Case Name: Grace Krotosky, Respondent, v. Philip Krotosky, also Known as Philip Kay and Philip K. Dalton, Appellant
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1915-11-12
Citations: 169 A.D. 850
Docket Number: 
Parties: Grace Krotosky, Respondent, v. Philip Krotosky, also Known as Philip Kay and Philip K. Dalton, Appellant.
Judges: 
Reporter: Appellate Division Reports
Volume: 169
Pages: 850–857

Head Matter:
Grace Krotosky, Respondent, v. Philip Krotosky, also Known as Philip Kay and Philip K. Dalton, Appellant.
First Department,
November 12, 1915.
Attachment — husband and wife — necessaries—warrant refused.
In an action by a wife against her husband, a resident of this State, to recover for money claimed to have been necessarily expended for the support and maintenance of herself and children, a warrant of attachment should not be granted where there is no substantial evidence that the defendant has or is about to dispose of his property for the purpose of defrauding his creditors or that he has other debts.
Dowlito, J., dissented.
Appeal by the defendant, Philip Krotosky, from an order of the Supreme Court, made at the New York Special Term and entered in the office of the clerk of the county of New York on the 27th day of August, 1915, denying, upon a rehearing, defendant’s motion to vacate and set aside a warrant of attachment herein.
Also an appeal from an order entered in said clerk’s office on" the 14th day of September, 1915, resettling the order above mentioned.
An appeal is also taken from the original order entered in the office of the clerk of the county of New York on the 11th day of August, 1915, denying the motion to vacate the warrant.
Harvey J. Cohen [Herman Joseph with him on the brief], for the appellant.
Julius J. Popper, for the respondent.

Opinion:
Ingraham, P. J.:
A warrant of attachment in this action was granted on the ground that the defendant had assigned, disposed of and secreted his property, or was about to assign, dispose of or secrete the balance of his property with intent to defraud his creditors.
Assuming that the plaintiff had made out a prima facie case to justify the issue of a warrant of attachment in the first instance, the facts that would justify this conclusion have been fully met and answered by the defendant's affidavits, and on the whole case there seems to be a lack of evidence to justify a finding that the defendant either has transferred or assigned or is about to transfer or assign his property to avoid his creditors. The defendant is a resident of this State, and tying up all of his property to await the determination of this action is not justified unless there is substantial evidence that the defendant is about to make some disposition of his property for the purpose of defrauding his creditors. There is no evidence that he has other debts; his business is here; and nothing that he has done will justify the inference that he is about to make such a disposition of his property as will justify an attachment.
For these reasons I think the order appealed from should be reversed, and motion to vacate the attachment granted, under the circumstances, without costs.
Clarke and Scott, JJ., concurred; Dowling, J., dissented.