Case Name: Thomas Earl GRETTENBERG, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee
Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1990-05-09
Citations: 790 S.W.2d 613
Docket Number: No. 1378-88
Parties: Thomas Earl GRETTENBERG, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.
Judges: MILLER, J., dissents.
Reporter: South Western Reporter Second Series
Volume: 790
Pages: 613–618

Head Matter:
Thomas Earl GRETTENBERG, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.
No. 1378-88.
Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, En Banc.
May 9, 1990.
Stanley G. Schneider, Houston, for appellant.
John B. Holmes, Jr., Dist. Atty., and Cathleen C. Herasimuchuk and Russell Hardin, Jr., Asst. Dist. Attys., Houston, Robert Huttash, State’s Atty., Austin, for the State.

Opinion:
OPINION ON STATE'S PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW
CAMPBELL, Judge.
Appellant was convicted, after a jury trial, of burglary of a habitation with the intent to commit aggravated assault. V.T. C.A. Penal Code, § 30.02. Enhanced by a prior conviction, the jury assessed punishment at life imprisonment in the Texas Department of Corrections and a $10,000 fine. In an unpublished opinion; the San Antonio Court of Appeals reformed the trial court's judgment, finding that appellant was not given notice that the State would seek an affirmative finding of the use of a deadly weapon. Grettenberg v. State, No. 04-87-00151-CR (Tex.App. — San Antonio 1988) (citing Ex parte Patterson, 740 S.W.2d 766 (Tex.Cr.App.1987); Y.A.C.C.P. 42.12, § 3g(a)(2)). The affirmative finding was deleted and the judgment was affirmed as reformed.
We granted the State's petition for discretionary review to determine: "(1) If Ex parte Patterson is the law in Texas, should it be given retroactive effect to cases indicted and tried before its promulgation?; (2) If Ex parte Patterson is the law in Texas, did the appellant preserve any issue for appellate review under Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 1.14?; (3) If Ex parte Patterson is the law in Texas, did the appellant have actual notice that the State would be seeking a deadly weapon finding in the present case?; and (4) If Ex parte Patterson is the law in Texas and an indictment fails to give formal notice of the State's intent, is the proper remedy to delete the affirmative finding or to remand the case to a trial court for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the appellant had actual notice of the State's intent?" We will reverse.
Appellant was indicted in a single indictment which alleged that appellant:
with intent to commit aggravated assault, enter a habitation owned by ALLISON LAUER, a person having a greater right to possession of the habitation than the Defendant and hereafter styled the Complainant, without the effective consent of the Complainant, namely without any consent of any kind.
It is further presented that in Harris County, Texas, THOMAS GRETTEN-BERG, hereafter styled the Defendant, heretofore on or about AUGUST 18, 1986, did then and there unlawfully while in the course of committing and attempting to commit burglary of a habitation owned by ALLISON LAUER, attempt to cause the death of ALLISON LAUER, hereafter styled the Complainant, by intentionally strangling the Complainant around the neck with an object unknown to the Grand Jury and having intent to commit capital murder of the Complainant.
The second count, charging attempted capital murder, was voluntarily abandoned by the State prior to trial. On appeal, the Court of Appeals, without deciding whether dismissed portions of an indictment could be used to establish the requisite notice, held that the dismissed portion of the instant indictment failed to do so under any theory. Grettenberg, slip op. 16. The Court of Appeals further held that an indictment does not give adequate notice unless it expressly alleges the use of a deadly weapon or alleges the use of a weapon that is deadly per se, relying on Ex parte Patterson, 740 S.W.2d 766 (Tex.Cr.App.1987). Id.
In its third ground of review, the State argues that under Ex parte Patterson, the appellant was on notice that the State would be seeking a deadly weapon finding. We agree with the State.
Clearly, the dismissed portion of the indictment in the instant case satisfies Ex parte Beck, 769 S.W.2d 525, 526 (Tex.Cr.App.1989). Accused persons are entitled to notice in some form that the use of a deadly weapon will be a fact issue at the time of prosecution, if the State intends to pursue the entry of a deadly weapon finding pursuant to Y.A.C.C.P. art. 42.12, § 3g(a)(2); art. 42.18, § 8(b). Ex parte Beck, 769 S.W.2d 525, 526 (Tex.Cr.App.1989). Any allegation which avers an attempt to cause the death of a person by the use of a named weapon necessarily includes an allegation that the named weapon or instrument was, in the manner of its use or intended use, capable of causing death. See Ex parte Brown, 773 S.W.2d 332 (Tex.Cr.App.1989); Eason v. State, 768 S.W.2d 312 (Tex.Cr.App.1989). Accordingly, the Court of Appeals erred when it held otherwise.
The instant case is complicated by the fact that the portion of the indictment containing the deadly weapon allegation was voluntarily abandoned by the State. However, accused persons are only entitled to notice, in some form, that the use of a deadly weapon will be a fact issue at the time of trial. Ex parte Beck, 769 S.W.2d at 526. When the theories of prosecution contained in the counts are so interrelated as under the facts of this case, the election by the State to pursue one of the counts in preference to the other will not vitiate the notice given in the indictment in its original form. Thus, we hold that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the dismissed portion of the indictment failed to give the appellant adequate notice that the State would seek an affirmative finding of the use of a deadly weapon. Because of our disposition of this point of error, we need not reach the other grounds presented by the State's petition for discretionary review.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
. Now the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division.