Case Name: Augustus H. Lee, plaintiff in error, vs. William W. Clark, executor, defendant in error
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia
Jurisdiction: Georgia
Decision Date: 1872-07-04
Citations: 49 Ga. 81
Docket Number: 
Parties: Augustus H. Lee, plaintiff in error, vs. William W. Clark, executor, defendant in error.
Judges: Before Judge Greene.
Reporter: Georgia Reports
Volume: 49
Pages: 81–89

Head Matter:
Augustus H. Lee, plaintiff in error, vs. William W. Clark, executor, defendant in error.
When A filed a bill in equity against C’s administrator, alleging that he (A) and B had, during the late war, traded lands; that B was at the time indebted to C for a pari of the purchase money of the land, but C was refusing Confederate money, so that the debt could not be paid; that for this reason A only gave to B his bond for titles to the land he let him have; that B afterwards traded the land he got of complainant to D and transferred the bond; that shortly after thisi complainant received a message from C, then in life, that he might safely make a deed to D, as he (C) was now willing to take Confederate money from B for his debt; that knowing positively that B had the money and was ready to pay, he, (A) in consequence of this message, made titles to D and took up his bond ; that he is informed that B soon after tendered the Confederate money to C, who refused it; that C had died, and his administrator, the defendant, was proceeding to levy his judgment, which was a judgment on the foreclosure of a mortgage on the land. The bill prayed a perpetual injunction against the mortgage, and a temporary injunction until the trial. The Court granted the temporary injunction. C’s administrator, the defendant, answered the bill, denying, on his information and belief, the sending of the message and the tender of Confederate money, and moved to dissolve the injunction and to dismiss the bill for want of equity. The Court dissolved the injunction and dismissed the bill:
Held, 1. That as the statements of the bill, on which its equity depends, were not stated as in the complainant’s own knowledge, and was not supported by any affidavits of their truth, the Court did not err in dissolving the injunction.
2. That there is equity in the bill, for which complainant has no remedy at law, and that it was error to dismiss the bill.
Warner, Chief Justice, dissented.
Equity. Injunction.
Before Judge Greene.
Newton county. At Chambers.
July 4th, 1872.
Lee filed his bill against Clark, as the executor of "William D. Conyers, deceased, containing substantially the following allegations:
Complainant and one Turner Horton each owned tracts of land in Newton county. They agreed to exchange. Before this contract was executed, Horton informed complainant that he purchased his land from William W. Clark; that a portion of the purchase money was still unpaid, and that Clark had transferred his claim to the same to William D. Conyers. Under these circumstances, complainant declined to execute a deed to Horton to his (complainant’s) land, but instead thereof, made and delivered to him a receipt, in the nature of a bond for title, conditioned to execute a title deed so soon as the balance of the purchase money due upon the land for which he had contracted, should be paid. Complainant, knowing that Horton was, at the time, amply able to discharge said liability, accepted his deed to the land for which he was exchanging, and went into possession of the same. Shortly after the execution of the aforesaid receipt by complainant, Horton traded the lands specified therein to Lewis Zachary and transferred to him said receipt. Complainant has been informed and believes, and so states, that the difficulty in reference to the payment of the balance of the purchase money was, that Conyers would not accept from Horton in payment thereof what was then the only currency of the State, viz: Confederate treasury notes. Subsequently to this, complainant received a message from Conyers, that he would accept from Horton Confederate money in payment of the said claim, and that he (complainant) might safely execute a deed to Zachary, to whom Horton had transferred the receipt as aforesaid. Relying upon this, promise, and knowing that Horton had the money on hand, and that he had been exceedingly anxious to pay off said balance, complainant, without hesitation, executed and delivered to said Zachary a deed to said lands, and took up and destroyed the aforesaid receipt. Complainant has |?een informed and believes, and so states, that immediately after he had executed the deed as aforesaid, said Horton tendered to said Conyers Confederate money sufficient to pay off and satisfy the balance of said unpaid purchase money on the lands conveyed to complainant. He believed that the whole matter had been settled, and never heard anything to the contrary until October 29th, 1868, when he received a notice from the sheriff of Newton county that he had levied a mortgage execution, in favor of William W. Clark against Turner Horton, which had been transferred to William D. Conyers, upon the lands conveyed to complainant by said Horton. On investigation, complainant discovered that there' was such a mortgage on record, bearing date December 3d, 1859, and covering the premises described; that, a petition for foreclosure was filed at the March term, 1860, of Newton Superior Court, and at the next succeeding term a rule absolute issued. Complainant would never have executed a title to Zachary to the lands conveyed by him, but for the assurances of Conyers, upon the faith of which he acted. The mortgage execution has no entry thereon from the third day of October, 1860, the date of its issue, to the ninth day of October, 1869. Complainant has filed his claim to said property, and the case will be pressed to trial at the next term of Newton Superior Court by Clark, as executor of Conyers, unless restrained by an order of this Court. Prayer, that the defendant be enjoined from-the further prosecution of said levy and from pressing said claim case to trial until the further order of the Court; that said mortgage execution may, by decree, be perpetually enjoined from proceeding against the property of complainant; that the writ of injunction may issue.
The Chancellor sanctioned the bill and the writ of injunction issued.
The answer of the defendant, on his information and beliefj denies that Conyers ever sent any message to complainant that he would receive Confederate money for the balance of the purchase money due on the land; denies that Horton ever tendered to Conyers Confederate money in payment thereof; denies that Conyers ever declined to receive Confederate money in payment.
The defendant moved to dissolve the injunction and to dismiss the bill. The Court sustained both motions, and complainant excepted, and now assigns said ruling as error.
J. J. Floyd, for plaintiff in error.
Clark & Pace, by Peeples & Howell, for defendant.

Opinion:
McCay, Judge.
There was no error in dissolving this injunction. This Court, in the case of Jones et al. vs. Macon & Brunswick Railroad, 39 Georgia, 138, has held that to justify the use of this extraordinary writ the statements of the complainant must be positive, and within his own knowledge, or if he cannot say this, but relies on information and belief, he must bring with him the sworn statements of those who do know. And this is only a reasonable and proper requirement. The whole equity of this bill turns upon the message received by the complainant from Dr. Conyers. The bill does not say this message was sent by Conyers within the personal knowledge of the complainant. Indeed the inference is rather to the contrary. This brings the case within the decision referred to, and the injunction ought never to have been granted without other evidence.
But we are clear there is equity in the bill. It alleges that the complainant received a message from Dr. Conyers that he might safely make the deed, as he would take Confederate money from Horton; that as he knew Horton had the money, and was anxious to pay it, he did make the deed. True, it is not stated positively that Dr. Conyers sent the message, nor is any precise date stated. But the other facts stated show when the exchange of lands was made, and it is said this occurred shortly after. As to the want of a positive statement, that it is true, is a good reason why the temporary injunction should not be granted. But does that make the bill subject to demurrer ? The demurrer admits as true all that is stated. It therefore admits that complainant " received a message" from Dr. Conyers as stated. Could he have received the message if it had not been sent. If I say I received a message from A, and he comes into Court and admits I did so, does he not admit that he sent it ? And if it be proven on the trial that complainant did receive such a message from Dr. Conyers, no jury would hesitate to decree on that proof, since it is impossible that he should receive such a message unless it was sent. If such a message was sent to complainant by Dr. Conyers, and complainant received it and acted on it, we think that discharged the lien of the mortgage. Nor is there on this contract (for a contract it is, if the facts be proven, since it was a proposition of one, on which the other acted to his own hurt,) any remedy at law. With this contract Horton had nothing to do. As to him Conyers might repudiate it, but as to complainant he could not, since he had acted on it, and put himself in a new and not so good a position. He has no remedy against anybody on this contract, except the very remedy he asks, to-wit, the release of his land from this lien.
We think, therefore, there was equity in the bill, and the Court erred in dismissing it.
Judgment reversed.
TripPe, Judge, concurred, but furnished no opinion.