Case Name: SENIOR ACCOUNTANTS, ANALYSTS & APPRAISERS ASSOCIATION v. CITY OF DETROIT
Court: Michigan Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1976-12-31
Citations: 399 Mich. 449
Docket Number: Docket No. 56982
Parties: SENIOR ACCOUNTANTS, ANALYSTS & APPRAISERS ASSOCIATION v CITY OF DETROIT
Judges: Coleman, Fitzgerald, and Lindemer, JJ., concurred with Williams, J.
Reporter: Michigan Reports
Volume: 399
Pages: 449–471

Head Matter:
SENIOR ACCOUNTANTS, ANALYSTS & APPRAISERS ASSOCIATION v CITY OF DETROIT
Docket No. 56982.
Argued October 6, 1976
(Calendar No. 3).
Decided December 31, 1976.
Rehearing denied 400 Mich 953.
Senior Accountants, Analysts and Appraisers Association, and its individual members brought an action for breach of contract in Wayne Circuit Court, James Montante, J., against their employer, the City of Detroit, for a declaratory judgment and for breach of contract. The employees had been ordered by the Mayor of Detroit to increase their work schedule from 35 to 40 hours per week. The Michigan Employment Relations Commission ordered the city to rescind its action but denied the employees’ claim for back pay for the extra five hours, and the plaintiffs did not appeal the commission’s decision. The circuit court granted summary judgment for defendant. The Court of Appeals, D. E. Holbrook, P. J., and Danhof and N. J. Kaufman, JJ., affirmed (Docket No. 19584). Plaintiffs appeal. Held:
The determination by the Employment Relations Commission that the plaintiffs were not entitled to back pay for the unfair labor practice operates as a collateral estoppel to the subsequent maintenance of a suit in circuit court to recover the same reimbursement as damages for breach of contract. The questions of fact necessary for determination of damages by the circuit court would be identical to questions of fact already determined by the Michigán Employment Relations Commission in concluding that awarding back pay would be improper in this case. The test for determining whether a back pay order is appropriate is whether the employee would have been paid absent the unlawful unilateral action, and the MERC trial examiner found that overtime would not have been paid. The circuit court, if damages were awarded, would have to determine whether the legal basis of the plaintiffs’ employment relation — past practice, ordinance, contract, or existing city policy — required monetary reimbursement, and these determinations had already been made by the trial examiner.
References for Points in Headnotes
[1] 2 Am Jur 2d, Administrative Law §§ 654-670, 676.
[2] 48 Am Jur 2d, Labor and Labor Relations §§ 1022, 1034, 1055, 1063-1077, 1100, 1184.
[3] 2 Am Jur 2d, Administrative Law §§ 324, 325, 497, 500.
[4] 46 Am Jur 2d, Judgments § 410.
[5, 6] 46 Am Jur 2d, Judgments § 394 et seq.
[7-9] 48 Am Jur 2d, Labor and Labor Relations §§ 1294, 1321-1324.
[10] 53 Am Jur 2d, Master & Servant §§ 76-79.
Affirmed.
Justice Levin, joined by the Chief Justice and Justice Ryan, dissented. The employees do not seek to relitigate the determination of the Employment Relations Commission that there was no history of payment for additional hours worked so that they had not lost pay as a result of the unfair labor practice. Rather, they claim contract damages for breach by the city of the collective bargaining agreements in increasing the number of hours in the work week. Whether requiring the employees to work additional hours or requiring additional work without compensation was a breach of the collective bargaining agreements is a question that depends on the terms of the agreements, all of the pertinent facts, and the law of contracts. The Employment Relations Commission expressly made no finding on whether or not the collective bargaining agreements had been breached. When a remedy is denied, not on the merits, but because it is not available in the forum where it is sought, the doctrine of collateral estoppel does not bar an action to obtain the remedy in the forum where it is available. Remedies available from an administrative tribunal are ordinarily not exclusive, and judicial remedies may fill out administrative remedies when they are inadequate. The unavailability of the back pay remedy does not preclude this subsequent action seeking the alternative or supplemental remedy of damages. The failure to award back pay does not resolve the underlying question of whether there is a right to damages for a breach of the collective bargaining agreements.
60 Mich App 606; 231 NW2d 479 (1975) affirmed.
Opinion op the Court
1. Estoppel — Collateral Estoppel — Employment Relations Commission — Back Pay.
A determination by the Employment Relations Commission which was not appealed, that city employees were not entitled to an award of back pay for an unfair labor practice operates as collateral estoppel to the subsequent maintenance of a suit in circuit court to recover the same reimbursement as damages for breach of contract, where the questions of fact necessary to determination of damages by the circuit court would be identical to questions of fact already determined by the Employment Relations Commission.
2. Labor Relations — Public Employment — -Unfair Labor Practice —Back Pay.
The test for determining whether an award of back pay or monetary reimbursement is appropriate under the public employment relations act is whether the employee in question would have been paid absent an unlawful unilateral action (MCL 423.216[b]; MSA 17.455[16] [b]).
3. Estoppel — Collateral Estoppel — Administrative Law.
The doctrines of collateral estoppel and res judicata apply to administrative determinations which are adjudicatory in nature, where a method of appeal is provided, and where it is clear that it was the legislative intention to make the determination final in the absence of an appeal.
4. Estoppel — Collateral Estoppel — Question of Fact.
A determination of a question of fact essential to a judgment is conclusive between parties in a subsequent different cause of action where the question is actually litigated.
Dissenting Opinion
Kavanagh, C. J., and Levin and Ryan, JJ.
5. Labor Relations — Unfair Labor Practice — Back Pay — Damages —Collateral Estoppel — Res Judicata.
Contract damages for alleged breach of a collective bargaining agreement in requiring city employees to work additional hours, in contrast with an award of back pay to remedy an unfair labor practice, do not depend on a showing that the employees would have been paid for the additional hours even if the city had not increased the work week, and the factual and legal issues respecting a claim for compensation in a law action are sufficiently different from those in an unfair labor practice proceeding before the Employment Relations Commission that a decision in the administrative proceeding denying an award of back pay does not preclude a law action for damages under the doctrines of res judicata or collateral estoppel.
6. Estoppel — Collateral Estoppel — Remedies.
The doctrine of collateral estoppel does not bar an action to obtain a remedy in a forum where it is available although the remedy has been denied in another forum, not on the merits, but because it is not available in the forum where it is sought.
7. Labor Relations — Collective Bargaining Agreement — Breach of Contract — Damages.
Whether damages are recoverable by city employees under a collective bargaining agreement for being required to work additional hours or for such additional work being required without compensation depends upon the terms of the agreement, all the pertinent facts, and the law of contracts, not on the historical fact whether payment has ever been made for additional hours in a normal work week or whether such payment could ever be made under existing city policy.
8. Labor Relations — Employment Relations Commission — Back Pay — Damages.
A conclusion of the Employment Relations Commission that a back pay award is not available under the remedial standards it has developed does not preclude an action for damages for breach of a collective bargaining agreement where the commission’s ñndings are not inconsistent with maintenance of the action at law.
9. Labor Relations — Employment Relations Commission — Remedies. .
The power of the Employment Relations Commission to order affirmative relief under the labor relations acts is merely incidental to the primary legislative purpose to stop and to prevent unfair labor practices; the Legislature did not establish a general scheme authorizing the Employment Relations Commission to award full compensatory damages for injuries caused by wrongful conduct.
10. Master and Servant — Employment Contract — Additional Work- — Compensation.
Requiring an employee to give up his time and expend labor beyond the requirements of an employment contract may entitle him to compensation for the time and labor expended; payment to an employee of the full weekly wage agreed upon in the contract does not preclude an action for additional compensation for additional hours worked.
David N Walsh (George Stone, of counsel) for plaintiffs.
Kermit G. Bailer, Corporation Counsel, and Anna J. Diggs and Linda D. Bernard, Assistants Corporation Counsel, for defendant.

Opinion:
Williams, J.
The issue in this case is limited to the consideration of whether an unappealed determination by the Michigan Employment Relations Commission that plaintiff is not entitled to "back pay" for a determined unfair labor practice operates as collateral estoppel to the subsequent maintenance of a suit in circuit court to recover the same reimbursement as "damages" for breach of contract.
We hold that plaintiffs are barred from suing for "damages" under a breach of contract theory by the doctrine of collateral estoppel because the questions of fact necessary for determination of "damages" by the circuit court in this case would be identical to questions of fact already determined by the Michigan Employment Relations Commission in concluding "back pay" was improper in this case.
Accordingly, we uphold the circuit court and the Court of Appeals.
I — Facts
This case was submitted to the Court of Appeals on an agreed statement of facts, in compliance with GCR 1963, 812.10. The Court of Appeals well summarized the pertinent facts as follows:
"Certain of the plaintiffs prior to 1970 were employed in various city departments where, pursuant to Ordinance 90-F and Ordinance 303-G, they were allowed a reduced work schedule of 35 rather than 40 hours per week. On July 17, 1970 the mayor of the City of Detroit ordered all employees to begin working 40 hours per week. This order was held in an action in the Wayne County Circuit Court to be ineffective because, under the ordinances, only department heads had the power to so alter the work schedule. A comparable order was subsequently issued by the appropriate department heads requiring these employees to work 40 hours for the same annual salary they had received for 35 hours of work per week.
"On August 24, 1970, many of the unions representing city employees affected by this change filed an unfair labor practice charge with the Michigan Employment Relations Commission. On December 28, 1970, a trial examiner rendered a decision and recommended issuance of a cease and desist order to compel the city to rescind its unilateral action, and also recommending that the employees' claim for back pay for the extra five hours per week be denied. On March 12, 1971, the full Michigan Employment Relations Commission affirmed the trial examiner's decision and order. The City of Detroit filed an application for leave to appeal to this Court which was denied. The affected employees and their unions made no effort to appeal the commission's decision.
"In July, 1973, 200 members of the Senior Accountants, Analysts and Appraisers Association brought a class action seeking to recover compensation for the extra time worked during the period of approximately nine months before the cease and desist order was entered. On February 19, 1974, the trial court granted defendant city's motion for a summary judgment accompanied by a letter to the attorneys indicating 'that the defense of res judicata and/or collateral estoppel is valid for the reasons and grounds asserted by defendant city in its brief.' " 60 Mich App 606, 608-609; 231 NW2d 479 (1975).
On April 25, 1975, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court. Plaintiffs applied for leave to appeal. This Court granted leave on December 5, 1975.
II — Discussion
We granted leave in this case "limited to the consideration of this issue: Does an unappealed determination by the Michigan Employment Relations Commission, that plaintiff is not entitled to 'back pay' for a determined unfair labor practice, operate as a collateral estoppel to the subsequent maintenance of a suit in circuit court to recover the same reimbursement as 'damages' for breach of contract?"
In resolving this issue, it is essential that we keep in mind the precise questions of law and fact decided by the Michigan Employment Relations Commission (MERC) trial examiner. First, the trial examiner held, as a matter of law, that the city's unilateral increase of the work week to 40 hours "without notice and bargaining with the representatives of its employees violated § 10(a) and (e) of [the public employment relations act] PERA." Accordingly, the trial examiner recommended "the usual remedial order in such cases". This decision and order of the trial examiner was affirmed by the full Michigan Employment Relations Commission and is not in dispute in this appeal.
Second, the trial examiner was asked by the charging parties "that the city be required to pay all employees affected by the increase in hours time and one-half for all hours worked between 35 and 40" as an additional remedial order to the order stated supra. Clearly, it was within the trial examiner's power to order such a "back-pay" remedy. As § 16(b) of the public employment relations act, MCLA 423.216(b); MSA 17.455(16)(b) provides in pertinent part:
"If upon the preponderance of the testimony taken the board is of the opinion that any person named in the complaint has engaged in or is engaging in the unfair labor practice, then it shall state its findings of fact and shall issue and cause to be served on the person an order requiring him to cease and desist from the unfair labor practice, and to take such affirmative action including reinstatement of employees with or without back pay, as will effectuate the policies of this act."
The trial examiner correctly noted that the legal test for determining whether a "back-pay" order (or monetary reimbursement) is appropriate is "whether or not the employee in question would have been paid absent the unlawful unilateral action". Hooker Chemical Corp, 186 NLRB No 49; 75 LRRM 1357 (1970). Applying this test to the case before him, the trial examiner made the following determinations of fact:
"The record in the instant case conclusively establishes that under the ordinances and the collective bargaining agreements applicable to employees working a 35 hour week, the practice has been that the pay week is computed on a 40 hour basis and no overtime is paid for work between 35 and 40 hours in a normal work week. The only exception to this policy and practice has been those instances where the employees involved worked a 35 hour week and were called in to work a sixth day of work. This exception to the policy of crediting overtime only for work in excess of 40 hours was designed to alleviate a hardship on employees required to work a sixth day without forcing them to work five hours without any compensation or compensatory time.
In the absence of any evidence to establish that under past practice, ordinance, or contract such payment has ever been made for the additional five hours work in a normal work week, or that such payment even could be made under existing city policy, the undersigned can find no basis for a reimbursement remedy herein. Therefore, the undersigned will refuse to recommend any monetary reimbursement or compensatory time as part of the remedy in this case."
The full MERC also affirmed this decision of the trial examiner. Furthermore, as mentioned in the facts, the affected employees and their unions made no effort to appeal the affirmance of the full commission.
Plaintiffs Senior Accountants, et al., then brought suit in circuit court against the city alleging breach of contract and asking the court to award damages "in an amount equal to five hours wages per, at overtime rates, for the full period they were forced to work 40 hours, plus interest at five percent (5%) from the date of work ", i.e. damages based on the extra 5 hours per week worked since the 40-hours work order went into effect (essentially the same remedy sought before MERC). The question before us is whether plaintiffs are barred from maintaining this suit because of the doctrine of collateral estoppel. In this particular case, the answer to this question is yes.
It is established law in this state that the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel apply to administrative determinations which are adjudi catory in nature, where a method of appeal is provided, and where it is clear that it was the legislative intention to make the determination final in the absence of an appeal. Roman Cleanser Co v Murphy, 386 Mich 698, 703-704; 194 NW2d 704 (1972), reversing and adopting Judge (now Justice) Levin's dissent in Roman Cleanser Co v Murphy, 29 Mich App 155, 166-171; 185 NW2d 87 (1970).
The applicable test for collateral estoppel in this case is accurately stated in § 68 of the Restatement Judgments, p 293:
"Where a question of fact essential to the judgment is actually litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment, the determination is conclusive between parties in a subsequent action on a different cause of action ,"
See Howell v Vito's Trucking & Excavating Co, 386 Mich 37, 41-42; 191 NW2d 313 (1971); Jones v Chambers, 353 Mich 674, 680-681; 91 NW2d 889 (1958).
In the instant case, if the trial court were to rule on whether plaintiffs are entitled to the "damages" for which they complain ("an amount equal to five hours wages per, at overtime rates, for the full period they were forced to work 40 hours"), the court would have to determine whether the legal basis of plaintiffs' employment relation — past practice, ordinance, contract, or existing city policy — required such monetary reimbursement. But the trial examiner made these precise determinations in finding "back pay" was improper in this case. See Joint Appendix, exhibit A, pp 48-50, and discussion supra. In other words, the questions of fact necessary for a determination of "damages" by the trial court in this case would be identical to the questions of fact already determined by the trial examiner in his conclusion that "back pay" was improper in this case. Consequently, plaintiffs are barred under the doctrine of collateral estoppel from re-litigating these same questions of fact in their subsequent action for "damages" based on a breach of contract theory.
We uphold the circuit court and the Court of Appeals.
No costs, a public question.
Coleman, Fitzgerald, and Lindemer, JJ., concurred with Williams, J.
The Court of Appeals noted:
"The grounds asserted in support of the motion were that the issues raised in the complaint were barred by a prior judgment. The motion should properly have been brought under the accelerated judgment provisions of GCR 1963, 116.1(5). Dunlap v Southfield, 54 Mich App 398, 399, 400; 221 NW2d 237 (1974)." 60 Mich App 606, 608, fn 1.
The order was to "require the city to cease and desist from unilaterally changing hours and other terms and conditions of employment of its employees without notice and bargaining with the collective bargaining representatives of said employees; restore the status quo by placing all employees whose hours were unlawfully increased back on the same work week which they were working prior to the unlawful increase in working hours; require the city to bargain collectively with the collective bargaining representatives of their employees with respect to hours and other terms and conditions of employment; and post appropriate copies of a notice to all employees, setting forth the terms of the recommended order herein."
The doctrine of collateral estoppel also requires that "the second action is between the same persons who were parties to the prior action". Restatement Judgments, § 68, p 294; see, also, Howell, supra, and Jones, supra. Plaintiff union was, of course, party to the action before MERC. The individual plaintiffs in this case do not dispute the Court of Appeals holding that "[t]he individual plaintiffs here are substantially identical to the labor organizations which represented them as charging parties before MERC", 60 Mich App 612. See Steelman v Portage, 12 Mich App 334; 162 NW2d 837 (1968), and cases cited therein.