Case Name: CITY OF MUSKEGON v. SLATER. APPEAL re SHAMEL
Court: Michigan Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1967-10-02
Citations: 379 Mich. 466
Docket Number: Calendar No. 7, Docket No, 51,417
Parties: CITY OF MUSKEGON v. SLATER. APPEAL re SHAMEL.
Judges: Dethmers, C.J., and Souris, O’Hara, and Brennan, JJ., concurred with Kelly, J.
Reporter: Michigan Reports
Volume: 379
Pages: 466–474

Head Matter:
CITY OF MUSKEGON v. SLATER. APPEAL re SHAMEL.
Separate Opinion.
Dethmers, C. J., and Kelly, Souris, O’Hara, and Brennan, JJ.
1. Costs — Regulation—Statute.
The legislature’s right to regulate the items and amounts allowable as costs in suits was recognized in the court rules (GCR 1963, 526.1).
References for Points in Headnotes
20 Am Jur 2d, Costs §§ 2, 6.
27 Am Jur 2d, Eminent Doman § 473 et seq.
[3, 5-8] 20 Am Jur 2d, Costs § 72 et seq.-, 27 Am Jut 2d, Eminent Domain § 476.
5 Api Jur 2d, Appeal and Error § 1009.
2. Eminent Domain — Constitution—Legislature—Costs.
The Constitution of 1963 did not take, away from the legislature the power to prescribe what costs should he allowable in condemnation proceedings (Const 1963, art 10, § 2).
3. Same — Statutory Limitation.
The legislature had authority to fix the maximum attorney’s fee allowable in condemnation proceedings at $25, and no statutory authority exists for the taxation of an attorney’s foo in a larger amount (CL 1948, § 213.37).
4. Costs — Constitutional Law — Condemnation Proceeding.
No costs are allowed on appeal from judgment of Court of Appeals reversing trial court’s judgment assessing attorney’s fee in excess of $25 as part of costs in condemnation proceeding, a constitutional question being involved (Const 1963, art 10, §2; CL 1948, §213.37).
Separate Opinion.
Kelly, Black, T. M. Kavanagh, O’Hara, and Adams, JJ.
5. Eminent Domain — Just Compensation — Attorney’s Pee.
Attorney fees are not a part of just compensation, to he fixed by the court under the Constitution, for the taking of private property for public use (Const 1963, art 10, § 2).
6. Costs — Attorney’s Pees — Statutory Provision.
Present statutory provisions dealing with the allowance of costs, including attorney fees, follow no pattern and when viewed as a whole are completely unjust.
7. Eminent Domain — Attorney’s Pee.
Reasonable attorney’s fee may he allowed in a condemnation ease where the condemning authority discontinues the action before an award has been made, hut the attorney’s fee is limited to $25 by statute in case an award is made (CL 1948, §§ 213.37, 213.38).
8. Costs — Attorney’s Pees — Statutes.
Assessment of costs and allowance of attorney fees in actions should be the responsibility of the Supreme Court through amendment by the legislature of the revised judicature aet (CLS 1961, § 600.2401).
Appeal from Court of Appeals, Division 3, Holbrook, P. J., and Bnrns and J. H. Grillis, JJ,. reversing Mnskegon, Beers (Henry L.), J.
Submitted March 8, 1967.
(Calendar No. 7, Docket No, 51,417.)
Decided October 2, 1967.
Rehearing denied December 4, 1967.
2 Mich App 235, affirmed.
Condemnation petition by City of Muskegon, a municipal corporation, against Henry S. Slater, John D. Shamel, Esther H. Shamel, and others to acquire land for an urban renewal project. Award confirmed and order entered assessing attorney fee for defendants against plaintiff city in the amount of $1,250. Reversed by Court of Appeals and remanded for entry of judgment for attorney’s fee in the amount of $25. Defendants appeal.
Affirmed.
Parmenter, Forsythe & Steendam, for plaintiff.
James F. Sohoener, for defendants Shamel.
Sinas, Dramis, Brahe & Werbelow (Lester N. Turner, of counsel), and James F. Schoener, for defendants on application for rehearing.

Opinion:
Kelly, J.
The city of Muskegon adopted an urban renewal plan and, to implement said plan, filed its petition for condemnation, including a parcel owned by defendants John D. and Esther H. Shamel.
A two-week trial ended in a jury verdict for plaintiff as to the question of necessity and an award of $20,500 damages in favor of defendants Shamel. Defendants filed their proposed taxed bill of costs which included an attorney's fee of $1,250 and the city of Muskegon filed objections, citing the statutory limitation.
The trial court granted the requested attorney fee, stating:
"It is my opinion that this statute is an illegal and unlawful interference with the power of the court to assess reasonable costs, and further, that it is in direct violation of the rights of the defendant to receive just compensation for the taking of his property."
The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court, holding (1) that no statutory authority existed for the court's grant of $1,250 attorney fee and, according to our holding in Detroit Edison Company v. Janosz (1957), 350 Mich 606, such authority was necessary; and (2) that in a case involving the Michigan condemnation statutes the United States Supreme Court held:
"Attorneys' fees and expenses are not embraced within just compensation for land taken by eminent domain."
Defendants' and appellants' claim that the legislature lacks the power to regulate the amount of costs is not supported by cases in Michigan or any other jurisdiction. In fact, authority is to the contrary.
The Michigan legislature's right to regulate the items and amounts allowable as costs was recognized and acknowledged in our promulgated court rules, GCB, 1963, 526.1.
Defendants and appellants, add an additional issue in their ¿ppeal to this Court, claiming the 1963 Constitution took away from the legislature its previous right to determine when, and as to what amount, the court could assess costs.
The 1908 Constitution, under article 13, entitled "Eminent Domain," devoted five sections to this subject. The 1963 Constitution, under article 10, entitled "Property," devoted one of its six sections, namely section 2, to eminent domain, as follows:
"Private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation therefor being first made or secured in a manner prescribed by law. Compensation shall be determined in proceedings in a court of record."
It is defendants' contention that the last sentence, "Compensation shall be determined in proceedings in a court of record," placed the entire question, including costs, in the hands of the court and took it away from the legislature.
A review, however, of the proceedings and reports of the constitutional convention which wrote the 1963 Constitution discloses no merit in this contention.
In third reading before the convention, Delegate Lawrence offered (2 Constitutional Convention Record (1961), p 3151):
"Mr. President and members of the convention, this amendment consists of 7 words, 7 words only, and it is designed solely for the purpose of protecting the people of the State in giving them the security of knowing that if their property is taken by eminent domain that they will be heard in a court.
"It leaves the method of doing this entirely up to the legislature to do, but does give the people the right to know that they will have their property rights determined in a court rather than before a board or bureau."
The convention clearly rejected any change in the meaning of "just compensation" or any expansion of the power of the court, other than insuring court supervision of condemnation proceedings.
We agree with the Court of Appeals' conclusion that:
"Since no statutory authority exists for the taxation of the $1,250 attorney fee, the order of the circuit judge is reversed and the cause remanded for the entry of an order taxing $25 for the attorney fee."
No costs, a constitutional question being involved.
Dethmers, C.J., and Souris, O'Hara, and Brennan, JJ., concurred with Kelly, J.
CL 1948, §213.37 (Stat Aim 1958 Rev §8.27) as follows: "Officers, jurors and witnesses in any proceeding under this act shall be entitled to receive from the petitioner the same fees and compensation as are provided by law for similar services in an ordinary action at law in the circuit courts, and it shall be lawful for the judge in any ease to order the payment by the petitioner to any respondent of such reasonable attorney fee as he may deem just, not exceeding $25, which may be taxed with the costs."
2 Mich App 235.
Dohany v. Rogers (1930), 281 US 362, 368 (50 S Ct 299, 74 L ed 904, 68 ALR 434).
20 Am Jut 2d, Costs, §5, p8; 26 ALR 2d, Annotation: Attorney's fees as -within statute imposing upon condemner liability for "expenses," "costs," and the like, pp 1295-1301.
Referring to proposed amendment "except in a court of record and" to be inserted after the word use in the first sentence of section 2 above quoted.