Case Name: Lennard Lapoint JENKINS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1999-12-03
Citations: 747 So. 2d 997
Docket Number: No. 99-341
Parties: Lennard Lapoint JENKINS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: DAUKSCH, J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 747
Pages: 997–1002

Head Matter:
Lennard Lapoint JENKINS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. 99-341.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
Dec. 3, 1999.
Rehearing Denied Jan. 14, 2000.
James B. Gibson, Public Defender, ánd S.C. Van Voorhees, Assistant Public Defender, Daytona Beach, for Appellant.
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Wesley Heidt, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellee.

Opinion:
GRIFFIN, J.
Lennard L. Jenkins ["Jenkins"] appeals his judgment and sentence for armed robbery with a weapon. We affirm.
On November 22, 1997, Jenkins, seated in the passenger seat of an automobile driven by his female co-defendant, snatched a woman's purse in the Best Buy parking lot in Daytona Beach. The vehicle bumped the victim's hip and Jenkins reached through the open window grabbing the purse strap, thereby yanking the victim to the ground and dragging her along the pavement until she relinquished her hold on her purse. The victim sus tained a fractured upper arm, contusions on her knees and elbow and asphalt burns.
After grabbing the purse, the car drove off, pursued on foot by members of the victim's family and other "good Samaritans." The police quickly apprehended the couple and Jenkins confessed to snatching the purse. The State charged Jenkins with: (1) principal to armed robbery with a weapon, to wit: an automobile and (2) principal to aggravated battery.
The court conducted a jury trial on November 12, 1998. At trial, the victim testified that the force of the automobile caused her injuries:
A. I was no more than two cars' length away, two cars from where I just parked my car. All of a sudden I got hit in my hip. The first thing I said, "This guy just hit me in the hip with this car." And the next thing I knew the purse, the strap of my purse, was being tugged off from my shoulder and I immediately grabbed the bulk of my pocketbook with my left arm to hold it close to me. He kept pulling it towards me, the purse kept getting tugged ahead.

Q. Now, when you say this arm came out and grabbed your hand, the purse at that point was in the process of being tugged at the same time?
A. Yes.
Q. So what happens after this arm grabs your hand?
A. The car began to accelerate and I was still with my right hand trying to hold the strap that I was clinging to. As the car accelerated I started to lose ground, and that's when I went down. I fell. I was dragged along the asphalt. And the pocketbook was gone. I actually saw the strap had been broken in the air. It was gone.
She also testified that she was dragged by the automobile until she surrendered the purse:
Q. Once you fell to the ground, you said you were dragged. Do you know how far you were dragged?
A. I don't honestly remember how long I was being dragged, but it seemed like forever at that time. But once I felt the actual burning and the ripping of my skin, I just gave up.
On cross-examination, the victim reiterated:
Q. Now, as I understand it, when you first become [sic] aware there was a problem, you were bumped on the hip by the car; is that correct?
A. That's correct.
Q. Did this knock you out?
A. I wasn't just bumped, I was hit.
The victim testified that she sustained permanent scarring and underwent numerous physical therapy sessions.
Jenkins moved for judgment of acquittal at the close of the State's case and renewed it at the close of his own arguing that, as a matter of law, the car was not used as a weapon. The court denied both motions. The jury returned a verdict of guilty as charged on all counts. Jenkins filed a post-verdict motion for judgment of acquittal and for new trial. The trial court denied the motions.
On appeal, Jenkins contends that the trial court erroneously denied his motion for judgment of acquittal and for new trial. According to Jenkins: "[T]he central issue on appeal, is whether, in the specific circumstances of this case, the car was to be classed as a weapon so as to enhance a strong-arm robbery to an armed robbery." We agree with the lower court that the evidence was sufficient for a jury to find that the automobile was used as a weapon. The notion that the evidence at trial does no more than show that the vehicle was used as transportation to and from the site of the purse snatching ignores the victim's description of events. At the very least, it is a jury question whether the automobile was used as a weapon.
The dissent's discussion of Jackson v. State, 662 So.2d 1369 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995), is not without interest and if we were faced with deciding whether a car could be "carried" as a weapon within the meaning of Section 812.13(2)(b), we might or might not embrace the First District's view. The issue plainly has not been raised as an issue on appeal, however, and we do not reach it.
AFFIRMED.
DAUKSCH, J., concurs.
HARRIS, J., dissents, with opinion.
. § 812.13(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (1997).