Case Name: Abe McFARLAND, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas
Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1999-03-24
Citations: 989 S.W.2d 749
Docket Number: No. 1093-98
Parties: Abe McFARLAND, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas.
Judges: in which MANSFIELD, KELLER, PRICE, WOMACK and KEASLER, JJ., joined.
Reporter: South Western Reporter Second Series
Volume: 989
Pages: 749–754

Head Matter:
Abe McFARLAND, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas.
No. 1093-98.
Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, En Banc.
March 24, 1999.
Pamela S. Derbyshire, Houston, for appellant.
Carol M. Cameron, Assistant DA, Houston, Matthew Paul, State’s Atty., Austin, for the State.

Opinion:
OPINION
McCORMICK, P.J.,
delivered the opinion of the Court,
in which MANSFIELD, KELLER, PRICE, WOMACK and KEASLER, JJ., joined.
A jury convicted appellant of aggravated robbery. Appellant entered a plea of true to the enhancement paragraph. The jury found the enhancement allegation true and assessed punishment at confinement in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division, for seventy-five years.
In his brief on direct appeal, appellant raised five points of error. The Houston Court of Appeals, First District, decided appellant waived the contention presented in his first point of error but it nevertheless reversed the judgment of the trial court and remanded the case for a new trial based on unassigned error relating to the prosecution's jury arguments. McFarland v. State, 902 S.W.2d 540 (Tex.App.-Houston [1 st Dist.] 1995). This Court granted the State's petition for discretionary review, and remanded the case to the Court of Appeals to address appellant's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. We dismissed the State's other grounds for review without prejudice. McFarland v. State, 930 S.W.2d 99 (Tex.Cr.App.1996).
On remand, the Court of Appeals rejected appellant's sufficiency challenge and again reversed based on the prosecution's jury argument. McFarland v. State, No. 01-93-0536-CR, 1998 WL 255174 (Tex.App-Houston [1 st Dist.] delivered May 21, 1998). We granted the State's petition for discretionary review on three grounds.
We will address the grounds for review in the same order as presented by the State in its petition. We begin with the first ground for review and agree with the State that the Court of Appeals, in its original opinion, failed to conduct a proper preservation of error analysis with respect to the arguments made by the prosecution during closing. The State called as a rebuttal witness James Bolding, the supervisor of criminalistics at the Houston Police Department crime lab. Officer Bolding testified that he compared blood taken from appellant and semen samples taken from the complainant but the results were inconclusive. Bolding then concluded that a DNA test was the best scientific method of determining whether the semen sample linked appellant to this crime. However, he explained that a DNA analysis would take a minimum of four weeks to complete. The State then announced that it would not oppose a motion by the defense for a continuance. Appellant responded that he had no motion. At the end of rebuttal redirect examination, the State made another suggestion that appellant move for a continuance to await the DNA test results. Appellant responded by stating that if the State was moving for a continuance, then the matter needed to be discussed before the bench.
During closing argument, appellant criticized the prosecution for waiting too long to "try to positively identify appellant through scientific testing." Appellant also argued Holding's testimony "so far indicates" appellant was not the perpetrator.
"Defense Counsel: The most telling testimony came this morning, as you know. The most telling testimony came in the form of the testimony from Officer Hubly and Officer Bolding. You know from ivhat the assistant district attorney told you that they started the scientific test in this case last Friday. This case has been pending, as you know, from the date of his arrest back in September. They chose to, on Friday, for whatever reason, try to positively identify this defendant through scientific testing, and they asked H.P.D. crime lab to assist them in that regard. You know what they told you this morning. I want to briefly remind you of this testimony because it is so essential and so crucial. You know from what Officer Bolding told you that there are two types of individuals and only two types. There is the secreter and non-secreters. With a secreter, what they're seeking to do is match up the blood type with the seminal fluid in this case that they had located and recorded and saved through the vaginal swab on Delice Hannon on that night. What he told you was that they were unable to match up the defendant in this case, who is type O, with what they found on the vaginal swab that night, which type A. The most telling evidence in this case came from the State's own witness when he told you, in answer to my question— and I quote — The evidence we have so far indicates it is not this defendant. I ask that you consider that evidence with all the gravity and magnitude that that evidence deserves." (Emphasis added).
The State responded with the following:
"Prosecutor: Say one more thing to you about the DNA evidence. That is another piece of evidence that I drew a warrant and I got some blood to show you as much as I could. Defense attorney here certainly does not want you to know the DNA final result. He did not.
"Defense Counsel: Your Honor, I'm going to object. Outside the record. That's nonsense.
"The Court: Sustained.
"Prosecutor: The defense attorney stood up here and postulated to you that, well, the man said, the last time he said it he said it the way the defense attorney wanted it said. I can't say it's him. And he doesn't ask the court-and this is on the record and you can consider it-he didn't even ask for the court's consideration on a motion for continuance to have time to get the results.
"Defense Counsel: I object. Outside the record. I'm not required to make a motion for continuance so the State can put together a case. If the State wants to move for continuance, let them move for continuance.
"The Comt: Overruled. Please proceed.
"Prosecutor: You can consider every bit of that. Why would it huH Abe McFarland for you to see the bottom line? I have nothing to hide. Again, if we didn't get the results in time, by all means, I'm taking the hit on that one, and I don't want to dodge blame if it's mine. I'll take that responsibility, but please don't hold that against [the complainant]. She doesn't deserve that. And we have enough evidence, we have abundant evidence here, more than is necessary beyond a reasonable doubt for you to base a verdict of guilty on. Don't reward him because they laid low until the end of trial and got lucky enough for us not to have a DNA result. It's obvious to everyone in this courtroom that he really doesn't want to see it.
"Defense Counsel: Your Honor, again, I'm going to object. Outside the record.
"The Court: Sustained." (Emphasis added).
In this case, after the trial judge sustained the objections to the first, third, and fourth emphasized arguments made by the prosecution, appellant did not ask for an instruction to disregard or move for a mistrial. This Court has held that before a defendant will be permitted to complain on appeal about an erroneous jury argument, he will have to show he objected and pursued his objection to an adverse ruling. Cockrell v. State, 933 S.W.2d 73, 89 (Tex.Cr.App.1996). Since the record reflects that appellant did not pursue his objections to the first, third, and fourth emphasized arguments to an adverse ruling, appellant failed to preserve any error as to these arguments.
The next issue we address is whether the Court of Appeals erred in failing to hold that the prosecutor's second emphasized argument fell within the bounds of permissible jury argument. To be proper, jury argument must encompass summation of evidence presented at trial, reasonable deductions drawn from evidence, answers to opposing counsel's argument, or plea for law enforcement. Lagrone v. State, 942 S.W.2d 602 (Tex.Cr.App.1997), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 118 S.Ct. 305, 139 L.Ed.2d 235 (1997); Nethery v. State, 692 S.W.2d 686 (Tex.Cr.App.1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1110, 106 S.Ct. 897, 88 L.Ed.2d 931 (1986).
In this case, a reasonable inference from appellant's jury argument is that the prosecution did not want the jury to know the results of any DNA test since the prosecution waited so long to request such a test. The prosecution during its closing argument simply responded to this argument by pointing out the defense also did not want the jury to know the results of any DNA test. We find that the prosecution's statement qualifies as a permissible answer to argument of opposing counsel. Nethery 692 S.W.2d at 703.
The Court of Appeals decided the prosecution's argument was not a legitimate response to appellant's argument because appellant's argument never mentioned "DNA testing." See McFarland, 902 S.W.2d at 543. On this record, appellant's argument referring to "scientific testing" was a reference to "DNA testing." On this record, everyone knew the reference to "scientific testing" was a reference to "DNA testing."
Based on the foregoing we sustain grounds for review one and two, making it unnecessary to address ground for review three. We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand to the Court of Appeals to address appellant's remaining points of error.
HOLLAND and JOHNSON, JJ., files dissenting opinions.
MEYERS, J., not participating.
. None of appellant's points of error in the Court of Appeals complained of improper jury arguments.