Case Name: In the Matter of the Application of Mary Elizabeth Langslow, as Executrix of Richard D. Lewis, Deceased, Respondent, for an Order Directing K---, an Attorney, Appellant, to Pay Over Certain Moneys
Court: New York Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1901-06-04
Citations: 167 N.Y. 314
Docket Number: 
Parties: In the Matter of the Application of Mary Elizabeth Langslow, as Executrix of Richard D. Lewis, Deceased, Respondent, for an Order Directing K---, an Attorney, Appellant, to Pay Over Certain Moneys.
Judges: 
Reporter: New York Reports
Volume: 167
Pages: 314–329

Head Matter:
In the Matter of the Application of Mary Elizabeth Langslow, as Executrix of Richard D. Lewis, Deceased, Respondent, for an Order Directing K---, an Attorney, Appellant, to Pay Over Certain Moneys.
1. Appeal — Referee’s Finding — Affirmance by Appellate Division. A referee’s finding, upon conflicting evidence, in a summary proceeding to compel the payment of money collected by an attorney at law, that the latter has no money of the petitioner which came to him as attorney, and that the only money in his hands belonging to her came to him as her business agent, adopted by the Special Term and affirmed by the Appellate Division, is conclusive in the Court ol Appeals.
2. Jurisdiction — Consent of Attorney Confers no Power upon Court to Compel by Order in a Summary Proceeding Payment of Money in his Hands as a Business Agent. A stipulation in the proceeding providing for the amendment of an order of reference so as to include also the determination of the differences between the parties as to moneys in the attorney’s hands as a business agent, and authorizing the court upon the confirmation of the referee’s report to enter a decree ordering him to pay over any amount found due, is binding upon him in his character as business agent only to the extent of the determination of the amount due, since the court, having no jurisdiction to compel by tirder instead of judgment and execution the payment of moneys in his hands as agent, cannot, even with his consent, acquire such jurisdiction, which would make him subject to imprisonment without bail for contempt if he failed to obey the order.
(Argued April 15, 1901;
decided June 4, 1901.)
Matter of Langslow, 52 App. Div, 635, modified.
Appeal from an order of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the "fourth judicial department, made July 9, 1900, affirming an order of Special Term "entered upon the report" of a referee directing the appellant herein to pay over to the petitioner certain moneys. •
This proceeding was instituted by a petition and notice of motion to compel the appellant to pay over to the respondent certain moneys which she alleged he had collected as' her attorney at law. The appellant denied that he had received, in a professional capacity, any money belonging to her, and alleged that, as an attorney, he'had performed valuable services for her, in; payment for which, with her consent, he had applied certain moneys collected by him as her business manager. The Special Term, upon its own motion, made an order sending the issue" to a' referee to take the proofs and report with his opinion whether the appellant “ acted as attorney for the petitioner in collecting all or any portion of the money referred"to in the petition, and the amount, if any, that was collected by him as her attorney'” It was.further ordered that the referee should “ ascertain and report the amounts for which” the appellant “should be credited on account of disbursements made by him and on account of legal services rendered by him to the petitioner.” The order contained no direction for the payment of any sum that might be found due.
After the close of the evidence, the referee filed an opinion stating that some of the moneys in question had been received by the appellant as attorney and some as business agent, and that the petitioner could not “ have a full and final adjudication of all the matters referred to in the petition in this proceeding.” Thereupon the parties entered into a stipulation, which, after stating that its object was “to avoid further litigation and to enable the parties to this controversy to come to a full, absolute and binding determination as to all the questions in difference between them,” provided that an order might be entered nunc fro tunc amending the order of reference so as to give the referee full power to hear, pass upon and report with his opinion as to all the differences between the parties, and to state separately the value of the appellant’s legal services and of his services as agent, as well as the amount of all moneys received by him in either capacity, with the balance, if any, due and owing by him in both capacities. It was further stipulated “ that upon the coming in of the said report and its confirmation or modification by the court an order ” might “ be entered directing the ” appellant “ to pay over to the petitioner any amount which may by the court, upon such report, be found to be due from him to her with like force and effect as if the order had so provided in the first instance.” The Special Term made an order accordingly and the reference proceeded.
Upon the hearing it appeared that the appellant, with complete success, had conducted an important proceeding'for the respondent,. extending over a period of five years, during which he had advanced all the disbursements. After one trial before the surrogate, another before a jury and two appeals to the Appellate Division, he succeeded in defeating the probate of a will, purporting to have been made by the grandfather of the respondent, upon the ground of undue influence and lack of testamentary capacity. The result was that, through an earlier will, which was admitted to probate, the respondent became entitled to more property than she would have received under the will so set aside. After she came into possession of the property, which consisted largely of improved real estate in Kansas City, she employed the appellant to manage it for her as her business agent. There was no controversy as to the amount of money received by. him, but there was a contest as to the capacity in which he received it and as to the value of his services. The referee found that the total amount received by him was $13,550.70; “ that the aggregate amount of his disbursements therefrom, which he is entitled to have allowed and which are undisputed, is $6,911; ” that he had paid to the respondent several sums of money, amounting to $230 ; that he was “entitled to retain-for the legal counsel and services of himself and his firm the * * * sum of $3,980, and this sum represents the amount which he has collected and received in the capacity of attorney at law; for his services as business agent for said petitioner he is entitled to retain the sum of $990 ; the aggregate of these deductions from the whole amount received is $4,970, and the balance $1,439.53, for which balance,” he continued, “ with interest thereon from January 1st, 1898, I find and decide as conclusion of law, that said” appellant “is now indebted to the petitioner. I also find and decide that said balance accrued from-moneys collected and received by said ” appellant “ in his capacity as business agent for petitioner and not as attorney at law.” The referee expressed no opinion and made no recommendation as to the relief that should be granted.
The respondent moved at Special Term to confirm the report and for an order requiring the appellant to pay said balance, with costs and disbursements. At the same time the appellant moved to confirm the report and to dismiss the proceeding, with, costs against the petitioner. The court made an order confirming the report, fixing the petitioner’s disbursements in the proceeding at the sum of $539.50, being simply the fees of the referee, and requiring the appellant within twenty days after notice of the order to pay the petitioner $2,150.58, being said balance with interest and referee’s fees. The appellant appealed to the Appellate Division from “ each and every part ” of said order, “ except that portion which confirms the referee’s finding that the respondent has no money in his hands which he received as attorney at law.” The Appellate Division affirmed the order, one of the justices not voting, and thereupon the appellant appealed from the order of affirmance to this court.
John Van Voorhis for appellant.
The referee having found as a fact that the respondent has received no money as attorney which he is not entitled to retain, and that finding having been confirmed by the Special Term, the petition should have been dismissed, with costs. The petition is the foundation of this proceeding and there is nothing in it asking for any relief against the respondent as an agent. The only relief sought for against him by the petition is that he be required to pay over moneys that he has received as attorney winch he is not entitled to retain. The referee finds he has received no such moneys, and that finding is affirmed by the court. (Matter of Husson, 26 Hun, 132.) Summary proceedings based upon the petition could not be maintained for the reason that the relation of attorney and client did not exist with reference to the moneys found to be due from the respondent to the petitioner. (Tylee v. L. I. R. R. Co., .14 Beav. 14; Taylor v. L. I. R. R. Co., 38 App. Div. 595 ; Matter of Hillebrandt, 33 App. Div. 193; Cole v. Grow, 1 Scott N. R. 30; Ex parte Faith, 9 Dowl. P. C. 973; Matter of Knapp, 85 N. Y. 284; Matter of Forster, 49 Hun, 114; Matter of Baltes, 64 N. Y. Supp. 613; Ex parte Lange, 18 Wall. 163, 178.) Jurisdiction of the subject-matter cannot, be conferred upon any court by stipulation or consent. (Bartlett v. Spicer, 75 N. Y. 528; Bullard v. Kuhl, 54 Wis. 544, 545 ; Mathie v. McIntosh, 40 Wis. 120; Dicks v. Hatch, 10 Iowa, 380, 384; Latham v. Edgerton, 9 Cow. 227; Dudley v. Mayhew, 3 N. Y. 9; Oakley v. Aspinwall, 3 N. Y. 547 ; Burckle v. Eckhart, 3 N. Y. 137; Beach v. Nixson, 9 N. Y. 35 ; Muldrow v. Norris, 2 Cal. 74.)
James Breck Perkins for respondent.
The appellant acted in a professional capacity in receiving and withholding the balance of $1,439.53. (Matter of Dakin, 4 Hill, 42; Grant's Case, 8 Abb. Pr. 357; Ex parte Staats, 4 Cow. 76; Saxton v. Wyckoff, 6 Paige, 182; Wilmerdings v. Fowler, 14 Abb. Pr. [N. S.] 249; Matter of Grant v. Chester, 17 How. Pr. 260; B. G. S. Bank v. Todd, 52 N. Y. 489; Matter of Husson, 26 Hun, 130; Matter of Aitkin, 4 B. & A. 48; Clarke v. Sawyer, 2 N. Y. 498.) The order entered on the stipulation of the parties was valid and binding. Even if the conclusion of the referee, that the balance was received by the appellant as business agent and not as attorney, was correct, the order directing him to pay was proper. (Matter of N. Y., L. & W. R. R. Co., 44 Hun, 275; Dawson v. Parsons, 74 Hun, 221; Aldrich v. Carpenter, 160 Mass. 166; Lange v. Benedict, 73 N. Y. 12; Belden v. Wilkinson, 44 App. Div. 420; McCormick v. P. C. R. R. Co., 49 N. Y. 303 ; Sentenis v. Ladew, 140 N. Y. 463; Cowenhoven v. Ball, 118 N. Y. 234; Matter of N. Y., L. & W. R. R. Co., 98 N. Y. 447; Leiter v. Beecher, 2 App. Div. 577.)

Opinion:
Vann, J.
The Special Term specifically confirmed the report of the referee " in all respects," and thus necessarily adopted the facts found by him. As the respondent has not appealed from the order of confirmation, she is bound by the facts thus established and cannot attack them on this appeal. The appellant does not attack that portion of the report which states, in substance, that he is not indebted to the respondent for any moneys received in a professional capacity, but he contends that the referee erred in finding that he was indebted to her for a balance received by him as her business agent. As there was a conflict in the evidence relating to this subject, and the Appellate Division has affirmed, the finding is conclusive in this court.
Both parties have acquiesced in and are bound by the finding that the appellant has no money of the respondent which came to him as an attorney, and that the only money in his hands belonging to her came to him as her business agent. This narrows the controversy to the question whether the amended order of reference, although made upon the written stipulation of the appellant, is binding upon him, and if so, to what extent. That order authorized the referee to decide the entire controversy, and authorized the court, upon confirming his report, to direct the appellant to pay the respondent any amount found due from him to her.
The court had no jurisdiction upon a summary application based upon a petition and notice of motion, to compel the appellant to pay over moneys collected by him merely as a business agent. The cases where the court has jurisdiction to thus enforce payment by an attorney are confined strictly to moneys collected in an official or professional capacity. If an attorney acts as a commercial- agent for another and receives money in that capacity, the remedy for non-payment is by action only. An agent who collects money is not subject to summary process to compel the payment thereof merely because he happens to be an attorney. He cannot be punished for contempt if he retains moneys collected by him in pursuance of an ordinary contract of trade, not involving the relation of attorney and client. It is only when he receives money while acting as an officer of. the court that there is jurisdiction to compel payment by order instead of by judgment and execution. For the protection of the court and the maintenance of high character on the part of its - officers, acts done by an attorney, as such, are carefully scrutinized and he is held to a rigid accountability for moneys received by him by virtue of the professional relation. Courts, however, do not extend such acute scrutiny to mere business relations between lawyers and laymen, such as have no connection with the office of attorney, but might exist as well if neither party to the transaction were a lawyer. For wrongs done by an attorney in his professional character he may be summarily proceeded against, but for acts done by him merely as a man of business, the person aggrieved by his misconduct is left to the remedy by action, although the court, in order to protect the public, ibaintain the integrity of the legal profession, and protect it from the influence of a vicious member,' may discipline or disbar the offender.
Whéther this proceeding rests on the provisions of the Code or upon the general control exercised by the Supreme Court over attorneys at law, there was no power to require the appellant to pay a debt to the petitioner, even if contracted in a fiduciary capacity, unless it sprang directly from the relation of attorney and client. (Code Civ. Pro. § 14, 2266 et seq) The court could not acquire jurisdiction to proceed summarily against the appellant, even with his express consent, for the non-payment of a debt contracted by him merely as agent. While he was bound by his consent to liquidate the claim through the medium of a motion instead of an action, he was not bound by his consent that the court might order him to pay it, when liquidated, with the necessary result that if he did not obey the order he would become guilty of contempt and subject to imprisonment without bail until he complied with it. Upon the recovery of a judgment against him for moneys received in a fiduciary capacity, merely as agent, an execution against his person could be issued, provided an execution against his property had been returned unsatisfied. Under these circumstances, however, upon giving an undertaking he would be entitled to the liberties of the jail and could thus avoid actual imprisonment. (Code Civ. Pro. § 149.) After a comparatively short time, upon making an assignment and otherwise conforming to the statute, he could be discharged even from constructive imprisonment. (Id. § 2200-2218.) Imprisonment for contempt in failing to obey an order of the court, however, is never constructive but always absolute, and the person subject to it must be actually confined in jail. Can a man by agreement incur this liability ? Can he stipulate himself in jail? While he can stipulate facts can he stipulate power to imprison himself ? Can he by consent give the court jurisdiction to deprive himself of liberty, when without such consent it would have no such power ? The answer to these questions is obvious. Imprisonment is a form of slavery, and the law will not permit a man to enslave himself even by the most solemn engagement. The right to personal liberty is so sacred that he cannot part with it by consent, although he may forfeit it by crime. He cannot barter away his liberty, nor be deprived of it without due process of law. He cannot give his own body in pledge nor consent that a court may imprison him unless he pays a certain debt. He cannot put himself in contempt by promising that a failure to do a certain thing may be punishable as for contempt wdien it would not otherwise be thus punishable. He cannot consent to be imprisoned any more than he can consent to be assaulted, or to forfeit one of his members, or a " pound of flesh." Such engagements cannot be enforced by any court, because security of the person is protected by the Bill of Rights against any violence unless inflicted by command of the law itself.
The appellant could lawfully consent to the liquidation of the claim of the petitioner against him and of his own against her, even in a proceeding founded on a petition and notice of motion. Hence we consider that he is bound by the concurrent action of the courts below in settling the amount of his-indebtedness to the respondent, including as a part thereof the fees paid to the referee. All this he lawfully consented to- and hence the liquidation is final so that she can proceed by action without farther litigation as to amount. (Burnside v. Whitney, 21 N. Y. 148; Cutter v. Cutter, 16 J. & S. 470; S. C., 98 N. Y. 628 ; Diedrick v. Richley, 2 Hill, 271; New York Lumber & W. W. Co. v. Schnieder, 119 N. Y. 475, 478.) To this extent, therefore, the action of the Supreme Court, should be sustained. The ap>pellant could not, however, lawfully consent to go to jail for non-payment, and that part of the order which might lead to that result cannot be sustained.
The orders of the courts below should be modified by striking out the provision requiring payment of the amounts found due and, as thus, modified, 'affirmed, without costs in this court to either party.