Case Name: Cedric Lee PANNELL, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee
Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1984-02-29
Citations: 666 S.W.2d 96
Docket Number: No. 61527
Parties: Cedric Lee PANNELL, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.
Judges: MILLER, J., joins.
Reporter: South Western Reporter Second Series
Volume: 666
Pages: 96–104

Head Matter:
Cedric Lee PANNELL, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.
No. 61527.
Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, En Banc.
Feb. 29, 1984.
Joe E. Weis, Larry W. Green, Greenville, for appellant.
Jerry Spencer Davis, Dist. Atty., Green-ville, Robert Huttash, State’s Atty., Austin, for the State.

Opinion:
OPINION ON APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR REHEARING
McCORMICK, Judge.
On original submission, a panel of this Court held that appellant, after having counsel appointed for him, waived his right to counsel and gave a voluntary confession to authorities. We granted appellant's motion for leave to file his motion for rehearing to consider, among other things, the fourth ground of error which was raised in his original brief but not specifically addressed by the panel opinion.
Appellant contends that because the district attorney interviewed appellant without attempting to obtain the consent of his court-appointed attorneys the district attorney violated Disciplinary Rule 7-104(A)(l) of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a provision of the laws of the State of Texas. Appellant argues that since a law of the State of Texas was violated the admission of the confession into evidence violated Article 38.23, V.A.C.C.P.
Disciplinary Rule 7-104(A)(l) provides:
"(A) During the course of his representation of a client a lawyer shall not:
"(1) Communicate or cause to communicate on the subject of the representation with a party he knows to be represented by a lawyer in that matter unless he has the prior consent of the lawyer representing such other party or by law is authorized to do so."
See also, State Bar of Texas, Committee on Interpretation of the Canons of Ethics, Opinion 137 (1956).
Article 38.23, V.A.C.C.P., provides as follows:
"No evidence obtained by an officer or other person in violation of any provisions of the Constitution or laws of the State of Texas, or of the Constitution or laws of the United States of America, shall be admitted in evidence against the accused on the trial of any criminal case.
"In any case where the legal evidence raises an issue hereunder, the jury shall be instructed that if it believes, or has a reasonable doubt, that the evidence was obtained in violation of the provisions of this Article, then and in such event, the jury shall disregard any such evidence so obtained."
Initially, let us note that we have thoroughly reviewed the record and agree with the panel that appellant made a knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to counsel followed by a voluntary and knowing confession. The question before us is then the following: Does a violation of a disciplinary rule constitute a violation of State law?
The federal courts have been presented with a similar question in several cases. In United States v. Thomas, 474 F.2d 110 (10th Cir.1973), cert. denied 412 U.S. 932, 93 S.Ct. 2758, 37 L.Ed.2d 160 (1973), a special agent for the New Mexico Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs obtained a written statement from Thomas in the absence of and without the knowledge of Thomas' attorney. After noting that Thomas had requested the interview and had read and signed a Miranda -type waiver of rights form, the Court of Appeals found that the canons of ethics governing the actions of attorneys in federal courts had been violated. However, the Court affirmed Thomas' conviction on the following basis:
"A violation of the canon of ethics as here concerned need not be remedied by a reversal of the case wherein it is violated. This does not necessarily present a constitutional question, but this is an ethical and administrative one relating to attorneys practicing before the United States courts. The problem is initially one for the trial courts; however, in appeals such as this in the future the concerned attorneys will appear before this Court and consideration of the matter will be therein undertaken as to occurrences taking place after this opinion has been circulated." 474 F.2d at 112.
See also: United States v. Four Star, 428 F.2d 1406 (9th Cir.1970), cert. denied 400 U.S. 947, 91 S.Ct. 255, 27 L.Ed.2d 253 (1970), in this the Court also found a violation of professional ethics but affirmed Four Star's conviction. The Fifth Circuit has also found that ethical violations alone in these situations will not justify reversal when the record clearly shows that a defendant waived the presence of counsel. Wilson v. United States, 398 F.2d 331, 333 (5th Cir.1968), cert. denied 398 U.S. 1069, 89 S.Ct. 727, 21 L.Ed.2d 712 (1969).
Let us now turn to the Texas scheme. In 1939, the Texas Legislature enacted the State Bar Act, Article 320a-l, V.A.C.S. This act created the State Bar, denominating it "an administrative agency of the Judicial Department of the State." Article 320a-l, Section 2, supra. The act provided that the Supreme Court of Texas should promulgate rules and regulations for disciplining, suspending and disbarring attorneys. The Supreme Court was also to prescribe a code of ethics governing the professional conduct of attorneys. Article 320a-l, Section 4, supra. In February of 1940, the Supreme Court approved its first set of rules and code of ethics.
In 1971, a new Code of Professional Responsibility was promulgated by the Supreme Court. Section 8, Article XII, Rules Governing the State Bar of Texas, following Article 320a-l, V.A.C.S. (1973).
The 66th Legislature enacted a new State Bar Act effective June 11, 1979. This new act retained the administrative status of the State Bar and again empowered the Supreme Court to adopt rules and regulations pertaining to conduct of the members of the State Bar. Section 8, Article 320a-l, supra (Supp.1980). In an order dated June 11, 1979, the Supreme Court decreed that the Code of Professional Responsibility should continue to be in effect. See also, 7 Tex.Jur. 3rd, Attorneys at Law, Sections 8 and 9 (1980).
Are these rules governing the conduct of attorneys in Texas considered to be laws of the State of Texas? As noted above, the Code of Professional Responsibility was not promulgated by the Legislature, the law-making body of this State, but by the Supreme Court, part of the judicial branch of the state government. Article III, Section 1, Texas Constitution; Article V, Section 1, Texas Constitution. As noted in the very language of the State Bar Act, the Code of Professional Responsibility was prepared for an "administrative agency"— the State Bar of Texas. Thus, the rules contained therein were to be used and applied in an administrative capacity. Furthermore, several cases have found the State bar rules are "quasi-statutory" and "have the same force and legal effect upon matters to which they relate as the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure have to matters to which they relate." Rattikin Title Company v. Grievance Committee of the State Bar of Texas, 272 S.W.2d 948 (Tex.App.— Ft. Worth, 1954, no writ history); Cochran v. Cochran, 333 S.W.2d 635 (Tex.Civ.App. —Houston, 1960, ref. n.r.e.); State v. Dancer, 391 S.W.2d 504 (Tex.App. — Corpus Christi, 1965, ref. n.r.e.). But see: Silverman v. State Bar of Texas, 405 F.2d 410, 414 (5th Cir.1968), on remand 303 F.Supp. 486 (W.D.Texas 1969), where the Texas State Bar "concedes that its Rules 'have the force and effect of statutes in this state.' "
Because of all the foregoing, we now hold that the disciplinary rules of the Code of Professional Responsibility are not laws of the State of Texas as were contemplated by Article 38.23, supra. Thus, violation of one of these disciplinary rules in obtaining evidence for a criminal proceeding will not bar introduction of that evidence at trial. Article 38.23, V.A.C.C.P. We agree with our brothers in the federal system that such ethical violations are to be dealt with by means of the administrative mechanisms specially established for dealing with such unethical conduct. Appellant's first ground of error is overruled.
In his second ground of error, appellant argues that the panel opinion erred in finding no testimony that the prosecutor offered appellant a life sentence in exchange for his confession.
The record shows that during the hearing on the motion to suppress appellant testified that when he notified the jailer he wanted to plead guilty the district attorney was telephoned. Appellant was allowed to speak to the district attorney over the telephone. Appellant testified that when he talked to the district attorney appellant asked the district attorney if the "deal" was still good. Appellant testified the district attorney replied in the affirmative and told appellant that appellant would have to make a statement. Nothing specific was said about the terms of the "deal" but appellant interpreted "deal" to mean a life sentence since the district attorney had previously mentioned such an arrangement to appellant's court-appointed attorneys.
Our review of the record supports the finding of the panel opinion. Nowhere in the record is there testimony that the district attorney personally offered appellant a life sentence in exchange for a confession. There is testimony that appellant interpreted the remarks of the district attorney to convey such an offer, but that is not the same thing. The record does show that the district attorney and his staff had mentioned to appellant's attorneys the possibility of a life sentence in exchange for a guilty plea but there was never any formal offer of a life sentence in exchange for a confession made directly to appellant by the district attorney. All of the State's witnesses at the hearing on the motion to suppress testified that no promises were made to appellant in exchange for his confession and that he knowingly and voluntarily confessed. The trial court found the confession to be voluntarily given and the record supports such a finding. Appellant's second ground of error is overruled.
Next, appellant contends the panel opinion erred in relying on Goss v. State, 580 S.W.2d 587 (Tex.Cr.App.1979), in holding that the trial court's refusal to quash the indictment was not reversible error. Appellant relies on Brasfield v. State, 600 S.W.2d 288 (Tex.Cr.App.1980), and Evans v. State, 601 S.W.2d 943 (Tex.Cr.App.1980), two cases in which the capital murder indictments failed to name the victims of the aggravating offense. Those cases can be distinguished from the instant case in that in the instant case appellant was convicted of the lesser included offense of murder, while in the two aforementioned cases the defendants were convicted of capital murder. In the case at bar, the failure to properly plead the victim of the aggravating element in no way harmed the appellant because the aggravating element played no part in his conviction. Reversal would not cure the error because in effect it has already been cured, by the jury.
We are cognizant of our recent opinion in Jeffers v. State, 646 S.W.2d 185 (Tex.Cr. App.1983) (opinion on rehearing) in which we stated:
"The test for deciding the sufficiency of an indictment in the face of a motion to quash for insufficient notice is to examine the indictment from the perspective of the accused. Drumm v. State, 560 S.W.2d 944 (Tex.Cr.App.1977)....
"To require evidence reflected in a statement of facts to establish insufficient notice is to ignore the requirement that notice must appear on the face of the indictment. Examination of the indictment, not the evidence, is the ultimate test." (Emphasis added) Jeffers v. State, 646 S.W.2d at 189.
We are not departing from that holding. However, reversal of this case would be pointless. The harm has already been cured. The panel properly relied on Goss v. State, supra. Appellant's third ground of error is overruled.
On original submission, appellant complained that the trial court erred in failing to dismiss the indictment when he proved that the method of selecting a Hunt County Grand Jury foreman was racially discriminatory. On rehearing, appellant contends the panel erroneously overruled this contention. Appellant relies on Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 99 S.Ct. 2993, 61 L.Ed.2d 739 (1979).
Our review of the record of the pretrial hearing convinces us that appellant failed to establish a prima facie case of systematic exclusion of black persons from serving as the grand jury foreman. Lee Bostick, the county auditor, testified that he had worked for Hunt County in various capacities since 1946 with the exception of a period of four years. His testimony on direct examination regarding the foremen of grand juries was as follows:
"Q. All right. To your knowledge since 1946 to your personal knowledge, has there ever been a foreman of a duly constituted grand jury in Hunt County that's been of the black or the Negro race?
"A. I don't know any knowledge of it, no.
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"Q. All right. To your knowledge have you ever known of a foreman of a grand jury in Hunt County to be a black person?
"A. No, sir."
Mrs. Anne Prince, the district clerk for the 196th Judicial District testified that she had had an on and off employment association with the county since December of 1949.
"Q. All right. To your own personal knowledge, can you recall whether or not there's ever been a foreman served and sworn of a Hunt County grand jury?
"A. Not that I know of, sir.
"Q. That was of the black or Negro race?
"A. No, sir.
u (
"Q. Okay. But to your knowledge no such, no such black or Negro foreman has ever served?
"A. Not that I know of, no, sir.
"Q. All right. And that memory dates back at least to 1950?
"A. Well, we were gone part of, for about ten years in there, but not ' for any time that I know of, no, sir.
"Q. Okay. Since you've been back to your knowledge has a black person ever served as grand jury foreman?
"A. No, sir.
"Q. Since you've been back working in the courthouse continuously?
"A. No, sir."
The evidence relied on in the case at bar is surprisingly similar to the evidence produced in Rose v. Mitchell, supra, which the Supreme Court found insufficient to constitute a prima facie case of discrimination. There is nothing in the record to show that either witness knew who had served as grand jury foremen in the years between 1946 and the time of trial. The defense attorney read a list of names to witness Bostick, whom Bostick identified as white individuals, but nowhere in the record is this list identified as a list of grand jury foremen nor does the record indicate that if so, what years these individuals served. Furthermore, neither of the witnesses expressed any knowledge as to the race of grand jury foremen before 1946. Thus, there was no positive testimony that no black had ever served as grand jury foreman — just that the witnesses had no personal knowledge of a black serving in that capacity from approximately 1946 to the time of appellant's trial.
In addition, even if the witnesses' testimony was sufficient to account for the years from 1946 to the time of trial, just as in Rose, there was no evidence as to the total number of grand jury foremen appointed in Hunt County during that time.
"Absent such evidence, it is difficult to say that the number of Negroes appointed foreman, even if zero, is statistically so significant as to make out a case of discrimination under the 'rule of exclusion.' . Inasmuch as there is no evidence in the record of the number of foremen appointed, it is not possible to perform the calculations and comparisons needed to permit a court to conclude that a statistical case of discrimination had been made out . and proof under the 'rule of exclusion' fails_" (Citations omitted) Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. at 571, 99 S.Ct. at 3008.
Appellant's ground of error is overruled.
The appellant's motion for rehearing is denied and the panel opinion is affirmed.