Case Name: State of Wisconsin, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Jamale A. Bonds, Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner
Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Wisconsin
Decision Date: 2006-06-30
Citations: 292 Wis. 2d 344
Docket Number: No. 2005AP948-CR
Parties: State of Wisconsin, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Jamale A. Bonds, Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner.
Judges: AbRAHamson, C.J., concurs.
Reporter: Wisconsin Reports Second
Volume: 292
Pages: 344–408

Head Matter:
State of Wisconsin, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Jamale A. Bonds, Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner.
Supreme Court
No. 2005AP948-CR.
Oral argument April 28, 2006.
Decided June 30, 2006.
2006 WI 83
(Also reported in 717 N.W.2d 133.)
AbRAHamson, C.J., concurs.
Bhadley and ButleR, Jh., J.J., join.
Chooks, J., concurs in part, dissents in part.
Wilcox and Phosser, J.J., join.
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs by Diana M. Felsmann, and oral argument by Jeremy C. Perri, assistant state public defenders.
For the plaintiff-respondent, the cause was argued by Aaron R. O'Neil, assistant attorney general, with whom on the brief was Peggy A. Lautenschlager, attorney general.

Opinion:
PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, J.
¶ 1. We review the State's post-conviction amendment to a criminal complaint for battery in violation of Wis. Stat. § 940.19(1) (2003-04), as the amendment affects the basis for the allegation that Jamale Bonds is an habitual criminal. In regard to habitual criminality, the complaint alleged three misdemeanor convictions. The date of the prior convictions was misstated in the body of the complaint, but certified copies of the judgments of conviction were attached to the'copy of the complaint that was given to Bonds. Bonds pled not guilty and was convicted by a jury. At sentencing, he did not admit the allegation of habitual criminality. The State then changed the factual basis for its allegation that Bonds was a repeater and sought to prove a prior felony forgery conviction. The State submitted a Consolidated Court Automation Programs (CCAP) report as proof of that conviction. Bonds objected to amending the basis on which the State sought to prove habitual criminality and also asserted that the proof the State had submitted was insufficient to prove habitual criminality beyond a reasonable doubt. The circuit court permitted the amendment, accepted the CCAP report as sufficient proof of habitual criminality, and sentenced Bonds as a repeater. Bonds claims it was error to do so.
¶ 2. Four members of the court conclude that with sufficient proof, the State's post-conviction amendment of the basis for proving habitual criminality would have been permissible for two reasons: (1) The complaint satisfied the requirements of Wis. Stat. § 973.12 and of due process because Bonds had notice that he was being charged as an habitual criminal and of the potential maximum sentence he faced before he pled; and (2) Bonds was not prejudiced in making an intelligent plea as a result of the State's shift to a different prior conviction as the factual basis for its repeater allegation. However, a different majority of the court also concludes that the State's use of a CCAP report as evidence of Bonds's conviction does not constitute prima facie proof of that conviction and that Bonds did not waive his right to object to the State's use of the CCAP report. Accordingly, the court of appeals decision is reversed and the matter is remanded to the circuit court to vacate the enhancer portion of Bonds's sentence.
I. BACKGROUND
¶ 3. The relevant facts are undisputed. Jamale Bonds was charged with battery as an habitual crimi nal, in violation of Wis. Stat. § 940.19 and 939.62. In the criminal complaint, the State alleged three prior misdemeanor convictions as the basis for the habitual criminality allegation:
[T]he defendant is a repeater as defined in Wisconsin Statutes Section 939.62, in that the defendant was convicted of... (three misdemeanors) during the five year period immediately preceding the commission of the crime charged in this complaint, which conviction(s) remain[] of record and unreversed. If this is found to be the case, the maximum term of imprisonment for this crime may be increased to not more than 2 years, exclusive of other enhanced penalties charged herein.
Criminal Complaint 1 (Milwaukee County Cir. Ct. July 29,2003). The three prior misdemeanor convictions were described individually by: the offense committed, the statute that was contravened, the county of conviction and the case number for each matter. The date of the convictions was misstated in the body of the complaint; however, certified copies of the judgments of conviction were attached to the copy of the complaint that was given to Bonds.
¶ 4. Bonds pled not guilty, went to trial, and was convicted by a jury. At sentencing, the State recommended that Bonds be sentenced to the maximum term for battery with an habitual criminality enhancer: 18 months initial confinement and six months extended supervision. In support of its sentencing request, the State asked that the habitual criminality finding be based on a 1998 felony forgery conviction in lieu of the misdemeanor convictions that were alleged in the complaint. Bonds did not admit to a prior conviction so the State presented a CCAP report that indicated he was convicted of felony forgery one day after the misdemeanor convictions set out in the complaint. The sen tencing transcript provides the following communication between the sentencing judge and the prosecutor about the amendment of the basis for habitual criminality that was alleged in the complaint and the calculations that bore on Bonds's repeater status:
MR. RESAR:... I have copies of all the circuit court access records. I would ask specifically, either through these records or through the defendant's own admission that a finding be made that the defendant was convicted of a felony forgery and that that conviction took place on April 16th of 1998.
THE COURT: That is the day after he was found guilty of the battery charge and bail jumping charge, misdemeanor charges. Right?
MR. RESAR: That is accurate. But I just, I think that using the felony is a little cleaner and doesn't rely on the older misdemeanor that we need to piece together confinement time. However, we still do need to rely on confinement time. The State is asking the court to rely on that. As the defendant was charged in this case on July 29th, 2003. So, we need at least 5 months at that point. There is approximately five years and five months between the time the defendant was charged and the time the defendant was convicted of the felony forgery and that time, excludes that five year period, excludes any time defendant spent in confinement. There are records from the Milwaukee County Jail which have been shown to counsel, which establish that the de fendant was in the custody of the Milwaukee County Jail between July 26th in 1999 and May 8th of 2000. That he was serving a sentence on those cases the court refers to.
So, with that we know the defendant was in custody for nearly ten months, far surpassing the five months that would be required in order to establish habitual criminality enhancer in this case. With that, I would ask that the court make those findings, either through those documents or through the defendant's own admission to the validity of the same.
¶ 5. Defense counsel objected to the State's amendment and asked the court to find that the habitual criminality allegation was defective for two reasons: (1) the felony conviction was not alleged in the complaint; and (2) the State had not proved the felony conviction beyond a reasonable doubt. The State responded that all that was required to advance on the habitual criminality enhancer was to allege prior to a plea that a person was an habitual criminal. The State contended that the complaint was not required to specifically allege which conviction or convictions formed the basis for the habitual criminality allegation. Additionally, the State contended that CCAP reports are sufficient proof.
¶ 6. CCAP is a case management system provided by Wisconsin Circuit Court Access program (WCCA). It provides public access online to reports of activity in Wisconsin circuit courts for those counties that use CCAP Circuit court employees enter all CCAP data in the county where the case files are located, and the information feeds into the statewide access system. How ever, CCAP is a voluntary program, and only counties or divisions within a county that elect to use CCAP's case management system generate CCAP reports.
¶ 7. The WCCA website, through which all CCAP reports can be accessed by the public, asks all users of the system to read and accept the following agreement:
WCCA is not the official Judgment and Lien Docket. The official Judgment and Lien Docket is located in each county's Clerk of Circuit Court Office.
The data available in the CCAP database is limited by:
1. Some counties currently use CCAP for selected case types. Portage has data only for Probate cases.
2. Counties that are on CCAP began using it at different times and made independent decisions about the "backloading" of pre-CCAP cases.
3. All the data in the CCAP database is entered in the individual counties where the case files are located. Case information is updated hourly unless CCAP is performing periodic maintenance or experiencing technical problems.
If you believe any of the data contained in this database is inaccurate, please contact the circuit court where the original record was created and filed. CCAP provides no warranties insuring the accuracy of the information contained in records available on WCCA, or that electronic mail sent via WCCA is delivered to, accessed by, or read by its intended recipient.
Please indicate that you have read the above and agree to the use of WCCA subject to the above terms, and understand the limitations of the CCAP database.
http://wcca.wicourts.gov/index.xsl (last visited June 24, 2006).
¶ 8. The circuit court concluded that the criminal complaint gave Bonds notice that the State intended to ask the court to find that he is an habitual criminal because it alleged three prior misdemeanor convictions. The court also concluded that the shift to a felony conviction as the grounds for a finding of habitual criminality did not prejudice him. The court concluded that it could take judicial notice of the CCAP report of Bonds's conviction for felony forgery.
¶ 9. The circuit court sentenced Bonds to 18 months of confinement and six months of extended supervision. At sentencing, the judge explained that the application of the repeater enhancer was supported by Bonds's forgery conviction. He told Bonds that although the forgery conviction occurred more than five years before the battery for which Bonds was being sentenced, the time Bonds was confined for the forgery conviction had to be subtracted from the time between the forgery conviction and the current charge of battery. Doing so placed the forgery conviction within the applicable five-year period according to the provisions of Wis. Stat. § 939.62(2).
¶ 10. Bonds filed a motion for post-conviction relief pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 809.30 and 974.02, arguing that the court had improperly determined that he was an habitual criminal and requesting that his sentence be changed to nine months, the maximum penalty for a Wis. Stat. § 940.19(1) battery conviction. Bonds argued that he had been denied notice of the habitual criminality allegation because the State had not alleged the forgery conviction as its basis before his plea. He also refined his argument that the State had not proved habitual criminality beyond a reasonable doubt, by asserting that the CCAP report was unreliable and insufficient to prove habitual criminality status. The circuit court denied his motion.
¶ 11. The court of appeals adopted the circuit court's reasoning as its own. We review the court of appeals decision.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
¶ 12. When we review the application of a statute to a set of facts to determine whether a penalty enhancer is valid, we are presented with a question of law that we review independently, without deference to previous court decisions. State ex rel. Bingen v. Bzdusek, 2002 WI App 210, ¶ 8, 257 Wis. 2d 193, 650 N.W.2d 894; see also State v. Koeppen, 195 Wis. 2d 117, 126, 536 N.W.2d 386 (Ct. App. 1995). When we determine whether a defendant has received notice that the State intends to seek increased imprisonment, we independently review the notice that was given to determine whether it satisfies due process. State v. Stynes, 2003 WI 65, ¶ 11, 262 Wis. 2d 335, 665 N.W.2d 115.
B. Increased Penalty for Habitual Criminality
¶ 13. Wisconsin Stat. § 939.62 allows increased penalties to be imposed on repeat criminals at the time of sentencing. Section 939.62 states in pertinent part:
(1) If the actor is a repeater, as that term is defined in sub. (2), and the present conviction is for any crime for which imprisonment may be imposed, except for an escape under s. 946.42 or a failure to report under s. 946.425, the maximum term of imprisonment prescribed by law for that crime may be increased as follows:
(a) A maximum term of imprisonment of one year or less may be increased to not more than 2 years.
(2) The actor is a repeater if the actor was convicted of a felony during the 5-year period immediately preceding the commission of the crime for which the actor presently is being sentenced, or if the actor was convicted of a misdemeanor on 3 separate occasions during that same period, which convictions remain of record and unreversed. . In computing the preceding 5-year period, time which the actor spent in actual confinement serving a criminal sentence shall be excluded.
¶ 14. Wisconsin Stat. § 973.12 sets forth the statutory requirements for alleging and applying the repeater enhancer. It states, in pertinent part:
(1) Whenever a person charged with a crime will be a repeater or a persistent repeater under s. 939.62 if convicted, any applicable prior convictions may be alleged in the complaint, indictment or information or amendments so alleging at any time before or at arraignment, and before acceptance of any plea. The court may, upon motion of the district attorney, grant a reasonable time to investigate possible prior convictions before accepting a plea. If the prior convictions are admitted by the defendant or proved by the state, he or she shall be subject to sentence under s. 939.62 unless he or she establishes that he or she was pardoned on grounds of innocence for any crime necessary to constitute him or her a repeater or a persistent repeater. An official report of the F.B.I. or any governmental agency of the United States or of this or any other state shall be prima facie evidence of any conviction or sentence therein reported. Any sentence so reported shall be deemed prima facie to have been fully served in actual confinement or to have been served for such period of time as is shown or is consistent with the report.
The proper application of § 973.12 is at the center of Bonds's challenge to his sentence as a repeater.
1. The parties' positions
¶ 15. Bonds contends that the State improperly amended the complaint when it changed the factual basis of the repeater allegation from three misdemeanors to a felony forgery conviction. Bonds supports this position with the following arguments: (1) Wis. Stat. § 973.12(1) unambiguously requires that prior convictions be alleged at or before the acceptance of any plea; (2) State v. Martin, 162 Wis. 2d 883, 907, 470 N.W.2d 900 (1991), held that a repeater allegation cannot be added after a plea; and (3) even if the State was able to amend the complaint regarding the basis for the repeater allegation after a plea, Bonds was prejudiced and therefore, the State may not amend here.
¶ 16. The State, on the other hand, argues that Wis. Stat. § 973.12 does not bar all post-plea amendments of allegations of habitual criminality. The State supports its position with the following arguments: (1) modifications are permissible if the complaint gives the defendant notice of the potential maximum penalty to which the defendant could he subjected when pleading, such that the defendant would not be prejudiced in deciding how to plead; (2) the complaint gave Bonds adequate notice of the maximum penalty he faced at the time of his plea; and (3) Bonds was not prejudiced by the State's change in the factual basis for the repeater allegation.
2. Interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 973.12
¶ 17. Although no amended complaint was actually filed in the circuit court, Bonds characterized the State's request to change the basis for proving habitual criminality as an untimely amendment of the complaint. Therefore, in order to examine the requirements of Wis. Stat. § 973.12 and how an amendment of the basis for habitual criminality set out in the complaint may affect the statute's requirements, we begin with Whitaker v. State, 83 Wis. 2d 368, 265 N.W.2d 575 (1978), which discussed amendments to charging documents in general. Id. at 374. Whitaker did not concern a repeater enhancer, but rather it addressed an initial charge of party to the crime of theft that the State amended to robbery, after Whitaker's arraignment and plea of not guilty. Subsequent to the amendment, Whitaker was again arraigned, this time on the amended information, and a new plea was taken. Id. at 370-71. We interpreted Wis. Stat. § 971.29 in reaching our conclusion that there was no statutory bar to amending an information with leave of the court after arraignment so long as there was no prejudice to the defendant. Id. at 374. We reasoned that the purpose of an information is to "inform the defendant of the charges against him," and that "[n]otice is the key-factor." Id. at 373 (citing La Fond v. State, 37 Wis. 2d 137, 144, 154 N.W.2d 304 (1967) (Heffernan, J., dissenting) and the Wisconsin Constitution, Art. I, sec. 7: "In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right... to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him."). We explained that an amendment of an information before trial would not be prejudicial if a defendant's right to notice, right to a speedy trial, and right to prepare and present a defense to the criminal charges were not affected. Whitaker, 83 Wis. 2d at 374.
¶ 18. In recent years, we have had occasion to determine the validity of various post-plea amendments relating to habitual criminality. Those cases guide our analysis of whether the State's amendment in this case was permissible under Wis. Stat. § 973.12 and constitutional due process requirements.
¶ 19. In Martin, we consolidated two cases that raised the same issue. Each defendant challenged the State's assertion of habitual criminality after a plea of not guilty to the charges at arraignment. We interpreted Wis. Stat. § 973.12(1) as prohibiting an amendment that alleged that the defendant was an habitual criminal where a defendant has been arraigned and has pled not guilty to an information that made no allegation that the defendant was a repeater. Martin, 162 Wis. 2d at 900. We reviewed the legislative history and concluded that the language of the statute, coupled with that history, made clear that:
[T]he legislature has established the time of arraignment and of any plea acceptance as the cut-off point after which time a defendant can no longer face exposure to repeater enhancement for the crime set forth in the charging document and pleaded to by the defendant at arraignment.
Id. (emphasis in original).
¶ 20. In weighing the meaning of the statute against the facts of the consolidated cases, we relied in part on the reasoning of a prior decision, Block v. State, 41 Wis. 2d 205, 210,163 N.W.2d 196 (1968), in which we analyzed the 1965 amendment to the repeater statute:
Being a repeater is not a crime but may enhance the punishment of the crime for which the repeater is convicted. The allegation of recidivism is put in the information in order to meet the due-process requirements of a fair trial. When the defendant is asked to plead, he is entitled to know the extent of .his punishment of the alleged crime, which he cannot know if he is not then informed that his prior convictions may he used to enhance the punishment.
Martin, 162 Wis. 2d at 900-01 (quoting Block, 41 Wis. 2d at 210 (emphasis in Block)).
¶ 21. Martin addressed when the initial allegation of habitual criminality must be made. Here, there is no dispute that Bonds was alleged to be a repeater in the initial criminal complaint, in compliance with Martin. The question we must decide is when can an amendment of the initial basis for proving habitual criminality that was alleged in the complaint be made. Subsequent to Martin, we have allowed some post-plea amendments of initial repeater allegations. See State v. Gerard, 189 Wis. 2d 505, 517-19, 525 N.W.2d 718 (1995); see also Stynes, 262 Wis. 2d 335, ¶ 32, 34; State v. Campbell, 201 Wis. 2d 783, 792, 549 N.W.2d 501 (Ct. App. 1996).
¶ 22. In Gerard, we held that a criminal information that alleged habitual criminality could be amended, after the defendant had pled not guilty to the charges, but prior to the start of trial, to correct the number of years by which the defendant's sentence could be enhanced due to his status as a repeater. Gerard, 189 Wis. 2d at 507-09. We distinguished the facts of that case from those of Martin, noting that the complaint and information relating to Gerard's charges correctly alleged his repeater status and that a mere scrivener's error misstating the potential length of enhancement due to the penalty enhancer did not affect the sufficiency of the notice given to Gerard. Id. at 512, 517-19. We rejected Gerard's argument that he was prejudiced because at the time of arraignment, due to a clerical error, he thought that he was subject to three, rather than six, additional years in prison if convicted on one of the underlying counts. Id. at 516-18.
¶ 23. We were persuaded by three factual aspects of the case that caused us to conclude Gerard suffered no prejudice: (1) Gerard discovered the error in the information and the complaint and brought it to the court's attention, so that he was fully aware of the actual sentence enhancement he faced, yet he failed to move to withdraw his plea; (2) Gerard did not assert that he was prejudiced by the court's decision to grant the State's motion to amend; (3) Gerard discovered the clerical error at the very early stages of the criminal proceedings, nine months before his trial. Id. at 518-19.
¶ 24. In Stynes, we held that a complaint that misstated by one day the date of one of the defendant's convictions provided adequate notice of convictions on which his repeater status was based, as it included descriptions of the offenses, stated the correct county in which the convictions occurred, and cited the case numbers for the convictions. Stynes, 262 Wis. 2d 335, ¶ 32. We determined that the error in the date "did not meaningfully change the basis" for Stynes's plea of not guilty. Id., ¶ 34. Accordingly, we held that Stynes was not prejudiced because the amendment gave him notice of the prior convictions on which the repeater allega tions were based, and therefore, we permitted an amendment of the date of conviction after Stynes pled. Id.
¶ 25. In Stynes, we also reviewed the court of appeals decision in State v. Wilks, 165 Wis. 2d 102, 477 N.W.2d 632 (Ct. App. 1991). Wilks held that where the misstatement of a date of a prior conviction was significant enough to call into question whether the State was relying on a prior conviction that actually existed, the error could not be corrected without prejudice to a defendant who had pled no contest. See Stynes, 262 Wis. 2d 335, ¶ 22-27. We distinguished Wilks in Stynes because the information in Stynes misstated the date of one of the prior convictions by one day and there was no confusion about whether the alleged convictions actually existed. Id., ¶ 28.
¶ 26. Further, in Stynes we relied on Gerard's reasoning that a statement of the number of years by which the sentence could be enhanced was not essential to a repeater allegation because there was no statutory requirement that the number of years by which the sentence could be enhanced be specified in the charging document. Id., ¶ 30. We summarized the impact of Wilks and Gerard as follows:
Wilks identified that the underlying policy of the notice required by Wis. Stat. § 973.12(1) is to satisfy due process by assuring that the defendant knows the extent of the potential punishment at the time of the plea. Gerard reiterated that "[d]ue process requires the defendant to be informed of his or her repeater status before pleading to the charges."
Id., ¶ 31 (citations omitted); see also State v. Fields, 2001 WI App 297, ¶ 7-14, 249 Wis. 2d 292, 638 N.W.2d 897 (analyzing Martin and Gerard to conclude that the State's pre-plea submission of a certified copy of defendant's prior convictions constituted an amendment to the information, thereby curing the information's defects, because the defendant had adequate notice that he was being charged as a repeater).
¶ 27. In Campbell, the court of appeals held that a post-arraignment amendment to an information, to add a fourth misdemeanor to three initially alleged as the basis for the repeater enhancer, did not violate Wis. Stat. § 973.12. Campbell, 201 Wis. 2d at 792. Campbell argued that he was prejudiced by the amendment because there was a possibility that one of his prior misdemeanors would be reversed on appeal. Id. at 792-93. Therefore, he argued, in the event of such a reversal, the amendment to add a fourth misdemeanor affected his potential punishment because without it, there would be only two valid misdemeanors and the State could not prove repeater status. Id. Consequently, he argued, the amendment meaningfully changed the basis of his not guilty plea and should not have been permitted. Id. at 793.
¶ 28. The court of appeals responded to this theory by concluding that even if the court were to assume that a reversed prior conviction would change Campbell's status as a repeater under the three original misdemeanor charges, the amendment did not prejudice his ability to assess the potential maximum punishment he faced. Id. The court of appeals explained that the prejudice Campbell described is what he perceived to be the potential adverse effect of the amendment on his chances of defending against the penalty enhancer, but that did not affect his ability to evaluate the potential maximum punishment to which he could be subjected, either at arraignment or at the plea hearing. Id.
¶ 29. Campbell relied on the reasoning of Martin and Gerard that the sufficiency of notice to a defendant of the potential maximum punishment he or she faces as a result of a repeater enhancer is the keystone to the permissibility of post-arraignment amendments regarding repeater allegations. Id. at 791-92. Since Campbell had notice of his potential maximum punishment for the crime and the penalty enhancer at the time of his plea, the amendment did not affect the sufficiency of the notice he had been given or violate Wis. Stat. § 973.12. Id. at 792.
¶ 30. When considered together, this precedent establishes the following principles:
(1) The purpose of the allegations of repeater status in a charging document is to provide the defendant with sufficient notice of the potential maximum penalty he faces in order that the defendant may make an informed plea. Gerard, 189 Wis. 2d at 512 n.6.; Martin, 162 Wis. 2d at 900-01; Whitaker, 83 Wis. 2d at 373.
(2) If there has been no repeater allegation made prior to the court's acceptance of a plea, and the defendant does not re-plead after the charging document has been amended, sentence enhancement is not permissible upon conviction. Gerard, 189 Wis. 2d at 513-14; Martin, 162 Wis. 2d at 902-03; Campbell, 201 Wis. 2d at 791-92.
(3) With leave of court, and after a plea has been accepted, charging documents that were sufficient before the plea was accepted may be amended with regard to the initial allegations concerning a defendant's repeater status so long as the defendant is not prejudiced by the amendment. Stynes, 262 Wis. 2d 335, ¶ 31, 34; Gerard, 189 Wis. 2d at 509; Campbell, 201 Wis. 2d at 793.
(4)When a post-plea amendment to allegations earlier made concerning a defendant's repeater status does not compromise the sufficiency of notice of the potential maximum sentence a defendant faces, no prejudice occurs. Stynes, 262 Wis. 2d 335, ¶ 31-32; Gerard, 189 Wis. 2d at 516; Campbell, 201 Wis. 2d at 793; Wilks, 165 Wis. 2d at 110.
C. Bonds's Claim of Prejudice
¶ 31. It is the State's burden to prove that Bonds was not prejudiced and Wis. Stat. § 973.12(1) was satisfied through notice of sufficient allegations of the basis for charging habitual criminality. Stynes, 262 Wis. 2d 335, ¶ 10. When we apply the principles from Stynes, Gerard, Campbell and Wilks to the facts before us, we conclude that Bonds was not prejudiced by the State's post-conviction amendment of the original allegations in the complaint on which the State based its assertion of habitual criminality. First, there is no dispute that Bonds's prior convictions made him a repeater. Second, there is no dispute that Bonds was alleged to be a repeater before he pled, in compliance with § 973.12. The complaint that was given to him before he pled to the battery charge attached, and incorporated by reference, certified copies of the judgments of conviction for three prior misdemeanors. The specific crime that was committed, the statutory section that was violated, the case number for each matter, and the county of conviction were all set out in the complaint for each misdemeanor. Third, Bonds suffered no prejudice when at sentencing, after he was convicted by a jury, the State amended the factual basis to a felony conviction that was sufficient to satisfy Wis. Stat. § 939.62, rather than relying on the three misdemeanor convictions listed in the criminal complaint. The amendment did not prevent Bonds from meaningfully assessing the potential maximum penalty to which he could be subjected. Under § 939.62(l)(a), whether the State proved his repeater status by three misdemeanor convictions or by one felony conviction, Bonds's potential maximum penalty was the same. This is so because a battery conviction under Wis. Stat. § 940.19(1) is a Class A misdemeanor that has maximum imprisonment of nine months. Wis. Stat. § 939.51(3)(a). Therefore, even with the repeater enhancement, Bond's maximum term of imprisonment for the battery conviction could not be increased to more than two years, regardless of whether the State relied on three misdemeanors or one felony.
¶ 32. We also are unpersuaded by Bonds's argument that he pled not guilty because he believed that he would not be sentenced as a repeater as the actual dates of the misdemeanor convictions occurred more than five years before he was charged with battery. Any misstatement of dates listed in the body of the complaint was cured by the attachment of the certified copies of the judgments of conviction that were given to Bonds with the complaint. As explained in Fields, 249 Wis. 2d 292, ¶ 8, providing a defendant with a certified copy of his prior convictions constitutes an amendment to the charging document that cures prior defects in it. Bonds acknowledges that he was incarcerated for ten months for the forgery conviction. This period of time is not counted in the five-year period of time when assessing whether convictions fall within the requisite time-frame of five years. Wis. Stat. § 939.62(2). In addition, the "prejudice" that Bonds complains of is the adverse effect on a potential defense to the repeater allegation. Campbell concludes this is insufficient to set aside an amendment to a repeater allegation because it does not affect a defendant's ability to assess the potential maximum sentence to which he may be subjected. Campbell, 201 Wis. 2d at 793. We agree with Campbell.
D. Evidence of Habitual Criminality
¶ 33. The second issue we address is whether the CCAP report offered by the State at sentencing is sufficient to constitute prima facie proof that Bonds is an habitual criminal. The parties agree that the State has the burden to prove Bonds's repeater status beyond a reasonable doubt.
1. The parties' arguments
¶ 34. Bonds argues that the State failed to meet its burden because CCAP reports are unreliable as they do not even purport to accurately reflect official court records. He reminds us that the CCAP user agreement explicitly states that CCAP reports should not be relied on as accurately representing the information provided. Furthermore, Bonds argues that CCAP records do not constitute an "official report" of a government agency that would constitute prima facie evidence pursuant to the language of Wis. Stat. § 973.12(1). Therefore, even absent an objection on his part to the evidence offered, the State did not meet its burden to prove a qualifying conviction.
¶ 35. The State, on the other hand, argues that CCAP records should be considered official government reports pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 973.12(1) and the reasoning of State v. Farr, 119 Wis. 2d 651, 350 N.W.2d 640 (1984), in which we suggested that a presentence report "may" constitute an "official report" where it contains the date of conviction for the previous offense. Id. at 658. The State also contends that even if there are problems with using a CCAP report, Bonds waived his right to challenge the CCAP report as proof of his prior conviction because he did not specifically object to its use at sentencing. Therefore, we need not address whether CCAP records are adequate proof of a qualifying conviction. The State relies on our decision in State v. Saunders, 2002 WI 107, 255 Wis. 2d 589, 649 N.W.2d 263.
2. Evidence presented
¶ 36. Wisconsin Stat. § 973.12(1) directs that "[a]n official report of the EB.I. or any other governmental agency of the United States or of this or any other state shall be prima facie evidence of any conviction or sentence therein reported." We discussed the meaning of this language in Farr, 119 Wis. 2d at 656-60.
¶ 37. In Farr, we concluded that a probation report that did not state the dates of a defendant's prior convictions "left to conjecture whether any of them were within the previous five years." Farr, 119 Wis. 2d at 657-58. We determined that such a report was not an official report of the type described in Wis. Stat. § 973.12(1). Id. at 658. We did not decide whether a presentence or probation report that had the proper information could serve as an official report, but we explained:
To be an official report under sec. 973.12(1), Stats., on which reliance may be placed, the report must contain relevant information regarding the issue of repeater status and must specifically include the date of conviction for the previous offense. . The report in the present case did not contain such information and, therefore, could not be relied on for the penalty enhancement.
Id.
¶ 38. In Saunders, we reviewed the same statutory term, "official report," where a defendant challenged the State's use of an uncertified copy of a judgment of conviction, as failing to prove habitual criminality. We concluded that although certified copies of judgments are sufficient to constitute prima facie evidence of habitual criminality, Wis. Stat. § 973.12(1) does not require the State to use certified copies of prior judgments of conviction as the basis for enhanced penalties. Saunders, 255 Wis. 2d 589, ¶ 24.
¶ 39. We also explained that before a circuit court may enhance a sentence, a criminal defendant's repeater status must be established. We explained that repeater status can be proved with a variety of evidence. Id., ¶ 26. If the rules of evidence were to apply in proving prior convictions under § 973.12(1), those rules would require that the State use a certified copy of a judgment of conviction to satisfy its burden of proof. Id., ¶ 38. However, the rules of evidence do not apply:
Considering many factors, we conclude that the proceeding in which the state seeks to prove habitual criminality is, under Wisconsin's statutory scheme, more analogous to the sentencing process than to trial and, therefore, should be treated similarly in terms of evidentiary requirements.
Id.
¶ 40. We also held that just because the rules of evidence do not apply to documentary proof under Wis. Stat. § 973.12(1), the State is not relieved of its burden of proof. Id., ¶ 47. Proof of prior convictions directly affects the sentence a criminal defendant may receive, and therefore, it affects a liberty interest. Accordingly, proof beyond a reasonable doubt is essential to the State's pursuit of additional punishment under Wis. Stat. § 939.62. Id., ¶ 47-51.
¶ 41. In the course of our discussion, we drew several principles from our prior considerations of the proof of prior convictions: (1) an admission by the defendant must contain specific references to the date of the conviction and any period of incarceration, if relevant to applying Wis. Stat. § 939.62, and must be made by the defendant, personally; (2) a certified copy of a judgment of conviction is evidence sufficient to prove prior convictions; (3) no decision had concluded that using an uncertified copy of the judgment of conviction or another type of report as evidence of prior convictions was prohibited. Id., ¶ 21-28.
¶ 42. We reasoned that an uncertified copy of a judgment of conviction was being represented as an authentic copy of the original document, which we had previously concluded is sufficient proof of a prior conviction. Id., ¶ 24-34. We noted that certifying a record helps to insure its authenticity, but that an uncertified copy is not materially different from a certified copy, and is identical with the exception of an official stamp. Id., ¶ 28. The same information will be present in both documents. "[Ljittle is gained by distinguishing between certified and uncertified prior judgments of conviction in this context." Id., ¶ 28. Accordingly, we concluded that an uncertified copy of a judgment of conviction can also serve "to prove prior convictions under Wis. Stat. § 973.12." Id., ¶ 33. We noted that if an uncertified copy contains inaccurate information, the defendant should object and move the court to require the State to take remedial action, just as a defendant should do if a certified copy of a judgment contained a material error. Id., ¶ 29.
¶ 43. In Saunders, we also noted that Saunders had made no objection to the use of an uncertified copy of the judgment. Id., ¶ 62. We concluded that his lack of an objection was significant because it showed Saunders "stipulated to the mode of proof employed by the State." Id., ¶ 63. However, we expressly concluded that this stipulation did not constitute a " 'waiver' of the State's overall proof requirement." Id.
¶ 44. We established the following related principles with regard to proof of habitual criminality at sentencing: (1) if the State fails to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is a repeater, "then the sentencing court is without authority to sentence the defendant as a repeat offender," id., ¶. 49; (2) when the State provides an official report that constitutes prima facie proof of a conviction pursuant to the requirements of Wis. Stat. § 973.12(1), a defendant's failure to object operates as a stipulation to the mode of proof that the State has chosen to use, id., ¶ 63; (3) a lack of an objection explicitly aimed at the mode of proof offered by the State does not relieve the State of its burden to prove habitual criminality beyond a reasonable doubt, id.
¶ 45. It is important to note that one of the questions we addressed in Saunders was whether an uncer-tified copy of a judgment of conviction was what it purported to be, i.e., an authentic copy of the judgment of conviction. Id., ¶ 28. That question differs markedly from the question posed by a CCAP report. With a CCAP report, the question is whether the report is an accurate narration of the judgment of conviction of a particular defendant, for a particular crime, on a particular date. Koeppen, 195 Wis. 2d at 127.
¶ 46. According to the "Policy on Disclosure of Public Information Over the Internet" provided by the Director of State Courts, a CCAP report is provided through a public-access internet website containing open record information, the WCCA. The Director of State Courts explains:
Because information in the CCAP database changes constantly, WCCA is not responsible for subsequent entries that update, modify, correct or delete data. WCCA is not responsible for notifying prior requesters of updates, modifications, corrections or deletions.
http://wcca.wicourts.gov/index.xsl; choose "Public Records on the Internet" link, 2.g. (last visited June 24, 2006). Therefore, a CCAP report, by its own terms, is of questionable accuracy. It is not the official record of a criminal case, as the clerks of court for each county are the officials responsible for those records. Wis. Stat. § 59.40(2)(c). And, a CCAP report is not a copy of the actual judgment of conviction. Yet, it was offered to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Bonds was convicted of felony forgery on a particular date. The disclaimer with which a CCAP report is conditioned causes us to have reasonable doubt about its accuracy.
¶ 47. Our concerns about the use of CCAP records to satisfy the requirements of Wis. Stat. § 973.12(1) do not affect our view that CCAP provides quality, immensely valuable, services to the citizens of Wisconsin and to those who work in the Wisconsin court system. We agree with the concurrence/dissent, that the creation of CCAP has facilitated efficient use of court resources and greater access to court information by the public. Concurrence/Dissent, ¶ 112. Although we have decided that a CCAP record is insufficient to establish prima facie proof that Bonds is an habitual criminal, our decision is driven in large part by the design of CCAR which was not devised to afford proof of a factual proposition beyond a reasonable doubt. CCAP was designed to assist the circuit courts in case management functions and to afford greater public access to the court system. CCAP has been extraordinarily successful in accomplishing these purposes.
¶ 48. While Saunders clearly holds that documents other than a certified copy of a judgment of conviction may constitute an official report that would serve as prima facie proof of habitual criminality under Wis. Stat. § 973.12(1), only an uncertified copy of the judgment and a presentence report that lists the crime and the date of conviction have been held to be sufficient by a Wisconsin appellate court. Saunders, 255 Wis. 2d 589, ¶ 33; see also State v. Goldstein, 182 Wis. 2d 251, 259, 513 N.W.2d 631 (Ct. App. 1994); State v. Caldwell, 154 Wis. 2d 683, 694-95, 454 N.W.2d 13 (Ct. App. 1990). And, as the court of appeals explained in Caldwell, one of the reasons for accepting that presentence report was the assurance of its accuracy because the investigating agent "expressly contemplated" the complaint's repeater allegation and the agent "verified" both the prior conviction and the date of conviction from sources other than the complaint. Caldwell, 154 Wis. 2d at 694.
¶ 49. Accordingly, we are persuaded that the reasoning of Saunders cannot be analogously applied to a CCAP report. CCAP records are not like uncertified copies of judgments in that CCAP reports do not purport to be identical to the court records, as photocopies do. The agreement to which all CCAP users are asked to adhere specifically warns that CCAP provides no warranty of accuracy for the data in its reports. We cannot, under those circumstances, consider the contents of a CCAP report to rise to the level of reliability sufficient to establish prima facie proof that a defendant has a prior qualifying conviction. In addition, Bonds did not stipulate to using a CCAP report as the "mode of proof' for habitual criminality. He asserted before the circuit court that the State had not proved habitual criminality beyond a reasonable doubt; he has continued to do so throughout the appellate process. Therefore, we conclude that by relying solely on the CCAP report, and without other evidence that could prove Bonds's repeater status beyond a reasonable doubt, the State did not offer sufficient evidence to constitute prima facie proof that Bonds was an habitual criminal. Accordingly, the State did not meet its burden to prove habitual criminality.
3. Waiver
¶ 50. It is undisputed that the State has the burden of proof with regard to the question of whether Bonds is a repeater and we have concluded that the State did not satisfy that burden because it relied solely on a CCAP report. Therefore, in order for the State to have the power to sentence Bonds as a repeater, we would have to conclude that Bonds waived his right to challenge the evidence of habitual criminality because he did not object to using the CCAP report as the sole mode of proof in the circuit court.
¶ 51. The State contends that we concluded in Saunders that an objection to the sufficiency of the evidence of habitual criminality must be made in the circuit court or it is waived. The State no doubt refers to the following passage:
It would be an odd result if we were to preclude the state from offering an uncertified copy of a prior judgment of conviction when the defendant makes no objection to the submission of the document. It is commonly understood that when evidence is submitted at trial, much less for sentencing, a defendant who remains silent generally waives any objection to the submission of that evidence.
Saunders, 255 Wis. 2d 589, ¶ 31.
¶ 52. However, as we explained in ¶ 43 above, the State misunderstands the reason that we could have concluded waiver was present in Saunders. In Saunders, the evidence offered, a copy of the judgment of conviction, was sufficient to constitute prima facie proof of habitual criminality. Saunders offered no countering evidence. Therefore, on the record in Saunders, the State did provide sufficient evidence to meet its burden of proof.
¶ 53. Here, the CCAP report was not sufficient to constitute prima facie proof of Bonds's repeater status. Therefore, not making a specific objection when evidence that is insufficient to constitute prima facie proof of a prior qualifying conviction is presented is not a waiver. Bonds did object to the sufficiency of the evidence the State presented, arguing that the State had not proved habitual criminality beyond a reasonable doubt. For the reasons explained above, a CCAP report does not come within our holding in regard to waiver, set out in Saunders. Because the only evidence submitted was the CCAP report, we conclude that Bonds's objection is sufficient to defeat the State's contention that he waived his objection to proving habitual criminality with a CCAP report. Therefore, we conclude that the repeater portion of Bonds's sentence must be vacated.
III. CONCLUSION
¶ 54. Four members of the court conclude that with sufficient proof, the State's post-conviction amendment of the basis for proving habitual criminality would have been permissible for two reasons: (1) The complaint satisfied the requirements of Wis. Stat. § 973.12 and of due process because Bonds had notice that he was being charged as an habitual criminal and of the potential maximum sentence he faced before he pled; and (2) Bonds was not prejudiced in making an intelligent plea as a result of the State's shift to a different prior conviction as the factual basis for its repeater allegation. However, a different majority of the court also concludes that the State's use of a CCAP report as evidence of Bonds's conviction does not constitute prima facie proof of that conviction and that Bonds did not waive his right to object to the State's use of the CCAP report. Accordingly, the court of appeals decision is reversed and the matter is remanded to the circuit court to vacate the enhancer portion of Bonds's sentence.
By the Court. — The decision of the court of appeals is reversed and remanded.
All further references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2003-04 version unless otherwise noted.
Justices Jon E Wilcox, N. Patrick Crooks, David T. Prosser and Patience Drake Roggensack form the majority for permitting a post-conviction amendment of the factual allegation in the complaint upon which the State alleged Bonds was an habitual criminal.
Chief Justice Shirley S. Abrahamson and Justices Ann Walsh Bradley, Patience Drake Roggensack and Louis B. Butler, Jr. form the majority for concluding that a CCAP report is not sufficient to constitute prima facie proof of Bonds's prior conviction of a felony.
We note that for the purposes of subtracting Bonds's time in confinement from the date of conviction for the forgery, the State submitted Milwaukee County Jail records. The use of those records is not in dispute.
The version of the statute interpreted in Whitaker v. State, 83 Wis. 2d 368, 265 N.W.2d 575 (1978), is identical to the 2003-04 version. Wisconsin Stat. § 971.29 provides:
(1) A complaint or information may be amended at any time prior to arraignment without leave of the court.
(2) At the trial, the court may allow amendment of the complaint, indictment or information to conform to the proof where such amendment is not prejudicial to the defendant. After verdict the pleading shall be deemed amended to conform to the proof if no objection to the relevance of the evidence was timely raised upon the trial.
(3) Upon allowing an amendment to the complaint or indictment or information, the court may direct other amendments thereby rendered necessary and may proceed with or postpone the trial.
Because the statute refers to both complaints and informa-tions, and because informations are only required in felony cases, we conclude that the reasoning of Whitaker and all subsequent case law regarding the amendment of an information, can be analogously applied to all charging documents.
We briefly list our conclusions from State v. Martin, 162 Wis. 2d 883, 470 N.W.2d 900 (1991), regarding the history of Wis. Stat. § 973.12:
(1) Initially, a repeater allegation was not considered essential to the substantive offense charged; rather, it was considered essential to "the information in order to secure the punishment provided for in case of a second offense and [repeater status had to] be alleged in the information." Id. at 897 (citation omitted).
(2) Revisions to the statute in 1919 permitted investigation of a defendant's criminal record after conviction, even when the charging document had not alleged the defendant was a repeater. Id. at 898. At that time, the statute did not require notice to the defendant at arraignment. Id.
(3) The 1949 revisions to § 973.12 permitted the allegation of repeater status at any time before the execution of a sentence. Id.
(4) In 1965, § 973.12 was again amended, wherein the legislature eliminated "all references to a defendant's ability to demand a juiy trial" on whether prior convictions existed. Id. at 899. It also eliminated the language that allowed a court to make the repeater allegation at any time before sentencing; it required that the initial repeater allegations be made "before or at arraignment, and before acceptance of any plea." Id. at 899-900.
The day, month and year were incorrectly stated in the criminal complaint and no county of conviction was mentioned. State v. Wilks, 165 Wis. 2d 102, 105 n.3, 106, 477 N.W.2d 632 (Ct. App. 1991).
We recognize that Campbell also involved a plea agreement made after Campbell's original arraignment. State v. Campbell, 201 Wis. 2d 783, 786-87, 549 N.W.2d 501 (Ct. App. 1996). In the original arraignment, Campbell stood mute and the court entered not guilty pleas. Id. at 786. Several weeks later, concurrent with the State's amendment of the complaint, Campbell reached a plea agreement in which he pled no contest to the underlying charges as a repeater. Id. at 786-87. Campbell challenged the amendment because it was made post-arraignment. Id. at 792. The court in Campbell separately analyzed the effect of the post-arraignment amendment on his original not guilty plea, which is the part of Campbell that is applicable to the issues raised by Bonds, and on Campbell's plea agreement. Id. at 792-94.
In order to give sufficient notice of the potential maximum penalty that a defendant faces due to allegations of habitual criminality, a complaint must specify the date or dates of conviction, the substantive crime or crimes of which the defendant was convicted, and whether each conviction was a felony or a misdemeanor. State v. Stynes, 2003 WI 65, ¶ 15, 262 Wis. 2d 335, 665 N.W.2d 115 (citing State v. Gerard, 189 Wis. 2d 505, 515-16, 525 N.W.2d 718 (1995)).
Wisconsin Stat. § 939.62(l)(a) provides: "A maximum term of imprisonment of one year or less may be increased to not more than 2 years."
The concurrence/dissent is incorrect to assert that the repeater allegation is proved because of Bonds's admission in regard to a qualifying conviction. Concurrence/Dissent, ¶ 111. Although we do not agree that Bonds admitted a prior felony conviction, we point out that in order for a defendant to admit a prior conviction for purposes of proving habitual criminality, the defendant's admission must contain specific reference to the date of the conviction and any period of incarceration. State v. Zimmerman, 185 Wis. 2d 549, 557, 518 N.W.2d 303 (Ct. App. 1994). Bonds made no statement that could establish the date of a prior felony conviction.
We do not exclude the use of a CCAP report as a tool to facilitate .a review with the defendant at sentencing of defendant's past history of criminal convictions.
As we explained in Saunders:
The question ultimately becomes whether the state has submitted enough evidence to satisfy the sentencing judge beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant has the requisite number of qualifying prior convictions. To answer this question the court must look to the totality of the post-trial evidence presented by the state, including copies of prior judgments of conviction, be they certified or uncertified.
State v. Saunders, 2002 WI 107, ¶ 53, 255 Wis. 2d 589, 649 N.W.2d 263.