Case Name: Julie CONNELL, Century 21-R. Winston Connell, Realtor, Appellants, v. Bobby FLOYD, Big Bend Timber Services, Inc., Jerry Walton and Richard Connell, Appellees
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 2004-01-08
Citations: 866 So. 2d 90
Docket Number: No. 1D02-4510
Parties: Julie CONNELL, Century 21—R. Winston Connell, Realtor, Appellants, v. Bobby FLOYD, Big Bend Timber Services, Inc., Jerry Walton and Richard Connell, Appellees.
Judges: ALLEN, J., concurs; BENTON, J., dissents with opinion.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 866
Pages: 90–94

Head Matter:
Julie CONNELL, Century 21—R. Winston Connell, Realtor, Appellants, v. Bobby FLOYD, Big Bend Timber Services, Inc., Jerry Walton and Richard Connell, Appellees.
No. 1D02-4510.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
Jan. 8, 2004.
Rehearing Denied Feb. 20, 2004.
John R. Beranek of Ausley & McMullen, Tallahassee; and Charles J.F. Schreiber, Jr., and Paul M. Harden of Bateman Harden, P.A., Tallahassee, for Appellants.
J. Steven Carter and Laura Beth Fara-gasso of Henry, Buchanan, Hudson, Súber & Carter, P.A., Tallahassee, for Appellees.

Opinion:
DAVIS, J.
In this appeal from the trial court's denial of the appellants' motion to tax attorneys' fees and costs pursuant to section 768.79, Florida Statutes (2002), and Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.442, we review de novo the appellants' assertion that they were entitled to fees based on the appellants' extension of a $1.00 proposal for settlement to Appellee-Floyd (hereinafter, "appellee"), the appellee's rejection thereof, and the fact that the appellants ultimately prevailed. We affirm the trial court's order denying an award of attorneys' fees to the appellants.
The appellants are correct that, had their proposal for settlement been valid, they would have been entitled to an award of fees under section 768.79 and Rule 1.442. The appellants' proposal for settlement, however, was not legally sufficient to be valid because it contained a non-monetary condition that was not stated with the particularity required by Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.442(c)(2)(C) & (D). Thus, the appellee's rejection of the proposal did not vest the appellants with an entitlement to fees.
Below, the appellee named the appellants as joint defendants in a lawsuit, and the appellants responded by filing multiple compulsory counterclaims against the ap-pellee — counterclaims that arose from the exact same set of facts and circumstances which spawned the appellee's claim against the appellants. The appellants proposed to give the appellee $1.00 to settle his claims against them, but, as a condition of that settlement, the appellants required the appellee's stipulation to a final judgment that would have made a specific finding that the appellants prevailed in defense of the appellee's claims against them.
After succeeding at trial, the appellants sought attorneys' fees pursuant to section 768.79 and Rule 1.442. Having carefully considered the matter based on his knowledge of the entire record and the totality of the circumstances, the trial judge denied the appellants' motion for attorneys' fees and costs and found specifically that the potential impact on the remaining counterclaims of the final judgment condition was contrary to the appellants' claimed desire to settle the appellee's claims against them. Because the potential ramifications of the proposed final judgment condition did not simply place the appellee in the position of having to make a hard choice, but rather, rendered him unable to evaluate what his choices were, we agree with the trial court that the proposal was invalid.
Rules 1.442(c)(2)(C) and (D) require all non-monetary terms of an offer to be stated with particularity. See Zalis v. M.E.J. Rick Corp., 797 So.2d 1289 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001); Gulf Coast Transp., Inc. v. Padron, 782 So.2d 464 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001). This requirement of particularity is fundamental to the purpose underlying the statute and rule because a proposal for settlement is intended to end judicial labor, not create more. See Lucas v. Calhoun, 813 So.2d 971 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002); Jamieson v. Kurland, 819 So.2d 267 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002). For this reason, a proposal for settlement should be as specific as possible, leaving no ambiguities, so that the recipient can fully evaluate its terms and conditions. Id. at 973 (citing United Servs. Auto. Ass'n v. Behar, 752 So.2d 663, 665 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000)). Further, the rule and statute must be strictly construed because they are in derogation of the common law. Willis Shaw Express, Inc. v. Hilyer Sod Inc., 849 So.2d 276, 279 (Fla.2003).
Applying strict construction, we conclude that the non-monetary condition proffered by the appellants was not stated with sufficient particularity to have allowed the appellee to fully evaluate its terms or the impact thereof. Contrary to the appellants' assertion, this non-monetary condition was not intended to just settle the appellee's claims against the appellants. Although the appellants assert that they sought to bring an early end to a portion of the litigation, a goal which is acceptable under the statute and the rule, the appellants concede that a final judgment containing a finding that the appellants prevailed on the facts of this case might have been admissible in the litigation of the remaining counterclaims and most likely would have eviscerated the ap-pellee's defense(s) thereto. Moreover, the counterclaims were still being vigorously pursued by the appellants and the appellants could have and, in fact, did amend those counterclaims to seek more damages. Had the appellee acquiesced to the appellants' , requirement, the appellee would have been bound by whatever impact the final judgment might have had on the counterclaims, regardless of subsequent amendments thereto.
While a proposal for settlement may settle only a portion of a lawsuit, a valid proposal for settlement must at least settle that portion with certainty. Because the non-monetary condition was not susceptible to meaningful evaluation by the appellee, it was not stated with sufficient particularity to have rendered the proposal valid. See Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.442(c)(2)(C) & (D); see also Hales v. Advanced Systems, Design, Inc., 855 So.2d 1232 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003)(finding insufficiently particular a proposal's requirement that an of-feree execute a general release of all future claims because the offeree could not evaluate whether the offer was sufficient to cover any future claims).
Accordingly, this proposal for settlement was not valid and the trial court's order is affirmed.
ALLEN, J., concurs; BENTON, J., dissents with opinion.