Case Name: JOHNSON v. STATE
Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1923-04-04
Citations: 252 S.W. 554
Docket Number: No. 7512
Parties: JOHNSON v. STATE.
Judges: 
Reporter: South Western Reporter
Volume: 252
Pages: 554–558

Head Matter:
JOHNSON v. STATE.
(No. 7512.)
(Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
April 4, 1923.
Rehearing Denied June 20, 1923.
Order Refusing Second Motion for Rehearing June 29, 1923.)
1. Criminal law &wkey;>603(I I) —Application for continuance for absent witness held properly denied for not showing diligence.
An application for continuance for absent witness, which showed that the process for the witness was for a former term than that of the trial and stated no facts excusing lack of further diligence, was properly denied.
2. Criminal law <&wkey;598(2) — Burden on applicant for continuance to show diligence In attempt to secure witness.
The burden is on the applicant for continuance for absent witness to establish diligence in support of the application.
3. Criminal law <&wkey;598(8) — Subpcena not sufficient diligence to secure witness if attachment is available.
The diligence • is not sufficient to entitle applicant the continuance for absent witness if only a subpoena was applied for when the law authorized attachment.
4. Criminal law <&wkey;368(2) — Statement by defendant’s wife held admissible as res gestae in prosecution for killing another.
In prosecution of defendant for shooting and killing his wife’s aunt shortly after he had shot and wounded his wife, testimony of a witness, who lived in the same house as did defendant and wife, that the morning after defendant and wife had had some trouble she saw the wife returning from an errand crying, and witness entered the house to talk with her and- on coming out saw defendant with a gun and in reply to his inquiry as to what was the matter replied, “Julia said you drew a gun on • her,” was admissible as res gestas; the evidence showing that the wife was shot while leaving the house shortly after, and that as defendant then leaving was followed by the aunt defendant turned, approached, and shot the aunt.
5. Witnesses <&wkey;52(5) — Evidence of wife’s statement concerning husband admissible if res gestee.
While the wife may not be called by the state as a witness in the prosecution of her husband for killing another, yet' statements made by her become admissible, when shown by other witnesses, if res gestee.
6. Criminal law <&wkey;363 — Rule as to time of res gestee stated.
An approved rule as to res gestse is that there is no limit of time in'which the res ges-tee are arbitrarily confined but they vary with each particular case and need not be coincident as to time if they are joined by the existing feeling which exists, without break or let-down, from the moment of the event they elicit; if the acts and declarations appear to spring out of the transaction, if they elucidate it, if they are voluntary and spontaneous, and if they are made at a time so near it as reasonably to preclude the idea of deliberate design, then they are to be regarded as contemporaneous, and are admissible.
7. Homicide <@=>338(()— Error, If any, in admitting evidence of statement by defendant’s wife, held harmless.
Where the evidence showed that shortly after defendant was told that his wife had stated he had drawn a gun on her he shot her and immediately thereafter shot and killed her aunt, any error in admitting evidence of the wife’s statement as to the gun was harmless in prosecution for killing the aunt.
On Motion for Rehearing.
8. Homicide <&wkey;d 94 — Evidence of wife’s statement concerning husband held admissible to show his state of mind in prosecution for killing another.
Where, shortly after defendant was told that his wife had stated that he had drawn a gun on her, he shot her and shot and killed her aunt, and his claim was self-defense and that the two and couple of others had attempted to kill him the night before, the wife’s statement being interwoven with the facts attending the killing of the aunt for which he was being prosecuted was admissible and competent as bearing on the defendant’s state of mind.
Appeal from District Court, Liberty County ; J. L. Manry, Judge.
Melvin Johnson was convicted of murder, and appeals.
Affirmed.
Stevens & Stevens, of Houston, and E. W. Love, of Cleveland, for appellant.
W. A. Keeling, Atty. Gen., and C. L. Stone, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.

Opinion:
HAWKINS, J.
Appellant was convicted for the murder of Lucinda Daniels, and the death penalty awarded.
No complaint is made of the court's charge, and no special instructions were requested. An application for continuance wa,s sought, based upon the absence of two witnesses, White and Williams. White appeared and testified.' " The application recites that process was issued for Williams on the 11th day of April, 1922, and was served on May 10, 1922. The term of court at which the trial was had convened on August 7, 1922. From this we know the process for the witness was for a former term. The application fails to state that the witness was present at the former term in obedience to the process served on May 10th, and states no facts which would excuse the exercise of further diligence to secure his attendance at the instant trial. Brittain v. State (Tex. Cr. App.) 40 S. W. 297; Hamilton v. State, 74 Tex. Cr. R. 219, 168 S. W. 537. The burden is on appellant to establish the exercise of diligence in support of an application for continuance. See Branch's Ann. P. C. § 314, p. 186, for authorities. The diligence is not sufficient if only a subpcena was applied for when the law authorized an attachment. The court was justified in refusing the continuance.
Appellant and his wife (Julia), Tenie Mitchell and her husband, occupied the same house, but different rooms. Lettie, a sister of Tenie, lived in an adjoining house in the same yard. The deceased, Lucinda Daniels, was Julia's aunt, and Tenie's sister. All parties were negroes. The killing occurred on Monday morning. Upon one statement of Tenie Mitchell, admitted over objection, is the only other bill of exception based.
She testified that on Sunday night no one was at her house except her husband, herself, Julia, and appellant; that appellant had gone to bed before witness did; that some time during the night appellant called witness and asked where his wife, Julia, was; that witness told him she was over at Let-tie's ; that appellaht asked witness to go tell her to come home, to which she replied that she could not go as she was undressed, but told appellant to go, and he replied, "All right.'' Witness then went back to bed. The record does not show when Julia went to Lettie's or how the witness knew she was there. If any disturbance occurred between appellant and his wife at the house during the night, witness was not aware of it. The next she saw of appellant was early Monday morning. She had sent Julia after some soap and washing powders, and appellant was near the fence as Julia went after the articles. When she returned she came in back of Let-tie's house and called the witness, who at that time did not see appellant. Julia came on and went in the house. She was crying at the time and witness went in to see what she wanted. When witness came out she met appellant, who hqd a shotgun with him. Julia had not been in the house'more than a minute. As witness came out appellant asked her what was the matter, to which witness replied, "Julia said you drew a gun on her,'" whereupon appellant said: "Oh, I didn't; 1 came back down here because I knew Julia was coming back down here and tell some stories on me." Witness then said to appellant, "I didn't think you would draw a gun on Julia," to which he replied, "No, I wouldn't hurt my wife for nothing," and said he would talk to Julia and went in the house. A few minutes later Julia came out to where witness was washing and said she was going to Mrs. Grogan's, and started away. Appellant started off with his gun. When Julia saw him, she turned and came back to witness. Appellant also came back and the three of them went in the house. Witness had some conversation with appellant. He finally said he wanted Julia to get his brass knucks. Witness told Julia to give him the knucks if she could find them, and all three of them seem to have instituted a search for the missing knucks. Witness says it was not long after this until the shooting took place; that after the brass knucks could' not be found she went after Rev. Washington, to get him to talk to appellant and his wife, and that while she was away the shooting occurred. She did not see it, but heard the reports. Other evidence shows that appellant's wife came out the front door of the house, and appellant was following her and shot her in the back of the head, then fired another shot at her after she had fallen; that he reloaded his gun and went out the gate onto a little "tramroad" and started away when Lucinda came running toward the house wringing her hands, and asked what was the matter. Appellant turned, went back to meet Lucinda, and drew the gun on her. She was seen by witnesses to throw her hands above her head, they being in this position when he fired at her, the shot striking her in the face, from the effects of which she immediately died..
Appellant's story about the transaction was that after he had gone to bed on Sunday night four women came in and tried to kill him, and that he jumped out of the window and ran off; that Lucinda Daniels had a pistol and two of the others had knives; that the reason he shot his wife was because she was trying to kill him with the same shotgun that he shot her with, and that when Lucinda Daniels came up she had her hands under her apron and he thought she was going to shoot him was the reason he killed her. Objection is urged to the simple statement made by Tenie to appellant, viz., "Julia said you drew a gun on her," on the ground that it was hearsay, and in effect was using the wife as a witness against appellant. Witness was relating a conversation between her and appellant, and repeated to him Julia's statement in response to a direct question from him inquiring "what was the matter." Nothing was wrong with the witness; therefore the inquiry could not have been with reference to her. Appellant's wife was crying, and evidently had just told witness in the house that appellant had drawn a gun on her, and what she had said was communicated to appellant when he was approaching the house with a gun in his possession. Julia was not called as a witness; indeed, could not be under the law, appellant being on trial, not for shooting her, but for killing Lucinda; but the shooting of the one and killing the other were so related as to be practically one transaction. It was not possible to develop the facts relating to Lucinda's death without also showing the shooting of Julia. While the wife may not be called by the state as a witness in the prosecution of her husband for killing another, yet statements made by her become admissible when shown by other witnesses if res gestae. As said by Judge Morrow in Bibb v. State, 83 Tex. Cr. 616, 205 S. W. 135:
"It is not her testimony that is used, but her verbal act so connected with the transaction as to become a part of it, and provable by competent witnesses like any other part of the transaction. See Robbins v. State, 73 Texas Crim. Rep. 367 [166 S. W. Rep. 528]; Cook v. State, 22 Tex. Crim. App. 511 [3 S. W. 749]; Wharton's Crim. Ev., secs. 252, 253." (The citation to Wharton is an error. It should be sections 262, 268.)
See, to the same effect, the later case of Gilmore v. State, 91 Tex. Cr. R. 31, 241 S. W. 492, We quote from section 262. Wharton's Crim. Evidence:
"As long as the transaction continues, so long do acts and deeds emanating from it become part of it, so that in describing it in a court of justice they can be detailed. The distinguishing question is, Is the evidence offered that of the event speaking through the participants? If so, what was thus said can be introduced without vcalling those who said it. Is the evidence offered that of observers speaking about the event? If so, such observers must be called to testify.
"Nor are there ány limits of time within which the res gestm can be arbitrarily confined. They vary in fact with each particular case."
Unless we misapprehend the record the transaction which culminated in the death of Lucinda and-the shooting of appellant's wife had begun when Julia returned to the house crying; it was practically continuous from that time until the killing resulted.
"There is no limit of time in which the res gestae are arbitrarily confined. They vary with each particular case. They need not he coincident as to time if they are joined by the existing feeling which exists without break or let-down, from the moment of the event they elicit. If the acts and declarations appear to spring out of the transaction, if they elucidate it, if they are voluntary and spontaneous, and if they are made at a time so near it as reasonably to preclude the idea of deliberate design, then they are to be regarded as contemporaneous, and are admissible." The fore going statement from Branch's Ann. P. C. § 83, p. 53, epitomizes the rule, and is in consonance with Wharton, supra, and is supported by the many cases collated, notably McGee v. State, 31 Tex. Cr. R. 74, 19 S. W. 764; Bronson v. State, 59 Tex. Cr. R. 17, 127 S. W. 177; Lewis v. State, 29 Tex. App. 204, 15 S. W. 642, 25 Am. St. Rep. 720; Craig v. State, 30 Tex. App. 621, 18 S. W. 297. As we view the record the ,statement objected to was a part of the transaction; grew out of it, and was a spontaneous verbal act of appellant's wife incident thereto.
If, perchance, we have misapplied the rule, then it is inconceivable to us how even the erroneous admission of the statement complained of could have injuriously affected appellant under the facts shown by the record. Within a short time after he was told that his wife claimed he had drawn a gun on her, he shot her in the back of the head, and immediately thereafter killed her aunt. The punishment fixed by the jury is the severest known to the law, but we cannot say it is unmerited.
The judgment is affirmed.
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