Case Name: Edward DeCLOUET and Edward DeClouet for and on behalf of Jerome DeClouet, a Minor, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. The KANSAS CITY SOUTHERN RAILWAY COMPANY et al., Defendants-Appellees
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1965-06-02
Citations: 176 So. 2d 471
Docket Number: No. 1404
Parties: Edward DeCLOUET and Edward DeClouet for and on behalf of Jerome DeClouet, a Minor, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. The KANSAS CITY SOUTHERN RAILWAY COMPANY et al., Defendants-Appellees.
Judges: Before FRUGÉ, HOOD and CULPEP-PER, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 176
Pages: 471–476

Head Matter:
Edward DeCLOUET and Edward DeClouet for and on behalf of Jerome DeClouet, a Minor, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. The KANSAS CITY SOUTHERN RAILWAY COMPANY et al., Defendants-Appellees.
No. 1404.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana. Third Circuit.
June 2, 1965.
Rehearing Denied June 24, 1965.
Nichols & Drewett, by E. M. Nichols, Lake Charles, and James B. Collins, Lake Charles, for plaintiff-appellant.
Porter, Scofield & Cox, by James J. Cox, Lake Charles, for defendants-appellees.
Before FRUGÉ, HOOD and CULPEP-PER, JJ.

Opinion:
CULPEPPER, Judge.
Plaintiff's tort suit was dismissed as having been abandoned by failure of the plaintiff or defendant to take any steps in its prosecution for five years. (LSA-C.C.P. Art. 561) Plaintiff appealed.
The facts are undisputed. Plaintiff's petition was filed on March 20, 1959, and the defendants' answer was filed April 2, 1959. On October 28, 1964, more than five years after the filing of plaintiff's petition and the defendants' answer, plaintiff filed a rule citing defendants to show cause why the case should not be placed on the "active docket" and assigned for trial. Defendants, on November 9, 1964, filed a motion for dismissal on the ground of abandonment. At the trial of the motion to dismiss, evidence of negotiations between the parties and of certain discovery depositions taken within the five year interval was introduced. These depositions were taken at the request of plaintiff, for purposes of discovery, under a stipulation by counsel for plaintiff and defendant as to the time, place, etc., all as provided for in LSA-C.C.P. Art. 1421 et seq. Nothing concerning the depositions was made a part of the court record of the case.
The sole issue presented is whether the taking of the depositions constituted steps in the prosecution of the suit, within the meaning of LSA-C.C.P. Art. 561, which reads as follows:
"Art. 561. Abandonment in trial and appellate court
"An action is abandoned when the parties fail to take any steps in its prosecution or defense in the trial court for a period of five years. This provision shall be operative without formal order, but on ex parte motion of any party or other interested person, the trial court shall enter a formal order or dismissal as of the date of its abandonment.
"An appeal is abandoned when the parties fail to take any step in its prosecution or disposition for a period of five years; and the appellate court shall dismiss the appeal summarily."
Our jurisprudence is now firmly established that the term "steps in its prosecution", as contained in LSA-C.C.P. Art. 561, and its source, Louisiana Civil Code Art. 3519, requires some formal action before the court, intended to hasten the suit to judgment. In the very recent case of Henry v. Stephens, La.App., 169 So.2d 422 (3rd Cir.1964), the alleged step in the prosecution was that plaintiff had filed the transcript of testimony and paid the court reporter. We held as follows:
"Under the jurisprudence, normally, neither the filing of the transcript of testimony nor the payment of court costs for such transcript are regarded as steps in the prosecution or defense of an action. Sanders v. Luke, La.App. 1 Cir., 92 So.2d 156; Newson v. Bailey, La.App. 2 Cir., 88 So.2d 391; Reagor v. First National Life Insurance Co., La.App. 2 Cir., 85 So.2d 312. This is because of the jurisprudential definition of a 'step' in the prosecution or defense of the action as some 'formal move before the court intended to hasten judgment. A situation arising outside the record cannot be considered as a step taken in the prosecution of the suit. A step in the prosecution of a suit means something done in court towards the progress of the suit in court.' Sliman v. Araguel, 196 La. 859, 200 So. 280, 281."
The reason for the requirement that the "steps in its prosecution" must be something done formally in the court, is given by our Supreme Court in Sliman v. Araguel, 196 La. 859, 200 So. 280 (1941) as follows:
"In the case of State ex rel. Yazoo & M. V. R. Co. v. Edrington, Judge, 11 Orleans App. 288, Mr. Justice St. Paul, who later became a member of this court, as organ of the court stated:
" 'As it is perfectly clear that there could be no uncertainty whatever that a plaintiff had no intention of abandoning his suit, if he had actually taken some formal steps before the Court in connection therewith, it follows that the whole uncertainty grew out of things done informally and out of Court.
" 'Hence it was this species of uncertainty which the Legislature meant to eliminate.
" 'To hold then, that anything done in pais might constitute a step taken in the prosecution of the suit would be to restore the whole matter to the same chaotic condition in which it was before, and thus defeat absolutely the legislative purpose.' "
This legislative purpose of providing certainty in the court record itself as to when a suit is ripe for a motion of abandonment, was reaffirmed by our legislature when it added to LSA-C.C.P. Art. 561, the following provision, not found in the source Civil Code Art. 3519:
"This provision shall be operative without formal order, but on ex parte motion of any party or other interested person, the trial court shall enter a formal order or dismissal as of the date of its abandonment."
See also the Official Revision Comments under LSA-C.C.P. Art. 561, which support our view.
Plaintiff argues he did not at any time intend to abandon this suit; that he followed the procedures set forth for the taking of discovery depositions in our Code of Civil Procedure, Art. 1421, et seq.; and he should not be penalized because he took these depositions outside the record, under a stipulation of counsel, rather than by filing formal motions in court for the taking thereof.
This is indeed a persuasive argument. But we find ourselves in the same position as the court in Sanders v. Luke, La.App., 92 So.2d 156 (1st Cir.1957) where it said:
"As in most difficult decisions, we are faced with a border-line conflict between two sound policies: on the one hand, the desire to see every litigant have his day in court, and not to lose same by some technical carelessness or unavoidable delay; on the other hand, the legislative purpose that suits, once filed, should not indefinitely linger, preserving stale claims from the normal extinguishing operation of prescription. The pertinent portion of Article 3519 was adopted pursuant to the latter objective, and has been judicially interpreted as calling for the certainty of formal action in the judicial proceedings themselves, rather than the uncertainty of informal action by counsel outside thereof, as necessary to interrupt the running of the five years during which action is required."
For the reasons assigned, the judgment appealed is affirmed.
Affirmed.