Case Name: Rennold PENDER, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Mose ALIX et al., Defendants and Respondents, v. Leon BROWN, Intervening Plaintiff and Respondent
Court: Utah Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Utah
Decision Date: 1960-08-24
Citations: 11 Utah 2d 58
Docket Number: No. 9167
Parties: Rennold PENDER, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Mose ALIX et al., Defendants and Respondents, v. Leon BROWN, Intervening Plaintiff and Respondent.
Judges: Crockett, C. J., dissented.
Reporter: Utah Reports, Second Series
Volume: 11
Pages: 58–64

Head Matter:
354 P.2d 1066
Rennold PENDER, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Mose ALIX et al., Defendants and Respondents, v. Leon BROWN, Intervening Plaintiff and Respondent.
No. 9167.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Aug. 24, 1960.
Crockett, C. J., dissented.
Rennold Pender, Richard S. Johnson, Salt Lake City, for appellant.
Boyden, Tibbals, Staten & Croft, Salt Lake City, for intervening plaintiff and respondent.

Opinion:
HENRIOD, Justice.
Appeal from a summary judgment in favor of Intervenor Brown in a quiet title action. Affirmed with costs to Brown.
In September, 1942, Brown received a 'tax deed from Salt Lake County to the •subject property. In 1947 Pender filed a •quiet title suit in which the property, along •with many other parcels, was described. He joined Salt Lake County as defendant, but -not Brown. In 1948, he filed a lis pendens giving notice of the pending suit. Later Brown learned of Pender's action, and intervened in July, 1959, setting out the tax deed, alleging continued occupancy and payment of taxes thereon at all times after receipt of the tax deed (for about 17 years), •and setting up Title 78-12-5.2, U.C.A.1953 in support of his title.
Pender answered, generally denying Brown's contentions. Thereafter Brown filed authenticated copies of tax receipts and the tax deed, valid on its face, along with a motion for summary judgment, again pleading Title 78-12-5.2 as a defense to Pender's claim. Nowhere did Pender plead or attempt to prove occupancy or payment of taxes during or after the four years ensuing after Brown obtained his tax deed.
Under such uncontroverted circumstances and applying the provisions of Title 78 — 12— 5.2 thereto, it becomes obvious that Pender was vulnerable to the four-year limitations statute mentioned. Therefore, there was no genuine issue of fact triable and the summary judgment inescapably was proper.
We have interpreted the statute the same way in two previous cases of similar factual import, to which reference hereby is made.
WADE, McDONOUGH, and CALLIS-TER, JJ., concur.
. Hansen v. Morris, 1955, 3 Utah 2d 310, 283 P.2d 884; Peterson v. Callister, 1957, 6 Utah 2d 359, 313 P.2d 814.