Case Name: WHITE v. EAST SIDE MILL CO.
Court: Oregon Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Oregon
Decision Date: 1917-05-01
Citations: 84 Or. 224
Docket Number: 
Parties: WHITE v. EAST SIDE MILL CO.
Judges: 
Reporter: Oregon Reports
Volume: 84
Pages: 224–245

Head Matter:
Motion to affirm judgment overruled January 9,
argued on the merits April 20,
affirmed May 1, 1917.
WHITE v. EAST SIDE MILL CO.
(161 Pac. 969; 164 Pac. 736.)
Appeal and Error — Record—Failure to File Transcript — Motion to Dismiss — Affidavits.
1. The recitals of a nunc pro tunc order as to an oral order previously made extending the time for filing transcript on appeal imports absolute verity, and cannot be contradicted, on motion to dismiss the appeal for .failure to file transcript, by affidavits of counsel as to what actually occurred at the time of the previous order.
Appeal and Error — Transcript—Time for Filing — Extension.
2. Under Act Feb. 28, 1913 (Laws 1913, p. 619), providing that the trial court or Supreme Court may enlarge the time for filing the transcript, but that such order shall be made within the time allowed to file the transcript, an order extending the time for filing the transcript may be entered before appeal has been perfected.
Appeal and Error — Order Extending Time to File Transcript — “From Day to Day.”
3. An order extending time for filing transeript “from day to day” is self-executing to extend the time from one day to another until the next term of the appellate court, and gives the court making it jurisdiction to make further order limiting the time for such filing.
Courts — Record—“Journal Entry.”
4. A “journal entry” is the prescribed memorial of what the court actually did, and must speak the real truth; so that, if the court did not in fact make an order on a certain date, one cannot be supplied by any subsequent journal entry.
Motions — Nunc Pro Tunc Order.
5. The authority to make an order nunc pro tunc cannot be used to amend or change an order actually made.
Appeal and Error — Transcript—Time to File — Extension—Nunc Pro Tunc Order.
6. An order reciting that the court previously orally ordered that time for filing transeript on appeal be extended from day to day and ordering that appellant have an extension of ten days after the date when the court reporter should file a typewritten transcript of his stenographic notes of the testimony, operated not only as a nunc pro tunc order, but also as a new order further declaring the limits of time within which the transeript might be filed.
Appeal and Error — Record—Time to File Transcript — Extension.
7. Under Laws 1913, page 619, as to extension of time for filing transeript, providing that no such order shall extend it beyond the next term of the appellate court, the expiration of such term automatically ends the right of defendant to file his transeript, whether or not specified by order.
Appeal and Error — Rights on Appeal — Liberal Construction.
8. An appeal being a remedy, the laws and actions of courts in respect thereto should be liberally construed with a view to make the remedy effective.
ON THE MERITS.
Appeal and Error — Right of Appeal — Payment of Costs.
9. The mere fact that costs on former appeal have not been paid does not 'entitle the defendant to dismissal of the appeal in the absence of showing that the costs cannot be collected.
Evidence — Crossing Accidents — Admissibility.
10. In action for death of traffic officer when struck by auto truck, it was not error to admit statement of witness as to what seemed to him to have been the circumstances where he used the expression as the equivalent of “as I saw it.”
[As to admission of opinion evidence of witness as to whether a person’s conduct was “eareless,” “negligent,” or “reckless,” see note in Ann. Cas. 1913C, 1077.]
Appeal and Error — Scope of Review — Preservation of Exceptions.
11. A party who fails to move to strike out an answer to a question has no cause for complaint that the testimony was admitted.
Evidence — Crossing Accidents — Admissibility.
12. While, as a genera] rule, a witness must testify to facts and not conclusions or opinions, yet, in action for death of traffic officer when struck by auto truck whose tires were of peculiar make and the tracks of which could not be reproduced, a witness could say that the tracks found fitted the tires of defendant’s automobile.
Evidence — Province of Jury — Disregarding Testimony.
13. The jury need not aecept as conclusive uncontradicted statements of any witness, and it may disregard undisputed testimony if unsatisfactory.
Municipal Corporations — Crossing Accidents — Questions for Jury— Evidence.
14. Evidence held to present a jury question whether driver of defendant’s automobile truck was negligent in turning to the left before crossing an intersection, and in so doing killing the traffic officer stationed at sueh intersection.
Municipal Corporations — Injuries to Persons — Instructions — Care Required.
15. In action for death of traffic polieeman when struck by auto truck, instruction precluding recovery if the polieeman was negligent, and that the jury could consider that he had duties to perform, and could not look after himself as an ordinary pedestrian, is not objectionable as imposing less than the ordinary degree of care upon the officer, where the court further instructed the jury to consider all the circumstances.
Trial — Instructions.
16. Instruction that the jury is supreme in the realm of fact, and that the court is supreme in the realm of law, whether it correctly states it or not, is proper.
Trial — Instructions—Repetition.
17. Refusal of requested instructions which, in so far as they conform to the law, were covered by charges given, was not error.
Costs — Dilatory Appeal — Damages.
18. Where an appeal was taken in good faith and with probable cause, the respondent is not entitled to 10 per cent of the judgment as damages for delay.
Prom Multnomah: Henry E. McGinn, Judge.
This is an action by Lulu E. White, administratrix of the estate of James E. White, deceased, against East Side Mill and Lumber Company, a corporation, to recover damages for an injury that caused the death of plaintiff’s husband. From a judgment in favor of plaintiff for $6,000, defendant appeals. On respondent’s motion to affirm judgment. Motion overruled.
(See, also, 81 Or. 107, 155 Pac. 364, 158 Pac. 173, 158 Pac. 527.)
In Banc. Statement by Mr. Justice Burnett.
In this case a judgment was rendered in the Circuit Court in favor of the plaintiff on October 6,1916. On the 21st of that month defendant served its notice of appeal which was perfected on the 31st. No transcript having been filed in this court, the plaintiff moves for an affirmance of the judgment on the ground that the appeal has been abandoned. Resisting this motion the defendant shows that the Circuit Court made an order on December 18, 1916, which, omitting the title of the cause, here follows:
“The above entitled cause having come on regularly to be heard upon motion of Hamilton Johnstone, Esq., one of the attorneys for the above named defendant; and it appearing to the Court that heretofore, to-wit, on October 21,1916, the said Hamilton Johnstone, Esq., having appeared in open court before me in support of a motion for extension of time within which to file transcript on appeal in the Supreme Court, and within which to file and settle bill of exceptions herein, the said defendant appearing on said October 21,1916, by said Hamilton Johnstone, its attorney, and plaintiff appearing by R. A. Sullivan, Esq., her attorney; and it further appearing that the court on said October 21, 1916, did order that the defendant be allowed an extension of time from day to day in this cause within which to file a transcript on appeal in the Supreme Court and to file and settle bill of exceptions herein, but that no written memorandum of said order was made on October 21, 1916, and entered in the journal of this court, and the court having at the time of said order assured Hamilton Johnstone, Esq., attorney for said defendant, that no advantage would be taken of him or said defendant because of any delay in procuring extension of the stenographic notes of the testimony taken at the trial of the above cause; and it further appearing that the reason for the failure of the defendant heretofore to file a transcript on appeal and to file and settle bill of exceptions is due to no fault of the defendant or its attorneys, but to the unavoidable pressure of business devolving upon the court reporter of this department; and the court being fully advised in the premises—
“It is Hereby Ordered that said defendant have and it is hereby granted an extension of time to a date ten (10) days from and after the date when the court reporter of this department shall file in this court a typewritten extension of the stenographic notes of the testimony taken at the trial of the above-entitled cause, within which to file a transcript on appeal in the Supreme Court, appealing from the judgment heretofore rendered in the circuit court of the state of Oregon, for the county of Multnomah, in this action, and within which to file and settle bill of exceptions herein.
“And It is Further Ordered that this order be made and entered nunc pro tunc as of October 21, 1916, the date when this court made said order.
“Dated Portland, Oregon, December 18, 1916.
‘ ‘ (Signed) Henry E. McGinn, Judge. ’ ’
Motion Overruled.
Mr. Raymond A. Sullivan, for the motion.
Messrs. Asher & Johnstone, contra.
On presumption of negligence in case of automobile accident, see note in 38 L. R. A. (N. S.) 496.
On the question of negligence of operator of automobile under particular state of facts, see note in 1 L. R. A. (FT. S.) 228.
On instruction of negligence of operator of automobile under particular state of facts, see note in 1 L. R. A. (N. S.) 234.
Repostes.

Opinion:
Mr. Justice Burnett
delivered the opinion of the court.
In the act- of February 28, 1913, it is laid down as a rule that':
"If the transcript or abstract is not filed with the clerk of the appellate court within the time provided, the appeal shall be deemed abandoned, and the effect thereof terminated, bnt the trial conrt or the judge thereof, or the supreme court or a'justice thereof, may, upon such terms as may be just, by order enlarge the time for filing the same; but such order shall be made within the time allowed to file transcript, and shall not extend it beyond the term of the appellate court next following the appeal."
Earlier in this enactment it is said:
"Upon the appeal being perfected the appellant shall, within thirty days thereafter, file with the clerk of the appellate court a transcript or such an abstract as the law or the rules of the appellate court may require, of so much of the record as may be necessary to intelligently present the question to be decided by the appellate tribunal, together with a copy of the judgment or decree appealed from, the notice of appeal and proof of service thereof, and of the undertaking on appeal. "
In the present juncture there is a wealth of affidavit on both sides declaring the versions of respective counsel of what occurred in the Circuit Court on October 21st. With these in that respect we are not concerned as they amount to mere bickerings between court and counsel. The order above quoted being the solemn act of a court imports absolute verity which we cannot question. Therefore, the matter must be determined by the proper construction to be given to that judicial utterance. It is contended that in fact the court made no order on the date last mentioned. But the certified exemplification before us declares in these words:
"That the court on said October 21, 1916, did order that the defendant be allowed an extension of time from day to day in this cause within which to file a transcript on appeal in the supreme court and to file and settle bill of exceptions herein."
It is argued that this is of no effect because made before the commencement of the thirty-day period. The statute, indeed, says that "such order shall be made within the time allowed to file the transcript." This language, however, has been construed in Wolf v. City Ry. Co., 50 Or. 64 (85 Pac. 620, 91 Pac. 460, 15 Ann. Cas. 1181), and in Vincent v. First Nat. Bank, 76 Or. 579 (143 Pac. 1100, 149 Pac. 938). In the latter case the court said:
"The contention made that this order can only be made after the appeal has been perfected and before the time to file the transcript has expired, we think not sound. This construction is far too narrow. The context shows that it was meant that the order should be made before the time had expired to file the transcript, and not to restrict it to the time after the appeal had been perfected. We think this order was made within the proper time."
Substantially the same language is used in the Wolf Case. In that instance several orders were made each before the expiration of the time specified in the one next preceding, so that the time was extended on several occasions and yet this court held that it had jurisdiction.
Having shown that the order was actually made on October 21st, allowing extension of time.from day to day we next consider the effect of that order. "From day to day." means from one day to its succeeding day: 2 Words & Phrases (2 Series), 671. It must be held, therefore, that the court's order operated to extend the time from day number 1 to day number 2 and from that to number 3, and thenceforward, and was limited only by the provision that the time shall not be extended beyond the next term of the appellate court. The order was self-executing so as to carry the time on day by day with the restriction noted. The court did not say that the time should be extended from October 21st to October 22d, in which event it would have been necessary to make a second order on the latter date and so following. But a fair construction of the judicial direction would be that without further order the time would go on day after day until it reached the legal limit noted. The effect of this is to retain within the bosom of the Circuit Court jurisdiction to make further order respecting the matter under consideration, provided it was made before the statutory lapse of the extension already granted.
We come then to the force of what was done December 18th. It is urged against the order quoted that it does not enter of record nunc pro tunc the same order that the court says it made on October 21st. More concretely explained the contention is that whereas the court should have again declared that "the time is extended from day to day" without saying more, it entered a different direction, viz., that the defendant have an extension of time to a date ten days from and after the date when the court reporter shall file extension of his stenographic notes of the testimony.
A journal entry is the prescribed memorial of what the court actually did. It must speak the real truth. If the court did not in fact make an order on the earlier date, one cannot be supplied by any subsequent journal entry. Moreover, the authority to make an order nunc pro tunc cannot be used to amend or change the order actually made. Here, however, we have spread upon the journal on December 18th, the statement that:
Oh October 21st the court ' did order that the defendant be allowed an extension of time from day to day in this cause within which to file a transcript on appeal in the supreme court and to file and settle bill of exceptions herein. ' '
By this recital written upon the journal by authority we are officially informed that the court made the order quoted. In precise words we have a memorial of what the court' actually did on October 21st, and it is sufficient as a nunc pro tunc order to show that on December 18th jurisdiction to make further order respecting the time was within the breast of the Circuit Court. Thus empowered, the trial judge had a right to make a new order as was done in the Wolf Case differently declaring the time within which the transcript might be filed. Consequently he was within the sanction of the law when he said :
"It is hereby ordered that the said defendant have and it is hereby granted an extension of time to a date ten days from and after the date that the court reporter of this department shall file in this court a typewritten extension of the stenographic notes of the testimony taken at the trial of the above entitled cause within which to file a transcript on appeal in the supreme court."
The quoted extract from the journal of the court operates not only as a mmc pro tunc order, but likewise as a new order further declaring the limits of time within which the transcript may be filed. Of course all this is subject to the limitation established by the statute to the effect that the time shall not be extended beyond the succeeding term of the appellate court. Without anything further being said, the expiration of that term will automatically end the right of thé defendant to file its transcript. An appeal, is a remedy and the laws and actions of courts in respect thereto should he liberally construed with a view to make the remedy effective. The Circuit Court evi dently intended to grant an extension of time. We cannot presume that the judge arbitrarily held out allurements to the defendant as to a Tantalus, that its right to appeal should be protected, yet at the same time intending to let the privilege lapse by limitation.
We conclude, then, that as a matter of fact the court on October 21st made an order extending the time "from day to day"; that this operated without further direction of the court to continue the matter subject to the restriction prescribed by law relating to the next term of the appellate court; that the effect was to retain in the bosom of the Circuit Court the right to make further orders relating to the extension of time; that the journal entry of December 18th operates not only as an official statement of what was indeed transacted on October 21st, but also as a further order controlling the matter to the present time. The motion to affirm the judgment is overruled and the application of the defendant to cure the diminution of .record is allowed. Motion Overruled.