Case Name: Winifred Culpepper BRASWELL, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Houston P. MORRIS, Defendant-Appellant
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1972-09-12
Citations: 275 So. 2d 189
Docket Number: No. 11901
Parties: Winifred Culpepper BRASWELL, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Houston P. MORRIS, Defendant-Appellant.
Judges: Before AYRES, BOLIN and HALL, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 275
Pages: 189–196

Head Matter:
Winifred Culpepper BRASWELL, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Houston P. MORRIS, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 11901.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Second Circuit.
Sept. 12, 1972.
On Rehearing Feb. 6, 1973.
Charles H. Ryan, Monroe, for defendant-appellant.
John E. Lawhon, Shreveport, for plaintiff-appellee.
Before AYRES, BOLIN and HALL, JJ.

Opinion:
BOLIN, Judge.
In 1964 defendant Morris purchased from plaintiff a house and lot in Monroe, Louisiana, for which he gave cash consideration of $500 and his promissory note for $14,000, secured by a vendor's lien and mortgage on the property. Asserting defendant had violated the mortgage agreement by removal of the buildings from the lot, plaintiff filed this suit October 11, 1971 to recover the balance due on the note, plus interest, attorney's fees and costs. Without assigning written reasons the trial judge rendered judgment in favor of plaintiff for the full amount of her demand and defendant appeals, complaining only of that portion of the judgment casting him for attorney's fees and costs.
Before this court appellee has filed a motion to dismiss the appeal based on the premise that appellánt had lost his right to appeal since he voluntarily and unconditionally acquiesced in the judgment by payment of the judgment in full, including principal, interest, attorney's fees and all costs. Attached to the motion to dismiss is a copy of a letter from defendant's attorney wherein he stated he was enclosing a release and, if there were no objections, he would appreciate the plaintiff's attorney signing the release on behalf of Mrs. Braswell and returning it to him so that he might have the judgment released and cancelled from the mortgage records of Ouachita Parish. Also attached to the motion is a copy of the release which recites the fact the judgment was rendered in favor of plaintiff and that the judgment "having been paid and satisfied in full, the Clerk of Court and Ex-Officio Recorder of Mortgages for the Parish of Ouachita is hereby authorized and directed to release this judgment in full and to cancel its inscription in the Mortgage Records of his office." This release was signed by plaintiff through her attorney and the judicial mortgage was admittedly cancelled from the record.
Defendant filed an opposition to the motion to dismiss in which he admitted that the above mentioned letter and release were in fact written by him and that the release was signed and the judicial mortgage had been cancelled. Howeyer, he asserts his payment of the judgment was pursuant to the order of the court and should not be held to be a voluntary acquiescence.
These pleadings raise the question: Has appellant lost the right to appeal because he voluntarily and unconditionally acquiesced in the judgment rendered against him by paying the judgment in full, including principal, interest, attorney's fees and all costs ?
Initially we must determine whether the motion to dismiss and answer thereto can be examined by this court to determine the answer to the foregoing question or if the case should be remanded for the taking of testimony on the point. We conclude the facts alleged in the motion to dismiss, which are admitted by appellant in his opposition to the motion, supply sufficient evidence to permit of an opinion on the merits. In Hogan v. Hogan, 181 La. 27, 158 So. 610 (1935) the Louisiana Supreme Court held:
"This court has repeatedly held that where the facts on which the motion to dismiss is based are admitted, it is not necessary to remand the case, in order that proof may be offered to establish those facts. Our reading of the motion to dismiss and the answer thereto in this record leaves no doubt in our minds that the appellant has admitted substantially all of the facts relied upon by the movers, and that this court has ample evidence in the record to justify an opinion on the merits."
We now consider the law relative to the issue raised by the motion; i. e., has defendant lost his right of appeal? Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure, Article 2085 provides:
"An appeal cannot be taken by a party who confessed judgment in the proceedings in the trial court or who voluntarily and unconditionally acquiesced in a judgment rendered against him. Confession of or acquiescence in part of a divisible judgment or in a favorable part of an indivisible judgment does not preclude an appeal as to other parts of such judgment."
The preceding article has been interpreted in relatively few cases and with varying results. In Griffis v. Harmon & Crane (La.App. 2d Cir. 1959), 108 So.2d 822 the court had before it the cancellation of a judgment against defendant-appellant which read as follows:
"By virtue of an order dated May 14th, 1958, signed by W. D. Goff, Jr., Attorney, authorizing and directing the cancellation of this, as same has been paid in full, said judgment is hereby cancel-led. This May 17th, 1958." Signed: J. J. Smith "Clerk of Court".
This court held defendant had acquiesced in the judgment since there was no allegation that appellant's payment of the judgment was made under protest, and there was no express reservation of his right to appeal. Lacking any allegation of such reservation, the court reasoned it could only be concluded such reservation was not made. In so holding the court stated:
"While courts zealously preserve and enforce the right of appeal, and are exceedingly loath to deny such right to a party litigant, they are not at liberty, under the guise of equity, to enforce such a right in the face of the clear codal provision above noted." (Art. 567 of the Code of Practice — now C.C.P. Art. 2085). See also Adolph v. Sewerage & Water Board Pension Committee (La.App. 4th Cir. 1967) 202 So.2d 664; Washington v. Independence Oak Flooring Co. (La.App. 1st Cir. 1959) 114 So.2d 599; Robicheaux v. Albritton (La.App. 2nd Cir. 1959) 113 So.2d 87.
In the recent case of Langlois v. Southern Timber, Inc., of Woodville, Miss., et al (La.App. 1st Cir. 1971) 256 So.2d 320, the court dismissed an appeal under C.C.P. Article 2085 on the ground defendant-appellant had acquiesced in the judgment by unconditionally and voluntarily executing it. The court stated:
". . . Voluntary payment without reservation of rights would certainly seem to be an acquiescence in, or voluntary execution of the judgment."
Running through the decisions in cases involving loss of right to appeal because of voluntary and unconditional acquiescence in a judgment is the paramount idea that in order to preserve the right of appeal as to any part of a judgment there must be an indication of an intention to reserve such right. In the instant case there is no such reservation. Rather, the release of the judgment appealed is complete, without any expressed or implied intention that it should not be considered satisfied. The words of the release are unambiguous, containing no reservation of the right to pursue by appeal the question of the correctness of the portion of the judgment dealing with attorney's fees. Furthermore, prior to the appeal the release was obtained and used for the purpose of having eradicated from the records the judicial mortgage created by the judgment.
The appeal is dismissed at appellant's cost.