Case Name: Jay H. ADAMS, Petitioner, v. The AUCHTER COMPANY, a corporation, and State of Florida Department of Commerce, Industrial Relations Commission, Respondents
Court: Florida Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1976-08-25
Citations: 339 So. 2d 623
Docket Number: No. 47027
Parties: Jay H. ADAMS, Petitioner, v. The AUCHTER COMPANY, a corporation, and State of Florida Department of Commerce, Industrial Relations Commission, Respondents.
Judges: ROBERTS, Acting C. J., and HENSLEY and MELVIN, Circuit Judges, concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 339
Pages: 623–626

Head Matter:
Jay H. ADAMS, Petitioner, v. The AUCHTER COMPANY, a corporation, and State of Florida Department of Commerce, Industrial Relations Commission, Respondents.
No. 47027.
Supreme Court of Florida.
Aug. 25, 1976.
Rehearing Denied Dec. 13, 1976.
Joseph Egan, Jr., of Hamilton, Douglas & Bennett, Orlando, for petitioner.
Robert C. Lanquist and William H. Andrews, of Hamilton & Bowden, Jacksonville, for respondents.

Opinion:
ENGLAND, Justice.
This case was certified to us by the First District Court of Appeal after it had rendered the decision reported at 304 So.2d 487. The certification recites that the decision passes upon a question of great public interest as contemplated by Article V, Section 3(b)(3) of the Florida Constitution. We agree and accept jurisdiction.
The undisputed facts are set forth in the district court's opinion. The sole question for our review is whether unemployment compensation benefits are payable under Chapter 443, Florida Statutes, to a claimant union member who refuses to accept work of the same type that he normally performs, at wages substantially similar to those he normally receives, because the proposed work is to be performed on a non-union job. Cast in the language of our statute, the question is whether a claimant in that position "is able to work and is available to work", or whether he "has failed without good cause . to accept suitable work when offered to him." We hold that unemployment benefits are not available under these circumstances, thus answering the certified question in the negative. We can add little to the analysis, reasoning and authorities set forth in the district court's opinion. The decision below is in accord with the view of virtually every state which has considered the same question. It comports with the philosophy of our unemployment compensation law, as expressed in the legislature's declaration of public policy, that funds under the act shall be "used for the benefit of persons unemployed through no fault of their own." For these reasons, we affirm the decision below.
ROBERTS, Acting C. J., and HENSLEY and MELVIN, Circuit Judges, concur.
ADKINS, J., dissents with opinion.
.Numerous incidental issues raised in this proceeding have been reviewed and resolved in the district court's opinion. We have considered and approve of their disposition below. A number of other arguments presented here for the first time have also been considered, and found to be without merit.
. Section 443.05(l)(c)(l), Fla.Stat. (1973).
. Section 443.06(2), Fla.Stat. (1973).
. See e. g., Norman v. Employment Security Agency, 83 Idaho 1, 356 P.2d-913 (Idaho 1960); 56 A.L.R.2d 1015.
. Section 443.02, Fla.Stat. (1973).