Case Name: Jeffrey OXNER, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES, Appellee
Court: District of Columbia Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: District of Columbia
Decision Date: 2010-05-13
Citations: 995 A.2d 205
Docket Number: No. 09-CF-224
Parties: Jeffrey OXNER, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES, Appellee.
Judges: Before RUIZ, GLICKMAN and BLACKBURNE-RIGSBY, Associate Judges.
Reporter: West's Atlantic Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 995
Pages: 205–211

Head Matter:
Jeffrey OXNER, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES, Appellee.
No. 09-CF-224.
District of Columbia Court of Appeals.
Submitted Feb. 3, 2010.
Decided May 13, 2010.
Bruce A. Johnson, Jr., Bowie, MD, was on the brief for appellant.
Channing D. Phillips, Acting United States Attorney, and Roy W. McLeese III, Elizabeth Trosman, Mond Sahaf, and Erin B. Andrews, Assistant United States Attorneys, were on the brief for appellee.
Before RUIZ, GLICKMAN and BLACKBURNE-RIGSBY, Associate Judges.

Opinion:
GLICKMAN, Associate Judge:
Appellant Jeffrey Oxner entered a conditional guilty plea to unlawful distribution of cocaine, reserving the right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress his show-up identification. Appellant argues that his identification should have been suppressed as the fruit of an illegal war-rantless entry into his home. We disagree. The police acquired sufficient information to justify appellant's detention for the show-up identification before they entered his abode to seize him; they did not rely on any information gained during that entry. Under prevailing Fourth Amendment doctrine, appellant's identification therefore was not tainted by the putative illegality of the warrantless intrusion. Accordingly, we affirm appellant's conviction.
I.
The relevant facts, elicited in an eviden-tiary hearing on appellant's suppression motion, are not in dispute. On the afternoon of March 3, 2006, a team of Metropolitan Police Department undercover officers conducted a "buy-bust" narcotics operation in Southeast Washington, D.C. Posing as interested buyers, Officers Marvin Washington and Carol Turner approached Valerie Williams on Wheeler Road and asked her if anyone was selling drugs. Williams introduced them to Brian Washington, who said "his man" was selling drugs on Valley Avenue. Williams and Brian Washington led the two undercover officers to the third floor of an apartment building at 1201 Valley Avenue, S.E. The officers waited with Williams in the stairwell while Brian Washington entered Apartment 801. After a few minutes, he came out of the apartment with appellant. In the transaction that followed, Officer Washington handed $30 to Williams, who passed it to Brian Washington, who gave it to appellant in exchange for two ziplock bags of cocaine. Brian Washington handed the bags to Officer Washington. Everyone but appellant then left the building.
Officer Washington promptly went to the undercover police car that had been following his movements. From there he directed an arrest team to Apartment 301 and described the person to be apprehended there as a black, heavy-set male, about 6'1" or 6'3" tall, wearing blue jeans, a long-sleeve black T-shirt, and tan Timberland boots. Within minutes, three police officers arrived at the apartment. In response to their knock, a woman opened the door and the officers observed appellant standing approximately two feet inside. The officers, who were still in the hall, recognized that appellant matched the description given by Officer Washington. The officers then entered the apartment and told appellant he would have to come with them. Neither of the occupants consented to the intrusion. The police escorted appellant downstairs and walked him past the undercover police vehicle. Officers Washington and Turner positively identified appellant and he was placed under arrest.
Appellant moved to suppress his show-up identification as the fruit of a Fourth Amendment violation, namely the warrant-less, nonconsensual entry into his home. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial judge denied the motion. Although the judge rejected the government's argument that exigent circumstances existed to justify intrusion without a warrant, he ruled that the police acted lawfully. Given the "detailed lookout, including that the person described was in Apartment 301," the judge concluded that "simply stepping across the threshold for a Terry stop [to pursue] an on-scene ID was entirely reasonable . Saying to the police . you just have to stand there and try to coax the person out just didn't . make sense."
II. Analysis
Appellant contends the police violated his Fourth Amendment rights by entering his home without a warrant or consent in order to seize him there, and that this violation required suppression of the ensuing show-up identification outside the home by the officers who conducted the undercover drug purchase. The government argues that the warrantless entry was justified by exigent circumstances, and that even if it was not, appellant's identification was not excludable as a fruit of the illegality. We agree with the government's second argument and do not reach the first.
The Fourth Amendment "prohibits the police from making a warrantless and nonconsensual entry into a suspect's home in order to make a routine felony arrest." In New York v. Harris, the Supreme Court considered whether the exclusionary rule required suppression of evidence (a confession, in that case) obtained from an arrestee by the police after they removed him from his home following such a violation. The answer to that question, the Court said, depended on whether the police had probable cause to make the arrest prior to their unlawful intrusion. If so, the Court reasoned, then notwithstanding the illegality of the arrest inside the home, the arrestee's subsequent detention outside the home was lawful, and the evidence then obtained from him therefore was "not the product of being in unlawful custody." Accordingly, unlike evidence obtained inside the home or derived from information gained there, Harris's subsequent confession was "not the fruit of the fact that the arrest was made in the house rather than someplace else." As the confession was "not an exploitation of the illegal entry into [the arrestee's] home," the exclusionary rule did not require its suppression.
Harris involved a confession, but its analysis applies to other forms of evidence — including eyewitness identifications. Like a confession, an identification of a suspect procured during his lawful detention outside the home is not subject to suppression merely because the suspect was seized inside the home in violation of the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement. For the detention to be lawful, it must be justified by evidence independent of the constitutional violation of warrant-less entry; it cannot be based on new information obtained inside the home as a result of the illegal intrusion. Although the detention in Harris was a custodial arrest based on probable cause, under Terry a limited investigative detention of a suspect short of an arrest may be justified on less than probable cause by reasonable articulable suspicion. Harris's principles apply equally to such a detention, so long as it is based on information acquired by the police prior to their warrantless entry. Thus, under Harris, a show-up identification or other evidence obtained during such a lawful investigative detention is deemed not to be a suppressible "fruit" of the illegal intrusion.
These principles govern the present case. The police did not conduct an unreasonable search or seizure in contravention of the Fourth Amendment merely by knocking on the door of appellant's apartment and looking in from the hallway after the door was opened. At that point, before they crossed the apartment threshold without a warrant or consent, the officers saw a man matching the detailed description of the seller standing inside the apartment from which, only minutes earlier, the seller had emerged with the drugs. That correspondence of description, time and location provided at least reasonable suspicion to justify an investigative detention of the man — appellant—for purposes of a show-up identification (as the trial judge concluded), if not probable cause to arrest him then and there. Appellant therefore was in legal custody when he was shown to Officers Washington and Turner, and their identifications of him were not excludable as the fruit of the warrantless and nonconsensual entry into his home, even if that intrusion was not supported by exigent circumstances.
Affirmed.
. Williams and Brian Washington also were detained, identified, and arrested.
. See generally Dorman v. United States, 140 U.S.App. D.C. 313, 435 F.2d 385 (1970) (en banc).
. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968).
.Our review is de novo with respect to whether the claimed Fourth Amendment violation requires suppression of the show-up identification of appellant. See Brown v. United States, 590 A.2d 1008, 1020 (D.C.1991).
. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 576, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980).
. 495 U.S. 14, 110 S.Ct. 1640, 109 L.Ed.2d 13 (1990).
. Id. at 18, 110 S.Ct. 1640 (citing United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463, 474, 100 S.Ct. 1244, 63 L.Ed.2d 537 (1980), for the proposition that a defendant is not "immune from prosecution because his person was the fruit of an illegal arrest"). As the Court added, the illegality of Harris's warrantless arrest in his home did not require the police to release him after his removal from the premises, nor would it have precluded the police from immediately rearresting him had he been released. Id.
. Id. at 19, 110 S.Ct. 1640.
. Id. at 20, 110 S.Ct. 1640.
. Id. at 19, 110 S.Ct. 1640.
. See 6 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 11.4(g), at 47 n. 358 (4th ed. 2004) ("An arrest without probable cause must be distinguished from an arrest made with probable cause but without a warrant when a warrant was required because the arrest was made within private premises. In such a case, by analogy to New York v. Harris . identification information obtained later at the station need not be suppressed.") (citations omitted). See, e.g., Mosby v. Senkowski, 470 F.3d 515, 523-24 (2d Cir.2006) (refusing to suppress lineup identification where the police had probable cause to arrest the defendant and the lineup was not prompted by the warrant-less arrest at his home or by anything the police discovered inside the home); United States v. Villa-Velazquez, 282 F.3d 553, 556 (8th Cir.2002) (observing that police should not have to release and rearrest the defendant to preserve post-arrest identity information); People v. Jones, 2 N.Y.3d 235, 778 N.Y.S.2d 133, 810 N.E.2d 415, 420-22 (2004) (holding lineup identification admissible despite Fourth Amendment violation where the arrest was based on probable cause).
. Cf. Bryant v. United States, 599 A.2d 1107, 1112 (D.C.1991) ("[B]ecause the evidentiary predicate for appellant's detention was dependent on the constitutional violation [of war-rantless entry arid seizure], the subsequent [show-up] identification made during that detention must be excluded as a derivative fruit of the prior illegal entry."); Junior v. United States, 634 A.2d 411, 420 (D.C.1993) (finding that warrantless entry into a home without probable cause rendered show-up identification evidence suppressible).
.The concurrence describes this conclusion as an extension of Harris. Not so. It is a straightforward application of the Supreme Court's rationale in that case. The logic of Harris turns simply on whether there exists untainted legal justification for the detention of the suspect outside the home, not on whether that justification amounts to probable cause as opposed to reasonable suspicion. If the level of detention equates to that of an arrest, as was the case in Harris, then probable cause is the required legal justification; but investigative detentions short of an arrest, such as appellant's detention in this case, require only reasonable suspicion to be valid.
. See Bryant, 599 A.2d at 1111 n. 8. The trial judge erred, however, in thinking that it justified a warrantless, nonconsensual entry in the absence of exigency.
. In his brief on appeal, appellant — surprisingly — concedes that the police had probable cause to support his arrest prior to the show-up identification. We do not rely on this concession. It is immaterial under Harris whether there was probable cause as opposed to reasonable suspicion — either way, appellant's detention was justified.