Case Name: Rosemary CASTLE, Individually and On Behalf of Her Minor Children, Dwayne Castle, Age 12, Joseph Castle, Age 11, and Tosha Castle, Age 3, v. PRUDHOMME TANK TRUCK LINE, INC. and United States Fidelity & Guaranty Company
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1982-05-25
Citations: 417 So. 2d 1205
Docket Number: No. 14500
Parties: Rosemary CASTLE, Individually and On Behalf of Her Minor Children, Dwayne Castle, Age 12, Joseph Castle, Age 11, and Tosha Castle, Age 3, v. PRUDHOMME TANK TRUCK LINE, INC. and United States Fidelity & Guaranty Company.
Judges: Before EDWARDS, LEAR, SHORTESS, SAVOIE and CHIASSON, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 417
Pages: 1205–1212

Head Matter:
Rosemary CASTLE, Individually and On Behalf of Her Minor Children, Dwayne Castle, Age 12, Joseph Castle, Age 11, and Tosha Castle, Age 3, v. PRUDHOMME TANK TRUCK LINE, INC. and United States Fidelity & Guaranty Company.
No. 14500.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, First Circuit.
May 25, 1982.
Rehearing Denied Aug. 24, 1982.
Harold J. Lamy, New Orleans, for plaintiffs and appellants.
Robert D. Morvant, Thibodaux, for defendants and appellees.
Before EDWARDS, LEAR, SHORTESS, SAVOIE and CHIASSON, JJ.

Opinion:
CHIASSON, Judge.
Plaintiff-appellant, Rosemary Castle, individually and on behalf of her three minor children, appeals the judgment of the trial court dismissing her suit for death benefits under the Workmen's Compensation Act which she had filed against Prudhomme Tank Truck Lines, Inc. and its insurer, United States Fidelity and Guaranty Company, defendants-appellees.
Plaintiff-appellant brought suit as dependent members of the family of Alexander Davis who was killed in an automobile accident while in the course and scope of his employment with defendant-appellee, Prud-homme Tank Truck Lines, Inc. Defendants-appellees filed third party actions against: Bonnie McGee, individually and on behalf of her three minor children; Rachel Bertrand, individually and on behalf of her minor child; and Mary Ann Calloway. The third party demands allege: that Davis had lived with, but had never married Bonnie McGee and Rachel Bertrand; that he was the natural father of Bonnie McGee's three children and of Rachel Bertrand's child; and that Davis had married and, at the time of his death, was legally separated from Mary Ann Calloway, with whom he had no children. Third party defendants did not answer these suits, and default judgments were confirmed against them.
The trial court held that plaintiff-appellant did not sufficiently establish that she and her children were dependent upon the earnings and support of Davis and dismissed her suit. Plaintiff-appellant perfected the instant appeal and alleges that the trial court erred in concluding that plaintiff-appellant could not recover death benefits because they bore no legal relationship to the decedent and that plaintiff-appellant could not be considered dependent upon the decedent since they were receiving adequate money and other income to provide for themselves.
The record reveals plaintiff-appellant was living with, but never married to Alexander Davis, the decedent. Her three minor legitimate children of her former marriage to Joseph Castle also lived with her and Davis at the time of Davis' death. They had lived together for approximately sixteen months and had not lived with anyone else during this period of time. For the last six months, they shared a trailer which was in the name of Rosemary Castle and monthly notes of $200.00 were paid by her in cash. Mrs. Castle testified that she was and had been employed by Picadilly Cafeteria as a cook from which she received approximately $140.00 a week, and that she and Davis would pool their incomes and pay their bills, except for twenty-five or thirty dollars each pay check which Davis retained for himself. The light bill was in her name and the gas bill was in Davis' name. Her former husband was employed and was under a court order to pay $60.00 per child per month for the support of the three minor children. The evidence shows that Mrs. Castle did in fact receive support payments from her former husband although the record does not disclose the exact amount paid. Additionally, Davis had not obtained a legal divorce from his former wife and no actions had been taken by him to adopt her three children. Mrs. Castle also testified that, with the exception of separate savings accounts which she alleges was used to purchase the trailer and furniture, neither she nor the decedent had bank accounts and that they paid all of their bills by cash. In addition to all of the household bills, Mrs. Castle stated that she and Davis shared equally in the caring for and the rearing of her three children.
Plaintiff-appellant does not benefit from the conclusive presumption of dependency provided for in La.R.S. 23:1251. The question of actual dependency, in whole or in part, then becomes a matter of proof with the onus resting upon the claimant. McDermott v. Funel, 258 La. 657, 247 So.2d 567 (1971). Therefore, it was the responsi bility of plaintiff-appellant to prove actual dependency upon the earnings of the decedent at the time of his death by a preponderance of the evidence. La.R.S. 23:1252. Louisiana jurisprudence has firmly established the principle that actual dependency, in whole or in part, and the extent thereof, is a question of fact which must be proved by a preponderance of credible evidence. La.R.S. 23:1252; McDermott v. Funel, supra; Hurks v. Bossier, 359 So.2d 1114 (La.App. 3rd Cir. 1978), reversed on other grounds, 367 So.2d 309. The trial court held that plaintiff-appellant had not carried her burden of proof. Specifically, the trial court, in its written reasons for judgment concluded that, "[Although plaintiff contends that she and the children were dependent upon the earnings and support of decedent, the Court does not believe it has been sufficiently established that to be true."
No documents were introduced into evidence to establish appellant's earnings. She only testified from one pay check stub and it was later brought out in other testimony that this stub was for less than forty hours per week, although appellant admitted she did, at times, earn overtime pay.
From the sketchy record before us, and even applying the most liberal interpretation to the Compensation Act, we are unable to conclude the trial judge erred in holding that appellant had not borne her burden of proving dependency upon the decedent's earnings.
Although it is true that the trial court cited additional reasons for dismissing appellant's suit, we need not comment on their correctness since they do not change his finding of fact on which we base this opinion.
For these reasons, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed at appellant's cost.
AFFIRMED.
SAVOIE, J., concurs.
SHORTESS, J., concurs and assigns reasons.
LEAR, J., dissents and assigns reasons.
EDWARDS, J., dissents and assigns reasons.
. R.S. 23:1231:
"For injury causing death within two years after the accident, there shall be paid to the legal dependent of the employee, actually and wholly dependent upon his earnings for support at the time of the accident and death, a weekly sum as hereinafter provided. If the employee leaves legal dependents only partially actually dependent upon his earnings for support at the time of the accident and death, the weekly compensation to be paid shall be equal to the same proportion of the weekly payments for the benefit of persons wholly dependent as the amount contributed by the employee to such partial dependents in the year prior to his death bears to the earnings of the deceased at the time of the accident.
However, if the employee leaves no legal dependents, the sum of twenty thousand dollars shall be paid to each surviving parent of the deceased employee, in a lump sum, which shall constitute the sole and exclusive compensation in such cases."
. R.S. 23:1251:
"The following persons shall be conclusively presumed to be wholly and actually dependent upon the deceased employee:
(1) A surviving spouse upon a deceased spouse with whom he or she is living at the time of the accident or death.
(2) A child under the age of eighteen years (or over eighteen years of age, if physically or mentally incapacitated from earning) upon the parent with whom he is living at the time of the injury of the parent, or until the age of twenty-three if enrolled and attending as a full-time student in any accredited educational institution."
. R.S. 23:1252:
"In all other cases, the question of legal and actual dependency in whole or in part, shall be determined in accordance with the facts as they may be at the time of the accident and death; in such other cases if there are a sufficient number of persons wholly dependent to take up the maximum compensation, the death benefit shall be divided equally among them, and persons partially dependent, if any, shall receive no part thereof."