Case Name: PEOPLE v. JONES
Court: Michigan Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1982-11-18
Citations: 121 Mich. App. 484
Docket Number: Docket No. 56943
Parties: PEOPLE v JONES
Judges: Before: Danhof, C.J., and Beasley and J. P. Swallow, JJ.
Reporter: Michigan appeals reports; cases decided in the Michigan Court of Appeals.
Volume: 121
Pages: 484–489

Head Matter:
PEOPLE v JONES
Docket No. 56943.
Submitted June 1, 1982, at Lansing.
Decided November 18, 1982.
Rufus J. Jones was convicted of assaulting a prison employee while incarcerated, Jackson Circuit Court, James H. Fleming, J. The defendant appeals alleging that his conviction should be reversed because the trial court lost jurisdiction to try him when a trial was not commenced within 180 days after the prosecuting attorney received notice from the Department of Corrections that the defendant was incarcerated. Held:
The trial court lost jurisdiction to try the defendant because the delay which followed the 180-day period was occasioned by normal docket congestion of the trial court and that delay should be attributed to the prosecution. The defendant’s conviction should be reversed.
Reversed.
J. P. Swallow, J., dissented. He would affirm the defendant’s conviction. He was unable to find any inexecusable delay or evident intent not to bring the case to trial promptly which would be attributable to the prosecution as a result of normal docket congestion. He believed that if preliminary action was taken within the first 180 days following notice, as it was in this case, then inexcusable delay and an evident intent not to bring the case to trial promptly are necessary precedents to divestment of the trial court’s jurisdiction to' try the defendant under the statute which requires that an action be commenced on pending charges within 180 days or the charges are to be dismissed.
Opinion of the Court
1. Criminal Law — Speedy Trial — Inmates.
The statute which requires that an inmate be brought to trial on pending charges within 180 days after the prosecuting attorney receives notice that the defendant is incarcerated applies to a defendant despite the fact that he was incarcerated at the time the offense was committed (MCL 780.131; MSA 28.969[1]).
References for Points in Headnotes
21A Am Jur 2d, Criminal Law §§ 662, 857, 867.
21A Am Jur 2d, Criminal Law § 655 et seq.
21A Am Jur 2d, Criminal Law § 854 et seq.
2. Criminal Law — Speedy Trial — Inmates.
A delay in bringing an incarcerated defendant to trial caused by chronic congestion of a trial court’s docket should not be excused when applying the mandate of the statute which requires that an inmate be brought to trial on pending charges within 180 days after the prosecuting attorney receives notice that the defendant is incarcerated or the charges are to be dismissed; such a delay should be attributed to the prosecution and the trial court loses jurisdiction to try the defendant (MCL 780.131; MSA 28.969[1]).
Dissent by J. P. Swallow, J.
3. Criminal Law — Speedy Trial — Inmates.
Dismissal of the charges against an incarcerated defendant is proper where, pursuant to the statute which requires that an action be commenced within 180 days after the prosecuting attorney receives notice that the inmate is incarcerated or the charges are to be dismissed, there is an inexcusable delay by the prosecution and an evident intent not to bring the case to trial promptly; delay occasioned by normal congestion of a trial court’s docket should not constitute inexcusable delay attributable to the prosecution requiring dismissal of the charges against the defendant (MCL 780.133; MSA 28.969[3]X
4. Criminal Law — Speedy Trial — Inmates.
The right to a speedy trial, predicated upon constitutional principles, is compromised where there is an unreasonable delay in proceeding with a trial which results in prejudice to a defendant and prejudice should not be assumed until the delay exceeds 18 months (Const 1963, art 1, §20X
5. Criminal Law — Speedy Trial — Inmates.
The statute which requires that an action be commenced within 180 days after the prosecuting attorney receives notice that the defendant is incarcerated or the charges are to be dismissed focuses on prosecutorial delay and prejudice to the defendant is immaterial; however, under that statute, if preliminary action is taken within the ñrst 180 days, inexcusable prosecutorial delay and an evident intent not to bring the case to trial promptly are necessary precedents to divestment of the court’s jurisdiction to try the defendant (MCL 780.133; MSA 28.969[3]X
Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Louis J. Caruso, Solicitor General, Edward J. Grant, Prosecuting Attorney, and Brian E. Thiede, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for the people.
Myron E. Sanderson, for defendant on appeal.
Before: Danhof, C.J., and Beasley and J. P. Swallow, JJ.
Circuit judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.

Opinion:
Per Curiam.
Defendant appeals as of right his conviction for assaulting a prison employee, MCL 750.197c; MSA 28.394(3). He was sentenced to serve a term of from 2-1/2 to 4 years in prison which was to be served consecutively to the sentence he was then serving.
Defendant claims that his conviction must be reversed because the trial court lost jurisdiction over him when a trial was not commenced within 180 days as required by MCL 780.131; MSA 28.969(1).
It is clear that the statute does apply to defendant despite the fact that he was incarcerated at the time that he committed the offense. People v Woodruff, 414 Mich 130; 323 NW2d 923 (1982). Since the first. four months of delay which occurred following the expiration of the 180-day period was occasioned by normal docket congestion, and since that delay must be attributed to the prosecution, we are compelled to conclude that the trial court lost jurisdiction to try defendant. People v Moore, 96 Mich App 754, 759; 293 NW2d 700 (1980).
Defendant's conviction is reversed.