Case Name: STATE of Tennessee, By and Through Phil M. CANALE, Jr., District Attorney General for the 15th Judicial Circuit on relation of E. Woody HALL, et al., Plaintiffs, v. MINIMUM SALARY DEPARTMENT OF the AFRICAN METHODIST EPISCOPAL CHURCH, INC., a Tennessee Corporation, et al., Defendants
Court: Tennessee Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Tennessee
Decision Date: 1972-02-07
Citations: 477 S.W.2d 11
Docket Number: 
Parties: STATE of Tennessee, By and Through Phil M. CANALE, Jr., District Attorney General for the 15th Judicial Circuit on relation of E. Woody HALL, et al., Plaintiffs, v. MINIMUM SALARY DEPARTMENT OF the AFRICAN METHODIST EPISCOPAL CHURCH, INC., a Tennessee Corporation, et al., Defendants.
Judges: DYER, C. J., McCANLESS, J., and JENKINS, Special Justice, concur.
Reporter: South Western Reporter Second Series
Volume: 477
Pages: 11–15

Head Matter:
STATE of Tennessee, By and Through Phil M. CANALE, Jr., District Attorney General for the 15th Judicial Circuit on relation of E. Woody HALL, et al., Plaintiffs, v. MINIMUM SALARY DEPARTMENT OF the AFRICAN METHODIST EPISCOPAL CHURCH, INC., a Tennessee Corporation, et al., Defendants.
Supreme Court of Tennessee.
Feb. 7, 1972.
Eugene C. Gaerig, Asst. Dist. Atty. Gen., Montedonico, Heiskell, Davis, Canale & Glankler, Gerber, Gerber, Marshall & Rule-man, Memphis, for relators-appellees.
Hanover, Walsh, Barnes & Jalenak, Ratner, Sugarmori & Lucas, Memphis, for de f endants-app ellants.

Opinion:
OPINION
HUMPHREYS, Justice.
The majority of the Court is of opinion the motion to dismiss incorporates grounds equivalent to a demurrer and so should be treated as before this Court on discretionary appeal. The motion to dismiss is made on the basis of Rule 12.02: (1) that the courts lack jurisdiction of the subject matter; (6) the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; and the complaint fails to join an indispensable party. These grounds for the motion to dismiss are equivalent to a demurrer and should be treated as such for purposes of discretionary appeal under § 27-305 T.C.A
It has long been the rule of this Court that pleas shall be given the effect required by their content, without regard to the name given them by the pleader. Murphy v. Johnson, 107 Tenn. 552, 64 S.W. 894 (1901); Arnold v. Moyers, 69 Tenn. 308 (1878); Dreher v. Hill, 5 Tenn. App. 10 (1927); Commerce Union Bank v. Haiman, 4 Tenn.App. 669 (1927). We see no reason why this rule should not be applied in this case, in implementation of the Rules of Civil Procedure adopted by this Court and approved by the legislature.
The first ground of the motion is that the court had no jurisdiction of the subject matter for a variety of reasons. A demurrer will lie for want of jurisdiction in the court. Caruthers' History of a Lawsuit, 8th Ed., § 202. We are of opinion however that this ground of the motion is not good. The basis of the motion is that the Minimum Salary Department of the African Methodist Episcopal Church, Inc. is not a public, charitable Tennessee corporation. This assumption is contrary to the allegations of the complaint, which must be taken as true on a motion to dismiss on grounds equivalent to a demurrer. Taking this allegation of the complaint, together with allegations of diversion of funds, we have a quo warranto case of which the Court has jurisdiction.
The second part of this complaint of no jurisdiction of the subject matter is, that relators do not possess the requisite interest to maintain the suit. This ground is not good. § 23-2810 T.C.A., a part of the quo warranto statute, provides that anyone who gives security for the costs of the 'proceedings can be a relator.
Another ground of the motion is lack of an indispensable party, the parent church, the African Methodist Episcopal Church, Inc., a Pennsylvania corporation. This ground of the motion is not good. The Minimum Salary Department of the African Methodist Episcopal Church, Inc., is a separate Tennessee corporation, chartered in Tennessee as a public welfare corporation, for charitable purposes, and as such is the only party necessary to a quo warranto proceeding in which all of the allegations of malfeasance and misfeasance are against the corporate officers of the Tennessee corporation.
Failure to join an indispensable party may be taken advantage of by demurrer, Gibson's Suits in Chancery 5th Ed., § 118, so we have considered this ground.
We are of opinion that the Chancery Court has jurisdiction of the subject matter, that the complaint states a claim upon which relief can be granted, and that all necessary parties are before the court. Accordingly, we affirm the action of the Chancellor in overruling the motion to dismiss. However, there are some observations it is necessary to make at this time with respect to the granting of discretionary appeals on the overruling of a motion to dismiss.
Hereafter this Court will not consider any discretionary appeal from action on a motion to dismiss unless the chancellor has designated the particular grounds of the motion which he regards as amounting to a demurrer, and the discretionary appeal limited to these particular grounds. A discretionary appeal without this particularization of grounds of the motion to dismiss, or such an appeal predicated on the entire motion to dismiss, will be dismissed.
Since the free granting of discretionary appeals unnecessarily delays final disposition of cases, such appeals should be allowed only in the rare instance where the chancellor has grave doubt as to the correctness of his ruling on the demurrer. This attitude of discouragement of such appeals will enter into this Court's disposition thereof.
The order of the chancellor overruling the motion to dismiss is affirmed with respect to all grounds amounting to a demurrer, and the case is remanded to the lower court for further proceedings.
DYER, C. J., McCANLESS, J., and JENKINS, Special Justice, concur.
CRESON, J., dissents.
. The dissent contains a full statement of the case, the pleadings and the issues, having first been written as the proposed opinion of the Court.
. "27-305. Discretionary appeal before final decision. — The chancellor or circuit judge may, in his discretion, allow an appeal . in equity causes . . . on overruling a demurrer . . . ."
. If this Court is to preserve the practice of discretionary appeals, and so give effect to the legislative intent that discretionary appeals be allowed, because of the permissible breadth of a motion to dismiss under Rule 12.02, trial courts must restrain themselves in allowing such appeals, and this Court must insist that such appeals conform to the requirements of this opinion.