Case Name: Toumey v. The State
Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Mississippi
Decision Date: 1872
Citations: 1 Mor. St. Cas. 305
Docket Number: 
Parties: Toumey v. The State,
Judges: 
Reporter: Mississippi State Cases; being criminal cases decided in the High court of errors and appeals
Volume: 1
Pages: 305–329

Head Matter:
Toumey v. The State,
8 Smedes & Marshall, 104.
Nape
Questions are leading, •which suggest to the witness the answer desired; or which embody a material fact, and may be answered by a mere negative or affirmative; or which involve an answer bearing immediately upon the merits of the cause, and indicating to the witness a representation which will best accord with the interests of the party«propounding them.
On tbe examination in chief, it is irregular and improper to propound a question which assumes a fact to be proved which is not proved;—whether such a question is or is not a leading question.—Qucere ?
It is a well-established general rule, that leading questions should not be propounded to a witness on the examination in chief; but there are exceptions to this general rule; as where the witness is manifestly reluctant and hostile to the interest of the party calling him; or where he has exhausted his memory without having stated the particular required, as a proper name or other fact, which cannot be arrived at by a general inquiry; or where the witness is a child of tender years, whose attention cannot be otherwise called to the subject matter.
The circuit court before which the examination is had, is allowed to exercise a certain discretion in permitting leading questions to be propounded to a witness on the examination in chief; that discretion, however, is not an absolute or arbitrary one, but is subject to revision in the appellate court; and if it appear that leading questions were propounded under circumstances that did not justify them, and that the party against whom they operated excepted to them at the time, this court will reverse the judgment, and grant the injured party a new trial. Mr. Justice Clayton dissenting as to the power of the appellate court to revise the discretion exercised by the court below in permitting the leading questions.
This discretion of the court to permit leading questions on the examination in chief, is allowed to be exercised alone in the eases forming exceptions to the general rule, and where these do not exist, the discretion is not allowed; as where the witness is a willing witness, of competent age, or favorable to the party calling him; in these cases, to allow leading questions will he a fatal error.
Ou the trial of the prisoner for a rape, the victim of the outrage being a witness for the state, testified that the crime had been committed about seven months before indictment found, which, as far as appeared by the record, was the first disclosure by the witness of the commission of the crime; it also appeared that the prisoner had been the guardian of the witness from early orphanage, and was her step-father; and that she was, at the time of the alleged offense, sixteen years of age;—she was then asked ; “ Did the prisoner then, or at any subsequent time, say anything to you in relation to this matter 'to dissuade you from disclosing it ? State when, where and what he said.” This was held to be a leading and illegal question. Mr. Justice Clayton, dissenting, held the question to be legal and proper.
Under the same circumstances, the following question propounded to the same witness was held to be leading and improper viz.: “Did the prisoner, at anytime subsequent to the transaction, say anything to you about what punishment the laws of Mississippi would inflict on you or him, or both? State it all.” Mr. Justice Clayton dissenting.
Under the same circumstances, the question to the same witness, “ If the prisoner, in any of his antecedent conversations offered property, or any other advancement to you in order to attach you to him, say sowas held to be illegal and inadmissible. Mr. Justice Clayton dissenting.
On the trial of a prisoner for a rape upon his ward, the entire record of his proceedings, as guardian, in the probate court, including his accounts and settlements and appropriations of the ward’s property, is evidence to establish the continuing guardianship of the prisoner over the ward; and if the prisoner desire to exclude any portion of the record as irrelevant, he should move to exclude the irrelevant part, and not the whole record; in default of which the admission of the whole record will not be error, though the prisoner except to it at the time. Chief Justice Sharkey dissenting, and holding that the whole record was inadmissible, as calculated to prejudice the jury against the prisoner, inasmuch as it showed that he had squandered the property of his ward, besides having despoiled her of her vir-. ginity.
The prisoner was on trial for a rape, and a witness was asked if he had not at a certain time authorized his wife to offer the victim of the outrage a home, and in what manner he had authorized it; and the record, without setting forth the answer of the witness, stated in general terms that he answered the question in the affirmative, and stated the reasons which he had stated to his wife; it was held that, the record not disclosing what the testimony wa3 which the witness gave, the court could not determine as to its legality. Chief Justice Sharkey dissenting, and holding that, let the testimony be what it might, it was inadmissible, being a conversation between a man and his wife, not in the presence of the prisoner, and forming no part of the res gestee.
On the trial of a prisoner for a rape, if the victim of the outrage be a witness in the cause, it is competent for the prosecution to prove her good character, by way of confirming her credibility before the jury.
Error to tbe circuit court of Claiborne county.
At tbe May term, 1845, of tbe circuit court of Warren county, Isaac Tourney was indicted by tbe grand jury, for a rape upon tbe person of Mary Eolkes, on tbe first day of September, 1844. Tbe venue was changed to Clairborne county, where at tbe June term of the circuit court, he was tried and found guilty, and sentenced to twenty years in tbe penitentiary.
Tbe bill of exceptions, made part of tbe record in tbe case, shows substantially as follows: Mary Folkes, on behalf of tbe prosecution, testified that about the first day of September, 1844, tbe defendant committed a rape upon her in Warren county, near a bridge in tbe main road from Yicksburg to Warrenton; tbe rape was committed ten or twelve steps from tbe road, behind an embankment about two miles from Warrenton. She was then just sixteen years old. The counsel for tbe state then asked the witness, “ Did Mr. Tourney then, or at any subsequent time, say anything to you in relation to this matter to dissuade you from disclosing it ? state when, where and what he said.” To this question the counsel for the prisoner then and there objected, but the objection was overruled, and the prisoner excepted. The record proceeds—in answer to this question the witness stated that the prisoner had charged her not to tell it, that it would ruin her, and her friends would desert her, that it would hurt her mother’s feelings, (who was the prisoner’s wife), and she would not be believed; the witness further testified that the prisoner had always been very affectionate towards her, and said he loved her better than any child he ever saw. She had lived with him as her guardian and stepfather from eight or nine years old to 1842.” The counsel for the state then asked the following question, to wit: “ If in any of his antecedent conversations he offered property or any other advancement to you, in order to attach you to him, say so.” (The objection to this question being made, overruled, and exceptions taken, the record proceeds), “ The witness answered, the prisoner had talked of adopting her and of leaving her half of his property; that on their way to Yicksburg on the morning of the day the rape was committed, he offered to give her a gold watch and fifteen dollars, to induce her to consent to his desires.” The counsel for the state then asked witness the following questions, viz: “ If at any time subsequent to this transaction, he said anything about what punishment the laws of Mississippi would inflict on him, or you, or both ? State it all.” (To this question a like objection was made, and exceptions taken to its admission). The witness answered that the prisoner said it would penitentiary him and her, both; this was said about the first of March, last.
The record of the probate court of Warren county was offered, showing the proceedings in the matter of guardianship of Mary, Florida, and Virginia Folkes. The prisoner, in November, 1836, took letters of guardianship, of these three children, (minor heirs of Henry Folkes, deceased), in right of his wife, widow of said Henry, and mother of the children. In February, 1837, the prisoner presented his annual account as guardian, in which he charged each of his wards $144 a year for board; besides separate charges of their clothing. In August, 1837, he applied by petition to the probate court, to sell the slaves of his wards, six in number; aged 20 years, 18, 13, 5, 4, respectively, and one 10 months. He states in his petition that it would be greatly to the benefit of the heirs to sell the slaves, and that if the order were granted, he would maintain and educate the minors at his own expense until they attained an age when they could maintain themselves. The sale was ordered on a credit for twelve months, and at January term he reported it; amounting to about $4,000, of which $1,115 belonged to Mary. At same term, in his annual account as guardian, he charged each of his wards $144 a year for board, which was allowed. At March term, 1840, he gave a new guardian bond. At March term, 1841, he presented another annual account showing amount in his hands, and which he was to retain, and pay lawful interest for it. At November term, 1842, filed his petition, stating that he educated, boarded and clothed the children, and in consideration thereof asked to be exonerated from payment of interest; this was granted. At February term, 1845, reported to the court that he held the ward’s money in his hands, neither paying interest nor charging board, etc. At May term 1845, on his own petition showing that circumstances connected with the guardianship were, of such a nature as to compel him to relinquish it, and that he was in the jail of Warren county, and was unable to say when his confinement would end; court discharged him from his guardianship. This is the substance of the whole record. The defendant objected to the admission of the record as illegal and incompetent, but the court overruled the objection, it was read, and the exceptions taken.
Samuel Luckett was then called for the state, who testified that Mary Folkes was half sister of his wife; and was asked by the prosecution, “ Please tell whether or not, you last fall, or at any other time, offered Mary Folkes a home at your house, or authorized your wife to do so; if so, state in what manner and when.” This was objected to, allowed, and exceptions taken. “ The witness stated that he had authorized his wife to offer Mary Folkes a home in his house, and proceeded to state the reasons which induced him to do so, and which he stated to his wife;” “to which testimony, as to the reason, etc., of the wit ness, the prisoner’s counsel objected,” but it was admitted and exceptions taken.
The prosecution then asked, “ From your knowledge of Mary Folkes, has she maintained the reputation of a lady of good fame ? This was also objected to, and being admitted, exceptions were taken. Witness answered, “she has, and he had heard several ladies speak well of her.” This was also objected to.
Benjamin Folkes, brother of Mary, called by the prosecution, stated that on the 9th or 10th of April, 1845, prisoner told him he had taken Mary Folkes to Hendersonville, Ky., and left her with a Mrs. Taylor, a relation of his ; witness went to Hender-sonville, and not finding her there, returned to Yicksburg, where, learning from another source, that his sister was at Newburgh, Indiana, he went for and found her with the prisoner’s brother-in-law, and brought her back to Vicksburg. This was objected to, but admitted, and exceptions taken.
Miles C. Folkes, on the part of the state, said Mary Folkes was his half sister by the same father; prisoner married Mary’s mother in 1835 or 1836; he was then asked, “After the prisoner married your step-mother, on what terms was the intercourse between him and the half-brothers of Mary Folkes regulated, whether friendly or otherwise ?” Exceptions were taken to its admission, and he answered that until the year 1842, it had not been cordial, but since that period it had been of a social and friendly nature. Witness also stated the conversation he had with his brother when he first heard the rumors about his sister’s condition, and the language of rebuke to the persons who first communicated it. These conversations and language are not inserted in the record, but their admission was made the subject of exception. Same witness detailed the interview between his brother Benjamin and-himself, as to the reports in circulation about their sister, and only of putting a stop to them ; also of facts relative to his brother’s trip to Hendersonville, and Indiana and the reasons which led to it. These conversations, etc., are not set out in the record, but were admitted to the jury, and excepted to.
James C. Goodwin, stated that Bullitt was the brother-in-law of Toumey, prisoner, etc., bad at one time worked in the witness’s shop; and stated tbe history of some tools belonging to witness, which had been found in Bullitt’s chest, and the conversation between Toumey, Bullitt and witness about them. This conversation was also made the subject of an exception.
William T. Martin, on the part of the state, testified that the general reputation and standing of Mary Folkes was as good as that of any girl; her associates and her character were good; he never heard her chastity or truth questioned.
The prisoner’s counsel asked the witness if he knew the general reputation of Miss Folkes for veracity ; witness responded, that he had never heard it spoken of, or called in question; the question was repeated, and a similar reply given. Prisoner’s counsel insisted on a more distinct and direct answer being given, but the court decided the reply to be sufficient, and exceptions were taken.
Foote c& Hutchinson, for plaintiff in error.
John D. Freemcm, attorney general.

Opinion:
Thacher, J.:
An indictment for rape was preferred by the grand jury of Warren county against Isaac Toumey, at the April term, 1845, of the circuit court of that county. Under the statute a change of venue was allowed, and the indictment was tried in the county of Claiborne, whereupon a verdict of guilty was rendered, and the defendant sentenced to imprisonment in the penitentiary for the term of twenty years.
The defendant below brings the cause into this court by a writ of error, sued out upon exceptions reserved to the ruling of the court, in admitting and rejecting testimony upon the trial.
The first exceptions exhibited in the record relate to the mode of examination pursued with the witness for the state, Mary Folkes. This witness, having previously testified that about the first day of September, 1844, at which time she was just sixteen years of age, the defendant committed a rape upon her, was then permitted by the state to be asked upon her examination in chief, this question: " If Mr. Toumey then, or at any subsequent time, said anything to you in relation to this matter to dissuade you from disclosing it? State when, where and what he said." Again, the witness having testified that she was the defendant's step-danghter, and had lived with him as her guardian from the age of eight or nine years to the year 1842, during which time he had treated her very affectionately, was also permitted to be asked by the state : " If, in any of his antecedent conversations, he (Tourney) offered property, or any other advancement to you, in order to attach him to you, say so ?" Again, the following question was permitted to be put to the same witness: " If, at any time, subsequent to the transaction, he (Tourney) said anything about what punishment the laws of Mississippi would inflict on him, or you, or both Instate it all." These questions were answered affirmatively.
It is well settled that in the inquiry into the nature of a transaction, whatever was said by both parties, as well as what was done during the continuance of the transaction, is admissible. Roscoe's Cr. Ev., 22. But in this case the objections are directed to the form of the questions, upon the ground of their being leading questions.
It is often extremely difficult to distinguish such questions as should not be allowed because of their leading tendency, from those which, though in form leading, in effect only draw the mind of the witness to the subject of inquiry. But, while it is impossible to lay down any fixed rule, which will serve in all cases, there are yet certain established rules upon the subject of leading questions, which afford a good test by which to discriminate in cases not very doubtful. For instance, that is a leading question which suggests to the witness the answer desired. 1 Stark. Ev., 124; 2 Phill. Ev., 722; The People v. Mather, 4 Wend., 249. And that is also a leading question which assumes a fact to be proved, which is not proved. A question is also leading which, embodying a material fact, admits of an answer by a simple negative or affirmative. The latter constitutes an argumentative or pregnant cause of interrogation, which the law holds objectionable. 1 Greenl. Ev., § 434.
On tbe other hand, however, there are exceptions to the rule, which forbids leading questions to be put to a witness in bis examination in chief; as when he is manifestly reluctant and hostile to the interest of the party calling him, or when he has exhausted his memory without stating the particulars required, where it is a proper name, or other fact, which cannot be arrived at by a general inquiry, or when the witness is a child of tender years, whose attention cannot be otherwise called to the subject matter. Moody v. Rowell, 17 Pick., 498.
It is also to be observed upon this subject, that much discretion is confided to a court in regulating and controlling the examination of witnesses, which is to be governed by the circumstances of each case; and that some courts have gone so far as to hold that the subject, under what circumstances a leading question may be put, is a matter resting in the sound discretion of the court presiding over the examination, and is not a matter upon which to base a motion for a new trial, or which can be assigned for error. Greenl. Ev., § 435; 17 Pick., 498 ; Stratford v. Sanford, 9 Conn. R., 275.
In order the better to scrutinize the character of the questions propounded in this case to the witness, Mary Polkes, we must bear in mind the state of the evidence at the different periods when they were severally proposed to her. Before the first question now objected to was asked, it had been shown that about seven months had elapsed between the time when the act of violence was alleged by her in her testimony to have been committed, and the finding of the indictment, which, for all that appears, was the first disclosure of the offense charged. It was, therefore, a material fact for the state to explain satisfactorily the cause of this long concealment by Mary Folkes, of the enormity alleged to have been perpetrated upon her. A sufficient explanation of this long silence might be established by proving that the defendant dissuaded the witness from disclosing the deed by promises or threats, or altogether prevented it by a removal from her friends. It had already appeared in evidence, that, from year to year from a very early period of the orphanage of the witness, he had with constant assiduity insinuated himself into her confidence, and it was fair to presume that by the accomplished arts of such a deliberate scheme of remorseless and calculating villainy, he had succeeded in becoming the master and tyrant of her mind, and rendered her the slave either of his promises or threats. Under these circumstances, the witness is asked to reply whether the defendant dissuaded her from disclosing the act, and also whether he informed her what punishment the laws of Mississippi would inflict upon either or both of them in consequence of it. It is clear that both of those questions embody a material fact in the case, and are capable of a conclusive answer affirmatively or negatively. They are likewise interrogatories pregnant with circumstances indispensable to be proved for the success of the prosecution. Had the witness simply rejoined that the defendant did dissuade her from disclosing the matter, and did inform her that the laws of Mississippi affixed a punishment upon her for her part in the transaction ; such answers, in view of the high degree of abused confidence already shown to repose in the mind of the witness towards the defendant, must have most satisfactorily accounted for the long delay in bringing the dark atrocity to the exposure of light. But, while the principle of law fortunately is fixed, that it being often necessary, it is, therefore, admissible to bring the mind of a witness into contact with the subject of inquiry, especially when a witness is examined as to any conversation or admission ; still it is also a principle of law equally fixed, and beyond the control of the indignation of public justice, that, in such questions, the witness should not be prompted to give a particular answer, or be asked any questions to which the answer "Tes" or "No" would be conclusive. 1 Stark. Ev., 124; Nicholls v. Dowding, 1 Starkie's C., 81; opinion of Lord Ellenborough. It is undoubtedly more convenient to ask a witness whether such a thing was said or done; and questions so framed might, in many cases, be asked without danger of perjury, even involuntary, and we do not deny that such was the result in the very case under consideration ; and there are also instances when such leading questions are proper, as have been before alluded to; but, in ordinary cases, it is certainly most consistent with fairness and justice, both to the witness and the defendant, to ask the witness what was done, and what was said, rather than whether a particular and material thing was done and said. "We are compelled, therefore, to the conclusion that the questions propounded to Mary Folkes, and which have been examined, conform to the legal definition of leading questions.
It comes next in order to inquire whether there were any of. those peculiarities surrounding this witness which warranted leading questions to be asked in the direct examination. It does not appear that the witness was hostile to the interests of the state in the prosecution. On the contrary, every witness so unfortunately situated as this one was, must be presumed, if supposed to indulge any sentiment upon the subject, other than a desire to simply state the facts of the occurrence, to entertain deep feelings of profound indignation and horror towards her violator. Keeping in mind that the witness had already deposed as to the perpetration of the actual violence at the point of time when the questions objected to were propounded, it necessarily became a subject of great moment to her reputation and good fame to vindicate her purity of mind and chastity of heart. It is not unreasonable to conceive that any one so unfortunate might be willing to adopt and assent to whatever might be suggested for her own benefit; and it is wisely provided, that whenever a witness, from peculiar situation, has, or upon interrogation, shows a bias in favor of the examining party, a court should prohibit leading questions, even upon cross-examination. Further, the facts sought to be obtained from the witness were not such as could not significantly be pointed to by general interrogations, or which could not have been extracted from the witness by a skillful and legitimate mode of interrogation. And lastly, upon this branch of the subject, while it may with propriety be inferred that the witness was very naturally confused, and perhaps confounded, by the peculiarity of her position, in being re- quircd to testify in public to facts so repugnant to female delicacy, it yet appears that the most dreaded and abhorrent details had been communicated; and it does not appear from the course of examination that repeated unsuccessful efforts had been first attempted in the proper mode to call forth what was supposed to exist in point of fact. In conclusion, nothing appears to show that the purposes of justice required the exercise of the discretionary power to vary the general rule controlling direct examinations, but rather the contrary.
It having been determined then, that leading questions were addressed to this witness, and that they were not essential to the ends of justice in this substance, it remains solely to inquire in this connection, whether this court will undertake to interfere with the discretionary power which is admitted to subsist with the courts who preside over the examination of witnesses.
It is true that it has been held in the nisi prius courts of England, that the rules of evidence are exactly the same in civil and in criminal cases, and that in both, it is in the discretion of the judge how far he will allow the examination in chief of a witness to be by leading questions, or, in other words, how far it shall assume the form of a cross-examination. Regina v. Murphy and Douglas, 8 C. & P., 297. But the decisions above quoted from this country, wherein it was held that the matter of judicial discretion respecting the examination of witnesses, was not such as upon which to base an application for a new trial, or which can be assigned for error, were made in civil and not in criminal cases. Yet, in the case of Duncan v. McCullough, Admr., 4 Serg. & Rawle, 482, which was a civil action, the supreme court of Pennsylvania admitting the rule, that the manner of examining witnesses as a matter very much in the discretion of the court presiding upon the trial, intimate that they would entertain the question, whether that court would reverse for error on a point in which the law permits the court below to exercise their discretion, provided it appeared that there had been any abuse of discretion. In the case of The People v. Mather, 4 Wend., 247, which was the case of an indictment for a conspiracy in the abduction of William Morgan, the court, while it also admits the doctrine that considerable discretion is left to a judge who presides at a trial to control and regulate the examination of witnesses, and that appellate courts should cautiously avoid encroaching upon the proper exercise of this discretion, yet held, that if an established rule of law has been violated, the party injured has an undoubted right to belief, and that the court would feel no reluctance to grant it. The rule thus laid down by the Supreme Court of New York seems most consonant to the object of public justice, which is more the protection of the innocent than the punishment of the guilty.
Upon other points relied upon in the case, it now becomes necessary to speak but generally.
In regard to evidence of the actual guardianship of the defendant over the person of Mary Folkes, the chief witness, it was, perhaps, only necessary to have produced the copy, or a certificate of the grant of letters. This would have been enough to have established the existence of such guardianship during the minority of the ward, unless 'the contrary was made to appear by proof of a resignation or removal from the trust. Yet, I am not prepared to say, that the state could not be permitted to anticipate any such presumption, and establish the continuance of the guardianship up to any period necessary to be shown by means of the records of the probate court granting the letters.
Evidence was introduced as to the good fame of the person violated. This was competent, because she was made a witness in the cause. The party ravished is a competent witness to prove the fact, but the credibility of her testimony must be left to the jury. It is legitimate to support her credibility by evidence of her good fame, or to attack it by evidence of her evil fame. Such evidence tends to show that the connection with the woman was had against or with her consent. 4 Bl. Com., 213.
In consequence of the inadmissibility of the questions propounded to the chief witness, and the objection to them by the defendant upon the trial below, the judgment must be reversed, and a new trial awarded by the circuit court of Claiborne county.
See 1 Archbold Cr. Pr. & Pl., 577.
1 Greenl. Ev., 434, 435, 437; Hill v. Coombe, 1 Ev., 163, note qq; Hanley v. Ward, ib.; Roscoe Nisi Prius Ev., 171; 2 Phill, Ev., 888-889; Roscoe Cr. Ev., 130, et seq.
See note 2 supra.
Stringfellow v. State, 26 Miss., 157; Gunter v. Watson, 4 Jones, 455.
Bank of Northern Liberties v. Davis, 6 Watts & Serg., 285; Towns, v. Alford, 2 Ala., 378; 1 Greenl. Ev., 434-5, notes.
Huckins v. People's M. F. Ins. Co., 11 Foster, 238.
People v. McNair, 21 Wend., 608.
Colclough v. Rhodes, 2 Pick., 76; Sears v. Shaffer, 1 Barb., 408; Donnell v. Jones, 13 Ala., 490; West v. State, 2 N. J., 212; Gayle v. Bishop, 14 Ala., 552; State v. Lall, 37 Maine, 246; York v. Pease, 2 Gray, 282; Budlong v. Van Nostrand, 24 Barb., 25; Walker v. Dunspaugh, 20 N. Y., 170; Green v. Gould, 3 Allen, 465; Steer v. Little, 44 N. H., 613; Barton v. Kane, 17 Wis., 122.
See note 11, p. 313; 1 Greenl. Ev., 435, notes ; Clarke v. Saffrey, Ry. & M., 126.