Case Name: In the Matter of Robert T. Johnson, as District Attorney of Bronx County, Appellant, v. George E. Pataki, as Governor of the State of New York, et al., Respondents; In the Matter of Rafael Martinez et al., Appellants, v. George E. Pataki, as Governor of the State of New York, et al., Respondents
Court: New York Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1997-12-04
Citations: 91 N.Y.2d 214
Docket Number: 
Parties: In the Matter of Robert T. Johnson, as District Attorney of Bronx County, Appellant, v George E. Pataki, as Governor of the State of New York, et al., Respondents. In the Matter of Rafael Martinez et al., Appellants, v George E. Pataki, as Governor of the State of New York, et al., Respondents.
Judges: 
Reporter: New York Reports
Volume: 91
Pages: 214–243

Head Matter:
[691 NE2d 1002, 668 NYS2d 978]
In the Matter of Robert T. Johnson, as District Attorney of Bronx County, Appellant, v George E. Pataki, as Governor of the State of New York, et al., Respondents. In the Matter of Rafael Martinez et al., Appellants, v George E. Pataki, as Governor of the State of New York, et al., Respondents.
Argued October 21, 1997;
decided December 4, 1997
POINTS OF COUNSEL
Robert T. Johnson, District Attorney of Bronx County, Bronx (Anthony J. Gírese, Joseph N. Ferdenzi, Peter D. Coddington, Stephen Muller and Jean Joyce of counsel), appellant pro se in the first above-entitled proceeding.
I. Executive Order No. 27 impermissibly invades the independent constitutional power of the District Attorney. (Bourquin v Cuomo, 85 NY2d 781; Rapp v Carey, 44 NY2d 157; Matter of Broidrick v Lindsay, 39 NY2d 641; People ex rel. Broderick v Morton, 156 NY 136; Matter of Guden, 171 NY 529; Matter of Haggerty v Himelein, 89 NY2d 431; Della Pietra v State of New York, 71 NY2d 792; People v Kramer, 33 Misc 209; People ex rel. Gardenier v Board of Supervisors, 134 NY 1; People v Brennan, 69 Misc 548.) II. Executive Order No. 27 impermissibly invades the legislative province by substituting the Governor’s own policy regarding the death penalty in place of the statutory scheme set forth by the Legislature. (Matter of Broidrick v Lindsay, 39 NY2d 641; Rapp v Carey, 44 NY2d 157; Boreali v Axelrod, 71 NY2d 1; Bourquin v Cuomo, 85 NY2d 781; People ex rel. Saranac Land & Timber Co. v Extraordinary Special & Trial Term of Supreme Ct., 220 NY 487.) III. Executive Order No. 27 unconstitutionally punishes the District Attorney for exercising his First Amendment rights and denies him equal protection of the laws. (Connick v Myers, 461 US 138; Rankin v McPherson, 483 US 378; First Natl. Bank of Boston v Bellotti, 435 US 765; Pickering v Board of Educ., 391 US 563; Carey v Brown, 447 US 455; Brown v Hartlage, 456 US 45; Mills v Alabama, 384 US 214; Mulroy v Carey, 43 NY2d 819; Wayte v United States, 470 US 598; Rutan v Republican Party of Ill., 497 US 62.) IV. Executive Law § 63-d limits the power of the Governor to direct the Attorney-General to enter a first-degree murder prosecution to a case where the District Attorney has requested assistance. (Matter of Haggerty v Himelein, 89 NY2d 431; Rapp v Carey, 44 NY2d 157; Matter of Martinis v Supreme Ct., 15 NY2d 240; People v Walker, 81 NY2d 661.) V. All four of appellant’s claims are justiciable. (Bourquin v Cuomo, 85 NY2d 781; Saxton v Carey, 44 NY2d 545; City of New York v State of New York, 86 NY2d 286; People ex rel. Eldred v Palmer, 154 NY 133; People ex rel. Wogan v Rafferty, 208 NY 451; Warner v People, 2 Denio 272; Matter of Turecamo Contr. Co., 260 App Div 253; Rapp v Carey, 44 NY2d 157; Matter of Guden, 171 NY 529; People v Grasso, 162 Misc 2d 84.)
Arthur Eisenberg, New York City, Christopher Dunn, Norman Siegel, Edna Wells Handy, Bruce Johnson, Anthony G. Amsterdam, Eric M. Freedman and Andrew I. Schepard for appellants in the second above-entitled proceeding.
I. Executive Order No. 27 is not authorized by the State Constitution nor is it authorized by State law and it therefore violates the holding and principles of "limited government” set forth by this Court in Rapp v Carey (44 NY2d 157). (Matter of Broidrick v Lindsay, 39 NY2d 641; Youngstown Co. v Sawyer, 343 US 579; Myers v United States, 272 US 52; Humphrey’s Executor v United States, 295 US 602; Wiener v United States, 357 US 349; People v P. J. Video, 68 NY2d 296; Matter of Kelley v McGee, 57 NY2d 522; People v Di Falco, 44 NY2d 482; People v Eboli, 34 NY2d 281.) II. The death of Angel Diaz eliminated any justification that might have existed for Executive Order No. 27. III. This controversy is justiciable. (Baker v Carr, 369 US 186; People v Ohrenstein, 153 AD2d 342, 77 NY2d 38; Rapp v Carey, 44 NY2d 157; Matter of Turecamo Contr. Co., 260 App Div 253; Berger v Carey, 86 Misc 2d 727; Mulroy v Carey, 58 AD2d 207, 43 NY2d 819; Youngstown Co. v Sawyer, 343 US 579; People ex rel. Saranac Land & Timber Co. v Extraordinary Special & Trial Term of Supreme Ct., 220 NY 487.) IV. Executive Order No. 27 violates the constitutional rights of the voters of the Bronx. (Dunn v Blumstein, 405 US 330; Kramer v Union School Dist., 395 US 621; Eu v San Francisco Democratic Comm., 489 US 214; Anderson v Celebrezze, 460 US 780; People ex rel. Stapleton v Bell, 119 NY 175; Golden v Clark, 76 NY2d 618; Seaman v Fedourich, 16 NY2d 94; Landes v Town of N. Hempstead, 20 NY2d 417; Freeman v Lamb, 63 Misc 2d 231.)
White & Case, New York City (Richard J. Holwell, Dwight A. Healy and Daniel P. Goldberg of counsel), for George E. Pataki, respondent in the first and second above-entitled proceedings.
I. The court below properly held that the propriety of the Governor’s superseder order presents a nonjusticiable question. (Matter of Nistal v Hausauer, 308 NY 146; People ex rel. Saranac Land & Timber Co. v Extraordinary Special & Trial Term of Supreme Ct., 220 NY 487; Matter of Guden, 171 NY 529; Mulroy v Carey, 58 AD2d 207, 43 NY2d 819; Matter of New York State Inspection, Sec. & Law Enforcement Empls. v Cuomo, 64 NY2d 233; Matter of Abrams v New York City Tr. Auth., 39 NY2d 990; People ex rel. Broderick v Morton, 156 NY 136; Matter of Schulz v Silver, 212 AD2d 293, 86 NY2d 835; Matter of Korn v Gulotta, 72 NY2d 363; Saxton v Carey, 44 NY2d 545.) II. The courts below properly found that, even if justiciable, petitioners’ claims are meritless. (Matter of Pell v Board of Educ., 34 NY2d 222; Matter of Woodlawn Veterans Mut. Hous. Co. v New York State Div. of Hous. & Community Renewal, 159 Misc 2d 639, 210 AD2d 149; Dalton v Educational Testing Serv., 87 NY2d 384; Gregg v Georgia, 428 US 153; Pulley v Harris, 465 US 37.) III. Executive Order No. 27 does not abridge the District Attorney’s First Amendment rights. (Wayte v United States, 470 US 598; United States v O'Brien, 391 US 367; Connick v Myers, 461 US 138; Thomson v Scheid, 977 F2d 1017, 508 US 910; Fender v City of Oregon City, 811 F Supp 554, 37 F3d 1505; Scott v Flowers, 910 F2d 201; Mortal v Judiciary Commn., 565 F2d 295, 435 US 1013; Pickering v Board of Educ., 391 US 563; Waters v Churchill, 511 US 661; Jeffries v Harleston, 52 F3d 9.) IV. Executive Order No. 27 does not affect the constitutional rights of Bronx County voters. (Berger v Carey, 86 Misc 2d 727; Matter of Turecamo Contr. Co., 260 App Div 253; Powell v McCormack, 395 US 486.) V. The court below properly found that section 63-d does not preclude superseder under section 63 (2) in capital cases. (Ball v State of New York, 41 NY2d 617; Cimo v State of New York, 306 NY 143; Matter of Long v Adirondack Park Agency, 76 NY2d 416; People v Ryan, 274 NY 149.)
Dennis C. Vacco, Attorney-General, New York City (Edward D. Saslaw, Christopher G. Quinn, Susan Watson, Michael S. Buskus, Steven Connolly, Michael Hueston and Jill Gross Marks of counsel), respondent pro se in the first and second above-entitled proceedings.
I. The Governor’s exercise of his authority to require the Attorney-General to prosecute a criminal case in lieu of the District Attorney is not subject to judicial review. (Mulroy v Carey, 43 NY2d 819; Matter of Turecamo Contr. Co., 260 App Div 253; Matter of Nistal v Hausauer, 308 NY 146; People v Broncado, 188 NY 150; Matter of Buchanan, 146 NY 264; People v Burns, 77 Hun 92, 143 NY 665; People ex rel. Page v Brophy, 248 App Div 309, 277 NY 673; People ex rel. Patrick v Frost, 133 App Div 179; People v Ohrenstein, 153 AD2d 342, 77 NY2d 38; Baker v Carr, 369 US 186.) II. The District Attorney’s authority to prosecute a criminal case is subordinate to the Governor’s to require the Attorney-General to take over responsibility for a particular criminal matter. (People v Kramer, 33 Misc 209; Spielman Motor Co. v Dodge, 295 US 89; Mulroy v Carey, 58 AD2d 207; Matter of Turecamo Contr. Co., 260 App Div 253; People v Zara, 44 Misc 2d 698; Matter of Cunningham v Nadjari, 39 NY2d 314; People ex rel. Saranac Land & Timber Co. v Extraordinary Special & Trial Term of Supreme Ct., 220 NY 487; People v Tru-Sport Publ. Co., 160 Misc 628; People v McLeod, 25 Wend 483; People ex rel. Gardenier v Board of Supervisors, 134 NY 1.) III. The establishment of provisions by which a District Attorney might request assistance of the Attorney-General in capital prosecutions has not diminished or otherwise affected the Governor’s authority to invoke Executive Law § 63 (2). (Ball v State of New York, 41 NY2d 617; Cimo v State of New York, 306 NY 143; Matter of Haggerty v Himelein, 89 NY2d 431; People v Walsh, 67 NY2d 747; People v Eboli, 34 NY2d 281; People v Sansanese, 17 NY2d 302; People v Walker, 81 NY2d 661; Matter of Mann Judd Landau v Hynes, 49 NY2d 128.) IV. The District Attorney’s promise that he had "no present intention” to seek the dealth penalty did not place any limitation on the right of the Governor to exercise his authority under section 63 (2) and, in doing so, the Governor did not deprive the voters of Bronx County of any fundamental right under the Constitutions of the State of New York or of the United States. (Society of Plastics Indus. v County of Suffolk, 77 NY2d 761; Matter of Sun-Brite Car Wash v Board of Zoning & Appeals, 69 NY2d 406; Matter of Dairylea Coop. v Walkley, 38 NY2d 6; Matter of Abrams v New York City Tr. Auth., 48 AD2d 69, 39 NY2d 990; New York State Coalition for Criminal Justice v Coughlin, 103 AD2d 40; Boryszewski v Brydges, 37 NY2d 361; Wein v Comptroller of State of N. Y., 46 NY2d 394; Matter of Schulz v Cobleskill-Richmondville Cent. School Dist. Bd. of Educ., 197 AD2d 247; Matter of New York State Bldrs. Assn. v State of New York, 98 Misc 2d 1045.) V. Executive Order No. 27 does not violate the District Attorney’s First Amendment rights or those under the Equal Protection Clause. (Ward v Rock Against Racism, 491 US. 781; United States v O’Brien, 391 US 367; Mulroy v Carey, 43 NY2d 819; Connick v Myers, 461 US 138; Rankin v McPherson, 483 US 378; Pickering v Board of Educ., 391 US 563; Rutan v Republican Party of Ill., 497 US 62; Kaluczky v City of White Plains, 57 F3d 202.)
Richard A. Brown, District Attorney of Queens County, Kew Gardens, Roseann B. MacKechnie, Brooklyn, Victor Barall, Ann Bordley and Leonard Joblove for New York State District Attorneys Association, amicus curiae in the first above-entitled proceeding.
This Court has the power to review the validity of an Executive Order superseding a District Attorney. (Matter of Schumer v Holtzman, 60 NY2d 46; Matter of Dondi v Jones, 40 NY2d 8; People ex rel. Wogan v Rafferty, 208 NY 451; People v Van Sickle, 13 NY2d 61; Matter of Kelley v McGee, 57 NY2d 522; Matter of Holtzman v Goldman, 71 NY2d 564; Matter of Additional Jan. 1979 Grand Jury of Albany Supreme Ct. v Doe, 50 NY2d 14; Humphrey’s Executor v United States, 295 US 602; Matter of Haggerty v Himelein, 89 NY2d 431; People v Soddano, 86 NY2d 727.)

Opinion:
OPINION OF THE COURT
Chief Judge Kaye.
By this appeal we are asked to determine whether Governor George E. Pataki had the legal authority to supersede Bronx County District Attorney Robert T. Johnson in a potential death penalty prosecution involving a slain police officer. We hold that the Governor acted lawfully under constitutional and statutory authority, and that even if the rationale for his action were subject to judicial review the superseder order here would be valid.
On March 21, 1996, pursuant to article IV, § 3 of the New York Constitution and Executive Law § 63 (2), Governor Pataki issued Executive Order No. 27 (9 NYCRR 5.27), which required respondent Attorney-General Dennis C. Vacco to replace District Attorney Johnson in all investigations and proceedings arising out of the shooting of Police Officer Kevin Gillespie. As recited in the Executive Order, the District Attorney's statements, correspondence and swift rejection of the death penalty option in prior death-eligible cases indicated that the District Attorney had adopted a "blanket policy" against imposition of the death penalty.
Such a policy, according to the Executive Order, both violated a District Attorney's statutory duty to make death penalty determinations on a case-by-case basis and opened future death sentences to challenge on proportionality grounds. Given his obligation to take care that the death penalty law would be faithfully executed and the possibility that the District Attorney would take action that would irrevocably foreclose the death penalty in the Gillespie matter, the Executive Order continued, the Governor concluded that his immediate intervention through a superseder order was necessary.
Subsequently, the Grand Jury indicted Angel Diaz on two counts of murder in the first degree and related offenses in connection with Officer Gillespie's death. Diaz's alleged accomplices, Jesus Mendez and Ricardo Morales, were indicted for second-degree murder and other lesser crimes. The Attorney-General then filed notice that the People intended to seek the death penalty against Diaz.
Before the Attorney-General's announcement appellants District Attorney Johnson, and Bronx County voters and taxpayers (whose standing is assumed for purposes of this appeal), separately commenced CPLR article 78 proceedings contesting the legality of Executive Order No. 27. Supreme Court dismissed both petitions, holding that the superseder was an executive action pursuant to a valid grant of authority and as such was nonjusticiable. Alternatively, the court found that the District Attorney's pronouncements and practices provided "ample basis" for the Governor's action. During pendency of the appeals, Diaz committed suicide in his jail cell. Mendez and Morales were later tried in Federal court for their involvement in the Gillespie murder. They were found guilty of violating the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations statute (18 USC § 1962), and their State indictments were dismissed.
The Appellate Division, concluding the appeals were not moot, unanimously affirmed Supreme Court's dismissal of both petitions (229 AD2d 242). Finding that this case fell considerably short of the possible justiciable controversies reserved in Mulroy v Carey (43 NY2d 819, 821), the court applied the traditional test for determining the validity of a superseder order — whether the Governor had acted within constitutional or statutory authority — and concluded that appellants had not made this requisite showing. Like the trial court, the Appellate Division went on to consider the reasonableness of the order, holding that the Governor's intervention was "fully justified" in light of the possibility that the District Attorney would take steps to preclude the death penalty in the Gillespie matter (229 AD2d at 246). We now affirm.
Mootness
We first reject the Attorney-General's contention that this appeal has been mooted by the death of Diaz, the conviction of Mendez and Morales on Federal charges, and the dismissal of the State indictments against these two defendants. An appeal presents a live controversy where the rights of the parties will be directly affected by the determination and where the judgment has "immediate consequence" for them (Matter of Hearst Corp. v Clyne, 50 NY2d 707, 714). Here, a live controversy remains in at least two respects. First, Executive Order No. 27 mandates that Bronx County pay all charges incurred by the Attorney-General in prosecuting the Gillespie matter. Since the validity of the charges depends on the validity of the order — the issue before us — the appeal continues to have immediate consequence for the parties. Second, the Executive Order is not by its terms limited to the prosecution of Diaz, Mendez and Morales. To the extent that the District Attorney — who himself argues against mootness — may find it necessary to initiate additional proceedings or inquiries if the Executive Order is invalidated, the outcome of this appeal also has immediate consequence for the parties.
The Law Regarding Superseder
Passing from mootness to the merits, we begin analysis with a recognition that when the Governor acts by Executive Order pursuant to a valid grant of discretionary authority, his actions are largely beyond judicial review (see, e.g., Matter of Cunningham v Nadjari, 39 NY2d 314, 317-318; Gaynor v Rockefeller, 15 NY2d 120, 131; Matter of Nistal v Hausauer, 308 NY 146, 152-153, cert denied 349 US 962).
Judicial review in such cases is generally limited to determining whether the State Constitution or the Legislature has empowered the Governor to act, and does not include the manner in which the Governor chooses to discharge that authority (see, e.g., Mulroy v Carey, 58 AD2d 207, 214-215, affd 43 NY2d 819; People ex rel. Saranac Land & Timber Co. v Extraordinary Special & Trial Term of Supreme Ct., 220 NY 487, 491; People v Kramer, 33 Misc 209, 219). For abuse of lawful discretionary authority, the remedy as a rule lies with the people at the polls, or with a constitutional amendment, or with corrective legislation.
Whether a Governor is empowered to supersede a District Attorney in a particular prosecution is not a novel question. We have long held that article IV, § 3 of the Constitution and Executive Law § 63 (2) together provide the Governor with discretionary authority to supersede the District Attorney in a matter (see, Mulroy v Carey, 43 NY2d at 821, supra; see also, Matter of Additional Jan. 1979 Grand Jury of Albany Supreme Ct. v Doe, 50 NY2d 14, 16). Article IV, § 3 delegates to the Governor, as head of the executive branch, the duty to "take care that the laws are faithfully executed." Executive Law § 63 (2), the legislative grant of authority, provides:
"The attorney-general shall [w]henever required by the governor, manag[e] and conduc[t] criminal actions or proceedings as shall be specified in such requirement; in which case the attorney-general shall exercise all the powers and perform all the duties in respect of such actions or proceedings, which the district attorney would otherwise be authorized or required to exercise or perform; and in any of such actions or proceedings the district attorney shall only exercise such powers and perform such duties as are required of him by the attorney-general".
The statute neither limits the Governor's authority to supersede nor requires the Governor to explain that choice. Consistent with that authority, Governors have numerous times invoked the superseder power (see, e.g., Pitler, Superseding the District Attorneys in New York City — The Constitutionality and Legality of Executive Order No. 55, 41 Fordham L Rev 517, 522-527 [1973]).
In Mulroy v Carey (43 NY2d at 821, supra), this Court reserved the possibility that in some undefined circumstance, the courts could invalidate this executive action. There we upheld the Governor's superseder of the Onondaga County District Attorney, rejecting the argument that the Governor was required to establish "to the satisfaction of the court the necessity of such action" in that case (58 AD2d at 208, supra). We added, however, that
"no view is expressed whether in any or all circumstances the exercise of the executive power to supersede an elected District Attorney would be beyond judicial review or correction in a direct or collateral action or proceeding brought or defended by the county or the elected District Attorney involved" (43 NY2d at 821, supra).
Application of the Law to Appellants' Additional Arguments
Executive Order No. 27 is on its face valid, reflecting the authority granted the Governor by article IV, § 3 of the New York Constitution together with Executive Law § 63 (2). Appellants challenge its legality on several additional grounds.
The major thrust of appellants' argument — asserted from the vantage point of both the District Attorney and Bronx voters — is that the District Attorney, a constitutional officer accountable to the local electorate, is insulated from nonconsensual superseder by a "zone of independence" based on a delegation to him of exclusive authority to prosecute crimes in Bronx County (see, NY Const, art XIII, § 13; County Law § 700 [1]). Belatedly, appellants argue that the power of superseder is limited to subordinates in the executive branch (which do not include the District Attorney) or to instances where the District Attorney is disabled from acting, as by reason of local conflict of interest.
The Constitution provides for the offices of Governor, Attorney-General and District Attorneys, but it does not identify particular — let alone exclusive — prosecutorial duties or allocate the responsibility among them. Rather, the delineation of law enforcement functions has consistently been left to the Legislature (see, e.g., Matter of Schumer v Holtzman, 60 NY2d 46, 53).
While prosecutorial authority over the decades has in fact passed from the Attorney-General to the District Attorneys, the Legislature has recognized for more than 150 years the authority of the Attorney-General to prosecute crimes, even at the local level, when properly directed to do so by the Governor (see, Executive Law § 63; CPL 1.20 [32]; Matter of Dondi v Jones, 40 NY2d at 19, supra; Pitler, 41 Fordham L Rev at 518-522, op cit). Nor has such authority been restricted to instances where a local conflict of interest disabled a District Attorney, an officer within the executive branch (see, People v Leahy, 72 NY2d 510, 513), from prosecuting a matter. No such limitation appears in the Constitution or statutes, and none has been found in prior case law dealing with these very issues (see, Mulroy v Carey, 58 AD2d at 208-209, 214-215, supra; Matter of Turecamo Contr. Co., 260 App Div 253, 256-258; People v Malek, 99 Misc 2d 439, 442-443; Berger v Carey, 86 Misc 2d 727, 728).
Similarly, we are unpersuaded by the contention that Executive Law § 63-d, passed in connection with the recent death penalty legislation (L 1995, ch 1), implicitly repealed the portion of Executive Law § 63 (2) pertaining to first-degree murder prosecutions. Section 63-d permits the Governor to direct the Attorney-General, when requested by the District Attorney, to assist in a potential death penalty case (see, Governor's Mem approving L 1995, ch 1, 1995 McKinney's Session Laws of NY, at 2283, 2288; Mem of Assembly Codes Comm, 1995 NY Legis Ann, at 1, 14-15). Nothing in or about that section evinces a legislative intention to limit a Governor's supersession authority. In short, these statutes simply provide two different, but complementary, avenues by which the Attorney-General can exercise the limited prosecutorial authority of that State office. There is no repugnancy indicating implicit repealer.
Appellants next improperly analogize Executive Order No. 27 to the invalidated order in Rapp v Carey (44 NY2d 157). The challenged order in Rapp — issued pursuant to article IV, § 3 of the State Constitution and section 74 of the Public Officers Law — required a wide range of State employees to file extensive personal financial statements and to abstain from various activities. This Court held that while the Governor has "the power to enforce legislation and is accorded great flexibility in determining the methods of enforcement" by the "take care" clause of the State Constitution, the Governor's rule-making Executive Order actually conflicted with the Legislature's intent and negated the statute it purported to administer (44 NY2d at 163). Consequently, we concluded that the order represented an unconstitutional encroachment on the powers of the legislative branch (44 NY2d at 163-167, supra). By contrast, Executive Order No. 27 does not promulgate any rules requiring District Attorneys to seek the death penalty and directs only supersession, as contemplated by Executive Law § 63 (2). Clearly then, the separation of powers concerns motivating Rapp are absent here.
Finally, we reach appellants' argument that the Governor abused his authority in choosing to supersede the District Attorney merely because he disagreed with the District Attorney's discretionary decision about sentencing. Although a Governor is not obliged to state reasons for superseder, Executive Order No. 27 does in fact detail Governor Pataki's reasons for superseding the District Attorney in this instance, and they go beyond disagreement with a discretionary decision in a particular matter. We need not define whether a standard of review, if one is applicable at all, should be reasonableness, necessity or some other standard. In any event, we agree with the trial court and Appellate Division that the challenged Executive Order expresses the Governor's executive judgment that there was a threat to faithful execution of the death penalty law that supported this particular superseder.
Response to the Dissents
A. The Titone Dissent. The Court unanimously agrees that a Governor can lawfully supersede a District Attorney in a particular matter. We part company over whether the Governor lawfully superseded the District Attorney in the Gillespie matter. The Titone dissent concludes that supersession here violated statutory law by substituting the Governor's policy choice for the legislative delegation of unfettered discretion to the District Attorney.
Whether or not District Attorneys must exercise their death penalty discretion on a case-by-case basis, clearly the Legisla ture did not allow one or all 62 District Attorneys to functionally veto the statute by adopting a "blanket policy," thereby in effect refusing to exercise discretion. Nor did supersession substitute the Governor's policy choice for the death penalty in the Gillespie matter. As permitted by Executive Law § 63 (2), the Governor designated the Attorney-General in place of the District Attorney in prosecuting the entire matter, including the exercise of discretion regarding sentence.
Indeed, this dissent avoids all reference to Executive Law § 63 (2). In enacting the death penalty statute, the Legislature— mindful of the special responsibilities of litigating such cases— authorized the assistance of the Attorney-General at the request of a District Attorney (see, Executive Law § 63-d). Yet significantly, in the very same section of the Executive Law the Legislature also left unchanged the long-standing authority vested in the Governor to supersede a District Attorney in a particular matter (see, Executive Law § 63 [2]; Mulroy v Carey, 43 NY2d 819, supra).
B. The Smith Dissent. This dissent concludes that the superseder lacked even a rational basis. The premise of the dissent is that the superseder was irrational because it reformulated, and indeed nullified, the Legislature's grant of discretionary authority to the District Attorney to choose whether to seek the death penalty or a life sentence in first-degree murder cases (Smith dissenting opn, at 241). What is not clear is whether the dissent derives that premise from the first-degree murder statute, or from this District Attorney's pronouncements and practices. It is in either event flawed.
We turn first to the first-degree murder statute. Plainly the grant of discretionary authority to District Attorneys does not in all cases foreclose superseder. The dissent points to Execu tive Law § 63-d. — providing for assistance by the Attorney-General at the request of the District Attorney — as the Legislature's sole authorization for the Attorney-General's involvement (Smith dissenting opn, at 241, n 5). That argument ignores Executive Law § 63 (2) — which we all agree has long provided a statutory basis for superseder even in the absence of a request by the District Attorney. The stated objective of superseder in the Gillespie matter was not to override the statutory grant of discretionary authority regarding sentencing. Rather, the stated purpose of the Executive Order was to assure that discretion would be exercised, in circumstances where the District Attorney's "blanket policy" might raise doubt that it would be, where he might have foreclosed an exercise of discretion, and where such a measure might have affected proportionality. We cannot agree with the dissent that the superseder in such circumstances lacked a rational basis.
For much the same reason the dissent's alternative premise — that, based on the conduct of the District Attorney, superseder in this matter was invalid — is also flawed. As recited in the Executive Order, superseder proceeded from the executive judgment that a "blanket policy" — never unequivocally disavowed — existed that precluded the exercise of discretion by the District Attorney. Thus, the record fails to support the dissent's, assertion that the Governor acted irrationally in deciding to supersede.
Appellants' remaining arguments lack merit.
Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should be affirmed, without costs.
. We have no cause to doubt the District Attorney's own argument that the case is not moot because of several additional steps he could take if the superseder were found invalid, and therefore cannot agree with the dissent that such an argument is "speculative" (Smith dissenting opn, at 236). That the spectre of expenses chargeable to Bronx County by the Attorney-General is not "independently significant" (id.) similarly does not determine mootness. Those costs remain a live issue. Given this record, we need not and do not reach the exception to the mootness doctrine, which the Appellate Division found applicable even if the case were moot.
. This Court has rejected appellants' argument that Executive Law § 63 (2) should be read narrowly, as merely defining the general duties of the Attorney-General (see, e.g., Matter of Haggerty v Himelein, 89 NY2d 431, 436; Mulroy v Carey, 43 NY2d at 821, supra; Matter of Dondi v Jones, 40 NY2d 8, 19; People v Rallo, 39 NY2d 217, 224).
. While the dissent speaks of discretion of the District Attorney, in point of fact the Criminal Procedure Law vests ultimate discretion to seek the death penalty in "the people," a class of representatives that includes the Attorney-General (CPL 250.40, 400.27; see also, CPL 1.20 [31], [32]).
. As the Memorandum of the Assembly Codes Committee points out, "District attorneys who must prosecute death penalty cases face unique challenges and must allocate additional resources in a capital case. In recognition of these burdens, [the death penalty] legislation provides a range of assistance programs for prosecutors litigating first degree murder cases" (1995 NY Legis Ann, at 1, 14). In addition to section 63-d, the Legislature enacted Executive Law § 837-a (7), which provides prosecutors with "continuing legal education, training, advice and assistance" in death penalty cases, and Executive Law § 837-l, which provides monies to District Attorneys financially burdened by capital prosecutions.