Case Name: POLHILL v. POSTAL TELEGRAPH-CABLE CO. et al.
Court: Court of Appeals of Georgia
Jurisdiction: Georgia
Decision Date: 1915-07-29
Citations: 16 Ga. App. 601
Docket Number: 6153
Parties: POLHILL v. POSTAL TELEGRAPH-CABLE CO. et al.
Judges: 
Reporter: Georgia Appeals Reports
Volume: 16
Pages: 601–603

Head Matter:
6153.
POLHILL v. POSTAL TELEGRAPH-CABLE CO. et al.
1. In a suit against a telegraph company for damages on account of nondelivery of a telegram, where the plaintiff introduces in evidence the telegram, and on the back of it is printed a stipulation that “the company shall not be liable for damages, or statutory penalties, in any case where the claim is not presented in writing within sixty days after the telegram is filed with the company for transmission,” it is incumbent upon the plaintiff, in order to make out his case, to show that this stipulation had been complied with, or that the company had waived it.
(a) This is true in an action ex delicto as well as in one ex contractu, when the plaintiff’s right to sue rests upon his contract with the telegraph company, contained in the telegraph-blank. See Hill v. W. U. Tel. Co., 85 Ga. 425 (11 S. E. 874, 21 Am. St. R. 166) ; Western Union Tel. Go. v. James, 90 Ga. 254 (16 S. E. 83); Stamey v. W. U. Tel. Go., 92 Ga. 613 (18 S. E. 1008, 44 Am. St. R. 95) ; Western Union Tel. Co. v. Wawelbaum, 113 Ga. 1017 (39 S. E. 443, 56 L. R. A. 741); Postal Tel. Go. v. Moss, 5 Ga. App. 503 (63 S. E. 590) ; Williams v. Central R. Go., 117 Ga. 830 (43 S. E. 980); Albers v. Western Union Tel. Co., 98 Iowa, 51 (66 U. W. 1040); Hart v. Western Union Tel. Co., 66 Cal. 579 (6 Pae. 637, 56 Am. R. 119, 1 Am. El. Cases, 734, 739); Western Union Tel. Co. v. Jones, 95 Ind. 228 (48 Am. R. 718, 719).
(b) The plaintiff’s evidence failing to show that the above-mentioned stipulation had been complied with, or that it had been waived by the company, the grant of a nonsuit was not error.
2. The exclusion of the letter as complained of by the plaintiff, if error, was harmless.
3. Where a plaintiff has rested his case and a motion for a nonsuit has been made, and he then moves the court to be allowed to introduce other evidence, the reopening of the case for this purpose is within the sound discretion of the court, and such discretion will not be controlled unless it has been'manifestly abused. In the present case this court can not say that the trial judge abused his discretion. See Penn v. Georgia So. Ry. Go., 129 Ga. 856 (60 S. E. 172), and cases there cited.
Decided July 29, 1915.
Action for damages; from municipal court of Atlanta. November 5, 1914.
Hines & Jordan, for plaintiff.
Dorsey, Brewster, Howell & Heyman, B. W. Crenshaw, John K. MacDonald, for defendants.

Opinion:
Broyles, J.
The first headnote alone needs elaboration. It is contended by the learned counsel for the plaintiff that as there was no allegation in the plaintiff's petition that written notice of the claim was given within sixty days, and that as neither of the defendant companies pleaded failure to give such notice within the required time, the question whether the plaintiff gave such notice to the defendants within sixty days is not in issue in this case; and the said counsel further declare that "in all cases where a nonsuit has been granted in this State, on the ground of failure to give notice (e. g. Hill, 85 Ga. 425, and James, 90 Ga. 254), it affirmatively appeared (doubtless on proper pleadings) that such notice had not been given; which clearly distinguishes this line of cases from the case at bar, where there was no evidence of failure to give such notice." The same counsel admit further that "if the plaintiff had put this question in issue by alleging the giving of notice, or if defendant had put it in issue by specially pleading it, then a nonsuit would have been proper, had the plaintiff failed to sustain tins issue." From an examination of the original record in the Gill case, supra, we find that the plaintiff's petition (just, as in the case at bar) contained no allegation that the notice of the plaintiff's claim was given within sixty days, and that the defendant telegraph company did not plead as a defense that such notice was not given within the required time; and yet in that case, in the trial court, counsel for the defendant company, after the plaintiff had introduced his evidence, moved for a nonsuit, "on the ground that, as appears from the evidence, no demand or claim for damages had been given in writing to said company or its agents, within sixty days, as required by the rules and regulations of the company, printed on the blank on which the message was sent," and the court sustained the motion and granted the nonsuit on that ground. The Supreme Court sustained this ruling, so far as it related to the failure of the plaintiff to make a written demand upon the company within the time specified, though the judgment granting a nonsuit was reversed, the reversal being solely upon the ground that the evidence submitted showed that the company, by the action of its agent, had waived the written demand or notice. As neither the letter admitted in evidence in the case at' bar nor the one which was excluded by the court, nor both together, showed any waiver on this'point by the defendant company, in our judgment the non-suit was properly awarded. Judgment affirmed.