Case Name: In re SCHREIBER'S WILL
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1906-04-20
Citations: 98 N.Y.S. 483
Docket Number: 
Parties: In re SCHREIBER’S WILL.
Judges: Argued before O’BRIEN, P. J., and McLAUGHLIN, INGRAHAM, CLARKE, and HOUGHTON, JJ.
Reporter: West's New York Supplement
Volume: 98
Pages: 483–486

Head Matter:
(112 App. Div. 495)
In re SCHREIBER’S WILL.
(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department.
April 20, 1906.)
Wills — Probate—Evidence.
Under Code Civ. Proe. § 2623, providing that, if it appears to the surrogate that a testator was competent to make a will and not under restraint, it must be admitted to probate, there must be positive evidence that the testator was competent and not under restraint.
[Ed. Note. — For cases in point, see yol. 49, Cent. Dig. Wills, §§ 138, 421, 697, 698.]
Ingraham, J., dissenting.
Appeal from Surrogate’s Court, New York County.
In the matter of the last will and testament of Jane Schreiber, deceased. From a decree admitting the will to probate, an appeal is tcikcn
IR-Gvcrscd
Argued before O’BRIEN, P. J., and McLAUGHLIN, INGRAHAM, CLARKE, and HOUGHTON, JJ.
Charles O. Maas, for appellant.
James Ridgway, for respondent.

Opinion:
McLAUGHLIN, J.
On the 19th of October, 1904, Jane Schreiber _ died, leaving what purported to be her last, will and testament, which bore date October 14, 1904, and upon proceedings taken by the executrix therein named the same was admitted to probate, against the objections of decedent's husband, as her last will and testament, valid to pass personal property, and he has appealed.
The validity of the decree of the surrogate's court admitting the will to probate is challenged principally upon the ground that there was (a) no proof to establish testamentary capacity of the testatrix; and (b) that the proof was insufficient to justify a finding that there was a due execution and publication of the instrument as a last will and testament. The two subscribing witnesses were the only ones sworn in the probate proceedings, neither of whom, by way of opinion or otherwise, gave any testimony whatever bearing on the subject of testamentary capacity of the testatrix, or that she was at the time of the execution not under restraint.
Section 2623 of the Code of Civil Procedure expressly provides that, "if it appears to the surrogate that the will was duly executed and that the testator at the time of executing it was, in all respects, competent to make a will and not under restraint," then it must be admitted to probate. The phrase "if it appears to the surrogate" as used in this section implies there must be some evidence given. tending to show that the person who made the will was competent to make it, and at the time of its execution not under restraint. Evidence is the only way by which a fact can be made "to appear" to one acting in a judicial capacity. This must be so, otherwise there would be no way of reviewing an official act. This section, therefore, is equivalent to a positive requirement that the fact of competency must be established, in the first instance, by sufficient evidence by the proponents of a will. This is usually done by the subscribing witnesses (Miller v. White, 5 Redf. Sur. 321), inasmuch as the proponent has the affirmative of the issue (Matter of the Will of Cottroll, 95 N. Y. 336; Matter of Freeman, 46 Hun, 458) ; and unless it be done probate should be refused (Matter of Goodwin's Will, 95 App. Div. 183, 88 N. Y. Supp. 734). Indeed, if there could have been any doubt upon the subject, it was removed by Matter of Ramsdell, 16 N. Y. St. Rep. 281, where probate was denied upon this express ground, and the decree of the surrogate was affirmed by the late General Term (3 N. Y. Supp. 499), which in turn was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in 117 N. Y. 636, 22 N. E. 1130. And to the same effect is Matter of Goodwin's Will, supra, and Kingsley v. Blanchard, 66 Barb. 317.
It is undoubtedly true there is a presumption, as contended by the respondent, partly of law and partly of fact, that every man is sane. But this presumption is not enough, in view of the section of the Code referred to, to be the basis of a finding that a testator, at the time an alleged will was made, was competent to make it and not under any ¡restraint.
The evidence bearing upon the execution and publication of the will is quite meager. The will, as already' indicated, was made only a few days before the testatrix's death, and at a time when it is quite evident that she was very ill. The witness McMullen testified:
"I went over there, and I was asked to sign the paper, and I done so. It was read over to Mrs. Schreiber. After it was read over to Mrs. Schreiber, she signed her name. The pen broke. It was with her paralyzed hand she . done it."
The witness does not say who requested her to sign, nor is there anything in her testimony to indicate — other than the reading of the will, and that thereafter the testatrix signed it — that she knew when she did so it was her will.
As to the other witness, she testified:
"The will was read, and she recognized me. She nodded to me. I was requested to sign that — to write our names. Mrs. Schreiber requested it"
Just how the request was made does not appear, but the witness further stated:
"I heard the paper read. It was read to us all. She nodded to me that I should sign it. She could not speak very well. She was paralyzed, but she was conscious. She recognized me when I came in, and nodded to me, but could speak very little."
This is substantially all the testimony there is bearing upon the question of the execution and publication, and, while it may be sufficient, nevertheless, it is so unsatisfactory I think there should be a further hearing on the subject.
I am of the opinion, therefore, that the decree of the surrogate should be reversed and an order made under section 2588 of the Code of Civil Procedure, directing the trial by a jury of the questions of the competency of the testatrix, as well as the due execution and publication of the will, with costs to the appellant to abide the event, payable out of the estate.
All concur, except INGRAHAM, J., who dissents.