Case Name: William D. BROWN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. STATE FARM FIRE & CASUALTY COMPANY, Defendant-Appellant
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1981-11-16
Citations: 407 So. 2d 1251
Docket Number: No. 8445
Parties: William D. BROWN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. STATE FARM FIRE & CASUALTY COMPANY, Defendant-Appellant.
Judges: Before DOMENGEAUX, CUTRER, SWIFT, STOKER and DOUCET, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 407
Pages: 1251–1257

Head Matter:
William D. BROWN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. STATE FARM FIRE & CASUALTY COMPANY, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 8445.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Third Circuit.
Nov. 16, 1981.
Stockwell & Associates, John S. Bradford, Lake Charles, for defendant-appellant.
Baggett, McCall, Singleton & Ranier, Ho-, mer C. Singleton, Lake Charles, for plaintiff-appellee.
Raggio, Cappel, Chozen & Berniard, Christopher M. Trahan and G. Michael Bourgeois, Lake Charles, for defendant-ap-pellee.
Before DOMENGEAUX, CUTRER, SWIFT, STOKER and DOUCET, JJ.

Opinion:
DOMENGEAUX, Judge.
This is a workmen's compensation suit. There is no dispute as to the amount of compensation and medical expenses awarded to the plaintiff.
William David Brown (Brown) is self-employed. He had been engaged in the business of repairing homes and other structures in the Lake Charles area for about two years. His work consists principally of general carpentry, roofing and painting. Brown usually performs the work himself but, at times, he hires other workers to assist him. At the time of the accident referred to hereinafter there were approximately six men on his payroll as helpers or journeymen. Since his advent in the repairing business he had been performing intermittent work for Mr. Peyton Coving-ton, an attorney, who owned rental property. When a problem developed with any of Mr. Covington's rental property, he would usually call Brown who would perform the work needed to repair or maintain it. Mr. Covington would pay Brown as per the invoice prepared by Brown upon completion of each job.
Approximately six months prior to April 25, 1979, Mr. Covington had noticed that the roof of his building which he used as a law office was leaking in areas around two bathrooms and the chimney. He called Brown to repair the roof. Brown recommended that a type of roofing cement be applied to the areas and on April 25, 1979, he began applying the roofing material which was also furnished by him. In the process of performing this work he fell from the edge of the roof to the ground breaking his leg. This injury resulted in eight weeks of disability and $6,897.55 in medical expenses.
Brown brought suit against Covington's insurer, State Farm Fire & Casualty Company (State Farm), to recover workmen's compensation benefits. State Farm denied liability on the ground that the work being performed by Brown was not a part of the trade, business or occupation of Mr. Coving-ton. State Farm also filed a third party demand against St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Company (St. Paul), the insurer of United Craftsmen, Inc. United Craftsmen, Inc. was a corporation owned by Brown of which he was a sole shareholder. The basis for the third party action by State Farm is that Brown was an employee of the corporation at the time of the accident.
The trial court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff, Brown, and against State Farm. The third party demand against St. Paul was dismissed. Brown was awarded $141.00 per week for the eight weeks he was temporarily and partially disabled, and $6,897.55 for medical expenses. Brown's claim for attorney's fees and penalties was denied.
From this judgment State Farm appeals seeking reversal of the judgment or, alternatively, a right of indemnification against St. Paul. St. Paul answers denying responsibility. Brown answered seeking affirmance and also recognition of a claim for attorney's fees and penalties.
The principal issues involved in this appeal are whether Brown's services to attorney Covington in repairing the roof to the latter's office building was a part of Cov-ington's trade, business, or occupation, and whether or not plaintiff Brown is entitled to compensation notwithstanding pronouncements of the Supreme Court in the case of Lushute v. Diesi, 354 So.2d 179 (La.1977).
State Farm contends that plaintiff Brown did not perform services arising out of and incidental to Covington's trade, business, or occupation as an attorney. The facts show that the workmen's compensation policy issued by State Farm was to the law partnership of Covington and Babin and covered the office personnel of those attorneys.
State Farm contends that it is the "office personnel" who are the employees that are part of Mr. Covington's trade, business, or occupation.
The trial court noted that plaintiff was in fact an independent contractor but further determined that he was covered under the workmen's compensation act because the work performed by him was part of Mr. Covington's trade, business, or occupation. The trial court's finding makes Mr. Coving-ton the principal of plaintiff in accordance with La.R.S. 23:1061. We feel that in so holding, the able trial judge evaded the rationale of Lushute v. Diesi, supra, and thereby erred.
In order to find plaintiff entitled to compensation benefits under the facts of this case, we would have to ignore and disregard the reasoning of the Supreme Court in the Lushute v. Diesi case, supra. In that case, Lushute's widow sued Diesi for workmen's compensation benefits resulting from the death of her husband who was killed while repairing an air conditioning system at Diesi's restaurant. The Supreme Court dismissed plaintiff's suit on the ground that the decedent was not performing work which was a part of the trade, business, or occupation of Diesi.
The Supreme Court in referring to La. R.S. 23:1021(6) stated:
"We therefore conclude that an independent contractor is covered under the workmen's compensation law only when a substantial part of his work time is spent in manual labor in carrying out the terms of his contract with the principal and the work performed by him is a part of the principal's trade, business or occupation." (Emphasis added).
In connection with the above principal, the Supreme Court found that Lushute was an independent contractor, and that just prior to the accident therein he was performing a substantial part of his work time in manual labor carrying out the repairs of the air conditioning system at the restaurant.
The high court then felt, however, that Lushute's repairing of the air conditioning system at the restaurant was not part of the trade, business, or occupation of the restaurant owner. The court concluded that Lushute was not an independent contractor entitled to coverage under the workmen's compensation act, and therefore his widow was not entitled to compensation benefits.
In the case before us for consideration, the leaks in Mr. Covington's office building had been in existence for some six months and were in the vicinity of or over the two bathrooms and the chimney. Plaintiff was under a contract to repair that roof. Mr. Covington is an attorney and the building in question served as an office for his law practice.
Following Lushute we would agree with the trial judge that the plaintiff here was an independent contractor and that just prior to the accident of April 25, 1979, he was performing a substantial part of his work time in manual labor carrying out the repairs of Mr. Covington's roof. But unlike the opinion of the trial judge, we feel that we cannot escape the consequences of Lu-shute. Lushute dictates to us that if an air conditioning system in this day and age is not a necessary part of a restaurant owner's trade, business, or occupation, then certainly a leaky roof near the bathrooms and chimney of an attorney's law office and the repair thereof, likewise, cannot be considered as a part of the attorney's trade, business, or occupation. To hold otherwise would be to find a distinction without a difference between the facts in Lushute and those here.
Accordingly, following our high court's rationale in Lushute, we find it necessary to reverse the judgment of the trial court which awarded compensation benefits to plaintiff against Mr. Covington's insurer, State Farm.
An issue which is no longer viable in view of the conclusion reached hereinabove is whether defendant — plaintiff in reconvention — State Farm would be entitled to indemnification from third party defendant, St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Company. Inasmuch as State Farm is relieved of liability herein, its third party action against St. Paul becomes moot. Although the trial court dismissed State Farm's third party action against St. Paul for other reasons, our conclusion herein mandates an affirmation of that action.
It follows, from all of the above, that plaintiff's answer to the appeal seeking attorney fees and penalties should be and is hereby rejected.
For the above and foregoing reasons the judgment of the district court which awarded compensation benefits to plaintiff and taxed trial court costs against defendant State Farm Fire & Casualty Company, is hereby reversed and plaintiff's suit is ordered dismissed.
In all other respects the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
All costs, at trial and on appeal, are assessed against plaintiff-appellant, William D. Brown.
REVERSED IN PART, AFFIRMED IN PART, AND RENDERED.
SWIFT, J., concurs and assigns written reasons.
STOKER, J., concurs and assigns written reasons.
CUTRER, J., dissents with written reasons.
. The named Covington in the law firm is the same person who owns the office building from which plaintiff fell and injured himself.
. The actual owner of the restaurant was a corporation known as Little Capitol of Louisiana, Inc.
. It has been suggested that Slocum v. Lamartiniere, 369 So.2d 201 (La.App. 3rd Cir. 1979) should apply here so as to allow benefits to plaintiff Brown. Slocum is distinguished. There it was determined that the defendant grocer Lamartiniere in effect was engaging in a second trade, as a contractor, in building a new grocery store, and for the reasons stated therein found that Slocum, the carpenter, was covered in workmen's compensation.