Case Name: STATE of New Mexico, Petitioner, v. Richard Edward WILLIAMS, Respondent
Court: Supreme Court of New Mexico
Jurisdiction: New Mexico
Decision Date: 1982-03-24
Citations: 97 N.M. 634
Docket Number: No. 13574
Parties: STATE of New Mexico, Petitioner, v. Richard Edward WILLIAMS, Respondent.
Judges: EASLEY, C. J., and FEDERICI and RIORDAN, JJ., concur.
Reporter: New Mexico Reports
Volume: 97
Pages: 634–640

Head Matter:
642 P.2d 1093
STATE of New Mexico, Petitioner, v. Richard Edward WILLIAMS, Respondent.
No. 13574.
Supreme Court of New Mexico.
March 24, 1982.
Jeff Bingaman, Atty. Gen., Charles F. Noble, Marcia E. White, Asst. Attys. Gen., Santa Fe, for petitioner.
Martha A. Daly, Appellate Defender, Santa Fe, for respondent.

Opinion:
OPINION
PAYNE, Justice.
The defendant was convicted of armed robbery with firearm enhancement, con trary to Sections 30-16-2 and 31-18-4, N.M.S.A.1978. The Court of Appeals reversed on grounds that evidence obtained pursuant to an improper search of the defendant's car directly undermined the defendant's claim of insanity and should have been suppressed. The search was made without a warrant and the court concluded that it neither was made under exigent circumstances nor satisfied the requirements of an inventory search. We disagree with the latter conclusion and affirm the conviction.
On May 6, 1979, the defendant displayed a gun and forced a cashier to empty three separate cash registers at a grocery store. The cashier placed the money in a grocery bag which he carried from register to register. While the cashier was emptying a fourth register, a customer, wielding a gun, directed the defendant to set his weapon down on the counter. Shortly thereafter, the defendant was arrested and taken to the police station for booking. During booking, an officer found a set of keys in the defendant's pocket and, without obtaining a warrant, returned to the store to locate the defendant's car. The officer found the car locked and legally parked behind the grocery store. He then conducted an inventory search of its contents. Among the items inventoried were a map marked with an "escape route" and a checkbook showing a negative balance. These were seized by the officer.
The trial court denied a motion to suppress the seized evidence with the following statement:
The City or the police department have an obligation to protect the vehicle, to protect the inventory, and to hold them responsible in excess of the normal responsibility would be unfair to them. They have to inventory, and if they don't inventory they could be liable for the loss, and they must remove the vehicle from its location because of the possibility of danger. It was taken in accordance with the regulations. Unless there is something that is given to the Court that the Court would have notice that there was a violation of the procedures or something else was done that is not in accordance with their inventory procedure, then the Court is going to deny the motion.
We limit our discussion of the search to a determination of whether it was a proper inventory search. An inventory search of an automobile is constitutional if three requirements are met: 1) the vehicle to be inventoried is in police control or custody; 2) the inventory is made pursuant to established police regulations; and 3) the search is reasonable. State v. Ruffino, 94 N.M. 500, 612 P.2d 1311 (1980).
The defendant does not assert that his vehicle was not in police control and custody. Other courts have held in similar situations that such custody of personal property is proper. United States v. Staller, 616 F.2d 1284 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 869, 101 S.Ct. 207, 66 L.Ed.2d 89 (1980); United States v. Gravitt, 484 F.2d 375 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1135, 94 S.Ct. 879, 38 L.Ed.2d 761 (1974); United States v. Rosenberg, 458 F.2d 1183 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 868, 93 S.Ct. 166, 34 L.Ed.2d 117 (1972). Rather, his challenge goes to the further requirement that custody "must be based on some legal ground and there must be some nexus between the arrest and the reason for the impounding. Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 84 S.Ct. 881, 11 L.Ed.2d 777 (1964); United States v. Lawson, 487 F.2d 468 (8th Cir. 1973)." Id. at 502, 612 P.2d at 1313 (footnote omitted). The Preston case was decided on the basis that the search "was too remote in time or place to have been made as incidental to the arrest." Preston, supra at 368, 84 S.Ct. at 883. That search was never characterized as an "inventory search;" indeed, the manner of search — entering the trunk through the back seat of the car — distinguishes it from the type of search involved in the instant case. The only relevance of Preston to inventory search cases is in its example of a nexus between the arrest and the impoundment. In Preston, the defendants were arrested for vagrancy while sitting in their parked car. Upon this arrest, the police properly took custody of the vehicle, even though they presumedly could have locked it and left it parked where it was. United States v. Lawson, supra, also cited in Ruffino, involved an arrest for passing insufficient funds checks. The defendants' vehicle was locked and parked in a motel parking lot. It was impounded and taken to the police station on the day of the arrest. The next day an inventory search was performed. There was no suggestion that the impoundment was improper.
Preston and Lawson, as examples of impoundments incident to the respective arrests, indicate that while there must be some nexus between the arrest and the reason for the impounding, that nexus need only be reasonable. In neither of those cases could the impoundment be characterized as necessary because the car was a traffic hazard, Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 93 S.Ct. 2523, 37 L.Ed.2d 706 (1973), or because it was violating a parking ordinance, South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 96 S.Ct. 3092, 49 L.Ed.2d 1000 (1976). Therefore, Preston and Lawson were cited in Ruffino as illustrations that no compelling need must be present to justify impoundment of a vehicle incident to an arrest.
Accordingly, we hold that the first Ruffino requirement was satisfied in this case. When the officer returned to locate the defendant's car, as directed by his supervisors, he was authorized to take custody for the purpose of having it towed. Thus, the vehicle was in police control and custody. The possible use of the vehicle as evidence of the crime, discussed more fully infra, supplies the necessary nexus between the arrest and the reason for impounding. The fact that the vehicle was legally parked and could have been left there does not make the impoundment improper.
The second Ruffino requirement, that the inventory must be made pursuant to established police regulations, was considered by the trial court. The defendant claimed that the officer did not follow the following police department standard operating procedure:
314.02 The owner/operator of a vehicle has the right to select a wrecker of his choice or to release his vehicle to a qualified driver present at the scene or to legally park the car unless:
A. He is physically or mentally incapable of doing so.
B. The vehicle is needed as evidence of a crime.
The defendant was afforded no such choice.
The State argues that the vehicle was a means of escape, and therefore was needed as evidence of the crime. Until the officer actually located a car with license plates from the defendant's home state and which could be opened with the defendant's keys, the very existence of the car was uncertain. Once the car was found, its proximity to the scene of the crime and testimony related to the officer by local residents to the effect that the car had been there only a short while constituted sufficient basis for a conclusion that the vehicle was related to the crime. Hence, there was no need to give the defendant a choice as to disposition of the car.
No other failure to comply with the police regulations was alleged by the defendant. On this evidence, the second Ruffino requirement was satisfied.
The third requirement—that the search be reasonable—has been carefully examined in inventory search cases. See, e.g., Opperman, supra; Dombrowski, supra; Lawson, supra. It is unnecessary to restate the balancing approach to determining the reasonableness of inventory searches. The Lawson case upheld suppression of a gun found in a locked trunk because the only justification for the search of the automobile was its possession by police.
While police custody may justify reasonable measures to protect . property within plain view in the automobile, such reasonable measures do not extend to breaking into a locked trunk.
Id. at 475. While we disagreed with this analysis in Ruffino and specifically permitted trunk searches as part of an inventory procedure, even under the Lawson approach the map and checkbook could have been removed as a protective measure.
We hold that in light of Ruffino, the search made here was reasonable and permissible, and we uphold the trial court's denial of the defendant's suppression motion. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals is reversed.
The defendant raised three additional issues before the Court of Appeals which that court did not reach. Since the remaining issues are easily disposed of, we consider them here.
First, the defendant assigns error to the trial court's refusal to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offense of attempted armed robbery. This claim is based on the fact that the defendant never actually possessed the money nor left the store with it. The implication is that the defendant never "carried away" the money, which is an essential element of armed robbery. N.M.U. J.I.Crim. 16.11, N.M.S.A.1978. N.M.U.J.I. Crim. 16.02 defines "carried away" as "moving the property from the place where it was kept or placed by the owner." The instant the cashier, under the defendant's coercion, removed the money from the first register, this element was satisfied. There is no evidence to justify a jury finding that this element was not met. There was no error in refusing the instruction.
Second, the defendant assigns error to the trial court's refusal to instruct the jury on the definition of mental disease. Although the general insanity instruction, N.M.U.J.I.Crim. 41.00, N.M.S.A.1978, was given, the defendant claims the instruction was incomplete here because, while the instruction mentions mental disease, it fails to define what a mental disease is. N.M.U.J.I. Crim. 41.00 adequately instructed the jury on insanity and the trial court did not err in refusing the defendant's tendered instruction. See State v. Blakely, 90 N.M. 744, 568 P.2d 270 (1977).
Finally, the defendant would have us reverse because the trial court refused to instruct the jury as to the consequences of a verdict of not guilty by reason of ifisanity. This was a proper refusal. State v. Luna, 93 N.M. 773, 606 P.2d 183 (1980); State v. Chambers, 84 N.M. 309, 502 P.2d 999 (1972).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
EASLEY, C. J., and FEDERICI and RIORDAN, JJ., concur.
SOSA, Senior Justice, respectfully dissenting.