Case Name: PALM CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. Porter W. HOMER, as County Manager, Tax Assessor and Tax Collector of Dade County, Florida, political subdivision of the State of Florida, et al., Respondents
Court: Florida Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1972-04-26
Citations: 261 So. 2d 822
Docket Number: No. 40886
Parties: PALM CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. Porter W. HOMER, as County Manager, Tax Assessor and Tax Collector of Dade County, Florida, political subdivision of the State of Florida, et al., Respondents.
Judges: ROBERTS, C. J., and ADKINS and Mc-CAIN, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 261
Pages: 822–826

Head Matter:
PALM CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. Porter W. HOMER, as County Manager, Tax Assessor and Tax Collector of Dade County, Florida, political subdivision of the State of Florida, et al., Respondents.
No. 40886.
Supreme Court of Florida.
April 26, 1972.
Rehearing Denied June 1, 1972.
Lucien C. Proby, Jr., and Edward A. Stern, of Pallot, Silver, Pallot, Stern, Pro-by & Adkins, Miami, for petitioner.
Stuart Simon, Dade County Atty., and Gary S. Brooks, Asst. County Atty., for respondents.

Opinion:
DEKLE, Justice.
Petition for certiorari is before us in this cause asserting conflict with Walter v. Shuler, 176 So.2d 81 (Fla.1965). There is conflict for jurisdiction here under Fla. Const. art. V, § 4, F.S.A.
Petitioner (taxpayer-property owner) seeks review of the decision of the Third District Court of Appeal at 243 So.2d 641 (1971), reversing the trial court's finding from the evidence of a valuation different from the assessment and the consequent reduction of the property owner's 1968 taxes on a shopping center in Miami Beach. The able and experienced trial judge based his determination principally upon the assessor's failure to apply all of the criteria in accordance with this Court's opinions in Walter v. Shuler, supra, and City of Tampa v. Colgan, 121 Fla. 218, 163 So. 577 (1935).
Fla.Stat. § 193.011, F.S.A., (brought forward from § 193.021) sets forth the required criteria to be considered by a tax assessor in determining a property assessment. One of these is the income from the property. This is a factor which is particularly applicable to business properties such as shopping centers; yet this important consideration was admittedly not used by the assessor in this instance. The reason given for not doing so was that the property owner refused voluntarily to submit its income from the shopping center to the assessor for his consideration.
If there are adequate data available for an assessor's use in applying the income or economic approach he should do so even though he does not have the property owner's actual income figures. These may not be available or may not be divulged for tax reasons or privilege affecting the matter. So long as the income approach is validly applied in good faith by the assessor to the best of his ability under the circumstances, e. g., as it may be generally known from related businesses or recognized appraisal formulae, then his assessment can not be invalidated just because it later develops at trial upon actual income figures being made available, that the taxpayer's information would belatedly change the result. But to refuse to consider the income criterion solely because the taxpayer declines to supply his figures, fails to comply with the statute.
The assessor's assigned reason why he did not use an income criterion was that the property owner would not furnish it unconditionally for use. This alone is not sufficient. We cannot agree with his position that the income approach for assessment need not be used though required by the statute unless the property owner provides voluntarily his income figures for computation. This may be desirable, if both parties agree, in arriving at a fair assessment but there is no requirement for the property owner to make such revelation as a predicate to its consideration in line with Fla.Stat. § 193.011, F.S.A. The taxpayer may, however, suffer the consequences of unreasonably withholding such information. He can not in a later suit to change a valid assessment, benefit from his wrongful refusal by belatedly offering his income information, provided the assessor, after reasonably demanding such information and being refused, has in good faith applied such general income data as was applicable and available to him.
The assessment here, however, was primarily on a replacement cost basis less the depreciation, with the land being based upon a square foot basis, according to the tax assessor. In the light of failure by the assessor to use the very pertinent criterion of income applicable here, the trial judge was well justified in finding that the assessment did not satisfy legal requirements, and in fixing a proper assessment which included consideration of the omitted income factor based upon evidence of it offered at trial.
Certiorari is accordingly granted; the District Court opinion is quashed with directions to reinstate the final judgment.
It is so ordered.
ROBERTS, C. J., and ADKINS and Mc-CAIN, JJ., concur.
ERVIN, J., dissents with opinion.
SPECTOR, District Court Judge, dissents with opinion.
. The income was tendered but upon condition that the assessor advise how it would be treated or used, to which the assessor did not agree.