Case Name: Ann Beck vs. W. E. Martin
Court: South Carolina Court of Errors
Jurisdiction: South Carolina
Decision Date: 1842-02
Citations: 2 McMul. 260
Docket Number: 
Parties: Ann Beck vs. W. E. Martin.
Judges: Butler and Wardlaw, Justices, concurred.
Reporter: South Carolina Law Reports
Volume: 27
Pages: 260–269

Head Matter:
Ann Beck vs. W. E. Martin.
The general rule of law is, drat partners are bound by the acts of each other; and where one of a law partnership obtained the possession of a letter (containing an authority to take care of the interests of the plaintiff,) directed to the other partner, and acted under the instructions contained in the letter, it was held, that the plaintiff was bound by die act of the partner, as much so as if he to whom the letter was directed had received it, and acted upon it.
Before Richaldson, J., at Gillisonville, Fall Term, 1841;
This was an action of trover to recover a negro, (Richard.)
Ann Beck held a mortgage of Richard and several other negroes, from her brother, Josiah Beck. Col. Rice, sheriff of Colleton district, got possession of the mortgage ; and having also junior fi.fa’s. against Josiah Beck, sold Richard at public out-cry ; and the defendant, W. E. Martin, became the purchaser.
The question made was, whether the sale so made precluded the rights of Ann Beck, under the mortgage, and vested the title to Richard in the purchaser, under the cir-' cumstances attending the sale.
Ann Beck had, through her agent, Williams, enclosed the mortgage in a letter to Albert Rhett, authorizing him to take care of her interests, (fee. Rice, the sheriff, received this letter, took the liberty of opening it, and having so got possession of the mortgage, sold Richard, under it, on sale-day in April, 1840. This happened during Court at Walterborough. But Albert Rhett did not arrive till the day after, and knew not of the agency confided to him by Ann Beck, before his arrival.
In the mean time, his brother and professional partner, Edmund Rhett, had arrived on sale-day, and hearing of the sale intended under the mortgage, got possession of it from Rice, and also of the letter to Albert Rhett, and forbid the sale. Wm. Branch, deputy-sheriff, stated, that after Richard had been bid off, Edmund Rhett directed Rice to tender the bill of sale to the purchaser, and demand the money. This statement was altogether denied by Edmund Rhett. Rice, however, made the bill of sale, and received the purchase money. This summary may perhaps be sufficient, as the grounds of appeal turn chiefly upon the charge to the jury.
The presiding Judge charged the jury, that the rights of Ann Beck could not be affected by the sale so made by Rice; that, as her agent, Albert Rhett did not even know of his agency, till after the sale; Edmund Rhett could not have been his sub-agent, under any implication; that Edmund Rhett being the professional partner of Albert Rhett, did not, of itself, authorize him to act in the place of his absent brother, so as to affect the rights of Ann Beck, even if he had directed the bill of sale to be tendered, (fee., as stated by Branch. The agency was to Albert Rhett alone.
The plaintiff ought, therefore, to recover, and the defendant be left to his own resort to Rice, who had assumed the agency without authority.
The jury found for plaintiff, and the defendant appeals, on the grounds,
1. Because his Honor charged that the sheriff was not authorized to sell under the mortgage.
2. Because his Honor charged that an agent cannot appoint a sub-agent.
3. Because, although it was proved that Messrs. E. cfc A. Rhett were partners in business, his Honor charged that Mr. Ed. Rhett could not confirm the sale, because the mortgage had been enclosed in a letter directed to Mr. Albert Rhett.
4. Because his Honor charged that a mortgage sent to a lawyer was not a professional matter, but was private business.
5. Because, if the sheriff proceeded under mistake, it was caused by the plaintiff’s agent, and she is bound.
6. Because a purchaser is not bound to inquire into the regularity of a sale, when he sees a vendor in possession of a legal instrument.
7. Because the verdict was, in other respects, contrary to law and the evidence.
W F. Hutson, for the motion, said:
1. A mortgage sent to a lawyer is professional business. The profitsarising from such business is considered a part of the partnership profits ; that it is directed to one partner instead of the firm, does not alter the question. It was proved E. & A. Rhett were partners in Walterborough ; that Ed. Rhett confirmed the sale by Rice, and his con-nexion with his brother made him Miss Beck’s agent, and his confirmation was the confirmation of his principal.
2. A party purchasing is not bound to inquire into the regularity of the proceeding, if he sees the vendor in possession of a legal instrument. So of fi.fa. 1 Bail. 512; why not of a mortgage 'l
3. A mistake occasioned by a party’s agent is binding on the party ; 10 B. <fe C. 755 ; 2 Bay, 90, 112; 2 M’C. R. 251. If there is any mistake, it was occasioned by Miss Beck’s agent, Mr. Rhett.
4. Miss Beck’s agent stood by, and did not forbid the sale until the negro was bid off. She is bound ; 1 U M’C. 334,
Colcock, contra.

Opinion:
Curia, per
Evans, J.
It appears from the report of this case, that the presiding Judge charged the jury that " Edmund Rhett's being the professional partner of Albert Rhett, did not of itself authorize him to act in the place of his absent brother, so as to affect the rights of Ann Beck, even if he had directed the bill of sale to be tendered, &c., as stated by Branch." The agency was to Albert Rhett alone. The correctness of this as a legal proposition, is brought in question by the grounds of appeal, and it becomes the duty of this Court to decide it. The business confided by Williams's letter to Albert Rh'e'tt, was to take care of the plaintiff's interest' against Beck's creditors. This he could only do by ascertaining what her rights were, according to law, and then decide what course would best protect and secure them. Her rights were in collision with the creditors of Beck; and to decide what these rights were, as well as how they were to be protected and secured, were questions requiring legal knowledge to decide and determine. The business, therefore, committed by the plaintiff to Mr. Albert Rhett, was one which had connection with his professional employment; and if, in the exercise of the authority thus committed to him, he had ordered the sale of the negro, or had received the money afterwards, in confirmation of the sale, there would be but little doubt that the plaintiff would have been bound. Assuming, therefore, (and I think there is no reasonable ground to doubt it,) that the business committed by Williams's letter to Mr. Albert Rhett, was professional, is not he, and consequently his principal, bound by the act of Mr. E. Rhett, the professional'partner of Albert RhettThe general rule is, that partners are bound by the acts of each other, in all matters within the scope of the partnership business. It is on the principle that the act of one is the act of both; that each agreed, on the formation of the partnership, that the other should act for him in all matters connected with their partnership business. The acts of each are the acts of both, and neither is at liberty to disaffirm what the other does. In this matter, therefore, the act of E. Rhett may be considered as the act of Albert Rhett. If a plaintiff should write a letter of instruction to one of a law copartnership, directing the commence ment or prosecution of a suit, and the letter should come into the hands of the partner, who should commence the suit without consulting the one to whom the letter was directed, could the act be disaffirmed by either the principal or the other partner, unless it should appear that the power was specially and exclusively delegated to the one to whom the letter was addressed'? Or if a man in the country should, by letter addressed to one of a firm in the brokerage or commission - business, direct the purchase or sale of some article of property, could not another partner, in the absence of the one to whom the letter was addressed, effect the sale or purchase, so as to bind the principal'? It can hardly be denied the plaintiff would have been bound by the acts of Albert Rhett; and by the very nature of a partnership, the acts ofEdmund are the acts of Albert Rhett, by which he is as much bound as if he had acted himself. If, therefore, Mr. Edmund Rhett did authorize or affrm this sale, it seems to me the plaintiff is bound by it. I do not say he did any such act. I should rather conclude from the testimony he did not; but these are matters which should be passed on by the jury, and as the presiding Judge in his view of the law thought them immaterial, a majority of this Court are of opinion a new trial should be granted, and it is so ordered.
Butler and Wardlaw, Justices, concurred.