Case Name: Ceasar ROBINSON, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent
Court: Florida Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 2000-10-05
Citations: 770 So. 2d 1167
Docket Number: No. SC93210
Parties: Ceasar ROBINSON, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
Judges: SHAW, HARDING, PARIENTE, LEWIS and QUINCE, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 770
Pages: 1167–1173

Head Matter:
Ceasar ROBINSON, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
No. SC93210.
Supreme Court of Florida.
Oct. 5, 2000.
James Marion Moorman, Public Defender, and Kevin Briggs, Assistant Public Defender, Tenth Judicial Circuit, Bartow, Florida, for Petitioner.
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, Robert J. Krauss, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Chief of Criminal Law, and Patricia A. McCarthy, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, Florida, for Respondent.

Opinion:
WELLS, C.J.
We have for review State v. Robinson, 711 So.2d 619 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998). We accepted this case based on express and direct conflict with the opinions in Tibbs v. State, 397 So.2d 1120 (Fla.1981), Johnson v. State, 442 So.2d 185 (Fla.1983), Evans v. State, 692 So.2d 966 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997), and Borgess v. State, 455 So.2d 488 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984). We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const. Although we approve the Second District's reversal of the trial court's order granting postconviction relief in this case, we reach our conclusion through reasoning that differs from that of the district court, and we remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
The facts in this case, as set forth in the decision of the Second District below, are as follows:
In the early morning hours of December 5, 1981, Avil Francis was shot to death while sleeping at a residence in Winter Haven, Florida. His newlywed wife, Bernadette Francis, was shot in the head, but survived the shooting. The residence was the former marital abode of Ms. Francis and Robinson, who were divorced five months prior to the shootings. At a trial in August 1982, the jury found Robinson guilty of the first-degree murder of Mr. Francis and the attempted first-degree murder of Ms. Francis. The trial court sentenced Robinson to life in prison with a minimum of twenty-five years, plus a consecutive prison term of twenty years with a three-year minimum.
Approximately fourteen years later, in July 1996, Robinson filed a motion for postconviction relief asserting newly discovered evidence. Robinson alleged that Ms. Francis and her daughter lied at his trial concerning their eyewitness accounts of the shooting. In support of his motion, he filed the affidavit of a fellow inmate, Wilbert Hollins, who purportedly obtained such information during a conversation with Ms. Francis in New York, in 1989. Robinson claimed that he learned of this information only a few months prior to filing his 1996 motion for postconviction relief.
In response to Robinson's motion, the State agreed to an evidentiary hearing. Following the evidentiary hearing, the trial court granted postconviction relief by written order in May 1997.
711 So.2d at 620 (footnote omitted). The State appealed, and the Second District reversed, finding that the trial court had abused its discretion in that the court had not recognized that the circumstantial evidence presented at trial, coupled with direct evidence in the form of testimony of Ms. Francis and her daughter Shantel, "so clearly outweighs the newly discovered, impeachment evidence that no reasonable person would have reached the conclusion that the trial court did." Id. at 623. In analyzing Robinson's alleged newly discovered evidence, the district court applied the two-prong test this Court provided in Jones v. State, 591 So.2d 911 (Fla. 1991) ([Jones I), and further explained in Jones v. State, 709 So.2d 512 (Fla.1998) (Jones II). Id. at 622. As to the first prong, the court found that Hollins' testimony constituted newly discovered evidence in that it was unknown at the time of the trial and that neither Robinson nor his counsel could have known of it by the use of diligence. See id.
Concerning the second prong of the Jones test, which assesses the probable effect of the newly discovered evidence at retrial, the court noted that Hollins' testimony would be admissible on retrial as impeachment evidence under section 90.608, Florida Statutes (1997). See id. After recognizing recent case law holding that impeachment evidence alone may in some circumstances warrant a new trial, the district court found that the trial court erred in failing to balance the weight of Hollins' impeachment testimony "against all of the other evidence stacked against Robinson." Id. at 623. The district court concluded that the trial court abused its discretion in determining that Hollins' testimony "would probably produce an acquittal on retrial" and reversed the trial court's grant of postconviction relief. Id.
In this Court, Robinson contends that the Second District erred in that it assumed the trial court's role and erroneously reweighed the ' evidence rather than finding the "palpable" abuse of discretion which is required to overturn a trial court's granting of a new trial. Robinson contends that the trial court correctly weighed the credibility of the newly discovered evidence alongside the direct testimony and circumstantial evidence presented at trial. Robinson further argues that the testimony of Hollins seriously undermined the only, direct evidence of guilt the State presented at trial, which was the testimony of Ms. Francis and her daughter.
As to our jurisdiction in this case, we find upon further consideration that there is no conflict with the alleged conflict cases, which concern the proper role of appellate courts in evaluating weight and sufficiency of evidence in various factually distinguishable contexts. However, we do find conflict between this case and our decisions in Jones I and Jones II as to the analysis for determining whether alleged newly discovered evidence warrants a new trial.
As to the merits of this case, we approve the Second District's conclusion that the trial court erred in granting post-conviction relief. However, the basis for our holding as to trial court error is not that the trial court abused its discretion, as held by the district court. Rather, we find in the trial court's order a misapplication of law as set forth in the Jones cases.
In its decision below, the Second District did not deal with the trial court's legal error in the application of an incorrect test for determining whether newly discovered evidence warrants a new trial. In Jones I, we explained the test for determining whether to grant a new trial based on newly discovered evidence as first requiring a finding that the evidence was unknown and could not have been known at the time of trial through due diligence. See 591 So.2d at 916. Once past this threshold finding, a court must apply the second prong which requires a finding that the newly discovered evidence "would probably produce an acquittal on retrial." Id. at 915.
Here, the trial court properly analyzed the threshold step in the Jones test but then stated as to the second prong, "The Court finds that the newly discovered evidence could probably produce an acquittal on retrial." State v. Robinson, No. CF813683A1-XX, Order Granting Motion for Postconviction Relief at 6 (Fla. 10th Cir. Ct. order filed May 28, 1997) (emphasis added). The uncertainty of this statement is compounded by the trial court's earlier statement, "The Court finds the new evidence would have probably affected the outcome of the case." See Robinson order at 5. These statements are in conflict with the definitive standard we set forth in Jones II, in which we held, as stated, that newly discovered evidence must be of such nature that it "would probably produce an acquittal on retrial." 709 So.2d at 521 (emphasis added).
In Jones II, we further explained that to reach the conclusion as to the probable acquittal on retrial,
[T]he trial court is required to "consider all newly discovered evidence which would be admissible" at trial and then evaluate the "weight of both the newly discovered evidence and the evidence which was introduced at the trial." [Jones I, 591 So.2d at 916.]
In considering the second prong, the trial court should initially consider whether the evidence would have been admissible at trial or whether there would have been any evidentiary bars to its admissibility. Once this is determined, an evaluation of the weight to be accorded the evidence includes whether the evidence goes to the merits of the case or whether it constitutes impeachment evidence. The trial court should also determine whether the evidence is cumulative to other evidence in the case. The trial court should further consider the materiality and relevance of the evidence and any inconsistencies in the newly discovered evidence.
709 So.2d at 521 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). We also required in Jones II that the trial court undertake a cumulative analysis by evaluating the newly discovered evidence in conjunction with evidence presented at all prior evidentiary hearings and evidence presented at trial. See id. at 522. We agree with the district court that impeachment evidence could be part of this cumulative analysis, as this Court stated in Jones I, Jones II, and Williamson v. Dugger, 651 So.2d 84, 89 (Fla.1994).
Therefore, we determine that this case should be remanded to the trial court for the trial court to reconsider its ruling. Accordingly, we remand to the Second District Court of Appeal with directions for the trial court to conduct a reweighing of the newly discovered impeachment evidence and a cumulative analysis by taking into consideration all the evidence presented at trial and in the evidentiary hearing below.
It is so ordered.
SHAW, HARDING, PARIENTE, LEWIS and QUINCE, JJ., concur.
ANSTEAD, J., concurs specially with an opinion, in which PARIENTE, J., concurs.
1. The Second District Court of Appeal affirmed the conviction and sentence in Robinson v. State, 436 So.2d 112 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983).