Case Name: L. E. Moore v. J. B. Snowball et al.
Court: Supreme Court of Texas
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1904-05-30
Citations: 98 Tex. 16
Docket Number: No. 1261
Parties: L. E. Moore v. J. B. Snowball et al.
Judges: 
Reporter: Texas Reports
Volume: 98
Pages: 16–42

Head Matter:
L. E. Moore v. J. B. Snowball et al.
No. 1261.
Decided May 30, 1904.
Res Judicata—Title—Equitable Relief.
A plaintiff who sued to remove cloud on title and to recover land sold under execution on a judgment for taxes on the ground that the judgment was void for want of citation and the sale void because in bulk for property part of which was homestead was not precluded, by an adverse judgment, from thereafter maintaining suit, in the nature of a bill in equity, to set aside the sheriff’s deed for irregularities in the sale leading to inadequacy in the price,—the suits, issues, and evidence to support them being distinct. (Brown, J., dissenting.) (Pp. 22-2Y.)
Question certified from the Court of Civil Appeals for the First District, in an appeal from Harris County.
Coleman & Abbott and W. J. Howard, for appellant.
When a judgment in a former suit is pleaded in a subsequent suit in the same court between the same parties as a former adjudication of the matters and issues involved therein, and the record in such former suit is before the court and in evidence, parol evidence will not be permitted to contradict or vary the said records, or to show upon what issues or branch of the case testimony was heard, what allegations were ignored by the court, upon what the court based its judgment, or what issues as made by the pleadings were submitted to the court, or decided,—the record, the pleadings and the judgment being conclusive of all such matters. Allen v. Read, 66 Texas, 18; Freeman v. McAninch, 87 Texas, 135; Rackley v. Fowlkes, 89 Texas, 617; McGrady v. Monks, 1 Texas Civ. App., 613; Freem. on Judg., 275, 300; Vanfleet on Coll. Attack, 526.
The record of the judgment conclusively establishes that the title was in issue, and it was not competent for the defendant to impeach and contradict it by the production of parol evidence. Fisk v. Miller, 20 Texas, 581; Roberts v. Johnson, 48 Texas, 137; Hanrick v. Gurley, 93 Texas, 461; Graves v. White, 13 Texas, 126; Oldham v. McIver, 49 Texas, 572; Nichols v. Debrell, 61 Texas, 542; Flippen v. Dixon, 83 Texas, 423; Lee v. Kingsbury, 13 Texas, 72; Tadlock v. Eccles, 20 Texas, 792; McGrady v. Monks, 1 Texas Civ. App., 613; Armstrong v. St. Louis, 69 Mo., 310; Long v. Webb, 24 Minn., 383; Bailey v. Williams, 6 Ore., 7; Sturtevant v. Randall, 53 Me., 153; Butler v. Glass Co., 126 Mass., 516; Campbell v. Butts, 3 Coms., 174; Jones v. Perkins, 54 Me., 396; Freem. on Judg., 275, 300; Black on Judg., 265; Vanfleet on Coll. Attack, 526; Whart. on Ev., 785; Smith’s Lead. Cases, 8 Am. Ed., 915. et seq. The cases of Cook v. Burnley, 45 Texas, 118; Horton v. Hamilton, 20 Texas, 611, and Pishoway v. Runnels, 71 Texas, 354, do not hold to the contrary. This case was followed and reaffirmed in Rackley v. Fowlkes, 89 Texas, 617, and the same principle is announced by all the authorities above cited.
When upon the trial of a pending suit it is shown by the defendant therein by the uncontroverted record, pleadings and judgment in another and former suit in the same court, on the same cause of action, between' the same parties, and for the same subject matter, that all the matters in controversy and issues involved in such pending suit were finally adjudicated adversely to the plaintiff and in favor of the defendant, by a judgment upon the merits rendered in said former suit and pleaded in bar of the pending suit, and such judgment adjudges the title and possession of the lands forming the subject matter of both suits to be in the defendant, there is nothing left in the second suit for a jury to determine, and the court should instruct the jury to find for the defendant for the lands in controversy. Nichols v. Debrell, 61 Texas, 542; Thompson v. Lester, 75 Texas, 523; Freeman v. McAninch, 87 Texas, 135; Rackley v. Fowlkes, 89 Texas, 613; McGrady v. Monk, 1 Texas Civ. App., 613; City of Houston v. Walsh, 3 Texas Ct. Rep., 344.
When a plaintiff in his petition avers substantially the matters required by statute in a petition in trespess to try title, such petition constitutes a suit for land, and puts the title of the land in controversy in issue, and a judgment rendered thereon is conclusive of the interest of all the parties to the suit, and is a bar to any subsequent suit between the same parties as to any claim to the land existing at the time such judgment was rendered. Shepard v. Cummings, 44 Texas, 505; Snyder v. Munn, 66 Texas, 259; Tevis v. Armstrong, 71 Texas, 63; Rains v. Wheeler, 76 Texas, 397; Hoodless v. Winter, 80 Texas, 640; Rev. Stats., art. 5275.
Ewing & Ring (James R. Masterson, of counsel)-, for appellees.
The plea of res adjudicata upon the facts appearing can not be sustained, as the identity of cause of action is fatally absent, the cause of action in the instant suit not being within the scope of the pleadings in the former suit.
It is entirely plain, upon the facts certified, and it will hardly be denied, that the appellees, unless defeated by the plea of res adjudicata, are entitled, on the equitable cause alleged by them, to have the sheriff’s sale in question set aside on account of gross inadequacy of price, coupled with and conduced by the irregularity or nondelivery of the notice of the sale (Bean v. City of Brownwood, 91 Texas, 684, 690, and statutes and cases there cited; Steffens v. Jackson, 16 Texas Civ. App., 280, error denied; Leeper v. O’Donohue, 18 Texas Civ. App., 533, error denied; Beckham v. Medlock, 19 Texas Civ. App., 62, error denied; Irvin v. Ferguson, 83 Texas, 496; House v. Robertson, 89 Texas, 687, citing Taul v. Wright, 45 Texas, 395), and by the irregularity of selling the property by separate artificial lots, though not susceptible of such separate sale, by reason of the improvements thereon (Sayles’ Texas Civ. Stats., art. 2362, and eases cited; Glasscock v. Price, 45 S. W. Rep., 415; Moore v. Perry, 46 S. W. Rep., 878), the principle being equally applicable to an undivided interest (22 Am. and Eng. Enc. of Law, p. 611), and to a direct action in equity as well as to a motion in the original cause. Owen v. City of Navasota, 44 Texas, 522.
The fundamental principles applicable to a plea :of res adjudicata .are well settled. To comprehend the precise question certified, it is necessary to distinguish carefully between the using a “former suit as a bar to a second suit for the same cause of action, and using a former adjudication of a fact as an estoppel to litigating it in a second suit.” Andrews’ Am. Law, p. 1109, note 4. It is true that, although the cause of action or subject matter, either or both, may be different, it is possible for some question of law or fact, necessary for maintenance of the second suit, to have been adversely adjudicated in the former suit, so that the former judgment will operate an estoppel to the relitigation of that particular question between the same parties. Hanrick v. Gurley, 93 Texas, 461. Equally true is it that there being no adjudication of any particular question of fact or law as an estoppel to litigating it in the second suit, and the effort being merety to set up the former judgment as a. bar or merger, it is indispensable that identity of cause of action, as well as the identities- of subject matter and parties, shall be present. Philipowski v. Spencer, 63 Texas, 603, 606-607; 2 Black on Judg., 2 ed., secs. 610, 725, pp. 927, 1086. The only supposed exception is, as stated in the last cited text, not an exception at all, but a necessary part of the rule itself. It is that any claim or demand is barred which was an inseparable part of the cause of action in the former suit. Id., p. 1087. This is only saying, in effect, as held in Girardin v. Dean, 49 Texas, 248, that if the cause of action is the same, it is immaterial that the grounds or points of the cause of action are different, just as it is immaterial that new defenses are urged which might have been, but were not, set up in the former suit. Nichols v. Dibrell, 61 Texas, 542; Freeman v. McAninch, 87 Texas, 135. The distinction above noted is clearly stated in Nesbit v. Ind. Dist. of Riverside, 144 U. S., 621, Law. Ed., 563. In Vanfleet’s Former Adjudication, vol. 1, sec. 159, the matter of this supposed exception is made demonstrably clear.
Indeed, the very essence of the rule we are considering precludes possibility of the bar or merger of a cause of action which was not within the scope of pleadings in a former suit, even though it might have been there set up. Bes adjudicata may apply, as we have seen, in the case of the same cause of action, to every ground or reason of the cause, whether set up or not, and to every defense to the cause, whether set up or not, but it can never apply to a different cause of action, whether it might or might not have been set up in the former suit. The maxim, “Nemo debit bis vexari pro una et eadam causa,” limits the rule by its very terms to identity of the cause. 2 Black on Judg., 2 ed., sec. 732; Pishoway v. Runnels, 71 Texas, 354; Norton v. Wochler, 72 S. W. Rep., 1025-26, and cases cited. The doctrine is also well stated in 1 Freeman on Judg., secs. 277, 288. The only question certified is one, not of estoppel as to any particular fact or question, but of bar or merger by the former judgment; arid on that issue it has been demonstrably shown (1) that the cause of action set up in the instant suit must have been in issue in the former suit, and (2) that if it was not, it can not help the plea that it might have been.
The inquiry then is, was the cause of action now set up within the scope of the pleadings of the former suit? We apply the question to the scope of the pleadings, because we concede that if the instant cause of action was judicable under the pleadings in the former suit, it would tie immaterial that no evidence was adduced in its support. Rackley v. Fowlkes, 89 Texas, 613. The cause of action is necessarily made up of the facts constituting it. The facts essential to the instant action are (1) stated irregularities, pleaded as such; (2) gross inadequacy of price, pleaded in like manner; (3) that the irregularities caused or conduced to such gross inadequacy of price; and (4) an offer to do equity by returning the purchase price. The certified question affirms the entire absence of these facts in the pleadings of the former suit. That the cause of action here set up is not title, legal or equitable, but only the right to get the title through the aid of a court of equity as by reconveyance, has been expressly held. Ayres v. Duprey, 27 Texas, 594, 605. The petition in the instant suit, based on that view, expressly-affirmed the title, both legal and equitable, to be in the defendant Moore, and sought relief on that theory alone, as shown by the certified question.
It would seem that no consideration could furnish a more conclusive test against the plea of bar by the former judgment (vide 1 Freeman on Judg., 4 ed., sec. 282). The cause of action now set up not being legal' or equitable title, could not be availed of in trespass to try title, offensively or defensively, in the absence of an affirmative plea setting up specifically the facts constituting it. Ayres v. Duprey, 27 Texas, 594, 605; McCampbell v. Durst, 15 Texas Civ. App., 524, 531-35, and cases cited. Whatever is title sufficient, legal or equitable, to sustain an action of trespass to try title, or defeat the action under a plea of not guilty, is within the scope of the litigation; but no right incapable of being so availed of, or which can not be availed of without an affirmative equitable plea, can be regarded as within the scope of such pleadings. The conclusion is submitted as irresistible that-the cause of action here set up was not, in the state of the pleadings in the former suit, judicable therein; it was not within the scope of the pleadings in the former suit. 1 Freeman on Judg., 4 ed., sec. 271.
In the light of what has been said, it is submitted that the certificate of the Court of Civil Appeals forecloses further inquiry, for it distinctly states that in the former suit “neither the pleadings nor evidence raised the issue" of the instant suit. State of Texas v. O’Connor, 7 Texas Ct. Rep., 650; Philipowski v. Spencer, 63 Texas, 603-607; City of Houston v. Walsh, 66 S. W. Rep., 106, error denied; Norton v. Wochler, 72 S. W. Rep., 1025, and cases cited. How can a judgment, we repeat, be a bar or merger of a cause of action that was not within the scope of the pleadings judicable in the former suit ? The following authorities, closely in point, will confirm a negative answer. Horton v. Bassett, 17 R. I., 129, 20 Atl. Rep., 234, 235; Bonker v. Charlesworth, 33 Mich., 81; Wright v. Anderson, 117 Ind., 349, 355, 20 N. E. Rep., 247; Am. Freehold Land and Mortgage Co. v. McDonnel, 93 Texas, 405; Evans v. Borchard, 8 Texas Civ. App., 279.

Opinion:
WILLIAMS, Associate Justice.
Certificate from the Court of Civil Appeals for the First District, as follows:
"James B. Snowball brought this suit, as by bill in equity, to set aside a sheriff's sale, under execution, of real estate to the defendant, L. E. Moore, on account of attendant irregularities which it was alleged had conduced to sacrifice the property for a grossly inadequate price, the petition expressly affirming the title, both legal and equitable, to be in the defendant, L. E. Moore, the purchaser at such sheriff's sale, but seeking, as a matter of affirmative equitable relief, to regain such title on account of the equity mentioned, as would be by reconveyance in equity. The city of Houston and James Snowball, the plaintiff's father, were joined as defendants; but the former disclaimed, judgment being entered as to it accordingly, and the latter, by a cross-petition, set up as to himself the same allegations made by the plaintiff, and became in effect a coplaintiff. The defendant, L. E. Moore, answered, so far as necessary to state, by general denial, by plea in bar of former TecoYevj as res adjudicata, by plea of improvements in good faith, and by cross-plea for recovery. The plaintiff and cross-plaintiff replied by first supplemental petition, denying generally the averments of the answer, and .specially pleading claim for rents from the premises, and that, in so far as the alleged former suit rested upon the cross-action therein, said plaintiffs had neither been cited nor appeared thereto, and that no guardian ad litem had been appointed therein for the plaintiff James B. Snowball, who was then a minor. The defendant, L. E. Moore, by first supplemental answer, put in a general denial to said supplemental petition. The case was tried with a jury and resulted in a verdict and judgment for said plaintiffs on January 17, 1903, awarding to them the equitable relief sought in respect to their alleged interest in the land, such interest being a life interest of a third in the whole to the cross-plaintiff, James Snowball, and a third interest in fee simple to the plaintiff James B. Snowball, subject to said life estate, but upon condition of said plaintiff's returning $1139.46 towards the purchase price paid by defendant, L. E. Moore, he recovering at the same time $424 for his share of the rents, and upon condition of said cross-plaintiff's returning $619.73 towards the purchase price paid by defendant, L. E. Moore, he at the same time recovering $1272 as his share of the rents. The judgment offset the rents against the return payments, and directed, as to the plaintiff, that he pay the balance remaining, with 6 per cent per annum interest thereon from date of judgment, into the registry of the eourt within ten days after filing of the mandate of the appellate court, if an appeal was taken, and as to the cross-plaintiff, that he recover the balance remaining in his favor from the defendant, L. E. Moore, with interest at 6 per cent per annum from the date of the judgment. The verdict found that the defendant, L. B. Moore, was the owner in fee simple of the remaining undivided interest of said real estate, and the decree adjudged'that partition be made in the usual manner, commissioners being appointed therefor," but to be so made that the defendant's improvements should go to her, if it could be done without prejudice to the interests of said plaintiffs.
"The material facts disclosed by the record are these: The property in controversy was the separate property of Mary A. L. Snowball, deceased, and at her death the fee simple title to same descended to and vested in her three children, Daisy Dean McKinney, Lilian B. Bisher, and the plaintiff James B. Snowball. The cross-plaintiff, James Snowball, is the surviving husband of said Mary Snowball, and upon her death became entitled as such survivor to an estate for life in one-third of said property. In 1898, after the death of Mrs. Snowball, the city of Houston brought suit against her heirs above named to recover taxes due said city upon said property and to foreclose the tax lien for same. On May 12, 1898, a judgment was rendered in said suit in favor of the plaintiff for the sum of $1572.30 and foreclosing the tax lien. In accordance with this judgment an order of sale was issued and in pursuance thereof the property was sold on the first Tuesday in August, 1892, at public outcry before the courthouse door of Harris County. At this sale the appellant, L. B. Moore, became the purchaser for the sum of $1600, which amount she paid to the sheriff, and received his deed for the property. This deed is in the usual and proper form and was duly recorded in the deed records of Harris County. Subsequent to this purchase at sheriff's sale the appellant procured from Mrs. McKinney and Mrs. Bisher a conveyance of their interest in the property. Kotices of the sheriff's sale were posted as required by the statute, but no notice of same was served upon either of the appellees, both of whom lived in Harris County at that time. The property consisted of various lots and parcels of land, but the improvements thereon and the purposes for which the property was used were such as to prevent its being sold advantageously by separate lots, notwithstanding this fact it was sold in separate parcels according to artificial lot lines. At the time of this sale the fair market value of the property was $17,000. The homestead of appellee James Snowball had been established upon a portion of this property for thirty years and he and the appellee James B. Snowball, who is a minor, were occupying said homestead at the time of the sheriff's sale, and continued to occupy same until dispossessed by the sheriff at the instance of the appellant, neither of the appellees had any knowledge or notice of said sale until some time after it had occurred. Had they known of the sale they would have endeavored to secure the money to pay off the lien, and failing to do this they would have demanded a publication of notice of the sale in a newspaper and may have thereby obtained more bidders at such sale, and would have required the property to have been subdivided and sold with reference to the improvements and not by artificial lot lines. On the 24th of August, 1893, appellee James Snowball, for himself and as next friend of the minor appellee, brought a suit in the District Court of Harris County against L. E. Moore, the appellant herein, the city of Houston and R. R. Anderson, sheriff of Harris County, to recover the identical property which is the subject matter of this suit. The petition in that suit, in addition to the usual allegations of a petition in trespass to try title, alleged that the judgment obtained by the city in the tax suit was void because no citation had been served upon the defendants in said suit. It was further alleged that said judgment and the order of sale issued thereon were void for the reason that the judgment and order of sale directed that the property be sold in bulk for the whole amount of taxes adjudged to be due thereon, notwithstanding a portion of said property was the homestead of plaintiffs and could not therefore be lawfully sold to satisfy the taxes due upon the remainder of said property. It was further alleged that the tax judgment and the proceedings had thereunder constituted a cloud upon the plaintiff's title. The prayer of the petition was for the cancellation and annulment of said judgment and all proceedings thereunder, and for a perpetual injunction against any attempt to enforce same, for the recovery Of the title and possession of the property and for equity and general relief. To this petition the defendant, L. E. Moore, answered by general denial and plea of not guilty and by plea in reconvention in which she claimed title to the property in controversy and prayed that the same be adjudged to her. Upon the trial of this case judgment was rendered by the District Court that the plaintiffs take nothing by their suit, that the defendant recover the title and possession of the property and that all the right, title and claim of plaintiffs in and to said property be devested out of them and vested in the defendant, ,L. E. Moore. This judgment was rendered on the 21st of November, 1898, and was-never set aside or appealed from. In the suit in which this judgment was rendered neither the pleadings nor evidence raised the issue of the invalidity of the sheriff's sale under which the defendant claimed title to the property by reason of any irregularities in such sale, the only attack made upon the sale being incidental and dependent upon the alleged nullity of the judgment and order of sale issued thereon. Ho service of notice of the cross-bill or plea in reconvention set up by defendant in that suit was had upon the plaintiffs, and no guardian ad litem was appointed to represent the minor plaintiff, James B. Snowball, in defense of such cross-bill, and no appearance or answer was filed therein, but the plaintiff James Snowball knew that said plea in reconvention had been filed in said suit.
"Upon the foregoing statement of the pleadings and evidence in the above styled and numbered cause pending in this court on appeal from the District Court of Harris County, we respectfully certify for your decision the following question:
"Do the facts stated sustain the appellant's plea of res adjudicata?"
In the former action the ultimate issue was one of title to the land in 'controversy. To sustain this plaintiffs charged that the judgment ahd> in consequence, the sale founded on it, were void, leaving their title unaffected. As the judgment affected them in other ways than in its operation upon their title, they sought a judicial declaration of nullity against it, and against the sale as dependent on it. No attack was made upon the sale for any vice peculiarly affecting it. This was the utmost scope of that action. Whether the special allegations designed to show the invalidity of the judgment were sufficient or not they asserted no other cause of action. The answer and plea in reconvention raised no other issue but that of title made by the petition, and did not enlarge the scope of the issues. Hoodless v. Winter, 80 Texas, 538; Shepard v. Cummings, 44 Texas, 502. A finding that the judgment was not void necessarily led to a judgment in favor of the defendants. In the present proceeding the plaintiffs concede to the defendants all that was denied in the former, admitting that the judgment and sale were not void and that the title passed to and is still in the defendants; and attack the sale upon grounds which affect it alone, and which would not have sustained a claim of title in plaintiffs but simply entitle them to a judgment setting the sale aside and restoring their title upon compliance by them with certain equitable terms and conditions. Different evidence is necessary to sustain the two actions, and different judgments are applicable to them, one- in favor of the plaintiffs in this case being entirely consistent not only with the correctness of that rendered in the former, but with any that might have been rendered therein on the issue of title had it been unrestricted by special allegations. That the relief now sought could have been obtained under the pleadings in the former action will not be claimed. On the other hand, it must be admitted that, by appropriate pleading, the plaintiffs might have joined together the cause of action which they attempted to set up and that which they now assert, and, by alternative prayer, could have enforced the latter where they failed in the former. This is true partly because of the abolition of the distinction between law and equity and partly because of the liberal allowance in our law of the joinder of different causes of action, whether legal or equitable. Upon an issue of title the plaintiff or defendant may, of course, recover upon that which constitutes a title, whether it be legal or equitable; and it may be that in support of such an issue, any title of either kind which the party has must be adduced. Judgment on the merits settles the title and neither party will be heard afterwards to say that he had a title which he did not adduce,' whether his failure was due to the condition of his pleading or his evidence. But the attempt here is to setup that which was not a title, which was inadmissible in evidence upon the issue of title, and which constitutes, as it has been defined by the decisions of this court, a cause of action different from that formerly adjudicated. The question therefore is, were the plaintiffs bound to assert it, because it was a right respecting the property sued for, and one which the law regulating joinder of actions permitted them to con nect with their former action, or otherwise have it cut off by the judgment in favor of the defendants on the issue of title? It is claimed that they were, upon the principle so often and so broadly laid down that a judgment "is not only final as to the matter actually determined, but as to every other matter which the parties might litigate in the cause and which they might have had decided." Foster v. Wells, 4 Texas, 104; Nichols v. Dibrell, 61 Texas, 541; McAninch v. Freeman, 87 Texas, 132. This we understand to mean only that all matters which properly belong to a cause of action asserted in the pending suit such as will sustain or defeat, in whole or in part, that cause of action, must be produced or be barred by the judgment, and not that all the different causes of action a party may have respecting the same property must be joined, because they may be, in one proceeding. To illustrate this, if the plaintiffs in the former stiit could have shown some other title to the property, or that the judgment or sale was absolutely void for some other reasons than those set up, they could not now aver them, because the title and the nullity vel non of the judgment and sale were put in issue, and anything that would have established either would have established plaintiffs' title; and they were bound to bring forward all such matters. Werlein v. New Orleans, 177 U. S., 401. But to so apply this doctrine as to embrace within an adjudication of the title to property every cause of action which the party had at the time of its rendition respebting such property, when only one of them was set up, would, in view of the liberality of our law allowing joinder of actions, be equivalent to saying that but.one suit about the same property can be prosecuted to judgment upon its own merits between the same parties, a proposition no one will assert. Under such a conception of the law a plaintiff who had been defeated in an action of trespass to try title would not be allowed afterwards to show that that which he had supposed to be a title was only a mortgage, and to foreclose it, or that, though not entitled to recover the land, he was entitled to the enforcement of a vendor's lien, or to specific performance of an executory contract. For under our procedure a plaintiff, in doubt as to his true rights, might seek to recover land upon an allegation of title, and, in the alternative, to enforce any one of these supposed claims, or many others that might be instanced. Courts and text writers have often found it necessary to so qualify the broad statement of the rule above quoted. In the case of Aurora City v. West, 7 Wall., 102, Mr. Justice Clifford thus states the doctrine: "Where every objection urged in the second suit was open to the party within the legitimate scope of the pleadings in the first suit, and might have been presented in that trial, the matter must be considered as having passed in rem judicatam." Says Freeman: "An adjudication is final and conclusive, not only as to the matter actually determined, but as to every other matter which the parties might have litigated and have had decided as incident to or essentially connected with the subject matter of the litigation, and every matter coming within the legitimate purview of the original ac tion. The general expression, often found in the reports, that a judgment is conclusive of every matter which the parties might have litigated in the action is misleading. What is really meant by this expression is, that a judgment is conclusive upon the issues tendered by the plaintiff's complaint. It may be that the plaintiff might have united other causes of action with that set out in his complaint, or that the defendant might have interposed counterclaims, cross-bills, and equitable defenses, etc. But as long as these several matters are not tendered as issues in the action, they are not affected by it." Freeman on Judg., 249; Black on Judg., 732; Am. and Eng. Enc. of Law, 2 ed., 766, 775, 784. This we understand to be the true doctrine, and the principle that all matters are concluded that might have been litigated has not been differently applied by the judgments of this court in cases cited by appellants. The statement has always been made with reference to some matter that was comprehended within the issues in the former action and not concerning causes of action distinct from those before asserted and adjudicated. If, as we have said, the matter now set up by plaintiffs constitutes a different cause of action from that which they formerly sought to maintain, they were not, under the authorities cited, bound to enforce it in their first action. Freeman on Judg., 256. That it is such we think the decisions of this court leave no doubt. Nothing but evidence of title was admissible or could have been made admissible under the former issues without the introduction of a different cause of action. Ayres v. Duprey, 27 Texas, 604-5; Haskins v. Wallet, 63 Texas, 218, same case, 68 Texas, 418; Rippetoe v. Dwyer, 49 Texas, 506; Fuller v. O'Neal, 69 Texas, 352; Chicago T. & M. C. Ry. Co. v. Titterington, 84 Texas, 224; Rutherford v. Stamper, 60 Texas, 450; Fisher v. Wood, 65 Texas, 205. The substance of these decisions applicable here is that a right of action to set aside such a deed as that defendants held, not void, but merely voidable by direct attack and upon equitable terms, can not be enforced under the pleadings in the action of trespass to try title. If that proposition is sound, and it is firmly established, it inevitably follows that such a right is not comprehended in the issue of title; for if it were it could, of course, be made effectual as a ground of recovery or of defense in such an action. While a plaintiff is permitted under our system to invest one proceeding with all the characteristics of both kinds of actions, and, if he fail in. one, to recover upon the other, it is still true that the causes of action are distinct, the judgments applicable to them are different, and the allowance of one denies the existence of the other. A defendant when sued in trespass to try title may plead not guilty, thus making the issue of title, and may also plead specially such a right as that which plaintiffs here set up; but when he does so he, in substance, asserts in reconvention a different cause of action against the plaintiff from that which plaintiff asserts against him. If it were not so, his right would necessarily be available under his plea of not guilty. The case of Bonker v. Charlesworth, 33 Mich., 81, sustains the view which we have expressed. See also Hills v. Sherwood, 48 Cal., 386, and Blanchard v. Brown, 3 Wall., 249. The two cases last cited illustrate the principle, but as the matters which it was held could be set up by bill in equity, to avoid a deed, after judgment in ejectment, could in this State be proved on the issue of title in an action of trespass to try title, it may be that the particular applications there given to the rule of res judicata would' not be given here. But the rulings made in these cases do apply where, as in the present instance, the matter set up in the second action could not have been litigated -in the issues of the first suit. Williams v. Barnett, 52 Texas, 130; Catlin v. Bennett, 47 Texas, 172.
The plaintiffs, believing the judgment of foreclosure and sale against them to be void, leaving their title unaffected, brought suit to recover the land. Judgment was rendered against them adjudging the title to be in the defendant, because the judgment and sale were not void but sufficient to pass the plaintiffs' title. They had asserted a cause of action which they did not have, simply mistaking the character of their right and, therefore, their remedy. They now assert a different cause-of action, which, we must assume for present purposes, they did have, but did not, because of their error, put in issue in their first proceeding. The former judgment was not on the merits of their real cause of action, so far as the certificate discloses, but was probably the result of their misconception of their remedy. Freeman on Judg., 263, 265. With reference to this, the author says: "The second subdivision (in section 263) includes all judgments rendered on the ground that, conceding the plaintiff to have a cause of action upon which he is entitled to a remedy, yet he is not entitled to so recover under the remedy of-form of action which he has chosen. The exception which takes these-cases out of the general rules in relation to estoppel is a very important one, saving the plaintiff from the loss of his claim through any error of judgment on the part of his attorney in determining what form of action is best suited for the enforcement of the plaintiff's rights."
There is at the foundation of appellant's whole contention the mistaken assumption, that, because plaintiffs had but one cause of action with respect to this land, it follows that it was'set up in the previous, action and was the subject of the former adjudication, when the truth is that their real cause of action was never asserted and therefore never-adjudicated. That which they did allege was a cause of action which they did not possess, and that they did not possess it was the matter-determined against them. The effect of that judgment must be determined by inquiring, not what was the character of the' cause of action respecting the land which they really had, but what was the character of that which they set up and put in issue; and the judgment deelar-. ing that they did not have that which they set up can not with justice be applied to one which they had but did not set up.
It seems to be supposed that the case is affected by article 5275, Revised Statutes, which proyides that a judgment in an action of trespass to try title "shall be conclusive as to the title or right of possession established in such action." There is no contention that the judgment is not conclusive as to the title and right of possession. The proposition here is that the title is held subject to any right of plaintiffs which was not and could not have been adjudicated within the scope of the action of trespass to try title in which it was rendered. Such a right is not a title judicable in that action. There is nothing new in the proposition that one party may have title and right of possession and yet 'hold the property subject to equitable rights of another and duties of his own which may and must be enforced in proceedings other than actions involving only title and right of possession. Martin v. Robinson, 67 Texas, 381. Such a right and corresponding duty are asserted by plaintiffs, and as is was not determinable in the former action it was not cut off by the judgment therein.
We answer that the facts stated do not sustain the plea of res adjudicata.