Case Name: Rachel Glatner, Respondent, v. Caroline Glatner, Appellant
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1912-02-23
Citations: 149 A.D. 89
Docket Number: 
Parties: Rachel Glatner, Respondent, v. Caroline Glatner, Appellant.
Judges: 
Reporter: Appellate Division Reports
Volume: 149
Pages: 89–94

Head Matter:
Rachel Glatner, Respondent, v. Caroline Glatner, Appellant.
First Department,
February 23, 1912.
Will—real property — life estate — charge for support of daughter — liability of devisee — evidence — equity — remedy at law.
Where a testator devised lands to his wife for life, “subject, however, to my said wife giving a home to my daughter Rachel, so long as my said daughter desires to remain at home,” the acceptance of the devise creates a personal liability on the part of the wife either to furnish the daughter a home or to pay to her the reasonable cost of providing a home for herself.
In an action by the daughter against her mother to recover damages for breach of the condition of the devise, evidence of the income derived from the real estate is immaterial.
The'daughter’s remedy for breach of the condition is an action at law, but where she brings a suit in equity and defendant does not question the form of the action on the trial the court on appeal will not reverse the judgment on that ground.
Ingraham, P. J., and Laughlin, J., dissented, with opinions.
Appeal by the defendant, Caroline Glatner, from a judgment of the Supreme Court in favor of the plaintiff, entered in the office of the clerk of the county of New York on the 1st day of July, 1911, upon the decision of the court rendered after a trial at the New York Special Term.
George P. Breckenridge, for the appellant.
Charles Putzel [Eliphalet W. Tyler with him on the brief], for the respondent.

Opinion:
Scott, J.:
In my opinion the defendant by accepting the devise of the real estate became absolutely bound while said real estate remained in her possession to give a home to plaintiff so long as said plaintiff desires to remain at home and this irrespective of the question what income was derived from the real estate. The provisions of the will respecting the plaintiff and the son Harry are very different. Respecting plaintiff the obligation imposed is absolute and unqualified. The devise to defendant is made subject "to my said wife giving a home to my daughter Rachel, so long as my said daughter desires to remain at home." As to the son Harry the similar obligation is qualified in two ways. To him the defendant is to provide a home " as best as she can " and only " if he needs it." Ho such qualification is attached to the condition in favor of plaintiff. ' I, therefore, think that all the evidence as to the income realized from the property was immaterial. As I regard it,.the acceptance of the devise created a personal liability on the part of defendant either to furnish plaintiff a home, or, failing that, to pay the reasonable cost to plaintiff of providing a home for herself by way of damages for the breach of the condition. In this aspect of the case the plantiff's remedy was an action at law or perhaps successive actions for damages, and I should concur with the presiding justice that this action in equity could not be maintained if defendant had persisted in her objections to such an action. She did not, however, persist. It is true that by her answer she denied plaintiff's allegation that she had no adequate remedy at law, but no point was made of this on the trial, no motion made to dismiss the complaint and no application made for a trial by jury. On the contrary, both parties tried the case as if it was properly brought, and even upon this appeal the defendant makes no question as to the form of the action or as to equity's cognizance thereof. Under these circumstances the parties must be held to have consented to try the case as one in equity, and I see no reason why we should reverse the judgment because • it should have been brought on the law side of the court.
The judgment should, therefore, be affirmed, with costs.
Clarke and Miller, JJ., concurred; Ingraham, P. J., and Laughlin, J., dissented.