Case Name: The Wells & French Company v. Martin Kapaczynski
Court: Illinois Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Illinois
Decision Date: 1905-06-23
Citations: 218 Ill. 149
Docket Number: 
Parties: The Wells & French Company v. Martin Kapaczynski.
Judges: 
Reporter: Illinois Reports
Volume: 218
Pages: 149–158

Head Matter:
The Wells & French Company v. Martin Kapaczynski.
Opinion filed June 23, 1905
Rehearing denied December 6, 1905.
1. Appeals and Errors—the Appellate Court’s finding of facts is conclusive. A finding of the ultimate facts incorporated by the Appellate Court in its judgment reversing a judgment at law without remanding is conclusive as to the facts so found, the only question for the Supreme Court being whether the facts found justify the judgment entered.
2. Master and servant—when doctrine of assumed risk has no application. If the Appellate Court, in reversing a judgment in favor of the defendant in an action by a servant for personal injury, finds that the injury resulted from the wrongful and negligent order of the defendant, the plaintiff being without fault, the doctrine of assumed risk has no application.
Scott and Hand, JJ., and Cartwright, C. J., dissenting.
Appeal from the Branch Appellate Court for the First District;—heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. R. W. Clifford, Judge, presiding.
This was an action on the case brought by the appellee, against appellant, to recover for personal injuries.
The substantial averments in the declaration are, that the defendant was possessed of, using, controlling and operating a certain factory, building and plant, commonly called “car shops,” which then and there contained certain machinery, operated by steam power, used and operated in the conduct of the business of the said defendant; that the plaintiff was in the employ of said defendant as a planer, under the orders and direction of a certain foreman or boss of defendant and whose orders and commands in the premises plaintiff was obliged to obey, and that on the day aforesaid said foreman or boss of the defendant then and there ordered and directed him to work at and on a certain machine to plane certain pieces of wood there; that in pursuance of such order he then and there did proceed to do said work at and upon said machine; that thereupon it became and was the duty of the defendant to have seen that said machine was a reasonably safe and proper one for the performance of said work, and that it was suitable for the performance thereof and would not subject the plaintiff to unnecessary exposure of loss of life or limb in the performance of his duties as servant of the defendant; that the said defendant, in disregard of its duty in this behalf, did not see to it that said machine was a reasonably safe, proper and suitable one for the performance of such work, inasmuch as the tables of the said machine were allowed to be and remain at a great distance apart, to-wit, at a distance of three and a quarter inches, whereby and by means of the premises and the wrongful and negligent order and command of said foreman or boss, and while plaintiff, in the exercise of due care and caution for his safety, was planing certain pieces of wood on said machine, said wood was caught and tipped into the knives of said machine, and the fingers and left hand of plaintiff were then and there thrown against said knives, and by means thereof three of the fingers of plaintiff were then and there cut off and amputated, and the plaintiff was otherwise greatly and permanently wounded, disabled and injured, etc.
To the declaration a plea of not guilty was filed and two verdicts rendered in favor of the plaintiff were set aside. Upon the third trial the court, on motion of the defendant, after all the evidence was introduced, directed a verdict in its favor and entered judgment thereon. It was thereupon stipulated by the parties that upon an appeal to the Appellate Court, if the case should be reversed upon the ground that the plaintiff was entitled to recover under all the evidence introduced on the trial and submitted to the jury, then judgment should be entered in that court against the defendant, and in favor of the plaintiff, for the sum of $3000. Plaintiff prosecuted his appeal to the Appellate Court for the First District, where the judgment of the trial court was reversed and a judgment entered in favor of the plaintiff for $3000, in pursuance of said agreement. The Appellate Court having found the facts different from that of the trial court, made the following finding of the ultimate facts: “First, that appellee wrongfully and negligently ordered appellant to perform certain work, and that in obeying such order appellant was injured, all as charged in the declaration; second, that the appellant was not guilty of any negligence which caused or contributed to such injury.” The defendant prosecuted this further appeal.
F. J. Canty, (J. C. M. Clow, of counsel,) for appellant.
Edward Maher, for appellee.

Opinion:
Mr. Justice Wilkin
delivered the opinion of the court:
Appellant relies upon two propositions for a reversal in this court: First, that, by plaintiff's own testimony he was told by the foreman that he could take his choice of going ahead and doing the work or going home, and it is said that if he chose to remain and go on with the work he did so at his own risk, and that the only constraint under which he proceeded was moral constraint, which the law does not and cannot recognize, and that there is no legal coercion; and second, that the claim of the plaintiff of assurance of safety cannot be applied to the case, for the reason that the plaintiff was as well aware of the danger of using the machine as was the boss or foreman who, it is claimed, ordered him to proceed with the work; and it is argued that the only question for our consideration is whether the Appellate Court was justified in finding that the verdict should have been for the plaintiff instead of for the defendant. Both propositions insisted upon by counsel must necessarily depend upon the facts of the case, and the Appellate Court having found the facts adversely to the defendant below, the legal questions attempted to be raised cannot be considered.
Under the provisions of section 86 of the Practice act and the repeated decisions of this court, the finding of facts by the Appellate Court is conclusive upon this court, and the only question which we can consider is whether the judgment as entered by the Appellate Court was such as should have been rendered under the facts so found by it. Accepting as true the finding that defendant negligently ordered the plaintiff to perform certain work, and that in obeying such order the plaintiff was injured, all as charged in the declaration, and that the plaintiff was not guilty of any negligence which caused or contributed to such injury, there can be no serious question but that the judgment of the Appellate Court was the only one which could, under the law, have been properly entered. As to the binding- effect of the finding of facts by the Appellate Court upon this court, see Supple v. Agnew, 202 Ill. 351, and cases cited. The injury to the plaintiff having resulted, according to the finding of the Appellate Court, from the wrongful and negligent order of the defendant, and the plaintiff himself being without fault,' the doctrine of assumed risk can have no application whatever to the case. Chicago Anderson Pressed Brick Co. v. Sobkowiak, 148 Ill. 573; Dallemand v. Saalfeldt, 175 id. 310; Western Stone Co. v. Muscial, 196 id. 382; Chicago and Eastern Illinois Railroad Co. v. Hecrey, 203 id. 492.
The judgment of the Appellate Court is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.