Case Name: Lessee of H. Stoddard v. Jacob Myers
Court: Supreme Court of Ohio
Jurisdiction: Ohio
Decision Date: 1837-12
Citations: 8 Ohio 203
Docket Number: 
Parties: *Lessee of H. Stoddard v. Jacob Myers.
Judges: 
Reporter: Cases decided in the supreme court of ohio : upon the circuit at the special sessions in Columbus
Volume: 8
Pages: 207–213

Head Matter:
*Lessee of H. Stoddard v. Jacob Myers.
•Judgment reversed pending a bill to subject land to satisfy it, and again re- _ covered, the bill being continued, and a supplemental bill filed to reach the case of the second judgment, an alienation after the reversal and before the second recovery, is affected by the lis pendens.
This cause was adjourned from the county of Montgomery, .and came before the court upon facts agreed. The property in controversy was the north half of in-lot No. 80, in the town of Dayton. The plaintiff derived title under certain legal proceedings between Geo. Beitz and David Wolf; the defendant’s title was direct from Wolf, through intermediate conveyances.
At September term of the common pleas, 1831, Beitz recovered •a judgment against Wolf for upward of $2,000. Finding no property whereupon to levy, Beitz, September 8, 1831, filed a bill in chancery against Wolf and his children, to subject the half-lot in ■question to the payment of his judgment. June, 1832, the judgment of Beitz v. Wolf was reserved, in tbe Supreme Court, and the cause remanded to the Montgomery common pleas to be proceeded in, where it was docketed, September, 1832. It came to be tried again in March, 1833, and Beitz again recovered a judgment. Before the filing of the original bill, or the obtaining of the first judgment, Wolf had conveyed the half-lot to his children. These, in September, 1832, conveyed to J. H. Lesher, who conveyed to the defendant, Myers. The bill in chancery was regularly continued to June term, 1833, when a supplemental bill was filed, alleging the recovery of the new judgment, and asking, ás asked in the original bill, that the court decree a sale of the half-lot for the satisfaction of the judgment. In 1835, the court decreed the sale prayed for, at which the plaintiff lessor became the purchaser.
Lesher, the purchaser from the Wolfs, had no notice, in fact, of, ' the claim, to subject the half-lot to the satisfaction of a debt due toBeitz, and under this defense the defendant claimed protection. The plaintiff maintained that the Us pendens was conclusive noti ce.
Stoddard, for the plaintiff:
The rule is believed to be well settled that whatever is sufficient-to put a party upon inquiry, is sufficient notice of every fact, that, upon such inquiry, he might with reasonable diligence have learned.
So it is settled, by repeated decisions, that a suit which draws property in question, incidentally or collaterally, is such lis *pendens as affects a purchaser of such property, with constructive notice. As in the case of Gouth v. Ward, 2 Atkins, 174, the chancellor held that a suit by devisees against the heir to-perpetuate testimony, and to establish the will, was such a lispendens as affected a purchaser of the property with notice.
So in the ease of Culpepper v. Aston, 2 Chancery Cases, 115,. 221-223, where land had been conveyed to executors in trust to pay debts, etc. A bill was filed by the heir against the executors-for an account, alleging that the .land was not wanted to discharge the debts, and during the pendency of that suit the executor sold the land. It was held that the suit for an account was notice to the purchaser. Upon an account taken, it turned out that the land was not necessary for payment of the debts, and the purchaser (Aston) lost the land, notwithstanding he purchased with or t any actual notice of the trust, and paid the full^price of the land, See Barnes v. Canning, 1 Chancery Cases, 301, and 1 Johns. Ch. 57, 579.
In a case of Wattington v. Howley and others, 1 Desaussure,, 168, which was a bill against an executor for an account of assets and pending the suit she sold a certificate of public debt which-belonged to the estate, the court held the sale void.
That the suit of Beitz v. Wolf and his children was a suit pending from September 15, 1831, and that it was in a course of continued prosecution is clearly shown by the record of the cause, and can not be denied. The inquiry is then presented, whether the pendency of that suit was such notice to Lesher and Myers,, both of whom purchased the subject matter of that suit, while it-was pending, as affects them with notice; for if it is, the purchase is void, and Beitz and the plaintiff claiming under the decree, in his-cause, need not take notice of a title so acquired. Ludlow v. Kidd,
3 Ohio, 542, 354; Bennett v. Williams, 5 Ohio, 462; Self v. Maddax, 1 Vern. 459; Murray v. Ballan, 1 Johns. Ch. 565. And the same authorities establish the position, that a lis pendens is notice per se. The chancery suit was pending from September 15, 1831, as before stated., and was in a course of continued and diligent prosecution, and from that time Lesher and Myers had constructive notice of every fact that is averred in the bill, and it does not absolve them from the legal consequences of that notice, that the judgment at law, one of the facts mentioned in the bill, was afterward reversed on error; for the existence of that judgment, is only one of many facts that are ^alleged, and notwithstanding the reversal of the judgment, the suit in chancery remained pending and in prosecution until the final decree in the Supreme Court at the June term, 1835, by which the lot in question is subjected to sale according to the prayer of the bill. It is not the facts alleged in the bill (except so far as they show the complainant’s claim upon the property, or subject of the suit by direct averment or necessary inference), that affects a purchaser with constructive notice, but it is the simple fact, that a suit is pending. That of itself is notice.
The argument that no decree could be rendered upon the original bill in this cause, without the supplement, is not sound, for many cases may be supposed where no decree could be made in the cause without the aid of a supplement; as if, after a cause is at issue, it is discovered that it is necessary to bring new parties before the court, as in the cases before stated, and a supplemental bill is filed for that purpose. The filing of such supplemental bill will not do away the effect of the original bill as litis pendentia, and yet no decree could be rendered in the cause without such supplement. Nor has a suit any the less effect upon a purchase made pendente lite, that the decree to be made upon the hearing does not operate directly, but only incidentally, upon the property in controversy; as in the before-cited cases of G-auth v. Ward, and Culpepper v. Anton, no decree was or could be rendered operating directly upon the property, and yet those who claimed by purchase were not the less pendente lite purchasers and consequently affected with notice, upon the principle that their attention was necessarily drawn to the claim to the property, adverse to the title of those UDder whom they claimed.
The defendant’s counsel has referred to cases to be found in the' Condensed English Chancery Reports, as sustaining positions taken in argument, one of which is, “ that a supplemental bill can not be filed to supply the title of an original bill,” and the case of King v. Judock, 2 Cond. Eng. Ch. 503, was cited.
That was a suit in chancery by the assignees of a bankrupt, who by statute are prohibited from bringing any suit without the consent of the creditors or commissioners, “testified in writing under their hands.” This want of authority to institute the suit was set up in defense. The plaintiff then filed a supplemental bill, alleging that since filing the original bill they had obtained the authority of the commissioners to bring the suit. To the supplement there was a demurrer, which was sustained *on the ground that the statute requisition of such authority was necessarily precedent, and that the authority subsequently obtained could not be considered as ab initio authorizing the suit. It was a statutory requisite to the bringing of the suit. The application of the case to the one before the court is not perceived.
Another position is, that “ lis pendens does not hold good if the -decree is founded on a supplemental bill, filed after sale of propertyand the case of Kinsman v. Kinsman, 4 Cond. Eng. Ch. 581, is cited. The lord chancellor, in that case, says the question was, “ whether there was or was not a lis pendens,” and that “to ..constitute a litis pendentia there must be a continuance of litis con.testatioand after examining the facts in the case, he says, “upward of a quarter of a century has elapsed ” since the decree was pronounced in the original suit, and he therefore held that the -original suit was not pending, and that the bill filed as a suppleplement was not of that character; and the purchase having been .made after the decree, etc., in the original suit, and before filing what was intended as a supplemental bill, there was no litis pendentia of the original bill, of which the purchaser was bound to take notice. ■
The case of Beits v. Wolff, etc., is not of that character, for the record of that suit shows that there was not only litis pendentia, but also litis contestatio, in the strictest sense, from the time of filing the original bill.
Another position is, that a “ supplemental bill can not be filed to change altogether the grounds of the original bill,” and authorities are referred to as sustaining the position. On examination, it is not perceived that the authorities sustain the position, nor is the application of such a rule to the case in question perceived.
P. P. and R. P. Lowe, for defendant:
Does the first bill operate as a Ns pendens to the purchaser, Leasure, who bought after the. reversal of the judgment at law, as described in the first bill, and before a new recovery was had, and of course before the supplemental bill was filed, and was it after the reversal of the first judgment reasonably sufficient to put the purchaser upon his guard?
The reversal of the judgment set forth in the original bill operates as a direct and certain suspension of any further action in the chancery suit. The life of the bill was depending on that of the judgment it describes, and by destroying the judgment, *the fate of the bill is sealed. Its equities and ground work are stripped from it, so as to satisfy the law of its insufficiency to operate as notice. The sole object of this bill being that of getting satisfaction of the judgment (it describes, and no other claim, the purchaser then, on examination, finds no such judgment as the bill describes; he even finds no judgment that would operate as a lien itself (were the legal title in the lot in question in Daniel Wolf), or be the basis u]Don which a bill could be filed, were the legal title fraudulently out of Daniel Wolf. The court will not ask so unreasonable a thing, as to require-him who is looking out for that which may reasonably be sufficient to put him on his guard, that he should run into a new conjecture, as to what the future may bring forth, or enter upon a prophecy as to what may be the probable course of things. A second recovery for the same cause of action would not relate back as a lien to the date of the first judgment. The law will not assume greater strength for the bill than is given to the judgment itself. The reversal of the judgment at law, it is true, is not in fact a reversal of the chancery proceedings, yet it is so in effect. Suppose A. files a bill to satisfy a judgment he has recovered against B. by making lot number ten liable; after the bill is filed for this sole object, A. amends or files his supplemental bill, praying that lot number 11 may be held liable to satisfy the judgment described in the first bill. D., between the filing of the first bill, and that of the amended or supplemental bill, buys lot 11. The first bill in this instance would not operate as a lis pendens to D.
But perhaps the more important question to be decided in this- case is, whether the amended or supplemental bill as it is called, relates back in such a manner as to place its contents and allegations into the first bill, or, in other words, to have the same effect as if they were placed there. And in viewing this branch of the subject, we will, first, deny that the amended or supplemental bill filed by Beits, as between the purchaser under the decree, and the grantee of an innocent bona fide purchaser, is, in truth, an amended or supplemental bill to the one originally filed, in the sense of the authorities. The defendant, in ejectment, contends there is no connection, as the court will perceive. It has no relation back, because the facts it contains are not new discoveries not new discoveries, because they had no existence at the time of the purchase. In making up the final decree, no allusion could be had to any fact contained in the original bill, no reference to it was necessary to do what the complainant ^desired. If, then, the last bill filed, be not an amended or supplemental bill, the suit in chancery is inadmissible in this case as evidence. See 2 Mad. 404-409. It is also inadmissible because it was filed without leave of the court. See same authority. But an amended, or supplemental,bill, can not be filed to supply the title of an original bill. See 2 Cond. Eng. Ch. 503; 2 Sim. & S. 265; 2 Young & Jarvis, 475; 2 Mad. 50. Nor can a supplemental bill be filed to change altogether the grounds of the original bill. See 6 Cond. Eng. Ch. 286. But even if the court should determine the supplemental bill well filed, yet, inasmuch as Leasure was an intermediate purchaser, after reversal of judgment, and the supplemental bill filed long after the sale to him, it could not operate as notice. See case of Kinsman v. Kinsman, 4 Cond. Eng. Ch. 581.
The case referred to by Mr. Stoddard, in 3 Ohio, 352, furnishes rather a strong case for the defendant in one point of view. ‘‘ That the reversal of a decree in chancery, which confers a title, actually divests it, and reinvested it in the person where it rested before the decree was made.” True it is, there was strictly no reversal of the suit in chancery, but everything which made up the complainant’s claim to equity, was completely destroyed, and as effectually as if a reversal took place.
A bill of reviva was filed in this case, upon the suggestion of Daniel Wolf’s death. Bills of reviva, as well as supplemental bills, do not necessarily refer back to the commencement of original suit. See 3 Ohio, 341, 541; 5 Ib. 461.
The common practice is, for a purchaser first to examine the recorder’s office for conveyance by deed, or mortgage ; then he goes to the clerk’s office, and finds no judgment against Daniel Wolf that would operate as a lien, or upon which a bill could be filed, so as to make the property held by his children liable to pay it. If a purchaser does all this, and finds these results we might suppose he ought to be satisfied. The most astute and wary man in community would be satisfied with such a result., and purchase-, yet Leasure bought, precisely under these circumstances, fairly and innocently obtaining title, for the consideration of $1,400. The consideration might be proof positive of his ignorance of a lien, or notice of incumbrance, as he gave double what was paid for the pemises under the decree.

Opinion:
* Judge Lane
delivered the opinion of the court:
The general rule that no alienation of property is permitted whilst a suit is pending in relation to it, either in law or equity, is familiar and well settled. 3 Ohio, 542 ; 5 Ohio, 462.
It is assumed 'that when the.right to recover, in the bill in equity, was taken away, by the reversal of the judgment, the suit ceased to be pending; so far as to bind the property. We are not satisfied that this position is a sound one. No such distinction is to be found in the books. But the doctrine seems plain that by the institution of a suit, the subject of litigation is placed beyond the power of the parties to it; that whilst the suit continues in court, it holds the property to respond to the final judgment or decree. This suit, instituted in 1831, was regularly continued until the final decree in 1835. The supplemental bill was engrafted into the original bill, and became identified with it. The whole was a lis pendens, effectually preventing an intermediate alienation. Judgment for plaintiff.