Case Name: Robert Thomas KRAEMER, Jr., Appellant, v. GENERAL MOTORS ACCEPTANCE CORPORATION and Nationwide Insurance Company, Appellees
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1992-12-30
Citations: 613 So. 2d 483
Docket Number: No. 92-00315
Parties: Robert Thomas KRAEMER, Jr., Appellant, v. GENERAL MOTORS ACCEPTANCE CORPORATION and Nationwide Insurance Company, Appellees.
Judges: HALL, J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 613
Pages: 483–493

Head Matter:
Robert Thomas KRAEMER, Jr., Appellant, v. GENERAL MOTORS ACCEPTANCE CORPORATION and Nationwide Insurance Company, Appellees.
No. 92-00315.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
Dec. 30, 1992.
Rehearing Denied Feb. 18, 1993.
Thomas P. Fox, Tampa; and David J. Abbey and Hillary H. Coleman of Fox & Grove, Chartered, St. Petersburg, for appellant.
Larry I. Gramovot and Matthew R. Dan-ahy of Shofi, Smith, Hennen, Jenkins, Stanley & Gramovot, P.A., Tampa, for appellee General Motors Acceptance Corp.
Stuart J. Freeman of Williams, Brasfield, Wertz, Fuller, Goldman, Freeman & Lovell, P.A., St. Petersburg, for appellee Nationwide Ins. Co.

Opinion:
PARKER, Judge.
Robert Thomas Kraemer, Jr. appeals a final summary judgment entered in favor of General Motors Acceptance Corporation (GMAC) and also appeals the denial of his motion for partial summary judgment in an action to determine insurance coverage.
This is the second occasion that this case has been to this court. The supreme court quashed this court's first opinion, concluding that GMAC still could be held liable under the dangerous instrumentality doctrine even though the beneficial ownership to a vehicle owned by GMAC had been transferred to a long-term lessee.
This case requires this court to consider the application of section 324.021(9)(b), Florida Statutes (Supp.1986). That section, which under certain circumstances relieves an automobile lessor from such responsibility as the owner of the automobile, provides:
Notwithstanding any other provision of the Florida Statutes or existing case law, the lessor, under an agreement to lease a motor vehicle for 1 year or longer which requires the lessee to obtain insurance acceptable to the lessor which contains limits not less than $100,000/$300,000 bodily injury liability and $50,000 property damage liability; further, this subsection shall be applicable so long as the insurance required under such lease agreement remains in effect, shall not be deemed the owner of said motor vehicle for the purpose of determining financial responsibility for the operation of said motor vehicle or for the acts of the operator in connection therewith.
§ 324.021(9)(b), Fla.Stat. (Supp.1986). The term "financial responsibility for the operation of said motor vehicle or for the acts of the operator in connection therewith" in section 324.021(9)(b) means "liability [as owner] under the dangerous instrumentality doctrine." Kraemer v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 572 So.2d 1363, 1366 (Fla.1990).
In May 1986 Michael A. Green entered into a closed-end four-year lease agreement with GMAC for a 1987 Nissan automobile. The lease required Green to obtain liability insurance of $100,000/$300,000 bodily injury, $50,000 property damage (minimum of $300,000 combined single limit). Green signed an insurance information form, agreeing to honor GMAC's lease conditions for liability insurance of $100,000/$300,000, $50,000, or $300,000 combined single limit. An authorized agent for Nationwide countersigned this form stating, "I agree to endorse the above policy as directed by the lessee [Green] and certify coverage for the vehicle described . as required under terms of the lease provisions." Nationwide's agent represented to GMAC that GMAC would be included as an additional named insured and loss payee under the policy and represented to GMAC that Nationwide had obtained coverage as required by GMAC. The form further required GMAC to receive notice by certified mail of any expiration, cancellation, or reduction of insurance applicable to this vehicle.
Three days later, Green obtained a policy from Nationwide with bodily injury liability of $25,000 each person/$50,000 each occurrence and property damage coverage of $25,000. Green paid for the policy with a check which was later dishonored by his bank for nonsufficient funds. One month later Nationwide notified Green that it had been "necessary to void your policy as of the initiating effective date. This means that no coverage has been provided by this policy." Green did not obtain any other insurance coverage for the car.
On May 6, 1987, Calvin Gary borrowed the automobile from Green. The next day Gary committed an armed robbery while driving the automobile and was involved in a high-speed chase with law enforcement authorities when he collided with another vehicle, which resulted in the death of Marguerite Kraemer. At the time of the accident, Green was five months' delinquent in his payments on the lease. It is undisputed that GMAC received no notice of any insurance changes at the time this vehicle was involved in this accident.
GMAC sued for declaratory judgment, asserting that it was not liable for the death because GMAC did not have beneficial ownership of the car. Mr. Kraemer, as husband and personal representative of the decedent, counterclaimed seeking damages from GMAC for Gary's negligence on the basis of GMAC's liability as the owner and lessor. The trial judge entered summary judgment in favor of GMAC.
This court, in the first appeal, concluded that GMAC, as a lessor of a vehicle under a long-term lease giving the lessee the option to purchase, was not the beneficial owner of the vehicle and could not be held liable for injuries caused by the vehicle under the dangerous instrumentality doctrine. The supreme court quashed the opinion, holding that GMAC could not avoid liability for the driver's negligence under the dangerous instrumentality doctrine by transferring beneficial ownership of the vehicle to Green under a long-term lease.
Following the supreme court's opinion, this case was returned to the trial court, where Nationwide and its agent admitted that Nationwide had in full force and effect a policy of insurance which provided $100, 000/$300,000/$50,000 coverage on the day of the accident. Nationwide tendered $100,000 to Kraemer based upon the fact the policy was never canceled properly and the policy remained in full force and effect on the day of the accident. This event seems inconsistent with the following language of the supreme court in its Kraemer opinion: "It is significant that even if the statute [section 324.021(9)(b) ] were applicable to this case, it would not help GMAC because the liability insurance on the automobile had lapsed when the accident occurred." Kraemer v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 572 So.2d 1363, 1367 (Fla.1990). We are not inclined to disregard an unequivocal statement of our supreme court even though GMAC argues that the statement is dicta. However, the issue presented from this court's opinion to the supreme court in this case apparently did not address whether this insurance policy was in effect at the time of the accident. Based upon Nationwide's position when this case was returned to the trial court that it had in place an existing policy and tendered its policy limits of $100,000, we conclude we must address whether GMAC acquired immunity from liability by Nationwide's admission of liability and tender of policy limits.
Even though this lease was made prior to the passage of section 324.-021(9)(b), GMAC still receives the benefit of immunity from further liability if it has complied with the provisions of the statute on the day of the accident. See Abdala v. World Omni Leasing, Inc., 583 So.2d 330 (Fla.1991). We conclude that Nationwide's admission that its policy was in effect on the day of the accident and the tender to Mrs. Kraemer's personal representative of $100,000 from Nationwide permits GMAC, as a long-term lessor, to claim immunity from liability pursuant to section 324.-021(9)(b), Florida Statutes (Supp.1986).
Judge Lehan in his dissent cites case authority for the proposition that Nationwide's admission is not binding upon the Kraemer family. We have no quarrel with that proposition. However, it does not alter our opinion that the full $100,000 cover-agé pursuant to the statute has been tendered to the Kraemer family and is available should the family choose to accept it.
The dissent would decide this case upon the wording of the lease which required insurance coverage of $100,000/ $300,000/$50,000 or $300,000 single limit coverage. It presents a scenario that if the accident had substantial property damage also covered by the policy, the payment of property damage could reduce the available insurance proceeds available for personal injury or death under the policy. Our response to that scenario is that it did not happen in this case. The bottom line is that Nationwide has tendered its policy limits and that amount, $100,000, equals the amount required by the statute, under the facts of this case, to exempt GMAC from liability. Mrs. Kraemer's family can receive the full $100,000 to which it was entitled under the terms of the policy, and if there had been evidence of multiple bodily injury or death, the family could seek the full $300,000. If there were a case that fits the scenario presented by the dissent, we would consider the statute's application at that time to those specific facts. However, because GMAC developed these liability insurance requirements before the statute was enacted and Abdala permits GMAC to claim immunity from liability if the amounts of coverage comply with the statute, we conclude that GMAC, as to the facts of this case, has complied with the statute and is entitled to immunity from further liability.
We affirm the trial court, concluding that GMAC is immune from further liability by virtue of its compliance with section 324.-021(9)(b).
HALL, J., concurs.
LEHAN, Chief Judge, dissents with opinion.
. See Kraemer v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 556 So.2d 431 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989).
. The record does not disclose the reason why the policy issued contained limits lower than those certified by Nationwide in the binder.