Case Name: Thomas Wayne JONES v. STATE of Maryland
Court: Court of Appeals of Maryland
Jurisdiction: Maryland
Decision Date: 2004-02-18
Citations: 379 Md. 704
Docket Number: No. 57
Parties: Thomas Wayne JONES v. STATE of Maryland.
Judges: 
Reporter: Maryland Reports
Volume: 379
Pages: 704–746

Head Matter:
843 A.2d 778
Thomas Wayne JONES v. STATE of Maryland.
No. 57,
Sept. Term, 2001.
Court of Appeals of Maryland.
Feb. 18, 2004.
Reconsideration Denied April 2, 2004.
Fred Warren Bennett (Booth Marcus Ripke, Bennett & Nathans, LLP, on brief), Greenbelt, for petitioner.
Celia Anderson Davis, Asst. Atty. Gen. (J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Atty. Gen., on brief), for respondent.
Argued before BELL, C.J., ELDRIDGE, RAKER, WILNER, CATHELL, BATTAGLIA, THEODORE G. BLOOM (retired, specially assigned), JJ.
Eldridge, J., now retired, participated in the hearing and conference of this case while an active member of this Court; after being recalled pursuant to the Constitution, Article IV, Section 3A, he also participated in the decision and adoption of this opinion.

Opinion:
RAKER, J.
Petitioner presents a single question for review in this Court: Whether the Court of Special Appeals exceeded the outer limits of its discretion by improperly excusing the State's procedural default and remanding this case to the circuit court for further proceedings. This case is a post-conviction proceeding. The primary question before the post-conviction hearing court was whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object at trial to the admissibility of a hearsay statement. We hold that the Court of Special Appeals has the discretion, in the context of a post-conviction proceeding, to excuse a procedural default or waiver and did not abuse its discretion in this instance.
In December 1996, petitioner Thomas Wayne Jones was tried and convicted in the Circuit Court for Prince George's County of the first degree felony murder of Gary Gulston and other related offenses, including kidnapping, robbery with a deadly weapon, and use of a handgun in a felony. The trial court sentenced Jones to life without the possibility of parole for the felony murder conviction and consecutive terms of twenty years each for the handgun and armed robbery offenses; the remaining offenses were merged for sentencing purposes. In an unreported opinion, the Court of Special Appeals affirmed the conviction. Jones filed no appeal from that judgment.
In November 1998, Jones filed a petition for post-conviction relief pursuant to the Maryland Post Conviction Procedure Act, Md.Code (1957, 1996 Repl.Vol.) Art. 27, § 645A, alleging that he had received ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel in violation of his constitutional rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. As one of his bases for post-conviction relief, Jones argued that his trial and appellate counsel were constitutionally deficient because they failed to object to the admissibility of a hearsay statement contained within the written statement of Derrick Smith, a State witness. At Jones's trial, Smith in a written statement had described how he, Jones, and Don Gutrick, another participant in the criminal episode, had planned and committed the robbery of Gary Gulston's home that resulted in the felony murder for which Jones was convicted. Within the written statement, Smith stated that Gutrick had told him that "we killed him," meaning that Gutrick and Jones had killed Gary Gulston. Because Jones's counsel never objected to the admissibility of this incriminating statement by Gutrick as hearsay contained within Smith's written statement, Jones claimed in his post-conviction petition that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. The post-conviction court that adjudicated Jones's petition agreed with Jones and issued an order granting Jones a new trial, stating that "[Jones's counsel's] trial performance, although generally excellent, did fall below a standard of reasonableness when he failed to object to [Don Gutrick's statement]."
The State filed an Application for Leave to Appeal to the Court of Special Appeals pursuant to the Uniform Post Conviction Procedure Act, Md.Code (2001, 2003 Cum.Supp.) § 7-109 of the Criminal Procedure Article. The State presented several legal arguments for the admissibility of the incriminating statement, among which was the argument that Don Gutrick's remark was "clearly admissible as a statement of a coconspirator made during the course of and in furtherance of the conspiracy." See Maryland Rule 5-803(a)(5); Perry v. State, 344 Md. 204, 231-35, 686 A.2d 274, 287-89 (1996). This argument had not been raised in the post-conviction court, nor was it raised in the State's opening brief to the intermediate appellate court. In its reply brief, however, the State again stated the co-conspirator exception to the hearsay rule as an alternative theory for the statement's admissibility. Because of the State's failure to raise this theory initially upon appeal, Jones's counsel filed a motion to strike that portion of the State's reply brief. The Court of Special Appeals agreed, and found that the legal theory, raised for the first time in the reply brief, was not properly before the court and therefore would not be considered on the merits by that court.
After the Court of Special Appeals affirmed the decision of the post-conviction court, the State filed a Motion to Reconsider, arguing that the court had erred in refusing to consider the co-conspirator exception theory presented in the Application for Leave to Appeal and the reply brief. Although the Court of Special Appeals rejected the legal grounds of the State's motion, it revised its opinion and, in the exercise of its discretion, ordered a limited remand so that the post-conviction court might determine whether the hearsay statement was admissible under the co-conspirator exception to the hearsay rule. The Court of Special Appeals explained its action as follows:
"The cases cited above elucidate for us that, in a criminal case, the State can be found to have waived a valid claim, even if the waiver leads to the reversal of a conviction. On the other hand, when the State fails to raise an important argument, an appellate court ordinarily has discretion to review the record or the trial judge's ruling in its effort to reach a sound result. Similarly, the appellate court generally retains discretion to consider an argument that is belatedly raised.
"In light of the importance of the issue presented with regard to the co-conspirator exception, we have determined, in the exercise of our discretion, that a remand is appropriate, so that the parties will have an opportunity to fully litigate before the post-conviction court the question of whether Gutriek's statement was admissible under the co-conspirator exception to the hearsay rule. Moreover, we believe a remand is appropriate because resolution of the issue in the context of a post-conviction proceeding will require careful analysis of the entire record, appropriate briefing, and, perhaps, further examination of defense counsel and appellate counsel.
"In reaching our decision to remand, we perceive that this is not a case in which the State made a tactical decision to forego raising the co-conspirator exception. Instead, it seems to have inadvertently omitted the argument from its initial brief after including it in the Application. Further, in contrast to some of the cases we have considered, the State eventually raised the co-conspirator issue in its reply brief; it did not fail altogether to raise the matter until after we ruled, as happened in some of the cases that we cited. Nor did it make the kinds of damaging or misleading concessions below that we saw in other cases that we discussed. To the contrary, the State has steadfastly maintained that Smith's entire statement was admissible and has persisted in its claim that Jones's conviction should be upheld."
State v. Jones, 138 Md.App. 178, 241-242, 771 A.2d 407, 444 (2001). Jones noted a timely petition for writ of certiorari, which we granted. 365 Md. 266, 778 A.2d 382 (2001).
Before this Court, petitioner contends the intermediate appellate court abused its discretion by considering the unpreserved issue and ordering the remand to the post-conviction court. He contends that by exercising its discretion to permit the post-conviction hearing court to determine the admissibility of the hearsay statement under the co-conspirator exception, the Court of Special Appeals effectively held the State to a lower standard for preservation of post-conviction and appellate arguments than it does for criminal defendants. Finally, petitioner argues that Maryland appellate courts have consistently applied the principle of waiver to preclude consideration of arguments raised belatedly, such as in this post-conviction proceeding in which the argument was raised for the first time in the reply brief. The end result, says petitioner, was an appearance of partiality by the intermediate appellate court and a second chance by the State to resurrect a dead argument.
The State claims that the co-conspirator argument belatedly raised in its reply brief was a subsidiary of its bedrock theory that trial counsel did not render ineffective assistance, a theory that the State properly raised and maintained throughout the post-conviction proceedings. The post-conviction court could not resolve the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel without first determining whether the hearsay statement would have been admissible in any event. Thus, it was not an abuse of discretion for the Court of Special Appeals to order a remand on an issue that was necessarily included within the State's overarching objection to Jones's ineffective assistance of counsel claim. If Jones's trial counsel could not have prevented admission of Smith's written statement in any event, then Jones could not win his Sixth Amendment claim. The action by the Court of Special Appeals, according to the State, was a routine exercise of appellate judicial discretion pursuant to Maryland Rule 8-131(a).
I.
The Court of Special Appeals exercised its authority twice when it ordered a remand to the post-conviction court. First, the court exercised its discretion to consider an unpreserved argument. Although that court did not address the merits of the State's theory under the co-conspirator exception, the court took up the belated argument implicitly when it decided to remand the case back to the post-conviction court. This act by the Court of Special Appeals is sufficient for us to determine that the court exercised the type of appellate discretion that permits consideration of unpreserved arguments.
The Court of Special Appeals exercised a second, distinct type of authority when it decided to remand the issue to the post-conviction court. This sort of authority is distinct from the discretion to consider unpreserved arguments or to excuse a procedural default or waiver, because a remand of an issue requires that the issue, in some way or another, be properly before the remanding appellate court in the first place. In other words, the decision to consider an unpreserved argument was antecedent to the decision to remand.
Maryland Rule 8-131(a) permits the appellate courts to consider unpreserved issues:
"(a) Generally. The issues of jurisdiction of the trial court over the subject matter and, unless waived under Rule 2-322, over a person may be raised in and decided by the appellate court whether or not raised in and decided by the trial court. Ordinarily, the appellate court will not decide any other issue unless it plainly appears by the record to have been raised in or decided by the trial court, but the Court may decide such an issue if necessary or desirable to guide the trial court or to avoid the expense and delay of another appeal."
The first sentence of the Rule sets forth the general principle that the question of subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time and thus may be raised properly for the first time on appeal. See Lane v. State, 348 Md. 272, 278, 703 A.2d 180, 183 (1997). The second sentence of the Rule articulates the ordinary and strong presumption that appellate review is limited to those issues raised at the trial level. We are concerned in this case with the second aspect of Rule 8-131 (a).
The second sentence of Rule 8-131(a) sets forth the general proposition that an appellate court ordinarily will not consider an issue that was not raised or decided by the trial court. The plain language of the rule, however, makes clear that the prohibition is not absolute. See Crown Oil v. Glen, 320 Md. 546, 561, 578 A.2d 1184, 1191 (1990) (noting that, inasmuch as Rule 8-131(a) employs the term "ordinarily," it permits exceptions, and appellate courts have occasionally decided cases on issues not previously raised). The word "ordinarily" in Rule 8-131(a) anticipates that an appellate court will, on appropriate occasion, review unpreserved issues. This has been the practice of the Maryland appellate courts, as well as of the federal courts and our sister states, dating well before Rule 8-131(a). See Atlantic Mutual v. Kenney, 323 Md. 116, 122, 591 A.2d 507, 510 (1991) (noting that Rule 8-131(a) is simply enunciatory of the practice which has existed since 1825); see also Annot., Issue First Raised on Appeal, 76 A.L.R. Fed. 522 (1986). In State v. Bell, 334 Md. 178, 638 A.2d 107 (1994), we concluded:
"It is clear from the plain language of Rule 8-131(a) that an appellate court's review of arguments not raised at the trial level is discretionary, not mandatory. The use of the word 'ordinarily' clearly contemplates both those circumstances in which an appellate court will not review issues if they were not previously raised and those circumstances in which it will."
Id. at 188, 638 A.2d at 113. Thus, under the Rule, an appellate court has discretion to excuse a waiver or procedural default and to consider an issue even though it was not properly raised or preserved by a party. In this case, the default is two-fold. In the first instance, the State failed to present the eo-eonspirator theory to the post-conviction hearing court. Compounding that error, the State did not raise the argument in its opening brief on appeal, subjecting it to the rule that an appellate court ordinarily will not consider an issue raised for the first time in a reply brief. Fearnow v. Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone, 342 Md. 363, 384, 676 A.2d 65, 75 (1996).
There is no fixed formula for the determination of when discretion should be exercised, and there are no bright line rules to conclude that discretion has been abused. See State v. Hutchinson, 287 Md. 198, 202, 411 A.2d 1035, 1038 (1980) (refusing to set forth a "fixed formula" for determining when the exercise of appellate discretion in considering an unpreserved issue is proper). We have, however, laid out in prior cases, by explanation and example, principles to guide the courts when consideration of unpreserved issues might be proper.
The primary purpose of Rule 8-131(a) is to ensure fairness for all parties and to promote the orderly administra tion of law. See Conyers v. State, 367 Md. 571, 594, 790 A.2d 15, 29 (2002). Although the interests of fairness generally are furthered by requiring thé issues to be brought first to the attention of the trial court so that the trial court may pass upon it in the first instance, the appellate court has the discretion to excuse the default and consider the issue. Id. This discretion should be exercised only when it is clear that it will not work an unfair prejudice to the parties or to the court. While the authority to review unpreserved issues is discretionary, it should not be exercised when it will work an unfair prejudice to the parties. Bell, 334 Md. at 191, 638 A.2d at 114. Therefore, the animating policy behind Rule 8-131(a) is to ensure fairness for the parties involved and to promote orderly judicial administration. Thus, when presented with a plausible exercise of this discretion, appellate courts should make two determinations concerning the promotion or subversion of 8-131(a)'s twin goals.
First, the appellate court should consider whether the exercise of its discretion will work unfair prejudice to either of the parties. Id. at 189-90, 638 A.2d at 113-14. For example, with respect to the parties, a new argument presented by the State would work unfair prejudice to a criminal defendant if its validity depended upon evidence not adduced at the trial level. Id. In such a case, an appellate court's consideration of the argument would most likely be an abuse of its discretion under Rule 8-131(a) because it would be manifestly unfair to the defendant who had no opportunity to respond to the argument with his own evidence to the contrary. Similarly, unfair prejudice may result if counsel fails to bring the position of her client to the attention of the lower court so that that court can pass upon and correct any errors in its own proceedings. Id. In addition, the reviewing court should look to the reasons for the default or waiver. The court should consider whether the failure to raise the issue was a considered, deliberate one, or whether it was inadvertent and unintentional. See, e.g., Conyers, 367 Md. at 595-596, 790 A.2d at 30.
Second, the appellate court should consider whether the exercise of its discretion will promote the orderly administration of justice. This simply means that the Rule seeks to prevent the trial of cases in a piecemeal fashion, thereby saving time and expense and accelerating the termination of litigation. See, e.g., Crown Oil, 320 Md. at 562-63, 578 A.2d at 1191. Although this policy goal does not require that the case be remanded back to the court, it does imply that an appellate court should feel less constrained by the ordinary course of issue preservation when its decision to raise an unpreserved issue will not effect but will improve the efficiency of judicial administration. See id.
Finally, we note that we do not reverse the Court of Special Appeals for the exercise of its discretion unless it has clearly been abused. While this Court retains its own independent discretion to hear unpreserved arguments, Squire v. State, 280 Md. 132, 134, 368 A.2d 1019, 1020 (1977), that does not mean we review the discretionary functions of the lower appellate court de novo. To the contrary, we respect the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals in determining whether it needed to consider the issue for the proper execution of justice, and unless upon our review that court abused its discretion under the Rule, we will not substitute our judgment for theirs. Fearnow, 342 Md. at 384, 676 A.2d at 75; Ritchie v. Donnelly, 324 Md. 344, 375, 597 A.2d 432, 447 (1991); see also Hutchinson, 287 Md. at 204 n. 1, 411 A.2d at 1038 n. 1 (applying abuse of discretion standard to Court of Special Appeals's discretion to take cognizance of and correct plain error).
Turning now to the case sub judice and applying the analytic framework and standard of review outlined above, we hold that the Court of Special Appeals did not abuse its discretion to consider the unpreserved argument on appeal under Rule 8-131(a). We find little if any prejudice generated against either petitioner or the post-conviction court by the Court of Special Appeals's exercise of discretion in this matter; furthermore, we find the second policy goal of Rule 8- 131(a), orderly and efficient judicial administration, strongly favors the outcome determined by the intermediate appellate court.
Putting our ruling in context, it is helpful to imagine hypothetically what would happen if the Court of Special Appeals had not exercised its discretion and had only affirmed the post-conviction court. In that case, Jones would receive a new trial, and the State surely would submit Smith's written statement, upon which Jones's new trial counsel, this time, would just as surely object to Gutrick's hearsay statement within Smith's written statement. Now, the State would respond with the co-conspirator exception argument that was foreclosed to it by the post-conviction proceedings, and the trial court would decide this matter of law. Essentially, the scenario would unfold whereby the question regarding the co-conspirator exception would be fully litigated even if there was no remand and petitioner's position prevailed in this Court. The only difference between the above hypothetical scenario and the current decision by the Court of Special Appeals to litigate the question in post-conviction proceedings is that the former requires the extreme and expensive measure of both empaneling a new jury and relitigating every single issue and fact relevant to Jones's conviction. ,The absurdity of this is made even more clear when it is understood that depriving the post-conviction court from determining this legal issue could result in the hearsay statement reaching the jury in the same manner as in Jones's original trial — nothing will have changed.
On the other hand, pursuant to the Court of Special Appeals's order to remand, the post-conviction judge will have the opportunity to determine the question of law, the admissibility of Derrick Smith's statement. If the judge determines that the statement is inadmissible, then Jones will receive his new trial. If, on the other hand, the judge determines that the statement is admissible, the post-conviction court will deny his post-conviction petition for relief based on ineffective assistance of counsel because in that case his rights were never violated.
Finally, we note, as did the Court of Special Appeals, that the State has never wavered from its position that the statement was admissible in its entirety, and that therefore Jones was afforded sufficient assistance of counsel. The State did not make a tactical decision to forgo, waive, or concede the argument that the statement was admissible under the co-conspirator argument and, indeed, had clearly set forth the legal theory in its Application for Leave to Appeal. The State's failure to mention it again in its opening brief therefore appears to have been an inadvertent and pure oversight. While such a mistake is serious, we do not think it was an abuse of discretion for the lower appellate court to excuse it in light of the fact that Jones will suffer no prejudice (except the loss of a new trial he may never have been entitled to in the first place) and the substantial judicial resources that will be saved by adjudication of this collateral matter.
II.
Initially, we addressed only the propriety of the antecedent determination by the Court of Special Appeals to consider, in the exercise of its discretion, the unpreserved argument because the propriety of the Court of Special Appeals's "limited" remand was raised solely by the State. In this regard, petitioner vigorously denounced the State's understanding of his argument, stating as follows:
"In this Court, Petitioner did not focus his challenge on the [decision by the Court of Special Appeals to order a limited remand]. Instead, Petitioner respectfully requested that this Court find that the Court of Special Appeals erred prior to that by failing to hold the State to the well-established rules for record/claim preservation....
"Whether the Court of Special Appeals abused its discretion is the primary question before this Court."
Petitioner's Reply Brief at 2-3. The dissent believes that petitioner raises the propriety of the remand and that the issue should be addressed, even though it was the petitioner who asked that the issue not be addressed. Because the heart of the dissent's argument relates to the remand, we will respond.
The dissent's characterization of the hearsay issue as "integral" and not collateral (and therefore inappropriate for limited remand) is without merit. The hearsay issue in the instant case is part and parcel of the larger issue before the reviewing court — the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel — and that larger issue is indisputably a collateral matter. The fact that the hearsay issue is integral to determination of the collateral Sixth Amendment challenge is irrelevant to the question of whether the matter is appropriate for remand.
The crux of the dissent's argument appears to rest on the mistaken belief and novel suggestion that "post-conviction proceedings are the equivalent of a trial," and that the "appropriate question is whether the issue is collateral to . the proceedings out of which they arise" Dissenting op. at 11 (emphases added). This has never been the law in this State, nor should it be. By definition, a post-conviction proceeding is collateral, and thus the issues adjudicated in that proceeding are ipso facto collateral and appropriate for remand.
The dissent's view that this case falls within our case law on limited remands as set forth in Gill v. State, 265 Md. 350, 289 A.2d 575 (1972), and its progeny is wrong. Of course, as the dissent correctly notes, Gill is not limited to its facts; nonetheless, this case is not a "Gill " case and does not fall within the rationale of Gill. The issue in Gill was the voluntariness of a confession, a matter which is a mixed question of law and fact specially designated for the ultimate determination by a jury. In Gill, we held as follows:
"[A] remand solely for a redetermination of the confession's voluntariness can never be permitted in a jury trial since even if the trial judge again concludes the statement was voluntary, that only establishes, prima facie, it was uncoerced. The jury still must have the opportunity to consider the evidence pertaining to its voluntariness before deciding whether the accused is guilty or innocent. This inviolable jury function would be eliminated unless the judgment was reversed and a new trial awarded."
Id. at 358-59, 289 A.2d at 580 (emphases added). Under Maryland law, the jury must find a confession to be voluntary beyond a reasonable doubt before the statement may be considered. See Brittingham v. State, 306 Md. 654, 665, 511 A.2d 45, 50 (1986).
III.
In sum, the comparison of the two alternatives open to the intermediate appellate court makes clear (1) that it was not manifestly unfair or prejudicial to Jones for the Court of Special Appeals to take up the issue of the co-conspirator exception, and (2) that the interests of judicial economy are strongly furthered, not subverted, by exercise of appellate discretion. It would be unreasonable and inconsistent for this Court to conclude, particularly under the deferential standard afforded such judicial discretion, that the Court of Special Appeals abused its discretion under Rule 8-131(a) to reach a result that promoted the Rule's twin policy goals. We will not do so, and instead affirm the Court of Special Appeals's exercise of judicial discretion in this case.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED, WITH COSTS TO BE PAID BY PETITIONER.
BELL, C.J., and CATHELL, J., dissent.
. The Maryland Post Conviction Procedure Act was recodified as the Uniform Postconviction Procedure Act, Md.Code (2001, 2003 Cum. Supp.) Tit. 7 of the Criminal Procedure Article.
. Smith, having been convicted at the time of Jones's trial, was called as a State's witness but unexpectedly denied knowledge of and participation in the murders and related events. The State therefore offered Smith's written statement into evidence.
. The dissent's belief that petitioner argued that the intermediate appellate court abused its discretion in ordering the limited remand belies petitioner's express statement that "the propriety of the limited remand [is] not relevant to the question before this Court." Petitioner's Reply Brief at 3. The dissent relies on the "question presented" in petitioner's opening brief which is manifestly ambiguous as to whether the question relates to just the excuse of the procedural default or to both the default and the limited remand, see dissenting op. at 4; a sentence in petitioner's reply brief that, taken in context, clearly furthered petitioner's argument that the limited remand issue should not be decided by this Court, see Petitioner's Reply Brief at 3; dissenting op. at 4; and a heading in petitioner's reply brief that is irrelevant to the dissent's (mistaken) belief about the question petitioner wanted this Court to address, see dissenting op. at 4-5. Petitioner did not present a single argument — apart from his core argument that the remand was improper because the antecedent excuse of the procedural default was improper (which we address) — in either its opening or reply brief that addressed the issue of the limited remand and, to the contrary, expressly asked this Court not to address it.