Case Name: PEOPLE v. MARKHAM
Court: Michigan Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1976-08-27
Citations: 397 Mich. 530
Docket Number: Docket No. 57205
Parties: PEOPLE v MARKHAM
Judges: Coleman, Fitzgerald, and Lindemer, JJ., concurred.
Reporter: Michigan Reports
Volume: 397
Pages: 530–549

Head Matter:
PEOPLE v MARKHAM
Docket No. 57205.
Decided August 27, 1976.
On application by the people for leave to appeal the Supreme Court, in lieu of granting leave to appeal, reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals.
Rehearing denied 398 Mich 952.
Larry Markham was convicted of kidnapping by a Wayne Circuit Court jury, John M. Wise, J. The defendant was subsequently convicted of first-degree murder for the rape and killing of the kidnapping victim by a Washtenaw Circuit Court jury, William F. Ager, Jr., J., on March 19, 1970. The Court of Appeals, McGregor, P. J., and Quinn and M. F. Cavanagh, JJ., relying on the "same transaction” test, granted the defendant’s motion for peremptory reversal of the murder conviction after the defendant raised the issue of double jeopardy by filing a delayed motion for a new trial which was denied by the Washtenaw circuit judge (Docket No. 22452). The people apply for leave to appeal. Held:
The "same transaction” test announced in People v White, 390 Mich 245; 212 NW2d 222 (1973), shall be applicable only when the prosecution upon which a double jeopardy claim is based began after November 20, 1973, the date it was decided.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed and the conviction is reinstated.
Justice Williams concurred in the result but would limit the rule in a memorandum opinion strictly to what is necessary to resolve the case. Markham raised the issue of the "same transaction” rule almost one year after the rule was announced in White and he had been tried more than three years before White. He would not be eligible to rely upon White under the broadest saving clause to a nonretroactive rule.
Justice Ryan concurred in the result but would also limit the application of the rule to the facts of the case. People v White had a dual aspect: substantively, it proscribed multiple prosecu tions for the same or a similar criminal act under certain circumstances; procedurally, it compelled joinder of elementally distinct crimes committed as part of the same transaction. Considerations of retroactivity are different for these two classes of case. People v White would not apply retroactively to cases involving compulsory joinder, such as the one at bar.
References for Points in Headnotes
[1] 21 Am Jur 2d, Criminal Law § 96.
[2-8, 10, 11] 21 Am Jur 2d, Criminal Law §§ 165, 182.
[9] 21 Am Jur 2d, Criminal Law § 495.
Justice Levin, with Chief Justice Kavanagh concurring, dissented. He would hold that the "same transaction” test applies retroactively at least in cases pending on direct appeal when White was announced, November 20, 1973, and that failure to assert the defense does not waive it. The general principle is that full retroactivity is the rule, not the exception. Only a substantial reason justifies according limited retroactivity to a decision recognizing a constitutional right, and no such reason appears in this case.
390 Mich 245; 212 NW2d 222 (1973) applies prospectively only.
Opinion of the Court
1. Criminal Law — Precedents—Retroactive Application — Prospective Application.
A three-pronged test governs whether an announced rule of law should be applied retroactively or prospectively: (1) the purpose of the new rule, (2) the general reliance on the old rule, and (3) the effect on the administration of justice.
2. Criminal Law — Precedents—Constitutional Law — Double Jeopardy — Prospective Application.
Prospective application of a new rule of criminal law is possible where the ascertainment of guilt or innocence is not at stake; the guarantee against double jeopardy and an announced rule of the "same transaction” test are not required to ascertain guilt or innocence, and thus the rule may be given prospective effect.
3. Criminal Law — "Same Transaction” — Constitutional Law— Double Jeopardy — Prospective Application.
The "same transaction” test announced by the Supreme Court, which requires the prosecution, except in most limited circumstances, to join at one trial all the charges against a defendant that grow out of a single criminal ’ transaction, applies only where the prosecution upon which a double jeopardy claim is based began after November 20, 1973, the date on which the rule was announced by the Court.
Concurring Opinion
Williams, J.
4. Criminal Law — Double Jeopardy — Precedents—Retroactive Application.
A defendant is not eligible to rely on the ''same transaction” test for a double jeopardy claim where the test was announced three years after the defendant was tried and he did not raise the issue until one year after the test was announced and where the test is not retroactive.
Concurring Opinion
Ryan, J.
5. Criminal Law — Constitutional Law — Same Transaction — Retroactivity.
The decision of the Supreme Court announcing the same transaction test had a double aspect: in the proscription of multiple prosecutions for the same or a similar criminal act it was a substantive expansion of the Double Jeopardy Clause; in requiring joinder of elementally distinct crimes committed as part of the same transaction it was procedural; only the latter class of cases is susceptible of the three-prong analysis to determine whether it should be retroactive (People v White, 390 Mich 245; 212 NW2d 222[1973]).
6. Criminal Law — Same Transaction — Retroactivity.
The decision of the Supreme Court announcing the same transaction test, insofar as it requires joinder in one prosecution of elementally distinct crimes occurring in the course of a continuous transaction, should not be applied retroactively (People v White, 390 Mich 245; 212 NW2d 222 [1973]).
Dissenting Opinion
Kavanagh, C. J., and Levin, J.
7. Criminal Law — Double Jeopardy — Same Transaction — Retroactive Application.
The "same transaction” test for a double jeopardy claim should apply retroactively in cases pending on direct appeal when the test was announced, November 20, 1973, and failure to assert the same transaction claim at trial or on direct appeal should not waive it.
8. Criminal Law — Double Jeopardy — Failure to Raise Issue.
Failure to raise in the trial court a double jeopardy claim based on the same transaction test does not preclude a defendant from raising the double jeopardy claim on appeal even where he pled guilty to a charge where the charge judged on its face was one the state could not constitutionally prosecute.
9. Criminal Law — Plea op Guilty — Waiver op Defects.
A plea of guilty generally waives all nonjurisdictional defects in the proceedings, but the defendant may always challenge whether the state had a right to bring the prosecution in the first place by raising rights which might provide a complete defense to a criminal prosecution, those which undercut the state’s interest in punishing the defendant, or the state’s authority or ability to proceed with the trial.
10. Criminal Law — Double Jeopardy — Same Transaction — Homicide — Kidnapping.
A charge of kidnapping and a charge of murder against a defendant arose out of the same criminal transaction where both charges involved the same victim and the kidnapping continued until the killing; after the defendant was placed in jeopardy for kidnapping the murder victim, the state could not constitutionally prosecute the defendant for murder.
11. Criminal Law — Double Jeopardy — Precedents—Retroactive Application.
The United States Supreme Court has indicated that ordinarily its double jeopardy decisions will be applied retroactively; the practical result of application of the double jeopardy guarantee is to prevent a trial from taking place at all, which is significantly different from procedural guarantees held to have prospective effect only and to require retrials when violated.
Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Robert A. Derengoski, Solicitor General, William F Delhey, Prosecuting Attorney, and John J. Hensel, Senior Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for the people.
George Bashara, Sr., for defendant.

Opinion:
Per Curiam.
Defendant was convicted of kidnapping, MCLA 750.349; MSA 28.581, by a Wayne County Circuit Court jury on October 19, 1967. This conviction was affirmed by the Court of Ap peals. 19 Mich App 616; 173 NW2d 307 (1969). The validity of that conviction is not before our Court. Subsequently, on March 19, 1970, defendant was convicted by a Washtenaw County Circuit Court jury of first degree murder, MCLA 750.316; MSA 28.548, for the rape-slaying of the kidnapping victim. It is the validity of this conviction which is at issue in this appeal.
Originally, by unpublished per curiam opinion (Docket No. 9933, rel'd December 3, 1973), the Court of Appeals affirmed the murder conviction. However, on November 1, 1974, defendant raised the issue of double jeopardy by filing a delayed motion for a new trial. This motion was denied by the circuit judge. The Court of Appeals granted defendant's motion for peremptory reversal of the murder conviction on May 28, 1975, citing only People v White, 390 Mich 245; 212 NW2d 222 (1973). In lieu of granting plaintiffs application for leave to appeal, pursuant to GCR 1963, 853.2(4), this Court hereby reverses the order of the Court of Appeals and reinstates defendant's murder conviction.
Defendant did not raise the White double jeopardy claim before or at trial. The issue of whether he thereby waived the claim is currently pending before this Court in People v Cooper, 58 Mich App 284; 227 NW2d 319 (1975), leave granted, 395 Mich 753 (1975). Assuming for purposes of this opinion only that defendant has a viable claim, the issue is whether or not the rule of People v White, decided November 20, 1973, is retroactive. Prosecution in both cases against Markham was commenced prior to that date. This decision on retroactivity will be governed by application of Linkletter v Walker, 381 US 618; 85 S Ct 1731; 14 L Ed 2d 601 (1965), and People v Hampton, 384 Mich 669; 187 NW2d 404 (1971). Those cases establish a three-pronged test, namely, "(1) the purpose of the new rule; (2) the general reliance on the old rule; and (3) the effect on the administration of justice". 384 Mich at 674.
The first factor promotes an inquiry into whether the purposes of the rule can be effectuated by prospective application. When the ascertainment of guilt or innocence is not at stake, prospective application is possible. 384 Mich at 677. White and the guarantee against double jeopardy are not required to ascertain guilt or innocence.
"The second and third factors can be dealt with together because the amount of past reliance will often have a profound effect upon the administration of justice." Id.
When a decision overrules past settled law, more reliance is likely to have been placed in the old rule than in cases where the old law was unsettled or unknown. People v Grimmett, 388 Mich 590; 202 NW2d 278 (1972), was a restatement of "settled" Michigan law and White specifically overruled it. Results of prosecutorial reliance may be seen in People v Teague, 57 Mich App 347; 225 NW2d 761 (1975); People v Joines (On Remand), 55 Mich App 334; 222 NW2d 230 (1974); People v West, 54 Mich App 527; 221 NW2d 179 (1974); and People v Davenport (On Remand), 51 Mich App 484; 215 NW2d 702 (1974). We hold that the same transaction test announced in People v White shall be applicable only when the prosecution upon which a former jeopardy claim is based began after November 20, 1973, the date White was decided. Accord, State v Fair, 263 Or 383; 502 P2d 1150 (1972).
This order of the Court of Appeals is reversed and defendant's conviction is reinstated.
Coleman, Fitzgerald, and Lindemer, JJ., concurred.