Case Name: The STATE, Respondent, v. John BARNETT, Appellant
Court: South Carolina Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: South Carolina
Decision Date: 2004-03-08
Citations: 358 S.C. 199
Docket Number: No. 3751
Parties: The STATE, Respondent, v. John BARNETT, Appellant.
Judges: GOOLSBY, J., concurs.
Reporter: South Carolina Reports
Volume: 358
Pages: 199–208

Head Matter:
594 S.E.2d 534
The STATE, Respondent, v. John BARNETT, Appellant.
No. 3751.
Court of Appeals of South Carolina.
Submitted June 9, 2003.
Decided March 8, 2004.
Rehearing Denied April 22, 2004.
Assistant Appellate Defender Tara S. Taggart, of Columbia, for Appellant.
Attorney General Henry Dargan McMaster, Chief Deputy Attorney General John W. McIntosh, Assistant Deputy Attorney General Charles H. Richardson and Assistant Attorney General David Spencer, all of Columbia; and Solicitor Warren Blair Giese, of Columbia, for Respondent.

Opinion:
HOWARD, J.:
John Barnett was convicted of two counts of kidnapping, two counts of first-degree burglary, and one count of grand larceny of a motor vehicle. Subsequently, he was sentenced to thirty years imprisonment for each of the kidnapping charges, forty years imprisonment for each of the burglary charges, and five years imprisonment for the grand larceny of a motor vehicle charge, all to run concurrently. Barnett appeals, arguing the indictment charging grand larceny of a motor vehicle was insufficient to confer subject matter jurisdiction because the body of the indictment failed to allege the motor vehicle's value was in excess of one thousand dollars. We affirm.
FACTUAL/PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A grand jury indicted Barnett for two counts of kidnapping, two counts of first-degree burglary, and one count of grand larceny of a motor vehicle. The indictment for grand larceny of a motor vehicle was captioned "GRAND LARCENY OF MOTOR VEHICLE UNDER $5000 S.C.Code: 16-13-30(B)(1)," and alleged:
[t]hat John Barnett did in Richland County on or about March 10, 2000, feloniously take and carry away the personal property of Rosa Daniels to wit: 1988 Pontiac 6000 with S.C. tag 542KJD, valued under $5000.00. Against the peace and dignity of the State, and contrary to the statute in such case made and provided.
(emphasis added).
Subsequently, Barnett was convicted on all the charges and sentenced to thirty years imprisonment for each of the kidnap ping charges, forty years imprisonment for each of the burglary charges, and five years imprisonment for the grand larceny of a motor vehicle charge, all to run concurrently. Barnett appeals.
LAW/ANALYSIS
Barnett argues the indictment for grand larceny of a motor vehicle was insufficient to confer subject matter jurisdiction because the body of the indictment did not allege the stolen vehicle was valued at more than one thousand dollars. We disagree.
In evaluating the sufficiency of an indictment, this Court should "look at the issue with a practical eye in view of the surrounding circumstances." State v. Gunn, 313 S.C. 124, 130, 487 S.E.2d 75, 78 (1993); see also State v. Thompson, 305 S.C. 496, 504 n. 1, 409 S.E.2d 420, 425 n. 1 (Ct.App.1991) (holding when evaluating an indictment, this Court should give "a common sense reading [to] the indictment as a whole"). If the offense is stated with sufficient certainty and particularity to enable the trial court to know what judgment to pronounce, and the defendant to know what he is called upon to answer, the indictment is sufficient to confer subject matter jurisdiction. Carter v. State, 329 S.C. 355, 362, 495 S.E.2d 773, 777 (1998). "The true test of the sufficiency of an indictment is not whether it could be made more definite and certain, but whether it contains the necessary elements of the offense intended to be charged and sufficiently apprises the defendant of what he must be prepared to meet." Browning v. State, 320 S.C. 366, 368, 465 S.E.2d 358, 359 (1995) (citations omitted). "An indictment passes legal muster if it 'charges the crime substantially in the language of the . . statute prohibiting the crime or so plainly that the nature of the offense charged may be easily understood....'" State v. Reddick, 348 S.C. 631, 635, 560 S.E.2d 441, 443 (Ct.App.2002) (quoting S.C.Code Ann. 17-19-20 (1985)).
South Carolina Code Annotated section 16-13-30(B) (2003) defines grand larceny as "[larceny] of goods, chattels, instruments, or other personalty valued in excess of one thousand dollars----" See State v. Parker, 351 S.C. 567, 570, 571 S.E.2d 288, 289 (2002) ("[G]rand larceny is the felonious taking and carrying away of the goods of another, where the value exceeds $1,000."). Larceny is the taking and carrying away of the goods of another without consent. State v. Brown, 274 S.C. 48, 49, 260 S.E.2d 719, 720 (1979).
It is clear the indictment sufficiently alleges larceny, a misdemeanor, as it alleged Barnett feloniously took a motor vehicle from Rosa Daniels against the peace and dignity of the State. See Brown, 274 S.C. at 49, 260 S.E.2d at 720 (holding larceny is the taking and carrying away of the goods of another without consent). However, the remaining inquiry is whether the indictment sufficiently alleges the motor vehicle was worth more than one thousand dollars, elevating the charge to grand larceny. See S.C.Code Ann. § 16-13-30(B).
This case is analogous to State v. Wilkes, 353 S.C. 462, 578 S.E.2d 717 (2003). In Wilkes, the defendant was convicted of one count of resisting arrest and two counts of assault on a correctional facility employee. One of the indictments was captioned, "ASSAULT ON CORRECTIONAL FACILITY EMPLOYEE § 16-3-630," and the other indictment was captioned "ASSAULT ON CORRECTIONAL FACILITY EMPLOYEE." Both indictments alleged the defendant "did in Chester County on or about April 24, 1999[,] assault . [an officer] while she[/he] was attempting to process him after his arrest." Neither of the indictments, within their bodies, alleged the officers were correctional facility employees.
On appeal, this Court vacated the two indictments for assault on a correctional facility employee, holding the indict ments were jurisdictionally defective because they failed to allege the officer was a correctional facility employee. This Court further held the captions of the indictments could not cure the otherwise defective indictments. Id. at 464, 578 S.E.2d at 718.
On grant of certiorari, our supreme court reversed, holding the indictments were sufficient to confer subject matter jurisdiction to the circuit court because, reading the captions in conjunction with the body of the indictment, the indictments "stated the offense with sufficient certainty and particularity to enable the trial court to know what judgment to pronounce and . [the defendant] to know what he was being called upon to answer." Id. at 465, 578 S.E.2d at 719.
In the present case, although the body of the indictment fails to specifically state the motor vehicle's value was in excess of one thousand dollars, the caption of the indictment states the charge is "GRAND LARCENY" and cites "S.C.Code: 16 — 13—30(B)(1)." We conclude this language, coupled with the language in the body of the indictment, is sufficient to state the offense of grand larceny with certainty and particularity such that the circuit court knew what judgment to pronounce and Barnett knew what to defend against. Thus, the indictment is not jurisdictionally defective.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the circuit court is
AFFIRMED.
GOOLSBY, J., concurs.
BEATTY, J., dissenting in a separate opinion.
. The indictment originally alleged Clanda James owned the motor vehicle. However, the indictment was amended to name Rosa Daniels as the owner of the motor vehicle. The amendment of the name of the victim under these circumstances is not a jurisdictional flaw. See State v. Johnson, 314 S.C. 161, 166, 442 S.E.2d 191, 194 (Ct.App.1994) (holding an amendment changing the name of the owner of the property listed in an indictment for breach of trust did not change the nature of the offense); State v. Sweat, 221 S.C. 270, 273-74, 70 S.E.2d 234, 235-36 (1952) (holding an amendment to a larceny indictment did not change the nature of the offense, where the indictment changed the name of the victim); see also State v. Guthrie, 352 S.C. 103, 111-12, 572 S.E.2d 309, 313-14 (Ct.App.2002) (holding an element is an essential ingredient of the crime when an amendment to that element would materially change the proof required to convict the defendant of the crime); 41 Am.Jur.2d Indictments and Informations § 168 (1995) (stating an amendment is substantive and thus not permitted unless "the same defense is available, to the defendant both before and after the amendment and upon the same evidence").