Case Name: BARTHOLOMEW SCOTT, Respondent, v. ELIZABETH A. SWEENEY, JAMES J. SWEENEY and WILLIAM A. SWEENEY, Appellants
Court: New York Supreme Court, General Term
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1884-11
Citations: 41 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 292
Docket Number: 
Parties: BARTHOLOMEW SCOTT, Respondent, v. ELIZABETH A. SWEENEY, JAMES J. SWEENEY and WILLIAM A. SWEENEY, Appellants.
Judges: Leaened, P. J., concurred.
Reporter: Supreme Court Reports (Hun)
Volume: 41
Pages: 292–297

Head Matter:
BARTHOLOMEW SCOTT, Respondent, v. ELIZABETH A. SWEENEY, JAMES J. SWEENEY and WILLIAM A. SWEENEY, Appellants.
Liability of a master for an ingury to a servant — when the negligence is to be treated as that of the master, and when as that of a fellow servant.
The plaintiff was engaged with two other laborers, all employees of the defendants, in moving stone on a truck in the defendants’ stone yard. While passing a derrick the boom fell, striking the plaintiff and causing the injury complained of in this action. It was claimed' that the boom was lowered at that particular time in pursuance of the order of one Simpson, the defendants’ foreman, who had charge of the derrick. The judge charged the jury that if Simpson had authority from the defendants to direct the operations of the derrick, then pro hac vice his orders were their orders; and if the order given by him to lower the boom was, under the circumstances of the case, a negligent one, then his negligence was that of the defendants and rendered them liable for the damages sustained by the plaintiff.
Held, that this was error; that the negligence, if any there were, of Simpson was the negligence of a co-employe and not that of the master. (Bocees, J., dissenting.)
Appeal from a judgment in favor of tbe plaintiff, entered upon tbe verdict of a jury.
Tbe action was brought to recover damages for injuries alleged to have been occasioned by tbe negligence of tbe defendants. Tbe plaintiff was employed in tbe defendants’ stone yard as a laborer. He was alleged to have been injured through tbe negligence of one Simpson, tbe defendants’ foreman, by tbe lowering of tbe boom of a derrick.
Alton B. Pcvrker, for tbe appellants.
J. Newton Fiero, for the respondent.

Opinion:
Landon, J.:
Within the cases of Crispin v. Babbitt (81 N. Y., 516), and Slater v. Jewett (85 id., 63), I think it should have been held as a matter of law, upon tbe evidence, that Simpson, tbe foreman in charge of tbe defendant's yard and workmen employed therein, was, with respect to tbe act of lowei'ing tbe boom of the derrick, whereby plaintiff was injured, a fellow servant of tbe plaintiff. These cases point out with some clearness the test running through the previous cases, whereby we can determine whether the act, with respect to which negligence is alleged, is the act of the master or of the servant. Briefly stated, if the act is one which from its nature and character belongs or ought to belong to the department of the master, then it is the master's act, no matter to what inferior agent or servant the authorization, not the execution when authorized, of the act is intrusted. If, however, the act done or omitted is in the execution of the proper details of the principal work which has been by the master directed to be done, such execution of proper details is the act of the servant, no matter how high the rank of the subordinate who performs the labor. Illustrations taken from the cases may enable us to see more clearly the rule and its application. Whether train No. 50 shall be detained at Cayuga or be sent on to Auburn, is within the department of the master (Sheehan v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. R. Co., 91 N. Y., 334), but the detail work in taking it, if ordered, within the servant's department. So the giving a telegraphic order as to where two trains should meet was held in Slater v. Jewett to be the work of the master. The order was properly given and came to the hands of the conductor, who ought to have given it to the engineer, but forgot to do it. It was contended that the conductor was, for the purpose of communicating the order, pro hao nice the master. The court said no, the making of the order was the master's work, the delivering of it by the servant a detail of execution — the work of a servant. In Crispin v. Babbitt, the foreman who " represented the defendant and stood in his place," carelessly turned on steam whereby the plaintiff was injured; it was held to be servant's work. Suppose instead of turning it on himself, a servant had done it by his direction, it is impossible to see that the rule could have been changed. It would still have been an executive detail, a matter of mere work or labor. And such seems to be the case under review. When Simpson said "lower the boom," he was carrying out his part of the details of his master's work, no less than the workman who turned the crank. He was operating the derrick, a work needing one servant to be watchful of details and so to direct the labor of others as to make it useful to tbeir common employer, in moving stone from the yard to the mill. Whether a derrick, or tbis particular derrick, was a proper machine to be used may be a question for the master to decide, but the work of operating it is servants' work. If therefore the plaintiff was injured by Simpson's negligence in operating the derrick, or in moving it out of the way, lie was injured by the negligence of a fellow servant. I advise a reversal of the judgment.
Leaened, P. J., concurred.