Case Name: Adrian TRAVIS a/k/a Adrien Travis, Appellant v. STATE of Mississippi, Appellee
Court: Mississippi Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Mississippi
Decision Date: 2007-05-15
Citations: 972 So. 2d 674
Docket Number: No. 2004-KA-00097-COA
Parties: Adrian TRAVIS a/k/a Adrien Travis, Appellant v. STATE of Mississippi, Appellee.
Judges: MYERS, P.J., GRIFFIS, BARNES, ISHEE AND CARLTON, JJ., CONCUR. KING, C.J., DISSENTS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION, JOINED BY LEE, P.J., IRVING AND CHANDLER, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 972
Pages: 674–694

Head Matter:
Adrian TRAVIS a/k/a Adrien Travis, Appellant v. STATE of Mississippi, Appellee.
No. 2004-KA-00097-COA.
Court of Appeals of Mississippi.
May 15, 2007.
Rehearing Denied Oct. 2, 2007.
Julie Ann Epps, Michael V. Ward, Canton, attorneys for appellant.
Office of the Attorney General by Deirdre McCrory, attorney for appellee.

Opinion:
ROBERTS, J.,
for the Court.
SUMMARY OF THE CASE
¶ 1. On September 15, 2003, a jury sitting before the Madison County Circuit Court found Adrian Travis guilty of DUI homicide, in violation of Sections 63 — 11— 30(l)(c) and 63-11-30(5) of the Mississippi Code Annotated (Rev.2004). On October 17, 2003, the circuit court sentenced Travis to a twenty-five year sentence with fifteen years suspended and ten years to serve. The circuit court also sentenced Travis to five years of supervised probation. Following unsuccessful motions for JNOV or, alternatively, for a new trial, Travis appeals. Travis raises three issues, listed verbatim:
I. TRAVIS'S CONVICTION MUST BE REVERSED BECAUSE THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT AS A MATTER OF LAW TO SHOW THAT HE IS GUILTY.
II. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN ADMITTING TESTIMONY FROM OFFICER HENDERSON THAT BASED ON HIS INVESTIGATION HE BELIEVED TRAVIS HAD BEEN DRIVING THE CAR.
III. THE PROSECUTION'S ARGUMENT AND ATTEMPTS TO INTRODUCE INADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE OF TRAVIS'S SILENCE VIOLATED TRAVIS'S DUE PROCESS RIGHTS AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION AND TO A FAIR TRIAL UNDER THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS.
Finding no error, we affirm.
FACTS
¶ 2. The events that led to Travis's appeal originated from a fatal traffic accident that occurred during the late night of February 6, 1999, or the early morning hours of February 7, 1999. At any rate, at approximately 2:05 a.m., on February 7, 1999, Sergeant George Henderson of the Mississippi Highway Patrol received a call regarding an automobile accident at the intersection of Highway 51 and Davis Road just north of Canton in Madison County, Mississippi. Sergeant Henderson responded and arrived at the scene of the accident at 2:20 a.m. and found a two-vehicle accident. Sergeant Henderson was not the first responder at the scene, as a number of emergency responders were already there when he arrived.
¶ 3. Sergeant Henderson found a man lying in the intersection. Another man stood near the intersection. Sergeant Henderson discovered that the man lying in the intersection had no pulse. The de ceased was later identified as Milton Garrett. The man near the intersection was Adrian Travis. Sergeant Henderson found Travis confused and disoriented.
¶ 4. Travis told Sergeant Henderson that "he couldn't remember" what happened. According to Travis, he "was going to his girlfriend's house" and he could not remember from where he was coming. That is, Travis could not remember where he had been earlier that evening. Sergeant Henderson was concerned that Travis had suffered some form of head trauma, but Travis had no scratches, cuts, or bruises. Sergeant Henderson placed Travis in the back seat of his patrol car, but he did not handcuff Travis. However, in the process, Sergeant Henderson smelled alcohol on Travis.
¶ 5. Sergeant Henderson completed his investigation while Travis remained in his patrol car. Sergeant Henderson found no eyewitnesses to the collision. Later, Sergeant Henderson drove Travis to the station, informed Travis of his Miranda rights, and conducted an Intoxilyzer test on Travis. According to the Intoxilyzer report, Travis had a blood alcohol content of .14%, while the legal limit is .08%.
¶ 6. Sergeant Henderson's subsequent investigation revealed that Milton Garrett owned one car and that the other car was registered to a man named Eddie Winston. Neither car was registered to Travis. Sergeant Henderson did not contact Eddie Winston to determine just how his vehicle ended up involved in the collision.
¶ 7. Dr. Steven Hayne, a forensic pathologist, conducted an autopsy on Garrett. Dr. Hayne concluded that Garrett died as a result of the automobile accident. Dr. Hayne also found that the cause of Garrett's death was damage to his heart, lungs, liver, and spleen.
¶ 8. Sergeant Cecilia Kazery, an accident reconstructionist with the Mississippi Highway Patrol, determined that as Garrett proceeded north in the right lane of Highway 51, the second car ran the stop sign and "t-boned" the side of Garrett's vehicle. Sergeant Kazery did not determine the rate of speed at which the cars were traveling at the time of the collision. Sergeant Kazery did not determine the speeds of the cars for two reasons. For one, when the cars were removed from the scene of the accident, the tow truck had to manipulate Garrett's vehicle. In the process, the tow truck operator made it impossible for her to conduct the necessary tests based on the impact to the car. Second, after the collision, the cars came to rest against an embankment. That embankment stopped the progress of the cars. Accordingly, Sergeant Kazery could estimate as to a range of speed, but she could not determine a precise or accurate rate of speed.
¶ 9. However, Sergeant Kazery was able to conclude that, despite having a blood alcohol content of .18%, Garrett was traveling in the proper lane of traffic at the time of the collision. Sergeant Kazery could not conclude whether Garrett used his headlights or whether he obeyed the speed limit.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶ 10. On April 28, 1999, the Madison grand jury returned an indictment against Travis and charged him with DUI homicide, in violation of Sections 63-ll-30(l)(c) and 63-11-30(5) of the Mississippi Code Annotated. Travis pled "not guilty." Accordingly, the matter proceeded to trial.
¶ 11. Travis went to trial before the circuit court on September 11, 2003. The prosecution called Sergeant Henderson and Sergeant Kazery as witnesses. Additionally, the parties stipulated to the con- elusions in Dr. Hayne's autopsy of Garrett. At that point, the prosecution concluded its case-in-chief.
¶ 12. Subsequently, Travis's attorney made an ore tenus motion for a directed verdict. Travis then rested without calling any witnesses. The jury deliberated and found Travis guilty. On October 17, 2003, the circuit court sentenced Travis. Following unsuccessful motions for JNOV or for a new trial, Travis appeals.
ANALYSIS
I. TRAVIS'S CONVICTION MUST BE REVERSED BECAUSE THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT AS A MATTER OF LAW TO SHOW THAT HE IS GUILTY.
¶ 13. Travis claims the circuit court erred when it overruled his motion for JNOV. Travis claims we should reverse because there was insufficient evidence to find that he actually drove the vehicle registered to Eddie Winston.
¶ 14. A motion for JNOV challenges the legal sufficiency of the evidence. Griffin v. State, 883 So.2d 1201(¶ 6) (Miss.Ct.App.2004). We will only reverse if the evidence of one or more of the elements of the charged offense is such that, considered in the light most favorable to the prosecution, reasonable and fair-minded jurors could only find the accused not guilty. Id. In testing the sufficiency of the evidence to substantiate a verdict, we are required to accept as true all the evidence favorable to the verdict as well as all reasonable inferences favorable to the verdict. E.g., Smith v. State, 907 So.2d 292(¶ 33) (Miss.2005). Based on our standard of review, we must find that reasonable and fair-minded jurors exercising sound judgment could have logically concluded that Travis was guilty.
¶ 15. The jury found Travis guilty of "operating a motor vehicle negligently while legally intoxicated" in violation of Mississippi Code Annotated § 63 — 11— 30(l)(c) and (5) (Rev.2004). "[T]o be guilty of driving or operating a motor vehicle . with an illegally high blood alcohol content, the person must be shown by direct proof or reasonable inferences to have driven the vehicle while in that condition." Lewis v. State, 831 So.2d 553(¶18) (Miss.Ct.App.2002).
¶ 16. "A person may be arrested, tried, and convicted of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicating liquor even if there is no eyewitness presented who viewed the defendant operating the vehicle, provided there is sufficient evidence." Holloway v. State, 860 So.2d 1244(¶ 12) (Miss.Ct.App.2003). "Reasonable doubt need not be removed about whether the defendant had actually driven the vehicle prior to his discovery." Id. With due respect for the opinion of my colleagues, as expressed in the dissent, based on our careful review of the record, the prosecution sufficiently demonstrated, by reasonable inferences, that Travis drove the car registered to Eddie Winston.
¶ 17. The time and location of the collision allowed the jury to form a reasonable inference that Travis drove the car that hit Garrett. The collision occurred at approximately 2:00 a.m., at the intersection of Highway 51 and Davis Crossing, three to four miles north of Canton, Mississippi in Madison County. Pictures introduced into evidence show that Highway 51 and Davis Crossing are both two lane roads and are not in highly developed areas. The area can accurately be described as rural. There were no sidewalks and there was nothing to indicate the presence of pedestrian traffic. The jury could have found it unlikely that Travis would have been walking in that area at that time of the morn ing. Accordingly, the jury could have reasonably inferred that Travis was at the scene of the collision because he drove one of the two cars involved in the collision.
¶ 18. Other pictures introduced into evidence showed the vehicles involved in the collision. Based on the condition of the two vehicles, the collision could fairly be described as severe. The jury could have found that a participant in that collision would not have been able to leave the scene of the accident. Thus, the jury could have inferred that Travis's presence at the scene indicated that he was involved in the collision in some manner.
¶ 19. Further, there were two cars involved. Both were located off the highway in a nearby ditch. Garrett, the victim, was the registered owner of one of the two cars. There was only one other car involved. There was only one other person at the scene who was not an emergency responder or a law enforcement officer. The jury could reasonably conclude that Travis was driving the only car that was not registered to the only other person at the scene. When Sergeant Henderson arrived at the scene of the accident shortly after he was dispatched, he found emergency responders, one deputy, and two civilians. One of those civilians was Garrett, the victim. Garrett was lying dead in the middle of Highway 51 when Sergeant Henderson arrived. Travis was the only living person present who was not an emergency responder. The jury could have found that Travis's proximity and his status as the sole non-emergency personnel present indicated his involvement in the collision.
¶ 20. Sergeant Henderson testified that, when he arrived at the scene, emergency personnel were tending to Travis. The jury could have reasonably inferred that, by needing some degree of medical assistance, Travis had been involved in that accident. What is more, Sergeant Henderson opined that he thought Travis had some form of head trauma. The picture of the vehicle that struck Garrett shows a large "spiderweb" section of the windshield in front of the driver's seat. A reasonable juror could have concluded that the driver of that car hit the windshield with his head. By the same logic, a reasonable juror could have concluded that Sergeant Henderson's testimony regarding the possibility that Travis suffered from head trauma was corroborated by the presence of the broken windshield. Additionally, Sergeant Henderson testified that Travis was in a "dazed," "lost," or "confused" mental state. The jury could have inferred that Travis was in that mental state as a result of his being involved in the collision and having struck his head on the windshield.
¶ 21. According to Sergeant Henderson, Travis stated that he was in transition between some unknown point and his girlfriend's house. Specifically, Travis told Sergeant Henderson that "he was on his way to his girlfriend's house." Travis did not indicate that he was on foot or that he left from some place nearby or that he was on his way to some place nearby. The jury certainly could have concluded that Travis was not on foot at that time of the morning in a remote area.
¶ 22. Statements by Travis to Sergeant Henderson supported the jury's decision. Travis told Sergeant Henderson that he could not "remember" how the collision happened. Travis did not state that he did not know how the collision occurred. The jury could have concluded that Travis was involved in the accident. That is, there is a difference between happening upon an accident that had already occurred and being unaware of how it occurred, versus being involved in a collision and not remembering how the collision occurred.
¶ 23. Sergeant Henderson tested Travis to see if Travis had been driving under the influence. On redirect, Sergeant Henderson testified that Travis never said he was not driving or that someone else was driving. Travis never told Sergeant Henderson that he was on foot. Travis also never mentioned anyone else who could have possibly been driving. While this does not demonstrate that Travis had been driving, it is certainly evidence that Sergeant Henderson was of the opinion that Travis had been driving.
¶ 24. Sergeant Henderson was absolutely of the opinion that Travis drove the car that struck Garrett. He testified that Travis drove the car that was not registered to Garrett. Additionally, the prosecutor asked Sergeant Henderson whether Travis indicated which car he had been driving. Sergeant Henderson testified that "[i]t seems like [Travis] did." A rational juror could conclude that Travis had been driving one of the two cars. "It [is] within the jury's province to draw reasonable inferences from the evidence based on their experience and common sense." Broomfield v. State, 878 So.2d 207(¶ 30) (Miss.Ct.App.2004). On cross-examination, Travis's attorney asked Sergeant Henderson what caused him to conclude that Travis drove the other car. Sergeant Henderson testified that he concluded that Travis was driving based on Travis's presence, the presence of emergency responders, and "common sense." The Mississippi Rules of Evidence permit Sergeant Henderson's opinion and inference testimony because his testimony was "(a) rationally based on the perception of the witness, (b) helpful to the clear understanding of testimony or the determination of a fact in issue, and (c) not based on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge within the scope of Rule 702." M.R.E. 701; Christian v. State, 859 So.2d 1068(¶ 7) (Miss.Ct.App.2003).
¶ 25. While reviewing challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence, we must consider the evidence in the light most consistent with the verdict. Jordan v. State, 936 So.2d 368(¶24) (Miss.Ct.App.2005). In the context of an appeal of a criminal conviction, we give the State the benefit of all favorable inferences that may reasonably be drawn from the evidence. Id. If we conclude that reasonable jurors could not have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Travis was guilty, then we must reverse Travis's conviction. Id. Otherwise, we must affirm. Id.
¶ 26. The circuit court instructed the jury that it was "permitted to draw such reasonable inferences from the evidence as seem justified in the light of [their] own experience." The jury heard ample evidence to form a reasonable and permissible inference that Travis was guilty. While there was no eyewitness testimony that Travis, in fact, drove the car that hit Garrett, there was sufficient circumstantial evidence to convict Travis. "Our system of justice allows the jury to make logical and reasonable inferences and presumptions." Broomfield, 878 So.2d at 215(¶ 31). As was his constitutional right, Travis did not testify nor did he call a single witness in defense of the charge laid in the indictment. Based on the totality of the circumstances detailed at trial, a juror would have had to rely on speculation and conjecture to arrive at the conclusion that Travis was not the driver of the car that hit Garrett. "We will affirm if any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt and excluding every reasonable hypothesis consistent with innocence." Dunaway v. State, 919 So.2d 67(¶ 9) (Miss.Ct.App.2005) (internal quotations omitted). "Moreover, a mere fanciful or farfetched or unreasonable hypothesis of innocence is not sufficient to require an acquittal." Id. (internal quotations omitted). The jury could only have found Travis not guilty by just such a fanciful, farfetched or unreasonable hypothesis of innocence. Accordingly, we affirm.
II. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN ADMITTING TESTIMONY FROM OFFICER HENDERSON THAT BASED ON HIS INVESTIGATION HE BELIEVED TRAVIS HAD BEEN DRIVING THE CAR.
¶27. In his second issue, Travis suggests that the circuit court erred when it allowed Sergeant Henderson to testify as to his opinion that Travis drove the car registered to Winston. We review a circuit court's decision to admit evidence pursuant to our familiar abuse of discretion standard. Burton v. State, 875 So.2d 1120(¶ 6) (Miss.Ct.App.2004). We will find an abuse of discretion where a defendant shows clear prejudice resulting from an undue lack of constraint on the prosecution or undue constraint on the defense. Id. We will not disturb the circuit court's decision unless it is clearly wrong. Id.
¶28. During direct examination, the prosecution asked Sergeant Henderson whether he determined who had been driving the two cars. Sergeant Henderson testified that Garrett drove one car. Sergeant Henderson also testified that Travis drove the car registered to Winston. The prosecution attempted to ask Sergeant Henderson, "where did you get that information, sir?" At that point, counsel for Travis objected on the basis of hearsay. The circuit court sustained Travis's objection. Still, Sergeant Henderson testified, without objection, that Travis drove the car registered to Winston.
¶29. Later during direct examination, Sergeant Henderson testified that Travis never denied driving the car registered to Winston. However, Travis objected and the circuit court sustained Travis's objection. During cross-examination, Sergeant Henderson testified that he did not see Travis operate a vehicle at the time of the collision. Similarly, Sergeant Henderson testified that no witnesses told him that they saw Tram operate a vehicle at the time of the collision.
¶ 30. On redirect, the prosecution asked Sergeant Henderson "who is driving the car shown in State's Exhibit 3?" At that point, counsel for Travis objected and argued that the prosecution had failed to lay a foundation for the question. The circuit court conducted a side-bar conference. After counsel presented their respective arguments, the circuit court found:
[Sergeant Henderson] answered yes [on direct examination], when asked was this the car the Defendant was driving, or however the question was phrased. And there was no contemporaneous objection at that time. If there had been, then a foundation would have certainly been required. From a practical standpoint, usually there are no objections made to that type of question. I guess because it's presented that the witness has some basis for knowing or a basis of knowledge. Then, it comes out on cross that nobody told him. He didn't see him. The Defendant didn't tell him. So, I think that before that question is re-asked that there ought to be some further foundation for it. So, sustained, denied, and just, you know, establish a foundation. And you can ask the Defendant to challenge the points made on cross. I think at this point you'd have to establish some sort of further eviden-tiary basis and foundation.
¶ 31. Following the circuit court's ruling, Sergeant Henderson apparently began to again testify that Travis drove Winston's car. The circuit court instructed the prosecution that it would have to establish a foundation. The prosecution then questioned Sergeant Henderson regarding Travis's presence at the scene of the collision, Travis's statement that he "didn't remember" how the accident occurred, Travis's destination, Travis's inability to remember from where he came, the fact that Sergeant Henderson gave Travis an Intoxilyzer test, that Travis never claimed that he was not driving Winston's car, that he informed Travis that he was being charged with DUI, and that, aside from emergency personnel, Travis was the only living person at the scene.
¶ 32. At that point, the prosecution asked Sergeant Henderson, "were you able to conclude who was driving the vehicle depicted in State's Exhibit No. 3?" Counsel for Travis stated, "Same objection, Your Honor." The circuit court overruled Travis's objection and Sergeant Henderson testified that Travis had been driving. Eventually, the prosecution asked Sergeant Henderson again whether he knew who drove the car that collided into Garrett. Again, Sergeant Henderson testified, over objection, that Travis drove that car.
¶ 33. On appeal, Travis argues that the prosecution failed to establish a foundation. Travis also claims that Sergeant Henderson's testimony was not admissible as a lay opinion. The admissibility of lay witness opinion testimony is determined by a two part test under M.R.E. 701 and M.R.E. 602. Pursuant to M.R.E. 602, "[a] witness may not testify to a matter unless evidence is introduced sufficient to support a finding that he has personal knowledge of the matter." As for the admissibility of Sergeant Henderson's opinion and inference testimony, it is admissible if it was "(a) rationally based on the perception of the witness, (b) helpful to the clear understanding of testimony or the determination of a fact in issue, and (c) not based on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge within the scope of Rule 702." M.R.E. 701; Christian v. State, 859 So.2d 1068(¶ 7) (Miss.Ct.App.2003).
¶ 34. It is important to note that, during direct examination, Sergeant Henderson testified that Travis drove Garrett's car. Counsel for Travis did not object or otherwise challenge Sergeant Henderson's initial testimony. Consequently, the procedural bar operates, and this issue is deemed waived. Gary v. State, 796 So.2d 1054(¶ 6) (Miss.Ct.App.2001). Accordingly, even if we found that the circuit court erred when it allowed Sergeant Henderson to testify, on redirect, that Travis drove Winston's car, we could not find that Sergeant Henderson's redirect testimony prejudiced Travis because Sergeant Henderson testified to the same thing, without objection, during his direct testimony.
¶ 35. Further, Sergeant Henderson's testimony was based on his personal knowledge. Sergeant Henderson personally observed numerous facts and circumstances at the scene of the accident. Based on those personal observations, Sergeant Henderson formed his opinion that Travis operated Winston's vehicle. Additionally, the prosecution asked Sergeant Henderson whether Travis indicated which car he had been driving. Sergeant Henderson testified that "[i]t seems like [Travis] did." A rational juror could conclude that Travis had been driving one of the two cars. On cross-examination, Travis's attorney asked Sergeant Henderson what caused him to conclude that Travis drove the other car. Sergeant Henderson testified that he concluded that Travis was driving based on Travis's presence, the presence of emergency responders, and "common sense." All things considered, we cannot find that the circuit court abused its discretion, particularly where the substance of the testimony at issue went before the jury without objection.
III. THE PROSECUTION'S ARGUMENT AND ATTEMPTS TO INTRODUCE INADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE OF TRAVIS'S SILENCE VIOLATED TRAVIS'S DUE PROCESS RIGHTS AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION AND TO A FAIR TRIAL UNDER THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS.
¶ 36. Here, Travis claims the prosecution improperly argued that, at the scene of the accident and during the investigation that followed, Travis's failure to state that he did not drive the car at the scene was evidence that Travis actually did drive the car at the scene. According to Travis, that evidence was inadmissible for two reasons: "(1) there is no evidence that anyone ever accused Travis of the crime under circumstances so that there is in fact no admissible 'admission by silence' " and "(2) evidence of a defendant's silence after Miranda warnings is not admissible." The standard of review announced in issue two, above, applies here. For brevity's sake, we will not repeat it. Suffice it to say, we review under the familiar abuse of discretion standard.
¶ 37. The first time the prosecution asked Sergeant Henderson, "Did [Travis] ever deny driving?" Counsel for Travis objected, the circuit court sustained the objection, and Travis did not request any further relief. Where a circuit court sustains an objection and a party does not ask the circuit court to instruct the jury to disregard the objectionable matter, there is no error. Perry v. State, 637 So.2d 871, 874 (Miss.1994). Said differently, when a defendant received the relief he requested, the defendant has no basis to complain on appeal. Broomfield, 878 So.2d at 221 (¶ 57).
¶ 38. On redirect, the prosecution asked Sergeant Henderson whether Travis ever told him that someone else had been driving. Sergeant Henderson answered, "No sir. He did not." Counsel for Travis did not object. We will not find that a circuit court erred when it declined to grant relief that was not requested. That is, Travis cannot complain about testimony to which he did not object. Roberson v. State, 595 So.2d 1310, 1315 (Miss.1992).
¶ 39. .During closing arguments, the prosecution stated, "[W]hen Sergeant Henderson approaches [Travis], walks up to him to find out how this accident happened, you didn't hear Henderson testify that Travis told him somebody else was driving. You would expect that." Counsel for Travis objected. The circuit court sustained the objection. Counsel for Travis did not request any further relief. As mentioned above, this statement cannot serve as the basis for reversible error, as Travis received the exact relief he requested. Similarly, after Travis's attorney presented his closing argument, the prosecution had an opportunity to rebut. During rebuttal, counsel for Travis objected to a similar argument. Again, the circuit court sustained the objection. Counsel for Travis did not ask the circuit court to admonish the jury to disregard the argument. Likewise, Travis's attorney did not request a'mistrial.' Regardless, the jury instructions directed the jury that it was to "disregard all evidence which was excluded by the Court from consideration during the course of the trial." "[T]he law presumes the jury is competent and follows the instructions they are given." Curry v. State, 939 So.2d 785(¶ 17) (Miss.2006). Because Travis received the relief he requested, and did not object to a separate instance, we cannot find reversible error. As such, we affirm.
¶ 40. THE JUDGMENT OF THE MADISON COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT OF CONVICTION OF DUI HOMICIDE AND SENTENCE OF TWENTY-FIVE YEARS IN THE CUSTODY OF THE MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, WITH FIFTEEN YEARS SUSPENDED, TEN TO SERVE AND FIVE YEARS OF SUPERVISED PROBATION IS AFFIRMED. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO THE APPELLANT.
MYERS, P.J., GRIFFIS, BARNES, ISHEE AND CARLTON, JJ., CONCUR. KING, C.J., DISSENTS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION, JOINED BY LEE, P.J., IRVING AND CHANDLER, JJ.