Case Name: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Harry SEIDMAN, Defendant-Appellant
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 1998-09-09
Citations: 156 F.3d 542
Docket Number: No. 97-4075
Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Harry SEIDMAN, Defendant-Appellant.
Judges: 
Reporter: Federal Reporter 3d Series
Volume: 156
Pages: 542–563

Head Matter:
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Harry SEIDMAN, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 97-4075.
United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.
Argued Jan. 30, 1998.
Decided Sept. 9, 1998.
ARGUED: Mark J. Biros, Proskauer Rose, L.L.P., Washington, DC, for Appellant. Ira Lee Oring, Asst. U.S. Atty., Baltimore, MD, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Alec W. Farr, Proskauer Rose, L.L.P., Washington, DC, for Appellant. Lynne A. Battaglia, U.S. Atty., Baltimore, MD, for Appellee.
Before WILLIAMS and MICHAEL, Circuit Judges, and KISER, Senior United States District Judge for the Western District of Virginia, sitting by designation.

Opinion:
Affirmed by published opinion. Judge WILLIAMS wrote the opinion. Judge MICHAEL wrote a separate opinion concurring in parts I, II and IV and the judgment. Senior Judge KISER wrote a separate opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part.
OPINION
WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge:
Harry Seidman was convicted on September 26, 1997, on one count of conspiracy to embezzle funds from a labor union, see 18 U.S.C.A. § 371 (West Supp.1998) and 29 U.S.C.A. § 501(c) (West 1985), and on twelve counts of embezzlement from a labor union, see 29 U.S.C.A. § 501(c) (West 1985), or aiding and abetting the same, see 18 U.S.C.A. § 2 (West 1969). The district court sentenced Seidman to thirty-nine months imprisonment on each count, the sentences to run concurrently, and imposed a fine of $30,000. Seidman appeals his convictions on two grounds: (1) that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress a tape-recorded conversation; and (2) that the district court's instructions on 18 U.S.C.A. § 2 were improper. Because we conclude that the district court properly denied the suppression motion and correctly instructed the jury on aiding and abetting, we affirm Seidman's convictions.
I.
Seidman was employed by the International Organization of Masters, Mates, and Pilots (the Union), a labor union headquartered in Linthicum, Maryland, from the 1950s until December of 1993. Seidman eventually became the Comptroller for the Union. His responsibilities as Comptroller included paying the Union's bills, administering the Union office on a day-to-day basis, and obtaining annual financial audits. Seidman was personally authorized to sign checks on the Union's behalf. Although the Secretary/Treasurer, James T. Hopkins, Jr., was the chief financial officer of the Union, a major portion of the Secretary/Treasurer's time was devoted to handling contract grievances for Union members. The Secretary/Treasurer did not review invoices submitted to the Union or checks signed by Seidman on behalf of the Union.
When Timothy Brown became President of the Union in April of 1991, the Union was in poor financial condition. In 1992, Seidman informed Brown that Seidman had cashed the last of the Union's cash reserves which had been held in million dollar certificates of deposit. Approximately five to six percent of the Union's total expenditures, or $30,000 a month, were incurred by the Union-published monthly newspaper. In the fall of 1992, Brown decided to print the newspaper on a bimonthly basis to reduce costs.
Ronald Schoop was an independent contractor who provided printing services to the Union through the corporate entity "Mercury Graphics" from approximately 1978 to October 1993. Initially, Schoop provided general printing services, including business cards, envelopes, and wall calendars. During 1985, Schoop began printing the Union newspaper. In October of 1993, Schoop briefly became an employee of the Union until his resignation in December of 1993 when a scheme of embezzlement between Seidman and Schoop was discovered. Schoop had an office located in the Union headquarters, but no printing services were actually performed at the Union office. To obtain payment for his printing services, Schoop submitted bills to the Union which were paid by Seidman. In late May of 1993, Beverly Gutmann, the Un ion's Assistant Comptroller, informed Brown that there had been a potential double billing for the Union newspaper. Brown questioned Seidman about the possible double billing, and Seidman responded that the additional charges were for editorial changes that Brown had made in a recent issue of the paper. Brown did not question Seidman's answer because he had substantially rewritten large sections of that edition of the paper.
When Brown later inquired about the expenses associated with producing the newspaper during the summer of 1993, Seidman responded that the cost of the newspaper had not decreased even though the paper was being published bimonthly instead of monthly. Brown was not satisfied with Seid-man's explanation of the expenses associated with publishing the newspaper. He became even more suspicious in November of 1993 when Gutmann approached him again about double charges for Schoop's printing services for the December 1992/January 1993, February/March 1993, and May/June 1993 editions of the Union newspaper. Gutmann told Brown that she believed Seidman and Schoop were -embezzling funds from the Union.
Because of these mounting suspicions of financial impropriety, Brown hired an outside forensic auditor, Gunther Borris, to perform an audit. On December 24,1993, Borris met Brown and Hopkins, the Secretary/Treasurer, at the Union office. Borris spent the entire day reviewing the Union's financial records, particularly the potential double billings for the Union newspaper. As a result of Borris' investigation, Brown learned for the first time that checks had been issued to Ronald Schoop personally for invoices submitted by Mercury Graphics and that 1099 forms had not been issued to Schoop. Bor-ris also confirmed that there had been at least two double billings for the Union newspaper.
On December 28, 1993, Borris submitted his financial report at a meeting of the International Subcommittee, a group of five individuals charged with managing the affairs of the Union during time peri ods between meetings of the General Executive Board. During the meeting, Seidman and Schoop were questioned about the allegations of double billings. As a result of Borris' audit and the December 28 meeting, the Subcommittee asked Seidman for his resignation. Seidman signed a resignation letter on December 28, 1993. Ronald Schoop, who was at that time a salaried employee of the Union, resigned one day later.
In March of 1995, Schoop confessed to agents of the Department of Labor's Office of Labor Racketeering to conspiring with Seidman to embezzle funds from the Union and agreed to. participate as a government informant. In that capacity, Schoop made two recorded telephone calls to Seidman, on March 9, 1995, and March 21, 1995. Schoop agreed to go to Seidman's residence wearing an electronic recording device and record a conversation with Seidman on May 23, 1995. Upon arriving at Seidman's residence, Schoop knocked on Seidman's door approximately ninety times. When he received no answer, Schoop opened the unlocked door and saw Seidman in the hallway near the door. When Schoop asked Seidman what he was doing, Seidman responded that he had been riding his exercise bicycle in the basement and closed the door to the basement, as if he had just come upstairs. Seidman led Schoop to the kitchen where the two proceeded to have a conversation for the next forty-five minutes.
II.
On May 14, 1996, Seidman was charged in a thirteen count indictment with one count of conspiracy to embezzle funds from a labor union and twelve counts of embezzlement from a labor union or aiding and abetting the same. The indictment alleged that Seidman conspired with Schoop from approximately 1987 to July 1993 to embezzle approximately $800,000 in a complicated kickback scheme by "directing" or "causing" Schoop to submit fraudulent invoices for services from Mercury Graphics and other corporate entities.
A two-week trial was held in September of 1996. Schoop testified that he and Seidman participated in a kickback scheme. Schoop testified that he submitted fraudulent invoices to the Union from his corporation, Mercury Graphics, and that Seidman issued cheeks on the Union's checking account to Schoop personally. Schoop explained that he cashed the cheeks and gave approximately eighty percent of the proceeds to Seidman. Schoop also testified that he gave Seidman and his family gifts and made payments for expenses incurred by Seidman and his fami ly. The Government contended that the gifts and payments were part of the kickback scheme.
Seidman's version of events was that he received gifts and payments from' Sehoop because he and Sehoop were close friends for many years. Seidman also claimed that Sehoop gave him cash to be held in trust for Schoop's son because Sehoop was addicted to gambling and alcohol. In a letter to Sehoop dated March 21, 1994, Seidman stated that he was returning the money to Sehoop because Seidman had retired from the Union: "I am returning to you all the assets you entrusted to me, including all interest earned thereon." (J.A. at 1046.) In conjunction with the letter, Seidman gave Sehoop a check for $265,000.00. At Seidman's request, Sehoop signed the March 21 letter. Sehoop also accepted and cashed the cheek for $265,-000.00. Sehoop testified at trial, however, that he was shocked when Seidman gave him the money and that he had never asked Seidman to hold any money in trust for him.
The jury found Seidman guilty on all thirteen counts of the indictment. Seidman appeals his conviction, arguing that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress the tape-recorded conversation and that a portion of the district court's jury instructions constituted reversible error. We address each argument in turn.
III.
On appeal, Seidman first claims that Sehoop, acting as a government agent, entered his home illegally. As a result, Seid-man contends that the recorded conversation obtained by Sehoop was the tainted fruit of the illegal entry and should have been suppressed. Even assuming, without' deciding, that there was an illegal entry, we conclude that the ensuing conversation between Seid-man and Sehoop was sufficiently independent of the unlawful invasion to purge any taint arising from the initial entry. Therefore, we hold that the district court did not err in denying Seidman's motion to suppress.
We review legal conclusions made pursuant to a district court's suppression determination de novo, but review the underlying factual findings for clear error. See United States v. McDonald, 61 F.3d 248, 254 (4th Cir.1995). We construe the evidence in the light most favorable to the Government, the prevailing party below. See United States v. Elie, 111 F.3d 1135, 1140 (4th Cir.1997) (citing United States v. Han, 74 F.3d 537, 540 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1239, 116 S.Ct. 1890, 135 L.Ed.2d 184 (1996)).
The Fourth Amendment protects the "right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures" by the government or its agents. U.S. Const, amend. IV; see also United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113, 104 S.Ct. 1652, 80 L.Ed.2d 85 (1984). During the suppression hearing on August 30, 1996, the Government conceded that Sehoop was acting as a government agent when he went to Seidman's home. Thus, Schoop's conduct violated the Fourth Amendment if it constituted an unreasonable search or seizure. See Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 113, 104 S.Ct. 1652; United States v. Taylor, 90 F.3d 903, 908 (4th Cir.1996). "A 'search' occurs when an expectation of privacy that society is prepared to consider reasonable is infringed." Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 113, 104 S.Ct. 1652. It is well established that a search conducted without a warrant is "per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment — subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions." Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967); see also Wilson v. Layne, 141 F.3d 111, 1998 WL 159673 (4th Cir. April 8, 1998) (en banc) (noting that entry into a home without a warrant is per se unreasonable unless an exception to the warrant requirement exists). The district court concluded that Schoop's action of opening Seidman's unlocked door and stepping inside, without a warrant, was an unreasonable infringement on Seidman's privacy and thus constituted a search in violation of the Fourth Amendment.
The district court, nevertheless, denied Seidman's motion to suppress the recorded conversation. The district court concluded that it was irrelevant whether Schoop stepped inside Seidman's house without express invitation because Seidman voluntarily consented to the ensuing conversation. The district court determined that Seidman's consent to the conversation was manifested by Seidman's attempt to create the appearance that, out of politeness to Schoop, he had not heard Schoop's knocks. According to the district court, Seidman also manifested his consent to the conversation by never asking Schoop to leave and by speaking to Schoop at length about various topics including family relations and their personal lives. Moreover, the district court noted that Schoop never acted in a threatening or hostile manner toward Seidman, so Seidman was not coerced into the conversation.
"[0]ne of the specifically established exceptions to the requirements of both a warrant and probable cause is a search that is conducted pursuant to consent." Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973). If the Government has committed a constitutional violation, however, evidence obtained as a result of the violation cannot be used unless the connection between the unlawful conduct and the acquisition of the evidence has "become so attenuated as to dissipate the taint." Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341, 60 S.Ct. 266, 84 L.Ed. 307 (1939). Because the district court concluded that Schoop entered Seidman's residence in violation of the Fourth Amendment, it was required to apply a "tainted fruit" analysis to determine whether the taint of the illegal entry was purged. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 486-88, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963). The district court erred in simply concluding that Seidman's subsequent consent rendered the tape-recorded conversation admissible. Rather, the district court should have determined whether the taint arising from the unlawful entry was sufficiently attenuated by the consent.
As a general rule, evidence obtained as a result of a Fourth Amendment violation is inadmissible. See id. at 484-85, 83 S.Ct. 407. This broad exclusionary prohibition extends to verbal evidence as well as physical evidence. See id. In Wong Sun, however, the Supreme Court noted that an intervening "act of free will [may] purge the primary taint of the unlawful invasion." Id. at 486, 83 S.Ct. 407. Factors relevant to the inquiry include: (1) the amount of time between the illegal action and the acquisition of the evidence; (2) the presence of intervening circumstances; and (3) the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct. See Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 603-04, 95 S.Ct. 2254, 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975). Nevertheless, "a finding with respect to attenuation . can only be made after consideration of all the circumstances of the ease." United States v. Wellins, 654 F.2d 550, 554 (9th Cir.1981) (citing Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 248-49, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973)). This requires a "careful sifting of the unique facts and circumstances of each case." Schneckloth 412 U.S. at 233, 93 S.Ct. 2041. Finally, "[t]he burden of showing admissibility rests . on the prosecution." Id. at 604, 95 S.Ct. 2254. Although the district court did not engage in an inquiry as to whether the taint of the illegal entry had been purged, the district court's factual findings transcribed at the suppression hearing and the May 23 tape recording are sufficient for us to make such a determination, so that remand is not necessary. See id. at 604, 95 S.Ct. 2254.
For purposes of this appeal, we will assume, without deciding, that Schoop's entry into Seidman's home was violative of the Fourth Amendment. With that having been said, we note that the brief intrusion into Seidman's home was at worst a minor and technical invasion of Seidman's rights. Indeed, unlike the cases cited by the concurrence, Seidman was neither arrested without probable causé, nor involuntarily transported to the police station and interrogated in the hope that something would turn up. See Taylor v. Alabama, 457 U.S. 687, 102 S.Ct. 2664, 73 L.Ed.2d 314 (1982); Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 99 S.Ct. 2248, 60 L.Ed.2d 824 (1979); Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 95 S.Ct. 2254, 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975); People v. Gonzalez, 64 Cal.App.4th 432, 75 Cal.Rptr.2d 272 (1998). Nor, for that matter, was Seidman present when incriminating evidence was found in an illegal search of his home or confronted by the police with incriminating evidence that they had illegally seized. In fact, this case lacks the element of overt police coercion that exists in every case cited by the concurrence. See Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 100 S.Ct. 2556, 65 L.Ed.2d 633 (1980); Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 92 S.Ct. 1620, 32 L.Ed.2d 152 (1972); United States v. Gooding, 695 F.2d 78 (4th Cir.1982); United States v. Wellins, 654 F.2d 550 (9th Cir.1981). As a result, the taint that must be purged here is, at best, slight.
Applying the analysis developed in Wong Sun and its progeny, we determine that the taint of the illegal entry had been purged, and, therefore, the tape-recorded conversation of May 23, 1995, was properly admitted at trial. As to the first factor, we recognize that very little time elapsed between Schoop's entry and the conversation regarding Schoop's tax dilemma. Approximately one minute after he entered, Schoop stated, "What are we going to do about this, bub?" (J.A. at 83) referring to his unpaid taxes. Despite the concurrence's contentions to the contrary, the lack of a significant intervening period of time does not require that the tape recording in question be suppressed for want of sufficient attenuation. See United States v. Rodriguez, 585 F.2d 1234, 1239, 1242 (5th Cir.1978). Indeed, "the Brown test does not require that each of the factors set forth be resolved in favor of the Government." United States v. Wellins, 654 F.2d 550, 554 (9th Cir.1981). Here, the second and third factors weigh strongly in favor of admissibility.
As to the second factor, we conclude that Seidman's actions toward Schoop after Schoop's entry constitute intervening circumstances. Almost immediately after Schoop entered the home, any taint arising from Schoop's entry was attenuated by Seidman's consent to the conversation. Shortly after Schoop opened the door to Seidman's house, Seidman shut the front door behind Schoop, and Seidman motioned him into the kitchen. These intervening acts indicated Seidman's willingness to engage in a conversation with Schoop. More importantly, shutting the door behind Schoop and motioning him into the kitchen were independent acts of free will by Seidman. For the following forty-five minutes, Seidman and Schoop engaged in a conversation in Seidman's kitchen, regarding their families, personal lives, Union business, and Schoop's tax dilemma. Seidman never asked Schoop to leave.
The third factor also weighs against suppression. As noted above, the flagraney and offensiveness of the governmental misconduct in this case pales in comparison to other cases where evidence has been held inadmissible on Fourth Amendment grounds. In Wong Sun, six or seven officers went to the business of James Toy, a man alleged to have sold heroin, broke open his door, followed him into his bedroom, and almost immediately handcuffed and arrested him. Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 474, 486, 83 S.Ct. 407. The Supreme Court held that Toy's statements to the officers shortly thereafter were inadmissible because it was unreasonable to infer that the statements were an act of free will under the circumstances. Id. at 486, 83 S.Ct. 407. Similarly, in Brown, police officers broke into Brown's apartment and searched it without probable cause and without a warrant. See Brown, 422 U.S. at 592, 95 S.Ct. 2254. Brown was returning to his apartment when a police officer pointed a revolver at him and told him he was under arrest. See id. Brown subsequently was held at gunpoint and searched. See id. at 593, 95 S.Ct. 2254. The degree of coercion resulting from the police officers' illegal, acts in Wong Sun and Brown v. Illinois simply was not present here. According to Seidman's own testimony, he and Schoop had been friends for many years. In fact, Schoop's visit to Seidman's house that day was not entirely unexpected. In a recorded telephone conversation on March 21,1995, the two had discussed potentially meeting in person in Columbia, Maryland, where Seidman resided, instead of Baltimore, Maryland, where Schoop worked and resided. As the district court noted, Schoop never made any threats to Seidman or exerted any force towards him. Seidman now claims on appeal that he did not ask Schoop to leave because Schoop intimidated him. In a slightly different context, however, we have noted that "[s]ubsequent testimony by an accused about his prior subjective mental impressions and reactions must be carefully scrutinized, as such testimony is always influenced by [his] self-interest." United States v. Braxton, 112 F.3d 777, 781 (4th Cir.) (en banc) (holding statement to police officers was voluntary under the Fifth Amendment in view of totality of circumstances) (internal quotation marks omitted), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 118 S.Ct. 192, 139 L.Ed.2d 130 (1997). With the exception of Seidman's own testimony, there is simply no evidence to suggest that Schoop intimidated Seidman.
Considering all of the factors set forth by the Supreme Court in Brown v. Illinois, and the unique circumstances of this case, we conclude that the admission of the May 23 tape-recording at trial did not abridge Seid-man's Fourth Amendment guarantee of freedom from an unreasonable search and seizure. Even though the time span between the unlawful entry and Seidman's consent was short, we cannot say that Seidman's statements resulted from the exploitation of the unlawful entry. Rather, we conclude that the taint arising from the initial entry was purged by the intervening independent acts of Seidman shutting the door behind Schoop, motioning Schoop into his kitchen, and engaging Schoop in conversation for a substantial period of time. Seidman acted voluntarily, without coercion or threat of force from Schoop. Therefore, we conclude that the May 23 tape-recording was properly admitted by the district court.
IV.
Next, Seidman argues that his convictions on Counts two through thirteen of the indictment must be vacated because the district court's instructions on 18 U.S.C.A. § 2 (West 1969) were improper. Specifically, Seidman contends that Schoop, as a matter of law, could not have been convicted of violating 29 U.S.C.A. § 501(c) (West 1985). Thus, Seidman claims that the district court erred in instructing the jury that it could find him guilty under § 2 if it found that he aided and abetted Schoop in violating § 501(c). "Both the decision to give (or not to give) a jury instruction and the content of an instruction are reviewed for abuse of discretion." United States v. Russell, 971 F.2d 1098, 1107 (4th Cir.1992). If, however, Schoop, as a matter of law, could not have been convicted of violating § 501(e), the district court did abuse its discretion in instructing the jury. See Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 100, 116 S.Ct. 2035, 135 L.Ed.2d 392 (1996) (noting that "[a] district court by definition abuses its discretion when it makes an error of law").
Counts two through thirteen of the indictment charged Seidman with embezzlement from a labor union in violation of 29 U.S.C.A. § 501(c) or aiding and abetting the same in violation of 18 U.S.C.A. § 2. When a jury has been instructed on two legal theories, one of which is legally inadequate, the conviction must be reversed if it is not possible to determine whether the jury convicted on the legally adequate, or inadequate, theory. See Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 312, 77 S.Ct. 1064, 1 L.Ed.2d 1356 (1957); cf. Griffin v. United States, 502 U.S. 46, 56-60, 112 S.Ct. 466, 116 L.Ed.2d 371 (1991) (explaining that when a case is submitted to a jury on two adequate legal theories and the jury returns a general verdict of guilty, affirmance is appropriate so long as the evidence is sufficient to support a conviction on either theory). Because the jury returned a general verdict of guilty, it is not possible to determine whether Seidmaris convictions were based on the theory that he violated 29 U.S.C.A. § 501(c) or on the theory that he violated 18 U.S.C.A. § 2. Seidman concedes that § 501(c) provides a legally adequate ground for his convictions. Thus, this case turns on whether § 2 provides a legally adequate ground for Seidman's convictions.
Section 2 provides:
(a) Whoever commits an offense against the United States or aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces or procures its commission, is punishable as a principal.
(b) Whoever willfully causes an act to be done which if directly performed by him or another would be an offense against the United States, is punishable as a principal.
18 U.S.C.A. § 2. The district court charged the jury that it could find Seidman guilty as a principal under § 2(a) if it found "beyond a reasonable doubt that the government has proved that another person actually committed the offense with which the defendant was charged and that the defendant aided or abetted that person in the commission of the offense." As a result, the district court instructed the jury that it must first
find that another person, Mr. Schoop, has committed the crime charged, the embezzlement alleged in the substantive count. Obviously, no one can be convicted of aiding and abetting the criminal acts of another if no crime was committed by the other person in the first place so, therefore, if Mr. Schoop did not commit the embezzle-ments charged in 2 through 13 then Mr. Seidman could not be convicted of aiding and abetting Mr. Schoop.
(J.A. at 1016.)
The crime charged in the substantive count was 29 U.S.C.A. § 501. That section provides:
Any person who embezzles, steals, or unlawfully and willfully abstracts or converts to his own use, or the use of another, any of the moneys, funds, securities, property, or other assets of a labor organization of which he is an officer, or by which he is employed, directly or indirectly, shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned for not more than five years, or both.
29 U.S.C.A. § 501(c) (emphasis added). Section 501, by its own terms, only applies to persons "employed" by the Union. Seidman claims that Schoop was not an employee of the Union. Accordingly, Seidman contends that Schoop could not have been convicted of violating § 501. Following this line of reasoning (ie., Schoop could not have been convicted of embezzlement from a labor union), Seidman argues that he could not have been convicted of aiding and abetting embezzlement in violation of 18 U.S.C.A. § 2.
Whether § 2 provides a legally adequate ground for Seidman's convictions turns on whether Schoop was employed by the Union within the meaning of § 501(c). Despite Seidman's contentions to the contrary, we conclude that Schoop was so employed during the entire time period covered by the indictment. An individual has the requisite status to be convicted under § 501(c) if "he is employed, directly or indirectly," by a labor organization. See 29 U.S.C.A. § 501(c). It was clearly established at trial that Schoop provided printing services to the Union during the entire time period covered by the indictment. Cf. United States v. Lawton, 995 F.2d 290, 294-95 (D.C.Cir.1993) (holding individual could not have embezzled pursuant to § 501(c) where relationship to International union was not clearly established at trial). We have little difficulty concluding that a contractor hired to perform printing services is indirectly employed by the Union. Cf. United States v. Capanegro, 576 F.2d 973, 976 (2d Cir.1978) (holding that an attorney who provided legal services primarily to individual union members was employed by the union). In so holding, we recognize that the common law definition of "employee" does not include independent contractors. See, e.g., Baker v. Texas & Pacific Ry. Co., 359 U.S. 227, 79 S.Ct. 664, 3 L.Ed.2d 756 (1959); Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722, 728-29, 67 S.Ct. 1473, 91 L.Ed. 1772 (1947). Indeed, the definition of employee in 29 U.S.C.A. § 152(3) (West 1973) expressly excludes independent contractors. Here, however, Congress chose not to use the word "employee" in § 501(c). See Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 263, 72 S.Ct. 240, 96 L.Ed. 288 (1952) (noting that when Congress uses a term of art it presumably knows and adopts the meaning attached to the word). Instead, Congress applied § 501(c) to "any person" who embezzles or steals from a labor organization "by which he is employed, directly or indirectly." We believe that the aforementioned language is broad enough to include independent contractors like Schoop.
Because we conclude that Schoop could be convicted under § 501(c), it necessarily follows that Seidman could also be convicted under § 2 for aiding and abetting Schoop. Accordingly, we hold that Seidman's convictions do not require reversal under Yates.
V.
We conclude that the district court properly denied Seidman's motion to suppress the May 23,1995, conversation at Seidman's residence. We also conclude that the district court's instruction on aiding and abetting was proper because Sehoop was indirectly employed by the Union. Accordingly, we affirm Seidman's conviction on all counts.
AFFIRMED.
. During some of the relevant events underlying this action, the Union office was located in New York City. The Union office was moved to Maryland sometime in 1984 or 1985.
. Schoop was placed on the Union payroll to reduce the cost of the Union newspaper and to bring the Union into compliance with guidelines regarding the status of employees and independent contractors.
. Persons engaged in a trade or business who make payments of more than $600 annually to an individual of "rent, salaries, wages, premiums, annuities, compensations, remunerations, emoluments, or other fixed or determinable gains, profits, and income" are required to make informational returns, commonly referred to as "1099 forms" to the Secretary of the Internal Revenue Service setting forth the amount of the income. See 26 U.S.C.A. § 6041(a) (West Supp. 1998). Beverly Gutmann testified at trial that the Union typically accounted for payments made to individuals other than salaried employees by the issuance of 1099 forms. Gutmann further testified that Seidman instructed Gut-mann not to issue a 1099 form for Schoop for the money paid to him personally. John Gorman, who succeeded Seidman as Comptroller for the Union, testified that upon learning that no 1099 forms had been issued to Schoop, they were then issued and filed with the IRS.
. The tape-recorded conversation between Seid-man and Schoop related to Schoop's tax dilemma, Union business, and Schoop's and Seid-man's personal lives. Although Seidman did not explicitly confess to participation in a scheme to embezzle funds from the Union, his responses to Schoop's questions, and his failure to respond in some instances, supported and corroborated the testimony of the government's witnesses and the government's documentary evidence. The contents of the taped conversation in pertinent part follow:
Schoop: Well, this is your problem too. Are you going to help me?
Seidman: I wish — I don't know. All I can tell you is in fact, tell Jeff [referring to Schoop's accountant].
Schoop: If I told Jeff everything, then it would incriminate you and me.
Seidman: I would give them this and tell him, "Do what you have to."—
Schoop: I don't know. — I'm sick, Harry.
Seidman: I understand that. — Believe me, I understand that.
Schoop: What do you want me to tell them?
Seidman: I received these ten [..] [referring to 1099 forms], "Here's a letter'.'—
Schoop: No, no, no, I'm talking about when the Feds come back 'cause I'm sure they will.
Seidman: Tell them the truth.—
Schoop: Tell them the truth? I mean, both of us are in trouble .
(J.A. at 97.)
Schoop: Well, whatever it is on this thing here, I expect you to pay for it 'cause I ain't gonna to pay for it. I don't have it to begin with. If I had it, bub, I'd do it. I'd pay it. But I don't have it. I've been putting this off and putting it off. Every day I look at it, and I get sick.
Schoop: I counted it up. I gave you almost a million dollars. Do you know that? And you're living over here. (Laughing.)
Schoop: What are you going to do? Are you going to stay here?
Schoop: You don't know?
Schoop: Huh?
Seidman: I don't — I'm not sure what my plans are in the future.
(J.A. at 105.)
Schoop: You know, you tell me to tell the truth. I tell the truth to them, both of us are in trouble. Is that what you want me to do?
Seidman: Tell the truth.
(J.A. at 110.)
Schoop: Yeah, send it to him, but there's no record that, ah, you know — how in the hell can I prove that I gave you the money? I can't do it.
Seidman: But any liability may not be as high as you think it is.... My guess is you're going to work it out with the IRS.
Schoop: It's a lot of money, Harry. That bullshit thing you gave me with the two-sixty-five doesn't even come nowhere near it.
(J.A. at 116-17.)
. Schoop pleaded guilty to conspiracy to embezzle funds from the Union. Schoop received a two-level downward departure under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines as a result of his willingness to testify at Seidman's trial.
. Schoop "broke down" his bills for printing into legitimate invoices for the cost of the actual printing services provided by his corporation, Mercury Graphics, and fraudulent invoices for "typesetting" services that he never performed. In accordance with the invoices, checks for the legitimate services were made payable to Mercury Graphics, while the checks for typesetting were made payable to Schoop personally. Schoop cashed the checks made payable to him personally for typesetting services and provided most of the cash to Seidman.
Schoop also submitted duplicative invoices for printing services for the newspaper and other items, such as the Union constitution. For example, Schoop submitted two invoices in February of 1993 (one for printing and one for typesetting) for the February/March issue of the newspaper. Schoop then submitted duplicate invoices in March of 1993 for the same issue.
. Although we are not bound by the Government's concession, see United States v. Stanfield, 109 F.3d 976, 984 n. 5 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, U.S.-, 118 S.Ct. 156, 139 L.Ed.2d 101 (1997), we agree that the evidence demonstrated that Sehoop was acting as a government informant when he went to Seidman's home.
. Seidman told Schoop that he had not heard Schoop knocking because he was in the basement riding his exercise bike. The clear suggestion is that had Seidman heard the knocking, he would have let Schoop in.
. The district court's finding that Seidman consented to the ensuing conversation with Schoop and that the tape-recorded conversation was therefore admissible was tantamount to a finding that the taint of the illegal entry was purged. The district court, however, did not explicitly apply the analysis set forth in Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963), and Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 95 S.Ct. 2254, 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975).
. By focusing on Seidman's subsequent consent to the conversation, the concurrence suggests that we have "confused the Fifth Amendment voluntariness analysis with Brown's distinct Fourth Amendment attenuation analysis." See post at 22. We disagree. The proper test, which we have applied, is whether a statement made subsequent to a Fourth Amendment violation is "sufficiently an act of free will to purge the primary taint." Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 602, 95 S.Ct. 2254, 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975) (citing Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 486, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963)). Consent has often been recognized as sufficient to waive Fourth Amendment rights. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973). We see no reason why it could not also sever the connection between an unlawful act and the acquisition of additional evidence. Indeed, voluntary consent is the quintessential act of free will. See United States v. Dickson, 64 F.3d 409, 410-11 (8th Cir.1995) (holding that defendant's independent and voluntary consent to search his apartment dissipated taint of prior illegal search); United States v. Sheppard, 901 F.2d 1230, 1234 (5th Cir.1990) (holding that defendant's voluntary consent to search his car dissipated taint of officer's illegal entry).
. Seidman testified at the suppression hearing, however, as follows:
Q. And it wasn't once during the course of this conversation that you asked him to leave?
A. That is correct, sir.
(J.A. at 264.)
Q. Did Mr. Schoop threaten you during the course of this conversation?
A. No, sir.
Q. Did he shout at you during the course of this conversation?
A. No, sir.
Q. Did he make a threatening physical motion at you?
A. No, sir.
(J.A. at 265-66.)
. In its brief, the Government has conceded that Schoop was not an employee of the Union. Notwithstanding the Government's concession, we may conduct our own review of the issue. See Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 58, 88 S.Ct. 1889, 20 L.Ed.2d 917 (1968) (noting that "[i]t is the uniform practice of this Court to conduct its own examination of the record in cases where the . Government . confesses [error]"); Young v. United States, 315 U.S. 257, 258, 62 S.Ct. 510, 86 L.Ed. 832 (1942) (noting that concessions of error do not "relieve this Court of the performance of the judicial function"); United States v. Stanfield, 109 F.3d 976, 984 n. 5 (4th Cir.1997) (refusing to reverse defendant's conviction despite Government's concession of error), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 118 S.Ct. 156, 139 L.Ed.2d 101 (1997).
. It is undisputed that Schoop was a salaried employee of the Union for three months, from October of 1993 through December of 1993. As such, Schoop was, at least for a time, directly employed by the Union. For reasons that are not entirely clear, however, the indictment covered only acts occurring between 1987 and July of 1993.
. Even assuming that Schoop was not employed by the Union, Seidman could have been convicted as a principal pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2(b) if he willfully caused Schoop to perform acts which, if directly performed by Seidman, would be an offense against the United States. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 2(b) (West 1969). Thus, Seid-man is simply incorrect in arguing that he could not be convicted under § 2 if Schoop could not be convicted under 29 U.S.C.A. § 501(c).
.In instructing the jury on the elements of § 501(c), the district court defined the terms embezzlement, conversion, and theft. Of particular importance here, the district court instructed the jury that a person can embezzle funds only if he holds a position of trust. Although we readily conclude that Schoop was indirectly employed by the Union, we agree with Seidman that Schoop did not hold a position of trust. As a consequence, Schoop could not have embezzled funds from the Union.
In explaining the elements necessary to convict Seidman of aiding and abetting pursuant to 18 U.S.C.A. § 2, the district court erroneously stated that the jury must find that Schoop "committed the crime charged, the embezzlement alleged in the substantive count." (J.A. at 1016.) (emphasis added). Of course, a cursory review of the statutory language reveals that it was not necessary for the jury to find that Schoop embezzled the funds. The jury could convict Seidman of violating 18 U.S.C.A. § 2 by finding that Schoop con verted or stole the funds. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 501(c) (stating "[a]ny person who embezzles, steals, or unlawfully and willfully abstracts or converts to his own use, or the use of another" money or other assets from a labor union violates § 501(c)). Indeed, the district court had previously instructed the jury that a person violates § 501 by either embezzling, stealing, or converting funds. Sehoop could not embezzle funds, but he certainly was capable of stealing or converting those funds. It is clear, therefore, that the district court simply used "embezzlement" as a short hand for describing all the acts prohibited by § 501(c). Although we do not consider the district court's instruction a model of clarity, we do not find it to be so harmful as to require reversal of the convictions. See Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, -, 117 S.Ct. 1544, 1549, 137 L.Ed.2d 718 (1997) (stating that a misinstruction is "subject to harmless-error analysis"). In particular, we conclude, "beyond a reasonable doubt, that a correctly instructed jury would have reached the same conclusion." United States v. Hastings, 134 F.3d 235, 241 (4th Cir.1998), cert. denied - U.S. -, 118 S.Ct. 1852, 140 L.Ed.2d 1100 (1998). The evidence that Sehoop stole money from the labor Union was simply overwhelming.
. Seidman also claims that because the district court's instruction on Counts two through thirteen of the Indictment — the object offenses of the conspiracy — was legally inadequate, his conspiracy conviction also rests upon legally inadequate grounds. Because we find that Seidman's convictions on the substantive counts of embezzlement in Counts two through thirteen were proper, we also conclude that Seidman's challenge to the conspiracy charge in Count one of the indictment fails.