Case Name: Tomayko v. Carson, Appellant
Court: Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
Jurisdiction: Pennsylvania
Decision Date: 1951-10-03
Citations: 368 Pa. 379
Docket Number: Appeals, Nos. 25, 26 and 27
Parties: Tomayko v. Carson, Appellant.
Judges: Before Drew, C. J., Stern, Stearne, Jones, Bell, Ladner and Chidsey, JJ.
Reporter: Pennsylvania State Reports
Volume: 368
Pages: 379–393

Head Matter:
Tomayko v. Carson, Appellant.
October 3, 1951:
Argued March 22, 1951.
Before Drew, C. J., Stern, Stearne, Jones, Bell, Ladner and Chidsey, JJ.
Charles C. Arensberg and Adolph L. Zeman, with them Patterson, Crawford, Arensberg & Dunn, Robert L. Zeman, Zeman & Zeman, Howard F. Carson and William S. Yard, for executors and legatee, appellants.
George B. Stegenga, with him Bloom, Bloom & Yard, for legatee, appellant.
Clarence O. Devore, for appellee.

Opinion:
Opinion by
Mr. Justice Allen M. Stearne,
The question is whether the claimant, appellee, has established ownership to corporate stock which was in the name of a decedent, and unendorsed, found after the death in a safe deposit box which was in the names of both decedent and claimant. The proof chiefly relied upon by claimant consists of declarations alleged to have been made by decedent that he had given the stock to claimant. The claim was presented to the orphans' court and, upon its own motion, was certified to the court of common pleas. A jury rendered a verdict in favor of claimant. Upon refusal of motions for new trial and judgment for defendants n.o.v., these appeals followed.
As we view the evidence, there are no disputed questions of fact to be determined by a jury. The question is whether claimant's evidence, regarded as true and most favorable to him, is sufficient at lato to support his claim of ownership to the stock by inter vivos gift.
Samuel A. Swearingen, of Charleroi, Washington County, was the sole owner of 500 shares of the common stock of a corporation named the "Coca Cola Bottling Company of Charleroi, Pennsylvania." 498 shares were in the name of decedent, unendorsed; of the remaining two qualifying shares: one was in the name of claimant and the other in the name of Charles L. Phillips (an employe). Both shares, while unendorsed, were accompanied by attached options to decedent to purchase.
The stock was found in the safe deposit box above referred to, which also contained $112,680 in cash, decedent's gold coin collection, two ladies' rings, one gentleman's ring, one wrist watch, one diamond stick pin, United States Bonds, personal letters and papers of decedent and various shares of stock in different corporations.
Claimant, in his amended petition, claimed all of the contents of the safe deposit box, being 181-A of the National Bank of Charleroi and Trust Company. During the proceedings he withdrew all claims except to the stock of the Coca Cola Bottling Company of Charleroi.
Alex A. Tomayko, the claimant, was decedent's faithful and efficient employe, in whom decedent reposed great confidence. On February 23, 1944, decedent made his will wherein he bequeathed claimant all his stock in the Coca Cola Bottling Company of Charleroi. (italics supplied) On May 17, 1945, decedent made a first codicil which has no effect upon this litigation. On August 10, 1946, decedent executed a second codicil wherein he revoked the bequest of the stock to claimant and provided: "I direct that my executors give to the Coca-Cola Company of Pennsylvania (italics supplied) the first opportunity to buy my stock in the Coca-Cola Bottling Company of Charleroi (italics supplied), Pennsylvania, at the fair and reasonable value of my said stock." A third codicil was executed on February 16,1947, republishing the will but which did not change the testamentary provisions concerning the disposition of the stock. Decedent died June 24, 1948, and his will and codicils were duly probated July 13, 1948. Judge Carson, a common pleas judge of Washington County, co-executor and sole trustee in the will, a close personal friend of decedent, testified concerning decedent's reason for the change in his will. It was that the Coca-Cola Bottling Company of Charleroi was the licensee of the Coca-Cola Company of Pennsylvania. Officials of the latter company learned in some undisclosed manner of decedent's bequest. They objected. As licensor they feared that the stock might "pass into hands that would not manage the business correctly and properly." They insisted that the licensor company be permitted to purchase the stock upon decedent's death at its fair value. Decedent did not oppose these wishes because of his fear that the license might be withdrawn, whereupon the stock would be worthless. Decedent thereupon reluctantly agreed to change his will. The Chicago lawyer of the licensor company drafted a clause which was accepted by decedent and which was incorporated in the codicil prepared by decedent's friend Judge Carson. When the Judge inquired of decedent whether there should be incorporated a clause bequeathing the proceeds of sale of the stock to claimant, decedent stated that he "had already made arrangements that Alex would be talcen care of."
Against this evidence claimant relies upon (a) testimony of three witnesses, all of whom testified to general declarations made by decedent that he had given the stock to claimant and (b) the fact that the safe deposit box, wherein the stock was found, was in the joint names of decedent and claimant.
A claim of a gift inter vivos against the estate of the dead must be supported by clear and convincing evidence: Leadenham's Estate, 289 Pa. 216, 137 A. 247; Snyderwine, Admrx. v. McGrath, 343 Pa. 245, 22 A. 2d 644. In order to effectuate an inter vivos gift there must be evidence of an intention to make a gift and a delivery, actual or constructive, of a nature sufficient not only to divest the donor of all dominion over the property but also invest the donee with complete control over the subject matter of the gift: Pyewell's Estate, 334 Pa. 154, 5 A. 2d 123; Rynier Estate, 347 Pa. 471, 32 A. 2d 736. It is claimant's burden to prove by clear and satisfactory evidence that a gift in fact was made: Sullivan v. Hess, 241 Pa. 407, 88 A. 544; Kata Estate, 363 Pa. 539, 70 A. 2d 351; Lochinger v. Hanlon, 348 Pa. 29, 39, 33 A. 2d 1. Cf. Campbell's Estate, 61 D. & C. 19.
We have examined the testimony of claimant's witnesses with care. We agree with counsel for appellant that there is insufficient evidence establishing with necessary preciseness just when, where or under what cir cumstances such declarations were made, or when such gift was in fact made. The declarations relied upon are entirely too loose and vague to prove an inter vivos gift. Such declarations do not constitute clear and convincing evidence of an inter vivos gift.
James Naccarato, an employe of the company, testified, p. 63a: "Well, he told me that he had already given it to Alex and it was already in a safety deposit box with — he didn't tell me the exact figures but somewhere around $100,000.00 for a building and as long as I got along with him, my job was secure."
J. H. Waggoner, also an employe of the company, testified, p. 72a: "He had told me that he had already given the stock and money to Alex and it was in a safety deposit box in the bank and Alex had the key for it, and he gave him that in order to build a new plant." Gerald A. Perella, a salesman of the Virginia Dare Extract Company, testified concerning the date of the alleged declarations. When questioned as to the time of the last conversation about the gift of the stock, the witness said it was, p. 96a: "Just a little before he died —a good many months — a few months before."
He also testified, p. 97a: "He told me on several occasions he had given the stock to Alex and had given him the key to the safety deposit box and that it was Alex's."
Plaintiff maintains that since three witnesses testified in the vague and loose language above recited that decedent stated that he had given the stock to plaintiff, the proof of delivery was established. Claimant relies upon the legal principle that when a donor declares that he has given a gift at a previous time, it is implied that delivery and every other formality necessary to create a complete gift has taken place. Counsel for appellee cites Malone's Estate, 38 Leg. Int. 393; Jacques v. Fourthman, 137 Pa. 428, 20 A. 802; Kulp v. March, 181 Pa. 627, 37 A. 913; Leitch v. Diamond National Bank of Pittsburgh, 234 Pa. 557, 83 416; Leadenham's Estate, 289 Pa. 216, 137 A. 247; Sherman v. Stoner, 78 Pa. Superior Ct. 189; Adams' Estate, 139 Pa. Superior Ct. 512, 12 A. 2d 465. A careful examination of these cases will disclose that in each instance there was additional evidence of delivery or of surrounding circumstances reflecting a delivery. Declarations by the deceased donor did not stand alone. Thus in Malone's Estate, supra, in addition to the declaration, witnesses testified to having seen the policy in the donee's (wife's) possession; in Jacques v. Fourthman, supra, the notes were found in donee's possession after donor's decease; in Kulp v. March, supra, donor had executed a written assignment of insurance policy to donee (his wife) and policy and assignment were found in donor's safe in an envelope with the donee's (wife's) name endorsed thereon; in Leitch v. Diamond National Bank of Pittsburgh, supra, the donor (husband) rented a safe deposit box in his wife's name, in which he deposited bonds and gave his donee (wife) key to the box; and also had produced the list of the bonds which he said belonged to his wife; in Leadenham's Estate, supra, donor took bonds out of his own safe deposit box and placed them in a separate box giving the donee a key; in Sherman v. Stoner, supra, donor gave a valuable clock to donee and signed a written declaration affirming the gift; in Adams' Estate, supra, donor executed a written declaration that the bonds had been given by her to the donees (her daughters).
The fact that decedent and claimant had joint access to the safe deposit box is not evidence of a completed gift to the latter. A joint lease of a safe deposit box is not of itself sufficient to establish joint ownership of securities found therein which originally belonged to one of the lessees: Wohleber's Estate, 320 Pa. 83, 181 A. 479.
Considering the evidence as a whole, proof of the alleged inter vivos gift is not sufficiently clear and convincing. The testamentary provisions were made in order to avoid the possible withdrawal of the license by the company which would have rendered the stock worthless. Without additional proof, it is difficult to discern why decedent would by will grant the licensor corporation the right to purchase the stock but at the same time secretly make an inter vivos gift of it to claimant, which gift, if the apprehensions of the decedent were as well founded as he considered them, would be worthless. As the licensor corporation disapproved of a gift of the stock to claimant, it would be immaterial whether such alleged gift was testamentary or inter vivos. Under all the facts and circumstances in this case the gift was not clearly and sufficiently proven.
The judgment is reversed.