Case Name: Lorenzo L. JONES, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Barbara BOCK, Warden, et al., Defendants-Appellees
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 2005-06-15
Citations: 135 F. App'x 837
Docket Number: No. 03-2576
Parties: Lorenzo L. JONES, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Barbara BOCK, Warden, et al., Defendants-Appellees.
Judges: 
Reporter: West's Federal Appendix
Volume: 135
Pages: 837–839

Head Matter:
Lorenzo L. JONES, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Barbara BOCK, Warden, et al., Defendants-Appellees.
No. 03-2576.
United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.
June 15, 2005.
Lorenzo L. Jones, Southern Michigan Correctional Facility, Jackson, MI, pro se.
Before BATCHELDER and COLE, Circuit Judges; and REEVES, District Judge.
The Honorable Danny C. Reeves, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Kentucky, sitting by designation.

Opinion:
OPINION
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff-Appellant Lorenzo Jones appeals a district court order dismissing his action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of the First, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. For the reasons that follow, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.
I. BACKGROUND
On November 14, 2000, Plaintiff-Appellant Lorenzo Jones sustained serious injuries from a motor vehicle accident while he was in custody of the Michigan Department of Corrections. Jones alleges that after the accident, various prison officials required him to complete tasks which aggravated his injuries. He argues, inter alia, that this action constituted deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution. The defendants sought dismissal of the complaint based on Jones's failure to exhaust administrative remedies as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996) ("PLRA"), codified at various sections of 28 and 42 U.S.C. The district court granted the motion. This appeal followed.
II. ANALYSIS
The district court did not err in dismissing the claims against the prison officials based on Jones's failure to exhaust his administrative remedies. The PLRA requires plaintiffs to exhaust all administrative remedies before bringing an action in federal court regarding prison conditions. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). This Circuit follows the "total exhaustion" rule, meaning that we must dismiss a complaint for failure to exhaust administrative remedies whenever there is a single unexhausted claim, despite the presence of other exhausted claims. See Bey v. Johnson, 407 F.3d 801, 806 (6th Cir.2005) ("We now join the Tenth and Eighth Circuits in holding that total exhaustion is required under the PLRA."). An action is one regarding prison conditions where it arises under federal law and concerns, inter alia, the "effects of actions by government officials on the lives of persons confined in prison." 18 U.S.C. § 3626(g)(2).
This Court has held that in order to meet the exhaustion requirement of the PLRA, a prisoner must either attach a copy of his prison grievance forms to the complaint or state the nature of the remedies pursued and the result of each process. See Knuckles El v. Toombs, 215 F.3d 640, 642 (6th Cir.2000). Jones stated in his complaint that he had exhausted his administrative remedies. However, he neither attached the grievance forms to his complaint nor described the remedies he pursued and the outcome. The fact that the defendant Later provided evidence that Jones may have exhausted some of his claims is irrelevant under the PLRA and Sixth Circuit precedent. See Baxter v. Rose, 305 F.3d 486, 488-90 (6th Cir.2002). Furthermore, even if Jones had shown he had exhausted some of his claims, the district court properly dismissed the complaint because Jones did not show that he had exhausted all of his claims. See Bey, 407 F.3d at 806. Accordingly, Jones's prison-conditions claim was properly dismissed as he did not comply with the exhaustion requirement, as defined by this Court's precedent.
III. CONCLUSION
For the preceding reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.