Case Name: Mike LONG, Plaintiff-Respondent v. Beverly HUTCHINS, Defendant-Respondent
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 2005-12-14
Citations: 926 So. 2d 556
Docket Number: No. 40,548-CA
Parties: Mike LONG, Plaintiff-Respondent v. Beverly HUTCHINS, Defendant-Respondent.
Judges: Before BROWN, STEWART and MOORE, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 926
Pages: 556–567

Head Matter:
Mike LONG, Plaintiff-Respondent v. Beverly HUTCHINS, Defendant-Respondent.
No. 40,548-CA.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Second Circuit.
Dec. 14, 2005.
Opinion Granting Rehearing En Banc April 26, 2006.
Roland V. McKneely, III, Shreveport, for Plaintiff-Respondent.
Charles W. Strickland, for Defendant-Respondent.
Tina Vicari Grant, Assistant Attorney General, for Intervenor-Applicant State of Louisiana and Charles C. Foti, Jr.
Tina V. Grant, Frances J. Pitman, Assistant Attorneys General, for Intervenor-Applicant, State of Louisiana and Charles C. Foti, Jr., on rehearing.
Before BROWN, STEWART and MOORE, JJ.

Opinion:
MOORE, J.
| í Mike Long was found guilty of constructive contempt of court for violating an injunction in favor of his former paramour and business partner, Beverly Hutchins (now Beverly Drum), and Ms. Drum's daughter. The district court sentenced him to 120 days in jail with 100 days suspended, pursuant to La. R.S. 13:4611(l)(b). On Long's application, this court granted a stay order and a writ vacating the conviction and sentence. Subsequently, the State of Louisiana filed an application for rehearing which this court granted, vacating its prior writ ruling and ordering an appeal. For the reasons expressed, we clarify our previous order, vacate the conviction and sentence, and remand.
The matter arose in the course of litigation by Long to obtain corporate documents and personal property that Ms. Drum allegedly would not return to him. On August 6, 2004, by the agreement of the parties, the court rendered judgment enjoining Long from directly or indirectly contacting Ms. Drum or her daughter. On February 11, 2005, Ms. Drum filed the instant rule for contempt, alleging that she had received some 12 e-mails, several cards, a book and a flower arrangement from Long in violation of the injunction.
Ms. Drum's rule was heard on May 16, 2005. Ms. Drum called Long to testify, but claiming that the matter was criminal in nature, Long asserted his right against self-incrimination. Ms. Drum and her daughter then testified and she rested her case. Long orally moved for judgment of acquittal;' the district court denied this and immediately sentenced Long to 120 days in jail, with 100 suspended. Long objected that he had not been' ^permitted to put on his case. The court called the objection an abuse of process and "nonsense": "You had an opportunity- to put your witness on. Your witness was called, he took the Fifth Amendment, and you didn't tell me that he wanted to untake the Fifth Amendment." tong took the instant writ, which this court later converted to an appeal.
Long correctly argued, both at the contempt rule and in briefs to this court, that this matter is one of criminal contempt. When the object of a proceeding is to punish a person for disobeying a court order, the proceeding is for criminal contempt. State in Int. of R.J.S., 493 So.2d 1199 (La.1986). As we explained in Johnson & Placke v. Norris, 38,300 (La.App. 2 Cir. 5/12/04), 874 So.2d 340, writ denied, 2004-1478 (La.9/24/04), 882 So.2d 1137:
[A] fixed sentence of imprisonment is punitive and criminal if it is imposed retrospectively for a completed act of disobedience such that the contemnor cannot avoid or abbreviate the confinement through later compliance-the defendant is furnished no key and he cam-hot shorten his term by promising not to repeat'the offense.
Criminal penalties may not be imposed on someone who has not been afforded the protections that the Constitution requires of such criminal proceedings. Hicks on Behalf of Feiock v. Feiock, 485 U.S. 624, 108 S.Ct. 1423, 99 L.Ed.2d 721 (1988). Criminal contempt is a crime in every fundamental respect, and the defendant in a criminal contempt proceeding is entitled to basic constitutional protections. Richey v. Richey, 98-1195 (La.App. 3 Cir. 3/10/99), 733 So.2d 618, writ denied, 99-2122 (La.10/29/99), 749 So.2d 639. In Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 88 S.Ct. 1477, 20 L.Ed.2d 522 (1968), the court delineated these safeguards:
|sDue process of law, therefore, in the prosecution of contempt, except of that committed in open court, requires that the accused should be advised of the charges, and have a reasonable opportunity, to meet them by way of defense or explanation. We think this includes the assistance of counsel, if requested, and the right to call witnesses to give testimony, relevant either to the issue of complete exculpation or in extenuation of the offense and in mitigation of the penalty to be imposed. (Internal citations omitted.)
The courts of this state have frequently reaffirmed this standard. State v. Austin, 374 So.2d 1252 (La.1979); Richey v. Richey, supra; Robards v. Robards, 01-1100 (La.App. 5 Cir. 1/29/02), 807 So.2d 1111.
A simple review of this record shows that the district court did not permit Long to present a defense. The judgment of contempt is therefore invalid. Richey v. Richey, supra; Robards v. Robards, supra; State v. Anderson, 2004-1567 (La.App. 4 Cir. 3/9/05), 899 So.2d 93; Fellman v. Mercantile Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 116 La. 733, 41 So. 53 (1906) ("[Wjhere the judge has no personal knowledge of the matter imputed as contempt, he should not pass sentence without having afforded the party a full opportunity to present his defense."). It is of no moment that Long previously- invoked his right against self-incrimination. If he chooses to take the stand, he is subject to cross-examination over matters addressed on direct. State v. Rhodes, 337 So.2d 207 (La.1976).
Moreover, the maximum penalty for contempt is 12 months, La. R.S. 13:4611 (l)(b); this entitles the accused to trial by a jury of six members, all of whom must concur to render a verdict, La. Const, art. 1, § 17; La. C. Cr. P. art. 779 A. The record shows that Long was never advised of this right. Finally, the district court remarked that the evidence "shows" that Long | ¿contacted Ms. Drum and her daughter after the injunction. This does not reflect a finding that every element of the offense was proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Lutke v. Lutke, 33,001 (La.App. 2 Cir. 2/1/00), 750 So.2d 512. The judgment is invalid for these deficiencies as well.
In one of our previous writ rulings, this court stated that the defendant in a criminal contempt proceeding was entitled to the right of prosecution by an appropriate prosecuting authority. Because we find that Long was denied the right to present a defense, never advised of his right to a jury trial, and perhaps convicted on an inadequate burden of proof, we pretermit any consideration of the need for an "appropriate prosecuting authority." While La. Const, art. 5, § 26(B) appears to require a district attorney or his designated assistant "to have charge of every criminal prosecution," the Code of Civil Procedure provides that a rule to show cause for contempt may issue "on the court's own motion or on the motion of a party to the action or proceeding^]" La. C.C.P. art. 225 A. Moreover, jurisprudence recognizes the courts' independent power to impose submission to their lawful mandates. International Union, United Mine Workers v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 114 S.Ct. 2552, 129 L.Ed.2d 642 (1994). We are aware of no Louisiana case to hold that contempt cases must be prosecuted by the district attorney or his designated assistant. We therefore clarify our prior ruling to conform to the statement of due process rights enumerated in Bloom v. Illinois, supra, Richey v. Richey, supra, and this opinion.
PREVIOUS ORDER CLARIFIED; JUDGMENT REVERSED, AND CASE REMANDED.
STEWART, J., concurs and assigns written reasons.
BROWN, C.J., dissents with written reasons.