Case Name: In the Interest of R.K., Jr., a minor
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1988-12-07
Citations: 535 So. 2d 312
Docket Number: No. 87-2812
Parties: In the Interest of R.K., Jr., a minor.
Judges: FRANK, J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 535
Pages: 312–316

Head Matter:
In the Interest of R.K., Jr., a minor.
No. 87-2812.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
Dec. 7, 1988.
Peter K. Mislovic, Lakeland, for appellant.
Geraldyne H. Canton of Canton & Carlton, P.A., Lakeland, for appellee.

Opinion:
SCHOONOVER, Acting Chief Judge.
The appellant, the mother of R.K., Jr., challenges a final judgment permanently committing her child to the custody of the appellee, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS). We find that the juvenile court violated the appellant's right to counsel and, accordingly, reverse.
After the appellant's child had been adjudicated dependent pursuant to the provisions of chapter 39, Florida Statutes (1983), HRS filed a petition seeking the permanent commitment of the child to HRS custody for the purpose of subsequent adoption. The record reflects that the appellant was present at the permanent commitment hearing conducted on June 25, 1987, and represented herself in opposition to HRS's petition. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court granted fiRS's petition and entered a final judgment permanently committing the child to fiRS for subsequent adoption. This timely appeal followed.
The primary issue in a permanent commitment hearing is the determination of the manifest best interests of the child. § 39.41(1)(f)1., Fla.Stat. (1983).
There is also, however, a constitutionally protected interest in preserving the family unit and raising one's children. Because the interest at stake is so important and fundamental in nature, our supreme court has held that under the due process clauses of the United States Constitution and the Florida Constitution, a parent has a fundamental right to counsel in proceedings which might result in the permanent termination of his child custody rights. See In the Interest of D.B., 385 So.2d 83 (Fla.1980). In order to insure the proper procedure in protecting a parent's right to counsel, the Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure provide:
(a) Duty of the Court.
(1) At each stage of the proceeding the court shall advise the parent, guardian or custodian of their right to have counsel present. The court shall appoint counsel to insolvent persons who are so entitled as provided by law. The court shall ascertain whether the right to counsel is understood and where appropriate, knowingly and intelligently waived. The court shall enter its findings in writing with respect to the appointment or waiver of counsel for insolvent parties as aforementioned.
(2) The court may appoint an attorney for the parent, guardian or custodian of a child, as provided by law.
(b) Waiver of Counsel.
(1) No waiver shall be accepted where it appears that the party is unable to make an intelligent and understanding choice because of his mental condition, age, education, experience, the nature or complexity of the case, or other factors.
(2) A waiver of counsel made in court shall be of record. A waiver made out of court shall be in writing with not less than two attesting witnesses, and shall be filed with the court. Said witnesses shall attest the voluntary execution thereof.
(3) If a waiver is accepted at any stage of the proceedings, the offer of assistance of counsel shall be renewed by the court at each subsequent stage of the proceedings at which the party appears without counsel.
Fla.R.Juv.P. 8.560.
Thus, in order to satisfy the constitutional requirements recognized in In the Interest of D.B., the juvenile court must inform the parent of his right to counsel and, if the parent wishes to waive this right, establish that the waiver is knowing and intelligent. In determining whether or not a parent's tendered waiver should be accepted, the trial court must consider special circumstances such as the parent's mental condition, age, education, experience, the nature or complexity of the case, or other factors. Fla.R.Juv.P. 8.560(b)(1). See also, Thomas v. Hoppe, 493 So.2d 549 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986).
Although the final judgment of permanent commitment states that the appellant had "previously refused" counsel, our review of the record in this case and the supplement thereto leads us to conclude that rule 8.560 was not followed. We, accordingly, find that the appellant's right to counsel was violated.
The appellant was represented by counsel at various stages of the proceedings leading up to the permanent commitment hearing but represented herself at other times. Specifically, the appellant was not represented by counsel at the dependency hearing nor the permanent commitment hearing. Although the supplement to the record contains a notice furnished to the appellant informing her that she had the right to counsel, this was a prehearing notice and the record does not reflect that any offer of counsel was renewed, as required by rule 8.560(b)(3), when the appellant appeared at the permanent commitment hearing without counsel. Additionally, although the supplemental record contains the juvenile judge's conclusion that he adequately advised the appellant of her right to counsel and that she properly waived that right, the record does not contain any competent evidence to support this conclusion. The record does not contain a written or an oral waiver of counsel, and the transcript of the permanent commitment hearing establishes that the appellant was not questioned in any manner concerning her understanding of her right to counsel, her alleged waiver of this right, or her ability to make an intelligent and understanding choice.
Although not necessary for the disposition of this case, we note that the record, in addition to not reflecting compliance with rule 8.560, contains evidence which indicates that the appellant did not have the ability to make an intelligent and understanding choice concerning her right to counsel. The original dependency petition alleged, among other things, that the appellant had not accepted the existence of her own emotional instability nor sought appropriate counseling after two psychiatric hospitalizations. The court found these allegations were true. The child's disposition hearing had to be continued because the appellant was once again hospitalized. The preparation and execution of a performance agreement with the appellant was delayed on one occasion because she was hospitalized at G. Pierce Wood Memorial Hospital in Arcadia, Florida, and on another occasion because she spat on the counselor and then walked out of the meeting. The sworn petition for permanent commitment alleged, among other things, that it was in the manifest best interest of the child because the appellant is emotionally unstable to the point where she is totally unable to provide for the child's most basic needs; that her behavior is chaotic and unpredictable and she exhibits poor and defective judgment. The final judgment found that these allegations were proven by clear and convincing evidence. With this evidence before the court, it was especially important that the court renew the offer of counsel and inquire as to appellant's ability to knowingly and intelligently waive this right.
Because the record fails to establish that the juvenile court complied with the provisions of rule 8.560 before permitting the appellant to proceed pro se, we reverse the final judgment of permanent commitment and remand for a new hearing. See In the Interest of D.M.S., 528 So.2d 505 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988). See also, In the Interest of D.B.; White v. Dep't of Health & Rehabilitative Serv., 483 So.2d 861 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986); In re R.W., 429 So.2d 711 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983).
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
FRANK, J., concurs.
HALL, J., dissents with opinion.
. We note that section 39.465(1), Florida Statutes (1987), contains substantially the same language as rule 8.560. That statute, however, was not effective at the time the permanent commitment hearing was conducted sub judice. See Ch. 87-289, § 12, Laws of Fla.