Case Name: RUI JUN SHI, Petitioner, v. Loretta E. LYNCH, United States Attorney General, Respondent
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 2016-08-24
Citations: 657 F. App'x 50
Docket Number: 15-1182
Parties: RUI JUN SHI, Petitioner, v. Loretta E. LYNCH, United States Attorney General, Respondent.
Judges: PRESENT: ROBERT D. SACK, RICHARD C. WESLEY, PETER W. HALL, Circuit Judges.
Reporter: West's Federal Appendix
Volume: 657
Pages: 50–52

Head Matter:
RUI JUN SHI, Petitioner, v. Loretta E. LYNCH, United States Attorney General, Respondent.
15-1182
United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
August 24, 2016
For Petitioner: Keith S. Barnett, New York, New York.
For Respondent: Benjamin C. Mizer, Principal Deputy, Assistant Attorney General; Song, Park, Senior Litigation Counsel; Michele Y.F. Sarko, Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation, United,States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
PRESENT: ROBERT D. SACK, RICHARD C. WESLEY, PETER W. HALL, Circuit Judges.

Opinion:
SUMMARY ORDER
Petitioner Rui Jun Shi, a native and citizen of the People's Republic of China, seeks review of a March 19, 2015, decision of the BIA denying his motion to reopen his removal proceedings. In re Rui Jun Shi, No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (B.I.A. Mar. 19, 2015). We assume the parties' familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history in this case.
We review the BIA's denial of a motion to reopen for abuse of discretion. Kaur v. BIA, 413 F.3d 232, 233 (2d Cir. 2005). A motion to reopen proceedings may be filed no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision is rendered. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7) (C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). There is no dispute that Shi's February 2015 motion to reopen was untimely because the final administrative order of removal was issued in 2013. The time limitation does not apply if the motion "is based on changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality or the country to which removal has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding." 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).
Shi argues that the BIA should have granted reopening based on his recent conversion to Christianity. However, it is well-settled that changed personal circumstances alone may not excuse a late motion. See Wei Guang Wang v. BIA, 437 F.3d 270, 273-274 (2d Cir. 2006).
The BIA's conclusion that Shi failed to show a material change in China's treatment of underground church members is supported by substantial evidence, Jian Hui Shao v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 138, 169 (2d Cir. 2008). The 2009 State Depart-' ment report, in evidence at Shi's 2012 merits hearing, states that the Chinese government repressed underground religious activity, but that religious freedom was increasing in many areas. The 2013 International Religious Freedom Report, which Shi submitted with his motion, reports arrests and prosecutions of some religious believers, and a 2013 congressional report noted two raids on house churches in Shi's home province. However, the State Department's 2013 report also indicated that some house church members have more freedom than in the past. In any event, neither the State Department nor congressional reports indi-' cate that there has been a material increase in China's overall repression of house church members. Matter of S-YG-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 247, 257 (BIA 2007) (explaining that an "incremental" change in conditions is insufficient to show changed conditions on reopening). Under these circumstances, the BIA did not err in finding no materially changed country conditions excusing Shi's untimely motion. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); Jian Hui Shao, 546 F.3d at 169.
Shi presents two additional arguments. He relies on several unpublished BIA decisions granting motions to reopen of non-citizens who converted to Christianity after they were ordered removed to China, arguing that the BIA impermissibly departed from those decisions. However, we will not rely on unpublished BIA decisions as precedent. Douglas v. INS, 28 F.3d 241, 245 (2d Cir. 1994) (relying on 8 C.F.R. § 3.1, redesignated as 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1 (2003)). Finally, Shi argues generally that the BIA should have reopened his case sua sponte. However, we lack jurisdiction to review the BIA's decision not to reopen sua sponte because it is entirely discretion ary. Ali v. Gonzales, 448 F.3d 515, 518 (2d Cir. 2006).
For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. As we have completed our review, any stay of removal that the Court previously granted in this petition is VACATED, and any pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition is DISMISSED as moot. Any pending request for oral argument in this petition is DENIED in accordance with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second Circuit Local Rule 34.1(b).