Case Name: ROBERT R. BRIDGES, Ex'r., against NANCY R. WILKINS and others
Court: Supreme Court of North Carolina
Jurisdiction: North Carolina
Decision Date: 1857-12
Citations: 3 Jones Eq. 342
Docket Number: 
Parties: ROBERT R. BRIDGES, Ex’r., against NANCY R. WILKINS and others.
Judges: 
Reporter: North Carolina Reports
Volume: 56
Pages: 342–345

Head Matter:
ROBERT R. BRIDGES, Ex’r., against NANCY R. WILKINS and others.
A bequest to the testator’s six sisters and their issues, in one clause, to their children, in another, and to their progeny, in a third clause, while only one of the sisters was married and had issue at the date of the bequest, was Held to give an estate to. each of the sisters for her life, with a remainder to her children, applying- as well to such of the sisters as might thereafter marry and have children, as the one already married..
A bequest to six sisters, one of whom was married, “ not to go to any but my sisters directly and their progeny, and'not to their husbands,” waslMü to confer a sole and separate estate for-life,- as'well upon the unmarried sisters, who might thereafter marry and have- children, as upon the married one.
(The case distinguished from Apple v. Allen, ante 120-, and Miller, v. Bingham, 1 Ire. Eq. Rep. 423.)
Cause removed from the Court of Equity of Edgecombe county.
The bill was filed by the executor of the will of Thomas M. Wilkins, asking the Court for a.construction of certain clauses thereof. The material parts of the will are as follows :
“ Item 1st. After paying all my just debts out of cash on band, or debts dne me, I give and bequeath the balance of my property to my sisters, that may be living at the time of my death, and their lawful issues, except the slaves.
“Item 2nd. The slaves of which I am now seized and possessed, I give to my mother during her natural life, and after her death to go to my sisters and their children as above-mentioned, with the express condition that no property, of which I am now possessed, or may hereafter fall heir to, shall go to any but my sisters directly and their progeny, and not their husbands. * * *
“ Item 4th. I give and bequeath to my sisters, as before stated, my life-policy of five thousand dollars.''’
The testator left six sisters surviving him, of whom William Annie alone was married before the death of the testator. Her husband is the defendant Hardy Norvall. Since the testator’s death, another sister, Heron J., has intermarried with the defendant Joseph John Pender. The other four sisters, Mary, Nancy R., Esther Anne, and Cáfila Antoinette, are still unmarried.
Mrs. Norvall had issue of her marriage, during the lifetime of the testator, one child, who is made, a party, and one after the testator’s death.
The executor prays the opinion of the Court as to the point, whether the estates given to the.sisters, are sole and separate estates; and if so, as to the defendant Mrs. Norvall, who was married when the will took effect, whether such is the casein respect to Mrs. Pender, who married subsequently to that event; and especially whether the provision for a sole and separate estate, is to apply to such as may marry hereafter.
He asks instruction also upon the question, whether the issue of the sisters is entitled to any interest in these legacies, or whether the whole does not go to the sisters in absolute right; and if the children shall be considered entitled, whether they take jointly with their mothers, or estates in remainder after the death of their mothers.
The defendants answered, admitting the facts as above stated, and uniting in the executor’s request for a construction by this Court.
Cause set down for bearing on the bill and answer, and transmitted by consent.
JB. F. Moore, for the plaintiff,
for the defendants.
This cause was decided at the last term, but accidentally omitted in the reports of that term.

Opinion:
Battle, J.
"We are satisfied tliat it was the intention of the testator to give to his sisters the proceeds of his life-policy, in the same manner as he had given the balance of his property in the first item of his will. The expression, " to my sisters as before stated," admits of no other sensible construction. The fourth item of the will, in which it is found, was indeed unnecessary, as the policy would have passed under the first; but the testator seemed to have had an idea that it required express words to pass it, and his only purpose was to make it certain tliat the policy should be included in the gift of the " balance," excepting the slaves.
We have no doubt that the word "issues" in the first, and the word " progeny" in the second, item of the will, as applied to his sisters, were used in the same sense, to wut, children, and that the testator meant that all the children which his sisters might have, should be benefitted by the bequest. One, only, of the testator's six sisters was married and had children at the time when his will was made and at his death, and he certainly did not intend to exclude the children which his unmarried sisters might have, if they should think proper at any future time to marry and bear children. To give full effect to the will, therefore, it is necessary to adopt the construction, that the sisters shall take estates for life in the slaves and other property, with remainders to their children. This will embrace all the " issues," " progeny" or children, which the sisters, or any of them, may ever have, and is supported by the ease of Ponton v. McLemore, 2 Dev. and Bat. Eq. Rep. 285.
It is very certain that the testator intended his married sister should take what he gave her for her sole and separate use. The expression that none of his property should " go to any but my sisters direct^, and their progeny, and not their husbands," can admit of no other fair interpretation. It is applied equally to all the sisters, and the Court cannot make any distinction between them. It differs from the case of Apple v. Allen, ante 120, because here, one of tire sisters is married, and the husbands of all are expressly excluded. As to the unmarried sisters, their future husbands, should they ever marry, were necessarily referred to. No other construction can be put upon the words, and in that respect it differs from the case of Miller v. Bingham, 1 Ire. Eq. Rep. 423. It must therefore be declared to be the opinion of the Court, that the testator's sisters take each a life-estate in the property bequeathed to them, with remainders to their children respectively, and that they take their life-estates to their sole and separate use exclusive of their husbands, which either of them now has, or may hereafter have. A reference must be made to ascertain a suitable person to act as trustee for tliem.
Pee CuniAM, Decree accordingly.