Case Name: In re Kelle HINSON-LYLES
Court: Louisiana Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 2003-12-03
Citations: 864 So. 2d 108
Docket Number: No. 2002-OB-2578
Parties: In re Kelle HINSON-LYLES.
Judges: WEIMER, J., concurs and assigns reasons.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 864
Pages: 108–117

Head Matter:
In re Kelle HINSON-LYLES.
No. 2002-OB-2578.
Supreme Court of Louisiana.
Dec. 3, 2003.
Rehearing Denied Jan. 16, 2004.
Schiff Law Corporation, Leslie J. Schiff, Opelousas, Counsel for Applicant.
Charles B. Plattsmier, Baton Rouge, Daniel A. Webb, New Orleans, Harry J. Philips, Jr., Baton Rouge, Counsel for Respondent.

Opinion:
ON APPLICATION FOR ADMISSION TO THE BAR
| .PER CURIAM.
This matter arises from a petition by Kelle Hinson-Lyles seeking admission to the Bar of the State of Louisiana. For the reasons that follow, we deny the petition.
UNDERLYING FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In her application to sit for the July 2002 Louisiana bar examination, petitioner disclosed that she was convicted of a felony-sexual offense in 1999. By letter dated June 12, 2002, the Committee on Bar Admissions ("Committee") notified petitioner that in light of her conviction, she would not be certified for admission to the practice of law. A majority of this court subsequently granted petitioner permission to sit for the bar, subject to the condition that upon her successful completion of the exam, she apply to the court for the appointment of a commissioner to take character and fitness evidence. In re: Hinson-Lyles, 02-1805 (La.7/3/02), 819 So.2d 1027. Petitioner successfully passed the essay portion of the July 2002 bar exam. We thereafter appointed a commissioner to take evidence and report to this court whether petitioner possesses the appropriate character and fitness to be admitted to the bar and allowed to practice law in the State of Louisiana. We also authorized the Office of Disciplinary | ¡>,Counsel to conduct an investigation into petitioner's qualifications to be admitted to the bar.
Proceedings before the Commissioner
The commissioner conducted a character and fitness hearing on February 18, 2003, pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XVII, § 9(B). The commissioner received documentary evidence and heard testimony given by petitioner and her witnesses. This record reveals that in May 1996, petitioner received an undergraduate degree in business and office education. With the assistance of her father, who was then the Superintendent of the Vernon Parish School Board, petitioner obtained a teaching position at DeRidder High School in Beauregard Parish. In May 1998, as petitioner was completing her second year of teaching at DeRidder High, she began a sexual relationship with M.C., a fourteen-year old student in her ninth-grade English class. Petitioner was twenty-three years of age at this time.
Over a period of approximately six weeks, petitioner spoke with M.C. on the telephone or saw him in person nearly every day. Because M.C. was too young to have a driver's license, petitioner arranged to pick him up in an alley behind his home and to take him back to her house, where they engaged in sexual intercourse. In addition, petitioner and M.C. drank alcohol supplied by petitioner, and on one occasion, petitioner allowed M.C. to smoke marijuana that he had brought to her home.
On the evening of July 11,1998, petitioner picked up M.C. and brought him back to her house, where they engaged in sexual intercourse. However, unbeknownst to petitioner or M.C., the Beauregard Parish Sheriffs Office had received a report from M.C.'s father that his son was "having a sexual affair with one of his school 13teachers." The officers agreed to investigate the complaint. Upon arriving at petitioner's home, the officers knocked on the door and announced themselves. Petitioner turned off the lights in the house and told M.C. to hide. Meanwhile, petitioner dressed and eventually opened the door, telling the officers she had not heard the knocking because she had been washing her hair. The officers asked whether M.C. was in the house; petitioner lied, said that he was not, and denied he had been inside her home. The officers then requested and obtained petitioner's permission to search the home. M.C. was found hiding in a bedroom closet, underneath a pile of clothes.
Petitioner was arrested and charged with five counts of carnal knowledge of a juvenile and three counts of contributing to the delinquency of a juvenile. On February 25, 1999, pursuant to a plea agreement, the State filed an amended bill of information charging petitioner with two counts of felony carnal knowledge of a juvenile and one count of indecent behavior with a juvenile, also a felony. Petitioner pleaded guilty to the charges in the amended bill of information and was placed on supervised probation for a period of three years with special conditions. State v. Hinson, No. CR-598-98 on the docket of the 36th Judicial District Court for the Parish of Beauregard.
Following her conviction, petitioner was terminated from her position at DeRidder High and she was required to forfeit her teaching certificate to the Louisiana |4State Department of Education. Petitioner's probation concluded on February 25, 2002, and she has subsequently received an automatic first offender pardon.
At the character and fitness hearing, petitioner admitted she knew her relationship with M.C. was wrong. At the conclusion of the hearing, the commissioner issued detailed findings of fact and conclusions of law and recommended that petitioner be conditionally admitted to the practice of law in Louisiana, subject to a probationary period of two years.
The Committee timely objected to the commissioner's recommendation, and oral argument was conducted before this court pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XVII, § 9(B)(3).
DISCUSSION
This court has the exclusive and plenary power to define and regulate all facets of the practice of law, including the admission of attorneys to the Bar of this state. Bester v. Louisiana Supreme Court Comm. on Bar Admissions, 00-1360 (La.2/21/01), 779 So.2d 715. Among other requirements for admission to the Bar, applicants must demonstrate by competent evidence that they have "good moral character and the fitness necessary to practice law in the State of Louisiana." Supreme Court Rule XVII, § 5(E).
The primary purpose of character and fitness screening is to assure the protection of the public and to safeguard the administration of justice. Supreme Court Rule XVII, § 5(A); In re: Singer, 01-2776 (La.6/12/02), 819 So.2d 1017. The term "good moral character" includes, but is not limited to, the qualities of honesty, fairness, candor, trustworthiness, observances of fiduciary responsibility and of the | Jaws of the State of Louisiana and of the United States of America, and a respect for the rights of other persons. Supreme Court Rule XVII, § 5(B). One of the specific factors to be considered in making a determination of good moral character and fitness is whether the applicant has been convicted, of a felony. Supreme Court Rule XVII, § 5(0(19).
This court has never taken the view that a prior felony conviction will automatically bar an applicant from admission to the practice of law, and we decline to adopt that approach at this time. Rather, we prefer to consider the facts of each case based on the totality of the circumstances which brings the applicant before us. In re: Dileo, 307 So.2d 362 (La.1975). In other words, a felony conviction is simply one of many factors to be considered in determining whether an applicant presently possesses good moral character and fitness.
After reviewing the record developed in this matter, we find that serious character and fitness concerns are present which necessitate the denial of petitioner's application for admission to the practice of law. Setting aside for a moment the gravity of any felony sexual offense, particularly those involving a juvenile victim, we are extraordinarily troubled by the factual circumstances underlying the crimes of which petitioner was convicted. Petitioner occupied a position of trust as a teacher, yet she knowingly and intentionally breached that trust to gratify her own needs. Knowing full well that her conduct was immoral, inappropriate, and illegal, petitioner nevertheless carried on a sexual affair with her fourteen-year old student for nearly two months. Far from discouraging M.C.'s involvement in the relationship, petitioner in fact fostered and encouraged it. She candidly admitted during the character and fitness hearing that | fithe affair would have continued indefinitely but for the fact that M.C.'s father called the police. On more than one occasion, petitioner supplied alcohol for consumption by a minor child, and she countenanced and permitted his use of marijuana while in her home. Finally, when confronted by law enforcement officials, petitioner lied, denied any involvement with M.C., and hid him in a closet in an effort to avoid detection by the police and his parents. Taken as a whole, we find this conduct is not an isolated instance of poor judgment on petitioner's part, but is rather evidence that she fundamentally lacks the character and fitness to be admitted to the practice of law. Accordingly, we must reject the commissioner's recommendation that petitioner be granted the privilege of practicing law in Louisiana.
DECREE
After hearing oral argument, reviewing the evidence, and considering the law, we conclude petitioner has failed to meet her burden of proving that she has "good moral character" to be admitted to the Louisiana State Bar. Accordingly, it is ordered that Kelle Hinson-Lyles' petition for admission be and is denied.
WEIMER, J., concurs and assigns reasons.
CALOGERO, C.J., concurs for the reasons assigned by WEIMER, J.
KNOLL, J., additionally concurs and assigns reasons.
KIMBALL and TRAYLOR, JJ., dissent and assign reasons.
. In cases in which the Committee has declined to recommend admission based on character and fitness concerns, it has been the court's customary practice to permit the applicant to sit for the bar examination subject to a later determination respecting character and fitness. It will frequently be necessary for this court to appoint a commissioner for the purpose of developing a record upon which we can proceed to make such a determination. The appointment of a commissioner in no way represents a finding by this court that the applicant does, in fact, possess good moral character and fitness.
.The carnal knowledge of a juvenile charges relate to five separate occasions on which petitioner had sexual relations with M.C.; however, petitioner candidly admitted in a sworn statement that "there's probably seven or eight, maybe even nine" occasions on which she and M.C. had sex. The contributing to the delinquency of a juvenile charges relate to the occasions on which petitioner gave alcohol to M.C. and allowed him to smoke marijuana in her presence.
. The indecent behavior charge relates to an occasion on which petitioner and M.C. engaged in oral sexual relations. The district attorney's office dropped the contributing to the delinquency of a juvenile charges.
. It appears from the record that no administrative proceeding was conducted; rather, petitioner surrendered her teaching certificate as a condition of her guilty plea.
. We observe that sexual misconduct resulting in a felony criminal conviction is a ground for the permanent disbarment of an attorney who is licensed to practice law in Louisiana. See Guideline 4 of the permanent disbarment guidelines set forth in Supreme Court Rule XIX, Appendix E.
. While we afford some deference to the commissioner's recommendation, making due allowance for the commissioner's opportunity to observe and evaluate the demeanor of the applicant and the witnesses, the ultimate decision regarding admission rests with this court.