Case Name: Richard B. BISHOP v. LINKWAY STORES, INC., ARKANSAS CREDIT COUNCIL, S. T. (Ros) SMITH, Bob WIMBERLY, and ARKANSAS RETAIL MERCHANTS ASSOCIATION
Court: Arkansas Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Arkansas
Decision Date: 1983-07-11
Citations: 280 Ark. 106
Docket Number: 83-119
Parties: Richard B. BISHOP v. LINKWAY STORES, INC., ARKANSAS CREDIT COUNCIL, S. T. (Ros) SMITH, Bob WIMBERLY, and ARKANSAS RETAIL MERCHANTS ASSOCIATION
Judges: Holt and Hays, JJ., not participating.
Reporter: Arkansas Reports
Volume: 280
Pages: 106–127

Head Matter:
Richard B. BISHOP v. LINKWAY STORES, INC., ARKANSAS CREDIT COUNCIL, S. T. (Ros) SMITH, Bob WIMBERLY, and ARKANSAS RETAIL MERCHANTS ASSOCIATION
83-119
655 S.W.2d 426
Supreme Court of Arkansas
Opinion delivered July 11, 1983
[Rehearing denied September 12, 1983. ]
/. H. Cottrell, for appellant.
Jack Young of Laser, Sharp, Haley, Young & Huckabay, for appellee Linkway Stores, Inc.
James M. McHaney and James M. McHaney, Jr. of Owens, McHaney ir Calhoun, for appellees Arkansas Credit Council et al.
Jim Guy Tucker of Mitchell, Williams, Selig, Jackson ir Tucker, for appellee Arkansas Retail Merchants Association.
Hickman, J., and Rhodes and Hatfield, Special JJ., would grant rehearing.

Opinion:
Richard B. Adkisson, Chief Justice.
This case questions the amount of interest that can be charged on consumer loans and credit sales under Section 13, Article XIX of the Arkansas Constitution as recently amended by Amendment 60. Appellant, Richard B. Bishop, purchased from appellee, Linkway Stores, Inc., certain items of furniture for his home, executing in part payment a conditional sales contract providing for an interest rate of 15 percent per annum on the unpaid balance. Appellant later filed suit, alleging that the contract was usurious. Appellant contended that since the Federal Discount Rate was 8.5 percent on the date of the transaction, the maximum allowable rate of interest on the contract was 5 percent over the Federal Discount Rate, or 13.5 percent. Appellees, Arkansas Credit Council and Arkansas Retail Merchants Association, intervened and after a trial the Pulaski County Chancery Court held that the conditional sales contract was not usurious and that Section 13 (a) was not applicable to consumer loans and credit sales. On appeal we reverse.
As approved by the electorate, Amendment 60 provides:
BE IT RESOLVED BY THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, AND BY THE SENATE, OF THE SEVENTY-THIRD GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE STATE OF ARKANSAS, A MAJORITY OF ALL MEMBERS ELECTED TO EACH HOUSE AGREEING THERETO:
THAT the following is hereby proposed as an amendment to the Constitution of the State of Arkansas, and upon being submitted to the electors of the State for approval or rejection at the next general election for Representatives and Senators, if a majority of the electors voting thereon at such election adopt such amendment, the same shall become a part of the Constitution of the State of Arkansas, to wit:
SECTION 1. Section 13, Article XIX, of the Arkansas Constitution of 1874, is hereby amended to read as follows:
'Section 13. (a) General Loans:
(i) The maximum lawful rate of interest on any contract entered into after the effective date hereof shall not exceed five percent (5%) per annum above the Federal Reserve Discount Rate at the time of the contract.
(ii) All such contracts having a rate of interest in excess of the maximum lawful rate shall be void as to the unpaid interest. A person who has paid interest in excess of the maximum lawful rate may recover, within the time provided by law, twice the amount of interest paid. It is unlawful for any person to knowingly charge a rate of interest in excess of the maximum lawful rate in effect at the time of the contract, and any person.who does so shall be subject to such punishment as may be provided by law.
(b) Consumer Loans and Credit Sales: All contracts for consumer loans and credit sales having a greater rate of interest than seventeen percent (17%) per annum shall be void as to principal and interest and the GeneralAssembly shall prohibit the same by law.
(c) Definitions: As used herein, the term:
(i) 'Consumer loans and credit sales' means credit extended to a natural person in which the money, property, or service which is the subject of the transaction is primarily for personal, family, or household purposes.
(ii) 'Federal Reserve Discount Rate' means the Federal Reserve Discount Rate on ninety-day commercial paper in effect in the Federal Reserve Bank in the Federal Reserve District in which Arkansas is located.
(d) Miscellaneous:
(i) The rate of interest for contracts in which no rate of interest is agreed upon shall be six percent (6%) per annum.
(ii) The provisions hereof are not intended and shall not be deemed to supersede or otherwise invalidate any provisions of federal law applicable to loans or interest rates including loans secured by residential real property.
(iii) The provisions hereof shall revoke all provisions of State law which establish the maximum rate of interest chargeable in the State or which are otherwise inconsistent herewith.'
SECTION 2. The ballot title for this amendment shall be:
An Amendment to Section 13 of Article XIX of the Constitution of the State of Arkansas to Control Interest Rates and Set the Penalty for Violations Thereof.
SECTION 3. The popular name for this amendment shall be:
The 1982 Interest Rate Control Amendment.
It is well settled that when a constitutional amendment or a statute is plain and unambiguous, there is no room left for judicial construction, and neither the exigencies of a case, nor a resort to extrinsic facts will be permitted to alter the meaning of the language used in the statute. Cunningham v. Keeshan, 110 Ark. 99, 161 S.W. 170 (1913); Berry v. Sale, 184 Ark. 655, 43 S.W.2d 225 (1931). As here, where the meaning of an act or constitutional amendment is clear and unambiguous, this Court is primarily concerned with what the document says, rather than what its drafters may have intended. See City of Little Rock v. Arkansas Corp. Commission, 209 Ark. 18, 189 S.W.2d 382 (1945).
The language used in Amendment 60 is clear and unambiguous, and we have no authority to construe the amendment to mean anything other than what it says. Section 13 (a) (i) provides that the "maximum lawful rate of interest on any contract" (emphasis ours) shall not exceed 5 percent per annum above the Federal Reserve Discount Rate at the time of the contract. The word "any" means exactly what it says, and a consumer loan certainly falls within the category of "any contract."
Section 13 (b), when read in conjunction with Section 13 (a), provides for a further limitation on interest rates but is applicable only to consumer loans and credit sales. Section 13 (b) specifically limits the maximum interest rate on such loans to 17 percent. These separate subsections are in no way conflicting and each has its own penalty for violations.
It is clear, therefore, that the provisions of Amendment 60 have a two-fold limitation on the maximum amount of interest a lender can charge on a consumer loan or credit sale — the lesser of 17 percent or 5 percent over the Federal Reserve Discount Rate. Here, since this contract has a rate of interest in excess of the lawful rate provided for under Section 13 (a), it is void as to the unpaid interest as provided by Section 13 (a) (ii).
Reversed.
Holt and Hays, JJ., not participating.
Richard F. Hatfield and James R. Rhodes, III, Special Justices.
Hickman, J., and Hatfield and Rhodes, Special JJ., dissent.