Case Name: John B. Ayres agt. The Western Railroad Company
Court: New York Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1866-11
Citations: 32 How. Pr. 351
Docket Number: 
Parties: John B. Ayres agt. The Western Railroad Company.
Judges: 
Reporter: Howard's Practice Reports
Volume: 32
Pages: 351–358

Head Matter:
SUPREME COURT.
John B. Ayres agt. The Western Railroad Company.
1. An action brought by an assignee of a claim for damage for the breach of a contract of a common carrier to carry goods is an action by an assignee of a promissory note or chose in action, within the meaning of the judiciary act, and cannot be removed into the circuit court of the United States.
2. Where a defendant has been served with process in a state court; and, before filing his bond and petition for the removal of the cause, his attorney obtains an ex parte order extending the time to answer, although such extension is obtained for the purpose of making the application of removal, and the attorney serves the order upon plaintiff’s attorney, indorsing it with his name as “Defendant’s AttorneySeId, that the defendant had submitted to the jurisdiction of the state court, and had lost the right to remove the cause; although his appearance was subsequently entered within the required time in the state court, and the bond and petition there filed for removal. (Bajbhakd, G. J., dissenting.)
New York General Term, November, 1866.
Before Barnard, P. J., Clerke and Ingraham, Justices.
The plaintiff, a citizen of Hew York, brought an action as the assignee of a certain claim of the Southworth Manufacturing Company, a Massachusetts corporation, against the defendant, a corporation incorporated in Massachusetts, but who were the lessees and who operated a railroad from East Albany to .the state line, for the loss of certain goods by fire, in defendant’s hands as a common carrier.
The complaint set out the non-performance of the contract to carry, the loss of the goods, and that the goods and the claim for damages had been assigned to the plaintiff.
The summons ■ and complaint were served on the 5th of June, 1866, upon the defendant’s attorney, who obtained an ex parte order on the 25th of June, for time to answer, in order that he might apply to remove the cause into the cir cuit court of the United. States, and served a copy of the order, indorsing it “please to take notice,” &c., &c., and signed it with his name as defendant’s attorney.
The defendant’s . formal appearance was entered in the supreme court, as under the old practice, and the petition and bond filed on the 5th of July.
At the special term Mr. Justice Barnard ordered the cause to be removed to the circuit court of the United States, and from tins order the plaintiff appealed.
Buss & -Cadwaladeb, for appellant.
John H. Betnohds, for respondent.

Opinion:
By the court, Ingraham, J.
The defendants are incorporated under the laws of Massachusetts. The plaintiff is a citizen of New York, and sues as assignee of a company incorporated under a law of Massachusetts. The defendant moved for an order to remove the cause into the United States court. The motion was granted, and the .plaintiff appealed.
It is clear that between the original parties, as both were corporations created by laws of Massachusetts, this action could not have been removed. But inasmuch as the plaintiff, who is assignee of the claim, is a citizen of New York, the case is within the statute, unless the United States court is prevented from taking cognizance of the action, under the seventeenth section of the United States statute, which says: The court shall not have cognizance of any suit to recover the contents of a promissory note or other chose in action, in favor of an assignee, unless a suit might have been prosecuted if no assignment had been made.
The question then arises, is this action brought to recover upon a chose in action ?
A chose in action, or a thing in action, is a term used in contradistinction to a chose or thing in possession, and is applicable to cases where the title to money or property is in one person and the possession is in another, which by contract he is bound to deliver to the owner.
In Campbell agt. Perkins (8 N. Y. R. p. 430), it was held that a claim against common carriers, although in form for a wrong, was founded on contract. It was founded on an agreement, and is technically a claim. If so, then the claim is a chose in action transferred to the assignee, and bringing the case within the exception of the statute.
It is similar in its nature to that of Anderson agt. The Manufacturer's Bank (14 Abb. R. 436). That action was against the defendant for not protesting a note. The ground was negligence. So here the action is for not delivering goods according to agreement.
I think there is good grounds for holding also, that the defendant, by obtaining time to answer by an order from the court, and serving that with a notice signed by an attorney, as attorney for the defendant, has done what is equivalent, to an appearance. It was doing an act within the progress of the cause, and submitting to the jurisdiction of the state court, and was equivalent to an appearance (Cooley agt. Lawrence, 5 Duer, 610).
The order should be reversed.
Clerk®, J., concurring.
Barnard, J., dissenting.
Order appealed from reversed.