Case Name: BEVINS v. STATE
Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1928-05-23
Citations: 7 S.W.2d 532
Docket Number: No. 11569
Parties: BEVINS v. STATE.
Judges: 
Reporter: South Western Reporter Second Series
Volume: 7
Pages: 532–535

Head Matter:
BEVINS v. STATE.
(No. 11569.)
Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
May 23, 1928.
Rehearing Denied June 20, 1928.
Moore & Wilson, of Amarillo, for appellant.
A. A. Dawson, State’s Atty., of Austin, for the State.

Opinion:
LATTIMORE, J.
Conviction for theft; punishment, two years in the penitentiary. One Hanson testified that on the night of June 29th he went at 3:30 a. m. to his room on the third floor of the Ross Hotel in Amarillo, Tex., and, asi he started down the hall toward said room, he saw appellant jump into the second door from witness' room. Witness retired. Next morning he found that some $80 had been stolen from his pocketbook. He at once reported the matter to the police, describing appellant and his movements of the night before, and telling the officers to hurry over, the man was likely to escape. They went at once. Appellant that morning had checked out at the hotel, and paid his bill, amounting to some $7. When the officers got to the hotel and went to appellant's room, they said he had his grip ready to leave the room. They arrested him, searched, him, and found a $50 bill in his left sock between the foot and the sock. They also got $22.10 additional from his person. Mr. Hanson identified the $50 bill as being money taken from him on the night before, and said the other money resembled that which he lost. Appellant did not take the stand, and introduced no testimony.
There are six bills of exception. Two of same raise the admissibility of testimony of the officers as to what they found upon their search of appellant; the objection being that no search warrant was had by the officers. This question is not new or novel, and we are called upon to pass on it in substance in many eases. Qur C. C. P. art. 215, authorizes pursuit and arrest of persons suspected of felonies by officers to whom a satisfactory showing has been made by a credible person that a felony has been committed and the offender is about to escape, and that there is not time to procure a warrant for arrest. We are of opinion that such showing was made in thisi case, and, it being well settled that one so arrested may be legally searched and the facts thus ascertained given in evidence upon his trial, we hold it not error to admit the testimony. Agnello v. United States, 269 U. S. 20, 46 S. Ct. 4, 70 L. Ed. 145, 51 A. L. R. 409; Moore v. State, 107 Tex. Cr. R. 24, 294 S. W. 552, and authorities cited; Hodge v. State, 107 Tex. Cr. R. 579, 107 Tex. Cr. R. 573; Reynolds v. State, 106 Tex. Cr. R. 391, 293 S. W. 178.
Objection on the ground that same was hearsay, to testimony of the officers that before they arrested appellant the alleged stolen money had been described to them, was properly overruled. The witness did not state what description had been given, nor who gave it. We find no element of hearsay in this. Harris v. State, 1 Tex. App. 74; Estes v. State, 23 Tex. App. 600, 5 S. W. 176.
Oomplaint is made that the trial court, in the presence of the jury, in reply to certain objections made by appellant, said, in substance, that he thought the testimony Of Officer De Witt stowed that a report,of a felony had been made to him by Hanson, and that he was authorized to pursue and arrest appellant, if he could, before he escaped, and, if he did, then incidentally he had the right to search him and fake him before a magistrate. In the record we find not the slightest dispute of the fact that Mr. Hanson did. report to Officer De Witt that a felony had been committed, nor of the fact that appellant had cheeked out at the hotel and was about to leave when the officers came immediately to same and arrested him, nor of the fact that Mr. Hanson was a credible person. We are of opinion that there was no fact issue regarding this matter demanding submission to the jury, and that the submitting of same to the jury was an error on the part of the court, but one favorable to the accused. In our opinion, the statement of the court was not a harmful comment, and but an announcement of what should have been his ruling upon the objections made to this matter, and hence , same was not in violation of article 707, 0. O. P., which forbids discussion or comment on the weight of evidence by the court in ruling on the admissibility of same. The matter to which the remark related in no way bore on the guilt of the accused, but only on the admissibility vel non of evidence, and would seem of no possible injury in any event. Rodriguez v. State, 23 Tex. App. 503, 5 S. W. 255; Stayton v. State, 32 Tex. Cr. R. 33, 22 S. W. 38; Smith v. State, 81 Tex. Cr. R. 368, 195 S. W. 595; Patterson v. State, 89 Tex. Cr. R. 402, 231 S. W. 763; Hollobaugh v. State, 96 Tex. Cr. R. 548, 258 S. W. 1064.
We fail to see any possibility of injury arising' from the fact that one of the officers who arrested appellant said that they searched him to see if he had any concealed weapons. No testimony was given of the fact that any such weapdn was found. Officers legitimately arresting a person for a crime have the right to see -that he has no concealed weapons. Reynolds v. State, supra. The statement of the fact of such search was but a detail in relating what was done, and could have had no possible evil influence upon this case.
If the witness Hanson could say, from having seen people moving about at 3:30 a. m., that it was not customary for them to jump as did appellant when Hanson saw him, we can see no serious objection to his so stating. • To make pertinent an objection to such testimony, there should be some fact stated in the bill showing the surroundings or the setting or what led up to the question. It could, be readily conceived that, if said witness had been vigorously cross-examined regarding his claim, that the way and manner of appellant jumping into the door aroused his attention, and was one of the causes which led him to report the matter to the officers, the state might well go into the matter referred to. Appellant's attorneys have on file an able brief citing many authorities, but none are believed by us to conflict with our views above expressed. Mr. Hanson positively identified the money taken from appellant as his, and the movements of appellant were not free from suspicion.
Believing the jury justified in their conclusion of guilt, and that no error appears-in the record, the judgment will be affirmed.