Case Name: Laurie Beth TESSLER, n/k/a Laurie Beth Major, Appellant, v. Eric Neil TESSLER, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1989-03-01
Citations: 539 So. 2d 522
Docket Number: Nos. 88-1558, 88-2427
Parties: Laurie Beth TESSLER, n/k/a Laurie Beth Major, Appellant, v. Eric Neil TESSLER, Appellee.
Judges: GLICKSTEIN, J., concurs specially with opinion.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 539
Pages: 522–525

Head Matter:
Laurie Beth TESSLER, n/k/a Laurie Beth Major, Appellant, v. Eric Neil TESSLER, Appellee.
Nos. 88-1558, 88-2427.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
March 1, 1989.
Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc Denied April 6, 1989.
Jerry B. Schreiber, Miami, and John Ber-anek of Klein & Beranek, P.A., West Palm Beach, for appellant.
Donald G. Criscuolo of Genet & Milner, North Miami Beach, for appellee.

Opinion:
STONE, Judge.
This is an appeal from a modification of the child custody provisions of a final judgment of dissolution. The judgment initially provided for shared parental responsibility with the mother as the residential parent. The modification granted the father sole custody. We affirm.
The trial court, in a full week of trial, heard extensive evidence concerning the difficulties between the parties as they affected the conduct and exercise of visitation. The evidence included testimony about the conduct of the parties, including references to specific incidents. There was also expert testimony by psychologists presented by each side, including an independent expert appointed by the court.
The court found that there had been a substantial change in circumstances impacting on visitation, and that the mother's conduct, which had become increasingly more erratic, aggressive and antagonistic, was detrimental to the child's best interest. The court found that this conduct included the mother using every means at her disposal to prevent meaningful visitation. The judge found her conduct to be willful, and that she intentionally attempted to alienate the child's affections towards the father.
There was evidence that the mother's conduct was highly emotional, and of a history of arguments and disputes in the presence of the child. There was evidence that the mother admitted filing false rape charges against the husband and attempting to have them publicized. She also tried to have him arrested on other charges that the father contends were not justified by the facts. There was testimony of efforts to frustrate visitation and of the mother's intent to interfere with the child's relationship with her father. The court specifically found that shared parenting was detrimental to the child.
We recognize the heavy burden required for custody modification and that the trial court does not have the same degree of discretion in modification that it does at the time of the final judgment. E.g., Baker v. Baker, 360 So.2d 19 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978), cert. denied, 366 So.2d 879 (Fla.1979). Clearly, interference with court orders alone, in the absence of substantial evidence of impact on the child, is more appropriately remedied by use of contempt rather than modification. See Breeding v. Breeding, 515 So.2d 374 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987); Crippen v. Crippen, 508 So.2d 1339 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987). See also Doran v. Doran, 212 So.2d 100 (Fla. 4th DCA), cert. denied, 218 So.2d 174 (Fla.1968). However, here there is sufficient testimony in the record, albeit disputed, to support the findings and conclusion of the trial court that there had been a substantial change in circumstances, and that the best interest of the child was promoted by the custody modification. Upon a review of the record, we cannot say that there was an abuse of the trial court's discretion. Cf. Cole v. Cole, 530 So.2d 467 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988); Jones v. Vrba, 513 So.2d 1080 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987); Baker v. Baker; Wilson v. Wilson, 504 So.2d 1278 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986); McIntyre v. McIntyre, 452 So.2d 14 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984).
Additionally, we find any error in admitting privileged information in the psychologists' testimony, even if not within the waiver provisions of section 491.0147(3), Florida Statutes, to be harmless. Cf. Cadillac Fairview of Florida, Inc. v. Cespedes, 468 So.2d 417 (Fla. 3d DCA), rev. denied, 479 So.2d 117 (Fla.1985). We find no error in the other issues raised.
The modification of the final judgment is affirmed.
GLICKSTEIN, J., concurs specially with opinion.
WALDEN, J., dissents with opinion.