Case Name: BRAZIL v. DUPREE et al.
Court: Oregon Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Oregon
Decision Date: 1952-11-14
Citations: 197 Or. 581
Docket Number: 
Parties: BRAZIL v. DUPREE et al.
Judges: Before Brand, Chief Justice, and Rossman, Lusk, Latourette, Warner and Tooze, Justices.
Reporter: Oregon Reports
Volume: 197
Pages: 581–600

Head Matter:
Argued September 8,
reversed with instructions November 14,
rehearing granted December 9, 1952, argued on rehearing January 14, former opinion withdrawn and order granting new trial affirmed March 25, 1953
BRAZIL v. DUPREE et al.
250 P. 2d 89
254 P. 2d 1041
Norman B. Kobin, of Portland, argued the cause for appellant. "With him on the brief was David Weinstein, of Portland.
Arthur H. Lewis, of Portland, argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent, E. W. LeBeck.
Before Brand, Chief Justice, and Rossman, Lusk, Latourette, Warner and Tooze, Justices.

Opinion:
LATOURETTE, J.
This is an appeal by plaintiff from an order granting a new trial to defendants after verdict in favor of plaintiff in a claim and delivery action to recover possession of two frame houses which were detached from the real property, and also for damages for their wrongful detention.
Plaintiff alleged that he was the owner of and entitled to the immediate and exclusive possession of the houses, that the defendants were in possession of the same in Multnomah county and wrongfully and unlawfully withheld possession thereof from the plaintiff ; that the reasonable value of the said houses was $2,000, and that he was damaged in the sum of $2,500 for the wrongful withholding of the same. Defendants in their separate answers pleaded general denials. On trial the jury brought in a verdict against the defendants jointly in the sum of $3,750.
To understand the legal questions involved, we will briefly narrate the facts in the case. Columbia Food Company (hereinafter termed "food company"), owner of the houses sought to be replevined, desired to have them removed from its real property and entered into a verbal contract on or about September 19, 1949, with the defendants, Dupree and Stark, copartners, dba Spokane. Wrecking Company, whereby they agreed to wreck and remove the houses not later than September 25, 1949, it being understood that for such services they should have and retain said houses for their own use and benefit. On said September 19, the food company was informed by Dupree and Stark that a written authorization would be required to obtain a wrecking permit from the the city of Portland, whereupon the following document was written and signed by the food company:
"Spokane Wrecking Co.
" Gentlemen:
"This will authorize you to wreck and remove the two houses and garages at 2025 and 2037 S. E. Insley, Block 5, Alton Park. We agree not to charge you for the houses and materials, nor are you to charge us for your services.
"Yours truly,
W. T. Triplett, President
Columbia Pood Co."
The following endorsement appeared on the reverse side of this letter:
"Sept. 19, 1949.
"Sold the 2 houses and garages to LeBeck & Son to be moved off premises in 30 days from date.
"Robert Dupree,
Owner."
On September 22, 1949, Mr. Triplett, president of the food company, noticed that nothing had been done to wreck and remove the houses and notified Dupree and Stark that they had until Sunday night, September 25, 1949, to comply with the agreement, and that if such agreement was not complied with by that date, the contract would terminate. The food company had no knowledge that the contract had been assigned to LeBeck.
Neither Dupree and Stark nor LeBeck had removed the houses from the premises at the expiration date, to-wit: September 25, 1949, so that on September 26 the food company executed a bill of sale to the houses to plaintiff Brazil, of which action defendants were notified. Thereafter, over protest, the two houses were removed from the property by LeBeck, which removal prompted the present action and resulted in a judgment for plaintiff.
Following are the grounds on which Dupree and Stark based their motion for a new trial:
"(A) There was error in law prejudicial to these defendants in the courts [sic] of the trial, in the admission of and refusal to admit exhibits, and the giving and refusal to give instructions, all over the objection of and duly excepted to by these defendants.
" (B) The evidence is insufficient to justify the verdict."
LeBeek's motion, for a new trial is predicated on the following grounds:
" (a) The evidence is insufficient to justify the verdict;
"(b) The verdict is against the law of the case; and
"(c) There was error in law occurring at the trial, in the admission of testimony, and in the giving of instructions all duly excepted to by defendant, E. W. LeBeck."
The trial court granted a new trial to the defendants on the grounds " that manifest error was committed in instructions given the jury whereby the province of the jury was invaded .", the claimed erroneous instruction being:
"Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, the Court instructs you further that in the event you find in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants Dupree and Stark your verdict must also be against the defendant, LeBeck."
It will be observed that the grounds for the motions for a new trial were general and not specific and were not legal grounds for a new trial because they did not comply with § 5-804, OCLA, which, insofar as pertinent, follows:
"In all cases of motion for a new trial, the grounds thereof shall be plainly specified, and no cause of new trial not so stated, shall be considered or regarded by the court. # "
The word, "specify", is defined in Webster's New International Dictionary (2d ed) as: "To mention or name in a specific or explicit manner; to tell or state precisely or in detail;
In Independent Highway Dist. No. 2 v. Ada County, 24 Idaho 416, 134 P 542, 545, we find the following definition: "'Specify' is defined to mean: To mention specifically; to state in full and explicit terms; to point out, to particularize, or to designate by words one thing from another. " See Herrin v. Erickson, 90 Mont 259, 2 P2d 296, 300; A. M. Dillow & Co. v. City of Monticello, 145 Iowa 424, 124 NW 186, 189.
In Easton v. Quackenbush, 86 Or 374, 168 P 631, we held that where the motion for a new trial was general and not specific the motion was too indefinite, and that the court was justified in refusing to grant a new trial.
In Sullivan v. Wakefield, 65 Or 528, 133 P. 641, we held that since the adoption of Article VII, § 3, of the constitution, insufficiency of the evidence is not a ground for a new trial, although a motion for a new trial based on the grounds that there was no evidence (meaning no substantial evidence) to support the verdict would be good grounds for the granting of a new trial.
Defendants argued that the trial court had the authority to grant a new trial on its own motion where prejudicial error occurs on the trial, citing Clark v. Fazio et al., 191 Or 522, 230 P2d 553, and Lyons v. Browning et al., 170 Or 350, 133 P2d 599. It appears from the record that the judgment in the present case was entered on December 5, 1950, and the order granting a new trial was entered on January 25, 1951, over 30 days having elapsed between their entry. Section 5-806, OCLA, provides as follows:
"If a new trial is granted by the court on its own motion, the order shall so state and shall be made within 30 days after the filing of the judgment. Such order shall contain a statement setting forth fully the grounds upon which the order was made, which statement shall be a part of the record in the case. In event an appeal is taken from such an order, the order shall be affirmed only on grounds set forth in the order or because of reversible error affirmatively appearing in the record. [O. C. 1930, § 2-807; L. 1933, ch. 233, § 2, p. 339.] "
Since 30 days had elapsed from the date of the judgment up to the date of the order granting the new trial, the trial court had no authority to grant a new trial on its own motion.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, we believe that the instruction given by the court, on which, because of asserted error, a new trial was granted, was a proper instruction. The oral agreement hereinbefore set out is established by substantial and uncontradieted evidence. The interest that Dupree and Stark had in such houses, under the circumstances, was not such that they could have given a valid bill of sale to LeBeck at the time in question. Their ownership in the houses was conditional, and, until the houses were removed from the premises, no title vested in Dupree and Stark. The agreement between the parties was an agreement for services to be performed by Dupree and Stark in removing the houses, they to receive the buildings in question in payment for such services instead of money. In no event would LeBeek's rights rise to any higher dignity than the rights of Dupree and Stark. At the most, the transaction between Dupree and Stark and LeBeck was, in effect, an assignment of the original agreement between Dupree and Stark and the food company. Columbia R. I. Co. v. Alameda L. Co., 87 Or 277, 288, 168 P 64, 440; Corvallis & Alsea River R. Co. v. Portland E. & E. Ry. Co., 84 Or 524, 539, 163 P 1173; 4 Am Jur, Assignments, 311, § 104; 6 CJS, Assignments, 1142, § 84.
It is the law that a plaintiff may join in a replevin action all joint tort feasors who have had anything to do with the unlawful taldng or withholding of personal property. Gordan v. Briody et al., 170 Or 410, 134 P2d 431, 145 ALR 898.
The evidence discloses that Dupree and Stark gave a spurious bill of sale to LeBeck, and thereafter, when difficulty arose, they gave to LeBeck an indemnity agreement to indemnify him against damages that might accrue from the removal of the buildings, and that, after the buildings were removed, they went on to the premises and cleaned up the debris occasioned by the removal of the houses.
Under the evidence, the jury was justified in bringing in a verdict against Dupree and Stark, and, as LeBeek's interest in and to the houses was taken with all the burdens to which Dupree and Stark were subjected under their agreement with the food company, the verdict against Dupree and Stark would necessarily justify the jury in bringing in a verdict against LeBeck since he was in possession of the buildings and refused to turn them over to plaintiff.
Norman B. Kobin, of Portland, argued the cause for Appellant. With him on the brief was David Weinstein, of Portland.
Arthur H. Lewis, of Portland, argued the cause and filed a brief for Respondent E. W. LeBeck.
Reversed with instructions to reinstate the judgment in favor of plaintiff against the defendants.