Case Name: CITY OF HOUSTON v. SCANLAN et al.
Court: Texas Courts of Civil Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1929-03-07
Citations: 16 S.W.2d 550
Docket Number: No. 9267
Parties: CITY OF HOUSTON v. SCANLAN et al.
Judges: 
Reporter: South Western Reporter Second Series
Volume: 16
Pages: 550–553

Head Matter:
CITY OF HOUSTON v. SCANLAN et al.
(No. 9267.)
Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. Galveston.
March 7, 1929.
Rehearing Denied April 11, 1929.
Sewall Myer, J. H. Painter, and Sidney Benbow, all of Houston, for appellant.
Walter E. Brown, of Houston, for appel-lees.

Opinion:
GRAVES, J.
The city of Houston herein appeals from a judgment of the trial court perpetuating a temporary injunction it had granted in this cause on July 15 of 1927, which this court affirmed on October 26, 1927, as reported in San Jacinto Const. Co. v. Scanlan, 300 S. W. at page 220.
The opinion on the former appeal reflects the nature of the case, the names of the parties, and many facts common to both records; for present purposes, without repetition of those so appearing of record, it is only deemed necessary that such additional matters be recited as are material to the disposition of the appeal now at bar.
The final order here challenged, after formally reciting the perpetuation of the temporary injunction before issued, runs: "That the defendants, San Jacinto Construction Company, a corporation, and the City of Houston, a municipal corporation, be, and they are hereby, permanently and perpetually enjoined from destroying the grass, herbage and trees on the property of the plaintiffs, Kate Scanlan, Lillian Scanlan, Stella Scanlan, and Alberta Scanlan, southwest of the southwest curb line on Calhoun Avenue,' in Houston, Texas, as such curb existed at the time the defendants began the paving of Calhoun Avenue, and from placing any hard surface pavement for vehicular traffle southwest of the said curb line on plaintiffs' property."
There were also reciprocal claims for damages between the opposing parties, as well as a cross-action for such a recovery by the construction company over against its codefend-ant, the city of Houston, but all these were denied, and no complaint upon that score has been presented here; the construction company has not appeared at all.
The court submitted two special issues to a jury relating to the appellees' action for damages, which were answered unfavorably to them, but, there having been no request in writing for the submission thereof, did not submit any on the claims appellant city made in its pleadings to having acquired an easement for a street and sidewalk in the strip of property involved through asserted dedication of it by the appellees or their ancestors, as well as through prescription and limitation resulting from its own alleged long use thereof for such purposes, which title it had sought to have quieted; neither was there an objection presented to the charge under R. S. art. 2185, on the ground that it failed to submit issues on either limitation or prescription, but there was this one on the omission to present the Claim for dedication: "The defendants except to the action of the Court in taking away from the jury the question of the title to the property involved in this suit, and in holding that there was no evidence raising the question of a general dedication by the plaintiffs in this ease, and that the defendant, the City of Houston, had no right to take such property for street purposes, and in refusing to submit to the jury the issues of dedication of the land for general purposes whatsoever outside of the fence lines situated between the fence and the curb line north of Block No. 404, because there was sufficient evidence by reason of long-continued use of the public and acts of the plaintiffs herein to raise the question and entitle its submission to the jury."
As concerns limitation and prescription, there having been neither written request for, nor objection to the charge omitting, the submission of either, there was plainly, under R. S. arts. 2185 and 2190, no predicable error. Gulf, C. & S. F. Railway v. Conley, 113 Tex. 472, 260 S. W. 561, 32 A. L. R. 1183; Texas Co. v. Ramsower (Tex. Com. App.) 7 S.W.(2d) 876; Robertson & Mueller v. Holden (Tex. Com. App.) 1 S.W.(2d) 570; Stolle v. Kanetzky (Tex. Civ. App.) 259 S. W. 657; El Paso Printing Co. v. Glick (Tex. Com. App.) 263 S. W. 260; St. Louis, B. & M. Railway v. Price (Tex. Com. App.) 269 S. W. 422; Wichita Falls Electric Co. v. Huey (Tex. Civ. App.) 246 S. W. 692; Fresnos Land & Irrigation Co. v. Box (Tex. Civ. App.) 233 S. W. 369; F. C. Pennington Produce Co. v. Browning (Tex. Civ. App.) 293 S. W. 935; Eastern Texas Electric Co. v. Baker (Tex. Civ. App.) 238 S. W. 339; Frick v. Ry. Co. (Tex. Civ. App.) 207 S. W. 200; Rosenthal v. Hillebrandt (Tex. Civ. App.) 280 S. W. 884; Dancy v. Peyton (Tex. Civ. App.) 282 S. W. 822; Ormsby v. Ratcliffe (Tex. Sup.) 1 S.W.(2d) 1085.
Appellant city insists that the situation is different, however, as concerns the issue of dedication, in view of the fact that it did protest against the refusal to submit that matter to the jury in the quoted objection to the charge, and that the trial court's action notwithstanding constituted reversible error; while the question thus raised does not seem free from doubt, we conclude that it has been determined the other way in the cases cited. Here the court had failed to charge upon that subject at all, and the city's plea of having acquired title by dedication constituted an independent issue and a complete defense to the suit, wherefore, under these cases, especially the Conley, Orms-by, Browning, and Frick holdings, supra, the mere objection to the court's charge because it failed to submit that issue was not sufficient ; it still being incumbent upon the city to request such submission.
It is true the judgment itself- contains this recital: "And, the pleading and the evidence of all parties having been heard and considered, the Cpurt is of the opinion and holds that the defendant, City of Houston, upon its plea of dedication, prescription and limitation of and to the property involved in this suit, had failed to introduce and offer sufficient evidence to justify the submission of its claim to the property involved in this suit to the jury, and the Court, therefore, refused to submit defendant City of Houston's cross-action and claim to the title to the property involved herein by dedication, prescription, or limitation to the jury,- and decided against said defendant City of Houston upon such cross-action and pleas, and submitted to the jury only the following issues;" then follow the issues relating to damages, as above stated.
That, however, seems to us only to have been a statement of the procedure actually taken; the fact undisputedly remains that appellant did not make written request for the submission of any one of these three issues, pursuant to the provisions of article 2185, and permitted the court without it to so call in the jury's aid and enter the judgment upon the verdict returned. The mandatory terms of article 2190, as applied to that situation, appear therefore to prohibit a reversal on that ground. Since the city's claim to the easement so acquired was its only defense to the. suit for injunction, this conclusion determines the merits of the 'appeal and renders unnecessary the discussion of other questions presented in the briefs; were it proper to pass on the question of the sufficiency of the evidence to warrant the submis sion of an issue as to whether the city had acquired by dedication the right claimed, a majority of the court would hold that it was, while this member wo.uld hold the other way.
The judgment has been affirmed.
Affirmed.