Case Name: Town of Germantown, Appellant, vs. Industrial Commission of Wisconsin and another, Respondents
Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Wisconsin
Decision Date: 1922-11-08
Citations: 178 Wis. 642
Docket Number: 
Parties: Town of Germantown, Appellant, vs. Industrial Commission of Wisconsin and another, Respondents.
Judges: 
Reporter: Wisconsin Reports
Volume: 178
Pages: 642–646

Head Matter:
Town of Germantown, Appellant, vs. Industrial Commission of Wisconsin and another, Respondents.
October 13
November 8, 1922.
Workmen’s compensation: Person working out highway tax as ' employee of town.
One working out a road tax, as permitted by sec. 1248, Stats. 1917, instead of paying cash, is an “employee” of the town within the meaning of the workmen’s compensation act (sub. (1), sec. 2394 — 7, Stats. 1921). Rosenberry, Escn-weiler, and Jones, JJ., dissent.
Appeal from a judgment of the circuit court for Dane county: E. Ray Stevens, Circuit Judge.
Affirmed.
There was an application by the dependent before the Industrial Commission for compensation by reason of the death of Phillip Wagenknecht, resulting from accident while in the course of his employment, working out a highway tase for the plaintiff town. The Industrial Commission awarded compensation and the award was affirmed by the circuit court. There is no dispute upon the facts, and the only question before this court is one of law as to the construction of the following language in the compensation act:
“Section 2394 — 7. The term ‘employee’ as used in sec tions 2394 — 1 to 2394 — 31, inclusive, shall be construed to mean: (1) Every person in the service of any . . . town . . . under any appointment, or contract of hire, express or implied, oral or written. . . .”
The plaintiff contends that the deceased was not in the service of the town under any contract of hire, express or implied.
The cause was submitted for the appellant on the brief of Sazuyer & Sazuyer of Hartford; for the respondent Wagenknecht on that of John O’Meara of Milwaukee; and for the respondent Industrial Commission .on that of the Attorney General and Winfield W. Gilman, assistant attorney general.

Opinion:
CrowNHArt, J.
This court has many times held that the compensation act is to be liberally construed to carry out its manifest purpose. That purpose is to relieve workmen from the distress of work accidents by placing a portion of the burden upon the employers, and through such employers, in the cost of production, upon the people as a whole. In passing this act the legislature made it elective as to private employers, but, having in mind that the state and municipalities should sét a good example, made the law mandatory as to them.
In this case we have a workman working for the town on its highways to pay an obligation of his to the town. He had his choice to pay this obligation in cash or in labor. Sec. 1248, Stats. 1917. This was the offer presented to him by law, and his election to pay in labor completed an implied contract of service. When he went to work he was an employee of the town, and the town was his employer. His relation to the town was no different than that of an employee working beside him for cash under the same direction and supervision. Had the deceased paid his obligation in cash, then the town would have taken the cash to employ some other workman to do the same work m the same way as was done by the deceased. In that case the town would have had to compensate such workman in case of injury, The distinction between the two kinds of workmen is too subtle and technical to be within the spirit and purpose of the law. The following cases seem to justify our conclusion that deceased was an employee at the time of his injury. Elder v. Bemis, 2 Met. (43 Mass.) 599, 604, 605; In re Ashby, 60 Kan. 101, 55 Pac. 336, 338; Winfield v. Peeden, 8 Kan. App. 671, 57 Pac. 131.
By the Court. — The judgment of the lower court is affirmed.