Case Name: ST. JOSEPH'S HOSPITAL, INC. v. NEASE et al.; BUELVAS et al. v. NEASE et al.
Court: Court of Appeals of Georgia
Jurisdiction: Georgia
Decision Date: 1988-10-17
Citations: 189 Ga. App. 239
Docket Number: 76952, 76953
Parties: ST. JOSEPH’S HOSPITAL, INC. v. NEASE et al. BUELVAS et al. v. NEASE et al.
Judges: Deen, P. J., Pope and Benham, JJ., concur. Beasley, J., concurs specially. Birdsong, C. J., McMurray, P. J., Carley and Sognier, JJ., dissent.
Reporter: Georgia Appeals Reports
Volume: 189
Pages: 239–244

Head Matter:
76952.
ST. JOSEPH’S HOSPITAL, INC. v. NEASE et al. BUELVAS et al. v. NEASE et al.
76953.
(375 SE2d 241)

Opinion:
Banke, Presiding Judge.
This is a medical malpractice action filed against the appellants by the appellees. The appellants moved to dismiss the action based on the appellees' failure to comply with OCGA § 9-11-9.1 (a) (Ga. L. 1987, p. 887, § 3), which requires that the complaint in professional malpractice actions be accompanied by an affidavit from a competent expert supporting at least one of the allegations of negligence. The trial court allowed the appellees to correct this defect by amendment and accordingly denied the motion to dismiss. The case is before us pursuant to our grant of the appellants' application for interlocutory appeal.
The appellees had filed two previous complaints against the appellants seeking to recover on the same cause of action but had voluntarily dismissed both those actions before trial. The affidavit submitted by the appellees in response to the appellants' motion to dismiss the present action was identical to an affidavit which they had previously submitted in response to a motion for summary judgment in one of the prior actions. The appellants contend that the appellees' failure to file this affidavit contemporaneously with their complaint constituted a non-amendable defect and that the affidavit was, in any event, deficient because it was based on a review of medical records which were not made a part of the record in the present case. Held-.
1. The appellants argue that if the Legislature had intended to allow the required affidavit to be filed by amendment, it would have had no reason to enact subsection (b) of OCGA § 9-11-9.1, which permits the application to be supplied by supplemental pleading in "any case in which the period of limitation will expire within ten days of the date of filing [of the complaint] and, because of such time con straints, the plaintiff has alleged that an affidavit of an expert could not be prepared." While we must agree with the appellants that the specification of this single exception to the contemporaneous filing requirement suggests an intention on the part of the Legislature not to permit any other such exceptions, we are constrained by the Supreme Court's recent decision in Glaser v. Meek, 258 Ga. 468 (369 SE2d 912) (1988), to conclude that other such exceptions may be made.
In Glaser v. Meek, the Supreme Court held that a defendant in a malpractice action had waived the defect created by the plaintiffs' failure to file the required affidavit contemporaneously with their complaint by waiting until after the statute of limitation had run on the claim to assert the defect. Noting that because of the defendant's delay in asserting the defect the plaintiffs had been precluded from dismissing their complaint voluntarily and filing a renewal action, the Court concluded that to dismiss the case under such circumstances would be contrary to OCGA § 9-11-8 (f), which provides: "All pleadings shall be so construed as to do substantial justice."
Normally, a defect in a pleading which may be waived by failure to assert it in a timely manner is considered amendable, and vice versa. See, e.g., Crump v. Jordan, 154 Ga. App. 503 (1) (268 SE2d 787) (1980); American Liberty Ins. Co. v. Sanders, 120 Ga. App. 202, 207 (170 SE2d 249) (1969), reversed on other grounds Sanders v. American Liberty Ins. Co., 225 Ga. 796 (171 SE2d 539) (1969). If, as urged by the appellants, the failure to file the affidavit required by subsection (a) of OCGA § 9-11-9.1 constitutes a non-amendable defect under all circumstances except those set forth in subsection (b), then a complaint filed without the affidavit would be void ab initio in all cases where subsection (b) did not apply, rendering all subsequent proceedings in such cases a nullity even if no motion to dismiss were filed. Such a result would, however, be inconsistent with the result reached by the Supreme Court in Glaser v. Meek, supra.
Section 15 (a) of the Civil Practice Act (OCGA § 9-11-15 (a)) establishes a general policy favoring the amendment of pleadings so as to enable each action to be tried on its merits. Accord McDonald v. Rogers, 229 Ga. 369, 378 (7) (191 SE2d 844) (1972); McRae v. Britton, 144 Ga. App. 340 (2) (240 SE2d 904) (1977). "When the courts are called upon to determine if there is a conflict between statutes, they are required to undertake to construe them together and seek to give full effect to both laws as representing all of the legislative intention. (Cit.)" Fulton County v. Corp. &c. of Latter Day Saints, 133 Ga. App. 847, 851 (212 SE2d 451) (1975). While there is no question that OCGA § 9-11-9.1 (a) contemplates that the required affidavit will normally be filed contemporaneously with the filing of the complaint, it does not expressly provide that a complaint filed without the affidavit will be considered a nullity; nor would the purpose of the Code sec tion necessarily be defeated by allowing the affidavit to be supplied by amendment, since the complaint would remain subject to dismissal unless and until the affidavit were supplied.
Certainly, the appellants in the present case cannot claim to have been prejudiced by the appellees' failure to file the affidavit contemporaneously with their complaint, since they (the appellants) had already been served with the affidavit in connection with a previous suit on the same cause of action. On the other hand, the appellees, like the plaintiffs in Glaser v. Meek, would be unable to pursue a renewal action in the event their present complaint were dismissed. See OCGA § 9-11-41 (a). Applying the policy expressed in OCGA § 9-11-8 (f) that "[a] 11 pleadings shall be so construed as to do substantial justice," we consequently conclude that the trial court did not err either in allowing the affidavit to be provided by amendment or in denying the appellants' motion to dismiss.
2. The appellants' contention that the affidavit was ineffective because it was based on a review of medical records which were not contained in the record was not raised below and consequently presents nothing for review on appeal. See Bradbury v. Mead Corp., 174 Ga. App. 601 (1) (330 SE2d 801) (1985).
Judgment affirmed.
Deen, P. J., Pope and Benham, JJ., concur. Beasley, J., concurs specially. Birdsong, C. J., McMurray, P. J., Carley and Sognier, JJ., dissent.