Case Name: STATE ex rel. MEYERS CO. v. RAYNOLDS, Judge
Court: Supreme Court of New Mexico
Jurisdiction: New Mexico
Decision Date: 1917-03-22
Citations: 22 N.M. 473
Docket Number: No. 1937
Parties: STATE ex rel. MEYERS CO. v. RAYNOLDS, Judge.
Judges: PARKER, J., concurs.
Reporter: New Mexico Reports
Volume: 22
Pages: 473–493

Head Matter:
[No. 1937.
March 22, 1917.]
STATE ex rel. MEYERS CO. v. RAYNOLDS, Judge.
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT.
1. By section 3 of article 6 of our Constitution there is conferred upon the Supreme Court a superintending control over all inferior courts and. the power to issue writs of mandamus, error, prohibition, habeas corpus, certiorari, injunction, and all other writs necessary or proper for the complete exercise of its jurisdiction. P. 478
2. In all matters resting within the jurisdiction of an inferior court, and upon which it has acted in a judicial capacity, this court will refuse to review its proceedings or to revise its rulings in the absence of a showing of gross abuse of discretion, or inadequacy of r'emedy by appeal. P. 478
Bobert, J., dissenting in part
Original mandamus by the State of New Mexico, on relation of the Meyers Company, against Herbert E. Baynolds, Judge, etc.
Buie discharged.
Benei-ian & Wrigi-it of Santa Ee and Marrón & Wood of Albuquerque for relator,
H. C. Miller of El Paso, Tex., for respondent.
STATEMENT OP PACTS.
This is an action in mandamus, brought in this court on the relation of the Meyers Companjq against Hon, Herbert F. Eaynolds, district judge of the Second judicial district. The petition for the writ, without referring to formal matters, is predicated upon the following facts:
On April 8, 1914, a complaint was filed in the district court of Bernalillo county by Ernest Meyers against the Meyers Company. About a year later an amended complaint in the same cause was filed, which was subsequently demurred to; the demurrer being overruled. The cause of action sued on was predicated upon the fact that the Meyers Company had been carrying on its books for some time a credit in favor of Alex D. Shaw & Co., of New York, of $501.88, which, it was claimed by Ernest Meyers, was not a legal liability of the Meyers Company, and at the time when he sold his interest in said company he provided by a contract between himself and the purchasers of his interest that, whenever the Meyers Company should thereafter be released from liability to the said Shaw & Co. for the balance carried on the books, that such amount should be credited to himself, and that he should thereafter be entitled to demand and receive such amount, but that he should not be entitled to demand or receive payment thereof until the claim of said Shaw & Co. had been “legally extinguished or abandoned.” The complaint filed by Mr. Meyers asserted that the claim had been legally extinguished, in that it was barred by the statute of limitations, and that Shaw & Go. had assigned “any claim it may have had” in the said sum to the plaintiff, Ernest Meyers, the plaintiff therefore seeking to| recover the amount of this account, which had been carried on the books of Meyers & Co. as a balance due Shaw & Go.
Issue was joined by the filing of an answer, and the cause proceeded to trial before a jury. During the course of the trial Francis E. Wood, attorney for the Meyers Company, introduced in evidence a release signed by Ernest Meyers in favor of Shaw & Co., and in this connection it is asserted that in so doing he made representations concerning the character of this release which amounted to fraud, and that at the time he had knowledge of the fact that the release was of no validity, force, or effect.
Thereafter, at the close of the defendant’s evidence, Mr. Wood moved the court to direct a verdict in favor of the defendant, on the following grounds: First, that the contract sued on was neither made nor ratified by the defendant; second, assuming that it had been, the claim of Shaw & Co. had never been legally discharged or abandoned, but, on the contrary, still existed as binding as it had ever been; third, that the complaint showed no indebtedness of the Meyers Company to the plaintiff; and, fourth, that the plaintiff’s claim had been settled, satisfied, and discharged.
This motion was sustained by the court, and a verdict directed for the defendant. Plaintiff promptly filed a motion for a new trial, and later a supplemental motion, neither of which motions were acted upon at that term. A new trial was subsequently granted, but the court’s attention being directed to the question of jurisdiction to grant a new trial at that time, the order was set aside.
At the following term of court the plaintiff filed a further motion, setting up that the defendant had procured the alleged release from Meyers by false and fraudulent representation, and that the plaintiff’s attorney had offered it in evidence with full knowledge of such representations.
A motion to strike this latter motion was interposed, and the matter came on to be heard before the court upon the two motions on April 22, 1916, a.t which time the district court made an order setting aside the verdict and granting a new trial, upon the ground that the release offered in evidence was offered as proof of payment,' and that such offer was a fraud upon the court, because defendant’s attorney knew that the claim had not been actually paid. Thereafter the Meyers Company, through its counsel, Mr. E. S. Wright, interposed a motion to vacate and set aside the order setting aside the verdict and ordering a new trial, and for a judgment in favor of the defendant upon the verdict of the jury previously rendered, upon the following grounds: That the facts before the court and appear ing from the record and papers on file in the case, and the facts occurring on trial thereof, as appears from the minutes of the official stenographer reporting the case, show that the court was compelled by the record and the testimony given upon such trial to direct a verdict in favor of the defendant; that the verdict was predicated upon the ground that the contract sued upon was not the contract of the defendant, nor ratified nor adopted by it; that if it were the contract of the defendant it conclusively appeared from the record that the claim of Shaw & Co. against the Meyers Company had never been legally discharged or abandoned according to the terms of the contract annexed to the complaint; that the facts before the court when it set aside the verdict upon the ground of fraudulent imposition on the court were wholly insufficient in matter of law to warrant the court in finding that any fraud or imposition was practiced upon the court in said case; that the granting of said motion was a gross and unwarranted abuse of discretion and unauthorized exercise of power; that the court upon the facts before it had neither power nor discretion to set aside the verdict and award a new trial of said cause, and, even if the court misunderstood or was misled or deceived by the facts set forth in its opinion, the court would still be compelled upon the record as presented to have directed a verdict for this defendant upon other questions; and, lastly, because the complaint in said cause failed to state any cause of action.
The petition for the writ concludes with a general allegation that petitioner is without a speedy, adequate, or any, remedy at law to compel the court to enter a judgment in its favor upon the verdict of the jury; that it is compelled without warrant or authority of law to submit to a further trial of the cause, the court being without right or discretion to grant the motion of the plaintiff for a new or further trial, and that the exercise of such asserted right by the court constitutes gross abuse of power or discretion, if any such discretion existed in the court; that the record in the case fails to show that the court was warranted on the facts in finding that any fraud or imposition had been practiced upon the court, for which reason the petitioner is entitled to the judgment upon the verdict of the jury.
It does not appear from the petition for the writ that the last-mentioned motion of petitioner, seeking the setting aside of the order setting aside the verdict of the jury, has ever been disposed of by the district court.
The return of the district judge, so far as it is necessary for us to give consideration thereto, denies that relator, the Meyers Company, is without speedy and adequate remedy at law, and sets up certain facts upon which the court predicated its conclusion that the directed verdict had been obtained by 'reason of the fraudulent conduct of attorney for the defendant, asserting that the said release was believed by the trial court to be a bona fide release and proof of the payment of said claim of plaintiff against the defendant, as it was so represented to be before the court and jury by the said Francis E. Wood, and that the district judge, relying upon such representations, directed the verdict referred to for the- defendant, which was subsequently returned, and which was afterwards set aside upon the motion interposed by counsel for plaintiff, wherein it was charged that the said counsel for defendant had perpetrated fraud upon the court.'
The honorable district judge, in the final paragraph of this return, asserts that the motion to vacate and set aside the instructed verdict was called for hearing before him as judge of the Second judicial district of New Mexico, within and for the county of Bernalillo, and that respondent, as judge of said court, and after considering the affidavits filed by the plaintiff, hearing the argument of counsel, and considering the briefs filed by the respective parties and by Francis E. Wood individually, granted said motion to vacate and set aside the instructed verdict, and reinstateed the cause upon the ground that the said verdict was procured through deceit and fraud knowingly and intentionally practiced upon the court by the said Francis E. Wood as attorney for the defendant, all of which respondent-alleges were judicial acts of the district eourt of the Second judicial district of New Mexico.

Opinion:
HANNA, C. J.
(after stating the facts as above.) From the statement of facts it appears that relator seeks, by mandamus, to compel the district judge of the Second judicial district ijor the county of Bernalillo to sign and enter judgment in his favor upon the verdict of the jury rendered by said court's direction at the March, 1915, term of said court.
By section 3 of article 6 of our Constitution there is conferred upon the Supreme Court a superintending control over all inferior courts and the power to issue writs of mandamus, error, prohibition, habeas corpus, certiorari, injunction, and all other writs' necessary or proper for the complete exercise of its jurisdiction.
The Constitution of the state of Wisconsin contains a provision similar to that of ours, which has been construed by the Supreme Court of that state, some members of that court holding that the power of superintending control is unlimited and unrestrained; that it extends to judicial and ministerial errors; that it includes control of the proceedings of inferior courts; that said court may, upon writs framed by itself to meet the special purpose and in the nature of writs of mandamus, direct the vacation of orders erroneously made, may direct the inferior court to proceed in a legal and proper manner, and may control discretion of the inferior court, where that discretion has been abused, in the denial- of legal rights.' It has also been held by some of the judges that the power extends to correcting errors in judicial proceedings where it is necessary to prevent injustice and the demand is urgent and will not admit of delay. Bailey on Habeas Corpus; p. 862; State ex rel. Umbreit v. Helms, 136 Wis. 432, 118 N. W. 158.
The leading case in Wisconsin upon the subject is State ex rel. v. Johnson, 103 Wis 591, 79 N. W. 1081, 51 L. R. A. 33. To the last citation is appended an extensive note where numerous authorities aire collectfed, considering the various phases of the question.
In this Wisconsin case it is held that under the superintending power given the Supreme Court by the Constitution that court may by mandamus compel an inferior court to perform a duty imposed by statute which is not discretionary in its nature, and may also compel action in cases where discretion is to be exercised, when it clearly appears such discretion has not been exercised, or that action has been taken in manifest disregard of duty or without semblance of legal power, and where it further appears that there is no remedy by appeal, or that such remedy, if existing, is entirely inadequate/ and the exigency is of such an extreme nature as to justify the interposition of such extraordinary superintending power. See, also, State v. Judge of Civil District Court, 52 La. Ann. 1275, 27 South. 697, 51 L. R. A. 71; People v. Court, 27 Colo. 405, 61 Pac. 592, 51 L. R. A. 105; State ex rel. v. Judge, etc., 35 La. Ann. 873.
The foregoing statement from the Wisconsin case of State ex rel. v. Johnson is no more than a broad statement of the general principles governing the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in the exercise of its superintending control. Like all other statements of general principles, the application thereof to concrete cases presents much difficulty. In most of the cases to which our attention has been directed the court has considered the matter from but'one standpoint, and has applied but one portion of the rule which has been broadly stated supra. The Wisconsin cases referred to are of particular value in our consideration of this question, by reason of the fact that they cover the entire field of the question of superintending control by the superior over the inferior tribunal.
Later cases are collected in a case note found appended to the ease of State ex rel. Francis E. McGovern v. Orren T. Williams 136 Wis. 1, 116 N. W. 225, 20 L. R. A. (N. S.) 941.
From the statements of the general rule as announced in the Wisconsin case, State v. Johnson, supra, it is evident that this court in the exercise of its superintending control could by mandamus direct the district court to act, even though the right to obtain a review by appeal or writ of error existed, where such remedy is entirely inadequate, but in this ease there is no attempt to do more than to assert that the remedy by appeal is inadequate, no showing as to the alleged inadequacy of the remedy being attempted or made.
For this reason we conclude that the circumstances do not justify the issuance of the writ applied for.
We do not understand that it is contended by relator that there was no jurisdiction in the district court to enter the order vacating the verdict of the jury. This seems to be admitted. A careful examination of the petition and the argument of counsel seems to indicate that the essential objection of relator is based upon the alleged absence of right or discretion in the district court to grant the motion of the plaintiff for a newr or further trial, and that the exercise of such asserted right constitutes a gross abuse of such power or discretion.
The argument of counsel is primarily directed to the point that the action of Mr. Wood in introducing the evidence in question did not constitute a perpetration of fraud. It becomes a question of fact and is argued as such. Affidavits pro and con were introduced, all of which were before the court, and in his conclusion he has resolved this question against the contention of relator. In so doing he has doubtless exercised judicial discretion, and if such discretion was abused his action is subject to review by appeal.
We have examined the entire record before us carefully without finding the condition which is argued to exist by the relator, namely, that there was no evidence of fraud. Our conclusion is to the contrary.
In view of these conditions were are under the necessity of holding that there is no merit in relator's contention that a gross abuse of judicial discretion has been presented for our consideration. This being our opinion and conclusion, the rule must be discharged; and it is so ordered.
PARKER, J., concurs.