Case Name: PEOPLE v. MAYNARD
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1912-06-27
Citations: 137 N.Y.S. 19
Docket Number: 
Parties: PEOPLE v. MAYNARD.
Judges: 
Reporter: West's New York Supplement
Volume: 137
Pages: 19–22

Head Matter:
(151 App. Div. 790.)
PEOPLE v. MAYNARD.
(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Department.
June 27, 1912.)
1. Obstructing Justice (§ 4*)—Inducing Witness to Absent Himself.
Penal Law (Consol. Laws 1909, c. 40) § 2440, making it a felony to offer or promise a bribe to a witness for influencing his testimony, or to induce him to give false testimony, does not make it criminal to induce a person to absent himself, and thus not become a witness.
. [Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Obstructing Justice, Cent. Dig. § 13; Dec. Dig. § 4.*]
2. Obstructing Justice (§ 4*)—Dissuading Witness from Attending Trial.
Penal Law (Consol. Laws 1909, c. 40) § 2441, providing that a person who willfully prevents or dissuades any person who has been duly summoned or subpoenaed from attending court as a witness pursuant to the summons or subpoena is guilty of a misdemeanor, applies only to witnesses who have been summoned, and not to inducing a witness before being summoned to absent himself so as to prevent his being summoned.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Obstructing Justice, Cent. Dig. § 13; Dec. Dig. § 4.*]
3. Obstructing Justice (§ 9*)—Inducing Witness to Absent Himself— Principal and Accessory.
Penal Law (Consol. Laws 1909, c. 40) § 379, provides that a person who is or who is about to be a witness, who receives or agrees to receive a bribe upon any agreement or understanding that he will absent himself, is guilty of a felony. Section 2 declares that a person who directly or indirectly counsels, commands, induces, or procures another to commit a crime is a principal. Held, that where B was about to be subpoenaed to appear as a witness against accused for a violation of the liquor tax law, whereupon accused by paying him $25 procured him to go beyond the jurisdiction, so that he could not be subpoenaed and testify, accused was liable as a principal under section 2.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Obstructing Justice, Cent. Dig. § 18; Dee. Dig. § 9.*]
Smith, P. J., and Houghton, J., dissenting in part.
*For other cases see same topic & § number in Dec. & Am. Digs. 1907 to date, & Rep’r Indexes
Appeal from Washington County Court.
David Maynard was indicted for feloniously inducing another to receive a bribe and absent himself from a hearing before a grand jury, and, from an order sustaining a demurrer to' the indictment, the People appeal.
Reversed, and demurrer overruled.
Argued before SMITH, P. J., and KELLOGG, HOUGHTON, BETTS, and LYON, JJ.
Erskine C. Rogers, Dist. Atty., of Hudson Falls, for the People.
John Van Valkenberg, of Hudson Falls, for respondent.

Opinion:
JOHN M. KELLOGG, J.
The indictment charged that the defendant wrongfully, unlawfully, and feloniously counseled, commanded, induced, and procured Henry Paige to receive a bribe and absent himself from a hearing before the grand jury of the county of Washington ; that the defendant had previously been arrested for violation of the Liquor Tax Law (Consol. Laws 1909, c. 34); that the said Paige was used as a witness against him in the preliminary examination and swore to the illegal sale of liquors by the defendant; that the defendant was held to await the action of the next grand jury; that said Paige was about to be subpoenaed as a witness to appear before the grand jury; that on December 20, 1911, the defendant offered him $25 if he would leave the state and go to Canada and stay there until after the January, 1912, grand jury had met and been discharged; that said Paige accepted the offer, agreed to absent himself, received the money from defendant, and did absent himself.
The district attorney claims the defendant was indictable as a principal, under sections 2 and 379 of the Penal Daw (Consol. Daws 1909, c. 40). Section 2 provides that:
"A person who directly or indirectly counsels, commands, induces or procures another to commit a crime is a principal."
Section 379 provides that:
"A person who is or who is about to be a witness upon a trial, hearing or other proceeding before any court who receives or agrees to receive a bribe upon any agreement or understanding that he will absent himself from the trial, hearing, or other proceeding is guilty of a felony."
It is clear that Paige was guilty. The statute does not in terms apply to the briber. Section 2440 of the Penal Daw makes it a felony to offer or promise to a witness a bribe for influencing the testimony of the witness, or to induce the witness to give false testimony. That section evidently does not make it criminal to induce a person to absent himself and thus not become a witness.
Section 2441 only relates to a witness who has been subpoenaed.
In this case the witness was not, in fact, subpoenaed, but was about to be subpoenaed. It is evident that the defendant is not punishable, unless section 2 applies to him.
If A bribes B to absent himself so that he may not be a witness, B is liable for taking a bribe. If B is reluctant to take the bribe, but is advised and induced by C to take it from A, it is evident that C is liable under section 2 for advising and procuring B. to commit the crime. People v. McKane, 143 N. Y. 455, 38 N. E. 950.
It is difficult to see how A is less liable than C, for, to a greater extent than C, he procured B to commit the crime. C only advised the taking of the money; A actually furnished it and made the corrupt bargain.
I think the purpose of section 2 was to provide for the punishment . -of a person who procures a crime to be committed, but who does not .actually participate in it in such a manner as to otherwise bring him -within the Criminal Daw.
The judgment should therefore be reversed, and the demurrer overruled, and the defendant required to plead.
BETTS and DYON, JJ., concur.