Case Name: Paul Irwin et al., Respondents, v. Wes Estes et al., Respondents, New American Community, Inc., et al., Petitioners
Court: Washington Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Washington
Decision Date: 1969-11-26
Citations: 77 Wash. 2d 285
Docket Number: No. 41306
Parties: Paul Irwin et al., Respondents, v. Wes Estes et al., Respondents, New American Community, Inc., et al., Petitioners.
Judges: 
Reporter: Washington Reports
Volume: 77
Pages: 285–305

Head Matter:
[No. 41306.
En Banc.
November 26, 1969.]
Paul Irwin et al., Respondents, v. Wes Estes et al., Respondents, New American Community, Inc., et al., Petitioners.
Frank J. Owens and Frank Parks Weaver, Jr., for petitioners.
John S. Lynch, Owen J. Wales, Delbert W. Johnson, Roger J. Crosby, and Fred D. Gentry, for respondents.
Reported in 461 P.2d 875.

Opinion:
Hill J.
On August 29, 1969 this court reviewed on a writ of certiorari an order entered on August 28 by the Superior Court for Thurston County which temporarily enjoined the New American Community, Inc., its agents and representative from sponsoring and conducting a proposed Sky River Rock Festival and Lighter Than Air Fair in Thurston County. The order also provided (apparently in response to a cross-claim by the New American Community, Inc. for a writ of mandamus directing the county auditor to issue a license for its festival and fair) that in "accordance therewith [the injunction] no license shall be issued for the conducting of the festival." The order further provided that the injunction "shall not be effective until security in the form of Twenty-Five Thousand Dollars ($25,000.00) has been deposited with the Clerk."
It was stipulated at the beginning of our hearing on August 29 that neither cash nor bond in the sum of $25,000 had been deposited with the Clerk of the Superior Court as required by the superior court's order. It was further stipulated that no such deposit would be made.
It was therefore apparent to this court that there was not and would not be a valid injunction. We thereupon entered an order which left the parties in exactly the same position as though there had been no injunction; stating that an opinion giving the legal basis for our order would follow.
No public authority was seeking to enjoin the proposed Rock Festival and Lighter Than Air Fair. The injunction was sought by private property owners, with whom the Northern Pacific Railway Co. later joined. For a temporary injunction to be issued at the instance of private parties, as in this case, the posting of a bond is mandatory. A statute (RCW 7.40.080) provides:
No injunction or restraining order shall be granted until the party asking it shall enter into a bond, in such a sum as shall be fixed by the court or judge granting the order, with surety to the satisfaction of the clerk of the superior court, to the adverse party affected thereby, conditioned to pay all damages and costs which may accrue by reason of the injunction or restraining order. The sureties shall, if required by the clerk, justify as provided by law, and until they so justify, the clerk shall be responsible for their sufficiency.
In Western Academy of Beaux Arts v. De Bit, 101 Wash. 42, 171 P. 1036 (1918), we stated that where a statute requires the giving of a bond as a condition precedent to the granting of an injunction, the court is not at liberty to disregard such statute; and it is error in such case to grant the injunction without the required bond.
The Superior Court for Thurston County properly required filing of security with the clerk of that court. It was never filed, and consequently there was no injunction.
There being no valid injunction to restrain the holding of the festival and fair, the superior court's direction in its order that no license should issue was without any legal foundation.
The county's requirements for the issuance of such a license date back to 1949. The Thurston County Code, TCC 6.04.010 reads as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any person or group or combination of persons to operate any circus, carnival, or public exposition for profit without first having obtained a license therefor from the county auditor as provided hereinafter.
All applications for such licenses shall be made to the county auditor. Upon application and payment of the license fee, the auditor shall issue a license setting forth the period of time for which such license shall be valid.
It shall be the duty of such licensee to place and maintain such license on the premises in such a position as to be clearly and readily observed by anyone entering the circus, carnival or public exposition.
The license fee shall be twenty-five dollars for each day such circus, carnival, or exposition is to be operated in Thurston County, provided, that the fee for the full number of days shall be paid at the time of original application. (Ord. 1691, §1,1949).
The language of the ordinance is clear, unambiguous and mandatory in its terms. The duty imposed on the county auditor thereunder is not discretionary, but ministerial.
The law is well summarized in the following statement from Corpus Juris Secundum (53 C.J.S. Licenses § 38 (1948)):
under statutes mandatory in terms no discretion is vested in the licensing board or officer, and every person who possesses the statutory qualifications and who complies with the statutory requirements is entitled to a license,
The superior court's direction to the county auditor in its order of August 28 was tied to the injunction, and when the injunction did not become effective, the auditor had no choice but to issue the license when the requisite fees were tendered.
The issue of whether this particular festival or fair should be held was never before this court. Neither did we sanction nor approve any violations of the law.
Our order of August 29 was based on two obvious legal propositions:
1. That private parties cannot secure an injunction without putting up a bond as required by statute. (There never was any motion to reduce the amount of the bond, or any suggestion that it was excessive.)
2. That under ordinances which vest no discretion in the licensing officer, and in the absence of an injunction, a licensing officer has no alternative and must issue a license when the applicants comply with the conditions precedent to the issuing thereof.
For these reasons we issued our order of August 29, 1969 disposing of the issues then before us.
Hunter, C. J., Rosellini, Neill, and McGovern, JJ., concur.
Finley, Weaver, and Hamilton, JJ., did not participate.