Case Name: John T. Lewis, Respondent, v. Eli M. Upton and Others, Appellants, Impleaded with Mary Crennell
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1904-01
Citations: 90 A.D. 453
Docket Number: 
Parties: John T. Lewis, Respondent, v. Eli M. Upton and Others, Appellants, Impleaded with Mary Crennell.
Judges: 
Reporter: Appellate Division Reports
Volume: 90
Pages: 453–473

Head Matter:
John T. Lewis, Respondent, v. Eli M. Upton and Others, Appellants, Impleaded with Mary Crennell.
Stare decisis — a decision of the Appellate Division on a first appeal, that a question of fact was presented for the jury, adhered to on a second appeal, where the facts were substantially the same on each trial.
The plaintiff in an action brought to compel the determination of a claim to real property asserted a record title to the property, and also a title thereto by adverse possession. Upon the first trial of the action the court submitted both these questions to the jury, and the jury found a general verdict in favor of the plaintiff.
Upon an appeal the Appellate Division held that there was no evidence to support the plaintiff’s claim of a record title, but that the question whether the plaintiff had acquired title by adverse possession was one of fact for the jury. Being unable to say upon which claim the jury based its verdict, the Appellate Division reversed the judgment and directed a new trial upon the question of adverse possession alone.
The evidence given upon the new trial with respect to the issue of adverse possession was substantially the same as that given on the former trial. The issue was submitted to the jury and the plaintiff again obtained a verdict.
Upon a second appeal to the Appellate Division it was claimed that, there was no question for the jury on this issue, and that the trial court should have held as matter of law that the plaintiff acquired'no title by adverse possession.
Held, that the Appellate Division, having once decided that the issue of adverse possession was properly submitted to the jury, should adhere to that decision and leave the correctness thereof to be considered by the Court of Appeals, if the defendants desired to appeal to that court.
McLennan, P. J., and Stover, J., dissented.
Appeal by the defendants, Eli M. Upton and others, from a judgment of the Supreme Court in favor of the plaintiff, entered in the office of the clerk of the county of Monroe on the 29th day of December, 1902, upon the decision of the court rendered after a trial at the Monroe Trial Term, made after the verdict of a jury rendered by direction of the court, and also from an order entered in said clerk’s office on the 29th day of December, 1902,. denying the said defendants’ motion for a new trial made upon the minutes-
Charles J. Bissell and Erwin E. Shutt, for the appellants.
John Van Voorhis, for the respondent.

Opinion:
Williams, J.:
The judgment and order should be affirmed, with costs.
The action was brought under section 1638 of the Code of Civil Procedure to compel the determination of a claim to real property. The plaintiff claimed that he had a record title, to the real property and that he had also acquired title thereto by adverse possession.
Upon a former trial of the action both these questions were submitted to the jury under the instruction of the court that the plaintiff could recover if it was found that he had either a record title or a title acquired by adverse possession. The jury rendered a general verdict for the plaintiff. Upon appeal to this court it was held that there was no evidence to support the verdict if it was based upon the claim of a record title, because the deed under which he claimed did not cover the property in question. The court also held that the- question of title acquired by adverse possession was one of fact for the jury. (52 App. Div. 617.)
Inasmuch as the court could not say upon which claim the jury based its verdict, it was compelled to reverse the judgment and direct a new trial upon the question of adverse possession alone. Thereupon the case was again tried, and the decision of this court followed. The question of a record title was eliminated from the case, and the question of title by adverse possession was submitted to the jury. The plaintiff again had a verdict. Upon an appeal to this court it is now claimed that there was no question for the jury upon this issue, and that the trial court should have held as matter of law that the plaintiff acquired no title to the property by adverse possession. This court having once passed upon that question, on practically the same class of evidence, we should adhere to our former decision and leave the question to be considered by the Court of Appeals should the defendants desire to take the case to that court. If this court had held upon the former appeal that there was no question for the jury as to adverse possession, the case could then have gone directly to the Court of Appeals; but, under the decision then made, a new trial became necessary and it was had at considerable expense to the parties, and the result of such trial should not now be nullified by reversing our former decision. Moreover, upon the merits, we are of the opinion that the various questions involved in the claim of title by adverse possession, including the occupation and cultivation of the property and the protecting of the same by substantial inclosure, were properly submitted to the jury, and the evidence was sufficient to support the verdict rendered.
Ho errors in the admission or rejection of evidence, or in the charge of the court, were committed, calling for a reversal of the judgment.
The judgment and order should, therefore, be affirmed, with costs.
All concurred, except McLennan, P. J., dissenting in an opinion in which Stover, J., concurred.