Case Name: Zanib CHAUDHRY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. TARGET CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 2016-01-28
Citations: 632 F. App'x 38
Docket Number: No. 14-3388
Parties: Zanib CHAUDHRY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. TARGET CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee.
Judges: PRESENT: DENNIS JACOBS, RICHARD C. WESLEY, and DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON, Circuit Judges.
Reporter: West's Federal Appendix
Volume: 632
Pages: 38–39

Head Matter:
Zanib CHAUDHRY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. TARGET CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee.
No. 14-3388.
United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
Jan. 28, 2016.
Karen R. King (Jeffrey Newton, Damon C. Andrews, and Lance A. Polivy on the brief), Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison LLP, New York, NY, for Appellant.
Daniel J. Krisch, Halloran & Sage LLP, Hartford, CT, for Appellees.
PRESENT: DENNIS JACOBS, RICHARD C. WESLEY, and DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON, Circuit Judges.

Opinion:
SUMMARY ORDER
Zanib Chaudhry appeals from the judgment of the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut, granting summary judgment in favor of defendant-appellee Target Corporation ("Target"). We assume the parties' familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history, and the issues presented for review.
We review an order granting summary judgment de novo, drawing all permissible inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. Lederman v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Parks & Recreation, 731 F.3d 199, 202 (2d Cir.2013). Plaintiff asserts common law negligence against Target for creating or failing to remedy a dangerous condition that caused her to slip and fall on an unknown substance (thought to be spilled orange liquid). Chaudhry raises two issues: (1) whether Target had actual or constructive notice of the spill; and (2) whether Target's "mode of operation" gave rise to a foreseeable risk of injury to customers and plaintiffs injury was proximately caused by an accident within that zone of risk.
As to constructive notice, plaintiff abandoned this theory of liability during the summary judgment hearing. See Special App'x at 2. The argument is therefore waived. See Island Software & Comput. Serv., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 413 F.3d 257, 262 (2d Cir.2005).
As to "mode of operation" liability, we agree with the district court that the claims do not survive summary judgment. The law of the forum state governs a diversity case. See Omega Eng'g, Inc. v. Omega, S.A., 432 F.3d 437, 443 (2d Cir.2005). In Connecticut, the mode of operation doctrine allows proof of "negligence upon presentation of evidence that the mode of operation of the defendant's business gives rise to a foreseeable risk of injury to customers and that the plaintiffs injury was proximately caused by an accident within the zone of risk." Fisher v. Big Y Foods, Inc., 298 Conn. 414, 3 A.3d 919, 926 (2010) (quoting Kelly v. Stop & Shop, Inc., 281 Conn. 768, 918 A.2d 249, 263 (2007)). We conclude here that Target's mode of operation did not give rise to a foreseeable risk of injury to customers of the sort experienced by plaintiff.
For the foregoing reasons, and finding no merit in Chaudhry's other arguments, we hereby AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.