Case Name: Melissa HEBERT v. BLUE'S AUTO AND TRUCK PARTS
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 2001-12-28
Citations: 804 So. 2d 953
Docket Number: No. 2000 CA 2154
Parties: Melissa HEBERT v. BLUE’S AUTO AND TRUCK PARTS.
Judges: BEFORE: FITZSIMMONS, DOWNING, and LANIER JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 804
Pages: 953–960

Head Matter:
Melissa HEBERT v. BLUE’S AUTO AND TRUCK PARTS.
No. 2000 CA 2154.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, First Circuit.
Dec. 28, 2001.
Marvin Gros, Donaldsonville, LA, for plaintiff/appellant, Melissa Hebert.
Debra Parker, Baton Rouge, LA, for defendant/appellee Blue’s Auto and Truck Parts.
BEFORE: FITZSIMMONS, DOWNING, and LANIER JJ.
. The Honorable Walter I. Lanier, Jr., Judge (retired), First Circuit Court of Appeal, is serving as judge pro tempore by special appointment of the Louisiana Supreme Court.

Opinion:
J^DOWNING, Judge.
This is a workers compensation dispute. At a hearing on a motion to clarify judgment held April 28, 2000, the workers' compensation judge (WCJ) ruled that the August 28, 1999 benefit termination date memorialized in a prior judgment was a typographical error and corrected the .'ate to read August 28, 1998; a new judgment was signed to that effect. Plaintiff appealed alleging that the WCJ committed an error of law by substantively amending an original judgment.
For the following reasons, we annul and set aside the second judgment and reinstate the original judgment dated September 17, 1999.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The WCJ conducted a trial on the merits on September 8, 1999 and orally ruled on September 17, 1999 that Melissa Hebert was injured in the course and scope of her employment and was entitled to disability benefits from April 21, 1998 until August 21, 1998. The signed judgment however, reflected that Ms. Hebert would be entitled to benefits until August 28, 1999. This judgment was signed on September 17,1999. After this first judgment was signed on September 17, 1999, the notice of judgment was sent by certified mail; defendant filed for a suspensive appeal on October 13, 1999 and it was granted on November 9, 1999; bond was set at $4,000.00. We note that the record fails to reflect that the Clerk of Court ever sent notice of estimated costs as required by LSA C.C.P. art 2126. In any event, defendant apparently did not pay estimated costs because on March 2, 2000, plaintiff filed a Motion to Dismiss Appeal for failure to pay fees.
Hereafter the record becomes confusing because on March 13, 2000 the trial court entered an order setting a hearing for March 31, 2000 and also dismissing defendant's appeal pursuant to LSA C.C.P. art. 2126(e)(1). It |3appears that on April 5, 2000, the trial court again dismissed the defendant's appeal. The transcript states that a hearing was held on the motion to dismiss on March 31, 2000, although no minute entry or any other indication of a hearing is in the record. We can only assume that the March 13, 2000 order to dismiss was meant to be an order to show cause since it also set a hearing date. No appeal, however, was ever taken from the order dismissing the defendant's first appeal.
At the trial court's request, the defendant filed a Motion to Clarify the Judgment on April 4, 2000; this motion was heard on April 28, 2000, and the trial court ruled that the September 17, 1999 judgment contained an error due to a typographical mistake and did not reflect the correct period for plaintiffs disability. A judgment filed on May 4, 2000 (date signed is unknown) decrees that the correct term of disability is from April 21, 1998 until August 28, 1998, and that this judgment is to clarify and correct a typographical error and reflect the year 1998 instead of 1999, as clearly stated in the court's reasons for judgment. It is apparent that the WCJ was attempting to remedy the incorrect judgment pursuant to LSA-C.C.P. art. 1951 which provides that a final judgment may be amended to alter the phraseology and errors of calculation but not the substance thereof. Notice of this judgment was mailed on May 10, 2000.
Plaintiff appealed alleging that the trial court committed an error of law by amending the original judgment.
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff argues that there is no basis in law for the WCJ to amend a final judgment by way of a Motion to Clarify. We agree. It is well settled that when the trial judge signs a judgment and then signs another, the second 1 Judgment is an absolute nullity and without legal effect. Villaume v. Villaume, 363 So.2d 448 (La.1978).
Louisiana Civil Code article 1951 provides as follows
A final judgment may be amended by the trial court at any time, with or without notice, on its own motion or motion of any party:
1. To alter the phraseology of the judgment, but not the substance; or
2. To correct errors of calculation.
In Frisard v. Autin, 98-2637, p. 7 (La.App. 1 Cir. 12/28/99), 747 So.2d 813, 818, writ denied, 00-0126 (La.3/17/00), 756 So.2d 1145, this court outlined the methods for properly amending a judgment, as follows:
Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 1951 allows a trial court to amend a final judgment, on its own motion, (1) to alter the phraseology of the judgment, but not the substance, or (2) to correct errors of calculation. A judgment may be amended by the court where the amendment takes nothing from or adds nothing to the original judgment. However, an amendment to a judgment which adds to, subtracts from, or in any way affects the substance of the judgment, is considered a substantive amendment. Substantive amendments to judgments can be made only after a party has successfully litigated a timely application for new trial, an action for nullity, or a timely appeal. The Louisiana Supreme Court has also recognized that, on its own motion, and with the consent of the parties, the trial court may amend a judgment substantively. (Citations omitted.) (Emphasis added.)
The amendment to the original judgment of September 17, 1999 directly affected the rights of the plaintiff. Therefore, the one-year reduction in a disability period is a substantive change. See Terry v. Terry, 612 So.2d 808, 809-810 (La.App. 1 Cir.1992), Frisard v. Autin, 98-2637 at p. 7-8, 747 So.2d at 819, Starnes v. Asplundh Tree Expert Company, 94-1647, p. 6 (La.App. 1 Cir. 10/6/95), 670 So.2d 1242, 1246, and Gulfco Investment Group, Inc. v. Jones, 577 So.2d 775, 777 (La.App. 2d Cir. 1991) inter apices |¿juris. The record fails to reflect any consent of the parties to correct the judgment. As this court further stated in Frisard v. Autin, 98-2637 at p. 8, 747 So.2d at 819:
When a trial court substantively amends a judgment without recourse to the proper procedure, the amended judgment is an absolute nullity. If a judgment is an absolute nullity, such nullity may be invoked by anyone against whom it is interposed and whenever and wherever it is asserted. (Citations omitted.)
We find merit in Melissa Hebert's assignment of error raised in her Appeal. The second judgment subtracts from and affects the substance of the judgment and is therefore an absolute nullity. Frisard, 98-2637 at p. 7, 747 So.2d at 818.
The usual remedy applied by an appellate court that finds an amendment made of substance in a judgment is to annul and set aside the amending judgment and reinstate the original judgment. Alliance for Good Government, Inc. v. Jefferson Alliance for Good Government, Inc., 96-309, p. 7 (La.App. 5 Cir. 10/16/96), 683 So.2d 836, 839.
Accordingly, we annul and set aside the second judgment of May 10, 2000, and reinstate the judgment of September 17, 1999.
We are aware that this may result in an unjust outcome, but this is as the law mandates. We also recognize that plaintiff may be benefiting from a technicality; however, we must follow the law. Costs of this appeal are assessed to appellees, Blue's Auto Parts and Louisiana Workers' Compensation Corporation.
| JUDGMENT OF MAY 10, 2000 ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE; ORIGINAL JUDGMENT OF SEPTEMBER 17, 1999 REINSTATED.
FITZSIMMONS, J., concurs, and assigns reasons.
LANIER, J., concurs and will assign reasons.
. We note an apparent conflict between the First and Second Circuits and the Third and Fifth Circuits. In United Companies Financial Corp. v. Austin, 618 So.2d 7 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1993), the Third Circuit found that the trial court's amendment of the judgment to reflect ownership of a certain lot 27 rather that lot 26 "cured a typographical error and did not constitute a substantive change." United Companies, 618 So.2d at 9. In Burmaster Tractor and Truck Service v. Degeorge, 99-28, 99-29, p. 8 (La.App. 5 Cir. 8/31/99), 742 So.2d 974, 978, the Fifth Circuit found that the "substance of the judgment" was not af fected in a workers' compensation case where the workers' compensation judge amended its judgment to award an offset under LSA-R.S. 23:1225(A) after it mistakenly entered judgment awarding the offset under LSA-R.S. 23:1225(C).