Case Name: J.L. SPOONS, INC., Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Nancy J. DRAGANI, Acting-Director, Ohio Department of Safety, et al., Defendants-Appellants
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 2008-08-15
Citations: 538 F.3d 379
Docket Number: No. 07-3178
Parties: J.L. SPOONS, INC., Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Nancy J. DRAGANI, Acting-Director, Ohio Department of Safety, et al., Defendants-Appellants.
Judges: Before: RYAN, SILER, and COLE, Circuit Judges.
Reporter: Federal Reporter 3d Series
Volume: 538
Pages: 379–393

Head Matter:
J.L. SPOONS, INC., Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Nancy J. DRAGANI, Acting-Director, Ohio Department of Safety, et al., Defendants-Appellants.
No. 07-3178.
United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.
Argued: March 18, 2008.
Decided and Filed: Aug. 15, 2008.
ARGUED: Robert J. Krummen, Office of the Ohio Attorney General, Columbus, Ohio, for Appellants. J. Michael Murray, Berkman, Gordon, Murray & DeVan, Cleveland, Ohio, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Robert J. Krummen, William P. Marshall, Charles E. Febus, Office of the Ohio Attorney General, Columbus, Ohio, for Appellants. J. Michael Murray, Berk-man, Gordon, Murray & DeVan, Cleveland, Ohio, for Appellee.
Before: RYAN, SILER, and COLE, Circuit Judges.
SILER, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which RYAN, J., joined. COLE, J. (pp. 386-93), delivered a separate dissenting opinion.

Opinion:
OPINION
SILER, Circuit Judge.
Plaintiffs, a group of strip club owners in Ohio, challenged Ohio Liquor Control Commission Rule 52 on First Amendment grounds. Enacted in 2004, Rule 52 provided that an establishment holding a liquor permit may not knowingly or willfully allow nudity or sexual activity on its premises. The district court granted plaintiffs a temporary injunction against enforcement of Rule 52. Later, it declared that parts of Rule 52 were unconstitutionally overbroad and it permanently enjoined their enforcement anywhere in Ohio. Defendants now appeal, arguing that Rule 52 is constitutional. We hold that Rule 52 is not over-broad and we REVERSE.
BACKGROUND
The strip club owners challenge § (A)(2), (B)(2), and (B)(3) of revised Rule 52. The challenged sections read as follows:
(A) Definitions as used in this rule:
(2) "Nudity" means the showing of the human male or female genital, pubic area or buttocks with less than a fully opaque covering, the showing of the female breast with less than a fully opaque covering of any part of the nipple and/or areola; the exposure of any device, costume, or covering which gives the appearance of or simulates the genitals, pubic hair, natal cleft, perineum, anal region, or pubic hair region; or the exposure of any device worn as a cover over the nipples and/or areola of the female breast, which device simulates and gives the realistic appearance of the nipples and/or areola.
(B) Prohibited activities: no permit holder, his agent, or employee shall knowingly or willfully allow in and upon his licensed permit premises any persons to:
(2) Appear in a state of nudity;
(3) Engage in sexual activity as said term is defined in ORC Chapter 2907.
Sexual activity means "sexual conduct or sexual contact, or both." ORC Chapter 2907. The Ohio Revised Code defines "sexual conduct" as:
vaginal intercourse between a male and female, anal intercourse, fellatio, and cunnilingus between persons regardless of sex; and, without privilege to do so, the insertion, however slight, of any part of the body or any instrument, apparatus, or other object into the vaginal or anal cavity of another. Penetration, however slight, is sufficient to complete vaginal or anal intercourse.
"Sexual contact" is defined as "any touching of an erogenous zone of another, including without limitation the thigh, genitals, buttock, pubic region, or, if the person is a female, a breast, for the purpose of sexually arousing or gratifying either person." ORC Chapter 2907.
In July 2000, the district court permanently enjoined enforcement of several sections of old Rule 52 , finding them invalid under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. As a result, the Ohio Liquor Control Commission ("the Commission") commenced proceedings for the enactment of a new version of Rule 52. In September 2003, the Commission received evidence and testimony regarding the validity of proposed new language for Rule 52. At this hearing, Mark Anderson, Executive Director of the Commission, testified that the earlier version of Rule 52 had been rescinded and that all of the filing requirements imposed by state law for the new version of Rule 52 had been met.
The Commission heard extensive testimony from Bruce Taylor, an attorney from Fairfax, Virginia. Throughout his career he prosecuted vice crimes, including obscenity, prostitution, and liquor violations. He spoke at length about his understanding of precedent in this area and the constitutionality of liquor regulations. He testified that "nude dancing does contribute to its own types of secondary effects and to a greater degree than other liquor bars that don't have nude dancing." Specifically, prostitution, drug trafficking, and fights occur more frequently in and around bars that allow nude dancing than those that do not permit nude dancing. Taylor expressed his opinion that the language under consideration for the new Rule 52 would be held constitutional by the courts.
The new version of Rule 52 was finalized and filed on February 9, 2004. It was scheduled to take effect on February 20, 2004. On February 20, the strip club owners filed suit after learning of plans for enforcement agents to investigate strip clubs to determine compliance with Rule 52. They claimed that the Rule 52 provisions concerning "nudity" and "sexual activity" were broadly restrictive of protected expression. They sought a declaratory judgment that these sections were unconstitutional and a permanent injunction barring their enforcement. The district court granted the request for a temporary restraining order and scheduled a preliminary injunction hearing.
At the preliminary injunction hearing, the plaintiffs called Dr. Judith Hanna, Ph. D., a cultural anthropologist and sociologist who researches and writes about arts, dance, and society. She stated that exotic and erotic dance has artistic value and conveys a range of potential messages. She also discussed a variety of "mainstream" ballet, modern dance, and theater performances that allegedly involve types of nudity and sexual contact that could be prohibited by Rule 52. The club owners also presented testimony from Dr. Daniel Linz, Ph.D., a sociologist and psychologist, who stated that his research showed no positive correlation between the presence of liquor-serving establishments featuring nude or semi-nude dancing and the types of crimes cited by the Commission in support of its decision to adopt Rule 52. Dr. Linz stated that in some cases there was a negative correlation, meaning that nude dancing establishments actually decreased crime in the surrounding community.
The Commission then presented testimony from Scott Pohlman of the Ohio Department of Safety in support of Rule 52. He described numerous occasions where he personally observed illicit behavior in and around liquor-serving establishments that feature nude or semi-nude dancing. He stated that Rule 52 was needed to limit illicit behavior.
Following the hearing, the Commission agreed to refrain from enforcing Rule 52 until at least April 1, 2004, in order to grant the district court enough time to enter a ruling on the strip club owners' motion for a preliminary injunction. On April 1, the district court granted plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction against the Commission. It enjoined the defendants from enforcing § (A)(2), (B)(2), and (B)(3) anywhere in Ohio. In January 2007, it granted plaintiffs a permanent injunction and declared § (A)(2), (B)(2), and (B)(3) unconstitutionally over-broad. The district court concluded that it could not sever the unconstitutional language from the regulation because § (A)(2), (B)(2), and (B)(3) were over-broad.
ANALYSIS
We review constitutional issues de novo. Vasha v. Gonzales, 410 F.3d 863, 872 (6th Cir.2005). We find that Rule 52 is a constitutional, content-neutral regulation of the undesirable secondary effects, including prostitution, drug trafficking, and assault, associated with nude dancing in an environment serving alcohol. It is not overbroad.
Pap's AM.
Rule 52 is almost identical to the regulation upheld by the Supreme Court in City of Erie v. Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 120 S.Ct. 1382, 146 L.Ed.2d 265 (2000). While Pap's A.M. involved a challenge on First Amendment freedom of expression grounds, not an overbreadth challenge, a discussion of Pap's AM. is necessary. In Pap's A.M., the United States Supreme Court upheld a regulation making it "a summary offense to knowingly or intentionally appear in public in a 'state of nudity.' " Id. at 283, 120 S.Ct. 1382. The regulation had wording and definitions very similar to Rule 52.
The Court began its analysis by stating that while being "in a state of nudity" is not an inherently expressive condition, nude dancing is expressive conduct and it falls within "the outer ambit" of the First Amendment's protection. Id. at 289, 120 S.Ct. 1382. To determine what level of scrutiny applies, a court must decide whether the state regulation is related to the suppression of expression. Id. If the governmental purpose is unrelated to suppression of expression, then the regulation must satisfy the less stringent standard from United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377, 88 S.Ct. 1673, 20 L.Ed.2d 672 (1968). Id. If, on the other hand, the government interest is related to the con tent of the expression, the regulation must be justified under a more demanding standard. Id.
The Court held that government restrictions on public nudity, such as the one passed by Erie, "should be evaluated under the framework set forth in O'Brien for content-neutral restrictions on symbolic speech." Id. If a law is a general prohibition on public nudity, then by its terms it regulates conduct alone, not speech. Id. at 289-90, 120 S.Ct. 1382. The ordinance at issue did not attempt to regulate the primary effects of expression, i.e., the effect of the audience watching nude dancing, but rather the secondary effects that impact the public health, safety and welfare. Id.
The regulation must pass muster under the O'Brien standard: (1) the regulation must be within the constitutional power of the government to enact, (2) the regulation must further an important or substantial government interest, (3) the government interest must be unrelated to the suppression of free expression, and (4) the restriction must be no greater than essential to the furtherance of the government interest. Id. at 296, 301, 120 S.Ct. 1382. The Erie regulation passed the O'Brien test. First, Erie's efforts to protect public health and safety were clearly within the police powers. Id. at 296, 120 S.Ct. 1382. Second, the regulation furthered a substantial government interest because Erie found that "lewd, immoral activities carried on in public places for profit are highly detrimental to the public health, safety, and welfare, and lead to the debasement of both women and men, promote violence, public intoxication, prostitution and other serious criminal activity." Id. at 297, 120 S.Ct. 1382 (quoting Erie's findings contained in Petition for Cert.). Erie did not need to carry out a study documenting these effects and it did not need to develop a specific evidentiary record to support its ordinance. Id. at 298, 120 S.Ct. 1382. It is self-evident that strip clubs cause public health and safety problems. Id. at 300-01, 120 S.Ct. 1382. Third, the government's interest in suppressing the negative secondary effects of strip clubs was unrelated to the suppression of free expression. Id. at 301, 120 S.Ct. 1382. Finally, the restriction was no greater than was essential because it only had a de minimis impact on the expressive element of nude dancing. Id. The requirement that dancers wear pasties and G-strings is a minimal restriction that leaves ample capacity to convey the dancer's erotic message. Id.
Overbreadth
Pap's AM. would be directly on-point and would decide the issue were it not for the fact that the district court struck down Rule 52 on the grounds that it was overbroad, not that it violated the First Amendment guarantee of freedom of expression under O'Brien. Pap's AM. did not address an overbreadth argument. See 529 U.S. at 286,120 S.Ct. 1382 (stating that lower court did not reach the over-breadth issue). The overbreadth doctrine prohibits the government from proscribing a "substantial" amount of constitutionally protected speech judged in relation to the statute's plainly legitimate sweep. Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 118-119, 123 S.Ct. 2191, 156 L.Ed.2d 148 (2003). A finding that a law is overbroad "suffices to invalidate all enforcement of that law, until and unless a limiting construction or partial invalidation so narrows it as to remove the seeming threat or deterrence to constitutionally protected expression." Id. at 119, 123 S.Ct. 2191 (internal quotations omitted). Overbreadth doctrine exists to allay the concern that the threat of enforcement of an overbroad law may deter or chill constitutionally protected speeeh-especially when the law provides criminal sanctions. Id. Many persons would refrain from engaging in constitutionally-protected speech rather than risk case-by-case litigation of their rights, putting them at substantial risk. Id. Thus the overbreadth doctrine exists to protect the marketplace of ideas and reduce the social costs of withheld speech. Id.
However, "there comes a point at which the chilling effect of an overbroad law, significant though it may be, cannot justify prohibiting enforcement of that law." Id. This principle is especially important when a law reflects the legitimate state interests in maintaining comprehensive controls over harmful, constitutionally unprotected conduct. Id. Overbreadth doctrine creates substantial social costs when it blocks application of a law to constitutionally unprotected conduct. Id. "To ensure that these costs do not swallow the social benefits of declaring a law over-broad, [the Supreme Court has] insisted that a law's application to protected speech be substantial . relative to the scope of the law's plainly legitimate applications . before applying the strong medicine of overbreadth invalidation." Id. at 119-20, 123 S.Ct. 2191 (internal quotations omitted). The overbreadth claimant bears the burden of demonstrating from the text of the law and from actual fact that substantial overbreadth exists. Id. at 122, 123 S.Ct. 2191. We have emphasized that overbreadth doctrine is only to be used as a last resort. Sensations, Inc. v. City of Grand Rapids, 526 F.3d 291, 300 (6th Cir.2008).
The strip club owners cannot carry their burden to show that Rule 52 is substantially overbroad. Nude dancing is protected by the First Amendment, but it is within the "outer ambit" of the First Amendment's protection. Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. at 289, 120 S.Ct. 1382. Rule 52 has a minimal impact on the marketplace of ideas because persons desiring to perform mainstream works of art involving nudity and sexual activity may do so in an establishment that is not licensed to sell liquor. In the alternative, they may perform their works in an establishment licensed to sell liquor if they wear clothing or pasties and a G-string and avoid sexual conduct or sexual contact. Ohio narrowly defines sexual conduct to include vaginal intercourse, oral sex, and vaginal or anal penetration. The prohibition against sexual contact applies only if the purpose of the contact is to arouse sexually or to gratify either person. By its own terms, Rule 52 does not apply to contact done in furtherance of legitimate works of art for the purpose of conveying artistic meaning, such as the touching of an actor's thigh in a play. Thus, mainstream works of art that merely suggest sexual activity will not be burdened. Invalidating Rule 52 as overbroad would impose substantial societal costs because it would hamper Ohio's legitimate interest in curtailing the negative secondary effects, such as prostitution and drug trafficking, associated with an environment mixing alcohol with nudity and sexual activity. See Hicks, 539 U.S. at 119, 123 S.Ct. 2191.
The district court concluded that "numerous examples of mainstream theater and dance which contain nudity and/or sexual contact," such as Oh! Calcutta!, would be prohibited by Rule 52. However, such productions may still be held in venues that do not have a liquor license, or by requiring the performers to wear pasties and a G-string and to avoid vaginal intercourse, oral sex, and vaginal or anal penetration. See Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. at 301, 120 S.Ct. 1382 ("The requirement that dancers wear pasties and G-strings is a minimal restriction in furtherance of the asserted government interests, and the restriction leaves ample capacity to convey the dancer's erotic message"). While there may be legitimate artistic works that involve actors appearing in a state of nudity, "[b]eing in a state of nudity is not an inherently expressive condition" that is protected by the First Amendment. Id. at 289, 120 S.Ct. 1382. Moreover, the First Amendment does not provide a right to engage in sexual activity in public. The effect of Rule 52 on legitimate artistic works is incidental and does not call for the "strong medicine" of overbreadth doctrine.
Furthermore, a law is not invalid simply because some impermissible applications are conceivable. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 772, 102 S.Ct. 3348, 73 L.Ed.2d 1113 (1982) (concluding that a New York statute prohibiting possession of child pornography was not overbroad); see also Sensations, Inc., 526 F.3d at 300 (upholding regulation banning total nudity in sexually oriented businesses because there was no realistic danger that the statute would significantly compromise recognized First Amendment protections of parties not before the court). In Ferber, the Supreme Court upheld against an over-breadth challenge a statute criminalizing possession of child pornography even though it may have reached some protected expression, such as medical textbooks and artistic works. 458 U.S. at 773, 102 S.Ct. 3348. The Court upheld the statute because it "seriously doubt[ed] . that these arguably impermissible applications of the statute amount to more than a tiny fraction of the materials within the statute's reach." Id. Here, analogizing to Ferber, any arguably impermissible application of the statute to citizens engaged in artistic expression amounts to no more than a fraction of Rule 52's reach. Also, as in Sensations, there is no "realistic danger" that the regulation will "significantly compromise recognized First Amendment protections of parties not before the [e]ourt" because there is no constitutional right to appear in public in a state of nudity or engage in sexual intercourse in public. 526 F.3d at 300.
The district court relied heavily on Triplett Grille, Inc. v. City of Akron, 40 F.3d 129 (6th Cir.1994), in striking down Rule 52 as overbroad. In Triplett Grille, we struck down as overbroad an Akron ordinance banning public nudity. The city's lawmakers testified that they enacted the provision because of constituents' moral outrage toward nude dancing. Id. at 131. No witness testified that the prevention of prostitution or other illegal activity was the ordinance's goal. Id. Instead, lawmakers passed the ordinance to establish "a community standard" even though Akron had never experienced any negative secondary effects commonly associated with nudity. Id. We struck down the ordinance as overbroad:
Because the City has failed to demonstrate a link between nudity in non-adult entertainment and secondary effects, we do agree with the district court that the Akron ordinance must be struck down as facially unconstitutional under the First Amendment overbreadth doctrine.
Id. at 135 (emphasis added). The public indecency ordinance prohibited all public nudity, including live performances with serious literary, artistic, or political value. Id. at 136. Because the ordinance covered expressive conduct with literary and artistic value that is not generally associated with prostitution, sexual assault, or other crimes, it was overbroad. Id.
Triplett Grille is distinguishable from the situation presented here and does not control. First, in Triplett Grille, the city ordinance banned all public nudity in all public places. 40 F.3d at 131. However, Rule 52 bans public nudity only in establishments licensed to sell liquor. Therefore, Rule 52 is much less restrictive and covers much less speech than did the regu lation at issue in Triplett Grille. Second, in Triplett Grille, the city enacted its ban because of constituents' moral outrage toward nude dancing, not concern over the negative secondary effects of nude dancing. Id. Here, however, the Commission enacted Rule 52 out of a concern over the negative secondary effects of nude dancing, not moral outrage. Moreover, the Pap's AM. Court rejected Justice Souter's concurrence in Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 581, 111 S.Ct. 2456, 115 L.Ed.2d 504 (1991) (Souter, J., concurring), upon which the Triplett Grille court exclusively relied, 40 F.3d at 136, and held that the proponent of a regulation did not need to carry out any study documenting secondary effects and it did not need to develop a specific evidentiary record to support its ordinance. Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. at 299-300, 120 S.Ct. 1382 (rejecting Justice Souter's position that Erie should have conducted a study because negative secondary effects are amenable to empirical treatment). Triplett Grille's progeny are similarly distinguishable. See, e.g., Hamilton's Bogarts v. Michigan, 501 F.3d 644 (6th Cir.2007); Odie v. Decatur County, 421 F.3d 386 (6th Cir.2005). Rule 52 is constitutional and the Commission was not required to study the application of the ordinance to non-adult or "high-culture" theater.
REVERSED.
. The primary difference between the old and the new Rule 52 is that the old Rule 52 covered the showing of electronically reproduced images depicting actual or simulated sexual activities.
. While Barnes involved a First Amendment freedom of expression challenge to a regulation, not an overbreadth challenge, 501 U.S. at 585 n. 2, 111 S.Ct. 2456, we nevertheless incorporated the reasoning of Barnes into our overbreadth analysis in Triplett Grille. 40 F.3d at 136. Applying the rule from Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 97 S.Ct. 990, 51 L.Ed.2d 260 (1977), that the opinion of the Justice concurring in the judgment on the narrowest grounds should be considered the Court's opinion, the Triplett Grille court relied on Justice Souter's concurring opinion in Barnes for its holding. 40 F.3d at 133-36. Like Barnes, Pap's A.M. resulted in a plurality opinion on the merits of the case, although a majority of the Justices concluded that the case was not moot. 529 U.S. at 282-83, 120 S.Ct. 1382. Applying the Marks doctrine, we conclude that Justice O'Connor's opinion is the Court's opinion because it was the narrowest opinion concurring in the judgment. Justice Scalia's concurring opinion, in which Justice Thomas joined, concluded that the case was moot and is therefore not the narrowest opinion concurring in the judgment. Id. at 302, 120 S.Ct. 1382 (Scalia, J., concurring). Thus, Pap's A.M. modified Barnes, which underpinned our reasoning in Triplett Grille.