Case Name: Mary A. Sweeney, as Administratrix of John Hanlon, Deceased, Pl'ff and Resp't, v. The New York Steam Co., Def't and App'lt
Court: New York Court of Common Pleas
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1889-06-03
Citations: 25 N.Y. St. Rep. 598
Docket Number: 
Parties: Mary A. Sweeney, as Administratrix of John Hanlon, Deceased, Pl’ff and Resp’t, v. The New York Steam Co., Def’t and App’lt.
Judges: 
Reporter: New York State Reporter
Volume: 25
Pages: 598–602

Head Matter:
Mary A. Sweeney, as Administratrix of John Hanlon, Deceased, Pl’ff and Resp’t, v. The New York Steam Co., Def’t and App’lt.
(New York Common Pleas, General Term,
Filed June 3, 1889.)
1. Negligence—Master and servant—Contributory negligence— Question for jury.
The plaintiff's intestate was employed by defendant to attend the guy rope attached to a hoisting bucket for unloading coal, as it was raised and lowered, to prevent it from striking against the boat or the wharf. By some unexplained means the guy rope caught his leg and he was hoisted up feet foremost about fifteen feet, and a boy, about sixteen years of age, who had been left in charge of the hoisting engine by the engineer during the engineer’s temporary ab ence, let the plaintiff’s intestate down so swiftly that he fell into the hold of the boat and was so severely injured that he died. In an action for damages for the injuries received by him, the trial judge rightly left it to the jury to decide whether, under the circumstances, the injury was proximately caused by the defendant’s negligence in permitting the boy to run the engine, notwithstanding the plaintiff’s intestate’s negligence in permitting himself to be caught by the rope. The injury was received, not by his going up, which was caused by his own want of care, but by his too hasty coming down, caused by the boy’s want of skill. Larrbmore, Oh. J., dissenting.
2. Same—Proximate cause.
An injured party, or his representatives, may recover damages for an injury caused by' defendant’s negligence, notwithstanding the injured party’s own negligence exposed him to the risk of the injury, if such injury was proximately caused by defendant’s omission to use ordinary care for the purpose of avoiding the injury after being aware of the danger.
3. Same—Bight of assumption by servant that competent workmen ARE EMPLOYED.
Nor can the master claim that he is not liable for injuries resulting from the carelessness of a co-servant, if he employs unskillful or incompetent workmen where these are needed to direct or assist the performance of the work. The servant has a right to assume that only competent workmen are employed.
4. Same—Trial—Instructions toi jury—Evidence.
It was not error in the trial judge to refuse to charge the jury, on defendant’s request, “that if no notice was given to or received by an officer of the defendant responsible for its general conduct, that the boy was running the engine, the plaintiff could not recover,” inasmuch as there was some proof on that point.'
Appeal from a judgment enteren on a verdict of a jury for $1,200 damages to the next of kin, by reason of defendant’s alleged negligence, causing death.
The facts are sufficiently stated in the opinions.
J. W. Hawes, for app’lt; Henry Schmitt, for resp’t."

Opinion:
Bookstaver, J.
I cannot concur in tne opinion of the learned chief judge in this case. Assuming for the present that the evidence conclusively establishes that the deceased's leg became entangled in the guy-rope managed by him entirely through his own negligence or inexperience, and as a result he was hoisted head downwards from ten to fifteen feet above the deck of the boat on which he was working, it would not necessarily follow that his representatives could not recover in this action.
For it is well settled that an injured party, or his representatives, may recover damages for any injury caused by defendant's negligence, notwithstanding the injured party's own negligence exposed him to the risk of the injury, if such injury was proximately caused by the defendant's omission to use ordinary care for the purpose of avoiding the injury after being aware of the danger Austin v. N. J. S. Co., 43 N.Y., 81; Silliman v.Lewis, 49 id., 383; Shearman & Redfield on Neg. (4th ed.), § 99, and authorities there cited.
The question then is, whether the deceased's injuries were proximately caused by his own negligence or by the negligence of defendant or its servants. Conceding his suspension was caused by his own act, he did not fall because his weight drew his foot through the coil of rope by which he was suspended, nor did he fall because of any exertion on his part, either of which would have been his own act and the proximate cause of his falling, nor did he fall because the machinery employed was not calculated and could not reasonably have been required to support his additional weight. The learned chief justice himself says the deceased hung suspended for a short time, and "was unable to slide down the rope, because it was wound around his leg." So his falling into the hold of the boat, and consequent injuries, were not and could not have been proximately caused by his suspension; those arose from the rapidity with which he had dropped into the hold. But the carelessness of the deceased in the management of the guy-rope by which he became entangled is the only negligence of the defendant relied on by the chief judge to defeat his recovery.
Counsel for the appellant, upon the argument, also claimed that if the lad in charge of the engine was so notoriously unfit for the duty assigned him, then it was negligence on the part of Hanlon in giving the direction to "lower him easy." But granting that he was incompetent, there is no evidence in the case tending to show that the deceased knew of this, for he had been at work for the defendant not more than twenty minutes when the accident happened, and consequently knowledge of incompetence will not be assumed in the absence of some proof of it.
It was also claimed that the injuries resulted from the carelessness of a co-servant, for which the defendant is not liable.
But a master owes the duty to his servants of employing skillful and competent workmen where these are needed to direct their labor, or assist in the performance of their work, and the servants have a right to assume that only such workmen are employed. Pantzar v. Tilly Foster Mining Co., 99 N. Y., 368; Booth v. Boston R. R. Co., 73 id., 38; Abel v. Delaware and H. C. Co., 103 id., 581; 4 N.Y. State Rep., 269, and many cases which might be cited.
I therefore think the trial judge was right in refusing to dismiss the complaint upon defendant's motion, either when plaintiff rested or at the close of the case, and in leaving the question of the defendant's negligence to the jury, as he was bound to do, and that the instructions given it on that subject were correct. Nor can I find any error in the judge's charge respecting the negligence of the defendants. He refused to charge 1 ' that there is no evidence of any notice to the defendant, or to any of its officers responsible for its general conduct, >of the fact, if it be a fact, that the boy Crowley was allowed by the engineer to have charge of the engine."
But he had already fully and correctly charged the jury on this point when he said "if they (the company) employed a competent engineer, and they did not know he was transferring his duties to somebody else, they would not be liable; but if they permitted an incompetent person to share the duties of an engineer,- then they would be liable. Baker and the engineer were, of course, not laborers like the deceased and Carroll and Nellilcer; their grades of employment were different, but they were nevertheless fellow-servants, and the negligence of a fellow-servant is one of the risks of the employment which every employee takes. It is the negligence of the master that must be established to make the master liable." And also defendant's request that if no notice was given to or received by an officer of the defendant responsible for its general conduct that the boy Crowley was running the.engine, the plaintiff cannot recover.
The request wras also improper because it required the court to say that there was no evidence of any notice, whereas there was some proof upon that subject, which brought it -within the province of the jury to determine the fact, and it was not the province or duty of the court to do it for them.
The other exceptions to the charge are sufficiently noticed in what has been before said. They are based either upon the original negligence of the deceased, which, as I think, was not the proximate cause of the injuries, or upon the negligence of his fellow-servant, or upon the absence of proof when there were some evidence to go to the jury. •
The exceptions to the admission or rejection of evidence seem to me to be equally untenable, and the judgment should, therefore, be affirmed with costs.
Allen, J., concurs.