Case Name: Charles Ray JOHNSON, D.M.D., Appellee/Counter-Appellant, v. BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF REGISTERED DENTISTS OF the STATE OF OKLAHOMA, a Body Politic and Corporate, Appellant/Counter-Appellee
Court: Oklahoma Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Oklahoma
Decision Date: 1996-03-19
Citations: 913 P.2d 1339
Docket Number: No. 82371
Parties: Charles Ray JOHNSON, D.M.D., Appellee/Counter-Appellant, v. BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF REGISTERED DENTISTS OF the STATE OF OKLAHOMA, a Body Politic and Corporate, Appellant/Counter-Appellee.
Judges: ALMA WILSON, C.J., KAUGER, V.C.J. and SIMMS, HARGRAVE and OPALA, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Pacific Reporter 2d
Volume: 913
Pages: 1339–1356

Head Matter:
Charles Ray JOHNSON, D.M.D., Appellee/Counter-Appellant, v. BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF REGISTERED DENTISTS OF the STATE OF OKLAHOMA, a Body Politic and Corporate, Appellant/Counter-Appellee.
No. 82371.
Supreme Court of Oklahoma.
March 19, 1996.
Concurring Opinion of Justice Opala Corrected March 25, 1996.
As Corrected May 2, 1996.
Hammons & Associates by Mark Ham-mons, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for appel-lee/counter-appellant Charles Ray Johnson, D.M.D.
Susan B. Loving, Attorney General of Oklahoma, Rabindranath Ramana, Scott Boughton, James Robert Johnson, Assistant Attorneys General, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for appellant/counter-appellee Board of Governors of Registered Dentists of State of Oklahoma.

Opinion:
HODGES, Justice.
I. Issues
The issues before this Court are (1) whether the district court had jurisdiction, (2) whether an administrative agency is required to adopt rules under rule-making procedures setting out standards for the imposition of punishment, (3) what is the standard of proof for imposing discipline in a proceeding against a person who holds a professional license, (4) whether the rule establishing the standard of proof in this matter as a preponderance of the evidence was properly promulgated as an emergency rule, and (5) whether the district court erred when it ordered the members of the Board of Governors of Registered Dentists of the State of Oklahoma (Board or Dental Board), including the member conducting the investigation, disqualified. We hold (1) the district court had jurisdiction over this matter, (2) the Board was not required to establish guidelines for the imposition of discipline, (3) the proper standard of proof in disciplinary proceedings against a person holding a professional license is clear and convincing evidence, and (4) the district court was within its discretion when it ordered the members of the Board disqualified from hearing the proceeding against the appellee. Because we find the proper standard of proof is clear and convincing, we need not address the procedures under which the Board promulgated the rule establishing a preponderance of the evidence as the standard of proof.
II. Facts
The Board's statement of the facts is uncontested. Beginning January 1992, the Board received some complaints against Dr. Johnson, the plaintiff in this ease. The complaints alleged Dr. Johnson allowed dental assistants to perform procedures which should have been performed only by a licensed dentist. The complaints were initially investigated by the Board's investigator, David Murdock. On finishing his investigation, Mr. Murdock drafted a summary of his findings. Based on an unwritten practice of the Board, the summary was submitted to the Board member for the district in which the complaints arose. The member in this case was Dr. James Farley. Dr. Farley was a competitor of Dr. Johnson since they practiced in the same geographical area.
Dr. Farley then conducted his own investigation. Dr. Farley determined the evidence warranted a hearing and requested the Board appoint him as the investigatory officer. The Board granted his request at its March 14, 1992 meeting. At the May meeting, Dr. Farley recommended a hearing be set as soon as the statutes allowed. Thus, the Board voted to hold the hearing on May 30, 1992. Following the May meeting and without a vote of the Board, the Board's special prosecutor issued a formal complaint against Dr. Johnson. Dr. Farley admits it was his decision to issue the formal complaint but insists he was acting on behalf of the Board.
After the formal complaint was issued and the hearing was set, Dr. Johnson requested a continuance of ninety days which was granted in part with the hearing rescheduled for July 24,1992. On July 15,1992, Dr. Johnson filed a petition in the district court. On July 21, the district court granted Dr. Johnson a temporary restraining order prohibiting the Board from holding an administrative hearing and setting the matter for a hearing in the district court for permanent relief.
On August 11,1992, the Board's new president ordered a hearing before the Board on September 10, 1992. On September 1, 1992, Dr. Johnson filed another request for an injunction against the Board. After a hearing, the district court found if the Board's hearing were held on September 10, 1992, Dr. Johnson could not prepare an adequate defense. The district court found the Board had not complied with parts of Dr. Johnson's discovery requests. On October 6, the district court filed an order enjoining the Board from holding a disciplinary hearing before December 7,1992.
On January 7, 1993, the Board held a meeting at which it voted not to disqualify Dr. Farley as the investigating officer and not to disqualify the other members of the Board from hearing the allegations against Dr. Johnson. At the same meeting, the Board voted not to adopt certain rules but defined the standard of proof in the proceedings against Dr. Johnson as a preponderance of the evidence.
As a result of the action taken at this January meeting, Dr. Johnson again filed a petition in the district court asking it to enjoin the Board from proceeding against him because the Board had not properly adopted a rule setting the standard of proof in disciplinary proceedings as clear and convincing. Dr. Johnson also requested the members of the Board, including Dr. Farley, be disqualified in the proceedings against him. The district court entered a temporary stay until the issues raised by Johnson could be resolved.
The district court cases were then consolidated. At a hearing on March 24, 1993, the district court issued a writ of prohibition from the bench. Then on April 27, 1993, it entered a written order prohibiting the Board from proceeding against Dr. Johnson until it had properly enacted rules in compliance with the Administrative Procedures Act. The district court refused to identify particular deficiencies but found that the Board had faded to adopt a rule establishing the standard of proof in disciplinary proceedings.
In the interim, on April 2, 1993, the Board adopted a rule under the emergency procedures setting the standard of proof as a preponderance of the evidence. The rule was filed with the Governor on April 8,1993, and signed by the Governor on May 21,1993, forty-three days after it was filed with the Governor but more than forty-five days after it was adopted.
After the rule was signed by the Governor, Dr. Johnson filed a motion for summary judgment and supplements thereto arguing the rule was not properly adopted. He also reasserted the proper standard of proof was clear and convincing evidence and the members of the Board should be disqualified from proceeding against him.
On September 17, 1993, the district court issued an order which is the subject of this appeal. The district court (1) found the rule adopting a preponderance of the evidence as the standard of proof in disciplinary proceedings before the Board was properly adopted and complied with due process requirements, (2) found the Board's complaint against Dr. Johnson was void because it had not been properly issued, (3) prohibited the Board from taking any disciplinary action against Dr. Johnson until it adopted rules establishing objective guidelines categorizing offenses by seriousness and specifying a punishment proportionate to the seriousness of the offense, and (4) disqualified the present members of the Board, including the member investigating the charges, from participating in any disciplinary proceedings against Dr. Johnson. The Board appealed, and Dr. Johnson filed a counter-appeal.
III. Jurisdiction
The Dental Board is subject to the Administrative Procedures Act. Okla.Stat. tit. 75, § 301-323 (1991). Section 306 authorizes an action for declaratory judgment to test the validity of an agency rule. Section 318 provides for judicial review of final agency orders. Section 328.43 of title 59 provides that an appeal from a disciplinary proceeding is in the district court. The Board argues Dr. Johnson is appealing an interlocutory order and, under these statutory provisions, the district court does not have jurisdiction until a final order issues.
Generally, a litigant must seek review of agency decisions in a manner prescribed by statute and cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court in a separate proceeding. Conoco, Inc. v. State Dep't of Health of the State of Oklahoma, 651 P.2d 125, 129 (Okla.1982); Martin v. Harrah Independent School District, 543 P.2d 1370, 1377 (Okla.1976). An independent action is permitted where the judicial review of an agency decision "fails to provide an adequate remedy." Martin, 543 P.2d at 1375. Statutory procedures can be circumvented when there is a constitutional question, inadequate administrative relief, and threatened or impending irreparable injury. Id. "A district-court action is not abatable if the uninvoked administrative remedy was unavailable, ineffective or would have been futile to pursue." Tinker Investment & Mortgage Corp. v. City of Midwest City, 873 P.2d 1029, 1038 (Okla.1994) (emphasis omitted).
Dr. Johnson has alleged a constitutional question in that the right to due process is a protection afforded by both the United States and the Oklahoma Constitutions. Due process "entitles a person to an impartial and disinterested tribunal in both civil and criminal" adjudicative proceedings. Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 242, 100 S.Ct. 1610, 1613, 64 L.Ed.2d 182 (1980); Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 578-79, 93 S.Ct. 1689, 1697-98, 36 L.Ed.2d 488 (1973). The lack of due process resulting from a biased tribunal cannot be corrected on appeal. Ward v. Village of Monroeville, Ohio, 409 U.S. 57, 61, 93 S.Ct. 80, 83-84, 34 L.Ed.2d 267 (1972). Likewise, a professional whose license is at stake is "entitled to be treated according to a previously established uniform system of published rules and regulations." Adams v. Professional Practices Commission, 524 P.2d 932, 934 (1974).
Dr. Johnson has also alleged inadequate administrative relief and irreparable injury. Dr. Johnson alleged the members of the Board were biased and proceeding without having properly enacted rules or the rules under which the Board was acting were void. There is little doubt an appearance before a biased tribunal will be ineffective and inadequate and is not authorized by law as the Board argues. An appellate review is inadequate to correct injury to a professional's reputation after a board has pronounced a negative decision. Because Dr. Johnson has alleged facts sufficient to justify circumventing statutory procedures, the district court's jurisdiction was correctly invoked.
Not only did the trial court have jurisdiction under the rule set out in Martin, 543 P.2d 1370, it also had jurisdiction under article 7, section 7 of the Oklahoma Constitution. Article 7, section 7 "vests in the district court 'unlimited, original jurisdiction of all justiciable matters . and such powers of review of administrative action as may be provided by statute.' " Lincoln Bank and Trust v. Oklahoma Tax Commission, 827 P.2d 1314, 1318 (1992).
IV. The standard of proof
The standard of proof is a matter of due process and serves "to allocate the risk of error between the litigants and to indicate the relative importance attached to the ultimate decision." Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423, 99 S.Ct. 1804, 1808, 60 L.Ed.2d 323 (1979). The three standards of proof are (1) preponderance of the evidence, (2) elear-and-convincing evidence, and (3) beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 424, 99 S.Ct. at 1808. A preponderance of the evidence is generally the measurement used in private disputes, while beyond a reasonable doubt is generally the measurement used in criminal proceedings. Id. The application of the preponderance of the evidence standard requires the parties to equally share the risk of error. Id. at 423, 99 S.Ct. at 1807-1808.
The clear-and-convincing standard is employed "in civil cases involving allegations of fraud or some other quasi-criminal wrongdoing by the defendant. The interest at stake in those cases is deemed to be more substantial than mere loss of money and some jurisdictions reduce the risk to the defendant of having his reputation tarnished erroneously by increasing the plaintiff's burden of proof." Id. at 424, 99 S.Ct. at 1808.
This Court has consistently recognized "where it is necessary to procure a license in order to carry on a chosen profession or business, the power to revoke a license, once granted, and thus destroy in a measure the means of livelihood, is penal and therefore should be strictly construed." State ex rel. Oklahoma State Board of Embalmers and Funeral Directors v. Guardian Funeral Home, 429 P.2d 732, 733, 736 (Okla.1967); Board of Examiners of Veterinary Medicine v. Mohr, 485 P.2d 235, 240 (Okla.1971). The loss of a professional license is more than a monetary loss; it is a loss of a person's livelihood and loss of a reputation. Further, a dental license in Oklahoma is a constitutionally protected property interest which must be afforded due process. See Okla.Stat.Tit. 59, § 328.32 (1991); Barry v. Barchi, 443 U.S. 55, 64, 99 S.Ct. 2642, 2649, 61 L.Ed.2d 365 (1979); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 601, 92 S.Ct. 2694, 2699-700, 33 L.Ed.2d 570 (1972).
Because of the interest at stake in the loss of a license and the potential damage to a professional reputation resulting from disciplinary proceedings, this Court has recognized that the standard of proof in revocation proceedings against a person holding a professional license is a clear-and-convincing-evidence standard. State ex rel. State Bd. of Official Shorthand Reporters v. Isbell, 803 P.2d 1143 (Okla.1990); State ex rel. Oklahoma Bar Association v. McMillian, 770 P.2d 892, 895, n. 6 (Okla.1989).
In Addington, 441 U.S. at 424, 99 S.Ct. at 1808, the United States Supreme Court articulated a three part test to determine what burden of proof should be employed in a civil commitment proceeding. The Court balanced "the extent of the individual's interest" and "the state's interest" while being "mindful that the function of the legal process [was] to minimize the risk of erroneous decisions." Applying this test, the Court determined the preponderanee-of-the-evidence standard failed to sufficiently protect the defendant's interest and the beyond a reasonable doubt standard failed to protect the state's interest. The Court found that the clear-and-convincing standard struck the appropriate balance. Thus, the Court held that the elear-and-convincing-evidence-standard was constitutionally required in civil commitment proceedings. Id. at 433, 99 S.Ct. at 1813.
In the case at bar, as in Addington, the interest of the defendant are substantial. The defendant suffers the possible lost of a constitutionally protected property right, the loss of a livelihood, and the loss of a professional reputation. These losses are greater than monetary losses. See Addington, 441 U.S. at 424, 99 S.Ct. at 1808; Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 756, 102 S.Ct. 1388, 1396, 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982). The state has an interest in the health, safety and welfare of its citizens. The third concern is the risk of error. There is high risk when an agency seeks to revoke a professional license. As in this case, revocation proceedings have the agency acting as investigator, prosecutor, and decision maker. The risk is increased where, as in this case, a competitor of the defendant serves as the investigator and makes prosecutorial recommendations to the Board. Balancing the interest of the individual against the interest of the state and taking into consideration the risk of an erroneous decision, due process requires the Board prove its case against Dr. Johnson by clear-and-convincing evidence.
The Board has enacted a rule establishing a preponderance of the evidence as the standard of proof in disciplinary proceedings before it. The dissent relies on the fact that thirty-nine medical boards require a preponderance of the evidence standard and only eighteen require clear and convincing evidence. "[M]inimum requirements of [due process] being a matter of federal law [cannot be] diminished by the fact that the State may have specified its own procedures that it may deem adequate for determining the preconditions to adverse official action." Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 491, 100 S.Ct. 1254, 1263, 63 L.Ed.2d 552 (1980); Santosky, 455 U.S. at 755, 102 S.Ct. at 1395-96. Although there are times that we may look to other states for guidance, see Burrows v. Burrows, 886 P.2d 984, 988-89 (Okla.1994); Busby v. Quail Creek Golf & Country Club, 885 P.2d 1326, 1330-31 (Okla.1994), where federal constitutional issues are involved we generally look to the federal courts, and more specifically to the United States Supreme Court. See In re C.J.S., 903 P.2d 304, 307-308 (1995); Sharp v. Tulsa County Election, 890 P.2d 836, 841-845 (1994); McDonald v. Wrigley, 870 P.2d 777, 780-781 (1994).
The Board relies on Steadman v. SEC, 450 U.S. 91, 101 S.Ct. 999, 67 L.Ed.2d 69 (1981). However, the Board's reliance is misplaced. In Steadman, the Court addressed whether the section 7(c), 5 U.S.C. § 556(d) required clear and convincing evidence in disciplinary proceedings before the Securities and Exchange Commission. Steadman, 450 U.S. at 97, 101 S.Ct. at 1005-1006. The Court specifically noted that the "Petitioner [made] no claim that the Federal Constitution require[d] application of a clear-and convincing-evidence standard." Id. at 97 n. 15, 101 S.Ct. at 1006 n. 15. Thus, the Court did not address whether the Federal Constitution required a clear-and-convincing standard in disciplinary proceedings before an administrative agency. It should be noted, the dissenters citing Addington and evaluating the three factors cited in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 349, 96 S.Ct. 893, 909-10, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976) would have addressed the federal constitutional requirements and held the agency to the clear-and-convincing standard.
The State of Oklahoma can afford greater due process safeguards than those provided by the Federal Constitution. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1037-42, 103 S.Ct. 3469, 3474-77, 77 L.Ed.2d 1201 (1983); Messenger v. Messenger, 827 P.2d 865, 872 (Okla.1992). Because of the penal nature of disciplinary proceedings involving a professional license, the Oklahoma Constitution requires that the clear-and-convincing standard be applied in such disciplinary proceedings. In applying state standards to the issue of burden of proof in administrative disciplinary proceedings, this Court has previously determined the appropriate standard to be clear-and-convincing evidence. Isbell, 803 P.2d at 1144; McMillian, 770 P.2d at 898-99.
As stated, constitutional due process requires the standard of proof in disciplinary proceedings against a person holding a professional license to be clear and convincing. The Board's rule does not comply with federal or state minimum constitutional due process requirements and is invalid. Because we find the preponderance of the evidence standard constitutionally inadequate, we need not address the procedure under which it was enacted.
V. Duty to enact rules
Dr. Johnson argues the Board is required to enact rules establishing guidelines for the imposition of disciplinary actions. Dr. Johnson relies on section 302(A)(2) of title 75 which requires each agency to "adopt rules of practice setting forth the nature and requirements of all formal and informal procedures available." Dr. Johnson incorrectly interprets this statute as requiring the Board to establish guidelines before imposing discipline on a licensed dentist.
Section 328.32 of title 59 gives the Board the power to revoke or suspend the license of a dentist, to place a dentist on probation, or to issue a public or private reprimand. Unlike section 302 of title 75, which requires the Board to enact rules relating to procedure, section 328.32 gives the Board discretion in determining the appropriate discipline. To the extent the discipline is not arbitrary or capricious, within the law, and supported by the facts, the decision as to what discipline is proper is within the discretion of the Board. See Robinson v. United States, 718 F.2d 336 (10th Cir.1983).
Dr. Johnson also argues due process requires the Board to enact rules establishing disciplinary guidelines that are uniform. The United States Supreme Court has rejected the argument that sanctions must be uniform. In Butz v. Glover Livestock Commission Company, Inc., 411 U.S. 182, 93 S.Ct. 1455, 36 L.Ed.2d 142 (1973), the petitioner, the Secretary of Agriculture, had issued a cease and desist order against the Glover Livestock Commission Company. The Commission Company argued the sanction was improper because the sanction was more severe than imposed in other cases. Id. at 187, 93 S.Ct. at 1458-59. The Court recognized Congress had given the Secretary of Agriculture wide discretion in determining the appropriate sanction and found the sanction was within the Secretary's statutory authority. Id. at 187-88, 93 S.Ct. at 1458-59. The Court then reviewed the sanction to determine if the sanction was justified in fact. Finding authority in the law and justification in fact for the sanction, the Court held the Secretary had not abused his discretion. Id. at 188, 93 S.Ct. at 1459.
In this case like in Butz, the lawmaking body has given the Board wide discretion in determining the appropriate sanction. Okla.Stat. tit. 59, § 328.32 (1991). If the sanction is within the Board's statutory authority and is justified in fact so as not to be arbitrary or capricious, then the sanction does not violate due process. Further, the Board is not required to predetermine the range of sanctions applicable to a particular offense. See American Power & Light v. Securities & Exchange Commission, 329 U.S. 90, 112, 67 S.Ct. 133, 145-46, 91 L.Ed. 103 (1946).
VI. Disqualification of the Board including the Investigatory Officer
A. The Board
The decision as to whether the Board members and the investigatory officer should be disqualified will not be reversed on appeal absent a clear abuse of discretion. See Osage Implement Co. v. Bottrell, 363 P.2d 940 (Okla.1961). In this case, the trial judge did not abuse his discretion.
This Court has consistently held and due process requires every litigant receive a decision that is the result of "the cold neutrality of an impartial judge." Sadberry v. Wilson, 441 P.2d 381, 382, 384 (Okla.1968); Craig v. Walker, 824 P.2d 1131, 1132 (Okla.1992). Likewise, the Oklahoma Statutes require an agency member to "withdraw from any individual proceeding in which [the member] cannot accord a fair and impartial hear- mg or consideration." Okla.Stat. tit. 75, § 316 (1991). "When circumstances and conditions surrounding litigation are of such a nature that they might cast doubt and question as to the impartiality of any judgment the trial judge may pronounce, said judge should certify his disqualification." Sadberry, 441 P.2d at 384 (quoting Callaham v. Childers, 186 Okla. 504, 99 P.2d 126, 128 (1940)). This is an objective standard and is not dependent on the judge's belief. Merritt v. Hunter, 575 P.2d 623, 624 (Okla.1978).
In Merritt, the respondent judge traveled to Kansas to testify in a hearing involving at least one of the parties who was appearing in a matter before him. In holding the judge had abused his discretion by not disqualifying himself, this Court stated:
Although we do not doubt Respondent's good intentions in making such an appearance in the Kansas Court, we have consistently held that even though a judge personally believes himself to be unprejudiced, unbiased and impartial, [that judge] should [enter a disqualification] where there are circumstances of such a nature to cause doubt as to his partiality, bias or prejudice.
Id. This rule applies equally to administrative boards acting in an adjudicatory capacity as it does to judges. Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 579, 93 S.Ct. 1689, 1698, 36 L.Ed.2d 488 (1973).
The evidentiary material presented in the trial court shows the Board abdicated its decision-making responsibilities to Dr. Farley rather than examining the allegations and coming to a conclusion of its own. The Board allowed Dr. Farley to make decisions beyond his authority. Among other things the Board allowed Dr. Farley to issue the formal complaint without action by the Board and to determine the hearing dates. Later, the Board set a disciplinary hearing in violation of an injunction by the district court. These actions were in violation of the statutes, Board rules, and a court order.
Dr. Johnson argues the Board should have automatically disqualified itself from hearing the case against him when it was named as a defendant in the actions he filed against it. Under this argument, any time a litigant is unhappy with a judge's decision that litigant could file an action against the judge and the judge would be disqualified. While we cannot agree such a situation results in automatic disqualification, it is a factor which might reflect on the appearance of bias by the Board. Taking into consideration all of the evidentiary material before the trial judge, we cannot say he abused his discretion in disqualifying the Board from hearing the proceedings against Dr. Johnson.
B. The Investigatory Officer
Although Dr. Farley is prohibited by the Board's own rule from sitting as an adjudicator during the hearing, Board of Governors of Registered Dentists Rule 195:3-1-2(b) (1992), he investigated the allegations, made recommendations to the Board, and in fact made decisions that were within the Board's providence, and ruled on prehearing motions. As Investigatory Officer, Dr. Farley was required to "determine all issues of procedure and motions prior to the actual commencement of the hearing before the Board_" Id. at Rule 195:3-1-2(e). Being in the same geographical region, Dr. Farley is a competitor, albeit not a close competitor, of Dr. Johnson and thus has a pecuniary interest in the outcome of the proceedings.
It is presumed someone who has a financial interest in the outcome of a decision, even a pretrial decision, cannot render a decision with "the cold neutrality of an impartial judge." In Ward v. Village of Monroeville, Ohio, 409 U.S. 57, 93 S.Ct. 80, 34 L.Ed.2d 267 (1972), the United States Supreme Court held, because of a pecuniary interest in the decision, the mayor of the town, who was responsible for the town's finances which were derived in part from fines, was not an impartial judge as required by the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution to adjudicate matters which would result in a fine. The nexus in this case is even less attenuated than the nexus in Ward. The Board most likely recognized the conflict when it exempted the investigatory officer who was from the same district as the subject of the investigation from sitting as an adjudicator. Because of his pecuniary interest in the outcome, Dr. Farley should not act as an adjudicator even on pretrial motions.
While the same strict requirements applicable to adjudicators do not apply to administrative prosecutors, serious due process implications arise when the investigator and prosecutor have a personal financial interest in the outcome of the proceedings. Marshall, 446 U.S. at 250, 100 S.Ct. at 1617. As the trial judge noted, these constitutional ramifications could easily be avoided by selecting an investigatory and prosecutorial officer from a different region than the subject of the investigation. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in disqualifying Dr. Farley from the proceedings as an investigator, prosecutor, and hearing officer on pretrial motions.
VII. Conclusion
We hold: (1) the trial court had jurisdiction over this matter, (2) the Board was not statutorily required to promulgate rules establishing disciplinary guidelines, (3) the proper standard of proof in disciplinary proceedings involving a person who holds a professional license is clear and convincing, and (4) the trial court was acting within its discretion when it ordered the members of the Board, including Dr. Farley, disqualified. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed in part and reversed in part. The cause is remanded with instructions for the trial court to enter judgment consistent with this opinion.
TRIAL COURT'S JUDGMENT AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED IN PART; CAUSE REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.
ALMA WILSON, C.J., KAUGER, V.C.J. and SIMMS, HARGRAVE and OPALA, JJ., concur.
LAVENDER, SUMMERS and WATT, JJ., concur in part, dissent in part.
. The Board's rules provide for the President of the Board to designate one of the members to investigate a complaint and determine whether a formal hearing is warranted. Board of Governors of Registered Dentists Rule 195:3 — 1—2(b). The Board's rules do not require the investigatory member be approved by the Board.
. Rule 195:3-l-4(a) of the Board's rules specifies:
In each instance where a formal hearing is to be conducted, the Board shall cause to be prepared a "Statement of Complaint or Purpose of Investigation" which shall include the allegations or charges concerning which the hearing is to be conducted. Such statement shall advise the person complained against . of the charges made of Purpose of Investigation in order that he or she may prepare the appropriate defenses and have benefit of a full and complete hearing thereon.