Case Name: Charles N. Fuller v. City of Jackson
Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Mississippi
Decision Date: 1910-03
Citations: 97 Miss. 237
Docket Number: 
Parties: Charles N. Fuller v. City of Jackson.
Judges: 
Reporter: Mississippi Reports
Volume: 97
Pages: 237–260

Head Matter:
Charles N. Fuller v. City of Jackson.
[52 South. 873.]
TWO CASES.
1. Criminal Law and Procedure. Unlawful sale of intoxicating liquors. Code 1906, § 1746. Municipal ordinance.
Code 1906, § 1746, as amended by Laws 1908, ch. 115, p. 116, prohibiting the sale of any vinous, alcoholic, malt, intoxicating, or spirituous liquors or intoxicating bitters or other drinks which if drunk to excess will produce intoxication, prohibits the sale of vinous, alcoholic, malt, intoxicating, or spirituous liquors or intoxicating bitters, without reference to whether they in fact intoxicate because such class of liquors are known to be of an intoxicating character; and also prohibits the sale of any other drink which if drunk to excess will produce intoxication.
2. Same. Malt ale.
The sale of malt ale, which is a malt liquor, and which contains two and seventy-one one hundredth per centum of alcohol by volume and two and twelve one-hundredth per centum by weight, is prohibited by Code 1906, § 1746. (Per .Mates, C. J., and ■ Smith, J.)
3. Same. Non-intoxicating leverage.
A sale of a beverage which is not shown to be a vinous, alcoholic, malt, intoxicating, or spirituous liquor or intoxicating bitter, and which contains eighteen one-hundredths of one per centum of alcohol by volume and thirteen one-hundredths of one per centum by weight, is not prohibited by Code 1906, § 1746. (Per Mates, C. J., and Anderson, J.)
From the circuit court of, first district, Hinds county.
Hon. Wiley H. Potter, Judge.
Fuller, appellant, was convicted in the municipal court of Jackson, in two cases, of unlawfully selling intoxicating liquors violation of a city ordinance; he appealed both cases to the circuit court where he was tried de novo in each case and was again convicted in each of them, and he appealed in each of them to the supreme court. The facts as stated by Anderson, J., were as follows:
These cases, being governed by practically the same principles, are considered together. The defendant was convicted in two cases for the unlawful sale of intoxicating liquors under the ordinances of the city of Jackson, and appeals to this court.
As authorized by section 3410, Code 1906, the municipal authorities adopted a general ordinance making all offenses against the criminal laws of the state, occurring within the limits of the city, not amounting to a felony, violations of the city ordinances and punishable as such. In each case the affidavit charged the defendant, Fuller, with selling “vinous, malt, alcoholic, intoxicating, and sprituous liquors,” etc., in violation of section. 1746, Code 1906, which had become' an ordinance of the city as above set forth. There was an agreed state of facts in each case. In case No. 14,306 the facts agreed on are as follows: “The defendant did sell in the city of Jackson, Hinds county, Miss., a beverage known as ‘Brewett’ on the date mentioned in the affidavit filed herein. lie sold it for cash and received the money for it. The said beverage sold by the said Fuller contained by volume .18 of 1 per cent, of alcohol, and by weight .13 of 1 per cent, of alcohol. The said beverage did not contain enough alcohol to make it intoxicating to any extent when drunk to excess. The said beverage so sold was not in fact an intoxicating liquor.”
In this case the court gave the following instruction for the plaintiff: “The court instructs the jury for the plaintiff that if you believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did on the date named in the affidavit sell a beverage known as ‘Brewett,’ and that the said liquor contained some alcohol, although not a sufficient amount of alcohol to make the said beverage intoxicating to any extent when drunk to excess, you should find him guilty as charged.” And refused instructions Nos. 1, 2, and 3 on behalf of the defendant, as follows: “No. 1. The court instructs the jury to find the de-, fendant not guilty. No. 2. The court instructs the jury for the defendant that a liquor is not, within the meaning of the statutes of this state, alcoholic unless it contains a sufficient amount of alcohol to make it intoxicating to some extent when drunk to excess. No. 3. The court further instructs the jury for the defendant that if you believe from, the evidence that the defendant did on the date named in the affidavit sell a certain beverage known as ‘Brewett,’ and that the said beverage contained the small per cent, of alcohol shown by the evidence,, and that the said percentage of alcohol was too small to make the said liquid intoxicating to any extent even when drunk to excess, then, you should find the defendant not guilty.”
In case 14,307 the agreed facts are as follows: “The said defendant did on the date laid in the affidavit herein sell for cash, in the city of Jackson, Hinds county, Miss., as a beverage, a -certain liquor known as ‘Malt Ale.’ The said beverage sold by the said defendant on the said date contained by volume 2.70 per cent, of alcohol and by weight 2.12 per cent, of alcohol.”
The court gave the following instruction for the state: “The court instructs the jury for the plaintiff that if you believe from the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant on or about the date named in the affidavit sold a certain liquor known as ‘Malt Ale,’ and that the said liquor was sold as a beverage and contained 2.12 per cent, of alcohol or 2.70 per -cent., then you will find the defendant guilty as charged.” And refused the following instructions asked on the part of the defendant: “The court instructs the jury for the defendant that the burden is upon the city of Jackson to prove that the liquor charged to have been sold is intoxicating to some extent when drunk to excess; that it is not sufficient merely to show that the said liquors contained a small amount of alcohol. The court further instructs the jury that, unless you believe from the evidence that the said liquor sold by the defendant contained a percentage of alcohol large enough to make the same when drunk to excess intoxicating to some extent, then you will find the defendant not guilty.”
The giving of the charges asked for the state, and refusing, those asked on behalf of the defendant, are assigned as error.
Flowers, Fletcher &. Whitfield, for appellant.
Code 1906, § 1746, is a statute which affects the police power of the government. In the exercise of its police power the state can enact and execute laws abridging the rights of citizens to sell intoxicating liquors. All laws which concern the sale of intoxicating liquors are passed and enforced in the, exercise of this police power. Glozza v. Tieman, 148 IT. S. 657; Kidd v. Pierson, 128 IT. ,S. 1; Mugler.v. Kansas, 123 IT. S. 623.
It is because intoxicating liquors disturb the public peace and endanger the life, health and morals of the people that laws prohibiting or regulating the manufacture and distribution of them-are upheld as being within the police power. Boston Beer Go., v. Massachusetts, 97 IT. S. 25.
All the laws of our different states similar -to Code 1906,. § 1746, are generally aimed at intoxicating liquors, that is, liquors which actually intoxicate, which contain an intoxicating-element. The great temperance movement which is sweeping over our state and nation is directed not against innocent beverages but against those beverages which actually intoxicate the' drinker.
The beverage sold by appellant contains only a very small quantity of alcohol. In a fifty gallon barrel of the beverage' there is only two-thirds of a pint of alcohol. It would be, necessary to drink from three to. five gallons of the beverage to take into the stomach as much alcohol as is contained in a pint of ordinary beer. The proportion of alcohol is so small in the beverage that enough of it cannot be taken into the human body and retained at any one time to even upset the mind in the slightest perceptible degree. The only fault chargeable against the beverage is that it has the above-mentioned small quantum of alcohol in it.
Can the legislature go so far as to prohibit the sale of liquors which are harmless when taken into the body and harmless also in other respects? There must somewhere be a limit on the restrictive powers of the legislature. Such limit is exceeded when the police power of the state or governing body is held, under Code 1906, § 1746, to be given tire authority to prevent the sale of a beverage free of intoxicating elements or qualities. Intoxicating Liquor cases, 37 Am. St. Bep. 284, 291.
A legislature may define'intoxicating liquors and may embrace within the definition liquors which are not in fact intoxicating, according to Black on Intoxicating Liquors, § 43. But the authorities upon which this textbook writer relies will be found not to support his dictum. State v. Smith, 14 B. I, 100; Commonwealth v. Timothy, 8 Gray (Mass.), 480. And in Elder v. State, 50 South. 370, the Alabama court discussed a statute similar to Code 1906, § 1746, and held the statute to be constitutional. But the Alabama court cited no decisions of other states to uphold its opinion.
In Potts v. State, 123 Am. St. Bep. (Texas), 847, the Texas court had before it the question whether lager beer was intoxicating, and under the evidence, or rather, lack of evidence, a judgment of conviction of appellant was reversed. And see State v. Fredericksburg, 115 Am. St. Bep. 295’; Ex parte Brown, 70 Am. St. Bep. 743; State v. Qilmore, 33 W. Va. 146.
The supreme court of the United States in the first case where it became necessary to say that the states have the right to control the sale of liquors or any other business inimical to the public peace, health, morals or safety, emphasizes the idea that the liquors prohibited may be thus properly controlled by the state because they are intoxicating, and hence are dangerous and are supposed to be a menace to the public welfare. It is for such reason that they may be constitutionally condemned. Bariemeyer v. Iowa, 18 Wall. 129, 21 L. Ed. 929. This is the first case in which the supreme court of the United States had occasion to say that no one had an inalienable right to deal in intoxicating liquors prior to the fourteenth amendment, and that no new privileges and immunities were created for him by that amendment. Such a question could not have arisen prior to the fourteenth amendment which was adopted in the year 1868. And it appears that in the subsequent cases that court has uniformly dealt with the question as involving intoxicating beverages. This is the kind against which the states have authority to protect the local public.
Code 1906, § 1J46, forbids trafile only in intoxicating liquors. It can hardly be denied that the prohibition movement is directed against intoxicating liquors. This is what public opinion condemns and it is what the legislature dealt with. Uq> to this time there had been no thought of going further into the regulation of the conduct of citizens or in tile restriction of their activities. It may be that when the larger evil is eradicated, attention will be fastened upon smaller real or imagined evils. It may be that if it is found to be impossible to enforce the laws against the intoxicating liquors the legislature may concede the idea of prohibiting the use of devices in the sale of certain liquids which render it difficult to prove violation of the law. But the legislature has not done this yet. We have not advanced so far. This extreme has not yet become necessary.
Code 1906, § 1746, prohibits the sale of vinous liquors. Grape juice is a vinous liquor even before it is fermented. Is it not sold in unfermented form every day, and has the right of dealers to sell it ever been questioned ? It is a fact that this beverage contains a slight proportion of alcohol. All malt liquors are intoxicating to some extent, however slight. In fact, no malt liquor has yet been brewed which did not contain some alcohol to preserve it. Certainly all malt liquors known to the legislature were intoxicating.
Spirituous liquors are such as contain spirits of alcohol, but it is generally held by the courts that, in order to come within the meaning of statutes prohibiting sales of such liquors, it must appear that alcohol is contained to a sufficient extent to make the liquors in question intoxicating.
If the word “alcoholic” is not intended to designate intoxicating beverages, then it is the only word used to describe certain condemned liquors, and all the rest apply to such as will produce intoxication. The statute also includes “other drinks which if drunk to excess will produce intoxication.” Now, such other drinks covered by the statute must of necessity contain alcohol in order to be intoxicating. On that particular point in the paragraph there can be no mistake as to the meaning of the legislature. The “other drinks,” in addition to those already enumerated, contain alcohol in sufficient quantity to produce intoxication when drunk to excess, are also condemned. These drinks are alcoholic drinks. But it is specially provided that these other drinks are condemned only when they will produce intoxication when drunk to excess. If every liquor which contains some alcohol, whether enough to produce intoxication or not, is to be condemned, then this last clause defining the forbidden “other drinks” has no meaning whatever and is surplusage. In fací, the word “intoxicating” used in the statute is entirely unnecessary' unless our construction here insisted upon is correct.
We are aware that this court upheld the action of the trial court in the case of Adams, v. Berry, in which the lower court gave a peremptory instruction for the plaintiff on proof that the liquid sold by Berry contained about two per cent, of, alcohol, but it appeared in that case that whatever might be the quantity of alcohol in the liquid, it was sufficient to produce intoxication and did in fact intoxicate the man who drank it for the purpose of testing it. And in the case of Edwards v: City of Gulfport, 95 Miss. 148, 49 South. 620, the court was dealing with a liquid which contained four and six-tenths per cent of alcohol. It was shown to be a malt liquor and that two bottles of it would intoxicate an average man. In that case the court did not hold that any liquor which contains any alcohol is necessarily an alcoholic liquor within the meaning of the statute. In fact the court said that the defendant could not complain of the failure of the court below to define for the benefit' of the jury what malt and intoxicating liquor was, because it was said the defendant did not ask for such an instruction.
James B. McDowell, assistant attorney-general, for appellee.
This case was tried in the court below on an agreed statement of fact that the defendant sold a beverage known as “Brewett/-’ containing a small per centum of alcohol but not enough to make the beverage intoxicating even when drunk to excess. On the trial in the court below the court instructed the jury that they should find the defendant guilty as charged if they should find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that the beverage contained any alcohol. The court below refused instructions asked by the defendant to the effect that unless there was a sufficient quantity of alcohol in the beverage to make it intoxicating the defendant should be acquitted. This appeal involves the interpretation of Code 1906, § 1746.
The intention of the legislature, with regard to the statute in question, must be determined from the language of the statute. It is to be presumed that the legislature intended to prohibit the sale of every liquor and beverage in any way alcoholic; and not only alcoholic liquor but also vinous and malt liquor. Beyfelt v. State, 73 Miss. 415; Marks v. State, 48 South. 864.
We do not contend that everything which contains alcohol must be prohibited from sale under Code 1906, § 1746. Cologne, bay rum, spirits of camphor, hair tonic, and in fact many other commodities, contain some trace of alcohol for preservative purposes. Many medicines contain alcohol. But it is a dangerous precedent to begin to allow the sale of beverages admittedly containing alcohol in slight amount, on the theory that such beverages, while containing alcohol, contain so little in proportion that there are no accompanying intoxicating effects. What will intoxicate one person possibly will not intoxicate another.
In Code 1906, § 1746, the words, “other drinks which if drunk to excess, will produce intoxication,” are not meant to qualify the words, “vinous,” “spiritous,” “alcoholic,” “malt,” but are inserted in the statute to cover any omission which might have been made in enumeration of classes of drinks unclassified by the prohibiting words quoted.
Learned cotmsel for appellant contend that the court should define what proportion of alcohol a liquor intended as a beverage should contain in order to come under the prohibition of the statute, the specific argument being made that the beverage must contain enough alcohol to make it intoxicating in some degree when drunk to excess. But how can this be ascertained before the beverage is actually imbibed ? Shall this court say that one per centum, or two per centum or ten per centum of alcohol shall be the limit beyond which it shall be illegal to proceed in the mixing and selling of beverages ? This would certainly be an unwarranted assumption. Had the legislature intended to fix a certain per centum for intermixture of alcohol in beverages, it would have worded the statute differently.
It would be impossible to make proof in many cases that some certain questionable beverage was or was not intoxicating merely by showing its effect on the human system. . The actual specific drink would have been consumed, and the state conld not oftentimes be able to prove similarity to samples exhibited before the jury.
What is “Brewett ?” Its name would indicate that it was a brewed drink possibly similar to beer although containing less alcohol. What is the object in selling “Brewett?” We may presume it to be offered as a substitute, in our prohibition state, for beer, less harmful than beer. Certainly it is not intended for medicinal purposes solely. Appellant was not selling it for medicinal purposes. Appellant is not a druggist, nor a physician. But its similarity in taste to other stronger brewed drinks, presumably alcoholic beer, is doubtless the leading influence causing its sale. Now, if the beverage “Brewett” does contain any alcohol and if its purposes are as a substitute for stronger brewed drinks, the ban of the law, under Code 1906, § 1746, should be applied. For the intent of the legislature in passing the statute was to do away, at one fell swoop, with all liquors which contain alcohol and also all liquors which if drunk to excess will intoxicate.
The court is not warranted in defining what are alcoholic liquors except by following the statute. 17 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law (2d ed.) 198; notes 2 L. R. A., 408; 76 Iowa, 243’.
This is a test case. If this court shall hold that this particular beverage, “Brewett,” is not prohibited from sale under the statute, why may not every drug store, every soda-fountain stand, dispense it to women and children ? If it is a brewed article, it doubtless contains malt, and belongs to1 the extensive beer family without having the intoxicating feeling and effect given by beer. Was it the intent-of the legislature to encourage the sale of these make-shifts ? Where would such a policy lead ? What will be the probable effect on children, accustomed to drinks of this character, as regards their choice of beverages when they grow older and naturally desire something stronger in effect?
In the Edwards case the appellant urged the court to reverse the judgment on the ground that the court below failed to define what was an alcoholic liquor. 'The safe ground here is to construe the statute literally, and avoid all entangling complications resultant from technical presumptions. Elder v. State, 50 South. 3Y0; Black on Intox. Liq. § 34.
A wide latitude is allowed to the legislature in dealing with the malodorous liquor question. Outlawed liquors cease to be property, and may be seized and destroyed. The owner of a building in which intoxicating liquors are sold becomes amenable to the law. The legislature may pass laws which in their results will ruin or depreciate the business of a brewer or distiller, and such laws will be constitutional. The state is the unit of government, and its police powers must be given the fullest scope. Accordingly this statute should be construed in its general scope, as written.
Argued orally by J. N. Flowers, for appellant, and by James B. McDowell, for appellee.

Opinion:
Anderson, J.,
after stating the facts as above, delivered the opinion of the court.
The paragraph of section 1746 of the Code of 1906, which is the ordinance of the city under which the defendant was convicted, is as follows: "If any person shall (a) sell or barter, or give away to induce trade, or keep for sale or barter, or to be given away to induce trade, any vinous, alcoholic, malt, intoxicating, or spirituous liquors, or intoxicating bitters, or other drinks, which if drank to excess will produce intoxication, in any quantity less than one gallon, without having a license therefor in pursuance of this chapter," etc. The language, "which if drank to excess will produce intoxication," qualifies the terms "vinous, alcoholic, malt, intoxicating, or spirituous liquors, or intoxicating bitters, or other drinks." There are alcoholic drinks which are known to the law to be intoxicating. Within this class are alcohol, wine, beer, ale, porter, whisky, brandy, gin, rum, and perhaps others. Such liquors, according to the common understanding, are intoxicating. The courts take judicial notice of the fact that they are alcoholic liquors, and will produce intoxication when drunk to excess. 23 Cyc. 61, 62, 63; 17 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law (2d ed.) pp. 198, 199, 200, 201. There will be found collated in these two authorities the cases on this subject. In a case where the liquor in question belongs to this class, it is not necessary for the state to prove that it will intoxicate when drunk to excess; while, on the other hand, if it is not within this class which the court judicially shows are intoxicating, it is necessary for the state to prove that if drunk to excess it will cause intoxication. The term "alcoholic" is a general term which seems to have been thrown in rather for good measure than for any purpose. The statute is directed against alcoholic intoxicants. The sale of alcoholic liquors is prohibited provided they contain sufficient alcohol to intoxicate when drunk to excess.
The history of what is commonly known as the "prohibition movement" in this state, which resulted in the enactment of the statutes on this subject now in force, shows that it was directed against the sale of intoxicating liquors. Construing all these statutes together, it is apparent that the object of the legislature was to prohibit the sale of intoxicating liquors. This is clearly demonstrated by sections 1747, 1748, 1749, 1750, 1752, 1755, 1758, 1759, 1765, 1767, 1773, 1776, 1791, 1794, 1797, and 1798 of Code 1906, and also chapter 117 of the Laws of 1908, which is a memorial to congress, to enact a law to prevent the issuance of United States revenue license to' any person selling "intoxicating liquors" in any locality where the sale is prohibited by local laws.
It is contended that the case of Edwards v. City of Gulfport, 49 South. 620, is authority for the instructions given in these cases for the state. The liquor sold in the Edwards case was "Pabst.Mead," containing 4.6 per cent, alcohol to each bottle; and the testimony showed that two bottles of it would intoxicate an average man. The court charged the jury that, if the liquor sold was a malt or alcoholic liquor, they should find the defendant guilty, whether shown to be intoxicating or not. Judge Whitfield uses this language in that case: "This case falls squarely within the case of Reyfelt v. State, 73 Miss. 415, 18 South. 925. On the evidence in this case it is perfectly manifest that a conviction is proper on either one of two grounds: First, that the liquor was shown to be both alcoholic and malt liquor; and, second, that it was shown to contain enough alcohol to make an average man drunk if he drank two bottles." Marks v. State, 159 Ala. 71, 48 South. 864, is referred to as authority for the Edwards case. It is true that in the Marks case (reviewing the statute substantially the same as section 1746, Code 1906) the Alabama court held that the language, "which if drunk to excess will produce intoxication," did not relate to each and all the liquors preceding it. However, the court held further in that case (exactly contrary to what was held in the Edwards case): "Whether a beverage containing 1.46 per cent. of alcohol by weight, and 1.88 per cent, by volume, and .20 per cent, maltose, making 2% teaspoonfuls of alcohol per pint, is an alcoholic, spirituous, vinous, malt, or intoxicating liquor, or whether if drunk to excess will produce intoxication, is a question of fact for the jury." The Reyfelt case is not authority for the Edwards case. In the former the liquor sold was home-made wine; and the court held it was unlawful to sell it regardless of the opinion of witnesses that it would not intoxicate. The decision of the court- was manifestly correct, because wine is one of the liquors which has an accepted judicial meaning, and judicially known to be intoxicating when drunk to excess.
It is contended on behalf of the state that the purpose of the legislature was to prohibit the sale of all drinks as beverages containing alcohol in any quantity, however small; the object being not alone to lessen drunkenness, but to put out of reach of the people drinks which have a tendency to create a thirst for intoxicants. There is nothing in our statutes, nor in the history of the "prohibition movement," to indicate such purpose.
If the charges complained of in the instant cases, and which were authorized by the Edwards case, are the law, then if a person should sell, as a beverage, a barrel of water with a teaspoonful of alcohol in it, he would violate this statute; and so-would the owners of soda fountains, selling the usual cold drinks, using various extracts in the same, containing a small portion of alcohol for their preservation.
These views necessitate, in my judgment, the overruling of so much of the Edwards case as holds that the charge in question in that case was a correct statement of the law. That case stands alone, unsupported, and. is unsound.
In.both of these cases the court should have instructed the jury peremptorily to find a verdict for the defendant, because neither of the drinks sold was shown to be intoxicating when drunk to excess. In ease No. 14,301, if the "Malt Ale" sold had been proven to be ordinary ale, then the jury would have been authorized to convict, whether the ale was shown to be intoxicating or not when drunk to excess; ale being in the class of liquors which are judicially known to be intoxicating.
The judgments in these cases, both of them, are, therefore, reversed and the causes remanded.
Reversed.