Case Name: Theresa Montalbano, Wife of/and Erhard THUMFART v. Ronald J. LOMBARD, State Farm Insurance Company and Water Board of New Orleans and/or City of New Orleans
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1993-01-21
Citations: 613 So. 2d 286
Docket Number: No. 91-CA-2602
Parties: Theresa Montalbano, Wife of/and Erhard THUMFART v. Ronald J. LOMBARD, State Farm Insurance Company and Water Board of New Orleans and/or City of New Orleans.
Judges: Before KLEES, BYRNES, ARMSTRONG, PLOTKIN and WALTZER, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 613
Pages: 286–299

Head Matter:
Theresa Montalbano, Wife of/and Erhard THUMFART v. Ronald J. LOMBARD, State Farm Insurance Company and Water Board of New Orleans and/or City of New Orleans.
No. 91-CA-2602.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fourth Circuit.
Jan. 21, 1993.
Rehearing Denied March 10, 1993.
Writ Denied May 21, 1993.
John F. Tooley, Jr., Woodlands, and Kevin A. Rieth, Gretna, for plaintiffs/appellants.
Marianne S. Pensa, Galloway, Johnson, Tompkins & Burr, New Orleans, for defendants/appellees.
Before KLEES, BYRNES, ARMSTRONG, PLOTKIN and WALTZER, JJ.

Opinion:
WALTZER, Judge.
This appeal comes from a trial court judgment dismissing plaintiff's claims against defendants Ronald Lombard and the Sewerage and Water Board of New Orleans. In his reasons for judgment, the trial judge stated that Theresa Thumfart, plaintiff, failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence whether the uncovered hole causing her injuries was the hole located on Mr. Lombard's property or the Sewerage and Water Board's meter box hole, which was on city property. After a trial on the merits, the trial judge dismissed plaintiff's claims against Mr. Lombard and the Water Board. The trial judge never reached the issue of damages. Plaintiff now appeals the trial court's judgment, claiming both liability and damages.
This action arose from an accident involving an uncovered hole in a parking lot on November 27, 1988. On that date, Theresa Thumfart drove to a lounge known as Chasers at 5771 Crowder Boulevard. Chaser's Lounge is one part of a building owned by Ronald Lombard. The other part of the building contains a pawn shop. In front of the building, in the parking lot, is a snowball stand. On the evening of November 27, 1988, Mrs. Thumfart parked her car in front of the snowball stand. She walked across the parking lot, entered the bar, had one drink, and left. As she was walking back to her car, Mrs. Thumfart failed to notice an uncovered hole, which could have been either one foot or four inches deep. Her foot fell into the hole and her arm and upper body hit the pavement, causing several sprains, bruises, and other injuries. Plaintiff then made her way back to the lounge and told the owner what had happened. The owner went out to the parking lot to examine the area, saw the uncovered water meter hole, and immediately called the Sewerage and Water Board of New Orleans, who then sent someone to replace the cover that night. Mrs. Thumfart then went to Methodist Hospital's emergency room where she was treated. She was later treated by several other physicians.
Mr. Lombard had purchased the lot at 5771 Crowder Boulevard in 1976. At that time, the lot was undeveloped grassland. In 1976, Mr. Lombard built a building which he now leases to Chaser's Lounge and a pawn shop. In 1977, he constructed a separate snowball stand on the lot. In addition to the building and the snowball stand, Mr. Lombard paved the rest of his property as a parking lot and driveway. While he initially paved only his property, he later got a permit and servitude to pave over city property which separated a portion of his land from Crowder Boulevard, and which Mr. Lombard used to extend his parking lot and create another entrance to his property. An imaginary line thus runs through the parking lot separating Mr. Lombard's property from the City's. On Mr. Lombard's side of the property line is a hole for sewerage drainage and cleanout, which he built and was required to have in accordance with city regulations. On the City's side of the property line, close to the other hole, is a water meter hole wherein the Sewerage and Water Board reads the meter in order to determine Mr. Lombard's water bill. The attorney for Mrs. Thum-fart argued before this Court that Mr. Lombard constructed the water meter hole when he developed the city property on which it is located. The attorney for Mr. Lombard denied this allegation, claiming that the water meter hole existed prior to Mr. Lombard's development of the property. The deposition testimony of Warren Lawrence of the Sewerage and Water Board indicates that the water meter box existed prior to Mr. Lombard's development of the property.
The trial judge found it difficult to determine which hole Mrs. Thumfart fell into. Because there were no witnesses to the incident, only Mrs. Thumfart could give direct testimony as to which hole caused her injuries. At trial she stated that Mr. Lombard's drainage cleanout hole caused her fall. She also introduced photographs, taken the day after the accident, indicating the hole on Mr. Lombard's property as the cause. Defendant's witnesses were found equally credible as they identified the Sewerage and Water Board's water meter hole as the one fallen into by plaintiff. The owner of the lounge and an employee of the Sewerage and Water Board both testified that there was a missing cover to the water meter hole on the evening of the accident. The trial judge, having found the plaintiff and defendant's witnesses equally credible, stated in his reasons for judgment that neither party proved by a preponderance of the evidence which hole caused Mrs. Thumfart's fall.
After a full trial on the merits, the trial judge ruled that (1) although strict liability applied, and the uncovered hole (whichever one actually caused the plaintiff's injuries) constituted a defect, because Mrs. Thum-fart could not prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the hole she fell into was located on Mr. Lombard's property, her claim against Mr. Lombard must be dismissed, and (2) that if the hole causing her injuries was the Sewerage and Water Board's water meter hole, then plaintiff failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the Sewerage and Water Board had actual or constructive notice of the missing cover. Moreover, because the trial judge did not affirmatively answer the issue of liability, he found no need to answer the question of damages. The trial judge did, however, apportion one third of the fault to Mrs. Thumfart, pointing to the fact that she had one drink and was walking through a dark parking lot inattentively. Mrs. Thumfart now appeals the trial court's judgment, arguing that her claim against Mr. Lombard was improperly dismissed and that damages should be awarded.
The plaintiff's claim against Mr. Lombard is based upon La.Civil Code article 2317. That article states:
We are responsible not only for the damage occasioned by our own act, but for that which is caused by the act of persons for whom we are answerable or of the things which we have in our custody. This is to be understood with the following modifications, (emphasis added)
In order to prove liability under article 2317, the plaintiff must prove that (1) a defect posing an unreasonable risk of harm to persons exercising ordinary care, (2) which was in the custody of the defendant, (3) caused her injuries. Sistler v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, 558 So.2d 1106 (La.1990). The trial judge, in his reasons for judgment, found that the uncovered hole (whichever one) in a "somewhat dark" area of the parking lot at night posed an unreasonable risk of injury to persons exercising ordinary care and thus a defect for 2317 purposes. This Court agrees with that conclusion. Further more, there was no question in the trial court that one of the two holes caused Mrs. Thumfart's accident. The issue on appeal is whether the trial court was correct in ruling that Mr. Lombard could only be liable under 2317 for injuries resulting from the hole on his property, and not for the hole located on city property.
It is well settled law in Louisiana that strict liability under La.C.C. article 2317 is based upon the relationship between the person with custody and the thing posing an unreasonable risk of harm to others. The article imposes liability based on custody and not ownership. Ownership allows a presumption of custody. Doughty v. Insured Lloyds Ins. Co., 576 So.2d 461, 464 (La.1991). However, absence of ownership does not end the inquiry of 2317 liability. Custody, distinct from ownership, refers to a person's supervision and control (garde) over a thing posing an unreasonable risk of harm. Loescher v. Parr, 324 So.2d 441, 446 (La.1975). Under Louisiana law, the guardian is in a better position than the innocent victim to detect, evaluate, and take steps to eliminate a defect posing an unreasonable risk of harm to others. Doughty, supra at 463, 464 (citing Ross v. La Coste de Monterville, 502 So.2d 1026, 1028 (La.1987); Kent v. Gulf States Utilities Co., 418 So.2d 493, 497 n. 5 (La.1982)). Our Louisiana Supreme Court has recently used a two part test in determining whether the defendant has custody. First, the defendant should have a right of direction and control over the thing. Second, a court'should examine what, if any, kind of benefit the defendant derives from the thing. Doughty v. Insured Lloyds Ins. Co., 576 So.2d 461, 464 (La.1991); King v. Louviere, 543 So.2d 1327, 1329 (La.1989).
In the case presently before us, the trial judge dismissed plaintiffs claim against Mr. Lombard stating, "[t]he plaintiff has failed to establish by a preponder-anee of the evidence that it is more likely than not that she stepped into the hole for sewerage/drainage clean-out located on Lombard's property." The trial judge thus determined that strict liability could not exist for the hole located on property not owned by the defendant. While ownership would have allowed a presumption of custody, the inquiry of liability does not end with a determination of nonownership. We think the trial court should have further determined whether Mr. Lombard exercised sufficient control or supervision over property with the water meter hole and whether Mr. Lombard benefited from this property.
The trial record indicates that Mr. Lombard received a significant benefit from the property with the water meter hole. Mr. Lombard leased his property and building at 5771 Crowder Blvd. to three businesses: a lounge, a pawn shop, and a snowball stand. The city property over which Mr. Lombard paved was used as an additional driveway and parking area for patrons visiting those businesses located on his property. The trial judge noted that such a benefit existed during the direct examination of Mr. Lombard.
BY MR. TOOLEY:
This is all on city property, all that front area?
BY MR. LOMBARD:
All except behind that diagonal line I drew.
BY MR. TOOLEY:
The one that's called sewer meter is on the city property from this line (indicating), but it's all concrete and drive that you built, correct?
BY MR. LOMBARD:
You have to have a driveway to get into a place of business, so we were required to put the driveway in. We wanted to put the drive only on the ser vice road. The city insisted we have, since our address was on Crowder Boulevard, we had to have a driveway entrance on Crowder. The city insisted we did.
BY MR. TOOLEY:
To have a commercial establishment you had to do that?
BY MR. LOMBARD:
That's what they said. We had an address on Crowder Road. We couldn't have an entrance on the service road. It had to be on Crowder.
BY THE COURT:
This is not leading to anything I need.
BY MR. TOOLEY:
May it please the Court, I think that the custody — I have to show that he—
BY THE COURT:
He's already testified that he paved it (the portion of land with the water meter hole).
BY MR. TOOLEY:
It's for his economic benefit.
BY THE COURT:
He already testified to that.
Trial Transcript, Volume III, page 92, 93.'
Because the trial court determined that a benefit to Mr. Lombard existed, the question now before us is whether Mr. Lombard also had the requisite supervision and control over the property to impose La.C.C. 2317 strict liability. We believe he did.
During the late 1970's, Mr. Lombard obtained a permit and was granted a servitude by the City to pave over the portion of land with the water meter hole. This portion of land was used as a driveway to and an extension of the parking lot for the businesses on Mr. Lombard's property. Mr. Lombard also stated that he visited either the Wendy's or Denny's adjacent to his property several times a week, and that he did a good deal of work from a window booth overlooking his property. Mr. Lombard additionally testified that he remembered seeing the Sewerage and Water Board checking the meter sometime during the week prior to Mrs. Thumfart's fall. Mr. Lombard stated that his contractor had informed him of the deteriorating condition of the pavement surrounding the drainage cleanout hole on his property, a few feet away from the water meter hole. Furthermore, he stated on direct examination that he had taken the lids off both holes on different occasions and was familiar with the insides of both. Just as these factors would support a finding that Mr. Lombard had control and custody over the parking lot on his side of the property, the same is true for the remaining part of the parking lot located on city property. For these reasons, we believe that Mr. Lombard exercised sufficient control and direction, and received enough of a benefit, to have custody of the property for La.C.C. art. 2317 purposes.
This case is distinguishable from the typical sidewalk cases. The Supreme Court, this Court, as well as other Circuit Courts, have held on several occasions that an abutting property owner is not liable for injuries caused by defects located on adjoining sidewalks or streets unless the property owner did something to help create the defect. St. Paul v. Mackenroth, 246 La. 425, 165 So.2d 273 (1964); Arata v. Orleans Capitol Stores, 219 La. 1045, 55 So.2d 239 (1951); Houssiere v. Lafayette Insurance Co., 559 So.2d 903 (La.App. 4th Cir.1990); Murphy v. City of New Orleans, 537 So.2d 1183 (La.App. 4th Cir.1988); reh. den. (Feb. 16, 1988); writ den., 541 So.2d 896 (La.1989); George v. Western Auto Supply Co. Inc., 527 So.2d 428 (La.App. 4th Cir.1988); Jones v. Gillen, 504 So.2d 575 (La.App. 5th Cir.1987); reh. den. (April 16, 1987); writ den., 508 So.2d 86 (La.1987); Simmons v. City of Lake Charles, 368 So.2d 1167 (La.App. 3 Cir.1979). We agree with the principle of law expressed by the above mentioned cases. However, the case before us presents a substantially different set of facts. The abutting property owners in previous cases did not develop, benefit from, or use city property to the extent Mr. Lombard did. Furthermore, the abutting property owners in previous cases never obtained permits or servitudes from their municipalities to develop adjacent city property and adopt it as their own. In prior cases, the city property on which defects were located always remained designated for public use. The city property over which Mr. Lombard paved was not held out as a sidewalk or street for public use, but rather was developed for the exclusive and private use by patrons visiting the businesses located on his property. To suggest that the portion of the parking lot on city property was open to the public to use as they would a city street or sidewalk simply defies reality. We maintain that where an abutting landowner develops adjacent property and adopts it as his own for private, and not public, use, he may be held strictly liable for defects posing an unreasonable risk of danger located on such property.
We believe the facts and reasoning of the Second Circuit case Lowe v. Thermal Supply of Shreveport, 242 So.2d 351 (La.App.2d Cir.1970); reh. den. (Jan. 11, 1971) are analogous to the present case. In that case, the court held that a storeowner and property owner could be held liable for a customer's injuries which resulted while crossing an empty lot to get to the store. The storeowner did not own the adjacent vacant lot, but had allowed and invited customers to use it as a pathway to his business. The Second Circuit described the storeowner's duty as follows:
The occupier thus owes a duty to avoid reasonably foreseeable danger to his invitee and to keep his premises safe from hidden dangers in the nature of traps or pitfalls in that they are not known to the invitee and would not be observed and appreciated by him in the exercise of ordinary care, [citing Levert v. Travelers Indemnity Company, 140 So.2d 811, 813 (La.App. 3d Cir.1962) ] Lowe v. Thermal Supply of Shreveport, supra at 352.
In the case now before us, Mr. Lombard invited patrons of the businesses leasing his property to use the City's property by developing it as an additional entrance and parking area. . Furthermore, Mr. Lombard obtained a permit and servitude from the municipality to develop, pave over, construct upon, and adopt this portion of city property as his own for private and not public use. Mr. Lombard also was either present or oversaw the property at 5771 Crowder Blvd. on a regular basis. We therefore hold that the facts in this case show that Mr. Lombard had custody of the adjoining city property, and a duty may be imposed upon him to keep the area free from defects which pose an unreasonable risk of harm.
For these reasons, we reverse the trial court's judgment and find Mr. Lombard strictly liable for the injuries sustained by Mrs. Thumfart. Damages should thus be assessed and awarded.
The proceeding from the lower court was a full trial on the merits, and this Court has before it all the evidence presented at trial regarding Mrs. Thumfart's injuries. We therefore decide to exercise our appellate jurisdiction to review the facts and accordingly assess damages without remanding. Gonzales v. Xerox Corporation, 320 So.2d 163 (La.1975); Nolan v. Jefferson Downs Inc., 592 So.2d 831 (La.App. 5th Cir.1991), reh. den. (1992), writ den., 596 So.2d 558, 559 (La.1992).
The evidence in the record reveals that the plaintiff suffered numerous inju-. ries and physical problems from prior accidents and illnesses. During the 1970's, she suffered several accidents injuring her lower back and requiring surgery. Additionally, the plaintiff had been put in traction about two years before her fall, had been diagnosed to have carpal tunnel syndrome a year prior to her fall, had been seeing a physician for lower back trouble, and had been suffering from hypertension and bowel problems consisting of colitis, gastritis, and hemorrhoids for several years prior to her accident.
Four physicians were called by the plaintiff to testify about her injuries resulting from the accident. The defendant called no medical experts.
Dr. A. Cracco, an orthopedist, testified that he examined the patient on November 29, 1988, two days after the accident. Dr. Cracco stated that the plaintiff at that visit complained of a ringing in her ears, soreness at the back of her head, diarrhea, arm and neck pains, pains in her right leg and foot, and discomfort in her lower back. His examination at that time, which included a review of the X-rays from Methodist Hospital from two days before, indicated a cervical sprain at C4, 5, and 6, several abrasions and bruises, and inflammation of her pre-existing arthritis. Yalpin, an anti-inflammatory drug, was prescribed, along with moist heat. The doctor also indicated that he was treating Mrs. Thumfart for a fractured toe she suffered about a month and a half before the fall, which resulted from having dropped a frozen hen on her foot. Mrs. Thumfart returned to Dr. Crac-co on December 22 for a check up of her fractured toe and the injuries from her fall on November 27. She next visited the doctor on January 12, 1989, at which time she again complained of pain in her hand and right thumb, and informed the doctor that the medication earlier prescribed was upsetting her stomach. Dr. Cracco's records next indicated a phone call to his office from Mrs. Thumfart in which she stated that she again injured her toe, and wanted to know if she should tape it up herself. She did not go back to Dr. Cracco's office until March 2. On that visit she repeated her complaints about her hand and thumb, as well as pains in her knee. Dr. Cracco noted a flare up of Mrs. Thumfart's preexisting arthritis and carpal tunnel syndrome, for which he prescribed cortisone treatments and a wrist support and recommended that she see Dr. Hedgpeth. Mrs. Thumfart did not return again until August of 1989. On that visit she complained of pain in her feet and a possible sprain in her shoulder. Dr. Cracco did not relate these later problems to the fall. However, Dr. Cracco again saw the plaintiff in September and October of 1990 for problems in her right hand related to her arthritis. In his testimony, Dr. Cracco described his medical history with the plaintiff, which began in 1979. He described that several domestic quarrels, accidents, and degenerative conditions resulted in dislocated shoulders and fingers, sprained ankles, wrists, and fingers, carpal tunnel syndrome and arthritis in her hands and right thumb, and two fractured toes.
Dr. M. Hedgpeth, an expert in rheuma-tology and internal medicine, began treating the plaintiff in April of 1989. She was referred by Dr. Cracco to determine the cause of the plaintiff's stiffness and pains in her shoulders, neck, elbows wrists, hips, knees, and lower back. Her diagnosis revealed rheumatoid arthritis, which she felt would have developed without the fall, but was most certainly exacerbated by the accident. While Dr. Hedgpeth stated that it was difficult to determine whether plaintiff's pains and stiffness experienced during much of 1989 was related specifically to the accident or to natural progression of rheumatoid arthritis, she did state that, more likely than not, the stiffness in the hip, knees, and ankles was related to the accident in November of 1988.
Dr. Harry Colcolough, an internist, testified that the plaintiff suffered intestinal problems during the month after the accident including serious gastritis, colitis, hemorrhoids, and explosive bowel movements. The witness attributed this to the accident, stating that the trauma of the fall, coupled with the pain medication taken by plaintiff, greatly aggravated her preexisting condition. This witness also testified that the plaintiff returned to his office a few weeks later suffering from a urinary infection, which the physician stated was most probably not related to the fall. However, Dr. Colcolough testified that the plaintiff revisited him several times during the following months, again complaining of bowel problems and suffering from hypertension, which the witness again attributed to the accident. In September of 1990, Mrs. Thumfart was admitted into a hospital for costoeongritis, an inflammation of a cartilidge in the chest wall which blocks the flow of oxygen making it more difficult to breathe. The witness stated that this condition, two years after the accident, was most likely not related to the plaintiffs fall.
Dr. R. Llewellyn, a neurosurgeon, testified that he had been seeing the plaintiff for many years, and had performed lower back surgery on her in 1980 and wrist surgery in 1987. He stated that Mrs. Thumfart came to him in June of 1989 complaining of pains in her neck, shoulder, lower back, knees, legs, and foot. Dr. Llewellyn consequently ordered an MRI. He compared the MRI results from June 1989 with a MRI test he ordered in August of 1988. His conclusion was that the plaintiff suffered a new injury at C3 and C4, which explained the pains in her neck and shoulders. Dr. Llewellyn attributed this condition to the accident of November 1988. He then prescribed physical therapy consisting of various exercises which led Mrs. Thumfart to join a health clinic known as No Sweat. Dr. Llewellyn suggested that she continue wearing the orthopedic shoes which had been prescribed by Dr. Cracco for her fractured toe in 1988. Dr. Llewellyn continued seeing the plaintiff through 1989 and 1990. In August of 1990, another MRI was ordered which revealed a significant improvement at C3 and C4.
After considering the testimony described above, the trial judge reached the following conclusion with regard to Mrs. Thumfart's injuries resulting from her November, 1988 fall:
Mrs. Thumfart has an extensive medical history and the gravamen of the dispute with respect to her injuries is the extent to which the accident accelerated prior existing conditions or caused new medical conditions for her. Extensive medical tests were performed by various doctors and testing entities. Primarily, Mrs. Thumfart's injuries are acceleration and aggravation of rheumatoid arthritis; contusions; abrasions; hand injuries (irritation of borderline carpal tunnel syndrome); right knee injuries; left shoulder injuries; and further minor aggravation of a cervical bulge at C3-4.
We agree with these findings but further note the plaintiff's pain and considerable discomfort due to her aggravated bowel condition experienced during the month or so after the accident as testified to by Dr. Calcolough.
The plaintiff introduced into the record her medical expenses accumulated since her fall in November of 1988. These bills total $16,816.80. However, each physician testified that a portion of their treatment was for injuries or illnesses not related to the fall. After a careful review of the record, we believe that about three-fourths (3/4) of plaintiff's physician expenses are attributable to her accident. We therefore find $12,000.00 awardable as compensation for the plaintiff's medical expenses resulting from the accident on November 27, 1988.
The plaintiff was not working nor looking for work at the time of the accident. She therefore lost no past or future wages as a result, and such damages need not be awarded.
With regard to plaintiff's general damages, our review of the record indicates that the plaintiff suffered pain and aggravation well into 1989, almost a full year after the fall. The plaintiff testified that much of her time was spent in doctor's offices, hospitals, and physical therapy clinics, and that she had great difficulty in doing some of the things she used to with her husband like long walks, tennis, and boating. However, she also testified that not too long after the accident, she and her husband took a trip to Europe and Medju-gorje. Again concluding that about one-fourth of Mrs. Thumfart's pain and suffering, as well as any loss of enjoyment of life, was not attributable to the accident, we believe that $60,000.00 should be awarded in general damages. We believe this figure reasonable after a review of the record and considering other awards for general damages in recent cases with similar injuries.
We defer to the trial court's determination that the plaintiff was one-third at fault for the accident, and her damages should be adjusted accordingly. The plaintiff shall thus be awarded two-thirds (⅜) of the total of her medical expenses and general damages attributable to the accident.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial court finding no liability on the part of defendant, Mr. Lombard, is reversed, and the plaintiff is hereby awarded $48,000, which is two-third (⅜) of the plaintiffs medical expenses and general damages resulting from the accident, plus legal interests and costs.
REVERSED AND RENDERED.
PLOTKIN, J., concurs with written reasons.
BYRNES, J., dissents with reasons.
ARMSTRONG, J., dissents for reasons assigned by BYRNES, J.
. The City of New Orleans was also named as defendant, but was never served with notice of the proceedings. The trial judge thus separated plaintiffs' claims against the City from this case.
. As noted by the trial judge, it was difficult to determine which hole the plaintiff fell into. The drainage cleanout hole, located on Mr. Lombard's side of the property line was estimated to be about four inches deep, while the water meter hole, located on city property was around one foot deep.
. The trial judge noted that the case cited by plaintiff, Dickson v. Wal-Mart Stores Inc., 535 So.2d 800 (La.App.2d 1988), did not support liability on the part of Mr. Lombard. That case dealt with the liability of a storeowner for "premise hazards". The liability in that case is defined in LSA-R.S. 9:2800.6, which details the burdens of proofs and liability of store owners ("merchants") for dangerous conditions located on their premises. The trial judge was thus correct in noting that Dickson did not apply to Mrs. Thumfart's claim against Mr. Lombard. Mr. Lombard was the owner and lessor of the property, and not a "merchant" as defined by the statute.
. The case cited by the defendant, Lombard, is also not applicable. Kuck v. City of New Orleans, 531 So.2d 1142 (La.App. 4th Cir.1988). In that case, the City argued that the abutting property owner should be liable for the thing posing an unreasonable risk of injury, even though it was located on city property, in accordance with section 4 of Act 536 of 1950, which places the responsibility of repair on the adjacent property owner. This Court held that even though responsibility for repair may lay with the adjacent property owner, liability did not shift from the City, on whose property the defect was located. In this case, plaintiff is not seeking to shift or place liability on defendant Lombard by way of city ordinances which place responsibility of repair on the abutting landowner. Mrs. Thum-fart seeks liability under La.C.C. 2317 against Mr. Lombard based upon his own use and control of the property which contained the water meter hole, Kuck does not stand for the principle that only one party may have custody under 2317. Even if liability may more fairly rest on the Sewerage and Water Board for the plaintiff's injuries, Mr. Lombard may be held liable by his own actions and relationship to the thing causing Mrs. Thumfart's injuries.
. We are aware of cases which have stated that a missing cover to a water meter box does not automatically trigger strict liability. Jackson v. Sewerage and Water Board, 501 So.2d 826 (La.App. 4th Cir.1986); Rigao v. Sewerage and Water Board of New Orleans, 467 So.2d 1263 (La.App. 4th Cir.1985). These cases, which always involved public defendants, applied judicially created standards that existed prior to the 1985 legislative enactment of LSA-R.S. 9:2800. This legislation reflected the then current opinions which repeatedly held that the City and public entities could not be held strictly liable for defects on City property and within the custody of the City or public entity. These previous decisions subsequently held that the public defendants could only be found liable upon proof that they had either actual or constructive notice. Jackson, supra at 827; Rigao, supra at 1264-65. Because LSA-R.S. 9:2800 now mandates that actual or constructive notice exist for any 2317 suit against the City or public entity, we need no longer automatically turn strict liability suits against a public body into suits of negligence. Louisiana law has traditionally required proof of some kind of notice before holding public entities liable for the various and numerous defects around the City. This is precisely why the suit against the Sewerage and Water was dismissed in the present case.
However, to hold that a missing cover to a water meter box, as a matter of law, can never constitute a defect would be unreasonable. Such a conclusion would logically mean that similar holes with virtually identical covers, like the drainage hole on Mr. Lombard's property as evidenced by the photographs in the record, could never as a matter of law be considered to pose an unreasonable risk of harm to individuals exercising ordinary care. This we will not do. Because the determination of whether something is a defect is based primarily on factual findings, we will defer to the trial judge's determination that the uncovered hole in the dimly lit parking lot at night constituted a defect.
. The trial judge further illustrated his conclusion that La.C.C. 2317 could apply only to property owners in the second page of his reasons for judgment where he states, "Civil Code Article 2317 establishes the doctrine of strict liability. Thus, the owner of premises is strictly liable for defects in the premises."
. In oral argument counsel for the defendant admitted that if plaintiff had proven that she fell in the hole located on defendant's property, the defendant would be strictly liable. The holes in question are so close to each other that it is difficult to imagine that Mr. Lombard's eyes would automatically have come to rest and stopped to examine only the hole on his property, disregarding any potential dangers that may have come about from a defect only a few feet away.
. $524.81 to Methodist Hospital Emergency Room for tests and treatment on the evening of the accident; $766.88 to Dr. Cracco; $2,662.00 to Dr. Hedgpeth; $15.00 to Dr. Berthier; $9,930.75 to Dr. Colcolough; and $2,917.26 to Dr. Llewellyn.
. In Alexander v. Rivers, $90,000 was awarded in general damages for a woman who suffered carpal tunnel syndrome, knee injuries, fractured jaw and loss of some teeth after an automobile accident. Alexander v. Rivers, 560 So.2d 999 (La.App. 4th Cir.1990). In Baio v. Haggerty, plaintiff was awarded $55,000 in general damages for a leg injury which required surgery and several months of physical therapy. Baio v. Haggerty, 558 So.2d 691 (La.App. 1st Cir.1990). In Cascio v. Continental Casualty Co., $75,000 was determined to be a reasonable figure for general damages suffered by a plaintiff who experienced aggravation to a preexisting spinal condition, which possibly required surgery in the future. Cascio v. Continental Casualty Co., 547 So.2d 743 (La.App. 4th Cir.1989), reh. den. (1989). In South Central Bell v. American Holding Corporation, a plaintiff was awarded $20,000 in general damages for injury to her leg after a slip and fall accident. This award was found not inadequate, nor excessive, after the appellate court determined that her alleged resulting leg injury was due mostly to the plaintiff's tennis play and yard work after the accident. South Central Bell Telephone Co. v. American Holding Corp., 548 So.2d 339 (La.App. 1st Cir.1989). In Lewis v. State of Louisiana, an award of $100,000 was found reasonable for back and knee injuries suffered after a slip and fall accident by woman who had a history of back and leg pain, right knee and back surgery, and who was deemed "permanently disabled" from physical activities prior to her fall. Lewis v. State of Louisiana, 546 So.2d 484 (La.App. 4th Cir.1989), reh. den. (1989).