Case Name: ESTELLA DURHAM v. JOSEPH E. HALE and wife, ROBBIE M. HALE
Court: North Carolina Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: North Carolina
Decision Date: 1990-12-18
Citations: 101 N.C. App. 204
Docket Number: No. 9012DC368
Parties: ESTELLA DURHAM v. JOSEPH E. HALE and wife, ROBBIE M. HALE
Judges: Judge LEWIS concurs.
Reporter: North Carolina Court of Appeals Reports
Volume: 101
Pages: 204–208

Head Matter:
ESTELLA DURHAM v. JOSEPH E. HALE and wife, ROBBIE M. HALE
No. 9012DC368
(Filed 18 December 1990)
Contracts § 27 (NCI3d) — terms of contract — sufficiency of evidence to support findings
• In an action to recover the balance due on a contract for the sale of plaintiff’s house to defendants where defendants counterclaimed for repairs they made to the property, evidence was sufficient to support the trial court’s findings with regard to the sales price, defendants’ assumption of first and second mortgages on the property, plaintiff’s renting of the premises, unpaid rent and late charges, plaintiff’s unauthorized removal of a refrigerator from the premises, and lack of defendants’ entitlement to recovery for repairs.
Am Jur 2d, Vendor and Purchaser § 743.
Judge WYNN dissenting.
Appeal by defendants from Cherry (Sol GJ, Judge. Judgment entered 16 January 1990 in District Court, CUMBERLAND County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 3 December 1990.
This is a civil action wherein plaintiff seeks to recover from defendants the balance due on the purchase price from the sale of her home to defendants. Defendants filed an answer denying that they owed plaintiff anything and alleged in a counterclaim that plaintiff owed them for repairs they had made on the property.
After a hearing, without a jury, Judge Cherry made detailed findings of facts and conclusions of law which are set out in part as follows:
2. That on or about the 2nd day of March, 1988, the Plaintiff and Defendants entered into an agreement for the purchase and sale of a residence owned by the Plaintiff and located at 5244 Brownwood Drive, Fayetteville, North Carolina.
3. That the Defendants agreed to purchase the property from the Plaintiff for a total price of $54,027.00.
4. That as a part of the purchase price, the Defendants agreed to assume and pay the outstanding balance due on a first mortgage to First Wachovia Corporation in the amount of $38,900.00.
5. That the Defendants further agreed to assume and pay the outstanding balance on a second mortgage to Fleet Finance Company in the amount of $9,311.00.
6. That the balance due the Plaintiff at the time of closing the transaction was $5,805.00.
7. That on the 15th day of March, 1988 the Plaintiff executed and delivered a Warranty Deed to the Defendants conveying title to the property.
8. That the Plaintiff agreed to occupy and pay rent on the premises from the 1st day of March, 1988 to the 1st day of July, 1988; that the amount of the rent was $595.00 per month.
9. That the Plaintiff did in fact occupy the residence and pay the monthly rental until mid June, 1988, leaving a balance due of $358.75 for unpaid rent and late charge.
10. That under the terms of the Sales Contract, the Plaintiff agreed to leave a refrigerator in the residence, which said refrigerator was removed by the Plaintiff at the time she vacated the premises; that the fair market value of the refrigerator on May 2, 1988 and on July 1, 1988 was $700.00.
2. That the Plaintiff is entitled to recover of the Defendants the sum of $5,805.00 as the balance due on her contract, setting off and deducting from said amount the sum of $700.00 for the refrigerator removed by Plaintiff, and the sum of $358.75 for rental due on the contract, but the Defendants are not entitled to recover from the Plaintiff any items of repair claimed in their counterclaim.
Based on its findings and conclusions, the trial court entered a judgment ordering that plaintiff have and recover of defendants $4,746.25. Defendants appealed.
Downing, David, Maxwell & Melvin, by Harold D. Downing, for plaintiff, appellee.
Barrington, Herndon & Raisig, P.A., by Carl A. Barrington, Jr., and Paul A. Raisig, Jr., for defendants, appellants.

Opinion:
HEDRICK, Chief Judge.
By their two assignments of error brought forward and argued on appeal, defendants' principal contention is that the findings of fact made by the trial judge are not supported by the evidence and that the conclusions of law drawn therefrom do not support the judgment entered. We disagree.
Defendants argue that the trial judge "misconstrued" the agreement between the parties with respect to the sale and purchase of the property. In their brief, defendants state "[t]he trial court, under the guise of construction, had no power to write into the contract between [plaintiff] and [defendants] any provision that was not there in fact or by implication of law."
It is well settled that where the terms of a written contract are unambiguous, the interpretation is a question of law; but when the terms of the contract are ambiguous, or leave something to be decided, it is for the finder of fact to construe the contract. MAS Corp. v. Thompson, 62 N.C. App. 31, 302 S.E.2d 271 (1983); Goodyear v. Goodyear, 257 N.C. 374, 126 S.E.2d 113 (1962).
In the present case, Judge Cherry was the "finder of fact," and his findings and conclusions with respect to the terms of the agreement between the parties were amply supported by the evidence presented. Therefore, the judgment of the trial court will be affirmed.
Affirmed.
Judge LEWIS concurs.
Judge WYNN dissents.