Case Name: COLUMBIA CASUALTY COMPANY, Appellant, v. T. E. MAHANEY, Appellee
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 1956-02-10
Citations: 229 F.2d 848
Docket Number: No. 15534
Parties: COLUMBIA CASUALTY COMPANY, Appellant, v. T. E. MAHANEY, Appellee.
Judges: 
Reporter: Federal Reporter 2d Series
Volume: 229
Pages: 848–849

Head Matter:
COLUMBIA CASUALTY COMPANY, Appellant, v. T. E. MAHANEY, Appellee.
No. 15534.
United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit.
Feb. 10, 1956.
Thos. H. Law, Fort Worth, Tex., Bar-wise, Magoffin & Carrigan, Fort Worth, Tex., Tilley, Hyder & Law, Fort Worth, Tex., for appellant.
Robert D. Maddox, Robert S. New-kirk, Fort Worth, Tex., McDonald, Sanders, Nichols, Ludlum, Wynn & Ginsburg, Fort Worth, Tex., for appellee.
Before HUTCHESON, Chief Judge, and HOLMES and RIVES, Circuit J udges.

Opinion:
HOLMES, Circuit Judge.
This is a suit on a standard workmen's compensation and employers' liability insurance policy, containing a voluntary compensation endorsement that covers farm laborers. Thus, as stated by the court in Hartford Accident & Indemnity Company v. Morris, Tex.Civ.App., 233 S.W.2d 218, it is a suit on a policy in the nature of a workmen's compensation policy, because it extends the benefits' of the Texas workmen's compensation laws, Vernon's Ann.Civ.St.Tex. art. 8306, § 1 et seq., to the injured employee, but does not give jurisdiction to the Industrial Accident Board.
The vountary endorsement on the policy agrees that if any person suffers what would have been a compensable injury under the Texas compensation law, had the injured person been an employee as defined in said act and engaged in employment included therein, the company will pay such person an amount equal to the compensation, medical and other benefits to which he would have been entitled if said act had been applicable to such injuries.
The appellee sustained accidental injuries resulting in total and permanent disabilities; written demand by him for the benefits due him under the contract was refused by the appellant; thereafter, appellee sued for the compensation and medical benefits allegedly due him under the contract, together with penalties in the form of interest and attorneys' fees allegedly allowable by the statute of Texas because of the refusal of appellant to pay the benefits due under the contract. In addition to other pleadings, appellant moved to strike appellee's prayer for said interest and attorneys' fees, which motion was sustained by the trial court. The trial resulted in a verdict and judgment for appellee. An appeal was taken from this judgment.
The appellant contends that, under the plain terms of the policy, when appellee commenced an action at law for damages in excess of the benefits allowable, the liability, if any, of the appellant was terminated. This is appellant's sole assignment of error, and we think it is predicated upon an erroneous interpretation of a clause in the contract of insurance. The appellee submits that the clear and unambiguous import of the questioned provision is that he was forced thereby to elect between a common law action for negligence and a suit upon the contract. We agree with appellee; the latter having instituted the proper action, it then became the function of the court to determine the amount of benefits due under the contract and the extent of the damages.
We find no reversible error in the record, and the judgment appealed from is affirmed.
Affirmed.