Case Name: SARAH C. LEGGETT against A. H. COFFIELD, ADM'R AND OTHERS
Court: Supreme Court of North Carolina
Jurisdiction: North Carolina
Decision Date: 1860-06
Citations: 5 Jones Eq. 382
Docket Number: 
Parties: SARAH C. LEGGETT against A. H. COFFIELD, ADM'R AND OTHERS.
Judges: 
Reporter: North Carolina Reports
Volume: 58
Pages: 382–384

Head Matter:
SARAH C. LEGGETT against A. H. COFFIELD, ADM'R AND OTHERS.
Where there is a statute of limitations at law, which furnishes an analogy, a suit in equity in pari materia, is barred by it.
Where, therefore, a married woman was entitled to property by a marriage settlement, which was sold and conveyed by her trustee and her husband, during her coverture, it was Held that she was barred after the lapse of three-years from the death of her husband, from bringing a suit against the purchaser.
Cause removed, from the Court of Equity of Martin county.
The plaintiff alleges that on the eve of a marriage with William B. Leggett, to wit, on 10th January, 1839, she conveyed to Charles Eobinson two slaves, Conda and Warden, with a trust and proviso, that if her intended husband should die first, the title of the said slaves was to be conveyed to her; that about a year after the marriage, (21st December, 1839,) she was prevailed on by ormeh persuasion, to join with her husband and the trustee, in a conveyance of these slaves in absolute right to one Brown Coburn for $600, which was paid to her husband and improvidently spent, and that she was not privily examined; that after the execution of the deed aforesaid, Coburn, who had full knowledge of the plaintiff’s equity, took the slaves into his possession, and held them adversely, as his own, till his death in June, 1859, and that the defendants, who administered cum. tes. on his estate, have continued the possession, claiming in the same manner (adversely;) that her husband, William B. Leggett, died in 1855, insolvent, and no administration has been taken on his estate; that Coburn, by his will, gave these slaves to the defendant, Whitfield, who threatens to remove them from the country.
The prayer of the bill is for a sequestration, and for a recon-veyance of the property.
The defendants demurred, alleging as one of the grounds, the length of time from the death of Leggett, to the bringing of the suit, and insisted that the statute of limitations applied to the case, and barred the plaintiff’s right of recovery.
JJoiole, for the plaintiff.
Winston, Jr., for the defendant.

Opinion:
Peaesok, C. J.
The fact that plaintiff united in the execution of the bill of sale with her husband and the trustee, was inoperative and of no effect, by reason of her coverture; consequently, at the 'death of her husband, she had a clear equity to convert Coburn into a trustee for her, on the ground that he purchased with notice.
But her equity, as against Coburn and his personal representatives, is'barred'by'the statute of limitations, as her .suit was not commenced for'more than three years after "her right accrued, during which time they held the slaves adversely, and no fact is alleged to"bring her within the savings of the statute.
The counsél for the plaintiff insisted that the case did not fall under the statute of limitations, but was embraced by the 19th section of the 65th chapter of the Revised Code, which raises a'presumption, after ten years, of an abandonment of a right of action, or'"any equitable interest or claim."
In this, he is mistaken. 'The distinction is this: where there is a statute of limitations at Law, which furnishes an analogy, a suit in Equity is'barred by it. If there be no statute, to furnish an analogy, the case then rests on" the statute raising a presumption; for example: a bill for a specific performance of a contract under seal rests on the statute raising a presumption, because there is no statute of limitations at law, to furnish an analogy. But, in our case, there is a statute of limitations, which not only bars an action at law, for a slave after three years adverse possession, but gives the adverse holder a good indefeasible title, and it falls within the principle of Taylor v. Dawson, 3 Jones' Eq. 86, and Whitfield v. Hill, (ante 316,) where, in the case of land, seven years adverse possession under color of title, was held to be a bar to a bill in Equity, seeking to enforce a right in Equity to convert the party into a trustee.
Pee. CuRIAm, The demurrer sustained and bill dismissed.