Case Name: THE WROUGHT-IRON BRIDGE COMPANY OF CANTON, Stark County, Ohio, Respondent, v. THE TOWN OF ATTICA, Appellant
Court: New York Supreme Court, General Term
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1888-10
Citations: 56 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 513
Docket Number: 
Parties: THE WROUGHT-IRON BRIDGE COMPANY OF CANTON, Stark County, Ohio, Respondent, v. THE TOWN OF ATTICA, Appellant.
Judges: Barker, JP. J., and Haight, J., concurred.
Reporter: Supreme Court Reports (Hun)
Volume: 56
Pages: 513–523

Head Matter:
THE WROUGHT-IRON BRIDGE COMPANY OF CANTON, Stark County, Ohio, Respondent, v. THE TOWN OF ATTICA, Appellant.
When the subject of a local act is sufficiently expressed by its title, to satisfy the requirements of section 16 of article 3 of the Constitution ■ — ■ an act providing for the payment for a bridge is not within section 18 of said article.
Pursuant to the terms of a contract made by the commissioner of highways of the town of Attica with the plaintiff, the latter furnished the materials and constructed a bridge upon the line of a highway over the Tonawanda creek, in that town, which was completed, and accepted by the commissioner, in February, 1885, and has since been used by the public. Subsequently, and in February, 1885, the auditing board of the town audited and allowed the account of the commissioner for the contract-price of the bridge, and also for eighty-nine dollars and sixty-one cents as the expense of removing the old bridge, which was removed by the plaintiff upon the promise of the commissioner to pay the expense of so doing. In an action, brought by the plaintiff against the successor of such commissioner, who refused to pay for the work, the plaintiff’s complaint was finally dismissed upon the ground that the commissioner of highways, as such, had no power to make the contract,
In 1887 the legislature passed an act entitled “ An act to legalize the acts and proceedings of the town board, and the town board of auditors, of the town of Attica, Wyoming county, in relation to the erection of a certain iron bridge over the Tonawanda creek on Main street, in the village of Attica, in said town, and the acts and proceedings of the annual town meeting of said town, held on the 22d day of February, 1885, in relation to said bridge, and the acts and proceedings of George D. Miller, as highway commissioner of said town, in relation to said bridge.”
By sections 1, 2, 3 and 4 of this act the proceedings of the electors and the commissioner of highways of the town, leading to and resulting in the contract, and of the town board in auditing the commissioner’s account, etc., were, in terms, seriatim, legalized and confirmed. By the latter part of section 4 it was declared that the provisions of that act and the preceding sections were for the purpose only of enabling the plaintiff to recover from the town the value of the bridge, the cost of the removal of the old one and interest, as specified in the fifth section, which provided that nothing in the act contained should be so construed as to require the town to pay the amount audited by the town board of auditors for the contract-price of the bridge constructed, or for the taking down of the old one, but that the plaintiff might maintain an action against the town to recover a fair and reasonable compensation for such work, with interest from the time of the completion and acceptance of the work.
Held, that the act, though local in character, did not violate section 16 of article 3 of the Constitution, providing that no private or local bill shall embrace more than one object, and that that shall be expressed in the title. (Dwight, J., dissenting.)
Matter of Mayor of New York (99 N. Y., 569, 577) distinguished.
That said act did not violate section 18 of article 3 of the Constitution, forbidding the passage of private or local bills, “providing for building bridges,” as the act did not provide therefor, but only for the payment for a bridge already built.
Appeal from a judgment entered upon the verdict of a jury-rendered at tbe Wyoming Circuit, on November 23, 1887, in tbe county of Genesee, and from an order denying a motion for a new trial, made upon tbe minutes of tbe justice before whom tbe action was tried.
George U. Loveridge, for the appellant.
Tyrrell da Ballard, for tbe respondent.

Opinion:
Bradley, J.:
Pursuant to the terms of a contract made by tbe commissioner of highways of tbe town of Attica with tbe plaintiff, tbe latter furnished the materials and constructed a bridge upon tbe line of a highway over Tonawanda creek in that town. Tbe bridge was completed, and by tbe commissioner accepted, in February, 1885, and has since then been used by the public. The contract-price for the materials and construction of the bridge was $3,975. The plaintiff also removed the old bridge there, upon the promise of the commissioner to pay the expense of doing it. Subsequently, and in February, 1885, the auditing board of the town audited and allowed the account of the commissioner for the contract-price of the bridge, and eighty-nine dollars and sixty-one cents as the expense of the removal of the old bridge. After the election of the successor in office of the commissioner who made the contract with the plaintiff, the constituted authorities of the town refused to provide for or make payment to the plaintiff for the work as provided by the contract. And in an action brought against such succeeding commissioner upon it, the plaintiff's complaint was finally dismissed. The situation appeared to be such that there was no liability of the officer to pay the plaintiff, because it was not within the power of the commissioner of highways, as such, to make the contract.
And for that reason the legislature passed an act, entitled " An ac't to legalize the acts and proceedings of the town board, and the town board of auditors of the town of Attica, Wyoming county, in relation to the erection of a certain iron bridge over the Tonawanda creek on Flain street, in the village of Attica, in said town, and the acts and proceedings of the annual town meeting of said town, held on the twenty-second day of February, eighteen hundred and eighty-five, in relation to said bridge, and the acts and proceedings of George D. Miller, as highway commissioner of said town, in relation to said' bridge." (Laws of 1887, chap. 205.)
By sections 1, 2, 3 and 4, the proceedings of the electors and commissioner of highways of the town, leading to and resulting in the contract, and of the town board in auditing the commissioner's account, etc., were in terms, seriatim,, legalized and confirmed. And by the latter part of section 4, it was declared that the provisions of that and the preceding sections were for the purpose only of enabling the plaintiff to recover from the town the value of the bridge, the cost of the removal of the old one and interest, as specified in the fifth section, which provided that nothing in the act contained should be so construed as to require the town to pay the amount audited by the town board of auditors for the contract-price of the bridge constructed, or for taking down the old one, but that the plaintiff might maintain, an action against the town to recover a fair and reasonable. compensation for such work, with interest, from the time of the completion and acceptance of the bridge.
This act was effectual to support a liability on the part of the town, and the recovery, unless the power for that purpose was denied to the legislature by the Constitution. (Town of Guilford v. Supervisors of Chengo Co., 13 N. Y., 113; Town of Duanesburgh v. Jenkins, 57 id., 177.) But, as the act is local in character, it is contended that it is violative of the provision of the Constitution that no private or local bill shall embrace more than one subject, and that shall be expressed in the title. (Art. 3, § 16.) The terms of the title, as expressed by it, indicate a purpose to legalize the proceedings had in the town in relation to the bridge. All those proceedings had some relation to the means employed to procure the construction of the bridge, and to provide for payment of the expense of it. They are parts of a single subject, and the title is free from objection. The contention, however, is that the provisions of the act embrace more than one subject, and are extended beyond the purport of the title, because it provides not only that such proceedings be legalized and confirmed, but makes the value rather than the contract-price the measure of compensation and liability for the work. It is true that simply legalizing the proceedings would apparently have the effect to give validity to the contract made by the commissioner with plaintiff, and charge liability upon it to the latter, and for that reason there may seem to be some apparent force in the contention that the title is not sufficiently broad to embrace within its meaning a purpose to charge upon the town any other or different measure of liability for compensation to the plaintiff than that furnished by the terms of the contract. But for the purposes of the question presented, the import of the title does not require a construction so restricted. The subject of the title has relation to the bridge and the proceedings taken by the authorities of the town to procure its construction resulting in the employment of the plaintiff to furnish it, and with a view to payment therefor. And the provisions of the act so far legalize and confirm those proceedings as to render the employment valid and entitle the plaintiff to recover and receive fi'om the town the value or reasonable compensation for the erection of the bridge, and for taking down the old one.
The fact that the measure of liability and compensation given by the act is a qualification to that extent of the proceedings had pursuant to which the work was performed is not a departure from the subject referred to in the title. The purpose for which the title is required to express the subject of a private or local bill is not to furnish by it the details of the act, but to call attention to the matter to which it relates, for the details of which reference must be had to the provisions of the bill. The question is not one of degree of particularity, but whatever comes within the purview of the subject expressed in tbe title is permissible in tbe act. (Brewster v. City of Syracuse, 19 N. Y., 116; Tifft v. City of Buffalo, 82 id., 204; People ex rel. Rochester v. Briggs 50 id., 553; Matter of P.P. and C. I. P. P. Co., 67 id., 372; Kerrigan v. Force., 68 id., 381; Neuendorff v. Duryea, 69 id., 557; Matter, of Met. Cas Light Co., 85 id., 526.
But it is urged that tbe title of tbe act is such as to exclude from its import any indication of purpose to furnish a measure of habihty of tbe town, other than that wbicb tbe contract, as made, purported to create, and that in view of the provisions, in that respect, of tbe act, it was deceptive and misleading, and, therefore, cannot survive tbe test apphcable to such cases declared In Matter of Mayor, etc., of New York (99 N. Y., 569, 577). But the title of tbe act in question is not obnoxious to tbe rule of construction and effect, there announced, as that upon wbicb vahdity depends. All tbe provisions of tbe bill are within and have relation to tbe general subject of tbe title. Tbe question has frequently been considered, and tbe courts are not inclined to rigidly criticise the manner of expressing the subject in tbe titles and tbe purposes contained in tbe provisions of bills, with a view to distinguish tbe latter from tbe former, as appears by tbe cases before cited, from tbe doctrine of wbicb, in that respect, tbe subsequent cases have not departed. While tbe subject of tbe bill must be, tbe purposes of tbe bill need not be, expressed in tbe title, but may be found only in tbe provisions of ' tbe act. There is nothing in this title wbicb, in terms or necessary effect, exclude from tbe subject expressed in it tbe consequences to be provided as tbe result of tbe confirmation of tbe proceedings legahzed. Tbe title merely fails to indicate tbe details in that respect. Tbe provisions of section 4 qualify tbe effect of such con firmatioii before therein expressed, and those of section 5 deciare the consequences of it.
They have relation to the compensation of the plaintiff and the liability of the town for the work of construction of the new bridge and for the removal of the old one. This is within the details of the subject of the title. (People ex rel. Comrs. v. Banks, 67 N. Y., 568.) The reason, as represented by the defendant's answer, for the refusal to pay, which produced the legislative act and its provisions making the value the measure of liability, was the alleged fact that the eon-tract-price was in excess of the value of the work. And it may be observed that the recovery was less than the amount (with interest upon it), which the commissioner, by the contract, undertook to pay the plaintiff. This right of recovery was properly made dependent upon the legislative confirmation of the employment of the plaintiff by the commissioner and as the result of it. The act does not seem to come within the inhibition of the constitutional provision before mentioned. Nor was the power to pass the act denied to the legislature by section 18 of article 3 of the Constitution. It did not provide for building any bridge, but merely charged the town with the duty to provide for the payment, and to pay for one already constructed by the plaintiff, upon employment by the commissioner, pursuant to proceedings defectively or ineffectually taken, and had for that purpose to create liability for the work. This legislation came within neither the letter or manifest purpose of such constitutional restriction of legislative power. Nor is it violative of any other provision of the Constitution. (Jones v. Chamberlain, 109 N. Y., 100.)
There was no error in the reception of the evidence of the proceedings of the constituted authorities of the town referred to in the enactment in question, and which were legalized, so far as they were, by it. The evidence was not improperly received to show upon what the legislative act of ratification was founded. The case presents no error in the rulings of the trial court.
The judgment and order should be affirmed.
Barker, JP. J., and Haight, J., concurred.