Case Name: BOARD OF EDUCATION OF JOHNSTON COUNTY v. BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS OF JOHNSTON COUNTY
Court: Supreme Court of North Carolina
Jurisdiction: North Carolina
Decision Date: 1930-03-05
Citations: 198 N.C. 430
Docket Number: 
Parties: BOARD OF EDUCATION OF JOHNSTON COUNTY v. BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS OF JOHNSTON COUNTY.
Judges: 
Reporter: North Carolina Reports
Volume: 198
Pages: 430–432

Head Matter:
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF JOHNSTON COUNTY v. BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS OF JOHNSTON COUNTY.
(Filed 5 March, 1930.)
Appeal and Error J g — Where tax has been levied and six months school had, question of necessary tax rate is moot and not necessary to he decided.
Where the county board of education has submitted to the board of county commissioners the amount to be included in the budget for a six months term of public schools, and upon a joint session of the two boards the clerk of the court has met with them as arbitrator (C. S., 5608), and decided for the board of education, and on appeal the judge of the Superior Court has accordingly directed an issue, and pending appeal has entered an order for a tax levy to take care of the debt service and a current expense fund for the schools, C. S., 5609, and on appeal to the Supreme Court it appears that the tax has been accordingly collected and applied to the support of the schools, and the six months term has almost expired: Held,, the appeal presents an abstract question unnecessary to decide, and held, further, in any view of the record there was no error.
Appeal by defendant from Sinclair, J., at September Term, 1929, of JohnstoN. No error.
Abell & Shepard for plaintiff.
James Raynor, Ezra Parker and Winfield H. Lyon for defendant.
Attorney-General Brummitt and Assistant Attorney-General Nash as Amici Curies.

Opinion:
Adams, J.
On 10 July, 1929, the plaintiff submitted to the defendant a proposed budget of the necessary expenses of operating the public schools of Johnston County for a term of six months. The defendant rejected the budget in part and suggested certain reductions. The parties held a joint session on 6 August, 1929, the plaintiff voting to adopt the budget and the defendant to amend it. The clerk of the Superior Court was called upon to act as arbitrator of tbe issues raised by tbe disagreement. C. S., 5608. Tbe clerk beld tbat tbe amount proposed in tbe budget was essential to tbe maintenance of tbe schools and ordered tbe defendant to levy a tax sufficient for tbis purpose. Tbe defendant appealed to tbe Superior Court and tbe jury under a directed instruction found in response to tbe issue tbat $10,115, tbe amount in controversy, was needed to maintain tbe schools for a term of six months. Judge Sinclair rendered judgment tbat tbe defendant levy a tax sufficient, with sums received from other sources, to produce tbe following amounts: for current expenses $399,348.89; for capital outlay, $3,650.50; for debt service, $156,116.46, the three items aggregating $559,176.46. C. S., 5596. Tbe defendant excepted and appealed to tbis Court. To prevent delay beyond a reasonable time for levying tbe tax, tbe judge directed tbe defendant to levy a tax for tbe ensuing year at a rate sufficient to raise $156,176.97 for tbe debt service fund and an amount, which with funds derived from other sources, would total $405,541.15, which was tbe current expense fund for tbe previous year. Tbe defendant excepted and appealed.
Tbe presiding judge made tbis order pursuant to tbe authority conferred by section 5609. In consequence tbe defendant levied a tax sufficient to produce a debt service fund and current expense fund in excess of tbe amount which would have been collected for these purposes under tbe budget. Tbe tax, or a large part of it, has been collected and applied to tbe support of tbe schools and tbe term of six months has almost expired. A new trial or a reversal of tbe judgment would not alter these conditions. Tbe appeal therefore raises a question which is abstract or academic. It would be useless to consider tbe bare question whether there was error in ordering tbe levy of a school tax which has been collected and paid out. It is tbe custom of appellate courts to disregard matters which have no relation to concrete form. Wikel v. Commissioners, 120 N. C., 451; Harrison v. Bryan, 148 N. C., 315; Pickler v. Board of Education, 149 N. C., 221; Wallace v. Wilkesboro, 151 N. C., 614; Moore v. Monument Co., 166 N. C., 211; Kilpatrick v. Harvey, 170 N. C., 668; Glenn v. Culbreth, 197 N. C., 675.
We do not mean to say that there was error in tbe judgment. In objecting to tbe budget tbe defendant proposed reductions amounting to $25,275.62. Tbe plaintiff agreed tbat tbis amount should be réduced by deducting $14,000 as tbe charge for fire insurance; and tbe defendant agreed tbat from its proposed reductions tbe items of $500 and $600.62 should be eliminated. Tbe remaining question was whether tbe difference ($10,175) was needed to maintain tbe schools for six months and it was determined under an issue which was submitted to tbe jury. Under tbe last clause of section 5608 tbe jury was permitted to consider "all papers and records relating to the case," including the verified budget. It is contended by the plaintiff that there is no exception to the admission of the papers and records, no competent evidence to impeach the items embraced in the issue, and that the directed instruction was correct. In any view of the record we find
No error.