Case Name: STUDENT ALPHA ID NUMBER GUJA, Appellant, v. The SCHOOL BOARD OF VOLUSIA COUNTY, Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1993-02-26
Citations: 616 So. 2d 1011
Docket Number: No. 92-84
Parties: STUDENT ALPHA ID NUMBER GUJA, Appellant, v. The SCHOOL BOARD OF VOLUSIA COUNTY, Florida, Appellee.
Judges: GOSHORN, C.J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 616
Pages: 1011–1017

Head Matter:
STUDENT ALPHA ID NUMBER GUJA, Appellant, v. The SCHOOL BOARD OF VOLUSIA COUNTY, Florida, Appellee.
No. 92-84.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
Feb. 26, 1993.
Rehearing Denied April 27, 1993.
Eric A. Latinsky, Daytona Beach, for appellant. „
Barbara J. Foster, Deland, for appellee.

Opinion:
HARRIS, Judge.
A student was found sleeping after the lunch period near the Guidance Center at Seabreeze High School. He was ashen gray and appeared very ill; he was eventually transported to Peninsula Medical Center. It was determined that the student had consumed marijuana during his lunch break. He stated that he had received the marijuana from appellant at the beginning of the lunch period at her locker. Appellant was questioned about the incident and admitted giving the marijuana to the student. At this time, she did not indicate where the exchange took place. She and her parents were notified that she would be recommended for extended suspension because of her "distribution of a controlled substance (marijuana) on the school campus."
Although appellant's admission and the other student's statement were placed into the record at the suspension hearing through the testimony of George Janan, the administrative assistant at the school, the student who was given the marijuana dropped out of school and did not testify. At the suspension hearing, appellant again admitted that she took the marijuana from her locker and gave it to the other student but contended that the actual transfer took place off campus. The school board determined that since the only evidence that appellant actually delivered the marijuana on campus was hearsay, they would find her guilty only of possession. The school board found, however, that even possession', under the facts of this incident, justified suspension.
Appellant contends that her suspension violated due process because she was actually "charged" with distribution on campus but found guilty of possession. She urges that she was not prepared to • defend against "the lesser included charge" of possession.
Any analysis of procedural due process in a school suspension or expulsion case must begin with Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 95 S.Ct. 729, 42 L.Ed.2d 725 (1985) where the Supreme Court held that a student facing suspension from a public school has property and liberty interests that qualify for protection under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Goss, 95 S.Ct. at 736. In Goss nine students were suspended from high school without a hearing. The suspensions were based upon disruptive or disobedient conduct. The court commented that the fundamental requisite of due process is the opportunity to be heard and declared that at the very minimum, students facing suspension must be given some kind of notice and afforded some kind of hearing (emphasis in original). Goss, 95 S.Ct. at 738.
The court noted, however, that interpretation and application of due process are intensely practical matters which negate any concept of inflexible procedures universally applicable to every imaginable situation. Goss, 95 S.Ct. at 738. The timing and content of the notice and the nature of the hearing depends upon the appropriate accommodation of the competing interests. Goss, 95 S.Ct. at 738-39.
After Goss, it became clear that due process in student disciplinary proceedings requires adequate notice, an opportunity to be heard, and substantial evidence to support the penalty. There are, however, no hard and fast rules by which to measure meaningful notice. Nash v. Auburn Univ., 812 F.2d 655 (11th Cir.1987). It is equally clear that disciplinary proceedings do not require the same safeguards afforded criminal defendants. See e.g., Gordon v. Savage, 383 So.2d 646 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980), rev. denied 389 So.2d 1110 (1980) (an administrative accusation is not a criminal proceeding; therefore, criminal procedures are not applicable to an inquiry into fitness to practice dentistry); Jaska v. Regents of Univ. of Michigan, 597 F.Supp. 1245 (E.D.Mich.1984), aff'd 787 F.2d 590 (6th Cir.1986) (school disciplinary proceedings are not criminal trials); Norton v. Discipline Comm. of East Tennessee State Univ., 419 F.2d 195 (6th Cir.1969), cert. denied 399 U.S. 906, 90 S.Ct. 2191, 26 L.Ed.2d 562 (1970) (there is not a good analogy between student discipline and criminal procedure); Esteban v. Central Missouri State College, 415 F.2d 1077 (8th Cir.1969), cert. denied 398 U.S. 965, 90 S.Ct. 2169, 26 L.Ed.2d 548 (1970) (school regulations are not measured by standards of criminal law).
The due process requirement of an administrative proceeding is that the proceeding must be "essentially fair". See Gordon v. Savage, 383 So.2d 646 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980).
The question before us is whether it was "unfair" to suspend appellant for her admitted possession of marijuana (admittedly an offense for which suspension was authorized) when she was put on notice that the administrative hearing involved her alleged distribution on campus.
Appellant's position would have more merit if she had been accused and tried for a violation of the school policy on marijuana but suspended for absenteeism or cheating on an exam. Then she could clearly claim surprise.
But here it was apparent that appellant was on notice from the outset that disciplinary action against her was contemplated because of her role in the marijuana incident involving the other student. She was not prejudiced by the notice given for the formal suspension hearing. Appellant's argument that in fact she handed the marijuana to the other student just off campus does not deprive the school board of the authority to suspend her for her admitted possession on campus of the same marijuana (same incident) delivered to the other student.
Appellant urges that she was prejudiced by the "formal charge" because had she suspected the school board was concerned about mere possession, she might not have testified.
Her admission that she possessed marijuana on campus made before the formal hearing was both admissible (an exception to the hearsay rule) and sufficient to establish the offense of possession.
Next she indicates that had the "charge" been mere possession she would have put on mitigation evidence instead of a defense. After the school board found that she violated the policy against possessing marijuana, she was given the opportunity to establish mitigation but elected not to do so.
She also contends that suspension for mere possession, although authorized, is not mandatory and that she might have negotiated a better deal had she known the charge included mere possession. It is true that the principal has the discretion to recommend or not recommend extended suspension in the case of possession. However, there is no authority for him to "cut a deal." Further, she urges that students have not always been suspended for mere possession. However, in any view of the matter, this was not a mere possession offense. Although the delivery might have been completed off campus, there was admittedly a delivery during the school day to a fellow student of marijuana kept on campus. This fact, regardless of where the delivery was completed, is relevant in determining the punishment for this admitted violation of school policy.
Like our colleague, we too are concerned about what lesson students will learn from this experience. We believe that they often learn of their rights much earlier and much better than they learn of their responsibilities and obligations. Perhaps, un der the facts of this case, accountability for one's actions is the better lesson.
AFFIRMED.
GOSHORN, C.J., concurs.
DAUKSCH, J., dissents with opinion.
. We are not convinced that the fact that the marijuana was handed to the other student "off campus" during the lunch break prevents this from being distribution on campus when the marijuana was taken from the school locker, carried to the rendezvous and then returned to campus. Distribution is a broader concept than the mere handing of the marijuana to another.