Case Name: The State of Washington, Respondent, v. Jock Wayne Ellis, Appellant
Court: Washington Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Washington
Decision Date: 1987-07-01
Citations: 48 Wash. App. 333
Docket Number: No. 16587-9-I
Parties: The State of Washington, Respondent, v. Jock Wayne Ellis, Appellant.
Judges: Webster, J., concurs.
Reporter: Washington Appellate Reports
Volume: 48
Pages: 333–340

Head Matter:
[No. 16587-9-I.
Division One.
July 1, 1987.]
The State of Washington, Respondent, v. Jock Wayne Ellis, Appellant.
Dori Jones of Washington Appellate Defender Association, for appellant.
Norm Maleng, Prosecuting Attorney, and Michael Hogan, Deputy, for respondent.

Opinion:
Williams, J.
Jock Wayne Ellis was convicted by a jury of second degree burglary. He appeals from the judgment entered upon the verdict, contending the trial court erred by not giving his proposed instruction on the necessity of corroboration for dog track evidence.
Shortly after 3 a.m. on December 22, 1983, Seattle police officers answered a silent alarm at Dunlap Elementary School. Two men were seen running from the south end of the school, one wearing a brown leather jacket and darker pants, the other wearing a dark top and lighter colored pants. The police pursued, but lost sight of them when they went past a fence and separated. A tracking dog was brought to the scene, and a man wearing a brown leather jacket and dark pants, later identified as Larry Chapman, was quickly located by the dog under a car.
After being returned to the school, the dog picked up a second scent leading to a nearby house, and pursued a man who ran from some bushes into a swampy area. The man displayed a knife but dropped it when ordered to by the police. Although he said his name was Robert Johnson, from fingerprint identification it was determined that he was Jock Wayne Ellis.
At his trial for second degree burglary, Ellis said that on the morning in question he awoke at 2:30 or 2:45 a.m., watched television for a short time, then went out to take his usual morning jog wearing white tennis shoes, a brown jacket and dark gray khaki pants. He said he was apprehended while on his way to a jogging area on the beach.
The issue presented by Ellis's single assignment of error is whether the court erred in refusing to give the following jury instruction:
The jury must view evidence concerning a police dog track with caution. Evidence concerning a police dog track is insufficient, standing alone, to support a conviction for Burglary 2.
To sustain its burden of proof, the State must introduce other evidence which clearly connects the accused with the commission of the offense. If the State has not introduced such evidence, it has not borne its burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and you must find the defendant not guilty.
In State v. Loucks, 98 Wn.2d 563, 656 P.2d 480 (1983), the court held that the dangers inherent in the use of dog track evidence can only be alleviated by the presence of corroborating evidence identifying the accused as the perpetrator of the crime, and reversed a conviction because the dog track was "unsupported by other evidence linking Loucks to the burglary." Loucks, at 569. In State v. Wagner, 36 Wn. App. 286, 287-88, 673 P.2d 638 (1983), the court characterized a proper instruction as stating that dog track evidence "must be viewed with caution; that it must be considered with all other testimony in the case; and that, in the absence of some other evidence of guilt, it does not warrant conviction."
Given these standards, Ellis's proposed instruction is a definite overstatement. Corroborating evidence is not "other evidence which clearly connects the accused with the commission of the offense." (Italics ours.) State v. Loucks, supra, and State v. Wagner, supra, refer simply to "other evidence." Corroborating evidence is defined as " [ejvidence supplementary to that already given and tending to strengthen or confirm it". (Italics ours.) Black's Law Dictionary 414 (4th ed. 1968). The proposed instruction implies that the other evidence must be sufficient by itself to convict the accused. Such an argument was specifically rejected in State v. Nicholas, 34 Wn. App. 775, 779, 663 P.2d 1356 (1983).
It is well established that a court is not required to give an instruction which is erroneous in any respect. See State v. Refsnes, 14 Wn.2d 569, 574, 128 P.2d 773 (1942); State v. Humphries, 21 Wn. App. 405, 411, 586 P.2d 130 (1978). Because Ellis's proposed instruction incorrectly stated the standard for dog track evidence, the trial court quite properly did not use it.
Ellis argues, in effect, that the court committed error in not giving a proper instruction on dog track evidence sua sponte. We held in State v. Bockman, 37 Wn. App. 474, 483, 682 P.2d 925 (1984) that the "lack of a limiting instruction on the weight of dog tracking evidence, however, is subject to a constitutional harmless error analysis", citing People v. McRaft, 102 Mich. App. 204, 301 N.W.2d 852 (1981). In that case the Michigan court adopted a constitutional analysis without discussion as to what provision of the constitution was implicated or why the failure to give the instruction rose to such magnitude. We certainly agree that when requested in an appropriate case the instruction must be given, State v. Wagner, supra, but the constitutional question in the final analysis is one of sufficiency of the evidence. Thus, dog track evidence standing alone is not sufficient to support a conviction. State v. Nicholas, supra. The sufficiency of the evidence to convict implicates the defendant's due process rights and may be raised for the first time on appeal. State v. Baeza, 100 Wn.2d 487, 488, 670 P.2d 646 (1983).
In this case, there is sufficient evidence taken as a whole, including the dog track evidence, to find Ellis guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
The judgment is affirmed.
Webster, J., concurs.