Case Name: Charles Ray HIGH, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee
Court: Texas Courts of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1999-07-01
Citations: 998 S.W.2d 642
Docket Number: No. 01-95-00713-CR
Parties: Charles Ray HIGH, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.
Judges: Panel consists of Justices COHEN, O’CONNOR, and TAFT.
Reporter: South Western Reporter Second Series
Volume: 998
Pages: 642–650

Head Matter:
Charles Ray HIGH, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.
No. 01-95-00713-CR.
Court of Appeals of Texas, Houston (1st Dist.).
July 1, 1999.
Kirk J. Oncken, Houston, for Appellant.
John B. Holmes, Dist. Atty. Carol M. Cameron, Asst. Dist. Atty., Houston, for State.
Panel consists of Justices COHEN, O’CONNOR, and TAFT.

Opinion:
OPINION ON REMAND FROM THE TEXAS COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
MICHOL O'CONNOR, Justice.
On May 6, 1999, this Court reversed the trial court's judgment. On June 6, 1999, the State filed a petition for discretionary review with the Court of Criminal Appeals. Under the authority of Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 50, we reconsider our majority, concurring, and dissenting opinions; we withdraw our majority, concurring, and dissenting opinions; and we issue these opinions in their stead.
Background
Charles Ray High, the appellant, pleaded guilty before a jury to aggravated robbery, and the judge assessed punishment of 60 years. In the original appeal, we reversed the conviction because the judge did not admonish the appellant about the range of punishment pursuant to Code of Criminal Procedure Article 26.13(a)(1). High v. State, 962 S.W.2d 53 (TexApp.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1997), rev'd, 964 S.W.2d 637, 638 (Tex.Crim.App.1998). We held that, under Ex parte McAtee, 599 S.W.2d 335 (Tex.Crim.App.1980), a complete failure to admonish a defendant on the range of punishment for an offense does not constitute substantial compliance under Article 26.13(c) and, therefore, is fundamental, reversible error without regard to whether the defendant was harmed. High, 962 S.W.2d at 56.
The State filed a petition for discretionary review, arguing we erred by reversing the conviction without conducting a harm analysis. The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed and remanded to this Court for a harm analysis under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 44.2. High, 964 S.W.2d at 638. The Court of Criminal Appeals held that, even when the admonishment is not in "substantial compliance" with Article 26.13, the error is still subject to a harm analysis under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 44.2. High, 964 S.W.2d at 638. However, the Court did not indicate whether the harm analysis should be conducted under subsection (a) or subsection (b) of Rule 44.2. On remand, this Court, relying in part on Aguirre-Mata v. State, 962 S.W.2d 264 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1998), held that the trial court's error was a "constitutional error" subject to review under Texas Rule of Appellate Pro cedure 44.2(a). We reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded the cause.
On May 26, 1999, the Court of Criminal Appeals reversed this Court's holding in Aguirre-Mata and held that the failure to admonish a defendant about the possible range of punishment was error subject to a harm analysis under Rule 44.2(b). See Aguirre-Mata v. State, 992 S.W.2d 495 (Tex.Crim.App.1999). Under Rule 44.2(b), we must disregard the error and affirm if the error did not affect the appellant's substantial rights. See Tex. R.App. P. 44.2(b). "A substantial right is affected when the error had a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict." King v. State, 953 S.W.2d 266, 271 (Tex.Crim.App.1997). Because the appellant pled guilty, we review the entire record to determine whether his knowledge and comprehension of the full and correct information would have been likely to affect his willingness to plead guilty. See Rachuig v. State, 972 S.W.2d 170, 175 (Tex.App.—Waco 1998, pet. ref d).
Harm Analysis
The following exchange occurred between the trial court and the appellant:
Q. Mr. High, let me just admonish you as to several matters before we proceed. You understand upon your plea of guilty the court will instruct the jury to And you guilty and return a verdict of guilty? You fully understand that?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. You, of course, have discussed this with Mr. Davis?
A. Yes.
Q. And are you — you're presently competent? Are you mentally competent?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you understand the nature of this proceeding?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. You have discussed any defenses you have with Mr. Davis in aiding him in representing you?
A. Yes, sir.
The trial court never mentioned the range of punishment attached to the offense to which the appellant pleaded guilty. Nevertheless, the State contends the trial court did admonish the appellant on the range of punishment and the appellant understood the applicable range of punishment because (1) the jury charge stated "the Court, as required by law, has admonished him of the consequences" and (2) the competency evaluation reflects the appellant "was unsure of the maximum sentence that he could receive. He stated that he has been told that he can receive anywhere from five years to life in prison."
We do not agree with the State that boiler plate language in a jury charge or the statement of the psychologist in a competency evaluation indicates the trial court admonished the appellant about the range of punishment. See Murray v. State, 561 S.W.2d 821, 822 (Tex.Crim.App.1977) (article 26.13(a) provides that it is the trial court that must admonish the defendant of the punishment range attached to the offense). Further, we will not revisit our earlier determination that the trial court erred by not admonishing the appellant on the range of. punishment. High, 964 S.W.2d at 638. Instead, we determine only whether the appellant was harmed by the error.
Here, there is no affirmative showing that the appellant had full knowledge of the punishment range. In January 1999, the appellant told the psychologist he was "unsure" of the maximum sentence, but he had been told the punishment range was five years to life. That was correct then. However, almost six months later, the appellant pled true to the enhancement paragraph, raising the minimum sentence to 15 years. The psychologist's statement is evidence that the appellant did not have full knowledge of the applicable punishment range before entry of his guilty plea. Therefore, the trial court's error had a substantial and injurious effect or influence on the appellant's decision to pled guilty.
We sustain point of error one.
We reverse the trial court's judgment and remand.
Justice COHEN concurring.
Justice TAFT dissenting.
. Article 26.13(a)(1) provides: "Prior to accepting a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, the court shall admonish the defendant of: (1) file range of the punishment attached to the offense...." Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 26.13(a)(1).