Case Name: Michael K. MILES, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1997-06-04
Citations: 694 So. 2d 151
Docket Number: No. 96-0323
Parties: Michael K. MILES, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: GROSS, J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 694
Pages: 151–154

Head Matter:
Michael K. MILES, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. 96-0323.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
June 4, 1997.
Richard L. Jorandby, Public Defender, and Tatjana Ostapoff, Assistant Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Joseph A. Tringali, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.

Opinion:
STEVENSON, Judge.
Appellant, Michael Miles, raises numerous challenges to his conviction for burglary of a dwelling. We find merit in his challenge to the statistical DNA evidence admitted at trial since the trial court did not make the necessary findings that the statistical methodology was generally accepted, or that the DNA expert was qualified to present the statistical results.
At trial, the State presented Mr. Earl Ritz-line as an expert in forensic serology. Mr. Ritzline's testimony concerned DNA testing that he conducted on saliva taken from a cigarette butt found in the burglarized trailer. Mr. Ritzline testified that the extracted DNA matched appellant's, and that the probability of such a match was one in 796. Among appellant's trial-level challenges to the DNA evidence was a claim that Mr. Ritzline was not adequately qualified to render an opinion on the DNA evidence. Appellant also objected to the general acceptance of the employed DNA testing methodology, and challenged the validity of Mr. Ritzline's statistical conclusion.
In a series of recent cases which were issued after the date of this trial, but during its pendency on appeal, the Florida Supreme Court revisited procedures for admitting DNA evidence at trial and pronounced several changes in the law which impact this case. In Brim v. State, 22 Fla. L. Weekly S45, S45, — So.2d -, -(Fla. Jan. 16, 1997), the court wrote to "clarify and emphasize that the DNA testing process consists of two distinct steps." Id. at S45, at-. The first step, the "DNA testing process," is founded upon principles of molecular biology and chemistry. Id. The second step, which is implicated in the instant ease, is the statistical step. It relies upon principles of statistics and population genetics; it is what gives "significance to a match." Id. The court, in Brim, held that the statistical analysis in a DNA comparison is independently subject to a Frye inquiry as a prerequisite to admissibility. See Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C.Cir.1923)(holding that the scientific basis for an expert opinion must, as a prerequisite to admissibility, be shown to be generally accepted in the relevant scientific community).
In this case, the trial court did not determine that the statistical methodology employed by Mr. Ritzline was generally accepted. Nor does the record clearly reveal just what statistical technique was applied. While Mr. Ritzline briefly described how the statistical data was procured, this limited explanation, absent some speculation, does not identify the statistical methodology, nor does it address its general acceptance. Because the supreme court had not yet clarified that DNA testing involves two distinct steps, rather than just one, we find that appellant's objection to the general acceptance of the DNA test conducted in this case and his subsequent challenges at trial to the validity of the statistical conclusions were sufficient to preserve this issue for our review.
We are also unable to discern from the record whether Mr. Ritzline was properly qualified to report population frequency statistics. In Murray v. State, 692 So.2d 157, 162-64 (Fla.1997), the supreme court provided some guidance concerning the necessary credentials of the expert reporting the DNA statistical and population genetics analysis, noting that it is not required that the DNA expert personally participate in the compilation of the statistical database referenced in a particular case, but that he "must, at the very least, demonstrate a sufficient knowledge of the database grounded in the study of authoritative sources."
Because the record does not reveal the statistical methodology employed in this case, or Mr. Ritzline's qualifications to present the statistical evidence, we remand for a limited evidentiary hearing similar to the one ordered in Brim. On remand, the trial court is to (1) assess Mr. Ritzline's competence to present the statistical evidence; and (2) clarify the exact methods used in calculating the DNA statistics and then conduct a Frye hearing to determine the general acceptance of the employed statistical techniques. If Mr. Ritzline is adequately qualified, and if the statistical methodology originally employed passes the Frye test, appellant's conviction is to stand. Otherwise, appellant must be afforded a new trial.
GROSS, J., concurs.
FARMER, J., dissents with opinion.
. Mr. Ritzline explained, "So, what we do is we have, we would go out and test 100 or 200 individuals and find out how often a specific type occurs like the one type of DQ Alpha 1.2,2. We would just go out and test and see how often it occurs. Each one would do that. We can multiply that together because they are inherited separately, they're not linked, and when you multiply that number together you find out what the frequency is."
. We find that the errors in this case were not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See State v. DiGuilio, 491 So.2d 1129 (Fla.1986). In this so-called "open and shut" case, appellant was acquitted of charges of theft of the items which were taken from the home but convicted of bur-glaiy. Because the DNA evidence was the only evidence directly placing appellant inside the burglarized residence, we cannot say that the admission of this evidence was not the deciding factor in appellant's conviction on the burglary charge.