Case Name: STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Mark BUCKNER, Fred Senczyszyn and Lenora Senczyszyn, Appellees
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1985-06-19
Citations: 472 So. 2d 1228
Docket Number: No. 84-2713
Parties: STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Mark BUCKNER, Fred Senczyszyn and Lenora Senczyszyn, Appellees.
Judges: CAMPBELL, A.C.J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 472
Pages: 1228–1243

Head Matter:
STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Mark BUCKNER, Fred Senczyszyn and Lenora Senczyszyn, Appellees.
No. 84-2713.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
June 19, 1985.
Rehearing Denied July 25, 1985.
Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Candance M. Sunderland, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tampa, for appellant.
Russell K. Peavyhouse of Peavyhouse, Grant, Clark, Charlton, Opp & Martino, Tampa, for appellee Buckner.
Allen M. Blake of Allen M. Blake, P.A., Tampa, for appellees Senczyszyn.

Opinion:
FRANK, Judge.
We reverse the order of the trial court. There is no constitutional infirmity in section 232.02, Florida Statutes. That statute plainly sets out the means by which regular school attendance is to be achieved.
The trial court found section 232.02 so impermissibly vague that the appellees, who were accused of failing to insure their children's regular attendance at school, could not know whether their conduct subjected them to criminal liability. The appel-lees' contention is unsupported by a rational reading of the statute in its entirety. One must bear in mind that the title to Chapter 232 is "Compulsory School Attendance: Child Welfare." With its basic premise that the paramount concern subtending the Legislature's enactment of school attendance regulations is the best interest of the children of our state, this essentially unambiguous statute crystallizes into a clear proscription against certain kinds of conduct aimed at evading the statutory mandate.
Our starting point is the vagueness test formulated in Reynolds v. State:
The test of vagueness of a statute is whether the language conveys sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and purpose. The statute must give reasonable notice that a person's conduct is restricted by the statute. 383 So.2d [228] at 229 (Fla.1980).
The Reynolds test requires that we infuse the meaning of any statute with our "common understanding and purpose." Obviously, if we demanded precise definition of every statutory word to shield against the void for vagueness doctrine our codified laws would fill endless shelves and the result would be obfuscation rather than clarification of our organic law. Instead, in the absence of a statutory definition, we shall assume the common or ordinary meaning of a word. State v. Little, 400 So.2d 197, 198 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981). Section 232.02, when read in all of its parts and attributing to each subpart its common meaning, is not unconstitutionally vague.
The statute provides that a child's regular school attendance may be achieved at any one of four facilities:
(1) a public school supported by public funds.
(2) a parochial or denominational school;
(3) a private school supported in whole or in part by tuition charges or by endowments or gifts; and
(4) at home with a private tutor who meets all requirements prescribed by law and regulations of the state board for private tutors. § 232.02, Fla.Stat.
The statute becomes vague only if one fails to attribute the common, ordinary meaning to certain key words: "school" and "home." As to the word "school," the pertinent statutes provide some guidance. Section 228.041(5), Florida Statutes, provides: "A school is an organization of pupils for instructional purposes on an elementary, secondary, or other public school level ." Our common understanding is that a school is an organization of pupils who come together at an institution for learning. The school may be supported by public, church, or private funds. (Hence, subparts (1), (2), and (3) of section 232.02). Although we hope that children are enriched by and learn from their home environments, the common meaning of "home" neither contemplates nor encompasses an organization of pupils as an institution for learning. Thus, when a child is instructed "at home," in a circumstance, for example, where he or she suffers from a physical impairment that precludes leaving the home, the Legislature has required that the instruction be provided by a certified tutor. A home is a private place, not accessible to the public, and to insure that a somewhat sequestered child receives quality education, the Legislature has enacted the certified tutor requirement.
The Legislature's intent behind the home tutor requirement is clear — to insure the child's welfare. Therefore, although in some exceptional circumstances a child may live at a place on which a private school is located and where instruction is undertaken for an organization of pupils, the statute clearly prohibits an unqualified parent from teaching a child at home under the guise that a private school has been established. Indeed, as is stated in State v. M.M. and S.E., 407 So.2d 987 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981),
[t]his is so for the reason that the Legislature, in Section 232.02, clearly intended to distinguish between private schools on the one hand and home instruction by a private tutor on the other. If "private school," as that term is used in Section 232.02(4). People v. Turner, 121 Cal.App.2d Supp. 861, 263 P.2d 685, 688 (1983). Since the Legislature saw fit to incorporate subsections (3) and (4) in Section 232.02, both sub-sections must be given effect in accordance with the above quoted rule of statutory construction [that the effect must be given to each subpart of a statute as well as to the statute as a whole]. 407 So.2d at 990. Parents need not guess at the interpreta-
tion of section 232.02 to know whether or not they have complied with the requirement of insuring their child's regular attendance at school. There well may be, and probably are, as is noted above, extraordinary circumstances in which a child's home is encompassed within the confines of a private school. This would assume, for example, that the primary purpose of the physical plant is for instruction of pupils and that the child resides with a parent in an adjacent apartment. Nevertheless, the child would still have a "home" that is not a "school," and his instruction could take place either at the school or at home with a certified private tutor. The bare record before us reveals that, in all likelihood, the Buckner and Senczyszyn children were being taught at home rather than at a private school.
We reverse the trial court's order and remand the case for a full determination of whether the parents had indeed established private schools or were merely attempting to evade the statutory prescriptions under the pretense that the children's home was also their school.
CAMPBELL, A.C.J., concurs.
LEHAN, J., dissents with opinion.