Case Name: James Clark, trustee, etc., plaintiff in error, vs. Way & Taylor, defendants in error
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia
Jurisdiction: Georgia
Decision Date: 1864-03
Citations: 33 Ga. Supp. 149
Docket Number: 
Parties: James Clark, trustee, etc., plaintiff in error, vs. Way & Taylor, defendants in error.
Judges: 
Reporter: Georgia Reports
Volume: 33 Suppl.
Pages: 149–155

Head Matter:
James Clark, trustee, etc., plaintiff in error, vs. Way & Taylor, defendants in error.
1. The certificate of the clerk, on the back of a deed, as to the fact and date of registration being so written as to render the date doubtful and uncertain, and it being material to show the true date, a copy of the deed with the fact and date of registration taken from the record and duly certified, was offered in evidence to show said date, and the evidence was rejected by the Court:
Held, That the Court erred.
2. A marriage settlement, duly recorded within the time prescribed by law, in the county of the residence of the husband, need not be again recorded in the county or counties to which the husband may subsequently remove. The first registration, if properly done, is sufficient.
3. It was not error for the presiding Judge to decline to charge as requested, and to charge as he did in this case.
Attachment and claim. In Sumter Superior Court. Tried before Judge Alexander A. Allen, at the April Term, 1861.
Eeturnable to April term, 1858, Way & Taylor instituted an action in Sumter Superior Court against Brown & Carmichael, to recover the sum of $11,827 70, which the plaintiffs alleged was due them from the defendants. Pending this action, to-wit: on the 3d of February, 1858, the plaintiffs obtained an attachment against Henry H. Brown, one of the defendants, on the ground that he “absconds.” The attachment was levied on “ one house and lot in the city of Amerieus, formerly occupied by H. H. Brown, and still occupied by his family; also, the following negroes, to-wit: Eliza, a woman about twenty-nine years old, Nancy, a girl about nine years old, Lawyer, a boy about twelve years old, and Jack, a man about twenty-eight years old; also, the house and lot occupied by A. A. Danforth, as a residence, in the city of Amerieus, all levied on as the property of said Brown.
James Clark, as trustee for Mrs. Eva M. Brown, interposed his affidavit, alleging that said property was not the property of said Henry H. Brown, but the property of Mrs. E. M. Brown, and not subject to sale under said attachment.
On the trial of the issue made by the levy and claim affidavit, Way & Taylor proved their debt against Brown & Carrni chael, and introduced the attachment with the levy thereon, and also proved that Brown built the house levied on, and used and occupied it, and, also, had possession of the negroes levied on, except Eliza, up to within a few days of the time the levy was made. The plaintiffs also proved that the property was worth $5,500 00, and closed. The claimant then proved that prior to December, 1863, Brown had carried on business in the city of Oglethorpe, in Macon county, and had a plantation in Marion county, and a house in Oglethorpe; that part.of the time his children stayed with him in the house; that in December, 1853, in Lumpkin, Stewart county, he married Mrs. Eva M. Bedingfield, the eestui que trust of the claimant, that Mrs. Bedingfield was then a widow and housekeeper in Lumpkin, and that after the marriage, Brown remained with her in her house until about the first of January, 1854, when they sold their household effects and removed to Americus. The claimant also proved that Mrs. Brown, formerly Mrs. Bedingfield, had an interest in the estate of her former husband, worth $10,000 00. He also proved that at the time the debt due to plaintiffs was created or incurred, Brown was a man of large property and credit, and that Carmichael also owned considerable property, and had good credit; that plaintiffs resided in Savannah. Claimant then introduced in evidence a deed of marriage settlement entered into and executed by Mrs. E. M. Bedingfield, and the said H. H. Brown, dated 3d of December, 1853, in which, in consideration of the marriage then about to be solemnized between the parties, it was covenanted and agreed that the one-third interest of Mrs. Bedingfield in seventeen negroes named in the deed, including the negro woman Eliza, levied on as aforesaid, should forever be and remain the separate estate and property of the said E. M. Bedingfield, to her sole and separate use during life, with full power and authority to dispose of the same to any one she may think proper, such disposition to take effect at her death and not before. It was also stipulated in the deed, .that if the said E. M. Bedingfield should be in life at the death of the said Brown, she is to be placed in as good a condition as at the time of her marriage with Brown, and that the latter should be bound and liable for the full amount of prop erty and effects lie might receive from the estate of Bryau Bedingfield, the former husband of the said Eva M. Bedingfield. The deed also stipulated that Brown was to be trustee of said negro property, and use and manage the same for the uses and purposes of the trust, but the property should in no event be liable for Brown’s debts, contracted before or after said marriage. This deed was recorded in the county of Stewart, where Brown resided at the time, and the certificate of the clerk, on the back of the same, was doubtful as to the date of registration, the figures being so made as to read either “December 5th, 1853,” or “December 5th, 1855.” To render this certain, the claimant offered to read in evidence a certified copy of the deed, with the date of its registration, taken from the records of Stewart Superior Court, which showed that the deed was recorded the 5th of December, 1853. Upon objection made to this evidence, it was rejected by the presiding Judge.
Clainiant then read in evidence a deed from H. H. Brown to James Clark, as trustee for Mrs. E. M. Brown, conveying the house and lot levied on, dated 23d December, 1857, and a like deed conveying the negroes in dispute except Eliza, dated 21st December, 1857. Both of these deeds purported to be made in consideration that Brown was indebted to his wiip for certain negroes of hers, which he had sold, and certain moneys and effects which he had received from the estate of his wife’s former husband, and which he had applied to his own use and had never accounted for. Complainant further proved that Brown did sell Mrs. Brown’s negroes and received the money for them, one negro bringing $1,200 00, and that he received from the estate of Bedingfield, notes and effects belonging to Mrs. Brown amounting to $4,000 00 or $5,000 00, and that Brown had- not lived in Oglethorpe after his marriage with Mrs. Bedingfield. The plaintiffs, in rebuttal, proved that the deeds from Brown to Clark, as trustee, were executed at his house at night, and only a short time before Brown left the county, and that neither Mrs. Brown nor Clark were present.
Claimant, in rejoinder, showed that one of the deeds was written in Clark’s hand and one by H. K. McCay, Esq., and were in the hands of Clark.
Counsel for complainant asked the presiding Judge to charge the jury “that even if the marriage contract between Brown and his wife was not duly recorded, yet it was a good contract between the parties, and if Brown became indebted to his wife by applying to his own use the property therein settled, he might lawfully pay her, even though he was in failing circumstances, the debt due thus from him to her being a valuable consideration; that if the property Mrs. Brown brought into the marriage was not in her possession at the time, but was obtained by Brown from the executor, by virtue of and in accordance with the term of the settlement, then his marital rights never did attach, and if he afterwards held the property as trustee, and sold it, and used the proceeds, he became her debtor, and might lawfully convey property to her as well as to other creditors, in payment of what he owed her.”
The Court declined to give these instructions as requested, but charged the jury “that if Brown became indebted to his wife by virtue of a marriage settlement duly recorded in the county of his residence at the time, or duly recorded in the county of his residence at any time before the credit was given, then he may pay her, as well as any other creditor, if there is no fraud in the transaction and it be done bona fide.”
The jury found the property all subject except the negro Eliza, and found her not subject, and the claimant prosecutes the writ of error in this case to reverse the judgment because of alleged error in rejecting the testimony, and refusing to charge as hereinbefore stated.
McCay & Hawkins, for plaintiff in error.
James J. Scabboeouq-h, contra.

Opinion:
By the Court
Lumpkin, C. J.,
delivering the opinion.
Way & Taylor attached the property of Brown, one of the firm of Brown & Carmichael, and the property was claimed by James Clark, as trustee for Mrs. Brown. Mrs. Brown, formerly Mrs. Bedingfield, was a legatee of her former husband's estate. Her interest in the estate was estimated to be worth 010,000 00. At the time of her intermarriage with Henry Brown she lived in Lumpkin, Stewart county. Brown, who transacted business in Oglethorpe city, Macon county, and owned a plantation in Marion county, entered into a marriage settlement with his wife at the time, to-wit: the 3d of December, 1853, and the deed was recorded two days thereafter, in Stewart county, to-wit: the 5th of December, 1853. After residing with his wife about one month in Lumpkin, they removed to Americus, Sumter county, and the first question made in the record, was as to the date of the registration of the marriage settlement. The original deed was before the Court, with the clerk's certificate indorsed thereon, but it was doubtful whether the figures should be read 1853 or 1855, a very material fact. All the evidence showed that it was intended to be 1853; but to remove the doubt, and make assurance doubly sure, a certified copy of the deed, taken from the record book in Stewart, together with the clerk's certificate of registration at the bottom, taken from the record book, was offered in proof, and rejected by the Court. Wherein we think his Honor erred.
The certificates were both original entries, to-wit: that on the deed, and that on the foot of the deed in the record book. But there was doubt how the former should be read. What objection could there be to the introduction of the certified copy to make clear the meaning? None, we hold. A second question raised and discussed in this case, is this: Whether a marriage settlement should be recorded in every county where the' husband may subsequently reside? or whether one registration made in the county of the residence of the husband at the time-will suffice ? And this depends upon the construction of the-Act of 1847 : Cobb's Digest, 180, which is in these words:-
Section I. " That all marriage agreements or settlements heretofore executed, either within this or any other State or territory, where the husband resides within the limits of this State, shall be recorded within twelve months after the passage- and publication of this Act, in the clerk's office of the Superior Court in the county of the residence of the husband."
Section II. "All marriage agreements or settlements hereafter made, either in this State or any other State or territory where the husband resides in this State, shall be recorded within three months from the execution thereof, in the clerk's office of the Superior Court of the county of the husband's residence."
Section III. "If any such instrument be not recorded within the time prescribed by this Act, the same shall not be of any force or effect against a bona fide purchaser without notice, a bona fide creditor without notice, or a bona fide surety without notice, who may purchase or give credit, or become surety before the actual recording of the same."
We remark, that prior to this Act, marriage settlements-were not required to be recorded, and although policy might require a recording in any county to which the husband might subsequently remove, the Act itself does not go so far, and it will be for the Legislature and not the Courts to extend the remedy, if, in their opinion, the mischief requires it.
Claimant introduced two deeds from Brown to Clark, trustee of Mrs. Brown, dated in December, 1851, and recorded within a few days after they were given : one for the house and lot and the other for the negroes, on which the attachment was levied, and sundry testimony going to show that Brown had removed and sold various articles of property coming to his wife from the estate of her former husband, Bedingfield, and for' which he was indebted to her large sums of money, and then requested the Court to charge the jury that, even if the marriage contract between Brown and his wife was not duly recorded, yet, that it was a good contract between the parties, and if Brown became indebted to his wife by applying her property to his own use, he might lawfully pay it, even though in failing circumstances, the debt due from him to her being a lawful consideration ; that if the property that Mrs. Brown brought into the marriage was not in his possession at the time, but was obtained by Brown from the executor of Bedingfield's estate, by virtue of, and in •accordance with, the marriage settlement, then his marital rights never did attach; but if he afterwards became her trustee, and held the property as such, and used the proceeds, he became his wife's debtor, and might lawfully convey property to her, as well as to other creditors, in payment of what he owed her. To these requests the Court responded, that if Brown became in debted to his wife by virtue of a marriage settlement duly recorded in the county of his residence at the time, or duly recorded in the county of his residence at any time before the credit was given, he may pay her, as well as any other creditor: Provided, the transaction was bona fide. We are not prepared to go further than the Circuit Judge.
Let the judgment be reversed, on the ground that the Court erred in rejecting the certified copy of the record from Stewart county, as explanatory of the date of the registration of the marriage settlement.