Case Name: The People of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Freddie Lee Bell, Defendant-Appellant
Court: Illinois Appellate Court
Jurisdiction: Illinois
Decision Date: 1972-03-21
Citations: 4 Ill. App. 3d 397
Docket Number: No. 11381
Parties: The People of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Freddie Lee Bell, Defendant-Appellant.
Judges: 
Reporter: Illinois Appellate Court Reports, Third Series
Volume: 4
Pages: 397–406

Head Matter:
The People of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Freddie Lee Bell, Defendant-Appellant.
(No. 11381;
Fourth District
March 21, 1972.
Theodore A. Gottfried, of Defender Project, of Chicago, (Kenneth L. Gillis, of counsel,) for appellant.
Basñ G. Greanias, State’s Attorney, of Decatur, for the People.

Opinion:
Mr. JUSTICE SIMKINS
dehvered the opinion of the court:
The Defendant-Appellant, Freddie Lee BeH, was jointly indicted, on November 5, 1969, with Harold Junior Bradford, Kenneth Lynn and Albert James Love, for the murder of one Hobart Hostetler, committed during the course of an attempted armed robbery. The PubHc Defender was appointed for all four defendants.
Thereafter, the PubHc Defender filed a motion which asserted that the defense of Bradford and the defenses of the other three defendants represented a conflict of interest; Pursuant to the motion the Public Defender was relieved of his representation of Bradford for whom other counsel was appointed. The Public Defender continued his representation as to defendants BeH, Love and Lynn.
On January 15, 1970, Bradford entered a plea of guilty to the crime of murder, and was sentenced to an indeterminate term of 30 to 60 years. Five days later, on January 20, 1970, the State's Attorney filed an information jointly charging the defendants BeH, Lynn and Love with the crime of voluntary manslaughter committed during the attempted armed robbery of Hostetler. On that same day, the defendant Bell, together with Lynn and Love, waived indictment, trial by jury and simultaneously entered pleas of guilty to voluntaiy manslaughter. The defendants and the People then waived hearing in aggravation and mitigation, and the State's Attorney recommended the sentences which were ultimately imposed by the Court. At this juncture the Court inquired of defendant's attorney whether he wanted to be heard why the Court should not accept the sentence recommendation and adopt it. To this inquiry counsel responded "No, Your Honor, and if I may I would Hire to make a brief statement as to the sentence recommended". The Judge repfied that he would hear defendant's attorney " because, as you know, I have said how can this be reconciled in view of the sentence imposed on a co-defendant. (Referring to the sentence imposed on Bradford) I am ready to listen to you".
Defendant's attorney then told the Judge, that this case had arisen out of an agreement of the four defendants to rob a gasoMne station in Decatur, Illinois. That Lynn, Love and Bradford proceeded toward the gas station and " an old man came towards them and Mr. Bradford, I am informed from aU the facts and circumstances in this case, announced his intention or desire to commit a robbery of this individual rather than to go ahead what has been suggested in the beginning. Mr. Bell, of course, not being present at .the time and knew nothing of this, and Mr. Lynn and Mr. Love strenuously objected to this action on the part of Mr. Bradford, told him that they did not want to become involved in that and did not want anything to be done to the man. But Mr. Bradford insisted at that time that he was going to do it anyway and he parted company with Mr. Love and Mr. Lynn and went up and carried out his intentions without the assistance or backing of tire other defendants in this case. It was in the process of the commission of this crime that Mr. Hostetler lost his life. The defendants' position in the case has been that they attempted to withdraw and I do believe that they did attempt to withdraw from the situation and to disassociate themselves from Mr. Bradford in the action that he took.
It is also clear from the evidence that Mr. Bradford is the one who possessed the weapon and intended to carry this crime out, and in fact did carry it out, where the others not only tried to disassociate themselves from this activity but were also without any weapons themselves.
Further each of these three individuals who now stand before the Court were in position of giving full cooperation to the police department, and it is due in some part to their willingness to tell about what happened that the crime was solved and that the individual who actually perpetrated this killing was finally brought into court and a conviction was obtained Because of these factors that are involved, * s 0 the information was filed in this case # * of which the defendants have now been convicted, and it is for this reason that the recommendation is made in the case. I think I feel and also the State's Attorney feels that there is a substantial difference in the responsibility and in the degree of participation, and in the attitude of these three individuals from that of Mr. Bradford It is for this reason that I feel the sentence should be accepted by the Court".
The State's Attorney then stated: "I ratify the suggestions made by counsel as far as the People's position and reason, and the People's position in this matter. Again there is the legal theory involved here as to actually in fairness in application to these three defendants as compared to the co-defendant, and substantially his statement of our position is the same as stated here in the court room". Whereupon the court imposed identical sentences of 7 to 20 years on Bell, Lynn and Love.
In their argument, the People state that the pleas of Bell, Lynn and Love were "obviously negotiated pleas", and while the pleas were taken prior to the adoption of Supreme Court Rule 402, and the formal requirements of that Rule did not obtain, the record amply supports that observation and we treat this for what it plainly was: a negotiated plea.
Defendant Bell urges here that the trial judge, before accepting the plea, did not adequately inform the defendant of the nature of the crime of voluntary manslaughter "° as well as his position regarding the principle of criminal accountability, which bore on the defendant's situation".
On the day of Bell's plea he, together with Lynn and Love, had received copies of the information and indicated their desires to plead to voluntary manslaughter. They had previously (on November 6, 1969) been arraigned on the murder charge and had received copies of that indictment. The indictment charged the four defendants as principals. The minder indictment reciting that Bradford, Lynn, Love and Bell had committed the offense of murder in that they, pursuant to a plan to commit the offense of armed robbery, attempted to take United States currency from the person of Hobart Hostetler, by threatening the use of force while armed with a gun and did kill Hostetler during the attempt in that they shot him with a gun. The information charged Bell, Lynn and Love with voluntary manslaughter in that they, pursuant to a plan to commit the offense of armed robbery, attempted to take money from the person of Hobart Hostetler by threatening the use of force with a gun, and did kill Hostetler during the attempt to commit armed robbery, in that they shot him with a gun; and that at the time of the killing they were acting under a sudden and intense passion, resulting from serious provocation by the individual killed.
Before accepting the pleas the Court inquired if each understood what he was accused of doing in the information, to which question each answered yes. He asked if they understood that it involved the death of one Hobart Hostetler, and the purported robbery of the deceased, to which Bell and each of the other defendants answered in the affirmative. The Court explained the minimum and maximum limit of the sentence which could be imposed, explained their right to a trial by jury and took their waiver of the same, asked them if they were each pleading guilty because they were, in fact, guilty of voluntary manslaughter, to which each defendant replied affirmatively; made long and careful inquiry to determine whether or not they had been subjected to any threats, coercion or improper inducement of any kind in connection with their pleas, and each responded that nothing of the sort had occurred. The Court found that their pleas were voluntary and accepted the pleas. Their counsel stated to the Court that all three of the defendants had been given an opportunity to confer with members of their family and had fully considered the matter with them and also with counsel.
Following imposition of sentence the judge inquired of each defendant as to whether the sentence was more severe or longer than their counsel or the State's Attorney might have indicated that they would receive on their plea, or whether anyone had misinformed them as to what they might receive on the pleas and each answered in the negative.
In determining whether a defendant has been sufficiently admonished and comprehends the nature of the charges against him the "total record" must be considered. (People v. McGrady, (Ill.App.2d), 267 N.E.2d 515.) We have examined the "total record" here, and the context in which it was made, together with the postures of Bell and his co-defendants at that particular moment in time.
We note that there is no suggestion as to how the trial judge was to be expected to admonish the defendants about the legal principle of accountability in view of the fact that the information charged the defendants as principals. The first indication of accountability being involved came after the pleas had been accepted and judgment of conviction entered; it first entered the case, so far as the judge was concerned, at the time when sentence was to be imposed, and it came from defendant's own counsel, and is contained in his statement to the Court excerpted above. We further note that there is no contention here that the defendants were not competently represented.
Bell was 21 years of age at the time he entered his plea. We find it incredible that he did not understand that he was being held accountable for the acts of Bradford. The minder indictment and the information charged Bell with killing Hostetler by shooting him with a gun. Bell was aware that he did not shoot the victim; he was aware that he did not personally attempt to take money from Hostetler, and he was aware that when Hostetler was killed he (Bell) was not " 6 acting under a sudden and intense passion resulting from serious provocation by the individual killed". His attorney related that Bell had discussed the matters referred to in his statement to the Court, and the State's Attorney in concurring in the statement referred to the "legal theory involved here". We also note that Bell, and his co-defendants, were aware that Bradford had previously entered a plea of guilty to the murder charge. Bradford then became, of course, an available witness for the People and it is noted that the statement of "facts" is that of defendant's counsel, and presumably reflects his clients' version of the incident. What Bradford's version would have been, had he been called as a witness during a trial, we do not know, nor does defendant.
In Brady v. United States, 25 L.Ed.2d 747, p. 761 the Court said "Often the decision to plead guilty is heavily influenced by the defendant's appraisal of the prosecution's case against him and by the apparent likelihood of securing leniency should a guilty plea be offered and accepted. Considerations like these frequently present imponderable questions for which there are no certain answers; judgments may be made which in the light of later events seem improvident, although they were perfectly sensible at the time. The rule that a plea must be intelligently made to be valid does not require that a plea be vulnerable to later attack if the defendant did not correctly assess every relevant factor entering into his decision".
We are confident, in reviewing the record in this case that Bell had weighed, after consultation with his family, and his attorney, the chances and risks involved in standing trial on either the murder charge or the voluntary manslaughter charge.
A judgment of conviction is justified by defendant's admission that he committed the crime charged even though there is no separate, express admission by the defendant that he committed the particular acts claimed to constitute the offense charged in the indictment or information. North Carolina v. Alford, 27 L.Ed.2d 162.
By entering his plea of guilty Bell had bargained for, and received from the People their agreement that he would escape exposure to the possible imposition of a sentence which carried a statutory minimum of 14 years and a maximum entirely within the Court's discretion, or a penalty of death (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1969, ch. 38, par. 9 — 1(b)), but would, instead, be pleading to an offense prescribing substantially lesser penalties, to-wit: a minimum of one year and a maximum of twenty years (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1969, ch. 38, par. 9 — 2(c)). There is no evidence of compulsion or threat; he was ably represented, and the agreement was freely arrived at and intelligently made. Bell was not lured into the plea. He had consulted with his family and his attorney; he had weighed the risks and the advantages. His attorney requested the Court to accept the recommended sentence. Such a plea is not invalid. (Brady v. United States, 25 L.Ed.2d 747.) His plea was not only an admission of past conduct, but the quid for the quo which the People had extended and for which he had negotiated with advice of counsel. The record establishes that Bell, and his co-defendants were aware of the nature of the charges to which they entered their pleas and that they were being held accountable for acts of Bradford in which they had not physically participated.
The dissenting opinion deals at length with the contents of "statements" given to the authorities by Bell, Bradford, Love and Lynn. These were attached to the People's answer to defendants' motion for discovery. The statements are physically present in the record before us. There is no indication in the record that the judge was aware of the presence of the statements in the file at the time Bell's plea was taken, and we are unaware that the judge is under any obligation to search the file and read every document which it contains when taking a plea. We disagree that the statements are " presumably part of the total record". These "confessions" were never offered in evidence, no foundation was ever laid to establish their authenticity and they were not, therefore, before either the trial judge, nor, in our view, are they before this Court for consideration for any purpose whatsoever. To utilize these "confessions" for the purpose of reversing this case, and in the process to weigh the matters therein contained, to construe the ambiguities present is, in our view, to consider matters not before us.
Judgment affirmed.
TRAPP, P. J., concurs.