Case Name: Lally, Appellant, vs. Lally, Respondent
Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Wisconsin
Decision Date: 1913-01-28
Citations: 152 Wis. 56
Docket Number: 
Parties: Lally, Appellant, vs. Lally, Respondent.
Judges: 
Reporter: Wisconsin Reports
Volume: 152
Pages: 56–73

Head Matter:
Lally, Appellant, vs. Lally, Respondent.
October 29, 1912
January 28, 1913.
Divorce: Judgment: Alimony or final division of estate? Annuity: Modification: Stipulation.
1. Under see. 2369, Stats. (1898), a judgment in a divorce action decreeing a final division of the husband’s estate cannot be modified after the term at which it is entered; but a judgment for alimony may be modified at any time upon the application of either party.
2. A statement or recital in the judgment that it is for a final division of the estate is not conclusive. The legal effect of the judgment, not the mere language used, must govern.
3. A judgment that the husband, “his heirs, executors, and administrators,” shall pay to the wife, in monthly instalments, a certain sum per year during her life or until she shall remarry,, and that upon refusal or neglect to make such payments the wife may apply to the court for an order enforcing the same, ■ is a judgment for alimony, although it is expressly stated therein that “said payments are to be made and accepted as a full, absolute, and final division of the estate of the parties.”
4. The provision for payment by heirs, executors, and administrators is a nullity, since alimony, although it may be made a charge upon specific real estate, is not a charge upon the husband’s general estate.
5. A stipulation of the parties, upon which such judgment was in part based, that the yearly sum stated therein be accepted as a final division, is not a bar to the modification of the judgment.
6. Under sec. 2364, Stats. (1898), when a wife is given a portion of her husband’s estate as a final division of his property, such portion should by the judgment be transferred and set over to her to be and become her separate estate, subject to her control and dominion, and capable of being disposed of by her by will or otherwise. The court may require such portion to be paid to her in any reasonable number of payments running through a series of years, but the number of payments and their time of commencement and termination must be fixed by the judgment, and they cannot rest upon any contingency or be made defeasible by remarriage.
7. Assuming, but not deciding, that the court may as a final di- - vision of the property require the wife to take an annuity, such annuity must not be made to cease or be forfeited upon her remarriage.
ICekwin, Siekeckek, and Timlin, JJ., dissent.
Appeal from an order of tbe circuit court for Milwaukee county: WaeRPN D. TaeRakt, Circuit Judge.
Uevers&d.
In 1906. plaintiff and defendant were divorced by a decree entered by tbe circuit court for Milwaukee county. Tbe judge wbo tried tbe action found as facts
“that tbe defendant receives an income of at least $10,000 per annum,” and “that tbe plaintiff is without means of her own; that tbe sum of $300 per month to be paid to tbe plaintiff by tbe defendant during her lifetime or so long as she shall remain single is a reasonable sum to be paid to her by tbe defendant’ as a full, absolute, and final division of the estate of tbe parties hereto; provided, however, that on tbe remarriage of said, plaintiff such payments by said defendant at once cease. In making this finding as to tbe division of tbe estate of said parties I have taken into consideration with other things tbe fact that the parties hereto, by their attorneys, have stipulated and agreed in open court that the above sum be paid and accepted as an absolute, full, and final division of tbe estate of tbe above named parties. And I further find that such division and distribution of defendant’s property and estate as above found, and as stipulated and agreed to between tbe parties above named, is a just and equitable division and distribution of the estate of said parties.”
Tbe judgment, among other things, decreed
“that tbe defendant, his heirs, executors, and administrators, pay or cause to be paid to tbe plaintiff during her natural life or until she shall remarry tbe sum of $3,600 per year, payable in equal monthly instalments of $300 on the first day of each and every month during such term, said payments to be made and accepted as a full, absolute, and final division of tbe estate of said parties in accordance with tbe findings of fact and conclusions of law herein on file; provided, however, that on tbe remarriage of said plaintiff said payments herein provided for shall at once cease. . . . That upon the neglect or the refusal of the defendant to make such payments as are hereby adjudged, tbe plaintiff, upon filing an affidavit showing such failure or refusal, may apply to the court for an order for the enforcement of the same in such manner as to tbe court may seem proper.”
On tbe 15tb day of September, 1911, tbe plaintiff filed in said court ber petition for a revision and alteration of said judgment respecting tbe amount of alimony therein provided, as sbe claims, and for other relief which it is not nécessary to enumerate. Tbe court entered an order dismissing tbe petition for want of jurisdiction, on tbe ground that tbe judgment of divorce provided in terms for a final division of tbe estate, and should be so construed, and therefore could not be revised after tbe term at which it was entered. From sueb order tbe plaintiff appealed.
For tbe appellant there was a brief by Quarles, Spence & Quarles, attorneys, and William A. Vincent, of counsel, and oral argument by I.-A. Fish.
For tbe respondent there was a brief by Flanders, Bottwm> Fawsett & Bottwm> and oral argument by F. L. McNamara.

Opinion:
Tbe following opinion was filed November 19, 1912:
ViNJE, J".
Tbe plaintiff claims tbe judgment entered was for alimony; tbe defendant, that it was a final division of bis estate. If it was a judgment for alimony, then it may be modified at any time upon tbe application of either party. Sec. 2369, Stats. (1898); Campbell v. Campbell, 37 Wis. 206; Thomas v. Thomas, 41 Wis. 229. If it was a judgment decreeing a final division of defendant's estate, then tbe court has no power to modify it after tbe term. Sec. 2369, Stats. (1898); Bacon v. Bacon, 43 Wis. 197, 206; Kistler v. Kistler, 141 Wis. 491, 124 N. W. 1028. It cannot be both. Von Trott v. Von Trott, 118 Wis. 29, 94 N. W. 798; Kistler v. Kistler, supra.
Sec. 2364, Stats. (1898), provides that in lieu of alimony tbe court may "finally divide and distribute tbe estate, both real and personal, of tbe husband . . . between tbe parties and divest and transfer the title of any thereof accordingly." Was such a division, distribution, and transfer made by tbe judgment in the present case ? True, the trial court said so in the judgment when it was rendered and it said so when the order dismissing the petition was entered. In cases of doubt great weight should be aecordéd the recitals in the judgment, but they cannot be permitted to override the plain commands of the statute, nor can they change the inherent qualities of the judgment rendered. If the judgment in fact makes no final division of the husband's estate, it is not a judgment of final division though so named therein. The label may be useful in ascertaining what kind of judgment is rendered, but it is not conclusive. If the judgment rendered bears all the characteristics of a judgment for alimony and contains none of the essential requisites of a judgment of final division, then it is of little importance what name it gives itself. The judgment rendered-provides (1) for the payment, monthly, by the husband, his heirs, executors, and administrators, of $300 to the wife; (2) that such payments are to cease upon the death or remarriage of the wife; and (3) that upon a refusal or neglect of the husband to make the adjudged payments the plaintiff may apply to the court for an order for the enforcement of the same. These are all the provisions the judgment makes in respect to the husband's estate. Tested by the statutes and decisions they are all essential characteristics of a judgment of alimony, to wit, monthly payments, ceasing upon death or remarriage and enforceable by further application to the court. It is true the provision for payment by his heirs, executors,- and administrators does not harmonize with the idea of alimony, for that ceases upon the death of the husband. Campbell v. Campbell, 37 Wis. 206; Maxwell v. Sawyer, 90 Wis. 352, 63 N. W. 283. But in view of the failure of the judgment to meet the requirements of the statute relating to a final division of the husband's estate, that cannot be considered very significant. It was probably tbe result of inadvertence, perhaps of babit, for the words "his heirs, executors, and administrators" are' customarily linked with the name of an ob-ligor. In any event it is a nullity, for alimony is not a charge upon the husband's general estate. Campbell v. Campbell, 37 Wis. 206. It may be made a charge upon specific real estate owned by him. Sec. 2367, Stats. (1898). The judgment fails to comply with the statute because (1) it does not divide the estate between the parties; (2) it does not distribute it between them; and (3) it does not divest and transfer the title of any thereof to the wife. She is given no estate that she can own, control, mortgage, sell, or bequeath. For, confessedly, monthly payments ceasing upon either of two such uncertain contingencies as marriage and death are not very valuable assets to offer in the financial market, and are not subjects of a bequest in a will, as they cease upon the death of the testator. It was held in Kempster v. Evans, 81 Wis. 247, 51 N. W. 327, that an instalment of alimony to be paid the wife was not assignable before due. The same rule might perhaps be applicable to the payments provided for in this judgment, even if it were held to be a division of property, on the ground that each payment is no-more than necessary for the support of the wife and child until the next one falls due. The statute contemplates that when a wife is given a portion of her husband's estate as a final division of his property such portion should by the judgment be transferred and set over to her to be and become her separate estate, subject to her control and dominion, and capable of being disposed of by her will or otherwise. It is true the wife's portion may be required by the court to be paid to her in any reasonable number of payments running-through a series of years, because of the hardship upon the husband to pay it in one or several payments within a short time. But the number of payments, their time of commencement and termination, must be fixed by the judgment. They cannot rest upon any contingency nor be made defeasible by remarriage. Such provisions for a number of payments, however, do not prevent the wife from ascertaining, when the judgment is rendered, just how much of the estate she gets or when she is to receive it. Nor do they prevent her from mortgaging, selling, or bequeathing her portion. Such judgment i£ a division within the statute, and, like an ordinary money judgment, becomes a lien upon the husband's estate, and may be enforced like any money judgment — not by an application to the court for a further order, in his discretion, as is provided for in the judgment in question.
Assuming, but not deciding, that the court could, as a final division of property, require the wife to take an annuity, still the payments provided for in the judgment cannot be regarded as an annuity within the meaning of the statute relating to a final division of the husband's estate. It ceases upon remarriage. No final division of property under the statute can be made so that the wife's share reverts .to the husband upon her remarriage. Whatever is given her as her share of the property remains hers forever. She cannot be made to forfeit it by remarriage — not even if she remarries her former husband. Kistler v. Kistler, 141 Wis. 491, 124 N. W. 1028. The statute requires a final division, distribution, or transfer of title. Nothing less will satisfy it. Kempster v. Evans, 81 Wis. 247, 51 N. W. 327.
The findings show that the husband had an income of at least $10,000 a year and the wife none. The custody of one child was awarded to the wife and the custody of the other child to the husband. In view of his income and station in life, a monthly allowance of $300 to the wife would' seem to be only all adequate amount for her support and for the maintenance and education of the child whose custody was awarded to her. Payments made for support, whether in a gross sum or at stated intervals, must be regarded as alimony. Brenger v. Brenger, 142 Wis. 26, 125 N. W. 109.
If it be urged and conceded that a final division of property in the form of monthly payments during life or widowhood is more advantageous to the wife than the receipt of a gross estate at once, the answer is that the statute does not contemplate or permit such a judgment, and no judgment of final division not within the statute can lawfully be made. Bacon v. Bacon, 43 Wis. 197; Brenger v. Brenger, supra.
If the judgment be one for alimony, then the stipulation of the parties, recited by the trial court, that the sum of $3,600 per year be accepted as an absolute, full, and final division of the estate, is not a bar to the modification of the judgment. In Blake v. Blake, 68 Wis. 303, 32 N. W. 48, the wife stipulated to receive $2,000 in full of alimony and for a full share of her claim in and to any property of which the husband had been seised during coverture. But it was held such stipulation did not preclude the court from afterwards modifying the judgment, which was construed to be for alimony. See, also, Blake v. Blake, 75 Wis. 339, 43 N. W. 144.
That the legal effect of the judgment must govern and not the mere language used therein was decided as early as Bacon v. Bacon, 43 Wis. 197. In that case the judgment awarded "as further allowance and alimony to the plaintiff" the sum of $2,750 in money out of the husband's estate. Chief Justice RyaN, in speaking of this part of the judgment, says:
"It is quite apparent that the original judgment of the court below was framed upon a different theory, and regards both the real and personal estate assigned to the wife as alimony. Indeed it expressly so calls them. But this is a patent and mere misuse of the word, not affecting the legal construction of the judgment. The words, alimony and allowance, used in it, are superfluous. The judgment must be taken according to its legal effect as judgment for division and distribution between the parties of the husband's estate, real and personal."
So, also, in Kempster v. Evans, 81 Wis. 247, 51 N. W. 327, the judgment awarded to tbe wife $1,000 annually "as alimony for ber personal support and maintenance," payable as designated during her natural life in ease she remain unmarried. It further declared that such judgment for alimony should "be and stand as a final division of property between the plaintiff and the defendant." The court held that this was not a final division of the husband's estate because the payment or allowance was liable to be terminated at any time by marriage, and further, because it did not undertake to make the final division and distribution of the husband's estate contemplated by the statute, so as to vest in the wife any absolute and irrevocable right, title, or interest in any portion of such estate, or to vest the title thereof absolutely and irrevocably in the husband, so as to preclude the court from thereafter modifying said judgment and making other provision for the wife. In Von Trott v. Von Trott, 118 Wis. 29, 94 N. W. 798, the judgment decreed "that the said defendant pay to the said plaintiff the sum of $3,900 out of said defendant's estate as alimony, support, and maintenance and as a full and final division, partition, and distribution of said estate." It was held that the judgment was one of final division and not of alimony. In Kistler v. Kistler, 141 Wis. 491, 124 N. W. 1028, a judgment reciting that it was for "permanent alimony and division of property" was construed to be a judgment of final division. So it will be observed that, whether the recitals in the judgment as to what kind of a judgment it is are consistent or inconsistent with themselves, the court must look to the legal effect of the decree and determine from such effect what was in fact the judgment rendered. Tested by this rule it seems clear that the legal effect of the judgment under consideration was the granting of alimony and not the division and distribution of the husband's estate. The court therefore erred in dismissing the petition on tbe ground that it had no jurisdiction to alter or modify the judgment after the term at which it was rendered.
By the Court. — Order reversed, and cause remanded for further proceedings according to law.