Case Name: CURRAN v. SCHARPF
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia
Jurisdiction: Georgia
Decision Date: 2012-03-23
Citations: 290 Ga. 780
Docket Number: S11F1976
Parties: CURRAN v. SCHARPF.
Judges: All the Justices concur, except Benham, J., who concurs specially.
Reporter: Georgia Reports
Volume: 290
Pages: 780–785

Head Matter:
S11F1976.
CURRAN v. SCHARPF.
(726 SE2d 407)

Opinion:
MELTON, Justice.
Aline Mary Curran (Wife) and Nikolaus Scharpf (Husband) were married on February 1, 1997, and, following a jury trial, were divorced pursuant to an April 8, 2011 Final Judgment and Decree. Following the denial of Wife's motion for new trial, Wife filed a timely application to appeal, which this Court granted pursuant to the now-expired Pilot Project, by which this Court granted all non-frivolous applications for discretionary review from a final judgment and decree of divorce. On appeal, Wife contends that the trial court erred in upholding in the Final Decree the jury's allegedly erroneous finding that an Individual Retirement Account (IRA) in Husband's name was Husband's separate property that was not subject to equitable division. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
1. As an initial matter, we must address Husband's claim on appeal that Wife waived any alleged error in the jury's verdict when her counsel stated affirmatively that Wife had no objections to the "form" of the verdict returned by the jury. Wife's failure to object to the form of the jury's verdict does not mean that Wife has somehow waived her right to make a substantive challenge to the evidentiary basis for the jury's award on appeal. Wife's argument has nothing to do with the "form" of the verdict. Indeed, the form of the verdict may have been just fine. It is the substantive finding by the jury in connection with the actual evidence presented at trial with which Wife has a problem, and it is not a problem that could have been fixed through any means connected with the form of the verdict itself. See, e.g., Berry v. Risdall, 1998 S.D. 18 (576 NW2d 1, 5) (SD Sup. Ct. 1998) (party did not waive right to challenge jury verdict by failing to object to verdict form where "[t]he alleged deficiencies in the verdict [were] not merely mechanical, but rather, they [went] to the heart of the jury's findings"). In short, there is a difference between problems as to form and substantive challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence that go to the heart of the jury's findings. Id. See also, e.g., Beasley v. Wachovia Bank, 277 Ga. App. 698 (1) (627 SE2d 417) (2006) (although party waived right to an "explanation" of the jury's damages award by failing to include method for calculation of damages on verdict form, Court of Appeals addressed other substantive challenges to sufficiency of evidence that had nothing to do with form of the verdict).
This Court has previously recognized that a failure to object to the form of a judgment, particularly in a domestic relations context such as the instant case, does not result in the waiver of a party's right to make substantive challenges to the lower court's final judgment on appeal:
Where a final order is "approved by" counsel for both parties in writing. . . [i]t is not approval of the substance (result) of the order (if it were, the right of appeal would be waived), but a showing that counsel has seen the proposed order and agrees that it contains what the court orally directed be included in it. Counsel's "approval" thus is an indication of approval of the content or form of the order rather than its substance.
(Emphasis supplied.) Rude v. Rude, 241 Ga. 454, 455 (1) (246 SE2d 311) (1978). See also id. at 455 (1) ("After approving the form of the order, a party cannot complain of the court's failure to include findings of fact and conclusions of law" in the order) (emphasis supplied).
By failing to recognize the fundamental distinction between issues of form and those of substance that "go to the heart of the jury's findings" (Berry, supra), Husband is attempting to use a party's failure to object to form as a means of depriving that party of her right to assert a substantive challenge to the jury's findings on appeal. We cannot allow for the untenable result that would be obtained from adopting Husband's position, as it would create a rule where form would trump substance in a manner that makes no sense. In this connection, to the extent that Ray v. Stinson, 254 Ga. 375 (329 SE2d 502) (1985) can be read to support the anomalous conclusion that a party's failure to object to the form of a verdict results in the waiver of its right to make substantive arguments on appeal, the case is hereby disapproved and should no longer be followed.
The analysis of the special concurrence only underscores the untenable results that would obtain from the rule that Husband would like this Court to endorse. Indeed, on the one hand, the special concurrence argues that the jury's verdict is unsupported by the evidence, which would make the jury's verdict substantively unauthorized, and then, on the other hand, the special concurrence goes on to conclude that Wife is precluded from making a substantive (and winning) argument on appeal about the jury's unauthorized finding based on her failure to object to the form of the jury's verdict below. It cannot be the case that a party who consents to providing the jury with the necessary choice of determining the status of assets on a verdict form is prohibited from challenging the jury's substantive findings on appeal if there is no evidence to support them. See Berry, supra. We therefore conclude that no waiver occurred in this case.
2. However, because at least some evidence supports the jury's determination that Husband's IRA was his separate property, we must affirm the trial court's decision. See Bloomfield v. Bloomfield, 282 Ga. 108 (1) (646 SE2d 207) (2007) (findings of fact regarding status of property as marital or non-marital asset will be upheld on appeal where supported by any evidence). Indeed, the evidence revealed that Husband may have had several different retirement accounts, with some ambiguity existing as to which ones were marital property and which ones may have been his separate property. As the final arbiter of questions of fact and witness credibility, the jury was free to reject portions of Husband's testimony and conclude from the remaining evidence that this particular IRA in Husband's name may in fact have remained his separate property. See, e.g., Bass v. Bass, 264 Ga. 506, 508 (448 SE2d 366) (1994) (appreciation of non-marital asset during marriage caused only by market forces not subject to equitable division).
Judgment affirmed.
All the Justices concur, except Benham, J., who concurs specially.
The Pilot Project expired on June 30, 2011, and, effective July 1, 2011, was replaced by Supreme Court Rule 34 (4), by which this Court shall grant a timely application from a final judgment and decree of divorce that is determined by the Court to have possible merit.
As shown in Division 2, infra, we disagree with this conclusion, as at least some evidence supports the jury's finding and it is not this Court's duty to judge the credibility of witnesses.