Case Name: ABIGAIL DE PUY, Appellant, v. WILLIAM QUINN, Respondent
Court: New York Supreme Court, General Term
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1891-10
Citations: 68 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 237
Docket Number: 
Parties: ABIGAIL DE PUY, Appellant, v. WILLIAM QUINN, Respondent.
Judges: Dwight, P. J., concurred.
Reporter: Supreme Court Reports (Hun)
Volume: 68
Pages: 237–246

Head Matter:
ABIGAIL DE PUY, Appellant, v. WILLIAM QUINN, Respondent.
Juror — exclusion of, in a civil damage act case, because of a prejudice against the sale of liquor — what considered on appeal.
In an action, brought to recover damages under the civil damage act, a juror was challenged by the defendant, and upon being examined as to his competency said that he did not-think much of the business of selling liquor, and that he would go into the jury-box with a prejudice against it. He further testified that he had no prejudice against the defendant, and could give an impartial verdict irrespective of what he thought of the business itself.
Reid, that the juror was competent and his exclusion was error.
That the question of fact whether the juror is indifferent between the parties is one for the court; and it must be decided by the court, and an appeal lies from such decision.
That the court cannot arbitrarily excuse a competent juror.
That the fact that the juror had an opinion relative to the sale of liquor was not material.
That an appellate court, in deciding upon the propriety of a ruling as to the com, petency of a juror, cannot go outside the record, e. g., to consider the effect of the appearance of the juror, and his manner of testifying, unless some statement in reference thereto appears in the record. (Macomber, J., dissenting, on the ground that the challenge was not for principal cause, but to the favor and for actual bias, in deciding which the judgment of the trial court should not be disturbed.)
Appeal by tbe plaintiff Abigail De Puy from a judgment of the Supreme Court, entered in the office of the clerk of the county of Cayuga on the 28th day of October, 1890, after a trial at the Cayuga Circuit before the court and a jury, at which a verdict was rendered for the defendant; and also from an order, entered in said office on the 5th day of November, 1890, denying a motion for á new trial upon the minutes.
F. D. Wright, for the appellant.
Lyon ds Fierce, for the respondent.

Opinion:
Lewis, J. :
This action was brought under the civil damage act to recover damages against defendant for the loss of the means of support of the plaintiff caused by the death of her son while intoxicated, which intoxication the plaintiff alleged was caused in whole or in part by intoxicating liquors furnished him by defendant.
The only question which it is necessary to examine upon this .appeal is the one raised by the plaintiff's exceptions to the ruling of the trial court sustaining the defendant's challenges to the proposed jurors, George C. Graham and W. T. Tuller, who were members of the panel of jurors in attendance upon the court. Graham, when called, was challenged by defendant, and the following proceedings were had. He was sworn as to his competency as a juror, and was examined by defendant's counsel, and testified that he did not think much of the business of selling liquor; that he had a prejudice against it, and that were he to sit as a juror in the case he would go into the box with a prejudice against the business. He further testified that he had no prejudice against the defendant; that he could sit and hear the evidence and give an impartial verdict according to the evidence in the case, irrespective of what he thought of the business itself. The trial court allowed the challenge and excused the juror, and the plaintiff excepted. Like proceedings were had and testimony to the same purport was given when Tuller was called, and there was a like ruling by the court and an exception 'by the plaintiff. The parties exhausted tlieir peremptory challenges. A panel of jurors was secured, the trial proceeded and resulted iii a verdict for the defendant. The trial court was required to decide the question, "Tas the proposed juror indifferent between the parties?" That question, section 1180 of the Code provides, must be tried and determined by the court only. Either party may take an exception and the determination of the court is reviewed in the .same manner as when an issue of fact presented by the pleadings is tried by tile court, and the case is required to contain the matters necessary to present the facts upon which the determination excepted to was based.
In impanneling jurors a liberal discretion is vested in the trial court. Such discretion conduces to the'just and correct administration of law in the trial of causes by jury. Yet litigants are entitled to the benefit of the provisions of • law goveniing the impanneling of juries. Section 1166 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that the first twelve persons who appear as their names are drawn and called, and are approved as indifferent between tlie parties and not discharged or excused, must be sworn to constitute a jury to try the issue. The court cannot arbitrarily excuse a proposed juror who is, in all respects, competent to sit. If the facts presented failed to prove that Graham and Tuller were disqualified to sit as jurors in the case, it was error to exclude them. And it was so held in the case of Hildreth v. The City of Troy (101 N. Y., 234). The ground of challenge in that case was that the juror was incompetent because he was a resident and taxpayer in the city of Troy. The challenge was sustained.
The charter of the city provided that the facts mentioned did not disqualify a person as a juror in a case in which the city was defendant, and Justice Andrews, in his opinion, says: "Jurors differ in intelligence, judgment and fitness to act as jurors. It is, we think, the legal right of a party to have the jury selected from the competent names in the jury-box, and that the range of selection shall not be limited by excluding, without cause, competent jurors from the panel. The law prescribes the qualifications of jurors. The court cannot add to or detract from them. It cannot itself select the jury, directly or indirectly.. It cannot, in its discretion, or capriciously, set aside jurors as incompetent whom the law declares are competent, and thus limit the selection of the jury to jurors whose names may he left. If this is done a légal right is violated for which an appellate court will give redress." It was a question of law that was presented for the decision of the court in the ease of Hildreth v. The City of Troy. In the case at bar the court was required to decide the question of fact, "Was the proposed juror indifferent between the parties ? "
The question litigated in this case was, Did the defendant sell or furnish to the deceased, liquor, which wholly or in part caused his intoxication, etc. The propriety or morality of selling liquor was not in question any more than were the political or religious views of the defendant. The jurors stated they had no prejudice against the defendant; that it would not require any greater evidence in 'a case tried before them where one party was engaged in that business than if he were engaged in any other business; that they could sit and hear the evidence and give an impartial verdict according to the evidence in the case, irrespective of what they thought of the business of selling liquor. They were, so they testified, indifferent between the parties.
A very large proportion of persons who have arrived at their majority entertain opinions as to the propriety of selling liquor to be used as a beverage. The majority of them undoubtedly think it does not tend to elevate and improve mankind, and such opinion is not confined to the classes not engaged in the business. Substantially, every one has an opinion upon the subject. They either think it is or is not a beneficial calling.
If one who, like Graham, does not think much of the business, is adjudged incompetent to sit, a person entertaining an opposite opinion ought also to be held incompetent, and juries would have to be selected from those who had never given the subject sufficient reflection to have formed an opinion, if such could be found possessing the qualifications required by section 1126 of the Oode, a in the possession of his natural faculties, intelligent, of sound mind and good character and able to read and write the English language understandingly."
It does not seem to us that the fact that Graham and Tuller entertained a prejudice against the business of selling, liquor disqualified them to sit as jurors in the case, so long as they testified that they were indifferent between the parties, and could sit and hear the evidence and give an impartial verdict according to the evidence in the case, irrespective of what they thought of the business.
It is suggested that the court, having the juror before him, had a better opportunity to judge of the qualifications of the juror than the appellate court; that he saw the juror, his manner of testifying and his appearance generally. ¥e must, however, assume that no unfavorable impressions were thus obtained by the court, as the case fails to so state. There is the usual certificate in the case that it contains all the evidence and proceedings in the action.
• If their manner and appearance afforded to the trial justice evidence of their unfitness, that fact should have been stated in the case and would be decisive of the question before us. To go outside of the case and indulge in speculation as to what might have influenced the mind of the court would render nugatory the provisions of the Oode, providing for the review of the rulings of the trial court on such questions.
The respondent further suggests that the appellant had induced the trial justice to hold that a juror was disqualified if he was prejudiced against the civil damage act, and that he had thereby established a precedent, and should be held to be estopped from objecting to the enforcement of the rule against him. .
It may well be doubted if the questions were alike in principle. The jury when impanneled became an important part of the court, which was to be asked to enforce the law if it had been violated j and if a juror, who is opposed to capital punishment, is disqualified as a juror on the trial of a person charged with a crime where the punishment is death, it might, perhaps, be correctly held that a juror entertaining a prejudice against the act in question ought not to be allowed to sit in such a case, but we do not think the doctrine of estoppel can be held to apply to such a question.
We think there was an absence of any evidence tending to show that Graham and- Tuller were incompetent to sit as jurors in the case, and that it was error to exclude them, for which the judgment should be reversed.
The judgment and order denying a new trial should be reversed and a new trial granted, with costs to abide the event.
Dwight, P. J., concurred.