Case Name: GRIGGS, Administrator of the Estate of Clark, v. CLARK et al.
Court: Supreme Court of California
Jurisdiction: California
Decision Date: 1863
Citations: 23 Cal. 427
Docket Number: 
Parties: GRIGGS, Administrator of the Estate of Clark, v. CLARK et al.
Judges: 
Reporter: California Reports
Volume: 23
Pages: 427–431

Head Matter:
GRIGGS, Administrator of the Estate of Clark, v. CLARK et al.
Tub jurisdiction of the Probate Courts over the estates of deceased persons, does not divest the District Courts of their general jurisdiction as Courts of Chancery, over actions for a settlement of the affairs of a partnership.
In the' absence of any special agreement between partners upon the subject, the rule of law is, that partners are to share equally both profits and losses; and the mere fact that partners have put unequal amounts of capital into the common stock, or that one has put in all the capital, and the others only their skill and industry, will make no difference jn the rule.
As a general rule, it is the duty of each partner, during the partnership, to devote himself to the interests of the concern without compensation, unless there is an express agreement that he receive compensation. But when the partnership is dissolved by death, and the survivor expends his time and labor in the care and management of the partnership property, by which its value is enhanced, he should receive compensation for the same, to be deducted out of the profits realized from the enhanced value of the property. A surviving partner, however, is not entitled to pay for services rendered, for merely winding up the affairs of the concern.
When a bill is filed to settle the affairs of a partnership, the partnership transactions of each and all the partners should be taken into account; and the deci-ee should include all these, so as to leave nothing open for future litigation.
Appeal from the District Court, Seventh Judicial District, Sonoma County.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Shattuck, Spencer, & Reichert, for Appellants.
The complaint does not contain facts which constitute a cause of action; and the demurrer should have been sustained. It shows defendants surviving partners by law; they alone could settle the partnership. (Wood’s Dig. 411, Art. 2317, Sec. 198.) And they could only be sued when they had abused then’ trust; but the complaint charges no facts showing abuse. (Story on Part. Secs. 844-346; Collyer on Part, Sec. 129; 3 Kent’s Com. 37; Evans v. Evans, 9 Paige, 178.) And having commenced in the Probate Court, he should have continued there. (Blanton v. King, 2 How., Miss., 861; Carmeischel v. Brawder, 3 Id. 252; Kimball v. Kimball, 19 Ver. 579.)
Wm. Ross and R. Robinson, for Respondent.

Opinion:
Baldwin, J.
delivered the opinion of the Court—Cope, J. concurring.
It seems to us that the report of the referee, and the consequent judgment of the Court, is erroneous in this: That it decrees that the defendants, as surviving partners, are liable for the full amount found to be due of assets collected, or in the hands of these survivors, without regard to the indebtedness of some* $7,500 found to be due in Missouri, on account of the firm operations. We understand that the partnership was formed in Missouri, and comprehended, as well transactions in that State, as in this; and a full settlement should involve and conclude as well transactions there as here. The administrator of the deceased partner, therefore, is not entitled to a decree, irrespective of the firm debts there ; and the survivors would seem to be entitled to retain in their own hands, money, or assets, sufficient to pay this indebtedness, whether due in Missouri, or on contracts made there or here. But if we are mistaken in this, it is obvious that the report of the referee, which seems to be the whole predicate of the decree of the District Court, does not furnish any ground for such decree; for the referee says that it is impossible for him to ascertain the true state of the accounts, or make a full settlement in this respect, in the absence of information as to the amount of the Missouri debts, or by whom they were paid.
Judgment reversed, and cause remanded.