Case Name: T. C. Crane v. The State
Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1909-12-22
Citations: 57 Tex. Crim. 476
Docket Number: No. 205
Parties: T. C. Crane v. The State.
Judges: 
Reporter: Texas Criminal Reports
Volume: 57
Pages: 476–480

Head Matter:
T. C. Crane v. The State.
No. 205.
Decided December 22, 1909.
1. —Theft of Horse — Bill of Exceptions — Order Allowing Filing After Adjournment.
Where, upon appeal from a conviction of theft of a horse, it appeared from the record that at the time of the trial the former law, permitting the filing of bills of exception within twenty days subsequent to the' adjournment of the court, was in force, and said bills of exception were not filed within said time, they could not be considered.
2. —Same—Alibi—Charge of Court — Circumstantial Evidence.
Where, upon trial for theft of a horse, the evidence was purely circumstantial, and the question of alibi was not affirmatively an issue in the case, no charge on alibi was necessary.
3. —Same—Requested Charge.
Where, upon trial for theft of a horse, the evidence upon which the requested charge was based was, in fact, never introduced, there was no error in refusing said charge.
4. —Same—Requested Charge — Indictment.
Where, upon trial for theft of a horse, nothing appeared in the record on appeal that the State insisted that the indictment should be regarded by the jury as evidence, there was no error in rejecting a requested charge on this phase of the case.
5. —Same—Practice on Appeal.
Where, upon appeal from a conviction of theft of a horse, it appeared from the record that no objection had been made in the court below to rejected testimony, and that therefore the court had refused to approve the bills of exception, there was no error, and no question for revision.
6. —Same—Practice on Appeal.
Where the court below refused a bill of exceptions because no objection was made to the testimony at the time of its introduction, there was no error, and no question for revision presented.
7. —Same—Sufficiency of the Evidence.
Where, upon trial for theft of a horse, the evidence showed that the defendant .was seen going in the direction where the alleged horses were taken, coming away from said point, shipping, handling and disposing of the property, and in no way accounting for his possession thereof, a conviction will not be disturbed.
Appeal from the District Court of Mitchell. Tried below before the Hon. James L. Shepherd.
Appeal from a conviction of theft of a horse; penalty, ten years imprisonment in the penitentiary.
The opinion states the case.
F. Q. Thurmond, for appellant.
F. J. McCord, Assistant Attorney-General, for the State.

Opinion:
DAVIDSON, Presiding Judge.
Appellant was convicted of horse theft, his punishment being assessed at ten years confinement in the penitentiary.
Appellant reserved two bills of exception, which were filed too late to be considered. Court adjourned on the 18th of June. The bills were filed on the 17th of July following. There was an order of twenty days allowed for the filing of bills of exception. This was in accordance with the statute. The bills were filed after the time allowed by the court, and provided by the statute, and, therefore, can not be considered.
1. " Several grounds of the motion for a new trial suggest error on the part of the court in admission of testimony. There being no bills of exception presenting these matters, they can not be considered. It is insisted the court erred in not charging the law applicable to alibi. We are of opinion, under the evidence in this case, that this contention is not well taken. The case is one purely of circumstantial evidence, and the question of alibi was not an issue in the case otherwise than suggested under. the general theory of circumstantial evidence. We are of opinion that the failure of the court to charge on alibi is not of such material character as would require a reversal. An appropriate charge presenting the law of circumstantial evidence was given.
2. There were two special charges requested, which were refused by the court. In the first charge the court was requested to chárge the jury that all testimony as to the contents of the bill of lading, including name of shipper, sought to be introduced in evidence in this case, was by the court excluded from your consideration, and same shall not be considered by the jury for any purpose. On the face of this charge such evidence was not introduced, but only sought to be introduced. We are of opinion it was not necessary to instruct the jury as requested. In the second special charge the court was requested to instruct the jury that an indictment is no evidence of guilt, and the fact that there is an indictment against the defendant in this case should not be considered by them as a circumstance of guilt. There is nothing shown in the record that it was an insistence before the jury that the indictment should be regarded by them as evidence of guilt in any manner either by argument or otherwise, and we, therefore, are of opinion the court did not err in refusing this requested instruction.
3. Appellant insists the evidence is not sufficient to warrant the finding of the jury. As above stated, the testimony is circumstantial, but we are of opinion that it is sufficient to justify the verdict of the jury. ,
There are a great many facts and circumstances in the ease which we think authorized the jury to conclude that appellant was a guilty party in the theft of the horses, but we deem it unnecessary to collate these facts and circumstances.
The judgment is therefore affirmed.
Affirmed.
Brooks, Judge, absent.