Case Name: SENTRY INDEMNITY COMPANY v. SHARIF; and vice versa
Court: Court of Appeals of Georgia
Jurisdiction: Georgia
Decision Date: 1980-12-05
Citations: 156 Ga. App. 828
Docket Number: 60016, 60017
Parties: SENTRY INDEMNITY COMPANY v. SHARIF; and vice versa.
Judges: Quillian, P. J., McMurray, P. J., and Carley, J., concur. Deen, C. J., concurs specially. Shulman, Banke, Birdsong and Sognier, JJ., dissent.
Reporter: Georgia Appeals Reports
Volume: 156
Pages: 828–837

Head Matter:
60016, 60017.
SENTRY INDEMNITY COMPANY v. SHARIF; and vice versa.

Opinion:
Smith, Judge.
Appellant Sharif brought an action seeking actual and punitive damages for appellant's alleged bad faith refusal to pay a claim. The claim arose out of an automobile collision between appellee's son, Mohammed, and a third party. The collision occurred during the period covered by a binder of insurance. At trial, appellant moved for a directed verdict on all issues, its primary contention being that material misrepresentations relating to appellee's son's driving record rendered any contract with appellant void ab initio. See Code § 56-2409. However, the trial court granted appellant's motion solely with respect to punitive damages. The jury awarded appellee $841.29 actual damages, a $210.32 "penalty" charged against the insurer and $1,875.00 in attorney fees. See Code § 56-1206. Appellant brings this appeal, asserting, inter alia, that the trial court erred in denying its motion for directed verdict. Cross-appellant (appellee in the main action) appeals the trial court's direction of a verdict as to punitive damages. On the main appeal, we affirm on condition; otherwise reversed. On the cross-appeal, we affirm.
1. The holding of the Georgia Supreme Court in the recent case of Pearce v. Sou. Guaranty Ins. Co., 246 Ga. 33 (268 SE2d 623) (1980) controls the issues raised in appellant's first enumeration of error. In Pearce, 35, supra the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 36 (Code Ann. § 24-4536), certified the following question to the Georgia Supreme Court: " 'After the effective date of the Georgia No-Fault Act (Georgia Motor Vehicle Reparations Act, Georgia Laws 1974, pp. 113, et seq., Ga. Code Ann., Chapter 56-34B), can an automobile insurance policy providing basic third-party liability insurance and basic personal injury benefits, issued to a Georgia resident, be voided ab initio based upon misrepresentations made in the application for the insurance, as provided by Ga. Code Ann. § 56-2409, after an automobile accident giving rise to a claimed loss?' " Southern Guaranty Insurance Co. v. Pearce, 607 F2d 146, 147-148 (5th Cir. 1979). The Georgia Supreme Court answered in the negative. Pearce v. Sou. Guaranty Ins. Co., supra.
We note that, in Pearce, the formal insurance policy had been issued prior to the collision, whereas, in the case at bar, appellee had only a binder at the time of the collision. However, this factual dissimilarity does not render the holding in Pearce inapplicable to the instant case. The binder was a contract of insurance. See Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Stuart, 139 Ga. App. 80, 81-82 (227 SE2d 771) (1976). Moreover, the rationale employed by the court in Pearce would apply to all insurance contracts providing applicable coverage regardless of whether such coverage exists by formal policy or by binder. See Ga. L. 1974, pp. 113, 123 as amended (Code Ann. § 56-3412b).
As we are bound by the Supreme Court's holding in Pearce, we must hold that the defense afforded by Code § 56-2409 is unavailable to appellant.
2. Appellee is not entitled to punitive damages and attorney fees pursuant to Code § 56-1206. "The proper rule is that the judgment should be affirmed if there is any evidence to support it unless it can be said as a matter of law that there was a reasonable defense which vindicates the good faith of the insurer." Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co. v. McClain, 243 Ga. 263, 265 (253 SE2d 745) (1979); State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Mills Plumbing Co., 152 Ga. App. 531, 538 (263 SE2d 270) (1979). Appellant's refusal to páy áppellee's claim preceded the Supreme Court's ruling in Pearce v. Sou. Guaranty Ins. Co., supra. In view of the misrepresentations contained in the application for insurance, we find, as a matter of law, that there was a reasonable defense which vindicates the good faith of the insurer. Interstate Life & Acc. Ins. Co. v. Williamson, 220 Ga. 323 (138 SE2d 668) (1964). "The judgment is therefore affirmed on condition that the plaintiff write off the . . . penalty and attorney fees; otherwise reversed." Ga. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Troupe, 154 Ga. App. 108, 110 (267 SE2d 834) (1980).
3. The remaining enumerations of error presented in the main appeal are either without merit or rendered moot by our holdings in Divisions 1 and 2 of this opinion.
Argued June 2, 1980
Decided December 5, 1980
Rehearings denied December 19, 1980
Richard B. Eason, Jr., Carolyn J. Kennedy, for appellant.
Thomas B. Murphy, Jack F. Witcher, for appellee.
4. Even assuming, as cross-appellant contends, that punitive damages in addition to the 25% penalty allowable under Code § 56-1206 may be recovered in tort, there is no evidence of any tortious conduct on the part of the insurer in this case. Thus, on the cross-appeal, we affirm.
Judgment affirmed on condition; otherwise reversed on main appeal. Judgment affirmed on cross-appeal.
Quillian, P. J., McMurray, P. J., and Carley, J., concur. Deen, C. J., concurs specially. Shulman, Banke, Birdsong and Sognier, JJ., dissent.