Case Name: Will Alsup v. The State
Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1919-03-12
Citations: 85 Tex. Crim. 36
Docket Number: No. 5116
Parties: Will Alsup v. The State.
Judges: 
Reporter: Texas Criminal Reports
Volume: 85
Pages: 36–42

Head Matter:
Will Alsup v. The State.
No. 5116.
Decided March 12, 1919.
1. —Murder—Co-Defendant—Practice in District Court—Surprise. ■
Where appellant complained that he was deprived of the testimony of his witness because he was arrested on an indictment for the same offense while under the rule as the jury were being selected in defendant’s case, but there was no showing in the record that this indictment was found fraudulently or purposely to deprive the appellant of the witness’ testimony, and there was no application for postponement or continuance on the ground of surprise, there was no reversible error. Following Raleigh v. State, 74 Texas Crim. Rep., 484, 168 S. W. Rep., 1050, and other cases.
2. —Same—Statement in Original Opinion—Rehearing.
Where appellant objected in his motion for rehearing to the language in the original opinion, to the effect that no fraudulent purpose appeared to deprive appellant of his witness’s testimony whoQ^as indicted while under the rule, etc., but this was a reasonable deduction ‘from the record in the manner in which it appeared, there is no error. "''
3. —Same—Charge of Court—Apparent Danger—Standpoint of Defendant.
Where, upon trial of murder, the court’s charge on apparent danger instructed the jury that a reasonable apprehension of death or serious bodily injury will excuse a party in using all necessary force to protect his life or person, and it is not necessary that there should be actual danger provided he acted upon a reasonable apprehension of danger as it appeared to him from his standpoint at the time, and in which case the party acting under such real or apparent danger is in no event bound to retreat in order to avoid the necessity of killing his assailant, there was no reversible error. Distinguishing' Hays v. State, 199 S. W. Rep., 621.
4. —Same—Requested Charge—Apparent Danger—Standpoint of Defendant.
Where appellant complained of the court’s refusal to give his requested charge on apparent danger, but it appeared from the record that the court had submitted another requested charge of defendant on the same subject which, taken with the main charge, fully instructed the jury that they •should view the situation from the standpoint of the defendant, there was no reversible error; besides this special charge as refused was on the weight of the evidence.
5. —Same—Requested Charges—Bill of Exceptions.
Where it did not appear from the requested charge or bill of exceptions whether said charge was presented or refused before or subsequent to the reading of the court’s charge, the same cannot be considered.
6. —Same—Requested Charge.
Where it appeared from the record that the requested charges were either given in the main charge or submitted, there was no reversible error.
7. —Same—Evidence—General Reputation.
Where the bill of exceptions showed no reversible error in the. admission of testimony as to general reputation of the deceased and whether he was mad, or the testimony admitted as to the location of the bullet holes, etc., there was no reversible error.
8. —Same—Argument of Counsel.
In the absence of a requested charge to withdraw the argument of State’s counsel to which objection was raised privately there was no reversible error.
'Appeal from the District Court of Williamson. Tried below before the Hon. James R. Hamilton, judge.
Appeal from a conviction of murder; penalty, seven years imprisonment in the penitentiary.
The opinion states the ease.
J. F. Taulbee, for appellant.
E. B. Hendricks, Assistant Attorney General, for the State.

Opinion:
LATTIMORE, Judge.
Appellant was convicted of murder and his punishment fixed at seven years confinement in the penitentiary.
On this appeal his most serious complaint is that he was deprived of the testimony of his.witness Allison, by reason of the fact that while the jury were being selected in his case, and after the witness had been sworn and put under the rule, said witness Allison was indicted for the same offense as that charged against appellant, and he was thereby unable to have the benefit of Allison's testimony; which facts, and the testimony he expected to obtain from said witness, were set out at length in appellant's motion for new trial. It also appears that appellant did not know of such indictment or the arrest of said witness thereunder, until after the completion of the jury and the arraignment and plea of not guilty of the appellant, but that he did know of same before any testimony wa« introduced.
There is no claim or allegation on the part of appellant, in his motion for new trial, that the indictment of Allison was fraudulently or purposely done without just ground and to deprive appellant of his testimony, nor is such proposition suggested or sustained by any evidence introduced in support of said motion for new trial. From the record it seems that the indictment against Allison for complicity in the same offense charged against appellant, was rather expected by the parties. The grand jury met on the first Monday in January, 1918 and recessed on the 11th, after returning an indictment against appellant, said recess being taken until the 28th of said month. On the 14th the trial court set the case of appellant down for January 29th. The grand jury reconvened on the 28th and on the 29th returned into court the indictment complained of by appellant here. The district attorney states, without controversy, that he was not with the grand jury on the day the indictment against Allison was returned, and also says that when the grand jury took its recess, as mentioned, that he was surprised that an indictment had not been returned against Allison.
Our statute, Article 616, C. O. P., plainly provides for a continuance or postponement of a case upon application of, either party, when by some unexpected occurrence, after the trial has begun, the applicant is so taken by surprise as that a fair trial cannot be had. If appellant really desired the testimony of Allison he should have availed himself of his right under this statute and should have made such motion. While same is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court, its apparent abuse has always been revised by this court, and if an accused failed to avail himself of this plain remedy, he cannot for the first time set up the matters which constitute the unforseen occurrence in his motion for new trial.
As said by this court in Childs v. State, 10 Texas Crim. App., 183, speaking of a case where the appellant claimed surprise during the trial: "It then became the duty of the defendant to apply to the court for either a continuance or a postponement, and not to pass it by and depend upon a new trial to enable him to counteract the effect of the surprise. He should have acted at the time and in the manner prescribed by law, and not having done so, he cannot now be heard to complain." See Higginbotham v. State, 3 Texas Crim. App., 447; Walker v. State, 7 Texas Crim. App., 245; Roach v. State, 21 Texas Crim. App., 249; Eldridge v. State, 12 Texas Crim. App., 208.
That such matter is not available when set up for the first time on motion for new trial is well settled; Raleigh v. State, 74 Texas Crim. Rep., 484, 168 S. W. Rep., 1050; Graves v. State, 65 Texas Crim. Rep., 419, 144 S. W. Rep., 961; Bryant v. State, 35 Texas Crim. Rep., 394.
Other witnesses testified substantially as appellant claimed Allison would have done, and one accused, on the trial, or at any other stage in his case, may not neglect his plain statutory remedies and take chances on the result, and on motion for new trial make his first complaint because the result was unfavorable to him. Appellant should have made a motion for a postponement setting up the facts and if same had.been granted he could then have demanded the. trial first of Allison in due statutory form.
• The other matters set up by appellant we do not think constitute any reversible error.
The judgment is affirmed.
Affirmed.