Case Name: SEABOARD COAST LINE RAILROAD COMPANY and Harold Jefferson Bridges, Appellants, v. Darlene D. FRIDDLE, as Administratrix of the Estate of Thomas B. Friddle, a/k/a Thomas Bascom Friddle, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1974-02-15
Citations: 290 So. 2d 85
Docket Number: Nos. 72-969 and 72-970
Parties: SEABOARD COAST LINE RAILROAD COMPANY and Harold Jefferson Bridges, Appellants, v. Darlene D. FRIDDLE, as Administratrix of the Estate of Thomas B. Friddle, a/k/a Thomas Bascom Friddle, Appellee.
Judges: OWEN, C. J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 290
Pages: 85–91

Head Matter:
SEABOARD COAST LINE RAILROAD COMPANY and Harold Jefferson Bridges, Appellants, v. Darlene D. FRIDDLE, as Administratrix of the Estate of Thomas B. Friddle, a/k/a Thomas Bascom Friddle, Appellee.
Nos. 72-969 and 72-970.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
Feb. 15, 1974.
William H. Davis and Frederick J. Ward, Giles, Hedrick & Robinson, Orlando, for appellants.
Jack B. Nichols, Skolfield, Nichols & Tatich, Orlando, for appellee.

Opinion:
WALDEN, Judge.
Plaintiff brought wrongful death and survival actions which were consolidated.
Thomas Friddle was killed at a railroad crossing when his automobile collided with defendants' train. These negligence actions ensued. The plaintiff, decedent's widow and administratrix, received verdicts totalling $191,259.00. Defendants appeal. We reverse and remand for a new trial.
Defendants' Points II and V lack merit. Their remaining points do have merit. They concern various preserved eviden-tiary rulings.
We record at the very outset that our problem would be difficult if we were faced with only one misstep and we would be most likely, in that event, to affirm on the basis of harmless error. However, it is our firm judgment that the weight and impact of the errors, when combined, are of such moment as to cloud the issues and seriously prejudice the defendants' right to fair trial in accordance with law. We feel that the simple justice of the cause mandates a new trial with a new jury not subjected to the influences of the illegal evidence here described.
There were no eyewitnesses other than the train crew and hence, at best, there can only be speculation as to why decedent did not see or hear the train or heed the warnings. We do not definitively know whether in truth or fact the producing cause of the collision was the static condition of the crossing, the conduct — by way of omission or commission — of the train crew, or otherwise.
Point I. A witness was permitted to testify and describe an accident that occurred more than two years earlier. The old accident happened in the daytime (the instant one at night) with a motorist trav eling east (the decedent here was traveling west). There were different warning devices at the respective times along with other significant omissions which could only make the testimony concerning the prior accident diversionary. Further, there was no sufficient showing that the conditions, causes and circumstances were the same or substantially so at the time of the respective accidents. In sum, we are persuaded that this prior accident testimony was without probative value as concerns any allowable issue and that its only effect was to seriously prejudice the defendants. Chambers v. Loftin, Fla.1953, 67 So.2d 220; Loftin v. McGregor, 1943, 152 Fla. 813, 14 So.2d 574; Powell v. Horne, 1942, 149 Fla. 240, 5 So.2d 451; FEC v. Young, 1932, 104 Fla. 541, 140 So. 467. See also Jewell v. Penn, Del.Supr., 183 A.2d 193, and 70 A.L.R.2d 178.
Point III. A witness was permitted to testify that he had listened for the train warning horn as other trains approached the crossing at various unspecified times and had been unable to hear it until the train was on the crossing. This is clear error. Powell v. Horne, 1942, 149 Fla. 240, 5 So.2d 451.
Point IV. Six lay-witnesses were permitted to testify that decedent and his widow had a son who had died about nine months prior to the collision and fatality in issue and the impact of this death upon decedent's widow. Plaintiff argued that this child's death created a pre-existing condition in the widow and so that the death of her husband in the instant accident aggravated that pre-existing mental and emotional condition so as to entitle plaintiff to more damages. This was not competent nor relevant evidence and its receipt could not help but be prejudicial to defendants' case.
Damages for mental anguish and suffering of the survivor are not recoverable in a wrongful death action according to the applicable Florida Statutes 768.01 and 768.02 F.S.A. Wadsworth v. Friend, Fla. App.1971, 201 So.2d 641. See Nimnicht v. Ostertag, Fla.App.1969, 225 So.2d 459; St. John's Electric Company v. Lawler, 1925, 90 Fla. 188, 105 So. 818. We agree with appellants' observation; to permit testimony as to the son's death was to try the defendant railroad not only for the death of the husband, but also to try the defendant for the death of the son of the plaintiff and to attempt to recover damages for the mental anguish caused by the death of the son.
All appellate circumstances considered in light of the excellent advices of counsel for the respective sides, the judgment is reversed and the cause remanded for a new trial, all consistent with the views herein expressed.
Reversed and remanded.
OWEN, C. J., concurs.
MAGER, J., dissents, with opinion.
. The cited statutes were repealed and replaced by F.S. 768.16-768.27, effective July 1, 1972.