Case Name: Raleigh R. POWELL, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 1966-12-28
Citations: 373 F.2d 225
Docket Number: No. 20102
Parties: Raleigh R. POWELL, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee.
Judges: Before Danaher, Circuit Judge, Edwards, Circuit Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, and Tamm, Circuit Judge.
Reporter: Federal Reporter 2d Series
Volume: 373
Pages: 225–226

Head Matter:
Raleigh R. POWELL, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee.
No. 20102.
United States Court of Appeals District of Columbia Circuit.
Argued Nov. 10, 1966.
Decided Dec. 28, 1966.
Petition for Rehearing en Banc Denied March 3, 1967.
Mr. Edwin R. Schneider, Jr., Washington, D. C. (appointed by this court), for appellant.
Mr. Theodore Wieseman, Asst. U. S. Atty., with whom Messrs. David G. Bress, U. S. Atty., Prank Q. Nebeker and Donald S. Smith, Asst. U. S. Attys., were on the brief, for appellee. Mr. Charles A. Mays, Asst. U. S. Atty., also entered an appearance for appellee.
Before Danaher, Circuit Judge, Edwards, Circuit Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, and Tamm, Circuit Judge.
Sitting by designation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 291(a).

Opinion:
PER CURIAM:
The appellant was convicted and sentenced for grand larceny after a jury trial. On appeal he claims that the trial judge should have granted a hearing sua sponte at trial on the issue of his mental competence to stand trial. He relies upon Hansford v. United States, 124 U.S.App.D.C. 387, 365 F.2d 920 (1966).
Approximately five months before this trial there was a statutory hearing under D.C.Code § 24-301 (a) (1961) on appellant's mental competence to stand trial. This resulted from appellant's pretrial motion filed by his then court-appointed counsel. This motion was filed May 12, 1965. After a hearing before the District Court, appellant was committed to St. Elizabeths Hospital for a 60-day mental examination. The Acting Superintendent's report, dated September 21, 1965, informed the court that the appellant at material times had not been
"suffering from mental disease or defect, but he was suffering from drug addiction which is in remission."
On October 5, 1965, without objection from appellant's trial counsel, the Dis trict Court found that appellant was mentally competent to stand trial. Trial was then held on February 7, 1966, and appellant was found guilty by the jury.
It is appellant's contention before us that the delay between October 5, 1965 and February 7, 1966, where the court knew from the prior St. Elizabeths report that defendant "was suffering from drug addiction which is in remission" was sufficient to advise the trial judge of the possibility that defendant might be under the influence of drugs during the course of the trial. Appellant asserts that these facts, standing alone, were sufficient to require another hearing on mental competence.
In Hansford, supra, there had also been a pretrial statutory hospital examination and report, and a determination of Hans-ford's mental competence to stand trial. But otherwise, the record in this case does not match the factual record in Hansford. In the instant case the defendant did not testify and hence did not supply any evidentiary basis for such a hearing in his own testimony. There was no expert testimony in this case which served to put the trial judge on notice as to any abnormal mental condition on the part of defendant. The defendant-appellant did not seek such a hearing either by motion or otherwise.
Additionally, there was no evidence of a long record of disturbed behavior such as to create a doubt of appellant's competence to stand trial. Cf. Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 86 S.Ct. 836, 15 L.Ed. 2d 815 (1966). And in this case appellant had never been adjudged to be of unsound mind nor had he been civilly committed. Cf. Whalem v. United States, 120 U.S.App.D.C. 331, 346 F.2d 812 (en banc), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 862, 86 S.Ct. 124, 15 L.Ed.2d 100 (1965).
In Hansford it is recognized that there must be facts which create a "substantial doubt" of a defendant's mental competence before due process requires the trial judge to order such a hearing sua sponte.
Affirmed.