Case Name: Charles M. O'Neil, Respondent, v. Jane Hester, Appellant
Court: New York Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1894-12
Citations: 89 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 432
Docket Number: 
Parties: Charles M. O’Neil, Respondent, v. Jane Hester, Appellant.
Judges: Herrick, J., not acting.
Reporter: Supreme Court Reports (Hun)
Volume: 89
Pages: 432–435

Head Matter:
Charles M. O’Neil, Respondent, v. Jane Hester, Appellant.
The denial of a motion for learn to amend an answer is discretionary ■ — a decision as to a doubtful point of la/w is not a sufficient reason for an amendment ■— laches.
Ah order made by the Special Term of the Supreme Court, denying a motion made by the defendant in an action for leave to amend his answer, rests entirely in the discretion of the Special Term, and unless upon appeal the court can see that there was an abuse of discretion on the part of the Special Term such order will not be reversed.
While newly discovered facts may justify the amendment of a pleading, it is doubtful whether the promulgation of a decision, settling a question of law theretofore unsettled, furnishes any sufficient reason for the allowance of an amendment of a pleading to meet such new conditions.
A delay on the part of a defendant in an action in making a motion to amend his answer may, in the discretion of the judge hearing the motion, furnish a sufficient reason for the denial thereof.
Appeal by the defendant, Jane Hester, from an order of the Supreme Court, made at the Albany Special Term and entered in the office of the clerk of the county of Ulster on the 2d day of July, 1894, denying the defendant’s motion for leave to amend her answer and for an order requiring the plaintiff to reply thereto.
A. T. Olearwater and William O. De Witt, for the appellant.
Brimmier do Newcomb and John E. Y<m Etten, for the respondent.

Opinion:
Mayham, P. J.:
The complaint in substance alleges that Mary Y. O'Neil, at the time of the commencement of this action, was, and for more than twenty years had been, the plaintiff's wife, with whom he lived happily, and that during the years 1887,1888 and 1889, while he was so living with his wife, the defendant, who was his wife's mother, intending to injure plaintiff and deprive him of the comfort, society and aid of his wife, wrongfully induced her to refuse to live and. cohabit with the plaintiff, and to insist upon the plaintiff leaving her house, and by her threats of disinheriting her daughter induced and caused a separation between the plaintiff and his wife, and induced plaintiff's wife to refuse to live and cohabit with him, and claimed damage in the sum of $30,000.
" The original answer in substance denied the allegations of the complaint, alleged that the refusal of plaintiff's wife to live with him was her own voluntary aet, and was not caused or procured by the defendant, alleged want of support by the plaintiff of his wife, and unkind and improper treatment of her by the plaintiff.
The action was once tried, and the trial resulted in a disagreement of the jury. On the case being moved for a second trial the defendant's attorney obtained from the judge holding the Circuit an order to show cause, returnable in term, why the defendant's answer should not be amended by incorporating therein an allegation that the plaintiff and his wife, by an instrument in writing and under seal, dated the 27th day of September, 1889, made a voluntary agreement of separation, and that ever since that time had,, pursuant to that agreement, lived separate and apart, and that the plaintiff had thereby voluntarily relinquished the comfort, society and assistance of his wife.
On the return of that order and on the hearing of that motion the trial judge denied the same, with costs, but without prejudice to the renewal of the same by the defendant. On the 29th day of June, 1894, the defendant renewed the motion to amend her ansiver on notice and all the proceedings in the action, and upon the affidavit, of the defendant's attorney setting forth, among other things, as a-reason for the renewal of the motion, the decision in a recent case promulgated since the decision of the former motion, that such voluntary contract of separation constituted a complete bar to tbe action of tlie plaintiff.
The Special Term again denied her motion, and from tlie order denying the same tlie defendant appeals.
Without stopping to inquire whether'as an original proposition we would have granted the motion to amend, we think that there are two valid reasons why we must affirm this order.
First. The order was, we think, purely in the discretion of tlie judge at Special Term, and unless the court can see that there w'as an abuse of the discretion, an order granting or refusing an application to amend will not be reversed on appeal. (Sayre v. Frazer, 47 Barb. 26; Denis v. Snell, 54 id. 411; Rosenwald v. Hammerstein, 12 Daly, 377.)
There is no pretense in this motion that the existence of the contract proposed to be set up was not known at the time of tlie service of the original answer, which was served several years before, this motion to amend, and while newly discovered facts may sometimes justify the amendment of a pleading, it -is doubtful whether tlie promulgation of a decision settling a question' of law hitherto unsettled, furnishes any sufficient reason for the allowance of an amendment of a pleading to meet such new conditions.
Second. The delay of the defendant in making the motion to amend might, in the discretion of the judge hearing the motion, furnish a sufficient reason in the exercise of his discretion for the denial of this motion. Even if it be held that newly-promulgated law may .furnish a reason for the allowance of an amendment, the motion should be promptly made.
The case to which tlie defendant refers in the moving affidavit was affirmed in January, 1893 (Buckel v. Suss, 21 N. Y. Supp. 907), and the notice of this motion bears date June 14, 1894, a period during which fifteen regular Special Terms had been held in this district at Albany, and four times that number of Special Terms at Chambers in tlie third judicial district, at which this motion might have been heard.
Under such circumstances we cannot hold that the learned, judge at Special Term abused his discretion in denying this motion.
Order affirmed, with ten dollars costs and disbursements.