Case Name: WILLIS v. PARKER
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1916-05-24
Citations: 159 N.Y.S. 676
Docket Number: 
Parties: WILLIS v. PARKER.
Judges: 
Reporter: West's New York Supplement
Volume: 159
Pages: 676–682

Head Matter:
(173 App. Div. 552)
WILLIS v. PARKER.
(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Fourth Department.
May 24, 1916.)
1. Municipal Corporations <@=>808(7)—Defects in Sidewalk—Liability
of Adjoining Owner—Statute.
Under Auburn City Charter (Laws 1906, c. 185) § 99, requiring the owner or occupant of land abutting on the street to maintain the adjoining sidewalk and providing that such owner or occupant shall be liable for any injury or damage by reason of failure to maintain such sidewalk, providing for serving of notice upon the owner to remedy a defective condition, and making him personally liable to the city, in case of neglect to comply with the notice, for the amount of expense in repairing such condition and making the same a lien on the premises, and section 30, subds. 20-22, 48, 50, 51, and sections 100, 101, and 101a, as amended by Laws 1910, c. 379, giving a city care and control of its streets, with full authority to provide by ordinance for keeping them reasonably safe and passable, an abutting owner is not directly liable to one injured by falling on a defective sidewalk in front of his premises, but only to the city by way of indemnity.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Municipal Corporations, Cent. Dig. § 1691; Dec. Dig. <@=>808(7).]
2. Municipal Corporations <@=>808(7)—Defects in Sidewalk—Liability of
Adjoining Owner—Statute.
Under Auburn City Charter, § 99, requiring abutting owners to maintain sidewalks, no liability would arise against such owner for injuries from the defective condition of the sidewalk in front of his premises until after notice had been given, and proceedings taken under the charter to compel him to repair the sidewalk, and his default.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Municipal Corporations, Cent. Dig. §
1691; Dec. Dig. <@=>808(7).]
Foote and Merrell, JJ., dissenting.
<@=5>For other cases see same topic & KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests & Indexes
Appeal from Special Term, Cayuga County.
Action by Cora Willis against E. Edwin Parker. From an interlocutory judgment sustaining defendant’s demurrer to the complaint, plaintiff appeals. Affirmed, with leave to plead over.
Argued before KRUSE, P. J., and FOOTE, RAMBERT, HERRETE, and DE ANGETIS, JJ.
Frank C. Cushing, of Auburn, for appellant.
Amasa J. Parker, of Auburn, for respondent.

Opinion:
KRUSE, P. J.
The plaintiff seeks to hold the defendant liable to her for personal injuries she sustained by falling upon a defective sidewalk located in front of his premises in the city of Auburn. Her claim is founded upon the provision contained in section 99 of the charter of the city of Auburn (Laws 1906, c. 185), which requires the owner or occupant of lands fronting or abutting on the street to malee, maintain, and repair the sidewalk adjoining his lands, and provides that:
"Such owner and occupant, and each of them, shall be liable for any injury or damage by reason of omission, failure or negligence to make, maintain or repair such sidewalk, or for a violation or nonobservance of the ordinances relating to making, maintaining and repairing sidewalks."
But the section does not state to whom the owner or occupant shall be liable. It further provides for serving notice upon the owner or occupant to repair, remove, or remedy the dangerous or defective condition in a sidewalk adjoining his property, and makes the owner or occupant personally liable to the city, in case of his neglect to comply with the notice, for the amount of the expenses of repairing or remedying such condition, besides making the same a lien upon the premises.
Section 30 of the charter authorizes the city tO' make ordinances. Ordinances may be made to prevent incumbering the streets and sidewalks (subdivision 20); to compel persons to make and maintain sidewalks (subdivision 21); to compel the removal of dirt, rubbish, snow, or ice from the street between the sidewalk and the center of the street (subdivision 22); to regulate digging in the street (subdivision 48),; to control the placing of wires, poles, conduits, and subways in the streets (subdivision 50); to regulate the use of the sidewalks and streets by foot passengers (subdivision 51). Section 36 provides that the commissioner of public works shall have the direction and control of the construction, alteration, repair, care, cleaning, paving, flagging, lighting and improving of streets, ways, and sidewalks, and requires the sidewalk inspector to inspect the sidewalks and see that the provisions of the charter and all the ordinances relating to sidewalks are strictly enforced, and report to the commissioner of public works the location of all sidewalks the condition of which requires new walks to be laid or need repairs. Sections 100, 101, and 101a, as amended in 1910 (Laws 1910, c. 379), give the common council authority to- require the owners and occupants to make, maintain, and repair sidewalks and other parts of the street, and in case of neglect the common council may cause the same to be done and have the expense thereof assessed against the property and collected like other taxes, making it a lien upon the lands.
It is contended on behalf of the plaintiff that the Legislature intended to make the owner or occupant of lands adjoining a street primarily liable to the injured person for injuries or damages sustained from a defective sidewalk in front of the premises. The Special Term held that the owner or occupant was not liable directly to the injured person, but only to the city, by way of indemnity. I think that holding is correct; but, whether that is so or not, I am of the opinion that, in order to make the owner liable at all, it is necessary to give the notice and take the proceedings prescribed by the charter for compelling an owner or occupant to repair the sidewalk, and it is not until he makes default that any liability arises against him from the defective condition of the sidewalk. It is not alleged in the complaint, nor is it claimed, that the owner has violated or failed to observe any of the ordinances, or to comply with any notice or requirement of the city respecting the sidewalk in question.
I think it is apparent from the various provisions in the city charter that the state delegated to the city the care and control of its streets, giving it full authority and adequate means for keeping them reasonably safe and passable, and the exercise of this power carries with it the corresponding obligation upon the part of its officers to perform that duty. Dillon on Municipal Corporations (5th Ed.) § 1704; 2 Shearman & Redfield on Negligence (6th Ed.) § 289. This rule was early adopted in this state. Conrad v. Trustees of the Village of Ithaca, 16 N. Y. 158; Hickok v. Trustees of the Village of Plattsburgh, 16 N. Y. 161, note. This duty is primarily upon the city, not upon the adjoining landowners. The city determines where the sidewalk shall be located, how it shall be made, when it shall be repaired, and the manner of doing it; and its authority is supreme. The owner or occupant must conform to the direction of the city, which is the superior authority. If the city and the owner or occupant had equal authority, a conflict might easily arise.
It is true that the statement is made in the opinion in the case of Cushen v. City of Auburn, 22 Wkly. Dig. 387, that a party suffering an injury from a defective sidewalk may pursue either the city or the individual owning or occuping the lands abutting upon the street, and the same statement is reiterated in the opinion in the case of City of Rochester v. Campbell, 55 Hun, 138, 8 N. Y. Supp. 252; but that question was not involved in either of those cases, and the' Court of Appeals, in reversing the Campbell Case (123 N. Y. 405, 25 N. E. 937, 10 L. R. A. 393, 20 Am. St. Rep. 760) held directly to the contrary, distinguishing the cases cited in the opinion at General Term as authority for that proposition, by pointing out that they were all cases where the dangerous condition of the street was created by the defendants, who were held liable for the consequences of their unlawful acts, under their common-law obligations as creators of a nuisance, and not by reason of any duty enjoined upon them by statute or otherwise.
I am unable to see how the owner can be held liable here, in view of the reasoning of the Court of Appeals in the Campbell Case, supra; and the doctrine of that case, I think, is in harmony with text-writers and the decisions of other courts. Shearman & Redfield on Negligence (6th Ed.) § 301, 343, 384, 701, and cases there cited. The Supreme Court of Minnesota has even gone so far as to hold that a statute which makes an adjoining owner liable for all damages, to whomsoever resulting, from his default in not keeping a street sidewalk next to his premises in good repair, is unconstitutional, so far as it assumes to make the owner liable to others than the city. Noonan v. City of Stillwater, 33 Minn. 198, 22 N. W. 444, 53 Am. Rep. 23. We do not go to that extent. We hold that under the statute here under consideration no cause of action is stated against the owner.
I think the interlocutory judgment should be affirmed, with costs, with the usual leave to plead over.
LAMBERT and DE ANGELIS, JJ" concur.