Case Name: T. B. FLETCHER, and his wife, Aline Fletcher, Appellants, v. Lois Philpot WILLIAMS, Ruth Fletcher and P. C. Crapps, Jr., as Administrators of the estate of Madison Fletcher, deceased, with the Will annexed, and as Executors of the last Will and Testament of Mae Fletcher, deceased, and as Trustees for the Trust left for the use and benefit of Walter Madison Fletcher and McCall's Chapel Methodist Church, Appellees
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1963-05-21
Citations: 153 So. 2d 759
Docket Number: No. E-66
Parties: T. B. FLETCHER, and his wife, Aline Fletcher, Appellants, v. Lois Philpot WILLIAMS, Ruth Fletcher and P. C. Crapps, Jr., as Administrators of the estate of Madison Fletcher, deceased, with the Will annexed, and as Executors of the last Will and Testament of Mae Fletcher, deceased, and as Trustees for the Trust left for the use and benefit of Walter Madison Fletcher and McCall’s Chapel Methodist Church, Appellees.
Judges: CARROLL, DONALD K., Chief Judge, concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 153
Pages: 759–773

Head Matter:
T. B. FLETCHER, and his wife, Aline Fletcher, Appellants, v. Lois Philpot WILLIAMS, Ruth Fletcher and P. C. Crapps, Jr., as Administrators of the estate of Madison Fletcher, deceased, with the Will annexed, and as Executors of the last Will and Testament of Mae Fletcher, deceased, and as Trustees for the Trust left for the use and benefit of Walter Madison Fletcher and McCall’s Chapel Methodist Church, Appellees.
No. E-66.
District Court of Appeal of Florida. First District.
May 21, 1963.
J. L. Blackwell, Live Oak, for appellants.
Alfred T. Airth, Live Oak, for appellees.

Opinion:
WIGGINTON, Judge.
Plaintiffs have appealed from a final judgment granting Appellees' motion to dismiss their third amended complaint with prejudice on the grounds, among others, that (1) the verbal agreement sued upon violates the statute of frauds; and (2) that the agreement was not in writing signed in the presence of two subscribing witnesses by the persons whose executors are now sought to be charged. It is contended that the complaint states a cause of action for the relief prayed therein, and that the chancellor erred in the rendition of his decree of dismissal.
The complaint is one for declaratory decree by which plaintiffs .allege that they acquired title to a parcel of land in Dixie County pursuant to a parol agreement between them and defendants' decedents whereby the latter promised to make a gift of the land to plaintiffs either by deed or by last will and testament. The complaint praj^s for a judicial declaration of plaintiffs' rights in the premises and a decree requiring defendants to execute and deliver a conveyance of the land to them, or in the alternative that plaintiffs' title be quieted against the claims asserted by defendants, in their representative capacities.
The complaint alleges that fee title to-the land in question was vested in Madison Fletcher and his wife, Mae Fletcher, prior to their respective deaths. It is alleged', that plaintiffs entered into a parol agreement with the Fletchers during the latter's, lifetime whereby the latter bound themselves to make a gift of the land to plaintiffs if plaintiffs would move onto the-property and care for it and the livestock-maintained thereon, and render other personal services to the Fletchers so long as: they should live. It is alleged that the-gift was to be consummated either by deed', or by last will and testament. Plaintiffs, allege that they performed their part of the agreement by moving on the land, caring for it, the livestock and improvements located thereon; by clearing and placing in cultivation a portion thereof, and by rendering other personal services to the-Fletchers until their respective deaths in: 1960 and 1961. It is alleged that no deed' conveying the land to plaintiffs was executed during the lives of either of the decedents, and that although both of them-, died testate, no provision was made in-either of their wills devising the land in; question to plaintiffs.
Tested by common law principles, relating to the law of contracts it must be held that the complaint is sufficient to state a cause of action. For the purpose of considering a motion to dismiss, the well' pleaded allegations of the complaint are taken as true. The complaint sufficiently alleges an agreement entered into between, plaintiffs and defendants' decedents regarding a conveyance of real property. From the complaint it affirmatively appears that plaintiffs have fully discharged their obligations under the contract, and fully paid their part of the consideration for which it was agreed they would receive a conveyance of the land in question,. the conveyance to be made either by deed or by devise in the last will and testament of the decedents.
Appellees assert that even conceding the truth of the facts alleged in the complaint, plaintiffs are precluded from maintaining this • action and seeking the relief prayed by the complaint for the reason that the agreement to convey by deed is not in writing and otherwise violates the mandatory provisions of the statute of frauds, as well as the statute relating to agreements to make a will of real or personal property. We pause to note that the latter statute is only declaratory of the decisional law of this state. Prior to the adoption of this statute it was consistently held by the courts of Florida that contracts to make a will devising real estate are in the same class as agreements for the sale or conveyance of lands which, if not in writing, are clearly condemned by the statute of frauds.
At common law contracts for the sale or conveyance of lands, as well as contracts to make a devise of lands by a last will and testament, could be established either by parol evidence or by a written instrument in the same manner as any other kind of contract. It was primarily to prevent fraud and perjury in claims relating to land that the English adopted the first statute of frauds entitled "An Act for the Prevention of Frauds and Perjuries". The English statute of frauds is usually not considered as extending to this country and is of force here only by virtue of its adoption by the legislatures of the several states, directly or indirectly. Statutes requiring contracts to be in writing or evidenced by a written memorandum thereof do not deprive the parties of the right to contract with respect to the matters therein involved, but merely regulate the formalities of the contract necessary to render it enforceable. Such statutes do not render a verbal contract void, but are merely a limitation on the judicial authority to afford a remedy for enforcement.
Appellants contend that if appellees elect to rely on the statute of frauds as a defense to the cause of action alleged in the complaint, they may assert it only by pleading the bar of the statute as an affirmative defense in an answer filed to the complaint as required by Rule 1.8(d), 1954 Rules of Civil Procedure, 30 F.S.A., but may not urge the statute as a ground of the motion to dismiss.
Prior to the year 1950 the practice and procedure in Florida was in accordance with principles of common law pleading or as provided in the chancery act then in effect. Under this system affirmative defenses to causes of action alleged in a declaration at law or complaint in equity were normally asserted by way of plea or answer. It was likewise a generally accepted rule of pleading that if an affirmative defense to the cause of action sued upon appeared on the face of the declara tion or complaint, the defense could be asserted as a ground for a motion to dismiss or demurrer. Typical of the cases so holding is the Thrasher case decided by the Supreme Court of Florida in 1943.
In 1949, effective January 1, 1950, the Supreme Court adopted our present rules of civil procedure which now control the practice and pleading in causes of action both at common law and in equity. These modern rules of procedure introduced into the jurisprudence of this state an entirely new concept of pleading and procedure to be employed in the litigation of civil actions. Among the rules so adopted is one relating to affirmative defenses in which it is provided that:
"In pleading to a preceding pleading, a party shall set forth affirmatively accord and satisfaction, arbitration and award, assumption of risk, contributory negligence, discharge in bankruptcy, duress, estoppel, failure of consideration, fraud, illegality, injury by fellow servant, laches, license, payment, release, res judicata, statute of frauds, statute of limitations, waiver, and any other matter constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense. "
The rules further provide:
"A party shall be deemed to have waived all defenses and objections which he does not present either by motion as hereinbefore provided or, if he has made no motion, in his answer or reply, except (1) that the defense of failure to state a cause of action, the defense of failure to join an indispensable party, and the objection of failure to state a legal defense to a claim may also be made by a later pleading, if one is permitted, or by motion for judgment on the pleadings or at the trial on the merits, and except (2) that, whenever it appears by suggestion of the parties or otherwise that the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter. See Rule 1.39. The objection or defense, if made at the trial,, shall be disposed of as provided in: Rule 1.15(b) in the light of any evidence that may have been received." '
The foregoing rules have been uniformly construed to mean that if a complaint filed in a civil action states a cause of action in accordance with either statutory, common law or equitable principles, the complaint will be sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss it. If a defendant elects to assert an affirmative defense as a bar to the action, such defense must be pleaded in an answer filed in response to the complaint. Affirmative defenses may not be asserted as grounds for a motion to> dismiss the complaint, even though the-availability of the defense as a bar to the action may appear on the face of the complaint.
Rule 1.8(d) of the Florida Rules of Civil' Procedure was taken from and is an exact counterpart of Rule 8(c) of the Federal; Rules of Civil Procedure relating to the pleading of affirmative defenses. Courts-in the federal jurisdiction have consistently construed this rule to mean that the affirmative defense of the statute of frauds must be pleaded in a responsive pleading addressed to a cause of action, and may not be asserted as a ground for a motion to dismiss. The only exception to this rule of procedure in the federal courts is in those instances where an affirmative defense appears on the face of the pleading to which, a response is required. In these instances & motion to dismiss the pleading for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted may be treated under Rule 12(b) of the Federal Rules as a motion for summary judgment. We have no provision in the Florida Rules similar to Rule 12(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, so the exception recognized in the federal practice is not recognized under the rules of procedure which are in effect in this state.
Following the adoption in 1949 of the new rules of civil procedure the Supreme Court was called upon in the Tuggle case to review a decision of a trial court dismissing a complaint on the ground that it affirmatively appeared that the statute of limitations had run on the claim set forth therein. The motion to strike filed by the defendant was treated by the trial court as a motion to dismiss, and as such was granted. In reversing the order dismissing the complaint the Supreme Court said:
"Another reason for considering the motion to strike as one to dismiss or in dismissing the cause on his own account was the affirmative appearance that the claim was barred by the statute of limitations. This was a ground of the -motion to strike but was not authorized as such by the rule. On the contrary it is specifically provided that the statute of limitations, when relied upon as a defense, shall be set forth affirmatively. Rule 9(d). This method was purposely adopted to obviate the necessity of the initial pleader's setting forth that the •statute had been waived or tolled and to dispel any existing uncertainty in the law on the subject. If the statute is affirmatively pleaded and such waiver or tolling is considered by the plaintiff to have counteracted its effect he may present the matter by a reply under rule 8(a). Of course, being an affirmative defense, the defendant may waive the statute by ignoring it."
In Hough the trial court entered an order granting a motion to dismiss a complaint upon the asserted grounds that the issues raised were res judicata because of a previous suit to quiet title, and because on the face of the pleading the statute of limitations barred plaintiff from recovery. In reversing the order of dismissal the Supreme Court said:
"Grounds (2) and (4) of the motion to dismiss are affirmative defenses which are not properly raised on motion to dismiss, but should be raised in an answer. See Fla.Rules Civ.Proc. rules 1.8(d) and 1.11(b), 30 F.S.A."
In the Stone case the chancellor dismissed a complaint with prejudice pursuant to a motion to dismiss which raised the affirmative defenses of res judicata and/or estoppel by judgment. The Third District Court of Appeal, speaking through Judge Horton, properly characterized the defenses asserted as affirmative in character which under our rules of procedure could be asserted only in an answer filed to the complaint. In reversing the decree appealed, the court said:
" To supplement a complaint with additional facts, by way of motion to dismiss, in order to render the complaint legally insufficient, is a practice that is not authorized by the rules. The motion to dismiss certainly could not operate in this instance as a substitute for a motion for summary decree because to do so would deny the opposing party the benefit of notice and opportunity to reply provided for by the summary decree rule if not in effect denying him due process. See Rule 1.36, Florida Rules of Civil Procedure."
The same conclusion was reached by the Third District Court of Appeal in the Braz case , wherein an order dismissing with prejudice a complaint pursuant to a motion to dismiss on the ground that the action was barred by laches and res judicata was reversed. The Court, again speaking through Judge Horton, said:
"The first and second grounds of the motion to dismiss, i. e., that the action is barred by laches and/or res judicata, can, we feel, be disposed of upon the authority of Hough v. Menses, Fla.1957, 95 So.2d 410, and Stone v. Stone, Fla.App.1957, 97 So.2d 352, which, in effect, uphold Florida Rules of Civil Procedure 1.8(d) and 1.11(b), 30 F.S. A., requiring such defenses to be incorporated in an answer rather than in a motion to dismiss."
The statute quoted in the foregoing part of this opinion which renders unenforceable parol agreements to make a will of real or personal property was considered by the Third District Court of Appeal in disposing of one of the questions raised on the appeal. In holding that the statute constituted an affirmative defense which could not be asserted except in an answer filed to the complaint, the Court, speaking through Judge Barkdull, said:
"While the appellant urges the aforementioned contract is void by virtue of § 731.051 Fla.Stat., F.S.A., a search of the record on appeal reveals the statute was never plead in the court below. § 731.051 Fla.Stat., F.S.A., is similar to the Statute of Frauds and, as such, is a defense personal to the defendant in any given action. It must be affirmatively plead by appropriate pleadings or, for purposes of the instant proceeding, the provisions of the statute are waived. 25 Fla.Jur., Pleadings, § 77, 78; F. R. C. P. 1.8(d), 1.11(h), 30 F.S.A. The appellant herein having failed to plead § 731.051, Fla.Stat., F. S.A., as an affirmative defense below,. has waived his right to that defense and is hereby estopped from bringing it up' for the first time on appeal. "
Appellees contend that the complaint was properly dismissed for failure to-síate a cause of action in that it contained no allegations of fact which could be considered sufficient in law to avoid the statute-of frauds as a bar to the contract sued upon. Stated differently, it is argued that the burden rests on plaintiff to anticipate that defendants would elect to assert the statute as-a bar to the action, and then to go forward' by alleging facts which would be sufficient in law to avoid the statute.as a bar to the-cause of action sued upon. Such contention is without merit and must be rejected.. There is hardly any cause of action to which' a defendant could not conceivably interpose-many statutory and common law defenses-which, if established by competent proof, would be a bar to the action. Our rules of pleadings do not impose upon a plaintiff the duty of not only alleging a cause of action,, but also anticipating all conceivable defenses which could possibly be interposed' by the defendant, and to allege facts which would be sufficient to negative or avoid such defense if pleaded. This was the conclusion reached by the Supreme Court in the Hough case, supra, when in holding that affirmative defenses may not be properly raised by motion to dismiss but must be raised in an answer, said that the reason for this is that the plaintiff should not have the burden of anticipating a defense and then overcoming it in its initial pleadings. If appellees elect to rely on either of the above quoted statutes of fraud as a bar to the action, they must allege them as a defense in an answer filed in response to the complaint. Until this is done, appellants have no opportunity to file a reply alleging such facts as may be known to them as will avoid or negate the effect of the statute, or bring their cause of action within one of the exceptions to the statute. If such a reply is filed, an issue is thus made on which the case may proceed to trial. If no such reply is filed, or if such reply as may be filed is legally insufficient to avoid the bar of the statute, appellees may then move for a summary final decree. This is the orderly procedure contemplated by our rules, and the one which must be followed when affirmative defenses are relied upon to defeat the cause of action alleged in a complaint.
We are not unmindful of the decision rendered by this court in the Flye case . We were there called upon to review the propriety of an order dismissing with prejudice a complaint in chancery on the ground, among others, that the complaint showed on its face laches which would bar recovery under any theory. In the opinion we called attention to our rules of procedure which require that affirmative defenses, such as laches and others, be affirmatively pleaded, but through oversight we applied the rule pronounced by the Supreme Court in the Thrasher case, supra, as permitting an exception to the general rule. Upon the authority of Thrasher we held that when a complaint shows laches on its face it is subject to dismissal on a motion to dismiss asserting laches as a ground therefor. In rendering our decision we did not realize at the time that the decision in Thrasher was rendered in 1943, some seven years prior to the adoption of our present rules, and at a time when the rule stated therein was accepted as a proper rule of procedure. It necessarily follows that our holding in the Flye case on the point now under consideration was incorrect, and we now hereby recede therefrom.
The decree appealed is reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings. Upon the going down of our mandate ap-pellees shall be allowed a reasonable time within which to answer the complaint and interpose such defenses as they may deem advisable.
Reversed.
CARROLL, DONALD K., Chief Judge, concurs.
STURGIS, J., dissents.
. F.S. § 725.01, F.S.A.: "No action shall be brought upon any contract for the sale of lands, tenements or hereditaments, or of any uncertain interest in or concerning them, unless the agreement or promise upon which such action shall be brought, or some note or memorandum thereof shall be in writing and signed by the party to be charged therewith or by some other person by him thereunto lawfully authorized."
.F.S. § 731.051, F.S.A.: "No agreement to make a will of real or personal property or to give a legacy or make a devise shall be binding or enforceable unless such agreement is in writing signed in the presence of two subscribing witnesses by the person whose executor or administrator is sought to be charged."
. Gable v. Miller, (Fla.1958), 104 So.2d 358; Sample v. Ward, 156 Fla. 210, 23 So.2d 81; Battle v. Butler, 138 Fla. 392, 189 So. 846; Miller v. Carr, 137 Fla. 114, 188 So. 103.
. Stat. 29 Car. II, c 3 (1677).
. 49 Am.Jur. — Statute of Frauds, § 2, p. 364.
. 49 Am.Jur. — Statute of Frauds, § 3, p. 365.
. Thrasher et al. v. Ocala Mfg. Ice and Packing Co. et al., 153 Fla. 488, 15 So.2d 32.
. Rule 1.8(d) 1954 Rules of Civil Procedure.
. Rule 1.11(h), 1954 Rules of Civil Procedure.
. Continental Collieries, Inc. v. Shober (Ct.App. 3rd Ct., 1942), 130 F.2d 631; Richard Nathan Corp. v. Mitsubishi Shoji Kaisha, Limited (D.C.S.D.N.Y.1941), 41 F.Supp. 299; Piest v. Tide Water Oil Co., (D.C.S.D.N.Y.1939), 27 F.Supp. 1020.
. Tuggle v. Maddox (Fla.1952), 60 So.2d 158; see also Proctor v. Schomberg (Fla.1953), 63 So.2d 68; Hawkins v. Bay County Publishers, Inc. (Fla.App.1963), 148 So.2d 561.
. Hough v. Menses et al. (Fla.1957), 95 So.2d 410.
. Stone v. Stone (Fla.App.1957), 97 So.2d 352.
. Braz v. Professional Insurance Corporation (Fla.App.1958), 101 So.2d 594.
. Cypen v. Frederick (Fla.App.1962), 139 So.2d 201.
. Flye v. Jeffords et al. (Fla.App.1958), 106 So.2d 229.