Case Name: Gibson Oil Company v. Sherry
Court: Arkansas Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Arkansas
Decision Date: 1927-02-21
Citations: 172 Ark. 947
Docket Number: 
Parties: Gibson Oil Company v. Sherry.
Judges: 
Reporter: Arkansas Reports
Volume: 172
Pages: 947–952

Head Matter:
Gibson Oil Company v. Sherry.
Opinion delivered February 21, 1927.
W. R. Bonham, for appellant.
Robert L. Rogers and Sam Robinson, for appellee.

Opinion:
Hart, C. J.,
(after stating the facts). The main reliance of counsel for the defendant for a reversal of the judgment is that the evidence is not legally sufficient to support the verdict. In making this contention counsel insists that the court should have declared as a matter of law that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence, and therefore not entitled to recover. This court has held that, in view of the highly dangerous character of gas and its tendency to escape, a gas com- " pany must use a degree of care to prevent the escape of gas from its pipes proportionate to the dangers which it is its duty to avoid, and that, if it fails to exercise this degree of care and injury results therefrom, the company is liable, provided the person suffering the injury, either in person or in property, is free from contrib utory negligence. Pulaski Gas Light Co. v. McClintock, 97 Ark. 576, 134 S. W. 1189; and Little Rock Gas & Fuel Co. v. Coppedge, 116 Ark. 334, 172 S. W. 885. Many other cases from other States are cited in support of the rule in 25 A. L. R. 262.
Gasoline becomes volatile when exposed to the air, and is easily ignited when it comes in contact with a flame. Therefore gasoline is also a highly dangerous substance, and the same rule applies to it as above stated with regard to gas. Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. Knisel, 79 Ark. 608, 96 S. W. 342; and Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Johnson, 149 Ark. 553, 233 S. W. 680.
When the gasoline was drained from the tank of the plaintiff's car and was allowed to flow on the concrete floor of the filling station, it became exposed to the oxygen of the air and formed a gaseous substance which was easily ignited when a flame was applied to it. The defendant should have drained the gasoline into a container, and not have allowed it to flow across the concrete floor of the filling station into the gutter of the street. This was a highly populous neighborhood, and the defendant should have anticipated that some one passing by might throw a lighted match into the gutter, which would ignite the vapor formed by the gasoline coming in contact with the air and thereby destroy the plaintiff's automobile. Thus it will be seen that the negligence of the defendant was the proximate cause of the destruction of the plaintiff's property.
This brings us to the question of the plaintiff's contributory negligence' as a bar to his right to recover. This we regard as a very close question, but, under the circumstances, we do not think the court erred in refusing to declare as a matter of law that the plaintiff was-guilty of contributory negligence. In reaching this conclusion it must be remembered that the jury were the judges of the credibility of the witnesses, and had a right to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, if they believed that he was telling the truth about the matter. St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co. v. Ellenwood, 123 Ark. 428, 185 S. W. 768. The plaintiff denied that he told the employees of the defendant or the persons present that the gasoline which was drained from the tank of his automobile would not burn and that he deliberately stuck the flame of a match to it to demonstrate that it would not burn. On the other hand, he says that he walked out on the sidewalk twenty feet away from his automobile and lit his pipe and threw the lighted match into the street, not anticipating that the defendant's employees would allow the gasoline which was being drained from the tank of his automobile to flow across the sidewalk into the street. Under these circumstances it cannot be said as a matter of law that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence in throwing the lighted match into the street.
The next assignment of error is that the court erred in giving instruction No. 2, which reads as follows: "If you find that the defendant was negligent and that, by virtue of such negligence, the plaintiff's automobile was destroyed, then you must find for the plaintiff, unless you find that the plaintiff was himself negligent and that his negligence contributed to the cause of the damage. ' '
At the request of the defendant the court instructed the jury that, before the plaintiff was entitled to recover, he must prove every material allegation of the complaint by a preponderance of the evidence. Under the allegations of the complaint the negligence of the defendant was substantially as established by plaintiff's own testimony. Hence, if counsel for the defendant thought that the instruction now complained of did not limit the jury to a consideration of such acts of negligence as might have been the proximate cause of the destruction of the automobile, a specific objection should have been made to the instruction. Not having made a specific objection and pointed out wherein it was objectionable, the defendant is not now in an attitude to complain of the action of the court in giving the instruction. Pine Bluff & A. R. Ry. Co. v. Washington, 116 Ark. 179, 172 S. W. 872, and Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Freudenberg, 168 Ark. 616, 271 S. W. 15.
It follows that the judgment was correct, and will therefore be affirmed.