Case Name: Tod Geoffrey HELFRICH, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Court: District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 2019-03-20
Citations: 272 So. 3d 454
Docket Number: No. 3D16-1941
Parties: Tod Geoffrey HELFRICH, Appellant,
v.
The STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: Before EMAS, C.J., and SALTER and FERNANDEZ, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Third Series
Volume: 272
Pages: 454–457

Head Matter:
Tod Geoffrey HELFRICH, Appellant,
v.
The STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. 3D16-1941
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
Opinion filed March 20, 2019
Carlos J. Martinez, Public Defender and Robert Kalter, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant.
Ashley Moody, Attorney General and Natalia Costea, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
Before EMAS, C.J., and SALTER and FERNANDEZ, JJ.
Judge Salter did not participate in oral argument.

Opinion:
PER CURIAM.
Tod Geoffrey Helfrich appeals his conviction, sentence, and denial of pre-trial and post-trial motions. Helfrich was charged and found guilty of grand theft auto, fraudulent use of personal information, fraudulent use of a credit card, robbery with a deadly weapon, and felony murder, as a habitual offender. The trial court sentenced him to life without parole. The two issues on appeal concern (1) the peremptory challenge of prospective juror Corn and (2) the trial court's failure to issue a written order specifying the conditions of probation that had been violated, in conformance with the trial court's oral revocation of probation. After review of the record, we affirm in part and reverse in part.
Based on the abuse of discretion standard, we find nothing in the record that compels this Court to hold that the trial court failed to conduct a genuineness analysis in applying Melbourne to the preemptory strike challenge. Nowell v. State, 998 So.2d 597, 602 (Fla. 2008) ; Melbourne v. State, 679 So.2d 759 (Fla. 1996). We, therefore, affirm as to this issue.
Responding to our colleague's dissent, we disagree that our affirmance conflicts with the cases cited in the dissenting opinion. In this case, (1) the objection made by the defense never specified juror Corn's race; (2) the defense never contended that the State's proffered reasons were pretextual (as opposed to merely disagreeing with the characterization of juror Corn's responses by the State); and (3) there was no basis offered, and none is apparent in the record, to suggest disparate or "non-race neutral" treatment of juror Corn in the context of other voir dire questioning, peremptory strikes, or the resulting composition of the jury.
Melbourne holds that, throughout all three steps of a challenge, "the burden of persuasion never leaves the opponent of the strike to prove purposeful discrimination." 679 So.2d at 764. While the appellant and our dissenting colleague are correct that the colloquy relating to juror Corn was less precise than it might have been, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion or that the defense carried its burden to demonstrate pretext or anything approaching "purposeful discrimination."
As to the absence of an order of revocation, the State concedes that the trial court failed to issue a written order on the violations of probation. We agree and reverse and remand to the trial court to issue the required written order specifying the conditions that were violated. See Burt v. State, 931 So.2d 1005, 1006 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006) ; Lumpkin v. State, 717 So.2d 122, 123 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998).
Affirmed in part; reversed in part and remanded.
SALTER and FERNANDEZ, JJ., concur.