Case Name: Scott Richard SIBLEY, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1994-05-20
Citations: 636 So. 2d 893
Docket Number: No. 93-2193
Parties: Scott Richard SIBLEY, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: W. SHARP, J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 636
Pages: 893–895

Head Matter:
Scott Richard SIBLEY, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. 93-2193.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
May 20, 1994.
James B. Gibson, Public Defender, and Noel A. Pelella, Asst. Public Defender, Day-tona Beach, for appellant.
Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Robin Compton Jones, Asst. Atty. Gen., Daytona Beach, for appellee.

Opinion:
COBB, Judge.
The defendant, Sibley, was convicted on two counts of dealing in stolen property. He testified at trial that he received the property (jewelry belonging to Sanchez) from one Michael Smyth. He was then asked by his counsel whether he was given any reason to believe that Smyth was the rightful owner of the property. When he answered that Smyth "indicated" he was the rightful owner of the jewelry, the state interposed an objection on the basis that the question called for hearsay. The objection was promptly and erroneously sustained by the trial judge. The judge then asked defense counsel for any exception to the hearsay rule that would permit this testimony. There is no such exception, of course, because Sibley's testimony as to what he was told by Smyth did not constitute hearsay at all.
"Hearsay" is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted. See § 90.801(l)(c), Fla.Stat. (1993). The issue at trial was not whether Smyth was in fact the rightful owner of the jewelry at the time he delivered it to Sibley — it was clear that he was not — but whether Sibley knew that Smyth had given him stolen property. Smyth's representation of ownership to Sib-ley, whether true or false, clearly was not hearsay. The fact at issue was Sibley's knowledge, and what he was told by Smyth was obviously germane to that issue. The ruling by the trial judge precluded the jury from hearing the explicit statement of Smyth to Sibley in regard to ownership, as opposed to some nebulous "indication" of ownership.
The issue before us, then, is whether the trial court's ruling can be tolerated as harmless error. See State v. DiGuilio, 491 So.2d 1129 (Fla.1986). In order to say yes, we must be able to conclude that there is no reasonable possibility that the error contributed to the conviction. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967). In respect to this harmful error analysis, we must agree with the argument set forth in the appellant's brief:
Quite clearly, Smyth's out of court statements were not offered to prove that the jewelry at issue was indeed the property of Smyth or his mother. Everyone in the courtroom knew that the jewelry had been stolen from the Sanchez residence. Smyth's statements were offered to show that Appellant had relied on Smyth's assertions, at the time they were made, not to prove that the statements were ever true. Smyth's statements were essential to Appellant's theory of defense. The statements were probative of Appellant's claim that he had sold the jewelry without knowledge or reason to believe it was stolen, (the only issue with regard to the charges of dealing in stolen property), and tended to disprove the existence of an essential element of the charged offenses. Therefore, the error in excluding this evidence was not harmless.
We reverse and remand for a new trial on the two counts of dealing in stolen property.
REVERSED AND REMANDED FOR NEW TRIAL.
W. SHARP, J., concurs.
GOSHORN, J., dissents with opinion.