Case Name: Anna M. Troth v. Henry W. Wills, Appellant
Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
Jurisdiction: Pennsylvania
Decision Date: 1898-07-29
Citations: 8 Pa. Super. 1
Docket Number: Appeal, No. 100
Parties: Anna M. Troth v. Henry W. Wills, Appellant.
Judges: Before Bice, P. J., Wickham, Beaver, Orlady, Smith and Porter, JJ.
Reporter: Pennsylvania Superior Court Reports
Volume: 8
Pages: 1–14

Head Matter:
Anna M. Troth v. Henry W. Wills, Appellant.
Trespass by domestic animal — Acts incident to primary trespass — Responsibility of owner.
In eases of damage inflicted by the trespassing of domestic animals the primary trespass is the entry of the animal upon the land; the attendant damage for which the owner may be held liable is a matter of aggravation. Mischievous acts of the animal when incident to the primary,trespass, in any of its aspects, or so closely associated with it as to form a substantial part or an immediate result of it, are a legitimate matter of aggravation, for which the owner should be held liable.
Trespass and incidental injuries — Question for jury.
If an animal injures a person lawfully trying to prevent it from trespassing, the owner will be held liable, though the injury be one which the animal is not prone to commit.
A cow trespassing upon another’s land hooked the plaintiff who was driving it off. The cow was not known to be naturally mischievous; the court left the questions of negligence and damages to the jury, with suitable instructions as to the measure of damages for the injuries inflicted as being aggravating incidents to the trespass., • '
Argued Oct. 13, 1897.
Appeal, No. 100, Oct. T., 1897, by defendant, from judgment of C. P. No. 1, Phila. Co., Dec. T., 1895, No. 382, on verdict for plaintiff.
Before Bice, P. J., Wickham, Beaver, Orlady, Smith and Porter, JJ.
Affirmed.
Wickham and Porter, JJ., dissent.
Trespass for personal injuries. Before Bbégy, J.
It appears from the evidence that the plaintiff, a lady about fifty-five years of age, was temporarily living with her son, in a small country place, and the cow of the defendant strayed into the garden belonging to the son. The plaintiff, seeing the cow in the garden, came out. of her son’s house and attempted to drive the cow out of the garden back into the pasture field, from where she entered into the garden. The plaintiff alleges that while so driving the cow out of the garden back into the field, the cow deliberately went towards the field, and that she followed closely behind the cow, when the cow suddenly turned her head and butted the plaintiff in the abdomen, and hence her injuries.
The son of the plaintiff was the tenant of one Shonberger, and in his verbal lease had undertaken the place, with the fences in the condition they were, in order to have cheaper rent. Tbe defendant was also a tenant, of the same owner, of several stalls in his, said owner’s barn, which adjoined the plaintiff’s son’s place, and that during this particular period of the year, the well at the barn ran dry, and the owner permitted the defendant to drive his cow over a field to a small creek therein for water. This field was divided from the garden of plaintiff’s son by a fence. The defendant’s servant was in the habit, in the mornings, of letting the cow out of the stable, with other cattle, and she would go to the creek for water and gradually return to the stable; in the mean while the servant would clean up the stable.
On the morning of October 29, 1895, this cow, on its way back from the creek, strayed or broke into the garden as described.
The evidence on behalf of the plaintiff was that the fence between the garden and the field was in good order and repair . on that morning. The evidence on behalf of the defendant was that the fence had been in bad condition prior to the accident but did not say how it was on this morning.
The judge, in charging the jury, left it for them to say whether the defendant was negligent in allowing his cow to roam about a pasture field, when the evidence of the plaintiff was that the fences were in good condition.
The court declined defendant’s points as follows:
1. There is no evidence in this case to show that defendant’s cow was vicious, or the defendant had any knowledge that it was claimed, that she was vicious.
2. [If the jury believe that the cow of the defendant was simply wandering away from its stable, in search of water, over a private field, and during its progress entered upon the premises on which plaintiff was, there is nothing in these facts that justify a verdict against this defendant.] [1]
8. I instruct you that the duty to keep the fences in repair was either upon the owner, Shonberger, or the tenant, Troth, but not upon the defendant.
• 4. [The evidence being uncontradicted, that the defendant had permission of the owner to allow the cow to roam in his field, that then there was no negligence on the part of the defendant, and the verdict should be for him.] [2]
5. [Under all the evidence the verdict should be for the defendant.] [3]
. Verdict and judgment for plaintiff for $400. Defendant appealed.
Errors assigned were (1) in declining to charge as requested in defendant’s second point, reciting same. (2) In declining to charge the jury as requested in defendant’s fourth point, reciting same. (3) In declining to charge the jury as requested in defendant’s fifth point, reciting same.
Ohas. E. Linde, for appellant.
In the present case the defendant did not omit or neglect to perform any duty which a prudent man under the circumstances would have done. He did just what every careful man would or could do: McIlvaine v. Lantz, 100 Pa. 586.
The burden is upon the plaintiff to show a negligence on'the part of an owner, even when the animal belongs to a class of known dangerous propensities: Curtis v. Schlosser, 14 C. C. R. 600; Mann v. "Weiand, 81* Pa. 243; Linnehan v. Sampson, 126 Mass. 506.
Julius C. Levi, for appellee.
The principle of law that seems to govern this case, is that an animal liable to do injury to man or property is a nuisance, and that keeping it after notice of such liability is so wrongful that the owner is chargeable for any neglect to keep it with such care that it cannot do damage-to a person or property who, without any essential of fault, is injured thereby. This principle is clearly approved and confirmed in the case of Mann v. Weiand, 81* Pa. 243.
July 29, 1898:
Mr. Justice Mercur in delivering the opinion of the court cites a number of authorities to show a single instance of the knowledge of the owner that his animal would injure either persons or property is sufficient to support any claim for damages arising from his negligence to properly restrain such animals or keep them within a safe enclosure.
In support of this principle may be cited the cases of Dolph v. Ferris, 7 W. & S. 367; Gregg v. Gregg, 55 Pa. 227; McIlvaine v. Lantz, 100 Pa. 586; Barber v. Mensch, 157 Pa. 391.
The question of the defendant’s knowledge of the vicious habits of the animal was properly left to the jury under the evidence hereinabove quoted, and a verdict rendered thereon should not be set aside.

Opinion:
Opinion by
Smith, J.,
It is not necessary, in disposing of this case, to determine the liability of the owner of a domestic animal for all its acts while trespassing upon another's land. In such eases, the primary trespass is the entry of the animal upon the land; the attendant damage for which the owner may be held liable is matter of aggravation. The minimum liability of the owner is for -acts arising from the natural propensities of the species, and from special characteristics and acquired habits of the individual of which the owner has notice. When the primary trespass is the wilful act of the owner, he may be held to a larger measure of responsibility; thus, if he take a dog into a field where he is himself a trespasser, and the dog there kills or injures sheep, this, though its first offense, may be laid as an aggravation of the trespass: Beckwith v. Shandike, Burr. 2092; Michael v. Alestree, 2 Lev. 172, cited in Dolph v. Ferris, 7 W. & S. 367. Beyond this, the authorities appear unsettled, and principle and analogy form the only guide. Doubtless there may be mischief so far independent of the primary trespass, and unrelated to the propensity or habit leading to this, that it can not properly be deemed matter of aggravation. In my view, however, the mischievous act, when incident to the primary trespass, in any of its aspects, or so closely associated with it as to form a substantive part or an immediate result of it, is a legitimate matter of aggravation, for which the owner should be held liable. In such case, the propensity or habit leading to the primary trespass may be regarded as the proximate cause of the resulting injury. If, for example, trespassing cattle, in order to reach the vegetation in a hot bed, break its glass covering, the owner must be held liable for this injury, though cattle are not bjr nature prone to break glass. Such breaking is incident to the primary trespass, and grows out of the propensity leading to this. If an animal injure a person lawfully trying to prevent it from trespassing, the owner should be held liable, though the injury be one which the animal is not prone to commit. In such case the mischievous act is closely associated with the primary trespass, and in fact grows directly out of it. The same principle must govern if a person be injured in trying to prevent the continuance of a trespass, or of acts forming an aggravation of it.
As was said in Rossell v. Cottom, 31 Pa. 525: " The property in the animal raises the duty, on the part of the owner, to guard against its mischievous propensities; and failing in this, it holds him answerable for its injurious acts, without regard to the degree of care bestowed in controlling it. ' Sic utere tuo ut alienum non lsedas ' applies to all such cases. It is not a question of negligence or want of due care on the part of the owner." This principle is more in accord with the requirements of present conditions and needs of the people than the doctrine of non-liability of the owner without notice of the vicious habits of his cattle. It is reasonable to presume that an owner of cattle is better acquainted with their habits than a stranger would be, and if ignorance on this point will relieve an owner from the consequences of their mischievous acts, the burden of showing this should rest with him. By a statute passed two centuries ago domestic animals had a right to roam at will over a stranger's land, if not adequately fenced. Yerily, a landowner, under this statute, was keeper of his neighbor's cattle. But this statutory duty has ceased, and now the owner of cattle must restrain them or be held liable for the consequences. There is no sound reason for visiting upon third persons the injurious results of the acts of trespassing cattle, or for subjecting them to loss thus caused, while exempting the owners.
In this view of the principles which should govern' the determination of this case, the injury to the plaintiff must be deemed an aggravation of the trespass committed by the animal in entering the garden. This injury, indeed, is not such as a cow is ordinarily prone to commit; ajid there is no evidence that the defendant's cow had contracted the habit of making such assaults.' Bub the act of the animal was one to which a creature of that kind is naturally disposed on being disturbed while feeding; and it was so directly associated with the primary trespass that, unless the plaintiff's right to prevent a continuance of this be denied, there can be no ground for questioning the liability of the owner. This right cannot be controverted, for under the circumstances the act of the plaintiff is to be regarded as that of the tenant of the premises. The act of the animal by which the plaintiff was injured, so far from being independent of the primary trespass, or unrelated to it, grew directly out of the propensity in which this originated, coupled with the plaintiff's attempt to prevent its continuance. The defendant's fifth point was therefore properly refused. The case was submitted to the jury with suitable instructions, and their finding on the questions involved was concurred in by the trial court.
The judgment is affirmed.