Case Name: Alvin HEBERT, Sr. and Marion M. Dupuis Hebert v. ANCO INSULATION, INC., A.P. Green Industries, Inc., Armstrong World Industries, Inc., Asbestos Claims Management Corp., f/k/a National Gypsum Company, Asbestos Corporation, Ltd., A.W. Chesterton Company, The Dow Chemical Company, Mortimer Currier, Charlie Halphen, Lester Poirrier, Harold Hoyle, Theodore Trokelson, James E. Campbell, Joe Bristol, Gerard W. Daigle, Malcolm L. McNabb, V.K. Rowe, Dr. Holder, Dr. Gordon, Don Morris, John Calmes, Al Paradiso, Charlie Melancon, Associates Indemnity Corporation, the American Insurance Company, Travelers Casualty and Surety Company, Flexiallic, Inc., GAF Corporation, The McCarty Corporation, AC & S, Pittsburgh Corning Corporation, Rapid American Corporation T & N, Union Carbide Corporation, and Uniroyal, Inc.
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 2002-07-31
Citations: 835 So. 2d 483
Docket Number: No. 2000 CA 1929
Parties: Alvin HEBERT, Sr. and Marion M. Dupuis Hebert v. ANCO INSULATION, INC., A.P. Green Industries, Inc., Armstrong World Industries, Inc., Asbestos Claims Management Corp., f/k/a National Gypsum Company, Asbestos Corporation, Ltd., A.W. Chesterton Company, The Dow Chemical Company, Mortimer Currier, Charlie Halphen, Lester Poirrier, Harold Hoyle, Theodore Trokelson, James E. Campbell, Joe Bristol, Gerard W. Daigle, Malcolm L. McNabb, V.K. Rowe, Dr. Holder, Dr. Gordon, Don Morris, John Calmes, Al Paradiso, Charlie Melancon, Associates Indemnity Corporation, the American Insurance Company, Travelers Casualty and Surety Company, Flexiallic, Inc., GAF Corporation, The McCarty Corporation, AC & S, Pittsburgh Corning Corporation, Rapid American Corporation T & N, Union Carbide Corporation, and Uniroyal, Inc.
Judges: Before: GONZALES, WHIPPLE, FITZSIMMONS, KUHN and DOWNING, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 835
Pages: 483–513

Head Matter:
Alvin HEBERT, Sr. and Marion M. Dupuis Hebert v. ANCO INSULATION, INC., A.P. Green Industries, Inc., Armstrong World Industries, Inc., Asbestos Claims Management Corp., f/k/a National Gypsum Company, Asbestos Corporation, Ltd., A.W. Chesterton Company, The Dow Chemical Company, Mortimer Currier, Charlie Halphen, Lester Poirrier, Harold Hoyle, Theodore Trokelson, James E. Campbell, Joe Bristol, Gerard W. Daigle, Malcolm L. McNabb, V.K. Rowe, Dr. Holder, Dr. Gordon, Don Morris, John Calmes, Al Paradiso, Charlie Melancon, Associates Indemnity Corporation, the American Insurance Company, Travelers Casualty and Surety Company, Flexiallic, Inc., GAF Corporation, The McCarty Corporation, AC & S, Pittsburgh Corning Corporation, Rapid American Corporation T & N, Union Carbide Corporation, and Uniroyal, Inc.
No. 2000 CA 1929.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, First Circuit.
July 31, 2002.
Rehearing Denied Nov. 5, 2002.
Writs Denied Feb. 21, 2003.
Cameron Waddell, Brian Blackwell, Burton LeBlanc, Baton Rouge, for Plaintiffs/2nd Appellants, Marion D. Hebert, Alvin A. Hebert, Jr., Stanley Robert Hebert, Cindy Hebert Himel, Nancy Hebert Viller-ette, Catherine Hebert Harrelson and Blake J. Hebert.
H. Alston Johnson, III, Baton Rouge, F. Barry Marionneaux, Plaquemine, John R. Tharp, David Bienvenu, Jr., Gregory E. Bodin, Baton Rouge, for Defendant/lst Appellant, The Dow Chemical Company.
H. Alston Johnson, III, John R. Tharp, David Bienvenu, Jr., Gregory E. Bodin, Baton Rouge, for Defendants/Appellees, Harold Hoyle, Harold Gordon, M.D. and Ben Holder, M.D.
Susan Kohn, New Orleans, for Defendant, McCarty Corporation.
David Barfield, Gaye Nell Currie, Jackson, MS, for Defendant, AC & S, Inc.
Julie Difulco Robles, Metairie, for Defendant, ANCO Insulations, Inc.
A. Wendell Stout, III, New Orleans, for Defendant, United States Gypsum.
Thomas Milazzo, James L. Fletcher, Jr., Metairie, for Defendant, Asbestos Corp., Ltd.
Michael G. Durand, Lafayette, for Defendants, Associates Indemnity Co. & American Insurance Co.
Edward Castaing, Jr., New Orleans, for Defendant, A.W. Chesterton.
Edwin Ellinghausen, III, New Orleans, for Defendant, Pittsburgh Corning Corp.
T. MacDougall Womack, Baton Rouge, for Defendant, Our Lady of the Lake RMC.
Charles Giordano, Metairie, for Defendant, Rapid American Corporation.
John Cosmich, Laura Sanders Brown, Jackson, MS, for Defendants, Owen-Uli-nois, Inc. & Uniroyal, Inc.
Arthur W. Landry, New Orleans, for Defendant, Synkoloid, A Division of Múra-lo, Inc.
Darrell Sims, New Orleans, for Defendant, Eagle, Inc.
Janice M. Culotta, New Orleans, for Defendant, Armstrong World Industries, Inc.
Before: GONZALES, WHIPPLE, FITZSIMMONS, KUHN and DOWNING, JJ.

Opinion:
| «FITZSIMMONS, J.
This case involves claims by Alvin A. Hebert, Sr. and his wife, Marion M. Du-puis Hebert, against The Dow Chemical Company ("Dow") for damages based upon Mr. Hebert's contraction of mesothelioma, a disease resulting from exposure to asbestos-containing products. Following trial, the jury answered interrogatories and found Dow strictly hable. Dow appeals from an amended judgment, which ordered Dow to pay plaintiffs the total sum of $265,625.00 as its virile share of the total damage award. Plaintiffs have also appealed various rulings rendered by the trial court during the course of the proceedings below. We affirm the judgment maintaining the exceptions of lack of personal jurisdiction of various defendants; however, we vacate the "amending judgment" on the merits and remand the case to the trial court with instructions.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In February of 1999, Mr. Hebert, a retired millwright, was diagnosed with mesothelioma, cancer of the mesothelia cells that line the outside of the pleural membrane and the lining of the chest wall, for which there is usually no cure. Mr. Hebert and his wife then instituted this suit against numerous defendants, including manufacturers of asbestos-containing products, corporate sellers of such products, owners of premises allegedly defective due to the presence of asbestos-containing products, and certain executive officers of Dow, one of the premises owners sued. In general terms, plaintiffs alleged that the defendant corporations had engaged in the design, manufacture, sale, distribution, and/or installation, handling, storage or transportation of asbestos-containing materials.
Dow was sued as a premises owner based on allegations that Mr. Hebert was exposed to asbestos-containing materials while working as a millwright at Dow's Plaquemine, Louisiana facility from approximately 1956 to 1975, during his employment |4with Nichols Construction and later with National Maintenance. Additionally, the executive officers of Dow who were named as defendants were sued on the basis that they were negligent in failing to provide Mr. Hebert with a safe place to work.
Prior to trial, defendants Harold Hoyle, Dr. Harold Gordon and Dr. Benjamin Holder, all former employees and alleged executive officers of Dow, filed declinatory exceptions raising the objection of lack of personal jurisdiction. Following argument on the exceptions, the trial court maintained the exceptions and dismissed plaintiffs' claims against these defendants without prejudice. Plaintiffs also settled with numerous defendants, and their claims against various other defendants were dismissed with prejudice on motions for summary judgment. Dow also filed a motion for partial summary judgment, seeking dismissal of Mrs. Hebert's claim for loss of consortium. The court granted the motion, and this claim likewise was dismissed with prejudice.
Thereafter, the matter proceeded to trial against Dow and the McCarty Corporation, the only remaining defendants. Following a two-week trial, the jury returned a verdict, finding that Mr. Hebert had sustained an asbestos-related injury. The jury further found that the McCarty Corporation was not at fault. With regard to Dow, while the jury found that Dow was not negligent, it did find that Dow had custody and control of a defective thing which created an unreasonable risk of harm to which Mr. Hebert had been exposed. The jury made the same finding as to one other company on whose premises Mr. Hebert had worked, Kaiser Aluminum Corporation. Additionally, the jury concluded that six manufacturers with whom plaintiffs had settled prior to trial, Garlock Corporation, Johns-Manville Corporation, Pittsburgh Corning Corporation, Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corporation, Armstrong World Industries, Inc. and Flexital-lic Gasket Company, Inc., had introduced into commerce unreasonably dangerous products to which Mr. Hebert had been exposed and that these products were substantial contributing causes of his disease. The jury then awarded Mr. Hebert $2,000,000.00 in general damages and $500,000.00 in past and future medical expenses.
In entering judgment in accordance with the jury verdict, the trial court cast Dow with a one-eighth virile share of the verdict, based on Dow's strict liability and the fault | sof seven of the settling defendants. Thus, judgment was rendered against Dow in the amount of $312,500.00.
Both Dow and Mr. Hebert filed motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. While Mr. Hebert's motion was denied in its entirety, Dow's motion was granted in part, on the issue of the award of medical expenses. The trial court then rendered an amended judgment, reducing the total amount awarded for medical expenses from $500,000.00 to $125,000.00. Thus, the amended judgment cast Dow for damages in the amount of $265,625.00, its virile share of the total amended award, plus interest and costs.
Dow suspensively appealed from the amended judgment on the merits, assigning the following as error:
(1) The trial court erred in its application of strict liability to the facts and circumstances of Mr. Hebert's claim against Dow by failing to direct a verdict in favor of Dow on the strict liability claim and then erroneously instructing the jury on the law of strict liability under La. C.C. art. 2317.
(2) The trial court committed legal error by failing to hold that plaintiffs' settlement with the manufacturers of asbestos-containing products to which Mr. Hebert had been exposed on Dow's premises extinguished Dow's secondary or derivative strict liability as premises owner.
(3) The jury erred in failing to allocate any fault to the settling defendants, BASF and Georgia Pacific, because Mr. Hebert's own admissions established that he was exposed to asbestos-containing products on the premises owned by these settling defendants, plaintiffs' own experts opined that every exposure to asbestos-containing products was a substantial contributing cause of Mr. Hebert's disease, and these settling defendants had care or custody of the same unreasonably dangerous thing that formed the basis of Dow's strict liability.
(4) The jury's general damage award of $2,000,000.00 was excessive as a matter of law.
Thereafter, plaintiffs appealed devolu-tively from three judgments: the judgment granting the exceptions of lack of personal jurisdiction and dismissing plaintiffs' claims | ^against Gordon, Holder and Hoyle; the judgment granting Dow's motion for partial summary judgment and dismissing Mrs. Hebert's loss of consortium claim; and the amended judgment on the merits. They have set forth the following assignments of error:
(1) The trial court erred in granting the exceptions of lack of personal jurisdiction filed on behalf of defendants, Harold Gordon, Benjamin Holder and Harold Hoyle.
(2) The trial court erred in granting the motion for partial summary judgment filed on behalf of Dow and dismissing Mrs. Hebert's claim for loss of consortium.
(3) The jury erred in failing to find that Dow was negligent in causing Mr. Hebert's mesothelioma.
(4) The jury erred in finding Kaiser Aluminum Corporation, Garlock Corporation, Johns-Manville Corporation, Armstrong World Industries, Inc. and Flexatallie Gasket Company, Inc. at fault in causing Mr. Hebert's mesothelioma.
EXCEPTIONS OF LACK OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION
Defendants, Dr. Harold Gordon, Dr. Benjamin Holder and Harold Hoyle, filed declinatory exceptions raising the objection of lack of personal jurisdiction, which were maintained by the trial court. In their first assignment of error, plaintiffs contend that the trial court erred in maintaining these exceptions. Specifically, plaintiffs aver that these defendants submitted themselves to the exercise of personal jurisdiction over them by filing a motion for summary judgment while their exceptions were still pending, thus waiving the exceptions. Alternatively, plaintiffs contend that these defendants had sufficient minimum contacts with the state to permit a Louisiana court to exercise personal jurisdiction over them. Thus, plaintiffs seek to have the judgment maintaining the exceptions of lack of personal jurisdiction reversed and the matter remanded for trial against these defendants.
Turning first to plaintiffs' contention that Gordon, Holder and Hoyle submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the court, we find no merit to this argument. A declinatory exception raising the objection of lack of personal jurisdiction must be pleaded either prior to or contemporaneously with the filing of an answer or any other |7pleading seeking relief other than entry or removal of the name of an attorney as counsel of record, extension of time within which to plead, security for costs or dissolution of an attachment issued on the ground of the nonresidence of the defendant. Otherwise, the objection is waived. La. C.C.P. art. 928A.
In the instant case, these defendants did file their exceptions prior to filing an answer or the subsequently-filed motions for summary judgment. While the filing of the motions for summary judgment constituted a general appearance that would have waived any objections raised by the declinatory exception if these actions had occurred before the personal jurisdiction exception was filed, this general appearance did not waive the pending exceptions of personal jurisdiction. See Bickham v. Sub Sea International, Inc., 617 So.2d 483, 484 (La.1993). As the Louisiana Supreme Court stated in Bickham, "the subsequent general appearance, before trial of the exception, does not constitute waiver of the pending exception." (Emphasis supplied.) Bickham, 617 So.2d at 484. Thus, the subsequent filing by these defendants of motions for summary judgment before trial of their exceptions did .not have the effect of waiving their pending exceptions. This argument lacks merit.
We likewise find no merit to plaintiffs' alternative argument that these defendants had sufficient minimum contacts with this state to warrant the exercise of personal jurisdiction over them. Personal jurisdiction is the legal power and authority of the court to render a personal judgment against a party to an action. La. C.C.P. art. 6. Louisiana's long-arm statute imposes personal jurisdiction over non-residents in the following pertinent circumstances:
A. A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident, who acts directly or by an agent, as to a cause of action arising from any one of the following activities performed by the nonresident:
(1) Transacting any business in this state.
(2) Contracting to supply services or things in this state.

(4) Causing injury or damage in this state by an offense or quasi offense committed through an act or omission outside of this state if he regularly does or solicits business, or engages in any other persistent course of conduct, or derives revenue from goods used or consumed or services rendered in this state.

B. In addition to the provisions of Subsection A, a court of this state may exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident on any basis consistent with the constitution of this state and of the Constitution of the United States.
La.R.S. 13:3201.
The intent of Louisiana's long-arm statute is to procedurally extend personal jurisdiction of the Louisiana courts over nonresidents to comport with the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. La. R.S. 13:3201; Jasper v. National Medical Enterprises, Inc., 94-1120, p. 4 (La.App. 1 Cir. 6/23/95), 657 So.2d 604, 607, writ denied, 95-1836 (La.10/27/95), 661 So.2d 1347. The limits of Louisiana's long-arm statute and constitutional due process are, thus, coextensive. Superior Supply Company v. Associated Pipe and Supply Company, 515 So.2d 790, 792 (La.1987). Accordingly, the inquiry into personal jurisdiction over a non-resident involves an analysis of constitutional due process requirements. Superior Supply Company, 515 So.2d 790 at 792.
The landmark case, International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945), established the constitutional test for the application of personal jurisdiction to a nonresident. The United States Supreme Court held that personal jurisdiction could be constitutionally imposed if there were "certain minimum contacts with [the forum] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.' . Whether due process is satisfied must depend rather upon the quality and nature of the activity in relation to the fair and orderly administration of the laws which it was the purpose of the due process clause to insure." International Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 316, 319, 66 S.Ct. at 158, 160.
Through the years, the United States Supreme Court has broadened its interpretation of "minimum contacts" relative to the ongoing question of specific jurisdic tion over an unconsenting out-of-state party to accommodate a changing society. See McGee v. International Life Insurance Company, 355 U.S. 220, 78 S.Ct. 199, 2 L.Ed.2d 223 (1957); Burger King Corporation v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 105 S.Ct. 2174, 85 L.Ed.2d 528 (1985). Nevertheless, the Court has admonished that the "constitutional touchstone remains whether the defendant purposefully established 'minimum contacts' in the forum State." Burger King Corporation, 471 U.S. at 474, 485, 105 S.Ct. at 2183, 2189. In this regard, the foreseeability that is critical to due process analysis is that the defendant's action and affiliation with the forum state must be such that he should "reasonably anticipate being haled into court there." Purposeful availment requires that the contacts consist of a deliberate engagement in significant activities within a state, as opposed to a "random," "fortuitous," or "attenuated" relationship with the state seeking personal jurisdiction. Burger King Corporation, 471 U.S. at 474, 475, 480, 486, 105 S.Ct. at 2183, 2186, 2189; Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 774, 104 S.Ct. 1473, 1478, 79 L.Ed.2d 790 (1984).
Further, jurisdiction over individual officers and employees of a corporation may not be predicated merely upon jurisdiction over the corporation itself. However, jurisdiction over the corporation may also confer jurisdiction over the individual officers and employees where they are engaged in activities within the jurisdiction that would subject them to the coverage of the state's long-arm statute. Briley Marine Service, Inc. v. Toups, 551 So.2d 755, 759 (La.App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 553 So.2d 476 (La.1989); Cobb Industries, Inc. v. Hight, 469 So.2d 1060, 1063-1064 (La.App. 2nd Cir.1985).
Thus, the pivotal question before us remains whether the activities of each of these defendants, Gordon, Holder and Hoyle, taken as a whole, reflect that he purposefully availed himself of the privilege of conducting activities within the state of Louisiana to the extent that he should "reasonably anticipate" litigation in Louisiana. Burger King Corporation, 471 U.S. at 474-475, 105 S.Ct. at 2183.
In the instant case, plaintiffs contend that these executive officers of Dow clearly had enough contact with Louisiana to support the exercise of personal jurisdiction. They contend that these defendants carried on activities in Louisiana, acted as consultants to the Louisiana Division of Dow, and committed acts of omission and | incommission outside of the state of Louisiana that had deleterious effects on the health of Louisiana residents, including Mr. Hebert, and that the Louisiana court, accordingly, may exercise jurisdiction. We disagree.
The record demonstrates that Dr. Harold Gordon was a resident of Michigan, having resided there for the last seventy-five years. He never resided in Louisiana and never owned any property in Louisiana. He began working for Dow in 1946 as plant physician at Dow's Midland, Michigan facility. He eventually became assistant medical director in approximately 1956, and was then promoted to the position of medical director in 1967, a position he maintained until his retirement in 1977.
As an employee of Dow, Dr. Gordon never maintained an office within the Louisiana Division of Dow and was never stationed at the Louisiana Division. He visited Louisiana only four to six times during his thirty-one-year career with Dow and never treated a patient in the state of Louisiana. Even as medical director, Dr. Gordon never had any authority over the Louisiana Division of Dow to require it to comply with any medical requirements or to implement any health and safety plan. Rather, each division of Dow retained responsibility for its own medical program.
Dr. Benjamin Holder, who resided in Florida at the time of the trial, also never resided in Louisiana. In 1953, Dr. Holder began working for Dow as a staff physician responsible for general patient care and evaluation in Midland, Michigan. He held various positions with Dow's Michigan plant through the. 1960s and 1970s.
Eventually, Dr. Holder became the medical director for Dow's United States operations in 1979, and he held that position until he became the global coordinator of occupational health in 1981. The following year, Dr. Holder became the corporate medical director, and he held that position until he retired in 1985. However, by the time Dr. Holder assumed a position extending beyond the Midland, Michigan plant, Mr. Hebert was no longer working at Dow's Plaquemine facility.
Moreover, while Dr. Holder acknowledged that he had come to Louisiana "quite a few times" during his career with Dow, he explained that his role was that of a consultant. He stated that as the United States Area Medical Director, he had no direct responsibility over the medical program of any division of Dow. Rather, his only Inresponsibility was to make himself available for support and consultation. He further stated that he had never received any inquiries from the Louisiana division regarding asbestos.
Harold Hoyle similarly never resided in Louisiana, nor did he ever hold an employment position within the Louisiana Division of Dow. Rather, Hoyle resided in Midland, Michigan. Hoyle began working for Dow in 1941 as an estimator for the pipe shop at its Midland, Michigan facility. He eventually became the safety engineer at the Midland facility in 1944. Thereafter, in 1948, Hoyle became Dow's first full-time industrial hygienist and was assigned the responsibility of creating an industrial hygiene department for the company. He explained that at that time, "the company" was comprised of the Midland operations, a Texas division and a recently-acquired company in California that eventually became the Great Western Division of Dow.
Hoyle only visited the Louisiana division of Dow on a few occasions during his employment with Dow. He further stated that although he was Dow's top industrial hygienist from 1948 until 1975, certain divisions of Dow, including the Louisiana Division, hired their own industrial hygienists, over whom he had no direct responsibility. Additionally, Hoyle testified that he never had any authority over maintenance contractors or their employees, such as Mr. Hebert, at Dow's Plaquemine facility. His responsibility was to furnish information and assistance as an internal consultant to divisional industrial hygienists.
Given these facts and considering the record as a whole, we find no error in the trial court's conclusion that there were insufficient contacts with this state to satisfy due process and to properly assert personal jurisdiction over Gordon, Holder or Hoyle. Their contacts with Louisiana do not amount to a course of conduct that would make them amenable to Louisiana's jurisdiction. We do not find that the quantity, quality or nature of the contacts of these individuals with Louisiana make it fair and reasonable to subject them to suit in Louisiana based on the facts of this case. See Briley Marine Service, Inc., 551 So.2d at 759-760. Accordingly, we find no merit to this assignment of error.
| nEXTINGUISHMENT OF CLAIMS AGAINST DOW BY PRIOR SETTLEMENTS
In this assignment of error, Dow argues that because its liability to plaintiffs herein was based solely on the finding that it had custody or control of a defective thing, the liability of Dow is properly viewed as secondary or derivative to the manufacturers' liability. As such, Dow contends that it did not owe plaintiffs a separate virile share where the manufacturers who actually created the hazard have been released by plaintiffs. According to Dow, the only portion of the debt for which it could have been liable has been fully satisfied by plaintiffs' settlements with the manufacturing defendants found to be at fault by the jury. Thus, it contends, any debt it may have owed was extinguished.
In response to this argument, plaintiffs assert that Dow failed to affirmatively plead the defense of extinguishment of the debt, and, accordingly, it is precluded from arguing this defense on appeal. We agree.
The defendant is required to affirmatively set forth in his answer any matter constituting an affirmative defense upon which he will rely. La. C.C.P. art. 1005. An affirmative defense raises a new matter which, assuming the allegations in the petition to be true, constitutes a defense to the action and will have the effect of defeating plaintiffs demand on its merits. Johnson v. Steele, 98-1726, p. 5 (La.App. 1 Cir. 9/24/99), 754 So.2d 1006, 1009.
The purpose of the requirement that certain defenses be affirmatively pled is to give the plaintiff fair and adequate notice of the nature of the defense and, thereby, prevent last minute surprise to the plaintiff. Johnson, 98-1726 at p. 5, 754 So.2d at 1009. The policy behind the requirement that affirmative defenses be raised in answer is sensible and laudable. Because affirmative defenses raise matters for judicial resolution outside of issues raised by plaintiffs petition, plaintiff must be made aware of these matters so that plaintiff can prepare an opposition to the defense and adjust his case, if necessary, in light of the new facts and issues raised by the affirmative defense. Patterson v. State, 95-1668, pp. 8-9 (La.App. 3 Cir. 12/11/96), 685 So.2d 473, 478.
A defense that liability has been extinguished, discharged or released by the plaintiffs settlement with, and/or release of, a solidary obligor is an affirmative defense 113that must be specifically pled. La. C.C.P. art. 1005. In the instant case, Dow did not move to amend its answer to assert the affirmative defense of extinguishment of debt upon plaintiffs' settling with various manufacturing defendants. Rather, Dow raised this affirmative defense for the first time after the completion of trial and the rendering of a verdict by the jury, in its motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.
While failure to so plead an affirmative defense does not automatically preclude the application of the defense in all cases, the general rule is that pleadings may be enlarged by evidence adduced without objection when such evidence is not pertinent to any other issue raised by the pleadings and, hence, would have been excluded if objected to timely. La. C.C.P. art. 1154; Snearl v. Mercer, 99-1738, 99-1739, pp. 8-9 (La.App. 1 Cir. 2/16/01), 780 So.2d 563, 572. If the evidence were admissible for any other purpose, the pleadings could not be enlarged without the express consent of the opposing party. Id. In the instant case, the evidence regarding fault of the manufacturing defendants and plaintiffs' settlements with those defendants was relevant to the issue of the assessment of liability to those defendants for purposes of determining the number of joint tortfeasors and, consequently, the number of virile shares, which had the effect of reducing Dow's financial exposure herein. See Carroll v. Kilbourne, 525 So.2d 284, 286-287 (La.App. 1st Cir.1988). Accordingly, applying these legal precepts, we are unable to conclude that Dow's pleadings were expanded at trial to include the affirmative defense of extinguishment of the debt. Thus, Dow's untimely assertion of the affirmative defense of extin-guishment of the debt in a motion filed after conclusion of the trial and the rendition of a verdict herein precludes Dow from raising this issue on appeal.
| uIn addition to arguing that the plaintiffs' settlements with the manufacturing defendants extinguished any -debt it owed to plaintiffs, Dow further contends that the release of any solidary obligor, such as the manufacturing defendants, without a reservation of rights discharges the debt as to the remaining solidary obli-gors. The settlement documents, whereby plaintiffs settled with the manufacturing defendants, were excluded from this record, and Dow contends that plaintiffs have failed to prove that they reserved their rights to proceed against Dow, as a solidary obligor. The temporal relationship between the facts of this case and the controlling civil code articles results in a meritorious claim by Dow for the following reasons.
Acts 1979, NO. 431 amended La. C.C. arts. 2323, 2324, 2103 and La. C.C.P. arts. 1811 and 1917 (related generally to comparative negligence). Ushered in with the introduction of comparative negligence in 1979, was a concomitant amendment to La. C.C. art. 2103, which provided that the obligation "shall be divided in proportion to each debtor's fault." The last paragraph in the amendment to article 2103 expressly limited the amendment's application as follows: "The provisions of this act shall not apply to claims arising from events that occurred prior to the time this act becomes effective."
In 1985, La. C.C. art. 2103 was replaced by La. C.C. arts. 1803 and 1804. Louisiana Civil Code article 1803 states: "Remission of debt by the obligee in favor of one obligor, or a transaction or compromise between the obligee and one obligor, benefits the other solidary obligors in the amount of the portion of that obligor." Article 1804 provides for an offense or quasi-offense that "a virile portion is proportionate to the fault of each obligor."
|1BIn Cole v. Celotex Corporation, 599 So.2d 1058 (La.1992), the Louisiana Supreme Court concluded that Act 431 of 1979 applied prospectively. The court concluded that: "when the tortious exposures occurring before Act 431's effective date are significant and such exposures later result in the manifestation of damages, pre-Act law applies." Cole v. Celotex, 599 So.2d at 1066. Employing analogous reasoning, this court has concluded that the pre-Act rules of contribution apply among the defendants.
At the same time that La. C.C. arts. 1803 and 1804 were enacted by the legislature to replace La. C.C. art. 2103, another code article relevant to this case, La. C.C. art. 2203, was coextensively abolished. Until 1985, article 2203 had required an express reservation of rights against other solidary obligors when an obligee entered into a compromise. Utilizing the same precepts employed in, and following, Cole v. Celotex, the pre-Act provisions of La. C.C. art 2203 should equally apply to this issue that affects damages among the alleged tortfeasors. Stated alternatively, in the same way that pre-Act law applies relative to contribution, so too does pre-Act law apply to the requirement that a settling party reserve his or her rights against other solidary obligors pursuant to La. C.C. art. 2203. See also Carona v. State Farm Insurance Company, 458 So.2d 1275, 1278 (La.1984).
Following oral argument addressing Dow's subpoena duces tecum of the settlement documents involving the manufacturers and plaintiffs' motion to quash same, the trial court pronounced that the settlement documents would be produced for an in-camera inspection. The court, however, failed to thereafter indicate whether, in fact, the inspection had transpired and whether the settlement documents contained the requisite reservation of rights by plaintiffs necessary to preserve their claim against Dow. Given the court's action vis-a-vis the subpoena duces tecum, it became the Irresponsibility of the court to conduct the inspection and to pronounce its conclusion. The court's failure to render a determination of this critical issue that had been expressly sought by Dow impacts a core issue of the viability of plaintiffs' claims against Dow.
The trial court's error necessitates the vacating of the judgment on the merits and a remand of the case to the trial court for a determination of the unresolved issue of whether the plaintiffs indeed reserved their rights against Dow when they settled with the manufacturing solidary obligors pursuant to La. C.C. art. 2203. It is, furthermore, ordered that the trial court issue an order that the settlement documents of the released solidary obligors at issue be placed into the court record. Resolution of the remaining issues on appeal is held in abeyance pending the out come of this court's remand. All costs associated with this appeal are assessed such that appellants and appellees shall each incur one-half of the costs.
AFFIRMED IN PART; VACATED AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.
WHIPPLE, J., concurs in part and dissents in part for reasons assigned.
DOWNING, J., concurs in part and dissents in part for the reasons assigned by WHIPPLE, J.
. Mr. Hebert died during the pendency of this appeal. Accordingly, by order dated October 29, 2001, this court granted the motion to substitute parties, substituting Marion D. Hebert, Alvin A. Hebert, Jr., Stanley Robert Hebert, Cindy Hebert Himel, Nancy Hebert Vil-lerette, Catherine Hebert Harelson and Blake J. Hebert, the surviving spouse and children of decedent, as plaintiffs in lieu of Mr. Hebert.
. In their original and amended petitions, plaintiffs named a total of thirty-eight defendants.
.Although Dow contends in its brief on appeal that it had no notice of the parties with whom plaintiffs had settled until the morning of trial, we note that Dow acknowledged at the beginning of the trial that it had received an amended list of settling defendants four days prior to the commencement of trial. (Thus, it is apparent Dow had received a list of settling defendants, albeit incomplete, even prior to that.) Accordingly, absent any showing of undue duress or restriction by the trial court, we find Dow was not relieved of the obligation to timely amend its pleadings to assert any affirmative defense it wished to raise regarding extinguishment of the debt on the basis of plaintiffs' settlements with a manufacturing defendant.
Additionally, we find no merit to Dow's assertion that it properly raised this affirmative defense in its answer simply by pleading that plaintiffs' injuries were caused by the sole fault of others or by averring that any award to plaintiffs should be reduced to the extent of any settlement or releases of any persons or entities. In sum, reduction by pro rata virile shares on the basis of settlement with a soli-dary coobligor is an entirely separate defense than extinguishment of the debt in favor of the alleged secondary or derivative obligor by virtue of settlement with the alleged primary obligor.
. Although Dow similarly did not amend to specifically plead extinguishment of the debt on this particular basis either, both sides presented argument at the beginning of trial on this issue with regard to a subpoena duces tecum served on plaintiffs. Accordingly, we shall address the merits of Dow's argument herein.
. Prior to 1979, and the amendment to La. C.C. art. 2324, the provisions of La. C.C. art. 2103 stated in pertinent part: "As between the solidary debtors, each is liable only for his virile portion of the obligation." (Emphasis added.) "Virile portion" was interpreted as "equal" portion. Efferson v. State, 463 So.2d 1342, 1352-1353. Negligence was not graded by degrees of fault. See Comparative Fault & Solidary Delictual Obligations: On Further Consideration, 60 Louisiana Law Review 513, 531.
. Acts 1984, No. 331, eff. January 1, 1985.
. Former La. C.C. art. 2203 provided:
The remission or conventional discharge in favor of one of the debtors in solido discharges all the others, unless the creditor has expressly reserved his right against the latter.
In the latter case, he cannot claim the debt without making a deduction of the part of him to whom he has made the remission.