Case Name: Nancy SMITH, Appellant, v. UNION BLEACHERY/CONE MILLS and Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, Respondents
Court: Supreme Court of South Carolina
Jurisdiction: South Carolina
Decision Date: 1981-06-17
Citations: 276 S.C. 454
Docket Number: 21493
Parties: Nancy SMITH, Appellant, v. UNION BLEACHERY/CONE MILLS and Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, Respondents.
Judges: Littlejohn and Harwell, JJ., concur.
Reporter: South Carolina Reports
Volume: 276
Pages: 454–461

Head Matter:
21493
Nancy SMITH, Appellant, v. UNION BLEACHERY/CONE MILLS and Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, Respondents.
(280 S. E. (2d) 52)
Don R. Moorhead, of Law Offices of John Bolt Culbertson, Greenville, for appellant.
J. Wright Horton, of Horton, Drawdy, Hagins, Ward & Blakely, Greenville, for respondents.
June 17, 1981.

Opinion:
Gregory, Justice:
This appeal arises from the denial of Workmen's Compensation benefits for injuries arising from participation on a company sponsored softball team. We affirm.
The appellant employee injured her left leg while participating in a softball game after working hours.
The single commissioner denied compensation, but the full Industrial Commission, in a 3-2 decision, reversed and awarded the appellant compensation. The circuit judge then reversed the award of the full commission and dismissed the claim.
The question is whether the softball injury arose out of and in the course of appellant's employment within the meaning of Section 42-1-160, Code of Laws of South Carolina (1976).
The burden is on the claimant to prove such facts as will render the injury compensable within the provisions of the State Workmen's Compensation Law. Ellis v. Spartan Mills, et al., 277 S. E. (2d) 304 (1981); Riley v. South Carolina State Ports Authority, 253 S. C. 621, 172 S. E. (2d) 657 (1970).
We have recently recognized that the decisions of the Industrial Commission will be set aside only if unsupported by substantial evidence. Ellis v. Spartan Mills, supra; Lark v. Bi-Lo, Lnc., S. C., 276 S. E. (2d) 304 (1981).
However, where the evidence is not in dispute, the question of whether or not the employee sustained an injury arising out of and in the course of his employment becomes a question of law for the court. Douglas v. Spartan Mills, 245 S. C. 265, 140 S. E. (2d) 173 (1967). This principle remains unchanged by the Administrative Procedures Act, Section 1-23-10 et seq., Code of Laws of South Carolina (Cum. Supp. 1980). Section 1-23-380 [Subsection g] of the Act provides this Court may reverse or modify the decision "if substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions or decisions are . . . [Sub-subsection (4)] affected by other error of law."
Here, the facts are undisputed.
The team was organized when appellant's co-employees on their own initiative approached management of respondent about sponsorship of the women's softball team.
Respondent agreed to permit organization of the team, furnish the uniforms and some equipment and pay the league's entrance fee. Because of his knowledge of recreational programs, respondent's personnel manager agreed to assist the employees in finding a league in which the team could participate. Respondent did not require the team to join a particular league.
The manager first approached the city league, which had no openings for additional teams.
The team ultimately joined a league sponsored by the Greenville County Department of Recreation. The league required that the uniforms contain the name of the employer and that only employees play on the team.
When the team could find no suitable place to. practice, they were permitted to use a field on property owned by respondent. However, the game at which appellant was injured was played at a public park away from respondent's premises.
The players were not required to participate nor were they rewarded for doing so. They provided their own trans-portion to and from practice and the games. The coach, who was selected by the players, received no compensation or benefits for her efforts.
In denying the compensation and dismissing the claim the trial judge applied the principles of Pate v. Plymouth Mfg. Co., 198 S. C. 159, 17 S. E. (2d) 146 (1941). There, the court found an injury to a textile worker, who was returning from a softball game, was not "out of and in the course of employment" and, hence, was not compensable.
The court found participation on the softball team to be recreational activity primarily for the benefit of the employees and unrelated to their jobs.
The facts here, with minor exceptions, are nearly identical to those of Pate. Appellant's efforts to circumvent Pate, which she must for the injury to be compensable, are unpersuasive. Appellant had initially sought permission under Rule 8, Section 10 of the Rules of Practice of this Court to argue against the holding of Pate, but permission was denied.
Here, respondent did allow organizational meetings, on company time. However, the company in Pate conferred a similar benefit by permitting players to use the telephone in the mill office to schedule games.
Respondent here provided a practice field at the request of the employees. In Pate, the company similarly benefited the employees by occasionally allowing them to use a superintendent's automobile for transportation to the games.
Non-employees were allowed to play on the team in Pate. However, in this case, the league rules, not the policy of respondent, prohibited the participation of non-employees.
Finally, in this case, while respondent did allow recruiting posters to be posted on company property, such was done at the request of the employees.
We quote from the order of the trial judge adopted as part of the Pate opinion, ". . . it is impossible for me to see where the corporation had any connection with the ball club, other than from a charitable or benevolent standpoint to promote the social life of its workers," Id., at 163, 17 S. E. (2d) 146.
We agree Pate, which the full commission never addressed in its award, controls. The commission's failure to apply its principles to this significantly similar factual situation is an error of law.
Therefore, we hold the injury was sustained as part of a recreational activity and not out of and in the course of employment. We affirm the order of the trial judge denying compensation and dismissing the claim.
Affirmed.
Littlejohn and Harwell, JJ., concur.
Lewis, C. J., and Ness, J., dissent.