Case Name: DIFFENDERFER et al. v. CENTRAL BAPTIST CHURCH OF MIAMI, FLORIDA, INC., et al.
Court: Supreme Court of the United States
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 1972-01-10
Citations: 404 U.S. 412
Docket Number: No. 70-47
Parties: DIFFENDERFER et al. v. CENTRAL BAPTIST CHURCH OF MIAMI, FLORIDA, INC., et al.
Judges: Mr. Justice Powell and Mr. Justice Rehnquist took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
Reporter: United States Reports
Volume: 404
Pages: 412–417

Head Matter:
DIFFENDERFER et al. v. CENTRAL BAPTIST CHURCH OF MIAMI, FLORIDA, INC., et al.
No. 70-47.
Argued December 6, 1971
Decided January 10, 1972
Leo Pfeffer argued the cause for appellant Diffen-derfer. With him on the brief were Richard Yale Feder, Irma Robbins Feder, and Melvin L. Wulf. Howard J. Hollander argued the cause and filed a brief for appellant Paul.
Charles M. Whelan argued the cause for appellee Central Baptist Church of Miami. With him on the brief were Herbert S. Sawyer, Karl B. Block, Jr., and William R. Consedine.
Franklin C. Salisbury and Noel H. Thompson filed a brief for Protestants and Other Americans United for Separation of Church and State as amicus curiae urging reversal. Robert L. Shevin, Attorney General of Florida, pro se, filed a memorandum.

Opinion:
Per Curiam.
This is an action for a declaratory judgment that Florida Stat. § 192.06 (4) (1967) violates the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States insofar as it authorizes a tax exemption for church property used, inter alia, as a commercial parking lot, and for an injunction requiring appropriate state and local officials to assess and collect taxes against such property. It is brought by citizens and taxpayers of Dade County, Florida, where the property in question is located. The crux of their complaint is that state aid in the form of a tax exemption for church property used primarily for commercial purposes amounts not only to an establishment of the one religion aided, but also to an inhibition on the free exercise of other religions. A three-judge District Court, convened pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 2281, 2284, upheld the validity of the statute as applied to the property involved herein, 316 F. Supp. 1116 (1970), and plaintiffs appealed to this Court. 28 U. S. C. § 1253. We noted probable jurisdiction on March 1, 1971. 401 U. S. 934.
The Central Baptist Church of Miami, Florida, Inc., is the owner of nearly a full square block of land in downtown Miami which is occupied by church buildings and an offstreet parking lot. The parking facilities are utilized by numerous persons pursuing a variety of church activities. These facilities are also used as a commercial parking lot every day except Sunday. At the time this suit was instituted and decided in the District Court, Fla. Stat. § 192.06 (4) provided for exemption from taxation of:
"All houses of public worship and lots on which they are situated, and all pews or steps and furniture therein, every parsonage and all burying grounds not owned or held by individuals or corporations for speculative purposes, tombs and right of burial . . . ."
Prior to the decision of the District Court, the Florida Supreme Court had held, in a case involving the same property as is involved here, that church parking lots retain their full tax exemption under state law even though they may be used for commercial as well as church purposes. Central Baptist Church v. Dade County, 216 So. 2d 4 (1968). This led to the constitutional challenge in the District Court.
At its 1971 Regular Session, the Florida Legislature repealed § 196.191 (the 1969 successor to § 192.06) and enacted new legislation, approved June 15, 1971, effective December 31, 1971, which provides, in relevant part, that church property is exempt from taxation only if the property is used predominantly for religious purposes and only "to the extent of the ratio that such predominant use bears to the non-exempt use." Fla. Stat. § 196.192 (2).
We must review the judgment of the District Court in light of Florida law as it now stands, not as it stood when the judgment below was entered. Hall v. Beals, 396 U. S. 45, 48 (1969); United States v. Alabama, 362 U. S. 602, 604 (1960); cf. Thorpe v. Housing Authority, 393 U. S. 268, 281-282 (1969); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U. S. 52, 60 (1941). It is clear that the church parking lot that was the subject of the taxpayers' complaint is no longer fully exempt from taxation. If, in fact, it can be demonstrated that the lot is predominantly used for nonreligious purposes, it will receive no exemption whatever. "The case has therefore lost its character as a present, live controversy of the kind that must exist if we are to avoid advisory opinions on abstract propositions of law." Hall v. Beals, supra, at 48.
This is not a case that is "capable of repetition, yet evading review," Southern Pacific Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U. S. 498, 515 (1911), nor is it the kind of case that may produce irreparable injury if not decided immediately, see, e. g., Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U. S. 814 (1969) ; Gray v. Sanders, 372 U. S. 368 (1963). The only relief sought in the complaint was a declaratory judgment that the now repealed Fla. Stat. § 192.06 (4) is unconstitutional as applied to a church parking lot used for commercial purposes and an injunction against its application to said lot. This relief is, of course, inappropriate now that the statute has been repealed.
Because it is possible that appellants may wish to amend their complaint so as to demonstrate that the repealed statute retains some continuing force or to attack the newly enacted legislation, rather than remanding the case to the District Court for dismissal as is our usual practice when a case has become moot pending a decision by this Court, United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U. S. 36, 39, and n. 2 (1950), we vacate the judgment of the District Court and remand the case to the District Court with leave to the appellants to amend their pleadings. Bryan v. Austin, 354 U. S. 933 (1957).
Judgment will be entered accordingly.
Mr. Justice Powell and Mr. Justice Rehnquist took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.