Case Name: PEOPLE v. RICKER
Court: New York Supreme Court, General Term
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1889-02
Citations: 7 N.Y. Crim. 19
Docket Number: 
Parties: PEOPLE v. RICKER.
Judges: 
Reporter: New York Criminal Reports
Volume: 7
Pages: 19–23

Head Matter:
Supreme Court—General Term—Second Department.
February, 1889.
PEOPLE v. RICKER.
Bubglaby.—Evidence.—Accomplices.
Where a witness called by the people states that what he testified to before the grand jury was untrue, a cross-examination as to the details of his evidence before the grand jury, and the showing to the court of the minutes of the grand jury to show that the witness is an unwilling one, is proper.
Where a witness for the prosecution testifies upon a trial for burglary that he was in a room with the several defendants on the night of the burglary prior to the time thereof, and that he went to sleep, and that early the following morning two of the defendants came in and he went out with them, and, he knowing nothing of the burglary, assisted them in placing the stolen articles in a hiding-place, and afterwards the witness was informed by defendants that the goods came from the house which was broken open,—Held, that such witness is not an accomplice, and corroboration of his evidence is not necessary.
Appeal by defendants, Thomas Bicker, Bichard Bicker, and, Matthew O’Neil from a judgment of the Court of Sessions of Queens County entered upon a conviction of burglary in the second degree, and larceny in the second degree.
The facts appear in the opinion.
Benjamin W. Downing, for defendants, appellants.
John Fleming, district-attorney, for the people, respondents.

Opinion:
Baknabd, P. J.
The evidence shows that one Michael Holzer, of Long Island City, securely closed his shoe store on the night of Saturday, the 13th of November. On Monday morning the door showed evidence of having been broken in, and a large portion of the shoes was gone. The shoes were subsequently in part found in a pawn-shop in Long Island City. The three defendants were convicted of the crime, and this appeal presents the record of the trial. The proof of the burglary and larceny is not questioned, but certain errors are assigned as calling for a reversal, and it is also urged that there was an insufficiency of evidence to authorize a conviction. The first error arises, as is claimed, under the following circumstances: One John Boyle had been a witness before the grand jury, and had testified against the other defendants. He was called again by the people on the trial, and then testified that what he had said before the grand jury was untrue. The people were manifestly taken by surprise, and questioned him particularly as to the details of his evidence before the grand jury, all of which he denied. The counsel for the accused objected to this examination of the people's witness by the district-attorney, and the minutes of the grand jury were handed to the judge to show him that the witness was an unwilling witness. The examination then stopped. The minutes were not needed to show that the witness was testi fying falsely on the trial, or had done so before the grand jury. The examination went no further than was justifiable under the circumstances. Bullard v. Pearsall, 53 N. Y. 230.
The next error is one of proof. The people called a witness one John Kelley. He testified that the three convicted defendants were all at a room in Long Island City on the Saturday night .the store was robbed; that he (Kelley) lay down and went to sleep; that when he woke up, two of the appellants, Thomas Bicker and Matthew O'Heil, came in. This was about three o'clock Sunday morning. Kelley then went with them, and on the corner of Jackson Avenue and Tenth Street they found Thomas Bicker, O'PTeil, and Boyle, and they had about 60 pairs of shoes. All these persons assisted in putting the shoes in the cellar of one O'Dowd. During the day, while all the parties were together, they said the shoes came from Shearer's Hall, which is the building where the Holzer store was. The evidence does not show that Kelley was an accomplice in the crime. He was not present at its commission ; did not organize or take part in it, further than to help the defendants conceal the property after the burglary, and even then he knew of nothing criminal in its acquisition. It was subsequently that they told him that it was taken from Shearer's Hall (Holzer's). There may well be doubt whether he was as innocent as he claims, but there was no proof of his being an accomplice.' It was a question for the jury to determine. If he was not an accomplice, the corroboration was not necessary. It was only a question of credibility of the witness, which is also a question for the jury. Under the rules governing the trial of issues there was no error committed on the trial, either by the court or jury, and the conviction should, therefore, be affirmed.
Pbatt, J., concurs.