Case Name: David Mayer, plaintiff in error, vs. George W. Reed & Co., defendants in error
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia
Jurisdiction: Georgia
Decision Date: 1867-12
Citations: 37 Ga. 482
Docket Number: 
Parties: David Mayer, plaintiff in error, vs. George W. Reed & Co., defendants in error.
Judges: 
Reporter: Georgia Reports
Volume: 37
Pages: 482–490

Head Matter:
David Mayer, plaintiff in error, vs. George W. Reed & Co., defendants in error.
Note. — This case was argued after the death of Lumpkin, C. J., and before Warner became C. J.
During the continuance of hostilities between the Confederate States and the United States, interest did not run in favor of a citizen of Pennsylvania, resident there, against a citizen of Georgia, resident here.
Harris, J.
After 13th July, 1861, interest did not run on such claims till the 10th of May, 1865. 'Walker, J.
Attachment. Judgment for interest accruing during the war. Decided by Judge "Warner. Fulton Superior Court, April Term, 1867.
This was an attachment returnable to April Term, 1867. It was founded upon three promissory notes, (the first for $692 37, dated 15th August, 1860, and due four months thereafter, the other two, each for $692 36, dated 31st August, 1860, and due four and five months after date, respectively, all payable to plaintiff’s order, with exchange on Philadelphia,) and upon accounts for goods sold 31st August, 1860, amounting to $2,209 20, and for goods sold 4th September, 1860, amounting to $158 17, bought by defendant on six months credit.
Defendant had notice of the attachment according to law, and appeared by counsel and defended it. At the trial term, judgment was confessed for the principal debts, “ with such interest, if any, as the Court may allow,” with costs of suit. No distinction was made between the notes and open accounts.
The case was submitted to the consideration of the Court upon a written statement, as follows:
“Said defendant makes no other or further defense but “ this: He says that at the dates of the notes, and at the “ dates of the purchases of the goods, plaintiffs were, and “ever since have been, citizens of Pennsylvania, United “ States of America, and said defendant then was, and, until “the cessation of hostilities hereinafter mentioned, was a “ citizen of, and resident in Atlanta, Georgia; that on the “ 19th day of January, 1861, Georgia passed what is known “as her secession ordinance; that she subsequently attached “ herself to the so-salled Confederate States of America? “ which recognized a war to exist between it and the United “ States of America, on the 6th of May, 1861; that actual “ hostilities did not exist between the United States and said “ Confederate States, from that date till 10th May, 1865; “and that during the interval between the two dates last “ named, said plaintiff had no agent in Georgia, authorized “to receive and receipt for money due said plaintiff; further “ that the rate of interest of Pennsylvania was and is only “six per cent, per annum; and contends that no interest “ should run during said interval.
Brown & Pope, Weil, Defendants’ Attorneys.
“ We admit all the foregoing without admitting that, if we “had had such agent in Georgia, defendant was able or “ willing to pay said debts and accounts, and contend that he “ is, notwithstanding, bound to plaintiffs for interest.
A. W. Hammond & Son, Plaintiff’s Attorneys.”
The Court, after argument had, decided that interest, at the rate of six per cent, per annum, should be counted from the time when said several items fell due, up to the date of judgment, and defendants excepted. The Supreme Court (Judges Harris and Walker,) held up the case for consideration till December Term, 1867.
Brown & Pope, Samuel Weil, for plaintiff in error.
A. W. Hammond & Son, for defendants in error:

Opinion:
Harris, J.
A single question is presented by the record, and it is whether the plaintiffs below, citizens of Pennsylvania, can recover of defendant, a citizen of Georgia, interest upon the several notes sued on, accruing during the recent war between the States which remained in the Federal Union, and those which renounced it.
It is a settled principle of both municipal and international law, that the existence of war between States or Governments arrests all intercourse between the citizens or subjects of the respective belligerents, closes the Courts to all coercion by the creditor, prohibits the debtor, upon reasons of State policy, from paying his debts or obligations to the enemy creditor, however desirous he may be to maintain his credit or keep faith. The debtor dare not pay without license from the government to which he belongs; the creditor cannot receive, without similar license; after hostilities begun they stand towards each other as enemies, for that is the posture of their respective governments. That hostilities existed from April 1861, to April 1865, between Pennsylvania and Georgia, or in other words, between the States which remained in the Federal Union, and those which, by ordinances as sovereign States, separated themselves from that Union, is a " fixed fact" which will be difficult to deny, or forget, or ehange. It was not a civil war, in its legitimate sense; for that is a war between one portion of the citizens of a State with another portion, as was the case in the war begun in England in 1642, and during the continuance of which Charles I was beheaded, or like the rebellion in the eighteenth century in behalf of his descendants. These were insurrectionary rebellions, and, in every sense, civil wai's, unauthorized by the action of a State or its government. Georgia, a sovereign State, with other States South, stood, upon her sovereignty, and engaged in war, and called her citizens to arms. Her act, as sovereign, was as distinct as that of Prussia or Austria. She was a belligerent as a State, in her entirety. To her, as such, attached all belligerent rights, and all nations and people are bound by a common law, among themselves, called the law of nations, to respect them. By the laws of war, Georgia's debtor citizen could not pay without committing a crime against the Confederacy, to which Georgia had united herself, and for paying could be punished. The logical result is, that during the continuance of hostilities, the right of the creditor was suspended, so that he could not receive; and as interest, when not directly contracted for and specified in the note, is, on principle, the fruit alone of detention of money beyond the time stipulated for payment, as.compensation in damages to him from whom a debt has been illegally witheld, the creditor certainly cannot be permitted to recover for the term of hostilities, as by law he could neither receive nor the debtor pay.
To compel the Georgia debtor in this case to pay interest to the Pennsylvania creditor during the continuance of hostilities, can be done only on the assumption that the war in which the South was engaged was an insurrection, a rebellion on the part of a portion of its people against the rightful authority of its government. This is a profound error, and this is demonátrated by the undeniable fact that it was a war between States. Nothing can be more absurd than to apply to war made or carried on by Sovereign States, the terms of insurrection or rebellion.
The case under review was decided lay Judge Warner, and was discussed before Judge Walker and myself, who unite in reversing the judgment below. Judge Wa^£er places his assent to a reversal solely upon an act of the Congress of the United States, forbidding intercourse between the belligerents.
Judgment reversed.