Case Name: PEOPLE v. REUTHER
Court: Michigan Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1981-06-17
Citations: 107 Mich. App. 349
Docket Number: Docket No. 52046
Parties: PEOPLE v REUTHER
Judges: Before: Cynar, P.J., and Bronson and D. F. Walsh, JJ.
Reporter: Michigan appeals reports; cases decided in the Michigan Court of Appeals.
Volume: 107
Pages: 349–359

Head Matter:
PEOPLE v REUTHER
Docket No. 52046.
Submitted April 9, 1981, at Lansing.
Decided June 17, 1981.
Vern F. Reuther, Jr., was charged with delivery of a controlled substance and was convicted on his plea of guilty in Bay Circuit Court, Eugene C. Penzien, J., of attempted possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver. Defendant was sentenced to a jail term of six months, fined $250, placed on probation for five years, and ordered to pay $1,250 in costs. Defendant appeals, alleging that the costs imposed did not bear a reasonable relationship to the actual cost of the prosecution of the case, that the five-year probation term was improper since the crime to which he pled guilty was a two-year misdemeanor and thus subject to only a two-year term of probation, and that the provision of the Public Health Code under which he was convicted violates the title-object clause of the Michigan Constitution. Held:
1. Since the costs associated with probationary oversight are included in the costs of prosecution, and since the costs associated with such probationary oversight alone would justify the costs imposed, the costs imposed are reasonably related to the cost of prosecution of the defendant.
2. The provision in the Code of Criminal Procedure fixing the maximum term of probation is controlled by the definition of a felony contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure. The crime for which defendant was convicted, being punishable by more than one year in prison, is a felony under the definition contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, and probation may be imposed accordingly, even though the crime, for the purpose of the Penal Code, is classified as a two-year misdemeanor.
References for Points in Headnotes
21A Am Jur 2d, Criminal Law § 1044.
Items of costs of prosecution for which defendant may be held. 65 ALR2d 854.
21 Am Jur 2d (Rev), Criminal Law §§ 28, 29.
73 Am Jur 2d, Statutes §§ 99, 101.
73 Am Jur 2d, Statutes §§ 145,146.
73 Am Jur 2d, Statutes § 293.
73 Am Jur 2d, Statutes § 305.
73 Am Jur 2d, Statutes § 180.
21 Am Jur 2d (Rev), Criminal Law §§ 567, 568.
3. The provision of the Public Health Code providing for proscriptions and penalties relating to the delivery and possession of controlled substances does not violate the title-object clause of the Michigan Constitution.
Affirmed.
Bronson, J., while concurring in the conviction and imposition of costs, dissented from that portion of the opinion holding that the five-year term of probation was proper. He would hold that, in order to give full effect to both the Penal Code and the Code of Criminal Procedure, a crime designated as being a two-year misdemeanor in the Penal Code must be treated as a misdemeanor under the probation provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the specific designation of the nature of the crime contained in the Penal Code taking precedence over the general definition contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure. He would affirm the conviction and imposition of costs but would reduce the term of probation to two years.
Opinion op the Court
1. Criminal Law — Costs — Probation — Statutes.
Costs assessed in a criminal case may include those costs reasonably related to the cost of prosecution, including the costs associated with the probationary oversight of the probationer (MCL 771.3[3]; MSA 28.1133[3]).
2. Criminal Law — Sentencing — Probation — Felony — Misdemeanor — Statutes.
A crime carrying a two-year maximum sentence, even if such crime is statutorily designated as a misdemeanor for the purpose of the Penal Code, is statutorily treated as a felony for the purpose of the Code of Criminal Procedure; a term of probation imposed upon conviction of such crime is subject to the five-year limitation for felonies contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure (MCL 761.1[g], 771.2; MSA 28.843[g], 28.1132).
3. Criminal Law — Constitutional Law — Public Health Code — Controlled Substances — Statutes.
The proscriptions and penalties relating to the delivery and possession of controlled substances contained in the Public Health Code do not violate the title-object clause of the Michi gan Constitution (Const 1963, art 4, § 24, MCL 333.7401; MSA 14.15[7401]).
Partial Concurrence and Partial Dissent by Bronson, J.
4. Statutes — Judicial Construction.
Statutes should be construed to effectuate the will of the Legislature in such a way that every word of the statute is rendered effective and no part of the statute is rendered nugatory.
5. Criminal Law — Statutes — Judicial Construction.
Any ambiguity in a criminal or penal statute is to be construed in favor of lenity.
6. Criminal Law — Judicial Construction — Penal Code — Code of Criminal Procedure.
The Penal Code and the Code of Criminal Procedure are in pari materia and must be construed together so as to complement one another.
7. Statutes — Judicial Construction — Presumptions.
The presumption that the Legislature in amending a statute must be presumed to have knowledge of existing laws should be resorted to only if all other doctrines of statutory construction fail to render a sensible meaning to the statute in question.
8. Criminal Law — Sentencing — Probation — Statutes.
A sentence of probation for a crime deñned in the Penal Code as being a two-year misdemeanor is subject to the two-year limitation on sentences of probation contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure despite the general provision in the Code of Criminal Procedure that crimes punishable by more than one year in prison are felonies (MCL 761.l[g], 771.2; MSA 28.843[g], 28.1132).
Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Robert A. Derengoski, Solicitor General, George B. Mullison, Prosecuting Attorney, and Thomas J. Rasdale, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for the people.
Zimostrad, Wenzloff, Allsopp & Zimostrad, P.C., for defendant.
Before: Cynar, P.J., and Bronson and D. F. Walsh, JJ.

Opinion:
Per Curiam.
Defendant was charged with delivery of a controlled substance (marijuana), MCL 333.7401; MSA 14.15(7401). On March 31, 1980, he pled guilty to the offense of attempt to possess a controlled substance (marijuana) with intent to deliver, MCL 333.7401; MSA 14.15(7401), MCL 750.92; MSA 28.287. On May 5, 1980, defendant was sentenced to serve six months in jail, fined $250, placed on probation for five years, and ordered to pay $1,250 in costs.
Defendant appeals by right and raises three issues, none of which require reversal.
There is no merit to defendant's argument that the trial court erred in imposing costs in the amount of $1,250. Although case law holds that an assessment of costs in a criminal case must be reasonably related to the cost of prosecution, it is recognized that costs of probation may be a factor. People v Teasdale, 335 Mich 1; 55 NW2d 149 (1952). Specific language in MCL 771.3(3); MSA 28.1133(3) authorizes the trial court to consider all expenses, direct and indirect, which the public has been or may be put to in connection with the .apprehension, examination, trial, and probationary oversight of the probationer.
Contrary to defendant's assertion, the trial judge did explain his basis for assessing the amount in question on the record at the motion for resentenc-ing. As the trial court noted, the costs of probationary supervision for five years is alone sufficient justification for the costs imposed.
There is no merit to defendant's argument that the trial court lacked authority to impose a period of probation in excess of two years. Although the crime to which defendant pled guilty is labeled a two-year misdemeanor, the determination of whether it is a misdemeanor or a felony for pur poses of the limitations on length of probation in MCL 771.2; MSA 28.1132 is governed by MCL 761.1(g); MSA 28.843(g), People v Stiles, 99 Mich App 116, 121; 297 NW2d 631 (1980). Since the allowable maximum sentence exceeds one year, the crime in question is a felony and the five-year limit on probation applies.
Defendant's challenge to the constitutionality of the statute under which he was convicted was specifically rejected in People v Trupiano, 97 Mich App 416, 420; 296 NW2d 49 (1980), lv den 409 Mich 895 (1980), and is therefore without merit.
Affirmed.
Cynar, P.J., and D. F. Walsh, J., concurred.