Case Name: Seth Daniel v. Wm. J. Harley
Court: South Carolina Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: South Carolina
Decision Date: 1848-11
Citations: 3 Strob. 231
Docket Number: 
Parties: Seth Daniel v. Wm. J. Harley.
Judges: Evans, J. — Frost, J. — and Withers, J. — concurred.
Reporter: South Carolina Law Reports
Volume: 34
Pages: 231–235

Head Matter:
Seth Daniel v. Wm. J. Harley.
The sheriff cannot be made liable on his contract of sale, without the proper entry in his sale-book, required by the sheriff’s Act of 1839, or such a clear and explicit admission in writing as will stand in place of such entry.
Before O’Neall, J. at Barnwell, Fall Term, 1847.
This was an action of assumpsit, brought against the ex-sheriff, to recover the difference between the sale and re-sale of eighteen slaves, sold as the property of James M. Loper, and purchased by the plaintiff.
The defendant’s advertisement of the sale of 38 negroes, the property of James M. Loper, for sale-day, in October, 1842, was given in evidence. There was no entry of the sale in the sheriff’s book. It was proved by a written admission of the defendant, that $638, the purchase money of eighteen slaves, the property of James M. Loper, sold by him, and purchased by the plaintiff, had been tendered to him by the plaintiff, before aetion brought. The slaves were re-sold November, 1842, sale-day, and from the entry in the sheriff’s book, it seemed that they sold for $3,630. The difference, $2,992, was claimed by the plaintiff. When the plaintiff closed his case, the defendant moved for a non-suit, on the ground that there was no sufficient evidence of the sale, to take it out of the Statute of Frauds. The Circuit Judge thought the admission of the defendant was enough, and therefore refused the motion.
In the defendant’s defence, it abundantly appeared, that from the belief that James M. Loper, under the will of some person from whom he received the slaves, had only a life-estate therein, the defendant offered only the life-estate, and required the purchasers to give bond for the return of the property on the falling in of the life-estate, and in the mean time, that the slaves should not be carried out of the State, ■ or abused. These terms were proclaimed by the sheriff, J when his sale was.commencing. In the progress of the sale, Col. Condy, who was present, and who became a purchaser, asked — “ L)o you sell all Loper’s interest?” The defendant said, “Yesmeaning, however, as one of the witnesses said, no rmre, still, than that he sold the life-estate. For that was all the estate which it was supposed Loperhad. Col. Condy purchased one or more of the slaves, and after some-controversy with the sheriff, in which he claimed the absolute estate, he gave the bond required by the sheriff’s terms. The sheriff, soon after the sale, discovered that Loper had an absolute estate. He (the sheriff.) required the plaintiff to give the bond which his terms had required. He (plaintiff,) was unable, or refused to do so ; and the sheriff re-sold, on sale-day, in November, 1842, for the sum already stated.
The jury were instructed that the sale was good, unless it was avoided by mistake or fraud. His Honor said there seemed to him nothing from which fraud could arise, unless it might be that some implication thereof could be made from the gross inadequacy of price. There was, however, nothing in that which could avail the defendant. For his sales were accompanied, uniformly, with more or less sacrifice. Was there any mistake? It was manifest that the sheriff sold a less estate than that which the debtor had.— This was clearly the result of mistake. He said he thought the sheriff might sell, when neither debtor nor creditor objected, a less estate than that which the debtor held, and that he might superadd such terms as he did on this occasion.— That he thought the proof was not at all inconsistent with the sheriff’s advertisement, for that did not define the estate intended to be sold. If even the sale were good, the plaintiff, he thought, in failing to give boud, as required by the terms, and as demanded from him by the sheriff, had forfeited his contract, and was not entitled to recover. The jury found for the defendant.
The defendant renewed the motion for a non-suit, on the ground taken in the Court below, to wit: that there was no sufficient note or memorandum, in writing, of the bargain of the sale in question, to take the case out of the Statute of Frauds.
The plaintiff also appealed and moved for a new trial, on several grounds, which it is unnecessary to specify, as the motion for a non-suit was, alone, considered by the Court.
Carroll & Wardlaw. for the motion.
Bellinger & Hutson, contra.
Dud. R. 142.
Acts or ’39, p. 27.
i 407.
At 410.
Copy of Defendant's Admission.
It is admitted that Seth Daniel has tendered to me the chase money, being six hundred and thirty-eight dollars, for the eighteen negroes which he bid off at sheriff’s sale, last sale day, at this place, sold as the property of James M. Lo-per, and named as follows: Viney, Serene, Viney, Hannibal, Julia, Charles, Jinsey, Hetty, Jack, Cynthia, Handy, Civility, George, Caesar, Lucy, Georgiana, Spencer and Letty. The said purchase money has been tendered to me several times, and he has offered to comply with the terms of the sale, by paying for and taking the property. But I have been notified not to comply with the terms of sale on my part, on the ground of inadequacy of price at which the property sold, and that Loper had an absolute estate — and therefore have hitherto refused to comply. W. J. Hahley.
3d November, 1842.

Opinion:
O'Neall, J.
delivered the opinion of the Court.
As the motion for non-suit must, in the opinion of this Court, prevail, the ground taken in that behalf will alone be considered.
In the case of Carter v. Bennett, it was held that an entry by an auctioneer, (or more properly speaking, by a vendue master,) in his book, under the 6th section of the Act of 1785, is sufficient to charge a purchaser, and that such contract, thus evidenced, is a compliance with the Statute of Frauds and Perjuries. The Act of '39 concerning the office, duties and liabilities of sheriffs, proceeding upon the idea which had been suggested by the Vendue Master's Act of '85, provides in the 4th paragraph of the 6th section, for the keeping of a sale book by the sheriff, in which are to be " transcribed all levies (" specifying the property, and date of each levy,") " and all advertisements of property levied on," " and the parts of the said book, in which accounts of sales shall be kept, shall be divided in separate and suitable columns, in which the sheriff shall enter the names of the parties, a description of the property sold, when, sold, to whom sold, amount of sale," <fcc.
The case of Cristie v. Simpson held such an entry, although not made at the moment of sale, a compliance with the Statute of Frauds. In it the observation is made by my brother Wardlaw, " the office book is the evidence required by lawand generally, I think, it may be said, that without an entry, in such book, a purchaser could not be charged; and so too, without it, the sale could not be enforced against the rights of the creditors or debtor. -It may be, however, that as against the sheriff alone, the sale on his clear and unequivocal admission, in writing, of everything required by the law to be noticed, in the sale book, would be enforced. In this case, however, the sheriff stands for the creditors; he re-sold, and applied the proceeds to their debts. The action, here, is to take from them, through him, this fund. So far as they are concerned, they can demand the entry in the sale book, and on the non-production of it, the claim to enforce the contract is at an end.
The admission, signed by the defendant, cannot, however, charge him. For it does not set out the levy, advertisement, nor certainly the character of the estate, sold by the sheriff; indeed, from the terms used, it would seem that he meant to say, in this paper, "1 sold only the life estate, in the negroes, and as you claim more, I will not comply with the sale, as you understand it." It is true, that if the paper had merely contained the admission of the sale of the negroes, at sheriff's sale, and nothing had been said about the ground on which he refused to comply, that then the legal implication would have been, that the absolute estate had been sold.— But it is our duty to read the whole paper, and give it construction in all its parts. Thus reading it, in connection with the evidence of what actually took place, at the sheriff's sale, there is no difficulty in understanding that the defendant meant to say in it, " I sold only the life estate of Loper, you claim the absolute estate, and therefore I will not comply." It is, therefore, not such a clear and explicit admission, as will stand in place of the entry required by the Act of '39.
There can be no doubt, that if the sheriff refuses or neglects to make the proper entry, in his. sale book, of a sale made by him, and thereby the purchaser sustains injury, that m such case, he would be liable, in an action on the case, for the damages. But he cannot be made liable, on the contract of sale, without the proper entry, or an equivalent admission in writing.
The defendant's motion for a non-suit is granted.
Evans, J. — Frost, J. — and Withers, J. — concurred.