Case Name: Herman Bloch v. The State
Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1916-11-08
Citations: 81 Tex. Crim. 1
Docket Number: No. 4240
Parties: Herman Bloch v. The State.
Judges: 
Reporter: Texas Criminal Reports
Volume: 81
Pages: 1–21

Head Matter:
Herman Bloch v. The State.
No. 4240.
Decided November 8, 1916.
Rehearing granted March 14, 1917.
1. —Receiving Stolen Propérty — Indictment—Statutes Construed.
Under article 1349, Penal Code, it is an offense to either receive or conceal stolen property knowing it to be stolen, and where the indictment alleged the receiving of stolen property, it was not necessary to allege that he unlawfully and fraudulently concealed the same, and there was no error in refusing to quash the indictment. Following Thurman v. State, 37 Texas Crim. Rep., 646.
2. —Same—Evidence—Bills of Exception.
In the absence of bills of exception, alleged errors in admitting and rejecting testimony can not be reviewed on appeal. Following Owen v. State, 4 Texas Crim. App., 153, and other cases.
3. —Same—Circumstantial Evidence — Charge of Court — Corpus Delicti— Extra-judicial Verbal Confessions.
Where, upon trial of receiving stolen property, the alleged extra-judicial verbal confessions that defendant knew that it was stolen, etc., was simply a circumstance and did not prove the corpus delicti or main fact of the theft, and was, therefore, simply circumstantial evidence, it required a charge thereon. Harper, Judge, and Prendergast, Judge, dissenting.
4. —Same—Rule Stated — Compound Crime — Charge of Court.
WTierever the case is of a compound nature, the rule applies both to the original ease and to its derivative, and where the defendant was charged with receiving stolen property and made extra-judicial verbal confession, both the original and subsidiary offense must be proved, and a charge on circumstantial evidence is required in the absence of direct evidence of the main fact.
5. —Same—Circumstantial Evidence — Confessions—Charge of Court.
Where, upon trial of receiving stolen property, testimony of an extra-judicial verbal confession by the defendant was introduced in evidence, and he did not identify either the original theft, either by positive or circumstantial evidence, •his declaration of receiving the stolen property could only be circumstantial evidence, and a charge thereon was required. Following Kaufman v. State, 70 Texas Crim. Rep., 438. Prendergast, Judge, dissenting.
6. —Same-—Rule Stated — Possession of Property Recently Stolen.
The rule is that where the State relies upon the possession of recently stolen property to show guilt of defendant, it would be nothing more than a case of circumstantial evidence in the absence of direct evidence of the taking in a theft case.
7. —Same—Confession—Circumstantial Evidence — Charge of Court — Rule Stated.
To relieve the court from the necessity of charging on circumstantial evidence, the confession must be that defendant committed the act for which he is then on trial, or the admission must be unequivocal that the defendant did the main fact, and if it is only by a process of inference that it can be determined that there is a confession or admission of the main fact, it is error to fail to submit a charge on circumstantial evidence. Following Beason v. State, 43 Texas Crim. Rep., 442, and other cases.
8. —Same—Rule Stated — Definition of Offense — Charge of Court.
Although the proof shows that the defendant was present at the scene of the offense and he denies guilty participation, and there is no direct proof that he assisted in its commission, it is error to fail to charge on circumstantial evidence, and if defendant was present and participated in the theft, he was not a receiver and could not be convicted of receiving stolen property. Following Early v. State, 50 Texas Crim. Rep., 344.
9. —Same—Rule Stated — Compound Offense — Principal—Receiver—Charge of Court.
The rule seems clear that where there is a compound offense, theft and receiving stolen property, and conviction is sought for receiving stolen property, the theft must be proved with the same cogency as would the guilt of the defendant for receiving the stolen property, and if he was not present but was a conspirator to the transaction and was to receive the stolen property he would be a principal, not a receiver, and the knowledge of the fact of the theft of the property as a receiver thereof, while this could be shown by circumstantial evidence, a charge thereon was, nevertheless, required. Prendergast, Judge, dissenting.
10. —Same—Misconduct of Jury — Affidavits—Motion for Mew Trial.
Morrow, Judge, is inclined to the belief that the affidavits which were made a part of the motion for a new trial and which showed misconduct of the jury, and which are not shown to have been controverted by the' State, are such as to require the granting of the motion for rehearing. Harper, Judge, and Prendergast, Judge, dissenting.
Appeal from the District Court of El Paso. Tried below before the Hon. W. D. Howe, Special Judge.
Appeal from.a conviction of receiving stolen property knowing it to-be stolen; penalty, two years imprisonment in the penitentiary.
The opinion states the case.
P. E. Gardner, M. Scarborough, Hudspeth & Dale, and George E. Wallace, for appellant.
On question of charge on circumstantial evidence: Hunt v. State, 7 Texas Crim. App., 212; Ross v. State, 9 id., 275; Ward v. State, 10 id., 507; Crowell v. State, 24 id., 404; Sullivan v. State, 18 id., 623; Hyden v. State, 31 Texas Crim. Rep., 401; Polanka v. State, 33 id., 634; Pace v. State, 41 id., 203; Jones v. State, 54 id., 37; Goode v. State, 56 Texas Crim. Rep., 418, 120 S. W. Rep., 199; Rix v. State, 33 Texas Crim. Rep., 353; Carlisle v. State, 31 id., 537; Collins and Lindley v. State, 24 Texas Crim. App., 141; Crook v. State, 27 id., 198; Wyvias v. State, 64 Texas Crim. Rep., 236, 142 S. W. Rep., 585; Shockley v. State, 71 Texas Crim. Rep., 475, 160 S. W. Rep., 452; Nichols v. State, 39 Texas Crim. Rep., 80, 44 S. W. Rep., 1091; Lassater v. State, 39 Texas Crim. Rep., 532; Hanks v. State, 56 S. W. Rep., 922; Dysart v. State, 46 Texas Crim. Rep., 52, 79 S. W. Rep., 534.
On question of misconduct of jury: Hogan v. State, 28 S. W. Rep., 949; Tuller v. State, 58 Texas Crim. Rep., 551, 126 S. W. Rep., 1158; Barr v. State, 62 Texas Crim. Rep., 58, 136 S. W. Rep., 454; King v. State, 59 Texas Crim. Rep., 511, 129 S. W. Rep., 626; Jones v. State, 72 Texas Crim. Rep., 496, 163 S. W. Rep., 75; Terry v. State, 38 S. W. Rep., 986; Mitchell v. State, 36 Texas Crim. Rep., 278, 36 S. W. Rep., 456; Hardeman v. State, 53 S. W. Rep., 121; Henderson v. State, 37 Texas Crim. Rep., 79; Drake v. State, 29 Texas Crim. App., 265; Suit v. State, 30 id., 319; Hess v. State, 30 id., 477; Bell v. State, 31 Texas Crim. Rep., 521; Sanders v. State, 60 id., 341; Jones v. State, 173 S. W. Rep., 75; Harris v. State, 76 Texas Crim. Rep., 155, 172 S. W. Rep., 1146; Solis v. State, 76 Texas Crim. Rep., 230, 174 S. W. Rep., 343; Johnson v. State, 71 Texas Crim. Rep., 391.
C. C. McDonald, Assistant Attorney General, for the State.
On question of circumstantial evidence, accomplice, etc.: Wampler v. State, 28 Texas Crim. App., 353; Thompson v. State, 33 Texas Crim. Rep., 217; Kidwell v. State, 35 id., 264; McKinney v. State, 48 id., 402; Tune v. State, 49 id., 445; Perry y. State, 69 Texas Crim. Rep., 644, 155 S. W. Rep., 263; Johnson y. State, 72 Texas Crim. Rep., 387, 162 S. W. Rep., 512.
On question of misconduct of jury and statement of facts: Bailey v. State, 65 Texas Crim. Rep., 1, 144 S. W. Rep., 996; Treadway y. State, 65 Texas Crim. Rep., 308, 144 S. W. Rep., 655; Kinney v. State, 67 Texas Crim. Rep., 175, 148 S. W. Rep., 783; Brewer y. State, 163 S. W. Rep., 622; Lucas v. State, 165 S. W. Rep., 527; Robbins v. State, 70 Texas Crim. Rep., 52, 155 S. W. Rep., 936; Ethridge v. State, 74 Texas Crim. Rep., 635, 169 S. W. Rep., 1152; Merkel v. State, 75 Texas Crim. Rep., 551, 171 S. W. Rep., 738; Dodson v. State, 76 Texas Crim. Rep., 439, 174 S. W. Rep., 1048.

Opinion:
HARPER, Judge.
Appellant was convicted of receiving stolen property, knowing it to be stolen, and his punishment assessed at two years confinement in the State penitentiary.
Appellant sought to quash the indictment on the ground that it did not allege appellant "unlawfully and fraudulently concealed the property," as well as alleging that he unlawfully and fraudulently received it, knowing it to be stolen. Article 1349 makes it an offense to either receive or conceal stolen property, knowing it to be stolen. It is not necessary to do both to be guilty of an offense, but the doing of either is a violation of the law. Thurman v. State, 37 Texas Crim. Rep., 646. The court committed no error in refusing to quash the indictment on the grounds named in the motion.
The motion for a new trial alleges many grounds as error in admit' ting and rejecting testimony, but no bills of exception appear in the record in regard to such rulings, therefore the questions are not presented in a way we are authorized to review them. (Owen v. State, 4 Texas Crim. App., 153; Smith v. State, 34 Texas Crim. Rep., 123; Janea v. State, 56 Texas Crim. Rep., 100, and cases cited on page 132, Branch's Annotated Penal Code.)
There are but two bills of exception in the record, the first presenting the question that the court erred in failing to charge on circumstantial evidence, and erred in refusing to give appellant's special charge on that issue. This is not a case depending on circumstantial evidence. The stolen property is positively identified by several witnesses; its receipt by appellant is shown by positive evidence, Louis Cohn swearing to that fact, and then the State proves several admissions of defendant, in one instance Mr. Goodwin swearing appellant said, "I knew at the time I bargained for it and knew when I paid for it, it was stolen off the train." Wampler v. State, 28 Texas Crim. App., 352; Whitehead v. State, 49 Texas Crim. Rep., 123, and cases cited in section 203, Branch's Crim. Law.
The only other bill in the record relates to the action of the court in overruling his motion for a new trial. One ground of the motion alleges the misconduct of the jury. To properly present this question for review a bill of exceptions should have been reserved, and in this bill should be incorporated the testimony heard on this ground of the motion, and it should have been filed in term time. The term of court at which appellant was tried adjourned June 24, 1916. The bill in the record (which includes no testimony heard) was not presented to the court for approval until September 7th, — some forty days after adjournment of the court. There is with the record a separate paper which is termed "supplemental statement of facts, on motion for new trial," filed on September 8, 1916, in the trial court — long after court had adjourned for the term. In Black v. State, 41 Texas Grim. Rep., 185, this question was thoroughly discussed, and it was there held: "These matters must be made part of the record during the term of court. There is no statute authorizing such matters to be perpetuated in papers filed subsequent to the term." In that case the motion for a new trial alleged misconduct of the jury, as in this, and the court refused to consider the ground because the evidence heard thereon was filed after term time. The rule announced in that case has been followed in an unbroken line of decisions.
The judgment is affirmed.
Affirmed.