Case Name: STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Julio BLANCO, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 2005-03-02
Citations: 896 So. 2d 900
Docket Number: No. 4D03-113
Parties: STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Julio BLANCO, Appellee.
Judges: STONE, WARNER, KLEIN, STEVENSON, SHAHOOD, GROSS, TAYLOR, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 896
Pages: 900–908

Head Matter:
STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Julio BLANCO, Appellee.
No. 4D03-113.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
March 2, 2005.
Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General, Tallahassee and Frank J. Ingrassia, Douglas J. Glaid and Andrea D. England, Assistant Attorneys General, Fort Lauderdale, for appellant.
Kevin J. Kulik, Fort Lauderdale, for appellee.

Opinion:
ON MOTION FOR REHEARING EN BANC
MAY, J.
We grant the State's motion for rehearing en banc, withdraw our previous opinion, and substitute the following opinion in its place.
The State appeals an order dismissing charges against the defendant based upon entrapment. We reverse the order of dismissal and remand the case to the trial court for reinstatement of the charges.
Law enforcement received information that drugs were being sold at a bar without any detailed information. Undercover officers went to the bar to attempt to find the dealers. Upon arrival, one of the officers approached the bar and sat next to the defendant. A conversation ensued. The officer indicated that he liked to "party," and explained to the defendant that he meant the use of cocaine.
The defendant left the bar at some point and went to the restroom. Upon his return, he told the officer no one was selling cocaine, but he found someone selling "Tina" or crystal meth for $60. The officer gave money to the defendant, who returned with the drugs. The officer bought the defendant a beer and talked for awhile. The officer exchanged numbers with the defendant and called him during the following days. The defendant was arrested two weeks later.
The defendant moved to dismiss the case on the grounds of entrapment. The court heard testimony from the defendant and the officer. They both testified to a conversation taking place and the use of the term "party." However, the defendant's interpretation of the word, and who said what, differed from that of the officer.
The trial court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss. The court explained:
I have to kind of disagree with [the State].... [T]his particular defendant was not a target of an investigation. He had not been previously noted as someone who dealt in drugs and that they were targeting him. This officer walks into knowingly — knowing it's a gay bar. — -and, as he testified, he approached this man who was sitting alone. He was the one that began the conversation. If it had been a woman sitting there I think she would have felt the same way. This was a man who was interested in her or him. The manner of procedure here and the talk that resulted would certainly seem to me objectionable, denied this man of his due process rights. And I am going to grant the motion to dismiss.
It is from this ruling that the State appeals.
Unlike subjective entrapment, which focuses on the issues of inducement and the defendant's predisposition, an objective analysis of entrapment on due process grounds focuses on the conduct of law enforcement. Munoz v. State, 629 So.2d 90 (Fla.1993). The type of conduct held to violate due process is that which so offends decency or a sense of justice that judicial power may not be exercised to obtain a conviction. See, e.g., State v. Glosson, 462 So.2d 1082 (Fla.1985) (law enforcement entering into a contingency contract with informants to obtain convictions); Cruz v. State, 465 So.2d 516 (Fla.), cert. denied, 473 U.S. 905, 105 S.Ct. 3527, 87 L.Ed.2d 652 (1985) (law enforcement officer appearing inebriated and hanging-money from his pocket in high crime area); State v. Williams, 623 So.2d 462 (Fla.1993) (illegal manufacture of crack cocaine by law enforcement officials for use in reverse-sting operation); Soohoo v. State, 737 So.2d 1108 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999) (undercover agent's consignment arrangement for sale of drugs). When government conduct violates a defendant's due process rights, the remedy is dismissal. See Munoz, 629 So.2d 90.
In this case, the defendant's version of the facts differed from that of the officer. But, even assuming the facts in the light most favorable to the defendant, law enforcement's conduct was not so outrageous that dismissal was warranted.
The trial court failed to limit its consideration to the conduct of law enforcement. Rather, it focused its attention on the effect of the officer's conduct on the defendant, the defendant's subjective perception of the situation, and his apparent lack of predisposition to commit the offense. Respectfully, those factors are irrelevant to a ruling when it is objectively analyzed on due process grounds.
Law enforcement was. alerted that drugs were being sold at this bar. As it does on a daily basis, it engaged undercover officers to find the dealers at the suspected location. We conclude the officer's conduct did not rise to that level of "outrageous" as required under the case law to support a finding of entrapment on due process grounds.
Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's order of dismissal and remand the case for reinstatement of the charges. The factual dispute between the State and the defendant prevents the resolution of subjective entrapment on a motion to dismiss. A jury may very well find the defendant not guilty on the basis of subjective entrapment. That, however, is a decision for another day.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
STONE, WARNER, KLEIN, STEVENSON, SHAHOOD, GROSS, TAYLOR, JJ., concur.
FARMER, C.J., dissents with opinion, in which GUNTHER and POLEN, JJ., concur.
HAZOURI, J., Recused.
. As Justice Kogan noted in his concurrence in Munoz, "[t]he due-process entrapment defense recognized in Cruz, Glosson, and [State v. ]Hunter[, 586 So.2d 319 (Fla.1999)] essentially is the same as 'objective entrapment.' Thus, the majority appears to toss objective entrapment out the front door but then readmits essentially the same concept into Florida law via the rear entrance, with some minor tinkering as to analysis." Id. at 102.