Case Name: PEOPLE v. WHITE
Court: Michigan Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1981-07-13
Citations: 411 Mich. 366
Docket Number: Docket No. 62677
Parties: PEOPLE v WHITE
Judges: Levin, Fitzgerald, and Ryan, JJ., concurred with Kavanagh, J.
Reporter: Michigan Reports
Volume: 411
Pages: 366–404

Head Matter:
PEOPLE v WHITE
Docket No. 62677.
Argued December 3, 1979
(Calendar No. 7).
Decided July 13, 1981.
John L. White, Jr., was charged with delivery of heroin to an undercover narcotics officer who drove him from Oscoda to Detroit and back to buy the heroin. During the preliminary examination in 81st District Court, J. Richard Ernst, J., he denied having "any business dealings” with the officer. White was later charged with perjury in the preliminary examination, and convicted, on his plea of guilty, in Iosco Circuit Court, Allan C. Miller, J., of perjury and attempted delivery of heroin. The Court of Appeals, D. E. Holbrook, Jr., P.J., and D. E. Holbrook and Cynar, JJ., reversed as to the conviction of perjury in a memorandum opinion, holding that the perjured statement concerned an issue of ultimate fact and thus could not be the subject of a charge of perjury (Docket Nos. 77-3614, 78-168). The parties appeal.
References for Points in Headnotes
[1] 60 Am Jur 2d, Perjury § 66.
81 Am Jur 2d, Witnesses §§ 463, 518, 597, 657.
[2] 60 Am Jur 2d, Perjury §§ 13, 34, 36.
[3] 60 Am Jur 2d, Perjury § 4 et seq.
[4, 5] 60 Am Jur 2d, Perjury § 71.
[6] 21 Am Jur 2d, Criminal Law §§ 184, 165 et seq., 473 et seq.
[7] 46 Am Jur 2d, Judgments §§ 394, 401, 402, 415.
[8] 60 Am Jur 2d, Perjury § 38.
[9,10] 21 Am Jur 2d, Criminal Law §§ 487-491.
[11] 46 Am Jur 2d, Judges § 180.
[12-14, 20-22] 21 Am Jur 2d, Criminal Law § 143 et seq.
Availability in state court of defense of entrapment where accused denies committing offenses charged. 5 ALR4th 1128.
[14, 15, 23] 25 Am Jur 2d, Drugs, Narcotics, and Poisons § 43.
[16] 21 Am Jur 2d, Criminal Law §§ 313, 315.
Modern status of rules and standards in state courts as to adequacy of defense counsel’s representation of criminal client. 2 ALR4th 27.
[17] 5 Am Jur 2d, Appeal and Error §§ 624-627.
21 Am Jur 2d, Criminal Law § 315.
[18, 19] 21 Am Jur 2d, Criminal Law § 495.
In an opinion by Justice Kavanagh, joined by Justices Levin, Fitzgerald, and Ryan, the Supreme Court held:
Whether or not there is a rule that a charge of perjury cannot be grounded on lies about the ultimate fact in issue, the defendant in this case lied about what were clearly adjudicative facts as well as the ultimate fact of participation in the drug transaction, and his conviction of perjury is reinstated. The defendant was entrapped in the narcotics transaction as a matter of law, and his conviction of attempted delivery of heroin is reversed. The defendant may seek post-conviction relief on the ground of ineffective assistance of counsel.
1. The evils that might result from permitting the prosecutor to retry ultimate facts by charging the defendant with perjury are not present in this case. White elected to testify at the preliminary examination on a charge of delivery of heroin. There was no prior determination that his story was the truthful version, and, there having been no trial, the prosecutor cannot be said to be seeking a more satisfactory result in the drug matter by presenting the same issues in a trial for perjury. The defendant’s argument that no perjury charge should be based on perjured statements of the accused even as to adjudicative facts, because the threat of prosecution might coerce defendants into silence and because other evidentiary safeguards at trial are generally sufficient so that the jury would not be misled, is of no force here. White testified falsely at the preliminary examination where the focus is on the prosecution’s evidence. The defendant has less interest in testifying at the preliminary examination, and the prosecutor is substantially less likely to be prepared to test his credibility effectively at the preliminary examination than at trial should he unexpectedly testify.
2. A review of the record shows that White lied about what were clearly material adjudicative facts, as well as about the assertedly ultimate fact of participation in the drug transaction. He denied knowing the undercover police officer, denied having "any business dealings” with him, and denied riding with him in an automobile from Oscoda to Detroit and back to make the transaction. The defendant asserts that there is an insufficient factual basis for his plea of guilty of perjury. Even if the defendant is correct in saying that his statement was an admission as to the ultimate fact only, the proper remedy would be to remand the matter to give the prosecutor an opportunity to adduce facts supporting the plea. Since the evidence on remand would only consist of the transcript of the preliminary examination, the accuracy of which has not been challenged, there is no reason for a pro forma remand in this case. The transcript and the defendant’s statement at the guilty-plea proceeding that he had falsely denied any participation adequately establishes a factual basis for his plea.
3. The defendant also seeks to have his perjury conviction vacated on the grounds of double jeopardy and collateral estoppel. The constitutional protection against double jeopardy does not ordinarily bar the defendant’s prosecution for and conviction of perjury committed at a criminal proceeding against him because the perjury is not the same offense as the substantive one charged in that proceeding. Similarly, the conviction of perjury is not barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel, for which an issue of ultimate fact must have once been determined by a valid and final judgment in previous litigation between the same parties. The result of the preliminary examination in this case was only to bind the defendant over for trial.
4. The defendant contends that the information for perjury was defective because it failed to give him notice of the specific statements alleged to be false or to assert the materiality of the false statements. The information was sufficient under the Code of Criminal Procedure, which does not require that the specific statements alleged to be false be set forth. If the defendant was uncertain as to the exact statements alleged to be false, his remedy was to have requested a bill of particulars. The addendum to the information specifically stated that the defendant "stated falsely a material fact.”
5. The defendant also contends that his plea to the charge of perjury was unknowing and involuntary because he was not informed of the requisite element of intent, and because the court did not name all the witnesses against him. The court complied with the requirement that the court tell the defendant the name of the offense to which he is pleading. The court is not required to explain the elements of the offense. The judge also adequately complied with the requirement that the court inform the defendant that he is giving up the rights he would have at trial to have witnesses against him appear and the right to question witnesses against him.
6. The district judge who conducted the preliminary examination on the charge of perjury was the same judge who had conducted the defendant’s preliminary examination on the charge of delivery of heroin. The defendant alleges that it was reversible error for the judge not to have disqualified himself because of bias. Merely proving that a judge conducted a prior proceeding against the defendant does not amount to proof of bias for purposes of disqualification.
7. The trial judge’s finding that the defendant was not entrapped is clearly erroneous. A claim of entrapment is distinct from other defenses such as insanity, self-defense, and lack of specific intent, which involve an assessment of guilt or innocence. A claim of entrapment does not involve an assessment of guilt or innocence, but rather expresses a policy that there should be no prosecution at all. In that respect, it is like a jurisdictional defect which is not waived by a plea of guilty. Michigan has adopted the objective test of entrapment. The question is whether, regardless of the predisposition to crime of the particular defendant involved, the governmental agents have acted in a way that is likely to instigate or create a criminal offense. The trial judge in this case did not properly apply the objective test. While he considered the conduct of the police officers, he also attached undue significance to the propensities of the defendant, finding that the defendant’s "only hesitancy was in accumulating enough business to make it worthwhile”. The police officer in this case sought out the defendant and asked to purchase narcotics from him. The officer gave the defendant some money, and they agreed to meet several days later. When the defendant did not show up at the meeting place, the officer twice sought him out again. When the defendant said he had not purchased the narcotics because he did not have a ride, the officer offered him one. A week later two undercover police officers drove the defendant from Oscoda to Detroit, gave him money to purchase more narcotics than previously requested, waited while he purchased the narcotics, and drove him back to Oscoda. The defendant was entrapped as a matter of law. The police officers impermissibly manufactured or instigated a crime. That is exactly the governmental activity that is sought to be prevented by the policy against entrapment.
8. White argues that he was denied effective assistance of counsel because his trial lawyer had him testify at the preliminary examination and told him the judge would dismiss the charge if presented with any evidence that White did not commit the offense. White claims he provided the judge with such evidence on his lawyer’s instruction to "deviate” from the truth. He further asserts that all lawyers who handle criminal cases know that a defendant should never testify at his own preliminary examination. White’s supporting affidavit sufficiently establishes his right to an evidentiary hearing on whether he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. A claim of ineffective assistance which depends on facts not of record may not, however, be raised for the first time on appeal.
Reversed.
Justice Williams, joined by Chief Justice Coleman, concurred with Justice Kavanagh except for the holding on entrapment. He believed there was no entrapment.
Justice Moody, dissenting in part, agreed with Justice Kavanagh as to the reinstatement of the conviction of perjury. He also agreed with the conclusion that the defendant has not waived his defense of entrapment by pleading guilty but he wrote separately on that issue. He dissented as to the conclusion that the defendant was entrapped as a matter of law, and would affirm the defendant’s conviction of attempted delivery of heroin.
1. The general rule is that a plea of guilty waives all non-jurisdictional defects in the proceedings. However, those rights which might provide a complete defense to a criminal prosecution, and those which undercut the state’s interest in punishing the defendant or the state’s authority or ability to proceed with the trial, may never be waived by a plea of guilty. Where it is found that the result of the right asserted is similar to that of the jurisdictional defenses in that, if proven, the right asserted would prevent the trial from taking place, a plea of guilty does not waive the right. The defense of entrapment fits within the category of protected rights because, if successfully raised, it provides a complete defense to a criminal prosecution and undercuts the state’s interest in punishing the defendant and authority or ability to proceed with the trial.
2. The spirit of the cases decided by the Supreme Court of the United States, respect for the state’s interest in the finality of conviction and the judicial economy of the guilty-plea procedure, would not allow a defendant to preserve a wide variety of defenses in spite of his plea of guilty. Underlying the rationale of the plea of guilty in many cases is the bargain and exchange; the defendant gives up important rights and in exchange he may be convicted of a lesser crime or receive a shorter sentence. Courts should be hesitant to allow a defendant to upset a bargain by which he knowingly and intelligently admitted his guilt. Therefore, only those rights and defenses which reach beyond the factual determination of the defendant’s guilt and implicate the very authority of the state to bring a defendant to trial are preserved. Such rights may never be waived.
3. Those rights of the defendant which are subsumed in a plea of guilty necessarily relate to all the rights and challenges associated with the conduct of trial. Thus, important safeguards relating to the capacity of the state to prove the defendant’s factual guilt and those regulating the prosecution’s conduct at trial are among the ones the defendant waives when he pleads guilty. The rights which essentially relate to the gathering and presentation of evidence are lost even if a successful challenge would prevent the continuation of the prosecution. For example, the right to challenge the legality of a search which produced the evidence against the defendant would not survive a plea of guilty.
4. The defense of entrapment, in essence, claims entitlement to the benefit of a judicial policy that, even if culpable, the defendant should be insulated from prosecution because of the impropriety of the government’s conduct. In Michigan, the objective test of entrapment focuses on the illegal use of the power of government to gain convictions, and on whether the actions of the police were so reprehensible under the circumstances that the defendant should not have been brought to trial in the first place. The defendant should be able, in spite of his plea of guilty, to preserve a claim that without governmental involvement the crime would not have taken place.
5. Where the conduct of the police is of a kind that could induce or instigate the commission of a crime by one not ready and willing to commit it entrapment has occurred. The trial judge in this case did not properly apply the test because he appeared to place undue emphasis upon the defendant’s propensity to commit the crime. However, the defendant bears the burden of proving entrapment. In this case, the police officer testified that before arrangements were made for the ride to Detroit to buy narcotics, he gave the defendant an opportunity to cancel the proposed drug transaction and return the money advanced, but White refused, stating that he would still like to obtain the heroin for the officer. The actions of the police officer in attempting several times to arrange the heroin sale and in providing the necessary transportation were not so reprehensible under the circumstances as to amount to entrapment as a matter of law.
Justice Ryan wrote that, while he concurred fully with Justice Kavanagh’s opinion, he also concurred with parts I and II of Justice Moody’s opinion, summarized in paragraphs 1 through 4 immediately preceding.
Opinion of the Court
1. Perjury — Witnesses — Credibility.
Nothing should impede legitimate efforts to punish perjury; how ever, the trial is the primary safeguard against inaccurate testimony, through cross-examination, rebuttal, and impeachment (MCL 705.422; MSA 28.664).
2. Perjury — Defendant Testifying — Preliminary Examination.
The evils that might result from permitting the prosecutor to retry ultimate facts by charging a defendant with perjury are not present where an accused elected to testify at the preliminary examination on a charge of delivery of heroin and falsely' testified that he had not participated in the transaction; there was no prior determination that the accused’s story was the truthful version, and, there having been no trial, the prosecutor cannot be said to be seeking a more satisfactory result in the drug matter by presenting the same issues in a trial for perjury (MCL 750.422; MSA 28.664).
3. Perjury — Defendant Testifying — Adjudicative Facts.
A defendant charged with delivery of heroin lied about what were clearly material adjudicative facts, lies which will support a charge and conviction of perjury, as well as about the assertedly ultimate fact of participation in the drug transaction, where he falsely denied knowing the undercover police officer who was the complaining witness, denied having "any business dealings” with the officer, and denied riding with him in an automobile from Oscoda to Detroit and back to make the. transaction (MCL 750.422; MSA 28.664).
4. Perjury — Plea of Guilty — Factual Basis.
The proper remedy for a defendant convicted, on his plea of guilty, of perjury on the inadequate factual basis that he falsely denied only an ultimate fact would be a remand to the trial court to give the prosecutor an opportunity to adduce facts supporting the plea; however, there is no reason for a pro forma remand where the evidence would only consist of the transcript of the defendant’s false testimony, and the accuracy of the transcript is not questioned (MCL 750.422; MSA 28.664).
5. Perjury — Plea of Guilty — Factual Basis.
The transcript of the defendant’s false testimony in a preliminary examination on a charge of delivery of heroin and the defendant’s statement at a guilty-plea proceeding that he had falsely denied any participation in the heroin transaction adequately establishes a factual basis for his plea of guilty of perjury where the defendant, in the same plea-taking proceeding, admitted he participated and pled guilty of attempted delivery of heroin (MCL 750.422; MSA 28.664).
6. Perjury — Constitutional Law — Double Jeopardy — Defendant Testifying.
The constitutional protection against double jeopardy does not ordinarily bar the defendant’s prosecution for and conviction of perjury committed at a criminal proceeding against him because the perjury is not the same offense as the substantive offense charged at the proceeding (US Const, Am V; Const 1963, art 1, § 15; MCL 750.422; MSA 28.664).
7. Perjury — Collateral Estoppel — Defendant Testifying — Preliminary Examination.
A defendant’s prosecution for and conviction of perjury committed at preliminary examination on another charge against him is not barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel where the defendant was bound over for trial on the other charge; in order to apply collateral estoppel, an issue of ultimate fact must have once been determined by a valid and final judgment in previous litigation between the same parties (MCL 750.422; MSA 28.664).
8. Indictment and Information — Perjury — Sufficiency — Notice.
An information for perjury is not defective because it fails to give notice of the specific statements alleged to be false where it specifically charges that the defendant "stated falsely a material fact” at a preliminary examination on another charge; if the defendant is uncertain as to the exact statements alleged to be false, his remedy is to request a bill of particulars (MCL 750.422, 767.44, 767.73; MSA 28.664, 28.984, 28.1013).
9. Criminal Law — Plea of Guilty — Perjury — Nature of Charge — Elements of Offense.
A trial court is not required to explain the elements of the offense in accepting a plea of guilty of the offense; therefore, a plea of guilty of perjury is not unknowing and involuntary on the ground that the defendant was not informed by the trial court of the requisite element of intent (GCR 1963, 785.7).
10. Criminal Law — Plea of Guilty — Advice of Rights — Trial — Witnesses.
Failure of a judge conducting a plea-taking proceeding on a charge of perjury to advise the defendant that the witnesses who were present during alleged perjured testimony given by the defendant in another criminal matter included the judge, prosecuting attorney, and defense attorney is not erroneous where the plea-taking judge adequately complied with the requirement that he inform the defendant that he is giving up the rights he would have at trial to have witnesses against him appear and the right to question witnesses against him (GCR 1963, 785.7).
11. Judges — Disqualification — Bias.
Merely proving that the district judge who conducted a preliminary examination on a charge of perjury was the same judge who conducted the prior proceeding against the defendant at which the perjured testimony was given does not amount to proof of bias for purposes of disqualification of the examining judge (GCR 1963, 912.2).
12. Criminal Law — Plea of Guilty — Entrapment.
A claim of entrapment does not involve an assessment of guilt or innocence, but rather expresses a policy that there should be no prosecution at all; in that respect, it is like a jurisdictional defect which is not waived by a plea of guilty.
13. Criminal Law — Entrapment — Objective Test.
The defense of entrapment, in Michigan, is based on the belief that the method employed by the government to bring about conviction cannot be countenanced; the question is whether, regardless of the predisposition to crime of the particular defendant involved, the governmental agents have acted in a way that is likely to instigate or create a criminal offense.
14. Criminal Law — Entrapment — Objective Test — Controlled Substances — Delivery of Heroin.
A trial judge did not properly apply the objective test of entrapment in accepting a plea of guilty of attempted delivery of heroin where, although the judge considered the conduct of the police officers in the case, he attached undue significance to the propensities of the defendant to commit the crime, finding that the defendant’s "only hesitancy was in accumulating enough business to make it worthwhile” (MCL 333.7401; MSA 14.15[7401]).
15. Criminal Law — Entrapment — Objective Test — Controlled Substances — Delivery of Heroin.
A defendant charged with delivery of heroin was entrapped as a matter of law where an undercover police officer sought out the defendant and asked to purchase narcotics, gave the defendant some money and agreed to meet him several days later, twice again sought out the defendant after he failed to meet the officer as agreed, offered and provided the defendant transportation by automobile from Oscoda to Detroit to make the transaction, gave him money to purchase more narcotics than previously requested, waited while the defendant purchased the heroin, and drove him back to Oscoda (MCL 333.7401; MSA 14.15[7401]).
16. Criminal Law — Assistance of Counsel — Evidentiary Hearing.
A defendant sufficiently establishes his right to a post-conviction evidentiary hearing on whether he was denied the effective assistance of counsel where he claims that his lawyer had him testify at the preliminary examination and told him the judge would dismiss the charge if presented with any evidence that the defendant did not commit the offense, that he provided the judge with such evidence on his lawyer’s instruction to "deviate” from the truth, and that all lawyers who handle criminal cases know that a defendant should never testify at his own preliminary examination.
17. Criminal Law — Assistance of Counsel — Preserving Question.
A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel which depends on facts not of record may not be raised for the first time on appeal.
Opinion Concurring in Part and Dissenting in Part by Blair Moody, Jr., J.
See headnotes 1-11, 13, 14.
18. Criminal Law — Plea of Guilty — Defenses — Preserving Question.
The general rule is that a plea of guilty waives all non-jurisdictional defects in the proceedings; however, those rights which might provide a complete defense to a criminal prosecution, and those which undercut the state’s interest in punishing the defendant or the state’s authority or ability to proceed with the trial, may never be waived by a plea of guilty.
19. Criminal Law — Plea of Guilty — Defenses — Preserving Question.
Rights which are not subsumed by a plea of guilty include strictly jurisdictional defenses and those defenses which, if proven, would prevent the trial from taking place; only those rights and defenses which reach beyond the factual determination of the defendant’s guilt and implicate the very authority of the state to bring a defendant to trial are preserved.
20. Criminal Law — Entrapment.
The defense of entrapment, if successfully raised, provides a complete defense to a criminal prosecution by claiming the beneñt of a judicial policy that, even if culpable, the defendant should be insulated from prosecution because of the impropriety of the government’s conduct.
21. Criminal Law — Plea of Guilty — Defenses — Entrapment.
A defendant does not waive his claim of the defense of entrapment by a plea of guilty of the substantive offense because that defense assumes that without improper involvement by the police the crime would not have taken place.
22. Criminal Law — Entrapment — Burden of Proof.
The defendant bears the burden of proving a defense of entrapment.
23. Criminal Law — Entrapment — Objective Test — Controlled Substances — Delivery of Heroin.
A defendant charged with delivery of heroin was not entrapped as a matter of law where an undercover police officer, who sought him out to buy narcotics several times and provided the transportation to make the sale, gave the defendant an opportunity to cancel the proposed drug transaction and return the money advanced, and the defendant refused, stating that he would still like to obtain the heroin for the officer (MCL 333.7401; MSA 14.15[7401j).
Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Robert A. Derengoski, Solicitor General, Stephen H. Naegle, Prosecuting Attorney, and Leonard J. Malinowski, Assistant Attorney General, for the people.
State Appellate Defender (by Derrick A. Carter) for defendant.

Opinion:
Kavanagh, J.
John L. White, Jr., was convicted on his plea of guilty of the offenses of attempted delivery of heroin and of perjury. MCL 335.341(1)(a); MSA 18.1070(41)(1)(a); MCL 750.92; MSA 28.287; MCL 750.422; MSA 28.664.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals in an unpublished opinion affirmed the defendant's conviction of attempted delivery of heroin and reversed his perjury conviction, relying on People v Longuemire, 87 Mich App 395; 275 NW2d 12 (1978). The people assert that the Court of Appeals erred in setting aside the defendant's conviction of perjury. On cross-appeal, the defendant asserts that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming his conviction of attempted delivery of heroin.
We reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and reinstate the conviction of perjury. We reverse the conviction of attempted delivery of heroin.
A
White was an airman stationed at Wurtsmith Air Force Base near Oscoda, nearly 200 miles north of Detroit. Curtis Chambers, an undercover narcotics officer, testified at preliminary examination that he approached White on January 5, 1977, and asked to purchase narcotics from him. White stated that it wasn't very profitable for him to make the trip downstate to make a single purchase but "possibly in a couple of days" he would have received other requests for narcotics and would be able to make the trip. Chambers gave White $70 to purchase narcotics for him and arranged to meet White three days later.
When White missed the rendezvous, Chambers sought him out. White said he had not yet made the trip but might go down the following week.
On January 16, 1977, Chambers again contacted White, who said that he had not yet purchased the narcotics because he did not have a ride. Chambers offered to drive White down, and the two agreed to make the trip on January 19.
On January 19, Chambers and another undercover officer drove White from Oscoda to Detroit, gave him an additional $130 to purchase narcotics, waited outside an apartment building while he made the purchase, and drove him back to Oscoda, where he transferred the narcotics to them. The officers dropped White off at his residence, contacted their backup crew, and returned to arrest White a few minutes later.
White was charged with delivery of heroin. After Chambers and another officer testified at his preliminary examination, he took the stand. On direct examination he admitted knowing Chambers by an alias but denied having "any business dealings" with him on the relevant dates or riding with him from Oscoda to Detroit and back. On cross-examination he expressly denied taking money from Chambers or delivering heroin to him.
White was subsequently charged with committing perjury at his preliminary examination and ultimately entered guilty pleas to the perjury charge and a reduced charge of attempted delivery of heroin. At the plea proceeding, after White recounted the events leading to the delivery of heroin charge, the following colloquy ensued:
"The Court: [N]ow, with reference to false swearing, as I understand it, you made two different versions of the — of this incident?
"The Defendant: No, sir, only one. My statement was made falsely.
"The Court: I see, and what was that?
"The Defendant: Denial of any participation in the drug transactions."
We granted leave in this case to speak to the following issues:
(A) Whether a defendant who allegedly lies about the ultimate fact at issue during proceedings on the criminal charge against him may subsequently be prosecuted for and convicted of perjury.
(B) Whether the trial court failed to elicit a sufficient factual basis for the defendant's perjury plea.
Whenever a charge of perjury arises out of a defendant's testimony during his prosecution for another crime, we should be alert to all the dangers which may be involved in the charge.
On the one hand we should be mindful of the menace to our trial system which a perjurious witness imports. It is difficult to imagine a more potent threat to the adjudicative process than perjury. Nothing should impede legitimate efforts to punish it.
On the other hand, the trial process itself is the primary safeguard against inaccurate testimony. Cross-examination, rebuttal and impeachment are elements of the trial process intended to expose untruthful testimony. It is the function of the trier of fact to assess credibility as well as to determine the facts.
An overzealous prosecutor might bring a subsequent charge of perjury simply to ask a second jury or judge to determine fact and credibility issues already decided in the defendant's favor by the first fact finder or in an attempt to ask a second judge to augment a sentence the prosecutor found disappointing. The very chance of a spiteful perjury prosecution might dissuade a truthful but timid defendant from testifying at all.
In this case, however, no such evils are present. White elected, atypically, to testify at his preliminary examination on a drug charge. There was no prior determination that White's story was the truthful version and, there having been no trial, the prosecutor cannot be said to be seeking a more satisfactory result by presenting the same issues to a second jury or judge.
With this in mind we consider the errors asserted.
B
The Court of Appeals, in People v Longuemire, supra, p 398, held that adjudicative facts can form the basis for a perjury charge, but ultimate facts cannot, and provided a definition for distinguishing the two. In the instant case, the Court of Appeals applied the rule of Longuemire and reversed the defendant's conviction of perjury, concluding that the defendant lied about ultimate facts.
When we granted leave to appeal, we directed the parties to brief the issues as stated above. This was unfortunate, for as the people properly point out, the error assertedly made by the Court of Appeals did not implicate the correctness of the Longuemire rationale, but rather its application.
We need not here decide whether Longuemire is correct in its holding that ultimate facts cannot form the basis of a perjury charge or in its standard for distinguishing ultimate from adjudicative facts. A review of the record shows White lied about what were clearly adjudicative facts as well as about the assertedly ultimate fact of participation in the drug transaction. He denied knowing Officer Chambers, denied having any business dealings with him, and denied riding in an automobile with him from Oscoda to Detroit and back. These are material adjudicative facts, lies as to which will support a perjury charge and conviction.
White argues that no perjury charge should be based on an accused's perjurious statements even as to adjudicative facts. This is not because a defendant has a right to testify untruthfully but because the threat of liberal perjury prosecutions and potential prosecutorial abuse might coerce accuseds into silence, and other safeguards, such as cross-examination, impeachment and rebuttal, are generally sufficient to insure that a defendant does not mislead the jury with his testimony. Bronston v United States, 409 US 352; 93 S Ct 595; 34 L Ed 2d 568 (1973).
Whatever merit this argument might have when applied to the facts of a different case, it is of no force here because White testified falsely not at trial but rather at a preliminary examination where the focus is on the prosecution's evidence. The defendant has less interest in testifying at the preliminary examination and the prosecutor is substantially less likely to be prepared to effectively test the accused's credibility at the preliminary examination than at trial should the accused unexpectedly testify.
C
In Guilty Plea Cases, 395 Mich 96, 128-132; 235 NW2d 132 (1975), and People v Haack, 396 Mich 367, 376-377; 240 NW2d 704 (1976), our Court considered the question of factual bases for guilty pleas. We said that "on appellate review the standard to be applied in determining the adequacy of the factual basis is whether the trier of fact could properly convict on the facts as stated by the defendant".
The defendant asserts that the only factual basis elicited by the court during his guilty plea to perjury was that he had falsely denied any participation in drug transactions. The defendant contends that, because this testimony concerned an ultimate fact, there were no facts upon which the trier of fact could properly convict.
The defendant pled guilty of attempted delivery of heroin and perjury in the same proceeding. The defendant first testified that he took money from Officer Chambers, rode to Detroit with Officers Chambers and McCarty, picked up heroin from a heroin dealer in Detroit, and gave the heroin to the officers when they returned to Oscoda. The defendant then stated that his prior statement, denying any participation in the drug transactions, was made falsely.
Even if the defendant is correct that his statement that he had falsely "deni[ed] any participation in the drug transactions" was an admission as to an ultimate fact only, the proper remedy under Guilty Plea Cases, supra, p 129, would be a remand to give the prosecutor an opportunity to adduce facts supporting the plea. Since the perjury occurred at the preliminary examination on the delivery of heroin charge, this evidence would consist entirely of the transcript of that preliminary examination, which is part of the record on appeal. The defendant has not challenged the accuracy of the transcript. We see no reason for a pro forma remand so that the prosecutor can summon a stenographer to certify the accuracy of a transcript the verity of which has been so conceded. The transcript, taken together with the defendant's conclusory statement at the time his guilty plea to the perjury charge was offered that he had falsely "deni[ed] any participation in the drug transactions", adequately establishes a factual basis for his plea.
D
The defendant raises many other issues, several of which merit only brief discussion. He seeks to have his perjury conviction vacated on the grounds of double jeopardy and collateral estoppel. The perjury charge was based on statements made by the defendant during his preliminary examination for the offense of delivery of heroin.
Double jeopardy bars reprosecution for the same offense. US Const, Am V; Const 1963, art 1, § 15. Perjury committed at a judicial proceeding is not the same offense as the substantive offense charged in that proceeding. United States v Williams, 341 US 58, 61; 71 S Ct 595; 95 L Ed 747 (1951); see, also, People v Albers, 137 Mich 678, 681-684; 100 NW 908 (1904). Therefore, the constitutional protection against double jeopardy does not ordinarily bar the defendant's prosecution for and conviction of perjury.
Similarly, the defendant's prosecution for and conviction of perjury is not barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel. In order to apply collateral estoppel, an issue of ultimate fact must have once been determined by a valid and final judgment in a previous litigation between the same parties. Ashe v Swenson, 397 US 436, 443; 90 S Ct 1189; 25 L Ed 2d 469 (1970).
The purpose of a preliminary examination is to determine whether a felony was committed and whether probable cause exists to believe that the defendant committed it. We need not decide whether a finding respecting the defendant's credibility rendered at a preliminary examination could ever be accorded collateral estoppel effect, for in the instant case the defendant was bound over for trial.
The defendant contends that the information for perjury was defective because it failed to give him notice of the specific statements alleged to be false or to assert the materiality of the false statements. The information was sufficient under MCL 767.73; MSA 28.1013, which does not require that the specific statements alleged to be false be set forth. If the defendant was uncertain as to the exact statements alleged to be false, his remedy was to have requested a bill of particulars under MCL 767.44; MSA 28.984.
The information and addendum comply with the materiality requirements of People v Cash. The addendum specifically stated that the defendant "stated falsely a material fact".
Citing Bronston v United States, supra, as authority, the defendant argues that because his statements were literally correct, they did not constitute perjury. At the defendant's first preliminary examination the following colloquy occurred:
"Q. Are you acquainted with a Curtis Chambers who you saw testify on the stand just a few minutes before this?
"A. No, sir, I know him by an alias.
"Q. What is his alias?
"A. His alias was Ken.
"Q. Did you have any business dealings with Mr. Chambers on or about January 5, 1977?
"A. No, sir.
"Q. Did you have any business dealings with him on or about the 16th of January, 1977?
"A. No, sir.
"Q. Or the 19th of January, 1977?
"A. No, sir.
"Q. He has testified you rode with him in an automobile from the Oscoda area to Detroit and back to Oscoda?
"A. No, sir."
The defendant's theory is that his denial of associating with Curtis Chambers was literally correct because he did not associate with Officer Chambers in his capacity as a police officer; he knew him only by an alias. This argument has no merit. The defendant denied having any business dealings with the witness after admitting he knew him by an alias. The officer's contrary testimony could support a verdict of perjury.
The defendant contends that his guilty plea to perjury was unknowing and involuntary because he was not informed of the requisite element of intent. The court complied with GCR 1963, 785.7(1)(a) which requires that the court tell the defendant the name of the offense to which he is pleading. The court is not required to explain the elements of the offense. See Guilty Plea Cases, supra, p 116.
At the plea taking, the judge informed the defendant that he had a right to confront witnesses against him. The judge read a list of specifically named witnesses against him. The defendant alleges error because the judge did not include the names of the judge, prosecuting attorney and defense attorney who were present during the alleged perjurious testimony.
The plea-taking judge adequately complied with GCR 1963, 785.7(1)(g), subds (v) and (vi), which requires that the court inform the defendant that he is giving up the rights he would have at trial to have witnesses against him appear and the right to question witnesses against him. See Guilty Plea Cases, supra, pp 119-125.
The district judge who conducted the preliminary examination on the charge of perjury was the same judge who conducted the defendant's preliminary examination on the charge of delivery of heroin. The defendant alleges that it was reversible error for the judge not to have disqualified himself because of bias. Merely proving that a judge conducted a prior proceeding against the same defendant does not amount to proof of bias for purposes of disqualification under GCR 1963, 912.2.
E
The defendant asserts that his conviction of attempted delivery of heroin should be vacated because of entrapment. The people assert that the defendant has waived this defense by his plea of guilty. We disagree.
We put the claim of entrapment in proper perspective in People v D'Angelo, 401 Mich 167, 179; 257 NW2d 655 (1977), when we said:
"When an accused claims entrapment he is asserting, in essence, entitlement to the benefit of a judicial policy that his claim, if true, is a bar to the prosecution of the case. His claim does not involve an assessment of guilt or innocence and, in fact, is irrelevant to it."
A claim of entrapment is distinct from other defenses such as insanity, self-defense, and lack of specific intent, which involve an assessment of guilt or innocence. Id. A claim of entrapment does not involve an assessment of guilt or innocence, but rather expresses a policy that there should be no prosecution at all. In this respect, it is like a jurisdictional defect which is not waived by a plea of guilty. See People v Alvin Johnson, 396 Mich 424, 439-445; 240 NW2d 729 (1976).
Turning to the merits of the asserted claim, we hold that the trial judge's finding that the defendant was not entrapped is clearly erroneous.
Michigan has been at the forefront in protecting persons from being convicted of a crime which was instigated, induced or manufactured by a government agent. Over a hundred years ago, Justices Marston and Campbell deplored such governmental action. Justice Marston forcefully wrote:
"The course pursued by the officers in this case was utterly indefensible. Where a person contemplating the commission of an offense approaches an officer of the law, and asks his assistance, it would seem to be the duty of the latter, according to the plainest principles of duty and justice, to decline to render such assistance and to take such steps as would be likely to prevent the commission of the offense, and tend to the elevation and improvement of the would-be criminal, rather than to his farther debasement." Saunders v People, 38 Mich 218, 221-222 (1878).
People v Longuemire, 87 Mich App 395; 275 NW2d 12 (1978), defined ultimate facts as those concerning "the legal definitions and effects ascribed to the basic facts or combination of basic facts as found". "Ultimate facts encompass statements as to noncommission of the crime charged or a legal element of the crime." Examples given were "I didn't bribe Mr. X" or "I didn't break into that house".
Adjudicative facts were defined as facts pertaining to "who did what, where, when, how and with what motive or intent". The examples given were "I didn't give Mr. X $50,000" or "I didn't force the door open".
We do not wish to be understood as authorizing the use of . preliminary examination transcripts by a reviewing court to establish a factual basis for a guilty plea where the crime did not consist solely of the testimony at the preliminary examination.
The defendant's guilty plea did not waive his right to assert a double jeopardy defense. People v Alvin Johnson, 396 Mich 424; 240 NW2d 729 (1976).
"An indictment for perjury or for subornation of, solicitation, or conspiracy to commit perjury, is sufficient which indicates the offense for which the accused is prosecuted, the nature of the controversy in respect of which the offense was committed and before what court or officer the oath was taken or was to have been taken, without setting forth any part of the records or proceedings with which the oath was connected, and without stating the commission or authority of the court or other authority before whom the perjury was committed or was to have been committed or the form of the oath or affirmation or the manner of administering the same." MCL 767.73; MSA 28.1013.
People v Cash, 388 Mich 153, 159; 200 NW2d 83 (1972), restates the rule in Michigan that "materiality of the false swearing to the matter in question must be alleged or it must clearly appear so from the statements alleged to be false".