Case Name: Frederick G. Groff, as Assignee, etc., App'lt, v. Louisa C. Friedline, Resp't
Court: New York City Court
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1895-10-29
Citations: 70 N.Y. St. Rep. 500
Docket Number: 
Parties: Frederick G. Groff, as Assignee, etc., App’lt, v. Louisa C. Friedline, Resp’t.
Judges: 
Reporter: New York State Reporter
Volume: 70
Pages: 500–501

Head Matter:
Frederick G. Groff, as Assignee, etc., App’lt, v. Louisa C. Friedline, Resp’t.
(New York City Court, General Term,
Filed October 29, 1895.)
Ple adiro—-Set-off—G-ererad assignee.
In an action by a general assignee, the defendant cannot offset a note • made by the assignor, which fell due after the assignment of the subject of the action was made.
Appeal from a judgment in favor of defendant upon his claim of set-off.
L. B. Bunnell, for app’lt; Lippman & Buck, for resp’t.

Opinion:
McCarthy, J.
The plaintiff brings this action to recover of the defendant the amount due him, as assignee of Benedict & Fowler, for goods sold and delivered. Upon the trial the defendent withdrew from consideration every defense except an alleged claim for imperfect goods, goods returned, and the sum of $462, which she claimed she had paid the plaintiff's assignors prior to the date of the assignment. It appears from the evidence that about November 20, 1894, H. W. Benedict, one of the plaintiff's assignors, obtained from W. B. Williams his promissory note for $462, -dated November 20, 1894, payable to the order of Benedict & Fowler two months after said date, which he indorsed in the firm name, and took to S. A. Friedline, the defendant manager, and asked him to negotiate the sale of the same.' Mr. Friedline took this- to August Kohn, who, upon the defendant's guaranteeing the payment of the note at its maturity, advanced the amount thereof. The note was not paid by the maker, and the defendant paid it about the 24th day of January, 1895. This is the history of the transaction, which constitutes the basis of the defendant's counterclaim of $462, and the right of set-off against the demand of the plaintiff herein.
It appears in the evidence that in one of her answers herein the defendant made this note the basis of a' counterclaim as one of her defenses to the cause of action set forth in the complaint. The records of this court show that the plaintiff demurred to that defense on the ground that it was insufficient in law on the face thereof, and that on the 81st day of January, 1895, the demurrer was sustained. It is clear from an examination of the evidence in this case that the'set-off alleged in the fifth paragraph of the defendant's answer is founded on the promissory note. Respondent's counsel, by his brief, admits it, but contends that the law is not as claimed by the appellant. It is also admitted, and the evidence shows, that this note was not due and payable at the time of the making of the general assignment herein, but long after. It is well settled, however, that in an action by an assignee the defendant cannot offset a note made by the assignors, which fell due after the assignment of the subject of the action was made. This defendant, then, had no right to offset this note against the demand in suit. An allowance to a party by way of offset is always founded on an existing demand in praesenti, and not one that may be claimed in future. Martin v. Kunzmuller, 37 N. Y. 396; Fera v. Wickham, 135 N. Y. 223, 228, 229 ; 47 St. Rep. 866; Myers v. Davis, 22 N. Y. 489. The case of Maas v. Goodman, 2 Hilt. 275, cited by the respondent, is not the law; nor does the case of Chance v. Isaacs, 5 Paige, 592, aid the respondent, for both of these cases are overruled. See Martin v. Kuntzmuller, 37 N. Y. 403, 404. At page 404, Davis, C, J., says:
"We have held that if at the time of the assignment, the defandant has no present debt due and payable by the assignor, he has no offset, and that he cannot set off against a debt due and payable by him to the assignor a debt "of his which matures after-wards."
_. The trial judge erred in permitting this offset to be considered by the jury, and the judgment is therefore reversed, and a new trial granted, with costs to the appellant to abide the event, J All concur.