Case Name: SANDMAN v. SEAMAN et al.
Court: New York Supreme Court, General Term
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1895-02-11
Citations: 32 N.Y.S. 338
Docket Number: 
Parties: SANDMAN v. SEAMAN et al.
Judges: 
Reporter: West's New York Supplement
Volume: 32
Pages: 338–341

Head Matter:
(84 Hun, 337.)
SANDMAN v. SEAMAN et al.
(Supreme Court, General Term, Second Department.
February 11, 1895.)
Fraudulent Conveyances—Inference of Fraud.
A fraudulent intent may be inferred by a conveyance from a husband to his wife where it appears that the value of the property conveyed was $5,000, and the alleged consideration for the conveyance was a debt amounting to about $1,000. Dykman, J., dissenting.
Appeal from special term, Queens county.
Action by David Sandman against Horace Seaman and another . to set aside a deed made by defendant Horace Seaman to his wife, Estelle F. Seaman, on the ground of fraud; that such conveyance be declared void as against plaintiff. There was a judgment in favor of plaintiff, and defendants appeal. Affirmed.
The opinion of Mr. Justice BARTLETT at special term is as follows:
The statement made by Horace Seaman, upon his examination in supplementary proceedings, as .to the consideration moving from his wife for the conveyance of the property to her, seems to me more credible than his statement on the trial of the present action. Assuming the consideration to have been $1,000, and having regard to the fact that there was a mortgage of $1,000 on the premises, she seems to have acquired the place for about $8,000 less than it was worth, for the evidence indicates that its value was not less than $5,000. This discrepancy is sufficient to warrant the inference of a fraudulent intent in disposing of it at a time when the owner was in debt to the plaintiff, and was putting off the payment of his debt, especially when we find that, by conveying this property away, he deprived himself of all power to pay the obligation. The constructive imprisonment of the defendant Horace Seaman within the liberties of the jail was terminated by operation of law, under section 111 of the Code of Civil Procedure, upon the expiration of six months after it began. That period had expired before this case came on for trial, and hence the defendant was not then constructively in custody. The taking of the body of a debtor in execution bars the creditor from all other remedy for the collection of the debt so long as the imprisonment continues. Koenig v. Steckel, 58 N. Y. 475. It would seem, therefore, that the defendant might have obtained a stay of proceedings if he was on the limits when the summons was served. He does not appear, however, to have raised the objection that the remedies of the creditor were suspended, or to have brought the matter in any way to the attention of the court, until the trial, when it was too late, because, as already suggested, the constructive imprisonment had then come to an end. There must be judgment for the plaintiff, with costs against the defendant Horace Seaman.
Argued before BROWN, P. J., and DYKMAN and PRATT, JJ.
J. J. Bennett, for appellants.
John S. Griffith, for respondent.

Opinion:
PER CURIAM.
Judgment affirmed, on tne opinion of the court
at special term.