Case Name: Karen QUAY, as Mother and Next Friend of Leigh Lamson, Minor, and on Behalf of the Heirs of William Lamson, II, Deceased, Appellant, v. Archie L. CRAWFORD and Shippers Express, Inc., Appellees
Court: Mississippi Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Mississippi
Decision Date: 2001-01-09
Citations: 788 So. 2d 76
Docket Number: No. 98-CA-00696-COA
Parties: Karen QUAY, as Mother and Next Friend of Leigh Lamson, Minor, and on Behalf of the Heirs of William Lamson, II, Deceased, Appellant, v. Archie L. CRAWFORD and Shippers Express, Inc., Appellees.
Judges: KING, P.J., LEE, MYERS, PAYNE, JJ„ concur. SOUTHWICK P.J., dissents with separate Opinion joined by McMILLIN, C.J., BRIDGES and THOMAS, JJ., CHANDLER, J„ not participating.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 788
Pages: 76–93

Head Matter:
Karen QUAY, as Mother and Next Friend of Leigh Lamson, Minor, and on Behalf of the Heirs of William Lamson, II, Deceased, Appellant, v. Archie L. CRAWFORD and Shippers Express, Inc., Appellees.
No. 98-CA-00696-COA.
Court of Appeals of Mississippi.
Jan. 9, 2001.
Rehearing Denied March 13, 2001.
Certiorari Denied June 21, 2001.
Suzanne Griggins Keys, Isaac K. Byrd Jr., Jackson, Robert George Clark III, Attorneys for Appellant.
B. Stevens Hazard, Quentin A. Daniels, Gregory M. Johnston, Jackson, Attorneys for Appellees.

Opinion:
IRVING, J.,
for the Court:
¶ 1. Karen Quay appeals from an order of the Circuit Court of Hinds County granting summary judgment against her on her complaint against Archie L. Crawford and Shippers Express, Inc., for the wrongful death of William Lamson, II. In this appeal, Quay argues that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment because there exist genuine issues of material facts regarding the functioning of the rear lights on the Shippers Express trailer with which Lamson collided causing his death. We agree and reverse and remand this case for a full hearing on the merits.
FACTS
¶ 2. On February 8, 1995, around 11:00 p.m., William Lamson left Jackson, Mississippi going to Grenada to meet a truck bringing the Commercial Appeal newspaper from Memphis, Tennessee for distribution in the Jackson, Mississippi area. He was driving a Chevrolet Chevette and had made this trip many times, as his job required him to pick up the papers and distribute them to various vendor sites in the Jackson area. On this night, he never arrived at his destination because somewhere along a stretch of Interstate Highway 55, south of Vaiden, he collided with the rear trailer of a Shippers Express tandem trailer rig operated by Archie L. Crawford and was killed, apparently instantly. Other facts will be developed as appropriate in the discussion of the issue.
ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION OF THE ISSUE
1. The Taillights on the Trailer
¶ 3. In her complaint against Crawford and Shippers Express, Quay alleged, inter alia, that Crawford and Shippers Express were negligent in not having proper warning reflectors and lights on the tractor and tandem trailers, and in operating an inadequately-maintained vehicle. It is Quay's theory that there were either no rear lights or barely illuminated lights on the rear tandem trailer.
¶ 4. According to the report of Officer Cotten, who was the highway patrolman that investigated the accident, there were no eyewitnesses to the accident. He testified that no one, professing to be a witness, ever approached him, and he did not recall another tractor trailer being parked up the road from the scene of the accident.
¶5. Despite the fact that no witness presented himself to the investigating officer on the scene the night of the accident, a William Windsor, who claims to have been an eyewitness to the accident, was discovered or appeared after litigation had commenced. He claims to have passed the Shippers Express tractor trailer rig and observed that all lights on the tractor trailer rig were working properly. Shortly after passing the Shippers Express rig, according to Windsor, he pulled off the road to get a drink of water. He was off the road for only a short while, and, as he was going down the entrance ramp to resume his journey, he saw the Shippers Express truck go by. Shortly thereafter, he saw a car approach from the rear and pass him. He estimated the speed of the car, as it passed, to be approximately ninety miles an hour. He said the car was weaving a little bit, nearly side-swiped him, and almost hit a mile marker post. He thought the driver was drunk. He said that approximately a half mile up the road near the top of a hill, he saw a "big flash," and he knew the car, which had just passed him, had run into the back of the Shippers Express tractor rig.
¶ 6. Windsor claims to have pulled his rig in the left lane to pass the Shippers Express rig which was in the right lane. After passing the Shippers Express rig, Windsor pulled off the road, set his emergency brakes, put his four-way blinkers on and walked over to the Shippers Express rig. He told the driver of the Shippers Express rig that a car was behind the Shippers Express rig. They then went to the back of the Shippers Express rig where they found Lamson's car wedged underneath the trailer of the Shippers Express rig.
¶ 7. Crawford and Shippers Express's claim that no genuine issue of material fact exists rests primarily on Windsor's testimony that the rear lights on the Shippers Express rig were operable, and that Lamson simply ran into the back of the Shippers Express rig. In addition to Windsor's testimony, the record contains an affidavit of Glenn Porch, Director of Operations for Shippers Express, Inc. The affidavit is not referenced as being a part of either the motion for summary judgment or the response to the motion for summary judgment. The affidavit appears to bear a February file date while the motion for summary judgment bears a January 20 file date, and the response to the motion for summary judgment bears a February 4 file date. The affidavit is filed among the exhibits attached to the response but, as stated, does not appear to be part of the response. Nevertheless, the affidavit states that following the accident, Glenn Porch followed the Shippers Express rig as it was leaving the scene of the accident and observed that all lights on the tractor and trailers were operable and functioning properly.
¶ 8. Shippers Express and Crawford also offered excerpts from Crawford's deposition wherein he stated that he checked the lights on the truck and trailers around 11:40 p.m. at the Jackson terminal. He related the accident this way:
Q. Now after you heard that bump, did you start — did you lose speed or did you maintain your speed?
A. I maintained my speed.
Q. Until it suddenly stopped, until the trailer suddenly stopped because the brakes locked up?
A. Yeah. It started to — my buzzer come on and I realized then something was going on, and I said, "I better stop and pull over and see what done happening." By that time, those buttons jumped out and the trailer locked down, and I tried to move and couldn't move, and, so, I gets out and go back there and look and I see a car back there, and I go back to my tractor and get my flashlight and go back there and shine it.
(emphasis added).
¶ 9. As stated, Windsor, who belatedly claimed to be an eyewitness to the accident, told a different story. This is what he said:
And I got out of my truck, set my emergency brakes and put my four-ways on and got out of my truck and walked over there, and I said, "Man, there's a car behind your truck." And I said, "I don't know if he was drunk or what." I said, "he was all over the road. He actually just about hit me," and he did. And we went back there and there was newspapers all in his car, I believe it was a little Chevy Chevette, or something like that, and it took us a minute to find him, he was down in the floorboard, and he just run into Shippers Express, you know.
(emphasis added).
¶ 10. In opposition to the motion for summary judgment, Quay offered, inter alia, (1) repair records which showed the repairs that were made to the-tractor and trailer as a result of the February 8 accident, (2) the answers to her first set of interrogatories, (3) excerpts from the deposition of Daniel Skinner who inspected the truck and trailer for damages after the accident, (4) excerpts from the deposition of David McBroom who admitted doing repair work on the tractor on May 9, (5) an affidavit from William David Barrett which stated that Barrett did the repair work on May 8, 1995, and (6) affidavits from John Eubanks and Douglas Bynum.
¶ 11. For some unexplained reason, the repairs were done over a period of three months beginning February 11, 1995, which was two days after the accident, and concluding with repairs on May 8, 9, 10 and 19, 1995. According to excerpts from David McBroom's deposition, he performed the repair work on February 11 and May 9 or 19. As stated, Barrett's affidavit states that the repair work on May 8 was performed by Barrett. In that affidavit, Barrett said the repair order reflected all the repairs he made and that he did "nothing to the taillight on the trailer." There is no clear indication in the record as to who made the repairs on May 10, and if McBroom did not make the repairs on both the 9th and 19th of May, we also are without knowledge as to who made the repairs for the day he did not.
¶ 12. As stated, Daniel Skinner did the inspection of the tractor and trailer following the accident. He described the inspection and damage this way:
Q. Now, after the accident in February of '95, did you do an inspection of this trailer?
A. Yes, ma'am. It was brought in and we did the repairs on it, uh-huh.
Q. Now, who would have determined what repairs were needed to be done?
A. Well, I went over it myself, and Johnny Babb was one of them that went over it, and I believe he noticed a lot of things, and, of course, there was a lot of things on it, and we just all together noticed, you know, any repairs that it needed I could be correcting them, you know. ‡ ‡ ‡ ‡
Q. And there wasn't any — the impact didn't affect the lights at all; is that correct?
A. I don't think it did, no, ma'am it didn't. Because I believe the lights were still burning on it all even though it still got an inspection and everything.
¶ 13. Crawford provided the following answers to Quay's interrogatories:
INTERROGATORY NO. 1: While you were driving on the night of the accident, just prior to the accident, was there anything wrong with the lights in the tractor (including the headlights, dash lights, switches, etc.)? If so, please describe the problem, who you reported it to and what was done to alleviate the problem.
RESPONSE: There was nothing wrong with the lights in the tractor on the night of the accident.
INTERROGATORY NO. 2: At the end of your trip (post trip), was there anything wrong or any problem noted by you with the lights in the tractor (including the headlights, dash lights, switches, etc.)? If so, please describe the problem, who you reported it to and what was done to alleviate the problem.
RESPONSE: There was nothing wrong with the lights in the tractor at the end of my trip on the night of the accident.
¶ 14. The February 11 repair record, which was the first post-accident repair and made just three days after the accident, showed that two feet of wire had been replaced on the tractor and six wire connectors had been utilized to connect some wires which were not identified. Additionally, the repair order showed that an unidentified light had been repaired. From all indications, these repairs were made before the tractor and trailers were placed back in action following the accident. It is not clear from the record where all of the repairs were made.
¶ 15. While it is unclear where the February 11 repairs were made, it is clear that McBroom made them, and the following excerpts from his deposition are instructive:
Q. Okay. So this says that on 2-11-95, would that be the date that this work actually got done?
A. Yes, ma'am.
Q. It indicates that you did some repairs—
A. Uh-huh.
Q. And this is on — 2042 is the tractor? A. Yes, Ma'am, it would be a tractor.
Q. This would have just been like a day or two after the accident. Can you recall what it was that you repaired on the tractor?
A. No, ma'am.
Q. Looking at the parts that you used, can you tell me what that description is, I can't make it out, for the four-something another?
A. 725106 is a wire connector.
Q. It's a wire connector?
A. Yes, ma'am.
Q. What is a wire connector?
A. It's a little thing about this long you connect two wires with and you just crimp it to connect wires.
Q. And what part of the tractor would that have been connecting up? Do you know?
A. I don't know which part of the— what I — I don't remember fixing lights. I don't know.
Í*? i{5 ^ #
Q. When it says repair lights, do know which [sic] lights you might—
A No.
Q. You're not sure what you're repairing?
A. No.
(emphasis added).
¶ 16. The May 8 repair order for the tractor and trailer showed that two lights were repaired, one light lens, six light bulbs and a 7 way light receptacle had been replaced. Barrett's affidavit indicates that it was clearance lights to the front of the trailer that he repaired on May 8. However, four of the light bulbs that were replaced on May 8 bore part number 194, and Skinner testified by deposition that the bulbs bearing part number 194 were little marker bulbs along the topside of the trailer and that all the bulbs along the top of the trailer were replaced. One of the lights that was replaced on May 8 bore part number 426R, and Skinner testified that this was a taillight. This testimony concerning the taillight is in direct conflict with Barrett's affidavit. Remember, Barrett said he did "nothing to the taillights on the trailer" and that he was the one who did the repairs to the trailer on May 8.
¶ 17. In Eubanks's affidavit, offered in opposition to the motion for summary judgment, Eubanks said the following:
I inspected the Shipper's Express trailer shortly after the accident in question. I have also reviewed the answers to discovery provided, depositions, and maintenance/repair records on the tractor and trailer. From these materials and from my examination, I am of the opinion that the rear lights of the trailer in question were not in good working condition and/or even operational and therefore, the negligence of the defendants in failing to have properly operational lights would be a proximate or contributing cause of this accident and Mr. Lamson's death.... Also, it appears from the tickets on the repairs to the trailer, and from the testimony of the person who did the repairs, that the taillight bulb had blown and needed replacement. This repair not being caused by improper welding procedures indicates that at the time of the accident, that taillight was not working. Moreover, though [sic] trailer was not fitted with any reflective tape to help with conspicuity [sic] of the trailer,
(emphasis added).
¶ 18. It appears to us that a fair assessment of the proof offered for and against the motion for summary judgment left a glaring question of fact as to whether the fights on the rear trailer of the Shippers Express rig were functioning properly so as to adequately illuminate the rear of the trailer. We fully realize that Quay offered only circumstantial evidence to contradict the direct testimony offered by Crawford and Shippers Express that the fights on the rear trailer were functioning properly, but we are not aware of any case law which holds that circumstantial evidence is insufficient to raise a question of fact in the summary judgment context.
¶ 19. As to the direct testimony offered by Crawford and Shippers Express, we note that all of it, except the testimony of William Windsor, was from Crawford and employees of Shippers Express. Clearly the testimonies of Crawford and Glenn Porch, Director of Operations for Shippers Express, are self-serving. Self-serving statements cannot form the basis of summary judgment evidence. See Burton v. Choctaw County, 730 So.2d 1 (¶ 38) (Miss.1997).
¶20. The dissent correctly points out that Burton "did not overrule countless summary judgment decisions in which the evidence comes from the parties involved" and that "[t]estimony from parties and their employees is not objectionable at trial because of their interests in the outcome." We cannot know whether it was the intent of the Burton court to expand the well established body of summary judgment law or to simply restate in a different way some of its cogent principles, but we can and do accept Burton's plain and unambiguous holding that self-serving testimony can never be the basis for summary judgment. We point out, however, that it makes sense to require something other than a party's sworn affidavit to support a motion for summary judgment. If that should be all that is required, it appears to us that summary judgment actions would be reduced to a swearing match between the parties, and that, in our opinion, would result in judicial gridlock with one party swearing and the other party counter-swearing with respect to the crucial issues of fact. But even if Crawford's and Porch's testimony is considered evidentiary, Burton notwithstanding, that does not negate the fact that it was placed in dispute by the circumstantial evidence offered by Quay.
¶ 21. According to Crawford, after the impact, he tried to move and could not. He then got out, took his flashlight, went to the back of his rig and shined the flashlight to see what had happened. According to Windsor, Windsor got out of his truck, "walked over there" and said, "Man, there's a car behind your truck." Crawford makes no mention of Windsor. Surely, the failure of Crawford to mention this episode that Windsor contends occurred, raises a question of fact as to whether Windsor was in fact an eyewitness to the accident. This conclusion also is buttressed by the fact that the investigating officer did not see or speak with Windsor at the scene.
¶22. In addition to the glaring differences between the versions given by Crawford and Windsor, there is additional evidence casting a dark shadow of suspicion on Windsor. This additional evidence also points to a conclusion that Windsor was not a witness to the accident. As stated, Windsor testified that he saw a "big flash," and that Lamsoris vehicle was traveling around ninety miles per hour.
¶ 23. The American Heritage College Dictionary, 3rd edition, 1993, defines "flash" as "a sudden, brief, intense display of light." The evidence is undisputed that Lamsoris vehicle did not burst into flames upon impact. The headlights of Lamson's vehicle burst as a result of the impact, but the bursting of headlamps that were already burning would cause a sudden darkness, not a sudden, brief, intense display of light. A good example of a "flash" occurs when one walks into a dark room, flips the electrical switch and the light bulb burns a split second but suddenly blows.
¶ 24. Robert Cooper did an analysis of the accident and concluded that the impact speed of Lamsoris vehicle was approximately 28 miles per hour and that the forward speed of Lamsoris vehicle was between 57 and 62 miles per hour. This evidence is in direct conflict with Windsor's testimony that Lamsoris vehicle was going approximately 90 miles per hour.
¶25. As pointed out earlier, Windsor also testified that it was he who informed Crawford that a vehicle was underneath the second trailer. This testimony, as stated, contradicts Crawford's testimony, and appears to be an attempt to synchronize Windsor's testimony with the fact that the Shippers Express rig traveled approximately 403 feet with Lamson's car in tow underneath before Crawford discovered it was there. However, the attempt at synchronization, if indeed that is what it was, fails in light of Crawford's testimony that it was the locking of the brakes on the rig that caused him to stop and investigate.
¶ 26. In light of the testimony given by Windsor and Crawford, whether Windsor was an eyewitness to the accident is a material fact, and we conclude a genuine issue exists with respect to this fact. We recount the crucial factual points of Windsor's testimony. First, he thought Lam-son was drunk. Toxicology reports, which were offered in opposition to the motion for summary judgment, showed that no alcohol or drugs, other than caffeine, were found in Lamsoris blood. Caffeine is hardly a drug that induces sleep, quite the contrary. Windsor put Lamsoris speed at 90 miles an hour. Robert Cooper, Quay's accident reconstructionist put Lamsoris speed at 57 to 62 miles per hour. Windsor said he saw a "big flash." The evidence is uncontradicted that no fire occurred upon impact, and the sudden extinguishment of burning lights produces darkness, not a "big flash." Windsor said he alerted Crawford to the fact that Lamson's car was underneath Crawford's rig. Crawford said that he discovered the car himself after his forward movement was made virtually impossible by the locking of his brakes. Windsor said he and Crawford went to the rear of Crawford's rig and discovered Lamson's car. Crawford said he went alone with his flashlight.
¶27. Quay, as the non-moving party, was required to produce supportive evidence of significant and probative value in opposition to the motion for summary judgment. But Quay was required to go forth and produce such evidence only if Crawford and Shippers Express made a prima facie case that no genuine issue of material fact exists. The burden of persuasion remains with the moving party.
¶ 28. The excerpts from the depositions of Windsor and Crawford were offered in support of Crawford and Shippers Express's motion for summary judgment. Their testimony, without a doubt, raises a serious question of whether Windsor was in fact a witness to the accident. Added to this mix is the accident report and the testimony of the investigating highway patrolman who said there were no witnesses at the scene of the accident, and none contacted him. Clearly, the patrolman inquired of Crawford whether there were any witnesses to the accident. Had the conversation between Crawford and Windsor, that Windsor claims took place, actually occurred, Crawford surely would have advised the investigating officer. In this case, we believe that the conflicting testimony of Windsor and Crawford and the accident report of the investigating officer, all of which were offered by the moving party, created a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Windsor was an eyewitness to the accident.
¶29. It goes without saying that if Windsor was not a witness to the accident, his statements regarding the accident could not be based on personal knowledge. In the summary judgment context, the averments contained in a witness's affidavit must be based on the witness's personal knowledge. Otherwise, the affidavit has no probative value. M.R.C.P. 56(e); Daniels v. GNB, Inc., 629 So.2d 595, 599 (Miss. 1993).
¶30. Windsor's credibility problems pose a substantial hurdle for Crawford and Shippers Express. To this argument, the dissent quite correctly points out that "Windsor's potential credibility problems do not become evidence for the plaintiff." We readily agree, but they do become evidence against the movant in the summary judgment context, for, as stated, no probative value can be accorded his testimony if there is a genuine issue as to whether he is testifying from personal knowledge. It is a dispute over credibility, and all questions regarding a witness's credibility must be resolved by a jury, thereby precluding summary judgment. Leonard v. Dixie Well Serv. and Supply, Inc., 828 F.2d 291, 294 (5th Cir.1987).
¶ 31. Windsor's credibility problems notwithstanding, the ultimate issue is whether the taillights on the tractor trailer rig were functioning properly. As stated, Crawford and Shippers Express rely not only on the testimony of Windsor but also on the testimony of the driver, Crawford, and Operations Director Porch to support their contention that no genuine issue of material fact exists regarding the issue of the tail light. This reliance fails to accord proper weight to the circumstantial evidence offered by Quay on this issue.
¶ 32. Recall the testimony of McBroom who did repairs on the tractor just two days after the accident. He could not recall what repairs were done. He used six wire connectors and two feet of wire. What was he connecting? Why could he not remember which repairs were made? After all, these repairs were made just two or three days after the accident.
¶ 33. To say that McBroom's testimony does not give rise to probative circumstantial evidence which raises a genuine issue of material fact regarding the question of whether the lights on the trailer were working properly is to ignore the fact that the trailer does not have a separate electrical system to power the trailer lights. All electrical power to the trader is generated by the tractor and furnished to the trailer through electrical wires running from the tractor to the trailer. The fact that a witness says no repairs were made to lights on the trailer does not eliminate the fact question in the face of this evidence regarding repairs to the electrical system that powered all lights. Further more, if a defective wire was running from the tractor to the trader that powered the trader lights, it could be technicady correct to say that no repair was made to the trader lights, yet the trader could be without lights because of the defective wire in the tractor. We thus conclude that the totality of Quay's evidence, along with the contradictions in the testimonies of Crawford and Windsor, raised genuine issues of material facts.
2. The Underride Guard
¶ 34. Quay offered the affidavits of two experts, John Eubanks and Douglas Bynum, in support of her contention that the underride guard was defective and that the defect resulted in the exacerbation of Lamson's injuries. Eubanks could not say whether the underride guard was broken prior to the accident or during the accident. However, in either case, it was his opinion that the guard did not comply with the Federal Motor Carrier's regulations because the welded guard was not firmly attached or substantially strong to withstand the impact. Bynum, an expert in the field of engineering, said that the prior weld of the underride guard had been done improperly, causing it to give way during the impact. He stated that the weld materials should have been stronger than the parent materials. According to Bynum, the improperly welded guard broke allowing Lamson's car to "pitch forward" and causing, as stated, Lamson's injuries to be exacerbated.
¶ 35. Crawford and Shippers Express admit that federal regulations require that the underride guard be "substantially constructed and firmly attached." However, they contend that the purpose of the un-derride guard is to "limit the distance that the striking vehicle's front end slides under the read end of the impacted vehicle." They then reason that because the passenger compartment of Lamson's vehicle was not compromised by the impact, the conclusion must be that the guard functioned properly, thus no negligence.
¶ 36. It strains reason to say unequivocally that the guard functioned properly even though it broke and allowed Lam-son's car to proceed underneath the trailer. That the passenger compartment of Lamson's vehicle was not compromised in no way proves that the guard worked properly in light of the undisputed testimony that it broke during the collision or was already broken prior to the collision. While it is true that the top of Lamson's vehicle was not sheared off during the impact, that, however, may well have been due to the fact that the guard, though improperly maintained, did provide some protection. We cannot, however, conclude that an underride guard which provides some protection but breaks upon impact with a vehicle is the equivalent of a properly maintained underride guard.
¶ 37. To say that no genuine issue of material fact exists with respect to the maintenance of the underride guard under these circumstances simply because the top of Lamson's vehicle was not sheared off, is to overlook the fact that Shippers Express and Crawford had a duty to install and to maintain an underride guard capable of preventing vehicles from traveling underneath the rear of the trailer in case of a rear-end collision. To hold that it is okay to have an underride guard that allows vehicles to travel beyond the guard and underneath the trailer as long as the top of the vehicle is not sheared off is nonsensical.
¶38. For the reasons set forth, we reverse and remand this case for a full hearing on the merits. It may be difficult for Quay to meet her burden of proof on remand, but that is not the standard for determining whether summary judgment was properly granted. Looking at all of the evidence in the light most favorable to Quay, we can see how a reasonable jury could conclude that the underride guard was defective and that the rear lights on the rear trailer of Crawford's rig were either dimly lit, functioning improperly or not at all.
¶ 39. THE JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT OF HINDS COUNTY GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF THE APPELLEES IS REVERSED AND THE CASE REMANDED FOR A FULL HEARING ON THE MERITS. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO THE AP-PELLEES.
KING, P.J., LEE, MYERS, PAYNE, JJ" concur. SOUTHWICK P.J., dissents with separate Opinion joined by McMILLIN, C.J., BRIDGES and THOMAS, JJ., CHANDLER, J" not participating.
. The dissent makes much of the fact that some of Quay's evidence in opposition to the motion for summary judgment involved the repairs made in May, some three months after the accident. However, there is nothing in the record to suggest that the repairs were the result of post-accident use of the trailer.