Case Name: First Baptist Church, Appellant, v. Robberson
Court: Supreme Court of Missouri
Jurisdiction: Missouri
Decision Date: 1879-10
Citations: 71 Mo. 326
Docket Number: 
Parties: First Baptist Church, Appellant, v. Robberson.
Judges: All concur, except Hough and Henry, JJ., who dissent.
Reporter: Missouri Reports
Volume: 71
Pages: 326–353

Head Matter:
First Baptist Church, Appellant, v. Robberson.
1. Validity of Devises and Bequests to Churches under Constitution of 1865. A devise of land not exceeding one acre to a church or religious society to erect a church upon, was permitted by section 13, article 1 of the constitution of 1865 ; but. a bequest of money to such a society for the purpose of building a church or for the support of a minister was prohibited. So, it is to the last degree doubtful whether a bequest to sucha society to be used for the erection of a female seminary was not also, prohibited by that section.
2. -: party to suit to establisii devise. A suit to establish a devise in favor of an incorporated religious society, should be brought in the name of the society, and not in the name of the “board of trustees” through which such societies were required by section 12, article 1 of the constitution of 1865, to manage such land as they were allowed to hold.
3. Charitable Bequests: ambiguity op will : pleading. Obscurity in the language used by a testator in_designating the beneficiary of a charitable bequest will not defeat the bequest; and if the petition in a suit brought to establish the bequest identifies the plaintiff as the intended beneficiary, it will not, on demurrer, be held bad because of the uncertainty of the will in this particular.
4. Will, Suit to Establish : proper parties plaintiff. One whe claims to be the beneficiary intended by a will may maintain a suit to construe the will.
5. Equity: pleading. A petition in a suit to obtain a construction of a will alleged, that a controversy had arisen between the plaintiff (a legatee) and the executor respecting his duties and plaintiff’s rights under the will, that doubts had arisen as to its proper construction, and that danger to plaintiff’s rights was apprehended unless equity interfered and gave proper directions to the executor; Held, that the petition was good on demurrer.
6. Jurisdiction of Probate and Circuit Courts of Greene County, in the Construction of Wills. The probate and common pleas court of Greene county was by law, (Local Acts 1855, p. 58,2 4,) invested with “ exclusive original jurisdiction * * to hear and determine all disputes and controversies whatsoever respecting wills, the right of executorship, administration or guardianship, or respecting the duties or accounts of executors,” &c. Held, that the jurisdiction so conferred did not embrace the powers of a court of chancery, and, therefore, a suit to construe a will and to ascertain the rights of the devisees and legatees and the duties of the executor thereunder, was not cognizable in the probate and common pleas court, but only in the circuit court, and this whether administration was still pending in the former court or not. Hough and Henry, JJ., dissenting.
Appeal from Greene Circuit Court. — Hon. "W. F. Geiger, Judge.
Reversed.
The plaintiff filed a petition in the circuit court of Greene county which was substantially as follows : That plaintiff is a corporation duly incorporated and organized under the general laws of the State of Missouri; that on the 26th day of October, 1870, Harriet Bailey made and published her last will, as follows : * *
Second. I hereby bequeath the sum of $5,000 to be expended in the erection of a church edifice in the city of Springfield, to be used and enjoyed by the Baptist society forever as a church. It is my will that said money be ex pended under the direction and management of three discreet persons, to be appointed by said Baptist church. I further devise to said society, or church, one acre of land to be selected by three discreet persons, to be appointed as aforesaid, upon which said church edifice shall be erected, the said land and church edifice to remain the property of the Baptist church or society in the city of Springfield forever. I also hereby bequeath the sum of $1,000 to said Baptist church in the city of Springfield, in trust for'the following uses, to-wit: The proper officers or trustees of said church shall take charge of said sum of $1,000 and shall keep the same at interest on good securities, and shall apply the annual interest arising therefrom to the support of the minister for the time being in charge of the church to be erected as hereinbefore provided for. * *
Sixth. It is my will, and I hereby devise and bequeath all the balance of my estate, both real and personal, to the Baptist church in the city of Springfield, upon the following conditions and for the following us^ and purposes, to-wit: To be used for the erection of a seminary of learning for the use of misses and young ladies exclusively, this devise and bequest not to take effect until the said church shall raise in addition to the amount herein bequeathed and devised, to be used for the same purpose, twice the amount of this bequest or devise. My executor is hereby directed to pay over to such discreet persons, not less than three in number, as such church may appoint for the purpose, the amount of this legacy, as soon as the same can be ascertained and collected, if at that time he shall be satisfied that said church has received twice that amount from other sources, to be used in the erection of a seminary, as hereinbefore provided, in Springfield.
Seventh. In case the money to be raised by the Baptist church, in order to comply with the conditions of the legacy mentioned in the last preceding item, is not secured in good faith within one year after the amount of this legacy shall be ascertained, then it is my will that all the' property, both real and personal, mentioned in item sixth, shall go to Dr. E. T. Robberson, &c., &c.
That on the 7th day of July, 1873, said Harriet Bailey departed this life; that on the 17th day of October, 1873, said will was duly admitted to probate before the probate and common pleas court of said Greene county, and the respondent, E. T. Robberson, the executor named in said will, duly qualified as such executor and thereafterward entered upon the discharge of his duties as such executor, and has ever since been and was at the commencement of this suit the legal and acting executor of said will ; that the other defendants are legatees and devisees under said will and legal heirs of said testatrix; that the plaintiff is the Baptist church mentioned in said will; that there are conflicting claims set up to the same property under the provisions of said will, and that the l’ights of the plaintiff under and by force of each of the before named clauses and items of said will is the subject of controversy with the executor of said will; that appellant is in doubt as to how and by whom the acre of land devised to plaintiff in the second item of said will shall be selected; and when and by whom the amount of the devise and bequest to plaintiff in the sixth item in said will shall be ascertained and determined; and when and to whom said last named devise- and bequest in said item sixth in said will shall be paid over by said executor; and when the year mentioned in the seventh item of said will will commence, within which the appellant is to secure from other sources to be used in the erection of the seminary the amount mentioned in the sixth item of said will; that said testatrix died leaving real estate of the value of $20,000, describing it; and personal property of the value of $40,000. And praying the advice and direction of the court as to the proper and just construction and effect of the several clauses of said will and the rights of the devisees and legatees under the same, and the duties of the executor in the performance of the trusts by force of said will.
The defendants filed a demurrer to this petition, setting np the following grounds of objection: 1. The petition states no facts entitling plaintiff to equitable relief. 2. No facts are stated in said petition showing uncertainty or ambiguity in any of the provisions of said will under which plaintiff can claim. Nor does it appear that there is any ambiguity, doubt or uncertainty in the meaning of any of the provisions of said will requiring the aid of a court of equity to construe them. 3. It is not averred in said petition, nor does it appear that plaintiff at the date of the execution of said will had any legal existence or being. 4. If plaintiff has any interest at all under said will, she has a complete and adequate remedy at law. 5. The devisees and legatees of the said will having a complete remedy at law, this eoui’t has no jurisdiction at their suit or at the suit of any one of them to construe said will. 6. No facts are stated by plaintiff in her petition authorizing a construction of said will at her suit. 7. The said bequest of $5,000 to erect a church edifice, named in the first clause of said will, is void. And the said bequest of $1,000 to said Baptist church in the city of Springfield, named in second clause of said will, is likewise void. And the residuary clause .of said will, devising and bequeathing the residue of testatrix’s property to said Baptist church, is also void, and no suit can be maintained to construe any of said clauses. 8. There is no doubt, ambiguity or uncertainty of and concerning the said devise of one acre of laud, named in the first clause in said will, requiring the aid of a court of equity. 9. Because this court has no original jurisdiction over this suit.
The demurrer was sustained and final judgment entered for the defendant. Plaintiff appealed. The case was twice argued in this court.
G. W. Thrasher and TI. G. Young for appellant.
G. B. McAfee and Chas. A. Winslow for respondent.

Opinion:
On Rehearing.
I.
Sherwood, C. J.
Upon more mature reflection, I am satisfied that the view expressed by us in a former opinion, that the bequest in Harriet Bailey's will, 1 whereby she bequeathed $5,000 to be used in erecting a church edifice on an acre of ground also devised by the will to the Baptist church or society in the city of Springfield, was a valid bequest, was an erroneous, though plausible, view of the subject.
The 13th clause of the 1st article of the constitution of 1865 prohibits, in express terms, every gift, sale or devise of land, and every gift, sale or bequest of goods and -chattels for the use, benefit or support of any minister, &c., or of any church, &c. The only exception made to the above comprehensive prohibitions is that exception which permits the gift, sale or devise of the quantity of land mentioned in the next preceding clause of the article. By that clause, one acre of ground is the limit in quantity of land which any church may hold in a town or city. With the wisdom or unwisdom of these constitutional provisions we have no concern. That was a matter confided to the framers of the constitution of 1865, and we have only to obey its behests. One thing which greatly contributed to our error on this point, on a former occasion, was our unwillingness to believe that the framers of that constitution, while permitting the donation or devise of an acre of ground to a church organization, would yet, at the same time, absolutely cut off and prohibit every gift, bequest or devise, whereby such donation or devise could be rendered of any benefit to the church or religious society to which it might have been made. But we are now fully convinced that the bequest of $5,000 for the purposes of a church building, and the bequest of $1,000 for the support of. a minister, which last we held invalid before, must both oc cupy the same position, and be held alike obnoxious to the provisions of the constitution before mentioned, thus falling within the ruling made in Kenrick v. Cole, 61 Mo. 572, and Schmucker's Estate v. Reel, 61 Mo. 592.
II.
It is altogether unnecessary to discuss the validity or invalidity of the 6th clause of the will of the testatrix relative to the establishment of a seminary for young ladies, for the reason that it is not averred in the petition, but that the amount of the bequest specified therein has been ascertained and collected, the year elapsed after such ascertainment and collection, and yet the sum required to be secured by the church within that time, in order to obtain the legacy, not so secured. It would, therefore, be useless to discuss what would be the rights of the plaintiff in the premises, when it does not appear whether the conditions have been performed, upon whose performance alone those rights must depend. The remark, however, may be ventured, that, even if the averment just mentioned had been made, showing a full compliance with the conditions specified, it is to the last degree doubtful whether the constitutional provisions before quoted would not be applicable in this instance also, thus preventing the plaintiff'from taking the bequest, not for its own benefit, but for merely a charitable or educational purpose.
III.
I have no doubt as to the legal capacity of the plaintiff to maintain this action. The petition alleges the incorporation of the plaintiff', and the demurrer * X / admits the truth of such allegation. The corporate name was, therefore, the obviously proper one in which to bring suit. North St. Louis Christian Church v. McGowan, 62 Mo. 279. And there.is nothing in clause 12 of article 1 of the constitution, supra, which forbids this view. The fact that, under the provisions of that clause, a. board of trustees is'to transact the financial business of the ecclesiastical corporation does not change the rules of pleading, nor the authority of well-settled precedents. The same line of reasoning which would forbid the church from suing in its corporate name would also prevent the " board of trustees " from doing the like as such board, for the obvious reason that no such power is conferred by the clause just referred to, and consequently, according to the defendant's theory, cannot exist.
IV.
Nor is it to be doubted that, under the pleadings, the plaintiff is the beneficiary under the will. This the petifi°n alleges ; this the demurrer admits. And even if the language of the bequest were somewhat obscure, such obscurity would not be suffered to defeat the purpose of the testatrix as to the one acre of grpund, this being the ease of a recognized charity. Schmidt v. Hess, 60 Mo. 591, and cases cited.
V.
. And it was competent for the plaintiff, in this instance, to take the initiative and institute the present proceedings, though this is usually done by the executor or trustee, by a bill in the nature of a bill of interpleader; and this for his own. protection. I Redfield on Wills, 492, and cases cited; Com. Dig. Chy. 3, G. 6; 1 Sto. Eq. Jur., § 544; Stevens v. Warren, 101 Mass. 564; Bailey v. Briggs, 56 N. Y. 407.
VI.
So far as concerns the petition, it is substantially good, since it alleges a controversy to have arisen between the plaintiff and the executor, respecting his duties and plaintiff's rights under the will, and that doubts have arisen as to its proper construction, and that danger to those rights is apprehended, unless equity interfere and give proper directions to the executor.
VII.
I shall next discuss whether the circuit court had jurisdiction of the cause. Under the law of it organization, (Loc- Acts> 1855> P- 58> § the probate and common pleas court of Greene county has exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases relative to the probate of last wills and testaments, granting letters testamentary and of administration, and the settlement and-allowance of accounts of executors, administrators, guardians and curators, and to hear and determine all disputes and controversies whatsoever respecting wills, the right of executorship, administration or guardianship, or respecting the duties or accounts of executors, administrators, guardians or curators, to hear and determine all disputes and other proceedings instituted against executors and administrators, upon any demand against the estate of their testator or intestate, etc., etc. The statute creating the probate and common pleas court of Greene county differs in no essential particular from the statutes at large respecting the jurisdiction of county courts, which statutes in relation to the probate jurisdiction of such courts have been on the statute book since 1825.
In Miller v. Woodward, 8 Mo. 169, where no final settlement 'had been made, in commenting upon similar language to that above quoted, Mr. Justice Napton, speaking for the court, held that such language did not oust the circuit court of its chancery jurisdiction to establish a demand against an estate, or to restrain, by injunction, the administrators of that estate from making distribution, nor preclude that court from affording to the complainant, a surety, equitable relief by substituting him in the place and stead of the creditor, as to all securities, funds, liens and equities which the latter possessed ; and that such substitution could only be recognized and accomplished in a court of equity; and this upon the ground of the demand being purely equitable. And in Clark v. Henry's Admr., 9 Mo. 340, Miller v. Woodward, supra, is mentioned with approval by the same judge who delivered the opinion in each case, and the original and ancient jurisdiction of courts of equity, so far, at least, as concerns proceedings analagous to the present one, undisturbed by statutory provisions, or modern usage in courts of law, fully and forcibly maintained. The case of Overton v. McFarland, 15 Mo. 312, enunciates nothing to the contrary of the cases just cited. The only point in judgment there was that the powers conferred on the county court, by the statutory provisions already quoted, were not absorbed by reason of the circuit court being possessed of a general control over executors, administrators, etc. It is scarcely necessary to say that the maintaining of the present proceeding by no means depends upon a denial of that doctrine.
. The powers invoked here are not within the scope, grasp or jurisdiction of probate courts; but powers possessed alone by courts of equity — possessed independent of and long anterior to the existence of the statute mentioned —possessed for the beneficent purpose of affording relief where no adequate redress can be afforded under the ordinary course of legal procedure. Now it has been determined that probate courts in this State possess no chancery powers. Presbyterian Church v. McElhinney, 61 Mo. 540. But it is only in a tribunal possessing such powers that an executor or administrator can file a bill in the nature of a bill of interpleader, in order to have his duties defined and his pathway marked out by the decree of a court fully competent to adjudicate upon the complex questions which sometimes arise in the course of administration. And the reason why a court of equity is the only tribunal thus competent is because a court of law can deal alone with past occurrences, while the peculiar province and distinguishing feature of the court of equity is to administer preventive justice; to entertain measures of precautionary relief; to forestall wrongs or anticipated mis chief; and in affording its comprehensive and wide-reaching relief, extend its arm in futuro; arrest the progress of impending evils and thwart the threatened danger. Besides, a court of equity ought to entertain jurisdiction of this cause, because capable to avoid a multiplicity of suits, which a court of law would be compelled to entertain at the instance of each dissatisfied suitor interested iirthe subject matter of the will. I think it may be safely affirmed that no instance can be found in the books where a court of law, a court merely of statutory origin, has been adjudged the possessor of such powers.
Doubtless the Legislature might confer such powers on probate courts, but doubtless our Legislature never has. This is shown not only by the authority just referred to, but by the case of Schulter's Admr. v. Bockwinkle's Admr., 19 Mo. 647, a case which arose in St. Louis county. In that instance, it was ruled that the special statutory proceeding against an executor or administrator, under the provisions of section 36, page 148, R. S. 1845, for specific performance, could be maintained in the county court only when the contract was in writing; otherwise, the proceeding must be had " under the general law," i. e., in the circuit court, which alone could enforce specific performance when the contract rested in parol. And the Legislature must evidently have been of the same opinion as to the jurisdiction of county courts, or else they would not have been at the pains to have conferred, in a single instance and in one particular way, equity powers upon such courts, if those courts already possessed a general equitable jurisdiction. So, also, in the case of Mead v. Jennings, 46 Mo. 91, it was held that, if the executors of a will failed to act as required by the testatrix, a complete remedy was to be had by filing a bill, not in the county court, but in equity, to compel them to execute the trust. The above are only a few of the many cases which might be cited as showing what hithei'to has not been deemed doubtful, that circuit courts, or those on which such jurisdiction was expressly conferred by the law of their organization, were the only fora capable to administer equitable relief.
I am aware of but two instances where the attention of this court has been called to a proceeding like the present; that is, a bill to construe a will. Those cases are Collier's Will, 40 Mo. 287, and Jamison, Exr. of Bell, v. Hay et al., 46 Mo. 546. In the first instance, the proceeding was instituted by the trustees mentioned in the will; whether they were also executors does not appear. In the second instance, the application was by the executor as such. Distinguished counsel were, however, employed in each instance, and the matters incident to the construction of wills learnedly and exhaustively discussed ; but it was not for a moment questioned that the circuit court, sitting as a court of equity, was the only forum competent to give instructions to those applying therefor how safely to dispose of the vast property devised and bequeathed in the first instance mentioned, and of the by no means, inconsiderable estate devised and bequeathed in the second instance.
But it is suggested by counsel, that Collier's case differs from this, in that it does not appear, but that the general administration had in that ease been finally closed. I am altogether unable to see how that circumstance affects in the slightest degree the point under discussion, for if the jurisdiction of the probate and common pleas court, as to all matters pertaining to the " duties or accounts of executors, &c., and as to all disputes and controversies whatsoever respecting wills," is "original and exclusive," then it must needs follow that the only jurisdiction which the circuit court could'possibly exercise in such matters would be an appellate jurisdiction; and this regardless of the question, whether the administration was pending in the probate court or previously determined; for it cannot, with any show of reason, be contended that the final winding up and settlement of an estate in the probate court, would ipso facto — would by operation of law develop a new juris diction in the circuit court, never existing before, until that hour. So that the position of defendant's counsel will be found ultimately to resolve itself into this : That you cannot invoke the equitable interposition of the circuit court, while the administration is in progress, because the jurisdiction of the probate and common pleas court is original and exclusive; nor after final settlement, for the self same reason — in a word, that in no probate matter will equity take cognizance or afi'ord relief. I am unwilling to accept such a theory, or such, its inevitable consequences.
Granting, however, for the sake of argument, that the jurisdiction of the probate and common pleas court is as extensive as counsel claim; grantingthat we must stick in the bark of a literal construction, still this case does not fall within that jurisdiction, and for this obvious reason: That the duties of this executor, Robberson, are not conferred by the statute, but by the will. In the case of Coil v. Pitman's Admr., 46 Mo. 51, an administrator with the will annexed, under the power conferred by that instrument, sold land, but failed to make a deed to the purchaser, and the latter applied to the county court for specific performance, which was refused. This court, after quoting the statutory provisions before noted, held that, as the specific power to sell was conferred by the will, and had no existence in consequence of statutory law, the administrator acted independently of the county court, and was not amenable to it for the performance of any duty respecting the sale; that, when the authority to sell was derived from statutory provisions, a different rule prevailed, and the administrator became subject to the control of the court, and its full " supervisory power and jurisdiction in all matters touching the premises;" but that, since the will in that instance bestowed the power, the only resort of the purchaser for specific performance was to a court of chancery; that the statute had not conferred such jurisdiction on the county court, and that nothing in favor of the jurisdiction of that court was to be taken for granted or given by im plication. It is quite evident from the case just cited that only matters resting in the ordinary routine of administration were held exclusively cognizable by probate courts. Tested by the rule just announced, it will be found that,as the powers in the present instance are conferred by the will, and not by the statute, the probate and common pleas court has no jurisdiction, and the only proper resort of plaintiff was to the present method of procedure, and in the circuit court.
VIII.
If it is established that the circuit court has jurisdiction, then no more difficulty can attend the enforcing of the decree which it may render in this than in any other cause whatsoever. Jurisdiction existing, the power to enforce and effectuate whatever may be done pursuant to such jurisdiction follows as a necessary incident.
IX.
It would seem that the devise as to the acre of ground on which to build a church was sufficiently definite to obviate the necessity of asking the construction of that clause of the will, but the petition alleges and the demurrer confesses that a controversy has arisen between the plaintiff and the executor respecting that devise. Eor this reason alone, the judgment will be reversed and the cause remanded.
All concur, except Hough and Henry, JJ., who dissent.