Case Name: Joyce GOOLSBY, Individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. W. Michael BLUMENTHAL, as Secretary of the Department of the Treasury, et al., Defendants-Appellees
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 1978-10-04
Citations: 581 F.2d 455
Docket Number: No. 76-2198
Parties: Joyce GOOLSBY, Individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. W. Michael BLUMENTHAL, as Secretary of the Department of the Treasury, et al., Defendants-Appellees.
Judges: 
Reporter: Federal Reporter 2d Series
Volume: 581
Pages: 455–471

Head Matter:
Joyce GOOLSBY, Individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. W. Michael BLUMENTHAL, as Secretary of the Department of the Treasury, et al., Defendants-Appellees.
No. 76-2198.
United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.
Oct. 4, 1978.
Rehearing En Banc Granted Nov. 7, 1978.
Brown, Chief Judge, concurred with statement.
Thornberry, Circuit Judge, dissented and filed opinion.
Steven F. Granberg, Georgia Legal Services Programs, Gerald R. Tarutis, Emerson R. Marks, Jr., Alfred O. Bragg, III, Macon, Ga., James A. Kushner, Los Angeles, Cal., Jack Greenberg, Charles E. Williams, III, New York City, for plaintiffs-appellants.
Denver L. Rampey, Jr., U. S. Atty., Greg J. Leonard, John D. Carey, Asst. U. S. At-tys., Macon, Ga., for Simon, Hill, Coleman, et al.
F. Robert Raley, Andrew W. McKenna, City Atty., Macon, Ga., for Ronnie Thompson, et al.
Before Chief Judge BROWN, THORN-BERRY and MORGAN, Circuit Judges.

Opinion:
LEWIS R. MORGAN, Circuit Judge:
Joyce Goolsby, having been told she must leave her apartment to make way for a road construction project, filed this suit in the Middle District of Georgia seeking relocation assistance under the Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies Act of 1970 (URA), 42 U.S.C. § 4601 et seq.-, seeking a preliminary injunction pending compliance with the requirements of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. § 4321 et seq.; and seeking relief for various constitutional violations. Originally filed as a class action, the complaint named as defendants the Secretary of the Department of the Treasury; the Secretary of the Department of Housing and Urban Development; the Secretary of the Department of Transportation; the Administrator of the Federal Highway Administration; the Commissioner of the Georgia State Department of Transportation; the Mayor of Macon, Georgia; the members of the City Council of Macon, Georgia; and the Director of the Department of Community Development of Macon, Georgia. Following denial of class certification, all parties filed motions for summary judgment. The trial court, concluding that URA and NEPA did not apply to the construction project which is the subject of this dispute, and concluding further that there were no constitutional violations, granted defendants' motions for summary judgment.
The material facts are not disputed. Ms. Goolsby and her family rented an apartment in the Unionville neighborhood of Macon, Georgia. By March, 1975, the property on which they resided had been acquired by the city of Macon for the purpose of widening, straightening, and paving a .52 mile stretch of Dempsey Avenue. The funds for the project came from two sources: $259,-000 from the Georgia Department of Transportation, and $280,000 from general revenue sharing funds allocated to Macon, pursuant to the State and Local Fiscal Assistance Act of 1972 (Revenue Sharing Act), 31 U.S.C. § 1221 et seq. The purchase of land by the city required the displacement of one individual and four families living in their own homes, and five individuals and fourteen families living in rental housing. This suit was filed on April 24, 1975, after Ms. Goolsby received notice to vacate. Summary judgment was entered against Ms. Goolsby on March 1, 1976, and this appeal followed.
Ms. Goolsby originally raised three issues: (1) whether projects funded in part with revenue sharing funds are subject to the requirements of URA; (2) whether projects funded in part with revenue sharing funds are subject to the requirements of NEPA; (3) if either URA or NEPA or both are not made applicable by the use of revenue sharing funds, whether the use of Community Development funds alters the result. The parties have stipulated that all issues involving the applicability of NEPA have become moot because the project has been completed; therefore, we need only address the first question.
The Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies Act was passed as a remedial measure to lessen the impact of public projects on those persons forced to leave their homes to make way for such projects. 42 U.S.C.A. § 4621 (1977). To achieve this purpose, it was provided that the head of any federal agency which undertakes a program or project resulting in the displacement of any person shall make payments for "actual reasonable moving expenses," 42 U.S.C.A. § 4622(a)(1), "actual direct losses of tangible personal property," § 4622(a)(2), and "actual reasonable expenses in searching for a replacement business or farm," § 4622(a)(3). Section 4625 requires the agency involved to provide various other relocation assistance services. Although the provisions of § 4622 and § 4625 refer only to federal agencies, § 4630 conditions the availability
of federal funds to state agencies upon the receipt of assurances that the state agencies will comply with the substantive requirements of URA. This limitation upon the disbursement of funds to the states is phrased in very forceful terms, being applicable "notwithstanding any other law."
The problem confronting us is whether the benefits just described ought' to be made available to Ms. Goolsby. Relying on the express terms of URA, plaintiff contends that she is entitled to those benefits because she is a "displaced" person under the Act, having moved from her apartment "as a result of the acquisition of such real property . for a program or project undertaken by a Federal agency, or with Federal financial assistance . ." 42 U.S.C.A. § 4601(6). Thus, if the Dempsey project is a "program or project undertaken . . . with Federal financial assistance," then she and her family are entitled to the benefits enumerated in § 4622 and 4625. Slightly more than half of the money used in this project came from Macon's general revenue sharing funds, and, according to plaintiff, the use of these funds constitutes "federal financial assistance" and thus obligates the city of Macon to comply with the URA. The Act defines "federal financial assistance" to include:
a grant, loan, or contribution provided by the United States, except any Federal guarantee or insurance and any annual payment or capital loan to the District of Columbia.
42 U.S.C.A. § 4601(4). Viewed in this light, plaintiff's position certainly has appeal. Revenue sharing funds would appear to be a "contribution provided by the United States," and "notwithstanding any other law" such contributions cannot be made, absent the proper assurances, to pay for all or part of a project that results in displacing any persons.
Defendants, in an attempt to overcome the strong statutory language, point to the legislative history of the Revenue Sharing Act and argue that the intent of Congress, when it passed the Act, was to establish a "no strings attached" method of providing funds to the states. According to defendant, this "no strings" approach was designed to provide federal financial aid to the states, but to avoid the various limitations and restrictions, such as URA, normally accompanying such funds. Defendants find further support for their argument in a "Statement of Congressional Intent" published by several congressmen after the enactment of URA, and a statement made in a speech by the Director of the Office of Revenue Sharing. Finally, directing our attention to sections expressly making the Davis-Bacon Act, 40 U.S.C.A. § 276a et seq., and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000d, applicable to revenue sharing projects, defendants urge that the express inclusion of these restrictions allows us to infer an intention to exclude all other federal restrictions.
Although defendants' arguments are not without force, we cannot accept their interpretation. First, as we read the legislative history, we agree that it expresses an intention to eliminate, or severely limit, federal involvement in the initial determination of the manner in which the funds are to be used:
The committee believes the basic purpose of the bill should be to provide the States and localities with a specified portion of Federal individual income tax collections to be used by them in accordance with local needs and priorities and without the attachment of strings by the Federal Government. .
If 'no strings are attached,' the funds may be spent by the local government for what the local citizenry recognize as their high-priority purposes, rather than having priorities established by the Federal Government for them which could conflict with their own interests.
S.Rep. No. 92-1050, 92nd Cong., 2nd Sess., reprinted in 1972 U.S.Code Cong, and Admin.News, pp. 3874, 3876. We do not, however, find any indication of a desire to eliminate all obligations arising as a result of the ultimate manner in which the funds are used. On this question, the legislative history is at best inconclusive, offering little or no support for either position. However, one theme is consistent throughout. Revenue sharing, although obviously designed to allow maximum flexibility, is nevertheless perceived as "federal aid," and, as such, ought not to be free from all federal policies and restrictions. Therefore, any weight we attach to the relevant legislative history favors plaintiff's position.
Defendants' other authorities are similarly unpersuasive. The "Statement of Congressional Intent" is not part of the legislative record and cannot be considered when determining congressional intent. As the Supreme Court has stated:
post-passage remarks of legislators, however explicit, cannot serve to change the legislative intent of Congress expressed before the Act's passage. . . . Such statements "represent only the personal views of these legislators, since the statements were made after passage of the Act."
Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 132, 95 S.Ct. 335, 353, 42 L.Ed.2d 320, 347 (1974). Similarly, the remarks of Mr. Watt, then Director of the Office of Revenue Sharing, are not entitled to the deference normally afforded agency interpretations. Such informal remarks are a much less reliable indicator of official agency positions than are interpretations contained in the regulations or offered in a formal setting. Investment Company Institute v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 91 S.Ct. 1091, 28 L.Ed.2d 367 (1971). Furthermore, even if Mr. Watt's informal remarks on the Revenue Sharing Act are entitled to some deference, his views as to the coverage of other statutes are not those of the agency charged with implementing those other statutes, and, accordingly, are not entitled to the same deference.
Defendants' finally point to the express inclusion of the Davis-Bacon Act, 40 U.S.C.A. § 276a et seq. (1969), and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000d (1974). Urging application of the canon of statutory construction expressio unius est exclusio alterius, defendants contend that the clear implication is one of excluding all federal statutes not expressly made applicable. Congressional treatment of Title VI is not particularly instructive. As plaintiff points out, Title VI, as mentioned in the 1972 Revenue Sharing Act, contains a significant alteration; sex discrimination has been added to the list of prohibited acts. 31 U.S.C.A. § 1242 (1976). Thus, arguably, the purpose of its mention is to alter its applicability rather than to extend the coverage of Title VI to a statute to which it might not otherwise apply.
The treatment of the Davis-Bacon Act is more useful. In the final version of the Revenue Sharing Act, Davis-Bacon was made applicable only to projects in which revenue sharing funds amounted to 25% or more of the total. 31 U.S.C.A. § 1243(a)(6) (1976). Plaintiff would have us treat this limitation in the same manner as the alteration of Title VI mentioned above; however, the legislative history reveals a much more significant interpretation. The original House version of the Revenue Sharing Act would have made Davis-Bacon fully applicable to all projects funded in whole or in part with revenue sharing funds. 1972 U.S. Code Cong, and Admin.News, pp. 3889-90. The Senate Finance Committee deleted this provision stating: "it is no more appropriate to specify the wage rates that are to be paid with aid funds in such cases than to specify how the local governments are to spend the funds." Id. at 3890. From the Senate discussion, it is possible to infer a feeling by the Senators that Davis-Bacon would not apply unless expressly made applicable. Thus the 25% limitation on Davis-Bacon is seen as a compromise rather than an inclusion for the purpose of altering the scope of an act which would have applied without being mentioned. Because Davis-Bacon is an act of general applicability, covering "public works . . . financed in whole or part by loans or grants from the United States . . ," 40 U.S.C.A. § 276c (1969), its treatment provides an interesting analogy to the issue at hand. If the treatment of Davis-Bacon is read to indicate the feeling that federal requirements not mentioned in the Revenue Sharing Act are not applicable, that inference certainly supports the position taken by the defendants. However, one additional factor must be considered.
In effect, defendants' position, and that of the court below, is that the Revenue Sharing Act is impliedly exempted from URA. This contention is contrary to the strong policy against such implied exemptions. Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579, 96 S.Ct. 3110, 49 L.Ed.2d 1141 (1976); Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 95 S.Ct. 335, 42 L.Ed.2d 320 (1974); Silver v. New York Stock Exchange, 373 U.S. 341, 83 S.Ct. 1246, 10 L.Ed.2d 389 (1963). In order to hold that one statute has created an implied exemption from another statute, we must conclude that there is either an "affirmative showing of the intent to repeal" or a "positive repugnancy which 'cannot be reconciled.' " ICC v. Southern Railway Co., 543 F.2d 534 (5th Cir. 1976). Where the two statutes in question are capable of standing together, there is no irreconcilable conflict.
Considering the statutes before us, we are not persuaded that they are incapable of standing together. Neither the ends hoped to be achieved nor the means chosen appear to conflict irreconcilably. The Revenue Sharing Act requires that certain assurances be given before a recipient becomes entitled to its portion of the revenue sharing funds. Similarly, URA prohibits final approval of federal financial assistance by the head of the relevant agency until the recipients have given assurances that the terms of URA will be followed if a project results in the displacement of any individual. We perceive no reason why these assurances cannot be given simultaneously, or in any other manner designed to convince the Secretary of the Treasury that persons displaced by revenue sharing projects will be relocated. The mechanical implementation of the programs required by URA would certainly pose no more problems when arising in the context of a revenue sharing project than when arising in the context of any other state program receiving federal aid. Finally, we are not unaware of the possibility that the increase in costs by an amount sufficient to cover relocation expenses might negatively influence the decision to proceed with a particular project. However, we feel the risk that such increased costs will deter recipients of revenue sharing funds from undertaking projects is insignificant when balanced against the strong federal policies designed to ensure adequate housing and an equitable distribution of the burdens arising out of public works programs. The importance of these policies has been clearly stated by Congress:
[I]t [has become] increasingly apparent that the application of traditional concepts of valuation and eminent domain resulted in inequitable treatment for large numbers of people displaced by public action. When applied to densely populated urban areas, with already limited housing, the result can be catastrophic for those whose homes or businesses must give way to public needs. The result far too often has been that a few citizens have been called upon to bear the burden of meeting public needs. . The imperative need for a uniform, fair, and comprehensive program in this area has been . . documented . . . The bill as recommended is necessary to eliminate the great inconsistencies that exist among Federal and federally assisted programs with respect to the amount and scope of payments, other assistance provided, and assurance of housing offered. It recognizes that relocation is a serious and growing problem in the United States and that the pace of displacement will accelerate in the years immediately ahead. It recognizes that advisory assistance is of special importance in the relocation process especially for the poor, the nonwhite, the elderly, and people engaged in small business. . In short, this legislation recognizes that the Federal Government has a primary responsibility to provide uniform treatment for those forced to relocate by Federal and federally aided public improvement programs and to ease the impact of such forced moves.
H.R.Rep. 91-1656, 91st Cong., 2nd Sess., reprinted in 1970 U.S.Code Cong, and Admin.News, pp. 5851-52.
To resolve the question confronting us, we must balance the inference of exclusionary intent against the recognized judicial opposition to implied exemptions, the clearly enunciated congressional policies which prompted URA, and the forceful language contained in the provisions making URA applicable to the states. Although defendants' arguments that URA does not apply to revenue sharing projects are not totally without merit, they fall short of establishing an affirmative intent to repeal URA, or an irreconcilable conflict between URA and the Revenue Sharing Act. After reviewing the express terms of the acts in question, the structure of the acts, and the relevant legislative and administrative materials, we cannot conclude that the Revenue Sharing' Act created an implied exemption from URA. Where Congress has established the standard that "notwithstanding any other law" states are not entitled to federal contributions absent the requisite relocation assurances we would be most reluctant to rule that such a strong standard could be circumvented as easily as defendants suggest.
This result is not inconsistent with the "no strings" approach of the Revenue Sharing Act. It does not hamper in any significant way the flexibility given to the states to use revenue sharing funds in accordance with local priorities, rather than being compelled to use those funds on projects selected by the federal government. Instead, we seek to effectuate the strong policy of the URA by ensuring that revenue sharing funds are not used to place a disproportionate burden for projects designed to benefit the public as a whole upon those unfortunate few who are forced to leave their homes. If Congress intended, by enacting the Revenue Sharing Act, to allow the states to avoid obligations such as those imposed by URA, it did not express that intention in a meaningful and discernible manner. Until such time as the intent to remove such requirements is more clearly expressed, we are compelled to hold that no implied exemption was intended, and that URA is applicable to projects where the only federal involvement is the presence of revenue sharing funds. We hold that Joyce Goolsby is entitled to relocation benefits, and that the judgment below, insofar as it applies to officials responsible for providing relocation assistance in connection with the Dempsey Avenue project, must be reversed. Under the terms of URA, the Mayor and City Council of Macon, Georgia, the officials in charge of the Dempsey project, are required to provide whatever assistance is due Ms. Goolsby. 42 U.S.C.A. § 4630; cf. 24 C.F.R. § 42.20(s), § 42.65. As to the other defendants, they are not responsible for providing relocation benefits in this case. Accordingly, the judgment below on this issue is affirmed as to all federal and state defendants, and reversed as to all local defendants.
AFFIRMED in part, and REVERSED in part.
. Although administrative remedies are provided under URA, 42 U.S.C.A. § 4633(b)(3) (1977); 24 C.F.R. § 42.60, no contention has been made that the case ought to be dismissed for failure to exhaust those remedies. Indeed, because all of the agencies to which Ms. Goolsby could apply have consistently taken the position that she is not entitled to any relief, there is no reason for us to require her to pursue what would only be futile claims. See Houghton v. Shafer, 392 U.S. 639, 88 S.Ct. 2119, 20 L.Ed.2d 1319 (1968).
. 42 U.S.C.A. § 4625 provides:
(a) Whenever the acquisition of real property for a program or project undertaken by a Federal agency in any State will result in the displacement of any person on or after January 2, 1971, the head of such agency shall provide a relocation assistance advisory program for displaced persons which shall offer the services described in subsection (c) of this section. If such agency head determines that any person occupying property immediately adjacent to the real property acquired is caused substantial economic injury because of the acquisition, he may offer such person relocation advisory services under such program.
(b) Federal agencies administering programs which may be of assistance to displaced persons covered by this chapter shall cooperate to the maximum extent feasible with the Federal or State agency causing the displacement to assure that such displaced persons receive the maximum assistance available to them.
(c) Each relocation assistance advisory program required by subsection (a) of this section shall include such measures, facilities, or services as may be necessary or appropriate in order to—
(1) determine the need, if any, of displaced persons, for relocation assistance;
(2) provide current and continuing information on the availability, prices, and rentals, of comparable decent, safe, and sanitary sales and rental housing, and of comparable commercial properties and locations for displaced businesses;
(3) assure that, within a reasonable period of time, prior to displacement there will be available in areas not generally less desirable in regard to public utilities and public and commercial facilities and at rents or prices within the financial means of the families and individuals displaced, decent, safe, and sanitary dwellings, as defined by such Federal agency head, equal in number to the number of and available to such displaced persons who require such dwellings and reasonably accessible to their places of employment, except that the head of that Federal agency may prescribe by regulation situations when such assurances may be waived;
(4) assist a displaced person displaced from his business or farm operation in obtaining and becoming established in a suitable replacement location;
(5) supply information concerning Federal and State housing programs, disaster loan programs, and other Federal or State programs offering assistance to displaced persons; and
(6) provide other advisory services to displaced persons in order to minimize hardships to such persons in adjusting to relocation.
(d) The heads of Federal agencies shall coordinate relocation activities with project work, and other planned or proposed governmental actions in the community or nearby areas which may affect the carrying out of relocation assistance programs.
. 42 U.S.C.A. § 4630 (1977) provides:
Notwithstanding any other law, the head of a Federal agency shall not approve any grant to, or contract or agreement with, a State agency, under which Federal financial assistance will be available to pay all or part of the cost of any program or project which will result in the displacement of any person on or after January 2, 1971, unless he receives satisfactory assurances from such State agency that—
(1) fair and reasonable relocation payments and assistance shall be provided to or for displaced persons, as are required to be provided by a Federal agency under sections 4622, 4623, and 4624 of this title;
(2) relocation assistance programs offering the services described in section 4625 of this title shall be provided to such displaced persons;
(3) within a reasonable period of time prior to displacement, decent, safe, and sanitary replacement dwellings will be available to, displaced persons in accordance with section 4625(c)(3) of this title.
. The statement as quoted in appellee's brief reads as follows:
We have been informed that the Civil Service Commission is intending to apply the Hatch Act to state and local government employees who are paid in whole or in part from revenue sharing funds. This is completely contrary to what we believe was the clearly expressed Congressional intent that revenue sharing was to be an entirely new concept in federal fiscal programs to which the old rules for federal grants would not apply.
Revenue sharing was intended as a way of assisting state and local governments in their fiscal problems in a manner that would avoid the complexity and restrictions of the previous federal grant programs. Consequently, Congress carefully considered the extent to which federal rules and regulations or 'strings' should be attached to the use of revenue sharing funds. Insofar as state and local governments are concerned, the act names nine specific priority categories for which the funds are to be spent. In addition, two federal laws were specifically made applicable. Congress specifically included anti-discrimination provisions and Davis-Bacon provisions with the understanding that those were the only federal laws to apply. The fact that it was believed necessary to include these restrictions for them to have application shows clearly that it was not intended to make other federal acts, such as the Hatch Act, applicable.
At no time was it the understanding or intent of Congress that any other federal law would apply to the state and local government use of revenue sharing funds. This was one of the major innovative steps taken by the Congress in establishing the revenue sharing program; that funds would be automatically distributed to state and local governments and treated for the most part as state and local government funds. Minimal restrictions on the use of these funds were to be imposed and those referred to above were to be only the ones specified in the State and Local Fiscal Assistance Act.
Consequently, the interpretation by the Civil Service Commission that the Hatch Act is to apply to state and local employees who are paid in whole or in part from federal revenue sharing funds is without foundation in law and is in direct contravention to the clearly expressed intent of Congress.
. The non-federal appellees quote a statement purportedly made by Graham W. Watt, in a speech to the United States Conference of Mayors Workshop:
Generally speaking, we take the position that only those federal laws specifically referenced in the State and Local Assistance Act of 1972 apply to use of revenue sharing funds.
Appellee's brief at p. 18.
. The original Act created a very broad list of priorities for which the funds were to be used: § 1222(a) Use of funds by local governments for priority expenditures
(a) Funds received by units of local government under this subchapter may be used only for priority expenditures. For purposes of this chapter, the term 'priority expenditures' means only—
(1) ordinary and necessary maintenance and operating expenses for—
(A) public safety (including law enforcement, fire protection, and building code enforcement),
(B) environmental protection (including sewage disposal, sanitation, and pollution abatement),
(C) public transportation (including transit systems and streets and roads),
(D) health,
(E) recreation,
(F) libraries,
(G) social services for the poor or aged, and
(H) financial administration; and
(2) ordinary and necessary capital expenditures authorized by law.
31 U.S.C.A. § 1222(a). Mathews v. Massell, 356 F.Supp. 291 (N.D.Ga.1973). These priorities were repealed by Pub.L. No. 94-488, 90 Stat. 2341 (1976).
. The "no strings" approach to funding was distinguished from existing methods:
Present aid programs generally are of the categorical type and often do not provide for the most pressing purposes. Instead, they provide air for specific and frequently relatively narrowly defined purposes. Moreover, they often require local matching funds which, in many instances, imposes a financial strain on the local governments and causes a shift of local funds to areas of lesser priority to the local governments. While State and local governments, under certain Federal programs, may retain some flexibility in spending such categorical aid, there are ordinarily severe limitations to this flexibility. . .
The committee believes that the State and local governments will be able to make most efficient use of the aid funds if they are given the authority to determine how these funds are to be used. To a considerable extent, the adoption of the revenue-sharing program stems from the need to avoid the problems inherent in many categorical programs which specify how the recipient governmental unit is to spend the funds. Such categorical aid programs may result in forcing the recipient governmental unit to spend the funds for the specified purpose even though the governmental unit may have other more urgent needs to finance.
The committee's bill is designed to provide a new program of Federal aid to the States and local governments which will not be subject to the same type of limitations as the categorical aid programs and which will permit these government units flexibility to use the funds most advantageously in the public interest. In other words, the broad purpose of this legislation is to fill the gap in the present aid programs by granting State and local governments complete flexibility in the expenditure of the new aid funds so as to supplement the present categorical aid and to secure a more balanced and efficient system of Federal aid.
1972 U.S.Code Cong, and Admin.News, pp. 3884, 3888-89.
. It is interesting to note that Davis-Bacon applies to projects receiving loans or grants from the federal government, whereas URA applies to projects receiving loans, grants, or contribu tions from the federal government. An argument could be made that the inclusion of federal contributions in URA extends the applicability of URA beyond that of Davis-Bacon, thus making it necessary to specifically mention Davis-Bacon in order to insure its applicability, but not necessary to mention URA.
. 31 U.S.C.A. § 1243 provides:
(a) In order to qualify for any payment under subchapter I of this chapter for any entitlement period beginning on or after January 1, 1973, a State government or unit of local government must establish (in accordance with regulations prescribed by the Secretary, and, with respect to a unit of local government, after an opportunity for review and comment by the Governor of the State in which such unit is located) to the satisfaction of the Secretary that—
(1) it will establish a trust fund in which it will deposit all payments it receives under subchapter I of this chapter;
(2) it will use amount in such trust fund (including any interest earned thereon while in such trust fund) during such reasonable period or periods as may be provided in such regulations;
(3) Repealed.
(4) it will provide for the expenditure of amounts received under subchapter I of this chapter only in accordance with the laws and procedures applicable to the expenditure of its own revenues;
(5) it will — •
(A) use fiscal, accounting, and audit procedures which conform to guidelines established therefor by the Secretary (after consultation with the Comptroller General of the United States),
(B) provide to the Secretary (and to the Comptroller General of the United States), on reasonable notice, access to, and the right to examine, such books, documents, papers, or records as the Secretary may reasonably require for purposes of reviewing compliance with this chapter (or, in the case of the Comptroller General, as the Comptroller General may reasonably require for purposes of reviewing compliance and operations under subsection (c)(2) of this section), and
(C) make such annual and interim reports (other than reports required by section 1241 of this title) to the Secretary as he may reasonably require;
(6) all laborers and mechanics employed by contractors of subcontractors in the performance of work on any construction project, 25 percent or more of the costs of which project are paid out of its trust fund established under paragraph (1), will be paid wages at rates not less than those prevailing on similar construction in the locality as determined by the Secretary of Labor in accordance with the Davis-Bacon Act, as amended, and that with respect to the labor standards specified in this paragraph the Secretary of Labor shall act in accordance with Reorganization Plan Numbered 14 of 1950 and section 276c of Title 40;
(7) individuals employed by it whose wages are paid in whole or in part out of its trust fund established under paragraph (1) will be paid wages which are not lower than the prevailing rates of pay for persons employed in similar public occupations by the same employer; and
(8) in the case of a unit of local government as defined in the second sentence of section 1227(d)(1) of this title (relating to governments of Indian tribes and Alaskan native villages), it will expend funds received by it under subchapter I of this chapter for the benefit of members of the tribe or village residing in the county area from the allocation of which funds are allocated to it under section 1227(b)(4) of this title.
. See note 3, supra.
. Although our decision requires that local money be used to provide the URA benefits, we believe that future displacements need not be funded solely by local government. URA provides that money spent to provide the required benefits will be federal money to be added to the other costs of a project and included in the federal dollars received by the state or local agency. 42 U.S.C.A. § 4631. Only where a state or local agency has violated URA, failed to request funds sufficient to provide the URA benefits, expended all of the provided federal money, and is unable to obtain other federal assistance to help pay URA costs will the agency be required to use non-federal money. Therefore, in the future, local units complying with URA can apply for extra federal funds to cover the cost of displacements.
Any administrative difficulties springing from our holding have been greatly ameliorated by 1976 amendments to 31 U.S.C.A. § 1241. The recent enactments impose reporting and accounting requirements on the use of revenue sharing funds. As a result, there should be little difficulty in determining whether revenue sharing is involved in a particular project for purposes of applying URA.