Case Name: STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Belinda Joy KELLEY, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1991-08-08
Citations: 588 So. 2d 595
Docket Number: No. 90-259
Parties: STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Belinda Joy KELLEY, Appellee.
Judges: NIMMONS, J., specially concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 588
Pages: 595–600

Head Matter:
STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Belinda Joy KELLEY, Appellee.
No. 90-259.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
Aug. 8, 1991.
On Appellee’s Application for Rehearing Nov. 1, 1991.
Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., and Gypsy Bailey, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellant.
John F. Daniel, of Daniel & Komarek, Chartered, Panama City, for appellee.

Opinion:
ON REHEARING
ERVIN, Judge.
Upon considering appellant's motion for rehearing, we withdraw our previously released decision and subtitute the following therefor.
The state appeals a final order granting appellee's motion for judgment of acquittal after the jury verdict, arguing that the prosecution presented sufficient circumstantial evidence in appellee's manslaughter trial to rebut her hypothesis of innocence, i.e., self-defense. We agree and therefore reverse and remand with directions to reinstate the jury verdict of guilty of manslaughter and sentence appel-lee in accordance therewith.
Before discussing the merits of the appeal, some discussion is required concerning appellee's contention that appellant had no right to appeal the order granting appel-lee's motion for judgment of acquittal after the jury verdict. Prior to July 1, 1987, the state did not have the right to appeal such orders. State v. Brown, 330 So.2d 535 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976). Effective July 1, 1987, Section 924.07, Florida Statutes, was amended to provide the state with the right to appeal from orders granting judgment of acquittal after a jury verdict. Because the date of the criminal offense in this case was June 1, 1987, the question then arises as to whether the amended statute may be applied so as to grant the state the right to appeal here.
A general rule of statutory construction is that, in the absence of a clear legislative intent to the contrary, a law is presumed to act prospectively. Walker & LaBerge, Inc. v. Halligan, 344 So.2d 239, 241 (Fla.1977). Because the legislature made no clear statement concerning retroactive or prospective application of this statute, see Section 924.07, Florida Statutes (1987), and Chapter 87-243, Sections 46 and 76, Laws of Florida, resort must be made to the rules of statutory construction.
Two exceptions to the general rule against retroactive application exist. The first relates to procedural statutes, which unlike substantive statutes, may be applied retroactively, because no one has a vested interest in any given mode of procedure. Id. at 243. The second relates to remedial statutes. Because such statutes "do not create new or take away vested rights, but only operate in furtherance of the remedy or confirmation of rights already existing, [they] do not come within the legal conception of a retrospective law, or the general rule against retrospective operation of statutes." City of Lakeland v. Catinella, 129 So.2d 133, 136 (Fla. 1961).
A statute conferring a right to appeal upon a litigant relates to a substantive, rather than a procedural right. Vic Potamkin Chevrolet, Inc. v. Bloom, 386 So.2d 286, 289 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980) (Hubbart, J., concurring); Durand v. New Mexico Comm'n on Alcoholism, 89 N.M. 434, 435, 553 P.2d 714, 715 (Ct.App.1976). See also State v. Furen, 118 So.2d 6 (Fla.1960) (substantive rights were created under statute authorizing a right to appeal orders of real estate commission to circuit court). Although a statute creating a substantive right would ordinarily be deemed to operate prospectively, if such statute is considered remedial, it may be given retrospective application. See Rothermel v. Florida Parole & Probation Comm'n, 441 So.2d 663, 664-65 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983). And, as applied specifically to appeals, in the absence of a constitutional provision conferring such right, the legislature may validly repeal such right in that there is no vested right to an appeal. Id.
Because a statute establishing the right to appeal from a particular type of order is one that confers a means to enforce a right or redress an injury, it is apparent that the statutory amendment granting the state the right to appeal from orders granting motions for judgment of acquittal after jury verdicts is remedial, and may, under the circumstances, be applied retroactively. Consequently, we conclude that the state does in fact have the right to appeal the judgment of acquittal entered in the instant case.
Turning to the merits of this appeal, this is a circumstantial evidence case. The evidence presented by the parties is generally the same as that presented at appellee's first trial, which is set forth in Kelley v. State, 543 So.2d 286 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989). The only additional evidence presented was that of defense experts Gerald Doolittle and Terry Lavoy. Doolittle, a professor of psychology and statistics, testified regarding a test he conducted using thirty-two women to determine the amount of time it would take a woman in the same age range as appellee to fire three rounds from the gun in question. He related that when trying to fire the gun quickly, the slowest firing time was 7.5 seconds; the fastest was .85 seconds; and the average time was 1.91 seconds. When attempting to shoot with accuracy, the median firing time was 4.7 seconds.
Terry Lavoy was qualified as an expert in firearm identification, ballistics, and crime scene investigation. He testified that in his opinion appellee.- probably shot the victim from her position on the bed as she contended. He identified a lead smear on the vanity door in the bathroom and opined that one bullet could have struck the victim in the buttock, passed out through the thigh, hit the vanity door, ricocheted off the door and struck a knob, which it broke, and then ricocheted off the knob and entered the bathroom wall. He performed calculations showing that each of the three shots fired could have been fired from the bed, just as appellee contended. He also opined that the evidence was consistent with one shot having struck the victim's arm, causing the victim to turn, which in turn would cause the second shot to enter the victim's buttock. It was his opinion that the victim was standing approximately two feet from the bed when he was shot. He found nothing in the two circular blood stains in the bathroom that suggested a pattern of any sort. He stated that the blood splatters on the bedroom carpet were not inconsistent with a theory that the first shot hit the victim's arm.
It has long been held that when the only proof of guilt is circumstantial, no matter how strongly the evidence may suggest guilt, a conviction cannot be sustained unless the evidence presented is inconsistent with the defendant's hypothesis of innocence. McArthur v. State, 351 So.2d 972, 976 n. 12 (Fla.1977); Fowler v. State, 492 So.2d 1344 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986), review denied, 503 So.2d 328 (Fla.1987). The state is not required, however, to rebut conclusively every possible variation of events which could be inferred from the evidence, but only to introduce competent evidence which is inconsistent with the defendant's theory of events. Once that threshold burden has been met, it becomes the jury's duty to determine whether the evidence is sufficient to exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Law, 559 So.2d 187, 189 (Fla.1989).
In the instant case, the additional evidence submitted on remand by appellee certainly supports her theory of self-defense, i.e., that she shot the victim in the bedroom while he approached her in a threatening manner as she sat on the bed. However, it does not have the effect of negating the state's evidence inconsistent with that theory — evidence including the location of the bullet hole in the bathroom wall, the circular blood splatters, and the use of a powerful firearm with a strong recoil, which supported the state's contention that the three shots were fired in a deliberate rather than fearful manner. See Kelley, 543 So.2d at 287-88. Cf. Holton v. State, 87 Fla. 65, 99 So. 244 (1924) (state's circumstantial evidence did not refute defendant's story in detail). The fact that appellee presented evidence tending to conflict with the state's damaging evidence does not warrant a judgment of acquittal. Davis v. State, 425 So.2d 654 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983); Sands v. State, 403 So.2d 1090 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981).
To summarize: the state met its threshold burden of producing evidence inconsistent with appellee's theory of innocence, and the jury considered all the evidence and concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that appellee committed manslaughter. Because there is legally sufficient evidence in the record to support the jury's verdict, the trial court's order granting judgment of acquittal must be reversed. Cf. Law (quashing district court's ruling regarding defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal and remanding for reinstatement of jury verdict).
REVERSED and REMANDED with instructions that the trial court reinstate the jury's verdict, and enter judgment and sentence accordingly.
NIMMONS, J., specially concurs.
ZEHMER, J., dissents without written opinion.
. In so saying, we find no merit in the ex post facto argument raised. Section 924.07 neither creates a new crime nor increases the punishment therefor. Furthermore, because of our resolution of the issue, we decline to address the question of what the operable date is for the purpose of taking an appeal.