Case Name: White v. King and M'Call
Court: Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia
Jurisdiction: Virginia
Decision Date: 1835-07
Citations: 5 Leigh 726
Docket Number: 
Parties: *White v. King and M’Call.
Judges: 
Reporter: Virginia Reports
Volume: 32
Pages: 271–276

Head Matter:
*White v. King and M’Call.
July, 1835.
riilldams — Motion to Abate as Nuisance — Case at Bar. —An act of assembly empowers a county court to issue a writ of ad quod damnum, and to give leave to an individual to make a dam across a river which is a public highway, as if it was not a public highway, provided he shall not be entitled to the benefit of the act, unless he make in his dam, and keep in repair, a lock or slope for the passage of fish, boats, &c. and the act constitutes the county court judges of the sufficiency of the lock or slope, with power to abate the dam as a nuisance, if, after three months notice entered of record, the lock or slope shall, in its opinion, be insufficient; the dam is erected by leave of the court; notice is given by two individuals, and entered of record, of a motion to abate the dam as a nuisance, because raised higher than authorized, and because no sufficient lock or slope; and on that motion the county court orders dam to be abated as a nuisance, and the circuit superiour court affirms the order: Held,
1. Same — Same—Criminal Prosecution — Writ of Brror —This is a criminal prosecution, and a writ of error lies from this court to the order of the cir. cuit superiour court, affirming order of the county court.
2. Same — Same—notion in Name of Individuals —The act does not authorize the proceeding by motion in the name and behalf of individuals, upon notice given by them.
3. Same — Same—Power of Court to Allow Time to Alter Dam. — The county court, adjudging that the dam was raised too high, and that there was no sufficient lock or slope, had authority to give the proprietor reasonable time to reduce his dam to the proper height, and to construct a sufficient lock or slope.
The proceedings in this case were founded on an act of assembly, passed in January 1817, entitled “an act concerning James White;” Sess'. Acts of 1816-17, p. 193. The preamble recited, that White was engaged in the erection of extensive machinery for the manufacture of iron, that a dam across Holstein river (theretofore declared a public highway) was indispensably necessary for the purpose, that it was represented that a dam might be erected in such manner as not to obstruct navigation or the passage of fish, by building a lock or slope &c. and that it was the wish of the legislature to encourage the manufacture of iron, an article of the first necessity: therefore, the act (§ 1,) empowered the county court of Washington to grant a writ of ad quod damnum, and, in general, gave that court the same power in the matter, *as if the river had not been declared a public highway, provided White should not be entitled to the benefits of the act, unless he should erect in his dam, and keep always in repair, a lock or slope sufficient for the passage of fish, boats &c. and (§2,) constituted the county court judges of the sufficiency of the lock or slope, with full power at any time to abate the dam as a nuisance, if, after three months notice to the proprietor thereof, entered of record, the lock or slope should, in its opinion, be insufficient for the passage of fish, boats &c.
In October 1833, King and M’Call served a notice on White, that they would, at March term 1834 of the county court of Washington, submit a motion to that court to abate his iron-works dam erected across the north fork of Holstein river, because the same was more than six and a half feet high; and because he did not erect therein, and keep in repair, a lock or slope sufficient for the passage of fish and boats. And they gave him a further notice, that at the November term 1833 of the same court, they would submit a motion to have the first mentioned notice entered of record. Accordingly, at November term, both notices were duly proved; and White being called and not appearing, the court ordered the first mentioned notice to be entered of record, and that it would “proceed, on the first day of March term, to ascertain whether it would abate the iron-works dam aforesaid for the reasons stated in the first notice; and it was further ordered, that White should be summoned to shew cause, why the court should not abate his dam as a nuisance, because the dam was more than six and a half feet high, and because he had not erected in the said dam, and kept in repair, a lock or slope sufficient for the passage of fish and boats, and because he, had, on the contrary obstructed, and still obstructed, the navigation of the river and the passage of fish, the slope erected by him being insufficient for the passage of fish, boats &c. At March term 1834, the motion was continued till the second day of the term, on the motion of King and M’Call, and at their costs; and, on that day, it was continued till the next term, at White’s costs. At * April term, the case was continued at the costs of King and M’Call; and they consented, that White might take an affidavit to be read on the trial. At May term, White moved the court to quash the proceedings ; which motion was overruled. He moved, that a jury might be sworn to-decide the facts in issue; which was also refused. And the court, having heard the testimony and arguments of counsel, adjudged “that the said iron-works dam of White was more than six and a half feet high, and that he had not erected, and kept in repair, a lock or slope, sufficient for the passage of fish, boats &c. and that the dam obstructed the navigation of the river and the passage of fish; therefore, that the dam was a nuisance, and that it should be abated; that White should pay the costs of this motion, and that the commonwealth’s writ be directed to the sheriff, commanding him to abate the dam. But the court added, that it would, had it thought it had the: power, have ordered, that, if White would reduce his dam to six and a half feet high, and construct a lock or slope, by which fish and boats could pass the river, and which he, in open court, proposed to do, judgment should be entered pursuant to this proposition of White, allowing a reasonable time to perform the same; but thinking it had no-such power, it refused to give time &c.
To this order, the circuit superiour court of Washington, upon the application of White, allowed a writ of error; but, upon the hearing, it affirmed the order: and then White applied to this court for a writ of error to the order of affirmance; which was allowed.
Taylor, for the plaintiff in error.
Johnson, for the prosecutors, King and M’Call.
MiHdams. — See monographic note on “Mills and Milldams” appended to Calhoun v. Palmer, 8 Gratt. 88.
Writ of Error. — See generally, monographic note on “Appeal and Error” appended to Hill v. Salem, etc., Co., 1 Rob. 263.
This, it Is presumed, was the height to which, by the inquisition on the writ of ad quod d amnum, and the order of the county court thereupon, White was authorized to raise his dam. — Note in Original Edition.

Opinion:
MAY, J.,
delivered the opinion of the court. The first question which arises here, is, has this court jurisdiction? In other words, is this proceeding, in its nature, a civil or a *criminal one? •To determine it, we must look to the nature of the act or offence which is complained of, and the judgment rendered, rather than to the mode of proceeding prescribed by the statute or adopted by the court. The act or offence is one injurious to the public-generally, and not to individuals ; it is a nuisance; emphatically, a public offence; and the judgment of the court is for the abatement of that nuisance. It is for the benefit, not of any individual, but of the public: it condemns White to-no remuneration of private injury, but to-the forfeiture of a valuable grant, declared by the law to be indispensable to his iron works, and represented by him to involve a heavy loss. But, it is said, the privilege to White was a grant on certain conditions; and that this, being a proceeding for the' purpose of ascertaining whether he has not lost the privilege, by failing to comply with the conditions, and not being by indictment or information, is, therefore, a civil proceeding. The single condition of this grant was, that he should erect, and keep in repair a lock or slope sufficient for the passage of fish, boats &c. Had the law terminated with this provision, what course must have been pursued, to abate the dam, when the condition had been broken? Certainly, a prosecution by indictment or information. Can the abatement of a nuisance become a civil proceeding, merely because a statutory remedy, more simple or more summary has been specially prescribed, or because the nuisance has resulted from the breach of the condition of a statutory grant? Suppose that the second section of the statute, instead of the plenary power, thereby delegated to the county court, had authorized an information to be filed, without any previous rule, and a trial of the case upon process returnable instanter; or that, standing in its present form, it had required furthermore, that the court should imprison the proprietor, until the dam should be abated: would the proceeding have been a civil one? Surely, no. The dam, then, being declared to be a nuisance, and liable to be abated, upon the condition before stated, we are of opinion, that the proceeding for that purpose, in '^whatsoever form prescribed, is, in its nature, a criminal proceeding; and, therefore, that this court has jurisdiction.
The second question is, whether the proceedings have conformed with the provision of the statute? It may well be doubted what particular course was in contemplation of the legislature; for none is distinctly indicated; and it is well known, that very little attention is bestowed by that body, generally, on the details of. statutes of a local or private nature. But we may safely affirm, that it was not intended, that the proceeding should assume the form of a motion, in the name and behalf of private individuals, upon a notice given by them, and admitted to record by the court, without any perceptible motive or object. What possible information could White derive from the notice given, and the orders made at November term, except that two individuals complained of his dam and slope, and that the court intended, at a future day, to investigate the complaint? Suppose, however, that he had taken a different view, and had made such alterations as might satisfy those persons; what could prevent another, who perhaps might disapprove of that change, from taking precisely the same step, at the next term? Every change of plan might leave some one dissatisfied; and, if the court should ever sustain the complaint of any person whatever, the inevitable consequence, according to the judgment in this case, would be the destruction of the dam. Although the county court had been satisfied (as it seems, in fact, it was) that proper alterations might be made, and that a reasonable time ought to be allowed for the purpose, rather than pronounce a judgment which right involve the ruin of the proprietor; yet it is contended, that the notice of two individuals, given and admitted to record three months before, should, without any evidence or investigation whatever on the part of the court, require White to commence altering his slope, at the peril, of having his dam prostrated as a nuisance, and probably his costly and valuable machinery and other works destroyed, if the court should be of opinion, that there was the slightest obstruction to the navigation, at the moment of its action on the subject. ®The intention of the legislature-should be strongly expressed, and the mode of proceeding distinctly indicated, before we should adopt a construction, which would lead to results so harsh. Eor these reasons, we are of opinion, that the proceeding under the notice and on the motion of individuals was illegal.
It is said, however, that although this mode be improper; yet the court made substantially the proper orders, in the first instance, and allowed White the proper time to alter his slope. But it had no power capriciously or arbitrarily to make orders, which were likely to have such important effects on the rights of this individual. It should have had legal evidence to prove that the slope was not in the condition required by law, before any order whatever was made : whereas it is obvious that it proceeded on the belief, that the notice given was the proper initiatory step, and that the first orders made, were merely formal matters, in order to a hearing and decision of the controversy. The plaintiff in error doubtless adopted the same idea : and thus when he ascertained the opinion of the court to be that his slope was insufficient, he discovered at the same moment, that the utter destruction of his dam and works was to be the unavoidable consequence. Considering, therefore, that these proceedings were irregular and illegal from the commencement, we are of opinion, that the motion to quash them ought to have been sustained.
But we are also of opinion, that after the county court had decided upon the insufficiency of the slope, it was competent of it to allow a reasonable tipie for the making of such alterations as would render it sufficient. The statute does not mandatorily direct the court, in all events, to abate the dam, at the instant when, after three months notice, it adjudges it to be an obstruction of the navigation; it gives the court full power, at any time, to do so, if after such notice, it shall be, in its opinion, insufficient. Laws must be construed reasonably and with reference io their subject matter. If after the notice in this case, White had, by proper locks or slopes, obviated all obstructions to the navigation, 'x'and immediately before the term of the court, at which the cause was to be decided, a tempest or fresh should have destroyed the works erected for that purpose, will it be contended, that the court had no power, except to complete the destruction which the hand of providence had left imperfect?
When we erect that the legislature designed to confer a benefit on White, for a purpose which it declared its wish to promote ; that a dam or other works erected across any water course, and especially across mountain rivers, would always be liable to occasional accidents and injuries; and that the reparation of them must So a work of time; we cannot but presume, that the legislature designed to confer, as indeed their language implies, full power on the county court, to act with a just discretion in the matter.
For these reasons, the orders of both courts must be reversed.