Case Name: MICHIGAN UNITED CONSERVATION CLUBS v. SECRETARY OF STATE (AFTER REMAND)
Court: Michigan Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 2001-06-29
Citations: 464 Mich. 359
Docket Number: Docket No. 119274
Parties: MICHIGAN UNITED CONSERVATION CLUBS v SECRETARY OF STATE (AFTER REMAND)
Judges: Corrigan, C.J., and Young and Markman, JJ., concurred with Taylor, J.
Reporter: Michigan Reports
Volume: 464
Pages: 359–429

Head Matter:
MICHIGAN UNITED CONSERVATION CLUBS v SECRETARY OF STATE (AFTER REMAND)
Docket No. 119274.
Argued June 13, 2001
(Calender No. 1).
Decided June 29, 2001.
Rehearing denied post, 1222.
Michigan United Conservation Clubs and others brought an action for mandamus in the Court of Appeals against the Secretary of State and the State Board of Canvassers to require the defendants to reject a petition for a referendum on 2000 PA 381, filed by intervening defendant People Who Care About Kids. The act, inter alia, modified the standards for issuance of concealed weapons permits. The plaintiffs argued that, because the act appropriated monies to the State Police to implement certain provisions of the act, it is not subject to referendum. The Court of Appeals, McDonald, P.J., and O’Connell and Metek, JJ, dismissed the complaint in an unpublished order on the ground that the matter was not ripe for its consideration (Docket No. 233331). The Supreme Court vacated the order and remanded the case to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings. 463 Mich 1007 (2001). On remand, the panel denied mandamus, determining that 2000 PA 381 is not an act making appropriations to state institutions within the meaning of Const 1963, art 2, § 9, and therefore is subject to referendum. 246 Mich App 82 (2001). The plaintiffs appeal.
In an opinion by Justice Taylor, joined by Chief Justice Corrigan, and Justices Young and Markman, the Supreme Court held:
The power of referendum of the Michigan Constitution does not extend to 2000 PA 381.
The power of referendum of Const 1963, art 2, § 9 does not extend to acts making appropriations for state institutions. 2000 PA 381 provides that “one million dollars is appropriated from the general fund to the department of state police . ...” An appropriation of $1,000,000 is an appropriation, and the Department of State Police is a state institution.
Chief Justice Corrigan, concurring, stated that when the Legislature makes an appropriation, the people have a direct remedy, the initiative process. Moreover, the Legislature’s subjective motivation for making a $1,000,000 appropriation in 2000 PA 381 is irrelevant. Courts must not be concerned with the alleged motives of a legisla tive body in enacting a law, but only with the actual language of the legislation.
Justice Young, concurring, stated that 2000 PA 381 is exempt from the referendum power of art 2, § 9.
The merits or demerits of the underlying act are not before the Court. The sole question to be decided is a legal one: Is 2000 PA 381 subject to the referral process under the provisions of art 2, § 9? The primary goal in construing a constitutional provision is to give effect to the intent of the people who ratified the constitution by applying the rule of common understanding, a search for the original meaning attributed to the words of the constitution by those who ratified it.
Under art 2, § 9, the people’s right of referral is expressly limited: There is no right of referral for acts making appropriations for state institutions. Unless art 2, § 9 had some other particularized meaning in the collective mind of the 1963 electorate, effect must be given to the natural meaning of the language used. Nothing in the 1963 constitutional record provides a basis for concluding that the people were led to believe that the art 2, § 9 limitation on the right of referral meant or was intended to mean anything other than what it plainly says. Nor do contemporaneous news articles or other documents circulated in the public domain suggest that the public in 1963 had a specific or “common” understanding of art 2, § 9 that diverged from the natural and plain meaning of its text.
Art 4, § 1 gives the Legislature plenary power to enact laws for the benefit of Michigan citizens. Art 2, § 9 provides a means for citizens directly to challenge legislative action or inaction. It is a matter of constitutional significance that the initiative power contains no limitation, but the referendum power is expressly limited by two substantive restrictions. The people are still free to directly challenge the propriety of the legislation by initiative. Additionally, if the people believe that the Legislature has abused its powers by capriciously precluding their power of referral, the traditional means of voter sanction remain, recall and the ballot box. However, the limitations imposed in art 2, § 9 on the people’s right of referral preclude that they do so by means of referendum.
The tests the dissent urges to assess whether an act making an appropriation is nonetheless amenable to referral despite the express constitutional limitation have no basis in the text of the constitution. The judiciary is not authorized to create ways of evading the terms of the constitution; nor should the courts manufacture tests that amount to no more than providing a means of promoting sitting judges’ personal preferences to accomplish such goals.
Justice Markman, concurring, stated that the Michigan Constitution excepts from the referendum process “acts making appropriations for state institutions.” It does not except merely acts that are necessary in order for the state to “exercise its various functions free from financial embarrassment;” merely acts appropriating monies without which state agencies “would cease to function,” or without which their “continued existence” would be in jeopardy; or merely acts that pertain to the “core functions,” or that are not “peripheral to the core purpose,” of state agencies. In reading into the constitution these alternative limitations upon the referendum process, the Court of Appeals, without warrant, has substituted its own judgment concerning how the constitution ought to read, in place of the judgment of those who actually proposed and ratified the constitution.
The Court of Appeals further misapprehends the judicial role in its assertion that, “[ejven if we were to conclude that the statutory expenditures constituted appropriations for state institutions as contemplated by [the constitution], we would nevertheless hold that the overarching right of the people to their ‘direct legislative voice’ . . . requires that 2000 PA 381 be subject to referendum.” In a system of constitutional government, the language of the constitution itself is examined to determine which rights are “overarching.” Whether the referendum process or the legislative judgment should prevail in a particular case does not depend upon which right or which value is perceived to be more “overarching” by a judge, but rather upon which result is required by the terms of the constitution itself.
The dissent by Justice Cavanagh does not ultimately rest its interpretation upon any specific language or phrase contained in the constitution. Instead, it relies upon such amorphous concepts as “the overall approach” to legislation taken by the constitution’s framers and the people who ratified it. Rather than taking the framers and ratifiers of the constitution at face value and assuming that they intended what they plainly wrote, it concludes that the framers and ratifiers meant something other than what they wrote.
Contrary to what Justice Cavanagh asserts, the majority does not interpret the constitution “literally” or “legalistically”; rather, there is simply no reasonable alternative interpretation to the words “acts making appropriations for state institutions.” It is the responsibility of the judiciary to say what the law is, not what it believes that it ought to be. When constitutional language is straightforward, it should be accorded its plain and ordinary meaning.
Contrary to the dissent by Justice Weaver, case law does not stand for the proposition that only appropriations that enable the state to exercise its various functions free from financial embarrassment, or without which state agencies would cease to function, are excepted from the referendum process. However, even if a decision had said what the dissent asserts, no decision of the Supreme Court can permanently transform the plain language of the constitution. The Supreme Court has a responsibility to protect the people’s power of referendum and the people’s power of representative self-government as set forth by the people’s constitution. The principal responsibility of the Supreme Court is to read the language of the people’s constitution faithfully.
Contrary to the dissent by Justice Kelly, the majority examines “the provision’s plain meaning as understood by its ratifiers at the time of its adoption,” and, because there is no evidence that shows otherwise, concludes that the people of this state in 1963 understood the language “acts making appropriations for state institutions” to mean what it plainly says.
As a final query for the dissenters: Had those who proposed and ratified our constitution truly intended to limit the referendum power as the majority interprets it, how should they, how could they, have fashioned it any more clearly than they did in article 2, § 9? That is, what words should they have used that they did not?
Reversed; mandamus granted.
Justice Cavanagh, joined by Justice Kelly, dissenting, stated that in Const 1963, art 2, § 9, the people of Michigan reserved the right to vote on laws enacted by the Legislature. The referendum power is not unlimited. Art 2, § 9 limits the power so that it does not extend to acts making appropriations for state institutions. However, acts making appropriations for state institutions that deny the people’s reserved power of referendum are understood to be general appropriations bills containing substantial grants to state agencies. Such grants would have to ensure the viability of the agencies or support the agencies’ core functions. Further, article 4 prohibits the Legislature from playing deceptive games in the course of enacting legislation, and further seeks to assure that legislation is given meaningful consideration before it is adopted.
The concealed weapons legislation that is the subject of this suit, late in the enactment process, acquired language that provided for a $1 million grant to the Michigan State Police. The intervening defendant suggests that the monetary provision of the act was added specifically to evade the people’s right to review the wisdom of the concealed weapons provisions in that act. In answering this argument, the majority focuses narrowly on the superficially straightforward question whether 2000 PA 381 fits within the phrase “acts making appropriations for state institutions,” and grants the lame-duck legislative majority the freedom to change the concealed weapons law without public review through the referendum process.
The referendum power is the people’s reserved check on the Legislature. With its decision in this case, the majority removes the people’s check. By holding that the money inserted into 2000 PA 381 circumvents the people’s reserved referendum power, the majority holds that the referendum power exists at the Legislature’s pleasure: whenever the Legislature wants to avoid the people’s check on its power, it need only insert some money into a bill.
Justice Weaver, dissenting, stated that 2000 PA 381 is not exempt from the power of referendum of the Michigan Constitution.
It is a well-established rule of constitutional construction that the framers of a constitution are presumed to have knowledge of existing laws, and act in reference to that knowledge. People v May, 3 Mich 598, 610 (1885). This Court interpreted the precursor of art 2, § 9 of the 1963 Constitution (art 5, § 1 of the 1908 Constitution) as intended “to enable the state to exercise its various functions free from financial embarrassment.” Detroit Automobile Club v Secretary of State, 230 Mich 623 (1925). No case has criticized or questioned Detroit Automobile Club. Because Detroit Automobile Club was the sole and uncontradicted interpretation of “acts making appropriations for state institutions,” its reasoning is the best evidence of the framers’ understanding of this language. The money appropriated in 2000 PA 381 is not necessary for the State Police to “exercise its various functions free from financial embarrassment,” but rather is necessary only to implement that act itself. The State Police would not cease to function without the appropriation.
The majority fails to recognize the importance of the referendum and this Court’s responsibility to protect the people’s power of referendum. No court should construe a clause or section of a constitution to impede or defeat its generally understood ends when another construction, equally concordant with the words and sense of that clause or section, will guard and enforce these ends. In this case, given the prior, uncontradicted, and equally concordant construction in Detroit Automobile Club, the Supreme Court may not apply the constitutional provision in a way that would take the power of the referendum away from the people and give it to the Legislature. By determining that the inclusion of a monetary provision in 2000 PA 381 circumvents the people’s reserved referendum power, the majority effectively holds that the referendum power exists at the Legislature’s pleasure.
Justice Kelly, dissenting, stated that 2000 PA 381 does not constitute an act “making appropriations for state institutions” within the meaning of Const 1963, art 2, § 9, and, thus, is subject to referendum.
The majority fails to examine carefully the meaning of the phrase “acts making appropriations for state institutions,” and, in particular, ignores the meaning of the word “for” as used in that phrase. In essence, it interprets art 2, § 9 to exempt from referendum any act that makes an appropriation “to” a state institution. This interpretation not only lacks support from the plain language of the article, it fails to appreciate the critical difference between the meanings of “to” and “for.” A reasonable interpretation of art 2, § 9 is that legislation that contains an appropriation aimed at satisfying the purpose or reason for which a state institution exists is referendum-proof. Unless the appropriation is intended to support the core function of a state institution, it does not prevent the people from voting on the legislation in referendum. Applied in this case, Act 381 does not make an appropriation for a state institution. Of the $1,000,000 it allocates to the Department of State Police, not a penny serves the central function for which the department exists. Instead, it implements the specific substantive provisions of the act. None of them is a core function of the department.
The “core function” interpretation is supported by Supreme Court case law. The majority’s rejection of it is inconsistent with those decisions. The “core function” interpretation renders the referendum exception consistent with the fundamental purpose of the general power of referendum. If the appropriation provision in an act is essential to a core purpose of a state institution, the act may not be referred. The risk is too great that the delay caused by a referendum vote would embarrass government and be detrimental to the public. On the other hand, where the appropriation provision is for a lesser function not essential to the purpose of the department, the embarrassment problem does not arise. In such a case, the people’s right to decide policy issues for themselves, which is the core purpose for which the people reserved the referendum power, should survive.
While the intervening defendant retains the direct remedy of the initiative process, any alternative remedy that exists is irrelevant to the issue before the Court: whether Act 381 constitutes an act “making appropriations for state institutions” within the meaning of art 2, § 9. Moreover, there are real and heightened practical difficulties associated with pursuing an initiative process, as compared with a referendum. Not only does the initiative process require far more petition signatures than the referendum process, it also involves much more complicated procedures. This case presents the exact situation for which the referendum power was created: to permit citizens to suspend or annul laws passed by the Legislature until the people can vote on the merits of the law. The power of initiative, on the other hand, is intended to protect against a Legislature that fails to act.
Dickinson, Wright, P.L.L.C. (by Peter H. Ellsworth, Jeffery V. Stuckey, and Scott R. Knapp), for the plaintiffs-appellants.
Jennifer M. Granholm, Attorney General, Thomas L. Casey, Solicitor General, and Gary P. Gordon and Katherine C. Galvin, Assistant Attorneys General, for the defendants-appellees.
Timothy A. Baughman for the intervening defendant.
Amici Curiae:
Mika, Meyers, Beckett & Jones, PL.C. (by Michael A. Zagaroli and Elizabeth K. Bransdorfer), for Michigan Association of Chiefs of Police.
Dykema, Gossett, P.L.L.C. (by Richard D. McLellan and Sandra M. Cotter), for Michigan State Senator Hoffman and Michigan State Representatives Richner and DeVuyst.

Opinion:
Taylor, J.
The issue here is whether 2000 Public Act 381 is exempt from the power of referendum of the Michigan Constitution. Having granted leave to appeal and heard oral,argument, this Court finds as follows:
(1) The power of referendum of the Michigan Constitution "does not extend to acts making appropriations for state institutions . . . ." Const 1963, art 2, § 9.
(2) 2000 PA 381 states that "one million dollars is appropriated from the general fund to the department of state police . . . MCL 28.425w(l).
(3) An appropriation of $1,000,000 is an "appropriation," and the Department of State Police is a "state institution."
(4) Therefore, the power of referendum of the Michigan Constitution does not extend to 2000 PA 381.
Accordingly, consistent with Const 1963, art 2, § 9 and an unbroken line of decisions of this Court interpreting that provision, the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the relief sought in the complaint for mandamus is granted. The May 21, 2001 declaration by the Board of State Canvassers of the sufficiency of the petition for referendum on 2000 PA 381 is vacated and defendant Secretary of State and the Board of State Canvassers are directed that 2000 PA 381 is not subject to referendum for the reasons set forth herein.
Pursuant to MCR 7.317(C)(4), the clerk is directed to issue the judgment order in this case forthwith.
Corrigan, C.J., and Young and Markman, JJ., concurred with Taylor, J.
Co Rd Ass'n of Michigan v Bd of State Canvassers, 407 Mich 101; 282 NW2d 774 (1979); Bds of Co Rd Comm'rs v Bd of State Canvassers, 391 Mich 666; 218 NW2d 144 (1974); Good Rds Federation v State Bd of Canvassers, 333 Mich 352; 53 NW2d 481 (1952); Moreton v Secretary of State, 240 Mich 584; 216 NW 450 (1927); Detroit Automobile Club v Secretary of State, 230 Mich 623; 203 NW 529 (1925).