Case Name: Grover Essery v. The State
Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1913-12-17
Citations: 72 Tex. Crim. 414
Docket Number: No. 2836
Parties: Grover Essery v. The State.
Judges: 
Reporter: Texas Criminal Reports
Volume: 72
Pages: 414–439

Head Matter:
Grover Essery v. The State.
No. 2836.
Decided December 17, 1913.
Rehearing denied January 14, 1914.
1.—Murder—Verdict—Discharge of Jury.
Where the court had accepted the verdict and discharged the jury, he had no authority or power to reconvene this jury two days later and permit them to amend their verdict; however, the verdict was sufficient as originally rendered.
2. —Same—Degrees of Murder—Verdict—Statutes Construed—Case Stated.
Where, upon trial of murder, under the old law defining degrees of murder, the indictment being in the usual form that defendant with malice aforethought did the killing, and the evidence did not raise the issue of any lower degree than murder in the first degree, which alone was submitted in the court’s charge, and the jury returned a verdict finding the defendant guilty as charged in the indictment and assessed his punishment at imprisonment for life, the same was sufficiently certain upon which to base a judgment of conviction of murder in the first degree. Davidson, Judge, dissenting.
3. —Same—Rule Stated—Degrees of Murder—Verdict—Charge of Court.
While under the old law, when murder was divided into two degrees and both degrees were submitted to the jury, it was a valuable right for the defendant to have them determine of what degree of murder he had been adjudged guilty, yet where, under the law, the court submitted to the jury only murder in the first degree and they were not and could not be authorized to return a verdict of guilty of murder of any other degree than murder in the first degree, a verdict which found the defendant guilty as charged in the indictment and assessed his punishment at imprisonment for life is sustained. Davidson, Judge, dissenting.
4. —Same—Practice in District Court—Harmless Error.
While perhaps it was erroneous for the court to accept a verdict which did not specifically find that defendant was guilty of murder in the first degree, yet, when the verdict is taken in connection with the indictment and the charge of the court, and the only conclusion is that the verdict found him guilty of murder in the first degree, which was the only issue submitted, it was not reversible error. Davidson, Judge, dissenting.
5. —Same—Rule Stated—Statutes Construed.
When murder was divided into two degrees it was intended that when the two degrees were submitted to the jury, they should he required to find of what degree defendant had been adjudged guilty; but the Code providing that murder committed in a certain way is murder in the first degree, the law so makes it and the jury by their verdict can not find otherwise.
6. —Same—Hot Reversible Error—Case Stated—Presumption.
Where no error was committed in the trial of the case, as is shown by the record, and the only matter complained of is that the verdict in express language did not state of what degree of murder the defendant was found guilty, and the charge of the court only submitted murder in the first degree, it must be presumed that the facts showed that if defendant was guilty of any offense, it was murder in the first degree, and the charge of the court, the verdict and the indictment must be looked to in passing upon this question, and there is no reversible error. Davidson, Judge, dissenting.
7. —Same—Express Malice—Murder in the First Degree.
Under article 1141, former Penal Code, all murder committed with express malice is murder in the first degree, and all murder not of the first degree is murder of the second degree, and under all our decisions murder with implied malice is murder in the second degree, and can not be murder in the first degree, and where the indictment charged express malice and was sustained by the evidence, and murder in the first degree alone was submitted to the jury, who found defendant guilty as charged in the indictment and assessed his punishment at imprisonment for life, the verdict must be sustained as one finding defendant guilty of murder in the first degree; and the whole record must be looked to in construing this verdict. Davidson, Judge, dissenting.
8. —Same—Allegations by Inclusion—Indictment.
Where the indictment, under all the forms and under the statute and decisions of this State, on its face expressly charged murder in t the first degree and nothing else, all lower degrees of homicide are only charged by inclusion, and not otherwise, and where defendant was found guilty as charged under a charge of the court submitting murder in the first degree alone, and the evidence did not raise any other degree, such verdict is sustained. Davidson, Judge, dissenting.
9. —Same—Statutes Construed—Degrees of Murder.
Article 1142, Penal Code, must be construed in 'the light of other articles in the Penal Code and the Code of Criminal Procedure, and so construing the same, a verdict in a murder ease, which finds defendant guilty as charged in the indictment and assesses his punishment for life is not void because it does not expressly find in so many words of what degree of murder he is guilty, as it is absolutely certain that thereby a verdict for murder in the first degree was intended under the record of this case. Distinguishing Slaughter v. State, 24 Texas, 410; Buster v. State, 42 Texas, 315. Davidson, Judge, dissenting.
10. —Same—Charge of Court—Verdict—Rule Stated.
The verdict of the jury must be considered in connection with the charge of the court even more so than in connection with the indictment itself. Following Marshall v. State, 4 Texas Crim. App., 549; Styles v. State, 37 Texas Crim. Rep., 599, and other cases. Distinguishing Burton v. State, 62 Texas Crim. Rep., 648; McCloud v. State, 37 Texas Crim. Rep., 237, and other cases.
11. —Same—Cases in Point—Rule Stated.
The ease of McGee v. State, 39 Texas Crim. Rep., 190, even goes further than the rule laid down in this case with reference to degrees of offenses and fully sustains the opinion in this case. Following Holland v. State, 38 Texas, 474.
12. —Same—Practice in District Court—Degrees of Murder.
In all murder trials under the old statute, the trial court should see to it that the verdict read guilty of murder in the first degree or in the second degree, as the case may be. Not only because the statutes say so, but to avoid just such a question as arises and is urged in this case.
Appeal from the District Court of Bexar. Tried below before the Hon. W. S. Anderson.
Appeal from a conviction of murder; penalty, imprisonment for life in the penitentiary.
The opinion states the case.
Will S. Payne, for appellant.—Cited cases in opinion.
C. E. Lane, Assistant Attorney-General, for the State.

Opinion:
HARPER, Judge.
The indictment in this case charges that appellant did, with malice aforethought, kill L. T. Ammann.
Ho statement of facts accompanies this record,, and there is no question that can, or should, be reviewed in the absence of a statement of facts, except the one in which appellant complains of the action of the court in sustaining the verdict as rendered and in permitting the jury to amend their verdict. This presents a serious question and one. to which we have given much thought since occupying this high position. Ho one, under any circumstances, should be deprived of any right given him byzthe laws of this State, and if any provision of our Code of Crim inal Procedure has been overlooked or disregarded, if, in the remotest degree, it could have been hurtful or harmful to the person on trial, the verdict should be set aside. He has. a right to be tried in accordance with the rules and forms of law, and if this sort of a trial is not accorded him, he has a right to complain, and to this complaint we will always give an attentive ear. In one ground of the motion we find the following complaint:
"The court erred in permitting the jury, after they had been discharged by the court on Thursday evening at 7:45 o'clock, and after they had rendered a verdict in the case, to again have them resummoned to reform their verdict; that said summons and said reformation of said verdict was on Saturday the 21st of June, 1913, after they had mixed and mingled with the outside world they were again resummoned and came into open court and reformed their verdict; that said verdict as it was originally rendered was void in that they failed to state what they found the defendant guilty of, in that they omitted the words 'murder in the first degree'; that b'y reason of said words being omitted in the verdict as it was originally rendered, rendered said verdict void for the reason that they had been discharged by the court, and for the further reason that they were not permitted to talk with any one before the rendition of the original verdict, and after the returning of same into open court, and after their discharge by the court, and their mixing and mingling with the outer world, and some of them having discussed the case; that said reformation of said verdict is void and was error on the part of the court, and was error on the part of the district attorney in requesting said reformation in said verdict to be made."
Of course, after the court had accepted the verdict and discharged the jury on the 19th it had no authority or power to reconvene this jury two days later, and permit them to amend their verdict. This was erroneous, and the amendment of the verdict gave no force nor validity thereto-, other than the verdict was originally entitled to as first rendered and accepted by the court. This is true both in civil and criminal cases (Cookville Coal & Lumber Co. v. Evans, 135 S. W. Rep., 750). So the verdict, if sustained, must be held sufficient as originally rendered. It then read: "We, the judy, find the defendant guilty as charged in the indictment and assess his punishment at imprisonment for life." Article 1141, Penal Code, describes murder in the first and second degrees ; and article 1142 requires that the jury shall state in their verdict whether they find the person on trial guilty of murder in the first or the second degree. We have cases that hold it was error for the jury to fail to so find, even though the facts only authorized a charge on, murder.in the first degree. (See Johnson v. State, 30 Texas Crim. App., 419, and Brooks v. State, 42 Texas Crim. Rep., 347.) But neither of these cases are reversed solely on that ground. In the case of Johnson, supra, the court committed an error in his charge, and in the Brooks case, supra, the charge was also held to be erroneous. In many cases, which will be found collated in section 842 of Branch's Crim. Law,. it will be seen that this court has held a verdict erroneous which fails to state the degree of murder of which the person on trial has been adjudged guilty. But in none of them has the case been reversed because of this error alone. When murder was divided into degrees, it was proper, where more than, one degree of murder was submitted to the jury, to require the jury to state of which degree they found the person on trial guilty, for if a new trial was granted it was material to a defendant to know of which grade of homicide he had been found guilty, for if only of murder in the second degree, the death penalty could not be inflicted on the second trial. Therefore, when murder was divided into two degrees, and both degrees were submitted to the jury, it was a valuable right for the defendant to have determined of what degree of murder he had been adjudged guilty. However, in this case the court submitted to the jury only murder in the first degree and they were not and could not be authorized to return a verdict of guilty of murder of any other degree than murder in the first degree.
Had the court submitted both murder in the first and second degrees, there would be merit in appellant's contention, but as the court submitted only murder in the first degree, to the jury, their verdict could not be interpreted nor understood as finding appellant guilty of any other degree than that submitted to them, and while perhaps it was erroneous to have accepted the verdict which did not specifically find that appellant was guilty of murder in the first degree and so state, yet, when we take the indictment, the charge of the court and the verdict as first returned, it is not only a necessary, but the only conclusion that could be arrived at—the jury did find appellant guilty of murder in the first degree. This was the only issue submitted to them, and while the verdict may be said to be erroneous, it is not such error as calls or will necessitate a reversal of the case. Any other construction of article 1142 of the Penal Code would be a strained construction, and never intended by the Legislature. After dividing murder in two degrees, it was intended that when the two degrees were submitted to the jury, then the jury should be required to find of what degree he had been adjudged guilty. But. when the Code said that murder committed in a certain way was murder of the first degree, the law so makes it, and a jury by their verdict could not find otherwise.
We have often heard discussed- technicalities of the law. The writer is of the opinion that while some of the language used in some of the opinions may be said to be technical; yet, there are really no technicalities in the law. A matter is either erroneous or not, and if erroneous, and it could have resulted in hurt or harm to the person on trial, the case should be reversed. But even though the matter complained of may be said to be erroneous, yet, if by no construction the error, if error there be, could have resulted in hurt or harm, then it is wrong to reverse the case. In this case no error was committed in the trial of the case as shown by this record; neither was there error in the charge of the court, and the only matter complained of is that the verdict in plain language did not state of what degree of murder the appellant was found guilty, when only one degree of murder was submitted to them for their consideration, and under this record we must presume that the facts-showed if appellant was guilty of any offense, it was by the Code declared to be murder in the first degree. Under such circumstances it seems to us the height of absurdity to say we can not determine by the indictment, the charge and the verdict of what degree of murder appellant was found guilty, and although we may be said to have some cases that incline to that view of the law, yet we can not get our assent to follow such technical construction of the law. We do not think the articles of the Code referred to call for or will bear such construction, but when the law says murder committed under given circumstances is murder in the first degree, and the court instructs the jury that if it was not committed in that way by the appellant to acquit, then to say that the verdict of guilty could be other than for murder in the first degree, seems to us an absurdity.
[Rehearing denied January 14, 1914.—Reporter.]
The judgment is affirmed.
Affirmed.