Case Name: William Hyman LINGEFELT, in his own right, and William Hyman Lingefelt, as Administrator of the Estate of Thelma Louise Lingefelt, deceased, Appellants, v. Herbert L. HANNER and Ruby Hanner, Appellees
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1960-12-22
Citations: 125 So. 2d 325
Docket Number: No. 59-483
Parties: William Hyman LINGEFELT, in his own right, and William Hyman Lingefelt, as Administrator of the Estate of Thelma Louise Lingefelt, deceased, Appellants, v. Herbert L. HANNER and Ruby Hanner, Appellees.
Judges: PEARSON, J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 125
Pages: 325–328

Head Matter:
William Hyman LINGEFELT, in his own right, and William Hyman Lingefelt, as Administrator of the Estate of Thelma Louise Lingefelt, deceased, Appellants, v. Herbert L. HANNER and Ruby Hanner, Appellees.
No. 59-483.
District Court of Appeal of Florida. Third District.
Dec. 22, 1960.
Murray D. Shear, and Gerald Kogan, Miami, for appellants.
Walton, Lantaff, Schroeder, Atkins, Carson & Wahl, Miami, for appellees.

Opinion:
'HORTON, Chief Judge.
Plaintiffs below seek review of an order dismissing their complaint with prejudice. By 'this order, the trial court determined as a matter of law that "the alleged failure to leave the automobile ignition locked is not a proximate cause of the alleged accident." In their complaint the plaintiffs alleged:
"On December 5, 1958 the Defendant, Herbert L. Hanner did negligently and carelessly with negligent disregard of the lives and safety of others allow the above motor vehicle to stand unattended without locking the ignition and did leave said vehicle unattended with ignition unlocked at or about the vicinity of N.W. 34th Street and N.W. 7th Avenue, Miami, Florida at approximately 7:45 P.M., in violation of Chapter 38, Article VI, Section 155 of the Code of the City of Miami, Florida and Ordinance 57-12 of Dade County, Florida, Section 6.01, certified copies of which are attached hereto as Plaintiff's Exhibits A and B respectively and are made a part of this Complaint.
"That the Defendant knew or should have known that as a proximate result of the aforesaid negligent act it was reasonably forseeable [sic] that an unauthorized person would enter and operate said automobile.
"That at the time, place, date and under the' circumstances hereinbefore mentioned, one Davis Alvis Robinson, did enter and operate the aforesaid automobile of the Defendants. The said Davis Alvis Robinson so negligently and carelessly operated the Defendants automobile, that on the aforesaid date at approximately 11:45 P.M., at or near the intersection of N.W. 34th Street and N.W. 22nd Avenue, Miami, Florida, he collided with the automobile owned and being operated by the Plaintiff, William Flyman Lingefelt, and in which the Plaintiff's wife, Thelma Louise Lingefelt was a passenger."
The appellants first argue that the violation of statutes or ordinances raises a presumption of negligence against the appel-lees. We conclude that the determinative issue is one of causation, and therefore it is not necessary to discuss this contention. For the purpose of our discussion, we will assume that the act of the appellees in violation of the ordinances was prima facie evidence of negligence, and proceed to a determination of the issue of proximate cause, for if the negligent act was not the proximate cause of appellants' injuries, they could not recover.
Proximate cause is defined in 23 Fla.Jur., Negligence, § 26, as "that cause which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred." See Pope v. Pinkerton-Hays Lumber Co., Fla.App.1960, 120 So.2d 227.
Although this case appears to be one of first impression in Florida, the question here presented has been considered by a number of courts in other jurisdictions. See 51 A.L.R.2d 633. The majority view as expressed by these courts holds that a wilful, malicious, or criminal act as a general rule breaks the chain of causation. Lack of foreseeability appears to be the basis for this conclusion. We believe it is grounded in reason and logic, and align ourselves with this view. The act of ap-pellee in negligently leaving the ignition switch of his automobile unlocked may have been the proximate cause of the unauthorized taking, but the appellants' injuries were due solely to the negligent operation, by an unauthorized person, of appellee's automobile. See Galbraith v. Levin, 323 Mass. 255, 81 N.E.2d 560; Corinti v. Wittkopp, 355 Mich. 170, 93 N.W.2d 906; Anderson v. Theisen, 231 Minn. 369, 43 N.W.2d 272; Permenter v. Milner Chevrolet Co., 229 Miss. 385, 91 So.2d 243; Hersh v. Miller, 169 Neb. 517, 99 N.W.2d 878. Contra: Ross v. Hartman, 78 App.D.C. 217, 139 F.2d 14, 158 A.L.R. 1370; Ostergard v. Frisch, 333 Ill.App. 359, 77 N.E.2d 537; Ney v. Yellow Cab Company, 2 Ill.2d 74, 117 N.E.2d 74, 51 A.L.R.2d 624.
While it is true that proximate cause is normally a question of fact to be submitted to the jury, however, where the facts are not disputed and are susceptible of only one inference, this issue becomes one of law for the court to determine. See Tatom v. Seaboard Air Line R. Co., 93 Fla. 1046, 113 So. 671; Florida Power & Light Co. v. Bridgeman, 133 Fla. 195, 182 So. 911; Faulk v. Parrish, Fla.1952, 58 So.2d 523; 23 Fla.Jur., Negligence, § 133; 38 Am.Jur., Negligence, § 133; 38 Am.Jur., Negligence, § 351.
Accordingly, the order appealed is affirmed.
Affirmed.
PEARSON, J., concurs.
CARROLL, CHAS., J., dissents.