Case Name: Quigley, et al. v. Ackerman, Administrator, etc.
Court: Appellate Court of Indiana
Jurisdiction: Indiana
Decision Date: 1953-03-03
Citations: 123 Ind. App. 660
Docket Number: No. 18,233
Parties: Quigley, et al. v. Ackerman, Administrator, etc.
Judges: 
Reporter: Indiana Court of Appeals Reports
Volume: 123
Pages: 660–674

Head Matter:
Quigley, et al. v. Ackerman, Administrator, etc.
[No. 18,233.
Filed March 3, 1953.
Rehearing denied June 3, 1953.
Transfer denied September 28, 1953.]
Frank M. Fish, of Evansville, for appellant.
Phelps F. Darby and William T. Fitzgerald, both of Evansville, for appellee.

Opinion:
ON MOTION TO DISMISS
Bowen, J.
Roy F. Ackerman, as administrator of the estate of Lee Cozart, deceased, filed his final report as such administrator in the Vanderburgh Probate Court. Appellants, Lanie Cozart Quigley and Ledye Cozart Northcutt, two of the four heirs of the decedent, filed written objections to the final report on April 10, 1950. An intervening petition and written objections were also filed on behalf of the estate of Rado Cozart, deceased, (wife of decedent) on March 25, 1950. The intervenors filed a motion for a consolidation of the issues for trial on the objections to the final report and the intervening petition. All parties requested special findings of fact.and conclusions of law. After a trial by the court without a jury, the court entered special findings of fact and conclusions of law.
In its conclusions of law, the court found with the intervening petitioner on his intervening petition and granted such petition and concluded that the issues as to the ownership of certain bonds and proceeds therefrom had been properly and timely raised and tendered to the court for decision by the administrator's final report and objections filed thereto and by the intervening petition and response thereto.
The court made other findings and conclusions of law as to the objections filed to the administrator's report and concluded that the report which had been filed by the administrator was prematurely filed, and that the administrator was directed to file a final account in accordance with the court's special findings of fact and conclusions of law.
The court ordered the administrator, Roy F. Ackerman, to pay and deliver to Roy F. Ackerman, as executor of the estate of Rado Cozart, deceased, nine-tenths of the proceeds received by him from the sale of ten Series G. United States Government bonds referred to in Finding No. 7 of the court, and that he transfer and deliver certain other property to the surviving heirs of Lee Cozart, deceased, and the court ordered and allowed certain other surcharges, and in the concluding paragraph of the court's judgment, it ordered that this judgment and special findings of fact and conclusions of law upon which said judgment is based be certified to the regular judge of the trial court as a final adjudication of the matters heretofore venued in this cause.
In the appellees' motion to dismiss this appeal, the appellees' assign that the order and judgment appealed from does not constitute an appealable final judgment; that, this appeal was hot taken or perfected as an interlocutory appeal and appellants have not filed any appeal bond, and that an appeal has not been filed nor perfected under. any statute, nor pursuant to any court rule, and should .be dismissed.
As to the judgment .of the court ordering the administrator to file a new final accounting, such judgment ordering such final accounting was not an appealable final judgment. In re Heineman's Estate (1951), 122 Ind. App. 343, 101 N. E. 2d 194; Shuey v. Lambert (1913), 53 Ind. App. 567, 102 N. E. 150; Oertling v. Oertling (1948), 226 Ind. 146, 78 N. E. 2d 546.
. • Appellants' assignments of error and that part of appellants' appeal which are based upon the judgment of the trial court on the objections filed by Lanie Cozart Quigley and Ledye Cozart Nor'thcutt on their objections to the final report which questions the judgment of the court ordering a new final accounting is hereby dismissed.
. However, the judgment of the court on the intervening petition filed by Roy F. Ackerman, as executor of the estate of Lee Cozart, deceased, and the judgment of the court granting the prayer of such petition was an appealable final judgment. The appellee-executor's intervening petition alleged a set of facts claiming ownership of certain United States Government bonds and the proceeds from the sale thereof, and the conclusions of law and the judgment of the -court decided such issue of ownership and granted the prayer for relief in the appellee-executor's intervening petition.
• Such issue of ownership of such bonds was fully and finally, determined by the. judgment of the trial court. Claims of the same type as the one alleged in the intervenor's petition, wherein it is claimed that a husband was holding property as trustee of his wife, have been enforced during the lifetime of the husband in the following cases: First Nat. Bank v. Rust et al. (1933), 205 Ind. 638, 185 N. E. 127; Wilkins v. Miller (1857), 9 Ind. 100.
• Also claims of such nature as the claim asserted in the intervenor's petition have been enforced against the estate of a deceased husband by the regular statutory claim procedure in each of the following cases: Denny et al. Executor v. Denny (1889), 123 Ind. 240, 23 N. E. 519; Parrett, Admr. v. Palmer, Admr. (1893), 8 Ind. App. 356, 35 N. E. 713; Hileman, Admr. v. Hileman (1882), 85 Ind. 1; King, Admr. v. King (1899), 24 Ind. App. 598, 57 N. E. 275; Haymond, Admr. v. Bledsoe (1894), 11 Ind. App. 202, 38 N. E. 530; Armacost, Admr. v. Lindley, Admr. (1888), 116 Ind. 295, 19 N. E. 138.
It has been repeatedly held that a judgment on an intervening petition is a final judgment from which an appeal may be taken. Ind. Nat. Bank of Indianapolis v. Danner, Rec. (1932), 204 Ind. 709, 170 N. E. 327; Hamrick, Trustee v. Loring et al. (1896), 147 Ind. 229, 45 N. E. 107; General Highways System v. Thompson (1928), 88 Ind. App. 179, 155 N. E. 262.
And the rule is well settled that a final judgment from which an appeal may be taken is one which determines the rights of the parties in the suit, or a' distinct and definite branch of it, and reserves no further-quesr tion or decision for future determination. Zumpfe v. Piccadilly Realty Co. (1938), 214 Ind, 282, 13 N. E. 2d 715, 15 N. E. 2d 363; Kalleres et al. v. Glover, Receiver (1935), 208 Ind. 472, 196 N. E. 679; General Highways System v. Thompson, supra; Ind. Nat. Bank of Indianapolis v. Danner, supra; Butler University v. Danner (1943), 114 Ind. App. 236, 50 N. E. 2d 928, 51 N. E. 2d 487; Holaday v. Rickard, Exr. (1921), 190 Ind. 684, 131 N. E. 760.
It is clear from the record in the instant case that the judgment of the lower court on the intervening petition of appellee-executor, which was consolidated for trial with appellants' objections to the appellee-administrator's final report finally determined the rights of the parties as to the facts asserted as to the ownership of the bonds in question, and no further question on such issue was reserved for future determination.
Therefore, the motion of the appellees to dismiss the appeal as to the questions raised with reference to the action of the trial court in ordering a new final accounting to be filed by the administrator of the estate of Lee Cozart, deceased, is hereby sustained.
Such motion to dismiss the appeal herein as to the assignments of error questioning the findings of fact, conclusions of law, and judgment of the court granting the prayer of the intervening petition of Roy F. Ackerman, as executor of the estate of Rado Cozart, deceased, is hereby overruled.