Case Name: PEOPLE v. VERMEULEN
Court: Michigan Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1989-03-08
Citations: 432 Mich. 32
Docket Number: Docket No. 81558
Parties: PEOPLE v VERMEULEN
Judges: Brickley, Cavanagh, and Archer, JJ., concurred with Levin, J.
Reporter: Michigan Reports
Volume: 432
Pages: 32–48

Head Matter:
PEOPLE v VERMEULEN
Docket No. 81558.
Argued April 6, 1988
(Calendar No. 3).
Decided March 8, 1989.
John A. Vermeulen was charged in the Oakland Circuit Court with the first-degree murder of Urime Lewis, whom he had married before his divorce from Sharon Vermeulen became final. The court, Fred M. Mester, J., granted the people’s motion in limine to allow admission of the testimony of Sharon Vermeulen regarding statements made by the defendant that he intended to kill Urime Lewis, so as to refute the defendant’s claim that the death was an accident arising out of the defendant’s attempted suicide. The court stated that since the marital relationship essentially had long ceased to exist, the statements made by the defendant to his wife were not confidential. The Court of Appeals, Holbrook, Jr., P.J., and Hood and Maher, JJ., reversed, holding that the statements made by the defendant to his wife during the legal existence of the marital relationship were barred on the authority of People v Hamacher (On Remand), 160 Mich App 759 (1987) (Docket No. 100085). The people appeal.
In an opinion by Justice Levin, joined by Justices Brickley, Cavanagh, and Archer, the Supreme Court held:
In this case, the Court of Appeals correctly held that the spousal communication privilege barred the testimony of the defendant’s wife.
1. Section 2162 of the Revised Judicature Act provides two distinct privileges: the spousal privilege and the communication privilege. The spousal privilege, which is applicable only when the witness and the spouse are married at the time of trial, bars one spouse from testifying for or against the other without the other’s consent, except in certain enumerated circumstances. The communication privilege bars a spouse from testifying as to any communications made by one to the other during the marriage without the consent of the other. The communication privilege applies whether the testimony is sought during or after the marriage, as long as the communication occurred during the marriage. The act provides no exceptions with respect to the communication privilege on the grounds that the spouses are separated or are in the process of obtaining a divorce.
References
Am Jur 2d, Witnesses §§ 148-171.
Effect, on competency to testify against spouse or on marital communication privilege, of separation or other marital instability short of absolute divorce. 98 ALR3d 1285.
2. Although the statute speaks of “any communication,” only confidential communications are protected. In determining whether a communication is confidential, its nature and circumstances may be considered. The nature of the marriage relationship immediately preceding or following the communication, however, is not a circumstance that may be considered. A witness spouse, during the marriage or afterwards, may not be examined regarding any communication made during the marriage.
3. In this case, the nature and circumstances of the communication by the defendant to his wife do not rebut the claim that it was confidential.
Affirmed.
Justice Boyle, joined by Chief Justice Riley and Justice Griffin, dissenting, stated that the proper focus in this case is whether the communication at issue was intended to be confidential. The trial court’s holding that the communication was not confidential within the meaning of § 2162 did not rest on the time of the communication, but focused on the nature of what was said and the circumstances under which the statement was made. On the basis of its review of the facts and the applicable law, the trial court concluded that the presumption of confidentiality was rebutted. The nature of a particular relationship between a defendant and a witness spouse is a legitimate factor to be considered in determining whether a communication is confidential. In the end, the determination depends on the intention of the communicator, which in turn depends on the relationship with the person to whom and the circumstances under which the communication is made. In this case, it was reasonable for the trial court to conclude on the basis of the circumstances, including the nonexistent marriage relationship, that the statements of the defendant to his permanently separated wife were not confidential and thus admissible.
Witnesses — Husband and Wife — Communication Privilege — Separation — Divorce.
The communication privilege under the Revised Judicature Act bars a spouse from testifying as to any communications made by one spouse to the other during the marriage without the consent of the other spouse regardless of whether the testimony is sought during or after the marriage as long as the communication occurred during the marriage; the act provides no exceptions with respect to the privilege, including no exception on the grounds that the spouses are separated or are in the process of obtaining a divorce (MCL 600.2162; MSA 27A.2162).
Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Louis J. Caruso, Solicitor General, L. Brooks Patterson, Prosecuting Attorney, Robert C. Williams, Chief, Appellate Division, and Michael J. Modelski, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for the people.
John D. Lazar and Lawrence G. Kaluzny for the defendant.

Opinion:
Levin, J.
We granted leave to appeal in this case, consolidated on appeal with People v Hamacher, 432 Mich 157; 438 NW2d 43 (1989), to consider the application of the spousal communication privilege set forth in the Revised Judicature Act, § 2162. We conclude that the Court of Appeals correctly held that the privilege bars the testimony of the defendant's wife in this case and affirm.
i
Rja § 21G2 provides two distinct privileges. The first, the spousal privilege, is only applicable when the witness and the spouse are married at the time of trial.
The second privilege, the communication privilege, bars one spouse from testifying "as to any communications made by one to the other during the marriage" without the consent of the other. The communication privilege applies whether the testimony is sought "during the marriage or after-wards" as long as the communication occurred during the marriage. Rja §2162 states no exceptions with respect to the communication privilege.
ii
Vermeulen is charged with the murder of his "second" wife, Urime Lewis. Approximately one week before her death, Vermeulen spoke to his "first" wife, Sharon Vermeulen, and allegedly said that he would kill Urime Lewis if she left him. The prosecutor seeks to have Sharon Vermeulen testify to the substance of that conversation to refute Vermeulen's claim that Urime Lewis' death was an accident arising out of Vermeulen's attempted suicide.
The prosecutor filed a motion in limine, seeking the admission of Sharon Vermeulen's testimony. The court granted the motion, stating that "[essentially the marital relationship [with Sharon Vermeulen] had long ceased to exist. Thus, statements made by the Defendant to his first wife, Sharon, concerning his intentions on the life of his second wife, Urime, were and are not confidential." The court said:
Society's interest in protecting the confidentiality of the relationships of permanently separated spouses is outweighed by the need to secure evidence in the search for truth that is the essence of a criminal trial, and proof of the permanent separated status at the time of the communication between the Defendant, John Vermeulen, and his first wife, Sharon Vermeulen, renders the communication privilege automatically inapplicable.
The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that statements "defendant made to his wife during the legal existence of the marital relationship" were barred on the authority of People v Hamacher (On Remand), 160 Mich App 759; 408 NW2d 549 (1987). The prosecutor argues on appeal in this Court that the protection of the communication privilege may not be invoked because no viable marital relationship existed at the time the statement was made. Vermeulen had filed for divorce and bigamously married Urime Lewis.
The prosecutor relies on United States v Byrd, 750 F2d 585, 593 (CA 7, 1984), where the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit declared that "only communications that take place during a valid marriage between couples still cohabiting pursuant to that marriage are protected by the privilege." That court was, however, expounding and qualifying the federal common-law privilege, not a statutory privilege. In Michigan, privileges are statutory and, in the absence of a "court rule governing marital privileges, the statute controls." People v Love, 425 Mich 691, 699; 391 NW2d 738 (1986) (opinion of Cavanagh, J.).
This Court has not undertaken a review of the statutory privileges—whether marital, physician-patient, lawyer-client, or other—since the promulgation of the Michigan Rules of Evidence. The Court declines the invitation that we do so piecemeal.
The statute clearly and unequivocally provides that a spouse may not, "during the marriage or afterwards" (emphasis added) be examined as to any communication made "during the marriage." Unless and until the statute is amended or a court rule superseding the statute is adopted, the trial courts may not inquire into the viability of the marriage. The communication is barred if it was made during the marriage. We thus adhere to this Court's recent statement in People v Hamacher, 428 Mich 884; 402 NW2d 484 (1987), where this Court observed that the statute "contains no exception to the privilege regarding communications between a husband and wife where the husband and wife are separated or are in the process of obtaining a divorce." Here, as there, Vermeulen and Sharon Vermeulen "remained husband and wife at the time the communication . . . was allegedly made." Id.
in
The prosecutor relies on People v Zabijak, 285 Mich 164, 182; 280 NW 149 (1938), where this Court concluded that neither the spousal nor the communication privilege barred the wife's testimony that the defendant entered their home, locked the door and window, showed her a gun, said he was going to kill her and then their baby which she was holding, and as they both began to cry, he pushed her on the bed, "with my baby on the arm, he shoot me twice, two bullets go through baby," he shot her again and started running to her mother's home and said, "I am finish with you; I am going outside and going to kill your mother now." Zabijak proceeded immediately to shoot his mother-in-law, then shot himself but recovered, and was being tried for the murder of his mother-in-law.
This Court declared that Zabijak had failed to establish that he and the witness were still married at the time of trial, and thus the spousal privilege, which might have barred her from testi fying, was inapplicable. Turning to the communication privilege, the Court declared that the statement that he was "going to kill" his mother-in-law "now" was not confidential. The statement was not, said the Court, "in the nature of an admission or confession or an act of which she otherwise might not be cognizant. Nothing was revealed in consequence of the privacy of the marriage relation. The statements testified to were in the nature of threats." The Court added that the testimony "did not injure the marriage relation of the parties by the betrayal of any confidence reposed in her by defendant."
Although the statute speaks of "any communication," it is well-established in this state and generally that only confidential communications are protected by the communication privilege. It has been said that "a variety of factors, including the nature of the message or the circumstances under which it was delivered, may serve to rebut a claim that confidentiality was intended."
We agree that the nature and circumstances of the communication may be considered in determining whether the communication was confidential. The nature of the marriage relationship immediately preceding or immediately after the communication is not, however, a circumstance respecting the communication that may be considered in determining whether it is confidential. To hold otherwise would be contrary to the statutory mandate providing that the witness spouse shall not "during the marriage or afterwards" be examined regarding any communication made during the marriage._
The statement allegedly made by Vermeulen to Sharon Vermeulen that he would kill Urime Lewis if she left him, in contrast with the statement in Zabijak, was not made in the course of a murderous assault on the witness spouse. The statement in "the nature of threats" in Zabijak concerned a contemplated assault that was an aspect of the same felonious transaction in which, and was uttered immediately after, the witness spouse had been shot and their baby killed. It was at that point that Zabijak said that he was going to kill the witness spouse's mother "now," which he proceeded immediately to do and then shot himself. Under the circumstances, it is not remarkable that this Court concluded that Zabijak's statement concerning the contemplated assault on his mother-in-law was not confidential. While the Court added that the witness' testimony did not injure the marriage relation, that was not the basis of decision, which appears rather to have been based on the nature of the communication and the circumstances in which it was delivered.
The nature and circumstances of the communication in the instant case do not rebut a claim that the communication was confidential.
IV
We conclude that the Court of Appeals correctly held that the spouse's testimony was inadmissible. We decline the invitation to judicially amend the communication privilege stated in § 2162 of the RJA.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. The cause is remanded to the trial court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Brickley, Cavanagh, and Archer, JJ., concurred with Levin, J.
MCL 600.2162; MSA 27A.2162.
A husband shall not be examined as a witness for or against his wife without her consent; nor a wife for or against her husband without his consent, except in suits for divorce and in cases of prosecution of bigamy, in cases of prosecution for a crime committed against the children of either or both, and where the cause of action grows out of a personal wrong or injury done by one to the other, or grows out of the refusal or neglect to furnish the wife or children with suitable support, and except in cases of desertion or abandonment, and cases arising under section 6 of chapter 83 of the Revised Statutes of 1846, as amended, relating to marriage, and cases where the husband or wife shall be a party to the record in a suit, action, or proceeding, where the title to the separate property of the husband or wife so called or offered as a witness, or where the title to property derived from, through or under the husband or wife so called or offered as a witness, shall be the subject matter in controversy or litigation in such suit, action or proceeding, in opposition to the claim or interest of the other of said married persons, who is a party to the record in such suit, action or proceeding; and in all such cases, such husband or wife who makes such claim of title, or under or from whom such title is derived, shall be as competent to testify in relation to said separate property and the title thereto without the consent of said husband or wife, who is a party to the record in such suit, action or proceeding, as though such marriage relation did not exist; nor shall either, during the marriage or afterwards, without the consent of both, be examined as to any communication made by one to the other during the marriage, but in any action or proceeding instituted by the husband or wife, in consequence of adultery, the husband and wife shall not be competent to testify. [MCL 600.2162; MSA 27A.2162.]
This privilege bars one spouse from testifying for or against the other without the other's consent except in (1) actions for divorce, (2) prosecutions for bigamy or for a crime committed against the children of either or both, (3) actions growing out of a personal wrong or injury done by one to the other or the refusal or neglect to furnish the spouse or children with suitable support, (4) cases of desertion or abandonment, and (5) certain cases relating to marriage and title to property.
Vermeulen filed for divorce from Sharon Vermeulen on October 28, 1985. He married Urime Lewis on November 11, 1985, before he was divorced. Urime Lewis was killed on December 26, 1985. A judgment divorcing Vermeulen and Sharon Vermeulen was entered on February 7, 1986.
It has been said that
the pragmatic difficulty involved in determining when hostility between the spouses has become implacable, argues for the more easily administered approach of terminating the privilege only upon a decree of divorce. In any event, this latter view is generally adopted. [McCormick, Evidence (3d ed), § 81, p 196.]
See also Coleman v State, 281 Md 538; 380 A2d 49, 53 (1977), Muetze v State, 73 Wis 2d 117; 243 NW2d 393 (1976), and People v Fields, 31 NY2d 713; 289 NE2d 557; 337 NYS2d 517 (1972), affg 38 AD2d 231; 328 NYS2d 542 (1972).
People v Zabijak, 285 Mich 164, 177; 280 NW 149 (1938), Pierson v Illinois CR Co, 159 Mich 110, 113; 123 NW 576 (1909), and People v Stubli, 163 Mich App 376, 380; 413 NW2d 804 (1987).
McCormick, Evidence (3d ed), § 80, p 193.
Id.
To the extent Zabijak can be read as stating a rule that a communication to a spouse of ah intention to inflict injury on a third person is not a confidential communication per se because it is in the nature of a threat, it is overruled.