Case Name: EISINGER v. E. J. MURPHY COMPANY
Court: Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia
Jurisdiction: District of Columbia
Decision Date: 1919-03-31
Citations: 48 App. D.C. 476
Docket Number: No. 3168
Parties: EISINGER v. E. J. MURPHY COMPANY.
Judges: 
Reporter: Reports of Cases Adjudged in the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia
Volume: 48
Pages: 476–482

Head Matter:
EISINGER v. E. J. MURPHY COMPANY.
Motion for Directed Verdict; Effect; Agent; Personal Liability; Proof of Authority.
1. A motion for judgment for a directed verdict in an action upon an order to pay money to the plaintiff does not foreclose the right of the defendant, who admitted signing the acceptance of the order, to challenge, on appeal, the judgment on the ground of his non-liability upon the order as matter of law, because his acceptance was on behalf of a principal.
2. One who signs, though without describing himself as an agent, the acceptance of an order to pay money addressed to him as the agent of a named principal, is not personally liable thereon, under see. 1324 of the D. C. Code (31 Stat. at L. 1398, chap. 854), providing that where the instrument contains words indicating that the subscriber signs for or on behalf of a principal, he is not liable on the instrument if he was duly authorized. (Mr. Chief Justice Smyth dissenting.)
3. An agent attaching his personal signature to the acceptance of an order to pay money addressed to him as agent can, without proving Ms authority as agent, claim exemption from personal liability under sec. 1324 of the D. C. Code, which provides that where the instrument contains words indicating agency, the signer will not be liable thereon if he was duly authorized. (Mr. Chief Justice Smyth dissenting.)
No. 3168.
Submitted January 9, 1919.
Decided March 31, 1919.
Hearing on an appeal "from a judgment of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, on verdict, in. an action of debt on a written order.
Reversed.
Tbe Court in tbe opinion stated tbe facts as follows:
Appellant Walter G. Eisinger, defendant below, appealed from tbe judgment rendered against him upon the following order:
Washington, D. C., Feb. 17, 1915.
Mr. W. G. Eisinger, Agent for Harry Lambros and Louis Kanelopoulos:
Kindly pay to the order of E. J. Murphy Company tbe sum of Four Hundred and Seventeen Dollars ($417), covering glass and glazing at No. 600 N. Capitol street and No. 3 “E” street N. W.
James E. Blakeney.
Accepted:
W. G. Eisinger.
Tbe president of tbe E. J. Murphy Company, appellee, testified that it had furnished tbe labor and material called for in tbe order; that it was the owner and bolder of tbe order, and that it had not been paid. Defendant admitted signing tbe acceptance. On this evidence, both parties moved for a directed verdict. Tbe court sustained plaintiff’s motion, and tbe verdict and judgment followed.
Mr. Hayden Johnson, and Mr. T. H. Patterson for the appellant.
Mr. D. W. O’Donoghue and Mr. A. A. Alexander, for the appellee, in their brief cited:
Bank of N. A. v. Hooper, 66 Ana. Dee. 390; Daniel v. Olidden, 38 Wash. 76; De Forest v. United States, 11 App. D. C. 458; Evans v. Shoemaker, 2 App. D: 0. 62; Exchange Nat. Bank y. Tlvird Nat. Bank, 112 U. S. 276; Frankland v. Johnson, 147 111. 520; G-reenl. Ev.; Hypes v. Griffin; 89 111. 134; Koenigsberger v. Mining Go. 158 IT. S. 41; Lallerstedt y. Griffin, 29 Qa. 708; Meaehem, Law of Agency; Nupen y. Pearce, 235 Eed. 497; New York Electric B. Go. y. Fifth Nat. Bank, 135 IT. S. 432; Poiuers y. Briggs, 79 111. 493; Bandon v. Toby, 11 How. 493; Bobinson v. Kanawha Valley Bank, 58 Am. Rep. 829; 3 R. C. L. Bills & Notes; Scanlan y. Keith, 102 111. 634; Shaw y. Stone, 1 Cush. 228; Styles & C. Agency; Smith y. Morse, 9 Wall. 76; Thompson y. McKay, 41 Cal. 221; Turner y. Trail, 24 Okla. 129 ; Tuttle y. Bank, 187 Mass. 533 ; Wege v. Safe Cabinet Go. 249 Eed. 696; Beuttell y. Magone, 157 H. S. 154; Colo. v. Harrison, 228 Fed. 894; Illinois G. B. Go. y. Egan, 203 Eed. 939 ; Bunkle y. Burnham, 153 H. S. 216 ; Sena y. American Turguoise Co. 220 U. S. 497; Union P. B. Go. y. Harris, 63 Fed. 800; Western U. Teleg. Go. y. Thompson, 144 Fed. 583.

Opinion:
Mr. Justice Van Orsdel
delivered the opinion of the Court:
It is urged that a motion for judgment for a directed verdict, being in the nature of a demurrer to the evidence, admits the validity of the order and forecloses the right of defendant on appeal to challenge the judgment on the ground of his nonliability upon the instrument sued on as matter of law. We are not impressed with this contention. The rule invoked admits the truth of the facts proved, but not matters of law. Hence, defendant's motion for judgment admitted the competency, of the order as evidence in the case, but not the legal interpretation thereof as affecting his liability.
This brings us to the single question, whether or not defendant, in accepting the order, did so personally or as the agent of Lambros and Kanelopoulos. Section 1324 of the District Code [31 Stat. at L. 1398, chap. 854], provides as follows: "Where the instrument contains or a person adds to his signature words indicating that he signs for or on behalf of a principal, or in a representative capacity, he is not liable on the instrument if he was duly authorized, but the mere addition of words describing him as an agent or as filling a representative character without disclosing his principal does not exempt him from personal liability."
The language of the statute is clear and needs no extended interpretation. If the instrument anywhere contains words indicating agency with a disclosure of the principal,' or if the acceptor uses such words after his signature, it is sufficient to put the payee on notice. The name of the party to whom the order is addressed is a material part of the instrument. If the agency is disclosed in the address, as here, the instrument will be held to contain words indicating that the acceptance is not personal, but as agent for the principal named therein.
But it is contended that defendant failed to prove his authority as agent, and, therefore, is not entitled to claim exemption from personal liability under this section ¡of the Code. By the great weight of modern authority, no action can be brought against an agent on a contract executed in the name of a principal, even though the agent was without authority; for the reason that the contract was not intended to be the personal contract of the agent. The only remedy against him is on the ground of fraud and deceit, or breach of an implied warranty of authority. As was said in Kent v. Addicks, 60 C. C. A. 660, 126 Fed. 112: "There are authorities which hold that the contract in such a case is that of the agent, against whom a recovery may be directly had; but the prevailing and the better doctrine is that where, as in the present instance, the undertaking on its face is that of the supposed principal, the agent is liable only on tbe implied warranty that he bad tbe right to make it."
Tbe acceptance of tbe order purports to be tbe acceptance of the principals, through defendant as agent, and not tbe personal acceptance of defendant. Hence, under tbe rule laid down in tbe Kent Case, no action lay against defendant on tbe order, irrespective of whether or not be bad authority. Even according to tbe section of tbe Code here under consideration a construction changing tbe above rule in so far as negotiable instruments are concerned, and permitting an action to be maim tained on the instrument itself against tbe agent acting without authority, there is, nevertheless, a presumption that tbe instrument is what it purports to be, — tbe obligation of tbe disclosed principal,- — and tbe burden is upon tbe plaintiff of overcoming this presumption by affirmative proof of tbe want of authority of tbe agent.
Tbe judgment is reversed'with costs, and tbe cause remanded for a new trial. Reversed and remanded.