Case Name: PERRY vs. PERRY
Court: Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
Jurisdiction: Pennsylvania
Decision Date: 1874-10-19
Citations: 4 Walk. 389
Docket Number: No. 110
Parties: PERRY vs. PERRY.
Judges: 
Reporter: Reports of cases decided by the supreme court of pennsylvania which have been omitted from the regular reports
Volume: 4
Pages: 389–391

Head Matter:
PERRY vs. PERRY.
A deed may be converted into a mortgage by parol evidence show* ing that it was taken as a security for money loaned.
Where one party is dead, the other party is not a competent witness even to contradict a witness who has testified to events occurring during decedent’s life time.
Error to District Court of Allegheny County. No. 110, November Term, 1878.
This was an action of ejectment brought by Emma M. Perry, sole heir of John F. Perry, against Hugh Perry to recover two lots of ground. The plaintiff alleged that John F. Perry conveyed the two lots to Hugh Perry, under a parol agreement that he should pay certain debts of John P. Perry, and after he was reimbursed from the rents, or paid otherwise, he would reconvey the same. She also alleged that Hugh Perry was fully reimbursed, and refused to reconvey as agreed.
Jane H, Perry, the widow of John F. Perry, having released all her interest in the property to her daughter, was examined as a witness for plaintiff, and was allowed to testify, though objected to by the defendant. 1 he defendant was offered as a witness to contradict Jane H. Perry, but was rejected. The jury rendered a verdict in favor of the plaintiff. Hugh Perry then took a writ of error, complaining of the admission and rejection of testimony. Hugh Perry had executed a mortgage to John F. Perry, who negotiated; and thus raised money to pay part of the debt.
Messrs. D. W. Bell and M. W. Atcheson, Esqs., for plaintiff in error,
argued a parol trust was void, and cited Act of April 22, 1856, P. Laws, 533, Sect. 4; Chaffees vs. Risk, 24 Pa., 432; Craft vs. Webster, 4 R., 255; Wilson vs. Schoeuberger, 31 Pa,, 295; Moore vs. Cornell, 68 Pa., 322; Hewitt vs. Hu ing, 11 Pa., 27; Porter vs. Mayfield, 21 Pa., 263; Barnet vs. Dougherty, 32 Pa., 371; Seichrist’s Appeal, 66 Pa., 237; Kellum vs. Smith, 33 Pa., 165; Brawdy vs. Brawdy, 7 Pa., 158; Todd vs. Campbell, 32 Pa., 250; DeFrance vs. DeFrance, 34 Pa., 385; McGinity vs; McGinity, 63 Pa., 38; Murphy vs. Hubert, 16 Pa., 50; Thomsons’s Appeal, 70 Pa., 434.
Messrs. Weir, & Gibson, contra,
argued that a deed may be shown by parol to be only a security for money loaned, and then only amounted to a mortgage; and cited: Craft vs. Webster, 4 R., 255, Wilson vs. Shoenberger, 31 Pa., 295; Moore vs. Cornell, 68 Pa., 322; Chaffees vs. Risk, 24 Pa., 432; Harper’s Appeal, 64 Pa., 315; Danzeisen vs. Miller, 73 Pa., 65; Murphy vs. Hubert, 7 Pa., 424.
They also argued that Jane H. Perry, having assigned her interest, was rightly admitted to testify; Taylor vs. Gitt, 10 Pa., 430; Cornell vs. Vanartsdalen, 4 Pa., 373; Smith vs. Bank, 5 S. & R., 318; Kerns vs; Soxman, 16 S. & R., 315; Karns vs. Tanner, 66 Pa., 297.

Opinion:
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the District Court on October 19, 1874, in the following opinion:
Per Curiam.
That a deed absolute on its face may be converted into a mortgage by parol evidence, showing that it was taken as a mere security for a loan of money, is too well settled to be questioned. It is also decided that this being the real purpose of the deed, the fact that it is through the instrumentality of a mortgage given by +he grantee, does not change the relation of the part.es, as between the grantor and grantee. In this case the testimony of Mr. Dicken, as to the use to be made of the deed, is clear, distinct and positive. If believed the testimony was satisfactory and convincing of the purpose intended. He was also strongly cortoboratsd. The effect of the evident© of the defendant was to raise a question of credibility, merely, and this was rightly submitted to the jury. Jane H. Perry, the widow, was no party to the issue, and having released - her interest in the estate, she was a competent witness at common law. The Act of April 15, 1869, P. Laws, 30, did not apply to the case. Its purpose is not to disqualify, but to make competent, witnesses, who, before its passage, were incompetent. Finding no error in the record, the judgment of the Court below is
Affirmed.