Case Name: CURRIE v. STATE
Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1925-10-14
Citations: 279 S.W. 834
Docket Number: No. 8731
Parties: CURRIE v. STATE.
Judges: 
Reporter: South Western Reporter
Volume: 279
Pages: 834–837

Head Matter:
CURRIE v. STATE.
(No. 8731.)
(Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
Oct. 14, 1925.
Rehearing Denied Feb. 3, 1926.)
John B. Howard, of El Paso, for appellant.
Tom Garrard, State’s Atty., and Grover O. Morris, Asst. State’s Atty., both of Austin, for tbe State.

Opinion:
LATTIMORE, J.
Appellant was convicted in tbe district court of Howard county of transporting intoxicating liquor, and bis punishment fixed at one year in tbe penitentiary.
There are six bills of exception. Tbe first was to tbe action of tbe court below in stopping counsel for appellant in bis argument, and admonishing him that tbe law of tbe ease was contained in tbe charge of the court, and should be so understood by tbe jury. It appears that defense counsel was attacking tbe law in bis argument to the jury, and was telling them that tbe Legislature which enacted tbe law did not contain any good lawyers, as tbe best lawyers could not go to tbe Legislature, could not afford it; that be was'arguing that what was not reason was not law; and that it was not reasonable, and therefore not tbe law, that appellant would be guilty of a felony if be merely transported a pint of whisky for two or three miles along tbe road. It was entirely within tbe province of tbe trial judge to stop such argument and call counsel's attention to tbe fact that tbe charge contained tbe law which would govern tbe jury.
The second bill complains of tbe failure of tbe charge to define tbe word "transport," and also tbe refusal to give special charge defining said word as meaning "tbe conveyance from one place, locality, or country to another." There is nothing in tbe complaint. Tbe state witness swore positively that upon invitation.he took a ride of several miles with appellant Dockery et al. on tbe day of tbe alleged occurrence, and that, while in tbe car, appellant, who was driving tbe car, produced from bis pocket a bottle of whisky from which they all took a drink; that about a half mile farther they took another drink from tbe same bottle. This was clearly transportation such as is forbidden by tbe statute. Dockery, for tbe defense, swore that said party went riding and appellant drove tbe car, and that, as they proceeded, tbe state witness produced a bottle of whisky, and they all took a drink out of it, and thereafter took one or more drinks while proceeding on their journey to tbe place to which they bad started. This also plainly made a case of transportation. Appellant's guilt did not depend in the least on bis ownership of tbe whisky. He was equally guilty whether be produced it or tbe state witness produced it with tbe knowledge of appellant, and it was thereafter carried in tbe car. Tbe definition of "transportation" asked in said special charge could have added nothing to the jury's understanding of tbe law or its application to tbe facts of this ease. There could be no question or doubt in tbe mind of any juror as to the fact that whisky was carried by appellant in bis car from one place to' another. Tbe statement in said special charge "from one country to another" under tbe facts of this case could have but been confusing. As said by Presiding Judge Morrow in Lee v. State, 95 Tex. Cr. R. 654, 255 S. W. 425:
"The statute does not define 'transport.' Under the law, it is to be given the meaning 'understood in common language,' taking into consideration the context and subject-matter. Penal Code, art. 10. In common language, 'transport' signifies the carrying or conveying 'from one place, locality, or country to another. Cyc. of Law & Proc. vol. 38, p. 946. There might arise a case where the peculiarities in the testimony might make it necessary to give the definition or at least some explanatory statement relative to what is embraced within the term 'transporting intoxicating liquors.' As applied to the present case, however, it would seem unnecessary."
The Lee Case has been followed since. In Maynard v. State, 93 Tex. Cr. R. 580, 249 S. W. 473, we said:
"The Legislature has not seen fit to' attempt to define said term [meaning transportation] in its enactment forbidding the transportation of intoxicating liquor. It is made unlawful for any common carrier or individual to transport such liquor, and the facts clearly show a transportation by appellant,"
— and we refused to hold erroneous the action of the trial court in overruling an exception to his charge because it did not define transportation. There are no peculiar facts in the case before us such as to make it possible of injury to appellant to fail to give the special charge.
The state, having taken a written statement from one of its witnesses, could not be compelled merely because of such fact to deliver said written statement to appellant's counsel for his inspection, the state not having used said statement in any way.
To ask a witness for the opposite party if he had not been in some sort of trouble, if he had not been in jail on some kind of proposition, is manifestly not such question as should be allowed, and there was no error in the trial court so holding.
The objection of the state to the question by appellant's attorney to a state witness if it was not true that he was not a naturalized citizen of the United States was properly sustained. Nothing appears in the bill complaining of this action which shows that the inquiry was expected to lead to any matter of benefit to the appellant.
Bill No. 6 complains that the court declined to let appellant's counsel argue to the jury regarding a matter to which state's objection had been sustained.
The facts in evidence amply support the verdict, whether viewed from the standpoint of the state's testimony or that of appellant.
Finding no error in the record, the judgment will be affirmed.