Case Name: The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Edward Junior Lane, Defendant, and Theodore McNeil, Clarence Lee Sloan and John Henry Williams, Appellants
Court: New York Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1961-11-30
Citations: 10 N.Y.2d 347
Docket Number: 
Parties: The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Edward Junior Lane, Defendant, and Theodore McNeil, Clarence Lee Sloan and John Henry Williams, Appellants.
Judges: 
Reporter: New York Reports
Volume: 10
Pages: 347–361

Head Matter:
The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Edward Junior Lane, Defendant, and Theodore McNeil, Clarence Lee Sloan and John Henry Williams, Appellants.
Argued June 7, 1961;
reargued October 3, 1961;
decided November 30, 1961.
James P. Cassidy for Theodore McNeil, appellant.
I. In the court’s main charge, reversible error was committed in charging that the statements given by defendant McNeil to the police and District Attorney were sufficient for conviction, if found to be voluntary and if it was found also that Claude Quick was criminally killed on the date in question. (People v. Kingston, 8 N Y 2d 384.) II. The court did not permit the jury to consider McNeil’s defense of withdrawal from the underlying felony by its refusal to charge as requested on two occasions. (People v. Nichols, 230 N. Y. 221.) III. Unjustifiable prejudice was created against McNeil by the summation of the District Attorney. (People v. Lovello, 1 N Y 2d 436; People v. Reade, 1 N Y 2d 459; People v. Marks, 6 N Y 2d 67; People v. Leavitt, 301 N. Y. 113.) IV. So far as McNeil is concerned, the People failed to prove that the killing was committed by a person engaged in the commission of a felony or in an attempt to commit a felony, and the motion to dismiss at the end of the People’s case should have been granted. (People v. Ryan, 263 N. Y. 298; People v. Collins, 234 N. Y. 355; People v. Sobieskoda, 235 N. Y. 411; People v. Wood, 8 N Y 2d 48.) V. Reversible error was committed by the court in failing to exclude statements made by McNeil to the police and to the District Attorney’s office as involuntary. (Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U. S. 199.) VI. It was error not to have charged the various degrees of homicide to the jury with respect, at least, to the actual gunman. (People v. Cummings, 274 N. Y. 336; People v. Koerber, 244 N. Y. 147.) VII. It was error for the trial court to refuse defendant McNeil a separate trial.
On reargument: I. The revolver, People’s exhibit 3, should not have been received in evidence. (Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643; United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U. S. 56; People v. Esposito, 118 Misc. 867; Rios v. United States, 364 U. S. 253; Johnson v. United States, 333 U. S. 10; United States v. Di Re, 332 U. S. 581; Byars v. United States, 273 U. S. 28; Henry v. United States, 361 U. S. 98; Jones v. United States, 362 U. S. 257.) II. The testimony of the ballistics expert and the statements taken from McNeil by the police and District Attorney were the fruit of the poisonous tree of illegally obtained evidence and should have been excluded from evidence. (Silverthorne Lbr. Co. v. United States, 251 U. S. 385; Nardone v. United States, 308 U. S. 338.) III. The statements taken from McNeil by the police and District Attorney should not have been admitted in evidence. (People v. Di Biasi, 7 N Y 2d 544; People v. Waterman, 9 N Y 2d 561; People v. Noble, 9 N Y 2d 571.) IV. The cumulative effect of the errors pointed out in the main brief on this appeal require the reversal of the conviction as to appellant McNeil.
Lazarus I. Levine for Clarence Lee Sloan, appellant.
I. The trial court erroneously omitted to charge the various lesser degrees of homicide. The evidence tending to prove that defendants were intoxicated mandated a charge as to the lesser degrees of homicide. (People v. Koerber, 244 N. Y. 147; People v. Cummings, 274 N. Y. 336.) II. The evidence tending to prove that the felony had terminated when the fatal shots were fired mandated a charge as to the lesser degrees of homicide. (People v. Ryan, 263 N. Y. 298; People v. Moran, 246 N. Y. 100.) III. Sloan’s statements were procured by force, brutality and coercion and their admission into evidence violated the due process clauses of the Constitution of the United States (Fourteenth Amendment) and the Constitution of the State of New York (art. I, § 6), and the provisions of section 395 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. (People v. Vargas, 7 N Y 2d 555; Spano v. New York, 360 U. S. 315.) IV. The statements by Sloan were not confessions and it therefore was error for the court to charge that the statements, if voluntarily made, together with other proof that the crime was committed, would be sufficient to convict. V. The District’s Attorney conduct deprived defendant Sloan of a fair trial. (People v. Jackson, 7 N Y 2d 142; People v. Lovello, 1 N Y 2d 436; People v. Tassiello, 300 N. Y. 425; People v. Levan, 295 N. Y. 26; People v. Miller, 6 N Y 2d 152; People v. Hicks, 287 N. Y. 165; People v. Marks, 6 N Y 2d 67.) VI. The trial court’s refusal to permit evidence as to brutality practiced on the witness McNair was error. The District Attorney’s unfair comment in summation that McNair was not beaten compounded the error. VII. The District Attorney improperly referred to the failure of defendant Sloan to take the stand. (People v. Leavitt, 301 N. Y. 113.) VIII. The testimony of the accomplices Lane and Williams was not corroborated by other independent evidence tending to connect Sloan with the commission of the crime. IX. Sloan was deprived of a fair trial by various errors committed prior to and during the course of the trial. The motions for severances improperly were denied. X. The motion for a change of venue improperly was denied. XI. The trial jury was not chosen pursuant to statutory requirements. XIII. Sloan’s pretrial motion to inspect his statements improperly was denied.
On reargument: I. The search of the McNair automobile was illegal and the evidence thereby obtained was inadmissible in the courts of this State. (Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643; People v. Jung Hing, 212 N. Y. 393; Rios v. United States, 364 U. S. 253; Jones v. United States, 362 U. S. 257; United States v. Di Re, 332 U. S. 581; Johnson v. United States, 333 U. S. 10.) II. Sloan was unlawfully removed from his cell and questioned subsequent to arraignment on the gun charge. His statements thus were unlawfully obtained. (People v. Di Biasi, 7 N Y 2d 544; People v. Waterman, 9 N Y 2d 561; People v. Steuding, 6 N Y 2d 214.) III. A new trial is mandated by the cumulative effect of errors discussed in the main brief. (People v. Feolo, 282 N. Y. 276; People v. Fisher, 249 N. Y. 419.)
Solomon A. Klein for John Henry Williams, appellant.
I. Defendant’s right to a fair and impartial evaluation of his defense was irretrievably prejudiced when the District Attorney persisted in conveying to the jury, without any basis whatever, that defendant’s witness, Mrs. Sulner, (a) was the daughter of an expert who “ testified for the Hungarian Government against Cardinal Mindszenty ”, (b) was herself a witness against many Hungarian people who “ lost their land ”, and (c) was rejected in American courts as unworthy of belief; prevailed upon the court to strike her denial that either she or any of her relatives ever testified against Cardinal Mindszenty; and offered his personal integrity, time and again, as support for the credibility of the police. (Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U. S. 440; People v. Robinson, 273 N. Y. 438; Toomey v. Farley, 2 N Y 2d 71; People v. Malkin, 250 N. Y. 185; People v. Slover, 232 N. Y. 264; People v. Wolf, 183 N. Y. 464; People v. Lovello, 1 N Y 2d 436; People v. Jackson, 7 N Y 2d 142.) II. It was reversible error for the court to instruct the jury that they could render a verdict of guilty upon defendants’ pretrial statements and proof of the corpus delicti. (People v. Kingston, 8 N Y 2d 384; People v. Bretagna, 298 N. Y. 323; People v. White, 11 A D 2d 742.)
On reargument: The decision in Mapp v. Ohio (367 U. S. 643) —'holding that “all evidence obtained by search and seizure in violation of the Constitution is, by that same authority, inadmissible in a state court ” — requires a new trial to be granted in the interests of justice. (People v. Defore, 242 N. Y. 13; Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U. S. 25; People v. Finkelstein, 9 NY 2d 342; People v. Hernandez, 10 N Y 2d 774; Patterson v. Alabama, 294 U. S. 600; Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 132; Henry v. United States, 361 U. S. 98; Williams v. United States, 263 F. 2d 487; Judd v. United States, 190 F. 2d 649; People v. Martin, 45 Cal. 2d 755; People v. Rudish, 294 N. Y. 500; McDonald v. United States, 335 U. S. 451.)
Abraham Isseks, District Attorney (Angelo J. Ingrassia and Robert M. Devitt of counsel), for respondent.
I. The guilt of each of the defendants was established beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v. Harris, 306 N. Y. 345; People v. Michalow, 229 N. Y. 325; People v. Ryan, 263 N. Y. 298; People v. Lunse, 278 NT. Y. 303; People v. Nichols, 230 N. Y. 221.) II. The statements of defendants were properly received in evidence. (People v. Malinski, 292 N. Y. 360; People v. Mleczko, 298 N. Y. 153; People v. Fernandez, 301 N. Y. 302; People v. Vargas, 7 N Y 2d 555.) III. The trial court properly submitted the case to the jury as murder in the first degree and properly omitted to charge the lesser degrees of homicide. (People v. Schleiman, 197 N. Y. 383; People v. Seiler, 246 N. Y. 262; People v. Martone, 256 N. Y. 395; People v. Lunse, 278 N. Y. 303; People v. Mussenden, 308 N. Y. 558.) IV. The charge of the trial court with respect to the statements of defendants and with respect to intoxication was proper. (People v. Kingston, 8 N Y 2d 384.) V. The comments of the District Attorney were proper and did not constitute error. (People v. Reade, 1 N Y 2d 459; People v. Lovello, 1 N Y 2d 436; People v. Doody, 172 N. Y. 165.) VI. The testimony of the codefendants Lane and Williams, accomplices as a matter of law, was amply corroborated. (People v. Weiss, 7 N Y 2d 139; People v. Reddy, 261 N. Y. 479; People v. Dixon, 231 N. Y. 111; People v. Plath, 100 N. Y. 590.) VII. The cross-examination of the witness Hannah Sulner by the District Attorney was proper. VIII. The trial court properly denied the motions of defendants for a severance.
On reargument: I. Defendants, by failing to raise the question as to an alleged illegal search and seizure prior to trial or during the trial, have waived their rights under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution. (Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643; United States v. Di Re, 159 F. 2d 818, 332 U. S. 581; Jones v. United States, 362 U. S. 257; Brinegar v. United States, 338 U. S. 160; Segurola v. United States, 275 U. S. 106; Jordan v. United States, 254 F. 2d 710; United States v. Sheba Bracelets, 248 F. 2d 134; United States v. Sferas, 210 F. 2d 69; United States v. Herskovitz, 209 F. 2d 881.) II. The search of the McNair automobile was not illegal and the evidence thereby obtained was properly admitted into evidence. (United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U. S. 56.) III. The decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in Mapp v. Ohio (367 U. S. 643) has no applicability whatsoever to defendant Williams. (Agnello v. United States, 269 U. S. 20.) IV. The statements of defendants were properly admitted in evidence. (People v. Vargas, 7 N Y 2d 555; People v. Di Biasi, 7 N Y 2d 544; People v. Waterman, 9 N Y 2d 561.) V. The testimony of the ballistics expert was properly admitted in evidence.

Opinion:
Burke, J.
The judgments convicting defendants of felony murder and sentencing them to death must be reversed and new trials ordered.
The most substantial errors raised by appellants concern the admissibility of their confessions, nature of the search resulting in discovery of the revolver, sufficiency of evidence corroborating accomplice testimony, and propriety of actions of the District Attorney.
We hold that no error was committed in submitting to the jury, under proper instructions, the voluntary nature of the confessions, although obtained after removal from the county jail, and during a delay in arraignment (Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U. S. 534; Stein v. New York, 346 U. S. 156, 187-188). Admissibility of confessions is a matter of State procedure (Rogers v. Richmond, supra, p. 543). Nothing in Mapp v. Ohio (367 U. S. 643) is to the contrary.
It is evident that Mapp does not bar the admission, as evidence, of the revolver found in McNair's car, unless it was seized by an unreasonable search, for " It is [only] unreasonable searches that are prohibited by the Fourth Amendment." (United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U. S. 56, 60; Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 132,147). A search incident to a lawful arrest is itself lawful (People v. Defore, 242 N. Y. 13, 18; People v. Chiagles, 237 N. Y. 193; Carroll v. United States, supra) and, regardless of the character of the arrest, a search is legal if there is consent thereto.
The investigation conducted in this case meets both these tests.
"A peace officer may, without a warrant, arrest a person, ® [w]hen a felony has in fact been committed, and he has reasonable cause for believing the person to be arrested to have committed it " (Code Grim. Pro., § 177).
The classic statement of the meaning of probable, or reasonable, cause is that of Chief Justice Marshall in Locke v. United States (7 Crunch [11 U. S.] 339, 348): "It may be added, that the term 1 probable cause,' according to its usual acceptation, means less than evidence which would justify condemnation. It imports a seizure made under circumstances which warrant suspicion." (See, also, Henry v. United States, 361 U. S. 98, 102; Brinegar v. United States, 338 U. S. 160, 175; Carroll v. United States, supra, p. 162; Dumbra v. United States, 268 U. S. 435.)
It is conceded that the arrest took place at the time that Sergeant Decker and Officer Cerone approached the car with guns drawn and ordered the two occupants out (see Henry v. United States, supra, p. 103; Code Crim. Pro., § 167, 171). The testimony of decedent's wife, Sergeant Gallagher and Officer Cerone shows that the arresting officers had " reasonable cause for believing the person to be arrested to have committed " the felony (Code Grim. Pro., § 177). The arrest, therefore, being lawful, the incidental search was also permissible.
Furthermore we find the search of the automobile was conducted with the consent of the owner, McNair. Such acquiescence is binding on the occupants, for " [t]he immunity from unreasonable searches and seizures being personal, one cannot object to the searching of another's premises or property if the latter consents to the search, even though property is found, for the possession of which defendant is subsequently prosecuted." (4 Wharton's Criminal Law and Procedure, p. 215).
Defendants' contention that there is insufficient evidence in the record to corroborate the accomplice testimony given by Lane and Williams is contrary to the facts. Such proof is clearly found in testimony that McNeil and Sloan were arrested while seated in a car in which the murder weapon was found, and further that of the witness Kirby as to the presence of all of the defendants together in an apartment both before and after the killing.
However, when the District Attorney, in spite of objections, referred in his summation to the absence of brutal treatment of McNair, reversible error was committed. The testimony of this witness, which had been excluded as a result of the District Attorney's objection, was relevant, and could have been allowed on the issues of credibility and coercion. A common pattern of mistreatment of all of the suspects held in connection with the commission of the crime was pertinent to a particularly critical conflict in the evidence. It was, therefore, clearly prejudicial to the defendants for the District Attorney, after succeeding in preventing testimony on that subject by McNair, to argue that McNair was not beaten, and urge that, therefore, the jury should find the others similarly treated. Such conduct merely served to illustrate the importance attached by all parties to that testimony. Hence the reference by the District Attorney to the nonexistent evidence constitutes error requiring our reversal.
A reversal is also dictated by the cumulative effects of the improprieties committed on cross-examination and in the summation. Although taken singly they were not detrimental, considered collectively they were exceedingly harmful (see People v. Carborano, 301 N. Y. 39, 42).
In this view it is not necessary to pass on the other questions. Accordingly, all the judgments appealed from should be reversed, and a new trial ordered.