Case Name: Hugh J. BREEN, Jr., Appellant v. COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, BUREAU OF DRIVER LICENSING
Court: Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania
Jurisdiction: Pennsylvania
Decision Date: 2001-04-12
Citations: 771 A.2d 879
Docket Number: No. 1360 C.D. 2000
Parties: Hugh J. BREEN, Jr., Appellant v. COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, BUREAU OF DRIVER LICENSING.
Judges: Before: SMITH, Judge, KELLEY, Judge and RODGERS, Senior Judge.
Reporter: West's Atlantic Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 771
Pages: 879–883

Head Matter:
Hugh J. BREEN, Jr., Appellant v. COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, BUREAU OF DRIVER LICENSING.
Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania.
Submitted on Briefs Dec. 1, 2000.
Decided April 12, 2001.
Brian J. Carlin, Huntingdon Valley, for appellant.
Marc A. Werlinsky and Timothy P. Wile, Asst. Counsel In-charge, King of Prussia, for appellee.
Before: SMITH, Judge, KELLEY, Judge and RODGERS, Senior Judge.

Opinion:
RODGERS, Senior Judge.
Hugh J. Breen, Jr. (Licensee) appeals from the order of the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County (trial court) dismissing his appeal from a one-year suspension of his operating privilege imposed by the Pennsylvania Department of Trans portation (Department) pursuant to the Driver's License Compact (Compact). We affirm.
On November 30, 1997, Licensee was charged with violating N.J.Stat. § 39:4-50(a), New Jersey's driving under the influence (DUI) statute, and he pled guilty to that offense on January 15, 1998. By notice dated February 10, 1998, the Department notified Licensee that his license would be suspended for one year as a result of his conviction in New Jersey, which the Department determined to be for an offense equivalent to a violation of Section 3731 of the Vehicle Code, 75 Pa. C.S. § 3731.
Licensee filed a timely appeal with the trial court, which consolidated Licensee's case with thirty-three other cases and held a de novo hearing. The Department admitted into evidence a packet of certified documents, including a copy of the conviction report received from the New Jersey Division of Motor Vehicles. Licensee offered evidence that he entered his guilty plea to the New Jersey DUI offense with civil reservation. The trial court sustained Licensee's appeal by order dated September 21, 1998; however, this Court subsequently reversed that order and remanded the matter to the trial court. Aldridge v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, (No. 2871 C.D.1998, filed November 30, 1999).
On remand, the trial court held that, under the analysis set forth in Petrovick v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 559 Pa. 614, 741 A.2d 1264 (1999) New Jersey's DUI statute is substantially similar to Article IV(a)(2) of the Compact. The trial court further held that the fact that Licensee's guilty plea was entered pursuant to civil reservation does not prevent the Department from relying on the conviction to suspend Licensee's operating privilege. The trial court dismissed Licensee's appeal by order dated May 11, 2000.
On appeal to this Court, Licensee first argues that the provisions of New Jersey's DUI statute are not substantially similar to the provisions of Article IV(a) of the Compact. In pertinent part, Article TV(a) of the Compact provides as follows:
(a) The licensing authority in the home state, for the purposes of suspension . shall give the same effect to the conduct reported . as it would if such conduct had occurred in the home state in the case of convictions for:
(2) driving a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or a narcotic drug or under the influence of any other drug to a degree which renders the driver incapable of safely driving a motor vehicle.
15 Pa.C.S. § 1581 (emphasis added).
A person violates N.J. Stat. § 39:04-50(a) when he or she "operates a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, narcotic, hallucinogenic or habit producing drug; or operates a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration of 0.10% or more by weight of alcohol in defendant's blood.... "
In Seibert v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 715 A.2d 517 (Pa.Cmwlth.1998), this court compared the two statutes and held that the offense described by New Jersey's DUI statute is substantially similar to the conduct described in Article IV(a)(2) of the Compact. The Seibert court held that, although New Jersey's DUI statute does not use the words "incapable of safely driving," such condition is implicitly described by the statute's terms. The New Jersey statute prohibits a person from operating a vehicle with a blood alcohol level of 0.10%, and there is no question that a person -with a blood alcohol level of 0.10% is incapable of safe driving. Id. Therefore, a violation of New Jersey's DUI statute is grounds for a reciprocal license suspension under the Compact. Id.
Licensee's second argument is that, because his guilty plea was entered with civil reservation, the Department should be barred from introducing evidence of his conviction in the civil license suspension proceeding. Licensee acknowledges that this argument was expressly rejected in Bourdeev v. Department of Transportation, 755 A.2d 59 (Pa.Cmwlth.2000), appeal granted, (No. 565 E.D. Alloc. Dkt.2000, filed March 27, 2001), but he contends that the holding in Bourdeev is contrary to the dictates of the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States Constitution, U.S. Const., Art. IV, § 1.
This argument was specifically addressed by our court in Hession v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 767 A.2d 1135 (2001). Relying on Bourdeev, the Hession court held that the manner in which the guilty plea comes about is of no import, as it is the conviction, not the guilty plea, that triggers an out-of-state conviction report to the Department. In addition, the Hession court observed that the Full Faith and Credit Clause does not require a state to subordinate public policies within its borders to the laws of another state.
Accordingly, we affirm.
ORDER
NOW, April 12, 2001, the order of the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County in the above matter is affirmed.
. Section 1581 of the Vehicle Code, 75 Pa. C.S. § 1581.
. Our scope of review in a license suspension appeal is limited to determining whether findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence, an error of law was committed, or the trial court abused its discretion. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing v. Fellmeth, 108 Pa.Cmwlth. 172, 528 A.2d 1090 (1987).
. We note that New Jersey courts have interpreted this statute as prescribing a condition of serious impairment under which a driver poses a danger to himself and others. See State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146, 199 A.2d 809 (1964); State v. Morris, 262 N.J.Super. 413, 621 A.2d 74 (1993). The mandatory sentence imposed for a conviction under this statute is further evidence that New Jersey's is a true DUI statute: for a first offense, the licensee is subject to a fine, a period of detainment in an Intoxicated Driver Resource Center and, possibly, a term of imprisonment. N.J. Slat. § 39:4-50(a)(l).