Case Name: Ellen O'Donnell, Resp't, v. Robert McIntyre, Appl't
Court: New York Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1890-01-14
Citations: 28 N.Y. St. Rep. 619
Docket Number: 
Parties: Ellen O’Donnell, Resp’t, v. Robert McIntyre, Appl't.
Judges: 
Reporter: New York State Reporter
Volume: 28
Pages: 619–622

Head Matter:
Ellen O’Donnell, Resp’t, v. Robert McIntyre, Appl't.
(Court of Appeals, Second Division,
Filed January 14, 1890.)
1. Landlord and tenant—Attornment.
On the trial of an action for assault and battery committed by the owner of the tax title of a house and lot upon the former owner, iu possession, where the tenant had agreed to continue in possession as the tenant of the owner of the tax title, the judge instructed the jury that the former owner was still in possession, and had the right to usé reason hie force 10 retain possession and eject plaintiff. Held, no error.
2. Same.
One who acquires real estate pursuant to a tax sale is not in privity with the former owner. So that plaintiff and defendant were not privies hut strangers, and the attempted attornment by the tenant to defendant was void.
(Follet, Ch. J., dissenting.)
Appeal from a judgment of the general term of the fifth department, affirming a judgment entered on a verdict for $1,000.
This action was brought to recover damages for an assault and battery, which the plaintiff alleged the defendant committed on her April 5, 1888, at a dwelling house known as Ho. 39 Orange street, in the city of Eochester, which dwelling each party claimed to be the owner and in possession of. The battery was committed while each was using more or less force against the other in defending the possession claimed.
It was assumed on the trial that the plaintiff had been the owner of the premises from prior to April 1,1881, to March 1,1883, and in possession, through her tenant, from the first date to April 2, 1883. In 1879 the premises were assessed for taxes to Mary Harrigan, but whether as owner or occupant the case does not show. On the third Tuesday of August, 1880, the premises were sold for the non-payment of taxes for 1879, and August 29, 1882, the defendant received a deed which in terms conveyed the fee. On the 1st day of March, 1883, the time allowed for redemption had run, and assuming the validity of the tax proceedings, which were not questioned on the trial, the defendant then became the owner in fee simple.
The record does not show when, from whom or how the plaintiff acquired her title or possession, but it does, appear and was not disputed on the trial that about April 1, 1881, one Joseph H. Bates entered into possession of the premises as plaintiff’s tenant and occupied them under the plaintiff until April 2, 1883, when the defendant presented his tax deed and demanded possession of Bates, who then surrendered the house keys to the defendant and agreed to thereafter continue in possession as his tenant and pay the subsequently accruing rent to him. The plaintiff heard that the defendant had taken the house keys, and in the afternoon of
April 5, 1883, she went to the house with a carpenter to put on new locks and fit new keys to the locks from which the keys had been taken, and while engaged in this work the defendant entered the house and ordered the plaintiff to leave, but she refused, and thereupon he attempted to eject her by force, which attempt was successfully resisted.
Fanning & Williams, for resp’t; J. A. Stull, for app’lt.
Affirming 1 N. Y. State Rep., 68.

Opinion:
Parker, J.
The question requiring consideration is presented by an exception taken to the charge of the learned trial justice. He instructed the jury that the plaintiff was at the time of the quarrel in possession of the premises and had the right to use reasonable force to retain her possession and to eject the defendant ; that he had no right to exercise force to acquire possession or to remain in the house after having been notified by the plaintiff to leave. It is insisted by the appellant that the attornment of Bates to the defendant was valid, and that thereafter he was the owner and in possession of the premises. The statute provides: " Sec. 3. The attornment of a tenant to a stranger shall be absolutely void and shall not, in any way, affect the possession of his landlord unless it be made, (1) with the consent of the landlord; or, (2) pursuant to or in consequence of a judgment at law or the order or decree of a court of equity; or, (3) to a mortgagee after the mortgage has become forfeited." 1 R. S., 744. All attornments by lessees were not abolished by the Revised Statutes. Austin v. Ahearne, 61 N. Y., 6.
If then the defendant, after obtaining tax title to these premises, was a stranger to the plaintiff in respect thereto, the attornment was void, otherwise it was valid. In its general legal signification, stranger is opposed to the word privy. By privity is meant the mutual or successive relationship to the same rights of property, and privies are classified according to the manner of relationships. There are privies in estate, as donor and donee, lessor and lessee, and pint tenants; privies in blood, as heir and ancestor; privies in representation, as testator, executor and administrator; privies in law, as where the law, without privity of blood or estate, casts land upon another by escheat. 1 Green-leaf, § 189; Bouvier's Institutes. We are of the opinion that one who acquires real estate pursuant to a tax sale is not in privity with the former owner. No contractual relation exists between them. The owner does not grant his title. Such a purchaser is a grantee of the state. Becker v. Howard, 66 N. Y., 5. The land is assessed irrespective of any special interests, the taxation of all particular estates or rights being merged in the burden put upon it. If the tax be not paid, then the state, by virtue of its taxing power, and through the medium provided by statute, either acquires the land or grants it to a citizen. The purchaser is not subjected to any of the inconveniences of the old title, nor can he take any advantage from it. Covenants running with the land do not bind him, nor do him any good. Blackwell on Tax Titles, § 965.
He not only obtains his title from a source other than the former owner, but the estate acquired is not of necessity the same. The owner of the old title may have granted rights of way and other easements which a purchaser from him would be estopped from denying. He may have encumbered the lands by mortgage, in which event the estate acquired by his grantee would likewise be burdened with it. But as we have seen, the owner of the tax title obtains the land free from incumbrances of every character. Not excepting the mortgage lien after the mortgagee's time for redemption has expired. Becker v. Howard, supra.
It seems to be apparent, therefore, that the plaintiff and defendant were not privies, but strangers. It follows that the attempted attornment by the tenant to this defendant was void, and that the trial court rightly instructed the jury.
We do not regard Hubbell v. Weldon, Hill & Denio's Supp., 139, as an authority upon the question here decided. Neither the right of a tenant to attorn, the statute in relation thereto, nor the question of privity were before the court for consideration. The action was ejectment brought by the grantee of one who had acquired title pursuant to a tax sale, against a tenant who had entered into possession of the premises under a lease from the former owner. Objection was made that the lot was held adversely at the time of the conveyance from the purchaser at the tax sale to the plaintiff, and that for that reason the deed was void. And it was with reference to that question solely that the observations were made which are urged in support of appellant's contention. The other exceptions do not require consideration.
The judgment should be affirmed.