Case Name: Betty Ann SUBLET v. UNITED T. V. RENTAL, INC.
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1973-11-02
Citations: 284 So. 2d 783
Docket Number: No. 5369
Parties: Betty Ann SUBLET v. UNITED T. V. RENTAL, INC.
Judges: Before SAMUEL, REDMANN, LEM-MON, GULOTTA, STOULIG, BOU-TALL, and SCHOTT, JJ., and BAILES and FLEMING, JJ., pro tem.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 284
Pages: 783–786

Head Matter:
Betty Ann SUBLET v. UNITED T. V. RENTAL, INC.
No. 5369.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fourth Circuit.
Nov. 2, 1973.
Robert J. Hobbs, Galen S. Brown, New Orleans, for plaintiff-appellant.
H. Edward Weidlich, Jr., J. Stuart Douglass, New Orleans, for defendant-ap-pellee.
Before SAMUEL, REDMANN, LEM-MON, GULOTTA, STOULIG, BOU-TALL, and SCHOTT, JJ., and BAILES and FLEMING, JJ., pro tem.

Opinion:
ON MOTION TO DISMISS
FLEMING, Judge pro tem.
This is an appeal from a judgment rendered by the First City Court of New Orleans. The following dates are pertinent:
March 23, 1972 — Judgment signed and notice of judgment mailed to the parties.
April 11, 1972 — Motion and order of appeal signed (no bond was necessary as this is a pauper case).
This court, on its own motion has raised the question of whether the appeal has been timely filed.
This case involves more than one hundred dollars. Code of Civil Procedure Article 5002, as amended provides that:
"The delay for answering shall be stated in the citation and shall be five days, exclusive of legal holidays. A defendant shall incorporate in his answer all of the exceptions on which he intends to rely. No prior default is necessary, and judgment may be rendered as provided in Article 4896. Notice of the rendition of judgment is not necessary, except as provided in Article 4898. The delay for answering garnishment interrogatories shall be five days, exclusive of legal holidays.
"A new trial may be applied for within three days, exclusive of legal holidays, of the date of judgment, or within three days of the service of notice of judgment when necessary.
"A devolutive or suspensive appeal to the proper appellate court may be granted if applied for within ten days after the expiration of the delay for applying for a new trial, or within ten days of the denial of a new trial.
"The suspensive appeal bond, as required by the applicable provisions of Article 2124 must be filed within the delays allowed above for a suspensive appeal."
Here the judgment was signed on March 23, 1972, and the motion for appeal made on April 11, 1972, a period of nineteen days elapsed from the time the judgment was signed and the time the motion for appeal was made. As C.C.P. art. 5002 only allows ten days, after the expiration of the delays for applying for a new trial, the motion for the appeal comes too late.
The appellant argues that the notice of judgment that was mailed was incorrectly addressed and on remailing by the court, he did not receive it until April 10, 1972, after the delays to appeal had expired; that he moved to appeal at once and that under the decision of this court in the case of Reid v. Blanke, 215 So.2d 406 (1968), where the clerk does send out notices of judgment by custom, the appellant will not be deprived of his appeal where he relied on the practice of the court to notify him.
We first note that the initial hearing of Reid v. Blanke, reported at 200 So.2d 132, this court remanded the case for a hearing for the purpose of taking evidence on the question of how and when defendants could have ascertained that the judgment had been signed. This court then found that a custom existed and was relied upon by the attorneys, and since appeals are favored, granting an out-of-time appeal.
We now question whether the case of Reid v. Blanke, supra, should stand. If it does, it would be proper to remand this case to the First City Court for additional evidence.
The Code of Civil Procedure, as amended, provides for the necessary rules that our courts must follow, as directed by the legislature. In C.C.P. art. 5002 it grants ten days for an appeal from a city court judgment after the expiration of the delays for appealing for a new trial or service of notice of judgment, when necessary.
In City Courts, C.C.P. art. 4898 provides :
"Notice of judgment shall- be served on a defendant against whom judgment is rendered if the citation was not served on him personally, and he failed to answer.
"Notice of judgment need not be given in any other case."
Thus notice is required only when a defendant was not served personally and failed to answer. Here it is the plaintiff who is appealing ergo no notice is required.
The legislature simply has not provided in a case such as this and in Reid v. Blanke, supra, that a notice of judgment is required. Since no notice is required, the appellant's argument that he received the notice late cannot prevail. The desirability of a mandatory notice or the efficacy of a customary notice addresses itself to the legislature not to the courts. In district court cases a notice of judgment is usually required, C.C.P. art. 1913.
The custom of the clerk as shown in Reid v. Blanke, supra, cannot prevail over the requirements of the Code of Civil Procedure to allow an out-of-time appeal. While custom can be considered (Civil Code Article 21) it is only when there is no express law on the subject. Here in C.C.P. art. 5002 there is an express law that no notice of judgment is required, therefore the motion for an appeal comes too late.
In coming to the conclusion that we have in this case, it becomes necessary to overrule Reid v. Blanke insofar as it is inconsistent with this decision.
Because we overruled the Reid case, we have submitted this matter to the court en banc in accordance with our internal rules.
The appeal is dismissed.
Dismissed.