Case Name: Michael C. McCRARY, infant by Curtis L. McCrary and Sandra McCrary and Colin M. Gonzales, infant by Raymond Gonzales and Margaret R. Gonzales, Appellees, v. Russell L. RUNYON and Katheryne E. Runyon, Defendants, Southern Independent School Association, Appellant; Michael C. McCRARY, infant by Curtis L. McCrary and Sandra McCrary and Colin M. Gonzales, infant by Raymond Gonzales and Margaret R. Gonzales, Appellees, v. Russell L. RUNYON and Katheryne E. Runyon, Appellants, Southern Independent School Association, Defendant; Michael C. McCRARY, infant by Curtis L. McCrary and Sandra McCrary, Plaintiffs, and Colin M. Gonzales, infant by Raymond Gonzales and Margaret R. Gonzales, Appellants, v. Russell L. RUNYON, Katheryne E. Runyon and Southern Independent School Association, Appellees; Colin M. GONZALES, infant by his parents, Raymond Gonzales and Margaret R. Gonzales, Appellees, v. FAIRFAX-BREWSTER SCHOOL, INC., Appellant; Colin M. GONZALES, infant by his parents, Raymond Gonzales and Margaret R. Gonzales, Appellants, v. FAIRFAX-BREWSTER SCHOOL, INC., Appellee
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 1975-04-15
Citations: 515 F.2d 1082
Docket Number: Nos. 73-2348 to 73-2352
Parties: Michael C. McCRARY, infant by Curtis L. McCrary and Sandra McCrary and Colin M. Gonzales, infant by Raymond Gonzales and Margaret R. Gonzales, Appellees, v. Russell L. RUNYON and Katheryne E. Runyon, Defendants, Southern Independent School Association, Appellant. Michael C. McCRARY, infant by Curtis L. McCrary and Sandra McCrary and Colin M. Gonzales, infant by Raymond Gonzales and Margaret R. Gonzales, Appellees, v. Russell L. RUNYON and Katheryne E. Runyon, Appellants, Southern Independent School Association, Defendant. Michael C. McCRARY, infant by Curtis L. McCrary and Sandra McCrary, Plaintiffs, and Colin M. Gonzales, infant by Raymond Gonzales and Margaret R. Gonzales, Appellants, v. Russell L. RUNYON, Katheryne E. Runyon and Southern Independent School Association, Appellees. Colin M. GONZALES, infant by his parents, Raymond Gonzales and Margaret R. Gonzales, Appellees, v. FAIRFAX-BREWSTER SCHOOL, INC., Appellant. Colin M. GONZALES, infant by his parents, Raymond Gonzales and Margaret R. Gonzales, Appellants, v. FAIRFAX-BREWSTER SCHOOL, INC., Appellee.
Judges: Before HAYNSWORTH, Chief Judge, and WINTER, CRAyEN, BUTZNER, DONALD RUSSELL, FIELD and WIDENER, Circuit "Judges, sitting en banc.
Reporter: Federal Reporter 2d Series
Volume: 515
Pages: 1082–1097

Head Matter:
Michael C. McCRARY, infant by Curtis L. McCrary and Sandra McCrary and Colin M. Gonzales, infant by Raymond Gonzales and Margaret R. Gonzales, Appellees, v. Russell L. RUNYON and Katheryne E. Runyon, Defendants, Southern Independent School Association, Appellant. Michael C. McCRARY, infant by Curtis L. McCrary and Sandra McCrary and Colin M. Gonzales, infant by Raymond Gonzales and Margaret R. Gonzales, Appellees, v. Russell L. RUNYON and Katheryne E. Runyon, Appellants, Southern Independent School Association, Defendant. Michael C. McCRARY, infant by Curtis L. McCrary and Sandra McCrary, Plaintiffs, and Colin M. Gonzales, infant by Raymond Gonzales and Margaret R. Gonzales, Appellants, v. Russell L. RUNYON, Katheryne E. Runyon and Southern Independent School Association, Appellees. Colin M. GONZALES, infant by his parents, Raymond Gonzales and Margaret R. Gonzales, Appellees, v. FAIRFAX-BREWSTER SCHOOL, INC., Appellant. Colin M. GONZALES, infant by his parents, Raymond Gonzales and Margaret R. Gonzales, Appellants, v. FAIRFAX-BREWSTER SCHOOL, INC., Appellee.
Nos. 73-2348 to 73-2352.
United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.
Argued April 2, 1974.
Decided April 15, 1975.
Rehearing Denied May 29, 1975.
George S. Leonard, Washington, D. C., and Louis Koutoulakos, Arlington, Va., for appellants in Nos. 73-2348, 73-2349 and 73-2350.
Andrew A. Lipscomb, Washington, D. C. (Gary R. Sheehan and Tolbert, Lewis & Fitzgerald, Arlington, Va., on brief), for appellants/cross-appellees in Nos. 73-2351 and 73-2352.
Thomas J. Schwab, Washington, D. C., on brief for amici curiae in Nos. 73-2348, 73-2349 and 73-2351.
Allison W. Brown, Jr., Washington, D. C. (Robert M. Alexander, Arlington, Va. and Roderick V. O. Boggs, Washington, D. C., on brief), for appellees/cross-appel-lants in Nos. 73-2348, 73-2349, 73-2350, 73-2351 and 73-2352.
Before HAYNSWORTH, Chief Judge, and WINTER, CRAyEN, BUTZNER, DONALD RUSSELL, FIELD and WIDENER, Circuit "Judges, sitting en banc.

Opinion:
HAYNSWORTH, Chief Judge:
The issue in this case is whether 42 U.S.C.A. § 1981 prohibits private schools from denying admission to qualified black applicants solely on the basis of their race.
This appeal is a consolidation of two suits initiated by parents of black children who claim that they were denied admission to the appellant schools because of their race.
The Southern Independent School Association intervened in these actions, alleging that it is an association representing over 300 private, non-profit schools in the South, some of which con-cededly are racially exclusive in their admission policies. The position of the in-tervenor is simply that racial discrimination by private schools is not prohibited by § 1981, and, in any event, cannot be constitutionally prohibited.
I.
As found by the trial judge, in early May 1969, the parents of Colin Gonzales contacted the Fairfax-Brewster School, a private school located in Fairfax County, Virginia, about enrolling their son in the school's summer day camp program, and continuing into the first grade in the fall. The Gonzales' learned of Fairfax-Brewster through a mass mailing addressed to "Resident," an advertisement in the Yellow Pages in the telephone book, and from a friend whose son attended the Summer Camp.
Thereafter, the Gonzales visited the school and, being pleased with what they saw, completed an application for their son. They also furnished, as required, a medical certificate and application fee. On May 16, 1969, the medical certificate and application fee were returned, accompanied by a form letter stating that the school was "unable to accommodate the application." No further explanation was given.
Mr. Gonzales called the school and spoke with someone who identified himself as Captain Reiss. In response to Mr. Gonzales' inquiry as to why his son's application was rejected, he was told that the school was not integrated.
Captain Reiss is the Chairman of the Board of Fairfax-Brewster School. His son, Robert, is the Administrative Director, and his daughter-in-law Olga is the Registrar.
Both Captain Reiss and his son deny any such conversation. They testified that Colin, age 5V2, was rejected because they felt that the kindergarten he had previously attended gave Colin insufficient preparation for the first grade at Fairfax-Brewster. Because they found Colin unqualified for the first grade, the Reisses concluded that "there was no point" in allowing him to enter the summer camp only to have to "yank him out" at the beginning of the academic year.
Subsequent to their son's rejection from Fairfax-Brewster, the Gonzales telephoned Bobbe's School, and were told that only members of the Caucasian race were accepted.
In August 1972, Mrs. McCrary called Bobbe's School about enrolling her two year old son, Michael, in the nursery school. She asked whether the school was integrated and accepted blacks, and was told it did not. She did not file a formal application with Bobbe's.
Mr. Gates, the superintendent of Bobbe's, testified that he never received a call from either the Gonzales or Mrs. McCrary. He testified that the school does not discriminate on the basis of race, although he said that no black child had ever applied.
The district court found the testimony of the Reisses "unbelievable," and concluded that Colin had been rejected from Fairfax-Brewster because of his race. He further found that both the Gonzales and Mrs. McCrary had called Bobbe's and had been told that the school would not accept blacks. It' held that "[i]t is of no moment that no formal application was filed. It would be ridiculous to require this of the plaintiffs after they had effectively been told it was useless."
Accordingly, the court concluded that the appellant schools practiced racial discrimination in their admissions policies.
On the authority of Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co. 392 U.S. 409, 88 S.Ct. 2186, 20 L.Ed.2d 1189 (1968); Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229, 90 S.Ct. 400, 24 L.Ed.2d 386 (1969) and Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Assn., 410 U.S. 431, 93 S.Ct. 1090, 35 L.Ed.2d 403 (1973), it held that § 1981 prohibits racial discrimination in private contractual arrangements, even when there is no state involvement. Therefore, it held that the schools were in violation of § 1981 in their admissions policies, and permanently enjoined defendants and intervenors from discriminating against blacks in enrollment in their schools. In addition, it awarded damages for embarrassment, humiliation and mental anguish to Colin, Michael and Michael's parents, and attorney's fees against Fairfax-Brewster and Bobbe's. Gonzales v. Fairfax-Brewster School, Inc., 363 F.Supp. 1200 (E.D.Va. 1973).
Defendants and intervenor appeal. We affirm the injunction and the award of damages, but reverse the award of attorney's fees.
II.
Initially, the appellants contest the district court's findings of facts, urging that the district court was clearly erroneous in concluding that Fairfax-Brew-ster and Bobbe's practice racial discrimination.
There was conflicting testimony as to whether the Gonzales had been told that Fairfax-Brewster was not integrated and whether both the McCrarys and Gonzales were told that Bobbe's was not integrated. Resolution of this conflict depended upon the district court's evaluation of the credibility of the witnesses. We may not reverse a trier of fact, who had the advantage of hearing the testimony, on a question of credibility.
In addition, the testimony of the black parents was corroborated and supported by the testimony of two other witnesses. Mrs. Bryant testified that she had telephoned Fairfax-Brewster and Bobbe's to inquire about their admissions policies and was told that the schools were not integrated. Mr. Brooks, Mrs. McCrary's supervisor at her job, testified that a Mr. Gates, at Bobbe's, told him, over the telephone, that Bobbe's did not accept blacks.
The trial judge also thought that the Reiss's story that Colin was rejected on educational rather than racial grounds was undercut by the fact that Fairfax-Brewster allows applicants to take an entrance examination when previous scholastic preparation is inadequate. Colin was not given this opportunity.
In short, there is ample evidence in the record to support the trial judge's factual determinations, and we are unable to say that, viewing the record as a whole, he was clearly erroneous in concluding that Colin and Michael were denied admission to the schools because of their race.
III.
The substantive legal questions, which have been the subject of varied comment in the literature, we think were correctly resolved by the district court. Section 1981 is a limitation upon private discrimination, and its enforcement in the context of this case is not a deprivation of any right of free association or of privacy of the defendants, of the intervenor, or of their pupils or patrons.
A.
It may once have been supposed that § 1981 served only the limited office of removing legal disabilities which state statutes imposed upon black people. It, of course, did cancel state statutes which imposed restrictions upon the right of blacks to contract, but the- Supreme Court has clearly held that it did much more than that. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 88 S.Ct. 2186, 20 L.Ed.2d 1189 (1968); Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229, 90 S.Ct. 400, 24 L.Ed.2d 386; Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreational Assn., 410 U.S. 431, 93 S.Ct. 1090, 35 L.Ed.2d 403 (1973).
In Jones v. Mayer, the Court was concerned with the right to purchase real estate. There a real estate developer had refused to sell a residence in a "white area" to the black plaintiff. Analyzing the text and legislative history of § 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, the Court held that § 1982 applied to purely private activity and provided a judicial remedy. As so construed, it was held that enactment of § 1982 was a valid exercise of the power of Congress under the enforcement clause of the Thirteenth Amendment, which gave Congress power to "pass all laws necessary and proper for abolishing all badges and incidents of slavery." The Court concluded that, unlike the Fourteenth Amendment, the Thirteenth reached private conduct in which no state action was involved.
As an intellectual exercise, the historical reading and interpretation of the majority in Jones v. Mayer may be debatable. See VI History of the Supreme Court of the United States; Fairman— Reconstruction and Reunion, 1207 et seq. That reading and interpretation was followed in Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park and in Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven, however, and, for us, is firmly established.
Jones v. Mayer, of course, dealt with § 1982, assuring the right to purchase property. We deal with § 1981, assuring the right to contract, but both sections derive from § 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866. Both are subject to the same analysis and must be interpreted in the same light. In Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven, the claim of the guest and the host rested upon § 1981. The Supreme Court expressly noticed the relation between § 1981 and § 1982, their common derivation from § 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the necessity of according them similar interpretation.
It is contended here, however, that § 1981 confers no right of action unless the contract denied the aggrieved person was open to all white people. It seems obvious that the relationship between the school on the one hand and a pupil and his parents on the other hand is a contractual one and that admission is a part of the process of forming such a contractual arrangement. It is also true that admission to the school is not open to all white people because there are academic, financial and other restrictions upon admission. Within the qualified class, however, there is no other limitation upon the admission of white applicants up to the school's capacity.
We may not read § 1981 so restrictively as the schools would have us to do it. The school may not refuse with impunity to accept an otherwise qualified black applicant simply because it declines to admit unqualified white applicants. The section is violated by the school as long as the basis of exclusion is racial, for it is then clear that the black applicant is denied a contractual right which would have been granted to him if he had been white.
What we have said should not be read to call into question the right of the school to insist upon an evenhanded requirement of academic and other racially neutral qualifications. Indeed, the right of the school to be selective on those bases is unquestioned here. All that is contended and all that we hold is that § 1981 prohibits the rejection of a black applicant when his qualifications meet all other requirements and race is the only basis for his rejection.
B.
As applied here, we see no violation of any constitutionally protected rights of free association and of privacy.
There is a protected right of free association. As stated by the Supreme Court in NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 78 S.Ct. 1163, 2 L.Ed.2d 1488 (1958), "It is beyond debate that freedom to engage in association for the advancement of beliefs and ideas is an inseparable aspect of freedom of speech." Id. at 460, 78 S.Ct. at 1171. The constitutional protection,' however, is essentially an attribute of First Amendment rights and would not ordinarily justify exclusion of others sharing the same beliefs and ideas. Here, at least, there is no showing that discontinuance of their discriminatory admission practices would inhibit in any way the teaching in these schools of any ideas or dogma.
Nothing in § 1981 impedes parents in their exercise of a choice of a private school presenting ideas or having educational methods or practices which are not available in the public schools. They may do the same iihing to avoid ideas and influences in the public schools which they regard as unhealthy. See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 45 S.Ct. 571, 69 L.Ed. 1070 (1925). Among private schools, they are free to prefer one with a certain curriculum or dogma over others, but the school, while it may exclude applicants on the basis of neutral principles, may not exclude on the basis of race.
There is also a right of privacy. Its constitutional basis may be elusive, but it has clearly been held to exist. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 93 S.Ct. 705, 35 L.Ed.2d 147 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 85 S.Ct. 1678, 14 L.Ed.2d 510 (1965).
Though certain intimate and private affairs of men and women are protected from governmental interference, the schoolhouse is far from the realm of protection. The right is appropriately recognized in certain instances when only a few people are involved in activity unintended for the public view. In such instances, it is more than likely or inevitable that there is some plan or purpose of exclusiveness other than race. When relations between husband and wife are involved, their purpose to exclude all the rest of the world has no racial connotations. When a school holds itself open to the public, however, or even to those applicants meeting established qualifications, there is no perceived privacy of the sort that has been given constitutional protection.
Indeed, § 1981 does not purport to reach all private associations. It reaches only those which evidence "no plan or purpose of exclusiveness" other than race. Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, supra. Private associations having non-racial criteria for the selection of members may apply their criteria, even if it results in a disproportionate impact upon the members of one race. It is only when blacks are excluded because they are black, or denied a right to contract which would be granted were they white, that § 1981 is violated.
Nor do we read anything in Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 93 S.Ct. 2804, 37 L.Ed.2d 723 (1973), as holding that rights of association or rights of privacy, or both combined, prevent the application of § 1981 here. In Norwood the Supreme Court struck down a Mississippi statute giving free textbooks to all students, including those attending private, segregated schools. Mississippi contended that its failure to furnish free textbooks to students in private, segregated schools would violate the equal protection clause and would undermine the right of the parents to send their children to private schools. In answer, the Court observed that because "the Constitution may compel tolerance of private discrimination in some circumstances does not mean that it requires state support for such discrimination." 413 U.S. at 463, 93 S.Ct. at 2809.
The observation in Norwood is far from a holding that segregation in a private school is constitutionally protected. Earlier in the opinion the Court had observed that no such question was presented. 413 U.S. at 457, 93 S.Ct. 2804. Nor are we met with the question whether segregation in private schools is itself a violation of the Thirteenth or Fourteenth Amendment. We deal with a specific statute passed in implementation of the Thirteenth Amendment. See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 86 S.Ct. 1717, 16 L.Ed.2d 828 (1966); Note, Federal Power to Regulate Private Discrimination: The Revival of the Enforcement Clauses of the Reconstruction Era Amendments, 74 Colum.L.Rev. 449 (1974).
Finally, the Court in Norwood recognized the thrust of § 1981 and § 1982 when it noted that private discrimination "has never been accorded affirmative constitutional protections. And even some private discrimination is subject to special remedial legislation in certain circumstances under § 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment." 413 U.S. at 470, 93 S.Ct. at 2813. We deal with such circumstances. In short, we cannot read Nor-wood as a holding that segregation in private schools such as these is constitutionally protected so as to be beyond the reach of § 1981.
C.
Some schools may be so private as to have a discernible rule of exclusivity which is inoffensive to § 1981. Should siblings combine to employ tutors for their children, they may exclude the rest of the world, for the rule of exclusivity bars the more distantly related and the unrelated regardless of race. The schools here are not private in that sense, and there is no discernible neutral rule of exclusivity which would bar these plaintiffs. The schools are private only in the sense that they are managed by private persons and they are not direct recipients of public funds. Their actual and potential constituency, however, is more public than private. . They appeal to the parents of all children in the area who can meet their academic and other admission requirements. This is clearly demonstrated in this case by the public advertisements. Within that constituency, they may not exclude a black applicant, solely because of his race, while accepting white applicants with comparable qualifications.
IV.
The district court awarded damages for embarrassment, humiliation and mental anguish suffered plus an award of attorney's fees. The schools complain of both.
A.
It is not helpful to look to state decisions in personal injury tort cases in which damages for such injuries are denied. That damages are recoverable for violations of § 1981 and 1982 is established by Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, 396 U.S. 229, 240, 90 S.Ct. 400, 406, 24 L.Ed.2d 386, in which we are told, "both federal and state rules on damages may be utilized, whichever better serves the policies expressed in the federal statutes."
Section 1981 doubtless was intended to give to the former slaves access to opportunities for material betterment of themselves, but it was also intended to remove the stigma which accompanied the disabilities under which they formerly had labored. The plain command of the statutes is that those formerly enslaved henceforth shall be treated as having all of the rights and dignity of other people dwelling with them in a land of freedom. A denial of those statutory rights is treatment of the victim as being subject to those earlier disabilities. It is an affront, of which embarrassment and humiliation are natural consequences. If the statute is to be enforced fairly, if injuries suffered directly because of its violation are to be fairly compensated, damages for embarrassment and humiliation must be recoverable in a case such as this.
B.
The award of attorney's fees stands in a different posture. It is one thing to award damages for the invasion of a legal right and quite another to impose all of the litigation costs on the defendant. Unlike damages, attorney's fees have been granted only in narrowly defined circumstances.
We have recognized the propriety of an award of fees when a party maintained his position in bad faith, displaying "obstinate obduracy." Brewer v. School Board of City of Norfolk, 4 Cir., 456 F.2d 943, 948-52. The district court, however, made no finding of "obstinate obduracy," and we can see no basis for such a finding. Since this suit involves a novel application of a recently revived statute, the litigation of the issues cannot be equated with the recalcitrance we found in Brewer. Although at trial the parties recounted different versions of the facts and the court accepted the plaintiffs' story, the finding suggests no bad faith or perjury. Faults in perception or memory often account for differing trial testimony, but that has not yet been thought a sufficient ground to shift the expense of litigation.
Attorney's fees, of course, are available where Congress has expressly authorized them. A conspicuous example is Title II of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 88 S.Ct. 964, 19 L.Ed.2d 1263 (1968). Section 1981 never contained a provision for fees, and although the Emergency School Aid Act of 1972 expressly allows fees in suits to desegregate public or federally aided secondary or elementary schools, plaintiffs have made no showing of federal aid to, or state action by, the defendants.
In the absence of expressed congressional direction, we are presented with the question whether to adopt a "private attorney general" theory. Although application of that theory may be proper in some actions based on the 1866 and 1870 Civil Rights Act, it would be inappropriate in this case. In considering an award of fees in an action based on the older civil rights statutes, we look to more recent congressional determinations that a policy is so important or public enforcement mechanisms are so ineffective that attorney's fees are necessary to promote private enforcement. Mere provision of a private cause of action is not sufficient. A statutory grant of attorney's fees in suits covering the same subject matter, however, would be a strong indication of such a congressional determination.
In Lee v. Southern Home Sites Corp., 5 Cir., 444 F.2d 143, Judge Wisdom looked to the enactment of the Fair Housing Law of 1968, which contained a fees section, 42 U.S.C. § 3612(c), in deciding that fees were available to a plaintiff seeking to redress racial discrimination in the sale of houses under § 1982. In 1968 Congress had acted, pursuant to its powers under the Thirteenth Amendment, to prohibit discrimination in the sale of private housing. In Lee's § 1982 action, he proceeded against precisely the discrimination that Congress had sought to curb by providing for an award of reasonable fees for his attorney to a prevailing plaintiff in a private enforcement action.
Employment discrimination suits provide another example of judicial allowance of fees under the older, more general civil rights' statutes. We have recognized that a plaintiff under Title VII might recover attorney fees. Reaching beyond Title VII, courts have allowed fees in actions brought under the older civil rights statutes to eliminate similar employment discrimination. Fowler v. Schwarzwalder, 8 Cir., 498 F.2d 143 (§§ 1981, 1983); Harper v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, D.Md., 359 F.Supp. 1187, 1218-19, modified on other grounds sub nom., Harper v. Kloster, 4 Cir., 486 F.2d 1134 (§§ 1981, 1983); Cooper v. Allen, 5 Cir., 467 F.2d 836 (§ 1981). In Cooper the plaintiff based his suit on racial discrimination in hiring by a municipal golf course, but he failed to go through the conciliation procedures of Title VII and could not proceed under the statute. Nevertheless, Congress had authorized fees in the similar Title VII action to encourage private elimination of such discrimination. Where plaintiffs advance precisely the same congressional goal by the use of a more general statute, they may be entitled to attorney's fees. That is not to say, however, that once fees are awarded in any § 1981 or § 1982 case, they should always be granted in actions based on those statutes. The focus of the inquiry should be whether the plaintiffs advanced a goal the attainment of which Congress sought to further by providing for the recovery by a prevailing plaintiff of his attorney's fees.
In this case the plaintiffs have not acted to foster a goal that Congress deemed so urgent. The Emergency School Aid Act spoke only to desegregation actions against public and federally aided schools. Unlike the Federal Housing Law or Titles II and VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, the statute does not aim to eliminate discrimination from a facet of private American life. The limitation in that statute to public schools is not merely a technical or procedural restriction, but goes rather to the substance of the congressional goal. Without some congressional direction, even by analogy, we will not award attorney's fees, but will adhere to the usual rule that prevailing plaintiffs may not recover their attorney's fees, for we find none of the recognized exceptions applicable.
Affirmed in part.
Reversed in part.
. "All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no other."
. See, Note, Federal Power to Regulate Private Discrimination: The Revival of the Enforcement Clauses of the Reconstruction Era Amendments, 74 Colum.L.Rev. 449 (1974); Note, Desegregation of Private Schools: Section 1981 as an Alternative to State Action, 62 Geo.L.J. 1363 (1974); Note, Segregation Academies and State Action, 82 Yale L.J. 1436 (1973); Comment, Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co. Extended to Private Education: Gonzales v. Fairfax-Brewster School, Inc., 122 U.Pa.L.Rev. 471 (1973); Recent Decisions, 45 Miss. L.J. 246 (1974); Recent Decisions, 8 U.Rich.L.Rev. 285 (1974); Recent Cases, 42 U.Cin.L.Rev. 767 (1973); Recent Cases, 26 Vand.L.Rev. 1307 (1973).
. 14 Stat. 27.
. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20, 3 S.Ct. 18, 28, 27 L.Ed. 835 (1883).
. After the recent decision of the Virginia Supreme Court in Womack v. Eldridge, 215 Va. 338, 210 S.E.2d 145 (1974), it is arguable that the .plaintiffs here could recover damages in a state tort action for emotional distress. For an earlier discussion of Virginia's requirement of a resulting physical injury in distress cases, see Hughes v. Moore, 214 Va. 27, 197 S.E.2d 214 (1973).
. In refusing punitive damages, the district court found that the defendants had not "acted recklessly or wilfully in disregard of clear existing law." 363 F.Supp. at 1205 n. 5.
. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(b).
. 20 U.S.C. § 1617 (allowing fees against a "local educational agency, a State . or the United States" for a violation of that Act, Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act or the Fourteenth Amendment). See Bradley v. School Board of the City of Richmond, 416 U.S. 696, 94 S.Ct. 2006, 40 L.Ed.2d 476 (1974); Northcross v. Board of Education of the Memphis City Schools, 412 U.S. 427, 93 S.Ct. 2201, 37 L.Ed.2d 48 (1973).
. United States v. Hunter, 4 Cir., 459 F.2d 205, 214.
. After December 31, 1968 the Act applied to all dwellings, 42 U.S.C. § 3603(a)(2), except those enumerated in § 3603(b). In Lee it was not clear whether the Act applied since the transactions occurred before December 31, 1968, and evidence on the applicability of § 3603(a)(1), which covered that time period, was not recounted in the opinion.
. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k); Lea v. Cone Mills Corp., 4 Cir., 438 F.2d 86; Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 4 Cir., 444 F.2d 791.
. Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 717, 87 S.Ct. 1404, 18 L.Ed.2d 475 (1967).
. See Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 93 S.Ct. 1943, 36 L.Ed.2d 702 (1973); Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 90 S.Ct. 616, 24 L.Ed.2d 593 (1970).