Case Name: In the Matter of the Interest of Steven Wolf, a child under 18 years of age. Steven WOLF, Appellant, v. The STATE of Idaho, Respondent. In the Matter of the Interest of Rory Brooks, a child under 18 years of age. Rory BROOKS, Appellant, v. The STATE of Idaho, Respondent
Court: Idaho Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Idaho
Decision Date: 1978-07-27
Citations: 99 Idaho 476
Docket Number: Nos. 12633, 12634
Parties: In the Matter of the Interest of Steven Wolf, a child under 18 years of age. Steven WOLF, Appellant, v. The STATE of Idaho, Respondent. In the Matter of the Interest of Rory Brooks, a child under 18 years of age. Rory BROOKS, Appellant, v. The STATE of Idaho, Respondent.
Judges: McFADDEN, J., and SCOGGIN, J. Pro Tern., concur.
Reporter: Idaho Reports
Volume: 99
Pages: 476–497

Head Matter:
583 P.2d 1011
In the Matter of the Interest of Steven Wolf, a child under 18 years of age. Steven WOLF, Appellant, v. The STATE of Idaho, Respondent. In the Matter of the Interest of Rory Brooks, a child under 18 years of age. Rory BROOKS, Appellant, v. The STATE of Idaho, Respondent.
Nos. 12633, 12634.
Supreme Court of Idaho.
July 27, 1978.
Rehearing Denied Sept. 19, 1978.
Charles F. McDevitt, McDevitt, Pursley & Webb, Boise, for appellants.
Wayne L. Kidwell, Atty. Gen., Lynn E. Thomas, Deputy Atty. Gen., David H. Leroy, Ada County Pros. Atty., Boise, for respondent.

Opinion:
SHEPARD, Chief Justice.
This is a consolidated appeal from orders waiving juvenile jurisdiction as to appellants Wolf and Brooks, who are juveniles and accused of committing first degree murder. The effect of the waiver orders is that the State may prosecute the appellants as adults. We affirm.
One Enrico Flory was murdered on June 3,1976, at which time appellant Brooks was 17 years of age and appellant Wolf was 15 years of age. Appellants were charged with that murder. Petitions requesting the waiver of juvenile jurisdiction as to appellants in connection with these charges were filed on September 9, 1976. Separate hearings as to each appellant were had on the waiver petitions. At each of those hearings the county prosecutor testified that there was probable cause to believe that the appellants had committed the murder. The magistrate held that the right to cross-examine did not attach on the determination of probable cause in the waiver setting, and hence, appellants' counsel was not permitted to cross-examine the prosecutor. Thereafter, the magistrate found probable cause.
Findings of fact and conclusions of law were entered by the magistrate in separate orders waiving juvenile jurisdiction. See State v. Gibbs, 94 Idaho 908, 500 P.2d 209 (1972). The magistrate concluded that each appellant was an anti-social sociopath, but not mentally incompetent. See State v. Powers, 96 Idaho 833, 537 P.2d 1369 (1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1089, 96 S.Ct. 881, 47 L.Ed.2d 99 (1976); State v. Linn, 93 Idaho 430, 462 P.2d 729 (1969); State v. White, 93 Idaho 153, 456 P.2d 797 (1969). The magistrate also concluded that the prognosis for improvement of each of the appellants was unsatisfactory and that the condition of each of the appellants would likely continue beyond the age of 21 rendering the appellants dangerous to the public beyond that age. Juvenile jurisdiction for rehabilitative treatment terminates by law when the person reaches age 21. I.C. § 16-1805. See Schroeder, Developments in the Enforcement of Parental and State Standards in Juvenile Proceedings, 10 Idaho L.Rev. 153 (1974). See also Note, Problem of Age and Jurisdiction in the Juvenile Court, 19 Vand. L.Rev. 833, 837 — 49 (1966). The magistrate concluded that each had shown an escalating propensity for violent activity. Each appellant had previous juvenile adjudications of record and in the interval between the murder of which they are accused and the filing of the petitions, appellants had participated together in rape and two kidnappings. The magistrate also concluded that each appellant had failed to respond to rehabilitation, that they were emotionally and mentally mature, that they could not benefit from juvenile facilities available in Idaho and that they would likely disrupt the rehabilitation of other juveniles in those facilities.
As to appellant Wolf alone, the magistrate held that I.C. § 16-1806(l)(a) was in conflict with I.C. § 18-216. Section 16-1806(l)(a) did not authorize the waiver of jurisdiction over a juvenile who was between the ages of 14 and 16 at the time of the act of which he is accused. I.C. § 18-216, however, authorizes the waiver of jurisdiction over any juvenile between 14 and 18. In ordering the waiver of juvenile jurisdiction over appellant Wolf as a 15 year old, the magistrate held that I.C. § 18-216 was the controlling statute. The magistrate further held that I.C. § 16-1806(l)(a) was an unconstitutional limitation on the jurisdiction of the district court relying on Idaho Const., Art. 5, § 20; State v. Lindsey, 78 Idaho 241, 300 P.2d 491 (1956); and Idaho Const., Art. 5, § 13; State v. McCoy, 94 Idaho 236, 486 P.2d 247 (1971).
Those orders of the magistrate waiving juvenile jurisdiction were appealed to the district court. Without reaching the merits, the district court remanded the cause for further proceedings in light of an interstate agreement between Idaho and California providing for the transfer of Idaho juveniles to California juvenile treatment facilities. The magistrate's original orders were predicated in part on the lack of adequate facilities in Idaho which would pro vide both the maximum security in which to confine violent juveniles and treatment programs which gave a realistic promise for the rehabilitation of such juveniles. Under the interstate agreement, the facilities in California to which Idaho juveniles could be transferred offer both maximum security confinement and treatment for violent juveniles.
Following remand from the district court, the magistrate considered that alternative but reaffirmed his original waiver of jurisdiction orders and gave two reasons therefor. The magistrate emphasized the appellants' unsatisfactory prognosis for rehabilitation and the probability they would remain dangerous beyond the age of 21 at which time they would be released from juvenile confinement. Additionally, the magistrate expressed concern that California could refuse to accept the appellants, could return them to Idaho on 15 days notice or cancel the entire agreement on 30 days notice. Should any of these contingencies occur, the problem of the inadequacy of Idaho juvenile facilities would again be posed. We note that under the YRA, I.C. § 16-1806(7), once juvenile jurisdiction is exercised, it is no longer possible to transfer the juvenile for adult prosecution. State v. Gibbs, supra. Once a juvenile adjudication is made, double jeopardy attaches to preclude adult criminal prosecution. Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 95 S.Ct. 1779, 44 L.Ed.2d 346 (1975). Therefore it is not possible to commit a juvenile to juvenile jurisdiction and. in the event that fails then transfer him to adult jurisdiction. Whitebread & Batey, Transfer Between Courts: Proposals of the Juvenile Justice Standards Project, 63 Va.L.Rev. 221, 227 (1977).
From those orders of the magistrate reaffirming his previous orders waiving juvenile jurisdiction, appeals were taken to the district court. The district court affirmed as to appellant Brooks in a brief opinion. The district court also affirmed as to appellant Wolf, but in so doing rejected the magistrate's constitutional conclusions regarding I.C. § 16-1806. Rather, the district court found that I.C. § 16-1806 had been impliedly repealed to the extent that it was inconsistent with I.C. § 18-216 and thus waiver of jurisdiction as to appellant Wolf was affirmed.
From the decisions of the district court affirming the magistrate orders waiving juvenile jurisdiction, these appeals result. Each appellant assigns as error the magistrate's ruling permitting the prosecutor to testify as to the existence of probable cause without being subject to cross-examination. Each appellant also assigns as error the alleged failure of the magistrate's division of the district court to recognize that appellants have a right to rehabilitative treatment as juveniles. Each appellant assigns the order waiving juvenile jurisdiction as error. Appellant Wolf asserts the order waiving juvenile jurisdiction as to himself as erroneous since he was 15 at the time of the alleged murder. Finally, Wolf assigns as error the magistrate's refusal to grant a continuance so he might seek a writ of prohibition in the district court which would prohibit the magistrate from conducting the waiver proceedings.
I.
We turn first to the question of the necessity of finding probable cause as an element of the waiver hearing. While a number of jurisdictions do require a probable cause finding in conjunction with the waiver process, Rudstein, Double Jeopardy in Juvenile Proceedings, 14 William & Mary L.Rev., 266, 298-99 (1972), Idaho does not. We are not unique in our position. Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 536 n.16, 95 S.Ct. 1779, 44 L.Ed.2d 346 (1975). As to a distinction on the requirement of showing probable cause depending upon type of offenses, see Institute of Judicial Administration and American Bar Ass'n Joint Comm'n on Juvenile Justice Standards, Transfer Between Courts § 2.2(A)(1) (Proposed Draft 1976).
The function of a probable cause determination at the waiver stage is not clear. It would even appear to be duplicitous since a juvenile will receive a prompt determination of that question regardless of how the waiver issue might be resolved. When a juvenile court waives jurisdiction, an adult court must still conduct a preliminary hearing at which probable cause must be determined. I.C.R. 51. On the other hand, if the juvenile court does not order jurisdiction waived, a probable cause determination is made by the juvenile court as to whether and how to proceed on the juvenile petition. I.J.R. 17 and 20. While various considerations arguably militate for the incorporation of the probable cause standard at a waiver hearing, such .is not required by either the Idaho or federal constitutions.
It is argued, however, that the magistrate did in fact make a probable cause inquiry in this case and found probable cause to believe the appellants murdered Enrico Flory. Whether or not a probable cause inquiry is constitutionally mandated, it may be contended that considerations of fundamental fairness require that the accused be given the opportunity to cross-examine those who present evidence against them. We disagree. The probable cause hearing did no more than establish that the appellants were accused of murder. The nature of the accusation is a relevant factor for the court to consider in deciding whether or not to waive jurisdiction. In re Ferris, 222 Kan. 104, 563 P.2d 1046 (1977). Assuming, but not deciding, that it is necessary to establish that fact by the probable cause standard, we are not convinced that appellants had a right, as asserted, to confrontation with the witnesses themselves who inculpated them in the murder nor to cross-examine the prosecutor. As stated in Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 95 S.Ct. 854, 43 L.Ed.2d 54 (1975):
The sole issue is whether there is probable cause for detaining the arrested person pending further proceedings. This issue can be determined reliably without an adversary hearing. The standard is •the same as that for arrest. That standard — probable cause to believe the suspect has committed a crime — traditionally has been decided by a magistrate in a nonadversary proceeding on hearsay and written testimony, and the Court has approved these formal modes of proof.
420 U.S. at 120, 95 S.Ct. at 866 (footnote omitted).
Measured by the standard of Ger-stein the proceedings before the magistrate in the instant case were constitutionally sufficient. The only determination by the magistrate was the existence of probable cause to justify transfer to the adult court. That determination could be based on hearsay and need not be tested by cross-examination and confrontation. Note, Sending the Accused Juvenile to an Adult Criminal Court: A Due Process Analysis, 42 Brooklyn L.Rev. 309 (1972).
We note, parenthetically, that section 8(b) of the new I.C. § 16-1806, as amended by the 1977 legislature, authorizes the juvenile court to consider "whether the alleged offense was committed in an aggressive, violent, premeditated or wilful manner." Since this statute was enacted after the murder of Mr. Flory, the ex post facto clauses of the Idaho and federal constitutions prohibit us from applying it to these appeals. We caution, however, that this new statute does not authorize an adjudication or determination of facts beyond the existence of probable cause to believe that a particular crime was committed and that a particular juvenile committed it. It merely authorizes the trial court to consider circumstances in aggravation as bearing on the question of whether juvenile jurisdiction should be retained. A determination which exceeds that narrow scope could result in the attachment of double jeopardy and a plea in bar to any proceedings in an adult court. Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 95 S.Ct. 1779, 44 L.Ed.2d 346 (1975).
II.
Both appellants contend that the Youth Rehabilitation Act confers on them a statutory right to rehabilitative treatment as juveniles. We reject the argument that the appellants have an unqualified right to treatment as juveniles. I.C. § 16-1806 and 18-216 make it clear that not all chronological age juveniles will receive treatment as juveniles. While juvenile treatment programs are intended to divert youthful per sons from association with hardened criminals and thereby abort incipient criminal tendencies, the criteria we supplied in State v. Gibbs, supra, take cognizance of the fact that some young persons are not susceptible to juvenile rehabilitation programs and such would not benefit themselves, the public to which they must be released at age 21, or other juveniles undergoing treatment and with whom they would be confined. Neither Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 86 S.Ct. 1045, 16 L.Ed.2d 84 (1966), nor any other case to which we have been cited supports appellants' absolutist proposition.
III.
In State v. Gibbs, supra, we announced the following criteria for the guidance of juvenile courts in determining waiver questions:
Jurisdiction ordinarily is waived when (1) the defendant has acquired such a degree of emotional or mental maturity that he is not receptive to rehabilitative programs designed for children; (2) although the defendant is immature, his disturbance has eluded exhaustive prior efforts at correction through existing juvenile programs; or (3) the defendant is immature and might be treated, but the nature of his difficulty is likely to render him dangerous to the public, if released at age twenty-one, or to disrupt the rehabilitation of other children in the program prior to his release. These areas of consensus provide flexible but definite criteria for waiver of jurisdiction. Each criterion requires that the child's potential for rehabilitation be evaluated in terms of his present state of development and the availability of facilities, programs and personnel capable of providing effective and individualized treatment.
94 Idaho at 916, 500 P.2d at 217 (footnotes omitted.
In the instant case the magistrate found that each of appellants was emotionally and mentally mature and that the prognosis for each appellant under available juvenile rehabilitation programs was unsatisfactory. He also found that each would likely remain dangerous to the public if released at age 21 and in the interim each would likely disrupt the rehabilitation of other juveniles. These findings are supported by the record. Our decision in Gibbs furnished notice that findings of that nature would warrant waiver. The magistrate's findings in the instant case are a blend of the first and third criteria, but the fact that there was borrowing from both criteria is not error since our decision in Gibbs does not demand rigid adherence to an inflexible formula.
Our object is not to rigidify the discretionary waiver decision; rather, it is to guide the sound exercise of that discretion in order to implement the legislative purpose and to protect the waiver process from constitutional infirmity.
94 Idaho at 916 n. 36, 500 P.2d at 217 n. 36. The findings of the magistrate adequately met the criteria of Gibbs and we find no error.
We turn now to appellant Wolf's assertion that the district court erred in affirming the waiver order since Wolf was less than 16 years of age at the time he allegedly committed the murder. His argument is based on the language of I.C. § 16-1806(l)(a) which he asserts forbids the prosecution of a person between 14 and 16 years of age for a crime.
Since prior to statehood, in one form or another, the legislature has enacted statutes similar to I.C. § 18-201. Until 1972 § 18-201 provided:
Persons capable of committing crimes. —All persons are capable of committing crimes, except those belonging to the following classes: 1. Children under the age of fourteen years, in the absence of clear proof that at the time of committing the act charged against them, they knew its wrongfulness.
Said § 1 of I.C. § 18-201 was eliminated and I.C. § 18-216 was enacted (see Ch. 31 § 10, 1970 Idaho Sess.Laws) providing:
Criminal trial of juveniles barred — Exceptions — Jurisdictional Hearing — Transfer of defendant to probate court. — 1. A person shall not be tried for or convicted of an offense if (a) at the time of the conduct charged to constitute the offense he was less than fourteen (14) years of age; or (b) at the time of the conduct charged to constitute the offense he was not less than fourteen (14) nor more than seventeen (17) years of age, unless: 1. A court of this state has no jurisdiction over him pursuant to Chapter 18, Title 16, Idaho Code; or 2. The court having jurisdiction pursuant to Chapter 18, Title 16, Idaho Code, has entered an order waiving jurisdiction and consenting to the institution of criminal proceedings against him.
We deem the legislative history of I.C. § 18-216 to show an intent to change the common law which at times authorized the prosecution for a crime of a child as young as seven years of age. The common law rule was that infants under the age of seven were conclusively presumed incapable of crime; those between seven and fourteen were rebuttably presumed incapable; and those 14 or over were presumptively capable. 43 C.J.S. Infants § 204, p. 528-29. The legislative enactment in effect at the time of and applicable to the instant case clearly permitted criminal prosecution as an adult of a child over the age of 14 years. Additional requirements were placed upon the ability to try and convict a child over the age of 14 years in that "the court having jurisdiction pursuant to Chapter 18, Title 16, Idaho Code," must have entered an order waiving jurisdiction and consenting to the institution of criminal proceedings.
The legislature in its wisdom has sought to implement the above statutory intent that a child of the age of 14 or over may be prosecuted as an adult if an order has been entered waiving juvenile jurisdiction and consenting to the institution of "criminal proceedings" against him. As noted by the trial court, such implementing legislation was first enacted in 1955 and carried through in essentially the same form up to the time at issue in the case at bar. See I.C. § 16-1806 in its present and prior forms. At the time at issue in the case at bar it provided in pertinent part
Waiver of jurisdiction and transfer to other courts. — (1) After the filing of a petition and after full investigation and hearing, the court may waive jurisdiction under the Youth Rehabilitation Act over the child and order that the child be held for adult criminal proceedings when: (a) a child is alleged to have committed an act after he or she became sixteen years of age which would be a crime if committed by an adult;
The learned trial court with admirable restraint stated:
It is apparent that the legislature has not come to grips with what it is doing in this area and recognized that it has two statutes operating in the same field that are inconsistent. Therefore one must attempt to arrive at a rational conclusion arising out of an irrational state of legislative enactment.
We note further that to date the legislature has only recognized its error and acted to remove one-half of the irrational state of the law since it has again amended I.C. § 16-1806 in 1977 to specify how waiver proceedings shall be conducted but only as to a child of fifteen years of age. Rather obviously the same problem to be faced in this case may be faced in the future as to a child of 14 years of age.
We must, nevertheless, attempt to bring some order out of the chaos resulting from the literal language of the two statutory enactments. We hold that the clear intent of the legislature in the enactment qf I.C. § 18-216 and its antecedents as gained from the literal language was to define the minimum age at which a child could be tried for and convicted of a criminal offense as if he were an adult. That age is specified as 14 if an order has been entered waiving jurisdiction and consenting to the institution of criminal proceedings against him. We hold that § 16-1806 and its antecedents were intended to implement the statutory provisions of I.C. § 18-216 and an obvious error was committed. We agree with the reasoning of the trial court that Hayes v. Gardner, 95 Idaho 137, 504 P.2d 810 (1972), recognized I.C. § 18-216 to be the operative statute in resolving whether a child within the meaning of the Youth Rehabilitation Act could be tried as an adult. Admittedly, Hayes did not consider the discrepancy between the two statutes pointed out here since in Hayes the juvenile involved was 17 years of age.
We do not rest our holding on the precise reasoning of the district court wherein he opined that since the two statutes were in conflict, the latest enactment was the best guide to legislative intent. See Jordan v. Pearce, 91 Idaho 687, 429 P.2d 419 (1967). The trial court reasoned that since I.C. § 18-216 as enacted in 1972 was the latest legislative indication of intent and thereby impliedly repealed the conflicting provisions of I.C. § 16-18Q6(l)(a). Being faced with the argument that I.C. § 16-1806(l)(a) had been amended in 1976 and thereby became the latest statement of legislative intent to be used in resolving the conflict between the two statutes, the district court opined that the 1976 amendment to I.C. § 16-1806 had not been concerned with the age provisions for waiver, but only with expanding the crimes for which waiver could be ordered. We agree with his factual view of the 1976 amendment of I.C. § 16-1806 and point out that it is buttressed by the statement of purpose attached to said legislation which reveals the legislative intent to, by amendment, allow waivers of juvenile jurisdiction for misdemeanors wherein previously waivers were allowed only in regard to alleged felonies. Said statement of intent further reveals legislative ignorance of the then state of the statutory law previously enacted by it. See Archives and Documents of the 1976 Idaho Legislature, Legislative Council, Statement of Purpose, Senate Bill No. 1421.
As above stated, while we agree with the district court's characterization of the 1976 legislative amendment of I.C. § 16-1806, we do not rest our holding on that basis. See, however, State, Department of Parks v. Idaho Department of Water Administration, 96 Idaho 440, 530 P.2d 924 (1974); Employment Security Agency v. Joint Class A School Dist., 88 Idaho 384, 400 P.2d 377 (1965). But also see Leonard Constr. Co. v. State ex rel. State Tax Commission, 96 Idaho 893, 539 P.2d 246 (1975).
The district court specifically disagreed with the ruling of the magistrate court that the legislative enactment of I.C. § 16-1806 constituted an unconstitutional legislative invasion of the judicial branch of government under the holdings of State v. Lindsey, 78 Idaho 241, 300 P.2d 491 (1956) and State v. McCoy, 94 Idaho 236, 486 P.2d 247 (1971). We refrain from expressing an opinion on that holding of the magistrate court and the rejection of it by the district court. Since our holding is reached on other grounds, it is unnecessary to consider and express an opinion upon that constitutional question.
Appellant Wolf assigns as error the refusal on the part of the magistrate to order a continuance to permit appellant to seek a writ of prohibition in the district court which would have prohibited the magistrate from proceeding with the waiver hearing. The decision to so grant or deny a continuance is within the sound discretion of the magistrate. State v. Richardson, 95 Idaho 446, 511 P.2d 263 (1973) cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1163, 94 S.Ct. 928, 39 L.Ed.2d 117 (1974). We note further that appellant has pointed to no prejudice resulting from the denial of the continuance and that an alternative writ of prohibition was sought in this Court and denied. Although the cause is still at the stage of determining the validity of the order of waiver, exhaustive proceedings have taken place both at the district court level and here. The record demonstrates thorough protection of appellant's rights at all stages with vigorous and capable counsel presenting many and varied arguments and theories which were thoroughly considered by the lower courts.
Orders affirmed.
McFADDEN, J., and SCOGGIN, J. Pro Tern., concur.