Case Name: People of State of Illinois, Defendant in Error, v. Michael A. Gerrard, Plaintiff in Error
Court: Illinois Appellate Court
Jurisdiction: Illinois
Decision Date: 1957-11-06
Citations: 15 Ill. App. 2d 301
Docket Number: Gen. No. 47,167
Parties: People of State of Illinois, Defendant in Error, v. Michael A. Gerrard, Plaintiff in Error.
Judges: FRIEND, J., concurs.
Reporter: Illinois Appellate Court Reports, Second Series
Volume: 15
Pages: 301–311

Head Matter:
People of State of Illinois, Defendant in Error, v. Michael A. Gerrard, Plaintiff in Error.
Gen. No. 47,167.
First District, Third Division.
November 6, 1957.
Released for publication December 18, 1957.
Albert E. Jenner, Jr., Kenneth J. Burns, Jr., Prentice H. Marshall, of Chicago (Thompson, Raymond, Mayer, Jenner & Bloomstein, of counsel) for respondent-plaintiff in error.
Benjamin S. Adamowski, State’s Attorney of Cook county (L. Louis Karton, and Robert W. Scherman, Assistant State’s Attorneys, of counsel) for defendant in error.

Opinion:
PRESIDING JUSTICE BURKE
delivered the opinion of the court.
The trial in December, 1955, of the case of Narro v. Chicago Transit Authority, an action for personal injuries because of alleged negligence in the operation of a bus, resulted in a verdict in favor of the plaintiff for $5,000. Mr. Fred Lane was the trial lawyer for the plaintiff and Mr. Michael A. Gerrard for the defendant. The defendant filed a motion for a new trial containing 22 points. The argument on the motion was concluded before the trial judge on February 20, 1956. In the argument Mr. Gerrard contended that the questioning by and actions of Mr. Lane during cross-examination of defendant's witness Horstman were prejudicial to the defendant in that he (Lane) used the words "police report" in reference to exhibit No. 11 for identification, interrogated the witness about the exhibit and used the word "police" at the time he framed the question. Mr. Gerrard also contended that the exhibit was handled by Mr. Lane so that the jury knew that the document was a police report. Mr. Lane in his argument before the court, in opposition to the allowance of the motion for a new trial, denied that he had used the words "police report" in his examination of the witness or that he had displayed it before the jury so as to give the impression that the document was a police report. During the argument the court stated that his recollection of the incident coincided with the version given by Mr. Lane and was contradictory to the version of Mr. Gerrard. Upon the conclusion of the argument the court requested that the portion of the cross-examination of the witness in dispute be transcribed as taken by the court reporter and presented to the court so that the court could read what the reporter had to say about it and Mr. Gerrard agreed to procure a transcript of the testimony as requested.
On the afternoon of the day the argument was completed Mr. Gerrard instructed his secretary to order the transcript from the Sullivan Court Beporting Agency. His secretary did so. Mrs. Shirley Ann Cook reported the case for the agency. At the request of the agency she transcribed her notes and delivered the transcript, consisting of 11 pages, to the agency. At that time she was not in the employ of the agency. On February 29,1956, the agency delivered a transcript of 11 pages to Mr. Gerrard's office. When Mr. Gerrard examined the transcript at about 9:15 A.M. on February 29, 1956, he found that it contained what he believed were inaccuracies. His secretary called the agency on the telephone and Mr. Gerrard gave to a man at that office his (Gerrard's) version of the actions and words in the cross-examination of Horstman by Mr. Lane. Mr. Gerrard testified that the man said he would have the transcript picked up and checked. The transcript was picked up on that day. On arrival at his office the following day (March 1, 1956) Mr. Gerrard's secretary laid the transcript on his desk. It had been returned by the agency that morning. As he was on his way to the courthouse he took the transcript with him. He checked page 7, which was the page on which Mr. Lane's question and the objection thereto appeared and noticed that the page had been corrected to conform with his (Gerrard's) recollection. On that morning, March 1, 1956, he gave the transcript to the trial judge.
The judge gave the transcript to Mr. Lane for examination. Shortly thereafter Mr. Lane protested to the judge that the transcript was not accurate in its report of the cross-examination of Horstman on page 7. The judge told Mr. Lane he could proceed in any manner that he thought he should. The court had the motion for a new trial under advisement. On April 6, 1956, the opposing lawyers appeared separately in the court room of the trial judge in eases not related to the Narro case. The court indicated to the respective lawyers that he had waited "a long time" and that he was not disposed to "wait much longer." The respective lawyers filed briefs in support of their contentions on the motion for a new trial. The court granted the motion for a new trial on April 18, 1956, and an order to that effect was entered the following day. Thereupon Mr. Lane filed a petition to vacate the order granting a new trial. In the petition Mr. Lane stated his belief that Mr. Gerrard wilfully and fraudulently falsified and changed page 7 of the transcript by replacing the page presented to him with another page. Following the hearing on the motion to vacate the petition allowing the new trial, the court entered a rule against Mr. Gerrard charging him with criminal contempt in that as counsel for the defendant, Chicago Transit Authority, he hindered the due administration of justice in Narro v. Chicago Transit Authority in three particulars. Respondent filed a verified answer and denied the substance of the three charges. At the suggestion of an Assistant State's Attorney that the court give "his version of those things which are within his own knowledge," the trial judge stated that he would "outline the history of the case as he knows it and those events that occurred and are within the court's own knowledge" and made such a statement. Witnesses and exhibits were introduced on behalf of the People and the respondent. The court adjudged the defendant guilty of contempt of court and fined him $750. The respondent prosecutes a writ of error to reverse the judgment.
The People maintain that the respondent's offense is a direct criminal contempt. In direct criminal contempt cases the order must recite facts showing that a direct contempt of court has occurred, and the recitation of facts which purport to establish the offense must be of events either personally or constructively known to the court or admitted by the contemnor in open court. The contempt having been committed in the presence of the court, evidence is unnecessary and no record is made. All the essential facts must be fully set forth and facts which did not occur in the presence of the court should not be taken into consideration by the court in adjudging guilt. People v. Loughran, 2 Ill.2d 258, 263. The findings in the judgment order contain statements of fact which were not within the trial judge's personal or constructive knowledge and which were controverted by the respondent's testimony. The procedure followed by the People, the respondent and the trial judge was that of indirect criminal contempt. We think that the respondent was charged with indirect criminal contempt.
The respondent urges that the People were required to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The People assert that in a case of direct criminal contempt it is not necessary to prove the respondent guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. We have held that the respondent was charged and tried for indirect criminal contempt. All of the elements were not known to the court. One of the essential elements of which the trial judge could not have personal or constructive knowledge and which was expressly asserted by respondent in his verified answer and testimony concerns the circumstances supporting respondent's understanding that the transcript accurately reflected the court reporter's notes. In our opinion it was incumbent upon the People to prove the respondent guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Spain, 307 Ill. 283, 292; Hollister v. People, 116 Ill. App. 338, 341. The People cite the cases of People v. Kowalski, 307 Ill. 378 and Flannery v. People, 225 Ill. 62, for the proposition that it is not necessary to prove the accused guilty beyond a reasonable doubt in a contempt case. These were civil contempt cases. Other authorities cited by the People are cases where the alleged contempt was a direct criminal contempt wherein the elements therein occurred within view and hearing of the court and were personally known to the court so that the taking of testimony was unnecessary and issues • of fact were not involved. See People v. Andalman, 346 Ill. 149; People v. Parker, 328 Ill. App. 46. The doctrine of purgation by oath is not an issue in this case. See People v. Gholson, 412 Ill. 294.
The transcript which the trial judge requested was first received by the respondent from the agency on February 29, 1956. Upon receiving it from the agency on the morning of the next day in what respondent believed to be substantially accurate form, he presented it to the court. Page 7 of the transcript was revised by the agency. The evidence shows that at the time the transcript was delivered to the judge the respondent had no reason to believe that it reflected other than the reporter's notes. The testimony of the court reporter and the proprietor of the agency does not tend to controvert the evidence introduced by respondent that the transcript was delivered by him to the judge on the morning of March 1, 1956, after the agency had revised and returned the transcript to him, and that thereafter it was in the possession of the judge or Mr. Lane. The motion for a new trial was considered by the trial judge in all its ramifications. During the oral argument it was stated without contradiction that on July 16, 1956, the trial judge denied the plaintiff's petition to vacate the order granting a new trial.
Because the People failed to prove the defendant guilty of criminal contempt the judgment of the Circuit Court of Cook county is reversed.
Judgment reversed.
FRIEND, J., concurs.