Case Name: Jeffrey H. DIXON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1992-07-17
Citations: 603 So. 2d 570
Docket Number: No. 91-790
Parties: Jeffrey H. DIXON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: GOSHORN, C.J., COBB, COWART, HARRIS, PETERSON, and GRIFFIN, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 603
Pages: 570–576

Head Matter:
Jeffrey H. DIXON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. 91-790.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
July 17, 1992.
Rehearing Denied Sept. 31, 1992.
James B. Gibson, Public Defender, and James R. Wulchak, Chief, Asst. Public Defender, Daytona Beach, for appellant.
Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Bonnie Jean Parrish, Asst. Atty. Gen., Daytona Beach, for appellee.

Opinion:
ON MOTION FOR REHEARING EN BANC
W. SHARP, Judge.
We grant Dixon's motion for rehearing en banc. We withdraw the opinion issued by the three judge panel in this case and replace it with the following.
Dixon was charged by information with the attempted first degree murder of his wife. At Dixon's trial, defense counsel objected to a jury instruction on aggravated battery as a lesser included offense of attempted murder, because there was no evidence presented at trial that any weapon other than Dixon's bare hands and fists were used to accomplish the offense. Overruling this objection, the trial judge gave the instruction on aggravated battery and the jury returned a verdict on the lesser charge. He was found not guilty of attempted murder. We reverse.
The crime of aggravated battery as defined in Florida can be established by proving one of two possible scenarios:
(l)(a) A person commits aggravated battery who, in committing battery:
1. Intentionally or knowingly causes great bodily harm, permanent disability, or permanent disfigurement; or
2. Uses a deadly weapon.
§ 784.045, Fla.Stat. (1989). The state conceded at trial and on appeal that the first scenario set out in (l)(a)l. does not apply to this case. Thus, the issue here is whether bare hands and fists can be found by a jury to be "deadly weapons" pursuant to section 784.045(l)(a)2. If not, Dixon's conviction cannot be sustained and the lesser included offense instruction was reversible error.
At trial, the state proved Dixon went to his estranged wife's house. He waited until they were alone, and then he told her he was going to kill her. She thought he was joking.
He went into the kitchen. When he returned he grabbed her and began choking her with his hands. He also struck her jaw and ribs several times with his fists.
As a result of being strangled, the victim passed out for about ten minutes. When she regained consciousness, Dixon was rummaging through her purse. She managed to escape to a neighbor's house after convincing Dixon to go to the kitchen to get her a glass of water.
We are reluctant to overturn Dixon's conviction for aggravated battery, since proof that he brutally attacked his wife was clear. However, it is axiomatic in our legal system that a defendant cannot be convicted of a crime unless the state proves all the necessary elements of the crime, and that crime must be properly charged.
The trial court reasoned that depending on how they are used, fists and hands can be considered to be deadly weapons. If the circumstances are such that bare hands inflict deadly force, this issue is one which should be resolved by the jury. Although there is some out-of-state authority for this view, we have found no Florida appellate case that so holds.
We think that view is contrary to good public policy, the law in this district, and the law in most other jurisdictions. The Model Penal Code, section 210.0(4), defines "deadly weapon" as:
[a]ny firearm, or other weapon, device, instrument, material or substance, whether animate or inanimate, which in the manner it is used or is intended to be used is known to be capable of producing death or serious bodily injury.
Clearly something more than the use of bare hands is intended by this definition. Otherwise, the concept of what constitutes a deadly weapon could become so broad as to be meaningless and unconstitutionally vague. Almost every battery would potentially be an "aggravated battery." That would do violence to our long accepted mandate to construe criminal statutes strictly. See Duba v. State, 446 So.2d 1167, 1169 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984).
In Davis v. State, 565 So.2d 826 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990), we held that an indictment, which alleged the defendant kicked the victim with his foot, failed to charge him with aggravated battery because no "deadly weapon" was alleged to have been used. The court acknowledged in Davis that had the information alleged the defendant wore a heavy shoe or boot which could have inflicted deadly force, the aggravated battery charge would have passed legal muster. See Johnson v. State, 249 So.2d 452 (Fla. 4th DCA 1971); Bass v. State, 172 So.2d 614 (Fla. 2d DCA 1965).
We conclude that, in general, bare hands (like bare feet) are not deadly weapons for purposes of alleging or proving the crime of aggravated battery. The issue of whether the bare hands or feet of a person specially skilled or trained in martial arts to kill or inflict deadly force with them can be deemed "deadly weapons" is reserved for future consideration. But, in this case, there was no allegation or proof Dixon had any such skills or training.
Accordingly, we reverse Dixon's conviction for aggravated battery and we direct that it be reduced to simple battery. We remand to the lower court for resentencing on simple battery.
REVERSED and REMANDED.
GOSHORN, C.J., COBB, COWART, HARRIS, PETERSON, and GRIFFIN, JJ., concur.
DAUKSCH, J., dissents with opinion, in which DIAMANTIS, J., concurs.
. Ray v. State, 403 So.2d 956, 961 (Fla.1981).
. Carella v. California, 491 U.S. 263, 109 S.Ct. 2419, 105 L.Ed.2d 218 (1989) (due process requires state to prove, beyond reasonable doubt, every element of the offense charged).
. See Ray v. State, 580 So.2d 103 (Ala.App.1991); Johnson v. State, 815 S.W.2d 707 (Tx.App.1991); Morales v. State, 792 S.W.2d 789 (Tex.App.1990); Cooper v. State, 773 S.W.2d 749 (Tex.App.1989).
. "Parts of the Human Body as Dangerous Weapons," 8 A.L.R.4th 1268, 1269.
. See Ransom v. State, 460 P.2d 170, 171-172 (Alaska 1969).
. § 784.03, Fla.Stat. (1989).