Case Name: The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Franklin Rodriguez, Appellant
Court: New York Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 2004-11-30
Citations: 3 N.Y.3d 462
Docket Number: 
Parties: The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Franklin Rodriguez, Appellant.
Judges: 
Reporter: New York Reports
Volume: 3
Pages: 462–474

Head Matter:
[821 NE2d 122, 787 NYS2d 697]
The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Franklin Rodriguez, Appellant.
Argued October 19, 2004;
decided November 30, 2004
POINTS OF COUNSEL
Center for Appellate Litigation, New York City (Barbara Zolot and Robert S. Dean of counsel), for appellant.
I. It was error (a) under People v Burgos-Santos (98 NY2d 226 [2002]) for the trial court to admit on rebuttal the factually mistaken notice of alibi appellant disavowed during trial; and (b) for the court, having admitted the notice, to then bar appellant’s mother, the source of the information in the notice, from testifying about the notice to explain its inconsistency with the trial defense. (Williams v Florida, 399 US 78; People v Rivera, 58 AD2d 147, 45 NY2d 989; People v Brown, 98 NY2d 226; People v Nelu, 157 AD2d 864; Brooks v Tennessee, 406 US 605; United States v McKeon, 738 F2d 26; People v Laing, 79 NY2d 166; People v Pelchat, 62 NY2d 97; Taylor v Illinois, 484 US 400; People v Dawson, 50 NY2d 311.) II. The court erred in refusing to issue a missing witness charge against the People for their failure to produce Pacasio Beuno, a concededly material witness, where the prosecutor failed to demonstrate that any “diligent efforts” were made to locate him. (Reid v Senkowski, 961 F2d 374; People v Savinon, 100 NY2d 192; People v Gonzalez, 68 NY2d 424; Graves v United States, 150 US 118; People v Kitching, 78 NY2d 532; People v Vasquez, 76 NY2d 722; People v Robertson, 205 AD2d 243; People v Gladden, 180 AD2d 747; People v Crimmins, 36 NY2d 230.) III. The court violated appellant’s constitutional and statutory right to be present by excusing a qualified sworn juror “on consent” in appellant’s absence. (People v Buford, 69 NY2d 290; People v Harris, 99 NY2d 202; People v Roman, 88 NY2d 18; People v Mullen, 44 NY2d 1; People v Maher, 89 NY2d 318; People v Davidson, 89 NY2d 881; People v Childs, 247 AD2d 319; People v Sprowal, 84 NY2d 113; People v Morales, 80 NY2d 450; People v Torres, 80 NY2d 944.)
Robert T. Johnson, District Attorney, Bronx (Yael V. Levy, Joseph N. Ferdenzi and Stanley R. Kaplan of counsel), for respondent.
I. Defendant’s guilt was proven beyond a reasonable doubt by overwhelming evidence. II. The trial court properly (1) admitted defendant’s alibi notice into evidence on the People’s rebuttal case, and (2) precluded defendant’s mother from testifying about the notice. (People v Burgos-Santos, 98 NY2d 226; Williams v Florida, 399 US 78; People v Stephens, 84 NY2d 990; People v Iannelli, 69 NY2d 684; People v Whitehead, 305 AD2d 286, 100 NY2d 600; People v Thomas, 210 AD2d 935; People v Parson, 268 AD2d 208; Taylor v Illinois, 484 US 400; People v White, 228 AD2d 209; United States v Chiavola, 744 F2d 1271.) III. The trial court properly declined to give a missing witness charge with respect to Pacasio Beuno. (People v Stephens, 84 NY2d 990; People v Keen, 94 NY2d 533; People v Gonzalez, 68 NY2d 424; People v Savinon, 100 NY2d 192; People v Macana, 84 NY2d 173; People v Delacruz, 276 AD2d 387; People v Escalera, 220 AD2d 259, 87 NY2d 846; People v Smith, 279 AD2d 259, 96 NY2d 835; People v Vasquez, 76 NY2d 722; People v Robertson, 205 AD2d 243.) IV Defendant’s right to be present at a material stage of his trial was not abridged by his absence from a discussion about a sworn juror’s continued fitness to serve. (People v Dokes, 79 NY2d 656; People v Robles, 86 NY2d 763; People v Sandoval, 34 NY2d 371; People v Metro, 173 AD2d 282, 79 NY2d 1004; People v Harris, 99 NY2d 202; People v Morales, 80 NY2d 450; People v Mullen, 44 NY2d 1; People v Aguilera, 82 NY2d 23; People v Darby, 75 NY2d 449; Snyder v Massachusetts, 291 US 97.)

Opinion:
OPINION OF THE COURT
Rosenblatt, J.
The Legislature has enacted a protocol in connection with alibi defenses in criminal cases. Pursuant to CPL 250.20 (1), the prosecution may compel the defense to serve a notice that spells out the particulars of an intended alibi defense. If a defendant fails to supply the notice or calls a witness not specified in it, the statute gives the trial court discretion to exclude alibi testimony or receive it after granting the prosecution an adjournment (CPL 250.20 [3]). In the case before us, the defense, after disavowing reliance on its alibi notice but not withdrawing it, introduced two alibi witnesses who gave a new alibi relating to a different time frame. Rather than strike their testimony, the court allowed the prosecution to introduce the notice of alibi on its rebuttal case. We agree with defendant that this was error.
I.
The jury heard evidence that in mid-August 1997, defendant had an altercation with Pacasio Beuno and James Hiciano. Defendant later encountered Beramy Garcia and told him that if defendant were ever to see Garcia with Beuno or Hiciano, he would shoot them all. In the early morning hours of August 28, 1997, Beuno, Garcia and Hiciano were walking together on a public street in the Bronx when a car with no lights cruised slowly by them. From the front passenger seat, defendant fired several shots, wounding all three men. Defendant was eventually apprehended and indicted for the shootings.
Defendant's first lawyer prepared an alibi notice stating that at "the date and time the alleged crime was committed," defendant was at a birthday party on Sheridan Avenue in the Bronx, in the presence of his uncle and another man. The notice did not set forth any dates or times.
During its case, the defense called defendant's girlfriend who testified she was asleep with defendant during the early morning hours of August 28th—when the shooting took place—and that they woke up together at about 10:00 a.m. Defendant did not list her as an alibi witness even though she was obviously furnishing an alibi and a time frame different from the one described in the notice. The People, however, did not object to her direct testimony or ask to have it stricken, nor did they ask for an adjournment to investigate the new alibi.
Partway through his cross-examination of this witness, the prosecutor asserted for the first time that the girlfriend's testimony violated CPL 250.20 and asked for a Dawson hearing to probe whether she was justified in withholding exculpatory information (see People v Dawson, 50 NY2d 311 [1980]). During the hearing, defendant's attorney told the court that he had been mistaken as to the timing of the alibi and had "just brought back from the Dominican Republic an alibi witness [defendant's uncle] who turns out not to be an alibi witness because I was looking at the wrong date." Although defendant did not withdraw the alibi notice, it became obvious from the girlfriend's surprise testimony that defendant was presenting a new and different alibi covering the early morning hours of August 28th, the time of the actual shootings. Defendant's attorney maintained that only after speaking with defendant's uncle did he realize that former counsel's alibi notice covered the wrong, earlier time span. At the conclusion of the Dawson hearing, the court allowed the prosecution to impeach the witness for her failure to come forward earlier.
The defense also called the witness's mother, who on cross-examination by the prosecution corroborated the new alibi. Again, the prosecution did not ask the court to preclude this testimony or seek an adjournment, but used the alibi notice in an attempt to refresh the mother's recollection. Further, on its rebuttal case and over defendant's objection, the prosecution introduced the alibi notice as a "judicial admission" to assail the credibility of defendant's girlfriend and her mother, even though neither made statements contained in the alibi notice.
The prosecutor declined the court's offer to strike defendant's girlfriend's alibi testimony. Both the girlfriend and the girlfriend's mother had already been severely discredited, the former by the Dawson hearing and the latter by the prosecutor's use of the conflicting, earlier alibi notice to "refresh her recollection"—even though the notice had no relevance to her testimony. Despite the effective cross-examination of the witnesses, the court further allowed the prosecutor to move the alibi notice into evidence during his rebuttal case. The prosecutor then argued in summation that the notice demonstrated defendant's deceptiveness and consciousness of guilt. The court thus gave the prosecutor a two-fold tactical advantage: first, it allowed him to impeach the credibility of the new alibi witnesses with the notice; it then permitted the prosecutor to offer the notice as evidence of defendant's duplicity.
The jury found defendant guilty of three counts of attempted murder in the second degree (Penal Law § 110.00, 125.25) and criminal use of a firearm in the first degree (Penal Law § 265.09). The Appellate Division affirmed, concluding that the use of the alibi notice did not warrant reversal. A Judge of this Court granted leave to appeal. Although we conclude that the use of the alibi notice was error, we affirm because the error was harmless.
II.
CPL 250.20 rests on the premise that in criminal cases a state may impose a limited form of pretrial discovery—in the form of an alibi notice requirement—on defendants without violating their Fifth Amendment and due process rights. The question before us is whether the prosecution may use the notice at trial to discredit the testimony of defendant's witnesses and as evidence of his guilt.
In People v Burgos-Santos (98 NY2d 226, 235 [2002]), we held that the People could not use an alibi notice to cross-examine the defendant when the defense had withdrawn the notice before trial. We also recognized the potential unfairness in allowing the prosecution to exploit a withdrawn alibi notice, and that permitting the prosecution to impeach a defendant who had abandoned an alibi defense before trial could have a "fixing" tendency (id. at 234), tying the defendant ineluctably to a strategy that, owing to circumstances, might no longer be valid. While we disfavor unprincipled experimentation with trial tactics, we have never held or suggested that it is improper for parties to alter their strategies based on developments during the litigation so long as the opposing party is not prejudiced and there is no evidence of bad faith.
Burgos-Santos is instructive but critically different from the case before us. Contrary to the prosecution's contention, it may not be read as authorizing the prosecution to introduce an alibi notice on rebuttal to discredit the testimony of defense witnesses. Here, in contrast to Burgos-Santos, the prosecutor did not use the alibi notice to cross-examine defendant, its nominal maker. Instead, after defendant abandoned the notice, the prosecutor introduced it as evidence to rebut the testimony of two defense witnesses and in his summation as evidence of defendant's consciousness of guilt. This is particularly inappropriate where, as here, defendant had a plausible basis for abandoning the notice, with no claim of bad faith or prejudice to the prosecution.
If we adopted the prosecution's argument, a defendant who serves an alibi notice relying on a particular witness would risk the introduction of the notice if, for some reason, the witness becomes unavailable. Under those circumstances, using the notice as evidence of defendant's guilt could raise constitutional objections. The format projected by CPL 250.20 is carefully balanced, with rights and with remedies designed to redress violations. By authorizing the trial court to exclude alibi testimony (or to receive it after granting a prosecution adjournment), the statute shields the People from trial by ambush. The statute fosters procedural orderliness while protecting against fabricated or surprise testimony. It does not provide for any sanction other than an adjournment for the prosecution or an exclusion, in whole or in part, and we see no basis to allow the sanction imposed: introduction of the alibi notice on the prosecution's rebuttal to discredit the testimony of witnesses other than defendant—witnesses who themselves made none of the statements contained in the alibi notice—and to use the notice affirmatively as evidence of guilt.
The prosecutor did not pursue a statutory remedy. Instead of raising the appropriate objection and availing himself of a CPL 250.20 (3) remedy (exclusion or adjournment to investigate), the prosecutor sat by, failing to object as the defense elicited more than 30 pages of trial transcript from a witness to an alibi for which no notice had been given. When the prosecutor finally raised the issue while cross-examining defendant's girlfriend, he asked not for exclusion or an adjournment—which the court would have been compelled to grant before receiving testimony— but for a Dawson hearing, on which he prevailed. Having declined to seek a correct remedy, the prosecution cannot avail itself of an incorrect one.
Three of our colleagues would hold that the trial court properly admitted the alibi notice as evidence. We disagree. The statute offers two remedies. In its discretion, the trial court may preclude the alibi testimony (in whole or part) or it may receive it, provided the court first gives the prosecution a chance—an adjournment of not more than three days—to investigate. What the statute does not permit is the sanction the court allowed here. Despite the suggestion in the concurrence, our holding does not chill defendant's constitutional right to present a defense. The trial court could have allowed the alibi defense following an adjournment. We conclude, however, that neither the statute nor the rules of evidence supported the court's ruling here. We find it odd of our concurring colleagues to justify their affirmance based on the absence of error and to then characterize such an affirmance as somehow more protective of defendant's constitutional rights. Indeed, an affirmance in which we condone the misuse of the alibi notice could carry its own constitutional objections.
Notwithstanding the improper introduction of the alibi notice, we do not believe this case merits reversal. There was overwhelming evidence of guilt, including the eyewitness testimony of two victims and his own announced intention to shoot the victims. We therefore conclude that the error was harmless (see People v Crimmins, 36 NY2d 230, 242 [1975]).
We have considered defendant's remaining contentions and find them without merit. Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should be affirmed.
. According to the subsequent defense counsel, the source of the information in the alibi notice was defendant's uncle who was in the Dominican Republic until mid-January 2000.
. This alibi notice was dated November 9, 1998. Two days before the trial commenced—and more than a year after the date on the alibi notice—the newly assigned prosecutor asked defendant's subsequent lawyer for a copy of the alibi notice, because the prosecutor "couldn't find [the alibi notice]" in his file. More than 10 days into the trial, as of January 17 or 18, 2000, the prosecutor had still not investigated the notice of alibi, having just received the date of birth and address of the alibi witness. It is clear from this sequence of events that prior to trial the prosecutor neither investigated nor relied on the facts contained in the alibi notice.
. The concurrence suggests that trial counsel did not preserve the argument that CPL 250.20 prohibits impeachment by prior alibi notice (concurring op at 471). We have no difficulty concluding tbat the 30 pages of argument over the admissibility of the notice preserved the issue for our review.
. See Williams v Florida, 399 US 78 (1970); People v Copicotto, 50 NY2d 222, 229-230 (1980); People v Burgos-Santos, 98 NY2d 226, 233 (2002). See generally 4 LaFave, Israel and King, Criminal Procedure § 20.4, at 887-908 (2d ed 1999).
. We noted that the applicable Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure precludes impeachment with a withdrawn alibi notice without restricting when a defendant might withdraw (see Burgos-Santos at 234-235; Fed Rules Grim Pro rule 12.1 [f]; see also Conn Super Ct Rules § 40-25; Mass Rules Grim Pro rule 14 [b] [1] [F]; DC Super Ct Rules Grim Pro rule 12.1 [f|; SD Codified Laws § 23A-9-6).
. Indeed, on these facts, it is difficult to see how the prosecutor was prejudiced by the disavowal of the alibi notice (concurring op at 473). On the eve of trial the prosecutor had not even seen the alibi notice, and partway through trial he had not even investigated it.
. In support of an affirmance, our concurring colleagues go so far as to aver that the preclusion of unnoticed alibi testimony may be unconstitutional—an argument that not even defendant has made. This issue is therefore not before us. Defendant raises no constitutional claims in this appeal.
. We note that defense counsel, on realizing the mistake in the alibi notice, should have notified the court of the dilemma. Instead, in violation of section 250.20, the defense said nothing and elicited from defendant's girlfriend a fine of testimony that furnished defendant with a brand new alibi. Had the defense acted properly and aired the issue in limine, the court could have heard both sides and exercised its discretion appropriately.