Case Name: Hyman D. Siegel, Appellant, v. People of the State of New York, et al., Respondents
Court: New York Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1965-12-30
Citations: 16 N.Y.2d 330
Docket Number: 
Parties: Hyman D. Siegel, Appellant, v. People of the State of New York, et al., Respondents.
Judges: 
Reporter: New York Reports
Volume: 16
Pages: 330–337

Head Matter:
Hyman D. Siegel, Appellant, v. People of the State of New York, et al., Respondents.
Argued November 24, 1965;
decided December 30, 1965.
Matthew H. Brandenburg for appellant.
I. The indicated eavesdrops (especially the room eavesdrops and the use which respondents have indicatedly made thereof) have worked a denial to Siegel of his constitutional and statutory rights, both State and Federal, which ought to be redressed in this proceeding. (People v. Dinan, 11 N Y 2d 350, 371 U. S. 877.) II. The eavesdropping herein viewed in its entirety, with particular emphasis on the room-cavesdrop phase, was unconstitutional and illegal. (Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643; Silverman v. United States, 365 U. S. 505; Clinton v. Virginia, 377 U. S. 158; Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U. S. 25; Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U. S. 471; Ker v. California, 374 U. S. 23; Goldman v. United States, 316 U. S. 129; Olmstead v. United States, 277 U. S. 438; On Lee v. United States, 343 U. S. 747; Lopez v. United States, 373 U. S. 427.) III. More specifically as to the telephone wiretap phase, the afore-mentioned 1962 statutory changes in this State wore adopted to meet the constitutional command of the Mapp case not only with regard to room eavesdrops but likewise with respect to telephone wire taps. (Benanti v. United States, 355 U. S. 96; Nardone v. United States, 302 U. S. 379; Schwartz v. Texas, 344 U. S. 199; Elkins v. United States, 364 U. S. 206; Chapman v. United States, 365 U. S. 610; Pugach v. Dollinger, 277 F. 2d 739, 365 U. S. 458; Williams v. Ball, 294 F. 2d 94; Lebowich v. O’Connor, 309 F. 2d 111; Matter of Landers v. O’Connor, 43 Misc 2d 1040.) IV. The remedy which is presently sought is available in a CPLR 5704 (subd. [a]) “ Special Proceeding ” in the Appellate Division. (People v. Lombardi, 18 A D 2d 177; Draper v. United States, 358 U. S. 307; People v. Cohen, 42 Misc 2d 403; People v. Beshany, 43 Misc 2d 521; Jones v. United States, 362 U. S. 257; Hoffritz v. United States, 240 F. 2d 109; Cheng Wai v. United States, 125 F. 2d 915; United States v. Coplon, 185 F. 2d 629, 342 U. S. 920; Sablowsky v. United States, 101 F. 2d 183.) V. An eavesdrop “ search ” for “ evidence of crime ” and eavesdropping as a “ general search ” are per se unconstitutional irrespective of any permissive court order. (Brinegar v. United States, 338 U. S. 160; Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 617; Gouled v. United States, 255 U. S. 298.)
Frank S. Hogan, District Attorney (Raymond S. Hack and H. Richard Uviller of counsel), for respondent. I. The appeal should be dismissed.
(De Rosa v. Slattery Contr. Co., 14 A D 2d 278, 12 N Y 2d 735; Matter of Barkley v. New York Cent. & H. R. R. R. Co., 42 App. Div. 597, 161 N. Y. 647; Matter of Mitchel v. Cropsey, 177 App. Div. 663; Matter of Judicial Inquiry Pursuant to Order of App. Div., Second Dept., 5 A D 2d 872; Matter of Willmark Serv. System, 21 A D 2d 478; Matter of Police Benevolent Assn. of N. Y. State Police v. Gagliardi, 9 A D 2d 929, 10 A D 2d 874, 9 N Y 2d 803; People v. Cohen, 41 Misc 2d 158, 42 Misc 2d 403; Matter of Alpert, 15 N Y 2d 937.) II. The denial by the Appellate Division of appellant’s motion was proper. (People ex rel. Lemon v. Supreme Ct. of State of N. Y., 245 N. Y. 24; Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643; Silverman v. United States, 365 U. S. 505; People v. Grossman, 45 Misc 2d 557; People v. Golly, 43 Misc 2d 122; People v. Scardaccione, 41 Misc 2d 433; People v. Cohen, 41 Misc 2d 158, 42 Misc 2d 403,13 N Y 2d 595; People v. Laverne, 14 N Y 2d 304.)

Opinion:
Burke and Scileppi, JJ.
The order of this court granting leave to appeal should be vacated. An ex parte application for an order for eavesdropping is criminal in nature (Code Crim. Pro., § 813-a). It always has been the rule that unless there is a provision in the Code of Criminal Procedure permitting an application in connection with, or an appeal from, an order of a criminal nature, no review may be had. There is, of course, no provision in the Code of Criminal Procedure which allows an application to be made to the Appellate Division in connection with any such orders. Therefore, the Appellate Division had no jurisdiction to entertain in the first instance the application addressed to the orders for eavesdropping under CPLR 5704 (subd. [a]). As this is a criminal matter, under our Constitution and statutes relief cannot be authorized by that section. The Appellate Division should have dismissed the proceeding rather than have denied relief. The petitioner having been indicted now may move to suppress evidence illegally secured (Code Crim. Pro., § 813-e; CPLR 4506).
The appellate courts as a matter of first impression may not intervene in the course of an investigation where, as here, orders were obtained, a judicial officer had already determined the propriety of the methods sought to be used by the law enforcement agency, and there exist adequate means of review of that determination. For if the appellant's premises were the subject of an eavesdrop order he is protected, as a citizen, by the requirements of section 813-a, and as a defendant in a criminal case he is protected by statute (CPLR 4506) and Constitution (Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643 [1961]; Silverman v. United States, 365 U. S. 505 [1961]).