Case Name: Richard BLEVINS v. HAMILTON MEDICAL CENTER, INC. d/b/a Southwest Medical Center-Lafayette
Court: Louisiana Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 2007-06-29
Citations: 959 So. 2d 440
Docket Number: No. 2007-CC-127
Parties: Richard BLEVINS v. HAMILTON MEDICAL CENTER, INC. d/b/a Southwest Medical Center-Lafayette.
Judges: VICTORY, J., dissents for the reasons assigned by WEIMER, J.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 959
Pages: 440–450

Head Matter:
Richard BLEVINS v. HAMILTON MEDICAL CENTER, INC. d/b/a Southwest Medical Center-Lafayette.
No. 2007-CC-127.
Supreme Court of Louisiana.
June 29, 2007.

Opinion:
KNOLL, Justice.
J^This personal injury claim concerns a suit against a private hospital for injuries allegedly sustained when a hospital bed moved causing plaintiff to lose his balance and fall. The issue presented is whether plaintiffs claims fall within the Louisiana Medical Malpractice Act ("LMMA").
At the same time plaintiff filed his petition, he contemporaneously requested a medical review panel based upon the same allegations in his petition. Before any discovery was conducted, the defendant hospital filed a dilatory exception of prematurity on the basis that the medical review panel had not yet deliberated. The district court denied the exception in part and sustained the exception in part, finding three of the allegations pertaining to the hospital bed sounded in general negligence, while the remaining six allegations sounded in medical malpractice, and severed the non-medical malpractice claims, from the medical malpractice ones. The court of appeal reversed, sustaining the exception as to all of the allegations. We granted writs to address the correctness vel non of the court of appeal, i.e., whether the three allegations regarding plaintiffs hospital bed sound in general negligence or fall within the parameters of the LMMA. Richard Blevins v. Hamilton Medical Center, Inc., 07-0127 (La.3/23/07), 951 So.2d 1103. For the following reasons, we findhthese allegations sound in general negligence and reverse the judgment of the court of appeal.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
This civil case originated with a petition for damages filed by plaintiff, Richard Blevins, in the Fifteenth Judicial District Court for the Parish of Lafayette on January 19, 2006, naming as defendant, Hamilton Medical Center, Inc., d/b/a Southwest Medical Center-Lafayette ("SMC"). In his petition for damages, plaintiff alleged that on or about January 11, 2005, he was admitted to SMC for incision and drainage of an infected wound of his left groin. On January 17, 2005, while still a recuperating patient at defendant's facility, plaintiff fell in his room when his hospital bed rolled as he attempted to get out of the bed to use a bedside commode. With the movement of the bed, plaintiff lost his balance and fell, causing a tear of the meniscus of his right knee.
In his petition, plaintiff also stated he had filed a request for a medical review panel to review the conduct of those individuals who participated and/or furnished medical care to plaintiff during his hospitalization with regard to his fall of January 17, 2005, and who were covered under the provisions of the LMMA. Plaintiff further alleged that his fall was also proximately caused by the negligence and fault of defendant SMC in the following non-exclusive respects:
(a)Failing to properly monitor and provide adequate and necessary care to plaintiff;
(b)Failing to exercise the requisite amount of care toward a patient that the particular patient's condition required;
(c)Failing to protect a patient from the dangers that may result from the patient's physical and mental incapacities, as well as from external circumstances particularly within the hospital's control;
(d) Failing to have in force adequate policies, procedures and equipment to safeguard and prevent falls of patients such as plaintiff;
|s(e)Failing to exercise a reasonable degree of skill and competence possessed and required of hospitals;
(©Failing to furnish the patient with diligent and skillful care; and
(g)Failing to furnish patient with equipment in proper working condition;
(h)Failing to keep the patient's bed in the lowest position with the wheels locked; and
©Failing to properly instruct the patient on proper use of and safety with regard to his bed.
SMC, a qualified health care provider pursuant to the LMMA, filed a dilatory exception of prematurity to plaintiffs petition for damages on the basis that plaintiffs allegations raised in his petition for damages were identical to the allegations he raised in his request for a medical review panel, which panel had not yet deliberated nor rendered an opinion concerning the matter, and therefore, the lawsuit was premature. Plaintiff answered that while some of his allegations fell within the purview of the LMMA, the district court was at liberty to determine which of plaintiffs allegations fell outside the LMMA's provisions and allow plaintiff to proceed in district court on those allegations of ordinary negligence.
The district court heard argument on defendant's exception and granted the exception as to the medical malpractice allegations (a) through (f), but denied the exception as to allegations (g) through (i), as those allegations sounded in ordinary negligence. By dismissing plaintiffs claims alleged in (a) through (f), the district court severed the malpractice claims from the ordinary negligence claims.
SMC applied for supervisory writs from the district court's denial of its exception of prematurity as to allegations (g) through (i). A five-judge panel of the Third Circuit Court of Appeal, with three judges signing, granted the writ and made it peremptory, reasoning:
{4The claims raised by Respondent are properly raised under the Medical Malpractice Act. La.R.S. 40:1299.41; Taylor v. Christus Health Southwestern Louisiana, 04-627 (La.App. 3 Cir. 11/10/04), 886 So.2d 696. Accordingly, we find error in the judgment rendered below and reverse. Relator's exception of prematurity is maintained, and Respondent's petition is dismissed without prejudice, at his cost.
Richard Blevins v. Hamilton Medical Center, Inc., 06-01270, p. 1 (La.App. 3 Cir. 12/22/06). Two judges dissented, with the following language:
We disagree with the majority opinion because the faulty equipment at issue is not intricately connected to the medical care provided by the hospital. Taylor v. Christus Health Southwestern Louisiana, 04-627 (La.App. 3 Cir. ll/10/04).[,] 866[886] So.2d 696 (Cooks, J., concurring). We would therefore deny the writ application as there was no error in the trial court's ruling.
Blevins, 06-01270 at p. 1. We granted plaintiffs writ application to address the correctness of the appellate court's decision regarding the hospital bed claims contained in allegations (g) through (i) of the petition.
LAW AND DISCUSSION
The dilatory exception of prematurity provided in La.Code Civ. Proc. art. 926 questions whether the cause of action has matured to the point where it is ripe for judicial determination as an action is premature when it is brought before the right to enforce it has accrued. Williamson v. Hospital Service Dist. No. 1 of Jefferson, 04-0451, p. 4 (La.12/1/04), 888 So.2d 782, 785(finding alleged negligence of hospital in failing to repair wheelchair and in failing to make sure that wheelchair was in proper working condition did not arise from "medical malpractice"); Sprad- lin v. Acadia-St. Landry Medical Foundation, 98-1977, p. 4 (La.2/29/00), 758 So.2d 116, 119(alleged patient "dumping" case sounded in malpractice). Under the LMMA, a medical malpractice claim against a private qualified health care provider is subject to dismissal on a timely filed exception of prematurity if such claim has not first been reviewed by a pre-suit medical review panel. Williamson, 04-0451 at p. 4, 888 So.2d at 785; La.Rev. Stat. 40:1299.47(A). This exception is the proper procedural mechanism for a qualified health care provider to invoke when a medical malpractice plaintiff has failed to submit the claim for decision by a medical review panel before filing suit against the provider. Spradlin, 98-1977 at p. 4, 758 So.2d at 119; La.Code Civ. Proc. art. 926; Frank L. Maraist & Harry T. Lemmon, 1 Louisiana Civil Law Treatise, Civil Procedure § 6.6, 116 (West 1999). In such situations, the exception of prematurity neither challenges nor attempts to defeat any of the elements of the plaintiffs cause of action. Spradlin, 98-1977 at p. 4, 758 So.2d at 119; Maraist & Lemmon, supra. Rather, the defendant asserts that the plaintiff has failed to take some preliminary step necessary to make the controversy ripe for judicial involvement. Spradlin, 98-1977 at p. 4, 758 So.2d at 119; Maraist & Lemmon, supra. The burden of proving prematurity is on the exceptor, in this case the defendant health care provider, who must show that it is entitled to a medical review panel because the allegations fall within the LMMA. Williamson, 04-0451 at p. 4, 888 So.2d at 785.
While the grounds for the exception of prematurity clearly arise out of the LMMA's procedural requirement that a medical malpractice claim must first be reviewed by a medical review panel before the commencement of litigation, the dilatory exception of prematurity, which "merely retards the progress of the action," must be tried in the district court. La.Code Civ. Proc. arts. 923, 926 & 929. Moreover, unlike our Code of Civil Procedure, the LMMA provides no procedure for the trying of the exception before a medical review panel. See La.Code Civ. Proc. art. 929. Therefore, despite SMC's contention to the contrary, whether the matter should proceed to a review panel is a determination for the courts in the trial of the exception of prematurity, and not the yet to be convened panel.
| ^Moreover, this court has, without exception, emphasized that the LMMA and its limitations on tort liability for a qualified health care provider apply strictly to claims "arising from medical malpractice," and that all other tort liability on the part of the qualified health care provider is governed by general tort law. Coleman v. Deno, 01-1517, pp. 15-16 (La.1/25/02), 813 So.2d 303, 315(finding claim for alleged wrongful transfer from one emergency room to another of patient whose left arm was amputated following transfer sounded in malpractice); Williamson, 04-0451 at p. 5, 888 So.2d at 786. This is so because the LMMA's limitations on the liability of health care providers are special legislation in derogation of the rights of tort victims, and as such, the coverage of the act should be strictly construed. Sewell v. Doctors Hospital, 600 So.2d 577, 578 (La.1992)(finding strict liability for defects in hospital bed which collapsed resulting in injury to patient was not included within "malpractice" under the LMMA). These limitations apply only in cases of liability for malpractice as defined in the LMMA. Williamson, 04-0451 at p. 5, 888 So.2d at 786.
The LMMA defines "malpractice" to mean
any unintentional tort or any breach of contract based on health care or profes sional services rendered, or which should have been rendered, by a health care provider, to a patient, including failure to render services timely and the handling of a patient, including loading and unloading of a patient, and also includes all legal responsibility of a health care provider arising from acts or omissions during the procurement of blood or blood components, in the training or supervision of health care providers, or from defects in blood, tissue, transplants, drugs, and medicines, or from defects in or failures of prosthetic devices implanted in or used on or in the person of a patient.
La.Rev.Stat. 40:1299.41(A)(8). The LMMA further defines "tort" and health care":
"Tort" means any breach of duty or any negligent act or omission proximately causing injury or damage to another. The standard of care required of every health care provider, except a hospital, in rendering professional services or health care to a patient, shall be to exercise that 17degree of skill ordinarily employed, under similar circumstances, by the members of his profession in good standing in the same community or locality, and to use. reasonable care and diligence, along with his best judgment, in the application of his skill.
"Health care" means any act or treatment performed or furnished, or which should have been performed or furnished, by any health care provider for, to, or on behalf of a patient during the patient's medical care, treatment, or confinement, or during or relating to or in connection with the procurement of human blood or blood components.
La.Rev.Stat. 40:1299.41(A)(7) & (9).
Cognizant of the principles espoused above, this Court in Coleman set forth six factors to assist a court in determining whether certain conduct by a qualified health care provider constitutes "malpractice" as defined under the LMMA:
(1) whether the particular wrong is "treatment related" or caused by a dereliction of professional skill,
(2) whether the wrong requires expert medical evidence to determine whether the appropriate standard of care was breached,
(3) whether the pertinent act or omission involved assessment of the patient's condition,
(4) whether an incident occurred in the context of a physician-patient relationship, or was within the scope of activities which a hospital is licensed to perform,
(5) whether the injury would have occurred if the patient had not sought treatment, and
(6) whether the tort alleged was intentional.
Coleman, 01-1517 at pp. 17-18, 813 So.2d at 315-16.
As demonstrated by this court in Williamson, a court in its trial of the exception of prematurity analyzes the allegations of the petition under the Coleman factors to determine whether the allegations sound in medical malpractice and, thus, must proceed in accordance with the LMMA or sound in general negligence and, thus, should proceed under general tort law. Williamson, 04-0451 at p. 11, 888 So.2d at 789. Accordingly, we must apply the Coleman factors to the allegations of plaintiffs Ispetition regarding his hospital bed, ie., allegations (g) through (i), to determine whether those allegations fall outside the LMMA and would require defendant's exception of prematurity be denied.
At the outset, we note with significance this suit is one against a qualified health care provider brought to recover for an injury allegedly sustained due to a patient's contact with faulty equipment, specifically when the plaintiff put pressure on an allegedly unlocked or defective bed, which rolled, causing plaintiff to lose his balance and fall. With this in mind, we turn now to an application of. the Coleman factors.
Application of the Coleman Factors
(1)Whether the particular wrong is "treatment related" or caused by a dereliction of professional skill?
Although SMC asserts that the hospital bed, where a patient spends most of his time recovering, is integral to recovery and is intricately tied to the treatment of the patient, we find the particular wrong alleged, i.e., the furnishing of equipment not in proper working order, has nothing to do with the condition and associated treatment for which the plaintiff was hospitalized. Plaintiff fell and sustained a new injury to his knee when he put pressure on the bed that rolled and moved. He was hospitalized to treat an infection of the groin. These two separate ánd distinct events occurred independently of each other with one being treatment-related as to his groin infection and the other being an injury sustained by a fall caused by a bed that improperly rolled.
SMC further asserts that in order for SMC's staff to be able to provide for a safe and uneventful recovery, they need to be familiar with the equipment, which is knowledge they acquire in the education, training, and certification they must undergo to acquire their professional status. However, in this case, plaintiff, alleges |9his hospital bed was either defective or someone did not lock the bed down as he should have. The locking or securing of a bed is something that is routinely performed by maintenance or housekeeping personnel or nurse's aides and failure to properly lock a bed does not result from any dereliction of professional skill that is treatment-related for the patient. SMC's interpretation of treatment-related would be very broadly applied which' is contrary to the proper strict interpretation we are bound to give in that the LMMA is in derogation of a tort victim's rights. Thus, we find this factor weighs in favor of plaintiffs position that the allegations sound in general negligence.
(2) Whether the wrong requires expert medical evidence to determine whether the appropriate standard of care was breached?
As to this factor, SMC asserts the act of properly equipping a hospital room involves a consideration of the actions and inactions of the nursing staff as well as hospital procedure, as does the failure to give proper instructions, which is one of the key roles of nurses. Thus, according to the defendant, expert testimony on nursing practices and hospital equipment may be relevant. However, as the locking or securing of a bed routinely falls to the maintenance staff or nurse's aides, we find no medical expert will be needed to determine whether locking a bed for a hospital patient is negligent or to determine the proper maintenance procedures regarding the bed. We find this factor as well weighs in favor of the plaintiffs position.
(3)Whether the pertinent act or omission involved assessment of the patient's condition?
Although SMC asserts the act of properly equipping a hospital room, the decision to keep the patient's bed in the lowest position with the wheels locked, and the proper instructions to give a patient on the use and safety of his bed all involve an examination of the assessment of plaintiffs condition, we find the pertinent acts or omissions in this case do not implicate or require an assessment of a patient's |inmedical condition. There is simply no showing that the failure alleged in this case even involved an assessment of plaintiffs condition by any hospital employee. Moreover, the condition for which the plaintiff was hospitalized and assessed has nothing to do with the omissions alleged, i.e., his groin infection has nothing to do with the failure to provide proper working equipment or to instruct the patient. Therefore, we find this factor weighs in favor of finding the allegations sound in general negligence.
(4) Whether an incident. occurred in the context of a physician-patient relationship, or was within the scope of activities which a hospital is licensed to perform?
SMC submits this factor is clearly met in this case because plaintiff was admitted to SMC for surgery and plaintiffs recuperation in a hospital bed and his transfer to and from a bedside commode during his recovery period occurred in the context of his admission at SMC. However, the alleged incident did not occur in the context of a physician-patient relationship or within the scope of activities the hospital is licensed to perform, but rather when the patient put pressure on the bed, which rolled causing him to fall. Again, we find analysis of this factor weighs in favor of plaintiffs position.
(5) Whether the injury would have occurred if the patient had not sought treatment?
SMC contends that beds and bedside commodes are solely for patients' use, but, as with the defective wheelchair in Williamson, it is just as reasonable to say that any visitor' to the hospital, even those not seeking treatment, who put pressure on this .particular bed, could have suffered injury. See, Williamson, 04-0451 at p. 14, 888 So.2d at 791. Moreover, the injury sustained was a completely independent injury from the condition for which the plaintiff sought treatment, i.e., drainage of his groin ^infection. We find this factor, too, weighs in favor of finding the allegations sound in general negligence.
(6)Whether the alleged tort was intentional?
This factor is not an issue in this case as there are no allegations that the actions or inactions of SMC or its staff were intentional.
Although the defendant asserts plaintiffs allegations sound in medical malpractice or are so intertwined with his medical malpractice claims that they cannot be severed from those claims, we find the application of the Coleman factors demonstrate that the failure to provide a patient with equipment in proper working condition, to keep a patient's bed in the lowest position with the wheels locked, and to properly instruct a patient on proper use and safety with regard to his bed sound in general negligence as the wrongs alleged are not integral to the rendering of care and treatment by the health care provider to the patient in this case.
Moreover, as explained in Coleman, only plaintiffs claims "arising from medical malpractice" are governed by the LMMA, and all other tort liability on the part of the qualified health care provider is governed by general tort law. Coleman, 01-1517 at pp. 15-16, 813 So.2d at 315. Thus, plaintiffs claims of general negligence contained in allegations (g) through (i) are not entitled to the limitations or subject to the procedural requirements of the LMMA of first review by a pre-suit medical review panel, and should, as the district court determined, be severed from his medical malpractice claims, contained in allegations (a) through (f); to- proceed in accordance with general tort law.
Accordingly, under the Coleman test, plaintiffs allegations regarding his hospital bed are weighted in favor of our finding that these claims sound in general negligence and fall outside the purview of the LMMA, requiring the non-medical 1 ^malpractice claims to proceed under general tort law. Therefore, we find the district court correctly denied the exception of prematurity as to those allegations and rightly severed the claims from those sounding in medical malpractice.
CONCLUSION
With the assistance of the Coleman factors, we have applied the LMMA's definition of medical malpractice to the allegations regarding plaintiffs hospital bed set forth in his petition, and we conclude that these claims do not fall within the provisions of the LMMA. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeal sustaining the exception of prematurity as to these claims and reinstate the judgment of the district court.
DECREE
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeal and reinstate the judgment of the district court.
REVERSED and REINSTATED.
VICTORY, J., dissents for the reasons assigned by WEIMER, J.
WEIMER, J., dissents and assigns reasons.
. According to the petition, the request is presently pending.
. In its exception, SMC also explained that plaintiff had requested the appointment of David Cook as the attorney chairman for the panel and had received confirmation of the appointment of the attorney chairman by the Patient's Compensation Fund.