Case Name: DETROIT MOTION PICTURE PROJECTIONISTS UNION, LOCAL 199, IATSE, AFL-CIO v. EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS COMMISSION
Court: Michigan Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1976-04-06
Citations: 68 Mich. App. 458
Docket Number: Docket No. 23702
Parties: DETROIT MOTION PICTURE PROJECTIONISTS UNION, LOCAL 199, IATSE, AFL-CIO v EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS COMMISSION
Judges: Before: J. H. Gillis, P. J., and Quinn and R. E. Noble, JJ.
Reporter: Michigan appeals reports; cases decided in the Michigan Court of Appeals.
Volume: 68
Pages: 458–467

Head Matter:
DETROIT MOTION PICTURE PROJECTIONISTS UNION, LOCAL 199, IATSE, AFL-CIO v EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS COMMISSION
Opinion op the Court
1. Administrative Law — Administrative Board’s Decisions — Competent Material and Substantial Evidence.
The Court of Appeals will not disturb a decision by an administrative board that is based on the board’s findings where the findings are supported by competent, material and substantial evidence on the whole record (Const 1963, art 6, § 28).
Dissent by R. E. Noble, J.
2. Labor Relations — Employer’s Discriminatory Conduct — Anti-union Motivation — Substantial Business Justification.
The United States Supreme Court has established two principles of Federal law which provide the Court of Appeals with guidance in the interpretation of Michigan labor relations law: (1) if it can reasonably be concluded that an employer’s discriminatory conduct was "inherently destructive” of important employee rights, no proof of an antiunion motivation is needed and the board can find an unfair labor practice even if the employer introduces evidence that the conduct was motivated by business considerations, and (2) if the adverse effect of the discriminatory conduct on employee rights is "comparatively slight”, an antiunion motivation must be proved to sustain the charge if the employer has come forth with evidence of legitimate and substantial business justification for the conduct.
3. Administrative Law — Administrative Board’s Decision — Competent Material and Substantial Evidence — Legal Conclusions.
The Court of Appeals is bound to accept the findings of fact by the Employment Relations Commission Board which are supported by competent, material and substantial evidence on the whole record, however, the Court of Appeals is clearly able to review and reject the legal conclusions which the board draws from the facts.
References for Points in Headnotes
[1, 3] 2 Am Jur 2d, Administrative Law §§ 456-458.
[2] 48 Am Jur 2d, Labor and Labor Relations § 544.
[4] 48 Am Jur 2d, Labor and Labor Relations § 613 et seq.
[5] 48 Am Jur 2d, Labor and Labor Relations § 1360.
[6] 48 Am Jur 2d, Labor and Labor Relations § 742.
[7] 48 Am Jur 2d, Labor and Labor Relations §§ 626, 634, 874.
4. Labor Relations — Refusal of Union’s Offer — Discharge of Union Employees.
An honest economic reason for refusing a union’s offer does not justify the drastic step of discharge of the employees belonging to the union since a union has a right to press for high wages.
5. Labor Relations — Privately Employed Workers — Statutory Requirements — Strikes—Threat of Strike.
Privately employed workers must comply with certain statutory requirements before they can actually strike, however, before following these procedures, a union is allowed to forewarn an employer of its ultimate intentions to strike should good-faith bargaining fail; therefore a union’s threat of a strike does not constitute "unclean hands” where an impasse is reached during good-faith negotiations between the union and an employer (MCLA 423.9; MSA 17.4B4[9j).
6. Labor Relations — Temporary Lockout — Temporary Layoff— Threat of Strike.
An employer may temporarily lock out its workers or temporarily lay them off when a strike is threatened or imminent.
7. Labor Relations — Temporary Replacement of Strikers — Unilateral Terms and Conditions — Permanent Discharge.
An employer may temporarily replace striking workers, or may, in some situations, impose certain unilateral terms and conditions of employment; however, an employer, facing an impasse in bargaining and fearing a union strike, may not permanently discharge employees represented by a union.
Appeal from Employment Relations Commission.
Submitted January 7, 1976, at Detroit.
(Docket No. 23702.)
Decided April 6, 1976.
Leave to appeal applied for.
The Detroit Motion Picture Projectionists Union, Local 199, IATSE, AFL-CIO, filed an unfair labor practice charge with the Employment Relations Commission against the Ninety-Six Grand Corpo ration, Sol Krim, Leonard Krim, Harry Krim and Mac Krim, doing business as Krim Enterprises. The Employment Relations Commission rendered a decision for defendants. Plaintiff appeals.
Affirmed.
Miller, Klimist, Cohen, Martens & Sugerman, P. C. (by Sheldon L. Klimist and Murray A. Gorchow), for plaintiff.
Honigman, Miller, Schwartz and Cohn (by Charles H Tobias), for defendants.
Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Robert A. Derengoski, Solicitor General, and Francis W Edwards, Assistant Attorney General, for the Employment Relations Commission.
Before: J. H. Gillis, P. J., and Quinn and R. E. Noble, JJ.
Circuit judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.

Opinion:
Quinn, J.
Plaintiff appeals from a decision by Michigan Employment Relations Commission which reversed a decision by an administrative law judge that defendants had committed an unfair labor practice. The decisive issue is whether the decision appealed from is supported by competent, material and substantial evidence on the whole record, Const 1963, art 6, § 28.
By oral contract, defendants employed Robert Holmes as a projectionist for a new theater operated by them. Holmes was a member of plaintiff and the oral employment agreement was that Holmes would work two weeks while defendants and plaintiff worked out a contract. Holmes was paid union scale wages. Plaintiff sent George Klokis to defendants as a relief projectionist and he worked as such. After two weeks no contract was reached and the projectionists were placed on day to day employment.
Plaintiff demanded union scale wages for Holmes and Klokis. Defendants maintained it was economically impossible for them to pay union scale wages on the basis of box office receipts. No contract was ever reached between plaintiff and defendants, and defendants finally discharged Holmes and Klokis. At the request of plaintiffs agent, defendants formalized that discharge by letter dated January 31, 1973. Thereafter, plaintiff filed an unfair labor practice charge under MCLA 423.16; MSA 17.454(17).
MERC found no per se unlawful activity, that there was no antiunion motivation, that only incidental harm to employee rights was involved, and that there was sound economic basis for defendants' actions. From our review of the record, these findings are supported by competent, material and substantial evidence on the whole record. NLRB v Great Dane Trailers, 388 US 26; 87 S Ct 1792; 18 L Ed 2d 1027 (1967), supports the decision of MERC.
Affirmed, with costs to defendants.
J. H. Gillis, P. J., concurred.