Case Name: Alfredo APOLINAR, et al. v. PROFESSIONAL CONSTRUCTION SERVICES, INC.
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1997-05-07
Citations: 694 So. 2d 537
Docket Number: No. 96-CA-1492
Parties: Alfredo APOLINAR, et al. v. PROFESSIONAL CONSTRUCTION SERVICES, INC.
Judges: Before BARRY, LOBRANO, PLOTKIN, WALTZER and MURRAY, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 694
Pages: 537–547

Head Matter:
Alfredo APOLINAR, et al. v. PROFESSIONAL CONSTRUCTION SERVICES, INC.
No. 96-CA-1492.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fourth Circuit.
May 7, 1997.
Dwight W. Norton and Bernard V. Davis, Metairie, for Plaintiff/Appellant Alfredo Apo-linar.
Robert E. Leake, Jr., Donald E. McKay, Jr., Leake & Andersson, New Orleans, for Defendant/Appellee Professional Construction Services, Inc.
Before BARRY, LOBRANO, PLOTKIN, WALTZER and MURRAY, JJ.

Opinion:
hMURRAY, Judge.
Plaintiffs, five employees of Professional Construction Services, Inc. (PCS), appeal both the trial court's refusal to certify this proceeding as a class action as well as a denial of their motion to compel discovery. In the exercise of our supervisory jurisdiction, we reverse both judgments and remand with instructions for further proceedings.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Alfredo Apolinar filed this suit in June 1994, seeking unpaid overtime wages plus interest, penalties and attorney fees under La. R.S. 23:631 et seq., claiming that PCS had failed to comply with an overtime provision in its public works contract for a certain project. Mr. Apolinar alleged that laborers were paid overtime on the project only if they worked more than forty hours a week, but PCS's contract specified that overtime would also be paid when an employee worked more than eight hours a day. Because the project's workweek allegedly consisted of four ten-hour days, Mr. Apolinar claimed that overtime pay was owed |2to himself as well as "all other laborers and mechanics" who had worked for PCS on that project. PCS's initial defense to the claim, that the contractual provision was ineffective because its inclusion in the bid specifications was illegal, was ultimately rejected by the Supreme Court, and the matter was remanded for further trial court proceedings. Apolinar v. Professional Const. Serv., 95-0746 (La.11/27/95), 66B So.2d 17.
When the matter was returned to district court, an amending petition was filed to add Alan Therence as a named plaintiff and to obtain class certification based upon the allegation that "in excess of 60 persons" also were entitled to the same relief. PCS opposed certification as a class action, arguing that neither the numerosity nor common character requirements were met. In support of its opposition, PCS submitted the affidavit of Edward J. Abate, Jr., its vice-president. The affidavit attested to Mr. Abate's ability to easily identify, by name, address, employee number and social security number, each employee who worked for PCS as a laborer on the project at issue. The affidavit also attested to Mr. Abate's personal knowledge of the number and identity of each employee who worked on the project at issue as an hourly employee as laborer or mechanic, and the number of hours and on what dates each employee worked. Attached to this affidavit was a computer printout showing weekly pay data for 136 different employee numbers. Neither the affidavit nor the computer list indicates how many, or how few, of the 136 laborers worked over eight hours on any day during the project, which appears to have ended in February 1994.
IgAfter submission of additional memoran-da by both parties, a hearing was held during which the trial court noted:
I read your memos, I don't think it's appropriate for a class action at this point. Now if there is — you all go back and look, he is giving you what he has, he knows them by name, give them to him, if you can figure it out. At this point it is not right for class action. I understand your argument, some people may be left out, that happens every day whenever somebody claims to be a part of a group of people are effected [sic], I mean sure, I just don't see it at this point, and I am not going to certify a class at this point. [Emphasis added.]
In response to this statement, plaintiffs' counsel offered testimony from the named plaintiffs to establish that they were aware of 70 to 80 other employees who they believed were in the same situation as they. The trial court refused to permit this evidence, stating:
They can bring their own action. I am not going to certify a class, if it gets down to a bunch of them file their suits and they all get consolidated_ But what I am saying is I am not going to certify it as a class today. If I get — the cases get filed and there are a bunch of them I may end up having to do it, but I don't see it today. I am not going to certify the class today.
A written judgment denying class certification was entered on April 4,1996.
Relying on the portions of the court's remarks highlighted above, plaintiffs' counsel moved on April 11,1996 to compel responses to his prior discovery requests for identifying information and payroll data concerning other employees who might be owed overtime. In opposition, PCS argued that because class action status was refused, the requested information was "irrelevant, immaterial and not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence." The defendant further contended that production of the information would violate its employees' privacy rights and its own right to proprietary information necessary to maintaining a competitive advantage; would be overly burdensome and |4expensive; and "is being requested solely for the purpose of recruiting and soliciting these individuals so as to 'create' a class."
After oral arguments, the trial court denied the motion to compel because "[i]f there's no class action, he is not required to give you the names." It was again emphasized that there was no need to certify a class because the employees were identifiable from their time sheets and because plaintiffs' counsel had not established that the workers did not know they might be entitled to addi tional wages. After entry of a written judgment on May 22, 1996, plaintiffs filed the instant appeal, challenging both judgments.
DISCUSSION
1. Jurisdiction
PCS contends that this court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal because both judgments at issue are interlocutory and the plaintiffs have not alleged irreparable harm. This court, however, may review such interlocutory matters under its supervisory jurisdiction, La.Const. art. V, § 10(A), and we do so here. See Cotton v. Gaylord Chemical Corp., 96-2426 (La.10/25/96), 680 So.2d 1187.
2. Class certification
A class action may be instituted when the persons constituting the class are so numerous as to make it impracticable for all of them to join or be joined as parties, and the character of the right sought to be enforced for or against the members of the class is common to all members of the class. La.Code Civ.Proc.Ann. art. 691. The class action is nothing more than a procedural mechanism designed to efficiently and economically manage large numbers of claims in which common issues predominate over individual issues. Stevens v. Board of Trustees of Police Pension Fund, 309 So.2d 144, 151 (La.1975). The sole consideration for a trial court in ruling on certification, and for this court in reviewing that ruling, is whether the case at bar is one in which the procedural device of a class action is appropriate. Although a trial court's determination on this issue will not be reversed absent manifest error, the flexibility provided under Article 593.1 of the Code of Civil Procedure weighs in favor of class certification because the decision may be modified at a later time. McCastle v. Rollins Environmental Serv., 456 So.2d 612, 620 (La.1984); Dumont v. Charles Schwab & Co., Inc., 95-2010, p. 3 (La.App. 4th Cir. 2/29/96), 670 So.2d 548, 549.
A. Numerosity
In this case, PCS contends that its employee list establishes that there were "only" 136 laborers who worked on this project, and only five have come forward to claim additional wages under the contract. It is further argued that, as in O'Halleron v. L.E.C., Inc., 471 So.2d 752 (La.App. 1st Cir.1985), and Phillips v. Orleans Parish School Bd., 541 So.2d 226 (La.App. 4th Cir.1989), all members of the potential class are identifiable, thus obviating the need for a class action to adjudicate these claims. Because of the limited number of actual claimants and the lack of evidence concerning others who may have been underpaid, the defendant asserts that the numerosity requirement for class certification is not met.
There is no magic number that will satisfy the numerosity requirement for class certification. What is required is "a class so numerous that joinder is impracticable." McCastle at 616. The numerosity element does not depend upon whether or not the plaintiffs can identify all potential class members; difficulty in identifying the claimants is but one factor which makes joinder difficult. Id. at 16620. Instead, class certification requires a definable group of claimants whose joinder is otherwise impractical. Spitzfaden v. Dow Corning Corp., 619 So.2d 795, 798 (La.App. 4th Cir.), writs denied, 624 So.2d 1236-37 (La.1993). In Stevens, for example, the Supreme Court found that a potential class of approximately one hundred members, located throughout this state and elsewhere, justified consideration of class proceedings for refunds of former employees' pension contributions.
The only evidence considered by the court below, the computer printout, establishes that 136 laborers were employed by PCS under the contract at issue. While the defendant maintains that the plaintiffs failed to carry their burden of proof as to which of these employees are owed additional wages, this information is exclusively within PCS's control. PCS has offered an affidavit that establishes that it easily could determine from its records exactly how many of its hourly laborers who worked more than eight hours in any one day were not paid overtime. Despite its admitted ability to do so, PCS has offered nothing to rebut the obvious inference that these laborers, like the five named plaintiffs, were not paid overtime when they worked more than eight hours in any one day. Compare, e.g., Carter v. Benson Automotive Co., Inc., 94-158, 94-261, p. 1 (La.App. 5th Cir. 9/27/94), 643 So.2d 1314, 1315 (defendant's affidavit explaining that only eighteen potential class members existed was sufficient to defeat class certification). Instead, PCS has been adamant in its refusal to provide the information that would allow a definitive determination as to the number of laborers who worked more than eight hours in any one day and were not paid overtime as required by its contract. This situation is thus distinguishable from those presented in O'Haileron and Phillips, relied upon by PCS here. In both of 17those cases, information provided by the defendant demonstrated that the actual number of potential claimants was less than fifty. In contrast, the record before us establishes that the potential class consists of as many as 136 claimants.
Additionally, joinder must be impractical, not impossible, in order to satisfy the numerosity requirement. Although PCS represents that its records reflect local addresses for all of the employees listed, it has refused to divulge how many, or even if any, of these workers are still employed by it. In view of the length of time that has elapsed since this project was completed as well as the itinerant nature of employment as a laborer, it cannot be assumed that all class members remain in this geographic area. On these preliminary facts, a class action appears to be the appropriate procedural mechanism to handle 136 potential claims.
B. Common character
PCS contends that the common character requirement for class certification is not met here because "[a] class action is not needed to prevent inconsistent judicial determinations or uniformity of decisions" since all any plaintiff need do is prove the number of hours worked in excess of eight on any day. It is further argued that the fact that only five claims have been thus far filed indicates that class proceedings will not contribute to judicial efficiency above what can be accomplished through joinder.
The common character element for class certification requires that there be a relationship between the claims of the purported class members greater than simply a sharing of a common question of law or fact. Stevens, 309 So.2d at 150. |8This has been interpreted to require that questions of law or fact common to the class members predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that the class action be superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. State ex rel. Guste v. General Motors Corp., 370 So.2d 477, 489 (La.1978). As Justice Tate noted in Stevens, this limits the use of the class action procedural device "to occasions where the class action will be clearly more useful than other available procedures for definitive determination of a common-based right, if such definitive determination in the single proceedings should be afforded in the interests of the parties (including both the class and the opponent[s] to it) and of the efficient operation of the judicial system.'' Stevens, 309 So.2d at 151.
In this case, PCS appears to argue that because the issue of law concerning the entitlement to overtime under the contract has already been decided, potential class members no longer share a common-based right, but only need to establish the amount of their individual claims. However, the defendant has ignored the remaining issue of law presented by the pleadings, which is the plaintiffs' entitlement under La.R.S. 23:632 to penalties and attorney fees for PCS's failure to make timely payment of all wages due. This question is common to all potential class members and, in fact, now predominates over the issue of the amount of the individual claims. Furthermore, use of a class action to decide whether La.R.S. 23:632 applies and, if so, whether PCS has an equitable defense to the imposition or amount of penalties due, would prevent inconsistent results in adjudicating claims of the affected laborers. See, e.g., Boudreaux v. Hamilton Medical Group, Inc., 94-0879 (La.10/17/94), 644 So.2d 619; Thomas v. Orleans Private Industry Council, Inc., 95-1577 (La.App. 4th Cir. 2/15/96), 669 So.2d 1275, writ denied, 96-0686 (La.4/26/96), 672 So.2d 671.
Judicial efficiency would also be served by class proceedings in this case because evidence relevant to these questions need be presented only once, yet the determination would be binding as to all in the class. Accordingly, the common character necessary for preliminary certification of a class has been established in this case.
Because the parties have not raised the adequacy of representation, the remaining requirement for class certification, we need not address that question.
3. Discovery
PCS argues, and the trial court held, that unless and until plaintiffs establish that the requirements for class certification are met, no discovery concerning the identity of potential class members or the value of the claims involved would be permitted. However, this decision is manifestly erroneous and was a clear abuse of the trial court's discretion.
When the issue of class certification is raised, .some showing beyond the pleadings is generally required concerning the issues of numerosity, common character, and adequate representation. Stevens, 309 So.2d at 152-53. As explained above, the plaintiffs in this case have presented a prima facie case for certification, but the information necessary to define the class and to identify and notify potential members is within the defendant's exclusive control. Such information is clearly relevant to these proceedings, as it is reasonably calculated to lead to evidence admissible on the certification issue. See, e.g., Holloway v. City of Alexandria, 506 So.2d 234 (La.App. 3d Cir.1987). Therefore, PCS must be required to make this information available to plaintiffs' counsel.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons assigned, the judgments below are reversed. The case is remanded to the trial court to enter a preliminary order of class certification defining the class, and to formulate a case management order that would include provisions for notification to class members. The parties are to be permitted full discovery of all information relevant to these issues, subject to necessary and appropriate protective orders. Professional Construction Services, Inc., is to pay the costs of this appeal.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
BARRY, J., dissents with reasons.
WALTZER, J., concurs with reasons.
. On May 21, 1996, a second amending petition was filed, adding three more named plaintiffs but raising no additional issues of law.
. The number 134 appears in the parties' briefs and oral arguments. However, this court's review of the printout shows that there are 136 employee numbers listed.
. In Phillips, it was determined that 32 people fell within the defined class; in O'Halleron, two separate classes were found to consist of 32 and 49 members, respectively.
. Although plaintiffs' counsel suggested that testimony would establish there were generally only 70 or 80 laborers working on this project for ten hours each day, four days each week, the trial court refused this offer of proof.
. At the May 17, 1996 hearing, defense counsel made it clear that PCS had offered to pay the actual wages due, but disputed the fact that anyone was entitled to anything more.