Case Name: STATE of Florida, Petitioner, v. Richard DIAMOND, Respondent
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1988-08-22
Citations: 553 So. 2d 1185
Docket Number: Nos. 87-1992, 87-1993
Parties: STATE of Florida, Petitioner, v. Richard DIAMOND, Respondent.
Judges: SMITH, C.J., and JOANOS, J., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 553
Pages: 1185–1203

Head Matter:
STATE of Florida, Petitioner, v. Richard DIAMOND, Respondent.
Nos. 87-1992, 87-1993.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
Aug. 22, 1988.
On Rehearing En Banc Dec. 28, 1989.
Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., and Bradford L. Thomas, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, for petitioner.
William B. Richbourg, Pensacola, for respondent.

Opinion:
ZEHMER, Judge.
The state petitions for a writ of certiorari to review a pretrial order entered by the circuit court of Santa Rosa County in the criminal prosecution of respondent Richard Diamond on two charges of sexual battery upon persons under the age of 12 years. The order, entitled "Judgment," provides that "the State be, and is, estopped and enjoined from the prosecution of the Defendant upon each of these causes unless and until the State['s] complaining child witness, in any such cause to be prosecuted, shall first submit to a physical examination by the Defendant's medical expert." The state contends the trial court violated a clearly established principle of law when it ordered the alleged victims to submit to a compelled physical examination, citing State v. Smith, 260 So.2d 489 (Fla.1972). Respondent contends there is nothing illegal about the trial court's order and that it does not depart from the essential requirements of law.
The facts revealed by the record before us are as follows. On May 22, 1987, respondent Diamond was charged by separate informations with two charges of sexual battery upon young girls under 12 years of age in violation of section 794.-011(2), Florida Statutes (1985). The information in case number 87-1992 charged that sexual battery was committed against A.H., age eight years, "between January 1, 1986 and December 13, 1986 . by vaginal penetration by the Defendant's penis and/or finger." The information in case number 88-1993 makes a similar charge in respect to C.F., age eight years.
After making a demand for discovery and offering to reciprocate, Diamond filed his "Motions To Compel Physical Examination" in each case, reciting that each of the alleged victims had been physically examined by Dr. Lelia Montes, a pediatrician and the medical examiner for the Child Protection Team, and that the findings by Dr. Montes as a result of these examinations were medically inconsistent with statements given by the two girls. More specifically, it is alleged that Dr. Montes's examination of C.F. revealed that, in her opinion, the vaginal opening of one child measured one-half (½) centimeter with evidence of "a slight hymenal tear that had healed at some time in the past" which, Dr. Montes stated on deposition, indicated that full sexual intercourse with an adult male was possible. Dr. Montes's examination of A.H. revealed a vaginal opening of three-quarters (¾) centimeter and "an old hyme-nal tear that had apparently healed some time in the past" which, Dr. Montes opined on deposition, constituted "evidence of dia-lation [sic] in an eight year old child" who "had experienced penetration by an adult male." The defendant's motion further alleges that these findings of Dr. Montes and the history as related by each of the two girls have been discussed with two separate gynecologists, "each of whom indicated that the doctor's findings and the child's history, are not medically consistent." Diamond's motion requests that his expert, Dr. C.A. Horan, a qualified gynecologist, be allowed to examine the alleged victims "as an independent medical examiner."
After these motions were filed, the state, in both cases, gave notice of its intent to offer hearsay evidence in the form of the statements made by the two girls to Dr. Montes during her interview and physical examination and to Officer Jean Slappe of the Santa Rosa County Sheriff's Department, and also gave notice of its intent to use similar fact evidence in respect to defendant's commission of sexual battery and lewd and lascivious assaults upon these two girls and another girl. The state and the parents of both children objected to the requested examinations, so a joint eviden-tiary hearing was held on defendant's motions. The custodial parents of the alleged victims testified that while they had consented to the examination by Dr. Montes, they refused to consent to the examination requested by defendant, as they were already made uneasy by Dr. Montes's examination. Dr. Horan testified that the results of Dr. Montes's examinations of the alleged victims were inconsistent with their statements that they had repeatedly engaged in "full intercourse with an adult male" and that an examination of the victims would be very helpful if he were called to testify in this matter. Specifically, he indicated that Dr. Montes's conclusions were not well supported by the alleged victims' vaginal condition, and were not consistent with repeated intercourse because a child's vaginal opening should be at least 1.5 centimeters to show that full intercourse occurred. Moreover, Diamond contends, the correctness of Dr. Montes's description and diagnosis of an "old hymenal tear" may be highly important to deciding whether or not repeated intercourse by an adult male occurred, as contended by the state. Dr. Horan and defendant's counsel offered to have the examination performed in Dr. Montes's office with Dr. Montes and the child's parents present.
The trial court's six-page order recites that it is "the final order and judgment of the Court that the Defendant's motion be, and is, hereby granted...." The court explicitly finds that
Dr. Horan expressed the opinion that he needed an opportunity to conduct a personal physical examination of each of the subject complaining child witnesses in order to apppropriately present his testimony and expert opinion upon the issue of whether or not either of said complaining witnesses manifested physical findings, upon examination, consistent with vaginal, sexual intercourse with the adult male Defendant.
The Court finds that the Defendant has offered sufficient evidence to establish a clear and convincing prima facie showing of good cause for the need for such physical examination by the Defendant's expert physician witness to aid in the presentation of evidence in his defense.
The Court further finds that the State has not offered sufficient evidence to rebut the Defendant's showing of good cause for the examination nor any evidence that the results of such physical examination could not, or would not, be likely to disclose material and relevant evidence bearing directly upon the Defendant's guilt or innocence and upon the credibility of the State's complaining child witnesses.
The trial court's order then discusses the state's reliance on the supreme court's decision in State v. Smith, 260 So.2d 489, and recognizes that witnesses in criminal prosecutions have a common law and constitutional right of privacy under Section 23 of the Florida Declaration of Rights that protects them from court ordered physical examinations "unless the State can demonstrate a compelling State interest that justifies such intrusion upon an individual's right to privacy." But the court also notes that it is required to consider a criminal defendant's right to due. process under the fourteenth amendment to the federal constitution and the Florida constitution, which must be weighed against the protection afforded by the witnesses' right of privacy, and notes that in Winfield v. Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering, 477 So.2d 544 (Fla.1985), the supreme court ruled that the right of privacy may give way only upon proof of a compelling state interest. The court's order then continues:
This Court notes that each of the complaining child witnesses have previously been voluntarily examined by the State's medical expert at the request of, and upon direction of local law enforeement and that the reasonable scientific inferences, opinions and results that may be derived from such physical examination, can reasonably be expected to have a direct material and substantial impact upon the determination of the Defendant's guilt or innocence in each of the pending cases.
To allow the State to prosecute these criminal proceedings against the Defendant, utilizing the testimony of each of the complaining child witnesses, supported by the testimony of the State's selected examining physician, Dr. Lelia Montes, while denying to the Defendant the opportunity to present an effective defense through an examining physician of his choice — who if permitted to conduct such physical examination can reasonably be expected to testify in the Defendant's behalf upon a material and substantial issue and essential element of the charged offense — will in effect deny the Defendant his Constitutional rights to due process and his Constitutional right to fairly enjoy and defend his liberty.
This Court is therefore confronted with a dilemma of how to protect the Defendant's constitutional rights and its obligation to protect the right of privacy of each of the State's complaining child witnesses to the extent that the same may be guaranteed by Section 23 of the Declaration of Rights of our Constitution and as recognized by our Florida Supreme Court in the case of State v. Smith....
It is, of course, the right of each of the complaining child witnesses, acting through their lawful parental custodians, to elect to waive their rights of privacy and to voluntarily submit to the physical examination by a qualified physician as they have previously done in connection with the State's expert witness, Dr. Montes.
The court concluded that under the circumstances of this case — where the complaining witnesses, with the concurrence of the state, have opposed the requested physical examination — "the State should be es-topped and enjoined from proceeding upon the trial of the Defendant on the pending sexual battery charges, unless and until such time as the complaining child witness, upon the charge to be prosecuted, has submitted herself to a physical examination by the examining physician selected by the Defendant in preparation of his defense." The court ordered that the state is es-topped and enjoined from proceeding with the prosecution until the witnesses have submitted to the examination, and further provided that each case will be restored to the calendar upon demonstration that the physical examinations have taken place, otherwise the case will be "stayed indefinitely pending further order of the Court."
The first issue we must address is whether this order may be properly reviewed by certiorari, as requested by the state. Subsequent to the entry of the order the state moved the court to treat its ruling as an order of dismissal so the state could take an immediate appeal. The court denied that motion, but did state that it believed its ruling involved a question of great public importance, thereby indicating that it should be reviewed by this court. Thus, despite the ambiguous language of the order under review that it is "the final order and judgment of the Court," the order cannot be treated as a final judgment for purposes of appeal, for the action continues in the trial court. Yet, it is readily apparent that the state cannot proceed with the prosecution of these cases so long as the trial court's order remains outstanding, unless the parents of the child witnesses relent in their opposition and consent to the examinations, a matter over which the state has no power or control. We agree with the state, therefore, that we have the authority to review this pretrial order upon a petition for writ of certiorari provided the state can show that the ruling constitutes a departure from the essential requirements of the law, keeping in mind that this "extraordinary writ is reserved for those situations where there has been a violation of a clearly established principle of law resulting in a miscarriage of justice." State v. Pettis, 520 So.2d 250, 254 (Fla.1988).
The parties have represented that there is no specific statute or rule which explicitly authorizes a trial court to require a. complaining witness in a sexual battery case to submit to a physical examination of the type sought here. Our research has likewise failed to reveal any authority precisely on point. The state argues, however, that State v. Smith, supra, is controlling on this question. In Smith, the trial court had entered a pretrial order that a "witness, who may be used by the State for identification of the persons involved in the perpetration of the crime alleged to have been committed by defendants, shall be examined for visual acuity." 260 So.2d at 490. On review, the supreme court found that the common law did not authorize a court to require the physical exam of a witness "because discovery in criminal cases was unknown to the common law," and nothing in the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure relating to discovery "purports to authorize a trial court to grant a motion compelling witnesses to submit to a physical examination of any sort." The court, in holding that the trial court departed from the essential elements of law, stated:
The only ground for the motion asserted by the defendants in the case sub judice was that the State's case depended in whole or in part upon the identification of defendants by eye witnesses. Even assuming, that in some rare instance, justice may require some type of physical examination of a witness, more must be shown than, in the case sub judice.
260 So.2d at 491 (emphasis added). From this rationale the state argues that the trial court had no authority to require physical examinations of the two child victims as a condition of the state's proceeding with the prosecutions. The state contends that "the trial court's order violated two principles of law: one, the principle established in State v. Smith, supra, that a witness to a crime may not be compelled to undergo physical examination; and two, the right of privacy established by the Florida Constitution, cit ed by the trial court. See Article I, Section 23, Fla. Const. (1980)."
Diamond responds that the trial court was presented with a situation involving conflicting constitutional rights and was required to consider and weigh each right against the other to determine which should give way and which should be enforced in this instance. Respondent points out that the trial court recognized the complaining witnesses' right of privacy and did not order them to submit to a physical examination, but left it to them to decide whether to voluntarily consent so that the state could proceed to use their testimony. He further argues that in State v. Smith the supreme court recognized that in certain instances justice may require some type of physical examination, and because denial of such examination in this case would effectively deny defendant the right to due process and a fair trial, the trial court had authority to condition the prosecution of these charges upon the consent of the complaining witnesses to undergo the requested examination. Respondent concedes that the specific relief granted by the trial judge may not be the only manner of enforcing respondent's constitutional rights, and suggests that we fashion such additional relief should we disagree with the trial court's ruling.
Before considering these arguments, we must determine precisely what the trial court has ordered. We are not aware of any authority granting the trial court power to curtail the state's prosecution of criminal charges for sexual battery upon failure of the complaining witness to submit to a physical examination, and we do not believe the trial court had such power or intended that result. Rather, the trial judge's comments in the hearing transcript suggest that the court is treating defendant's motion for examination as akin to a motion to suppress the use of certain evidence, and only intends to preclude the state from using any evidence that must be presented through the testimony of Dr. Montes or any evidence regarding the physical examination by Dr. Montes unless the children consent to be physically examined by defendant's gynecologist. This intent is made even more evident by the trial court's refusal to dismiss these prosecutions upon the state's motion. Our decision, therefore, is based upon our construction of the subject order as precluding the state's use of certain evidence and not that the prosecution cannot go forward upon other evidence the state might be able to present. To the extent that the order may have intended to foreclose the state's presentation of such other evidence, it would be beyond the court's power at this point and would have to be vacated. Our construction of the order avoids a remand on this particular point and is consistent with that argued by respondent.
While we have found no other case dealing with physical examination of a complaining witness in criminal cases, there are some judicial decisions dealing with mental examination of a complaining witness. Both the Second and the Fourth Districts have recognized that a trial court has the inherent power to order a psychiatric examination of a complaining witness if "strong and compelling" reasons for the examination are shown to exist.
In Dinkins v. State, 244 So.2d 148 (Fla. 4th DCA 1971), the court upheld the trial court's denial of a defendant's motion to compel the victim of a sexual battery to submit to a psychiatric examination, stating there was "absolutely no showing that psychiatric examination of the prosecutrix was essential to prevent a manifest miscarriage of justice." Id. at 150. The court recognized that several scholars had advocated the power to order such examinations, but stated:
Nonetheless, it strikes us as sound, in the absence of either express statutory authority or court rule permitting such, or in the absence of such strong and compelling evidence of mental or emotional instability of the prosecutrix that denial of a psychiatric examination could amount to a denial of due process of law, that the court should not subject the prosecutrix to such an examination. Thus, while we do not expressly reject the concept of the court possessing inherent power to require such an examination under the most compelling circumstances where it is necessary to insure a just and orderly disposition of the cause, we would discourage the practice in any but the most extreme instances.
244 So.2d at 150 (emphasis added).
Similarly in State v. Coe, 521 So.2d 373, 375 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988), the court was faced with deciding "whether the trial court has the inherent power to require victims of sexual battery to undergo psychiatric or psychological examinations in order to determine their credibility, and if so, whether the facts of the present case support ordering such an examination." Concluding that the facts in Coe did not support the ordering of such an examination, the court nevertheless recognized that a trial court did possess such inherent power, stating:
Even in jurisdictions holding that the trial court does have the authority to require such examinations, the courts emphasize that such authority should only be exercised for "strong" and "compelling" reasons. [Citations omitted]. The fourth district's opinion in Dinkins, while not expressly holding that the trial courts possess this authority, is aligned with the latter view that even if such [inherent] authority exists, it should not be exercised unless "strong" and "compelling" reasons exist. We agree with the view espoused in Dinkins.
521 So.2d 376.
We recognize, as stated by the supreme court in State v. Smith, that there was no common law right to compulsory discovery in criminal cases. But a court always has the inherent power to insure that a party before it is accorded constitutional rights of due process and a fair trial, whether or not a statute or rule of court explicitly covers the needs shown by the particular circumstances. Our rules of criminal procedure are designed and intended to provide the criminally accused a fair trial in accordance with constitutional concepts of due process. The rules now provide for limited pretrial discovery and for compulsory process to obtain both testimonial and physical evidence at trial. But the rules of procedure do not cover every conceivable situation that may arise in the course of a prosecution. A court's power to assure compliance with due process requirements cannot be limited to the explicit authority or procedure found either in court rules or in statutes, for the court's power to enforce constitutional rights stems from the constitution itself and the judicial power given the courts to interpret and enforce the federal and state constitutions. Rose v. Palm Beach County, 361 So.2d 135 (Fla.1978). The state does not point to any explicit rule that authorizes or restricts physical or mental examinations of complaining witnesses in sexual battery cases for the purpose of implementing the constitutional right to privacy. Rather, the court must necessarily consider and weigh that constitutional right against competing, inconsistent rights and interests of the accused in determining which right shall be enforced under the circumstances. We hold that the trial court in this case had the power to consider defendant's motion for a physical examination of the complaining witnesses and, if necessary to insure a just and orderly disposition of the cause, to grant the motion upon a showing of strong and compelling reasons that denial of such relief would amount to a denial of due process of law. We believe that the supreme court's explicit reservation in Smith, emphasized in the text quoted above, is necessarily based upon these constitutional considerations.
Next, the state argues that even if the trial court had the power to grant the defendant's requested relief, he has failed to show sufficiently strong and compelling reasons for the court's doing so in this case. It argues that "this is not a situation when a defendant is facing an expert's unrebuttable testimony that the children conclusively experienced sexual intercourse" because "Dr. Montes' examination did not show either alleged victim's genitalia" met the 1.5 centimeter criteria espoused by Dr. Horan, and "Dr. Horan could use the State's own evidence to exonerate the defendant of forcing the children to have repeated intercourse." (Petition er's Brief, pp. 8-9.) The state concludes that "if the trial court's order is upheld, no sexual battery victim will be safe from the ultimate invasion of privacy." (Id. at p. 11.)
Respondent contends that without the physical examination Dr. Horan will be unable to learn all the pertinent facts concerning the condition of the children's genitalia sufficient to opine without reservation that the sexual intercourse charged could not have taken place as described by the children. In particular, respondent says, whether or not Dr. Montes's "diagnosis of an 'old hymenal tear' is correct or not could be extremely important" and "there is no way to know unless an expert (in this case Dr. Horan who is a gynecologist) makes his own examination of the same child to see if he agrees or disagrees with the State's witness." (Respondent's Response, p. 7.) Respondent asserts that it would deprive him of the ability to defend himself if the state can obtain physical evidence of the condition of the complaining witnesses but the defendant cannot, even though it is shown that such physical evidence can prove the offense could not have occurred as the complaining witnesses have stated. Further, respondent points out that the trial judge did not compel the witnesses to forego their right to privacy and submit to a compulsory examination but left the matter to their voluntary decision, thereby effectuating as much as possible the constitutional rights of both parties. Therefore, respondent concludes, the order does not violate any clear principle of law and does not constitute a departure from the substantial requirements of the law.
As previously noted, the trial court carefully weighed the competing constitutional rights of the interested individuals and concluded, in the exercise of judicial discretion, that the interests of justice would be served best by requiring voluntary consent of the child witnesses to the requested physical examination before the state would be permitted to use the evidence developed by Dr. Montes's physical examination against defendant. We are, therefore, essentially reviewing an exercise of judicial discretion by the trial court. Upon petition by the state in criminal cases, appellate courts should grant the extraordinary writ of common law certiorari only when there has been a violation of a clearly established principle of law resulting in a miscarriage of justice. State v. Pettis, 520 So.2d 250 (Fla.1988); Combs v. State, 436 So.2d 93 (Fla.1983). We hold that there has been no showing by the petitioner of any violation of a clearly established principle of law resulting in a miscarriage of justice, because the trial court has fashioned an order which attempts to balance the rights of the complaining witnesses with the rights of the accused in a reasonable manner. The state's position that our refusal to overturn the order in this case will subject every victim of such offenses to a compulsory physical examination in every case of sexual battery is grossly overstated. These circumstances do not necessarily occur in every such prosecution; rather, it would seem to be somewhat unique to defend such a charge on the premise that evidence from a medical examination shows a physical impossibility for the offense to have occurred as contended by the victims.
Our decision should not be read as a callous disregard of the rights of these child victims. We are most mindful that a gynecological examination of the type here involved can be intimidating and unpleasant for these child witnesses, and we sympathize with their plight. But the defendant is charged with a serious criminal offense, one of the most serious the state can bring, and his constitutional right to due process and a fair trial must be protected as well as the rights of the children. We particularly note, as did the trial court, that each of these child witnesses previously submitted to examination by the state's medical expert voluntarily to assist it in making out a case against the accused. This fact was of pivotal significance to the trial court's ruling and is likewise to our decision. Further, in attempting to lessen the unpleasantness of the examination, the court and Dr. Horan agreed that the victims' parents and Dr. Montes could be present in Dr. Montes's office or any other place the latter should designate for the examination. It is crucial in this sexual battery case to determine "whether or not either of said complaining witnesses manifested physical findings, upon examination, consistent with vaginal, sexual intercourse with the adult male Defendant" (R. 32) as described by them. Based on the record before us, we are unable to say that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering the victims to undergo a voluntary physical examination upon the conditions specified in respect to the state's prosecution of the charges.
We agree with the trial court that this issue is one of great public importance, and certify to the supreme court the following question:
WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT'S ORDER REQUIRING THE COMPLAINING CHILD WITNESSES TO VOLUNTARILY CONSENT TO A PHYSICAL EXAMINATION BY THE ACCUSED'S EXPERT GYNECOLOGIST UNDER THE CONDITIONS STATED THEREIN CONSTITUTES A VIOLATION OF A CLEARLY ESTABLISHED PRINCIPLE OF LAW RESULTING IN A MISCARRIAGE OF JUSTICE?
Because we have answered the certified question in the negative, the petition for certiorari is DENIED.
SMITH, C.J., and JOANOS, J., concur.
. This latter date was obviously intended to be December 31, 1986, as all other references in this file and the companion case refer to December 31, not December 13.
. Dr. Horan did say on cross-examination that he had no reason to believe Dr. Montes's physical findings regarding the children's genitalia conditions were incorrect. But this statement must be construed in light of his contention that Dr. Montes's findings are not consistent with the children's statements of what had occurred.
. In those prior instances where such physical examination has become as important as it is in this case, the hearing transcript reveals through comments by the trial judge that the state and the complaining witnesses have voluntarily submitted to such examinations under conditions similar to those offered by the defendant's doctor and the court in this case.