Case Name: Beverly BREWER, Respondent, v. MISSOURI TITLE LOANS, INC., Appellant
Court: Supreme Court of Missouri
Jurisdiction: Missouri
Decision Date: 2010-08-31
Citations: 323 S.W.3d 18
Docket Number: No. SC 90647
Parties: Beverly BREWER, Respondent, v. MISSOURI TITLE LOANS, INC., Appellant.
Judges: RUSSELL, WOLFF and STITH, JJ., concur; PRICE, C.J., dissents in separate opinion filed; FISCHER, J., concurs in opinion of PRICE, C.J.; BRECKENRIDGE, J., dissents in separate opinion filed.
Reporter: South Western Reporter Third Series
Volume: 323
Pages: 18–29

Head Matter:
Beverly BREWER, Respondent, v. MISSOURI TITLE LOANS, INC., Appellant.
No. SC 90647.
Supreme Court of Missouri, En Banc.
Aug. 31, 2010.
Rehearing Denied Nov. 16, 2010.
Jonathan F. Andres and Martin M. Green, Green Jacobson PC in Clayton, for Appellant.
John Campbell, Erich Vieth, John Simon, The Simon Law Firm PC in St. Louis, for Respondent.

Opinion:
RICHARD B. TEITELMAN, Judge.
Missouri Title Loans, Inc., appeals a judgment finding that a class arbitration waiver contained in its loan agreement is unconscionable and unenforceable. The judgment is affirmed in part and reversed in part. The case is remanded.
FACTS
Beverly Brewer borrowed $2,215 from Missouri Title Loans. She signed a loan agreement, promissory note and security agreement. The loan was secured by the title to Brewer's 2003 Buick Rendezvous. The annual percentage rate on the loan was 300 percent. The loan agreement included language requiring individual arbitration and a waiver of Brewer's right to class arbitration.
Brewer filed a class action petition against Missouri Title Loans alleging violations of numerous statutes, including the Missouri merchandising practices act. Missouri Title Loans filed a motion to dismiss or to stay the claims and to compel Brewer to arbitrate her claims individually. The trial court entered a judgment finding the class arbitration waiver in the loan agreement unconscionable and unenforceable. The court ordered the claim to proceed to arbitration to determine whether it was suitable for class arbitration. Missouri Title Loans appeals.
ANALYSIS
Missouri Title Loans raises three points on appeal. It asserts that the federal arbitration act ("FAA") preempts the trial court's decision, that the class arbitration waiver was not unconscionable, and that the waiver is a valid and permissible exculpatory clause under Missouri law.
I. Standard of Review
The trial court heard evidence on the record at a hearing on Missouri Title Loans' motion. The judgment will be affirmed if it is supported by substantial evidence, is not against the weight of the evidence, and does not erroneously declare or apply the law. Woods v. QC Financial Services, Inc., 280 S.W.3d 90, 94 (Mo.App.2008). The issue of whether a dispute is subject to arbitration is subject to de novo review. Id.
II. Federal Arbitration Act
The FAA, 9 U.S.C. section 1, et seq., provides that valid arbitration agreements that affect interstate commerce must be enforced unless an exception applies. Kansas City Urology, P.A. v. United Healthcare Servs., 261 S.W.3d 7, 10-11 (Mo.App.2008). Although the FAA is drafted to favor the enforcement of arbitration provisions, generally applicable state law contract defenses such as fraud, duress and unconscionability may be used to invalidate all or part of an arbitration agreement without contravening the FAA. Swain v. Auto Services, Inc., 128 S.W.3d 103, 107 (Mo.App.2003) (citing Doctor's Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687, 116 S.Ct. 1652, 134 L.Ed.2d 902 (1996)).
The interplay between Brewer's state law unconscionability defense and the FAA is informed by the recent decision in Stolt-Nielsen v. AnimalFeeds International Corp., - U.S. -, 130 S.Ct. 1758, 1776, 176 L.Ed.2d 605 (2010). In Stolt-Nielsen, the Supreme Court held that where an arbitration agreement is silent with respect to class arbitration, the parties cannot be compelled to submit the dispute to class arbitration. The Court premised its holding on the notion that arbitration is fundamentally a matter of consent, and, as a result, an arbitrator's authority over claims and parties is limited by the scope of the arbitration agreement Id. at 1774-75. Therefore, "it follows that a party may not be compelled under the FAA to submit to class arbitration unless there is a contractual basis for concluding the party agreed to do so." Id. at 1775. Because the parties in Stolt-Nielsen had reached no agreement on the issue of class arbitration, there was no contractual basis for concluding there was consent to class arbitration. Id. Without consent, the arbitrator lacked the authority to act. Id.
In this case, the arbitration contract was not silent with respect to class arbitration. To the contrary, a central aspect of the arbitration contract between Missouri Title Loans and Brewer was the class arbitration waiver that Brewer is seeking to invalidate. With the waiver, Missouri Title Loans expressly withheld its consent to class arbitration. Although Stolt-Nielsen is factually distinguishable from this case because it involved sophisticated international business entities, the fact remains that the Supreme Court's analysis is premised on the concept of consent. Missouri Title Loans expressly withheld its consent to class arbitration. Were this Court to strike the class action waiver clause, the result would be an agreement that was silent as to class arbitration. As Stolt-Nielsen requires an affirmative consent to class arbitration before it may be compelled, its rationale would preclude Missouri Title Loans from being forced to submit to class arbitration.
The conclusion that Missouri Title Loans cannot be compelled to participate in class arbitration does not mean that Brewer must submit to individual arbitration. The trial court found that the class arbitration waiver was unconscionable and unenforceable and ordered the case to proceed to arbitration for a determination of whether class arbitration is appropriate. In effect, the trial court, consistent with prior Missouri cases, severed what it found to be an unconscionable clause (the class arbitration waiver) from the otherwise enforceable arbitration contract. Under Stolt-Nielsen, however, class arbitration is not an option in this case because Missouri Title Loans expressly withheld its consent to class arbitration, and absent an express agreement to class arbitration, class arbitration is not an option.
For this reason, simply invalidating the class waiver would not remedy the unconscionable aspects of the arbitration contract should this Court agree that denial of the right to proceed on a class basis is unconscionable on these facts. That is because were the class waiver simply invalidated and severed from the remainder of the arbitration contract, Brewer then would be required to submit to individual arbitration. If this Court were to agree with the trial court that, on the facts of this case, individual arbitration is not economically practical or feasible because the amount in controversy is so small in relationship to the risks and costs involved that a reasonable attorney would not take the case, however, then individual arbitration would not be a feasible remedy. This difficulty could be avoided only by permitting litigation of this matter as part of a class action, and as there is no affirmative agreement to class arbitration, the class action must proceed in court. This is not surprising, for one of the rationales behind allowing class actions is to permit suit to be brought on a class basis where it is not economically or practically feasible to do so on an individual basis. Woods, 280 S.W.3d at 98.
This is not to say that an arbitration agreement is always unconscionable merely because there is no agreement to class arbitration; Stolt-Nielsen demonstrates that requiring individual arbitration can be reasonable and enforceable. It is only when the practical effect of forcing a case to individual arbitration is to deny the injured party a remedy — because a reasonable attorney would not take the suit if it could not be brought on a class basis either in court or through class arbitration that — a requirement for individual arbitration is unconscionable. The Court, therefore, turns to the facts of this case to see whether the individual arbitration agreement imposed by Missouri Title Loans was unconscionable here.
III. Unconscionability
An unconscionable arbitration provision in a contract will not be enforced. See State ex rel. Vincent v. Schneider, 194 S.W.3d 858, 856-61 (Mo. banc 2006) (invalidating as unconscionable arbitration clauses requiring the consumer to pay for all arbitration fees and allowing an entity related to one of the parties to select the arbitrator); Whitney v. Alltel Communications, Inc., 173 S.W.3d 300, 308-314 (Mo.App.2005) (invalidating as unconscionable an arbitration provision barring consumer claims from being raised as class actions). There are procedural and substantive aspects to unconscionability. Procedural un-conscionability relates to the formalities of the making of an agreement and encompasses, for instance, fíne print clauses, high pressure sales tactics or unequal bargaining positions. Woods, 280 S.W.3d at 94 (citing Whitney, 173 S.W.3d at 308). Substantive unconscionability refers to undue harshness in the contract terms. Whitney, 173 S.W.3d at 308 (quoting Funding Sys. Leasing Corp. v. King Louie Int'l, Inc., 597 S.W.2d 624, 634 (Mo.App.1979)).
A number of decisions from the Missouri court of appeals has held that there must be both procedural and substantive unconscionability before a contract or a clause can be voided. See Woods, 280 S.W.3d at 94. These cases characterize the test for unconscionability as a balancing test or "sliding scale" between the substantive and procedural aspects. Whitney, 173 S.W.3d at 308. This general rule provides an acceptable analytical framework for most cases because a party who employs procedurally unconscionable bargaining tactics usually does so with the goal of inducing the other party into a one-sided contract. Nonetheless, there are cases in which a contract provision is sufficiently unfair to warrant a finding of unconscionability on substantive grounds alone. For instance, in Schneider, this Court did not address procedural unconscionability and, instead, determined that as the arbitration clause at issue was substantively unconscionable, it was void. 199 S.W.3d at 858-59. Although Schneider did not hold expressly that it is unnecessary to find both procedural and substantive unconscionability, the analysis in the case supports the conclusion that Missouri law does not require the party claiming unconscionability to prove both procedural and substantive unconscionability. Under Missouri law, unconscionability can be procedural, substantive or a combination of both.
The evidence in this case supports the trial court's determination that the class arbitration waiver is unconscionable. With respect to procedural uneonscionability, there was evidence that the loan agreement was non-negotiable and difficult for the average consumer to understand and that Missouri Title Loans was in a superior bargaining position. As Brewer notes, this evidence is virtually identical to Woods, 280 S.W.3d at 96, in which the court of appeals affirmed a judgment finding that a class arbitration waiver provision contained in payday lender's loan contract was unconscionable. As in the present case, the evidence in Woods demonstrated that the lender was in a superior bargaining position because the high-interest loan agreement was offered to people in financial distress on a take-it or leave-it basis. As in Woods, there is sufficient evidence in this case to support the trial court's finding of procedural un-conscionability.
Brewer also introduced substantial evidence of substantive unconscionability. Brewer presented expert testimony from three consumer lawyers who testified it was unlikely that a consumer could retain counsel to pursue individual claims. John Ammann, a professor from St. Louis University School of Law, testified that it would be very hard, "if not impossible," for a consumer to find counsel to handle a claim under the loan agreement because it is a complicated area of law. Such a claim would require significant expertise and discovery; therefore, it would not be financially viable for an attorney because of the complicated nature of the case and the small damages at issue. Bernard Brown, another expert testifying on behalf of Brewer, testified it would be "exceedingly difficult," if not "outright rare," to find representation for individual claims. The final expert, Dale Irwin, testified that the likelihood of an individual finding an attorney to represent him or her was "virtually nil" because of the small damages and the likelihood of a "heavily defended" defendant such as Missouri Title Loans.
Brewer's evidence is similar to the class action waiver held unconscionable in Woods. The Woods court found that class action waiver and arbitration provision substantively unconscionable based on the limitation it placed on Woods's ability to retain counsel to pursue a cause of action. The inability to retain counsel leaves the consumer with no meaningful avenue of redressing complicated statutory and common law claims. Id. at 97, 98. The net result of class arbitration waivers in consumer contracts involving small amounts of money is that "'[a] company [that] wrongfully exacts a dollar from each of millions of customers will reap a handsome profit [and] the class action is often the only effective way to halt and redress such exploitation.' " Id. at 97 (quoting Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 36 Cal.4th 148, 30 Cal.Rptr.3d 76, 113 P.3d 1100, 1105 (2005)). Therefore, the Woods court determined there was sufficient evidence to support a finding of unconscionability. Id. at 99. As was the case in Woods, the net result of the class arbitration waiver in this case is that Brewer effectively forfeited legal counsel in any claim that arose under the loan agreement. To hold otherwise would allow lenders to continue unfair lending practices "since none of its customers would have a practical remedy to bring about a stop to the conduct." Whitney, 173 S.W.3d at 310. Furthermore, because Brewer proved that the class arbitration waiver was unconscionable, the unavailability of class arbitration under the FAA means that the entire arbitration agreement is rendered unconscionable. Given that class arbitration is not an option in this case, the only way to remedy the unconscionability in this case is to strike the entire arbitration agreement.
IV. Exculpatory Clause
In its final point on appeal, Missouri Title Loans argues that the class arbitration waiver is permissible because it functions as an unambiguous exculpatory clause. A defendant cannot exculpate itself from liability unless the language is clear and unambiguous. Alack v. Vic Tanny Intern. of Missouri, Inc., 923 S.W.2d 330, 334 (Mo. banc 1996). Missouri Title Loans asserts that the class arbitration waiver is clear and unambiguous and that the average consumer would understand that he or she is giving up the right to class arbitration. This argument is without merit because the real issue is not whether the consumer realizes he or she is forsaking class arbitration but, instead, is whether the consumer realizes that he or she effectively is bypassing the opportunity to retain counsel to litigate a claim against the lender. The net result is that the class arbitration waiver effectively immunizes the loan company from liability, creating an economic impediment to the consumer's retention of counsel for litigating his or her claim. See Woods, 280 S.W.3d at 99. Nothing in the language of the class arbitration waiver unambiguously informs the consumer that the net result of the waiver is that the lender effectively is immunized from liability. As was the case in Woods, the class arbitration waiver here will not be enforced as a valid exculpatory clause.
CONCLUSION
The judgment finding the class arbitration waiver unconscionable is affirmed. The judgment is reversed, however, to the extent that it severs the class arbitration waiver and requires an arbitrator to determine the propriety of class arbitration. Given the FAA's prohibition of class arbitration under the facts of this case and the fact that the unconscionable aspects of the arbitration contract are a result of the class arbitration waiver, the appropriate remedy is to strike the arbitration agreement in its entirety. The case is remanded.
RUSSELL, WOLFF and STITH, JJ., concur; PRICE, C.J., dissents in separate opinion filed; FISCHER, J., concurs in opinion of PRICE, C.J.; BRECKENRIDGE, J., dissents in separate opinion filed.
. Cases from other jurisdictions are split on the issue of whether a party must prove both procedural and substantive unconscionability to void a contract or clause. In Maxwell v. Fidelity Financial Services, Inc., 184 Ariz. 82, 907 P.2d 51, 59 n. 3 (1995), the court noted decisions in Utah, New York and New Hampshire expressly holding that a contract can be voided on grounds of unconscionability without finding both procedural and substantive unconscionability. See Resource Management Co. v. Weston Ranch & Livestock Co., 706 P.2d 1028, 1043 (Utah 1985) ("gross disparity in terms, absent evidence of procedural uncon-scionability, can support a finding of uncon-scionability"); Gillman v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 73 N.Y.2d 1, 537 N.Y.S.2d 787, 534 N.E.2d 824, 829 (1988) ("while determinations of unconscionability are ordinarily based on the court's conclusion that both the procedural and substantive components are present . there have been exceptional cases where a provision of a contract is so outrageous as to warrant holding it unenforceable on the ground of substantive unconscionability alone"); American Home Improvement v. MacIver, 105 N.H. 435, 201 A.2d 886, 889 (1964) (holding a contract unconscionable due to substantial price to value disparity).
. Section 407.025 of the Missouri merchandising practices act authorizes the recovery of attorney fees. As such, the legislature anticipated that consumers need an attorney for successful vindication of the rights extended by the MPA.