Case Name: The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Sandro Lopez, Appellant; The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Yolanda Billingslea, Appellant; The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Winston Nicholson, Appellant
Court: New York Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 2006-02-16
Citations: 6 N.Y.3d 248
Docket Number: 
Parties: The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Sandro Lopez, Appellant. The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Yolanda Billingslea, Appellant. The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Winston Nicholson, Appellant.
Judges: 
Reporter: New York Reports
Volume: 6
Pages: 248–264

Head Matter:
[ 844 NE2d 1145, 811 NYS2d 623]
The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Sandro Lopez, Appellant. The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Yolanda Billingslea, Appellant. The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Winston Nicholson, Appellant.
Argued January 12, 2006;
decided February 16, 2006
POINTS OF COUNSEL
Center for Appellate Litigation, New York City (David J. Klem and Robert S. Dean of counsel), for appellant in the first above-entitled action.
The intermediate appellate courts retain a residuum of authority sua sponte, and in an extraordinary case, review the excessiveness of a sentence despite a valid waiver of the right to appeal. (People v Delgado, 80 NY2d 780; People v Thompson, 60 NY2d 513; People v Pollenz, 67 NY2d 264; Waldo v Schmidt, 200 NY 199; People v Bourne, 139 AD2d 210; People v Coleman, 30 NY2d 582; People v Zuckerman, 5 NY2d 401; People v Speiser, 277 NY 342; People v Stevens, 91 NY2d 270; People v Farrell, 85 NY2d 60.)
Robert T. Johnson, District Attorney, Bronx (Jonathan Zucker and Joseph N Ferdenzi of counsel), for respondent in the first above-entitled action.
Defendant’s valid waiver of his right to appeal foreclosed his ability to raise an excessive sentence claim and the Court appropriately declined to review that claim in the interest of justice. (People v Seaberg, 74 NY2d 1; People v Callahan, 80 NY2d 273; People v Hidalgo, 91 NY2d 733; People v Blakley, 34 NY2d 311; People v Campbell, 97 NY2d 532; People v Francabandera, 33 NY2d 429; People v Armlin, 37 NY2d 167; People v Lococo, 92 NY2d 825; People v Allen, 82 NY2d 761; People v Calvi, 89 NY2d 868.)
Lynn W.L. Fahey, New York City, for appellant in the second above-entitled action.
I. Appellant’s waiver of her right to appeal was not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, since the court told her the right to appeal existed only if she went to trial, and was automatically waived by pleading guilty. (Johnson v Zerbst, 304 US 458; People v Callahan, 80 NY2d 273; People v Seaberg, 74 NY2d 1; Barker v Wingo, 407 US 514; People v Harris, 61 NY2d 9; People v Thomas, 53 NY2d 338; Carnley v Cochran, 369 US 506; People v Muniz, 91 NY2d 570; People v Williams, 36 NY2d 829; People v Calvi, 89 NY2d 868.) II. The parties lack the power to deprive the Appellate Division of its interest of justice jurisdiction to modify a sentence as excessive. (People v Thompson, 60 NY2d 513; People v Delgado, 80 NY2d 780; People v Hidalgo, 91 NY2d 733; People v Pride, 3 NY2d 545; People v Bleakley, 69 NY2d 490; People v Bourne, 139 AD2d 210; People v Miles, 173 App Div 179; People v Spagnolia, 260 App Div 551; People v Pollenz, 67 NY2d 264; People v Zuckerman, 5 NY2d 401.)
Charles J. Hynes, District Attorney, Brooklyn (Joyce Slevin and Leonard Joblove of counsel), for respondent in the second above-entitled action.
I. Defendant’s claim that her waiver of the right to appeal was invalid is not preserved for this Court’s review. In any event, the waiver was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. (People v Robinson, 36 NY2d 224; People v Lopez, 71 NY2d 662; People v Epps, 255 AD2d 840; People v Carmona, 192 AD2d 446; People v Conte, 186 AD2d 579; People v Nixon, 21 NY2d 338, 393 US 1067; People v Toxey, 86 NY2d 725; People v Johnson, 82 NY2d 683; People v Claudio, 64 NY2d 858; People v Pascóle, 48 NY2d 997.) II. Defendant’s waiver of her right to appeal foreclosed appellate review of her excessive sentence claim by the Appellate Division. (People v Pollenz, 67 NY2d 264; People v Thompson, 60 NY2d 513; People v Callahan, 80 NY2d 273; People v Muniz, 91 NY2d 570; People v Seaberg, 74 NY2d 1; People v Bourne, 139 AD2d 210; People v Burk, 181 AD2d 74; People v Discala, 45 NY2d 38; People v Thompson, 60 NY2d 513; People v Howe, 56 NY2d 622.)
Center for Appellate Litigation, New York City (Robert S. Dean of counsel), for appellant in the third above-entitled action.
I. The waiver of appellant’s right to appeal cannot be considered knowing, intelligent, and voluntary when it was presented to him as something that happened automatically merely by virtue of the fact that he was pleading guilty. (People v Seaberg, 74 NY2d 1; People v Williams, 36 NY2d 829; People v Callahan, 80 NY2d 273; People v Moissett, 76 NY2d 909; People v Bray, 154 AD2d 692; Johnson v Zerbst, 304 US 458; People v Pollenz, 67 NY2d 264; People v Hidalgo, 91 NY2d 733; People v Muniz, 91 NY2d 570; People v Thompson, 60 NY2d 513.) II. The intermediate appellate courts retain a residuum of authority, in extraordinary cases, to review the excessiveness of a sentence despite a valid waiver of the right to appeal. (People v Delgado, 80 NY2d 780; People v Thompson, 60 NY2d 513; People v Pollenz, 67 NY2d 264; Waldo v Schmidt, 200 NY 199; People v Bourne, 139 AD2d 210; People v Miles, 173 App Div 179; People v Coleman, 30 NY2d 582; People v Zuckerman, 5 NY2d 401; People v Stevens, 91 NY2d 270; People v Farrell, 85 NY2d 60.)
Robert T Johnson, District Attorney, Bronx (Jennifer Marinaccio and Joseph N. Ferdenzi of counsel), for respondent in the third above-entitled action.
I. Defendant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right to appeal. (People v Seaberg, 74 NY2d 1; People v Moissett, 76 NY2d 909; People v Hidalgo, 91 NY2d 733; People v Moyett, 22 AD3d 114; People v Pollenz, 67 NY2d 264.) II. Defendant’s valid waiver of his right to appeal, part of a bargained-for plea agreement, forecloses him from seeking review of the agreed-upon sentence as harsh and excessive in the interest of justice. (People v Callahan, 80 NY2d 273; People Seaberg, 74 NY2d 1; People v Pollenz, 67 NY2d 264; People v,Miles, 61 NY2d 635; People v Discala, 45 NY2d 38; People v Blakley, 34 NY2d 311; People v Campbell, 97 NY2d 532; People v Francabandera, 33 NY2d 429; People v Armlin, 37 NY2d 167; People v Allen, 82 NY2d 761.)
Legal Aid Society of New York, Criminal Appeals Bureau, New York City (Steven Banks and Laura R. Johnson of counsel), amicus curiae in the third above-entitled action.
Given the increasingly prevalent prosecutorial and/or judicial insistence upon pro forma, nonnegotiable appeal waivers as the “price” of a guilty plea resolution, the perfunctory waiver obtained in the case before the Court should be deemed unenforceable and this Court should hold, for policy as well as statutory reasons, that the Appellate Division departments retain interest-of-justice jurisdiction to review unjustly harsh sentences despite a waiver of appeal. (People v Seaberg, 74 NY2d 1; People v DeSimone, 80 NY2d 273; People v Holman, 89 NY2d 876; People v Moyett, 22 AD3d 114.)
Richard A. Brown, District Attorney, Kew Gardens (Gary S. Fidel and John M. Castellano of counsel), amicus curiae in the third above-entitled action.
The plea court properly ensured defendant’s knowing waiver of his right to appeal, and the Appellate Division properly declined to address the excessive sentence issue based on the waiver. (People v Seaberg, 74 NY2d 1; People v Callahan, 80 NY2d 273; People v Moissett, 76 NY2d 909; People v Allen, 82 NY2d 761; People v Hidalgo, 91 NY2d 733; People v Muniz, 91 NY2d 570; People v Avery, 85 NY2d 503; People v Outley, 80 NY2d 702; People v Vargas, 88 NY2d 363; People v Harris, 98 NY2d 452.)

Opinion:
OPINION OF THE COURT
Chief Judge Kaye.
Can a criminal defendant who has validly waived the right to appeal nonetheless ask the Appellate Division to exercise its interest-of-justice jurisdiction to reduce a sentence? We answer that question in the negative, though in so doing we underscore the critical nature of a court's colloquy with a defendant explaining the right relinquished by an appeal waiver.
People v Lopez
Following arrest and indictment for possession and sale of a controlled substance in or near school grounds, defendant Lopez pleaded guilty to a reduced charge. In exchange for this plea, the court promised to impose a sentence of imprisonment of 21/2 to 5 years. At the time of the plea, defendant waived his right to appeal on the record, both verbally and in writing. Despite this waiver, on January 14, 2004, defendant, acting pro se, filed a timely notice of appeal, noting only that he would appeal the "conviction and/or sentence." After appointment by the Appellate Division, appellate counsel argued that the Court should reduce defendant's sentence in the interest of justice despite his waiver of the right to appeal.
The Appellate Division affirmed with respect to defendant's sentence, holding that "defendant's valid waiver of his right to appeal encompassed his excessive sentence claim and thus forecloses interest of justice review. In any event, were we to find that defendant did not validly waive his right to appeal, we would perceive no basis for reducing the sentence" (16 AD3d 258, 258 [1st Dept 2005] [citation omitted]). On defendant's appeal of the excessive sentence issue, we now affirm the Appellate Division's conclusion.
People v Billingslea
Defendant Billingslea, after suffering a psychotic episode, repeatedly stabbed both her best friend and her seven-year-old daughter, killing the child. Indicted for three counts of murder in the second degree and one count of attempted murder in the second degree—along with lesser crimes—defendant pleaded guilty to manslaughter in the first degree in satisfaction of all charges and was sentenced to the agreed-upon prison term of 15 years.
During the plea allocution, the court asked defendant a series of questions concerning facts surrounding the homicide and whether she understood that by pleading guilty she was giving up the rights attendant to a criminal trial. After defendant responded "Yes," the court then said to her, "And last, if you went to trial and were convicted, you would have what is known as the right of appeal. That means that a group of judges would review everything done in this case to make sure your rights have been protected, but when you plead guilty you waive your right of appeal." Defendant again replied "Yes" when asked if she understood.
After defendant filed an appeal requesting a reduction of her sentence in the interest of justice, the Appellate Division affirmed her conviction and sentence stating, "The record demonstrates that the defendant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived her right to appeal, which included any challenge to her sentence, which was imposed pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement" (16 AD3d 516, 516 [2d Dept 2005]). Concluding that defendant's waiver was not adequately informed, we now reverse and remit to the Appellate Division to consider defendant's excessive sentence claim.
People v Nicholson
Defendant Nicholson was charged with attempted murder in the second degree as well as five related charges arising out of a 1999 knife fight with a rival gang member. In exchange for a promised prison sentence of eight years, defendant pleaded guilty. As part of his plea colloquy, and following an explanation of the trial rights forfeited by virtue of a guilty plea, the court said to defendant, "You also understand you're giving up your right to appeal, that is, to take to a higher court than this one any of the legal issues connected with this case? You understand that?" Defendant answered "Yes." One month later, prior to sentencing, the court reiterated, "[defendant is waiving his right to appeal in this matter." Defendant raised no objection to that statement. Both the court and the court clerk noted in the record that defendant waived his right to appeal. Like defendant Billingslea, Nicholson did not execute a written appeal waiver.
On his appeal to the Appellate Division, defendant argued that the appeal waiver, as explained to him, was invalid and that, even if the waiver was valid, the Appellate Division maintained its interest-of-justice authority to review what he believed was an excessive sentence. The Appellate Division concluded that the "valid waiver of [defendant's] right to appeal encompassed his present claim that his agreed-upon sentence is excessive and forecloses interest of justice review of that claim. In any event, were we to find that review was not precluded, we would perceive no basis for reducing the sentence" (15 AD3d 237, 237-238 [1st Dept 2005] [citations omitted]). We agree that the waiver was valid and therefore affirm.
I
A defendant's valid waiver of the right to appeal includes waiver of the right to invoke the Appellate Division's interest-of-justice jurisdiction to reduce the sentence.
In People v Seaberg (74 NY2d 1, 10 [1989]) this Court recognized the enforceability of guilty pleas conditioned on a defendant's waiver of the right to appeal. While certain claims remain outside the ambit of a valid appeal waiver—for example, legality of a sentence (see People v Callahan, 80 NY2d 273, 280 [1992]), challenge to a defendant's competency (see Seaberg, 74 NY2d at 9) and a constitutional speedy trial claim (see id.; see also People v Campbell, 97 NY2d 532, 535 [2002])—generally, an appeal waiver will encompass any issue that does not involve a right of constitutional dimension going to "the very heart of the process" (People v Hansen, 95 NY2d 227, 230 [2000]). Indeed, an appeal waiver made as a condition of a plea arrangement facilitates the desirable objective of prompt, effective resolution of criminal litigation.
By waiving the right to appeal in connection with a negotiated plea and sentence, a defendant agrees to end the proceedings entirely at the time of sentencing and to accept as reasonable the sentence imposed. While the Appellate Division may be divested of its unique interest-of-justice jurisdiction only by constitutional amendment (see People v Pollenz, 67 NY2d 264, 267-268 [1986]), a defendant is free to relinquish the right to invoke that authority and indeed does so by validly waiving the right to appeal.
A defendant may not subsequently eviscerate that bargain by asking an appellate court to reduce the sentence in the interest of justice—realistically an issue that as a practical matter is brought to an appellate court's attention only when raised by defendants. The important goals of fairness and finality in criminal matters are accomplished only insofar as the parties are confident that the " 'carefully orchestrated bargain' " of an agreed-upon sentence will not be disturbed as a discretionary matter (Seaberg, 74 NY2d at 10, quoting People v Prescott, 66 NY2d 216, 220 [1985]).
We therefore conclude that when a defendant enters into a guilty plea that includes a valid waiver of the right to appeal, that waiver includes any challenge to the severity of the sentence. By pleading guilty and waiving the right to appeal, a defendant has forgone review of the terms of the plea, including harshness or excessiveness of the sentence.
II
Because only a few reviewable issues survive a valid appeal waiver, it is all the more important for trial courts to ensure that defendants understand what they are surrendering when they waive the right to appeal. Giving up the right to appeal is not a perfunctory step.
A waiver of the right to appeal is effective only so long as the record demonstrates that it was made knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily (see People v Calvi, 89 NY2d 868, 871 [1996]). And though a trial court need not engage in any particular litany when apprising a defendant pleading guilty of the individual rights abandoned, it must make certain that a defendant's understanding of the terms and conditions of a plea agreement is evident on the face of the record (People v Callahan, 80 NY2d at 280).
When a trial court characterizes an appeal as one of the many rights automatically extinguished upon entry of a guilty plea, a reviewing court cannot be certain that the defendant comprehended the nature of the waiver of appellate rights. The record must establish that the defendant understood that the right to appeal is separate and distinct from those rights automatically forfeited upon a plea of guilty—the right to remain silent, the right to confront one's accusers and the right to a jury trial, for example.
Forfeiture of certain claims occurs by operation of law as a consequence of a guilty plea, with respect to issues that do not survive the plea. Waiver, on the other hand, occurs when a de fendant intentionally and voluntarily relinquishes or abandons a known right that would otherwise survive a guilty plea (People v Hansen, 95 NY2d at 230 n 1). When a trial court inaccurately employs the language of forfeiture in a situation of waiver, it has mischaracterized the nature of the right a defendant was being asked to cede.
In People v Billingslea we conclude that the record does not demonstrate that defendant understood she was relinquishing a known right and that her waiver was thus invalid. During the colloquy, the trial court explained to defendant that "when you plead guilty you waive your right of appeal." This misleading statement, when accompanied by nothing other than defendant's one-word response to the question whether she understood the conditions of her plea, is not sufficient to guarantee that defendant understood the valued right she was relinquishing. Because her appeal waiver was invalid, defendant is thus entitled to review of whether her sentence was excessive.
In People v Nicholson, on the other hand, the trial court engaged in a fuller colloquy, describing the nature of the right being waived without lumping that right into the panoply of trial rights automatically forfeited upon pleading guilty and eliciting agreements of understanding from the defendant on multiple occasions. A better practice might have been to explain to defendant that though he ordinarily retains the right to an appeal even after pleading guilty, in this case he was being offered a particular plea by the prosecution on the condition that he give up that right. It would be even better to secure a written waiver including such explanation (as in Lopez). The record is, however, sufficient to satisfy this Court that defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his right to appeal.
Accordingly, the orders in People v Lopez and People v Nicholson should be affirmed, and the order in People v Billingslea should be reversed and the case remitted to the Appellate Division for consideration of the excessive sentencing issue.
We emphasize that only the right to appeal harsh or excessive sentence is at issue in these cases. There is, moreover, no question of plea withdrawal.