Case Name: Fred S. BALL, Appellant, v. INLAND MUTUAL INSURANCE CO., Huntington, West Virginia, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1960-06-02
Citations: 121 So. 2d 470
Docket Number: No. 59-51
Parties: Fred S. BALL, Appellant, v. INLAND MUTUAL INSURANCE CO., Huntington, West Virginia, Appellee.
Judges: CARROLL, CHAS., J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 121
Pages: 470–479

Head Matter:
Fred S. BALL, Appellant, v. INLAND MUTUAL INSURANCE CO., Huntington, West Virginia, Appellee.
No. 59-51.
District Court ot Appeal of Florida. Third District.
June 2, 1960.
Rehearing Denied June 21, 1960.
Headley, Mosca & Sudduth, Miami, for appellant.
Morehead, Forrest, Gotthardt & Green-berg, Miami, for appellee. .

Opinion:
HORTON, Chief Judge.
This appeal was taken by the plaintiff from a judgment entered upon a directed verdict in a garnishment proceedings.
Prior to the institution of the garnishment proceedings, the plaintiff had recovered, in a personal injury action arising from an automobile accident, a judgment against one McNaughton, the driver of a truck owned by Bestways, Inc., and insured by Inland Mutual Insurance Company, the appellee here. In the garnishment proceedings from which this appeal arises, the plaintiff proceeded on the theory that the insurance carrier was indebted to the driver, McNaughton, by the terms of the policy insuring Bestways, which provided:
"With respect to the insurance for bodily injury liability and for property damage liability the unqualified word 'insured' includes the named insured and also includes any person while using the automobile and any person or organization legally responsible for the use thereof, provided the actual use of the automobile is by the named insured or with his permission."
The garnishee denied liability, contending that at the time of the accident, McNaughton was not driving the truck with the permission of the insured.
At the conclusion of the testimony of appellant's sole witness, McNaughton, he rested his case. The trial court thereupon directed a verdict for appellee. Judgment was entered upon the directed verdict and appeal was taken from that judgment.
The sole question raised on appeal is whether or not the trial court erred in granting the appellee's motion for directed verdict at the close of appellant's case.
Appellant has cited, and we are cognizant of the many cases latest of which is Brady v. Kane, Fla.App.1959, 111 So.2d 472, 474, which state the proposition that:
"On a motion for directed verdict the trial court will consider the testimony adduced in the cause in the light most favorable to the party moved against; and the moving party admits every conclusion favorable to the adverse party which may rationally be inferred by the jury from the evidence before it."
However, in applying the principle enunciated in the Brady case, we must also consider the application of the converse rule which requires the trial court to direct a verdict for the defendant if, from the evidence submitted, a jury could not lawfully find a verdict for the plaintiff. See Swilley v. Economy Cab Co. of Jacksonville, Fla. 1951, 56 So.2d 914; Gilmer v. Rubin, Fla.App.1958, 98 So.2d 367; Traurig v. Spear, Fla.App.1958, 102 So.2d 165; Manganelli v. Covington, Fla.App. 1959, 114 So. 2d 320.
Upon a careful review of the record and application of the principles stated, we conclude that the able trial judge was correct in directing a verdict since the evidence demonstrated that a lawful verdict for the appellant could not have been rendered by the jury.
Affirmed.
CARROLL, CHAS., J., concurs.
MILLEDGE, STANLEY, Associate Judge, dissents.