Case Name: RENNINGER v. NEW YORK CENT. & H. R. R. CO.
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1896-12-16
Citations: 42 N.Y.S. 813
Docket Number: 
Parties: RENNINGER v. NEW YORK CENT. & H. R. R. CO.
Judges: 
Reporter: West's New York Supplement
Volume: 42
Pages: 813–824

Head Matter:
RENNINGER v. NEW YORK CENT. & H. R. R. CO.
(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Fourth Department.
December 16, 1896.)
1. Master and Servant—Reasonable Care—Coupling Cars.
The evidence fails to show that plaintiff, an experienced brakeman, exercised reasonable prudence in coupling a car by going between it and the engine, where he found that there was a link and pin on the tender of the engine, and that there was also on the head end of the car a coupling pin, which he tried to draw, but could not, as it was pounded in the draw-head, and, in stepping out, was caught and crushed by the engine, which he had signaled to back. Ward, J., dissenting.
2. Same—Defective Appliances—Improper Selection of Instrument.
An injury is not caused by defective appliances, but by the improper selection and use of a link and pin, where a brakeman, going between a car and engine to couple them, found there was a link and pin on the engine, and there was also on the end" of the car next to the engine fastened in the drawhead a pin which he attempted to draw, and, not succeeding, tried to step out from between the cars, but was caught and crushed. Per Adams, J. Ward, J., dissenting.
8. Same—Failure to Use Coupling Sticks.
A release to a railroad company by a- brakeman entering its employ from any injury caused “from not using a coupling stick,” is not a rule or contract forbidding a coupling except with a stick, and does not apply to a case where the use of a coupling stick would be ineffectual to remove an obstacle from a coupling which the brakeman was ordered to malte, and which necessitated his going between the cars, and using his hands in order to accomplish it. Per Ward, J., dissenting.
The injuries were received by the plaintiff on the 22d of November, 1894, while coupling cars at Corfu, on the defendant’s road. Plaintiff sought to couple a car standing on a branch track to an engine, and, in doing so, the plaintiff “rode the car out until she got to the crossing.” He'then gave the engineer a signal to stop, and he swung up, and the stake which had been used to move the dead car fell down, and then the engineer hacked up, and, when he backed up, the plaintiff “went in between the car and engine, and found there was a link and pin there, and got hold of the pin in the head end of the car, next the engine. There was a link and pin in the engine also." The plaintiff had been in the employ of the defendant as brakeman nearly five years, and he testified he was “familiar with disconnecting cars,” and that he was familiar with the manner in which pins were used. The plaintiff testified that he went to the engineer, signaled him to hack up, and that he got off the car after he had got the same on the main track, and he gave the engineer a signal to hack up. “The engine was about a. half a car length away. After signaling him to back up, 1 got in, and got hold of the pin and link; and after I discovered the pin was fast, and I couldn’t pull it, and I dropped the link, and tried to get out, arid, before I could get out, I was caught. I took hold of the pin with the left hand, and the link with the right hand. I was on the south side of the car, the engineer’s side. I discovered it was driven in with another pin and link on the top. It was pounded. I shook it; shook the link, and tried to pull it out, and couldn’t.” When he discovered that it was fast, he started to hack out, and stepped back to get out. “The engine caught the sill ■of the car, and drove me against the sill of the car.” The witness testified: “It was necessary to draw that pin in order to make the coupling, because you could not make the coupling if you did not raise the pin. If I could have raised the pin, I could have entered the other link in the drawhead. It was in the way. You cannot connect the car with two links in each end of the car.” The witness says that, when he found there was a link in the engine and one in the car, he undertook to take the one out of the car, so he could couple the engine onto the car, and that he made the discovery, and got injured, and that he started to get out when he discovered that the pin was fastened. “I couldn’t pull it. I didn’t believe it could be driven out; it was pounded so tight in on the top. You could see where it was pounded; and I'let go, and tried to get out.” In the course of the plaintiff’s cross-examination he said: “After I gave the signal to back up, I got down, and got hold of the pin with my left hand, and got hold of the link with my right hand, and I found the pin was fast. I shook the link up and down. After I found she was fastened, I tried to get it out, but I hadn’t sufficient time to get it out before I was caught. I got in to pull that link out.” The plaintiff testified that, in the ordinary coupling and uncoupling of cars, there is difficulty in removing the pin. He adds, however: “They are supposed to pull easy.” He further testified that this particular pin “was driven in there. It was too large for the hole of the drawhead.”
Appeal from trial term.
Action by John N. Renninger against the New York Central & Hudson River Railroad Company for personal injuries. Prom a verdict in favor of plaintiff, and from an order denying a motion for a new trial, on the case and exceptions, defendant appeals. Reversed.
The facts are further stated by Mr. Justice WARD, as follows:
This is an action for personal injuries alleged to have been sustained by the plaintiff while in the employ of the defendant as a brakeman, while he was attempting to couple cars upon the defendant’s road. The defendant’s answer is a general denial, with a special defense that the plaintiff’s injuries were caused solely by his negligence in disregarding a rule of defendant as to the use of a coupling stick in coupling cars, and a release upon consideration of defendant’s liability from injuries to the plaintiff while coupling cars. The action was brought in the superior court of Buffalo, tried in November, 1895, where the plaintiff recovered a verdict of §3,000. Upon the merger of the superior court into this court, in 189(1, a motion for a new trial was made, upon a case and exceptions by the defendant, which was denied, and the appeal herein is taken from the judgments rendered in the action, and from the order denying the motion for a new trial. The plaintiff was injured November 22, 1894. He had been in the employment of the defendant as a brakeman for about a month. He had been a brakeman upon other roads for several years. When he entered the defendant’s employment, there was presented to him for his signature, which he signed, a paper of which the following is a copy: “I am of lawful age, and hereby acknowledge the receipt of a coupling stick, and the notice regarding the use of the same, from which this receipt is to be detached, and I acknowledge that the provisions of said notice are fully understood by me, and I expressly release the N. Y. O. & H. R R R Co. from all liability to me or my representatives for any injury happening to me from not using the coupling stick.”
It was claimed by the defendant, and a witness testified, that, at the time of the execution of the said paper, there was a notice appended to the back thereof as follows:
“Coupling Stick Notice and Receipt.
“(Note. These notices and receipts can be obtained on regular requisition, and must be kept on hand by all those having under them employes whose duties require them to couple freight ears. At the time of signing the receipt, the coupling stick must be delivered to the employe, in the presence of the person witnessing the signing of the receipt. The receipt, when signed, should be sent at once to the division superintendent for safekeeping.)
“Notice.
“In consequence of frequent injuries received by men engaged in coupling freight cars, by thoughtlessly stepping too far in between them, or remaining too long between them, coupling sticks are provided to prevent injury by their use. The company requires every employs making couplings to use one of these sticks,' and every employs injured in coupling from not using a stick will be deemed voluntarily to have taken all the risks of such injury.”
The notice further provided that, whenever the stick delivered at the time of signing was lost or broken, it was the duty of every employé who made couplings to apply for another at once. The plaintiff went to work upon a local way freight of defendant, which ran between Buffalo and Rochester. On a trip taken by this freight train from Rochester to Buffalo, on the 18th of November, 1894, there was upon this train a gondola coal ear, that belonged to the Pennsylvania Railroad, and is known in the case as a “foreign car.” This car was left upon the siding at Corfu, a small station on defendant’s road. On the 22d of November, this train, on its way from Buffalo to Rochester, stopped at Corfu, and the conductor ordered the plaintiff, who was the rear brakeman on the train, to go forward, and stake out this car from the siding, and to make it a part of the train. The plaintiff obeyed these directions, and informed the engineer of the train what they were. The engineer disconnected the engine from the train, and ran ahead to the siding. The plaintiff opened the switch connecting the siding with the main track, and then went to the engine, and took a stake therefrom, and placed one- end of it against -the engine tender, and the other against the end of the car on the'siding, and then got upon the car. The engineer moved his engine back, which forced the car out onto the main track. The engine stopped, and the stick fell to the ground. The plaintiff signaled the engineer to back up, so he could couple the car -to the tender of the engine. As the engine approached, the -plaintiff attempted to make the connection, and he then discovered that there was a link and pin in the end of the car nearest to the engine, and also a link and pin in the tender of the engine. One of these links and pins had to be removed before the coupling could" be made. The plaintiff stepped in at the end of the car which was nearest to him, and took hold of the link and pin with his right hand, and the drawhead with his left hand, to remove the pin. The plaintiff’s testimony tended to show that then for the first time he discovered that the pin had been "driven in so it could not be removed with his hands, though he made considerable effort to remove it, without avail, and, seeing the tender close upon him, he sought to get out from between the cars,- but was unable to do so, and was crushed between the cars, and was severely injured. It was claimed by the plaintiff, and his testimony tended to show, that, if he had experienced no difficulty in removing the pin from the link, he would have had time to have made a safe coupling, and not received any injury. He further testified that as he understood the rules of the road, when he found the link and pin in each of the two cars he was attempting to couple, one being an engine, it was his duty to remove the link and pin from the end of the car; that another rule or custom of the road was that, when a car was left anywhere along the line, the link and pin in the car that was left on the siding was left in the rear end. It appear.ed that the company had no written rules upon the subject. The rule referred to was the custom among the brakemen in operating the train. The plaintiff denied his ever receiving the coupling stick, while admitting the execution of the agreement. He denied all recollection or knowledge of seeing the notice which, as the defendant claimed, was appended to the receipt, and given to the plaintiff; while John E. Cary, a witness and an employé of the defendant, and whose name is signed to the receipt as a witness, testified tliat he saw the plaintiff sign the receipt, and that he received a copy of the notice. The conductor of the train testified that at the time of the accident he found a large pin in the drawhead, which was tight in the link, though not clear •down, but the pin was so large that it was bound in the drawhead; that he tried, with his hand, and could not lift it out, that he finally got it out, and threw it away; and that he made the coupling by taking the link and pin from the engine, and using the link that was in the car. There was no conflict in the •evidence except upon the subject of the rules, the delivery of the coupling stick, and the service of the notice. The plaintiff testified that he never used the •coupling stick to effect a coupling, and never saw one used; and the evidence was uncontradicted that a coupling stick would have been of no service in the attempt to remove the pin that was bound in the link connected with the car.
Argued before HARDIN, P. J., and FOLLETT, ADAMS, GREEN, and WARD, JJ.
James F. Gluck, for appellant.
George W. Cothran, for respondent.

Opinion:
HARDIN, P. J.
At the close of the plaintiff's evidence, the defendant moved for a nonsuit on several grounds, and among them on the ground that "by the plaintiff's testimony it appears that he himself had ample opportunity to observe the defect, if a defect had existed, in any appliances furnished"; and, secondly, that it appeared that the injuries were received by reason of a risk which the plaintiff assumed, and on the further ground that no negligence was shown sufficient to charge the defendant. The motion for a nonsuit was denied, and an exception was taken. At the close of the whole evidence, the defendant moved for a direction of a verdict in its behalf. The motion was denied, and an exception was taken.
Before the plaintiff stepped in between the car and the engine, he had ample opportunity to inspect the pin and link in the car he was about to attach to the engine. He could have approached the car, and made an examination of the pin and link, and discovered whether it was readily removed when applying such force as his hand would bestow upon the pin. He made no such effort. On the contrary, he allowed the opportunity to pass by, and signaled the engineer to approach, and placed himself voluntarily in the place where he received the injuries. As he said, and as the evidence discloses, and as common observation indicates, there is more or less difficulty in removing pins from drawheads caused by the ordinary incidents attending their use. It seems the plaintiff voluntarily ventured to place himself in a point of danger without having used the caution -which a person of ordinary care and prudence should have exercised. It is now well settled that an employé takes the ordinary risks incident to the business in which he is employed. Kaare v. Iron Co., 139 N. Y. 369, 34 N. E. 901; Flood v. Telegraph Co., 131 N. Y. 603, 30 N. E. 196; Albert v. Railroad Co., 80 Hun, 152, 29 N. Y. Supp. 1126; Knisley v. Pratt, 148 N. Y. 372, 42 N. E. 986; Graves v. Brewer, 4 App. Div. 330, 38 N. Y. Supp. 566.
In France v. Railroad Co., 88 Hun, 318, 34 N. Y. Supp. 409, it was said:
"As a rule, a servant entering into an employment which is hazardous assumes the usual risks and perils of the service,—those which are apparent to ordinary observation, or which he must know if he exercises ordinary care and observation; and. when lie accepts or continues in the service with knowledge of the structures or implements used from which injury may be apprehended, he assumes the hazards incident to the situation."
In Crown v. Orr, 140 N. Y. 452, 35 N. E. 648, O'Brien, J., alludes to the rule, and states that if the servant voluntarily enters into or continues in the service, without objection or complaint, having knowledge of "or the means of knowing the dangers involved, he is deemed to assume the risk, and to waive any claim for damages against the master in case of personal injury to him. He is bound to take notice of the ordinary operation of familiar laws, and to govern himself accordingly, and, if he fails to do so, the risk is his own. He is bound to use his eyes to see that which is open and apparent to any person so using them, and, if he neglects to do so, he cannot charge the consequences upon the master."
The trial judge charged the jury "that one of the dangers to be apprehended by the brakemen in the ordinary operation of the road was the misfit of links and pins, and the possibility that in coupling, or attempting to couple, they might not successfully do so." And he further charged "that this being so, being one of the dangers to be apprehended, it was one of the risks incident to the business which the plaintiff assumed." When the court had given the instructions just quoted to the jury, the counsel for the defendant asked the court to direct a verdict for the defendant. The court thereupon declined, and an exception was taken. Then the defendant excepted to that part of the charge of the court which submitted the question to the jury "whether the plaintiff exercised ordinary prudence in giving the signal for the engine to start before endeavoring to ascertain the condition of the coupling." The counsel for the defendant then asked the court to. charge the jury "that, the possibility of not making a successful coupling being one of the risks of the employment, the plaintiff was bound to examine such instruments before attempting to place himself in a-position of danger." The court declined so to instruct the jury, and the defendant took an exception. Then the counsel for the defendant took an exception to that part of the charge of the court "that the-plaintiff has a right to assume that the link and pin were in order, and that he might operate them as they were ordinarily used." The court modified its charge by saying to the jury, "You may be able to say from the testimony that he had a right so to assume," and to that an exception was taken by the defendant. The evidence fails to show that the plaintiff exercised that care and caution that a person of reasonable prudence, under the circumstances, should have exercised.. The verdict in that regard is not satisfactory. The judgment should-be reversed, and a new trial ordered, with costs to abide the event.
Judgment and order reversed, and a new trial ordered, with costs to. abide the event.
POLLETT and GREEN, JJ., concur.