Case Name: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Laura Michelle MONTROSE, Defendant-Appellant
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 2001-07-27
Citations: 15 F. App'x 89
Docket Number: No. 00-4184
Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Laura Michelle MONTROSE, Defendant-Appellant.
Judges: Before WILLIAMS and TRAXLER, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.
Reporter: West's Federal Appendix
Volume: 15
Pages: 89–91

Head Matter:
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Laura Michelle MONTROSE, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 00-4184.
United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.
Submitted May 15, 2001.
Decided July 27, 2001.
Tamura D. Coffey, Kevin B. Cartledge, Wilson & Iseman, Winston-Salem, NC, for appellant. Walter C. Holton, Jr., United States Attorney, Lisa B. Boggs, Assistant United. States Attorney, Bryce Quine, Third Year Law Student, Greensboro, NC, for appellee.
Before WILLIAMS and TRAXLER, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion:
OPINION
PER CURIAM.
Laura Michelle Montrose was found guilty by a jury of aiding and abetting bank robbery and armed bank robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C.A. § 2 (West 2000), bank robbery and armed bank robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C.A. § 2113(a), (d)(West 2000), and conspiracy to commit bank robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C.A. § 371 (West 2000). The court imposed a sentence of 121 months incarceration on February 17, 2000. This appeal followed.
Montrose asserts error in the district court's decision to disallow impeachment of two government witnesses based on their prior conduct, specifically, a witness' prior petit larceny conviction and another witness' probation violation. Evidentiary rulings are reviewed by this court for abuse of discretion and are subject to harmless error review. See United States v. Brooks, 111 F.3d 365, 371 (4th Cir.1997). The petit larceny in which the government witness was involved was not shown to be a crime of dishonesty or false statement and therefore was not admissible under Fed.R.Evid. 609(a)(2). See United States v. Cunningham, 638 F.2d 696, 698 (4th Cir.1981). The court similarly found no dishonesty involved in the second witness' violation of probation. We find no abuse of discretion in this finding, but note that even if we concluded otherwise, there would be no harmful error. The second witness testified he was on probation for six convictions of breaking and entering and that he had pled guilty to armed bank robbery and carrying a firearm during a crime of violence. In view of this testimony, the impact on the jury of the added evidence of a probation violation would have been minimal.
Montrose next challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support her conviction. This court reviews the denial of a motion for acquittal under a sufficiency of the evidence standard. See Fed.R.Crim.P. 29; Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80, 62 S.Ct. 457, 86 L.Ed. 680 (1942); United States v. Romer, 148 F.3d 359, 364 (4th Cir.1998). Montrose's conviction must be affirmed if the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the government, is sufficient for any rational jury to find the elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Burgos, 94 F.3d 849, 862 (4th Cir.1996) (en banc). In evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence, we do not review the credibility of the witnesses, and we assume that the jury resolved all contradictions in the testimony in favor of the government. Romer, 148 F.3d at 364. With these standards in mind, we conclude sufficient evidence supports Montrose's convictions.
Finally, Montrose avers that the district court erred in its denial of her motions for downward departure at sentencing on the grounds of extraordinary physical impairments, delayed mental and emotional development, extreme vulnerability to victimization in prison, and the combination of these factors. The denial of a downward departure is not renewable unless the district court perceived it lacked authority to depart on the grounds offered. United States v. Hall, 977 F.2d 861, 863 (4th Cir.1992); United States v. Bayerle, 898 F.2d 28, 30-31 (4th Cir.1990). We conclude the court was aware of its authority to depart but did not find a departure warranted in this case.
Accordingly, we affirm Montrose's convictions and sentence. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED.