Case Name: Lawrence STUFFLEBEAN, Appellant, v. The OHIO CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, a foreign corporation and Prudential Property and Casualty Insurance Company, a foreign corporation, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1994-11-16
Citations: 645 So. 2d 136
Docket Number: No. 94-2577
Parties: Lawrence STUFFLEBEAN, Appellant, v. The OHIO CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, a foreign corporation and Prudential Property and Casualty Insurance Company, a foreign corporation, Appellee.
Judges: DELL, C.J., and HERSEY and KLEIN, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 645
Pages: 136–137

Head Matter:
Lawrence STUFFLEBEAN, Appellant, v. The OHIO CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, a foreign corporation and Prudential Property and Casualty Insurance Company, a foreign corporation, Appellee.
No. 94-2577.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
Nov. 16, 1994.
Ronald P. Gossett of Gossett & Gossett, P.A., Hollywood, for appellant.
Gregory T. Anderson of Billing, Cochran, Heath, Lyles & Mauro, West Palm Beach, for appellees.

Opinion:
ON MOTION TO DISMISS
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff has filed a notice of non-final appeal from an order granting defendant's motion for partial summary judgment holding that under the doctrine of collateral estoppel, the jury verdict in another case is determinative of the negligence and comparative negligence of the parties in this case.
Plaintiff argues that this order is appeal-able because it determines "the issue of liability in favor of a party seeking affirmative relief," and is therefore appealable under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.130(a)(3)(C)(iv). Defendant appellees have moved to dismiss the appeal on the ground that this order was not "in favor of a party seeking affirmative relief." We agree.
The jury verdict in the other case found plaintiff 65% at fault in causing the accident. Plaintiff opposed the application of collateral estoppel. This order, therefore, was not in favor of plaintiff, who is the only party seeking affirmative relief in this case. We therefore dismiss the appeal.
DELL, C.J., and HERSEY and KLEIN, JJ., concur.
. This is not a situation in which we can relinquish jurisdiction for the trial court to enter a final judgment, because other claims are still pending in the trial court.