Case Name: The State ex rel. E. D. Miller, District Attorney, vs. D. J. Reid, Sheriff, Etc.
Court: Louisiana Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1893-01
Citations: 45 La. Ann. 162
Docket Number: No. 11,133
Parties: The State ex rel. E. D. Miller, District Attorney, vs. D. J. Reid, Sheriff, Etc.
Judges: 
Reporter: Louisiana Annual Reports
Volume: 45
Pages: 162–184

Head Matter:
No. 11,133.
The State ex rel. E. D. Miller, District Attorney, vs. D. J. Reid, Sheriff, Etc.
1. Notwithstanding a district attorney declines to prosecute an appeal from an adverse judgment, in an intrusion-into-office suit, the Attorney General may, without being justly chargeable with the performance of an act ultra vires.
The former didnot thereby cease to be relator, nor the latter become a party to the suit.
The objection urged does not appertain to the status of the appeal, but to the status of the cause.
Under the law the Attorney General has undoubted authority to appear before this court, sitting in New Orleans, and prosecute and defend all appeals in cases, criminal or civil, in which the State may be a party, or interested; and this authority necessarily draws to it authority to apply for and obtain an order of appeal.
2! An averment made in a suit brought against a sheriff for his removal from office, under the provisions of Arts. 196 and 200 of the Constitution, to the effect that he was duly elected, commissioned and qualified as sheriff, though subsequently filed, can not operate, or be given effect as an estoppel against the further prosecution of a pending suit previously filed against same respondent for his removal from office, on the score of constitutional ineligibility to hold office.
In such second suit, such averment is not a germinal or controlling one, but merely descriptive of the respondent’s capacity, preparatory to the further allegation that he had, during his incumbency of the office, been guilty of repeated acts of malfeasance and nonfeasance in office, on account of which he should be removed from office.
3. Under the intrusion-into-office statutes the police jury of a country parish being a party interested in the question may be joined as relator; and they clearly contemplate such party as may have complaint to urge of the respond ent’s ineligibility, and do not exclusively to rival claimants to office.
But inasmuch as the district attorney was fully capacitated to institute and prosecute such suit independent of any other party being joined as relator, that was a sufficient reason for the disallowance of respondent’s exception on that score.
4. The admissibility vel non of testimony at the tidal does not exclusively depend upon the then existing attitude the case is in, in point of fact, but, in part, upon the pleadings; for, notwithstanding plaintiff has not offered affirmative proof of some of his allegations on the opening of his case, the respondent may be constrained to put in evidence, lest advantage be taken of its absence. It is, at all events, better practice to rule evidence in than out of a case.
:5. In case the proof discloses proper and sufficient settlements to have beenmade during preceding years between a tax collector and a police jury, a subsequent settlement between the same tax collector and a succeeding police jury can not be made to depend on such collector undertaking to reopen such preceding settlements and re-establish their correctness, contradictorily with such police jury, under compulsion of the latter. Such settlements must stand until they are annulled and sot aside in due course of law.
In such suit as this no advantage can be taken of the respondent for declining to tender and make settlement on such terms.
>6. In the constitutional disqualification to hold office is the idea not only of debt, but of default with dishonor — not only that the collector owes, but that he owes money collected and in his hands — not only that he is debtor, but defaulter. The denunciation of the organic law is that no person who has been a collector of taxes shall be eligible to any office of honor, trust or profit, until he shall have obtained a discharge for all moneys he has collected, or which have been entrusted to him.
The penalty of ineligibility can attach only in the particular event pointed out, the failure of a tax collector to obtain a discharge for moneys actually eollected. It can not attach to a failure of a tax collector to make collection of taxes remaining uncollected.
The evident object and dominant idea of the framers of the Constitution was to exclude from office defaulting tax collectors and other public functionaries; they had no purpose or intention of making the eligibility of the citizen to hold office depend upon mere pecuniary liability to the State.
'7. The statutes governing the duties and defining the responsibilities of tax collectors must be examined and construed in order to ascertain what is the true definition and purport of the constitutional phrase obtain a discharge for the amount of such collections.” And, as an aid to the determination of the question, adjudicated cases on questions inpari materia may be examined and considered also.
8. Having thus examined and compared the revenue laws applicable, as well as pertinent decisions interpreting similar provisions of a prior Constitution, it > appears that a parish treasurer’s receipt for moneys collected and paid over by a tax collector furnishes the primary and best evidence of a discharge for such collections as he has made. •
APPEAL from the Twelfth District Court, Parish of Calcasieu. Fournet, J.
M. J*. Cunningham, Attorney General, D. B. Gosham and R. P. O’Bryan for Plaintiff and Appellant:
•The State of Louisiana and the police jury of Calcasieu parish are co-plaintiffs and joint litigants in this case. The police jury has the right and authority to em ploy associate counsel. The petition being signed, with the consent of the district attorney, by co-counsel, is an admission by him that said counsel jointly with him represent the interests of plaintiffs. He is concluded thereby and estopped from denying their authority. 5 An. 119; 24 An. 135, 136; 1 Dillon Municipal Corp., 4th Ed., Sec 479.
The district attorney is not plaintiff in this case. He is not the State, but only of counsel for the State; and neither he nor the Attorney General can acquiesce in a judgment adverse to plaintiffs. 25 An. 434; 30 An. 70; 27 An. 819; 29 An. 147; 33 An. 711; State ex rel. Eord vs. Attorney General, 33 An., not reported in full.
Act No. 65 of 1884 is unconstitutional — in any event the Attorney General hadpower to appear herein. 5 N. S. 344; 41 An. 910.
The court will only pronounce a law unconstitutional when it is manifestly so. 3 M. 12; 4 N. S. 138; 3 It. 383; 8 An. 384; 9 An. 562; 20 An. 198, 587.
The title of an act need not be a synopsis of its contents. 37 An. 188.
On a motion to dismiss an appeal the interests of parties appealing can not be inquired into. Their interests and their rights in the litigation must be determined on the trial of the merits. 21 An. 669, 670; 26 An. 42, 43; 30 An. 70, 71; 28 An. 548.
The appeal in this case was regularly granted by motion made in open court; and all the conditions thereof have been complied with.
The appeal was taken to the first ensuing session of the Supreme Court, which had full authority on proper showing made by any counsel in the case to extend the return day. 2 li. 237; 33 An. 712; C. E. 883.
The appearance made by counsel before the Supreme Court at Shreveport, La., was on behalf of all plaintiffs, as appears by said motion. The extension of time and the return of the appeal to New Orleans was proper.
Wm. Sohwing, Clegg & Thorpe and E. N. Pugh for Defendant and Appellee:
Suit under Act 156 of 1868, known as Intrusion- in - Ofiic e Act.
I.
Officers of State are but agents exercising delegated powers.
Special authority to use the name of the State with all its privileges and prerogatives, to appear in judicial proceedings, and to sue or be sued in her behalf is absolutely necessary. O. C. 2997; 9 An. 402; 5 N. 5327; 25 An. 434; 29 An. 774 ; 34 An. 433; 33 An. 510; Ex. parte Drum., 8 C. O. 207; 7 An. 192; 11 Wal. 199.
The Attorney General and district attorney belong to the “judiciary department their powers and duties fixed by Legislature. Const., Arts. 94, 124; Act No. 96 1880; li. S., 131, et seq.; 17 How. 512;;Acts 1862, p. 62, No. 21;H880, No. 6, p. 14; 27 An. 29; Acts 1877, E. S. 109.
When the Constitution or Legislature has made a particular officer the depository of a specified power, neither the court nor any other officer or authority can exercise this power. The exercise of it belongs to the officer and can not be waived. 7 An. 189; 31 An. 837; 51 Texas, State vs. Moore; 5 A. and E. Ency. 712; 18 An. 677; 20 An. 432; 30 An. 954; 31 An. 68,863; 35 An. 196; 21 An. 551; Black Jurisdiction, Secs. 18, 49; 24 How. 508.
“The Intrusion-in-Cffice Act” vests the Attorney General with exclusive jurisdiction in the parish of Orleans alone. District attorneys outside of Orleans have sole control and charge of suits arising under this statute. Whether after trial in court an appeal shall be taken by the State is to be decided by the Attorney General or the district attorney, as the ease may be. This decision is final and conclusive. 82 An. 267; 11 An. 251,227; SB An. 1858; 80 An, 517; 18 An. 195; 3 M 57; 21 How. 508; 133 U. S. 557; 40 An. 854 ; 28 M. 38; 61 Jc., 548 ; 55 Cal. 378 ; 61 Md. 648; 128 U. S, 40; 31 An. 713; 27 An. 169, 458; 30 An. 710; 22 An. 603; 21 An. 323; 18 An. 195; 26 An 83; 164 U. S. 636 ;8N. S. 644; 91 U. S. 340 ; 96 U. S. 535; 13 Pet., 5,11; 9 How. 333; 18 How. 44; 20 How. 6; 13 Wal. 72; 19 Wal. 653; Black Jurisdiction, Sec. 532; 98 N. Y. 222; 11 Pac. Rep. 602; 55 Cal. 375.
The Attorney General in Orleans and the district attorneys outside of Orleans are the only persons who can represent the State in such suits. 18 An. 657; 20 An. 422; 30 An, 954; 35 An. 196; 31 An. 837; 36 An. 903; 32 An. 918; 27 An. 662.
Act 156, special statute, and by this statute alone has the court jurisdiction over the subject matter. Statutes must be strictly followed, taken as a whole or not at all. 83 An. 265; 18 An. 90; 25 An. 15, 268; 28 An. 698; 41 An. 849; Suth. Const. Stat., Secs. 399, 392, 394; Black Jurisdiction, Secs. 14,19; 38 An. 973; 14 An. 187.
The Attorney General has no supervisory control over the district attorney, and if he had it would embrace ministerial duties and not cases where the law itself requires the district attorney to exercise his discretion and judgment. 31 An. 642 ; 6 R. 63; 8 R. 533; 33 An. 267; 133 U. S. 215; 14 An. 251; 24 How. 508; 4 I. C. 327; Black Jurisdiction, Secs. 18, 49; 14 Peters; 18 How. 524.
.14 An. 227; Hew. 835, Nos. 11, Co irt, Art. 90; 31 An. 836; 36 An. 903 ; 32 An, 918; 27 H. 663; 22 Wal. 641; 2 Dal. 409 ; 410 N. District attorneys have a discretion as to entering anol.pros. Could the Attorney General prevent the exercise of this discretion, or could he substitute in case of difference and against the will of the district attorney, his judgment and discretion to that of the district attorneys? Undoubtedly not. 6 R. 63; 8 R. 533; 31 An. 642.
The State not having appealed this litigation ends. No “ interested party ” is before the court. The police jury lays no claims to the office. 33 An. 266; 21 An. 655, 18, 710; 33 An. 784; 25 An. 365; 83 An. 493; 21 An. 712; 25 An. 274; C. Ia. 15; 15 An. 171; 15 An. 507; 23 An. 25, 787; 22 An. 18; 63 N. T. 820; Wait. Y. S., p. 265 ; 34 An. 931. The pleadings fatally defective police jury not a party. 33 An. 630, 706; 33 An. 58. Can not sustain appeal as third parties, ñoras an individual. Sue. of Venard, lately decided; 28 An. 324; 27 An. 820; 21 An. 743; C. P. 571.
No pecuniary interest. 21 An. 743; 32 An. 911; 84 An. 836; 25 An. 17; 26 An. 627; 32 An. 173.
No order of appeal by Vincent individually. Hew. 45, No. 2; 23 An. 543; 24 An. 276; 35 An. 833; 35 An. 935.
Counsel of police jury alone changed time and place of return of this appeal, the State doing nothing. This court exercised original jurisdiction. See. 12, Act 156; Sec. 45 of 1870 ; 2 L. 511; C. P. 514; 22 An. 551; 32 An. 281; 33 An. 131; 35 An. 888, 981; 38 An. 905 ; 40 An. 297; 37 An. 709 ; 43 An. 130; 32 An. 119.
Act of 1874 unconstitutional, body not covered by title. Court Art. 29, 33 An. 67; 5 An. 94; 6 An. 605; 42 An. 142; 44 An. 90.
This act, if relied on, is set up and in this court, and for tile first time, the Attorney General taking no part, heretofore never having appeared in District Court. 37 An. 504.

Opinion:
On Motion to Dismiss Appeal.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
Watkins, J.
The several grounds assigned in defendant's motion need not be enumerated, but may be stated and decided seriatim more conveniently.
The first in order is that there are no proper parties to this appeal. It appears that the district attorney, who filed suit and represented the State as relator and party plaintiff, declined to prosecute an ap - peal from the judgment rendered in favor of the defendant, and the Attorney General applied for and obtained an order of appeal, and has appeared in this court personally and by brief, in connection with other counsel, and represented the State; and the argument is, that the State of Louisiana, the only real plaintiff, has'not appealed, and that the acts of the,Attorney General are ultra vires, because " in this particular instance he was and is entirely without power, right or authority to stand in judgment for his principal, the State."
We are clearly of the opinion that this objection is untenable. It does not appertain to the status of the appeal, but the status of the cause.
The suit was properly instituted by the district attorney as relator, personating the State; but, forsooth, he declined to prosecute an appeal from the judgment therein rendered, it does not follow that he ceased for that reason to be the relator; nor does it follow that because the Attorney General did prosecute an appeal that he became or attempted to assume the position or capacity of relator.
While it is not doubted that the Attorney General had no power or authority in law to institute suit as relator, it is equally clear and undoubted that he has the capacity to appear in this court and represent the interest of the State in any given controversy. The duties of that officer are particularly defined in the Revised Statutes, and they declare, inter alios, " that he shall appear for the State in she Supreme Oourt sitting in New Orleans, and prosecute and defend all appeals in cases criminal or civil in which the State may be a party or interested." Revised Statutes, Sec. 131 (italics ours).
This authority is supplemented by a more recent statute, which empowers him " to institute and prosecute any and all suits he may deem necessary for the protection of the interests of the State." Sec. 1, Act 65 of 1884.
There is no question of the authority of the Attorney General under those statutes to prosecute the present appeal, and that power and authority necessarily draw to them authority and power to obtain an order of appeal.
It is clear that the quoted precepts of the written law furnish a complete answer to defendant's contention. In prosecuting an appeal in such a case as this the Attorney General does not attempt to personate the State as relator. The district attorney does not, on that account, cease to be relator. The situation and attitude of the parties, respectively, remain the same as they at first existed in the District Oourt. There is not properly presented, in the motion to dismiss, any question of the capacity of the Attorney General to stand in judgment. But it is quite clear that he could not. And, in so far as the right of the district attorney to join the police jury as party plaintiff is concerned, its determination must be postponed to the consideration of the merits.
The second ground of objection is that this court was without power to so change the place at which this appeal is to be heard and determined as to transfer the cause from Shreveport, where the order of appeal made same returnable, to the city of New Orleans for trial and decision.
The order of court transferring this cause from Shreveport to New Orleans was evidently made upon the theory that the parties had consented to such transfer.
The record discloses that at our recently adjourned term at Shreveport the plaintiffs requested, in a written motion to that effect, "that the return day be extended and made returnable to the next regular session of this court in New Orleans and on the 21st of November, 1892."
The reason assigned for this extension was that it was necessary to enable the clerk to complete the transcript, and in verification thereof the clerk of the court of Calcasieu furnished proper certificate.
Upon this paper is this endorsement, viz.: " Reserving any and all right to dispute the right or manner of appeal, the legality thereof and all rights under the law to have the appeal dismissed, we admit," etc.
We can not construe this endorsement as reserving to defendant any right to dismiss the appeal on the ground stated. If not consented to in express terms the transfer of the cause was impliedly consented to. Otherwise the admission was meaningless.
But in any event this can furnish no ground for the dismissal of the appeal, for, if defendant be correct in his interpretation of the waiver, his only right would have been to move for the re-transfer of the cause to Shreveport for trial, as having been improperly removed therefrom. In this respect the motion is not well grounded.
These are, substantially, the only grounds on which the defendant appears to place reliance, because they are the only ones argued in brief; hence all others may be treated as having been abandoned.
There is no merit in the motion, and it is therefore denied.