Case Name: State of Vermont v. David P. Brunell
Court: Vermont Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Vermont
Decision Date: 1988-09-16
Citations: 150 Vt. 388
Docket Number: No. 86-468
Parties: State of Vermont v. David P. Brunell
Judges: Present: Allen, C.J., Peck, Gibson and Dooley, JJ., and Barney, C.J. (Ret.), Specially Assigned
Reporter: Vermont Reports
Volume: 150
Pages: 388–406

Head Matter:
State of Vermont v. David P. Brunell
[554 A.2d 242]
No. 86-468
Present: Allen, C.J., Peck, Gibson and Dooley, JJ., and Barney, C.J. (Ret.), Specially Assigned
Opinion Filed September 16, 1988
Jeffrey L. Amestoy, Attorney General, and Susan R. Harritt, Assistant Attorney General, Montpelier, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
Kimberly B. Cheney, Robert Sheil, and Ken Messing and Karen Golden, Law Clerks (On the Brief), Montpelier, for Defendant-Appellee.

Opinion:
Allen, C.J.
The State appeals, pursuant to 13 V.S.A. § 7403(c)(1) and (2) and V.R.A.P. 5(b)(1)(A) and (B), the grant of a motion to suppress statements made to police officers by the defendant following interrogation at police barracks. Defendant is charged with murder in the first degree. 13 V.S.A. § 2301. We affirm.
The unchallenged findings of fact indicate that a state police officer received a call from the Medical Examiner's office advising that a female child had been pronounced dead on arrival at a hospital and that a brief examination revealed signs of physical abuse. The state police officer notified the chief of police of the town where the victim and her parents resided, and the two officers then attended the autopsy of the victim. At the conclusion of the autopsy, they were informed by the physician performing it that the death was a homicide caused by suffocation and severe shaking.
The police officers, based on earlier abuse allegations, suspected that either the defendant or his wife was responsible for the death. They were also aware that the victim had been removed from the home by the Department of Social and Rehabilitation Services, and only recently returned to it.
After learning of the whereabouts of defendant, the officers met with the state's attorney to discuss the investigation. It was agreed at this meeting that they would not take defendant and his wife into custody "so that defendant and his wife could be questioned without being first informed of their Miranda rights."
The officers, along with a third state police officer who could assist in locating the home of the parents of defendant where defendant and his wife were visiting, arrived at the parents' home shortly after 10:00 p.m. Present at the parents' home were several of defendant's siblings and their spouses, as well as defendant and his wife.
The officers informed defendant and his wife that the officers were required to investigate the child's death and asked them to go the police station to speak with them about the child's death. One of the state police officers told defendant and his wife that they did not have to come to the police station, but that if they did come he would bring them back home after the interview. Defendant's mother then inquired as to whether they had to go that night. The chief of police answered that they did because he wanted the. statement while the events were still fresh in their minds. Defendant's brother requested permission to accompany defendant to the interrogation, but this request was refused. Defendant and his wife then agreed to go. They were taken by police cruiser to the state police barracks, located about a half-hour drive from the parents' home.
Upon arrival at the barracks, they were immediately separated. A state police officer and the chief placed the defendant in a small office, where they began their interrogation at about 10:40 p.m. Defendant was informed at the outset that he was not under arrest or in custody, that he did not have to talk, and that they would give him a ride home when he wanted. Defendant agreed to be interviewed, and at no time indicated his unwillingness to speak with them.
During the course of this interview, and before any Miranda warnings were given, defendant, in response to a suggestion by the chief that the death was "accidental," stated that "it was an accident," and inquired as to whether he was going to jail that night. After being informed that he was not going to jail that night, he made additional incriminating statements. After making these statements, he was read his Miranda rights, acknowledged that he understood them, and signed a written waiver of those rights. This took place shortly after midnight. The officers then took a taped statement from defendant, in which he reiterated his earlier statements. At the start of the taped interview, he acknowledged that his presence at the barracks was voluntary, that he knew he was free to leave, and that he had not been subjected to threats or promises, other than the promise that he would be driven home. He was then driven home, leaving the barracks at 12:47 a.m.
Defendant sought to suppress all of the statements made during his interrogation at the barracks, on the grounds that they were taken in violation of his rights under the Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and Chapter I, Article 10 of the Vermont Constitution. He contended that he was in custody during the interrogation, and that because the initial portion of the interrogation was not preceded by Miranda warnings, the initial statements must be suppressed. He further contended that the subsequent taped statement must also be suppressed because the later warnings were not sufficient to "purge the taint of the initial illegal interrogation."
The trial court concluded that the statements obtained from the defendant had to be suppressed because the defendant was "in custody" within the meaning of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). We affirm.
In our review, we must be guided by certain fundamental principles, the first and foremost being that the trial court's ruling will not be disturbed unless it was clearly erroneous. State v. Harvey, 145 Vt. 654, 657, 497 A.2d 356, 357 (1985). The State had the burden to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the confession was voluntary, Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 489 (1972), and that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his Fifth Amendment rights. State v. Clark, 143 Vt. 11, 12, 460 A.2d 449, 450 (1983). Here, the trial court properly focused on this Court's statement in State v. Willis, 145 Vt. 459, 494 A.2d 108 (1985), that:
[I]n determining when a suspect "has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way," our courts should make an objective inquiry into the totality of the circumstances to determine if a reasonable person would believe he or she were free to leave or to refuse to answer police questioning.
Id. at 475, 494 A.2d at 117 (citation omitted). The trial court concluded that a reasonable person in defendant's shoes under the existing circumstances would not have felt free to leave or to refuse to submit to questioning.
The State argues that the legal conclusion drawn from the facts found by the court is erroneous as a matter of law. It contends that the outcome under the Fifth Amendment is dictated by the per curiam holdings of the United States Supreme Court in Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492 (1977), and California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121 (1983). In Mathiason, a police officer, after attempting to contact the defendant for three or four days without success, left a card at defendant's apartment asking defendant to call. The defendant did call and was asked when it would be convenient to meet. The defendant had no preference so the officer asked if the defendant could meet at the state police office at about 5:00 p.m. This office was about two blocks from the defendant's apartment. They did meet, shook hands, and the defendant was told that he was not under arrest. The interview was over in a half an hour and the defendant left. In summarily reversing the grant of the suppression motion, the United States Supreme Court stressed the defendant's voluntary arrival at the police station, the brief stay, and the casual nature of the entire action. Mathiason, 429 U.S. at 494-96. In Beheler, the Court held that the defendant had not been in custody during an interview with police and therefore was not entitled to Miranda warnings. The Court based its conclusion on the facts that the defendant accompanied the police to the station house, he was informed that he was not under arrest, the interview lasted less than thirty minutes, and the defendant was permitted to leave. Beheler, 463 U.S. at 1122-25.
While these cases have factual similarities to this case, the differences justify a different result. Here, defendant was requested to go to the station, was told that he did not have to go, that he would be brought back after the interview, and agreed to go — but only after his mother had been informed in his presence that he "had" to go that night. While the statements made by the officers may have been contradictory and confusing, it cannot be said on these factual findings that the trial court was wrong, as a matter of law, in concluding that a reasonable person would not believe that he was free to refuse to go to the barracks and answer police questioning that evening. The continued assertions by the officers that he was not under arrest or in custody, pursuant to their plan to avoid having to give Miranda warnings, cannot overcome the restriction placed upon defendant's freedom by the statement that he "had" to go that night, the thirty minute ride in the cruiser during the late evening, the refusal to permit his brother to attend, and the lengthy interrogation in a small office by two officers out of the presence of his wife. The totality of these circumstances readily supports the conclusion that a reasonable person would believe he was not free to refuse to go to the barracks and submit to questioning. See State v. Willis, 145 Vt. at 475, 494 A.2d at 117. The activity described far exceeds the relatively innocuous requests and conduct described in Mathiason and Beheler. The trial court's conclusion was not erroneous as a matter of law. Accordingly, we affirm.
Affirmed.
The trial court's analysis was based only on the United States Constitution. On appeal, neither the State nor defendant raises issues pertaining to the Vermont Constitution.