Case Name: The People ex rel. Charles F. Pond, App'lt, v. The Board of Supervisors of Monroe County, Resp't
Court: New York Supreme Court, General Term
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1892-09-13
Citations: 47 N.Y. St. Rep. 456
Docket Number: 
Parties: The People ex rel. Charles F. Pond, App’lt, v. The Board of Supervisors of Monroe County, Resp’t.
Judges: 
Reporter: New York State Reporter
Volume: 47
Pages: 456–483

Head Matter:
The People ex rel. Charles F. Pond, App’lt, v. The Board of Supervisors of Monroe County, Resp’t.
(Supreme Court, General Term, Fifth Department,
Filed September 13, 1892.)
Elections—Apportionment act—Constitutional law.
Chapter 397, Laws 1892, the apportionment act, is unconstitutional, in that it does not comply with the requirement- to apportion the members of the legislature among the several counties of the state, as nearly as may be, according to the number of their respective inhabitants.
(Macomber, J., dissents.)
Appeal by the relator, Charles F. Pond, from an order of the Monroe special term, granted August 3,1892, and entered August 8, 1892, denying his motion for a mandamus requiring the defendant to reconvene and apportion the county of Monroe into three assembly districts, under chapter 397 of the Laws of 1892. The following is the opinion at special term.:
Rumsey, J.—On the 30th of April, 1892, at an extraordinary session of the legislature called for that purpose, an act was passed to organize the senate districts and to apportion the members of assembly. By that act there were allotted to the county of Monroe three members of assembly. The act required that the boards of supervisors of counties which were entitled to more than one member should meet on the third Tuesday of July, and divide their respective counties into so many assembly districts as they were entitled to. The supervisors of Monroe county met on that day but refused to proceed under the act, alleging as a reason that it was not constitutional.
Thereupon the relator moves for a writ of mandamus to compel them to act. It appears that the relator is a citizen of Rochester, Monroe county, and an elector thereof. It further appears that the city of Rochester, with a citizen population of 129,355, constitutes one assembly district, and that the remainder of the county, with a citizen population of 51,875, is divided into two districts, thus giving to 25,937 people in the towns the same representation in the assembly as is given to the entire population of the city. In this way the people of the city of Rochester, including the relator, are deprived of their proper representation in the assembly by the refusal of the supervisors to act as the bill directs.
That a writ of mandamus is the proper remedy in such a case, and that the writ may be sued out at the relation of a citizen and elector has so recently been decided by the highest court of this and other states that no discussion upon that point is necessary. People ex rel. Derby v. Rice, 129 N. Y., 461; 41 St. Rep., 932; People ex rel. Daley v. Rice, 129 N. Y., 449; 41 St. Rep., 938; People ex rel. Giddings v. Blacker, Secretary of State, Sup. Ct. of Mich., July 23, 1892; People ex rel. Stephens v. Halsey, 37 N. Y., 344. The relator, therefore, is entitled to have the writ issued unless the defendants have shown a good reason why it should be denied.
It seems to be forgotten sometimes that the supreme law of the state is the constitution, and that obedience to that instrument is obligatory not only upon the courts and the legislature, but on all citizens and officials whatsoever. In yielding that obedience, it is the duty of each officer of the state, when called upon by statute to do any act, to examine whether such statute is within the constitution. As is said by Judge Cooley : “ Every official of every department may at any time, when a duty is to be performed, be required to pass upon a question of constitutional construction.” Cooley Const. Lim., 41. If any act of the legislature violates the constitution it is a nullity and as if it had never been. Ho rights can be acquired by it and no duty imposed. Chenango Br. Co. v. Paige, 83 N. Y., 178, 191; Boston v. Cummins, 16 Geo., 102; Bailey v. P., W. & B. R. R. Co, 4 Harr., 389; Taylor v. Porter, 4 Hill, 140. Boards of supervisors are as much bound to regard the constitution as are any other officials, and if a law, so called, seeks to compel them to do some act which the constitution does not authorize, it is their duty, like that of every other person, to obey the fundamental law and pay no attention to the decree which violates it It is quite true that they may refuse obedience to the statute at their peril if disobedience is followed by a penalty, provided they are mistaken in their judgment and the statute is constitutional. But none the less they are bound to look first at the fundamental law made by the people, and give that their first and highest obedience, and if any peril is involved it is one of those things which is inherent in the holding of official position. Following this well settled rule, it has recently been held by the court of appeals that no public officer can be compelled by mandamus to do any act which involves the violation of a constitutional provision, or which the law does not require him to do. People ex rel. Sherwood v. Bd. Canvassers, 129 N. Y., 360, 370, et seq.; 41 St. Rep., 912; Same v. Rice, 129 N. Y., 391; 41 St. Rep., 937.
Therefore the board of supervisors not only had the right, but it was their duty, if the act of apportionment was a violation of the constitution, to refuse to obey it, and if they are right in that judgment no mandamus can issue to compel them to do so.
We are directly and necessarily brought then to an examination of the constitutionality of the apportionment act.
That question, being necessarily involved in the case, is not to be evaded or declined.
But before proceeding to it, it is well to recall some rules which have been adopted by the courts for their guidance in the discussion of such questions.
In the first place, it is settled that there can be no presumption that the legislature had any but public and proper motives in view in the passage of any act. The question of constitutionality is one solely of power in the legislature. Cooley Const. Lim., 186.
In the second place, no act of the legislature can be adjudged unconstitutional unless it is either expressly or by necessary implication in conflict with the fundamental law. People v. Draper, 15 N. Y., 532, 543; Cooley Const Lim., 168, et seq.
Springing out of this rule is the further principle that if there be any well founded doubt whether the act be unconstitutional such doubt should be resolved in favor of the law. Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat., 213, 270; Cooley Const. Lim., 182.
But while these rules are well settled and will- always be followed because they only are consistent with the respect which the courts must show to a co-ordinate power of the state, still it is also settled, as stated by Judge Allen, that an act violating the true intent and meaning of the instrument, and in evasion of its terms as properly interpreted and understood, and frustrating its general and clearly expressed or necessarily implied purpose, is as clearly void as if in express terms forbidden. People ex rel. Bolton v. Albertson, 55 N. Y., 50, 55.
It will not be denied that the power to change its own organization, and to create new units of representation, is not inherent in the legislature, and that it is one which that body could not exercise unless it had been granted by the constitution. Unlike most of the powers which are exercised by the legislature, it is not necessarily involved in the power to make laws. If the constitution did not give it, no legislature would presume to exert it.
The composition of the legislature and the boundaries of the several districts are established in the first instance by the people in their constitution. When so established, they must continue as made, unless the people see fit to change them, or unless they authorize someone else to do it. The power then having its origin in the constitution is limited by that instrument, and must be exercised in the manner therein prescribed. The general rule is that to the due execution of a power there must be a substantial compliance with every condition required to precede it or to accompany its exercise. Allen v. De Witt, 3 N. Y., 276, 278. Especially is this the case where the condition and limitation of the manner of executing a power is contained in the constitution. The fundamental law, it is said, is presumed to be, and indeed is, prepared with the very greatest deliberation, and adopted only after every opportunity for reflection upon the meaning of each word has been had by different legislatures, and by the people at large. People ex rel. Gilbert v. Wemple, 125 N. Y., 485, 490; 36 St. Rep., 20.
These limitations upon the manner of exercising the power cannot be deemed to be merely directory. It is absurd to suppose that the people have carefully prescribed the manner in which so important a duty shall be performed for no other purpose than to advise the legislature, and then have left that body to follow the directions or not at its pleasure. If directions are given respecting the times or modes of proceeding in which a power should be exercised, there is, says Judge Cooley, at least a strong presumption that the people designed it should be exercised in that time and mode only. Cooley Const. Lim. 79, 81. Indeed, I am firmly persuaded that the principle which allows any provisions or limitations of the constitution to be construed as directory, and not as mandatory, is pernicious and dangerous, and such construction is not in accordance with the weight of authority in this state at least. People v. Purdy, 2 Hill, 31, 36, 37; People v. Lawrence, 36 Barb., 177, 185; People v. Albertson, 55 N. Y., 50, 55; Cooley, supra. In the case of People v. Supervisors of Chenango, 8 N. Y., 317, Judge Willard expressed the opinion that the requirement of the constitution that the yeas and nays upon the final passage of a bill shall be entered on the journal was directory, but that holding was purely obiter, because he had already held that as matter of fact they had been so taken and entered in the case in question, Cooley Const. Lim., 79, and, therefore, the case is no authority on that point.
The constitution prescribes that an enumeration of the inhabitants of the state shall be taken under the direction of the legislature in the year 1855, and at the end of every ten years thereafter, and that the senate districts shall be so altered by the legislature, at the first session after the return of every enumeration, that each senate district shall contain as nearly as may be an equal number of inhabitants, excluding aliens and persons of color not taxed. It is provided further in the next section that the legislature, at the first session after the return of every enumeration, shall apportion the members of assembly among the several counties, as nearly as may be, according to the number of their respective inhabitants, excluding aliens. But each county shall be entitled to one member of assembly whatever its population, except that Fulton and Hamilton constitute one county for this purpose. It is by virtue of this constitutional provision that the apportionment act was passed,- and the objections to it based upon these sections are:
1. That the enumeration upon which it was based was taken in 1892, and not at a tenth year after 1855.
2. That the extraordinary session at which the act was passed was not the first session after the return of the enumeration within the constitutional provision.
8. That the senate apportionment is unconstitutional because in estimating the number of inhabitants in the new senate°districts pei’sons of' color not taxed were included.
4. That both senate and assembly apportionments are unconstitutional because the senate districts are grossly unequal in number of inhabitants and the members of assembly are not apportioned among the counties as nearly as may be according to the number of citizen inhabitants, but that command of the constitution is ignored.
I am quite clear that the census for purposes of apportionment cannot be taken until the time prescribed in the constitution has arrived.
Whether, if not then taken, it may be taken at the earliest moment afterwards and a valid apportionment may be based upon a census then made, might be doubtful if it were an original question. But I am of the opinion that the question, as well as the question whether the apportionment may be made at an extraordinary session of the legislature, has been practically decided by courts of high authority, and, therefore, I shall not consider them. Rumsey v. People, 19 N. Y., 45; State v. Cunningham, 51 N. W. Rep., 724, 740.
It is quite clear that the constitutional census, as it may be called, furnishes the only information for the legislature to use in reorganizing the senate and assembly districts. Rumsey v. People, 19 N. Y., 41, 46; Lanning v. Carpenter, 20 id., 447; Opinion of the Justices, 142 Mass., 601. The apportionment is a continuing process, beginning with the enumeration of voters and ending with the division into districts. Opinion of the Justices, 142 Mass., 601, 605. Being one entire act, all parts of it are to be examined in construing it. The law directing the census upon which the apportionment was based makes no provision for ascertaining the number of persons of color not taxed, and there is not contained in the return to the legislature any information on that subject. That there are large numbers of such persons in the state who are citizens appears by the papers; and if it did not so appear, I have no doubt that the court would be obliged to take judicial notice of so notorious a fact with regard to the population of the state. Kernitz v. Long Island City, 50 Hun, 428; 20 St. Rep., 781; Howard v. Moot, 64 N. Y., 262; Mayor, etc., v. Sands, 105 id., 210; 7 St. Rep., 337. The number of such persons was not deducted from other citizens in reorganizing the .senate districts. It is clear that the constitution requires that they shall be excluded. Such is not the rule in apportioning members of assembly. The people struck out the provision excluding persons of color not taxed from assembly representation in 1874, but they retained it as to senators. Why it was so retained does not appear, nor is it important. It is sufficient that they have so ordained. It has not been unusual that the senate or upper house of the legislature of a state should represent a different class of people than the other house. By the constitution of 1777 the members of assembly were apportioned upon the number of electors and the senators upon the freeholders possessing freeholds of the value of one hundred pounds sterling. The idea'was abandoned .in 1821, and the representative population for senators and assemblymen remained the same until 1874, when the constitution as to members of assembly was amended so as to place persons of color not taxed among the assembly representative population, leaving the senate representative population untouched. It may be that the doing of this was an oversight, but that it was done and that as the result of such action the apportionment of senators still is to be based upon the number of citizens excluding persons of color not taxed cannot be denied.
It is claimed by counsel for relator that this exclusion of persons of color is a violation of the XIVth and XVth amendments to the constitution of the United States. As to the XVth amendment it is sufficient to say that it protects alone the right to vote, which is not affected by the provisions of the state constitution now in question.
The XIVth amendment prohibits the abridgement bv any state •of the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States. The privileges thus protected are privileges of citizens of the United States as such, and not those which attach to the citizens of any particular state. Any state may regulate the political rights of its own citizens except as prohibited by the XVth. amendment, but it cannot deprive the citizens- of other states who become its citizens from sharing the rights which the like class of citizens enjoy under its government. Thus far and no further the states are controlled by the XIVth amendment. Slaughter House cases, 16 Wall., 36; Presser v. Illinois, 116 U. S., 252. This direction of our constitution then is not prohibited by the national fundamental law. It is precise, clear and positive. It leaves nothing to the discretion of- the legislature. It is quite clear that it was ignored by the legislature in passing the enumeration law and the apportionment act based on the census taken under it.
It was as clearly the duty of the legislature to give effect to this direction as to any other positive instruction of the people contained in the fundamental law. That body is quite as much bound by the constitution as any other collection of citizens. People v. Albertson, 55 N. Y., 50. It has no dispensing power. It is true that the people can impose no punishment on the legislature for disobedience, but the fact that one is only bound by his honor to obey the wishes of his superior furnishes not infrequently to-honorable men the very strongest reason for implicit and careful compliance with such commands.
This command was not obeyed and I see no escape from the conclusion that the act in that regard violates the constitution.
The next objection taken to the act is that it violates that injunction of the constitution that the senate districts shall contain as nearly as may be 'an equal number of inhabitants and that the assemblymen shall be apportioned among the several counties as nearly as may be according to the number of their respective inhabitants.
The constitution prohibits the division ,bf a county in the formation of a senate district unless such county shall equitably be entitled to two or more senators, and requires that each county, however small its population, shall have at least one member of assembly, Fulton and Hamilton being rated as one county for that purpose. A statement of the inequalities will show how far they are due to a compliance with these provisions, which must necessarily prevent exact equality of population in the several districts.
The representative population of the state, as shown by the return made to the legislature, is 5,790,865, so that the population of each of the thirty-two districts, if all could be equal, would be 180,899. The county districts contain the following population : 16th, 199,674; 17th, 176,341; 18th, 165,699 ; 19th, 156,748 ; 20th, 176,139 ; 21st, 229,005 ; 22d, 215.947 ; 23d, 196,481; 24th, 188,-732 ; 25th, 201,017; 26th, 207,566 ; 27th, 169,499; 28th, 181,230; 29th, 185,922 ; 32d, 176,028.
It will be noticed that the 21st to the 26th districts inclusive contain 1,233,748, or an average population of 205,624, being altogether 148,354 more than the ratio ; while 17th, 18th, 19th, 20th and 27th contain'844,393, or an average population of 168,879, and altogether 60,100 less than the ratio. 0
Yet in these eleven districts are forty counties lying in one body, varying in population from 4,784 to 156,748, so that almost any division would seem possible of them.
In New York county, where the districts are divided by street lines, so that there is no difficulty in equalizing the numbers, the variation is still more remarkable. The 9th district has 164,936 and the tenth 206, 463. The 11th, 12th and 13th districts are carved out of the 19th and 22d wards, with part of the 12th and 23d wards, and they lie together. Yet the 11th contains 166,175;. the 12th, 105,720, and the 13tb, 241,138. Albany county, with 156,748 people, is made one district. Erie county, with 304,712, is made into two districts. If the proportion between city and country be taken, the result is still more strange and unjust. New York, Putnam and Westchester are together formed into nine districts, with an average population of 174,059, or 6,840 each less than the .ratio, while the remainder of the state has twenty-three districts, with an average population of 183,666, or 2,767 each more than the ratio. If Mew York • alpne had been divided into eight districts, each would have had an average of 177,996, or each one 3,103 less than the ratio; leaving to the state at large twenty-four senators, or an average of one to 181,952, or 1,053 more than the ratio, which then would have given Mew York an advantage over the rest of the state.
Mew York, Westchester, Putnam, Kings and Richmond, compose fourteen districts, with an average population of 177,292, or each 3,607 less than the ratio, leaving the rest of the state with ■eighteen senators representing an average of 183,819, or 292 over the ratio. Mew York, Westchester, Putnam, Kings, Richmond, Albany and Erie have seventeen senators, representing an average ■of 173,151, or each 7,748 less than the ratio, while the remainder of the state has fifteen senators, representing each 189,819, or an average of 8,920 each over the ratio.
In the apportionment of assemblymen we see that Albany, with 156,784 people, has four members, while Monroe, with 181,230, has three, which is the same number given to Rensselaer with 121,679, and to Queens with 123,974. Dutchess, with 75,078, has two members, while St Lawrence, with 80,679, and Chautauqua, with 73,884, have each but one.
The unnecessary inequality of much of this apportionment is quite manifest. For instance, if Mew York had been divided into eight districts, each would have had, as we have seen, an average population much nearer the true ratio than its districts now have. Albany, united with either Greene, Schoharie or Schenectady, would have been much nearer the true ratio than now, while if Miagara had been added to Erie the two •districts which might have been formed would have been quite near the true number. These suggestions are made simply to show that some of the inequalities of the senate districts are clearly unnecessary, and that the districts do not contain “ as nearly as may be ” an equal number of inhabitants. With regard to the apportionment of assemblymen among the counties mentioned above the unnecessary inequality is clearly apparent. It needs no argument to show that the constitution means what it says when it requires that each district shall contain as nearly as may be an equal number of inhabitants, and that the members of assembly shall be apportioned among the counties as nearly as may be according to the number of inhabitants. Such provisions or equivalent ones are contained in the constitutions of a majority of the states and of the United States. It is the intention of the people that each person shall have as nearly as possible the same influence in the government as any other person, so that the representation of the constitution shall be of all the citizens equally. In the constitution of 1777 it was required that if upon the census it shall appear that the number of representatives in assembly from the counties is not justly proportioned to the number of electors in said' counties respectively, that the legislature do adjust and apportion the same by that rule. In that constitution, as in each subsequent one, it was recognized that it was necessary that there-should be a fair and just representation in the legislature of all those entitled to be represented there at all. I shall take no time to establish what must be and is conceded, that the people intend that representation in senate and assembly shall be as nearly equal as possible.
In the year 1885, an enumeration act was passed by the legislature, but vetoed by the governor.
Since that time there have been constant complaints that the representation in either house of the legislature was not just or equal, and a continued demand that it be adjusted. These very complaints show the understanding of the people that the representation in the legislature should be proportioned to numbers. They show also that the apportionment demanded is an equal and just one, based, as the constitution requires, upon the number of inhabitants, so far as may be, and not an arbitrary and unequal distribution.
But it is said that this matter is left to the discretion of the legislature, and that discretion cannot be reviewed by the courts. That some discretion in that regard is vested in the legislature cannot be denied, as it must have been left in the nature of things. But it is just as clear that the discretion is not absoluté, because it is expressly directed that the apportionment should be equal “ as near as may be.”
As is said by Judge Shepley, 18 Maine, 472, “ The very language limits, or more properly prohibits, any such discretion by declaring that the conformity shall be 1 as near as may be; ’ that is, as near as it may be practicable to make them, having regard to the number of inhabitants. The language must have been used to define the rule, not to permit a departure from it at discretion, however soundly and justly exercised it might be. If there may be a sound and a just exercise of discretion it cannot be overlooked that there maybe an unsound and unjust exercise of it, if it be permitted at all in any other case than when it arises out of an absolute and moral necessity. And between such a discretion and any other there is this great and favorable distinction. It. finds its own certain limit in the necessity which gave rise to it;- and it can extend no further than that necessity requires that it should; and it is not, therefore, liable to be abused. And this is the only discretion that can in this case be admitted.”
There is a wide distinction between such a limited discretion and the absolute power in the legislature to do as it pleases. It must be remembered that the making of an apportionment is not like the passage of a law, a matter which is to be done or not as the legislature sees fit. It is an absolute duty imposed by the people; without a sanction, it is true, but none- the less a duty. The manner of performing this duty is also prescribed. The provision of the constitution, as I have shown above, is mandatory and .not by way of advice or suggestion only. The limited discretion to be exercised is not a mere arbitrary one, but one to be extended only as far as may be necessary. When it appears, as it does here, that the narrow and limited discretion is departed from so widely that it cannot possibly be accounted for on the ground of necessity or even of convenience, then the conclusion is inevitable that no constitutional discretion- has been used. But the people have expressly required that the limit of necessity should be observed.
The power to apportion is limited by the conditions of the-grant, and these conditions inhere in it. When the legislature disregards them it goes beyond its constitutional power. If the constitutional limits are overstepped and the legislature enacts that which the people have forbidden, I see no reason why the courts-should not take their stand at that point and assert the supremacy of the fundamental law. As is said by Judge Allen: “Usurpation of power or the exercise of power in disregard of the express-provision or plain intent of the instrument, as necessarily implied from all its terms, cannot be sustained under the pretense of a liberal or enlightened interpretation or in deference to the judgment of the legislature or some supposed necessity.” People v. Albertson, 55 N. Y., 50, 55.
It is well known that since 1845, not only in this state, but throughout the country, the tendency of the people has been to-limit and confine the power and authority of the legislatures. Whether this arises from a distrust which the people have for the members of their legislatures, as Mr. Bryce asserts, or from the jealousy of power which seems to be inherent in the people, it is-not necessary,to inquire. Every one recognizes a tendency in all legislatures to evade constitutional restrictions in every possible way. It is fair to suppose that the people meant these restrictions to be effectual to control the acts of their law makers, and as they can impose no punishment for their violation, there is no-other sanction than for the courts to insist to the fullest reasonable-extent upon their undoubted power to apply to every law the constitutional test, and insist that that instrument shall be obeyed. The case seems to me one of those where that power of the court, should be exercised.
The conclusion I have reached, that the action of the legislature in apportioning the senate districts and assemblymen is subject to review by the courts, is sustained by many adjudged cases of high authority. State v. Cunningham, 51 N. W. Rep., 724, and cases cited on page 728; People ex rel. Giddings v. Blacker, Sup. Ct. of Mich., July 23, 1892; People ex rel. Van Bokkelen v. Canaday, 73 N. C., 198.
In the first two cases last cited, the flagrant and unnecessary inequalities of the apportionment was conceded, and the serious-question presented in each was whether the limited discretion reposed in the legislature was the subject of review in the courts. In each of those .cases the decision of the courts was unanimous,, and the court declared, the apportionment void for the sole reason that it was manifestly and needlessly unfair and unequal.
The constitutional provisions on the subject are in each of those states substantially the same as in New York, and the decisions are express authority upon the point. The length of this opinion, however, prevents extended quotations from them.
There can be no doubt that the apportionment of the several senate districts is so manifestly and flagrantly unequal as to amount to a clear violation of the constitutional requirement, as is also the undoubted disparity between the number of inhabitants in the' country as distinguished from the city districts. It is clear, too, that the constitution was grossly disregarded by giving to Albany county one more member of assembly than- is allotted to Monroe with over 24,000 more inhabitants, as well as by allowing to Dutchess county, with 75,078 people, two members, and to St. Lawrence, with 80,679 only one. These are violations which are clearly utterly unnecessary, and because of them the act is void.
The provisions of an act of this kind are so largely dependent •upon each other that’if part of them violate the constitution the whole act must be declared void. State v. Cunningham, supra.
For these reasons the motion for a mandamus is denied, with costs.
C. D. Kiehel, for app’lt; Wm. A. Sutherland and Charles Daniels, for resp’t.

Opinion:
Lewis, J.
—By § 5, article 3, of the constitution, it is made the •duty of the boards of supervisors of such counties as may be entitled, under an apportionment, to more than one member of assembly to assemble at such times as the legislature making the apportionment shall prescribe, and divide their respective counties into assembly districts equal to the number of members of assembly to which the county is entitled.
By chapter 397 of the Laws of 1892, entitled " An act to organize the senate districts, and for the apportionment of the members of assembly of this state," three members were allotted to the county of Monroe. The act required -the board of supervisors to meet on the- third Tuesday in July, 1892, and proceed to divide their respective counties into so many assembly districts as they are entitled to, respectively, and make and file the proper certificates.
The board of supervisors of Monroe county convened on the day designated, but refused to divide their county as required by the act, for the reason that the board was advised by counsel that the act aforesaid is unconstitutional and void, upon various .grounds stated in resolutions adopted by the board.
Thereupon a motion was made at the Monroe special term ex rel. Charles F. Pond, a resident, citizen and elector of Bochester, for a mandamus commanding the board to convene and proceed with the division of the county as directed by the act.
The motion was denied, and an appeal was thereupon taken to this court from the said order.
The constitutionality of the act is assailed for reasons which will hereafter be mentioned.
Section 4, article III, of the constitution, provides that an enumeration of the inhabitants of the state shall be taken under the direction of the legislature in the year 1855, apd at the end of every ten years thereafter, and. that the senatorial districts shall be so altered by the legislature at the first session after the return of every enumeration that each senate district shall contain, as nearly as may be, an equal number of inhabitants, excluding aliens and persons of color not taxed, and shall remain unaltered until the return of another enumeration. '
Section 5 provides that the legislature, at its first session after the return of every enumeration, shall apportion the members of the assembly among the several counties of the state.
The legislature of 1885 passed an act providing for an enumeration. This act met with an executive veto, and nothing further was done looking to an enumeration until the session of 1892, seven years after the decennial year 1885, when an act was passed which provided for the taking of a census and required the secretary of state to tabulate and arrange the returns of the enumerators and report the same to the legislature.
An enumeration was made, and on the 21st day of April the secretary of state made a report to the legislature of the result of such enumeration. On the day of the opening of this report, and while the legislature was still in session, the governor, by special message, called an extraordinary session of the legislature to convene on the following Monday, April 25,. 1892. The legislature adjourned sine die on April 21, and again convened on the day designated,- and on the 30th day of said month passed, and on the-same day the governor signed the act, chapter 397 aforesaid.
It is the contention of the respondent that there was no power-in the legislature to pass this act in the year 1892, as that is not a. decennial year; that the act was unconstitutional and void, because it was passed at the same session and by the same legislature under whose direction the enumeration was taken, and for the further reason that said extraordinary session was not a session of the legislature, within the meaning of the constitution, having the power under the constitution to make the apportionment, and on the further ground that the apportionment was. unequal and unjust.
It is the contention of the appellant that the provisions concerning the enumeration and apportionment are simply directory, and that, therefore, it is discretionary with the legislature when the enumeration and apportionment shall be made.
The constitution, as has been seen, provides that the apportionment of the members of assembly shall be made at the first session after the return of every enumeration.
First Then, are these provisions of the constitution mandatory, or advisory simply ? That the people have the right in their constitution to speak in mandatory language no one will question. They are the source of power; the constitution emanates from them. They have the right to impose such limitations and restrictions upon powers they confer upon their servants as. they choose.
If important interests are involved, which may be jeopardized if the language be held to be simply advisory, it must be assumed that its authors intend to speak in mandatory terms.
If the provisions under consideration are advisory simply, it follows that an apportionment may be made at any time that suits the wishes or plans of the party in power.
If advisory only, an enumeration can be taken and a tabulated .statement of the result délivered to the legislature, to be immediately followed by an apportionment without any opportunity for its examination by the people, and the people may thereby be made victims of a party in power, who may, for partisan purposes, so manipulate and falsify an enumeration and follow it by .so arranging the senatorial districts and apportioning the members of assembly as to place the control of the election of members thereafter of both houses under the control of a small minority of the electors.
The districts could be easily so selected and arranged that a majority of the legislature could thereafter be elected by electors whose predilections were with the party making the apportionment and who compose but a small minority of the electors of the state, and the majority would be practically disfranchised; and as amendments of the constitution can be secured only through •and by the consent of the legislature, it would be practically impossible to remedy the wrongs by lawful means.
If directory only, there is no necessity, for calling an extra session. The enumeration and apportionment may be consummated .at one sitting of the legislature.
Holding these provisions to be mandatory not only does no violence to the language of the constitution, but accords with the •common understanding of the people.
Courts tread upon very dangerous ground when they venture to apply the rules which distinguish directory and mandatory statutes to the provisions of a constitution. Constitutions do not usually undertake to prescribe mere rules of proceeding, except when such rules are looked upon as essential to the thing to be •done, and they must then be regarded in the light of limitations upon the power to be exercised.
It is the province of an instrument of this solemn and permanent character to establish those fundamental maxims and fix the unvarying rules by which all departments of the government must at all times shape their conduct, and if it descends to prescribing mere rules of order in unessential matters it is lowering the proper dignity of such an instrument and usurping the proper province of ordinary legislation.
If directions are given respecting the times or mode of proceeding in which a power shall be exercised, there is at least a strong presumption that the people designed it should be exercised in that time and mode only.
There are some cases, however, where the doctrine of directory •statutes has been applied to constitutional provisions, but they are so plainly at variance with the weight of authority upon the precise points considered that we feel warranted in saying -that the judicial decisions as they now stand do not sanction the application.
This is a quotation from Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, in. pp. 78, 79. Judge Emott said, in speaking for the court in. People v. Lawrence, 36 Barb., 186: " It will be found, upon full consideration, to be difficult to treat any constitutional provision as merely directory, and not imperative."
The same doctrine is held in Brown v. Goben, 122 Ind., 113. Judge Orton, in the Wisconsin apportionment case, 51 H. W. JEtep., 730, says: " That most dangerous doctrine that this and other restrictions upon the power of the legislature are merely •declaratory and not mandatory should not be encouraged, even to the extent of discussing the question. The convention, in making the constitution, had a higher duty to perform than to give the legislature advice."
There is no part of the machinery of our state government which more vitally affects the interests of the people than the provisions for enumeration and apportionment. Ours being a representative government, frauds which may tend to deprive the people of equal representation, especially in their legislative bodies, strike at the very foundation of our institutions and naturally and inevitably tend to arouse bitter and vindictive feelings.
The people, appreciating the importance of this matter, naturally would wish, in this respect at least, to retain power in their own keeping and direct how it should be used, and not leave its •exercise to the discretion or caprice of their servants selected . from time to time to represent them in the legislature.
While legislative acts sometimes speak in directory language, a constitution has the right to speak and should speak only in words of command.
Upon the authorities referred to and for the reasons suggested, the provisions under the constitution must, we think, be held to be mandatory, and if mandatory it follows that the legislature has not the power to make the apportionment at the same session that the enumeration was taken.
Hence the question arises, was this extraordinary session, within the meaning of the constitution, the first session after the return of the enumerations ?
Article 10, § 6, of the constitution provides that the political year and legislative term shall begin on the 1st day of January, and that the legislature shall assemble on the first Tuesday in January, unless a different day shall be appointed by law. The legislative term, therefore, may begin before the meeting of the legislature. It begins and ends with the year, and the life of a legislature also ends with the year.
A brief review of the provisions of the various constitutions of the state relating to this subject may aid in the solution of this •question.
j The constitution of 1777 provided that " as soon after the expiration of seven years subsequent to the termination of the present war as may be a census should be taken, and that once in every seven years after the taking of the first census a new one should be taken."
Ho time or session was specified for making the apportionment. The first census was taken in 1790, pursuant to chap. 7, of that year. The first apportionment by the legislature was made by chap. 4, Laws of 1791. The next census was in 1795. The apportionment was made by chap. 19, Laws of 1796. Another census was taken in 1801.
Pursuant to an act passed April 7, chap. 175, an amendment to the constitution was adopted Oct. 27, 1801, providing that the legislature "at their next session" shall apportion the number of assemblymen fixed by the said amendment, and make a reapportionment upon the return of every census thereafter, Accordingly the legislature made an apportionment March 31, 1802. The next census was in 1807, pursuant to an act of April 3, 1807. The apportionment was made April 1, 1808. Another census was taken in 1814, act' of April 15. Apportionment was made by chap. 142, Laws of 1815. The constitution of 1822 provided that " an apportionment shall be made by the present legislature according to the last United States census; that a census should be taken in 1825 and at the end of every ten years thereafter; that the senate districts shall be altered and the apportionment of the members of assembly shall be made at the first session after the return of every enumeration."
The legislature accordingly made an apportionment by chap. 207, Laws of 1822. No state census had been taken since 1814. By chap. 100, Laws of 1825, the legislature provided not only for the taking of the census that year, but also for future years.
The next apportionment was made by chap. 289, Laws of 1826. The act of 1825 was substantially incorporated into the Revised Statutes, vol. 1, page 87, which took effect Jan. 1, 1830. The census was taken in 1835, and apportionment made by chap. 436, Laws of 1836.
The provisions of the Revised Statutes for the taking of the census were superseded by Laws of 1845, chap. 140, which was amended by chap. 239, Laws of 1854. These statutes were repealed by Laws of 1855, chap. 64. An apportionment was made by chap. 44 of the Laws of 1846, based upon the census of 1845.
The constitution adopted in 1846 is substantially the same as the constitution of 1822, in so far as the particular matter here under consideration is concerned. The next census was taken in 1855 ; the apportionment was postponed until 1857 (chap. 337.) Another apportionment was made by chap. 607, Laws of 1866, based upon the census of 1865. Another enumeration was had in 1875, but noi apportionment was made until 1879 (chap. 208.)
It will be observed from the foregoing that the invariable practice has been to make the enumeration at an annual session after the taking of the census.
This .is the first instance since these provisions were incorporated into the constitution that the same legislature has assumed to make both the enumeration and the apportionment. No census was taken in 1885, for the reason before stated.
The framers of our constitution, in providing that the apportionment should be made at the first session after the enumeration, were aware that the taking of the census of this populous state would be a work of great labor and detail, necessarily more or less complicated, and that every step in the proceeding should be taken deliberately and openly, so that the people would have an opportunity to watch its progress, and that a sufficient time should •elapse between the completion of an enumeration and an apportionment to enable all who desired so to do to fully examine into the details, and to accomplish that it was necessary that full and complete statements of the work of the enumerators should be deposited in some public office, there to remain for a sufficient time for full examination before the apportionment should be made.
The convention that framed the constitution of 1846 was in session the year following the passage of chapter 140 of the Laws of 1845, which provides a complete plan for taking the census, with ample provisions for the deposit of the returns of the enumerations in public offices for the inspection of the people. A compliance with the provisions of this act would necessarily require all the time prior to the sitting of the annual session of the legislature in 1846.
The members of the convention, we assume, were familiar with this act, and in preparing the provisions of the constitution under consideration, it is reasonable to suppose, understood the importance of providing that the apportionment should not be made at the same session as the enumeration.
Another reason why the enumeration and apportionment ought not to be made by the same legislature is, that if irregularities or frauds should occur in taking the census, the electors should have an opportunity at the polls to prevent the consummation of the fraud by electing members of the legislature for the following year who had not taken part in the frauds.
If an extraordinary session of the same legislature is a " session " within the meaning of the constitution, it would be in the power of a hostile governor to prevent an apportionment by failing to recommend to the legislature that subject for consideration.
Section 4, article 4, provides: " At extraordinary sessions no subject shall be acted upon except such as the governor may recommend for consideration.".
There have been many instances of extraordinary sessions of the legislature since the state existed. The proceedings of the entire year, including those of the extraordinary session, have invariably been called and known and printed as the laws of but one session. This shows the meaning attached to the word " session " of the legislature by the people.
The governor is required to communicate by message to the legislature every session the condition of the state, and recommend such matters to it as he shall judge expedient.' No governor has yet, so far as we are aware, considered this provision of the constitution applicable to an extraordinary session of the legislature.
Section 6, article 6, prior to the amendment of 1879, provided that judicial districts might be reorganized by the legislature at the first session after the return of every enumeration, " and at no other time."
We are of the opinion that an extraordinary session of the same legislature under whose direction an enumeration is taken is not, within the meaning of the provision under consideration, the first session.
We are also of the opinion that the said provisions are mandatory.
We have carefully examined the cases of Rumsey v. People, 19 N. Y., 45, and State v. Cunningham, 51 N. W. Rep., 724, relied upon by appellant's counsel as deciding that the provisions .under consideration are merely directory, and do not think they are authority upon this question.
The case of Rumsey v. People holds that an apportionment may be made by a subsequent legislature, when their predecessors have-neglected their duty in that regard. The questions presented in the case at bar were not before that court for decision.
In the case of the State v. Cunningham, supra, the supreme court of Wisconsin adjudged an apportionment act void because it was unequal and fraudulent.
Judge Pinney, in his opinion, suggests that another apportionment could be passed at a special session if one should be called. It was a casual suggestion, evidently made without an examination of the question, and was obiter.
We have not been referred to and we are not aware of any case-deciding the questions here involved. In the event that the legislature, for any reason, should fail to provide for an enumeration at the decennial year, as required by the constitution, whether it could be taken by some succeeding legislature, we do not deem it necessary to consider, for that question is not before us; nor is it necessary to pass upon the question whether an apportionment can be made at an extraordinary session. It undoubtedly could be so made, provided it was not a meeting of the same legislature-under whose direction the enumeration was taken.
The constitutionality of the act under consideration is further-assailed for the reason that the provisions of the constitution requiring that each senate district shall contain, as nearly as may be, an equal number of inhabitants, and that the members of assembly shall be apportioned among the several counties' of the state, as nearly as may be, according to the number of their respective inhabitants, excluding aliens, was violated in the apportionment under consideration.
The ratio of representation for a member of assembly, as shown by the enumeration, is 45,241. Monroe's representative population was 181,230. The county was, therefore, entitled to four members, with a surplus population of 266; she was given but. three. The population of Albany county was 156,348; she was,, therefore, entitled to but three members, but was given four. Two members were awarded Dutchess county, with a population of 75,078, and yet but one was given to St. Lawrence county,, with a population of 80,679..
These were not unintentional errors. The constitution says-the members of assembly shall be apportioned among the several counties of the state by the legislature, as nearly as may be, ac cording to the number of their respective inhabitants, excluding aliens.
The case presents many other striking illustrations of gross and inexcusable irregularities in apportioning members of assembly and in arranging senatorial districts, etc.
This point was so fully and ably discussed and illustrated in the opinion of Justice Rumsey, at special term, that we do not deem it necessary to add anything, except to say that we fully concur in his conclusions.
No one can read the figures and facts set out in the record and fail to come to the conclusion that the apportionment was a flagrant violation of the plain provisions of the constitution; that it could not have been the result of the just judgment of the members of the legislature, but was a bold and partisan proceeding, enacted and consummated with a view of giving to the party engineering the bill advantages in representation to which they were not in justice or in truth entitled.
Other points were presented and discussed by counsel which we do not deem it necessary to consider, for we prefer to put the decision upon the grounds discussed in this opinion, and for the reason stated we think the act, chapter 397 of the Laws of 1892, unconstitutional, which leads to the affirmance of the order appealed from.