Case Name: Mrs. Wilder Barnes BOUIS et al., Plaintiffs & Appellees, v. The EMPLOYERS LIABILITY ASSURANCE CORPORATION, Defendant & Third Party Plaintiff-Appellant, Boyd B. DURR, Third Party Defendant-Appellee
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1963-12-03
Citations: 160 So. 2d 36
Docket Number: No. 983
Parties: Mrs. Wilder Barnes BOUIS et al., Plaintiffs & Appellees, v. The EMPLOYERS LIABILITY ASSURANCE CORPORATION, Defendant & Third Party Plaintiff-Appellant, Boyd B. DURR, Third Party Defendant-Appellee.
Judges: Before TATE, FRUGÉ and CULPEP-PER, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 160
Pages: 36–42

Head Matter:
Mrs. Wilder Barnes BOUIS et al., Plaintiffs & Appellees, v. The EMPLOYERS LIABILITY ASSURANCE CORPORATION, Defendant & Third Party Plaintiff-Appellant, Boyd B. DURR, Third Party Defendant-Appellee.
No. 983.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana. Third Circuit.
Dec. 3, 1963.
On Rehearing Jan. 15, 1964.
Rehearing Denied Feb. 11, 1964.
Cook, Clark, Egan, Yancey & King, by Charles D. Egan, Shreveport, for third party plaintiff-appellant.
Gerard F. Thomas, Jr., Natchitoches, for plaintiff-appellee.
Gahagan & Gahagan, by Russell E. Gaha-gan, Natchitoches, for defendant-appellee.
Before TATE, FRUGÉ and CULPEP-PER, JJ.

Opinion:
CULPEPPER, Judge.
In this tort action, Mrs. Wilder Barnes Bouis sues for personal injuries and her husband, Ashton E. Bouis, sues for special damages caused when the automobile in which Mrs. Bouis was a passenger was struck from the rear by an automobile owned by Mr. Boyd Durr, but being used by him at the time in the performance of his duties as chief of police of the city of Natchitoches. Mr. and Mrs. Bouis named as defendants, The Employers Liability Assurance Corporation, Ltd., liability insurer of the City of Natchitoches. This insurer filed a third party demand against Boyd Durr, asking for judgment over against Durr in the full amount of any judgment that may be rendered in favor of Mr. and Mrs. Bouis in the principal action. The district judge held in favor of the plaintiffs in the principal action, but rejected the third party demand against Durr. From this judgment The Employers Liability Assurance Corporation, Ltd. has appealed. Mr. and Mrs. Bouis have answered the appeal, asking increases in the awards.
We will address ourselves first to the principal action by Mr. and Mrs. Bouis against The Employers Liability Assurance Corporation, Ltd. The first issue presented here is whether Mr. Durr was negligent in allowing the vehicle which he was driving to strike the rear of the automobile in which Mrs. Bouis was a passenger. The relevant facts show that a funeral procession was moving south along Third Street in the City of Natchitoches. The police vehicle, being driven by Mr. Durr, was the last vehicle in the procession. The Moses' car, in which Mrs. Bouis was a passenger, was immediately in front of the Durr vehicle. The cars were going from 5 to 8 miles per hour. As the Moses car went through the intersection of Third Street with St. Denis Street, a car ahead in the procession had trouble on a hill and stopped. This caused the vehicles to its rear, including the Moses' car, to stop. The police car being driven by Mr. Durr did not stop. Instead, Durr drove forward at a speed of about 5 miles per hour and struck the rear of the Moses vehicle. Chief Durr's explanation was that, as he reached the intersection of Third Street with St. Denis Street, the procession was passing through a red traffic signal light. He had looked off to his left to see if anyone was coming out into Third Street from St. Denis Street. When he looked back, he was too close to avoid striking the Moses' car, which had stopped ahead of him.
The defendant insurer argues that this was an unavoidable accident; that Chief Durr's official duty required him to check for vehicles coming out of St. Denis Street; that he could not look in two directions at once and when he was able to again turn his attention to the Moses' car, it had come to an unexpected stop and the collision was inevitable.
We cannot agree with this argument. The jurisprudence is well established that the operator of the following vehicle is required to keep his car under control; to observe the forward vehicle; to follow same at a safe distance and if an accident occurs he is generally presumed to be negligent where a rear end collision occurs. See Foster v. Phoenix Insurance Company, 146 So.2d 647 (1st Cir.App.1962) and the cases cited therein. The stop which was made by the Moses' car was not so sudden or unexpected that if Chief Durr had been observing ahead, and following at a safe distance, he would not have been able to avoid the collision. We think the trial judge correctly concluded that Chief Durr was negligent. Accordingly, the defendant insurer is liable to Mr. and Mrs. Bouis for the damages sustained.
We will now consider the third party demand by the defendant insurer against Chief Durr, for judgment over against Durr in the full amount of any judgment rendered in favor of Mr. and Mrs. Bouis. The defendant insurer contends that even though the named insurer, the City of Natchitoches, is covered by the policy provisions, the driver of the vehicle, Chief Durr, was not an "insured" under the definition contained in the policy. Citing London, Guarantee & Accident Insurance Co. v. Vicksburg, S. & P. R. Co., 153 La. 287, 95 So. 771, Universal Automobile Insurance Co. v. Manisalco, La.App., 148 So. 731, and Hansen v. Hickenbotham, La.App., 61 So.2d 620, the defendant insurer argues that under the general provisions of L.S.A.-C.C. Art. 2315 it is entitled to recover from Durr any damages it suffers through Durr's fault. We do not find it necessary to pass on this fundamental premise for the third party demand because we have concluded that Chief Durr was an "insured" driver under the policy provisions.
The policy provision in question is Insuring Agreement III, which gives the definition of "insured". The pertinent provision states that coverage is extended to " any executive officer of the named insured with respect to the use of a non-owned automobile in the business of the named insured." The vehicle was a "non-owned automobile", i. e., it was not owned by the named insured, the City of Natchitoches. It was owned by Chief Durr and was being used for city business, i. e., handling traffic for a funeral procession. The sole issue is whether Chief of Police Durr was an executive officer of the City of Natchi-toches. If he was, then he is an insured under the policy and the third party demand against him must be denied.
Black's Law Dictionary, 4th Ed., defines "Executive Officer" as follows:
"An officer of the executive department of government; one in whom resides the power to execute the laws; one whose duties are to cause the laws to be executed and obeyed. People v. Salsbury, 134 Mich. 537, 96 N.W. [936] 939; Petterson v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 58 S.W. 100; Mekota v. State Board of Equalization and Assessment, [146] Neb. [370], 19 N.W.2d 633, 640. An administrative officer. Sheely v. People, 54 Colo. 136, 129 P. 201, 203.
"Officers who are neither judicial nor legislative are executive officers. Spivey v. State, 69 Okl.Cr. 397, 104 P.2d 263, 277; State v. Emory, 55 Idaho 649, 46 P.2d 67, 68.
"One vested with power to carry out obligations intrusted to him and charged with administrative duties relative to executing, performing and carrying into effect purposes of his employment. State Automobile Mutual Ins. Ass'n of Columbus v. Freidman, 122 Ohio St. 344, 171 N.E. 591, 592.
"One who assumes command or control and directs course of business, or some part thereof, and who outlines duties and directs work of subordinate employees. Arkansas Amusement Corporation v. Kempner, 182 Ark. 897, 33 S.W.2d 42, 43."
As regards the word "officer" our Supreme Court has held in the case of Hall v. City of Shreveport, 157 La. 589, 102 So. 680 that a policeman is a public officer who exercises some portion of the sovereign power of the state. In the recent case of Myers v. Fidelity & Casualty Company of New York, La.App., 152 So.2d 96, this court held that a policeman may be both an officer and an employee. In the case of Dawkins v. Bazer, 172 La. 327, 134 So. 238 the court held that the chief of police of the City of Shreveport is the chief executive officer of the police force, in interpreting a Civil Service Act
Under these authorities we have no difficulty in concluding that the chief of police of the City of Natchitoches is an executive officer. Certainly he is an officer and we think it is just as clear that he is an executive. Therefore, Chief Durr was an insured under the policy and the third party demand against him must be rejected.
The next issue is the quantum of damages. The district judge awarded Mrs. Bouis $2,000 for a whiplash injury and awarded Mr. Bouis $265 for medical expense and other special damages. The defendant contends the award to Mrs. Bouis was excessive. Plaintiffs have answered the appeal asking increases in both awards.
Without detailing the expert medical testimony, or the lay testimony,' we think that the award of $2,000 to Mrs. Bouis is neither inadequate nor excessive. The record shows that Mrs. Bouis did suffer a whiplash injury. She was not hospitalized nor placed in traction nor did she wear a brace, but she did stay in bed for two weeks at home and took medicine for pain and muscle relaxation. She continued to suffer periodic episodes of pain for several months and complained of pain to the date of trial, eight months after the accident, but neither the treating physician nor the orthopedic specialist were able to find any objective symptoms after 7 or 8 months. See Cassreino v. Brown, La.App., 144 So.2d 608 which sets forth general guide lines for whiplash injuries, with citation of authority.
Mr. Bouis requests an increase in his award to cover the loss of Mrs. Bouis's services as a bookkeeper and record keeper at the service station which he operated. He asks $250 to cover this item. It is our opinion the evidence does not show with sufficient certainty how much time Mrs. Bouis missed from these bookkeeping activities nor does it show the value thereof nor that anyone was paid to perform these services.
For the reasons assigned, the judgment appealed is affirmed. All costs of this appeal are assessed against the defendant, The Employers Liability Assurance Corporation, Ltd.
Affirmed.