Case Name: Adeline Havens et al., Administratrix of James H. Havens, deceased, Respondent, v. The Erie Railway Company, Appellants
Court: New York Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1869-12-21
Citations: 41 N.Y. 296
Docket Number: 
Parties: Adeline Havens et al., Administratrix of James H. Havens, deceased, Respondent, v. The Erie Railway Company, Appellants.
Judges: 
Reporter: New York Reports
Volume: 41
Pages: 296–303

Head Matter:
Adeline Havens et al., Administratrix of James H. Havens, deceased, Respondent, v. The Erie Railway Company, Appellants.
One who is approaching a railway crossing, is not absolved from the duty of looking up and down the track to see whether a train is approaching, by the omission to ring the bell or blow the whistle; and if failure to take such precaution contributes to any injury received by him by a collision with trains "running on said railroad, he cannot recover for such injury. (Lott, J., and Hunt, Ch. J., contra)
Ernst v. Hudson River Railroad Company (39 N. Y., 61), and Wilcox v. Rome and Watertown Railroad, Company (id., 358), approved and followed
(Cause argued September 28th, 1869,
and decided December 21st, 1869.)
Appeal from a judgment of the General Term of the Supreme Court in the seventh judicial district, upon a verdict rendered by a jury at the Steuben Circuit, for the plaintiffs for $1,300.
The action was under the statute for negligently causing the death of the plaintiff’s intestate, at a railroad crossing in the town of Corning.
Evidence given by the plaintiff’s witnesses tended to show that no whistle was blown or bell rung upon the defendant’s train when approaching the crossing where the accident occurred.
The plaintiff’s counsel, after the judge had charged the jury, requested him to charge them that the deceased was not bound to stop and look up and down the railroad unless there were signals given; and if he heard no signals, he would have a right to assume there was no train within eighty rods of the crossing. The court so charged the jury. The defendant’s counsel then asked the court to charge, that if the deceased night at any point within ten rods of the crossing, have easily seen the approaching train nearly, a mile off, he was bound to survey the space, or in other words to look up the road; and if by omitting so to do he lost his life, the plaintiff cannot recover. The court refused and the defendant excepted.
The defendant’s counsel further requested the court to charge, that if the bell was rung as the defendant’s engineer and fireman swear it was, the plaintiff cannot recover. The court refused and the defendant excepted.
The jury brought in a verdict for the plaintiff of $1,300, and the court stayed judgment, and ordered exceptions heard on first instance at General Term.
The General Term ordered judgment for the plaintiff on the verdict.
The case below is reported 53 Barb., 258.
Hiram Gray, for the appellant,
insisted that there was error in the refusal of the judge to charge the first request of the defendant, and cited Ernst v. Hudson River Railroad Compamy (39 N. Y., 61, 68).
Brown & Graves, for the respondent,
on this point, cited Ernst v. Hudson River Raiload Co. (35 N. Y., pp. 27, 28, 30, 33, 35, 37, 38); 39 N. Y., pages 64, 65; Brown v. New York Central Railroad Co. (32 id., 597) ; Newson v. New York Central Railroad Co. (29 id., 390) ; Johnson v. Hudson River Railroad Co. (20 id., 74); Hegan v. Eighth Avenue Railroad Co. (15 id., 383); Ireland v. Oswego Railroad Co. (13 N. Y., 533); Oldfield v. N. Y. & H. R. R. Co. (14 id., 310) ; Beisiegel v. New York Central R. R. Co. (34 N. Y., 627); Mackay v. N. Y. Central (35 N. Y., 79); Cook v. N. Y. Central. R. R. Co. (3 Keyes, 479); McGrath v. Hudson River R. R. Co. (32 Barb., 147); Harper v. Curtis (1 E. D. Smith, 78); Gordons v. Grand, Street R. R. Co. (40 Barb., 550).

Opinion:
Grover, J.
The questions argued by the counsel for the appellant, are those arising upon exceptions taken by the defendant's counsel upon the trial, to the charge of the judge to the jury, and to his refusal to charge as requested. It appears from the case, that when the judge concluded his charge, to which no exception was taken, that the plaintiff's counsel requested him to charge that the deceased was not bound to stop, and look up and down the road unless there were signals given; and that if they heard no signals, they would have the right to think that there was no train within eighty rods, and the court so charged. The defendant's counsel here asked the court to charge, that if the deceased might at any point within ten rods of the crossing have easily seen the approaching train nearly a mile off, he was bound to survey the space, or in other words, to look up the road, and if by omitting so to do, he lost his life, the plaintiff cannot recover. The court refused, and the defendant's counsel excepted. This request of the defendant's counsel must be read in connection with the propositions charged by the court upon the request of plaintiff's counsel immediately preceding it. When so read, it is clear that the point in controversy between the counsel was, whether the omission to give the signals upon the train required by statute, excuses the traveler approaching the crossing from all obligation to look up and down the track, when that can readily be done, to ascertain whether trains are approaching, and whether the omission to use his eyes for that purpose constitutes negligence that will preclude a recovery for an injury received by a collision with such train. From the charge given, and the refusal to charge as requested, the jury must have understood the court as holding that the omission to give the signals did excuse the traveler from looking up and down the track, and that his omission so to do, was no obstacle to a recovery. At the time the case was tried, some doubt existed as to the law upon these points in this State. Opinions given in this court published in the reports, had laid down the law, as it was given by the judge to the jury in the present case; but a close examination of the cases in which they were given will fail to show that such was the doctrine of the court. On the contrary, the rule that any negligence of .the party injured contributing thereto will bar a recovery therefor has been uniformly adhered to. It may now be regarded as settled by this court, that a traveler approaching a crossing is required to use his eyes and ears in looting, and listening to ascertain whether trains are approaching, irrespective of the question whether the signals required by statute are given upon the train, and that if an injury is received in consequence of his omission so to do, he cannot recover therefor. (Ernst v. Hudson R. R. Co. 39 N. Y., 61; Wilcox v. Rome & Watertown R. R. Co. id., 358.) The principle of these cases has been applied in several subsequent cases not reported. A further discussion of the principle or examination of the cases is unnecessary. The evidence in the case clearly made it the duty of the judge to charge upon these points. There was evidence tending to show, that by looting, the train could have been readily seen, and thus the danger avoided. The judge erred in refusing to charge as requested by the defendant's counsel. He should have instructed the jury, that an omission to ring the bell, or blow the whistle, would not excuse the deceased from the observance of proper care on his part, and that this care required him to look for trains when he had opportunity so to do, while riding in the wagon; and that if the injury would have been avoided by his so doing, the plaintiff could not recover. The judgment should be reversed and a new trial ordered.