Case Name: Frank Bittner, as Administrator, Respondent, v. The Crosstown Street Railway Co., Appellant
Court: New York Superior Court
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1895-05
Citations: 12 Misc. 514
Docket Number: 
Parties: Frank Bittner, as Administrator, Respondent, v. The Crosstown Street Railway Co., Appellant.
Judges: 
Reporter: New York Miscellaneous Reports
Volume: 12
Pages: 514–519

Head Matter:
Frank Bittner, as Administrator, Respondent, v. The Crosstown Street Railway Co., Appellant.
(Superior Court of Buffalo
General Term,
May, 1895.)
In attempting to prevent running over a boy the motorman reversed the current, but failed to restore it when the car stopped, in consequence of which the car ran back over the boy as he was trying to rise, and killed him. In an action to recover damages for his death the evidence was conflicting, but there was evidence which would justify a finding that the original accident was due solely to the motorman’s negligence. HOld, that, under these circumstances, a refusal to charge that the company was not responsible for the error of judgment of the motorman, if any, in the management of the car after it struck the boy, was proper.
Hatch, J., dissents.
This is an appeal by the defendant from a judgment entered upon the verdict of a jury in favor of the plaintiff and from an order denying the defendant’s motion for a new trial upon the minutes.
Porter Norton, for appellant.
Emery P. Close, for respondent.

Opinion:
White, J.
I am of the opinion that the judgment and order appealed from should he affirmed. The controversy as to whether they should or not depends substantially upon the correctness of the ruling by the trial court upon the defendant's request No. 4, as it appears in the appeal book. As I construe the language of the request the refusal was right, and the exception is not well taken. As the evidence then stood the jury would have been justified in finding either way upon the question as to whether or not the emergency which the motorman was called upon to meet after he had run over the body of the deceased in the first instance was attributable solely to his own negligence. If it was, then his efforts to extricate the boy from peril, however praiseworthy, would not relieve the defendant from the consequences of an error in judgment in making those efforts. Error in judgment on the part of one who negligently injures another cannot be invoked as a defense in behalf of him who causes the injury. With equal propriety might a cause of action in favor of the one injured be predicated upon his error in judgment in erroneously deciding that he could do with safety the act which resulted in his injury.