Case Name: TIMOTHY TOLAND, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. SUNLAND HOUSING GROUP, INC., Defendant and Respondent
Court: Supreme Court of California
Jurisdiction: California
Decision Date: 1998-06-01
Citations: 18 Cal. 4th 253
Docket Number: No. S050870
Parties: TIMOTHY TOLAND, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. SUNLAND HOUSING GROUP, INC., Defendant and Respondent.
Judges: 
Reporter: California Reports
Volume: 18
Pages: 253–283

Head Matter:
[No. S050870.
June 1, 1998.]
TIMOTHY TOLAND, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. SUNLAND HOUSING GROUP, INC., Defendant and Respondent.
Counsel
Hefner, Stark & Marois, Robert P. Biegler and Stephen S. Talt for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Stanley J. Bell, Ian Herzog, Douglas Devries, Leonard Sacks, Bruce Broillet, Harvey Levine, Ronald Wrinkle, William D. Turley, Steven Kleifield, David A. Rosen, Tony Tanke, Mary E. Alexander, David Casey, Robert B. Steinberg, Stoplman, Krissman, Elber, Mandel & Katzman, Dennis M. Elber, Thomas G. Stolpman, Rose, Klein & Marias, David A. Rosen, The Ams Law Firm, Robert S. Arns and Morgan C. Smith as Amici Curae on behalf of Plaintiff and Appellant.
Shepard & Haven, Kenneth B. Shepard and Karen E. Halbo for Defendant and Respondent.
William M. McMillan, George Cory, Kenneth G. Nellis, Sedgwick, Detert, Moran & Arnold, Frederick D. Baker, Kirk C. Jenkins, Schaffer & Lax, Clifford L. Schaffer, Horvitz & Levy, David M. Axelrad, Stephen E. Norris, John Gueli, Thelen, Marrin, Johnson & Bridges, Philip R. Placier, Jennifer Kuenster, Kevin O’Brien, Crosby, Heafey, Roach & May, Ezra Hendon and Kathy M. Banke as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Respondent.

Opinion:
Opinion
KENNARD, J,
Under the doctrine of peculiar risk, a person who hires an independent contractor to do inherently dangerous work can be held liable for tort damages when the contractor causes injury to others by negligently performing the work. The doctrine serves to ensure that innocent bystanders or neighboring landowners injured by the hired contractor's negligence will have a source of compensation even if the contractor turns out to be insolvent. As we explained in Privette v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 689, 694 [21 Cal.Rptr.2d 72, 854 P.2d 721] (Privette), courts created the peculiar risk doctrine in the belief that "as between two parties innocent of any personal wrongdoing—the person who contracted for the work and the hapless victim of the contractor's negligence—the risk of loss occasioned by the contracted work was more fairly allocated to the person for whose benefit the job was undertaken."
In Privette, supra, 5 Cal.4th 689, we unanimously held that under the peculiar risk doctrine the hiring person's liability does not extend to the hired contractor's employees. Because the Workers' Compensation Act (Lab. Code, § 3200 et seq.) shields an independent contractor from tort liability to its employees, applying the peculiar risk doctrine to the independent contractor's employees would illogically and unfairly subject the hiring person, who did nothing to create the risk that caused the injury, to greater liability than that faced by the independent contractor whose negligence caused the employee's injury. (5 Cal.4th at pp. 698-700.) As we concluded: "[T]he property owner should not have to pay for injuries caused by the contractor's negligent performance of the work when workers' compensation statutes already cover those injuries." (Id. at p. 699.)
The doctrine of peculiar risk, as relevant here, is described in two sections of the Restatement Second of Torts, section 413 and section 416. Under section 413, a person who hires an independent contractor to do inherently dangerous work, but who fails to provide in the contract or in some other manner that special precautions be taken to avert the peculiar risks of that work, can be liable if the contractor's negligent performance of the work causes injury to others. Under section 416, even if the hiring person has provided for special precautions "in the contract or otherwise," the hiring person can nevertheless be liable if the contractor fails "to exercise reasonable care to take such precautions" and the contractor's performance of the work causes injury to others. There has been some disagreement in the trial courts and the Courts of Appeal whether Privette, supra, 5 Cal.4th 689, bars recovery only in actions brought under section 416, or also under the theory of peculiar risk described in section 413. Here, a subcontractor's employee sued the general contractor for on-the-job injuries, asserting that Privette did not bar recovery under section 413. The Court of Appeal disagreed, holding that Privette barred recovery under section 413 as well as section 416. We affirm the decision of the Court of Appeal.
I
In December 1992, Timothy Toland was working for framing subcontractor CLP Construction, Inc. (CLP) at a housing development under construction. While helping other CLP employees in raising a large and heavy framed wall, Toland was injured when the wall fell on him. The project's owner and general contractor was Sunland Housing Group, Inc. (Sunland).
Toland sought recovery from his employer, CLP, under the Workers' Compensation Act. He also sued Sunland, alleging that raising the wall created a peculiar risk of injury for which Sunland should have required subcontractor CLP to take special precautions.
Sunland moved for summary judgment in the trial court, asserting that Toland's action was barred under this court's then recent decision in Privette, supra, 5 Cal.4th 689. In opposing the motion, Toland argued that Privette had eliminated peculiar risk liability for employees of independent contractors only in actions based on section 416 of the Restatement Second of Torts (hiring person liable for contractor's negligence in spite of providing that the contractor take special precautions), but that Privette had no effect on an action such as his, which was brought under section 413 (hiring person who fails to provide for special precautions liable for contractor's negligence).
The trial court entered summary judgment for Sunland. The Court of Appeal affirmed.
II
We begin with a brief overview of the doctrine of peculiar risk and the treatment of that doctrine in sections 413 and 416 of the Restatement Second of Torts. We then discuss our decision in Privette, supra, 5 Cal.4th 689, as well as the Court of Appeal cases that have considered whether Privette bars recovery only under section 416 or also under section 413.
A. The Doctrine of Peculiar Risk
Under the doctrine of peculiar risk, one injured by inherently dangerous work performed by a hired contractor can seek tort damages from the person who hired the contractor. (Privette, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 693.) The doctrine provides an exception to the common law rule that an individual who hires an independent contractor generally is not liable for injuries to others caused by the contractor's negligence in performing the hired work. (Ibid.) The courts created this exception in the late 19th century to ensure that innocent third parties injured by inherently dangerous work performed by an independent contractor for the benefit of the hiring person could sue not only the contractor, but also the hiring person, so that in the event of the contractor's insolvency, the injured person would still have a source of recovery. (Id. at-pp. 693-694.)
In determining the applicability of the doctrine of peculiar risk, a critical inquiry "is whether the work for which the contractor was hired involves a risk that is 'peculiar to the work to be done,' arising either from the nature or the location of the work and ' "against which a reasonable person would recognize the necessity of taking special precautions." ' (Aceves v. Regal Pale Brewing Co., [(1979)] 24 Cal.3d 502, 509 [156 Cal.Rptr. 41, 595 P.2d 619], quoting Griesel v. Dart Industries, Inc. [(1979)] 23 Cal.3d 578, 586 [153 Cal.Rptr. 213, 591 P.2d 503]; Rest.2d Torts, § 413, com. b; id., § 416, com. b.)" (Privette, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 695, italics added.)
A peculiar risk need not be one that would inevitably arise in the course of the work. " 'It is sufficient that it is a risk which the employer should recognize as likely to arise in the course of the ordinary and usual method of the work, or the particular method which the employer knows that the contractor will adopt.' " (Griesel v. Dart Industries, Inc. (1979) 23 Cal.3d 578, 586 [153 Cal.Rptr. 213, 591 P.2d 503], quoting Rest.2d Torts, § 416, com. e, p. 397; see also Mackey v. Campbell Construction Co. (1980) 101 Cal.App.3d 774, 785-786 [162 Cal.Rptr. 64] ["Where the employer should recognize that a risk is likely to arise as a result of a method of work which the employer knows that the contractor will adopt, this is clearly a peculiar risk within the rule. [Citation.] A peculiar risk may arise out of a contemplated and unsafe method of work adopted by the independent contractor."].)
Even when the work presents a special or peculiar risk of harm, the person who hired the contractor will not be liable for injury to others if the injury results from the contractor's "collateral" or "casual" negligence. (Aceves v. Regal Pale Brewing, Co. (1979) 24 Cal.3d 502, 510 [156 Cal.Rptr. 41, 595 P.2d 619]; Prosser & Keeton on Torts (5th ed. 1984) § 71, pp. 515-516; Rest.2d Torts, § 426.) Negligence is collateral when it involves an "operative detail of the work, as distinguished from the general plan or method to be followed." (Aceves v. Regal Pale Brewing Co., supra, at p. 510.) But, as we have recognized, "it is often difficult to distinguish those risks that are inherent in the work from those that are collateral, and the line to be drawn between the two types of risks is 'shadowy.' (Van Arsdale v. Hollinger [(1968)] 68 Cal.2d 245, 252 [66 Cal.Rptr. 20, 437 P.2d 508], quoting Harper, Law of Torts (1933) § 292.)" (Privette, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 696.)
B. The Restatement Second of Torts
In the Restatement Second of Torts, sections 413 and 416, both of which set forth a theory of peculiar risk liability, appear in chapter 15. The chapter is entitled "Liability of an Employer of an Independent Contractor." Its first section states the general rule that "the employer of an independent contractor is not liable for physical harm caused to another by an act or omission of the contractor or his servants." (Rest.2d Torts, § 409, p. 370.) Sections 413 and 416 describe exceptions to this general rule of nonliability, as we discuss below.
1. Section 413
Section 413 of the Restatement Second of Torts is part of chapter 15's topic 1, entitled "Harm Caused by Fault of Employers of Independent Contractors." Section 413 bears the heading, "Duty to Provide for Taking of Precautions Against Dangers Involved in Work Entrusted to Contractor." It reads: "One who employs an independent contractor to do work which the employer should recognize as likely to create, during its progress, a peculiar unreasonable risk of physical harm to others unless special precautions are taken, is subject to liability for physical harm caused to them by the absence of such precautions if the employer [H] (a) fails to provide in the contract that the contractor shall take such precautions, or [H] (b) fails to exercise reasonable care to provide in some other manner for the taking of such precautions." (Rest.2d Torts, § 413.) Because section 413 rests the liability of the hiring person on his or her omission to provide for special precautions in the contract or in some other manner, it is sometimes described as a rule of "direct liability." (See Aceves v. Regal Pale Brewing Co., supra, 24 Cal.3d 502, 509; Griesel v. Dart Industries, Inc., supra, 23 Cal.3d 578, 585-586; see also Kelleher v. Empresa Hondurena de Vapores, S.A. (1976) 57 Cal.App.3d 52, 62 [129 Cal.Rptr. 32].)
2. Section 416
Section 416 of the Restatement Second of Torts appears in chapter 15's topic 2, "Harm Caused by Negligence of a Carefully Selected Independent Contractor." Section 416 is entitled, "Work Dangerous in Absence of Special Precautions." It provides: "One who employs an independent contractor to do work which the employer should recognize as likely to create during its progress a peculiar risk of physical harm to others unless special precautions are taken, is subject to liability for physical harm caused to them by the failure of the contractor to exercise reasonable care to take such precautions, even though the employer has provided for such precautions in the contract or otherwise." (Rest.2d Torts, § 416.) As the introductory note to this section explains, "the [hiring person] is under a duty which he is not free to delegate to the contractor." (Rest.2d Torts, ch. 15, topic 2, Introductory Note, p. 394; see also Van Arsdale v. Hollinger (1968) 68 Cal.2d 245, 255 [66 Cal.Rptr. 20, 437 P.2d 508] [describing section 416 as imposing a "nondelegable duty to exercise due care"].)
Because the hiring person's liability under section 416 of the Restatement Second of Torts flows from the independent contractor's negligent failure to take special precautions in performing the inherently dangerous work, as required by "the contract or otherwise," the hiring person's liability is often referred to as "vicarious liability." (See Kelleher v. Empresa Hondurena de Vapores, S.A., supra, 57 Cal.App.3d at p. 62; Anderson v. Chancellor Western Oil Dev. Corp. (1975) 53 Cal.App.3d 235, 240 [125 Cal.Rptr. 640].)
C. Our Decision in Privette v. Superior Court
As noted at the outset, in Privette, supra, 5 Cal.4th 689, we held that the doctrine of peculiar risk, which serves to ensure a source of tort recovery for innocent bystanders or neighboring landowners injured during the course of inherently dangerous work performed by an independent contractor, should not apply to the contractor's own employees. Privette expressly overruled Woolen v. Aerojet General Corp. (1962) 57 Cal.2d 407, 410-411 [20 Cal.Rptr. 12, 369 P.2d 708], to the extent it held that an employee of an independent contractor could recover under the peculiar risk doctrine against the person who hired the contractor. (.Privette, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 702, fn. 4.) Privette's holding is consistent with the law in most of the jurisdictions that have considered the issue. (Id. at pp. 698-699, citing cases.)
Privette pointed out that the policy reasons that support imposition of peculiar risk liability on the hiring person for injuries to neighboring property owners or innocent bystanders are absent when the person injured by the independent contractor's negligence is an employee of the contractor. (Privette, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 701.) The neighboring landowner or innocent bystander may have no other source of compensation for injuries resulting from the contractor's negligence in doing the inherently dangerous work. In contrast, an employee of the negligent contractor can, for workplace injury caused by the contractor's negligence, recover under the workers' compensation system regardless of the solvency of the contractor. (See Lab. Code, § 3716 [providing workers' compensation benefits to workers employed by uninsured employers].) As we explained in Privette, when an independent contractor's employee is injured on the jobsite, workers' compensation achieves the same objectives as tort damages awarded under the peculiar risk doctrine: a dependable source of compensation for workplace injury; spreading the risk of harm of dangerous work to those who contract for and thus benefit from the work, by including the cost of workers' compensation insurance in the price paid for the contracted work; and promoting safety in the workplace. (5 Cal.4th at p. 701.)
Privette also noted that when the injured person is an employee of the independent contractor, a policy justification for imposing peculiar risk liability on the hiring person—namely the hiring person's right to equitable indemnity from the independent contractor—is also absent. (Privette, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 701.) We explained: "When a property owner or general contractor who hires an independent contractor for work presenting a peculiar risk of harm to others is held liable under the doctrine of peculiar risk for injuries to an innocent bystander or an owner of neighboring land, the property owner or general contractor can, for the damages paid the injured party, obtain equitable indemnity from the independent contractor responsible for the injuries. This ensures that the ultimate responsibility for the harm caused by the peculiar risk of the work done is borne by the individual or entity at fault for the injury. But when the person injured is an employee of the independent contractor, the exclusivity provisions of the workers' compensation scheme shield the negligent contractor from an action seeking equitable indemnity. ([Lab. Code,] § 3864.)" (Ibid.)
We also observed in Privette that although the doctrine of peculiar risk is sometimes described as "a nondelegable duty" rule, it is in effect a form of vicarious liability. (Privette, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 695.) In a footnote, which briefly mentioned sections 413 and 416 of the Restatement Second of Torts, we said: "The conclusion that peculiar risk is a form of vicarious liability is unaffected by the characterization of the doctrine as 'direct' liability in situations when the person hiring an independent contractor 'fails to provide in the contract that the contractor shall take [special] precautions.' (Rest.2d Torts, § 413; see Aceves v. Regal Pale Brewing Co., supra, 24 Cal.3d at p. 509; Griesel v. Dart Industries, Inc. (1979) 23 Cal.3d 578, 585-586 [153 Cal.Rptr. 213, 591 P.2d 503].) Irrespective of whether a contract of hire provides that special precautions be taken, a person who employs an independent contractor to perform dangerous work is subject to liability under the doctrine of peculiar risk. (Rest.2d Torts, § 416.) Thus, peculiar risk liability is normally premised on the broader rule of vicarious liability for the contractor's negligence. (See [Note, Liability to Employees of Independent Contractors Engaged in Inherently Dangerous Work: A Workable Workers' Compensation Proposal] [(1980)] 48 Fordham L.Rev. 1165, 1171; Bower v. Peate [(1876)] 1 Q.B.D. [321,] 326 [the contractor's default is attributable to the person who authorized the work].)" (Privette, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 695, fn. 2.) These remarks have, as discussed below, sparked some debate in the Courts of Appeal regarding the scope of our holding in Privette: whether it applies only to section 416 or also to section 413 of the Restatement Second of Torts.
D. Post-Privette Decisions by the Courts of Appeal
We filed our decision in Privette, supra, 5 Cal.4th 689, on July 19, 1993. In April 1994, the Court of Appeal decided Owens v. Giannetta-Heinrich Construction Co. (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 1662 [29 Cal.Rptr.2d 11]. In that case, a subcontractor's employee was injured while working as a dry wall installer on a construction project. The employee sued the project's general contractor under the doctrine of peculiar risk. A jury returned a verdict in favor of the subcontractor's employee. The Court of Appeal reversed, agreeing with the general contractor that Privette barred recovery by the subcontractor's employee.
In its decision, the Court of Appeal in Owens made these general observations about the doctrine of peculiar risk: "[Pjeculiar risk is not exclusively a form of vicarious liability. It may arise as a form of direct liability if the person who hires an independent contractor '(a) fails to provide in the contract that the contractor shall take such precautions, or ffl] (b) fails to exercise reasonable care to provide in some other manner for the taking of such precautions.' (Rest.2d Torts, § 413; see Aceves v. Regal Pale Brewing Co. (1979) 24 Cal.3d 508-509 [156 Cal.Rptr. 41, 595 P.2d 619]; Woolen v. Aerojet General Corp. (1962) 57 Cal.2d 407, 410 [20 Cal.Rptr. 12, 369 P.2d 708]; Addison v. Susanville Lumber, Inc. (1975) 47 Cal.App.3d 394, 398-399 [120 Cal.Rptr. 737]; Stilson v. Moulton-Niguel Water Dist. (1971) 21 Cal.App.3d 928, 938 [98 Cal.Rptr. 914].) Peculiar risk liability is vicarious when injury is caused 'by the failure of the contractor to exercise reasonable care to take [special] precautions, even though the employer has provided for such precautions in the contract or otherwise.' (Rest.2d Torts, § 416; see Van Arsdale v. Hollinger (1968) 68 Cal.2d 245, 254 [66 Cal.Rptr. 20, 437 P.2d 508].)" (Owens v. Giannetta-Heinrich Construction Co., supra, 23 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1667-1668, fn. omitted.)
The Court of Appeal in Owens added: "It is plain from the discussion in Privette that the Supreme Court intended its holding to apply only in those situations where third party liability is vicarious rather than direct." (Owens v. Giannetta-Heinrich Construction Co., supra, 23 Cal.App.4th at p. 1668.) The Court of Appeal gave no explanation for that conclusion. It may have provided a clue to its reasoning, however, in quoting Privette's footnote 2 in its entirety but italicizing the word "normally" in the last sentence, as follows: " '[P]eculiar risk liability is normally premised on the broader rule of vicarious liability for the contractor's negligence.' " (Owens, supra, at p. 1667, fn. 4; see also Yanez v. U.S. (9th Cir. 1995) 63 F.3d 870, 873 [describing Owens as stating "a narrow exception- to Privette" for cases brought on the "direct liability" theory of Restatement Second of Torts section 413].)
In this case, the Court of Appeal concluded that Owens v. GiannettaHeinrich Construction Co., supra, 23 Cal.App.4th 1662, was wrong in interpreting our decision in Privette, supra, 5 Cal.4th 689, as applying only to the theory of peculiar risk described in section 416 of the Restatement Second of Torts: "Both the express language of Privette and a complete reconciliation of the peculiar risk doctrine with the workers' compensation system preclude a landowner's liability for injuries to the employee of a contractor hired by the landowner resulting from work involving a peculiar risk, whether the liability is characterized as direct or vicarious." The Court of Appeal in this case reasoned that Privette made no distinction between section 413 liability and section 416 liability, noting that Privette expressly overruled Woolen v. Aerojet General Corp., supra, 57 Cal.2d 407, a case that involved only section 413 liability. Because of these conflicting views by the Courts of Appeal, we granted review to clarify the scope of our holding in Privette, supra, 5 Cal.4th 689.
Ill
Plaintiff Toland asserts that Privette, supra, 5 Cal.4th 689, bars recovery by an employee of an independent contractor only in cases based on section 416 of the Restatement Second of Torts, which, Toland observes, holds the hiring person vicariously liable for the independent contractor's failure to take the special precautions provided for "in the contract or otherwise." Thus, Toland contends, Privette has no bearing on cases such as his that are premised on the theory of section 413 of the Restatement, which holds the hiring person directly liable for failing to provide in the contract or in some other manner for the taking of special precautions. Toland's argument rests on the distinction some courts and commentators have drawn between these two sections, characterizing the liability under section 413 as "direct" liability, while describing the liability under section 416 as "vicarious" liability. As we explain, this distinction is misleading, for liability under these sections is neither purely direct nor purely vicarious.
Under section 413 of the Restatement Second of Torts, a person who hires a contractor to do inherently dangerous work but fails to provide "in the contract" or "in some other manner" for the taking of special precautions can be held liable when the contractor's negligence causes injuries to others. Section 416 of the Restatement pertains to a hiring person who, unlike the hiring person in section 413, has provided for special precautions, but section 416 nevertheless holds the hiring person liable when the contractor's failure to take such precautions causes harm to others. Thus, under either section 413 or section 416, the hiring person is subject to liability for injuries to others resulting from the contractor's failure to take safety precautions while performing the inherently dangerous work.
Both sections 413 and 416 of the Restatement Second of Torts are exceptions to the general rule of nonliability that "the employer of an independent contractor is not liable for physical harm caused to another by an act or omission of the contractor or his servants." (Rest.2d Torts, § 409.) Both impose on one who hires an independent contractor to do inherently dangerous work a duty to ensure that the contractor take special precautions to prevent harm to others. (See Bower v. Peate (1876) 1 Q.B.D. 321, 326 ["[A] man who orders a work to be executed, from which, in the natural course of things, injurious consequences to his neighbour must be expected to arise . . . cannot relieve himself of his responsibility by employing some one else . . . ."].) Thus, under both sections 413 and 416, the hiring person's liability is cast in the form of the hiring person's breach of a duty to see to it that special precautions are taken to prevent injuries to others; in that sense, the liability is "direct." Yet, peculiar risk liability is not a traditional theory of direct liability for the risks created by one's own conduct: Liability under both sections is in essence "vicarious" or "derivative" in the sense that it derives from the "act or omission" of the hired contractor, because it is the hired contractor who has caused the injury by failing to use reasonable care in performing the work. We made this point in Privette, supra, 5 Cal.4th at page 695, in footnote 2: "The conclusion, that peculiar risk is a form of vicarious liability is unaffected by the characterization of the doctrine as 'direct' liability in situations when the person hiring an independent contractor 'fails to provide in the contract that the contractor shall take [special] precautions.' "
As amicus curiae California State Department of Transportation notes, liability under both sections 413 and 416 of the Restatement Second of Torts "arises from the absence of special precautions which the contractor performing the work is required to take without regard to the requirements of the contract." It points out that the confusion stems from the Restatement's placement of the two sections: Section 413 appears in the "direct liability" provisions discussed in topic 1 of chapter 15, while section 416 appears under topic 2 of chapter 15, which deals with "vicarious liability." This placement would imply theories of liability that are mutually exclusive. But the theory of liability expressed in section 413 (hiring person who fails to provide for special precautions liable for contractor's negligence) is not mutually exclusive of section 416's theory of liability (hiring person liable for contractor's negligence in spite of providing that the contractor take special precautions). Rather, the two forms of liability overlap. As explained in Kelleher v. Empresa Hondurena de Vapores, S.A., supra, 57 Cal.App.3d 52, 62: "Where there is a special risk of physical harm, the 'employer' is liable to third persons injured as a proximate result of the independent contractor's negligence whether or not there is an agreement requiring the independent contractor to take special precautions." (Italics added.) No doubt it is for this reason that one commentator has characterized sections 413 and 416 as "redundant statements" of the peculiar risk doctrine, faulting the Restatement for not articulating "a single statement of the doctrine." (Comment, Clarifying the Peculiar Risk Doctrine: The Rule Restated (1988) 20 Pacific L.J. 197, 205-206.) As observed in Monk v. Virgin Islands Water & Power Authority (3d Cir. 1995) 53 F.3d 1381, 1394, footnote 36, most courts have "explicitly refused" to distinguish cases brought under section 416 from those brought under section 413 "just because [section 416 appears] under the vicarious liability part of Chapter 15 and [section 413] is under the direct liability heading." (See also Dillard v. Strecker (1994) 255 Kan. 704 [877 P.2d 371, 378] [noting the "confusion" furthered by the courts in describing section 413's form of liability as "direct" and section 416's as "vicarious," when the theories "obviously overlap in some cases and appear to be used interchangeably in others" and the underlying policy provisions apply "uniformly to both"].)
Plaintiff Toland seizes on a comment in Privette, supra, 5 Cal.4th 689, that when an employee of an independent contractor suffers on-the-job injuries, and thus can seek recovery under the Workers' Compensation Act, imposing liability for those same injuries on the person who hired the contractor would produce "the anomalous result that a nonnegligent person's liability for an injury is greater than that of the person whose negligence actually caused the injury." (5 Cal.4th at p. 698, italics added.) According to Toland, such an anomaly does not exist in an action such as his that relies on Restatement Second of Torts section 413, which imposes liability based on the hiring person's failure to provide in the contract or in some other manner that the contractor take special precautions in performing the inherently dangerous work. Plaintiff misunderstands what we said in Privette.
Privette relied in part on the reasoning expressed in a tentative draft to the Restatement Second of Torts that workplace injuries are covered by workers' compensation insurance, "the cost of which is 'included by the contractor in his contract price' and 'ultimately . . . borne by the defendant who hires him.' " (Privette, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 699, quoting Rest.2d Torts (Tent. Draft No. 7, Apr. 16, 1962) ch. 15, special note, pp. 17-18.) The tentative draft also stated that "when the Sections in this Chapter speak of liability to 'another,' or 'others,' or to 'third persons,' it is to be understood that the employees of the contractor, as well as those of the defendant himself, are not included." (Rest.2d Torts (Tent. Draft No. 7, Apr. 16, 1962) ch. 15, special note, p. 18, italics added.)
Therefore, under Privette, supra, 5 Cal.4th 689, even though a person hiring an independent contractor to do inherently dangerous work can be liable under the peculiar risk doctrine for failing to see to it that a hired contractor take special precautions to protect neighboring property owners or innocent bystanders, such a person has no obligation to specify the precautions an independent hired contractor should take for the safety of the contractor's employees. Absent an obligation, there can be no liability in tort. (See Prosser & Keeton on Torts, supra, § 30, pp. 164-165 [A cause of action for "negligence" requires each of the following: (1) a duty, or obligation, recognized by law; (2) a breach of the duty; (3) legal cause; and (4) actual loss or damage.]; United States Liab. Ins. Co. v. Haidinger-Hayes, Inc. (1970) 1 Cal.3d 586, 594 [83 Cal.Rptr. 418, 463 P.2d 770] [same]; 6 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (9th ed. 1988) Torts, § 732, p. 60 [same].)
Thus, contrary to plaintiff Toland's assertion, our decision in Privette, supra, 5 Cal.4th 689, bars employees of a hired contractor who are injured by the contractor's negligence from seeking recovery against the hiring person, irrespective of whether recovery is sought under the theory of peculiar risk set forth in section 416 or section 413 of the Restatement Second of Torts. In either situation, it would be unfair to impose liability on the hiring person when the liability of the contractor, the one primarily responsible for the worker's on-the-job injuries, is limited to providing workers' compensation coverage. Our view is shared by an overwhelming majority of courts that have considered the issue. (See Kane v. J.R. Simplot Co. (10th Cir. 1995) 60 F.3d 688, 692-693 [interpreting Idaho law]; Monk v. Virgin Islands Water & Power Authority, supra, 53 F.3d 1381, 1390-1393 [following our decision in Privette in interpreting Virgin Islands law]; Anderson v. Marathon Petroleum Co. (7th Cir. 1986) 801 F.2d 936, 940-942 (opn. by Posner, J.) [declining to distinguish between so-called "direct" and "vicarious" liability theories in applying Illinois law]; Hess v. Upper Mississippi Towing Corp. (5th Cir. 1977) 559 F.2d 1030, 1033-1035 [holding in a maritime case that a hired contractor's employees cannot recover against the hiring person under section 413]; Dillard v. Strecker, supra, 255 Kan. 704, 725-727 [877 P.2d 371, 385] [declining to distinguish between sections 416 and 413 in holding no peculiar risk liability to employees of independent contractors]; Matteuzzi v. Columbus Partnership, L.P. (Mo. 1993) 866 S.W.2d 128, 131-132 [holding in the case of an employee of an independent contractor "the same reasons . for rejecting a claim under § 416 are equally persuasive . . . under § 413"]; Fagundes v. State (1989) 116 Idaho 173, 177 [774 P.2d 343, 347] [no liability to independent contractor's employee under either section 416 or section 413]; Stockwell v. Parker Drilling Co., Inc. (Wyo. 1987) 733 P.2d 1029, 1031-1032 [same].)
Against this considerable weight of authority, the concurring and dissenting opinion proposes that employees of an independent contractor should be exempt from Privette's nonliability rule in cases in which the hiring person has "superior knowledge . of a special risk or the precautions . to avoid it. . . ." (Cone, and dis. opn., post, at p. 277.) This suggestion, couched in the familiar language of fault-based liability, has superficial appeal, but it does not hold up under scrutiny.
Even a cursory review of the cases in which employees of independent contractors have sought tort recovery under the doctrine of "peculiar risk" reveals that they arise overwhelmingly from injuries sustained in the building trades and typically involve claims brought against a general contractor by the employees of a subcontractor. It is a common practice in the construction industry for general contractors to hire subcontractors to do particular jobs. (See generally, Comment, The Peculiar Risk Doctrine: High Rise Benefits for California Construction Workers (1986) 19 Loyola L.A. L.Rev. 1495.) It would be a rare case indeed in which a general contractor was entirely ignorant of the methods used and requirements of the work being performed by subcontractors. Thus, although at first blush the concurring and dissenting opinion's proposed rule appears limited in scope, its practical effect would be to eviscerate our holding here that employees of an independent contractor, because of the availability of workers' compensation benefits, cannot seek recovery under section 413 of the Restatement Second of Torts.
Moreover, the proposed rule is impractical. The term "superior knowledge" has superficial appeal when considered in the abstract, but its practical application presents considerable difficulties. How is a trier of fact to determine whether to impose liability based on the relative knowledge of two parties, each of whom is "knowledgeable" in some form or degree? Must the general contractor's knowledge be "superior" with regard to industry practices or must it be "superior" with regard to the actual instrumentality of the injury? Does a general contractor with 25 years of experience in the. construction industry possess greater or lesser knowledge than a subcontractor with 5 years of experience in a particular building trade? There is little basis on which a jury could sensibly impose liability using the concurring and dissenting opinion's "comparative knowledge" rule.
Contrary to what the concurring and dissenting opinion implies, claims based on a general contractor's "superior knowledge" will not be amenable to summary judgment, because the question of who possesses the "superior knowledge," the subcontractor or the general contractor, will almost always present a triable issue of material fact. Summary judgment practice imposes on a moving defendant the burden of proving that a necessary element of the plaintiff's case cannot be established. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c; Addy v. Bliss & Glennon (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 205, 214 [51 Cal.Rptr.2d 642].) Under the rule proposed by the concurring and dissenting opinion, a general contractor could prevail on summary judgment only by presenting uncontroverted evidence that its own knowledge was demonstrably less than that of the subcontractor hired to do the particular work. Because in most cases the subcontractor and the general contractor will both have considerable knowledge, this will be a virtually impossible task. Sunland's successful summary judgment motion in this case in no way suggests that the question of "superior knowledge" was or could have been resolved on summary judgment. Here, contrary to the concurring and dissenting opinion's conclusion that "the record in this case shows the general contractor here was not better positioned than the framing subcontractor" (cone, and dis. opn., post, at p. 271), the question of who, as between the general and subcontractor, had "superior knowledge" was never litigated as part of Sunland's summary judgment motion. Rather, Sunland sought summary judgment, and the trial court granted it, on the ground that Toland, as the employee of an independent contractor, cannot recover against the hiring person under the doctrine of peculiar risk.
In the end, the concurring and dissenting opinion would effectively deprive general contractors of a right available to any other hiring person: the right to delegate to independent contractors the responsibility of ensuring the safety of their own workers. On peril of incurring civil liability, general contractors would, under the concurring and dissenting opinion's approach, have to specify in their contracts with subcontractors every conceivable safety or precautionary measure to be taken during construction. Even then, a general contractor could still incur tort liability if the employee of a subcontractor suffers an injury because the employee could, in a lawsuit against the general contractor, claim that the safety measures set forth in the contract were just not specific enough in averting the injury. In effect, the concurring and dissenting opinion's proposed rule would impose liability on general contractors simply for "having written a certain kind of contract, a contract found too vague on one point." {Nelson v. United States (9th Cir. 1980) 639 F.2d 469, 477.)
Ultimately, our conclusion here that employees of independent contractors cannot recover under either section 416 or section 413 of the Restatement Second of Torts is premised on policy: whether the peculiar risk liability of a general contractor, a landowner, or any other hirer of an independent contractor should, consistent with its common law origins, be limited to protecting third parties such as innocent bystanders or neighboring landowners against the possible insolvency of the hired contractor at fault, or whether such liability should extend to the independent contractor's employees as well. As we concluded in Privette, supra, 5 Cal.4th 689, it is illogical and unfair that a landowner or other person who hires an independent contractor should have greater liability for the independent contractor's negligence towards the contractor's employees than the independent contractor whose liability is limited to providing workers' compensation coverage. Imposing on the hiring person a liability greater than that incurred by the independent contractor (the party with the greatest and most direct fault) is equally unfair and illogical whether the hiring person's liability is premised on the theory of section 413 (hiring person who fails to provide for special precautions liable for contractor's negligence) or the theory of section 416 (hiring person liable for contractor's negligence in spite of providing that the contractor take special precautions).
Accordingly, the Court of Appeal in this case correctly held that our decision in Privette, supra, 5 Cal.4th 689, necessarily bars an employee of an independent contractor from relying on the doctrine of peculiar risk to seek recovery under either section 413 or section 416 of the Restatement Second of Torts.
Disposition
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is affirmed.
George, C. J., Baxter, J., Chin, J., and Brown, J., concurred.
A third theory of "peculiar risk" liability is set forth in section 427 of the Restatement Second of Torts. Entitled, "Negligence as to Danger Inherent in the Work," it provides: "One who employs an independent contractor to do work involving a special danger to others which the employer knows or has reason to know to be inherent in or normal to the work, or which he contemplates or has reason to contemplate when making the contract, is subject to liability for physical harm caused to such others by the contractor's failure to take reasonable precautions against such danger." (Ibid.) Here, plaintiff Toland, who relies on section 413, does not suggest that liability under section 427 is exempt from our holding in Privette, no doubt because a comment in the Restatement describes section 427 as "closely related to, and to a considerable extent a duplication of' the rule stated in section 416. (Rest.2d Torts, § 427, com. a., p. 416.)
Our grant of review did not extend to, and therefore we do not decide, a second issue raised by Toland: whether Privette, supra, 5 Cal.4th 689, would preclude an employee of an independent contractor from seeking tort recovery for workplace injuries under the theory of section 414 of the Restatement Second of Torts that the general contractor or landowner "retained control" over the operative details of the hired work. As the Court of Appeal unanimously concluded, the facts Toland offered in opposing summary judgment were insufficient to raise a triable issue on that question.
By concocting a duty in a particular situation to prevent another from acting negligently, as an exception to the general rule that "one owes no duty to control the conduct of another" (Davidson v. City of Westminster (1982) 32 Cal.3d 197, 203 [185 Cal.Rptr. 252, 649 P.2d 894]), it is always possible to impose liability on one person for the negligence of another and to label that liability "direct." The concurring and dissenting opinion does precisely this when it insists on characterizing Restatement Second of Torts section 413's theory of liability (which, as explained in the text, is essentially vicarious or derivative) as "direct" and refuses to acknowledge any distinction between this artificial "direct liability" and the liability imposed on the hiring person for injuries resulting from the hiring person's own conduct, such as, for example, concealing a hidden danger (see fn. 4, post) or insisting on use of an unsafe method to execute the work.
Our decision in no way precludes employees of independent contractors from seeking recovery from a general contractor or other hiring person for personal injury resulting from a failure to disclose a concealed preexisting danger at the site of the hired work that was known to the hiring person. Recovery in such a case would be for fraudulent concealment or misrepresentation, however, and would not involve the "comparative knowledge" analysis proposed by the concurring and dissenting opinion, nor would it depend on the peculiar risk doctrine.
To the extent that Owens v. Giannetta-Heinrich Construction Co., supra, 23 Cal.App.4th 1662, concludes to the contrary, it is disapproved.