Case Name: STATE of Louisiana, Appellee v. Umekia Deon KIMBLE, Appellant
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1996-05-08
Citations: 688 So. 2d 552
Docket Number: No. 27960-KA
Parties: STATE of Louisiana, Appellee v. Umekia Deon KIMBLE, Appellant.
Judges: Before SEXTON, HIGHTOWER and STEWART, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 688
Pages: 552–567

Head Matter:
STATE of Louisiana, Appellee v. Umekia Deon KIMBLE, Appellant.
No. 27960-KA.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Second Circuit.
May 8, 1996.
Opinion on Rehearing Sept. 3, 1996.
Indigent Defender Board by Ford E. Stin-son, for Appellant.
Richard Ieyoub, Attorney General, James Bullers, District Attorney, and Whitley Graves, Assistant District Attorney, for Ap-pellee.
Before SEXTON, HIGHTOWER and STEWART, JJ.

Opinion:
h HIGHTOWER, Judge.
After a jury found Umekia Deon Kimble guilty of two counts of armed robbery, La. R.S. 14:64, and two counts of second degree kidnapping, La.R.S. 14:44.1, the trial judge sentenced her to a total of fifteen years at hard labor. She now appeals her convictions and punishment. We affirm.
Facts
Late on the evening of December 30,1993, Sean Moch and Tyrone Gilliam went to the Motel 6 in Bossier City, having been invited there by two young women, Zelwannica Coleman and defendant, for the purported purpose of consuming alcohol and drugs and engaging in sexual intercourse. At first, all four individuals gathered in Kimble's downstairs room. Shortly after defendant received a phone call, however, Gilliam and Coleman left to go to a second floor room, leaving the other two occupants alone.
Outside, several armed men in ski-masks confronted Gilliam and Coleman, took the couple to the upstairs room, and bound them with duct tape. Some of the assailants then taped Gilliam's eyes and removed him to a waiting vehicle, while directing other malefactors to go downstairs to get Moch. During a thirty-five to forty minute automobile ride, the kidnappers continually asked Gilliam about drugs they believed he possessed at another location, threatened and beat him, and eventually robbed him of $300 cash. Finally, the men put Gilliam out of the car, telling him to walk straight ahead to the door of a nearby house while they escaped. His ordeal ended when the police, called by the residents of the home, freed Gilliam from his bonds.
Immediately after Gilliam's abduction, defendant responded to a phone call from Coleman requesting that she come upstairs. Upon her exit, at least two hooded men burst into the room and abducted Moch at gunpoint. Before removing him from the motel to the back seat of a vehicle, they used tape to bind his hands, eyes, and mouth, and then robbed him of $200 to $300, in addition to his car keys. When his abductors demanded drugs from a Shreveport residence where they thought he distributed controlled dangerous substances, Moch stated he had cocaine at that address. Arriving there, the abductee persuaded the culprits to unbind him. Upon going into the house, however, he immediately slammed the |2door and blocked further entry. His former captors then quickly fired two shots into the entrance and fled.
In the early morning hours, the Bossier City Police Department began investigating the abductions and robberies. In one of the motel rooms, officers found duct tape and evidence of a scuffle. Both robbery victims had duct tape residue about their persons and exhibited signs of having been physically attacked. After eventually learning the women had been criminally involved in the episode, authorities arrested Coleman on January 3,1994.
About a week later, Detective Dwayne Presley allowed Coleman's aunt to visit with her niece at the police department. Following this short meeting, the incarcerated woman gave the investigator a statement concerning the events in question. After an advisement and waiver of her rights, she admitted that she and Kimble had been "the bait" to lure Moch and Gilliam from their suspected Shreveport "drug house" so that it could be burglarized of money and drugs. With the discovery of other people at the targeted residence, however, the initial plan fell through, necessitating another scheme that entailed kidnapping and robbery. Several days after giving her recorded statement, Coleman, the mother of four children and pregnant with a fifth, gained release on her own recognizance. Some three or four days later, she fell victim to a homicide subsequently linked to a cousin of one of her co-conspirators.
Coleman's confession resulted in four persons, viz., Adrian Dewayne Anderson, Bro-derick T. Collins, Brian Keith Powell, and Kimble, being charged in the kidnappings and robberies. When these individuals sought to suppress the statement on grounds it had been obtained in violation of Coleman's constitutional right to representation, the district judge found that they lacked standing to make such a challenge. By means of a motion in limine, the alleged conspirators then urged a hearsay objection; however, the trial court ruled the statement to be against the declarant's penal interest and, with her obviously unable to testify, admissible under La. C.E. Art. 804(B)(3). Thereafter, in one trial, the state presented two counts of kidnapping and two counts of armed robbery against each of the defendants.
|3The jury heard testimony from the two victims and the investigating officers, together with Coleman's confession. Both Moch and Gilliam specifically identified Kimble, in court, as being with them at the motel on the night of their abduction. Regarding defendant's direct involvement in the alleged conspiracy, Coleman's statement specifically stated that both she and Kimble willingly participated in the plan to lure the two men, believed to be drug dealers, to the hotel. She also revealed the other defendants' involvement in the actual abductions and robberies, Powell's role as the mastermind, and the fact that Kimble rented one room while Anderson provided the other key. The state further introduced a signed receipt showing defendant paid for Room 128 at the motel. Coleman's admission additionally explained that, although she had initially been bound in order for her to appear to be a victim, the tape had deliberately been left loose to facilitate her escape and subsequent telephone call requesting that defendant leave the other room.
After the jury found all four codefendants guilty as charged, Kimble received five years at hard labor on each conviction. Man-datorily, the terms imposed for armed robbery and two years as to each second degree kidnapping will be served without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. In addition, the trial judge ordered that the incarceration on the final kidnapping count be served concurrently with the other three sentences, which will run consecutively to each other. After the denial of a motion for reconsideration, Kimble appealed.
Discussion
Admissibility of Deceased Conspirator's Confession
In her first briefed assignment of error, Kimble challenges on several grounds the admissibility of her deceased co-conspirator's confession.
JjA.
Initially contending that the trial court wrongly denied her motion to suppress, defendant asserts that the police obtained the statement in violation of Coleman's right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 13 of the Louisiana Constitution. Specifically, based upon State v. Hattaway, 621 So.2d 796 (La.1993), it is argued that the state overstepped Coleman's constitutional guarantees when, after the appointment of a public defender, officers interviewed her without first contacting that attorney. We disagree.
Although the trial court rejected Kimble's motion after concluding she lacked standing to insist upon Coleman's right to counsel, we need not address the soundness of that ruling. Even if we assume such standing, no constitutional violation occurred. In a recent partial overruling of Hattaway, the Louisiana Supreme Court held that during an interrogation a defendant may validly waive his previously attaching, but unasserted or unin-voked, federal and state constitutional right to counsel. See State v. Carter, 94-2859 (La. 11/27/95), 664 So.2d 367.
The present record does not show that Coleman ever asserted her right to counsel, but, instead, clearly indicates she initiated the discussion with the police after conversing with her aunt. Moreover, Coleman continued in her desire to make a statement, even after being read a Miranda warning by the detective. Thus, the state adequately proved that she waived her right to counsel in a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary manner.
B.
Kimble also maintains that the trial court erred in denying the motion in limine directed at Coleman's statement. In heavy reliance upon Williamson v. U.S., 512 U.S. 594, 114 S.Ct. 2431, 129 L.Ed.2d 476 (1994), defendant contends that the confession constituted inadmissible hearsay, as well as violated her constitutional right of confrontation.
|sThe first question faced in this regard is whether, under the hearsay exception within La.C.E. Art. 804(B)(3), the custodial statement of a deceased accomplice may be admits ted against an accused as a statement against the confessor's penal interest. Because the Louisiana rule closely parallels Fed.R.Evid. 804(b)(3), federal jurisprudence can assist in resolving the issue. See State v. Coates, 27,287 (La.App. 2d Cir. 09/27/95), 661 So.2d 571. Indeed, where a defendant has been implicated by such a statement, our state courts have been directed to the discussion of the federal rule in Williamson, supra. See State v. Smith, 94-1221 (La. 10/07/94), 643 So.2d 1221.
Recognizing the strong motivation to implicate another and exonerate oneself, the Williamson court deemed custodial statements about another's actions to be generally less credible than ordinary hearsay. See also Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 106 S.Ct. 2056, 90 L.Ed.2d 514 (1986). That pronouncement, however, does not indicate that Rule 804(b)(3) precludes admission of all statements wherein an accomplice implicates an accused. Instead, the opinion explains that "[e]ven the confession of arrested accomplices may be admissible if they are truly self-inculpatory, rather than merely attempts to shift blame or curry favor." Williamson, 512 U.S. at 603, 114 S.Ct. at 2436. By analogy then, in cases involving La.C.E. Art. 804(B)(3), the relevant question becomes whether the challenged statement is sufficiently against the declarant's penal interest that a reasonable person in that position would not have made the statement unless believing it to be true. Id., at 603-05, 114 S.Ct. at 2437. Such an inquiry can only be answered in light of the total circumstances, including those surrounding the criminal activity involved. Id.
In the case sub judice, Coleman had the opportunity to meet in private with her maternal aunt, Deborah Johnson, immediately prior to talking to the detective. During the conversation with her closest living relative in the Shreveport area, Coleman detailed the planning and commission of the crime, including the parts played by herself, defendant, and the others. When made in a noninvestigatory context, where the setting indicates no motive Uto speak falsely, statements against penal interest and confessions to personal acquaintances or family members suggest reliability, even when adversely implicating others. See U.S. v. Flores, 985 F.2d 770 (5th Cir.1993). What Johnson later recited at the motion to suppress, concerning her niece's statement, is generally indistinguishable from what Coleman told the detective. Assuring the declarant she could tell her the truth, the aunt had stated she would do her best to be of assistance. Johnson also denied inferring, during their discussion, that Coleman could gain any advantage from the authorities. In fact, she acknowledged that Detective Presley had initially been reluctant to arrange the conference.
In her statement to Detective Presley as well as to her aunt, Coleman disclosed that the nefarious plot had been discussed at her residence with both young women present. Although Coleman's boyfriend, Powell, devised the scheme to rob the victims of money and drugs, she and Kimble willingly agreed to lure the men away from the suspected drug house in order for it to be burglarized, and, as matters later developed, to facilitate the kidnappings and robberies. In addition to admitting her complicity, she directly acknowledged an awareness that the planned actions violated the law. While indicating that the male perpetrators had the most involvement, she never placed more blame on her cohort, Kimble, than on herself. Each statement in that regard is generally stated in terms of "me and Kimble." In point of fact, by confessing that she phoned defendant to get her out of the downstairs room so that Moch could be accosted, she implicated herself more deeply than an individual merely following direct orders.
Beyond all that, Coleman's taped statement correlates with the other evidence presented at trial. Unquestionably, both victims placed Kimble and her now-deceased accomplice at the hotel when the assaults and kidnappings began. Moch even noted that defendant quite conveniently left the room an instant before the men forced their way inside. Also, the introduced motel receipt verifies Coleman's assertion that defendant actually rented one of the rooms utilized in setting the trap.
Reviewing the entire circumstances, we find Coleman's statements to the police to be sufficiently against her penal interest that a reasonable person in her position would not have 17made them unless believing them to be true. As such, they are genuinely self-incul-patory in nature. Importantly too, none of the statements relative to Kimble's involvement appear to stem from an effort to shift or spread blame, curry favor, avenge oneself, or divert attention to another. Accordingly, the trial court correctly held the confession to be trustworthy and reliable and, thus, admissible under the hearsay exception of La.C.E. Art. 804(B)(3) and the dictates of Williamson.
Although Williamson can be read to warn against the in globo introduction of inculpato-ry confessions which implicate others, we would not view such a general interpretation to be controlling in the ease against Kimble. Any portions of the present statement that might not qualify as truly self-inculpatory concern events beyond defendant's actual involvement, and do not further implicate her. To the extent that references are made to acts committed by other confederates and duplicate occurrences already related to the jury by the victims, we find the admission of these to be harmless. See La.C.Cr.P. Art. 921; State v. Coates, supra.
Defendant additionally contends that the admission of the statement into evidence contravenes her right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 16 of the Louisiana Constitution. We again disagree. In Williamson, although choosing not to address this issue directly, the prevailing justices observed that the very fact that a statement is genuinely self-inculpatory is, itself, one of the "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness" affording admissibility under the Confrontation Clause. Williamson, 512 U.S. at 605, 114 S.Ct. at 2437. See also Lee, supra. Thus, having previously determined Coleman's confession to be self-incul-patory, we discern no constitutional infringement. What is more, upon examining the total circumstances surrounding Coleman's statement, particularly her prior admissions to her aunt, the declarant emerges particularly worthy of belief. See Idaho Uv. Wright, 497 U.S. 805,110 S.Ct. 3139, 111 L.Ed.2d 638 (1990); U.S. v. Flores, supra. This is especially cogent where, as in this ease, the state has no means of procuring the declarant's testimony and, indeed, may have been precluded from doing so by the actions of one of the conspirators. See generally U.S. v. Flores, supra.
In sum, then, we find no merit in Kimble's complaints regarding the admission of Coleman's taped statements into evidence.
Excessive Sentence
In her last assignment of error, Kimble contends that the lower court both imposed a constitutionally excessive sentence and erred in not following the recommendation of the Louisiana Felony Sentencing Guidelines.
Although it must consider the guidelines, the trial court has complete discretion to reject those standards and impose any sentence which is within the statutory range of the applicable crime and not constitutionally excessive. State v. Smith, 93-0402 (La. 07/05/94), 639 So.2d 237. The district judge need only state the considerations taken into account and the factual basis for the sentence imposed. La.C.Cr.P. Art. 894.1; Id. When such compliance occurs, our review is limited to constitutional excessiveness. State v. Smith, supra.
The present record reflects a fidly articulated factual basis for the sentence. Although Kimble's minor participation in the crimes and her previous successful completion of juvenile probation resulted in the statutory minimum five-year term being imposed for each of the four offenses, the trial judge found adequate reason to run the first three periods of incarceration consecutively. In that regard, the court noted the serious nature of the criminal acts involved, the "strong possibility" that Coleman had been killed because she gave a statement implicating her accomplices, the judge's direct observation of threats (made in the court hallway) by Kimble's family and associates toward Coleman's aunt, threats against [9another witness resulting in her fate and whereabouts being unknown, and the relationship of the crime to drugs in that one band of dealers tried to steal the cache of another group.
It is well within a trial court's discretion to run sentences consecutively rather than concurrently. State v. Coates, supra; State v. Smith, 26,661 (La.App. 2d Cir. 03/01/95), 651 So.2d 890, writ denied. Concurrent sentences are not mandatory, nor are consecutive sentences necessarily excessive simply because two convictions stem from the same course of conduct. State v. Ortego, 382 So.2d 921 (La.1980), cert. denied; State v. Coates, supra; State v. Lighten, 516 So.2d 1266 (La. App. 2d Cir.1987); see also La.C.Cr.P. Art. 883; La.S.G. § 215. When imposing concurrent sentences, the trial court need only state for the record the factors considered and reasons justifying such action. State v. Smith, supra; State v. Lighten, supra. Reviewing the entire record and considering the previously mentioned factors, we find the district judge adequately justified the decreed punishment.
As the trial court articulated an adequate factual basis for the sentence, we limit further review to the question of constitutional excessiveness. See State v. Smith, supra. For a discussion of the parameters applied in that determination, see La. Const. Art. I, § 20; State v. Lobato, 603 So.2d 739 (La.1992); State v. Barberousse, 480 So.2d 273 (La.1985); State v. Square, 433 So.2d 104 (La.1983); State v. Bonanno, 384 So.2d 355 (La.1980). In that connection, considering the present circumstances in their totality and the serious nature of the acts committed, we conclude that Kimble's combined fifteen-year sentence is not excessive.
Error Patent — Credit for Time Served
Our review of the record does not reveal any credit accorded for time served. The provisions of La.C.Cr.P. Art. 880 require that the trial judge thus ascribe such periods in actual custody, and failure to do so constitutes error patent. State v. Coleman, 605 So.2d 231 (La.App. 2d Cir.1992); State v. Hughes, 587 So.2d 31 (La.App. 2d Cir.1991), writ denied; State v. Allen, 571 So.2d. 758 (La.App. 2d Cir.1990). Accordingly, the sentences will be amended to reflect any time in actual custody, as a result of these offenses, which has | ipnot been calculated against any other term of incarceration. Cf. State v. Combs, 600 So.2d 751 (La.App. 2d Cir.1992), writ denied.
Conclusion
We affirm for these reasons both the convictions and, after amendment as indicated, the sentences.
CONVICTIONS AFFIRMED; SENTENCE AMENDED AND AFFIRMED.
STEWART, J., dissents with reasons.
. The separate appeals of Kimble's three code-fendants appear in unpublished opinions. State v. Anderson, 27,956-KA (La.App. 2d Cir. 04/03/96), 673 So.2d 366; State v. Collins, 27,957-KA (La.App. 2d Cir. 04/03/96), 670 So.2d 809; State v. Powell, 27,959-KA (La.App. 2d Cir. 04/12/96), 677 So.2d 1008.
. Although she originally listed six assignments of error, Kimble now addresses only two. Assignments neither argued nor briefed are deemed abandoned. URCA-Rule 2-12.4; State v. Schwartz, 354 So.2d 1332 (La.1978); State v. Kotwitz, 549 So.2d 351 (La.App. 2d Cir.1989), writ denied.
.Anent standing to challenge a confession improperly obtained from a third party, see State v. Burdgess, 434 So.2d 1062 (La.1983); State v. Hawkins, 490 So.2d 594 (La.App. 2d Cir.1986), writ denied.
. Nor do we read Smith, supra, to herald such an expansive bar. Rather, the court in that instance found the conspirator's statement, by merely attempting to shift blame or curry favor, to be "presumptively" unreliable under Lee, supra.
. We do not find the identity, per se, of the male conspirators to be overwhelmingly significant in defendant's conviction. Coleman's statement links Kimble to a plan to kidnap and rob Moch and Gilliam. Consistent with that plot, and with the two women present at the scene, several masked men later assaulted those two individuals at the motel. Subsequently, in the presence of the jury, both victims identified defendant as being with them at the hotel on the night in question.
. While the record does not implicate Kimble directly in Coleman's homicide, the sentencing transcript notes that one of the other codefend-ants, Powell, may have been involved. In fact, Powell's cousin had by that time been arrested for the murder. Moreover, in sentencing defendant, the trial judge both mentioned the intimidation that had occurred against various state witnesses, in addition to members of Coleman's family, and recognized the likelihood that Coleman had been killed because she talked to the police.