Case Name: ANDREWS v. RENTZ
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia
Jurisdiction: Georgia
Decision Date: 1996-05-28
Citations: 266 Ga. 782
Docket Number: S96A0569, S96A0571
Parties: ANDREWS v. RENTZ (two cases).
Judges: All the Justices concur, except Sears and Carley, JJ., who dissent; Hines, J., not participating.
Reporter: Georgia Reports
Volume: 266
Pages: 782–787

Head Matter:
S96A0569, S96A0571.
ANDREWS v. RENTZ (two cases).
(470 SE2d 669)

Opinion:
Benham, Chief Justice.
This direct appeal involves a will contest. William J. Bignon, Jr. died testate in 1993 at the age of 83. His estate consisted of approximately $150,000 on deposit and two residences valued in excess of $100,000. His first will, executed in 1988, apparently left the bulk of his estate to his granddaughter and $200 to his daughter, Patricia Ann Bignon Andrews. His latter will, executed in 1991, left his granddaughter nothing, left Andrews with $200, and left Mary W. Rentz, a friend of Bignon who had taken care of him since his wife died, with the bulk of his estate in addition to appointing her as executrix. Rentz filed the will for probate, and Andrews filed a caveat on grounds of undue influence and lack of testamentary capacity. The probate court ruled in favor of probate, and Andrews appealed to the superior court.
Through the testimony of several witnesses, the evidence presented to the superior court indicated that Rentz was a close personal friend of Bignon's, was paid $500 per month to help him, and did help him with his financial affairs and personal needs. Rentz ad mitted that she had a confidential relationship with Bignon, but did not discuss the disposition of his estate with him. There was evidence presented regarding Bignon's mental state during the years preceding and following the execution of the 1991 will which indicated that although he was depressed about his wife's recent death, his faculties were normal and he was not disoriented. The trial court directed a verdict in favor of Rentz and subsequently denied Andrews's motion for new trial.
1. We must first address the issue of jurisdiction. Andrews filed a notice of appeal on June 2, 1995, from the judgment directing a verdict in favor of Rentz which was entered on May 26, 1995. That appeal was docketed in this Court as Case No. S96A0569. On August 23, 1995, Andrews filed a motion for new trial in the trial court which was denied on August 26,1995. She appealed the court's denial of her motion on August 31, 1995, which was docketed in this Court as Case No. S96A0571. Because Andrews did not file a timely motion for new trial under OCGA § 5-5-40, and her notice of appeal from the judgment had divested the trial court of jurisdiction, Andrews's appeal from the trial court's denial of the motion for new trial must be dismissed. See Housing Auth. of City of Atlanta v. Geter, 252 Ga. 196, 197 (312 SE2d 309) (1984).
2. Andrews contends that the trial court erred in granting Rentz's motion for directed verdict because sufficient circumstantial evidence regarding lack of testamentary capacity and undue influence was presented to go to the jury. We disagree. A directed verdict is authorized when "there is no conflict in the evidence as to any material issue and the evidence introduced, with all reasonable deductions therefrom, shall demand a particular verdict." Scoggins v. Strickland, 265 Ga. 417 (2) (456 SE2d 208) (1995). To support her claim of lack of testamentary capacity, Andrews presented, inter alia, a physician's testimony that Bignon had a moderate degree of brain atrophy in 1979 which caused forgetfulness, but the physician further testified that such atrophy was not unusual in a person of Bignon's age, and that Bignon was otherwise oriented and able to comprehend and understand. This evidence falls short of showing a lack of testamentary capacity, and certainly fails to show such at the time that Bignon executed the will in 1991. See Browning v. Holbrook, 247 Ga. 525 (276 SE2d 635) (1981) (testamentary capacity is determined by the condition of the mind at the time of execution of the will). Therefore, the trial court correctly granted a directed verdict on this issue.
3. " 'Undue influence which operates to invalidate a will is such influence as amounts either to deception or to force and coercion, destroying free agency.' [Cit.]" Sims v. Sims, 265 Ga. 55 (452 SE2d 761) (1995). A presumption of undue influence arises when it is shown that the will was made at the request of a person who receives a substan tial benefit, who is not a natural object of the maker's estate, and who held a confidential relationship with the testator. Bryan v. Norton, 245 Ga. 347, 348 (265 SE2d 282) (1980). However,
"[a] person standing in confidential relation to another is not prohibited from exercising any influence whatever to obtain a benefit to himself. The influence must be what the law regards as undue influence. Such influence that. . . would give dominion over the will to such an extent as to destroy free agency, or constrain one to do against his will what he is unable to refuse."
Ehlers v. Rheinberger, 204 Ga. 226, 230-231 (49 SE2d 535) (1948). The evidence presented at trial indicated that Rentz had a confidential relationship with Bignon and was present during the execution of the 1991 will. However, no evidence indicated that Rentz had any discussions with Bignon regarding the disposition of his estate, participated in the testamentary planning, or requested or coerced Bignon to make such disposition, or that Bignon felt coerced to make the disposition that he did. Further, no evidence was presented to indicate that Bignon did not make the disposition freely and voluntarily or that his free agency to dispose of his estate as he wished was destroyed. In fact, Bignon, in his contested 1991 will, left Andrews the same amount that he did in his 1988 will — $200. This consistency and the lack of any evidence indicating that Rentz unduly influenced Bignon to change his will supports the trial court's granting of a directed verdict on this issue.
4. Because we concluded that the trial court correctly directed a verdict in favor of Rentz, it is unnecessary to consider Andrews's remaining claim that the trial court erred in expressing its opinion to the jury regarding matters of fact.
Judgment affirmed in Case No. S96A0569; appeal dismissed in Case No. S96A0571.
All the Justices concur, except Sears and Carley, JJ., who dissent; Hines, J., not participating.
Initially, Andrews had also contested the will on the ground of monomania. At trial, Andrews withdrew this claim.