Case Name: Sol W. LAYKIN, Relator, v. John R. McFALL, Judge, 237th District Court, Lubbock County, Respondent
Court: Texas Courts of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1992-04-28
Citations: 830 S.W.2d 266
Docket Number: No. 07-91-0276-CV
Parties: Sol W. LAYKIN, Relator, v. John R. McFALL, Judge, 237th District Court, Lubbock County, Respondent.
Judges: Before DODSON, BOYD and POFF, JJ.
Reporter: South Western Reporter Second Series
Volume: 830
Pages: 266–278

Head Matter:
Sol W. LAYKIN, Relator, v. John R. McFALL, Judge, 237th District Court, Lubbock County, Respondent.
No. 07-91-0276-CV.
Court of Appeals of Texas, Amarillo.
April 28, 1992.
McWhorter, Cobb & Johnson, Brian P. Quinn and Gary R. Terrell, Lubbock, for relator.
Law Offices of Jack McClendon, Jack McClendon and Greg Teeter, Lubbock, for respondent.
Before DODSON, BOYD and POFF, JJ.

Opinion:
BOYD, Justice.
Relator Sol W. Laykin brings this petition seeking writ of mandamus directed to the Honorable John R. McFall, respondent. This proceeding arises from a suit against relator by Jane Livermore seeking recovery for conversion, fraud and deceptive trade practices. Relator, a California resident, filed a special appearance, contesting the Texas court's jurisdiction over him. Respondent, the trial judge, overruled relator's special appearance, finding the court did have jurisdiction over him.
Parenthetically, while neither respondent nor the real party at interest, Livermore, contests the right of relator to test respondent's action by this mandamus proceeding, a proper disposition of this proceeding requires us to determine whether the use of that vehicle is proper in this case. We note there is relevant precedent holding that a writ of mandamus may be sought when a special appearance is overruled. United Mexican States v. Ashley, 556 S.W.2d 784, 785 (Tex.1977); Hutchings v. Biery, 723 S.W.2d 347, 350 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 1987, no writ).
However, the viability of that precedent in the instant case requires us to examine closely the recent seminal decision of our Supreme Court in Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833 (1992). In that case, and as relevant here, the Court held that the propriety of a trial court refusal to accede to discovery requests might not be tested by mandamus, but, since the refusal could be tested on appeal, mandamus was not available. In the course of its holding, the Court conducted an extensive review of prior holdings indicating that mandamus was available in such instances. In doing so, it reiterated the long standing rule that mandamus would not lie where there is an adequate remedy by appeal and concluded that "an appellate remedy is not inadequate merely because it may involve more expense or delay than obtaining an extraordinary writ." Id. at 474, 827 S.W.2d at 842. In reaching that conclusion, the Court specifically disapproved cases which, it observed, had not adequately considered the above rule, and applied a more lenient standard justifying mandamus review whenever an appeal "would arguably involve more cost or delay than mandamus." Id.
However, in its discussion, the Court noted even in discovery cases there were instances where a party might not have an adequate remedy by appeal. One such instance, it commented, would be "where a discovery order compels the production of patently irrelevant or duplicative documents, such that it clearly constitutes harassment or imposes a burden on the producing party far out of proportion to any benefit that may obtain to the requesting party." Id. at 475, 827 S.W.2d at 843.
We believe the erroneous overruling of a special appearance is analogous to the above situation described by the Supreme Court. When a nonresident's special appearance is erroneously overruled, the burden on the nonresident is great; he must go through an entire trial in order to have the action dismissed on appeal. Furthermore, the burden is far out of proportion to any benefit that may obtain to the other party. In fact, there is no benefit to the other party in having to go through the expense and delay of an entire trial when the action will be dismissed on appeal with the result that the trial was an exercise in futility. That being so, the burden is heavy on both parties.
We believe the decisions in United Mexican States and Hutchings in holding that a writ of mandamus may be issued to correct an erroneous overruling of a special appearance constitute viable precedent in this ease. Thus, we hold that relator is entitled to seek mandamus in the instant proceeding.
It is well established that, to be entitled to mandamus, a relator must establish a clear legal right to the issuance of the writ. King v. Payne, 156 Tex. 105, 292 S.W.2d 331, 336 (1956). In this cause, relator requests that the trial judge be directed to set aside his order overruling the special appearance and enter an order granting his special appearance dismissing the underlying suit. Alternatively, relator requests that this court reverse the trial court's order and dismiss the suit for lack of personal jurisdiction.
The suit against relator arose from a transaction in which Livermore, a Texas resident, telephonically contacted relator, a California resident, and requested that he sell a ring for her. They agreed that the ring would be sent to relator and the proceeds, less a commission for relator, would be sent to Livermore in Texas. If relator was unable to sell the ring, it would be returned to Texas.
Livermore sent the ring to relator in California. However, before relator could find a buyer for the ring, Livermore found one in Texas. Livermore requested that relator return the ring, but he refused to do so and attempted to negotiate a purchase of the ring for himself. In doing so, relator sent two letters to Texas (one to Livermore and one to her attorney) and, Livermore alleged, relator made two phone calls to her in Texas. During this time, Livermore repeatedly demanded either return of the ring or payment of the amount she requested.
Prior to the suit, relator had never owned any real or personal property in Texas, never solicited any business in Texas, nor ever visited Texas. While relator has had up to twelve customers from Texas, all of the sales to them occurred in states other than Texas.
In U-Anchor Advertising, Inc. v. Burt, 553 S.W.2d 760, 762 (Tex.1977), cert, denied, 434 U.S. 1063, 98 S.Ct. 1235, 55 L.Ed.2d 763 (1978), the Court held that the Texas long arm statute is limited only by the constitutional limitations of due process. See also Hoppenfeld v. Crook, 498 S.W.2d 52, 56 (Tex.Civ.App.—Austin 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.). The U-Anchor Court went on to say that such a construction is desirable in that it allows courts to focus on the constitutional limitations of due process rather than engaging in technical and abstruse attempts to define the wording of the long arm statute. See U-Anchor, 553 S.W.2d at 762; Hoppenfeld, 498 S.W.2d at 56. Indeed, in Helicópteros Nacionales v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 413, 104 S.Ct. 1868, 1871, 80 L.Ed.2d 404, 410 (1984), which involved a question of the right of Texas to exercise in personam jurisdiction over a nonresident, the Supreme Court noted and accepted the holding of the U-Anchor Court that the Texas long arm statute reaches as far as due process permits, with the comment, "Thus, the only question remaining for the court to decide was whether it was consistent with the Due Process Clause for Texas courts to assert in personam jurisdiction over Heli-col."
For a Texas court to exercise jurisdiction over a nonresident in a manner consistent with constitutional guarantees of due process, three requirements must be met:
(1) The nonresident defendant or foreign corporation must purposefully do some act or consummate some transaction in Texas.
(2) The cause of action must arise from, or be connected with, such act or transaction. Even if the cause of action does not arise from a specific contact, jurisdiction may be exercised if the defendant's contacts with Texas are continuing and systematic.
(3)The assumption of jurisdiction by the court must not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice, consideration being given to the quality, nature, and extent of the activity in Texas, the relative convenience of the parties, the benefits and protection of the laws of Texas afforded the respective parties, and the basic equities of the situation.
Schlobohm v. Schapiro, 784 S.W.2d 355, 356-58 (Tex.1990).
In the Schlobohm case, the Court cautioned that these elements are not to be mechanically applied, but are rather to provide a checklist to help ensure that all aspects of the necessary due process jurisdictional analysis are considered. Id. at 358.
The first part of the Texas formula regards the issue of whether the defendant's activities, regardless of their volume, justify the conclusion that he purposefully directed his activities into Texas such that he should have reasonably anticipated being called into a Texas court. Id. at 359.
The mere fact that relator had customers who came to him from Texas and that Livermore's contact with him originated from Texas is not sufficient to justify the required conclusion. Since the determination of the issue requires a focus upon the activities of the defendant, the activities of others cannot support a determination of the requisite conclusion that defendant purposefully directed his activities into Texas in such a manner that he should have reasonably anticipated being called into a Texas court. See Schlobohm v. Schapiro, 784 S.W.2d 355; U-Anchor Advertising, Inc. v. Burt, 553 S.W.2d 760.
Relator's agreement to either send the sale proceeds of the ring or to send the ring back to Texas, even coupled with the two letters and two phone calls to Texas, do not amount to the required purposeful invocation of the benefits and protections of Texas law. See U-Anchor Advertising, Inc. v. Burt, 553 S.W.2d 760. Indeed, relator did nothing to indicate or support an inference of any purpose on his part to exercise the privilege of conducting activities in Texas.
In Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 104 S.Ct. 1482, 79 L.Ed.2d 804 (1984), the United States Supreme Court had occasion to explore in some depth the requisites to maintain jurisdiction over a non-resident. In that case, the Court found that the nonresident petitioners' conduct gave California jurisdiction over them. The respondent claimed that she had been libeled in an article written and edited by petitioners in Florida.
The Court noted that respondent, the subject of the allegedly libelous magazine article, lived and worked in California and the article concerned respondent's activities in California. Id. at 785, 788, 104 S.Ct. at 1484, 1486. The Court also noted: (1) the circulation of the magazine in California was about 600,000, almost twice the level of the next highest state, (2) petitioner South, the author of the first draft of the article, had gathered the information contained in the article by phone calls to sources in California, (3) petitioner South, shortly before publication, called respondent's home and read to her husband a draft of the article so as to elicit his comments on it, (4) petitioner Calder, president and editor of the magazine, " 'oversee[s] just about every function of the [magazine],' " Id. at 786, 104 S.Ct. at 1485, (5) petitioner Calder reviewed and approved the initial evaluation of the subject of the article and edited it in its final form, and (6) petitioner Calder declined to print a retraction requested by respondent. Id.
The Court concluded that the petitioners' "actions were expressly aimed at California," Id. at 789, 104 S.Ct. at 1487 (emphasis added), and "intentionally directed" at California, Id. at 790, 104 S.Ct. at 1487 (emphasis added).
The dissent would rest jurisdiction upon the torts of fraud and conversion. However, unlike the petitioners' actions and the surrounding circumstances enumerated in Calder and which were determinative in that case, relator's actions do not rise to the necessary level of an act or acts purposefully directed at or aimed at Texas as a forum. While in the Calder case, in the words of the Court, "California [was] the focal point of both the story and of the harm suffered," in this case Texas is not the focal point of relator's action. Id. at 789, 104 S.Ct. at 1486. En route to its decision, the Calder Court emphasized, "the plaintiff [residing in California] is the focus of the activities of the defendants." Id. at 788, 104 S.Ct. at 1486. In this case, Livermore was not the focus of relator's activities.
While Livermore was allegedly harmed by relator's actions in response to Liver- more's initiated contact with him, those actions cannot be said to be directed at Texas or focused upon Livermore in the same manner the Calder petitioners' activities were directed at California and focused upon that plaintiff. In Calder, the California activities of a California resident, being the subject of the magazine article, Id. at 788, were obviously the focus, direction, and aim of the respondent's actions.
We find the dissent's proposition that under Calder, the necessary minimum contacts are always established when an intentional tortfeasor knowingly causes an injury in Texas to be too broad an interpretation of the Calder case.
The United States Supreme Court and Texas Supreme Court have rejected the notion that personal jurisdiction might be determined by mechanical tests. Burger King Corp. v. Budzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 478, 105 S.Ct. 2174, 2185, 85 L.Ed.2d 528, 545 (1985); International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319, 66 S.Ct. 154, 159, 90 L.Ed. 95, 103 (1945); see also Schlobohm v. Schapiro, 784 S.W.2d at 358. "Whether due process is satisfied must depend rather upon the quality and nature of the activity in relation to the fair and orderly administration of the laws which it was the purpose of the due process clause to insure." International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. at 319, 66 S.Ct. at 160; accord Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 806, 105 S.Ct. 2965, 2971, 86 L.Ed.2d 628, 638 (1985); see also Schlobohm v. Schapiro, 784 S.W.2d at 358-59.
To hold that the requisite minimum contacts are automatically established when an intentional tortfeasor knowingly causes injury in the forum state would practically reduce due process to a mechanical test which fails to examine the quality and nature of the non-resident's actions.
We hold that the quality and nature of relator's actions are such that he did not purposefully direct his activities into Texas in such a manner that he should have reasonably anticipated being sued in a Texas court. That being so, this state lacks jurisdiction over the relator and he had a clear legal right to have his special appearance sustained and the suit dismissed.
We must, therefore, conditionally grant relator's petition for writ of mandamus, direct respondent to vacate his order overruling the special appearance and enter judgment granting relator's special appearance and dismissing the suit for lack of jurisdiction. Since we are confident that respondent will comply with our direction, the writ will issue only if he fails to do so.
. We note that in United Mexican States the special appearance was filed on the basis of sovereign immunity. Sovereign immunity concerns both subject matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1330(a), (b) (Supp.1990); Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 435 n. 3, 109 S.Ct. 683, 688 n. 3, 102 L.Ed.2d 818, 828 n. 3 (1989); Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank, 461 U.S. 480, 485 n. 5, 489 n. 14, 103 S.Ct. 1962, 1967 n. 5, 1969 n. 14, 76 L.Ed.2d 81, 86-87 n. 5, 89 n. 14 (1983).
In United Mexican States, Mexico sought mandamus and the Texas Supreme Court conditionally granted mandamus because Mexico's "motions for special appearancé' were overruled. United Mexican States, 556 S.W.2d 784 (emphasis added). A special appearance may raise the issue of lack of personal jurisdiction but not the issue of lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Tex. R.Civ.P. 120al; Oliver v. Boutwell, 601 S.W.2d 393, 395 (Tex.Civ.App. — Dallas 1980, no writ); Crockett v. Crockett, 589 S.W.2d 759, 762-63 (Tex.Civ.App. — Dallas 1979, writ refd n.r.e.). Thus, United Mexican States concerned personal jurisdiction only.
. In footnote six of that opinion, the Court stated that it did not rely on the investigative activities as forming an independent basis for jurisdiction. Id. at 787, 104 S.Ct. at 1485. However, while not forming an independent basis for jurisdiction, the phone calls apparently impacted on the Court's decision that petitioners' "activities were expressly aimed at California [emphasis added]," which formed a portion of the "effects" basis for jurisdiction.
That the phone calls impacted on the Court's holding appears from the inclusion of that fact in the opinion. This becomes further apparent by footnote four in which the Court referred to an alleged visit to California by petitioner South — a fact (unlike the phone calls) stated by the Court as not relied upon for its holding and not described by the Court in the body of the opinion. Id. at 786, 104 S.Ct. at 1485.
The Court also pointed out, among other facts, that "[t]he article was drawn from California sources," in determining that California was the focal point of the story and of the harm suffered and, thus, jurisdiction was proper. Id. at 788-89, 104 S.Ct. at 1486-87.
. Although the Court's actual language was "intentionally directed at a California resident," read in the context of the other statements made by the Court, it is apparent the Court found jurisdiction proper because the petitioners intentionally directed their activities at the forum — California. The Court's statement should not be interpreted beyond the facts of the case. For example, we do not find the language as supporting jurisdiction when the forum resident is injured outside the forum and the tortfeasor is unaware of the injured party's residence, i.e., a Texan who intentionally torts a vacationing California resident in Texas, unaware of the person's residence. In such a case, the tort-feasor could not reasonably anticipate being haled into a California court.
. Determining that an activity is an intentional tort might be construed as determining the activity's nature. However, in Calder, the Court, in examining the petitioners' conduct, refused to determine whether the petitioners' conduct constituted a tort. The Court described the petitioners' conduct as "intentional, and allegedly tortious," Calder, 465 U.S. at 789, 104 S.Ct. at 1487 (emphasis added), and further described the conduct as an "alleged wrongdoing," Id. at 790, 104 S.Ct. at 1487 (emphasis added). Thus, it appears that determining an activity's nature does not encompass determining whether the activity creates a specific legal cause of action. See also Hoppenfeld v. Crook, 498 S.W.2d 52.
Regardless, we refuse to hold that all intentional torts are of the same quality.