Case Name: Timothy LORANGER, a minor, By and Through Louis LORANGER, his father and next friend, and Louis Loranger, individually, Appellants, v. STATE of Florida, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1983-07-13
Citations: 448 So. 2d 1036
Docket Number: No. 82-1238
Parties: Timothy LORANGER, a minor, By and Through Louis LORANGER, his father and next friend, and Louis Loranger, individually, Appellants, v. STATE of Florida, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, Appellee.
Judges: HERSEY, J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 448
Pages: 1036–1039

Head Matter:
Timothy LORANGER, a minor, By and Through Louis LORANGER, his father and next friend, and Louis Loranger, individually, Appellants, v. STATE of Florida, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, Appellee.
No. 82-1238.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
July 13, 1983.
Rehearing Denied May 9, 1984.
William deForest Thompson, Fort Laud-erdale, and Joel L. Kirschbaum of Esler, Kirschbaum & Gustafson, Fort Lauderdale, for appellants.
Timothy J. Payne of Conrad, Scherer & James, Fort Lauderdale, for appellee.

Opinion:
ANSTEAD, Chief Judge.
This is an appeal from a final summary judgment exonerating DOT from responsibility for injuries suffered by the minor appellant when he was struck by an automobile on the Florida Turnpike. We reverse.
Timothy Loranger, then two months shy of eight years of age and intending to go fishing, gained access to the turnpike by going through a hole under a fence erected by DOT to prevent access to the roadway. He apparently followed a worn path which led to the fence and continued through the hole under the fence down onto the turnpike. After having crossed both the southbound and northbound lanes, Timothy followed several other boys he was with back across the road to check on their bicycles. Timothy was hit by a car before reaching the other side of the road.
In its motion for summary judgment, memorandum in support thereof, and at the hearing on the motion, DOT argued only that its alleged negligence in improperly maintaining the fence was too remote as a matter of law to constitute a proximate causal factor of Timothy's injuries. In Cole v. Leach, 405 So.2d 449, 450 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981), this court stated:
One whose negligence causes injury to another is liable for all of the consequences that naturally and proximately flow from such injury, Cone v. Inter-county Telephone and Telegraph Company, 40 So.2d 148 (Fla.1940), including injury from an intervening cause when such intervening cause is itself a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the tort-feasor's conduct, Gibson v. Avis Rent-A-Car Systems, Inc., 386 So.2d 520 (Fla.1980), the question of whether the intervening cause was reasonably foreseeable being one for the trier of fact. Gibson v. Avis Rent-A-Car Systems, Inc., supra.
In Goode v. Walt Disney World Co., 425 So.2d 1151 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982), the Fifth District Court of Appeal was confronted with the issue of whether the trial court erred in entering summary judgment in favor of Walt Disney World Co. in a wrongful death action. A child drowned after he apparently climbed over a fence in the theme park. The trial court found that genuine issues of fact existed as to the design of a fence, but found those issues immaterial because of the lack of a causal relationship between the alleged negligence and the child's death. In reversing the trial court, the Goode opinion declared:
We believe there is a reasonable inference available to the jury that a causal relationship exists between the negligence (admitted for summary judgment argument) of the defendant in having a fence too short to prevent physical access, to the moat by small children and the drowning death of Joel Goode. Disney World has conceded that it is foreseeable that small children frequently become separated from their parents and that they have been known to climb its short fences and gain access to the grassy area bordering the moat. Access to the edge of the moat is access to the moat itself. A four-year-old boy cannot be guilty of contributory negligence so as to constitute an efficient intervening cause precluding Disney World's liability. Nor can the mother's negligent supervision, admitted arguendo by appellant, serve as an efficient, intervening cause shielding Disney World from liability, since her negligent supervision, similar to that of thousands of other parents which occurs annually at the Magic Kingdom, was foreseen by Disney World. Indeed, the evidence below was that at the Kingdom's Lost Children Center there were 11,420 "lost children" reported in 1977. If an intervening cause is foreseeable, it cannot insulate a defendant from all liability. Rupp v. Bryant, 417 So.2d 658 (Fla.1982).
425 So.2d at 1156.
In the instant case, we believe the trier of fact could properly conclude that a causal relationship existed between the alleged negligent maintenance of the fence and the injuries sustained by the minor appellant when he was hit by a car on the turnpike. The foreseeability of injuries of the type suffered here seems proper for the jury. Is it not foreseeable that a child, attracted to a fishing hole located behind his neighborhood and across the turnpike and frequented by the neighborhood children, would be hit by an automobile if there are not sufficient warnings or properly maintained barriers to prevent the child from wandering onto the turnpike? Looking at the facts in a light most favorable to appellant and resolving all inferences against DOT, we believe the final summary judgment was erroneously entered.
Accordingly, the judgment is reversed and this cause is remanded for further proceedings consistent herewith.
HERSEY, J., concurs.
BERANEK, J., dissents with opinion.