Case Name: MEYERSON v. UNITED STATES GRAND LODGE, INDEPENDENT ORDER SONS OF BENJAMIN
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Term
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1915-03-04
Citations: 151 N.Y.S. 932
Docket Number: 
Parties: MEYERSON v. UNITED STATES GRAND LODGE, INDEPENDENT ORDER SONS OF BENJAMIN.
Judges: 
Reporter: West's New York Supplement
Volume: 151
Pages: 932–936

Head Matter:
MEYERSON v. UNITED STATES GRAND LODGE, INDEPENDENT ORDER SONS OF BENJAMIN.
(Supreme Court, Appellate Term, First Department.
March 4, 1915.)
L Insurance (§ 817 ) — Mutual Benefit Insurance — Amount of Recovery —Burden of Proof.
Where a benefit certificate provided for reduction of the amount of the certificate when one-half of one assessment would not produce that amount, the burden is on the company to prove what the amount, if less, would be.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Insurance, Cent. Dig. §§ 1999-2002; Dec. Dig. § 817.*]
2. Insurance (§ 819*) — Mutual Benefit Insurance — Amount of Recovery —Sufficiency of Evidence.
In an action on a benefit certificate for $500, providing that no more could be recovered than one-half of one full assessment would bring, defendant’s evidence held insufficient to show what the amount would be, and hence not to overthrow a verdict for the full amount of the certificate.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Insurance, Cent. Dig. §§ 2006, 2007; Dec. Dig. § 819.*]
Pendleton, J., dissenting.
Appeal from City Court of New York, Trial Term.
Action by Annie Meyerson against the United States Grand Lodge, Independent Order Sons of Benjamin. From a judgment on a verdict directed for plaintiff, and from an order denying a motion for a new trial, defendant appeals.
Affirmed.
Argued February term, 1915, before GUY, PENDLETON, and SHEARN, JJ.
M. Angelo Elias, of New York City, for appellant.
Henry Kuntz, of New York City (Abraham P. Wilkes, of New York City, of counsel), for respondent.
For other cases see same topic & § number in Dec. & Am. Digs. 1907 to date, & Rep’r Indexes

Opinion:
SHEARN, J.
Concededly the burden of going forward with the proof to establish the amount of one-half of one full assessment on each member of defendant order at the time of the death of the member, which occurred February 28, 1912, was upon the defendant. No such evidence was introduced. Defendant merely handed the Grand Secretary of the order certain unidentified papers, which appear to have assessments in 1909 and 1910, and was asked what the assess ment per member in class B as of the 1st of February, 1912, was, and answered:
"The assessment realized. $368.75 per death."
Then followed this hypothetical question and answer:
"Q. So that, if Meyerson was a member of the order, and the order had assessed its membership for the payment of that death, it would have realized for the payment of one death claim how much? A. $368.75."
This fell short of establishing that an assessment was levied, or, if not levied, what it would have realized as of February 28, 1912.
Moreover, even assuming that the assessment would have realized only $368.75, plaintiff would have been entitled to that sum, and not one-half thereof. The assessment to be levied in such case was not a full assessment, but was "one-half of one full assessment." When the witness was attempting to testify as to what an assessment duly levied would have-realized, he must be deemed to have referred to the assessment that was authorized to be levied in such case, which was "one-half of one full assessment." This was plainly the view of defendant's counsel on the trial, who, in asking a direction of a verdict, said:
"I further ask that in no event has there been proven more than $368.75, and therefore no verdict can be predicated for an amount in excess of that."
But it was incumbent on the defendant to prove what an assessment duly levied at the time of the member's death would have amounted to, and, having failed so to do, the verdict should not be disturbed.
After the deceased had maintained his membership for a period of 20 years, and had paid his assessments on the assumption that his widow would receive $1,000 at his death, the constitution and by-laws of the defendant were amended, and his membership was changed so that the death benefit was reduced to $500. After paying dues for 22 years, some five weeks prior to his death an attempt was made to forfeit all his rights for alleged failure to pay his dues for December, 1911, and January, 1912, amounting to the sum of about $8. Such circumstances do not warrant excusing the defendant from complying strictly with the burden of proof in its attempt to whittle this claim down to $184.37.
In my opinion the' judgment should be affirmed, with costs.
Judgment affirmed, with costs.
GUY, J., concurs.