Case Name: WOLF v. CITY RAILWAY CO.
Court: Oregon Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Oregon
Decision Date: 1907-08-20
Citations: 50 Or. 64
Docket Number: 
Parties: WOLF v. CITY RAILWAY CO.
Judges: 
Reporter: Oregon Reports
Volume: 50
Pages: 64–81

Head Matter:
Argued 11 July,
decided 20 August, 1907.
WOLF v. CITY RAILWAY CO.
85 Pac. 620, 91 Pac. 460.
Appeal—Time bob Filing! Tbans'oript—Poweb ob Ootjbt.
1. Section 558, B. & O. Oomp., providing for appeals to the supreme court, and authorizing the court, upon the appeal being perfected, to extend the time for filing the transcript, does not require that the undertaking on appeal must be filed before an order can be taken enlarging the time to file the transcript, but only that such order must be taken before the expiration of time already allowed for that purpose. . -
Tbial—Duty op, Ootjbt to Reject Unseasonable Testimony.
2. Where the undisputed circumstances show that the testimony of a witness is so improbable and unreasonable that a fail- mind must reject it,'the court should withdraw such testimony from the jury.
Decided 12 June, 1906.
85 Pac. 620.
Street Railroads—Injury to Persons on Track—Evidencf.
3. In an action for the death of plaintiff’s intestate, caused by liis being struck by a street car, evidence examined, and that of a certain witness for plaintiff held not so opposed to all reasonable probabilities as to require its exclusion, as a matter of law, from the jury.
Street Railroads—Injury to Pedestrian at Crossing—Contributory Negligence of Person Injured.
4. A person about to cross a street at a crossing is not bound to wait because a car is in sight; but if the car is at such a distance that he has time to cross, if it is run at the usual speed, it is not negligence, as a matter of law, to attempt to do so.
Street Railroads—Accident at Crossing—Care Required.
5. It is the duty of a street railway company, in operating its cars at street crossings, to use such care as is proportionate to the danger likely to be encountered, regardless of whether the rate of speed has been limited by statute or ordinance, or not.
Same—Reasonableness of Speed is for Jury.
(5. Whether a given speed was reasonable for a street car in a large city at a crossing in a residence district is a question that should be submitted to the jury.
Same—Evidence—Sufficiency.
7. That at-the time a pedestrian was struck by a street car there were seven persons at or near the crossing justifies an inference that the street was much used.
. Railroads and Street Railroads—Rules as to Speed.
8. The rules governing the management and speed of steam railroads and electric street railways are not always the same, and a rule that is applicable to one may not be controlling against the other.
Appeal—Reviewing Refusal to Reduce Verdict.
0. The action of a trial court in reference to a motion to set aside a verdict as excessive is not subject to review on appeal.
- From Multnomah: Alfred F. Sears, Jr., Judge.
Action by Mollie Wolf, administratrix of the estate of Isaac Wolf, deceased, against the City & Suburban Eailway Co. Judgment for plaintiff, and deféndant appealed; A motion to dismiss the appeal was overruled, after which the ease was beard on the merits.
Motion Denied: Affirmed.
Mr. Alexander Bernstein for the motion.
Mr, Ossian Franklin Paxton and Mr. William P. Lord, contra. ■■

Opinion:
On Motion to Dismiss the Appeal.
Per Curiam:
Motion to dismiss an appeal because the transcript was not filed within the time allowed by law. The judgment from which the appeal was taken was rendered on October 7, 1905, and a notice of appeal thereupon given in open court. Thereafter and on the- same day an order was made by the trial judge enlarging the time 60 days in which to file the transcript. On October 17, 1905, the undertaking on appeal was filed. On December 2d, a further order was made extending the time in which to file the transcript, and similar orders were subsequently made, each within the time allowed by the previous order, until February 26, 1906, when the transcript was filed in this court. The statute provides, in effect, that upon the appeal being perfected the appellant shall, within 30 days, or within such an extension of time as' the trial court or judge thereof, or the Supreme Court or. a justice thereof, may allow, file with the clerk of this court a transcript or such abstract as the rules of the court may require, but that the order enlarging the time "shall be made within the time allowed to file the transcript": B. & C. Comp. § 553. It is argued in support of the motion to dismiss that, under this statute, an order enlarging the time in which to file a transcript cannot be made by the trial court or judge thereof until after the appeal is perfected by the filing of an undertaking and the expiration of the time in which to except to the sureties thereon, and that such is the meaning of the words "within the time allowed to file the transcript," and therefore the order of October 7th was null and void, and as no transcript was filed within 30 days after the appeal was perfected, nor an order obtained within that period extending the time in which to file the transcript, the appeal should be dismissed. But this is too technical a construction of the statute to meet with our approval. The act of 1899 (Laws 1899, pp. 227, 229), which includes said Section 553 and is now in force governing the procedure on appeal, was designed to simplify such procedure, and to remove many of the technicalities with which ic was hedged about prior to that time. It should, therefore, receive a liberal construction to accomplish the end intended. The provision that an order enlarging the time "shall be made within the time allowed to file the transcript" simply means that it should be made before the appellant is in default: Tallmadge v. Hooper, 37 Or. 503, 508 (61 Pac. 349). And there is no valid reason why the trial court or judge thereof should not make such an order after the notice of appeal has been given, and before the appeal is perfected' by the filing of an undertaking. Motion Denied.
Decided 20 August, 1907.
91 Pac. 460.
For appellant there was a brief over the names of O. F. Paxton and William P. Lord, with oral arguments by Mr. Lord and Mr. Ephraim Baynard Seabroolc.
For respondent there was a brief with oral arguments by Mr. Alexander Bernstein and Mr. D. Solis Cohen.