Case Name: In the Matter of the Petition of JOHN T. LORD, to Vacate an Assessment, etc.
Court: New York Supreme Court, General Term
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1880-06
Citations: 28 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 555
Docket Number: 
Parties: In the Matter of the Petition of JOHN T. LORD, to Vacate an Assessment, etc.
Judges: 
Reporter: Supreme Court Reports (Hun)
Volume: 28
Pages: 555–559

Head Matter:
In the Matter of the Petition of JOHN T. LORD, to Vacate an Assessment, etc.
Application to vacate an assessment — when denied on account of the laches of the petition&r — 1858, ch. 338.
On December 37, 1876, this proceeding was commenced to vacate an assessment for paving a street in tlie city of New York, which had been confirmed in 1869, on the ground that the ordinance, directing the work to be done, had not been published, as required by the charter. Upon the hearing, it • appeared that, while the list was in the hands of the collector, and prior to January 1, 1871, the assessment upon twenty-four of the parcels, amounting to $6,661.63, had been paid; that the assessment.upon five of the thirtvone remaining parcels, returned to the bureau of arrears as unpaid, had been paid before this proceeding was commenced; that the assessment upon all the others had been vacated, by orders of the Supreme.Court, made in 1871, 1873 and 1873. and that two of the lots, upon which the assessments had been paid, liad changed hands and now belonged to different persons.
Held, that, as it- appeared that the assessment had been partly enforced and paid, and that some of the lots had changed hands, thereby rendering it impossible to do justice to the other property owners, if the assessment upon the petitioner’s lot should be vacated, his application should be . denied on account of his laches in instituting the proceedings. (Brady, J., dissenting.)
Appeal from an order made at a Special Term, denying a motion to vacate an assessment for paving Great Jones street, and from an order denying a motion made by tbe petitioner for leave to reopen tbe case and put in farther proof.
Tbe work was completed in April, 1869, and tbe assessment confirmed in September of tbat year. On December 27, 1876, this proceeding was commenced, to vacate the assessment, on the ground that the ordinance directing the work to be done had not been advertised before its adoption, as required by the charter, and that an assessment for a prior pavement of the street had been laid on the lot, and paid. No proofs were taken in the matter until April 10, 1878. It was brought to a hearing on May 20, 1878, and the prayer of the petition was denied at the Special Term, on the ground of laches. The General Term affirmed the decision of the Special Term, and the Court of Appeals reversed that decision and ordered a re-hearing. (78 N. Y., 109.) Upon the re-liearing it was shown that of the entire assessment, amounting to $20,362.15, $7,067.07 had been paid prior to the filing of the petition. And also, that two of the lots upon which the assessments had been paid had since that time changed hands, and now belonged to different persons.
Judge Donohue held that this proof established a proper case to deny the application, within the opinion of the Court of Appeals, saying: “ It seems to me that where improvements are made which the law intended property benefited should pay for, thattliere should be some limit to the time when they should be attacked. Papers may be lost, facts forgotten, or othei rights arise, as here, when the city is placed where nothing can be done even by legislation to obtain redress. Here the facts disclose that part of the assessments are paid, property has changed hands, and justice requires that the party who slept on their rights should be barred. There are cases where this may be excused by actual want of business knowledge, or in some other way, but here it is not. Motion denied.”
The petitioner’s attorney then applied for leave to re-open the case, aird put in further proof, which was denied.
T. F. Neville, for the appellant.
J. A. Beall, for the respondent.
The equitable doctrine of laches is applicable in proceedings under chapter 338 of Laws of 1858. (People v. Mayor, 2 Hill, 12, 13 ; Elmiendorf v. Ma/yor, 25 Wend., 693 ; People y. Mill, 53 N. Y., 519 ; People v. Supervisors Alleghany, 15 Wend., 198; People v. Shillwell, 19 N. Y., 531; State y. Newark, 30 N. J. Law, 303 State v. Jersey City, 35 Id., 455 ; Chinn v. Trustees, 32 Ohio St.; Am. Law Reg., March, 18?9, p. 203 ; People y. Utica, 65 Barb., 9.; Wiggm v. Wiggm, 9 Paige, 25.)

Opinion:
Barrett, J.:
I am in favor of the affirmance of the orders appealed from substantially upon the opinion of Donohue, j., in the court below. A few words, in addition, may not, however, be out of place. Upon the present hearing, the city has supplied the very proofs, the absence of which, upon the former hearing, was illustratively dwelt upon by the Court of Appeals. It now appears that the assessment has been partly enforced and paid; also, that some of the lots have changed hands. Thus, owing to the petitioner's great laches, it has become impossible to do justice to other property owners. The petitioner has enjoyed the benefit of the improvement during all these years, and now, upon a mere technicality, without alleging fraud, oppression or even unreasonable charges, he seeks to throw the burden upon the general tax-payers of the city, mcluding, of course, these very property owners who home already paid their full sha/re of the cost cf the work. If others have succeeded in vacating the assessment, it was because they moved in due season. That incident ought not to avail the petitioner. The question of his laches is an independent one. If he had moved within any reasonable time, the merely formal irregularities of which he complains might have been corrected, and a new assessment effectively laid. The latter is now practically impossible. There is no real merit in the application, and, under' the intimation of the Court of Appeals, as to the effect of the evidence now before us, it should be denied.
The order should be affirmed, with costs.
Davis, P. J.:
I think the order should be affirmed for the reasons assigned by Barrett, J. They show that substantial justice was done by the court below, and that ought to be the object in reviewing these assessments. The strict technicalities that have controlled this class of cases have been, largely productive of the greatest injustice to the tax-payers of the city.