Case Name: ANIMAL RIGHTS FOUNDATION OF FLORIDA, INC., et al., Appellant, v. David SIEGEL and Westgate Resorts, Ltd., etc., Appellees
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 2004-02-06
Citations: 867 So. 2d 451
Docket Number: No. 5D03-653
Parties: ANIMAL RIGHTS FOUNDATION OF FLORIDA, INC., et al., Appellant, v. David SIEGEL and Westgate Resorts, Ltd., etc., Appellees.
Judges: ORFINGER, J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 867
Pages: 451–469

Head Matter:
ANIMAL RIGHTS FOUNDATION OF FLORIDA, INC., et al., Appellant, v. David SIEGEL and Westgate Resorts, Ltd., etc., Appellees.
No. 5D03-653.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
Feb. 6, 2004.
Rehearing Denied March 17, 2004.
Thomas R. Julin & Patricia Acosta of Hunton & Williams, Miami, for Appellants.
Michael Marder, Victor Kline and Amanda Chapman of Greenspoon, Marder, Hirschfeld, Rafkin, Ross & Berger, P.A., Orlando, for Appellees.

Opinion:
PALMER, J.
The Animal Rights Foundation of Florida and Heather Lischin (collectively "the Foundation") appeal the non-final order entered by the trial court granting a temporary injunction to David Siegel and Westgate Resorts, Inc. We reverse.
David Siegel is president of Westgate Resorts, which is engaged in the business of timeshare development. The events precipitating the request for an injunction stem from Siegel's hiring of Tiger's Eye Productions to provide entertainment for Westgate Resorts through twice weekly animal shows as a draw for potential buyers. Tiger's Eye is an exotic animal performance company.
In August 2002, Siegel and Westgate filed a complaint against the Foundation alleging claims of tortious interference with business relationships, invasion of privacy, slander, and libel. The Foundation is a non-profit organization founded on the principle that animals have the right to live their lives "free of exploitation, abuse, and harm inflicted upon them by society." Foundation members conduct demonstrations and letter writing campaigns, and use other media to promote animal rights. The complaint alleged that on or about April 4, 2002, Foundation supporters began to publish false statements about Sie-gel and Westgate concerning their continued association with Tiger's Eye. The Foundation allegedly picketed both at the front gate of Siegel's residential community and at his Westgate business offices, and circulated leaflets wherein the Foundation published various statements including claims that "David Siegel abuses animals" and that Westgate was "supporting animal abuse." The complaint sought both damages and injunctive relief.
Siegel and Westgate filed an emergency motion seeking a temporary injunction prohibiting the Foundation from publishing false and defamatory statements. After a hearing, the trial court denied the request for injunctive relief, finding that "a preliminary injunction which prohibits peaceful assembly and imposes prior restraints on speech is not sustainable under the first amendment and common law principles," and that "equity will not enjoin an actual or threatened defamation." The trial court also found that the cases cited in support of the injunctive relief involved "economic speech" and were therefore distinguishable from this case.
When protest activities continued, West-gate and Siegel filed a second emergency motion for a temporary injunction. This time, after receiving and considering additional evidence, the trial court granted the motion and entered a temporary injunction against the Foundation.
The Foundation challenges the injunction, raising two claims of error: (1) that Siegel and Westgate failed to meet the legal requirements for issuance of a temporary injunction, and, in the alternative, (2) that, even if a prima facie case for injunctive relief was made, the instant injunction operates as an improper prior restraint on its constitutional right of free speech granted by the state and federal constitutions. We conclude that the evidence of record was insufficient to warrant the issuance of an injunction because said evidence failed to prove that Siegel and Westgate were entitled to receive a temporary injunction and because portions of the instant injunction violate the,Foundation's first amendment rights.
The instant injunction operates to regulate both speech itself (that is, the Foundation's spoken and written word) and symbolic speech commonly referred to as "expression" or "verbal acts" (that is, the Foundation's picketing and demonstrating). In pertinent part, the injunction reads as follows:
INJUNCTION

B. That defendants Heather Lischin and the Animal Rights Foundation of Florida, and their servants, employees, agents and any person or entity acting on their own behalf or at their request, and any person in active concert or participation with them (hereinafter "Defendants") are forthwith and immediately enjoined from tortiously interfering with Plaintiffs' advantageous business relationships by directly or indirectly publishing verbally, or in writing the following statements:
"David Siegel abuses animals"
"David Siegel condones animal abuse"
"Now featuring at Westgate Animal abuse"
"David Siegel supports animal abuse"
"Westgate supports animal abuse"
"Westgate supports cat beater"
"David Siegel supports cruelty to animals"
"Westgate supports cruelty to animals"
"Now featuring at Westgate animal abuse" and
'Westgate refuses to stop sponsoring animal cruelty," to:
(1) Plaintiffs' actual or prospective customers and their guests at the entrance to, or within any of Plaintiffs' timeshare in Florida. "Customers" shall mean all persons who have been invited by Plaintiffs, either directly or indirectly, to purchase or lease a timeshare unit at any of Westgate Resorts, Ltd's resorts. "Guests" shall mean all persons who have been invited by customers of West-gate Resorts, Ltd. "Invited" means those persons who have come to any of Westgate Resorts, Ltd's resorts as a result of any advertising, marketing or promotional activities by Westgate Resorts, Ltd.
(2) David Siegel's neighbors at the entrance to, or within, the subdivision wherein the Home is located.
C. That Defendants are enjoined from picketing at the gates of the subdivision wherein the Home is located or the entrance of Plaintiffs' timeshare resorts in Florida except that Defendants may have 5 agents or less appear on either side of the street from the gates of the subdivision wherein the Home is located and the other side of the road on which any of Plaintiffs' Florida timeshare resorts are located. The Foundation's agents shall be enjoined from videotaping any passers-by; from using megaphone or bull horn; from shouting at passers-by and from prohibiting the free flow of traffic in all the foregoing locations.
In Liberty Fin. Mortgage Corp. v. Clampitt, 667 So.2d 880 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996), the Second District set forth the applicable standard for the issuance of a temporary injunction as follows:
The general function of a temporary injunction is to preserve the status quo until full relief can be granted in a final hearing. Such an injunction is an extraordinary remedy. It should be granted only sparingly and only after the moving party has alleged and proved facts entitling it to relief.
(Citations omitted). Generally, in order to succeed on a motion for temporary injunction the moving party must prove that:
(1) the party has a clear legal right to the relief requested; that is, a substantial likelihood of success on the merits;
(2) irreparable harm will likely result if the trial court refuses to issue injunctive relief because an adequate remedy at law is not available; and,
(3) the public interest will be served by the imposition of an injunction.
Hall v. City of Orlando, 555 So.2d 963 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990); South Florida Limousines, Inc. v. Broward County Aviation Dep't., 512 So.2d 1059 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987). In applying this analysis to the instant injunctive order, we will first discuss the injunction provisions relating to limitations on the Foundation's right to picket, and then address the prohibitions relating to the list of banned phrases.
We begin by recognizing that peaceful demonstrations in public places such as streets and sidewalks are protected by the first amendment yet subject to reasonable regulation. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 116, 92 S.Ct. 2294, 33 L.Ed.2d 222 (1972). The determination of whether a regulation is reasonable initially depends upon whether the regulation is content-neutral or viewpoint based. Here, the restrictions placed upon the Foundation's right to picket generally relate to issues concerning the manner in which the picketing takes place, not to the content of the message delivered by the picketers; therefore, the regulations are content-neutral. As such, the picketing provisions of the injunction do not constitute traditional prior restraints which are subject to elevated constitutional scrutiny; however, general first amendment principles still apply. See Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 763 n. 2, 114 S.Ct. 2516, 129 L.Ed.2d 593 (1994). To that end, when evaluating the constitutionality of a content-neutral injunction issued relating to picketing activity the court must determine "whether the challenged provisions of the injunction burden no more speech than necessary to serve a significant government interest." Madsen, 512 U.S. at 765, 114 S.Ct. 2516. In applying this analysis, our courts have found significant government interests to exist in instances where an injunction is entered to ensure the public safety and order, to promote the free flow of traffic on the public streets and sidewalks, and to protect the property rights of all citizens, concluding that such interests are "sufficient to justify an appropriately tailored injunction to protect them." Madsen, 512 U.S. at 768,114 S.Ct. 2516.
Here, the trial court's injunction prohibits picketing which would impede the free flow of traffic. While such restrictions are generally allowed to support the significant public interest in promoting the free flow of traffic on the public streets and sidewalks while at the same time not burdening more speech than necessary, the entry of such injunctive relief in this ease was improper in light of the fact that the record is devoid of any evidence that the Foundation had impeded or was likely to impede the free flow of traffic absent such injunctive relief. Compare Operation Rescue v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 626 So.2d 664 (Fla.1993) aff'd in part, rev'd in part sub. nom. Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., 512 U.S. 753, 114 S.Ct. 2516, 129 L.Ed.2d 593 (1994) (upholding injunctive relief prohibiting blocking access to abortion clinic where trial court made factual finding based on competent substantial evidence that enjoined party had engaged in impermissible activities now being enjoined).
Next, the instant injunction enjoins the Foundation's agents from using mega phones or bull horns, and from shouting to passers-by. We conclude that these noise restrictions improperly burden more speech than is necessary to protect any valid public interest because they enjoin all shouting and all uses of bull horns or megaphones, rather than tailoring a prohibition against impermissible conduct, either engaged in or threatened by the Foundation's demonstrators. As such, the injunction is impermissibly broad. In so ruling, we rely upon the analysis regarding the regulation of amplified speech set forth in Daley v. City of Sarasota, 752 So.2d 124 (Fla. 2d DCA), rev. denied, 776 So.2d 275 (Fla.2000). In that case, the City had passed an ordinance prohibiting all amplified sounds emanating from incompletely enclosed structures in a commercial section of town. In invalidating that restriction, the court noted that the restriction was not limited to prohibiting "unreasonable" sound, but rather, prohibited all amplified sound during certain hours of the day, regardless of the volume of the sound and regardless of who could hear the sound. The Second District noted that, although the City could regulate unreasonable sound, that goal
could not be achieved by the overbroad regulation of activities protected by the First Amendment. As currently written, the City's ordinance could be used to suppress First Amendment rights far more severely than can be justified by the City's interest in regulating unreasonable sound.
752 So.2d at 126 (citation omitted). The court noted further that a blanket ban on all such amplified speech, regardless of its volume, would extend too far. See also Easy Way of Lee County, Inc., v. Lee County, 674 So.2d 863 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996)(holding that a noise ordinance prohibiting amplification of sounds which were "plainly audible" fifty feet away was deemed to be overly broad and vague and therefore unconstitutional). See generally State v. Globe Communications, Corp., 622 So.2d 1066, 1073 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993), aff'd, 648 So.2d 110 (Fla.1994)(explaining that prior restraints come in the form of both injunctions and legislation).
The instant injunction also states that the Foundation is permitted to picket at the gates of the Siegel's subdivision and the entrance of Westgate but that the number of picketers must total five agents or fewer, and the picketers must remain on the "other side of the road" from said properties. Again, we conclude that, on the basis of the instant record, these restrictions burden more speech than is necessary to protect any valid pubic interest in that no evidence was presented which indicated the need for the regulation of the number of protesters or the location of the demonstrations.
Lastly, the injunction completely prohibits the picketers from videotaping any passers-by. However, the record fails to suggest how such videotaping causes Westgate and Siegel (neither of whom are the subject of the videotaping) irreparable harm for which other remedies at law are inadequate and for which Siegel and West-gate have a clear legal right to receive relief. Compare Goosen v. Walker, 714 So.2d 1149 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998)(allowing the enjoining of videotaping by the person being videotaped upon an evidentiary showing that the conduct rose to the level of stalking); Wolf son v. Lewis, 924 F.Supp. 1413 (E.D.Pa.1996) (allowing in-junctive relief in the form of a prohibition on videotaping on behalf of the person being videotaped where the conduct was a persistent course of hounding, harassment, and unreasonable surveillance which rose to the level of invasion of privacy based on intrusion upon seclusion).
In summary, we conclude that all of the injunction provisions relating to limitations on the Foundation's right to picket must be struck down as being improper.
Moving on to the injunction's regulation of the picketers' speech, the trial court prohibited the Foundation members from directly or indirectly publishing, verbally or in writing, the following statements:
David Siegel abuses animals
David Siegel condones animal abuse
Now featuring at Westgate-Animal abuse
David Siegel supports animal abuse
Westgate supports animal abuse
Westgate supports cat beater
David Siegel supports cruelty to animals
Westgate supports cruelty to animals
Now featuring at Westgate animal abuse, and
Westgate refuses to stop sponsoring animal cruelty
Unlike the picketing restrictions, these restrictions are clearly content-based regulations which operate as prior restraints on the Foundation's constitutional right to freedom of expression. As such, the restrictions are presumptively invalid and must overcome strict scrutiny. See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 114 S.Ct. 2445, 129 L.Ed.2d 497 (1994); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 112 S.Ct. 2538, 120 L.Ed.2d 305 (1992). "Under 'strict' scrutiny, which applies inter alia to certain classifications and fundamental rights, a court must review the [regulation] to ensure that it furthers a compelling state interest through the least intrusive means." North Florida Women's Health & Counseling Services, Inc. v. State, 866 So.2d 612 n. 16 (Fla. 2003).
Here, there is no "compelling state interest" which is met by the instant injunction terms, which merely regulate the private rights of the parties. Accordingly, these provisions of the trial court's injunction are in violation of the Foundation's first amendment rights. See Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 91 S.Ct. 1575, 29 L.Ed.2d 1 (1971)(holding that designation of conduct of community organization in distributing leaflets critical of real estate broker's alleged "block busting" and "panic peddling" activities in area of Chicago as an invasion of broker's rights of privacy was not sufficient to support an injunction against peaceful distribution of informational literature, and claim that literature was intended to exercise a coercive impact on broker did not remove literature from the reach of the first amendment).
In closing, we note that the arguments of Siegel and Westgate that the injunction is proper because the Foundation's activities constitute tortious interference are misplaced. Our analysis of this argument must begin with a determination of whether the prohibited speech is pure or commercial speech. In Strang v. Satz, 884 F.Supp. 504, 507 (S.D.Fla.1995), the district court aptly explained the difference between the two types of speech as follows:
Pure speech is that in which society has an interest wholly apart from the speaker's or listener's economic interest. Abramson v. Gonzalez, 949 F.2d 1567, 1574 (11th Cir.1992). In contrast, commercial speech is that which proposes a commercial transaction. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 96 S.Ct. 1817, 48 L.Ed.2d 346 (1976). In comparison to pure speech, the Supreme Court affords commercial speech "a limited measure of protection, commensurate with its subordinate position in the scale of First Amendment values, while allowing modes of regulation that might be impermissible in the realm of noncommercial expression." Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 456, 98 S.Ct. 1912, 1918, 56 L.Ed.2d 444 (1978).
The evidence in the record established that the Foundation was not a competitor of Siegel or Westgate, nor was the Foundation's activity promoting some economic interest. Rather, the speech was of a political nature, protesting alleged animal rights violations. As such, the speech involved in this case was pure speech which was not properly restrained to prevent the tortious interference alleged. See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 102 S.Ct. 3409, 73 L.Ed.2d 1215 (1982)(enjoining non-violent political protests in order to prevent a tortious interference with business violates the first amendment).
REVERSED and REMANDED.
ORFINGER, J., concurs.
SAWAYA, C.J., concurs in part and dissents in part, with opinion.
. The First Amendment of the United States Constitution provides:
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition to the Government for a redress of grievances.
U.S. Const. Amend. I. Article I, section 4 of Florida Constitution provides:
Every person may speak, write and publish his' sentiments on all subjects but shall be responsible for the abuse of that right. No law shall be passed to restrain or abridge the liberty of speech or of the press.
Art. 1, § 4, Fla. Const.
. "A regulation of speech which distinguishes favored speech from disfavored speech on the basis of ideas or viewpoints is generally content — based, while a regulation which imposes a burden on speech without reference to the ideas or viewpoints expressed in the speech is, in a majority of instances, content-neutral." Café Erotica v. Florida Dep't. of Transp., 830 So.2d 181 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002), rev. denied, 845 So.2d 888 (Fla.2003); see also Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 763, 114 S.Ct. 2516, 129 L.Ed.2d 593 (1994)(explaining that the principal inquiry in determining content neutrality is whether the government has adopted a regulation of speech without reference to the content of the regulated speech).
. "The clearest definition of prior restraint is an administrative system or a judicial order that prevents speech from occurring." Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law: Principles and Policies 770 (1997).
. The trial court appears to have properly recognized this fact is its first order denying the request for injunctive relief, since it found cases involving economic speech to be distinguishable.