Case Name: WHITE-RODGERS, a division of Emerson Electric Co., SCI Propane, LLC, Midland-Impact, LLP, Rushshelby Energy Rural Electric Cooperative, Inc., SCI Services, LLC, RSE Services, Inc., and South Central Indiana Rural Electric Membership Corporation, Appellants-Defendants, v. Lonnie KINDLE, Courtney Frederick a/k/a Courtney Arnold, Samuel Frederick, by his parent Courtney Frederick, Courtney Frederick, as personal representative of the estate of Stephan Frederick, deceased, Ciera Davis, by her parents Kenneth Craig Davis and Billie Joanna (Jodi) Davis, and Kenneth Craig Davis and Billie Joanna (Jodi) Davis, individually, Appellees-Plaintiffs
Court: Court of Appeals of Indiana
Jurisdiction: Indiana
Decision Date: 2010-04-14
Citations: 925 N.E.2d 406
Docket Number: No. 55A05-0906-CV-00308
Parties: WHITE-RODGERS, a division of Emerson Electric Co., SCI Propane, LLC, Midland-Impact, LLP, Rushshelby Energy Rural Electric Cooperative, Inc., SCI Services, LLC, RSE Services, Inc., and South Central Indiana Rural Electric Membership Corporation, Appellants-Defendants, v. Lonnie KINDLE, Courtney Frederick a/k/a Courtney Arnold, Samuel Frederick, by his parent Courtney Frederick, Courtney Frederick, as personal representative of the estate of Stephan Frederick, deceased, Ciera Davis, by her parents Kenneth Craig Davis and Billie Joanna (Jodi) Davis, and Kenneth Craig Davis and Billie Joanna (Jodi) Davis, individually, Appellees-Plaintiffs.
Judges: FRIEDLANDER, J., concurs.
Reporter: North Eastern Reporter 2d
Volume: 925
Pages: 406–420

Head Matter:
WHITE-RODGERS, a division of Emerson Electric Co., SCI Propane, LLC, Midland-Impact, LLP, Rushshelby Energy Rural Electric Cooperative, Inc., SCI Services, LLC, RSE Services, Inc., and South Central Indiana Rural Electric Membership Corporation, Appellants-Defendants, v. Lonnie KINDLE, Courtney Frederick a/k/a Courtney Arnold, Samuel Frederick, by his parent Courtney Frederick, Courtney Frederick, as personal representative of the estate of Stephan Frederick, deceased, Ciera Davis, by her parents Kenneth Craig Davis and Billie Joanna (Jodi) Davis, and Kenneth Craig Davis and Billie Joanna (Jodi) Davis, individually, Appellees-Plaintiffs.
No. 55A05-0906-CV-00308.
Court of Appeals of Indiana.
April 14, 2010.
George E. Purdy, Bryan H. Babb, Kellie M. Barr, Bose McKinney & Evans LLP, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellant White-Rogers.
David K. Herzog, Jon Laramore, Jane A. Dall, Baker & Daniels LLP, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellees.

Opinion:
OPINION
BAKER, Chief Judge.
In 2004, an apartment explosion in Morgan County claimed the life of one individual and seriously injured several others. In 2005, the victims of the explosion filed a complaint against several defendants, including White-Rodgers, the company that had manufactured the gas control on the water heater in the residence where the explosion occurred. Unfortunately, this case has gotten mired in fervently-contested discovery disputes. The most recent is the subject of this interlocutory appeal and stems from the trial court's decision to award attorneys' fees as a discovery sancetion against White-Rodgers for its failure to produce expert materials from a settled case in which White-Rodgers was also a defendant.
While White-Rodgers certainly consulted with experts in the prior case, these experts were never designated as experts who would testify at trial. Indeed, White-Rodgers settled the case before designating any expert witnesses. Accordingly, these experts were and remain nontestify-ing experts whose materials are protected from discovery by the Indiana Trial Rules. Consequently, White-Rodgers has produced all that it was required to produce under the trial court's orders at issue herein, and we reverse the sanction's order and remand for the continuation of the underlying litigation.
Appellant-defendant White-Rodgers, a division of Emerson Electric Company, (White-Rodgers) challenges the trial court's decision ordering it to pay $18,187 in attorneys' fees as a sanction for discovery noncompliance. White-Rodgers also appeals the merits of the underlying discovery orders preceding the sanctions award. Appellees-plaintiffs Lonnie Kindle; Courtney Frederick; Samuel Frederick, by his parent Courtney Frederick; Courtney Frederick as personal representative of the estate of Stephan Frederick, deceased; Ciera Davis, by her parents Kenneth Craig Davis and Billie Joanna Davis; and Kenneth Craig Davis and Billie Joanna Davis, individually, (collectively, "the Plaintiffs"), cross-appeal for appellate expenses. Inasmuch as the materials produced by nontestifying experts are protected from discovery not only in the litigation for which they were hired, but also in subsequent litigation, White-Rodgers has already produced all that it was required to produce under the discovery orders at issue herein. Thus, we reverse the award for sanctions and remand for the continuation of the underlying litigation.
FACTS
The Explosion
In May 2004, an explosion occurred in an apartment attached to the barn of Bill and Betty Kindle in Morgan County. As a result of the explosion, Stephan Frederick was killed, and his wife, Courtney, and two-year-old son, Samuel, were badly burned. Courtney's two-year-old cousin, Ciera Davis, was also badly burned along with her uncle, Lonnie Kindle. On April 25, 2008, the Plaintiffs filed their amended complaint asserting claims against White-Rogers for strict products liability and negligent design of a water heater control that the Plaintiffs alleged caused the explosion.
Motions to Compel Discovery
It is undisputed that at a hearing on April 15, 2008, the Plaintiffs moved to compel White-Rodgers to produce non-privileged documents from an ongoing case against White-Rodgers in Missouri, captioned Glascock v. State Industries (Glascock). Glascock also involved a propane gas explosion and a water heater with a White-Rodgers gas control valve. Two people were injured in the Glascock explosion. The trial court in this case ordered that White-Rodgers had a continuing duty to supplement discovery herein with non-privileged, non-confidential materials in Glascock.
On October 27, 2008, the Plaintiffs filed a motion to compel, asking the trial court to issue an order compelling a White, Rodgers representative to respond under oath to questions regarding claims in (Glas-cock, permitting the Plaintiffs to participate in Glascock depositions, and amending a protective order to facilitate the sharing of discoverable White-Rodgers information between the Plaintiffs and the plaintiffs in Glascock.
On November 24, 2008, White-Rodgers filed its response opposing the Plaintiffs' motion to compel. In its response, White-Rodgers informed the trial court that Glascock had been settled on November 12, 2008, and, consequently, "perhaps all or at least most of plaintiff's demands in the pending motion [are] academic." Appellant's App. p. 169-70.
On December 8, 2008, the Plaintiffs filed a reply seeking new relief. Specifically, the Plaintiffs requested that the trial court compel White-Rodgers to produce "expert reports" and "any reports of White-Rodgers' experts to White-Rodgers' counsel." Id. at 186.
On December 10, 2008, the trial court held a hearing on the Plaintiffs' motion to compel. At the hearing, White-Rodgers informed that trial court that, "[njever, before Judge Gray,[ ] was there the slight est hint of disclosing expert opinions, expert investigation in Glascock under the umbrella of his order regarding public ree-ords. . The Court never addressed that, it never came up whether or not in this matter a related case could be discovered in another matter in the disclosure of those expert opinions, those investigation findings." Tr. p. 72.
On February 3, 2009, the Plaintiffs filed an unsolicited statement in support of the proposed order, arguing that White-Rodgers had to produce all expert materials from Glascock because "these expert materials are no longer entitled to protection from discovery." Appellant's App. p. 205. In support of this contention, the Plaintiffs cited to American Buildings Co. v. Kokomo Grain Co., Inc., 506 N.E.2d 56 (Ind.Ct.App.1987), which held that advisory consultants from prior litigation are not protected from discovery by Indiana Trial Rule 26(B)(4)(b). On February 6, 2009, White-Rodgers filed a motion to strike the Plaintiffs' unsolicited statement in support.
On February 9, 2009, the trial court issued its initial order (Initial Order) on the Plaintiffs' motion to the compel, requiring White-Rodgers to "produce all documents and tangible things that constitute or relate to any communications with any experts, any expert report, any expert file document, any correspondence, any discovery response or request, and/or any pleading or other paper not already produced from the claim/case of Glascock v. State Industries, et al." Id. at 238-89. The trial court referenced American Buildings as direct support for its ruling, but did not address White-Rodgers's motion to strike the Plaintiffs' unsolicited statement in support.
On February 17, 2009, White-Rodgers filed a motion to reconsider, arguing that it had been prejudiced by the Plaintiffs' belated arguments regarding advisory consultants' materials in @lascock and the scope of the holding in American Buildings. In addition, White-Rodgers maintained that the Initial Order granted the Plaintiffs more relief than they requested, was overbroad, and that American Buildings was inapplicable because @lascock settled before White-Rodgers had designated expert witnesses or disseminated expert reports. Finally, White-Rodgers asserted that the holding in American Buildings is flawed and cited authority criticizing the opinion.
On February 25, 2009, the trial court granted White-Rodgers's motion to reconsider and issued an amended order (Amended Order) limiting the (Glascock production. Specifically, the Amended Order stated that:
White-Rodgers shall produce all documents prepared by expert witnesses including notes, drawings, emails and reports from any experts retained in anticipation of litigation or for testimonial purposes. The only expert to be excluded from this discovery order shall be experts employed solely for purposes of consultation with counsel. White-Rodgers shall be relieved of an obligation to produce written materials provided to counsel and for counsel's use from experts retained solely for consulting purposes which set forth advisory opinions on litigation strategy or for purposes of settlement. Defendant White-Rodgers shall further produce any discovery responses or depositions provided by any expert in the Glascock litigation, all pleadings filed in the CHascock litigation, results of tests performed on the water heater control (or on a water heater control similar to the Glascock control) in the Glascock litigation, photographs, drawings, specifications, or design documents relating to the Glascock water heater control.
Appellant's App. p. 438-89.
On March 2, 2009, counsel for White, Rodgers corresponded with counsel for the Plaintiffs, noting that the Amended Order "is limited by its language to 'expert witnesses." There were no 'expert witnesses' [designated] in @Glascock on behalf of White-Rodgers," and no expert reports were published in Glascock. Id. at 457-59. White-Rodgers reiterated that it had already produced all non-privileged materials that were responsive to the Amended Order and that it had nothing further to produce.
The Plaintiffs' Motion for Sanctions
On March 6, 2009, the Plaintiffs filed a motion for sanctions against White-Rodgers. They argued that although the Amended Order relieved White-Rodgers from producing any written materials provided to counsel for counsel's own use from experts retained solely for consulting purposes, "White-Rodgers is playing seman tics in suggesting that it doesn't have experts because it never disclosed testifying expert opinions in (@lascock." Id. at 445. The Plaintiffs asserted that the Amended Order was based on the holding in American Buildings that "[a] determination that items are not protected by T.R. 26(B)(4) [ (dealing with expert testimony) ] does not necessarily preclude a determination that the same materials are protected from discovery under TR. 26(B)(3) [ (dealing with work product) ]," and maintained that White-Rodgers had experts whose reports are not work product protected from discovery in subsequent litigation. Id.
On March 13, 2009, White-Rodgers filed a response to the Plaintiffs' motion for sanctions, contending that the trial court's Amended Order did not require it to produce communications with consultants. White-Rodgers. explained that "[elxpert witnesses are established when a party declares a person an expert and proffers him for discovery. Until that event, which never occurred in Glascock, the engineers and other technically qualified personnel consulting with counsel about a case are consultants assisting the attorney in deciding trial strategy and settlement." Id. at 492 (emphasis in original).
On March 19, 2009, the Plaintiffs filed a reply in support of their motion for sane-tions, citing again to American Buildings. White-Rodgers filed a supplemental memorandum in opposition to the motion for sanctions, detailing its extensive discovery production and distinguishing and eritiqu-ing American Buildings.
On April 7, 2009, the trial court held a hearing on the Plaintiffs' motion for sane-tions. Two days later, the trial court issued a sanctions order (Sanctions Order) stating:
There is no showing that any of Defendant White-Rodgers's retained experts in the Glascock case were solely consulting/advisory experts. Therefore, without implied limitation, the expert notes, drawings, documents, and reports created in the Glascock matter relating to the manufacturing defect in the valve of the water heater shall be disclosed to Plaintiffs White-Rodgers may redact trial strategy/litigation advice from produced materials. Attorney communications to experts shall not be disclosed. If it becomes necessary, a referee shall be named to review materials with cost to be born[e] by White-Rodgers. Production to occur by April 30. White-Rodgers is ordered to pay reasonable fees incurred in drafting and filing the Motion for Sanctions and appearance to so argue.
Id. at 709-10.
On April 24, 2009, the Plaintiffs submitted a petition for attorneys' fees with an affidavit from the Plaintiffs' lead counsel supporting their request for $18,187 in fees. White-Rodgers filed a response on May 4, 2009, arguing that "its opposition to plaintiffs' motion was 'substantially justified [and] Rule 37 precludes an award of attorney's fees." Id. at 719. White-Rodgers maintained that "there [has been] no refusal to obey a court order" and emphasized that the trial court continuously narrowed White-Rodgers's required production in its subsequent orders. Id. at 724.
On May 7, 2009, the trial court entered an order awarding the Plaintiffs $18,187 in attorneys' fees (Fee Order). White-Rodgers now appeals.
DISCUSSION AND DECISION
I. Jurisdiction
As an initial matter, we observe that although this is an interlocutory appeal as a matter of right because the Sanctions Order required White-Rodgers to pay money, White-Rodgers asks this court to review the underlying discovery orders in addition to the Sanctions Order. See Indiana Appellate Rule 14(A) (providing for an interlocutory appeal "as a matter of right" when an interlocutory order requires "the payment of money"). The Plaintiffs argue that White-Rodgers cannot challenge the underlying discovery orders because White-Rodgers did not intentionally disobey the Amended Order. In support of their position, the Plaintiffs direct this court to Allstate Ins. Co. v. Scroghan, 851 N.E.2d 317 (Ind.Ct.App.2006).
In Seroghan, this court concluded that it had jurisdiction to review an underlying discovery order after a party incurred a monetary sanction for noncompliance with the order. Id. at 322. This court reasoned that "[wJhile we do not condone the practice of intentionally violating discovery orders to obtain appellate review of those orders, we recognize that such a practice can act as an important 'safety valve," which relieves parties from generally non-appealable discovery orders." Id. The Sceroghan court proceeded to review the merits of the underlying discovery order and ultimately reversed the trial court's decision denying the appellant's request for a protective order. Id. at 324-25.
Although, unlike the appellant in Sero-ghan, White-Rodgers did not intentionally fail to comply with the discovery orders, judicial economy supports the conclusion that this court should review the merits of the underlying discovery orders. Indeed, it is impractical for this court to determine whether White-Rodgers's opposition to the discovery orders was substantially justified without first analyzing the merits of the underlying discovery orders.
Moreover, in light of Sceroghan, a rule that would only permit review of the underlying discovery order when there has been intentional noncompliance with the order would reward disobedient parties with a broader basis for appellate review while punishing obedient parties. We decline to adopt such a rule.
IL Discovery Orders and Sanctions
A. Standard of Review
Proceeding to the merit s, White-Rodgers argues that this court should reverse the trial court's decision to impose monetary sanctions on it because its opposition to the Plaintiffs' discovery into the Glascock materials was substantially justified and the underlying discovery orders are erroneous. A trial court has broad discretion in ruling on issues of discovery and in determining appropriate sanctions for failing to comply with a trial court's discovery order. Scroghan, 851 N.E.2d at 321-22. Accordingly, an appellate court will interfere only when the appealing party can show an abuse of discretion. Id. An abuse of discretion occurs when a trial court reached a conclusion that is against the logic and effect of the circumstances before it. Burr v. United Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 560 N.E.2d 1250, 1253-54 (Ind.Ct.App.1990).
When a trial court must compel discovery, Indiana Trial Rule 37(A)(4) (Rule 37) provides that the trial court shall award "the moving party the reasonable expenses incurred in obtaining the order, including attorney's fees, unless the court finds that the opposition to the motion was substantially justified or that other cireum-stances make an award of expenses unjust." A party is substantially justified for the purposes of avoiding sanctions for re sisting discovery "if reasonable persons could conclude that a genuine issue existed as to whether a person was bound to comply with the requested discovery." Penn Cent. Corp. v. Buchanan, 712 N.E.2d 508, 513 (Ind.Ct.App.1999). Likewise, fees should not be awarded when genuine discovery disputes occur between parties, even though the dispute is ultimately resolved in favor of one party. Id. at 512.
B. Discovery of Expert Materials
At the core of this dispute is Indiana Trial Rule 26(B)(4) (Rule 26(B)(4)), which governs experts. Specifically, Rule 26(B)(4) states, in relevant part:
(a) (1) A party may through interrogatories require any other party to identify each person whom the other party expects to call as an expert witness at trial, to state the subject matter on which the expert is expected to testify, and to state the substance of the facts and opinions to which the expert is expected to testify and a summary of the grounds for each opinion.
a * #
(b) A party may discover facts known or opinions held by an expert who has been retained or specially employed by another party in anticipation of litigation or preparation for trial and who is not expected to be called as a witness at trial, only . upon a showing of exceptional cireumstances under which it is impracticable for the party seeking discovery to obtain facts or opinions on the same subject by other means.
Accordingly, Rule 26(B)(4) distinguishes between an expert who is expected to testify at trial and one who is not expected to testify by permitting broad discovery of the former, but very limited discovery of the latter. Indeed, Rule 26(B)(4)(b) provides one of the few exceptions to the general rule that "[plarties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject-matter involved in the pending action...." Ind. Trial Rule 26(B)(1). Additionally, Rule 26(B)(4) "'was adopted in order to treat the expert witness outside of the work-product privilege, but within the specific context of a Rule and upon a basis of 'fairness.""'" R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co. v. N. Tex. Steel Co., Inc., 752 N.E.2d 112, 132 (Ind.Ct.App.2001) (quoting William F. Harvey, Indiana Practice: Rules of Procedure Annotated § 26.14 (3d ed. 2000)).
In determining whether Rule 26(B)(4)(b)'s discovery protections apply to an expert, this court has stressed the importance of whether the expert has been designated as a testifying expert. In Reeves v. Boyd & Sons, Inc., a plaintiff designated an expert as a witness at trial but subsequently undesignated the same expert after a notice of deposition and subpoena had already been served. 654 N.E.2d 864, 874 (Ind.Ct.App.1995). The trial court issued a protective order preventing the deposition and, on appeal, this court affirmed:
"Although plaintiff may have originally designated the witness as a testifying expert, plaintiff has the prerogative of changing his mind. Since plaintiff changed his mind before any expert testimony was given in this case, the witness never actually acted as a testifying expert witness. The court cannot find, then, that the shift in designation affects the witness's current status as a non-testifying expert witness and denies him the protection afforded such a witness."
Id. at 875 (quoting Ross v. Burlington N.R.R. Co., 136 F.R.D. 638, 639 (N.D.Ill.1991)).
After recognizing that the rationale behind the federal counterpart to Rule 26(B)(4) was to prevent unfairness, this court emphasized that "[wle presume that our supreme court was familiar with the rationale underlying the drafting of the federal rule . when adopting our very similar [Trial Rule] 26(B)(4) and, in so doing, distinguishing between discovery as to a testifying expert and a non-testifying expert." Id. Consequently, this court concluded that "[iln the case of an expert 'who is not expected to be called as a witness at trial, a 'showing of exceptional cireum-stances' is required in order to go forward with discovery." Id. (quoting Ind. TR. 26(B)(4)(b)).
Similarly, in Donnelley, one of the defendants in a multi-defendant products liability action "hired . an expert" in the case but "did not designate him as a witness for trial because [it] settled out of the case before filing a witness list." 752 N.E.2d at 130-31. After the settlement, a remaining defendant sought discovery of the nondesignated expert's opinion. Id. at 131.
This court held that when a party seeks discovery of an expert who is not expected to be called at trial, exceptional cireum-stances must be shown, even if the party who consulted with the expert settles before trial. Id. at 182. We reasoned that the policy behind this rule is " 'to prevent a party from building his own case by means of his opponent's financial resources, superior diligence and more aggressive preparation.'" Id. (quoting Reeves, 654 N.E.2d at 875). Moreover, "[the same reasoning applies although [the party who hired the expert] settled out of the case." Id. Thus, Reeves and Donnelley establish that under Indiana law, a party's designation of a testifying expert is a crucial decision that directly affects the discovery protection provided by Rule 26(B)(4)(b).
In the instant case, the Amended Order, which was issued in response to White, Rodgers's motion to reconsider the Initial Order, narrowed the seope of what White, Rodgers was required to produce. Specifically, the Amended Order stated:
White-Rodgers shall produce all documents prepared by expert witnesses including notes, drawings, emails and reports from any experts retained in anticipation of litigation or for testimonial purposes. The only expert to be excluded from this discovery order shall be experts employed solely for purposes of consultation with counsel. White-Rodgers shall be relieved of an obligation to produce written materials provided to counsel and for counsel's use from experts retained solely for consulting purposes which set forth advisory opinions on litigation strategy or for purposes of settlement.
Appellant's App. p. 438-89.
Less than one week later, on March 2, 2009, counsel for White-Rodgers sent a letter to the Plaintiffs' counsel stating that the Amended Order was limited to "expert witnesses," and that White-Rodgers did not have expert witnesses in (@lascock. Id. at 457. The letter also detailed White, Rodgers's production of other Glascock materials, including depositions, pleadings, photographs, field notes, and drawings before concluding that White-Rodgers had already produced "all non-privileged materials responsive to the Court's [Amended Order]." Id. at 459.
In light of this court's holdings in Reeves and Donnelley, we conclude that White, Rodgers indeed had produced all that it was required to produce under the Amended Order. Because White-Rodgers never designated any testifying experts, the Plaintiffs were required to show "exceptional cireumstances under which it is impracticable for the party seeking discovery to obtain facts or opinions on the same subject by other means." T.R. 26(B)(4)(b). Inasmuch as the Plaintiffs never argued that exceptional cireumstances existed, White-Rodgers did not have to disclose its expert materials from (Glascock.
Nevertheless, the Plaintiffs argue that pursuant to American Buildings, White-Rodgers was required to produce "documents from both testifying experts and consulting experts" onee Glascock had settled. Appellee's Br. p. 23. In American Buildings, this court held that expert-related materials from prior, terminated litigation are subject to discovery in later litigation after the litigation for which the experts were engaged has been resolved. 506 N.E.2d at 60.
Initially, we observe that Reeves and Donnelley were decided after this court's 1987 decision in American Buildings. And as discussed above, both Reeves and Donnelley stand for the proposition that a party's designation of a testifying expert directly affects the discovery protection provided to that expert. Accordingly, to the extent that American Buildings holds that Rule 26(B)(4)(b)'s discovery protections do not extend to subsequent litigation, that holding is overly broad and was subsequently narrowed.
Moreover, to hold that Rule 26(B)(4)(b) discovery protections do not extend to subsequent litigation would chill the purposes of the discovery rules, which are to "provide parties with information essential to litigation of the issues, to eliminate surprise, and to promote settlement." Nat'l Eng'g & Contracting Co., Inc., v. C & P Eng'g & Mfg. Co., Inc., 676 NE.2d 372, 375 (Ind.Ct.App.1997). Specifically, compelling a party to disclose materials from its nontestifying experts from prior litigation would have a detrimental impact on settlement that is two-fold. First, parties will be reluctant to consult with experts if they know that any expert with whom they consult will be discoverable in subsequent litigation. Indeed, parties will delay gathering information from experts for as long as possible even though this information would reveal the various strengths and weaknesses in a given case. Consequent ly, settlement will be delayed if it occurs at all. Additionally, parties will be reluctant to settle if they know that settlement will strip discovery protections from the materials produced by their nontestifying experts, thus clogging the courts with additional and perhaps unnecessary litigation.
Furthermore, the discovery protections provided to nontestifying experts by Rule 26(B)(4)(b) are based upon principles of fairness of not allowing one party to build its case on the resources and due diligence of another party. Donnelley, 752 N.E.2d at 132; Reeves, 654 N.E.2d at 875. Although the Plaintiffs argue that "the 'fairness' equation is completely different in subsequent litigation because the prior-litigation expert work already was purchased in the prior case," appellee's br. p. 33, this argument ignores the fact that expert materials are still valuable to the purchasing party even though the litigation for which they were initially hired may have terminated. Indeed, the case herein is very similar to Glascock, and, consequently, it is reasonable to infer that the expert materials from Glascock will assist White-Rodgers in developing its litigation strategy. Moreover, a party who seeks discovery of the materials produced by another party's nontestifying expert remains free to utilize his own resources to gather such information.
That said, pursuant to the underlying discovery orders, White-Rodgers was only required to disclose expert witnesses or, in other words, testifying experts. Because White-Rodgers had not designated any testifying experts in Glascock, it was required to produce materials from its nontestifying experts only if the Plaintiffs could demonstrate "exceptional cireum- stances," T.R. 26(B)(4)(b), which the Plaintiffs failed to show. Consequently, because White-Rodgers had already produced all non-privileged materials pursuant to the underlying discovery orders, the trial court abused its discretion when it imposed sanctions, and we reverse and remand for the continuation of the underlying litigation.
The judgment of the trial court is reversed and remanded for the continuation of the underlying litigation.
FRIEDLANDER, J., concurs.
CRONE, J., dissents with opinion.
. Although White-Rodgers is the only defendant in this multi-defendant suit seeking relief in this interlocutory appeal, its co-defendants are listed in the case caption pursuant to Indiana Appellate Rule 17(A), which provides, "A party of record in the trial court . shall be a party on appeal."
. We heard oral argument on January 21, 2010, at Carmel High School. We would like to thank the school's administration, faculty, and students for their hospitality. Additionally, we thank counsel for their able presentations.
. The Plaintiffs filed their initial complaint on October 24, 2005.
. The Plaintiffs' amended complaint asserted claims against three new parties and the second-generation defendants moved for automatic change of judge, which the trial court granted on August 5, 2008. Appellant's App. p. 26. The Honorable Robyn L. Moberly was appointed Special Judge, and the December 10, 2008 hearing was the first hearing before her in this case.
. Initially, we note that on December 1, 2009, the Plaintiffs filed a motion requesting that their brief and appendix be opened to public access. Inasmuch as White-Rodgers does not oppose this request, the Plaintiffs' motion is granted.
. Inasmuch as we find in favor of White, Rodgers, we need not consider the Plaintiffs' request for appellate expenses.