Case Name: Robert A. CAREY, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES, Appellee
Court: District of Columbia Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: District of Columbia
Decision Date: 1977-08-01
Citations: 377 A.2d 40
Docket Number: No. 8816
Parties: Robert A. CAREY, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES, Appellee.
Judges: Before NEBEKER, YEAGLEY and MACK, Associate Judges.
Reporter: West's Atlantic Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 377
Pages: 40–52

Head Matter:
Robert A. CAREY, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES, Appellee.
No. 8816.
District of Columbia Court of Appeals.
Argued March 9, 1976.
Decided Aug. 1, 1977.
Linda Kay Davis, Public Defender Service, Washington, D. C., for appellant; Frederick H. Weisberg, Public Defender Service, Washington, D. C., also entered an appearance.
Timothy J. Reardon, III, Asst. U. S. Atty., Washington, D. C., with whom Earl J. Silbert, U. S. Atty., John A. Terry and James F. McMullin, Asst. U. S. Attys., Washington, D. C., were on the brief, for appellee.
Before NEBEKER, YEAGLEY and MACK, Associate Judges.

Opinion:
NEBEKER, Associate Judge:
Appellant was convicted after a jury trial of one count of carrying a pistol without a license, in violation of D.C.Code 1973, § 22-3204. On appeal, he argues that the trial court erred in (1) refusing to instruct tile jury on the defense of innocent possession, and (2) denying the motion to suppress the gun seized from him by the police. We affirm the judgment of conviction.
I.
At about 3:10 p. m. on the day in question, two men entered a laundry establishment and robbed two women. A third man remained outside. When they fled, a report of the offense was made and an initial police radio broadcast, a "tentative lookout flash", ensued. Police in vehicles came to the scene. Among them was an Officer Galante, but he was not the first on the scene because he testified that he saw two "old clothes tac" officers leaving when he arrived at 3:20 p. m. Officer Galante was the only officer who responded to the scene to testify at the suppression motion hearing.
Officer Galante got a description of the suspects from one of the women, but neither he nor his partner broadcast it. It took about fifteen or twenty minutes — that is, until 3:35 or 3:40 p. m. — for him to get that description as the women were "pretty hysterical." It is this description which forms the fulcrum for appellant's challenge to the lawfulness of his arrest. He contended at the hearing on the motion, and does so on appeal, that it established that an earlier broadcast description was sufficiently inaccurate to invalidate his arrest. He also contends that he and his two companions did not sufficiently match the description received to permit their arrest.
The description given Officer Galante was:
Subject number one was a Negro male, thin, medium complexion, wearing a green nylon ski jacket; subject number two was a Negro male, six foot, medium complexion, wearing dark brown three-quarter length coat. No further description.
The woman was unable to describe a third suspect.
Meanwhile, two other officers were cruising in an area a few blocks from the scene. At 3:23 p. m. they received a broadcast description respecting this robbery. According to a transcription of this broadcast,the description was for
number one Negro male armed with a hand gun and in a green jacket . Number two Negro male 18 to 19 5 foot 8 light brown complexion dark troussers [sic] plaid shirt, number three Negro male brown complected A beige coat mustach [sic] last seen from Sheriff towards Eastern 1523 . . . . [3:23 p. m.]
The officers began looking for such a group and within fifteen minutes they observed appellant and his companions walking away from the reported scene. They were about seven blocks in distance from that address. They were the only group of three seen as described and they fit the description broadcast.
Appellant was wearing a green army field jacket which was closed. One of his companions also wore a green army field jacket which was open, revealing a multicolored shirt; the third wore a corduroy "medium to dark" brown or tan three-quarter length coat. All three men wore dark pants and had mustaches. One officer testified that they appeared to be "20 to 21, possibly 22" years old. When asked if they did not appear to be "much older than [18 to 19]," he responded, "Not too much, to me . ." The other officer was not questioned about the apparent ages of the three, contrary to Appellant's Brief, at 4 & 31. Rather, the thrust of the questions put to him was as to their actual ages. As to age, the topic was ended with, "Isn't it in fact true they were substantially older than that [19 or 20]?" That officer responded, "I'd say they would be about 24." As appellant notes in his brief (at 4, n. 7), he was then 24 years old.
The officers approached the three men, identified themselves, and told them of the reported robbery. Appellant had his hands in his pockets and he was told to remove them. As appellant was being frisked, his right arm stiffened and it had to be forced aside in order for the officer to continue the frisk. The officer felt what he thought to be a gun in the right front pocket of appellant's coat. A search into the pocket revealed a loaded .22-caliber derringer. Appellant explained that he had just found the gun in his recently burglarized apartment and that he was going to the police station to turn it in and report the burglary. The three were then transported to the scene of the robbery where the victims reported that they were not the ones who committed the robbery. Appellant was then charged with carrying a pistol without a license (D.C. Code 1973, § 22-3204).
Appellant argued in a motion to suppress evidence that the search was incident either to an arrest made without probable cause, or to a stop and frisk when the police officers had no reasonable grounds for believing appellant was engaged in criminal activity. The motion was denied by an order, in which the trial court found that the three men substantially matched the description of the robbery suspects given on the police radio run, and that a limited search for weapons was justified based on the report that one of the suspects was armed. After a jury trial, appellant was found guilty of illegally carrying the pistol and was subsequently sentenced to two-to-ten years' imprisonment. The sentence was suspended and appellant was placed on probation for five years. This appeal followed.
II.
Appellant's request for an instruction on "innocent possession" was based upon his trial testimony, substantially corroborated by his two companions and his wife, as to events beginning late on the evening of November 26, 1973. At that time, appellant, with the help of his two friends, began the task of moving his family and their possessions from his apartment to his father's home. Leaving appellant's wife and children at his father's home, the three men returned to the apartment building at about 1:30 a. m. Approaching the building, appellant heard a noise "like a door slamming" and noticed that the lights in his first-floor apartment were on and the door was ajar. He had turned off the lights and locked the door when leaving the apartment. Appellant could not immediately ascertain whether any possessions were missing, since the apartment was in disarray and he was not certain about what had already been moved. He did notice that the television and the stereo component set were not in the apartment. He called his wife (from an outside public pay phone) and ascertained that she had the TV but not the stereo set. Searching among the boxes for the component set, he came upon a brown paper bag on top of one of the boxes. Inside the bag was a loaded pistol which he showed to his friends. His friends left the apartment for the night but appellant slept there. It was then approximately 2 a. m., November 27th.
Upon returning to appellant's apartment some time before noon on the 27th, appellant's friends found that appellant still had the gun and had not yet reported the burglary or the gun to the police. Appellant testified that he was considering keeping the gun. After a discussion in which his friends reminded him of his probationary status and that it was illegal for him to have a gun, appellant decided to give the gun to the police. He and his companions testified that they left the apartment at about 3 p. m. and were enroute to the precinct to turn in the gun and report the burglary when they were stopped by the police.
The trial court ruled that the defense of innocent possession was not available as a matter of law upon the facts of this case. This ruling stemmed from the court's conclusion that even if the jury completely credited the testimony of appellant and his witnesses, all of whom claimed appellant was carrying the gun on the street for the sole purpose of turning it in at the nearest police station, the defense was not available to appellant because he had admittedly found the gun in his apartment and not on the street, and because he thereafter intentionally carried the gun on the street. The trial court said that there might be instances where a special instruction should be given, but ruled this was not such a case.
We note at the outset that D.C.Code 1973, § 22-3204, is a statute of general intent, and that proof of intent to use a weapon for an unlawful purpose is not an element of the crime. Mitchell v. United States, D.C.App., 302 A.2d 216, 217 (1973). We note further that exceptions to this construction are limited. One exception which has been recognized is possession for self-defense. Id. See also Wilson v. United States, 91 U.S.App.D.C. 135, 136, 198 F.2d 299, 300 (1952).
Appellant would assert another defense, that of innocent possession. The possibility of such a defense was acknowledged by this court in Mitchell v. United States, supra at 218, and discussed at some length in Hines v. United States, D.C.App., 326 A.2d 247 (1974). Hines held that the defendant was not entitled to a jury instruction as to the defense of innocent or momentary possession where his admitted purpose in carrying an allegedly newfound pistol was to show it to his girlfriend. The court implied that it might have reached a different result had appellant's asserted purpose been civic minded and with an intent to aid law enforcement, e. g., where a "pistol was picked up out of an altruistic motive either to protect the finder or others from harm, to turn it over to the police, or to otherwise secure it." Id. at 248. The court cited with approval People v. LaPella, 272 N.Y. 81, 4 N.E.2d 943 (1936), in which the defendant's evidence showed that he had found the weapon in a public toilet, put it in his pocket, kept an appointment, and then, twenty minutes after discovering the gun, surrendered it to the police.
In this vein, appellant asserts that since his proof demonstrates that his sole purpose in possessing the weapon was to further the aims of law enforcement by turning it over to the police, he was entitled to the proffered instruction. We do not agree. Appellant did not find the gun in a public place, as did the defendant in LaPel-la, nor did he, upon finding it in his apartment, either call the police or take it "as soon and as directly as possible to law enforcement officers." Hines v. United States, supra at 249. With full knowledge that possession of the pistol was illegal, appellant nonetheless retained it for more than twelve hours, and then carried it, still loaded, on the street. Under these circumstances, we do not deem his claim properly cognizable as an excuse under the policy of § 22-3204. We therefore hold that under the facts tendered in appellant's defense, he was not entitled as a matter of law to the requested instruction on innocent possession.
III.
Appellant's two-fold argument to the trial court to suppress the pistol was (a) that the police broadcast was an inaccurate description of the robbers, making police action pursuant to such description unconstitutional, and (b) there was such a variance between the broadcast description and the appearance of appellant and his companions that there was neither probable cause to arrest them nor justification for a stop and frisk. In its written order denying the motion, the trial court found that the description of the robbers as broadcast on the police radio was substantially the same as the appearance of appellant and his companions. In addition, the order stated that since the radio run described one of the suspects as being armed, the police officers were justified in conducting a limited search for weapons pursuant to Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). The order made no express reference to the accuracy of the radio run. However, a permissible inference of a finding of sufficient accuracy is fairly embraced in the holding made, reasonable and circumstantial accuracy being necessary to lawful police action on the broadcast. Daniels v. United States, 129 U.S.App.D.C. 250, 393 F.2d 359 (1968).
We do not reach that aspect of the order of the trial court which held that a Terry frisk was justified because we conclude that the particular circumstance of this case gave the officers probable cause to arrest and search appellant. See Galloway v. United States, D.C.App., 326 A.2d 803, 804 (1974). Accordingly, the seizure of the pistol from appellant was proper and appellant's motion to suppress the evidence was properly denied.
This court has only recently reiterated that in the area of constitutional inquiry we deal with flexibility as an unavoidable, if not a desirable, ingredient of reasonableness and probability determinations; and we do not hold reasonable action impermissible simply because, in retrospect, an alternative is preferred. Crawford v. United States, D.C.App., 369 A.2d 595 (1977). We analyze appellant's contentions in light of these principles.
We note at the outset, in response to the dissent, that although the government did not prove which of the other officers was responsible for initiating the radio broadcast or who, as between the two victims, furnished the information contained in it, no point was made of this lack of proof at the suppression hearing. It is clear that all assumed that one of the victims furnished the details which were broadcast. Like wise, the point is not pressed here. While appellant contended at the suppression hearing that the radio run description was inaccurate or garbled, he never suggested that the descriptive information in it originated other than with one of the victims. He was given the opportunity to do so when the trial court suggested the following hypothetical at the hearing:
[T]he holdup occurred and the police officers give a description from the old ladies that are in the shop, and that then for some reason they got another piece of paper there from another holdup and they send the wrong one out over the air, and they pick your individuals up on that, and as a result of that you're saying it's a clear mistake, that they put the wrong call out, you're saying in such an instance it would be a violation of their constitutional rights. That's the clearest case; where there's a clear mistake and they put out a call that's erroneous.
To this, appellant's counsel answered, "Your Honor, I think that's somewhat distinct from the situation we have in this case." Moreover, at an earlier point in the proceedings, appellant's counsel conceded the possibility that other "tac' officers" obtained from the victims the information which was ultimately broadcast and which served as the basis for appellant's arrest. That inference is fairly embraced in the ruling on the motion.
The court in Daniels v. United States, supra, 129 U.S.App.D.C. at 252, 393 F.2d at 361, was also faced with the problem that "the Government proved neither which officer was responsible for initiating the lookout nor who gave him the information contained in it. But again no point was made of this lack of proof in the District Court". However, the court held that the absence of direct proof of the source of lookout information is not a ground for suppression and that such source may be proved inferentially. We are satisfied that the radio lookout description was shown to have originated with one of the victims. Thus, it is apparent that the officers in this case were acting on eyewitness information within a few moments of the offense. See Mitchell v. United States, D.C.App., 368 A.2d 514 (1977) (majority and concurring opinions); Lawson v. United States, D.C.App., 360 A.2d 38 (1976).
As a general rule, if the information in a radio run is obtained from a victim of a crime, the bulletin will provide probable cause for an arrest, and the police are entitled to act on the strength of the bulletin. Whiteley v. Warden of Wyoming State Penitentiary, 401 U.S. 560, 568, 91 S.Ct. 1031, 28 L.Ed.2d 306 (1971); Galloway v. United States, supra at 805. That the information comes from a victim with whom the arresting officers have had no direct dealings prior to the arrest does not undermine the constitutionality of an arrest or seizure on the basis of such information. Brown v. United States, 125 U.S.App.D.C. 43, 46, 365 F.2d 976, 979 (1966). A victim's report which is demonstrably based on personal observation is a factor stressed in Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 84 S.Ct. 1509, 12 L.Ed.2d 723 (1964), and in Lawson v. United States, supra at 40, as weighing heavily in the constitutional equation.
Appellant does not contest these general principles. Rather, he argues that the radio run pursuant to which he was arrested inaccurately reflected the information to the police, and that this inaccuracy negated probable cause to arrest. Appellant bases his claim of inaccuracy of the radio run on the fact that the broadcast description differed from the description given by a victim after the broadcast occurred. It is thus reasoned, falsely, that the earlier description forming the basis of the broadcast must also have been different from the broadcast, thereby making it inaccurate, and giving rise to constitutional deficiencies. Appellant's argument hinges on the unsupportable premise that the description forming the basis of the broadcast was essentially the same as the second description given the police. This does not necessarily follow for it may have been that the two descriptions were given by the same victim on separate occasions or that each victim gave a description at a different time. Then, too, each of the victims was understandably in an agitated state throughout the immediate post-offense events and their powers of totally accurate recall or repetition of details may not have been optimal. Such factors adequately support the probabilities that the description forming the basis of the broadcast differed in minor fashion from the second description, or may well have been equally accurate.
We look at whether the broadcast description conflicts with the second description, not whether it differs from the second one as appellant urges. This difference in approach is critical to a determination whether the earlier description forming the basis of the broadcast in all probability was accurately reflected in the broadcast. The descriptions differ from each other only as to whether the three-quarter length coat was beige or dark brown. (As to the number of perpetrators, one victim suggested the probability of three individuals even in the nonbroadcast description.) However, the descriptions agree as to the facts that two Negro males and probably a third person committed the offense; that one of them wore a three-quarter length brown coat; and that another wore a green jacket.
Every other difference between the two descriptions is explained by the fact that each description, without being inconsistent with the other, contains some details which the other does not, the radio run being far more detailed than the second description. Such greater detail suggests merely that the radio run was not based on the second description and not that the radio run was an inaccurate transmission of an earlier description. In fact, the greater detail of the radio run serves to disprove defense counsel's argument at the suppression hearing:
[Sjecondly, there was in fact either a garbled communication between the witnesses and the initial officers who took it; they were too hurried in taking it, or they were just plain sloppy in taking it and they got descriptions that were in fact inaccurate. .
If anything, the greater detail of the radio run would suggest that it was based on a much more complete description.
Necessarily underlying the conclusion of the trial court that the intrusion was justified is the fact that the broadcast related to this offense and no other, and that the description in the broadcast sufficiently reflected the descriptive details furnished by the victims so as to have avoided constitutional deficiency. The greater and, significantly, nondiscrepant detail of the radio run in combination with the number of details on which it agrees with the second description outweighs the significance of the one descriptive fact on which they disagree. Accordingly, there is sufficient support for the conclusion of the trial court, and we reject appellant's contention that the radio run description was shown to be so inaccurate as to make police action pursuant thereto illegal.
As to appellant's second reason why the pistol should have been suppressed, we cannot agree that the trial judge erred in ruling that the physical appearance of appellant and his companions was sufficiently close to the broadcast description as to have given the police probable cause to arrest them. We look first to all of the circumstances to determine whether appellant and his companions reasonably matched the description received. See Brown v. United States, supra, in which the court considered the coalescence of numerous significant factors, some in common with the instant case, to make a like decision. Appellant and his companions were apprehended within 25 minutes of the robbery and about 15 minutes after receipt of the broadcast. They were walking in a direction away from and within seven blocks of the crime scene, a distance consistent with the elapsed time. Moreover, the arresting officers noted that appellant and his companions were the only group of three persons they saw in the vicinity during their 15 minutes of cruising.
Appellant makes much of the fact that his group was not acting in a suspicious manner. While suspicious actions will contribute to probable cause, their absence, under the circumstances, is at most neutral and certainly does not detract therefrom. Additionally, the absence of attempted flight or apprehension as the officers approached can be explained by the fact that the officers were "old clothes" policemen and thus were not recognized as officers.
As to whether the specific physical characteristics of appellant and his companions reasonably matched the broadcast description, we note that the arresting officers observed three Negro males within the age group described (the radio run described only one of the individuals as 18-19 years old and did not state the age of the other two), a green jacket, a three-quarter length tan/beige coat, and a multi-colored shirt, dark trousers on all three suspects, and mustaches. All of these characteristics were enumerated in the radio run.
We find from the above factors enough particularized information for the trial judge to have found probable cause to justify an arrest. We note that a crime victim's observation may be faulty in some respects but the mistakes are irrelevant if there is sufficient particularized information and circumstances to constitute probable cause as to identity. Brown v. United States, supra; Bailey v. United States, 128 U.S.App.D.C. 354, 389 F.2d 305 (1967). "[R]oom must be allowed for the mistakes of reasonable officers when acting on facts which lead to conclusions of probability." Crawford v. United States, supra at 600. The same may be said of mistakes emanating from holdup victims. In Brown v. United States, supra, the initial radio run described the perpetrator as a Negro male, heavy build, driving a maroon 1954 Ford. This description was found adequate by the court in light of the fact that the car model was relatively unusual and that the arrest occurred at 4 a. m., when few ears were on the street. A more detailed second broadcast described the perpetrator as 5'5", wearing a brown jacket and cream-colored straw hat. When arrested, the suspect had a felt hat in his car, was wearing blue, and was 5'11" tall. According to the court, such discrepancies "did not destroy the ascertainment made on the basis of the accurate portion of the identification, which was by itself enough to constitute probable cause . ." Brown v. United States, supra, 125 U.S.App.D.C. at 45, 365 F.2d at 978.
We do not find in Gatlin v. United States, 117 U.S.App.D.C. 123, 326 F.2d 666 (1963), the similarity with this case which appellant urges. There was in Gatlin a single person observed after a three-person lookout with but one clothing detail, a trench coat. The time between offense and arrest was one hour and forty minutes, and the distance from offense to arrest locale was a mile and one-half.
Moreover, had the police in this case waited for even more detailed information before making the arrests, the suspects' identity might never have been ascertained. The exigencies of the situation made the course of action imperative. "The emergency character of these arrests weighs heavily in determining their reasonableness." Bailey v. United States, supra, 128 U.S.App.D.C. at 358, 389 F.2d at 309.
Finally, we note that the fact that the victims did not ultimately identify the apprehended individuals as the perpetrators is irrelevant to the question of a valid arrest. The warrantless arrest must be judged as of the time it was made. Terrell v. United States, D.C.App., 294 A.2d 860 (1972); Von Sleichter v. United States, 153 U.S.App.D.C. 169, 472 F.2d 1244, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1063, 93 S.Ct. 555, 34 L.Ed.2d 517 (1972).
The judgment of conviction is
Affirmed.
. The instruction proposed by defense counsel reads as follows:
Evidence has been introduced which tends to show that the defendant acquired possession of the pistol after it was left in his apartment by a burglar who was surprised when the defendant returned to his apartment and that he carried it for the sole purpose of reporting the offense to the police and turning the weapon over to the police.
You are instructed that if a person has possession of a pistol under certain circumstances which indicate that he did not have the intent to do the acts which constitute the offense of carrying a pistol without a license, that person would not be guilty of carrying a pistol. In other words, if you do not find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not have this pistol as the result of its being left in his apartment by a person who had burglarized his apartment and that he merely had the pistol on his person for the purpose of taking it to the police station to report the burglary then you must find him not guilty.
. See also Blango v. United States, D.C.App., 335 A.2d 230, 235 (1975).
. Officer Galante testified at the suppression hearing from the police report form on which he wrote the description as it was given to him by Ms. Jackson.