Case Name: ADLER et al. v. NORTHERN HOTEL CO. et al.
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 1949-06-21
Citations: 175 F.2d 619
Docket Number: No. 9822
Parties: ADLER et al. v. NORTHERN HOTEL CO. et al.
Judges: 
Reporter: Federal Reporter 2d Series
Volume: 175
Pages: 619–624

Head Matter:
ADLER et al. v. NORTHERN HOTEL CO. et al.
No. 9822.
United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.
June 21, 1949.
MINTON, Circuit Judge, dissenting.
Albert E. Jenner, Jr., Edward H. Hatton, Chicago, Illinois, for appellants.
Kenneth J. Marks, Robert Marks, Chicago, Illinois, for appellees.
Before KERNER, MINTON, and DUFFY, Circuit Judges.

Opinion:
KERNER, Circuit Judge.
This is an appeal by defendants from a judgment in favor of plaintiffs in an action under § 205 of the Housing and Rent Act of 1947, 50 U. S .C.A.Appendix, § 1895, for treble damages for alleged overcharges of rent. In this court, defendants have made a motion that the cause be remanded to the District Court with instructions to vacate the judgment and dismiss the complaint on the ground that the District Court was without jurisdiction because the claim of each plaintiff was less than $3,000.
The motion involves interpretation of the Act in its entirety, and in addition, a consideration of the provisions of the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, 50 U.S.C.A.Appendix, § 901 et seq.
Section 205' of the Housing and Rent Act of'1947, as amended, provides that a tenant may bring an .action for alleged overcharges and recover a- maximum of three times the amount of the overcharges (or a minimum amount equal to the actual overcharges), or $50, whichever may be the greater, and that "Suit to recover such amount may be brought in any Federal, State, or Territorial court of competent jurisdiction within one year after the date of such violation."
The identical words "competent jurisdiction" were .used in the Emergency Price Control Act, supra, and 'that phrase in that •statute has not been construed as a restriction upon federal jurisdiction. On the contrary, federal courts have tried damage Claims without regard to the amount involved. This the defendants concede, but they say that' federal courts are • competent to try such actions, not by § 205(e) of that .Act which provides that such action may be brought "in any court of competent jurisdiction" but by virtue of § 205(c) which provides that "The district courts shall have jurisdiction concurrently with 'State and Territorial courts, of all other proceedings *' ." But § . 205(c) has to be read with § 205(e), and when so read, as to jurisdiction, they produce language in effect identical with •§ 205 of the Housing and Rent Act.
Defendants call attention to the case of Fields v. Washington, 3 Cir., 173 F.2d 701, and make the point that a federal court in order to be competent within the meaning of the Housing and Rent Act, supra, must find its jurisdiction under some provision of law existing at the 'time of the enactment of § 205 as part of the Act; they claim that the Act contains no general grant of jurisdiction, and argue that § 205 means any federal court authorized by a pre-existing jurisdictional grant to hear and determine a particular case, requiring as one of its conditions an amount in controversy in excess of $3,000. It does not appear that the court in Fields v. Washington, supra, considered § 205(e) of the Emergency Price Control Act, or that it was called to its attention.
Congress has the power to authorize a suit arising under a federal law to be brought in any inferior court, Robertson v. Railroad Labor Board, 268 U.S. 619, 622, 45 S.Ct. 621, 69 L.Ed. 1119. The question is whether it did so by passage of the Act here involved. The sole object-of construction is to determine tire legislative intent. In considering the problem, it is well to bear in mind that the Housing and Rent Act of 1947, as amended, is emergency legislation. This' appears by § 201(b) of the Act where it is stated:
" the Congress recognizes that an emergency exists and that, for the prevention of inflation and for the achievement of a reasonable stability in the general level of rents during the transition period, as well as the attainment of other salutary objectives of the above-named Act, it is necessary for a limited time to impose certain restrictions upon rents charged for rental housing accommodations in defense-rental areas."
Thus Congress created the treble damage remedy as a means of statutory enforcement. The Act creating this remedy is highly remedial, and the plain purpose of § 205 authorizing recovery of three times the amount of an overcharge was to enlist the help of tenants by soliciting their aid in filing suits against overcharging landlords. A remedial statute should be liberally construed to effect the purpose of Congress and to give a remedy in all cases intended to be covered. Miller v. Robertson, 266 U.S. 243, 248, 45 S.Ct. 73, 69 L.Ed. 265. Hence, the language used in § 205 ought to be so construed as to permit the greatest freedom for the filing of such suits.
In construing the language of § 205, we commence with the rule that the courts are not at liberty to construe any statute so as to deny effect to any part of its language. "It is a cardinal rule of statutory construction that significance and effect shall, if possible, be accorded to every word. Another rule equally recognized is that every part of a statute must be construed in connection with the whole, so as to make all the parts harmonize, if possible, and give meaning to each." Market Co. v. Hoffman, 101 U.S. 112, 115, 116, 25 L.Ed. 782, and Ex parte Public Nat. Bank, 278 U.S. 101, 104, 49 S.Ct. 43, 73 L.Ed. 202. That is to say, every word used is presumed to have meaning and purpose, for Congress is not to be thought by the courts to have used language idly.
As already noted, § 205 provides that suit to recover such amount ($50 or three times the amount of the overcharge) may be brought in any federal court of competent jurisdiction. The terms "such amount," "federal," and "competent jurisdiction," we have been told, cannot be removed from the context but must be read as part of the entire section and construed so as to give effect to the intent of Congress, Cf. United States v. American Trucking Associations, 310 U.S. 534, 542, 60 S.Ct. 1059, 84 L.Ed. 1345, and that in deciphering that intent we must construe the details of an Aot in conformity with its dominating general purpose so as to carry out the expressed legislative policy. Securities and Exchange Commission v. C. M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 350, 64 S.Ct. 120, 88 L.Ed. 88.
When the purposes of Congress are considered and the well known principles of the rules already mentioned are applied, there can be no doubt that the Housing and Rent Act, supra, does contain a grant of general jurisdiction to the federal courts. See Adams v. Backlund, D.C., 81 F.Supp. 643. To hold otherwise we would have to ignore § '205, especially the phrase such amount. This we may not do. Market Co. v. Hoffman, supra, and Ex parte Public Nat. Bank, supra.
In view of the foregoing, the motion is denied.