Case Name: ROGOWSKI v. BRILL (two cases)
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1913-02-07
Citations: 139 N.Y.S. 1123
Docket Number: 
Parties: ROGOWSKI v. BRILL (two cases).
Judges: 
Reporter: West's New York Supplement
Volume: 139
Pages: 1123–1123

Head Matter:
ROGOWSKI v. BRILL (two cases).
(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department.
February 7, 1913.)
Appeal from Appellate Term. Action by Henri Rogowski against Max Brill. From a determination of the Appellate Term (132 N. Y. Supp. 1144) reversing judgments of the Municipal Court in actions on promissory notes, plaintiff appeals. Reversed. See, also, 153 App. Div. 894, 137 N. Y. Supp. 1140. Swan & Moore, of New York City (Joseph R. Swan, of New York City, of counsel), for appellant. S. Charles Sugarman, of New_ York City (M. Spencer Bevins, of New York City, of counsel), for respondent.

Opinion:
PER CURIAM.
These are two appeals, argued together, from determinations of the Appellate Term reversing judgments of the Municipal Court in actions on promissory notes brought by the payee against the indorser. The cases have twice been appealed to the Appellate Term and twice reversed, and have been tried by three different Municipal Court, judges, who have every time decided in favor of the plaintiff. The defense is that the defendant was an accommodation indorser for the benefit of the plaintiff. The trial court found that he was an indorser for the benefit of the maker. Plaintiff is a printer. The maker of the note was the president of a company which published a newspaper. A careful examination of the facts presented by the record has convinced us that these notes were given for a good consideration, and that the indorsement was obtained in the interests of the publishers to procure its printing by the plaintiff, the printer, and therefore that the judgment of the trial court was right, and the conclusion reached by the Appellate Term erroneous. It follows, therefore, that the determination, appealed from should be. reversed and the judgments of the Municipal Court reinstated, with costs to the appellant in all courts.