Case Name: Waitstill Dean, Appellant from a decree of Judge of Probate, versus Job Dean, Administrator
Court: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
Jurisdiction: Massachusetts
Decision Date: 1806-10
Citations: 1 Tyng 150
Docket Number: 
Parties: Waitstill Dean, Appellant from a decree of Judge of Probate, versus Job Dean, Administrator.
Judges: 
Reporter: Massachusetts Reports
Volume: 2
Pages: 144–145

Head Matter:
Waitstill Dean, Appellant from a decree of Judge of Probate, versus Job Dean, Administrator.
The discretionary power to sustain appeals, given by Stat. June 18,1791, does not extend to appeals from the Probate Court
This was an appeal from a decree of the Probate Court, allowing two accounts of the appellee as administrator. The appellant, having neglected to claim her appeal within the time limited by statute, obtained a resolve of the legislature, dated June 12, 1805, authorizing her to appeal from said decree, notwithstanding such neglect and declaring that such appeal should have the same effect as if claimed within thirty days; provided she should give bond to prosecute her appeal, file the reasons thereof, and notify the adverse party, before the 1st day of September then next. August 29, 1805, she gave bond, and filed her reasons of appeal; but the ad verse party was not notified until the 23d day of September, 1805. The appeal was entered at the last October term of this Court And now, at this term,
* Sprout, of counsel for the appellee,
moved the Court, upon these facts being shown, to dismiss the appeal.
Tillinghast,
on the other side, contended that the Court had authority to sustain the appeal, and that the interposition of the legislature, as it showed their opinion that the appellant was in fact aggrieved, would incline the Court to exercise their authority.
By statute of June 18, 1791, entitled An Act in addition to an act, entitled an act empowering the justices of the Supreme Judicial Court to grant writs of review, in certain cases,” the justices of this Court are empowered, on the petition of the party, at their discretion, to order an appeal in a civil action to be entered at any other term than that to which such appeal shall have been made, and to try the same in the same manner as they might have done if the appeal had been entered at the proper.term, when, by reason of any acci dent, mistake, or unforeseen cause, such appeal may not have been entered at the proper term; provided such petition be presented within one year after the term at which such appeal ought to have been entered. Tillinghast argued, that the very general expressions made use of in this statute might well be extended to the case before the Court.

Opinion:
Curia.
From the interposition of the legislature, we have reason to apprehend there is some hardship in this case. But sitting, as we do, as the Supreme Court of Probate, in virtue of a statute, we cannot extend our authority beyond the provisions of that statute. We think that the general powers given us to sustain appeals in civil actions cannot be extended to appeals from the Probate Courts. The resolve of the General Court gives us the same cognizance of this cause as if the appeal had been regularly claimed and entered, and no more —provided certain pre-requisites are performed. Those pre-requisites not having been performed, the appeal must be dis missed.