Case Name: Abner G. Beazley v. W. B. Denson
Court: Supreme Court of Texas
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1874
Citations: 40 Tex. 416
Docket Number: 
Parties: Abner G. Beazley v. W. B. Denson.
Judges: 
Reporter: Texas Reports
Volume: 40
Pages: 416–438

Head Matter:
Abner G. Beazley v. W. B. Denson.
1. Though an appellant who has failed to object to instructions on the trial cannot generally avail himself of error in the charge on appeal, yet when the verdict of the jury has been made to turn upon an erroneous charge, and the judgment upon the merits is thus founded in error, it will be reversed, though the charge was not complained of at the time.
2. The formal burden of proof in trials directly upon the probate of the will, whether in the court of probate or upon appeal, is upon the executor, or those who set up the will.
3. The presumption in favor of the sanity of the maker of a deed or ordinary contract does not apply on the probate of a will.
4. When the estate is disposed of by will changing the course of descent and distribution, proof of the mental capacity of the testator has always been exacted as essential to the establishment of the will.
5. Objections to the venue of a cause, made for the first time on a motion for new trial, and based on the alleged unconstitutionality of the act creating the. county in which the cause was tried, will not be considered on appeal.
6. See opinion in this case- for facts concerning the misconduct of a jury which are pronounced inconsistent with a pure administration of law.
Appeal from San Jacinto. Tried below before the Hon; J. R. Burnett.
The will of Col. Hamilton Washington, who had never married, bequeathing his estate to his only sister, Mrs. Mary Beazley, since dead, the wife of appellant, was probated in the County Court of Polk county, at its August term, A. D. 1868. That will was dated May 19, 1860. Pending the application for probate, F. M. Sansom and Douglass Mitchell presented to the court another instrument, alleged to be the will of Col. Washington, bearing date June 6, 1868, in which they were named as executors. By that instrument W. B. Denson, appellee, a stranger to the blood, was given the major portion of the estate, and Mrs. Beazley named as residuary legatee. The amount bestowed on her by the last named instrument was of trifling value. The capacity of the testator on the sixth of June, A. D. 1868, was denied by Mrs. Beazley. The will of 1868 was adjudged invalid, and the will of May 19, 1860, probated. From that judgment Denson appealed to the District Court of Polk county. The case was tried at the October term, A. D. 1870, and a • verdict rendered, on which judgment was entered, again establishing the will of 1860. From that judgment an appeal was taken to the Supreme Court, which reversed the judgment of the District Court, Judge Evans dissenting. (34 Texas, 193.) The case was again tried at the Fall term, 1871, in the court below, and resulted in a verdict establishing the will of 1868, from which Beazley appealed.
The following is a portion of the lengthy charge given on the trial: ; . •
“This suit is an appeal from the County Court of Polk county, on a judgment admitting to probate an alleged will of Col. Hamilton Washington, deceased, dated May 19, 1860. The plaintiff, Denson,, claims that said alleged is not the last will and testament of Col. Washington, but that the alleged will and codicil, dated respectively June 6 and June 8, 1868, constitute his last will and testament. * * * You will first inquire into the validity of the alleged will and codicil, dated June, 1868, and determine whether they constitute the last will and testament of the testator, Washington. The law of our State provides that every person twenty-one years or upwards, being of sound mind, shall have power, at his or her will and pleasure, by last will and testament, in writing, to devise all the' estate he or she may at the time of his or her death, provided such will and testament be "signed by the testator, or by some other person in his or her presence, and by his or her direction, and be attested by two or more credible witnesses above the age of fourteen years, subscribing their names, in his or her presence; "but if the will be wholly written by the testator, no subscribing witnesses are necessary. Every man is presumed by the law to possess a sound mind until the contrary be shown by evidence, and fraud or undue influence cannot be presumed, but must be proved. If, then, the plaintiff, Den-son, has shown by the evidence that the alleged will and codicil, dated in June, 1868, were wholly written by the testator, Col. Washington, or if not-wholly written, by him were signed by him, and were attested by two .credible witnesses above the age of fourteen years, who subscribed their names in his presence, then you will find in your verdict that said will and codicil constitute his last will and testament, unless the defendant, Beazely, has satisfactorily shown by the evidence that said will was so written or signed by the testator when, of unsound mind, or that it was procured by the fraud of plaintiff, or by Ms use of undue influence exercised by Mm. over the testator, as will be hereafter explained.
“As before stated, the law presumes- every person is of sound mind, and it therefore devolves on the defendant, who alleges insanity or unsoundness of mind, to establish the fact.” .
The evidence was quite voluminous, presenting some features of novel interest, but further reference to it,, both in the statement of the case and briefs, is omitted as not necessary, in view of the issues, to-the discussion of which the opinion is confined.
B. C. Franklin, for appellant.
1. That the court erred in the charge, as applicable to the pleading and facts in this case, it seems to me can be made manifest by stating the following proposition :
The allegation that Col. Washington was of sound mind at the time of making his will, in June, 1868, was not made; it was a necessary allegation, and had to be proved.
Again, the charge assumes that the onus rested on the party opposing the probate of the will, of establishing the insanity of the testator. I presume that-the judge of the District Court, during the confusion and hurry of the trial, .and in the absence of authorities, overlooked the provisions of Sections 75, 76 and 77, of the act prescribing the mode of proceeding in District Courts in matters of probate. (Acts of 1870, p. 152.)
2. The second ground of the motion for a new trial is, “that the act creating the county of San Jacinto, on its face, and in the mode in which it passed, violates the Constitution.” To sustain this position it is only necessary to examine the journals of the Legislature, of which the court will take judicial notice, and the act creating the county of San Jacinto. (Laws of 1870, p. 79.)
The bill was not read on three several days in each house, and in a case where no emergency existed to authorize either house to dispense with the constitutional rule. If the Legislature construed the 24th Section, Article 3, Constitution, as only directory, such a construction is totally unauthorized by the language , of the section ; it is mandatory, and the Legislature has no power to set it aside at pleasure.
Judge Story says: “When no ambiguity exists, or doubt appears in the law, the court should coniine its attention to the law; contemporary construction can never abrogate the text, can never fritter away its sense, can never narrow down its true limits ; it can never eaÉarge its natural boundaries.” (Story on the Constitution, Sec. 407; Evans v. Myers, 25 Penn. St., 116; Saddler v. Langhow, 34 Ala., 311; Barnes v. Parish of Falmouth, 6 Mass., 417; Cooley’s Const. Limitations, 78 et seq., 81, 88; McCullough v. The State, 11 Ind., 432; Willet v. Wigdon, 7 Ind., 452; Oakly v. Aspinwall, 3 New York, 568; People v. Purdy, 2 Hill, 36; 4 Hill, 144 and 384; Green Castle Township v. Black, 5. Ind., 566; People v. Campbell, 3 Gilm., 466; People v. Lawrence, 35 Bar bour, 177, 186; Protho v. Orr, 12 Ga., 36; Indiana R. R. Co. v. Potts, 7 Ind., 683; People v. Draper 15 N. Y., 543. And further, as to the admissibility of the journal in evidence, see Gardner v. The Collector, 6 Wallace, 499, and the cases cited in the opinion of the court; also, The People ex rel. Barnes v. Starne, 35 Ill., 138, and 2 Minn., 330.)
.3. The third cause assigned for a new trial involves the constitutionality of the act of the thirteenth of April, 1871, Pamphlet Laws, p. 34, entitled, “An act providing for the change of venue in certain cases pending in the District Court of Polk county, from the county of Polk to the county of San Jacinto.”
It is respectfully suggested that this act assumes a power that is judicial in its character, and which the Legislature is prohibited from exercising, by Section 1, Article 2, of the Constitution.
4. The sixth ground embraced in the motion for a new trial should have b.een sustained.
I call the attention of the court to the affidavit of Green B. Byrd, a gentleman having no interest to be affected by the result of the suit, and to the testimony of Dr. R. D. Haden, sustaining, in part, the testimony of Green B. Byrd. The testimony of Mr. Byrd, in the community in which he lives, needs no aid to secure absolute belief. He states facts occurring under his own observation, during this trial, as well as the conversation that passed between himself and Keys, an individual living on the plantation of W. B. Darby, W. B. Denson’s half-brother. He (Keys) told witness that he was hauling cotton to Patrick’s gin, and on Tuesday evening last he received a letter from W. B. Darby, asking him to come to Cold Springs ; if he ever was his friend now was the time to show it. When he came down, Darby wanted him to go on the jury. He managed to be placed on the jury. He did not expect to fee objected to, because he had served with Beazley in the army, and that when he was objected to he got a man in his place who would be carried round the circuit and rot in the jury box before he would give up the case..
The affidavit of Martin Branch states the fact that, during the trial, Billingsly and R. E. Lee, two of .the jury, were drinking liquor at Ross’ store with Cole, the brother-in-law (and I have no doubt the silent partner in the whole transaction) of Denson, when Cole told Billingsly that “ he must.stand up to him.” I am aware that both Cole and Billingsly deny the statement of Martin Branch'; but upon a question of credibility I think the case strongly in favor of Martin Branch, for Cole, in his testimony on the trial, admitted that he had taken the benefit of the bankrupt law, filed his schedule and swore to it, yet had omitted to include a debt of $4000 due him from his brother-in-law, W. B. Denson; and Billingsly, whilst denying that he had ever made the remarks testified to by Branch, and that any person had ever talked to him on the subject of the trial, evincing an indignation on the subject and seeming to feel it his duty to have presented to the judge any person who would dare to do such a thing, yet he seems to have forgotten that one Dobson, in Darby’s store, told him he must find for Denson, and treated him to cheese and crackers, and that J. E. Haden, who was in the store, interfered and stopped the conversation about the case. That the jurors who tried the case should.file affidavits exculpating them selves from blame is very natural and is to .be looked for, whether the jurors be honest or dishonest. * * *
Abercrombie & Banton, Walton,and Hancock & West, for appellee.
1. It is evident that Denson did not come within any of the exceptions to the general rule permitting parties to.the suit to testify in their own behalf. We deem-it unnecessary to discuss this point.
2.. That there''was no error in charging the jury that every man is presumed to be of sound mind, and that those who allege his unsoundness must prove it, is a proposition quite too clear for argument. This is the presumption when his life is at stake where there is a counter-presumption of innocence, and we apprehend a different rule would not be adopted where any property is involved. (See 1 Redf. on Wills, pp. 31, 45-47; Jackson v. Van Dusen, 5 Johnson, 144-158.)
No counter-charge was asked, no exception taken, and the charge was not complained of in the motion for a new trial.
3. Oil the former appeal it was claimed for the contestant that Col. Washington labored under a delusion, and the judge below having charged that the existence of delusion was evidence of unsound mind, this court held that the charge was erroneous, and further, that the record contained no evidence of such delusion as to affect the testamentary condition of Col. Washington’s mind. This, we respectfully submit, settles the question and relieves us of its discussion, unless the record now before the court discloses more testimony on that point than was before the court on the former appeal. From the statement of facts, as shown in the additional transcript, it will be seen that the statement of facts in the former trial was, by agreement of counsel, read as evidence on the trial of this cause.
4. We call the particular attention of the court to the fact that no affidavit or charge connects the plaintiff, either directly or indirectly, with any effort to influence the jury, and it is settled that such efforts by strangers will not vitiate the verdict, especially where it is in accordance with the law and the evidence. (The People v. Carnal, 1 Parker, N. Y. Crim. R., 260.) And although some earlier decisions, especially in Massachusetts, go to the extent of holding that any intermeddling with the jury by anyone, whether the jury was thereby influenced or not, would vitiate the. verdict, the tendency of more recent decisions is to confine the motion tor a new trial to the question of abuse, and to invariably deny the application where no injury has resulted. (Collins v. The State, 20 Ark., 50; see also Barbour v. Archer, 3 Bibb, 8.) That no injury resulted to the defendant in this case is manifest-from affidavits of the jurors, which show that the verdict would have been the same in the absence of the influences complained of. It is also manifest from the more important fact that the verdict is abundantly supported by the law and the evidence.
Where motions for new trials are made on the ground of misconduct, etc., and there are conflicting affidavits, the judge of the lower court, who has all the parties and circumstances before him, is held to be best qualified to pass upon the merits of the application — in fact, is said to be the exclusive judge of its merits. (Heath’s Case, 1 Rob., Virginia R., 742; McCarty v. McCarty, 4 Rich. S. C. R., 598; Cox v. The State, 32 Texas, 610.)
In conclusion we respectfully submit that your honors, sitting as a jury on this case, could not under the law as adjudged by this court, and on the facts already passed upon by the court, come to any other conclusion than that to which the jury came.

Opinion:
McAdoo, J.
This is a contested will. case. It-comes from the District Court of San Jacinto county by appeal.
The first point raised by the appellant goes to the jurisdiction of the court below, based Upon the allegation that the so-called county of San Jacinto is-of less dimensions than nine hundred square miles, and therefore the act of the Legislature organizing said county is in violation of Article 12, Section 24, of the Constitution of 1869.
We find no proof in the record of the want of area, and we think we cannot, in a collateral proceeding, pass upon this question.
But the charge of the court is objected to, in that the jury are instructed that " every man is presumed by the law to possess a sound mind till the contrary be shown by evidence."
This.is error. In matters of probate, under our law, no such presumption is indulged. On the contrary, in order to establish any will, it must affirmatively appear that .the deceased was of sound mind when he signed the will. (Article 5537, Paschal's Digest.)
This affirmative testimony would be. necessary if there were no contest; and the law does- not j ustify the imposition of a new rule when, by a contest, the soundness of the testator's mind is put in issue.
As we can well conceive the jury were liable to be misled by the erroneous instructions just noticed, we must, of necessity, reverse the judgment and remand the cause.
Reversed and remanded..
Opinion delivered October 28, 1873.