Case Name: Joe HAYES, Appellant, v. Fred A. SEATON, Secretary of the Interior, Appellee
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 1959-07-09
Citations: 270 F.2d 319
Docket Number: No. 14813
Parties: Joe HAYES, Appellant, v. Fred A. SEATON, Secretary of the Interior, Appellee.
Judges: Before Edgerton, Danaher, and Burger, Circuit Judges.
Reporter: Federal Reporter 2d Series
Volume: 270
Pages: 319–326

Head Matter:
Joe HAYES, Appellant, v. Fred A. SEATON, Secretary of the Interior, Appellee.
No. 14813.
United States Court of Appeals District of Columbia Circuit.
Argued March 18, 1959.
Decided July 9, 1959.
Petition for Rehearing en Banc Denied Oct. 5, 1959.
Burger, Circuit Judge, dissented.
Mr. Leon BenEzra, Washington, D. C., for appellant.
Mr. Robert S. Griswold, Jr., Attorney, Department of Justice, with whom Mr. Roger P. Marquis, Attorney, Department of Justice, was on the brief, for appellee.
Before Edgerton, Danaher, and Burger, Circuit Judges.

Opinion:
EDGERTON, Circuit Judge.
Section 1 of the Act of June 25, 1910, 36 Stat. 855, as amended, 25 U.S. C.A. § 372, provides in part:
"When any Indian to whom an allotment of land has been made, or may hereafter be made, dies before the expiration of the trust period and before the issuance of a fee simple patent, without having made a will disposing of said allotment as hereinafter provided, the Secretary of the Interior, upon notice and hearing, under such rules as he may prescribe, shall ascertain the legal heirs of such decedent, and his decision thereon shall be final and conclusive. "
Joseph Thomas, an Indian, disappeared August 3, 1939, and has not been heard from since. His father John Thomas, an Indian, died September 22, 1940, leaving a will made in 1923. After disposing of clothes, the will said: "all other property of any nature belonging to me or in which I have any interest to my son Joe Thomas." The Secretary of the Interior decided that the son survived the father and took his estate, and that Emma J. Luton, as the son's heir, took both estates.
If the son did not survive the father, (1) the father's devise to the son lapsed; (2) the father, not Emma Luton, was the son's heir; and (3) appellant Hayes, as the father's heir, took both estates. Appellant Hayes asks review and reversal of the Secretary's decision that the son survived the father and Luton is the heir.
Since the Secretary's decision that the son survived the father was an essential part of the Secretary's "final and conclusive" ascertainment of the son's legal heirs, it was a final and conclusive decision. It determined who took the son's property and also who took the father's property. We think it was final and conclusive for both these purposes. Even if it were reviewable and in our opinion erroneous, we could not disturb it, for it was not arbitrary or unreasonable. " 'The judicial function is exhausted when there is found to be a rational basis for the conclusions approved by the administrative body.' " Rochester Telephone Corp. v. United States, 1939, 307 U.S. 125, 146, 59 S.Ct. 754, 83 L.Ed. 1147.
We see no basis for appellant's reliance on § 2 of the 1910 Act, 25 U.S.C.A. § 373. It provides (1) that the Secretary may prescribe regulations in accordance with which Indians may make wills disposing of trust property, and (2) that "no will so executed shall be valid until it shall have been approved by the Secretary ." As we held in Homovich v. Chapman, 89 U.S. App.D.C. 150, 153, 191 F.2d 761, 764, this section does not prevent judicial review of the Secretary's action in making regulations for executing wills or in approving wills. But even in regard to such matters, we said: "To be sure, if upon such review it appears that [the Secretary's] action was within the scope of the authority conferred upon him, the court cannot disturb his decision." Moreover, the present case does not turn on such matters. It is undisputed that the Secretary's regulations for making wills were valid, that the will of John Thomas was validly executed, and that the will was approved by the Secretary. The appellant attacks only the Secretary's decision that the son survived the father, and its consequences. As we have shown in the preceding paragraph of this opinion, we cannot disturb that decision.
We think the District Court was right in dismissing appellant's complaint,
Affirmed,