Case Name: NASON ICE-MACH. CO. v. UPHAM et al.
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1898-03-08
Citations: 50 N.Y.S. 197
Docket Number: 
Parties: NASON ICE-MACH. CO. v. UPHAM et al.
Judges: 
Reporter: West's New York Supplement
Volume: 50
Pages: 197–206

Head Matter:
(26 App. Div. 420.)
NASON ICE-MACH. CO. v. UPHAM et al.
(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department.
March 8, 1898.)
Mechanic’s Lien—When Allowed.
In an action brought under Laws 1885, c. 342, as amended by Laws 1895, e. 673, to foreclose a mechanic’s lien for furnishing and placing upon the premises .owned by one of the defendants, and leased by another, an ice-making machine, under a contract with a former tenant, there was evidence that the machine was masoned into the ground, and was so constructed that the ¡building to winch it was fastened would have to be taken to pieces in order to remove the tanks, and the trial judge found that the work and material “were used in the erection and alteration of the buildings on the premises.” IlrlO, that if the work was done and material furnished with the owner’s consent, a lien would exist under the statute.
Appeal from special term, Westchester county.
Nason IcerMaehine Company against Sarah B. Upham and the Yonkers Hygeia Ice Company. From part of a judgment* dismissing the complaint on the merits against two of the defendants, with costs, plaintiff appeals. Reversed.
Argued before GOODRICH, P. J., and CULLEN, BARTLETT, and HATCH, JJ.
Charles De Hart Brower, for appellant,
Joseph F. Daly, for respondents,

Opinion:
WILLARD BARTLETT, J.
This is an action to foreclose a mechanic's lien claimed by the plaintiff for furnishing and placing upon the premises of the defendant Upham, in the city of Yonkers, a certain ice-making apparatus of a specified patent. The contract for installing the apparatus was made with the defendant Heermance, who, at the time, was the lessee of the premises. Before the machinery was completely installed, the defendant Heermance assigned his lease to the Yonkers Hygeia Ice Company. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff against tire defendant Heermance personally for the value of the ice-making apparatus, but held that the notice of lien was insufficient, and dismissed the complaint on the merits as against the defendants Upham and the Yonkers Hygeia Ice Company. The record indicates that the lien was deemed insufficient upon the ground that the statute did not authorize a mechanic's lien for ice-making machines. The mechanic's lien law in force at the time the action was commenced and at the time of the trial was chapter 342 of the Laws of 1885, as amended by chapter 673 of the Laws of 1895. Under the first section of that statute a lien might be acquired by one who performed any labor or service or furnished any materials used or to be used in erecting,.altering, or repairing any house, wharf, pier, bulkhead, bridge, vault, building, or appurtenances to any house, building, or building lot, or who should dredge, fill in, grade, or otherwise alter or improve land under water, meadow, marsh, swamp or other low lands, or who should perform any labor or services or furnish any materials used in improving or equipping any house, building, or appurtenances with any chandeliers, brackets, or other fixtures or apparatus for supplying gas or electric light, with the consent of the owner. Un der ordinary circumstances, the language used in this section would not embrace the furnishing of an ice-maliing apparatus; and, if nothing appeared in the case beyond the fact that such an ice-making apparatus as is described in the contract between the plaintiff and the defendant Heermance was placed upon the land of the defendant Upham, I should think the ruling of the trial court was clearly correct. But something more does appear. The learned trial judge expressly finds, in his formal decision, after reciting the making of the contract for the erection of an ice-making plant upon the premises described in the complaint, that the plaintiff duly performed such contract, and that the work and materials required by said contract "were used in the erection and construction of said plant upon the aforesaid premises, and in the erection and alteration of the buildings upon said premises." Here, then, we have it distinctly decided, as matter of fact, that the labor performed and the materials furnished pursuant to the contract for putting up the ice plant weré actually used in erecting and altering buildings upon the land. This finding brings the work and materials directly within the scope and purview of the statute, and, if there was any evidence to sustain such finding, it followed that the plaintiff was entitled to a lien. I think there is enough evidence in the record to support the finding. One witness testified that the machine was masoned into the ground, and was so fastened to the building that the building would have to be taken to pieces in order to remove the tanks. This testimony, though meager, warranted a conclusion like that which was reached in regard to a similar annexation to the freehold in Watts-Campbell Co. v. Yuengling, 125 N. Y. 1, 25 N. E. 1060,—that the plaintiff performed labor and furnished materials in altering or repairing a building for which a lien could be acquired under the statute. The learned trial judge did not pass upon the question whether the work was done and the materials were furnished with the consent of the owner, evidently because he deemed this question immaterial in view of his decision that there could be no lien for an ice plant. The proof on this subject was conflicting, and it is not necessary that we should express any opinion in regard to its weight, as more testimony upon this branch of the case may be offered on a new trial. It is enough, for the purposes of the present appeal, to say that the evidence on the first trial would have warranted, though it did not require, a finding that such consent was given.
These views require a reversal of the judgment so far as appealed from.
CULLEN and HATCH, JJ., concur.