Case Name: J.K. HURDLE, Jr. and Sam Hurdle, Hurdle and Son, General Partnership, All Jointly and Severally, v. Michael HOLLOWAY
Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Mississippi
Decision Date: 2003-06-19
Citations: 848 So. 2d 183
Docket Number: No. 2001-IA-01681-SCT
Parties: J.K. HURDLE, Jr. and Sam Hurdle, Hurdle and Son, General Partnership, All Jointly and Severally, v. Michael HOLLOWAY.
Judges: PITTMAN, C.J., SMITH, P.J., COBB, EASLEY, CARLSON AND GRAVES, JJ„ CONCUR. McRAE, P.J., DISSENTS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION. DIAZ, J., NOT PARTICIPATING.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 848
Pages: 183–189

Head Matter:
J.K. HURDLE, Jr. and Sam Hurdle, Hurdle and Son, General Partnership, All Jointly and Severally, v. Michael HOLLOWAY.
No. 2001-IA-01681-SCT.
Supreme Court of Mississippi.
June 19, 2003.
Lawrence Lee Little, Dion Jeffery Shan-ley, attorneys for appellants.
Barrett Jerome Clisby, Oxford, James Kizer Jones, attorneys for appellee.

Opinion:
WALLER, Justice, for the Court.
¶ 1. After they had both consumed several beers, Sam Hurdle, of Hurdle and Son General Partnership, offered Michael Holloway, a Hurdle and Son employee, a ride home after work. On the way, one of the tires on the truck in which they were riding suffered a blowout, causing Sam to lose control of the vehicle. The truck flipped several times, and Holloway was seriously injured.
¶ 2. After filing a tort action in circuit court against J.K. Hurdle, Jr., Sam Hurdle, and Hurdle and Son, Holloway filed a claim with the Workers' Compensation Commission, which granted the claim. The Hurdles and their WC carrier appealed to the circuit court, claiming that Holloway was not within the course and scope of his employment when he was injured. After the circuit court affirmed the WCC's ruling, the Hurdles appealed to this Court, and we transferred the appeal to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the grant of benefits. The Court of Appeals specifically ruled that Holloway was in the course and scope of his employment when he was injured and that his injuries were compen-sable under the Act.
¶ B. Holloway's tort action against the Hurdles was brought out of abeyance, and the Hurdles filed a motion for summary judgment, contending that Holloway's complaint was barred by the exclusivity provision of the Act. After the circuit judge denied the motion for summary judgment, we granted the Hurdles permission to bring this interlocutory appeal. See M.R.A.P. 5. We reverse and render the circuit court's denial of the motion for summary judgment because the Act's exclusivity provisions bar Holloway's complaint.
DISCUSSION
¶4. We employ a de novo standard of review of a trial court's grant or denial of a summary judgment and examine all the evidentiary matters before it— admissions in pleadings, answers to interrogatories, depositions, affidavits, etc. The evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party against whom the motion has been made. If, in this view, there is no genuine issue of material fact, and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, summary judgment should forthwith be entered for the movant. Otherwise, the motion should be denied. Heigle v. Heigle, 771 So.2d 341, 345 (Miss.2000).
WHETHER THE EXCLUSIVITY PROVISION OF THE ACT BARS HOLLOWAY'S COMPLAINT IN TORT AGAINST THE HURDLES.
¶ 5. It is well established that the Act is the exclusive remedy for an employee injured while acting in the scope and course of his employment. Miss.Code Ann. § 71-3-9 (Rev.2000); Medders v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 623 So.2d 979, 984 (Miss.1993). The exclusivity provision of the Act is not applicable to an employee's claim if: (1) the injury is caused by the willful act of the employer or another employee acting in the course and scope of employment and in the furtherance of the employer's business; and (2) the injury must be one that is not compensable under the Act. Newell v. Southern Jitney Jungle Co., 830 So.2d 621, 624 (Miss.2002).
¶ 6. Because the Court of Appeals has decided as a matter of law that Holloway was acting in the course and scope of his employment when he was injured, that his injuries were not the result of an intentional tort, and that his injuries were compensable under the Act, the exclusivity provision of the Act bars his tort claims against the Hurdles, and the circuit court erred when it denied the Hurdles' motion for summary judgment.
CONCLUSION
¶ 7. We reverse the circuit court's order denying the Hurdles' motion for summary judgment, and we render summary judgment here for the Hurdles finally dismissing Michael Holloway's complaint and this action with prejudice.
¶ 8. REVERSED AND RENDERED.
PITTMAN, C.J., SMITH, P.J., COBB, EASLEY, CARLSON AND GRAVES, JJ" CONCUR. McRAE, P.J., DISSENTS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION. DIAZ, J., NOT PARTICIPATING.
. The truck was owned by Hurdle and Son.
. Hurdle & Son v. Holloway, 749 So.2d 342 (Miss.Ct.App.1999).
. The Court of Appeals' ruling was not altered by a motion for rehearing or by a petition for certiorari to this Court.
. If the injuries were caused by an intentional tort, the exclusivity provision would not apply. Miller v. McRae's, Inc., 44.4 So.2d 368, 371 (Miss.1984). However, there is no proof in the record that Sam acted willfully and maliciously, and the Court of Appeals specifically found that the proximate cause of the accident was "equipment failure," i.e., the tire blow out. Hurdle & Son, 749 So.2d at 342.