Case Name: Adrienne JONES v. HYATT CORPORATION OF DELAWARE, XYZ Insurance Company, et al.
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1996-07-26
Citations: 681 So. 2d 381
Docket Number: No. 94-CA-2194
Parties: Adrienne JONES v. HYATT CORPORATION OF DELAWARE, XYZ Insurance Company, et al.
Judges: Before BARRY, BYRNES and LANDRIEU, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 681
Pages: 381–396

Head Matter:
Adrienne JONES v. HYATT CORPORATION OF DELAWARE, XYZ Insurance Company, et al.
No. 94-CA-2194.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fourth Circuit.
July 26, 1996.
Opinion Granting Rehearing, Sept. 26,1996.
Sonje W. Wilkerson, Iris A. Tate, Wilkerson, Tate & Williams and Russ M. Herman, Stephen J. Herman, Herman, Herman, Katz & Cotlar, L.L.P., New Orleans, for Plaintiff/Appellee.
Craig R. Nelson, Christina P. Fay, Ward, Nelson & Pelleteri and Martin A. Stern, Jeffrey E. Richardson, Adams and Reese, New Orleans, for Appellant.
E. Fredrick Preis, Jr., James M. Garner, Martha M. Young, McGlinchey Stafford Lang, New Orleans, for Amicus Curiae.
G. Bruce Parkerson, J. Marie Rudd, Phelps Dunbar, L.L.P., Martin A. Stern, Donald C. Massey, Jeffrey E. Richardson, Adams and Reese, New Orleans, and Albert C. Miranda, Elizabeth M. Truett, LeBlanc, Miranda & deLaup, Metairie, for Amici Curiae.
Before BARRY, BYRNES and LANDRIEU, JJ.

Opinion:
liBYRNES, Judge.
Adrienne Jones brought this personal injury action against Hyatt Corporation of Delaware (Hyatt) for damages sustained in a slip and fall accident on March 18, 1989, while walking through a corridor at the Hyatt Regency Hotel in New Orleans. The case was removed to federal court, but was later remanded to state court through proceedings that are not at issue on this appeal.
A jury found Hyatt liable to plaintiff for $40,000.00 in past medical expenses; $30,-000.00 future medical expenses; $45,000.00 past lost wages and benefits; $20,000.00 loss of personal services; $400,000.00 future lost wages, including earning capacity and all benefits; and $400,000.00 general damages for a total award of $935,000.00. We amend and affirm as amended.
The primary complaint of appellant, Hyatt, is that it was error for the trial court to instruct the jury that Hyatt as an innkeeper "owes his guests a high degree of care and protection." Hyatt objected to this charge and further objected to the failure to charge the jury that Hyatt should only have been required to exercise ordinary reasonable care. Hyatt contends that because thej^trial court instructed the jury to require an erroneously high standard of care it is now entitled to a de novo review of the record on appeal.
Hyatt argues that the cases imposing a "high" standard of care on the innkeeper instead of ordinary reasonable care are limited to damages arising out of third party criminal activity. Kraaz v. LaQuinta Motor Inns, Inc., 410 So.2d 1048 (La.1982); Banks v. Hyatt Corp., 722 F.2d 214 (5 Cir.1984). In Kraaz the court stated at 1055:
The innkeeper's position vis-a-vis his guests is similar to that of a common carrier toward its passengers. Wilson v. Iberville Amusement Co., 181 So. 817 (Orl.App.Ct.1938). Thus, a guest is entitled to a high degree of care and protection. See Galland v. New Orleans Public Service, Inc., 377 So.2d 84 (La.1979), and Green v. TACA 304 So.2d 357 (La.1974). [Emphasis added.]
Although the Kraaz ease involved damages caused by third party criminal activity, the rationale behind the standard of care adopted by the Kraaz court as quoted above was not based on the criminal nature of the activity, but upon an analogy to the standard required of common carriers having nothing to do with criminal activity. See also: Franklin v. Paul Dupuis & Associates, 543 So.2d 970 (La.App. 3 Cir.1989), writ den. 545 So.2d 1042 (La.1989). The Galland case cited above by the Kraaz court involved a lady who was injured as she was alighting from a bus. No criminal activity was involved. The Galland court imposed the following standard and burden on the common carrier:
It is well established that common carriers are charged with the highest degree of care to their passengers and that the slightest negligence causing injury to a passenger will result in liability. Wise v. Prescott, 244 La. 157,151 So.2d 356 (1963); Gross v. Teche Lines, 207 La. 354, 21 So.2d 378 (1945). Further, where there is proof of injury to a fare-paying passenger, the burden shifts to the defendant carrier to show that he is free from negligence. Wise v. \%Prescott, supra; Carter v. New Orleans Public Service, Inc., supra. [305 So.2d 481, 483 (La.1975) ]. It is here that the court of appeal erred when it stated that the plaintiff must not merely prove that the injury was caused by an incident, occurrence or condition which is attributable to the carrier before the presumption is created in favor of the plaintiff. Properly stated, the rule is that the mere showing of injury to a fee-paying passenger on a public conveyance and his failure to reach his destination safely establishes a prima facie case of negligence and imposes the burden on the carrier of convincing by overcoming the prima facie ease. Wise v. Prescott, supra.
Galland, 377 So.2d at 85.
Likewise, the Green case also cited by the Supreme Court in Kraaz involved a common carrier passenger injured in a fall. No criminal activity was involved. The Supreme Court in Green, 304 So.2d at 359, described the applicable standard:
The duty owed by a common carrier in Louisiana to its passengers is stringent, whether it be termed "the highest standard of care," [footnote omitted] "highest degree of vigilance, care and precaution for the safety of those it undertakes to transport," or "the strictest diligence."
The Banks case cited by Hyatt involves innkeeper liability for third party criminal acts, but the Banks court did not limit the high standard of care to third party criminal acts. In Banks, 722 F.2d at 221, the court stated that: "Under Kraaz, innkeepers owe a high degree of care, which embraces a duty to take reasonable precautions against criminal assaults on guests." The Banks court was making the point that the duty to take precautions against third party criminal acts was only one aspect of the high degree of care owed by the innkeeper in connection with tort liability generally.
The Banks court also noted that the theory of innkeeper tort liability is an expanding field. Cases expanding the scope of the duties imposed on innkeepers cause previous cases calling for a more limited scope to become | outdated quickly. In this regard we note that the innkeeper liability cases cited by Hyatt ante-date the Supreme Court's pronouncement in Kraaz and are no longer controlling.
In Brawn v. Harlan, 468 So.2d 723 (La.App. 5 Cir.1985), dismissal granted, writ not considered 472 So.2d 26 (La.1985),the court found error in jury instructions that imposed only a standard of ordinary care on an innkeeper. No criminal activity was involved. The Brawn court quoted from Banks explaining that the higher standard "is no doubt rooted in the belief that business patrons of innkeepers, like those of common carriers and unlike those of other businesses, have entrusted their personal security to the innkeeper." Brown at 727.
Sutter v. Audubon Park Com'n, 533 So.2d 1226 (La.App. 4 Cir.1988), writ den. 538 So.2d 597 (La.1989) fails to support the proposition for which it is cited by the defendants. In Sutter the court considered for the first time the liability of a public park for third party criminal activity. The Sutter case has no bearing on the instant case because the Sutter court did not consider either in dicta or by implication an innkeeper's standard of care for general tort liability.
On the other hand, Lorio v. The San Antonio Inn, 454 So.2d 864 (La.App. 5 Cir.1984), applied the Kraaz "high degree of care" where no third party criminal activity was involved. In doing so it was not inconsistent for the Lorio court to cite Brasseaux v. Stand-By Corp., 402 So.2d 140 (La.App. 1 Cir.1981), writ den. 409 So.2d 617 (La.1981), for the proposition that inspections of the premises and mechanical equipment are duties owed by the innkeeper; Rand to cite Kauffmann v. Royal Orleans, Inc., 216 So.2d 394 (La.App. 4 Cir.1968), for the proposition that the innkeeper will be held to have constructive knowledge of dangerous conditions that existed long enough that they should have been discovered, even though both of these cases ante-dated Kraaz.
In Gregor v. Constitution State Ins. Co., 534 So.2d 1340, 1343 (La.App. 4 Cir.1988), writ den. 536 So.2d 1238 (La.1989), this court considered the standard of care owed to a claimant who fell from defendant's roof: "An innkeeper owes his guest a high degree of care and protection." This means a "greater than ordinary standard of care." Id.
Hyatt cites cases involving the duty of merchants, but merchants are governed by a specific statute, LSA-R.S. 9:2800.6, which does not apply to innkeepers. See Neyrey v. Touro Infirmary, 94-0078 (La.App. 4 Cir. 6/30/94), 639 So.2d 1214. Additionally we note that LSA-R.S. 9:2800.6 applies only to causes of action arising on or after September 1, 1990, the effective date of the act.
In Johnson v. Beavers, 496 So.2d 1251, 1257 (La.App. 5 Cir.1986), the court stated that "the hotel owed a duty to its invitees to use reasonable care" which Hyatt notes is a lesser standard than a "high degree of care." However, there is no indication that the Johnson court chose "reasonable care" over "high degree of care." As the court found the innkeeper liable under the lesser standard of care there was no need for the court to decide whether the innkeeper would have been liable under the more demanding "high degree of care" standard and the question never came up.
| eBased on the foregoing, we find no error in the jury instruction requiring "a high degree of care and protection."
There is no presumption of fault simply because a person falls. Kinchen v. J.C. Penney Co., Inc., 426 So.2d 681 (La.App. 1 Cir.1982). Defendants contend that "because plaintiff did not put on any evidence to prove a defect in the lighting or the floor surface, the sole explanation for the jury verdict must be their belief in the presence of a 'quarter size' water spot." Assuming for purposes of argument that this contention is correct, defendants then argue that such a belief must be manifestly erroneous because the "only witness who testified regarding the alleged water spot was plaintiffs sister-in-law, An-ear, who said she saw the spot, but before she could warn plaintiff, she had gone through it and fallen down." Defendants assert that Ancar's testimony was so unreliable that it was error for the jury to credit it. Ancar's testimony is not so contradicted by documents or objective evidence, and her story in not so internally inconsistent or implausible on its face, that a reasonable fact finder would not credit the witness's story. Rosell v. ESCO, 549 So.2d 840 (La.1989). Defendants imply strongly that Ancar's testimony was not impartial, and for that reason should not be credited. Although this court might have viewed the evidence differently had it been the trier of fact, we cannot say that the jury's finding was unreasonable in light of the record reviewed in its entirety. There is no indication in the record that the jury failed to consider the relationship between plaintiff and Anear in making its credibility determination. It is a certainty that the jury had the opportunity, which this Court does not, to observe the variations in Ancar's demeanor and tone of voice which it could 17then weigh against her relationship to the plaintiff in making its credibility determination. We cannot say that a jury decision to credit Ancar's testimony was manifestly erroneous.
As the plaintiff could not state with certainty what she slipped on, defendants cite Foster v. Walgreen's Drug Stores, Inc., 468 So.2d 656 (La.App. 4 Cir.1985) and Hanks v. Petroleum, Club of Lafayette, 553 So.2d 1076 (La.App. 3 Cir.1989) in support of their contention that plaintiffs testimony was insufficient to prove causation. Those cases are inapposite because they were based solely on the plaintiffs inconclusive testimony. In the instant case there is a witness, Anear, who testified to the presence of a foreign substance on the floor. Keith Caruso, the assistant manager who came to investigate the fall immediately after it occurred, testified that the plaintiff told him that she had slipped on something.
Defendants assert that "plaintiff failed to prove inadequate maintenance." Under the facts of this case, that is not plaintiffs burden. Once plaintiff has demonstrated the existence of a foreign substance creating a hazard, the burden shifts to the defendant to show adequate maintenance. It is not sufficient that the defendants show that they had a maintenance program. They must show that they followed that program. Duckett v. KMart Corp., 94-0579 (La. 10/17/94), 645 So.2d 621; Neyrey v. Touro Infirmary, 94-0078 (La.App. 4 Cir. 6/30/94), 639 So.2d 1214. Whether the maintenance was adequate is a matter for the jury to decide. The jury was evidently not satisfied with the Hyatt's maintenance procedures under the circumstances. The jury could have concluded that the Hyatt had a clean-up program, but that it was either Inadequate in the location where plaintiff fell, or it was not properly followed. The record would permit either conclusion. The jury could have reasonably concluded that hotel employees responsible for policing such hazards were not sufficiently diligent in their precautions against small hazards that guests might not be expected to notice. A large puddle would probably have been more visible thereby making it perhaps more difficult for the jury to have found the plaintiff free from fault. Reviewing the record as a whole we cannot say that the jury's finding was manifestly erroneous.
Likewise we find no manifest error in the jury decision to assign no contributory negligence to the plaintiff. Cases have held that a pedestrian on a sidewalk or customer in a store is not held to the same standard of vigilance as would be necessary in traversing a jungle. Johnson v. New Orleans Dept. of Streets, 94-1542 (La.App. 4 Cir. 2/23/95), 650 So.2d 1216. Hotel guests have even less reason to expect a need for vigilance when traversing hotel corridors than do pedestrians on sidewalks or customers in stores. Hotel owners know that their patrons come for social discourse and social intercourse and should not have to anticipate the same kind of obstacles one might expect to encounter on a sidewalk which are known to be frequently uneven, cracked or littered, or a store where spills are more common and merchandise is known to fall into the aisles. There is a rational basis for holding the innkeeper to a higher standard than the merchant.
Hyatt argues that the failure of the jury to consider the effects of two subsequent auto accidents and a subsequent fall at home when determining causation and apportionment of fault was error, citing Davis v. Wal-Mart, Inc., j9 594 So.2d 557 (La.App. 3 Cir.1992), writ den. 600 So.2d 608 (La.1992) is inapposite. In Davis at 564 and 565 the court found that:
Insofar as plaintiff's physical complaints are concerned, we find her lacking in credibility. She denied any previous neck problem and denied a fall subsequent to her fall at Wal-Mart in June 1986. Evidence admitted at trial proved otherwise on both issues.
Further, the medical records from plaintiffs former and present physicians and from the various hospitals where she obtained treatment speak for themselves. They show no marked increase in doctor's visits or hospitalizations between June 23, 1986, the fate of her alleged fall, and September 4,1986, the date of her subsequent serious fall in the kitchen of her home.
In sum, plaintiff neither increased her visits to her physician, nor changed her medication profile, nor proved a recognizable link between her June 1986 fall and her neck surgery in September 1987, especially considering her intervening fall in September 1986. [Emphasis added.]
The plaintiff in Davis had six back surgeries prior to the time she allegedly sustained the injuries complained of in the Davis suit and was still being treated for those preexisting back problems at the time she filed suit. Unlike the plaintiff in the Davis case, Adrienne Jones' medical treatment increased markedly after her fall at the Hyatt. Adrienne Jones did not have a prior medical history to which her problems could be attributed. Her testimony was not self-contradictory and inconsistent. She did not deny that she had been involved in subsequent automobile accidents. Dr. Watermeier testified that it was his opinion that her medical problems arose as result of the fall at Hyatt and not as the result of some subsequent fall or auto accident. Dr. Watermeier's opinion is supported circumstantially by the fact that the liopattern of plaintiffs visits for medical treatment did not change in any material way after the subsequent automobile accidents. The Davis opinion makes no mention of any favorable medical testimony such as Dr. Watermeier gave on behalf of Adrienne Jones.
Plaintiff cites Nathan v. Home Depot, 522 So.2d 712 (La.App. 5 Cir.1988), writ den. 530 So.2d 84 (La.1988) because in that case the jury rejected Dr. Watermeier's testimony in favor of that of other experts. However, the court did not say that the jury was right, only that it was not clearly wrong:
. Where the testimony of expert witnesses differs, it is largely a matter of fact for the jury to determine the most credible evidence, and a finding of fact in this regard will not be overturned unless manifest error appears in the record. Nathan at 715.
The court in Nathan implies strongly that had the jury been swayed by Dr. Watermeier's testimony to reach the opposite result, that that result would also have withstood a manifest error standard of review. Nathan is also distinguishable because it involved a prior accident and a pre-existing condition. In the instant ease the defendant is arguing about the effect of subsequent accidents.
Likewise, Livaccari v. United Jewish Appeal, Inc., 126 So.2d 67 (La.App. 4 Cir.1961), fails to support Hyatt's argument. In Livac-cari, 126 So.2d at 70 the court noted that "none of the three doctors who saw the plaintiff after the second accident was able to say whether these injuries to the right knee and back were caused by the first or by the second accident.... The other doctor, who saw the plaintiff after the first accident and did not see him after the second, did not feel that his injuries were very serious and had discharged him Inprior to the second accident." (Emphasis added.) Dr. Watermeier's testimony in support of plaintiff distinguishes the instant case from Livaccari.
Nor does Sanders v. Collins, 551 So.2d 644 (La.App. 1 Cir.1989), writ den. 556 So.2d 1261 (La.1990), persuade us to favor Hyatt's position on damages because the Sanders quantum analysis was based on a specific jury finding that the plaintiff was injured in the subsequent accident. No such finding was made in the instant case. Although the Sanders jury found that the plaintiff was injured in the subsequent accident it failed to determine the amount of damages plaintiff sustained as a result of being injured in the second accident. The appellate court was compelled to do a de novo review to determine the amount of those damages which required an apportionment between the two accidents. There are no similar jury failings in the instant case which would compel an apportionment of damages among different accidents.
Hyatt complains that the jury award of $400,000 for general damages was excessive. Our role in reviewing general damages is not to decide what award would be appropriate, but rather to review the exercise of discretion by the trier of fact. Youn v. Maritime Overseas Corp., 623 So.2d 1257 (La.1993) cert. den., Maritime Overseas Corp. v. Youn, 510 U.S. 1114, 114 S.Ct. 1059, 127 L.Ed.2d 379 (1994). Only after a determination of an abuse of discretion is a resort to prior awards appropriate, and then only for the purpose of determining the highest or lowest point which is reasonably within that discretion. Id. The discretion vested in the trier of fact is great and even vast. Id. It is only when the award is, in either direction, beyond that which a reasonable trier of fact could assess for | igthe effects of the particular injury to the particular plaintiff under the particular circumstances that the appellate court should increase or reduce the award. Id. at 1261.
As a result of the injuries plaintiff sustained when she fell at the Hyatt, she has endured years of pain and can reasonably be expected to continue to do so. She suffered for several years until she felt she could endure the pains, which she described as being like electric shocks, no longer and reluctantly consented to the operation she desperately hoped could be avoided. She underwent an anterior cervical fusion operation on her neck. The pain and discomfort that she had to endure in connection with this operation was compounded by the fact that in order to perform the operation Dr. Watermeier had to take a bone graft from her hip. The resulting hip wound was the source of substantial additional pain and disability. She has been forced to curtail her vocational, recreational, and domestic activities. Because of the nature of her work in the field of "special ed" which often involved emotionally disturbed children her physical pains and limitations were especially intrusive.
The award of $400,000.00 is thus "not obviously the result of passion or prejudice", and it bears a reasonable relationship to the elements of proved damages. Id. at 1261. We cannot conclude from the entirety of the evidence in this record that a rational trier of fact could not have fixed the award at the level set by the jury, or that this is one of those exceptional cases where the | igaward is so extreme as to be contrary to right reason. Id. at 1261. See also Weatherford v. Commercial Union Ins., 94-1793 (La. 2/20/95), 650 So.2d 763.
The evidence cited by Hyatt in support of its contention that the plaintiff was contribu-torily negligent was not so compelling as to require this court to find the jury conclusion to the contrary manifestly erroneous. Plaintiffs failure to notice the liquid on the floor was excusable under the circumstances. The arguments that the true cause of plaintiffs fall was an ankle sprain of some two or more weeks earlier and her unwise choice of high "spike" heeled shoes are unpersuasive. Plaintiff testified that she was wearing "wedged" heels and Hyatt's witness said that he did not know the difference between the two types of heels. Dr. Logaglio testified that his records showed that his nurse had noted that the plaintiff had some ankle swelling on March 6,1989, two weeks prior to her fall at the Hyatt. Dr. Logaglio noted no clinical findings regarding plaintiffs ankle. He considered the swollen ankle "minor" and saw no problem in the way that the plaintiff walked.
The award of $40,000.00 for past medical expenses was excessive. Plaintiff argues that "Dr. Watermeier testified that the past medical expenses for the plaintiff totals over $40,000 ." Our reading of Dr. Watermeier's testimony reveals only $23,260.80 of past medical expenses. The parties stipulated that Dr. Charles April had bills totalling $688.10; Dr. Philip Logaglio had bills of $475.00; and Dr. Thomas Cashio had bills of $310.00. |14These stipulated bills aggregated with the $23,260.80 to which Dr. Watermeier testified, brings the total to $24,733.90. This is the maximum recovery for past medical expenses that can be supported by the record.
The award for future medical expenses of $30,000.00 was excessive. Plaintiff must prove that future medical expenses will be incurred, even though such costs cannot be fixed with precision. Smith v. Two R Drilling Co., Inc., 606 So.2d 804, 811 (La.App. 4 Cir.1992), writ den., 607 So.2d 560 (La.1992). Future medical expenses must be established with some degree of certainty. Id. Awards for future medical expenses must be supported with medical testimony and estimation of probable costs. Id. The bulk of the award for future medical expenses can only be ascribed to a belief by the jury that it was more probable than not that the plaintiff would have to undergo another operation in the future. Such a conclusion is not justified by Dr. Watermeier's testimony: "I think it is a possibility only at this time. I cannot say that we would have to do it." This testimony is insufficient to establish that it is more probable than not that the plaintiff will need another operation.
Dr. Watermeier also testified that he charged $150.00 for each visit. He testified that he would need to give the plaintiff injections from time to time in the future and that he would have to perform various tests. We recognize that the calculation of future medical expenses is highly speculative and not susceptible of calculation with mathematical certainty. Young v. Armadores de Cabotaje, S.A, 617 So.2d 517, 540 (La.App. 4 Cir.1993), writ den., 625 So.2d 170 and 171 (La.1993) and cert. den. by Empresa Nacional Siderurgica, S.A v. Young, 510 U.S. 1117, 114 S.Ct. 1067, 127 L.Ed.2d 386 (1994). The highest reasonable | iSaward for future medical expenses that can be supported by the record as a whole is $4,000.00.
The award for past lost wages was $44,-536.00. That figure was based on a calculation of plaintiff's expert economist, Dr. Wolfson. Defendants claim that they should be given credit for plaintiff's sabbatical pay which would limit plaintiffs claim for past lost wages to only $9,485.00.
We disagree. Defendant is not entitled to credit for the sabbatical pay received by the plaintiff. Such pay should be treated as compensation from a collateral source. Plaintiff would not have had to use her sabbatical for health reasons had she not been injured. A tortfeasor may not benefit by payments made to an injured party to which the tortfeasor has not contributed. See Friedmann v. Landa, 573 So.2d 1255 (La.App. 4 Cir.1991).
The awards of $400,000.00 for lost future wages and $20,000.00 for loss of personal services were not excessive. In view of Dr. Wolfson's testimony had the jury awarded somewhat more in each category we could not say that such awards would have been so high as to be manifestly erroneous.
For the foregoing reasons the judgment of the trial court is amended to reduce the award for past medical expenses to $24,-733.90. The judgment is further amended to reduqe the award for future medical expenses to $4,000.00. In all other respects the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
AFFIRMED AS AMENDED.
Before BARRY, BYRNES, CIACCIO, WALTZER and LANDRIEU, JJ.
. Defendants contend that the surgery performed by Dr. Watermeier was unnecessary. The jury obviously found otherwise. We cannot say that such a finding is manifestly erroneous.
. The parties stipulated only that the amounts of the bills were correct. The defendants did not stipulate that they were for justifiable medical expenses. Defendants mentioned in their brief that only $1000.00 out of the total medical expenses was justifiable, but they failed to give any specifics. We find no basis for denying plaintiff's claim to any of the stipulated amounts.