Case Name: STATE of South Dakota, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Larry H. PACK, Defendant and Appellant
Court: South Dakota Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: South Dakota
Decision Date: 1994-05-18
Citations: 516 N.W.2d 665
Docket Number: No. 18341
Parties: STATE of South Dakota, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Larry H. PACK, Defendant and Appellant.
Judges: WUEST and SABERS, JJ., concur.
Reporter: North Western Reporter 2d
Volume: 516
Pages: 665–672

Head Matter:
STATE of South Dakota, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Larry H. PACK, Defendant and Appellant.
No. 18341.
Supreme Court of South Dakota.
Considered on Briefs Feb. 14, 1994.
Decided May 18, 1994.
Mark Barnett, Atty. Gen., Scott Bogue, Asst. Atty. Gen., Pierre, for plaintiff and appellee.
Lester Nies of Richards, Hood, Brady & Nies, Spearfish, for defendant and appellant.

Opinion:
MILLER, Chief Justice.
Larry H. Pack pled guilty to two counts of rape, SDCL 22-22-1(5), a Class 3 felony with a maximum punishment of fifteen years' imprisonment and a $15,000 fine. The court ordered that Pack serve two consecutive fifteen-year terms, that upon release or parole he attend a sexual offender program and receive substance abuse counseling and that, upon his release from the program, a mental health counselor would determine whether he would be allowed to have contact with minor children.
On appeal, Pack claims his sentence is excessive and violates the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article VI, § 23 of the South Dakota Constitution. We affirm.
FACTS
Pack moved to South Dakota in September 1990, after the State of Wyoming began investigating him for sexual contact involving his middle stepdaughter, T.O. His wife, S.O. (who is also the mother of the girls involved), and the children followed. Pack then began raping his youngest stepdaughter, thirteen-year-old J.O. He followed the same pattern he had established in his sexual predation of his oldest stepdaughter, P.O. He would wait until his wife was at work, send the younger children out of the house and force J.O. into sex through threats of being beaten, abandoned by S.O., or grounded. Pack continued to rape J.O. twice a week for two years.
In October of 1992, due to reports of truancy and sexual abuse, the South Dakota Department of Social Services and the Lawrence County Sheriff interviewed J.O. and learned of Pack's activities. On October 23, 1992, a grand jury indicted Pack on twenty-six counts of rape of J.O. between September 1990 and October 1992.
On February 10, 1993, pursuant to a plea agreement, Pack signed a petition to enter a plea of nolo contendere to two of the charges. On March 9, 1993, he amended his plea to guilty. The remaining charges in the indictment — twenty-four additional counts of rape and a fugitive from justice complaint — were dismissed. In addition, the Lawrence County State's Attorney's Office agreed not to file a Part II Information against Pack, to bar subsequent prosecution of any uncharged incidents of rape between September 1990 and October 9, 1992, and to make the agreement contingent upon completion of a plea agreement between Pack and the State of Wyoming, which called for any Wyoming sentence to be served concurrently with the sentence imposed for the South Dakota charges. As noted earlier, the trial court sentenced him to two consecutive fifteen-year terms in prison.
Pack filed an appeal on April 30, 1993. On May 10, 1993, he requested that this court remand his appeal for the purpose of allowing a motion to the trial court seeking a hearing on the legality of his sentence. We granted the remand. The trial court conducted two motions hearings and entered an order upholding the legality of Pack's sentence. He appeals.
ISSUE
WHETHER PACK'S SENTENCE CONSTITUTES CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT.
It is important to note that Pack's motion to this court for remand to the trial court to request hearing on his sentencing was to determine the legality of his sentence, not a request for Eighth Amendment review. Pack's thirty-year sentence is clearly within statutory limits for two counts of rape of a minor. SDCL 22-22-1; SDCL 22-6-1. Therefore, as the trial judge found, it is "not facially illegal." Nor does Pack allege any other circumstance under which we have found sentences to be illegal. See State v. Tibbetts, 333 N.W.2d 440 (S.D.1983) (finding denial of credit for presentence incarceration rendered sentence illegal); State v. Ford, 328 N.W.2d 263 (S.D.1982) (finding sentence illegally increased after oral pronouncement of sentence). Therefore, we apply the following standard of review:
'On appeal, we first determine whether the sentence "shocks the conscience" or is so disproportionate to the crime that it activates the Eighth Amendment "within and without jurisdiction" proportionality tests.... ' State v. Lykken, 484 N.W.2d 869, 879 (S.D.1992); State v. Basket, 468 N.W.2d 413, 418 (S.D.1991). Accord State v. Andrews, 393 N.W.2d 76, 82-83 (S.D.1986); Weiker II, [State v. Weiker] 366 N.W.2d [823] at 827 [ (S.D.1985) ]. 'Absent a sentence which is so excessive in duration that it shocks the conscience of the court, it is well settled in South Dakota that a sentence within statutory limits is not reviewable on appeal.' Lykken, 484 N.W.2d at 879; State v. Janssen, 371 N.W.2d 353, 356 (S.D.1985) (citing cases). Stated alternatively, we will only engage in extensive review of a sentence where we have first determined the sentence was manifestly disproportionate to the crime. State v. Holloway, 482 N.W.2d 306, 310-311 (S.D.1992); Weiker II, 366 N.W.2d at 827. 'If a sentence is manifestly disproportionate to the crime, [in light of the gravity of the offense and harshness of the penalty] . then the other two factors listed in Helm [sentence imposed on others in the same jurisdiction and in other jurisdictions] become more focused and require extensive review.' Weiker II, 366 N.W.2d at 827. See also [Solem v.] Helm, 463 U.S. [277] at 292, 103 S.Ct. [3001] at 3011, 77 L.Ed.2d [637] at 650 [ (1983) ].
State v. Castaneira, 502 N.W.2d 112, 114-15 (S.D.1993) (quoting State v. Gehrke, 491 N.W.2d 421, 423 (S.D.1992)).
The test to determine whether a sentence is so constitutionally offensive as to shock the conscience is two-fold. State v. Shilvock-Havird, 472 N.W.2d 773 (S.D.1991).
First, is the punishment so excessive or so cruel 'as to meet the disapproval and condemnation of the conscience and reason of men generally.' And second, whether the punishment is so excessive or so cruel as to shock the collective conscience of this court.
Id. at 779.
When determining a fitting sentence, the sentencing court should " 'acquire a thorough acquaintance with the character and history of the man before it.' " State v. Carsten, 264 N.W.2d 707, 709 (S.D.1978) (quoting United States v. Hendrix, 505 F.2d 1233, 1235-36 (2d Cir.1974) cert. denied, 423 U.S. 897, 96 S.Ct. 199, 46 L.Ed.2d 130 (1975)); State v. Murphy, 506 N.W.2d 130 (S.D.1993). This study should examine a defendant's "general moral character, mentality, habits, social environment, tendencies, age, aversion or inclination to commit crime, life, family, occupation, and previous criminal record." State v. Degen, 396 N.W.2d 759, 760 (S.D.1986); Murphy, 506 N.W.2d at 133 (lying to the trial court is a proper factor to be considered by the sentencing court in determining defendant's attitudes toward society and prospects for rehabilitation); State v. Lohnes, 432 N.W.2d 77 (S.D.1988) (stating defendant's lack of remorse was properly considered at sentencing).
Pack repeatedly raped J.O. for over two years. He began raping P.O. when she was twelve years old and continued for six years. He used physical force and threats of abandonment to force his stepdaughters to submit. When T.O. resisted his advances, he made up excuses to beat her.
Pack shows no remorse for his acts but blames the girls for being "wild" and claims J.O. "asked me to have sex with her." The report by the court services officer shows "[e]very negative circumstance revealed in this pre-sentence investigation, from the robbery in Washington, the dishonorable discharge from the military, to the rape of his stepdaughter was continually justified by this defendant as being 'the other guy's fault.' " Pack is a repeat offender both as to his pattern of raping his stepdaughters and his additional criminal history.
Pack's chances for rehabilitation were described by the court services officer as "sickeningly bleak." This court has previously taken note of the high recidivism rate of sexual offenders. In re R.P., 498 N.W.2d 364, 368 n. 3 (S.D.1993); In re J.J., 454 N.W.2d 317, 325 n. 7 (S.D.1990).
The indictment charged Pack with twenty-six counts of rape — a possible sentence of 360 years in the penitentiary and a fine of $390,-000. Further, had the prosecutor filed a Part II Information alleging Park was an habitual criminal, he faced additional years added to his sentence under SDCL ch. 22-7. Under the plea agreement accepted by the court, Pack was allowed to serve his South Dakota sentence concurrently with a sentence from Wyoming. Further, the prosecutor dropped fugitive from justice charges against Pack.
The trial court had the benefit of a statement by Pack, a statement from his victim, an extensive pre-sentence report and a psychological evaluation of Pack before handing down a sentence. The court stated at sentencing:
You have either sexually abused or attempted to sexually abuse all of your stepdaughters. You've got a long history of this. There's a history of physical abuse of those children.... You've been evaluated as being a pedophiliac. It's noted that you are a multiple offender and that you have likely offended in ways other than which you've been willing to disclose. You've been assessed as a high-risk offender. Without treatment, you're not safe to have in society. You've preyed upon young children, adolescents for your own sexual gratification.
For the repeated rape of J.O., Pack faced a potential sentence four times longer than his expected natural life. Thirty years for his predatory rapes is not excessive or cruel and does not shock the conscience of this court. We agree with the trial judge who stated, "I considered very strongly the presentence investigation and the psychological report that I had received, which indicated to me that this man needed to be put away for a long time to protect society."
As for the second prong of the test — • whether Pack's sentence "shocks the conscience of men generally" — we have stated that "[pjublic intent is reflected in the legislative acts defining the permissible punishment for specific crimes." State v. Phipps, 318 N.W.2d 128, 132 (S.D.1982) appeal dismissed, 406 N.W.2d 146 (S.D.1987).
As we expressed in State v. Basker:
We do not reach the Eighth Amendment proportionality analysis because we find Basker's sentence does not shock the conscience of the court, nor is it manifestly disproportionate to the crimes committed. The sexual abuse of children by their parental custodian violates the sacred trust that is the parent-child relationship. It distorts in the developing psyche of a child that which we as a society recognize as healthy human sexual behavior. The trial court's sentence of thirty years is within the statutory maximum. It neither shocks the conscience nor is disproportionate to the crimes Basker committed. The trial court did not abuse its discretion and we affirm.
468 N.W.2d 413, 418 (S.D.1991). Similarly, Pack's thirty-year sentence for the repeated rape of J.O. does not shock the conscience of this court nor is it manifestly disproportionate to the crimes he has committed. Because the sentence does not meet the threshold test of shocking the conscience, the issue of inter and intra jurisdictional proportionality will not be reached.
We affirm.
WUEST and SABERS, JJ., concur.
AMUNDSON, J., concurs in result.
HENDERSON, J., dissents.
. The record shows T.O. was left behind in the custody of Wyoming officials after allegedly suffering physical abuse in retaliation for her refusal to consent to sex and perform fellatio on Pack.
. Wyoming officials verified that Pack fathered a child by P.O. The record shows Pack began raping P.O. when she was twelve years old and did not stop until she left home at age eighteen. Pack forced P.O. to engage in fellatio and cunnilingus. He forced her to masturbate while he photographed her.
. SDCL 22-22-1 provides in part:
Rape is an act of sexual penetration accomplished with any person under any of the following circumstances:
(5) If the victim is ten years of age, but less than sixteen years of age, and the perpetrator is at least three years older than the victim;
⅛ * ⅜
A violation of subdivision (5) or (6) of this section is rape in the third degree, which is a Class 3 felony.
. SDCL 22-6-1 provides in part:
Except as otherwise provided by law, felonies are divided into the following eight classes which are distinguished from each other by the respective maximum penalties hereinafter set forth which are authorized upon conviction:
(5) Class 3 felony: fifteen years imprisonment in the state penitentiary. In addition, a fine of fifteen thousand dollars may be imposed;
Nothing in this section shall limit increased sentences for habitual criminals under § 22-7-7 and 22-7-8.
. In Bult v. Leapley, 507 N.W.2d 325 (S.D.1993), we concluded a sentence was so shocking to this court that we found- it unnecessary to engage in inter and intra jurisdictional analysis to find the sentence disproportionate. The proportionality review employed in Bult is limited to the unique facts and circumstances of that case. Moreover, as we noted in Bult, "[wjhether the Eighth Amendment even encompasses a proportionality principle in non-capital cases has been called into question by the United States Supreme Court." Id. at 328 n. 2 (citing Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 111 S.Ct. 2680, 115 L.Ed.2d 836 (1991)).
. Pack also claims the trial court abused its discretion by reviewing his sentence under the appellate "shock the conscience" standard. We have considered this issue and found it to be without merit.