Case Name: STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Donald DUHART, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 2002-02-06
Citations: 810 So. 2d 972
Docket Number: No. 4D01-1343
Parties: STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Donald DUHART, Appellee.
Judges: POLEN, C.J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 810
Pages: 972–975

Head Matter:
STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Donald DUHART, Appellee.
No. 4D01-1343.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
Feb. 6, 2002.
Rehearing Denied April 2, 2002.
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and James J. Carney, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellant.
Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and Paul E. Petillo, Assistant Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellee.

Opinion:
SHAHOOD, J.
Appellant, State of Florida, appeals an order granting appellee's motion to suppress. Holding that the trial court abused its discretion in granting appellee's motion to suppress, we reverse and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
In this case, the state charged appellee, Donald Duhart, by information with grand theft of a motorcycle. Appellee filed a motion to suppress the motorcycle that was seized, as well as any statements he may have made to the law enforcement officers.
At the hearing on the motion, the arresting officer testified that he was dispatched to appellee's residence after receiving an anonymous call that a black male was in his garage removing parts from a stolen motorcycle. The caller gave a specific address and indicated that the black male was not wearing a shirt. Upon arriving at the address, the officer observed appellee and one other person removing parts from a motorcycle. Appellee did not have a shirt on.
The officer approached appellee, asked him for identification, and asked whether he had a title to the motorcycle. Appellee answered that he did not, so the officer entered the garage without a search warrant or appellee's invitation to do so. The officer retrieved the Vehicle Identification Number (VIN) from the motorcycle. After running the number through the teletype, the officer confirmed with the Fort Lauderdale Police Department that the motorcycle was stolen out of Fort Lauder-dale. Thereafter, he placed appellee under arrest and read him his Miranda rights. Based on this evidence, the trial court granted appellee's motion to suppress.
In considering whether one's Fourth Amendment rights have been violated, the analysis is whether that person has a "constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy." Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967). Although it is well settled that one has an expectation of privacy in his home or its curtilage, the Fourth Amendment is not necessarily a protection in areas of the home, as in this case, which are open and exposed to public view. See, e.g., Koehler v. State, 444 So.2d 1032 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984)(no expectation of privacy on unenclosed front porch which was exposed to public view); State v. Detlefson, 335 So.2d 371 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976)(no reasonable expectation of privacy on front porch of home where delivery men and others were free to observe plants thereon).
In this case, although the area where appellee was working was repeatedly referred to as a garage, the officer actually described it as a covered open area that was attached to the house, more like a carport. Appellee could not have had a reasonable expectation of privacy under these circumstances.
Both the Florida Supreme Court and the United States Supreme Court have held that a vehicle registration number on the outside of a vehicle is considered to be in plain view, even if one must use a flashlight or bend down to view the numbers. See Ramer v. State, 530 So.2d 915, 918 (Fla.l988)(citing New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 106 S.Ct. 960, 89 L.Ed.2d 81 (1986))(looking under the car to obtain the VIN number is not a factor which makes the search unreasonable).
Hence, since the officer was lawfully on the premises and the VIN number was in plain view, appellee's Fourth Amendment rights were not violated. Consequently, the seizure was valid and the trial court erred in granting appellee's motion to suppress.
REVERSED AND REMANDED FOR PROCEEDINGS CONSISTENT WITH THIS OPINION.
POLEN, C.J., concurs.
KLEIN, J., dissents with opinion.