Case Name: TODD v. STATE
Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1921-02-16
Citations: 229 S.W. 515
Docket Number: No. 5917
Parties: TODD v. STATE.
Judges: 
Reporter: South Western Reporter
Volume: 229
Pages: 515–519

Head Matter:
TODD v. STATE.
(No. 5917.)
(Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
Feb. 16, 1921.
Rehearing Denied March 30, 1921.)
1. Indictment and information <©=-125(31) — Indictment charging several offenses named in one statute held duplicitous.
An indictment charging that defendant received, transported, exported, and delivered, solicited, and took orders for and furnished intoxicating liquors charges a number of separate and distinct felonies in the same count, some of which were not involved in some of the others, and produced confusion and uncertainty as to the offense intended to be charged, so that the indictment was bad for duplicity, though all the offenses charged therein were stated disjunc-tively in the same statute.
On Motion for Rehearing.
2. Criminal law <&wkey;l 186(3) — Charging distinct offenses in same count defect of substance warranting reversal.
Charging a number of distinct felonies in one count of an indictment violates the right, of accused under Bill of Rights, § 10, to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him, since an offense is but one act or omission forbidden by positive law under Pen. Code 1911, art. 53, so that the defect is not a matter of form, but of substance, and warrants a reversal, notwithstanding Vernon’s Ann. Code Cr. Proc. 1916, art. 476.
3. Criminal l^w &wkey;l 167(I)— Limiting jury to one offense does not cure duplicitous indictment.
The fact that the court submitted to the jury only one of the several distinct offenses charged in one count of the indictment does not ■cure the defect in the indictment.
4. Indictment and information &wkey;>!25(19) — Indictment cannot allege separate offenses defined in same statute.
The rule that, when several ways are set forth in the same statute by which an offense may be committed, they may be charged con-junctively in the same count in the indictment, applies only where the statute defines but one offense, and not where it defines several distinct offenses, some of which did not involve the others.
5. Indictment and information &wkey;>l 10(31) —• Cannot follow statute defining separate offenses.
Since an indictment in the language of the statute is frequently insufficient even if the statute attempts to describe but one offense, the fact that an indictment charging several distinct offenses was in the language of the statute defining those several offenses does not make it valid.
Appeal from District Court, McLennan County; Richard I. Munroe, Judge.
W. R.'Todd was convicted of a violation of the Dean Liquor Law, and he appeals.
Reversed, and cause dismissed.
Herbert Scharff, John McNamara, and Williams & William's, all of Waco, for appellant.
Erank B. Tirey, Co. Atty., of Waco, Prank Pfitzpatrick, Asst. Co. Atty., of Waco, O. M. Cureton, Atty. Gen., and C. L. Stone and Alvin M. Owsley, Asst. Attys. Gen., for the State.

Opinion:
LATTIMORE, J.'
Appellant was convicted in- the district court of McLennan county of a violation of the Dean Liquor Law (Laws 1919 [1st & 2d Called Sess.j c. 78), and his punishment fixed at one year in the penitentiary.
The conviction was had under the second count in the indictment, the charging part of which was as follows:
"W. R. Todd did receive, transport, export, and deliver and solicit and take orders for and did furnish spirituous, vinous and intoxicating liquors," etc.
A motion to quash this count in the indictment upon the ground that it was vague and indefinite, failed to particularize the offense charged, and combined in the same count a number of separate and distinct felonies, naming them, was overruled. We are of opinion that said motion was meritorious. The authorities are not quite clear 'as to those cases in which offenses of different nature may be charged in the same count, but all of them seem to agree that offenses not involving each other may not be so charged. 2 Wharton, Precedent of Indictment and Pleas, p. 834, says:
"Where offenses are of a distinct nature, neither of them capable of being resSlved into the other, it is error to join them in the same count."
In the instant case it must be admitted that each of the things mentioned in the said count, to wit, transporting, exporting, delivering, soliciting, taking orders for, possessing, furnishing, are separate felonies, and, while some of them may involve some of the others, this is not true of all of tBem. Por instance, possession is involved in most, of tlie others, but clearly transporting and exporting do not involve soliciting; taking orders for does not involve exporting; receiving does not involve delivering. In Beaumont v. State, 1 Tex. App. 537, 28 Am. Rep. 424, it is held that an indictment which produces confusion and uncertainty as to what offense was really intended to be charged, and in one count of which two distinct offenses are charged, is bad. In Brown v. State, 38 Tex. Cr. R. 597, 44 S. W. 176, this court said:
"Duplicity consists of alleging, in one count, separate and distinct felonies."
In Perguson v. State, 189 S. W. 271, Judge Prendergast for this court held an indictment bad in which three separate and distinct felonies were set out in one count. In Vernon's O. C. P. § 17, under article 481, occurs this statement, supported by many citations :
"Duplicity is the 'joinder of two or more distinct offenses in one count, and, if it be such as to produce confusion and uncertainty as to what was intended to be charged, it would vitiate the indictment."
Substantially the same rule is' announced in Branch's Ann. Penal Code, § 506. Applying what has been said to the instant indictment, it would appear that transporting is a separate and distinct act as well as felony from soliciting; that exporting is likewise separate and distinct from taking orders for; that receiving intoxicating liquors is a separate and distinct act and felony from delivering same; and that charging one with each and all of these acts in one count would necessarily lead to confusion and uncertainty. One accused of crime is presumed innocent, and one office of an indictment is to apprise him of that which he must meet in court as the charge against him. We do not think he could be so informed by the indictment in the instant case.
Believing the indictment fatally defective, we forego discussion of the other questions raised, and for said defect the cause will be reversed and dismissed.
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