Case Name: Joseph B. CAMMARATA and Judith A. Cammarata, Petitioners, v. Anna Marie JONES, as Trustee of the Michael F. Cammarata and Jennie M. Cammarata Living Trust, Respondent
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 2000-08-02
Citations: 763 So. 2d 552
Docket Number: No. 4D00-1543
Parties: Joseph B. CAMMARATA and Judith A. Cammarata, Petitioners, v. Anna Marie JONES, as Trustee of the Michael F. Cammarata and Jennie M. Cammarata Living Trust, Respondent.
Judges: GUNTHER and POLEN, JJ., concur. STONE, J., dissents with opinion.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 763
Pages: 552–554

Head Matter:
Joseph B. CAMMARATA and Judith A. Cammarata, Petitioners, v. Anna Marie JONES, as Trustee of the Michael F. Cammarata and Jennie M. Cammarata Living Trust, Respondent.
No. 4D00-1543.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
Aug. 2, 2000.
James B. Boone, Sunrise, for petitioner.
William R. Black of William R. Black, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, for respondent.

Opinion:
PER CURIAM.
During a hearing on the Respondent's motion for leave to amend complaint, the trial court denied the Respondent's motion, but suggested the following:
[W]hy don't we talk about the possibility of conforming-of a motion to, or entertaining a motion to conform the pleadings to the evidence and see if you can do it that way, because it's too late now to add an indispensable party and amend your pleadings a month before trial.
Well, the second thing you can do, you can take a voluntary dismissal and refile because it's always dismissed without prejudice. The third thing is you can move to conform the pleadings with regard to a piercing of the corporate veil situation.
The Petitioners' counsel objected to the suggestions on the ground that it was improper for the judge to offer advice to opposing counsel. Ten days later, the Cammaratas filed their verified motion for disqualification, alleging that the judge's advice to opposing counsel demonstrated bias leading them to believe they would not get a fair trial. The motion to disqualify was denied, and this petition for writ or prohibition followed.
With regard to the legal sufficiency of the motion for disqualification, Hayslip v. Douglas, 400 So.2d 553, 555-56 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981) and Fischer [v. Knuck], 497 So.2d [240] at 242 [(Fla.1986)], establish that the standard is whether the party has a "well-founded fear" of prejudice on the part of the trial judge.
Michaud-Berger v. Hurley, 607 So.2d 441, 446 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992). Although the trial judge in this case is known to be an extremely fair and impartial jurist and we have no doubt the Petitioners would receive a fair trial from her, the law requires us to consider this petition from the Cam-maratas' perspective. See id. (stating, "We wish to make it clear that we have the utmost confidence in Judge Hurley's commitment to be fair and impartial and we have no doubt that petitioner would receive a fair trial from him. However, the law requires us to consider this petition from petitioner's perspective.").
The judge in this case erred in suggesting to the Respondent's counsel alternatives on how to proceed strategically. See Crescent Heights XLVI, Inc. v. Sea-Air Towers Condo. Ass'n, 729 So.2d 420 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999); Shore Mariner Condo. Ass'n v. Antonious, 722 So.2d 247 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998). "Obviously, the trial judge serves as the neutral arbiter in the proceedings and must not enter the fray by giving 'tips' to either side." Chastine v. Broome, 629 So.2d 293, 295 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993). Thus, we conclude the trial judge's suggestions to the Respondent's counsel caused the Petitioners to have a well-founded fear that they would not receive a fair trial. We grant the petition, but withhold issuance of the writ since we are confident that the trial judge will act in a manner consistent with this opinion.
PETITION GRANTED.
GUNTHER and POLEN, JJ., concur. STONE, J., dissents with opinion.