Case Name: MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES v. Douglas HELTON
Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Mississippi
Decision Date: 1999-08-19
Citations: 741 So. 2d 240
Docket Number: No. 97-CA-01064-SCT
Parties: MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES v. Douglas HELTON.
Judges: PRATHER, C.J., PITTMAN, P.J., SMITH, MILLS AND COBB, JJ., CONCUR. McRAE, J., DISSENTS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION JOINED BY SULLIVAN, P.J., AND BANKS, J.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 741
Pages: 240–246

Head Matter:
MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES v. Douglas HELTON.
No. 97-CA-01064-SCT.
Supreme Court of Mississippi.
Aug. 19, 1999.
Deborah Kennedy, Mize, Attorney for Appellant.
Helen J. McDade, De Kalb, Attorney for Appellee.

Opinion:
WALLER, Justice,
for the Court:
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
¶ 1. The Mississippi Department of Human Services filed a paternity action against Douglas Helton on behalf of Robin Blay and the State of Florida. The petition alleged that Helton was the father of Blay's son Austin. Helton filed a motion to dismiss for lack of prosecution. The chancellor granted that motion and dismissed the petition with prejudice. The Department of Human Services has appealed.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶ 2. Austin Blay [hereinafter "Austin"] was born on September 26, 1992, in Clear-water, Florida. His mother Robin Blay ["Robin"] alleged that her son's father was Douglas Helton ["Helton"]. She claimed that she and Helton had a sexual relationship in Mississippi in December of 1991. The Mississippi Department of Human Services ["DHS"] filed the present action in the Chancery Court of Leake County on behalf of Robin under the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act ["URE-SA"]. Miss.Code Ann § 93-11-21. Robin sought an order establishing paternity and child support from Helton. Helton filed an answer denying that he was the child's father.
¶ 3. A prior chancellor ordered that blood tests be performed on the parties. The blood tests were conducted by Gen-escreen, a DNA laboratory in Dallas, Texas. Robert C. Giles, Ph.D., the laboratory director at Genescreen, submitted an affidavit which stated that Helton had been determined to be Austin's father by a probability of 99.97%.
¶4. This matter was filed on June 14, 1993. For reasons which are not revealed in the record, the court granted continuances on eleven occasions. The case was eventually set for trial on May 25, 1995. On that day Helton filed a motion to dismiss for lack of prosecution in which he cited the numerous continuances and the length of time that had passed since the matter had been filed. In the hearing on that motion, the chancellor learned that Helton had not been given the results of the blood test as is required by Miss.Code Ann. § 93-9-23(2). After a discussion on the motion to dismiss, but before reaching the merits of the case, the chancellor granted the motion to dismiss. The DHS filed a motion to set aside the judgment on March 10, 1997. The chancellor denied motion as untimely. The DHS appealed, claiming that the chancellor erroneously denied its motion to set aside the judgment.
ANALYSIS
¶ 5. The chancellor dismissed this matter on May 25, 1995. The DHS filed its motion to set aside the final judgment on March 10, 1997, a year and nine months after the judgment. Miss. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6) allows a trial court to set aside a final judgment for "any . reason justifying relief from the judgment." However, the motion must be made "within a reasonable time." Helton claims that the year and nine month period between the final judgment and the motion was not within a reasonable time.
¶ 6. Relief under Rule 60(b)(6) is available only in extraordinary and compelling circumstances. Briney v. U.S. Fidelity & Guar. Co., 714 So.2d 962, 966 (Miss.1998). However, the Rule is a "grand reservoir of equitable power to do justice in a particular case." Burkett v. Burkett, 537 So.2d 443, 445 (Miss.1989) (quoting Bryant, Inc. v. Walters, 493 So.2d 933 (Miss.1986)).
¶ 7. In Briney, this Court discussed the reasonableness of a motion filed three years after the judgment became final. The Court cited the following analysis from Wright and Miller's FedeRal Practice AND Procedure:
'What constitutes reasonable time must of necessity depend upon the facts in each individual case." [Footnote omitted.] The courts consider whether the party opposing the motion has been prejudiced by the delay in seeking relief [footnote omitted] and they consider whether the moving party had some good reason for his failure to take appropriate action sooner. [Footnote omitted.]
11 Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, FedeRal Practice & Procedure § 2866 (1995), quoted in Briney at 967. The facts in the matter at hand show that the DHS waited for a year and nine months to file the Rule 60(b)(6) motion. The only reasons offered for the delay were that there had been personnel changes in the Leake County DHS office and that the original attorney handling this matter for the DHS had left the Department and a new attorney unfamiliar with the case had replaced her. Ordinarily, those reasons would be completely insufficient to justify a delay of this length. But this particular case is exceptional because of the interests of the child in this matter and because Helton has not suffered any prejudice from the delay.
¶ 8. Protecting the best interests of a child is the paramount concern in actions to which a child is a party. Lauderdale County Dept. of Human Services v. T.H.G. and L.D.G., 614 So.2d 377, 383 (Miss.1992). It is "the goal of utmost import in any judicial proceeding." Dept. of Human Services v. Jones, 627 Sd.2d 810, 811 (Miss.1993).
¶ 9. In Dept. of Human Services v. Jones, 627 So.2d at 810, this Court considered the failure of the DHS to file timely motions for blood testing. The Court discussed the "inflexible public policy" of protecting a child's best interests, id. at 811, and held that "protection of the children's best interests as expressed in this state's policy statutes must override any concern over timeliness." Id. at 812.
¶ 10. We hold that under the very limited circumstances presently before the Court, it was an abuse of discretion for the chancellor to deny the motion to set aside the judgment as untimely. The best interests of the child involved required that this matter be heard.
¶ 11. The chancellor's decision to dismiss was based on the DHS's failure to prosecute. The order dismissing this matter mentions only the repeated continuances and the failure of the DHS to deliver a copy of the blood test results to Helton. Helton claims that there had been a decision on the merits. The record reveals otherwise. After initially stating his inten tion to deny the motion and proceed to the merits, the chancellor heard further argument and apparently changed his mind. The chancellor stated "based on the delay . I think that this man has been mistreated." The judge concluded that "I think your rights have been violated in this case and I think, procedurally, you [Hel-ton] are entitled to a dismissal." (Emphasis added.) The order, signed the same day, mentions only the numerous continuances and the failure of the DHS to serve a copy of the blood test results on Helton. The chancellor did not find that the DHS had failed to meet its burden of proof. No witnesses were called and no evidence was presented. The parties did discuss the blood test during the motion hearing, but only in the context of the failure of the DHS to serve Helton with a copy of that report. Additionally, the only motion before the court was Helton's motion to dismiss for the delays resulting from the continuances, which was filed before the hearing. It is clear that the judge's decision was procedural in nature and that there was no decision on the merits.
¶ 12. The dismissal for lack of prosecution was based on Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b). This Court recently discussed the requirements for dismissal under Rule 41(b) in American Tel. and Tel. Co. v. Days Inn, 720 So.2d 178 (Miss.1998). Those requirements are a finding of contemptuous or contumacious conduct on the part of the plaintiff and a finding that lesser sanctions would not remedy the situation. Id. at 181. Additionally, the court should consider the following aggravating factors: "the extent to which the plaintiff, as distinguished from his counsel, was personally responsible for the delay, the degree of actual prejudice to the defendant, and whether the delay was the result of intentional conduct." Id. (citing Rogers v. Kroger Co., 669 F.2d 317, 320 (5th Cir. 1982)). Under these standards, dismissal clearly was not warranted.
¶ 13. There is no indication that the conduct of the DHS attorneys was anything other than neglectful. There is nothing contemptuous or contumacious about requesting continuances. Helton never objected to the continuance requests and the chancellor granted each continuance. The judge could have denied any of the motions for continuance and proceeded to trial. Or the chancellor, could have attempted lesser sanctions. Sanctions or the threat of sanctions probably would have had a great effect toward advancing this matter on the docket. Thus, neither of the two requirements has been shown.
¶ 14. Finally, the aggravating factors are absent. Two-year-old Austin Blay clearly was not responsible for the delays. The conduct of the DHS attorneys is not attributable to him, and he should not have to pay for their neglect. Other than a delayed decision on his paternity of Austin, Helton cannot show that he has suffered actual prejudice in this matter. This Court has held that a "mere delay in asserting the right to determine parentage" is not sufficient to deprive the child of his day in court. Miss. Dept. of Human Services v. Molden, 644 So.2d 1230, 1233 (Miss.1994). Yet no evidence of any prejudice whatsoever was presented. In Mol-den, a delay of twelve years was not so prejudicial as to require dismissal. Hel-ton's right to an adjudication was delayed for less than two years. The only real prejudice in this matter has been to the child. Finally, there has been no showing that the delay was intentional rather than negligent. The aggravating factors simply are not present.
¶ 15. I do not condone the performance of the DHS attorneys in this matter. The interests of Austin Blay were not diligently represented. The DHS sought continuances on eleven occasions. It took the DHS almost a year to get the blood test results, and the DHS apparently never saw that Helton received a copy of those results. Sanctions might be appropriate. But the neglectful conduct of the DHS attorneys does not justify the harsh result reached by the chancellor. Dismissal with prejudice is an extreme measure. "[Dismissal of a litigant's suit is the toughest sanction that can be imposed upon him." Harris v. Fort Worth Steel and Machinery, Co., 440 So.2d 294, 296 (Miss.1983). This Court has consistently held that "the law favors trial of issues on the merits, and dismissals for want of prosecution are therefore employed reluctantly." Watson v. Lillard, 493 So.2d 1277, 1278 (Miss.1986). Helton failed to show that he was entitled to a dismissal under Rule 41(b). The chancellor erroneously dismissed this case, and that decision is reversed.
¶ 16. Additionally, as discussed above, the chancellor completely failed to take into account the best interests of the child which is the "goal of utmost import" in paternity and child support actions. Dept. of Human Services v. Jones, 627 So.2d at 811. The best interest of Austin Blay in this matter was to have his paternity determined. That interest takes priority over Helton's right to a prompt adjudication of this matter. Because the preeminent concern in matters like this is the best interest of the child, the dismissal of the paternity action is reversed.
CONCLUSION
¶ 17. The chancellor erred when he dismissed the paternity petition for lack of prosecution. There was.no showing that the petitioners' conduct was contumacious or that lesser sanctions would not have been sufficient. Additionally, the chancellor failed to consider the best interests of the child, which were to have his paternity determined and to begin receiving child support. Finally, the taxpayers should not have to carry the child-support debts of a man whose paternity has been determined by a 99.97% probability. Accordingly, this cause is reversed and the matter is remanded to the Chancery Court of Leake County.
¶ 18. REVERSED AND REMANDED.
PRATHER, C.J., PITTMAN, P.J., SMITH, MILLS AND COBB, JJ., CONCUR. McRAE, J., DISSENTS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION JOINED BY SULLIVAN, P.J., AND BANKS, J.