Case Name: JERRY CHAPMAN, INC. and Security Insurance Company, Appellants, v. William IVEY and Division of Workers' Compensation, Appellees
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1984-03-06
Citations: 448 So. 2d 11
Docket Number: No. AV-176
Parties: JERRY CHAPMAN, INC. and Security Insurance Company, Appellants, v. William IVEY and Division of Workers’ Compensation, Appellees.
Judges: McCORD, GUYTE P., Jr. (Ret.), Associate Judge, concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 448
Pages: 11–12

Head Matter:
JERRY CHAPMAN, INC. and Security Insurance Company, Appellants, v. William IVEY and Division of Workers’ Compensation, Appellees.
No. AV-176.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
March 6, 1984.
Rehearing Denied April 18, 1984.
Susan J. Silverman of Marlow, Shofi, Ortmayer, Smith, Connell & Valerius, Miami, for appellants.
Alfred D. Bieley, Miami, for appellees.

Opinion:
MILLS, Judge.
In this workers' compensation action, the employer/carrier appeal from a deputy commissioner's order awarding claimant's attorney a fee of $2,500. Because the deputy commissioner erred in denying the employer/carrier's motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute pursuant to Workers' Compensation Rule of Procedure 11(b), we reverse.
It is apparent from the record that no action contemplated by WCRP 11(b) took place on the claim for attorney's fees from 2 February 1981 through 2 March 1983, the day the employer/carrier filed a motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute. Claimant had already been awarded benefits and all that remained was for claimant's attorney to request a hearing on attorney's fees within two years of the last action taken on the claim. When the employer/carrier moved to dismiss after the two-year period expired and claimant's attorney failed to show good cause why the claim should remain pending, the deputy commissioner had no choice but to dismiss. Regal Wood Products, Inc. v. Mendez, 432 So.2d 141 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983).
Claimant's attorney contends negotiation with counsel for the E/C concerning a fee constituted "action" within the meaning of WCRP 11(b). The examples of action set out in 11(b), however, are affirmative acts more definite than mere preliminary negotiation between the parties. To consider such negotiation action contemplated by 11(b) would pervert the meaning of the rule.
For purposes of clarity, we note there is no question compensation to the claimant was paid within two years preceding the E/C's motion to dismiss. But this compensation was paid on the claim for benefits, not on the claim for attorney's fees and is therefore irrelevant.
REVERSED.
McCORD, GUYTE P., Jr. (Ret.), Associate Judge, concurs.
WENTWORTH, J., dissents with written opinion.