Case Name: William B. VINOSKI and Wife, Roberta N. Vinoski, Appellants, v. C.M. PLUMMER, Ronnie Plummer and C.M. Plummer, III, Appellees
Court: Mississippi Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Mississippi
Decision Date: 2004-05-25
Citations: 893 So. 2d 239
Docket Number: No. 2002-CA-02109-COA
Parties: William B. VINOSKI and Wife, Roberta N. Vinoski, Appellants, v. C.M. PLUMMER, Ronnie Plummer and C.M. Plummer, III, Appellees.
Judges: Before KING, C.J., THOMAS and MYERS, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 893
Pages: 239–246

Head Matter:
William B. VINOSKI and Wife, Roberta N. Vinoski, Appellants, v. C.M. PLUMMER, Ronnie Plummer and C.M. Plummer, III, Appellees.
No. 2002-CA-02109-COA.
Court of Appeals of Mississippi.
May 25, 2004.
Rehearing Denied Oct. 26, 2004.
Certiorari Denied Feb. 10, 2005.
Joseph R. Meadows, Gulfport, attorney for appellants.
Floyd J. Logan, Gulfport, attorney for appellees.
Before KING, C.J., THOMAS and MYERS, JJ.

Opinion:
THOMAS, J., for the Court. .
¶ 1. The Vinoskis and Plummers are neighbors, each having received their property from a common source. The Plummers filed a complaint to obtain an easement by necessity across the Vinoskis' property. The Chancery Court of Harrison County granted the easement. Aggrieved, the Vinoskis assert the following issues on appeal:
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE EASEMENT BECAUSE THE PLUMMERS HAD AN ADEQUATE REMEDY AT LAW FOR ESTABLISHING A PRIVATE RIGHT-OF-WAY PURSUANT TO MISS. CODE ANN. SECTION 65-7-201, ET SEQ.
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE EASEMENT BECAUSE THE PLUMMERS HAD A MORE DIRECT AND REASONABLE ACCESS TO THEIR PROPERTY.
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE EASEMENT BECAUSE AN EASEMENT OF ANY KIND ACROSS THE VINOSKIS' PROPERTY WOULD SEVERELY DAMAGE THE PROPERTY, WOULD ENCROACH ON THE HOME OR OUTBUILDINGS, WOULD DISRUPT THE VINOSK-IS' PRIVACY, AND WOULD PREVENT THE VINOSKIS FROM THE PEACEFUL AND QUIET USE AND ENJOYMENT OF THEIR PROPERTY.
IV.THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE EASEMENT BECAUSE IT WAS A TAKING OF THE VINOSKIS' PROPERTY WITHOUT JUST COMPENSATION, ALL OF WHICH IS GUARANTEED BY THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI, AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION TO THE EXTENT THAT A PERSON'S PROPERTY MAY NOT BE • TAKEN WITHOUT JUST COMPENSATION.
Finding no error, we affirm.
FACTS
¶2. In 1979, the Schermer family obtained a rectangular parcel of land in Harrison County which fronts 220 feet along Old Highway 49 and extended west 2,492 feet. In 1986, Sheila Schermer Casey conveyed a portion of the property to Floyd Smith. The property conveyed to Smith contained all of the .frontage on Old Highway 49 and extended west approximately 460 feet. Casey retained the rest of the property at this point which was now landlocked and extended approximately 2,023 feet west of the property conveyed to Smith.
¶ 3. In 1996, Floyd Smith conveyed his portion of the property to the appellants, William and Roberta Vinoski. At the time of trial, the Vinoskis had a house and pool approximately centered on their property, and a barn slightly farther back on the south side behind the house. In 1999, Casey conveyed the property that she had retained to the appellees, C.M. Plummer, Ronnie Plummer, and C.M. Plummer, III. The Plummers are builders and developers and purchased the land knowing that it was landlocked but hoped to develop it at a later date. The surrounding land is owned by James Bond.
¶ 4. On December 21, 1999, the Plum-mers filed a complaint to obtain an easement by necessity across the Vinoskis' property, requesting damages, costs of suit, and other relief that the court might deem proper. The Vinoskis responded, stating that the Plummers had a plain and adequate remedy at law, had a more direct and reasonable access to the property, that the taking of the easement by necessity without compensation would violate the Mississippi and United States Constitutions, and the Plummers knew that the property was landlocked when they purchased it. The Vinoskis were allowed to add the City of Gulfport as a necessary party due to a utility easement which the city had that ran across the Plummers' property.
¶ 5. The trial court dismissed the City of Gulfport after the city's attorney informed the court that the city only, retained a water and sewer easement and in its opinion did not have the authority to grant a roadway-type easement to the Plummers. According to the city, it would not object to the Plummers' use of the easement as long as it did not affect its ability to maintain or install water or sewer lines, but that the actual landowner should be brought in to determine the landowner's rights in the matter. The city did not know who the landowner was, but indicated that it had initially received its utility easement from Orange Grove Utilities.
¶ 6. At trial, C.M. Plummer testified that the most direct and shortest route for access to his property would be across the Vinoski property, less than 500 feet to Old Highway 49. Plummer testified that he only wanted a temporary easement thirty feet wide in order to provide access to his property, but that he would not build a road. Although he wanted to develop the property, he understood that it would need a fifty foot right-of-way for development and that he would obtain that at a later date from another source as other property surrounding his was developed into subdivisions, which he estimated would take place in four to five years. Plummer testified that the distance from his property to the paved road over the city easement was 1,000 feet and that it was very muddy and he bogged up to his ankles when he tried to walk it. The Bond property is wooded and rough terrain and Plummer testified it would cost approximately $75,000 to $95,000 to gain access across it, and that it would be a greater distance than the access granted across the Vinoski property. Plummer also testified that a prior logging road which he referred to as more of a "trail" on the Bond property did not contact his property.
¶ 7. Roberta Vinoski testified that her property contained a series of large mature trees along the south property line, and that her gas meter and water well were within forty feet of the property line and her barn was forty feet from the line as well. Her home is forty seven feet from the northern property line. Vinoski testified that she is a real estate agent and that a thirty foot easement would destroy her privacy and diminish the value of her property by approximately forty to fifty thousand dollars as well as make the property hard to sell. Finally, a thirty foot easement would reduce her frontage on Old Highway 49 from approximately 230 feet to 200 feet. Vinoski testified that she did not want an easement across her property and that she felt there were other reasonable access routes to Plummer's property, including the logging road on Bond's property, the city water and sewer easement, and other access routes across the Bond property.
¶ 8. The chancellor inspected the property and ruled the Plummers were entitled to an easement which would begin at Old Highway 49 along the south side of the Vinoskis' property. The chancellor did not grant the thirty foot easement sought by the Plummers, however, instead he granted only a twelve foot easement that weaves closely beside the shrubbery, avoiding trees, and goes between the barn and the shrubbéry to the back of the Vinoski property. Since the easement goes through a fence put up by the Vinoskis, the Chancellor ruled the Plummers may install a gate consistent with the style and quality of the Vinoskis' fence.' The Plummers were not given the option of removing trees except at the southwest corner where it meets their property. No damages were granted and the easement was deeiped temporary and was to terminate at such time as any other road access became available.
¶ 9. The Plummers filed a motion to alter or amend the judgment requesting that the easement by necessity be increased from'twelve to twenty feet wide. The original chancellor retired shortly after the filing, and a new ehancéllor heard the motion. The new chancellor also went to the property,'and in denying the Plum-mers' motion stated that in his opinion the easement should have only been granted as a measure of last resort after requiring the Plummers to actively seek other potential avenues. The new chancellor felt that the easement would reduce the value of the Vinoskis' property substantially and agreed 'with the Vinoskis that an easement wider than twelve feet would require destruction of several large, mature trees that would damage the property even further. The Vinoskis then perfected an appeal to this Court
ANALYSIS
I. DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN GRANTING THE EASEMENT BECAUSE THE PLUMMERS HAD AN ADEQUATE REMEDY AT LAW FOR ESTABLISHING A PRIVATE RIGHT-OF-WAY PURSUANT TO MISS. CODE ANN. SECTION 65-7-201, ET SEQ.?
¶ 10. The Vinoskis assert the Plummers had an adequate remedy at law for' establishing a private right-of-way pursuant to Mississippi Code Annotated Section 65-7-201. Although amended in 2003 to provide that county courts should hear such petitions, at the inception of the litigation at bar, Section 65-7-201 provided a statutory right to anyone whose property was landlocked and who desired a private road laid out through the land of another for purposes of ingress and egress. A landowner accomplished his intentions by filing a petition with the county board of supervisors in the county where the land was located. The Vinoskis assert that the Plummers could have petitioned the board and the board could have granted an easement through the uninhabited land of the Bond property to the north or over the utility easement owned by the City of Gulf-port.
¶ 11. As in the case of Broadhead v. Terpening, 611 So.2d 949 (Miss.1992), the Vinoskis are correct in their underlying premise that where a complete and adequate remedy exists at law for a plaintiffs claim, the chancery courts should not intervene to award equitable relief. Id. at 954 (citing Moore v. Sanders, 558 So.2d 1383, 1385 (Miss.1990); Partee v. Kortrecht, 54 Miss. 66, 72 (1876)). However, as stated in Broadhead and subsequent case law, Section 65-7-201 does not pro vide a complete and adequate alternative remedy to the recognition and enforcement of the Plummers' easement by way of necessity. Broadhead, 611 So.2d at 954-55; Cox v. Trustmark Nat. Bank, 733 So.2d 353, 356-57 (¶ 13-15) (Miss.Ct.App. 1999).
¶ 12. The Vinoskis point out that Broadhead was a 4-4 decision affirming the trial court's acceptance of easement by necessity. However, as pointed out by this Court in Cox, there was no such division when the doctrine was later approved in Rowell v. Turnage, 618 So.2d 81, 85 (Miss.1993). Cox, 733 So.2d at 357(¶ 14). As we held in Cox, "[t]he fact that an alternative exists for a person who is landlocked but is not entitled to an easement by necessity in no way eliminates the value of the doctrine.... " Id. at (¶ 15). It is undisputed that both the Vinoskis and Plummers received their land from what was originally a common source as required by the common law doctrine. Taylor v. Hays, 551 So.2d 906, 908 (Miss.1989) (citing Pleas v. Thomas, 75 Miss. 495, 22 So. 820 (1897)). This issue is without merit.
II. DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN GRANTING THE EASEMENT BECAUSE THE PLUMMERS HAD A MORE DIRECT AND REASONABLE ACCESS TO THEIR PROPERTY?
¶ 13. The Vinoskis assert that the Plummers had a more direct and reasonable access to their property than across the Vinoskis' land, specifically across the City of Gulfport's utility easement, a logging road on the Bond property, or across the wooded Bond property immediately to the north of the Vinoskis' property. The chancellor found the route across the Vi-noskis' property to be the shortest and most reasonable. The evidence before the chancellor showed the Vinoskis' property to be the shortest route to a paved road. The City of Gulfport, through its attorney, informed the court that it only retained a utility easement and could not grant the Plummers an easement to be used for ingress and egress. The city's rights pertained only to the maintenance and installation of water and sewer lines. The logging road was described as more of a "trail" by Mr. Plummer , and he testified that it did not come anywhere near his property. The Bond property immediately to the north was found to be rugged and would cost substantially more to create an access way there)
¶ 14. This Court has a limited standard of review in examining and considering the decisions of a chancellor. McNeil v. Hester, 753 So.2d 1057, 1063(¶ 21) (Miss.2000). "The chancellor, as the trier of fact, evaluates the sufficiency of the proof based on the credibility of witnesses and the weight of their testimony." Fisher v. Fisher, 771 So.2d 364, 367(¶ 8) (Miss.2000) (citing Richard v. Richard, 711 So.2d 884, 888(¶ 13) (Miss. 1998)). A chancellor's findings will not be disturbed upon reviev by this Court unless the .chancellor was manifestly wrong, clearly erroneous, or applied the wrong legal standard. Bank of Miss. v. Hollings-worth, 609 So.2d. 422, 424 (Miss.1992). "The standard of review employed by this Court for review of a chancellor's decision is abuse of discretion." McNeil, 753 So.2d at 1063(¶ 21). This issue is without merit.
III. . DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN GRANTING THE EASEMENT BE- CAUSE AN EASEMENT OF .ANY KIND ACROSS THE VINOSKIS' PROPERTY WOULD SEVERELY DAMAGE THE PROPERTY, WOULD ENCROACH ON, THE HOME OR OUTBUILDINGS, , WOULD DISRUPT THE VINOSK-IS' PRIVACY, AND WOULD PRE VENT THE VINOSKIS FROM THE PEACEFUL AND QUIET USE AND ENJOYMENT OF THEIR PROPERTY?
¶ 15. The Vinoskis assert that the trial court erred in granting the easement because an easement of any kind across their property would severely damage the property, would encroach on the home or outbuildings, would disrupt the Vinoskis' privacy, and would prevent the Vinoskis from the peaceful and quiet use and enjoyment of their property.
¶ 16. "It is well established that a way [of] necessity should be located so as to be the least onerous to the owner of the servient éstate while, at the same time, being a reasonable convenience to the owner of the dominant estate." Taylor, 551 So.2d at 909 (citing Stair v. Miller, 52 Md.App. 108, 447 A. 2nd 109, 111 (1982)). The chancellor granted an easement only twelve feet wide that followed the southern property line of the Vinoskis' property and wound along beside the shrubs and between the trees. After having determined that an easement through the Vinoskis' property was the most direct and reasonable route, the chancellor attempted to make the route less "onerous" in its layout. The Vinoskis fail to demonstrate that the chancellor's findings are an abuse of discretion or are manifestly wrong. This issue is without merit.
IV. DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN GRANTING THE EASEMENT BECAUSE IT WAS A TAKING OF THE VINOSKIS' PROPERTY WITHOUT JUST COMPENSATION, ALL OF WHICH IS GUARANTEED BY THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI, AND THE UNÍTED STATES CONSTITUTION TO THE EXTENT THAT A PERSON'S PROPERTY MAY NOT BE TAKEN WITHOUT JUST COMPENSATION?
¶ 17. The Vinoskis assert that the doctrine of easement by necessity is antiquated and provides for an illegal taking of property contrary to the Mississippi and United States Constitutions. The Vinoskis point to the case of Broadhead v. Terpen-ing, cited above, as being a split decision that came very close to abandoning or modifying the common law rule in this jurisdiction. In support of their argument, the Vinoskis cite heavily to the dissent in Broadhead. As pointed out above, however, the Mississippi Supreme Court later referred to the doctrine with approval in Rowell v. Tumage, 618 So.2d at 81, 85 (Miss.1993). This Court stated in Cox that "[w]e find the easement by necessity principle to be alive and well." Cox, .733 So.2d at 357(¶ 15). This issue is without merit.
¶ 18. THE JUDGMENT OF THE CHANCERY COURT OF HARRISON COUNTY IS AFFIRMED. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO THE APPELLANTS.
KING, C.J., BRIDGES, P.J., IRVING, MYERS AND GRIFFIS, JJ., CONCUR.
SOUTHWICK, P.J., DISSENTS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION JOINED BY LEE AND CHANDLER, JJ.