Case Name: Samuel SCHUSTER, Appellant/Cross-Appellee, v. BANCO DE IBEROAMERICA, S.A., a Panamanian corporation, Appellee/Cross-Appellant
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1985-09-24
Citations: 476 So. 2d 253
Docket Number: No. 84-2093
Parties: Samuel SCHUSTER, Appellant/Cross-Appellee, v. BANCO DE IBEROAMERICA, S.A., a Panamanian corporation, Appellee/Cross-Appellant.
Judges: Before SCHWARTZ, C.J., and DANIEL S. PEARSON and JORGENSON, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 476
Pages: 253–255

Head Matter:
Samuel SCHUSTER, Appellant/Cross-Appellee, v. BANCO DE IBEROAMERICA, S.A., a Panamanian corporation, Appellee/Cross-Appellant.
No. 84-2093.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
Sept. 24, 1985.
Rehearing Denied Oct. 23, 1985.
Rodriguez-Chomat, Fernandez & Associates and Jorge Rodriguez-Chomat, Miami, for appellant/cross-appellee.
Valdes-Fauli, Cobb & Petrey and Jose E. Sirven and William C. Crenshaw, Miami, for appellee/cross-appellant.
Before SCHWARTZ, C.J., and DANIEL S. PEARSON and JORGENSON, JJ.

Opinion:
DANIEL S. PEARSON, Judge.
Schuster, the plaintiff below, appeals from an order dismissing his amended complaint with prejudice on the ground that the defendant-bank owed no duty to notify him when the Internal Revenue Service served a notice of levy on his account in the bank. The bank cross-appeals from an order denying its motion for attorneys' fees pursuant to Section 57.105, Florida Statutes (1983). We affirm both orders.
The heart of Schuster's amended complaint is that:
"8. On or about July 26, 1983, a Notice of Levy . was served by the Internal Revenue Service upon an officer of the Defendant, identifying the Plaintiff as 'agent, nominee, trustee or holder of a beneficial interest for Susie Schuster, a/k/a Susie Translateur'.
"9. Said Notice of Levy was incorrect and the Defendant had no legal obligation to comply with it for the following reasons:
"A. It did not identify SAMUEL SCHUSTER in his individual capacity, but merely as an agent for another person.
'TO. Defendant did not comply with said Notice of Levy of July 26, 1982 because, in fact, and in the opinion of Defendant's counsel, the Notice of Levy was incorrect and improper.
"11. Defendant had at that time the implied contractual and common law obligation with the Plaintiff to notify him of the service of the Notice of Levy by Internal Revenue Service upon the Bank to allow Plaintiff to take whatever course of action, within the scope of the law, was available to him. Defendant failed to take any action to advise Plaintiff on July 26, 1982 that a Notice of Levy had been served upon the Bank attempting to levy and seize Plaintiff's monies at the Bank.
"12. Defendant called Internal Revenue Service and requested a second Notice of Levy.... Three (3) days later, on July 29,1982 a second Notice of Levy was served by Revenue Officer O'Dea of the Internal Revenue Service upon a Defendant's Officer.
"13. This time the Notice of Levy . identified Mr. SAMUEL SCHUSTER in dividually, and Defendant proceeded to comply with the Notice of Levy of July 29, 1982 and on August 9, 1982 surrendered to the Internal Revenue Service the sum of NINETY FIVE THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED EIGHTY and 19/100 ($95,880.19) DOLLARS.
"14. The monies that were surrendered to the Internal Revenue Service on August 9, 1982 were owned by the Plaintiff in Certificate of Deposit No. 104 and in Checking Account No. 01020005.
"15. The actions of Defendant in failing to notify Plaintiff on July 26, 1982 that a Notice of Levy had been served by the Internal Revenue Service upon the Bank and that said Notice of Levy was incorrect and improper and that the Bank was not going to comply with it was, in fact, a breach of the contractual obligations that existed between Defendant and Plaintiff in this cause of action.
"16. Plaintiff had the right to be notified immediately upon receipt by Defendant of the Notice of Levy of July 26, 1982 of the events that were taking place, so that he would have had the opportunity to act within the law to protect his properties."
(emphasis supplied).
It is inescapable that the purported cause of action alleged in the amended complaint is that the bank had a duty to notify Schus-ter of the service of the Internal Revenue Service notice of levy and breached that duty. Even if one could generously read the allegations of paragraph 12 to mean, in the dissenter's words, "that the bank actually solicited the government's correction of its mistake by informing the Internal Revenue Service that there were accounts in Mr. Schuster's individual name," it remains that this is not what Schuster was suing about. In the words of his own attorney, at the hearing on the motion to dismiss, it was the bank's non-feasance (failure to notify Schuster), not malfeasance (contacting the IRS), that damaged Schuster:
"We are saying that the Federal Bank's duty to notify the debtor of the action of the IRS, just to give him notice to take whatever legal rights available to him, was breached.
"Because that contractual obligation of the bank was breached, the subsequent return of the money to IRS become [sic] a wrongful return."
And when asked if he wanted to further amend the complaint or to stand on the sole cause of action pleaded and argued — the bank's failure to notify Schuster — Schuster chose to stand pat and requested the entry of a dismissal with prejudice, grounded, as we have said, on the singular legal conclusion that "the Defendant owed no duty to Plaintiff to notify Plaintiff when the Internal Revenue Service served a Notice of Levy, pertaining to Plaintiff's account with Defendant, on Defendant." In our view, that conclusion is eminently correct — because (a) no statute, regulation, or case (state or federal) imposes, even by implication or analogy, a duty upon a bank to notify a taxpayer-depositor of the fact of receipt of a notice of levy ; or (b) even if, as the dissent suggests, "[a] common law duty exists when a court says it does because it thinks it should," a majority of this panel does not think it should.
Affirmed.
. The only times that a potential cause of action for an unauthorized disclosure of information concerning the existence of Schuster's account was mentioned were at oral argument of the appeal and in the dissent to this opinion. This court has recognized the existence of such a 'cause of action in the context of a bank's voluntary disclosure to private creditors of information concerning depositors' bank accounts. See Milohnich v. First National Bank of Miami Springs, 224 So.2d 759 (Fla. 3d DCA 1969).
. The IRS is required to notify the taxpayer of the levy. 26 U.S.C.A. § 6331(d) (1985).