Case Name: J.R. FARBER and Amelia V. Farber, husband and wife, Plaintiffs, v. The STATE of Idaho, The City of Nampa, Asphalt Paving and Construction Co., Inc., a corporation, Defendants; ASPHALT PAVING AND CONSTRUCTION CO., INC., a corporation, Cross-Plaintiff, v. The STATE of Idaho, Cross-Defendant; The CITY OF NAMPA, Cross-Claimant, v. The STATE of Idaho, Cross-Defendant; The STATE of Idaho, Cross-Complainant-Respondent, v. ASPHALT PAVING AND CONSTRUCTION CO., INC., a corporation, Cross Defendant-Appellant
Court: Idaho Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Idaho
Decision Date: 1984-06-08
Citations: 106 Idaho 677
Docket Number: No. 14845
Parties: J.R. FARBER and Amelia V. Farber, husband and wife, Plaintiffs, v. The STATE of Idaho, The City of Nampa, Asphalt Paving and Construction Co., Inc., a corporation, Defendants. ASPHALT PAVING AND CONSTRUCTION CO., INC., a corporation, Cross-Plaintiff, v. The STATE of Idaho, Cross-Defendant. The CITY OF NAMPA, Cross-Claimant, v. The STATE of Idaho, Cross-Defendant. The STATE of Idaho, Cross-Complainant-Respondent, v. ASPHALT PAVING AND CONSTRUCTION CO., INC., a corporation, Cross Defendant-Appellant.
Judges: DONALDSON, C.J., and BAKES, J., concur.
Reporter: Idaho Reports
Volume: 106
Pages: 677–681

Head Matter:
682 P.2d 630
J.R. FARBER and Amelia V. Farber, husband and wife, Plaintiffs, v. The STATE of Idaho, The City of Nampa, Asphalt Paving and Construction Co., Inc., a corporation, Defendants. ASPHALT PAVING AND CONSTRUCTION CO., INC., a corporation, Cross-Plaintiff, v. The STATE of Idaho, Cross-Defendant. The CITY OF NAMPA, Cross-Claimant, v. The STATE of Idaho, Cross-Defendant. The STATE of Idaho, Cross-Complainant-Respondent, v. ASPHALT PAVING AND CONSTRUCTION CO., INC., a corporation, Cross Defendant-Appellant.
No. 14845.
Supreme Court of Idaho.
June 8, 1984.
David Emerson Comstock and Robert M. Tyler, Jr., Boise, for appellant.
Warren E. Jones and Mary S. Hobson, Boise, for respondent.

Opinion:
SHEPARD, Justice.
This is an appeal by Asphalt Paving and Construction Co., Inc., from a judgment against it awarding attorneys' fees to the State of Idaho pursuant to the terms of an indemnification agreement. We affirm.
The State contracted with Asphalt for street improvements in Nampa close to a building owned by the Farbers. That contract incorporated the State Standard Specifications for Highway Construction, which provide in § 107.10:
"107.10. RESPONSIBILITY FOR DAMAGE. The contractor shall indemnify and save harmless the department, its officers and employees from all suits, actions, or claims of any character brought because of any injuries or damages received or sustained by any person, persons, or property on account of the operations of the contractor or his subcontractors, or on account of or in consequence of any neglect in safeguarding the work; . or because of any act or omission, neglect or misconduct of the contractor or his subcontractors, . or from any claims or amounts arising or recovered under the workmen's compensation act or any other law, ordinance, order or decree."
The Farbers claimed damage to their property and brought suit against the State and Asphalt on theories of negligence and condemnation. As to the negligence claim, the Farbers alleged that the use of heavy vibratory equipment used to compact the roadbed caused damage to their building. Both Asphalt and the State cross-claimed against each other. Asphalt settled with the Farbers, and trial took place with the State defending on the issues of condemnation and negligence. The jury returned a special verdict finding both the State and Asphalt to be free from any tort liability. The jury also found against the Farbers on the issue of condemnation. Since Asphalt had previously settled with the Farbers, it appeared at trial only in response to the State's claim against Asphalt for indemnification.
Following trial, the State moved for an award of attorneys' fees against Asphalt, and the court awarded judgment therefor in the sum of $13,882.89, which sum did not include fees relating to the State defense of Farbers' condemnation claim.
Asphalt asserts that it should not be required to indemnify the State, arguing that, since both the State and Asphalt were found not negligent, the indemnification provision is inoperative. We do not agree.
In the instant case, Asphalt agreed to indemnify the State and save it harmless in the event that any suit, action, or claim of any character is "brought . on account of the operations of the contractor _" (Emphasis added.) We hold that the word "brought" signifies that the duty to indemnity is triggered when the claim is made and not when and if it is successfully concluded. As stated by the trial court:
"The fact that the law suit is brought because of an injury or damage received or sustained does not mean there is liability, and to give the construction to the contract requested by Asphalt would put the indemnitee in a position where he would have to defend every law suit even though the indemnitor might be in a more knowledgeable position to defend, and then find the same to be counterproductive if he (the indemnitee) wins since the indemnitee's recovery of costs and expenses would be limited only to those cases where there is a Judgment against him. This is a strained construction and, in my opinion, not realistic in light of the facts of this case."
The Oregon Court, under somewhat similar facts, held in St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Co. v. Crosetti Bros., Inc., 256 Or. 576, 475 P.2d 69, 71 (1970):
"The rule in most jurisdictions, regardless of whether indemnity is based upon an implied or an express agreement, is that when a claim is made against an indemnitee for which he is entitled to indemnification, the indemnitor is liable for any reasonable expenses incurred by the indemnitee . regardless of whether the indemnitee is ultimately held not liable. [Citations]" See also Richmond F. & P.R. Co. v. Hughes-Keegan, Inc., 207 Va. 765, 152 S.E.2d 28 (1967).
In the instant case, the Farbers' claim in negligence was predicated upon actions of Asphalt rather than actions of the State. Thus, State v. Interstate Amiesite Corp., 297 A.2d 41 (Del.1972); Indiana State Highway Commission v. Thomas, 169 Ind. App. 13, 346 N.E.2d 252 (1976); State Highway Commission v. L.A. Reynolds Co., 272 N.C. 618, 159 S.E.2d 198 (1968); Andrus v. State, 541 P.2d 1117 (Utah 1975), are inapplicable since those cases each involved an attempt by a state to be indemnified for its own negligence.
Asphalt further argues that Williams v. Johnston, 92 Idaho 292, 442 P.2d 178 (1978), and Weston v. Globe Slicing Machine Co., 621 F.2d 344 (9th Cir.1980), stand for the proposition that, in the instant case, there is no liability for indemnification absent the establishment of liability of the State to the Farbers. We disagree. In both Williams and Globe Slicing, the opinions of the court made clear that those holdings were based on the absence of a formal indemnity agreement. We distinguish both cases on that basis, just as those cases refused to follow precedents based on formal indemnity agreements.
In International Harvester Co. v. TRW, Inc., Idaho (December 15, 1983), it was held that "[ojnce a party's right to indemnification is established and if the indemnitor has been given proper notice and opportunity to defend the underlying litigation, the indemnitee is entitled to recover from the indemnitor its costs and attorneys' fees in defending the main action." Here, Asphalt contractually agreed to "indemnify and save harmless" the State. In St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Co. v. Crosetti Bros, Inc., supra, that language was held to require the indemnitor to make a choice between defending or paying the defense costs, and since the indemnitor did not defend the suit, it had a duty to pay the attorneys' fees and investigative expenses of the indemnitee.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. Costs to respondent. No attorneys' fees on appeal.
DONALDSON, C.J., and BAKES, J., concur.