Case Name: The People ex rel. Aaron B. Gardenier, App'lt, v. The Board of Supervisors of Columbia County, Resp't
Court: New York Supreme Court, General Term
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1890-02-04
Citations: 29 N.Y. St. Rep. 455
Docket Number: 
Parties: The People ex rel. Aaron B. Gardenier, App’lt, v. The Board of Supervisors of Columbia County, Resp’t.
Judges: 
Reporter: New York State Reporter
Volume: 29
Pages: 455–461

Head Matter:
The People ex rel. Aaron B. Gardenier, App’lt, v. The Board of Supervisors of Columbia County, Resp’t.
(Supreme Court, General Term, Third Department,
Filed February 4, 1890.)
1. Distbict attobney—Expenses op in pubsuit op indicted cbdiinai a CHANGE ON COUNTY.
One Cadby was indicted in Columbia county for forgery. Before this he had fled to Hamilton, Ontario-, Canada. The relator, then district attorney, went to Hamilton and instituted extradition proceedings. Before he could be arrested there, Cadby fled to Halifax; the relator idlowed and began proceedings here, and am-sted him. Under habeas corpus, while passing through the province of New Brunswick, Cadby was discharged. He was then arrested and held in New Brunswick, and upon a requisition was finally lodged in jail in Columbia county. In these various proceedings the relator expended a large sum of money, including railroad fare, hotel bills, telegrams, meals on railroads, detective’s services, and services of attorneys in Canada and in this state. None of these expenses were made by the relator as agent either of the governor of this state or of the president of the United States for the purpose of receiving Cadby and bringing Mm to this state. The defendants refused to audit said bill or any part thereof. At special term a demurrer to an alternative writ of mamda/mm was sustained. Held, error.
2. Same.
Such expenses, so far as they were needful and proper, are a county charge within 1 R. S., m. p. 385, §§ 8 and 9, relating to the expenses of the district attorney necessarily incurred by him in criminal cases, and relating to moneys necessarily expended by any county officer in executing the duties of his office.
3. Same.
When a crime has been committed, and an indictment found, and the ■ accused has escaped, the district attorney is the proper person to decide whether any effort, and what effort, shall be made to capture him. And such necessary and proper expenses must be paid by the county.
(Fish, J., dissents.)
Appeal from the judgment of the special' term, sustaining a demurrer to an alternative writ of mandamus.
In brief, the facts alleged are as follows:
One Cadby was indicted at Columbia county in April, 1886, for forgery. Previous to that time he had fled to Hamilton, Province of Ontario, Dominion of Canada.
In March, 1886, the relator, who was the district attorney of Columbia county, went to Hamilton to institute extradition proceedings there against Cadby. The relator commenced these proceedings, but before Cadby could be arrested he fled from that province to Halifax, Hova Scotia, in order to take ship for England. The relator pursued him to Halifax, and there again commenced extradition proceedings. Cadby was arrested. While officers were carrying him through Hew Brunswick, he was taken under habeas corpus to St. Johns, Hew Brunswick, and there was discharged about March 18.
Proceedings for extradition were then taken in Hew Brunswick, and Cadby was arrested and held. At relator’s instance, on the requisition of the governor of the state, the president of the United States demanded the delivery of Cadby, and he was thereupon delivered and finally lodged in the jail of Columbia county, about June 2, 1886.
The relator has presented to the supervisors a bill for his disbursements and expenses in this matter. The bill includes railroad fare, hotel bills, telegrams, meals on railroad travel, detectives’ services, services of attorneys employed in Canada, and services of attorneys of this state. The aggregate is over $4,000. Hone of these expenses were made as agent either of the governor or of the president for the purpose of receiving Cadby and bringing him to the state of Hew York.
The relator’s bill was presented to the board of supervisors, and they refused to audit or allow it, or any part of it.
Albert Hoysradt, for app’lt; B. M Andrews, for resp’t.

Opinion:
Learned, P. J.
The relator relies first on the clause in art. 10 of the treaty between Hnited States and Great Britain, August 9, 1842; Treaties of U. S., p. 320, as follows: "The expense of such apprehension and delivery shall be borne and defrayed by the party who makes the requisition and receives the fugitive." The word "party," in this clause, refers to the contracting parties to the treaty, as will appear by art. 11. It is intended to relieve the government which delivers the fugitive from the duty of incurring or paying any expense. It has no reference to the question which might arise between the government which receives the fugitive and any of its officers or citizens. That clause of the treaty does not touch the question here raised.
Again, the relator urges that by the regulation of the state department, applications must come from the governor of the state; and that in this state applications to the governor must come from the district attorneys. And it appears that when Cadby had been finally held in Hew Brunswick, .the relator applied to the governor, and, according to the practice, after stating that in his opinion the ends of public justice required that the criminal should be brought to the state for trial at public expense, he stated that he was willing that such expense be a charge on the county of Columbia.
This consent of the relator of course refers to such expense, and only to such, expense, as might be incurred by the governor on the part of the state, or by the president, at his requisition. It did not refer to expenses already paid, or incurred by the relator previously. It could not refer, therefore, to any part of this bill. For the writ expressly states that these expenses were not made as agent or the like in mating the demand or bringing back the fugitive. These expenses were all made as a preliminary to the application to the governor. Whether they are, or are not, properly a county charge, cannot depend on the regulations of the executive department of the state.
Prior to the action of the governor upon the relator's application the state had incurred no expense. All that had been previously done had been done by the relator voluntarily or in the performance of the duties of his office; and the question of the liability of the county must be decided by an examination of the powers and discretion entrusted to the district attorney. Ho light is thrown thereon by the treaty or by the regulations of the United States or the state government relative to extradition. Indeed, as to anything done in procuring the demand from the governor and the like, the relator is forbidden to take compensation. Penal Code, § 51.
There is no doubt that it was the duty of the relator to conduct the prosecution of the offense of Cadby. 1 R. S., m. p. 383, § 89". It was one cognizable in oyer and terminer of the county of Columbia. Certainly to conduct the prosecution means more than simply to attend the trial. A district attorney would be negligent of his duty who should omit to take any steps to secure the attendance of witnesses or the presence of the accused at the trial. The investigation whether a crime has been committed, and the labor of seeing that the accused person shall not escape, may certainly in some cases come within the words : " Conduct, all prosecutions for crimes and offenses." This follows the language used in chapter 8, Laws of 1796, which authorized the. appointment of assistant attorneys-general for several " districts of the state to " manage and conduct all suits and prosecutions for crimes and offenses." Hence undoubtedly we have our present " district attorney." Thus it has long been the policy of the state that prosecutions should be conducted rather by a public than by a private prosecutor. To conduct such prosecutions must require the expenditure of money. Therefore, it is provided in 1 R. S., m. p. 385, § 3, that the following shall be county charges:
Subd. 2. The fees of the district attorney and all expenses necessarily incurred by him in criminal cases arising within his county.
Subd. 9. The moneys necessarily expended by any county officer in executing the duties of his office, etc.
Now there is no question that the Cadby case arose in the county of Columbia. Were these expenses necessarily incurred? The meaning of these words was passed upon in People v. Supervisors, 32 N. Y., 473. They were said to include such expenditures as were not only needful and proper as distinguished from such as are needless and improvident, but also reasonable, appropriate and necessary in the discharge of the particular official duty. This same principle is affirmed in People v. Supervisors, 45 N. Y., 196. It is not necessary to cite further cases.
The supervisors in refusing to audit the relator's account, and in demurring to the alternative writ, have placed themselves on the ground that these expenses were not a county charge even if they were necessarily expended in the case of Cadby. In this we think they were in error.
Probably it is not for us on this appeal to decide in detail as to the necessity of each item, as no proof on the matter is before us. Prom the circumstances of the case, in any such criminal matter, the district attorney, to a large extent, must be the judge of what expenditures are needed. It would interfere with the course of justice if he had to decide, in every instance, when he expended money, at the peril of having the board of supervisors decide otherwise, after the public interest in the capture and conviction of the accused had subsided. People v. Supervisors, 58 Barb., 139.
The defendant's counsel in commenting on this provision for the payment of expenses necessarily incurred cite People v. Supervisors of Fulton County, 14 Barb., 56. But that was a claim for the payment of services rendered by the district attorney for which no compensation was provided by law.
In this case he is not asking for .payment for his services but for reimbursement of expenses. And if these expenses were necessarily incurred (as is admitted by the demurrer) there is no justice in refusing to reimburse him. The expense of prosecuting crimes committed within the county must fall on the county and not on an officer who has been vigilant in doing his duty. We are referred to no case by the defendant's counsel showing that such expenses as these are not a proper county charge. And it is hardly to be supposed that, in the many cases in which fugitive criminals have been arrested in other states and countries and ultimately brought back to this state, the expense of the discovering and arresting them has been borne by the district attorney of the county from his own private funds without reimbursement.
When a crime has been committed and an indictment has been found and the accused has escaped, some one must decide whether any effort, and what effort, shall be made to capture him. We know of no other officer than the district attorney who is to decide this question. Certainly it is not one for the board of supervisors.
If there is any 'benefit to the public in the punishment of crime, it is important that the criminal shall not escape by fleeing to another country. We should be very unwilling to say that expenses of a district attorney, honestly made in the effort to recapture in another country a fugitive from justice were not to be regarded as necessarily incurred.
It is carefully pointed out in People v. Supervisors Delaware County, ut supra, at 199, 200, what are the respective duties of the court and of the supervisors in regard to contingent charges against the county. And it is not on these papers our duty to determine the amount to which the relator is entitled. But he is entitled to have his bill audited in accordance with the views we have stated.
The order sustaining the demurrer must be reversed and judgment for the relator must be granted on the demurrer that a peremptory mandumus issue as prayed for in the writ, with costs below and on the appeal.
Landon, J., concurs.