Case Name: Alexander H. NEUSTADTER, et al. v. HOLY CROSS HOSPITAL OF SILVER SPRING, INC.
Court: Court of Appeals of Maryland
Jurisdiction: Maryland
Decision Date: 2011-02-24
Citations: 418 Md. 231
Docket Number: No. 12
Parties: Alexander H. NEUSTADTER, et al. v. HOLY CROSS HOSPITAL OF SILVER SPRING, INC.
Judges: Argued before BELL, C.J., HARRELL, BATTAGLIA, GREENE, MURPHY, ADKINS and BARBERA, JJ.
Reporter: Maryland Reports
Volume: 418
Pages: 231–280

Head Matter:
13 A.3d 1227
Alexander H. NEUSTADTER, et al. v. HOLY CROSS HOSPITAL OF SILVER SPRING, INC.
No. 12,
Sept. Term, 2010.
Court of Appeals of Maryland.
Feb. 24, 2011.
Thomas J. Mack (University of the District of Columbia, David A. Clarke School of Law, Washington, D.C.) (Rene Sandler of Sandler Law LLC, Rockville, MD; Stephen B. Mercer of Stephen B. Mercer, Esq., P.C., Rockville, MD), on brief, for petitioners.
Michelle R. Mitchell (David A. Levin of Wharton, Levin, Ehrmantraut & Klein, P.A., Annapolis, MD), on brief, for respondent.
Abba Cohen, Esq., Jenny Figa, Esq., Agudath Israel of America, Washington, D.C., Steven A. Loewy, Esq., German-town, MD, for Amicus Curiae brief of Agudath Israel of America in Support of Petitioners.
Kenneth Lasson, Esq., Professor of Law, University of Baltimore, Baltimore, MD, for Amici Curiae brief of Interested Professors of Law in Support of Petitioners.
Argued before BELL, C.J., HARRELL, BATTAGLIA, GREENE, MURPHY, ADKINS and BARBERA, JJ.

Opinion:
GREENE, J.
Petitioner ("Mr. Neustadter") appeals from a judgment of the Circuit Court for Montgomery County and asserts that his constitutional right to the free exercise of his religion was infringed by rulings denying a two-day postponement or recess during his medical malpractice case so that he could observe an Orthodox Jewish holiday. The trial judge and County Administrative Judge collectively denied four motions for postponement of the case. We hold that the judges abused their discretion in denying the requests for a continuance of the trial where the movant's religious beliefs prohibited any appearance or advocacy on his behalf in the pending civil court proceeding. Therefore, we reverse and remand for a new trial.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Petitioner filed a complaint in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County against Capital Internal Medicine, LLC, Dr. Ahmed Nawaz, MD, and Holy Cross Hospital of Silver Spring ("Holy Cross") alleging negligent medical care of his father, Israel Neustadter, who died on March 27, 2003. On October 20, 2006, the Circuit Court scheduled the case for a ten-day trial to commence on February 11, 2008. At a pre-trial hearing on January 24, 2008, the trial judge rescheduled the ten day trial, on a motion to continue by Respondent, to begin instead on June 2, 2008. In addition, the trial judge appointed a Special Master to resolve ongoing discovery disputes.
Between January and May, 2008, counsel for the parties communicated on several occasions about an anticipated scheduling conflict due to Petitioner's anticipated religious observances, which would fall on the fifth and sixth days of the, then, ten-day trial. Subsequently, on May 6, 2008, Petitioner filed a "Motion to Suspend Trial Days for Religious Holidays" , ("May 6th motion") stating in pertinent part:
Mr. Neustadter is an Orthodox Jew who is one of the most observant followers of Jewish principles and requirements.
During Shavous he is (1) prohibited from doing any work including attending trial on these days [June 9 and 10, 2008] and (2) his attorney is prohibited, as his agent, from doing work on his behalf . On the Sabbath, Orthodox Jews . strictly observe the requirement that work is prohibited . and an agent is also prohibited from doing work on his behalf.
Petitioner's motion also summarized the attempts that had been made with opposing counsel to resolve the scheduling conflict without the intervention of the court. Dr. Nawaz opposed the motion. In his opposition motion, Dr. Nawaz suggested that rather than suspend the trial, if the trial court was "inclined to accommodate Plaintiffs religious beliefs, the entire case should be continued to a future date where any conflicting religious commitments can be known in advance and avoided." An order denying Petitioner's first motion was entered May 7, 2008. Subsequently, Petitioner raised the scheduling conflict at a discovery hearing on May 14, 2008, at which point Respondent expressed an interest in maintaining the current trial schedule. The trial judge denied Petitioner's request to alter the trial schedule. At that hearing, Petitioner notified the court that he would file a motion to reconsider.
On May 19, 2008, Petitioner filed a second postponement motion entitled, "Motion to Reconsider Motion to Suspend Trial Days for Religious Holidays." Petitioner reiterated his argument from the May 6th motion and submitted an affidavit from the Assistant Rabbi of his congregation citing the specific prohibitions of the Sabbath and concluding that it would be impossible for either Petitioner, or his attorney, to participate in any way in a legal proceeding on June 9th and 10th. Furthermore, Petitioner contended that conducting his trial on the Sabbath violated his First Amendment Rights, that he had a right to attend and appear at trial, and that he would be prejudiced if the trial were held in his absence. When the Motion to Reconsider was discussed at the pre-trial hearing on May 22, 2008, Petitioner asked the court to consider the "constitutional issues . when deciding not to honor somebody's religious requirements." The Motion to Reconsider was denied.
On June 2, 2008, the day before trial was to begin, Petitioner filed a third "Motion to Postpone Trial for Religious and Fairness Reasons," which was opposed by Respondent. Petitioner stated two grounds for the motion: (1) prejudice and (2) fairness because of an earlier accommodation to Respondent. Petitioner stated in the motion:
This case was rescheduled on January 24, 2008 . due to pending discovery matters and other issues that still had to be resolved. . At that time, the Plaintiff consented to the postponement.
At that time, it was about two weeks before trial when the defense attorneys' scheduling problem was raised for the first time at the pretrial conference.
Respondent opposed the Motion to Postpone arguing that the court had already denied Petitioner's request on three occasions, that there was no mention at the January pre-trial conference of a scheduling conflict, and that only one of their four expert witnesses could be rescheduled to testify on June 11th. The Administrative Judge denied the Motion to Postpone.
On June 3rd, before the trial judge, Petitioner raised the issue of postponement "one more time." The trial judge declined to postpone the trial stating, "[w]e've addressed that issue numerous, this issue, particular issue, numerous times and I have explained numerous times why the case is not going to be continued or suspended and that's really the ruling of the case at this point. So I have to deny the motion."
The trial began on June 3, 2008. Petitioner presented his case, which consisted of 13 witnesses, from June 3rd through June 6th. At the conclusion of Mr. Neustadter's case on June 6, 2008, Holy Cross moved for judgment, which the court denied. After the jury was dismissed for the day, the trial judge asked Mr. Neustadter's counsel, "[i]t's my understanding you're not going to be here [on Monday]?" Counsel for Petitioner responded affirmatively and then objected to the trial continuing on Monday and Tuesday. Court proceedings were set to begin mid-morning on Wednesday so that Petitioner could listen to a recorded transcript of the trial proceedings. The parties also discussed that a defense witness, Dr. Geckler, who had previously agreed to move his appearance to Wednesday, would actually testify on Monday.
On Monday and Tuesday, June 9 and June 10, 2008, in Mr. Neustadter's absence, Holy Cross Hospital put on its entire case-in-chief, which included the testimony of four expert witnesses and one of Israel Neustadter's treating physicians, all offered to refute the Hospital's liability for damages. On June 9, 2008, Holy Cross offered the testimony of Dr. Richardson, qualified as an expert in geriatric and family medicine, and of Dr. Geckler, qualified as an expert witness in internal medicine and infectious disease. On June 10, 2008, Holy Cross introduced the testimony of Dr. Ball, one of the treating critical care pulmonologists for Israel Neustadter; Ms. McMullen, qualified as an expert in the field of nursing; and Dr. Goldstein, qualified as an expert in internal medicine, pulmonary medicine, and critical care medicine. In addition to offering the testimony of the witnesses mentioned, Holy Cross offered as physical evidence a manual on nursing ethics and the curricula vitae for those experts who testified. After- wards, Holy Cross rested its case. On June 11, 2008, Mr. Neustadter and his counsel appeared at trial. That day the jury returned a verdict in favor of Holy Cross.
Petitioner appealed the judgment of the Circuit Court asking the intermediate appellate court to consider three questions related to: a possible violation of his right to religious freedom and right to be present at trial; error in refusing to submit a claim of administrative negligence to the jury; and error in refusing an instruction on negligence per se. In an unreported opinion, the Court of Special Appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment holding, in pertinent part, that there was no constitutional violation of Petitioner's right to free exercise of religion, stating:
Given appellant's delay in alerting the court to the conflict with trial on June 9-10, and given the scheduling conflicts that existed at the time appellant made his requests, as well as counsel's failure to suggest any other options, we find no error in the trial court's ruling denying the requests for a postponement of the trial.
We granted certiorari, Neustadter v. Holy Cross Hosp., 412 Md. 494, 988 A.2d 1008 (2010), to consider the following question, which we have reworded slightly for clarity:
Whether the trial court's denial of Petitioner's request to suspend a civil trial for two days that Petitioner's Jewish Orthodox faith required him to strictly observe as days of worship violated Petitioner's constitutional right to free exercise of his religion.
I.
Petitioner urges this Court to scrutinize strictly the trial court's rulings by positing that his right to engage in religious conduct, protected by the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, was impermissibly infringed. Conversely, Respondent maintains that we should apply an abuse of discretion analysis because the trial court's rulings were discretionary and had no constitutional implications. The intermediate appellate court explicitly declined to apply any particular standard of review stating, "[w]e need not decide the applicable standard. Even applying the higher standard advocated by appellant, we find no error."
Ordinarily,
[i]n reviewing a possible violation of a constitutional right, this Court conducts its own independent constitutional analysis. See Crosby v. State, 366 Md. 518, 526, 784 A.2d 1102, 1106 (2001) ("[W]hen the issue is whether a constitutional right has been infringed, we make our own independent constitutional appraisal"). "We perform a de novo constitutional appraisal in light of the particular facts of the case at hand----" Glover v. State, 368 Md. 211, 221, 792 A.2d 1160, 1166 (2002).
State v. Davis, 415 Md. 22, 29, 997 A.2d 780, 784 (2010). Although the issue, briefs and oral argument in this case directed our attention to the various tests employed by the United States Supreme Court upon claims of violations of the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, we conclude that the issue presented here, i.e., the propriety of repeatedly denying Petitioner's motions to suspend and/or postpone his civil trial, can be resolved without reaching the constitutional question. Therefore, our task is to determine whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying Petitioner á reasonable accommodation when his religious beliefs directed that he and his attorney refrain from any form of advocacy during the two days of the Jewish Orthodox Holiday of Shavuot that fell in the period scheduled for his civil trial.
II.
Md. Rule 2-508 states that, "[o]n motion of any party or on its own initiative, the court may continue a trial or other proceeding as justice may require." Generally, an appellate court will not disturb a ruling on a motion to continue "unless [discretion is] arbitrarily or prejudicially exercised." Dart Drug Corp. v. Hechinger Co., 272 Md. 15, 28, 320 A.2d 266, 273 (1974) (finding no abuse of discretion in denying a motion where there was an "eleventh hour" request to continue a 26 month trial). This Court recently reiterated that the "decision to grant a continuance lies within the sound discretion of the trial judge." Touzeau v. Deffinbaugh, 394 Md. 654, 669, 907 A.2d 807, 816 (2006) (noting in footnote five that the legislative history of Md. Rule 2-508 and the judicial discretion to consider such motions dates back to 1787). We have also affirmed that the trial court has authority over the management of its trial docket. Goins v. State, 293 Md. 97, 111, 442 A.2d 550, 557 (1982) (stating "[e]xcept as limited by statute or rule, a trial court has inherent authority to control its own docket").
Appellate courts do not defer to discretionary rulings of the trial judge, however, when the judge has resolved the issue on 'unreasonable or untenable' grounds. We have stated:
We have defined abuse of discretion as "discretion manifestly unreasonable, or exercised on untenable grounds, or for untenable reasons." Jenkins v. City of College Park, 379 Md. 142, 165, 840 A.2d 139, 153 (2003) (emphasis not included). See also Garg v. Garg, 393 Md. 225, 238, 900 A.2d 739, 746 (2006) ("The abuse of discretion standard requires a trial judge to use his or her discretion soundly and the record must reflect the exercise of that discretion. Abuse occurs when a trial judge exercises discretion in an arbitrary or capricious manner or when he or she acts beyond the letter or reason of the law.") (quoting Jenkins v. State, 375 Md. 284, 295-96, 825 A.2d 1008, 1015 (2003)).
Touzeau, 394 Md. at 669, 907 A.2d at 816.
In exercising discretion, the trial court must apply the correct legal standard in rendering its decision:
[W]here the record so reveals, a failure to consider the proper legal standard in reaching a decision constitutes an abuse of discretion.
The "abuse of discretion" standard of review is premised, at least in part, on the concept that matters within the discretion of the trial court are "much better decided by the trial judges than by appellate courts...." So long as the Circuit Court applies the proper legal standards and reaches a reasonable conclusion based on the facts before it, an appellate court should not reverse a decision vested in the trial court's discretion merely because the appellate court reaches a different conclusion.
Aventis Pasteur, Inc. v. Skevofilax, 396 Md. 405, 433, 436, 914 A.2d 113, 130-32 (2007) (citations omitted) (holding that a trial judge did not abuse his discretion in denying a motion for voluntary dismissal without prejudice because the judge considered the proper legal standard as defined by Maryland case law, namely that there was no conflict of interest, fraud, or neglect by a party moving on behalf of a minor). In Edwards v. State, where we undertook an analogous challenge, we stated that "the ultimate decision, assuming the application of correct principles of law in the balancing process, is a discretionary one with the trial court ., we look to see whether the court applied correct legal principles and, if so, whether its ruling constituted a fair exercise of its discretion." 350 Md. 433, 441-42, 713 A.2d 342, 346 (1998) (internal citations omitted) (holding that there was no abuse of discretion in denying a defendant's motion for disclosure of the identity of a confidential informant after an appropriate balancing test which did not run afoul of defendant's constitutional rights). Thus, here, we must consider whether the interests of the court and the Petitioner were properly balanced.
This Court has consistently affirmed denials of motions to continue when litigants have failed to exercise due diligence in preparing for trial, in the absence of unforeseen circumstances to cause surprise that could not have been reasonably mitigat ed, where untimely requests were made, where procedural rules were ignored, where attorneys failed to adequately prepare for trial, where a witness was missing, and where a litigant's chosen counsel was absent but alternative counsel was available. See Touzeau, 394 Md. 654, 678, 907 A.2d 807, 821 (2006) (finding no abuse of discretion when the trial court denied a request to continue where a self-represented litigant did not exercise due diligence to obtain counsel until five days before trial and failed to demonstrate that hardship in obtaining counsel was an unanticipated event); Dart Drug Corp., 272 Md. at 28, 320 A.2d at 273 (finding no abuse of discretion where there was an "eleventh hour" request to continue a 26 month trial); Abrams v. Gay Inv. Co., 253 Md. 121, 124, 251 A.2d 876, 878 (1969) (finding no abuse of discretion where a party failed to follow court procedural rules); Cruis Along Boats, Inc. v. Langley, 255 Md. 139, 142-44, 257 A.2d 184, 186 (1969) (finding no abuse of discretion where an unavailable lead attorney could be replaced with associate counsel at trial).
In contrast, this Court has found reversible error in the denial of a motion to continue in certain circumstances:
We have found that it would be an abuse of discretion for a trial judge to deny a continuance when the continuance was mandated by law, see Mead v. Tydings, 133 Md. 608, 612, 105 A. 863, 864 (1919), or when counsel was taken by surprise by an unforeseen event at trial, when he had acted diligently to prepare for trial, Plank v. Summers, 205 Md. 598, 604-05, 109 A.2d 914, 916-17 (1954), or, in the face of an unforeseen event, counsel had acted with diligence to mitigate the effects of the surprise, Thanos v. Mitchell, 220 Md. 389, 392-93, 152 A.2d 833, 834-35 (1959).
Touzeau, 394 Md. at 669-670, 907 A.2d at 816. The intermediate appellate court has also reversed a denial of a motion to continue when a wife sought more time to obtain counsel in a contentious and complex divorce proceeding, Reaser v. Reaser, 62 Md.App. 643, 650, 490 A.2d 1315, 1319 (1985), and when a mother could not attend a custody hearing because the child whose welfare was in issue was ill, In re McNeil, 21 Md.App. 484, 499-500, 320 A.2d 57, 66 (1974).
We hold that the trial judge abused her discretion in denying the May 6th Motion and discretion was unreasonably exercised with regard to Petitioner's three subsequent pleas for a suspension of the proceeding, and finally for a postponement on May 16, June 2, and June 3, 2008, because the articulated rationales, discussed infra, failed to reasonably accommodate Petitioner's right to engage in religious conduct and to meaningfully participate in his trial. In this case, the absence of the plaintiff and his counsel from trial could not have been and indeed was not meaningfully mitigated. Moreover, Petitioner's notice to the court and opposing counsel of the scheduling conflict was not so untimely as to preclude accommodation or indicate an utter lack of diligence.
III.
In the instant case, the trial judge concluded that Petitioner's repeated request to suspend trial for two days was impossible to accommodate in light of the court's interest in the orderly administration of the court proceedings. Essentially, the court's reasons included: lack of approval from the County Administrative judge, inconvenience to jurors and witnesses, prior rescheduling, double-booking the judge and defense counsel for a speculative third week of trial, untimeliness of Petitioner's first motion, a crowded trial docket, and that the court was "down two judges." In our view, these rationales do not indicate the impossibility of offering a reasonable accommodation to Petitioner and therefore the decision misses the mark and implicates prejudice to the movant.
On May 14th, the trial judge stated:
[The] difficulty I have is, and I did discuss this with our administrative judge before I ruled on that motion, is that when this trial date was set in February this issue was not raised.

And I cannot, the administrative judge will not let me, hold up jurors for an extra two days because of something that was not brought to our attention. And the case has already been rescheduled once, and I simply cannot suspend the trial for those two days.
If we had depositions de bene esse that were already "in the can," as they say, or on film, we could play those and then it wouldn't matter. But I don't know that we do.
And, you know, our trial calendar is extremely heavy right now. I'm down two judges, and I'm simply not authorized to suspend the trial for two days. Because, it affects a lot of people not just us in . this room, it affects the witnesses, but if affects jurors, members of the community, and the entire docket if I don't finish the trial within a time that's allowed for it. So, I cannot suspend the trial.
But you can file a motion to reconsider if you want, but I won't be suspending the trial.
At the pre-trial hearing on May 22, 2008, the trial judge considered Petitioner's Motion to Reconsider stating:
The concern, the Court's concern is that when this trial was scheduled to back in, I believe it was the end of January when a motion to continue the February trial date was discussed and this trial date was picked, there was, at that time, no request that this trial be suspended for two days. It was set for nine days to begin on Tuesday the 3rd. And had there been a request to suspend it for two days it would have been addressed when the trial was set. And either, if it couldn't be accommodated, you know, if that wasn't agreeable a different date would have been picked.
But the problem is that the request comes less than a month before trial in a very crowded trial docket for the court system itself, because we are short two judges. We are already having a lot of problems juggling trials and so forth, so it's very difficult on the Court. It also carries the trial over to next week for jurors who are greatly imposed on.
And it may seem like a relatively short trial to a federal court if they typically have six, eight, 14 week trials, but for a circuit court an eight, nine, 10 day trial is a long trial and it ties up a lot of, it ties up myself, it ties up all the courtroom personnel, it ties up a lot of people, but also jurors.
Not to mention . expert witnesses.
Petitioner interjected:
Your Honor . you'll recall that there was tremendous difficulty finding a date at all for the two defense firms, that they could not find when the primary counsel had to be here, and that was a date that was taken out of the only time frame that could be accepted. So the fact that is if you had known that an earlier date, I don't think there would have been an easier way to set this trial unless it was next year.
But the fact is that we did, and I laid out in my motion that I did contact pretty promptly, in February, the two defense firms and said to them, "Look, we got this problem, and here's what the problem is. Would you consent?" And I think I laid out the dates in my motion. And I got a response back from Mr. Ceppos [Counsel for Dr. Nawaz], and I, some time passed I had to contact Ms. Ward [Counsel for Holy Cross] again and she responded. And the fact is that, you know, we couldn't reach agreement on it.
With the, with the dropping of Dr. Nawaz from the case, this case is now going to be three or four days shorter.
Therefore, by extending this trial, by having a two-day, two days off it's really not going to be any longer than the original court trial schedule, was scheduled for anyway.
Petitioner maintained that June 9th and 10th could be removed from the trial calendar because the case was going to involve significantly fewer witnesses because of the dismissal of Dr. Nawaz. Respondent disagreed, stating, "I don't possibly see how Dr. Nawaz not being in this case is going to shorten this trial three to four days." The court restated its position from the first motion:
The motion to suspend was filed May 6th. And I don't know, I didn't look at when the e-mail correspondence started. There was some attached, I just didn't notice the date. But the motion itself as we got it May 6th was ruled on promptly, because I immediately called, after I realize that the defense counsel were saying their witnesses were lined up and couldn't consent I did immediately check with the administrative judge.
So, as of this point, it's still my position I do not have authority to suspend the trial for two days.
On May 22, 2008, the trial judge denied Petitioner's Motion to Reconsider.
On June 2, 2008, the Administrative Judge denied a third Motion to Postpone, without a hearing. Subsequently, the trial judge declined to postpone the trial upon an oral motion on June 8, 2008, stating, "[wje've addressed that issue numerous, this issue, particular issue, numerous times and I have explained numerous times why the case is not going to be continued or suspended and that's really the ruling of the case at this point. So I have to deny the motion."
At the most, six jurors, possibly eight including two alternates, would have been asked to stand by, while trial proceedings were suspended for two days. This would not have been an unprecedented scenario. The double-booking issue similarly fails because there is no indication that the trial judge was specially assigned to hear the merits of this particular case, judges are double-booked not infrequently, and in the present case, another judge stepped in for the trial judge, to handle another medical malpractice case set for the same ten-day period as Petitioner's case. The threat of a third week of trial does not follow from the facts of the case, which indicate that the trial was originally set for ten days, was then shortened to nine days because the trial judge would not be available on the first day, shortened further when Dr. Nawaz was dismissed from the suit on May 22, 2008 (along with an estimated 29 witnesses and substantial number of exhibits), and ultimately was completed in seven days. The record indicates that Petitioner did try to obtain the consent of defense counsel prior to bringing the conflict to the court's attention through e-mails dated January 28, April 22, April 28, and May 1, 2008. When no consent was given, Petitioner filed a motion with the trial court, approximately one month prior to the start of trial.
This Court is not unsympathetic to the need for trial courts to efficiently and effectively manage overflowing dockets and judicial resources. There is no evidence on the record, however, that suspending court proceedings for two days of a nine day trial would unreasonably or substantially burden the docket or squander resources. Pursuant to the record, the trial judge could have taken a two day break and resumed the proceedings on Wednesday, June 11, 2008, and still finished the trial by the end of the second week. We have indicated on prior occasions that if a request for a continuance is predicated upon a circumstance that may be "obviated within a brief period of time," then the fact that the trial may resume progress "within a reasonable, rather than a protracted, period of time is an important consideration in a continuance decision." Touzeau, 394 Md. at 671-72, 907 A.2d at 818 (citing King v. Mayor of Rockville, 249 Md. 243, 246, 238 A.2d 898, 900 (1968)).
The only attempt at any alternate means for adapting the trial schedule to accommodate Petitioner was an ineffective attempt to reschedule Respondent's witnesses for June 11th when Petitioner would return to court. At the pre-trial hearing on May 22, 2008, Counsel for Holy Cross stated:
Additionally, which my four experts, either three or four of them are scheduled for Monday and Tuesday. So, to say that it wouldn't affect anything is, is, frankly, not true. Even though I'm, I understand that there's not multiple defendants anymore, I still have experts that I've prepaid and prearranged with to be here to testify on those two days.
The trial judge then inquired:
I would ask counsel if you can contact your expert witnesses to see if any of them are available to reschedule . Wednesday or Thursday____If enough witnesses were rescheduled so that we didn't need to sit either Monday or Tuesday I would then not sit.
But . I can't do it the third week, either. [T]he Court's calendar is, I mean, I'm already, frankly, double booked the second week of this trial . they are bringing another judge in to cover [another malpractice case]. But that's how, I mean, we're just double and triple booked every week.
So it is important that this trial end that second week. But if defense counsel can reschedule any of their experts, I am asking them to attempt to do that.
On May 28, 2008, Petitioner wrote the trial judge stating that he and Respondent had communicated about rescheduling some of Respondent's expert witnesses, but only one of the four could possibly move. Ultimately, the defense did not move any of its witnesses.
The trial judge stated that her denials "had nothing to do with the fact" that the nature of the request was religious, which we accept. Taking an objective view of Petitioner's predicament, however, it is difficult to imagine that a trial court would have refused to accommodate a litigant or counsel who requested a continuance because of family or personal illness, or in order to observe a time of bereavement upon the death of a family member. We note an apt reflection by the intermediate appellate court in In re McNeil wherein that court stated, "myopic insistence upon expeditiousness in the face of a justifiable request for delay can render the right to due process an empty formality." 21 Md.App. at 499, 320 A.2d at 66. The trial court did not give sufficient weight to the impact on Petitioner of being absent from trial for the Respondent's entire case-in-chief. Moreover, the court unreasonably juxtaposed the convenience of jurors, witnesses, and attorneys against Petitioner's request for a religious accommodation, prejudicially assigning more value to the former.
While the trial court has broad discretion under Md. Rule 2-508 to continue a trial, the facts of this case gave rise to an exceptional circumstance that warranted a continuance. E.g. Thanos, 220 Md. at 392,152 A.2d at 834-35 (stating "[i]n some instances, however, refusal to grant a continuance has been held to be reversible error . We think the case before us is one of the exceptional instances where there was prejudicial error") (citation omitted). Under the circumstances of the present case, the trial court abused its discretion by failing to make a reasonable accommodation, given the exceptional circumstance raised by the movant, whereby both he and his counsel were prohibited from participating in court proceedings for two days as a result of an asserted and uncontroverted religious tenet.
IV.
When an appellate court determines that a trial court has abused its discretion in ruling on a motion to continue, to the prejudice of the movant, the appropriate appellate action is to overturn such a ruling. Jackson v. State, 214 Md. 454, 459, 135 A.2d 638, 640 (1957) (noting that a discretionary-ruling on a motion to continue should not be disturbed absent a showing of abuse that was prejudicial to the movant); see also Thanos, 220 Md. at 392, 152 A.2d at 834-35; Plank, 205 Md. at 605, 109 A.2d at 917. Prejudice means an "error that influenced the outcome of the case." Harris v. David S. Harris, P.A., 310 Md. 310, 319, 529 A.2d 356, 360 (1987) and cases cited therein.
Petitioner contends that prejudice should be presumed in the instant case because he was "wrongfully excluded" by the trial judge, citing our decision in Safeway Stores v. Watson, 317 Md. 178, 562 A.2d 1242 (1989). In Safeway Stores, we held that a corporate entity had a right under Md. Rule 2-513 to designate a representative to be in the courtroom and that the trial judge's exclusion of Safeway's expert designee was wrongful and presumptively prejudicial so that Safeway did not have to prove both error and the prejudice. 317 Md. at 184, 562 A.2d at 1245-46. Relying on our decision in Safeway Stores, we stated more recently that "[w]hat emanates from these cases is that there is a right of presence, that the right is not absolute, and that a determination of whether exclusion of a party constitutes sufficient prejudice, either presumed or actual, to warrant a new trial depends, to some extent, on the circumstances." Green v. N. Arundel Hosp. Ass'n, 366 Md. 597, 620, 785 A.2d 361, 375 (2001) (citing Gorman v. Sabo, 210 Md. 155, 122 A.2d 475 (1956)).
In the instant case, we hold that conducting the trial in Petitioner's absence was presumptively prejudicial and requires reversal. Petitioner's absence from court is analogous to the "wrongful exclusion" in Safeway Stores, and pursuant to Green, while some exclusions are appropriate given the dr cumstances of the case, others are reversible error. In essence, the trial court precluded Petitioner from effectively litigating his case when it created a circumstance in which Respondent presented its entire case in the Petitioner's absence. Moreover, upon the presumption of prejudice, the non-complaining party must prove that the error did not impact the outcome of the case, which Holy Cross has failed to do. See e.g. Harris, 310 Md. at 319-20, 529 A.2d at 361 (noting that an erroneous disqualification of an attorney must be shown, by the advantaged party, to have had no influence on the outcome of the case).
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS REVERSED. CASE REMANDED TO THAT COURT WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO REMAND THE CASE TO THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR MONTGOMERY COUNTY FOR A NEW TRIAL. RESPONDENT TO PAY THE COSTS.
HARRELL, MURPHY, and ADKINS, JJ., Concur.
. Capital Internal Medicine, LLC and Dr. Ahmed Nawaz, MD, were dismissed from the suit on October 16, 2006, and May 22, 2008, respectively, leaving Respondent, Holy Cross Hospital, as the sole defendant in the underlying trial.
. Although the date entered in the record was June 2, 2008, all parties understood that trial would actually begin on June 3, 2008. On May 23, 2008, the trial judge notified the Assignment Office that trial would begin on June 3, 2008, and had been reduced to nine days.
.In his first postponement motion entitled, "Motion to Suspend Trial Days for Religious Holidays" ("May 6th motion"), Petitioner drew the trial court's attention to the parameters of the Orthodox Jewish Holiday described by the Orthodox Union website at http://www.oit/org/ calendar/2008.htm:
Shavuot
6 Sivan — Israel (6 & 7 in Diaspora)
Moses Receives The Torah (Pentecost) — Celebrating G-d's giving of the Torah and Ten Commandments to the Jews at Mt. Sinai. Memorial (Yizkor) services said (on 2nd day in diaspora).
Work Restrictions: Sabbath-like work restrictions one day in Israel — two days in Diaspora.
. The May 6th motion provided the first notice to Respondent and to the trial court that counsel for Mr. Neustadter was also prohibited from being present in court on June 9th and 10th because as an agent he was prohibited from doing work on Mr. Neustadter's behalf.
. Mr. Neustadter urges this Court to scrutinize strictly the case pursuant to either: (1) the balancing test of government conduct as weighed against the "substantial burden" imposed upon an individual espoused by the Supreme Court in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 410, 83 S.Ct. 1790, 1797, 10 L.Ed.2d 965, 974 (1963), in which the Court held that a state had no compelling interest in imposing a statute that substantially infringed upon a Seventh Day Adventist who was denied unemployment benefits upon a refusal to accept Sabbath day employment; or alternatively, according to the "hybrid rights" theory espoused in Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Ore. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881, 110 S.Ct. 1595, 1601, 108 L.Ed.2d 876, 887 (1990), in which the Court held that a neutral and generally applicable criminal law is applicable even if it imposes a burden upon religious conduct and noting that the only cases in which the Court has struck down such a law was when other constitutionally protected rights were contemporaneously infringed, i.e. "freedom of speech and of the press ., or the right of parents to direct the education of their children."
. The Court of Special Appeals used a test that Petitioner asserts and we agree was a "free-floating balancing test," which apparently combined elements of a constitutional analysis with those of an abuse of discretion analysis. That court held that Petitioner's religious beliefs were sincere and caused a bona fide conflict, nevertheless it held that the trial court had a compelling interest in the "efficient and orderly administration of justice," the tardiness of Petitioner's request "weighed against" him, and that the trial court had no ability to adjust its schedule to accommodate the request.
. "[T]his Court has regularly adhered to the principle that we will not reach a constitutional issue when a case can properly be disposed of on a non-constitutional ground." In re Julianna B., 407 Md. 657, 667, 967 A.2d 776 (2009) (quoting State v. Lancaster, 332 Md. 385, 403 n. 13, 631 A.2d 453, 463 n. 13 (1993) (declining to consider the constitutionality of actions by defendants when the case was found to be moot)); Montrose Christian Sch. Corp. v. Walsh, 363 Md. 565, 578, 770 A.2d 111, 119 (2001); Baltimore Sun v. Baltimore, 359 Md. 653, 659, 755 A.2d 1130, 1133-1134 (2000). Moreover, because the Supreme Court has not addressed the impact of its Smith decision, supra note 6, on judicial determinations such as the one in the instant case, there is no applicable constitutional precedent that must be applied in this case. At least one of our sister states has applied a strict scrutiny analysis to discretionary judicial rulings even after the apparent limitation on that analysis as enunciated by the Smith Court. Given that it is unclear how Smith impacts such discretionary rulings, we prefer to resolve this case according to well-settled Maryland non-constitutional law relating to Md. Rule 2-508 (Continuances). See, e.g., People v. Farrell, 28 A.D.3d 244, 812 N.Y.S.2d 101, 102 (2006) (holding that the court had a "legitimate and compelling interest in completing the trial without the requested weekend adjournment" that defendant made in order to observe Jewish Sabbath); People v. Gilliam, 215 A.D.2d 401, 626 N.Y.S.2d 245, 245 (1995) (holding that a defendant's request to adjourn court proceedings to observe Muslim Sabbath was "improperly denied in that no compelling State interest was shown"); People v. Williams, 197 A.D.2d 401, 602 N.Y.S.2d 377, 378 (1993) (holding that defendant's request for a Friday adjournment to attend religious services properly denied because the proceeding was an incidental burden, justified by the compelling interest of the state to insure a fair trial where the jury had been sequestered for two days).
. Respondent moved for a continuance of the first trial date in order to resolve discovery issues and that request was granted at the pre-trial conference on January 24, 2008.
. On January 24, 2008, the trial judge noted to counsel that there was another medical malpractice case beginning on June 9th:
I have [another] case on my [docket] . It's also a medical malpractice case . scheduled to start at June 9th. But we also double book cases all the time, too . It is double booking us for the following week, but apparently it's also double booking Ms. Kahn's [Dr. Nawaz's counsel] office.
Moreover, according to the trial transcript and docket entries, the trial judge was not specially assigned to the trial when the original trial date was set. At the pre-trial conference on January 24, 2008, the trial judge stated, "the assignment office doesn't have this on my calendar for that date [Feb. 11, 2008] and set in another trial recently on that same date____I mean, we don't have to change the trial date, but it might affect whether they bring in another judge or not."
. The trial judge also suggested that each party could take some depositions on video, de bene esse, and those could be presented to the jury by television.
. Because we conclude that prejudice is presumed in the instant case, we need not reach Petitioner's alternative argument that he was actually prejudiced because of the trial judge's comments to the jury, which arguably criticized Petitioner's two-day absence from trial.