Case Name: Chosar Corporation, et al. v. Beulah Owens, et al.
Court: Supreme Court of Virginia
Jurisdiction: Virginia
Decision Date: 1988-06-17
Citations: 235 Va. 660
Docket Number: Record No. 850699
Parties: Chosar Corporation, et al. v. Beulah Owens, et al.
Judges: 
Reporter: Virginia Reports
Volume: 235
Pages: 660–670

Head Matter:
Chosar Corporation, et al. v. Beulah Owens, et al.
Record No. 850699
June 17, 1988
Present: All the Justices
S. Strother Smith (William H. Drake, on brief), for appellants.
Benjamin F. Sutherland for appellees.

Opinion:
STEPHENSON, J.,
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The principal questions in this appeal are (1) whether mining of coal owned by cotenants without the consent of all owners constitutes waste and the exclusion of the interests of the nonconsenting owners entitling them to injunctive relief, and (2) if such mining does constitute waste and the exclusion of the nonconsenting own ers' interests, whether the consenting coal owners may permit a third party to transport coal from adjoining land through an underground passageway created by such mining, over the objection of the nonconsenting owners.
In this chancery cause, Beulah Owens and others (collectively, Owens) seek to enjoin Chosar Corporation and William H. Drake (collectively, Chosar) from mining coal in which Owens owns an undivided fractional interest and from hauling coal from the land of a third party through an underground passageway created by such mining. The trial court ruled that "the mining of coal by Chosar and its lessees . . ., without the consent of all cotenants, is the commission of waste, the exclusion by [Chosar] of [Owens] from their interest in the property, and an appropriation thereof to [Chosar]." The court also ruled that fewer than all cotenants could not permit the haulage of coal, produced from other lands, through underground passages carved out of the jointly-owned coal. Consequently, the trial court permanently enjoined Chosar from such mining and haulage, ordered an accounting, and referred the cause to a special commissioner. This appeal ensued pursuant to Code § 8.01-670(B).
The relevant facts are undisputed. The coal in controversy lies within a 61-acre tract of land in Dickenson County (the Willis tract). The coal is owned by the heirs and successors in title of Andrew and Crissie Willis (collectively, Willis). At present, approximately 90 persons own undivided interests in the coal.
Approximately 85 percent of the co-owners executed leases transferring to Chosar "all their right, title and interest" in all the merchantable seams of coal on the Willis tract. The leases provided for a royalty that is the greater of two dollars per 2,000 pounds of coal or eight percent of the price obtained from the coal. The leases also granted Chosar the right to transport coal from adjoining lands through underground passageways on the leased premises.
The most valuable coal on the Willis tract is the "Splashdam seam," which is several hundred feet beneath the surface of the land. Chosar subleased the right to mine the Splashdam seam to coal operators at a royalty rate of 14 percent of the selling price.
Because the Splashdam seam does not outcrop on the Willis tract, access for underground mining had to be achieved from other lands. Consequently, Chosar obtained a lease from Pittston Resources, Inc. (Pittston), to mine coal from land owned by Pittston that adjoins the Willis tract. Thus, a portal was established at the outcropping of the Splashdam seam on the Pittston tract, approximately 200 feet from the Willis tract's boundary.
The mining operation proceeded from the portal to the Willis tract, thence through the Willis tract to Pittston's land on the opposite side. Thereafter, coal mined from Pittston's property was transported underground through the passageways on the Willis tract and thence to the surface. The passageways on the Willis tract were created by the mining operation.
Although a cotenant may transfer to another his undivided interest in the common property without the consent of his cotenants, see Va. Coal and Iron Co. v. Hylton, 115 Va. 418, 421-22, 79 S.E. 337, 338 (1913), nonconsenting cotenants are not bound by an agreement purporting to lease the entire property or any specific portion thereof, Phillips v. Dulany, 114 Va. 681, 683, 77 S.E. 449, 449 (1913). A lessee claiming under such a lease acquires rights no greater than those of his lessor. See Nickels v. Miller, 126 Va. 59, 64, 101 S.E. 68, 70 (1919). Consequently, our inquiry here necessarily focuses upon the extent of the consenting cotenants' rights in the common coal lands.
We first consider whether Chosar's mining of the coal without the consent of . all owners constituted waste. Generally, waste is defined as "[a] destruction or material alteration or deterioration of the freehold, or of the improvements forming a material part thereof, by any person rightfully in possession, but who has not the fee title or the full estate." Black's Law Dictionary 1425 (5th ed. 1979). At common law, a cotenant was not liable to his cotenants for waste. 2 R. Minor, The Law of Real Property § 879 (2d ed. 1928). The common law, however, has been changed by statute: "If a tenant in common, joint tenant or parcener commit waste, he shall be liable to his cotenants, jointly or severally, for damages." Code § 55-212. Injured parties also have a remedy at law for waste committed by "any tenant of land . . . while he remains in possession." Code § 55-211.
Notwithstanding these statutory remedies, a court of equity, in a proper case, may grant an injunction to prohibit waste. Marble Co. v. Standard Gas Co., 155 Va. 249, 257-58, 154 S.E. 518, 521 (1930); Fleenor v. Sproles, 148 Va. 503, 508, 139 S.E. 286, 288 (1927); Harris v. Thomas, 11 Va. (1 Hen. & M.) 17, 18 (1806). What constitutes waste sufficient to entitle the injured party to injunctive relief depends upon the circumstances of each particular case. Findlay v. Smith, 20 Va. (6 Munf.) 134, 142 (1818). For example, the cutting of timber in some instances may constitute waste, while in other cases it may be a benefit. Macaulay's ex'or v. Dismal Swamp Land Co., 41 Va. (2 Rob.) 507, 527-28 (1843); Findlay, 20 Va. (6 Munf.) at 148-49 (Roane, J., dissenting).
In the case of tenants in common, no tenant can change or alter the common property to the injury of his cotenants without their consent. Woods v. Early, 95 Va. 307, 312, 28 S.E. 374, 376 (1897). Injunctive relief against a cotenant is proper where the injury is material, continuing, and not adequately remedied in damages. Id. at 314-15, 28 S.E. at 376-77.
In the present case, the extraction of coal from the Willis tract is a material and continuing destruction of the very substance of the mineral estate. The consenting cotenants had no right to remove coal from the common property without the consent of Owens. Consequently, the consenting cotenants could not authorize Chosar to mine coal from the property without the consent of the other cotenants. We conclude, therefore, that the trial court correctly ruled that Chosar's mining within the Willis tract constituted the commission of waste. Because continued mining would cause irreparable harm to Owens, we further conclude that the trial court properly enjoined Chosar from committing further waste.
We next consider whether Chosar's mining of the Willis tract excluded the nonconsenting cotenants from their interest in the property. At common law, one cotenant who used the common land exclusively was not required to account to the other cotenants unless his use resulted in an ouster or exclusion of his cotenants. Fry v. Payne, 82 Va. 759, 761, 1 S.E. 197, 199 (1887). Now, however, an accounting may be had against a cotenant "for re ceiving more than comes to his just share or proportion." Code § 8.01-31.
In his use of the common property, a cotenant cannot appropriate to himself the entire estate, Dotson v. Branham, 197 Va. 674, 678, 90 S.E.2d 783, 786-87 (1956), or unilaterally partition the property by appropriating to himself any specific portion of the property, Cox v. McMullin, 55 Va. (14 Gratt.) 82, 90 (1857). If a cotenant desires partition, he may seek relief under Code § 8.01-81. That section also authorizes courts to compel partition of "mineral rights east and south of the Clinch River."
Significantly, however, courts had no authority to partition mineral rights until 1964. In that year, the General Assembly amended the predecessor to Code § 8.01-81 to permit the partition of mineral rights "east of the Blue Ridge mountains." Acts 1964, c. 167. Subsequently, the General Assembly again amended that section, empowering courts to partition mineral rights "east and south of the Clinch River." Acts 1968, c. 412.
Thus, by negative implication, Code § 8.01-81 prohibits the partitioning of mineral rights west and north of the Clinch River, which is where the mineral rights in the Willis tract are located. If a court has no authority to partition mineral rights west and north of the Clinch River, a fortiori, such mineral rights cannot be partitioned without the consent of all cotenants.
In the present case, however, Chosar's conduct of mining operations was such an appropriation of a specific portion of the Splashdam seam, and, in effect, a unilateral partitioning of the mineral estate. Thus, we conclude that the trial court correctly ruled that Chosar's mining excluded the nonconsenting cotenants from their interests in the property.
Similarly, the transporting of coal from Pittston's adjoining land through the underground passageway created in the Willis tract by Chosar's mining constitutes an exclusion of the non-consenting owners' interest in the property. Moreover, the underground passageway is a product of the waste of the estate. Allowing Chosar to use the tunnel to transport coal would permit Chosar to profit from its own wrongdoing. We conclude, therefore, that the trial court properly enjoined Chosar from further haulage.
We have considered Chosar's other assignments of error and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, we will affirm the de crees of the trial court and remand the cause for further proceedings consistent with the views expressed herein.
Affirmed and remanded.
The other complainants are: Willie Willis, Trella Boyd, Neville Willis, Betty J. Garrett, Annisteen Burchett, Betty L. Willis, Darlene J. Anderson, Mary A. Lindsey, Duster Willis, Ercel Ratliff, Estes Ratliff, Phyllis J. Prater, Imel R. Jackson, Foster L. Ratliff, George Ratliff, Bobby J. Ratliff, Rodney R. Ratliff, Jack Ratliff, David L. Ratliff, Carley Sluss, Madeline Shortridge, Patricia Epling, James Archie Sluss, Danny Sluss, and Sonja McCowan.
The parties concede, however, that the exact number and identity of the owners have not been established.