Case Name: STATE of Louisiana v. Robert HARRISON
Court: Louisiana Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1974-02-18
Citations: 291 So. 2d 782
Docket Number: No. 53929
Parties: STATE of Louisiana v. Robert HARRISON.
Judges: CALOGERO, J., concurs with written reasons.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 291
Pages: 782–786

Head Matter:
STATE of Louisiana v. Robert HARRISON.
No. 53929.
Supreme Court of Louisiana.
Feb. 18, 1974.
Rehearing Denied March 22, 1974.
William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Barbara Rutledge, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jim Garrison, Dist. Atty., Louise Korns, Asst. Dist. Atty., for plaintiff-appellee.
Ronald J. Rakosky, Mayer Finkelstein, Parker & Finkelstein, New Orleans, for defendant-appellant.

Opinion:
DIXON, Justice.
Defendant, Robert Harrison, was convicted of armed robbery and sentenced to serve sixty years imprisonment at hard labor. La.R.S. 14:64. He appeals.
The defendant was tried for the July 20, 1970 armed robbery of Judice's Bakery (later renamed Gambino's Bakery) in the City of New Orleans. It was established that on that occasion two men entered the bakery with guns drawn. They announced, "This is a holdup." A saleslady, Mrs. Pearl Márchese, and two patrons of the bakery, Anthony Cefalu and John Neverro, were then robbed. The robbers then fled the store and made good their escape.
At defendant's trial, neither Cefalu nor Neverro was able to identify the defendant as one of the robbers. The State's case therefore rested entirely on the identification of the defendant by Mrs. Márchese.
In its opening statement, the State announced its intention to introduce evidence of another crime to show guilty knowledge, system, intent and identity. Defense counsel objected to any such evidence on grounds of relevancy. When the objection was overruled, defense counsel reserved a bill of exceptions, making a part thereof the entire record in the proceedings.
The evidence of similar acts consisted of the following:
On January 12, 1971 two men entered Gambino's Bakery. The one identified as the defendant doubled up as if in pain. His companion told Mrs. Márchese, the saleslady, that his friend was having cramps, and asked her for assistance. Mrs. Márchese testified that she saw a bulge under the defendant's shirt which looked like a gun. There was no overt act by either person indicating an attempt to rob the store.
She went running into the back to inform her employer, Mr. Warren Gambino, that she thought they were being robbed. Mr. Gambino then armed himself with a pistol and went into the store. Mr. Gambi-no and Mr. Karl Sauviac, the manager of the bakery, each testified that the defendant straightened up, reached across the counter and removed two cartons of ice cream and that when challenged by Mr. Gambino the defendant dropped the ice cream on the floor and fled along with his companion. Mr. Gambino followed the men outside. After the men entered their car the defendant removed a gun from his shirt, pointed it at Mr. Gambino and said, "I got one too. I didn't get you this time." The two men then fled in the automobile. Mr. Gambino was able to get the license number of the vehicle, except for one digit. From this partial license number, the police were able to locate the defendant and his companion, Paul Honoré.
Many recent decisions of this court have dealt with the admissibility of evidence of other crimes in a criminal prosecution under La.R.S. IS :445 — 15:446. See, e. g., State v. Jordan, 276 So.2d 277 (1973); State v. Prieur, 277 So.2d 126 (1973); State v. Moore, 278 So.2d 781 (1973); State v. Jefferson, 284 So.2d 882, decided October 29, 1973; State v. Grant and Dixon, 295 So.2d 168, decided October 29, 1973; State v. Pettle, 286 So.2d 625, decided December 5, 1973.
La.R.S. 15:445 — 15:446 provide:
"In order to show intent, evidence is admissible of similar acts, independent of the act charged as a crime in the indictment, for though intent is a question of fact, it need not be proven as a fact, it may be inferred from the circumstances of the transaction."
"When knowledge or intent forms an essential part of the inquiry, testimony may be offered of such acts, conduct or declarations of the accused as tend to establish such knowledge or intent and where the offense is one of a system, evidence is admissible to prove the continuity of the offense, and the commission of similar offenses for the purpose of showing guilty knowledge and intent, but not to prove the offense charged."
We held in State v. Moore, supra, that evidence of other crimes under these statutes is admissible only where relevant, and then only when their probative value outweighs their prejudicial effect. 278 So.2d at 785.
In the case at bar, the perpetrators of the July 20 robbery entered the bakery with guns drawn and announced, "This is a holdup." Therefore, there was no need to use evidence of other crimes to prove guilty knowledge or intent. State v. Jordan, supra; cf. State v. Pettle, supra.
With regard to "system" or modus operandi, it is sufficient to note that there was no similarity between the two incidents. In the July 20 incident, the perpetrators entered the bakery with guns drawn and immediately announced that, "This is a holdup." There was no attempt at stealth, subterfuge or deception. From the recital of the circumstances of the January 12 incident it is clear that the two incidents were totally dissimilar, as far as modus operandi is concerned. See, State v. Grant and Dixon, supra; State v. Spencer, 257 La. 672, 243 So.2d 793 (1971); State v. Montegut, 257 La. 665, 243 So.2d 791 (1971). Thus, the evidence of the fact that defendant participated in the January 12 incident does not prove that he committed the earlier crime and is simply hot relevant to the issue of identity. State v. Moore, supra.
Although the fact that defendant committed the second offense is not relevant to an issue in the case at bar, we are confronted with the question of whether testimony as to the details of that offense may be properly adduced where it is incidental to identification of the defendant as perpetrator of the first offense by an eyewitness.
The State contends that Mrs. Márchese was unsure of her identification of the defendant as the perpetrator of the July 20 robbery until she saw him again in January, thus making the details of the January offense admissible as the circumstance under which a definite identification was made.
Assuming, arguendo, that this is the case, we nevertheless must reverse the conviction. We note that Mrs. Márchese had limited knowledge of the January 12 incident. She saw the men enter the store, she recognized the defendant as the perpetrator of the robbery of July 20, she saw a gun in his waistband and fearing another robbery went into the back of the bakery, where she remained, to inform her employer of her fear. The more prejudicial details of the second occurrence, which were outside the knowledge of Mrs. Márchese and hence not germane to her identification of the defendant, were provided by five other witnesses who were not connected with the offense for which defendant was being tried. It was highly improper for the prosecution to parade before the jury the five additional witnesses to prove the defendant's complicity in the January 12 incident, as this added nothing to the question of ability of the witness, Mrs. Márchese, to identify the defendant as the perpetrator of the July 20 robbery. This evidence served only to place, to the fullest possible extent, the bad character of the defendant before the jury. As such its admission is reversible error. La.R.S. 15 :481; State v. Moore, supra.
For the reasons assigned, the conviction and sentence are reversed and the case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings not inconsistent with the views expressed herein.
CALOGERO, J., concurs with written reasons.
SANDERS, C. J., dissents and assigns reasons.
SUMMERS, J., dissents and assigns reasons.
MARCUS, J., dissents.
. Defendant reserved three bills of exceptions; however, bills two and three are neither briefed nor argued and are deemed abandoned. State v. Edwards, 261 La. 1014, 261 So.2d 649 (1972).
. Defense counsel urged his objection and the trial judge retired the jury. The court reporter did not transcribe the arguments of counsel which followed, so it is impossible to determine the full scope of the objection. However, the trial judge treated the objection as general throughout the trial and in per curiam and it is so treated here.