Case Name: Joseph F. Smith v. Abner S. Lipscomb
Court: Supreme Court of Texas
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1855
Citations: 13 Tex. 532
Docket Number: 
Parties: Joseph F. Smith v. Abner S. Lipscomb.
Judges: 
Reporter: Texas Reports
Volume: 13
Pages: 532–544

Head Matter:
Joseph F. Smith v. Abner S. Lipscomb.
Where an attorney at law is retained, it is competent for him to substitute another in his room and stead, and if the client knows of the substitution, and either accepts the services or does not object, he is bound by the substitution. Special Coubt.
In an action by an attorney at law on a special contract for professional services, under a general averment of performance the plaintiff may prove performance by substitution with the defendant’s consent. Special Coubt.
Whore one party promises to render certain services, the time of rendering which cannot, from the nature of the services, he fixed, in consideration of a certain, sum of money to be paid at a stipulated time, in an action for the recovery of the money, after the time fixed for its payment, it is not necessary to allege performance of the services. Special Coubt.
Where an attorney at law, in consideration of a certain fee, to be paid at a certain time, undertook to attend to certain suits &o., and having sued for the fee, the defendant denied that the plaintiff had rendered the service, and on the trial proved that’plaintiff had not rendered the service in person, it was held that it was competent for the plaintiff, without allegation, to rebut the testimony of the defendant by proving that by procurement of the plaintiff, with defendant’s consent, another attorney had done the service, until he was discharged by the defendant; and it was further held, that such proof entitled the plaintiff to a recovery as if the contract had been fully performed by the plaintiff in person. Special Coubt.
Where a party in whose favor something is to be done, in consideration of his promise to pay a certain sum of money to another, prevents that performance, and the other is not in default, the money may he recovered as if the act had been performed. Special Coubt.
Appeal from Victoria. Action by Abner S. Lipscomb for the use of himself and Barry Gillespie, late partners in the practice of law, against Joseph F. Smith, on a contract in writing, dated at Austin, April 16th, 1840, as follows: “ It 66 is this day mutually agreed by and between Joseph F. Smith “ and Abner S. Libscomb. For the consideration hereinafter to “ be expressed, the said Lipscomb undertakes to render Ms “ professional services, as an attorney and counsellor at law, “in support of the land claims of said Smith, both those in “Ms own right, and those claimed by Mm as agent for others, “ at this time, on the west side of the Guadalupe ; and the “ said Smith in consideration of such services undertakes, and “ promises to pay to the said Lipscomb five thousand dollars, “in good and lawful money, in three equal instalments, that “ is to say, one-third at the end of one year from date, one- “ third at the end of eighteen months from this date, and the “ remaining one-third at the end of twenty-four months,33 éso. The contract contained a further stipulation that Lipscomb should receive one-twentieth of the land which should be secured to Smith “by being the immediate subject of a judicial decision ;’3 but this suit only claimed the payment of the money and interest. On the 22d of June, 1845, Smith endorsed on the contract, “ I do hereby confirm the within agreement and expressly waive any law of prescription that might intervene,33 signing his name thereto. The original contract was signed by both parties, in duplicate. The petition declared on the contract and its confirmation, setting them both out; and averred “ that he has done or caused to be done, all and every thing incumbent on him to do under said contract, to entitle Mm to the sum now demanded from said defendant.33
Defendant demurred on the ground that “ plaintiff cannot recover money of the said defendant for services performed or legal advice given to said defendant by another person, as claimed in said plaintiff s petition.” Answered, denying that the plaintiff had performed his part of the contract; and pleaded specially in reconvention damages sustained by him by reason of the failure of the plaintiff to attend to two certain suits brought against this defendant, for the recovery of the lands covered by the agreement, whereby it became necessary for the defendant to employ other counsel. The suits were specified, and some as late as 1850, and two in the Federal Court at Galveston.
The proof was, that soon after the contract was made in 1840, Lipscomb and Gillespie became partners in the practice of law, and the partners, with the approbation of Smith, attended to the suits contemplated by the contract, until Lipscomb became a Judge of the Supreme Court, after which, with the approbation of Smith, Gillespie attended to said suits, until sometime in the year 1847, when Smith dismissed and released said Gillespie from any further control and management of his suits; and that after that time several suits were brought against Smith involving the titles to the lands contemplated in the contract of 1840, to which no one had attended under that contract. There was no cause shown for Gillespie’s discharge.
The Court below instructed the jury, that if they believed, from the testimony, that Lipscomb, or Gillespie at Lipscomb’s procurement, and with consent of Smith, rendered all legal service pertaining to lands west of the Guadalupe river, it would be a compliance with the contract, and they should find for the plaintiff. If the jury believed from the testimony, that Smith accepted the services of Gillespie in place of Lipscomb, and afterwards discharged him without cause, they should find for the plaintiff the amount of the contract.
Verdict and judgment for the plaintiff for $5,000.
Special Court composed of Robert Hughes, F. H. Merriman and B. C. Franklin, Esqs.
J. If. Bniith, for appellant.
Phillips & Phillips, for appellee.

Opinion:
Hughes, S. J.
The action in the Court below was commenced upon an agreement in writing between the appellant Smith, and the appellee Lipscomb, of the date of the 16th day of April, 1840, by which, in consideration of the matters therein mentioned, Lipscomb agreed to render his professional services as attorney at law, &c., in the land business of Smith, and for those persons for whom he was agent; in consideration whereof said Smith promised to pay said Lipscomb the sum of five thousand dollars, in three equal instalments, one-third at the end of one year, one-tliird in eighteen months, and the remainder in twenty-four months from date. By the agreement referred to the covenants on the part of Lipscomb were not to be performed within any limited period.
On this agreement action was commenced by Libscomb, for the use of Lipscomb and Gillespie, in the District Court of Victoria county, on the 20th day of April, 1849, to recover the five thousand dollars. By the petition the agreement is sued on by proper averments, connected with an allegation, that, on the 22d day of June, 1845, by indorsement upon the agreement, the said Smith confirmed the same, and waived the law of prescription. The petition then avers that he, Lipscomb, had done and caused to be done, all and every thing on his part to be done and performed, to entitle him to the sum demanded, and then concludes with a breach, and the necessary prayer for relief.
The defendant, after service of process, entered his appearpearance by filing his answer, in which is a demurrer, and this assigned for cause: that said plaintiff cannot recover money of the said defendant for services performed as an attorney, or legal advice given to said defendant by another person, as claimed in said petition.
This demurrer was submitted to the Court by order preceding the order setting out the trial, &c,, and was overruled. And the first question is, did the Court err in making this ruling ? This is the main question, and as such will now be considered and disposed of.
The averment of the petition is, that Lipscomb had done and performed, and caused to be done and performed, all on his part to be done and performed. But this is said not to be sufficient, for the reason, that when Lipscomb was employed, he had no right to employ another; and it being alleged by Lipscomb that he had caused to be done, what was necessary to be performed ; this is tantamount to the allegation that it was done by another, and consequently he did not perform and was not entitled to recover.
This we believe not to be the correct rule. We are satisfied that the correct rule is, that, in the case supposed, the case of an attorney, it is competent for him to substitute another in his room and stead, and if the client knew of the substitution, and either accepts the services of the substitute, or does not object, he is bound by the substitution. To this effect the law is laid down by the Supeme Court of the State. (Butler v. Allcorn, 8 Tex. R. 56.) The demurrer was, therefore, properly overruled by the Court below.
The trial was thereupon had ; during the progress of which various objections and exceptions were taken and questions reasoned, and a verdict and judgment was rendered in favor of Lipscomb. A new trial was asked for, overruled and appeal to this Court.
But a portion of the questions made in the Court below or in this Court, are thought to be entitled to notice.
It is contended, as it had been in the Court below, that the agreement sued on was with Lipscomb, who in consideration of the promise by Smith, agreed to perform certain professional services; and if true that Gillespie was substituted with the consent of Smith, express or implied, yet this was not properly given in evidence on the trial in the Court below, because there was no allegation to that effect in the petition.
Were it true that, to entitle Lipscomb to recover the five thousand dollars on the agreement, it was necessary for him to allege performance on Ms part, we would say that the allegation is sufficient. The performance, as we have seen by a substitute, is sufficient, when done with the consent of the party to be charged ; and this must go upon the ground that the performance by the substitute is the performance of the principal; and consequently an averment of performance, without allusion to a substitute, is good, and under it evidence might be given of such substitute, and performance by him. But this question does not properly arise.
It is true that Lipscomb avers performance, but this was unnecessary. An action might have been sustained to recover the five thousand dollars, without any such averment. The rule applicable here as to covenants is, that where a day is appointed for the payment of a sum of money which is or may arrive before the time appointed for, or the performance of the act to be done in consideration of the money to be paid; then the covenants are mutual and independent, and the payee may maintain an action for the recovery of the sum promised to be paid, without averring performance on his side. (Leftwich v. Coleman, 3 How. Miss. 167; Rector v. Price, Id. 321.)
Three determinate periods were fixed for the payment of the five thousand dollars in instalments, and from the nature of the acts to be performed by Lipscomb, it is either certain that the times fixed for payment would, or that they might arrive before the performance on the part of Lipscomb; for Lipscomb was to act as the counsel and attorney of Smith, in an extensive land litigation, which this record shows is not yet ended. The covenants are therefore independent of each other, and Lipscomb had a right to maintain his action, without averment of performance on his part. It is true, however, that Lipscomb having sued, after the relation of attorney and client had ceased, it was competent for Smith to show a failure of consideration, and then in answer to the case attempted to be made by the defendant, it was competent for the plaintiff to show that Gillespie was substituted to Lipscomb with Smith's consent; and that Gillespie performed the covenants faithfully, until dismissed by Smith. This, however, would not be shown for the purpose of proving a cause of action, but in answer to the proof as to failure of consideration by showing that Lipscomb had not done what he had agreed to do; that whatever was done, was done and performed by Gillespie. The covenants being mutual and independant, showing the promise, the arrival of the time fixed for payment, and a failure to pay was all that was necessary to make out a cause of action by the plaintiff, and the proof as to performonee was a mere negation of the plaintiff's case. It was the dismission or discharge of Gillespie as attorney, which relieved Lipscomb from further performance by himself or any one else, and perfected his right to the five thousand dollars promised to be paid; the rule being well established, that where a party in whose favor something is to be done, in consideration of his promise to pay a certain sum of money to another, prevents that performance, and the other is not in default, the money may be recovered as if the act had been peformed. (Kennedy v. Kennedy, 2 Bibb. 454; Marshall v. Craig, 1 Bibb, 389-390.)
The plaintiff'below, Lipscomb, then, was entitled to recover, though everything was not in fact done by him which was required by the agreement, because the act of Smith by preventing, excused the non-performance, and it was as if there had been a perfect performance by Lipscomb, and the new trial was properly overruled.
We think there was no error in the judgment of the Court, and that the same ought to be and accordingly is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.