Case Name: GREENE v. GULF OIL CORPORATION
Court: Court of Appeals of Georgia
Jurisdiction: Georgia
Decision Date: 1969-01-07
Citations: 119 Ga. App. 87
Docket Number: 43984
Parties: GREENE v. GULF OIL CORPORATION.
Judges: Bell, P. J., Hall, Pannell, Quillian and Whitman, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Georgia Appeals Reports
Volume: 119
Pages: 87–93

Head Matter:
43984.
GREENE v. GULF OIL CORPORATION.
Argued October 7, 1968 —
Decided January 7, 1969—
Rehearing denied January 24,1969 —
Greene & Greene, James E. Greene, for appellant.
Stone & Stone, Hugh W. Stone, John C. Lee, for appellee.

Opinion:
Eberhardt, Judge.
Is this judgment void because of the provisions of 'Code § 24-1302 relative to the continuance of a case in the justice court wherein a counter-affidavit or a verified defense has been filed? We think not.
As Judge Powell pointed out in dealing with a similar provision as to a suit on a written obligation, "The manifest legislative intent is to give to the plaintiff the right to exercise his own volition as to whether the trial shall be had at the first term or the second, subject, of course, to the right of the defendant to continue for cause. This gives to the plaintiff no undue advantage. It merely protects him against the legal surprise which may arise from the filing of the plea, and affords him the time, if he needs it, to make preparation to meet the matters set up in defense. The defendant has already had 10 days' notice of the plaintiff's demand, and is, therefore, ordinarily expected to be ready for trial at the first term. If the plaintiff is also ready, there is no need for further delay. The law may justly extend to the plaintiff, if he wishes it, further time to meet a plea just filed, without affording the defendant further delay when he is or should be ready for trial. Of course, if the defendant is not ready, and can make a proper showing for a continuance, the magistrate may grant it." Williams v. Fain & Stamps, 2 Ga. App. 136, 139 (58 SE 307).
The provisions of Code § 24-1302 relative to a continuance of the case upon the filing of the counter-affidavit or verified defense are obviously intended for the benefit of the plaintiff, not the defendant. It is the plaintiff who might complain if the magistrate refused to continue the case and rendered a judgment adverse to him.
Even if it were error to proceed with the disposition of the case at the first term, that procedure was harmless as to the defendant, and the plaintiff, making no exception, has waived it. This is particularly true under the assertion in his petition for certiorari that the defendant, having filed his plea and answer, advised the magistrate "in advance of the hearing that he would not be present for the hearing," and further, "that if he were present he would rely solely upon the facts set forth in his plea of usury." Moreover, as defendant points out in his brief to this court, no point was raised in the trial court or in the petition for certiorari relative to the failure of the justice of the peace to continue the case, and no error is enumerated in this appeal on that ground.
Generally no judgment can lawfully be rendered by the magistrate on the verified account, once a verified defense is filed contesting all or any portion of the account, without additional supporting evidence, and it is to permit the plaintiff to procure the additional needed evidence that a continuance must be granted.
However, where, as here, the defendant makes a solemn admission in his answer or plea that the plaintiff's demand, or some portion thereof, is due and correct, no proof is needed of that which is admitted. "Without offering the same in evidence, either party may avail himself of allegations or admissions made in the pleadings of the other." Code § 38-402. This is a codification of the principle announced in East Tenn. R. Co. v. Kane, 92 Ga. 187, 192 (18 SE 18, 22 LRA 315) and a number of prior cases, in which it was asserted that "certainly a party should be relieved from proving that which his adversary distinctly alleges," and this he may do "without formally tendering the [pleading] in evidence." "An admission in the pleadings . . . is to be taken as true, and the record should not be burdened by proof of the fact admitted." Lovell v. Frankum, 145 Ga. 106 (5) (88 SE 569). "A party to a suit will not be allowed to disprove an admission made in his pleadings, without withdrawing it from the record." Florida Yellow Pine Co. v. Flint River &c. Co., 140 Ga. 321 (2) (78 SE 900). Here there was no amendment, change or withdrawal of the defendant's plea and the admission of the correctness of the plaintiff's demand to the extent of $46.14 removed any issue as to that and authorized entry of a judgment for that amount without additional proof. Royal v. McPhail, 97 Ga. 457 (5) (25 SE 512); Field v. Manly, 185 Ga. 464, 466 (195 SE 406); Armour v. Lunsford, 192 Ga. 598 (2) (15 SE2d 886); Alexander Hamilton Institutes. VanLandingham, 44 Ga. App. 606 (1) (162 SE 304).
But since there was neither any admission nor proof from which it could be determined that the $1.75 was a proper and lawful charge against the defendant, and this item was specifically denied and contested as a usurious charge, the inclusion of that in the the judgment was error.
The item of $1.75, illegal as a part of the judgment, is nevertheless a separable item and this court is authorized to direct a modification of the judgment by deleting it and allowing the legal part to stand. Davis v. Davis, 206 Ga. 559 (2) (57 SE2d 673); Taylor v. Gilmore, 3 Ga. App. 93 (59 SE 325); Finley v. Southern R. Co., 5 Ga. App. 722 (64 SE 312); Lovelady v. Moss, 50 Ga. App. 652 (3) (179 SE 168); Parks v. Parks, 89 Ga. App. 725, 728 (80 SE2d 837); McLaurin v. Henry, 90 Ga. App. 864 (2) (84 SE2d 713).
Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed with direction that the sum of $1.75 be written off or the judgment be modified to exclude it. Although this amount is small and would not ordinarily be regarded as a substantial modification of the judgment, yet it is the whole of the amount that was contested in the trial court and, for that reason, we regard the writing off of that amount a substantial modification under these circumstances. Accordingly, the costs on appeal are taxed against the appellee. Equitable Life Assur. Society v. Gillam, 195 Ga. 797, 807 (25 SE2d 686); Anderson v. Beasley, 169 Ga. 720 (151 SE 360).
Judgment affirmed with direction.
Bell, P. J., Hall, Pannell, Quillian and Whitman, JJ., concur.
Deen, J., concurs specially.
Felton, C. J., and Jordan, P. J., dissent.