Case Name: EAST PENNSYLVANIA R. R. CO.'S CASE
Court: Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
Jurisdiction: Pennsylvania
Decision Date: 1868-03-09
Citations: 1 Walk. 428
Docket Number: Nos. 263 and 355
Parties: EAST PENNSYLVANIA R. R. CO.’S CASE.
Judges: 
Reporter: Reports of cases decided by the supreme court of pennsylvania which have been omitted from the regular reports
Volume: 1
Pages: 428–435

Head Matter:
EAST PENNSYLVANIA R. R. CO.’S CASE.
The office buildings, machine shops, repair shops and paint shops of a railroad company are liable to municipal taxation.
Only so much of a railroad’s property as is indispensible to the construction of the road, and fitting it for use, is exempt from municipal taxation.
Error to Common Pleas of Berks County. Nos. 263 and 355, January Term, 1868.
Case stated in substance as follows: 1st. That the Assessor of Seventh ward of Reading has returned for taxation for County purposes, &c., as the property of the East Penna. R. R. Co. a lot at the corner of Sixth and Walnut Street, on which is erected a building occupied by the offices of the President, Treasurer, General Superintendent, General Freight and Ticket . Agent and Tel egraph of the company. The President and his family reside in it; and it is situated two and half squares from the terminus of the road. The lot was purchased by the company.
2nd. That the Assessor of the Ninth ward of Reading has returned for taxation 20 acres of land in said ward adjoining the main track, but not included in the 60 feet width of main track. On this twenty acres are erected railroad sidings, machine shops, in which engines are repaired, blacksmith shop in which smith work of the road is done, carpenter shop in which cars are built and repaired,-paint shop, oil and waste house where oil and waste are stored, round house, turn tables, coal docks in which' coal for locomotives is stored, water station and cattle yard.
3rd. That at various points along the road, immediately adjoining the track the company has erected houses for the accommodation of their watchmen and trackmen.
4th. That the land mentioned in 2nd and 3rd paragraphs was acquired by right of eminent domain and were charged to cost of construction. If the Court be of the opinion that ail or any of the above described property is liable for taxation then judgment to be .entered in favor of the county, otherwise in favor of the Railroad Co.; either party reserving the right to sue out a writ of error. The Court entered judgment in favor of the county on Sept. 14/1867 in the following opinion per
Woodward, P. J.:
By the proviso to the second section of the Act of Feby. 19, 1849, P. Laws 80 railroad companies are authorized to purchase and hold real estate “necessary or convenient for the making and constructing of their railroads, or for the furnishing of materials therefor, and for the accommodation of depots, offices, warehouses, machine shops, tool bouses, engine and .water stations, and other appropriate appurtenances, and for the persons and things employed or used in or about the same.” If this section stood alone, it is probable that all the property of the .iefendants described in the case stated, would be free from municipal taxation. The fact that the building used for the general purposes of the office of the company, is at a distance from the line of the road, would still leave it “real estate convenient for the accom smodation” of the officers. But all the provisions of the Act of 1849 are to be constructed together. While the second section specifies the property that may be held, the tenth section defines the means of selection and appropriation, and the mode in which title may be acquired. Railroad companies are authorized “to •survey, ascertain, locate, fix, mark and determine such route for railroad as they may deem expedient, and thereon to lay down, ■erect, construct and establish a railroad, with such branches as .may be specifically authorized, and with such bridges, viaducts, turnouts, sidelings or other devices as they may deem necessary •or useful, and to enter upon and into, and occupy all land on which the said railroad or depots, warehouses, offices, tool houses, ■engine or water stations, or other buildings or appurtenances ■hereinbefore mentioned may be located, and therein and thereon •to dig, excavate and embank, make, grade, lay down and construct the same, and to enter npon any lands adjoining or in the ■neighborhood of their railroad, and to quarry, dig, cut, take and ■quarry away therefrom any stone, gravel, clay, sand, earth, wood, ■or other suitable material necessary or proper for the construction of any bridges, viaducts or other buildings, which may be required for the use, maintenance or repair of said railroad,” subject to the duty in entering upon any such lands, of making ample compensation to the owners or tendering adequate security •therefor.
The two sections are in pari materia, and the scope of the first must be held to be limited and restrained by the last. Applying them to the facts agreed upon, can the property at the corner of Sixth and Walnut streets, in the heart of the City of Reading, ■and two and a half squares from any point which the railroad touches, be such land as the company has the statutory right to .appropriate ? Upon the answer to this question must be the liability of the property for municipal taxes depend. In the cases •referred to on the argument, in each of which the question raised ■ was, whether structures erected by companies operating under ■special charters were exempt which were indispensible to the exercise and enjoyment of the corporate franchises. Such were thé •cases of Schuylkill Navigation Co. vs. Commissioners, 1 Jones -202; Carbon Iron Co. vs. Carbon County, 3 Wright 251; Rail road Co. vs. Berks Co., 6 Barr 70. The real estate held by railroad companies under the Act of 1849, stands upon a footing materially different. The effect of that Act is to exempt such estate as being capable of acquisition in the statuary form, may be ascertained to be “necessary or convenient.” If, therefore, a title to this office building could be acquired under the provisions of the general law, it would have to be held to be a necessary or convenient appurtenance of the corporation. But could it be so acquired ? It is not upon the line of the road, nor is it on lands adjoining or in the neighborhood of that line. It is no more an essential part of the corporate property than it would be if it were a mile from the depot. It might as well, for corporate purposes, be situated anywhere within the City of Reading, as where it is. It has no actual,- physical, practical connection with the railroad. Having been purchased in the ordinary way, and being held by a title created by an ordinary conveyance, it had none of the characteristics of permanent corporate property. The company could change the location of their office at their pleasure or convenience. This building could be sold and its place supplied by another without affecting the operations of the company in the slightest degree. It is no more an essential structure than any one of a series of houses would be which the company might annually rent in succession during a series of years. To entitle railroad structures to exemption from municipal taxation, they must be such as a railroad company shall erect on lands which the tenth section of the Act of 1849 authorizes them to select, enter on and appropriate. This office is not such a structure, and the county has the right to subject it to taxation. The property described in the second and third paragraphs of the case stated, is governed by a different rule. Nothing appears to show that the tract of twenty acres in the Ninth Ward of the City of Reading, contains a quantity of land so great as to be unreasonable and excessive in views of the purposes to which it bas been applied. It was appropriated under the provisions of the statute, and sidetracks, machine, blacksmith, carpenter and paint shops, an oil and waste house, a round house, a turntable, coal docks, a water station and cattle yard have been erected on it. All these structures are essential to the use and enjoyment of the corporate rights of the company, and the case contains nothing to prove that any part of this tract could be dispensed with. Thus connected with the road, this land becomes part of the general corporate property, and for the purpose of taxation is merged in that. Its liability is fixed by the statutes which provide for the taxes imposed on corporations, and is outside of the control of the municipal authorities. The houses erected for trackmen along the road and within the line of the companies property, are exempt from municipal taxes upon the principles settled in the cases relied on in the argument, as well as under the provisions of the general railroad law.
Judgment is entered for the plaintiffs for the amount of the taxes assessed upon the property at the corner of Sixth and Walnut Streets, in the city of Reading.
The railroad company then took a writ of error complaining of the judgment.
On behalf of the railroad company J. Hagenman and J. S. Richards, JEJsqrs., argued that taxing the building at Sixth and Walnut Streets was illegal; Act Feby. 9, 1849, P. L. 79, Sect. 2nd; Lehigh Nav. Co. vs. Northampton County, 8 W. & S., 334; Schuylkill Nav. Co. vs. Berks County, 1 Jones, 202; New York and Erie R. R. Co. vs. Sabin, 2 Casey, 242; Wayne County vs. Delaware and Hudson Canal Co., 3 Harris, 351; Carbon Iron Co. vs. Carbon County, 3 Wright, 251. The case of Railroad vs. Berks County, 6 Barr, 70 referred to by the Court does not govern, this case ; as that decision was under the Act of April 4th, 1833, P. L. 144; incorporating the P. & R. R. R. Co. while this case is under the Act of 1849.
J. B. Bechtel, JEsq., for the County argued that all acts of incorporation are taken most strongly against the companies; Billings vs. Providence Bank, 4 Peters, 514; Charles River Bridge vs. Warren Bridge, 11 Peters, 521; Packer vs. Sunbury and Erie R. R. Co., 7 Harris, 218 ; Bank of Pennsylvania vs. Commonwealth 7 Harris, 144. A surrender of the taxing power is not to be presumed unless the intention to do so is clear ; N. Y. & Erie R. R. Co. vs. Sabin, 2 Casey, 242. If it is doubtful, the doubt should be decided against the company ; Commonwealth vs. Central Passenger Railway, 2 P. P. S., 506; he also cites West Chester Gas Co. vs. Chester Co., 6 Casey, 233 ; Lackawanna Iron and Coal Co. vs. Luzerne County, 6 Wright, 424; Shamokin Yalley R. R. Co. vs. Livermore, 11 Wright, 469.
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court below as to the office building, on March 9th, 1863, in the following opinion by
Sharswood, J.:
The only question which arises on this writ of error is as to the liability to taxation of a lot of ground on the Northwest corner of Sixth and Walnut streets, in the city of Reading, belonging to the plaintiffs in error. Upon this lot there is erected a large three-story brick fire proof building, in which are the offices of the President, Treasurer, General Superintendent, General Freight and Ticket Agent, and telegraph of the company ; and in which the President and his family reside. This property is plainly not a necessary appurtenant of the road ; but only convenient in con - ducting its operations. It is therefore liable to taxation.
Judgment affirmed.
The County of Berks also took a writ of error complaining of the action of the Court in not entering judgment on the whole case stated.
J. B. Bechtel and J. Glancy Jones, Esqrs., for. plaintiff in error,
argued that the railroad company was subject to the same rule of taxation as railroads generally. That the cattle yard, coal schutes, machine shops and warehouses are not incident to its construction and are therefore not exempt from taxation: Railroad Co. vs. Berks Co., 6 Barr, 75; New York and Erie R. R. Co. vs. Sabin, 2 Casey, 242. In case of ambiguity or doubt, the construction of the powers of a corporation should be against it and in favor of the public. Northern Liberties vs. Gas Co., 2 Jones, 320.
J. Hagenman and J. S. Richards, Esqrs., contra
cited the Act of incorporation, and its supplements, and afso the cases of Wayne Co. vs. Delaware and Hudson Canal, 3 Harris, 351; Lehigh Navigation Co. vs. Northampton County, 8 W. & S., 334; Schuylkill Nav. Co. vs. Berks Co., 1 Jones, 202; N. Y. and Erie R. R. Co. vs. Sabin, 2 Casey, 242; Carbon Iron Co. vs. Carbon Co., 3 Wright, 255. All property which the railroad can take is exempt. The Reading Railroad could not take the property described in 6 Barr, 70.

Opinion:
The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court below on March 9, 1868, in the following opinion by
Sharswood, J.:
The rule which is to be extracted from the authorities on the subject of the liability of railroad companies to taxation, for local purposes is, that it is only so much of their property, as is indispenssble to the construction of the road ; and fitting it for use, which is exempt. It is not all which they can lawfully take and hold under their charters. It is not enough that it is a convenient possession, affording facilities in conducting the business of the company and enabling it to make profits. The Railroad Co. vs. Berks County, 6 Barr, 70; Wayne County vs. The Delaware and Hudson Canal Co., 3 Harris, 351; The West Chester Gas Co. vs. The County of Chester, 6 Casey, 242. The learned judge in his opinion in the Court below seems to have considered that whatever the defendants could lawfully appropriate under the 10th Section of the Act of Feby. 19, 1849, P. Laws, 83 was necessarily exempt, and indeed he expressed an opinion that but for the limitation implied in that section, all the property they would be entitled to take and hold under the second section would also be free. That includes all real estste "necessary or convenient for the making and constructing of the railroad and for the furnishing of materials therefor, and for the accommodation of depots, offices, warehouses, machine shops, tool houses, engines and water stations, and other appropriate appurtenances and for the persons and things .employed or used in and about the same." This view may appear to receive confirmation from the opinion of this Court in The New York and Erie Railroad Company vs. Sabin, 2 Casey, 242, in which if was held that whether the buildings then in question were to be considered as indispensible or only as convenient appendages of the road they were exempt inasmuch as they were included in the cost of construction and represented in part the stock of the company. But that was a peculiar case, resting on special legislation. That company was a foreign corporation autnorized by the Act of Feby. 16, 1841. P. Laws 28 to extend their road through the County ot Susquehanna, and by the Act of March 26, 1846, P. Laws 179, additional privileges were conferred upon them, in consideration of which they were required to pay into the State Treasury the sum of ten thousand dollars annually and it was provided "that the stock of said company to an amount equal to the cost of the construction ot that part of their road situate in Pennsylvania shall be subject to taxation by this Commonwealth in the same manner at the same rate as other similar property is or may be subject." It was held that it was the intention of the Legislature as manifest in these provisions that whatever property of this corporation was included in the cost of construction and thus formed part of its capital stock should be subject to no other taxes than those specified in the Act.
Applying these principles to this case it appears to us and we so hold that "the machine shops, in which the locomotive engines of the road are repaired — the blacksmith shop in which the smith work of the road is done — the carpenter shop in which passenger and freight cars used on the road are built and repaired and the paint shop in which new and repaired cars used on the road are painted," are not necessary parts of the railroad, but merely useful in order to enable them to conduct their operatiohs more profitably and conveniently than if these matters were attended to by persons not in their regular employment. They are therefore liable to taxation. It follows that the judgment of the Court below upon the case stated must be reversed as to the machine shops, blacksmith shop, carpenter shop, and paint shop, but affirmed as to the other property therein described.