Case Name: Joy Marie FRIEDMAN, Petitioner, Appellant, v. COMMISSIONER OF PUBLIC SAFETY, Respondent
Court: Minnesota Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Minnesota
Decision Date: 1991-06-07
Citations: 473 N.W.2d 828
Docket Number: No. C9-89-1708
Parties: Joy Marie FRIEDMAN, Petitioner, Appellant, v. COMMISSIONER OF PUBLIC SAFETY, Respondent.
Judges: SIMONETT and GARDEBRING, JJ., took no part in the decision or consideration of this matter.
Reporter: North Western Reporter 2d
Volume: 473
Pages: 828–848

Head Matter:
Joy Marie FRIEDMAN, Petitioner, Appellant, v. COMMISSIONER OF PUBLIC SAFETY, Respondent.
No. C9-89-1708.
Supreme Court of Minnesota.
June 7, 1991.
As Clarified on Petition for Rehearing Aug. 15, 1991.
William R. Kennedy, Mark D. Fiddler and Peter Gorman, Asst. Hennepin County Public Defenders, Minneapolis, for appellant.
■ Hubert H. Humphrey, III, Atty. Gen., Joseph Plumer, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., Public Safety Div., St. Paul, for respondent.

Opinion:
YETKA, Justice.
On March 12, 1989, the Commissioner of Public Safety issued to Joy Marie Friedman a notice and order of revocation of her driver's license for 1 year for refusing to take an implied consent breath test. Friedman sought judicial review, but the revocation was sustained in an order by the district court. The district court was affirmed by the Minnesota Court of Appeals. 455 N.W.2d 93. We reverse.
On the evening of March 12, 1989, Joy Friedman was arrested by a Minneapolis police officer for DWI following her failure of a preliminary breath test. The officer took Friedman to the police station for an intoxilyzer test. They were forced to wait 25 minutes because the testing unit was in use. Friedman asked what her rights were and whether she could consult an attorney. The officer did not allow her to contact an attorney.
During the wait, another officer took Friedman into a video taping room. He questioned her on tape. The arresting officer read the implied consent advisory to Friedman. The advisory stated that Friedman's driver's license would be revoked for 1 year if she refused the chemical test for blood alcohol, that the refusal or the results of the test would be used against her at trial, and that she had a right to consult an attorney after testing. The officer read the advisory three times. Friedman told him that she didn't understand the advisory and that she had already been tested in the squad car. The police took Friedman's response as a refusal to be tested, and her driver's license was revoked for 1 year pursuant to Minn.Stat. § 169.123, subd. 4 (1990).
The issue before this court is: When does the right to counsel in a DWI proceeding attach?
I.
The right to counsel is a long-established principle in this nation. Under the common law of England, those accused of felonies had no right to retain counsel. See W. Beaney, The Right to Counsel in American Courts 8-9 (1955). In 1695, Parliament enacted a statute which permitted those accused of treason to retain counsel, but for all other felonies, there was no such provision until 1836. Id. at 9. Illogically, for minor offenses, including libel, perjury, battery, and conspiracy, counsel was permitted. Id. at 8. Blackstone denounced the English rule as inhumane. 4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries *355 (cited in Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 60-61, 53 S.Ct. 55, 60-61, 77 L.Ed. 158 (1932)).
The American colonies rejected the harsh English rule. Even before the federal Constitution was adopted, the constitutions of Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York and Pennsylvania granted the accused in criminal proceedings the right to retain counsel. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 61-62, 53 S.Ct. 55, 61-62, 77 L.Ed. 158 (1932). Delaware, North Carolina, South Carolina, Virginia, Connecticut, Georgia, and Rhode Island early in their history adopted constitutional or statutory provisions guaranteeing the right to counsel. Id. at 62-64, 53 S.Ct. at 61-62. When James Madison drafted the federal Bill of Rights, he drew upon existing provisions in various state constitutions. Force, State "Bills of Rights": A Case of Neglect and the Need for a Renaissance, 3 Val. U.L.Rev. 125, 136 (1969).
There is no history of the intentions surrounding the adoption of the right to counsel embodied in the sixth amendment of the United States Constitution. The sixth amendment provides: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have the assistance of counsel for his defense." U.S. Const, amend. VI. Although there was debate over other amendments, including religious freedom, free speech and free press, and the right to bear arms, there was no such debate over the clause granting assistance of counsel in criminal proceedings. See I Annals of Congress 756 (proposing right to counsel), 757-60 (religious freedom), 731-49 (free speech and free press), 749-56 (right to bear arms) (1834). It may be that the federal courts were perceived to have jurisdiction over only a small number of criminal cases. W. Beaney, supra, at 25. The extent of the right to counsel thus was left implicitly to be determined by the states.
State courts always have had the power to interpret their own constitutions. Before the fourteenth amendment was adopted, state courts determined questions of individual rights exclusively according to state constitutions. See Fleming & Nord-by, The Minnesota Bill of Rights: "Wrapt in the Old Miasmal Mist", 7 Hamline L.Rev. 51, 56 (1984).
In recent years, as the United States Supreme Court has retrenched on Bill of Rights issues, state courts have begun to interpret expansively the rights guaranteed under their own state constitutions. Commentators have noted and encouraged the trend. See, e.g., Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 Harv.L.Rev. 489 (1977); Countryman, Why a State Bill of Rights?, 45 Wash.L.Rev. 454 (1970); Falk, The State Constitution: A More Than "Adequate" Non Federal Ground, 61 Calif.L.Rev. 273 (1973); Fleming & Nordby, The Minnesota Bill of Rights: "Wrapt in the Old Mias-mal Mist", 7 Hamline L.Rev. 51 (1984); Force, State "Bills of Rights": A Case of Neglect and the Need for a Renaissance, 3 Val.U.L.Rev. 125 (1969); Linde, First Things First: Rediscovering the States' Bills of Rights, 9 U.Balt.L.Rev. 379 (1980); Morris, New Horizons for a State Bill of Rights, 45 Wash.L.Rev. 474 (1970).
State courts must follow the United States Supreme Court in matters of federal constitutional law. They are free to interpret their own law, however, so as to provide greater protection for individual rights than that which the federal Constitution minimally mandates. Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 81,100 S.Ct. 2035, 2040, 64 L.Ed.2d 741 (1980). Rulings which rest on adequate independent state grounds are not subject to review by the United States Supreme Court. Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 125-26, 65 S.Ct. 459, 462-64, 89 L.Ed. 789 (1945) (United States Supreme Court's "only power over state judgments is to correct them to the extent that they incorrectly adjudge federal rights").
In their expansion of the rights of individuals, states have been particularly attentive to the protection of those citizens accused of crimes. The United States Su preme Court has recognized the right of a state, under its own law, "to impose greater restrictions on police activity than those this Court holds to be necessary upon federal constitutional standards." Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 719, 95 S.Ct. 1215, 1219, 43 L.Ed.2d 570 (1975). A number of states have interpreted their own constitutions to grant a more expansive right to counsel to those accused of crimes than the right afforded by the sixth amendment of the federal Constitution.
Minnesota has a long tradition of assuring the right to counsel. Article I, section 6 of the Minnesota Constitution requires that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to have the assistance of counsel in his defense." Minn. Const, art. I, § 6. Minnesota Stat utes section 481.10, which has been the law in this state since 1887, provides:
All officers or persons having in their custody a person restrained of liberty upon any charge or cause alleged, except in cases where imminent danger of escape exists, shall admit any resident attorney retained by or in behalf of the person restrained, or whom the restrained person may desire to consult, to a private interview at the place of custody. Such custodians, upon request of the person restrained, as soon as practicable, and before other proceedings shall be had, shall notify any attorney residing in the county of the request for a consultation with the attorney. Every officer or person who shall violate any provision of this section shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and, in addition to the punishment prescribed therefor shall forfeit $100 to the person aggrieved, to be recovered in a civil action.
Minn.Stat. § 481.10 (1990). In State v. Schabert, 218 Minn. 1, 9, 15 N.W.2d 585, 589 (1944), we construed the statute and held that interrogation of an accused person was a "proceeding."
II.
We turn now to our case law in the area of DWI proceedings. The respondent relies on State v. Palmer, 291 Minn. 302, 191 N.W.2d 188 (1971), where we held that, under the Minnesota Constitution, the right to counsel does not extend to a DWI license revocation because of the civil or administrative nature of the proceeding. Id. at 306, 191 N.W.2d at 190. However, we subsequently questioned the validity of the "civil" label of the DWI license revocation proceeding in Prideaux v. State, Dep't of Public Safety, 310 Minn. 405, 247 N.W.2d 385 (1976):
The bases of all these [cases denying the right to counsel], including our decision in Palmer, have been that driver's license revocation is a civil proceeding, and, as a corollary, that the taking of a chemical test is not a "critical stage" in a criminal prosecution. Upon reflection, we have some doubt as to the continuing vitality of these cases.
Id. at 408-09, 247 N.W.2d at 388 (footnote omitted).
We then articulated in Prideaux three reasons why the "civil" label was subject to question. First, a driver's license revocation for failure to submit to chemical testing is "necessarily and inextricably intertwined with an undeniably criminal proceeding — namely, prosecution for driving while under the influence of an alcoholic beverage." Id. at 409, 247 N.W.2d at 388. Second, the revocation of a driver's license has, in most instances, the same impact as the traditional criminal sanctions of a fine and imprisonment. Thus, "[w]e cannot allow a 'civil' label to obscure the quasi-criminal consequences of revocation to the ordinary citizen." Id. at 410, 247 N.W.2d at 389. Third, we noted that the choice of whether to submit to the chemical testing procedures is a very important one to the individual driver. A driver must make a critical and binding decision regarding chemical testing, a decision that will affect him or her in subsequent proceedings. Therefore, when asked to submit to a chemical test, a driver finds him- or herself at a "critical stage" in the DWI process. Id. at 411, 247 N.W.2d at 389-90. However, we did not have to reach the constitutional issues in Prideaux, finding instead that the Minnesota Legislature, pursuant to Minn.Stat. § 481.10, did not intend a blanket denial of a right to counsel. Id. at 414, 247 N.W.2d at 391.
Subsequent to Prideaux, we reached the right-to-counsel issue in Nyflot v. Commissioner of Public Safety, 369 N.W.2d 512 (Minn.1985). We held that the decision of whether to submit to chemical testing was not a "critical stage" in the pretrial investigation. Thus, no right to counsel attached at that point. Id. at 515-16. However, Nyflot was decided under federal constitutional law. We must now confront directly whether Minnesota constitutional history dictates a different result. Because we do not find the Nyflot analysis persuasive under our constitution, we conclude that article I, section 6 requires that the right to counsel attaches at the chemical testing stage.
III.
We recognize that the purpose of the right to counsel is to protect the lay person who "lacks both the skill and knowledge" to defend him- or herself. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69, 53 S.Ct. 55, 64, 77 L.Ed. 158 (1932). As the United States Supreme Court explained in United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 93 S.Ct. 2568, 37 L.Ed.2d 619 (1973), the expansion of the right to counsel is necessary "when new contexts appear presenting the same dangers that gave birth initially to the right itself." Id. at 311, 93 S.Ct. at 2574. As we noted in Prideaux, such a context arises in DWI proceedings; the technology involved in the DWI testing procedure makes it "inextricably intertwined with an undeniably criminal proceeding." 310 Minn, at 409, 247 N.W.2d at 388.
As the Supreme Court stated in Ash, the test for whether the defendant needed assistance of counsel is "whether the accused required aid in coping with legal problems or assistance in meeting his adversary." 413 U.S. at 313, 93 S.Ct. at 2575. In defining what constitutes a "critical stage" in the proceeding, the Court held that it includes "those pretrial procedures that would impair defense on the merits if the accused is required to proceed without counsel." Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 122, 95 S.Ct. 854, 867, 43 L.Ed.2d 54 (1975). We adopt this broad definition as we now interpret the right to counsel set forth in the Minnesota Constitution. We believe that a driver who has been stopped for a possible DWI violation and has been asked to submit to a chemical test is at a "critical stage" in DWI proceedings, thus triggering the right to counsel.
The implied consent situation usually begins with a police officer requesting that the accused perform either a preliminary breath test or field sobriety test. Failure of either test can result in the issuance of a ticket or tab charge. Though the police could issue a ticket at this initial confrontation, one is not usually issued until after the implied consent advisory has been recited and the chemical test performed (or not performed if the accused declines to submit).
It was at this point in the process that Friedman requested, and was denied, an opportunity to consult her lawyer. As the facts in this case indicate, she initially agreed to take the preliminary breath test, failed it, and was taken to the police station. She was in police custody and was questioned on video tape. She was told that she would be tested again. When she asked why she had to be tested again, the officer made no attempt to explain. Another officer then read the implied consent advisory. When Friedman expressed confusion about the advisory, requesting a consultation with her attorney, her confused response was deemed a refusal to take the test.
In the facts before this court, the driver was confused about the legal ramifications of her decision. As is often the case, the driver at this critical stage looked to the police for guidance. An attorney, not a police officer, is the appropriate source of legal advice. An attorney functions as an objective advisor who could explain the alternative choices. We think the Minnesota Constitution protects the individual's right to consult counsel when confronted with this decision. Thus, to the extent that Minn.Stat. § 169.123 denies access to counsel under these circumstances, we find that it violates Minn. Const, art. I, § 6.
As noted earlier, other courts have taken a similar view, finding a state constitutional basis for expanding the right to counsel at the chemical testing stage of a DWI proceeding. We agree with the Oregon Supreme Court's decision in State v. Spencer, 305 Or. 59, 750 P.2d 147 (1988), which gave a more expansive reading than federal law to its state right-to-counsel provision, Or. Const, art. I, § 11. We find persuasive the following statement by that court:
A person taken into formal custody by the police on a potentially criminal charge is confronted with the full legal power of the state, regardless of whether a formal charge has been filed. Where such custody is complete, neither the lack of a selected charge nor the possibility that the police will think better of the entire matter changes the fact that the arrested person is, at that moment, ensnared in a "criminal prosecution." The evanescent nature of the evidence the police seek to obtain may justify substantially limiting the time in which the person may exercise his or her Article I, section 11, right, but it does not justify doing away with it.
305 Or. at 74, 750 P.2d at 155-56.
As the dissent said in Nyflot:
If forcing an individual to a police station alone is an intrusion on one's dignity, holding someone incommunicado on top of it makes the intrusion all the more severe.
This grave intrusion on an individual's dignity must be weighed against the state's interests. The state claims that denying a right to counsel will decrease the number of refusals to take the chemical test and increase the number of DWI convictions. Even if consultation with an attorney does increase the number of refusals, those who refuse lose their licenses for a year. Minn.Stat. § 169.123, subd. 4 (1984). Either way, the driver is severely punished and the state relatively unharmed. Even without the chemical test, the driver can still be convicted of driving while intoxicated.

The person suspected of drunk driving is generally an average citizen in a totally new, confusing, and uncomfortable situation. One's dignity, the dignity of a free citizen to determine one's rights and obligations through consultation with a trusted counselor rather than one's accusers, is gravely intruded upon. This grave intrusion is balanced against, at best, a weak and ill-supported state interest. The state has failed to show that the intrusion is reasonable; thus, denying counsel is constitutionally invalid.
Nyflot, 369 N.W.2d at 521 (Yetka, J., dissenting).
We recognize that drunk driving is a serious problem, but we do not believe it justifies cancelling out the protection offered by over 100 years of precedent in Minnesota.
In the years between our decision in Pri-deaux in 1976 and Nyflot in 1985, there is no credible evidence that law enforcement was inhibited in any way by a person demanding the right to counsel. The prosecutor in Nyflot argued that he believed that there were fewer defendants consenting to the alcohol chemical test than before Nyflot, but there was no evidence offered that there were fewer convictions; nor is there evidence that the drunk-driving problem has diminished after Nyflot. Similarly, there was no evidence presented here that the number of intoxicated drivers on Minnesota roads has decreased since Ny-flot. It is strange logic that concludes that there will be more drunk drivers on the road because a driver can consult counsel before taking a test rather than after taking it.
If the objective of DWI prosecution is to get drunk drivers off the highways, into treatment, and on the way to sobriety, an attorney can play a very important role. A good lawyer is not only interested in protecting the client's legal rights, but also in the well-being and mental and physical health of the client. A lawyer has an affirmative duty to be a counselor to his client. See Minn.R.Prof.Conduct 2.1 (1985) ("In rendering advice, a lawyer may refer not only to law but to other considerations such as moral, economic, social and political factors, that may be relevant to the client's situation.") The lawyer may be able to persuade a problem drinker to seek treatment. The prosecution, on the other hand, may be concerned only with getting statistics and convictions. We have ample evidence that a conviction alone does not solve the problem because we read almost daily in the newspapers of long-time inebriates, convicted again and again, who continue to drive and thus maim and kill their innocent victims. The intent should be, in our opinion, not only to convict, but also to get drunk drivers off the roads. In addition to education, there are numerous steps the legislature can take to mitigate the problem, including confiscation of the driver's license, the car plates, or even the automobile itself.
The rights of all citizens embodied in our Minnesota Bill of Rights, however, are so important that they cannot be overridden for temporary expediency in building statistics. Of all those rights embodied in our Bill of Rights, the two most fundamental are the right to counsel and the right to trial by jury. Without them, there can be no constitutional rights at all. Every citizen has learned at an early age that whenever one is in trouble, the first resort should be to contact one's attorney and seek advice. We thus repeat the age-old rule of law that was embodied in our state constitution: The defendant shall have the right to counsel.
However, we also recognize that the evanescent nature of the evidence in DWI cases requires that the accused be given a limited amount of time in which to contact counsel:
Consistent with this opinion, any person who is required to decide whether he will submit to a chemical test shall have the right to consult with a lawyer of his own choosing before making that decision, provided that such a consultation does not unreasonably delay the administration of the test. The person must be informed of this right, and the police officers must assist in its vindication. The right to counsel will be considered vindicated if the person is provided with a telephone prior to testing and given a reasonable time to contact and talk with counsel. If counsel cannot be contacted within a reasonable time, the person may be required to make a decision regarding testing in the absence of counsel.
Prideaux, 310 Minn. at 421, 247 N.W.2d at 394. Thus, we hold that, under the right-to-counsel clause in article I, section 6 of the Minnesota Constitution, an individual has the right, upon request, to a reasonable opportunity to obtain legal advice before deciding whether to submit to chemical testing.
IV.
The dissent asserts that it is inappropriate for judges to vote to overrule the major constitutional decision in Nyflot. Nyflot was based on federal constitutional grounds. What the dissent ignores is that Nyflot itself ignored the reasoning and precedent of the Prideaux case decided only 9 years earlier. The dissent also fails to recognize the rapidly growing precedent embodied in recent decisions returning initiative to the individual states in protecting individual liberties through state courts interpreting their own state constitutions. This is a return to the climate that existed at the time the United States Bill of Rights was first adopted. Where the federal courts and the federal criminal justice system have eroded the federal Bill of Rights, it is appropriate for judges of this court to consider the protection provided by our own state bill of rights. The United States Supreme Court has, in effect, encouraged the states to expand their own bills of rights. See Pruneyard, supra. This court has historically protected the rights of Minnesota citizens; our decision today is no startling and unjustified shift by this court. We have had a statute since 1877 recognizing the important right to counsel. Today's decision simply reinforces that ancient trend.
What has changed since Nyflot is not the membership of the court, but the development of state constitutional law. State courts are returning to local protection of individual liberties as intended by the colo nists before there was a United States Supreme Court. Whether the state constitution has language similar to that of the federal Constitution or not, states are free to interpret their own constitutions. See State v. Fuller, 374 N.W.2d 722, 726 (Minn.1985).
The dissent relies on State v. Hamm, 423 N.W.2d 379 (Minn.1988), for the proposition that contemporaneous history is a legitimate ground for interpreting the state constitution. Interestingly, today's dissenter dissented in State v. Hamm. In Hamm, this court found justification for interpreting the state constitution differently from the way the United States Supreme Court interpreted the federal Constitution. We believe that history supports our interpretation today of the right to counsel.
We reiterate these basic reasons for our decision in this case:
1. Since very early statehood, Minnesota has recognized the right to counsel as a fundamental right incorporated in the ancient statute adopted in 1877 and quoted in this opinion.
2. In Palmer, Prideaux, and Nyflot, this court has struggled with the question of what type of proceeding a DWI stop is and when right to counsel attaches. This struggle has occurred over a period of a quarter century. This case should help resolve with finality that struggle.
3. Prideaux came closest to defining this court's position on this subject in 1976. Even though our decision was based on statutory grounds, the dictum in that case also made clear what the court felt of the constitutional rights of defendants.
4. Nyflot was decided under the United States Constitution as this court thought the right to counsel would be defined by the United States Supreme Court, not under the Minnesota Constitution.
5. We hold today that, because of Minnesota's lengthy and historic recognition of human rights, human dignity, and the procedural protection for the rights of the criminally accused, detention of drivers suspected of driving while under the influence is a criminal proceeding invoking the right to counsel.
6. We do not disagree with the proposition that drunk driving is a very serious social as well as legal problem. The resolution, however, does not lie in eroding and weakening the Minnesota Bill of Rights and resorting to the law of the Old West. Nor will the solution be impeded by allowing an accused to consult counsel; rather the opposite is the more likely. It is altogether fitting that our constitution be interpreted by this state's highest court to offer greater safeguards of fundamental rights for Minnesota citizens than the protection offered citizens of the United States under the federal Constitution.
7. The legislature has the authority to pass, and in fact has passed, legislation making the penalty for refusal to submit to chemical testing nearly as serious as conviction for the offense itself. The availability of an attorney early in the process can aid in the removal of drunk drivers from the highway and assist in their rehabilitation. Certainly, no laws seem to have worked heretofore to deter the problem of drunk driving. We believe that the legal profession is uniquely qualified to aid in resolving the problem. Other professions and occupations deal with specific objectives of their jobs. It is the legal profes sion, with its broad educational base stemming from the Constitution itself, its code of professional responsibiity, and its advice to individual citizens in every field of endeavor, that will be looked to with increasing frequency to solve serious social and economic as well as legal problems. We challenge them further with this decision.
8. The dissent points out that this decision affords those charged with DWI privileges given no other accused. That is oversimplification and simply not true. In the case of a DWI, the chemical tests are more than just a search. The act itself could produce the evidence leading to conviction before any trial is even necessary.
Thus, while we hold that the point at which an individual is asked by law enforcement officials to undergo a blood alcohol test constitutes a critical stage in the criminal process and that article I, section 6 of the Minnesota Constitution guarantees an individual in such a situation the limited right to counsel within a reasonable time before submitting to testing, our holding does not justify the sweeping conclusions alleged by the dissent of the Chief Justice.
We have been required to decide a difficult question in a specific situation and have done so. We have held that a "ticket or tab charge" is the functional equivalent of a complaint in a DWI setting, but our holding does not go beyond that. It is unnecessary to speculate or decide issues not before us.
9. We believe that to hold differently could possibly lead to attempts in the future to decriminalize other serious public offenses and redefine them as civil rather than criminal and thus deny the right to counsel and a right to jury trial. Such denial would further erode fundamental rights that have been acquired over the centuries. Once erosion of these rights begins, where will it end?
We decide this case solely on the basis of article I, section 6 of our Minnesota Constitution, and not on any provision of either federal law or the United States Constitution. The trial court and the court of appeals are reversed.
SIMONETT and GARDEBRING, JJ., took no part in the decision or consideration of this matter.
. The trend for states to interpret the provisions of their own constitutions has become so pervasive that the National Association of Attorneys General began in December 1987 to publish the State Constitutional Law Bulletin, which reports monthly on cases decided pursuant to state constitutions.
. See, e.g., Roman v. State, 570 P.2d 1235 (Alaska 1977) (rights of parolee); Zehrung v. State, 569 P.2d 189 (Alaska 1977), modified on reh'g, 573 P.2d 858 (1978) (search incident to misdemeanor, bail rights); Davenport v. State, 568 P.2d 939 (Alaska 1977) (rights of parolee); Scott v. State, 519 P.2d 774 (Alaska 1974) (discovery power of prosecutor); Baker v. City of Fairbanks, 471 P.2d 386 (Alaska 1970) (right to trial by jury for minor offenses, overruling Knudsen v. City of Anchorage, 358 P.2d 375 (Alaska 1960)); State v. Bolt, 142 Ariz. 260, 689 P.2d 519 (1984) (exclusionary rule); People v. Anderson, 6 Cal.3d 628, 100 Cal.Rptr. 152, 493 P.2d 880 (1972) (death penalty is "cruel and unusual" punishment in violation of state constitution); People v. Paulsen, 198 Colo. 458, 601 P.2d 634 (1979) (double jeopardy); contra United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 98 S.Ct. 2187, 57 L.Ed.2d 65 (1978); People v. Clyne, 189 Colo. 412, 541 P.2d 71 (search incident to traffic arrest was violation of statute); State v. Santiago, 53 Haw. 254, 492 P.2d 657 (1971) (statement obtained in violation of Miranda may not be used for impeachment); State v. Pokini, 45 Haw. 295, 367 P.2d 499 (1961) (state constitution mandates exclusionary rule); State v. Mullen, 216 N.W.2d 375 (Iowa 1974) (entrapment defense on statutory grounds); State v. Sklar, 317 A.2d 160 (Me.1974) (state constitution permits trial by jury for all criminal prosecutions, not just "serious" violations); contra Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 88 S.Ct. 1444, 20 L.Ed.2d 491 (1968) (federal Constitution requires trial by jury for "serious", but not "petty" offenses); State v. Collins, 297 A.2d 620 (Me.1972) (burden of proof in determining voluntariness of confession); District Attorney for the Suffolk Dist. v. Watson, 381 Mass. 648, 411 N.E.2d 1274 (1980) (death penalty violates state constitution); People v. Beavers, 393 Mich. 554, 227 N.W.2d 511 (1974), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 878, 96 S.Ct. 152, 46 L.Ed.2d 111 (1975) (monitoring conversation); People v. White, 390 Mich. 245, 212 N.W.2d 222 (1973) (double jeopardy); People v. Turner, 390 Mich. 7, 210 N.W.2d 336 (1973) (entrapment defense); People v. Sundling, 153 Mich.App. 277, 395 N.W.2d 308 (1986) (search and seizure); State v. Granberry, 491 S.W.2d 528 (Mo.1973) (overruling State v. Nimrod, 484 S.W.2d 475 (Mo.1972)) (use of prior inconsistent statements as substantive evidence); State v. Johnson, 221 Mont. 503, 719 P.2d 1248 (1986) (right to counsel); State v. Hogg, 118 N.H. 262, 385 A.2d 844 (1978) (double jeopardy); State v. Phinney, 117 N.H. 145, 370 A.2d 1153 (1977) (burden of proof in determining voluntariness of confessions); State v. Mollica, 114 N.J. 329, 554 A.2d 1315 (1989) (search and seizure standard); State v. Johnson, 68 NJ. 349, 346 A.2d 66 (1975) (consent searches); State v. Burkholder, 12 Ohio St.3d 205, 466 N.E.2d 176, cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1062, 105 S.Ct. 545, 83 L.Ed.2d 432 (1984) (exclusionary rule in probation revocation); State v. Caraher, 293 Or. 741, 653 P.2d 942 (1982); State v. Benoit, 417 A.2d 895 (R.I.1980) (search of impounded vehicle); State v. Opperman, 247 N.W.2d 673 (S.D.1976) (vehicle inventory searches); Parham v. Municipal Court of Sioux Falls, 86 S.D. 531, 199 N.W.2d 501 (1972) (trial by jury for petty offenses); State v. Becker, 130 Vt. 153, 287 A.2d 580 (1972) (trial by jury for minor offenses); State v. Simpson, 95 Wash.2d 170, 622 P.2d 1199 (1980) (defendants have automatic standing under state constitution to challenge search or seizure of contraband or stolen goods); contra United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 100 S.Ct. 2547, 65 L.Ed.2d 619 (1980).
. See, e.g., Blue v. State, 558 P.2d 636 (Alaska 1977) (right to counsel at pre-indictment lineup); Roberts v. State, 458 P.2d 340 (Alaska 1969) (right to counsel at taking of handwriting samples); Nichols v. State, 425 P.2d 247 (Alaska 1967) (right to counsel on application to vacate or set aside sentence); State v. Stoddard, 206 Conn. 157, 537 A.2d 446 (1988) (police are required under state constitution to inform suspect in custody of attorney's efforts to reach him); Bryan v. State, 571 A.2d 170 (Del.1990) (failure of police to inform defendant his attorney was on telephone was denial of right to counsel as guaranteed by state constitution); Haliburton v. State, 514 So.2d 1088 (Fla.1987) (failure of police to inform defendant his attorney was at stationhouse was violation of state constitution); People v. Jackson, 391 Mich. 323, 217 N.W.2d 22 (1974) (requiring counsel at photo lineup and rejecting United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 93 S.Ct. 2568, 37 L.Ed.2d 619 (1973)); People v. Skinner, 52 N.Y.2d 24, 436 N.Y.S.2d 207, 417 N.E.2d 501 (1980) (suspect cannot waive right to counsel unless in the presence of counsel); State v. Spencer, 305 Or. 59, 750 P.2d 147 (1988) (driver arrested for DWI has right to counsel under state constitution before deciding to submit to breath test); Commonwealth v. Richman, 458 Pa. 167, 320 A.2d 351 (1974) (right to counsel attaches at arrest); State v. Welch, 135 Vt. 316, 376 A.2d 351 (1977) (right to counsel attaches before chemical test); State v. Fitzsimmons, 93 Wash.2d 436, 610 P.2d 893 (1980) (police denial of access to appointed counsel was violation of right to counsel as guaranteed by state law).
. In State v. Hershberger, 462 N.W.2d 393 (Minn.1990), we approved use of the terms "compelling state interest" and "least restrictive alternative," although they arose from federal doctrine, as embodying concepts that provided guidance as we examined our state constitution. We likewise make use of "critical stage" analysis as we now interpret our Minn. Const, art. I, § 6.
. The ticket or tab charge is the functional equivalent of a complaint. If the prosecution has not filed a complaint by the time of the defendant's first appearance in court under a gross misdemeanor DWI, the court administrator's office enters on the record a brief statement of the offense charged. "This brief statement serves as a substitute for the complaint and is referred to as a 'tab charge.' " M. Costello, R. Frase & S. Simon, Minnesota Misdemeanors and Moving Traffic Violations 48-49 (1990).
. This court has overruled precedent for reasons other than those articulated by the dissent. See, e.g., Hapka v. Paquin Farms, 458 N.W.2d 683 (Minn.1990) (overruling Superwood Corp. v. Siempelkamp Corp., 311 N.W.2d 159 (Minn.1981) in regard to UCC pre-emption of the law of negligence in cases involving damage to other property); Giese v. Green Giant Co., 426 N.W.2d 879 (Minn.1988) (declining to follow Patton v. Thompson Elec. Co., 420 N.W.2d 596 (Minn.1988), in regard to the amount of temporary partial disability compensation where an employee is working at a reduced-wage job); Herrly v. Muzik, 374 N.W.2d 275 (Minn.1985) (declining to follow Holmquist v. Miller, 367 N.W.2d 468 (Minn.1985), and Meany v. Newell, 367 N.W.2d 472 (Minn.1985), regarding the preemption of the dram shop field by the Civil Damages Act); Wakefield v. Federated Mutual Insurance Co., 344 N.W.2d 849 (Minn.1984) (declining to adhere to Wasche v. Milbank Mutual Insurance Co., 268 N.W.2d 913 (Minn.1978), regarding the stacking of priority level insurance coverage).
. Former Chief Justice Popovich presided over oral arguments, over the court conference in this case, and participated in the deliberations of this court when it arrived at a decision. Because the case was not released for filing until after he left office, his participation cannot officially be recorded in this matter.