Case Name: RYAN v. NEW ENGLAND MUTUAL LIFE INSURANCE CO.
Court: Supreme Court of South Carolina
Jurisdiction: South Carolina
Decision Date: 1921-06-30
Citations: 116 S.C. 469
Docket Number: 10672
Parties: RYAN v. NEW ENGLAND MUTUAL LIFE INSURANCE CO
Judges: Justices Watts and Fraser concur.
Reporter: South Carolina Reports
Volume: 116
Pages: 469–483

Head Matter:
10672
RYAN v. NEW ENGLAND MUTUAL LIFE INSURANCE CO
(108 S. E. 182)
Insurance — Whether Insurer, in Accepting Usual Premium and Failing to Reply to Insured's Letter Stating His Understand ing on Policy Terms, Waived Payment oe Extra War Prtmtum ' Held eor Jury. — Under a life insurance policy limiting the insurer’s liability, unless the insured, if he engaged in military service in time of war, paid an extra premium within 31 days, where insured more than 31 days after entering an officer’s training school, wrote to the company’s agent, informing him of such fact and asking whether, if he died in the service, his beneficiary could collect, to which the agent replied that she could, but that, when he received his commission, he must pay the extra premium, whereupon insured wrote, enclosing a check for the regular premium, and stating he understood from the agent’s letter that until he went abroad there was no extra premium, and the agent accepted the premium and made no reply, such letter was admissible, the evidence showing it had been received, and the contents, if correctly stated by plaintiff, tending to show waiver, which was for the jury.
Before Mendel L: Smith, Special Judge, Sumter, Spring term 1920.
Affirmed.
Action by Loretta M. Ryan against New England Mutual Life Insurance Co. Judgment for plaintiff and defendant appeals.
Trie exceptions directed to be reported were as follows:
I. That his Honor erred in admitting in evidence the. copy of the letter of J. B. Ryan, Jr., to R. J. Guinn, dated June 30, 1918, and in submitting the said letter to the jury to be considered by them on the question of waiver by the defendant of the conditions in the policy providing that upon the assured entering the military or naval service in time of war that the liability of the company in the event of the death of the insured while so engaged or within six months thereafter should be limited to the amount of the premiums paid. The error being:
(a) That the said Robt. J. Guinn and Miss Hanft, the only persons who could have received said letter, both testified that no such letter was received by them, that they did not know of its existence, and therefore the presumption that might otherwise arise that the letter was received by reason of the testimony of the plaintiff of its mailing was completely rebutted, arid there was no direct evidence or other circumstances showing that the letter had been received.
(b) That the said letter was a self-serving declaration and there being no- evidence that the defendant or any agent thereof received the letter or had knowledge of its existence, or acted upon it in any way, that the said letter was incompetent, and should not have been admitted in evidence or submitted to the jury on the issue of waiver.
(c) That his Honor should have struck the letter out of the record on motion of the defendant at the end of the defendant’s testimony, as the letter was admitted in evidence by reason of the presumption of the receipt of a letter which had been duly mailed and for the purpose of showing a waiver on the part of the defendant of the coridi tions contained in the applications and policy of insurance and was an effort by the plaintiff to prove that the defendant waived the conditions of the policy on the presumption of. the receipt of a letter which actually was not received.
2. That his Honor erred in ruling out a portion of the testimony of Miss Hanft as appears on page 4, of the Case, the error being that this testimony was competent as showing the custom of the defendant upon receiving notice that an assured had entered the military service.
3. That his Honor erred in not directing a verdict in favor of the defendant on the first ground set out in the motion, the error being that the original application and the supplemental application and the conditions of the policy provided that if the assured within five years from the date of the policy shall engage in any military or naval service in time of war the liability of the company in the event of the death of the assured, or within six months thereafter, will be limited to the return of the premiums (laid thereon, unless before engaging in such service or within thirty-one days thereafter the insured shall pay to the company at its home office in Boston, Mass., such extra premium as may be required by the company. The error being that this was a reasonable and valid condition and the contract between the parties, and it having appeared conclusively that the assured did enter the military service of the government and did not receive permission from the company, and that the assured failed to pay the additional premium of $37.50 per thousand of insurance as required by the company, and the assured having died in the military service that the beneficiary was not entitled to recover beyond the amount of the premiums actually paid.
4. That his Honor erred in not directing a verdict for the defendant on the second ground set out in the motion, the error being that the company having tendered to the beneficiary a check for the premiums paid on the policy, that this was all that the beneficiary was entitled to under the terms of the policy and the application signed by the assured. 1
5. That his Honor erred in not directing a verdict for the defendant under the third and fourth and fifth grounds of the motion, the error being that under the terms of the policy the beneficiary was only entitled to recover the amount of the premiums paid, to wit: $163.00, as there was offered in evidence a letter from the general- agent of the defendant company to the assured advising him that the additional premium would amount to- $37.50 per thousand of insurance, which must be paid as soon as he entered the military service of the government, otherwise the company’s liability would be limited to the return of the premiums in case he should die while in active service or within six months • thereafter.
6. That his Honor erred in submitting to the jury the question of waiver on the part of the defendant of the payment of the additional premiums for war service, there being no competent evidence on the part of the plaintiff that the defendant waived the said condition, but on the contrary the testimony all shows that the company insisted upon the performance of the conditions and the payment of the extra war premium.
7. That his Honor erred in charging the jury on the question of waiver and submitting to the jury the question of waiver on the part of the defendant of the payment of the additional premium under what is commonly known as the “War Clause,” there being no competent evidence showing any act of waiver on the part of of the defendant or any agent of the defendant, and on the contrary the evidence is conclusive that the defendant insisted upon the additional premium being paid and so notified the assured in writing.
8. That his Honor erred, it is respectfully submitted, in not granting the motion of the defendant for a new trial, as the verdict of the jury was contrary to the evidence and his Honor’s charge in that the jury having found the full amount for the plaintiff, and the presiding Judge having charged the jury that the terms and conditions of the policy were valid, that the jury necessarily based their verdict upon a waiver by the defendant of the terms and conditions of the policy, and there being no evidence of any waiver by the defendant, that the verdict should have been set aside and a new trial ordered.
9. That his Honor should have granted a new trial on motion of the defendant on the ground that the only way the jury could find for the plaintiff was on the ground of waiver, and the only evidence of waiver was the introduction of the copy of an alleged letter claiming to have been sent the agent of the defendant, which was never received, and this was not sufficient evidence upon which the jury could base a verdict for the plaintiff.
Messrs. Lee & Moise and Buist & Buist, for appellant.
Messrs. Lee & Moise cite;. ■ War clause in policy is valid and binding on assured: 218 S. W., 958; 186 Pac., 1069, (Wash.). Waiver: 84 S. C., 95; 40 Cyc/, 259.
Mr. J. H. Clifton, for respondent.
Oral argument.
June 30, 1921.

Opinion:
The opinion of the Court was delivered by
Mr. ChieE' Justice Gary.
This is an action on a policy of life insurance, issued by the defendant, to Jno. B. Ryan, Jr., on the 26th of July, 1917, in the sum of $2,500, wherein his wife, the plaintiff, was named as the beneficiary.
The application of Jno. B. Ryan, Jr., for the insurance, contained these words:
"I further agree that said policy shall be void, if within five years from its date I engage in military or naval service in time of war, without the written consent of the company previously obtained."
The supplemental application contains this provision:
"If within five years from the date of this policy the insured shall engage in any military or naval service in time of war, the liability of the company in event of the death of the insured while so engaged, or within six months thereafter, will be limited to the return of the premiums paid hereon, exclusive of any extra premium paid for military or naval service, less any indebtedness to the company hereon; unless before engaging in such service or within thirty-one days thereafter, or at the time of paying the first premium due hereon, if the insured shall be then so engaged, the insured shall pay to the company at its home office in Boston, Mass., such extra premium as may be required by the company, and in like manner shall pay annually thereafter on each anniversary of this policy or within thirty-one days thereafter, while the insured shall continue to be so engaged, such extra premium as may be required by the company."
The policy thus provides:
"This clause is by mutual agreement attached to said policy prior to its delivery, and is hereby expressly incorporated therein."
The plaintiff introduced in evidence the following letter:
"Greenville, S. C., Box 807, June 23, 1918.
"MV. Robert J. Guinn, Atlanta, Ga. — Dear Sir: On May 15, 1918, I entered the service of the United States by becoming a member of the Fourth Officers' Training School at Camp Sevier. Will you advise me by return mail what effect this will have on my policy No. 337355, which was issued in July, 1917.
"If I am killed or die in the service, whether while in this country or abroad, can my beneficiary collect this: policy ?
"Awaiting your reply before paying the premuim due on July 26, 1918, I remain,
"Yours very truly,
"J. B. Ryan, Jr.
"Box 807, Greenville, S. C."
Also the following:
"Atlanta, Ga., June 25, 1918.
"Mr. John B. Ryan, Jr., Box 807, Greenville, S. C.— Dear Sir: Re: Policy No. 337355. We have your favor of the 23d and note that on May 15th you became a member of the Officers' Training School, and making inquiry concerning your policy. In reply beg to advise that in the event of your policy becoming a claim, while you are in service, at home or abroad, the same is payable to your wife. But you will please be advised that when you receive your commission you will have to pay the extra war preimum, which is $37.50 per thousand per year.
"Trusting this is the information desired, we are
"Yours truly,
R. J. Guinn,
General Agent. H."
Also the following letter:
"June 30, 1918, Greenville, S. C., Box 807.
' "Mr. R. J. Guinn, Atlanta, Ga. Care of New England Mutual Eife Insurance Co. Dear Sir: ° Replying to yours of June 25th, I am inclosing herewith check for $81.50 for premium on my policy No. 337355. Also am inclosing order for my share of surplus profit to become $26.00 paid-up insurance.
"I. understand from yours of the 25th, that until I go abroad there is no extra war premium due on my policy.
"Yours very truly,
"J. B. Ryan, Jr.
"Please send receipt to Box 807, Greenville, S. C."
John B. Ryan, Jr., was commissioned a second lieutenant of infantry on the 25th of August, 1918, and died on the 4th of October, 1918.
The-following statement appears in the record:
Better from Jno. B. Ryan, Jr., to R. J. Guinn, dated June 30, 1918, offered in evidence. The defendant's attorney objects. to the introduction of the letter, there being no proof that it was ever mailed or received by Mr. Guinn, and that a waiver of a condition in a policy of insurance could not be established by an alleged letter claimed to have been written and mailed without proof that the same was received by the company or some officer or agent of the company.
The plaintiff testifies on cross-examination by defendant's attorney, and also on direct examination by plaintiff's attorney, that she wrote the letter in question, mailed it at the main postoffice in Greenville, S. C.,'duly stamped and addressed to Mr. Robert J. Guinn, at Atlanta, Ga. "I knew the address of Mr. Guinn, and had received letters from him." Over defendant's attorney's objection letter introduced in evidence and marked Exhibit D. "In this letter that my husband dictated to me, in which it says, 'Check inclosed for $81.50,' the check was put in that letter, in the letter of June 30, 1918. We left Camp Sevier about July. I don't remember the exact date, and went to Camp Gordon at Atlanta, and was called back to Camp Wadsworth. While in camp I kept copies of the letters. I had a book with carbon copies, and I wrote them and made, the carbon copies. I had no typewriter."
R. J. Guinn thus testified in behalf of the defendant:
"The premium due in July, 1918, was paid to me by check. I had no- original letter inclosing the check. There was no such letter as I remember. Usually no letter accompanied the check. I am positive that no letter came with this remittance. If any letter did come, I am positive no notice was sent with the premium that Mr. Ryan was in the service. I am positive that no letter came other than this: 'Enclosed find check for premium.' Most of them just send check .with no letter. I attend to all the correspondence out of the ordinary; all letters from the policy holders that required an answer were answered by me personally, or I would give direction as to how to answer the same. I have made search of all letters in our files and all copies of letters, and have not found the original letter from John B. Ryan, Jr., alleged to have been written on June 30, 1918."
Upon the close of the defendant's testimony the defendant moved to strike the letter from the record, on the ground that it had been admitted in evidence by reason of the presumption that the letter having been mailed according to the plaintiff's testimony, it was presumed to have been received, but that the defendant's testimony having- conclusively shown that the letter had not been received, the presumption had been rebutted. His Honor refused to-strike the letter from the record.
At the close of all the testimony the defendant's attorneys made a motion for the direction of a verdict, which was refused. The jury rendered a verdict in favor of the •plaintiff for the amount claimed, and the defendant ap-' pealed upon exceptions, which will be reported.
The appellant's attorneys did not argue the exceptions separately, nor do we ¡deem it necessary to consider them in detail.
There is no question that the letter which Jno. B. Ryan, Jr., mailed to the defendant, inclosing the check for $81.50, in payment of the second premium, due on his policy of insurance, was delivered to the defendant. • But the issue was whether the contents of' the letter were correctly stated in the plaintiff's testimony. If so, they tended to show waiver on the part of the defendant, and the case was properly submitted to the jury.
Affirmed.
Justices Watts and Fraser concur.