Case Name: ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE FUND, INC., Trout Unlimited, The Wilderness Society, Appellants, v. R. Keith HIGGINSON, Commissioner, Bureau of Reclamation, U. S. Department of the Interior, et al.; ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE FUND, INC., et al. v. R. Keith HIGGINSON, Commissioner, Bureau of Reclamation, U. S. Department of the Interior, et al. and Utah Power & Light Company (Intervenor-Defendant), Appellant; ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE FUND, INC., et al. v. R. Keith HIGGINSON, Commissioner, Bureau of Reclamation, U. S. Department of the Interior, et al. and State of Arizona, State of Nevada, State of Wyoming, and State of Colorado (Intervenor-Defendants), Appellants
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 1981-05-15
Citations: 655 F.2d 1244
Docket Number: Nos. 80-1123, 80-1242 and 80-1255
Parties: ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE FUND, INC., Trout Unlimited, The Wilderness Society, Appellants, v. R. Keith HIGGINSON, Commissioner, Bureau of Reclamation, U. S. Department of the Interior, et al. ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE FUND, INC., et al. v. R. Keith HIGGINSON, Commissioner, Bureau of Reclamation, U. S. Department of the Interior, et al. and Utah Power & Light Company (Interve-nor-Defendant), Appellant. ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE FUND, INC., et al. v. R. Keith HIGGINSON, Commissioner, Bureau of Reclamation, U. S. Department of the Interior, et al. and State of Arizona, State of Nevada, State of Wyoming, and State of Colorado (Intervenor-Defendants), Appellants.
Judges: 
Reporter: Federal Reporter 2d Series
Volume: 655
Pages: 1244–1253

Head Matter:
ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE FUND, INC., Trout Unlimited, The Wilderness Society, Appellants, v. R. Keith HIGGINSON, Commissioner, Bureau of Reclamation, U. S. Department of the Interior, et al. ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE FUND, INC., et al. v. R. Keith HIGGINSON, Commissioner, Bureau of Reclamation, U. S. Department of the Interior, et al. and Utah Power & Light Company (Interve-nor-Defendant), Appellant. ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE FUND, INC., et al. v. R. Keith HIGGINSON, Commissioner, Bureau of Reclamation, U. S. Department of the Interior, et al. and State of Arizona, State of Nevada, State of Wyoming, and State of Colorado (Intervenor-Defendants), Appellants.
Nos. 80-1123, 80-1242 and 80-1255.
United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit.
Argued April 3, 1981.
Decided May 15, 1981.
Dissenting Opinion June 30, 1981.
Paula C. Phillips, Denver, Colo., with whom George W. Pring, Denver, Colo., and William A. Butler, Washington, D. C., were on the brief, for appellants in No. 80-1123 and cross/appellees in Nos. 80-1242 and 80-1255.
William Cohen, Atty. Dept, of Interior, Washington, D. C., for Federal appellees. Sanford Sagalkin, Deputy Asst. Atty. Gen., Robert L. Klarquist and Joshua I. Schwartz, Attys., Dept, of Justice, Washington, D. C., were on the brief, for Federal appellees.
Jerome Muys, Denver, Colo., with whom Jack D. Palma, II, Dennis M. Montgomery, Denver, Colo., and James V. Lavelle for States of Arizona, et al. appellees in Nos. 80-1123 and 80-1242 and cross/appellants in No. 80-1255.
Gerry Levenberg, Washington, D. C., with whom R. Keith Guthrie and Jeffrey S. Christie, Washington, D. C., were on the brief, for Utah Power & Light Company, appellee in Nos. 80-1123 and 80-1255 and cross/appellant in No. 80-1242.
Before MacKINNON, MIKVA and EDWARDS, Circuit Judges.

Opinion:
Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge HARRY T. EDWARDS.
Dissenting opinion filed by Circuit Judge MacKINNON.
HARRY T. EDWARDS, Circuit Judge:
Before this court are cross-appeals from a summary judgment of the District Court holding that the defendant, the Department of the Interior, may delay preparation of a comprehensive environmental impact statement (CEIS) covering all proposed federal water projects in the Colorado River Basin. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Hig-ginson, [1980] 14 Env.Rep.Cas. (BNA) 1008 (D.D.C. Jan. 3, 1980). The plaintiffs, the Environmental Defense Fund (EDF) and two other environmental groups, sought declaratory and injunctive relief compelling the Department of the Interior to prepare a basin-wide or comprehensive EIS, and enjoining construction of federal water projects in the basin pending completion of that study. Because congressional action foreclosed the possibility of an injunction halting construction of the projects, the plaintiffs now seek only an order compelling completion of the study. For the reasons set forth below, we vacate the District Court's opinion and remand this case for further' proceedings.
Before initiation of this lawsuit, and while it was before the District Court, the Department of the Interior had recognized the desirability and necessity of completing a CEIS for the entire Colorado River Basin. The Department had refrained from completing such a study because Congress had not expressly allocated funds for the project. During the pendency of this appeal, however, the Department of the Interior changed its position regarding the necessity for the basin-wide study. Shortly before oral argument, the Department delivered to this court an affidavit from the Department's Deputy Assistant Secretary for Land and Water Resources informing the court that the Department will no longer seek funding for a Colorado River Basin CEIS. The Department stated that it would meet NEPA requirements in the Colorado River Basin through project or site-specific environmental impact statements in which the Department will "discuss[] and evaluate] any cumulative and synergistic environmental impacts." At oral argument counsel for the Department contended that this approach is consistent with both NEPA and the Supreme Court's decision in Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 96 S.Ct. 2718, 49 L.Ed.2d 576 (1976).
In Kleppe, environmental organizations sought to compel the Department of the Interior to prepare a comprehensive environmental impact statement covering the development of coal reserves in the Northern Great Plains region. The Court identified two circumstances in which the preparation of a CEIS may be required under NEPA. First, the Court made clear that an agency must prepare a CEIS with respect to any major federal action that is intended to be "regional" in scope. See id. at 398-402, 96 S.Ct. at 2724-2726. Second, the Court noted that, even absent such a regional plan, a
comprehensive impact statement may be necessary in some cases for an agency to meet [its duty under NEPA]. Thus, when several proposals for coal-related actions that will have cumulative or synergistic environmental impact upon a region are pending concurrently before an agency, their environmental consequences must be considered together. Only through comprehensive consideration of pending proposals can the agency evaluate different courses of action.
Id. at 409-10, 96 S.Ct. at 2729-30 (footnotes omitted). "Cumulative environmental impacts are, indeed, what require a comprehensive impact statement." Id. at 413, 96 S.Ct. at 2732. The Supreme Court found, on the record before it, that the Department had not abused its discretion in deciding not to prepare a region-wide CEIS.
We can find nothing in NEPA, or in the judicial opinions construing it, preventing the Department of the Interior from changing its position regarding the necessity for a CEIS in order to reflect a new departmental policy, a new evaluation of facts, or changed circumstances-. However, as Kleppe makes clear, the Department's ultimate decision — to prepare site-specific EISs and not a basin-wide EIS — is subject to review under the arbitrary and capricious standard. Accordingly, we remand this case to the District Court to enable the plaintiffs to challenge the Department's decision.
We believe that a remand is required because this court is in no position to determine whether plaintiffs have met their burden of showing that the Department's new policy is arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law, absent a trial record dealing with the specifics of the new policy. We have no doubt that the Government may have a change of position in a case of this sort; however, we are equally clear that plaintiffs are entitled to challenge the new position.
Insofar as the applicable law is concerned, we would emphasize that, even should the District Court conclude that the Department has not abused its discretion in deciding that a basin-wide EIS is not necessary, all parties to this action agree that NEPA nevertheless requires the Department to prepare environmental impact statements that evaluate the synergistic and cumulative effects of the proposed federal projects. Whether these effects can be properly evaluated in site-specific EISs is left to the Department's discretion, subject to the scope of review specified in Kleppe.
The opinion of the District Court is hereby vacated and this case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
So ordered.
MacKINNON, Circuit Judge, dissenting and files a statement of separate views.
. The plaintiffs sought an environmental impact statement (EIS) pursuant to the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. § 4321-4369 (1976 & Supp. Ill 1979). Section 102(2)(C) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1976), provides that:
all agencies of the Federal Government shall—
(C) include in every recommendation or report on proposals for legislation and other major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment, a detailed statement by the responsible official on—
(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action,
(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should the proposal be implemented,
(iii) alternatives to the proposed action,
(iv) the relationship between the local short-term uses of man's environment and the maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity, and
(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources which would be involved in the proposed action should it be implemented.
. Although collectively labeled "EDF" for the purpose of this opinion, the plaintiffs also include Trout Unlimited and the Wilderness Society.
. In a rider to an appropriations bill for the Department of the Interior, Congress specified that, "Notwithstanding any provisions of" NEPA, "construction of any feature" of certain water projects in the Colorado River Basin "shall proceed if a final Environmental Impact Statement has been filed on such feature." Pub.L.No. 95-465, § 110(a)-(c), 92 Stat. 1279, 1291 (1978). In other words, Congress decided that construction of these water projects should not be halted in the absence of a comprehensive (i. e., basin-wide) environmental impact statement, so long as a site-specific EIS had been prepared for each proposed project. This anti-injunction rider was added in direct response to the possibility that the present lawsuit might result in an injunction. See Remarks of Rep. Forsythe, 124 Cong. Rec. Hll,-685-86 (daily ed. Oct. 5, 1978). Of course, this rider does not, by its terms, prohibit the Department of the Interior from preparing a CEIS for the entire Colorado River Basin. See Remarks of Rep. Udall, 124 Cong. Rec. H11,686 (daily ed. Oct. 5, 1978) (supporting the anti-injunction rider, but still expressing the hope that a basin-wide EIS would be prepared).
. Also parties to this suit are five intervenor-cross appellants — the Utah Power & Light Co. and the states of Arizona, Colorado, Nevada, and Wyoming. The intervenors contend that the District Court erred in holding that the Department of the Interior has the discretion to complete a basin-wide or comprehensive EIS. Because of our disposition of this case, we do not reach that issue.
. All parties recognize that until this litigation, Congress has never required express funding for a CEIS in the budget of the Department of the Interior. The Department sought funding, however, after individual members of Congress contacted the Department about their concern that the Department's budget did not specifically provide for completion of a CEIS in the Colorado River Basin.
. There is no doubt that if an agency has adopted a region-wide plan that can be characterized as a major federal action, § 102(2)(C) of NEPA requires the agency to prepare an EIS covering the entire "region." See note 1, supra. Issues may arise, however, over the agency's determination of whether a regional plan exists, or with respect to the size of the region affected by the proposed plan. The agency's decision on the scope of the EIS to be prepared, based upon these factual determinations, is subject to judicial review under the arbitrary and capricious standard. See note 8, infra.
. In the affidavit submitted to this court, the Deputy Assistant Secretary noted that the Department had requested "specific funding to do a comprehensive environmental impact statement" and that Congress had denied the requested funding. In light of the failure to obtain funding and "current budgetary restraints" the Department decided no longer to seek funding for the preparation of this particular CEIS. The affidavit also recited the Department's intent to comply fully with NEPA "by discussing and evaluating any cumulative and synergistic environmental impacts in site-specific environmental impact statements prepared for individual projects."
. In order "to prevail [the environmental groups] must show that [the Department has] acted arbitrarily in refusing to prepare one comprehensive statement on this entire region." Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 412, 96 S.Ct. 2718, 2731, 49 L.Ed.2d 576 (1976). As this court recently noted, "the arbitrary and capricious standard also applies to segmentation of environmental review that avoids overall, programmatic evaluation." National Wildlife Federation v. Appalachian Regional Comm'n., 79-2349, slip op. at 16 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 19, 1981). See the Administrative Procedure Act, § 10(e)(2)(A), 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1976).
. Because the Department of the Interior did not submit its affidavit informing this court of its new position until after all briefs had been filed, EDF had no opportunity to prepare a challenge. Consequently, the best course for this court is to remand the case to the District Court, where the plaintiffs will have ample opportunity to test the Department's decision.
We note that Kleppe is instructive in determining whether the Department's decision is arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law.
The determination of the region, if any, with respect to which a comprehensive statement is necessary requires the weighing of a number of relevant factors, including the extent of the interrelationship among proposed actions and practical considerations of feasibility. Resolving these issues requires a high level of technical expertise and is properly left to the informed discretion of the responsible federal agencies. Absent a showing of arbitrary action, we must assume that the agencies have exercised this discretion appropriately.
427 U.S. at 412, 96 S.Ct. at 2731 (citation omitted).
. The parties recognized this duty in oral argument, and the Department of the Interior acknowledged its duty explicitly in the affidavit submitted to this court. See note 7, supra.
. The Council on Environmental Quality has stated in its NEPA regulations that:
Agencies shall make sure the proposal which is the subject of an environmental impact statement is properly defined.... Proposals or parts of proposals which are related to each other closely enough to be, in effect, a single course of action shall be evaluated in a single impact statement.
40 C.F.R. § 1502.4(a) (1980). See id. § 1508.25.
The Supreme Court has stated that "CEQ's interpretation of NEPA is entitled to substantial deference. The Council was created by NEPA, and charged in that statute with the responsibility" to review federal programs in light of the statute. Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U.S. 347, 358, 99 S.Ct. 2335, 2341, 60 L.Ed.2d 943 (1979) (citation omitted).