Case Name: TOM BUSH VOLKSWAGEN, INC., a corporation; Universal Underwriters Insurance Company, a corporation; Atlantic National Bank of Jacksonville, a corporation, Appellants, v. Luiz C. KUNTZ, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1983-03-29
Citations: 429 So. 2d 398
Docket Number: No. AK-273
Parties: TOM BUSH VOLKSWAGEN, INC., a corporation; Universal Underwriters Insurance Company, a corporation; Atlantic National Bank of Jacksonville, a corporation, Appellants, v. Luiz C. KUNTZ, Appellee.
Judges: NIMMONS, J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 429
Pages: 398–401

Head Matter:
TOM BUSH VOLKSWAGEN, INC., a corporation; Universal Underwriters Insurance Company, a corporation; Atlantic National Bank of Jacksonville, a corporation, Appellants, v. Luiz C. KUNTZ, Appellee.
No. AK-273.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
March 29, 1983.
Steven E. Rohan of Vickers & Rohan, P.A., Jacksonville, for appellants.
William H. Folsom, Jr., P.A., Jacksonville, for appellee.

Opinion:
MILLS, Judge.
Tom Bush Volkswagen, an automobile dealer, appeals a judgment entered in favor of Kuntz, the purchaser of an automobile. Following a jury trial which resulted in a verdict finding a breach of warranty on the part of Volkswagen, the trial court found that Kuntz could revoke his acceptance of the automobile and required Kuntz to elect his remedy. He chose revocation of acceptance. No set-off for use of the auto was given. We affirm in part and reverse in part.
Kuntz purchased a new 1980 Volkswagen Rabbit. The car required frequent trips back to the shop. About eleven such trips occurred. There have been and currently are problems with the car's radio, air conditioning, windshield washers, cruise control, tires, and paint. Repairs have not been successful. There are other minor problems.
During the year and a half that Kuntz had the car, he drove it extensively, about 25,000 miles. This included several pleasure trips, one to Miami, one to Charleston, and one to Washington, D.C. A portion of the use of the car was allocated to Kuntz' business (medical practice) for tax purposes.
The dealer argues that the value of the auto was not substantially impaired so as to permit a revocation of acceptance. We disagree.
There is competent substantial evidence that the value of the car was substantially impaired. Kuntz himself so testified. In addition, a long list of relatively minor problems was provided. As stated in Orange Motors v. Dade County Dairies, 258 So.2d 319 (Fla. 3d DCA 1972):
[Ejvery buyer has the right to assume his new car, with the exception of minor adjustments, will be "mechanically new and factory furnished, operate perfectly, and be free of substantial defects" especially in view of the high powered advertising techniques of the auto industry.
It is clear that Kuntz did not receive this. We affirm the revocation of acceptance.
Relying on Cowart v. Claude Nolan, Inc., 281 So.2d 907 (Fla. 1st DCA 1973), the trial court refused any set-off representing Kuntz' use of the car. Full repayment of the purchase price was required. Cowart, a contracts case, is distinguishable. Cowart appealed a judgment which set off the seller's damages for loss of use of the auto. Cowart was awarded damages which were to place him in the position he would have been in had the contract been performed. Had the contract been performed, the seller would not have had the car. In our case though, we are attempting to restore the status quo ante. Had Kuntz elected his contract remedy, Cowart would apply. Instead, he elected his equitable remedy, codified in the Uniform Commercial Code. The rule of Orange Motors, supra, holding that a set-off for use of an automobile before revocation was proper, is the correct one. See also Restatement of Restitution § 157(l)(b). The denial of a set-off is reversed.
We note that the amount of the set-off is the value to Kuntz of the use of the auto. See Restatement of Restitution § 155(1). The reduction in value due to frequent trips seeking repairs may reduce the value to Kuntz below the price of a rental auto. In fact, Kuntz may have received no value, although this is unlikely given his extensive use of the auto.
We remand this case so that the trial court may establish the amount of the set-off, taking further evidence on this issue if desired.
NIMMONS, J., concurs.
ERVIN, J., specially concurs with opinion.