Case Name: Tipton vs. The State
Court: Tennessee Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Tennessee
Decision Date: 1831-07
Citations: 2 Yer. 542
Docket Number: 
Parties: Tipton vs. The State.
Judges: 
Reporter: Tennessee Reports
Volume: 10
Pages: 542–544

Head Matter:
Tipton vs. The State.
■^'n indictment for open and notorious drunkenness, need not charge that the defendant was a common drunkard, and a nuisance to society. An averment, that he was openly and notoriously drunk upon the day stated in the indictment, and on divers other days before that time, is sufficient.
, It is not a sufficient reason to arrest the judgment, that the of-fence is not charged in the indictment to have been committed with force and arms.
The indictment in this case charged, “that Reuben Tipton, on the second day of August, in the year of our Lord eighteen hundred and thirty, at Maryville, in the county of Blount aforesaid, and on divers other days before that time, was openly and notoriously drunk, to the disturbance of the public peace, to the great injury of the public morals of the good citizens of the State, and to the evil example of all others, &c. and against the peace and dignity of the State.”
The jury found the defendant guilty in manner and form as charged in the bill of indictment; upon which the following reasons in arrest of judgment were filed. First, because the indictment does not charge the oflence to have been committed with force and arms. Second, because the indictment does not charge that the defendant was a common drunkard, and a nuisance to society.
The court held these reasons insufficient to arrest the judgment, and rendered judgment for a fine of five dollars and the costs, against the defendant, from which judgment he prosecuted an appeal in the nature of a writ of error to this court.
Hair, for the plaintiff in error.
J. R. JYelson, Attorney General, for the State.

Opinion:
Opinion of the court delivered by
Judge Whyte.
As to^the first reason assigned why the judgment should be arrested, the statute 37 Hen. 8, ch. 8, cited 3 Bac. Ab. 564, (Wilson's ed.) is a sufficient answer to it: there it is laid down, however material the words vi et armis might have been by the common law, the -above statute says they shall not of necessity be put in any indictment, nor shall the parties indicted have any advantage by writ of error, for the want of them or the like words, but the said indictment lacking said words, shall be adjudged effectual to all intents and purposes, as if these words had been in them. And Sergeant Hawkins says, "such objections have been often overruled, and it is not easy to show how they could prevail since the said statute."
As to the second reason in arrest of judgment, that the indictment does not charge the defendant was a common drunkard, and a nuisance to society, it cannot prevail. The assignment of this error is in effect substantially the same with the charge in the indictment, for the indictment does not charge a single act of drunkenness alone, but repeated acts of the like kind. It charges, "that he the said Reuben Tipton, on the second day of Aug. 1830, and on divers other days before that time, was openly and notoriously drunk.". This shows that the offence was a common thing with the defendant. | But it is argued, that a man may be drunk as often as he pleases in his own house, which is only a private injury to himself, and in which the public is not concerned. Suppose this reasoning were admissible, the indictment negatives its application in the present case, for the charge is, that the defendant was drunk, openly and notoriously, to the disturbance of the public peace, and to the great injury of the public morals of the good citizens of the State. Can it be said this conduct is not an injury to the public, and an evil example? The contrary but too often appears, and that too either accompanied with, or followed by fatal consequences.
The pernicious influence of an evil example is plain to every reflecting mind, and the powerful influence of this vice upon society, not only in its effect on the relations of private life, but also as being the origin, the fomenter, and the promoter of the greater portion of the public crime of the country, proves it tobe, what it is, an indict-
r able offence. The judgment of the circuit court was correct, and must be affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.