Case Name: BERNARD CORRIGAN et al., Appellants, v. KANSAS CITY and J. SCOTT HARRISON
Court: Supreme Court of Missouri
Jurisdiction: Missouri
Decision Date: 1908-05-13
Citations: 211 Mo. 608
Docket Number: 
Parties: BERNARD CORRIGAN et al., Appellants, v. KANSAS CITY and J. SCOTT HARRISON.
Judges: Gantt, C. J., Lamm and Fox, JJ., concur; Burgess, Graves and Woodson, JJ.„ dissent.
Reporter: Missouri Reports
Volume: 211
Pages: 608–662

Head Matter:
BERNARD CORRIGAN et al., Appellants, v. KANSAS CITY and J. SCOTT HARRISON.
In Banc,
May 13, 1908.
1. TAXATION: Assessment for Parks. An assessment under the charter of Kansas City, upon the' lands of a defined district, for establishing and maintaining a park, is in no sense a general tax for general revenue purposes; if a legal tax at all, it is a special tax for local improvements.
2. BENEFIT ASSESSMENT: All Real Estate: Omission of Churches and Railroads. The charter provided that “the real estate, exclusive of the improvements thereon, in each park district, may be assessed annually” for the establishment and maintenance of a city park, and the ordinance imposed a uniform tax of two and one-half mills on all real estate in the district, exclusive of improvements, except the city, church and railroad property, and that exception was made by the language of the ordinance which said that the assessment was to be on all real estate, exclusive of improvements, “as shown by the tax books of the city assessor for the assessment of real estate in said district made for general city purposes in said city” — the city assessor’s books showing no assessment against churches, city or railroad property. Held, that the assessment was not invalid because the property of the city, churches and railroads was not included. The charter does not require all real estate in the district to be assessed.
Held, by WOODSON, J., in a dissenting opinion, in which BURGESS and GRAVES, JJ., concur, that the words “the real estate in said park district,” used in the charter, mean all the real estate therein, and the ordinance, in exempting the lands owned by churches, railroads, and the city, did not harmonize with the charter, and the assessment is therefore void.
3. -: -: -: Assessments Against Railroads. The lands of railroads within the park district, if benefited, may be charged with their proportionate share of the cost of establishing and maintaining the park; but where the city council, by its ordinance apportioning the benefit assessments, omitted such lands, it will be held that, in the estimation of the council, they were not benefited by the improvement, and for that reason were omitted.
Held, by WOODSON, J., dissenting, that the mere fact that the lands were situated within the benefit district, is conclusive of the fact that they were benefited by the public park.
4. -: -: -: Exemptions. Section 3 of article 10 of the Constitution, requiring taxes to be made uniform, and sections 6 and 7 of the same article, the one exempting properties of certain kinds and the other forbidding any other exemptions, refer only to general taxes. They neither exempt nor forbid the exemption of properties from special assessments for local improvements.
Held, by WOODSON, J., dissenting, that the mere fact that land is situated in the benefit district is conclusive, of the fact that it is benefited by the park improvement; and for the Common Council, by ordinance, to charge two-thirds of the land with the improvement and to exempt the other third, is an unwarranted discrimination, is unjust and highhanded, and is contrary to any just scheme of taxation. The charter did not confer on the Common Council the power to exempt from benefit assessments property benefited equally with other property, and thereby increase the burden of taxation upon other property charged with the improvement.
5. -: -: -: Arbitrary Classification: Equal Protection of the Laws. The legislative department of the city government cannot make an arbitrary selection of property to be taxed for the benefit of a whole district, omitting other property of like kind and used for like purposes. But where all the properties of the same class are taxed, and all properties of other classes, such as all churches, city or railroad properties, are omitted from the assessment, there is no such arbitrary classification or inequality as makes the whole assessment invalid. The council has the power, as much as a freeholder’s jury, of determining whether or not certain properties are benefited by the improvement.
Beld, by WOODSON, J., dissenting, that a classification of property cannot be based on ownership, and that to exempt land owned by a church or railroad or charitable organization from the burden of the benefit assessment, and to impose the special tax on other lands owned by another corporation or association or individual, is to create an arbitrary and not a natural class, and is unjust discrimination, and denies to citizens within the district equal protection of the laws, contrary to the Fourteenth Amendment.
C. -: No Improvement: Injunction. The assessment for the establishment and maintenance of a park is not void on the ground that at the time it was made there was no park in the district, if the evidence shows that the city had laid out two large parks, and was using all its energies in pushing for ward -the litigation -required for the accomplishment of its undertaking, and the money that the assessment will raise will be needed for establishing the park.
7. -: Improvement: Lack of Specifications and Details. The language of the ordinance, that “the special assessments hereby levied shall be used for the purpose of maintaining, adorning, constructing, repairing and otherwise improving the parks, parkways, roads, boulevards or avenues, or portions thereof,” was not so general, indefinite, and uncertain as to make the special tax bills void; especially, where no showing is made that it could be made more definite and certain without impairing the necessary powers of the park board or involving it in a wilderness of detail.
-8. -: Without Benefits. An ad valorem area assessment for a park does not so ignore the question of. benefits conferred as to render the assessment void.
9. -: Notice: Due Process of Law. An assessment of an ad valorem tax upon the real estate of the district, exclusive of improvements, upon a valuation shown by the assessor’s books, by the city council, without notice to the property-owners, is not invalid, and does not deprive them of their property without due process of law. No notice is necessary in such case.
Appeal from Jackson Circuit Court. — Eon. Edward P. Gates, Judge.
Affirmed.
Warner, Dean, McLeod, Holden & Timmonds for appellants.
(1) Considered as a general tax, or tax for general purposes, this levy is void: 1. Because the city levy of 10 mills on each dollar of the assessed valuation “for general purposes,” which was duly paid by plaintiffs, was the maximum of the constitutional limit; and this additional levy of two and a half mills' on the dollar is in excess of that limit. Constitution, art. 10, sec. 11. 2. Because the rate is not the same in all the park districts; therefore, it is violative of section 3, article 10, of said Constitution, which provides that taxes “shall be uniform upon the same class of subjects within the territorial limits of the authority levying the tax.” 3. Because the division of the city into park districts for taxing purposes is void. Morgan v. Comptroller, 44 N. J. L. 572. 4. Because levied on one kind of property only, viz., real estate, exclusive of buildings and improvements, thereby exempting all other kinds of property, in violation of section 7, article 10, of said Constitution. 5. Because the answer alleges that this tax “is a special assessment, levied for local purposes, and is legally and properly levied for a purpose for which local and special assessments can be legally levied;” and it is on that ground that defendants seek to uphold its validity. (2) Ordinance number 9674 is void, because in conflict with section 33, article 10, of the charter. By comparison, it will be seen that the charter provides for the assessment of all the real estate, exclusive of improvements thereon, in the park district; while the ordinance does not include or cover all the real estate in the park district. It omits and exempts all real estate which is not “liable for taxation for state and county purposes,” and it omits and exempts all real estate not ‘ ‘ shown by the books of the city assessor for the assessment of real estate in said West Park District made for general city purposes in said year.” By reference to the 3rd paragraph of the agreed statement of facts, it will be seen that in West Park District there are 55 parcels of land, aggregating 37 acres, mostly belonging to churches, charitable institutions, Kansas City school district, etc., one parcel described as being Kansas City engine house, and two parcels described as belonging to Kansas City — none of which is ‘ ‘ charged with any state, county or general city tax for said year, because exempt from the payment of such taxes, and on all of which no park maintenance tax was levied. ’ ’ By reference to the 4th paragraph of said agreed statement, it will be seen that there are various parcels of land in West Park District; which “are owned by various railroad companies, the most of them being used for track and depot purposes, and some of them for shop and roundhouse purposes.” These railroad lands “amount in the aggregate'to 200 acres.” These railroad lands “do not appear on the assessment roll, because assessed by the State Board of Equalization. And they are not charged with any local park maintenance tax. ’ ’ So that while the charter requires that all the real estate, exclusive of improvements thereon, shall bear this local assessment, the ordinance omits and exempts therefrom all real estate not “liable for taxation for state and county purposes, ” which exemption, as shown in said agreed statement, covers 55 parcels of. land, containing in the aggregate 37 acres. No other real estate is to be charged with said assessment. This provision omits and exempts 200 acres of lands belonging to various railroad companies. The charter and ordinances of a city stand in the same relation to each other as the Constitution and statutes of a state. Quinette v. St. Louis, 76 Mo. 402. And the ordinances must be consistent with the charter. Kansas City v. Hallett, 59 Mo. App. 160. That church property and property used for charitable purposes are subject to local assessments, though exempt from general taxation, has been settled in this State. Sheehan v. Hospital, 50 Mo. 155. And railroad property is also sxibject to local assessments. State ex rel. v. City of Kansas, 89 Mo. 34. And so are railroad rights of way subject to local assessments. Elliott on Roads, 403; Railroad v. Decatur, 147 U. S. 190,126 111. 92; Railroad v. Moline, 159 111. 64; Railroad v. Kankakee, 164 HI. 608. The arbitrary exclusion, or exemption, of these properties amounts to oppression on the owners of the property assessed, and avoids the assessment. Scammon v. Chicago, 42 111. 192; Chicago v. Baer, 41 111. 306; Parmelee v. Chicago, 60 111. 267; Dyer v. Harrison, 63 Hal. 447. (3) This assessment is void, because there was no park, parkway, or boulevard in that district on which this fund could be lawfully expended. The theory underlying these local assessments is mutuality — a. quid pro quo; and yet here is a case in which the city is-undertaking to levy a local assessment to raise a fundi for the purposes of maintaining, etc., a four-acre tract, called a park, which the city “reserves the right at any time, by ordinance, to use for other purposes or to sell' or dispose of.” In other words, the city proposes to-assess the real estate in West Park District to raise a fund “for the purposes of maintaining, adorning, constructing, repairing and otherwise improving” a four-acre tract of land, called a park, which it may at any time use for city hall, market, water works, .jail or other purpose, or which it may at any time sell to any person or corporation, and be used for brick yards, slaughter houses, packing houses, churches, schools, railroad depots or roundhouses, stores, warehouses, cold storage plants, hotels, private residences, or anything else. Furthermore, the only other so-called park in that district is a parcel of land consisting of one-tenth of an acre — a tract about 65 feet square, which has never been placed under the control of the park board. Now, turning to section 6, article 10, of the charter, it will be seen that the park board only has control of such parks, parkways and boulevards as may, by ordinance, be placed under their control and management. Again, section 33, article 10, of the charter authorizes an assessment of this kind only for maintaining, etc., parks, parkways, etc., “which are under the control and management of the board of park commissioners.” So we have an ordinance passed April 21, 1898, levying this assessment for the purpose of maintaining, etc., parks, parkways, etc., when the record shows conclusively that there was no park, parkway or boulevard in that district under the control or management of such board, except the four acres above referred to; and the city has reserved the right to use that for other purposes or to sell it. Hausen v. Omaha, 11 Neb. 37; Leach' v. Cargill, 60' Mo. 316; G-uinotte v. Egelhoof, 64 Mo. App. 356; Kirksville v. Coleman, 103 Mo. App. 215. (4) Ordinance No. 9674 is void, because it omits and exempts many parcels of land from'the assessment. Childers v. Holmes, 95 Mo. App. 154. The city has no right, power or authority to' exempt property from either general taxes or special assessments.;' Vrana v. St. Louis, 164 Mo. 146; State v. Railroad, 75 Mo. 208; St. Louis v. Meier, 77 Mo. 13; 25 Am. and Eng. Ency. Law, 1193; Dillon, Mun. Corp. (4 Ed.), sec. 781; Cooley on Taxation (2 Ed.), 200, 215; Beach on Pub. Corp. sec. 1443; Elliott on Roads and Streets, 377. Where lands liable to assessment are not assessed, and the whole expense of the improvement is assessed on the remaining property, the assessment is void. Gray’s Limitation of Taxing Power, sec. 1902; 25 Am. and Eng. Ency. Law, 1199; People v. Lynch, 51 Cal. 15; Chicago v. Cummings, 144 111. 446; Kizer v. Winchester, 141 Ind. 694; State v. Union, 53 N. J. L. 67; People v. Buffalo, 159 N. Y. 571; Huntington v. Cincinnati, 3 Ohio Dee. 126; Masters v. Portland, 24 Ore. 161; Scranton v. Levers, 200 Pa. St. 56; Savage v. Buffalo, 131 N. Y.. 568. (5) The ordinance is void, because the purposes for which the assessment is made are too general, indefinite and uncertain. Wells v. City of Weston, 22 Mo. 384; Chouteau v. Leffingwell, 54 Mo. 467; Orphan Asylum Appeal, 11 Pa. St. 135; Chicago v. Blair, 149 111. 310. Ordinances levying local assessments must be specific as to the improvements to be made; otherwise, they will be held void. Sheehan v. Gleeson, 46 Mo-. 100; Haegele v. Mallinckrodt, 46 Mo. 577; Moran v. Lindell, 52 Mo. 229; Independence v. Gates, 110 Mo. 374; Construction Co. v. Loevy, 64 Mo. App. 430; State v. Hoboken, 47 N. J. L. 268. An ordinance which simply authorizes an improvement, without furnishing any directions as to the manner in which or materials with which the same shall be done, is void. Haegele v. Mallinckrodt, 46 Mo. 577; Rich Hill v. Donnan, 82 Mo. App. 386. This ordinance provides for doing many things; and an ordinance which provides for several improvements under one assessment, will be held void: 25 Am. and Eng. Ency. Law, 1213, 1214"; Dyer v.- Chase, 52 Cal. 440;. Adams Co. v. Quincy, 130 111. 566 ; Mendenhall v. Clugish, 84 Ind. 94; Dickinson v. Worcester, 138 Mass. 555; People v. Yonkers, 39 Barb. 266; Wilbur v. Springfield, 123 111. 295; State v. Hoboken, 47 N. J. L. 268; People v. Ladd, 47 Cal. 603; Randolph v. Cawley, 47 Cal. 458; People v. Clark, 47 Cal. 456. (6) The ordinance is void because it wholly ignores and disregards the question of benefits. The territory or district covered by this levy is about three miles in length and from one and a fourth to one and a half miles in width; and contains store-houses, warehouses,- private residences, manufacturing plants and industries, freight and passenger depots, railroad yards, grounds and rights of way, stockyards and stockyard pens, sheds and buildings, packing houses, hotels, churches, school houses and hospitals. It is perfectly apparent that, with this vast territory, in a populous city, where the various parcels of land therein are devoted to such diversity of uses and purposes as above mentioned, they could not all be benefited according to any uniform scale or rule (many could not be benefited at all) and that any attempt to levy upon all alike a uniform ad valorem tax must fee in utter disregard of any special benefits to accrue to the respective tracts burdened with the special assessment. And such practice, when once upheld by the courts, leaves no tax limit, nor any safeguard, for the protection of property from such an abuse of the taxing power. A special or local assessment is a burden imposed by law upon real property for a public improvement, the extent of the burden be ing determined by the special benefits which inure to the assessed property by reason of the improvement. 25 Am. and Eng. Ency. Law, 1168; Cooley on Taxation, p. 428; McCormack v. Patchin, 53 Mo. 36; Halpin v. Campbell, 71 Mo. 453; Corrigan v. Gage, 68 Mo. 541. There being a total failure to exercise the judgment of the board in determining the benefits, the assessment was void. Watkins v. Zweitisch, 47 Wis. 513; Johnson v. Milwaukee, 40 Wis. 315; Watkins v. Milwaukee, 52 Wis. 98. Where the rule is according to superficial area, it is not just or valid that property slightly benefited is charged equally with property greatly benefited. Thomas v. Gain, 35 Mich. 162; Seeley v. Pittsburg, 82 Pa. St. 360; Preston v. Rudd, 84 Ivy. 150; Washington Ave. case, 69 Pa. St. 352; Orphan Asylum Appeal, 111 Pa. 135; Wistar v. Philadelphia, 111 Pa. St. 614; State v. Fuller, 39 N. J. L. 576; Hansen v. Omaha, 11 Neb. 37; Chamberlin v. Cleveland, 34 Ohio St. 551; 2 Dillon, p. 920, note; Morse v. Westport, 136 Mo. 287; St. Louis v. Weber, 44 Mo. 547; Cape Girardeau v. Riley, 72 Mo. 224; Tarkio v. Cook, 120 Mo. 8; Copeland v. St. Joseph, 126 Mo. 431; St. Louis v. Russell, 116 Mo. 258; Kelly v. Meeks, 87 Mo. 401. (7) This assessment is void, because no provisions were made for notice to owners of property, nor were they given any opportunity to be heard. 1 Abbott, Mun. Corp. sec. 363; 32 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cases, 234; Paulsen v. Portland, 149 U. S. 36; Fay v. Springfield, 94 Fed-. 409; Norwood v. Baker, 172 U. S. 269. Where an assessment is to be made of benefits property owners have an absolute right to be heard, and a law for making it without provision for a hearing is void. Cooley on Constitutional Limitations, p. 622, note; Stewart v. Palmer, 74 N. Y. 183; Baltimore v. Sharf, 54 Md. 499; Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U. S. 97; Waples on Proceedings in Rem, 64; Philadelphia v. Miller, 49 Pa. St. 440; Stewart v. Trevor, 56 Pa. St. 374; Butler v. Supervisors of Saginaw, 26 Mich. 22; Thomas v. Gain, 35 Mich. 115; Cleghom v. Postelwait, 33 111. 428; Darling v. Gunn, 50 111. 422. (8) This assessment scheme is one to avoid the constitutional limitation as to the annual rate of taxation. Hansen v. Omaha, 13 Neb. 37; Cooley on Taxation, p. 456. And this is a judicial question. Wells v. City of Weston, 22 Mo. 384; Chouteau v. Leffingwell, 54 Mo. 469; Orphan Asylum Appeal, 111 Pa. St. 135. (9) Ordinance No. 9674 is void, because it violates the 14th amendment of the Federal Constitution. Giozza v. Tiernan, 148 H. S. 657; Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356; Railroad v. Chicago, 166 U. S. 234.
Edwin G. Meservey, Wm. A. Knotts and D. J. Hajf for respondents.
(1) The charter is in entire harmony with the laws and Constitution of the State of Missouri, and is not in conflict therewith. Kansas City v. Ward, 134 Mo. 172; Kansas City v. Marsh Oil Co., 140 Mo. 458; Kansas City v. Langston (North Terrace case), 147 Mo. 259; Kansas City v. Bacon (Penn Yalley case), 157 Mo. 450; Egyptian Levee Co. v. Hardin, 27 Mo. 495; Levee Co. v. Meier, 39 Mo. 53; Morrison v. Morey, 146 Mo. 565;, Land Co. v. Miller, 170 Mo. 240; State v. Drainage Dist., 192 Mo. 519; R. S. 1889/ sec. 6674; R. S. 1899, secs. 8201, 8437; Hanson ,v. Hammer, 15 Wash. 319; Hagar v. Reclamation Dist., Ill U. S. 701; Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U. S. 112. (2) The provisions of the Constitution of the State regulating taxation, cited by plaintiffs in their petition, do not apply to special assessments,, or special taxes, levied upon real estate, the proceeds of which are to be used for betterments and improvements which will be beneficial to the property paying the assessment. Farrar v. St. Louis, 80 Mo. 387; City to use v. Owen, 110 Mo. 453; City of Clinton v.- Henry County, 115 Mo. 565; Lamar W. & E. L. Co. v. Lamar, 128 Mo. 218. (3) But plain tiffs argue that the method pursued by the city council-in making this assessment was unconstitutional on the alleged ground that the assessment was an ad valorem one upon' the property assessed. The argument amounts to this, that the assessment of benefits must not be levied ratably in proportion-to the value of the property assessed, even though the benefits accrue that way; that simply because the ad valorem method is the one pursued in general taxation; an ad valorem assessment must necessarily be a general and not a special tax. Here was a charter provision directly authorizing,in fact, not only authorizing, but arbitrarily providing, that the assessment of benefits shall be levied in proportion to the value of- the property, in other words an ad valorem assessment levied in the same way that a general tax is levied. This charter provision was declared to be constitutional and equitable. Garrett v. St. Louis, 25 Mo. 510’; K. C. Grading Co. v.- Holden, 107 Mo. 310. The ad valorem method of making special assessments is no longer open to question in this State. Morrison v. Morey, 146 Mo. 565 ; Meier v. St. Louis, 180 Mo. 391. In some states the assessments for paving streets are levied in proportion to the value of the property as determined by the city assessor. Boehme v. City of Monroe, 106 Mich. 401. In some states, notably in Kansas, the method of levying assessments to pay for sewers is in proportion to the value of the lands taxed, without the improvements thereon, instead of the area rule. Douglas v. Craig, 4 Kan. App. 99. The ad valorem method of assessing benefits for public improvements is the one adopted in many important states of the Union, and uniformly upheld by the decision of the courts. I know of no decision to the contrary. Dorgan v. Boston, 12 Allen (Mass.) 223; Springfield v. Gay, 12 Allen (Mass.) 612; Snow v. Fitchburg, 136 Mass. 183; Fallbrook Irrig. Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U. S. 176. (4) The method of levying and apportioning the tax and the manner of its collection is a legislative question, and the discretion lodged in the legislative body is not subject to the control of the courts. Egyptian Levee Co. v. Hardin, 27 Mo. 498; Garrett v. St. Louis, 25 Mo. 513; Farrar v. St. Louis, 80 Mr. 395; Kansas City Grading Co. v. Holden, 107 Mo. 305; Moberly v. Hogan, 131 Mo. 23; Keith v. Bingham,* 100 Mo. 307; Morrison v. Morey, 146 Mo. 544; Barber Co. v. French, 158 Mo. 534; Prior v. Construction Co., 170 Mo. 439 ; Heman v. Allen, 156 Mo. 534; Heman v. Schulte, 166 Mo. 409; Meier v. St. Louis, 180 Mo. 391; Paving Co-, v. Munn, 185 Mo. 552; Mattingly *v. District of Columbia, 97 U. S. 692; Spencer v. Merchant, 125 U. S. 357; Hagar v. Reclamation District, 111 H. S. 705; Baumann v. Ross, 167 U. S. '589, where' various rules are summed up and many citations given; Railroad. v. Barber Co., 197 U. S. 430; Heman Const. Co. v. Railroad, 104 S. W. 67; Barber Asphalt Co. v. French, 181 U. S. 324; Webster v. Fargo, 181 H. S. 394; Heman v. Schulte, 189 U. S. 507; English v. Mayor of Wilmington, 37 Atl. 158; Pearson v. Zable, 78 Ky. 170; Dewey v. Des Moines, 101 la. 416; Bank v. Spokane, 18 Wash. 456; Adams v. Metropolitan Park Comsrs., 165 Mass. 497; Kingman v. Commissioners, 153 Mass. 566; Springfield v. Gay, 12 Allen (Mass.) 612; Snow v. Fitchburg, 136 Mass. 183; Cleveland v. Tripp, 13 R. I. 50; Raleigh v. Peace, 110 N. C. 38; 25 Am. and Eng. Ency. Law, 516, where about three hundred cases are cited. (5) The doctrine of “reasonableness” in the exercise of the legislative power and the “potentiality” of benefits as justifying the legislative determination in levying assessments for local improvements : Corrigan v. Gage, 68 Mo. 541; Chicago v. Blair, 149 111. 310; Hansen v. Omaha, 11 Neb. 37. The doctrine that the judiciary may properly declare an act of the legislature, or of a municipality, void simply, because unreasonable, is not sustained by the decisions. Morse v. Westport, 136 Mo. 276; People v. Brooklyn, 4 N. T. 420; Hernán v. Allen, 156 Mo. 534; Barber Co. v. French, 158 Mo. 535; Paving Co. v. Mnnn, 185 Mo. 563. That local assessments upon real estate is a legitimate and authorized’ method of raising money, not only for maintaining but also' for purchasing and constructing parks and boulevards, is as well settled in this country to-day as any principle of law can be determined by the courts. Kansas City v. Ward, 134 Mo. 172; Kansas City v. Langston, 147 Mo. 259; Kansas City v. Bacon, 157 Mo. 450; Shoemaker v. United States, 147 U. S. 302; Craighill v. Lambert, 168 U. S. 611; Owners of Ground v. Mayor of Albany, 15 Wend. 376; Holt v. City Council of Somerville, 127 Mass. 413; Kansas City ex rel. v. Scarritt, 127 Mo. 642; Foster v. Park Comsrs., 133 Mass. 338; Matter of Comsrs. Central Park, 63 Barb. 282; State v. District Court of Hennepin Co., 33 Minn. 235; Kedzie v. West Chicago Park Comsrs. .114 111. 280; Brooklyn Park Cmsrs. v. Armstrong, 45 N. T. 234; Briggs v. Whitney, 159 Mass. 97; People v. Brislin, 80 111. 423; Dunham v. People, 96 111. 331; R. S. Illinois, 1874, chap. 105, p. 733; West Chicago Park Comsrs. v. Sweet, 167 111. 326; Adams v. Met. Park Comsrs., 165 Mass. 497; Kingman v. Commissioners, 153 Mass. 566. (6) The language of section 33 of article 10 in question, specifying the object of the assessment to be for “maintaining, adorning, constructing, repairing, and otherwise improving park or parks, parkways,” etc., located within the district upon which the assessment is levied, clearly defines the purposes for which special assessments are authorized, to- use the language of Judge Gantt, “hy the unbroken current of authority in this country.” Barber Co. v. Hezel, 155 Mo. 399; charter of Kansas City, art. 9, sec. 7; Kansas City v. Huling, 87 Mo. 203; Gibbons v. Owens, 115 Mo. 259; Moore v. Westport, 110 Mo. 509; Black v. Ross, 37 Mo. App. 250. (7) As to property not assessed within the benefit district: “The illegal exemption by city ordinance of property of one taxpayer from assessment of a special sewer tax, will not authorize an injunction'to restrain the city from collecting the assessment against another taxpayer, not exceeding the amount which the city was authorized to impose, certainly not unless it appears that, upon the payment of the assessment sought to be enjoined, the plaintiff will have paid more than would have been his proportion had it not been for the exemption.” Page v. St. Louis, 20 Mo. 136; Paving Co. v. Munn, 185 Mo. 563; Davis v. Newark, 54 N. J. L. 147; Righter v. Newark, 45 N. J. L. 105; Humphreys v. Bayonne, 60 N. J. L. 406. The language of section 33 cannot he construed as counsel seek to construe it. It is permissive and not mandatory as to property which may or may not be assessed. If the section provided that all of the real estate within the park district must he assessed, then the argument of counsel might have some force; hut as to property used for churches, school and charitable institutions and for railroad rights of way, the most that any court has decided on this point is that such properties “may he” assessed; that they are not by the Constitution “exempt” from such special taxation. Kansas City v. Baird, 98 Mo. 220; Owners of Ground v. Mayor of Albany, 15 Wend. 374; Cooley on. Taxation (2 Ed.), p. 171; Land Co. v. Cook, 3 N. Y. App. Div. 164; Scotland Co. v. Railroad, 65 Mo. 123; College v. Schaefer, 104 Mo. 267; In re Churchill, 82 N. Y. 288; State ex rel. v. Lumber Co., 198 Mo. 430. (8) The contention of the complainants that section 33 and the ordinances thereunder, as to property charged with the assessment, violate that clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States, which provides that “no State shall deny to any person equal protection of the laws,” is not tenable. That such clause does not apply to exemption it is not necessary to argue, and if all the property assessed is assessed at a uniform ratio and by a uniform method, the provision of the Constitution above referred to is not violated.

Opinion:
VALLIANT, J.
— This is a suit in equity to enjoin the defendants, the city and- the city treasurer, from selling lands of the plaintiffs for- delinquent special taxes called by plaintiffs the Park and Boulevard Maintenance Taxes, they having paid all the other taxes assessed against these properties.
A temporary injunction was issued at the institution of the suit, but on final hearing the injunction was dissolved and the plaintiffs' bill dismissed, from which decree the plaintiffs appealed.'
The suit is founded on the theory that the special taxes in question were invalid, and that theory involves the question of the validity of the city ordinance under which the assessment was made and of the charter provision under which the Common Council acted in passing the ordinance.
Kansas City is organized under a special charter adopted in 1889, pursuant to sections 16 and 17, article 9, of the Constitution of 1875. By an amendment adopted in 1893, what is now article 10', was added to the charter. That article provides for the establishment of a Board of Park Commissioners "to devise and adopt a system of public parks, park-ways and boulevards," and to have general charge of the same. By its terms all the territory then in the.city was divided into three park districts, one of which, designated as "West Park District," embraces the city lots of the plaintiffs in this suit. The area embraced in that district is about three miles in length by one and a fourth to one and a half miles in width, including lots devoted to residences, and lots devoted to all kinds of business and other purposes which are naturally to be expected in a great and growing city like Kansas City; among which appellants call especial attention to lots owned and occupied for church purposes, lots owned by the city for fire engine houses, waterworks, etc., and also a large number of lots owned and occupied by railroad companies' for their rights of way and other railroad purposes. This article 10 provides how land may be selected, the procedure for acquiring the same and the assessment of benefits on the real estate in the district for the purpose of obtaining the money needed to pay for the land taken, the constructing, improving and maintaining the parks, park-ways, boulevards, etc.
The particular part of that article which commands our attention in this ease is section 33 which is as follows:
"The real estate, exclusive of improvements thereon, in each park district may, upon recommendation of the board of park commissioners, be assessed annually for maintaining, adorning, constructing' repairing and otherwise improving the park or parks, parkways, road or roads, boulevard or boulevards, avenue or avenues, or portions thereof, located therein, which are under the control and management of the board of park commissioners; and such assessment may be made according to the valuation and assessment of real estate in each park district made for city purposes. Every such assessment shall be made and collected as provided by ordinance of the common council."
Pursuant to that section the Common Council passed ordinance number 9674, the first section of which is as follows:
"That in pursuance of section number thirty-three of article numbered ten of the charter of said city, there is hereby levied for the fiscal year of 1898, upon all real estate, exclusive of all improvements thereon, liable for taxation for State and county purposes, in the "West Park District in Kansas City, Mis souri, a special assessment of two and one-half mills on each dollar of the assessed value of all said real estate, exclusive of said improvements, as shown by the books of the city assessor for the assessment of real estate in said West Park District made for general city purposes in said year."
At the same time other ordinances of like import applicable to the other park districts in the city were passed.
Appellants call attention to the fact that by the terms of the ordinance in this case only real estate, exclusive of improvements, is taxed, and, of it, only so much as is shown by the books of the city assessor as the assessment of real estate made for general city purposes, the effect of which is to omit from the special tax assessed all church property and city property, because such do not appear on the books of the city assessor, the church and city property being exempt from general city taxes, and the railroad property being assessed by the State Board of Equalization.
At the date of the enactment of this ordinance the only land owned by the city for park purposes in the West Park District was a small lot about sixty-five feet square and a tract about four acres in area which the city owned and had by ordinance appropriated to that purpose, but the ordinance reserved the right to the city to appropriate the land to other purposes or sell it if it should thereafter' see fit to do so. And there was no boulevard or street or avenue at that date in that district under the control of the Park Commissioners. But there had been selected and designated by the Park Commissioners in that district 134 acres of land for a park to be known as Penn Valley Park-and a tract of 26 acres for a park to be known as West Terrace Park, and proceedings were then pending for the condemnation of those lands, which proceedings were then far advanced, and have since the trial of this cause been concluded, and those two parks are now accomplished facts.
The assessed value of the lands in this district on the city tax books for 1898, exclusive of improvements, was $10,469,565; the assessed value of the buildings and improvements on the lands was $5,659',970.
Before enacting the ordinance in question making this special tax assessment, the city had already assessed taxes for general city purposes on all the property subject to taxation up to the limit allowed by the Constitution and these plaintiffs paid that assessment.
This appeal has been pending for several years in this court, having been continued from time to time by stipulation of counsel, and in the meantime other cases involving nearly the same points have come on for hearing and in those cases almost all the questions raised in .this appeal have been decided adversely to appellants' present contentions.
I. Appellants' first point is that if this Park Maintenance tax is to be understood as a tax for general purposes it is void for several reasons assigned. That point may be passed over with saying that this is in no sense a general tax; it must be maintained on the theory that it is a special tax for local improvements or not at all.
II. The next point presented is that the ordinance •assessing the special tax is unlawful because it does not conform to the requirements of section 33 of article 10 of the charter under which it was enacted. The alleged difference between the charter provision and the ordinance is that the charter authorizes the imposing of the tax on all the real estate, exclusive of improvements, in the district, whereas the ordinance imposes the tax only on so much of the real estate as is shown on the books of the city assessor for general city purposes, the result being the omission of the church, city and railroad properties already mentioned.
Whilst this question was not presented in the case of Kansas City v. Bacon, 147 Mo. 259, in exactly the same form in which it is now presented, yet one of the grounds on which the validity of the benefit assessment in question in that case was challenged was that it omitted from the burden of the tax assessed the same property that is now referred to and this court held that the assessment was not, for that reason, invalid.
In that case there was a condemnation of land for the park, and a benefit district marked out to be assessed to raise money to pay for the land taken; the freeholders' jury omitted church and railroad properties from the assessment, and the court held that it was lawful to do so. In the case at bar we have no benefit assessment by a jury, but we have an ordinance imposing a uniform ad valorem tax of 2y2 mills on the dollar of all real estate in the district exclusive of improvements except the city, church and railroad property. Whilst the charter in terms authorizes the Common Council to levy a- special tax in that way on all the real estate, exclusive of improvements, in the district, yet if the council, exercising the same reason that the jury exercised in the case of Kansas City v. Bacon, concluded that such property was not benefited, they were not compelled to include it in the assessment. Whether or not property possessing a distinct peculiar character is in fact benefited by a particular kind of improvement is a question to which different answers might be given. For a while it was doubted if railroad rights of way could be taxed for street improvements, but this court has recently settled that question in Heman Const. Co. v. Railroad, 206 Mo. 172, holding that the railroad right of way was liable.
Section 33 is the authority for this ordinance and if the ordinance violates that section it is invalid. That section of the charter does not require all of the real estate in the district to he assessed for this tax; it is permissive in its form,, it is a grant of power with a limit within which the Common Council may act. Article 10 of the city charter, adopted as it was in conformity with the provisions of the Constitution, is of at least as much force and effect as an act of the General Assembly enacting a similar charter; it confers on the city the power to levy such a tax, but the city is not compelled to go to the limit of the power in order to avail itself of its authority; it is sufficient if it acts within the limit.
Section 3, article 10, of the State Constitution requiring taxes to be uniform, and sections 6 and 7 of the same article, the one exempting properties of certain kinds and the other forbidding any other exemptions, refer only to general taxes; those sections neither exempt nor forbid the exemption of properties from special assessments for local improvement. If the legislative department of the State government or that of the city government should make an arbitrary selection of property to be taxed for the benefit of the whole district, omitting other property of like kind and used for like purposes, there are other clauses of both State and Federal constitutions that could be applied to prevent such inequality, but this is not such a case; here all properties of the same class are taxed and all properties of other classes are omitted from the assessment. The classification here shown is not beyond the legislative discretion of the Common Council.
If Kansas City had not availed itself of the provisions contained in sections 16 and 17 of article 9 of the Constitution, and if it was existing under a charter granted by the General Assembly, and if in such case the General Assembly had written into the charter the very same municipal powers that are contained in article 10- of the charter we are now construing, would any one doubt that the city had authority to establish these parks and maintain them by special assessments on private property in a benefit district established in conformity with such charter grants? If such doubts should arise they would rest alone on the idea that parks, and the boulevards appurtenant to the parks, were public improvements only, not local in their character, therefore to be obtained and maintained only at the expense of the city. But whatever doubts there may have been at one time on that point have been dispelled by the decisions of this court construing this very article 10 of the charter of Kansas City. [Kansas City v. Ward, 134 Mo. 172; Kansas City v. Bacon, 147 Mo. 259; Kansas City v. Bacon, 157 Mo. 450; Barber Asphalt Pav. Co. v. French, 158 Mo. 534, and other cases on this point cited in the brief for respondents.]
III. It is contended that the assessment is void because when made there was no park in the district. That contention is hardly supported by the facts in the case. It is true there was no finished park in the district, and there was no very considerable quantity of land acquired for park purposes, but there was a small piece of land unequivocally dedicated, and a tract of three or four acres donated by the city with the right to reclaim reserved. But if that was all that in fairness could be claimed by the city as ground for the ordinance imposing this tax, it would be liable to a graver charge affecting its good faith and validity than the strict technical grounds that are now brought against it. But' that was not all that, the city was providing for. Section 8 of article 10 requires that at least one park shall be provided in each district,.and the whole article contemplates á system of parks and park boulevards. The Park Commissioners had laid out and the city had adopted, as far as it. was able, two large parks in this district, and was pressing the litigation that was required for the accomplishment of the design with all its might, and we are told in the brief for respondents that one of these, at least, the Penn Valley Park, has been completed while this suit has been pending.
This is a suit in equity and we must bear in mind that a court of equity does not very readily lend its aid to advance a mere technical legal right, when there is no principle of natural justice involved; it prefers in such case generally to. leave the parties to the more technical courts of law. Whilst the petition frankly states that litigation on the part of the city was pending to acquire land and construct parks, yet there was no showing made either in the petition or at the trial that the work undertaken by the city was not being pressed with energy or that there was ground for any reasonable doubt that in the due course of the law there would be parks in the district for. which the money that this assessment would raise would he required. Under those conditions there was no occasion for the interposition of the extraordinary remedy of injunction.
IV. Appellants' fourth point relates to the omission of the church, city and railroad property from the assessment. We have already considered that subject in discussing appellants' second point.
V. Section 2 of the ordinance provides that "the special assessment hereby levied shall be used for the • purposes of maintaining, adorning, constructing, repairing and. otherwise improving the parks, parkways, roads, boulevards or avenues, or portions thereof, located in West Park District. "
Appellants complain of that that it is "too general, indefinite and uncertain," and they make a very pleasing argument to show that under the terms there used the money raised by the tax might he frittered away in frivolous and evanescent things in the neglect of more important and lasting works.
It is easier to point out defects in an instrument of this kind than it is to show how the evils suggested could be avoided. The learned counsel have not shown how this ordinance could be made more definite and certain without impairing the necessary powers of the Park Commissioners or without involving it in a wilderness'of detail. In the administration of laws it is often necessary, and it is not unusual, to trust something to the good faith and good judgment of the administrative officers. The security of the law depends to a great extent on the efficiency and honesty of the officers. The charter of Kansas City, in providing for the establishment of a system of parks, created a Board of Park Commissioners and prescribed a high grade of character for the persons who were to compose that board; they were to be five in number, "freeholders and electors of the city, well known for their intelligence and integrity, who shall have resided in the territory embraced within the city limits at the time of their appointment for a period of five years." The only compensation they were to receive was the honor and distinction the office conferred. If they showed cause for removal the law provided for their removal.
In the matter of park adornment there is room for wide differences of opinion, the opinions resulting in a great measure from individual taste and education; therefore it is next to impossible to be altogether specific in prescribing in an ordinance of what the adornment in a park shall consist. The framers of the city charter made the best provision for this uncertainty that they could, that is, by prescribing the qualifications of the members of the Board of Park Commissioners and trusting greatly to their integrity and good judgment. If the misfortune should occur that the men in that position fail to measure up to the high standard prescribed, or when their conduct is such as to show incompetency or worse, or when money is appropriated to a purpose that cannot fairly be said to be within the range of their legitimate discretion, there will be found law enough in the land and strength enough in the courts to right any such flagrant wrong they may commit.
VI. Appellants' sixth point is that the uniform tax of two and one-half mills on the dollar, as shown by the city assessment rolls, ignores the question of benefits, and assesses all the property alike in the face of the obvious fact that all is not to the same degree benefited. That is the same argument that has been in the past urged with so much force to show that the front-foot rule of assessment for street improvement was invalid. This court has expressed its opinion too often on that subject to render further discussion of it necessary.
VII. No notice was given the property-owners of the purpose to levy such a tax, and for that reason appellants contend that the assessment was void. The proposition involves also appellants ' tenth assignment, that is, that it deprives them of their property without due process of law.
Those points have been repeatedly decided by this court contrary to appellants' present contention in cases growing out of this article 10 of the charter of Kansas City; in the last of which decisions the whole subject and the former decisions were reviewed in an elaborate and exhaustive opinion by Chief Justice Cantt. [Barber Asphalt Pav. Co. v. French, 158 Mo. 534.] The occasion for the review of the subject in that case was a then recent decision of the Supreme Court of the United States, Norwood v. Baker, 172 U. S. 269, which was thought by some to lay down a different rule from that which this court had before-declared, but which when we came to consider it we thought was not so. In the case at bar the uniform ad valorem tax was imposed- by a direct exercise of the legislative power of the city government and it was held in the case last above referred to that in such case no notice to the property-owner was necessary and that the proceeding did not deprive him of his property without due process of law. We can say nothing more on the subject than was said in that case.
Yin. Appellants ' eighth assignment is that since this ordinance was passed at the same time when other ordinances of like character were passed covering in their aggregate all the territory in the city, the tax was a general one as distinguished from a special tax for local improvement, and since the taxing power for general city purposes had already been exercised to the full constitutional limit, the tax now in question was void.
True there were five ordinances passed at or about the same time, but each one of them covered only one district and its operation was entirely distinct from that of the others. This is a special, not a general tax.
IX. Lastly, the appellants think that by this tax they are denied that "equal protection of the law" that the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees them. This assignment rests chiefly on a fact we have already above discussed, that is, that church and railroad property within the district was omitted from the assessment. From what we above said on that subject we must rule this point against appellants.
The judgment is affirmed.
Gantt, C. J., Lamm and Fox, JJ., concur; Burgess, Graves and Woodson, JJ." dissent.