Case Name: Matthew Bonner v. John S. Ware et al.
Court: Supreme Court of Ohio
Jurisdiction: Ohio
Decision Date: 1841-12
Citations: 10 Ohio 465
Docket Number: 
Parties: Matthew Bonner v. John S. Ware et al.
Judges: 
Reporter: Cases decided in the supreme court of ohio : upon the circuit at the special sessions in Columbus
Volume: 10
Pages: 465–470

Head Matter:
Matthew Bonner v. John S. Ware et al.
Where a patent issues “ to A. B., assignee of O. D., who was executor of' John Hockaday, deceased,” a purchaser under the patentee must look at his peril to see whether John Hockaday’s executor had,the requisite power to assign the warrant.
An owner of land, tracing his title to a patent, is affected hy notice of the facts contained in the recitals of the patent.
This is a bill in .chancery from the county of Clark.
The plaintiff is the possessor of land, held by regular train of conveyances, under a patent to John Hoffman. He brings this suit to quiet his title against the heirs of John Hockaday.
The plaintiff’s right is incontestable, unless he is affected with notice of the interests of the defendant by the recitals in the patent under which he claims.
The patent to Hoffman professes to be made in consideration of the military-services of John Hockaday. It grants the land “to John Hoffman, assignee of Joseph Hoffman and others, who, with the said John, were the assignees of George ^Hoffman., who [466 was the assignee of Joseph Ladd, assignee of Robert S. Ware, who was executor of John Hockaday, deceased.” And the question is, whether this recital gives to the holder of the title under the patent such knowledge of the rights of the heirs of Hockaday, that he can obtain no protection in this suit.
G. Swan, for the plaintiff:
The main object of this suit is to bring into review the principle laid down by this court in Reeder, v. Barr, 4 Ohio, 446. It is not, however, proposed to disturb that case so far as it relates to private convegances, though there are authorities against it in toto, which seem to have been overlooked in the argument. Sug. Vend. 492; Attorney-General v. Backhouse,17 Ves. 293; Hitchcock v. Sedgwick, 2 Vern. 159; Ward v. Fox, Hughes, 231; Henry v. Brown, Ridg. P. C. 512; Boulden v. Massie’s Heirs, 7 Wheat. 147; McArthur’s Lessee v. Gallagher, 8 Ohio, 512.
But the error, if any, lies in applying the rule of private contracts to patents issued under the authority of government. This distinction is kept in view by the courts of Great Britain and of this country. Patents emanate not without great scrutiny and deliberation by the government officers, and they bear upon their face the impress of sovereign power. Indeed, they are uniformly considered a high species of record evidence, in which are merged all the preliminary proceedings, certificate, warrant, entry, survey; and behind which no court feel themselves at liberty to look, except in one solitary case, where there has been a junior one upon a valid prior entry. The officers appointed by'the government to decide upon the evidence produced by those entitled to bounty lands in the Virginia military district, in all the various stages, are governed by fixed rules prescribed by law, or necessary to carry into effect the laws themselves. These officers have no inducement to countenance frauds or impositions, and their judgment is not liable to be misled by interest or favoritism. From these eonsid467] erations, as well as general principles of ^policy operating with peculiar force in this country, patents have never been set aside except upon the most solemn proceedings, and then only in a few particular cases. 6 Bac. Ab. 111; 3 Bl. Com. 261; Alexander v. Greenup, 1 Munf. 134; 2 Wash. 55; Jennings v. Whittaker, 4 Monroe, 50; Bledsoe v. Wells, 4 Bibb, 329; Robinson v. Neal, 6 Monroe, 212; Jackson v. Lauton, 10 Johns. 23; Jackson v. Hart, 12 Johns. 77; Stearns v. Barrett, 1 Mason, 152; Witherington v. McDonald, 1 Hen. & Munf. 306; McMin v. Stafford, 2 Bibb, 487; Jackson v. Marsh, 6 Cow. 281; Pollard v. Dwight, 4 Cranch, 421; Taylor v. Brown, 5 Cranch, 242; Polk’s Lessee v. Wendell, 9 Cranch, 98; S. C., Wheat, 293; Jackson v. Parker, 9 Cow. 94; Hartwell v. Root, 19 Johns. 345 ; Buller N. P. 298; Gilb. Ev. 148; Williams v. East Ind. Co., 3 East, 192 ; Armstrong v. McCoy, 8 Ohio, 128; The King v. Combs, Comb. 57 ; Strother v. Lucas, 12 Pet. 112 ; United States v. Perchman, 7 Pet. 96 ; Miller v. Kerr, 7 Wheat. 1; Jasper v. Quarles, Hardin, 461; Bodley v. Taylor, 5 Cranch, 223 ; Finley v. Williams, 9 Cranch, 164; Parker v. Wallace, 3 Ohio, 492; Parker v. Dunn, 4 Ohio, 232.
The law and its general policy command a purchaser, in no equivocal terms, to presume that all things done by public officers are done in pursuance of their duty. Will this court, the, say that, for the purpose of protecting some latent and stale equity, it shall also be presumed they have omitted and neglected their duty? Such presumptions can not work together. One must yield to the other. It appears to us this is a dilemma from which there is no escape. ■ We must break down the whole current of authorities, or the latter must be given up. We hope to be pardoned if we ask the court respectfully to take this point in the case into their most serious consideration. In our view of the subject the reasoning can not be satisfactorily refuted. Stockbridge v. Stockbridge, 14 Mass. 261; Clay v. Smith, 1 Bibb, 523; 3 Br. C. 640; Decouche v. Savetier, 3 Johns. Ch. 190.
Besides, as against a stale claim, a grant will be presumed. “Not,” say the court, “that any one really thinks that a grant 468] *has been made, because it is not probable that a grant should have existed without its being upon record, but courts presume the fact, and from the principle of quieting possession.” Hillary v. Waller, 12 Ves. 252; The Mayor v. Horner, Cowp. 102 ; 2 Stark. Ev. 663, 5 ed.; Hall v. Campbell, Cowp. 214.
A patent bearing on its face the signature of the chief magistraté in the government is the highest species of evidence, and imports absolute verity. 2 Stark. Ev. 189; Bac. Ab., tit. Ex. 610 ; Swann v. Wilson, 1 Marsh. 101 ; Mendell v. Peckell, 9 Wheat. 575.
Mason and Torbet, on the same side,
maintained that as against a subsequent purchaser, for a valuable consideration without actual notice, a court of equity will not allow a patent to be impeached for defects existing prior to its being issued, or for irregularities anterior to the date of the warrant on which it is founded. They cited these additional authorities: Patterson v. Winn, 6 Pet. Cond. 355; Miller v. Holt, 1 Term, 111; Patterson v. Jenks, 2 Pet. 216; Stringer v. Young, 3 Pet. 320; Boardman v. Reed, 6 Pet. 328; Sug. Vend. 532; Newl. on Con. 511; Green v. Lighter, 8 Cranch, 247; Miller v. Kerr, 5 Pet. Cond. 202; Hoofnagle v. Anderson, 5 Pet. Cond. 271; Bouldin v. Massie’s Heirs, 5 Pet. Cond. 252; Kerr v. Mack, 1 Ohio, 169; McArthur v. Thomas, 2 Ohio, 419; Wilson v. Mason, 1 Cranch, 100.
J. L. Miner, for the defendant,
sustained the rule as laid down in Reeder v. Barr, and confirmed in Brush v. Ware, 1 McLean 533. He also cited Morrison v. Campbell, 2 Rand. 206; Kerr v. Moon, 9 Wheat. 565; Stevenson v. Sullivant, 5 Wheat. 207; 1 Ves. 261, 319.

Opinion:
Lane, C. J.
That the owner of land is chargeable with notice of facts recited in the deed through which he traces his title, is a proposition true in all cases where the deeds are private conveyances. The application of this principle to recitals *in [469 patents is earnestly deprecated, from its consequences, particularly in the military district. It is urged, with much show of reason, that grants from public officers ought to be presumed to be properly issued by competent authority, upon proof that all requisites have been complied with, and the holder of land who traces his title to such official act has a right to rely upon it as a perfect title.
In 1831, this question was before this court, and it was hold that the rule of notice applied to such acts of government as to private deeds. 4 Ohio, 446. We have again examined the point with the attention it deserves, and see no reason to change this opinion. The same doctrine has been before the United States court of this district upon this patent, 1 McLean, 533; and reviewed by the Supreme Court, 15 Pet. 93; and the same conclusion is adopted and defended by those tribunals. The plaintiff therefore makes no case for relief, and his bill must be dismissed.
Bill dismissed.