Case Name: J. C. Irwin v. Chester Thomas and others
Court: Kansas Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Kansas
Decision Date: 1873-07
Citations: 12 Kan. 93
Docket Number: 
Parties: J. C. Irwin v. Chester Thomas and others.
Judges: (All the justices concurring.)
Reporter: Kansas Reports
Volume: 12
Pages: 79–82

Head Matter:
J. C. Irwin v. Chester Thomas and others.
July Term, 1873.
1. Consideration: Indorsement as. The indorsement of a certificate of indebtedness or promise to pay imposes on the party indorsing some liabilities, and is consideration sufficient to sustain a contract.
2. Power of Attorney: Revocation. Where I. gave to R. a power of attorney to indorse and collect such vouchers as might be issued for beef to be delivered on a certain contract made with I., and R., under color of the authority thus given, was attempting to indorse and collect vouchers which, without I.’s consent, included beef delivered on a contract in which I. had no interest, and to which he was not a party, held, that I. was justified in revoking the power of attorney.
-8. Contract: Indorsement: Consideration. Where R., for moneys due himself, voluntarily takes from the authorities a government voucher payable to the order of I., the latter not having consented to such arrangement, and I. refuses to indorse such voucher until paid a certain sum, — if R., with full knowledge of all the facts, paysthe sum demanded and obtains the indorsement, he cannot thereafter recover back the money paid. Under these circumstances the indorsement is a sufficient consideration for the money.
Error from Pottawatomie district court.
Action brought by Chester Thomas, Matthew Eyan, and Jacob Everhardy, to recover from Irwin certain moneys alleged to have been had and received by Irwin to their use. The action was commenced in Shawnee district court, and transferred, on motion of defendant, to the district court of Pottawatomie county, where it was tried at the February term, 1872. *Verdiet and judgment for plaintiffs for $2,442.
Martin é Burns and Clough & Wheat, for plaintiff in error.
The jury were required to make specific findings on certain questions of fact, and one of their findings was that “Irwin exacted and received from said plaintiffs, before he would allow them to collect the amount of said vouchers, the sum of $1.50 per 100 pounds on such beef so furnished to said Indians, which amount ($1.50 per 100 pounds) so retained was $2,442.” We submit that no court in Christendom is authorized to pronounce as a conclusion of law, based on that finding, that the payments so made were involuntary payments, and they cannot be recovered back. Phillips v. Jefferson Co., 5-Kan. 416; Wabaunsee Co. v. Walker, 8 Kan. *431; Mays v. Cincinnati, 1 Ohio St. 274; Snow v. Johnson, 1 Minn. 40, (Gil. 24;). Patterson v. Cox, 25 Ind. 261; Benson v. Monroe, 7 Cush. 125.
A. H. Case and R. S. Flick, for defendants in error.
The payments made by defendants in error to Irwin were not voluntary. The findings of the jury, in substance and effect, were that, defendants in error, in order to obtain a collection of the vouchers, and as their only way to obtain such collection, paid to Irwin a larger ■ amount of money than he was entitled to receive or retain of the-vouchers; that Irwin exacted the payment of such larger amount before he would allow the defendants to collect and receive that part. of the amount of the vouchers rightfully belonging to them; that he had the power to thus prevent their collection; and that the only way they could get the amount rightfully belonging to them was to submit to such exaction. In other words, that Irwin, before he would allow defendants to receive what was really due them, having the power to prevent it, exacted from them an overpayment, and that amount was $2,442. The conclusions to be deduced from the findings of the jury are irresistible, that the payments made to Irwin were made on compulsion, and were extorted as a condition. The parties *did not treat on equal terms. Irwin’s position was, “unless you submit to this extortion, I will embarrass, your business and prevent you from collecting any of it, if possible.” Payments made under such circumstances may be recovered back.

Opinion:
Brewer, J.
The facts of this case are in substance as follows: On the twenty-seventh day of June, 1865, the plaintiff, Irwin, entered into a contract with the government to furnish fresh heef from the block to the troops at Laramie, Dakota territory; the contract to be in force one year, or such less time as the commissary general of subsistence should direct, commencing on the first of July, 1865. On the eleventh _ of said July Irwin sold this contract to the defendants for a bonus of $1.50 per 100 pounds upon all accepted beef under this contract. On said eleventh of July Irwin gave to defendant Eyana power of attorney, by which Eyan could draw and receipt for all the moneys due Irwin under the contract with the government. In June, 1866, Irwin revoked the power of attorney, and stopped payment of the vouchers to defendants. Under this contract and power of attorney the defendants could draw the money on the vouchers issued by the commissary at Laramie, payable to Irwin. The contract being in the name of Irwin, all vouchers were drawn payable to him; and by aid of the power, the signature or order of Irwin was not needed to enable the defendants to obtain the money for the vouchers. On the last of July or first of August, 1865, Everhardy, one of the defendants in error, went to Laramie to superintend the delivery of the beef, and the defendants in error put in under this contract from August 15,1865, to August 15, 1866, 120,000 to 130,000 pounds, all that was required. While Ever-hardy was at Laramie, the defendants in error made another contract with the government to furnish beef to the Indians in the vicinity of Laramie. Irwin was not a party to this contract, and had no interest in it. This contract was for "hoof" or "live" beef. The "block" and "hoof" beef *were both included in the vouchers issued in Irwin's name. This was done without his authority or consent. After revoking the power of attorney, Irwin demanded and received $2,442 before he would indorse the vouchers, and without his indorsement no money could be collected on them. He claimed that the vouchers included only beef put in under his contract. Of course, if this claim had been good, he would have been entitled under his arangement with the defendants in error to the amount he received. But the jury have found that 162,800 pounds included in these vouchers were put in under the contract made by defendants in error. Could he rightfully exact $1.50 per 100 pounds for this amount ? And if he could not, and yet did exact it, can they recover from him the amount exacted? Notwithstanding their purchase from him of his contract, they had a right to make the separate contract, put in beef under it, and receive the entire contract price. And if they had taken a separate voucher therefor, they could have collected it, and he would have had no recourse on them. But they had no right to use his name as payee of a voucher for beef delivered on their contract, or indorse his name to such voucher when issued. He had sold them his contract, and given them a power of attorney to collect and receipt for all moneys which should become due under it. This was as far as they had any right to use his name, and any attempted use in excess of sifch authority justified him in taking the needed steps to prevent it. It was a matter of convenience to them, they say; but their convenience entitled them to no liberties with his name. The indorsement of a certificate of indebtedness, or a promise to pay, imposes on the party indorsing some liabilities. It is an act one cannot do for an other without authority. And as soon as he found that under color of the authority given by the power of attorney they were indorsing his name upon vouchers other than those they were authorized to indorse, he had a right to revoke the power. By it alone would their use of his narpe have any semblance of authority. Only by revoking it could he fully protect himself. The revocation, *then, was justifiable. The question, then, is thus left: They took a voucher for moneys due them in Irwin's name. He refused to indorse that voucher until he had been paid a certain sum. They paid it, obtained his indorsement, and collected the money. Can they recover the money paid for the indorsement? Clearly not. It was an act he was under no obligations, legal or moral, to do. It was an act for their benefit, and one to his injury; for by it he assumed certain risks and obligations. The act, therefore, was ample consideration for a contract for the money paid. Whether the price paid was large or small, is immaterial. They paid for something they had no legal right to demand, and which they could not obtain except by purchase. There was no concealment, no misrepresentation. They bought with full knowledge of all the facts, bought with their eyes open, and must abide by the contract they made. Doubtless they thought it cheaper .and better to pay Irwin his price, rather than return the vouchers and .¡have them made out in the names of the real owners.
The judgment of the district court must be reversed, and the case remanded for further proceedings in accordance with the views herein expressed.
(All the justices concurring.)