Case Name: Henry Sheldon v. The City of San Antonio
Court: Supreme Court of Texas
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1860-10
Citations: 25 Supp. Tex. 177
Docket Number: 
Parties: Henry Sheldon v. The City of San Antonio.
Judges: 
Reporter: Texas Reports
Volume: 25 Supp.
Pages: 177–180

Head Matter:
Henry Sheldon v. The City of San Antonio.
The act of the 20th May, 1848, to organize justices’ courts, providing for a certiorari to the District Court, says, “And upon service of such certiorari being made on the justice of the peace, he shall make out a certified copy of the entries in the cause on his docket, and transmit the same, with the original papers, to the District Court;” * * * “and the case may be reviewed, and tried de novo." (Paschal’s Dig., Art. 468, Note 331.)
A motion to dismiss for want of original service was improperly sustained.
A certiorari is not awarded for the correction of the merely erroneous rulings of the justice, but it is to enable the party to have the very right and • justice of his case determined.
The District Court does not ,sit as a court of errors, but for a new trial upon the merits.
Appeal from Bexar. The case was tried before Hon. Edmund J. Davis, one of the district judges.
On the 6th September, 1859, Sheldon sued the city of San Antonio, before a justice of the peace, upon two coupons, each for $35. The summons was issued to “The Mayor of the City of San Antonio,” and served on the 21st January, 1859. The defendant, “without appearing,” moved to quash the citation, because the city was not made 'a party. The defendant plead the want of-authority to issue the bonds.
The justice rendered a judgment for the plaintiff.
The city prayed for a certiorari, urging the insufficiency of the summons, among other things. The case having been docketed for trial de novo, the city renewed the motion to quash the summons and service, because the city was not a party. The court sustained the motion, and dismissed the case.
There was brought into the statement of facts the charter of the city of San Antonio, wherein the corporate name is “The City of San Antonio;” whereby “it may sue and be sued.” So that the point of dismissal was, that the mayor, not the city, was sued. But, as the city sued out the certiorari, it got rightly into court; and the decision was, that as the trial was de novo, the misdescription of person could not be heard in the District Court.
. Hewitt £ Newton, for appellant.
—It will be contended by the appellee, that the city was not properly cited, for the reason that the citation did not, in his opinion, conform to the requirements of the charter of the city of San Antonio. In effect, “The City of San Antonio,” should have been cited thus: “The City of San Antonio, through James B. Sweet, mayor thereof;” and not “James B. Sweet, mayor of the city of San Antonio:” a futile effort to make a “ distinction without a difference;” an evident resort to a technical construction óf the language of the charter, and for no other purpose than that of delay. Bor is the language of the charter impera tive; it simply reads, “and "by that name and title” “the city of San Antonio may sue and be sued, plead and be impleaded,” &e.
It will not be contended but that the appellee was properly in the District Court. Then the trial de novo should have proceeded on the merits of the case. (See Perry v. Rhodes, 20 Tex., 729.) The irregularities of a justice’s court will not be looked to on trial ude novo.” (See Kellers v. Reppien, 9 Tex., 443; see also Mays v. Lewis, 4 Tex., 1.) The case must stand upon its merits.
W. H. Cleveland, for appellee.
—1. The motion to dismiss, as to the city of San Antonio, first made before the magistrate, was properly sustained by the District Court, because the said city had not been sued, nor served with citation before said justice, and he had not acquired jurisdiction over said city.
2. The charter of said city, which, by the 47th article thereof, is declared to be a public act, to be judicially taken notice of in all courts of this State, in the 1st section provides, that the city of San Antonio shall sue and be sued by the name and title of “ The City of San Antonio.” All corporations must sue and be sued in their corporate name, and not in the name of any of their officers; but, when sued in such corporate name, process may be served upon the principal officer of the corporation.
3. In this case, suit was brought against a citation issued upon “James R. Sweet, mayor of the city of San Antonio,” whereby Mr. Sweet, designated as such mayor, was personally and individually sued and served with process, and not said city; the words “Mayor of the City of San Antonio” being merely descriptive of the person.

Opinion:
"Wheeler, O. J.
—The want of proper citation and service would not authorize the dismissal of the suit. And in Perry v. Rhode, where there was no service, and judg ment by default was given by the justice, and the defendant removed the cause into the District Court by certiorari, and that court refused to entertain the objection of want of service in the justice's court, and to remand the case to obtain • service, this court affirmed the judgment. (20 Tex., 729.)
On the authority of that decision it must be held, that the court erred in dismissing the cause. The ground of the decision is, that a certiorari is not awarded for the correction of the merely erroneous rulings of the justice, but is for the purpose of enabling the party to have the very right and justice of his case administered. As the trial in the District Court is de novo, this object is as certainly attained as if there hacl been service duly made before the justice; and, the party being now properly in court, by his own petition for certiorari, and the cause having been removed into the District Court for a trial upon the merits, it would be an idle and useless thing to have it remanded to the justice, for the mere purpose of correcting the irregularity or illegality in the ruling of the justice respecting the service. The District Court does not sit as a court of errors for the correction of the errors of the justice, but entertains the case for the purpose of a new trial of the case upon its merits. The judgment is
Reversed and the cause remanded.