Case Name: Steven L. HOPKINS and Cheryl Hopkins, husband and wife, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. DUO-FAST CORPORATION, an Illinois corporation; Duo-Fast Corporation, Northwest Sales and Service Division, an Illinois corporation in good standing in the State of Idaho, Defendants-Respondents
Court: Idaho Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Idaho
Decision Date: 1993-01-28
Citations: 123 Idaho 205
Docket Number: No. 18372
Parties: Steven L. HOPKINS and Cheryl Hopkins, husband and wife, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. DUO-FAST CORPORATION, an Illinois corporation; Duo-Fast Corporation, Northwest Sales and Service Division, an Illinois corporation in good standing in the State of Idaho, Defendants-Respondents.
Judges: BAKES, C.J., and JOHNSON, J., concur.
Reporter: Idaho Reports
Volume: 123
Pages: 205–219

Head Matter:
846 P.2d 207
Steven L. HOPKINS and Cheryl Hopkins, husband and wife, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. DUO-FAST CORPORATION, an Illinois corporation; Duo-Fast Corporation, Northwest Sales and Service Division, an Illinois corporation in good standing in the State of Idaho, Defendants-Respondents.
No. 18372.
Supreme Court of Idaho,
Boise, September 1992 Term.
Jan. 28, 1993.
Howard & Owens, Coeur d’Alene, for plaintiffs-appellants. Kenneth B. Howard, Jr., argued.
Hall, Farley, Oberrecht & Blanton, Boise, for defendants-respondents. Donald J. Farley, argued.

Opinion:
1992 OPINION NO. 53, FILED MARCH 30, 1992, IS HEREBY WITHDRAWN AND THIS OPINION SUBSTITUTED THEREFOR.
ON REHEARING
McDEVITT, Justice.
Before and after his injury, plaintiff Steven Hopkins worked for Northwest Building Systems ("Northwest"), a manufacturer of modular homes. While at work reviewing a sheet of building specifications, Hopkins was struck in the left eye by a three inch nail and was permanently injured. At the time of this incident, a coworker was nearby, operating a pneumatic nail gun, which was manufactured by Duo-Fast. Duo-Fast provided Northwest with nail guns and in exchange Northwest purchased all of its nails and other fasteners from Duo-Fast.
Plaintiffs brought a product liability action against Duo-Fast, alleging defects in the nails and nail guns manufactured by Duo-Fast. The plaintiffs' theory at trial was that the nail gun which injured Steven Hopkins should have been provided with a safety device known as a "drop-off," that drop-offs were not provided by Duo-Fast as standard equipment on all of its nail guns, and that some of the nails manufactured by Duo-Fast for the nail guns were of a dimension that would allow them to escape from the guns in tandem. Without the drop-off attachment, when one nail was fired another nail might also be fired from the nail gun on a different trajectory. The gun used by the co-worker did not have a drop-off attachment.
During the trial, the defendants' expert, Bookwalter, modified what had been his earlier testimony in deposition, as the result of determining during the course of direct examination of plaintiffs' witness that he had been provided erroneous information as to the size of the nail head used in the nail gun in question. Bookwalter had been provided the nail head dimension by the defendants based upon information the defendants had provided in the course of discovery to the plaintiffs. Plaintiffs objected to this revised testimony; after inquiry, the court permitted the testimony.
An additional defense expert witness, Dr. Blotter, had had his deposition taken approximately two weeks prior to the commencement of the trial by the plaintiffs, had described the testing and analysis performed by him at that deposition, and rendered an opinion.' Subsequent to this deposition, and prior to his testimony, Dr. Blotter performed additional tests and analysis which changed his testimony to the effect that the nail gun did not generate the velocity required for the accident to have occurred as described by the plaintiffs.
Defense counsel informed plaintiffs' counsel of this contemplated change in testimony the morning that Dr. Blotter was to testify. Plaintiffs' counsel timely objected to the testimony which after inquiry was permitted over plaintiffs' objection.
After both parties presented lay and expert testimony, a jury returned a-verdict for Duo-Fast. The jury determined that Duo-Fast did not manufacture an unreasonably dangerous or defective product, and that no warranties had been breached by Duo-Fast.
The issues framed by the plaintiff on appeal with which we must deal are as follows:
1. Did the trial court err in permitting testimony of defendants' experts where:
(a) the defendants' expert deposition testimony was based on information concerning product condition provided by the defendant to the defendants' expert and where the defendant divulged, for the first time at trial, that the information upon which its expert relied and testified at deposition was in error;
(b) the opinions expressed by the defendants' expert witness at the time of his deposition were changed prior to trial, but no notice was given of the changed testimony to the plaintiffs until the day of testimony at trial of the defendants' expert witness;
(c) additional tests and analyses were performed after the deposition of the defendants' experts and the results of said tests and analyses were not provided to counsel for plaintiffs until the day of the experts' testimony at trial?
2. Did the trial court err in giving the jury a limiting instruction with regard to the introduction of defendants' safety bulletin, plaintiffs' Exhibit 18?
I.
DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN PERMITTING THE DISPUTED TESTIMONY OF DEFENDANTS' EXPERT WITNESSES
The testimony of Jeffrey Bookwalter, to which appellants object, was a result of Mr. Bookwalter learning during the course of plaintiffs' examination of its witness that Bookwalter had used a different dimension nail head than Hopkins' witness Mr. Novak. Bookwalter used the dimension supplied by Novak (plaintiffs' witness) rather than that he had used earlier.
After the timely objection of plaintiffs' counsel to the testimony of Bookwalter, the court made inquiry and determined that Mr. Bookwalter had relied upon engineering drawings of the nails, which were supplied by the defendants to the plaintiffs during discovery, and which became, during this trial, Exhibit 8. These engineering drawings were drawings of a nail then in use, but were of a dimension different than that which was in use at the time of the accident, March 4, 1986.
During plaintiffs' case-in-chief, they called Mr. Novak to establish the actual size of the head of the nail in use at the time of the injuries sustained by the plaintiff. It was during this testimony that Mr. Bookwalter learned for the first time that the information upon which he was relying was improper. Mr. Bookwalter then adjusted his analysis to reflect the evidence introduced by plaintiffs in their case-in-chief, as to the actual nail head dimensions.
The issue, as to the testimony of Dr. Blotter was framed based upon deposition testimony taken approximately two weeks prior to the trial date, and the proffered testimony of Dr. Blotter at the trial.
During the deposition of Dr. Blotter, an expert hired by Duo-Fast, plaintiffs' counsel asked Dr. Blotter whether or not he was going to conduct more tests:
Q. Are there any other opinions that you are going to be expressing in this trial in terms of areas of your evaluation that we haven't already discussed that you can think of?
A. Well, that will depend upon Mr. Farley [opposing counsel] and it will depend on the development of the case. I think if something comes up that needs a technical response as an expert, then I would respond to that request.
Q. Dr. Blotter, you can understand I am sure also that I am representing a client and I do not want to be ambushed by new information that comes out ten minutes or two days before trial. You understand that, don't you?
A. Yes, but could I also expect that you would welcome with a welcome hand anything that would add to the truthfulness as to what would happen.
Q. If I had an opportunity to test its truthfulness, yes, but I don't want you to be the sole judge of that. I want to know if you anticipate doing any further work on this [in] advance of trial.
Deposition of Dr. Blotter, 87-88 (taken August 31, 1989).
On the morning of the day that Dr. Blotter testified at trial:
"MR. HOWARD [counsel for Hopkins]: Over the break I asked Mr. Farley if there's any additional work that had been done by Dr. Blotter, who is his next expert witness he intends to call.
"He indicated to me that there was. The court afforded me the opportunity to talk to Dr. Blotter, who's out in the hallway now. I took about 10 minutes to do that.
"I guess I wanted to place my objection on the record. Also there's work that's been done by Dr. Blotter.
"We continued his deposition because he had indicated at his deposition, and Mr. Farley had, that he might want to do something more. And yet until I asked Mr. Farley this morning, I still wasn't told what it was.
"And he did some force tests and he did some other calculations in regard to shear strength, which I haven't had a chance — I have talked to him about it. But as a practical matter, there is no way that I'm going to be able to get into analyzing what he did so . that I can effectively interrogate him on that.
"I wanted to place my objection on the record, which is essentially the same objection I placed on the record with regard to Mr. Blotter — Mr. Bookwalter. I'm sorry. That I think it's the defendant's obligation to make that information available to me. Not 15 or 20 minutes before the witness goes on, but long enough for me to be able to meaningfully do something with it.
"And I guess I wanted to object to that. And he isn't on the stand yet, and I appreciate that. But this is in an effort to try and save some time with the jury.
"THE COURT: Mr. Farley?
"MR. FARLEY: Yes, Your Honor.
"I didn't know what Dr. Blotter had done until I met with him late last night. And there wasn't an opportunity for me to even advise Mr. Howard until this point during the day.
"The work that he has done since his deposition was discussed at his deposition and Dr. Blotter alluded to it. He said, I have done this type of a qualitative analysis, but I haven't done a quantitative analysis.
"And essentially that is what has been disclosed by Mr. Howard at this point. And building on the same information that was discussed at his deposition, what his quantitative analysis is based upon that.
"He's had the opportunity to talk to him, spend whatever time he wishes to spend with him. I don't know what else I can say. He's here, he's available for Mr. Howard to speak with for however long he wishes to speak with him.
"If he wishes to take his deposition before he testifies, since I know we're going to be going into tomorrow morning, I've got no problem with paying for the deposition.
"This is a product primarily of the schedule of Dr. Blotter. Period. I mean, he has not, by reason of his schedule, had an opportunity to do this kind of work until just now.
"THE COURT: What did he do specifically?
"MR. FARLEY: At the time of his deposition, he had undertaken some trajectory tests and force tests in a qualitative sense in terms of, All right, this is the kind of thing I would like to do.
"Since his deposition, I learned last night that he has, in essence, done some force tests by going down into his lab. And he's taken the exemplar nailer that he has— which was discussed at his deposition — and he has driven nails with it to determine how much force is necessary in order to drive a nail. The same kind of thing, in fact, it's the same sort of numbers that Mr. Bookwalter has already testified to. In terms of the force required by this nailer in order to drive a nail into the wood. That's, in essence, what he's done in terms of additional tests.
"From that information, he has then done an analysis, if a nail were to be able to get into a position where it could come out to the back of the raceway, what kind of velocity would it have?
"He had done velocity tests at the time his deposition was taken. And he, then and now, is prepared to talk about what kind of velocity a nail that would be projected out the back of the nose, if it got itself into that kind of a configuration, would have and whether or not that would be sufficient to reach the plaintiff in the location that he's standing.
"He has also just utilized the same data that was discussed at Mr. Blotter — Dr. Blotter's deposition and has arrived at a conclusion as to what he believes, how he believes the accident occurred.
"THE COURT: And is that a conclusion that he had not reached at the time that his deposition was taken?
"MR. HOWARD: He didn't know any way that it could have occurred. It could have occurred any number of ways.
"MR. FARLEY: That's correct, Your Honor.
"THE COURT: How does he conclude the accident occurred now?
"MR. FARLEY: Based upon what his analysis has been, the substance of his opinion is that the accident could have occurred by a striking — or a high strike on the board.
"The nail that was intended to go into the board or a second nail that, you know, after driving the nail that was intended to go and there's a bump on the edge of the board, the nail can project into the stack of lumber, and go up, and strike the plaintiff in the eye.
"That his analysis, based upon the velocity tests that he's done, which had been done previously, was that the velocity of the second nail wasn't sufficient. And even assuming all the things that the plaintiff has assumed as to how this accident occurred, that it was a second nail that got out the back of the raceway, what kind of velocity that kind of a nail would have.
"THE COURT: What did he conclude?
"MR. FARLEY: That it did not have sufficient velocity in order to reach the plaintiff.
"THE COURT: And he didn't give this opinion at the time of the deposition?
"MR. FARLEY: Not that exact opinion. But he talked about what kind of analysis he had done and what he was going to be doing in order to reach that conclusion.
"THE COURT: And when did he do this additional work from which he reached—
"MR. FARLEY: That I can't tell you. Because I don't know. Specifically time-wise, I don't know. I don't know when he did it. It may have even been as late as yesterday, for all I know.
"THE COURT: And this is the first time that it's been disclosed that the witness is going to say A, if the nail came out of the back of the gun — or if the second nail came out of the back of the gun, it wouldn't have sufficient velocity to hit the plaintiff?
"MR. FARLEY: That specific point, yes. But the methodology and what he was going to be doing in that sense was discussed at his deposition.
"THE COURT: And B, that this is the first time that the witness has given the opinion that the accident was caused by the intended nail going off in the wrong direction?
"MR. FARLEY: That was discussed at his deposition, Your Honor, as to whether or not, given the trajectory tests that he had done in the manner that he did them, you know, whether or not a nail — and what height a nail will get to.
"And he had already done those trajectory tests at the time of his deposition. The conclusion that he draws from that has been a conclusion that he has arrived at since that time, of which I learned for the first time last night.
"THE COURT: When was this deposition taken?
"MR. FARLEY: August 31st.
"MR. HOWARD: Two weeks ago.
"THE COURT: When was he hired?
"MR. FARLEY: When was he hired?
"THE COURT: Yes.
"MR. HOWARD: Two months ago.
"MR. FARLEY: About two months ago. That's about right.
"But he was made available before that. That was the only time that we could get Dr. Blotter and Ken Howard and me together to take the deposition.
"THE COURT: But it wouldn't have done any good to do it beforehand because he hadn't completed his work.
"MR. FARLEY: Yes, I understand that.
"MR. HOWARD: Your Honor, I would very much like to move this trial along. I realize that we've promised the jury they would be out of here earlier than what they're really going to get out of here.
"And I guess I want to reserve my objection with regard to Dr. Blotter. And I don't know how else to move it along and reserve my objection, other than to make it and to see what he says.
"I'm afraid that we're going to anger this jury if we take time off for a deposition. And that's not going to help me anyway because I'd have to pass that information by somebody else.
"And if we delay for a deposition or something, I mean, I'd have to get'back ahold of Dr. Adams. And I'd have to find out what he thought about the information so he could help me analyze it so I could make some head or tails of it.
"So a short recess to take his deposition is really not going to do any good. And a long one, I think, might be counterproductive.
"THE COURT: Of course I'm going on the representations that have been made at this point and not on what Dr. Blotter has actually testified to as to what he did.
"Based on what you've said, and I can— Mr. Howard, I can understand your problem. Because it is very definitely throwing a new wrinkle into, it seems to me, throwing a new wrinkle into the case. He's presenting a completely new opinion, even though, yes, you say, Well, he warned us that he might come up with something new.
"But he didn't bother coming up with something new until, as I understand it, or didn't tell anybody about it until last night.
"And it seems to me, from what I've heard at this point, that it's not because the defendant is sandbagging. And it's not because the plaintiff has failed to be diligent in pursuing its discovery.
"It seems to me that the problem is that the witness didn't get the work done because of the press of other business.
"So I don't think, from the point of view of looking at, Well, did the plaintiff — defendant fail to seasonably supplement his responses to discovery? The answer is no. Using a double negative, no, he didn't fail to do so because he didn't know about it.
"And 26(e)(4) says that if a party fails to seasonably supplement his responses, then the court may exclude the testimony.
"So I don't think that there's a predicate for excluding the testimony at this point. If I felt that, you know, this was a sandbagging situation, I'd rule otherwise.
"I don't think it comes within — well, I think the appropriate exercise of discretion would be to permit the testimony.''
Tr., 902-13 (emphasis added).
As the above excerpt displays, the trial court inquired into and was made aware of the problem presented to the plaintiffs by the late discovery.
The standard of review applicable is that of abuse of discretion in ruling on admissibility of expert testimony. Cosgrove v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceutical, Inc., 117 Idaho 470, 788 P.2d 1293 (1989); Sidwell v. William Prym, Inc., 112 Idaho 76, 730 P.2d 996 (1986); Stoddard v. Nelson, 99 Idaho 293, 581 P.2d 339 (1978).
The trial court in this case, as set forth herein, correctly perceived the issue of admissibility of the expert testimony of both Bookwalter and Blotter, as one involving discretion. The trial court made an intensive inquiry into what tests were conducted by the witness pre and post-deposition. The trial court entertained the argument of counsel on this and related evidentiary issues.
The trial court acted within its discretion and applied the correct legal standards and clearly reached its decision by exercise of reason. Sun Valley Shopping Center v. Idaho Power Co., 119 Idaho 87, 94, 803 P.2d 993, 1000 (1991); Braley v. Pangburn, 118 Idaho 575, 798 P.2d 34 (1990).
Under the circumstances presented, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to exclude the expert testimony in this case.
ii.
DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN GIVING THE JURY A LIMITING INSTRUCTION WITH REGARD TO THE INTRODUCTION OF DEFENDANTS' SAFETY BULLETIN, PLAINTIFFS' EXHIBIT 18
Exhibit 18 was a "Duo-Fast Safety Bulletin" bearing a date one year after the accident that was the subject of this litigation. Exhibit 18 was proffered by the plaintiffs to impeach the testimony of defendants' expert who had consistently testified that a "drop-off" was not a safety feature on the C-325 nailer, the instrument at issue.
Exhibit 18 did not deal with the C-325 nailer, but with three (3) other models of nailers manufactured by the defendant. Exhibit 18 read as follows:
Part Number CN-140-2 is a drop-off. It is used primarily on the C-350, KDN-75, and KDN-75L tools. Drop-offs are used for two reasons; functionally for use with short fasteners and for safety performance.
A raised drop-off permits the use of shorter fasteners. They prevent the fastener from tumbling which minimizes jamming. The chambered surface area on a drop-off will guide the point of a tumbling fastener back to its proper path down the raceway.
A drop-off can also serve as a safety feature. In these tools, the drop-off may capture a tumbling nail and prevent it from traveling in the direction of the operator.
When using nails shorter than two inches, the longer XK-1019 is recommended; nails from 2 inches to 2Vi inches should be used with a standard CN-140-2; nails longer than 2 Vi inches can be used without any drop-off; and nails longer than 3V2 inches must be used without a drop-off.
Because the density of the material being fastened can vary, drop-offs should also be considered with materials denser than medium grade lumber. For example; in metal piercing applications a drop-off is always recommended.
From a safety standpoint, the drop-off is not usually necessary. Consider the material density, the fastener length, and the angle of penetration. If you have any doubts about the fastener's performance, the best choice is to install a drop-off.
The defendants objected to the introduction of Exhibit 18 on the grounds that it did reflect steps taken after the date of the incident, did not deal with the C-325 nailer which was the subject of this litigation, was not relevant, and the claim of the defendants that Exhibit 18 was not admissible under Idaho Rules of Evidence 407.
The plaintiffs did not offer Exhibit 18 for introduction as evidence until the final act of their rebuttal, at which time the court admitted the exhibit for the purpose of impeaching the expert testimony of the defendants who had stated that a "drop-off" was not a safety feature in the following language:
Plaintiff's Exhibit 18 is a document that I believe the evidence will show was issued by Duo-Fast at some time after the occurrence of this accident. Any statements that are contained in this document may not be used, must not be used by you for the purpose of proving the products in issue were defective in design or manufacture or that the Defendant was negligent or otherwise at fault. The evidence in Plaintiff's Exhibit 18 may be considered by you only for the purpose of testing the believability of testimony that has been given during the trial. And that's the only purpose for which it can be used.
The trial court interpreted Exhibit 18 as an instrument that could be read to indicate remedial measures taken by the defendants one year after the injury complained of by the plaintiffs, but weighed its value as urged by the plaintiffs for the purpose of impeaching the testimony of defendants' expert and concluded it did outweigh the prejudice that might be attached to an interpretation that it consisted of a remedial measure and concluded that it could be introduced with a limiting instruction. It is clear from the transcript of the trial that the use of a "drop-off" in connection with the C-325 nailer was never recommended until following this injury, when an engineering recommendation was made to the company that a drop-off be installed on the C-325 nailer. This recommendation was marked for purposes of identification by the plaintiffs as Exhibit 19, dated October 1988. It was never offered into evidence.
The purpose for which the trial court admitted Exhibit 18 is clear. Plaintiffs' argument for introduction was:
What we're talking about is simply a safety bulletin which was subsequently dated, but which recognizes the use of the drop-off on the CN 325, which I think the testimony indicates was available all along.
The court ruled:
When the witness says, It's a safe product. The accident didn't happen this way. And they've got a document in their files saying that the piece or a piece similar to the piece that was not on the product also has a purpose as a safety feature, that tends to affect the credibility of the witnesses presented by the defendant.
So I'm going to let it in for that purpose. So, I think basically in reaching that decision, I'm looking at the discussion that's contained in McCormick in Section 275 and some of the cases that are cited in that area.
Of course, they're talking more about Rule 407 th[a]n they are talking about our statute. But I think that basically the same line of reasoning applies.
It's an area in dispute. That's one of the requirements. If they agree — if they'd have agreed with your position, then there would be nothing to dispute and then they shouldn't come in.
But this is an area which is in factual dispute. There's evidence they've taken a certain position; you've taken an opposite position with respect to the products involved.
So there is a factual issue in dispute. I believe this evidence, again, while it can't be used to prove culpability or a defect in design, it can be used to impeach the credibility of the defense witnesses and the opinions of the defense witnesses____
I don't think this is the type of document that would be unduly prejudicial, when you consider its probative value insofar as the issue of credibility is concerned.
And when the document is offered— which I expect will be in the very near future — I'll give the jury a precautionary instruction.
Tr. pp. 999-1001.
The trial court, while admitting Exhibit 18 for impeachment purposes, recognized Exhibit 18 as a document that might have been interpreted as a "remedial measure" and gave a limiting instruction. We find no error.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
The appellants' motion to augment the record is denied.
Costs to respondents.
BAKES, C.J., and JOHNSON, J., concur.
. Duo-Fast Corporation, an Illinois corporation; Duo-Fast Corporation, Northwest Sales and Service Division, an Illinois corporation in good standing in the state of Idaho, will hereinafter be referred to as "Duo-Fast."