Case Name: Rosemary Lefevre EDWARDS, et al. v. Mr. and Mrs. Jerome J. CONFORTO; J.J.C., INC., P.J., Inc. and William Colacurcio, III v. Rosemary Lefevre EDWARDS, Edward J. Lefevre, III, and Joann Lefevre Mullet
Court: Louisiana Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1993-11-29
Citations: 636 So. 2d 901
Docket Number: No. 93-C-1192
Parties: Rosemary Lefevre EDWARDS, et al. v. Mr. and Mrs. Jerome J. CONFORTO. J.J.C., INC., P.J., Inc. and William Colacurcio, III v. Rosemary Lefevre EDWARDS, Edward J. Lefevre, III, and Joann Lefevre Mullet.
Judges: CALOGERO, C.J., and LEMMON and MARCUS, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 636
Pages: 901–911

Head Matter:
Rosemary Lefevre EDWARDS, et al. v. Mr. and Mrs. Jerome J. CONFORTO. J.J.C., INC., P.J., Inc. and William Colacurcio, III v. Rosemary Lefevre EDWARDS, Edward J. Lefevre, III, and Joann Lefevre Mullet.
No. 93-C-1192.
Supreme Court of Louisiana.
Nov. 29, 1993.
Dissenting Opinion of Justice Watson Dec. 7, 1993.
Opinion Reversing Original Decision on Rehearing May 23, 1994.
Rehearing Denied June 24, 1994.
Lillian M. Cohen, Raymond A. McGuire, Trent & Cohen, New Orleans, for applicant.
Jerald N. Andry, Gilbert V. Andry, Jeanne M. Andry, Andry & Andry, New Orleans, for respondent.

Opinion:
1ORTIQUE, Justice.
This is an action by plaintiffs for the return of insurance proceeds distributed to defendants under a fire policy.
I.
The plaintiffs, J.J.C., Inc., P.J., Inc. and William Colaeurcio, III, are the sublessees of premises numbered 423, 425 and 427 Bourbon Street in New Orleans, Louisiana. Cola-curcio is the president of the two corporations, J.J.C., Inc. and P.J., Inc. Edward Lefevre, III had entered into a lease on these premises with Mr. and Mrs. Jerome J. Conforto on January 23, 1980. On August 1, 1981, the Confortos subleased the premises to J.J.C., Inc., P.J., Inc. Mr. Lefevre died soon thereafter, and the property passed by inheritance to the defendants, Rosemary Le-fevre Edwards, Edward J. Lefevre, III, and Joann Lefevre Mullet who hold the property in indivisión. The initial lease (1980 lease between Edward Lefevre and the Confortos) was for a term of thirty-one years four months and required the lessees at their expense to maintain fire insurance in the joint names of lessor and lessees, with a loss payable clause to the lessor against fire and extended coverage, in the amount of $50,-000.00. The lease required the lessee to make all repairs of any kind at his own expense. The second lease (1981 subleases between the Confortos and J.J.C., Inc., and between the Confortos and P.J., Inc.) was for a term of fourteen years ten months and adopted the same terms as the initial lease. Under the terms of the sublease, J.J.C., Inc. was to pay one third ($) of the costs necessary to maintain insurance in the joint names of Edward Lefevre and Mr. and Mrs. Con-forto, with a loss payable clause to 12Edward Lefevre, against fire and extended coverage in the amount of $50,000.00. The sublease between the Confortos and P.J., Inc. required the sublessee to pay two thirds (%) of the costs necessary to maintain insurance in the joint names of Edward Lefevre and Mr. and Mrs. Conforto, with a loss payable clause to Edward Lefevre, against fire and extended coverage in the amount of $50,000.00.
On January 9, 1985, a fire occurred at the Bourbon Street property, partially damaging the property. On January 10, 1985, the fire insurer, New Hampshire Insurance Co. issued a check to defendants for the fire damage in the amount of $21,540.00 payable to Rosemary Lefevre Edwards.
II.
On June 24, 1988, plaintiffs filed a Petition for the Return of Funds in the district court. Plaintiffs asserted that the $21,545.00 was due them, because they had paid the fire insurance premium on the property, and had in fact made the repairs to the property following the fire. At the trial on the merits, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of the defendants. The trial court relied on the following language from the sublease:
The sublease to J.J.C., Inc. by the Con-fortos and the sublease to P.J., Inc. by the Confortos both contain the requirement that lessee make all repairs of any kind at its own expense. See lines 175 & 176 of both leases. Those typewritten provisions, by terms of the lease, apply when in conflict with printed provisions of the lease contract.
The rationale for the trial court judgment is based on two lease provisions. The first provision is between the owners and the lessee, the sublessor and sublessees requiring the renter to make repairs of any kind. The second provision which appears in the lease between sublessor and sublessee allows, in the event the premises are destroyed by fire, the lessee the option of cancelling the lease, or borrowing money to rebuild the entire premises.
An appeal followed the trial court judgment in which plaintiffs contend as their sole assignment of error that defendant was un justly enriched by retaining the insurance proceeds. The appellate court affirmed the trial court decision, finding that plaintiffs claim of unjust enrichment to be without merit.
JjIIL
Upon application by plaintiffs, this court granted supervisory writs to consider whether the defendants have been unjustly enriched. The sole issue for consideration is whether the plaintiffs, sublessees of the leased premises, are entitled to the insurance proceeds in the amount of $21,545.00 paid to defendants. For the reasons expressed, we find the trial court and the appellate court erred in refusing to apply the doctrine of unjust enrichment.
IV.
In 1967 our jurisprudence recognized an action for unjust enrichment in Minyard v. Curtis Products, Inc., 251 La. 624, 205 So.2d 422 (1967). In Minyard v. Curtis Products, Inc. supra, 205 So.2d at 431, this court employed the action de in rem verso, reasoning as follows:
In all civil matters, where there is no express law, the judge is bound to decide according to equity. La.Civil Code art. 21 (1870). There is, moreover, in our law the moral maxim "that no one ought to enrich himself at the expense of another." La.Civil Code art. 1965 (1870). This latter article announces the principle of unjust enrichment.
This court has recognized five conditions which must be fulfilled in order to succeed in a suit by actio de in rem versd: (1) there must be an enrichment to the defendant; (2) there must be an impoverishment sustained by the plaintiff; (3) there must be a connection between the enrichment and resulting impoverishment; (4) there must be an absence of justification or legal cause for the enrichment and the impoverishment; and (5) the action will only be allowed when there is no other remedy at law i.e., the action is subsidiary or corrective in nature. Minyard v. Curtis Products, Inc., supra 205 So.2d at 432, citing Nicholas, Unjustified Enrichment in Civil Law, Part I, 36 Tul.L.Rev. 605, 610 (1962); Edmonston v. A-Second Mortgage Company of Slidell, Inc., 289 So.2d 116 (La.1974); Kirkpatrick v. Young, 456 So.2d 622 (La.1984).
This court recognizes the compatibility of La.Civil Code art. 2301 with the doctrine of unjust enrichment. La.Civil Code art. 2301 provides as follows:
He who receives what is not due to him, whether he receives it through error or knowingly, obliges himself to restore it to him from whom he has unduly received it.
V.
Plaintiffs allege as their sole assignment of error that defendants were unjustly enriched Lby retaining the insurance proceeds. We agree that defendants were unjustly enriched under the facts and circumstances of this case. Plaintiffs paid for all repairs to the building that were occasioned by the fire in January 1985 out of their own funds. These repairs were made with the concurrence of the owners. Plaintiffs/sublessees made all arrangements for repair of the building; they made arrangements with insurance adjusters for the issuance of their cheek covering the cost of repairs to the building. New Hampshire Insurance Company issued a check for fire damage in the amount of $21,-545.00 payable to the order of one of the owners, Rosemary Lefevre Edwards. The owners of the property agreed to turn over the proceeds as soon as six complaints and recommendations by the insurer had been completed. In accordance therewith the plaintiffs/sublessees completed the work in April 1987. However, the owners refused to tender the proceeds from the fire insurance, despite their earlier assurances that they would do so once all repairs had been satisfactorily completed.
A review of the leases involved on the 423-425-427 Bourbon Street property does not support owners' claim that they are entitled to retain fire insurance proceeds. The plaintiffs bore the expense of the insurance premiums over the years. They accepted the responsibility of making the repairs following the fire. They caused the repairs to be made. Plaintiffs took corrective measures demanded by the owner and the insurer. The repairs were completed in keeping with the owners/insurers demands.
Considering all of these facts, our conclusion is inescapable that, the trial court and the appellate court incorrectly determined that the owners were entitled to retain the insurance proceeds. The pleadings together with the trial testimony support an action for unjust enrichment, all as outlined herein-above. The defendants/owners are enriched by the receipt and retention of the fire insurance proceeds in the amount of $21,545.00. The defendants/owners did not expend any money or furnish any compensation adequate to justify an interest in these proceeds. There is the correlative impoverishment to the plaintiffs/sublessees, who paid for all of the repairs necessitated by the fire, expecting that they would be reimbursed from the |.4nsurance proceeds. The enrichment and the impoverishment are connected. The amount of the insurance funds retained by the owners of the premises is the same amount expended by sublessees in expectation of reimbursement. There is no legal cause which justifies the enrichment or impoverishment. An unbiased consideration of the leases involved, does not support the impoverishment to plaintiffs. Contrary to the interpretations of the trial court and appellate court, there is no legal cause which justifies the enrichment to the owners. The clear and original intention of the owner was to relinquish the funds, once the work was completed. In support of this proposition, the record contains a letter from Mrs. Edward's attorney to the Confortos, dated March 7, 1985 indicating that the check for property loss due to fire had been received by the owners, that it had been conveyed to the owners that the fire damage had not been repaired along with certain recommendations from the insurance company. The owners indicated that they were going to retain the proceeds until such time as the work was completed. One of the owners testified in her deposition that "... the check came as a shock. I didn't even know I was going to receive the cheek."
There is no other remedy available to impoverished plaintiffs/sublessees by which the impoverishment might have been reasonably avoided. The insurance policy covered only fire damage repairs. The policy was procured to protect the owner in the event that renter failed to make the repairs necessitated by fire. Plaintiffs/sublessees made the repairs at their expense. Once these repairs were completed, there is no conceivable loss to the owners. The insurance proceeds in the amount of $21,545.00 would come as a windfall to owners. There is no equitable interpretation of the property leases involved in this case supportable by public policy which would allow the double recovery sanctioned by the lower courts. Therefore, this court holds that the doctrine of unjust enrichment applies in this case.
Plaintiffs have unequivocally proven the prerequisites for unjust enrichment as set forth in our jurisprudence. Plaintiffs are accordingly entitled to reimbursement by the owners in the amount of $21,545.00 for repair expenditures necessitated by the fire damage.
_[¿DE CREE
For the reasons assigned, the judgment of the trial court and the Court of Appeal finding no merit to plaintiffs' claim of unjust enrichment are reversed and set aside. Judgment is entered in favor of plaintiffs, J.J.C., Inc., P.J., Inc. and William Colaeurcio, III and against defendants, Rosemary Le-fevre Edwards, Edward J. Lefevre, III and Joann Lefevre Mullet in the total amount of $21,545.00 together with legal interest from date of judicial demand until paid. It is further ordered, adjudged and decreed that defendants, Rosemary Lefevre Edwards, Edward J. Lefevre, III and Joann Lefevre Mullet are cast for the costs of these proceedings.
REVERSED AND RENDERED.
CALOGERO, C.J., and LEMMON and MARCUS, JJ., concur.
WATSON, J., dissents and assigns reasons.
. Pursuant to Rule IV, part 2, § 3, DENNIS, J. was not on the panel which heard and decided this case. See footnote in State v. Barras, 615 So.2d 285 (La.1993).
. Edwards, et al. v. Conforto, et al., 615 So.2d 400 (La.App. 4th Cir.1993).
. See Albert Tate, Jr., The Louisiana Action for Unjustified Enrichment: A Study in Judicial Process, 51 Tul.L.Rev. 466 (1977) for a discussion of the subject.
. The appellate court incorrectly interprets a pivotal fact in this case. The court of appeal surmised that "... Plaintiffs maintained that the owners did not pay the insurance premiums nor did they pay the costs of the fire repairs. They argue further that they were justified in their expectation that they would receive the insurance funds because they paid for the damages caused by the fire and two-thirds of the costs for insurance premiums. The lessee, the Confortos, paid the remaining one-third of the insurance premiums." Edwards v. Conforto, 615 So.2d 400 at 402 (La.App. 4th Cir.1993). The record supports the fact that plaintiffs/sublessees paid the entire insurance premium in the proportions of 2A's by P.J., Inc., and % by J.J.C., Inc.