Case Name: William V. JONES, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1992-10-14
Citations: 606 So. 2d 709
Docket Number: No. 91-2961
Parties: William V. JONES, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: ERVIN, SMITH, SHIVERS, WIGGINTON, ZEHMER and MINER, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 606
Pages: 709–714

Head Matter:
William V. JONES, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. 91-2961.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
Oct. 14, 1992.
Nancy A. Daniels, Public Defender, Carl S.McGinnes, Asst. Public Defender, Tallahassee, for appellant.
Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., Carolyn J. Mosley, Tallahassee, for appellee.

Opinion:
JOANOS, Chief Judge.
The appellant raises one issue in this appeal. Appellant complains that the trial court erred in imposing habitual felony offender sentences without finding, under section 775.084(l)(a)4., Florida Statutes (1989), that the predicate convictions required for imposition of the habitual offender sentences had not been set aside in post-conviction proceedings. We reverse.
Appellant was convicted of attempted burglary of a dwelling and possession of burglary tools. The state sought to have appellant sentenced as an habitual offender. At the sentencing hearing the State presented evidence that appellant had two prior felony convictions, including the dates of those convictions. The State also presented evidence that appellant had not been pardoned for any of the previous convictions. The trial court made the following findings:
[Ujnder the record presented Mr. Jones is a habitual offender. He has the appropriate prior number of convictions. At least two of those convictions are for burglar[y], and the other for introduction of contraband into a state facility. Those are all felonies, they are timely in the sense of the way they've been presented and have not been excused by the document presented over the signature of the then governor of the state.
Appellant was adjudicated to be a habitual felony offender and sentenced to consecutive five year prison sentences.
Our analysis starts with the habitual felony offender statute. Section 775.084 provides in pertinent part:
(1) As used in this act:
(a) "Habitual felony offender" means a defendant for whom the court may impose an extended term of imprisonment, as provided in this section, if it finds that:
1. The defendant has previously been convicted of any combination of two or more felonies in this state or other qualified offenses;
2. The felony for which the defendant is to be sentenced was committed within 5 years of the date of the conviction of the last prior felony or other qualified offense of which he was convicted, or within 5 years of the defendant's release, on parole or otherwise, from a prison sentence or other commitment imposed as a result of a prior conviction for a felony or other qualified offense, whichever is later;
3. The defendant has not received a pardon for any felony or other qualified offense that is necessary for the operation of this section; and
4. A conviction of a felony or other qualified offense necessary to the operation of this section has not been set aside in any post-conviction proceeding.
(3) . The procedure shall be as follows:
(d) Each of the findings required as the basis for such sentence shall be found to exist by a preponderance of the evidence and shall be appealable to the extent normally applicable to similar findings.
As noted, appellant's sole point on appeal is that the trial court failed to make the finding required by section 775.084(l)(a)4., i.e., that his prior convictions had not been set aside in any post-conviction proceedings.
In our opinion, the mandate of section 775.084(l)(a) is unequivocal. The sentencing court must make a specific finding that the defendant meets each of the criteria of the statute. Walker v. State, 462 So.2d 452, 454 (Fla.1985); Anderson v. State, 592 So.2d 1119 (Fla. 1st DCA1991), review pending, Case No. 79,535. The failure to make such findings constitutes reversible error. Id. The supreme court's opinion in Walker is particularly instructive. The sole issue on appeal in that case was the trial court's alleged failure to "state, as required by statute, the findings upon which he based [the] decision to [impose an habitual offender sentence]." The supreme court rejected the State's argument that an objection was required stating:
We hold that the findings required by section 775.084 are critical to the statutory scheme and enable meaningful appellate review of these types of sentencing decisions. Without these findings, the review process would be difficult, if not impossible. It is clear that the legislature intended the trial court to make specific findings of fact when sentencing a defendant as a habitual offender.
Moreover, the supreme court specified that:
Given this mandatory statutory duty, the trial court's failure to make such findings is appealable regardless of whether such failure is objected to at trial.
Id. at 454.
In this case there is no question that the trial court did not make the finding required by section 775.084(l)(a)4. The State's sole argument in opposition to appellant's argument is that appellant "admitted, at least by implication, that he qualified for sentencing as an habitual offender." In support of that argument the State refers to the following excerpt from the sentencing hearing:
THE COURT: Is he contesting either of these prior—
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Neither of those two, Your Honor, is that correct, Mr. Jones?
[MR. JONES]: Right.
THE COURT: All right. That's a sufficient factual basis for at least the state to request habitual offender.
In our opinion that is not an admission, even implicitly, that appellant qualified as an habitual offender. It is an admission that the appellant had two prior felony convictions. It was not an admission that those convictions had not been set aside. Under section 775.084(l)(a) the trial court is required to make four separate findings. One of those findings is that appellant has two prior felony convictions. Another separate finding is that those convictions have not been set aside.
The dissent argues that our decision in this case and Anderson, upon which appellant relies, are not a proper application of the statute in light of the supreme court's decision in Eutsey v. State, 383 So.2d 219, 226 (Fla.1980). The dissent asserts that Eutsey obviates the need for the findings mandated by the statute unless the appellant (defendant) presents some evidence that the prior convictions have been set aside. In our opinion that is not a proper reading of Eutsey.
In Eutsey the defendant was tried and convicted of burglary of a dwelling. The trial court conducted a hearing to determine whether Eutsey qualified for sentencing as an habitual offender. The trial court, over Eutsey's general objection, admitted into evidence a presentence investigation containing hearsay. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court specifically found:
. that Eutsey is the same person who was convicted of attempted robbery . that he is the same person who was convicted . of burglary in the present case; . that the latter conviction was within five years of the earlier conviction, . that Eutsey had not received a pardon and that his conviction had not been set aside in post-conviction relief proceedings.
Id. at 223. On appeal Eutsey argued, among other things, "that the evidence was insufficient to declare him an habitual offender" and that "the State failed to prove he had not been pardoned . or [the prior conviction] . had not been set aside in a post-conviction proceeding_" Id. at 226. The supreme court rejected the latter argument stating "these are affirmative defenses available to Eutsey, rather than matters required to be proved by the State." Id. at 226. While that language, without more, appears to support the dissent's argument, we believe that language must be read within the factual context of the case and as tempered by the supreme court's decision in Walker five years later, which decision did not mention Eutsey. In Eutsey the trial court made the required findings and the issue was whether there was evidence to support the findings. In this case the issue is not whether there is sufficient evidence to support a finding, had a finding been made by the trial court, but rather whether the lack of a finding altogether requires reversal. Walker and Whitfield unequivocally hold that it does. We do not have authority to rewrite the statute or overrule the supreme court. Were the issue a question of whether there was sufficient evidence to support such a finding, Eutsey might control.
By our opinion in this case and Anderson we do not mean to suggest or require that the state jump through some useless or impossible hoop so that the court can make the required finding. In our opinion the State's burden of going forward with sufficient evidence to support the required finding is minimal. As the Supreme Court's opinion in Eutsey makes clear, hearsay evidence is sufficient. Although we are not actually faced with the issue in this case, since we are remanding this matter for resentencing we offer the following guidance to the trial court. We believe that proof of the prior convictions such as by introduction of duly certified copies of the judgments is sufficient evidence to meet the state's burden and shift the burden of proof to defendant. See State v. Davis, 203 So.2d 160 (Fla.1967). That case held that in proving possession of a weapon by a convicted felon, the state's burden with regard to the prior conviction is discharged when a record of the prior conviction is placed in evidence; thereafter the defendant must establish the invalidity of the conviction. Id. at 163. We believe that if Walker and Eutsey are construed together the same rule of law results. Once the state puts into evidence competent proof of the prior conviction, the trial court can presume it to still be valid, absent contrary evidence from the defendant, and that presumption is a sufficient basis for the trial court to find that the conviction has not been set aside. As in Anderson, we certify the following question to the supreme court as one of great public importance:
Does the holding in Eutsey v. State, 383 So.2d 219 (Fla.1980) that the state has no burden of proof as to whether the convictions necessary for habitual felony offender sentencing have been pardoned or set aside, in that they are "affirmative defenses available to [a defendant]," Eutsey at 226, relieve the trial court of its statutory obligation to make findings regarding those factors, if the defendant does not affirmatively raise, as a defense, that the qualifying convictions provided by the state have been pardoned or set aside?
We reverse appellant's habitual offender sentences and remand this matter to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
ERVIN, SMITH, SHIVERS, WIGGINTON, ZEHMER and MINER, JJ., concur.
ALLEN, J., dissents with opinion in which BOOTH, BARFIELD, WOLF, KAHN and WEBSTER, JJ., concur.
.Although the opinion is not explicit, the PSI apparently contained hearsay statements that Eutsey had a prior felony conviction (at the time of Eutsey's sentence only one prior felony conviction was required for habitual felony offender sentencing). In our experience this is not an uncommon means for the state to prove the predicate felony convictions. E.g., McClendon v. State, 603 So.2d 607 (Fla. 1st DCA1992).
. The supreme court reaffirmed Walker a year later in State v. Whitfield, 487 So.2d 1045, 1046 (Fla.1986), stating that without the requisite statutory findings the sentence is illegal.
. The dissent also relies on Myers v. State, 499 So.2d 895 (Fla. 1st DCA1986). We recede from Myers to the extent it holds that the findings set forth in section 775.084(l)(a) are not required or the failure to make them is harmless.