Case Name: Smith v. State
Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Mississippi
Decision Date: 1914-03
Citations: 107 Miss. 486
Docket Number: 
Parties: Smith v. State.
Judges: 
Reporter: Mississippi Reports
Volume: 107
Pages: 486–509

Head Matter:
Smith v. State.
[65 South. 564.]
1. Criminal Offenses. State officers. Indictment, Code 1906, section 1144. Fraud. Acts constituting. Appeal. Harmless error. Instructions. • "
Under Code 1906, section-1144, providing that any officer or other person employed in any public office committing any fraud or embezzlement therein, should be punished as therein provided, an indictment charging that accused, a trustee of the state penitentiary, fraudulently caused to be bought and participated in buying an automobile from himself and a third person, and fraudulently procured and assisted in causing and procuring it to be paid for, and that the price therefor was well known to him to be exorbitant, unreasonable, and a fraud upon the state, whereby the state was cheated and defrauded out of the sum paid, was sufficient.
2. Fraud. Acts constituting.
Fraud involves a breach of duty, trust or confidence, it includes all acts, omissions, or concealments by which another is injured or an undue and unconscientious advantage is taken.
3. Criminal Law. Appeal. Harmless error. Instructions.
' Where a trustee of the state penitentiary was tried for fraud, consisting in buying and participating in buying an automobile from himself and a third party, and causing and procuring payment to be made by the state, knowing that it had not been purchased as provided by law, and that the price was exorbitant and unreasonable, instructions, that if accused, as trustee, voted for an order to pay the third party a specified sum of the state’s funds for the purchase of the automobile, and if such sum was paid in accordance therewith, and if defendant then knew that that sum was grossly in excess of the value of the machine, it would be the jury’s duty to find him guilty, and that, if under the con tract for the sale of the automobile to the state, it was to be delivered at the penitentiary farm in good condition, the sale was not completed until such delivery in good condition, and that if it was not so delivered in good condition, and the sum paid was a grossly exorbitant price for the automobile at the time it was paid for, and defendant knowing the price to be grossly exorbitant voted to pay such sum and such sum was paid by the state, it would be the jury’s duty to find him guilty;' while narrowing the issue presented by the indictment and proof' did not do so to the prejudice of accused.
Appeal from the circuit court of Hinds county.
Hon. W. A. Henry, Judge.
C. C. Smith was convicted of committing a fraud on the state, and appeals.
Appellant was indicted for committing,.a fraud upon “the- state, and was convicted and sentenced to the penitentiary and deprived of the office of penitentiary trus1 tee, to which he had been elected. The record, shows that appellant was the owner of a certain Buick automobile No.. 19 .which he purchased from one Withers for. the sum of five hundred dollars. At the time he. pur chased the automobile it was a little more than a year old, and had been owned by three different parties. The first' -owner of the machine was B. S. Withers, who owned a’ garage, and was a dealer in automobiles. The original-price of the machine was one thousand, two hundred and. ■fifty-seven dollars, according to the testimony of Withers.. Withers sold to Crook, and Crook to Brown, and Brown “back to Withers, who, in turn, sold it to appellant for the sum of five hundred dollars, with a cash payment of ■one hundred dollars and the balance on time. After keeping the automobile for about a year, Mr. Smith decided to sell it and buy a new automobile. According to the testimony of Withers, he approached him and told him that he would like to get a new automobile, and “that he wanted to sell his Buick to the state, and that, if Withers would help him sell it to the state, he might buy Ms new automobile from Withers; but Withers did not enter into the arrangement.
Appellant then got in communication with the Baker-McDowell Hardware Company, of Natchez, Mississippi, who were dealers in automobiles. This company sent one-of its traveling men, Mr. Liddell, to Insmore, the home-of the appellant, and, as a result of Mr. Liddell’s trip,, appellant became the owner of an E. M. F. car for the-sum of one thousand dollars, and the Baker-McDowell Hardware Company took appellant’s Buick in the trade-for nine hundred dollars, and at the same time sold it to-the state for the use of the penitentiary farm for the sum of nine hundred dollars, agreeing to wait for payment until the money was available in the- penitentiary fund. The -balance of the purchase price, one hundred dollars, was charged to appellant on the books of the Baker-McDowell Hardware Company, and afterwards credited back to him by reason of certain repairs, etc., which he-claims to have made on the E. M. F. machine.
While Mr. Liddell was at Insmore negotiating a deal with appellant, and, according to appellant’s testimony,, after Liddell had agreed to take the Buick at nine hundred dollars appellant suggested to Liddell that the' penitentiary farm needed a secondhand car, and that Col. Montgomery, another one of the penitentiary trustees, had been instructed to buy one, and that Col. Montgomery wanted to buy a Buick, and that, if he would take the-matter up with Col. Montgomery, he might be able to-sell this Buick to him. Thereupon Col. Montgumery was called over the telephone and talked to Liddell, who told him that he was at Insmore, and that Mr. Smith had told him that the state needed a secondhand automobile, and that he (Liddell) had a Buick which he could recommend, and which he would sell to the state for nine hundred dollars. Mr. Smith then went to the telephone and told Col. Montgomery that he knew the car and had driven it, and that it was well worth the money, and that he would recommend the purchase of it. Whereupon Col. Montgomery agreed over the phone to purchase the Buick, and it was agreed that Smith would drive the Buick through Edwards, Mississippi, the home of Col. Montgomery, and the latter would join him there, and they would drive to the state penitentiary farm at Tchula. ■Col. Montgomery never knew that the Buick automobile had ever been the property of Smith; but he had relied upon what both Liddell and Smith had said about the car being all right. Col. Montgomery testified that in bis opinion the car was worth the money. Mr. Alexander, the manager of the Baker-McDowell Hardware Company, "testified that Mr. Liddell called him over the telephone from Insmore and told him that he had made a deal with Smith to sell him an E. M. F. car for one thousand ■dollars, and allow Smith nine hundred dollars for his Buick, and that the state would take the Buick, provided the hardware company would wait for the money until the following February, when the funds would be available, as the current appropriation had been exhausted. Alexander agreed to the terms of the trade, and testified that the Buick was never delivered to the hardware company at all, but that.under the agreement Mr. Smith kept the Buick, and was to drive it to the state farm.
Alexander testified that E. M. F. car which he sold Smith cost one thousand and twenty-seven dollars f. o. b. Natchez, which was wholesale price, but he was selling all -of his automobiles, as he was going out of the automobile business, and was anxious to get rid of them as rapidly as possible.
A few days thereafter appellant drove the automobile •from Insmore to Edwards, where Col. Montgomery joined him, and the two started together in the automobile for the state penitentiary farm at Tchula. After traveling about sixty miles, the automobile broke down. Several ■efforts were made to repair it, without result. The automobile was placed under a shed on a plantation near the place where the brakedown occurred, but was after-wards rolled from under the shed and allowed to remain in the weather for several months. Subsequently it was-shipped by freight to the state farm, but was never used to any extent. Its value is estimated by various witnesses for the state at from one hundred and fifty to three hundred and fifty dollars. Defendant and his witnesses testified that it was worth from eight hundred to-one thousand dollars.
At the meeting of the penitentiary trustees in March,. 1913, the account of the Baker-McDowell Hardware Company for nine hundred dollars was presented and allowed; Messrs. Smith and Montgomery voting for the-allowance, and the other trustee, Taylor, voting in the-negative.
No resolution authorizing the purchase of this-automobile appears on the minutes; but, according to • defendant’s testimony, the resolution instructing Col. Montgomery to purchase a secondhand automobile' was verbal. No advertisement was ever made for competitive bids to be submitted, as is required by statute' when the state purchases supplies for the penitentiary. ■ ■ .
' The case was submitted to a jury on the instructions-hereinafter set out, and resulted in a conviction. - ■:
state’s INSTRUCTIONS GIVEN.
■' (1) The court instructs the jury for the state that you are the sole judges of the credibility of the witnesses-who have testified before you in this case, and, if you believe any witness or witnesses have willfully and corruptly sworn falsely to any material matter in this case, -then you may wholly disregard the testimony -of -such witness or witnesses in making up your verdict.
(2) The court instructs the jury for the state that* if you believe from the evidence in this case beyond all reasonable doubt that the defendant, C. C. Smith, in his capacity as trustee of the state penitentiary, voted for an order to pay B aker-McD owell Hardware Company the snm of nine hundred dollars ($900) of the state’s funds for the purchase of the automobile in question, and that said sum of money was paid in accordance with such order, and that, at the time of such purchase the defendant knew that nine hundred dollars ($900) was greatly in excess of the value of said machine, then it is the sworn duty of the jury to return the following verdict: “We, the jury, find the defendant guilty as charged in the indictment. ’ ’
(3) The court instructs the jury for the state that, if you believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt'that under the contract made for the sale of a Buick car to the state, that it was to be delivered by the defendant, C. C. Smith, at the penitentiary farm at Tchula in good condition, then the sale was not completed until such delivery at Tchula in good condition; and if you further believe from the evidence beyond all reasonable doubt that it'was not delivered at the penitentiary farm at Tchula in good condition, and that the sum of nine hundred dollars was a-grossly exorbitant price for the automobile at the timé it was paid for by the trustees of the state penitentiary,'and that the defendant, knowing the price grossly exorbitant,' voted to pay said sum of nine hundred dollars to the Baker-McDowell Hardware Company, and that said sum was paid by the state, then it is the sworn duty óf the'jury to find the deféndant guilty as charged. ' ' ' ' '■
INSTRUCTIONS GIVEN DEPENDANT.
(1) The court • instructs the jury for the defendant in this case, that the value of the car in’question must be determined as of the 8th day of October, 1912, the date on which the sale was made to the state of Mississippi, unless the jury believe from the evidence beyond all reasonable doubt that under the contract it was to be delivered by the defendant, C. C. Smith, at Tchula, Mississippi, in good condition.
(2) The court instructs the jury for the defendant that there are two necessary ingredients of a crime, to wit, a criminal act, and a criminal intent; and, in order for a man to he guilty of a crime, he must do an unlawful act, and there must be coupled with and accompanying the unlawful act a criminal intent to commit the crime charged. The criminal intent is just as necessary as the unlawful act, so that in this case the court charges you on behalf of the defendant that the burden of proof is on the state to prove -beyond all and every reasonable doubt that the defendant intended to defraud the state, before you can convict him, and if, after, considering all the tes-mony in this case, there is a reasonable doubt from the testimony, or for the want of testimony, that the defendant; Smith, intended to defraud the state,, then it is your sworn duty under .-your- paths to return into this .court the;, following verdict: - “We,.the-jury, .find the defendant not guilty.-” , ' ¡v .. : . -'
(i3). The court instructs the jury-for the defendant in this case that the. law presumes- every person who is charged with crime to be innocent of the, whole crime and every part-of it. It is incumbent, upon the state to prove by credible witnesses beyond all reasonable doubt that one charged of the-,crime,-is guilty. The presumption of innocence clothes and protects the defendant from all suspicion, malice, or prejudice, if any, and stands as a witness in his behalf throughout the course of the trial, and during your deliberations in the jury box; and before you can lawfully convict the defendant, the presumption of innocence must be overcome by credible testimony.
(4) The court instructs the jury for the defendant that the law presumes the defendant innocent of the whole crime charged and every part of it. The burden is on the state to prove the defendant guilty beyond every reasonable doubt arising from -the evidence or the want of evidence, and this burden of proof on the state never shifts to the. defendant, but continues with the state throughout the entire course of the trial. The defendant is never, under the law, required to prove and excuse or to prove his innocence of the crime charged or any part of it.
(5) The court 'instructs the jury for the defendant in this case that, if there is a probability of the defendant’s innocence, then there is a reasonable doubt of his guilt, and under circumstances the law requires an acquittal at your hands.
(6) The court instructs the jury for the defendant in this case that, if there is a probability of the innocence of the defendant, then a reasonable doubt of his guilt exists, and the jury must acquit him.
(7) The court instructs the jury for the defendant that, before you are warranted, under the law, in convicting the defendant in this case, it - is incumbent upon the state of Mississippi to prove each' and every material allegation in the indictment beyond every reasonable doubt. (8) The court instructs the jury for the defendant that suspicion, however strong, will not warrant the jury in finding the defendant guilty, but.that, before you can convict the defendant, under the' law, you must believe from the evidence beyond every reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty as charged in the indictment. .
(9) The court instructs the jury that, if you believe from the evidence that the delivery of the automobile in question was to be to C. C. Smith, at Insmore, Mississippi, instead of Tchula, Mississippi, and that the said automobile was delivered to the said C. C. Smith, at Ins-more, Mississippi, then under the law, the contract of sale and delivery was full and complete.
(10) The court instructs the jury for the defendant, that, unless they believe from the evidence in this case beyond all reasonable doubt that the automobile in question was not reasonably worth nine hundred dollars at the time it was sold to the state of Mississippi in October, 1912, and that the defendant knew it was not worth that sum at that time, they will find the defendant not guilty, notwithstanding the fact that they may further believe from the evidence that since the sale to the state the car has deteriorated in value, and is not worth nine hundred dollars, unless the jury believe from the evidence beyond all reasonable doubt that under the contract it was to be delivered by defendant, C. C. Smith, at Tchula in good condition.
(11) The court instructs the jury for the defendant in this case that, before you can find the defendant guilty of the offense charged in this indictment, you must believe from the evidence beyond all reasonable doubt that the defendant, C. C. Smith, willfully, fraudulently, and fe-loniously purposed and intended to cheat and defraud the state of Mississippi out of the sum of nine hundred dollars, or some part thereof, and that in pursuance of such purpose and intention he knowingly, willfully, fraudulently, and feloniously sold or participated in the purchase of the automobile in question by the state of Mississippi at exorbitant and unreasonable price, and for a price the said C. C. Smith knew at the time of the sale and purchase to be exorbitant and unreasonable.
(12) The court instructs the jury for the defendant in this case that the gist of the offense charged is fraud, and that the defendant is not charged with any offense of buying or participating in the buying for the state of Mississippi of an automobile from the lowest bidder, or for buying a car -which was not a necessary supply for the state penitentiary.
Watkins <& Watkins and Butler, Easterling Potter, for appellant.
Powell & Thompson and Geo. H. Ethridge, assistant attorney-general, for the state.

Opinion:
Need, J.,
delivered the opinion of the court.
Appellant, a trustee of the Mississippi penitentiary, was indicted, tried, and convicted on the charge of committing a fraud on the state.
The fraud charged against appellant was alleged to have consisted in his buying and participating in the buying of an automobile from himself and B aker-McDo well Hardware Company of Natchez, and in his assisting in causing and procuring the payment for the automobile by the state then knowing that it had not been purchased as provided by law, and that the price thereof was exorbitant and unreasonable.
Appellant and two other trustees had general supervision of the state penitentiary and management of the "business and affairs of the penitentiary farms. To appellant and his associates was committed the duty of purchasing necessary supplies for the use of the penitentiary.
Appellant owned a Buick automobile. This car had been the property of R. S. Withers, an automobile dealer In Jackson, Mississippi. Withers purchased it July 15, 1910. He sold it to Dr. Crook, of Jackson, who in turn •sold it to W. L. Brown, of the same city. In September* 1911, Mr. Withers again acquired ownership of the car. On September 28, 1911, he sold it to appellant for five hundred dollars, of which amount, one hundred dollars was paid in cash; the balance was on credit. Appellant took the car to his plantation at Insmore, Mississippi. He used it till October 8, 1912, when, through a trade or deal with the Baker-McDowell Hardware Company,- it was sold to the state for the price of nine hundred dollars. Shortly afterwards appellant, with another trustee* endeavored to deliver the automobile to the state farm at Parchman. It seems to have been the purpose at first, when the sale was negotiated, to deliver it to the farm at Tchula. On the way the car broke down and was .abandoned. It remained where it had broken down for several months. Finally after being repaired, it was shipped by railroad to Parchman. It was used scarcely at all after the breakdown, and thereafter was of small value. Pursuant to allowance of the account by the tr-us- tees, a warrant for nine hundred dollars was issued to the Baker-McDowell Hardware Company in payment for' the automobile. The allowance was made March 4, 1913, after the automobile had been left on the way, disabled.
We will not enter into any discussion or review of the evidence in the case. It is voluminous. Many witnesses were examined. There is much testimony, pro and conr relative to the value of the automobile, the sale to the-state, the place of delivery, the reputation of appellant,, and so on. A careful reading of the record convinces us that there was ample evidence to support the verdict of the jury. In truth it is manifest to us that the jury returned the only right verdict.
We do not find in the record any reversible error. It is claimed that the demurrer to the count in the indictment on which appellant was tried should have been sustained. From our view of the case, the indictment is sufficient. It is difficult to define fraud. In its commission there-.are devices "almost infinite in variety." As it involves breach of duty, trust, or confidence, it includes all acj;,s,. omissions, or concealments by which another is injured, or an undue and unconscientious advantage is-taken. The statement in the indictment of the acts constituting the offense, fraud, is made sufficiently direct,, clear, and concise, and furnished appellant an intelligible' description of the charge upon which he was tried.
It is contended that error was made in giving instructions. Three instructions were given for the state. Against two of these there is complaint. It appears to us that in both instructions, the second and third, the issue presented by the indictment and proof is somewhat narrowed, but not to the prejudice of appellant. These instructions directed the law to evidence which we find in the record. In this trial on the charge of fraud alleged to have been committed by appellant, a state officer, against the state, each of the two instructions presented facts, which, if the jury believed, were sufficient to support a conviction.
Twelve instructions were given for appellant. Taken and construed together, they sufficiently announce the law pertinent to appellant's defense.
Construing all of the instructions used in the case together, and considering them as a whole, we believe the law applicable was fairly given.
Appellant had a fair trial of his case. ¥e will not disturb the jury's verdict.
Affirmed.