Case Name: Edward G. Thompson and others, appellants, vs. David Thompson and others, respondents
Court: New York Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1855-11-05
Citations: 21 Barb. 107
Docket Number: 
Parties: Edward G. Thompson and others, appellants, vs. David Thompson and others, respondents.
Judges: 
Reporter: Barbour's Supreme Court Reports
Volume: 21
Pages: 107–128

Head Matter:
Edward G. Thompson and others, appellants, vs. David Thompson and others, respondents.
Erroneous, foolish, and even absurd opinions on certain subjects, do not show insanity, when the person entertaining them still continues in the possession of his faculties, discreetly conducting not only his own affairs but the business of others.
Accordingly, where it appeared, from the testimony, that a testator, previous to his death, was perfectly competent to, and did, transact business of a very large extent, for himself and as trustee for others, and as a director of several incorporated institutions; and that, although entertaining many peculiarities of opinion, such peculiarit® never disturbed his reason, and did not establish unsoundness of mind, or an inability to manage his own affairs, or to dispose of his property according^) the suggestions of his own unbiased and unfettered will; that his false opinions on many topics did not affect his intellect or affections, or render him incapable of disposing of his property in obedience to the free impulses .and motives by which the human mind, in its ordinary healthy state, is directed on such occasions; that they did not impair his ability to make prudent investments, .or to advise in the affairs of the various ■ companies with which he was connected; or in the least affect or influence his action in relation to the final disposition of his property, or in relation to any of the prior wills which he had executed; that they did not affect his testamentary capacity, in any degree; that he was not subject to any mental aberrations or imbecility that exposed him to undue influence, especially in the disposition of his property ; and that no such influence was in fact used; it was held that the testator was competent to make a valid will; and he having executed a will and assigned reasons for its provisions which showed a mind sound in its power of reasoning, a decree of the surrogate, admitting the same to probate, was affirmed. Clerke, J. dissented.
THIS was an appeal from a decree of the surrogate of- the county of Hew York, admitting to probate an instrument propounded as the last will and testament of Abraham Gr. Thompson, late of the city of Hew York, as a will of real and personal estate. The will was dated October 27, 1851, and the testator died two days thereafter, aged 75 years. The case before the surrogate is reported in 2 Bradford’s Hep. 449. The facts are so fully stated there, and in tlie following opinion of Justice Clerke, that any further statement here, is unnecessary.
C. D. Newman, C. O’Conor and Wm. Fullerton, for the appellants.
I. The paper offered for probate, is not the will of the decedent. It is in an inchoate state, in the absence of the schedule referred to in the body of the will, and which was to have been signed and attached thereto, as a part of the instrument. The schedule was to have been signed by the testator» By the omission, an unknown amount of property which was to have been named in the schedule, falls into the residuum of the estate, and contrary to the decedent’s wishes, will go to the charitable institutions, if this imperfect paper stands as a testament.
II. Considering the state of the decedent’s mind; he was the subject of an undue influence, at the time of the .preparation and execution of the will. The undue influence may not have been sufficient of itself to defeat the will, but it becomes important in this case to consider its nature, tendency and effects; in connection with the decedent’s insanity. As to the undue influence. (1.) Mrs. Fila Hunt was in a condition to exert an undue influence over the mind of the testator. He had been out of his house but five or six times during the six months next preceding his death, and Mrs. Hunt was his nurse. He had none of his friends with him, to counteract any influence she might exert, or bear testimony to its existence. It is not pretended that the tendency of Mrs. Hunt’s influence was to benefit herself; her object was not to benefit herself, but to injure others. Mrs. Hunt knew that the Abijah Mann will had been executed, and she was dissatisfied with it. The influence which Mrs. Hunt had over the testator, was acknowledged and explained by the testator himself. (2.) Mrs. Hunt was hostile to the grandchildren and daughter-in-law of the testator, and she attempted to, and did exert an influence detrimental to their interests-. Mr. Mann says the testator was disposed to listen to “ suggestions warning him against any thing.” Mrs. Hunt impressed upon his mind, that all his grandchildren wanted, was his money, and he. seemed to have a morbid aversion to the bare idea of his property ever going to any other individual. This condition is not consistent with perfect mental sanity.
III. The decedent was laboring under delusions amounting to insanity, and had not a disposing mind, during the prepara fcion or at the time of the execution of the will. (Waring v. Waring, 10 Jurist. Dew v. Clark, 3 Addams, 79.) Proofs of insanity: .The testator speaks of himself as deranged. He received a severe injury in the head the year before his death, and he acted differently after that. The testator’s mind presented all the indications which constitute the diagnosis of every case of mania, viz: irritability, capriciousness, credulity, forgetfulness-, confusion of ideas, and incapacity to recall to memory the words required to convey his wishes, was easily affected to laughter or tears-. The delusions under which the testator labored, amounted to unsoundness of mind-. The rule by which to judge of testamentary capacity, is this : “ If the mind is unsound on one subject, provided that unsoundness is at all times existing on that subject, it is erroneous to suppose such a man really sound on other subjects.” (Lord Brougham’s opinion, 12 Jurist, 947.) (1.) Incapacity to struggle against delusions, constitues unsoundness of mind. (Ibid. See also 12 Jurist, 925. Groom v. Thomas, 2 Hagg. 434. Frere v. Peacock, 1 Rob. Eccl. Rep. 442.) (2.) It ought not to be concluded, because the connecting link between the impeached act and the so-called monomania is not apparent, that it does not exist.
IY. If, in a case of this character, there is any real doubt as to the testamentary capacity of a testator, “it is proper to reverse the decision of the surrogate for the purpose of having the question of fact settled by the verdict of a jury.” This is acting in the spirit of the fundamental law. (Stewart’s Ex’r v. Lispenard, 26 Wend. 292 ; opinion of the Chancellor.)
Y. The disposition of the testator’s property was not in accordance with his previously expressed determination.
Isaac Dayton and A. L. Jordan, for the respondents.
I. The absence of the schedule referred to in the clause of the will, printed atfol. 669 of the case, does not impair the validity of the other parts of the instrument, or of its execution. So far as there is any evidence concerning the schedule, it does not appear that it had ever been prepared. The disposition of property intended by it, could not, therefore, ever take effect. (Wilkinson v. Adam, 1 Ves. § B. 445. Habergham v. Vincent, 2 Ves. fun. 204. The Countess of de Zichy Ferraris, &c. v. The Marquis of Hertford, 3 Curteis, 468, and cases cited.) The schedule, if it had been executed subsequently to the execution of the will, would have been a codicil to the will, and it would have been necessary to execute it with all the formalities required for the execution of a will. The clause in question, then is only a declaration of a design of the testator to make a schedule-codicil to his will. He published his will after the absence of the schedule was known and remarked. His design to make such a schedule or codicil, for some reason or another, seems to have been frustrated. There is not any pretense that he negle'cted making this schedule or proceeded to execute his will without it by any misrepresentations, artifice, or undue influence. The testator seems to have been indifferent on the subject. No case can be found where an accident, inadvertence or mistake of this kind has been held to affect the integrity of a will otherwise valid.
II. The contestants, appellants, proposing to impeach the validity of the will, on account of a supposed incapacity of mind in the testator, it was incumbent on them to establish such incapacity by the clearest and most satisfactory proofs. The bur-then of proof rests upon the person attempting to invalidate what on its face purports to be a legal act. Sanity must be presumed till the contrary is shown. (2 Phil. Ev. 191. 1 Taylor on Ev. 126. Jackson ex dem Van Deusen v. Van Deusen, 5 John. 144. Lessee of Hoge v. Fisher, 1 Peters, 163. Heirs of Lee v. Executors of Lee, 4 McCord, 183. See also Temple v. Taylor, 1 Hen. & Munf. 476.)
III. Not only is there a failure of proof on the part of the contestants in this case, to satify the imperative requirement of the law, but on the contrary, the evidence is clear and explicit that the testator, in all his intercourse and relations in life, acted the part of a sound, clear-headed, shrewd and calculating man of business; that the will in question was the result of long continued and mature premeditation ; that its terms and provis ions, and the disposition and distribution of his property proposed by the testator, were all matters by him carefully and rationally considered and determined upon, and that the execution of the will itself was attended by every requisite circumstance of calmness, deliberation, and freedom from restraint. All the witnesses who ever associated with the testator in commercial affairs, or ever had dealings or business transactions with him, are unanimous in their testimony as to his entire business capacity and soundness of mind up to almost the very hour of his death. The testator, by his own industry, shrewdness and enterprise, had amassed a large fortune, and was, at the time of his death, concerned in extensive business engagements, and his capacity for business was unimpaired up to 3 or 4 o’clock of the afternoon of the very day he died. The testimony of Judge Campbell proves the care and premeditation with which the will was prepared, and shows that a disposition of his property, by will, substantially the same as that made by the will in question, had been in the mind of the testator for a long period previous to the execution of this will. The testimony of Dr. Spring shows both a rational resolve to dispose of his property for the benefit'of religious and charitable societies, and the considerations which affected his mind to lead him to that purpose. To the like effect is the testimony of the Rev. Mr. Spencer. The testimony of the subscribing witnesses is ample to the rational, deliberate, business-like, and intelligent manner in which the execution and publication of the will were conducted.
IV. The peculiar notions or opinions which the testator entertained, or affected to entertain, in no way diminished the vigor of his mind, or impaired his understanding with respect to the ordinary topics or affairs of life. It does not appear that Kidd’s treasures, animal magnetism, divining rods, or the philosopher’s stone, at all influenced his religious sentiments, his intercourse with men, his dealings in business, or his affections' towards his relatives and family. Insanity cannot be predicated entirely on a matter of faith. Delirium of itself is not insanity: it is only so when it operates so as to affect a man’s disposition of his property. In the case of The Heirs at Law Of Mason Lee v. The Executors, &c. of Mason Lee, (4 McCord, 183,) the court of appeals of South Carolina held that proof that the imagination of the testator was generally disturbed with a strange belief in witches, devils and evil spirits, which he fancied continually worried him, and that he lived in the strangest manner, wearing an extraordinary dress, sleeping in a hollow log, and exhibiting other extravagances, was not sufficient to invalidate his will, it appearing that the man was able in other respects to manage his affairs. The circumstances of that case were far more extraordinary than those which mark the case now before the court. The testator was such as is above de-= scribed, and the property was left to two of the states of the Union, to the exclusion of the testator’s relatives, but the will was sustained. (Merdury v. Cross, 3 Curteis, 671.)
Y. There is not any evidence to sustain any imputation that the will was affected by his singularities.
YI. There is not any evidence of influence exerted to affect his intentions.
YII. The inconsiderable provisions made in the will for the testator’s grandchildren, as they do not of themselves render the will invalid, so they do not furnish any legal reason that it should be considered an irrational act. (2 Black. Com. 503. Dow v. Clark, 3 Add. 79 ; 2 Eng. Com. L. Rep. 436. Wrench v. Murray, 3 Curt. 623. Heirs of Lee v. Executors of Lee, 4 McCord, 183.) Whether the testator’s grounds for cutting off his grandchildren are to be approved or not is not the question. It is enough that the influences which operated upon his mind do not indicate insanity or restraint. His will, then, stands as the reason for his act.
YIII. The decree of the surrogate should be affirmed, and with costs to be paid by the appellants.

Opinion:
Mitchell, P, J.
The question whether the testator was of sound mind was so ably examined by the surrogate that it is unnecessary to do much more than refer to his opinion. The tes^ tator was perfectly competent to transact business of a very large extent, for himself and as trustee for others, and as a director of several incorporated institutions. His peculiarities of opinion never disturbed his reason. Erroneous, foolish, and even absurd opinions on certain subjects, do not show insanity, when the person entertaining them still continues in the possession of his faculties, discreetly conducting not only his own affairs, but the business also of others. Mr. Thompson gave good, and in the view of many discreet persons very Avise, reasons for the provisions made in his will and there is no proof that he was influenced by any one to dispose of his property as he did.
As we differ from our brother Gierke both as to the conclusions of fact, and as to the law, of this case, it would be proper to state our reasons fully, if the case had not been fully examined by the surrogate, or his opinion not been accessible to all, through his reports.
Using the negative of the language of our associate, we are satisfied as matter of fact, that whether all that any witnesses testified, as to peculiarities of opinion, be true or not, they do not establish, when other evidence is received, unsoundness of mind, or an inability to manage his own affairs, or to dispose of his property according to the suggestions of his oivn unbiased and unfettered will; that his false opinions did not affect his intellect or affections, or render him incapable of disposing of his property in obedience to the free impulses and motives by which the human mind in its ordinary healthy state is directed, on such occasions; that they did not impair his ability to make prudent investments, or to advise in the affairs of the various companies with which he was connected, nor, we add, to understand and enjoy the doctrines of the religion in which he was educated, and to make them more particularly the guides of his conduct as he approached nearer to the period when all worldly objects Avould lose their influence, except as they could be used by him to benefit his fellow men; that they did not in the least affect or influence his action in relation to the final disposition of his property, or in relation to any of the prior wills which he had executed ; that they did not affect his testamentary capacity, in any degree ; that he was not under the influence of any persons, in making the will, and that when he adopted the advice of any one it was because his mind was convinced that such advice was the-best, and that he adopted it only so far as his mind was so convinced; that he yielded to -such advice only as any other judicious man would do; that he was not subject to any mental aberrations or imbecility that exposed him to undue influence, especially in the disposition of his property ; and that no such influence was used in this case.
He assigned reasons why he gave a comparatively small part of his fortune to his relatives, which showed a mind sound in its power of reasoning, whether correct in its conclusion in the particular case or not. It was, in effect, that they would be really more happy with such provision as he made for them, in addition to what they had already, than if he gave them all that'he possessed. This was the conviction of one who had commenced life with moderate means, whose experience had shown him that property easily acquired was generally soon lost; and that those who had only enough to enable them to employ their abilities to advantage, were more likely to succeed, even in this world's goods, than those on whom large fortunes devolved without any exertion on their part. Many sound men' would approve his reasoning, although they might not have the resolution to carry it out, towards their nearest relatives, To conclude that a young man, or even a married woman, would be more successful and more happy with $50,000 than with $300,000 and more, does not argue insanity.
The decree of the surrogate should be affirmed, with costs.
Cowles, J. A careful examination of the whole case has brought me to the conclusion that the testator was of sound and disposing mind and memory; fully capable of making his last will and testament. And upon that ground I concur with my brother Mitchell in the conclusion at which he has arrived.