Case Name: Thelma B. STANTON, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. James Lawrence STANTON, Jr., Defendant and Appellant
Court: Utah Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Utah
Decision Date: 1976-06-23
Citations: 552 P.2d 112
Docket Number: No. 14268
Parties: Thelma B. STANTON, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. James Lawrence STANTON, Jr., Defendant and Appellant.
Judges: TUCKETT, Justice, concurs in the views expressed in the dissenting opinion of MAUGHAN, J.
Reporter: Pacific Reporter 2d
Volume: 552
Pages: 112–117

Head Matter:
Thelma B. STANTON, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. James Lawrence STANTON, Jr., Defendant and Appellant.
No. 14268.
Supreme Court of Utah.
June 23, 1976.
D. Gary Christian, Kipp & Christian, Salt Lake City, for defendant and appellant.
Bryce E. Roe, Roe & Fowler, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and respondent.

Opinion:
ELLETT, Justice:
This appeal challenges a judgment awarding $2,700 child support to plaintiff; together with interest and costs. The award was made for a daughter of the parties for a period ensuing after her eighteenth birthday and culminating at her twenty-first birthday. Statutory references are to U.C.A.1953.
In November of 1960, defendant, pursuant to an original decree of divorce, was ordered to pay plaintiff $100 per month support payments for each of the minor children of the parties. There were two children, a daughter, who was born February 12, 1953, and a son, whose birthday date was January 29, 1955. Upon the daughter attaining the age of 18 years, the father, defendant, ceased paying child support for her. Subsequently, the mother, plaintiff, filed a motion for entry of judgment against defendant for $2,700, the sum of which had accumulated since the eighteenth birthday of the daughter. The trial court denied the motion on the ground that the obligation to support, under the decree, terminated at the time the daughter attained her majority.
Plaintiff appealed to this court on the ground that the statute created an unconstitutional classification in violation of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. This court found the statutory classification reasonable and affirmed the trial court.
Plaintiff appealed the decision to the United States Supreme Court, which ruled that the classification set by 15-2-1 denied equal protection of the laws, as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. However, the court observed that its holding did not terminate the controversy as it was the prerogative of the state court to determine when defendant's obligation for his children's support pursuant to the divorce decree terminated under Utah law. The matter was remanded to this court, and in turn, the case was remanded by this court to the trial court for further proceedings.
The territorial Legislature of Utah in the lawful performance of its duty enacted Section 1035, C.L.U.1876, which reads:
The period of minority extends in males to the age of twenty-one years and in females to that of eighteen years;
The identical language has been carried in our law ever since.
Obviously the two provisions of the statute are separable and the Supreme Court of the United States in remanding this matter directed that we decide which age was correct and then legislate a bit on our own and say that the age of majority so chosen for the one sex is also the age of majority for the other sex.
The oath we took when chosen as justices of the Supreme Court of Utah forbids us to encroach on the duties and functions of the legislature. However, we need not make any such determination. The age of the male child in this divorce case has never been called into question. Counsel for the ex-wife raises a question as to when the girl child became of age. The Supreme Court never held that she did not become of age when she reached the age of 18 years.
We have said too many times to require citations that a statute is presumed to be valid unless it clearly appears to be in conflict with some provision of the Constitution. One looks in vain for some provision of the Constitution which says a girl does not become of age at age 18, and so we must hold that a girl does reach her majority at that age.
The Legislature of Utah, in an attempt to satisfy the justices of the Supreme Court of the United States, passed an amendment to Section 15-2-1, U.C.A.1953, so that it now reads:
The period of minority extends in males and females to the age of eighteen years; . . .
It thus is obvious that the statute holding- that girls attained their majority at age 18 was constitutional.
The claim is made that a difference in the age at which a person attains majority is a denial of equal protection of the law. Even if that be true the constitutionality of a statute can be raised only by one who had an interest in the lawsuit. Neither the boy nor the girl is a party to, nor interested in, this matter. It is only the parents who are fussing about who is obligated by the decree to give support. There is no question about the fact that each child has been properly supported.
By our statute both parents are charged equally with the duty to support and educate the children. The question before us is the interpretation to be given to the decree of divorce from which no appeal has ever been taken by either party. That decree is final and cannot now be changed. At the time the decree was made everybody knew that for almost one hundred years the age of majority for girls was and had been 18. The judge and the parties to this proceeding all assumed that when the decree stated that the father should be the one to furnish the support for the children during their minority it meant that the father should furnish the support for the son until he reached 21 and for the daughter until she reached age 18. No honest interpretation of that decree can be made to the contrary.
If the girl needs support after age 18, then if she be a minor, as claimed by the mother (which she is not), each parent is liable for her support and the burden cannot be cast upon just one of them.
If in a proper case it could be held that it is a denial of the equal protection of the law to recognize that there is a difference in age when the sexes mature, would it not also be a denial of equal protection to enable a female to marry at age fourteen while the male in order to marry must be 16?
The common law recognized this difference in maturation when it provided that girls could give consent to marriage at age 12, while a boy had to be 14 to give his consent.
Regardless of what a judge may think about equality, his thinking cannot change the facts of life. The records of the marriage department in Salt Lake County show that 62 per cent of all women who get married do so between the ages of 14 and 21, while only 25 per cent of the men who marry are under 21 years of age.
To judicially hold that males and females attain their maturity at the same age is to be blind to the biological facts of life.
The order of the trial court is reversed and costs are awarded to the appellant.
. Section 15-2-3, U.O.A.1953.
. Stanton v. Stanton, 30 Utah 2d 315, 517 P.2d 1010 (1974).
.Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 95 S.Ct. 1373, 43 L.Ed.2d 688 (1975).
. 30-2-9, U.C.A.1953.