Case Name: PEOPLE v. MOORE
Court: Michigan Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1978-12-05
Citations: 87 Mich. App. 475
Docket Number: Docket No. 77-4491
Parties: PEOPLE v MOORE
Judges: Before: J. H. Gillis, P.J., and V. J. Brennan and Bashara, JJ.
Reporter: Michigan appeals reports; cases decided in the Michigan Court of Appeals.
Volume: 87
Pages: 475–480

Head Matter:
PEOPLE v MOORE
Docket No. 77-4491.
Submitted August 31, 1978, at Detroit.
Decided December 5, 1978.
Ezell Moore was convicted, on his plea of guilty, of two counts of armed robbery and of possession of a firearm while in the commission of a felony, Recorder’s Court of Detroit, Michael J. Conner, J. Defendant appeals the felony-firearm conviction, claiming that it subjects him to double jeopardy. Held:
The felony-firearm conviction is not permissible because it violates the defendant’s right not to be subjected to double jeopardy. However, because the felony-firearm statute was intended as a sentence-augmenting statute, the defendant’s sentence is upheld.
Reversed in part, affirmed in part.
J. H. Gillis, J., dissented. He agrees that the felony-firearm conviction cannot stand, because the defendant is being doubly punished for committing a robbery while armed with a rifle. The evidence used to prove the armed robbery is the identical evidence used to prove the felony-firearm offense. However, because the conviction cannot stand, the punishment prescribed by the statute cannot be imposed for commission of the underlying felony.
References for Points in Headnotes
21 Am Jur 2d, Criminal Law §§ 9, 182-193, 546, 548.
40 Am Jur 2d, Homicide §§ 2, 549 et seq.
67 Am Jur 2d, Robbery §§ 4, 44, 48.
Court’s right, in imposing sentence, to hear evidence of, or to consider, other offenses committed by defendant. 96 ALR2d 768.
Construction and application of provision of Omnibus Crime Central and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (18 USCS § 934(c)) that person who uses firearm to commit, or carries firearm unlawfully during commission of, Federal felony, shall be sentenced to term of imprisonment in addition to punishment provided for such felony. 25 ALR FED 678.
21 Am Jur 2d, Criminal Law §§ 182-193, 546.
67 Am Jur 2d, Robbery § 75.
Opinion of the Court
1. Criminal Law — Armed Robbery — Felony Firearm — Statutes— Sentence Augmentation — Constitutional Law.
A defendant convicted of an armed robbery which was committed with a firearm may not also be convicted of violation of the statute which proscribes commission of a felony while armed with or possessing a firearm because the felony-firearm conviction constitutes a violation of the defendant’s right not to be subjected to double jeopardy; however, because that statute is intended to be a sentence-augmenting statute, the defendant’s sentence for the armed robbery conviction may be enhanced under the felony-firearm statute (MCL 750.227b, 750.529; MSA 28.424[2], 28.797).
Dissent by J. H. Gillis, P. J.
2. Criminal Law — Multiple Convictions — Elements of Offenses— Facts of Case.
It is necessary, where a defendant has been convicted of more than one offense, to examine both the elements of the crimes involved and the particular facts of the case to determine whether the defendant is being punished twice for the same offense.
3. Criminal Law — Multiple Punishment — Power of Legislature.
Punishment for different descriptions of the same offense is beyond the power of the Legislature to impose.
4. Criminal Law — Armed Robbery — Felony Firearm — Double Punishment — Evidence.
A defendant’s conviction for violation of the felony-ñrearm statute, arising from an armed robbery, constitutes double punishment where the evidence to prove each element of the armed robbery charge is the identical evidence necessary to prove the felony-ñrearm charge.
5. Criminal Law — Statutes—Felony-Firearm—Conviction—Punishment.
The language of the felony-ñrearm statute is clear and unambi-gous and no interpretation is necessary; the Legislature clearly intended to create an offense separate and distinct from the underlying felony and to impose a separate punishment for that offense; where a defendant’s conviction of a felony-ñrearm offense cannot stand, a punishment for that offense cannot be imposed for the commission of the underlying felony (MCL 750.227b; MSA 28.424[2]).
Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Robert A. Derengoski, Solicitor General, William L. Cabalan, Prosecuting Attorney, Edward R. Wilson, Principal Attorney, Appeals, and Paul C. Louisell, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for the people.
Daniel J. Blank, for defendant on appeal.
Before: J. H. Gillis, P.J., and V. J. Brennan and Bashara, JJ.

Opinion:
Bashara, J.
The majority accepts the facts as set forth in our brother's dissent. In view of the opinion of Judge Bashara expressed in People v McDowell, 85 Mich App .697; 272 NW2d 576 (1978), and that of Judge Brennan in People v Blount, 87 Mich App 501; 275 NW2d 21 (1978), we set aside the conviction for felony firearm. However, the defendant's sentence as an augmentation of the penalty for the underlying felony is upheld.
Reversed in part; affirmed in part.
V. J. Brennan, J., concurred.