Case Name: The Commonwealth v. Beeson
Court: Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia
Jurisdiction: Virginia
Decision Date: 1832-07
Citations: 3 Leigh 821
Docket Number: 
Parties: The Commonwealth v. Beeson.
Judges: DUNCAN, J., concurred in the two last resolutions; but he declined the expression of any opinion on the first point.
Reporter: Virginia Reports
Volume: 30
Pages: 815–818

Head Matter:
The Commonwealth v. Beeson.
July, 1832.
Roads- -Established along River Bank — Right of Public to Take Additional l.and without Condemnation Where Road Is Washed Away. — If a public road be opened and established along the hank of a river, on land of an individual proprietor regularly condemned for the purpose, according to the statute, and the land on which the road was so opened and established, be washed away, in whole or in part, by high waters, the public has no right to take so much other adjoining land of the proprietor as may suffice for the highway, without a new view and condemnation thereof, and compensation for the same, according to the statute.
Same -Same — Same—Liability of Owner for Nuisance in Use of Land before Condemnation. — And if, in such case, the public be ent’tled to additional land for the road, the proprietor cannot be guilty of any nuisance in the use of the land for his own purposes, until the road shall have been actually laid out and opened by the public through the instrumentality oi its agents.
Case adjourned from the circuit superiour court of Wood.
At April term 1832, the grand jury found an indictment against Agness Beeson for a nuisance. The indictment charged that the defendant, being the owner of certain lands in the county of Wood, contiguous to a public road there, on the 25th March 1832, and thenceforth till the 1st April following, permitted a fence of rails made across the road to remain and be continued, contrary to the form of the statute in such case made and provided, and against the peace and dignity of the commonwealth.
The attorney for the commonwealth and the defendant agreed the following case: That for thirty years past, there had been a road and public highway leading from Parkers-burg, along the bank of the Ohio river, to Marietta, being the same road described in the indictment : that the defendant *was the owner of a small farm bounding on the river for some forty or fifty rods ; and the road passed along the bank of the river, through the defendant’s land, and was bounded on the one side by the river, and on the other by the defendant’s fence : and that during a recent great and extraordinary fresh in the river, the ground on which the road ran, for its in tire extent through the defendant’s land, was washed away, nearly to the defendant’s fence, whereby the road was rendered wholly impassable, unless the defendant’s fence should be removed. And if upon this state of facts, the defendant was bound to set in her fence, and give more ground for the road, without a new view and condemnation of the same, in the manner of condemning lands for public highways, then judgment should be entered for the commonwealth for an amercement of one dollar ; but if th.e defendant was not bound so to set in her fence until the land should be regularly viewed and condemned for public use, then judgment should be'entered for the defendant.
The circuit, superiour court, with the consent of the defendant, adjourned to this court all questions of law arising on the case agreed, as novel and difficult.
Attorney general for the commonwealth.
Leigh for the defendant.
See monographic« 2 on “Nuisances.’

Opinion:
THOMPSON, J.,
delivered the opinion of the court.
The record does not inform us how the highway mentioned in the indictment was established, whether on a writ of ad quod damnum in pursuance of the statute concerning roads and landings (2 Rev. Code, ch. 236, § 1, 2, p. 233,) or by express grant of or contract with the proprietor of the land, or by presumption of such grant or contract arising from the public use -of the way for a great length of time: the indictment (as it well might) describes it, in general terms, as a public highway, without shewing how it. became such. The case agreed, nevertheless, should have disclosed *how the public derived its right of way. Owing to this omission, the court, not exactly foreseeing how far its decision might depend on or be varied by the state of that fact or the omission to state it, would have remanded the cause, in order that the defect might be supplied, but for the suggestion of the coun.sel, that a speedy decision of the principal question intended to be adjourned, was interesting and important to a whole community, as it would be decisive of a numerous class of similar cases, arisen and likely to arise, and prevent and end much litigation ; which suggestion was coupled with the concession both of the defendant's counsel and attorney general, that the court should consider the case, as if the record stated the road to have been established, (as most probably it was) in pursuance of the statute, upon the execution and ^return of a writ of ad qupd damnum.
The charge in the indictment is, for permitting or continuing a nuisance in an existing public highway; existing actually and in fact, and not merely by implication of law, if such a thing could be, where no road had ever been laid out or opened. The case agreed states, that the highway described in the indictment, was washed away by a recent fresh in the Ohio, and did not exist at the date of the commission of the alleged nuisance; that the fence now complained of as an obstruction to the road and a nuisance, was legally and rightfully erected on the defendant's private property ; that it now stands where it was so erected, forming no obstruction to the road mentioned in the indictment (for that is gone) nor to any public highway now actually existing or in use, or that ever existed or was used, but that it covers ground over which the public have a right to open a public highway, in lieu of the one destroyed by the floods, though as yet the public have taken no steps to open a road upon the land where the fence stands. To> say nothing, at present, of the variance' between the case charged and the case agreed, and supposing that the indictment had been so framed as to fit the case agreed ; conceding too, for the *sake of argument, that, in such a case as the present, the public have a right to take adjacent land without compensation, to the extent of the loss sustained by the flood, for the purpose of a public highway ; still the question remains, whether an individual in the defendant's situation, is bound to remove a fence lawfully erected, and on failure to do so, is indictable as for a nuisance to a public highway? or, in such a case, would it be the duty of the public, by its agent the surveyor of the old highway, to remove fences, lay out and open the new road, and until the road were thus laid out and opened by him, could a nuisance be committed upon it? We are of opinion, that it was not the duty of the defendant to move in her fence, even though the right of the commonwealth be conceded, but on the contrary, it would be incumbent on the public to locate its right of way upon ! the particular land claimed for the highway. This it could and should do by the agency of the surveyor, by some such act as laying out and opening the road, removing fences &c., and until this were done, no nuisance could be said to be erected or continued upon this imaginary highway. But suppose this were otherwise, and that a nuisance could be committed on a road never in fact opened, and alleged to exist only in legal contemplation of law, yet we are of opinion, that the variance between the case charged and the case agreed, would be fatal to this prosecution : for the nuisance is charged to have been permitted or continued in the road as existing and established, whereas it appears by the case agreed, to have been continued on land never before used or condemned for a road, where none was ever laid out or opened, where in fact none ever actually existed, and where, if there be a right of way at all, it exists only in contemplation of law, the road designated in the indictment, having been actually swept away. The decision of both or either of these points, in favor of the defendant, would suffice to dispose of this particular case. But they are, confessedly, the minor and technical points in the cause, and do not touch the important question intended to be adjourned.
*That question is, Whether, in the case of a public highway regularly established according to the statute, along the bank of a water course, if the ground on which the road runs be destroyed by abrasion, overflow, or permanent change of the bed of the stream, the commonwealth is entitled, at its pleasure, to substitute a sufficient quantity of the adjacent land for the highway, in lieu of that destroyed, without view, condemnation and compensation, in the manner prescribed by the statute ? It is contended, that she is : that she acquires by the judgment of the county court affirming the inquisition, and giving leave to lay out and open the road, a right of way, which, when it is bounded by a water course, varies and fluctuates with the fluctuations of the bed or banks of the stream ; that the seisin and freehold is not divested by the judg- merit of the county court, but remains with the original proprietor or his successors in interest; that upon an abandonment of the way by the public, it reverts to the proprietor of the land ; that as, on the one hand, he continues riparian owner, entitled to the benefit of any acquisition of- soil by alluvial accretion, or otherwise, and in addition to this benefit, has once received actual compensation, and is revérsioner of the land occupied by the public when the public easement ceases ; so, on the other hand, he should bear the risk of loss incident to land thus situated. There is certainly, some plausibility in this argument; but we think when followed to its consequences, it will be found so utterly at war with the letter and spirit of our law, and indeed the general principles of justice, as to justify us in pronouncing the argument wholly untenable however specious. It will not be denied, that, in this commonwealth, private property can only be taken for public purposes, and then only upon making a just compensation to the party deprived. This is a sound principle of our fundamental law ; and our road laws, in accordance with it, has certainly prescribed the mode in which the public right shall be exercised, as well as furnished the most guarded means by which this just compensation is to be ascertained *and paid. A jury of freeholders is to view the identical land on which it is proposed to conduct the highway ; to identify the land with reasonable certainty in its inquisition ; and to assess the value of the very land thus viewed and identified, as well as the value of the additional fencing made necessary by the road. The jury is not called upon, nor is it at liberty, to value a general right of way, confined to no fixed and determinate part of the land, which may shift with the whim or caprice of the public, or with circumstances arising out of casualty or accident: if it were, it would be difficult, if not impossible, so to assess the value and damages as to constitute an equal and just measure of compensation ; for it would depend upon contingent and subsequent events, whether its assessment would be too high or too low : if the road should be suffered to remain on sterile land, the estimate might be too high ; if shifted from barren to fertile land, it might be too low. This same statute which has conferred the right upon the public (and imposed the conditions upon which the right may be exercised) to take private property for public uses in any case, has imposed this limit upon the right, — that in no case, without the consent of the owner, shall the mansion house, curtilage &c. be invaded for public purposes, whether with or without compensation.
Let us now illustrate, by a few supposable and by no means extreme cases, the con sequences to which the argument for the affirmative of this question inevitably leads. A strip of sterile land bounded by a water course, is condemned by the public for a highway, and the value is assessed and paid ; it is afterwards (as in this case) carried away by a flood : the commonwealth has the right to make reprisal of land of double, treble or quadruple value, without making any additional compensation. Suppose that by the operation of the flood, or other natural causes, the road is not only swept away, hut the bank has receded so as to bring tiie stream to the threshold of the mansion house or mill, or other valuable erection, or to the very verge of the ^curtilage : it would necessarily result from sustaining the right claimed for the commonwealth, that the mansion house, mill or curtilage, might be entered by the commonwealth, in virtue of this shifting right of way, notwithstanding the limitation of the right imposed upon the public in original applications to establish roads. They could not only be entered and prostrated by the public, but would become indictable nuisances, according to one of the hypotheses of law involved in this prosecution. Suppose again, that all the lands oE the proprietor who received compensation upon the writ of ad quod damnum, be washed away, or so irreparably injured as to make a road upon them utterly impracticable : would not the doctrine contended for necessarily conduct us to this consequence, that the commonwealth would have a right to enter upon the laud of an adjacent owner who had never received any compensation, and appropriate a sufficient quantity for the highway, without view, condemnation or compensation ? If such be the legitimate consequences flowing from the positions assumed on the affirmative side of this question, (and they appear to the court inevitably and necessarily to follow) the positions themselves must be condemned and repudiated as untenable and unsound. They must be discarded, because when compared with our statute, they are found to conflict, with the plain and obvious interpretation of its provisions, with its letter and its spirit. That statute does not authorise the public against the consent of the owner, by the exercise of the sovereign power, to acquire a general right of way over his land : it must condemn a particular part of his land to be ascertained and identified. Upon what principle then, should we be justified in holding, that the land condemned shall remain at the risk of the original proprietor, rather than at the risk of the public, and that if destroyed by the flood, the commonwealth may indemnify herself by taking the adjacent land.
We consider the question, up on our statute, a clear one against the right claimed for the public : nor apart from the*statute, do we believe any authority in point can be adduced, either from the common or the evil law, to sustain the pretensions of the commonwealth : if any such exist, the court has not been referred to it. It is true that it is laid down by english commentators, and by the civilians, and ruled by the english judges in Taylor v. Whitehead, Doug. 744, as well as in cases, before and subsequent, that if the usual tracks of a public way be rendered impassable, it is for the general good that the people should be allowed to pass over the adjacent land, and that such passage wouk not constitute a. trespass : in this principle Blackstone says, the civil and the comtnoi law agree. The english authorities mentioned, expressly negative such a right ii the case of private way. These authorities are not understood by this court as touching such a case as the present. They are understood to affirm the right of the public to a temporary way of necessity, in case of a reparable injury, until the highway can be repaired, and nothing more ; by no means to transfer and permanently fix the right of way in a new location in case of total and irreparable destruction of the ancient way. The mode at present existing of acquiring land for public purposes in England, is precisely or very nearly the same as that prescribed by our statute — by writ of ad quod damnum. We are not apprised of any civilized code that would sanction such a claim on the part of the public, except that of Pennsylvania, where it would be reasonable and proper (subject to the limitation, that the curtilage shall not be invaded, in consequence of the shifting of the highway) because the public makes no compensation for the land condemned for the purpose of highways, the proprietor there having taken the land charged with the general public servitude of highways, expressly reserved by law in the earliest periods of the commonwealth, and being compensated in advance for the reservation. That state, in every grant, throws in, without compensation or price, six acres in the hundred, for which she reserves to herself the right of making as many roads through every' man's land as *the public interest requires, without compensation. Here, no such reservation is found in the grant or the law ; no such compensation is made; and no man's freehold shall be taken but upon payment of a fair, a just, a full compensation.
Therefore, the court is of opinion and doth decide — 1. That the defendant is not bound to set in her fence and give more land, without a new view and condemnation of the same, in the manner of condemning lands for public highways. 2. That, even if the public were entitled to the land without compensation, the defendant could not be guilty of a nuisance until the road had been actually laid out and opened by the public, through the instrumentality of its agents. 3. That the offence charged, and the facts appearing by the case agreed (if the court had not decided that they constituted no offence), are too variant, to warrant a judgment of conviction.
DUNCAN, J., concurred in the two last resolutions; but he declined the expression of any opinion on the first point.