Case Name: Loyd M. COLCLAZIER, Irvine E. Colclazier, and Gladys Colclazier Dawson, Appellants, v. Marie P. COLCLAZIER, Individually and as executrix of the last will and testament of M. E. Colclazier, deceased, Appellee
Court: Florida Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1956-06-27
Citations: 89 So. 2d 261
Docket Number: 
Parties: Loyd M. COLCLAZIER, Irvine E. Colclazier, and Gladys Colclazier Dawson, Appellants, v. Marie P. COLCLAZIER, Individually and as executrix of the last will and testament of M. E. Colclazier, deceased, Appellee.
Judges: DREW, C. J., and O’CONNELL and SEBRING, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 89
Pages: 261–269

Head Matter:
Loyd M. COLCLAZIER, Irvine E. Colclazier, and Gladys Colclazier Dawson, Appellants, v. Marie P. COLCLAZIER, Individually and as executrix of the last will and testament of M. E. Colclazier, deceased, Appellee.
Supreme Court of Florida. En Banc.
June 27, 1956.
Rehearing Denied Sept. 11, 1956.
Pritchard & Kurtz, Miami, for appellants.
Yonge, Whiteside & Prunty, Miami, for appellee.

Opinion:
PARKS, Associate Justice.
The plaintiffs in the lower court brought this suit against the defendant, individually and as executrix of the will of M. E. Col-clazier, deceased, for construction of his will, an accounting, and a declaration of the rights and interests of the parties in the property of the deceased. Plaintiffs are the children of the deceased and his first wife, Clara L. Colclazier, and defendant is his widow.
The will was executed by M. E. Col-clazier on the 4th day of October, I9S0, in Albuquerque, New Mexico, where he liad resided for many years. Shortly thereafter, in the same month, he removed to Dade County, Florida, establishing his domicile, and there he resided until his death in November, 1951.
The avowed purpose of the bill is to have the Court by its decree determine it was the intention of the testator to include in his estate and dispose of by his will all of his property, both real and personal, regardless of the status of its title. It is charged that some of the properties were in his name, some in the joint names of himself and defendant, and some of the bank accounts were in their joint names, it being his intention, however, to retain title to himself in all property and bank accounts in their joint names and that defendant have no interest in them.
The defendant in her answer agrees that it was his intention to include in his will and dispose of as prescribed therein, all of the properties belonging to him. The answer denies, however, that it was his intention that title to any of the properties or bank accounts in the joint names of the parties was to be retained in him or were so retained, and denies that they were included in the devise of the will, asserting that such properties belonged to her. Other issues in the pleadings need not be discussed.
Upon the answer being filed, the cause was referred to Honorable James A. Dixon, a member of the bar, as Special Master, with directions to hear the testimony of the parties, to report his findings and make his recommendations to the Court. This was done. Exceptions were filed by plaintiffs and the Court, upon hearing, overruled them and entered the decree from which this appeal is taken. The record developes that other issues were settled in disposing of the cause in the lower Court but the main controversy it was called upon to decide, and the chief one for this Court to review,-was that of determining which of the properties involved in the litigation belonged to the deceased and were therefore assets of his estate subject to devise, and which properties belonged to Marie P. Colclazier and were not subject to his devise.
Among the properties in controversy was the real property situated.in Dade County, Florida, held in the joint names of the deceased and Marie P. Colclazier, husband and wife; stocks and bonds, notes and mortgages, and other miscellaneous property, some of which were held in the name of deceased, M. E. Colclazier, and some in the joint names of the deceased and the defendant, Marie P. Colclazier; deposits of certain monies in banks in New Mexico and Florida in the joint names of himself and Marie P. Colclazier with the right of survivorship. In respect to these deposits it is charged that they were so deposited by him for the sake of convenience only so that each might draw such monies, his intention being, however, that no title to such funds should pass to her.
Plaintiffs contend .with respect to the real property that while the deeds purport to vest an estate by entirety in the deceased and Marie P. Colclazier, his intention was that she should take no title, that he furnished all the funds used in their purchase and, being unfamiliar with the laws of Florida with respect to estates by entireties and not knowing the nature of such title, he intended to retain sole title in himself.
The testimony of the parties was introduced before and heard by the Special Master concerning all issues between them. In a lengthy report the Master found the .issues against the plaintiffs, portions of the report pertinent to the disposition of the appeal, are the following:
"Except as to the matter of the decedent's domicile at the time of his death, the remainder of the record is practically free from any conflict and is mainly documentary in nature.
"M. E. Colclazier, after early financial difficulties in Oklahoma and Texas, went to New Mexico and embarked on a ranching venture. At first most of this operation was conducted on leased land, but beginning in 1943 and down to January 5, 1950, he bought lands until he assembled a large cattle ranch referred to in the testimony as the Poverty Pool Ranch.
"The deed by which he acquired title are Plaintiffs' Exhibits #5 through #18. All such conveyances are to decedent alone. All except the last, Plaintiffs' Exhibit #18, are prior to his marriage to the defendant on March 5, 1949.
"Under the law of New Mexico, community property is that acquired by husband or wife during marriage other than by gift, devise or inheritance. All property acquired before marriage is the separate property of the respective spouses. It is, therefore, apparent that, except a9 to one tract, all of the Poverty Pool Ranch was the separate property of the decedent and was not impressed with the incidents of community property.
"One of the chief incidents of community property is that one-half thereof belongs to the surviving spouse and is not subject to be devised or bequeathed by the deceased spouse's will. The other half, however, is subject to be devised or bequeathed in the same manner and to the same extent as separate property.
"The one tract of land in the Poverty Pool ranch which was community property consists of 440 acres (Plaintiffs' Exhibit #18) and on January 5, 1950, judging from the Federal documentary stamps attached to the deed, was acquired by the decedent for a consideration of $1500.00.
"In the spring and summer of 1950, the decedent sold the whole ranch to one Warren (Plaintiffs' Exhibit #5) for $283,805.62 in cash and a trust deed or mortgage securing a note in the amount of $301,194.38, payable to the decedent and the defendant, without more.
"Under the law of New Mexico, the estate by the entirety is unknown, and a conveyance or promise to husband and wife without more creates a tenancy in common. The Master therefore finds that the defendant owned one-half of this note and mortgage and that the other half was owned by the decedent, and became assets of his estate and subject to his will.
"The cash proceeds of the sale eventually found their way into three bank accounts, — one in Albuquerque, New Mexico, one in Roswell, New Mexico, and one in Miami Shores, Florida, and probably, though this is not entirely clear, into other investments and property owned by decedent at the time of his death.
"The Master finds that the rights of the parties in the bank deposits in the banks in New Mexico are governed by the laws of that state and the bank deposit in the Florida bank by the laws of this state, regardless of the domicile of the decedent at the time of his death, for the debtor-creditor contract created by the deposit derives its binding effect from the law of the state where the contract was made and has such legal consequences as are attributed to it by that state.
"Although New Mexico does not recognize the estate by the entirety, it does permit the creation of a joint tenancy in husband and wife with right of survivorship, provided apt words to this effect are used. The deposit contracts in both New Mexico banks contain such language, and the Master sees no reason why such contracts, should not be given effect.
"Plaintiffs here rely strongly upon the case of Trimble v. St. Joseph's Hospital, 57 N.M. 51, 253 P.2d 805, as holding that such a joint tenancy can he created only where the evidence is 'clear, strong and convincing' that the parties understood the import of their acts and intended the result. However, this decision deals with the conversion of community property into other forms of ownership, and does not, in the opinion of the Master, limit the freedom of disposition and contract of one spouse recognized by the law of New Mexico as to his or her separate property. As pointed out above, all of the Poverty Pool Ranch, except one tract, was the separate property of decedent, and there appears to be no restriction under the law of New Mexico upon his dealings with it or its proceeds. ' If he chose to use it to buy a promise (the bank deposits) payable jointly to himself and his wife, with right of survivorship, no obstacle appears to his doing so.
"It is impossible to separate the separate property in the Poverty Pool deal from the one community tract, but the participation of the defendant in the deposit contract would certainly seem to amount to a purchase by her, with her part of the community right, of a similar promise to the decedent in the bank deposit.
"As to the Florida bank deposit, the Miami Shores residence and other property located in Florida, including the corporate stock in the Florida corporation, there is no reason why the instruments evidencing the rights of the parties should not be given their customary effect — that is, property conveyed to or promises running to decedent and the defendant create a tenancy by the entirety and survives to her, and property owned solely in decedent's name becomes assets of his estate and subject to his will.
"With the consent of both parties, the Master had interviews with two New Mexico lawyers — Mr. J. R. Mo-drall, who is attorney for the plaintiffs in that state, and Mr. Quincy D. Adams, who is attorney for the defendant. These interviews were for the sole purpose of affording assistance to the Master in taking judicial knowledge of the statutory and common law of New Mexico, as permitted by F.S. A. 92.031.
"As is usually the case in instances of doubtful domicile, the evidence is inconclusive, but the Master is of the opinion that the evidence preponderates in favor of a domicile in Florida."
One of the contentions of the plaintiffs insisted upon with much force is that the defendant Marie P. Colclazier was put to an election of taking under the doctrine, that when inconsistent rights are conferred upon one he has the choice as to which he will take but cannot have both. Page on Wills, Third Edition, Sections 1346 and 1356, state as follows:
Section 1346: "Election — definition and nature. There is a broad principle of equity, running through many different subjects, to the effect that one upon whom inconsistent rights are conferred has his choice as to which he will take, but cannot have both. This right to choose between these inconsistent rights is known as election. The principle as applied to wills means that he who takes a benefit under a will must adopt all the contents of the will insofar as they concern him, conforming to all the provisions of the will and renouncing any right inconsistent with it. The gift by will in lieu of the other right is said to be equivalent to an offer, and to offer something to the devisee in return for his property or interest. On the other hand, an election to take against the will has no element of a contract. An election not to take under a will is not equivalent to a contest of the will."
Section 1356: "Election between community rights and gifts by will. In some states a wife acquires a vested interest in a fraction, generally one-half, of all property accumulated by husband and wife subsequent to marriage. If the husband in his will attempts to dispose of the entire ownership of the property thus accumulated, and in his will makes some provision for his wife, a case of election is created, and the wife may take the property given to her by the will, or may stand upon her rights as part owner of the community property. If testator's will refers only to his own property rights, no case for election is created. The fact that the gift is a large one does not show that it is intended to be in lieu of community property."
The matter of election referred to in these authorities was eliminated upon the findings of the Master and the confirming decree of the Court thereafter that Marie P. Colclazier was entitled to those properties, title to which (1) was already vested in her or (2) which under the law vested in her by the right of survivorship or as a survivor of an estate by entirety upon the death of M. E. Colclazier or (3) as a tenant in common with him as in the case of the purchase money mortgage of the Poverty Pool Ranch or (4) as the survivor under the conditions of the terms of the bank deposits agreements.
In conclusion, with respect to plaintiffs' arguments that the Ranch, Poverty Pool, was community property because of the fact that it was acquired during the marriage of M. E. Colclazier and defendant Marie in 1934, the Master found that said marriage was void because there was no divorce between M. E. Colclazier and his then living wife, Clara L. Colclazier, who died about the year 1940. He thereafter, on March 5, 1949, went through a marriage ceremony with Marie and this marriage is found to be lawful in all respects. In view of the decree confirming these findings of the Master, Poverty Pool Ranch was acquired by M. E. Colclazier after the death of Clara and prior to the valid marriage with the defendant Marie and therefore cannot be considered as community property under the laws of New Mexico.
We find that the Court in approving and adopting the Master's report committed no reversible error and the decree must be affirmed.
DREW, C. J., and O'CONNELL and SEBRING, JJ., concur.
TERRELL and ROBERTS, JJ., dissent.
THORNAL, J., not participating.