Case Name: Fox v. Mellon, Appellant
Court: Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
Jurisdiction: Pennsylvania
Decision Date: 1970-04-28
Citations: 438 Pa. 364
Docket Number: Appeal, No. 114
Parties: Fox v. Mellon, Appellant.
Judges: Before Jones, Cohen, Eagen, O’Brien, Roberts and Pomeroy, JJ.
Reporter: Pennsylvania State Reports
Volume: 438
Pages: 364–373

Head Matter:
Fox v. Mellon, Appellant.
Argued January 15, 1970.
Before Jones, Cohen, Eagen, O’Brien, Roberts and Pomeroy, JJ.
O. Richard Morton, with him Griffith, Morton & Buchely, for appellant.
Albert B. Wrigley, with him Kransley, Wrigley, Yergey and Daylor, for appellee.
April 28, 1970:

Opinion:
Opinion by
Mr. Justice Cohen,
This is an appeal from the refusal of the court below to open a default judgment which was taken at 9:08 a.m. on the twenty-first day following service of the complaint.
This action arose out of an automobile accident which occurred on May 15, 1964. On August 9, 1968, over four years later, appellee commenced her suit in trespass by filing a Praecipe for a Writ of Summons which was served on August 15. Appellant turned the writ over to his insurance agent who on August 19 forwarded it to the regional claims office of appellant's liability insurance carrier.
On October 3, 1968 appellee filed a complaint which was served on appellants' wife on October 4. Appellant had never been involved in a lawsuit before and did not notice the endorsement on the complaint to plead within twenty days. After trying unsuccessfully to talk to an attorney friend, he mailed the complaint to his broker who received it on October 14. The broker immediately mailed it to the liability carrier's claims office which received it on October 15. The manager of the claims office assumed that he had most of the twenty days left in which to respond because the broker's covering letter stated that he had received the complaint on October 14 and that it had been served shortly before that time.
During the following ten days the manager was busy processing approximately 1000 claims files in his office and attending court for several pending cases. On Friday, October 25 at about 4:10 p.m. (the prothonotary's office had closed at 4:00) the claims manager had requested C. Eichard Morton to enter an appearance for appellant. On Monday, October 28 when counsel attempted to enter an appearance, he discovered that appellee had taken a default judgment at 9:08 a.m. on October 25, the twenty-first day after service.
On November 4 appellant filed a petition to open the judgment which the lower court denied because it felt appellant had not established sufficient equitable consideration.
Our cases are clear that a petition to open a judgment is an appeal to the court's discretion, Richmond v. A. F. of L. Medical Service Plan of Philadelphia, 415 Pa. 561, 204 A. 2d 271 (1964) ; Murphy v. Smith, 415 Pa. 512, 204 A. 2d 275 (1964); Scott v. McEwing, 337 Pa. 273, 10 A. 2d 436 (1940), and that discretion may be exercised to order a judgment to be oj>ened when three factors are present: (1) the petition to open is promptly filed, (2) a defense is shown to exist on the merits, and (3) the default is reasonably explained or excused. Thorn v. Clearfield Borough, 420 Pa. 584, 218 A. 2d 298 (1966) ; Colucci v. Imperial, 414 Pa. 289, 200 A. 2d 297 (1964); Wheel v. Park Building, 412 Pa. 545, 195 A. 2d 359 (1963).
There is no question that the petition to open was filed promptly and that a meritorious defense to the personal injury claim has been shown by means of the statute of limitations. The court below felt appellant had not shown a reasonable explanation or excuse for the delay and thus insufficient equitable considerations were present to justify opening the judgment. The record shows that the complaint was served on appellant's wife and not on his counsel, that his education ended with the ninth grade, and that the notice to plead was in very small letters. A person untrained in the law would not be looking for any such notice, and when it was in such small lettering it was unlikely to catch his attention. Taking judgment so early on the twenty-first day together with the small notice to plead gives the impression that all this was a studied attempt by appellee to obtain a default judgment. Under all the circumstances, we feel appellant did show a reasonable explanation and excuse for ¡the delay and that the court below abused its discretion in refusing to open the judgment.
Order reversed.
Mr. Chief Justice Bell took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.