Case Name: Anna (Annie) Mae MENARD, et al. v. CITY OF LAFAYETTE, et al.
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 2001-05-23
Citations: 786 So. 2d 354
Docket Number: No. 01-4
Parties: Anna (Annie) Mae MENARD, et al. v. CITY OF LAFAYETTE, et al.
Judges: Court composed of NED E. DOUCET, Jr., Chief Judge, ULYSSES GENE THIBODEAUX and MICHAEL G. SULLIVAN, Judges.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 786
Pages: 354–361

Head Matter:
Anna (Annie) Mae MENARD, et al. v. CITY OF LAFAYETTE, et al.
No. 01-4.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Third Circuit.
May 23, 2001.
Rehearing Denied June 27, 2001.
Armand J. Brinkhaus, Olivier and Brinkhaus, Sunset, LA, Counsel for Plaintiffs/Appellants Anna (Annie) Mae Me-nard, et al.
Patrick B. Mclntire, Oats & Hudson, Lafayette, LA, Counsel for Defendant/Ap-pellee State of Louisiana, Department of Transportation and Development.
Michael D. Hebert, Steven Joseph Du-puis, Jr., Lafayette, LA, Counsels for Defendant/Appellee City of Lafayette.
Court composed of NED E. DOUCET, Jr., Chief Judge, ULYSSES GENE THIBODEAUX and MICHAEL G. SULLIVAN, Judges.

Opinion:
I t SULLIVAN, Judge.
Plaintiffs appeal the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the Louisiana Department of Transportation and Development and the City of Lafayette. For the following reasons, we affirm.
Facts
On January 5, 1995, Russell Comeaux was killed in an automobile accident at the intersection of Bertrand Drive and Banks Avenue in the City of Lafayette, Louisiana. He is survived by Plaintiffs, his wife, Anna Mae Menard Comeaux, and their three children.
Just prior to this accident, Mr. Comeaux was traveling in the northbound lane of Banks Avenue approaching the Bertrand Drive intersection. Mrs. Comeaux was traveling in another vehicle behind him. The intersection of Bertrand Drive and Banks Avenue was controlled by a stop sign on Banks Avenue. Bertrand Drive, a four-lane highway divided by a grass median, is owned by the Louisiana Department of Transportation and Development (DOTD). Banks Avenue is a two-lane undivided road owned by the City of Lafayette (the City). At the intersection of Banks and Bertrand, Banks runs in a north-south direction and Bertrand is angled at a northwest-southeast direction. Mr. Comeaux was traveling in the northbound lane of Banks as he approached Bertrand from the south. Approximately one-tenth of a mile before its intersection with Bertrand, Banks had a "stop ahead" sign. The accident occurred when Mr. Comeaux drove into the intersection without slowing down or stopping and his vehicle was struck by an oncoming car that was traveling southeast on Bertrand.
Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit naming the City and DOTD as Defendants. On or about February 9, 1999, the City filed a motion for summary judgment. DOTD filed La motion for summary judgment on February 3, 2000. A hearing was held on both motions on February 22, 2000. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court left the record open for sixty days to allow Plaintiffs to retain an expert. On May 22, 2000, Plaintiffs filed the affidavit of Roy W. Anderson, their expert, into the record of this matter. Thereafter, on August 8, 2000, the trial court granted both motions for summary judgment.
Summary Judgment
Appellate courts review summary judgments de novo, under the same criteria which govern a district court's consideration of the appropriateness of summary judgment. See Potter v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n of Scotlandville, 615 So.2d 318 (La.1993). Thus, appellate courts use the criteria used by trial courts when determining whether summary judgment is appropriate. Sehroeder v. Board of Sup'rs, 591 So.2d 342 (La.1991). The appellate court must determine whether "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to material fact, and that mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." La.Code Civ.P. art. 966(B). Summary judgment may be granted only if the mover has proved that no genuine issues of material fact exist and that the mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. La.Code Civ.P. art. 966. Despite the legislative mandate now favoring summary judgments, "factual inferences reasonably drawn from the evidence must be construed in favor of the party opposing the motion, and all doubt must be resolved in the opponent's favor." Willis v. Medders, 00-2507, p. 2 (La.12/8/00); 775 So.2d 1049, 1050.
| aCause-in-Fact
Plaintiffs allege in their petition that Defendants are liable to them for Mr. Co-meaux's death because the intersection was hazardous and was inadequately marked as there was no semaphore signal and/or the stop sign was inadequate and/or there were no marks or stripes. At the hearing on the motions for summary judgment, the trial court observed that Plaintiffs had not presented any evidence proving that the design of the intersection or lack of a signal was a cause-in-fact of the accident. The trial court further observed that, while the evidence indicated there had been "an inordinate number" of accidents at the intersection in question, he had reservations that the high number of accidents alone was sufficient "to require additional signing or a change in design" or to establish that the "albeit bad intersection was the cause of the accident."
In Duncan v. Kansas City Southern Ry. Co., 00-66, p. 4 (La.10/30/00); 773 So.2d 670, 675-76, the supreme court set forth the four factors which must be present for a plaintiff to establish liability on the part of another:
In order to determine whether liability exists under the facts of a particular case, our Court has adopted a duty-risk analysis. Under this analysis, plaintiff must prove that the conduct in question was a cause-in-fact of the resulting harm, the defendant owed a duty of care to the plaintiff, the requisite duty was breached by the defendant and the risk of harm was within the scope of protection afforded by the duty breached. Syne v. Schilhab, 96-1027, p. 4-5 (La.5/20/97); 693 So.2d 1173, 1176-77; Berry v. State, Through Dept. of Health and Human Resources, 93-2748, p. 4 (La.5/23/94); 637 So.2d 412, 414; Mundy v. Dept. of Health and Human Res., 620 So.2d 811, 813 (La.1993). Under the duty-risk analysis, all four inquiries must be affirmatively answered for plaintiff to recover. Mathieu v. Imperial Toy Corp., 94-0952, p. 4 (La.11/30/94); 646 So.2d 318, 322.
On the issue of causation, Plaintiffs submitted the affidavit of Roy W. Anderson, them expert witness. Mr. Anderson concluded:
RMy analysis of the foregoing, particularly the speed limits on both streets, the high traffic volume on Bertrand, the curvature of Bertrand approaching Banks, the width of Bertrand, and the absence of a traffic signal at Banks/Bertrand with nothing more than a stop sign on Banks, more likely than not, had there been a traffic signal at the intersection this accident would not have occurred.
Inadequate or improper intersection signals may create an unusually hazardous risk to a driver exercising "ordinary care and prudence, [and] DOTD may be liable for damage caused by that hazardous condition." Burge v. City of Hammond, 509 So.2d 151, 156 (La.App. 1 Cir.), writ denied, 513 So.2d 285 (La.1987). "However, the duty owed by DOTD does not include the obligation to protect a plaintiff against harm which would not have occurred but for the grossly negligent operation of the motor vehicle by plaintiff." Id. In Burge, the plaintiff stopped at a flashing red light, then proceeded into an intersection where she was hit by another vehicle. Liability against DOTD was asserted on the basis that the red flashing signal created an unreasonable risk of harm. In finding no liability on the part of DOTD, the court stated in part:
In the area of signals it is probably true that DOTD could always do more. However, it is an unreasonable burden to make DOTD liable for additional signals where the plaintiff involved does not heed those that are present.... We hold that the department's duty to maintain highways in a reasonably safe condition which includes adequate signing and signaling does not extend to the risk of a plaintiff whose injury is caused by her own gross negligence and inattention to a properly working, clearly visible, traffic signal.
Id. at 157.
On the issue of causation, the court concluded:
We know of no jurisprudential presumption to the effect that had additional or different signals been used the driver would have obeyed them or that the failure of the state to provide additional or different signalization of the intersection is always the cause of an accident occurring at that intersection.
Jit-
ln. Lamaire v. Motor Convoy, Inc., 625 So.2d 638 (La.App. 3 Cir.1993); writs denied sub nom. Lemaire v. Stewart, 93-2778 (La. 1/7/94); 632 So.2d 754, this court, citing Burge, 509 So.2d 151, upheld the trial court's finding that DOTD's failure to install a traffic light was not a cause-in-fact of a fatal accident that occurred when a motorist failed to stop at a stop sign. We noted that plaintiffs did not present any evidence, other than an expert's conclusory statement, to support their assertion that the errant motorist who ran a stop sign would have obeyed a traffic light.
The same is true here. Plaintiffs did not introduce any evidence which established that the design of the intersection, lack of a semaphore signal at the intersection, size of the stop sign or lack of markings on Banks Avenue was a cause-in-fact of Mr. Comeaux's accident. The evidence on the issue of cause-in-fact simply shows that Mr. Comeaux failed to obey an unobstructed stop sign. While Plaintiffs did establish that the number of accidents at the intersection warranted the installation of a signal, which was ultimately installed in 1997, they have produced no evidence, other than Mr. Anderson's con-clusory statement that a traffic signal "more likely than not" would have prevented this accident. Plaintiffs also suggest on appeal that the lighting on Banks Street made it difficult to see the stop sign. However, there is no evidence in the record to support this argument.
Application of the duty-risk analysis shows that Mr. Comeaux's failure to stop at the stop sign was the cause-in-fact of the accident. He had a duty to stop at the stop sign and yield the right of way to favored traffic; he breached that duty. La.R.S. 32:123. Under these circumstances, there is no genuine issue of material fact as to DOTD's and the City's liability for the accident.
| ^Decree
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. All costs of this appeal are assessed to Plaintiffs.
AFFIRMED.
THIBODEAUX, J., dissents.