Case Name: Hiram P. Rider, plaintiff in error, v. The B. & M. R. R. Co., defendant in Error
Court: Nebraska Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Nebraska
Decision Date: 1883-01
Citations: 14 Neb. 120
Docket Number: 
Parties: Hiram P. Rider, plaintiff in error, v. The B. & M. R. R. Co., defendant in Error.
Judges: 
Reporter: Nebraska Reports
Volume: 14
Pages: 120–129

Head Matter:
Hiram P. Rider, plaintiff in error, v. The B. & M. R. R. Co., defendant in Error.
1. Railroad grant: eight of way. The grant of right of way to'the Burlington & Missouri River Railroad Company over the lands of the United States, by Seo. 18 of the act of July 2d, 1864, was of a present interest, and notice from the passage of the act to all persons dealing with public lands, within the prescribed limits, of the company’s interest therein.
2. -: changed line of koad. And where after one location of its road, the railroad company changed its line pursuant to the act of congress, approved May 6,1870, U. S. Stat. at Large, 118, Held, That a purchaser of land from the United States, after the passage of the act, took it subject to the right of way under the new location afterwards made.
Error to the district court for Saline county. Tried below before Weaver, J.
J. JR. Webster, for plaintiff in error.
1. The entry made by a pre-emptor, when once consummated by performance of the conditions and payment made, is equivalent to purchase at the date of such location. Therefore the title of Rider and his right to compensation is as though full payment had been made June 7th, 1870. Prior to this date defendant had made no location of its line on these lands. On the contrary it had made a location on a line passing some miles north of these lands, and on that location had obtained the defining of its grant and the withdrawal of the granted lands from market. Even as late as May 6th, 1870, congress had passed an act permitting change in the location of its line, but no actual change of its line had been made when the pre-emption entry was made, nor till after February 20th, 1871, and probably not till between the 17th and 20th of March, 1871, which is the nearest approximation to the date that the chief engineer and superintendent Doane can give, and he is the sole witness. May 14th, 1870, the company had, besides its original fixed line, at least three new trial lines passing north and south of these lands.
2. This case is not dependent on the same principle as that of St. Joseph, & Denver It. It. v. Baldwin, 103 U. S., p. 426. Although the U. S. supreme court in that case came to a different conclusion to that reached by this court in the same cause, 7 Neb., 247, yet the opinion and reasoning of this court have the assent of the greater portion of the bar. In that case, however, the words and terms of the grant were somewhat different. Compare 13 U. S. Stat. at Large, 364, sec. 18. 14 U. S. Stat. at Large, 211, sec. 6. Admit the identity of the terms and effect of the grant in each case, the circumstances were different. In the case decided at the time of the entry, the railway company had a floating grant of right of way between two fixed termini. It had accepted the grant, and this was some notice that it might demand a right of way over these lands on a definite location of its line. Of the same character was Flint v. Gordon, 41 Mich., 420. In the case at bar a definite location had been made after the acceptance of the grant. This should fairly be held to be a fixing of any floating right of location, a segregation and definition of its claims for right of way. It was in effect a release of any floating right of way location, and consent that entry or location by private parties could safely be made on this land. The act permitting change of location (May 6th, 1870) was a mere license and not obligatory on the company, nor yet conferring any right as against others purchasing from the United States till it had been by defendant accepted and acted upon. This did not occur until after the lands in question had been segregated from the mass of the public domain by Englebright’s settlement and entry, when it was too late for defendant to appropriate them without compensation.
Marquett, Deweese & Hall, for defendant in error,
cited: Fitzpatrick v. Bubois, 2 Sawyer, 434. Frisbie v. Whitney, 9 Wallace, 191. The Yosemite Valley Case, 15 Wallace, 86. Grinter v. K. P. By. Co., 23 Kansas, 656. Merritt v. Northern B. B. Co., 12 Barb., 606.

Opinion:
Lake, Ch. J.
The controlling principle in this case is not different from that applied by the supreme court of the United States in the case of the St. Joseph & Denver City Railroad Co. v. Baldwin, 103 U. S. Reports, 426. The statute giving the right of way there considered is not essentially different from the one granting the right of way here in controversy. In both statutes, words of present grant are employed to designate the right given. To the St. Joseph & Denver City company, the grant is in these words, viz.: "That the right of way through the public lands be, and the same is hereby granted to said St. Joseph & Denver City Railroad company," etc. Sec. 6, act of July 23d, 1866,14 U. S. Statutes at Large, 211. The grant in this case is as follows: "And for the purpose of enabling said Burlington & Missouri River Railroad Company tp construct that portion of their road herein authorized, the right of way through the public lands is hereby granted to said company for the construction of said road." Sec. 18, act of July 2d, 1864, 13 U. S. Statutes at Large, 364.
Being a grant of a present interest, this language is notice from the passage of the act to all persons dealing with public lands within the prescribed limits of the grantee's interest therein. In this respect the grant of the right of way differs from that donating land to aid in the construction of the road, which is expressly limited in its operation to the time when the route is definitely fixed. Vance v. B. & M. R. R. Co., 12 Neb., 285.
Speaking upon this subject of right of way under the act of July 23d, 1866, in the case first above cited, Mr. Justice Field said: "But the grant of the right of way by the sixth section contains no reservations or exceptions. It is a present absolute grant, subject to no conditions, except those necessarily implied, such as that the road shall be constructed and used for the purpose designated." And again: "The uncertainty as to the ultimate location of the line of the road, is recognized throughout the act; and where any qualification is intended in the operation of the grant of lands from this circumstance, it is designated. Hád a similar qualification upon the absolute grant of the right of way been intended, it can hardly be doubted that it would have been expressed. The fact that none is expressed is conclusive that none exists."
It is claimed, however, that the case wherein this language was used differs from the one we are now considering in this, that the right of way there upheld was on the first and only line adopted by the railroad company, while here it appears that another and different location had been made as early as the 15th of June, 1865, and the right now contended for was selected in pursuance of a change therein, by which the road was made to cross the plaintiff's land. And it is urged that, although this change was authorized by act of Congress, yet it should not be held to confer any right upon the railroad company'as against a purchase from the United States, prior to the definite location of the new route; that the first location should "be held to be a fixing of any floating right of location, a segregation and definition of its claims for right of way."
We cannot assent to the application of this proposition to this case. If the plaintiff had acquired the government title to the land after the first location of the road, and before the passage of the act authorizing a change, there would be great strength in the position here taken. But as we view the effect of this act, it was, from the date of its passage,to bring section eighteen of the act of July 2,1864, above referred to, into full operation as to public lands, not otherwise disposed of, which the new location might cross. The act authorizing this change is, " Be it enacted," etc., " that the Burlington and Missouri River Railroad Company, or its assigns in the state of Nebraska, may so far change the location of that portion of its line that lies Avest of the city of Lincoln, in said state, as shown by the map thereof, now on file in the general land office of the United States, so as to secure a better and more practicable route, and to connect with the Union Pacific railroad at or near the Fort Kearney reservation, said new line to be located on the land grant made by the United States to aid in its construction. Provided, however, that said line shall not be located farther south than the southern boundary line of township -number seven, in said state, and said change shall not impair the rights to, nor change the location of said land grant, and the said company, or its assigns, shall receive no different or other or greater quantity of land than if this act had not been passed and no change had been made in the located line of said railroad."
It will be observed that there is nothing in this language evincing any intent or disposition on the part of congress to withdraw any right given by the act of July 2, 1864, which might be applicable to this new line, except that the location and extent c f the land grant as already determined should not be changed.
We are of opinion that when the plaintiff's grantor, Englebright,pre-empted thislandon the 7th day of June,1870, he took it subject to the right of the defendant to locate its new line across it. And the judgment of the district court, being in conformity with this view, is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.