Case Name: Kirsha BROWN-YOUNGER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. State of ILLINOIS and City of Chicago, Defendants-Appellees
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 2012-03-09
Citations: 458 F. App'x 571
Docket Number: No. 11-3308
Parties: Kirsha BROWN-YOUNGER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. State of ILLINOIS and City of Chicago, Defendants-Appellees.
Judges: Before RICHARD A. POSNER, Circuit Judge, DIANE P. WOOD, Circuit Judge, and JOHN DANIEL TINDER, Circuit Judge.
Reporter: West's Federal Appendix
Volume: 458
Pages: 571–572

Head Matter:
Kirsha BROWN-YOUNGER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. State of ILLINOIS and City of Chicago, Defendants-Appellees.
No. 11-3308.
United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.
Submitted March 7, 2012.
Decided March 9, 2012.
Rehearing Denied April 20, 2012.
Kirsha Brown-Younger, Chicago, IL, pro se.
Before RICHARD A. POSNER, Circuit Judge, DIANE P. WOOD, Circuit Judge, and JOHN DANIEL TINDER, Circuit Judge.
The appellees were not served with process in the district court and are not participating in this appeal. After examining the appellant’s brief and the record, we have concluded that oral argument is unnecessary. Thus, the appeal is submitted on the brief and the record. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2)(C).

Opinion:
ORDER
Kirsha Brown-Younger appeals the dismissal of her civil rights complaint against the State of Illinois and the Chicago Police Department for failure to state a claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). We affirm.
In her complaint, filed in part under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Brown-Younger claimed that police, the State, the CIA, and the FBI were monitoring her behavior, organizing hate groups to attack her, and otherwise harassing her. The district court screened the complaint and dismissed it because Brown-Younger failed to name an individual defendant, specify how her rights were violated, or allege that any violation of her rights resulted from an official policy of the State of Illinois or the Chicago Police Department.
On appeal Brown-Younger rehashes the allegations of her complaint and argues that the district court abused its discretion by failing to serve process on the defendants and by dismissing the complaint without a hearing. But dismissal here was appropriate because a complaint must contain sufficient facts to state a claim that is plausible on its face, see Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949-50, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009); Bausch v. Stryker Corp., 630 F.3d 546, 558 (7th Cir.2010); Sharp Elecs. Corp. v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 578 F.3d 505, 510 (7th Cir.2009); Brooks v. Ross, 578 F.3d 574, 581 (7th Cir.2009). Brown-Younger's implausible allegations-that state and federal officials are organizing hate groups to attack her, using various technologies to monitor her activities and thoughts, psychologically harassing her, and attempting to drive her to suicide and financial ruin — do not meet this standard.
AFFIRMED.