Case Name: The WICCAN RELIGIOUS COOPERATIVE OF FLORIDA, INC., Appellant, v. Jim ZINGALE and The Florida Department of Revenue, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 2005-03-08
Citations: 898 So. 2d 134
Docket Number: No. 1D03-3324
Parties: The WICCAN RELIGIOUS COOPERATIVE OF FLORIDA, INC., Appellant, v. Jim ZINGALE and The Florida Department of Revenue, Appellee.
Judges: BROWNING and POLSTON, JJ„ Concur; BENTON, J., Concurs in Part and Dissents in Part with Opinion.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 898
Pages: 134–141

Head Matter:
The WICCAN RELIGIOUS COOPERATIVE OF FLORIDA, INC., Appellant, v. Jim ZINGALE and The Florida Department of Revenue, Appellee.
No. 1D03-3324.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
March 8, 2005.
Rehearing Denied April 14, 2005.
Heather Morcroft, Orlando, for Appellant.
Charlie Crist, Attorney General; Eric J. Taylor, Senior Assistant Attorney General and Nicholas Bykowsky, Assistant Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellees.

Opinion:
PER CURIAM.
Appellant, The Wiccan Religious Cooperative of Florida, Inc., brought various constitutional challenges against sales tax exemption statutes and alleged that it was improperly and unlawfully denied a renewal of its certificate of exemption from Florida sales and use tax. The trial court granted the appellee Florida Department of Revenue's motion for summary judgment, ruling that Wiccan had standing and that the challenged statutes were constitutional. The trial court also ruled that Wiccan failed to exhaust its administrative remedies regarding obtaining a renewal of its certificate of exemption. Wiccan appeals only the trial court's ruling that section 212.06(9), Florida Statutes, is facially constitutional, arguing that the trial court erred because the statutory tax exemption clearly violates the United States Constitution Establishment Clause and Free Press Clause pursuant to Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 109 S.Ct. 890, 103 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989). As part of its response, the Department argues that Wiccan is without standing to bring such a challenge. We agree.
"[W]hen standing is placed in issue in a case, the question is whether the person whose standing is challenged is a proper party to request an adjudication of a particular issue and not whether the issue itself is justiciable." Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99-100, 88 S.Ct. 1942, 20 L.Ed.2d 947 (1968). A proper party is essential to prevent the courts from deciding " 'illdefined controversies over constitutional issues.' " Id. at 100, 88 S.Ct. 1942; see also Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, 454 U.S. 464, 473, 102 S.Ct. 752, 70 L.Ed.2d 700 (1982) (stating that the courts have declined to hear cases that "would convert the judicial process into 'no more than a vehicle for the vindication of the value interests of concerned bystanders' "); Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 505, 81 S.Ct. 1752, 6 L.Ed.2d 989 (1961) (stating that declining to hear cases where the challenging party is without standing is " 'a safeguard essential to the integrity of the judicial process' "); Brasfield & Gorrie Gen. Contractor, Inc. v. Ajax Constr. Co., Inc. of Tallahassee, 627 So.2d 1200, 1202-03 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993) (stating that the reason for requiring a party to have standing is to ensure that the party "will adequately represent the interest it asserts").
In the instant ease, Wiccan's constitutional challenge is that, based on the reasoning found in Texas Monthly, the Florida sales tax exemption benefits religion. The parties have stipulated that Wicca is a religion. Therefore, under Wiccan's argument that the tax exemption benefits religion, Wiccan, as a religious organization, benefits from the sales tax exemption. Accordingly, Wiccan fails to have the adverse interest necessary for standing and is not the proper party to assert the instant constitutional challenge. See Valley Forge Christian Coll., 454 U.S. at 473, 102 S.Ct. 752 (stating that a party must allege facts showing that he or she has been adversely affected); Congress of Indus. Orgs. v. McAdory, 325 U.S. 472, 475, 65 S.Ct. 1395, 89 L.Ed. 1741 (1945) (stating that the Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of legislation when the party bringing the suit cannot assert antagonistic rights); State v. Benitez, 395 So.2d 514, 517 (Fla.1981) (stating that a party cannot challenge a statutory enactment that does not adversely affect that party's personal or property rights); Chamberlin v. Dade County Bd. of Pub. Instruction, 171 So.2d 535, 537 (Fla.1965) (holding that parents who brought suit challenging certain religiously-related practices in public schools were without standing to challenge religious practices at baccalaureate programs because their children, who were enrolled in elementary schools, were not adversely affected by the challenged practice); Alachua County v. Scharps, 855 So.2d 195, 201 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003) (stating that a party who is not adversely affected by the statute he or she seeks to challenge does not have standing).
The dissent opines that the court cannot consider Wiccan's lack of standing as an appealable issue because the Department failed to file a cross-appeal. We disagree. Generally, a cross-appeal must be filed to challenge an unfavorable portion of a final judgment substantially favorable to the ap-pellee. See Smeaton v. Smeaton, 678 So.2d 501, 501 n. 1 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996). However, this rule is procedural, not jurisdictional, and can be waived. See Walker v. State, 457 So.2d 1136, 1137 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984) (ruling that "[bjecause the court gains jurisdiction over the entire cause at the time the notice of appeal is filed, neither the timely filing of a notice of cross appeal, nor the failure to timely file such a notice will affect the jurisdiction of the appellate court"). This permits an issue to be heard by waiver and consent, which occurred here. Both parties briefed the standing issue without objection. Furthermore, standing was argued, almost exclusively, during oral argument without objection. Accordingly, we conclude that the issue is before this court and we are not barred from considering standing in deciding this appeal as asserted by the dissent.
Therefore, we reverse, vacate the final judgment, and remand to the trial court with directions to enter final summary judgment in favor of the Department on the basis that Wiccan does not have standing.
REVERSED and REMANDED with instructions.
BROWNING and POLSTON, JJ" Concur; BENTON, J., Concurs in Part and Dissents in Part with Opinion.
. The trial court ruled that Wiccan is not being discriminated against in comparison to other religions. Wiccan did not appeal that ruling.