Case Name: STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Joseph AUGUSTYN, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1986-05-02
Citations: 490 So. 2d 104
Docket Number: No. 85-481
Parties: STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Joseph AUGUSTYN, Appellee.
Judges: CAMPBELL, A.C.J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 490
Pages: 104–117

Head Matter:
STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Joseph AUGUSTYN, Appellee.
No. 85-481.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
May 2, 1986.
Rehearing Denied June 30, 1986.
Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Davis G. Anderson, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., Tampa, for appellant.
James Marion Moorman, Public Defender, and Paul C. Helm, Asst. Public Defender, Bartow, for appellee.

Opinion:
HALL, Judge.
In its criminal prosecution for theft, burglary, and possession of a firearm, the state of Florida seeks this court's review of the trial court's suppression of evidence alleged to be stolen property. We accept appellant's argument that the initial stop of appellee's van was valid; therefore, the consents given by appellee to search both his van and his house were valid, and the yielded evidence was admissible. The trial court's order suppressing the evidence is therefore reversed.
The events of this case began when an informant called a deputy and told him that a certain individual who lived near him was involved in numerous burglaries. This deputy referred the informant to a Detective Weinstein who was patrolling the informant's neighborhood. On September 4, 1984, the informant called Detective Wein-stein and told him that he lived behind a certain individual who was involved in numerous burglaries and who had the stolen property in his residence. He described the vehicle being used to transport the stolen property as an older model, blue, customized, Ford van. Detective Weinstein told the informer that if the van returned and began to move the stolen property he was to call the police dispatcher. Several hours later that same evening, a police dispatcher called Detective Weinstein with the message that an older model, blue, customized, Ford van was in the process of moving stolen property in the Odessa area.
Detective Weinstein immediately contacted a Detective Longworth, who was in the area, and asked him to be on the lookout for the van. Longworth then proceeded to the area of Ogden Circle to meet a Detective Wilke. At this time he did not see a Ford van. Detective Wilke met Detective Longworth in a Kwik Trip parking lot about one-half mile from Ogden Circle, and while they were discussing the Ford van, an older model, blue, customized, Ford van pulled into the parking lot. As soon as the driver of the van saw them, he turned the van around and went back the same way he had come. Wilke followed the van out of the parking lot. The driver of the van then went back down the road and embarked on a U-turn course. Wilke eventually was told to stop the van and did so. Appellee was advised of his constitutional rights by Detective Longworth. Detective Long-worth used the Miranda card to advise appellee of his rights. The detective asked if he could look in the van, and appellee responded that he could. The detective then secured a written consent to search the van. The van was empty, except for a black and white television set. Appellee then took the deputies to his home, where he produced a driver's license. The detectives then asked for and secured a written consent to search appellee's home. Long-worth then searched appellee's home and found the stolen property.
At trial the court agreed to hear arguments on a motion to suppress the evidence after both appellant and appellee stipulated that the court could grant a mistrial if it suppressed the evidence so as to preserve the state's right to appeal.
Appellant raises four issues on appeal. We address the arguments pertaining to the legality of the van's initial detention and to the effect upon the ensuing consents given by appellee to search both the vehicle and his residence as indicated below.
This court has repeatedly held that in order to stop an automobile and request identification from its occupants it is not necessary for the police to have probable cause; rather, it is required that the officer have a founded or reasonable suspicion which requires further investigation, State v. Lewis, 406 So.2d 79 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981); Lewis v. State, 337 So.2d 1031 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976), or which has some factual foundation in the circumstances observed by the officer when interpreted in light of the officer's knowledge. Watts v. State, 468 So.2d 256 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985).
To justify such a stop a police officer "must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1880, 20 L.Ed.2d 889, 906 (1968). The circumstances which will justify an investigatory stop must reasonably indicate that the individual is engaged in criminal activity or else the stop is illegal. § 901.151, Fla.Stat. (1977); Whitley v. State, 349 So.2d 840 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977).
While acknowledging the holding of State v. Hetland, 366 So.2d 831 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979), which disallows detentions based on vague descriptions, we decline to apply it to the instant case where the aggregate circumstances supported a reasonable suspicion of appellee's involvement in the crimes of burglary and theft.
An informant reported that an individual who lived behind him was involved in numerous burglaries and was harboring stolen property in his residence. This individual was reported to drive an older model, blue, customized, Ford van.
At 9:30 p.m. on the evening of the events at issue, a Pasco County deputy received an informant's message from a Dade City dispatcher that an individual in an older model, blue, customized, Ford van was in the process of moving stolen property out of the Odessa area. The informant had previously reported this activity and was told to call the authorities as soon as he observed it again.
The deputy patrolled the vicinity of ap-pellee and informant's neighborhood and did not initially observe or encounter the van. The deputy then proceeded one-half a mile to a convenience store, where he met another deputy. While the deputies were discussing the Ford van, the van pulled into the parking lot and immediately turned around and left. The deputies followed the van, observing it take a U-turn course and go back down the road. The deputies continued to follow the van, eventually stopping it.
One of the officers issued prompt, cautionary Miranda warnings and asked ap-pellee to produce his driver's license. Ap-pellee was unable to do such but consented to a search of his van. After the van was searched, he asked the officers to accompany him back to his house to retrieve his license. He produced his license and thereafter executed a written consent to search his house. This search yielded the incriminating evidence which the court suppressed at trial.
We conclude that there was a sufficient basis for stopping appellee's van and that the subsequent consents were free of taint, thus precluding any application of the "fruits of the poisonous tree" analysis.
Of crucial significance to this position to reverse the trial court's determination of the stop's illegality is the temporal proximity between all of the events involved. No appreciable period of time lapsed between the initial call, the police response, and the eventual sighting of the van. It should also be noted that the location in issue is not densely populated, making it more reasonable to be suspicious of the van.
It is clear to us that the officers acted on the required standard of reasonable suspicion in stopping appellee's van. Watts v. State. Accordingly, we deem the stop of the van and the ensuing consents legal and the yielded evidence untainted.
Reversed and remanded with directions consistent with this opinion.
CAMPBELL, A.C.J., concurs.
LEHAN, J., dissents with opinion.