Case Name: DOUGHERTY et al. v. THOMPSON et al. (two cases)
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1900-11-16
Citations: 67 N.Y.S. 200
Docket Number: 
Parties: DOUGHERTY et al. v. THOMPSON et al. (two cases).
Judges: 
Reporter: West's New York Supplement
Volume: 67
Pages: 200–216

Head Matter:
(54 App. Div. 456.)
DOUGHERTY et al. v. THOMPSON et al. (two cases).
(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department.
November 16, 1900.)
1. Wills—Gifts—Vested Interest.
Under a will giving a life estate in land to B., nephew of testator, and, on death of B., giving the property to trustees to receive the income during the life of C., son of B., and to apply one-half thereof to the use of C., and the other one-half “to apply, during the whole of said term, to the use of all the other grandnieces and grandnephews of mine in equal shares, the issue of any deceased taking their parent’s share,” and on the death of C. to sell the property, and distribute the proceeds among all testator’s grandnieces and grandnephews in equal shares, the issue of any deceased grandnephew or grandniece taking his or her parent’s share, a grand nephew or grandniece has no vested interest in the income or the remainder, so that he or she, dying without issue, during continuance of the trust, cannot dispose of it by will or otherwise.
2. Same.
Under a will giving money to trustees to apply annually $700 of the income to the use of W., testator’s nephew, and the residue of the income to the use of J., wife of W., and their children, by paying the same to her for the support of herself and them during their minority, and, as each child became 21 years old, he or she to be entitled to receive one equal share of the surplus, to be determined by dividing it into one more share than there shall be children of W. and X, J. to be entitled to receive one of such shares for her own use during her life, after all the said children shall become 21 years old, and on the death of W. and X the trust property to be paid over to their children, and, if any of them shall have died leaving issue, such issue to receive their parent’s share, a child of W. and X has no vested interest in the income or the remainder during the life of W. or X, so that dying without issue after becoming 21 years old, and after the death of W., but before death of J., he cannot dispose of it by will or otherwise, but it will thereafter be divided as though he had never existed.
Hatch and Rumsey, JX, dissenting.
Appeal from special term, New York county.
Action No. 1, by J. Hampden Dougherty and another, trustees under the will of William D. Thompson, deceased, against Josephine L. Thompson and others, for construction of the ninth clause of the will of deceased; and action No. 2, between the same parties for the construction of the third clause of the will. From the judgments (59 N. Y. Supp. 608), certain defendants appeal.
Modified.
Argued before VAN BRUNT, P. J., and HATCH, RUMSEY, MCLAUGHLIN, and INGRAHAM, JJ.
Levi S. Tenney, for appellant Nina O’Donnell.
William T. Tomlinson, for appellant Marie Louise Norris.
Eustace Conway, for appellants John C. Thompson and others.
Charles E. Lydecker, for appellants Richard H. Thompson and Mary R. Thompson.
'Charles C. Hoge, for respondents Dougherty and another.
Henry B. B. Stapler, for respondent Josephine L. Thompson.

Opinion:
Action No. 1.
INGRAHAM, J.
This action was brought for a construction of the ninth clause of the will of William D. Thompson, deceased. The testator died in the year 1874, unmarried, and without issue. He left a large estate, and when the will was made had no brother or sister living. He had, however, certain nephews and nieces, the children of a deceased brother, who upon his decease would be his heir at law, and it was these nephews and nieces, and his grandnephews and grandnieces, that were to receive his estate. The testator's general scheme seems to have been to give a life interest in his property to his nephews and nieces, the fee of the estate upon the death of his nephews and nieces to go to his grandnephews and grandnieces. A consideration of the whole will, from which the intention of the testator is to be determined, indicates that it was the grandnephews and grandnieces that he intended should ultimately have his property. Most careful provisions were made to prevent his estate from being dissipated by his nephews and nieces. His nephews and nieces were to receive an income for their support during their lives, and upon the termination of these life estates the corpus of the estate was to be distributed between those who occupied to him the relation of grandnephews and grandnieces; and the will is peculiar, in that these grandnephews and grandnieces are not named as individuals when disposing of the ultimate remainder of the estate, but where such an ultimate remainder is disposed of the disposition is to his grandnephews and grandnieces, indicating it was the. class who occupied that relation that he had constantly in mind when he designated the persons to whom the estate should ultimately go rather than to any particular individual. There were several clauses in this will creating separate trusts for persons specifically named. The will shows that the testator had in mind the necessities and claims upon his bounty of his nephews and nieces. The provision made for them was not equal, and he evidently considered the claims and necessities of each, and determined what portion of his estate should be applied to their use; .but when he comes to direct the distribution of the remainder of the trust estates provided for by the ninth clause of the will he seems to be guided by a different principle, intending substantial equality as between the grandnephews and grandnieces, directing that this property be distributed among them in equal shares. It is to his grandnephews and grandnieces as a class, to those generally who occupied that relation to him, who are the object of his bounty,' not to any particular grandnephew or grandniece to whom he desires that this portion of his property should go. In this connection, attention should be called to the twelfth clause of the will, where provision is made for the death of either of his nephews or nieces during his lifetime. Considering, therefore, this general intention of the testator, we turn to the ninth clause of the will, which is the one to be construed in this action.
By this clause the testator disposes of a piece.of property, No. 139 Broadway, New York City, of considerable value. He gives a life estate in this property to his nephew John B. Thompson, and upon his death he gives the property to his executors in trust, to receive the income thereof during the life of John C. Thompson, the son of John B. Thompson, and to apply the same as follows: "One-quarter to the use of the said John C. Thompson, and one-quarter to the use of his mother, the wife of the said John B. Thompson;" and, in case of her death during the said term, then to devote the one-quarter of the income payable to her to the use of the said John C. Thompson, and the other half of the said income "to apply during the whole of said term to the use of all the other grandnieces and grandnephews of mine in equal shares, the issue of any deceased taking their parents' share." John C. Thompson, the grandnephew of the testator, was thus given either a quarter or a half of the income of this property after the death of his father. This is the single instance in the will in which a grandnephew or a grandniece is mentioned by name, and this trust was to continue during the life of John C. Thompson. There could be during that time no sale of this property. It was to be held in trust by the trustees. The rents and profits were to be collected by them. One half of such income was to be paid to John C. Thompson and his mother. The other half of this income the trustees were directed to apply during the whole of such term to "the use of all" the other grandnieces and grandnephews in equal shares, and then, having in mind a contingency that might happen, viz. that one or more of these grandnephews and grandnieces should die during the continuance of the trust, the testator directs that, if the grandniece or grandnephew so dying should leave issue, the income that would be payable to the one so dying should be paid to his or her issue. That this direction to apply this income "to the use of" his grandnephews and grandnieces was not a vested gift of income to any particular individual seems clear. It was these grandnieces and grandnephews as a class—those that occupied that relation to him when the income was to be distributed—that he intended should receive such income, and not the executor or legatee of any grandnephew or grandniece dying during the continuance of the trust without issue. The element of survivorship was in his mind as the persons to whom this income should be payable. If he had understood that :such income could be disposed of by the last will and testament of either of his grandnieces or grandnephews, the provision for a .devolution of the income upon the death of either of them leaving-issue would have been quite unnecessary. That was only essential, because, as the testator understood that he had provided that this income should go to the class or to those occupying the position of grandnephew or grandniece during the continuance of the trust, it was necessary, if he wished that, in case either of them died leaving issue, the issue should stand in- the parents' place, that provision should be made for that contingency.
In this connection, it is important to consider the language used in giving this income. The trustees are directed to "apply, during the whole of said term, to the use of all the other grandnieces and grandnephews, in equal shares." Here is not a direct gift of .the income to each grandniece and grandnephew living at the time the trust estate commences, but a direction to apply the income to the use of the grandniece and grandnephew during the whole term that the trust was to continue. Certainly a payment of a portion .of this income to the legatees or next of kin of a grandnephew or grandniece would not be applying the income to the use of the grandnephews and grandnieces. This is an entirely different provision from the usual provision "to pay to" or other similar term used when an income is specifically given to a beneficiary named, and this direction had no relation to the time of the testator's death, because the trust estate from which this income was to be received was to commence, not upon his death, but upon the death -of his nephew, to whom he had given a life estate in the property; and the direction to the trustees to apply one-half of the income of this property to his grandnephews and grandnieces was, by the express provisions of the will, to continue during the whole of the trust term.
When we look át the distribution that the testator directs upon the termination of the trust, we see that the same intention pervades the disposition of the remainder. He makes no present bequest to any grandnephew or grandniece, but he directs his trustees to sell, and to distribute the proceeds among his grandnephews and grandnieces, and then follows the same provision as to the disposition of the proceeds of this sale as was contained in the disposition of the income, that the issue of any grandniece or grandnephew dying before the time when this disposition was to be made was to take the share of the parent dying. Thus, it seems, to me that to hold that either one of these grandnephews and grandnieces is vested with an interest in these rents or in the remainder of this property, which he could convey or dispose of by will, would be to defeat the clear intention of the testator as to those who he intended should be benefited by the income of this property, and by the distribution of the remainder upon the termination of the trust,—an intention that is expressed in the whole will, and which, it seems to me, is clearly crystallized in this clause now under consideration. In determining the intention of a testator, as has been often remarked, reference to decided cases is generally of but little-advantage, as in each case the circumstances existing at the time of the making of the will and the language used by the testator-are controlling in determining his intention, but I think the authorities bear out the construction that I have indicated. The conclusion arrived at in Clark v. Cammann, 160 N. Y. 323, 54 N. E. 710, sustains this conclusion. There the sum of $10,000 was left to the use of the testator's niece for and during her natural life, "and. from and immediately after her decease, upon trust to pay over and divide the said principal sum of $10,000 unto and among all her children, share and share alike, and to their lawful representatives forever, as tenants in common, per capita, the issue of any such child who may then be dead to take his or her deceased parent's share." In that case the court, after discussing In re Brown, 154 N. Y. 313, 48 N. E. 537, said:
"In the will we now have under consideration the provision materially differs. 'And from and immediately after her decease, upon trust, to pay over and divide the said principal sum of $10,000 unto and among all her children, share and share alike.' Had the testator stopped here, we should have regarded this will to be in substance the same as in the Brown Case, and should not have hesitated to hold that the legacies vested in the sons. But the testator proceeds, 'and to their lawful representatives forever, as tenants in common, per capita, the issue of any such child who may then be dead to take his or her deceased parents' share.' Here we have an express provision of the will which seems to negative the claim that the estate vested in the sons. The testator apparently understood that it might happen that the sons would not survive his widow or their mother, and therefore undertook to provide for such a contingency by giving the estate to the issue of the sons in case of their death. If the estate was intended to vest in the sons, then, upon the death of either of them, the estate would pass to their executors or administrators, and might never reach the issue of such deceased child; but here we find, seemingly, an intention disclosed that the issue of the deceased child should take, rather than the executors or administrators. It is contended that the-words, 'and to their lawful representatives forever,' are used as words of succession or substitution, and not of limitation. We are aware that the words, 'lawful representatives,' are often intended to mean executors and administra tors; but to so construe the words in this case would not only render meaningless the provision which follows, but would, as we have shown, be in conflict with the testator's evident intention of having the estate go to the issue of the sons, should they die during the lifetime of their mother."
And the court then continues:
"The view that we entertain of this will is that the testator intended the estate to go to the issue of the sons of Mrs. Gillespie in case of the death of either during the existence of the life estate. No issue of these sons were in being at the dqath of the testator, and it was uncertain as to whether they would ever have issue. The remainder was therefore contingent, and not vested, for the reason that the persons to whom, or the event upon which, the estate was limited to take effect remained uncertain until the termination of the life estate. Futurity was annexed to the substance of the gift, 'and the vesting was suspended."
In Ee Brown, supra, in which it was held that the estate vested, the court held that it was clearly the intention to give the estate absolutely to the testator's grandchildren, without words of limitation as to the survivors, but subject to the outstanding life estates; but in this case we have no such intention expressed, but we have what seems to me to be a contrary intention.
We think, also, that this conclusion is further sustained by the case of Fargo v. Squiers, 154 N. Y. 250, 48 N. E. 509; McGillis v. McGillis, 154 N. Y. 532, 49 N. E. 145; and In re Baer, 147 N. Y. 348, 41 N. E. 702. In this case the court says:
"Where final division and distribution is to be made among a class, the benefits of the will must be confined to those persons who come within the appropriate category at the date when the distribution or division is directed to be made. In such cases the gift is contingent upon survivorship, and, if it vests at all before the date of distribution, it is subject to be devested by the death before that time of a person presumptively entitled to share in the distribution. While this rule is sometimes made to yield to indications of a contrary intent in the will, yet it may be said to be a general rule, and there is nothing to be found in the will in question to prevent its full application."
As in the case of Delaney v. McCormack, 88 N. Y. 174-183:
' "The case, therefore, falls within the rule that where the gift is money, and the direction for the conversion absolute, the legacy given to a class of persons vests in those who answer the description. Adding to these considerations the incongruity of a construction which would include James himself among the next of kin in the testator's mind and intention, we are entirely clear that the courts below correctly decided that the next of kin entitled were those who answered that description at the date of the distribution."
This incongruity would exist in this case; for if this legacy vested in John C. Thompson, who was to have a quarter or half of the income during his life, he would be entitled to a distributive share of the proceeds of the property, although such distributive share was not to come into being until after his death.
A further discussion of the cases upon this question would seem to be unnecessary. As before stated, each particular will has to be construed by a consideration of its own provisions and the conditions existing at the time the will was made. Giving to this provision of the will most careful consideration, we are forced to the conclusion that it was the intention of the testator that this half of the income to be distributed among his grandnephews and grandnieces was to be distributed to such of them as were in being when the distribution was to be made, except that, in case of the death of either grandniece or grandnephew before a final distribution leaving issue, the parent's share, both of the income and principal, was to be paid to the issue; but, in case of the death of either of the grandnephews or grandnieces during the continuance of the trust without issue, the half of the income of the property and the principal was t'o be divided among the survivors. It follows that the judgment appealed from should be modified in conformity with the views herein expressed, and as modified affirmed, with costs to the appellants and the plaintiff to be paid out of the estate.
VAN BRUNT, P. J., and McLAUGHLIN, J., concur..
Action No. 2.
INGRAHAM, J.
This action was brought to construe the third clause of the will of William D. Thompson, deceased. The facts are stated in the case of these plaintiffs against these defendants, which was brought to construe another clause of the same will decided herewith. By the clause in question the testator gives to his executors the sum of $100,000 in trust to receive the rents, incomes, and profits thereof, and out of the net income to apply to the use of his nephew William D. Thompson, Jr., the annual sum of $700, and the whole residue of such net income to apply to the use of Josephine, the wife of the said William D. Thompson, Jr., and their children, by paying the same to her for the support of herself and children during their minority, and, as each child attains the age of 21, he or she shall be entitled to receive one equal share of such surplus of income above $700 per annum, the same being divided into as many equal shares as there shall be children of the said William D. Thompson, Jr., and Josephine, his wife, and one more share for the said Josephine, which she shall be entitled to receive for her own use during her life, after all the said children shall have attained the age of 21; and, "upon the death of the longest liver of them, the said William D. Thompson, Jr., and Josephine, his wife, this trust shall cease, and the trustees shall forthwith transfer and pay over the whole of the trust property, and the proceeds and increase thereof, to the children of the said William D. Thompson, Jr., and Josephine, his wife, and, if any of said children shall have died' leaving issue, such issue shall receive their parents' share." At the death of the testator, William D. Thompson, Jr., had three children, all infants and unmarried. One of them, Stephen J. Thompson, died on April 27, 1897, without issue, during the continuance of the trust, Ms mother, Josephine Thompson, being still alive; and the question presented is as to who is entitled to the share of the income which the said Stephen J. Thompson had received during the continuance of the trust; or, in other words, whether this income vested in each of the three cMldren of William D. Thompson, Jr., either upon the death of the testator or upon their arriving at the age of 21 years. What was said as to the intention of the testator in maldng this will in the opinion construing the ninth clause of the will before referred to is applicable here. It is quite clear that the intent of the testator was to create a fund for the support and maintenance of his nephew William D. Thompson, Jr., and his family. Thus, he gives a yearly sum to his nephew to be first paid out of the income from the trust fund, the balance of the income to be paid to his nephew's wife for the support of herself and children. As each child arrives at the age of 21, however, that child was to have a share of the income, which was then to be paid to that child until the termination of the trust, subject to be increased upon the death of the father, or upon the death or remarriage of the mother. That no right to this income vested in either of the children of William D. Thompson, Jr., upon the death of the testator, was apparent; for during their minority the income was to be paid to their mother for the support of herself and her children. It must be clear that, if either of these children had died before arriving at the age of 21, no portion of this income would have been payable to the child's next of kin, but the income would have been divided as though that child had* never existed. That, certainly, was the intention of the testator. Then, upon the arrival of any child at the age of 21, the share of the income which had before been paid to his mother for his support was to be paid to him; but it was paid to him as one of the children of William D. Thompson, Jr., and to carry out the intention of the testator that the income of this trust fund was to be applied to the support of the family of his nephew. The whole intent of the testator, as expressed in this clause of the will, seems to provide a fund for the support of his nephew's family, to be paid to them in the way that he determined was the most conducive to accomplish that end. To allow a portion of this trust fund to be paid to the legatees of either one of these children dying without issue during the trust would violate what seems to me to be the clear intention of the testator. The bequest of the remainder upon the termination of the trust, upon the principles stated in the opinion construing the ninth clause of the will, would have to be distributed among those children of William D. Thompson, Jr., who were alive at the termination of the trust, except in the contingency of one dying leaving issue, in which case such issue was to receive the parent's share. Now, it certainly could not have been the intention of the testator to have the income during the continuance of the trust, which had been payable to the child who died without issue, paid to his legatees, when the legatees would not have been entitled to receive any part of the principal upon the termination of the trust. Upon the whole case, I think that the intention of the testator, as expressed in this clause, was that a share of the income should be paid to each of these children of his nephew William D. Thompson, Jr., upon his attaining the age of 21 years; that, upon the death of any one of William D. Thompson's children during the continuance of the trust, the share of the income paid to the child dying should be paid to the survivors and their mother in equal shares. It follows that the judgment appealed from must be modified in conformity with the views herein expressed, and as modified affirmed, with costs to the appellant and to the plaintiffs out of the fund.
VAN BRUNT, P. J., and McLAUGHHN, J., concur.