Case Name: Meshke vs. Van Doren
Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Wisconsin
Decision Date: 1862-06
Citations: 16 Wis. 319
Docket Number: 
Parties: Meshke vs. Van Doren.
Judges: 
Reporter: Wisconsin Reports
Volume: 16
Pages: 319–332

Head Matter:
Meshke vs. Van Doren.
Chapt. 361, Laws of 1860, conferring upon the county court of Winnebago county jurisdiction equal to and concurrent with the circuit court, for all sums not exceeding §500, is a public act, of which the conrts will take judicial notice; and the jurisdiction of such court need not be specially alleged in an action brought therein, where the value of the claim and its amount appear from the complaint to be within the- jurisdiction of the court.
A complaint for a money demand, alleging that the defendant on, &c., became and was indebted, without stating that he still is indebted &c., may be amended by inserting an allegation of present indebtedness- at the trial without costs, and without serving a copy of the amended complaint, andhe be required to answer it if he desires to do so, instanter; and it is proper to make such amendment by interlining the same in the original complaint, notwithstanding it has been verified.
Where the judge of the counts below was requested to reduce the charge to writing, in the absence of anything, in the record to the contrary, it will' be presumed that such request was complied with..
Where a quantity of wheat, the properly of the defendant, had been seized on an attachment, and he succeeded on the trial of a traverse of the affidavit for the writ, and the property had been ordered to be re-delivered to the defendant, and it appeared that wheat bore about the same market value when it was re-delivered as when it was seized, though it had in the meantime advanced considerably. Held. That in assessing the defendant’s damages by reason of such seizure and detention, that he was not entitled to the benefit of such advance without showing that he could or would have sold it for that price.
In such case, the defendant is entitled to recover damages for any loss he has sustained in consequence of being deprived of the use and control of his property during the pendency of the attachment, or for any injury thereto, or loss thereof, together with the costs incurred by him on the trial of the traverse.
A note or security, void on account of being usurious, given by a debtor to.his creditor in satisfaction or payment of his previous valid indebtedness, does not discharge or extinguish it. Paine, J., dissenting»
APPEAL from the County Court for Winnebago County.
The complaint of the plaintiff alleges in substance, that the defendant, on the 1st day of June, 1859, was indebted to him in the sum of $120 for money lent, and also in the further su cn of $231.13 the amount of a promissory note and interest thereon, executed by the defendant to him, the whole of which said indebtedness then amounted to $335.13, and that on that day the defendant proposed to give him a new note for the amount of such indebtedness, and to induce him to accept it proposed to secure the payment thereof by mortgage on certain real 'estate, and that the defendant did then execute a note to the plaintiff, whereby he promised to pay the plaintiff the said sum of $351.13 in one year from that time, with fifty dollars interest, and if not paid when due, to draw interest at the rate of fifteen per cent, per annum thereafter until paid; that the plaintiff is a German and couLd not read or write either the English or German languages, and could not have understood the note had it been read to him in the English language, and that he was ignorant of the terms and conditions of the note when it was given, all of which the defendant then well knew; that the defendant fraudulently represented to him that tae note was a legal and valid note, drawing interest at the rate of only seven per cent, per annum, when he well knew that the same was illegal and void, and was written and intended by the defendant to be wholly void, and that the plaintiff relying on such fraudulent representations gave up and surrendered the former note of @231.18 and discharged the debt of $120 for money lent, in consideration of the execution and delivery to him by the defendant of the note for $351.13, and that there was no agreement between them for any higher rate of interest than seven per centum per annum ; and the plaintiff claimed judgment for the sum of $351.13 with interest from June 1, 1859, at the rate of seven per cent.
The answer of the defendant admitted that an indebtedness on the part of the defendant to the plaintiff existed, on the 1st of June 1859, but alleged that the note of that date of $351.-18, mentioned in the complaint was given, and received by the plaintiff, in full satisfaction thereof and alleged that the amount of interest therein stipulated to be paid, was pursuant to an unlawful, corrupt and usurious agreement, then made between the parties to that effect, and specifically denied each of the allegations of frauds and deceit contained in the complaint. At the trial the defendant objected to the introduction of any evidence under the complaint, for the reasons. 1st. The court being one of limited jurisdiction, that fact must be averred in the complaint. 2d. The complaint does not show any present indebtedness, the allegation being that the defendant on the 1st of June, 1859, wets indebted and does not allege that he is still indebted to the plaintiff. The court overruled the first objection and allowed the plaintiff to amend by adding an allegation of present indebtedness to obviate the second objection, mstanter, and without the payment of costs, to which ruling the defendant excepted. The defendant’s counsel insisted that the amended complaint should be served, and that he should have time to demur or to answer thereto, but the court ruled that the defendant must demur or answer in -stauter, and that no delay should be allowed, unless cause therefor was shown by affidavit, to which ruling the defendant excepted. The plaintiff then amended his complaint by inserting an allegation of present indebtedness, interlining tbe same in the original complaint on file, and which had beep verified by the plaintiff. The defendant's counsel objected to amending, the complaint by interlineation, as it had been verified by the plaintiff . The court overruled the objection and the defendant excepted. The cause was tried before the court and a jury, and such other rulings and decisions of the court below and tbe facts upon which they were made are sufficiently stated in the opinion of the court.
C. Coolbaugh, for appellant.
Whittemore & Weisbrod, for respondent.

Opinion:
By the Court,
Cole, J.
There is a great number of exceptions contained in this record. Many of them we consider quite immaterial or not of sufficient importance to require notice here. Indeed, the case seems to have been tried upon the idea that everything must be objected to and as a consequence we have a multiplicity of exceptions. Only a few of the more material ones will be specialty considered.
The action was brought by the respondent in the county court of Winnebago county, to recover the sum of $120 which bad been loaned the appellanl, and likewise the sum of $231,IS the amount of a promissory note given by the appellant. On the trial, objection was taken to the admission of any evidence under the complaint, for the. reason that it was not alleged that, the court bad jurisdiction of the action; and because there was no averment of present indebtedness. The court beld the first ground of objection untenable and permitted an amendment to the complaint to obviate the other objection.
The ruling of the court was undoubtedly correct. The law of 1860, (S. Laws 1860, chap. 391,) conferring upon tbe county court of Winnebago county, jurisdiction in civil cases equal to and concurrent with tbe circuit court for all sums not exceeding five hundred dollars, was a public act of which the court would take judicial notice, and abare inspection of the complaint would • show that the court had jurisdiction of the action.
The amendment which was allowed to obviate a technical objection to the complaint, was very proper under the circumstances. Even concéding it was necessary, it could not possibly injure any one. Nor can we see any valid objection to the manner in which the amendment was made. At the commencement of the trial and before any evidence was given, the counsel for the defendant requested the judge to reduce his charge to writing, and it is now objected that this .was not done. This has been sufficiently answered by the remark, that the record fails to show whether this request was complied with or not. In the absence of anything to the contrary, we must presume that the charge was in writing. Besides it would seem to be anticipating matters somewhat, to make such a request even before any evidence was introduced, and before it was known that there would be any case to go to the jury. But there is no necessity for dwelling upon this point further in the present state of the record. The other principal exceptions, aré those which arise upon the refusal of the court to give the instructions which were asked on the part of the defendant and also the exceptions taken to the charge which was given j
It was insisted that the rule of damages laid down by the court was incorrect. The action was commenced by a summons and attachment upon which a quantity of wheat belonging to the defendant was seized. There was a traverse of the affidavit for the attachment and this issue was found against the plaintiff. The court thereupon dissolved the attachment and ordered the wheat to be re-delivered to the defendant. On the trial of the main issue, the defendant claimed to recover the damages sustained by him by reason of the taking and detention of the wheat, and that such damages should be assessed and allowed as an off-set to the plaintiff's demand. On this point the court instructed the jury, that the measure of damages for the taking and detention of the wheat was the difference in the value of the wheat at the time it was taken out of defendant's possession by the sheriff, and its value at the time of its re-delivery. And further that the jury might give the defendant as damages in their discretion, interest from the time of the taking to such re-delivery. The court further instructed the jury in effect, that they must determine from the evidence what damage the defendant had sustained by reason of the attachment of his property, and likewise the amount of costs which he had obtained on the trial of the traverse and apply such sums as an offset.
We think these instructions substantially correct in view of the evidence. The testimony showed that wheat bore about the same market value when seized upon the attachment and when re-delivered to the defendant. In the intermediate period, it appeared there was considerable rise in the price for a day or so. The defendant claimed that he should have the benefit of this rise in the value, although he did not show that he could or would have sold at that price. He was of course entitled to recover damages for any loss which he had sustained in consequence of being deprived of the use and control of his property during the pendency of the attachment, or for any injury thereto or loss thereof, together with costs incurred by him on the trial of the traverse. S. 26, chap. 130, R. S., 1859; Dunning vs. Humphrey, 24 Wend., 31; Groat vs. Gillpin, 25 id., 383; Pettit vs. Mercer, 8 B. Monroe, 51.
These damages the jury were directed to allow him under the rule laid down by the court. But to have permitted him to recover the difference between the highest market value of the wheat at any time during the pendency of the attachment, and the value when re-delivered to him without giving any testimony that he could or would have availed himself of that opportunity to sell it, seems to us would have been erroneous. Such a rule would be giving damages for injuries which the party had never sustained.
We have already stated that the action- was brought to recover $120, money lent, and also the amount of a promissory note for $281.13, given by the appellant to the respondent sometime before June 1, 1859. In his answer, the appellant, after admitting this indebtedness, proceeds to state and allege in avoidance and as a defense to the action, that on the 1st day of June, 1859, at the instance and request of the respondent, he gave him a promissory note for $351.13, payable one year from date, with fifty dollars interest, and that the note was taken and received by the respondent in full payment and discharge of such prior indebtedness. And he further insists and alleges that this last note is usurious and void. This defense was sustained on the trial by the testimony, and must have the effect to defeat the action, if a valid existing indebtedness can be discharged by a void and usurious security. The appellant contends that the receipt of the usurious note and mortgage accompanying it, had the effect to extinguish the previous indebtedness. The court, however, denied the soundness of this position, and in substance instructed the jury that taking the usurious note did not discharge and satisfy the pre-existing indebtedness, even though so intended by the parties, but that the respondent might recover upon it. It is claimed that this instruction is erroneous. It cannot be denied that it is in strict harmony with the general course of decisions upon this subject, both in this country and in England. For no principle of law has been more clearly laid down in numerous and most carefully considered cases than, that a valid subsisting debt is not destroyed by a void and usurious security. The following cases upon the point have come under my ob - servation while considering this question, and I have no doubt the list might be greatly increased. They are sufficient in number and respectability to show what the law upon the subject has been declared to be: Ferrial vs. Shaven, 1 Saunders R., 295, note 1; Rex vs, Allen, Sir T. Raymond's R., 197; The Queen vs. Sewel, 7 Modern, 119; Gray vs. Fowler, 1 H. Black stone, R., 462; Fossil vs. Brookes, 2 C. & P., 314; Phillips vs. Cockayne, 3 Campbell, 119; Bush vs. Livingston, 2 Caines' Cases in Error, 66; Swartwout vs. Payne, 19 Johns., 293; Hughes vs. Wheeler, 8 Cowen, 77; Merrill vs. Law, 9 id., 65; Rice vs. Welling, 5 Wend., 595; Hammond vs. Hopping, 13 id., 505; Vilas, et al, vs. Jones, et al, 1 Comstock, 276; Johnson vs. Johnson, 11 Mass., 359; Parker vs. Cousens, 2 Grattan, 372; Trautman vs. Barnett, 9 Geo., 30. The doctrine of these cases has been fully recognized and approved by this court in Eastman vs. Porter, 14 Wis., 39. In this ease,-the chief justice, in alluding to the origin and reason of the rule, says: " It is a clear rule of the common law, that a subsisting simple contract is not discharged or relinquished by the acceptance of another contract of the same nature, given by the same party, and founded upon the same consideration, unless it be expressly so agreed. If a valid new contract or security does not extinguish or destroy the pre-existing debt for which it is given, it would be very strange if a void one were to have that effect." And this is the clear and emphatic language of the cases, that a note void in its creation, for being usurious, will not defeat and destroy an existing liability, against which there is no defense. A contract originally valid, remains so, and stands unaffected by any subsequent arrangement which is utterly void.
It may be claimed that there is an inconsistency in the law, in enabling a party to abandon a subsequent usurious engagement, and fall back and recover upon the original indebted-edness, when it would deny an action to recover back money or any chattel paid and delivered in pursuance of the usurious agreement. It is true that a party is not permitted to recover back money or property once paid or applied in satisfaction of an usurious debt. Such payment is considered a voluntary one, and in equity the courts say the lender is entitled to retain the amount actually loaned with interest. And while they will refuse to enforce a Usurious contract, yet, when ex e-cuted, they permit it to stand. So it is said, a contract fair un der the law when made, is fair to the end. It shall' not be deemed merged in or extinguished, by any subsequent usurious contract relied on to destroy it. As I understand the eases, this is the distinction, and whether founded in reason and sound principles, I am disposed to adhere to the settled law upon the subject.
These remarks dispose of all of the questions upon the instructions which we deem material or necessary to be noticed.
The judgment of the county court is affirmed.