Case Name: Belden against Seymour and another
Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Connecticut
Decision Date: 1830-06
Citations: 8 Conn. 19
Docket Number: 
Parties: Belden against Seymour and another.
Judges: In this opinion Hosmer, Ch. J. fully concurred.
Reporter: Connecticut Reports
Volume: 8
Pages: 19–34

Head Matter:
Belden against Seymour and another.
Hartford,
June, 1830.
Where the grantors of a deed of land, describing themselves as admin" istrators of the estate of A., being thereunto authorised by the court of probate, for the payment of the debts of A., conveyed land to B., and in such deed, as administrators aforesaid, and by virtue of the powers aforesaid, for themselves and for the heirs of A., covenanted, that they had good right to convey the premises; which deed was signed by the grantors, without any addition to their names; it was held, that this was a personal covenant, which bound the grantors, and them only.
In the description of land conveyed by deed, known and fixed monuments will controul courses and distances; and metes and bounds will convey the land embraced by them, though the quantity vary from that expressed in the deed; on the principle, that the less must yield to the greater certainty.
Therefore, where the description of the land conveyed was as follows: “beginning at the South-West comer of M.’s home-lot; thence running South, on the line of Main-street, 50 feet; thence turning at right angles, and running East 186 feet; thence Northerly, 50 feet to the said lot of M.; thence West to the place of beginning; bounded South and East upon the heirs of C., Northerly upon the home-lot of M. and West upon Mam-streetand in an action of ejectment founded on such deed, the court charged the jury, that the grantors thereby conveyed to the plaintiff, and covenanted, that they had good right to convey, 50 feet of land on Main-street; and if the line fell short of 50 feet, the defendants had violated their covenant; it was held, that this was a misdirection; for it should have been left to the jury to ascertain the point of the South-west corner of ill’s, home-lot. and then to ascertain where C’s, land commenced on the South, after which they should have been directed, that if the plaintiff had obtained, by the deed, all the land lying between those points, whether 50 feet or less, the covenant in question was not broken.
This was an action on the covenants of seisin and of good right to convey in a deed of land, sold to the plaintiff, by the defendants, as administrators of the estate of John Chenevard jun. deceased, and by virtue of an order of the court of probate, for the payment of the debts due from such estate. The breach alleged was, that “the said John Chenevard jun. was not, at the time of his decease, seised of said land, nor had he any interest therein, and that the defendants had no right to sell the same, but the same was then owned by John M. Chenevard,”
The cause was tried, on a general plea of performance, at Hartford, February term, 1830, before Bissell, J.
On the trial, the plaintiff produced and read in evidence the deed mentioned in the declaration; the material parts of which were as follows: “Know ye, that we Henry Seymour and Mary J. Chenevard, administrators of the estate of John Chenevard, jun., deceased, being thereunto authorized, by the court of probate for the district of Hartford, for the payment of the debts of the said John Chenevard jun., as by the records of said court of probate will fully appear, for the consideration of 1800 dollars received to our full satisfaction of Thomas Belden, do give, grant, bargain, sell and confirm unto the said Thomas all that lot or plat of land, situate in the city of Hartford, described and bounded as follows, viz. beginning at the South-west corner of Mrs. Merrills’ home-lot, or the heirs of Hezekiah Merrills, deceased; from thence running South, in the line of Main street, 50 feet; thence turning at right angles, and running East 186 feet; thence turning and running Northerly, 50 feet, to said Merrills’ lot; thence turning and running West to the place of beginning ; bounded South and East upon the devisees and heirs of the said John Chenevard jun. and of his late father John Chenevard sen., Northerly upon the said Merrills lot, and West upon Main street. To have and to hold, &c. And also, we, the said Henry and Mary J., as administrators aforesaid, and by virtue of the powers aforesaid, do, for ourselves and said heirs, executors and administrators, covenant with the said Thomas, his heirs and assigns, that at and until the ensealing of these presents, we have good right to bargain and sell the same, in manner and form as is above written; and that the same is free of all incumbrances whatsoever. And furthermore, we, the said Henry and Mary J., as administrators, do, by these presents, bind said estate to warrant and defend, &c. In witness whereof, we have hereunto set our hands and seals, the 17th day of March, A. D. 1812.
Henry Seymour. [L. S.]
Mary J. Chenevard. [L. S.]”
The plaintiff claimed, that the defendants, by this deed, covenanted, that the lot conveyed measured 50 feet on Main street. He also claimed to have proved, that at the time of the execution of the deed, he paid to the defendants 56 dollars per foot, for 50 feet of land on Main street; that he immediately afterwards went into possession of the land; that in 1818, Henry Seymour, one of the defendants, measured off to him 50 feet of land on Main street, and set up stakes on the Northern and Southern extremities of the lot; that af terwards, one John M. Chenevard brought his action of eject-merit against the tenants of the plaintiff then in possession of the land for a part thereof, in which'suit the defendants were vouched in, and came in, to defend; and that the plaintiff in that action recovered the seisin and possession of 3 feet and 4 inches of said 50 feet, extending through the lot from front to rear. The plaintiff, therefore, insisted, that the defendants were liable for the deficiency; and that the rule of damages was the consideration and interest thereon.
The defendants contended, that having executed the deed as administrators, they were not personally liable on the covenants contained therein. They further insisted, that by a just construction of the deed, no more land was conveyed to the plaintiff than belonged to the estate of John Chenevard jun. between the South line of the Merrills' lot and the North line of the land owned by the heirs and devisees of John Chenevard sen., without regard to the measurement; and that, if they were liable, the consideration paid, with the interest thereon, was not the rule of damages.
The judge charged the jury, that the defendants were personally liable on the covenants contained in the deed; that by the deed, the defendants conveyed to the plaintiff 50 feet of land on Main street, and covenanted with him, that they had good right to sell and convey the exact quantity of land mentioned in the deed; that for any deficiency therein the defendants were liable; and that the rule of damages was that claimed by the plaintiff.
The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff; and the defendants moved for a new trial for a misdirection.
Hungerford and Toucey, in support of the motion,
contended. 1. That there had been no breach of covenant. To establish this position, they insisted, first, that the boundary lines of the adjoining proprietors on the North and South, are known, fixed monuments, or what is equivalent thereto. Howe & al. v. Bass, 2 Mass. Rep. 380. Pernam v. Wead, 6 Mass. Rep. 131. Mann & al. v. Pearson, 2 Johns. Rep. 37. Jackson d. Livingston v. Barringer, 15 Johns. Rep. 471. Cate v. Thayer, 3 Greenl. 71. Jackson d. Butler v. Widger, 7 Cowen 723. Secondly, such monuments controul distances or length of line and quantity of land. See the cases referred to above ; also, Newsom v. Pryor’s lessee, 7 Wheat. 7. Preston’s heirs v. Bowmar, 6 Wheat. 580. This results from the general principle. that what is most certain shall controul what, is less certain. Jackson v. Camp, 1 Cowen, 612. Thirdly, the length of line and precise quantity of land were not of the essence of the contract; and the line on Main street proving, on measurement, shorter than that mentioned in the deed, constitutes no breach of covenant. A description of land, by the length of line, or number of acres, rods or feet, is not a covenant, that such is in fact the length of line or quantity.
2. That the defendants were not personally bound, by the covenants in the deed. And here, it may be admitted, that administrators may bind themselves; by apt word's in a deed; as was done in Mitchell v. Hazen, 4 Conn. Rep. 495. and Coe v. Talcott, 5 Day 88. The general principle is, that where the terms of the contract bind the principal, and not the agent, the agent is not liable on the contract; though he may be, in an action on the case for assuming authority not delegated. Harper & al. v. Little, 2 Greenl. 14, 20, 21. 2 Kent’s Comm. 493. Ballou v. Talbot, 16 Mass. Rep. 461. All the cases establishing a personal responsibility, go on the ground of an express contract, shewing a clear intention of the party to assume such responsibility. Thayer v. Wendell, 1 Gallis. 37, 40, 41. Adams v. Whittlesey, 3 Con. Rep. 560. 566. In this case, it was not the understanding of either of the parties, that the defendants should be personally bound. The plaintiff did not rely on their persona] credit. The defendants did not act in their individual capacity, but as administrators, expressly declaring, bn the face of the deed, that their power to act was derived from the court of probate. If the covenant would be ineffectual to bind the estate, still it was all that one party was willing to give, and it was such as the other party was willing to accept. The court cannot make a covenant for the parties, which they have not thought fit to make for themselves.
I. Perkins, contra,
contended, 1. That if the land in question was embraced by the deed, the covenant of good right to convey extended to the quantity; this being an assurance to the purchaser, that the grantor has the very estate in quantity and quality, which he purports to convey. Howell v. Richards, 11 East, 633. 642. Recognized in Lockwood v. Sturdecant, 6 Conn. Rep. 373. 386.
2. That the deed purported to convey, and the defendants covenanted therein for, 50 feet of land on Main street. It may be admitted, without prejudice to the plaintiff's claim, that iked, visible monuments are to govern: but in this ease, there were no such monuments. Here was a tract of land, lying South of the Merrills’ lot, and East of Main street, belonging to the Chenevard estate. The defendants sold off to the plaintiff a part of this lot, viz, 50 feet on Main street, 186 feet deep. The breadth and length of the land sold, are given with precision. From these the boundaries may be ascertained exactly. But nothing else is given. Reject the length of line on Main street and the length of line from Main street Eastward, and it is impossible to ascertain the boundaries. It is the plaintiff who claims the benefit of the rule,-that what is certain shall controul what is uncertain. 4 Kent’s Comm. 455. Jackson d. Livingston v. Barringer, 15 Johns. Rep. 471. 473. Powell v. Clark, 5 Mass. Rep. 355.
3. That administrators, covenanting, as such, for a right to bargain and sell, are personally liable. The court will construe the covenant so that it may have effect, but an administrator cannot bind the estate, by such covenant. It is, in its nature, a personal covenant. 4 Dane’s Ahr. 332. c. 115. s. 5. 4 Kent’s Comm. 450. Mitchell v. Hasen, 4 Conn. Rep. 495. Mitchell v. Warner, 5 Conn. Rep. 497. Griswold V. Bigelow, 6 Conn. Rep. 258. Davis v. Lyman, 6 Conn. Rep. 249. Sumner, admr. v. Williams, 8 Mass. Rep. 162. The case last cited was ably argued and thoroughly examined, and is full to the point.

Opinion:
Daggett, J.
Two points are presented by this motion, for the consideration of the court. 1. Are the defendants personally liable on these covenants? 2. Are the defendants liable for a breach of these covenants, because the land, by mensuration, fell short of 50 feet on Main street? Both these points are presented, by the charge of the judge.
1. The covenant in the deed, so far as it bears on the first question, is in the following words: "Know ye, that we, Henry Seymour and Mary J. Chenevard, administrators on the estate of John Chenevard, jun., being thereunto lawfully authorized, by the court of probate for the district of Hartford," &c. "Also, we the said Henry Seymour and Mary J. Chenevard, as administrators as aforesaid, and by virtue of the powers aforesaid, do, for ourselves, and said heirs, executors and administrators. covenant with said Thomas Belden, his'heirs and assigns, that at and until the ensealing of these presents, we have good right to bargain and sell the same in manner and form as is above written ; and that the same is free of all incumbrances yvhatsoever. And furthermore, wc the said Henry Seymour and Mary J. Chenevard, as administrators, do, by these presents, hind said estate to warrant and defend," &c. By the word " heirs" &c. is meant the heirs of John Chenevard deceased. The deed was signed by the defendants, by their proper names, without the addition of administrators.
Are the defendants personally bound by these covenants? The case of Mitchell v. Hazen, 4 Conn. Rep. 495. must settle this question. That case was decided on deliberation, and by a unanimous opinion of the court, in June 1823. The difference is only;—first, in that case, the defendant covenanted for himself, his heirs, executors and administrators, and also for the heirs of another person. Here, the defendants bind themselves, and the heirs of another person. Secondly, in that case the defendant signed the deed as administrator. Here, the defendants sign without the addition of their character. In both cases, the administrators bound themselves ; in both cases? they attempted to bind others ; in neither ease, could they, on principles of law, bind others. The covenants in neither deed bound, or could bind, any but the grantors. They could have no operation, if not obligatory upon the grantors. This case, then, must be governed by the case of Mitchell v. Hazen. If the case cited needed any support, the strong case of Sumner v. Williams, 8 Mass. Rep. 162. and Duvall v. Craig, 2 Wheat. 45. are full to the purpose. In the first of these cases, the deed was executed by administrators ; they covenanted as administrators, that they were well seised as administrators, and as such, that they would defend, &c. They signed and sealed the deed as administrators. The only difference, then, is against these defendants.
In Duvall v. Craig, the supreme court of the United States held, that if a trustee bind himself, he is liable at law for a breach thereof, although he describes himself as covenanting as trustee. The doctrine, then, is, that where a person covenants in a deed as administrator, it is a personal covenant, and he is personally bound. Thus far, the charge is correct.
2. The judge charged the jury, that the defendants conveyed to the plaintiff 50 feet of land on Main street, and covenanted with the plaintiff, that they had good right and title to convey the exact quantity of land mentioned in the deed; and that for any deficiency therein, the defendants were liable. This part of the charge cannot be sustained.
The description of the land in the deed is as follows: "All that lot or plat of land, situate &c., described and bounded as follows, viz. beginning at the Southwest corner of Mrs. Merrills' home-lot, or the heirs of Hezekiah Merrills, deceased; from thence running South, on the line of Main street, 50 feet; bounded South on the heirs of John Che nevará, deceased." The question is, are the defendants liable for any deficiency of this line, should it, by mensuration, fall short of 50 feet? The rule is, that known and fixed monuments controul courses and distances. So the certainty of metes and bounds will include all the lands within, though the quantity vary from that expressed in, the deed. The least certainty must yield to that which is most certain, if they cannot be reconciled. 4 Kent's Comm. 455. This general doctrine is established, by the highest courts, in Connecticut, Massachusetts and New-York, and by the supreme court of the United States. Snow v. Chapman, 1 Root, 528. Howe & al. v. Bass, 2 Mass. Rep. 380. Pernam v. Wead, 6 Mass. Rep. 131. Jackson ex dem. Staats & al. v. Carey, 2 Johns. Ca. 350. Jackson ex dem. Butler v. Widger, 7 Cowen 723. Jackson ex dem. Roberts v. Ives, 9 Cowen 661. Preston's heirs v. Bowmar, 6 Wheat. 580. The judge charged the jury, that if the line fell short of 50 feet, the defendants had violated their covenants, without instructing them where to begin, or where to terminate. It should have been left to the jury to ascertain the point of the South-west corner of Mrs. Merrills' lot, and then to ascertain where John Chenevard's land commenced on the South; and they should have been directed, that if the plaintiff had obtained, by the deed, all the land lying between those points, be it 50 feet or less, the covenants of the defendants were not broken. In that event, the plaintiff would have holden to those points, and no further; nor did the defendants, according to the doctrine of the cases cited, convey, or attempt to convey more or other land. It is not suggested, that there is any uncertainty in the boundaries of the land on either side of the land in question. It then may have been so, that there is on the South-west corner of Mrs. Merrills' lot a known monument, and so on the North side or North-west corner of John Chenevard's lot. And if those corners are thus known, the deed did not convey, nor attempt to convey, more than lies between them. What if the deed had described the line as beginning at a white-oak tree, and terminating at a chesnut tree, and being 50 feet in length? It is ascertained, that between those trees the distance is only 40 feet; the plaintiff can claim no more; or, if it appears that it is 60 feet, the plaintiff will hold the whole. Fixed monuments must controul courses and distances. The case in 6 Mass. Rep. 131. is, except in name, this case.
I therefore think, that there ought to be a new trial, to the end that the parties may place the case on more correct ground.
It seems by the motion, that it was insisted on the part of the plaintiff, that he had been evicted of a certain part of the land in question, by a suit in which the defendants were vouched in to defend. As the judge took no notice of that point, in his charge, and as the cause appears to have been decided on the construction of the deed, it is unnecesary further to notice this part of the motion.
Let there be a new trial.
In this opinion Hosmer, Ch. J. fully concurred.