Case Name: In re ESTATE OF Rena Gunnell MURRELL, Dec'd E.C. Murrell v. Linda Dianne Rutter QUIN and Charles N. Rutter, Joint Executors, et al.
Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Mississippi
Decision Date: 1984-01-18
Citations: 454 So. 2d 437
Docket Number: No. 53922
Parties: In re ESTATE OF Rena Gunnell MURRELL, Dec’d E.C. Murrell v. Linda Dianne Rutter QUIN and Charles N. Rutter, Joint Executors, et al.
Judges: Before BROOM, P.J., and DAN M. LEE and PRATHER, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 454
Pages: 437–445

Head Matter:
In re ESTATE OF Rena Gunnell MURRELL, Dec’d E.C. Murrell v. Linda Dianne Rutter QUIN and Charles N. Rutter, Joint Executors, et al.
No. 53922.
Supreme Court of Mississippi.
Jan. 18, 1984.
Rehearing Denied Sept. 5, 1984.
Jones H. Hoskins, Brookhaven, for appellant.
Norman B. Gillis, Jr., Gillis & Gillis, McComb, for appellees.
Before BROOM, P.J., and DAN M. LEE and PRATHER, JJ.

Opinion:
DAN M. LEE, Justice, for the Court:
This cause involves two lawsuits which were filed in the Lincoln County Chancery Court and consolidated for trial. The first suit was filed by Linda Dianne Rutter Quin and Charles N. Rutter as individuals and co-executors of their mother's estate. In that suit they sought recovery of fire insurance proceeds from their step-father, E.C. Murrell, as constructive trustee of those proceeds and the return of their mother's jewelry bequeathed to Linda Quin or a judgment for the value of the jewelry. The second suit was brought by the decedent's husband, E.C. Murrell, wherein he sought reformation of the description of one acre of land deeded to him by his wife during her lifetime.
The chancellor held that the misdescription in the deed should be reformed to correctly show the intent of the parties. He also held that there was not sufficient proof to hold Murrell liable for the lost jewelry on a negligence theory. As to the insurance proceeds the chancellor ordered that they should be held in trust with Mur-rell receiving the benefit of any income therefrom and upon his death the principal was to pass to Dianne Quin and Charles Rutter in equal shares. From this decree the parties both appeal. We affirm the chancellor's decision as to the negligence and reformation of the deed; however, we reverse as to the insurance proceeds being held in trust.
Rena Murrell died testate on July 8, 1980. In her will she devised to her husband, E.C. Murrell, a life estate in their residence with the remainder to her children Linda Dianne Rutter Quin and Charles N. Rutter. They are the step-children of E.C. Murrell. During their marriage Murrell built a residence for himself and Rena on real estate owned by Rena. During the construction Mr. Murrell took out a builder's risk insurance policy in his name on the home. In 1975 the original builder's risk policy was converted into a homeowners policy with the names of "Mr. and Mrs. E.C. Murrell" as the named insured. Later, in 1978, the "Mr. and Mrs." was dropped because of a "computer issue" (not enough space on the computer to issue the policy in both names) and the policy named only "E.C. Murrell," as the named insured. It is not contested that all premiums paid on the policy were paid by Mr. Murrell by checks drawn on his business.
During their marriage Mrs. Murrell received a number of gifts of jewelry from her husband. She gave him a deed to one acre of land on March 21, 1971, for the purpose of building a workshop near their home.
Upon Mrs. Murrell's death her will was probated. In that will she devised to her husband interest in a camp, all livestock, a savings account, the lifetime use of the household furniture, and a life estate in the home together with a ten acre plot from the 110 acres on which the home was situated. The fee simple title to the 110 acres was devised to her two children subject to the life estate in her husband. The personal effects of Mrs. Murrell, including the jewelry involved in this lawsuit were bequeathed to her children.
After Mrs. Murrell's death, Mr. Murrell was given the jewelry by the funeral home director. Mr. Murrell gave one ring, a gift to Mrs. Murrell from a prior husband, to Linda Quin, but put the other jewelry in his home in a dresser drawer. From this location the jewelry was subsequently stolen while Mr. Murrell was in the hospital for treatment for a heart ailment. Only the jewelry was taken during the breakin of Mr. Murrell's home. Mr. Murrell never filed a police report or an insurance claim. Neither did he notify his wife's children of the missing jewelry.
After the death of his wife, Murrell recorded the deed to one acre of land. Through error the deed was mailed to Charles Rutter's mail box after recording. Because Rutter was an engineer he discovered that the legal description contained his mother's residence and was situated about 100 to 130 feet from his back door.
The surveyor who had measured the one acre of land testified that an error in the description was made by him and that the land as originally designated by Mrs. Mur-rell was not intended to include the home. Mr. Murrell also acknowledged the error; he claimed title to one acre but never the acre upon which the home rested, he never claimed anything more than a life estate in the home, and in fact he filed the action to reform and correct the deed.
On January 30, 1981, a fire destroyed the home. It is the insurance proceeds as a result of the fire which present the primary issue in this appeal.
We will first deal with the issue of negligence as it relates to Mr. Murrell's handling of the jewelry.
Here, the chancellor was the finder of fact and when the testimony is contradictory we cannot reverse absent a finding that he was manifestly wrong. Stone v. Campbell, 261 So.2d 127 (Miss.1972). Upon review of the record we must agree that Mr. Murrell's storage of the jewels in his dresser drawer did not constitute negligence. We therefore affirm the chancellor's dismissal of that claim.
As to the deed. Because both parties have agreed that the deed should be reformed to accurately reflect the property Mrs. Murrell intended to convey to her husband, the decision of the chancellor to so reform the deed is hereby affirmed.
The final question is whether the proceeds of the fire insurance policy are to be held in trust by Mr. Murrell and upon his death surrendered to Mrs. Murrell's son and daughter; or, declared to be solely the funds of Mr. Murrell. The chancellor held that the insurance proceeds were to be placed in a trust from which Mr. Murrell could obtain the interest, with the principal being held until his death and then distributed equally to Linda Dianne and Charles.
Our research has revealed few instances in which this Court has addressed the instant issue. In King v. King, 163 Miss. 584, 143 So. 422 (1932), Charles King brought a bill in equity against Mamie Louise King. Mamie Louise owned a life estate in certain property of which Charles was the remainderman. Mamie Louise had insured the property against fire for the sum of $10,000. After a fire destroyed the property Charles brought his bill in equity alleging that Mamie Louise, as a life tenant, was a trustee for Charles and should be required to hold the proceeds of the insurance policy and allowed to spend only her life estate interest therein. We resolved the King case by holding:
We think it is quite clear in the case at bar that the life tenant had an insurable interest and that the remainderman had an insurable interest in the same property, and in making the contract of insurance there was no duty imposed upon the life tenant to preserve the interest of the remainderman in the common property. She exercised her right to insure it, and under the valued policy of law, cited supra, she was entitled to recover the full amount thereof; it was a matter of contract between her and the insurance company. It was a matter of contract in which the re-mainderman here had no interest. Because he failed to exercise his right to insure his interest in the property is no reason for permitting him to claim an interest in the independent contract between the life tenant and the insurance company, nor can the courts invade it. The right of contract is a public policy in this state. We are therefore of the opinion that in the absence of a duty laid by contract or otherwise upon the life tenant to insure for the benefit of the re-mainderman the property in which they both have an interest, and in the absence of any agreement that the life tenant shall so do, the remainderman has no interest in the proceeds of the policy procured and paid for by the life tenant. In securing insurance it is a matter of contract between the life tenant and the insurance company, and there is no allegation that the life tenant here did anything which prevented or interfered with the remainderman's unquestioned right to insure his own interest. (Emphasis Added)
163 Miss, at 594, 595; 143 So. at 424.
Although the chancellor distinguished King by noting that at the time the instant insurance policy was purchased Mr. Mur-rell and his wife, Rena, were both living on the property and that Murrell's interest was not expressly limited to a life estate. While we recognize this distinction in King, we can see that it makes little difference.
"This Court is committed to the doctrine that fire insurance is an indemnity to the insured and the proceeds thereof do not run with the land." King, 163 Miss, at 595, 143 So. at 424.
The rule in this state does not differ whether the insured was originally holder of a life estate in the insured property or something more or less. Again, Rena Murrell's children could have insured their interest in the remainder of the estate had they chosen to do so. The fact that they did not does not entitle them to now become parties to Mr. Murrell's contract with the insurance company.
Based on all the foregoing, we hereby affirm as to the dismissal of the court alleging negligence against Mr. Murrell and the order of the chancellor reforming the land description and the deed; further, we reverse the chancellor's holding that the insurance proceeds are to be held in trust for Linda Dianne Rutter Quin and Charles N. Rutter and order the insurance proceeds delivered to E.C. Murrell.
ON DIRECT APPEAL REVERSED AND RENDERED IN PART, AFFIRMED IN PART. ON CROSS-APPEAL AFFIRMED.
PATTERSON, C.J., WALKER and BROOM, P.JJ., and ROY NOBLE LEE, BOWLING and HAWKINS, JJ., concur.
ROBERTSON, J., concurs in part and dissents in part.
PRATHER, J., dissents.