Case Name: MIAMI-DADE EXPRESSWAY AUTHORITY and Javier Rodriguez, P.E., etc., Appellants, v. TROPICAL TRAILER LEASING, L.L.C., et al., Appellees.
Court: District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 2018-06-27
Citations: 250 So. 3d 751
Docket Number: No. 3D16–2851
Parties: MIAMI-DADE EXPRESSWAY AUTHORITY and Javier Rodriguez, P.E., etc., Appellants,
v.
TROPICAL TRAILER LEASING, L.L.C., et al., Appellees.
Judges: Before ROTHENBERG, C.J., and SALTER and LUCK, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Third Series
Volume: 250
Pages: 751–764

Head Matter:
MIAMI-DADE EXPRESSWAY AUTHORITY and Javier Rodriguez, P.E., etc., Appellants,
v.
TROPICAL TRAILER LEASING, L.L.C., et al., Appellees.
No. 3D16-2851
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
Opinion filed June 27, 2018
Johnson, Anselmo, Murdoch, Burke, Piper & Hochman and Jonathan H. Railey, Michael R. Piper and Christopher J. Stearns (Fort Lauderdale), for appellants.
Akerman LLP and A. Rodger Traynor, Jr., and Lawrence D. Silverman, Miami, for appellees.
Before ROTHENBERG, C.J., and SALTER and LUCK, JJ.

Opinion:
SALTER, J.
Defendants/appellants, Miami-Dade Expressway Authority and Javier Rodriguez, P.E., in his official capacity as Executive Director of Miami-Dade Expressway Authority (collectively, "MDX"), appeal an order granting a motion for class certification by Tropical Trailer Leasing, L.L.C. ("Tropical Trailer"), and eight co-plaintiffs (collectively, the nine plaintiffs are referred to as "Plaintiffs"). We affirm.
I. Facts; Proceedings in the Circuit Court
The Plaintiffs are in the business of leasing trailers. The trailers are not self-propelled, and the Plaintiffs do not own the tractor trucks needed to transport the trailers. The Plaintiffs lease the trailers to third parties, who in turn hire the owners of tractor trucks to tow the leased trailers. Many times the tractor truck owners hire independent drivers for a particular haul or group of hauls.
Implemented in 2010, MDX uses an electronic transponder system to charge the motor vehicles and drivers on its roads a toll based on the number of axles on the vehicle. If the tractor truck contains a working electronic transponder device (a "SunPass transponder"), the entire toll amount for a five-axle vehicle (three axles for the tractor and two for the trailer) is automatically deducted from the SunPass transponder account of the tractor truck's owner. If the vehicle has no SunPass transponder, then the MDX toll system relies on a video "Toll by Plate" system, capturing an image of the vehicle's rear tag. In such cases, MDX charges the entire per-axle toll to the rear tag's registered owner.
This practice led MDX to charge the Plaintiffs a full five-axle toll. The Plaintiffs alleged that, starting in 2013, some MDX systems had the capability to photograph the front tag belonging to the driver, but MDX made no consistent effort to identify the driver of the motorized vehicle. The Plaintiffs asserted that MDX had no authority to impose a toll on their tractor-towed, non-motorized trailers before a 2012 amendment to the statutory definition of "motor vehicle," and thereafter, no authority to impose a toll on the trailers for the separately-owned and operated tractor trucks pulling the trailers.
The Plaintiffs sued MDX for declaratory, injunctive and monetary relief based on allegations that MDX's toll collection practices, through its video tolling and "Toll by Plate" system, had unlawfully charged the Plaintiffs tolls on occasions where third parties were towing their trailers. The Plaintiffs argued that a trailer owner is not the owner of the "motor vehicle" incurring the toll. The Plaintiffs sought to certify a class of all trailer owners who were charged a toll by MDX because the driver of the motorized tractor truck did not pay the toll incurred by the truck.
The operative Second Amended Class Action Complaint asserted that many of the tractor truck drivers tow the trailers on MDX roads without paying tolls. These drivers allegedly smudge or obscure the tractor plate to avoid MDX detection. Plaintiffs argued that Florida statutes make a driver ultimately responsible for the entire unpaid toll, not the trailer owner. See § 316.1001(2)(c), Fla. Stat. (2017). MDX has been imposing the toll on the trailer tag owners because the trailer tag was the only captured tag. The Plaintiffs have no practical way of identifying the drivers towing their trailers. This makes it impossible for the Plaintiffs to track down the toll violator to compel immediate payment of the toll, or to avoid the toll by providing MDX a timely affidavit with the toll violator's information, as required in section 316.1001(2)(C) 1., and 2., Florida Statutes (2017). As a result, the Plaintiffs have been paying most of the violations even though the tolls are unlawful.
The complaint also sought clarification of the trailer owners' liability for tolls after a 2012 statutory amendment. Prior to July 1, 2012, Plaintiffs allege that MDX had no authority to assess tolls against Tropical Trailer's non-self-propelled vehicles. This is based on section 316.110(2)(c), which specifies that the "owner of the motor vehicle involved in the violation is responsible and liable for payment ." The pre-2012 version of section 316.003 defined "motor vehicle" as "(21) Motor vehicle.-Any self-propelled vehicle not operated upon rails or guideway, but not including any bicycle, motorized scooter, electric personal assistive mobility device, or moped." As the trailers were not self-propelled, they could not be assessed any toll under the pre-2012 statute.
In 2012, however, the legislature amended section 316.003(21), defining "motor vehicle" as:
(21) Motor vehicle.-Except when used in s. 316.1001, any self-propelled vehicle not operated upon rails or guideway, but not including any bicycle, motorized scooter, electric personal assistive mobility device, or moped. For purposes of s. 316.1001, "motor vehicle" has the same meaning as in s. 320.01(1)(a).
§ 316.003(21), Fla. Stat. (2012) (emphasis added) (Ch. 2012-111, § 2, Laws of Fla., eff. July 1, 2012, to Dec 31, 2012) (currently renumbered as § 316.003(40) ). Section 320.01(1)(a), in turn, provides:
(1) "Motor vehicle" means:
(a) An automobile, motorcycle, truck, trailer, semitrailer, truck tractor and semitrailer combination, or any other vehicle operated on the roads of this state .
The 2012 amendment to the section 316.003(21) definition arguably created an ambiguity between the requirements in section 316.1001, requiring payment from the registered owner of the motor vehicle committing the toll violation, and the now-undefined responsible party for the toll when there were several owners involved in a "truck tractor and semitrailer combination," as is the case in the Plaintiffs' operations.
The Plaintiffs moved for class certification. At the class certification hearing, Tropical Trailer's co-owner and general manager, Alberto Vara, testified as the representative of all nine Plaintiffs. The second and only other witness was Stephan Andriuk, the Deputy Executive Director and Director of Toll Operations for MDX.
Vara testified that the two MDX toll violation databases he examined included over 83,000 trailer owners who had paid tolls to MDX between October 14, 2010, and April 2016 as a result of the video-based billing of trailer license plates. Vara described the methodology he used to analyze the data in the databases, and to compile the numbers he used. Although Vara was not able to state a precise number of other trailer owners that also owned the tractor truck pulling the trailer at the time of a citation, the Plaintiffs themselves owned some 2,600 towed units that were always pulled by tractors owned and operated by other persons or entities. Vara also testified about the registration holds placed against his trailers for unpaid tolls accrued years after the trailers had been sold. He also testified to collection attempts by MDX, including attempts at arrest, due to outstanding tolls.
Finally, Vara described his attempts to lobby for a fairer system of toll collection even before the beginning of this action. He testified that MDX billed the trailer owner incorrectly (and exclusively) rather than apportioning between tractor and trailer based on the number of axles of the composite vehicle transiting a set of sensors and cameras. He also described the difficulties and limited success in trying to pass through an erroneous tractor charge to the customers of the Plaintiffs who leased trailers (who might have knowledge the Plaintiffs did not have regarding the owner or operator of the tractor).
Andriuk testified on behalf of MDX. He stated that MDX had installed many front-facing cameras starting in 2013, and would have them in all of its toll facilities by August of 2017. He described the process MDX uses to store front tag pictures when the vehicle involved has more than two axles. He clarified on cross-examination that prior to June 30, 2012, no Toll by Plate fines were issued for front license plates in truck-trailer combinations. Andriuk also opined that Florida law permits MDX to bill trailer companies for tolls. Before this lawsuit, according to Andriuk, MDX settled all the toll disputes with trailer owners.
After the hearing, the trial court granted the motion for class certification. The court found that the elements of numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy, under Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.220(a), were established. The trial court also found that Rule 1.220(b)(2) was satisfied because "the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to all the members of the class." The order granting the motion for certification found that Rule 1.220(b)(3) was satisfied because the class members' common questions of law and fact predominate over individual class member claims, and the class action process is superior to other available methods for the adjudication of the controversy.
The trial court defined two subclasses, rather than the four proposed by the Plaintiffs, dividing the class members into those affected before, and those affected after, the July 1, 2012, legislative amendment: "(1) the owners of all trailers towed on MDX roadways for which MDX used the toll by plate method of toll imposition from October 14, 2010, through June 30, 2012," and "(2) the owners of all trailers on MDX roadways for which MDX used the toll by plate method of toll imposition since July 1, 2012." MDX appealed the order granting class certification.
II. Analysis
We review an order granting class certification for an abuse of discretion. Sosa v. Safeway Premium Fin. Co., 73 So.3d 91, 98 (Fla. 2011). The burden of proving the factual elements necessary to certify a class under Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.220 is on the movant. Initially, the Plaintiffs sought to certify four classes of claimants:
CLASS A-DAMAGES AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF: All trailer owners whose trailer license tag was used by MDX between 10/14/10 and 6/30/12 to charge a toll in any amount.
CLASS B-DAMAGES AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF: All trailer owners whose trailer license tag was used by MDX between 10/14/10 and 6/30/12 to charge a toll which is greater than the toll chargeable to two axle vehicles.
CLASS C-DAMAGES AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF: All trailer owners whose trailer license tag was used by MDX after 10/14/10 to charge a toll which is greater than the toll chargeable for three axle vehicles.
CLASS D-INJUNCTIVE RELIEF ONLY: All trailer owners whose license tag was used by MDX after 10/14/10 to charge a toll in any amount. Excluded from Class D would be all trailer owners who also own the motorized vehicle pulling the trailer at the time the toll is incurred.
The trial court concluded that these proposed class definitions "either overlap, are partly duplicative, or are overbroad." Based on the change in the statutory definition of "motor vehicle" effective July 1, 2012, the trial court certified the two subclasses described in part I of this opinion.
The certification order includes findings of fact regarding each of the elements specified in Rule 1.220 and the decisional law applying that Rule. The record includes competent, substantial evidence which, though disputed, supports the findings.
A. Rule 1.220(a) Findings
The four requisite elements in Rule 1.220(a), commonly referred to as "numerosity," "commonality," "typicality," and "adequacy," were addressed in the findings.
1. Rule 1.220(a)(1) : Numerosity
Addressing numerosity, more than 83,000 toll billings were shown to have been sent to trailer owners during the pertinent time interval. The nine proposed representative Plaintiffs themselves own over 2,600 towed, non-self-propelled units, and the record identifies numerous corporate parties that did not own the tractors that pulled their trailers during the class period (but which were nonetheless billed for tolls). MDX's evidence and argument that some such parties and tractor owners may have settled, or that the trailer billings were incontestable because the trailers were under common ownership with the tractors pulling them, are not per se obstacles to certification. Even a settling trailer owner may appreciate the benefit of the Plaintiffs' classwide prayer for injunctive relief to prevent future billing errors by MDX. "Individualized damage inquiries will also not preclude class certification." Sosa, 73 So.3d at 107.
Class certification does not hinge on proving a specific number of members. Toledo v. Hillsborough Cty. Hosp. Auth., 747 So.2d 958, 961 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999). The exact identity or location of each member need not be known for certification. The requirement is that class size not be based on mere speculation. Sosa, 73 So.3d at 114. Here, it is not.
MDX's reliance on Leibell v. Miami-Dade County, 84 So.3d 1078 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012), is unavailing. In that case, involving 1,400 participants in a toll program between the Venetian Islands and the mainland, "by the time of the hearing on the motion for certification, there existed evidence that only one of them, Ms. Leibell, had paid the program fee under protest. The evidence was that many more, represented by two homeowners' associations, do not wish to seek the remedies sought by Ms. Leibell in this lawsuit." Id. at 1083. MDX has presented no such evidence of prospective class members that might oppose the relief sought by the Plaintiffs in the present case.
2. Rule 1.220(a)(2) : Commonality
"The threshold of the commonality requirement is not high." Sosa, 73 So.3d at 107. Sosa holds that commonality is satisfied if the common interest of putative class members is in the object or result of the action (here, money damages but also injunctive relief), or in the general question implicated in the action. Id. The trial court correctly determined that "The claims of [the Plaintiffs] and the claims of the class depend upon a common contention."
3. Rule 1.220(a)(3) : Typicality
"The key inquiry for a trial court when it determines whether a proposed class satisfies the typicality requirement is whether the class representative possesses the same legal interest and has endured the same legal injury as the class members." Id. at 114. Here the legal interests are the same and not antagonistic. Before the 2012 legislative amendment, even the owner/operator of both the tractor and the trailer billed based on the trailer's plate has an argument that the five-axle billing should have been reduced by the number of axles on the trailer (i.e., trailers should not have been included in a bill at all). Proof of the Plaintiffs' claims will, as the trial court found, automatically prove the claims of other members of the class.
4. Rule 1.220(a)(4) : Adequacy
Vara's testimony regarding his work on behalf of the Plaintiffs, all accomplished at Vara's own expense, and his investigation on behalf of all prospective class members, supports the trial court's conclusion that the Plaintiffs are adequate class representatives and have common, not conflicting, interests in the remedies sought on behalf of the class. At the certification hearing, MDX commendably stipulated that the Plaintiffs' counsel has the requisite qualifications, experience, and ability to prosecute the case as counsel for the class.
B. Rule 1.220(b) Findings
The trial court also conducted the required analysis under Rule 1.220(b). Rule 1.220(b)(2) is satisfied here because, as the trial court found, MDX has acted in a similar manner towards all class members with its challenged toll practice. MDX's arguments regarding the statutory authority for its practices are the same for all class members.
The trial court also considered Rule 1.220(b)(3). The court found that common questions of law and fact predominate, and that class treatment is superior to other forms of representation. Common questions of fact predominate if the class representative has established a "reasonable methodology for generalized proof of class-wide impact." Sosa, 73 So.3d at 112. The record establishes such a methodology. MDX has not identified any individual issues that predominate, except to argue that individual treatment of the scores of cases would be preferable.
The sheer size of this class demonstrates the superiority of class treatment. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.220(b)(3). Here, as in Sosa, there are potentially thousands of prospective class members. Their individual claims are too small to expect them to be adjudicated separately. Certainly, separate joinder of the class members would be impractical. See Broin v. Philip Morris Co., Inc., 641 So.2d 888, 889 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994) (concluding that joinder of 60,000 people in the class would be impractical). Given the size of this class, class action is a more manageable and efficient way to proceed, and the most efficient use of judicial resources.
III. The Dissent
Our dissenting colleague contends that the certified classes are "speculative and overbroad," such that the trial court abused its discretion. We disagree.
Sosa directs a trial court to restrict its examination of the requirements for certification "to the substance of the motion and not the merits of the cause of action or questions of fact for a jury." Sosa, 73 So.3d at 105 (citing Morgan v. Coats, 33 So.3d 59, 63-64 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010) ). The substance of the Plaintiffs' motion for certification in this case is evident: the "Toll by Plate" method adopted by MDX did not, both before and after the 2012 redefinition of "motor vehicle," charge the proper party the proper amount as between tractor trucks and the trailers towed by those trucks. There was no testimony by either witness at the certification hearing disputing that (a) tractor-trailer combinations travel the MDX expressways regularly and in great numbers, and (b) when the driver of the tractor truck and owner of the trailer are different persons or entities, "Toll by Plate" lacks a mechanism to bill each party for its proper portion of the total toll.
Nor was there any contention or evidence that each individual toll billed erroneously could be efficiently addressed in a separate lawsuit and prosecuted to judgment. The dissent's concern that some tractor-trailer combinations (both owned by a single responsible operator) may have been correctly billed by the "Toll by Plate" method establishes that some class members may be unable to prove damages, but that is not a basis for reversing the certification order.
Again, the Florida Supreme Court's clear directive to the trial court in Sosa, quoting Morgan v. Coats, is to focus "on whether the requirements of rule 1.220 have been met and not on whether the moving party will prevail on the merits." Id. It is thus of no moment, at this phase of the proceeding, whether some trailer owners will opt out of the class, or whether they may also have operated the tractor trucks which pulled their trailers (precluding such owners from recovering damages).
The record before us presents competent, substantial evidence that numerosity exists, even if some trailer owners may be unable to prove compensable damages. MDX's (and the dissent's) reliance on Lucarelli Pizza & Deli v. Posen Constr., Inc., 173 So.3d 1092 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015), regarding numerosity and overbreadth is unpersuasive. In that case, two plaintiffs sought to certify a class of claimants who alleged lost business due to a contractor's rupture of a natural gas line serving approximately 1,200 customers of the gas company. The Second District affirmed the trial court's denial of certification, determining that the two movants "did not present any evidence that a single member of the class other than themselves had suffered any economic loss." Id. at 1093.
The dissent also contends that the majority opinion "implicitly relies upon the 'tipsy coachman' doctrine" (citing Porter v. Porter, 913 So.2d 691, 694 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005). We must again respectfully disagree. The trial court reached the right result, a finding of numerosity supporting certification, for the right reason and based on the record. We are not at liberty to conduct a "de novo" review of the record or to make our own "independent determination" as to whether the Plaintiffs satisfied that requirement of Rule 1.220. Sosa, 73 So.3d at 103.
IV. Conclusion
The class certification motion was thoroughly briefed and argued by experienced counsel on both sides. The evidentiary hearing, though shorter than many, included competent, substantial evidence establishing the elements required for certification. The very nature of the claim-allegedly-improper toll charges on heavily-traveled expressways with tens of thousands of pertinent billings-supports the adjudication of the claims as a class action. No single trailer owner could cost-effectively maintain such an action, seeking reimbursement for a series of charges of a few dollars per "Toll by Plate" billing.
The trial court was both diligent and vigilant (reforming the class definitions, for example) in assessing the required elements. We affirm the order and findings in all respects.
Certification order affirmed.
LUCK, J., concurs.
Vara identified other trailer-owning companies that were billed by MDX that owned only the trailer and not the tractor pulling the combined vehicle: Angle Leasing, Omega, Electra Intermodal, TAW, Bowman Leasing, XTRA Lease, Strick Lease, Tote Marine, and Seaboard Marine. The MDX witness testified that "pretty much the names that he listed," had settled with MDX, but provided no definitive testimony regarding the number of putative class members that have not settled.
Andriuk's testimony did not attempt to address all of the 83,000 trailer owner billings discussed by Vara in his testimony.
The Court observed that the single plaintiff, Ms. Leibell, had so far "proven a class of one." Leibell, 84 So.3d at 1084.
The fact that MDX may have settled some claims regarding those toll practices (as alluded to by Andriuk) does not alter the uniformity of MDX's "Toll by Plate" procedures affecting the class.