Case Name: BODIE v. CHAR. & WEST. CAR. RY. CO.
Court: Supreme Court of South Carolina
Jurisdiction: South Carolina
Decision Date: 1903-05-18
Citations: 66 S.C. 302
Docket Number: 
Parties: BODIE v. CHAR. & WEST. CAR. RY. CO.
Judges: Before McCullough, special Judge,
Reporter: South Carolina Reports
Volume: 66
Pages: 302–326

Head Matter:
BODIE v. CHAR. & WEST. CAR. RY. CO.
1. A New Trial may be granted for inadequacy of damages. Mr. Chief Justice Pope dissenting.
2. Evidence — Appliances—Methods.—In an action against a railroad company for inj ury from negligence in failure to furnish a requisite force of hands to do special work, after promise, it is competent te show the usual methods on this and other roads of doing the same work.
3. Jury — Circuit Judge.- — It is not error for a trial Judge to refuse to require the jury to visit the place of an accident, after deciding that they could do so, upon their informing him that a view of the place would be of no benefit to them.
4. Appliances — Contributory Negligence — Proximate Result— Methods — Section Foreman. — Charge as to duty of master to furnish proper appliances; ordinary care and contributory negligence in use of them by the servant; natural and proximate result; and methods adopted by the servant in doing the work, in case of section foreman inj ured by falling of one of his hands caused by inadequate force; approved.
5. Assumption of Risks — Section Foreman. — Performance of work by section foreman with insufficient hands, is not a defense to an action by him against master for injury occasioned thereby.
6. New Triae. — There being evidence to sustain a verdict, refusal of trial Judge to set it aside will not be disturbed.
7. Rehearing refused.
Before McCullough, special Judge,
Greenwood,
May, 1902.
Affirmed.
Action by Josiah W. Bodie against Charleston and Western Carolina Railway.
From judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals on the following exceptions:
“1. The defendant excepts to and appeals from the order or judgment of Judge Gary setting aside the verdict rendered on the trial before him and granting a new trial, on the ground that the Circuit Judge did not have the power to grant such new trial for inadequacy of the amount of the verdict rendered, and it was error of law for him to do so.
“2. The defendant excepts to the rulings of Honorable Joseph A. McCullough, presiding Judge, in relation to the introduction of testimony, and alleges error in such rulings as follows: (a) In allowing the plaintiff, Bodie, to testify, against the objection of the defendant, as to what was the usual and customary way of handling and loading rails, and that the manner in which he was handling rails when he was injured was the usual and customary manner, the testimony being as follows: ‘Q. AVhat is the usual and ordinary way? Mr. Grier: We object to that also as incompetent. Objection overruled. A. Just like I was handling them.’ The error being that the Circuit Judge by his ruling allowed testimony as to the usual and customary method of handling rails, upon the question of plaintiff’s ordinary care in handling such rails when he was injured, (b) In allowing the wit ness, Bodie, to testify that the method he adopted for handling these rails was usual and customary on the C. & W. C. Railroad, as follows: ‘Q. What has been the method adopted on the C. & W. C. Railway? Mr. Grier: We object to that as incompetent. Objection overruled. Q. What has been the custom adopted there ? A. The customary way of loading rails was to load it the way I spoke of just a few minutes .ago — -both ends at a time. We usually in loading loaded in no other way.’ The error being in allowing testimony as to the custom of other agents and employees of this defendant in handling rails, upon the question óf ordinary care of the plaintiff in handling rails when he was injured, (c) In allowing the witness, W. D. Melton, to testify what was the customary way of loading rails on a push car of the Central of Georgia Railroad and other roads — the testimony being as follows: ‘Q. What road did you work on ? A. I worked for the Central of Georgia. Q.- Did you work for the C. & W. C. ? A. Well, that was part of that road at that time. Q. What is the usual and customary way of loading rails on a push car? We object to that on the ground of incompetency. Objection overruled. Q. What is the usual and ■customary way of loading rails on a push car? A. Pick it up and carry it and load it on the car. Q. One end at a time, or altogether ? A. I never have picked up one end at a time. I just picked up the whole rail and carried it and ■load it on the car. Q. What is the usual and customary way? Was it ever done any other way? A. Always saw it that way.’ The eror being in allowing testimony as to the custom on other railroads or on this road in handling rails, upon the question of ordinary care of the plaintiff in handling rails when he was injured, (d) In allowing the witness, P. W. Ellenberg, to testify as to the usual and customary manner of handling rails, in answer to the following questions, to wit: ‘Q. What is the usual and customary manner of handling rail ? Do you know how it is done ? What is the customary way?’ The error being in allowing testimony as to the custom on other roads or on this road in handling rails upon the question of ordinary care of the plaintiff in handling rails when he was injured, (e) In allowing the witness, J. B. Ogilvie, on cross-examination, to testify that a larger force of hands would have been safer in this case, because such force would be able to catch and hold up'a falling rail, if one hand should slip. The error being that there was no such negligence alleged in the complaint, and such testimony was, therefore, incompetent.
“3. The presiding Judge, Honorable Joseph A. McCullough, erred in not requiring the jury to visit the place of the injury, after having ruled in defendant’s favor and against the objection of plaintiff, that they should do so, and in allowing the jury to determine this question for themselves. The error being: (a) Having decided that it was necessary to a just decision of the cause for the jury to visit such place, it was error of law for the Circuit Judge to subsequently allow the jury to determine the question whether they would so view the place or not for themselves, (b) Because the record shows that it was necessary to a just decision of this cause for the jury to view the place of injury, and the Circuit Judge having so held, it was error of law for him to allow the jury to have any voice in determining this question.
“4. The presiding Judge, Honorable J: A. McCullough, erred in charging the jury as follows: ‘If you conclude that defendant did not require the plaintiff to do this extra work, but the plaintiff did so freely, voluntarily, of his own motion, without being required by the defendant so to do, why then, of course, under the complaint, the plaintiff would not be entitled to recover, because he bases his action upon that theory. If, however, you conclude that the defendant did require the plaintiff to do this extra work, then there immediately followed a duty and obligation which the law imposes upon the defendant railway company, and that is, that the defendant railway company would furnish to the plaintiff suitable, safe and appropriate appliances for the purpose of doing that work’ — the error being that his Honor assumed as a fact in the case that the work in which the plaintiff was engaged when injured was extra work, when it was one of the issuable facts in the case whether such work was extra or was a part of and a mere incident to the general work of keeping up road-bed, which had been committed to the plaintiff — thus charging upon the facts, in violation of the provision of the Constitution which prohibits such a charge.
“5. The presiding Judge, Honorable J. A. McCullough, erred in charging the jury as follows: ‘That it was the duty of the defendant to adopt and use such machinery, apparatus, appliances, tools and means as were suitable and proper for the prosecution of the business which it required the plaintiff to do, with a reasonable degree of safety to life and security against injury, and it was the duty of the defendant and not the plaintiff to exercise due care and diligence to ascertain whether the appliances furnished were safe and suitable’ — the error being: (a) That while in some cases the employee may assume that machinery given him to work with is safe and suitable, and he is not bound to inquire whether it is so or not, such principle does not apply to this case, where the alleged negligence was in failing to furnish a sufficient force of hands, and the inefficiency, if it existed, was patent, and particularly where the plaintiff himself was in control of the instrumentalities given him for his work, and in some measure stood in the position of master with reference thereto, (b) In all cases it 'is the duty of an employee to exercise due care in and about the work committed to him, and it was error of law for the Judge to instruct the jury that it was not the duty of the plaintiff to exercise due care and diligence to ascertain whether the appliances furnished were safe and suitable, (c) The doctrine stated was not applicable to this case, and was error of law, for the further reason that the uncontradicted testimony of the plaintiff showed that he had full knowledge, some time before his injury, of the alleged insufficiency of the force committed to him.
“6. The presiding Judge, Honorable J. A. McCullough, erred in charging the jury, on the request of plaintiff, as fol lows: ‘That if the jury find that the plaintiff was injured by an accident resulting from the concurrent negligence of a fellow-servant, and of the defendant, the defendant is liable as though it were the sole offender.’ The error being: (a) The charge leaves entirely out of account the question of proximate cause, and instructs the jury in effect that plaintiff can recover for an accident resulting from any previous negligent act of the defendant, remote or proximate, if it concurred with a negligent act of a fellow-servant, (b) The instruction was more erroneous and hurtful to the defendant because the presiding Judge elsewhere in his charge instructed the jury that an accident and a negligent act are entirely different, and to be distinguished one from the other, (c) The effect of the charge was to instruct the jury that the defendant would be liable for an accident, (d) It decides all questions against the defendant, and practically instructs the jury to render a verdict in favor of plaintiff, inasmuch as one of the defenses of the railway company was that the cause of the injury was the accidental falling of a fellow-servant.
“7. The presiding Judge, Honorable J. A. McCullough, erred in refusing to charge the defendant’s third request as presented, as follows: ‘The jury cannot find for the plaintiff, unless the preponderance of the evidence shows that the defendants were guilty of negligence as charged in the complaint, and that such negligence was the proximate cause of the injury, and in order to’ warrant a finding that the negligence complained of was the proximate cause of the injury alleged, it must appear that the injury was a natural and probable consequence of the alleged negligence, and that it could have been and ought to have been foreseen,’ and in modifying the same by striking out the words: ‘and that it could have been and ought to have been foreseen.’ The error being: (a) The charge as modified makes the defendant liable, whether the alleged injury as the result of the alleged negligence could have and ought to have been fore-r seen or not. (b) The request as presented contained a sound proposition of law, and ought to have been charged without modification.
“8. The presiding Judge, Honorable J. A. McCullough, erred in refusing the defendant’s fourth request, as follows: Tf the jury believe that the cause of the injury was the accidental falling of one of the plaintiff’s coworkers, and that this fall was not caused by the negligence of the railway company, then the plaintiff cannot recover.’ The error being: (a) The request contained a sound proposition of law, and should have been charged as submitted, (b) The modification emasculates the request, (c) The modification makes the defendant liable for consequences of the fall, although not liable for the fall itself, and allows recovery for negligence not alleged in the complaint.
“9. The presiding Judge, Honorable J. A. McCullough, erred in refusing to charge the jury, as requested by the defendant, as follows: Tf the jury believe that the force of hands furnished to the plaintiff was sufficient and safe for doing the work in hand in a different way from that which he adopted, then the plaintiff cannot recover, if the evidence shows that his injury resulted from his use of the force for the work in a more dangerous way, unless the evidence also shows that he was directed or required by his employer to adopt such more hazardous way,’ and in modifying the same by inserting therein the word ‘negligent,’ the error being: (a) The request contained a sound proposition of law, and it was error not to charge it as presented, (b) The defendant was entitled to' the instruction that the use of a more hazardous way for doing work, when the plaintiff knew of a safe way, was in itself negligence that would bar a recovery, (c) In instructing the jury that before plaintiff could be barred for contributory negligence, defendant must show more negligence on the part of plaintiff than the adoption of a method for doing the work known to be dangerous.
“10. The presiding Judge erred in refusing to charge the defendant’s seventh request, as follows: Tf the negligence against which the plaintiff complains — if there was any such negligence on the part of the railway compapny — was long enough before the injury to admit of plaintiff’s guarding against it by the use of ordinary care, and he failed to do this, knowing of such negligence of the railway company, there can be no recovery.’ The error being: (a) The request contained a sound proposition of law, and it should have been charged as presented, (b) In view of the fact that the negligence complained of occurred long prior to plaintiff’s injury, the request contained a sound proposition of law applicable to the case as made, with reference to the question of contributory negligence, and its refusal eliminated that defense in the most material aspect of the defendant’s case.
“11. The presiding Judge, Honorable J. A. McCullough, erred in refusing to charge the defendant’s eighth request, as follows: ‘The Courts will not take better care of a man than he takes of himself; hence, if an employee knows that the work in which he is engaged is dangerous, or that the appliances used by him are dangerous or insufficient, and fails to exercise ordinary care and observation to protect himself after such knowledge, he cannot recover; and if the jury find such conditions to exist here, their verdict should be for the defendant.’ The error being: (a) The request contained a sound proposition of law, and should have been charged as presented, (b) In view of the fact that the negligence complained of occurred long prior to the plaintiff’s injury, the request contained a sound proposition of law, applicable to the case as made, with reference to the question of contributory negligence, and its refusal eliminated that defense in the most material aspect of the defendant’s case, (c) It is the duty of an employee to exercise ordinary care, even when the master has given him defective appliances with which to work, and the refusal of the Circuit Judge to present this charge to the jury, ignored this principle and relieved the plaintiff from' the exercise of such ordinary care, if the master had previously been negligent in failing to furnish a sufficient force.
“12. The presiding Judge, Honorable J. A. McCullough, erred in refusing to grant a new trial, because the testimony taken in its strongest light in favor of the plaintiff shows that the proximate cause of the injury was not the negligence of the defendant, but the accidental falling of one of the plaintiff’s fellow-servants, and it was error of law to refuse a new trial on this ground.”
Messrs. Sheppards & Grier and S. J. Simpson, for appellant.
Mr. Simpson cites: As to setting aside a verdict for inadequacy of daumages, at common lawc 14 Ency. P. & P., 764. Under our Statutes: 7 Stat., 253; 14 Stat., 39; Code, 1902, 2734; Code of Proc., 1902, 286. Decided cases: 1 Bay, 62; 2 Bay, 466 ; 2 N. & McC., 516; Harp., 56; 3 McC., 547; 2 Bail., 216. This question may be raised on this appeal: 17 S. C., 150; 19 S. C., 607; 20 S. C., 542; 36 S. C., 130; 59 S. C., 51; 46 S. C., 149.' Judge should have allowed jury to visit place of accident: Code, 1902, 2950. Charge on facts: 61 S. C., 563; 2 Ency. P. & P., 576; 57 S. C., 461; 58 S. C., 230. Plaintiff must ascertain if appliances are sufficient: 3 Wood on R.- R., 1716. It was duty of plaintiff to use ordinary care to protect himself after knowledge of defective force: Beach on Con. Neg., sec. 370.
Mr. Grier cites: Receiving incompetent evidence is error: 32 S. C., 538. No connection betzveen facts at issue and facts proved over objection: 1 Green. Ev., sec. 52; 23 Law. Ed., 708; 60 S. C., 153; 61 S. C., 488; 45 S. C., 278. As to combined negligence of master and fellozu-servant: 106 N. Y., 700; 3 Cush., 270; 46 Wis., 510; 61 Wis., 159; 27 W. Va., 305; 7 L- R. A., 500; 32 N. Y. S. R., 817. Liability arises alone from the proximate cause of an injury: 54 S. C., 503; 16 Ency., 1 ed., 428, 440; 116 Penn., 344; 27 Am. R., 653; 3 Par. on Con., 7 ed., 180; 52 S. C., 338; 1 Strob., 525. If plaintiff adopted more dangerous method, zvithout orders, he cannot recover: Beach on Con. Neg., 442 ; 61 S. C., 489 ; 34 S. C., 214; 42 S. C., 472; 18 S. C., 267. Doctrine of contributory negligence does not apply here; but injury was caused- alone by plaintiff’s negligence: 7 Fncy., 2 eel., 585; Beach on Con. Neg., 58; Thom, on Neg., 156; 61 S. C., 486; 66 la., 599; 41 L. R. A., 33; 82 N. Y., 370; 63 Fed. R., 407; 98 Ga., 655; 49 Fed. R., 393; 112 Ind., 592; 128 U. S-, 91; 100 U. S., 213; 32 S. C., 299; 59 Am. R., 739; 36 Kan., 129; 50 Ga.., 465.
Messrs. Gray don & Giles and Caldwell & Park, contra;
Court can set aside verdict for insufficiency of damages: Code, 1902, 2734; Code of Proc., 1902, 286; 59 S. C., 270; 1 Bay, 52; 2 Bay, 466; 4 McC., 156; 46 S. C., 510; 16 Fncy., 1 ed., 589. Hvidence objected to competent: 61 S. C., 488; 60 S. C., 169; 44 S. C., 443; 60 S. C., 263. Whether jury should view place is matter of discretion with Judge: Code, 1902, 2950. As to exceptions to charge: 38 S. C., 213; 18 S. C., 282, 270; 34 S. C., 215; 40 S. C„ 169; 42 S. C., 467; 61 S. C., 479; 21 S. E. R., 344; 42 S. C., 414; Whar. on Neg., 2 ed., secs. 17, 18, 19, 21; 1 Strob., 550. There being evidence to support the verdict, refusal of new trial will not be reviewed: 61 S. C.,491; 15 S. C., 407; 42 S. C., 471; 64 S. C., 112.
May 18, 1903.

Opinion:
The opinion in this case was filed April 20th, 1903, but remittitur stayed on petition for rehearing until
The opinion of the Court was delivered by
Mr. Justice Gary.
Statement of facts. — The allegations of the complaint, material to the consideration of the questions raised by the exceptions, áre as follows:
"II. That at the time hereinafter mentioned and for a long time prior thereto, the plaintiff was employed by the said defendant as section foreman upon section 18 of defeñdant's said line of railroad, and as such foreman was ordered and required, in addition to the other duties imposed upon him, to haul and put in piles upon the side of said railroad, certain steel rails, which had been taken up from said track and cast alongside the same.
"III. That during the summer of 1899, the said defendant furnished to the plaintiff a force of six section hands to do the ordinary and usual work required on said section, but prior to giving the special orders to haul and pile the said steel rails, the said defendant had reduced plaintiff's force of hands to three, and had required plaintiff to take the place of a hand and assist in all such work as required the services of more than three men.
"IV. That when the plaintiff was ordered and required by the defendant to haul and pile the said steel rails, he requested the said defendant to send him more help, protesting that the said steel rails were entirely too heavy (each one of them weighing 600 pounds or more) for the three hands and himself to handle, whereupon the said defendant promised two more men to assist in the said work, in the meantime requiring plaintiff to do and perform the same.
"V. That it was the defendant's duty to furnish to the plaintiff proper appliances and the help necessary to do and perform the work assigned to him and required of him, and notwithstanding its said promise, it wilfully and negligently and carelessly disregarded its duty to plaintiff and his request for more help, and failed to furnish to the plaintiff a sufficient force of hands to do the work required of him, and that such negligence of the defendant was the direct cause of the injury to the plaintiff hereinafter set forth and-alleged.
"VI. That on the 15th day of February, 1900, while the plaintiff, in compliance with the orders of the defendant, was trying, with the assistance of his three hands, to carry one of the said steel rails up an embankment for the purpose of loading it on his car and hauling and piling it as aforesaid, one of his said hands was entirely overcome and exhausted by the great weight of the said steel rail, on account of the failure of the defendant to furnish a sufficient force to carry the same, and fell to the ground, thereby causing the whole weight of one end of the steel rail to be thrown on the plaintiff, by which his right leg was knocked out of place, his back injured, and a great strain put upon his whole body, causing a lesion of his kidneys and other internal organs."
Upon the first trial the jury rendered a verdict in favor of the plaintiff for $2,400, but on appeal the Supreme Court granted a new trial (61 S. C., 468, 39 S. E., 715). When the case was tried the second time, the jury found a verdict in favor of the plaintiff for $1,000, which was set aside by the presiding Judge, on the ground that if the plaintiff was entitled to recover any sum at all, the said amount was inadequate. On the third trial the verdict was in favor of the plaintiff for $3,000. The defendant appealed upon exceptions, which will be reported.
Opinion. — First exception. This exception raises the question whether his Honor, the Circuit' Judge, had the power to grant a new trial for inadequacy in the amount of the verdict. Section 2734 of the Code of Laws provides that "Circuit Courts shall have power to grant new 'trials in cases where there has been a trial by jury for reasons for which new trials have usually been granted in the courts of law in this State." Section 286 of the Code of Procedure, in subdivision 4, contains the provision that "the Judge who tries the cause may, in his discretion, entertain a motion, to be made on his minutes, to set aside a verdict and grant a new trial upon exceptions, or for insufficient evidence, or for excessive damages, but such motions, if heard upon the minutes, can only be heard at the same term at which the trial is had" (italics ours). While 14 Enc. of Pl. & Pr., 764, does contain the language quoted in the opinion of Mr. Chief Justice Pope, under the head of "Inadequate Damages for Torts — Common Law Rule," it also adds immediately thereafter these words: "But the modern rule is that a new trial may be granted, in actions for torts, where the verdict is grossly inadequate, for the same reasons as those governing where the verdict is excessive." And under the head of "Code Provisions," on page 766, it also says: "The Code provisions as to new trials for inadequate damages appear in general to be merely decía ratory of the common law. In some States the Codes have been amended so as to permit new trials where the verdict is so inadequate as to indicate passion or prejudice. In the absence of such amendment, a new trial may be granted for inadequate damages, on the theory that the verdict is contrary to the evidence (italics ours). In 16 Ency. of Law, 591 (1st ed.), it is said: "Where a verdict gives grossly inadequate damages to a plaintiff, it is as much a ground for a new trial upon the motion of the plaintiff as a verdict for excessive damages would be, upon the motion of the defendant." In a note on the same page, the following language is quoted from McDonald v. Walter, 40 N. Y., 551: "A verdict for grossly inadequate amount stands upon no higher ground'in legal principle nor in the rules of law or justice than a verdict for excessive or extravagant amount. It is doubtless true, that instances of the former occur less frequently because it is less frequently possible to make it clearly appear that the jury have grossly erred. But when the case does plainly show such a result, justice as plainly forbids that the plaintiff should be denied what is his due as that the- defendant should pay what he ought not to be charged." The case of Benton v. Collins, 47 L. R. A. (N. C.), 33, is well considered and fully sustains our views upon this question.
The cases 'from our reports, cited in the opinion of Chief Justice Pope, while showing that the courts should cautiously exercise the right to grant new trials for inadequacy in the amount of the verdict, nevertheless clearly lay down the principle that the Court has the power to grant a new trial in such cases. See, also, Stuckey v. R. R., 57 S. C., 395, 38 S. C., 550, and cases therein cited, which even show that the Circuit Judge may, in his discretion, impose conditions upon granting a new trial.
Second exception. Assignments of error "a," "b," "c" and "d" will be first considered. The only ground of objection interposed by the defendant to the introduction of the testimony on the trial of the case, in the Circuit Court, was that it was incompetent. This objection failed to spécify in' what particular the testimony was inadmissible, and is, therefore, too general to be considered. But waiving this objection and considering the grounds set forth in the exceptions, they cannot be sustained, as the testimony was explanatory of the method for operating the appliances.
Assignment of error "e." In the first place, the witness testified that a larger force of hands would not have been safer in this case; and, in the second place, the testimony was responsive to the issues made by the pleadings.
Third exception. The jury informed his Honor, the pre-' siding Judge, that they had decided that it would be of no benefit to them to visit the place where the accident occurred. It was wholly within the discretion of the presiding Judge whether he would send the jury to view the place where the injury occurred, and under the circumstances his discretion was properly exercised.
Fourth exception. When the presiding Judge spoke of "this extra work," he did not mean to decide the question of fact, but only to refer to the extra work mentioned in the pleadings, which he had just explained to the jury, and which he pointed out as an issue in the case.
Fifth exception. The charge embodied a sound proposition of law, and if the defendant desired further explanation of the principle therein stated, it should have prepared requests to that effect.
Sixth exception. The charge mentioned in this exception is to be considered in connection with other portions of the charge. By reference to the charge set out in the seventh exception, it will be seen that the appellant had the benefit of the principle as the proximate cause of the injury.
Seventh exception. The charge as modified conformed to the principle stated in Harrison v. Berkeley, 1 Strob., 525 (cited with approval in Pickens v. R. R., 54 S. C., 503, 32 S. E., 567), in which the Court says: "It is required that the consequences to be answered for, should be natural as well as proximate. By this I understand, not that they should be such as upon a calculation of chances would be found likely to occur nor such as extreme prudence might anticipate, but only that they should be such as have actually ensued one from another, without the occurrence of any such extraordinary conjunction of circumstances or the intervention of any such extraordinary result, as that the usual course of nature should seem to have been departed from."
Eighth exception. The presiding Judge said: "I refuse to charge you that, that way. I charge you that request as follows: Tf the jury, believe that the cause was the accidental falling of one of plaintiff's coworkers, and that this fall, I have added, or its consequences was not due to the negligence of the railway company, then the plaintiff cannot recover.' " The authority last cited sustains the charge as modified.
Ninth exception. His Honor said : "I cannot charge you that way, but I charge you that with this modification, and you will pay attention now to the charge as I now read it to you: Tf the jury believe that the force of hands furnished the plaintiff was sufficient and safe for doing the work in hand in a different way from that which he adopted, then the plaintiff cannot recover, if the evidence shows that his injury resulted from his negligence, from his negligent use of the force for the work in a more dangerous way, unless the evidence also shows that he was directed or required by his employer to adopt such more hazardous way.' That is for you. Take into consideration the facts as they presented themselves to plaintiff on that occasion. Was he negligent? Did he lack ordinary care in the way in which he handled those rails? Gentlemen of the jury, in handling them, did he fall short of that standard, the standard of ordinary care ? If you find that he did, and that caused the injury, then, why then, of course, under the charge which I have given you, he contributed to his own injury. If'you find on that occasion that he didn't fall short of the standard, taking everything into consideration, he handled the rails with the force of hands just as an ordinarily prudent man would have been expected under the same circumstances, he would not be guilty of a lack of ordinary care. Then, if defendant was negligent, you cannot charge him with contributory negligence." The request to charge was objectionable, for the reason that it undertook to say what facts would constitute negligence. Even if the evidence showed that the plaintiff's injury resulted from his use of the force- for the work in a more dangerous way, and also that he was not directed or required by his employer to adopt the more hazardous way, nevertheless, it was for the jury to draw the inference therefrom, and to determine whether such facts constituted negligence.
Tenth exception. The case of Youngblood v. R. R. Co., 60 S. C., 9, 38 S. E., 232, shows that the request to charge was properly refused, in which the Court uses this language: "Sec. 15, art. IX., of the Constitution sets at rest any doubts that might be entertained on this question. It provides that 'Knowledge by an employee injured by the defective or unsafe character or' condition of any machinery, ways or appliances, shall be no defense to an action for injury caused thereby, except as to the conductors or engineers in charge of dangerous or unsafe cars or engines voluntarily operated by them.' In other words, where an empk^ee is injured while voluntarily operating machinery after knowledge of its unsafe condition, his action for injury caused thereby shall not be defeated by reason of this fact. The word 'defense' is not used in its technical sense. The words, 'shall be no defense to an action,' are to be understood as meaning, 'shall not defeat an action.' The Constitution did not intend to deal with pleadings but with a principle of law. It did not intend that a defendant on a motion for nonsuit should get the benefit of a state of facts which the Constitution declared should be no defense to the action. The object of this provision was to take from a defendant that failed to furnish suitable machinery, the right to defeat an action by the employee by showing that he did not act with clue care in voluntarily operating the machinery after knowledge of its defective condition.
Eleventh exception. This exception is likewise disposed of by the case last mentioned.
Twelfth exception. There was testimony to sustain the finding of the jury. This exception must, therefore, be overruled.
The judgment of the Circuit Court is affirmed.
Mr. Justice Jones concurs.