Case Name: SEKOT LABORATORIES, INC., Appellant, v. Lawrence P. GLEASON, Jr., Hospital Corporation of America, Allied Clinical Laboratories, Inc., International Clinical Laboratories of Florida, Inc., International Clinical Laboratories of Nashville, Inc., and Dade Immuno-Diagnostics, Inc., Appellees
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1990-06-26
Citations: 585 So. 2d 286
Docket Number: Nos. 89-516, 89-437, 89-435 and 89-433
Parties: SEKOT LABORATORIES, INC., Appellant, v. Lawrence P. GLEASON, Jr., Hospital Corporation of America, Allied Clinical Laboratories, Inc., International Clinical Laboratories of Florida, Inc., International Clinical Laboratories of Nashville, Inc., and Dade Immuno-Diagnostics, Inc., Appellees.
Judges: Before BASKIN, FERGUSON and COPE, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 585
Pages: 286–290

Head Matter:
SEKOT LABORATORIES, INC., Appellant, v. Lawrence P. GLEASON, Jr., Hospital Corporation of America, Allied Clinical Laboratories, Inc., International Clinical Laboratories of Florida, Inc., International Clinical Laboratories of Nashville, Inc., and Dade Immuno-Diagnostics, Inc., Appellees.
Nos. 89-516, 89-437, 89-435 and 89-433.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
June 26, 1990.
On Motion for Rehearing Sept. 17, 1991.
Mark V. Silverio and Robert J. Schaffer, Miami, for appellant.
Donald M. Papy, Kenny, Nachwalter & Seymour and James J. Kenny and Scott E. Perwin, Kelley, Drye & Warren and Beth Ann O’Neill, Baker & McKenzie and Landon K. dayman, Miami, for appellees.
Before BASKIN, FERGUSON and COPE, JJ.

Opinion:
PER CURIAM.
Sekot Laboratories, Inc., plaintiff below, appeals orders dismissing its third amended complaint with prejudice as to all defendants. The dismissals resulted because Sekot filed the third amended complaint beyond the time allowed by the court. We affirm the dismissal but strike so much of the order as indicates the dismissal is with prejudice.
In January and February, 1988 Sekot filed a complaint, and amended complaint, against a former employee, Lawrence P. Gleason, Jr., and two of Gleason's subsequent employers, Hospital Corporation of America ("HCA"), and Allied Clinical Laboratories, Inc. By leave of court, in June, 1988 Sekot filed a second amended complaint which added two new defendants, International Clinical Laboratories of Florida, Inc. and International Clinical Laboratories of Nashville, Inc. ("International"). International filed a tardy motion to dismiss. The parties submitted an agreed order granting International's motion and allowing Sekot until November 22, 1988, to amend. In the meantime Sekot moved for leave to add a new defendant, Dade Immu-no-Diagnostics, Inc., but apparently did not obtain a ruling on the motion.
On November 18, 1988, Sekot moved for an additional 20 days time to file the third amended complaint. On December 21, Sek-ot filed a document apparently intended to inform counsel that Sekot was still working on the third amended complaint and requesting "forbearance . until January 10, 1989."
On January 3,1989 Sekot served its third amended complaint, containing amended allegations as to all defendants. The third amended complaint also joined Dade Immu-no-Diagnostics as a new defendant. All defendants moved to dismiss. International moved to dismiss with prejudice under Rule 1.140, Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, for failure to state a cause of action. The other defendants moved to dismiss without prejudice, under Rules 1.140 and 1.420, Florida Rules of Civil Procedure.
At the hearing on Gleason's motion to dismiss, several defendants argued that the order granting twenty days' leave to amend had automatically become a dismissal with prejudice upon expiration of the time allowed. The trial court agreed and dismissed the third amended complaint with prejudice, pursuant to Rule 1.420(b), Florida Rules of Civil Procedure. The court thereafter dismissed with prejudice as to all other defendants, including the newly-joined Dade Immuno-Diagnostics.
The trial court erred by dismissing with prejudice. An order granting leave to amend permits the party to amend; it does not require it. See Edward L. Nezelek, Inc. v. Sunbeam Television Corp., 413 So.2d 51, 54 (Fla. 3d DCA), review denied, 424 So.2d 763 (Fla.1982). From a procedural standpoint, "[o]nce a court has dismissed a complaint with leave to amend, it cannot subsequently dismiss with prejudice for failure to timely amend unless (1) separate notice is given to plaintiff of the hearing on the motion to dismiss with prejudice, or (2) the order dismissing the complaint with leave to amend specifically provides that on failure to amend within the stated time, the cause will be dismissed without further notice." Neu v. Turgel, 480 So.2d 216, 217 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985), cause dismissed, 486 So.2d 598 (Fla.1986); accord Edward L. Nezelek, Inc. v. Sunbeam Television Corp., 413 So.2d at 54-55.
Taking point (2) of Neu first, the order on International's motion to dismiss granted leave to amend. It did not specify that there would be a dismissal with prejudice in the event the plaintiff failed to amend within the time allowed. There was, therefore, no basis for defendants' argument that the failure to timely amend automatically ripened into a dismissal with prejudice.
Defendants argue, however, that under point (1) of Neu, the dismissal with prejudice is sustainable because they gave notice of the hearing on the motions to dismiss, thus satisfying the "separate notice" requirement of Nezelek, 413 So.2d at 54. For two reasons, we disagree. First, no defendant moved to dismiss with prejudice pursuant to Rule 1.420(b). The only motion to dismiss with prejudice was filed by International. That motion traveled under Rule 1.140, and raised wholly different issues. The notice requirements of Neu and Nezelek were therefore not met.
Second, assuming arguendo that the notice requirements were met, this was not a proper case for dismissal with prejudice. Defendants proceed on the assumption that once notice of the hearing is given under Nezelek, they are entitled to dismissal with prejudice under Rule 1.420(b) as a matter of right. That is not so. Such a motion is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court and is reviewable for abuse of discretion. Where a court has permitted an amendment, the failure to amend timely is most nearly analogous to a failure to prosecute the action, which is the classic case for a dismissal without prejudice. Under the logic of Neu, such a dismissal is presumptively a dismissal without prejudice. In appropriate circumstances, a dismissal with prejudice will be sustained, but this is not such a case.
In the present case Sekot filed a timely motion for extension of time, which expired December 12. Appellees concede that the request for additional time was reasonable and that there was no basis on which to oppose an extension to that date or to the filing date of January 3. No appellee has been able to show any prejudice by reason of the delay. It was, of course, Sekot's burden to move for additional time where needed. Assuming a sanction was appropriate, dismissal without prejudice was as severe a sanction as could be justified. In the present case the delay was short, and it was abundantly clear at all times that the plaintiff intended to go forward. See Kerry's Bromeliad Nursery, Inc. v. Reiling, 561 So.2d 1305 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990); D'Best Laundromat, Inc. v. Janis, 508 So.2d 1325, 1326 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987), and cases cited therein.
We affirm the orders of dismissal but reverse insofar as they dismissed with prejudice.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part.
The limitation period had not run, so the effect was not that of dismissal with prejudice.