Case Name: Beverly W. MARCUM and Bennie Marcum, Individually and as the natural guardians of Lee Ann Marcum, a minor v. HANCOCK COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT
Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Mississippi
Decision Date: 1999-06-03
Citations: 741 So. 2d 234
Docket Number: No. 97-CA-00916-SCT
Parties: Beverly W. MARCUM and Bennie Marcum, Individually and as the natural guardians of Lee Ann Marcum, a minor v. HANCOCK COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT.
Judges: PRATHER, C.J., PITTMAN, P.J., BANKS, SMITH AND COBB, JJ., CONCUR.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 741
Pages: 234–240

Head Matter:
Beverly W. MARCUM and Bennie Marcum, Individually and as the natural guardians of Lee Ann Marcum, a minor v. HANCOCK COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT.
No. 97-CA-00916-SCT.
Supreme Court of Mississippi.
June 3, 1999.
James K. Wetzel, Gulfport, Attorney for Appellants.
Alben N. Hopkins, Thomas A. Waller, Gulfport, Attorneys for Appellee.

Opinion:
MILLS, Justice,
for the Court:
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
¶ 1. This case arose out of a negligence action brought against the Hancock County School District (hereinafter "District"), in response to an accident that allegedly occurred on April 3, 1995. Lee Ann Mar-cum (hereinafter "Marcum"), claimed that she was injured while riding in a Hancock County school bus. Marcum complained that she suffered a back injury when the bus driver, suddenly and without warning, slammed on the brakes.
¶ 2. Marcum, then a seventeen-year-old minor, filed suit against the District by and through her parents Beverly and Bennie Marcum. The complaint was filed in the Circuit Court of Hancock County, Mississippi on January 2, 1997, approximately one (1) year and nine (9) months after the alleged accident.
¶ 3. In response, the District filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to M.R.C.P. 12(b)(6). The District argued that the suit against it was barred by the one (1) year statute of limitations contained in the Mississippi Tort Claims Act found in Miss. Code. Ann. § 11-46-1 to -23 (Supp.1998) (hereinafter "MTCA"), which governs claims brought against the State of Mississippi and its political subdivisions. Mar-cum asserted that the statute of limitations was tolled due to her disability of infancy as prescribed by the minor savings clause .of Miss.Code Ann. § 15-1-59 (1995).
¶ 4. On July 11, 1997, the circuit court granted the District's motion to dismiss holding that Marcum's lawsuit was barred by the one (1) year statute of limitations. It is from that order that Marcum appeals to this Court raising the following issues:
I. THE CIRCUIT COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN HOLDING THAT MARCUM'S CAUSE OF ACTION WAS BARRED BY THE ONE YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS EXPRESSED IN § 11-46-11.
II. THE CIRCUIT JUDGE ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN DISMISSING MARCUM'S CAUSE OF ACTION.
III. THE MISSISSIPPI TORT CLAIMS ACT IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS IT VIOLATES THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND DISCRIMINATES AGAINST THE INDIVIDUALS IN THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI.
IV. SECTION 11-46-11 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS IT VIOLATES THE EQUAL PROTECTION RIGHTS OF MINORS.
¶ 5. We find that these claims are without merit and should be denied accordingly. The MTCA's one (1) year statute of limitations is the exclusive timing mechanism to be applied to any claim brought under the Act. Further, the minor savings clause in § 15-1-59 only applies to the actions contained in that chapter and does not pertain to the MTCA. Finally, the issue concerning the MTCA's constitutionality was not raised in the lower court and therefore, was not preserved for appeal by Marcum. Thus, the lower court's dismissal of Marcum's claim due to the expiration of the one (1) year statute of limitations was proper and is affirmed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
¶ 6. On the afternoon of April 3, 1995, Marcum was a passenger on a Hancock County school bus traveling home from school. Marcum claimed that at approximately 3:15 p.m., the driver of the school bus, suddenly and without warning, slammed on her brakes, causing a back injury to Marcum. At the time of the accident and when the complaint was filed, Marcum was a minor.
¶ 7. Due to Marcum's continued infancy, her parents brought a negligence action on her behalf in January of 1997 to recover damages from the District for injuries suffered during the alleged accident. The District filed a motion to dismiss arguing that the applicable one (1) year statute of limitations had expired. Marcum countered that the statute of limitations was tolled due to her disability of infancy.
¶ 8. The circuit court granted the District's motion to dismiss, holding that the statute of limitations contained in Miss. Code Ann. § 11-46-11 superseded the infancy tolling requirement under Miss.Code Ann. § 15-1-59. From that ruling, Mar-cum brings her appeal before this Court.
DISCUSSION OF THE ISSUES
I. THE CIRCUIT COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN HOLDING THAT MARCUM'S CAUSE OF ACTION WAS BARRED BY THE ONE YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS EXPRESSED IN § 11-46-11.
¶ 9. Marcum's first argument is that the Mississippi Tort Claims Act's one (1) year statute of limitations expressed in Miss.Code Ann. § 11-46-11 (Supp.1998), is tolled by the "minor savings clause" of Miss.Code Ann. § 15-1-59 (1995), until the minor achieves majority. There is no dispute by either party that this claim is subject to the MTCA as the District is a political subdivision of the State of Mississippi.
¶ 10. The MTCA was enacted in 1993 to create a limited waiver of immunity for the State and its political subdivisions. See Miss.Code Ann. § 11-46-1 to -23 (Supp. 1998). The immunity is provided as to specific claims within a specific period of time with a substantial limitation on the amount of damages that can be recovered. Id. We recognized in City of Jackson v. Lumpkin that "[t]he Legislature elected to waive sovereign immunity to a large extent in the Tort Claims Act statutes, but it saw fit to qualify this waiver with a number of procedural requirements which, it is logical to conclude, must be complied with for this waiver to take effect." City of Jackson v. Lumpkin, 697 So.2d 1179, 1181 (Miss.1997) overruled on other grounds, Carr v. Town on Shubuta, 733 So.2d 261 (Miss.1999).
¶ 11. As stated above, a procedural stricture mandated by the MTCA is a one (1) year statute of limitations provision in § 11-46-11 which reads in relevant part:
(3) All actions brought under the provisions of this chapter shall be commenced within one (1) year next after the date of the tortious, wrongful or otherwise actionable conduct on which the liability phase of the action is based, and not after; provided, however, that the filing of a notice of claim as required by subsection (1) of this section shall serve to toll the statute of limitations for a period of ninety-five (95) days. The limitations period provided herein shall control and shall be exclusive in all actions subject to and brought under provisions of this chapter, notwithstanding the nature of the claim, the label or other characterization the claimant may use to describe it, or the provisions of any other statute of limitations which would otherwise govern the type of claim or legal theory if it were not subject to or brought under the provisions of this chapter.
Miss.Code Ann. § 11-46-11 (Supp.1998) (emphasis added). It is obvious that the Legislature intended the MTCA's one (1) year statute of limitations to be the controlling measure of time applied to any actions brought under the Act. The statute's use of the word "shall" represents a firm mandate and unambiguously closes the door of interpretation concerning which statute of limitations applies to the MTCA.
¶ 12. Marcum contends that the MTCA's one (1) year statute of limitations is superseded by the minor savings clause of § 15-1-59 which states the following:
If any person entitled to bring any of the personal actions mentioned shall, at the time at which the cause of action accrued, be under the disability of infancy or unsoundness of mind, he may bring the actions within the times in this chapter respectively limited, after his disability shall be removed as provided by law....
Miss.Code Ann. § 15-1-59 (1995)(emphasis added).
¶ 13. In Cole v. State, 608 So.2d 1313 (Miss.1992), a prison inmate argued that his alleged incompetence tolled the three (3) year statute of limitations under the Mississippi Uniform Post-Conviction Collateral Relief Act. We held that "[t]he savings clause in § 15-1-59 applies only to actions mentioned in Chapter 1, Title 15 of the Mississippi Code.... " Cole, 608 So.2d at 1316. We added that, "we have clearly held so on at least two occasions." Id. See Foster v. Yazoo & M. V. R. Co., 72 Miss. 886, 18 So. 380 (1895), and Arender v. Smith County Hosp., 431 So.2d 491 (Miss.1983).
¶ 14. In Foster v. Yazoo & M. V. R. Co., 72 Miss. 886, 889-91, 18 So. 380, 381 (1895), a plaintiff brought a claim for the wrongful death of his father and the statute of limitations was raised as a defense. We held that the saving statute did not apply to the wrongful death statute as it was not included in the Code chapter on "limitations of actions." Id.
¶ 15. Additionally, in Arender v. Smith County Hosp., 431 So.2d 491 (Miss.1983), we unanimously dismissed the assertion that the time limit for bringing a wrongful death action was subject to § 15-1-59. We stated in Arender that:
The above statute § 15-1-59 specifically reserves the tolling of the limitation period to those personal actions mentioned within the chapter of which the wrongful death act is not one.
The statute of limitations does not look to the character of the plaintiff, but to the nature of the action. This is not so as to a savings clause. It contemplates the person, and not the action. The claim to exemption is against the current of the law, and not co-extensive with its effective provisions. In case of doubt, therefore, the presumption is against the one claiming the exemption. The savings of the statute are not to be as liberally construed as its effective provisions, because they are designed to put an end to strife and litigation, and tend to the security of all men.
Arender, 431 So.2d at 492-94 (citations omitted).
¶ 16. In Clifton v. Landry, Civ. A. No. 2:95-CV-266-PS, 1996 WL 755730, at *2 (S.D.Miss.1996) (Pickering, J.), the federal district 'court was presented with the issue before us and followed Cole and Arender in correctly concluding that the plaintiffs' argument that the savings clause of § 15-1-59 tolled the running of the one-year statute of limitations prescribed in § 11-46-11 was clearly contrary to Mississippi law.
¶ 17. In the present case, Marcum filed her complaint on January 2, 1997. This was approximately one (1) year and nine (9) months after her cause of action allegedly accrued on April 3, 1995. Therefore, the date of filing surpassed the MTCA's mandated one (1) year statute of limitations by nine (9) months.
¶ 18. We hold that § 11-46-11's one (1) year statute of limitations is not tolled by § 15-1-59's minor savings clause. The MTCA clearly mandates that a one (1) year statute of limitations be applied to any actions brought under the Act. Additionally, § 15-1-59's minor savings clause only applies to actions within that chapter and not to the MTCA. Therefore, the Circuit Court of Hancock County's judgment should be affirmed.
II. THE CIRCUIT JUDGE ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN DISMISSING MARCUM'S CAUSE OF ACTION.
¶ 19. As discussed above, Marcum filed her lawsuit one (1) year and nine (9) months after her cause of action allegedly accrued. The lower court properly applied the one (1) year statute of limitations contained in § 11-46-11 of the MTCA, which superseded the minor savings clause of § 15-1-59, and dismissed Marcum's lawsuit. As a result, we hold that the learned trial judge correctly applied the law and properly dismissed this case. This issue is without merit.
III. THE MISSISSIPPI TORT CLAIMS ACT IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS IT VIOLATES THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND DISCRIMINATES AGAINST THE INDIVIDUALS IN THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI.
IV. SECTION 11-46-11 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS IT VIOLATES THE EQUAL PROTECTION RIGHTS OF MINORS.
¶ 20. Marcum argues for the first time on appeal that the MTCA violates the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution and discriminates against individuals in Mississippi including minors. In Ellis v. Ellis, 651 So.2d 1068 (Miss.1995), we reaffirmed the well-established principle that, "[T]his Court has also consistently held that errors raised for the first time on appeal will not be considered, especially where constitutional questions are concerned." Id. (citing Patterson v. State, 594 So.2d 606, 609 (Miss.1992); Contreras v. State, 445 So.2d 543, 544 (Miss.1984); Smith v. State, 430 So.2d 406, 408 (Miss.1983)). Since these claims were not contemporaneously raised at the trial level, they are procedurally barred and are dismissed.
CONCLUSION
¶ 21. The one (1) year statute of limitations found in the MTCA is the exclusive measure of time to be applied to any claim brought under the Act. Additionally, the minor savings provision in § 15-1-59 only addresses those actions listed in that chapter and does not apply to the MTCA. Lastly, the constitutionality of the MTCA was raised for the first time on appeal, and the issue was not preserved by Marcum. Thus, the lower court's dismissal of Mar-cum's complaint and action due to the expiration of the one (1) year statute of limitations was proper and is affirmed.
¶ 22. AFFIRMED.
PRATHER, C.J., PITTMAN, P.J., BANKS, SMITH AND COBB, JJ., CONCUR.
McRAE, J., DISSENTS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION JOINED BY SULLIVAN, P.J.
WALLER, J., JOINS IN PART.
. We note that § 11-46-11 was amended, effective upon passage, in the 1999 session of the Mississippi legislature by H.B. 778, 1999 Miss. Laws Ch. 469, which was signed by the Governor on March 25, 1999. The amendment clarifies the notice of claim requirement and has no application in this case.