Case Name: BACKMAN v. BATEMAN et al.; TANNER v. BATEMAN et al.
Court: Utah Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Utah
Decision Date: 1953-11-13
Citations: 1 Utah 2d 153
Docket Number: Nos. 8052, 8064
Parties: BACKMAN v. BATEMAN et al. TANNER v. BATEMAN et al.
Judges: WADE, J., concurs.
Reporter: Utah Reports, Second Series
Volume: 1
Pages: 153–171

Head Matter:
263 P.2d 561
BACKMAN v. BATEMAN et al. TANNER v. BATEMAN et al.
Nos. 8052, 8064.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Nov. 13, 1953.
Marr, Wilkins & Cannon, Paul B. Cannon, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff.
E. R. Callister, Jr., Atty. Gen., John W. Horsley, Asst. Atty. Gen., for defendants.

Opinion:
CROCKETT, Justice.
Original proceeding in this court to test plaintiffs' rights to continue as school principal (Backman) and school teacher (Tanner) under a newly enacted revision of our anti-nepotism statute.
The pertinent portion reads as follows:
"It is unlawful for any person holding any position the compensation for which is paid out of public funds to retain in employment or to employ, appoint, or vote for the appointment of, his brother [certain other named relatives] when the salary of such appointee is to be paid out of any public funds; and it is unlawful for such appointee to accept or to retain such employment in all cases where the direct power of employment or appointment to such position is or can be exercised by any person within the degrees of consanguinity or affinity herein specified, or by a board or group of which such person is a member."
This statute is more comprehensive than its predecessor in that instead of being limited to named classes of officials with hiring power, it refers to all persons holding positions the compensation for which is paid out of public funds, whether employee or employer, and purports to apply whether the latter does in fact do anything affirmative in employing or retaining his relative in office or not.
The principles governing both cases being the same, they were consolidated. We first treat the suit brought by Ralph V. Backman. The facts recited are based upon the statement of the plaintiffs, which the defendants in their brief concede to be "accurate and complete."
Mr. Backman is 49 years of age, was born and has lived his life thus far in Salt Lake City. He owns his own home where he presently resides with his wife and five children; they are all integrated into various aspects of community life. He has been employed by the Salt Lake City Board of Education (hereinafter called the Board) continuously for the past 27 years. He began as a teacher and has progressed by several upgrading steps until he became principal of the South High School in 1948, in which position he has since served. He has met the educational and other standards set up for the various positions he has held to the satisfaction of the Board when he was originally hired and on each renewal of his contract since.
Further admitted facts are: That it is doubtful that he could secure employment as a principal in another school district of this State; no other district has high schools of comparable size to those of Salt Lake City and none pays as high a salary for such position. All during his employment he has been required by law to be a member of the local Teachers' Retirement Association, the funds for which are supplied by deductions from teachers' salaries, at the present time being 2% of the maximum of $2,500 and an equal amount contributed by the Board. To be eligible for benefits he must have taught 30 years and be a member of the Association at the time of retirement. If he cannot continue his employment by the Board he will lose all benefits of the Teachers' Retirement Association including the amount he has personally contributed. The Board employs its teaching personnel (including principals) under an annual written contract, but "has a tenure policy of renewal of these contracts when its teaching personnel are doing entirely satisfactory," which qualification Mr. Backman meets.
At a meeting of the Board a resolution was passed authorizing his continuance in his job for the next school year. His brother, LeGrand Backman, who first became a member of the Board years after Ralph V. Backman was hired, did not participate in this action. Ralph V. Backman had previously indicated his desire to be so employed. Therefore, he had a contract to work for the school year 1953-54, except only if the statute in question prevents him from being so employed.
Pursuant to statutory authority, Superintendent of Salt Lake City Schools (M. Lynn Bennion) requested an opinion from the State Superintendent of Public Instruction (E. Allen Bateman) as to the effect of the new anti-nepotism statute upon the employment of plaintiff. On advice of the Attorney General (E. R. Callister, Jr.) Bate-man notified Bennion that it would be unlawful to employ Ralph V. Backman "dur ing the time his brother is a member of the Board," -whereupon plaintiff was notified that the Board could not employ him for the sole reason of the alleged statutory prohibition; which laid the foundation for this action.
Mr. Backman contends that if this statute is interpreted and applied as suggested by the defendants, it would have the effect of destroying his employment and all of the advantages incident thereto — his preferred position in grade, pay, seniority — and cause him to lose the benefits which have accrued to him under the Teachers' Retirement Association. His argument is that for the law to thus forcibly compel him to uproot himself, his family, his home and destroy the career to which he has devoted his life because of a circumstance over which he has no control, is unreasonable and arbitrary in the highest degree and is a violation of his constitutionally guaranteed liberties, his right to work, and that it deprives him of property without due process of law.
Generally speaking, the state may prescribe the conditions upon which it will allow work to be done in its behalf, yet regulations pertaining to public employment cannot discriminate against individuals or classes without a reasonable basis therefor related to the public good, nor deprive persons of their liberty or property without due process of law.
That Mr. Backman's interest in his employment involves a constitutionally guaranteed liberty seems so certain as not to' admit of argument. This court observed in the case of McGrew v. Industrial Commission :
"Thus one may be said to have a special property in his profession or , calling by means of which he makes his support, and he can be deprived of it only by due process of law. The right to work, the right to engage in gainful occupations, the right to receive compensation for one's work are essentially property rights."
Such right is indeed one of the most important of the liberties vouched safe to one in our society. It was so regarded by the framers of our state constitution. Article XII, § 19: "Every person in this State shall be free to obtain employment whenever possible". Upon which we commented in State v. Packard, "This freedom to work complements and makes more meaningful the other rights guaranteed as part of our constitutional liberties." And further in Block & Griff v. Schwartz, this court through Bartch, J. cogently observed, "An enactment which deprives a person arbitrarily of his property, or some part of his personal liberty, is just as much inhibited by the supreme law as one which would deprive him of life." (Emphasis added.)
It should be observed further that — under the facts here presented — Mr. Backman had a contract to work. Based on the tenure policy of the board he had every reason to expect that he could continue in his job so long as his work was satisfactory; the board had passed its resolution hiring him for the next year which he- had accepted. This amounted to an agreement for his continuance in employment which vested in him a property right. This is not disputed ; the Attorney General makes no contention to the contrary; nor does he question the jurisdiction of this court to hear this cause, but on the contrary the defendant joins in the request that we entertain and determine the matter, which would be maintainable only if such a right were in jeopardy. A property right existed also in the benefits which had accrued to him in the Teachers' Retirement Association, and which would be lost if his employment does not continue.
It cannot be gainsaid that the personal liberties and property rights of plaintiff which this statute might abrogate, are of paramount importance and that they should be safeguarded to the highest possible degree consistent with the public good. They should not be made to yield to mere convenience or expediency, nor sacrificed to the exigencies of special circumstances, even though some abuses may exist, if their elimination requires the arbitrary violation of these constitutional liberties. This court has noted that "great caution must be observed in permitting encroachments upon basic rights, assured by the constitution, and such restriction can be effected only in accordance with constitutional prerogatives ."
The only basis upon which the proposed limitation of these rights could be justified would be under the police power to protect the public health, morals or welfare. It is true that when such matters are involved the police power is broad in its scope, but it is not without limit. .It must be measured in relation to the above referred to constitutional rights. There must exist an evil of a substantial nature, the correction of which would serve the public welfare, and the law must be such as could reasonably be supposed to tend toward the accomplishment of that purpose.
We are fully aware that it is not the prerogative of this court to question the wisdom of the legislature. But where the validity of a law which would infringe upon important constitutional liberties and property rights of citizens is questioned, it is not only permissible, but our duty to look beyond the first blush impression of the enactment to see whether there is a sound basis to justify such use of the police power; that is, whether there is an evil of a substantial nature affecting the public welfare at which the legislation is aimed, and whether it could reasonably be supposed to tend toward the accomplishment of that purpose. The extent to which such rights can be limited must bear some reasonable relationship to the seriousness of the evil which is sought to be corrected. As has been said of old, "It is unwise to burn a barn to get rid of a mouse."
The vice at which anti-nepotism statutes are aimed is avoiding inefficiency in public office by preventing officials from favoring their relatives and appointing those who may not be qualified to serve. In one of the earliest cases dealing with the subject, the basis upon which such statutes are held valid was stated by the Supreme Court of Idaho: " we believe it to be within the legislative power to prohibit officers from appointing persons to office related to them in the interest of efficiency in public service as a legitimate police regulation, and reasonable legislation in regard thereto is constitutional and enforceable." The same idea was announced by the Supreme Court of Florida, which stated, "adequate protection against appointments other than upon approved merits, is all that an 'anti-nepotism' law can constitutionally be supposed to cover and still remain within the police power, under the guise of which it is enacted." Numerous other authorities so affirm.
We agree that statutes which prohibit public officials from choosing and hiring their relatives, serve the salutary purpose of preventing selection of employees on the 'basis of favoritism to relatives rather than on merit. Such laws tend to make for better efficiency in public office, and are therefore a valid exercise of the police power. The authorities referred to, however, are concerned with anti-nepotism laws prohibiting the hiring of relatives in the original instance. Thorough research by ourselves and capable counsel has failed to discover any nepotism law which goes as far as this new Utah statute in that it proposes to interrupt and destroy the employment of persons who had been lawfully hired and had continued to work under the identical conditions for years. This presents a greatly different problem.
Under this statute employees who have been hired by boards or commissions in no way related to them and therefore presumably upon their qualifications for their jobs, and who have become more proficient therein by years of experience, are declared to be in violation of law on July 1st and thereafter, merely because some relative within one of 19 classes named is a member of a board or commission by which the power of employment "is or can be" exercised, whether the relative had anything whatsoever to do with employing or retaining him in his position. Paradoxically this would be so even if the relative did everything in his power to prevent the employment of, or to discharge the employee. The same result would inure' to an employee who had previously been in employment, if any such relative at any later time, became a member of such a board. Where an employee was hired when no relative was a member of the board, and where no relative does any affirmative act, directly or indirectly to employ or retain him, and further, has no power of supervision, how can it fairly be said that the bare fact of relationship would make for appointments of incapable employees or in any way tend to foster inefficiency in public office ? The answer seems obvious: There would be none; or at least the chance thereof would be so extremely small that it could not properly be regarded as an evil of a substantial nature.
As compared with the relatively negligible harm which might come from the sole fact of relationship as above discussed, far-reaching and drastic are the effects of this statute upon the lives and careers of plaintiffs and other capable and faithful public employees who have given many years to a particular job. Persons who had obtained employment on merit in the first place, and who had virtually given their working lives to making a career of such pursuit, simply by continuing to work under the same conditions which had existed for years, following what was theretofore a career of honorable service, are by this statute declared to be guilty of crime on July 1st; their plans are upset and the economic basis of their lives, upon which all its other aspects — social, religious and family — must devolve, is destroyed because of a circumstance arising through no fault of theirs and wholly beyond their control, and bearing little or no relationship to their capacity to render efficient service.
In addition to the foregoing, even if we should assume that some sufficient evil might result from the sole fact of relationship to warrant the invocation of the police power for the purpose of curtailing it and promoting efficiency in public office, an analysis of this effect of the statute makes it appear that it would not in fact serve such purpose, but the result would in all likelihood be to the contrary.
Public employment is already fraught with numerous disadvantages: the generally meager monetary rewards, presently existing uncertainties of tenure, public indifference to ability, diligence and merit, contrasted with ever-ready criticism for any lack therein; the necessity of living a "goldfish bowl" life, open to public scrutiny, the constantly present possibility of being pilloried for any mistake or indiscre tion, are factors which definitely discourage many capable people who might otherwise desire to follow a career of some type of public service from doing so. It is well known that such considerations even now make it difficult for public agencies to compete in the labor market for qualified employees. Add to this the possible effects of this statute: suppose, for instance, a young man who is capable, well educated, qualified as an engineer, accountant or specialized in some other field, were considering two positions — one in private industry — one in public employment; how could the latter compete in bidding for his services if in taking such job he would be under the constant hazard that if any relative of his of the 19 classes enumerated became a member of the board at any time during his career, his position and all-he had invested in it would be ipso facto destroyed? If this hazard were added to the already existing disadvantages of public employment the difficulty in inducing efficient personnel to take such jobs would be greatly increased and the net effect of the statute, in all probability, would be to decrease rather than increase efficiency in public employment. It is obvious that a statute cannot properly be justified as an exercise of the police power for the accomplishment of a purpose unless it could reasonably be regarded as calculated to effectuate the purpose; conversely if it appears that it would be wholly unreasonable to believe that the statute would tend toward the accomplishment of the purpose, violation of the individual rights involved would not be warranted.
Cognizant as we are that every doubt must be resolved in favor of constitutionality, we are nevertheless of the opinion, and hold that the retroactive effect of this statute which would prohibit employees from continuing in their erstwhile lawful employments, solely because of relationship, where the relative does nothing to appoint or retain, nor has any power of supervision or control over the employee, would amount to an unwarranted infringement upon rights guaranteed to individuals under our constitution and is therefore invalid.
The same principles apply in the case of Mathias C. Tanner. The school boards are therefore at liberty to follow their desires in employing the plaintiffs. Due to the fact that this suit has been conducted on a friendly basis there seems to toe no necessity for issuing any order to implement this opinion.
No costs awarded.
WADE, J., concurs.
. 52-3-1, U.C.A.1953 (1953 Supp.)
. 52-3-1, U.C.A.1953.
. 53-3-4, U.C.A.1953.
. Atkin v. Kansas, 191 U.S. 207, 24 S.Ct. 124, 127, 48 L.Ed. 148.
. Opinion of the Justices, 303 Mass. 631, 22 N.E.2d 49, 123 A.L.R. 199.
. 96 Utah 203, 85 P.2d 608, 610.
. Utah, 250 P.2d 561, 563.
. 27 Utah 387, 76 P. 22, 25, 65 L.R.A. 308.
. See footnote 7 supra.
. State ex rel. Cox v. Board of Education of Salt Lake City, 21 Utah 401, 60 P. 1013; 16 C.J.S., Constitutional Law, § 175a.
. Cooley, Constitutional Limitations (8th ed.) 1228.
. Barton v. Alexander, 27 Idaho 286, 148 P. 471, 475.
. State ex rel. Robinson v. Keefe, 111 Fla. 701, 149 So. 638.
. See 88 A.L.R. 1103.
. Newcomb v. Ogden City Public School Teachers' Retirement Comm., Utah., 218 P.2d 287; Hansen v. Public Employees Retirement System Board of Administration, Utah, 246 P.2d 591.