Case Name: FISKE v. WILLIAMS
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1896-04
Citations: 38 N.Y.S. 899
Docket Number: 
Parties: FISKE v. WILLIAMS.
Judges: 
Reporter: West's New York Supplement
Volume: 38
Pages: 899–901

Head Matter:
FISKE v. WILLIAMS.
(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Fourth Department.
April, 1896.)
COBTBACTS— CONSTBUCTION.
A writing delivered simultaneously with the indorsement and delivery of a note by the payee, accompanied by shares of stock, after reciting that the stock was delivered as collateral to the indorsement, provided that, if the note was not paid at maturity, the holder of the note should first exhaust his remedy against the maker, and, if the security given by the maker was not sufficient to pay the note, then the stock should be for the payment of whatever deficiency there might be. Held, that such writing, giving effect to every part thereof, showed a pledge of the stock, not as security for the indorsement merely, but for the payment of any deficiency that might remain after the indorsee had exhausted his remedy against the maker. Green, J„ dissenting.
Appeal from special term, Monroe county.
Action by Edwin B. Fiske against Demian D. Williams to recover shares of stock alleged to have been delivered to defendant merely as collateral security for plaintiff’s indorsement of a note. From a judgment dismissing the complaint on the merits, after a trial without a jury, plaintiff appeals.
Affirmed.
Argued before HARDIN, P. J., and FOLLETT, ADAMS, WARD, and GREEN, JJ.
Robson & Robinson, for appellant.
P. M. French, for respondent.

Opinion:
HARDIN, P. J.
When Fiske indorsed the note, and delivered it to the defendant, he placed his name upon the note, which was to run some months to .maturity. There was a twofold purpose accomplished by his indorsement: First, it was necessary that his name should be placed upon the note in order to transfer the legal title to the note; second, he, by placing his name upon the note, made a commercial contract, which made him additionally liable for the debt of the maker in the event the note was presented for payment at its maturity, demand and notice of protest given. At the same time that he indorsed the note, there were accompanying it 100 shares of the Scugog Medicine Company stock, that were pledged as collateral to the maker's obligation to pay the note. Apparently, the defendant, who was to advance the money for the note, was not satisfied with the obligation of Madden, the maker, nor with the Scugog Medicine stock, and required further security as a condition of parting with his money for the note. Thereupon, apparently, the plaintiff delivered to the defendant 15 shares of the Standard Electric Signal Company stock; and, in connection with the delivery of the note and the Scugog Medicine Company stock, he delivered the 15 shares of the Standard Electric Signal Company stock, and, simultaneously with the delivery therewith, executed an agreement which is set out in the findings of fact made by the trial judge. Upon an inspection of that agreement, it is found to recite that Fiske, the plaintiff, was to or had indorsed the note in question, and there is a recital in the agreement to the effect that the stock was delivered by the plaintiff, to wit, the 15 shares of the Standard Elec trie Signal Company, as collateral to the indorsement. If the lan- , guage of the instrument closed there, then there might be force in the contention of the plaintiff. But there was further language used, to wit:
"And it is expressly understood and agreed that the holder and owner oí said note, if the same is not paid on or before maturity, is first to exhaust his remedy as against R. M. Madden, the maker; and, if the security given by him is not sufficient to pay and discharge said note, then the certificate of stock hereto annexed is for the payment of such deficiency, whatever it may be."
It is a well-settled canon for the construction of instruments executed by parties that full force and significance should be given to all the language used by them, and that if two constructions are possible to an instrument, one of which does not give significance to all the words used, and another can be given to the instrument which will give force and effect to all the words found in the instrument, the latter construction is to be preferred and adopted; and, in case the meaning> of the words is doubtful, it is to be construed the most strictly as against the covenantor whose words they are. Applying these rules of construction to the instrument executed by the plaintiff, it seems reasonable to place upon it the construction which evinces an intention to pledge his stock as security for any deficiency that might arise after exhausting the remedies against Madden, the maker of the note; and after conversion and application of the proceeds of the sale of the Scugog Medicine Company stock, and for the purpose of satisfying the deficiency which arose after exhausting the prior sources, the stock of the Standard Electric Signal Company was a security in the hands of the defendant, and he was entitled to it for the purpose of satisfying "the deficiency" remaining after the exhaustion of the liability of Madden and the sale of the Scugog Medicine Company stock. Hence, at the time this action was commenced, the defendant had not wrongfully converted the property of the plaintiff, known as the 15 shares of the Standard Electric Signal Company described in the complaint; and it was therefore proper, at the close of the trial, to order judgment in favor of the defendant. The judgment should be affirmed.
Judgment affirmed, with costs.
FOLLETT, ADAMS, and WARD, JJ., concur.