Case Name: STATE of Arkansas v. Jimmy Clark LEE
Court: Arkansas Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Arkansas
Decision Date: 1982-10-11
Citations: 277 Ark. 142
Docket Number: CR 82-88
Parties: STATE of Arkansas v. Jimmy Clark LEE
Judges: Hickman, Purtle and Hays, JJ., dissent in part.
Reporter: Arkansas Reports
Volume: 277
Pages: 142–146

Head Matter:
STATE of Arkansas v. Jimmy Clark LEE
CR 82-88
639 S.W.2d 745
Supreme Court of Arkansas
Opinion delivered October 11, 1982
Steve Clark, Atty. Gen., by: Victra L. Fewell, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellant.
Beth Gladden Coulson and L. Gene Worsham, for appellee.

Opinion:
Richard B. Adkisson, Chief Justice.
Prior to trial the Jefferson County Circuit Court dismissed a charge of rape against appellee, Jimmy Clark Lee. Appellant, the State of Arkansas, brings this appeal pursuant to Ark. Stat. Ann. § 43-2720 — 2720.1 (Repl. 1977).
The first issue argued on appeal is whether the trial court erred in its interpretation of Ark. Stat. Ann. § 43-2036 (Supp. 1981) which provides that videotaped depositions of minor victims of sexual offenses shall be admitted in evidence in lieu of testimony:
43-2036. Videotaped deposition of alleged victim under seventeen years of age in sexual offense prosecution — Procedure — Use. — In any prosecution for a sexual offense or criminal attempt to commit a sexual offense against a minor, upon motion of the prosecuting attorney and after notice to the opposing counsel, the court may, for a good cause shown, order the taking of a videotaped deposition of any alleged victim under the age of seventeen (17) years. The videotaped deposition shall be taken before the judge in chambers in the presence of the prosecuting attorney, the defendant and his attorneys. Examination and cross-examination of the alleged victim shall proceed at the taking of the videotaped deposition in the same manner as permitted at trial under the provisions of the Arkansas Uniform Rules of Evidence. Any videotaped deposition taken under the provisions of this Act shall be viewed and heard at the trial and entered into the record in lieu of the direct testimony of the alleged victim.
The deposition of the eight-year-old victim was videotaped pursuant to this statute; however, at the videotaping she refused to testify about the alleged crime other than to state that appellee had done something with her that was unusual or odd. The court excused her for a short period of time subject to recall. On recall she testified: that the first time her dad ever did anything her brother was around; that her brother was playing outside and she and her dad were inside; and that she and her dad were watching t.v. in his bedroom. She then became silent and refused to answer any more questions or give any further testimony.
Several days after the videotaping appellee filed a motion to dismiss the charge because the victim's deposition failed to state any grounds for the charge. The trial court granted appellee's motion, holding that under Ark. Stat. Ann. § 43-2036 (Supp. 1981) the victim's videotaped depositions must be viewed and heard at trial and entered into the record in lieu of the direct testimony of the alleged victim. We agree with the trial court's interpretation of this statute. The mandatory language of the statute is clear and unambiguous. We have repeatedly held that when the wording of an enactment is self evident, we need not look elsewhere to determine meaning and intent. Casey v. Scott Paper Co., 272 Ark. 312, 613 S.W.2d 821 (1981); Ellison v. Oliver, 147 Ark. 252, 227 S.W. 586 (1921). Where a statute is plain and unambiguous, there is no room left for construction; and neither the exigencies of a case nor a resort to extrinsic facts will be permitted to alter the meaning of the language used in the statute. Cunningham v. Keeshan, 110 Ark. 99, 161 S.W.2d 170 (1913).
The State next argues that the trial court prematurely judged the State's evidence by dismissing the charge. We agree. The State indicated to the court that it would produce two witnesses other than the victim. Therefore, it was error for the trial court to dismiss the charge. The case is reversed on this point and remanded.
Reversed and remanded.
Hickman, Purtle and Hays, JJ., dissent in part.