Case Name: Louisville & Nashville R. R. Co. v. Daniel
Court: Kentucky Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Kentucky
Decision Date: 1909-01-29
Citations: 131 Ky. 689
Docket Number: 
Parties: Louisville & Nashville R. R. Co. v. Daniel
Judges: Judge Barker concurs in this dissent.
Reporter: Kentucky Reports
Volume: 131
Pages: 689–710

Head Matter:
CASE 71. — PERSONAL INJJJRY ACTION BY LEWIS DANIEL AGAINST THE LOUISVILLE & NASHVILLE R. R. CO.
January 29.
Louisville & Nashville R. R. Co. v. Daniel
Appeal from Hopkins Circuit Court.
J. F. Gordon, Circuit Judge.
Judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals
Affirmed.
1. Appeal and Error — Review—Questions of Pact — Successive Verdiqts. — Civil Code Practice, section 341, providing that a party shall not be granted more than two new trials upon the ground that the verdict is not sustained by the evidence, precludes reversal of the judgment and remand for a new trial upon the sole ground that the verdict is not sustained by the evidence, where there have been three verdicts upon substantially the same evidence for the same party, notwithstanding either of the first two verdicts may have been set aside for errors of law.
2. Same — Questions of Pact — Successive “Verdicts.” — A trial upon which the jury has failed to agree will not be considered as one of the “verdicts,” within Civil Code Practice, section 341, precluding sending the case hack for a new trial upon the ground that the evidence is insufficient to support the verdict, where there have been three verdicts upon substantially the same evidence.
3. Same — New Trial — Number That May Be Granted. — Civil Code Practice, section 341, providing that a party shall not be granted more than two new trials upon the ground that the verdict is not sustained by the evidence, does not limit the right to reverse me judgment and grant a new trial where prejudicial errors of law have been, committed, or the'verdict is so excessive as to make it plain that the jury must have been influenced by passion or prejudice.
4. Damages' — Personal Injuries — Excessive Verdict. — A verdict of $11,500 for personal injuries causing great pain resulting in the' loss of the right arm near the shoulder, and permanent injury to the other parts of the body, was not excessive.
5. Appeal and Error — Harmless Error — Form of Question.— Though it would have been better practice, in the introduction of evidence to show plaintiffs sobriety and industry; to have asked witness whether plaintiff was an industrious, sober man, yet where witness said that he had known plaintiff all his life, and was acquainted with his general reputation for sobriety and industry, and that his reputation in those respects was ’good, it was in substance the same as if witness had testified directly from his personal knowledge, and error in the form of the question does mot require a. reversal.
WADDELL & DEMPSEY and B. D.'WARFIELD fcr appellant.
POINTS DISCUSSED AND AUTHORITIES CITED.
1. On this third appeal of this case, the testimony for the plaintiff is substantially weaker, arid that fot defendant is substantially stronger than on the former trials. (L. & N. R. R. Co. v. Daniel, 122 Ky. 256; Same v. Same, 31 Ky. Law Rep. 944.) And, inasmuch as, on the trial from which this appeal is prosecuted it conclusively appeared from the physical facts and from uncontradicted and unimpeached testimony that plaintiff could not have been injured in the manner stated by him, but that he was injured in jumping from train No. 57 on which he beat his-way to Madisonville, and while the train was in rapid motion, defendant’s motion for a peremptory instruction should have been sustained. (Sinclair's Admr. v. I. C. R. R. Co., 112 S. W. on p. 911.)
2. Infamy event, the judgment must be reversed because the verdict on which it was rendered is not sustained by sufficient evidence. (Civil Code of Practice, sec. 340; Hurt v. L. & N. R. R. Co., 116 Ky. on p. 553; C., N. O. & T. P. Ry. Co. v. Zachary’s Admr., 32 Ky. Law Rep. 678; L. & N. R. R. Co. v. Hall, 115 Ky. on p. 580.)
3. Defendant’s testimony overwhelmingly refutes, and demon «trates the falsity of, plaintiffs wholly uncorroborated and incredible testimony.
4. This court is not precluded from reversing the judgment on this appeal because it is the third appeal in this case. The. reversal on the first appeal was not rested upon the ground that the verdict was not sustained by sufficient evidence. The reversal there was rested on three other grounds. Therefor, section 341, Civil Code, which provides among other things: “Nor .shall more than two new trials be granted to a party upon the ground that the verdict is not sustained by the evidence,” does not apply on this appeal. But one new trial has been granted by this court in this case on the ground that the verdict was not sustained by sufficient evidence. (L. & N. R. R. Co. v. Daniel, 31 Ky. Law Rep. 944.) “Errors of law that are prejudicial to the substantial rights of the unsuccessful party will always authorize a new trial.” (City of Bardstown v. Nelson County, 121 Ky. 737.) In L. & N. R. R. Co. v. Ricketts this court reversed four judgments obtained by plaintiff in the trial court: (1) 93 Ky. 116; (2) 96 Ky. 44; (3) 18 Ky. Law Rep. 687; (4) 21 Ky. Law Rep. 662. And in L. & N. R. R. Co. v. Carter, this court reversed three judgments recovered by plaintiff in the trial court; (1) 23 Ky. Law Rep. 2104; (2) 25 Ky. Law Rep. 759 — response, 25 Ky. Law Rep. 1303; (3) 27 Ky. Law Rep. 748.
5. The trial court erred in admitting evidence of reputation as to plaintiff’s habits of sobriety and industry. These habits should have been proven as facts and not as a matter of general reputation. (Abbott’s Trial Brief — Mode of Proving Facts, Ed. 1901, Title, Habit, 370; 16 Cye., Title Evidence, 1211; Buffalo Creek Coal Co. v. Hodges, 30 Ky. Law Rep. 346.)
6. The damages are excessive. (L. & N. R. R. Co. v. Lowe, 118 Ky. 260, 276; Same v. Kingman, 18 Ky. Law Rep. 82.)
7. The court erred in instructing the jury. Instructions tacitly approved by this court, given om former trials, were not properly given on the last trial when the testimony was materially different for plaintiff, and weaker for him, than that given on the former trials. (U. S. F. & G-. Co. v. Board of Education, 27 Ky. Law Rep. 865; Bridges v. McAllister, 106 Ky. 791; Klauber v. Sian Diego Street Car Co., 98 Cal. 105, 32 Pac. 876; Ohio & M. Ry. Co. v. Hill, 34 N. E. 646; U. S. F. & G. Co. v. Blackley Hurst &. Co., 27 Ky. Law Rep. 392; Adams' v. Thornton, 90. Pac. 713; Horn v. Arnold, Schwinn Co., 124 111. App. 185.)
8. Punitive damages should not have been authorized. There was not testimony on which to predicate such an instruction. (L. & N. R. R. Co. v. Joshlin, 33 Ky. Law Rep. on p. 517; Same v. Yach’s Admr., 33 Ky. Law Rep. —,. 112.S. W. 869; South- era Ry. Co. in Ky. v. Lee, by &c., 30 Ky. Law Rep. 1360; Same v. Brewer, 32 Ky. Law Rep. 1374; I. C. R. R. Co. v. Lence, 30 Ky. Law Rep. 988; Railroad Companies v. OJfutt 31 Ky. Law Rep. 936; jlj. & N. R. R. Co. v. Mount, 31 Ky. Law Rep. 210; Same v. McNary’s Admr., 32 R. on p. 1273; Lexington Ry. Co. v. Fain, 25 Ky. Law Rep. 2243; Southern Ry. Co. in Ky. v. Goddard, 28 Ky. Law Rep. 523; Hendersonr City Ry. Co. v. Lockett, 30 Ky. Law Rep. 321; Same v. Hawkins 28 Ky. Law Rep. 364; McHenry Coal Co. v. Sneddon, 98 Ky. 686; Shearman & Redfield on Neg., sec. 748; Covington Saw Mill Mfg. Co. v. Drexilius, 120 Ky. 493.)
GORDON, GORDON & COX for appellee.
SYNOPSIS OF BRIEF FOR APPELLEE ON THE THIRD APPEAL.
1. TMs is the third appeal in this oase from a judgment for appellee rendered on the fourth trial of the case, in the Hopkins circuit court, the evidence on each trial being substantially the same, and as the case has been twice reversed by this court because in its opinion the verdict is not sustained by the weight of the evidence, it cannot now be reversed on the same. ground. (L. & N. R. R. Co. v. Daniel, 28 Ky. Law Rep. 1148, 31 Ky. Law Rep. 944.)
2. Notice to appellant’s station' agents of the use of the pass-way by the public, was due notice to it thereof. (Glenn’s Admr. v. L. & N. R. R. Co., 28 Ky. Law Rep. 949.
3. This court is precluded from reversing this judgment by section 341, Civil Code. (Civil Code of Practice, .sec. 341; L. & N. R. R. Co. v. Daniel 28 Ky. Law Rep. 1148; L. & N. R. R. Co. v. Daniel, 31 Ky. Law Rep. 944.)
4. This court by its opinions on the two former appeals has settled the law of the case,’ 'and held, (1) that the case ought to go to the jury, and (2) that the instructions given the jury were correct, and as the only question left in the case is one of fact the court will -presume that the jury obeyed the instructions of the court. (I. C. R. R. Co. v. Stewart, 23 Ky. ikw Rep. 639.)
'5. Questions of fact are for the jury and their verdict will mot be disturbed unless “palpably and flagrantly” against the evidence, which this verdict is not. (I. C. R. R. Co. v. Brasher, 29 Ky. Law Rep. 1278; L. & N. R. R. Co. v. Eden, 29 Ky. Law Rep. 367; Holcomb Lobb Co. v. Kaufman, 29 Ky. Law Rep. 1006; Lexington Ry. Co. v. Herring, 29 Ky. Law Rep. 795.)
6. Independent of section 341 of the Code, the fact that there have been four trials of this case, on the same evidence, not one rsulting in a verdict for appellant, and three resulting in verdicts for Daniel, approved1 by tne trial court, requires that this judgment be affirmed. (L. & N. R. R. Co. v.' Graves, 78 Ky. 74; L. & N. R. R. Co. v. Shumaker, 23 Ky. Law Rep. 2458; C., N. O. & T. P. Ry. Co. v. Halcomb, 32 Ic. —; Board of Internal Improvement v. Moore, 25 Ky. Law Rep 16; L. & N. R. R. Co. v. Vanarse dell, Admr., 25 Ky. Law Rep. 1452; Southern Ry. Co. v. Goddard,' 32 Ky. Law Rep. 1392.)_
7. The hung jury on the third trial is to be taken on this appeal as though it had resulted in favor of Daniel. (Supreme Lodge K. of H. v. Lapp’s Admr , 25 Ky. Law Rep. 74; L. & N. R. R. Co. v. Connelley’s Admr. 9 Ky. Law Rep. 993; Adams Express Co. v. Hines, 1 Ky. Law Rep. 266.)
8. The opinions rendered on -the former appeal are me law of the case. (L. H. & St. L. R. Co v. Davis, 32 Ky. Law Rep. 581; Bright’s Exor. v. Bright’s Legatees, 30 Ky. Law Rep. 834.)
9. The evidence of Daniel’» reputation for sobriety and industry was properly admitted as an aid to the jury in estimating his earning capacity. (16 Cyc. (Text) 1275; Campbell v. Bannister, 79 Ky. 208; Comth. v. Nagle, 32 N. E. 861; L. & N. R. R. Co. v. Daniel, 28 Ky. Law Rep. 1148; Words & Phrases, vol. 2, p. 1061; Words & Phrases, vol. 7, p. 6118.)
10. Even if erroneous, .the error in the admission of evidence is harmless error, not affecting the substantial rights of appellant, “mere semblance of error that could not have controlled the verdict and ought not to be seized upon to disturb the finding of fact in a case where there has been three trials by jury, and not one of the three resulting in favor of the party complaining.”' (_u. & N. R. R. Co. v. Connelly’s Admr., 9 Ky. Law Rep. 993.)
11. The damages awarded by the fourth jury are not excessive for the loss by a young healthy, able-bodied, sober, industrious, man, 21 years of age, earning $40 to $60 per month, of the right arm near the shoulder, fracture of skull with concussion of the-brain, loss of two toes and other injuries to the foot, where the-injury was so severe as to cause him to remain unconscious two-weeks and to suffer greatly and continuously ever since.
12. This court on the first appeal tacitly held that $10,000, the-verdict of the first jury, was not excessive, and the present verdict is not equal to the first verdict plus' legal interest for the four yea-"s- delay since said first verdict was rendered. (Gray v. Dickinson, 11 Ky. Law Rep. 890; Smith v. Brannin, 79 Ky. 114; C. & O. Ry- Co. v. Judd’s Admx., 20 Ky. Law Rep. 1978; Dinkelspeil v. Central Ky. Asylum, 24 Ky. Law Rep. 2240; Ross v. Rees 21 Ky. Law Rep. 856; L. & N. R. R. Co. v. Mattingly, 22 Ky. Law Rep. 489.)
• 13. D. & N. R. R. Co. v. Lowe, 108 Ky. 26, cited by appellant is not in .point on the/ question of damages.
,.. 14. L. & N. R. R. Co. v. Kingman 18 Ky. Law Rep. 82, cited by appellant is not only not in point, but is imperfectly reported, and has been overruled by this1 court. (I. C. R. R. Co. -v. Stewart, 23 Ky. Law Rep. 639.)
15. A third verdict of a/ jury for the same litigant should not be set aside by this court on account of excessive damages. (Board of Internal Improvement v. Moore, 25 Ky. Law Rep. 15.)
16. The instruction on exemplary damages was proper; it was held tacitly by this court to be proper on the two former appeals;
and the. «ame facts proved on each of the trials showed gross negligence. (Kentucky Digest, vol. 1, title, “Appeal and Error,” p. 525; Conley v. C., N. O. & T. P. Ry. Co. 98 Ky. 402; National Life Insurance Company v. Anderson, 31 Ky. Law Rep. 415.)
20. 'McHenry Coal Company v. Sneddon, 98 Ky. 686, cited by appellant has been overruled by this court. ( I. C. R. R. Co. V. Stewart, 23 Ky. Law Rep. 641.)

Opinion:
Opinion op'the Court by
Judge Oarroll
Affirming.
There have been four trials of this case. On the .first, trial the damages in favor of appellee were assessed at $10,000. This court, in an opinion that may be found in 122 Ky. 256, 91 S. W. 691, 3 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1190, reversed the judgment awarding this sum for errors of law occurring during the trial, and also "because the verdict was palpably against the weight of the evidence," but held that .there was sufficient evidence to take the case to the jury. On the second trial the jury returned a verdict for $6,000. On an appeal from the judgment rendered upon that verdict, this court, in an opinion that may be found in 104 S. W. 344, 31 Ky. Law Rep. 944, reversed the judgment of the lower court upon the ground that the verdict was manifestly against the evidence. In fact, that was the only reason assigned for a reversal. Afterwards there, was another trial, but the jury failed to agree. Upon the trial in which the judgment herein appealed from was rendered, the damages were assessed at $11,500.
Counsel for appellant insist that errors of law were committed by the trial court, but we fail to discover any that would authorize a reversal. The case seems to have been practiced entirely within the lines laid down in the former opinions of this court. It is, however, earnestly contended that, as the verdict is palpably against the weight of the evidence, the judgment should be reversed fori this reason alone. The evidence on all of the trials was substantially the same, and as the last verdict, as well as the others, was flagrantly against the evidence — that is to say, upon the evidence a verdict should have been rendered for the other party — we would for this reason remand the case for a new trial, if we did not feel obliged by the provisions of the Code that will presently be noticed to affirm the judgment.
Section 341 of the Civil Code of Practice reads: "A new trial shall not be granted on account of the smallness of damages in an action for an injury to the person or reputation, or in any other action in which the damages equal the actual pecuniary injury sustained; nor shall more than two new trials be granted to a party upon the ground that the verdict is not sustained by the evidence. ' ' The first, part of this, section was contained in the old Code of' Practice, but the words "nor shall more than two^ new trials be granted to a party upon the ground that the verdict is not sustained by the evidence" were added to the section by the present Code, which took effect in January, 1877; and in 1879, two years after the provision in question, was inserted in the Code, this court, in the case of L. & N. R. R. Co. v. Graves, 78 Ky. 74, had occasion to consider and construe it. In that ease there had been three trials, and in each a verdict for the appellee, Graves, and also three appeals. In the course of the opinion on the last appeal the court said: "The case is therefore no stronger for the appellant than if we had simply said, on the former appeals, that the verdicts were clearly against the weight of the evidence. We are still of that opinion as to the last as well as the former verdicts. Was it, then, the duty of the court below to grant a neW trial, or is it the duty of this court to reverse because that court refused a new trial! The case has been tried three times, and each time there has been a verdict for the appellee on the same evidence. The former judgments were reversed for errors of law.' We have decided there was no error of law on the last trial, and, if we reverse, we must do so solely on the ground that the verdict is against the evidence. It is true the reversals of this ease have been upon questions of law; but the fact still remains that there have been three findings in the same way upon the same evidence, and, while the case may not be within the letter, it is dearly within the spirit of the statute, and it is also within .a rule laid' down in the decisions of this court prior to the enactment of the statute." Although two new trials had been granted by this court because of errors of. law committed during the progress of the trial, as well as for the reason that the verdicts were palpably against the .weight of the evidence, the court refused to disturb the third verdict, although it was also against the weight of the evidence, saying: "Questions of fact belong primarily to the jury, and the court only interferes to prevent injustice from haste, inadvertence, or prejudice; and as the court has no authority to decide questions of fact in a case properly triable by a jury, if there be any evidence proper to be considered by the jury, if the jury will not give way the court must, that there may be an end of litigation."
The construction then given to the provision in question has been followed by this court in L. & N. R. R. Co. v. Shumaker, 67 S. W. 829, 23 Ky. Law Rep. 2458; Board of Internal Improvements v. Moore, 74 S. W. 683, 25 Ky. Law Rep. 15; C., N. O. & T. P. Ry. Co. v. Halcomb, 105 S. W. 968, 32 Ky. Law. Rep. 381; Southern Ry. in Ky. v. Goddard, 108 S. W. 890, 32 Ky. Law Rep. 1397. So that it may now be considered as the settled practice that, when there have been three verdicts upon substantially the same evidence for the same party, the third verdict will not be disturbed upon the sole ground that it is not supported by, or is clearly against, the weight of the evidence. And this rule will obtain, although either one or both of the two first verdicts were set aside for errors of law appearing in the record. But there must be three verdicts. If there have been three trials, but the jury in one of them has failed to agree, the trial in which there was not a verdict will not be considered as one of the verdicts within the meaning of the code provision, although in Supreme Lodge of Knights of Honor v. Lapp, 74 S. W. 656, 25 Ky. Law Rep. 74, the court inadvertently said': "The rule in this State is that where there have been three verdicts for the same party, or two verdicts and a hung jury, the court will not disturb the verdict of the third jury on the ground that the verdict is not-sustained by the evidence." This code provision however, and the construction given to it, does not limit the right of this court to set. aside verdicts and grant a new trial when errors of law have been committed to the prejudice of the party appealing, or when the verdict is so excessive as to make, it plain that it was given under the influ-ence of passion or prejudice. When either of these conditions is made to appear, any number of verdicts may be set aside and new trials granted. City of Bardstown v. Nelson County, 121 Ky. 737, 90 S. W. 246, 28 Ky. Law Rep. 710; L. & N. R. R. Co. v. Ricketts, 52 S. W. 939, 21 Ky. Law Rep. 662; L. & N. R. R. Co. v. Carter, 86 S. W. 685, 27 Ky. Law Rep. 748.
It is further said that the verdict is excessive, and for this reason a new trial should! be granted. We cannot agree with- counsel in this contention. ' True it is that the verdict is contrary to the decided preponder enoe of the evidence; but it does not at all follow from this that it is excessive. Under the evidence there should have been a verdict for the railroad company; but, notwithstanding this, the jury, when they decided to find for the plaintiff, Daniel, were justified in assessing the damages at the amount they did. The injury appellee sustained not only caused him to suffer great pain, but resulted in the loss of his right arm near the shoulder and permanent injury to other parts of his body.
Complaint is also made of errors in the admission of evidence in respect to plaintiff's habits of sobriety and industry. Upon this point, and to illustrate it, a witness was asked: "Q. Are you acquainted with fh'e plaintiff, Lewis Daniel? A. Yes, sir. Q. How long have you known him? A. I have known him all my life. Q. Are you acquainted with the general reputation of Lewis Daniel as to sobriety and industry in the community in which he lives ? A. Cer tainly I know it. Q. Is that reputation for industry and sobriety good or bad? A'. It is good.' By the Court: Gentlemen of the jury, you will consider this evidence only in fixing- the earning capacity of Lewis Daniel." Hie argument is made that, although it was admissible to prove that Daniel was a sober and industrious man' by those whose acquaintance with and observation of him authorized them to make the statement as a fact known to them, yet is. w'as not competent to prove his general reputation in these particulars. We think it would have been-better practice, after the witnesses had qualified themselves- to testify by showing that they were acquainted with and had opportunity to know the habits of Daniel, to have asked them the direct question whether or not he was an industrious, sober man. But it is manifest that when the witnesses said that he knew Daniel all his life, and was acquainted with his general reputation for sobriety and industry, and that Ms reputation in these respects was good, it was in substance and effect the same as if the witness h'ad directly testified from personal knowledge that he was a sober, industrious man. There is, of course, a distinction that may be taken and made between statements made by a witness as a matter of fact based upon personal knowledge, and statements based upon what the witness knows the general reputation of the person to be; but the error in the form of the question is too trifling to authorize a reversal.
The judgment is affirmed.