Case Name: Claude M. FRANKS, as Tax Assessor of Alachua County, Florida, Appellant, and Florida Retail Federation, Inc., et al., Appellant-Intervenors, v. G. M. DAVIS et al., as and constituting the Board of County Commissioners of Alachua County, Florida, Appellees
Court: Florida Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1962-06-27
Citations: 145 So. 2d 228
Docket Number: No. 31605
Parties: Claude M. FRANKS, as Tax Assessor of Alachua County, Florida, Appellant, and Florida Retail Federation, Inc., et al., Appellant-Intervenors, v. G. M. DAVIS et al., as and constituting the Board of County Commissioners of Alachua County, Florida, Appellees.
Judges: TERRELL, THOMAS, O’CONNELL and CALDWELL, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 145
Pages: 228–233

Head Matter:
Claude M. FRANKS, as Tax Assessor of Alachua County, Florida, Appellant, and Florida Retail Federation, Inc., et al., Appellant-Intervenors, v. G. M. DAVIS et al., as and constituting the Board of County Commissioners of Alachua County, Florida, Appellees.
No. 31605.
Supreme Court of Florida.
June 27, 1962.
Rehearing Denied Oct. 23, 1962.
William B. Watson, Jr., Gainesville, for appellant.
Reinstine, Reinstine & Panken, Jacksonville, for appellant-intervenors.
Henry L. Gray, Gainesville, for appel-lees.

Opinion:
DREW, Justice.
The appeal in this cause is from a decree of the Circuit Court for Alachua County directly passing upon the validity of a state statute and construing a controlling provision of the Florida Constitution.
Suit by appellees for declaratory decree resulted in the entry of the controverted adjudication: that Chapter 61-295, Laws of Florida 1961, F.S.A. § 192.05, providing that "stock in trade" shall be assessed for taxation at 25 per cent of a valuation based on invoice cost, violates Article IX, Section 1, Florida Constitution, which reads:
"The Legislature shall provide for a uniform and equal rate of taxation, except that it may provide for special rate or rates on intangible property * ⅜ * and shall prescribe such regulations as shall secure a just valuation of all property, both real and personal, excepting such property as may be exempted by law for municipal, education, literary, scientific, religious or charitable purposes." (Emphasis supplied.)
The general provision controlling assessment of tangible personal property is F.S. Section 200.06, F.S.A.: "The tax assessor shall assess all tangible personal property at its full cash value." Because of its conclusion that Chapter 61-295 is unconstitutional, the court did not treat the novel contention of the appellant assessor that the act in question should be construed to amend existing law to provide that 25 per cent of current market value of tangible personalty generally, as well as real property, would represent the "full cash value" for the purpose of ad valorem assessments.
As recognized by the trial court, however, the manifest purpose of Chapter 61-295 is to classify stock in trade separately from other tangible personalty for purposes of tax assessment, and not to alter the general provision. Argument on this appeal therefore revolves primarily around the problem of legitimate classification under constitutional provisions for a "uniform and equal rate of taxation" and for a "just valuation of all property," except exemptions specifically permitted. Previous cases in this jurisdiction to which we are cited involve either the propriety of distinctions in properties to be subjected to taxes levied for special or local benefits, for excise or license purposes, or the necessity for uniform administration of assessment procedures.
Our law has since 1937 constitu-ed stock in trade a separate classification of tangible personalty for aggregate assessment, and the propriety of classification for that purpose has not been questioned. We find little support, however, for the exercise of the power to classify such taxable property so as to make it subject to assessment at a lower or higher percentage of its value than other classes, except where the controlling constitutional provision differs materially from that applicable in this State. A specious argument might arise from the fact that the uniformity requirement of Article IX, supra, relates in terms to the rate of tax imposed, and Chapter 61-295 on its face simply alters the formu la for valuation of a class of property already subject to separate assessment procedure. If rates cannot be varied directly, however, neither can that result be achieved indirectly by manipulation of the assessment basis upon which levy is made. Such is the recognized intendment of our provisions for a "uniform and equal rate of taxation" as well as a "just valuation of all property," construed as securing equality of burden for ad valorem taxation in this State.
A leading text states the prevailing rule, under constitutional limitations such as that in Florida, to be "that a classification whereby one class of property is required to be valued at a higher per cent of its value than another class is not a reasonable or permissible classification." While it would be impossible, and undesirable, to anticipate the various methods which might be lawfully prescribed for determining the "just valuation" of any particular class of property, we think that the statutory provision here involved, for assessment at one-fourth of invoice cost, is plainly not based upon any reasonable relationship to the just or true value of such property in the hands of the taxpayer. The disparity between F.S. Sec. 200.06, F.S.A., supra, and the law in question consequently renders the latter invalid.
We must further note that the constitutional mandate of just valuation is made applicable to "all property," excepting only such specified classes as may be exempt. Under established rules of construction, the specification of permissible exemptions will exclude others: expressio unius est exclusio alterius. Our cases in the past have been consistent upon this point, in accord with construction of similar provisions by other courts, and we can imagine no clearer infraction than the exclusion of seventy-five per cent of a valuation already based, presumably, on something less than, or different from, market or cash value.
The potential effect of a contrary conclusion would be obvious in the case of such a proportionate exclusion of invoice or cost value for assessment of property held purely for resale purposes by a dealer or developer of real estate. Yet the controlling language of Article IX is, with stated exceptions, expressly related to real and personal property alike, and its application here would govern that situation with equal force. If the legislative power in this respect should be construed as urged by appellants, no reasonable explanation or operation could be accorded the constitutional prescription of permissible exemptions. "Undoubtedly the Legislature is without power to provide for exempting from taxation any class of property which the Constitution itself makes no provision for exempting. The principle has been more than once affirmed in this state that the Constitution must be construed as a limitation upon the power of the Legislature to provide for the exemption from taxation of any classes of property except those particularly mentioned classes specified in the organic law itself." Upon this rationale alone the decree appealed must be affirmed.
It is so ordered.
TERRELL, THOMAS, O'CONNELL and CALDWELL, JJ., concur.
ROBERTS, C. J., and THORNAL, J., dissent.
. Article V, Sec. 4(2), Florida Constitution, F.S.A.: "Appeals from trial courts may be taken directly to the supreme court, as a matter of right, only ⅛ from final judgments or decrees directly passing upon the validity of a state statute * ⅞ * or construing a controlling provision of the Florida or federal constitution ⅜ *
. The pertinent provision of CHAPTER 61-295 here involved is as follows:
"Section 1. Section 192.05, Florida Statutes, is amended to read:
"198.05
"(1) Assessment of stocle in trade All personal property considered as goods, wares and merchandise commonly known as stock in trade, shall be assessed for the purpose of taxation by the counties, cities, villages, towns and taxing districts at twenty five percent of a valuation to be based upon the invoice cost value of the goods. Said valuation shall be the inventory data reported on the taxpayers Federal Income Tax Return and such other sworn data as shall be necessary to assure an accurate report of the average inventory of the taxpayer held or owned over a period of twelve months, next preceding the 1st day of January of the year for which the assessment is made." (emphasis supplied.)
Prior to the passage of CHAPTER 61-295 by the Legislature during the 1961 Session, Section 192.05 read as follows:
"192.05 Assessment of stocle in trade.
— All personal property considered as goods, wares and merchandise, commonly known as stock in trade, may be assessed for the purpose of taxation by state, counties, cities, villages, towns and taxing districts at a valuation to be based upon the average value of such stock of goods, wares and merchandise, or stock in trade, as held or owned over a period of twelve months next preceding the first day of January of the year for which the assessment is made." (emphasis supplied.)
. Smithers v. St. Lucie River Drainage District, Fla.1954, 73 So.2d 235; Town of Palm Beach v. City of West Palm Beach, Fla.1951, 55 So.2d 566; Hayes v. Walker, 54 Fla. 163, 44 So. 747.
. Florida Sugar Distributors v. Wood, 135 Fla. 126, 184 So. 641.
. Graham v. City of West Tampa, 71 Fla. 605, 71 So. 926.
. See. 1, Chapter 18297, Laws of Florida, 1937; F.S. See. 192.05, F.S.A., note 2 supra.
. Uniformity provisions may, for instance, read so as to require only that tax legislation be "uniform on the same class of subjects." See Dayton v. Board of Equalization, 33 Or. 131, 50 P. 1009, Or.Const. Art. 1, Sec. 32, Art. 9, Sec. 1, Ore.Rev.Stat. Vol. 5; Rees v. City of Erie, 243 Pa. 189, 90 A. 58, and Heisler v. Thomas Colliery, 274 Pa. 448, 118 A. 394, 24 A.L.R.2d 1215. Cf. Com. v. Alden Coal Co., 251 Pa. 134, 96 A. 246, L.R.A. 1916F, 154 and State v. Smith, 158 Ind. 549, 63 N.E. 25, 214, 64 N.E. 18, for proposition that the right of classification exists to correct inequalities and not to create them.
. Camp Phosphate Co. v. Allen, 77 Fla. 341, 81 So. 503.
. Cooley, on taxation, Vol. I, 4th ed., Sec. 298, citing First Nat. Bank of Urbana v. Holmes, 246 Ill. 362, 92 N.E. 893; In re Opinion of the Justices, 76 N.H. 588, 79 A. 31; 76 N.H. 609, 85 A. 757; Stillman v. Lynch, 56 Utah 540, 192 P. 272, 12 A.L.R. 552.
. State ex rel. Burbridge v. St. John, 143 Fla. 544, 197 So. 131, 134; 143 Fla. 876, 197 So. 549; L. Maxcy, Inc. v. Federal Land Bank, 111 Fla. 116, 150 So. 248; 112 Fla. 835, 151 So. 276; Steuart v. State, 119 Fla. 117, 161 So. 378. Anno. 61 A.L.R.2d 1038, et seq.
. State ex rel. Burbridge v. St. John, nota 10, supra, quoting earlier opinion.