Case Name: The People ex rel. Henry W. Steffan, App'lt, v. Joseph Murray et al., as Excise Commissioners, etc., Resp'ts
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1896-03-06
Citations: 73 N.Y. St. Rep. 61
Docket Number: 
Parties: The People ex rel. Henry W. Steffan, App’lt, v. Joseph Murray et al., as Excise Commissioners, etc., Resp’ts.
Judges: 
Reporter: New York State Reporter
Volume: 73
Pages: 61–62

Head Matter:
The People ex rel. Henry W. Steffan, App’lt, v. Joseph Murray et al., as Excise Commissioners, etc., Resp’ts.
(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department,
Filed March 6, 1896.)
1„ Excise board—Employes—Discharge.
The board of excise commissioners of the city of New York has power to remove excise inspectors at its discretion.
S. Same—Request to resign.
A resolution of such board, requesting an inspector to resign and declaring that if he did not resign by a certain hour he was discharged, is, ■without further action, effective as a discharge on his failure to resign.
Certiorari to review the action of the excise commissioners in removing relator from his employment
Chas. Blandy, for relator; J. M. Mayer, for resp’ts.

Opinion:
RUMSEY, J.
Up to the time of his discharge complained of, the relator was an excise inspector, having been appointed in (889. On the 28th day of February, 1895, the board of commiseioners of excise at a meeting resolved that the clerk should be <md was directed to request the resignation of the inspectors, among whom was the relator. It was further resolved at the «ame time that, in case of the refusal of any of them to resign as requested by four o'clock in the afternoon of that day, each one who did not resign was dismissed from the service of the department • A notice of the passage of this resolution was given to the relator. He was requested to resign, hut refused, and thereupon he was informed that his services were no longer required, and that he should consider himself dismissed. He brings this writ to review the action of the respondents in dismissing him.
It is not seriously contested by the relator but that the position which he occupies was that of a mere employe, and that the power of the removal was intrusted to the commissioners, to be used practically at their discretion. This was the opinion of the court of appeals with regal'd to persons bolding the same position, as expressed in the case of Gregory v. Mayor, etc., 113 N. Y. 416; 22 St. Rep. 703. Occupying, as the relator did, simply the position of an employe, it is well settled that the respondents, to whom was given the right to employ him, had also the right to remove him whenever they saw fit. People v. Morton, 148 N.Y. 156. But the complaint of the relator is not so much that he was dismissed by the respondents as that the resolution which they passed, although purporting to discharge him if he did not resign, was not in fact sufficient for that purpose. We can see no forye in this contention. It seems that under civil service rules certain disabilities follow the discharge of one who has been employed in the public service. For that reason, it having been determined by the respondents that the services of the relator were no longer necessary, they desired to relieve him from the disabilities which accompanied the fact of his discharge by permitting him to resign, if he saw fit to do so, upon receiving the notice. But their resolution was plain and positive that, if he did not resign, he was dischsrged. The action of the commissioners in discharging him was conclusive, and there was no doubt about the meaning of the resolution. They might have discharged him without any conditions whatever, they saw fit to permit him to resign as a favor, rather than exercise their undoubted right. If they had done this by two resolutions, one requesting his resignation, and the other, passed after the time fixed for the resignation, simply discharging him, nobody would suggest that they had done anything more than they had a rght to do. The fact that they exe- cised their undoubted right in a different way cannot affect the validity of their action.
The writ must be dismissed and the proceedings affirmed, with $50 costs to the respondents.
All concur.