Case Name: OLD DOMINION COPPER MINING & SMELTING CO. v. LEWISOHN et al.
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 1913-01-13
Citations: 202 F. 178
Docket Number: No. 101
Parties: OLD DOMINION COPPER MINING & SMELTING CO. v. LEWISOHN et al.
Judges: Before COXE, WARD, and NOYES, Circuit Judges.
Reporter: Federal Reporter
Volume: 202
Pages: 178–181

Head Matter:
OLD DOMINION COPPER MINING & SMELTING CO. v. LEWISOHN et al.
(Circuit Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
January 13, 1913.)
No. 101.
1. Courts (§ 96 ) — Federal Courts — Rules oe Decision.
Inferior federal courts are bound to follow the law as laid down by the Supreme Court of the United States, though it may be in conflict with the rules of the Supreme Court of the state on the same facts.
TEd. Note. — For other cases, see Courts, Cent. Dig. §§ 825, 327, 328, 334; Dec. Dig. § 96.
Conclusiveness of judgment between federal and state courts, see notes' to Kansas City, Ft. S. & M. R. Co. v. Morgan, 21 C. C. A. 478; Union & Planters’ Bank v. City of Memphis, 49 C. C. A. 408.]
2. Judgment (§ 572 ) — Decision on Demurrer — Res Judicata)
Where a demurrer was sustained on the merits of an amended bill, in which complainants had an opportunity of presenting all the facts with reference to the controversy, a judgment entered on such demurrer was res judicata, precluding complainants from thereafter filing a new bill against the same parties, with reference to the same subject-matter, but based on a different statement of facts, on the theory that the facts stated in the previous bill were untrue.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Judgment, Cent. Dig. §§ 1041, 1047-1049; Dec. Dig. § 572. ]
Appeal from the District Court of t]ie United States for the Southern District of New York; C. M. Hough, Judge.
Bill in equity by the Old Dominion Copper Mining & Smelting Company against Frederick Lewisohn and others. From a decree disr missing the hill (195 Fed. 637), complainant appeals.
Affirmed.
Brandéis, Dunbar & Nutter, of Boston, Mass., and Rounds, Schur-man & Dwight, of', New York City, for appellant.
Hoadly, Lauterbach & Johnson, of New York City (Edward Lau-terbach and Eugene Treadwell, both of New York City, of counsel), for respondents.
Before COXE, WARD, and NOYES, Circuit Judges.
3Toi’ other cases see same topic & § numbeii in Dec. & Am. Digs 1907 to date, & Rep’r Indexes

Opinion:
COXE, Circuit Judge.
The facts- bearing upon every phase of this controversy have been stated so often, not only in the federal courts, but also in the courts of Massachusetts that no useful purpose will be subserved by restating them. See 210 U. S. 206, 28 Sup. Ct. 634, 52 L. Ed. 1025; 225 U. S. 111, 32 Sup. Ct. 641, 56 L. Ed. 1009; 148 Fed. 1020, 79 C. C. A. 534 (C. C.) 195 Fed. 637; 203 Mass. 159, 89 N. E. 193, 40 L. R. A. (N. S.) 314. It is, of course, unfortunate that the entire burden of the alleged fraudulent transactions conr-plained of must fall upon Bigelow alone, but that result is due to the fact that the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts is not in accord upon the law with this court and the Supreme Court of the United States.
Manifestly it is our duty to follow the law of the Supreme Court unless the present record contains facts which clearly differentiate the present case from the case on demurrer. That every opportunity was given to state the facts in the 30,000 share suit cannot be denied. With full knowledge of the infirmities of the bill, after it had been held insufficient on demurrer, it was amended in an attempt to meet the criticism of the court. Every fact which could be relied on to remedy the fatal defects pointed out was stated by the pleader, and the facts were as accessible then as they were when the present bill was drawn. The most favorable statement of the cause of action consistent with the facts was presented by the amended bill. The same result followed, the demurrer to the amended bill was sustained and the ruling was affirmed by this court and the Supreme Court of the United States. We are unable to understand how the differences in the facts, pointed out at the argument, between this case and the case on demurrer change the legal aspect of the controversy. We think that the differences in the facts are inconsequential and that the same result must follow in either case. The opinion of the Circuit Court sufficiently states our conclusions in this regard.
But the decree in the demurrer suit is res judicata of the present controversy. The parties are the same, the subject-matter is the same and the questions are the same. Having stated the facts with great care and deliberation and having amended the bill to meet the criticism of • the defendants, the appellant cannot now be permitted to assert that these facts are untrue and assert a new cause of action based upon different facts. The bill stated the facts as the appellant understood them, the defendant admitted the statement to be correct; on this statement the court rendered its decree and on these facts this court and the Supreme Court rendered their judgments. Even if there were important differences on the facts, it is too late to assert, them now.
The facts regarding the July meeting, its validity and finality, are admitted by the demurrer. The appellant is not now permitted to assert that these statements are untrue and that the transaction was not consummated until after the public, with no knowledge of the transaction, had subscribed for 20,000 shares of the stock.
The decree is affirmed with costs.