Case Name: KELLER v. LOSINSKI
Court: Michigan Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1979-09-19
Citations: 92 Mich. App. 468
Docket Number: Docket No. 78-2176
Parties: KELLER v LOSINSKI
Judges: Before: R. B. Burns, P.J., and Allen and Mackenzie, JJ.
Reporter: Michigan appeals reports; cases decided in the Michigan Court of Appeals.
Volume: 92
Pages: 468–484

Head Matter:
KELLER v LOSINSKI
Docket No. 78-2176.
Submitted March 6, 1979, at Grand Rapids.
Decided September 19, 1979.
Leave to appeal applied for.
Plaintiff, Michael J. Keller, was riding a motorcycle owned by his first cousin’s husband, Jack Kozloski, with whom he was living, when he was injured in a collision with an automobile owned and operated by defendant David J. Losinski. Defendant Michigan Mutual Liability Company provided no-fault insurance coverage on Mr. Losinski’s car. Defendant League General Insurance Company provided no-fault insurance coverage on the Kozloski family car. The motorcycle had standard cycle coverage but did not have no-fault coverage. After the accident, Mr. Kozloski made an oral claim against League General and was informed that his no-fault policy did not cover accidents on his motorcycle. Plaintiff, knowing of League General’s disclaimer of liability, filed suit against Mr. Losinski and Michigan Mutual, which had paid plaintiff’s medical bills, for personal protection insurance benefits. League General was added as a party defendant upon stipulation of the original parties and Michigan Mutual cross-claimed against it, claiming that it was primarily liable to plaintiff. League General moved for summary judgment for failure to state a claim and accelerated judgment for lack of jurisdiction and capacity to sue on the part of Michigan Mutual and for the reason that the claim was barred by the statute of limitations. Plaintiff moved for summary judgment alleging that Michigan Mutual was liable for plaintiff’s injuries and Michigan Mutual moved for summary judgment alleging it had paid all the benefits due plaintiff. The Branch Circuit Court, Thomas C. Megargle, J., denied Michigan Mutual’s motion, granted plaintiff’s motion and held that, although League General’s statute of limitations argument did not apply, Michigan Mutual had failed to state a cause of action. After a motion for rehearing was denied, Michigan Mutual appealed and- League General cross-appealed. Held:
References for Points in Headnotes
7 Am Jur 2d, Automobile Insurance § 203.
41 Am Jur 2d, Indemnity § 39.
What statute of limitations covers actions for indemnity. 57 ALR3d 833.
Am Jur 2d New Topic Service, No-Fault Insurance § 1.
41 Am Jur 2d, Indemnity §§ 19, 20.
54 Am Jur 2d, Mistake, Accident or Surprise § 24.
An insurance company has one year from the date of the accident to sue to recover from another insurer personal protection benefits paid under the mistaken belief that the injured party was not covered by insurance where the other insurer was not notified in writing of the accident and two years when the other insurer has been given written notice. Therefore, League General’s motion for accelerated judgment should have been granted and Michigan Mutual’s action dismissed.
Remanded.
Ailen, J., dissented. He would hold that the Legislature, in enacting the no-fault statute, intended to provide: a) prompt and speedy payment of claims for economic loss; b) prompt and fair opportunity to investigate claims for losses, and c) protection from protracted litigation. He would further hold that Michigan Mutual’s action against League General was in the nature of indemnity, for which the statute of limitations begins to run either on the date the mistake is discovered or the date the payment is made. He would reverse and remand for trial.
Opinion of the Court
1. Insurance — No-Fault Insurance — Statute of Limitations.
An insurance company has one year from the date of the accident to sue to recover from another insurer personal protection benefits paid under the mistaken belief that the injured party was not covered by insurance where the other insurer was not notified in writing of the accident and two years when the other insurer has been given written notice (MCL 500.3145[1]; MSA 24.13145[1]).
Dissent by Allen, J.
2. Insurance — No-Fault Insurance — Statutes — Legislative Purpose.
The Legislature, in enacting the no-fault statute, intended to provide: a) prompt and speedy payment of claims for economic loss; b) prompt and fair opportunity to investigate claims for losses, and c) protection from protracted litigation (MCL 500.3101 et seq.; MSA 24.13101 et seq.).
3. Indemnity — Contracts — Negligence — Torts.
An implied contract of indemnity arises in favor of a person who, without any fault on his part, is exposed to liability and compelled to pay damages on account of the negligence or tortious act of another; this right of indemnity is based on the principle that everyone is responsible for his own negligence and it exists independently of statute, and whether or not contractual relations exist between the parties, and whether or not the negligent person owed the other a special or particular legal duty not to be negligent; a claim by one no-fault insurer against another to recover personal protection beneñts paid under the mistaken belief that the injured party was not covered by any other insurance is in the nature of indemnity.
4. Limitation of Actions — Indemnity.
The limitation period governing actions to recover payments made by mistake commences to run either on the date the mistake is discovered or the date the payment is made.
Lilly & Domeny, P.C. (by Sally Zack Wheeler), for defendant Michigan Mutual Liability Company.
Smith, Haughey, Rice & Roegge (by Lance R. Mather), for defendant League General Insurance Company.
Before: R. B. Burns, P.J., and Allen and Mackenzie, JJ.

Opinion:
R. B. Burns, P.J.
This case involves a collision between a motorcycle and an automobile. The dispute in this case is between two insurance companies each of which maintains that the other must pay no-fault benefits to the injured motorcyclist.
On March 22, 1975, plaintiff, while riding a motorcycle owned by Jack Kozloski, collided with an automobile owned and operated by defendant Losinski. Defendant Michigan Mutual Insurance Company provided no-fault automobile insurance on the Losinski car. Defendant League General Insurance Company provided no-fault automobile insurance on the family car owned by Jack and Mary Kozloski. The motorcycle had standard cycle coverage but did not have no-fault coverage. Plaintiff, a first cousin of Mary Kozloski, was allegedly living with the Kozloskis at the time of the accident and had Jack Kozloski's permission to use the motorcycle.
Shortly after the accident, Kozloski made an oral claim against League General but the agent in League General's office immediately informed Kozloski that his no-fault policy did not cover accidents on his motorcycle. Upon learning of League General's claim of noncoverage, plaintiff made claim against Michigan Mutual.
Plaintiff filed suit against defendants Losinski and Michigan Mutual. League General was added as a "party defendant" upon the stipulation of the parties, and Michigan Mutual cross-claimed against League General.
Upon being joined, League General moved for summary judgment, claiming a failure to state a cause of action, GCR 1963, 117.2(1), and for accelerated judgment, GCR 1963, 116.1, claiming lack of jurisdiction, lack of capacity to sue on the part of Michigan Mutual and that any claim against it was barred by the no-fault statute of limitations. Shortly thereafter, plaintiff moved for summary judgment alleging that Michigan Mutual was liable to pay for the injuries suffered by plaintiff. Michigan Mutual filed a motion for summary judgment claiming that it had paid all the no-fault benefits due plaintiff.
After a hearing on the motions, the trial court denied Michigan Mutual's motion, granted plaintiff's motion and held that, although League General's statute of limitations argument did not apply, Michigan Mutual had failed to state a cause of action. Michigan Mutual sought a rehearing which was denied.
The substance of Michigan Mutual's appeal is its desire to shift liability to League General and thereby to be reimbursed for its payments to plaintiff. The question which Michigan Mutual thus presents is whether a motorcyclist may recover benefits under a no-fault policy covering a motor vehicle with which the motorcyclist has collided, if he is covered by a no-fault policy on the automobile of the motorcycle's owner. We do not, however, reach this issue because, on League General's cross-appeal, we find that the trial court erred in denying League General's motion for accelerated judgment.
League General received no written notice of plaintiff's injury within a year of the accident and though the accident occurred on March 22, 1975, no attempt was made to bring League General into this action until April 20, 1977. Claims based on an obligation of League General to pay personal protection insurance benefits for plaintiff's injury are therefore barred by the time limitations established by the no-fault statute. MCL 500.3145(1); MSA 24.13145(1).
Arguments presented by Michigan Mutual to avoid the consequences of this statute of limitations have been rejected by the Court in Davis v Farmers Ins Group, 86 Mich App 45; 272 NW2d 334 (1978). Nor does this Court believe that the requirements of the doctrine of equitable estoppel are met in the present action. League General did not intentionally misinform plaintiff and then seek to deny the information it had given to plaintiff. Rather, League General accurately stated to plaintiff the position which it continues to advance. There is nothing for the Court to estop League General from denying.
Finally, Michigan Mutual cannot avoid the statute of limitations by classifying its action as one for indemnification rather than one for recovery on personal injuries. In its indemnification action, Michigan Mutual is subrogated to plaintiffs rights and cannot recover where plaintiff would be barred from bringing his own action.
Accordingly, we hold that League General's motion for accelerated judgment should have been granted and Michigan Mutual's action dismissed.
Remanded for action in accordance with this opinion. Costs to League General.
Mackenzie, J., concurred.