Case Name: STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Stanley SULLIVAN, Sr. v. Ross MAGGIO, Warden
Court: Louisiana Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1983-05-23
Citations: 432 So. 2d 854
Docket Number: No. 82-KH-1317
Parties: STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Stanley SULLIVAN, Sr. v. Ross MAGGIO, Warden.
Judges: DIXON, C.J., dissents.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 432
Pages: 854–860-864

Head Matter:
STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Stanley SULLIVAN, Sr. v. Ross MAGGIO, Warden.
No. 82-KH-1317.
Supreme Court of Louisiana.
May 23, 1983.
Rehearing Denied June 24, 1983.
Stanley Sullivan, Sr., Gerard A. Rault, Jr., New Orleans, for relator.
William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Barbara Rutledge, Asst. Atty. Gen., Ossie Brown, Dist. Atty., Kay Kirkpatrick, Lennie Perez, Asst. Dist. Attys., for respondent.

Opinion:
DENNIS, Justice.
This criminal case presents the question of whether our statutes require that a sentence of imprisonment for attempted armed robbery must be served without benefit of parole, probation or suspension of sentence.
Stanley Sullivan, the relator in the instant proceedings, was convicted of attempted armed robbery in July, 1975. He was sentenced to a term of twenty-five years at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation or suspension of sentence. On appeal we affirmed his conviction and sentence. State v. Sullivan, 352 So.2d 649 (La.1977). In April, 1982, relator Sullivan moved the trial court to modify his sentence by providing that he shall be eligible for parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. The trial court denied his motion. We granted a writ of certiorari to consider this ruling.
The issue of the instant case centers around an interpretation of Louisiana's criminal attempt statute, La.R.S. 14:27, which, in pertinent part, provides,

D. Whoever attempts to commit any crime shall be punished as follows:
(1) If the offense so attempted is punishable by death or life imprisonment, he shall be imprisoned at hard labor for not more than fifty years;
(2) If the offense so attempted is theft or receiving stolen things, and is not punishable as a felony, he shall be fined not more than two hundred dollars, or imprisoned for not more than six months, or both. If the offense so attempted is theft or receiving stolen things, and is punishable as a felony, he shall be fined not more than two hundred dollars, or imprisoned not more than one year, or both;
(3) In all other cases he shall be fined or imprisoned or both, in the same manner as for the offense attempted; such fine or imprisonment shall not exceed one-half of the largest fine, or one-half of the longest term or imprisonment prescribed for the offense so attempted, or both.
Specifically, the question is whether the language of the third penalty clause, section D(3), providing for punishment "in the same manner as for the offense attempted" means that a person who attempts armed robbery shall be sentenced without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.
This court decided the question in State v. Patterson, 259 La. 508, 250 So.2d 721 (1971), holding that the phrase "in the same manner" means "at hard labor" and "without benefit of parole, probation or suspension of sentence" as provided for armed robbery. The defendant in the present case argues, as did Patterson, that, because criminal statutes should be strictly construed, imprisonment "in the same manner" must be interpreted to refer only to hard labor and not to loss of eligibility for parole, probation and suspension of sentence. After reconsidering the question, we conclude that this court adopted the correct statutory construction in Patterson for the reasons hereinafter set forth.
It is an ancient rule of statutory construction and an oft repeated one that penal statutes should be strictly construed against the government or parties seeking to exact statutory penalties and in favor of persons on whom such penalties are sought to be imposed. 3 Sutherland Statutory Construction § 59.03 (1974); Lafave and Scott, Criminal Law § 10 (1972). This rule of strict construction grew out of harsh conditions during the period in England before the 19th century when hundreds of crimes, many relatively minor, were punishable by death. Lafave and Scott, supra. See also Hall, Strict or Liberal Construction of Criminal Statutes, 48 Harv.L.Rev. 748, 750 (1935). However, with the decline in the severity of punishment and with the introduction of procedural Safeguards, the rule of strict construction has become less favored. See, Lafave and Scott, supra; Sutherland, supra, § 59.07.
In fact, numerous state legislatures, frustrated in the field of criminal law, have abrogated or modified the rule. Sutherland, supra. Some states expressly repudiated the common law rule of construction and substituted a rule calling for a construction of criminal laws according to the "fair import of their terms." See, e.g. Cal. Penal Code § 4. Other states have gone even further and have opted for a "liberal" construction of their criminal laws. See Lafave and Scott, supra, n. 23, and states listed therein.
Louisiana took what might be termed a "middle ground" (approach somewhere between the old common law rule and the "liberal" rule adopted by other states. At the time of the drafting of the comprehensive criminal code, the members of the Louisiana State Law Institute refused to embrace a rule of either strict or liberal construction. See Morrow, the Louisiana Criminal Code of 1942 — Opportunities Lost and Challenges Yet Unanswered, 17 Tul.L. Rev. 1, 4-12 (1942). Instead the Law Institute recommended, and the legislature subsequently enacted, a rule of construction which provides:
The articles of this Code cannot be extended by analogy so as to create crimes not provided for herein; however, in order to promote justice and to effect the objects of the law, all of its provisions shall be given a genuine construction, according to the fair import of their words, taken in their usual sense, in connection with the context, and with reference to the purpose of the provision.
La.R.S. 14:3.
Thus, the courts are not empowered to extend by analogy the terms of a criminal provision to cover conduct not included within the crime definition of the criminal code. See, State v. Brown, 378 So.2d 916, 918 (La.1980). However, the rule of interpretation and its legislative history indicate that Louisiana courts are required to give the articles of the criminal code a "genuine construction, according to the fair import of their words," rather than a strict interpretation, if the Code is not thereby extended by analogy to create new crimes.
Applying these precepts to the instant case, we conclude that the basic holding of Patterson remains valid today. Giving the criminal attempt article a genuine rather than a strict interpretation, a person convicted of attempted armed robbery must be imprisoned "at hard labor" and "without benefit of parole, probation or suspension of sentence."
Armed robbery is a pernicious offense. The use of a dangerous weapon creates a great risk of emotional and physical harm to the victim, to witnesses, and, at times, even to the offender. Although firm fig ures are difficult to obtain, it would appear that robbery killings have increased four- or fivefold since the early 1960s. Silberman, Criminal Violence, Criminal Justice, Chapter I, p. 4 (1978). The Louisiana legislature has indicated a great concern for the crime of armed robbery in this state. In 1962, the penalty for armed robbery was enhanced to provide a maximum term of ninety-nine years at hard labor "without benefit of parole, probation or suspension of sentence." La.R.S. 14:64. The legislature also has shown particular concern over killings occurring during armed robberies by classifying as capital murder a specific intent killing during the perpetration or attempted perpetration of an armed robbery. La. R.S. 14:30.
Attempted armed robbery is only slightly less reprehensible than the completed offense. Force or intimidation of a victim with a dangerous weapon is usually involved. Consequently, the genuine risks of emotional and physical harm created by an attempted armed robbery make it equally as dreadful as a completed offense. Thus, it would seem logical to conclude that the legislature, by stipulating that the same kind of penalty shall accompany both crimes, intended to subject those who attempt armed robbery to the same type of enhanced punishment as those who complete the offense, i.e. imprisonment at hard labor without parole eligibility. This view is also encouraged by the fact that the legislature, cognizant of its pre-existing requirement that a would-be armed robber must be punished "in the same manner" as an actual armed robber, failed to exempt those who only attempt armed robbery when it enhanced the penalty provided for the completed offense.
The present case serves well to illustrate that most of the anti-social elements of armed robbery are usually involved in an attempt of the crime. Relator Sullivan entered into a plan to rqb Mr. Leon Ford by physically removing Ford from his home and striking Ford on the head with a club. As Ford walked out of his house, one of two men lying in wait struck Ford in the head, knocking him to his knees. Although he suffered a severe blow, Ford retained consciousness. Because he was still conscious and about to recover, Ford's assailants fled. Thus the offenders were unable to complete the theft of Ford's belongings. The offenders' conduct in the present case is the type of act which the legislature sought to deter by stiffening the penalty for armed robbery through abrogation of parole eligibility. The fact that a theft did not occur during the violence is relatively insignificant considering the injuries inflicted upon Mr. Ford and the graver risks threatened.
The armed robbery article of the criminal code, provides that any person who commits the crime of armed robbery "shall be imprisoned at hard labor for not less than five years and for not more than ninety-nine years, without benefit of parole, probation or suspension of sentence." La.R.S. 14:64. The attempt article subjects persons to punishment "in the same manner as for the offense attempted." La.R.S. 14:27 D(3). A realistic and genuine construction of the two provisions requires that persons who attempt armed robbery shall be punished at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation or suspension of sentence.
In the present case, the relator has raised no argument which was not considered by this court in deciding the Patterson case. There has been no showing that the holding of Patterson has been eroded by a subsequent decision of this court or of the United States Supreme Court. Moreover, during the twelve years since Patterson, the legislature has not sought to overrule or modify the decision.
Accordingly, we adhere to the statutory interpretation announced in Patterson and hold that a person adjudged guilty of attempted armed robbery must be imprisoned at hard labor and without benefit of parole, probation or suspension of sentence. Therefore, the trial judge was correct when he denied relator's motion to modify the sentence.
AFFIRMED.
DIXON, C.J., dissents.
CALOGERO, J., dissents and assigns reasons.