Case Name: STATE of Missouri, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Heidi BURKHARDT, Defendant-Appellant
Court: Supreme Court of Missouri
Jurisdiction: Missouri
Decision Date: 1990-09-11
Citations: 795 S.W.2d 399
Docket Number: No. 72256
Parties: STATE of Missouri, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Heidi BURKHARDT, Defendant-Appellant.
Judges: BLACKMAR, C.J., and HIGGINS, COVINGTON and BILLINGS, JJ., concur.
Reporter: South Western Reporter Second Series
Volume: 795
Pages: 399–411

Head Matter:
STATE of Missouri, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Heidi BURKHARDT, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 72256.
Supreme Court of Missouri, En Banc.
Sept. 11, 1990.
John Sims, Neosho, William Taylor, St. Louis, for defendant-appellant.
William L. Webster, Atty. Gen., Christopher M. Kehr, Robert V. Franson, Asst. Attys. Gen., Jefferson City, for plaintiff-respondent.

Opinion:
RENDLEN, Judge.
Defendant was convicted of possessing more than 35 grams of marihuana and punishment assessed at four years' imprisonment. Her cache of contraband measured some 57,753 grams (127 pounds) exceeding by 57,718 grams the established limit of 35 grams necessary to assess punishment of five years in the state penitentiary. The single issue on appeal involves the trial court's refusal to suppress as evidence the marihuana found in her car when stopped by state troopers following a traffic violation. A divided court of appeals held the trial court erred in not suppressing such evidence, concluding the marihuana had been seized in a unlawful search and ordered defendant discharged. We accepted transfer and now affirm the trial court's ruling.
On February 28, 1988, State Highway Patrol Troopers Timothy Rousset and Daniel Banasik were in a patrol car near the intersection of Missouri 43 and Interstate 44 in Newton County near the city limits of Joplin. The troopers were working west and east bound traffic along Interstate 44 in a region where the posted speed limit was 55 miles per hour. At approximately 10:30 that night, they spotted a 1988 Chrysler Fifth Avenue speeding eastbound on Interstate 44 at 64 miles per hour and as the automobile passed, Rousset noted that defendant, accompanied by a passenger, was driving.
Turning on their siren and lights, the troopers gave chase and about one and one-half miles further defendant pulled to the shoulder of the road followed by the patrol car. The troopers approached the automobile, Rousset on the driver's side, Banasik the other, and Rousset informed defendant she had been speeding. On request, defendant presented her driver's license, showing her as a California resident. The passenger, Beth Merrifield, produced her driver's license, indicating her residence as North Carolina.
Because of the din from passing traffic, Rousset asked defendant to accompany him to the patrol car that he might obtain the information for preparation of a traffic ticket. Banasik accompanied them leaving Merrifield in defendant's car. While in the patrol car, defendant stated the automobile was a rental she had picked up in California and showed them the rental agreement papers which appeared to be in order. The patrolman "thought it was unusual that one of them was from the West Coast and one of them from the East Coast." Further, the distances involved prompted the officers to ask why defendant rented a vehicle to travel from California to Ohio instead of flying. Defendant had no reply to this inquiry. Rousset then asked defendant the purpose of her trip and her relationship to Merrifield and, as noted above, explaining in his testimony that he found it somewhat unusual that defendant was from the West Coast and Merrifield from the East. He asked defendant how long she had known Merrifield to which defendant replied (1) "she had known her a long time", (2) that she had attended college with Merrifield's sister, and (3) had met her through the sister. Further, that (4) she worked as an artist and (5) Merrifield worked at a place near defendant's home in California. Defendant also related that they were traveling to Akron, Ohio to see defendant's sister. During this questioning, observing that defendant was "visibly nervous," "fidgety" and "yawning," and noting the yawns appeared to be forced, Rousset became suspicious that all was not as it appeared. He then left defendant in the patrol car and went to the other car where he asked the same questions of Mer-rifield and was given quite a different story. Merrifield stated (1) she had not known defendant long, (2) she made no mention of her sister with whom defendant had attended college, (3) she did not recall how they had met, and (4) was not currently employed, but (5) was looking for a job. Rousset returned to the patrol car where defendant and Trooper Banasik were wait-" ing and confronted defendant with the conflicting story of Merrifield. Defendant, immediately became more nervous, began again to yawn, pointing to a nearby Holiday Inn saying she was tired and just wanted to leave and go to sleep. When faced with this second round of questioning and advised that their tales failed to jibe in many important aspects, defendant's nervousness heightened appreciably, she "squirmed" in her seat, began "wringing" her hands and her voice developed a "tremor."
At this point Banasik left the patrol car and approached the rented Chrysler. During a cursory check for weapons, he no ticed two pieces of luggage, an overnight bag and a suitcase in the back seat of the automobile. Banasik asked Merrifield whose luggage it was and she replied "ours" and indicated that one of the pieces belonged to defendant.
In the patrol car, Rousset, recognizing defendant's visibly increasing nervousness, asked appellant if there was something in the car which made her nervous, to which she replied "no," so he asked if she would mind if he looked in the car for something that might be making her nervous. He then asked defendant if she would consent to a search of her automobile and her response was an inquiry: she wanted to know if she must allow the troopers to search her car. The trooper informed her that she did not and she stated she did not mind if they searched the automobile as long as they did not look in the luggage. Rousset then informed her that he would have to inspect the luggage because "it would be easy to conceal something, for instance drugs, in the luggage, and that we would not know whether the car contained drugs or not unless we looked in the luggage." Defendant said the luggage should not be searched because she did not want her lingerie "stretched up and down the side of the highway." The trooper assured her he had no intention of "stretching her lingerie up and down the highway and that if there was contraband in the car, that if she would tell us where it was, then there would be no need to go through her luggage." (Emphasis added.) Defendant responded that she "didn't know if she should tell" him and asked if he was going to search the car and its contents anyway. Trooper Rousset responded he "felt that we had probable cause based on her nervousness, and the fact that their stories didn't coincide." To this defendant responded, "You might as well go ahead and search it yourself. I'm not going to tell you where it's at." (Emphasis added.)
At this point, Trooper Rousset left defendant in the patrol car and went to the Chrysler where Merrifield had remained and asked her permission to search the car. Merrifield replied she did not feel the troopers had a right to make the search. Rous-set told her he believed he had the right given the differences in their stories and when Merrifield refused to give permission, the trooper told her to go to the patrol car and wait.
Only then did Rousset commence to search the automobile. He reached into the back seat and picked up the overnight bag and returned to the patrol car, asking the women to whom it belonged. Defendant told him it was hers. Rousset then opened the bag and found a small plastic package containing a small quantity of marihuana. Thereupon, he informed the women they were under arrest for possession of marihuana.
After the arrest, Rousset returned to the Chrysler and removed the large suitcase from the back seat. Opening it he discovered several large bags of marihuana and, on opening the trunk, found two large pieces of luggage, each containing sixteen plastic bags of marihuana, totaling in all 57,753.6 grams or approximately 127 pounds.
The officers called for a tow truck and defendant's car was taken to the police station where defendant waived her right to an attorney and informed the police she had only recently met Merrifield. Some friends of Merrifield had convinced her, as well as Merrifield, to drive from Laguna Beach to Akron to deliver a quantity of marihuana for which defendant would receive $1,000, and because she was having financial difficulties relating to delinquent income taxes, she agreed to the plan.
Prior to trial, defendant's counsel moved to suppress the marihuana and all of defendant's post arrest statements. At the suppression hearing, only the two troopers and the officer who recorded defendant's statements testified. The trial court denied the motions and at trial, both the marihuana and defendant's post arrest statements were admitted in evidence. The jury found defendant guilty of possession of more than 35 grams of marihuana, § 195.020.1, RSMo 1986, and defendant was sentenced to four years' imprisonment. § 195.200. l(l)(b), RSMo Supp.1987.
The sole issue is defendant's contention that the marihuana taken from the car was inadmissible under the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution as the officers lacked probable cause to undertake the search.
The Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures is enforceable against the states through the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. State v. Witherspoon, 460 S.W.2d 281, 284 (Mo.1970). Assertions that evidence intended for use at trial is the product of an unlawful search and seizure should be raised by motion to suppress, § 542.296, RSMo 1986; State v. Stuart, 415 S.W.2d 766, 767 (Mo.1967), to determine as a matter of law whether items alleged to have been unlawfully seized are inadmissible for that reason. State v. Simone, 416 S.W.2d 96, 100 (Mo.1967). The proponent of such motion has the burden of establishing that his constitutional rights were violated by the challenged search or seizure, State v. Lingar, 726 S.W.2d 728, 735 (Mo. banc 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 872, 108 S.Ct. 206, 98 L.Ed.2d 157 (1987); however the burden is on the State to justify a warrantless search and to demonstrate that such falls within an exception to the warrant requirement, e.g. search of a stopped car on a highway. State v. Epperson, 571 S.W.2d 260, 263 (Mo. banc 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 909, 99 S.Ct. 2820, 61 L.Ed.2d 274 (1979). A search of an automobile on the highways pursuant to probable cause to believe that contraband, weapons or evidence of a crime are within the automobile is a well established exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement. Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 90 S.Ct. 1975, 26 L.Ed.2d 419 (1970). The automobile exception to the warrant requirement stems from the fact an automobile's mobility often presents an exigent circumstance making procurement of a search warrant unfeasible, and especially because citizens have a less significant expectation of privacy in their automobiles than in their homes or offices. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971); State v. Johnson, 558 S.W.2d 424, 425 (Mo.App.1977). Such automobile search may be conducted on probable cause to believe that contraband is concealed within, a belief springing from circumstances that would justify issuance of a warrant. U.S. v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 809, 102 S.Ct. 2157, 2164, 72 L.Ed.2d 572, 584 (1982). Probable cause may arise when the facts and circumstances within the knowledge of the seizing officer are sufficient in themselves to produce in a man of reasonable caution a belief that the contents of the automobile offend the law. State v. Hornbeck, 492 S.W.2d 802, 805 (Mo.1973). The state alleges that Troopers Rousset and Banasik acted within this exception for they had probable cause to believe that contraband was concealed in defendant's automobile.
In our review of the trial court's denial of the motion to suppress, we look only to determine whether the evidence was sufficient to support the ruling. State v. Baskerville, 616 S.W.2d 839, 843 (Mo.1981). It is not this Court's province to substitute its discretion for that of the trial court, but instead from the record before us which encompasses all the circumstances, the total atmosphere of the case, we must decide only whether there was adequate evidence to support the trial court's action. State v. Novak, 428 S.W.2d 585, 592 (Mo.1968). It is not required that the trooper be right in his belief the automobile contained contraband, only that such belief was reasonable. U.S. v. Alden, 576 F.2d 772, 775 (8th Cir.1978); State v. Patterson, 624 S.W.2d 11, 14 (Mo.1981). The weight of the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses is for the trial court's determination. State v. Brown, 762 S.W.2d 471, 474 (Mo.App.1988).
Here, the troopers observed defendant's car violating the posted speed limit, hence stopping the car for issuance of a traffic summons was clearly within their authority. § 304.010.2, RSMo Supp. 1989; State v. Reynolds, 753 S.W.2d 1, 2 (Mo.App.1988). While stopping the car for speeding did not alone provide probable cause, neither did it forever preclude a full search of the automobile. State v. Achter, 512 S.W.2d 894, 902-904 (Mo.App.1974). This because the right to search is not dependent upon the right to arrest but upon the probable cause the officer has for belief that the contents of the automobile offend the law. State v. Hohensee, 473 S.W.2d 379, 381 (Mo.1971). Yet in many instances a traffic violation is a circumstance to consider among the elements giving rise to probable cause justifying a search of the automobile. State v. Achter, at 902.
The fact that the speeding violation occurred on Interstate 44 is also an element to be considered. We take notice that the section of Interstate 44 is (as mentioned in dissenting opinion of the court of appeals) a notorious route used by drug traffickers bringing controlled substances into this state. A similar fact was deemed relevant in Carroll v. U.S., 267 U.S. 132, 45 S.Ct. 280, 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925), which first enunciated the automobile exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment. There the Court noted the reputation of the Grand Rapids and Detroit areas for the smuggling of liquors into this country as a factor the police could consider relevant to the question of probable cause that a specific car carried illegal liquor. Carroll, 267 U.S. at 160, 45 S.Ct. at 287, 69 L.Ed. at 554.
To the trained observers, Rousset and Banasik, the late hour at when defendant and Merrifield were stopped for speeding could be considered among the accumulation of factors pointing to probable cause. See Annotation, Search and Seizure: "Furtive" Movement or Gesture as Justifying Police Search, 45 A.L.R.3d 581, 599 (1972); State v. Ferguson, 678 S.W.2d 873, 876 (Mo.App.1984).
The fact that defendant, driver of the car, was a California resident and that her passenger was from North Carolina were elements that the troopers could weigh, State v. Pruitt, 646 S.W.2d 369, 371 (Mo.App.1982) as well as the fact they were driving about 2,500 miles instead of flying that distance.
Defendant's visible nervousness, her fidgeting and yawning were important signs. These intensified and were accompanied by hand wringing, squirming and voice tremors when defendant was confronted with the glaring inconsistencies between her story and Merrifield's and these observations had heightened importance when coupled with other specific knowledge of surrounding circumstances. See U.S. v. McGlynn, 671 F.2d 1140, 1144 (8th Cir.1982). It has been well stated that:
innocent behavior frequently will provide the basis for a showing of probable cause; to require otherwise would be to sub silentio impose a drastically more rigorous definition of probable cause than the security of our citizen's demands . In making a determination of probable cause the relevant inquiry is not whether particular conduct is "innocent" or "guilty," but the degree of suspicion that attaches to particular types of noncriminal acts.
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 243 footnote 13, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 2335 footnote 13, 76 L.Ed.2d 527, 552 footnote 13 (1983). Defendant's suspicious conduct and movements were properly considered by the trooper when reaching the level of probable cause for a warrantless search of the automobile. State v. Whitnah, 493 S.W.2d 32, 35 (Mo.App.1973).
This Court, as did the trial court, views the circumstances in their totality as they unfolded that night on Highway 44. The troopers need not have been confronted with a prima facie showing of criminal activity by defendant, but rather they need only have concluded that a probability of criminal activity existed and from this have an acceptable basis for probable cause, State v. Pennington, 642 S.W.2d 646, 648 (Mo.1983), to believe the automobile was carrying contraband.
It was argued here a warrant-less search of an automobile must rest on facts providing probable cause which would justify issuance of a search warrant, State v. Donohoe, 770 S.W.2d 252, 255 (Mo.App. 1989), and for a warrant to issue the items to be seized must be described with sufficient particularity to render the search lawful. State v. Pennington, at 648. Though defendant contends Trooper Rousset was required to have probable cause to believe that marihuana was concealed in the car, probable cause to search an automobile arises when an officer stops a car and suspects it contains any contraband, weapons or evidence of a crime. State v. Ber-kwit, 689 S.W.2d 763, 767 (Mo.App.1985). Before he commenced, Rousset stated that a search of the luggage was needed because "it would be easy to conceal something, for instance, drugs, in the luggage." By vocalizing his concern of the probability that drugs were in defendant's car satisfied the specificity requirement.
The consensual search of the car itself was proper though defendant's consent was restricted by her statement that the luggage not be searched. State v. Smith, 357 Mo. 467, 209 S.W.2d 138, 140 (1948).
Concerning the luggage, any doubt as to the presence of probable cause was dispelled by defendant's final statements preceding the search. Mindful that the officer had previously told her "It would be easy to conceal something, for instance, drugs, in the luggage, and that we would not know whether the car contained drugs or not unless we looked in the luggage" (emphasis added), this testimony followed:
Q: She [Appellant] give any reason why she did not want her luggage looked into?
A: [Trooper Rousset] Yes, she made a statement about she really didn't care for the idea of having her lingerie stretched up and down the side of the highway.
Q: And did you make any comment in response to that?
A: Yes, I did. I said that we had no intention of stretching her lingerie up and down the highway, and that if there was contraband in the car, that if she would tell us where it was, then there would be no need to go through her luggage
(emphasis added).
Q: Did she give any immediate response to that?
A: She paused and then stated that she didn't know if she should tell us or not.
Q: She make any other statement at that time?
A: She did. She asked if we were going to go ahead and search the car anyway, to which I responded that I felt that we had probable cause based on her nervousness, and the fact that their stories didn't coincide, and that we were going to search the car.
Q: After you informed her of that, did she make any statement?
A: When confronted with the fact that we were going to search the car anyway, she said, "You might as well go ahead and search it yourself. I'm not going to tell you where it's at." (Emphasis added.)
It is obvious from this exchange, that prior to Rousset's search for contraband, he had probable cause to believe that drugs were in the automobile, specifically in the luggage, which caused defendant's sharp anxiety. Defendant's statement that, "I'm not going to tell you where it's at," could only refer to the contraband itself. The argument advanced by defendant's counsel that she was referring to her lingerie borders the absurd. Trooper Rousset made it clear to defendant that he was searching for contraband and it was that, not lingerie, which produced her nervous reaction and her several fabrications.
A question has been posed regarding consideration of defendant's final critical remark immediately before the search was undertaken. In this connection it must be emphasized that defendant's blurt out that "I'm not going to tell you where it's at" is not challenged under either Fifth or Sixth Amendment doctrine. The statement goes only to the issue of probable cause to reasonably search under the Fourth Amendment and is properly to be considered as a part of the "totality of the circumstances." To determine whether the statement was a pertinent circumstance, its temporal relationship to the search becomes important. The search of the defendant's vehicle and more specifically her luggage commenced immediately after this final damaging statement was made. Under all the circumstances, together with the rational inferences, the trial court, in effect, found that at the moment of search a man of reasonable caution would be warranted in believing the action taken was appropriate, U.S. v. Nicholas, 448 F.2d 622 (8th Cir.1971). The search had not begun when Banasik earlier had looked in the car at that which could be readily seen, State v. Harre, 280 S.W.2d 41 (Mo.1955), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 915, 77 S.Ct. 675, 1 L.Ed.2d 669 (1957). Such examination by flashlight from without the car is permissible, U.S. v. Wickizer, 465 F.2d 1154 (8th Cir.1972), and such looking into an automobile at objects open to public view is not a search within the purview of the Fourth Amendment, State v. Hawkins, 362 Mo. 152, 240 S.W.2d 688, 692 (1951). A search within the constitutional provisions invoked involves a quest for, a looking for or a seeking out of that which offends the law. "It implies prying into hidden places for that which is concealed." Id. 240 S.W.2d at 692. Nothing of that sort occurred until after defendant's final blurt out while sitting in the patrol car with the officers. Rousset then left the patrol car and went to the Chrysler where Merrifield sat waiting.
The presence of probable cause to believe that contraband was concealed somewhere within defendant's automobile permitted an immediate search without the necessity of presenting the issue to a magistrate. State v. Morgan, 592 S.W.2d 796, 805 (Mo.banc 1980), vacated, 449 U.S. 809, 101 S.Ct. 56, 66 L.Ed.2d 12 (1980), orig. op. aff'd, 612 S.W.2d 1 (Mo. banc 1981). Having arrested defendant and Merrifield, the trooper was allowed to continue the immediate search without the necessity of a warrant. State v. Hornbeck, at 807. When the search began, its scope was not limited to the containers in which the marihuana was concealed but instead extended to places in which the object of the search might be found, U.S. v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 823, 102 S.Ct. 2157, 2172, 72 L.Ed.2d 572, 593 (1982); State v. Jackson, 646 S.W.2d 367, 369 (Mo.App.1982), including the luggage in the passenger compartment as well as the trunk.
The record before us clearly contains substantial evidence supporting the trial court's ruling. In this court "tried" issue, the ruling of the trial court must be sustained by the appellate court unless there is no substantial evidence to support it. Murphy v. Carrón, 536 S.W.2d 30, 32 (Mo.banc 1976). The record here adequately supports the trial court's determination that the 127 pounds of marihuana seized in the search of defendant's automobile was admissible in evidence.
Judgment is affirmed.
BLACKMAR, C.J., and HIGGINS, COVINGTON and BILLINGS, JJ., concur.
ROBERTSON, J., concurs in result.
E. RICHARD WEBBER, Special Judge, dissents in separate opinion filed.
HOLSTEIN, J., not sitting.
. Under § 195.020.1, RSMo 1986, thirty five grams is the statutory limit beyond which even first offenders may be incarcerated in a state correctional institution.
. The marihuana in the plastic bag weighed 8.6 grams.