Case Name: STATE OF OREGON, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. JUSTIN JOE MARTIN, Defendant-Appellant
Court: Oregon Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Oregon
Decision Date: 2008-07-02
Citations: 221 Or. App. 78
Docket Number: 03C-40842, 04C-41831; A129854, A129855
Parties: STATE OF OREGON, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. JUSTIN JOE MARTIN, Defendant-Appellant.
Judges: Before Edmonds, Presiding Judge, and Wollheim, Judge, and Sercombe, Judge.
Reporter: Oregon Reports, Court of Appeals
Volume: 221
Pages: 78–91

Head Matter:
Submitted September 27,2007,
affirmed July 2,
petition for review denied November 26, 2008 (345 Or 418)
STATE OF OREGON, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. JUSTIN JOE MARTIN, Defendant-Appellant.
Marion County Circuit Court
03C-40842, 04C-41831; A129854 (Control), A129855
188 P3d 432
Ingrid Swenson, Executive Director, Peter Gartlan, Chief Defender, Legal Services Division, and John L. Susac, Deputy Public Defender, Office of Public Defense Services, filed the brief for appellant.
Hardy Myers, Attorney General, Mary H. Williams, Solicitor General, and David B. Thompson, Senior Assistant Attorney General, filed the brief for respondent.
Before Edmonds, Presiding Judge, and Wollheim, Judge, and Sercombe, Judge.
WOLLHEIM, J.
Sercombe, J., concurring.

Opinion:
WOLLHEIM, J.
Defendant appeals a judgment revoking his probation, arguing that the trial court erred in revoking his probation based only on its finding that he was not benefitting from probation. Defendant acknowledges that he did not preserve the asserted error in the trial court but contends that we should review it as error apparent on the face of the record. ORAP 5.45(1). As we explain, the asserted error is not reviewable because the legal point is not obvious; rather, it is reasonably in dispute. Accordingly, we affirm.
The relevant facts are undisputed. Defendant pleaded guilty to two counts of attempted sexual abuse in the first degree, ORS 161.405 and ORS 163.427, and was sentenced to 60 months' probation. The conditions of probation included "not hav[ing] contact with male or female persons under the age of 14." The state subsequently sought an order revoking defendant's probation on the grounds that (1) defendant had had contact with minors, and (2) defendant was not benefitting from probation.
At the probation revocation hearing, the trial court found that the state had failed to prove that defendant had been in contact with minors. However, the court found that defendant was "not benefitting from his probation." On that ground alone, the court concluded that defendant violated his probation, revoked probation, and sentenced him to the custody of the Department of Corrections.
On appeal, defendant argues, for the first time, that, pursuant to OAR 213-010-0001, the court has authority to revoke probation only if it concludes that defendant violated a condition of probation or participated in new criminal activity. Because neither prerequisite was met here, defendant argues that the trial court erred in revoking his probation based only on its finding that defendant was not benefitting from probation. Defendant acknowledges that he failed to preserve that contention, but he urges this court to review it as plain error. ORAP 5.45(1).
As a general rule, a claim of error must be preserved in the trial court to obtain our review. However, pursuant to ORAP 5.45(1), appellate courts have discretion to consider errors of law that are "apparent on the face of the record." For an error to be "apparent on the face of the record," i.e., plain error, the error must satisfy three criteria: (1) it must be an error of law; (2) it must be "apparent," meaning the legal point must be obvious, that is, "not reasonably in dispute"; and (3) it must appear on the face of the record, meaning the court need not go outside the record or choose between competing inferences to identify the error. State v. Brown, 310 Or 347, 355, 800 P2d 259 (1990). If those three criteria are satisfied, we must then determine whether to exercise our discretion to consider the error. Ailes v. Portland Meadows, Inc., 312 Or 376, 382, 823 P2d 956 (1991). That decision "should be made with utmost caution" because reviewing unpreserved errors is "contrary to the strong policies requiring preservation and raising of error." Id.
Here, the parties' arguments focus on the second plain error requirement — whether the asserted error is "obvious, not reasonably in dispute." Brown, 310 Or at 355. Defendant posits that, pursuant to OAR 213-010-0001 and State v. Buehler, 206 Or App 167, 136 P3d 64 (2006), it is obvious that the trial court erred in revoking his probation. According to defendant, "a trial court's authority to revoke probation is contingent upon it first making a valid determination that the offender either violated a condition of his probation or participated in new criminal activity. Absent that initial determination, the trial court has no authority to revoke the offender's probation." (Citation omitted.) The state responds that the claimed error is not "obvious" because the proper construction of OAR 213-010-0001 is reasonably in dispute. We agree with the state.
OAR 213-010-0001 provides:
"The decision to revoke probation is discretionary and may be exercised upon a finding that the offender has violated one or more of the conditions of probation, or that the offender has participated in new criminal activity."
According to defendant, the language of OAR 213-010-0001 is plain. To illustrate that point, defendant relies on Buehler in which we stated, "OAR 213-010-0001 provides that a trial court may, in its discretion, revoke an offender's probation if it finds that the offender has either (1) violated the terms of his probation, or (2) participated in 'new criminal activity since being put on probation." 206 Or App at 171.
In Buehler, however, as the state points out, the issue was not whether OAR 213-010-0001 precludes revocation of probation on any basis other than a violation of a condition of probation or participation in new criminal activity. In Buehler, the issue was whether the trial court's upward dispositional departure sentence was within the "statutory maximum," as that term is defined in Blakely v. Washington, 542 US 296, 124 S Ct 2531, 159 L Ed 2d 403 (2004). The state argued that the "statutory maximum" includes a "probationary sentence plus the six months' imprisonment and 24 months' post-prison supervision that a court is also authorized to impose should the court decide to revoke probation." Buehler, 206 Or App at 170. It was in that context that we cited OAR 213-010-0001 to emphasize that "[a] court's authority to revoke probation is therefore entirely contingent on the existence of facts that, by their nature, can occur only after the offender has already been sentenced to probation." Id. at 171 (emphasis in original). Based on that reasoning, we concluded that "if the presumptive sentence is probation, then the relevant statutory maximum, as that term is defined in Blakely, is the appropriate period of probation, and nothing more." Id. Accordingly, Buehler does not resolve to any extent — much less beyond reasonable dispute — the legal point raised here.
In the state's view, OAR 213-010-0001 can reasonably be interpreted to grant the trial court discretion to revoke probation if it finds that the offender is not benefitting from probation, because the first clause of OAR 213-010-0001 indicates that "[t]he decision to revoke probation is discretionary." Because OAR 213-010-0001 does not expressly indicate that the two grounds listed in the rule are the only grounds for revocation, the state argues that "it is reasonable to read the rule as not prescribing the exclusive grounds for revocation but, instead, merely stating permissive grounds for revocation." (Emphases in original.) The state's reading of OAR 213-010-0001, regardless of whether it is ultimately correct or incorrect, is at least plausible.
Another factor also suggests that the legal point at issue here is reasonably in dispute. Historically, a finding that a person is not benefitting from probation has been recognized as a basis for revoking probation. In Barker v. Ireland, 238 Or 1, 4, 392 P2d 769 (1964), the Supreme Court explained, "It is not necessary to revocation that the person on probation be convicted of a new crime, but only that the trial judge be satisfied that the purposes of probation are not being served, or that the terms thereof have been violated." The reasoning in Barker appears to be based on the legislative intent of former ORS 137.550 (1963), renumbered as ORS 137.545 (1999). See Barker, 238 Or at 3-4.
Although Barker's interpretation of former ORS 137.550 is not controlling, it is relevant in determining the meaning of OAR 213-010-0001. Specifically, the legislature in approving OAR 213-010-0001 may have intended to supplement the Supreme Court's interpretation of former ORS 137.550 in Barker or may have intended to overrule it. That inquiry is not resolved by looking only at the text of OAR 213-010-0001. The concurrence dismisses Barker on the ground that it was decided under a statutory context that "is different" from the statutory context at play in this case. 221 Or App at 90 (Sercombe, J., concurring). The concurrence does not explain why the subsequent enactment of OAR 213-010-0001 makes the Supreme Court's holding in Barker a nullity. We need not make that determination here, where, in the context of an unpreserved claim of error, the question before us is whether the legal point raised is "obvious," that is, "not reasonably in dispute." Brown, 310 Or at 355. In that context, we conclude that Barker is further evidence of a reasonable dispute as to whether the trial court erred in revoking defendant's probation in this case.
We need not resolve whether the trial court was authorized to revoke defendant's probation based on its finding that defendant was not benefitting from probation. The question before us is only whether the legal point is open to reasonable dispute. Given that (1) defendant's reliance on Buehler as controlling authority is misplaced; and (2) the state's contrary construction of OAR 213-010-0001, whether correct or incorrect, is reasonable, we conclude that there is a reasonable dispute whether the trial court's revocation in this case was error. Because the legal point raised is not obvious, the error, if any, is not plain and we therefore cannot review it.
Affirmed.
Former ORS 137.550 (1963) was also amended several times before it was renumbered in 1999. See Or Laws 1965, ch 346, § 2; Or Laws 1971, ch 743, § 326; Or Laws 1987, ch 908, § 1; Or Laws 1989, ch 790, § 17; Or Laws 1991, ch 196, § 2; Or Laws 1993, ch 14, § 12; Or Laws 1993, ch 581, § 2; Or Laws 1993, ch 680, § 17; Or Laws 1997, ch 313, § 11; Or Laws 1999, ch 614, § 2.
OAR 213-010-0001 was adopted as former OAR 253-010-0001 by the State Sentencing Guidelines Board in 1988 and approved by the Legislative Assembly in 1989.
After this case was submitted on the briefs, we asked the parties to file supplemental memoranda specifically addressing whether ORS 137.545(1) and (5)(b) limit the trial court's authority to revoke probation to only the circumstances in OAR 213-010-0001. Both ORS 137.545(1) and (5)(b) grant courts a considerable amount of discretion with respect to probation. ORS 137.545(1) grants courts discretion to determine the length of probation by setting the initial period of probation and discretion to continue or extend it, ORS 137.545(l)(a), and discretion to discharge probation "at any time," ORS 137.545(l)(b). Likewise, ORS 137.545(5)(b) authorizes courts to impose sanctions after it has revoked probation.
Defendant's response to our request sheds additional light on the inquiry at hand. Defendant acknowledges that neither ORS 137.545(1) nor (5)(b) limits a court's authority to revoke probation to only the circumstances in OAR 213-010-0001. Instead, defendant argues that other statutes — specifically, ORS 137.010(1) and ORS 137.540(6) — limit the court's authority to revoke probation to the circumstances in OAR 213-010-0001.
ORS 137.010(1) provides:
"The statutes that define offenses impose a duty upon the court having jurisdiction to pass sentence in accordance with this section or, for felonies committed on or after November 1, 1989, in accordance with rules of the Oregon Criminal Justice Commission unless otherwise specifically provided by law."
ORS 137.540(6) provides:
"Failure to abide by all general and special conditions imposed by the court may result in arrest, modification of conditions, revocation of probation or imposition of structured, intermediate sanctions in accordance with rules adopted under ORS 137.595."
We are not persuaded that either ORS 137.010(1) or ORS 137.540(6) conclusively limits the trial court's revocation authority to only OAR 213-010-0001. However, more importantly, defendant's response supports our ultimate conclusion that the legal point defendant raises is reasonably in dispute.