Case Name: John R. Beggs, Doing Business under the Firm Name and Style of J. R. Beggs & Co., Respondent, v. The New York Central Railroad Company, Appellant
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Term
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1916-12
Citations: 97 Misc. 652
Docket Number: 
Parties: John R. Beggs, Doing Business under the Firm Name and Style of J. R. Beggs & Co., Respondent, v. The New York Central Railroad Company, Appellant.
Judges: 
Reporter: New York Miscellaneous Reports
Volume: 97
Pages: 652–659

Head Matter:
John R. Beggs, Doing Business under the Firm Name and Style of J. R. Beggs & Co., Respondent, v. The New York Central Railroad Company, Appellant.
(Supreme Court, Appellate Term, First Department,
December, 1916.)
Carriers — of merchandise — failure to care for and deliver goods — hills of lading — evidence — verdict,
In a shipper’s action for failure to properly care for and deliver three carloads of potatoes it appeared that they were received by defendant from connecting carriers, consigned to the order of plaintiff at New York city with instructions that the purchaser be notified upon their arrival and no delivery was to be made except on surrender of the original bills of lading properly indorsed. The bills of lading with drafts attached were sent to a New York bank and though the purchaser was notified of the arrival of the potatoes it never paid the drafts nor received the bills but directed defendant to deliver the potatoes to a certain dock, which it did ten days later not having in the meantime received the bills of lading, and while on said dock three days the potatoes were frozen, and upon the purchaser’s refusal to accept them they were removed to a warehouse and later sold for less than the original purchase price. Held:
That as the bills of lading required the shipper to protect the potatoes from frost which could easily have been done in the cars defendant was not justified in unloading them where they were liable to freeze, defendant having no authority from plaintiff to unload except under the general provisions of the bills of lading whereby it had «the right to store for the benefit of the shipper.
That there being some evidence that plaintiff’s broker in New York who made the sale to the purchaser had authority to and did bind plaintiff by consenting to or ratifying a delivery at a point other than as called for by the bills of lading, the exclusion of testimony by defendant tending to show before such delivery said broker knew of and consented thereto and afterwards ratified it called for the reversal of a judgment for plaintiff on a directed verdict.
Appeal' by the defendant from a judgment of the City Court of the city of New York, entered on a directed verdict in favor of the plaintiff, and from an order denying motion for a new trial.
Alexander S. Lyman (William Mann, of counsel), for appellant.
Neil P. Cullom, for respondent.

Opinion:
Finch, J.
Action against the defendant railroad for failure to properly care for and. deliver three carloads of potatoes.
The potatoes were shipped by the plaintiff and received by the defendant from connecting carriers. The bills of lading show that they were consigned to the order of the plaintiff at New York city, with instructions that Parker Philips Company, the purchaser of the potatoes, be notified upon their arrival. The bills of lading also contain a stipulation for iC60th Street delivery (lighterage free)" and a provision that the merchandise was not to be delivered to any one except on the surrender of original bills of lading properly indorsed. The potatoes arrived in New York city about February 1, 1916, and the purchaser, Parker Philips Company, was notified. The bills of lading had been sent with the drafts attached to a New York bank, but the purchaser never paid the drafts nor received the bills. The purchaser instead directed the railroad to deliver the potatoes to the railroad's Barclay street docks. On February eleventh, the railroad, without having received the bills of lading which was necessary before a delivery could be made, lightered the cars to Barclay street and unloaded them on the dock where the potatoes remained until February fourteenth. . While lying on the dock they were frozen and .the purchaser refused to accept them. They were then removed to a warehouse, and sold in March for much less than the original purchase price. The court directed a verdict against the defendant for $1,742.45, and there is no question raised as to this amount.
The railroad was not justified in unloading the potatoes on the dock where they were liable to freeze. The bills of lading required the shipper to protect them from frost, and that could easily have been done in the cars. The plaintiff personally gave no authority to unload except under the general provisions of the bills of lading, whereby the carrier has the right to store for the benefit of the shipper if there is a delay in accepting the goods. The carrier was not acting under those provisions because it would then be liable as a warehouseman. The railroad claims that the direction from Parker Philips Company to deliver the potatoes at Barclay street was sufficient authority under the custom in New York and the schedules filed with the interstate commerce commission. Suffice it to say that the bills of lading called for delivery at Sixtieth street and the surrender of the bills before delivery. The bills of lading are not ambiguous, and the schedules filed are not at variance with them. It is true the bills provide for free lighter-age, but that is only in case the purchaser desires to avail himself of this free lighterage after a surrender of the bills of lading.
There was some evidence, however, that the plaintiff's broker in New York, who made the sale to Parker Philips Company, had authority to bind the plaintiff and did bind the plaintiff by consenting to or ratifying a transfer to Barclay street. The defendant offered evidence to show that before the transfer this broker knew of the transfer and consented to it, and also that afterwards he ratified it. This evidence was improperly excluded, and because of the exclusion of this evidence a new trial must be had.
Judgment reversed and a new trial ordered, with costs to appellant to abide the event.
Whitaker, J., concurs in result.