Case Name: Cochran v. People's Exchange Bank
Court: Arkansas Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Arkansas
Decision Date: 1928-04-02
Citations: 176 Ark. 830
Docket Number: 
Parties: Cochran v. People's Exchange Bank.
Judges: 
Reporter: Arkansas Reports
Volume: 176
Pages: 830–834

Head Matter:
Cochran v. People's Exchange Bank.
Opinion delivered April 2, 1928.
Strait & Strait, for appellant.
Ward & Caudle, for appellee.

Opinion:
Hart, C. J.,
(after stating the facts). Counsel for appellants seek to reverse the decree upon the ground that the sale of the machinery to appellants was procured by the false representations of L. B. McClure, vice president and manager of appellee bank. In order to vitiate a contract of sale on the ground of fraudulent representations, such representations must relate-to an existing fact material to the contract, .and upon which the other party had a right to rely, and did rely to his injury. If the means .of information as to the matters alleged to be misrepresented are equally accessible to both parties, they will be presumed to have informed themselves; and if they have not done so, they must abide by the consequences of their own carelessness. Bankers' Utilities Co., Inc., v. Cotton Belt Savings & Trust Co., 152 Ark. 135, 237 S. W. 707; and Manzil v. White, 161 Ark. 1, 255 S. W. 567.
Thus it will be seen that the issue raised by the appeal is entirely one of fact; and, in determining issues of fact in chancery cases, where the evidence is evenly poised, or so nearly so that we are unable to determine in whose favor the preponderance lies, the findings of fact by the chancellor are persuasive. In short, the findings of fact by the chancery court stand upon appeal, unless they are clearly against the preponderance of the evidence. Leach v. Smith, 130 Ark. 465, 197 S. W. 1160.
In the application of this rule to the facts in the record, viewed in the light of the attendant circumstances, it cannot be said that the findings of fact made by the chancellor are clearly against the weight of the evidence. Appellants were experienced sawmill men, and were shown the sawmill outfit before they purchased it. Harris and McClure both testified that they agreed to purchase the sawmill outfit as viewed by them. The machinery composing the sawmill outfit had been hauled from its location in the country and stored at the residence of the witness Harris, who held a first mortgage on it. Appellants saw the outfit before they purchased it. They now claim that certain pakts were missing when they hauled it away. They claim that they asked about the missing parts, and that Harris promised, to get them up. Appellants knew the missing parts were not with the other parts and that the parts examined by them had been hauled into town from their location somewhere in the country. It is not reasonable to think that they were induced to make the purchase by the representations of Harris and McClure as to the value and character of the parts which they now claim are missing. They saw the most valuable parts of the sawmill outfit, and it is more in accordance with reason and human experience that they purchased the machinery relying upon the value of the parts which were shown to them and which they examined before making the purchase. In addition they secured the sum of $'200, which they claim they were to use in operating expenses. •
We think the chancellor was justified in finding that the facts of the case bring it within the principles of law above announced, and it follows that the decree should be affirmed. It is so ordered.