Case Name: G.B. COLVIN III v. COMMITTEE ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
Court: Arkansas Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Arkansas
Decision Date: 1991-04-15
Citations: 305 Ark. 239
Docket Number: 90-184
Parties: G.B. COLVIN III v. COMMITTEE ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
Judges: Dudley and Newbern, JJ., dissent.
Reporter: Arkansas Reports
Volume: 305
Pages: 239–243

Head Matter:
G.B. COLVIN III v. COMMITTEE ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
90-184
806 S.W.2d 385
Supreme Court of Arkansas
Opinion delivered April 15, 1991
Compton, Prewett, Thomas and Hickey, by: Robert C. Compton, for appellant.
Hoover, Jacobs and Storey, by: Lawrence J. Brady, for appellee.

Opinion:
Per Curiam.
This appeal is brought from a decision of the Arkansas Supreme Court Committee on Professional Conduct, suspending for one year the attorney's license of appellant, G.B. Colvin, III, a member of the Arkansas Bar. The committee determined that Colvin was guilty of violating Rules 1.3 and 1.4 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct (Rules) upon the complaint of Tony Reginelli, Jr. Mr. Reginelli complained to the committee based on Colvin's handling of a suit for damages arising from injuries sustained when Reginelli was struck by a crop-dusting plane. Mr. Reginelli alleged that his lawsuit was dismissed with prejudice due to Colvin's failure to respond to requests for admissions and interrogatories within the time allowed by order of the Chicot County Circuit Court.
Colvin raises several points on appeal. He contends he was deprived of due process in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution, that the sanction was too harsh in light of established precedent and the evidence presented to the committee, that the sanction has a chilling effect upon the constitutional rights of indigent criminal defendants and that Colvin should be authorized to continue to serve as deputy prosecuting attorney.
Colvin submits he was deprived of due process by the failure of the committee to give him adequate notice regarding the proceeding against him. We find a flaw in the procedure the committee followed that leads us to conclude that the due process, to which each practitioner is entitled, was not fully accorded.
The committee notified Colvin that his actions appeared to violate certain rules, but it was not until the committee's final decision was rendered that a violation of Rule 1.4 was raised. Since no notice of the charge of Rule 1.4 was given in advance of the committee's proceedings, the finding of a violation of that rule cannot be sustained. Walker v. Supreme Court Committee on Professional Conduct, 275 Ark. 158, 628 S.W.2d 552 (1982).
In Walker, supra, this court found that the committee failed to give appellant notice of a specific rule that he was subsequently charged with violating before the committee's proceeding, so we vacated that particular finding; nevertheless, we left the other findings of the committee undisturbed. That would not be appropriate here. In this case, we have only five ballots in the record to substantiate the committee's vote, however, by affidavit the committee maintains that the outstanding votes of two committee members were acted upon in a subsequent meeting and both were votes to suspend Colvin. The five ballots in the record consist of three votes in favor of a reprimand and two in favor of suspension. So we know the committee was divided as to what sanction to impose, at least in the first juncture of its decision-making process. Also, on appeal Colvin questions the harshness of his sanction for a violation of Rules 1.3 and 1.4, in light of other sanctions imposed by the committee. Hence, we think the situation is different from that in Walker, and we remand the cause to the committee to reconsider the facts and determine the appropriate sanction for a violation of Rule 1.3 only. We do not need to address appellant's remaining points.
Reversed and remanded.
Dudley and Newbern, JJ., dissent.
Brown, J., not participating.
Rule 1.3 provides, " [a] lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence in representing a client,"
Rule 1.4 provides, "[a] lawyer shall keep a client reasonably informed about the status of a matter and promptly comply with reasonable requests for information. A lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation."