Case Name: PEOPLE v. LOCKRIDGE
Court: Michigan Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 2014-02-13
Citations: 304 Mich. App. 278
Docket Number: Docket No. 310649
Parties: PEOPLE v LOCKRIDGE
Judges: Before: BECKERING, EJ., and O’CONNELL and SHAPIRO, JJ.
Reporter: Michigan appeals reports; cases decided in the Michigan Court of Appeals.
Volume: 304
Pages: 278–317

Head Matter:
PEOPLE v LOCKRIDGE
Docket No. 310649.
Submitted October 1, 2013, at Detroit.
Decided February 13, 2014, at 9:00 a.m.
Leave to appeal granted, 496 Mich _.
An Oakland Circuit Court jury found Rahim O. Lockridge guilty of involuntary manslaughter, MCL 750.321. The recommended minimum sentence range under the sentencing guidelines was 43 to 86 months. The court, Nanci J. Grant, J., sentenced defendant to 8 to 15 years’ imprisonment, reflecting a 10-month upward departure from the recommended range for the minimum sentence. The court articulated the following reasons for the departure: (1) defendant (who had children with the victim) violated court orders regarding contact with her, (2) the sentencing guidelines did not reflect the extent of defendant’s prior altercations with the victim, (3) defendant killed the victim in the presence of their children and then left the residence while the children attempted to revive her, and (4) during and after the offense, defendant showed no concern for the children’s physical or emotional well-being. Defendant appealed.
In separate opinions, the Court of Appeals held:
1. Alleyne v United States, 570 US_; 133 S Ct 2151 (2013), held that any fact that increases the mandatory minimum sentence is an element that must be submitted to the jury or admitted by the defendant. People v Herron, 303 Mich App 392 (2013), subsequently rejected the argument that under Alleyne, the judicial fact-finding required by the Michigan sentencing guidelines to determine the minimum term of an indeterminate sentence violated the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. Herron was binding on subsequent panels under MCR 7.215(J)(1).
2. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by departing upward from the guidelines recommendation, and defendant is not entitled to resentencing.
3. A remand to the trial court is necessary for the ministerial task of correcting an error remaining in the presentence investigation report
Sentence affirmed and case remanded.
O’Connell, J., wrote the lead opinion and concluded that the trial court’s reasons for the departure were objective and verifiable. Considering the exceptional nature of the crime, the reasons stated keenly and irresistibly grabbed the panel’s attention in support of the upward departure. Moreover, while the prior record and offense variables accounted for defendant’s past criminal record and the psychological injury to the victim’s family, given the unique circumstances at hand, the trial court did not err by finding that those variables inadequately accounted for defendant’s conduct. Judge O’Connell also concluded that he was bound to follow Herron and declined to address the argument based on it.
BECKERING, BJ., concurring, agreed that under Herron defendant was not entitled to resentencing but also concluded that Herron was wrongly decided. United States Supreme Court precedent dictated that the guidelines range within which a sentencing court in Michigan must fix a minimum term of imprisonment is itself a legally prescribed mandatory minimum. Further, the mandatory minimum permissible for purposes of Alleyne is the guidelines range determined solely on the basis of a defendant’s criminal history and the facts reflected in the jury’s verdict or admitted by the defendant. Michigan’s sentencing scheme requires a trial court to engage in fact-finding by scoring the offense variables to determine the applicable guidelines range for a minimum sentence. Because of this, facts that are neither found by a jury nor admitted by a defendant increase the minimum term of imprisonment to which a defendant is exposed and, thus, the penalty. Alleyne prohibited this and therefore rendered Michigan’s indeterminate sentencing scheme unconstitutional. Earlier Michigan decisions that held that the state’s sentencing scheme was constitutionally sound were made without the benefit of the Alleyne Court’s ruling that any fact that increases the mandatory minimum is an element that must be submitted to the jury. While Judge Beckering agreed with Judge Shapiro that the upper end of the recommended minimum sentence range has no bearing on the maximum term of imprisonment to be imposed, she disagreed with his view that only the bottom of the minimum sentence range presents an Alleyne Sixth Amendment problem. Fact-finding to score the guidelines increases both the floor and the ceiling of the sentencing range, and an increase of the ceiling enhances the maximum minimum sentence a court can impose. This increases the penalty because both the floor and ceiling of sentence ranges define the legally prescribed penalty To remedy the constitutional defect, Judge Beckering would have made the Michigan sentencing guidelines advisory, as the United States Supreme Court did for the federal sentencing guidelines.
Shapiro, J., concurring, agreed with the lead opinion that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by departing upward from the guidelines recommendation and further agreed with Judge Beckering that the analysis in Herron did not comport with Alleyne, which explicitly barred judicial fact-finding that results in an increased mandatory minimum sentence, i.e., a sentencing floor, regardless of whether that mandatory minimum is defined within the statutory offense or by applicable statutory sentencing guidelines. Courts retain broad discretion to impose a minimum sentence within the limits fixed by law, but Alleyne made it clear that a trial court does not have the authority to set those limits with its own fact-finding. Judge SHAPIRO also agreed with Judge BECKERING that the upper end of the Michigan guidelines constitutes a maximum minimum sentence, but no case has established that category as being of Sixth Amendment import. It has no relevancy to the maximum term of imprisonment and, while it limits a court’s ability to sentence above a certain minimum term, it does not trigger a constitutional issue. He therefore disagreed with Judge Beckering that Alleyne rendered the entirety of the Michigan sentencing guidelines constitutionally infirm. Only the bottom of the minimum sentence range presents an Alleyne problem. The top of a given guidelines range does not set a mandatory minimum, and setting it through judicial fact-finding therefore presents no constitutional impropriety. Contrary to Judge Beckering’s view, only the lower end of the guidelines range need be advisory. Trial courts could continue to score the guidelines using findings made by a preponderance of the evidence standard, upper limits of the guidelines would remain mandatory, upward departures would be permitted only when there are substantial and compelling reasons for them, and downward departures from the lower end of a range would be subject to appellate review for reasonableness.
Bill Schuette, Attorney General, Aaron D. Lindstrom, Solicitor General, Jessica R. Cooper, Prosecuting Attorney, Thomas R. Grden, Chief, Appellate Division, and Danielle Walton, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for the people.
State Appellate Defender (by Desiree M. Ferguson) for defendant.
Before: BECKERING, EJ., and O’CONNELL and SHAPIRO, JJ.

Opinion:
O'CONNELL, J.
Defendant appeals as of right his sentence of 8 to 15 years' imprisonment for his jury-based conviction of involuntary manslaughter, MCL 750.321. We affirm defendant's sentence, but remand the case to the trial court for the ministerial task of correcting the presentence investigation report (PSIR).
Defendant first argues that the trial court abused its discretion by imposing a 10-month upward departure from the sentencing guidelines. Defendant maintains that the guidelines adequately accounted for his conduct and that the trial court failed to articulate a substantial and compelling reason for the departure. We review for abuse of discretion the trial court's conclusion that there was a substantial and compelling reason to depart from the guidelines. People v Hardy, 494 Mich 430, 438 n 17; 835 NW2d 340 (2013). A trial court " 'may depart from the appropriate sentence range established under the sentencing guidelines set forth in MCL [777.1 et seq.'] if the court has a substantial and compelling reason for that departure and states on the record the reasons for departure.' " People v Babcock, 469 Mich 247, 256; 666 NW2d 231 (2003), quoting MCL 769.34(3) (alteration in original). A substantial and compelling reason must be based on objective and verifiable factors. People v Horn, 279 Mich App 31, 43; 755 NW2d 212 (2008). "To be objective and verifiable, a reason must be based on actions or occurrences external to the minds of those involved in the decision, and must be capable of being confirmed." Id. at 43 n 6. "The reasons for departure must also be of considerable worth in determining the length of the sentence and should keenly or irresistibly grab the court's attention." People v Anderson, 298 Mich App 178, 183; 825 NW2d 678 (2012) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Further, as intended by the Legislature, a substantial and compelling reason exists only in exceptional cases. Babcock, 469 Mich at 257. Lastly, the "departure must be proportionate to the defendant's conduct and criminal history. The trial court must justify the particular departure it made by explaining why the sentence imposed is more proportionate than a sentence within the guidelines recommendation would have been." People v Portellos, 298 Mich App 431, 453; 827 NW2d 725 (2012) (quotation marks and citations omitted).
Defendant's 8-year minimum term of imprisonment is an upward departure from the recommended sentencing guidelines range of 43 to 86 months. The trial court articulated the following reasons for the departure: (1) that defendant had violated court orders regarding contact with the victim, (2) that the sentencing guidelines did not reflect the extent of defendant's prior altercations with the victim, (3) that defendant killed the victim in the presence of their children, and then left the residence while the children attempted to revive the victim, and (4) that during and after the offense, defendant showed no concern for the physical or emotional well-being of the children.
This Court has previously concluded that the psychological injury suffered by the victim's family members, the demonstration of escalating violence toward the victim, and the existence of a probation violation constitute objective and verifiable reasons to depart from the guidelines. See, e.g., People v Corrin, 489 Mich 855 (2011); Horn, 279 Mich App at 48; People v Schaafsma, 267 Mich App 184, 185-186; 704 NW2d 115 (2005). The trial court's reasons for the departure are objective and verifiable. Further, considering the exceptional nature of the crime, the trial court's stated reasons keenly and irresistibly grab this Court's attention in support of the upward departure.
Defendant argues that his conduct has been adequately accounted for by the sentencing guidelines. In departing from the sentencing guidelines, a trial court may "not base a departure on an offense characteristic or offender characteristic already taken into account in determining the appropriate sentence range unless the court finds from the facts contained in the court record, including the presentence investigation report, that the characteristic has been given inadequate or disproportionate weight." MCL 769.34(3)(b) (emphasis added). While prior record and offense variables may account for defendant's past criminal record and the psychological injury to the victim's family, given the unique circumstances at hand, the escalation of the domestic-violence conduct toward the victim, the fact that the crime occurred in plain view of the children, and that defendant left his children alone with the trauma of attempting to revive their mother, the trial court did not err by finding that the prior record and offense variables inadequately accounted for defendant's conduct.
Defendant also argues that the trial court based its departure on improper factors, i.e., defendant's gender and a belief that defendant was guilty of the greater offense of second-degree murder. A trial court may not base a departure on a defendant's gender or make an independent finding regarding whether a defendant is guilty of another offense and justify the departure on that basis. MCL 769.34(3)(a); People v Glover, 154 Mich App 22, 45; 397 NW2d 199 (1986), overruled in part on other grounds by People v Hawthorne, 474 Mich 174; 713 NW2d 724 (2006). While the trial court discussed the jury's verdict, the trial court's comments did not suggest or reveal an intention to base the departure on a perceived belief that the jury was wrong. Moreover, a review of the record does not suggest that the trial court departed from the guidelines because of defendant's gender. Indeed, the trial judge shared her opinion regarding domestic violence cases but, again, those comments do not suggest or reveal an intention to depart on that basis. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by departing upward from the sentencing guidelines range.
In a supplemental brief, defendant argues that the trial court engaged in judicial fact-finding, which, according to defendant, violated the new rule in Alleyne v United States, 570 US_; 133 S Ct 2151; 186 L Ed 2d 314 (2013). This Court recently held that the decision in Alleyne does not implicate Michigan's sentencing scheme. See People v Herron, 303 Mich App 392; 845 NW2d 533 (2013). This Court is bound to follow Herron, and accordingly, I decline to address the argument in defendant's supplemental brief.
At sentencing, defendant challenged the accuracy of the information in the PSIR, and the trial court agreed to make four corrections to the report. The PSIR has been amended and all but one of the changes has been made. Specifically, the PSIR still contains the following sentence: "[K.L.] told the police that her father was choking her mother in the master bedroom upstairs." Therefore, this Court remands for the ministerial task of making the correction to the PSIR and orders the trial court to transmit a corrected copy of the report to the Department of Corrections. See People v Martinez (After Remand), 210 Mich App 199, 203; 532 NW2d 863 (1995), overruling on other grounds recognized by People v Edgett, 220 Mich App 686, 692-694; 560 NW2d 360 (1996).
We affirm defendant's sentence, but remand for the ministerial task of correcting the PSIR. We do not retain jurisdiction.