Case Name: The town of East-Hartford against Pitkin and others, executors of Elisha Pitkin, deceased
Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Connecticut
Decision Date: 1831-06
Citations: 8 Conn. 393
Docket Number: 
Parties: The town of East-Hartford against Pitkin and others, executors of Elisha Pitkin, deceased.
Judges: Hosmer, Ch. J. was of the same opinion.
Reporter: Connecticut Reports
Volume: 8
Pages: 393–408

Head Matter:
The town of East-Hartford against Pitkin and others, executors of Elisha Pitkin, deceased.
Where the declaration, in an action for the support of a female slave, averred, that she was poor and destitute, in need of food, clothing, medicine and attention, and had no relations of sufficient ability to support her; it was held, that her poverty and impotency were sufficiently set forth.
Where a slave, after the death of her master, being neglected by his representatives, thus came to want, it was held to be the duty of the select-men of the town in which she resided, to relieve her.
Qu. Whether the town, in such case, can sustain an action against the executors of the master, for the supplies furnished; the claim not being a debt due from him, or one for which he was liable, at the time of his death.
This was an action of assumpsit. The declaration alleged, That Elisha Pitkin, a settled inhabitant of East-Hartford, died in August, 1819; that he left, at his decease, a negro female slave, named Flora, who then was, and ever since has been, a settled inhabitant of that town; that he was, during his life, and his estate has been, since his death, liable for her support; that she was and is part of the estate of the deceased; that she was never manumitted, but now is, and ever since his death, has been holden as a slave, and part of the estate of the defendants as executors. The declaration then alleged, That on or about the 1st of March, 1828, Flora became poor and destitute, and has at all times since, been in need of food, cloth ing, medicine and attention; that she has no relations of sufficient ability to support her; that between the 1st of March aforesaid, and the date of this writ, the town of East-Hartford, by their select-men, expended 300 dollars in her necessary support; and that the defendants have, at all times, known the facts aforesaid, and were especially notified thereof, on the 20th of October, 1830, and thereupon became liable, &c. and being so liable, assumed and promised, &c.
Hartford,
June, 1831.
To this declaration there was a demurrer; and the case was reserved for the advice of this Court.
Toucey, in support of the demurrer,
contended, 1. That the condition of the person for whom the supplies were furnished, was not so set forth as to shew that she was a pauper within our statute.
2. That a town is not obliged, by law, to relieve a slave, especially one whose master is able to support him; and consequently, the plaintiffs are in the condition of mere volunteers, and are not entitled to sue for a reimbursement of the expenses which they have incurred. The duty of support, during the subsistence of the relation, rests on the master alone. By positive statute, the master is made liable, generally, for support furnished to the slave coming to want after emancipation. Stat. 428. tit, 93. s. 2. This shews, that aside from such provision, or in cases to which it does not extend, the master is not liable. In Columbia v. Williams, 3 Conn. Rep. 467. 471. it was accordingly held, by Hosmer, Ch. J. delivering the opinion of the Court, that the town in which a slave in necessitous circumstances was settled, before the existence of the law referred to, “was deficient in remedy against the master and owner of the slave.” Slavery is not founded in reason and justice, like the relations of husband and wife, and parent and child; and arguments derived from those relations are inapplicable to the condition of a slave.
3. That if the testator, in his life-time, would be liable for supplies furnished without his authority, to his slave needing relief, his executors, after his death, are not liable. Kingsbury v. Tolland, 2 Root, 355. The supplies were not furnished until after the testator’s death. Here was no debt due from, or liability incurred by, him. If the defendants now own the slave, then sue them as owners, not as executors. To make the defendants liable as executors, it should at least appear, that they had assets; a fact not averred in the declaration.
W. W. Ellsworth, contra,
contended, 1. That the relation of master and slave is one recognized by the laws of this state. Stat. 428. tit. 93. Windsor v. Hartford, 2 Conn. Rep. 355. Columbia v. Williams, 3 Conn. Rep. 467.
2. That while this relation exists, the master is liable for the support of the slave.
3. That the slave in question, not having been emancipated, is now a part of the estate of Elisha Pitkin. His death did not emancipate her, or discharge her obligations; and the corresponding duties and liabilities of the owner remain unchanged. His representatives, who now hold her as he held her, and who can sell her at any hour, are liable as he would have been, had he lived.
4. That it appearing, that this slave was poor and destitute, and in need of food, clothing, &c. it was the duty of the town of East-Hartford, in which she resided, and in which she had a legal settlement, to relieve her.
5. That this duty having been performed, the remedy over is at law. Pitkin v. Pitkin, 7 Conn. Rep. 315. 318.

Opinion:
Daggett, J.
The demurrer was argued on the ground that no express promise existed; but the question presented was, whether the defendants were liable on the implied promise of law arising out of the facts of the case. Three objections were urged to the sufficiency of the declaration.
1. It was said, that the allegations of the poverty and impotency of Flora, were not explicitly stated. It is difficult to see the force of this objection. It is alleged, that she was poor, destitute, and in need of the necessaries of life, and that she had no relations of sufficient ability to support her. These averments are quite sufficient.
2. It is objected, that the town of East-Hartford were not liable for her support, and therefore, they have furnished this support voluntarily, and cannot call on the defendants for a reimbursement of their expenditures. This position is worthy of great consideration, and, if true, is decisive against the plaintiffs' right of recovery.
Here I would observe, that the counsel, on both sides, insist, that Elisha Pitkin, if living, would be, and his estate since his death, is, liable for the support of this slave. There can be no doubt of this position. It was never doubted, that a master was obliged to support his slave. From the first toleration of slavery in this state to the present hour, there never has existed a question on this subject. The slave was bound to serve his master; and this created a corresponding duty on the part of the master to furnish him or her support.
By the statute, title 93. Slavery, it is provided, in the second section, page 428. that in case slaves emancipated, by their masters, come to want, after their emancipation, they shall be supported, by their masters respectively, their heirs, executors or administrators; and on their refusal, the select-men of the town where they belong shall provide for their support; and the town shall be entitled, in a proper action on the case, to recover all the expense of such support from the owners or masters of such slaves, their heirs, executors or administrators. In this case, it is alleged, that Flora, the slave, never was emancipated. She is not, therefore, embraced by this section.
The question then occurs, is she a pauper of the town of East-Hartford? For paupers the select-men are authorized to furnish support. It is believed, that the towns would be very reluctant to admit, that all slaves, who come to want, were of their towns, and could claim support. If indeed a case should arise, where a master and the slave were both poor, impotent and unable to provide for themselves, then the town might be subjected to their support; but that is not this case. Here is no pretence of inability in the representatives of Elisha Pitkin, the defendants' testator. It is, then, precisely like the case, where the town provide for the child of a person of property, and afterwards sue him for reimbursement. Such is not a case provided for, by the statute; and of course, there can be no recovery. There is a binding obligation on the father to support his child until he arrives at twenty-one years of age. This is a duty prescribed by the law of nature. The child, in return, is bound to serve the parent until that period. On the same principle, the master is bound to support the slave, where slavery is tolerated, for the service which the slave is bound to render. The husband is also bound to support the wife, because he is entitled to her service, to her goods and chattels, and to the use of her real estate. These principles rest on the common law. The case before us, then, is one, where the common law obliges the master, if living, and his representatives, when he has deceased, to provide for and support this slave; nor is there any allegation in this declaration of any inability on the part of these executors to furnish this support.
I then enquire how the town of East-Hartford, became liable to support Flora, or why this corporation should have any claim for expenditures towards her subsistence? If there be any one principle of law clear of all dispute, it is, that a town is bound to afford support to those who are needy, only in the cases provided for in the statute, and in the manner therein specified. A manumitted slave, in case he needs support, may be furnished with it, by the town, and a recovery be had of the master or his representatives. That is certainly not this case.
The statute also provides, that it shall be the duty of the select-men to provide for all paupers; but Flora is not a pauper, in the sense of the statute; for we have seen, that the estate of her master is liable for her support. As well might it be said, that a wife, who was cast off, by her husband, or that a child turned out of doors destitute, by his father, are paupers of the town where they belong. The principle adopted, by this Court, in Newtown v. Danbury, 3 Conn. Rep. 553. is in point. There the counsel for the town of Danbury, contended, that the town could not be liable for the support of a wife, if her husband was of sufficient ability; and the superior court adopted the idea, and submitted to the jury the question whether his property or responsibility was such, that she could be deemed a pauper; and this opinion was sanctioned by this Court.
There is another case, where a town is obliged to support a person destitute, and where an action is provided for a reimbursement of the expense. That is where an inhabitant of one town becomes destitute in another town, the select-men of the latter may furnish the necessary support, and by a compliance with certain requisites of the statute, may recover the amount of the expenditures in an action against the town to which the pauper belongs.
It is also by statute made the duty of certain persons standing in the relation of father and mother, grand-father and grand-mother, children and grand-children, when of sufficient ability, to provide for their relations within those degrees, who are poor, impotent and unable to provide for themselves; and in case of refusal, the select-men, or one or more of the relations, may make application to the county court, who shall order such support in the manner pointed out. But this statute is not retrospective; it does not provide for a reimbursement of any expenses already incurred. Wethersfield v. Montague & al. 3 Conn. Rep. 507. Cook v. Bradley, 7 Conn. Rep. 57.) Mills v. Wyman, 3 Pick. 207. 212. If therefore, the plaintiffs had brought themselves within the statute, which they have not, still they could not recover.
If these views are correct, it is unnecessary to consider the third point.
Hosmer, Ch. J. was of the same opinion.