Case Name: John WADE, d/b/a John Wade and Associates v. James R. JOFFRION
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1980-06-09
Citations: 387 So. 2d 1265
Docket Number: No. 13351
Parties: John WADE, d/b/a John Wade and Associates v. James R. JOFFRION.
Judges: Before EDWARDS, LEAR and WATKINS, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 387
Pages: 1265–1267

Head Matter:
John WADE, d/b/a John Wade and Associates v. James R. JOFFRION.
No. 13351.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, First Circuit.
June 9, 1980.
Rehearing Denied Sept. 4, 1980.
Keith D. Jones, Baton Rouge, for plaintiff-appellant John Wade, d/b/a John Wade and Associates.
Arthur A. Vingiello, Baton Rouge, for defendant-appellee James R. Joffrion.
Before EDWARDS, LEAR and WATKINS, JJ.

Opinion:
EDWARDS, Judge.
Plaintiff, John Wade, d/b/a John Wade and Associates, appeals a trial court judgment rejecting his demands and dismissing his suit against James R. Joffrion. We affirm.
On August 24, 1978, Joffrion gave Wade an exclusive listing and marketing contract for the sale of certain lots in East Baton Rouge Parish. Joffrion himself subsequently sold two of the lots to Steven Gui-dry but refused to pay Wade his commission as provided for in the listing agreement. Wade filed suit for $3,996.00.
At trial, considerable testimony was heard to the effect that two potential purchasers, George M. Peters and Steven Gui-dry, had been excluded from the Wade-Jof-frion listing agreement and that should Jof-frion sell to one of them, no commission would be due Wade. While the written contract contained no exceptions to the listing agreement, testimony tending to establish such exclusions was admitted without objection by plaintiff's counsel.
The trial court heard the testimony, saw the evidence, and concluded that Peters and Guidry were, indeed, excluded from the contract. Plaintiff's suit was, therefore, dismissed at his cost.
Plaintiff appeals on the sole basis that the trial court erred in finding exclusions to the written contract.
We agree with the trial court's findings of fact. The record as a whole clearly establishes that Peters and Guidry were excluded from the listing agreement.
Plaintiff urges that parol testimony should not be controlling as against the clear and unambiguous terms of a written contract. This is true. However, plaintiff's counsel did not object to the admission of such testimony at trial. Therefore, under the basic evidentiary rule that everything not excluded is admitted, all the parol testimony was properly allowed into the record and considered by the trial court.
For the foregoing reasons, the trial court judgment is affirmed. All costs of these proceedings, both trial and appellate, are to be paid by John Wade.
AFFIRMED.
WATKINS, J., dissents and assigns reasons.
. Louisiana's parol evidence rule, LSA-C.C. Art. 2276, is evidentiary in nature and not substantive. See Writing Requirements and the Parol Evidence Rule, 35 La.L.Rev. 745, 757 (1975). An evidentiary rule not invoked at trial is waived and may not later be used to exclude evidence. Chivers v. Couch Motor Lines, Inc., 159 So.2d 544 (La.App. 3rd Cir. 1964); In re Industrial Homestead Ass'n., 198 So. 528 (La.App.Orl.Cir.1940); 32A C.J.S. Evidence 863; 88 C.J.S. Trial 115. It is true that Little v. Haik, 246 La. 121, 163 So.2d 558 (1964), implicitly overruled In re Industrial Homestead Ass'n. Little v. Haik, however, was not grounded on the evidentiary rule of LSA-C.C. Art. 2276 but on the clearly substantive requirement of LSA-C.C. Art. 2275 which provides that, in general, every transfer of immovable property must be in writing. Little must therefore not be extended beyond its facts and does not erode the basic principle that an evidentiary rule not invoked is waived. Southern Fleet Leasing Corporation, 228 So.2d 512 (La.App. 3rd Cir. 1969).