Case Name: WILLIS v. McKINNON et al.
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1898-11-22
Citations: 54 N.Y.S. 1079
Docket Number: 
Parties: WILLIS v. McKINNON et al.
Judges: 
Reporter: West's New York Supplement
Volume: 54
Pages: 1079–1082

Head Matter:
WILLIS v. McKINNON et al.
(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Department.
November 22, 1898.)
1. Landlord and Tenant—Estoppel to Assert Title.
Where a lease of an undivided interest gave the tenant the privilege of renewal, and the landlord refused to renew, and the tenant continued in possession without further arrangement, the landlord was estopped from asserting that the lease precluded the tenant from showing that, subsequent to making the lease, he became the owner of the other undivided interest, and hence was a tenant in common.
2. Same.
Where, prior to leasing an undivided interest in premises, the owner knew that the tenant had procured an option to purchase the other inter est, and the tenant made such purchase aiter execution of the lease,, the landlord cannot say that the lease estops the tenant from setting up his tenancy in common as against the landlord.
Parker, P. J., and Landon, J., dissenting.
Appeal from trial term, Delaware county. •
Ejectment by John G. Willis, substituted in place of Warren G-. Willis, deceased, against Frank H. McKinnon and others. There was a judgment for defendants, and plaintiff appeals.
Affirmed.
The action was brought to recover the possession of certain premises in the village of Masonville, in the county of Delaware. At the trial a jury was waived, and the case submitted to the court. The court found that at the commencement of the action the plaintiff was the owner of an undivided seven-eighths of the main store and lot, and an undivided three-fourths of the wing part, and that the defendant McKinnon was the owner of the remaining undivided portions; that the defendants did not actually oust the plaintiff, or do any act amounting to a total denial of his right; that, the plaintiff and defendant McKinnon being tenants in common, this action will not lie unless the defendant McKinnon is estopped from asserting his title and from disputing the title of the plaintiff. The court then, in effect, decided that such estoppel did not exist, and therefore dismissed the complaint.
Argued before PARKER, P. J., and LANDON, HERRICK, PUTNAM, and MERWIN, JJ.
C. L. Andrus, for appellant.
James R. Baumes, for respondents.

Opinion:
MERWIN, J.
Practically the only question presented by the appellant is that the court erred in declining to hold that the defendant McKinnon was estopped by the lease of April 15, 1886, from denying that Warren G-. Willis, the original plaintiff, was the owner of the entire title. The lease is from Prentice W. Willis, as surviving partner of the late firm of Travis & Willis, to Frank H. McKinnon, of a portion only of the property. It was then understood by all parties, according to the evidence on the part of the defendants, that Mrs. Travis, as executrix of the estate of Mr. Travis, the deceased partner, had an interest in the property. Prentice said that she would have to consent to the renting of it. She refused to sign the lease, saying that she wanted to sell. She finally agreed to give McKinnon three months' notice in case she sold, and also the option of buying at same price she could sell for to another party, and then McKinnon took the lease from Prentice. The lease provides that, in case of sale, McKinnon should have first privilege of buying, and at least two months' notice to vacate. It might be found from the evidence that the lease in the form it was, and in view of the negotiations with Mrs. Travis, was not intended to be hostile to the rights of Mrs. Travis. The lease was for one year, with privilege of renewal if the premises were not sold. At the end of the one year, Prentice and McKinnon settled. McKinnon wanted a renewal. Prentice refused to give it; said he could not; that his uncle was going to foreclose, and take the title, and McKinnon would have to make arrangements with him. After repudiating the lease, and disclaiming any right to control the possession, Prentice or his subsequent grantee, Warren G-. Willis, the original plaintiff, ought not to be permitted to say that McKinnon is estopped from asserting any right he subsequently obtained. It is to be observed that on this question of estop pel the plaintiff has no greater rights than Prentice himself had. Mc-Kinnon obtained a deed from Mrs. Travis on June 1, 1887. The deed was recorded June 15, 1887. The foreclosure of the two mortgages was, as it may be inferred, commenced soon after. Prentice deeded to W. G-. Willis May 1, 1888. It is stated in the "case," as to both foreclosures, that they did not in any way affect the interest or title of McKinnon, if he had any. Prentice knew of the desire of Mrs. Travis to sell, and of the option she gave McKinnon. Under the circumstances here appearing, he should be deemed to have assented to the purchase by McKinnon of the interest of Mrs. Travis. If so, he or his grantee, the predecessor of plaintiff, has no right to say now that McKinnon shall not have the benefit of his purchase. I think the conclusion of the trial court was right, and the judgment should be affirmed.
Judgment affirmed, with costs.
HEEEICK and PUTNAM, JJ., concur.