Case Name: J. E. MEEK and Mrs. J. E. Meek, Plaintiffs in Error, v. Floy V. WILLIAMS, Kathleen Anderson and Margaret Riley, Defendants in Error
Court: Oklahoma Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Oklahoma
Decision Date: 1968-05-21
Citations: 441 P.2d 420
Docket Number: No. 42471
Parties: J. E. MEEK and Mrs. J. E. Meek, Plaintiffs in Error, v. Floy V. WILLIAMS, Kathleen Anderson and Margaret Riley, Defendants in Error.
Judges: JACKSON, C. J., IRWIN, V. C. J., and BLACKBIRD, BERRY and HODGES, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Pacific Reporter 2d
Volume: 441
Pages: 420–425

Head Matter:
J. E. MEEK and Mrs. J. E. Meek, Plaintiffs in Error, v. Floy V. WILLIAMS, Kathleen Anderson and Margaret Riley, Defendants in Error.
No. 42471.
Supreme Court of Oklahoma.
May 21, 1968.
Geo. L. Verity, Brown, Verity & Brown, Oklahoma City, for plaintiffs in error.
H. C. Ivester, Ivester, Ivester & Ivester, Sayre, for defendants in error.

Opinion:
McINERNEY, Justice:
This case presents for decision the question of whether within the meaning of 12 O.S.1961, § 958 and 12 O.S.Supp.1963, § 972(a) a case made is deemed settled when the trial judge signs the certificate of settlement or when that certificate is attested by the clerk of the trial court. Our answer is that under the terms of Sec. 958 the date of the trial judge's certificate is controlling and the 20-day time limit prescribed by Sec. 972(a) begins to run from that date.
This appeal is governed by the provisions of 12 O.S.Supp.1965, § 962(a) and 12 O.S.Supp.1963, § 972(a). The cited enactments were in effect when the trial court's judgment was rendered on Oct. 26, 1966. See Poafpybitty v. Skelly Oil Company, Okl., 394 P.2d 515, 517.
The provisions of Sec. 972(a), as amended in 1963, prescribe that all proceedings in error which are prosecuted by case made must be commenced within 20 days from the date the case made is settled. The amendment dispenses with the previous requirement in 12 O.S.1961, § 972 of extending appeal time beyond three months from the date of final order. By force of the amendment extensions of appeal time became unnecessary and unauthorized. Under the terms of 12 O.S. Supp.1963, § 972(a), considered in conjunction with the provisions of 12 O.S.Supp. 1965, § 962(a), neither the trial court nor this court may, by any judicial act or order, extend the appeal time beyond the 20-day time limit prescribed by Sec. 972(a) for filing a proceeding in error by case made in this court. Blackwelder et al. v. Naylor, Okl., 439 P.2d 202.
The case made attached to the petition in error in this cause was settled by a certificate of the trial judge dated March 30, 1967; the certificate was attested by the clerk of the trial court on April 13, 1967. On the latter date the clerk also signed a certificate reciting that "casemade was settled on this 30th day of March 1967, and that 20 days from this date is the latest date by which Petition-in-Error can be filed in the Supreme Court to comply with Section 972, Title 12 The petition in error was filed here April 28, 1967 — more than 20 days from the date of the trial judge's certificate of settlement but within 20 days from the date case made was attested by the court clerk and certified as to the "latest date" for filing an appeal.
Under the terms of 12 O.S.1961, § 966, when a case made is settled by a stipulation of the parties waiving the trial judge's certificate of settlement, the settlement is not complete until the court clerk certifies, under the seal of the court, that the case made "is a full, true and correct record of the proceedings therein". This is so because the terms of Sec. 966 expressly provide that when the case made is not settled by the trial judge the clerk must certify as to its correctness. In short, by force of Sec. 966, the clerk's certificate is a pre-settlement requirement because it is indispensable to the settlement effected by stipulation of the parties. Henry Building Company v. Cowman, Okl., 363 P.2d 208, 211.
The terms of 12 O.S.1961, § 958, which prescribe the procedure governing a settlement of the case made by the trial judge do not require the inclusion of any such certificate by the clerk. They provide merely that the trial judge on settling and signing the case made shall "cause it to be attested by the clerk, and the seal of the court to be thereto attached. " When that is done, Sec. 958 provides, "[i]t [the case made] shall then be filed with the papers in the case."
It is readily apparent from the statutory language quoted above that the settlement is effected and complete within the meaning of Sec. 958 when the trial judge signs the certificate of settlement
and causes the attestation of the clerk to be made under the seal of the court. This statutory duty was discharged by the trial judge in the present cause on March 30, 1967, when he "settled and signed" the case made and directed the court clerk of the trial court "to attest the same with his signature and the seal of said court, and file the same as provided by law." The case made is "complete" when it is signed by the trial judge. City of Eureka v. Merri-field, 53 Kan. 794, 37 P. 113, 114. The attestation by the clerk under the seal of the trial court "is not a certificate" of correctness. It clearly constitutes a post-settlement requirement rather than a step toward completion of settlement. The clerk's "only duty is to attest, — that is, to witness, — the signature of the [trial] judge who settled and signed the case [made]." Abel v. Blair, 3 Okl. 339, 41 P. 342. He has no authority to attest before the trial judge has "actually settled" the case made and directed the attestation to be made. W. T. Rawleigh Co. v. Kelly, 137 Okl. 22, 278 P. 267, 268.
We therefore hold that a case made is settled within the meaning of 12 O.S.1961, § 958 and 12 O.S.Supp.1963, § 972(a) when the trial judge issues the certificate of settlement and directs the clerk to attest it under the seal of the court; the clerk's attestation of the certificate under seal, and the filing of the case made in the trial court must be regarded as post-settlement requirements toward perfecting the record on appeal rather than as steps necessary to complete settlement of a case made.
An appeal by case made is subject to dismissal when not commenced in the manner and within the time prescribed by law. Reed v. Moore, Okl., 386 P.2d 763; Albert v. Card, Okl., 317 P.2d 766. The right of appeal is fundamentally guaranteed only to those who comply with the procedure prescribed therefor. Hewitt v. Shephard, 205 Okl. 465, 239 P.2d 400, 402; Shepherd v. Herndon, Okl., 398 P.2d 511. The question of jurisdiction is primary and fundamental in every case. It may neither be waived by the parties nor overlooked by the court. Hutchins v. Sperling, Okl., 316 P.2d 589, 590. The Supreme Court is duty-bound to determine for itself whether its jurisdiction to review the cause has been invoked. Alexander Drug Co. v. Holbert, 156 Okl. 198, 10 P.2d 412, 413.
Inasmuch as this proceeding in error was not brought here within the period of 20 days from March 30, 1967, the date case made was settled by the trial judge's certificate, this court is without jurisdiction to entertain the instant appeal.
Appeal dismissed.
JACKSON, C. J., IRWIN, V. C. J., and BLACKBIRD, BERRY and HODGES, JJ., concur.
DAVISON, WILLIAMS and LAVENDER, JJ., dissent.