Case Name: PEOPLE v. SANCHEZ
Court: Michigan Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1980-07-02
Citations: 98 Mich. App. 562
Docket Number: Docket No. 45840
Parties: PEOPLE v SANCHEZ
Judges: Before: Allen, P.J., and M. F. Cavanagh and C. W. Simon, JJ.
Reporter: Michigan appeals reports; cases decided in the Michigan Court of Appeals.
Volume: 98
Pages: 562–567

Head Matter:
PEOPLE v SANCHEZ
Docket No. 45840.
Submitted March 4, 1980, at Grand Rapids.
Decided July 2, 1980.
Abel Sanchez was convicted of carrying a concealed pistol, Kalamazoo Circuit Court, Robert L. Borsos, J. The trial court granted the defendant’s motion for a new trial and, before the new trial was held, dismissed the case on the ground that the pistol involved was inoperable and therefore did not fall within the statute prohibiting the carrying of a concealed weapon. The people appeal. Held:
An inoperable handgun may be a "pistol” within the meaning of the concealed weapons statute; an unloaded firearm may be a "pistol” within the statute and there is no distinction between an unloaded firearm and an inoperable one.
Reversed and remanded.
M. F. Cavanagh, J., dissented. He would find that the distinction between an unloaded and an inoperable firearm is that an unloaded firearm is capable of being fired. The test of whether an inoperable pistol falls within the concealed weapons statute should be the facility with which the pistol may be made operable. In this case the pistol neither was capable of operating nor could it have been altered to operate within a reasonably short time. It therefore did not fall within the concealed weapons statute. Judge Cavanagh would therefore affirm the dismissal.
Opinion of the Court
1. Weapons — Inoperable Firearms — Pistols — Statutes.
An inoperable handgun may be a "pistol” within the meaning of the concealed weapons statute; an unloaded firearm may be a "pistol” within the statute and there is no distinction between an unloaded firearm and an inoperable one (MCL 750.227; MSA 28.424).
References for Points in Headnotes
[1-3] 79 Am Jur 2d, Weapons and Firearms §§ 3, 16.
Fact that gun was unloaded as affecting criminal responsibility for carrying gun. 79 ALR2d 1430.
73 Am Jur 2d, Statutes § 293 et seq.
Dissent by M. F. Cavanagh, J.
2. Weapons — Inoperable Firearms — Unloaded Firearms.
There is a distinction between an unloaded ñrearm and an inoperable ñrearm; an unloaded ñrearm is capable of being ñred.
3. Weapons — Inoperable Firearms — Statutes.
The question of whether a conviction of carrying a concealed weapon may be had where the weapon involved is an inoperable pistol should be directed toward the facility with which the pistol may be made operable; a pistol which does not meet the statutory deñnition of being capable of propelling a dangerous projectile and which cannot be altered to do so within a reasonably short time should not fall within the concealed weapons statute (MCL 8.3t, 750.227; MSA 2.212[20], 28.424).
4. Criminal Law — Statutes — Strict Construction.
Penal statutes are to be construed strictly and in a manner most favorable to the accused.
Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Robert A. Derengoski, Solicitor General, James J. Gregart, Prosecuting Attorney, and Stephen M. Wheeler, Chief Appellate Attorney, for the people.
John V. Dughie, for defendant on appeal.
Before: Allen, P.J., and M. F. Cavanagh and C. W. Simon, JJ.
Circuit judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.

Opinion:
Per Curiam.
The defendant was convicted by a jury of carrying a concealed pistol, MCL 750.227; MSA 28.424. Prior to the submission of proofs, the parties had stipulated that the weapon involved, a pistol, was not operable.
In post-trial proceedings, the lower court first granted the defendant a new trial due to what it considered to be improper questioning and argument by the prosecutor. Later, the court dismissed the case entirely on the ground that the inoperable pistol did not "fall within the statute prohibiting the carrying of a concealed weapon". The prosecution appeals.
The sole issue raised on appeal is whether an inoperable handgun may be a "pistol" within the meaning of the statute. We find the distinction between unloaded and inoperable firearms to be meaningless, and so are persuaded to follow the authority most directly addressing this issue: People v Jiminez, 27 Mich App 633; 183 NW2d 853 (1970), lv den 384 Mich 819 (1971).
There stands in the lower court record an order granting a new trial; that order is not affected by our decision in this appeal. The order dismissing the charges against the defendant is reversed, and the cause remanded for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.