Case Name: THE CENTRAL RAILROAD CO. OF NEW JERSEY v. THE UNITED STATES
Court: United States Court of Claims
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 1925-04-13
Citations: 60 Ct. Cl. 578
Docket Number: No. B-433
Parties: THE CENTRAL RAILROAD CO. OF NEW JERSEY v. THE UNITED STATES
Judges: Graham, Judge; Hat, Judge; DowNey, Judge; and Booth, Judge, concur.
Reporter: United States Court of Claims Reports
Volume: 60
Pages: 578–583

Head Matter:
THE CENTRAL RAILROAD CO. OF NEW JERSEY v. THE UNITED STATES
[No. B-433.
Decided April 13, 1925]
On the Proofs
Railroad rates; statutes of limitation. — A suit brought within three years from the approval of the act of February 28, 1920, 41 Stat. 491, 492, and within six years from the date when the cause of action accrued is not barred by the statutes of limitation.
The Reporter's statement of the case:
Mr. Alexander E. Elder for the plaintiff.
Messrs. Joseph H. Sheppard, Héber H. Riee, and Alton E. Laughlim,, with whom was Mr. Assistant Attorney General 'William, J. Donovam,, for the defendant.
Motion for new trial overruled June 1,1925.
The following are the facts as found by the court:
I. The plaintiff, a corporation, is engaged in the business of operating a system of railroads and is a common carrier for hire of freight and passengers. Its charges for the service of transporting freight and passengers are all duly published and filed with the Interstate Commerce Commission as required by law.
II. Prior to the date of the transportation hereinafter referred to, the plaintiff with other railroad carriers entered into a certain agreement with the United States Government regarding the transportation of military traffic, to wit, an agreement entitled “ Interterritorial Military Arrangement,” dated December 28, 1916, effective on and since'January 1, 1917. The said agreement was executed by the authorized representatives of the railway carriers throughout the United States and was executed on behalf of the United States by the Quartermaster General of the Army, United States War Department, the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation, United States Navy Department, and the Quartermaster, United States Marine Corps. The plaintiff and all connecting carriers participating in the transportation hereinafter described were parties to said agr. ement. The said agreement contained, inter alia, the following provisions :
“ iii
“ Traffic Covered by this Arrangement
“ The net faxes, allowances, and routes in connection therewith, authorized hereunder, are applicable exclusively for the transportation of officers and enlisted men and others connected with the United States Army, United States Navy, and United States Marine Corps, for whom the United States Government is lawfully entitled thereto, and when traveling on transportation requests of the issues of the United States Army, United States Navy, and United States Marine Corps, and at United States Government expense only.
“Net Fares and Allowances
“ 1. (a) The fares applicable under this arrangement will be the lawful commercial fares as on file with the Interstate Commerce Commission from starting point to destination at time of movement (see exceptions, Section V), less lawful land-grant deductions, properly established, less 5 per cent, the 5 per cent allowance not to exceed the maxima allowances or exceptions as specified in Section VI. Government fares so established will apply to all military traffic as described in Section III, including special train and special car movements as well as individual and party movements. (See Section XL)
“(5) Proportions will not be used in any case in the construction of fares.
“xv
“ 1. One hundred and fifty pounds of personal effects properly checkable as baggage under the tariff of the initial carrier will be transported without charge for each person. Personal baggage in excess of the free allowance stated when provision for the transportation of the excess baggage is specially made in United States Army, Navy, or Marine Corps transportation requests and is paid for by the United States Government, will be charged for at the regular excess-baggage rate, based upon the net individual fare.. When provision is not made in transportation request for the transportation of excess baggage, collection will be made from the traveler at the regular individual commercial rate for weight in excess of the free allowance stated. Excess-baggage charges will not be subject to allowances applicable in connection with the fares for tickets under this arrangement. Kaggage regulations in other respects than above will be in accordance with the tariff of the initial carrier -checking the baggage in each case.
“ 2. Company, battalion, regimental, or Government property is not included in the above.”
III. During the month of June, 1917, the plaintiff, in ■connection with the carriers named below, carried for the United States Government, on Government bill of lading No. 584, dated May 31, 1917, from McAllen, Texas, to New York, N. Y., which bill of lading was in due time accomplished, 31 carloads of property in connection with the movement of the Twenty-eighth Infantry, consisting of 109 men and one officer. For the passenger transportation involved regular transportation requests were issued and payment was made to the initial carrier of fares that were in each case 5 per cent less than the fares that would have been due and payable except for the concession of 5 per cent to the Government provided for in “Interterritorial Military Arrangements,” referred to hereafter. The 31 carloads -of freight transported under this bill of lading consisted of ■•the following:
20 carloads of mules.
4 carloads of liorses.
2 carloads of mixed hay and oats.
1 carload of sprinkler wagons.
1 carload of escort wagons, running gear, and harness.
1 car (K. C. S. 20534) containing 29 complete escort-wagon bodies (weight, 31,900 lbs.) and 5 running gears (5,550 lbs.).
1 ear (B. & O. 102576) containing company property (29,903 lbs.).
1 car (S. P. 86867) containing 13 escort wagons (29,254 lbs.) and 26 boxes of harness (2,626 lbs.).
Said freight ivas forwarded by the St. Louis, Brownsville & Mexico Railway Company, as initial carrier, thence over connecting lines as follows: Missouri, Kansas & Texas Railway Company of Texas, Missouri, Kansas & Texas Railway, Baltimore & Ohio Railroad, Philadelphia & Reading Railway, and, as last carreir, plaintiff, The Central Railroad Company of New Jersey, which carrier delivered said freight to the duly authorized representative of the United States at New York, New York.
IY. The plaintiff was the delivering carrier of said shipments, and, as such delivering carrier, it in due course submitted its bill, duly certified to be correct, C. R. R. Co. of N. J. Bill No. 57165-17-1000, for the said freight transportation, to the Auditor for the War Department in the sum of $8,567.68. The Auditor for the War Department allowed $8,053.92 of this bill and disallowed the balance. War warrant No. 44290 was issued March 2, 1921, in payment of the amount allowed by the auditor, the payment of which was accepted by the plaintiff. On October 15, 1921, plaintiff applied to the Comptroller General for a revision of the action of the Auditor for the War Department, the plaintiff claiming the additional sum of $465.71, the difference between the amount originally claimed and the amount allowed by the Auditor for the War Department. The application was dismissed by the Comptroller General January 2, 1922. On January 12, 1922, plaintiff submitted supplemental bill claiming $1,470.85 in addition to the amount allowed by the auditor. Under date of February 2, 1922, plaintiff was advised by the Comptroller General in letter headed “Appeal No. 37721,” that having accepted payment under a settlement by the auditor, this settlement was final and conclusive upon the executive branch of the Gov- eminent unless a revision thereof was obtained in the manner prescribed by statute in such cases.
V. In submitting the original bill plaintiff computed the freight charges on three cars, S. P. 86801, C., B. & Q: 102516, and K. C. S. 20534, at $880.84. By the application of the so-called free baggage car rule the assessed charges for these three cars were disallowed. The total amount disallowed from the original bill was $513.71, the difference being due to a revision upward of the freight charges for the other cars. The plaintiff has received no compensation for 'the transportation of these three cars. The charge for the three cars computed on a freight revenue basis is $1,354:66.
VI. The company property contained in said cars consisted entirely of camp and troop equipment and moved under agreement known as the freight tariff agreement, which reads in part:
“ The carriers * * * agree * * * to accept for the transportation of property moved by the Quartermaster Corps, United States Army, and for which the United States Government is lawfully entitled to reduced rates over land-grant roads, the lowest net rates lawfully available, as derived through deductions account of land-grant distance from a lawful rate filed with the Interstate Commerce Commission applying from point of origin to destination at time of movement.”
The court decided that plaintiff was entitled to recover.
Writ of certiorari granted.

Opinion:
Campbell, Chief Justice,
delivered the opinion of the court:
The Government concedes liability in this case except for the statute of limitations. The service was rendered by the plaintiff in June, 1917, and suit was instituted in this court December 13, 1922. This is well within the six-year statute of limitation. The defendant, however, contends that the suit is barred by the limitation prescribed in section 16 of the Interstate Commerce act, 41 Stat. 492, as amended June 7, 1924. Suit was brought within three years from the date of the act of February 28, 1920. This court has held that the operation of this latter statute was prospective. The suit was brought within six years from the time the cause of action accrued, and therefore the statute of limitations of six years is out of the case. Relative to the limitation prescribed by the transportation act above mentioned this court said that when suit is brought on a cause of action arising before this statute, and it alone is relied upon, the limitation it prescribes begins to run from the date of enactment of the statute. See Schaff, Receiver of the Missouri, Kansas & Texas Ry. Co., 59 C. Cls. 318. See also Lancaster and Wallace, Receivers of the Texas and Pacific Ry. Go., ante, p. 80. The court adheres to this ruling. Suit having been brought within three yéars from the passage of the transportation act is not barred by the limitation which that enactment prescribes. The plaintiff is therefore entitled to judgment. And it is so ordered. .
Graham, Judge; Hat, Judge; DowNey, Judge; and Booth, Judge, concur.