Case Name: McCABE et al. v. ATCHISON, T. & S. F. RY. CO. et al.
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 1911-02-10
Citations: 186 F. 966
Docket Number: No. 3,054
Parties: McCABE et al. v. ATCHISON, T. & S. F. RY. CO. et al.
Judges: Before SANBORN, HOOK, and ADAMS, Circuit Judges.
Reporter: Federal Reporter
Volume: 186
Pages: 966–989

Head Matter:
McCABE et al. v. ATCHISON, T. & S. F. RY. CO. et al.
(Circuit Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.
February 10, 1911.)
No. 3,054.
1. States (§ 9 ) — Formation—Enabling Acts — Construction.
The authority conferred by the act (Act June 16, 1906, c. 3335, 34 Stat. 267) enabling the people of Oklahoma and Indian Territory to form a constitution, which provides that the delegates to the constitutional convention shall adopt the federal Constitution, and shall form a state constitution which shall be republican in form, and which shall make no distinction in civil and political rights on account of race or color, and which shall not be repugnant to the federal Constitution, is a working rule, addressed to the delegates forming a constitutional convention, and, where a constitution formed by the convention has been declared by the President of the United States as authorized by the enabling act to conform to the enabling act, the obligations of the character indicated imposed by the enabling act cease, and individuals may not invoke the act as a prohibition against state legislation, though the enabling act also requires that the constitutional convention shall accept its terms and adopt an ordinance to that effect.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see States, Cent. Dig. § 4; Dee. Dig. § 9. ]
2. Constitutional Daw (§§ 200, 218 ) — Equal Pkotection of the Daws.
The provision of Comp. Daws Okl. 1909, § 434 et seq., requiring every railway company doing business in the state to provide separate coaches for the accommodation of the white and negro races, equal in points of comfort and convenience, and to maintain separate waiting rooms at their passenger depots for the accommodation of the races, does not abridge the privileges and immunities of the negro race, and deny to them the equal protection of the laws, in violation of the fourteenth amendment to the federal Constitution.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Constitutional Daw, Cent. Dig. §§ 625-648, 715;. Dec. Dig. §§ 206, 218. ]
3. Constitutional Daw (§ 21S ) — Equal Pkotection of the Daws.
The proviso in the statute that nothing contained therein shall be construed to prevent railway companies in the state from hauling sleeping cars, dining, or chair cars attached to their trains to be used exclusively by either white or negro passengers separately, imposes no obligation on carriers to haul such cars for either race, but permits them to haul such cars for the separate use of either of the races, and it is not discriminatory against either race, and does not deprive the negro race of the equal protection of the laws.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Constitutional Daw, Cent. Dig. § 715; Dee. Dig. § 218. ]
4. Constitutional Daw (§ 218 ) — Equal Pkotection of the Daws.
Equality of service does not mean identity of service. It is only when conditions and circumstances are substantially alike, and when demand for luxuries like sleeping cars, dining cars, and chair cars is of a substantial character, that they must be furnished for one race, if furnished for the other.
[hid. Note. — For other cases, see Constitutional Law, Cent. Dig. § 715; Dec. Dig. § 218. ]
5. Constitutional Law (§ 218 ) — Equal Protection or 'mis Laws.
That, carriers operating under Comp. Laws Okl. 1909, § 434 et seq., requiring carriers to provide separate coaches for the accommodation of the white and negro races, equal in all points of comfort and convenience, operate unevenly and oppressively to the negro race by ilieir interpretation and exedition of the statute, does not render the statute violative of the fourteenth amendment to the federal Constitution, as depriving the negro race of the equal protection of the laws.
¡Ed. Mote. — For other cases, see Constitutional Law, Cent. Dig. § 715; Dec. Dig. | 218. ]
6. Constitutional Law (§ 48 ) — Commerce Clause — Construction in Favor OF CONSTITUTIONALITY.
Comp. Laws Okl. 1909, § 434 et seq., requiring every railway company doing business in the state to provide separate coaches for the accommodation of the white and negro races, equal in all points of comfort and convenience, must he construed to apply to intrastate commerce alone, and. when so construed, it is not violative of the commerce clause of the federal Constitution.
[Ed. .Mote. — For other cases, see Constitutional Law, Cent. Dig. § 4G; Dec. Dig. § 48. ]
7. Injunction (§ 195 ) — Incidental Kei.tef — -Dill—Sufficiency.
The allegations of a bill in a suit to enjoin railroads from obeying Comp. Laws Okl. 1909, § 434 et seq., requiring every railway company to provide separate coaches for the accommodation of the white and negro races, brought before the statute became operative, that the railroads are making distinctions in the civil rights of the negro race and persons of the white race in the operation of its trains, in that equal comforts and accommodations will not be provided for the negro race, that passenger coaches maintained for the negro race are not provided with separate and equal toiiet and waiting rooms for male and female passengers of the negro race, nor equal smoking accommodations, nor separate and equal chair cars, sleeping cars, and dining car accommodations, are too vague to constitute a cause of action, and, where the court denies the injunctive relief sought, it may not award damages as inciden!al legal relief.
[Ed. Mote. — For other cases, see Injunction, Cent. Dig. § 415; Dec. Dig. § 195. ] ■
Sanborn, Circuit Judge, dissenting.
Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United Stales for the Western District of Oklahoma. ■
Suit by F. P. McCabe and others against the Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fé Railway Company and others. From a decree o_f dismissal rendered after sustaining a demurrer to the bill, complainants appeal.
Affirmed.
E. O. Tyler, E. T. Barbour, and William Harrison, for appellants.
S. T. Bledsoe (J. R. Cottingham, C. O. Blake, Clifford E. Jackson, R. A. Kleinschmidt, and C. E. Warner, on the brief), for appellees»
Before SANBORN, HOOK, and ADAMS, Circuit Judges.

Opinion:
ADAMS, Circuit Judge.
This case turns upon the validity or true construction of an act of the Eegislature of Oklahoma, approved De cember 18, 1907 (Comp. Raws Old. 1909, p. 271, c. 9, art. 2, § 434 et seq.), requiring every railroad company doing business in that state as a common carrier of passengers to provide separate coaches or compartments for the accommodation of the white and negro races, equal in all points of comfort and convenience, and to maintain separate waiting rooms at all their passenger depots for the accommodation of those races also equal in all points of comfort and convenience.
The complainants, five negro citizens of Oklahoma, instituted this suit against the defendants, several railway companies doing business throughout Oklahoma in state and interstate commerce, to enjoin them from obeying this law, on the grounds (1) that it violates the provisions of the act enabling the people of Oklahoma and the Indian Territory to form a constitution and be 'admitted into the Union, approved June 16, 1906 (part 1, 34 Stat. 267), in this: that it makes a distinction between the civil rights of the negro and white race of men, contrary to the condition imposed by section 25 of that act; (2) that it is in conflict with the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States, in that it abridges the privileges and immunities of citizens and deprives them of the equal protection of the laws; (3) that it violates the provisions of the commerce clause of the Constitution, in that it is an attempt to regulate commerce among the several states; and (4) that the several defendants are not in fact conforming to the requirements of the law by furnishing cars and waiting rooms for the negro race equal in point of comfort and convenience to those furnished for the white race. The learned trial judge sustained a demurrer to the bill, and, upon complainants declining to plead further, dismissed it. From this an appeal followed.
It is very clear, we think, that complainants cannot invoke the enabling act as in itself a prohibition against the legislation in question. The. first paragraph of section 3 of that act reads as follows:
"That the delegates to the convention thus elected shall meet at the seat of government of said Oklahoma Territory, and, after organization, shall declare on behalf of the people of said proposed state that they adopt the Constitution of the United States; whereupon the said convention shall, and is hereby authorized to form a constitution and state -government 'for said proposed state. The Constitution shall be republican in form, and make no distinction in civil and political rights on account of race or color, and shall not be repugnant to the Constitution of the United States and the principles of the Declaration of Independence."
The authority conferred by this section with its limitations and prohibitions was most obviously addressed to the delegates chosen under the provisions of section 2 of the act, when the5'- should have assembled in convention for the purpose of forming a constitution and state government. A constitution which should make no distinction in civil or political rights on account of race or color was the only kind of a constitution the delegates were empowered to make. When it should be made and the provisions of the enabling act found to have been "complied with in the formation thereof" by the President, who was the arbiter constituted for that purpose by the fourth section of the act, the state became a member of the federal Union "on an equal footing with the original states." The working obligation or instructions imposed by the enabling act in the respect now under considera tion upon the delegates chosen to make the Constitution ceased to have force or effect when that instrument was made and found and proclaimed by the constituted umpire to be in accordance with the act which authorized it. Permoli v. First Municipality, 3 How. 589, 609, 11 L. Ed. 739; Escanaba Co. v. Chicago, 107 U. S. 678, 688, 2 Sup. Ct. 185, 27 L. Ed. 442; Willamette Iron Bridge Co. v. Hatch, 125 U. S. 1, 8 Sup. Ct. 811, 31 L. Ed. 629; Ward v. Race Horse, 163 U. S. 504, 16 Sup. Ct. 1076, 41 L. Ed. 244; Bolin v. Nebraska, 176 U. S. 83, 20 Sup. Ct. 287, 44 L. Ed. 382; United States ex rel. v. United States Express Co. (D. C.) 180 Fed. 1006.
The requirement of section 22 of the enabling act that the constitutional convention should accept the terms and provisions of that act and adopt an ordinance to that effect, to which our attention is specially directed by counsel for complainants, affords no additional warrant for their contention. The provisions which called the convention into being and fixed boundaries and limitations upon its powers were not enlarged by the adoption of that ordinance; neither were they diverted from their object and purpose as plainly expressed. Whatever effect the acceptance of the terms and provisions of the enabling act may have upon other questions to which they might be applicable, we are clearly of opinion it was never intended by the langauge employed to transfer the limitation upon the powers of the convention itself to the state legislature after statehood should have been accomplished.
Therefore, even if the Oklahoma statute in some of its provisions made a distinction in civil rights on account of race or color contrary to the instructions of the enabling act (which, however, is not admitted), no cause of action could be predicated upon that act itself, and no relief could be granted unless the distinction (or discrimination as it was called in argument) violated some of the prohibitions of the federal Constitution, which after statehood became the exclusive federal chart of complainants' civil and political rights.
The argument is next made that the statute in question violates the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United vStates, in that the enforced separation of the negro race from the white race in railroad cars and waiting rooms abridges the privileges and immunities of the former, and denies to it the equal protection of the laws. This question in our opinion is not an open one. The Supreme Court of the United States in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U. S. 537, 16 Sup. Ct. 1138, 41 L. Ed. 256, has foreclosed further discussion. Mr. Justice Brown, speaking for that court, made these observations:
"The object of the amendment was undoubtedly to enforce the absolute equality of the two races before the law, but in the nature of thing's it could not have been intended to abolish distinctions based upon color, or to enforce social, as distinguished from political equality, or a commingling of the two races upon terms unsatisfactory to either, haws permitting, and even requiring, their separation in places where' they are liable to be brought Into contact, do not necessarily imply the inferiority of either race to the other, and have been generally, if not universally, recognized as within the competency of the state Legislatures in the exercise of their police power. So far, then, as a conflict with the fourteenth amendment is concerned, the case reduces itself-to the question whether the statute of Louisiana [similar to that here involved] is a reasonable regulation, and with respect to this there must necessarily he a large discretion on the part of the Legislature. In determining the question of reasonableness, it is at liberty to act with reference to the established usages, customs, and traditions of the people, and with a view to the promotion of their comfort, and the preservation of the public peace and good order. Gauged by this standard, we cannot say that a law which authorizes or even requires the separation of the two races in public conveyances is unreasonable, or more obnoxious to the fourteenth amendment than the acts o'f Congress requiring separate schools for colored children in the District of Columbia, the constitutionality of which does not seem to have been questioned,'or the corresponding acts of state Legislatures."
In view of this decision further discussion of the general question is neither nece'ssary nor seemly on our part.
But there is one special feature of the Oklahoma statute which counsel for the complainants contend is in itself discriminatory and operates to deprive the negro race of the equal protection of the laws within the meaning of the Constitution. This is found in the proviso to section 7, which reads as follows :
' "Provided that nothing herein contained shall be construed to prevent railway companies in this state from hauling sleeping cars, dining or chair cars attached to their trains to be used exclusively by either white or negro passengers, separately, but not jointly." Laws' 1907-08, c. 15.
!In our opinion- this contention is not sound. Other parts of the statute make ample provision for the actual transportation of both races in reasonable comfort and convenience. Separate coaches or compartments equal in all points of comfort and convenience must, under severe penalties, be carried on each trip by every train moving within the state. Sections 1 and 5. Sleeping cars, dining cars, and chair cars are, comparatively speaking, luxuries, and properly enough no such imperative provisions are made concerning them as are made concerning the common and indispensable coach or compartment. The proviso imposes no obligation upon carriers to haul .such cars for either race, but out of abundant caution lest the former provisions of the act, the keynote of which is equality of service between the races, should be construed to require the carriers 'to constantly haul separate sleeping, dining, and chair cars for them, it ;is provided that they might haul them 'for the separate but not joint ' use of either of the races. This provision in itself makes no more discrimination against one race than the other. The Legislature having in mind doubtless, what we judicially know, that the ability of the two races to indulge in luxuries, comforts, and conveniences was so dissimilar that sleeping and dining cars which would be well patronized by one race might be very little if at all by the other, legislated accordingly, and made a provision by which carriers might supply them for the exclusive use of either race as circumstances might dictate.
It may be conceded that the general principle of equality of service which pervades the Oklahoma statute and which is also required by the common and interstate commerce law (24 Stat. 379 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3154]) must be observed by all carriers. As a general rule, if carriers haul cars of special and peculiar convenience for citizens of one race, they must provide equal service for citizens of tlie oilier race. Equality of service, however, does not necessarily mean identity of service; and manifestly this rule does not require permanent provision for equal service, irrespective of the demand for it. No mere question of abstract or theoretical right can require the constant and regular equipment and hauling of substantially empty dining, sleeping, or chair cars for either race. Practical considerations, which are potent in reaching a correct interpretation of any statute, cannot be ignored in applying the principle of equality of service to the two races in Oklahoma. Neither can any such interpretation be given to the statute of that state as would in effect require carriers to render service to either race without compensation. That would deprive them of their property without due process of law.
We conclude, in view of these and other like consideral ions, that the principle of equality of service between the two races in Oklahoma contemplates substantial similarity of service, and this only when conditions and circumstances under which it is required are substantially the same.
Rut it is contended that the carriers operate under this law unevenly and oppressively to the negro race and by their interpretation and execution of its provisions demonstrate that it is discriminatory. The contention is made on the supposed authority of the case of Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356, 6 Sup. Ct 1064, 30 L. Ed. 220, and cases there cited. That was a case where the public authorities representing the state, against which alone the prohibition of the fourteenth amendment operates, exercised certain arbitrary powers conferred upon them by certain ordinances so as to unjustly discriminate against the Chinese. The Supreme Court held that:
"Whatever may have been the intent of the ordinances as adopted, they are applied by the public authorities charged with their administration, and thus representing the state itself, with a mind so unequal and oppressive as to amount to a practical denial by the state of that equal protection of the laws which is secured to the petitioners, as to all other persons, by the broad and benign provisions of the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States. Though the law itself be fair on its face and impartial in appearance, yet, if it is applied and administered by public authority with an evil eye and an unequal hand, so as practically to make unjust and illegal discriminations between persons in similar circumstances, material to their rights, the denial of equal justice is still within the prohibition of the Constitution."
This doctrine in our opinion is totally inapplicable to the facts of the present case.
It may well be that the interpretation and application of a law of the state by the properly constituted authorities control its meaning within the purview of the Constitution; but most obviously such interpretation and application of it by private citizens, the defendant carriers in this case, can have no such effect. If it could, lawbreakers might, by their continued violation oí a law, convert their own lawlessness into law, and the lawbreaker and not the lawmaker might become its final interpreter.
Is this statute an invasion of the exclusive prerogative of Congress over interstate commerce?
It may be conceded that, if it applies to interstate transportation, it is a regulation of interstate commerce within the meaning of the Constitution. We think this follows from the doctrine laid down by the Supreme Court in Hall v. De Cuir, 95 U. S. 485, 24 L. Ed. 547. In that case a law of Louisiana as interpreted by its highest judicial tribunal required carriers of interstate commerce when operating within the limits of the state to receive colored passengers into cabins set apart for white persons. The court said:
"It [the statute] does not act upon the business through the local instruments to be employed after coming within the state, but directly upon the business as it comes into the state from without or goes out from within."
This, it was held, interfered directly with the freedom of interstate commerce, and therefore encroached upon the exclusive power of Congress. See, also, Louisville, etc., Ry. Co. v. Mississippi, 133 U. S. 587, 590, 10 Sup. Ct. 348, 33 L. Ed. 784, and Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co. v. Kentucky, 179 U. S. 388, 391, 21 Sup. Ct. 101, 45 L. Ed. 244.
For like reasons, the Oklahoma law, if, as properly construed, it embraces or relates to interstate commerce at all, would also be a regulation of that commerce. It compels carriers when operating in that state to exclude colored persons from cars or compartments set apart for white persons. The only difference between the Louisiana and the Oklahoma law is that the one compels carriers to receive into and the other to exclude colored persons from cars or compartments carrying white persons. They act alike directly upon the carrier's business as its passenger crosses the state line. Hence, if one is a regulation of interstate commerce, the other must be. The contention, therefore, that the provisions of the Oklahoma statute do not amount to a regulation of interstate commerce, if they concern that commerce at all, is untenable.
The question, then, is whether that statute when properly construed applies to interstate transportation or whether it is limited in its application to that transportation which has its origin and ending within the coniines of the state. No provision is found in the act indicating in any express terms that it was intended to apply to interstate commerce. All its provisions concerning the subject of legislation are general.
Thus section 1 provides that "Every railway company doing business in this state, shall provide separate coaches," etc. Sections 2 and 6 make it unlawful "for any person" to occupy any waiting room or ride in any coach not designated for the race to which he belongs. While, therefore, the language of the act literally construed is comprehensive enough to include railroads doing interstate business and include passengers while making, interstate trips, it neither in express terms nor by any implication other than that involved in the general language employed manifests any intention to invade the exclusive domain of congressional legislation on the subject of interstate commerce.
Local transportation or that which is wholly within the state only, being within the competency of the state Legislature, would naturally be presumed to have been alone contemplated in the law enacted by it. The constitutional inhibition against a state legislating concerning interstate commerce and the uniform decisions of courts of high and controlling authority emphasizing and enforcing that inhibition, without doubt, were actually as well as constructively known to the members of the Legislature of Oklahoma. It is unreasonable to suppose they intended to legislate upon a subject known by them to be beyond their power and upon which an attempt to legislate might imperil the validity of provisions well within their power. Any other view would imply insubordination and recklessness which cannot be imputed to a sovereign state. This conclusion is supported by abundant authority.
In the case of Louisville, etc., Ry. Co. v. Mississippi, supra, a statute of Mississippi similar to that under consideration requiring all railroads carrying passengers in that state to provide equal but separate accommodations for the white and colored races, and obliging the conductors of passenger trains to assign each passenger to his appropriate car, was under consideration. The case was a writ of error to the Supreme Court of Mississippi which had ruled (Louisville, N. O. & T. Ry. Co. v. State, 66 Miss. 662, 6 South. 203, 5 L. R. A. 132, 14 Am. St. Rep. 599) that the statute, although general and comprehensive in its language, was intended to affect only commerce within the state, and was therefore not in violation of the commerce clause of the Constitution.
The Supreme Court in its decision had regard to the interpretation of the statute by the Supreme Court of Mississippi, and held that commerce wholly within a state was not subject to the constitutional provision, and as a necessary consequence that the law was not an infraction of the commerce clause of the federal Constitution.
In Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co. v. Kentucky supra, a statute was under consideration requiring all railroads to furnish separate coaches or compartments of equal convenience and accommodation for its white and colored passengers, empowering conductors to assign each white or colored passenger to his appropriate car or compartment, and authorizing them to decline to carry any passenger who refused to occupy such car or compartment. The language of the statute was, literally speaking, sufficiently comprehensive to include interstate as well as intrastate transportation. In deciding the case the Supreme Court reviewed the Mississippi Case and Plessy v. Ferguson, supra, and also the case of Ohio Val. Ry.'s Receiver v. Lander, decided by the Court of Appeals of Kentucky, 47 S. W. 344, 20 Ky. Law Rep. 913. It quoted liberally from the last-mentioijed case upon the authority of which the case then under consideration had been decided by the Kentucky court, to the effect that the Kentucky Legislature did not intend by the general language there employed to embrace transportation of interstate passengers, but only domestic or intrastate passengers. The Supreme Court then said:
"This ruling effectually. disposes of the argument that the act must be construed to regulate the travel 'or transportation on railroads of all white and colored passengers, while they are in the state. "
But the court added:
"Indeed; we are by no means satisfied that the Court of Appeals did not give the correct construction to this statute in limiting its operation to domestic commerce. It is scarcely courteous to impute to a Legislature the enactment of a law which it knew to be unconstitutional, and, if it were. well settled that a separate coach law was unconstitutional as applied to interstate commerce, the law' applj'ing on its face to all passengers should be limited to such as the Legislature were competent to deal with. . * While we do not deny the force of the railroad's argument in this connection, we cannot say that the General Assembly would not have enacted this law if it had supposed it applied only to domestic commerce; and, if we were in doubt on that point, we should unhesitatingly defer to the opinion of the Court of Appeals, which held that it would give it that construction if the case called for it."
In the more recent case of Chiles v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 218 U. S. 71, 30 Sup. Ct. 667, 54 L. Ed. 936, decided May 31, 1910, the Supreme Court again considered the contention of a colored person made under the Kentucky statute that he could not be required to occupy a car set apart exclusively for the transportation of persons of his race. It there reviewed its own decisions on the subject which have already been referred to, and refrained from discussing the constitutional restraint upon state Legislatures based upon the distinction between white and colored races, on the ground, as stated in the opinion, that it had been so much discussed in their own cases reviewed and cited "that we are relieved from further enlargement upon it." The judgment of the state court against the contentions of the Colored person was affirmed; the court seeming to regard the great question now in controversy as foreclosed.
From the foregoing it appears to us that the decisions of the Supreme Court point to a harmonious and consistent attitude on its part adverse to complainants' present contention, and, while some of the decisions are fortified by local courts' interpretation of statutes, there seems to be a willing acquiescence in the interpretation so placed upon them.
Our own court likewise stands committed to a principle leading 'inevitably to the same result. In the case of Butler Bros. Shoe Co. v. United States Rubber Co., 84 C. C. A. 167, 156 Fed. 1, we had before us the right of a foreign corporation doing business in Colorado to recover on certain contracts made by it with a domestic corporation. The defense was that the foreign corporation had not qualified to do business in Colorado and had not paid the annual license tax required by all foreign 'corporations by the Constitution and statutes of that state as a condition for doing business therein. This court, speaking by Sanborn, Circuit Judge, said: '
"If tbe Constitution and statutes of Colorado are to be interpreted to mean, as they clearly read, to prohibit) every foreign corporation from exercising any corporate power whatever, or doing any business whatever, in the state, unless they pay the fees and the annual license tax which this legislation requires as a condition thereof, they are unconstitutional and void, so far as they apply to interstate commerce conducted by foreign corporations or suits for and against them in the national courts. There is, however, another view of; this case which is both reasonable and persuasive. The law upon the subject which has been considered was the 'same when the Colorado Constitution was adopted and when her statutes- were enacted that it is to-day, and the legal presumption, in the absence of persuasive evidence of another purpose, is that the people and the Legislature of that state intended in the adoption of this Constitution and the enactment' of these laws to obey the supreme law of the laud, that they intended to prohibit the doing of intrastate business only without a license from their state. lienee this Constitution and these statutes should he read and interpreted.^ if possible, in the light of this presumption, so that they will not conflict with the Constitution and the laws of the United States. An interpretation of this legislation so it may conform to the national law, and so that acts done in undoubted violation of its plain terms may be held to be without its true meaning and purpose, is rational and just, and it is supported by high authority."
The Employer's Liability Cases, 207 U. S. 463, 28 Sup. Ct. 141, 52 L. Ed. 297, are thought to be authority against the conclusion reached by us in this case. In those cases it was held that the act of Congress approved June 11, 1906 (34 Stat. 232 [U. S. Comp. St. Supp. 1909, p. 1148]), subjecting any common carrier engaged in trade or commerce in the District of Columbia or in any territory of the United States or between the states to liability to "any of its employés," etc., was unconstitutional. Careful consideration of the opinions, however, has convinced us that the unconstitutionality of the act was not made to rest solely upon the provision creating a liability to "any" employe of a railroad company whether he was engaged in interstate commerce or not. As pointed out by Mr. Justice White, who .wrote the opinion cf the majority, the act oS Congress had relation not only to railroads doing transportation business between the states, but to those engaged in that business within the District of Columbia and within any of the. territories of the United States over which Congress had plenary legislative power. It might in the District of Columbia and territories regulate the relation o f carrier to employe in both inter and intra state transportation. Hence came the dilemma. If the words "any employe," etc., were limited to such employe as was engaged in interstate commerce, as argued in support of the constitutionality of the act, it would destroy its applicability to all railroad employés engaged otherwise than in interstate commerce in the District of Columbia and territories. Mr. Justice AVhite, .speaking of this situation, said:
"Thus it would come to pass, if we could bring ourselves to modify the statute by writing in the words suggested — that is, by causing the act to read 'any employe when engaged in interstate commerce'— we would restrict the act as to the District of Columbia and the territories, and thus destroy it in an important particular. To write into the act qualifying words, therefore, would be but adding to its provisions in order to save it in one aspect, and thereby to destroy it in another; that is, to destroy in order to save and to save in order to destroy."
He then adds:
"Of course, if it can be lawfully done, our duty is to construe the statute so as to render it constitutional. But this does not imply, if the text of an act is unambiguous, that it may ho rewritten to accomplish that purpose. Equally clear is it, generally speaking, that, where a statute contains provisions which are constitutional and others which are not, effect may be given to the legal provisions by separating them from the illegal. But this applies only to a case Where the provisions are separable and not dependent one upon the other, and does not support the contention that that which is indivisible may be divided. Moreover, even in a case where legal provisions may be severed from those which are illegal, in order to save, the rule applies only where it is plain that Congress would have, enacted the legislation with the unconstitutional provisions eliminated."
Because, therefore, of the disposition of the Supreme Court uniformly shown in prior cases of like character to that now before us, we cannot believe the Employers' Liability Cases, involving as they did a totally different subject and one complicated by statutory provisions which ivould have been irreconcilable if the desired limitation had been imposed, were intended to be applicable to a case like this, or that on their authority we are required to overturn a well understood national policy concerning a troublesome interracial question.
The doctrine of this court as announced in Denver & R. G. R. Co. v. Wagner, 92 C. C. A. 527, 167 Fed. 75, 81, and that of the Supreme Court as stated in the Employees Liability Cases, is that the, legal provisions of the statute may be severed from those which are illegal, "where it is plain that Congress would have enacted the legislation with the unconstitutional provisions eliminated." Applying this rule to the present cáse, we have no doubt the Legislature of Oklahoma would have enacted the statute in question had it in terms related only to domestic transportation. Why? As already pointed out, it knew it could go no further. It knew that legislation regulating interstate commerce was beyond its power. Most obviously, then, it would not have imperiled the separation of the faces in domestic transportation which, withoht doubt, comprehended the great bulk of that which materially concerned the convenience and sensibilities of the people of the state by deliberately invading the forbidden field of interstate commerce.
Our conclusion is that the act of Oklahoma is not violative of the commerce clause of the Constitution.
It is next contended that the demurrer to the bill was improperly sustained because its averments disclosed that the defendant railroad companies were not in fact furnishing for the negro race coaches or waiting rooms equal in point of comfort or convenience to those furnished for the white race ; that complainants were thereby damaged and "that "they could secure relief of this kind as incidental to the injunctive relief prayed for. It is argued that equity has jurisdiction to avoid a multiplicity of suits and also because no adequate remedy could be had at law.
The allegations of the bill thus brought into, judgment are as follows: ' •
"That, notwithstanding the terms of said act of Congress and of the Constitution of the state of Oklahoma, the said above-named defendants and each of them are- making distinctions in the civil rights of your orators and of all other persons, of the negro race and persons of the white race in the conduct and operation of its trains and passenger service in the state of Oklahoma, in, this, to wit: that equal comforts, conveniences, and accommodations will not he provided for your orators and other persons of the negro race; that said passenger coaches are not constructed or maintained so as to enable persons of the negro race to be provided with separate and equal toilet and waiting rooms for male and female passengers of said negro race, nor have equal smoking car accommodations, nor separate, and equal chair ears, sleeping cars, and dining car accommodations by providing, for your orators and other persons of the negro mee who may become passengers on said railroad, that separate waiting rooms with equal comforts and conveniences have been or are bound to be constructed by said defendants and each of them for your orators and other persons of the negro race desiring to become passengers on said railroad, and that said orators are not being and will not be provided with equal accommodations with the white race under the provisions of .said act.''
These allegations are too vague and uncertain to constitute a cause of action either in equity or at law. Moreover, the suit was instituted before the Oklahoma statute went into effect. Of course, therefore, no cause of action for damages could be stated. But, even if that were possible, such incidental legal relief could not he awarded in this case after the main injunctive relief sought by the bill and which was alone prayed for had been denied. Mitchell v. Dowell, 105 U. S. 430, 26 L. Ed. 1142; Lewis Publishing Co. v. Wyman (C. C. A.) 182 Fed. 13, decided August 20, 1910, and cases cited.
Some questions of practice were argued at the bar and in the brief of counsel, but the disposition of the case on its merits dispenses with any c\ .sideration of them.
The decree below is affirmed.