Case Name: STEVEN KADONSKY, APPELLANT, v. STEVE C. LEE, ACTING DIRECTOR OF THE DIVISION OF CONSUMER AFFAIRS, RESPONDENT
Court: New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New Jersey
Decision Date: 2017-10-31
Citations: 452 N.J. Super. 198
Docket Number: DOCKET NO. A-3324-14T4
Parties: STEVEN KADONSKY, APPELLANT, v. STEVE C. LEE, ACTING DIRECTOR OF THE DIVISION OF CONSUMER AFFAIRS, RESPONDENT.
Judges: Before Judges Messano, Espinosa, and Guadagno (Judge Espinosa dissenting).
Reporter: New Jersey Superior Court Reports
Volume: 452
Pages: 198–225

Head Matter:
172 A.3d 1090
STEVEN KADONSKY, APPELLANT, v. STEVE C. LEE, ACTING DIRECTOR OF THE DIVISION OF CONSUMER AFFAIRS, RESPONDENT.
DOCKET NO. A-3324-14T4
Superior Court of New Jersey Appellate Division
Argued November 29, 2016
Decided October 31, 2017
Before Judges Messano, Espinosa, and Guadagno (Judge Espinosa dissenting).
Joseph L. Linares argued the cause for appellant (Walsh Pizzi O’Reilly Falanga LLP, attorneys; Marc D. Haefner, Selina M. Ellis and Mr. Linares, on the briefs).
Jodi C. Krugman, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent (Christopher S. Porrino, Attorney General, attorney; Andrea M. Silkowitz, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Ms. Krugman, on the brief).
Barbour & Associates, LLC, attorneys for amicus curiae, L.B. on behalf of G.B. (Roger A. Barbour, on the brief).

Opinion:
The opinion of the court was delivered by
GUADAGNO, J.AD.
(retired and temporarily assigned on recall).
In January 2014, Steven Kadonsky, an inmate serving a sentence for marijuana trafficking, filed a petition with the Director of the Division of Consumer Affairs (Division) seeking to have marijuana rescheduled from a Schedule I controlled dangerous substance to Schedule IV. Kadonsky argued that because the Legislature determined that marijuana had "a beneficial use . in treating or alleviating the pain or other symptoms associated with certain debilitating medical conditions" when it passed the New Jersey Compassionate Use Medical Marijuana Act (CUMMA), N.J.S.A. 24:61-1 to -16, in 2010, marijuana no longer satisfied one of the requirements for inclusion in Schedule I, that the substance "has no accepted medical use in treatment," N.J.S.A. 24:21-5(a).
On January 9, 2016, the acting director (Director) of the Division denied Kadonsky's petition. The Director noted that marijuana has been listed as a Schedule I substance since the passing of the federal Controlled Substances Act (CSA) in 1970, see 21 U.S.C.A § 812(c), and N.J.S.A. 24:21-3(c) requires that he "simi larly control the substance" unless he "objects and follows the appropriate process to make the reasons for his objections public."
The Director also found no indication that, in passing CUMMA, the Legislature intended "to treat marijuana similar to or consistent with substances listed in Schedules II-V."
The Director observed that both the New Jersey Department of Health and the Board of Medical Examiners have interpreted CUMMA as neither rescheduling nor permitting the rescheduling of marijuana. Finally, the Director suggested federal law prohibited rescheduling:
[T]he Department of Health noted that marijuana is not approved by the United States Food and Drug Administration, and cannot be prescribed by physicians or dispensed by pharmacists. The Department explained that changing the classification of marijuana from a Schedule I substance in New Jersey would require a change in existing federal law.
Kadonsky appealed and now argues that the Division's decision is contrary to and inconsistent with the relevant statutes; rescheduling of marijuana is required; and the Director's decision renders much of the statutory scheme superfluous and conflicts with Supreme Court precedent.
We also granted leave to appear as amicus curiae to L.B. on behalf of 6.B., a minor child who takes medical marijuana as part of her treatment regimen for uncontrolled epileptic seizures. Ami-cus argues that the continued scheduling of marijuana as a Schedule I narcotic is arbitrary and capricious; the vast amount of contemporary scientific and medical evidence as to the efficacy of medical marijuana supports the argument that the scheduling of medical marijuana as a Schedule I narcotic is based upon antiquated and outdated scientific fallacies; and, the scheduling of marijuana is of great public and personal importance to amicus and any similarly situated individuals in this state.
I.
Well-recognized principles ascribe a "limited role" to our review of administrative agency determinations. In re Stallworth, 208 N.J. 182, 194, 26 A.3d 1059 (2011) (quoting Henry v. Rahway State Prison, 81 N.J. 571, 579, 410 A.2d 686 (1980)). We mil not reverse an agency's judgment unless we find the decision to be "arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable, or [] not supported by substantial credible evidence in the record as a whole." Ibid. (quoting Henry, supra, 81 N.J. at 579-80, 410 A.2d 686). Our inquiry is limited to:
(1) whether the agency's action violated the legislative policies expressed or implied in the act governing the agency; (2) whether the evidence in the record substantially supports the findings on which the agency's actions were premised; and (3) "whether in applying the legislative policies to the facts, the agency clearly erred in reaching a conclusion that could not reasonably have been made on a showing of the relevant factors."
[Barrick v. State, 218 N.J. 247, 260, 94 A.3d 895 (2014) (quoting In re Carter, 191 N.J. 474, 482, 924 A.2d 525 (2007)).]
We owe no deference to an administrative agency's "interpretation of a statute or its determination of a strictly legal issue." L.A. v. Bd. of Educ., 221 N.J. 192, 204, 110 A.3d 914 (2015) (quoting Mayflower Sec. v. Bureau of Securities, 64 N.J. 85, 93, 312 A.2d 497 (1973)).
The CSA places hazardous drugs in five categories, or schedules, which impose varying restrictions on access to the drugs. See 21 U.S.C.A. § 812 (1988). Marijuana is assigned by statute to Schedule I, the most restrictive of these. A drug is placed in Schedule I if (1) it "has a high potential for abuse," (2) it has "no currently accepted medical use in treatment in the United States," and (3) "there is a lack of accepted safety for use of the drug . under medical supervision." Ibid.
In 1971, the New Jersey Controlled Dangerous Substances Act (CDSA), N.J.S.A. 24:21-1 to -56, became effective and gave the Director the authority to "add substances to or delete or reschedule all substances enumerated in the schedules." N.J.S.A. 24:21-3(a). In determining whether to control a substance, the Director is obligated to consider:
(1) Its actual or relative potential for abuse;
(2) Scientific evidence of its pharmacological effect, if known;
(3) State of current scientific knowledge regarding the substance;
(4) Its history and current pattern of abuse;
(5) The scope, duration, and significance of abuse;
(6) What, if any, risk there is to the public health;
(7) Its psychic or physiological dependence liability; and
(8) Whether the substance is an immediate precursor of a substance already controlled under this article.
[ibid.]
After considering the above factors, the Director is required to "make findings . and . issue an order controlling the substance if he finds that the substance has a potential for abuse." Ibid. The Director is required to "similarly control" any "substance . designated, rescheduled or deleted as a controlled dangerous substance under Federal law." N.J.S.A. 24:21 — 3(c).
At the outset, we note a conflict between section (a) of N.J.S.A. 24:21-3, which appears to grant the Director the authority to "add substances to or delete or reschedule all substances," and subsection (c) which seemingly limits the Director's ability to reclassify controlled dangerous substances differently than they are classified under federal law.
Our Supreme Court provided guidance in resolving this conflict when it decided State v. Tate, 102 N.J. 64, 505 A.2d 941 (1986). Tate involved a quadriplegic defendant charged with possession of marijuana. Id. at 66-67, 505 A.2d 941. The defendant argued his use of marijuana was a "medical necessity" because it was the only treatment that eased the pain of recurring, spastic contractions which at times were "so severe as to render [him] completely disabled." Ibid.
A divided Court rejected Tate's argument. Writing for the majority, Justice Clifford noted that N.J.S.A. 24:21-5(a) classified marijuana as a Schedule I controlled dangerous substance, which indicated that "the legislature has determined that marijuana has 'high potential for abuse' and has 'no accepted medical use in treatment . or lacks accepted safety for use in treatment under medical supervision.' " Id. at 70, 505 A.2d 941.
However, Justice Clifford also observed that the Legislature "demonstrated foresight by leaving room for the possibility that scientific developments and advances in knowledge could ultimately render marijuana's Schedule I classification inappropriate," and noted that N.J.S.A. 24:21-3(a) "granted to the Commissioner of Health the authority to reschedule marijuana . giving consideration to, inter alia, current scientific knowledge." Id. at 71, 505 A,2d 941. Years later, Justice Clifford's words would prove prophetic.
Clearly, the CDSA did not contemplate a medicinal exception for the use or possession of marijuana. Indeed, when the CDSA was enacted, no state permitted the medicinal use of marijuana. In 1996, California became the first state to legalize medical marijuana. In 2010, New Jersey enacted CUMMA, creating a limited exception, de-criminalizing possession of marijuana for medical use by qualifying patients who obtain the appropriate registry identification card. N.J.S.A, 24:61-6; N.J.S.A. 2C:35-17.
Currently, twenty-nine states, the District of Colombia, Puerto Rico, and Guam, have legalized medical marijuana; twenty-one states and the District of Columbia have decriminalized the possession of marijuana; and eight states and the District of Columbia have passed laws regulating the recreational use of marijuana in the same manner as alcohol.
Scientific research suggests that marijuana has "potential therapeutic value" for "pain relief, control of nausea and vomiting, and appetite stimulation." Institute of Medicine, Marijuana and Medicine: Assessing the Science Base (J. Joy, S. Watson, and J. Benson eds. 1999), http://medicalmarijuana.procon.org/sourcefiles/IOM-Report.pdf. In addition, it has been reported that marijuana: reduces muscle spasms and spasticity; reduces intraocular pres sure; and reduces anxiety. Ibid. Moreover, marijuana has been used successfully to treat the debilitating symptoms of cancer and cancer chemotherapy, AIDS, multiple sclerosis, epilepsy, glaucoma, anxiety, and other serious illnesses. Ibid.
Amicus L.B., on behalf of her daughter G.B., argues the continued classification of marijuana as a Schedule I controlled dangerous substance frustrates the purposes of CUMMA and denies G.B. the constitutionally protected right to a free and appropriate education.
G.B., a teenager, suffers from uncontrolled grand mal and petit mal epileptic seizures. Before she was prescribed medical marijuana, G.B. suffered at least one grand mal and several petit mal seizures daily. Since she began taking medical marijuana as part of her treatment regimen, her grand mal seizures decreased by forty to fifty per-cent with greatly reduced severity, and her petit mal seizures were "essentially eliminated." L.B. confirmed that medical marijuana is the only medication that significantly reduces her daughter's seizures.
G.B.'s doctor prescribed four to five doses of medical marijuana per day, with one dose given at lunchtime. G.B. attends a special education school, located approximately thirty minutes from her home. When G.B.'s parents requested that the school's nurse administer G.B.'s medical marijuana, the school refused because marijuana is a Schedule I substance and cannot be permitted on school grounds. G.B. was required to leave school at lunchtime to receive her medication and did not return to school, causing her to miss a half day of school each day.
L.B. petitioned the Department of Education (DOE) to require the school to administer G.B.'s medication. The matter was re-feiTed to the Office of Administrative Law. After hearing oral argument, an administrative law judge (ALJ) dismissed L.B.'s petition, noting that marijuana was a Schedule I substance, and because N.J.S.A. 20:35-7 prohibited dispensing or possessing it with intent to distribute within 1000 feet of school property, the school nurse was not authorized to administer G.B.'s medication.
L.B. then filed a petition for emergent relief to permit her to come to school each day at lunchtime to administer her daughter's medical marijuana during school hours. The school opposed the petition and proposed alternatively that L.B. travel to school, pick up her daughter, take her at least 1000 feet away from school grounds, administer the medication, and return her to school. On September 15, 2015, the ALJ denied the petition, finding L.B. had not met the standards for emergent relief set for the in Crowe v. De Gioia, 90 N.J. 126, 447 A.2d 173 (1982). The judge did note that CUMMA was in "direct conflict" with the school zone statute, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7.
On November 9, 2015, N.J.S.A. 18A:40-12.22 became effective which permits "parents, guardians, and primary caregivers to administer medical marijuana to a student while the student is on school grounds." The amendment does not authorize school personnel, including nurses, to administer medical marijuana.
G.B. observes that if marijuana was reclassified as a Schedule III drug, school nurses would be able to administer her prescribed doses of medical marijuana. Because G.B. is not able to receive marijuana at school, she attends only half days and claims she is not receiving an appropriate education.
The CDSA requires the Dfrector to place a substance in Schedule I "if he finds that the substance: (1) has high potential for abuse; and (2) has no accepted medical use in treatment in the United States; or lacks accepted safety for use in treatment under medical supervision." N.J.S.A. 24:21-5(a).
While there may have been "no accepted medical use in treatment in the United States" for marijuana when the CDSA became effective, any argument suggesting that premise is still valid in the post-CUMMA era strains credulity beyond acceptable boundaries. Medical benefits from the use of marijuana not known in 1971, when the CDSA became effective, or in 1986, when Tate was decided, and impediments to its lawful use as a result of its Schedule I classification, are abundant and glaringly apparent now.
Similarly, the statement by the Tate Court that "the value of medical use of marijuana cannot be deemed to outweigh the values served by its prohibition," 102 N.J. at 74, 605 A.2d 941, must now be questioned and perhaps revisited, especially when considering the difficulties encountered by G.B. and others who may be similarly situated, caused by the Schedule I classification.
In 2005, the Supreme Court decided Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 125 S.Ct. 2195, 162 L.Ed.2d 1 (2005), involving two seriously ill California citizens (patients) who used marijuana for medical purposes on the recommendation of their doctors. One patient suffered from an inoperable brain tumor and a seizure disorder. Her doctor opined that without marijuana treatments she would suffer excruciating pain and could very well die. Id. at 6-7, 125 S.Ct. at 2199-2200, 162 L.Ed.2d at 12. Local sheriffs and agents from the Drug Enforcement Agency came to the home of one of the patients. Although the county officials concluded the marijuana use was permissible under California law, the federal agents seized and destroyed all six of the patient's marijuana plants. Id at 7, 125 S.Ct. at 2200, 162 L.Ed.2d at 12-13.
The patients sought injunctive and declaratory relief against the enforcement of federal CSA as it pertains to their cultivating and using marijuana for doctor-prescribed purposes, Id. at 7, 125 S.Ct. at 2200, 162 L.Ed.2d at 12.
The Supreme Court held that Congress' authority under the Commerce Clause includes the power to prohibit intrastate cultivation and use of marijuana, even if it is in compliance with California law. Id. at 32-33, 125 S.Ct. at 2214-215, 162 L.Ed.2d at 28-29. However, the Court "acknowledge[d] that evidence proffered by respondents in this ease regarding the effective medical uses for marijuana, if found credible after trial, would cast serious doubt on the accuracy of the findings that require marijuana to be listed in Schedule I." Id. at 27 n.37, 125 S.Ct. at 2211 n.37, 162 L.Ed.2d at 25 n.37.
Upon review, marijuana's continued classification as a Schedule I substance in New Jersey, would depend, in part, on a determination that it has a high potential for abuse and, if so, whether that factor justifies continued inclusion in the face of compelling evidence of accepted medical use and impediments to its legal use which may be attributable to its classification. The State concedes there is disagreement in the medical community as to whether marijuana poses a high potential for abuse.
While this issue is not squarely before us, it is certainly ripe for a determination by the Director. When the inconsistencies of sections (a) and (c) of N.J.S.A. 24:21-3 are viewed through the prism of the dicta in Tate, we conclude that the Director erred in determining he lacked the authority to reclassify marijuana without a change in existing federal law.
Our dissenting colleague suggests that the sole issue presented by this appeal is whether the Director "was required to reschedule marijuana, removing it from Schedule I of the [CDSA]." Post at 211, 172 A.3d at 1098. To be clear, our opinion does not mandate reclassification, we simply hold that the Director erred in determining he lacked authority to reclassify. We note that if the Director decides to remove marijuana from Schedule I, that would not decriminalize it, as possession or sale of substances under other schedules are illegal. See, e.g., N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(b)(13) (Schedule I, II, III, IV substances); N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(b)(14) (Schedule V substance).
N.J.S.A. 24:21-3(c) provides:
If any substance is designated, rescheduled or deleted as a controlled dangerous substance under federal law and notice thereof is given to the director, the director shall similarly control the substance under P.L.1970, c.226, as amended and supplemented, after the expiration of 30 days from publication in the Federal Register of a final order designating a substance as a controlled dangerous substance or rescheduling or deleting a substance, unless within that 30-day period, the director objects to inclusion, rescheduling, or deletion. In that case, the director shall cause to be published in the New Jersey Register and made public the reasons for his objection and shall afford all interested parties an opportunity to be heal'd. At the conclusion of any such hearing, the director shall publish and make public his decision, which shall be final unless the substance is specifically otherwise dealt with by an act of the Legislature. Upon publication of objection to inclusion or rescheduling under P.L.1970, c.226 (C.24:21-1 et seq.) by the director, control of such substance under this section shall automatically be stayed until such time as the director makes public his final decision.
The director may by regulation exclude any nonnarcotic substance from a schedule if such substance may, under the provisions of federal or State law, be lawfully sold over the counter without a prescription, unless otherwise controlled pursuant to rules and regulations promulgated by the division.
The dissent argues that any such action by the Director is precluded because the objection "must be made within the thirty-day period following publication; there is no authority granted to the Director to object thereafter." Post at 218, 172 A.3d at 1103. However, 21 U.S.C.A. 812(a), requires that the five schedules of controlled substances "shall be updated and republished on a semiannual basis during the two-year period beginning one year after the date of enactment of this title [enacted Oct. 27, 1970] and shall be updated and republished on an annual basis thereafter." N.J.S.A. 24:21 — 3(d) provides that the "director shall update and republish the schedules in sections 5 through 8.1 of P.L.1970, c.226, as amended and supplemented . periodically." At a minimum, the thirty-day window permitting the Director to object to a schedule classification, will reoccur on an annual basis.
Our dissenting colleague cites no authority to support her conclusion that the Director may only object to "a new decision made regarding the federal schedules" and "is not authorized to revisit established federal schedules and differ with the designations already made." Post at 218, 172 A.3d at 1103. If the Legislature had intended to place such limitations on the Director's review, it surely could have done so in the statute. Moreover, a review of classification by the Director based, not on changes to the federal schedule, but on "scientific developments and advances in knowledge [which] could ultimately render marijuana's Schedule I classification inappropriate" is exactly what the Tate Court anticipated. Tate, supra, 102 N.J. at 71, 505 A.2d 941.
Finally, we reject our dissenting colleague's conclusion that "[b]ecause [N.J.S.A. 24:21 — 3(a) ] applies to the Director's decision '[i]n determining whether to control a substance,' (emphasis in dissent), it presupposes the substance in question is not controlled at the time of the determination, that it is not listed on any federal schedule and that the Director is making an initial determination to control it or not." This finding is unsupported by any authority and is contradicted by N.J.S.A. 24:21-3(a) which clearly states "The director may add substances to or delete or reschedule all substances enumerated in the schedules in [N.J.S.A. 24:21-5 through N.J.S.A. 24:21-8.1]." (Emphasis added). The original bill incorporated a large list of substances pre-seheduled upon enactment, including "Marihuana." The Director is authorized to add, delete, or reschedule all substances enumerated, and is not limited to substances "not controlled at the time of the determination" as our colleague suggests.
This matter is remanded to the Director for proceedings consistent with our opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Kadonsky pled guilty to the "drug kingpin" statute, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-3, and was sentenced to life imprisonment with a twenty-five year period of parole ineligibility. State v. Kadonsky, 288 N.J. Super. 41, 43, 671 A.2d 1064 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 144 N.J. 589, 677 A.2d 761 (1996).
Alternatively, Kadonsky argued that Schedule V "may be more proper for marijuana."
Cal. Health & Safety Code § 11362.5.
For a list of states that have decriminalized or legalized marijuana, see http://norml.org/marijuana/personal.
The medical marijuana prescribed to G.B. is in oil form and can be taken mixed with a liquid.
On November 14, 2016, a Bill was introduced in the Senate, which would allow for secondary caregivers to administer medical marijuana to qualifying patients. S. 2794, 217th Leg. (2016). The Bill defines a secondary caregiver as an "adult employee of a patient's school or facility . who is authorized . by the patient for primary caregiver."
The State appears to concede, "for purposes of argument" only, that the enactment of CUMMA supports a finding that marijuana has an accepted medical use in treatment.
Other courts have rejected arguments that it is unconstitutional for the government to continue to classify marijuana as a Schedule I controlled substance. See e.g., Americans for Safe Access v. DEA, 706 F.3d 438, 453 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (finding DEA's denial of petition to reclassify marijuana as a Schedule III, IV or V drug was not arbitrary or capricious); United States v. Ernst, 857 F.Supp.2d 1098, 1103-04 (D. Or. 2012) (rejecting defendant's claim that continued classification of marijuana as Schedule I substance violated his due process and equal protection rights); Craker v. DEA, 714 F.3d 17, 19 n.1 (1st Cir. 2013) ("Although considerable efforts have been made to reschedule marijuana, it remains a Schedule I substance."). These cases, brought by defendants prosecuted for criminal violations, do not address problems caused by the Schedule I classification experienced by lawful medical marijuana users.
Our dissenting colleague notes that tire language we rely on in Tate is dicta and suggests that is "not germane to that holding." Post at 225, 172 A.3d at 1107. Even though Justice Clifford's statement that the Commissioner of Health has authority to reschedule marijuana may not have been "essential to the disposition of the case," it is nevertheless authoritative as "it is expressly declared by the court as a guide for future conduct" and must be considered a "binding decision!] of the court." State v. Rose, 206 N.J. 141, 182-83, 19 A.3d 985 (2011) (quoting 21 C.J.S. Courts § 230 (2006) and 5 Am. Jur. 2d Appellate Review § 564 (2007).