Case Name: Allen CLEWIS, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1992-10-06
Citations: 605 So. 2d 974
Docket Number: No. 92-283
Parties: Allen CLEWIS, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: Before FERGUSON, COPE and LEVY, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 605
Pages: 974–976

Head Matter:
Allen CLEWIS, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. 92-283.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
Oct. 6, 1992.
Bennett H. Brummer, Public Defender, and Beth C. Weitzner, Asst. Public Defender, for appellant.
Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., and Leslie Schreiber, Asst. Atty. Gen., for ap-pellee.
Before FERGUSON, COPE and LEVY, JJ.

Opinion:
FERGUSON, Judge.
Clewis was arrested for a midnight street sale of cocaine to a police officer, over four hours after the incident, by another police officer who did not witness the transaction. Clewis claimed to be a victim of a misidentification. Officer Meyers, an undercover Key West police officer who made the purchase, made the only eyewitness identification of the defendant as the seller. When arrested, the defendant had no drugs in his possession, was in attire different from that worn by the drug dealer, and was not in possession of the marked money used to make the purchase.
During final argument the prosecutor misadvised the jury as follows:
PROSECUTOR: That [the defendant's testimony] is not a reasonable doubt. A reasonable doubt is something you can attach reason to. You have to believe his story over the story of those police officers that saw him that night to have reasonable doubt.
You must believe that you must disbelieve the testimony of those police officers—
DEFENSE COUNSEL: Objection, your Honor.
THE COURT: You want to argue at the bench.
(Proceedings had at sidebar).
MR. JONES: Your Honor, reasonable doubt I don't think is where you believe one side or the other side.
PROSECUTOR: The case involves the belief of those police officers.
THE COURT: Overruled.
(Proceedings concluded at sidebar).
The test for reasonable doubt is not which side is more believable, but whether, taking all of the evidence in the case into consideration, guilt as to every essential element of the charge has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Stanfield, 521 F.2d 1122, 1125 (9th Cir.1975). The argument made by the prosecutor distorts the State's burden of proof by shifting that burden to the defense. See United States v. Reed, 724 F.2d 677, 681 (8th Cir.1984) (prosecutor's comment "that for the jury to acquit Reed '[they] must determine that Mr. Reed is telling the truth and that all [the government witnesses] are lying to you,' involves a distortion of the government's burden of proof."); United States v. Vargas, 583 F.2d 380, 387 (7th Cir.1978) ("To tell the jurors that they had to choose between the two stories was error."); People v. Ferguson, 172 Ill.App.3d 1, 12, 122 Ill.Dec. 266, 274, 526 N.E.2d 525, 533 (prosecutor's comment that "to find the Defendant not guilty . you have to believe he told you the truth . [a]nd that all of [the State's witnesses] are liars and fools" held to be such a misstatement of law as to constitute fundamental error), appeal denied, 122 Ill.2d 583, 125 Ill.Dec. 226, 530 N.E.2d 254 (Ill.1988).
In Rodriguez v. State, 493 So.2d 1067 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986), we held that a similar misstatement of the law was "unquestionably erroneous." We affirmed the conviction in Rodriguez because an objection to the comment had been sustained and a curative instruction was given which was obviously satisfactory to the defendant. Here the defendant's objection to the erroneous statement of law was overruled. We hold again, as in Rodriguez, that it is legally incorrect to ask the jury to decide, as the test for reasonable doubt, who is the liar as between the accused and a police officer. The trial setting in a small community, where the officer was known to one or more of the jurors, made the distortion of the law especially prejudicial.
The remaining question is whether the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See State v. DiGuilio, 491 So.2d 1129 (Fla.1986). We conclude it was not. It should be noted that in this case the jury acquitted the defendant on one count of sale of cocaine, while convicting on two other counts with which the defendant was charged. The jury sent out a note essentially inquiring whether the testimony of a third police officer shed light on the identity of the seller of the cocaine in one of the transactions. The fact that the police officer and the defendant had had prior contact with each other was argued by the State to bolster the officer's identification and by the defense to urge that the defendant would not knowingly engage in an illegal transaction with a police officer. The jury itself had enough doubt to acquit on one of three counts. We are unable to say that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
Reversed and remanded for a new trial.
COPE, J., concurs.