Case Name: Joe Plunk v. The State
Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1923-10-07
Citations: 98 Tex. Crim. 140
Docket Number: No. 7815
Parties: Joe Plunk v. The State.
Judges: 
Reporter: Texas Criminal Reports
Volume: 98
Pages: 140–145

Head Matter:
Joe Plunk v. The State.
No. 7815.
Delivered Oct. 7, 1923.
Rehearing granted April 2, 1924.
Rehearing granted State June 25, 1924.
Rehearing denied appellant October 15, 1924.
1. — Sale of Intoxicating Liquor — Bills of Exception — Qualification, of.
Where a bill of exceptions complains of the introduction of evidence of other offence that appellant stands charged with on the ground that such charges grow out of the same transaction for which he is on trial, and the court qualifies such bill and states that it was in no way shown that the transactions were the same, no error is presented.
2. —Same—Evidence—Imp caching — Other Offenses.
It is well settled, by a long line of decisions in this state that where a defendant testifies as a witness in his own behalf, he may be impeached by proof of pending indictments against him for felonies or misdemeanors involving moral turpitude. See Branch’s Ann. P. C. Sec. 167.
3. —Same—Continuing Foregoing Syllabi.
The case of Wright vs. State 140 S. W. 1105 cited by appellant involves only the point that where complaint is filed against the accused before an examining magistrate which has never been merged into an indictment after sufficient time has elapsed for same to take place, it furnishes no basis for impeachment of the accused.
4. —Same—Evidence—Hearsay Harmless — When.
Where the sheriff, testifying for the state was permitted to testify that when witness who purchased .whisky from appellant, came out of appellant’s house he told the officer that appellant’s child was sick, such evidence was hearsay, but of a harmless character, and could not possibly have injured appellant, and is for that reason not a reversible error.
5. —Same—Rehearing—Indictment—founts in.
Where one transaction embraces two or more offenses, such as the possession for sale, and the sale' of the same intoxicating liquor the charges should be embraced in one indictment, in separate counts, and ought to result in but one conviction. See Coulte vs. State, 252 S. W. Rep. 168.
6. —Same—Evidence—Impeachment Of Defendant.
Where the state elects to file two cases against a defendant upon a single criminal act, proof of another indictment pending against him growing out of the same transaction should not be used to impeach him. This is not intended to convey the idea that in a proper case several indictments for violating the law against possession, sale, transportation etc. of intoxicating liquor, returned upon the testimony of the same witnesses can not impeach the defendant.
7. —Same—Continuing Above.
Where the state, having but one case, wrongfully presents two indictments, one of them should not be used for impeachment purposes upon the trial of the other.
8. —Same—Rehearing—By State — Bills of Exception.
Where appellant complains of the use of indictments pending against him for impeachment purposes, on the ground that such indictments charge him with offenses growing out of the same transaction that he is on trial for, and the court qualifies such bill with the statement that the offenses were not the same, but charged separate and distinct transactions from the one on trial, no reversible error is shown.
9. —Same—Rehearing—Bills of Exception — Practice.
In passing upon bills of exception, there is an unbroken line of decisions in this state, beginning with Smith vs. State, 4 Tex. Grim. App. 630 for nearly fifty years to the present time which hold that the mere statement of the grounds of the objection are not considered on appeal, unless the bill goes further and shows that the grounds of the objection were true.
Appeal from District Court of Van Zandt County. Tried below before the Hon. Joel R. Bond, Judge.
Appeal from a conviction of selling. intoxicating liquor; penalty, three years in the penitentiary.
The opinion states the case.
Gentry & Gentry, for appellant.
Tom Garrard, State’s Attorney, and Grover C. Morris, Assistant State’s Attorney, for the State.

Opinion:
LATTIMORE, Judge.
— Appellant was convicted in the district court of Van Zandt county of selling intoxicating liquor, and his punishment fixed at three years in the penitentiary.
J. B. Rogers testified for the State that on a certain night he went to the home of appellant and bought from him two pint jars full of whisky for which he paid him $2.50. Said witness was accompanied to the home of appellant by the sheriff, a constable and justice of the peace. These three men stood outside of appellant's house and watched Rogers when he went inside and saw him come back with the whisky in his possession, which he delivered to the sheriff. The officers testified to such facts. The appellant put on the stand a number of witnesses who stated they were in his house on the night in ques tion and that Rogers did not come in said house nor purchase from appellant the liquor mentioned.
Appellant complains of the fact that the State was permitted to prove by the sheriff, and also to ask appellant while he was on the stand if it was not true, that he was then under indictment in other felony cases pending against him. Appellant's objection to this seems to be that such testimony -was not admissible because the indictments grew out of the same transaction which formed the basis for the instant prosecution. In his qualification to the bills of exception the learned trial judge states that it was in no way shown that the transactions were the same. In Mr. Branch's Annotated P. C., Sec. 167, numerous authorities are cited supporting the proposition that the defendant may be impeached as a witness by proof of pending indictments against him for felonies or misdemeanors involving moral turpitude. It seems to be the settled holding of this court. The case of Wright v. State, 140 S. W. Rep., 1105, cited by appellant, involves only the point that where a complaint is filed against the accused before an examining magistrate which has never been merged into an indictment, after sufficient time has elapsed for same to take place, it furnishes no basis for impeachment of the accused.
Appellant also complains of the testimony of the sheriff to the effect that when witness came out of appellant's house he told the officer that appellant's child was sick. In our opinion this was hearsay, but we are unable to detect anything in it which could be held at all injurious to appellant's case. Appellant insists that it might have been used by the jury as affecting the credibility of his witnesses and as upholding the credibility of Rogers. Upon this question as to' whether Rogers went into appellant's house on the night of the alleged sale, the witness was supported by the three officers mentioned who testified that they saw him go in and saw him come out. The fact that the jury elected to believe the State witnesses and not to give credence to those of appellant would not seem any cause for reversal, nor are we able to follow the reasoning of appellant in his effort to show that the fact that the officer testified that Rogers told him appellant's child was sick, and that he, therefore, did not arrest appellant on the night in question, could have had the effect of causing the jury to more readily believe Rogers.
Being -unable to agree to any of appellant's contentions, and being of opinion that the record presents no > error, an affirmance will be ordered.
Affirmed.