Case Name: William D. Elam, plaintiff in error, vs. H. J. Johnson, Ordinary, defendant in error
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia
Jurisdiction: Georgia
Decision Date: 1873-01
Citations: 48 Ga. 348
Docket Number: 
Parties: William D. Elam, plaintiff in error, vs. H. J. Johnson, Ordinary, defendant in error.
Judges: 
Reporter: Georgia Reports
Volume: 48
Pages: 258–260

Head Matter:
William D. Elam, plaintiff in error, vs. H. J. Johnson, Ordinary, defendant in error.
(Atlanta,
January Term, 1873.)
Attorney at Law — Appointment by Court — Compensation.—An attorney at law who was assigned by the Judge of the Superior Court as counsel to defend an indigent defendant, on his trial upon an indictment in the said Court, and who accordingly did appear and defend him, is not entitled by any law of this State to be paid for such services out of the county funds. i
Attorney at law. Pauper. County funds. Before Judge Harvey. Floyd Superior Court.' January Adjourned Term, 1872.
William D. Elam petitioned the Superior Court for a rule nisi requiring H. J. Johnson, as Ordinary of the county of Floyd, to show cause why the writ of mandamus should not *issue directing him to draw his draft on the county treasurer for the sum of $150 00, alleged to be due to relator for professional services rendered to a pauper. The petition made substantially the following case: At the January adjourned term, 1871, of Floyd Superior Court, there came on to be heard the case of The State vs. Reuben Taylor, upon an indictment for simple larceny. Upon the statement of the prisoner that he had no counsel to defend him, was unable to employ one, and desired relator to represent his case, the Court appointed relator to conduct the defense. Relator performed the duties of counsel in said case upon the trial; the defendant being convicted, he moved for a new trial. The motion having been overruled, he made out a bill of exceptions and carried the case by writ of error to the Supreme Court, where the judgment was affirmed. Relator made out his bill against the county of Floyd for said professional services, amounting to $150 00, and presented it to the Ordinary, requesting a draft upon the .county treasurer for that sum. The Ordinary rejected the account and refused the draft.
The respondent demurred to the petition. The demurrer was sustained and relator excepted.
W. D. Elam, by Underwood & Rowell, for plaintiff in error.
Alexander & Wright, for defendant.

Opinion:
McCay, Judge.
It is admitted that there is no specific authority granted by law to the Ordinary to pay this demand, that it is nowhere, in terms, made a charge against the county. If it can be paid at all, it is under paragraph 5 of section 547 of the Revised Code, "to pay the expenses of the county for bailiffs at Courts, nonresident witnesses in criminal cases, fuel, servant hire, stationery, and the like.1' But even, as to these expenses, the Ordinary can only pay such as are a legal charge against the county. Nor is it in the discretion of the Judge of the Superior *Court or the Ordinary to say what is included. This Court held in 24 Georgia, 82, that without a special law giving the authority, the Judge of the Superior Court could not charge the county with the expense of feeding jurymen, even whilst sitting in a case. At last, therefore, the inquiry is, whether in the nature of things, the demand now pressed is a charge on the county. Our constitutional provision, that a prisoner shall have "the privilege and benefit of counsel," is appealed ' to. Does this mean that the public shall furnish him' with counsel? We think not. The provision is general. It applies to the rich as well as the poor. It does not say he shall have this if he is unable to procure counsel, but what it guarantees is to all, to-wit: the right to "have the privilege and benefit of counsel." In England, this right was, in many cases, denied, or only allowed to a limited extent. And this clause was to secure this right, even against legislative infringement. We do not think the public has taken upon itself the duty of seeing to it, that every prisoner has the benefit of counsel, except in a collateral way. We do not think a Judge of the Superior Court has the power to appoint a private citizen, not "an adnvtted attorney, to any such duty; it is a-duty growing out of the office of an attorney, or rather of counselor, or advocate. An "attorney at law" in this State, exercises alb the functions of an attorney and counselor in England. His profession is recognized by law. He is a sworn officer; he is examined, licensed and commissioned, and has legal duties and privileges attached to his office. One of these is provided by 'our Code — "Never to reject, for considerations personal to himself, the cause of the defenseless or oppressed." This, too, is an old common law duty, and has been not only the admitted obligation but the pride and glory of the profession from time immemorial. The law. recognizes the profession and the office. As it confers privileges, it also imposes duties. One of these is, that he will never reject the cause of the defenseless, and that when the presiding Judge of a Court (at which he is in attendance) — the head of his profession for the time — presents to his notice a case coming *within the sphere of his obligation, he will, in good faith as a man and as a lawyer, come to his aid. 1 f he he fails in his
Thus far the law has provided for the defense of indigent persons charged with crime. The office of an attorney at law has this duty imposed upon it. It -is one of the duties the members of our profession take upon themselves with that office.
Judgment affirmed.