Case Name: CATHARINE DAWSON, Respondent v. THE CITY OF TROY, Appellant
Court: New York Supreme Court, General Term
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1888-07
Citations: 56 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 322
Docket Number: 
Parties: CATHARINE DAWSON, Respondent v. THE CITY OF TROY, Appellant.
Judges: Ingalls, J., concurred in the result on the last ground.
Reporter: Supreme Court Reports (Hun)
Volume: 56
Pages: 322–329

Head Matter:
CATHARINE DAWSON, Respondent v. THE CITY OF TROY, Appellant.
Action by a ma/rried woman for loss of services, resulting from personal injuries — her right to bring it — competency of testimony as to her future recove/ry — recovery for future suffering, wheninvproper — notice to municipality before suit.
In an action brought to recover damages for injuries sustained by the plaintiff in falling upon ice in the street of the defendant, a municipal corporation, a doctor was allowed to testify as follows: “ She will very likely recover in time;” “it will probably take until a change of life.”
JMd, that this testimony'was incompetent. (Landon, J., dissenting.)
The court charged, against defendant’s request and exception, that if the jury believed that there should be future bodily pain, they might allow for it.
Held, that as the plaintiff herself had only testified to her present pain and suffering, and there had been no evidence that such pain and suffering would continue (as the doctor had not testified that the plaintiff would suffer any pain), that the jury could not, under the evidence in this case, allow damages for future suffering. (Landon, J., dissenting.)
The piaintiff testified that at the time of the injury she was working in a mill that she always collected her wages, and as to the amount of such wages •, that she had no property except what she earned.
Held, that this evidence did not justify the court in charging the jury — that if the plaintiff had been allowed to make bargains in her own behalf for her labor and services, and had been accustomed to accept and appropriate the compensation therefor, as she saw fit, with the approval and consent of her husband, then she could recover for any loss in this respect — as there was no evidence that she was carrying on any business trade or labor upon or for her sole and separate account, and the fact that she collected her wages was quite consistent with her collecting them for her husband. (Landon, J., dissenting.)
A former action had been brought for this same cause by the service of a summons and complaint on the mayor of the defendant, and it was claimed that this was a sufficient service of a notice within the provision of the statute providing that no action shall be maintained against a municipal corporation under such cir cumstances, unless notice of the intention to commence such action shall have been filed with the counsel for the corporation within six months.
Held, that the service of that complaint was not notice of an intention to commence that action, because it was itself the commencement of the action.
That it was not a notice of intention to commence the present action, because the plaintiff had then, and could have had, no such intention. (Landon, J., dissenting.)
Appeal by tlie defendant from a judgment entered upon a verdict for $5,000, upon a trial had at the Saratoga Circuit.
On the 21st of January, 188Y, the plaintiff, a married woman, after dark in the evening, while walking upon River street, in the city of Troy, slipped upon .the ice, fell and sustained injuries, to recover damages for which this action was brought, the defendant being charged therein with negligence.
R. A. Pcvrmemter, for the appellant.
T. F. Hamilton, for the respondent.

Opinion:
TjEAened, P. J.:
In Strohm v. New York, Lake Erie and Western Railroad Company (96 N. Y., 305), the witness had testified that the plaintiff's condition was very likely to be permanent. The objection was made to the words " very likely" as speculative. The witness then said that such a patient might develop epilepsy, etc. The court held that this was too speculative.
In the present case the doctor testified: "She will very likely recover in time." " It will probably take until a change of life." This testimony had just that character of probability which the court held to be improper in the Strohm Case. But, furthermore, the doctor did not testify that plaintiff would probably suffer any pain in the future. So that there was really no evidence that she would have further suffering. Whether or not the disease would be painful in the future was a matter (so far as evidence went), of' conjecture. But the court charged, against defendant's request and exception, that if the jury believed there would be future bodily pain they might allow for it. The plaintiff herself testified as to her present pain and suffering, but without evidence that such pain and suffering would continue ; we think the jury could not, under the case cited, allow for it.
The plaintiff testified that at the time of the injury she was working in a mill and always collected her wages, and the rate of such wages. That she had no property except what she earned. This, seems to be all the evidence as to her right to her wages. The court, charged (and defendant excepted), that if she had' been allowed ta. make bargains in her own behalf, for her labor and services, and had been accustomed to receive and appropriate the compensation therefor as she saw fit, with the approval and consent of her husband,, then she could recover for any loss, etc.
It seems to us that there was nothing in the case to justify the supposition, and that the doctrine is not in accordance with Filer v. New York Central Railroad Convpawy (49 N. Y., 47). There certainly is no evidence in the language of that case that she was. carrying on any business, trade or labor upon or for her sole and separate account. That she collected her wages is quite consistent with her collecting them for her husband.
I do not feel willing to disregard the requirements of chapter 572,, Laws of 1886. The statute says: "No action shall be maintained unless notice of the intention to commence such action, etc., shall have been filed with the counsel to the corporation. within six months," etc. The question is, was the commencement of the former action for this same cause, by service of summons and complaint on the mayor, a compliance with this statute ? The service of that complaint was not notice of an intention to commence that action, because it was itself the commencement. It was not notice of an intention to commence this action, because the plaintiff had then, and could have had, no such intention. To construe the service of that former summons and complaint as a filing of a notice of intention with the corporation counsel under that statute seems to me to be an evasion, such as courts sometimes make to reheve a party from a mistake, and such as always produces mischief in the end by making the law uncertain. The plaintiff did not comply with the statute, and did not intend to comply with the statute; probably overlooked it. She commenced her action without having filed such notice of intention; and now she asks the court, out of sympathy for her, to say that a complaint which was not, and could not have been, a notice of intention to commence this present action, was such notice; and that a paper served on the mayor was a oaper filed with the corporation counsel.
I do not think our sympathy should lead us to disregard the plain words of the statute. We might as well say that if the corporation counsel had heard in the street that the plaintiff was about to commence this action, such hearing would relieve her from the requirements of that statute. It would give them notice enough to make the necessary investigation as said in Meyer v. Mayor (12 N. Y. State Rep., 675). The statute is plain and it is best to adhere to it.
Judgment reversed, and new trial granted, costs to abide event.
Ingalls, J., concurred in the result on the last ground.