Case Name: John H. Dwight and Others, Respondents, v. Howard G. Badgley, Appellant
Court: New York Supreme Court, General Term
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1894-01
Citations: 82 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 174
Docket Number: 
Parties: John H. Dwight and Others, Respondents, v. Howard G. Badgley, Appellant.
Judges: PARKER, J. concurred.
Reporter: Supreme Court Reports (Hun)
Volume: 82
Pages: 174–180

Head Matter:
John H. Dwight and Others, Respondents, v. Howard G. Badgley, Appellant.
The knowledge of an agent biiids his principal — intent, how determined, and from what inferred — ■ evidence as to gambling contracts.
The knowledge of a person’s agent is his knowledge, and is binding upon him. It is competent for a .person to testify that he engaged in a transaction in good faith or with a particular intent, hut if the transaction he such that, from it or from other evidence, a different intent than the one testified to by him may be fairly inferred, the question with what intent the act was done is to be determined by the jury; and it may be inferred from the course of the dealings between the parties.
What evidence is sufficient to present a question for the jury whether certain transactions amounted to gambling contracts, considered.
(O’Brien, J., dissenting.)
Appeal by the defendant, Howard G. Badgley, from a judgment of the Supreme Court in favor of the plaintiff, entered in the office of the clerk of the city and county of New York on the 12th day
■of January, 1892, upon the verdict of a jury for $2,562.28, rendered by direction of the court after a trial at the New York Circuit, and also from an order entered in said clerk’s office on the 9th day of Eebruary, 1892, denying the defendant’s motion to set aside the verdict and for a new trial made upon the minutes.
Edwin B. lemitt, for the appellant.
Wolff <& Hodge, for the respondents.

Opinion:
Follett, J.:
Hedge, the plaintiffs' principal witness, and with whom the defendant had his transactions, was the New York agent of the plaintiffs. He testified: "In these transactions I was associated with Dwight and Gillette as broker, and I received my commissions from them, and in each one of these transactions I was paid my commissions by Dwight and Gillette, the plaintiffs."
The defendant testified: " Q. What was your intention in regard to these transactions and to the delivery of .this wheat and the purchase and sale of it at the time you made these transactions ? A. My intention was entirely to buy and sell on options, and to adjust the difference. Q. Between the market price of buying and the market price of selling ? A. Yes; that was, distinctly stated to Mr. Hedge. Q. Did he state that to you? A. That was distinctly understood. Q. Was there anything said in regard to how the profits or losses should be adjusted ? A. Most assuredly. Q. What was said ? A. I cannot remember the specific conversation, but the substance of it was he would buy and sell on options, and the difference I should have, if any, in my favor. Q. But if it was a loss, you should lose what you put up? A. Yes. Q. And that was so in regard to each one of these transactions ? A. Yes, each and every one."
Here is positive evidence that it was distinctly stated between the plaintiffs' agent and the defendant that the contracts were to be gambling contracts. The knowledge of the plaintiffs' agent is their knowledge, and it is binding on them. It is conceded that none of the grain mentioned in these transactions was ever delivered, and there is no evidence that the plaintiffs owned any grain, or that they purchased any for delivery to the defendant. All of the purchases were for future deliveries, and the statements of the transactions rendered by the plaintiffs and them bill of particulars corroborate the testimony of the defendant that the transactions were intended by both parties to be wager contracts.
The plaintiffs' agent did not deny that he had the conversation with the defendant as testified by defendant. It is true that he testified that he intended that the grain should be delivered. It is competent for a person to testify that he engaged in a transaction in good faith, or with a particular intent, but if the transaction be such that from it, or from the other evidence in the case, a different intent may be fairly inferred, the question with what intent is one for the jury. If the testimony of a party that he committed an act, which, if done with a lawful intent, would be innocent, but, if with an unlawful intent, a crime, is to be held conclusive, convictions in criminal cases in which intent is a material fact will be quite difficult.
The intent with which those parties bought and sold may be inferred from the course of dealing between them. (Kenyon v. Luther, 4 N. Y. Supp. 493 ; S. C., 19 N. Y. St. Repr. 32.)
I think the evidence presented a question of fact for the jury, and that the court erred in directing a verdict for the plaintiffs.
The judgment and order should be reversed and a new trial granted, with costs to the appellant to abide the event.
PARKER, J. concurred.