Case Name: Curtis and Wilkins v. Cisna's Administrators
Court: Supreme Court of Ohio
Jurisdiction: Ohio
Decision Date: 1824-12
Citations: 1 Ohio 430
Docket Number: 
Parties: Curtis and Wilkins v. Cisna’s Administrators.
Judges: Judge Prase concurred.
Reporter: Cases decided in the supreme court of ohio : upon the circuit at the special sessions in Columbus
Volume: 1
Pages: 430–449

Head Matter:
Curtis and Wilkins v. Cisna’s Administrators.
Judgment at Law — Assignee—Equity.
Questions litigated and decided in an action at law can not, as of course, ha re-examined in equity.
Assignee of an agreement concluded in equity by decision at law against his assignor.
This case was reserved for decision here in the county of Knox. It is charged in the bill, that the complainant, Wilkins, being owner of a tract of land in the county of Knox, on the 11th of May, 1816, contracted to sell it to Thomas Cisna, since deceased. That seventy sheep were delivered by Cisna upon account of the purchase money, and a written agreement entered into, by which Wilkins agreed to convey +the land to Cisna, on or before the 1st day of September ensuing, upon Cisna then paying $100, and securing to be paid by his own bonds, and a mortgage on the lands, the further sums of $150, payable 1st of April, 1817; $100, 1st of April, 1818; and $100, 1st of April, 1819. That the contract was made and executed, and deposited for safe keeping, at Mount Yernon, where, complainant understood, the parties were to meet on the 1st of September to carry it into effect. The bill further charged, that Wilkins attended at Mount Yernon on the day to execute the contract, but that Cisna did not attend. That on the 7th of September, Wilkins executed a deed to Cisna for the land, and shortly afterward caused it to be tendered to Cisna, at his residence in Fairfield county, and required of him to perform his part of the agreement, when Cisna refused to receive the deed, or to comply with the contract. That a subsequent tender of the deed was made to Cisna, at Mount Yernon, who again neglected to perform on his part. That Wilkins being pressed for money, about the 1st of February, 1817, assigned his contract with Cisna to Silliman and Curtis, and entered into an agreement with them, that they should use his name to enforce the contract with Cisna, they to indemnify him against any claim of Cisna, and delivered tff them the deed executed for Cisna; at the same time a deed for the lands from Wilkins to Silliman and Curtis was executed and delivered to them. The bill further alleged, that Cisna was notified of the transaction, and again requested to accept the deed, and perform the contract, but did not do it; that Silliman afterward transferred his right to Curtis, who was at all times ready, willing, and able to perform the contract on his part; that while the contract remained unexecuted, Cisna deceased, and his administrators brought an action against Wilkins to recover back the value of the property received by Wilkins on the contract; that upon this trial a recovery was had against Wilkins, in consequence of the defendant not being able to prove a tender of the deed at the day, and in consequence of a defect in the proof of the chain of title at the trial. The bill prays an injunction against the judgment at law, and that the administrators of Cisna may be compelled to accept the conveyance, and pay the money.
*The answer denies all knowledge of the facts set out in the bill, and calls for proof. It insists that Wilkins having conveyed to Silliman and Curtis, Cisna, or his'representatives, are not bound to take from them a deed; and it sets up and relies upon the trial at law as concluding the rights of the parties under the contract, which ought not to be re-examined in equity.
The proofs substantially sustain the allegations in the bill, except that there is no testimony of Wilkins’ being at Mount Yernon to complete the contract on the 1st of September. The written contract between Wilkins and Silliman and Curtis, by which Cisna’s contract was assigned to the latter, contained the following reference to the contract with Cisna in describing the land: Being the same that Wilkins “ had contracted to sell to one Thomas Cisna, and which contract has since fallen through in consequence of Cisna’s not complying with his part.”
Curtis, for the complainants :
The trial and judgment at law evidently constitutes the main ground of the defense ; and this can not prevail either upon principle, or upon authority.
Had the interest remained in Wilkins, and should he bring an action on the contract against Cisna’s administrators, could they plead the judgment in bar, or give it in evidence to defeat a recovery? Upon an executory contract, containing mutual stipulations, both parties may sustain actions at law, and a resort to equity may at last be necessary to do justice between them. Cisna may recover damages for the non-conveyance; Wilkins may recover the purchase money; and neither could plead his own recovery in bar to the action of the other; yet there might be such inequality in the different amounts rendered by different juries, perhaps in different tribunals, or such other circumstances might attend the recoveries as to occasion gross injustice, did the mere fact of a judgment at law preclude all inquiry by a court of equity.
In the case of Rees v. Smith, 1 Ohio, 124, decided by this court at the last term, the complainant had actually prosecuted an action at law upon the same contract against the defendant; a trial was had upon the merits, and a verdict *and judgment against him. So far from regarding this as conclusive upon him, the court treat it as a strong ground for extending to him the aid of a court of chancery. “We can not,” say the court, “ shut our eyes on the fact, that the remedy at law has been extinguished by a judgment rendered against the complainant, by a court of competent jurisdiction, on the ground alleged by the defendant., that Solomon Mees had not complied with his contract.” “ The accidental circumstance that the complainant’s remedy at law has been destroyed by the practice of the defendant, ought rather to strenghten than to weaken his claim to the aid of this court.”
Here the complainant himself had resorted to an action at law: he was defeated because he had not complied on his part so as to entitle him to sue at law; yet this did not close against him a court of equity. Certainly the same consequence must fairly result from an unavailing attempt to sustain a defense at law, for the same reason adjudged untenable.
There is another reason why the proceedings at law can not be set up as a bar to this suit — the person in whom the real substantial interest was vested, was not a party to that proceeding.
Long, before the commencement of the suit, the beneficial interest in the contract had been fairly transferred to Siliiman and Curtis, and of this Cisna had full and complete notice.
Oh this point two propositions are insisted upon :
1. A court of equity will always protect the rights of a bona fideassignee to a chose in action.
2. A party having notice that his contract is assigned, in equity, can not, by any act of his own, or by any concert with the other original party, defeat or impair the rights of the equitable assignee. '
The first position is asserted by the elementary writers, is sustained by the adjudged cases, and is contained in all books of reference and practice.
Blaekstone, in his Commentaries, vol. 2, p.442, distinctly asserts-it; so does Powell, in his treatise on Contracts, vol. 1, p. 317. It is laid down in 1 Bacon, 249, and various authorities cited.
*The second-proposition can not be separated from the first; it is a necessary consequent. In Martin v. Harris, 2 Term, 595, an administratrix claimed to appropriate moneys arising upon an assigned agreement for wages, to pay off a judgment against the assignor, but the court would not permit her. The money was secured to the assignee. If the obligor pay money on a bond, though not assignable after notice of an assignment, he shall pay it again to the assignee. 2 Ver. 540 ; Chan. Cases, 232. If a debt or other chose in action be assigned, and the assignor release to-the debtor, who has notice of the. assignment, it can not affect theassignee. Ch. Cas. 169.
The direct acts of the parties to a contract can not impair the-rights of an assignee. Can these rights be impaired by any indirect proceeding? The release of the assignor avails nothing. Payment by the obligor to the obligee avails nothing; a judicial decision between them can not bo more operative.
When the administrators of Cisna commenced their suit against. Wilkins, they knew he had no interest in the contract, upon the-operation of which their right of recovery depended. No act of his, out of court, could avail anything; how, then, could he do-anything in court by which the contract could be touched ?" Would Wilkins’ default bind Curtis? Would h,is confession change- the rights of the parties ? Could he by pleading compromit interests otherwise beyond his reach ? It is.certainly clear that the interests of Curtis were as incapable of being affected by the acts of Wilkins in court as elsewhere. The judgment binds the parties and interests arising after the proceedings commence. But it does not affect strangers, or interfere with interests created and vested before the institution of a suit.
It is said that Cisna could only sustain an action against Wilkins ; he could not maintain one against the assignee. This is true of an action at law, but he could have filed a bill in equity against both to rescind the contract, and recover back what ho had paid. If he chose to proceed at law, he must encounter the consequence. He subjected himself to the inconvenience of litigating the matter with Wilkins in one suit, and with his assignee in another. To *hold Curtis concluded by the decision at law, to subject his rights to be determined in a case where he was not and could not be a party, is to subvert all established principles.
Irwin,-for the defendants:
The action of assumpsit is an equitable action, and when brought to recover the amount paid upon a sale of land, on the ground of a failure of the contract, the plaintiff can recover no more than the amount paid, wiLh interest. Such was the action brought by Cisna’s administrators v. Wilkins. The right to recover depended upon the failure of the contract, and this fact is established by the judgment in the cause. It is not competent for the complainants to impeach this judgment in equity, by asking of this court now to make a different decision, unless he shows that he was prevented from making his full and fair defense at law by fraud, accident, or some act of the other party, unconnected with negligence or fault of his own. The doctrine is fully laid down in 3 Johns. Ch. 356, and 1 Schoales & Lefroy, 203, and also 2 Bibb, 6, 326.
The fact that the contract had been assigned to Silliman and Curtis can not vary the case. The right of the assignee is no greater than that of the assignor. When they bought Cisna’s contract, they had full knowledge of the difficulties between the parties, and they agreed to indemnify Wilkins against all costs and damages. The failure of Wilkins to perform the contract, upon which the right of action accrued had taken place, before the as signment, and the right of action, with all its consequences, was beyond the reach of Wilkins or his assignee. An assignment could not divest it out of Cisna, and the right to prosecute the suit against Wilkins included the proposition that the decision should bind all interested. It is certainly well settled that the purchaser of a chose in action takes it subject to all the equities and interests existing between the original parties. 1 P. Wms. 130, 497; 1 Strange, 244; 1 Vesey, 123; 2 Vesey, 520.
The case of Rees and Smith, relied upon by the complainants’ counsel, does not seem to have any bearing on the point now in controversy. There the court proceed on the Aground of fraud and accident; there the plaintiff at law was defeated by the misconduct of the defendant. No allegation of that kind is made here.

Opinion:
Opinion of the court, by
Judge Hitchcock :
From the pleadings and evidence in this case it is manifest that the subject matter of the present controversy has been adjudicated by a court of law, in an action commenced by the present defendants against the complainant Wilkins. The object of the former suit was to recover back the consideration money which had been paid for the land, and could have been sustained upon no other principle than that the contract had been abandoned, or put an end to by the parties. In that case full defense was made, and precisely the same evidence exhibited on the part of the defendant as on the present occasion, with the exception of the testimony of a single witness. The testimony of this witness does not materially vary the facts. Having this evidence before them, the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff, and upon this verdict the court rendered judgment. About two years after the rendition of this judgment, the bill now before the court is filed, the prayer being first to enjoin the judgment at law, and second to enforce a specific performance of the contract.
As before observed, the court of law must hav.e proceeded upon the principle that the contract was at an end. There can be no doubt that the subject was completely within their jurisdiction ; and whether, the decision of the case was or was not correct is not now a subject of inquiry. A court of chancery does not act as a court of errors, to examine or reverse the judgments of a court of law. Upon a case made which comes exclusively within the jurisdiction of a court of chancery, and where a court of law could give no relief, chancery will interfere to enjoin or relieve against a judgment at law. But where the courts of law and of chancery have concurrent jurisdiction, and a party electing to pursue his remedy in one fails, he shall not be permitted, as a general rule, to resort to the othor. It is said, however, in the present case, that the complainants seek to enforce the specific performance of a contract, which could not have been done by a court of law. This *is true; and had the present bill been filed during the pendency of the suit at law, and had no defense been made in that case, this court might, and probably would have given relief. This, however, was not the course pursued. Wilkins had a right to elect, and did elect to make full defense in that court. He preferred to submit his controversy to that jurisdiction, and after a full examination the decision was against him. In this decision he acquiesced for two years or more, and, when threatened with execution, comes into this court to have the matter tried over again. I think he is too late, especially-if, in addition to the other circumstances, we take into consideration the fact that Cisna, the person with whom the contract was originally made, is dead, and that this suit is prosecuted against his personal representative.
The complainants, aware of the difficulty they have to encounter in consequence of the decision at law, undertake to distinguish this from ordinary cases. It seems to be admitted that if Wilkins were the sole complainant before the court, the judgment at law would be conclusive, and the bill must be dismissed. But it is argued that Curtis was not a party in that case, and no person who has not had a day in court, none but parties and privies, can be concluded by a judgment at law or a decree in chancery. It is urged that Curtis alone is the meritorious and interested complainant — that Wilkins has no interest — that ho is joined from necessity, or for the sake of form, in order to obtain the injunction — that inasmuch as Curtis has had no day in court he has now a right to be heard — and that the judgment against Wilkins shall not operate to the disadvantage of him, Curtis. This point has been argued with ability and ingenuity. Many authorities have been cited for the purpose of sustaining the position assumed. I feel no disposition to question the force of these authorities, but the difficulty is that they do not, in my apprehension, apply to the case under consideration. In order to ascertain the strength of this argument, let us for a few moments examine as to the relative situation of these parties, and inquire whether Curtis appears be¿ fore the court in a more favorable point of view than Wilkins. He claims to be, and is, an assignee, not the assignee of Cisna, but of Wilkins. *The contract for the purchase and sale of the land was entered into by Cisna and Wilkins. When this pontraot was reduced to writing, partial payments were made by Cisna to-Wilkins, and it was agreed that at a subsequent period the land should be conveyed, a further payment made, and other acts performed. .Both parties made efforts for the performance of this contract, but whether it were in fact performed by either is not now the subject of inquiry. Previous to the commencement of any suit, and but shortly after the contract was made, Wilkins assigned toSilliman and Curtis his interest in the contract, conveyed to them the land, and at the same time took from them an.obligation to indemnify him against any claim on the part of Cisna. This assignment was made without the assent of Cisna, the assignees having full knowledge of all the facts connected with the whole transaction. Subsequently Silliman transferred his interest to Ourtis. Thus Curtis, by his own act, became interested in the businoss, and, as far as he could, voluntarily placed himself in the situation of Wilkins. By these transactions the rights of Cisna. could not, it is believed, be affected.
It will not be denied, I presume, that had Cisna, on his part, complied with the contract, he might have applied to a court of chancery to enforce a specific performance by the other contracting party; or he might have resorted, at his election, to a court of law for the recovery of damages for the non-performance by his adversary. O.r if the contract was abandoned, he might recover back the amount which he had paid. If he elected to proceed at law, he must, from .necessity, proceed against Wilkins. Curtis was no party to the contract, and at law Cisna would have no claim against him. But were we to adopt the principle contended for by the complainants, Cisna, by the joint act of Curtía and Wilkins, would be deprived of his legal right; he could not avail himself of the remedy at law, but would be driven to-chancery; a doctrine from which such consequences would result, can not be sanctioned.
The complainants urge that Curtis had no day in court; but can this be said with propriety ? True, he was not a party upon the record, but from the bill it appears that he was in fact and in truth-the party in interest. He had undertaken *to indemnify Wilkins against any claim which might be brought against him by Cisna. When the action at law was commenced, he appeared, as is proven by the testimony, and managed the defense* until final judgment, and it is presumed that he will not complain that his rights were sacrificed in consequence of any misconduct or neglect on the part of his assignor.
Upon the whole, I am of opinion that, inasmuch as the subject-matter of this controversy has been settled by the adjudication of a court of competent jurisdiction; was acquiesced in for two-years; and inasmuch as the assignee, under the circumstances of this case, does not come before the court under circumstances any more favorable than those of the assignor, therefore the bill of the-complainants must be dismissed with costs.
Judge Prase concurred.
Judge Sherman, having been of counsel, did not sit in this-cause.