Case Name: ULYSSES S. G. WHITE v. THE UNITED STATES
Court: United States Court of Claims
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 1902-03-31
Citations: 37 Ct. Cl. 365
Docket Number: No. 22495
Parties: ULYSSES S. G. WHITE v. THE UNITED STATES.
Judges: 
Reporter: United States Court of Claims Reports
Volume: 37
Pages: 365–382

Head Matter:
ULYSSES S. G. WHITE v. THE UNITED STATES.
[No. 22495.
Decided March 31, 1902.]
On the Proofs.
The question in this case is whether the provision in the act of 1899 to reorganize the Navy operates retroactively, so as to give to engineers who have been appointed from civil life a credit of five years, which will increase their pay for past services, or whether it is prospective, to take effect after June 30, 1899.
I.The proviso in the .¿Lei 3d March, 1899 (30 Stat. L., 1004,1007, § 13), providing that “all officers, including warrant officers, who have been or may be appointed to the Navy from civil life shall, on the date of appointment, be credited, for computing their pay, with five years' service,” is governed by the initial clause of the section, “after June SO, 1899," and is to be so construed that it will give increased pay to such officers appointed from civil life as were not receiving their maximum pay on June 30, 1899, but to exclude those who were receiving their maximum pay on that date.
II.The statute being intended, as indicated by the title, “to reorganize and increase the efficiency of the personnel of the Navy," should not be construed so as to give a gratuity to certain officers for past services.
III.The decision in relation to the prospective or retroactive effect to be given to statutes, examined.
The Reporter s’ statement of the case:
, The following are the facts of the case as found by the court:
I. The claimant, Ulysses S. G. White, was on the 9th day of January, in the year 1887, appointed a civil engineer in the Navy from civil life. He remained such civil engineer and was such at the time of the passage of the Navy personnel act of March. 3, 1899.
II. The claimant, by reason of service in the Army, amounting to six years seven months and twenty-one days, previous to his entry into the Navy, reached the maximum pay of his grade, $3,500, May 19, 1885, under Revised Statutes, sections 1478, 1556. Thus the amount of pay received by him between the 9th of January, 1877, and the 19th of May, 1885, was as follows:
Three years and 130 days, at §2,700 per annum.§9, 061. 64
Five years, at §3,000 per annum. 15,000.00
Total. 24,061. 64
If he were, upon the date of his appointment, credited, for computing his pay, with five years’ service, and entitled to be paid from that date, he would receive pay at the following rates:
Three years and 130 days, at §3,000 per annum.§10,068.49
Five years, at §3,500 per annum. 17,500. 00
Total. 27,568.49
or $3,506.85 more than he has previously received.
Mr. William B. King for the claimant:
Numerous recent opinions of this court have declared the importance of using a statute itself as the best guide to its own interpretation. In two cases decided December 2, 1901 (Clark v. United States and Barnett v. United States), this doctrine has been reasserted. It has been greatly strengthened by the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Dewey v. United States, quoted in these later cases.
The examination discloses that this is not such a case as is often referred to in the text-books where a proviso carves special exceptions from a general rule laid down in the opening-clause of a statute, but that it is a series of eight pieces of legislation relating to different naval subjects and governing-different classes of people, some having direct connection with each other, some quite disconnected.
The second provision of the third proviso, the one under discussion, gives a credit of five years’ service to all officers, including warrant officers appointed from civil life. Of the three classes of commissioned officers included in the opening-clause, this provision has nothing to do with officers of the line. It concerns the other two classes, medical and pay officers, and in addition the commissioned officers of the corps of chaplains, professors of mathematics, and civil engineers and warrant officers.
The provision next following relates to an absolutely different subject-matter. It has no concern with pay or rank or length of service. In repealing the laws authorizing the distribution of prize money or bounty it affects not only all commissioned officers, but every one in the Navy from admiral to apprentice.
Having clearly ascertained that the provisos of this section are not qualifications of its opening clause, but pieces of legislation relating to different subjects and different persons, wo are led to consider the citation in the Roycc opinion of the rule quoted from Justice Story’s opinion in United States v. Dickson (15 Pet., 165), that “a proviso carves special exceptions onty out of the enacting clause.”
The first proviso of this section fulfills very clearly this definition, and the exception to this samé proviso contained in its last words is itself an instance in substance, though not in form, of the same sort of a proviso.-' The statute under consideration in the case of United States v. Dickson was of this character. The Supreme Court states that case in these terms, immediately7 following the extract quoted in the opinion in the Royce case:
“Applying this rule to the circumstances of the present case, how does it stand? The enacting clause gives to each receiver a commission of one per cent upon all the public moneys received by him. This was precisely in conformity to the antecedent laws. The. proviso limits that percentage to an amount not exceeding $2,500 for any one year. Until, then, the percentage of the particular receiver has reached that amount, in whatever period of the year it may arrive, the proviso, according to its very terms, has no operation; and ivhen that maximum is reached, the percentage ceases, whether any more public moneys are received by that officer or not. The case, then, of the present receiver falls directly within the enacting clause. He seeks only the maximum commissions upon the mone37s actually received by him during his continuance in office; and the proviso either does not touch his case or it only operates to cut off all subsequent commissions from him for other moneys received during his continuance in office.”
Not one of the other provisos or pieces of provisos in this section meets to any degree the definition of Judge Story. Its introduction into the discussion of the clause under consideration obscures the real meaning of the clause. It establishes a rule for something which does not exist in this case.
The rule laid down by Justice Story in United States v. Dickson, while unquestionably right under circumstances like those there existing, has by the exigencies of later and more hurried legislation become no longer of anything like universal application.
An extremely frequent modern use of provisos is different. It is succinctly stated in Georgia Banking Company v. Smith (128 U. S., 174, 181).
Numerous instances can readily be found. The most celebrated is that referred to by the Supreme Court in Hadden v. The Collector (5 Wall., 110; tho act of July 2,1864, sec. 3,13 Stat. L., 351).
See also the proviso construed by the Supreme Court and this court in United States v. Ewing (140 U. S., 142) and Faris v. United States (23 C. Cls. K.., 374).
Specimens selected at random from legislative history show very clearly that the decision in United States v. Dickson has but a limited application to the legislation of to-day.
Having disposed of the idea that any special interpretation of this part of this statute is required, because introduced by the words “provided further,” we are now able to approach the language of the statute itself with nothing in view but the ascertainment of the plain meaning of the words .used by Congress.
“All officers” — this is a comprehensive term to be limited only by the words which follow' — “who have been or may be appointed to the Navy ” — these words make the same grant to officers whose appointments have been made as to those yet to come — “from civil life” — this completes the limitations on the subject “all officers” and accurately describes this claimant — “shall on the date of appointment” — in his case January 9, 1877 — “be credited for computing their pay” — not for rank or retirement, but for pay — •“ with five years’ service”— or that, for computing his pay, this officer shall be treated as if he had been appointed on January 9, 1872.
The claimant has brought himself directly within the first rule of statutory construction which, this court has itself observed and frequently enforced, a' rule which dispenses with all interpretation.
In the ease of D&ioey v. United States the Supreme Court went so far in its adherence to the terms of the statutes in question that Mr. Chief Justice Fuller in his dissenting-opinion, after declaring (178 U. S., 522), “The obvious object of the law was to encourage personal gallantry and enterprise,” thus pointedly expressed himself in regard to the effect of the decision of the court upon this object:
“Undoubtedly it is our duty to give effect to the will of Congress, but in ascertaining its will the object Congress manifestly sought to attain must be recognized, and should be controlling, unless positively defeated-by the language used.”
This dissenting opinion is not stated as indicating that the majorhy of the court was wrong in the Dewey case, but as showing that the majority, agreeing with this court, held that the literal interpretation must control, even when so salutary an object was defeated by it. Such a decision would have been impossible in the day when most of the older, formal rules of statutory construction were adopted.
No answer to the position here taken has been found or can be found in the language of the statute itself. The opinion of this court clearly recognizes the impossibiiity of escaping this as the ordinary meaning of the terms used except b}- an adoption of a rule of interpretation which limits the effect of the words of the statute itself by considerations in regard to its probable effect, gathered from outside its terms. Thus the opinion cites extracts from Souther-land and Endlich on statutory interpretation and concludes with the following summary of the ground on which the case is decided, a ground which, we submit, is not consistent with the strict rule of literal interpretation enforced in the Dewey case and just now twice approved:
" Otherwise the act bestows upon them a gratuity. True, the Congress have the authority to enact such laws, but in doing so they must use language that will admit of no other meaning.”
The opinion treats the granting of a gratuity by Congress as something of so extraordinary a character that all presumptions' must be against it; but whatever may be said by philosophic statesmen upon the evils of granting gratuities, it must be confessed that the legislation of Congress is full of grants based upon no legal right, but upon some consideration not distinctly apparent to those not directly connected with the legislation.
A striking instance of this sort is that discussed in the case of Ilcmkins v. United States (19 C. Cls. R., 611), similar to this case both in subject-matter and in terms. The statute involved is quoted in our opening brief (p. 9). Like this statute, it grants to officers of the Navy credit, for computing their pay, for time to which, under previously existing laws, they were not entitled. Their service had been rendered under rates of pay established by law and the entire transaction was completed. The statute was retroactive for a period as long in some cases as thirty-one years (32 C. Cls. R., 379) and the amounts granted were most variable.
Nothing could more clearly illustrate the apparently fortuitous character of the grants under this act than the case of Oreen v. United States (25 C. Cls. R., 300; 138 U. S. R., 298). Under the decision of this court the claimant was given $796.08; under that of the Supreme Court, $1.17. But if the claimant had been commissioned four days earlier the Supreme Court would have given him the larger sum.
That statute, had its operation been held prospective only, would have conferred benefits in the way of retirement and, in many cases, increased pay, just as this statute has been construed. And a searching examination of the words of this statute will show that the rule adopted in the present case would have resulted in holding that statute prospective only. The court held it retrospective, but it certainly could not have said that Congress there used “language that will admit of no other meaning.” Full effect could be given to its terms in their normal meaning only by the adoption of a retrospective construction, and this the court adopted, using the words quoted on page 9. These are entirely'- applicable to the present case.-
It is for Congress to decide what grants shall be made from the public treasury, and the responsibility rests with Congress and not with the courts. This has been clearly declared by the Supreme Court in United States v. Realty Oo. (163 U. S. 441).
The extreme rule of a presumption against the retrospective operation of a statute, as stated, even if ever well founded, has no application to cases of grants by the United States. The principle on which all the cases declaring that a retroactive construction is, if possible, to be avoided, is the principle which has put into many of our State constitutions provisions forbidding all retroactive legislation, and which has forbidden in the Constitution of the United States certain classes of retroactive legislation. It is that a retroactive statute destroys vested rights or interferes with the private interests already settled under existing law. Such consequences, those rules say, can not be presumed to have been intended by the legislature unless the words used can have no other meaning.
The rules quoted from Southerland and Endlich on page 4 of the opinion of the court, like many other earlier rules of statutory interpretation, now largely abandoned by enlightened courts, are based upon a conservatism characteristic of older judges, which led to a defeat of the legislative intent as expressed in statutes. The modern rules seek first of all to find and follow the legisltive will.
Black on Interpretation of Laws states the modern rule on this subject much more aptly in the quotation given in defendants’ brief in the Royce case (rec., 15). The test of retrospective or prospective construction is said to be the expression of the legislative intention “by apt words.” The principle repeatedly recognized by this court in statutory construction has been well stated by this writer as governing him in his work (Preface, p. iii):
No student of the opinions of this court can fail to see that this has been the uniform rule of this court, a rule absolutely forced upon any tribunal constantly required to interpret statutes, as the only sound guard against judicial legislation.
There are four phrases requiring special consideration:
(1) “All officers.” If the intent of Congress was not to give a grant to the entire class, why was not the word “ officers” alone used? There was no need or advantage of using the word “all.” The object of that word in this case is to show that the credit is to be given in every instance to officers appointed from civil life. There are to be no exceptions. The construction which the court has placed upon the act in the Noyce case would substitute for the words “ all officers” the limitation “officers appointed from civil life, still in their original rank who have not yet reached their maximum pay in that rank.” A construction which thus transforms the terms of a statute is necessarily unsound.
(2) Equally significant are the words “who have been or may be appointed.” While it is true, as pointed out in the defendant’s brief, that there were a few officers already in the service who had not yet reached the highest rate of pay in their lowest grades and who would thereby become entitled to an increase of pay by the use of this phrase, yet when considered in connection with the words “all officers,” these words have a far wider significance. Not only are all officers who may be appointed from civil life to have this credit, but all officers who have been appointed.
(3) “On the date of appointment.” These words are of themselves conclusive. They operate to define the right exactiy. They forbid the narrowing of the right under the construction which the court has approved. If the credit is given on the date of appointment, the increase of pajr here claimed follows by operation of law.
(4) “For computing their pay.” These words fitly round out the clause. An increase in length of service may serve three purposes in the Navy: (a) To increase pay, (&) to raise rank, and (c) to shorten the period requisite for retirement. The words here used forbid any change of rank, forbid the use of constructive service in calculating the length of service for retirement, and they grant the benefit of that service for computing pay. This is all that this claimant asks.
The construction for which we are contending is not to be accepted alone because it satisfies all the words of the statute, but because it refrains from the introduction into this provision of words not there expressed. The other construction necessarily involves that there shall be inserted in the proviso in question after the words “ computing their pay” the words “after June 30, 1899.”
Tbis can not be sound; it involves tbe importation into this clause of a remote date. The independence of the numerous provisions in this section, demonstrated by the analysis already made, forbids the carrying of a portion of the opening clause into the later provisions. The insertion of this date in this clause is contradictory of the very terms of the act. That fixes the “ date of appointment” as the effective date and the computation of pay is directed to be from that date and not from Juty 1, 1899.
If it is incumbent on us to point out to what extent the date in the opening clause is to be carried into the later provisos, we should say undoubtedly that, as the opening clause transfers naval officers to army pay, the two provisos immediately following which qualify this transfer are necessarily controlled by the same date because of their identify of subject. The qualifications go into effect ex necessitate at the same date as the principal legislation. But this date does not extend to later provisions not concerned with, this transfer.
Mr. John Q. Thompson (with whom was Mr. Assistant Attorney-General Pradt) for the defendants:
That it is the duty of the court to first of all ascertain and follow the legislative will is no now or modern rule, and even if it were to be so construed the court in its opinion in the Koyce case have adopted that rule as the basis of their decision, and have constantly kept in view the will and intention of the legislative authority when legislating upon the matters embodied in the act commonly known as the “navy personnel act.”
Claimant’s counsel quotes from the preface in Black on Interpretation of Laws, to the effect that the doctrine of “equitable interpretation” has become obsolete.
Equitable construction of statutes and the necessity for such construction arose, out of the early acts of Parliament, which were brief and general in their terms. The courts .proceeded upon what was called the equify of the. statute, which was a construction made by the judges that cases out of the letter of the statue, yet being within the same'mischief, or because of the making of the same, shall be within the same remedy that the statute provides. (See Sutherland on Statutory Construe tion, sec. 413.) Of coarse, what has been termed the equitable construction of statutes in the above sense has been abandoned, but the principle that it is the duty of the court to interpret the will and intention of the lawmaking power is as much in vogue now as at any time during the history of legislative bodies.
Black on Interpretation of Laws has not abandoned the rule that it is the duty of the courts to find and follow the legislative will when interpreting any given law, and this court in rendering its opinion in the Boyce case certainly did not abandon that well-recognized principle governing the interpretation of statutes.
Of course, the meaning and intention should be ascertained, if possible, first from the language of the statute itself; but if the language is ambiguous or doubtful, or lacks precision, the intended meaning must be sought by the aid of all pertinent and admissible considerations. This is the doctrine announced by all writers on interpretation and construction of statutes. But while the doctrine of equitable interpretation of statutes as anciently used may have become obsolete, yet the principle of liberal interpretation and construction is still in force.
“The modern doctrine is that to construe a statute liberally or according to its equity is nothing more than to give effect to it according to the intention of the lawmaker as indicated by its terms and purposes.” (See Sutherland on Statutory Construction, latter part of sec. 415.)
“Where the meaning of a statute or any statutory provision is not plain a court is warranted in availing itself of all legitimate aids to ascertain the true intention, and among them are some extraneous facts. The object sought to be accomplished exercises a potent influence in determining the meaning of not only the principal but also the minor provisions of a statute. To ascertain it fully the court will be greatly assisted by knowing, and it is permitted to consider, the mischief intended to be removed or suppressed, or the necessity of any kind which induced the enactment, * * * the sense of the legal profession in regard to it, the course and usages of business which it will affect.” (See the author quoted, sec. 292.)
Again:
“A statute must be construed with reference to the whole system of which it forms a part.” (See sec. 284 of the work cited.)
Iii construing and interpreting laws’the literal sense of the words used in the statute should not necessarily control.
‘‘The mere literal construction of'-a section in a statute ought not to prevail if it is opposed to the intention of the legislature apparent by the statute; and if the words are sufficiently flexible to admit of some other construction it is to be adopted to effectuate that intention. * * * The particular inquiry is not what is the abstract force of the words or what they may comprehend, but in'what sense they were intended to be used as they are found in the act. The sense in which they were intended to be used furnishes the rule of interpretation, and this is to be collected from the context; and a narrower or more extended meaning is to be given according to the intention thus indicated.” (See sec. 2Í6 of the work cited.)
Claimant’s counsel seek to show that provisos are sometimes intended and used as independent pieces of legislation as well as serve to carve special exceptions only out of the enacting-clause. We concede that provisos may be and frequently are of both natures, but the language used by legislatures must be considered from the view point of the legislatures when legislating upon the subject under consideration, and in determining the nature of provisos the intention of the whole act will control the interpretation of the parts, and this interpretation is to be ascertained by considering the entire statute.
The third proviso of section 13 in the “navy personnel act ” embodies within it the legislation and words sought to be interpreted by the court, and in doing so the court of course considered the purpose and intention of the whole legislation embodied within the act. The title states clearly the purposes and objects of the act, and all legislation embodied within the same must be considered as having in view and contemplation the accomplishment of the objects sought as indicated by the title, unless there is a clear, definite, and plain intention of the legislators that the proviso or exception is meant to be a piece of legislation absolutely separate, apart, and independent of the subject under discussion-. No such intention is indicated by this proviso. If any. other legislation was intended to be a part of the act Congress would undoubtedly have so specifically and clearly indicated just what legislation was incorporated in the act not pertinent to the object by using unmistakable terms. If anything further were neces sary to be presented on the part of the Government than what has already been argued as to why this statute could not receive the interpretation asked for by claimant’s counsel, we might very properly urge the doctrine of ¿nGonve.iiena\ inasmuch as the statute seems ambiguous.
It is a well-known principle that—
“ In the consideration of the provisions of any statute they ought to receive such a reasonable construction, if the words and subject-matter will admit of it, as that the existing rights of the public or of individuals be not infringed. Considerations of what is reasonable, convenient, or causes hardship or injustice have a potent influence in many cases.” * * * (See sec. 322 of Sutherland on Statutory Construction.)
Again:
“A construction which must necessarily occasion great public and private mischief must never be preferred to a construction which will occasion neither, or not in so great a degree, unless the terms of the instrument absolutely require such preference.” (Sec. 823 of above work.)
* * * “The considerations of evil and hardship may properly exert an influence in giving a construction of a statute when its language is ambiguous or uncertain or doubtful, but not when it is plain and explicit. * * * The argument of inconvenience is very strong when the statute is ambiguous and fairly open to two constructions.” (See sec. 321 of the work cited.)
The well-known doctrine of inconvenience is upheld by Black on Interpretation of laws, Endlich on the Interpretation of Statutes, and by every other author that we have consulted on statutory interpretation and construction. Of course it only applies when the statute sought to be interpreted is doubtful or ambiguous or fairly open to more than one construction. By consulting the roster of the Navy of the United States it will be found that some 600 officers have been appointed to the Navy from civil life. Inasmuch as these officers are on the roster of the Navy, may we not assume that the court will take judicial notice of the fact when attention is called thereto?
If the interpretation that the claimant’s counsel seek to place upon the statute under consideration is the correct one, and the court should so find, it undoubtedly would open the doors of the United States Treasury to nearly all of these 600 officers for claims of like nature to the one under consideration. And if each of their claims were as large as claimant’s demand, they would draw from the Treasury some $2,000,000 in the nature of an absolute gratuity granted by the United States.
Such a construction wTould disturb preexisting laws, and it is always presumed that legislatures do not intend to make unnecessary changes in preexisting laws unless that intention is clear, plain, and unequivocal.
Again, such a construction of the statute would entail endless confusion in readjusting the pay of each one of those 600 officers of the Navy appointed from civil life so that each of them could receive his proper proportion of increased pay by reason of being credited with live years’ service at the date of his appointment.

Opinion:
Peelle, J.,
delivered the opinion of the court:
The question in this case is the same which was involved in the Royce case, decided adversely to claimant at the present term of court (36 C. Cls. R., 328), and but for the earnestness and ability with, which the claimant's counsel contends that the court erred in applying the rules it did in the interpretation of the statute, upon which the claimant bases his right to recover, we should let this case follow the Royce case without comment.
The statute referred to is section 13 of the act of March 3, 1899 (30 Stat. L., 1004, 1007), and reads as follows:
"That after June thirtieth, eighteen hundred and ninety-nine, commissioned officers of the line of the Navy and of the Medical and Pay Corps shall receive the same pay and allowances, except forage, as are or may be provided by or in pursuance of law for the officers of corresponding rank in the Army: Prodded, That such officers when on shore duty shall receive the alloAvances, but fifteen per centum less pay than when on sea duty; but this provision shall not apply to warrant officers commissioned under section twelve of this act: Provided further, That when naval officers are detailed for shore duty beyond seas they shall receive the same pay and allowances as áre or may be provided by or in pursuance of law for officers of the Army detailed for duty in similar places: Provided further, That naval chaplains who do not possess relative rank shall have the rank of lieutenant in the Navy; and that all officers, including warrant officers, who have been or may be appointed to the Navy from civil life shall, on the date of appointment, be credited, for computing their pay, with five years' service. And all provisions of law authorizing the distribution among captors of the whole or any portion of the proceeds of vessels, or any property hereafter captured, condemned as prize, or providing for the payment of bounty for the sinking or destruction of vessels of the enemy hereafter occurring in time of war, are hereby repealed: And provided further, That no provision of this act shall operate to reduce the present pay of any commissioned officer now in the Navy; and in any case in which the pay of such an officer would otherwise be reduced he shall continue to receive pa}7 according to existing law: And provided further, That nothing in this act shall operate to increase or reduce the pay of any officer now on the retired list of the Navy."
The claimant grounds his right to recover the difference between the pay he received under Revised Statutes, section 1566, during his first five years' service, and the amount he now claims, under the third proviso to the act quoted.
In the construction of that proviso, in connection with the section and the purpose of the act as we conceive it, the court in the Royce case reached the conclusion that the words "after June thirtieth, eighteen hundred and ninety-nine," were intended by the Congress to apply to all the officers mentioned in the section.
But in the Royce case, as in this, the claimant was receiving his maximum pay long before the act was passed, and so whether the claimant's rights became consummate upon the approval of the act or after June 30, 1899, is immaterial in this case.
In reaching the conclusion in that case, we did not intend to depart from the well-known rule of interpretation that the province of the court " is to declare what the law is, and not, under the guise of interpretation or under the influence of what may be surmised to be the policy of the Government, so to depart from sound rules of construction as in effect to adjudge that to be law which Congress has not enacted as such." (Dewey v. United States, 178 U. S., 521.)
We endeavored to follow the meaning of the language in the setting which the Congress gave — i. e., to construe the proviso, not independently of the purpose of the act or of the section of which it forms a part, but in connection there with; and while the construction we gave, if sustained, will operate to give increased pay to all officers of the Navy appointed from civil life who were not receiving-their maximum pay on June 30, 1899, it will exclude those who were receiving their maximum pay on that date.
Had the proviso omitted the words "who have been," then only those thereafter appointed would have been entitled to the increased pay, while those appointed less than five years prior thereto would have received less pay than those thereafter appointed.
The words, we think, are satisfied by construing them as applying to all those officers theretofore appointed from civil life who were not on June 30,1899, receiving their maximum pay, and this, we still think, was the purpose and intent of the Congress, and this conclusion we reached, not, as counsel say, by "rules of interpretation based on considerations outside the terms of the statute," but from the language used in connection with the whole section and evident purpose of the act.
The subject-matter of the proviso in question pertains to the rank of chaplains and to.the basis for computing the pay of "all officers, including warrant officers, who have been or may be appointed to the Navy from civil life;" and the purview or body of the section refers to the pay of "commissioned officers of the line of the Navy and of the Medical and Pay corps," many of whom — nearly all from the Medical Corps — were appointed from civil life, while the chaplains, the majority of the professors of mathematics, nearly all the civil engineers, and other officers were appointed from civil life.
So that the language of the proviso, " all officers who have been or may be appointed to the Navy from civil life," clearly includes those officers mentioned in the body of the section who were appointed from civil life.
If, therefore, the claimant's contention should prevail, those officers so appointed whose 'pay was increased after June 30, 1899, bjr assimilation to army pay, would, in addition thereto, bo entitled to receive from the date of appointment a gratuity of five years' additional pay, thereby fixing in the same section two distinct dates for- the beginning of the pay of the same officers. We can not believe that the Congress so intended.
The purpose of the act as expressed in the title thereto is "An act to reorganize and increase the efficiency of the personnel of the Navy and Marine Corps of the United States;" and while the body of an act can not be control led or restrained by the title, it may be referred to in connection Avith the language of the act to ascertain the meaning of the statute where the language is susceptible of different constructions. (Church v. United States, 143 U. S., 457-462.)
It can hardly be contended that the payment of a gratuity has anything to do with the reorganization or the increase of the efficiency of the personnel of the Navy.
An analysis of the statute shoAvs that the purposes were to transfer the officers constituting the Engineer Corps to the line of the Navy, defining their duties and how they shall take rank; defining the active list of the line of the Navy, retirement of officers, the pay of officers of the line and of the Medical and Pay corps; fixing the basis for the payment of officers appointed from civil life; repealing the prize and bounty laws; fixing the term olj, enlistment of enlisted men; providing for their retirement; defining the active list of the line officers of the Marine Corps and how vacancies therein shall be filled, and Avhat officers shall constitute the staff, etc., and repealing all acts in conflict therewith.
We must presume that the Congress were familiar with the rules relating to the construction of statutes; and in this connection the first thing to notice is that the presumption is against retrospective legislation. It is not looked upon with favor, and should not be applied where the language used is susceptible of another meaning. (Southerland on Statutory Construction, sec. 463 et seq.; Endlich on the Interpretation of Statutes, sec. 210 et seq.)
Or, as Ave said in the Royce case:
"Even though the language used would seem upon other principles of interpretation to require retroactive construction, yet in the absence of a clearly expressed intent to the contrary the presumption is against it." (Endlich on the Interpretation of Statutes, sec. 272 et seq.)
In the case of Murray v. Gibson (15 How., 422-423), concerning the construction of a statute in Mississippi limiting suits on judgments recovered out of that State, holding that such statute did not apply to judgments recovered before its passage, the court said:
"As a general rule for the interpretation of statutes, it may be laid down that they never should be allowed a retroactive operation where this is not required by express command or by necessary or inevitable implication. Without such command or implication they speak and operate upon the future only." Harvey v. Tyler (2 Wall., 328-347), United States v. Alexander (12 Wall., 177-179), Twenty Per Cent Cases (20 Wall., 179-187), and United States v. Moore (95 U. S., 760-763).
In the case of the United States v. Burr (159 U. S., 78-87), involving the construction of section 1 of the tariff act of 1894, which took effect August 28, 1894, providing that on and after the 1st day of August, 1894, there shall be levied, collected, and paid upon articles imported from foreign countries the rates of duties therein prescribed, the court, in the construction of that section, and the similar language in section 2, as to what articles shall bo exempt from dutir, held that "in our judgment the word 'shall ' spoke for the future and was not intended to apply to transactions completed when the act became a law."
In the case of United States v. Moore (supra) the court says:
"A thing may bo within the letter of the statute and not within its meaning, and it majr be within the meaning though not within the letter. "
And so in the present case, while the words of the third proviso of section 13 standing alone might justify the construction for which the claimant contends, yet considering the purpose of the act and the language of the section of which the proviso is a part, we think the meaning is that after June 30, 1899, "all officers, including warrant officers, who have been or maybe appointed to the Navjr from civil life shall, on the day of appointment, be credited, for computing their pay, with five years' service," thereby fixing the beginning of the pay of all officers so appointed after June 30, 1899.
For the reasons we have given the petition is dismissed.