Case Name: PEOPLE v. McCARVER
Court: Michigan Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1976-11-22
Citations: 72 Mich. App. 311
Docket Number: Docket No. 24499
Parties: PEOPLE v McCARVER
Judges: Before: R. B. Burns, P. J., and D. E. Holbrook and T. M. Burns, JJ.
Reporter: Michigan appeals reports; cases decided in the Michigan Court of Appeals.
Volume: 72
Pages: 311–329

Head Matter:
PEOPLE v McCARVER
Opinion of the Court
1. Criminal Law — Evidence—Other Crimes — Prejudice—Objective Appraisal — Appeal and Error.
Evidence tending to show that a defendant committed crimes other than those charged is generally inadmissible because whatever probative value such evidence has is outweighed by the disadvantage of diverting the trier of fact from an objective appraisal of defendant’s guilt or innocence; therefore, a conviction should be reversed where a defendant was convicted by a jury which was faced, on more than one occasion during the trial, with evidence that defendant had engaged in other illegal conduct before and at the time of the charged offense.
2. Criminal Law — Evidence—Other Crimes — Statutes.
Evidence of crimes other than those charged may be admitted at trial by statutory exception, but only where: (1) defendant’s motive, intent, knowledge, etc. are material to the case; (2) the evidence offered is of a like act; and (3) the probative value of the evidence outweighs the attendant prejudice to the defendant (MCLA 768.27; MSA 28.1050).
3. Drugs and Narcotics — Amphetamines—Marijuana—Like Crimes — Evidence—Instructions to Jury.
The law treats the felony of possession of amphetamines in a significantly different way than it treats the misdemeanor of possession of marijuana; they are not sufficiently alike to permit evidence of one to be admissible as evidence of a like crime in a prosecution for the other, especially where the trial court erroneously instructed the jury that both offenses were punishable to the same extent.
References for Points in Headnotes
29 Am Jur 2d, Evidence §§ 320, 321.
Comment Note. — Admissibility in criminal case of evidence relevant to the crime charged, as affected by incidental disclosure of another crime by defendant. 170 ALR 306.
75 Am Jur 2d, Trial §§ 623, 928, 929.
25 Am Jur 2d, Drugs, Narcotics, and Poisons §§ 46, 47.
25 Am Jur 2d, Drugs, Narcotics, and Poisons §§ 40, 47,
25 Am Jur 2d, Drugs, Narcotics, and Poisons §§ 46, 70.
4. Drugs and Narcotics — Evidence—Other Crimes — Possession of Marijuana — Probative Value — Prejudice—Possession of Amphetamines.
The probative value of evidence that a defendant possessed marijuana, a crime, clearly was outweighed by the prejudice the evidence caused to the defendant in his trial for possession of amphetamines where there was other evidence characterizing the defendant as a convicted felon and associating him with criminal activity in general.
Dissent by D. E. Holbrook, J.
5. Drugs and Narcotics — Evidence—Marijuana—Amphetamines— Like Crimes — Relevance—Intent and Knowledge.
Marijuana is often transported along the same underworld networks of distribution as harder drugs, and its possession is punishable under the same statute which punishes the illegal possession of amphetamines; therefore, possession of marijuana, which occurred at the same time as possession of amphetamines, is sufficiently relevant to constitute possession of the marijuana a like act of possession for purposes of admission in evidence in a trial for possession of the amphetamines where intent and knowledge were crucial issues.
6. Drugs and Narcotics — Marijuana—Amphetamines—Inferences —Knowledge.
A strong inference arises in a trial for possession of amphetamines that when one in possession of marijuana is also in possession of a large quantity of pills which are unblemished by pharmaceutical markings that the possessor knows the nature of the pills in his possession.
7. Drugs and Narcotics — Possession of Marijuana — Evidence— Possession of Amphetamines — Relevance—Knowledge of Illegality.
The obviously illegal possession of marijuana is highly relevant in showing that the possessor had knowledge of the illegality of another concurrently possessed but not so apparently illegal drug, amphetamines, and the relevance of such evidence outweighs any prejudice to defendant being tried for possession of amphetamines where knowledge of the proscribed nature of the amphetamines was clearly material to the case.
8. Evidence — Drugs and Narcotics — Res Gestae — Concurrent Possession.
Evidence that a defendant possessed marijuana at the same time and place that he also possessed amphetamines is part and parcel of the res gestae of the offense of possessing the amphetamines and should not be excluded from the trial for the possession of amphetamines.
9. Drugs and Narcotics — Appeal and Error — Preserving Question — Manifest Injustice.
Failure of a defendant to preserve an objection to the admission in evidence of marijuana seized at the time of his arrest, after a proper cautionary instruction, in his trial for possession of amphetamines limits appellate review of that issue, and the defendant’s conviction should be afñrmed where no manifest injustice has been shown.
Appeal from Berrien, Chester J. Byrns, J.
Submitted October 5, 1976, at Grand Rapids.
(Docket No. 24499.)
Decided November 22, 1976.
Leave to appeal applied for.
Alvin McCarver was convicted of possession of amphetamines. Defendant appeals.
Reversed and remanded.
Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Robert A. Derengoski, Solicitor General, John A. Smietanka, Prosecuting Attorney, and Sally M. Zack, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for the people.
Taylor, Yampolsky, Struwin & Hass, for defendant on appeal.
Before: R. B. Burns, P. J., and D. E. Holbrook and T. M. Burns, JJ.

Opinion:
T. M. Burns, J.
On March 26, 1975, defendant was convicted after a jury trial of possession of a controlled substance (amphetamines), MCLA 335.341(4)(b); MSA 18.1070 (41)(4)(b). On June 2, 1975, defendant was sentenced to 16 to 24 months in prison.
At the request of a U.S. Treasury agent and an officer of the Berrien County Sheriff's Department, a Federal search warrant was issued on November 25, 1974, authorizing the search of defendant's residence for firearms and narcotics. Execution of the warrant on November 26, 1974, resulted in the seizure of two shotguns, a quantity of pills, a vial containing a small amount of suspected marijuana, and a pipe containing suspected marijuana. Defendant was arrested and placed in custody.
Testimony given at the trial indicated that the pills found in defendant's home contained amphetamine and caffeine and that the vial contained marijuana. The amphetamines were introduced into evidence without objection, but defendant challenged the introduction of the vial of marijuana.
After some discussion, the marijuana was admitted into evidence.
Three defense witnesses testified that they had gone to defendant's house on November 24, 1974, to look at a motorcycle. Defendant told the three that he was gaining weight and wanted to get some diet pills. After defendant stated that his doctor would not give him diet pills because of high blood pressure, a fourth person, Dave Hawks, informed defendant that he could get some diet pills for him.
Defendant took the witness stand and corroborated the testimony of the three witnesses. He stated that Hawks sold the pills to him two days later. Shortly thereafter the search warrant was executed.
Hawks was called as a witness by defendant. He testified that he did not remember being with defendant on November 24 and denied that he bought any diet pills or delivered any to defendant.
Defendant argues on appeal that he was unduly prejudiced by evidence presented at trial and testimony elicited by the prosecutor which indicated that defendant had engaged in criminal activity other than the offense with which he was charged. Prior to trial, the trial court granted a defense motion to exclude from the trial any evidence of defendant's prior convictions.
In testifying for the prosecution, the Federal agent who obtained the search warrant stated that defendant was a convicted felon. While cross-examining another prosecution witness, a State Police detective, defense counsel asked the witness if he had tried to get someone to help entrap defendant. The witness responded:
"I recall talking to several different persons, and they advised me that, yes, they were aware of people who were in criminal activities; they were interested in assisting me, and the name A1 McCarver was brought into the picture."
On redirect examination the prosecutor pursued this point:
"Q. You said the name A1 McCarver came up in various conversations that you had with various people in the year you have been here; is that correct?
"A. That's correct.
"Q. Did you bring up his name?
'A. No, ma'am.
"Q. Was his name brought up to you?
'A. Yes, it was.
"Q. Was it brought up in connection with alleged criminal activity?"
At this point defense counsel objected to the line of questioning as being irrelevant and involving hearsay. In sustaining the objection the trial court commented as follows:
"[W]e are going to get into more and more irrelevancies and we are going to forget what we are trying to do here is determine what, if anything, Mr. McCarver has to do with what's charged against him here on the 26th of November that he possessed amphetamines."
The judge suggested that the inquiry cease before "we forget what case we are trying".
After the testimony of the witnesses for the prosecution had been taken, the prosecutor sought admission of the vial of marijuana and pipe into evidence. Defense counsel objected to the admission. After sustaining the objection to admission of the pipe, the trial court addressed the jury and informed them that the vial before him contained marijuana. He told the jury that defendant was not charged with possession of marijuana but, that defendant's possession of the substance could be used by them in deciding whether defendant knew that the pills he possessed were amphetamines and whether he knew that it was illegal to possess them. The judge carefully advised the jury of the limited purpose for which the marijuana was being admitted.
It is clear from these facts that the jury was faced, on more than one occasion during the trial, with evidence that defendant had engaged in other illegal conduct before and at the time of the charged offense. The legal proposition applicable to this appeal was recently restated in People v Spillman, 63 Mich App 256, 258-259; 234 NW2d 475 (1975):
"Evidence tending to show that the defendant committed crimes other than those charged is generally inadmissible 'because it has been decided that whatever probative value such evidence has is outweighed by the disadvantage of diverting the trier of fact from an objective appraisal of defendant's guilt or innocence'. People v DerMartzex, 390 Mich 410, 413; 213 NW2d 97 (1973). In other words:
" 'This rule of law guards against convicting an accused person because he is a bad man. Barring such evidence prevents the trier of fact from inferring that the accused person is guilty of the charged offense because he has committed other similar acts or crimes.' People v Matthews, 17 Mich App 48, 52; 169 NW2d 138 (1969)."
The primary issue is whether the fact that defendant was in possession of marijuana when the amphetamines were discovered was properly admitted into evidence. The prosecutor points to the statutory exception to the general rule of inadmissibility as authorizing the admission of the marijuana to show that defendant knew he had possession of a controlled substance:
"In any criminal case where the defendant's motive, intent, the absence of, mistake or accident on his part, or the defendant's scheme, plan or system in doing an act, is material, any like acts or other acts of the defendant which may tend to show his motive, intent, the absence of, mistake or accident on his part, or the defendant's scheme, plan or system in doing the act, in question, may be proved whether they are contemporaneous with or prior or subsequent thereto; notwithstanding that such proof may show or tend to show the commission of another or prior or subsequent crime by the defendant." MCLA 768.27; MSA 28.1050.
This statute has been interpreted as permitting the introduction of evidence of a pending narcotics charge against a defendant who, charged with possession of heroin with intent to deliver, testified that he was not familiar with narcotics and didn't know the contents of the package he delivered. People v Belen Johnson, 62 Mich App 63, 73; 233 NW2d 188 (1975). For evidence to be properly admissible under the statute, however, three criteria must be met:
1. Defendant's motive, intent, knowledge, etc. must be material to the case;
2. The evidence offered must be of a "like act";
3. The probative value of the evidence must outweigh the attendant prejudice to the defendant.
See People v Spillman, supra, 259-260.
In this case the first standard is met; knowledge of the proscribed nature of the controlled substance is certainly material to the case. People v Gould; 61 Mich App 614, 620; 233 NW2d 109 (1975). The proffered evidence in this case, however, does not meet the remaining two criteria. Defendant was charged with the felony of possession of amphetamines. The proffered evidence indicated that defendant may have been guilty of the misdemeanor of possession of marijuana. A long discourse at this point on the difference in the degree of evil society associates with the possession of marijuana as opposed to the possession of amphetamines is not necessary. The law treats the two crimes in significantly different ways. MCLA 335.341(4)(b); MSA 18.1070(41)(b), MCLA 335.341(4)(d); MSA 18.1070(41)(4)(d). Obviously, both offenses consist of possession of a controlled substance, but they are not sufficiently alike to permit evidence of one to be admissible under the statute in a prosecution for the other. Significantly accentuating the error in this case is the fact that the trial judge twice erroneously instructed the jury that possession of marijuana was an offense punishable to the same extent as possession of amphetamines.
The third criterion for admitting evidence of other similar offenses under the statute was also not met.
"[E]ven if the evidence meets the statutory requirements for admissibility, it still may be unacceptable if it is unduly prejudicial, insufficiently probative, or unnecessary in light of the other evidence." People v Spillman, supra, 260.
The proposition that the fact that one has possessed marijuana tends to prove that he knew that the possession of amphetamines was proscribed or that he knew that what he possessed was amphetamines is tentaive at best. Cf. People v Belen Johnson, supra. But even assuming that the other offense tended to prove an element of the charged offense, the probative value of the evidence that defendant possessed marijuana clearly was outweighed by the . prejudice the evidence caused defendant. This is particularly evident when consid ered with the ether testimony characterizing the defendant as a convicted felon and associating him with criminal activity in general. Defendant was charged with being in possession of amphetamines, nothing more, but the trial became so involved with allegations of prior and contemporaneous wrongdoing on defendant's part that it became necessary for the trial judge to remark that "we are going to forget what we are trying to do here". The trial court abused its discretion in admitting the evidence.
Reversed and remanded for a new trial.
R. B. Burns, P. J., concurred.
In a case in which the defendant was convicted of selling LSD, the Supreme Court of Arkansas held that the trial court erred in introducing evidence that defendant had possessed and sold marijuana:
"In the case at bar the issue for the jury was whether Sweatt [the defendant] had sold LSD to Robbie White. Proof that Sweatt had sold marijuana on other occasions had no relevancy except to show that Sweatt had dealt in drugs before and hence was likely to have done so again. That is precisely the type of proof that must be excluded. If Sweatt was guilty of other crimes, then, as we said in [Alford v State, 223 Ark 330; 266 SW2d 804 (1954)], 'each may be examined separately in a court of law, and punishment may be imposed for those established with the required certainty. In this way alone can we avoid the elements of unfair surprise and undue prejudice that necessarily attend trial by accusation Sweatt v State, 251 Ark 650; 473 SW2d 913, 914 (1971).
The State of Washington Court of Appeals has held that it was error for the prosecutor to introduce evidence that the defendant had also possessed marijuana and amphetamines in a prosecution for possession of LSD. In so ruling, the Court noted that the introduction of evidence of other similar offenses is not permitted as "its effect would be to generate heat instead of diffusing light" and such evidence was compared to the "minute peg of relevancy" which is "entirely obscured by the dirty linen hung upon it". State v Portrey, 6 Wash App 380; 492 P2d 1050 (1972), quoting from State v Goebel, 36 Wash 2d 367; 218 P2d 300 (1950).
An expert for the prosecution testified that the pills contained amphetamines and caffeine and were distinguishable from ordinary diet pills. In addition, there were no pharmaceutical markings on the tablets.