Case Name: The STATE of Colorado, By and Through the COLORADO STATE CLAIMS BOARD OF the DIVISION OF RISK MANAGEMENT, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Yvonne E. DeFOOR; Frank Bowen; Margie Bowen; Elinor M. Butenhoff; Urs Frei; Michael Hatton; the Estate of Anna Hayes, Deceased; the Children and Estate of Arlene Johnson, Deceased; Estate of John Killeen, Deceased; Estate of Markus Lang, Herbert Lang, as survivor, heir and personal representative of Markus Lang, and the Estate of Markus Lang, Rita Lang as survivor, heir and personal representative of Markus Lang and the Estate of Markus Lang, and Elfriede Borrillo, as Special Administrator of the Estate of Markus Lang; the Estate of Douglas MacKenzie, Deceased; Suzanne MacKenzie; Michael McGarvey, Nancy McGarvey; Bernadine M. Remmers; Carol J. Smith, Thomas C. Smith, and Meagan N. Smith, a minor; the Estate of Gladys Stewart, Deceased; the Estate of Sol Stewart, Deceased; the Children and Estate of Keith Walters, Deceased; the Children and Estate of Kathleen Walters, Deceased; Horoshi Yoshioka; Mordekhay Fumishika; Mashasiki Nakayma; Mikayo Tajima; and Rodney Alva West; and Clarendon National Insurance Company; San Juan Tours, Inc. d/b/a Gray Line Tours; and all persons or entities suffering, or claiming to suffer, damages resultant from the August 10, 1987, collision between a boulder and a Gray Line Tour Bus on U.S. Highway 40, about seven miles east of Winter Park, Colorado, while the bus was on Berthoud Pass, Defendants-Appellants, v. The COLORADO DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS and the Colorado Division of Highways, Phillip Pacheco, Earman Pacheco, Merle Zimmer, Phillip West, Ross Hamilton, Edward Fink, John M. Salazar, R.L. Clevenger, Dwight Bower, Phil McCullough, and Lowell Jackson, Third-Party Defendants and Counter Defendants-Appellees
Court: Colorado Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Colorado
Decision Date: 1992-02-03
Citations: 824 P.2d 783
Docket Number: No. 90SA351
Parties: The STATE of Colorado, By and Through the COLORADO STATE CLAIMS BOARD OF the DIVISION OF RISK MANAGEMENT, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Yvonne E. DeFOOR; Frank Bowen; Margie Bowen; Elinor M. Butenhoff; Urs Frei; Michael Hatton; the Estate of Anna Hayes, Deceased; the Children and Estate of Arlene Johnson, Deceased; Estate of John Killeen, Deceased; Estate of Markus Lang, Herbert Lang, as survivor, heir and personal representative of Markus Lang, and the Estate of Markus Lang, Rita Lang as survivor, heir and personal representative of Markus Lang and the Estate of Markus Lang, and Elfriede Borrillo, as Special Administrator of the Estate of Markus Lang; the Estate of Douglas MacKenzie, Deceased; Suzanne MacKenzie; Michael McGarvey, Nancy McGarvey; Bernadine M. Remmers; Carol J. Smith, Thomas C. Smith, and Meagan N. Smith, a minor; the Estate of Gladys Stewart, Deceased; the Estate of Sol Stewart, Deceased; the Children and Estate of Keith Walters, Deceased; the Children and Estate of Kathleen Walters, Deceased; Horoshi Yoshioka; Mordekhay Fumishika; Mashasiki Nakayma; Mikayo Tajima; and Rodney Alva West; and Clarendon National Insurance Company; San Juan Tours, Inc. d/b/a Gray Line Tours; and all persons or entities suffering, or claiming to suffer, damages resultant from the August 10, 1987, collision between a boulder and a Gray Line Tour Bus on U.S. Highway 40, about seven miles east of Winter Park, Colorado, while the bus was on Berthoud Pass, Defendants-Appellants, v. The COLORADO DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS and the Colorado Division of Highways, Phillip Pacheco, Earman Pacheco, Merle Zimmer, Phillip West, Ross Hamilton, Edward Fink, John M. Salazar, R.L. Clevenger, Dwight Bower, Phil McCullough, and Lowell Jackson, Third-Party Defendants and Counter Defendants-Appellees.
Judges: ROVIRA, C.J., specially concurs as to Part IV, and LOHR, J., joins in the special concurrence.
Reporter: Pacific Reporter 2d
Volume: 824
Pages: 783–803

Head Matter:
The STATE of Colorado, By and Through the COLORADO STATE CLAIMS BOARD OF the DIVISION OF RISK MANAGEMENT, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Yvonne E. DeFOOR; Frank Bowen; Margie Bowen; Elinor M. Butenhoff; Urs Frei; Michael Hatton; the Estate of Anna Hayes, Deceased; the Children and Estate of Arlene Johnson, Deceased; Estate of John Killeen, Deceased; Estate of Markus Lang, Herbert Lang, as survivor, heir and personal representative of Markus Lang, and the Estate of Markus Lang, Rita Lang as survivor, heir and personal representative of Markus Lang and the Estate of Markus Lang, and Elfriede Borrillo, as Special Administrator of the Estate of Markus Lang; the Estate of Douglas MacKenzie, Deceased; Suzanne MacKenzie; Michael McGarvey, Nancy McGarvey; Bernadine M. Remmers; Carol J. Smith, Thomas C. Smith, and Meagan N. Smith, a minor; the Estate of Gladys Stewart, Deceased; the Estate of Sol Stewart, Deceased; the Children and Estate of Keith Walters, Deceased; the Children and Estate of Kathleen Walters, Deceased; Horoshi Yoshioka; Mordekhay Fumishika; Mashasiki Nakayma; Mikayo Tajima; and Rodney Alva West; and Clarendon National Insurance Company; San Juan Tours, Inc. d/b/a Gray Line Tours; and all persons or entities suffering, or claiming to suffer, damages resultant from the August 10, 1987, collision between a boulder and a Gray Line Tour Bus on U.S. Highway 40, about seven miles east of Winter Park, Colorado, while the bus was on Berthoud Pass, Defendants-Appellants, v. The COLORADO DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS and the Colorado Division of Highways, Phillip Pacheco, Earman Pacheco, Merle Zimmer, Phillip West, Ross Hamilton, Edward Fink, John M. Salazar, R.L. Clevenger, Dwight Bower, Phil McCullough, and Lowell Jackson, Third-Party Defendants and Counter Defendants-Appellees.
No. 90SA351.
Supreme Court of Colorado, En Banc.
Feb. 3, 1992.
Rehearing Denied Feb. 24, 1992.
Sears, Anderson & Swanson, P.C., Leland P. Anderson, Denver, Victoria C. Swanson, P.C., Victoria C. Swanson, Colorado Springs, Pryor, Carney and Johnson, P.C., Thomas L. Roberts, Mark P. Martens, Englewood, Fogel, Keating & Wagner, David Struthers, Aisenberg & Kaplan, H. Paul Himes, Denver, for appellants.
Gale A. Norton, Atty. Gen., Raymond T. Slaughter, Chief Deputy Atty. Gen., Timothy M. Tymkovich, Sol. Gen., Timothy R. Arnold, Deputy Atty. Gen., Gregg E. Kay, First Asst. Atty. Gen., Simon P. Lipstein, Asst. Atty. Gen., Denver, for appellee State of Colorado.
Hall & Evans, David R. Brougham, Denver, for Individual appellees Phillip Pacheco, Earman Pacheco, Merle Zimmer, Phillip West, Ross Hamilton, Edward Fink, John M. Salazar, R.L. Clevenger, Dwight Bower, Phil McCullough, and Lowell Jackson.
The Ass’n of Trial Lawyers of America, Michael C. Maher, President, Washington, D.C., The Colorado Trial Lawyers Ass’n, John Gehlhausen, President, Denver, Vin-ton, Waller, Slivka & Panasci, Denis H. Mark, Denver, for amici curiae The Ass’n of Trial Lawyers of America (ATLA) and The Colorado Trial Lawyers Ass’n (CTLA).
Miller & McCarren, P.C., J. Kent Miller, Denver, for amicus curiae Colorado Head Injury Foundation, Inc.
Frederic K. Conover, II, Holme Roberts & Owen, Daniel S. Hoffman, Boyd N. Bo-land, Denver, for amicus curiae Colorado Bar Ass’n.
Eason, Sprague & Wilson, P.C., Eugene M. Sprague, Elizabeth A. McKeever, Denver, for amicus curiae Colorado School Districts Self Insurance Pool.
Griffiths & Tanoue, P.C., Susan K. Grif-fiths, Tami A. Tanoue, Elizabeth E. Sal-kind, Denver, Colorado Mun. League, Kathleen E. Haddock, Denver, for amici curiae Colorado Intergovernmental Risk Sharing Agency, Colorado Counties Cas. and Property Pool, Colorado Counties, Inc., Colorado Sp. Districts Property and Liability Pool, Sp. Dist. Ass’n of Colorado, and Colorado Mun. League.

Opinion:
Justice VOLLACK
delivered the Opinion of the Court as to Parts I, II, III, and V, and announced the Judgment of the Court as to Part IV.
Claimants appeal from a district court ruling that the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act, § 24-10-101 to -120, 10A C.R.S. (1988) (the Act), does not violate claimants' rights to equal protection of laws, access to courts, or due process of laws. Claimants also appeal from the district court's determination that their claims against individual defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988) were insufficient to expose those defendants to liability. We affirm the district court ruling regarding claimants' constitutional challenges, but remand the § 1983 allegations for further hearings.
I.
On August 10, 1987, Phillip Pacheco was operating a state-owned vehicle. He used this vehicle to move a 6.7-ton boulder, pursuant to Department of Highway ditch-clearing policies, on an upper switchback on the west side of Berthoud Pass. The boulder rolled down onto a roadway and hit a tour bus. Of the thirty-four passengers on the bus, nine were killed and twenty-five sustained injuries as a result of the collision.
On January 6, 1988, the Colorado Attorney General filed an interpleader action in Denver District Court. The Attorney General attempted to deposit the sum of $400,-000 with the registry of the Court, and to have a defendant class certified pursuant to C.R.C.P. 22 and 23. On April 28, 1989, the claimants filed a motion for summary judgment, contending that section 24-10-114(1), 10A C.R.S. (1988), of the Act violated their right to equal protection of laws, access to courts and due process of laws. Section 24-10-114(1) provides:
(1) The maximum amount that may be recovered under this article in any single occurrence, whether from one or more public entities and public employees, shall be:
(a) For any injury to one person in any single occurrence, the sum of one hundred fifty thousand dollars;
(b) For an injury to two or more persons in any single occurrence, the sum of four hundred thousand dollars; except that, in such instance, no person may recover in excess of one hundred fifty thousand dollars.
The claimants also made claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1988). The State filed its own motion for summary judgment and moved to dismiss the § 1983 claims. The district court ruled against the claimants and in favor of the State on the motions for summary judgment.
II.
Claimants urge that section 24-10-114(1), 10A C.R.S. (1988), violates their right to equal protection of the laws because it creates an arbitrary classification. Some individuals, according to claimants, may be fully compensated for injuries they sustain alone. Others jointly injured, however, may not be. Claimants further contend that the recovery limitations in the Act violate their right to equal protection of the laws because the limitations are not rationally related to the State's interest in assuming liability for its tortious acts. Claimants premise their argument on the equal protection guarantees found in the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and in Article II, Section 25, of the Colorado Constitution.
Claimants' argument raises the larger issue of whether the General Assembly can ever limit the State's liability for damages in tort, as any limitation will work favorably for some but not others. We have recognized, however, that it is within the province of the General Assembly to simultaneously create governmental liability and place limitations on actions brought against the State. See, e.g., Evans v. Board of County Comm'rs, 174 Colo. 97, 482 P.2d 968 (1971) (abrogating sovereign immunity in Colorado). We conclude that the General Assembly can limit the State's liability for damages and affirm the district court's ruling that the Act does not violate the claimants' right to equal protection of the laws.
A. Arbitrary Classification
Claimants contend that section 24-10-114(1) creates an arbitrary and irrational classification between individuals who may potentially receive full compensation under subsection (l)(a) as opposed to individuals who are less likely to receive full compensation for injuries under subsection (l)(b). Claimants further contend that their right to recover damages for personal injuries is important, and that section 24-10-114(1) should thus be reviewed under a heightened scrutiny equal protection test.
This court previously declined to apply a heightened scrutiny test to an equal protection attack on section 24-10-114(1) and applied a rational basis test instead, in Lee v. Colorado Department of Health, 718 P.2d 221, 227 (Colo.1986) (a rational basis test applies where no fundamental right is infringed nor suspect class created). See also Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 83, 98 S.Ct. 2620, 2635-36, 57 L.Ed.2d 595 (1978) (liability limitations are classic examples of economic regulation which is subject to rational basis review) (quoted in Austin v. Litvak, 682 P.2d 41, 50 (Colo.1984)). Pursuant to Lee, we again apply a rational basis test to the instant equal protection attack on section 24-10-114(1).
B. Rational Basis Review
Under the rational basis test, section 24-10-114(1) is presumed constitutional and can create a classification that affords disparate treatment to different groups only if it is rationally related to a legitimate state interest. Tassian v. People, 731 P.2d 672, 675 (Colo.1987). We begin our analysis with a review of the State's liability for injuries caused by the negligent operation of state-owned motor vehicles.
In 1949, the General Assembly enacted a statute that rendered the State liable for injuries caused by the tortious operation of certain classes of state-owned motor vehicles. Act approved May 6, 1949, ch. 118, sec. 1, 1949 Colo.Sess.Laws 268-69; see also § 13-10-1 to -3, 2 C.R.S. (1963). The General Assembly simultaneously limited the State's liability for such damages as follows:
(a) Bodily injury liability, Ten Thousand and No/100 ($10,000.00) Dollars for each person, Twenty Thousand and No/ 100 ($20,000.00) Dollars for each accident.
(b) Property damage liability, Five Thousand and No/100 ($5,000.00) Dollars for each accident.
Id. at 268. When enacting these sections, the General Assembly declared that the Act was necessary for "the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety." Id. at 269.
In 1968, the legislative council of the General Assembly appointed a committee to study sovereign immunity in Colorado. See Legislative Council Report to the Colorado General Assembly, Governmental Liability in Colorado, Research Publication No. 134 (Nov. 1968) [hereinafter "Legislative Council Report"]. The committee reviewed the extent of the State's liability in numerous areas, including liability for injuries related to roads, highways and negligent operation of motor vehicles. The committee also reviewed both the amount and nature of claims filed with the State from July 28, 1965, through September 5, 1967. Id. at 46-48. The committee analyzed "the practical fiscal considerations which might foreseeably flow from any enlargement of tort responsibility." Id. at 143.
On two different occasions, the committee met for the purpose of discussing the fiscal impact of purchasing government liability insurance. Id. at 144. In proposing approaches to legislation regarding governmental liability, the committee anticipated the equal protection issue currently before this court:
[I]t is said that any dollar limitation is arbitrary and bound to be unfair to some claimants since such limits will usually have no rational relationship to the amount of actual damages sustained. On the other hand, this approach does eliminate to a considerable degree the danger of the catastrophe judgment, and provides a sound basis for rational fiscal planning and the computation of insurance premiums.
Id. at 119. The committee was thus aware that any recovery limitation might not satisfy all claims equally. The committee noted that limiting recovery, however, provided "a sound basis for rational fiscal planning and the computation of insurance premiums." Id. In their report submitted to the General Assembly, the committee concluded that limiting liability was the best alternative to either no liability or unlimited liability. Id. at 144-45.
In March of 1971, this court considered and rejected the draconian doctrine of sovereign immunity in Evans v. Board of County Commissioners, 174 Colo. 97, 482 P.2d 968 (1971) (plaintiff sued for damages sustained after she fell on courthouse steps) In rejecting the doctrine, we held:
The effect of this opinion . is simply to undo what this court has done and leave the situation where it should have been at the beginning .: in the hands of the General Assembly of the State of Colorado. If the General Assembly wishes to restore sovereign immunity . in whole or in part, it has the authority to do so. If the legislative arm of our government does not completely restore these immunities, then undoubtedly it will wish to place limitations upon the actions that may be brought against the state and its subdivisions. This, too, it has full authority to accomplish.
Id. at 105, 482 P.2d at 972 (citations omitted).
In May of the same year, the General Assembly exercised this authority and created governmental liability in numerous areas, including highway maintenance, while simultaneously limiting recovery for liability to $100,000 per person and $300,000 per occurrence. Act approved May 22, 1971, ch. 323, sec. 1, 1971 Colo.Sess.Laws 1204-11; § 130-11-14, 6 C.R.S. (1971 Supp.); see, e.g., State v. Hartsough, 790 P.2d 836, 837-38 (Colo.1990). In 1979, the General Assembly approved sections 24-10-114(l)(a) and (b), which increased the liability limits to their current values — $150,000 per person and $400,000 per occurrence. Act approved June 15, 1979, ch. 219, sec. 4, 1979 Colo.Sess.Laws 863.
The General Assembly has thus rendered the State of Colorado liable for actions arising out of negligent operation of state-owned motor vehicles for forty-two years. Recovery has been limited since such actions were created in 1949. As the State's exposure has generally grown since 1949, the limits on liability have correspondingly been raised, in 1971 and again in 1979. Thus the monetary limits on the State's liability remained the same from 1949 through 1971, from 1971 through 1979, and from 1979 through the present. The General Assembly acted rationally during this period, when adjusting the State's liability to its monetary ability to assume such fiscal responsibilities.
C. State Interests
In evaluating the state interests involved, we look to those interests invoked by section 24-10-114(1) and by the Act generally. Section 24-10-114(1) provides monetary recovery for governmental liability created by the Act. In the Act's declaration of policy, the General Assembly recognized this court's abrogation of sovereign immunity and joined in our conclusion that the doctrine of sovereign immunity frequently produced unjust results. § 24-10-102, 10A C.R.S. (1988); Evans, 174 Colo. at 101, 482 P.2d at 970. The General Assembly stated, however, "that unlimited liability could disrupt or make prohibitively expensive the provision of . essential public services and functions." § 24-10-102. The General Assembly also noted that "the taxpayers would ultimately bear the fiscal burdens of unlimited liability." Id.
Claimants argue that section 24-10-114(1) is not rationally related to the enumerated state interests for the following reasons: because the recovery limits were arbitrarily chosen; because the scheme denies full recovery where government liability is potentially greatest; because the limits have not been raised since 1979; because there is no evidence of financial hardship to the community; and, because the amount of claims paid is not substantial. We reject claimants' contentions.
In Evans v. Board of County Commissioners, 174 Colo. 97, 482 P.2d 968 (1971), we abrogated the doctrine of sovereign im munity and returned to the legislature the authority to regulate the State's liability. Id. at 105, 482 P.2d at 972. Prior to our decision in Evans, the legislative council carefully considered the extent to which the State could afford liability insurance. Responding to both our decision in Evans and the Legislative Council Report, the General Assembly exercised its authority and abrogated sovereign immunity in 1971, while simultaneously establishing recovery limits. The General Assembly raised the recovery limits eight years later.
We have previously rejected an equal protection challenge to section 24-10-114(1) in Lee v. Colorado Department of Health, 718 P.2d 221, 227-28 (Colo.1986). We noted that the State had an interest in creating fiscal certainty in order to execute its myriad public responsibilities. Id. at 227. We did not hesitate to conclude that
[b]y limiting the liability of a public entity to a fixed amount, the Governmental Immunity Act protects the public entity against the risk that unforeseen and unlimited tort judgments will deplete the public coffers and result in the termination or substantial curtailment of important governmental functions.
Id. at 228. We found that section 24-10-114(1) satisfied equal protection of the laws. Id. at 228.
Claimants concede that their claim, the multi-person incident, is the rare exception and not the rule. Their claim thus presents the extreme case where a particular request for relief is not completely fulfilled as a result of limited liability. As the United States Supreme Court has said,
In the area of economics and social welfare, a State does not violate the Equal Protection Clause merely because the classifications made by its laws are imperfect. If the classification has some "reasonable basis," it does not offend the Constitution simply because "... in practice, it results in some inequality."
Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485, 90 S.Ct. 1153, 1161, 25 L.Ed.2d 491 (1970), quoted in Bellendir v. Kezer, 648 P.2d 645, 647 (Colo.1982). We find that section 24-10-114(1) is rationally related to the legitimate state interests of fiscal solvency and provision of essential services while minimizing taxpayer burdens. Accordingly, we affirm the district court's holding that claimants are not deprived of their right to equal protection of the laws.
III.
Claimants next contend that section 24-10-114(1), 10A C.R.S. (1988), deprives them of access to courts guaranteed by Article II, Section 6, of the Colorado Constitution because the statute denies them an adequate remedy for their injuries. We disagree.
Article II, Section 6, of the Colorado Constitution provides:
Courts of justice shall be open to every person, and a speedy remedy afforded for every injury to person, property or character; and right and justice should be administered without sale, denial or delay [ ]
This provision protects initial access to the courts. Torres v. Portillos, 638 P.2d 274, 277 (Colo.1981). The right of access is conditioned on the existence of a legal right under law to seek redress from another. When a right accrues under law, courts must be available to effectuate that right. Protect Our Mountain Env't, Inc. v. District Court, 677 P.2d 1361, 1367 n. 6 (Colo.1984) (the federal constitutional right to petition the government for a redress of grievances includes access to the courts) (citing Hurricane v. Kanover, Ltd., 651 P.2d 1218 (Colo.1982), and O'Quinn v. Walt Disney Prods., Inc., 177 Colo. 190, 493 P.2d 344 (1972)); see also Curtiss v. GSX Corp., 774 P.2d 873, 876 (Colo.1989) (rejecting a tort claim where a statute immunized an employer from lawsuits brought by an employee for work-related injuries).
Claimants contend that section 24-10-114(1) violates their right to open courts because it denies them an adequate remedy. Article II, Section 6, however, does not purport to control the scope or substance of remedies afforded to Colorado litigants. The open courts guarantee rather assures litigants "that courts of justice shall be open to every person and a speedy remedy afforded for every injury." Curtiss, 774 P.2d at 876.
Claimants alternatively contend that the legislature severely curtailed a remedy without providing an adequate alternative, contrary to the requirements of Kandt v. Evans, 645 P.2d 1300 (Colo.1982). In Kandt, we considered whether a plaintiff's right of access to the courts was violated when she was precluded from filing an intentional tort action against a co-employee under the Colorado Worker's Compensation Act. Kandt, 645 P.2d at 1306. We held that the General Assembly could abrogate common law rights as long as an adequate statutory remedy was supplied, and concluded that there was no access to courts violation.
Claimants do not contend that the General Assembly has eliminated a right to an adequate remedy that existed at common law, nor do they now dispute their ability to file suit against the State. We do not find Kandt to govern the present case. Because the access to courts guarantee does not address adequacy of remedy, we conclude that claimants have not been deprived of their access to courts.
IV.
Claimants contend that section 24-10-114(1), 10A C.R.S. (1988), deprives them of their rights to substantive due process under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and under Article II, Section 25, of the Colorado Constitution. We disagree.
The due process guarantee of the Colorado Constitution provides that "[n]o person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law." Colo. Const., art. II, § 25. We have observed that "[t]he constitutional provision pertaining to due process of law is applicable to rights, not remedies." White v. Ainsworth, 62 Colo. 513, 522, 163 P. 959, 962 (1917) (a party has no vested right in a remedy) (citing 6 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law 947 (2d ed.)). The United States Supreme Court has similarly observed that
although a vested cause of action is property and is protected from arbitrary interference, [appellants have] no property, in the constitutional sense, in any particular form of remedy; all that [they are] guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment is the preservation of [their] substantial right to redress by some effective procedure.
Gibbes v. Zimmerman, 290 U.S. 326, 332, 54 S.Ct. 140, 142, 78 L.Ed. 342 (1933) (citations omitted). Thus, the federal and state due process guarantee does not give litigants rights to particular remedies. Claimants argue that they have a legal right to damages for their injuries that is a property right which cannot be taken away without due process of law. Claimants rely on Rosane v. Senger, 112 Colo. 363, 149 P.2d 372 (1944), for the proposition that the right to damages for injuries constitutes property subject to the protections of the due process guarantee. The plaintiff in Rosane contested whether the district court erred in finding that her medical malpractice action was barred by a statute of limitations. We said that "[a] legal right to damage for an injury is property and one can not [sic] be deprived of his property without due process. There can be no due process unless the party deprived has his day in court." Id. at 370, 149 P.2d at 375. Plaintiff's property right to damages was thus effectuated by preserving her cause of action for damages. Id. at 370, 149 P.2d at 375-76. We accordingly found that her action was not barred by the statute of limitations. Id.
Claimants' contention equates rights to causes of action to rights to a specific remedy under section 24-10-114(1). Section 24-10-114(1) was enacted as part of the General Assembly's response to our abrogation of sovereign immunity. Evans v. Board of County Comm'rs, 174 Colo. 97, 482 P.2d 968 (1971). In Evans, we invited the General Assembly to recreate governmental immunity as it saw fit, in whole or in part. Id. at 105, 482 P.2d at 972. The General Assembly created a statutory scheme whereby claimants with rights to particular causes of action can seek limited recovery against the State. See generally § 24-10-101 to -120, 10A C.R.S. (1988). Section 24-10-114(1), as part of this scheme, is a limited remedial statute; it supplies a carefully defined range of remedies for causes of action created under other sections of the Act. It does not create a right to a specific dollar remedy.
Claimants' substantive due process claim to recover an amount in excess of the statutory scheme would set the unwarranted precedent that the State's liability is limited only when the particular plaintiffs are satisfied with the compensation received. The principles of limited liability, however, do not turn on the facts of particular cases.
We conclude that because there is no right to a remedy, claimants have failed to articulate a cognizable property interest in support of their due process claim.
Claimants alternatively contend that the due process guarantee incorporates claimants' right of access to courts which in turn requires a quid pro quo, or adequate, alternative remedy. Claimants' alternative contention fails for the above-discussed reason: it fails to articulate a cognizable property interest. We thus conclude that section 24-10-114(1) does not deprive claimants of their rights to substantive due process of laws.
V.
Finally, claimants contend that the district court erred in dismissing their § 1983 claims against individual defendants for failure to state claims sufficient to expose the individual defendants to civil rights liability. We agree.
In order to state a claim for relief under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that a defendant acted under color of state law and that the defendant's action deprived the plaintiff of a right secured by the federal constitution or federal laws. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535, 101 S.Ct. 1908, 1912-13, 68 L.Ed.2d 420 (1981). Courts must then determine whether such rights have been violated by applying substantive federal law that defines the requisite state of mind and the other requirements for pleading a civil rights action. Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 330, 106 S.Ct. 662, 664, 88 L.Ed.2d 662 (1985); Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 140, 99 S.Ct. 2689, 2692-93, 61 L.Ed.2d 433 (1979); Sheldon Nahmod, Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Litigation: The Law of Section 1983 § 3.02, 141 (3d ed. 1991). Finally, the defendant can assert qualified immunity defenses to defeat a § 1983 claim. Hafer v. Melo, — U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 358, 116 L.Ed.2d 301 (1991); Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989); Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987).
Noting that parties "against whom summary judgment is sought [are] entitled to the benefit of all favorable inferences that may be drawn from the facts," Churchey v. Adolph Coors Company, 759 P.2d 1336, 1339-40 (Colo.1988) (citations omitted), we are not convinced that there was no genuine issue of material fact with respect to claimants' § 1983 allegations. We thus reinstate and remand the § 1983 claims for further hearings.
ROVIRA, C.J., specially concurs as to Part IV, and LOHR, J., joins in the special concurrence.
MULLARKEY, J., specially concurs as to Part V and dissents as to Part II, and QUINN, J., joins in the special concurrence as to Part V.
QUINN, J., dissents as to Part IV, and MULLARKEY, J., joins in the dissent.
. This court has jurisdiction pursuant to § 13-4-102(l)(b), 6A C.R.S. (1988), as claimants contest the constitutionality of § 24-10-114(1). Claimants were the named defendants in an interpleader action filed by the State of Colorado on January 6, 1988. Claimants are the appellants before this court.
. Claimants also contended that the Act violated the constitutional prohibition against special legislation. That contention was not raised on appeal to this court.
. Claimants argue that § 24-10-114(1) creates additional, impermissible classifications. First, claimants contend that § 24-10-114(1) irrationally separates victims of private tortfeasors from victims of public tortfeasors. We rejected this contention in Lee v. Colorado Department of Health, 718 P.2d 221, 227-28 (Colo.1986). Secondly, claimants contend that § 24-10-114(1) irrationally compensates victims of torts in 1979 differently than victims of torts in 1991, given the rate of inflation. This court rejected a similar argument in Bellendir v. Kezer, 648 P.2d 645, 647 (Colo.1982). In Bellendir, we held:
In determining that the absence of an escalation of benefits provision applicable to individuals in the plaintiffs position violates no constitutional guarantee, we do not mean to indicate that the present statute necessarily best fulfills the social and economic objectives it was designed to achieve or that a more just system could not be formulated_ However, it is not the function of this Court to rewrite legislation; the power to change the present scheme rests with the General Assembly.
Id. We thus decline to invalidate § 24-10-114(1) on such grounds.
Finally, claimants contend that § 24-10-114(1) irrationally separates victims of torts from victims of breaches of contracts. This contention is without merit as contracts are the product of intentional acts for which public entities can accurately plan and budget. See, e.g., Faber v. State, 143 Colo. 240, 241, 353 P.2d 609, 609-10 (1960) (distinguishing Boxberger v. State Highway Dep't, 126 Colo. 438, 250 P.2d 1007 (1952), and Ace Flying Serv. Inc. v. Colora do Dep't of Agric., 136 Colo. 19, 314 P.2d 278 (1957), as cases involving actions on contracts wherein persons dealing with the state are entitled to enforce their contract rights, from cases premised on the state's negligence.)
.This court has previously detailed the analytical framework for addressing equal protection challenges. See, e.g., Tassian v. People, 731 P.2d 672, 674-75 (Colo.1987). While neither party contends that strict scrutiny should be applied to § 24-10-114(1), claimants ask this court to follow the jurisprudence of the Utah Supreme Court and the New Mexico Supreme Court in their recent application of an intermediate standard of review to equal protection attacks on statutory damage limitations. See Trujillo v. City of Albuquerque, 110 N.M. 621, 798 P.2d 571, 577-78 (1990), and Condemarin v. University Hospital, 775 P.2d 348, 352-56 (Utah 1989).
The Utah Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of damage limitations in a medical malpractice action brought against a state university hospital in Condemarin. When the plaintiff brought her action, government-owned health care facilities were immunized from suits by a governmental immunity act. Thus, the Condemarin court was required to evaluate the doctrine of sovereign immunity with respect to health care services. The Condemarin court considered the plaintiffs inability to bring suit and concluded that a heightened standard of review should be applied because "the legislature has not only limited recovery, but it has also extended partial governmental immunity to restrict rights which existed at common law." Id. at 356. We are not called upon here to evaluate partial governmental immunity and, under our holding in Lee, we decline to follow the Condemarin court.
The New Mexico Supreme Court held that damage limitations should be reviewed under intermediate scrutiny because "[a] tort victim's interest in full recovery of damages calls . for a form of scrutiny somewhere between 'the largely toothless invocation of minimum rationality and the nearly fatal invocation of strict scrutiny.'" Trujillo, 798 P.2d at 578 (citations omitted). The Trujillo court, however, declined to pass on the constitutionality of the damage limitations at issue. We decline to follow the jurisprudence of the Trujillo court because we do not recognize a right' to full recovery for damages, nor do we view (as claimants concede) the rational basis inquiry to be 'largely toothless.' See, e.g., Austin v. Litvak, 682 P.2d 41, 50 (Colo.1984) (a legislative classification failed under a rational basis test); and Gallegos v. Phipps, 779 P.2d 856 (Colo.1989) (statute failed to pass rational basis test).
. The rational basis test places the burden of proof on the party challenging the statute's constitutionality. The challenger must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the classification is unreasonable, or that it is unrelated to any legitimate state interest. Lee, 718 P.2d at 227; Tassian v. People, 731 P.2d 672, 675 (Colo.1987). The statute is afforded a presumption of constitutionality at the outset of the inquiry. Tassian, 731 P.2d at 675. See also Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 83, 98 S.Ct. 2620, 2635-36, 57 L.Ed.2d 595 (1978).
. Section (1) of the Act provided:
In case any injury to the person or property of another is caused by the tortious operation of a motor vehicle by a state, county, munici pal or quasi-municipal police, fire or health department while engaged in the line of duty, the state, county, municipality or quasi-municipality and the motor vehicle drivers thereof shall be liable for such injury to the extent hereinafter stated[J
Act approved May 6, 1949, ch. 118, sec. 1, 1949 Colo.Sess.Laws 268.
The General Assembly did not choose to include liability for injuries caused as a result of highway construction or maintenance at that time. See, e.g., § 120-7-13, 6 C.R.S. (1963).
. At the time of the report, nineteen states (including Colorado) were liable in damages for injuries caused by the negligent operation of certain classes of motor vehicles. Legislative Council Report at 60 and 71; see, e.g., § 13-10-1, 2 C.R.S. (1963).
. The comment appeared as a criticism of a proposal to limit liability to the amount of insurance coverage. At the time of the report, twenty-five states had authority to purchase liability insurance. Fourteen of those twenty-five states permitted recovery to the extent of insurance coverage. Legislative Council Report at 72.
. We announced our decision in Evans along with our decisions in Flournoy v. School District Number One, 174 Colo. 110, 482 P.2d 966 (1971), and Proffitt v. State, 174 Colo. 113, 482 P.2d 965 (1971). These cases have been superseded by statute as stated in State v. Hartsough, 790 P.2d 836 (Colo.1990).
. The committee recommended setting recovery limits at $100,000 per person/$3,000,000 per occurrence. Legislative Council Report at 145. During deliberations, Representative Sack motioned, however, to establish the per-occurrence limit at $300,000, and the draft bill was accordingly amended on February 24, 1971.
. Section 24-10-113(3) of the Act provides that when public entities are unable to pay judgments during the fiscal year, the entities "shall levy a tax, in a separate item to cover such judgment." § 24-10-113(3), 10A C.R.S. (1988). Public entities are required to levy such taxes until outstanding judgments are satisfied. Id.
. See also Duke Power, 438 U.S. at 86, 98 S.Ct. at 2637 (Limiting liability "will, of necessity, be arbitrary in the sense that any choice of a figure based on imponderables like those at issue here can always be so characterized. This is not, however, the kind of arbitrariness which flaws otherwise constitutional action.").
. Once again, claimants ask this court to follow the jurisprudence of the Utah Supreme Court and the New Mexico Supreme Court in their recent analyses of whether damage limitations burden litigants' access to courts. See Trujillo v. City of Albuquerque, 110 N.M. 621, 798 P.2d 571 (1990), and Condemarin v. University Hosp., 775 P.2d 348 (Utah 1989).
Under the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, the defendants in Condemarin were immune from suit. Thus, the plaintiff was deprived of her initial access to the courts. Unlike the Condemarin plaintiff, claimants in the present case are not deprived of their opportunity to sue the State. Thus they are not similarly deprived of their access to the courts.
The New Mexico Supreme Court considered whether damage limitations violated litigants' access to courts in Trujillo. The Trujillo court opined that an intermediate level of scrutiny should apply to statutes burdening access to courts, but declined to pass on the constitutionality of the damage limitations. We do not need to address what level of scrutiny should apply to restrictions on access to courts, as we find no access restricted in the present case.
. In Torres, we evaluated § 38-12-103(3)(a), 3 C.R.S. (1973), which allows landlords, but not tenants, to recover attorney fees in § 38-12-103(3)(a) actions. We held that the tenants' lack of equal opportunity to recover attorney fees did not deny initial access to the courts and . therefore did not contravene Article II, § 6. Torres, 638 P.2d at 277.
. Claimants contend that they are entitled to an adequate remedy under Boxberger v. State Highway Department, 126 Colo. 438, 250 P.2d 1007 (1952), wherein we stated that "[t]he rights of a citizen remain the same whether they collide with an individual or the government." Id. 250 P.2d at 1008. In Boxberger, we were concerned with a plaintiff's ability to sue the State Highway Department. The plaintiff had executed and delivered a deed granting access rights to a portion of his farm to the Department, but never received any consideration. We concluded that the district court erred in dismissing plaintiffs action.
Like Kandt, Boxberger is readily distinguishable from the instant case as the claimants' ability to file suit against the State is not in .dispute. Further, the instant case does not involve a dispute regarding contract rights, as did Boxberger. Thus, Boxberger's directive does not resolve the issue before this court.
.The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution similarly provides, in pertinent part: "No State . shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law_"
. The United States Supreme Court held, in Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 82, 98 S.Ct. 2620, 2635, 57 L.Ed.2d 595 (1978), that liability limitations found in the Price-Anderson Act did not violate the due process guarantee in the Fourteenth Amendment.
. Whether such a right exists is an unresolved question with respect to federal law. The Duke Power Court stated that "it is not at all clear that the Due Process Clause in fact requires that a legislatively enacted compensation scheme either duplicate the recovery at common law or provide a reasonable substitute remedy." Duke Power, 438 U.S. at 88, 98 S.Ct. at 2638.
. Claimants brought third-party actions under § 1983 against various individuals, including the Executive Director of the Department of Highways, the Chief Engineer, and highway maintenance supervisors and workers.