Case Name: GIBSON v. CASEIN MFG. CO.
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1913-05-07
Citations: 141 N.Y.S. 887
Docket Number: 
Parties: GIBSON v. CASEIN MFG. CO.
Judges: 
Reporter: West's New York Supplement
Volume: 141
Pages: 887–891

Head Matter:
GIBSON v. CASEIN MFG. CO.
(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Department.
May 7, 1913.)
1. Master and Servant (§ 289*)—Injuries to Servant—Contributory Neg-
ligence.
In the absence of evidence of a rule or custom to the contrary in the plant of the master, a showing that deceased was killed while adjusting a set screw upon machinery in motion will not warrant a finding as a matter of law that he was guilty of contributory negligence; it being unreasonable to assume that the usual custom was not followed, and a failure to shut off the power being for the benefit of the master.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Master and Servant, Cent. Dig. §§ 1089, 1090, 1092-1132; Dec. Dig. § 289.*]
2. Master and Servant (§ 274*)—Contributory Negligence—Evidence as
to Reputation.
In an action for the death of a servant, where there were no eyewitnesses, testimony that he was an ordinarily prudent, cautious man when employed around various kinds of machinery is inadmissible.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Master and Servant, Cent. Dig. §§ 939-949; Dec. Dig. § 274. ]
Smith, P. J., dissenting.
Appeal from Trial Term, Chenango County.
Action by Bessie Gibson, as administratrix of the -estate of Ira Gibson, deceased, against the Casein Manufacturing Company. From a judgment for plaintiff, and an order denying defendant’s motion for new trial, defendant appeals. Reversed and remanded.
See, also, 140 N. Y. Supp. 1120.
Argued before SMITH, P. J., and KELLOGG, HOWARD, and WOODWARD, JJ.
Page & Hays, of Binghamton (Frank M. Hays, of Binghamton, of counsel), for appellant.
Julien Scott, of Bainbridge, for respondent.
For other cases see same topic & § number in Dec. & Am. Digs. 1907 to date, & Rep’r Indexes

Opinion:
JOHN M. KELLOGG, J.
The charge properly submitted the case to the jury, and we cannot say that the verdict is not sustained by the evidence. It is not clear that the deceased was fixing the set screw while the machinery was in motion. If, however, we assume otherwise, we cannot say as a matter of law that he was guilty of contributory negligence. The appellant introduced such evidence as seemed to it proper. It did not show whether the rule's or custom of the mill required that the engine be shut down while the set screw was being adjusted. Apparently it was not deemed unusual that it was not shut down in this case. Naturally it would be better for the employe to shut off the power if he alone is considered; but that would delay the defendant's work. Permitting the engine to run was for the defendant's interest only, and it is not unreasonable to assume that the usual custom of the mill was followed. There was no eyewitness to the transaction, and I think, within Irish v. Union Bag & Paper Co., 103 App. Div. 45, 92 N. Y. Supp. 695, and Id., 183 N. Y. 508, 76 N. E. 1097, the jury may well have determined that the intestate was free from contributory negligence.
The difficulty with the case, as I see it, is that the plaintiff was permitted to prove, over the defendant's objection, that the intestate was an ordinarily cautious man when employed around the various kinds of machinery. The authorities • seem to compel the conclusion that such evidence is inadmissible. Zucker v. Whitridge, 205 N. Y. 50, 98 N. E. 209, 41 L. R. A. (N. S.) 683, holds that if there is an eye witness then it is inadmissible to prove that the deceased was a prudent, careful person, without passing upon the question whether the rule applies if there is no-surviving witness; but Parsons v. Syracuse, B. & N. Y. R. R. Co., 205 N._Y. 226, 98 N. E. 331, a case where there was no eyewitness to the intestate's acts, indicates that the rule applies whether there is or is not a surviving witness of the transaction.
Perhaps these cases do not necessarily decide the question, but it seems to me that we are foreclosed by them from further consideration of it. I therefore feel constrained to favor a reversal.
The judgment and order should be reversed, and a new trial granted, with costs to the appellant to abide the event.
HOWARD, J" concurs.