Case Name: Carl JOHNSON, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee
Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1981-11-10
Citations: 629 S.W.2d 731
Docket Number: No. 65844
Parties: Carl JOHNSON, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.
Judges: TEAGUE, J., not participating.
Reporter: South Western Reporter Second Series
Volume: 629
Pages: 731–740

Head Matter:
Carl JOHNSON, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.
No. 65844.
Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, En Banc.
Nov. 10, 1981.
Rehearing Denied Feb. 10, 1982.
Donald W. Rogers, Jr., Houston, court appointed on appeal, for appellant.
John B. Holmes, Jr., Dist. Atty., Molly Naylor, W. F. Roberts and Chris Lorenzen, Asst. Dist. Attys., Houston, and Robert Huttash, State’s Atty., Austin, for the State.

Opinion:
OPINION
W. C. DAVIS, Judge.
This is an appeal from a conviction for capital murder. The jury, after answering affirmatively special issues one and two pursuant to Art. 37.071, Vernon's Ann.C. C.P., assessed punishment at death. The sufficiency of the evidence is not challenged.
By his third ground of error, appellant contends that the trial court committed fundamental error by failing to submit the issue of provocation on the part of the deceased pursuant to the mandatory provisions of Art. 37.071(b)(3), supra. Art. 37.-071(b)(3) provides:
"(b) On conclusion of the presentation of the evidence, the court shall submit the following issues to the jury:
(3) if raised by the evidence, whether the conduct of the defendant in killing the deceased was unreasonable in response to the provocation, if any, by the deceased."
The record of the guilt stage of the trial reflects that appellant and Carl Baltimore entered Wayne's Food Market and committed a robbery. Baltimore held a gun to the owner's head; the appellant shot the 75-year-old security guard five times. The men took the money from the cash register and fled. During the punishment phase of the trial, the prosecutor read the appellant's confession to the jury. Appellant contends for the first time on appeal that the following portion of his confession raises the issue of provocation,
"I put the pistol in my pants and went inside the store with Baltimore. When we got inside, I saw a black man who I knew was a security guard. I knew he was a security guard because I have bought beer at Wayne's Supermarket since I have been old enough. I have known this security guard most of my life. And I called this man Ed. I think that is his real name. I had my hand on the butt of the pistol, and the security guard saw me and pulled his pistol and shot at me one time. At that time I ducked and pulled my pistol, which was a .38 revolver, and shot in the direction of the security guard. I was not aiming at him and was not trying to kill him. I think I shot four or five times, but I am really not sure."
In Evans v. State, 601 S.W.2d 943 (Tex.Cr.App.1980), the Court found that evidence taken from the defendant's confession that the deceased fired a shot at the defendant before the defendant shot at the deceased raised the issue of provocation. In Evans the Court held that the refusal to submit special issue number three after defend ant's timely request constituted reversible error.
In the instant case, as in Evans, appellant's statement in his confession that the deceased fired at appellant first raised the issue of provocation. It is settled that an accused is entitled to an instruction on every defensive matter raised by the evidence. The testimony of the defendant alone is sufficient to raise the issue. Garcia v. State, 605 S.W.2d 565 (Tex.Cr.App.1980).
Having determined that the issue of provocation was raised, the question is presented as to whether the failure of the trial court to submit the instruction sua sponte constitutes reversible error.
We agree with appellant that the language of Art. 37.07(b), supra, is mandatory. Thus, it was error to fail to submit the issue once raised. However, failure to object to the charge as submitted to the jury, waives all but fundamental error. See Duffy v. State, 567 S.W.2d 197 (Tex.Cr.App.1978). The appellant contends that the omission constitutes fundamental error. We disagree.
In Martinez v. State, 576 S.W.2d 854 (Tex.Cr.App.1979), the defendant, convicted of sexual abuse, contended that the court's charge was fundamentally erroneous because there was no instruction pursuant to Art. 38.07, Vernon's Ann.C.C.P. The Court held:
"Although the appellant failed to object to the court's charge at trial, he presently argues that the provisions of Article 38.-07, supra, are mandatory and that the court's failure to sua sponte comply with its provisions renders the court's charge fundamentally defective.
We agree with the appellant insofar as he contends that the directives of Article 38.07, supra, are mandatory; however, we cannot agree that the court's failure to so instruct the jury, in absence of appellant's objection or requested instruction, constitutes fundamental error. See Pitts v. State, 569 S.W.2d 898 (Tex.Cr.App.1978)."
In Williams v. State, 622 S.W.2d 116 (1981), the murder defendant argued that Article 37.071, Vernon's Ann.C.C.P. violated the Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments because it contained no provisions for directing and instructing the jury's consideration of mitigating circumstances at the punishment phase of the trial. The Court stated:
"It is appellant's contention that a 'charge on all mitigating evidence at the punishment phase of a capital murder trial is imperative if the jury is to give meaningful consideration to such evidence.' The appellant has failed to preserve the error now asserted on appeal. No objection to the court's charge or special requested instruction was filed. Ar-. tides 36.14 and 36.15. Absent such an objection or requested instruction, the trial court's failure to charge the jury as to the consideration of mitigating circumstances was not reversible error."
We hold that, in the absence of a timely objection, the failure to charge the jury on special issue number three does not constitute reversible error. The contention is overruled.
In ground of error one, appellant maintains that the trial court erred in excluding the testimony of one of his witnesses at the punishment stage, Shelvy Brown. Brown testified that he was the pastor at a Baptist church. He stated that he knew the appellant from visiting his grandmother and mother when they were ill and on other occasions. Brown also said that he visited appellant once when he was in jail. Defense counsel asked the witness,
"Q. Based on knowing him and knowing his family, do you know his reputa tion for being a peaceful, law-abiding citizen?
A. From the time I met him, it would be nice.

Q. Is that reputation good or bad?
A. Good."
On cross-examination the prosecutor asked Brown:
"Q. And who have you talked to about his reputation?
A. I talked to him personally, to his people, his sister.
Q. I am sure that they feel he has a good reputation. Who else have you talked to?
A. The only thing I can speak for was for how he was, he treated me. I never seen him violent as far as I am concerned.
Q. So, all you are saying is that you know what he told you and how he treated you, and that is what you are basing your statement on?
A. Not necessarily. I have been around him on occasion with the young people who were also there all together.
Q. Have you heard that this defendant, on the 18th day of December of 1976, was arrested for carrying a weapon?
MR. SCARDINO: We object to that question.
THE COURT: Overruled.
Q. (By Mr. Roberts) You may answer that question.
A. Yes, I did hear of that.
Q. You heard that?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Did you hear that on the 11th day of October, 1978, this defendant was arrested for the offense of capital murder?
MR. SCARDINO: Again, we object to the form of the question.
THE COURT: Again it is overruled. You may answer it.
A. Yes, I have heard that also.
Q. (By Mr. Roberts) And have you heard that on the 11th day of October of 1978 this defendant committed the offense of aggravated robbery?
A. No, I didn't hear about any robbery.
MR. SCARDINO: Again, we object.
THE COURT: Overruled.
Q. (By Mr. Roberts) And have you heard that in your hometown of Livingston, Texas, on the 26th of January of 1976 this defendant was arrested for the offense of theft?
MR. SCARDINO: We object.
THE COURT: Overruled. You may answer.
A. In the hometown of Livingston, no, sir, I haven't heard of him in Livingston.
Q. (By Mr. Roberts) If you had heard all those things, would you still have the opinion that he has a good reputation?
A. I said as far as I know.
Q. Well, I'm asking you that question. If you had heard all those things, would you still have the opinion that he has a good reputation?
A. As far as I am concerned, he do have a good reputation.
Q. So, there is nothing I could say or nothing that you could hear that would change your mind about his reputation?
A. Not necessarily.
Q. You are basing your opinion about his reputation on just knowing him ?
A. On the time I met him and have been around him, that is all I can say.
Q. You are not basing your opinion about his reputation at all on what you have heard other people say ?
A. I can't base it on what I hear.
MR. ROBERTS: I object to his testimony, then. He doesn't know his reputation.
THE COURT: Sustained.
MR. ROBERTS: Would ask that the jury be ordered to disregard his testimony entirely.
THE COURT: The jury is so ordered to disregard the testimony of this witness. You may step down, sir." (Emphasis added)
The appellant did not object to the trial court's action, thus nothing is preserved for review. We note, however, that the trial court ruled properly; the witness stated that his knowledge of appellant's reputation was based upon his personal encounters with appellant, not upon appellant's reputation in the community. See Patrick v. State, 156 Tex.Cr.R. 449, 243 S.W.2d 707 (1951). Contention number one is overruled.
Next, the appellant contends it was improper for the prosecutor to ask Shelvy Brown if he had heard that on October 11, 1978 the appellant had been arrested for the offense of capital murder. Appellant argues that it has long been recognized that it is improper to allow the State to test a witness' knowledge of an accused's reputation by questions based solely upon the alleged offense for which he is on trial. Stephens v. State, 128 Tex.Cr.R. 311, 80 S.W.2d 980 (1935). Stephens v. State, supra, relied upon by appellant is not applicable in the instant case. In Stephens, the defendant's indictment for the charged offense was the sole issue discussed in determining his reputation. In that case, the Court held:
"In all criminal cases the defendant is presumed to be innocent, and the indictment against him should not be used to destroy that presumption of law, nor can the indictment be appropriated by the jury as any evidence of guilt; neither should the same be used to impugn his good reputation which he has established by many years of good conduct and obedience to the law. If it were otherwise, it would give weight to a presumption against him arising entirely out of the charge contained in the indictment for which he is being tried. If the discussion of the charge contained in the indictment could be used as a basis for showing that a man's reputation as a law-abiding citizen was bad, then no man who was on trial could successfully show a good reputation as a law-abiding citizen."
In Ward v. State, 591 S.W.2d 810 (Tex.Cr.App.1978), the Court, quoting from Brown v. State, 477 S.W.2d 617 (Tex.Cr.App.1972), stated:
"The general rule is that, as part of its cross-examination, the State is permitted to ask the character witness if he has heard of a specific act of misconduct. However, the State may not ask whether the witness had personal knowledge of the act, nor may the question be framed so as to imply that the act has actually been committed. The State, as a prerequisite for asking the question, must have a good faith belief that the act actually occurred. Hart v. State, 447 S.W.2d 944 (Tex.Cr.App.1970); Stewart v. State, 148 Tex.Cr.R. 480, 188 S.W.2d 167 (1945). [Footnote omitted].

The only requirement is that the act be inconsistent with the character trait about which the witness has testified. See Pace v. State, 398 S.W.2d 123 (Tex. Cr.App.1965).

It should be kept in mind that the purpose of the cross-examination is not to discredit the person on whose behalf the witness is testifying, but rather, the purpose is to affect the weight of the witness' testimony."
We find that the trial court did not err in overruling appellant's general objection to the have-you-heard question. The contention is overruled.
In grounds of error four, five, and six, appellant contends that three veniremen were improperly excused "pursuant to the unconstitutional provisions of Sec. 12.-31(b) of the Penal Code." The appellant concedes that there were no objections to the dismissals of the veniremen by the court, but argues that trial counsel could not fairly be expected to object on a ground held meritless by this Court prior to his trial. Appellant's contentions have been raised and decided adversely to his position in Crawford v. State, 617 S.W.2d 925 (Tex.Cr.App.1980) (opinion on rehearing). The grounds of error are overruled.
Appellant, in ground of error eight, contends the trial court committed fundamental error by failing to give the jury limiting instructions on extraneous offenses in the charge at the punishment phase of the trial. The appellant at trial did not request such an instruction, nor did he object to the charge because it failed to include such an instruction. In the absence of an objection, the failure to submit an instruction on extraneous offenses is not fundamental error. See Romo v. State, 568 S.W.2d 298 (Tex.Cr.App.1978) (opinion on rehearing). The ground of error is overruled.
Appellant argues in ground of error seven that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel in violation of his constitutional rights. He maintains that his arrest was illegal; therefore, if trial counsel had properly presented a motion to suppress, the appellant's confession, taken soon after his arrest, and the weapons and stolen property found with appellant at that time would have been inadmissible. We are unable to agree with appellant that the record reflects his arrest was illegal. Further, appellants' speculation that a "reasonable possibility" existed for the exclusion of the confession and other evidence is not evidence that counsel was ineffective. The record shows that trial counsel filed a motion for a hearing on the voluntariness of appellant's confession. The hearing was held and the trial court concluded that the confession was voluntary. The adequacy of an attorney's representation is not to be judged by hindsight. Howell v. State, 563 S.W.2d 933 (Tex.Cr.App.1978).
Appellant maintains that ineffectiveness of counsel was demonstrated by counsel's failure to object to the omission in the charge of an instruction on extraneous offenses and, because appellant was circumstantially connected to the extraneous offense, circumstantial evidence. Also, the failure to request an instruction on special issue number three indicates that counsel had no basic understanding of the capital punishment scheme and procedures, he urges. The isolated instance of a failure to object will not necessarily render counsel ineffective. Passmore v. State, 617 S.W.2d 682 (Tex.Cr.App.1981). Regarding the failure to request an instruction of special issue number three, we note that Evans v. State, supra, had not been decided at the time of appellant's trial and there were no other cases from this Court on that issue to provide guidance to defense counsel. While such a charge would have specifically enabled the jury to consider the previously discussed portion of appellant's confession in mitigation of punishment in the context of the third punishment issue, we do not hold that the failure to object to this omission in and of itself renders counsel ineffective. See Howell v. State, supra. The adequacy of an attorney's assistance is based upon the totality of the representation. Passmore v. State, supra; Johnson v. State, 614 S.W.2d 148 (Tex.Cr.App.1981).
The appellant further argues that the record of the voir dire examination reveals many shortcomings in counsel's representation of appellant. Appellant maintains that the examination by counsel was "perfunctory and unskilled," that counsel improperly allowed the trial court to inquire as to the panel's understanding of the words "deliberately" and "probability," and finally that counsel exercised peremptory challenges prior to determining if the State would have excused such jurors. The voir dire examination of the potential jurors constitutes more than 1,300 pages of this record. This Court will not second guess the strategy of trial counsel. See Passmore v. State, supra. The test to be applied in determining whether counsel provided constitutionally satisfactory services is the "reasonably effective assistance" standard. Passmore v. State, supra. The trial court appointed two attorneys to represent appellant. The record as a whole reflects that appellant was afforded the reasonably effective assistance of counsel. The contention is overruled.
No reversible error having been presented, we affirm the judgment.
TEAGUE, J., not participating.
. The confession was introduced in evidence at the guilt stage.
. The reason for this conclusion is explained in Evans as follows:
"Firing his pistol only after being fired upon rendered appellant less culpable than an armed robber who kills without provocation. The jury should have been allowed to consider this mitigating circumstance in the context of the third punishment issue. Appellant's imperfect self-defense claim may have been sufficiently mitigating to warrant a sentence of life imprisonment."
. At the hearing on the voluntariness of the confession, Officer Young testified that he went to a residence looking for Carl Baltimore. Appellant was arrested at that residence because he matched the description of one of the robbers at the Wayne Food Store. It was not developed, but it was indicated that the police were aware of appellant's involvement from a confidential informant.
. We also note that testimony of witnesses to the robbery is in conflict with appellant's version of the shooting.