Case Name: PANTHER AIR BOAT CORPORATION, Appellant, v. MacMILLAN-BUCHANAN & KELLY INSURANCE AGENCY, etc., Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1987-09-24
Citations: 520 So. 2d 601
Docket Number: Nos. 86-724, 86-1315
Parties: PANTHER AIR BOAT CORPORATION, Appellant, v. MacMILLAN-BUCHANAN & KELLY INSURANCE AGENCY, etc., Appellee.
Judges: COBB and SHARP, JJ., each concurring specially with opinions.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 520
Pages: 601–604

Head Matter:
PANTHER AIR BOAT CORPORATION, Appellant, v. MacMILLAN-BUCHANAN & KELLY INSURANCE AGENCY, etc., Appellee.
Nos. 86-724, 86-1315.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
Sept. 24, 1987.
On Motion for Rehearing Feb. 25, 1988.
William T. McCluan, of Holland, Starling and Severs, P.A., Melbourne, for appellant.
Janet R. DeLaura, of Smalbein, Eubank, Johnson, Rosier and Bussey, P.A., Rock-ledge, for appellee.

Opinion:
UPCHURCH, Chief Judge.
In this appeal from final summary judgments, the issue presented is whether an insurance agent is a "professional" subject to a two year statute of limitations for malpratice. Appellant Panther Air Boat Corporation had an insurance policy with MacMillan-Buchanan & Kelly Insurance Agency. The insurance carrier for MacMil-lan was appellee Charter Oak Fire Insurance.
Panther was sued for the loss of an airboat belonging to a customer. The air-boat was destroyed by fire while being water tested by Panther. It was determined that this loss was not covered under Panther's policy with Charter Oak. Panther filed the instant action against Mac-Millan and its alleged principal, Charter Oak, for breach of an oral contract, refusing to defend and negligence for failing to provide coverage or to inform Panther that coverage was unavailable for water testing.
The trial court entered summary final judgment in favor of MacMillan because the insurance agents were professionals under Florida law and thus the two year statute of limitations had expired. Summary judgment was also granted as to Charter Oak based upon this court's opinion in Wilhelm v. Traynor, 434 So.2d 1011 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983), which held that a principal is not vicariously liable where the cause of action against the agent is time barred.
The first question presented is whether an insurance agent can be considered as a professional under the professional malpractice statute of limitations, which provides:
(4) WITHIN TWO YEARS.—
(a) An action for professional malpractice, other than medical malpractice, whether founded on contract or tort; provided that the period of limitations shall run from the time the cause of action is discovered or should have been discovered with the exercise of due diligence. However, the limitation of actions herein for professional malpractice shall be limited to persons in privity with the professional.
§ 95.11(4)(a), Fla.Stat. (1985).
The term "profession" varies with the context in which it is used. In Black's Law Dictionary, the following definition appears:
Profession. A vocation or occupation requiring special, usually advanced, education and skills, e.g. law or medical professionals. The term originally contemplated only theology, law and medicine, but as applications of science and learning are extended to other departments of affairs, other vocations also receive the name, which implies professed attainments in special knowledge as distinguished from mere skill.
Black's Law Dictionary 1089 (rev. 5th ed. 1979).
In Webster's the noun "professional" is defined as one who engages in a pursuit or activity often engaged in by amateurs as well as one engaged in one of the learned callings. Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1811 (17th ed. 1976). Thus, we have professional actors, boxers, golfers, tennis and football players, etc. The distinction being that they are so engaged for financial remuneration rather than for sport or pleasure, i.e. amateurs. Others are engaged in activities for remuneration which are not traditionally thought of as "professional"; for example, mechanics, electricians, plumbers, real estate agents, bankers, investment counselors, appraisers, yacht surveyors, etc. and whose skill, counsel and judgment is actively sought and relied upon by lay members of the community. Into this latter class, we believe that insurance agents also fall. Then there are the traditional "professionals", those engaged in a profession, such as doctors, lawyers, theologians.
In Cristich v. Allen Engineering, Inc., 458 So.2d 76 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984), we held that a land surveyor is a professional for purposes of section 95.11. We can find no rational distinction between that occupation and the one in issue here. In this instance, Panther bases its claim on the MacMillan's failure to properly advise and obtain the necessary coverage for its business. It therefore becomes obvious that Panther was relying on the special skill and training of MacMillan and its claim is caught squarely by the statute. We also think that to hold the statute applied only to lawyers, doctors, and theologians would render the section subject to serious constitutional attack as being discriminatory because we can think of no rational reason for applying a two year statute of limitation period for only the traditional "professional" but a four year period for all others upon whose judgment, skill and training people equally rely.
We also conclude that MacMillan satisfied its burden of demonstrating that the cause of action had expired under the statute of limitations and affirm on that issue. Finally, we affirm the summary judgment in favor of Charter Oak since it could not be vicariously liable when its agent had been relieved of liability. Wilhelm.
We hold that the decision of the lower court was correct and affirm.
AFFIRMED.
COBB and SHARP, JJ., each concurring specially with opinions.
. It should be noted that Panther has raised no constitutional questions concerning this statute. As a consequence, we shall not reach the interesting question of the effect of the legislature's failure to define "professional", as well as whether the legislature may shorten the limitation period for "professional" as we may defíne it, while keeping the formerly established period for all other acts of negligence.