Case Name: WALL v. CHELSEA PLANTATION CLUB
Court: Supreme Court of South Carolina
Jurisdiction: South Carolina
Decision Date: 1911-03-03
Citations: 88 S.C. 61
Docket Number: 7801
Parties: WALL v. CHELSEA PLANTATION CLUB.
Judges: Mr. Chief Justice Jones concurs.
Reporter: South Carolina Reports
Volume: 88
Pages: 61–69

Head Matter:
7801
WALL v. CHELSEA PLANTATION CLUB.
1. Demurrer. — Where a Circuit Judge on appeal from magistrate adjudges that defendant is entitled to a nonsuit, but remands the case for such action as the plaintiff may see proper to take, and he brings another action on the same cause of action without having magistrate enter nonsuit in first action, demurrer on ground that there is another action pending on the same cause of action or that the issues are adjudicated in the first action, is not well taken.
2. Principal and Agent — Estoppel.—Where one borrows money, giving a due bill signed by him as an individual but states in the body of the bill it is for another, there being no evidence that he was the agent of the other with power to borrow money, but there being no evidence that the money was not used for the benefit of the other as expressed in the bill, the third party is estopped from denying the agency of the subscriber.
Divided Court.
Before Dantzeer, J., Beaufort, September, 1909.
Affirmed.
Action by D. PI. Wall against Chelsea. Plantation Club in court of Magistrate H. D. Burnett. Prom Circuit order affirming magistrate’s judgment, defendant appeals on the following exceptions:
I. “Because his Plonor, the Circuit Judge, erred in deciding and holding that a second action could be brought by plaintiff while there was an action already pending between same parties, for the same cause and in the same Court at the time the second action was brought.
II. “That his Honor, the Circuit Judge, erred in deciding and holding that the order issued by the Circuit Court remanding this cause back to the magistrate court gave plaintiff the right to commence a new action for the same cause, and that plaintiff did not have to proceed under the pleadings in the original cause then pending before said magistrate.
III. “That his Honor, the Circuit Judge, erred in holding and deciding that, if said case was ended by the order of the Circuit Court, the matter was not res judicata and that plaintiff was not barred from bringing another action with that judgment standing against him.
IV. “His Honor erred in deciding and holding that the evidence produced at the trial showed an existence of such an agency between the defendant company and E. Martin as to authorize E. Martin to borrow money and pledge the credit of defendant company to pay same.
V. “His Honor erred in deciding that E. Martin was acting within the scope of his agency and had the power to borrow money, and1 to bind the defendant company to pay such debt and obligation when he borrowed the sixty ($60.00) dollars evidenced by the due bill introduced in evidence.
VI. “His Honor erred in deciding that the due bill for sixty ($60.00) dollars introduced in evidence in a way bound the defendant company to pay same unless proof of acceptance by said defendant company had been made.
VII. “His Honor erred in deciding the evidence showed that E. Martin had the power to bind defendant company to pay sixty ($60.00) dollars evidenced by the due bill introduced in evidence or that there was any evidence whatever to show that said Martin was acting within the scope of his agency when he borrowed cash money and undertook to pledge the credit of defendant company for same.
VIII. “His Honor erred in deciding and holding that the sixty ($60.00) dollars in question was not the personal obligation of E. Martin instead of being the obligation of defendant company.”
Mr. W. J. Thomas, for appellant,
cites: No agent can bind his principal while not acting within the scope of his agency: 47 S. C. 147; 39 S. C. 444; 1 Ency. 1136; 37 S. C. 380, 199; 72 S. C. 205; 86 S. C. 73.
Mr. Thos. B. Miller, contra,
cites: Plaintiff is not required to prove the agency was limited: 57 S. C. 347; 47 S. C. 148. Principal is bound by the acts of his agent: 39 S. C. 281; 13 S. C. 5; 56 S. C. 126; 57 S. C. 347; 48 S. C. 430; 49 S. C. 345; 44 S. C. 41; 35 S. C. 145; 47 S. C. 148; 29 S. C. 281; 10 Rich. 337; 4 Strob. 363; Riley 222; 3 Strob. Eq. 263.
March 3, 1911.

Opinion:
The opinion of the Court was delivered by
Mr. Justice Gary.
This action was commenced before a magistrate, to recover the sum of seventy-one dollars and thirty-five cents, alleged to be due on an open account. The magistrate rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff, for said amount. The defendant appealed, but the appeal was dismissed by the Circuit Court; whereupon- the defendant appealed to this Court upon exceptions, which will be reported.
The case was tried twice in the magistrate's court. On appeal from the first judgment, rendered by the magistrate, his Honor S. W. G. Shipp, presiding Judge, adjudged that the defendant was entitled to a nonsuit, and ordered that the case be remanded to the magistrate's court, for such further action, as the plaintiff might see fit to take. When the case was called for trial the second time, before the magistrate, the defendant demurred, on the ground that there was another action pending between the same parties, for the same cause. The magistrate overruled the demurrer, on the ground that the plaintiff had the right, under the order of Judge Shipp, to take such action thereafter, as he saw fit.
We do not deem it necessary to state any additional reasons, to show that the demurrer was properly overruled. This disposes of the first and second exceptions.
The due bill was as follows: "Due D. H. Wall for money advanced Chelsea Club $60.00. E. Martin."
In the statement of account rendered by the plaintiff against the defendant, on the 18th January, 1909, the following item appears: "May 26. Money advanced to payoff hands (due bill), $60.00."
The same item appears in the statement of account, rendered on the first of March, 1909, in this form: "May 26. To due bill for cash to pay hands, $60.00."
When the plaintiff offered the due bill in evidence, the objection which the defendant interposed to its introduction, was, "that it does not show who E. Martin is, and it does not appear, on the face of said due bill, that the defendant is bound by it."
Section 368 of the Code provides, that "upon hearing the appeal, the appellate Court, shall give judgment, according to the justice of the case, without regard to technical errors and defects, which do not affect the merits." Even conceding that E. Martin, the agent of the defendant, was not authorized to execute the due bill, nevertheless, it appears that it was given, for money advanced for the benefit of the club. And, it is a reasonable inference from all the testimony, that it was so expended, especially when it is taken into consideration, that the defendant did not rely upon the fact, that'the money was used for other purposes, but simply upon the objection, that it does not appear, upon the face of said due bill, that the defendant was bound by it. The cases of Williamson v. Eastern B. & L. Asso., 54 S. C. 582, 32 S. E. 765, and Drewry v. Amusement Co., 87 S. C. 445, show that under such circumstances, the principal is estopped from denying the authority of the agent.
Thus showing that the remaining exceptions cannot be sustained.
Affirmed.
Mr. Chief Justice Jones concurs.