Case Name: STATE of Louisiana v. Chester Terrell DURR
Court: Louisiana Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1977-02-28
Citations: 343 So. 2d 1004
Docket Number: No. 58534
Parties: STATE of Louisiana v. Chester Terrell DURR.
Judges: TATE, J., dissents and assigns written reasons.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 343
Pages: 1004–1008

Head Matter:
STATE of Louisiana v. Chester Terrell DURR.
No. 58534.
Supreme Court of Louisiana.
Feb. 28, 1977.
Rehearing Denied April 7, 1977.
Henry C. Gahagan, Jr., Gahagan & Gaha-gan, Natchitoches, for defendant-appellant.
William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Barbara Rutledge, Asst. Atty. Gen., James Lynn Davis, Dist. Atty., for plaintiff-appellee.

Opinion:
DIXON, Justice.
Chester Terrell Durr was indicted on a charge of second degree murder, a violation of R.S. 14:30.1 for the murder of Sammie A. Mitchell. A jury of twelve found defendant guilty as charged by a vote of ten to two; he was sentenced to imprisonment at hard labor for life, without eligibility for parole, probation or suspension of sentence for a period of twenty years. The defendant assigns three errors for reversal of his conviction and sentence, but has neither briefed nor argued Assignment No. 3, and it is thereby deemed abandoned. State v. Matthews, 292 So.2d 226 (La.1974); State v. Edwards, 261 La. 1014, 261 So.2d 649 (1972).
The facts surrounding the commission of this crime are as follows: on September 10, 1976, at approximately 8:30 p. m., Sammie Mitchell, the decedent, was sitting in the driver's seat of a 1973 Ford pickup truck parked on a secluded dirt road in Sabine Parish near J&M Poultry, a chicken farm. Sitting next to him was Martha Durr (the defendant's wife), and on the passenger side was Janet Moran (Martha Durr's sister), with her child in her lap. The defendant and Mrs. Durr had been having marital difficulties and Sammie Mitchell and Mrs. Durr had been seeing each other for three or four months. Shortly after 8:30 p.m., the defendant, Chester Durr, drove up and parked his pickup truck to the right of and behind Mitchell's truck. Defendant testified that he had gone to the farm where Sammie Mitchell worked to ask Mitchell to stop seeing his wife. The defendant left his truck and approached Mitchell's truck from the passenger side. After reaching the passenger window, the defendant asked his wife what she was doing there and whether she planned to come home. Mrs. Durr replied that she was talking to Sammie and that she did not plan to come home. At this point, the defendant alleges that Sammie Mitchell simultaneously reached for a rifle which was hanging on a gun rack in the back of the cab, and began opening his door. Defendant then fired a pistol into the truck several times, killing Sammie Mitchell. When the defendant took the stand he admitted shooting Mitchell but claimed that he took this action in self-defense.
Assignment of Error No. 1
After the defendant was found guilty he filed a motion for a new trial. In it he contended that during the course of trial the jury foreman, Mr. James R. Cook, alone, and without the knowledge or authority of the trial judge, went to a Ford dealership and re-enacted the circumstances of the shooting in a new pickup truck of the same make and model as the one in which decedent was shot (although of a different year). The foreman then allegedly discussed his findings with the other members of the jury prior to the rendition of their verdict. Defendant alleges that the actions of the foreman made him a "witness" against the defendant and thereby denied the defendant his right of confrontation (U.S.Const. VI Amend.) and due process of law (U.S.Const. XIV Amend.).
At the hearing on the motion for a new trial, the owner of the automobile dealership testified that Mr. Cook had come to his lot, got into a pickup truck, and tried certain movements while in the truck. However, Mr. Cook, the foreman, was not permitted to testify about the incident. The trial judge subsequently denied the motion for a new trial.
The actions of the trial judge in refusing to permit the foreman to testify and in denying the motion for a new trial were based on R.S. 15:470 which provides:
"No juror, grand or petit, is competent to testify to his own or his fellows' misconduct, or to give evidence to explain, qualify or impeach any indictment or any verdict found by the body of which he is or was a member; but every juror, grand or petit, is a competent witness to rebut any attack upon the regularity of the conduct or of the findings of the body of which he is or was a member."
This statute forbidding a juror from impeaching his verdict by testimony averring his own misconduct, "relate(s) to the public interest in finality of verdicts and in encouraging freedom and frankness in jury discussion in reaching them." State v. Ledet, 298 So.2d 761 (La.1974). The rule of law preventing a juror from impeaching the verdict of a jury of which he was a member is firmly established in the jurisprudence of this State. See e. g., State v. Sullivan, 333 So.2d 638 (La.1976); State v. Johanson, 332 So.2d 270 (La.1976); State v. Credeur, 328 So.2d 59 (La.1976); State v. Fortenberry, 307 So.2d 296 (La.1975); State v. Hatch, 305 So.2d 497 (La.1975), and cases cited therein; State v. Ledet, supra; State v. Calloway, 174 La. 134, 140 So. 2 (1932); State v. Guillory, 163 La. 98, 111 So. 612 (1927). In the case before us now, to permit Mr. Cook to testify would be to allow a juror to testify to his own alleged misconduct and to give evidence tending to impeach his verdict, in contravention to the settled law of this State. The trial judge was correct in precluding this testimony and in overruling the motion for a new trial. The evidence adduced at the motion for new trial did not establish jury misconduct.
This assignment lacks merit.
Assignment of Error No. 2
Defendant contends that the trial judge erred in denying his supplemental motion for a new trial which alleged that the general venire was improperly selected. The new trial was sought pursuant to C.Cr.P. 851 which provides in pertinent part:
"The court, on motion of the defendant, shall grant a new trial whenever:
"(4) The defendant has discovered, since the verdict or judgment of guilty, a prejudicial error or defect in the proceedings that, notwithstanding the exercise of reasonable diligence by the defendant, was not discovered before the verdict or judgment; or . . . "
The "error or defect" that the defendant "discovered" was the decision of this court in State v. Procell, 332 So.2d 814 (La.1976), which was rendered subsequent to the verdict of guilty in this case. In Procell this court held that the system employed for the selection of the general venire in Sabine Parish prevented the general venire from being selected as required by statute and the Louisiana Constitution. As a result of that holding the conviction of the defendant in Procell was reversed.
In Procell, however, the defendant filed a motion to quash prior to trial. No motion to quash was filed in this case. C.Cr.P. 535 provides in pertinent part:
"B. A motion to quash shall be filed at least three judicial days before commencement of trial, and may be filed with permission of the court at any time before commencement of trial, when based on any of the following grounds:
"(1) The time limitation for commencement of trial has expired;
"(2) The general venire or the petit jury venire was improperly drawn, selected, or constituted; or
"(3) A grand jury indictment is invalid because the manner of selection of the general venire, the grand jury venire, or the grand jury was illegal.
"C. A motion to quash based on any grounds, other than those stated in Paragraphs A and B of this article, may be filed of right within ten days after ar raignment or before commencement of the trial, whichever is earlier. Such motion may be filed with permission of the court after expiration of the ten-day period, but prior to commencement of trial.
"D. The grounds for a motion to quash under Paragraphs B and C are waived unless a motion to quash is filed in conformity with those provisions." (Emphasis added).
Official Revision Comment (c)(2) to that article provides:
"(2) The general venire or the petit jury venire was improperly drawn, selected, or constituted:
"This objection is waived unless it is urged before trial by a motion to quash the venire. It is not listed as a ground for the motion in arrest of judgment; nor is it, under ordinary circumstances, a proper ground for habeas corpus."
The correct procedural vehicle for alleging that the general or petit jury ve-nire was improperly drawn, selected or constituted is a motion to quash. By failing to file such a motion, the defendant has waived this objection. C.Cr.P. 535(D); State v. Kibby, 294 So.2d 196 (La.1974); State v. Reese, 250 La. 151, 194 So.2d 729, cert. den., 389 U.S. 996, 88 S.Ct. 485, 19 L.Ed.2d 495 (1967).
Finding no error in the rulings of the trial court, the conviction and sentence of the defendant are affirmed.
TATE, J., dissents and assigns written reasons.
CALOGERO, J., dissents believing assignment # 1 has merit.
DENNIS, J., dissents.
. The jurors were not sequestered during the course of the trial.
. While this prohibition is well settled in Louisiana, in a limited number of cases this court has recognized that a juror may be competent to testify as to certain improprieties. See State v. Kifer, 186 La. 674, 173 So. 169 (1937) (on motion to quash, the testimony of grand jurors that the district attorney and his assistant were present in the grand jury room during deliberations and the voting on the indictment was held admissible); State v. Bischoff, 146 La. 748, 84 So. 41 (1920) (in dicta the court indicated that if a charge of the use of force or violence on the jurors was made which induced a juror to render a verdict to which he did not willingly agree, a juror might be permitted to testify). See also Parker v. Gladden, 385 U.S. 363, 87 S.Ct. 468, 17 L.Ed.2d 420 (1966). However, the case before us now is not one of these exceptional circumstances.