Case Name: PEOPLE v. ALBION CIDER & VINEGAR CO. et al.
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1909-07-06
Citations: 118 N.Y.S. 15
Docket Number: 
Parties: PEOPLE v. ALBION CIDER & VINEGAR CO. et al.
Judges: 
Reporter: West's New York Supplement
Volume: 118
Pages: 15–21

Head Matter:
PEOPLE v. ALBION CIDER & VINEGAR CO. et al.
(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Fourth Department.
July 6, 1909.)
1. Reference (§ 58 )—Proceedings—Amendment of Pleadings.
A referee appointed, under Code Civ. Proc. § 1013, for the trial of issues, has the same power a court has to permit an amendment of a pleading upon the trial as provided by section 723, by conforming it to the facts proved.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Reference, Cent. Dig. §§■ 89, 90; Dec. Dig. § 58. ]
2. Reference (§ 58 )—Proceedings—Amendment of Pleadings.
An amendment of a complaint upon the trial, the effect of which is to separately number and state in appropriate counts the several causes of action alleged in gross, and the excision of unnecessary matter, is proper and within the power of the referee.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Reference, Cent. Dig. §§■ 89, 90; Dec. Dig. § 58. ]
3. Food (§ 16 )—Penalties.
Evidence hold sufficient to warrant a finding that vinegar in barrels marked “pure cider vinegar” was adulterated by the addition of artificial coloring matter in violation of Agricultural Law (Laws 1893, p. 667, c. 338) §§• 50-52.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Food, Dec. Dig. § 16. ]
4. Food (§ 16 )—Penalties.
For marking as “pure cider vinegar” barrels containing artificial ■ coloring matter, in violation of Agricultural Law (Laws 1893, p. 667, c. 338) §§ 50-52, cumulative penalties are recoverable under section 53, imposing a penalty for “each” violation, though the barrels are sold or kept for sale as a single lot.
[Ed. Note.-—For other cases, see Food, Dec. Dig. § 16. ]
McLennan, P. J., dissenting.
Appeal from Trial Term, Orleans County.
Action by the People of the State of New York against the Albion Cider & Vinegar Company and others. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendants appeal.
Affirmed.
Argued before McLENNAN, P. J., and SPRING, WILLIAMS, KRUSE, and ROBSON, JJ.
James M. E. O’Grady, for appellants.
Thomas C. Burke, for the People.
For other cases see same topic & § number in Dec. & Am. Digs. 1907 to date, & Rep'r Indexes

Opinion:
ROBSON, J.
Defendant the Albion Cider & Vinegar Company is a domestic corporation engaged in the manufacture and sale of cider and vinegar at Albion, N. Y. The other defendants in the order in which they are named in the title to the action are, respectively, the president and general manager, and the manager having immediate charge of the plant, of the corporation. The action was properly brought and prosecuted in the name of the people by the officers who are clothed with appropriate authority for that purpose. The judgment recovered is made up of 15 separate penalties of $100 each for keeping for sale at specified dates "one certain barrel of adulterated vinegar, as and for cider vinegar, which had been theretofore manu factored for sale by said defendants and which contained artificial coloring matter, was a product in imitation or semblance of cider vinegar and which was not made exclusively from pure apple juice," .and for marking or branding "as and for cider vinegar said certain barrel containing such adulterated and imitation vinegar by branding the same with the words 'New York State Pure Cider Vinegar,' all in violation of sections 50, 51, and 52 of the agricultural law (Laws 1893, p. 667, c. 338)."
Defendants urge that the referee erred in allowing an amendment of the complaint, which permission was given on an application made .at the final submission of the case. Defendants insist that the application should have been denied for laches. The right to make application for amendment of the pleadings was expressly reserved by stipulation. If the referee had the power to grant the amendment, the application was made in time. The referee, of course, had the same power a court has to permit an amendment of ,a pleading upon the trial of the action. Code Civ. Proc. § 1013. This includes the power to amend a pleading by conforming it to the facts proved, where the amendment does not substantially change the claim or defense. Code, 5 723. The original complaint charged defendants with manufacturing for sale and keeping and offering for sale adulterated vinegar, and with falsely branding such vinegar as "Pure. Cider Vinegar." As a part of such vinegar, the complaint' referred specifically to the' 15 barrels from which the 15 samples in question were taken and referred to. each sample by its appropriate number. The complaint as amended separately stated and numbered as separate causes of action a violation of the statute in regard to each of these 15 barrels, with two counts for each. No fact is stated in the amended complaint, and no cause of action therein alleged, which do not appear in the original complaint. Probably it was unnecessary to amend the original pleading, as a recovery on a complaint identical in form with this, mutatis mutandis, was sustained by this court, and later by the Court of Appeals. People v. Niagara Fruit Co., 75 App. Div. 11, 77 N. Y. Supp. 805, affirmed 173 N. Y. 629, 66 N. E. 1114. In any event, the effect of the amendment was simply to separately number and state in appropriate counts the several causes of action alleged in gross in the original complaint, and an excision therefrom of much extraneous and unnecessary matter. The amendment was proper, and within the power of the referee to allow, as he did.
Much of appellants' argument is expended in an effort to show that plaintiff failed to prove that the vinegar in these 15 barrels was adulterated within the meaning of the statute. 'The finding of the referee is that the vinegar in each barrel "contained artificial coloring matter, was a product in imitation or semblance of cider viriegár,/and -which was not made exclusively'from pure apple juice." Appellants urge that there is no proof, or not sufficient proof, that the vinegar contained artificial coloring matter, and that, if there is any evidence that 'if contained other substances than pure apple juice, these are 'accounted for by a possible addition of water,, containing, perhaps, no more than the normal amount of sodium,! etc., ordinarily found in water recognized, or usually considered, as pure. They further say that the addition of water to an extent which does not reduce the percentage of acetic acid below the statutory requirement is not a violation of the statute. People v. Heinz Co., 90 App. Div. 408, 86 N. Y. Supp. 141. Much of the evidence as to the results of the different tests made indicates only the addition of water. But, even if we are 'bound to accept the doctrine that the addition of water without explanation of the propriety or necessity of such addition is not an adulteration within the statute, there is, I think, sufficient evidence that each barrel of vinegar in question did contain artificial coloring matter of some kind, and that the vinegar for that reason alone was adulterated, and not cider vinegar within the definition of the statute. Two recognized tests for artificial coloring matter appear to be the Puller's earth test, and the acetate of lead test. Bach of these was applied by the witness Hill to samples examined by him, and he testifies that they disclosed the presence of added coloring matter. The other chemist, Miller, who examined eight other samples, says the vinegar was artificially colored. It is true he made the Puller's earth test on only one of the samples examined by him, and that disclosed such coloring. But his examination of the other samples by the acetate of lead test showed results which clearly indicated, as shown by Hill's and Mosher's testimony, results and conditions that would be accounted for by the presence of added coloring matter. In view of the evidence of the people's chemists that such coloring matter had been added, and of the somewhat evasive and unsatisfactory evidence of defendant's chemist that he found none he identified, the evidence of defendant Doyle, limited as it was to a statement that no injurious or deleterious matter had been added, taken in connection with the failure to call defendant's employes to testify as to the composition of the vinegar, and expressly that no coloring matter had been added, I think the finding of the referee as to that fact was correct.
Defendant also claims that, at most, only two penalties of $100 each could properly have been imposed, because there were but two lots of barrels inspected, which were on sale, had been sold, or offered for sale. I recognize the universal distaste of the courts to an award of cumulative penalties. But, if the statute clearly shows an intention that a penalty can be recovered for each offense, I understand the courts will still enforce them. Suydam v. Smith, 52 N. Y. 383-388. It is true that the opinion of the court in Griffin v. Interurban St. Ry. Co., 179 N. Y. 438, 449, 72 N. E. 513, contains an expression which might almost be interpreted to mean that a recovery of successive penalties could only be permitted under the present interpretation of statutes prescribing penalties when the law in so many words declared that the recovery by the same plaintiff of successive or cumulative penalties is allowed. I do not think, however, it has yet been held that, where the statute by other apt words shows the intention to create a liability for each infraction of the statute, the recovery of cumulative penalties is precluded. It will be observed that the recovery here is for false branding or marking each of 15 barrels of vinegar. Such false marking of a package is declared a violation of the statute. And a penalty of $100 is prescribed "for each violation." Section 53, c. 338, p. 668, Laws 1893. It would seem from the distinction sought to be drawn in the use of words prescribing a penalty for violation of a statute that, if the word "each" instead of the word "every" had been used in the statute .under consideration in the case last referred to, a different conclusion might have been reached by the court. Griffin v. Interurban Ry. Co., 180 N. Y. 538, 72 N. E. 1142. In any event, I think we must for the present, at least, hold that cumulative penalties are recoverable under this statute. In the case of People v. Niagara Fruit Co., supra, there was a recovery of two penalties for two separate sales of adulterated vinegar and eight penalties for falsely marking eight packages included in these sales. '
It is true this question is not discussed in the opinion in this court; but that it was at least a matter of consideration by the learned referee who heard that case appears from the following extract from his opinion then delivered:
"In my opinion the act of manufacturing and. selling as 'cider vinegar1' adulterated vinegar which simulated cider vinegar, but was not cider vinegar, constitutes but one offense in the case of each Shipment, for the reason that each transaction was an entirety. The marking of the barrels 'cider vinegar,' however, seems to be a distinct offense under the statute, and the marking of each one is a separate offense."
This was followed by an award of separate penalties for each offense.
The recovery of judgment against the individual defendants, who occupied, as to the defendant corporation, relations practically the same as the individual defendants did in the Niagara Fruit Co. Case, is warranted under the holding in that case.
Judgment affirmed, with costs. All concur, except McLENNAN, P. J., who dissents in an opinion.