Case Name: Violeta CIRCU, Petitioner, v. John ASHCROFT, Attorney General, Respondent
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 2004-11-22
Citations: 389 F.3d 938
Docket Number: No. 02-73420
Parties: Violeta CIRCU, Petitioner, v. John ASHCROFT, Attorney General, Respondent.
Judges: Before O’SCANNLAIN, SILER, JR., and HAWKINS, Circuit Judges.
Reporter: Federal Reporter 3d Series
Volume: 389
Pages: 938–943

Head Matter:
Violeta CIRCU, Petitioner, v. John ASHCROFT, Attorney General, Respondent.
No. 02-73420.
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
Argued and Submitted May 10, 2004.
Filed Nov. 22, 2004.
Sharon M. Dulberg and Rosy H. Cho, McVey Mullery & Dulberg, San Francisco, CA, for the petitioner.
Peter D. Keisler, Assistant United States Attorney General, Civil Division; Christopher C. Fuller, Senior Litigation Counsel; and Janice K. Redfern, Office of Immigration Litigation, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for the respondent.
Before O’SCANNLAIN, SILER, JR., and HAWKINS, Circuit Judges.
The Honorable Eugene E. Siler, Jr., Senior United States Circuit Judge for the Sixth Circuit, sitting by designation.

Opinion:
Opinion by Judge SILER; Dissent by Judge HAWKINS.
SILER, Circuit Judge.
Violeta Circu, a native and citizen of Romania, petitions for review of the decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA") denying her claim for asylum, but permitting her to voluntarily depart the United States. Circu argues, inter alia, that the Immigration Judge ("IJ") and BIA violated her right to due process by relying on the Department of State "1999 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices" in Romania ("1999 Report"), a document never introduced into evidence.
Circu entered the United States on November 2, 1994, as a nonimmigrant visitor for pleasure. She was authorized to remain in the United States until November 1, 1995. On March 27, 1996, the INS charged that Circu was subject to deportation under 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1)(B) (1994) for overstaying her visitor visa. She applied for asylum based on religious persecution. Romania is predominantly Romanian Orthodox; Circu and her family are Pentecostal.
Circu testified that persecution of her family dates back to when she was young. Her father was imprisoned; her family was forced to live in barracks; and her brother was taken from her family. In 1987, Circu witnessed an uprising involving several political strikes in Brasov. She was injured in the streets, and later detained and interrogated by the police for 36 hours. During her detention, she was sexually harassed and slapped. In 1990, she inadvertently became involved in a miners' strike and suffered injuries. As a result of the incident, she was once again interrogated by the police and harassed.
Circu was denied admission to public universities because her parents were not members of the Communist Party. In 1990, she was eventually able to enroll in a private university in Brasov. Circu was expelled from the university in 1994 after trying to print articles detailing atrocities committed by the Romanian government in 1987. After her expulsion, she fled to the United States. Her mother and father both have been granted asylum in the United States.
The IJ decided that although Circu had proven past persecution, she failed to demonstrate a well-founded fear of future per secution due to changed country conditions. In reaching this conclusion, the IJ relied upon the 1999 Report. As Romania was no longer a Communist regime and citizens can more freely practice minority religions, the IJ determined that the Country Reports rebutted Circu's presumption of future persecution.
We directly review the IJ's decision since the BIA affirmed without opinion. See Falcon Carriche v. Ashcroft, 350 F.3d 845, 851 (9th Cir.2003). Claims of due process violations are reviewed de novo. Lopez-Urenda v. Ashcroft, 345 F.3d 788, 791 (9th Cir.2003). Circu claims that the use of streamlined procedures violates her due process rights. However, these procedures do not, themselves, violate an alien's right to due process. See 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(a)(7) and (e)(4) (2003) ; Falcon Carriche, 350 F.3d at 848.
Because the IJ found that Circu suffered past persecution, she was entitled to the legal presumption of a well-founded fear of future persecution. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1); Borja v. INS, 175 F.3d 732, 737 (9th Cir.1999) (en banc). The INS, however, can rebut this presumption by showing by a preponderance of the evidence that the conditions in Romania "have changed to such an extent that [Cir-cu] no longer has a well-founded fear that she would be persecuted, should she return there." Borja, 175 F.3d at 738.
The IJ determined that conditions had changed, in part, by taking judicial notice of the 1999 Report, which was published after the hearing before the IJ. We review the IJ's decision to take judicial notice for abuse of discretion. See Getachew v. INS, 25 F.3d 841, 845 (9th Cir.1994). The IJ's reliance on the 1999 Report when considering Romania's changed country conditions did not violate Circu's due process rights. Although the IJ should have referenced the "Romania Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1997" ("1997 Report"), which was entered into evidence, her reliance on the 1999 Report was only a harmless or non-material error that did not amount to an abuse of discretion. See 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(a) (7) (ii) (B) ,
Upon comparing the 1999 Report with the 1997 Report, we observe no significant differences between the respective reports' language concerning religious persecution in Romania. Accordingly, the IJ did not abuse her discretion in taking administrative notice of the 1999 Report. See Getachew, 25 F.3d at 845. Moreover, Circu must have had notice that the IJ relied on the 1999 Report because she raised this issue on appeal to the BIA; therefore, she also had the opportunity to challenge the report's contents.
Since it was not an abuse of discretion for the IJ to consider the 1999 Report, the INS successfully rebutted Circu's presumption of future religious persecution. See Marcu v. INS, 147 F.3d 1078, 1081 (9th Cir.1998) (Country Reports are "the most appropriate and perhaps the best resource" for facts on foreign nations' political situations). Therefore, the IJ's determination that Romania's country conditions had so changed that Circu would not suffer future religious persecution was supported by substantial evidence. Gui v. INS, 280 F.3d 1217, 1229 (9th Cir.2002). By the same token, the IJ neither failed to consider Circu's evidence that country conditions had not changed, see Larito-Martinez v. INS, 220 F.3d 1092, 1095-96 (9th Cir.2000), nor erred in finding that Circu could relocate to another part of Romania, because the Country Reports provided evidence of Romania's improved religious climate. See Marcu, 147 F.3d at 1081.
Finally, because Circu did not have a well-founded fear of future persecution were she to return to Romania, the IJ did not err in concluding that she did not qualify for asylum. As a consequence, she "necessarily failed to satisfy the more rigorous standard for withholding of deportation." De Leon-Barrios v. INS, 116 F.3d 391, 394 (9th Cir.1997). Therefore, the IJ did not abuse her discretion in denying Circu's application for humanitarian asylum because her past persecution was not so egregious as to qualify for such relief. See Belayneh v. INS, 213 F.3d 488, 491 (9th Cir.2000).
PETITION DENIED.
. Currently 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(B).
. Currently 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(a)(7) and (e)(4), respectively.
. While the BIA's streamlined opinion does not expressly indicate that it relied upon the 1999 Report, we must presume it did. Since the BIA considered this out-of-record evidence, we may also. See Fisher v. INS, 79 F.3d 955, 964 (9th Cir.1996) (en banc).
.Currently 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(a)(7)(ii)(B).
. This circuit recently held when an immigrant files both an appeal and a motion to reopen to consider newly available evidence, the BIA should independently rule on the motion to reopen. Narayan v. Ashcroft, 384 F.3d 1065 (9th Cir. Sept.16, 2004). Although both the appeal and the motion request remand, the motion should be treated as a substantive issue separate from the appeal, id. at 1068 (citing Matter of Coelho, 20 I & N Dec. 464, 471 (BIA 1992)), because the two procedures follow different rules. See 8 C.F.R. § 3.2, 3.8, 103.5 (2000). Narayan is inapplicable, however, because Circu did not file a separate motion to reopen or reconsider her case. Because Circu only filed an appeal which requested remand as a remedy, Naray-an is not controlling.