Case Name: ROBERTS v. POSEY
Court: Michigan Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1970-08-24
Citations: 26 Mich. App. 95
Docket Number: Docket No. 6,918
Parties: ROBERTS v. POSEY
Judges: Before: R. B. Burns, P. J., and Levin and Churchill, JJ.
Reporter: Michigan appeals reports; cases decided in the Michigan Court of Appeals.
Volume: 26
Pages: 95–109

Head Matter:
ROBERTS v. POSEY
Opinion of the Court
1. Automobiles — Negligence — Owner’s Liability — Consent — Statutes.
The owner of a motor vehicle is liable for injuries caused by another who is using the owner’s vehicle with the owner’s express or implied consent or knowledge; however, where the owner’s consent is limited, use beyond that limit does not make the owner liable (MCLA § 257.401).
2. Automobiles — Negligence—Owner’s Liability — Consent—Limited Consent.
Owner of a motor vehicle was not liable for injuries caused by the negligence of a person driving the owner’s car where the owner had consented to the use of his car for the express purpose of allowing the borrower to pick up his paycheck and the owner admonished the borrower to bring the car back no later than 11:30 a.m., where the borrower agreed to the limitations, and where the accident occurred the morning of the next day (MCLA § 257.401).
References por Points in Headnotes
[1, 2, 4, 5] 8 Am Jur 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 595, 606.
[3] 8 Am Jur 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 595, 605.
[6] 8 Am Jur 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 595, 598, 605.
[7] 8 Am Jur 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 605, 606, 615.
[8] 8 Am Jur 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 606.
[9] 8 Am Jur 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 595, 597.
[10] 8 Am Jur 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 595, 597, 606.
Concurring Opinion
Levin, J.
3. Automobiles — Negligence—Owner’s Liability — Statutes.
The owner of an automobile is statutorily responsible for injuries occasioned by the negligent driving of his automobile if it is being driven with his express or implied consent or Knowledge (MCLA § 257.401).
4. Automobiles — Negligence—Owner’s Liability.
The owner of an automobile may place limitations on his consent to another’s use of his car and is not liable unless the vehicle is being driven for a purpose and at a time within the express or implied scope of the consent (MCLA § 257.401).
5. Automobiles — Negligence — Owner’s Liability —■ Stipulated Pacts.
A judgment of no cause of action was proper where the parties stipulated that at the time of the accident the borrower of the defendant’s automobile was operating it for a purpose and at a time beyond the scope of the agreement with the owner of the automobile (MCLA § 257.401).
6. Automobiles — Negligence — Owner’s Liability — Purpose of Statute.
The purpose of the civil liability act is to subject the owner of an automobile to liability whenever his automobile is being driven with his express or implied consent or Knowledge without a showing of negligence in the entrustment (MCLA § 257-.401).
7. Automobiles — Negligence — Owner’s Liability — Master and Servant.
The scope of the owner-employer’s consent is to be considered in cases in which he is sought to be held liable for injuries caused by negligence of one of his employees while driving one of the owner’s vehicles; no longer is the scope of employment test to be considered (MCLA § 257.401).
8. Automobiles — Negligence — Owner’s Liability — Evidence —■ Scope of Consent.
A defendant sought to be held liable for injuries caused by the negligence of a person driving the defendant’s car with the defendant’s consent should not be allowed to show that the driver’s use of the car exceeded the scope of the consent (MCLA §257.401).
9. Automobiles — Negligence—Owner’s Liability — Public Policy —Construction op Statute.
The purpose of the civil liability act is to permit a person injured by a negligent driver to sue the owner of the vehicle; this purpose is not advanced by a construction of the statute which allows the question of owner’s liability to turn on whether the plaintiff was injured before or after a certain hour or whether the driver was on one mission or another.
10. Automobiles —■ Negligence — Owner’s Liability — Knowledge op Use — Construction op Statutes.
Statutory language imposing liability on the owner of a vehicle for injuries caused by the driver of the vehicle who is driving it with the owner’s “express or implied consent or knowledge” is to be read disjunctively; it is sufficient that the owner had knowledge of the use of his automobile; it is of no importance that the owner limited his consent (MOLA §357.401).
Appeal from Wayne, George E. Bowles, J.
Submitted Division 1 May 12, 1970, at Detroit.
(Docket No. 6,918.)
Decided August 24, 1970.
Leave to appeal granted October 27, 1970. 384 Mich 772.
Complaint by Kenneth Roberts against Leonard Posey, as owner, for automobile negligence. Judgment of no cause of action. Plaintiff appeals.
Af-lirmed.
Metry, Metry, Sanom, Ashare <& Goldman (A. Jerome Allen, of counsel), for plaintiff.
Blum & Sternberg, Chartered, for defendant.
Before: R. B. Burns, P. J., and Levin and Churchill, JJ.
Cireuit judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.

Opinion:
Churchill, J.
Plaintiff, Kenneth Roberts, who was injured on September 11, 1965, when his auto mobile was struck in the rear by another automobile owned by defendant, Leonard Posey, and driven by James Montague, brought this action in Wayne County Circuit Court against defendant Posey alone to recover his damages. After a non-jury trial, the trial judge filed a written opinion that the plaintiff was entitled to recover damages in the sum of $6,000. Prior to the entry of that judgment, he filed a supplemental opinion, expressly reversing himself and directing the entry of a judgment of no cause of action. Such a judgment was entered and the plaintiff appeals.
Pursuant to GCR 1963, 812.10 the parties filed a stipulation in this Court that the statement of facts in the appellee's brief shall comprise the agreed statement of facts on appeal. The statement of facts leaves no doubt that the accident and the plaintiff's injuries were proximately caused by the negligent operation of the defendant's auto by Montague. The other significant facts may be summarized as follows, with certain direct quotations from the agreed-upon statement receiving our emphasis:
On September 10,1965, at 10 in the morning, Montague visited the home of the defendant, an ordained minister, and requested the loan of the defendant's auto for the express purpose of going to pick up his paycheck. The defendant agreed to allow Montague to use his vehicle but admonished him at the time that the auto must he brought hack no later than 11 or 11:30 a.m. so the defendant could use it for church business at that time. Montague, agreeing to the limitation, took the car. It was not returned at the agreed time. That afternoon the defendant became concerned about the whereabouts of his auto and made every reasonable effort to locate it, including notification to the police that it was missing. The defendant was unable to locate it until after it had been driven by Montague, early the next morning, into the rear of the plaintiff's car.
The defendant is charged with no fault. The sole question, on appeal, is whether, on these stipulated facts, the defendant is responsible for the plaintiff's damages by operation of the civil liability act. MCLA § 257.401 (Stat Ann 1968 Rev § 9.2101). The statute contains its own express limitation:
"The owner shall not be liable, however, unless said motor vehicle is being driven with his or her express or implied consent or knowledge."
This statute was most recently construed in a limited consent situation in Detroit Automobile Inter-Insurance Exchange v. Swift (1968), 11 Mich App 166, where this Court restated the rule that where consent is limited, use beyond that limit does not make the owner liable.
Consent and limitations thereon are ordinarily fact questions with the plaintiff having the burden. Detroit Inter-Insurance Exchange v. Gordon (1968), 15 Mich App 41. Here, by the stipulated facts, and also by the trial judge's findings, the plaintiff failed to sustain that burden. The trial judge correctly reversed himself and the judgment for the defendant is affirmed.
R. B. Burns, P. J., concurred.
In the supplemental opinion the trial judge stated:
"On the facts we must hold that he was not driving reasonably with the granted consent; he was on a personal, independent joyride of his own tlio next day after the consent had been given and over 12 hours after the period of time within the permitted use."