Case Name: Harvey OWENS, Appellant, v. GEORGIA PACIFIC CORPORATION, Appellee
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1988-10-26
Citations: 535 So. 2d 990
Docket Number: No. 19672-CA
Parties: Harvey OWENS, Appellant, v. GEORGIA PACIFIC CORPORATION, Appellee.
Judges: Before HALL, C.J., and MARVIN, JASPER E. JONES, FRED W. JONES, Jr. and SEXTON, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 535
Pages: 990–997-999

Head Matter:
Harvey OWENS, Appellant, v. GEORGIA PACIFIC CORPORATION, Appellee.
No. 19672-CA.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Second Circuit.
Oct. 26, 1988.
Murphy J. White, Mansfield, for appellant.
Plummer, Means & Burgess by Robert E. Plummer, Mansfield, for appellee.
Before HALL, C.J., and MARVIN, JASPER E. JONES, FRED W. JONES, Jr. and SEXTON, JJ.

Opinion:
FRED W. JONES, Jr., Judge.
Plaintiff appealed a judgment rejecting his demands for worker's compensation benefits, for wrongful termination, penalties and attorney fees. For the following reasons, we affirm.
On May 29, 1983, the plaintiff was employed as an operator on the glue line at the Georgia-Pacific Plant in Logansport on the graveyard shift. During the ten minute break around midnight, plaintiff started to the restroom. Hurrying down the stairs, he slipped and fell after stepping in glue water on the floor at the foot of the staircase, striking the back of his shoulders and head.
After supervisory personnel arrived at the scene of the accident, plaintiff was taken to the first-aid room where ice was applied to his back. He was instructed to go to the office of Dr. Dillard, a general practitioner in Mansfield, the company doctor, the next morning.
Dr. Dillard's medical records indicated that he examined plaintiff on June 2, 1983 for the injury resulting from the slip-and-fall accident. The physician testified that plaintiff had no external signs of injury, but complained of pain to his right upper back and shoulder. After prescribing a mild muscle relaxer, Dr. Dillard instructed plaintiff to rest a couple of days and return to work on June 6, 1983.
Defendant's personnel manager telephoned plaintiff and instructed him to come to the plant on June 6,1983. Upon complying with the order, plaintiff was asked if he could work. When plaintiff refused to return to work because he was "still under the doctor", he was fired for excessive absenteeism. According to the record, plaintiff had a history of absenteeism and had received several documented warnings.
On June 7, 1983, plaintiff consulted and began treatment with Dr. Kelly, a Mansfield chiropractor. Plaintiff asserted that he took this action because the prescription given to him by Dr. Dillard did not relieve his pain. Dr. Kelly, who treated plaintiff over a period of several months, testified that his patient had received serious injuries to his back as a result of the accident. This opinion was based on subjective findings as well as objective observation of muscle spasms. The chiropractor did not believe plaintiff was able to return to work until October 5, 1983.
Two other medical experts, Dr. J.A. Smith, orthopedic surgeon, and Dr. John Greer, radiologist, after examining medical reports and X-rays taken by Dr. Kelly, supported defendant's position that plaintiff should have been able to return to work when discharged by Dr. Dillard.
Plaintiff argued that he was entitled to worker's compensation benefits until he was discharged by Dr. Kelly. Plaintiff's testimony concerning his complaints of pain and disability was corroborated by that of his wife.
In a written opinion the trial court made the following findings of fact:
1) Plaintiff slipped and fell while working for Georgia-Pacific on or about May 29, 1983.
2) On June 2, 1983 plaintiff first saw Dr. Dillard.
3) Dr. Dillard, who had treated plaintiff on numerous occasions in the past, diagnosed the injury as a minor strain or sprain to the neck and shoulder area, treated the patient conservatively and concluded he could return to work on June 6, 1983.
4) Dr. Dillard communicated with the employer and advised plaintiff was free to return to work on June 6, 1983.
5) Plaintiff returned to work on or about June 6, 1983, informed his supervisor he could not perform a required, work-related task and was terminated.
6) Plaintiff was seen by Dr. Kelly, who treated him for five months and released him to return to work.
Concluding that plaintiff had failed to discharge his burden of proving disability or wrongful termination, the trial court dismissed his demands. Plaintiff appealed, contending the trial erred in 1) denying worker's compensation benefits from May 29, 1983 to October 5, 1983 and 2) ruling plaintiff was not entitled to penalties and interest under La.R.S. 23:1361 for wrongful termination.
It is a well settled legal principle that the trial court's factual findings in workmen's compensation cases are entitled to great weight. Ducote v. J.A. Jones Construction Co., 471 So.2d 704 (La.1985); Crump v. Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co., 367 So.2d 300 (La.1979); Green v. Jackson Rapid Delivery Service, 506 So.2d 1345 (La.App.2d Cir.1987). A reasonable evaluation of credibility and reasonable inferences of fact should not be disturbed even though the appellate court may feel that its own evaluations and inferences are as reasonable. This reasoning is based upon the trial court's greater opportunity and capacity to evaluate live witnesses as compared with the appellate court's access to only a cold record. Ducote, supra; Cadiere v. West Gibson Products Co., 364 So.2d 998 (La.1978).
La.R.S. 23:1317 requires that all findings of fact must be based on competent evidence. The appellate court may not overturn a finding of fact made by a trial court unless there is clear error, particularly where the weight of evidence involves credibility determinations. Louisiana Hospital Association Workmen's Compensation Group Self Insurance Fund v. Auguillard, 503 So.2d 1118 (La.App.3d Cir.1987); Ducote, supra.
The trial court is obligated to make a judgment call as to the motive of the employer in discharging the employee and this determination should not be disturbed upon appeal absent manifest error. Turner v. Winn Dixie Louisiana, Inc., 474 So.2d 966 (La.App.5th Cir.1985), writ denied 478 So.2d 147 (La.1985).
In a compensation case, the trial court has the responsibility of determining whether or not the claimant is disabled. Johnson v. Ins. Co. of N. America, 454 So.2d 1113 (La.1984). It is the function of the trial court to assess the weight to be accorded both the medical and lay testimony in order to make its determination on the question of disability. Simpson v. S.S. Kresge Co., 389 So.2d 65 (La.1980). The trial court may accept or reject the opinion of a physician or medical expert depending upon what impression the qualifications, credibility and testimony of that expert makes on the court. Westley v. Pressure Services, Inc., 452 So.2d 354 (La.App.1st Cir.1984); Green, supra.
In this case, as in Barry, supra, the plaintiff was released by the treating physician before going to a chiropractor. In Barry the court found that considering the record as a whole, the trial court was not clearly wrong in its determination that the plaintiff should not be awarded medical expenses for the chiropractic services she received. In this case, both Dr. Greer, a radiologist, and Dr. Smith, an orthopedist, could find no objective evidence that the allegations made by the chiropractor were accurate.
The finding of disability within the framework of the worker's compensation law is a legal rather than a purely medical determination. Calhoun v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Companies, 437 So.2d 900 (La. App.2d Cir.1983); Barry v. Western Electric Co., Inc., 485 So.2d 83 (La.App.2d Cir.1986), writ denied 487 So.2d 441 (La.1986); Green v. Jackson Rapid Delivery Service, supra.
A claimant may not prove permanent disability by asserting only a subjective belief that the claimant is unable to work. Johnson v. Monroe Pulpwood Co. Inc., 505 So.2d 862 (La.App.2d Cir.1987). The claimant has the burden of proving to a legal certainty, and by a reasonable preponderance of the evidence, the nature and extent of a disability. Campbell v. Luke Const. Co., 465 So.2d 688 (La.1985); Bar ry, supra; Green, supra. Dr. Kelly stated that he found objective indications that the claimant suffered the injuries he described. However, neither Dr. Dillard, Dr. Smith, nor Dr. Greer could find any objective findings of injuries.
The trial court evaluated all of the medical and lay testimony and found that plaintiff had not proven he was unable to return to work June 6, 1983. We cannot say the trial court was clearly wrong.
The record shows that plaintiff was not able to work from May 29 to June 6. However, La.R.S. 23:1224 provides:
No compensation shall be paid for the first week after the injury is received; provided, that in cases where disability from injury continues for six weeks or longer after date of the accident, compensation for the first week shall be paid after the first six weeks have elapsed.
Since plaintiff was only disabled for one week, he is not entitled to worker's compensation benefits for this period.
Wrongful Termination
The legislature has provided a remedy for an employee who suffers a retaliatory discharge following his filing of a worker's compensation claim in La.R.S. 23:1361, which provides in part:
C. Any person who has been denied employment or discharged from employment in violation of the provisions of this Section shall be entitled to recover from the employer or prospective employer a civil penalty which shall be the equivalent of the amount the employee would have earned but for the discrimination based on the starting salary of the position sought or the earnings of the employee at the time of the discharge, as the case may be, but not more than one year's earnings, together with a reasonable attorney's fee.
The purpose of the anti-discrimination statute is to prevent unjust dismissals and to allow employees to exercise their right to worker's compensation benefits without fear of retaliatory action by their employer. The supreme court has interpreted this statute as a penal statute because it seeks to provide a remedy against an employer for one year's wages if the employer has violated its provisions. Ducote, supra. This court has mandated that since the statute is penal, it must be strictly construed. Guye v. International Paper Co. Inc., 488 So.2d 1108 (La.App.2d Cir.1986); Rambin v. Louisiana Downs, Inc., 482 So.2d 916 (La.App.2d Cir.1986).
La.R.S. 23:1361 creates a civil cause of action as to which the normal civil burden of proof applies. Meyer v. State, Department of Public Safety, 312 So.2d 289 (La.1975). The plaintiff has the burden of proving a violation of La.R.S. 23:1361. Rambin, supra. He must prove that he was discharged from his job solely for the reason that he asserted a claim for Louisiana Worker's Compensation benefits. Moore v. McDermott, Inc., 481 So.2d 602 (La.1986), republished 494 So.2d 1159 (La. 1986). Proof by a preponderance of evidence requires that, taking the evidence as a whole, it shows the fact or cause sought to be proved more probable than not. Moore, supra; Marcotte v. Travelers Insurance Company, 258 La. 989, 249 So.2d 105 (1971).
In Moore there was no evidence of prior reprimands for excessive absences. There the claimant proved three points: he asserted a claim for worker's compensation; he was fired on the very day he purportedly had been told he was medically and physically capable of returning to work; and, most significantly, the company's division personnel administrator testified that compensation claimants were consistently treated differently from other employees who had simply missed a day of work.
No evidence presented here showed that the employer treated persons filing worker's compensation claims differently from other persons missing periods of work. In Locksey v. Capitol Mfg. Co., 517 So.2d 1102 (La.App.3d Cir.1987), the court found that where an employee was called by her employer on the day she was discharged by her doctor and told to return to work and she was not terminated until missing work for three days after the date of release by the doctor, the employer was not held to have wrongfully terminated the employee. There the employee had gone to another doctor for treatment after the release date and before she was officially fired.
In this case, the documentations for excessive absences had all occurred before the accident. See Guye, supra, where the documentation was all accomplished after the accident. No evidence indicated that the employer's attitude changed abruptly after the accident.
The plaintiff provided no evidence that he had filed or that his employer knew he intended to file a worker's compensation claim.
We cannot say the trial court erred in holding plaintiff failed to prove wrongful termination.
Conclusion
For the reasons explained, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED, at appellant's cost.
MARVIN, J., dissents in part, concurs in part, and assigns written reasons.
SEXTON, J., dissents in part and concurs in part for the reasons assigned by MARVIN, J.
HALL, C.J., dissents and assigns written reasons.
This case was assigned to a five judge panel pursuant to La. Const. Art. 5, § 8(B).