Case Name: AETNA INSURANCE COMPANY v. Robert NAQUIN, Individually, and Robert Naquin, d/b/a Bob's Roofing & Sheet Metal; Mrs. Philip FICARRA and Dennis Ficarra v. Robert NAQUIN, Individually and Robert Naquin, d/b/a Bob's Roofing & Sheet Metal
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1985-11-12
Citations: 478 So. 2d 1352
Docket Number: Nos. 85-CA-357, 85-CA-358
Parties: AETNA INSURANCE COMPANY v. Robert NAQUIN, Individually, and Robert Naquin, d/b/a Bob’s Roofing & Sheet Metal. Mrs. Philip FICARRA and Dennis Ficarra v. Robert NAQUIN, Individually and Robert Naquin, d/b/a Bob’s Roofing & Sheet Metal.
Judges: Before KLIEBERT, CURRAULT and DUFRESNE, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 478
Pages: 1352–1357

Head Matter:
AETNA INSURANCE COMPANY v. Robert NAQUIN, Individually, and Robert Naquin, d/b/a Bob’s Roofing & Sheet Metal. Mrs. Philip FICARRA and Dennis Ficarra v. Robert NAQUIN, Individually and Robert Naquin, d/b/a Bob’s Roofing & Sheet Metal.
Nos. 85-CA-357, 85-CA-358.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fifth Circuit.
Nov. 12, 1985.
Writ Granted Jan. 24, 1986.
W.D. Rankin, New Orleans, for plaintiff-appellee.
Richard A. Tonry, Chalmette, for defendant-appellant.
Before KLIEBERT, CURRAULT and DUFRESNE, JJ.

Opinion:
DUFRESNE, Judge.
This is a consolidated lawsuit which arose from the alleged negligent performance of a construction contract. The first lawsuit was filed by Aetna Insurance Company (Aetna), claiming legal subrogation (reimbursement) for the claims paid in settlement for damages on behalf of the Ficar-ras to their tenants under a homeowner's insurance policy covering a four-plex apartment building located in Metairie, Louisiana.
This action alleged that the damages sustained by the Ficarras and paid by Aetna were caused by the negligent performance and breach of contract to install a new roof on the four-plex apartment building insured by Aetna. Subsequently, a second lawsuit was filed by the Ficarras against the defendant, Naquin, for recovery of the cost of repairing damages from the water to the building and also for the cost of a replacement roof.
Defendant (Naquin) filed an Exception of Improper Venue in each of these lawsuits, alleging that "defendant herein resides in the Parish of St. Tammany and conducts his place of business in the Parish of St. Bernard". Naquin filed a separate recon-ventional demand in the Ficarra lawsuit for the price of the roofing work which was never paid. Further, Naquin filed a separate Third-Party Demand in the Aetna lawsuit, making the Ficarras' third-party defendants and seeking payment of the price of the roofing work.
In both the Reconventional Demand and the Third-Party Demand, Naquin claimed that any damages sustained by the "four-plex apartment dwelling" were done by an act of God in heavy rains and winds and said alleged damages were not due to any faulty workmanship on the part of Naquin.
After trial on the merits, the district court rendered judgment awarding the Fi-carras $4,820.00 and Aetna $7,224.73. He concluded that Naquin had breached his contractual duty to perform as a prudent contractor.
Subsequently, Naquin filed a motion for a new trial, urging that weather reports for the dates in question refuted the testimony of the plaintiff's witnesses that it had not rained during the period between the commencement of work on the roof and the date the roofing materials were blown off by heavy winds, thus interrupting the work in progress. Naquin also pleaded the bar of prescription in tort because the lawsuit by plaintiff, having been filed more than one year after the alleged misconduct, and further pleaded that Aetna had not established its entitlement to subrogation for the monies allegedly paid the Ficarras' tenants for water damage since the policy of insurance establishing its obligation and coverage of the incident in suit, was not offered or admitted in evidence. Finally, he reurged his exception to the venue because defendant was domiciled in St. Tammany Parish and his place of business was located in St. Bernard Parish. This motion for a new trial was denied by the trial court.
Naquin has appealed to this court for our review and has assigned the following specifications of error:
1. The trial court erred when it overruled defendant's exception to the venue of an action ex contractu when the defendant was domiciled in the Parish of St. Tammany and his place of business was maintained in the Parish of St. Bernard.
2. The trial court erred when it held that Aetna Insurance Company was legally subrogated to the monies paid to its insured's tenants for water damage to personal property when the evidence was insufficient to establish a conventional subro-gation and the insurer was bound to the insured to pay the damages of the tenants irrespective of any fault of a third-party.
Naquin argued that the action before us was filed in the Parish of Jefferson where venue existed pursuant to LSA-C. C.P. Article 74 relative to actions in tort. He asserts that the Ficarras elected to pursue their remedy in tort and, by their choice, to keep the action in the parish where the Ficarras resided, and expressly elected to limit their actions to one ex delic-to. At the outset, we recognize the rule that when a party has been damaged by the conduct of another arising out of a contractual relationship, he may have two remedies, one in tort and another in contract and he may elect to recover in either. Federal Insurance Company v. Insurance Company of North America, 262 La. 509, 263 So.2d 871 (1972). Therefore, the negligent performance of a contract can give rise to either a contract or tort action, and venue is appropriate in either the parish where the contract action or the tort action could be brought.
The record indicates that the Ficarras entered into an oral contract with Naquin to replace the roof on the four-plex apartment building in Metairie, Louisiana. Thereafter, the defendant, Naquin, d/b/a Bob's Roofing and Sheet Metal started replacement of the roof on the four-plex apartment building in accordance with the oral contract, stripping the old roof off and beginning the repair and replacement of a new roof. The negotiations for the repairs were made by the parties through conversations they had in person and over the phone. The conversations between these parties indicated that an offer was made and accepted in Jefferson Parish.
The law in Louisiana is clear that absent contrary intent by the parties, a contract is considered executed at the place where the offer is accepted or where the last act necessary to a meeting of the minds or to completing the contract is performed. We have concluded after a careful review of the record that the roofing contract was perfected in the Parish of Jefferson. The plaintiffs contend that while their suit arises out of a contract between the Ficarras and Naquin, their right of action for damages is not necessarily contractual, but within the exception provided by the Code of Civil Procedure. There is ample authority to support their argument that violation of a contract can cause damages ex delicto as well as contractual, and under certain conditions, the action may be in tort. Upon this premise, they contend that their actions for recovery of damages in this proceeding are based on the following: (1) quasi offenses resulting from the negligent and unskillful manner in which the defendant performed the building contract and (2) breach of oral contract. The record further reflects that the facts pleaded in the plaintiffs' petition have set forth a cause of action ex-delicto and one ex contractu, although the tort cause of action was prescribed, the breach of contract action was not. This lawsuit was brought asserting two theories of recovery, that is, tort and contract, and as long as the facts supporting both claims are interrelated, venue is proper as to both claims if it is proper as to one. Hebert v. Myers, 449 So.2d 185 (La.App.3rd Cir.1984); Metcalf v. Pool and Home Care, 467 So.2d 610 (La.App.3rd Cir.1985).
Under the general rule provided by Louisiana C.C.P. Article 42, the proper venue for a contract action is in the Parish of the defendant's domicile. However, LSA-C. C.P. Article 74 contains an exception to that rule, and the exception reads in pertinent part:
"An action for the recovery of damages for an offense or quasi offense may be brought in the parish where the wrongful conduct occurred, or in the parish where the damages were sustained."
The courts of this state have declared that when a plaintiff institutes an action on more than one theory of recovery arising out of one factual circumstance, and venue is proper as to any theory, the court has venue to decide all claims. Metcalf, supra.
The trial court awarded Aetna $7,224.74 as the subrogee of the Ficarras after the tenant's damages were paid. The defendant, Naquin, argues that this decision was erroneous, claiming that, as the insurer for the lessor, Aetna was not entitled to the effect of legal subrogation for monies paid on behalf of their insured. Furthermore, it is asserted that if such rights were acquired, these rights were only in tort and not in contract. The defendant argues that Aetna was not legally subrogated to the amount of damages paid to the tenants because the plaintiffs, Ficar-ras, were strictly liable for any negligence of breach of contract. However, in keeping with its policy of insurance, Aetna paid to and on behalf of its insureds, Mrs. Philip Ficarra and Denis Ficarra, the following amounts of damages: Apartment A, (Smith) $442.00; Apartment B, (Graves) $4,500.00; Apartment C, (Hill) $2,282.73; totalling $7,224.73. The record is void of any subrogation receipts and contains only a general release receipt which has no mention of any subrogation clause.
Subrogation is either legal or conventional, LSA-C.C. Articles 2159-2162. Article 2161 reads in pertinent part as follows:
Art. 2161 Subrogation takes place of right:
3. For the benefit of him who, being bound with others, or for others, for the payment of the debt, had an interest in discharging it.
A review of the Louisiana jurisprudence shows an inconsistency of results. One group of cases has held that simply legal subrogation occurs only when two parties are solidarily bound. See Pringle-Associated Mortgage Corporation v. Eanes, 254 La. 705, 226 So.2d 502 (1969).
Another case has denied legal subrogation when an insurer pays its insured medical benefits under the policy. See Courtney v. Harris, 355 So.2d 1039 (La.App. 4th Cir.1978). There it was reasoned the medical payments were owed to the insured by the insurer, regardless of the liability of a third party and therefore the insurer was not bound "with or for" any other person.
Yet another group of eases has allowed the insurer legal subrogation. In Hartford Accident & Indemnity Company v. Byles, 280 So.2d 624 (La.App.3rd Cir.1973) the insurer paid UM benefits to the insured and then sought to recover from the alleged tortfeasor. The court concluded legal sub-rogation had occurred and explained its reasoning as follows:
"We think the insurer who is bound under its contract of insurance for payment of the loss or damages caused by a third-party, and who is forced to pay under that contract as the result of the negligence of that party, is legally subrogated under LSA-CC Article 2161 to the rights of its insured against the third-party tort-feasor to the extent of the payment which it was required to make."
Therefore, the court concluded, the insurer was in fact bound "with or for" another and legal subrogation was appropriate.
We further agree with the First Circuit in Sentry Indemnity Company v. Rester, 430 So.2d 1159 (La.App. 1st Cir.1983) in that there are compelling reasons to allow the insurer legal subrogation. Subrogation should be implemented in order to remove the financial burden from the insurer and place the responsibility for the loss on the wrong-doer.
In the present case, the wrong-doer (Na-quin) was held responsible for the failure to perform the roofing work properly and breached his duty of workmanlike performance. We agree with the trial judge, that the insurer is entitled to legal subrogation against Naquin. To hold otherwise as ex pressed in Rester would allow the wrongdoer (Naquin) to go scot-free.
We find that the lessors' (Ficarras) liability is separate from the liability of the defendant (Naquin), stemming from his breach of his contractual duty, and does not deprive the insurer's right to seek indemnification. It is that right to indemnification which was acquired by Aetna upon the payment of the lessee's damages. We find that the decision of the trial court which was based upon Naquin's breach of contractual duty allowed the Ficarras to subrogate their contractual rights against Robert Naquin.
The trial court's judgment awarded reimbursement to Aetna for the amount of damages paid to the three lessees of Ficar-ra and further awarded the Ficarras' $4,820.00 which represented sums they paid for carpet cleaning, interior repainting and additional roof repairs. Although the appellant has not urged any error as to the correctness of these claims, we hold that the trial judge's decision in this regard is correct and most equitable.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
KLIEBERT, J., dissents with written reasons.