Case Name: THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Respondent-Appellee, v. JERRY L. JONES, Petitioner-Appellant
Court: Illinois Appellate Court
Jurisdiction: Illinois
Decision Date: 1990-05-31
Citations: 198 Ill. App. 3d 572
Docket Number: Nos. 3—89—0549, 3—89—0550 cons.
Parties: THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Respondent-Appellee, v. JERRY L. JONES, Petitioner-Appellant.
Judges: 
Reporter: Illinois Appellate Court Reports, Third Series
Volume: 198
Pages: 572–578

Head Matter:
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Respondent-Appellee, v. JERRY L. JONES, Petitioner-Appellant.
Third District
Nos. 3—89—0549, 3—89—0550 cons.
Opinion filed May 31, 1990.
HEIPLE, P.J., dissenting.
Greg McHugh, of Aledo, for appellant.
Michael J. Herr, State’s Attorney, of Aledo (Judith Z. Kelly and John X. Breslin, both of State’s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor’s Office, of counsel), for the People.

Opinion:
JUSTICE STOUDER
delivered the opinion of the court:
The petitioner, Jerry L. Jones, was arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 95½, par. 11—501(a)(2)). The State summarily suspended his driver's license after he refused to submit to a breathalyzer test (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 95½, par. 11—501.1(d)). The petitioner subsequently filed a petition to rescind the statutory suspension, alleging that the arresting officer had not had reasonable grounds to believe that he was driving or in actual physical control of a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol. The petitioner further alleged that he was not placed under arrest prior to being asked to submit to a chemical test. The trial court denied his petition. He appeals.
Mercer County sheriff's deputy John Stewart's arrest report shows that on April 30, 1989, Jeff Clawson called the sheriff's department reporting that he had observed a vehicle in a ditch. Clawson further noted that there was only one person in the vehicle. Deputy Stewart responded to the call and observed the petitioner about 200 yards from his truck. The petitioner staggered as he walked, slurred his speech, and smelled strongly of alcohol. He told the deputy that he had been drinking but not driving and stated that another man had been driving, though he did not know the man's name. After taking the petitioner's keys, driving permit, and registration, Stewart took him to the sheriff's department. At the department, the petitioner refused to perform a field sobriety test and refused to take a breathalyzer test. According to the arrest report, after the petitioner refused to take the tests, Stewart arrested him for driving under the influence of alcohol.
At the hearing on the petition to rescind, the petitioner acknowledged that he had been drinking on the night in question. He testified, however, that he was not driving and claimed that an old friend named John was driving.
On appeal, the petitioner contends that the trial court erred in finding that the arresting officer had reasonable grounds to believe that he was driving under the influence of alcohol. He emphasizes his testimony that he was not driving and relies on People v. Wireman (1989), 181 Ill. App. 3d 385, 536 N.E.2d 1346, for the proposition that a summary suspension should be rescinded if it is later determined at a hearing to rescind that the licensee was in fact not driving.
A trial court may properly grant a petition to rescind where the petitioner shows by a preponderance of the evidence that he was in fact not driving or operating a motor vehicle. (People v. Wireman (1989), 181 Ill. App. 3d 385, 536 N.E.2d 1346.) At the hearing on the petition, the burden of proof is on the petitioner. (People v. Orth (1988), 124 Ill. 2d 326, 530 N.E.2d 210.) A reviewing court will not disturb the trial court's finding unless it was manifestly erroneous. People v. Repp (1988), 165 Ill. App. 3d 90, 518 N.E.2d 750.
Initially, we note that after reviewing the instant trial court's written order denying the petitioner's petition, we find the court's reasoning convoluted and unclear. There is, however, a presumption that the trial court acted correctly, and we will begin our review at that point. People v. Henderson (1985), 136 Ill. App. 3d 1041, 483 N.E.2d 1068.
In its order, the trial court specifically noted the petitioner's testimony that he was not driving. Moreover, the court noted that it was aware of the Wireman case. Nonetheless, the court refused to rescind the summary suspension of the petitioner's license. Under the circumstances, we do not find that the trial court's decision was manifestly erroneous. The court was not obligated to believe the petitioner's story and could in its role as trier of fact properly conclude that his testimony was not credible.
The petitioner next argues that the arresting officer was required to arrest him prior to asking him to submit to a chemical test. He further contends that the trial court erred in finding that he was arrested before he refused to submit to the breathalyzer test. He points out that the traffic citation shows that he was arrested at 12:35 a.m. on April 30, while the summary suspension form shows that he refused to submit to the breathalyzer test at 12:30 a.m. on April 30.
Initially, we note that we agree with the petitioner's position that in order for the chemical test refusal to have been admissible in the summary suspension hearing it must have been preceded by an arrest. Section 11—501.1 states that the statutory summary suspension provisions are triggered by an arrest for driving under the influence of alcohol. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 95½, pars. 11—501.1(a), (c).
Regarding the issue of when the petitioner was placed under arrest, we note that the issuance of a traffic ticket or the time of an alleged arrest mentioned in a police report is not conclusive evidence of an arrest. Rather, the standard for determining if and when an arrest has occurred is whether a reasonable man, innocent of any crime, would have concluded that he was not free to leave considering the surrounding circumstances. (People v. Wright (1985), 111 Ill. 2d 128, 490 N.E.2d 640.) Such circumstances include the continuing possession of the individual's driver's license by a police officer, the placing of an individual in a squad car, and the duration of the individual's detention. (People v. Goodman (1988), 173 Ill. App. 3d 559, 527 N.E.2d 1055.) The trial court's determination regarding whether an arrest occurred will not be disturbed on review unless it was manifestly erro neons. See People v. White (1977), 51 Ill. App. 3d 155, 366 N.E.2d 491.
In the instant case, Deputy Stewart noted in his arrest report that the petitioner smelled of alcohol and slurred his speech. The deputy then transported the petitioner back to his vehicle, seized his keys, license and registration, and took him to the sheriff's department. Under these circumstances, we find that a reasonable person would have believed he was not free to leave once the deputy retained his license and transported him to the sheriff's department. Accordingly, we further find that the trial court's determination that the petitioner was already under arrest when he refused to submit to the breathalyzer test was not manifestly erroneous.
The judgment of the circuit court of Mercer County is affirmed.
Affirmed.
SCOTT, J., concurs.