Case Name: L.J. BERNHARDT, Director of Stark County Social Service Board, or any Successor County, as Assignee of Juanita K. Martin, Plaintiff Juanita K. Martin, Appellant v. Scott J. HARRINGTON, Defendant and Appellee
Court: North Dakota Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: North Dakota
Decision Date: 2009-11-17
Citations: 775 N.W.2d 682
Docket Number: No. 20080350
Parties: L.J. BERNHARDT, Director of Stark County Social Service Board, or any Successor County, as Assignee of Juanita K. Martin, Plaintiff Juanita K. Martin, Appellant v. Scott J. HARRINGTON, Defendant and Appellee.
Judges: [¶ 26] GERALD W. YANDE WALLE, C.J., and CAROL RONNING KAPSNER, J., concur.
Reporter: North Western Reporter 2d
Volume: 775
Pages: 682–694

Head Matter:
2009 ND 189
L.J. BERNHARDT, Director of Stark County Social Service Board, or any Successor County, as Assignee of Juanita K. Martin, Plaintiff Juanita K. Martin, Appellant v. Scott J. HARRINGTON, Defendant and Appellee.
No. 20080350.
Supreme Court of North Dakota.
Nov. 17, 2009.
Kent M. Morrow, Bismarck, ND, for appellant.
Robert A. Keogh, Dickinson, ND, for defendant and appellee.

Opinion:
CROTHERS, Justice.
[¶ 1] Juanita Martin appeals from a judgment awarding Scott Harrington physical custody of the parties' minor child. We affirm, concluding the district court's custody determination is not clearly erroneous.
I
[¶ 2] Martin and Harrington have a daughter, born in January 1999, but have never been married to each other. After the birth, Martin, Harrington and their daughter lived together in Dickinson until the parties separated in 2001. Martin and the child relocated to Bismarck. In May 2007, Martin and the child were evicted from their Bismarck apartment. The child spent the summer of 2007 with her grandmother in Dickinson and attended a Dickinson elementary school that fall. In November 2007, the child moved in with Harrington at his Dickinson residence.
[¶ 3] In December 2007, Harrington requested an initial custody determination and an ex parte interim order to secure temporary custody of the child. The district court entered an ex parte interim order, giving Harrington temporary custody of the child.
[¶ 4] Following the October 2008 custody trial, the district court awarded custody to Harrington, granted Martin reasonable visitation and ordered Martin to pay child support.
II
[¶ 5] Martin argues the district court erred in awarding custody of the child to Harrington. "A district court's award of custody is treated as a finding of fact and, on appeal, will not be reversed unless it is clearly erroneous under N.D.R.Civ.P. 52(a)." Wessman v. Wessman, 2008 ND 62, ¶ 12, 747 N.W.2d 85. "A finding of fact is clearly erroneous if it is induced by an erroneous view of the law, if no evidence exists to support it, or if the reviewing court, on the entire evidence, is left with a definite and firm conviction a mistake has been made." Burns v. Burns, 2007 ND 134, ¶ 9, 737 N.W.2d 243 (quoting Gietzen v. Gabel, 2006 ND 153, ¶ 6, 718 N.W.2d 552). "Under the clearly erroneous standard of review, we do not reweigh the evidence or reassess the credibility of witnesses, and we will not retry a custody case or substitute our judgment for a district court's initial custody decision merely because we might have reached a different result." Jelsing v. Peterson, 2007 ND 41, ¶ 11, 729 N.W.2d 157. This standard of review is particularly relevant when the district court makes "a difficult child custody decision involving two fit parents." Hanisch v. Osvold, 2008 ND 214, ¶ 4, 758 N.W.2d 421 (quoting Jelsing, at ¶ 11).
[¶ 6] A district court's award of initial custody is governed by N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.1, requiring the court to "award custody of the child to the person who will better promote the best interests and welfare of the child." Klein v. Larson, 2006 ND 236, ¶ 7, 724 N.W.2d 565. In its determination, the "trial court must consider all [relevant] factors specified in N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.2(1)." Schmidt v. Schmidt, 2003 ND 55, ¶ 6, 660 N.W.2d 196. "Between the mother and father, . there is no presumption as to who will better promote the best interests and welfare of the child." N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.1.
[¶ 7] Here, the district court considered all of the best interests factors in making its custody determination. The district court found factor (d) favored Harrington, while factors (a), (b), (c), (e), (f), (g), (h), (i), (]'), (k), (l) and (m) favored neither party.
A
[¶ 8] Martin argues the district court erred in finding factor (b) favored neither party. When considering factor (b), the court must look at "[t]he capacity and disposition of the parents to give the child love, affection, and guidance and to continue the education of the child." N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.2(l)(b). Martin contends factor (b) should have been weighed in her favor because she was her daughter's primary caretaker and provider from January 1999 until May 2007 and because Harrington only served in that capacity for the eleven months preceding trial.
[¶ 9] The district court's determination factor (b) favors neither party is supported by evidence in the record. Testimony from multiple witnesses supports the court's finding, "There is no doubt that in this case both parents dearly love [the child] and [the child] dearly loves both parents." The record also reflects both parties served as primary caretaker and provider at some point in their daughter's life, with Martin occupying this role from January 1999 to May 2007 and with Harrington occupying this role from November 2007 to October 2008. The court's determination factor (b) favored neither party is based on the court's observation of the parties and their witnesses, which is given great deference on appeal. Hanisch, 2008 ND 214, ¶ 24, 758 N.W.2d 421 (citing Mayo v. Mayo, 2000 ND 204, ¶ 24, 619 N.W.2d 631). "Under the clearly erroneous standard of review, we do not reweigh the evidence or reassess credibility when there is evidence to support a district court's findings, and we will not reverse a district court's decision merely because we might have reached a different result." Dvorak v. Dvorak, 2006 ND 171, ¶ 11, 719 N.W.2d 362 (citing Hentz v. Hentz, 2001 ND 69, ¶ 6, 624 N.W.2d 694). The district court's finding factor (b) favored neither party is supported by the evidence and is not clearly erroneous.
B
[¶ 10] Martin argues the court erred in finding factor (c) favored neither party. Under factor (c), the court must look at "[t]he disposition of the parents to provide the child with food, clothing, medical care, . and other material needs." N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.2(l)(c). Martin claims factor (c) should have been weighed in her favor because she tended to the child's needs for eight years and because Harrington has done so for only eleven months.
[¶ 11] In analyzing factor (c), the district court heard testimony indicating both parents were disposed to provide for their child according to N.D.C.C. § 14-09- 06.2(l)(c). Harrington believes that if Martin were given custody of the child, she would provide the child with food, clothing, shelter, education and medical needs. Conversely, Martin acknowledges Harrington has stepped up to his parental responsibilities since November 2007. Based on this testimony and the district court's opportunity to observe the witnesses, the court's finding factor (c) favored neither party is supported by the evidence and is not clearly erroneous.
C
[¶ 12] Martin argues the court erred in finding factor (d) favored Harrington. Martin claims the district court should not have considered in its stability analysis the eleven months Harrington was the child's primary caretaker because at the root of Harrington's time with the child was the ex parte interim order, which Martin asserts was based on misleading statements. However, Martin failed to challenge the necessity of the ex parte interim order by requesting a hearing after its issuance.
[¶ 13] When an ex parte interim order is entered in a domestic relation case, the North Dakota Rules of Court require the order to provide:
"(A) That the party to whom the order is directed, upon written motion may have a hearing upon the necessity for the issuance of the order or the amounts to be paid; and
"(B) That unless the motion is served and filed in the office of the clerk of district court within 10 days after service of the interim order, the order becomes final and is nonappealable, pending a final determination of the issues raised by the pleadings or until further order of the court in the event of a material change of circumstances.
"(C) That any hearing on the order must be held within 30 days from the date the motion is filed, unless an earlier hearing is required under N.D.C.C. ch. 14-07.1, or an application for change of venue is pending. If the ex parte order contains provisions delineated in N.D.C.C. ch. 14-07.1, the hearing must be scheduled in a timely manner to conform with the chapter."
N.D.R.Ct. 8.2(a)(5)(A-C). The district court's ex parte interim order instructed Martin of her right to a hearing on the order. Martin did not request a hearing, and none was conducted. Under N.D.C.C. § 1-02-28, a person may waive their rights "unless such waiver would be against public policy." "For a waiver to be effective, it must be a voluntary and intentional relinquishment and abandonment of a known existing right, advantage, benefit, claim or privilege which, except for such waiver, the party would have enjoyed." Steckler v. Steckler, 492 N.W.2d 76, 79 (N.D.1992) (citing Production Credit Ass'n v. Henderson, 429 N.W.2d 421, 423 (N.D.1988); Gajewski v. Bratcher, 221 N.W.2d 614, 628 (N.D.1974)). When a right is waived, the "right is gone forever and cannot be recalled." Meyer v. Nat'l Fire Ins. Co., 67 N.D. 77, 89, 269 N.W. 845, 852 (1936); see 28 Am.Jur.2d Estoppel and Waiver § 156 (1966 & Supp. 1999) ("Ordinarily, a waiver operates to preclude a subsequent assertion of the right waived or any claim based thereon.") (internal citation omitted).
[¶ 14] Here, the issuance of the ex parte interim order was not immediately appealable, but it can be reviewed on this appeal. N.D.R.Ct. 8.2(a)(5)(B). However, Martin has not provided us with an issue to review. The proper proceeding for Martin to challenge the factual basis of the affidavits supporting the ex parte interim order was a hearing challenging the issuance of the ex parte interim order. N.D.R.Ct. 8.2(a)(5)(A). Martin did not re quest a hearing and she did not provide the district court with any facts or any legal argument why it should have ruled differently than it did in the ex parte interim order. By not requesting a hearing within 10 days of the issuance of the ex parte interim order, Martin waived her right to now claim the district court erred in temporarily placing the child with Harrington. Steckler, 492 N.W.2d at 79. From this it follows that the district court did not err by considering the time the child spent with Harrington due to the ex parte interim order.
[¶ 15] When analyzing factor (d), the court must consider "[t]he length of time the child has lived in a stable satisfactory environment and the desirability of maintaining continuity." N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.2(l)(d). In Bums, this Court stated:
"Factor (d) 'addresses past stability of environment, including a consideration of place or physical setting, as well as a consideration of the prior family unit and its lifestyle as part of that setting. It also addresses the quality of that past environment, and the desirability of maintaining continuity.' "
2007 ND 134, ¶ 17, 737 N.W.2d 243 (quoting Stoppler v. Stoppler, 2001 ND 148, ¶ 9, 633 N.W.2d 142).
[¶ 16] The district court properly considered the stability and lifestyle provided by both Martin and Harrington. The court found that Martin had provided the stable environment from January 1999 to May 2007 and that Harrington had provided the stable environment since obtaining temporary custody in November 2007. The court also found the child's diagnosis of acute stress disorder is a result either of Martin's eviction or of the custodial shuffle between Martin and Harrington. The record reflects the child is doing well in her Dickinson school. Both parties are employed full-time, and each party rents housing with enough space for the child. Based on these facts, evidence supported the district court's finding on factor (d). The district court did not err in finding factor (d) favored Harrington.
D
[¶ 17] Martin argues the court erred in finding factor (l) favored neither party. This factor requires the court to examine "[t]he making of false allegations not made in good faith, by one parent against the other, of harm to a child as defined in section 50-25.1-02." N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.2(1)(£). Martin contends Harrington included false and deceptive allegations in the affidavits he filed supporting his motion for an ex parte interim order.
[¶ 18] Factor (l) requires the court to consider "[t]he making of false allegations not made in good faith, by one parent against the other, of harm to a child as defined in section 50-25.1-02." N.D.C.C. § 14 — 09—06.2(1)(Z). The types of harm described in factor (l) are contained in Chapter 50-25.1, Child Abuse and Neglect. Section 50-25.1-01, N.D.C.C., protects "the health and welfare of children by encouraging the reporting of children who are known to be or suspected of being abused or neglected." Harm to a child under section 50-25.1-02 includes abuse, as further defined by N.D.C.C. § 14-09-22(1), and neglect or deprivation, as further defined by N.D.C.C. ch. 27-20. N.D.C.C. § 50-25.1-02(3), (11).
[¶ 19] A child is abused when "a parent, adult family or household member, guardian, or other custodian . willfully commits any of the following .:
"a. Inflicts, or allows to be inflicted, upon the child, bodily injury, substantial bodily injury, or serious bodily injury as defined by section 12.1-01-04 or mental injury.
"b. Fails to provide proper parental care or control, subsistence, education as required by law, or other care or control necessary for the child's physical, mental, or emotional health, or morals.
"c. Permits the child to be, or fails to exercise reasonable diligence in preventing the child from being, in a disreputable place or associating with vagrants or vicious or immoral persons.
"d. Permits the child to engage in, or fails to exercise reasonable diligence in preventing the child from engaging in, an occupation forbidden by the laws of this state or an occupation injurious to the child's health or morals or the health or morals of others."
N.D.C.C. § 14-09-22(l)(a-d).
[¶ 20] A child is deprived and neglected when that child
"a. Is without proper parental care or control, subsistence, education as required by law, or other care or control necessary for the child's physical, mental, or emotional health, or morals, and the deprivation is not due primarily to the lack of financial means of the child's parents, guardian, or other custodian;
"b. Has been placed for care or adoption in violation of law;
"c. Has been abandoned by the child's parents, guardian, or other custodian;
"d. Is without proper parental care, control, or education as required by law, or other care and control necessary for the child's well-being because of the physical, mental, emotional, or other illness or disability of the child's parent or parents, and that such lack of care is not due to a willful act of commission or act of omission by the child's parents, and care is requested by a parent;
"e. Is in need of treatment and whose parents, guardian, or other custodian have refused to participate in treatment as ordered by the juvenile court;
"f. Was subject to prenatal exposure to chronic and severe use of alcohol or any controlled substance as defined in chapter 19-08.1 in a manner not lawfully prescribed by a practitioner; or
"g. Is present in an environment subjecting the child to exposure to a controlled substance, chemical substance, or drug paraphernalia as prohibited by section 19-03.1-22.2."
N.D.C.C. § 27-20-02(8)(a-g).
[¶ 21] Harrington alleged in his affidavit that Martin had provided inappropriate living conditions for the child and that Martin had effectively abandoned the child. These are allegations of harm as defined in N.D.C.C. § 50-25.1-02. In this regard, the district court erred when it found Harrington's affidavit "was not made specifically under 50-25.1-02, NDCC." Although Harrington's allegations contained the type of harm defined in section 50-25.1-02, the district court was not required to consider them under factor (l) because the court did not consider the allegations to be false. See N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.2(l)(Z) (allowing only false allegations of harm to be considered under factor (l)).
[¶ 22] At trial, the district court did not view Harrington's affidavits as fraudulent or deceptive. Indeed, the statements in Harrington's affidavit were supported by the evidence. Harrington's affidavit alleged, "[I]n the recent past [Martin] has had [living] conditions that weren't appropriate." The testimony at trial supported this allegation, indicating that while Martin had custody of the child, a male probationer lived with the two in their apartment and was arrested during his stay for violation of probation. Harrington's affidavit, further alleged Martin "effectively abandoned [the child]." The record reflects that after Martin's eviction in May 2007, she had minimal contact with the child through the summer because the child stayed with her grandmother in Dickinson. In the fall of 2007, Martin agreed to postpone the child's return to Bismarck and allowed the child to enroll in a Dickinson elementary school.
[¶ 23] We acknowledge the district court expressed its disappointment with "false accusations" in an affidavit. However, the court did not identify the affidavit or elaborate on the nature or extent of the accusations. Rather, the court proceeded to focus on the child's best interests, and we are left with nothing more than this general statement regarding non-factual information.
[¶ 24] Based on the evidence in the record and the deference given the district court's decision, we conclude the district court did not err in finding Harrington's allegations were not false. This conclusion renders the district court's error in misinterpreting the role of Chapter 50-25.1 under factor (l) harmless. We therefore conclude the district court did not err in finding factor (l) favored neither party.
Ill
[¶25] We conclude the district court did not clearly err in analyzing the best interests factors under N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.2. The district court's judgment granting custody of the minor child to Harrington is affirmed.
[¶ 26] GERALD W. YANDE WALLE, C.J., and CAROL RONNING KAPSNER, J., concur.
. The version of N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.1 applicable to this case has since been repealed by 2009 N.D. Sess. Laws ch. 149, § 12.
. The version of N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.2 applicable to this case has since been amended by 2009 N.D. Sess. Laws ch. 149, § 5.