that Quick's cause of action did not arise until asbestosis was diagnosed in 1980, four years after the effective date of Act 147 of 1976. Therefore, the Trial Judge was correct in his application of Act 147 of 1976 which bars claims against fellow employees based on negligence.
In his second assignment of error, Quick argues that even if Act 147 is applicable and immunizes executive officers from liability for injuries caused by their negligence, it does not immunize these officers from claims for injuries resulting from their intentional acts. He contends that the Trial Judge erred when he ruled that Quick's petition did not state a cause of action under this theory.
In his petition, Quick alleges:
Each of the defendants, executive officers, directors or shareholders knew the identity of the products being used at the Murphy Oil Company facility and they knew that the products that were used at that facility were extremely dangerous and would cause serious and/or fatal injuries to any person handling those materials.
Each of the defendant executive officers personally knew that the plaintiff was handling extremely dangerous materials containing asbestos from August of 1955 to February of 1980. Each of the defendant executive officers, directors, or shareholders personally knew that the plaintiff had not been provided with the required and/or necessary and/or adequate equipment for the handling of these extremely dangerous materials containing asbestos.
Likewise, each of the defendants, executive officers, directors or shareholders knew that the plaintiff had not been adequately warned concerning the hazards of handling extremely dangerous materials containing asbestos.
[Arthur Quick's] injuries and his damages resulting therefrom, were caused by defendant's executive officers, directors or shareholders intentional acts, in that the injurious consequences were substantially certain to follow from their acts.
In Bazley v. Tortorich, 397 So.2d 475 (La.1981), the Louisiana Supreme Court defined "an intentional act":
. The meaning of "intent" is that the person who acts either (1) consciously desires the physical result of his act, whatever the likelihood of that result happening from his conduct; or (2) knows that that result is substantially certain to follow from his conduct, whatever his desire may be as to that result. Thus, intent has reference to the consequences of an act rather than the act itself. Id. at 481.
The Court further noted:
. Only where the actor entertained a desire to bring about the consequences that followed or where the actor believed that the result was substantially certain to follow has an act been characterized as intentional. Id. at 481.
For the purpose of ruling on an exception of no cause of action, all well-pleaded allegations are accepted as true, and any doubts must be resolved in favor of the sufficiency of pleadings to state a cause of action. Guy Scroggins, Inc. v. Emerald Exploration, 401 So.2d 680, 684 (La.App. 3rd Cir.1981), writ denied, 404 So.2d 1257 (La.1981). The allegations of Quick's petition may be interpreted to allege that the executive officers did an intentional act or intentionally abstained from acting with the knowledge that Quick's injuries were substantially certain to follow. We conclude that these allegations are sufficient to state a cause of action based on intentional acts. Therefore, Quick should have an opportunity in trial or summary proceedings to prove his allegations of intentional torts. Accordingly, insofar as the petition alleges intentional torts, we reverse the Trial Court and overrule defendant's exception of no cause or right of action.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Trial Court dismissing Quick's claims based on negligence is affirmed. The judgment of the Trial Court dismissing Quick's claims based on intentional torts is reversed.
AFFIRMED IN PART. REVERSED IN PART.
. Arthur Quick died after his suit was filed.