Case Name: Commonwealth v. Mills, Appellant
Court: Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
Jurisdiction: Pennsylvania
Decision Date: 1971-12-31
Citations: 447 Pa. 163
Docket Number: Appeal, No. 321
Parties: Commonwealth v. Mills, Appellant.
Judges: Before Bell, C. J., Jones, Eagen, O’Brien, Pomeroy and Barbieri, JJ.
Reporter: Pennsylvania State Reports
Volume: 447
Pages: 163–177

Head Matter:
Commonwealth v. Mills, Appellant.
Argued April 23, 1971.
Before Bell, C. J., Jones, Eagen, O’Brien, Pomeroy and Barbieri, JJ.
Michael L. Levy, Assistant Defender, with him John W. Packel, Assistant Defender, and Vincent J. Ziccardi, Defender, for appellant.
Mark Sendrow, Assistant District Attorney, with him Milton M. Stein, Assistant District Attorney, James D. Crawford, Deputy District Attorney, Richard A. Sprague, First Assistant District Attorney, and Arlen Specter, District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
December 31, 1971:

Opinion:
Opinion by
Mr. Justice Eagen,
The sole question presented by this appeal is whether or not a person may be convicted and punished in the courts of Pennsylvania if he has previously been convicted and punished in a federal court for the identical unlawful conduct.
The appellant, Bonald Edward Mills, was arrested with an accomplice for the robbery of a federally insured Savings and Loan Association in Philadelphia. They were indicted by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania for violations of the state's criminal code, specifically, carrying a concealed deadly weapon, unlawfully carrying a firearm without a license and aggravated robbery. They were also indicted by the United States Government for violating 18 U.S.C. §2113(a) (b) and (d), i.e., a bank robbery and assault.
On May 16, 1969, Mills plead guilty to the federal indictment and was sentenced to a term of five years imprisonment. Subsequently, he filed a motion in the state court to dismiss the indictments there pending against him on the ground that further prosecution would constitute double jeopardy. This motion was denied. Later, he plead guilty to these indictments and was sentenced on one to pay a fine, the costs of prosecution and serve a term of probation for five years to begin at the expiration of the sentence imposed in the federal court. On the other indictment, he was sentenced to a concurrent three-year period of probation. Mills filed an appeal in the Superior Court, which subsequently affirmed the orders of the trial court. Judge Hoffman filed a dissenting opinion. See 217 Pa. Superior Ct. 269, 269 A. 2d 322 (1970). We granted allocatur.
In an almost identical factual situation, the United States Supreme Court in Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 79 S. Ct. 676 (1959), specifically ruled that successive prosecutions in federal and state courts do not constitute double jeopardy, and that the United States Constitution does not proscribe a prosecution and conviction in a state jurisdiction after there has been a prosecution and conviction in the federal courts for the same act. On the same day in Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187, 79 S. Ct. 666 (1959), sanction was given to a prosecution and conviction in the federal courts after a prosecution and conviction had been effected in a state jurisdiction on the same facts. Both decisions cited the principle of "dual sovereignty" enun dated in United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377, 43 S. Ct. 141 (1922), wherein the court stated:
"We have here two sovereignties, deriving power from different sources, capable of dealing with the same subject matter within the same territory. . . . Each government in determining what shall be an offense against its peace and dignity is exercising its own sovereignty, not that of the other.
"It follows that an act denounced as a crime by both national and state sovereignties is an offense against the peace and dignity of both and may be punished by each."
Aside from challenging the correctness of the ruling in Lanza and Bartkus appellant contends that more recent decisions specifically Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 80 S. Ct. 1437 (1960), and Murphy v. Waterfront Commission, 378 U.S. 52, 84 S. Ct. 1594 (1964) have so eroded the "dual sovereignty" concept formulated in Lanm that it is no longer viable.
While two members of the United States Supreme Court who joined in the Bartkus opinion have expressed this same view (see Stevens v. Marks, 383 U.S. 234, 250, 86 S. Ct. 788, 797 (1966) (concurring opinion)), and it would appear that Elkins and Murphy have at least undermined the "dual sovereignty" doctrine, we think that these cases are distinguishable and have not disturbed the ruling in Bartkus. In the cases referred to "the prosecuting jurisdictions were attempting to use the efforts of the other jurisdiction for its own purposes, whereas in the case of successive prosecutions, in accordance with the basic assumption of the dual sovereignties doctrine, the prosecuting jurisdiction may be acting independently of the other." 80 Harvard L. Rev., supra, at 1548.
Appellant further urges that if the situation is viewed realistically, successive prosecutions for the same act do constitute double jeopardy and since Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 89 S. Ct. 2056 (1969), are no longer constitutionally permissible. At least one jurisdiction has reached this same conclusion. See State v. Fletcher, 22 Ohio App. 2d 83, 259 N.E. 2d 146 (1970). However, as to this, we agree with the thinking of Judge Cercone, as expressed in the opinion for the majority of the Superior Court, namely, that this position fails to recognize the real foundation of successive prosecutions by the state and federal governments, i.e., dual sovereignty and that the Bartkus decision "clearly reveals that it was the Court's opinion that successive state and federal prosecutions could not be construed as double jeopardy. . . ." 217 Pa. Superior Ct. 273. Moreover, Benton did not specifically overrule Bwrtkus, and in Waller v. Florida, 397 U.S. 387, 90 S. Ct. 1184 (1970), which was subsequent to Benton, the Court impliedly recognized the continued viability of Bartkus. Significantly also, the United States Supreme Court recently denied certiorari in five cases wherein the appellants sought to have the Court reverse the "dual sovereignty" concept recognized in Bartkus. See Bechtel Corporation v. New Jersey; Leuty v. New Jersey; Feldman v. New Jersey; Colonal Pipeline Company v. New Jersey; and, Jacks v. New Jersey; all of which are noted in 10 Crim. L. Rptr. 4010 (1971). Additionally, other courts of recognized merit, after studied consideration of the problem, have concluded that Bartkus is still the law. For example, see United States v. Ward, 314 F. Supp. 261 (E.D. La. 1970); Whatley v. United States, 428 F. 2d 806 (5th Cir. 1970); States ex rel. Cullen v. Ceci, 45 Wis. 2d 432, 173 N.W. 2d 175 (1970).
However, while we conclude that Bmtkus is still the law and that successive prosecutions by the federal and state governments for the same offense do not constitute double jeopardy, we are not persuaded that the orders in the instant case should be permitted to stand for the following reasons.
When one examines the "dual sovereignty" doctrine as it applies to the double jeopardy clause, we are really involved in a balancing process, whereby we place the interests of the two sovereigns on one side of the judicial scale, and on the other side we place the interest of the individual to be free from twice being prosecuted and punished for the same offense. The basic problem with Bmtkus is that the majority first failed to recognize that the interests of the two sovereigns might be the same, but more important, they secondly failed to really examine the interest of the individual.
The double jeopardy clause breaks down into three general rules which preclude a second trial or a second punishment for the same offense: (1) retrial for the same offense after acquittal; (2) retrial for the same offense after conviction; (3) multiple punishment for the same offense at one trial. The judiciary views these rules as expressions of self-evident moral precepts: It is wrong to retry a man for a crime of which he previously has been found innocent, wrong to harass him with vexatious prosecution, and wrong to punish him twice for the same offense. The policies which underlie the prohibition are first, guilt should be established by proving the elements of a crime to the satisfaction of a single jury, not by capitalizing oh the increased probability of conviction resulting from repeated prosecutions before many juries; second, the authorities should not be able to search for an agreeable sentence by bringing successive prosecutions for the same offense before different juries; and third, criminal trial should not become an instrument for badgering individuals. See generally, Comment, Twice in Jeopardy, 75 Yale L. J. 262, 265-67 (1966); Comment, Statutory Implementation of Double Jeopardy Clauses: New Life for a Moribund Constitutional Guarantee, 65 Yale L.J. 339, 880-41 (1956).
The striking feature of the aforementioned rules and policies is that the focus is always on the individual; on a person's basic and fundamental rights. This feature is the common thread that runs across all of the provisions of the Bill of Rights, and we believe this is the element the Supreme Court failed to adequately consider in Bwrtkus.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, not once in his majority opinion in BwrtJms refers to the interest of the individual, he consistently focused on the interests of the Federal and State governments, and, for the purposes of double jeopardy, transformed one act into two. The late Mr. Justice Black in his dissent, however, by focusing on the individual points out that it makes little difference to a defendant who is prosecuting the case, the simple fact is there is double prosecution and possibly double punishment. We are talking about the two governments protecting their interests, when we really should be talking about the individual, since by focusing on the individual we see that it matters little where he is confined—in a federal or state prison—the fact is that his liberty is taken away twice for the same offense.
It appears to us that the only penological justification. for permitting a second prosecution and punishment for the same offense even where different sovereigns are involved is out and out punishment, and we certainly hope that at this late date in the history of the development of the penal system of this Commonwealth and the Nation, that incarceration for a criminal act stands on stronger footing than—an eye for an eye. We can assume that normally double prosecutions will involve felonies less than homicides, and when dealing with such felonies the primary goal for imprisonment must be reform and rehabilitation. In our view, placing an individual in a state prison after he had been incarcerated in a federal prison for the same offense is not in any way going to aid in his reformation and rehabilitation. If anything, after the second term of imprisonment, he will be more of an acomplished criminal, and he will also be much more embittered against everything our government stands for, as well as against society in general; thus, we have really defeated our own purpose.
There are other valid considerations which militate against permitting the second prosecution and punishment for the same offense: (1) It is in derogation of the principle that "no one should be twice vexed for the one and the same cause"; and (2) It destroys finality from the individual's standpoint and permits the governments with all their resources and power to make repeated attempts to convict, thus subjecting the accused to live in a continuous state of anxiety, insecurity and possible harassment.
After giving careful consideration to all factors involved, we now rule, that henceforth in Pennsylvania, a second prosecution and imposition of punishment for the same offense will not be permitted unless it appears from the record that the interests of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and the jurisdiction which initially prosecuted and imposed punishment are substantially different. In other words, if it appears that the interests of this Commonwealth were not sufficiently protected in the initial prosecution, then a second prosecution and imposition of additional punishment in Pennsylvania will be allowed. Since the record in the instant case fails to manifest that the interests of Pennsylvania were not fully protected by the initial prosecution in the federal courts, the convictions and punishment imposed cannot stand.
The order of the Superior Court and the orders of the court of original jurisdiction are vacated.
Mr. Justice Roberts took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
Act of June 24, 1939, P. L. 872, §628 (e) and 704, 18 P.S. §4628(e) and 4704.
While an order placing a criminal defendant on probation is not a judgment of sentence, it is an appealable order. Commonwealth v. Vivian, 426 Pa. 192, 231 A. 2d 301 (1967).
The decisions in Bartkus and Abbate have been subject to criticism. See Note, Double Prosecution by State and Federal Governments; Another Exercise in Federalism, 80 Harvard D. Rev. 1538 (1967).
Elkins held that evidence seized by a state official and introduced during a prosecution in the federal courts is subject to Fourth Amendment scrutiny, Murphy held that a state court may not constitutionally compel a witness given immunity from prosecution under its law to give testimony that might be used against him in the federal courts.
In this connection it is interesting and significant that following the decision in Abbate v. United States, supra, the United States Department of Justice issued a policy statement through Attorney General William P. Rogers, stating that the power to prosecute a defendant under both state and federal law "has been used sparingly by the Department of Justice in the past" and will not be done in the future "unless the reasons are compelling". Press Release, New York Times, April 6, 1969, page 1, column 4, page 19, column 1.
An order placing a criminal defendant on probation constitutes "punishment" in this context. Commonwealth v. Vivian, supra, n. 2 at 200.