Case Name: SMITH v. GINTHER
Court: Michigan Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1967-06-06
Citations: 379 Mich. 208
Docket Number: Calendar No. 6, Docket No. 51,513
Parties: SMITH v. GINTHER.
Judges: T. M. Kavanagh, Souris, and O’Hara, JJ., concurred with Adams, J.
Reporter: Michigan Reports
Volume: 379
Pages: 208–223

Head Matter:
SMITH v. GINTHER.
Opinion of the Court.
1. Municipal Corporations — Governmental Immunity — Statutes —Torts—Policemen and Firemen.
Tlie statute which permits municipal corporations to indemnify a policeman or fireman for any judgment recovered against him for torts committed while he is acting within the scope of his authority or in the course of his employment is permissive and does not impose liability on á municipal corporation for such torts, nor does it take away liability (CLS 1961, § 124.101 et seq., as amended by PA 1963, No 83).
2. Same — Governmental Immunity — Statute.
The statute which authorizes political subdivisions of the State to indemnify a policeman or fireman for any judgment recovered against him for tort committed while he is acting within the scope of his authority or in the eourse of his employment does not provide governmental immunity for cities (CLS 1961, § 124.101 et seq., as amended by PA 1963, No 83).
References for Points in Headnotes
37 Am Jur, Municipal Corporations § 130; 38 Am Jur, Municipal Corporations §§ 620, 623.
38 Am Jur, Municipal Corporations § 623.
20 Am Jur 2d, Courts §§ 70, 71, 76, 189.
5 Am Jur 2d, Appeal and Error § 901.
5 Am Jur 2d, Appeal and Error § 901; 20 Am Jur 2d, Courts §§ 70, 71, 74.
20 Am Jur 2d, Courts §§ 189, 195.
5 Am Jur 2d, Appeal and Error § 902; 20 Am Jur 2d, Courts §195.
20 Am Jur 2d, Courts § 73.
20 Am Jur 2d, Courts §§ 74, 75.
38 Am Jur, Municipal Corporations §§ 571, 572.
5 Am Jur 2d, Appeal and Error § 901; 20 Am Jur 2d, Courts §80.
20 Am Jur 2d, Courts §§ 186, 187, 192, 198, 231; 37 Am Jur, Municipal Corporations § 130.
5 Am Jur 2d, Appeal and Error § 1009.
8. Same — Governmental Immunity — Tort of Volunteer Fireman.
A complaint against a municipal corporation for damages resulting from alleged negligence of a volunteer fireman employee of the municipal corporation in the course of his employment states a cause of action against the city, as against the contention that the city enjoys governmental immunity, when the accident complained of occurred June 20, 1964, after governmental immunity as to cities was abolished by decisional law in 1961.
Dissenting Opinion.
Dethmers, C. J., and Kelly and Brennan, JJ.
4. Common Law — Promulgation—-Reports.
Law is a rule of reason ordained and promulgated for the common good, and in common-law countries the decisions of the highest courts, which have the force of law, are promulgated by being printed and published, but these reports are valuable only to the extent that the reader can determine from reading the decisions what rules of law are applicable to what sets of facts and circumstances.
5. Same — Decision—Opinion—Interpretation.
The function of an appellate court in a common-law judicial system is to decide a particular case in a particular way, and not to declare what the law will be in the future, nor to decide by resolution hoio various classes of cases will be treated in the future.
6. Same — Decision—Opinion—Interpretation.
The opinion and decision of an appellate court in a common-law judicial system must be read and examined as a whole in the light of the facts upon which it is based, and only the conclusions arrived at and announced upon the several questions discussed and essential to a proper disposition of the case are those of the court; other things in the case are not necessarily adopted as the opinion of the court, such other things b eing dicta and having no precedential value.
7. Courts — Torts—Governmental Immunity — Prospective Abolition.
Decision of the Supreme Court, affirming dismissal by the trial court of a city as defendant on the ground that the city enjoyed governmental immunity from suit for the torts of its employees, by' an evenly divided court, 4 voting for affirmance and 4 for reversal, constituted no precedent for abolition of the copmon law governmental immunity of the city, although one of the justices voting to affirm announced in his opinion that he wished to abolish governmental immunity, and. differed from those voting for reversal only in wishing to make such abolition prospective and not operative m the case then decided.
8. .Same — Appeal and Error — Affirmance—Evenly Divided Court —Precedent.
Affirmance of the trial court by an equal division of the justices of the Supreme Court sets no precedent.
9. Same — Constitutional Law — Opinions—Writing—Dissent.
The Constitution requires Justices of the Supreme Court to give in writing the reasons for their dissent in whole or in part from any decision of the court; hence, when a Justice concurs in the result without giving reasons for any dissent, it must be assumed that he did not dissent in whole or in part (Const 1963, art 6, §6).
10. Appeal and Error — Opinions—Euture Cases — Dictum.
Pronouncements in the opinion of the Supreme Court about all future cases and pending cases, or all cases arising before or after the date of this or that opinion, are meaningless because each case will be decided when it gets to the Supreme Court, according to the best judgment of the Justices then sitting and according to their view of and respect for the precedents which have been set.
11. Municipal Corporations — Governmental Immunity — Rule.
The rule that a municipal corporation is immune to suit for the torts of its employees in carrying on a governmental function is not a wrong, but simply a rule of reason ordained for the common good.
12. Same — Governmental Immunity — Rule.
Wrongs inflicted by government upon the people are wrongs they inflict upon themselves in a government of the people, by the people, and for the people. '
13. Same — Governmental Immunity — Rule.
Abolition of the common-law governmental immunity of municipal corporations by decisional law was a mistake and should now be overruled.
34, Appeal and Error — Courts—Policy.
Appellate court justices V)ho get info the area of deciding policy ■ get into trouble,
15. Statutes — Repeal—Decisional Law.
Decision of the Supreme Court that a provision prohibiting joinder of a political subdivision with a police officer as defendant in an action against the police officer for a tort committed while the policeman was engaged in the performance of his duty, included in a statute authorising municipal corporations to indemnify a policeman for any judgment recovered against him, was not effective because the common-law rule of governmental immunity in force when the statute was enacted had since been abolished by decisional law, and was a substitution of the will of the court for the will of the legislative assembly, and there is no way out of the difficulty but to overrule the decision (CLS 1961, § 124.101 et seg., as amended by PA 1963, No 83).
16. Costs — Public Question — Municipal Corporations — Tort op Volunteer Fireman.
No costs are allowed on city’s appeal from denial of its motion to dismiss action against it for the alleged tort of one of its volunteer firemen en route to a fire, a public question being involved.
Appeal by leave granted from Court of Appeals, Division 1; Lesinsld, C. J., Gillis and T. G. Kavanagb, JJ., order denying leave to appeal from Sanilac, Bacb (Arthur M.), J.
Submitted May 3, 1967.
(Calendar No. 6, Docket No. 51,513.)
Decided June 6, 1967.
Complaint by Constance Lee Smith against Leslie W. Ginther and the City of Croswell for personal injuries received in an automobile accident between a car in which she was a passenger and one driven by defendant Ginther while he was acting as a volunteer fireman for the City of Croswell. Motion by defendant City for summary judgment denied. Defendant City appeals.
Affirmed.
D. Bruce Wistrand, for plaintiff.
Gault, Davison £ Bowers (Philip M, Ambrose, of counsel), for defendant Ginther. ..
Bush, Buce, Henderson & Black, for defendant City of Croswell.

Opinion:
Adams, J.
Plaintiff was injured in an accident that occurred on June 20, 1964. Defendant Grinther, a volunteer fireman for the city of Croswell, while responding in his own car to a fire alarm, collided with a car being. driven by plaintiff's husband. Plaintiff brought suit against Grinther and the city of Croswell. The circuit judge denied a motion by the city for summary judgment, holding that this case falls squarely within Williams v. City of Detroit, 364 Mich 231; Sherbutte v. City of Marine City, 374 Mich 48; and Myers v. Genesee County Auditor, 375 Mich 1. The Court of Appeals denied application for leave to appeal, holding the case is controlled by Sherbutte. Appeal was taken to this Court upon leave granted.
Defendant city contends that Sherbutte, decided four and one-half months after the present cause of action arose, should not be given retrospective effect, that it has the right to rely on statutory governmental immunity granted by PA 1951, No 59, as amended by PA 1963, No 83 (Stat Ann 1963 Cum Supp § 5.3376[1] et seq.), and that the decision in Sherbutte, if controlling, should be overruled.
PA 1951, No 59, was considered by Justice O'Hara in Sherbutte. He reasoned that the act was adopted to improve the lot of plaintiffs, that it did not deal with governmental immunity because at the time of enactment cities had governmental immunity, and that when cities lost governmental immunity by virtue of Williams they might then be named as defendants. Since Williams is the foundation case for decision both in Sherbutte and here, no question of retroactivity is involved.
The title of PA 1951, No 59, was changed by the addition of the underlined words in the title of PA 1963, No 83:
"An act to authorize political subdivisions of the State to indemnify a policeman or fireman for any judgment recovered against him for torts, wrongful acts or omissions while such policeman or fireman is acting within the scope of his authority or in the course of his employment; and to authorize political subdivisions to furnish legal counsel."
No mention of governmental immunity or governmental function is made in either act. No right to sue policemen or firemen is conferred by either act. The statute as amended is permissive insofar as it pertains to political subdivisions. It permits political subdivisions under the conditions it imposes to indemnify a policeman or fireman for a judgment or to pay same. No liability is created. None is taken away.
Had the legislature intended to deal with governmental liability it had only so to state as was done in PA 1964, No 170 (MCLA § 691.1401 et seq., Stat Ann 1965 Cum Supp § 3.996[101] et seq.), the title of which commences as follows:
"An act to make uniform the liability of municipal corporations," et cetera.
Since it must be concluded that PA 1951, No 59, and PA 1963, No 83, do not provide governmental immunity for cities and since governmental immunity as to cities was abolished prospectively by Williams, decided September 22, 1961, plaintiff has stated a cause of action against the city arising out of the accident which occurred June 20, 1964.
•'The decision of the trial judge is affirmed. The case is remanded to him for further proceedings. Costs to appellees.
T. M. Kavanagh, Souris, and O'Hara, JJ., concurred with Adams, J.
CLS 1961, §124.101 et seq. (Stat Ann 1958 Rev § 5.3376[1] et seq.), repealed by PA 1964, No 170, § 14, — Reporter.