Case Name: STATE, EX REL. ROBERT BUMSTED, v. PATRICK GOVERN
Court: New Jersey Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: New Jersey
Decision Date: 1885-11
Citations: 47 N.J.L. 368
Docket Number: 
Parties: STATE, EX REL. ROBERT BUMSTED, v. PATRICK GOVERN.
Judges: 
Reporter: New Jersey Law Reports
Volume: 47
Pages: 368–383

Head Matter:
STATE, EX REL. ROBERT BUMSTED, v. PATRICK GOVERN.
1. Where a statute is general in its terms, and its sole effect is to remove in some degree the differences existing in the various regulations of internal affairs of towns or counties, and to subject those affairs to the operation of a general law, then the statute is not special or local in the constitutional sense, although the pre-existing legal conditions were such that it would effect a change in only one town or county.
2. The constitutional requirement that the object of every law shall be expressed in its title, is satisfied when the title fairly indicates the general object of the statute, although it does not indicate the means or method of attaining that object.
3. The object expressed in the title of an act was “ to make uniform the selection and duties of directors of the boards of chosen freeholders of the state.” The aim of the act was to abolish the peculiarities touching the selection and duties of director, which existed in Hudson county alone, and to subject the selection and duties of the director in that county to the general law governing the rest of the state. Held, that the title sufficiently expressed the object of the law.
On demurrer to an information in the nature of quo warranto.
The following is the information filed by the relator :
Hudson county, ss. — John P. Stockton, esquire, attorney-general of the State of New Jersey, who sues for the said state in this behalf, comes in his own proper person here into the Supreme Court of Judicature of the said state, before the justices thereof, at the state-house, in the city of Trenton, on the 8th day of June, in the year of our Lord 1885, for the said State of New Jersey, at the relation of Robert Bumsted, of Jersey City, in the county of Hudson in said state, desiring to sue and prosecute in this behalf, according to the form of the statute in such case made and provided, gives the said court here to be informed and understand that he is a citizen of the United States and of this state, and a resident, freeholder and taxpayer of that part of the city of Jersey City within the first assembly district of said county of Hudson, and has been such for five years last past, and upwards, and that on the 14th day of April last past, he was duly elected a member of the board of chosen freeholders for said county, for said district, for one year from the first Tuesday in May then next, and that he duly qualified for said office, and gave the bond required by law; that it is by law the duty of said board to hold its annual stated meeting on the Tuesday next after the first Monday in May of each year; that on the said Tuesday in May last the freeholders elect from the various assembly districts of said county, being two from each district, or twenty in all, having all duly qualified and given bond, assembled at the usual place of meeting of said board for the purpose of organization; that at that time and place one Patrick Govern assumed the chair, and called the roll of members elect, and proceeded to the transaction of business, with himself as presiding officer, and has ever since professed to act as a member and director of said board.
And the said attorney-general, on the relation aforesaid, further gives the court here to be informed and understand that, although true it is that by virtue of an act of the legislature of the State of New Jersey entitled “ An act to re-organize the board of chosen freeholders of the county of Hudson,” approved March 23d, 1875, the said Patrick Govern was on the first Tuesday of November, A. D. 1883, duly elected director of the board of chosen freeholders of the county of Hudson by the vote of the electors of said county at large, for a term of two years from the third Tuesday of November then next, and accepted said office, and took the official oath, and gave the bond required by said act, and on the third Tuesday of November, A. D. 1883, entered upon the duties of his said office, and continued to exercise the same until the passage of the act of the legislature hereinafter mentioned, and thence hitherto claims and alleges that said last-named act is unconstitutional and void, and that he is acting as member and director of said board under authority of said act approved March 23d, 1875, yet the said attorney-general, on relation aforesaid, gives the court here further to be informed and understand that, by an act of the legislature of the State of New Jersey, passed March 25th, A. D. 1885, entitled
“ An act concerning the constitution of the boards of chosen freeholders of this state, and to make uniform the selection and duties of directors of such boards,” it was enacted as follows, viz.:
1. Be it enacted by the Senate and General Assembly of the State of NeAV Jersey, That hereafter only those persons elected by the various townships, or other political divisions from which chosen freeholders are authorized to be elected by the laws of this state shall constitute the boards of chosen freeholders of the respective counties of this state; and no member or director of any board of chosen freeholders shall be elected by the vote of the electors of a county at large, any law to the contrary hereof notwithstanding.
2. And be it enacted, That the boards of chosen freeholders in the several counties of this state shall elect their own director from among their own number, in accordance with the provisions of the act entitled “ An act to incorporate the chosen freeholders in the respective counties of the state,” approved March 16th, 1846 ; and such director shall have the powers and perform the duties prescribed by said act, and no other powers and duties.
3. And be it enacted, That any office of director of a board of chosen freeholders created by any law of this state other than said act shall be and the same is hereby abolished, and in any county where there has hitherto been such an office the board of chosen freeholders shall immediately elect a director from their own number.
4. And be it enacted, That all acts and parts of acts, general or special, public or private, inconsistent with the provisions of this act, be and the same hereby are repealed.
5. And be it enacted, That this act shall be deemed a public act and take effect immediately.
Wherefore the said attorney-general, on the relation aforesaid, says that the said Patrick Govern, since the fifth day of May last, hath usurped, intruded into and unlawfully held, ■used and exercised, and yet doth use, intrude into and unlawfully hold, use and exercise the office of member and director •of the board .of chosen freeholders of the county of Hudson, to the great disadvantage of the said relator as a member of said board, and as a citizen and tax-payer of said county, to wit, at Jersey City, Hudson county aforesaid, in contempt of the State of Hew Jersey, and to its great damage and prejudice, against its dignity and sovereignty.
Whereupon the said attorney-general of the said state, at the relation of the said Robert Bumsted, desiring to sue and prosecute in this behalf, prays the advice of the court here in the premises, and for due process of law against the said Patrick Govern, in this behalf, to be made to answer to the said state by what warrant he- claims to hold, use, execute and enjoy the aforesaid office of member and director of said board of chosen freeholders of the county of Hudson, and the liberties, privileges and franchises thereof.
John P. Stockton,
Attorney-General.
R. B. Seymour,
Attorney of JRelator.
At request of defendant’s attorney it was stipulated by paper duly filed, that above information be considered amended so as to contain admissions:
1. That Hudson county is the only county in the state which, on March 25th, 1885, had a director-at-large, or a director or member elected by the vote of the electors of the county at large, and the only county electing chosen freeholders from assembly districts.
2. That no notice of intention to apply for the act of March 25th, 1885, was given.
Defendant filed a general demurrer, and relator filed the common joinder.
Argued at June Term, 1885, before Beasley, Chief Justice. and Justices Dixon and Mague.
For the relator, G. Collins.
For the demurrant, A. L. McDermott.

Opinion:
Dixon, J.
The demurrant takes two positions ; first, that the act of March 25th, 1885, (Pamph. L.} p. 137,) is special or local, and is therefore unconstitutional, both because it attempts to regulate the internal affairs of counties, and because no public notice was given of the intention to apply to the legislature therefor ; and second, that its title does not express its object, and therefore also it is unconstitutional.
1. Is this act special or local?
Nothing of a special or local character appears on the face of- the law. Its terms embrace the whole state and every board and officer in the classes to which it relates. But it seems that before its passage the legal conditions were such that no board or officer outside of the county of Hudson would be affected by fi>; all other boards of chosen freeholders were constituted, and the selection and duties of all other directors of such boards were regulated, in accordance with its provisions; its sole effect would be to put the office of director in Hudson county on the same footing as such directors elsewhere. While, therefore, if valid, its object and effect are to produce uniformity throughout the state, its operation is local, because only in one locality was there before any divergence from the normal •type which the act makes universal.
This, however, does not render the statute special or local within the constitutional prohibition. It should, I think, now be regarded as settled that whenever an act of the legisT lature is general in its terms, and its only effect is to remove in some degree the differences existing in the various regulations of the internal affairs of towns or counties, and to subject those internal affairs to the operation of a general law,, then the act is not prohibited by the constitution, but is in strict accordance with the command of that instrument, which expressly enjoins upon the legislature the passage of general laws for such cases. This principle has been approved in Van Riper v. Parsons, 11 Vroom 123; Sutterly v. Camden Common Pleas, 12 Vroom 495; Tiger v. Morris Common Pleas, 13 Vroom 631; Field v. Silo, 15 Vroom 355; Hines v. Freeholders of Essex County, 16 Vroom 504.
The statute cannot be defeated on this ground.
2. Does the title express the object of the act?
The constitutional provision is that " every law shall embrace but one object, and that shall be expressed in the title."
It is not necessary to review the numerous decisions involving the application of this and similar clauses. It is on all hands agreed that its purpose is to require the title of a bill to be such as will inform the public and the members of the legislature of the object of the enactment, and that this purpose is accomplished when the title fairly indicates the general object, although it does not indicate the means or method of attaining this object. Grover v. Ocean Grove, 16 Vroom 399; People v. Briggs, 50 N. Y. 553; Cooley on Const. Lim. 144.
In considering whether the title of an act meets this requirement, it must be presupposed that the legislature and the public are cognizant of the public laws touching the subject on which the intended statute is to operate. In the present case it must bo presumed to have been known that in every county of the state except Hudson the director of the board of chosen freeholders was selected by the board from its own members, and that his duties were those specified in the general law entitled " An act to incorporate the chosen freeholders in the respective counties of the state," approved March 16th, 1846 ; that in Hudson county the director was chosen by the voters at large, and that his duties were those specified in the local act of March 23d, 1875. In this condition of things the title now under review declares that the object of the law is " to make uniform the selection and duties of directors " of boards of chosen freeholders of the state. The law itself discloses that its exact aim was to abolish the peculiarities touching the selection and duties of director which existed in Hudson county .alone.
The question then is whether this title was fairly adapted to apprise the public and the members of the legislature of the general object of the law. I think it clearly was. It did not declare a purpose to legislate concerning all the directors in the state or concerning more than one of them, but it asserted that the object of the legislation was to produce uniformity among them all with regard to their selection and duties. It did not say whether that object was to be accomplished by placing all directors on the footing on which the-director in Hudson county stood, or by reducing him to the level of the rest, or by conforming all directors to some new scheme, but it did distinctly give notice that by some means-uniformity in these respects was to be secured. That was the general object of the act, and that alone was necessary to be expressed in the title. For the particular method of reaching-the end every one was legally bound to examine the body of the statute.
I do not see how the general object of the law could have been more aptly expressed. It may be said that it would have been done by entitling it, for example, "An act to-abolish the office of director of the board of chosen freeholders in Hudson county as it now exists, and to ordain that such office shall hereafter exist only under the act to incorporate the chosen freeholders in the respective counties of the-state, approved March 16th, 1846." Such a title would indeed have indicated more definitely the 'means by which the design of the legislature was to be carried out, but it would not have expressed more clearly the general object in view. If so specific a title be requisite, it can only be because of some such rule as this, that whenever the object of a statute is to remove a special characteristic in any municipal government so as to bring the government into conformity with a general law, the title of the act must expressly point out that characteristic. Such a rule would be impracticable. It would utterly prevent any general law for the government of towns-in this state, and would, I. think, defeat every law heretofore, passed having this design. At the timé our constitutional amendments were adopted, every city in the state was governed under a special charter, and these charters differed from each other in a multitude of particulars. Any general law framed for the government of these bodies would, therefore, necessarily abolish some peculiarities confined to single cities, some limited to a few, and some, perhaps, common to many. To require the enumeration of these special features in the title, or even in the body of a law, would, of course, be absurd. Yet if such a feature must be specified when it exists in only one town or county, why need it not be when it exists in two or in several ? And if it exists in several municipalities, and in the attempt to enumerate all the instances the legislature should omit one, the result would be that the act would wholly fail, because not embracing all the individuals properly standing in one class on the subject matter of the statute. I do not think such a rule can be adopted. The proper form of legislation is for the legislature to declare what shall be the law prevailing everywhere, and inconsistent special provisions, wherever found, must give way, and the appropriate form of title for such legislation is one that expresses a purpose to enact a uniform rule on the subject to which the law relates. This is the mould in which the present act and its title were' cast.
The statute being thus, in my judgment, constitutional with regard to its main design of securing uniformity in all things pertaining to the office of directors of boards of chosen freeholders, and with regard to the form for accomplishing that design, it is also valid in reference to its immediate abolition of the office of the demurrant. Such abolition was a necessary incident of the legislative purpose of putting Hudson county at once on the same basis as the rest of the state, and was therefore embraced within the object expressed by the title. Payne v. Mabon, 15 Vroom 213. The demurrant had no right to his office which could withstand the enactment of the legislature to remove him. City of Hoboken v. Gear, 3 Dutcher 265.
The attorney-general is entitled to judgment;
Magie, J., concurred.