Case Name: HOUSE v. LEHIGH VALLEY R. CO.
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1908-11-11
Citations: 113 N.Y.S. 155
Docket Number: 
Parties: HOUSE v. LEHIGH VALLEY R. CO.
Judges: 
Reporter: West's New York Supplement
Volume: 113
Pages: 155–157

Head Matter:
(128 App. Div. 756.)
HOUSE v. LEHIGH VALLEY R. CO.
(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Department.
November 11, 1908.)
1. Master and Servant (§ 198 )—Railroads—Fellow Servants—Section-man- and Operator.
An operator and a sectionman are fellow servants as to any negligent failure of the operator to inform the section foreman of a scheduled train which afterwards struck the sectionman.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Master and Servant, Cent. Dig. § 495; Dec. Dig. § 198.*
For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, vol. 3, pp. 2716-2730; vol. 8, p. 7662.]
2. Master and Servant (§ 198*)—Railroads—Fellow Servants—Section Foreman and Sectionmen.
The negligent failure of a section foreman to inform one of his section-men of a scheduled train which afterwards struck such sectionman was the act of a fellow servant.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Master and Servant, Cent. Dig. § 495; Dec. Dig. § 198.*]
Kellogg, J., dissenting.
Appeal from Trial Term, Chemung County.
Action by Chauncey House against the Lehigh Valley Railroad Company. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals.
Reversed, and new trial granted.
Argued before SMITH, P. J., and CHESTER, KELLOGG, and COCHRANE, JJ.
Diven & Diven (Eugene Diven, of counsel), for appellant.
Sherman Moreland (Richard H. Thurston, of counsel), for respondent.
For other cases see same topic & § number in Dec. & Am. Digs. 1907 to date, & Rep’r Indexes

Opinion:
SMITH, P. J.
This judgment has charged the defendant with a breach of its duty in failing to provide the plaintiff with a safe place to work. The plaintiff • was one of four sectionmen under a section foreman. Upon the morning of the 30th day of January, 1903, while at work upon a bridge upon the defendant's line, he was struck by one of the defendant's trains and severely injured. He was at work upon this bridge in due course of his employment, and this train was one that had been delayed about 11 hours by reason of having jumped the track at a point westerly of this bridge. A rule of the company required the track foreman to ascertain at the nearest telegraph office what extra or special trains were scheduled. Of the regular trains they had due notice. Upon the morning in question the foreman had applied to the telegraph operator at Swart wood, who had communicated with the train dispatcher. The evidence of the foreman is to the effect that the telegraph operator, after having communicated with the train dispatcher, told him that there was nothing extra scheduled for that day. The evidence of the operator is to the effect that he told the foreman that train 326 was in the ditch, and that the engineer had his leg broken. The train 326 was the train by which the plaintiff was afterwards struck. Here was a question of veracity between the foreman and the operator, and the question was submitted to the jury as to whether the operator negligently failed to inform the foreman of the fact that this train had been ditched and thereby delayed; the court charging the jury that the negligence of the operator, if such were found, was the negligence of the defendant, for which a recovery could be had. To this charge an exception was duly taken.
I am unable to distinguish this case from the case of Slater v. Jewett, 85 N. Y. 61, 39 Am. Rep. 627. In that case a telegraph operator had failed to give notice to an engineer of a train, to whom he was required by the rules of the company to give notice as to the running of the train. By reason of that negligence a collision occurred, in which an employe upon the train was injured. It was held that the negligence of the operator was the negligence of a fellow servant, and that the defendant was not liable therefor. While this case has been at times distinguished, it has never been overruled, and is, I think, a controlling authority in the case at bar.
The respondent contends that, if this be error, it is harmless, because of the admission in the appellant's brief that the foreman's negligence caused the injury. It is claimed that the foreman is the vice principal for the purpose of providing a safe place to work for the sectionmen and of warning them of known dangers. The answer to this contention would seem to be that, if the act of the telegraph operator in failing to give information to the foreman be the act of a fellow servant, it must be that the act of the foreman in failing to give the information of the danger to the section hand is also the, act of a fellow servant. In other words, every reason for holding that the giving of the information by the operator to the foreman is a matter of "executive detail" exists for holding that the giving of the information by the foreman to the section hand is a matter of "executive detail." It follows that the judgment and order must be reversed, and a new trial granted, with costs to appellant to abide the event.
Judgment and order reversed and new trial granted, with costs to appellant to abide event. All concur, except KELLOGG, J., dissenting in opinion, and SEWELL, J., not sitting.