Case Name: Isaiah Waddell and Z. C. Miles, under the name of Waddell & Miles, vs. the Steamboat "Daisy," &c.
Court: Washington Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Washington
Decision Date: 1881-07
Citations: 2 Wash. Terr. 76
Docket Number: 
Parties: Isaiah Waddell and Z. C. Miles, under the name of Waddell & Miles, vs. the Steamboat “Daisy,” &c.
Judges: 
Reporter: Washington Territory Reports
Volume: 2
Pages: 76–86

Head Matter:
Isaiah Waddell and Z. C. Miles, under the name of Waddell & Miles, vs. the Steamboat “Daisy,” &c.
Motion to dismiss.
When an appeal is taken, and allowed, from a definitive sentence in admiralty, at the time of its entry, and time is allowed, in which to perfect the appeal, no written petition for an appeal, or for apostles, is necessary, under the admiralty rules, nor are letters dismissory of the cause.
The practice of the courts of this country, and of this Court, has made the filing of the appellatory libel, known to the civil law, unnecessary.
An appeal, having been taken, and allowed, at the entry of sentence, and perfected within the time allowed by the Court, meets all the requirements of the civil law in those respects.
No monition issuing, out of this Court to the trial Court, to transmit the cause to this Court is required, and more especially is that the case, when no unwillingness on the part of the judge of the lower Court is shown.
As to whether filing of brief, without saving the right to raise the last question, is a waiver of it, not passed upon.
Opinion on case.
Where it appears that a person has a contract for the furnishing of the machinery for a vessel, and the materials of a third person, who had full knowledge, were used in the construction of such machinery, and it not appearing that the owner of the steam vessel, or his agents, authorized the using of said materials, the steamer is not liable for the same.
In determining whether a contract, for the furnishing of materials, in the construction of a vessel, is a maritime contract, the test is, not the location of the hull, as to being on the ways or afloat, but rather, was she so far finished, at the time, that anything further done upon or about her, would in its nature be maritime.
The libel averring that the material was used in the Tmilding of the vessel, demonstrates that the contract was non-maritime, and that this Court is without jurisdiction in rem.
Doubt expressed, as to the power of our Legislature, to confer jurisdiction upon the Courts to entertain an in rem, proceeding in Admiralty, for materials furnished in the building of a vessel.
It is a settled rule, in the construction of lien laws, that the Legislature will not be presumed to have provided a lien for the claims of persons, not in privity with the owner of the property against which the lien is sought, unless such provision is made in unequivocal language; and such intention»,does not appear in the language of our lien law, but a fair construction of the language employed, shows the legislative intention was to the contrary.
Costs.
Section 823, R S., and those following it, determine the tariff of fees for clerks in our Territorial Courts in Admiralty suits.
Appeal from Third Judicial District, holding terms at Seattle.
Burke ds Basim, and G. H. Hanford for appellants and libellants.
The “Daisy” was afloat when the materials were furnished. The implied agreement to pay for them was in the nature of a maritime contract. Eliza Ladd, 3 Sawyer, 419; The Revenue Cutter No. 2, 4 id. 143. Such contract will be enforced m rem if the statute of the Territory creates a lien in favor of libellants. The Mary Gratwick, 2 Sawyer, 342; The John Farron, 14 Blatchford, 24; The Brig Draco, 2 Sumner, 178; The Lotawanna, 21 Wallace, 558; Laws W. T., 1877, p. 216, subdiv. 3; Francis v. Barque Harrison, 2 Gallison, 475; 1 Sumner, 73; 1 Paine, 620; Benedict’s Admiralty, Sec 267. The articles furnished entered into and gave value to the vessel, and according to the policy of the maritime law a lien attaches. The Cabarga, 3 Blatchford, 45; The Phebe, 1 Ware, 263 and 270-1.
The fact of a contract between the owner and contractor— though known to libellants — did not deprive them of their lien. The Monsoon, 1 Sprague, 37; Francis, et al. v. Barque Harrison, 1 Sawyer, 353; 1 Ware, 263; 1 Brown, 537.
Strume, Hai/nes & Lea/ry for respondent and appellee.
Under the Admiralty law, as administered in the United States, no lien attaches to a vessel for repairs or supplies furnished in the home port. McGuire v. Card, 21 Howard, 251; The Edith, 4 Otto, 520.
What must be shown to give a lien on vessels for supplies or repairs. Pratt v. Reed, 19 Howard, 359; Thomas v. Osborn, id. 22; The Sarah Starr, 1 Sprague, 455.
The change claimed to be effected by the statute, should be made clearly to appear before the Court will adopt a construe tion at variance with the fundamental law. Sedgwick 'on Construction Statutory and Constitutional Law (2díed.), p. 209, note a, and p. 224; id. p. 248, Sec. 10; id. 259, note a; 17 Vermont, 479, 487.
Sub-contractors, in the absence of an express statute, have no lien upon the vessel. Smith v. Steamer Eastern Railroad, Curtis C. C. 253; The Whitaker, 1 Sprague, 230; Hubbell v. Dennison, 20 Wendell, 179; Childs v. Steamboat Brunette, 19 Mo. 518; 6 Blackford (Ind.), 148; 51 Texas, 395; 12 Illinois, 300.
Liens upon vessels discourage commerce and -are not encouraged. They are not to be extended by construction. Peoples Ferry Co. v. Beers, et. al., 20 Howard, 401; Pratt, et al., v. Reed, 19 id. 361; Vandemeter v. Mills, id. 90; The Joseph Grant, 1 Bissell, 196.
The Territorial Legislature cannot confer Admiralty jurisdiction on the District Courts. Neither can it create a maritime lien or make a lien enforceable in admiralty unless it arises from a maritime contract. Article III, Sec. 2, Federal Constitution; R. S. U. S., Sec. 563, subdiv. 8; Organic Act W. T., Sec. 9; The Thomas Jefferson, 10 Wheaton, 428; The Orleans, 11 Peters, 175; 4 Wallace, 644, 555; 7 id. 644; 21 id, 556, 580; 1 Black, 522; 2 id. 581.
The twelfth- admiralty rule, of the Supreme Court of the United States, should not be so extended, by construction, as to embrace material and labor used in the buildvng of a vessel. Sedgwick Statutory and Constitutional Law, pp. 360-1; Sandeman v. Breach, Barnwell & Cresswell, 96; 34 Georgia, 184; 21 Wisconsin, 496; 30 Mo. 376; 49 id. 559; 35 Miss. 25.
The contract, in the case at bar, is not maritime in its-nature, and a lien created by the local law, for services or materials under such a contract, is not enforceable in admiralty. Rooch, et al. v. Chapman, et al., 22 Howard, 129; The Belfast, 7 Wallace, 646; Edwards v. Elliot, 21 Wallace, 552; Shepperd v. Steel, 43 New York, 56; 26 Wisconsin, 488; 23 Howard, 494; 1 Brown’s Admiralty Reports, 495; 100 Mass. 409; 23 Ohio St. 565; 2 Clifford, 38; 29 Indiana, 279; 34 id. 448; 7 Am. Reports, 229.

Opinion:
Opinion by
Hoyt, Associate Justice.
Opinion on motion to dismiss.
The attorneys for the respondent, having reserved the right so to do in their brief, now move the Court to dismiss the appeal herein, for the reasons stated in their brief as follows:
1st. Ho petition for appeal, no petition for apostles and no letters dismissory, signed by the judge of the Court below, have been filed, and none are called for by the notice of appeal.
2nd. Ho appellatory libel has been filed.
3d. The appeal was not taken or perfected at the time, or at the same term, the decree was entered, or at any regular term of the Court entering said decree.
They also now urge the further point, that no monition issued out of this Court to the Court below to transmit the proceedings to this Court.
The transcript in the case shows that the appeal was from a definitive sentence, and that it was taken and allowed at the time of the entry of said sentence, and that the Court then allowed time, in which to perfect the appeal, and this was, in our opinion, such a compliance with the rules governing appeals in admiralty, as to fully meet the objections thereto raised by the first point above quoted, for we are of the opinion that no written petition, for an appeal from a definitive sentence, or for apostles is required, and that in view of the fact (as will be hereinafter stated), that no action of the appellatory Court is required to perfect the appeal, the action of the Court below, in allowing the appeal, and in granting time in which to perfect the same, was sufficient letters dismissory of the cause.
As to the second point, we are of the opinion that the rules of the Civil Law have been so far modified in this country and in this Court, by a uniform current of practice, as to make the filing of an appellatory libel in this Court unnecessary.
The appeal having been taken, and allowed at the time of sentence, and having been perfected within the time then fixed by the Court, it was sufficient in our opinion under the rules, as interpreted by .this Court, in the case of Brown, et al. v. The Steamer Zephyr, to meet the objections raised by the third point above stated.
It only remains to discuss the point now raised for the first time (the same not having been reserved in the briefs on file) as to the necessity of a monition issuing out of this court to the Court below and specially reserving the point, as to whether said objection was taken in time, we would say that we are of the opinion that no monition was necessary, as there has been a uniform practice in this Court to take jurisdiction of cases in admiralty sent up on appeal, without the intervention of such monition; and such has been the practice of the Supreme Court of the United States as to appeals from this Court. The appeal, having been perfected by the filing of a bond properly approved, and the Court having, in lieu of further apostles, directed the entire record to be sent up, was in our opinion sufficient to divest said Court of the case, and upon the filing of said record here, this court acquired jurisdiction therein.
The case is not presented, of a refusal on the part of the Court below to direct the record to be sent up, and we do not therefore now assume to decide as to what would be the correct practice in such a contingeny.
It follows from what we have said that the motion must be denied and it is so ordered.