Case Name: Allan KINNISON, Appellant (Defendant), v. Lorena Yorio KINNISON, Appellee (Plaintiff)
Court: Supreme Court of Wyoming
Jurisdiction: Wyoming
Decision Date: 1981-05-04
Citations: 627 P.2d 594
Docket Number: No. 5445
Parties: Allan KINNISON, Appellant (Defendant), v. Lorena Yorio KINNISON, Appellee (Plaintiff).
Judges: Before ROSE, C. J., RAPER, THOMAS and ROONEY, JJ., and TAYLOR, District Judge.
Reporter: Pacific Reporter 2d
Volume: 627
Pages: 594–599

Head Matter:
Allan KINNISON, Appellant (Defendant), v. Lorena Yorio KINNISON, Appellee (Plaintiff).
No. 5445.
Supreme Court of Wyoming.
May 4, 1981.
John W. Davis of Davis, Donnell, Worrall & Bancroft, P. C., Worland, for appellant.
Kim D. Cannon of Burgess & Davis, Sheridan, for appellee.
Before ROSE, C. J., RAPER, THOMAS and ROONEY, JJ., and TAYLOR, District Judge.

Opinion:
ROSE, Chief Justice.
This appeal has as its genesis the breakup of a nonmarital living arrangement. The district court awarded the plaintiff, Lorena Kinnison, $15,000 by way of enforcing a settlement contract with the defendant, Allan Kinnison. Mr. Kinnison has appealed, claiming that there was no express contract of settlement and, further, that Wyoming law prohibits an award upon the dissolution of a nonmarital relationship.
We will hold that the district court correctly found that there was an enforceable oral contract for the settlement of claims between the parties and will affirm.
THE FACTS
Allan and Lorena Kinnison were married on December 6, 1969. The marriage lasted nearly five years until September 3, 1974, when they were divorced. In the spring of 1975, the parties began living together again in the same house that they had occupied during their marriage. The couple parented two children; one child was born during the marriage, and the other during the time period when Lorena and Allan Kinnison were living together. In this action the district court awarded child support to the plaintiff for both children. Appellant did not take issue with that award.
From the spring of 1975 until the couple separated in April of 1979, they lived together continuously along with their children. They maintained a joint bank account, pooled their salaries and jointly handled the financial matters of the household.
In June, 1975, soon after the couple had begun living together again, Lorena Kinni-son learned of a house and ten acres of land which were for sale and informed the appellant of the availability of this property. Allan Kinnison purchased the property and the couple worked together on improvements to the property during the four years they lived on it together. When the relationship ended in April, 1979, Allan Kinni-son told Lorena Kinnison that he wished to sell the property and that he would give her the furnishings and some of the proceeds of the sale. The sum of $15,000 was first suggested by Lorena Kinnison and agreed to by the appellant. There was evidence that the increase in the value of the property during the time the couple lived together amounted to between $48,000 and $62,000. Of that increase, only $22,000 could be attributed to inflation. Accordingly, it would be reasonable to assume that the remaining increase in value could be attributed to the improvements made by the parties.
On June 27,1979, Lorena Kinnison filed a complaint in district court asking for an accounting and claiming one-half interest in the property acquired during the time they were living together. The plaintiff offered several theories upon which she based her claim, including quantum meruit and unjust enrichment. In the alternative, the plaintiff asked for the payment of $15,000 as the fulfillment of a contract entered into with the defendant to settle her claims against him. The trial took place on October 16, 1980, and resulted in an award to the plaintiff of $15,000. In making the award, the trial judge noted that Ms. Kinnison had claims of $34,000 based on the quantum meruit theory which the judge apparently believed applicable to the case. Nevertheless, the judge stated that the $15,000 award was made to enforce the settlement agreement between the two parties and was not to be regarded as resulting from any of the other theories advanced by the plaintiff.
THE LAW
Wyoming does not recognize the doctrine of common-law marriage. In re Roberts' Estate, 58 Wyo. 438, 133 P.2d 492 (1943); and In re Reeves' Estate, 58 Wyo. 432, 133 P.2d 503 (1943). In this state, living arrangements between a man and woman must be formalized by the state before the traditional protections of the marriage relationship can be invoked. While repeatedly rejecting the doctrine of common-law marriage, this court has never held, however, that the fact that a man and a woman live together out of wedlock and engage in a sexual relationship in any way invalidates agreements between them or, because of the relationship, renders them incapable of contracting with one another. Only when it is shown that such an agreement has meretricious sexual services as its consideration will the court deny enforcement as being against public policy. Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal.3d 660, 134 Cal.Rptr. 815, 557 P.2d 106, 113 (1976). There is no allegation here that the agreement to pay Ms. Kinnison $15,000 from the proceeds of the sale of the house was made in exchange for sexual relations. All the evidence indicates that the parties intended the payment to be in settlement of plaintiff's claims in quantum meruit and unjust enrichment arising out of her labors on the house (which resulted in its enhanced value) and in maintaining and managing the household during their unmarried years together. In Roberts v. Roberts, 64 Wyo. 433, 196 P.2d 361, reh. denied 64 Wyo. 455, 197 P.2d 697 (1948), we held that a woman who in good faith believes she had a valid common-law marriage could recover in quasi contract for the value of her services. While the Roberts facts are different from those at bar because the Robertses undertook to enter into a formalized commonlaw relationship and these parties did not do that, the Roberts holding must nevertheless be read to stand for the proposition that this court has not refused to enforce a contract between unmarried male and female partners living together out of wedlock. In Willis v. Willis, 48 Wyo. 403, 49 P.2d 670 (1935), this court refused to find that an implied contract for services rendered automatically arises when a woman lives with a man without marriage. It is to be carefully noted that neither of these cases involve the doctrines of quantum meruit and/or unjust enrichment. We have not heretofore ruled on the viability of such claims nor do we need to do so in order to decide this case.
A contract made in settlement of claims is valid even if the claims settled are of doubtful worth. Peters Grazing Association v. Legerski, Wyo., 544 P.2d 449 (1975), reh. denied 546 P.2d 189 (1976); Parsley v. Wyoming Automotive Company, Wyo., 395 P.2d 291 (1964). This means that this court will not look behind a settlement agreement to see who would have prevailed in a dispute out of which the settlement agreement arises. If the settlement agreement itself meets contractual requirements, it will be enforced. In the present case, the claims of the plaintiff were not foreclosed by any decision of this court and are supported by the decisions in several states which, like Wyoming, do not recognize a common-law marriage. See Beal v. Beal, 282 Or. 115, 577 P.2d 507 (1978); and Feldman v. Nassi, 111 Cal.App.3d 881, 169 Cal.Rptr. 9 (1980). The settlement of these claims by and of itself will be sufficient consideration to form a binding contract.
In the instant matter, the district court found that the defendant and the plaintiff had entered into an express oral contract to settle these claims. This agreement was not denied by the defendant. The evidence in the record is sufficient to support this finding and the district court was correct when it ordered the defendant to perform his part of the bargain.
Affirmed.
ROONEY, J., filed a dissenting opinion.