Case Name: Michael Thomas STARK, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Michael J. ASTRUE, Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant-Appellee
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 2011-12-21
Citations: 462 F. App'x 756
Docket Number: No. 10-55714
Parties: Michael Thomas STARK, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Michael J. ASTRUE, Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant-Appellee.
Judges: Before: NOONAN, GOULD, and IKUTA, Circuit Judges.
Reporter: West's Federal Appendix
Volume: 462
Pages: 756–757

Head Matter:
Michael Thomas STARK, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Michael J. ASTRUE, Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant-Appellee.
No. 10-55714.
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
Argued and Submitted Dec. 8, 2011.
Filed Dec. 21, 2011.
Thomas Garrett Roche, San Diego, CA, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
Shea Lita Bond, Amita Baman Tracy, Special Assistant U.S. Attorney, Ssa-So-cial Security Administration Office of the General Counsel, San Francisco, CA, Thomas C. Stahl, Chief Counsel, Office of the U.S. Attorney, San Diego, CA, for Defendant-Appellee.
Before: NOONAN, GOULD, and IKUTA, Circuit Judges.

Opinion:
MEMORANDUM
The ALJ's assessment of Michael Thomas Stark's residual functional capacity was sufficient under Social Security Ruling 96-8p because the Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") addressed and considered the opinions of each of Stark's examining and treating physicians, described the exertional and nonexertional limitations diagnosed by each, and explained that every physician's opinion was consistent with light-level work. See SSR 96-8p. Moreover, even assuming that the ALJ erred in failing to make more specific factual findings as to Stark's nonexertional limitations, that error was harmless because each limitation diagnosed by a physician or described by Stark was included in the ALJ's hypothetical questions to the vocational expert ("VE"), and in response to each of the hypothetical questions, the VE stated that jobs existing in substantial numbers in the economy could be performed by a person with such limitations. Cf. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1560(c); Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1101 (9th Cir.1999).
At his hearing, Stark did not raise the argument that the ALJ had failed to discharge his "affirmative responsibility" to "obtain a reasonable explanation for any apparent conflict" between the VE's testimony and the Dictionary of Occupational Titles. Massachi v. Astrue, 486 F.3d 1149, 1152-53 (9th Cir.2007). But even assuming that such an argument is not therefore waived, see Meanel v. Apfel, 172 F.3d 1111, 1115 (9th Cir.1999), it fails on the merits, because Stark has not pointed to any apparent inconsistency here: The ability to engage in frequent reaching and handling is not clearly inconsistent with the inability to engage in excessive or repetitive use of the hands. See U.S. Dep't of Labor, Selected Characteristics of Occupations De fined, in the Revised Dictionary of Occupational Titles Appx. C (1993) (defining "reaching" and "handling").
AFFIRMED.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.