Case Name: THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE, OF NEW YORK, Respondent, v. ARTHUR CIPPERLY, Appellant
Court: New York Supreme Court, General Term
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1885-09
Citations: 44 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 319
Docket Number: 
Parties: THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE, OF NEW YORK, Respondent, v. ARTHUR CIPPERLY, Appellant.
Judges: .Bocees, J., concurs.
Reporter: Supreme Court Reports (Hun)
Volume: 44
Pages: 319–329

Head Matter:
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE, OF NEW YORK, Respondent, v. ARTHUR CIPPERLY, Appellant.
Sale of adulterated milk — the legislature cannot establish, by statute a standard by which its adulteration is to be conclusively established —1884, eha/p. 202.
The defendant was convicted, under chapter 202 of 1884, of the offense of selling impure, unhealthy, adulterated and unwholesome milk. Upon an appeal taken hy him from the judgment convicting him:
Held, that so much of section 1 of the said act as provides that “no person or persons shall sell or exchange, or expose for sale or' exchange, any unclean, impure, unhealthy, adulterated or unwholesome milk,” is, if the prohibition he limited to milk to he used for the purposes of food, constitutional and valid, it being plainly within the power of the legislature to pass such an act as a police regulation to protect the public health.
That so much of the thirteenth section of the said act as provides that “in all prosecutions under this act relating to the sale and manufacture of unclean, impure, unhealthy, adulterated or unwholesome milk, if the milk be shown to contain more than eighty-eight per centum of water or fluids, or less than twelve per centum of milk solids, which shall contain not less than three per centum of fat, it shall be declared adulterated,” is unconstitutional and void, because it deprives the defendant of his liberty and property without due process of law, in that it deprives him of the right, upon the trial of the charge against him, to have the issue determined according to the evidence of the fact, and compels him to submit to the statutory declaration thereof without having the truth ascertained. (Learned, P. J., dissenting.)
It seems, that if the result of the statute is to prohibit the sale of pure and wholesome milk, then within the case of People v. Marx (99 N. Y., 377) the act would be void as being beyond the legislative power. (Landon, J.)
Appeal from a judgment of tbe Court of Special Sessions of the city of Albany, entered upon the conviction of the defendant of the offense of selling adulterated milk.
The defendant was arrested for a violation of chapter 202 of the Laws of 1884, in selling adulterated milk; he was tried before the Court of Special Sessions, held by the recorder of the city of Albany, convicted and fined twenty-five dollars. Upon the trial it appeared that the defendant was engaged in selling milk; that a sample of his milk was procured from the same can he was selling from, and that upon being tested it was found to contain more than eighty-eight per cent of water, less than twelve per cent of milk solids and less than three per cent of fat. It also appeared that nothing had been put in the milk and nothing taken from it. The defendant asked for his discharge upon the ground that the law was in violation of his constitutional rights. Objection was also taken by the defendant that no criminal intent was shown, and exceptions taken to the exclusion of evidence by which it was proposed to show that defendant had no criminal intent.
The sections of the statute upon which the decision of the question involved depends, read as follows:
SeotioN 1. No person or persons shall sell or exchange, or expose for sale or exchange, any unclean, impure, unhealthy, adulterated or unwholsome milk, or shall offer for sale any article of food made from the same or of cream from the same. This provision shall not apply to pure skim cheese made from milk which is clean, pure,, healthy, wholesome and unadulterated, except by skimming. Whoever violates the provisions of this section is guilty of misdemeanor and shall be punished by a fine of not less than twenty-five nor more than two hundred dollars, or by imprisonment of not less than one or more than six months, or both such fine or imprisonment for the first offense, and by six months’ imprisonment for each subsequent offense.
Seo. 13. In all prosecutions under this act, relating to the sale and manufacture of unclean, impure, unhealthy, adulterated or unwholesome milk, if the milk be shown to contain more than eighty-eight per centum of water or fluids, or less than twelve per centum of milk solids, which shall contain not less than three per centum of fat, it shall be declared adulterated, and milk drawn from cows within fifteen days before and five days after parturition, or from animals fed on distillery waste, or any substance in the- state of putrefaction, or fermentation, or upon any unhealthy food whatever, shall be declared unclean, impure, unhealthy and unwholesome milk. This section shall not prevent the feeding of ensilage from silos.
Eugene Burlingame, for the appellant.
D. Cady Herrick, for the respondent.

Opinion:
LaNdoN, J.:
The defendant was convicted under chapter 202, Laws of 1884, of the offense of selling adulterated milk. It is objected that sections 1 and 13 of the act in question are unconstitutional. The first section of the act provides that " no person or persons shall sell or exchange or expose for sale, or exchange any unclean, impure, unhealthy, adulterated or unwholesome milk." Assuming that it was within the legislative intention to limit this prohibition to the purposes of food, we think it was plainly within the legislative power to pass this section, so far as quoted, as a police regularion to protect the public health. This'seems to be well established by authority. (People ex rel. Cox v. Special Sessions, 7 Hun, 214; Blazier v. Miller, 10 id., 435; Commonwealth v. Waite, 11 Allen, 264; Commonwealth v. Farren, 9 id., 489.) Similar statutes have long stood unchallenged. (Chap. 467, Laws of 1862; chap. 544, Laws of 1864; Polinsky v. People, 73 N. Y., 65.)
The defendant, however, was convicted by force of the thirteenth section of the statute, which provides that "in all prosecutions under this act relating to the sale and manufacture of unclean, impure, unhealthy, adulterated or unwholesome milk, if the milk be shown to contain more than eighty-eight per centum of water or fluids, or less than twelve per centum of milk solids, which shall contain not less than three per centum of fat, it shall be declared adulterated." The milk in question was shown to contain eighty-eight and ninety-six thousandths per centum of water and two and six hundred and fifty-six thousandths per centum of fat, and as it fell short of the statutory standard it was by force of the statute declared to be adulterated, and the defendant was convicted, not withstanding he adduced evidence tending to show that the milk was entirely a natural and wholesome product, and wholly unadulterated or diluted.
If experience has shown that milk which does not possess the ingredients specified in the statutory standard is unwholesome and unfit for food, it may well be within the power of the legislature to prohibit its sale. But such is not this prohibition. The defend • ant was not charged with selling milk containing more than eighty-eight per centum of water, and less than twelve per centum of milk solids. He was charged with selling " impure, unhealthy, adulterated and unwholsome milk." Upon that charge he was entitled to a fair trial according to the " due process of law." " Due process of law/ says Judge Cooley, quoted with approbation in Bertholf v. O'Reilly (74 N. Y., 519), " in each particular case, means such an exertion of the powers of government as the settled maxims of the law sanction, and under safeguards for the protection of individual rights as those maxims jirescribe for the class of cases to which the one in question belongs." Due process of law gave to the defendant the right to con test the allegation that the milk was adulterated or impure or unwholesome. True, he gave his evidence, but the statute silenced its effect. There can be no trial if only one party is permitted to present his proofs, or if the statute requires judgment to be pronounced against the defendant upon proof by the people of some other fact not in issue. The legislature cannot restrain a party from setting up a good defense to an action against him. (Cooley's Const. Limitations, 369.) But it is said the legislature may make and alter rules of evidence. There is no doubt that in civil cases the legislature can make certain facts prima facie evidence of another fact. (Howard v. Moot, 64 N. Y., 262; Hand v. Ballou, 12 id., 543.) And it has been held competent for the legislature to provide that certain facts, having a tendency to prove the existence of another fact, shall, in criminal eases, be prima facie evidence of the latter fact. (Commonwealth v. Williams, 6 Gray, 1.) But the court was careful to hold that the presumption might be repelled by the circumstances or by other proofs. (Commonwealth v. Wallace, 7 Gray, 222; Commonwealth v. Rowe, 14 id., 47.) Here the statute denies the accused that protection. The legislature cannot make certain facts conclusive evidence which in their nature are not so. (People v. Lyon, 27 Hun, 180.) Evidence to secure a conviction should be such as to satisfy " the judgment of his peers," or of whatever tribunal that determines the fate of the accused. The legislature may prescribe rules for the .admission of evidence, but cannot compel the trial court to hold it conclusive of the defendant's guilt, without regard to that court's conviction or judgment as to its conclusiveness. If the legislature can compel the courts to render judgment contrary to their convictions of the truth, produced by the evidence, then the legislative power can coerce the judicial power; a proposition destructive of the co-ordinate departments of the government.
If the testimony on the part of the defendant was true, his milk was not unhealthy, adulterated nor unwholesome- — -he was innocent in fact. Certainly, the testimony that tended to show that he was careful, honest and innocent in this transaction ought to have been considered, and, if believed, ought to have resulted in his acquittal. But, under this statute, such evidence can have no weight. The -statute regards per centages only. Eighty-eight per centum of water is permitted. The evidence of the chemist showed an excess -of less than one-tenfh of one per centum, and upon that fraction the •statute required the defendant's conviction right or wrong.
~We think that the thirteenth section of the act, which requires that, upon a trial for selling adulterated milk, .the milk shall be declared adulterated if it do not contain the per centage of ingredients specified in the statute is beyond the legislative power, because it deprives the defendant of his liberty and property without due process of law, in that it deprives him of the right upon the trial of the charge against him, to have the issue determined according to the evidence of the fact, and compels him to submit to the statutory declaration thereof, without having the truth ascertained.
If the result of the statute is to prohibit the sale of pure and wholesome milk, then within the principle reaffirmed in the recent -case of People v. Marx (32 Albany Law Jour., 6) that, "it is one of the fundamental rights and privileges of every American citizen to adopt and follow such lawful industrial pursuits, not injurious to the community, as he may see fit," the prohibition would be beyond the legislative power.
Tbe production and sale of pure and wholesome milk is a lawful industrial pursuit, and is not injurious to the community. The act is not designed to prohibit that. It aims, as it properly may, to-suppress the sale of impure and adulterated milk. It prescribes, that upon any prosecution for the sale of impure or adulterated milk its per centage of water and milk solids may be shown. This, it is competent for the legislature to do. But wherein it provides, that upon the fact "being shown that the per centages do not comply with, the statutory standard, the milk shall be declared adulterated,, it seeks to compel the trial court to pronounce judgment upon that fact alone, without regard to what the truth may be shown to be,, and therein perverts the due process of law.
Conviction reversed and the defendant discharged.
.Bocees, J., concurs.
99 N. Y., 377. — [Rep.