Case Name: CHRISTENSEN, Petitioner-Appellant, v. EPLEY, et al, Respondents, MURPHY, et al, Petitioners-Respondents,
Court: Oregon Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Oregon
Decision Date: 1979-10-23
Citations: 287 Or. 539
Docket Number: TC 14561, CA 9092, SC 25898/25909
Parties: CHRISTENSEN, Petitioner-Appellant, v. EPLEY, et al, Respondents, MURPHY, et al, Petitioners-Respondents,
Judges: Before Denecke, Chief Justice, and Holman, Tongue, Howell, Linde and Peterson, Justices.
Reporter: Oregon Reports
Volume: 287
Pages: 539–580

Head Matter:
Argued and submitted June 4,
affirmed in part; reversed in part; and remanded October 23,
rehearing denied November 13, 1979
CHRISTENSEN, Petitioner-Appellant, v. EPLEY, et al, Respondents, MURPHY, et al, Petitioners-Respondents,
(TC 14561, CA 9092, SC 25898/25909)
601 P2d 1216
W. Eugene Hallman, Pendleton, argued the cause for petitioner/appellant. With him on the brief was Robert T. Mautz and Mautz and Hallman, Pendleton.
I. Franklin Hunsaker, Portland, argued the cause for petitioners/respondents. With him on the brief were R.R. Bullivant, Douglass M. Hamilton, Bulliv-ant, Wright, Leedy, Johnson, Pendergrass & Hoffman, Portland, and Corey, Byler & Rew, Pendleton.
Before Denecke, Chief Justice, and Holman, Tongue, Howell, Linde and Peterson, Justices.
TONGUE, J.
Separate opinions by TONGUE, J., PETERSON, J., and HOLMAN, J.

Opinion:
TONGUE, J.
This is an action for wrongful death. It was filed by the personal representative of the estate of a police officer who was fatally stabbed by one Daryl Thompson in the course of Thompson's efforts to assist in the escape of a female inmate from a juvenile detention center in Pendleton.
Named as defendants in addition to Daryl Thompson were Sherrie Murphy, the matron on duty at the center on the night of the escape and an employee of Umatilla County, who allegedly permitted Thompson to enter it and visit the inmate; James Epley and Tim Waller, also county employees, who allegedly assigned Murphy to work alone as the matron on the night of the escape, and Umatilla County.
The complaint was filed on behalf of decedent's surviving widow, his five minor children, and his mother. The complaint alleged and prayed for damages in the sum of $300,000 against defendants Murphy, Waller, Epley and Umatilla County. The trial court, on motion by these defendants, struck the allegation of damages in that amount on the ground that it exceeded the statutory limit under the Oregon Tort Claims Act of $100,000, as provided by ORS 30.270(1)(b). The trial court also sustained defendants' demurrer to plaintiff's complaint.
The Court of Appeals, on appeal by plaintiff from the resulting judgment dismissing her complaint with prejudice, held that the trial court erred in sustaining defendants' demurrer, but also held that the trial court properly limited plaintiff's prayer for relief to $100,000. 36 Or App 535, 585 P2d 416 (1978). Both parties filed petitions for review to this court. Defendants' petition for review asks this court to reverse the holding by the Comb of Appeals that the trial court erred in sustaining defendants' demurrer to plaintiff's complaint and that plaintiff is entitled to a trial under the allegations of her complaint. Plaintiff's petition for review asks this court to reverse the holding by the Comb of Appeals that the trial court properly limited plaintiff's prayer for relief to $100,000.
This court is equally divided on the question whether the Court of Appeals was correct in its holding that the trial court erred in sustaining defendants' demurrer to plaintiff's complaint. Chief Justice De-necke, Justice Holman and Justice Peterson are of the opinion that the trial court did not err. Justice Tongue, Justice Howell and Justice Linde are of the contrary opinion. Justice Lent disqualified himself from participation in this case.
Because the comb is equally divided upon this question a majority of the comb is of the view that it would serve no useful purpose for the court, as a court, to issue any opinion on this question. It follows, however, that the decision by the Court of Appeals must be affirmed on this question, with the result that plaintiff is entitled to a trial under the allegations of her complaint.
This court is unanimous, however, in its holding that the Comb of Appeals erred in its holding that the trial court properly limited plaintiff's prayer for relief to $100,000.
As previously stated, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals held that plaintiff's potential recovery of damages against Umatilla County and its employees, defendants Epley, Waller and Murphy, was limited to $100,000 by reason of provisions of the Oregon Tort Claims Act, ORS 30.270(l)(b).
ORS 30.270(1) provides:
"(1) Liability of any public body or its officers, employes or agents acting within the scope of their employment or duties on claims within the scope of ORS 30.260 to 30.300 shall not exceed:
"(a) $50,000 to any claimant for any number of claims for damage to or destruction of property, including consequential damages, arising out of a single accident or occurrence.
"(b) $100,000 to any claimant for all other claims arising out of a single accident or occurrence.
"(c) $300,000 for any number of claims arising out of a single accident or occurrence."
Defendants contend that the trial court and Court of Appeals were correct in so holding for the following reasons:
"The history and language of the Oregon Wrongful Death Act, ORS 30.010 et seq., and the cases decided thereunder show that a cause of action for wrongful death constitutes but one claim to be pursued by one claimant, the personal representative, regardless of how many persons are aggrieved by the wrongful death. The number of dependents and family relationships broaden the wrongful death measure of damages generally. But in wrongful death actions commenced under the Tort Claims Act, the number of beneficiaries simply defines the measure and apportionment of damages within the confines of the $100,000 limit governing the claim under ORS 30.270(1)(b). Therefore, the aggregate exposure of Defendants in this matter is $100,000, and the trial court was correct in so ruling."
A. The Oregon Wrongful Death Act.
The original Oregon Wrongful Death Act was enacted in 1862. See Deady, General Laws of Oregon 1845-1864, p. 241, § 367. The recovery under that first statute was for the benefit of the decedent's estate and the measure of damages, as held by this court in Carlson v. Oregon Short Line Ry. Co., 21 Or 450, 457-58, 28 P 497 (1892), was:
" the pecuniary loss suffered by the estate, without any solatium for the grief and anguish of surviving relatives or pain and suffering of the deceased; and that loss is what the deceased would have probably earned by his intellectual or bodily labor in his business or profession during the residue of his life, and which, as representing his net savings, would have gone for the benefit of his estate
In Carlson, however, this court (at 458-459) expressly distinguished between the Oregon statute and statutes as elsewhere adopted "modeled upon" the original Lord Campbell's Act, under which "the right of action is not given to the personal representative for the benefit of the estate, but for the benefit of certain persons named therein, and the personal representative is a mere nominal party, who sues for their benefit," saying:
« Not so un{jer Qur statute, where the object is to recover the loss sustained by the estate, and not to recover the pecuniary loss sustained by any particular individual or individuals.
"By force of [Hill's Code] section 371 [Deady Code § 367], the personal representative, in the prosecution of the action and the distribution of the proceeds, represents collectively all who are interested in the continuance of the life, whether as creditors, heirs, or distributees. "
and that:
" difference in the two classes of cases is between the damage done to the estate and the damage done to the designated persons. That to the estate is measured, as nearly as can be, by the value of the life lost, and that to the beneficiaries by the value of the life lost to them. "
We might well agree with defendant that under the original Oregon Wrongful Death Act there was but "one claim to be pursued by one claimant," so as to limit recovery under the Oregon Tort Claims Act to $100,000 by reason of the provisions of ORS 30.270(l)(b). We do not agree, however, with defendants' contention that the "basic character of the action remained unchanged" despite subsequent amendments to the Oregon Wrongful Death Act, or with defendants' contention that the effect of those amendments was only to "expand" the "measure and allocation of recoverable wrongful death damages."
On the contrary, we believe that the effect of amendments to the Oregon Wrongful Death Act, particularly those adopted in 1973, has been to so change its basic provisions as to make the Oregon Act more similar to wrongful death acts of the type described in Carlson under which the right of action in a case such as this is not primarily for the benefit of the estate, but for the benefit of the spouse and children of the decedent as the "real parties in interest," with the personal representative as "a mere nominal party," who sues for their benefit for the recovery of "the value of the life lost to them."
Under the present Oregon Wrongful Death Act, after amendments in 1939 and 1967, and more particularly in 1973, recovery is now expressly provided for the benefit of the spouse, children and parents of the decedent, not only for their pecuniary loss, but also for their loss of decedent's society, companionship and services, as well as for recovery to the estate of medical and funeral expenses, among other things. Thus, as a result of these amendments, the present statute provides, in effect, for an action to be brought in the name of the personal representative of the estate to enforce the individual claims of the spouse and of each child for the pecuniary loss to each of them as a result of the death of the decedent and for the loss to each of them of the decedent's society, companionship and services.
This is consistent with the view as stated in 2 Speiser, Recovery for Wrongful Death 2d, 238-40, § 11:34 (1975) that:
"A personal representative proceeding under wrongful death statutes requiring him to bring the action for the benefit of certain designated beneficiaries is a mere nominal party having no interest in the case for himself or the estate he represents. He does not act in his general capacity as executor or administrator or as representative of the decedent's estate. Instead, he sues as trustee on behalf of the particular persons designated in the act, even though the action is brought in his name as executor or administrator. In other words, the persons designated in the statute are the real parties in interest."
It follows, in our opinion, that we must reject defendants' contention that under the provisions of the Oregon Wrongful Death Act, there is in a case such as this, in which decedent left a widow and five children, "but one claim to be pursued by one claimant."
B. The Oregon Tort Claims Act.
As previously stated, the question to be decided is whether an action for wrongful death of a decedent leaving a widow and five children is subject to the $100,000 limitation imposed by ORS 30.270(1)(b) of the Oregon Tort Claims Act upon liability of public bodies or their officers, employees or agents "to any claimant for all other claims arising out of a single accident or occurrence," or whether such an action is subject to the $300,000 limitation imposed by ORS 30.270(1)(c) upon liability "for any number of claims arising out of a single accident or occurrence."
The terms "claimant" and "claims," as used in ORS 30.270, may be said to be ambiguous in the legal sense as applied to actions for wrongful death. In an attempt to discover the intent of the legislature in the use of these terms in this context, we have examined the legislative history of ORS 30.270 but have not discovered anything of any substantial assistance. We must therefore seek a solution to this problem by analysis of the terms of the Oregon Tort Claims Act, including ORS 30.270, when read together with the terms of . the Oregon Wrongful Death Act.
As previously stated, in actions for wrongful death involving a widow and minor children, they are the real parties in interest insofar as their claims under ORS 30.020(2)(d) for "pecuniary loss" and loss of services are concerned. It follows, in our judgment, that in such a case the personal representative of the estate, in prosecuting such claims under the Oregon Tort Claims Act in an action for wrongful death under the present Oregon Wrongful Death Act, acts only as a nominal party and is not a single "claimant" within the meaning of ORS 30.270(1)(b), so as to be subject to the limitation of $100,000 imposed by that subsection. Similarly, it follows, in our judgment, that in such a case there is more than one "claim" and more than one "claimant" within the meaning of ORS 30.270(1)(c), so as to be subject to the limitation of $300,000 as provided by that subsection.
For these reasons, the decision by the Court of Appeals reversing the trial court for sustaining defendants' demurrer to plaintiff's complaint must be affirmed because this court is equally divided on that question, but both the Court of Appeals and the trial court must be reversed for holding that the claims presented in this action for wrongful death, including claims for the benefit of decedent's widow and five children, are subject to the $100,000 limitation imposed by ORS 30.270(l)(b).
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
These motions and demurrers were filed on behalf of defendants Murphy, Epley, Waller and Umatilla County, who are referred to in this opinion as "defendants." Defendant Thompson is not involved in this appeal.
The Court of Appeals also held that the trial court properly sustained the demurrer of defendants Epley and Waller that plaintiff's complaint failed to state a cause of action under the Oregon Tort Claims Act against those defendants for the reason that their alleged conduct fell within the exception provided by ORS 30.265(3)(c) for discretionary acts. Neither petition for review contends that the Court of Appeals was wrong in so holding.
For a review of the history of the Oregon Wrongful Death Act prior to 1973, including amendments in 1939 and 1967, see Goheen v. General Motors Corp., 263 Or 145, 502 P2d 223 (1972).
Or L 1973 ch 718. See Comment, "Wrongful Death Actions in Oregon: New Developments," 10 Will. L.J. 217 (1974).
ORS 30.020 presently provides as follows:
"(1) When the death of a person is caused by the wrongful act or omission of another, the personal representative of the decedent, for the benefit of the decedent's surviving spouse, surviving children, surviving parents and other individuals, if any, who under the law of
intestate succession of the state of the decedent's domicile would be entitled to inherit the personal property of the decedent, may maintain an action against the wrongdoer .
"(2) In an action under this section damages may be awarded in an amount which:
"(a) Includes reasonable charges necessarily incurred for doctors' services, hospital services, nursing services, other medical services, burial services and memorial services rendered for the decedent;
"(b) Would justly, fairly and reasonably have compensated the decedent for disability, pain, suffering and loss of income during the period between injury to the decedent and the decedent's death;
"(c) Justly, fairly and reasonably compensates for pecuniary loss to the decedent's estate;
"(d) Justly, fairly and reasonably compensates the decedent's spouse, children and parents for pecuniary loss and for loss of the society, companionship and services of the decedent
In support of that contention defendants also refer to ORS 30.070 of the Oregon Wrongful Death Act, which provides that:
"The personal representative of the decedent, with the approval of the court of appointment, shall have full power to compromise and settle any claim of the class described in ORS 30.030, whether the claim is reduced to judgment or not, and to execute such releases and other instruments as may be necessary to satisfy and discharge the claim. "
and to ORS 30.030(1) which provides that:
"Upon settlement of a claim, or recovery of judgment in an action, for damages for wrongful death, by the personal representative of a decedent under ORS 30.020, the amount of damages so accepted or recovered shall be distributed in the manner prescribed in this section."
We do not believe these provisions to be inconsistent with the proposition that the widow and each child of a decedent have separate "claims."
This result is also consistent, in our judgment, with the provisions of ORS 30.275(2) of the Oregon Tort Claims, relating to notices of claims under the Act and which includes the following provision:
"When the claim is for death, the notice may be presented by the personal representative, surviving spouse or next of kin (Emphasis added)
Such a result is also consistent with the provisions of ORS 30.275(1), as amended in 1977 (Or L 1977 ch 823, § 3), which provide that notices of claims under the Oregon Tort Claims Act shall state "the name of the claimant and his representative or attorney, if any." (Emphasis added)
Thus, even though actions under the Oregon Wrongful Death Act must be filed in the name of the personal representative of the estate of the decedent for the benefit of his widow and children, it appears to be recognized by these provisions of the Oregon Tort Claims Act that when a claim under that Act is "for death," the "spouse" and "next of kin" of a decedent are "claimants"for the purpose of giving notice of such claims.