Case Name: STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Robert N. SMITH, Appellee
Court: Florida Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1994-06-09
Citations: 638 So. 2d 509
Docket Number: No. 82482
Parties: STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Robert N. SMITH, Appellee.
Judges: GRIMES, C.J., HARDING, J., and McDONALD, Senior Justice, concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 638
Pages: 509–513

Head Matter:
STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Robert N. SMITH, Appellee.
No. 82482.
Supreme Court of Florida.
June 9, 1994.
Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., and Katherine V. Blanco and Stephen A. Baker, Asst. Attys. Gen., Tampa, for appellant.
James Marion Moorman, Public Defender and Robert D. Rosen, Asst. Public Defender, Bartow, for appellee.

Opinion:
OVERTON, Justice.
We have on appeal State v. Smith, 624 So.2d 355 (Fla.2d DCA 1993), in which the district court declared section 322.34(3), Florida Statutes (1991), to be unconstitutional because it found that an act of simple negligence in operating a motor vehicle could not be combined with the crime of driving a motor vehicle under a canceled, suspended, or revoked license to create a new criminal offense. We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla.Const. For the reasons expressed, we find the statute to be constitutional and reverse the decision of the district court.
In this case, the appellee, Robert N. Smith, was charged with driving with a suspended license causing death or injury under section 322.34(3), which provides:
Any person whose driver's license has been canceled, suspended, or revoked pursuant to s. 316.655, s. 322.26(8), s. 322.-27(2), or s. 322.28(2) or (5) and who operates a motor vehicle while his driver's license is canceled, suspended, or revoked and who by careless or negligent operation thereof causes the death of or serious bodily injury to another human being, is guilty of a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083.
Smith moved to dismiss the charge on the basis that section 322.34(3) unconstitutionally criminalizes mere negligence. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss and the State appealed.
On appeal, the Second District Court of Appeal affirmed. The district court noted that driving with a suspended or revoked license is normally a misdemeanor. Under the statute at issue, however, the district court determined that simple negligence is used to enhance the crime of driving with a suspended or revoked license to a felony. In reviewing whether the statute was constitutional, the district court first determined that simple negligence, standing by itself, cannot constitute a criminal act. The district court then looked to the question of whether the non-criminal act of simple negligence could be combined with the criminal act of driving with a canceled, suspended, or revoked license to create a new and distinct criminal offense. Finding no causal connection between the criminal and non-criminal acts, the district court held that simple negligence could not be used to enhance a criminal act from a misdemeanor to a felony.
As the district court correctly noted, on several occasions this Court has found statutes criminalizing simple negligence to be unconstitutional. See, e.g., State v. Hamilton, 388 So.2d 561 (Fla.1980); State v. Winters, 346 So.2d 991 (Fla.1977). This does not mean, however, that simple negligence can never be used to enhance the penalty for a willful criminal act. For example, under section 316.193, Florida Statutes (1993), the act of driving under the influence (DUI), when combined with an act of simple negligence, is elevated to the crime of DUI manslaughter. See Magaw v. State, 537 So.2d 564 (Fla.1989). The district court distinguished the DUI manslaughter statute by stating that driving under the influence is, in and of itself, a reckless act, whereas driving with a suspended, canceled, or revoked drivers license is not. We disagree.
Only when a driver's license has been suspended, canceled, or revoked due to some wrongdoing on the part of the driver can a person be charged under section 322.34(3). For instance, only persons who have had their driver's licenses suspended, canceled, or revoked pursuant to sections 316.655 (suspension due to conviction of traffic offenses), 322.26(8) (suspension by a court due to conviction of serious traffic offense), 322.27(2) (suspension by the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles due to conviction of serious traffic offense), 322.28(2) (suspension for driving under the influence), or 322.-28(5) (suspension due to conviction of manslaughter or vehicular homicide), are subject to prosecution under the statute at issue. Consequently, when a person is charged under the statute, a determination already has been made that the person is no longer fit to be driving on Florida's highways. As such, knowingly driving with a suspended, canceled, or revoked driver's license, as defined under the statute at issue, is indeed a willful act in clear violation of the law.
We also disagree with the district court's conclusion that the statute is unconstitutional because "[n]o causal connection exists between driving with a cancelled, suspended or revoked license and an accident involving death or serious injury." 624 So.2d at 358. As we stated in Magaw:
[Under the DUI manslaughter statute,] the state is not required to prove that the operator's drinking caused the accident. The statute requires only that the operation of the vehicle . caused the accident. Therefore, any deviation or lack of care on the part of a driver under the influence to which the . accident can be attributed will suffice.
537 So.2d at 567 (emphasis added). Under either the DUI manslaughter statute or the statute at issue, it is not the simple negligence of the driver that is the criminal conduct being punished; it is the willful act of choosing to drive a vehicle under the influence or to drive a vehicle with a suspended, canceled, or revoked license that is the criminal conduct being punished. In both instances, the legislature has simply made a policy decision that anyone who engages in the prohibited criminal conduct and who, while engaging in that prohibited criminal conduct, negligently injures another, is guilty of a more severe crime than if the prohibited conduct had not resulted in injury to another. Similarly, one who negligently Mils another while engaged in the commission of certain enumerated felonies is guilty of felony mur der. See § 782.04(l)(a)(2), Fla.Stat. (1993). Although the homicide may have been unintentionally committed through negligence, it is the -willful act of committing the underlying felony that criminalizes the simple negligence supporting the conviction for felony murder. Consistent with that rationale, we hold that section 322.34(3) does not unconstitutionally criminalize simple negligence.
Accordingly, we find section 322.34(3), Florida Statutes (1991), to be constitutional, reverse the decision of the district court, and remand this cause for further proceedings.
It is so ordered.
GRIMES, C.J., HARDING, J., and McDONALD, Senior Justice, concur.
KOGAN, J., concurs in result only with an opinion, in which SHAW, J., concurs.
. Smith was also charged with DUI manslaughter under section 782.07, Florida Statutes (1991). That charge is not at issue in this appeal.