Case Name: Victor Ray CRAWFORD, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Michael S. EVANS, Warden, Salinas Valley State Prison, Respondent-Appellee
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 2010-10-22
Citations: 400 F. App'x 272
Docket Number: No. 09-16923
Parties: Victor Ray CRAWFORD, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Michael S. EVANS, Warden, Salinas Valley State Prison, Respondent-Appellee.
Judges: Before: HUG, RYMER and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
Reporter: West's Federal Appendix
Volume: 400
Pages: 272–273

Head Matter:
Victor Ray CRAWFORD, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Michael S. EVANS, Warden, Salinas Valley State Prison, Respondent-Appellee.
No. 09-16923.
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
Submitted Oct. 4, 2010.
Filed Oct. 22, 2010.
David McNeil Morse, Esquire, Law Office of David McNeil Morse, San Francisco, CA, for Petitioner-Appellant.
Peggy S. Ruffra, Esquire, Office of the California Attorney General, San Francisco, CA, for Respondent-Appellee.
Before: HUG, RYMER and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

Opinion:
MEMORANDUM
Victor Crawford appeals the district court's denial of his habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. We affirm.
The California Court of Appeal's determination that sufficient evidence supported Crawford's conviction for kidnapping to commit robbery was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, Supreme Court precedent. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The appellate court reasonably concluded that "any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt," Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979), because: (1) Crawford's first expression after kidnapping the victim was to question whether the victim had any money; and (2) Crawford forcibly moved the victim to a secluded area several blocks from the bus stop before questioning him, which a jury could reasonably conclude was done to prevent others from discovering Crawford's robbery attempt. To the extent Crawford argues that he did not use the force necessary to constitute a robbery, the state court reasonably rejected this as well, for the requisite "force or fear" could be inferred from the victim's testimony.
AFFIRMED.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.