Case Name: COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellant, v. Orlando HINDS, Appellee
Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
Jurisdiction: Pennsylvania
Decision Date: 2001-04-25
Citations: 775 A.2d 859
Docket Number: 
Parties: COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellant, v. Orlando HINDS, Appellee.
Judges: Before McEWEN, P.J., DEL SOLE, KELLY, POPOVICH, JOHNSON, JOYCE, MUSMANNO, ORIE MELVIN, and LALLY-GREEN, JJ.
Reporter: West's Atlantic Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 775
Pages: 859–868

Head Matter:
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellant, v. Orlando HINDS, Appellee.
Superior Court of Pennsylvania.
Argued Dec. 15, 2000.
Filed April 25, 2001.
Heather Adams, Asst. Dist. Atty., York, for Com., appellant.
John H. Arnold, York, for appellee.
Before McEWEN, P.J., DEL SOLE, KELLY, POPOVICH, JOHNSON, JOYCE, MUSMANNO, ORIE MELVIN, and LALLY-GREEN, JJ.

Opinion:
JOYCE, J.:
¶ 1 The Commonwealth appeals from the judgment of sentence entered following Appellee's convictions for two counts of possession of a controlled substance with the intent to deliver (PWID), two counts of criminal conspiracy, and one count of prohibitive offensive weapons. For the reasons set forth below, we vacate and remand for resentencing. The relevant facts and procedural history of this case are as follows.
¶ 2 On December 21, 1998, the police executed a search warrant at the apartment occupied by Appellee and his girlfriend, Lena Fa Glenn, which was located at the rear of the building on the second floor. Pursuant to their search, the police seized 5.97 grams of crack cocaine, four Ziploc packets containing 3.1 grams of marijuana, various drug packaging paraphernalia and two guns which had sawed off barrels.
¶ 3 Following the May 6-7, 1999 jury trial, Appellee was convicted of the above named offenses. Subsequently, the Commonwealth filed notices pursuant to 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 7508, § 6314 and 6317, seeking the prescribed mandatory sentences. On June 23, 1999, the court sentenced Appel-lee to an aggregate of five (5) to ten (10) years' imprisonment. This sentence included the mandatory period required under 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 7508. However, the court rejected mandatory sentences under both sections 6314 and 6317. The Commonwealth timely appealed.
¶ 4 The sole issue raised for our review is whether the trial court erred in failing to apply the mandatory two (2) year sentence pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6317. In relevant part, the statute states:
Drug-Free School Zones.
(a) General rule.- — A person 18 years of age or older who is convicted in any court of this Commonwealth of a violation of section 13(a)(14) or (30) of the act of April 14,1972 (P.L. 233, No. 64 [35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(14) or (30) ]) known as The Controlled Substance, Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act, shall, if the delivery or possession with intent to deliver of the controlled substance occurred within 1,000 feet of the real property on which is located a public, private or parochial school or a college or university or within 250 feet of the real property on which is located a recreation center or playground or on a school bus, be sentenced to a minimum sentence of at least two years of total confinement, notwithstanding any other provision of this title, The Controlled Substance, Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act or other statute to the contrary. The maximum term of imprisonment shall be four years for any offense:
(1) subject to this section; and
(2) for which The Controlled Substance, Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act provides for a maximum term of imprisonment of less than four years.
If the sentencing court finds that the delivery or possession with intent to deliver was to an individual under 18 years of age, then this section shall not be applicable and the offense shall be subject to section 6314 (relating to sentencing and penalties for trafficking drugs to minors).
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6317(a).
¶ 5 Appellee stipulated to the fact that his apartment was located within 1,000 feet from both Christ Lutheran School and St Mary's School. Despite this stipulation, however, the court determined that the provision did not apply based on the holding in Commonwealth v. Wilson, 737 A.2d 1281 (Pa.Super.1999) (unpublished memorandum). The Court in Wilson, supra, however, did not discuss the applicability of section 6317, as only the applicability of section 6314 (Sentencing and penalties for trafficking drugs to minors) was at issue. Appellee claims that although section 6317 was not discussed, the implication is that the same analysis should apply where section 6317 is merely an amendment of section 6314. Therefore, Appellee claims that for section 6317 to apply, the offense must necessarily involve a minor. We disagree.
¶ 6 This Court has previously considered the rules of statutory construction and analyzed the legislative intent in enacting this statute when discussing the applicability of this sentencing provision with regards to a playground. The same considerations apply to the decision which we render in this case, therefore, we will restate this Court's prior findings for purposes of our discussion. Relevantly, this Court has stated:
In construing the enactments of the legislature, appellate courts must refer to the provisions of the Statutory Construction Act. In determining the meaning of a statute, we are obliged to consider the intent of the legislature and give effect to that intention. Courts may disregard the statutory construction rules only when the application of such rules would result in a construction inconsistent with the manifest intent of the General Assembly. The General Assembly, in clarifying the proper approach to be used in the determination of legislative intent, stipulated that:
(a) The object of all interpretation and construction of statutes is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the General Assembly. Every statute shall be construed, if possible, to give effect to all its provisions.
(b) When the words of a statute are clear and free from all ambiguity, the letter of it is not to be disregard ed under the pretext of pursuing its spirit.
(c) When the words of the statute are not explicit, the intention of the General Assembly may be ascertained by considering, among other matters:
(1) The occasion and necessity for the statute.
(2) The circumstances under which it was enacted.
(3) The mischief to be remedied.
(4) The object to be attained.
(5) The former law, if any, including other statutes upon the same or similar subjects.
(6) The consequences of a particular interpretation.
(7) The contemporaneous legislative history.
(8) Legislative and administrative interpretations of such statute.
We are to give the words of a statute their plain and ordinary meaning. We are required to construe words of a statute . according to their common and accepted usage. Words of a statute are to be considered in their grammatical context. Furthermore, we may not add provisions that the General Assembly has omitted unless the phrase is necessary to the construction of the statute. Moreover, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that when interpreting a statute, presumably every word, sentence or provision therein is intended for some purpose, and accordingly must be given effect....
Commonwealth v. Campbell, 758 A.2d 1231, 1233-1234 (Pa.Super.2000) (citations and quotation marks omitted). With regards to interpreting this particular statute, this Court stated as follows:
Prior to the enactment of section 6317, "Youth/School Enhancement" was the title of the previously controlling enhancement provision, which only applied to areas "within 1000 feet of a public or private elementary or secondary school." It is our interpretation that the General Assembly regarded this statute as insufficient and, therefore, enacted 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 6317 to rectify those insuffi-ciencies. By enacting section 6317 in place of its predecessor, the Pennsylvania General Assembly not only intended to protect our children from the evils of illegal drug dealing on school grounds and on school buses, but additionally intended to protect our children from those same evils on or near their playgrounds and recreation centers, whether associated with municipal facilities, school property or, as in this present case, semiprivate apartment complexes....
It is our finding that the General Assembly's goal and purpose [in enacting this statute] was to protect the children of our communities from the ravages and evils of the illegal drug trade that pervades our country. Through the enactment of section 6317, it attempted to fortify the barrier that segregates the places where our children frequent from the illegal drug scene. A strict reading of the statute exemplifies the General Assembly's intent. The statute protects our children "within 1000 feet of the real property on which is located a public, private or parochial school or a college or a university." Furthermore, it protects our children on their way to and from school on their school bus. Finally, it protects our children in the places where they routinely play. The General Assembly did not choose to limit this protection solely to school play areas or municipal facilities, but chose to reinforce the purpose of the statute by including all areas within 250 feet of the real property on which is located a recreation center or playground.
Id. at 1236-1237 (citations and quotation marks omitted) (emphasis original).
¶ 7 Applying the rules of statutory construction and adopting this Court's prior interpretation of the legislative intent in enacting this statute, we must conclude the trial court erred in failing to apply the provisions of section 6317 under the facts of this case. In finding that the legislative intent of the statute is to protect the children of our communities from the harms attendant to the drug trade, we must necessarily determine that such harms are present when the individual merely resides within the mandatory 1,000 feet vicinity of a school, even when the drugs are not necessarily accessible to children. To hold otherwise would emasculate the meaning of "Drug Free School Zone." We cannot interpret the word, "zone," to exclude a residence which is clearly within the zone but not readily accessible by school age children. As discussed earlier, the statute is intended to curtail not only drug transactions involving children, but also to protect young children from all illegal activity which is necessarily attendant with the drug trade. The statute clearly does not require anything more than the actor delivering or possessing drugs within the requisite distance from the school. Contrary to Appellee's argument, we refuse to further require that a minor be involved in the offense.
¶ 8 Our findings today are consistent with the findings of another jurisdiction on a related matter. When deciding the constitutionality of a similar statute in Maryland, the Court of Appeals of that state determined that the sentencing provision applied regardless of the presence or absence of children in the area at the relevant time. Dawson v. State of Maryland, 329 Md. 275, 619 A.2d 111 (1993). Implicit in that court's findings is that whether or not the drugs are in fact accessible to children is irrelevant. Rather, it is protecting the children from all the attendant harms of the drug trade which is of paramount concern. Therefore, the fact that no children were present is of no consequence. Appellee's argument to the contrary must fail. Therefore, we are constrained to reverse and remand the findings of the trial court.
¶ 9 Judgment of sentence vacated. Case remanded for resentencing in light of the applicability of the sentencing provisions under 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6317. Jurisdiction relinquished.
¶ 10 JOHNSON, J., files Dissenting Opinion in which McEWEN, P.J. and DEL SOLE, J., join.
¶ 11 MUSMANNO, J., files Dissenting Opinion in which DEL SOLE, J., join.
¶ 12 DEL SOLE, J., files Dissenting Statement in which MUSMANNO, J., joins.
. 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(30).
. 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 903.
. 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 908(a).
. Our decision today is consistent with our holding in the companion case of Commonwealth v. Drummond, 775 A.2d 849 (en banc circulating opinion, vote date February 26, 2001).
. Lena Fa Glenn was charged separately with various offenses related to this search.
. The Commonwealth does not raise an issue regarding the application of section 6314. Therefore, we make no further determination.
. We note further that 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6314 (Sentencing and penalties for trafficking drugs to minors) applies when the sale is actually to a minor. The existence of this section, along with the reference to its applicability in § 6317, further supports our findings that accessibility to the drugs by the minors is not a factor detrimental to the application of the provisions of section 6317. Rather, a separate provision exists to address that offense.