Case Name: VAN WINKLE v. VAN WINKLE et al.
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1904-06-24
Citations: 89 N.Y.S. 26
Docket Number: 
Parties: VAN WINKLE v. VAN WINKLE et al.
Judges: 
Reporter: West's New York Supplement
Volume: 89
Pages: 26–32

Head Matter:
(95 App. Div. 605.)
VAN WINKLE v. VAN WINKLE et al.
(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department.
June 24, 1904.)
1. Deeds—Recitáis—Estoppel.
A recital in a deed that the grantors therein are each possessed of a certain interest estops the grantors and their privies in blood, law, and estate from asserting otherwise.
2. Same—Conveyance of Land Abutting on Highway—Ownership of Highway—Conveyance—Presumption.
Where one conveys land abutting on a highway, the fee of which is in him, the presumption is against a reservation of the fee, and such presumption is only overcome by express words which show an intent to exclude the highway from the subject-matter of the grant.'
3. Same—Conveyance of Highway—Construction of Deed.
The owner of a tract of land owned the fee of a public way, crossing the land, and his heirs gave deeds among themselves, which recited that the parties were proprietors as tenants in common of all the land, and the tracts abutting on the public way were described as “running to and thence along the way.” Held, that the fee of the way was conveyed in the deeds of the parcels abutting on the way.
O’Brien, J., dissenting.
Appeal from Trial Term, New York County.
Partition by Mary S. Van Winkle against Grace B. Ruggles and others. From the judgment, defendant Ruggles appeals.
Affirmed.
See 80 N. Y. Supp. 612.
The parcel is about 248 feet long and 37 feet wide. ' It is situate in a portion of what was formerly called “Cross Road to Harlem,” and is designated “A” on the following map.
The respondents claim that they are the owners of said tract, having acquired the same by mesne conveyances from Hugh Williamson and the heirs at law of Charles Ward Apthorpe, deceased, while the appellants claim an undivided" interest therein as heirs at law of said Apthorpe. Certain issues of fact raised by the pleadings were tried before a jury, where a verdict was rendered in favor of the plaintiff and the respondent Van Winkle. Subsequently the case came on for trial at Special Term, where a judgment was rendered sustaining the claim of the plaintiff and the respondent Van Winkle, and adjudging that the appellants do not own and'have no interest in said tract. The appeal is from that judgment, and involves also a review of the trial had before the jury, and an order denying a motion for a new trial.
Argued before HATCH, McLAUGHLIN, PATTERSON, O’BRIEN, and LAUGHLIN, JJ.
James A. Deering, for appellants Ruggles and others.
Edward R. Volmer, for appellants Hamilton and others.
Edward Mitchell, for respondent Mary S. Van Winkle.
Henry E. Miller, for respondent Elizabeth M. Van Winkle.

Opinion:
McLAUGHLIN, J.
In and prior to 1785, Charles Ward Apthorpe owned a tract of land of about 200 acres, through which, extending north and south, was a public thoroughfare called the "Bloomingdale Road," from which on the w,est to the Harlem Commons on the east extended a public way designated "Cross Road to Harlem," or "Apthorpe's Lane," or "Jauncey's Lane." The fee of this cross-road or lane was in Apthorpe, and the parcel of land the title to which is the subject-matter of this litigation is a portion of that roadbed. In 1785, Apthorpe mortgaged all of his land lying east of the Bloomingdale Road to the Marine Society of the City of New York for $2,500, which at the time of his death (May, 1797) remained unpaid. He died intestate, leaving him surviving nine children (among whom were two daughters, Ann and Charlotte, the latter having married John C. Vandenheuvel), and two grandchildren, the issue of a deceased daughter, who had married Hugh Williamson. Subsequent to the death of Apthorpe, the Marine Society commenced an action to foreclose its mortgage, to which the administrator of Apthorpe's estate, and Hugh Williamson, as guardian of the two grandchildren, were made parties. The action resulted in a sale of the lánd covered by the mortgage by the sheriff of the county of New York, at which Williamson became the purchaser, paying therefor $51,000. After deducting the amount due upon the mortgage, together with the costs and expenses of the sale, the balance was paid to the administrator, and by him distributed among those entitled thereto. In pursuance of the sale, the sheriff, on the 23d of April, 1799, delivered to Williamson a deed, absolute in form, of the entire tract sold.
It is contended by the appellants that the record title to the land in question became vested in Williamson under this deed, but they assert he purchased it as trustee or agent of the Apthorpe heirs, and, in subsequently dealing with it, acted in the same capacity. Upon this issue and another raised by the pleadings a jury trial was had, at the conclusion of which the court directed a verdict that Williamson, in making the purchase, did not act as the agent or trustee of the Apthorpe heirs, nor did he, in subsequently disposing of the land purchased, or any part of it, do so for their benefit. An exception was taken to the ruling, and this is one of the questions sought to be reviewed on the appeal. The conclusion at which we have arrived renders it unnecessary to determine whether the exception was well taken, because if it be assumed that it were, and that Williamson did in fact-take title as the representative of or agent for the Apthorpe heirs, it does not aid the apoellants, and therefore they could not have been injured by it.
This brings us to the consideration of the real question in the case, and that is whether the plaintiff and the respondent Van Winkle have, as the trial court held, acquired by mesne conveyances the title to the parcel in question. The fact is not disputed that in May, 1801, a map was made b'y Benjamin Taylor, similar to the one set out in the statement preceding this opinion, of the lands of which Charles Ward Apthorpe died seised, and that conveyances thereafter made of said land, either by Williamson or the Apthorpe heirs, were with reference thereto. Nor do we think it can be seriously disputed that the plaintiff and the respondent Van Winkle have acquired in the parcel in question whatever interest Charlotte Vandenheuvel had as the owner of lot 6, Ann Aptliorpe as the owner of lot 8, and the Jaunceys as owners of the lot sold to them. Each of said lots is designated on the Taylor map referred to; If, therefore, Charlotte Vandenheuvel, Ann Apthorpe, and the Jaunceys acquired title to the parcel in question by virtue of the conveyance to them of their respective lots, the plaintiff and the respondent Van Winkle now have such title, because the subsequent conveyances were sufficient to place in them whatever title the original parties had.
The first conveyance in point of time is the one to the Jaunceys. It bears date the 1st of August, 1799. The grantors therein named are Hugh Williamson and all of the heirs of Charles W. Apthorpe, except one, whose interest had apparently been acquired by one of the others. The land conveyed is described as follows:
"Beginning at the corner of a field at the junction of Bloomingdale Road with a cross road that leads to Harlem; thence running along the Bloomingdale Road south- ; then east; then north ; then east; ; then north ss ; then west to the beginning."
In this conveyance a covenant is inserted to the effect-that* each grantor is the owner of an undivided one tenth part, except one, who is the owner of two undivided tenth parts, having apparently acquired one tenth from one of the other Apthorpe heirs; and a further covenant—
"That they, the said parties of the first part, are respectively seized in the parts or "proportions hereinabove particularly specified of a sure, absolute and. indefeasible estate of inheritance in fee simple of, in and to the said tract."
This covenant unquestionably estopped all of the grantors, and all persons claiming under them, from thereafter claiming that their respective interests were not as therein "stated. The general rule is that a recital in a deed of a material fact is binding and conclusive upon the- parties, and those claiming under them as privies in blood, in estate, or in law. Demeyer v. Legg, 18 Barb. 14; Jackson v. Parkhurst, 9 Wend. 209; 24 Am. & Eng. Enc. of Law (2d Ed.) 60.
The other two conveyances, one to Charlotte Vandenheuvel and the other to Ann Apthorpe, bear date the 30th of November, 1802. In the former, the land conveyed is lot 6 on the Taylor map, and described as follows:
"Beginning at a stake by the fence on the Cross Road leading to Harlem, ; thence north to lot number five; thence, along the southern boundary of lot number five to the eastern boundary of lot number four ; thence by lot number four south to the public road; then east along the road to the place of beginning."
The grantors were Williamson and all the Apthorpe heirs, except Charlotte, and one other who had apparently died without issue. In the latter the land conveyed is lot 8 on said map, and described as follows;
"Beginning at a stake by the fence on the public Cross Road, the corner of Mr. Jauncey's land; thence running south ; thence west; thence south along Mr. Jauncey's land; then east to a stake the corner of lot number seven; thence north to the public road; then west along the public road to the place of beginning."
The grantors are the same as in the conveyance to Charlotte, with the exception of Ann, who took Charlotte's place.
It will be observed that in none of the descriptions is the starting point or boundary of the land conveyed "on the side" of the lane, and, therefore, even an inference that the grantors intended to exclude the fee therein is not justified. When land is described as running to and thence along a highway, the boundary of the land conveyed—the grantor owning the fee of the roadbed—is the center. This is the general rule. Matter of Ladue, 118 N. Y. 213, 23 N. E. 465; Matter of the Mayor, 20 App. Div. 404, 46 N. Y. Supp. 832, affirmed in 155 N. Y. 638, 49 N. E. 1100. There is a legal presumption against a grantor who owns the fee of a highway on which the land conveyed abuts intending to reserve such fee to himself (Holloway v. Southmayd, 139 N. Y. 400, 34 N. E. 1047, 1052), and such presumption is only overcome by express words which show an intent to exclude the highway from the subject-matter of the grant (Potter v. Boyce, 73 App. Div. 383, 77 N. Y. Supp. 24, affirmed in 176 N. Y. 551, 68 N. E. 1123). There are no words in any of the conveyances sufficient to overcome the presumption referred to. Not only this, but there are recitals in the conveyances to Charlotte and Ann which, as it seems to us, conclusively establish an intent on the part of the grantors in each of the deeds to convey to the center of the lane. The recitals are;
"Whereas the said parties - * are the proprietors as tenants in common of ail the real estate whereof Charles Ward Apthorpe * 15 * died seized And Whereas the said parties as proprietors of the said real estate did, in virtue of a written agreement bearing date the ninth day of May in the year one thousand eight hundred and one, proceed to make partition of the said real estate amongst themselves, And Whereas, upon such partition, the lot of land hereinafter particularly described fell to the share of the party of the second part:—Now, Therefore, this Indenture Witnesseth, that in order to carry the said partition into effect,
This recital not only strengthens the presumption above alluded to, but, we think, establishes an intent to convey to the center of the lane. All of the land had been divided; the part included in the lane was not reserved; hence it must follow that it was intended to be included in the respective conveyances of lots abutting thereon. The conclusion thus reached renders it unnecessary to take into consideration the deed from Williamson to Charlotte Vandenheuvel dated November 16, 1802.
Other errors are alleged, but after an examination they do not seem to be of sufficient importance to be here considered.
The judgment appealed from should be affirmed, with costs. All concur, except O'BRIEN, J., who dissents.