Case Name: Cornelius v. Hambay, Appellant
Court: Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
Jurisdiction: Pennsylvania
Decision Date: 1892-07-13
Citations: 150 Pa. 359
Docket Number: Appeal, No. 82
Parties: Cornelius v. Hambay, Appellant.
Judges: Before Paxson, C. J., Sterrett, Green, Clark, Williams, McCollum and Mitchell, JJ.
Reporter: Pennsylvania State Reports
Volume: 150
Pages: 359–368

Head Matter:
Cornelius v. Hambay, Appellant.
[Marked to be reported.]
Criminal Conversation—Punitive damages—Precedents.
The settled rule of the state being that a husband may recover punitive damages for the debauching of his wife, not only by way of compensation but by way of punishment, to deter the defendant and others from offending in like cases, the Supreme Court will not change the rule. Williams and Green, JJ., dissenting.
Illicit intercourse—Evidence—Inference.
In an action for criminal conversation, the fact that defendant and plaintiff’s wife visited a hotel late at night and remained there several hours, is a circumstance from which the jury may infer illicit intercourse.
Witness—Interest—Comment of court.
In view of the present condition of the law of evidence, it is proper for the court to call the attention of the juiy to the personal interest of a party to the record who testifies.
In an action for crim. con., it is not error to charge that defendant “ is interested in swearing, if there is any such thing as honor or moral right that would excuse falsehood, not only to that which would relieve himself but will protect his paramour,” plaintiff’s interest having also been commented upon.
Testimony of Ivusband as to wife's adultery.
In an action by a husband for criminal conversation, the husband is not a competent witness as to the wife’s adultery.
Argued Nov. 4, 1890.
Appeal, No. 82, Oct. T., 1890, by defendant, from judgment of C. P. No. 1, Allegheny Co., March T., 1889, No. 514, on verdict for plaintiff.
Before Paxson, C. J., Sterrett, Green, Clark, Williams, McCollum and Mitchell, JJ.
Trespass for criminal conversation.
The facts appear by the opinion of the Supreme Court and the charge of the court below. At the time of trial, plaintiff had applied for a divorce and was not then living with his wife.
Plaintiff was permitted to testify, under objection and exception. [1]
The court charged, inter alia, as follows by Stowe, P. J.:
[“ I now refer to the time they were at the theatre and went up to what is called the Greenwood Hotel. If that is true, if it is true that this man and woman went into that house that night, where he does not pretend, and where nobody can justify their being at that late hour—-11 or later at night—and staid there for two or three hours or more, then it is for the jury to say, if those facts are true, whether or not, in accordance with our observation, a reasonable conclusion would not justify the belief that illicit intercourse had taken place there.] [2] But the reason I mention this particularly is that the jury may look carefully at that point of the case, so far as the testimony is concerned.^ The testimony upon that subject comes, so far as it is absolute, from the plaintiff alone. On the other hand we have the defendant, and we have the plaintiff’s wife. [The defendant, of course, is interested in swearing, if there is any such thing as honor or moral right, that would excuse falsehood, not only to that which would relieve himself but will protect his paramour.] [4] On the other hand the plaintiff is just as deeply interested in convicting the defendants of the charge he makes against them .... Mc-Elhaney says he was standing by Manning’s Hotel on the pavement ; that he met Cornelius there, that he knew him before; that a woman and a man came along—that is the effect of it— that woman was Cornelius’ wife-—-he knew her before, he says; the other man he did not recognize, did not know anything about him, had never seen him before, and never saw him after-wards until these troubles commenced and Cornelius told him that that was the defendant in this case; he could not now recognize him with any degree of certainty; he thought this was the man. [Now, so far as that one fact is concerned, throwing out the parties for the present, and considering one side worth just as much as the other, the whole charge so far as this one act which would fix criminality on the defendant, if it oc curred, all rests on the testimony of this man, McElhaney. If, however, you think, taking it altogether, it can be relied upon and believed, and conclude to your own satisfaction that the parties who were in the Greenwood Hotel that night were Mrs. Cornelius and the defendant, then, as I said before, it is for you to draw your own conclusions; and if you think or believe what one would naturally infer occurred on such an occasion, the debauchery of the wife, the plaintiff would be entitled to a verdict. The amount of it I will refer to presently.] [2] . . . .
[“ Under all these circumstances, if the jury find that the defendant has done this wrong, it is for them to say, in view of what has occurred, and with a view to deter not only the defendant, but other parties from offending in like cases, to impose such a verdict as would be reasonable and proper, not only by way of compensation, but by way of punishment.”] [5]
Verdict for plaintiff for $2,000, reduced by the court to $500, and judgment thereon, whereupon defendant appealed.
Errors assigned were (2-5) charge and (1) ruling on evidence, quoting the charge as in brackets, and the bill of exception as above.
A. M. Imbrie, with him T. M. Marshall, W. JD. Moore and F. 0. MeCfirr, for appellant.
In addition to cases cited in opinion of Supreme Court: Com. v. Gordon, 2 Brews. 569; Com. v. I. F., 12 W. N. 108; Gilchrist v. Bale, 8 Watts, 355, a crim. con. case; and Com. v. Jailer, 1 Gr. 218. That the husband and wife were not living together and that the husband had applied for a divorce, does not change the rule.
Mere entry of the hotel will not warrant an inference of illicit intercourse, in the absence of registry, taking a room or, improper acts.
The charge covered by the 4th assignment lessened the effect of defendant’s testimony. The jury must have understood that there was a rule of morals or demand of honor that would justify a defendant to commit perjury to protect his paramour in a case like this.
The instruction as to damages left the jury without any guide, and allowed them to render a verdict to deter others from offending in like cases. Compensation is the measure laid down in Sherwood v. Titman, 55 Pa. 77. To same effect is 2 Gr. Ev., p. 235, 13th ed., § 253, note. Vindictive damages should be limited to the wrong inflicted on plaintiff only: 7 A. & E. Ene. L., p. 448, note 2; Ibid., pp. 450, 451, text, and cases cited in notes, where the question is elaborately discussed.
William H. McGtary, John S. Robb with him, for appellee.—
Plaintiff’s incompeteney is unsupported by authority. 1 Gr. Ev. 337 ; Dickerman v. Graves 6 Cush. 308; Ratcliff v. Wales, 1 Hill, N. Y. 63, decide the husband competent.
There is nothing to answer in assignments 2-4.
In crim. con. cases, damages large and exemplary may be given : 2 Bl. Com. 138. This principle is as old as the law itself. Punitive damages are penal in their nature, to deter others from like acts ; in crim. con. cases not merely to compensate the husband, but to protect the family. Exemplary damages, smart money and fines imposed at the suit of the people depend upon the same principle. Both are penal and intended to deter others from committing like crimes. Damages for the sake of example is as old as the hills, and juries are daily charged to find them in such cases. In actions for seduction, slander and the case at bar, there is no measure of damages for a jury, but they are inflicted wholly with a view to punish and make an example of defendant, that others may be deterred: McBride v. McLaughlin, 5 Watts, 375.
July 13, 1892.

Opinion:
Opinion by
Mb. Chief Justice Paxson,
The decision of this case has been delayed for reasons not personal to the writer.
' The suit was brought by the plaintiff in the court below against the defendant to recover damages for debauching his (the plaintiff's) wife. The jury found for the plaintiff in the sum of $2,000, which the court subsequently reduced to $500, and the verdict thus reduced was accepted by the plaintiff. This belongs to a class of cases in which the plaintiff has been allowed from time immemorial to recover punitive damages. Hence we cannot sustain the fifth specification in which it is alleged that the learned judge erred in applying this principle. In view of the fact that it is the settled rule of this state, and so understood by nearly every practitioner, we do not care to enter into a discussion of the controversy upon this subject which has recently arisen between some of our text-writers. Those who are curious in regard to it are referred to the second volume of Greenleaf on Evidence, and Sedgwick on Damages, where pretty much everything that can be said on either side may be found.
We find nothing to condemn in those portions of the charge embraced in the second and third specifications. If • the defendant and the plaintiff's wife visited the Greenwood Hotel late at night, and remained there for two or three hours as testified to by some of the witnesses, it was a circumstance from which the jury would have the right to draw an unfavorable inference, and this was substantially what the learned judge said to them.
The fourth specification alleges that the learned judge erred in instructing the jury that: " The defendant, of course, is interested in swearing, if there is any such thing as honor or moral right that would excuse falsehood, not only to that which would relieve himself, but will protect his paramour."
While this instruction is not sugar-coated, we cannot say it was error. The learned judge below had the right to call the attention of the jury to the fact of the nature of the defendant's interest. He had not only the pecuniary interest common to defendants in other cases, but he had also his own reputation and the reputation of the woman who was charged to have been his paramour at stake. When therefore the learned judge told the jury that he was not only interested in swearing to what would clear himself, but also the woman, he said nothing but the truth, and what all experience shows to be true. On the other hand the learned judge called the attention of the jury in equally vigorous language to the interest of the plaintiff as tending to affect his credibility. In view of the present condition of the law of evidence, it is entirely proper for the court to call the attention of the jury to the personal interest of a party to the record who goes upon the stand as a witness.
The first specification is more serious. The counsel for the defendant objected to the competency of the plaintiff as a witness. He was called to prove the criminal intercourse of his wife with the defendant; in other words, to prove her adultery. It is true, his wife was not a party to the record, but the object and effect of his testimony was to criminate her. I am not aware that any of our Acts of Assembly enlarging the com petency of witnesses permits husband and wife to testify against each other except in the case of personal injuries inflicted by the one upon the other, and in certain cases in divorce. And the rule which excludes such testimony does not depend upon the party criminated being a party to the record. The principle of the rule which excludes husband and wife from testifying against each other, requires its application to all cases in which the interests of the other pairty are involved; and therefore the wife is not a competent witness against any co-defendant tried with the husband if the testimony concern the husband, though it be not directly given against him. Nor may she in such a suit between others, testify to any matter for which, if true, her husband may be indicted. 1 Greenleaf on Ev., 334 and 335; Pringle v. Pringle, 59 Pa. 281; Stewart v. Johnson, 18 N. J. L. 89; Stein v. Bowman, 13 Peters, 209; Kelly v. Drew, 12 Allen, 107. The fifth section of the Act of May 23, 1887, P. L. 159, provides : " Nor shall husband and wife be competent or permitted to testify against each other, except in those proceedings for divorce in which personal service of the subpoena or of a rule to take depositions has been made upon the opposite party; or in which the opposite party appears and defends, in which case either may testify fully against the other, and except also that in any proceedings for divorce either party may be called merely to prove the fact of marriage." The rule that husband aird wife shall not testify against each other, extends, as before observed, to testimony by the one which tends to criminate the other, although not a party to the suit. The reason for it is the disturbance of the marital relations which would result from the admission of such testimony. This is the settled rule of the common law, and it has not been changed by any Act of Assembly, or by any decision in this state.
We are of opinion that it was error to permit the husband to testify in this case. He was an incompetent witness. The issue, and the only issue, involved the adultery of his wife. It was not competent for him to forge a single link in the chain of circumstances pointing to his wife's criminal conduct, and upon any other subject his testimony would have been irrelevant.
The judgment is reversed, and a venire facias de novo awarded.