Case Name: ALBERT STEIER, JR., et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. BATAVIA PARK DISTRICT, Defendant-Appellee
Court: Illinois Appellate Court
Jurisdiction: Illinois
Decision Date: 1996-09-25
Citations: 283 Ill. App. 3d 968
Docket Number: No. 2—95—1397
Parties: ALBERT STEIER, JR., et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. BATAVIA PARK DISTRICT, Defendant-Appellee.
Judges: 
Reporter: Illinois Appellate Court Reports, Third Series
Volume: 283
Pages: 968–979

Head Matter:
ALBERT STEIER, JR., et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. BATAVIA PARK DISTRICT, Defendant-Appellee.
Second District
No. 2—95—1397
Opinion filed September 25, 1996.
HUTCHINSON, J., dissenting.
Lloyd J. Tyler, of Tyler & Hughes, P.C., of Aurora, and George E. Bullwinkel, John T. Allen, Jr., and Thomas D. Laue, all of Bullwinkel Partners, Ltd., of Chicago, for appellants.
Bruce A. Brown and Jennifer M. Gomoll, both of Goldsmith, Thelin, Dickson & Brown, of Aurora, for appellee.

Opinion:
PRESIDING JUSTICE McLAREN
delivered the opinion of the court:
Plaintiffs, Albert J. Steier, Jr., William G. Ruby, and James D. Tully, appeal the trial court's order denying both their motion for summary judgment and objections to affidavits filed by defendant, the Batavia Park District (park district), and granting the defendant's cross-motion for summary judgment declaring valid the defendant's "Amended Ordinance Limiting the Use of Jet Skis" (Ordinance) (see Batavia Park District Amended Ordinance Limiting the Use of Jet Skis, Ordinance No. 101 (eff. July 18, 1989)). We reverse.
Initially, we note "Jet Ski" is a registered trademark of a particular manufacturer's brand of "personal watercraft." Therefore, to avoid contributing to the dilution of a registered trademark, we will use the term "personal watercraft."
The defendant is an Illinois municipal corporation organized under the authority of the Park District Code (Code) (see 70 ILCS 1205/1—1 et seq. (West 1994)). The defendant has jurisdiction over the portion of the Fox River referred to by the parties as the "Batavia section." Both parties agree the Batavia section lends itself to various recreational uses, including boating. On April 7, 1975, the defendant applied to the Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) for a permit to build a boat launch on the Fox River. The Corps issued defendant a building permit. This permit included provisions prohibiting the defendant from (1) infringing on any federal, state, or local law or regulation; (2) preventing the "full and free use by the public" of the navigable waters of the Fox River (see 70 ILCS 1205/11.1—3(f) (West 1994)); and (3) unreasonably interfering with navigation by the existence or use of the launch. Subsequently, the defendant built the launch.
In 1987, a number of Batavia residents began complaining about personal watercraft and the manner in which they were being operated in the Batavia section. Batavia residents complained personal watercraft produced excessive noise, tended to congregate in the Batavia section of the river, caused excessive wakes, and disrupted canoeing and fishing. In addition, Batavia residents complained personal watercraft users travelled at up to 40 miles per hour, circled boats, cut in front of canoeists, jumped out of the water, and performed figure eights and sharp turns. Further, residents complained that they had difficulty hearing each other speak over the noise of the personal watercraft. In response to the complaints, the defendant park district enacted the following ordinance to address these complaints:
"It shall be unlawful for any person to use, or attempt to use, the Park District Launch for the purpose of launching or removing jet skis [personal watercraft] on or from the Fox River, except for the following times and only when the Park District Launch is opened generally to the public:
Wednesday 1 p.m. to 9 P.M.
Saturdays Noon to 5 P.M."
On September 21, 1993, the plaintiffs filed a complaint seeking a declaratory judgment that the Ordinance was "void and of no effect." The trial court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss two of the original plaintiffs, Fox Valley Personal Water Craft Club and the National Marine Manufacturers, for lack of standing. We note the defendant did not raise an objection to the standing of the present plaintiffs, Steier, Ruby, and Tully. In addition, the trial court denied the defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint. The parties then filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The parties agreed no genuine issue of material fact existed and the trial court should decide the matter based on the evidence submitted to date, which included depositions, affidavits, and other exhibits.
After determining the evidence presented no genuine issue of material fact, the court found: (1) the Batavia section is a "navigable highway"; (2) the defendant has the authority to operate and regulate the launch under the Code; (3) no federal law prohibits the restrictions contained in the Ordinance; and (4) the Ordinance neither exceeds the defendant's authority under the Code, nor is it an unreasonable restriction on navigation of the Batavia section. Therefore, the trial court granted the defendant's cross-motion for summary judgment. This appeal followed.
On appeal, the plaintiffs essentially argue: (1) the defendant lacked authority to enact the Ordinance; (2) the Ordinance violates the commerce clause of the United States Constitution (U.S. Const., art. I, § 8, cl. 3) because it prohibits access to a navigable waterway; (3) the Ordinance violates Illinois law because it is unreasonable and arbitrary; and (4) the affidavits submitted in support of the reasonableness of the Ordinance do not comply with Supreme Court Rule 191 (see 145 Ill. 2d R. 191).
Initially, we must address the defendant's contention that the plaintiffs lack standing to challenge the Ordinance. We agree with the plaintiffs that this issue is waived because the defendant failed to raise it prior to this appeal. As an affirmative defense, standing must be raised within the time for pleading or the issue is waived on appeal. In re Marriage of Schlam, 271 Ill. App. 3d 788, 796 (1995), citing 735 ILCS 5/2—619(a)(9) (West 1994). We hold that, because defendant failed to contest plaintiffs' standing when challenging the standing of the plaintiff organizations, the issue is waived. We will, therefore, address the merits.
Summary judgment is proper where no genuine issue of material fact exists and the question before the court is solely a matter of law. 735 ILCS 5/2—1005(c) (West 1994); Lake County Public Building Comm'n v. City of Waukegan, 273 Ill. App. 3d 15, 18 (1995). On appeal, we must determine whether the trial court correctly found that there were no genuine issues of material fact and, if not, whether the trial court correctly entered judgment as a matter of law. Lake County, 273 Ill. App. 3d at 18. We review the trial court's order de novo. Lake County, 273 Ill. App. 3d at 18.
The plaintiffs argue the trial court erroneously found the defendant had the authority to enact the Ordinance under the Code. The plaintiffs urge us to strictly construe authorizing legislation against the defendant because the defendant is a non-home-rule entity. Accordingly, the plaintiffs claim the ordinance violates the Illinois and federal policy of the full and free use by the public of all navigable waters. The defendant acknowledges it is a non-home-rule entity. However, the defendant argues section 11.1—3(f) of the Code provided the power to enact the Ordinance at issue. See 70 ILCS 1205/11.1—3(f) (West 1994).
It is well settled that a park district is a non-home-rule municipal entity (Ill. Const. 1970, art. VII, § 8; Springfield Park District v. Buckley, 140 Ill. App. 3d 524, 527 (1986)) and, thus, has no inherent power. Ross v. City of Geneva, 71 Ill. 2d 27, 31 (1978). Instead, a park district has only the powers delegated to it by the legislature. Ross, 71 Ill. 2d at 31; Springfield Park District, 140 Ill. App. 3d at 527. Moreover, statutes that grant power to a non-home-rule entity are construed strictly against the entity that claims the right to exercise the power. Ross, 71 Ill. 2d at 31; Village of Bolingbrook v. Citizens Utilities Co., 267 Ill. App. 3d 358, 359 (1994).
Section 11.1—3(f) of the Code authorizes park districts:
"To license, regulate, and control the use and operation * of all water-borne vessels in the harbor and within 1000 feet of the outer limits of the harbor, or otherwise within the jurisdiction of the park district, except that such park district shall not forbid the full and free use by the public of all navigable waters, as provided by Federal law." 70 ILCS 1205/11.1—3(f) (West 1994).
The Code defines "harbor" as follows:
"The term 'harbor', as used in this article includes harbors, marinas, slips, docks, piers, breakwaters, and all buildings, structures, facilities, connections, equipment, parking areas and all other improvements for use in connection therewith." 70 ILCS 1205/11.1—1 (West 1994).
After reviewing the record, we find no evidence to support the defendant's contention that section 11.1—3(f) of the Code authorized the defendant to enact the Ordinance at issue. Nothing in the record supports the defendant's position that the Batavia-Fox River launch is a "harbor" within the meaning of the Code. Because there is no evidence that the Batavia section of the Fox River is a harbor, section 11.1—3(f) does not grant the defendant the power to "regulate[ ] and control" the use of the launch. 70 ILCS 1205/11.1—3(f) (West 1994).
In addition, the plaintiffs argue section 11.1—3(f) did not provide the defendant with the power to enact the Ordinance because the Ordinance prohibits "the full and free use by the public of all navigable waters, as provided by Federal law." 70 ILCS 1205/11.1—3(f) (West 1994). The defendant argues that the Ordinance is a reasonable regulation of a navigable water and thus does not violate federal law. We agree with the plaintiffs.
It is well established that under the commerce clause of the United States Constitution (U.S. Const., art. I, § 8, cl. 3) the federal government has the power to regulate navigable waters. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 173-74, 62 L. Ed. 2d 332, 341-43, 100 S. Ct. 383, 389-90 (1979); City of Chicago v. Law, 144 Ill. 569, 578-79 (1893). Accordingly, the United States Congress enacted section 10 of the Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899 (Rivers and Harbors Act), which provides:
"[Rt shall not be lawful to build or commence the building of any * [structure] in any * navigable river * except on plans recommended by the Chief of Engineers and authorized by the Secretary of the Army." 33 U.S.C. § 403 (1994).
Thus, a municipality may not build any structure in a navigable river without permission from the Corps. 33 U.S.C. § 403 (1994); see City of Chicago, 144 Ill. at 579-80. In addition, the Corps may place certain conditions on the issuance of a permit. United States v. Alaska, 503 U.S. 569, 590-91, 118 L. Ed. 2d 222, 241, 112 S. Ct. 1606, 1618 (1992).
In the instant case, the Corps issued a permit pursuant to sec tion 10 of the Rivers and Harbors Act (33 U.S.C. § 403 (1994)), allowing the defendant to build the launch. However, the permit placed the following conditions on the defendant:
"That no attempt shall be made by the permittee to prevent the full and free use by the public of all navigable waters at or adjacent to the [launch].

That there shall be no unreasonable interference with navigation by the existence or use of the [launch]."
After reviewing the record, we determine that the Ordinance violates the permit granted by the Corps. By prohibiting personal watercraft from using the launch 5½ days of the week, the defendant has essentially "prevented] the full and free use by the public" of the Fox River and unreasonably interfered with navigation. Therefore, the ordinance violates the permit issued by the Corps. Thus, we determine that the defendant lacked the authority to enact the Ordinance.
The case at bar is similar to Buckley v. City of Redding, 66 F.3d 188 (9th Cir. 1995). In Buckley, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit recognized a federal right of access for personal watercraft to navigable bodies of water. The court found personal watercraft could not be prevented from accessing and using a particular navigable waterway from a boat launch facility. Buckley, 66 F.3d at 193. In Buckley, the right of access originated in the Federal Aid in Sport Fish Restoration Act (Fish Act) (16 U.S.C. § 777 through 777k (1994)). Because the municipal defendant in Buckley accepted funds provided under the Fish Act to build a boat launch, the defendant was contractually obliged to accept the conditions set forth in the Fish Act's enabling regulations. Among these were a requirement that the defendant's launch accommodate " 'power boats with common horsepower ratings' " (emphasis omitted) (Buckley, 66 F.3d at 192, quoting 50 C.F.R. § 80.24 (1995)) classified by the United States Coast Guard. Because personal watercraft fall within the common horsepower rating, the defendant could not restrict such craft. Buckley, 66 F.3d at 192.
The defendant distinguishes Buckley from the case at bar by pointing out that the defendant did not build the launch with funds provided under the Fish Act. We find this distinction immaterial because in the instant case the defendant built the launch with permission from the Army Corps of Engineers. Accordingly, the defendant in the instant case must comply with the conditions placed on it by the Corps, just as the defendant in Buckley had to comply with the Fish Act (16 U.S.C. § 777 through 777k (1994)). We recog nize that the condition at issue in the instant case differs from the condition at issue in Buckley. Nevertheless, we are persuaded by the court's reasoning that a municipal defendant is contractually obliged to accept conditions set forth in an enabling document.
We recognize the defendant has a legitimate interest in preventing noise, wake, and wildlife problems. However, the Ordinance unreasonably singles out one type of watercraft in an effort to eliminate the deleterious effects that excessive noise and speed create. The problems of excessive noise and speed are not solely related to personal watercraft. We believe it is unreasonable to deny the use of the Batavia launch to users of personal watercraft and continue to allow all other watercraft of the same class (see United States Coast Guard Regulation 46 C.F.R. § 24.10—17 (1994)) to use the launch. Instead of singling out one type of watercraft, the defendant should enact appropriate ordinances which apply to all watercraft. See Springfield Park District, 140 Ill. App. 3d at 531; Great Lakes Motorcycle Dealers Ass'n v. City of Detroit, 38 Mich. App. 564, 196 N.W.2d 787 (1972). The defendant has the right to regulate, but a regulation applies equally to all. Because the Ordinance singles out one type of watercraft, it is unreasonable and thus violates the permit issued by the Corps.
The defendant argues that it has the authority to enact the Ordinance pursuant to its police powers. We reject this argument. We recognize that section 11—4 of the Code grants the defendant authority to "take charge of, control and police" its section of the Fox River. 70 ILCS 1205/11—4 (West 1994). However, section 11—5 of the Code limits the defendant's power in that regard. Section 11—5 provides that the authority granted in section 11—4 does not authorize the defendant to "interfere with the navigation of any navigable body of water or to shut off the access to any public dock or landing thereon." 70 ILCS 1205/11—5 (West 1994). By prohibiting personal watercraft from using the launch 5½ days of the week, the defendant has essentially "shut off" access. Thus, the defendant has exceeded its authority granted by section 11—4 of the Code (70 ILCS 1205/11—4 (West 1994)), and its argument fails.
Because we find the Ordinance invalid on the grounds stated above, we need not address the plaintiffs' more specific contentions that the ordinance violates: (1) "An Ordinance for the Government of the Territory of the United States north-west of the [R]iver Ohio" (Ordinance of 1787); (2) the "dormant" commerce clause of the United States Constitution; and (3) Illinois' prohibition against overly broad and arbitrary classifications. In addition, because the issue is moot, we need not address the plaintiffs' argument that the affidavits submitted in support of the ordinance do not comply with Supreme Court Rule 191 (see 145 Ill. 2d R. 191).
The judgment of the circuit court of Kane County is reversed.
Reversed.
GEIGER, J., concurs.