Case Name: SHANKS v. DELAWARE, L. & W. R. CO.
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1914-07-31
Citations: 148 N.Y.S. 1034
Docket Number: 
Parties: SHANKS v. DELAWARE, L. & W. R. CO.
Judges: 
Reporter: West's New York Supplement
Volume: 148
Pages: 1034–1039

Head Matter:
SHANKS v. DELAWARE, L. & W. R. CO.
(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department.
July 31, 1914.)
1. Commerce (§ 27 )—Federal Employees’ Liability Act—Employé Engaged in Interstate Commerce.
The test of whether a railroad employe is engaged in interstate commerce, so as to be within the protection of the federal Employers’ Liability Act April 22, 1908, c. 149, 35 Stat. 65 (U. S. Comp. St. Supp. 1911, p. 1322), is the nature of the work being done at the time of the injury and not what the employe expects to do after completing his task.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Commerce, Cent. Dig. § 25; Dec. Dig. § 27.*]
2. Commeroe (§ 27*)—Federal Employers’ Liability Act—Employé Engaged in Interstate Commerce.
Since a railroad employe is engaged in interstate commerce, so as to be within the protection of the federal Employers’ Liability Act April 22, 1908, c. 149, 35 Stat. 65 (U. S. Comp. St. Supp. 1911, p. 1322), only where his relation to traffic at the time of his injury was so direct that his injury tended to stop or delay the movement of a train engaged in interstate commerce, he is not entitled to the protection of such act,- where he is injured while installing machinery in a general repair shop of a railroad system which has extensive local train service as well as interstate traffic.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Commerce, Cent. Dig. § 25; Dec. Dig. § 27.*]
Burr, J., dissenting.
Appeal from Trial Term, Kings County.
Action by Bruce Shanks against the Delaware, Lackawanna Western Railroad Company. From judgment for plaintiff and an der denying motion to dismiss the complaint and granting plai motion for general verdict in his favor and an order denying for new trial, defendant appeals.
Reversed, and complaint dism
Argued before JENKS, P. J., and BURR, CARR, STAPLET and PUTNAM, JJ.
Frederick W. Thomson of New York City, for appellant.
Joseph A. Shay, of New York City, for respondent.
For other cases see same topic & § number in Dec. & Am. Digs. 1907 to date, & Rep’r Indexes

Opinion:
PUTNAM, J.
Defendant has been held liable under the federal Employers' Liability Act of April 22, 1908 (35 Stat. 65), for an injury to plaintiff at Kingsland, New Jersey, on .January 14, 1912, and after the Workmen's Compensation Law of New Jersey was in force. Plaintiff was a machinist in the defendant's railroad repair shops. He was doing overtime work on Sunday to remove a shaft-hanger bolted to a steel girder or truss, to be reset on same girder about two feet from its original position. This truss was one of a pair of longitudinal girders, a little over 50 feet apart, upon which were the tracks which carried an overhead traveling crane. The shaft-hanger conveyed power to a shaping machine on which brasses, keys, and cotters were finished for engine connecting rods. Apparently this machine was being removed as matter of shop arrangement, perhaps to make room for other tools near it. This was being done on Sunday, doubtless so as not to interrupt the full week day activities. After removthe bolts and detaching the shafthanger, plaintiff was about to drill new holes. He tried to reach over and down on the other side of the girder to the points where these holes came out. While he was thus reaching over the track of the crane, its wheels ran over his hands, causing the injuries for which this action is brought.
Plaintiff had previously worked repairing parts of locomotives, but at this time, and on the day before, he had been assigned to the wheelwright work of attending to the shop machines and of keeping them in repair. These shops at Kingsland were defendant's general repair shops in New Jersey. Often entire locomotives came there; sometimes only parts were sent there to be repaired and returned to the roundhouses. Repairs at these shops were on any locomotives indiscriminately, regardless of whether they ran in interstate or intrastate traffic.
The remedy by the federal statute is "to any person suffering injury while he is employed by such carrier in such commerce." These strict limitations are so as not to trench on the rights of the states. Congress can legislate concerning the mutual rights and liabilities of master and servant, when both are actually engaged in interstate commerce. Emp. Liability Cases, 207 U. S. 463, 28 Sup. Ct. 141, 52 L. Ed. 297.
The employé must be himself engaged in commerce, or his work must be a part of interstate commerce under federal protection, but this is not his general line of work, but "the particular service in which the. employé is then engaged." The test declared by the Supreme Court of the United States is the "nature of the work being done at the time of the injury," not what the employé expects to do after the completion of his task. Illinois Central R. R. Co. v. Behrens, 233 U. S. 473, 478, 34 Sup. Ct. 646, 58 L. Ed. -.
This plaintiff's recovery would require us to hold that the general repair shop of a railroad system, which has extensive local train service as well as through traffic—that the shop itself is an instrumentality of interstate commerce in the sense that a switch, or a bridge, has been so judicially declared. How carefully the courts discriminate is seen as to the crew of a switch engine, which sometimes moves local cars, and again cars carrying'freight for points beyond the state; the men working indiscriminately on both kinds of traffic. But these employés are not thereby held to be engaged in interstate commerce; on the contrary, such switching train work, though in constant change, is to be distinguished according to its character at the time of the employé's injury, and the liabilities by the federal act are applied only to the handling and movement of cars , that are then bound to or from across state lines. Illinois Central R. R. Co. v. Behrens, supra.
A test to decide if an injury to a railroad employé is within the protection of the act is its effect on the course and current of interstate commerce. Was the employé's relation to traffic so close and direct that his injury tended to stop or delay the movement of a train engaged in interstate commerce? Lamphere v. Oregon R. & Nav. Co., 196 Fed. 336, 116 C. C. A. 156, 47 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1. It is on this principle that not only the train crew, but an employé repairing its track or switch, is under the protection of the act. And as a bridge, if not kept in suitable condition, may by its defects interrupt commerce, the duty to repair such an instrumentality carries with it the protection of employés so engaged. Pedersen v. D., L. & W. R. R. Co., 229 U. S. 146, 33 Sup. Ct. 648, 57 L. Ed. 1125. And one working to repair a refrigerator car (Northern Pacific R. Co. v. Maerkl, 198 Fed. 1, 117 C. C. A. 237), or at a shop, repairing a locomotive that has been in interstate commerce, is held within the statute (Law v. Illinois Central R. Co., 208 Fed. 869, 126 C. C. A. 27). But the work of millwrights, installing machine tools in a general repair shop, is not interstate commerce, even if such tools are capable of use in repair of engines or cars. Many incidents of railroading cannot in any real or substantial sense be interstate commerce. For greater facility to expedite repairs, a carrier may operate its own foundry and forges, with warehouses to store axles and car wheels. But the labor in setting up and maintaining such a plant is not thereby made commerce. If a car comes to such a shop, those who work on the' car 'may be engaged upon an instrumentality of transportation. The shop machines, however, like the supplies within the paint shop, have n" reached the connection with the movement of trains required to hrr those so engaged under this act. To hold otherwise would ex/^the purview of the statute beyond its construction by the f/ courts.
I advise that the judgment and orders be reversed, with a judgment dismissing the complaint, with costs, but without prejudi to plaintiff's remedy under the Workmen's Compensation Acts of state of New Jersey. All concur, except BURR, J., who dissents.