Case Name: ORANGE COUNTY, Florida, a political subdivision of the State of Florida, et al., Appellants, v. BUTLER ESTATES CORPORATION et al., Appellees
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1976-03-19
Citations: 328 So. 2d 864
Docket Number: No. 75-553
Parties: ORANGE COUNTY, Florida, a political subdivision of the State of Florida, et al., Appellants, v. BUTLER ESTATES CORPORATION et al., Appellees.
Judges: OWEN, J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 328
Pages: 864–868

Head Matter:
ORANGE COUNTY, Florida, a political subdivision of the State of Florida, et al., Appellants, v. BUTLER ESTATES CORPORATION et al., Appellees.
No. 75-553.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
March 19, 1976.
Rehearing Denied April 14, 1976.
Steven R. Bechtel, of Mateer & Harbert, Orlando, for appellants.
Davisson F. Dunlap, of Carlton, Fields, Ward, Emmanuel, Smith & Cutler, Orlando, for appellees.

Opinion:
WALDEN, Chief Judge.
The zoning authority of Orange County appeals a trial court order requiring it to rezone appellees' property in accord with the following guideline:
"any rezoning less than close to sixteen (16) dwelling units per gross residential acre for garden apartments on the Petitioners' property would not comply with . . . [this court's] Amended Order."
For background this court has affirmed, as modified, a past order of the trial court in this same causé, in Orange County v. Butler Estates Corporation, 303 So.2d 66 (4th DCA Fla.1974):
"Although the final judgment directing appellant to rezone appellees' property to a zoning classification no less liberal than a P-D zoning classification is not a judicial assumption of a legislative power, we are of the view that to direct the appellant to rezone such property 'in accordance with the [appellees'] application' does, indeed, constitute an encroachment upon the exercise of the legislative power of the appellant." Id. at 67.
This opinion was rendered upon an appeal by the zoning authority which had originally sought to deny appellees' rezoning request altogether. Upon remand the trial court entered an order with the following directive:
". . .to [forthwith] rezone the Petitioner's property to a zoning classification not less liberal than a P-D zoning classificátion with a guideline as to units per gross residential acre, the zoning on the adjacent property, [the 'Russell Tract']."
The "Russell Tract" had been approved at 19.1 units per acre. The Zoning Authority of Orange County rezoned the subject property, in an attempt to comply with the order. The trial court then found that this rezoning was not in accord with the amended order, and entered the order now appealed. We reverse, and hold that the rezoning was sufficient to comply with the trial court's amended order. The facts and circumstances attending the rezoning rendered the decision of the zoning authority a fairly debatable one.
The property in question covers approximately 113.5 acres. The developer had originally requested zoning for 1,595 multi-family dwelling units at a gross residential density of 14.9 dwelling units per acre. After the trial court entered its amended order, appellees presented a revised plan proposing 1,671 dwelling units • at a gross residential density of 15.9 dwelling units per acre. Following a public hearing the Board of Commissioners approved a development of what they deemed to be 10.1 gross dwelling units per acre. This figure was arrived at by reducing the total planned development acreage by 38 acres, on the grounds that that acreage was in a natural drainage and flood prone area, and was in an area not properly situated for proposed recreation and business sites. Appellees owners, however, included the 38 acres in the acreage total when making a determination of gross unit per acre permitted by the revised zoning, and concluded the development had been approved at only 6.1 units per acre. The determination of units per acre must be made upon the number of gross acres, a term defined in Art. XXIX § 2 of the Orange County Planned Development District:
"An acre of land committed to the explicit use of residential, commercial, or industrial buildings or structures, or which provides access or contributes to the amenities of the development, such as private or public park areas, open space, streets, access drives to parking lots, and parking lots, hand devoted to school buildings, water areas, utility plants, and property similarly used shall not be included."
The determination of the Zoning Authority to delete the 38 acres from development was one within its discretion, but when the gross acreage measurement was calculated the 38 acres should have been included in the land total. We note that full credit was given on total acreage set aside as flood prone areas when the adjacent tract was rezoned. The unit allowance is, therefore, 6.1 units per acre. Notwithstanding this figure is less than, the 19.1 units per acre permitted the adjacent property, (the Russell Tract), the zoning authority has presented ample evidence of considerations that affected its decision and made it a fairly debatable one. Although the Russell Tract was permitted a higher density, it is closer to a commercial intersection; the zoning authority found by studies that the Russell Tract lent itself to a more logical vehicular pattern. It does not follow that simply because one tract of land has a certain density or use, that the adjoining properties must receive, or are suited for, the same use. In City of Miami Beach v. Wiesen, 86 So.2d 442 (Fla.1956), the Supreme Court noted that such a theory would lead to the eventual destruction of any zoning plan by "judicial erosion." See City of Miama Beach v. Ocean & Inland Co., 147 Fla. 480, 3 So.2d 364 (1941). The zoning authorities presented evidence the two properties were dissimilar in regard to soil types and flood prone areas. They presented testimony relative to the dissimilar shapes of the properties, and their dissimilar locations. The Zoning Board gave evidence that the plan for the Russell Tract provided for a graded density towards the instant property, and that the instant rezoning was a continuation of that receding density. The zoning authorities were mindful that they wished to keep high density development from extending into areas planned for continued agricultural zoning. It is notable that the majority of the surrounding properties were zoned for only one unit per acre under the rural classification. Therefore this situation can be distinguished from authorities holding zoning to be arbitrary and confiscatory, most of which deal with areas that had become islands by virtue of more liberally zoned surroundings. Tollius v. City of Miami, 96 So.2d 122 (Fla.1957); City of South Miami v. Hill-bauer, 312 So.2d 241 (3d DCA Fla.1975); Davis v. Sails, 318 So.2d 214 (1st DCA Fla.1975) ; Stokes v. City of Jacksonville, 276 So.2d 200 (1st DCA Fla. 1973) ; Metropolitan Dade County v. Pierce, 236 So.2d 202 (3d DCA Fla. 1970); Manilow v. City of Miami Beach, 213 So.2d 589 (3d DCA Fla. 1968).
These considerations warrant the decision that the rezoning was fairly debatable and therefore proper. City of St. Petersburg v. Aikin, 217 So.2d 315 (Fla. 1968); City of Miami Beach v. Wiesen, supra; City of Miami Beach v. Lachman, 71 So.2d 148 (Fla.1953); Watson v. Mayflower Property, Inc., 223 So.2d 368 (4th DCA Fla.1969); McCormick v. City of Pensacola, 216 So.2d 785 (1st DCA Fla. 1968). Though a judicial forum might disagree with a zoning decision, it is not permitted to substitute its discretion for that of the legislative body if the issue is a fairly debatable one. City of Miami Beach v. Wiesen, supra; City of Miami v. Schutte, 262 So.2d 14 (3d DCA Fla.1972). It was petitioners' burden to prove the rezoning, made upon a new petition, was an abuse of discretion, City of Miami Beach v. Wiesen, supra; Town of Hialeah Gardens v. Hebraica Community Center, Inc., 309 So.2d 212 (3d DCA Fla.1975); Board of County Commissioners v. Ralston, 284 So.2d 456 (2d DCA Fla. 1973); Miles v. Dade County, 260 So.2d 553 (3d DCA Fla. 1972); Watson v. Mayflower Property, Inc., supra; Manilow v. City of Miami Beach, supra; McCormick v. City of Pensacola, supra; Metropolitan Dade County v. Kanter, 200 So.2d 624 (3d DCA Fla. 1967), but these petitioners did not sufficiently carry that burden. This being so, there is nothing to warrant any judicial intervention into the decision of the Zoning Authority.
We reverse the final order of the trial court and hold the action of the zoning authorities was proper under the fairly debatable rule and the mandates of the law of the case.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
OWEN, J., concurs.
DOWNEY, J., dissents with opinion.