Case Name: SAFETY CASUALTY CO. v. WRIGHT et al.
Court: Supreme Court of Texas
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1942-01-14
Citations: 160 S.W.2d 238
Docket Number: No. 7768
Parties: SAFETY CASUALTY CO. v. WRIGHT et al.
Judges: 
Reporter: South Western Reporter Second Series
Volume: 160
Pages: 238–245

Head Matter:
SAFETY CASUALTY CO. v. WRIGHT et al.
No. 7768.
Supreme Court of Texas.
Jan. 14, 1942.
Rehearing Granted Feb. 18, 1942.
Further Rehearing Denied March 25, 1942.
Vinson, Elkins, Weems & Francis and C. M. Hightower, all of Houston, and Mc-Comb & Davis, of Conroe, for plaintiff in error.
Pitts & Liles, of Conroe, ahd Campbell & Foreman, of Livingston, for defendants in error.

Opinion:
CRITZ, Justice.
This is a workmen's compensation case. On July 22, 1938, Valentine C. Wright received burns which resulted in his death two days later. At the time of his injury Wright was an employee of Magnolia Pipe Line Company. Safety Casualty Company was such employer's compensation insurance carrier. Mrs. Daisy Wright, surviving widow of Valentine C. Wright, deceased, on behalf of herself, and on behalf of the three minor children of herself and the deceased, duly filed claim for compensation with the Industrial Accident Board. Such Board denied compensation, and Mrs. Wright in her own behalf, and as next friend of the minor children, filed this suit in the District Court of Montgomery County, Texas, against the above-named insurance carrier to recover compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Laws of this State. Trial in the district court, where the case was submitted to the jury on special issues, resulted in a verdict and judgment for Mrs. Wright et al. This judgment was affirmed by the Court of Civil Appeals. 140 S.W.2d 923. Safety Casualty Company brings error.
In response to Special Issue No. 1 of the court's charge,, the jury found that Wright was acting within the course of his employment' with Magnolia Pipe Line Company at the time he received the burns which resulted in his death. By proper assignment the casualty company contends that there is no evidence in this record to sustain the above finding. Such company further contends that the undisputed facts of this record affirmatively show that Wright was not acting within the course of his employment with the above-named employer at such time. These contentions make it necessary for us to make an extended statement of the facts.
The material facts of this record, as established by the verdict of the jury, show: That at the time of his injury Wright was employed by Magnolia Pipe Line Company as a pipe line walker; that at such time the above-named company owned and operated an oil pipe line, a section of which lay between the City of Con-roe, in Montgomery County, and the Trinity River; that Wright's duties required him to walk this pipe line between the above two points, a distance of about fifty-two miles, once each week; that Wright was required to repair any leaks that he might find in the above line, and for that purpose was required to carry certain tools; that necessarily these tools would have to be carried back after the end of the section of the line walked had been reached; that Wright lived with his wife and children in Cleveland, which was about midway between the ends of the section of the pipe line Wright was employed to walk and keep in repair; that the pipe line company had a station in Cleveland from which Wright would usually depart in the morning when he left to walk the pipe line; that Wright would return to such station in the afternoon, or when he got back from walking the pipe line, and make his report; that Wright usually started out to walk the pipe line about six o'clock in the morning, and did so on the day he received these fatal burns; that the pipe line company did not furnish Wright any means of travel in going to the pipe line and coming back after. he had completed his walking thereof; that the pipe line company allowed Wright $15 per month expenses; that the pipe line company did not attempt to exercise any manner of control over Wright's means of travel in going to and coming from the pipe line; that in such instances he was allowed to choose his own mode and means of-travel; that in such instances Wright sometimes used his own car, sometimes walked, -sometimes caught a ride, and sometimes rode the public bus, which ran for quite a distance parallel with and near to the pipe line; that Wright's employer knew that he used all of the above means of travel and approved the same; that Wright had a pass over the bus line above mentioned, which the pipe line company had assisted him in obtaining; that on the day he was injured Wright began walking the pipe line some four miles from Cleveland, and walked to Conroe; that on reaching Con-roe, Wright boarded the bus above mentioned, intending to ride thereon back to the point on the pipe line where he had begun walking in the morning, and that when such point was reached Wright intended to get off of the bus and walk the pipe line back to the station at Cleveland, where he would make his report. At this point, we think we are justified in concluding that Wright had his tools with him in returning to the point above designated.
The testimony further shows that when the bus on which Wright was riding reached a point about midway between Conroe and Cleveland something happened to the bus which caused it to stop. It was during this stop that Wright received the burns which caused his death.
The testimony is somewhat conflicting as to just how and where Wright received his burns. In regard to such matter the record presents two distinct and very divergent theories, viz.:
(a) According to the statement of the deceased, made very shortly after the accident, it was shown: That when the bus* stopped it was discovered that its gas line was broken and leaking gasoline from such break; that the bus driver asked Wright to get under the bus and stop the leak; that Wright attempted to comply with such request, and went under the bus in an effort to do so; that while Wright was under the bus the driver struck a match and threw it on the place where the gasoline which had leaked from the broken gas line had accumulated; that such lighted match caused the gasoline to explode; and that such explosion blew Wright almost out from under the bus, and fatally burned him.
(b) According to the testimony of the bus driver it was shown: That when .the bus 'stopped he investigated the cause and found that the gas line was broken; that gasoline was leaking,from such break; that he secured a wooden plug or pin and started to get under the bus to drive the plug into the broken end of the gas line; that Wright insisted that he be permitted to get under the bus and stop the leak; that Wright took the plug, got under the bus, and found another leak farther back; that Wright then got out from under the bus; that he, the driver, then decided to catch a ride to Conroe or Cleveland to get help; that he, the driver, then stepped in front of the bus;,that when he did so Wright was standing on the right-hand side of the bus by the door; that.Wright then reached in his pocket to get his tobacco and get a match to light his pipe; that Wright then let his hand drop beside him, and the explosion happened. At this point, we think that the record taken as a whole justifies the conclusion that Wright's clothing was ignited, causing .him to be fatally burned. We here, quote the following facts found by the Court of Civil Appeals in its opinion on motion for rehearing [140 S.W.2d 927] :
"(1) That the accident happened on-Thursday about 3 o'clock in the afternoon and from the point where deceased intended to get off of the bus and walk the line to the Magnolia pump station at Cleveland, Texas, was a distance of some 3 or 4 miles. Under deceased's contract of employment he was not required to walk this portion of the pipe line that afternoon, but could have walked it the next day, Friday, or on Saturday, because he had walked the east end from Cleveland to the Trinity River the first part of the week. With the exception of this portion of the line deceased's entire section of 52 miles had been covered that week.
"(2) The Magnolia Pipe Line Company did not require deceased to return to Cleveland at the end of each day, but he was privileged to spend the nights away from home, and had- spent the nights at Trinity River (the terminus of the east end of his line) and at Conroe (the terminus of the west end of the line). However he was frequently called out at night to assist in emergency repairs on the line, and as he resided at Cleveland, which was near the middle of the section of line he had to cover, and lived near the pipe line station he practically all of the time returned to his home at Cleveland to be on hand if called suddenly for extra services. This was known by the agent at Cleveland. The times he spent the night at the river or at Conroe were during the first four years of his service when he rode horseback over the line' — he had been constantly performing this service for nineteen years.
"(3) The bus which deceased was riding when he was injured was owned by one C. D. Thomas. Lawrence Pate was the driver and it was his duty to keep the bus in repair. The Magnolia Pipe Line Company had no interest in or control over the bus, or its operation, and the company did not require deceased to assist in repairing it, but the company did know that deceased used the bus in the discharge of his duties to the company, and made no objections to such use. It left deceased free to arrange his schedule of walking the pipe line, and free to choose his methods in getting over the line. The injury occurred on .Highway No. 105 which ran near to and practically parallel with the pipe line for a great part of the distance between Conroe and Cleveland. The accident was at a point on the highway some 11 miles from the place where deceased intended to get off of the bus and resume walking the pipe line back to Cleveland."
Under the above record, the casualty company contends that Wright was not in the course of his employment with Magnolia Pipe Line Company when he received the burns which caused his death. If that is true this judgment cannot stand. It is only injuries received in the course of employment that are compensable under our Workmen's Compensation statutes.
Before proceeding further we deem it advisable to state certain rules of law which we think control the decision of this case. Such rules are as follows:
1. It is the general rule that an employee is not regarded as within the course of his employment while merely going and returning from his work over and along the public streets or highways. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Flanagan, 134 Tex. 374, 136 S.W.2d 210. But where, in the performance of his work, an employee is required to travel from place to place, the means of travel being immaterial to his employer, an injury received while so traveling is ordinarily compensable. 45 Tex.Jur., p. 486. In this connection, it is the law that an injury received by an employee while traveling on a public street or highway is regarded as received in the course of employment, if such employee at the time of injury, was engaged upon an errand on behalf of his employer, and within the scope of his employment. Southern Casualty Co. v. Ehlers, Tex.Civ.App., 14 S.W.2d 111; Smith v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 129 Tex. 573, 105 S.W.2d 192. In the last cited case it is held that if a servant, in the course of his master's business, has to use a public street or highway, he is in the course of his employment in making such use.
2. An injury sustained by an employee in the. course of his employment "shall include all other injuries of every kind and character having to do with and originating in the work, business, trade or profession of the employer received by an employé while engaged in or about the furtherance of the affairs or business of his employer whether upon the employer's premises or elsewhere." Article 8309, § 1, Subdiv. 4, R.C.S.1925, Vernon's Ann. Civ.St. art. 8309, § 1, subd. 4.
3. An injury arises out of employment, within the meaning of Article 8309, Subdiv. 4, supra, when there is a causal connection between the conditions under which the work is required to be performed and the resulting injury. In this connection, it may be said that a risk is incidental to employment when it belongs to or is connected with what a workman has to do in performing his contract of service. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Cobb, Tex.Civ.App., 118 S.W.2d 375, writ refused. Maryland Casualty Co. v. Smith, Tex.Civ.App., 40 S.W.2d 913. Stated in another way, "an injury has to do with, and arises out of, the work or business of the employer, when it results from a risk or hazard which is necessarily or ordinarily or reasonably inherent in or incident to the conduct of such work or business." Lumbermen's Reciprocal Ass'n v. Behnken, 112 Tex. 103, 246 S.W. 72, 73, 28 A.L.R. 1402.
4. Under our compensation statutes, to entitle an injured employee to compensation, it is not required that he be discharging some specific duty connected with his employment at the time of injury. In regard to such matter, it is sufficient if it is shown that the risk was incidental to the work being performed. Of course, the exceptions contained in Article 8309, supra, must be observed. Federal Surety Co. v. Ragle, Tex.Com.App., 40 S.W.2d 63; 45 Tex.Jur., p. 466, Note 9.
When we come to view this record in the light of the above-stated rules of law, we are unable to say that the jury's finding that Wright was acting in the course of his employment for. Magnolia Pipe Line Company at the time he received his fatal burns is without any support in the record, or that such finding is contrary to the undisputed facts contained in the record. Even if it should be held that if Wright went under the bus in question here to stop a leaking gas line thereon and received his injuries while engaged in such undertaking, he, during such time, departed from the course of his employment with Magnolia Pipe Line Company, a point we do not decide, still we would be unable to say that the casualty company is not liable in this action, because there is evidence in this record which would justify a fact conclusion that Wright's injuries were received after he had completed his operations under the bus, and resumed his status as a passenger thereof. In this connection, it is true that the evidence does not show that Wright had actually gotten back in the bus, but it would not run, and we do not think that it was necessary for him to actually reboard it in order to occupy the status of a passenger if he occupied such status before it stopped.
Finally, we are of the opinion that the facts above recited are sufficient, in law, to support a fact finding that Wright was acting within the course of his employment with Magnolia Pipe Line Company within the meaning of Subdivision 4, Article 8309, supra, while he was a passenger of the bus here involved. We think there is no escape from this conclusion, because (a) his employment required him to travel from place to place; (b) his injury arose while so traveling and resulted therefrom; and (c) the risk he incurred was incidental to and arose out of his traveling.
In making his closing argument to the jury one of counsel for the plaintiffs made the following statement:
"Let's see about Jim Sanders. He said Jim Sanders has been on juries from time to time. Was Jim Sanders trying to do something unlawful? No. Could he have sat on this jury? He was honest enough to say, 'I know too much about it. Let me off.' If Jim Sanders is not the kind of a man the jury can believe, then Camy Hightower (of counsel for appellant) you could have put somebody on the stand that would testify he can't be believed.
"You go to messing with these railroads and insurance companies and these big-corporations and I be darned if they don't smoke you out of the country if you don't fight them from day light to dark.
"They even brought a man that went to. work in October. He didn't testify, but he was willing."
No objection was made to the above argument at the time it was made or thereafter during 'the actual trial. It was assigned as error in the motion fo.r new trial' filed by the casualty company.
In our opinion the argument ini regard to the witness, Sanders, was justified by the manner and contents of his-cross examination as a witness by counsel for the casualty company. We approve-the holding of the Court of Civil Appeals-in regard to this portion of the argument..
The balance of the argument was improper. All litigants stand equal before our courts. It is improper for any argument to be made to the jury which, would tend to excite passion or prejudice-against any litigant as a class. In spite of this we think this matter presents no. reversible error. The argument should have been objected to at the time it was-made. Had this been done its harmful effect, if any, could have been removed by proper instruction by the. trial court to the-jury.
The judgments of the Court of Civi-l-i Appeals and district court are both affirmed.