Case Name: Mikal D. MAHDI, Petitioner, v. STATE of South Carolina, Respondent
Court: Supreme Court of South Carolina
Jurisdiction: South Carolina
Decision Date: 2009-06-15
Citations: 383 S.C. 135
Docket Number: No. 26671
Parties: Mikal D. MAHDI, Petitioner, v. STATE of South Carolina, Respondent.
Judges: WALLER, BEATTY and KITTREDGE, JJ., concur.
Reporter: South Carolina Reports
Volume: 383
Pages: 135–140

Head Matter:
678 S.E.2d 807
Mikal D. MAHDI, Petitioner, v. STATE of South Carolina, Respondent.
No. 26671.
Supreme Court of South Carolina.
Heard Feb. 18, 2009.
Decided June 15, 2009.
Appellate Defender Kathrine H. Hudgins, of South Carolina Commission on Indigent Defense, of Columbia, for Petitioner.
Attorney General Henry Dargan McMaster, Chief Deputy Attorney General John W. McIntosh, Assistant Deputy Attorney General Donald J. Zelenka, and Assistant Attorney General J. Anthony Mabry, all of Columbia, and Solicitor David Michael Pascoe, Jr., of Orangeburg, for Respondent.

Opinion:
Justice PLEICONES:
Petitioner pleaded guilty to murder, second degree burglary, and grand larceny. The trial judge imposed a death sentence for murder finding two aggravating circumstances, and consecutive sentences of fifteen years (burglary) and ten years (larceny). This opinion combines the issue raised on certiorari and the sentencing review mandated by S.C.Code Ann. § 16-3-25 (2003). We affirm.
FACTS
On July 15, 2004, petitioner killed an employee while robbing a gas station in North Carolina. Petitioner shot the North Carolina victim twice in the face at point blank range using a gun he had stolen from his grandmother's neighbor. He was driving a vehicle stolen from Virginia, on which he had placed stolen license plates. Two days later, petitioner carjacked a man in Columbia at 3:30 a.m. using the same weapon. Early that same morning, petitioner pulled into the Wilco Travel Plaza located off Interstate 26 in Calhoun County. Employees at the Travel Plaza became suspicious when petitioner was repeatedly unable to purchase gasoline from the pumps, while attempting to use stolen credit and/or check cards. The employees called law enforcement, and when officers arrived, petitioner fled on foot. He ran to a nearby farm property owned by Captain and Mrs. Myers. The Myers did not reside on the rural property, but there was a shed in which they kept equipment and in which Mrs. Myers had an office.
Petitioner found a .22 caliber semi-automatic rifle in the shed where he apparently spent the day. When Captain Myers stopped by the farm that evening, petitioner shot him nine times with the .22: three bullets struck the victim in the head. Petitioner then poured diesel fuel over the body and lit it. He stole Myers' truck and various firearms from the shed and drove to Florida, where he was arrested three days later after a chase.
After a jury was selected but before it was sworn, petitioner elected to enter a guilty plea to the charges of murdering Captain Myers, burglarizing the shed, and stealing the personal property. The trial judge conducted a sentencing hearing, following which he issued an eleven and a half page sentencing order.
ISSUE
Whether petitioner's capital sentence should be reversed because the trial judge improperly based his decision to impose a death sentence on petitioner's assertion of his right to a jury trial, thereby effectively punishing him for exercising this constitutional right?
ANALYSIS
Petitioner's argument relates to the following passage from the sentencing order, which is the last paragraph in the section of the order titled "Mitigating Circumstances:"
The defense further argues as non-statutory mitigating circumstance that the Court should consider the Defendant's guilty plea in determining the appropriate sentence to be imposed. The Defendant's guilty plea occurred during the fourth day of his trial, following jury selection but prior to the jury being sworn. This was one day following his attempted escape through the use of the homemade key. In addition, Mr. Mahdi has failed to demonstrate any remorse for his actions at any point in time known to the Court. Therefore, I conclude that no significant weight should be given to this non-statutory mitigating circum stance in the Court's ultimate decision as to the sentence to be imposed.
Petitioner contends this paragraph, specifically the second sentence, "The Defendant's guilty plea occurred during the fourth day of his trial, following jury selection but prior to the jury being sworn," demonstrates the judge improperly punished petitioner for initially exercising his right to a jury trial. See e.g. State v. Hazel, 317 S.C. 368, 453 S.E.2d 879 (1995) (judge cannot consider defendants exercise of right to jury trial sentencing). The State maintains, to the contrary, that this sentence is merely a factual recitation, or at most a partial explanation why the judge declined to consider the plea as a significant mitigator, but that it is not indicative of any punitive intent. Since, as petitioner conceded at oral argument, there was no objection to this passage at trial, no issue has been preserved for this Court's review. State v. Owens, 378 S.C. 636, 664 S.E.2d 80 (2008) (strict error preservation rules apply to capital cases).
PROPORTIONALITY REVIEW
Pursuant to § 16-3-25(c), we have conducted a proportionality review and find the death sentence was not the result of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor. Furthermore, a review of other decisions demonstrates that petitioner's sentence is neither excessive nor disproportionate. See e.g. State v. Byram, 326 S.C. 107, 485 S.E.2d 360 (1997) (capital sentence upheld where aggravators were burglary and armed robbery).
CONCLUSION
Petitioner's conviction and sentences are
AFFIRMED.
WALLER, BEATTY and KITTREDGE, JJ., concur.
TOAL, C.J., concurring in a separate opinion.
. The Court agreed to issue a writ of certiorari to consider this case since no timely notice of appeal was served. See Ray v. State, 330 S.C. 184, 498 S.E.2d 640 (1998).
. Murder in the commission of a burglary, S.C.Code Ann. § 16 — 3— 20(C)(a)(l)(c) (Supp. 2008) and in the commission of larceny involving the use of a deadly weapon, § 16-3-20(C)(a)(l)(e).
. Captain Myers was a captain with the Orangeburg Department of Public Safety.