Case Name: PEOPLE ex rel. REYNOLDS v. COMMON COUNCIL OF CITY OF BUFFALO
Court: Buffalo Superior Court
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1892-12-21
Citations: 21 N.Y.S. 601
Docket Number: 
Parties: PEOPLE ex rel. REYNOLDS v. COMMON COUNCIL OF CITY OF BUFFALO.
Judges: 
Reporter: West's New York Supplement
Volume: 21
Pages: 601–611

Head Matter:
PEOPLE ex rel. REYNOLDS v. COMMON COUNCIL OF CITY OF BUFFALO.
(Superior Court of Buffalo, General Term.
December 21, 1892.)
1. Eminent Domain—Remedial Act—Construction—Permissive Words. Laws 1890, c. 393, declaring that the common council of Buffalo is “authorized” to audit and adjust the amount of damage done to certain private-property by the opening of a street, and providing that, on the appraisal of such damage, the city shall raise the same by assessment, and pay it over to. the owner of the property, is mandatory. 21 N. Y. Supp. 598, affirmed.
2. Same—Audit of Claim—Mandamus . Though the act provides that the expense of the proceeding to appraise the* damage to the property shall be included in the amount of such damages to-be raised by the assessment, the fact that the order of the court approving the report of the appraising officers, fixing the amount of damages, does not include such expenses, is no defense to an application for a writ of mandamus, to compel the common council to audit and adjust the claim, it appearing that the city has paid such expenses out of the general fund, as authorized, by a later statute.
8. Same—Appraisal—Report op Commissioners. Though the act only authorizes the commissioners to appraise the damages,, after which the common council is to audit and adjust the same, the fact that-in their report they say that they “make an award” to the person for damages to her property is immaterial, as the statute awards the amount of the damages-appraised, by directing that, when raised by assessment, it shall be paid to her.
4. Same—Repeal op Law. Where, under an act (Laws 1890, c. 393) directing a city to audit and adjust the amount of damage done to certain private property by the opening of a. street, providing for an appraisal thereof by commissioners, and requiring • the city to raise the amount by assessment, and pay it over to the owner of' the property, the commissioners have made the appraisal, and their report has been confirmed by the court, the owner’s claim against the city becomes. fixed, and cannot be affected by a subsequent repeal of the act, (Laws 1891, c. 42.) 21 N. Y. Supp. 598, affirmed.
5. Res Adjudicata—On Second Appeal. Where, on appeal from an order denying a stay of the proceedings of commissioners appointed to appraise the damages to certain private property from the opening of a street by a city, under an act authorizing such appraisal, and directing the common council to audit and adjust the claim, and raise the same by assessment, to be paid to the owner of the property, it is-decided that the proceedings of the commissioners are regular, that the act is valid, and within the power of the legislature, and that a certain contract between the city and such owner does not estop him, such questions are res adjudicata, and not open for consideration on a subsequent appeal from an order granting a writ of mandamus to compel the common council to.audit the amount of damages awarded by the commissioners. White, J.,. dissenting.
Appeal from special term.
Application by Amelia E. Reynolds for a peremptory writ of mandamus to compel the common council of the city of Buffalo to audit. and adjust a claim in favor of relator against the city, under Laws 1890, c. 393. The writ was granted, (21 N. Y. Supp. 598,) and respondent, appeals.. Affirmed.
For a more particular statement of the facts and the provisions of the* act of 1890, see 21 N. Y. Supp. 592.
Argued before TITUS, C. J., and WHITE, J.
George M. Browne, for appellant.
Daniel McIntosh and O. O. Cottle, for respondent.

Opinion:
TITUS, C. J.
This proceeding is instituted under chapter 393 of the Laws of 1890, authorizing the city of Buffalo to audit and adjust the amount of damage which has been occasioned to the property of Amelia E. Reynolds. In 1885 certain proceedings were instituted by the, city of Buffalo to take lands necessary to extend Elmwood avenue from Buffalo street to North street. The land of the respondent adjoined property through which the street passed. On this land was a large double house, a part of which was on the property taken, and the other part on the land of the respondent. No portion of the property of the respondent was taken in opening Elmwood avenue; but, in removing the portion of the building on the land taken by the city for the improvement, great damage was done to the portion of the house on the respondent's land: The commissioners in that proceeding did not award the respondent damages, because none of her property was taken, and no authority was found to authorize an award to her. The legislature then passed an act (chapter 393 of the Laws of 1890) under which the present proceeding- was taken. Commissioners were appointed by the court, as provided by the act, to appraise the damage to respondent's property. They made their report, and awarded her $5,500. The report was confirmed by the court on the 10th day of February, 1891. On the 3d day of March, 1891, and before the common council had audited and adjusted her claim, the legislature repealed the act of May, 1890, (chapter 42 of the Laws of 1891.) An application for a peremptory writ of mandamus was made at a special term of this court, which was granted, commanding the common council to audit and adjust the amount of damages occasioned to the property of the respondent at $5,500, the sum fixed by the commissioners in their report, and to raise the same by assessment upon the property benefited by the opening of Elmwood avenue. 21 N. Y. Supp. 598. An appeal by the common council from that order brings before us the questions we are to consider.
Before the passage of the act of 1890, Mrs. Rejmolds had entered into an agreement with the city of Buffalo, in consideration of the sale to her of the building upon the property taken in opening the street, to release the city from all damages which her property had sustained by reason of the opening of the street and the tearing down of one half of the building. An appeal was taken to'this court (21 N. Y. Supp. 598) from an order (Id. 592) denying a stay of the proceedings of the commissioners appointed to award damages to the respondent, and many of the questions here raised were passed upon adversely to the city on that appeal,— among them, the regularity of the proceedings, and the validity of the statute under which they were instituted, (chapter 393 of the Laws of 1890,) and the right of the legislature to authorize the city to pay the respondent whatever sum she was equitably entitled to, the force and effect of the contract made by Mrs. Reynolds with the city, namely, that it did not estop her from claiming damages under that act, but that, if she had received anything under the agreement with the city, it must be allowed in reduction of any award of damages to her. It appears from their report that the commissioners did take the agreement into consideration, and credit the city on such award with the value of the materials which she had received under her contract. So far as these questions are concerned, this court has passed upon them, and they must now be considered res adjudicata, and not open for further consideration, at least here. Culross v. Gibbons, 130 N. Y. 447, 29 N. E. Rep. 839.
The learned counsel for the defendant claims that the act of 1890, c. 393, is permissive, and not mandatory. The language used in the act is not different from that used in the many cases where this question has been before the courts. In People v. Board of Sup'rs of Livingston Co., 68 N. Y. 114, the same language was used by the legislature, and the court held it was mandatory. Judge Earl, in his opinion, said, "Where the public interest or private right requires that the thing shall be done, then the word 'may' is generally construed as 'shall;'" and a peremptory writ of mandamus was ordered. In People v. Board of Sup'rs of Otsego Co., 36 How. Pr. 1, it was held that, where the legislature authorized and empowered the board of supervisors to cause taxes illegally assessed and paid to the county to be repaid, it became their duty to do it; and a peremptory writ of mandamus was ordered. On appeal to the court of appeals, (51 N. Y. 401,) the court held that the statute was mandatory; the court saying that the words "authorized and empowered" are mandatory, when the statute directs the doing of a thing. Many other cases have been examined, but enough have been cited to illustrate the rule that, where a party has a claim based upon natural justice and equity, permissive words in a statute are construed so as to accomplish what the legislature intended.
The counsel for the appellant claims that the statute requires the expense of the proceeding to appraise such damages to be included in the amount of damage to be raised by local assessment, and the order only requires the common council to raise the amount of damage, not including the expense of the proceeding; that the common council is without power to comply with the order, the only authority being the statute in question. It is perhaps a súfñcient answer to this that chapter 42 of the Laws of 1891, which is the act repealing chapter 393 of the Laws of 1890, provided that the commissioners appointed under the act repealed should be paid by the city out of the general fund, and it appears that the expense of the proceeding was paid by the city without waiting to include it in the amount of damage to be raised. No reason can be' assigned why the city may not include the expense of the proceeding in the amount of damage to be assessed, and reimburse the general fund out of which it was paid, unless it be the act of 1891, above referred to. Certainly, nothing in the order forbids it; and, if the charter authorizes it, it may well be included in the amount to be raised. I do not think it is material, as affecting the powers of the common council to comply with the mandamus. By the act of 1890, the city was to audit and adjust the amount of damages to the respondent's property, after the amount of such damage had been appraised; , and the claim of the counsel for the appellant that the commissioners had no authority to "make an award" to her for damages to her property is, it seems to me, without force. The statute contemplates an appraisal of her damage, and. the fact that, in their report, they.say they "make an award for damages to her property," adds nothing to the force of the statute., as the statute "awards"' the amount of damage appraised to her, and, when the common council have appraised the damage, the statute directs to whom it shall be paid. - .
The principal claim made by the appellant is that the act of 1890 has-been repealed, and therefore there is no'law authorizing or requiring the-common council to audit and adjust the damages. The counsel's reasoning seems to rest upon the assumption that the respondent has no-claim which she can enforce after the statute has been repealed. In this I think he is mistaken. It is not claimed that if this was an award by commissioners in eminent domain proceedings, and confirmed by the-court, it would not then be a valid claim against the city, ,and have the force and conclusiveness of a judgment, with all of its incidents, includin'g that of contract. Mayer v. Mayor, etc., 101 N. Y. 284, 4 N. E. Rep. 336.
But it is insisted that these are not eminent domain proceedings; and consequently no such character or force attaches to the award of the commissioners. While it is not a proceeding directed against the property of another for a public purpose, the-statute clothed it with the character .of such a proceeding, and when the report was confirmed by the court its character was not changed. It had ripened from its equitable nature-into a legal and valid claim against the city. The respondent's damages-had been ascertained and fixed; it was then enforceable against the-city, and, under the authorities, it is difficult to see how the legislature could divest her of the claim. People v. Board of Sup'rs of Westchester Co., 4 Barb. 64; In re Com'rs of Washington Park, 56 N, Y. 144; In re Rhinebeck & C. R. Co., 67 N. Y. 242.
I do not think it necessary to refer to .the statute of 1890 for authority to pay the claim, assuming it to be a valid and legal claim, .after the report was confirmed. Section 15 of the revised -charter provides that "the common council shall audit all claimé against the city of Buffalo."' A like provision is found in the old charter, and it confers upon that, body power to audit all claims. . This is a liquidated claim. Nothing is to be done in addition .to what' has already been done to fix the amount. It has been determined in the manner directed by law, and the power-conferred upon the common council is ample, in .the absence of the statute of 1890,- to audit and adjust it. , The right is clear, and the amount is not in dispute. Therefore, I think the remedy by mandamus to enforce its payment is proper. It is damage occasioned by a local improvement, and should properly be assessed upon the property benefited by the improvement. The order appealed from should be affirmed, with-$10 costs and disbursements.