Case Name: Lindley v. Crider, Sheriff
Court: Arkansas Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Arkansas
Decision Date: 1954-02-22
Citations: 223 Ark. 200
Docket Number: 4761
Parties: Lindley v. Crider, Sheriff.
Judges: 
Reporter: Arkansas Reports
Volume: 223
Pages: 200–206

Head Matter:
Lindley v. Crider, Sheriff.
4761
265 S. W. 2d 498
Opinion delivered February 22, 1954.
Rex W. Perkins, E. J. Ball and W. B. Putman, for petitioner.
Tom Gentry, Attorney General and Thorp Thomas, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.

Opinion:
Griffin Smith, Chief Justice.
In an extradition proceeding responsive to a requisition by the chief executive of Missouri, Governor Cherry issued his writ to the sheriff of Washington County, directing the arrest of Lester Lindley. Lindley sought release through writ of habeas corpus. From an adverse ruling the record was brought here by certiorari.
Error is urged in two respects: First, it is insisted that the petitioner's rights were prejudiced when the court excluded some of the exhibits accompanying the requisition. Secondly, exception is taken to the court's holding that Lindley was the man named in the extradition proceedings. The latter assignment includes the defendant's contention that he is not a fugitive from justice, therefore not subject to the extradition process.
The criminal charge grew out of issuance by Walter Easley of a check payable to Bisig & Kretzer. It was signed "Lester Lindley, by Walter Easley" and bore the following certificate: "I hereby claim that I have the above amount in [the First National Bank, at Spring-dale, Ark.] at this time, and will leave the same on deposit there subject to this check upon presentation."
It is Lindley's contention that he was not in Missouri when the check was drawn, and that he did not authorize Easley to use his name. The check was given for "trailer repairs."
Section 43-3006, Ark. Stat's, authorizes the Governor to surrender to the demanding state any person charged with having committed a criminal act . . . in a third state, intentionally resulting in a crime in the state whose chief executive authority issues the requisition; "and the provisions of this Act not otherwise inconsistent shall apply to such cases, notwithstanding that the accused was not in that state at the time of the commission of the crime, and has not fled therefrom. ' '
We said in State ex rel. Herbert Lewis, Sheriff v. Allen, 194 Ark. 688, 109 S. W. 2d 952, that if the circuit judge had authority to entertain the petition . it could be considered for two purposes only: First, to establish the identity of the prisoner, and secondly to determine whether he was a fugitive. "These questions," says the opinion, "are primarily for the Governor of the asylum state, and where the requisition shows the necessary facts to entitle the demanding state to the return of the alleged fugitive, the two questions stated are the only ones to be considered."
The defendant's contention that he is falsely accused is not for the court's consideration when the cause is heard in response to the writ of habeas. corpus.
It was contended in Letwick v. State, 211 Ark. 1, 198 S. W. 2d 830, that identity of the prisoner had not been sufficiently established. Judge Frank G. Smith, in writing the opinion, pointed to this statement in the Lewis-Alien case: "The Governor of Arkansas, by his act in honoring the requisition, found that appellee was a fugitive from justice. In this state of the case the rule seems to be that before [the prisoner] would be entitled to a discharge by court order the evidence would have to be practically conclusive in his favor. ' ' [Munsey v. Clough, 196 U. S. 364, 25 S. Ct. 282, 49 L. Ed. 516].
In the Munsey case, supra, Mr. Justice Peckham, speaking for the U. S. Supreme Court, said that proceedings before a governor on petition for extradition "are summary in their nature . . . Strict common law evidence is not necessary." This evidence "must at least be satisfactory to the mind of the Governor." But the holding in Hyatt v. People ex rel. Cochran, 188 U. S. 691, 23 S. Ct. 456, 47 L. Ed. 657, is that the extradition warrant is but prima facie sufficient to hold the accused; that it is open to the petitioner, on habeas corpus proceedings, to show that he was absent from the demanding state at the time the crime was committed, hence could not be a fugitive from justice.
In 1935 Arkansas adopted the uniform extradition act. Section 6 appears as § 43-3006, Ark. Stat's. The construction given this section is shown in Uniform Laws, Ann., vol. 9, p. 192 et seq. Almost without exception it is held that an extradition provision such as § 6 falls within a state's police power and is not violative of the federal constitution.
Our conclusion is that the tender of some of the exhibits accompanying the Missouri executive's requisition did not overcome the prima facie verity attaching to Governor Cherry's action in directing that the accused be delivered to the demanding state; nor did a misprision in the writ's language militate against the executive's obvious intent. Neither are we able to say that evidence before the circuit court was not sufficient to identify the petitioner as the person named in the charges.
It follows that the judgment refusing to discharge the prisoner was correct. Affirmed.