Case Name: Clinton JOHNSON a/k/a Willie James, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1982-01-19
Citations: 408 So. 2d 813
Docket Number: No. 80-1311
Parties: Clinton JOHNSON a/k/a Willie James, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: Before SCHWARTZ, BASKIN and DANIEL S. PEARSON, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 408
Pages: 813–819

Head Matter:
Clinton JOHNSON a/k/a Willie James, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. 80-1311.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
Jan. 19, 1982.
Bennett H. Brummer, Public Defender and James V. Johnstone, Sp. Asst. Public Defender, for appellant.
Jim Smith, Atty. Gen. and Calvin L. Fox, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.
Before SCHWARTZ, BASKIN and DANIEL S. PEARSON, JJ.

Opinion:
BASKIN, Judge.
We have reviewed defendant's conviction for second-degree murder and sentence of life imprisonment, and we are unable to find support in the record for his contention that he was deprived of a speedy trial. Notably absent from the record is a motion for discharge. Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.191(a)(1). We deem it necessary, however, to reverse the conviction and sentence because we observe error in the trial court's exclusion of Dr. Loeffler's expert testimony in support of his opinion that defendant Johnson was legally insane at the time he committed the crime charged.
In furtherance of an insanity defense, defense counsel inquired of psychologist Dr. Loeffler:
Q. The incident took place on July 16.[ ] Could you render an opinion as to his mental state on July 16?
A. Yes, I can.
Q. What would that opinion be?
A. My opinion would be that at the time he did not know right from wrong. He did not know the nature and consequences of his behavior.
Q. In your opinion, within reasonable professional certainty, would Clinton Johnson be able to distinguish right from wrong on the date of July 16, and was he able to know the nature and consequences of his act?
A. No, my opinion is that he could not distinguish right from wrong and did not know the nature and consequences of his actions.
At the conclusion of all testimony, the state sought to exclude Dr. Loeffler's testimony on the ground that counsel's inquiry ^concerning July 16th rendered Dr. Loef-fler's responses irrelevant to the issue of whether defendant was insane on the date of the crime, July 19th. The court was unsure of its recollection and asked the court reporter to read back the testimony. The court reporter reread portions of the testimony containing the incorrect date; the court then agreed with the state and excluded Dr. Loeffler's testimony as irrelevant to prove defendant's insanity on the date of the offense. However, the reporter failed to read:
Q. In your opinion — your professional opinion, was he insane at the time of the crime?
A. In terms of the M'Naughten rule, I would say he was insane at the time of the alleged offense.
In our opinion, the exclusion of Dr. Loeffler's testimony deprived defendant Johnson of a fair trial and of his constitutional right to present witnesses in his behalf. See Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 87 S.Ct. 1820, 18 L.Ed.2d 1019 (1967). To establish insanity, defendant was required to prove that he was insane at the time of the offense. Chatman v. State, 199 So.2d 475 (Fla.1967); Blatch v. State, 216 So.2d 261 (Fla.3d DCA 1968), cert. dismissed, 225 So.2d 532 (Fla.1969). The exclusion may not be considered harmless error, Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824,17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967), despite the presence of other medical testimony that defendant Johnson was insane, cf. United States v. Minor, 459 F.2d 103 (5th Cir. 1972) (exclusion of record of state court adjudication of incompetency not harmless error where accused raised insanity defense, although lay witnesses testified that defendant had been adjudged incompetent), because the law placed the burden of proof on defendant Johnson while the court's action curtailed his opportunity to meet that burden.
Constitutional error may not be deemed harmless if a reasonable possibility exists that the error may have contributed to the conviction or that the error may not be found harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Nowlin v. State, 346 So.2d 1020 (Fla.1977), citing Chapman v. California, supra; see § 924.33, Fla.Stat. (1979).
Our decision to reverse defendant's conviction renders it unnecessary for us to review the propriety of the state's comment during closing argument that it was "unheard of" for a person to spend more than two years in the state hospital system if found insane. We agree that so prejudicial a comment should not have been made to the jury. Evalt v. United States, 359 F.2d 534 (9th Cir. 1966); Williams v. State, 68 So.2d 583 (Fla.1953). We need not reach defendant's remaining contentions.
Reversed and remanded for a new trial.
. The crime was alleged to have occurred on July 19, 1979.
. Chatman reiterates that the burden of proving insanity is on the defendant because he is presumed sane under the law. When he rebuts the presumption of sanity by presenting evidence of insanity sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt, the burden shifts to the state to prove sanity beyond a reasonable doubt. Holmes v. State, 374 So.2d 944 (Fla.1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 913, 100 S.Ct. 1845, 64 L.Ed.2d 267 (1980); Parkin v. State, 238 So.2d 817 (Fla.1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 974, 91 S.Ct. 1189, 28 L.Ed.2d 322 (1971); Farrell v. State, 101 So.2d 130 (Fla.1958); Greenfield v. State, 337 So.2d 1021 (Fla.2d DCA 1976).