Case Name: Mitchell v. Van Buren et al.
Court: New York Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1863-06
Citations: 27 N.Y. 300
Docket Number: 
Parties: Mitchell v. Van Buren et al.
Judges: 
Reporter: New York Reports
Volume: 27
Pages: 300–306

Head Matter:
Mitchell v. Van Buren et al.
Upon a motion by a subsequent judgment creditor to set aside judgments confessed by his debtor under § 383 of the Code, the court may allow an amendment supporting the judgment by the signing and verifying a new statement stating the facts more specifically.
Appeal from the Supreme Court. On the 11th of October, 1856, John M. Olmstead and Horace Hanford recovered a judgment against Harmon Van Burén, for $337.77, and Levi Olmstead another judgment against the same defendant, for $406.50. Both these judgments were upon confession, and they were duly docketed in Delaware county.
In March, 1860, Harmon Mitchell recovered a judgment against Van Burén in an action; the particulars of this judgment are not stated, but it was docketed in the same county.
• In February, 1862, Mitchel made a motion to set aside the judgments of the Olmsteads and Hanford, on account of the insufficiency of the statements. The motion was founded xxpon the confessions and records of these judgments, and upon an affidavit, stating the facts above quoted, and also that Van Burén was insolvent; that his real estate, upon which these judgments were liens, was about to be sold under foreclosures, and that there were other judgments against him.
The motion was opposed, with affidavits showing the particulars and consideration of the debts for which the Olmstead judgments were confessed; that they were confessed in good faith, and that the insufficiency of the statements was occasioned by the ignorance 'of the person who drew them, who was not a lawyer; that the debtor continued to transact business afterwards, and that had the motion been made and the judgments set aside at an earlier day, the plaintiffs might, nevertheless, have collected their debts.
An order was made at the special term, granting the motion unless new and verified statements should be subjoined to the judgments, stating the facts more specifically; granting leave to amend the judgments-by such statements, and denying the motion" if the judgments were so amended, and upon payment of costs. The order to be without prejudice to the creditors making the motion to bring an action to vacate the judgments.
The order was affirmed at the general term, on appeal, with costs, and the moving party in the court below appealed to this court.
Abraham, Becker, for the appellant.
William, Gleason, for the respondents.

Opinion:
Denio, Ch. J.
The question involved in this appeal is, whether the Supreme Court possesses power to authorize an amendment of the statement required to be signed and verified, upon the confession of a judgment, under sections 382, 383 and 384 of the Code. It has been plausibly argued, that the judgments contemplated by these provisions are statutory proceedings, as distinguished from judgments of courts, and that if a mistake be made, so that it could be said that the statute has not been substantially complied with, the proceeding is void and incapable of amendment, the courts having no more power in the matter than they would have to relieve against the omission to record a deed or mortgage, or any other thing which is wholly regulated by statute, irrespective of the courts'. But I think the argument is not warranted by the language of the legislature.' The last mentioned section expressly declares that, upon the statement being filed, the clerk shall enter in the judgment book, a judgment of the Supreme or said Superior Court. , These courts, as is well known, have a jurisdiction over their records, and have always been accustomed to relieve, upon a summary application, against the errors and mistakes of their officers and the suitors of the courts, by amendments and by allowing papers to be filed and entries made nunc pro tunc in, furtherance of justice. The proceedings of the appellant in the matter under review, can only be justified upon this theory. For if the judgment is to be considered as a matter unconnected with the court, there would have been no jurisdiction to entertain the appellant's motion to set aside the judgment; and the question whether it conformed to the statute, or was void for the want of such conformity, could:only be litigated in a regular action in which its validity should be collaterally brought in question. In my opinion, the court had the same power which they would have possessed if it had been rendered in an action actually pending in the court.
The courts of original jurisdiction have always exercised a large and very beneficial power, in supplying deficiencies or remedying defects in judgments and other judicial proceedings existing in their courts. But it will not be necessary to refer to the cases, since the jurisdiction has been affirmed in its greatest extent by the legislature. The 173 d section of the Code declares what may be done in this respect by the court, in furtherance of justice, and on such terms as it may judge proper It may amend any proceeding, by adding or striking out the name of any party, or by correcting a mistake in the name of a party, or a mistake in any other respect, or by inserting other allegations material to the case. This is very broad language, and plainly embraces a case like the present, where it was shown that the proceeding was in good faith, and the intention of the parties was to create valid judgments for debts honestly due, .to the amount stated in the judgment. But we are only concerned with the question of jurisdiction. The Supreme Court, having power to permit the amendment, had the exclusive right to determine whether a proper case was made for the exercise of its jurisdiction, and to prescribe the terms upon which the permission should be accorded. It is a jurisdiction of the same kind with that which it exercises in relieving against defaults and slips in practice, and its determinations in such matters are not reviewable on appeal to this court. I think the order should be affirmed.
Wright, Selden, Rosekrans, Balcom and Marvin, Js., concurred.