Case Name: COUNTY OF VOLUSIA, etc., et al., Appellants, v. W.R. PICKENS and Continental Insurance Company, Appellees
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1983-09-22
Citations: 439 So. 2d 276
Docket Number: Nos. 82-65, 82-397
Parties: COUNTY OF VOLUSIA, etc., et al., Appellants, v. W.R. PICKENS and Continental Insurance Company, Appellees.
Judges: COWART, J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 439
Pages: 276–280

Head Matter:
COUNTY OF VOLUSIA, etc., et al., Appellants, v. W.R. PICKENS and Continental Insurance Company, Appellees.
Nos. 82-65, 82-397.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
Sept. 22, 1983.
Rehearing Denied Oct. 26, 1983.
Daniel R. Vaughen, Asst. County Atty., DeLand, for appellants.
Peter B. Heebner of Van Wert, Heebner & Kennedy, P.A.S., Daytona Beach, for ap-pellee W.R. Pickens.

Opinion:
SHARP, Judge.
Volusia County appeals from a final judgment of $106,300.00 entered against it in an inverse condemnation case. Pickens filed this suit in 1978, and the trial court held that the county had "taken" Pickens' land on August 18,1976. We affirmed that order. County of Volusia v. Pickens, 399 So.2d 147 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981). The issues of compensation or damages to Pickens were then tried before a jury. In this appeal, the county argues that the trial court erred in directing the jury to value the property as of the date the trial on damages took place (1981), rather than the date of taking (1976), and in allowing Pickens to recover a sum for lost income (rents), together with interest from the date of taking to the date of the trial on compensation. We agree the trial court erred on both points.
Our state constitution provides that "full compensation" must be made to landowners if private property is taken for a public purpose. The constitution, however, does not state the date upon which "full compensation" should be measured, nor have we discovered any controlling statute or Florida appellate decision on this point. Possibly this lack of Florida authority is due to the fact that everyone assumed inverse condemnation suits were analogous to condemnation proceedings, and that the date of taking for both kinds of suits is the critical time of measurement of compensation. Further, it is unusual for the land to substantially appreciate in value after the date of taking, as in this case.
Although' there is authority in other states for other times to measure compensation for the land taken in inverse condemnation proceedings, we think the date of taking is the better rule. It is most consistent with the practice in condemnation proceedings, and Florida courts have frequently applied the same rules to both proceedings on the grounds of logic and fairness. See, e.g., County of Volusia v. Pickens, 435 So.2d 247 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983). Further, there is some support in Florida case law for establishing the date of taking as the date to value compensation. This rule might not be controlling in exceptional situations, analogous to eminent domain proceedings, but it should prevail in most cases. We find no exceptional circumstances in this case.
We also think the trial court erred in allowing an award for Pickens' estimated loss of rental income from date of taking to the time of trial on compensation. Analogous with eminent domain proceedings, the public body must pay:
[J]ust compensation, i.e., value at the time of the taking plus an amount sufficient to produce the full equivalent of that value paid contemporaneously with the taking. (Emphasis supplied.)
Behm v. Division of Administration, Department of Transportation, 383 So.2d 216, 218 (Fla.1980) (quoting United States v. Klamath and Moadoc Tribes of Indians, 304 U.S. 119, 123, 58 S.Ct. 799, 801, 82 L.Ed. 1219, 1223 (1938)). Since Pickens' property was taken in 1976, no damages for loss of rental income would be included as just compensation after that date because, in legal theory, Pickens suffered his loss of the property in 1976, and thereafter it belonged (albeit wrongfully appropriated) to the county.
Section 73.071, Florida Statutes (1981), provides for business losses in condemnation proceedings. However, the parties concede Pickens' rental losses do not fit within the statutory provisions. Therefore, the award cannot be sustained on that basis. Lost profits and business damages are generally not deemed to be property for which compensation is due in the context of condemnation proceedings, absent a special statutory remedy. Behm; Jamesson v. Downtown Development Authority of the City of Ft. Lauderdale, 322 So.2d 510 (Fla. 1975). No special statute appears applicable to this case. We think, however, Pick-ens is entitled to pre-judgment interest based on the value of his property taken in 1976 from that date as an appropriate element in his full compensation.
Accordingly, the judgment is reversed and this proceeding is remanded for a determination of full compensation consistent with this opinion.
REVERSED and REMANDED.
COWART, J., concurs.
FRANK D. UPCHURCH, Jr., J., dissents with opinion.
. The county also urges that we reconsider the inverse condemnation remedy in light of the waiver of sovereign immunity. We approved this proceeding in our prior ruling and we decline to reconsider that issue in this appeal. See, e.g., State Dep't. of Transp. v. Florida East Coast Ry. Co., 275 So.2d 289 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973).
. Art. X, § 6(a), Fla. Const.
. See § 73.041 and 73.071(2), Fla.Stat. (1981).
. Counsel stipulated in this case that an MAI appraiser would testify that as of 1976, the fair market value of Pickens' property was $35,750, and at trial Pickens' expert testified that it was worth $80,300 in 1981.
. See generally 29A C.J.S. Eminent Domain § 185 (1965); 26 Am.Jur.2d Eminent Domain § 152 (1966); Annot., 2 A.L.R.3d 1038 (1965).
. See Worth v. City of West Palm Beach, 101 Fla. 868, 132 So. 689 (1931); Casa Loma Springs Dev. Co. v. Brevard County, 93 Fla. 601, 112 So. 60 (1927); see also United States v. Clarke, 445 U.S. 253, 100 S.Ct. 1127, 63 L.Ed.2d 373 (1980).
. Yoder v. Sarasota County, 81 So.2d 219 (Fla. 1955).
. City of Miami v. Coconut Grove Marine Properties, Inc., 358 So.2d 1151, 1154 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978).
. Stewart v. City of Key West, 429 So.2d 784 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983); see Brooks-Scanlon Corp. v. United States, 265 U.S. 106, 44 S.Ct. 471, 68 L.Ed. 934 (1924); Behm v. Division of Admin., Dep't. of Transp., 383 So.2d 216 (Fla.1980); § 74.061, Fla.Stat. (1981).