Case Name: Joseph Maier v. Andrew Homan and Jacob Wernz
Court: New York Court of Common Pleas
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1871-11
Citations: 4 Daly (N.Y.) 168
Docket Number: 
Parties: Joseph Maier v. Andrew Homan and Jacob Wernz.
Judges: 
Reporter: Daly's Common Pleas Reports
Volume: 4
Pages: 168–170

Head Matter:
Joseph Maier v. Andrew Homan and Jacob Wernz.
An agreement not to engage in a particular business, unless it be restricted as to time and place, is void.
Where the verdict is rendered on incompetent testimony, and there is a well founded reason to believe that justice has not been done, the judgment will be reversed, even though there was no exception taken on the trial which would on appeal present the question of the incompetency of the evidence.
Appeal by plaintiff from a judgment of this- court entered upon a verdict at trial term; also, appeal from order denying plaintiff’s motion for a new trial.
The action was brought upon a promissory note for $500, dated July 1st, 1867, at six months, made by defendant Homan, and indorsed by defendant Wernz. The answer alleged that this note and another of like amount were given by defendant Homan upon the purchase by him of the interest of the plaintiff in the copartnership formerly existing between them; that the plaintiff, as part consideration of the notes, agreed that he would not engage in the same business again in the city of New Tort, and the breach of such agreement; that plaintiff obtained the notes by fraud.
The first note was paid before this suit was brought.
D. McAdam, for appellant.
A. H. Jdea/oey, for respondent.

Opinion:
Labremore, J.
—It appears, by positive testimony, that the property of the copartnership, at the time of its dissolution, was worth the sum of $2,000, independent of the alleged exclusive right to carry on the business of the firm. It cannot be pretended that Homan did not receive an equivalent in property for the amount of the notes given in payment.
There was no such evidence of fraud or. wilful misrepresentation as would justify the finding of the jury in this case. Nor does it appear that the notes were given upon the faith of an agreement that the plaintiff would not engage in the same business in the city of New York. The defendant swears, " plaintiff told me if I would buy his share in the cabinet business, he (plaintiff) would cease being in that trade."
Even regarding this statement as a part consideration of the sale, it is void as a defense, in that it is unlimited as to time and place (Chappel v. Brockway, 21 Wend. 157; Dunlop v. Gregory, 10 N. Y. 243).
It may have been the honest intention of the plaintiff, at the time he made such statement, to relinquish the business in which he was then engaged. But that such intention was made a condition of the sale, for a breach of which the sale might be avoided, is not, in my judgment, established by the evidence.
The verdict is against the evidence, and although the jury have passed upon the question of fraud, it is the duty of the court to grant a new trial ( Vance v. Phillips, 6 Hill, 436).
It is true, that there was no sufficient exception taken at the trial, but where (as in this case) there is a well founded reason for believing that justice has not been done, and that the verdict was rendered on incompetent testimony, it is just and proper for the court to interpose its authority and grant relief.
The judgment appealed from should be reversed on payment of the costs of the trial, and a new trial ordered.