Case Name: LENZ v. MAYOR OF DETROIT
Court: Michigan Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1955-12-01
Citations: 343 Mich. 599
Docket Number: Docket No. 39, Calendar No. 46,536
Parties: LENZ v. MAYOR OF DETROIT.
Judges: Carr, C. J., and Butzel, Boyles, Reid, and Kelly, JJ., concurred with Dethmers, J.
Reporter: Michigan Reports
Volume: 343
Pages: 599–610

Head Matter:
LENZ v. MAYOR OF DETROIT.
1. Municipal Corporations — Veterans’ Preference Act — Laches— Certiorari.
Plaintiff, a veteran who had been discharged from publie employment with city but who waited a year before instituting court proceedings to eompel reinstatement, which proceedings consumed about 3 years, and were followed by a delay of at least 7 months before seeking review by the proper remedy of certiorari, held, guilty of laches, especially where, during the interim, the city has eliminated the position formerly held by plaintiff and distributed the work among other employees already in employ of the city (CL 1948, § 35.402 et seq.).
2. Certiorari — Laches—Statute op Limitations — Suspension.
The provision in the statute of limitations, suspending its oper ation until a year after the conclusion of certain legal proceedings, under certain circumstances, is not controlling of the question of laches in the use of the discretionary remedy of certiorari (CL 1948, § 609.19).
References for Points in Headnotes
[1] 56 Am Jur, Veterans and Veterans’ Act §§ 11-13.
[1] Power to abolish or discontinue office. 4 ALE 205, 37 ALE 815, 172 ALE 1366.
[1] Constitutionality of State veterans’ publie employment preference ' law. 161 ALE 494.
[2] 19 Am Jur, Equity § 496.
[2, 3] 19 Am Jur, Equity § 501.
[4] See, generally, 14 Am Jur, Costs § 91.
3. Same — Time—Discretion of Court.
Statutory provision requiring the writ of certiorari to be issued within a given time does not take away the discretionary power of the court to quash for laches in. not suing out the-writ sooner (CL 1948, § 609.19).
4. Courts' — Determination as to Laches — Mandamus—Certiorari.
A decision that mandamus was not the proper remedy in earlier review of plaintiff’s proceeding against defendant did not constitute a conclusive determination on the question of laches, where trial court had decided no laches existed and the Supreme Court' did not disturb such finding.
5. Costs — Public Question — Veterans’ Preference.
No costs are allowed in veteran’s proceeding by certiorari- to review action of mayor of city in approving his dismissal, notwithstanding the veterans’ preference act, a public question being involved (CL 1948, § 35.402 et seq.).
Smith and Sharpe, JJ., dissenting.
Appeal from Wayne; Weideman (Carl M.), J.
Submitted June 9, 1955.
(Docket No. 39, Calendar No. 46,536.)
Decided December 1, 1955.
Rehearing denied March 1, 1956.
Certiorari denied by the Supreme Court of the United States June 11, 1956.
Certiorari by John N. Lenz against Albert E. Cobo, Mayor of the City of Detroit, to review proceedings resulting in plaintiff’s discharge. Judgment for plaintiff. Defendant appeals.
Reversed..
Craig Thompson, for plaintiff.
Paul T. Dwyer, Corporation Counsel, and Helen* Miller Smith, Assistant Corporation Counsel, for: defendant.
Chase E. Loive, for Local 836, American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, and' Veterans, on petition to intervene in rehearing.

Opinion:
Dethmers, J.
The facts are largely set forth in Lenz v. Mayor of Detroit, 338 Mich 383, in which we dismissed mandamus commenced in the circuit court on the ground that certiorari was the sole remedy available to review the action of the mayor approving and ordering plaintiff's discharge as a city employee after hearing before the mayor under the veterans' preference act. CL 1948, § 35.402 et seq. (Stat Ann 1952 Rev § 4.1222 et seq.).
The mayor's order of discharge issued February 6, 1950, and plaintiff delayed instituting the mandamus proceedings until February 5, 1951. Our decision in that case was announced December 29, 1953, and rehearing denied February 18, 1954. Plaintiff again •delayed until September 24,1954, before filing in the circuit court his petition for certiorari in this cause. The original notice to plaintiff of his discharge was dated November 14, 1949. The records in the mandamus case and at bar disclose that on November 9, 1949, the common council unanimously voted to abolish the 2 positions of legislative clerk, of which plaintiff held one, and on November 15, 1949, adopted a formal resolution abolishing them, the work thereof being thereby directed to be divided among and assigned to various other employees already in the employ of the city. On September 18, 1950, the civil service commission discontinued the classification of legislative clerk in city employment and it has not since been recreated.
Plaintiff seeks reinstatement to an abolished position, with resultant disruption of the existing system under which the duties of the abolished positions have been distributed and otherwise integrated therein, and giving rise to a serious question of rights to pension and unearned back pay for a 6-year period. In both the mandamus and certiorari cases defendant affirmatively raised the defense of laches, supported by testimony in the mandamus case and in this case by an affidavit attached to the motion to qnash the writ of certiorari, showing such facts, which indicate that reversal of the proceedings discharging plaintiff would result in prejudice, detriment and inconvenience to the public service. Under such circumstances we believe that plaintiff's delay of 1 year after the mayor's order of discharge before commencing the mandamus proceedings, with subsequent delay of almost 3 years occasioned by that ill-starred selection of remedy, and his further delay of 9, or at the least 7, months after decision by this Court in the mandamus case before commencement of this action, render him guilty of laches. Jones v. Doonan, 265 Mich 384; McGregor v. Carney, 271 Mich 278. Plaintiff cites Chamski v. Wayne County Board of Auditors, 288 Mich 238, to the contrary. The holding in that case was that plaintiff there could not be held guilty of laches because it is an affirmative defense and no testimony had been offered on the question. The case is, in that respect, distinguishable from that at bar.
While CL 1948, § 609.19 (Stat Ann § 27.611), cited by plaintiff, serves to suspend the bar of the statute of limitations under certain circumstances (McOmher v. Chapman, 42 Mich 117), the statute is not controlling of the question of laches. See In the Matter of Lantis, 9 Mich 324 (80 Am Dec 85), in which we held that the writ of certiorari at common law is not one of right, but rests in the sound discretion of the court; to be allowed or not as may best promote the ends of justice, and that a statutory provision requiring the writ of certiorari to be issued within 2 years did not take away the discretionary power of the court to quash for laches in not suing out the writ sooner.
Plaintiff stresses that the trial court decided in the mandamus proceeding that no laches existed and that this Court, on appeal therefrom, did not disturb that finding. Defendant did urge laches on appeal but there was no occasion to pass on it inasmuch as we held mandamus not the proper remedy. Decision in that case was, therefore, not conclusive of the question of laches.
Judgment of the court below setting aside the mayor's order of dismissal is reversed and the writ quashed, without costs, a public question being involved.
Carr, C. J., and Butzel, Boyles, Reid, and Kelly, JJ., concurred with Dethmers, J.