Case Name: Richard Pennell v. Frederick Pentz
Court: New York Court of Common Pleas
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1855-12
Citations: 4 E.D. Smith 639
Docket Number: 
Parties: Richard Pennell v. Frederick Pentz.
Judges: 
Reporter: E.D. Smith's Common Pleas Reports
Volume: 4
Pages: 639–643

Head Matter:
Richard Pennell v. Frederick Pentz.
A vendor cannot recover upon a parol promise to pay for goods sold to a third person, unless the whole credit was given to such guarantor or surety, and not to the purchaser.
But where the vendor of certain materials having refused to sell without a guaranty—the purchaser referred him to the defendant, who declined to become surety unless the purchaser would assign to him a paving contract with the city corporation, in the performance whereof the articles in question were to be used, and such assignment was accordingly executed to the defendant, who thereupon said to the vendor, " Go on and furnish the materials, and I will pay you, asno other person can draw the money but me;” held, that the defendant was liable for the price, as upon an original undertaking to pay.
Held, further, that the defendant was likewise liable as above, although, after the paving contract was performed, the defendant requested the vendor of the materials to make out his bill to the contractor, and the vendor thereupon did so, the defendant giving as a reason for the request that he desired to obtain a commission from the contractor, and stating that the latter would undoubtedly draw upon him (the defendant) in the plaintiff’s favor, and that if such draft was drawn, he (the defendant) would pay it. Per "Wood-ruff, J.; Daly, J., concurring. Ingraham, First J., dissented, holding, that under all the circumstances, the defendant could not be charged as a principal debtor.
A parol promise by a party, upon taking an assignment of a claim, to pay a debt of the assignor out of moneys to be realized from the assigned premises, is not within the statute of frauds.
Appeal from the Marine Court, where the plaintiff was defeated in an action brought to recover from the defendant the value of “blue flagging curb and gutter stones,” furnished to a contractor with the corporation of New York, for paving in a public street. The facts are stated in the opinions.
Horace P. Hardman, for the plaintiff.
Edmund J. Porter, for the defendant.

Opinion:
Ingraham, First J.,
for affirmance. This action was for goods sold and delivered, and the defence the statute of frauds. Upon the trial, it appeared that one Blumenrother applied to Thornton, the assignee, to purchase from him some stone ,* that a negotiation as to prices and terms took place, when Thornton agreed to furnish the stone at a certain price. He then asked what guarantee Blumenrother would give for the payment of the amount, and he replied, General Pentz. The latter parties then went to the defendant, who, on being informed of their object in calling, said he would not guarantee to pay for the stone unless Blumenrother would assign him the contract. This was agreed to. The contract was assigned, and the defendant told Thornton he could go on and furnish the materials for the contract, and he would pay him, as no other person could draw the money on the contract but himself.
Subsequently, on applying for money, the defendant told Thornton he must apply for money to Blumenrother, as he could only advance the money to him, in order that he (the defendant) might charge his commissions; and Thornton did so. After the work was done, an order for the amount was, in pursuance of the defendant's direction, drawn on the defendant, payable when funds were received on the contract.
Upon these facts the court below dismissed the complaint, upon the ground that the promise of the defendant was to pay the debt of another, and therefore within the statute of frauds.
It must be apparent that the ruling of the court was cor rect, if the defendant was not the purchaser. The action was for goods sold and delivered to the defendant, and whether the contract was or was not good under the statute of frauds, there could he no recovery if the goods were sold to Blumenrother.
It may he that under a proper complaint a recovery might be had upon proof of the defendant's promise to pay the debt of Blumenrother out of the moneys assigned to him by the assignor. Such a contract is not within the statute of frauds. (See Canfield v. Morgan, 12 J. R. 346; McMurray v. Ferris, 3 ib. 71; Morton v. Naylor, 1 Hill, 583.)
The evidence in this case shows facts from which it is apparent that the credit was not entirely given to the defendant. The contract was made with Blumenrother, the price agreed on with him, the goods delivered to him, payments made by him, the order for the balance drawn by him, and the vendor asking not for the principal indebtedness, but for a guarantee from the defendant. Under such evidence no other conclusion could be drawn but that Blumenrother was treated as the debtor, and the defendant as the security, who was to pay the debt out of a specific fund in his possession belonging to Blumenrother, while the declaration of the defendant that he wanted to procure or charge commissions to him, shows that he was acting rather as an agent than as a principal.
The court below was right, under such a state of evidence, in holding that the defendant was not the principal debtor. These views are sustained by the cases of Brady v. Sackrider, 1 Sandf. S. C. R. 514, where it is held, that if the whole credit be not given to the person who comes in to answer for another, his undertaking is collateral, and must be in writing; of Dixon v. Frazee, 1 E. D. Smith, 32; and of Brewster v. Silence, 4 Selden, 207.
The judgment should be affirmed.