Case Name: In re JONES' ESTATE
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1900-05-11
Citations: 64 N.Y.S. 667
Docket Number: 
Parties: In re JONES’ ESTATE.
Judges: 
Reporter: West's New York Supplement
Volume: 64
Pages: 667–673

Head Matter:
In re JONES’ ESTATE.
(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department.
May 11, 1900.)
1. Executors—Accounting—Limitations.
Where one is executrix as well as life tenant under a' will, and takes possession of the property as executrix, proceedings to have her account as such are not barred by limitations, though she also holds as life tenant, she not having taken steps to devest herself as executrix, further than to file an account, on which no action was taken.
'3. Same.
Kemainder-men who are entitled only to a judicial settlement of the accounts of the executrix, who is also the life tenant, have no remedy at law, so that their application for an accounting is not barred under the rule that-where there is a remedy at law against which the statute has run it will be deemed to have run against any other proceeding.
Ingraham, J., dissenting.
Appeal from order of surrogate, New York county.
In the matter of the estate of Isaac F. Jones, deceased. From an order made on petition of Millie A. Jones and another, requiring Mary E. Gulick to account as executrix (63 N. Y. Supp. 726), she appeals.
Affirmed.
Argued before VAN BRUNT, P. J., and HATCH, RUMSEY, PATTERSON, and INGRAHAM, JJ.
Frank Schaeffler, for appellant.
D. Frank Lloyd, for respondents.

Opinion:
RUMSEY, J.
On the 12th of January, 1871, letters testamentary were issued to the appellant, Mary E. Gulick, and she took possession of the property of the estate as executrix of the decedent. By the will the petitioners, who are the grandchildren of the testator, are entitled to the residuary estate after the termination of life estates in certain legatees of whom Mrs. Gulick, the executrix, is the last survivor. The petition states that Mrs. Gulick has never filed her accounts as executrix, and such facts are alleged as show it to be proper that an accounting should be ordered. Upon the filing of this petition the surrogate issued a citation returnable on the 9th of January, 1900, directed to Mrs. Gulick, to show cause why her accounts as such executrix should not be filed and judicially settled. On the return day of the citation Mrs. Gulick filed her answer. It denied no part of the petition except the allegation that she had disposed of and appropriated to her own individual use a large amount, if not all, of the personal property which had come into her hands as executrix. It alleged, however, that on the 28th of April, 1873, she had filed her account of her proceedings as executrix with the vouchers in support of it, but it did not .allege that any judicial settlement had ever been had, or any decree entered. She pleaded in her answer the statute of limitations. Upon the petition and answer the surrogate made an order requiring Mrs. Gulick to render and file her account as executrix, and procure it to be judicially settled. From this order this appeal is taken, and the only question is whether the statute of limitations has run against the petitioners so as to preclude them from having a judicial settlement of Mrs. Gulick as the executrix of their grandfather. There can be no doubt that Mrs. Gulick, when she assumed the duties of executrix, became a trustee for the persons who were entitled to share in the estate under the will; and, so long as she held the estate in that capacity, and did not assume any position adverse to the rights of her cestuis que trustent, the liability to account as trustee existed. The rule is that, as long as there is a subsisting and continuing trust, acknowledged or acted upon by the parties, the statute does not apply; but if the trustee denies the right of his cestui que trust, and the possession of the property becomes adverse, lapse of time from that period becomes a bar in equity. Kane v. Bloodgood, 7 Johns. 89. Until that adverse possession comes to exist, and the trust for that reason becomes extinguished, the cestui que trust is entitled to his accounting. In re Camp, 126 N. Y. 377, 27 N. E. 799. It is claimed by the appellant here that she has ceased to hold this estate in her capacity of executrix, and that at some time—but just when does not appear— she took it for life under the will. She bases that claim upon the statement in the petition that the life estate is now enjoyed by her as provided in said will. This statement, not having been denied, must be assumed to be true, but it must be taken in connection with the other allegations of the petition and answer to the effect that, although she has filed an account, she has never had a judicial settlement of that account; and there is no decree of the surrogate fixing the amount of the estate in her hands, or requiring her as executrix to pay over the money so in her hands to the persons entitled as legatees to the life estates. Although she has a life estate, that fact • does not create any presumption that she has transferred the property from herself as executrix to herself as legatee for life, and certainly there is no presumption that such transfer was known to the residuary legatees, or that they ever became aware that she had ceased to hold the estate as executrix; and, that being so, the rule laid down in the Case of Camp, supra, clearly applies. In that case a general guardian had received, in 1866, money for property of his wards, which he had sold. He was entitled to hold the money during his life as tenant by the curtesy. The infants became of age in 1872, and in 1888 they brought a proceeding to compel him to account as general guardian for the money which he had received in 1866. The court held that the statute of limitations was not a bar to the proceeding, because the guardian, having obtained possession of the fund in that capacity, must be deemed to have dealt with it as such as well as in that of tenant by the curtesy, and therefore he occupied the position of a trustee, which prevented the running of the statute; and as long as the money remained in his hands as guardian, and unaccounted for, the right of those interested in the estate to have an accounting continued to exist. That is precisely this case. Mrs. Gulick took the property as executrix, and she has never taken any steps to devest herself as executrix, and to hold the property as tenant for life, and, so long as she holds in both capacities, the petitioners are entitled to an accounting. But it is said the petitioners had a remedy at law, and that the rule is that, where a remedy at law exists against which the statute of limitations might have run, it will also be deemed to have run against any other proceeding. Kane v. Bloodgood, supra. But the respondents had no other remedy. They were not entitled to this property as long as Mrs. Gulick continued to live. They were entitled, however, to a judicial settlement of her accounts as executrix, and to a determination by the surrogate of the amount of the estate she held as such, and that they could obtain in no other way than by the application they have made here. The rule laid down in Kane v. Bloodgood does not apply, therefore, and there is no reason why the petitioners should not be entitled to the accounting which they seek.
The judgment must therefore be affirmed, with costs to the respondents.
PATTERSON and HATCH, JJ., concur. VAN BRUNT, P. J., concurs in result.