Case Name: John A. Kalembach v. The Michigan Central Railroad Company
Court: Michigan Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1891-10-09
Citations: 87 Mich. 509
Docket Number: 
Parties: John A. Kalembach v. The Michigan Central Railroad Company.
Judges: Chamjplin, O. J., and Morse, J., concurred with CrRANT, J.
Reporter: Michigan Reports
Volume: 87
Pages: 509–524

Head Matter:
John A. Kalembach v. The Michigan Central Railroad Company.
Trial — Erroneous instructions to jury — Measure of damages — Error without prejudice — Pleading—Contributory negligence.
1. The law does not presume that a jury in a negligence case, which found a verdict for the plaintiff notwithstanding erro- . neous instructions by the court upon the law of negligence, were prejudiced thereby in their assessment of damages.
2. A declaration in a negligence case in which the only allegations of special damages were “ that plaintiff had been put to great expense in procuring medicine, medical attendance, and care, in' which he had expended the sum of $500 for physicians’ services, nurses, and help,” and that he was “greatly and permanently injured, suffered great physical and mental pain, and became sore, sick, lame, and languishing,” is not sufficiently specific to admit testimony of any permanent injury.
3. The question of the contributory negligence of the owner of a runaway team, who takes it into a railroad freight-yard, and in close proximity to tracks over which cars are liable to pass at any time, is to be determined by the jury.
Error to Washtenaw. (Kinne, J.)
Argued May 13, 1891.
Decided October 9, 1891.
Negligence case. Plaintiff brings error.
Affirmed.
The facts are stated in the opinion.
Sawyer & Knowlton, for appellant, contended:
1. A trial judge, in charging the jury, should present the substantial issues of the case, and state the principles of law that govern the rights of the parties, whether any specific instructions are requested or not; citing Barton v. Gray, 57 Mich. 622.
2. The facts disclosed by the evidence bring this case squarely within the rule that, where the conduct of the defendant discloses such a degree of indifference to the rights of others as to be characterized as recklessness, the "doctrine of contributory negligence, does not apply, and the court should have so charged the jury. At least, there was evidence tending to show that the conduct of the defendant’s servants was wanton, willful, or reckless in driving the cars down upon plaintiff without notice to him; citing Shumacher v. Railroad Co., 39 Fed. Rep. 178; Noble v. Cunningham, 74 Ill. 51; Matta v. Railway Co., 69 Mich. 109, 113; Bouwmeester v. Railroad Co., 63 Id. 557; Battishill v. Humphreys, 64 Id. 514; Beach, Cont. Neg. § 22, p. 69; 2 Wood, Ry. Law, 1258, 1259.
3. The evidence also tends to prove that the conductor and trainmen in charge of the train saw the plaintiff’s position, and heard him request them to hold on a second until he could get out, in time to have averted the injury, but, instead of stopping or attempting to stop the cars, *they pushed down upon him, which management of the cars was characterized by negligence, and was equivalent to misdoing; citing Shumacher v. Railroad Co., 39 Fed. Rep. 177-179; Cooley, Torts, 674; Patterson, Ry. Acc. § 55; Price v. Railroad Co., 3 Amer. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 365.
4. The court instructed the jury that the plaintiff must satisfy them as to defendant’s negligence, which must mean beyond all doubt, when he is only required to prove his case by a preponderance of evidence; citing Mynning v. Railroad Co., 67 Mich. 677.
5. It was error to instruct the jury that “the plaintiff had no right to go upon defendant’s premises, and place his team in the position he did, and shut his eyes, and demand that the company should not injure him. The mere fact of his being injured by reason of a car being backed into tbe one from which he was unloading is not of itself sufficient to render the company liable,” — because—
a — The plaintiff, having gone upon the defendant’s grounds to receive a consignment of barrels, was lawfully there; citing Beach, Cont. Neg. § 17, p. 55; Watson v. Railway Co., 66 Iowa, 164. He went to the place the defendant had provided to receive the contents of the car, and occupied the only place provided by defendant for him to occupy. He was there under a sort of an implied warranty upon the part of the defendant that he should not be injured by negligence upon the part of the defendant while there conducting his business; citing Patterson, Ry. Acc. § 208; Railroad Co. v. Martin, 41 Mich. 667; and he was under no obligation to keep his eyes open {that is, on the watch). He could not be charged with negligence because he failed to anticipate some particular act of negligence on defendant’s part; citing Iltis v. Railway Co., 40 Minn. 273; Railroad Co. v. Martin, 41 Mich. 667; and he had a right to give his undivided attention to his work, and was justified in assuming, that the defendant would not molest him, or render his position hazardous, without giving him notice; ‘citing Railway Co. v. Goebel, 119 Ill. 515; and the defendant owed him the duty of such care as is necessary for the safety of all persons engaged as plaintiff was, and it was not for defendant’s employés to close their eyes, and excuse themselves by saying that they did not know that any one was being imperiled; citing Watson v. Railway Co., 66 Iowa, 164.
b — The mere fact that plaintiff was injured by reason of a car being backed into the one from which he was unloading was negligence per se, and, unexplained, was sufficient to render the defendant liable; citing Patterson, Ry. Acc. §§ 375, 377; Watson v. Railway Co., 66 Iowa, 164; Noble v. Cunningham, 74 Ill. 51; Shumacher v. Railroad Co., 39 Fed. Rep. 174; Mitchell v. Railway Co., 51 Mich. 236.
Henry Russel, for defendant.

Opinion:
Grant, J.
It is conceded in -this case that tbe court properly instructed the jury upon the measure of damages, but it is claimed that the court erroneously instructed them on the questions of negligence involved. Upon all these questions the jury found for the plaintiff, and I deem it unnecessary to discuss them.
It is insisted that the jury- were probably prejudiced upon the measure of damages by improper instructions upon the law of negligence. I cannot accede to this proposition. The law casts no such reflection upon honest and intelligent jurors. The law does not presume that a jury, which found the defendant liable notwithstanding erroneous instructions by the court, has been prejudiced thereby in their assessment of damages, especially in a case like the" present one. The verdict was for $150. What should have been the amount of damages so that the Court would say that they were not probably prejudiced? The result of this rule would be that a court must correctly instruct the jury upon all branches of every case, in order to avoid prejudicing the jury in their assessment of damages.
But, in determining the question as applied to the present case, it is proper to consider the allegations in the declaration as to the injury and the consequent damages, and the proofs. The only allegation of special damages is—
"That plaintiff had been put to great expense in procuring medicine, medical attendance, and care, in which he had expended the sum of $500 for physicians5 services, nurses, and help.55
It contains the general allegation that he was—
"G-reatly and permanently injured, suffered great physical and mental pain, and became sore, sick, lame, and languishing.55
No claim, is made of injury to his horses or wagon. He called no physician, and expended no money for nursing, medicine, or help. There is no evidence that Dr. Champlin attended plaintiff, at any time, in consequence of sickness claimed to have been the result of this accident. There was no evidence that plaintiff was unable to attend to his work for more than two weeks, and this testimony does not come from the plaintiff himself, but from his. son, who thought he was in bed four or five days, and that it was some two weeks before he got out. The declaration was not sufficiently specific to admit testimony of any permanent injury. No physician was called for the plaintiff, and the testimony of any permanent injury was of too 'indefinite a character' to form any reasonable basis for an award of damages. Plaintiff's testimony on this point is as follows:
"I am hardly a day without headache ever since. My off side is kind of not exactly right. I cannot remember as well as I use to before I got hurt."
The evidence in regard to the headache.s was stricken out by the court. Certainly no one would contend that the statement, "my off side is kind of not exactly right," would furnish any basis for the jury to award damages. How was it not right? and why was it not right? were questions the jury must answer; and there was nothing to connect this trouble, whatever it was, with the injury. How much should the jury have awarded because he could not remember as well as he did before? It would be absurd to base damages upon such evidence.
The testimony of his son John is no more satisfactory. It is as follows:
"Since the injury I have noticed that father was sickly like a great many times, and seemed to be almost out of his head, and would refuse to eat his meals, and the like of that; and, furthermore, he has had one or two sick spells since that, and he always gets them when he does something that he stoops over."
The other son testified:
"Since that time his mind does not seem to be as it was before, and his health has not been as it was before."
This loose and indefinite testimony constitutes all the evidence of any peiunanent injury there is in the case. The jury evidently ignored it as of no value, as, indeed, they should have done. I think the court would have been justified in instructing the jury that there was no evidence of any permanent injury for them to consider. If there was no permanent injury, the damages assessed were ample under the proofs.
There was evidence from the plaintiff's own witnesses that plaintiff had a runaway team at the time, and that this same team had run away with him and with others before. If he took such a team into this place, it was a proper question for the jury to determine whether he was guilty of negligence which contributed to the accident.
Under this record, I see no reason for holding that the jury were prejudiced by the alleged erroneous instructions. The errors, if any, were certainly not glaring ones.
Judgment should be affirmed.
Chamjplin, O. J., and Morse, J., concurred with CrRANT, J.