Case Name: Barbara Lou McINTOSH, Appellant, v. Thomas Frances McINTOSH, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1983-05-25
Citations: 432 So. 2d 176
Docket Number: No. AJ-101
Parties: Barbara Lou McINTOSH, Appellant, v. Thomas Frances McINTOSH, Appellee.
Judges: ROBERT P. SMITH, Jr., C.J., and BOOTH, LARRY G. SMITH, SHIVERS, JOANOS and NIMMONS, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 432
Pages: 176–178

Head Matter:
Barbara Lou McINTOSH, Appellant, v. Thomas Frances McINTOSH, Appellee.
No. AJ-101.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
May 25, 1983.
Robert A. Sandow, of Slaughter & Slaughter, Live Oak, for appellant.
Winston W. Jacobo, Crystal River, for appellee.

Opinion:
ON HEARING EN BANC
WENTWORTH, Judge.
Appellant wife seeks review of an order which dissolved the parties' marriage, divided their marital property, and awarded appellant child support and alimony. In making a minimal alimony award the trial court determined that appellant "has sufficient, assets for her support;" we find that the record does not support this determination and we therefore reverse the order appealed.
In dissolving the parties' marriage of 26 years, the trial court, after a prior; appeal, awarded appellant a half interest in various properties acquired during the marriage. After considering testimony as to the fair market value of the property, the trial court found that appellant "has substantial equity in the property" and therefore "has sufficient assets for her support." The trial court then awarded alimony in the amount of only $50 per month. The record establishes that the properties are encumbered with outstanding mortgages; however, there is no evidence as to the total amount of the outstanding indebtedness, and the true value of appellant's equity interest in these properties cannot be determined on this record. The trial court therefore erred in concluding, without more specific record evidence, that appellant's equity interest in the properties is an asset which is sufficient for her support.
The trial court also did not determine or consider appellant's request that the marital home be awarded as lump sum alimony, reasoning that "under the original petition and counter-petition in this cause there are no allegations presented to the court on the issue of lump sum alimony." Prior appellate decisions of this court have held that a request for lump sum alimony may not be granted unless specifically pleaded. See e.g., Nalley v. Nalley, 406 So.2d 1240 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981); Foxx v. Foxx, 357 So.2d 754 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978). In the present case appellant's counter-petition requested support and alleged ability to pay permanent alimony, but appellant did not classify the character of permanent alimony claimed as lump sum. The trial court's refusal to consider appellant's subsequent specific request for a lump sum award is consistent with this court's pronouncement in Nalley and Foxx; however, we now recede from the rule announced in those cases, and adopt the reasoning of Caidin v. Caidin, 367 So.2d 248 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979). In Caidin the court ruled that a request for lump sum alimony need not necessarily be pleaded specifically, and is encompassed within a claim for temporary and permanent alimony. The court reasoned that, pursuant to § 61.08, Florida Statutes, the authority to choose the method of payment of alimony lies with the trial court, and that the court's authority in this regard is invoked by a petitioner's general request for alimony. Also see Dobbins v. Dobbins, 359 So.2d 48 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978) (dissenting opinion). We therefore direct that on remand of this cause the trial court's disposition should encompass the merits of appellant's request for an award of lump sum as well as periodic permanent alimony, pursuant to all the applicable statutory standards.
Recognizing that the order appealed contains interdependent awards relating to the division of property and alimony, we hereby reverse the order and remand the cause for further proceedings.
ROBERT P. SMITH, Jr., C.J., and BOOTH, LARRY G. SMITH, SHIVERS, JOANOS and NIMMONS, JJ., concur.
MILLS, J., dissents with opinion.
ERVIN, J., dissents with opinion in which THOMPSON, WIGGINTON, and ZEH-MER, JJ., concur.
. McIntosh v. McIntosh, 393 So.2d 582 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981), reversing a special equity awarded to the appellee husband.