Case Name: STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Michael Randy MILES, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1999-01-27
Citations: 732 So. 2d 350
Docket Number: No. 97-3606
Parties: STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Michael Randy MILES, Appellee.
Judges: LAWRENCE, J., CONCURS.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 732
Pages: 350–356

Head Matter:
STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Michael Randy MILES, Appellee.
No. 97-3606
District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
Jan. 27, 1999.
Rehearing Denied April 16, 1999.
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, and Stephen R. White, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
Barry W. Beroset of Beroset & Keene, Pensacola, for Appellee.

Opinion:
JOANOS, J.
The State of Florida appeals an order in which the trial court ruled that the state will not be entitled to a presumption pursuant to section 316.1934, Florida Statutes (1995), in its prosecution of appellee on charges of driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI)/manslaughter, vehicular homicide, DUI causing personal injury, and DUI causing property damage. We affirm the trial court's ruling, with the proviso that the state will be entitled to the statutory presumptions of impairment subject to the qualifications outlined below. In addition, we certify a question of great public importance to the Florida Supreme Court.
The issue in this case concerns one of the rules promulgated by the Florida Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE) to implement the provisions known as Florida's implied consent law. "The implied consent law.consists of sections 316.1932, 316.1933, and 316.1934, Florida Statutes, which essentially, require all persons accepting a license to drive in Florida to consent to a blood-alcohol test upon being arrested for driving under the influence." See Robertson v. State, 604 So.2d 783, 789, n. 4 (Fla.1992). Appellee, the defendant in the criminal prosecution, filed a motion to suppress or alternative motion in limine to exclude the results of his blood-alcohol test due to the alleged inadequacy of the FDLE regulations for the collection of blood samples. The challenged rule, Florida Administrative Code Rule 1ÍD-8.012, provides:
11D-8.012 Blood Samples — Labeling and Collection.
(1) All blood sample vials or tubes shall be labeled with the following information:
(a) Name of person tested;
(b) Date and time sample collected;
(c) Initials of personnel collecting the sample.
(2) Cleansing of the person's skin in collecting of the blood sample shall be performed with a non-alcoholic antiseptic solution.
(3) Blood samples shall be collected in a vial or tube containing an anticoagulant substance. Said vial or tube shall be stoppered or capped to prevent loss by evaporation.
Appellee maintained the rule promulgated by the FDLE failed to ensure the scientific reliability of the test results, in that Rule 11D-8.012 fails to provide for proper collection, storage, and transportation of blood samples.
At the hearing on appellee's motion to suppress or to exclude the blood-alcohol test results, an FDLE expert witness testified that Rule 11D-8.012 is brief but adequate. According to the FDLE expert, it is not necessary to provide a methodology for handling a blood sample until such time as it is tested, because the principles for proper handling, transportation, and storage of blood are universally known. The defense expert disagreed, noting, among other things, that the rule does not require the presence of a preservative, and, although an anticoagulant is mentioned in the rule, the rule does not specify an amount of anticoagulant. The defense expert explained that a preservative in the sample prevents change in alcohol concentration, and prevents chemical oxidation of the blood. In the opinion of the defense expert, Rule 11D-8.012 is inconsistent with the core policies of the Florida implied consent law, because the blood collection, storage, and transportation regulations do not provide the scientific guidance necessary to ensure scientific reliability of the test.
The only question raised by appel-lee's motion to suppress or alternative motion to exclude blood-alcohol test results was whether the rule relating to preservation of blood samples drawn pursuant to section 316.1933, Florida Statutes (1995), adequately protects the due process rights of those persons charged with driving under the influence of alcohol. In this regard, the trial court found the rule adopted by the FDLE for collection of blood samples is inadequate to address the core policies of the state to ensure preservation of a blood sample which will result in an accurate analysis. Based on this finding, the trial court ruled the state was not entitled to a presumption under section 316.1934, Florida Statutes. The trial court also denied appellee's motion to suppress or alternative motion to exclude the blood-alcohol test results. Rather, the court ruled that at the trial of this cause, the parties will be permitted to establish or discredit the accuracy of the blood-alcohol test results in accordance with the principles articulated in Robertson v. State, 604 So.2d 783 (Fla.1992).
In Robertson, the supreme court analyzed the implied consent law with particular focus on the principles set forth in State v. Bender; 382 So.2d 697 (Fla.1980). The court explained—
Bender noted that, prior to the adoption of the implied consent law, scientific test results for intoxication were admissible
if a proper predicate established that (1) the test was reliable, (2) the test was performed by a qualified operator with the proper equipment and (3) expert testimony was presented concerning the meaning of the test.
See Robertson, 604 So.2d at 789, quoting Bender, 382 So.2d at 699. The former procedure required the state to establish the Bender predicate in every case. "If the state failed to do so, the evidence was not admissible." See Robertson, 604 So.2d at 789. Under the implied consent law, if the state follows the prescribed "checklist," a trial court's determination that the state has established the predicate is presumed correct. Although the defense still has the opportunity to rebut the presumption created by the statute, the burden would rest upon the defense to prove the point. See id., at 789, n. 6.
Robertson also instructs that the implied consent law does not constitute the only means by which blood-alcohol test results may be admitted into evidence. In the event the state lays the three-pronged predicate described in Bender, and successfully withstands any and all defense rebuttal, the evidence is deemed scientifically reliable, hence admissible. After admissibility has been determined in accordance with the common law principles, it seems, and we hold, that the legislatively created presumptions with respect to impairment are applicable to the blood-alcohol test results which have been determined to be admissible into evidence. However, because of the importance of this issue which is not entirely clear, we certify the following to the Florida Supreme Court as a question of great public importance:
Where the state lays the three-pronged predicate for admissibility of blood-alcohol test results in accordance with the analysis set forth in Robertson v. State, 604 So.2d 783 (Fla.1992), thereby establishing the scientific reliability of the blood-alcohol test results, is the state entitled to the legislatively created presumptions of impairment?
Accordingly, the trial court's ruling is affirmed, subject to the qualifications expressed herein.
LAWRENCE, J., CONCURS.
WOLF, J., CONCURS IN PART AND DISSENTS IN PART WITH WRITTEN OPINION.
. The rules implementing the implied consent law formerly were promulgated by the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services. Effective July 1, 1992, the legislature transferred the implied consent program to the FDLE. See Ch. 92-58, § 20, Laws of Fla. The rules promulgated by the FDLE became effective October 31, 1993.
. The core policies of the implied consent law are to ensure scientific reliability of the tests, and to protect the health of test subjects. See Robertson, 604 So.2d at 789, n. 5.
.In view of the narrow issue for determination, the trial court did not receive evidence regarding the reliability of the testing procedure employed in this case. Although the absence of evidence of the underlying facts distinguishes this case from Mehl v. State, 632 So.2d 593 (Fla. 1993), we conclude the trial court's ruling was consistent with the principles pronounced in Mehl.