Case Name: CYNTHIA J. KUDER, Plaintiff v. THOMAS E. SCHROEDER, Defendant
Court: North Carolina Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: North Carolina
Decision Date: 1993-06-01
Citations: 110 N.C. App. 355
Docket Number: No. 9220DC425
Parties: CYNTHIA J. KUDER, Plaintiff v. THOMAS E. SCHROEDER, Defendant
Judges: Judge GREENE dissents in a separate opinion.
Reporter: North Carolina Court of Appeals Reports
Volume: 110
Pages: 355–365

Head Matter:
CYNTHIA J. KUDER, Plaintiff v. THOMAS E. SCHROEDER, Defendant
No. 9220DC425
(Filed 1 June 1993)
Husband and Wife § 3 (NCI4th)— repayment for wife’s support through law school — oral agreement unenforceable
Plaintiff wife was not entitled to recover for breach of an oral agreement allegedly entered into by the parties after their marriage that plaintiff would forego her career as a veterinarian and work as a teacher in a community college to provide total financial support for their family while defendant husband obtained an undergraduate degree, worked on a master’s degree, and obtained a law degree, and that defendant husband would thereafter provide the family’s total support so that plaintiff could devote her full time to being a wife and mother, since each spouse has a personal duty arising from the marital relationship to support the other, and this duty of support may not be abrogated or modified by the agreement of the parties to a marriage.
Am Jur 2d, Husband and Wife §§ 8, 329-338.
Judge WYNN concurring.
Judge GREENE dissenting.
Appeal by plaintiff from order filed 30 January 1992 in Moore County District Court by Judge Michael E. Beale. Heard in the Court of Appeals 1 April 1993.
Plaintiff brought this action seeking a divorce from bed and board, child support, and alimony. Additionally, plaintiff asserted claims for breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and punitive damages related to the breach of contract claim. Defendant answered in apt time and moved to dismiss.
In an order dated 27 February 1991, the trial court dismissed plaintiff’s alimony claim on the grounds that she had not alleged that she was a dependent spouse. Plaintiff has not appealed from that order. In a subsequent order entered 22 January 1992, the trial court dismissed plaintiff’s claims for breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and punitive damages on the grounds that plaintiff had failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. It is from that order that plaintiff has appealed.
Evans and Riffle Law Offices, by John B. Evans, for plaintiff-appellant.
Brown & Robbins, by G. Les Burke and Carol M. White, for defendant-appellee.

Opinion:
WELLS, Judge.
A motion to dismiss pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 12(b)(6) tests the sufficiency of a complaint to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See Stanback v. Stanback, 297 N.C. 181, 254 S.E.2d 611 (1979). While the allegations in the complaint must be taken as true, the complaint must nevertheless be sufficient to satisfy the elements of some cognizable claim. Id. See also Harris v. Duke Power Co., 83 N.C. App. 195, 349 S.E.2d 394 (1986), aff'd, 319 N.C. 627, 356 S.E.2d 357 (1987).
Plaintiff's claims at issue in this appeal are based upon the following essential allegations:
Plaintiff and defendant were married in March of 1978. One child was born to their marriage in June of 1984. After plaintiff and defendant were married, they entered into an oral agreement that plaintiff would forego her career as a veterinarian and would work as a teacher in a local community college to support their family in order that defendant might pursue his undergraduate education at the University of North Carolina in Chapel Hill. Defendant agreed that upon the completion of his undergraduate studies, he would provide the family's total support, so that plaintiff could then give up her employment and devote her full time to being a wife and mother. Pursuant to this agreement, plaintiff did work and provide the sole support for their family. Plaintiff and defendant subsequently amended or extended their agreement to allow defendant to obtain a master's degree and a law degree. Following his graduation from law school, defendant was unable to earn sufficient income to fully support the family, but in December of 1989, defendant obtained a position with a law firm which provided him with sufficient income to fully support the family. Three months later, in April of 1990, defendant told plaintiff he no longer loved her and that there was no hope for their marriage; whereupon, the parties separated.
Plaintiff contends that the oral agreement asserted by her in her complaint is a valid and binding contract, entitling her to damages for its breach. Taking plaintiff's allegations as true, we are sympathetic to her apparent dilemma, and certainly would not condone defendant's apparent knavish ingratitude, but we do not find support in the law of this State for such a claim and therefore hold that the trial court correctly dismissed plaintiff's claims.
Under the law of this State, there is a personal duty of each spouse to support the other, a duty arising from the marital relationship, and carrying with it the corollary right to support from the other spouse. See N.C. Baptist Hospitals v. Harris, 319 N.C. 347, 354 S.E.2d 471 (1987). So long as the coveture endures, this duty of support may not be abrogated or modified by the agreement of the parties to a marriage. See Ritchie v. White, 225 N.C. 450, 35 S.E.2d 414 (1945). See also generally Lee, N.C. Family Law, § 16Á and 183 (4th ed. 1980)
Plaintiff's reliance on our decision in Suggs v. Norris, 88 N.C. App. 539, 364 S.E.2d 159, cert. denied, 322 N.C. 486, 370 S.E.2d 236 (1988) is misplaced. In that case, we sanctioned a claim for remuneration for services performed in a business (farming) enterprise by a person who was cohabiting with, but not married to, a deceased cohabitor. The facts and ruling in that case are in no sense relevant to the facts and issues presented in the case now before us.
For the reasons stated, the trial court's order must be and is
Affirmed.
Judge GREENE dissents in a separate opinion.
Judge WYNN concurs in a separate opinion.