Case Name: J. M. GWIN, as Tax Collector of the County of Wakulla and State of Florida, William A. Strickland, as County Tax Assessor of the County of Wakulla and State of Florida, and Ray E. Green, as Comptroller of the State of Florida, Appellants, v. CITY OF TALLAHASSEE, a municipal corporation created and existing under the laws of the State of Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1961-07-26
Citations: 132 So. 2d 273
Docket Number: No. 40078
Parties: J. M. GWIN, as Tax Collector of the County of Wakulla and State of Florida, William A. Strickland, as County Tax Assessor of the County of Wakulla and State of Florida, and Ray E. Green, as Comptroller of the State of Florida, Appellants, v. CITY OF TALLAHASSEE, a municipal corporation created and existing under the laws of the State of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: TERRELL, THOMAS and THORNAL, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 132
Pages: 273–288

Head Matter:
J. M. GWIN, as Tax Collector of the County of Wakulla and State of Florida, William A. Strickland, as County Tax Assessor of the County of Wakulla and State of Florida, and Ray E. Green, as Comptroller of the State of Florida, Appellants, v. CITY OF TALLAHASSEE, a municipal corporation created and existing under the laws of the State of Florida, Appellee.
No. 40078.
Supreme Court of Florida.
July 26, 1961.
A. L. Porter, Crawfordville, and Scruby & Yonge, Orange Park, for appellants.
James Messer, Jr., Tallahassee, for appel-lee.

Opinion:
DREW, Justice.
This direct appeal is from a final decree of the chancellor declaring null and void certain tax assessments for the years 1958 and 1959 levied by the tax assessor of Wakulla County, Florida against the electric generating plant and transmission and distribution lines of the City of Tallahassee located in said county and permanently enjoining the tax collector and assessor of said county from attempting to enforce the payment of said taxes and from assessing any further taxes on the aforementioned property of the said City of Tallahassee located within such county. The decree construes two controlling provisions of the Florida Constitution and upholds the validity of certain statutes of this State exempting municipally owned public utilities from taxation.
The City of Tallahassee, by virtue of a grant of authority of the Legislature of Florida, has been delegated the power and authority to supply public utility service for domestic and other purposes to its citizens and to individuals and corporations outside of the limits of said city including the exclusive right to transmit and sell electrical energy and natural and manufactured gas within a zone three miles wide adjacent to and extending around and outside the corporate limits of the city.
In 1934 the city extended its electrical distribution lines from its corporate limits southerly along State Road 363 to the community of St. Marks in Wakulla County for the purpose of supplying electrical energy for light and power to the inhabitants of said community at a time when no other supplier or distributor of electrical energy was able or willing to furnish such power to the said community. In 1948, the city acquired a tract of land lying adjacent to the St. Marks River in Wakulla County and thereafter constructed on said land an electric generating plant for the purpose of furnishing electric current to the City of Tallahassee, its inhabitants, the area lying adjacent thereto under the exclusive right heretofore mentioned, the inhabitants of the City of St. Marks, Newport and users in close proximity to its lines along and adjacent to said State Road 363.
No attempt was ever made by Wakulla County to assess any property of the City used in its generating plant or transmission lines until the assessments which are the subject of this litigation.
In a well reasoned opinion and decree, the able chancellor below determined that the decision in this case was controlled by Saunders v. City of Jacksonville, 1946, 157 Fla. 240, 25 So.2d 648, and, in so doing, made the following observations:
"The defendants argue, and cite respectable authority in support of the contention, that the distribution and sale of electric current by the City of Tallahassee to the inhabitants of St. Marks, New Port, Wakulla, and other areas in Wakulla County is not a municipal purpose of the City of Tallahassee, that a substantial part of the use to which the City of Tallahassee puts its property in Wakulla County is the generation and sale of electric current to these customers; that consequently this property of the City is not held and used exclusively for municipal purposes. They conclude that this property is, consequently, subject to taxation in Wakulla County.
"The case must turn upon a definition of 'municipal purposes.'
"The Supreme Court of Florida has held point blank: 'There is no doubt that the furnishing of electric current is a municipal purpose.' [Saunders vs. City of Jacksonville] The question naturally presents itself: May the furnishing of electricity by the City of Tallahassee to its inhabitants be a 'municipal purpose' of the City of Tallahassee but the furnishing of similar services to the inhabitants of a village in another county not be a 'municipal purpose' of the City of Tallahassee? This question has likewise been answered by the Supreme Court in the same case. The Court said: 'The exemption inures to the property itself when held and used for municipal purposes. The Constitution makes no requirement of its location. If the property serves a municipal purpose to the residents within Jacksonville, then it likewise serves a municipal purpose to the residents outside of Jacksonville. Its character does not change when the power line traverses the city or county line.' (Emphasis supplied.) .
"The defendants urge that the cited case was decided under a different statute and should not, therefore, he considered as absolutely controlling in the case at bar. In that case the Court defined the phrase 'municipal purpose', which is used in the statute there under consideration, is used in the Constitution, and is used in the statute now before the Court. If the furnishing of electric current to the inhabitants of towns in Clay County was a municipal purpose of the City of Jacksonville, which is located in Duval County, when the Saunders case was decided, then the furnishing of electricity to towns in Wakulla County by the City of Tallahassee is a municipal purpose of the City of Tallahassee today. It is the duty of this Court to follow the precedent established by the Supreme Court of the State."
The principal thrust of the argument of Wakulla County below and here was and is that the amendments to Sections 192.06(2) and 192.52 Florida Statutes in the 1957 session of the Florida Legislature, F.S.A. had the effect of rendering such decision inapplicable to the Tallahassee generating plant and distribution lines in Wakulla County and evidenced a clear legislative intention to subject such property to taxation by that county. The chancellor did not accept this argument nor can we.
The involved legislative history of this 1957 act, which embraces approximately 37 typewritten pages of the record, convinces us that the statute, as finally amended, does not differ in any material respect from the previous provisions insofar as the particular question with which we are now concerned. If any material change' may be discerned in the act, the four paragraphs in the preamble indicate the intention of the Legislature in July of 1957 to affirm the conclusion of this Court in the Saunders case that the electrical distribution system of the City of Tallahassee was not subject to taxation. The language used in the preamble, considered in connection with the legislative history as shown by the Journals of the Senate and House, and the new language "including all property of municipally ozvned and operated public utilities held and used exclusively for municipal purposes" does not, in our opinion, evidence any intent of the Legislature to subject the properties of this city lying outside Leon County to taxation. Nor does it in any way alter the effect of the decision of this Court in the Saunders case.
Wakulla County places great emphasis upon the addition in the act of the words "used exclusively for municipal purposes". We are urged, in construing this act, to draw a distinction between the words "municipal purpose" and "public purpose". Generically, of course, there is a difference but, so far as the use of the words in this particular setting is concerned, we think it clear that they are both used in the same sense and that is one generally embraced within the broad meaning of public purpose. Moreover, this argument seems to us to have been answered conclusively in the Saunders case contrary to Wakulla County's contention by the following language from that opinion:
"The exemption inures to the property itself when held and ttsed for municipal purposes. The Constitution makes no requirement as to its location. If the property serves a municipal purpose to the residents within Jacksonville, then it likewise serves a municipal purpose to the residents outside of Jacksonville. Its character does not change when the power line traverses the city or county line." 25 So. 2d at page 650.
We think it would be difficult to select language which would establish more clearly the interpretation of this Court that, as used in these acts, "municipal purpose" must be construed in its broader sense ;as "public purpose". The use of the word "exclusively" does not change the meaning of the statute as it previously existed. This ¡adverb was in the Constitution and in •Section 192.52, Florida Statutes, of the Act as it existed prior to 1927. Adding it as an additional sentence to Section 192.06, Florida Statutes, along with the word used has no effect whatever on our interpretation in the Saunders case. Moreover, we think the record in this case clearly establishes that all of the property owned by the City of Tallahassee and being used in its generating and distribution system is being used under the Saunders decision exclusively for municipal purposes. Even if we concede arguendo that the distribution lines serving the residents of St. Marks and Newport and incidental customers along the main transmission line between the City of Tallahassee and those communities was a private purpose as distinguished from a municipal or public purpose, such fact would not destroy the exempt status of this property. We were confronted with an analogous situation in Gate City Garage v. City of Jacksonville, Fla.1953, 66 So.2d 653 in a case where the City of Jacksonville had leased a filling station on a large parking lot for private purposes. It was contended in that case that such action on the part of the City was equivalent to taking one man's property by public authority and leasing to another for private gain and therefore controverted the Constitution of this State. In disposing of this contention this Court said:
" Constructing and leasing a filling station on a parking lot the size of that contemplated is a mere incident, the primary purpose being to acquire and construct a parking lot to serve a public and municipal purpose.
jjs % % ;ji %
"This Court takes judicial notice of the fact that in many municipal and county buildings, such as, city halls and court houses and even the State Capitol, space is leased or concessions are granted to private individuals for the sale of food, magazines, newspapers, public telephones and other things which are mere incidents to the main or primary purpose of the buildings, but are for the convenience of those who use the buildings or facilities for a pttblic purpose. In 18 Am. Jur. in the article on Eminent Domain, Sec. 41, p. 669, the author states:
"'The general rule is settled that the exercise of eminent domain for a public purpose which is primary and paramount ivill not be defeated by the fact that incidentally a private iise or benefit will result which will not itself warrant the exercise of the power. ' " (Emphasis supplied.) 66 So.2d at page 6S9.
In a later case of Panama City v. State, Fla.1957, 93 So.2d 608, 614, we affirmed the principle laid down in the Gate City case and held that so long as the private use "is an appendage, and therefore 'an incident to the main or primary purpose and for the convenience of those who use the facilities for a public purpose,' " the public nature of the project is not in any way affected. While, of course, these cases do not deal with the exact question with which we are now •concerned, the principal involved in each is identical.
The case for Wakulla County hangs by a thin thread indeed. If we were dealing here with the property of a private corporation claimed to be exempt, the county would be in a stronger position. If property owned by the municipalities of this State held and used for a valid municipal purpose is to be subjected to taxation by .another political body, we think the legislative authority for so doing should be •clear and unambiguous.
In the Saunders case this Court said, with reference to those properties of municipalities:
"Many of our opinions have been cited to sustain the principle that exemptions from taxes are frowned upon and each claim should be strictly construed. This rule does not apply where the question is raised by a municipality asserting the exemption by virtue of a statute duly passed pursuant to the Constitution. The latter case exemption is the rule and taxation is the exemption [sic exception]." 25 So.2d at page 651.
That the Legislature of this State has the power to permit Wakulla County to tax the electrical generating plant and transmission lines of the City of Tallahassee is beyond question. That the acts relied on by the county in this litigation do not accomplish that purpose is equally clear.
Affirmed.
TERRELL, THOMAS and THORNAL, JJ., concur.
O'CONNELL, J., concurs specially with opinion.
HOBSON, J., dissents with opinion.
ROBERTS, C. J., dissents and agrees with conclusion of dissenting opinion by HOBSON, J.
. Art. IX, Sec. 1 and Art. XVI, Sec. 16, Constitution of the State of Florida, F.S.A. relating to property which is or may be exempt from taxation.
. Laws of Florida 1919, Ch. S374, Constitutes the basic charter of the City; as to the particular sections applicable to this proposition see Sec. 113 of Ch. 8374, supra, as amended by Laws of Florida 1927, Ch. 13439 and as further amended by Laws of Florida 1947, Chapter 24910 and Laws of Florida 1949, Chapter 26247.
. Chapter 57-788
"Senate Bill No. 268
"An Act relating to tax exemption of Municipal Public Utilities; amending Section 192.06, Florida Statutes, and amending Section 192.52, Florida Statutes.
"Whereas, municipally owned and operated utilities of the several municipalities now existing in Florida are serving a valid municipal purpose in producing and distributing electrical power and water, and
"Whereas, the property of such municipally owned and operated public utilities serving such municipal purposes cannot be subject to taxation, and
"Whereas, under our system of free enterprise privately owned public utilities, while serving a necessary and useful function in providing utility services for large areas of Florida, should not be subjected to unfair competition from public utilities which are tax exempt where no municipal purpose is being performed, and
"Whereas, both private and municipal utility companies have their proper sphere of operation, Now, Therefore, "Be It Enacted by the Legislature of the State of Florida :
"Section 1. Subsection (2) of Section 192.06, Florida Statutes, is amended to read: (2) All public property of the several counties, cities, villages, towns and school districts in this state, used or intended for public purposes, including both real and personal property of all fire, hose and hook and ladder companies, except lands sold for taxes for the use of any counties, cities, villages, towns or school districts; and including all property of municipally owned and operated public totilities held and used exclusively for municipal purposes.
"Section 2. Section 192.52, Florida Statutes, is amended to read:
"192.52 Tax exemption, municipal public utilities. — The real and personal property of municipally owned and operated public utilities held and used exclusively for municipal purposes shall not be subject to ad valorem or personal property taxes."
The italicized words in the above act were the only changes made by the 1957 Legislature.