Case Name: MITCHELL COUNTY HOSPITAL AUTHORITY et al. v. JOINER
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia
Jurisdiction: Georgia
Decision Date: 1972-05-03
Citations: 229 Ga. 140
Docket Number: 27008
Parties: MITCHELL COUNTY HOSPITAL AUTHORITY et al. v. JOINER.
Judges: All the Justices concur, except Gunter, J., who dissents, and Jordan, J., disqualified.
Reporter: Georgia Reports
Volume: 229
Pages: 140–146

Head Matter:
27008.
MITCHELL COUNTY HOSPITAL AUTHORITY et al. v. JOINER.
Argued April 10, 1972
Decided May 3, 1972
Rehearing denied May 18, 1972.
Perry, Walters, Langstaff, Lippitt & Campbell, Robert B. Langstajf, H. H. Perry, Jr., Twitty & Twitty, for appellants.
H. Thaxton Monk, Jr., Ben L. Bateman, Frank C. Vann, for appellee.

Opinion:
Nichols, Justice.
Certiorari was granted in this case to review the decision of the Court of Appeals with respect to the responsibility of a Hospital Authority in'permitting an unqualified physician to serve on its staff, although such physician holds a valid license from the State of Georgia to practice medicine.
The applicant, Hospital Authority, cites in support of its application for certiorari cases wherein it has been held that a hospital is not responsible in damages for the negligent or unskilful treatment by a surgeon or physician employed on its staff where it has exercised reasonable care in the selection of a physician or surgeon and selects an authorized physician in good standing in his profession. See Black v. Fischer, 30 Ga. App. 109 (117 SE 103); Tench v. Downey Hospital, Inc., 36 Ga. App. 20 (135 SE 106). Pogue v. Hospital Authority of DeKalb County, 120 Ga. App. 230, 231 (170 SE2d 53), also relied upon by the applicant, relates to a situation where the Hospital Authority does not, and has no authority to, exercise any control in the diagnosis or treatment of the illness or injury. Such rule is generally recognized throughout the country. See 41 AmJur 228, Physicians and Surgeons, § 117.
The present case, however, does not come within the above cited authorities, for the plaintiff does not seek to hold the Hospital Authority liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior or principal and agent, but upon the doctrine of independent negligence in permitting the alleged negligent physician to practice his profession in the hospital, when his incompetency is known. Such negligence is comparable to that of the owner of a motor vehicle permitting an incompetent, inexperienced, or reckless driver to operate such motor vehicle. See Vaughn v. Butler, 103 Ga. App. 884 (121 SE2d 72). While in such cases the mere permission is insufficient to hold the owner liable without actionable negligence by the operator, yet each is held for his independent acts and not as master and servant or principal and agent.
In Yeargin v. Hamilton Memorial Hospital, 225 Ga. 661 (171 SE2d 136), it was held: "The court did not err in holding that the Hospital Authority was not required to grant a physician unlimited and unrestricted rights to serve as a member of the active staff of the hospital operated by the Authority, and not required to allow him to use all of the privileges of active staff members according to the dictates of his own opinion and judgment. The Authority and hospital may restrict a staff member's privileges by reasonable and nondiscriminatory rules and regulations." It was recognized in that opinion that the Hospital Authority had authority to limit the practice by physicians to those procedures which it deems such physician qualified to perform.
In Dunbar v. Hospital Authority of Gwinnett County, 227 Ga. 534 (182 SE2d 89), with one Justice dissenting, it was held that a physician could be barred from practicing medicine in the hospitals operated by the Authority where he did not comply with various rules of the Authority.
These two cases require a finding that a Hospital Authority operating a public hospital has authority to examine the qualifications of any physician seeking staff privileges and to limit his practice to those areas in which he is deemed qualified to practice or to completely bar him from such practice if he is incompetent, unqualified, inexperienced or reckless.
As pointed out by the decision of the Court of Appeals, the delegation of the authority to screen applicants for staff membership on the medical staff does not relieve the Au-. thority of its responsibility, since the members of such staff act as agents for the Authority, and whether it knew or from the information in its possession the incompetency of the physician was known, is a question of fact. If the physician was incompetent and the Authority knew, or from information in its possession such incompetency was apparent, then it cannot be said that the Authority acted in good faith and with reasonable care in permitting the physician to become a member of its staff.
The affidavit in support of the motion for summary judgment did not pierce the allegations of the plaintiff's complaint and the judgment of the Court of Appeals reversing the grant of such motion was not error for any reason assigned.
Judgment affirmed.
All the Justices concur, except Gunter, J., who dissents, and Jordan, J., disqualified.