Case Name: STATE v. SULLIVAN
Court: Supreme Court of South Carolina
Jurisdiction: South Carolina
Decision Date: 1923-12-10
Citations: 127 S.C. 186
Docket Number: 11366
Parties: STATE v. SULLIVAN
Judges: Messrs. Justices Fraser and Marion concur.
Reporter: South Carolina Reports
Volume: 127
Pages: 186–205

Head Matter:
11366
STATE v. SULLIVAN
(121 S. E., 47)
1. Criminal Law — Service at Defendant’s Residence of Notice of Rule to Si-iow Cause Why Suspended Sentence Should Not be Made Effective Held Sufficient.. — -Where a rule to show cause why a suspended sentence should not be carried into effect for a violation of the terms thereof was not served on defendant personally, but was left at his residence with a proper person, and defendant employed counsel to represent his interests at the hearing and endeavored to avoid personal service, held, that the service of the notice was sufficient.
2. Criminal Law — Interposing Objection Involving Merits Waiver of Defective Service of Notice. — Interposing objection involving the merits of the case held a waiver of defendant’s right to raise .the objection that he had not been personally served with a copy of a rule to show cause why suspended sentence should not be carried into effect.
3. Criminal Law — Exception to Order Declaring Suspended Sentence Violated Held Without Merit. — An exception stating that the presiding Judge erred as a matter of law and abused his discretion in declaring a suspended sentence violated and in ordering the same vacated, in that there was an entire failure of evidence to support his conclusion, held without merit.
Before Wilson, J., Charleston, October, 1922.
Appeal dismissed.
From an order making a suspended sentence for violation of the dispensary laws immediately effective because of violation of the conditions of such sentence defendant appeals.
Messrs. Logan & Grace and John I. Cosgrove, 'for appellant,
cite: Conditional pardon: 20 R. C. E., 574. Procedure for enforcement of violation of suspended sentence: Code Crim. Proc. 1922, Sec. 85; 1 Strob., 347; 4 Strob., 322; 123 S. C., 28; 115 S. E., 744; 107 S. C., 417;L. R. A., 1918C, 551; 19 S. C., 122; Code Civil Proc. 1912, Sec. 760, 761, 770. Rule to show cause: 15 Enc. PI. & Pr., 362, 349; 95 S. C., 379. When Supreme Court cam review finding of Court below,: 115 S. E., 747; 114 S. C., 451.
Mr. Thomas P. Stoney, Solicitor, for the State,
cites: Procedure in cancelling suspended sentence: 115 S. E., 744. Defendant making return to rule to show cause on the merits cannot object to jurisdiction of the Court: 115 S. E., 744; 1 Strob., 347; 107 S. C., 413; 16 C. J, 1335, Sec. 3140. Nor is he entitled to trial by a jury: 115 S. E., 744; 107 S. C., 413. Procedtire under suspended sentence: 107 S. C., 345; 109 S. C, 406; 114 S. C., 445; 108 S. C., 455; 107 S. C., 413; 115 S. E., 744.
December 10, 1923.

Opinion:
The opinion of the Court was delivered by
Mr. ChiEE Justice Gary.
This is an appeal from the following order of his Plonor, Judge Wilson:
"This matter comes before me on the rule to show cause first issued on the 26th day of September, 1922, which required that the defendant, M. S. Sullivan, do show cause before me why the conditions of a suspended sentence for violation of the dispensary law imposed upon the defendant by his Honor, I. W. Bowman, of this Court, at the February, 1917, term of this Court, should not be vacated and such sentence become forthwith effective. Exercising the discretion vested in me by the terms of this suspended sentence of his Honor, Judge I. W. Bowman, I ordered that the affidavit upon which the motion was based and the order to show cause be served upon the defendant personally or left at his last known place of residence in the City of Charleston, S. C. The affidavit On which the motion of Solicitor Stoney was based was signed by Louis Poppenhem, and is duly set forth. In the rule to show cause dated September 26, 1922, M. S. Sullivan was required to show cause before me on Monday morning at 10 o'clock, the 2d day of October, 1922. It áppears that inadvertently in this motion it was stated that the sentence as imposed upon M. S- Sullivan was imposed by his Honor, Judge R. Withers Memminger. It further appears that as soon as this error was detected that another rule to show cause was issued on the 27th day of September, A. D. 1922, and again exercising the discretion vested in me under the terms of the suspended sentence, I, as Judge, ordered that a copy of the affidavit upon which the motion was based be served upon the defendant personally or left at his last known place of residence in the City of Charleston. This rule was returnable on Tuesday morning, the 3d day of October, 1922, at 10 o'clock a. m., or soon thereafter as counsel could be heard. This matter came on for a hearing on the afternoon of October 3, 1922. The return of the sheriff shows that the first rule was served at the residence of M. S. Sullivan, on Congress street, in the City of Charleston, the same having been left with the wife of the said M. S. Sullivan. The rule as dated September 27, 1922, by return of the sheriff, shows that the same was left at the residence of M. S. Sullivan on Congress Street with Mrs. H. Svendsen, termed by the sheriff 'a person of discretion.' Counsel for the defendant takes the position that by reason of the fact that this rule was not served personally upon M. S. Sullivan that this Court has no jurisdiction. An affidavit was duly submitted by the Solicitor, signed by Louis Poppenheim, setting forth that M. S. Sullivan was absenting himself from the City of Charleston for the avowed purpose of delaying the action of this Court, in so far as the same would affect him. By reference to the sentence of Judge I. W. Bowman, it was never contemplated that M. S. Sullivan could evade the findings of this Court by undertaking to absent himself from the jurisdiction of same, in order to defeat the terms and conditions of the sentence which he voluntarily accepted, and is now stopped from denying. Furthermore, no showing whatsoever was made to me as to why M. S. Sullivan could not have been in Court in person if he had desired so to do. The record is peculiarly silent on this point.
"The, sentence as imposed upon the defendant by his Honor, Judge I. W. Bowman, together with the conditions thereof, is as follows:
" Tt is the judgment and sentence of the Court that the within named M. S. Sullivan be confined at hard labor upon the public works of the County of Charleston for a term of six months, or a like term at hard labor in the state penitentiary.
" Tt is further ordered and adjudged, however, that four months of the sentence herein imposed be, and the same is hereby suspended upon the conditions hereinafter imposed that is to say, upon the payment to the Clerk of the Court of said County, the sum of $150, or a service of a term of two months at hard labor on the public works of the County of Charleston or a like period at hard labor in the state penitentiary, and upon the further express condition that the within named M. S. Sullivan shall not in any way violate any of the laws of this State, or municipal ordinances, relating to alcoholic liquors, whether of a regulative or prohibitive nature, either directly or indirectly, or through the means of any form of agency, copartnership, or any other form of method of business so designed, and shall not in any manner use, or knowingly become a party to the use of, any premises, or engage in any manner or form in any business, whereby such laws or ordinances shall be violated; and in the event that it shall be brought to the attention of the Court that such terms and conditions, or any of them, are not being observed, and the Court shall, upon an investigation thereof in such manner as shall to' it seem proper, conclude that the terms and conditions as hereinabove set forth have been in whole or part violated, then the suspension of sentence as herein imposed shall thereupon immediately cease, and the within named M. S. Sullivan shall forthwith suffer and undergo the sentence of the Court as above imposed, that is to1 say, shall be confined at hard labor upon the public works of the County of Charleston for the remainder of said term, namely, four months, or for a like period, in like manner, in the state penitentiary.
"'[Signed] I. W. Bowman, Presiding Tudge.
" 'February 20, 1917.'
"After hearing testimony of the witnesses for the state, and upon careful consideration of the entire record before me the evidence being in I am satisfied that the defendant M. S- Sullivan has, since the sentence before referred to, violated the terms under which the said sentence was suspended, and that the terms and conditions of the said sentence have been violated.
"It is therefore ordered that the conditions of the sentence of this Court hereinbefore referred to be and the same are hereby vacated, and that the said sentence be and become immediately effective, that is to say, that the said defendant M. S. Sulliva be confined at hard labor on the public works of Charleston County for a period of four months or for a like period in like manner in the state penitentiary.
"[Signed] John S. Wieson
"Presiding Judge.
"Charleston, S. C., October 5, 1922."
The exceptions are as follows:
"The presiding Judge, it is respectfully submitted, erred in refusing defendant's motion to dismiss the rule herein,, the error being that said rule to show cause had not been served personally on defendant, M. S. Sullivan, so that the trial Court was without jurisdiction to hear the matter or pass judgment thereon.
"The presiding Judge, it is respectfully submitted, erred as a matter of law and abused his discretion in declaring the suspended sentence violated and in ordering the same vacated; the error being that there was an entire failure of evidence to support such finding and upon which to base the order herein appealed from."
The first question that will be considered is whether the appellant had reasonable notice of the rule to show cause why the suspended portion of the sentence should not be carried into effect. The fact that the defendant employed an attorney to represent him necessarily shows that he (the appellant) had notice that the rule to show cause had been issued. It was not necessary for him to be personally served with a copy of the rule to show cause, but the notice was sufficient if he was informed that a copy of the rule to show cause was left at his residence for him, with a proper person. Furthermore, the uncontradicted testimony is to the effect that the appellant had endeavored to avoid service of a copy of the rule to show cause.
There is another reason why the appellant cannot interpose the objection that he was not personally served with a copy of the rule to' show cause. The question raised by the second exception involves the merits of the case and was a waiver of the appellant's right to raise the objection that he had not been personally served with a copy of the rule to show cause. Fitzgerald v. Case Co., 94 S. C., 54; 77 S. E., 739. Williams v. Hatcher, 95 S. C., 49; 78 S. E., 615. Wichman & Son v. Fox, 96 S. C., 469; 81 S. E., 180. Mims v. Garvin et al., 106 S. C., 381; 91 S. E., 289.
The second exception is also without merit.
Appeal dismissed.
Messrs. Justices Fraser and Marion concur.
Messrs. Justices Watts and Cothran dissent.