Case Name: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Fernando QUEVEDO-ALVAREZ, Defendant-Appellant
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 2006-01-05
Citations: 161 F. App'x 386
Docket Number: No. 05-40403
Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Fernando QUEVEDO-ALVAREZ, Defendant-Appellant.
Judges: 
Reporter: West's Federal Appendix
Volume: 161
Pages: 386–388

Head Matter:
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Fernando QUEVEDO-ALVAREZ, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 05-40403.
Summary Calendar.
United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.
Decided Jan. 5, 2006.
James Lee Turner, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office Southern District of Texas, Houston, TX, for PlaintiffAppellee.
Marjorie A. Meyers, Federal Public Defender, H. Michael Sokolow, Margaret Christina Ling, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Federal Public Defender’s Office Southern District of Texas, Houston, TX, for Defendant-Appellant.
Before HIGGINBOTHAM, BENAVIDES, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.

Opinion:
PER CURIAM:
Fernando Quevedo-Alvarez (Quevedo) pleaded guilty to illegal reentry after deportation and was sentenced to 33 months of imprisonment, three years of supervised release, and a $100 special assessment that was ordered remitted on motion of the Government.
Quevedo argues for the first time on appeal that the district court erred in ordering him to cooperate in the collection of a DNA sample as a condition of supervised release and that this condition should therefore be vacated. He contends that his offense is not one of the offenses qualifying an offender for DNA collection under the DNA Analysis Backlog Elimination Act of 2000(Act). He further contends that a 2004 amendment to the Act broadening the qualifying offenses to "any felony" does not apply to him because he committed the offense before the amendment was enacted, and, therefore, application of the amendment either would violate the Ex Post Facto Clause or would improperly cause the amendment to operate retroactively.
Quevedo contends that a waiver-of appeal provision included in his plea agreement does not bar this claim. Because the district court erroneously advised Quevedo that he retained the right to appeal "an illegal sentence," without defining what constituted "an illegal sentence," the waiver was not made knowingly and voluntarily, and thus it does not bar this claim. See United States v. Robinson, 187 F.3d 516, 517 (5th Cir.1999). However, this claim is DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction because it is not ripe for review. See United States v. Riascos-Cuenu, 428 F.3d 1100, 1102 (5th Cir.2005).
Quevedo's constitutional challenge is foreclosed by Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 235, 118 S.Ct. 1219, 140 L.Ed.2d 350 (1998). Although Quevedo contends that Almendarez-Torres was incorrectly decided and that a majority of the Supreme Court would overrule Almendarez-Torres in light of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), we have repeatedly rejected such arguments on the basis that Almendarez-Torres remains binding. See United States v. Garza-Lopez, 410 F.3d 268, 276 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,—U.S.—, 126 S.Ct. 298, 163 L.Ed.2d 260 (2005). Quevedo properly concedes that his argument is foreclosed in light of Almendarez-Torres and circuit precedent, but he raises it here to preserve it for further review.
Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.