Case Name: David RICHARDSON, Patricia King, Patrick Kelly and Hiram Spain, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, Appellants, v. J. Means McFADDEN, Morris D. Rosen, C. W. F. Spencer, Robert D. Schumpert, David L. Freeman and Albert L. James, Jr., individually and as members of the State Board of Law Examiners, and Miss Frances Smith, Clerk of the Supreme Court of South Carolina, Appellees. David RICHARDSON, Patricia King, Patrick Kelly and Hiram Spain, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, Appellees, v. J. Means McFADDEN, Morris D. Rosen, C. W. F. Spencer, Robert D. Schumpert, David L. Freeman and Albert L. James, Jr., individually and as members of the State Board of Law Examiners, and Miss Frances Smith, Clerk of the Supreme Court of South Carolina, Appellants
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 1977-10-12
Citations: 563 F.2d 1130
Docket Number: Nos. 73-2512 and 73-2513
Parties: David RICHARDSON, Patricia King, Patrick Kelly and Hiram Spain, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, Appellants, v. J. Means McFADDEN, Morris D. Rosen, C. W. F. Spencer, Robert D. Schumpert, David L. Freeman and Albert L. James, Jr., individually and as members of the State Board of Law Examiners, and Miss Frances Smith, Clerk of the Supreme Court of South Carolina, Appellees. David RICHARDSON, Patricia King, Patrick Kelly and Hiram Spain, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, Appellees, v. J. Means McFADDEN, Morris D. Rosen, C. W. F. Spencer, Robert D. Schumpert, David L. Freeman and Albert L. James, Jr., individually and as members of the State Board of Law Examiners, and Miss Frances Smith, Clerk of the Supreme Court of South Carolina, Appellants.
Judges: 
Reporter: Federal Reporter 2d Series
Volume: 563
Pages: 1130–1134

Head Matter:
David RICHARDSON, Patricia King, Patrick Kelly and Hiram Spain, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, Appellants, v. J. Means McFADDEN, Morris D. Rosen, C. W. F. Spencer, Robert D. Schumpert, David L. Freeman and Albert L. James, Jr., individually and as members of the State Board of Law Examiners, and Miss Frances Smith, Clerk of the Supreme Court of South Carolina, Appellees. David RICHARDSON, Patricia King, Patrick Kelly and Hiram Spain, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, Appellees, v. J. Means McFADDEN, Morris D. Rosen, C. W. F. Spencer, Robert D. Schumpert, David L. Freeman and Albert L. James, Jr., individually and as members of the State Board of Law Examiners, and Miss Frances Smith, Clerk of the Supreme Court of South Carolina, Appellants.
Nos. 73-2512 and 73-2513.
United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.
Reargued March 15, 1977.
Decided Oct. 12, 1977.
Ray P. McClain and F. Henderson Moore, Charleston, S.C. (Laughlin McDonald, Neil Bradley, Atlanta, Ga., Melvin L. Wulf, E. Richard Larson, New York City, on brief), for appellants in 73-2512 and for appellees in 73-2513.
Randall T. Bell, Columbia, S.C. (Daniel R. McLeod, Atty. Gen. of South Carolina and A. Camden Lewis, Asst. Atty. Gen. of South Carolina, Columbia, S.C., on brief), for ap-pellees in 73-2512 and for appellants in 73-2513.
Before HAYNSWORTH, Chief Judge, BOREMAN, Senior Circuit Judge, WINTER, CRAVEN, BUTZNER, RUSSELL, WIDENER and HALL, Circuit Judges, sitting in banc on resubmission.
Judge Craven died before this opinion was prepared.

Opinion:
PER CURIAM:
We granted rehearing in banc to reconsider the issues decided by a panel of the court in Richardson v. McFadden, 540 F.2d 744 (4 Cir. 1976). There, in an action for declaratory and injunctive relief brought by four black law school graduates who had satisfied all requirements for admission to the South Carolina Bar, except that they received failing scores on the bar examination, the panel decided that the district court properly denied relief except for the individual claims of Spain and Kelly. With respect to them, the panel concluded that the Law Examiners had acted arbitrarily and capriciously, and it directed the district court to order them to be certified as having passed the South Carolina Bar.
I.
Except with respect to the individual claims of Spain and Kelly, we see no merit in plaintiffs' various contentions for the reasons assigned by the panel.
II.
With regard to the individual claims of Spain and Kelly, we conclude, in disagreement with the panel, that the district court correctly denied relief.
At the outset, we recognize that a jurisdictional question is raised by the assertion of individual claims for relief by Spain and Kelly, i. e., whether, in judging the intellectual fitness of applicants to practice law, the Law Examiners performed a judicial function on behalf of the South Carolina Supreme Court, so that under such precedents as Doe v. Pringle, 550 F.2d 596 (10 Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 916, 97 S.Ct. 2179, 53 L.Ed.2d 227 (1977), and MacKay v. Nesbett, 412 F.2d 846 (9 Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 960, 90 S.Ct. 435, 24 L.Ed.2d 425 (1969), we should conclude that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to review the denial of admission to the bar. We are divided on how this issue should be decided, but we find it unnecessary to debate or resolve our differences because a clear majority of us agrees that, even if the district court had subject matter jurisdiction, the proof will not support the conclusion that Spain and Kelly are entitled to individual relief.
Their claim to relief is founded upon due process and equal protection claims. Before turning to the factual basis of their claims, we stress that our function is not just to determine if the bar examiners made a mistake in one or more individual cases; it is to determine if there has been a denial of due process or of equal protection. Not every erroneous determination mounts up to a denial of due process or equal protection. Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 349-50, 96 S.Ct. 2074, 48 L.Ed.2d 684 (1976).
Factually, Kelly and Spain showed that other applicants at other times appeared to have received more favorable treatment in grading than that which was afforded' them. See table at 540 F.2d at 750. Specifically, Spain, who was a June, 1971, applicant having an average score of 70.5 and having been failed by three examiners, points to applicant 129, a June, 1970, applicant having an average score of 71.8 and also having been failed by three examiners, who was passed. Kelly, who was a February, 1971, applicant having an average score of 69.6 and having been failed by three examiners, points to applicant 10, also a February, 1971, applicant who was passed with an average score of 69.3 but who was failed by only two examiners.
We do not think this proof establishes the constitutional discrimination requisite to the granting of individual relief. In the case of Spain, the comparison urged on us is of different years. While the mere fact of different years does not make the comparison inapposite, all of the circumstances which make the two instances comparable were not shown. Moreover, the record does not show that in grading Spain the examiners had before them the record of what had been done the year before. In the case of Kelly, the fact that he was failed by three examiners serves to distinguish his case from the asserted analogue where the applicant was failed by only two examiners. The further fact that a February, 1970, applicant (No. 17) was failed with an average of 69.5 after having been failed by only two examiners does not destroy the distinction. Although it occurred in a different examination from the one about which Kelly complains, it may show discrimination with reference to 17; but Kelly can hardly advance his cause as a result of a possible due process violation to another. Significant also, with respect to Spain and Kelly, are the facts that of the aggregate 828 examinations given during the eight times that the bar examination was administered over a four-year period, only these two examples of alleged discrimination were proved, and that Spain and Kelly continued to fail on subsequent reexaminations. Succinctly stated, we simply do not think that Spain and Kelly proved their case.
Since we conclude that there was no error in the judgment of the district court on any of the grounds asserted, its judgment is
AFFIRMED.