Case Name: Albert Johnson et al. v. Joseph M. Brown
Court: Supreme Court of Texas
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1860-10
Citations: 25 Supp. Tex. 120
Docket Number: 
Parties: Albert Johnson et al. v. Joseph M. Brown.
Judges: 
Reporter: Texas Reports
Volume: 25 Supp.
Pages: 120–129

Head Matter:
Albert Johnson et al. v. Joseph M. Brown.
The refusal of the court to grant a continuance will not be revised, unless a bill of exceptions to the ruling be taken.
The 4th sec. of the act of 12th May, 1846, “to provide for the registry of deeds and other instruments of writing,” reads as follows: “It shall be the'duty of each recorder to record, in the books provided for his office, all deeds, mortgages, conveyances, deeds of trust, bonds, covenants, defeasances, or other instruments of writing, of or concerning any lands and tenements, or goods and chattels, or movable property of any description, in his county, which shall be .proved or acknowledged according to law, and delivered to him to be recorded in his office.” (Paschal’s Dig., Art. 5004, Note 1099.) A transfer of a judgment by the plaintiff to a third person is not embraced by this act; hence, a copy of such assignment cannot be proved by the certificate of the clerk, as the copy of a record, or as a recorded instrument. (Paschal’s Dig., Arts. 3715, 3716, Notes 839, 840.)
The object of this section (Art. 5004) is to declare the duty of the recorder, and to prescribe the requisites which imposé the duty to record, and not to define or prescribe what instruments ought to be recorded.
If the assignment of a judgment can be made a record anywhere, it ought to be in the court where the judgment was rendered and remains of record.
[Note.—This assignment was before the act of 14th February, 1860, (now repealed,) to prevent judgments from becoming dormant, &c. Paschal’s Dig., Art. 3964..—Reporter.]
The copy of the record having been excluded, the exclusion of the assignment of the intermediate assignee was a mere question of practice, and it was discretionary with the court to exclude it until the first assignment was proved.
Where the plaintiff had plead a written assignment of a judgment in reconvention, and the copy offered was rejected, parol evidence of the contents of the original, sworn to have been lost, was properly excluded.
Facts which do not prove, or conduce to prove, a defense, are not admissible evidence.
In Swenson v. Walker, 3 Tex., 93, the claim against the estate had been allowed and proved, and, two years afterwards, the purchaser was told by the administrator that it would be paid; and it was held that the administrator could not afterwards repudiate it. This differs from the purchase of a claim for set-off, which had never been exhibited or allowed.
Even if the administrator had authorized the debtor to purchase claims against the estate, it must be understood that he reserved the right to pass upon them.
The law does not confer upon the administrator the authority to purchase claims against an estate, to be used as offsets against debts due the estate. (See Paschal’s Dig., Arts. 3443 .to 3448, Notes 795 to 797.)
Error from Caldwell. The case was tried before Hon. A. W. Terrell, one of the district judges.
Brown, as administrator of Joseph L. Washam, sued Albert and Alfred Johnson.
There are many facts in the record not material to state, as the case really turned upon the merits of the defense as a set-off or plea in reconvention.
The suit was upon two notes, executed by the defendants to the plaintiff, described in said notes thus: “ Joseph M. Brown, administrator of the estate of Joseph L. Washam, deceased,” and to foreclose a mortgage given to secure the notes. And although the plaintiff sued as “ administrator,” the counsel and the court overlooked the fact, that the offset plead was a judgment rendered against Washam and another in his lifetime, when the legal right in the notes and mortgage was personally in Brown. (Gayle v. Ennis, 1 Tex., 184; Thompson v. Cartwright, 1 Tex., 87; Wimbish v. Holt,-26 Tex., 673; Butler v. Robertson, 11 Tex., 143; Claiborne v. Yeomans, 15 Tex., 46; Paschal’s.* Dig., Rote 499, 324.)
The precedent would, therefore, seem to establish that, although Brown might have sued in his own name, and treated his description in the note as merely personal, yet, if he elected to sue in his fiduciary character, the question of the circumstances under which an equitable offset would be considered would be the same as though the notes sued on had been payable to Brown’s intestate.
The defendants below, and plaintiffs in error, pleaded specially, in set-off and in reconvention, a judgment against said Brown, as such administrator, &c., in the same fiduciary capacity as he acts in this suit. The judgment so pleaded was rendered in the District Court of Comal county, 25th April, 1855, said judgment being in favor of J. E. & D. R. Torrey, partners, &c., and which said judgment defendants allege they own. They farther alleged, that the said Brown, while such administrator, authorized and induced them to purchase said judgment, to liquidate and pay the said notes sued on; and they now claim, in their pleas, the right to so offset the same.
They further alleged, that he, the said Brown, having induced the said purchase, is personally responsible in case the same is not a legal set-off in this action.
They farther pleaded, that the estate of Waskam is and was solvent, and able to pay all its debts.
When the cause came on for trial, the defendants filed an application for a continuance.
This application is a full compliance with, and more than the law requires. (Paschal’s Dig., Art. 1509, Uote 595.) But there was no bill of exceptions to overruling the continuance.
The bill of exceptions contains all the other points, save one. The defendants below, in order to make out their defense and show title to the judgment pleaded in offset, offered to prove their title to the same, 1. By making affidavit of the loss of the original transfer from the Torreys to Dooley,' and then offering a certified coj^y of such transfer, from the County- Court of Comal county, where said transfer had been recorded.
The court ruled out this evidence, on the ground that the instrument was not required by law to be recorded.
The defendants then offered in evidence the assignment of said Dooley to them of said judgment, and offered to prove his, Dooley’s, signature to the same. To this the party plaintiff objected, because the instrument was not executed in a manner to entitle it to be placed on record, and that the same could not, therefore, be read in evidence. These objections were sustained by the court.
This was ruled out, probably because the assignment to Dooley had been excluded, and therefore he had nothing to assign.
The defendants then offered to prove, by a witness who knew of the sale from Torrey to Dooley, and from Dooley to defendants, of the judgment pleaded by them in set-off; and to this the defendants in error again objected, and the objections were sustained, and the defendants below excepted.
Plaintiffs in error then offered to prove that the said Brown authorized them to purchase this or any other claim, and he would take the same in payment of the claim sued on; which testimony, upon objection being made, was excluded.
The defense being cut off, there were a verdict and judgment for the plaintiff, from which the defendants prosecuted error.
Chandler £ Turner, for plaintiffs in error,
cited Swenson et al. v. Walker’s Admr., 3 Tex., 93.
The appellee will rest his case mainly upon the supposition, that the proof in the statement of facts shows that the judgment, pleaded in .offset and payment, was not such an adjudicated right as could be plead in offset, notwithstanding the alleged authority of the said Brown to purchase the said debt against the estate; and they rely upon the authority in the case of Weathered v. Mays, 1 Tex., 72, to sustain their position.
In that case, the two suits were pending in the same court; and the judgment pleaded in offset was appealed from, and the appeal-bond was given; consequently, there was no time when an execution could have been issued. In short, there was no time when the litigation was suspended, or any tacit, admission on the part of the defendant that he was content with the judgment.
In this case, the judgment was rendered in Comal county, on the 25th day of April, 1855.
The answer of these defendants, pleading said judgment in offset or payment, was filed 23d October, 1856; a certified copy of the judgment was made part of the answer; there was no petition for a writ of error, up to this date, in the office of the district clerk of Comal county.
The judgment was assigned to M. A. Dooley, June 1, 1855, and hy Dooley to defendant, Albert Johnson, on the 1st day of September, 1856.
The petition for a writ of error was not filed until the 17th of April, 1857.
The writ of error was not issued until the 12th of September, 1857.
Spencer Ford, for defendant in error.
—This court will not hold the ruling of the District Court, in overruling Johnson’s application for a continuance, to he erroneous, for two reasons:
1. Because plaintiff's in error did not take a bill of exceptions to the ruling of the court.
2. The statute, hy which a certified copy of an instrument is permitted to be read in evidence,.after affidavit is made of the loss of the original, must be strictly construed. (Crayton v. Munger, 11 Tex., 234; Butler v. Duncan, 19 Tex., 559.)
The judgment sought to be plead in offset had been taken to the Supreme Court, and could not, therefore, be litigated in the Caldwell District Court. But appellants’ counsel, in their argument, say that “if Brown induced the purchase of this judgment, he could not afterwards^say aught against its validity;” hut it is insisted that Brown never authorized them to purchase this judgment.
As to the propriety of the ruling of the court, in excluding the parol evidence of ownership of the Comal judgment, hut little need he said. It had already appeared to the court that there was written evidence of the transfer, and defendants, we have contended, had not laid the predicate .for the introduction of secondary evidence: their parol evidence could not therefore he heard.
It may also be said, in conclusion, in reference to the refusal of the court to allow proof that Brown authorized Jdhnsons to bring claims against him, that Johnsons did not pretend to have bought any claim but'the Comal judgment, and they had failed to prove that they owned that one; and, therefore, evidence that Brown authorized them to purchase claims was irrelevant, and should have been excluded.
Hancock g- West also for defendant in error.
—Where there is no bill of exceptions to a motion overruling a continuance, the court will not revise the ruling of the court below. (Parker v. McElvane, 17 Tex., 157; Dangerfield v. Paschal, 25 Tex.; Campion v. Angier, 16 Tex., 93; Baker v. Kellogg, 16 Tex., 117.)
The third assignment of error is to the ruling of the court, in excluding a certified copy of the transfer from Dooley.
The affidavit of Johnson does not lay a sufficient predicate for the introduction of secondary evidence.
1. They only swear by inference to the existence of the deed itself.
2. There is no affidavit of the diligent search, in the proper places, that the law requires, nor in fact anywhere; ■ nor does he swear he ever attempted to get the deed from Dooley. (1 G-reenl. on Ev., § 558.)
3. This transcript of the deed cannot be admitted in evidence, because, 1, it is not an instrument required or permitted to be recorded; 2, the execution was not proved. (Erskine v. Wilson, 20 Tex., 80.)-
4. It is also clear, from the statement of facts, that the whole proof of title was irrelevant, because the judgment, to which they sought to show title, was then in the Supreme Court, and consequently could not be pleaded in offset in this suit. (Weathered v. Mays, 1 Tex., 472.)

Opinion:
Wheeler, O. J.
—Under the repeated decisions of this court, the refusal of the court below to grant.a continuance will not be revised, for the reason, that no exception was taken to the ruling.
The principal question in the case is, whether the court ruled rightly in excluding the evidence offered to prove the transfer of the judgment pleaded in set-off) from one of the plaintiffs therein to the defendants.
The ground on which the court excluded the certified copy' of the transfer from the plaintiff in the judgment to Dooley, was, that it was not an instrument which is within the provision of the registry laws, and was not therefore within the provision of the statute providing for the proof of the instrument by the production of a certified copy. (0. & W. Dig., Art. 469.) We are of opinion, that the ruling was correct, for the reason assigned.
To maintain his right to introduce the copy in evidence, the plaintiff in error relies on the 4th section of the act of 1846, "to provide for the registry, of deeds," &c., (0. & W. Dig., Art. 1706.) Literally understood and considered, without reference to other provisions of the laws upon this subject, this section would seem to authorize the recording of the transfer in question; and equally the transfer of a promissory note or any other chose in action. But this could not have been intended, since it could subserve no purpose contemplated by the registry laws. The object of the section appears to be, to declare the duty of the recorder to record the instruments, the recording of which was contemplated by'the law, when "proved or acknowledged according to law, and delivered to him to be recorded;" that is, to prescribe the circumstances or requisites which impose the duty to record the instrument, and not to define or prescribe what instrument ought to be recorded. That subject was embraced in other enactments. The object of recording deeds and other instruments, evidencing the title to property, is to give notice of the ownership, where it is not evidenced hy actual possession. But what purpose or notice could the registry of such a transfer as the present subserve? If made a record anywhere, it ought, it would seem, to be in the court where the judgment was recorded and remains of record. We do not think it such an instrument as the law contemplates shall be recorded, and are of opinion that the court did not err in excluding the copy offered to prove the assignment of the judgment.
This proposed evidence of the transfer by the plaintiff in the judgment having been excluded, there was no error in excluding evidence of the subsequent transfer, or of the authority of the defendant to make the purchase of the claim. Generally, the court will not interfere to control parties as respects the order in which they shall introduce their proofs. But where there is a fact essential to be proved as a basis for the introduction of other evidence, or where the materiality and relevancy of other evidence depend on proof of the proposed fact, it is within the discretion of the court to refuse to have its time consumed by proceeding with the introduction of such other evidence, until evidence of that fact shall first have been produced. Until the transfer in question was proved, it was useless to introduce evidence of the subsequent transfer, and it was within the discretion of the court to refuse to admit it. As the plaintiff had alleged a transfer in writing, the parol evidence offered to prove the allegation was very properly excluded. There is therefore no error in the rulings of the court upon the admissibility of evidence.
We are of opinion, that the evidence was properly excluded for another reason. It did not prove, or conduce to prove, any valid defense to the action. If the facts which it was proposed to prove were admitted, they did not constitute the proper subject-matter of a plea of set-off in this action. The defense is supposed to be warranted by the decision of this court in the case of Swenson v. "Walker's Administrator, (3 Tex., 93.) That case, however, is plainly distinguishable from the present. The account which was there held to be binding on the. estate had been allowed by the administrator and approved by the probate judge. Thus established, it was presented to the administrator by the party who proposed to purchase it, and he -ftas asked if it would be paid; to which he replied that it would. ' This was more than two years after it had been allowed and approved. Upon the faith of such allowance and approval, and the assurance of the administrator that it would be paid, the party purchased the claim; and it was held that, under these circumstances, the administrator was precluded from contesting its original justice, and that it was binding on the estate. That was a very different case from the present. Here, the defendant has bought up a claim against the estate which was never presented to the administrator for allowance, and is not in any manner established as a valid subsisting claim against the estate, and seeks to have it allowed as a set-off in the District Court against the estate. No ease has gone to the extent of permitting such a defense. It is averred, that the administrator had authorized the defendant to buy up claims against the estate; but not that he had authority to purchase this particular claim. It does not appear, nor is it averred, that the administrator had ever, in any way, admitted or recognized it as a just and subsisting claim against the estate. It is reasonable to suppose, and the contrary is not averred, that he reserved to himself the right to pass upon the justice of the claims which might be presented by the defendant. But be this as it "may, it is conceived the administrator has no authority to bind the estate in this manner. The law confers upon him no such authority. He may bind himself, but cannot bind the estate, by authorizing a party to buy up claims against it. The party who incurs expense by purchasing such claims, at the instance of the administrator, must look to him, and not to the estate, to be reimbursed their expenses, unless they are established as valid subsisting claims against the estate in the mode prescribed by law. To allow such defenses as the present, would greatly embarrass the settlement of estates, and would lead to the investigation of questions in the District Court touching the solvency of the estates, and other matters concerning their administration and settlement, which belong to the Probate Court, and the investigation of which ought to be confined to that court.
It is scarcely necessary to say, that this claim cannot be interposed by the defendant in this action against the administrator in his personal capacity.
It follows, from the view we have taken, that the court did not err in refusing a new trial. There is no error in the judgment, and it is
Affirmed.