Case Name: The State of Kansas v. William Jennings
Court: Kansas Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Kansas
Decision Date: 1881-01
Citations: 24 Kan. 642
Docket Number: 
Parties: The State of Kansas v. William Jennings.
Judges: “Brewer, J., concurring.
Reporter: Kansas Reports
Volume: 24
Pages: 642–661

Head Matter:
The State of Kansas v. William Jennings.
Homicide ; Court to Inform Defendant of the Verdict, etc., before Judgment. Where a defendant is charged on information with committing murder in the first degree, and “the jury find the defendant guilty in manner and form as charged in the information,” without otherwise stating the degree of the offense of which they find the defendant guilty, and no motion for a new trial is made, and the court sentences the defendant as for murder in the first degree, and the record of the case does not show that the defendant was informed by the court of the verdict of the jury, and asked whether he had any legal cause to show why judgment should not be pronounced against him, held, that the judgment of the court below must be set aside, and the cause remanded with the order that the defendant be again taken before the court below for sentence and judgment, and for such other and further proceedings as may be properly had in the case, and that before sentence or judgment shall be again pronounced against him, he shall “ be informed by the court of the verdict of the jury, and asked whether he have any legal cause„to show why judgment should not be pronounced against him.” (Comp. Laws, of 1879, p. 761, § 248.)
Appeal from Allen District Court.
At the March Term, 1880, of the district court, William Jennings was tried upon an information charging him with murder in the first degree in killing one Herschel McLaughlin, 'in Allen county, on or about the 12th day of December, 1879. The jury returned a verdict in the following form, to wit: “We, the jury, find the defendant guilty in manner and form as charged in the information.” The court sentenced the defendant as for murder in the first degree. From this sentence he appealed to this court. September 20,1880, the case was argued and submitted, and decided, November 9, 1880. Counsel for appellant filed a motion for a rehearing, which was granted, and a reargument had, December 6,1880. The second decision herein was made January 5, 1881. The opinions first filed are contained in the opinion, infra.
Gates & Keplinger, for appellant:
1. Whether the verdict is void, or voidable only, must be determined by a reference to its face and to the law, without regard to the result of the decision on any further trial. The court, in its opinion, claims that new trials cannot be granted after void verdicts without violating the constitutional provision, that “no person shall be twice put in jeopardy for the same oífense; ” and therefore the cases wherein new trials were ordered because of such verdicts, are cited as authorities for holding such verdicts not void. This position is, we think, unfounded. In all the cases referred to by the court, the defendant himself insisted upon a new trial. Whether a verdict be void, voidable, or valid, the court may set it aside at the defendant’s request, without any danger that the 'constitution will stand in the way. of a second trial. Where a strictly valid verdict is set aside at the instance of the defendant, a new trial may be ordered. (4 111. 463.) A fortiori, would this be true in case of a voidable verdict, or of one utterly void ? There are some instances where courts have ordered new trials after precisely such verdicts as in this case, against the wish, or, at least, without any request, on the part of the defendant. (30 Wis. 437; 16 Ala. 781; 3 Ohio St. 89.) Now if courts cannot set aside verdicts which are utterly void, and grant new trials against the wish of defendants, they certainly cannot do so in case of verdicts which are valid, or voidable only. Therefore, where after such verdicts courts have ordered new trials, it could not be that they did so because they considered such verdicts not void, and it may have been that they held so for the very reason that they did consider them utterly void. The bear ing which the distinction between verdicts which are void and those voidable only has upon the power of courts to order new trials, may, we think, be thus stated generally :
If the verdict be utterly void, this would be a mistrial; there is no option on the part of either party, and the proceedings must be ignored or set aside, and the prisoner retried. If the verdict be voidable only, and the prisoner does not except, there is no option with the court, and it must sentence as upon a valid verdict. If the prisoner excepts to treating the verdict as valid, there is no option with the court, which must treat it precisely as if it were utterly void, and order a new trial. If instead of excepting absolutely, as he may, if he will, he may except to considering the verdict as valid, but at the same time state a condition upon which he will waive the error. Of this the state cannot complain. The prisoner might have absolutely refused to waive the error. If the state is unwilling to accept the waiver with the condition, it must treat the exception as absolute.
Applying these principles, we say that this verdict was at least voidable, if not void. If void, defendant could not waive the defect, and the court erred in sentencing him at all. If voidablé, he was willing to waive the defect upon condition that he should be sentenced for manslaughter in the fourth degree, and the court erred in treating his conditional waiver as absolute. If accepted at all, his waiver should have been accepted with the condition upon which it was made.- If not so received, it should not have been received at all, and the exception should have been considered as absolute.
The court seems to hold that new trials cannot be ordered after void verdicts, fpr the reason that in such cases the prisoner receives no legal benefit from a new trial. To escape hanging under a void verdict is, one would think, sufficient benefit. If it be said there was no such danger, and therefore no such benefit, we reply that society receives a benefit in such cases, and this is sufficient ground for putting in jeopardy a supposed criminal who has not been there before. If he were in jeopardy under the void verdict, his escape therefrom would be sufficient benefit. If he were not, he cannot complain if the- court speedily places him in jeopardy. Under the highest authority on criminal law, this verdict is a nullity: 3 Whar. Cr. Law, §3198; 1 Bishop on Cr. Law, §844 (673); 1 Bishop on Cr. Pro., § 842.
But independent of all authority, and tested by reason solely, are not such verdicts nullities ? It is not every statement by a jury that constitutes a verdict. We look to the statute to see what a statement by a jury must be to constitute a verdict. In cases of this kind we find that the presence of two essential ingredients or elements is required, and one of these is no less essential than the other. If either be wanting, it is only a half-verdict — a mere statement by the jury, which does not rise to the dignity of a verdict. In this case, one of these essentials is wholly wanting, and for that reason it is not a verdict. The evident purpose of the statute is, that the verdict in and of itself, in cases of this kind, shall furnish the sole guide to the court in determining the offense of which the prisoner is guilty and the sentence that should be pronounced. Neither of those matters can be determined in this case, simply because this is not a verdict.
2. But conceding that the verdict was irregular only, and not void, what sentence should be pronounced? A jury in order to convict must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt, but when the court comes to pronounce sentence, it must be satisfied beyond all doub't what offense it is of .which the jury found the defendant guilty. To adopt any other rule would fritter away that high degree of certainty which our liberal and merciful system of jurisprudence requires should precede punishment. The.opinion confesses that the verdict and information leave some doubt as to the degree of defendant’s guilt. To relieve that last doubt, this court goes beyond the verdict and information. But in The State v. Reddieh, 7. Kas. 143, it had been decided in case of a similar verdict that this cannot be done. After a full consideration of the authorities, and relying chiefly upon the above case and that of The State v. Huber, 8 Kas. 447, we decided to ask sentence for manslaughter in the fourth degree instead of a new trial, because we thought such sentence better for the defendant than the hazard of a new trial.
If the verdict and the information leave it uncertain of what offense the jury found the prisoner guilty, what right had the court to pronounce sentence for the highest crime included in the information ? If the court does not sentence as requested by the defendant for manslaughter in the fourth degree, the presumption of innocence requires that the sentence should be for a simple assault, that being the lowest degree of offense included in the information. (30 Wis. 438; 3 Ohio St. 85.)
3. Was the defect waived by failure to move for a new trial ? If the verdict were void, of course not. But suppose it were irregular only: what then ? If an irregularity, under all the authorities it was one of the gravest character. Even though guilty, the defendant had one right left — that of being tried, convicted and executed according to law. It was the duty of the state to follow the forms' which it had itself prescribed, and that too, without suggestion from the defendant. That duty the state signally failed to perform. Before and after sentence the defendant called attention to the fact, and objected to a conviction otherwise than according to law, and entered his protest upon the record. That judgment carries with it wherever it goes, and brings with it into this court, that protest stamped upon its forehead as a mark of its infirmity. It is a double judgment, convicting both the state and the defendant of the same crime — that of taking life contrary to law. It establishes the guilt of the latter, not beyond a reasonable doubt, while it fixes the guilt of the former beyond all doubt. Where, as in this case, both error and exception appear in the face of the judgment, wherein was the ■exception not timely? and if timely excepted to, wherein was the irregularity better than a nullity ? and why should not the court have treated the verdict as a nullity within the rule as laid down by Bishop, supra? and how could failure to move for a new trial waive an error which occurred not until after the time for moving for a new trial had passed?
We rely chiefly upon the prior decisions of our own supreme court as establishing clearly and beyond all question, both expressly and by necessary implication, that this precise error under consideration is of such a character as not to be waived by a failure to move for a new trial. We call attention to the cases where this form of verdict has been considered by this court, all the more confidently, from the fact that the decision which we now ask to be reconsidered takes special pains to indorse in the fullest sense those decisions to which we now refer. (7 Kas. 143; 8 id. 447; also, 16 Ala. 781; 28 Cal. 456.)
No motion for a new trial would have reached the defect complained of in the verdict. Every work on practice shows that the words, “ verdict contrary to law,” apply only to cases where what the verdict says contradicts the law, and not to cases where the verdict omits to speak at all as to some essential matter upon which the law requires that it should speak. The verdict in this case may speak in accordance with the law and the evidence, so far as it speaks at all, but there is a total omission as to one material matter. Therefore, failure to move for a new trial would not have reached this defect, and the omission to do so was not a waiver.
There is also another defect in the record in this case. The statute provides for a trial proper which ends with the rendition of the verdict. Still, sentence cannot be pronounced. There must yet be a second hearing — a trial sub modo. The court must inform the defendant of the verdict. He must inquire of him, &c. Then, if no sufficient cause be alleged, or appear to the court, then, but not until then, the court can pronounce sentence. This second hearing is clearly and expressly a condition precedent, embodied in the clause granting power to sentence. Whoever would exercise the power, should show affirmatively the performance of the condition. This step in the proceedings is of as vital importance as any other. Our statute inherits it from the common law. We have no more right to pass it lightly by than the arraignment, or plea, or' trial proper. What would be said of a record which omitted; any one of those steps? Upon this point the authorities are uniform — so far at least as capital cases are concerned — that-the record must show a compliance with this provison. (Messner v. The People, 45 N. Y. 1; Safford v. The People, 1 Park. [N. Y.] Cr. 474; James v. The State, 45 Miss. 572; Hamilton v. Commonwealth, 16 Pa. St. 129; Perry v. The State, 43 Ala. 21; Dougherty v. Commonwealth, 69 Pa. St. 286.) The remedy in such case would be to remand, not for.a new trial, but for a proper sentence according to law. (Keeeh v. The State, 15 Fla. 609; ’ Dodge v. The People, 4 Neb. 221.) We do not claim that the record is void on this account, but voidable only. Of course this defect was not waived by a failure to move for a new trial.
The sentence is defective in yet another particular. The sentence is, or should be, the voice of the law. It orders the-prisoner to be hanged at such time as the governor may appoint. It .should be at such time after the expiration of one-year, as the governor may appoint.

Opinion:
The opinion of the court was delivered by
Valentine, J.:
This case was originally submitted to this court on the written briefs of counsel, without any oral argument being made. The brief for the state is immaterial. The briefs for the defendant are as follows (court and title-omitted ):
"Defendant was sentenced as for murder in the first degree,, on a verdict of 'guilty as charged.' We cite 8 Kas. 447, but more especially 7 Kas. 143, as conclusive. The defendant has already had a valid trial, and the verdict is not a nullity. It will support a sentence. Otherwise, habeas eorpus would lie.
"We ask that he be remanded to receive the highest sentence necessarily intended by the jury, viz.: manslaughter in the fourth degree. The jury must have intended this much; they may have intended more, and they may not.
Cates & Keplinger."
[Court and title omitted.) "The indictment in this case charged the defendant with murder in the first degree, and therefore charged him with all the different degrees of felonious homicide, including murder in the first and second degrees. The verdict of the jury found him guilty in manner and form as charged. The court sentenced him to suffer the penalty affixed to murder in the first degree, and rendered judgment for murder in the first degree against him. We contend that the judgment of the court below was erroneous, and cite, The State v. Reddick, 7 Kas., and authorities therein cited; Crim. Code, §239; 17 Kas. 402; 7 Iowa, 236; 58 Me. 564; 3 Ohio St. 89, 101; 16 Ala. 781; 17 Ala. 618; 9 Yerg. 279; 7 Yerg. 279.
Murray & Smith,
Attorneys for Defendant."
Upon the record and the briefs of counsel, the court decided the case, affirming the judgment of the court below, and the following opinion of the court, and dissenting opinion of the Chief Justice, were filed in the case, to wit:
'" The opinion of the court was delivered by
" Valentine,-J.: The defendant was prosecuted on an information for murder in the first degree. The jury found the defendant guilty, by a verdict in the following form (omitting title), to wit:
!'We, the jury, find the defendant guilty in manner and form as charged in the information.'
"The defendant was sentenced by the court as for murder in the first degree. No motion was made for a new trial, or in arrest of judgment, but the defendant duly excepted to the sentence imposed upon him, on the ground that the verdict was not sufficient to sustain such a sentence. And whether the verdict is sufficient or not, is the only question now presented to this court. That such a verdict is insufficient and voidable when attacked by a motion for a new trial,' has long ago been held by this court. [The State v. Reddick, 7 Kas. 143, 154; The State v. Huber, 8 Kas. 447.) But whether it is insufficient if not attacked by motion for a new trial, or whether it is absolutely void or not, and if not void, what sentence should be pronounced upon it, has never before been presented to this court. • In prior cases this court may have spoken -of such a verdict as though it were void; but the language was of course used with reference to. the circumstances of the particular case then under consideration; and the judgment of this court in the case or cases formerly before it was rendered as though the verdict were not void. The judgment of this court in such case or cases was, that the defendant should have a new trial. But if the verdict in such case or cases was void (absolutely and in fact), then the defendant was virtually acquitted ; for as he had already been once in jeopardy, he could not again be put in jeopardy. If he had been once acquitted of the offense in any form, either by the direct or unmistakable avowal of the verdict, of by its indirect and implied legal effect, he could not afterward waive such acquittal, nor could the court set it aside, so that he might again be tried or might again be put in jeopardy. A defendant can never be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense, except with his own consent, and he cannot consent, except where he is to gain some legal benefit or advantage by such consent. He can consent to a new trial or to being again put in jeopardy for the purpose of having a valid verdict against him set aside, for by such a thing he gains a legal advantage. But he cannot consent to a new trial or to being again put in jeopardy in order to procure the setting aside of a void verdict, for by such a thing he derives no legal benefit whatever.
"We must, then, not consider said verdict as void, but as valid; and then comes the question, What does it mean? What sentence, if any, should be pronounced upon it? We cannot, of course, grant a new trial, for the defendant does not ask for such a thing, and we cannot again place him in jeopardy against his consent. We must therefore construe the verdict as best we can, and determine what sentence, if any, it will require.
"Now as the information clearly charged the defendant with being guilty of murder in the first degree, and.as the jury in their verdict "find the defendant guilty in manner and form as charged in the information," there can be but little doubt as to what the jury intended, or as to what the verdict means. But the court also charged the jury, previously to their finding their verdict, that if they found the defendant guilty of murder in the first degree, the form of their verdict should be j ust such as the j ury afterward in fact used. And the court also gave the jury a written form of verdict for murder in the second degree, and also for each degree of manslaughter. This makes it clear beyond all doubt what the jury intended to find, and what they did in fact find. They in fact found the defendant guilty of murder in the first degree. • As the defendant did not ask for a new trial, the court did not err in sentencing him as for murder in the first degree. The defendant waived the irregularity in the form of the verdict, by not asking for a new trial.
"Before closing this opinion, we might say that we adhere strictly to the former decisions of this court with reference to verdicts in murder cases, but we do not think that such decisions control this case.
"The judgment of the court below will be affirmed.
"Brewer, J., concurring.