Case Name: ANDREW THOMAS HARTSELL v. INTEGON INDEMNITY CORPORATION
Court: Supreme Court of North Carolina
Jurisdiction: North Carolina
Decision Date: 1997-12-05
Citations: 347 N.C. 385
Docket Number: No. 342A97
Parties: ANDREW THOMAS HARTSELL v. INTEGON INDEMNITY CORPORATION
Judges: 
Reporter: North Carolina Reports
Volume: 347
Pages: 385–386

Head Matter:
ANDREW THOMAS HARTSELL v. INTEGON INDEMNITY CORPORATION
No. 342A97
(Filed 5 December 1997)
Insurance § 472 (NCI4th)— leased vehicle — destruction by fire — payment to lessor as loss payee — claim by lessee
The trial court erred in dismissing plaintiff insured’s claim against defendant insurer for the value of his leased vehicle which was stolen and destroyed by fire because the insurer paid the named loss payee, the lessor, the actual cash value of the vehicle where the policy provided that a loss was to be paid “as interest may appear to [the insured] and the loss payee”; after the loss plaintiff continued to make lease payments for the full duration of the lease; and the plaintiff is thus entitled to insurance proceeds to the extent of his interest in the vehicle as of the date of the loss.
Am Jur 2d, Automobile Insurance §§ 41, 42, 137-139.
Automobile property insurance-sole, unconditional, or absolute ownership clause. 71 ALR2d 223.
What constitutes ownership of automobile within meaning of automobile insurance owner’s policy. 36 ALR4th 7.
Appeal by plaintiff pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-30(2) from the decision of a divided panel of the Court of Appeals, 126 N.C. App. 511,485 S.E.2d 893 (1997), affirming an order entered by Johnson (E. Lynn), J., on 27 November 1995 in Superior Court, Moore County, which allowed defendant’s motion to dismiss pursuant to N.C. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Heard in the Supreme Court 17 November 1997.
Robbins May & Rich, L.L.P, by P. Wayne Robbins and Carol M. White, for plaintiff-appellant.
Kitchin, Neal, Webb & Futrell, P.A., by Stephan R. Futrell, for defendant-appellee.

Opinion:
PER CURIAM.
For the reasons stated in the dissenting opinion for the Court of Appeals by Greene, J., the decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed. The case is remanded to the Court of Appeals for further remand to the Superior Court, Moore County, for further proceedings not inconsistent with said dissenting opinion.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.