Case Name: COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Francisco Almena VAZQUEZ, Appellant
Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
Jurisdiction: Pennsylvania
Decision Date: 1992-11-16
Citations: 421 Pa. Super. 184
Docket Number: No. 704
Parties: COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Francisco Almena VAZQUEZ, Appellant.
Judges: Before MONTEMURO, KELLY, and CERCONE, JJ.
Reporter: Pennsylvania Superior Court Reports
Volume: 421
Pages: 184–191

Head Matter:
617 A.2d 786
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Francisco Almena VAZQUEZ, Appellant.
Superior Court of Pennsylvania.
Submitted June 3, 1992.
Filed Nov. 16, 1992.
Tony Sangiamo, Holly Springs, for appellant.
John F. Nelson, III, Dist. Atty., Chambersburg, for Com., appellee.
Before MONTEMURO, KELLY, and CERCONE, JJ.

Opinion:
KELLY, Judge:
In this opinion we are called upon to determine whether reference to the fact that a defendant's name appeared on a computer list of known drug dealers is sufficiently prejudicial as to require a new trial, notwithstanding curative instructions intended to countermand such prejudice. We find that the statement was irreparably prejudicial and reverse.
The instant appeal stems from the following facts. On May 25, 1990, appellant was charged with two counts of unlawful delivery. A jury trial was held on February 14, 1991. The Commonwealth called Trooper Gregory Stone who testified that, while undercover, he witnessed appellant sell cocaine. In an effort to demonstrate that Trooper Stone had become confused in his identification of appellant, defense counsel apparently attempted to establish that Officer Stone had engaged in several substantially similar transactions. When asked to explain a typical such transaction, Trooper Stone replied: "We have computers, and we have lists of known drug dealers. And, in this case, the defendant was on the list. I definitely knew he was a drug dealer." N.T. 2/14/91 at 32. A mistrial was requested and denied in favor of a curative instruction.
The jury returned a verdict of guilty on both counts of unlawful delivery against appellant. Appellant's post-trial motion requesting a new trial was denied, and this timely appeal followed.
Appellant contends that the introduction of the officer's testimony constituted reversible error. We agree.
It is well-settled that evidence of crimes unrelated to the charge for which a defendant is being tried is generally inadmissible. Commonwealth v. Martin, 479 Pa. 63, 387 A.2d 835 (1978); Commonwealth v. Turner, 454 Pa. 439, 311 A.2d 899 (1973). However, not all improper references to prior criminal acts require the award of a new trial. The decision of whether to declare a mistrial in a criminal prosecution is within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be reversed on appeal absent abuse of discretion. Commonwealth v. Reed, 400 Pa.Super. 207, 583 A.2d 459 (1990); Commonwealth v. Nelson, 389 Pa.Super. 417, 567 A.2d 673 (1989); Commonwealth v. Whiteman, 336 Pa.Super. 120, 485 A.2d 459 (1984). Moreover, this Court has held that the extreme remedy of a mistrial is not automatically required if it is determined that the inference of prior criminality was innocuous and that effective curative instructions were immediately given. Commonwealth v. Williams, 470 Pa. 172, 368 A.2d 249 (1977); Commonwealth v. Bruner, 388 Pa.Super. 82, 564 A.2d 1277 (1989); Commonwealth v. Fernandez, 333 Pa.Super. 279, 482 A.2d 567 (1984). Indeed, a mistrial must be granted only when an incident is of such a nature that its unavoidable effect is to deprive defendant of a fair trial. Commonwealth v. Chestnut, 511 Pa. 169, 512 A.2d 603 (1986); Commonwealth v. Brinkley, 505 Pa. 442, 480 A.2d 980 (1984); Commonwealth v. Kubiac, 379 Pa.Super. 402, 550 A.2d 219 (1988); Commonwealth v. Larkins, 340 Pa.Super. 56, 489 A.2d 837 (1985). Consideration of all the circumstances is necessary in determining whether an instruction can cure the exposure of improper evidence to the jury. Commonwealth v. Richardson, 496 Pa. 521, 526, 437 A.2d 1162, 1165 (1981). Among the circumstances to be considered are whether the remark was intentionally elicited by the Commonwealth, whether the Commonwealth exploited the reference, whether the answer is responsive to the question asked, and whether curative instructions were given were significant. Commonwealth v. Richardson, supra; Commonwealth v. Gaerttner, 335 Pa.Super. 203, 484 A.2d 92 (1984).
In Commonwealth v. Rivers, 238 Pa.Super. 319, 357 A.2d 553 (1976), a witness for the prosecution replied non-responsively on cross-examination by defense counsel that the defendant said "he had done a lot of federal time before." This Court held that "because this is a clear indication of prior criminal activity, and because such activity will predispose the jury to find appellant guilty, prejudicial error has been committed." Rivers, at 238 Pa.Super. at 323, 357 A.2d at 555. See also Commonwealth v. Wetzel, 276 Pa.Super. 445, 419 A.2d 541 (1980).
The testimony at issue in this case consists of the following dialogue during cross-examination of the Commonwealth's only witness.
Q. Were the purchases that you made in other than the ones that formed the basis of this complaint done similarly in the same fashion or at least similar fashion as to the purchase that was made in this situation?
A. Some could be similar. I don't always make a buy in somebody's residence. It could be in a bar, could be in a parking lot. It could be with several other individuals involved. It could be by myself.
Q. Maybe I could be more specific and that might help you some. Specifically, an approach would be made to an individual, ask that individual if he can provide cocaine for you. And then as you testified here, if possible, make the transaction, take the evidence, field-test it, submit it to the lab following that same pattern?
A. Yeah, that is correct. Normally when I work an undercover investigation in areas, we usually—we have computers and we have lists of known drug dealers. And in this case the defendant was on the list. I definitely knew he was a drug dealer.
N.T. of 2/14/92 at 31-32.
The record indicates that the answer by Trooper Stone was not responsive to the question asked by defense counsel. Trooper Stone was asked to describe the drug purchase process starting at the approach of alleged drug dealers. There was no proper reason for Trooper Stone to mention that appellant was on a computer list of known drug dealers and that he "definitely knew he was a drug dealer."
Moreover, although cautionary instructions were promptly given, they could not have cured the unavoidable prejudice suffered by such a remark. This was not a passing reference. The officer's intent was unquestionably to convince defense counsel and/or the jury of the certainty of the identification by supporting it through reference to something arguably not susceptible to the same type of human error, i.e. a computer list of "known drug dealers." Such a list would, even if reliable, show nothing more than appellant's propensity to commit the very crime for which he was standing trial. It is precisely this reasoning that the rule against admitting bad acts is intended to proscribe.
In sum, although we are otherwise inclined to defer to the trial court's superior vantage in assessing the probable impact of the challenged testimony on the jury, and notwithstanding the fact that the Commonwealth did not exploit or elicit this testimony, we are convinced that the unavoidable effect of this testimony was to deprive appellant of a fair trial. The record indicates that Trooper Stone was the only witness for the Commonwealth. The arrest of appellant was made approximately eight months after the alleged crimes were committed. The prejudicial testimony of Trooper Stone and the fact that the evidence against appellant was minimal, convinces us that appellant is entitled to a new trial.
Judgment of sentence reversed. Case remanded for a new trial. Jurisdiction relinquished.
CERCONE, J., filed a dissenting opinion.