Case Name: GEORGIA A. BURGESS v. LEO M. CRAFTS
Court: Minnesota Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Minnesota
Decision Date: 1931-11-06
Citations: 184 Minn. 384
Docket Number: No. 28,463
Parties: GEORGIA A. BURGESS v. LEO M. CRAFTS.
Judges: 
Reporter: Minnesota Reports
Volume: 184
Pages: 384–387

Head Matter:
GEORGIA A. BURGESS v. LEO M. CRAFTS.
November 6, 1931.
No. 28,463.
Smith, Callahan é Carlson, Eloi Bauers, and Bussell Smith, for appellant.
Sweet, Jolmson do Sands and Thompson, Hessian d Fletcher, for respondent.
Reported in 238 N. W. 798.

Opinion:
Loring, J.
In an action to recover for personal injuries suffered in an automobile accident, the defendant had a verdict, and the plaintiff appealed from an order denying her motion for a new trial.
The accident occurred on the Lincoln higliAvay in the state of Pennsylvania on July 20, 1928. Plaintiff Avas a guest in the defendant's car and Avas riding on the left side of the rear seat at the time she Avas injured. The defendant is a resident of Minneapolis and Avas taking his wife and her tAvo sisters on an automobile trip through the east. July 20 they had been driving over the hills and shortly before the accident had encountered a rainstorm, Avhich made the tarvia or bitulithic pavement very slippery. The defendant had been ascending a hill at approximately 30 miles an hour, and Avhen he arrived at the top, as he looked doAvn the steep hill on the other side, he discovered some cattle about 150 to 200 feet ahead and near the road. Théy were evidently just about coming onto the pavement. He immediately threw out his clutch and put his brakes on hard. As a result the car SAvayed and Avent into a whirling skid on the steep hill. It tipped over and injured the plaintiff.
The case was submitted to the jury on the question of the defendant's negligence and the plaintiff's contributory negligence. Plaintiff objected to the submission of her contributory negligence to the jury; and if it Avas improper for the court to do so she is entitled to a new trial unless the evidence is conclusive that the defendant Avas free from negligence. On the latter question Ave are of the opinion that the court was correct in submitting it to the jury. Reasonable men might differ as to' whether or not defendant exercised, that degree of care in handling his car Avhich a person of ordinary prudence would have exercised, Avhen confronted with a like situation. On slippery pavement of the character stated, a violent setting of the brakes, accompanied by throwing out the clutch on a steep hill, might be considered by drivers of ordinary prudence to be calculated to cause just such an accident. At least it Avas a question for the jury.
We come then to the question Avhether it was proper to submit to the jury the question of contributory negligence. A guest passenger is of course required to exercise ordinary care for his own safety, but that does not mean that he has to assume responsibility for the management of the car. This court has upon occasion defined the duties of a guest and laid doAvn the rule that he is not required to be constantly on the alert to discover dangers which the driver may perchance not discover. When he is riding Avith an apparently competent diWer his duty requires him to warn the driver of a danger which he has become aware of and which he has reason to believe the driver has overlooked or is not aAvare of. In the case at bar the speed of 30 miles an hour up the hill Avas not such evidence of carelessness on the part of defendant as to require a protest from a guest of ordinary prudence. If this speed were all the negligence chargeable to defendant, we should be inclined to the view that there Avas no evidence to go to the jury on- that issue. With the management of the car, when the defendant was confronted Avith the extremely slippery hill and the cattle threatening to cross the road, the plaintiff obviously could not have interfered or have done anything to prevent the accident. She Avas not a driver; and even if she had been and had known how to handle a car to prevent skidding under such circumstances, there would have been no opportunity to advise the defendant. The damage Avas done before anyone could interfere. In this connection we cite the cases' of Wicker v. North States Const. Co. Inc. 183 Minn. 79, 85, 235 N. W. 630, 632, and Engholm v. Northland Transportation Co. 184 Minn. 349, 238 N. W. 795.
The plaintiff takes exception to the court's charge in quoting from defendant's ansAver and in giving so many of defendant's requests to charge that too much emphasis was placed on the principles of laAv which placed the burden upon the plaintiff. This court has disapproved of quoting from the pleadings, but in the case at bar the quotation was short and harmless. In charging a jury Ave dis approve of the practice of giving such numerous requests to charge by either party as to throw the charge out of balance and to overemphasize the principles contended for by either side. Usually it is better for the court to cover the situation in its own language without giving undue emphasis by repetition or otherwise to any phase of the law and thus mislead the jury into believing that the emphasized principles should govern their verdict. Juries are too prone to give great weight to what they suspect, perhaps incorrectly, is the trial court's views on questions of fact.
The order appealed from is reversed.