Case Name: Thomas D. Van Hook v. S. C. Simmons
Court: Supreme Court of Texas
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1860-10
Citations: 25 Supp. Tex. 323
Docket Number: 
Parties: Thomas D. Van Hook v. S. C. Simmons.
Judges: 
Reporter: Texas Reports
Volume: 25 Supp.
Pages: 323–325

Head Matter:
Thomas D. Van Hook v. S. C. Simmons.
If the grantee of land alter or destroy his title deed, yet, it is said, his title to the land is not gone. It passed to him by the deed; the deed has performed its office, as an instrument of conveyance, and its continued existence is not necessary to the continuance of title in the grantee, hut the estate remains in him until.it has passed to another by some mode of conveyance recognized by law.
Appeal from Navarro. The case was tried before Hon. John Gregg, one of the district judges.
Van Hook sued Simmons in an action of trespass to try title. The defendant plead the general issue, not guilty. The statement of facts shows that Kercheffer recovered a judgment before a justice against Simmons, upon which the land, in controversy was sold by a constable, and the plaintiff became the purchaser. There was proof that a deed, signed by S. C. Simmons and J. P. Simmons, had been seen. S. C. Simmons was himself put upon the stand, who swore that he had made a deed and delivered it to J. P. Simmons in 1856; that he went to Corsicana, and found that J. P. Simmons had lost the lot in question on an election, and there was some complaint as to his not having a title to it, and that S.' C. Simmons made the deed as aforesaid to J. P. Simmons, to enable him to comply with his bet. That no consideration had passed from the grantor to the grantee. That the grantor won the bet, and it was agreed that the deed should be destroyed. This was before the rendition of the judgment of the justice; but the defendant did not really know whether the deed had been destroyed or not. The defendant had offered to pay the plaintiff the amount of his bid and interest.
The court charged the jury, that if S. C. Simmons conveyed the lot in controversy to J. P. Simmons, and it was afterwards agreed to destroy the deed, and that S. C. Simmons should take back the lot, and that this happened before the judgment of the justice, then, whether the deed was destroyed or not, the jury will find for the defendant. Verdict and judgment for the defendant, from which the plaintiff'appealed.
G. M. Winkler, for the appellant,
insisted that defendant was estopped from denying his own deed, and his admission that such a deed had existed.
Mills Beaton, for defendant in error,
insisted that the deed was in trust for a certain purpose; that no consideration had passed from the grantor to the grimtee; that there was an agreement to destroy the deed long before the judgment and execution; and that Van Hook, as pur chaser at sheriff’s sale, was charged with a knowledge of these facts.

Opinion:
"Wheeler, C. J.
—The charge of the court was to the effect, that the parol agreement between the defendant and his brother, J. P. Simmons, to destroy the deed of conveyance from the former to the latter, and take back the land, would destroy the effect of that conveyance, or it would divest the estate of the latter, whether the deed was in fact destroyed or not. In this we incline to think the court erred. "If the grantee of land alter or destroy his title deed, yet (it is said) his title to the land is not gone. It passed to him by the deed; the deed has performed its office as an instrument of conveyance; and its continued existence is not necessary to the continuance of title in the grantee, but the estate remains in him until it has passed to another by some mode of conveyance recognized by law." (1 Greenl. Ev., § 265, 568, and notes.)
The deed had been delivered and the estate vested; it did not appear that the deed had been in fact cancelled; and if it had been, it would seem this was not sufficient under the statute of frauds, which requires writing to divest or pass the estate out of the grantee.
It is not necessary, at present, to consider in what cases the cancellation of a deed will have the effect, operating in the nature of a surrender, to divest the estate. The evidence would not warrant the court in giving that effect to what transpired between the parties in the present case.
We are of opinion, therefore, that the judgment must be reversed and the cause
Remanded.