Case Name: Elizabeth Ross v. Anne Armstrong
Court: Supreme Court of Texas
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1860-10
Citations: 25 Supp. Tex. 354
Docket Number: 
Parties: Elizabeth Ross v. Anne Armstrong.
Judges: 
Reporter: Texas Reports
Volume: 25 Supp.
Pages: 354–374

Head Matter:
Elizabeth Ross v. Anne Armstrong.
Where the grantee of a head-right certificate placed it" in the hands of a locator under a covenant to locate, survey, and obtain a patent, and then to divide the land between the owner and the grantee, it is not a sale of land, although the formal words of conveyance are used, and a money consideration was paid; but it was an agreement for the future acquisition of land, in which, when acquired, the parties should have an equal joint interest.
Under such an agreement the purchaser was to make the selection, and the parties were to participate equally in the benefits to be derived from the selection when made.
It could not mean that if the loss should be sustained, the locator should take all the profits, and his partner pocket all the loss.
Such a contract, (for which see history of the case,) where it is really an adventure on shares, and the patent is to issue in the name of one for the benefit of both, is a resulting trust, in which the grantee becomes the trustee for the benefit of his equitable tenant in common.
And if a partition really take place, and it is afterwards discovered that the Government has gfanted land, which had been previously appropriated by . older title, it differs from the case of an ordinary partition between tenants in common. It is a partition upon a mistake of facts, from which equity will relieve.
It is a general rule in equity, that an act done, or contract made, under a mistake or ignorance of a material fact, is voidable and relievable against in equity; thus, if A buy an estate of B, to which the latter is supposed to have an unquestionable title, and it turns out, upon due investigation of the facts, unknown at the time to both parties, that B has no title, as if there be a nearer heir than B, who was supposed to be dead, but is, in fact, living, in such a case equity will relieve the purchaser and rescind the contract. So, if one person should sell a messuage to another, which was at the time swept away by a flood, or destroyed by an earthquake, without any knowledge of the fact by either party, equity would relieve the purchaser. So, if a person should execute a release to another party upon the supposition, founded in a mistake, that a certain debt or annuity had been discharged, although both parties were innocent, the release would be set aside on the ground of mistake.
The mistake or ignorance of fact is the subject of relief when it constitutes a material ingredient in the contract, or the motive of the act done by the parties, and disappoints their intention by a mutual error.
In Bustard’s case (4 Coke, 121) it was adjudged, that in every exchange of lands, there is implied both a condition of re-entry and a warranty, and if one party is evicted from the land conveyed to him, he may either re-enter upon his own land, or recover upon the warranty; but, in the latter case, the recompense shall be confined to the land given in exchange, and that the same condition and warranty were implied in the case of a partition. In both of these species of assurance there was not only an implied warranty, but a condition which, in case of eviction of either party, gave a right of re-entry upon the other portion. There was, however, this difference between the warranty and the condition: When a coparcener took advantage of the condition, she defeated the partition as to the whole; but when she vouched by force of the warranty, the partition was not defeated in the whole, but she recovered recompense for the part that was lost. But this implied warranty and condition were, by common law, confined to a partition made between coparceners, and for the reason, it is supposed, that the right of compulsory partition was given by the common law only to coparceners, and not to joint tenants, or tenants in common, to whom the right was first given by statute.
By the common law, a warranty and condition of re-entry were implied in the case of a partition between coparceners, and not in a partition by joint tenants and tenants in common. But the statute of 31 Henry VIII, c. 1, which gave to joint tenants and tenants in common the right of partition by compulsory process, gave also the warranty. By our law, the leading distinctive characteristics of those several kinds of estates have been abolished. By the act of the 28th of January, 1840, the right of survivorship between joint tenants was abolished, and it was provided, that coparceners might maintain waste against each other. (Paschal’s Dig., Art. 3429, Note 791.) And although the latter provision was omitted in the. act of the 18th of March, 1848, (Paschal’s Dig., Arts. 3419, 3422,) which was intended as a substitute for the former law and repealed it, we apprehend the legislation upon the subject would not warrant the supposition that it was intended to preserve the common law distinctions between an estate in coparcenary and other estates in joint ownership.
The effect of these provisions seems to be, to destroy the numerous and important distinctions which, existed between these several kinds of estates at the common law, and for all practical purposes to reduce them to one estate; namely, an estate in common, with, however, the rights and remedies that appertained to tenants in coparcenary at the common law. It then necessarily follows, that where there has been a partition between tenants in common, and there is failure of title, such relief must be given by bill in a court of chancery, or it must be altogether denied; a thing that justice and equity will not permit. We therefore think the remedy is in a court of chancery, either by setting aside the partition when improperly made and it can be done without injustice to others, or by contribution when it is most proper.
Appeal from Bobertson. The ease was tried before Hon. John Gregg, one of the district judges.
Elizabeth Boss, described herself as the widow and sole surviving heir of Thomas Boss, and she declared that said Thomas in his lifetime entered into a contract with one E. L. B. Wheelock, which, as the case turned mainly upon it, is given in these words:
“Beptjblic oe Texas, \
“ County of Robertson. )
“Know all men by these presents, that I, Thomas Boss, a citizen of the county of Robertson and republic aforesaid, for and in consideration of the sum §5,000, to me in hand paid by E. L. R. Wheelock, a citizen of the coünty aforesaid, the receipt whereof I, the said Thomas Ross, to my full satisfaction, do hereby acknowledge, have bargained and sold unto said E. L. R. Wheelock, his heirs or assigns, and do by these presents bargain, sell, and convey, and, so far as ability in me exists, deliver possession of unto, said E. L. R. Wheelock, his heirs or assigns, one half of a league of land, which I am entitled to as a colonist, hy virtue of certificate number one hundred and forty-three, issued to me, said Ross, by the hoard of land commissioners for Robertson county, dated 5th day of April, A. D. 1838; and I hereby authorize and empower the said E. L. R. Wheelock, his heirs or assigns, to locate and have surveyed the aforesaid league and labor of land, in any place where the law will permit within the republic aforesaid, and, when located, I authorize the said Whee-lock to divide the same; and I, the said Ross, do bind myself, my heirs and assigns, to take choice, within sixty days after notice given, of said location of my half, that the said Wheelock may sell and enjoy the half league of land (the labor not being included) as property acquired by a just and legitimate title, for the use of himself and his heirs, of the jurisdiction where the land may be located, with full and ample powers to act upon this as upon a final judgment with executive force; and there being no notary present, I have called upon William Winans and John Edmundson and John Armstrong as witnesses to this my act, that it may have all the effect and force of a notarial one. The words my half interlined before signing. Witness my hand and seal, this 6th of April, A. D. 1838.
“ Thomas Ross. [l. s.]
“Witnesses, William Winans, John G-. Armstrong, “John Edmundson.”
This bond was assigned to Anne Cavitt, now Anne Arm strong, the defendant. The plaintiff averred a failure of consideration of the bond, in this, that Wheeloek located the land in (now) Havarro county; that a division was made; but it was afterwards discovered that the land which fell to Eoss was covered by an older and superior title; but Wheelock’s share was without the conflict; and as she got nothing, she prayed for a cancellation of the bond, and to recover the moiety claimed by Armstrong as assignee of Wheeloek. The defendant filed several special exceptions to the petition; and in answer she admitted the execution of the bond, the location, division, &c.
The plaintiff afterwards amended her petition, in which she set up the proceedings in the county court of Eobertson county, whereby, under a decree of said court, she, as administratrix, specifically performed said, contract, and conveyed the half to the defendant, under a mistake as to her rights; that she made no personal contract, but simply obeyed the order of the court, which she supposed she was • compelled to do; but that the court had no jurisdiction of the subject-matter, and the contract wag void, and the deed void. She described the conflict with Latham’s older and superior outstanding title, which was a colonist grant, dated in 1835, and therefore the location was not on vacant land. She averred that Armstrong, the husband and agent of the defendant, made the location; that she, in her representative character, selected the half in conflict in ignorance of the conflict, and that she so remained when she made the conveyance under the decree of specific performance. She charged want of diligence in the location. She first discovered the conflict in 1857. Her deed under the decree of the county court for specific performance was dated 9th March, 1851. She brought in the children of Eoss as plaintiffs entitled to the community interest of the father. The decree of the county court was dated in January, 1850, and it was as specific as' the county coiu*t could make it. By a third amendment, she averred negligence and want of skill in the location, and laid damages at $5,000. A jury was waived, and the law and facts submitted to the court, who dismissed the petition, from which the plaintiffs appealed.
Ay cock ¿- Stewart, for appellants.
—The main features ol this case are as follows: “In 1838, Thos. Boss made a contract with Wheelock, in writing, by which Boss was to furnish a league certificate, and Wheelock was to pay $500, and locate that certificate on vacant land. The land was then to be equally divided. Wheelock was to divide the land, and Boss to take choice of halves. Wheelock transferred his interest to Anne Armstrong, who procured the location and patent of a league of land in ¡Navarro county. Boss died before the land was patented. Elizabeth Boss became administratrix, with the will annexed. Mrs. Armstrong divided the land into two equal parts. Mrs. Boss, as administratrix of her husband, Thos. Boss, made choice of the east half. The county court ordered "her to make title to the west half to Mrs. Armstrong. She did so as administratrix, in obedience to that decree. Sometime afterwards, it was ascertained that her whole selection, the entire east half, was covered by the Martin Latham grant, a superior outstanding title.”
1. The agreement between Thomas Boss, deceased, and Wheelock, who transferred his interest to Anne Armstrong, the appellee, upon which the county court acted, ordering Elizabeth Boss, administratrix of Thomas Boss’ estate, with the will annexed, to make title, and in obedience to which the deed sought to be vacated was executed, was a locative contract. By its terms one party pays $500, and undertakes to locate a league certificate on vacant land; the other agrees to convey, or does convey, to take effect when that consideration is performed, one-half of the land thus to be located. It is manifest that the locative duties of the locator are an essential condition of his right to the land. They cannot be separated from the contract without destroying its plain intent and meaning. It must be either a locative contract, a bond for title, or a deed upon condition that the locator places the certificate on vacant land.
2. Then the real rights of the parties to that contract, when the certificate was found located one-half on public domain, and the other on appropriated land, were a joint equitable title to the clear half.
3. The order of the county court decreeing the execution of the deed sought to be vacated, and in obedience to which it was executed, is void for want of jurisdiction in the court. The county court has authority, under the statute, (0. & W. Dig., Art. 761,) to order executors and administrators to execute deeds upon the written agreements of decedents for the sale of property. It is a tribunal of limited jurisdiction, and upon this subject has no authority except that conferred by the statute. By a sound construction of that statute, we contend that no jurisdiction over trusts was intended to be conferred. That subject of equity cognizance was not contemplated by the'words, “agreement for the sale of property.” This instrument, upon which the county court acted when the patent issued in the name of the heirs of Thomas Ross, raised a trust, under all its circumstances, mete for the arbitrius boni judiéis of a chancellor. (Watkins v. Gilkerson, 10 Tex., 343; Vardeman v. Lawson, 17 Tex., 10; Miller v. Roberts, 18 Tex., 19; also Stuart v. Baker, 17 Tex., 419.) From which it may be gathered that no contract is a contract for the sale of land which, if in parol only, would not infringe the statute of frauds. And this agreement, if entirely in parol, would not violate the statute of frauds. The decree of the county court is therefore coram nonjudiee, and void.
4. The legal title to the land conveyed by the deed is in the appellants by patent; and, if that deed be a nullity, what defense can it of itself afford to appellee? It is a cloud that may be removed unquestionably; but it can afford no defense to the appellee if the right to the land1 is shown to be in appellants. The legal title being in the appellants, the object of the suit cannot be defeated, unless appellee can show an equitable title. But what are elements of an equitable title? Taking possession under a verbal contract and making improvements, acting on faith of another’s declaration or act, and changing condition, &c. But no equity is here shown against the claim that we set up, which is simply to remove that cloud of title, and divide the clear land equally with appellee. She had no higher right at first than that would give her.
5. Our position is, that Mrs. Ross made her selection under a gross mistake of the material fact, that the half she was taking was entirely covered by the Martin Latham survey, a superior outstanding title, and that equity will relieve her from the consequences of that mistake, and readjust the rights of the parties.
But we will treat our case upon the merits. It is insisted by appellee, that, both parties being ignorant of this conflict of superior outstanding title, both alike being innocent, equities are equal, and the partition is binding. This argument is made, it will be found, upon a confusion of ideas. There is an important distinction between such cases as this and cases of contract, properly so called. It is the distinction between contract and estoppel. In contract, there is mutuality of consideration.' But this may not he so in estoppel. A man concludes himself against his right in estoppel, hut there may be no reciprocal benefit to him. In estoppel a man binds himself by his own act, (or word,) a mere act; while in contract he binds himself by his bargain, which includes the act of another which he has superinduced. It is in contract that the doctrine of equal equities so complacently invoked applies, but not in estoppel. Then, if we can establish the two following propositions, we are clearly relievable:
1. That Mrs-. Ross bound appellants by estoppel and one } contract, if at all. [
■ 2. That in estoppel no one can be bound by an act done } in gross ignorance of a material fact, and by which no one ) is injured in correcting the mistake.
And, first, Mrs. Ross, in selecting that part of the land covered by the Latham grant, was not making a contract. It was a mere act of hers, by which she was executing a supposed legal obligation of her testator. She was, in fiduciary capacity, doing what she supposed her testator bound in law to do by the terms of his contract. Again, by her act, she deprived her testator’s estate of that which in equity belonged to it, without any corresponding benefit to her estate, or injury or inconvenience to the appellee. This act of selection was no bargain by which she changed the rights or condition of the appellee. She only deprived the estate. She only injured that by abandoning, under a gross mistake, the equitable interest (or rather legal and equitable) it owned in the clear half of the land. She was only attempting to carry out a contract, not making one. On this point see Tolman v. Sparhawk, 5 Met., 499; Boyd’s Lessee v. Graves, 4 Wheat., 517.
In estoppel, no one can be bound by an act done in gross ignorance of a material fact, when no one will be injured by relieving the party sought to be estopped. It is enough to announce the principle, but the court is referred to the following authorities: Tolman v. Sparhawk, cited before; 9 B. Monf.,415; Fletcher v. Dyssart, Ib., 179; 4 Mass., 180; Taylor v. Zepp, 14 Mis., 482; 10 Ohio, 288; Ryers v. Farwell, 9 Barb. Sup. Ct., 615.
Prendergrast Feeney, for appellee.
—1. An examination of the written instrument establishes, 1st, That Ross made a valid and absolute sale to Wheelock of one-half of his head-right league of land, for the words used are the apt, fitting, and technical words of conveyance, and the payment by appellee of $500, the only consideration, required, shows that it was not an executory, but an executed contract, proceeding upon a valuable and paid consideration ; and the will of Boss, the inventory of Ms estate, the petition of the appellant, Elizabeth, in the county court, as well as the evidence of Sere and Bavner, show that, as understood by Boss and appellants, the sale was absolute, that title passed by it, and that it did not depend upon subsequent services, as a condition, the words being, “I authorize Mm to locate,” &c.; I authorize,Mm to divide; but there is no correspondent allegation required. It seems to appertain to the way in which their respective interests were to be ascertained, or that, if Wheelock, for Ms own interest, and to secure a location he might desire for Ms undivided half, and to see that title was perfected, desired, or was willing to take charge of the whole certificate, rather than to leave it to Boss, then this instrument empowers him to do so. 2d, Wheelock having assigned all his title in the league of land to appellee, who paid Boss the moneyed consideration therefor, still less, as to her, could the locating and patenting the certificate extend to the sale as parts of the contract; if assumed, it was a voluntary assumption, and the insertion of the words, “to have it surveyed when the law will permit,” would impose no greater obligation or responsibility than the undertaking itself, for the expression of that which the law implies works nothing. 3d. If the agency were accepted and executed, then it was the clear intention, and the instrument contains the legal expression of that intention, that the selection of one-half of the divided league by Boss, or his heirs, would vest the title to the other half in Wheelock, and to the instrument, as far as possible, is given the force of a confessed judgment. Eor the words are, have “ bargained and sold, and do sell and convey, one-half a league of land,” that the said Wheelock may use and enjoy the half league of land as property acquired by just and legitimate title, “ for the use of himself and heirs,” words of special conveyance are used, and being in writing, and proceeding upon a valuable consideration, and operative when said appellant had designated that for which the money was paid, as between the parties to this agreement, that the land should be held by a legitimate title, would become operative as that title, and be the vehicle of its conveyance in connection with the words of the sale.
2. If the authority given were accepted, the right of the appellee to locate, patent, and divide the land was not revoked by the death of Ross; for, owning one equal half of that upon which the power was to be exercised, to wit, the certificate, as well as that which was to be the result of the exercise of the authority, she had an agency, coupled with an interest, not revocable by the death of Ross. (Hunt v. Rousmanier, 8 Wheat., 201.)
3. The appellant had the right to select one-half of a league, when divided by appellee, and bind herself and the heirs of Ross by the selection: 1st, by her authority as executrix of Ross, and by the terms of the said written instrument; 2d, because it was a community league of land, and she had as great an estate therein as Ross had possessed, and she could certainly select her own; 3d, because she was the devisee of a life estate in six hundred and forty acres of land on his head-right league by his will, to be selected upon any corner or upon any line she might prefer, and there being only one partition between Ross and Wheelbck, any selection would be conclusive as to the half selected.
4. If the parties were competent to divide the league, and did divide it, and establish by metes and bounds, or even by an agreed line, (the parties possessing a common interest,) such a partition, even though verbal, would be good. (Stuart v. Baker, 17 Tex., 419; Boyd v. Graves, 4 Wheat., 517.) Or, if the parties claimed their respective parts in severalty by an agreed line, and acquiesced as long as in this case, a court would presume and enforce a partition. (24 Verm., 1 Dean, 560; 15 3ST. Hamp., 546.)
5. A locator of a land certificate is not a warrantor of his location, if ordinary good faith and diligence* be shown; for he is a bailee, a conductor operis faciendi, and the law of bailments applies to him. (1 Bibb, 377.)
6. The appellants having in their possession title, to wit, the patent, and standing as quasi vendors to appellee, they must be presumed to know the condition of that title; and the conflicting survey having been platted in the general land office, and on a sketch in the land district where the land was situated, before the selection was made by Mrs. Ross, she had constructive notice of the existence and conflict of the Latham survey. (Guilbeau v. Mays, 15 Tex.) It being her duty to inform herself, and the means of information being open to her, it is presumed she did know the conflict; nor can this court, in the absence of all proof, say but that, regarding the Latham title as of no value, she selected the east half for reasons satisfactory to herself; for it has been held, “ That if the means of information are alike accessible to both parties, so that, with ordinary diligence, they might respectively rely on their own judgment, they must be presumed to have done so, or, if they have not so informed themselves, they must abide the consequences of their inattention and carelessness. (Yates v. Price, 5 Eng., 58.) And a party relying .on ignorance must show not only that he had not the information, but could not with due diligence obtain it. (Wason v. Waring, 15 Eng. L. & E., 121; 1 Story’s Eq. Jur., § 146.)
7. There is no ground in the evidence to invoke the interposition of this court on the equitable doctrine of mistake or fraud. The latter is alleged, but abandoned in the proof. To obtain relief on account of mistake, it must appear that the fact which causes it, or in which it occurs, is material to the contract, and an efficient cause of its concoction, and such that the party could not get knowledge of by reasonable diligence when put on inquiry, or, that an unconscientious advantage has been taken, by the party concealing, upon whom there is some legal obligation to disclose. (1 Story’s Eq. Jur., §§ 140 to 149.) It is submitted, that locating the certificate which caused the alleged mistake was not a -part of, nor touched the consideration of the sale, as between Ross and appellee; that the appellant was in the same condition as appellee, as to •a knowledge or ignorance of the Latham title, having, the saíne means of information;' that there was no concealment or imposition; and there was no confidential relation existing between the parties after the patent was obtained, even if appellee had known thereafter -the conflict, which we deny; and we rely with confidence on 1 Story Eq. Jur., § 151, as containing the law on this point, and also 24 Maine, 82.
8. Where the equities are equal, equity will not interfere.

Opinion:
Wheeler, G. J. —
The contract of the 6th of April,
1838, was not a contract for the sale of land. It contemplated the future acquisition of land, in which, when acquired, the parties should have .an equal joint interest. That interest would be more or less valuable, according to the quality and locality of the land which should be selected. The purchaser was intrusted with making the selection, and the parties were to participate equally in the benefits to be derived from it when made. If it proved injudicious, and loss were sustained, it would certainly be a very hard case that the entire loss should fall on the other partner, and the locator should take the whole that remained. ' That certainly was not what the parties intended.
The money consideration paid did not convert the contract into a sale of land, for no land had been secured. If it had been a contract for the sale of a half league of land already located, it would have been a different case. The parties would have known about what they were contracting, and the purchaser would have acquired a right to a thing certain, which he would have been entitled to have conveyed to him for the price stipulated, however disadvantageous the contract might prove to the other party. But such is not the case. The purchaser contracted for one-half of what he might secure by means of the certificate, be that more or less. That was the intention of the contract. It would certainly be extremely inequitable to allow him, through a mistake of his own, though without fault on his part, to possess himself of the whole. Against the consequences of such a mistake, it would seem that equity ought to relieve. It was an adventure, in which the parties contributed, as they deemed, equally of their means, and were to share equally the profits. It is analogous to the case of a joint purchase, made by two persons, who advance and pay the purchase money in equal proportions, which, according to the common law, would create a joint tenantcy, but by our law, as the right of survivor-ship is abolished, would be deemed to create a trust, and if the purchase be made, and the title taken in the name of one of them, he becomes a trustee, and the other will be entitled to his share as a resulting trust. (2 Story's Eq., § 1206.)
If the parties had contributed equal sums, to be invested in the purchase of land, and one of them, being intrusted with malting the purchase, had taken the title in his own name, or in their joint names, and a loss were sustained by the failure of the title to a part, it cannot be doubted that, on principles of equity, each must bear his proportion of the loss. In such a case, they might have their recourse against their vendor upon the covenants in the deed. But in the present there is no recourse against the government on account of the failure of title, and the purchaser had but an equitable title. It, therefore, differs from the ordinary case of a partition of land between tenants in common. The division of the land, after it was acquired, by which the locator obtained the whole that was secured by the certificate, was made under an obvious mistake of fact; the consequence of which is, that the grantee of the certificate has lost all the benefit of it, and is remediless, unless the division be set aside, or the defendant be required- to yiake contribution. From the consequences of such, a mistake, equity, it would seéin, ought to relieve. It is a general rule in equity, that an act done, or contract made, under a mistake or ignorance of a material fact, is voidable, and relievable against in equity. Thus, if A buy an estate of B, to which the latter is supposed to have an unquestionable title, and it turn out upon due investigation of the facts, unknown at the time to both parties, that B has no title: as if there be a nearer heir than B, who was supposed to be dead, but is in fact" living: in such a case equity will relieve the purchaser and rescind the contract. (1 Story's Eq., § 141.) So, if one person should sell a messuage to another, which was at the time swept away by a fiood, or destroyed by an earthquake, without any knowledge of the fact by either party, equity would relieve the purchaser. So, if a person should execute a release to another party, upon the supposition, founded in a mistake, that a certain debt or annuity had been discharged, although both parties were innocent, the release would be set aside on the ground of mistake.. (Id., § 142.) In such case the act or contract is void, as founded upon a mutual mistake of matter constituting its basis. The mistake or ignorance of fact is the subject of relief, when it constitutes a material ingredient in the contract or the motive, of the act done by the parties, and disappoints their intention by a mutual-error. (Id., et seq.) Such was the case in the making of the-division of the land in question. The plain-' tiff, by her deed, released to the defendant the title to half the league, under the mistaken belief that she had an inde feasible title to the residue. The parties were alike ignorant of the existence of the superior title in a third party; the mistake was mutual, and did not arise from any want of care and diligence in the party who seeks to be relieved, and to have the act done in consequence of the ignorance and mistake set aside. But for the mistake, it is clear the deed would not have been executed. It has disappointed the intention of the parties by a mutual error, and has resulted in giving one of them an uneonscientious advantage, against which the other had not any means of providing; and it would seem that she is entitled to have the act done by her set aside, on the clear ground of mistake.
In the view we have taken, we have not considered the case strictly as that of a partition between tenants in common; but, viewing it in that light, what are the rights ot the plaintiff?
In Bustard's case,' (4 Coke, 121,) it was adjudged, that in every exchange of lands there is implied both a condition of re-entry and a warranty; and, if one party is evicted from the land conveyed to him, he may either re-enter upon his own land or recover upon the warranty; but, in the latter case, the recompense should be confined to the land given in exchange; and that the same condition and warranty were implied in the case of a partition. In both of these species of assurance there was not only an implied warranty, but a condition, which, in case of eviction of either party, gave a right of re-entry upon the other portion. There was, however, this difference between the warranty and the condition. Where a coparcener took advantage of the condition, she defeated the partition as to the whole; but when she vouched by force of the warranty, the partition was not defeated in the whole, but she recovered recompense for the part that was lost. But this implied warranty and condition were, by the common law, confined to a partition made between coparceners, and for the reason, it is supposed, that the right of compulsory par tition was given by the common law only to coparceners, and not to joint tenants, or tenants in common, to whom the right was first given by statute. The common law, having-given this right in favor of coparceners, deemed it reasonable and just that they should not be placed in a worse condition by the partition (which could be compelled by writ of partition or a bill in chancery) than if they had continued to enjoy their respective interests without a partition; in which case, if suit had been commenced upon a paramount title, all must have been impleaded, and in case of recovery, all must have sustained their due proportion of the loss. In order, therefore, that they should not be placed in a worse condition by a compulsory partition, the common law annexed to the partition the implied warranty, as a condition for their ¡n-otection. But as by the common law joint tenants and tenants in common could only make partition by agreement, there was not the same reason, it was thought, why the law should imply a warranty in case of a partition by them; because, in making the partition, it was competent for them, by the terms of their agreement, to provide against future losses by paramount titles. The law implied no warranty or condition, because they were not compellable to make partition, as coparceners were, and might protect themselves by express stipulations or covenants in their deeds of partition.
Such are some of the reasons why, by the common law, a warranty and condition of re-entry were implied in the case of a partition between co¡Darceners and not in a partition by joint tenants and tenants in common. But the statute of 31 Henry VIH, c. 1, which gave to joint tenants and tenants in common the right of partition by compulsory process, gave also the warranty. (Eawle on Gov., 467.)
By our law, the leading distinctive characteristics of those several kinds of estates have been abolished. By the act of the 28th January, 1840, the right of survivorship between joint tenants was abolished, and it was jn'ovided that coparceners might maintain waste against each other. (Hart. Dig., Arts. 588, 589.) And, although the latter provision was omitted in the act of the 18tli March, 1848, (O. & W. Dig., Art. 344, et seq.,) which was intended as a substitute for the former law and repealed it, I apprehend the legislation upon the subject Avould not Avarrant the supposition that it was intended to preserve the common-law distinctions between an estate in coparcenary and other estates in joint ownership. The act of the 5th of February, 1840, "to enable part owners of land to obtain partition thereof," recognizes no distinction between these several kinds of estates in joint ownership, but treats the tenants all alike, simply as "part owners," and gives all alike the right of compulsory partition. (Hart. Dig., Art. 2617; 0. & W. Dig., Art. 1510;) [Paschal's Dig., Art. 4707, Rote 1605.—Reporter.] It also provides against giving the partition the effect of destroying any previous warranty of the title under which the tenants hold, (O. & W. Dig., Art. 1511,) Avhich, in this respect, also places joint tenants and tenants in common upon the same footing as coparceners occupied at the common law. [Paschal's Dig., Rote 106, pp. 790, 791.—Reporter.]
The effect of these provisions seems to be to destroy the numerous and important distinctions which existed between these several kinds of estates at the common law, and for all practical purposes to reduce them to one estate, namely, an estate in common, with, however, the rights and remedies that appertained to tenants in coparcenary at the common law. This is in harmony Avith the comparative simplicity of our law of realty in other respects, and is a great improvement upon the former state of the law. The refined and artificial distinctions which existed at the common law were calculated only to perplex and embarrass, without producing any corresponding benefits. The practical effect of Aviping them away, and placing all upon the more favored footing of tenancy in coparcenary, giving to joint tenants and tenants in common the right of compulsory partition, and preserving their rights upon any previous warranty, as if they had been coparceners, would seem to be to confer upon them the rights and remedies of coparceners at common law; the most important of which, in case of partition, were the implied condition and warranty, whereby a coparcener, evicted by a permanent title, could defeat the partition in the whole, or recover recompense for the part that was lost.
"We find but few cases where the question has arisen in the courts of this country. The.Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in the case of Weisner v. Weisner, 5 Watts, 279, where the partition was by deed, which contained a clause of special warranty, held, that no warranty was implied, and that the rights of the tenants in common depended solely upon the covenants in the deed. But, in the subsequent case of Patterson v. Lansing, 10 Watts, 135, the same court held, that in á partition of lands between tenants in common, who derived their estate by descent, there is an implied warranty of title; and this was the case of a partition by deed. In the former case, the decision was probably much influenced by the consideration that the deed of partition contained an express covenant of special warranty, declared on as a general warranty; the court holding that an express covenant qualifies and restrains the generality of an implied covenant. Other considerations were adverted to, which doubtless had their influence upon the decision of the. court. And it is to be observed, moreover, that the statute law of-that State does not appear to have so completely effaced the distinctions between estates held in joint ownership as does ours.
The subject underwent an elaborate examination by the Supreme Court of Tennessee, in the case of Sawyers v. Cator, (8 Humph., 256,) where one tenant in common filed a bill for contribution and reimbursement against his co-tenants and their alienees, and the court held, that in partition between tenants in common there is an implied warranty between the parties to the partition, by which they have the mutual right, in case of eviction by paramount title, to have compensation from each other for loss sustained, and that the remedy is by bill in equity, either by setting aside the partition, as being founded in mistake, if it can be done without injustice; if not, then by a decree of pecuniary contribution. It was said the right of entry' did not exist, it was not given by statute, and had never been in use in that State; the implied covenant could not be vouched upon, because that mode of proceeding had never been in use there, and is now obsolete even in England. "We have been able to find (the court said) no precedent for an action of covenant upon such implied warranty. It then necessarily follows, that where there has been a partition between tenants in common, and there is failure of title, such relief must be given by bill in a court of chancery, or it must be altogether denied; a thing that justice and equity will not permit. It seems to us that a court of chancery is peculiarly adapted to give the relief, which is upon the principle of contribution; a subject over which such courts have so long had almost exclusive jurisdiction. We therefore think the remedy in a court of chancery, either by setting aside the partition, when improperly made and it can be done without injustice to others, or by contribution, when it is most proper." And as contribution was asked, and Avas deemed more appropriate and just in that case, it was accordingly decreed.
This Ave deem to be the just and equitable doctrine, Avhich ought to obtain in the administration of justice between joint owners of land in cases of partition in the courts of this State. Since, as Ave have seen, our statutory law has abolished the common-law distinctions between the joint OAvn'ers of land, and placed them upon the same footing for all practical purposes, and has rendered them alike liable to make partition at the election of any one or more of their co-tenants, it would seem to follow, that this remedy and mode of relief must be admitted, to avoid an utter denial of justice. Unless it be admitted, parties situated like the plaintiff in the present case would not only be wholly remediless, but would be unable to provide against loss by any precautionary means whatever. The contract obliged the plaintiff to make title in accordance with its terms; she could require no deed or assurance on the part of the defendant, because she held the title to the whole, and the contract did not authorize her to call on the defendant for such deed or assurance. She, therefore, had it not in her power to secure herself by any express cove- • nant by the defendant. Every consideration, therefore, which can address itself to a court of equity to grant relief • in any case, may be invoked on behalf of the plaintiff in this case. "We think she is entitled to the relief which she seeks, to have the proceedings and deed by which the division of the land was effected set aside as founded in mistake, and to have an equitable partition of the land which remains unaffected by the paramount title decreed between herself and'the defendant.
The judgment is therefore reversed, and the cause remanded for further proceedings.
Reversed and remanded.