Case Name: Lorraine RICHARDSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. James L. ALDRIDGE, et al., Defendants-Appellees; Kenneth Pollard, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Carsheneka Richardson, et al., Defendants-Appellees
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 2003-05-16
Citations: 854 So. 2d 923
Docket Number: Nos. 37,192-CA, 37,193-CA
Parties: Lorraine RICHARDSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. James L. ALDRIDGE, et al., Defendants-Appellees. Kenneth Pollard, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Carsheneka Richardson, et al., Defendants-Appellees.
Judges: Before STEWART, GASKINS and KOSTELKA (Pro Tempore), JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 854
Pages: 923–941

Head Matter:
Lorraine RICHARDSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. James L. ALDRIDGE, et al., Defendants-Appellees. Kenneth Pollard, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Carsheneka Richardson, et al., Defendants-Appellees.
Nos. 37,192-CA, 37,193-CA.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Second Circuit.
May 16, 2003.
Opinion Granting Rehearing Oct. 3, 2003.
Morris Bart, PLC, by Terry B. Loup, New Orleans, for Appellant, Lorraine Richardson.
Walker, Tooke & Lyons, by Laurie W. Lyons, Shreveport, for Appellant, Kenneth Pollard.
Lunn, Irion, Salley, Carlisle & Gardner, by Jack E. Carlisle, Jr., Shreveport, for Appellees, James Aldridge and Indiana Farmers Mutual Insurance Company.
Tracy L. Oakley, Ruston, for Appellees, Carsheneka Richardson and Safeway Insurance Company.
Hicks, Hubley & Marcotte, by Craig O. Marcotte, Shreveport, for Appellee, United Farm Family Mutual Insurance Company.
Before STEWART, GASKINS and KOSTELKA (Pro Tempore), JJ.

Opinion:
I,GASKINS, J.
The appeals in these two consolidated cases arise from a two-car auto accident. Passengers from the vehicles appeal from a jury decision that found neither driver at fault. We affirm.
FACTS
On March 7, 1998, Carsheneka Richardson was driving a 1988 Chevrolet Beretta west on 1-20 in Webster Parish, Louisiana. Lorraine Richardson, age 20, was in the front passenger seat of her sister's car, which Carsheneka had bought only four days before. The sisters were accompanied by their teenage brother, Carlos McDaniel, who was seated in the back seat. They were going from Springhill to Shreveport to look for a house. At the same time, James Aldridge, a retired fireman from Indiana, was also proceeding west on 1-20 in a 35-foot 1997 Chevrolet motor home. Kenneth Pollard, age 55, was a passenger in the Aldridge vehicle. Aldridge and Pollard were traveling to Texas on a fishing trip; they were pulling a 17-foot boat on a trailer behind the motor home. There was heavy rain, and visibility was poor. At about 1:30 p.m., a collision between the two vehicles occurred. Both vehicles left the roadway and struck trees.
On September 10, 1998, Lorraine Richardson filed suit against Aldridge and his insurer, Indiana Farmers Mutual Insurance Company, as well as against Car-sheneka Richardson and her insurer, Safeway Insurance Company of Louisiana. On March 4, 1999, Pollard filed suit against Carsheneka Richardson and Aldridge and their respective insurers, as well as his own UM carrier, United Farm Family Mutual Insurance Company. 1?, On December 23, 2000, the trial court granted the motion of Aldridge and his insurer to consolidate the two suits for trial.
A jury trial was held April 29 to May 2, 2002. The Richardson family members testified that they were traveling in the left lane when they were suddenly bumped in the right rear side by the Aldridge motor home. This caused them to hit the left side guard rail, cross back across the roadway into the motor home, and then leave the highway and hit a tree. Al-dridge testified that he did not bump the Richardson car. Instead he saw the Beretta hydroplane, lose control, hit the guard rail and then come back across the interstate and collide with his motor home. Pqllard testified that he was looking down at a map and that the Beretta was already out of control when he first saw it. He did not see what caused the Beretta to slide into the railing.
The jury found no negligence by either driver. Because the jury verdict form did not instruct them to stop after determining that the defendant drivers were not at fault, the jury continued on with its deliberations. It concluded that Lorraine Richardson was injured and set past medical expenses at $32,124.65 and past and future pain and suffering at $40,000. The jury also concluded that Pollard was injured and set past medical expenses at $30,978.90 and past and future pain and suffering at $20,000. A judgment rejecting the demands of the plaintiffs was signed on June 24, 2002.
On July 2, 2002, Lorraine Richardson filed a motion for JNOV and alternatively for new trial. Pollard filed a similar motion on July 3, 2002. |g The trial court issued a written opinion denying the motions on September 6, 2002. The trial court noted that it strongly disagreed with the verdict and would have found both drivers at fault with the "much larger percentage of fault" being assessed against Carsheneka Richardson. However, given the evidence presented at trial, the court concluded that it was unable to find that the jury's verdict was "not supportable by any fair interpretation of the evidence."
Both Lorraine Richardson and Pollard appealed.
NEGLIGENCE
Both appellants make essentially the same argument. They contend that the jury failed to properly apply the "guest passenger presumption of negligence." The rule was set forth in O'Donnell v. Adriatic Insurance Company, 34,994 (La.App.2d Cir.7/11/01), 792 So.2d 858, as follows:
When an innocent party is injured through the concurrent acts of two parties under circumstances where one or the other must be at fault, the burden is upon these parties to exculpate themselves from negligence.
See also Michel v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, 314 So.2d 535 (La.App. 1st Cir.1975); and Eason v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 327 So.2d 187 (La.App. 2d Cir.1976).
In Eason, supra, we adopted the reasoning of Michel, supra, and recognized the rule. We also agreed with the Michel court that it is an evidentiary rule, not a rule of substantive law; and, therefore, it does not exempt a plaintiff from the ultimate responsibility of proving his or her case. Under the reasoning of Michel and Eason, the guest passenger must first prove his or her innocence as to involvement in the accident and, bsecond, must prove that the circumstances of the accident compel a finding that either one or both drivers in a two-car collision must be at fault. Once this burden is satisfied, each defendant driver must then attempt to exculpate him or herself, not by general denials of allegations, but by "asserting facts and circumstances of affirmative force." Eason, 327 So.2d at 191. This rule was developed to assist a plaintiff in a proper case, not to allow the plaintiff to circumvent the ordinary requirements of burden of proof and "bring down two defendants with one shot; it was meant only to assure that the plaintiff would get the benefit of the rule for the purpose of showing at least one defendant was responsible." Michel, 314 So.2d at 539; Eason, 327 So.2d at 191.
A trial court's findings of fact will not be disturbed on appeal unless the reviewing court finds that they are clearly wrong or manifestly erroneous. Stobart v. State through Dept. of Transp. and Development, 617 So.2d 880 (La.1993); Rosell v. ESCO, 549 So.2d 840 (La.1989). Under the manifest error standard, the linchpin is whether the trial court's findings are reasonable; even if the appellate court feels its own evaluation of the evidence is more reasonable, the trial court's findings cannot be reversed if they are in fact reasonable. Linnear v. Mutual Service Casualty Insurance Company, 35,152 (La.App.2d Cir.10/31/01), 799 So.2d 634. In other words, the appellate court may not reverse simply because it is convinced that had it been sitting as the trier of fact it would have ruled differently. Linnear, supra.
| RWhere two permissible views of the evidence exist, the factfinder's choice between them cannot be manifestly erroneous or clearly wrong. Stobart, supra.
After a careful review of the evidence we find that the guest passenger presumption of negligence is inapplicable here because it has not been shown that one or both of the drivers must necessarily be at fault. See Jolivette v. Highland Insurance Co., 488 So.2d 235 (La.App. 3d Cir. 1986), writ denied, 489 So.2d 923 (La.1986).
Aldridge's alleged negligence
Carsheneka Richardson and her brother testified at trial that they were driving in the left westbound lane. According to their testimony, the Aldridge motor home bumped the right taillight of their car, causing it to hit the left-hand guardrail and then veer back across the highway into the motor home. However, when questioned by a state trooper at the hospital immediately after the accident, Car-sheneka made no mention of the motor home hitting her first. Instead she told Trooper Michael Allen that she was going west when her car began spinning, and that she hit the bridge rail and lost control. At trial, she insisted that she told the trooper she was bumped but he cut her off and "didn't want to hear that." She also asserted that the trooper told her that she hit a water puddle. In his trial testimony, the trooper stated that she never mentioned being bumped by the motor home and he denied cutting her off.
Lorraine Richardson also testified that their car was bumped by the motor home. However, Aldridge, a retired fireman with experience driving Rfire trucks, testified that there was no possibility that he clipped the Beretta and caused it to lose control. More importantly, Pollard — Al-dridge's passenger and another plaintiff also seeking damages — did not testify that the motor home bumped the car. As a passenger in the motor home, it is reasonable to assume that he would have felt the bump if that had, in fact, occurred and he would have testified accordingly. The only physical evidence of contact between the vehicles was gouge marks found in the right lane; the testimony indicates that this was where the Beretta and the motor home collided after the Beretta struck the railing.
It is obvious that the jury rejected the testimony of the siblings that their car was struck first by the motor home; had it accepted the testimony, the jury would not have absolved Aldridge of liability. Under the circumstances, we cannot say that such a finding was unreasonable.
The plaintiffs also argue that, under Al-dridge's version of the accident, he was far enough back from the Beretta to observe the out-of-control car and avoid the accident. Trooper Allen testified that Al-dridge told him he saw the car hydroplane about a quarter of a mile ahead of him. In his trial deposition , Aldridge admitted that he might have made that statement to the trooper and stated that he was not good at estimating distances. Aldridge testified that, like him, the Beretta was traveling in the right westbound lane of traffic. When it hit some water, the Beretta "kind of raised up," turned, and veered off to the left. At the time the car went out of control, it was 10 to 12 car lengths or 150 to 200 feet ahead of him. He 17applied his brakes to slow down. Although he thought hitting the water caused the car to spin out, he looked back to see if anything else might have caused it. Then he saw the Beretta coming off the railing and back across the road toward him. In an effort to avoid the car, he pulled to the right and was partially in the emergency lane when the Beretta and his motor home collided. Aldridge testified that he did not think he could have avoided the accident.
Aldridge estimated that he was going between 45 to 55 mph. (The speed limit on 1-20 is 70 mph.) His passenger, Pollard, testified at trial that Aldridge was going between 55 and 60 mph; after being confronted with his deposition testimony that Aldridge was going only 50 to 55 mph, he changed his estimate to 50 to 60 mph. Pollard also testified that when he saw the Beretta heading toward the railing, it was four to six car lengths or 100 feet ahead of them.
Under Louisiana's sudden emergency doctrine, a person "who finds himself in a position of imminent peril, without sufficient time to consider and weigh all the circumstances or the best means to adopt to avoid an impending danger, is not guilty of negligence if he fails to adopt what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to be the better method, unless the emergency is brought about by his own negligence.... " Linnear, supra; Clark v. Natt, 32,548 (La.App.2d Cir.12/8/99), 748 So.2d 584, writ denied, 2000-0084 (La.3/17/00), 756 So.2d 1142.
Given the condition of the rain-slick highway and the suddenness of the incident, the jury obviously concluded that Aldridge was not negligent |sm failing to take successful evasive action to avoid the collision. Under the facts as presented at trial, we cannot say that this conclusion was unreasonable. This is particularly true since the plaintiffs failed to put on evidence demonstrating the distance within which Aldridge should have been able to stop his motor home under the circumstances of this case.
Carsheneka's alleged negligence
Carsheneka Richardson testified that at the time of the accident she was going only 40 mph due to the rain. (As previously noted, the speed limit on 1-20 is 70 mph.) She did not recall — but did not deny— telling an insurance agent within a week of the accident that she was going 60 to 70 mph. Her brother testified that he did not know how fast she was driving. Her sister testified that while she did not know how fast Carsheneka was driving, she was going at a speed appropriate for the rainy-weather. According to Trooper Allen, when he spoke to Carsheneka at the hospital, she did not recall how fast she was going but she did not think she was going "all that fast."
Aldridge testified that he did not see the Beretta do anything "reckless." He estimated its speed as being about the same as his. He testified that the car spun out of control when it hit some water. Pollard stated that the car was already out of control when he saw it; he "supposed" it hydroplaned. In his deposition, he stated that he saw it "go airborne or whatever you called it when it hits that water." Trooper Allen testified that 19when he was dispatched to the accident scene he was only five miles away and there was severe, heavy rain with heavy winds and poor visibility. According to Trooper Allen, severe heavy rains and wind are "perfect conditions" for hydroplaning.
A motorist has a duty to maintain control of his vehicle, even in rainy weather. Tolbert v. Fireman's Fund Insurance Company, 1998-637 (La.App. 3d Cir.10/7/98), 719 So.2d 738; Shephard on Behalf of Shepard v. Scheeler, 96-1690 (La.10/21/97), 701 So.2d 1308.
The doctrine of unavoidable or inevitable accident relieves a person of liability, so long as the person invoking the doctrine shows that he was in no way to blame for the happening. Davis v. Smith, 35,117 (La.App.2d Cir.10/2/01), 796 So.2d 765, writ denied, 2001-2887 (La.1/25/02), 807 So.2d 250. If a motorist has exercised ordinary care as required by law (or the highest degree of care as may be required), and has nevertheless inflicted injury on another, the accident is said to be inevitable, for which no liability attaches. Davis, supra; Clark v. Natt, supra.
In the Shephard case, a 16-year-old boy was driving a pickup truck during a rainstorm. While going around a banked curve, he lost control and collided with a dump truck stopped partially on the shoulder. Although the trial court and appellate court found no fault on the boy's part because of standing water on the roadway, the supreme court reversed in part and assessed 80% of the fault to him. In so doing, the supreme court found that the evidence did not support the boy's claim that the accident was caused by a pool of standing water near the end of the curve. We note that in the]¿¡¡Shephard case, there was eyewitness testimony that the boy was driving at an excessive speed for the circumstances. Likewise, in Tolbert, supra, there was testimony that the delivery driver was going 52 mph in the rain before he spun out of control, crossing the center line and hitting another car head-on. The court found that his conduct in driving at almost the maximum speed limit (the speed limit was 55 mph) in a rainstorm with greatly decreased visibility was neither reasonable nor responsible. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's grant of partial summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs on the issue of liability. Wfliile admitting that the driver might have hydroplaned as he claimed, it found that the catalyst of the hydroplaning was not just the weather but also the excessive speed at which he was traveling.
Based on the evidence presented at trial, we cannot conclude that the jury's finding that Carsheneka was not negligent was unreasonable. Unlike Tolbert and She-phard, the evidence here does not show that the hydroplaning of the Richardson car was caused by Carsheneka driving at an excessive speed.
Apparently, the jury found Aldridge's testimony to be the most reasonable and believable explanation of the accident. He testified that he did not bump the Beretta, that he was traveling 45 to 55 mph, and that Carsheneka was traveling about the same speed. The trooper described the weather conditions that were present that afternoon as being conducive to hydroplaning. No expert testimony disputed this statement or established that the estimated speed of 45 to 55 mph was excessive for interstate travel launder the conditions facing these motorists. (In fact, driving too slow could have posed its own dangers in interstate driving.) Aldridge testified that the Beretta appeared to hydroplane and that he took evasive actions to brake and steer clear of the out-of-control Beretta. This testimony gave the jury a reasonable foundation upon which to conclude that Carsheneka exercised reasonable care in her driving and that the collision was inevitable. It also gave them a reasonable basis upon which to base their verdict of no liability on either driver. Even if this court felt that, had it been the trier of fact, we would have reached a different conclusion, it would not be proper for this court to substitute its judgment for that of the jury in the absence of manifest error.
CONCLUSION
The trial court judgment is affirmed. Costs are assessed equally among the appellants.
AFFIRMED.
STEWART, J., dissents with written reasons.
. Due to health problems, Aldridge, an Indiana resident, was unable to attend the trial in Louisiana.
. Since Aldridge and Pollard were taken to a different hospital than the Richardson women, Trooper Allen did not take a statement from Aldridge until the day after the accident. His statement to the trooper that he saw the Beretta hydroplane, spin out of control, hit the guardrail and then shoot back across the roadway was consistent with his trial testimony'