Case Name: William Roe, Respondent, v. Thomas E. Crimmins, Appellant
Court: New York Court of Common Pleas
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1895-01
Citations: 10 Misc. 711
Docket Number: 
Parties: William Roe, Respondent, v. Thomas E. Crimmins, Appellant.
Judges: 
Reporter: New York Miscellaneous Reports
Volume: 10
Pages: 711–717

Head Matter:
William Roe, Respondent, v. Thomas E. Crimmins, Appellant.
(New York Common Pleas
General Term,
January, 1895.)
One who voluntarily exposes himself to the risk of a danger from the negligence of another which he understands and appreciates cannot recover for an injury which results from such exposure.
On the evening of a general election the plaintiff, for the purpose of seeing the election returns displayed at certain newspaper offices, took up a position in the street between an open, unguarded trench and a car track, in the midst of a small hut rapidly-increasing crowd, which swayed back and forth to avoid the cars as they passed on the track. After remaining there over an hour, in one of the rushes of the crowd, plaintiff was pushed into the trench and received the injuries for which action was brought. Held, that plaintiff voluntarily exposed himself to a risk which was obvious to him, and was, therefore, guilty of contributory negligence, and was not entitled to recover.
Bischow, J., dissents.
Appeal by defendant from the affirmance by the General Term of the City Court of a judgment in favor of the plaintiff, entered upon the verdict of a jury, for damages sustained through the alleged negligence of the defendant, in maintaining an open and unguarded excavation in Park row, near Frankfort street, in the city of New York, during the construction of the Third Avenue Cable road.
Thomas 8. Moore, for appellant.
Edga/r J. Efatha/n, for respondent.

Opinion:
Daly, Ch. J.
The principle of law firmly established in this state, and recently stated, by this court, that " one who knows of a danger from the negligence of another, and understands and appreciates the risk therefrom, and voluntarily exposes himself to it, is precluded from recovering for an injury which results from the exposure " (Robinson v. Manhattan Railway, 5 Misc. Rep. 209 ; 25 N. Y. Supp. 91), seems to be particularly applicable to the case of this plaintiff. On the night of November 8, 1892, he went to Park row to look at the election returns displayed at the newspaper offices, and took up a position in the middle of the street, within two feet of an open, unguarded trench, along with a constantly-increasing crowd of persons ultimately numbering many thousands. He stood between the trench and a car track, and whenever a car approached the crowd surged or rushed to get out of the way. After he had stood on the spot about an hour and a half the crowd, in one of its rushes, pushed him into the trench, and he thereby sustained the injuries for which he sued.
There is no question that the plaintiff voluntarily exposed himself to an obvious risk. He saw the trench as soon as he reached it. It was dug for the purpose of laying the cable of the Third Avenue Street railroad, and was eight feet wide, six feet deep and running for some distance up and down the street, and was, according to his testimony, unprotected and unguarded at the point where he stood, although twenty feet away there was a fence to it. He chose the position he occupied in order to see the bulletins of both The "World and The Sun newspapers. When he first arrived at the spot " there was not much of a crowd," and the crowd commenced to come so that there might have been fifteen or twenty thousand persons. The whole of Park row was full of people cheering and crowding.
The plaintiff remained with this excited crowd about him, which was surging and rushing to get out of the way every time a car passed, and he knew that if the crowd pushed his way he must be precipitated into the trench beside which he stood, with no power, as he admits, to protect himself except to catch hold of some one, which he tried to do, but missed, at the time he sustained his injury. We look in vain for any evidence of care on plaintiff's part to guard against the danger to which he knew he was exposed. "It is a fundamental principle in the law of this state that in an action for a personal injury based on negligence of the defendant the absence of negligence on the part of the plaintiff contributing to the injury must be affirmatively shown by the plaintiff, either by direct proof or by circumstances." Weston v. City of Troy, 139 N. Y. 281. In the case last cited the court of last resort felt bound to set aside a recovery against the city of Troy for damages sustained by the plaintiff in slipping upon the ice in the public street. The court held 'that the negligence of the city was made out, but that the judgment could not be affirmed without making a precedent for overturning the rule above quoted; that if the plaintiff discovered the ridge of ice she might, by using due care, have kept on her way, but could not heedlessly disregard the precaution which the obvious situation suggested and proceed as though the sidewalk was free and unobstructed.
"While there might have been little or no danger when plaintiff took up his position near the trench, owing to the smallness of the crowd which had then gathered, the peril increased as the crowd increased and its irresistible motion became inevitable; and yet he remained there an hour next to the open excavation, and his continuance in the place of danger was an absence of all care which must defeat his recovery, for the risk was voluntarily assumed. Ho precaution was taken for self-protection, and there was a complete failure to establish an essential of his action, viz., the absence of contributory negligence.
The judgment should be reversed and a new trial ordered, with costs to appellant of the appeal and the former trial to abide the event of the action.
Pryor, J., concurs.