Case Name: STATE of Wisconsin, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Sidney FONDER, Defendant-Appellant
Court: Wisconsin Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Wisconsin
Decision Date: 1991-04-25
Citations: 162 Wis. 2d 591
Docket Number: No. 90-0687-CR
Parties: STATE of Wisconsin, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Sidney FONDER, Defendant-Appellant.
Judges: Before Gartzke, P.J., Dykman and Sundby, JJ.
Reporter: Wisconsin Reports Second
Volume: 162
Pages: 591–606

Head Matter:
STATE of Wisconsin, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Sidney FONDER, Defendant-Appellant.
Court of Appeals
No. 90-0687-CR.
Submitted on briefs December 11, 1990.
Decided April 25, 1991.
(Also reported in 469 N.W.2d 922.)
For the defendant-appellant the cause was submitted on the briefs of Mary E. Waitrovich, first assistant state public defender.
For the plaintiff-respondent the cause was submitted on the briefs of Donald J. Hanaway, attorney general, and Michael R. Klos, assistant attorney general.
Before Gartzke, P.J., Dykman and Sundby, JJ.
Petition to review denied.

Opinion:
GARTZKE, P.J.
Sidney Fonder appeals from a judgment of conviction for battery to a correctional officer, sec. 940.20(1), Stats. The issue is whether criminal prosecution of a prison inmate for battery subjects the inmate to double jeopardy after prison officials took disciplinary action against him for the same battery. We conclude that the inmate is not subjected to double jeopardy, and we therefore affirm.
Fonder is an inmate of Waupun Correctional Institution. On May 11, 1988, he fought with prison guards, injuring three of them. On May 20, 1988, during institutional disciplinary proceedings, he was found guilty of violating three prison regulations: Wis. Adm. Code sec. HSS 303.12 (May 1988), battery; Wis. Adm. Code sec. HSS 303.16 (May 1988), threats; and Wis. Adm. Code sec. HSS 303.24 (May 1988), disobeying orders. He was given a disposition of eight days of adjustment segregation, 360 days of program segregation, and a ten-day extension of his mandatory release date.
A criminal action charging three counts of battery to a correctional officer was subsequently brought against Fonder. He moved to dismiss the complaint on double jeopardy grounds. After the trial court denied the motion, Fonder pleaded no contest to one count and was sentenced to nine months consecutive to his existing sentence.
Fonder argues that the prison disciplinary action combined with the criminal prosecution for the same incident violated his right to be free from double jeopardy. U.S. Const, amend. V; Wis. Const, art. I, sec. 8. The constitutional issue is a question of law. We decide such questions without deference to the trial court. Davis v. Grover, 159 Wis. 2d 150, 158, 464 N.W.2d 220, 223 (Ct. App. 1990). Fonder concedes that we recently rejected the same argument he makes here in State v. Quiroz, 149 Wis. 2d 691, 439 N.W.2d 621 (Ct. App. 1989), where we relied on State v. Killebrew, 115 Wis. 2d 243, 340 N.W.2d 470 (1983). Fonder urges us to overrule Quiroz and to distinguish Killebrew from the present case.
Killebrew was a consolidated appeal of two cases, each involving the same double jeopardy argument. Each appellant was an inmate who had been subjected to disciplinary proceedings for escape. One had received a disposition of 360 days of program segregation and a forfeiture of five days earned good time. The other had received a disposition of eight days of adjustment segregation, 180 days of program segregation and forfeiture of all accumulated good time. Each was subsequently charged with escape in violation of sec. 946.42(3)(a), Stats. (1979-80). Each argued that the criminal charge subjected him to double jeopardy, since he had already been punished by prison officials.
The Killebrew court reasoned that the criminal charge would be barred by double jeopardy considerations only if the prison disciplinary action constituted punishment. Killebrew, 115 Wis. 2d at 256, 340 N.W.2d at 477. To determine what constitutes punishment the court applied a "principal purpose" test: "Governmental action is punishment under the double jeopardy clause if its principal purpose is punishment, retribution or deterrence." Killebrew, 115 Wis. 2d at 251, 340 N.W.2d at 475. The court held that the principal purposes of the disciplinary proceedings "are maintaining institutional order and safety and assisting individual rehabilitation." Killebrew, 115 Wis. 2d at 256, 340 N.W.2d at 477. The court concluded that prison disciplinary action is not punishment and thus the inmate was not subjected to double jeopardy. Killebrew, 115 Wis. 2d at 256, 340 N.W.2d at 477.
A similar situation arose in Quiroz, where an inmate escaped and was recaptured. Prison officials imposed eight days of administrative segregation, 360 days of pro gram segregation, and a ten-day extension of the inmate's mandatory release date. The inmate was later charged in circuit court for criminal escape. He moved to dismiss the charge, claiming that the criminal proceedings constituted double jeopardy. The trial court agreed and dismissed the case. Concluding that Killebrew controlled the case and that the inmate's double jeopardy rights were not violated, we reversed. Quiroz, 149 Wis. 2d at 692, 439 N.W.2d at 622.
Fonder argues that because of a statutory change between Killebrew and Quiroz, we mistakenly relied on the former when deciding the latter. In Killebrew, prison disciplinary action resulted in a loss of good time. In this appeal, as in Quiroz, disciplinary action extended the mandatory release date. Since statutory good time was eliminated after Killebrew, prison officials now extend mandatory release dates.
Fonder argues that the legislature intended the extension of mandatory release dates as punishment. He points to a note in the drafting file of 1983 Wis. Act 528. The note states: "That portion of the present statute [sec. 53.11(2), Stats. (1981-82)] dealing with punishment for institutional misconduct has been changed . . ." Wisconsin Legislative Reference Bureau, drafting file for 1983 Wis. Act 528, Proposed Revision of Good Time Statutes, Sept. 14, 1983, p.2. (emphasis added). We are not persuaded that the note reflects the legislature's intent. The legislative reference bureau did not refer to the note or to punishment in its analysis of 1983 Assembly Bill 1011, which resulted in 1983 Wis. Act 528.
Moreover, the Killebrew court said: "When the principal purpose is nonpunitive, the fact that a punitive motive may also be present does not make the action punishment." Killebrew, 115 Wis. 2d at 251, 340 N.W.2d at 475. As we have noted, the Killebrew court described the principal purposes of the prison disciplinary rules as maintenance of institutional order and safety and assistance of individual rehabilitation, even though the notes also specified punishment as a purpose. Killebrew, 115 Wis. 2d at 256, 340 N.W.2d at 477. The purposes of the rules stated in Wis. Adm. Code sec. DOC 303.01 are the same today as they were when Killebrew was decided.
Fonder also relies on the testimony of Owen Mooney, Registrar at the Waupun Correctional Institution. Mooney testified that " [p]unishment is one of the purposes of the disciplinary action." Mooney's testimony adds nothing new. He testified that other purposes include maintenance of order, safety and security, and rehabilitation of the inmate.
The conclusions in Killebrew, Quiroz and this appeal are in good company. Under various rationales, many federal and state courts have concluded that prison disciplinary action followed by criminal prosecution for the same incident does not violate the double jeopardy clause.
In sum, Fonder's arguments were essentially answered in Killebrew, more specifically answered in Quiroz, and are contrary to the overwhelming view of other courts. Because punishment was not the principal purpose of the disciplinary action taken against Fonder, the criminal proceeding based on the same incident did not subject him to double jeopardy. We affirm the judgment.
By the Court. — Judgment affirmed.
Program segregation entails the following: one inmate to a cell, unless overcrowding prevents it; provision for a clean mattress, sufficient light for reading, sanitary toilet and sink, and adequate ventilation and heating; upon request, provision for adequate clothing, bedding, hygiene supplies, paper, pens, and books; the same food as provided to the general population; unless permitted by written policy, no electronic equipment or typewriters in the cells (incentives are provided to earn the privilege of having these items); visitation, telephone, and mail rights; showers at least every four days; opportunity to participate in various programs and services; permission to leave cells for medical or clinical attention, showers, visits, exercise, and emergencies endangering inmate safety; approved items from the canteen may be brought to the inmate; smoking and talking are permitted, but regulated. Wis. Adm. Code sec. DOC 303.70.
Adjustment segregation prohibits smoking and places further restrictions on personal property permitted in the cells. The maximum term in adjustment segregation is eight days. Wis. Adm. Code sec. DOC 303.69.
1983 Wis. Act 528 amended sec. 53.11(2), Stats. (1983-84) (renumbered to sec. 302.11(2), Stats.).
Section 302.11(2), Stats., provides in part:
(a) Any inmate who violates any regulation of the prison or refuses or neglects to perform required or assigned duties is subject to extension of the mandatory release date as follows: 10 days for the first offense, 20 days for the 2nd offense and 40 days for the 3rd or each subsequent offense.
(b) In addition to the sanctions under par. (a), any inmate who is placed in adjustment, program or controlled segregation status shall have his or her mandatory release date extended by a number of days equal to 50% of the number of days spent in segregation status . . .
See United States v. Rising, 867 F.2d 1255 (10th Cir. 1989) (criminal prosecution of prisoner for murder of fellow prisoner not barred by prior imposition of administrative punishment); United States v. Salazar, 505 F.2d 72 (8th Cir. 1974) (administrative punishment and subsequent criminal proceeding for prisoner's same act does not violate double jeopardy); United States v. Williamson, 469 F.2d 88 (5th Cir. 1972) (per curiam) (no merit to prisoner's contention that his loss of "good time" credits combined with his subsequent conviction and sentence for unlawful escape constituted double jeopardy); Hutchison v. United States, 450 F.2d 930 (10th Cir. 1971) (per curiam) (forfeiture of 375 days of "good time" as administrative punishment in combination with criminal conviction does not constitute double jeopardy); United States v. Stuckey, 441 F.2d 1104 (3rd Cir.) (per curiam) cert. denied, 404 U.S. 841 (1971) (prisoner's placement in segregation unit for carrying knife-like instrument does not bar subsequent criminal prosecution for same conduct); United States v. Lepiscopo, 429 F.2d 258 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 948 (1970) (criminal prosecution of prisoner for attempted escape does not constitute double jeopardy after prisoner had been punished by prison officials); United States v. Apker, 419 F.2d 388 (9th Cir. 1969) (per curiam) (prisoner's placement in segregated confinement for 37 days for attempted escape and subsequent conviction for same offense does not implicate double jeopardy clause); United States v. Shapiro, 383 F.2d 680 (7th Cir. 1967) (imposition of administrative discipline and criminal punishment are "distinct and separate" even though based on same act, and therefore no double punishment); Gloria v. Miller, 658 F. Supp. 229 (W.D. Okla. 1987) (memorandum opinion) (prisoner's double jeopardy claim, based on disciplinary proceedings and criminal conviction without merit); Orosco v. United States, 526 F. Supp. 756, 759 (W.D. Okla. 1981) ("It is well established that administrative punishment imposed by prison officials does not render a subsequent judicial proceeding, criminal in nature, violative of the prohibition against double jeopardy"); People o. Jocelyn, 537 N.E.2d 1086, cert. denied, 545 N.E.2d 121 (1989) (revocation of 360 days of prisoner's good time no bar to subsequent criminal prosecution for escape); State v. Kjeldahl, 278 N.W.2d 58 (Minn. 1979) (criminal prosecution is not barred after prison disciplinary measures); State v. Loomis, 629 S.W.2d 637 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) (administrative sanction imposed on prisoner for carrying concealed weapon was exercise of administrative authority, thus subsequent criminal conviction for same act was not a punishment); State v. Maddox, 208 N.W.2d 274 (Neb. 1973) (prisoner's loss of good time for escape does not place him in jeopardy, thus subsequent conviction for escape does not constitute double jeopardy); People v. Frye, 144 A.D.2d 714, 534 N.Y.S.2d 735 (1988) (no double jeopardy when prison disciplinary proceeding followed by criminal proceeding based on same prisoner acts); Dean v. State, 778 P.2d 476 (Okla. Crim. App. 1989) (administrative disciplinary penalties for possession of marijuana no bar to criminal prosecution of prisoner for same offense); State v. Weekley, 240 N.W.2d 80 (S.D. 1976) (administrative discipline designed to ensure orderly administration of the prison and criminal prosecution designed to vindicate public justice); State v. Lebo, 282 A.2d 804, 805 (Vt. 1971) (". . . neither federal nor state concepts of double jeopardy include administrative discipline").
After briefs were filed, Fonder asked this court to also consider a United States Supreme Court decision, United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435 (1989), which was decided after Quiroz.
The Halper court said that "a civil sanction that cannot fairly be said solely to serve a remedial purpose, but rather can only be explained as also serving either retributive or deterrent purposes, is punishment . . ." 435 U.S. at 448. This language suggests that if punishment is a purpose of a civil sanction, then the double jeopardy protection is implicated. The court went on to hold that "a defendant who already has been punished in a criminal prosecution may not be subjected to an additional civil sanction to the extent that the second sanction may not fairly be characterized as remedial, but only as a deterrent or retribution." 435 U.S. at 448-49.
Halper is inapposite. Halper dealt with monetary damages sought by the federal government pursuant to a statute aimed at providing reimbursement for the costs of criminal prosecution. This appeal deals with administrative measures taken by a state agency pursuant to state regulations aimed at maintaining prison order and rehabilitating prison inmates. The factual contexts differ so significantly that we deem it inappropriate to apply the Halper analysis. It is for the Wisconsin Supreme Court, if it so chooses, to modify its Killebrew analysis in light of Halper.