Case Name: Terry L. BULLARD v. The GUARDIAN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY OF AMERICA
Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Mississippi
Decision Date: 2006-11-02
Citations: 941 So. 2d 812
Docket Number: No. 2005-CA-00849-SCT
Parties: Terry L. BULLARD v. The GUARDIAN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY OF AMERICA.
Judges: SMITH, C.J., WALLER AND COBB, P.JJ., DIAZ, CARLSON AND DICKINSON, JJ., CONCUR. GRAVES, J„ CONCURS IN RESULT ONLY. EASLEY, J., DISSENTS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 941
Pages: 812–820

Head Matter:
Terry L. BULLARD v. The GUARDIAN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY OF AMERICA.
No. 2005-CA-00849-SCT.
Supreme Court of Mississippi.
Nov. 2, 2006.
Rachel Marie Pierce, William M. Beasley, Tupelo, attorneys for appellant.
Steven H. Begley, Ridgeland, James R. Carroll, David S. Clancy, Kara E. Fay, attorneys for appellee.

Opinion:
RANDOLPH, Justice,
for the Court.
¶ 1. John W. Prather, M.D., and his wife Barbara Prather, (collectively "the Prath-ers"), filed suit against Terry L. Bullard ("Bullard") and The Guardian Life Insurance Company of America ("Guardian") on December 15, 2000, about their 1990 purchase of a Guardian life insurance policy. Bullard filed a cross-claim against Guardian, alleging Guardian induced him to sell the Prathers a life insurance policy based upon false and misleading sales presentations, policy illustrations, and other marketing and sales material.
¶ 2. Less than a year after filing suit, the Prathers settled the lawsuit with Bullard and Guardian, and a judgment of dismissal with prejudice was entered on December 18, 2002. Subsequently, Guardian moved for summary judgment on Bullard's cross-claim, which the trial court granted on the basis that Bullard's claims were barred by the statute of limitations.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶ 3. On December 15, 2000, the Prath-ers, sued Bullard and Guardian regarding them 1990 purchase of a Guardian life insurance policy. The Prathers alleged that Bullard represented to them that the "policy would require a 'single premium' payment of $96,132 which would carry the policy for their lives." The Prathers further alleged that, at the time of the sale, Bullard and Guardian concealed information and misrepresented the terms of the policy, including the interest sensitive nature of the payment plan and the fact that the premiums required for the policy could change, depending on the dividend scale of Guardian.
¶ 4. After the Prathers were notified that additional premiums would be due on this policy, the Prathers filed suit. The Prathers asserted claims of fraud, fraudulent concealment, misrepresentation, negligence, conspiracy, breach of fiduciary duty, and breach of duty of good faith and fair dealing. Bullard filed a responsive pleading, specifically denying all charges of fraud, misrepresentation, fraudulent concealment, and fraudulent inducement. Bullard moved for and was granted leave to file a cross-claim against Guardian. Bullard filed his cross-claim on February 5, 2002, alleging that Guardian induced him to sell the Prathers a life insurance policy based upon false and misleading sales presentations, policy illustrations, and other marketing and sales material. Bullard alleged that he was damaged as the result of the lawsuit and the allegations made against him.
¶ 5. Guardian then moved for summary judgment on Bullard's cross-claim. The trial court granted Guardian's motion for summary judgment, stating Bullard's claims were barred by the three-year statute of limitations. Bullard now appeals to this Court raising two issues for this Court to consider:
I. Whether the trial court erred in holding that the statute of limitations barred Bullard's claims.
II. Whether the statute of limitations was tolled by fraudulent concealment.
ANALYSIS
¶ 6. This Court reviews grants of summary judgment under the de novo standard. Stephens v. Equitable Life Assurance Co., 850 So.2d 78, 81 (Miss.2003); Cossitt v. Alfa Ins. Corp., 726 So.2d 132, 136 (Miss.1998). Pursuant to Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 56, summary judgment is appropriate when the non-moving party has failed "to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to the party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Wilbourn v. Stennett, Wilkinson & Ward, 687 So.2d 1205, 1214 (Miss.1996).
I. Whether the trial court erred in holding that the statute of limitations barred Bullard's claims.
¶ 7. Bullard argues the trial court erred in holding that the statute of limitations began to run at the time Bullard sold the insurance policy to the Prathers. Miss.Code Ann. Section 15 — 1—49 states, in part: "(1) All actions for which no other period of limitation is prescribed shall be commenced within three (3) years next after the cause of such action accrued, and not after."
¶ 8. Bullard contends that his cause of action did not accrue until 2000 when he first learned of Guardian's alleged fraud and dishonesty. In his amended cross-claim against Guardian, Bullard averred damage to his reputation after the Prath-ers filed suit and that it "appeared to the community that Guardian's 'vanishing premium' concept caused him to betray his policyholders." Guardian argues that Bul-lard's claims based on Guardian's alleged fraud began to run in 1990 upon completion of the sale of insurance to the Prath-ers that was purportedly induced by the alleged false representations.
¶ 9. This Court finds that in 1990 Bul-lard was without a cause of action, if as he claims he had no knowledge of being involved in an alleged fraudulent scheme, but more importantly, because he had suffered no damage. In the absence of damage, no litigable event arose. Bullard's cause of action against Guardian did not accrue or occur pursuant to Miss.Code Ann. Section 15-1-49(1) until the Prathers filed suit against him in 2000. As Bul-lard's claim against Guardian did not accrue until 2000, Bullard timely filed a cross-elaim in 2002, within the applicable statute of limitations.
¶ 10. Bullard's cross-claim reads, "[t]he acts of the plaintiffs in bringing this lawsuit against him have injured him and damaged his professional standing, reputation, character, and earning capacity, and he has suffered anxiety, embarrassment, worry, mental and emotional distress and he is entitled to actual damages in an amount to be determined by a jury." Bul-lard also seeks damages for the attorney's fees, which he would not have incurred, but for the suit filed by the Prathers. Bullard claims to have had no knowledge of the alleged fraudulent concept of Guardian preceding the filing of the lawsuit against him.
¶ 11. The basic elements necessary to state any tort claim are duty, breach of duty, causation between the breach of the duty and the injury, and actual damage. See City of Greenville v. Jones, 925 So.2d 106, 109 (Miss.2006); Montgomery v. Woolbright, 904 So.2d 1027, 1029 (Miss.2004). This Court has held that, "a cause of action 'accrues' when it comes into existence as an enforceable claim, that is, when the right to sue becomes vested." Forman v. Miss. Publishers Corp., 195 Miss. 90, 14 So.2d 344, 346 (1943). Bullard's -claim did not accrue until 2000, when knowledge of breach and actual damage occurred, after the Prathers made allegations against him. Even if Bullard had knowledge in 1990, which he denies, the outcome would be no different, for without injury, no action lies.
¶ 12. The circuit court erred in granting Guardian's motion for summary judgment, as Bullard's cause of action did not arise when the policy was sold. Based on the record, we cannot say Bullard had a cause of action when the policy was sold, nor can we say he was or should have been aware of the fraud allegedly committed by Guardian upon him and the Prathers. This is analogous to our holding in PPG Architectural Finishes, Inc. v. Lowery, a personal injury case in which we held, "it is well-established that prescription does not run against one who has neither actual or constructive notice of the facts that would entitle him to bring an action." PPG Architectural Finishes, Inc. v. Lowery, 909 So.2d 47, 50 (Miss.2005) (quoting Sweeney v. Preston, 642 So.2d 332, 334 (Miss.1994)).
¶ 13. Bullard claims to have learned of Guardian's fraud and suffered damage to his reputation in 2000. The dissent contends that Bullard should have brought suit within three years of 1990. This contention would require Bullard to presage that the Prathers would file suit against him and cause him damage. Such a claim for prospective or possible damages is not recognized by this state. See PPG Architectural Finishes v. Lowery, 909 So.2d 47; Prescott v. Leaf River Forest Prods., Inc., 740 So.2d 301 (Miss.1999); Staheli v. Smith, 548 So.2d 1299 (Miss.1989). We only have to ask ourselves if Bullard had brought suit in 1993, and no damage had yet occurred or accrued, could Bullard have successfully survived a Rule 12(b)(6) motion? See M.R.C.P. 12(b)(6). A reasoned analysis can result in only one conclusion: such a claim then could not survive.
¶ 14. As Issue I is dispositive, the Court finds Issue II to be moot.
CONCLUSION
¶ 15. Bullard did not have a cause of action against Guardian until 2000. Therefore, Bullard filed his claim within the statute of limitations. Accordingly, we reverse the circuit court's judgment and remand this case to that court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
¶ 16. REVERSED AND REMANDED.
SMITH, C.J., WALLER AND COBB, P.JJ., DIAZ, CARLSON AND DICKINSON, JJ., CONCUR. GRAVES, J" CONCURS IN RESULT ONLY. EASLEY, J., DISSENTS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION.