Case Name: ARMSTRONG v. STATE
Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1927-02-23
Citations: 293 S.W. 817
Docket Number: No. 10636
Parties: ARMSTRONG v. STATE.
Judges: 
Reporter: South Western Reporter
Volume: 293
Pages: 817–819

Head Matter:
ARMSTRONG v. STATE.
(No. 10636.)
Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
Feb. 23, 1927.
Rehearing Denied April 20, 1927.
T. R. Mears, of Gatesville, for appellant.
Sam D. Stinson, State’s Atty., and Robt. M. Lyles, Asst. State’s Atty., both of Austin, for the State.

Opinion:
BETHEA, J.
The appellant was Indicted, and tried for felony theft, and convicted of misdemeanor theft, and his punishment assessed at confinement in the county jail for six months and a fine of $250.
The charging part of the indictment under which appellant was tried and convicted reads as follows:
"Did then and there unlawfully and fraudulently take one Dunlop balloon automobile casing, of the value of fifteen dollars, and two Fisk balloon automobile casings, of the value of fifteen dollars each, totaling thirty dollars, three automobile rims, of the value of one dollar each, totaling three dollars, and three automobile inner tubes, of the value of two dollars each, totaling six dollars, the value of all of the said articles aggregating fifty-four dollars, the same being then and there the corporeal personal property of and belonging to L. E. Hawkins, from the possession of said L. E. Hawkins," etc.
We have examined the statement of facts carefully and find the same amply sufficient to sustain the verdict of the jury. The only defense made by the appellant and the only evidence offered was testimony tending to show the aggregate value of the property alleged to have been stolen to be under the value of $50. Inasmuch as the appellant was convicted of misdemeanor theft, the question of felony theft passes out of the case.
Appellant, by a motion to quash the indictment and also by bills of exception Nos. 1 and 2, raises the question as to whether or not the appellant should have been indicted and tried under article 1346 of the Penal Code, instead of article 1410, the general theft statute. The offense denounced under article ,1346 is an entirely separate and distinct offense from that of theft. The offense established by the proof in this case against the appellant was theft. The offense denounced in article 1346 is malicious mischief. The malicious and willful removal from any motor vehicle or bicycle, etc., of any tire, rim, etc., without authority from the owner and unlawfully, would constitute a violation of the law under said article 1346; but when the facts go further, as they did in this case, and show a fraudulent design to appropriate the property to the use of the offender, and deprive the owner of the value of the same, the offense assumes the graver character of theft, and, if the value of the property be under $50, is punishable by confinement in the county jail and by fine or by confinement in the county jail alone. The state had the right to elect to prosecute for the theft of the articles instead of prosecuting for the offense under article 1346.
There being no errors in the record, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
PER OURIAM. The foregoing opinion of the Commission of Appeals has been exam-' ined by the judges of the Court of Criminal Appeals and approved by the court,