Case Name: DAVIDSON v. CITY OF NEW YORK
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1909-06-04
Citations: 117 N.Y.S. 185
Docket Number: 
Parties: DAVIDSON v. CITY OF NEW YORK.
Judges: 
Reporter: West's New York Supplement
Volume: 117
Pages: 185–187

Head Matter:
DAVIDSON v. CITY OF NEW YORK.
(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department.
June 4, 1909.)
Municipal Cobpobations (§ 768 )—Defective Sidewalks—“Obviously Dangebous.”
A flagstone in a sidewalk 6 feet wide, which projected at the highest point 2% inches above the other stones, and gradually decreased in height until it was level with the other stones at the outside of the walk, was not an “obviously dangerous” defect, which would render the city liable for injuries to a person tripping and falling over it.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Municipal Corporations, Cent. Dig. § 1624; Dec. Dig. § 768. ]
Woodward, J., dissenting.
Appeal from Trial Term, Kings County.
Action by Caroline Davidson against the City of New York. From a judgment for plaintiff, and an order denying a new trial, defendant appeals.
Reversed, and new trial granted.
Argued before WOODWARD, JENKS, GAYNOR, BURR, and MILLER, JJ.
James D. Bell, for appellant.
Henry' E. Heistad, for respondent.
For other cases see same topic & § number in Dec. & Am. Digs. 1907 to date, & Rep’r Indexes

Opinion:
GAYNOR, J.
This case did not go to the jury on the theory that one flag might be above the other as much as 5 inches at the outside by the tree—the highest point. On the contrary, there was the testimony of an engineer that by actual measurement by him the elevation at such highest point was only 2% inches (and it gradually decreased to nothing at the outside of the flag walk, the width of which was 6 feet); and the learned trial judge charged the jury that they had to accept that evidence as against the loose estimates which had been testified to. Moreover, the learned trial judge refused to charge the request of the defendant that if the jury found that the elevation was only 2% inches at the highest point, and ran from that down to nothing, and that the plaintiff simply tripped and fell, the defendant was not liable; so that this is the precise point of the case. It is impossible to free a city from such slight defects, and unreasonable to say, or permit a jury to say, that they are "obviously dangerous," which is the test of the city's liability. We know that they are not. If they were, thousands and thousands would be hurt by them hourly. That it is "possible" for some one out of many, out of millions, it may be, to trip on such a defect does not make it dangerous. Probability, not possibility, governs. Butler v. Village of Oxford, 186 N. Y. 444, 79 N. E. 712; Gastel v. City of New York, 194 N. Y. 15, 86 N. E. 833.
The judgment should be reversed.
Judgment and order reversed, and new trial granted; costs to abide the event. All concur, except WOODWARD, J., who dissents.