Case Name: GUTTMANN v. SCANNELL
Court: Supreme Court of California
Jurisdiction: California
Decision Date: 1857
Citations: 7 Cal. 455
Docket Number: 
Parties: GUTTMANN v. SCANNELL.
Judges: 
Reporter: California Reports
Volume: 7
Pages: 455–462

Head Matter:
GUTTMANN v. SCANNELL.
In an action brought by a married woman concerning property belonging to her as a sole trader, under the act of 1852, the husband need not be joined.
So far from forbidding, the law, by the plainest implication, intends that the capital invested by the wife as a sole trader, to the extent of five thousand dollars, may be furnished by the husband.
If the husband at the time was embarrassed, the transfer, as to his creditors, would be fraudulent and void.
The act does not confine sole traders to any particular trade or occupation, nor prohibit the husband from being employed by, or acting for, his wife in the business.
The fact that the business was unsuited to the sex of the wife, and the employment of the husband therein, would be circumstantial evidence tending to establish fraud, but not conclusive evidence of it.
Per Burnett, J., dissenting.—The act of 1852, was designed to secure the rights of the wife as the owner of separate property, and only carries out the intention of the Constitution, which bestows upon the wife the full capacity to own separate property. The act nowhere says that the property employed by the wife as a sole trader, may be furnished by the husband, and, if so, protected from his creditors. The third section substantially declares that the property invested in the wife’s business, must be her separate property.
The fact that the former business of the husband is continued and conducted by him as the agent of his wife, is so pregnant with suspicion, that it should be held conclusive evidence of fraud.
Appeal from the Superior Court of the City of San Francisco.
The following findings of the Court below, taken in connection with the facts stated in the opinions of the Court, fully explain the case:
1. That for some time past, prior to the first of January, 1856, the husband of the plaintiff was engaged in selling clothing in the city of San Francisco, and was in debt to various persons.
2. That by virtue of judgments obtained against the husband, his entire stock was sold at public auction by the sheriff, about the last of December, 1855, to pay said judgments.
3. That the plaintiff, on the eighteenth day of January, 1856, in conformity to the statute of California, entitled “Anact to authorize married women to transact business in their own name as sole traders,” passed April 12th, 1852, commenced the business of selling ready-made clothing in the city of San Francisco, in her own name, and on her own account.
4. That on the twenty-sixth day of February, 1856, the defendant™ this case, by virtue of an execution in favor of one Carter, and against the husband of plaintiff, did levy upon and seize the property of plaintiff, and sell the same under execution.
5. That the goods so seized and sold by the sheriff, were exclusively the property of plaintiff, except six hundred and fifty dollars’ worth, purchased with the money belonging to her husband, and liable for his debts.
6. That the amount of goods sold by the sheriff belonging to plaintiff, was of the value of eight hundred and fifty dollars, exclusive of the six hundred and fifty dollars, which was liable for her husband’s debts; and that, by the acts of defendant, she sustained damage to the amount of one hundred and fifty dollars, for which sum, together with the value of the goods belonging to the plaintiff as sole trader, amounting to one thousand dollars, the plaintiff is entitled to judgment against defendant.
Judgment being rendered against defendant for one thousand dollars, and his motion for a new trial being denied, this appeal was taken from the judgment.
John Reynolds for Appellant.
At common law, the husband and wife are regarded as one person, and her legal existence lost or suspended, in a measure, during the continuance of the matrimonial union. 2 Kent, 129; Coke Litt., 112, 187; 1 Black. Com., 441.
The wife, therefore, can make no contract, except as she is expressly authorized by statute so to do, and the statute must be strictly construed and followed. 3 Cal. Rep., 83, 88; Duppa v. Mayo, 1 Saund., 276, note 2.
And every fact necessary to show a strict compliance with the statute must be averred and proved, for the statute is in derogation of the common law. Snyder v. Webb, 3 Cal. Rep., 83; 1 Samed, 276, note.
This act, allowing married women to transact business as sole traders, does not provide for the creation or setting apart of separate property, nor does it attempt to divorce husband and wife, and divide the common property. But it merely declares that married women, by complying with its provisions, may transact business in their own names, leaving the Court to give such construction to the law, as will secure the rights of the wife, without permitting any fraud upon her husband or his creditors.
This can only be done by allowing her, with her separate property alone, as the basis of her capital, to conduct a business, art, or profession, congenial, becoming, and suited to a woman.
Mow, I submit, that the act authorizing married women to transact business in their own names, and protecting them in the exclusive control and enjoyment of the gains and profits of such business, cannot fairly be construed to allow them any greater privilege than to use and control their own separate funds, and with them to conduct business in their own names and on their own account, and to enjoy the profits of such business.
The statute does not create or set apart separate property, nor does it create any new right in property, but confers upon the wife the power to exercise an existing equitable right.
If the husband, becoming indebted, can, as agent, conduct his former business—his art and profession—in the name of his wife, establish such business with his creditors’ money, and she take all the gain, and he do the work, a door is open for fraud that I am sure this Court will not recognize, and an inducement held out for men of avaricious disposition to degrade themselves and society to a most alarming extent.
Gregory Yale for Respondent.
Plaintiff was entitled to sue in her own name, by the express provisions of the act of the twelfth of April, 1852. Com. Laws, 881-2. _
_ • Section three provides that, “the person so making her declaration as aforesaid, shall be entitled to carry on said business, trade, profession, or art, in her own name; and the property revenue, money, debts, and credits, so invested, shall belong exclusively to said married woman, and shall not be liable for any of the debts of her husband, and said married woman shall be allowed all th\e privileges, and be liable to all the legal processes, now, or hereafter provided by law, against debtors and creditors.
By section five, if the amount invested is over five thousand dollars, the declaration shall be made under oath, that the surplus over five thousand dollars “ did not come from any funds belonging to her husband.”
The facts, from which the fraud is presumed, as alleged in the points on file, are all found by the Court, and the presumption of fraud, if any, is negatived by the finding and judgment.

Opinion:
Terry, .J.,
delivered the opinion of the Court—Murray, C. J., concurring.
This is an action instituted by the plaintiff, who is a married woman, and sole trader under the act of 1852, to recover the value of certain goods seized by defendant, under an execution against Samuel G-uttman, the husband of plaintiff.
It appears that Samuel G-uttman was engaged in the manufacture and sale of clothing; that he became involved, and that his whole stock in trade was sold under execution; that shortly afterwards his wife availed herself of the provisions of the act " to authorize married women to transact business in their own names as sole traders," and commenced business in her own name, upon money partly borrowed by herself for the purpose, and partly received by her from boarders, before she became a sole trader.
The Court below found the value of the goods to be one thousand six hundred and fifty dollars; that the sum of six hundred and fifty dollars, the amount received from the boarding-house, was liable for the husband's debts; and gave judgment for the sum of one thousand dollars, and from this judgment the defendant appeals.
It is contended, that inasmuch as this action does not concern the separate property of the wife, the husband should have been joined as plaintiff. This point is not well taken. The act of April, 1852, vests in the married woman, who avails herself of its provisions, the exclusive ownership and control of all the money and property invested in the trade, or business in which she is engaged, and as to such business, and the property invested, she is entirely independent of her husband. See McKune v. McGarvey, October Term, 1856.
It is also contended that the act was designed to permit a married woman to invest only her separate property, in some business not unsuited to her sex. That it should not be so construed as to enable her to embark in business on capital furnished by her husband, or to pursue the same trade in which he was engaged; as such construction would afford to a debtor great facilities to defeat the claims of his creditors, by transferring his property, and avoiding the payment of his debts, while continuing business in the name of his wife.
We do not think the Legislature intended to limit the provisions of the act to those women who were so fortunate as to be possessed of separate property; they designed to afford to every married woman an opportunity of providing against the improvidence or misfortunes of her husband, by engaging in any legitimate calling, by protecting her earnings against her husband and his creditors, and enabling her, by her own energy and industry, to support herself and children.
So far from forbidding, the law, by the plainest implication, intends that the capital invested, to the extent of five thousand dollars, may be furnished by the husband. If the husband were at the time in embarrassed circumstances, such transfer would amount to a Maud upon his creditors, and therefore be void as to them, but would, we think, be good against all others. In this case, however, the question does not properly arise, as the money furnished by the. husband was deducted from the judgment of the Court below.
The act in question does not confine sole traders to any particular trade or occupation, nor does it prohibit the husband from being employed by, or acting for, his wife, in relation to her business.
The fact that the trade or business was unsuited to her sex, or that the husband was employed in it, would be circumstances tending to establish fraud, but would not amount to conclusive evidence of its existence.
These facts were before the Court below, and the question of fraud raised by the pleadings was decided in favor of the plaintiff.
The business was certainly not unsuited to the sex or capacity of plaintiff; it was one of the few occupations offering a promise of remuneration, in which a woman "can with propriety engage, and though we may object to the employment of the husband by his wife, as tending to impair his dignity and authority, as the head of a family, it certainly is no reason for depriving the plaintiff of her rights under the law.
The judgment of the Court below is affirmed, with costs.