Case Name: Charles W. Mather, App'lt, v. The Eureka Mower Co., Resp't
Court: New York Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1890-03-11
Citations: 30 N.Y. St. Rep. 102
Docket Number: 
Parties: Charles W. Mather, App’lt, v. The Eureka Mower Co., Resp't.
Judges: 
Reporter: New York State Reporter
Volume: 30
Pages: 102–104

Head Matter:
Charles W. Mather, App’lt, v. The Eureka Mower Co., Resp't.
(Court of Appeals, Second Division,
Filed March 11, 1890.)
Corporation—Stockholder assuming duties of officer presumed to do SO GRATUITOUSLY.
Wiiere a stockholder, not a director of a corporation, assumes the duties of an office therein, and performs them without some agreement or provision for compensation, the presumption,in view of his relation and interest, may properly arise that he xierforms the official services gratuitously.
Appeal from judgment of the general term of the supreme court in the fourth judicial department, affirming judgment entered upon report of a referee.
J. W. Boyle, for app’lt; H. J. CooMnham, for resp’t.
Affirming 7 N. Y. State Rep., 593.

Opinion:
Bradley, J.
The plaintiff was the first treasurer of the defendant, a manufacturing corporation, and was appointed as such in April, 1884, entered into actual service in July following, and served about ten months. He sought by this action to recover compensation to which he claimed he was entitled. The referee found that the plaintiff's services were performed without any expectation on his part or any agreement or understanding that he should receive compensation, and that they were intended to be gratuitous. And as conclusion of law the referee determined that the plaintiff was not entitled to recover any sum for his services as treasurer, but allowed to him seventy-five dollars for clerical services of another employed by him as bookkeeper. The value of the plaintiff's services was found by the referee to have been $300. The main question upon the merits is whether the conclusion that there was no agreement expressed or implied to support the plaintiff's alleged claim was warranted by the evidence.
The fact that the plaintiff was appointed or employed as treasurer by the defendant, and that he performed beneficial services for the defendant, presumptively entitled him to payment of their value. Smith v. Long Island R. R. Co., 102 N. Y., 190 ; 1 N. Y. State Rep., 403. And when that appeared, the burden was with the defendant to relieve itself from liability. This it sought to do by making it appear that the plaintiff was a stockholder of the defendant; that he was a member of the banking firm of A. D. Mather & Co., composed of himself and another, who was also a stockholder and one of the trustees of the defendant; and that it was understood that such firm should have the banking business of the defendant. The further fact appeared that, by a by-law of the defendant, the power was given to the board of trustees to fix the compensation of its officers, and while that of secretary was so fixed, no compensation for the treasurer was designed and no provision made by the board in that respect.
It is well settled that a director of a corporation is not entitled to compensation for services performed by him, as such, without the aid of a pre-existing provision expressly giving the fight to it. They are the trustees for the stockholders and, as such, have the management of the corporate affairs. And to permit them to assert claims for services performed and then support them by resolution, would enable the directors to unduly appropriate the fruits of corporate enterprise. It would clearly be contrary to sound policy. The same reason may not exist for the application of the rule to a stockholder, not a director, who has become an officer of the corporation. But he has a pecuniary interest in its management and business. And when he assumes the duties of the office and performs them without some agreement or provision for compensation, the presumption, in view of his relation and interest, may properly arise that he performs the official services gratuitously. This proposition cannot be made dependent upon the proportionate amount of the stock held by him. If the officer expects to have compensation and the corporation intends to pay him for his official services, it may easily be provided for by resolution or agreement before he enters upon his services. This is at all events a salutary rule, as applied to an officer who is a stockholder of the corporation. Loan Assn. v. Stonemetz, 29 Pa. St., 534; Kilpatrick v. Penrose Ferry Bridge Co., 49 id., 118; Smith v. Putnam, 61 N. H., 632; Gill v. N. Y. Cab Co., 48 Hun, 524; 16 N. Y. State Rep., 236; Barril v. Calendar I. & W. Co., 50 Hun, 257; 19 N. Y. State Rep., 877. In such case there may be presumed to exist a reason in the fact of such relation and interest, to induce him to assume and exercise the duties of the trust, not dependent upon compensation for services when nothing appears to the contrary. The plaintiff had the relation of stockholder, and in addition to his interest as such in the corporation he had a further interest as banker in having the benefit, such as it might be, of doing the banking business which the company might furnish.
In view of those considerations and the further fact that he accepted the office and performed its duties without any express understanding that he should have compensation, the referee was permitted to conclude, as he did, that the plaintiff accepted the office of treasurer without any view to compensation, and performed the services gratuitously. The conflict of evidence bearing upon that subject was disposed of in the court below, and can-have no consideration on this review.
In Smith v. Long Island R. R. Co., the plaintiff, who performed the duties of secretary of the defendant, was neither a stockholder or director of the defendant, and, as the court there remarked, stood in no relation to the company which made it his interest to serve it without compensation.
In the present case several exceptions were taken to the reception of evidence. After the defendant had declined to furnish the books and papers called for by the notice of the plaintiff to produce them, the defendant could not properly be permitted to introduce them as evidence in its own behalf to meet the secondary-evidence of the plaintiff, as to their contents, or to give oral evi clence to that effect for such purpose. Bogart v. Brown, 5 Pick., 18; Tyng v. U. S., etc., Co., 1 Hun, 161. The evidence given by the defendant having relation to what appeared in the books and papers embraced in the notice to produce, did not tend to contradict evidence on the part of the plaintiff in any material respect, and no harm could have in any manner resulted from it to the plaintiff. All the exceptions have been carefully examined, and none of them seem to point to any error prejudicial to the plaintiff.
The judgment should be affirmed. *
All concur; Yann, J., in result; except Follett, Oh. J., not sitting.