Case Name: Susan M. STREGACK, as personal representative of the Estate of Manuel Moldofsky, Deceased, Petitioner, v. Sally D. MOLDOFSKY, Respondent
Court: Florida Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1985-06-20
Citations: 474 So. 2d 206
Docket Number: No. 65499
Parties: Susan M. STREGACK, as personal representative of the Estate of Manuel Moldofsky, Deceased, Petitioner, v. Sally D. MOLDOFSKY, Respondent.
Judges: BOYD, C.J., and OVERTON, ALDERMAN and SHAW, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 474
Pages: 206–208

Head Matter:
Susan M. STREGACK, as personal representative of the Estate of Manuel Moldofsky, Deceased, Petitioner, v. Sally D. MOLDOFSKY, Respondent.
No. 65499.
Supreme Court of Florida.
June 20, 1985.
Rehearing Denied Sept. 12, 1985.
Ainslee R. Ferdie of Ferdie & Gouz, Coral Gables, for petitioner.
Marvin W. Lewis of Shorenstein & Lewis, Miami, for respondent.

Opinion:
McDonald, justice.
We have for review Moldofsky v. Stregack, 449 So.2d 918 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984), which directly and expressly conflicts with Coleman v. Estate of Coleman, 439 So.2d 1016 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983). We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const. The issue here is whether a surviving spouse may challenge an antenuptial agreement based upon fraudulent nondisclosure of assets by a decedent spouse, in light of section 732.702, Florida Statutes (1983), which requires no disclosure for a valid antenup-tial agreement in probate. We quash Mol-dofsky because nondisclosure in any form cannot invalidate an antenuptial agreement in probate proceedings of a deceased spouse.
When Manuel Moldofsky died, his will contained no provision for his wife, Sally Moldofsky, beyond a reference to an ante-nuptial agreement between them. Mrs. Moldofsky filed a notice of elective share after the circuit court probate division admitted the will to probate. Susan Stre-gack, Mr. Moldofsky's daughter and personal representative of his estate, moved to strike the notice of elective share based upon an antenuptial agreement executed by the parties, in which Mr. and Mrs. Mol-dofsky waived all rights in each other's estate. Mrs. Moldofsky then filed an action in the circuit court general jurisdiction division seeking cancellation of the ante-nuptial agreement for fraud. The probate court struck Moldofsky's motion for elective share. Following this order, the trial court dismissed on mootness and res judicata grounds the pending action to cancel the antenuptial agreement.
The district court reversed both orders on appeal. While acknowledging that section 732.702 eliminated the disclosure requirement for an antenuptial agreement to be valid in probate, the district court held that a surviving spouse could challenge an antenuptial agreement for fraudulent nondisclosure by the deceased spouse. The district court declined to follow the contrary holding in Coleman.
In Del Vecchio v. Del Vecchio, 143 So.2d 17 (Fla.1962), this Court held that a valid antenuptial agreement must either contain fair and reasonable provisions for the spouse waiving his or her rights or else the spouse obtaining the waiver of rights must make a full and fair disclosure of assets to the other spouse. Id. at 20. The legislature changed this rule by enacting subsection 732.702(2), which provides: "Each spouse shall make a fair disclosure to the other of his or her estate if the agreement, contract, or waiver is executed after marriage. No disclosure shall be required for an agreement, contract, or waiver executed before marriage." (Emphasis added). We held this statute constitutional against access to courts, due process, and equal protection challenges. Estate of Roberts, 388 So.2d 216 (Fla.1980).
Relying on subsection 732.702(2), the Coleman court affirmed the denial of. a surviving spouse's motion to amend pleadings and attack an otherwise valid antenup-tial agreement for nondisclosure by the decedent spouse before execution of the antenuptial agreement. Coleman held that nondisclosure, however pled, could not constitute a basis for invalidating an ante-nuptial agreement in probate proceedings because the statute required no disclosure in such cases. 439 So.2d at 1018-19. In the present case, on the other hand, the district court interpreted subsection 732.-702(2) to eliminate the disclosure duty before marriage, but not the duty that any disclosure be made truthfully. According to the third district, fraudulent nondisclosure would provide a basis to challenge the antenuptial agreement because the surviving spouse's signature was "otherwise improperly obtained" under Roberts. 388 So.2d at 217. We disagree.
Nondisclosure, whether fraudulent or not, is precisely what the legislature intended to eliminate from consideration on the validity of antenuptial agreements. Many older Florida residents want to marry again but also want to keep their assets separate. Often this is the desire of both parties contemplating marriage. Section 732.702 allows complete control over assets accumulated over a lifetime without fear that a partial disclosure before marriage may trigger an unwanted disposition of those assets. We cannot accept the district court decision which rewards the totally silent spouse and punishes the spouse who attempts some disclosure.
We also reject the argument that fraudulent nondisclosure may render the surviving spouse's signature improperly obtained. The quoted language from Roberts would apply where the surviving spouse had been misled about what he or she was signing, i.e., a marriage license application instead of an antenuptial agreement. Such fraud could provide grounds to set aside an ante-nuptial agreement.
Accordingly, we quash the decision under review and approve Coleman. This cause is remanded for reinstatement of the trial court orders.
It is so ordered.
BOYD, C.J., and OVERTON, ALDERMAN and SHAW, JJ., concur.
EHRLICH, J., dissents with an opinion, in which ADKINS, J., concurs.