Case Name: WESTERN UNION TELEGRAPH CO. v. THOMPSON
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 1906-03-06
Citations: 144 F. 578
Docket Number: No. 1,457
Parties: WESTERN UNION TELEGRAPH CO. v. THOMPSON.
Judges: Before PARDEE and S1IEEBY, Circuit Judges, and MAXEY, District Judge.
Reporter: Federal Reporter
Volume: 144
Pages: 578–587

Head Matter:
WESTERN UNION TELEGRAPH CO. v. THOMPSON.
(Circuit Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.
March 6, 1906.
Rehearing Denied April 3, 1906.)
No. 1,457.
1. False Imprisonment — Distinguished From Malicious Prosecution— Eeeect of Amendment of Complaint.
An amendment oí a count of a complaint for malicious prosecution by striking out an allegation that plaintiff was arrested on a warrant, and substituting an allegation that she was arrested and held without a warrant, changed the cause of action stated, under the law of Alabama, from one in case for malicious prosecution to one in trespass for false imprisonment, and rendered the charge of the court based on the theory that the count was for malicious prosecution misleading and erroneous.
2. False Imprisonment — Issues and Proof.
Under the law of Alabama where malice and want of probable cause are alleged in the complaint, in an action for false imprisonment, they must be proved to warrant a recovery.
3. Same — Action Against Corporation — Unauthorized Act of Servant.
Under the law of Alabama an action in trespass for false imprisonment cannot be maintained against a corporation based on the negligent and unauthorized act of a mere servant working under the immediate orders of a superior.
4. Writ of Error — Grounds of Reversal — Estoppel.
A party should not be permitted to obtain a reversal of a judgment by taking one position in the trial court as to the cause of action stated in a count of the complaint, which was acquiesced in by the court, and another and antagonistic position in the appellate court. Per Shelby, Circuit Judge, dissenting.
In Error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Northern District of Alabama.
This suit was originally instituted by the defendant in error, in the city court of Birmingham, to recover damages of the plaintiff: in error, and was subsequently removed to the circuit court The complaint, filed by the plaintiff, contained the three following counts:
“First Count. The plaintiff claims of the defendant $5,000 damages for maliciously, and without probable cause therefor, causing the plaintiff to be arrested and imprisoned on a charge of obtaining money under false pretenses for a long time, to wit, one day, on the 29th day of October, 1901. Plaintiff avers that she was incarcerated in the city jail of Birmingham, Ala., which jail was filthy, full of bad odors, and vermin, and that she suffered great mental and physical distress and pain therefrom, and was made sick, sore, and disordered, all to her damage the amount aforesaid.
“Second Count. The plaintiff claims of the defendant $5,000 damages for maliciously, and without probable cause therefor, causing the plaintiff to be arrested under a warrant issued by C. W. Austin, chief of police, of Birmingham, Ala., on the 29th day of October, 1901, on a charge' of obtaining money under false pretenses, which charges, before the commencement of this action, had been judicially investigated and said prosecution ended, and the plaintiff discharged. And plaintiff avers that she sustained the injuries and suffered the damages set out more particularly in tlie first count of the complaint.
“Third Count. Plaintiff claims of the defendant So,000 damages for wrongfully imprisoning plaintiff, or causing plaintiff to be imprisoned, in the city jail of Birmingham, Ala., or restrained against her will, on tlie 29th day of October, 1901. And plaintiff avers that she sustained the injuries, and suffered the damages set out more particularly in the first count of the complaint.”
Prior to the trial the plaintiff below amended the second count by striking out tlie words, “Under a warrant issued by O. W. Austin, chief of police of Birmingham, Ala.,” and inserting in lieu thereof the following: “Without a warrant by a policeman of tlie city of Birmingham for the violation of am ordinance of said city.” The answer of the defendant below consisted (1) of a plea of not guilty; (2) a general denial; and (3) a plea of justification of the arrest by an officer. ' At the conclusion of the testimony the defendant requested a general affirmative charge in its favor, and the following instructions which were by the court refused: “(1) The court charges the jury that, if they believe the evidence, they cannot find for the plaintiff under the first count of tlie complaint. (2) The court charges tlie jury that, if they believe tlie evidence, they cannot find for the plaintiff under the second count of the complaint. (3) The court charges the jury, if they believe the evidence, they cannot find for the plaintiff under the third count of the complaint, (á) If tlie jury believe from the evidence that E. E. Williams was the manager of and represented the defendant telegraph company in the conduct of its business at Birmingham, and further boiieve from the evidence that said Williams did not request, or direct, the officer who arrested the plaintiff to arrest her, and that her arrest by the officer was made upon a charge preferred by another employe of the defendant, and at the request of the said other employe, then the plaintiff cannot recover under tiie first and third counts of the complaint. The law is that an agent cannot delegate his authority, and if Williams was the vice principal, or representative of tlie defendant, he could not delegate that authority to another; and the defendant would not be liable in trespass for the act of another employs, unless that other employe was clothed with authority by the defendant to do the act complained of.” The court then submited to the jury its general charge, tlie following part of which was excepted to by the defendant: “Hera was a corporation engaged in the business of transmitting money from abroad to people here, and it had a general manager and a general superintendent here. I charge you as a mo Iter of law that the general superintendent in the management of that business had the right, within tlie line of his duty, if he believed that a person lmd obtained money from the telegraph company by false pretense that hud been sent here for transmission, to act for tlie corporation and cause his arrest, and the corporation would be responsible for compensation, if the arrest was wrongful.”
The trial resulted in a verdict and judgment for the plaintiff, for the revision of which the defendant brought the cause to this court by writ of error.
E. K. Campbell, for plaintiff in error.
Frank S. White, for defendant in error.
Before PARDEE and S1IEEBY, Circuit Judges, and MAXEY, District Judge.

Opinion:
MAXEY, District Judge,
after stating the case, delivered the opinion of the court.
It is evident that the cause was submitted to the jury on the theory that the first and third counts of the complaint were in trespass for false imprisonment, and that the second was in case for malicious •prosecution. And, indeed, such was the attitude of the suit, as made by tire pleadings in the4ir original form, but the amendment of the second' count eliminated malicious prosecution as a cause of action and converted that count into one, also, of trespass for false imprisonment. As the second count stood originally, it charged that the defendant caused the plaintiff to be arrested under a warrant issued by C. W. Austin, chief of police, etc., and hence contained apt words ;to charge a case against the defendant for malicious prosecution. Thus it was said by the Supreme Court of Alabama in Rich v. McInerny, 103 Ala. 351, 352, 15 South. 665, 49 Am. St. Rep. 32:
"If the imprisonment is under legal process, but the prosecution has been commenced and carried on maliciously and without probable cause, terminating in the discharge of the defendant, it is malicious prosecution, and not false imprisonment. 7 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law. 603. The action for damages for false imprisonment is in trespass, for malicious prosecution, in case."
See, also, Ragsdale v. Bowles, 16 Ala. 62.
And by the same court it was said in Davis v. Sanders, 133 Ala. 278, 32 South. 499:
, "The complaint contained two counts; the first being in Code form (No. 19 p. 946, Code 1896) for false imprisonment; the second being the same, with additional averments of matters showing aggravation. Both counts are in trespass. Ragsdale v. Bowles, 16 Ala. 62; Sheppard v. Furniss, 19 Ala. 760; Holly v. Carson, 39 Ala. 345; Rhodes v. King, 52 Ala. 272; Rich v. McInerny, 103 Ala. 345, 15 South. 663, 49 Am. St. Rep. 32; 13 Ency. Pl. & Pr. 427, 428, 429, note 1. The amendment of the second count by the additional averment that 'said charge before 'the commencement of this action- had been judicially investigated and said prosecution ended and the plaintiff discharged,' did not change the character of the count from one in trespass for false imprisonment to one in ease for malicious prosecution. As amended, it was still wanting in averments essential to constitute a count for malicious prosecution. An- averment of the issuance of process properly describing it, and the plaintiff's arrest and imprisonment by virtue thereof, is essential in an action on the case for malicious prosecution."
From a perusal of the general charge of the court it will be readily observed that, obviously through inadvertence of the learned judge, the attention of the jury was mainly directed to the count for malicious prosecution, which had, as we have seen, disappeared from the pleadings, and no long'er constituted an issue in the case. And it is reasonably clear that the charge thus given had the effect of mislead" ing and confusing the jury upon the real issues before the court to the prejudice of the defendant. Instructions to a jury must be based upon, and be applicable to, the pleadings and evidence. They should be neither broader nor narrower than the pleadings, but should be predicated of all the issues raised by the pleadings and supported by the evidence, and they are equally faulty whether they enlarge or re- . strict the issues. 11 Enc. Pl. & Prac. pp. 158-160, and authorities cited. It may -be further observed that where the complaint is in trespass for false imprisonment, and it is alleged that the arrest was caused, by the party complained of, with malice and without probable cause, the proof should establish the existence of those elements to authorize a recovery. In speaking of the form of complaint and of the necessity for such proof, it was said by the Supreme Court of Alabama, in Rich v. McInerny, 103 Ala. 354, 15 South. 666, 49 Am. St. Rep. 32:
"The action is maintainable only wlien the arrest and imprisonment are done or caused by the defendant, upon a criminal charge, with malice and without probable cause. It alleges arrest and imprisonment of plaintiff,nby the procurement of the defendant, upon a charge of larceny, with malice, and without probable cause. Being alleged, these elements must be shown to have existed, to justify a recovery by the plaintiff."
At pages 356, 357, of 103 Ala., page 667 of 15 South. (49 Am. St. Rep. 32), it was further observed:
"The court tried the case upon the theory that the existence of malice and want of probable cause, actuating the defendant to cause the arrest, if he did cause it, were immaterial. We have shown that they were material by reason of being alleged. It was incumbent on plaintiff to satisfy the jury of both."
It is also insisted by the defendant that the trial court erred in giving in charge to the jury that portion of the general charge set out in the statement of -the case, and in refusing the special instructions by it -requested. The charge of the court was correct as it applied to Williams, who was the general manager and vice principal of the defendant at Birmingham,- and who stood for and represented, within the sphere of his authority, the corporate entity itself. Hence, for a trespass committed by him, in his representative character, or for one commanded or authorized by him in such character, suit would be maintainable against the defendant in trespass. Southern Bell Telephone Co. v. Francis, 109 Ala. 224, 19 South. 1, 31 L. R. A. 193, 55 Am. St. Rep. 930. But case, and not trespass, would be the appropriate remedy where the injury grew out of the negligent and unauthorized act of a mere servant working under the immediate control and orders of a superior. This distinction is illustrated by the cases of City Delivery Co. v. Henry, 139 Ala. 161, 34 South. 389; Railway Company v. Freeman, 140 Ala. 581, 37 South. 387; Southern Railway Co. v. Yancy (Ala.) 37 South. 342.
And further it may be said that as the several counts of the complaint are in trespass and count upon the malicious and wrongful act of the defendant corporation, and not upon wrongs committed by its servants, their averments are not supported by evidence showing that the injury complained of was inflicted by'a mere subordinate office employe of the defendant, acting without authority from his principal, even should it be assumed that his act was wrongful and malicious. Southern Railway Co. v. Yancy, supra. Nor does this ruling conflict with the admitted and settled principle of law, as held by the Supreme Court of Alabama, that the master, in the appropriate form of action, will lie held liable in damages for injuries willfully and intentionally inflicted by the servant while acting within the general scope or line of his employment. City Delivery Co. v. Henry, supra. In the present case the proof was conflicting as to whether Williams caused the arrest of the plaintiff, or whether she was arrested at the command and instigation of a mere subordinate employé in the defendant's office; and, as it was the purpose of the special instruction to submit this issue to the jury, we are of the opinion thaf the court erred in refusing it.
. For the errors indicated, the judgment should be reversed and the cause remanded for a new trial, and it is so ordered.
Reversed and remanded.