Case Name: PEOPLE v. MARTIN
Court: Michigan Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1977-07-19
Citations: 77 Mich. App. 76
Docket Number: Docket No. 28764
Parties: PEOPLE v MARTIN
Judges: Before: N. J. Kaufman, P. J., and V. J. Brennan and M. D. O’Hara, JJ.
Reporter: Michigan appeals reports; cases decided in the Michigan Court of Appeals.
Volume: 77
Pages: 76–81

Head Matter:
PEOPLE v MARTIN
Opinion of the Court
1. Trial — Jury—Rereading Testimony to Jury — Discretion.
The granting of a jury’s request for the rereading of trial testimony is discretionary; requesting a jury to resume deliberations without rehearing testimony with the knowledge that if necessary the jury’s request would be considered at a later time is a proper exercise of judicial discretion.
2. Trial — Jury—Rereading Testimony to Jury — Instructions to Jury — Allen Charge — Juror’s Duty.
Supplemental instructions directing a jury to recall trial testimony and to listen to collective recall of the testimony, but, "If you have to have it read back in a little while, please send a note and indicate that”, is an instruction similar to an Alien-charge; the instruction is not erroneous because it could not cause a juror to abandon his conscientious dissent and defer to the majority solely for the sake of reaching agreement.
Concurrence in Part, Dissent in Part by N. J. Kaufman, P. J.
3. Trial — Rereading Testimony to Jury — Discretion.
A trial court may properly request a jury to resume deliberations without granting their request to rehear the testimony of certain witnesses; it is within the court’s discretion to reconsider the jury’s request at a later time.
4. Criminal Law — Instructions to Jury — Standard Jury Instructions — Substantial Departure — Appeal and Error.
A substantial departure by the trial judge from the jury instruction concerning juror agreement adopted by the Supreme Court from the American Bar Association Standard Jury Instructions may cause a juror to abandon his conscientious dissent and defer to the majority solely for the sake of reaching agreement; such a departure results in reversible error (ABA Standard Jury Instructions 5.4).
References for Points in Headnotes
[1, 3] 76 Am Jur 2d, Trial §§ 1041-1043.
[2, 4] 76 Am Jur 2d, Trial §§ 1060-1062.
[5] 5 Am Jur 2d, Appeal and Error § 811.
5. Criminal Law — Harmless Error — Application.
The Court of Appeals may not properly apply the harmless error doctrine to a factual situation where the Supreme Court has previously ruled that the doctrine is inapplicable to an identical factual situation.
Appeal from Recorder’s Court of Detroit, Dalton A. Roberson, J.
Submitted February 1, 1977, at Detroit.
(Docket No. 28764.)
Decided July 19, 1977.
Charles Martin was convicted of armed robbery. Defendant appeals.
Affirmed.
Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Robert A. Derengoski, Solicitor General, William L. Cahalan, Prosecuting Attorney, Edward R. Wilson, Research, Training and Appeals, and Timothy A. Baughman, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for the people.
Hoffa, Chodak & Robiner, for defendant.
Before: N. J. Kaufman, P. J., and V. J. Brennan and M. D. O’Hara, JJ.
Former Supreme Court Justice, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment pursuant to Const 1963, art 6, § 23 as amended in 1968.

Opinion:
Per Curiam.
On March 30, 1976, defendant was convicted by a jury of robbery armed, contrary to MCLA 750.529; MSA 28.797, and sentenced to a term in prison of not less than 7-1/2 nor more than 15 years. Defendant appeals as of right.
The evidence indicates that on November 7, 1975, at approximately 8 p.m. a Kentucky Fried Chicken restaurant located on East Warren Avenue in the City of Detroit was robbed. At trial four people who were witnesses to the occurrence iden tilled defendant as the man who ordered some chicken, pulled a gun, pointed it at an employee, Randolph Evans, and ordered him to open the safe. The safe was opened and the robber escaped with some money. Defendant also admitted to one of the eyewitnesses, who testified to that, that he had robbed this branch of Kentucky Fried Chicken.
Shortly after the jury began deliberations the jury sent a note to the judge informing him that they would like to hear the testimony of "Randy Evans and Andrew Gaines to clarify points" and "we would also like to hear Mark's testimony". The judge properly exercised his discretion and requested the jury to resume deliberations without rehearing the testimony of the three witnesses with the knowledge that if necessary the judge would consider the jury's request at a later time. People v Howe, 392 Mich 670; 221 NW2d 350 (1974).
The judge then proceeded to give the jury supplemental instructions directing them to recall the testimony, to listen to the collective recall of the testimony, but,
"If you have to have it read back in a little while, please send a note and indicate that."
This instruction, similar to an Alien-charge , could not cause a juror to abandon his conscientious dissent and defer to the majority solely for the sake of reaching agreement.
If there was error here, and we fail to see it, it was harmless because of the overwhelming convicting evidence. Conviction affirmed.
Affirmed
Allen v United States, 164 US 492; 17 S Ct 154; 41 L Ed 528 (1896).