Case Name: Jesse C. CHESTER, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1974-06-26
Citations: 298 So. 2d 529
Docket Number: No. 73-1304
Parties: Jesse C. CHESTER, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: Before CARROLL and HENDRY, JJ., and GOBBIE, EVELYN, Associate Judge.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 298
Pages: 529–534

Head Matter:
Jesse C. CHESTER, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. 73-1304.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
June 26, 1974.
Rehearing Denied Aug. 5, 1974.
Phillip A. Hubbart, Public Defender, and Mark King Leban, Asst. Public Defender, and Kurt Marmar, Legal Intern, for appellant.
Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., and Lance R. Stelzer, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.
Before CARROLL and HENDRY, JJ., and GOBBIE, EVELYN, Associate Judge.

Opinion:
HENDRY, Judge.
On this appeal by the defendant below from conviction of murder in the first degree the appellant contends the court committed error by denying his motions made prior to trial for discharge on the ground that he was not brought to trial within the time required by Rule 3.191 CrPR, 33 F.S. A.
On September 9, 1972, the defendant was arrested and booked on a charge of murder in the first degree. Subsequently he was indicted therefor, on November 14, 1972, and on December S, 1972, the state filed an information charging the same offense. One hundred days after his arrest, on December 18, 1972, the court granted a motion of the defendant for a psychiatric evaluation.
The evaluation of the defendant by various psychiatrists extended 93 days, until March 21, 1973, when a final medical report was filed with the court indicating that the defendant was competent to stand trial. During this considerable delay, according to the medical reports, the defendant was uncooperative with those conducting his evaluation. The court was informed that the defendant was "malingering" and that there was evidence of "conscious distortions of his replies" during psychological testing, and "faked qualities" on his Rorachach Testing.
Thereafter, on August 16, 1973, the defendant filed a pro se motion for discharge under the speedy trial rule. Excluding the time period of the defendant's psychiatric evaluation, a total of 248 days had elapsed since the date upon which the defendant was arrested. This was comprised of the 100 days prior to the time the psychiatric evaluation was ordered, and 148 days subsequent to the time the evaluation period ended until the filing of the motion to discharge. The defendant's motion was denied, and a trial date of September 18, 1973 was set.
Prior to commencement of the trial on September 18, the defendant again moved for a discharge under the speedy trial rule, and the motion was denied. At -that time, another 33 days had elapsed raising the total number of days since the defendant's arrest, exclusive of the evaluation time, to 281.
The defendant then was tried by jury, and a verdict of guilty was returned. The court adjudicated him guilty and imposed a sentence of life imprisonment.
The defendant argues that his motion for discharge should have been granted on the ground that the 180-day period prescribed by Rule 3.191(a)(1) had expired prior to the time he was brought to trial.
The defendant primarily relies on language found in this court's decision in Parks v. State, Fla.App.1973, 278 So.2d 332. Therein, it was indicated that Rule 3.191(d) (2) (iv) provides for a period of "reasonable and necessary delay" during which a defendant may be given a psychiatric evaluation to determine his competency to stand trial.
By dicta in Parks it was further suggested that the 180-day rule still applies when a psychiatric evaluation is ordered, plus a period of reasonable and necessary delay. In that case a total of 184 days had elapsed since the defendant was arrested, exclusive of a 27-day interval for a psychiatric evaluation. We held that a 4-day delay was not shown to be unreasonable and affirmed the convictions.
The defendant herein argues that the delay in his case, excluding the evaluation time, was 281 days, and this period of time constitutes an unreasonable and unnecessary delay.
However, as we read Rule 3.191(d)(2) (iv), the conclusion reached by the defendant is not mandated by the Rule. The rule, in pertinent part, reads as follows:
"When Time May Be Extended: The periods of time established by this Rule may at any time be waived or extended by order of the court . . . (iv) a period of reasonable and necessary delay resulting from proceedings including but not limited to an examination and hearing to determine the mental competency or physical ability of the defendant to stand trial, for hearings or pre-trial motions, for interlocutory appeals, and for trial of other pending criminal charges against the accused."
This portion of Rule 3.191 provides that the time periods established by the speedy trial rule may (1) be waived or (2) extended by order of the court for a reasonable and necessary time so that the competency of the accused to stand trial may be determined, etc. This part of the rule is silent with respect to the question of the 180-day rule.
But, Rule 3.191(d) (3) (i), immediately thereafter, and our Supreme Court's holding in State ex rel. Butler v. Cullen, Fla.1971, 253 So.2d 861, supplies the necessary clarity to (d)(2)(iv). In sum, when the defendant in this case by his defense counsel moved for a psychiatric evaluation and the motion was granted, the 180-day time limitation in the rule was waived and therefore no longer applicable, and the court had the right to set the case for trial within a reasonable time after a "reasonable and necessary delay" for the psychiatric evaluation.
In State ex rel. Butler v. Cullen, supra, Mr. Justice (now Chief Justice) Adkins wrote the following:
"When the continuance was granted and the time limitations set forth in the rule were no longer applicable, the trial judge was nevertheless required to grant petitioners a speedy trial. In the absence of the time limitations specified in the Speedy Trial rule, the right to a speedy trial is necessarily relative. It is consistent with delays and the question of whether a trial date affords petitioners a speedy trial must be determined in the light of the circumstances of the particular case as a matter of judicial discretion. The mere lapse of time before trial is not the only factor to be considered under such circumstances. . " (253 So.2d at p. 863) See also, Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972).
In the instant case, the defendant filed his pro se motion for a discharge on August 16, 1973. His trial commenced on September 18, 1973. The defendant never filed a motion demanding a speedy trial, as provided by 3.191(a)(2), after his motion for a psychiatric evaluation was granted.
Nor did the defendant's motion for discharge allege any prejudice to the preparation of his defense to the criminal charge against him.
In Barker v. Wingo, supra, the United States Supreme Court identified four factors to be considered in assessing whether or not a. particular defendant has been denied his constitutional right to a speedy trial. They are: length of delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant's assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant.
In this light, the defendant's failure to assert his speedy trial right until after he believed the time under Rule 3.191 had expired and his uncooperative attitude during his psychiatric evaluation should be weighed against any possible prejudice, oppressive pretrial incarceration or the anxiety which is attendant to a criminal proceeding. On the facts presented sub jud-ice, we can only conclude the appellant was not denied his right to a speedy trial.
There is a second reason why we think that the 180-day period is inapplicable to this case. As previously stated, the record shows that just prior to the commencement of appellant's trial, his counsel moved to dismiss the charge against him on the grounds that the speedy trial time period had expired.
The court denied the motion after the assistant state's attorney, Mr. O'Donnell, stated to the court that defense counsel, Mr. Pollack, requested both an evaluation and a re-evaluation of the appellant. Mr. O'Donnell stated:
" . . .1 am sure the transcript, if we have it typed up, will bear out Mr. Pollack waived formalities, waived his right to speedy trial when after the first evaluation he came back and indicated that the Defendant was malingering and he was still on medication. Your Honor said well perhaps if we withdraw him from medication and send him back we can get a determination. Mr. Pollack said he would sign a waiver for speedy
It thus appears that the appellant through his counsel waived his right to trial within 180 days on a second occasion. See, State v. Earnest, Fla.App.1972, 265 So.2d 397.
Therefore, for the reasons stated and upon the authorities cited and discussed, the judgment and sentence appealed are affirmed.
Affirmed.