Case Name: NELLIE DeMOSS v. KANSAS CITY RAILWAYS COMPANY, Appellant
Court: Supreme Court of Missouri
Jurisdiction: Missouri
Decision Date: 1922-12-30
Citations: 296 Mo. 526
Docket Number: 
Parties: NELLIE DeMOSS v. KANSAS CITY RAILWAYS COMPANY, Appellant.
Judges: Graves, Jligbee and Elder, JJ., concur; James T. Blair, J., dissents; Walker, J., dissents in separate opinion in which Woodson, C. J., concurs.
Reporter: Missouri Reports
Volume: 296
Pages: 526–548

Head Matter:
NELLIE DeMOSS v. KANSAS CITY RAILWAYS COMPANY, Appellant.
In Banc,
December 30, 1922.
1. NEGLIGENCE: Automobile: Collision with Street Car: Independent Cause: Skidding. Where it clearly appears from all the evidence that an independent, intervening and efficient cause, over which the defendant street railway company had no control and which its motorman had no reason to anticipate,' namely, the skidding of the automobile as it crashed into the street car which was rounding a curve on a wet and slippery street, was the proximate cause, of the accident, without the intervention of which the collision would not have occurred, plaintiff, who was riding in the automobile, cannot recover damages from the railway company for her consequent personal injuries.
2. -:-: —-: Failure to Sound Gong and Look for Travelers: Independent Cause. A street car, coming from the-south, stopped on the south side of a cross street to discharge and receive passengers. Then the motorman, without sounding the gong and without looking westward for an oncoming automobile in which plaintiff was riding, but looking backward towards the place where passengers were being received, turned quickly westward around the curve into the intersecting street, and just then the automobile crashed into the side of the car. It was broad day, and the street was wet and slippery from rain. The automobile, driven by plaintiff’s husband, its owner, at a speed of from eight to ten miles an hour, was'equipped with chains, but they were not on the wheels. Plaintiff saw the street car when it was seventy-five feet away, saw it suddenly start forward when the automobile was thirty-five or forty feet away, immediately cried out to her husband, who applied the brakes to the automobile, and continued to look at the street car until the automobile crashed into it. She testified that if the automobile had not skidded it would have stopped. Held, that, assuming that the motorman was negligent in not sounding the gong and in not looking westward before starting the street car, his negligence was not the proximate cause of plaintiff’s injuries, but the accident was the result of an independent, intervening and efficient cause, which the motorman had no reason to anticipate, namely, the skidding of the automobile on the wet and slippery street, the general rule being that, although a defendant may be negligent in the performance of some duty owed to the person injured, no liability attaches unless such negligent act was the proximate cause of the injury.
Held, by WALKERi J,, dissenting, with whom WOODSON, C. J., concurs, that there being no issue of contributory negligence, and there being a total failure, of evidence to show that thfe accident was the result of negligence on the part of the driver of the automobile, the conclusion that must flow from all the facts is that the motorman was guilty of negligence, for otherwise the accident would not have happened. And as the street car had stopped on a' track which inclined slightly towards the intersection; the street was slippery from recent rains; without a starting signal, which was customary, the car was suddenly started forward around the curve, which brought -it nearer to the place at which the automobile would have to cross the tracks;"in starting the motorman did not look in the direction of the much-traveled street on which the automobile was approaching; it was his duty to look, and had he looked he would have seen the automobile, and would have realized from its nearness to the crossing and the condition of the streets that it would be difficult to stop it within the intervening distance between it and the crossing; the automobile was approaching the track at a speed of eight to ten miles per hour, and the driver saw the street car standing at. the edge of the curb line, and sounded his horn as a warning of his approach and to indicate his purpose to cross the tracks; to have stopped the automobile, on account of its nearness to the tracks and the condition of the streets, was impossible, these facts and the starting of the street car under such circumstances .were ample evidence to submit the question' of defendant's .negligence to- the jury, and to sustain a verdict for plaintiff.
Appeal from Jackson Circuit Court — Eon. Daniel E. Bird, Judge.
Reversed.
Chmies N. Sadler, E. E. Ball and Louis B. Weiss for appellant.
(1) The court erred in refusing to give the peremptory instructions in the nature of demurrers, requested by defendant. (a) The motorman had a right to as sume .the. automobile would stop. Boyd v. Railroad, 105 Mo. 371, 381; MeCreery v. United Rys., 221 Mo. 18; Lewis y. Met. St. Ry. Co., 181 Mo. App. 421 ; Markowitz vv‘ílailroad,.186 Mo. 358; Hicks v. Citizens Ry. Co., 124 Mb.- 115; Gessner v. Met. St. Ry. Co., 137 Mo. App. 53; Barnard-v. Met. St. Ry. Co., 137 Mo. App. 691; Lawson Legg y. Met. St.- Ry. Co., 154 Mo. App. 290; Dering v. Milwaukee Elec. Ry., 176 N. W. 343. (b) Failure to ring the bell is not negligence when not the proximate cause of accident. Gubernik v. United Rys., 217 S. W. 34; Murray. ,v. Transit Co., 176 Mo. 189; Hutchinson v. Railroad, 195 Mo. 549; Peterson y. Railway Co., 270 Mo. 67-; Barkley'v. Mo. Pac. Ry., 96*Mo. 378. (e) Even if plaintiff had not seen the car and observed it start, failure to ring the bell is not actionable negligence under the-eireumstances. State ex rel. v. Ellison, 271 Mo. 470; Apier. Brewing Assn.-v. Talbott, 141 Mo. 683; Battles v. Railways Co:, 178 Mo. App. 613; Warner v: Railroad, 178'Mb. 125; McGee v. Railroad, 214 Mo. 544; Heintz v.' Transit Co., 115 Mo. App. 667; McManamee v. Mo. Pác. Ry. Co., 135 Mo. 449; McCabe v. Inter. St. Ry., 97 N.-Y. Supp. 353. (2) The court erred in giving plaintiff’s instruction numbered one over the objection of defendant. It authorizes a recovery upon the finding of facts which the evidence conclusively shows was not the proximate cause ’ of' her alleged injuries. Gubernik v. United Rys., 217 S. W. 34; Murray v. Transit Cb., 176 Mcr. 189:;',Barkley, v. -Mo.JPae. Ry., 96 Mo. 378;.Petersom v. Railways Co., 270 Mcr. 67; Hutchinson v. Railroad, 195 Mo. 549.
8. L. Trusty, E. II. Oamble and McCanles, Kennard & Trusty for respondent.
(1) The court did not err in refusing to peremptorily instruct the jury to. find for defendant, because: (a)* The demurrer was general in form. Torrence v. Pryor,’210 S. W. 432; Schinogle .v. B&ughman, 228 S. W.‘ 90Í. (b) Starting’ of the car forward suddenly off the hill into a busy intersection, with.his head turned backwards, without warning, in violation of the .custom to give warning, when the street was slippery, and when the motorman knew that an automobile was* approaching and knew that his car .would ■ swing the curve and .suddenly bring it closer to the automobile, created an' issue of fact for the jury. The issue is the same as if motorman had violated a custom to stop at the crossing: Swinehart v.; Rys. Co.,. 233 S. W. 59; Majors y. K. C. Rys- Co.,- 228 S. W.- 517; McGurgan v. Railroad Co., 106 N. Y. Supp. 201; Lipshitz v. Third Ave. Ry. Co., 179. N. Y. Supp. 631; Hill v. Brooklyn H. Ry. Co., 130 N. Y. Supp. 387; McNamara v. Met, St. Ry. Co., 133 Mo. App. 645; Dahmer v. Met., 136 Mo. App. 448-; Eskridge-v.- - St,.Ry,, 170 Mo. App. 548; Malone v. Rys. Co., 232 S. W- 782; Berkley v. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co., 96 Mo. 378; Weber-v.. Rys-.- Co., 213 S. W. 535-; Rowe v. Hammond, 172 Mo. ■ App. 203; Grillispie v. Pry oí, 204 S. W. 835; Harrington v, Dunham, 273 Mo. 414;. Willinsky v. Nassau Railroad Co., 146 N. Y..Supp, 142; Lackey v. United Rys. Co., -231 Sr W.- 956; Jackels v. Rys. Co., 231 S. W. 1023. (c) There is no plea of contributory negligence and no plea that the driver was guilty of negligence imputable to plaintiff, and there is no issue of .contributory negligence involved, hence if defendant was guilty of any negligence'contributing to the accident the issue was for the jury. Authorities above, (d) By its instruction numbered one defendant admitted liability if the motorman did not see the automobile at the time-he started--his car, and also if automobile was not then in place of safety. This is the theory of plaintiff’s instruction, hence defendant cannot complain. Torrence v. Pryor, 210 S. W. 432; Schinogle v. Baughman, 228 S. W. 901. (e) By its instruction numbered 10 defendant admitted the sufficiency of the evidence under the peril doctrine.. Defendant created the peril. Torrence v. Pryor, 2Í0 S. W., 432 ;■ Schinogle v. Baughman,'228 S. W. 901. (2) The. court .did not err in giving plaintiff’s instruction numbered one, because; (a) Failure to warn and tbe other elements of negligence were submitted in the conjunctive. Mayer v. Railroad, 198 S. W. 839; Rigg v. Railroad, 212 S. W. 878; McIntyre v. Railroad, 227 S. W. 1047; Brossell v. Box Co., 220 S. W. 984. (b) By its instruction numbered one defendant admitted liability if the motorman did not see the automobile at the time he started his car and also if automobile was not at that time in a place of safety, and the jury found against this instruction and defendant’s demurrer was general, (o) Plaintiff’s instruction is in the nature of a peril-doctrine instruction. It required a finding that it was perilous to start the car forward and that the motorman knew such fact when he started the car. Swine-hart v. Rys. Co., 233 S. W. 62. (d) Defendant’s refused instruction numbered 10 admits liability if the motorman knew of the peril in time to have prevented the collision, and plaintiff’s instruction required a finding that the motorman knew of such danger when he started the car and hence knowledge in time to have prevented the collision. Torrence v. Pryor, 210 S. W. 432; Schinogle v. Baughman, 228 S. ~W. 901. (e) The street was slippery, the motorman knew the automobile was approaching, it w'as customary to sound a warning before starting the car, he knew his car would turn the curve in the path of the automobile and quickly shorten the distance and that he was starting down hill, and yet he suddenly started the car forward with his face turned backwards. Authorities under (b) point 1; Dahmer v. Met. St. Ry. Co., 136 Mo. App. 448. (f) The wet and slippery condition of the street was not made the basis of liability, but merely a fact to be found by the jury and one of the elements to be considered in determining whether or not the starting of the car forward under the circumstances shown was calculated to create peril.

Opinion:
DAVID E. BLAIR, J.
The action is in damages for personal injuries. From a judgment for $15,000 in favor of the plaintiff below, defendant has appealed. By reason of a dissent to an opinion written in Di vision Two affirming the judgment below, the case came here, where, after argument anew, the divisional opinion was rejected. In the view we take of the case we need consider only one assignment of error discussed in the divisional opinion, to-wit: The sufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict for plaintiff.
On May 18,1918, at about four or five o 'clock p. m,, plaintiff and her husband, John H. DeMoss, were proceeding eastward upon Fifteenth Street in Kansas City, Missouri, in an automobile owned and operated by Mr. DeMoss, and collided with a street car of defendant at the intersection of Prospect Avenue and said Fifteenth Street.
Defendant operated its cars over both streets by means of double tracks. Fifteenth Street is- approximately level at Prospect, while the latter street is down grade to the north at the intersection. One of defendant's cars moving northward on the east track in Prospect Avenue stopped at the south line of Fifteenth Street to receive and discharge passengers. When it moved forward it turned to the left toward the north track in Fifteenth Street to proceed westward on that street. Just as the street car was rounding the turn the. automobile in which plaintiff was riding crashed into the side of the car near or possibly back of the middle, damaging the automobile and seriously injuring plaintiff.
Plaintiff's evidence tended to show that the down grade in Prospect Avenue caused the street car to move forward more quickly that it would have moved on level ground in making such a turn; that she saw the car standing in Prospect Avenue when the automobile was seventy-five feet away, and that she saw it start forward suddenly when the automobile was about thirty-five or forty feet away. Plaintiff immediately exclaimed to her husband, "Oh, papa," and at the same time he applied the brakes; but the automobile continued to move forward until it struck the street car. • The automobile had no chains on its wheels, although it was equipped ydth them. The pavement was wet and slippery from rain. Plaintiff testified that if the automobile had not skidded it. would have stopped.... The automobile, was-moving nine or ten miles per hour when plaintiff saw the. street car sthrt forward and the. brakes of the auto-; mobile were applied. Plaintiff kept her eye on the-streetcar- from the time she first saw it standing- at. the-south line .of. Fifteenth Street until it. started, forward. ' She. testified that no gong was sounded before, it started,' ánd that the motorman- was looking back in the direction where the loading of the car was taking place and did not look west as he started.the street car. It was broad daylight, and the inferqpce is clear that if the motorman had-.locked to-the west he would have seen the automobile approaching. There was ample room in Prospect. Avenue west of the street car for the automobile. to. turn into that street and. pass the car without striking it
-The negligence relied-upon by plaintiff .was .the starting of the street car forward into the street intersection, without warning and without the motorman looking, west before starting the same, when.the automobile was approaching over a wet and slippery street. The allegations of the petition are rather involved, but the fore^ going is the substance thereof. Plaintiff also attempted to. plead the humanitarian doctrine, but such ground of negligence was abandoned. -, -
There is evidence tending to.show that the street car was moved forward quickly into the turn at the street intersection and directly in the path of the oncoming, automobile, without. preliminary warning and without the -motorman looking to the west immediately. before starting the car. It may be assumed for the purposes, of the case that the motorman was negligent in so doing. The plaintiff saw the street car and must have known it -would start forward as soon as it could. There was evidence -that the gong,is .usually sounded before .starts ing forward under such circumstances. The sounding of the gong was not required to advise plaintiff of the presence of the car, for she had already seen it, but only to advise her that it was about to be started. Let it be further assumed that plaintiff was in the exercise of ordinary care in expecting the street car not to be started forward until the gong had been sounded and until the motorman had looked to the west, although she knew he was looking back as the automobile approached. Nevertheless, it does not follow that plaintiff made a ease for the jury. It clearly appears from her- own evidence and all the evidence upon the point that an independent, intervening and efficient cause, over which defendant had no control and which its motorman had no reason to anticipate — the ski Iding of the automobile — was the proximate cause of the collision without the intervention of which the collision would not have occurred. The street was wet and slippery. Although the automobile -was equipped with chains for its wheels, the same were not in use. When the brakes were applied, the speed of the automobile was not sufficiently checked to avoid a collision. The brakes doubtless took hold and stopped the revolution of the wheels, but the momentum of.the automobile carried it forward by reason of the wheels sliding or skidding over the wet pavement. Plaintiffs testified "If it had not skidded, it would have stopped." The inference is, therefore, conclusive that, under ordinary conditions, the automobile could have, and reasonably should have been expected to be, stopped or turned into- Prospect Avenue in less than thirty-five or forty feet when going at a speed4 óf nine or ten miles per hour and after the street car was seen to start forward and indicate that it would immediately obstruct that part of the street upon which the automobile was proceeding eastward.
. If the motorman had looked to the west at the moment he started the street car, he would have seen an automobile approaching at such a distance and at such a speed that it could reasonably be expected to be stopped or turned before reaching the street car. He bad no means of knowing that ordinary precautions to put on chains bad not been observed and therefore could not have anticipated that the automobile was liable not to respond to its brakes for that reason. The automobile had no superior right in the street. The motorman had the right to assume that the driver of the car would use ordinary care and hence, if he had sounded the gong and had looked to the west before starting his car and had then seen the automobile approaching, he would have been guilty of no negligence, under the circumstances, in starting his car and assuming that the automobile would be seasonably brought to a stop or turned aside.
The general rule is that "although a defendant may be negligent in the performance of some duty owed to the person injured, no liability attaches unless such negligent act was the proximate cause of the injury." [29 Cyc. 488; Stepp v. Ry. Co., 85 Mo. l. c. 233.] "If the injury could not have been reasonably anticipated as the probable result of the act of negligence, such act is either remote or no cause of injury." [29 Cyc. 495; Daneschocky v. Sieble, 195 Mo. App. 470.] If injury could not reasonably have been anticipated as the result of the negligence, save for the intervention of an independent, efficient cause, the intervention of which could not have been anticipated by the person guilty of the negligence, there can be no recovery.
Division Two very recently decided a case where these principles of law were applied to a state of facts somewhat comparable with those in the case at bar. [Borack v. Mosler Safe Company, 231 S. W. 623.] There the conceded negligence of the driver of a heavy truck in turning his team to the left of the center of intersecting streets, in violation of an ordinance, was held not to be the proximate cause of the death of plaintiff's husband, due to a blow from the end of the wagon tongue which swung violently to one side by reason of the fall against it of one of the horses, resulting from a heavy jolt and the slippery condition of the street.
Onr conclusion is that plaintiff failed to make out a case for the jury and the judgment is therefore reversed.
Graves, Jligbee and Elder, JJ., concur; James T. Blair, J., dissents; Walker, J., dissents in separate opinion in which Woodson, C. J., concurs.