Case Name: Rabah SELMANE, Petitioner, v. Jefferson B. SESSIONS III, Attorney General, Respondent
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 2018-03-15
Citations: 714 F. App'x 819
Docket Number: No. 15-72519
Parties: Rabah SELMANE, Petitioner, v. Jefferson B. SESSIONS III, Attorney General, Respondent.
Judges: Before: McKEOWN and BEA, Circuit Judges, and BENITEZ, District Judge.
Reporter: West's Federal Appendix
Volume: 714
Pages: 819–820

Head Matter:
Rabah SELMANE, Petitioner, v. Jefferson B. SESSIONS III, Attorney General, Respondent.
No. 15-72519
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
Submitted March 12, 2018 San Francisco, California
Filed March 15, 2018
Christopher James Todd, Law Office of Christopher Todd, Mill Valley, CA, for Petitioner
Sharon Michele Clay, Esquire, Trial Attorney, DOJ—U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Division/Office of Immigration Litigation, Washington, DC, Chief Counsel ICE, Office of the Chief Counsel, Department of Homeland Security, San Francisco, CA, for Respondent
Before: McKEOWN and BEA, Circuit Judges, and BENITEZ, District Judge.
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
The Honorable Roger T. Benitez, United States District Judge for the Southern District of California, sitting by designation.

Opinion:
MEMORANDUM
Rabah Selmane, a native and citizen of Algeria, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals' ("BIA") order dismissing his appeal from an Immigration Judge's ("U") decision denying his application for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture ("CAT"). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252, and we deny the petition.
We review adverse credibility determinations under the substantial evidence standard. Shrestha v. Holder, 590 F.3d 1034, 1039 (9th Cir. 2010). The BIA's finding of ineligibility for relief will be reversed only if the evidence "compels" the reversal. Tang v. Gonzales, 489 F.3d 987, 990 (9th Cir. 2007).
Under the REAL ID Act, the BIA may make an adverse credibility determination after considering "the totality of circumstances, and all relevant factors." Shrestha, 590 F.3d at 1040 (internal quotation marks omitted). Relevant factors include an applicant's demeanor, candor, and responsiveness, as well as inconsistencies in oral and written statements. Id. "[E]ven minor inconsistencies that have a bearing on a petitioner's veracity may constitute the basis for an adverse credibility determination." Ren v. Holder, 648 F.3d 1079, 1089 (9th Cir. 2011).
Substantial evidence supports the BIA's adverse credibility determination. The-BIA considered a variety of factors in making its determination, including Selmane's demeanor during the hearings, his unresponsive testimony, and his inconsistent statements. The BIA pointed to two primary points of inconsistency. First, Selmane provided inconsistent statements about where he was employed. When given the opportunity to explain this discrepancy, Selmane had difficulty articulating a reason, and eventually responded that he did not know why he wrote down two different places of employment.
Second, Selmane provided inconsistent statements with regard to the events that transpired during his kidnapping by al-Qaida. In one account, Selmane claims he was approached by three members of al-Qaida, who demanded that he give them the medication he was delivering to the village, while another account states that he was approached by a driver and a passenger after delivering the medication.
Additionally, the BIA noted that Sel-mane's failure to provide corroborating evidence further undermined his credibility. Specifically, Selmane failed to provide the list of medications demanded by al-Qaida despite being requested to do so and testifying that he could. Considering the totality of the circumstances, substantial evidence supports the 'BIA's adverse credibility determination.
Because substantial evidence' supports the BIA's adverse credibility determination, we need not address whether Sel-mane adequately established a nexus between his fear of persecution and a protected ground. Without credible testimony or corroborating evidence, Sel-mane necessarily failed to meet his burden of proving he qualifies for asylum. Farah v. Ashcroft, 348 F.3d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 2003). Additionally, because Selmane failed to establish eligibility for asylum, he has not met "the higher burden- of proving" he is entitled to withholding of removal. Kumar v. Gonzales, 439 F.3d 520, 525 (9th Cir. 2006).
PETITION DENIED.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
. Selmane does not appeal the denial of his CAT application, Accordingly, this claim has been waived. See Martinez-Serrano v. INS, 94 F.3d 1256, 1259 (9th Cir. 1996).