Case Name: Alexander F. BARBIERI, Individually and Acting in his Official Capacity as the Court Administrator of Pennsylvania, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Milton J. SHAPP, Governor of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, C. Delores Tucker, Secretary of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, and Louis C. Mete, Commissioner of the Bureau of Elections, Commissions and Legislation for the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Respondents-Appellees
Court: Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
Jurisdiction: Pennsylvania
Decision Date: 1978-02-03
Citations: 476 Pa. 513
Docket Number: No. 449
Parties: Alexander F. BARBIERI, Individually and Acting in his Official Capacity as the Court Administrator of Pennsylvania, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Milton J. SHAPP, Governor of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, C. Delores Tucker, Secretary of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, and Louis C. Mete, Commissioner of the Bureau of Elections, Commissions and Legislation for the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Respondents-Appellees.
Judges: Before EAGEN, C. J., and O’BRIEN, ROBERTS, POMEROY, NIX and MANDERINO, JJ.
Reporter: Pennsylvania State Reports
Volume: 476
Pages: 513–531

Head Matter:
383 A.2d 218
Alexander F. BARBIERI, Individually and Acting in his Official Capacity as the Court Administrator of Pennsylvania, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Milton J. SHAPP, Governor of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, C. Delores Tucker, Secretary of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, and Louis C. Mete, Commissioner of the Bureau of Elections, Commissions and Legislation for the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Respondents-Appellees.
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
Argued May 26, 1977.
Decided Feb. 3, 1978.
Jonathan Vipond, III, Eve L. Cutler, Philadelphia, for petitioner-appellant.
Melvin R. Shuster, Deputy Atty. Gen., Vincent X. Yakowicz, Sol. Gen., Harrisburg, for respondents-appellees.
Before EAGEN, C. J., and O’BRIEN, ROBERTS, POMEROY, NIX and MANDERINO, JJ.

Opinion:
OPINION OF THE COURT
ROBERTS, Judge.
Four common pleas judges reached mandatory retirement age in the summer and fall of 1977. Pa.Const. art. V, § 16(b). Appellees, the Governor, the Secretary of the Commonwealth, and the Commissioner of the Bureau of Elections, Commissions, and Legislation, did not list these judgeships for election at the November, 1977, municipal elections. The Election Code requires that all positions to be filled at the municipal election be listed by the thirteenth Tuesday before Primary Day. This year the thirteenth Tuesday was February 15, 1977. On March 1, 1977, appellant, the Court Administrator of Pennsylvania, filed a petition for review in the Commonwealth Court, asking that appellees be required to list these judgeships for election. Appellees responded that under Pa.Const. art. V, § 13(b), these judgeships should not be listed this year, but should be filled by gubernatorial appointment until the November, 1979, municipal election. The Commonwealth Court granted appellees' motion for judgment on the pleadings and dis missed the complaint. This appeal followed. On October 26, 1977, this Court reversed the Commonwealth Court and ordered that the judgeships be listed for the November, 1977, municipal election, and noted that opinions would follow. Mr. Justice Nix and Mr. Justice Manderino dissented from the order.
I
Appellees initially argue that the Court Administrator has no standing to raise the issue herein. We do not agree.
The Court Administrator is a constitutional officer, Pa.Const. art. V, § 10, whose specific duties are detailed in the Rules of Judicial Administration, Rules 501 et seq. He is responsible for the "prompt and proper disposition of the business of all courts and justices of the peace." Rule 501. This duty gives him an interest in insuring that seats required to be filled by an election are in fact filled in that manner, so that courts and justices of the peace may promptly and properly dispose of litigation.
The Court Administrator disburses funds appropriated for the operation of the judicial system and maintains records of the qualifications and employment status of all persons in the judicial system. Rule 504. He is directly concerned with the constitutional qualification of judges to sit. Because he is responsible for disbursing both salaries and expense money to judges, he is responsible for ensuring that those who claim money as judges are constitutionally entitled to their positions. If appellant is placed in the position of paying funds to judges who have been selected for office improperly, he will suffer in his official capacity the most traditional kind of "substantial," "direct" and "immediate" harm, pecuniary loss to the judicial system. See generally William Penn Parking Garage, Inc. v. City of Pittsburgh, 464 Pa. 168, 191, 221, 346 A.2d 269, 280, 295 (1975) (plurality opinion of Roberts, J., and concurring opinion of Eagen, J.).
II
The Pennsylvania Constitution establishes a system of elected judges. Pa.Const. art. V, § 13(a) & (b) provides:
Ҥ 13. Election of justices, judges and justices of the peace; vacancies
(a) Justices, judges and justices of the peace shall be elected at the municipal election next preceding the commencement of their respective terms of office by the electors of the Commonwealth or the respective districts in which they are to serve.
(b) A vacancy in the office of justice, judge or justice of the peace shall be filled by appointment by the Governor. If the vacancy occurs during the session of the Senate, the appointment shall be with the advice and consent of two-thirds of the members elected to the Senate, except in the case of justices of the peace which shall be by a majority. If the vacancy occurs during sine die adjournment of the Senate such appointment shall not require the advice and consent of the Senate. The person so appointed shall serve for an initial term ending on the first Monday of January following the next municipal election more than ten months after the vacancy occurs."
This Court has emphasized that this section reflects a strong "public policy in favor of having the citizens served by . elected [judges]." Leedom v. Thomas, 473 Pa. 195, 201, n. 5, 373 A.2d 1329, 1333 n. 5 (1977).
Thus, whenever possible, election is the constitutionally prescribed method for filling judgeships in Pennsylvania. The appointment procedure of section 13(b) is a stopgap to fill seats that unexpectedly fall vacant. As this Court said unanimously in Berardocco v. Colden, 469 Pa. 452, 459, 366 A.2d 574, 577 (1976) (footnote omitted):
"whenever possible, judicial officers shall be elected by a complete electoral process. The appointive process of section 13(b) was intended to fill a judicial vacancy only until the office could again be filled by a popularly elected officer. The 'ten month' provision was designed simply to insure that the electoral process would be complete with a regularly conducted primary election, as well as a municipal election."
We reaffirmed this doctrine in Leedom v. Thomas, supra, emphasizing that "section 13(b) . . . 'was not intended to frustrate the electoral process.' " 473 Pa. at 199, 373 A.2d at 1331-32. Thus, we must construe this constitutional provision so that its effect is consistent with the intent we have found it to express.
When a judge reaches mandatory retirement age less than ten months before a municipal election, or between Election and Inauguration Days, a regularly conducted election to fill the judge's seat may be held without waiting two years for the next municipal election. The judge's mandatory retirement date is as easily and as certainly known in advance as the date upon which the regular term of a nonretiring judge will expire. Potential candidates, election officials and the voting public have sufficient notice to prepare for the election, even though the judge has not yet retired at the time the election process begins. Delaying such an election two years plainly frustrates the intent of the framers and of the People of the Commonwealth, who adopted section 13 intending that whenever possible judges are to be elected. We must therefore conclude that the "ten month" provision of section 13(b) does not apply where the end of a fixed term — expiration of the judge's elected term or attainment of mandatory retirement age — produces the vacancy.
Appellees argue that a literal reading of section 13(b) requires that whenever the Governor fills a judicial vacancy his appointee "shall serve for an initial term ending on the first Monday of January [Inauguration Day] following the next municipal election more than ten months after the vacancy occurs." However, as this Court held in Berardocco v. Colden, supra, and Leedom v. Thomas, supra, this clause cannot be read mechanically when to do so would distort the constitutional scheme requiring elected judges.
In Berardocco, a justice of the peace resigned less than ten months before the November, 1975, municipal election, which would have marked the end of his term. The Governor appointed respondent Colden to fill the vacancy. After the election, which relator Berardocco won, the Governor refused to issue Berardocco his commission. Colden remained in office, asserting that his constitutional term lasted until January, 1978, "following the next municipal election more than ten months after the vacancy occurred]." This Court held that this provision did not apply where the normal election process had begun before the resignation, and reaffirmed this holding in Leedom v. Thomas, supra. We construed the provision in light of the clear constitutional plan favoring election of judges. Vacancies are to be filled by appointment only when there is insufficient time to hold an election.
In Firing v. Kephart, 466 Pa. 560, 353 A.2d 833 (1976), this Court held that the term of office, defined in Pa.Const. art. V, § 15 & 16, of a judge who reaches mandatory retirement age ends when he reaches that age. It does not last until his seat would have been up for election had he been younger. In contrast, a judge under mandatory retirement age who resigns his office could be said to leave before the end of his term, not at the time his term expires. Under Berardocco v. Colden, and Leedom v. Thomas, the ten month rule of section 13(b) applies only to vacancies caused when a judge below retirement age leaves office before the end of his term. When he leaves office because his term ends — either by the passage of the constitutionally prescribed period between elections or by the attainment of the constitutionally prescribed retirement age — a new judge is to be elected for a new term, not appointed to fill out a "term" which has already expired.
The result we reach here implements the overall constitutional plan providing for an elected judiciary. Any other result would allow a narrow, technical construction of a single clause, the last sentence of section 13(b), which was designed to be effective in different circumstances, to frustrate the intent of the framers who drafted and the voters who approved the entire Judiciary Article of the Constitution.
Accordingly, on October 26,1977, we issued the following:
ORDER
FILED: October 26, 1977
PER CURIAM
The judicial terms of office of Judge Alexander F. Barbieri (Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia, First Judicial District), Judge Lawrence A. Monroe (Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County, Seventh Judicial District), Judge J. Quint Salmon (Court of Common Pleas of Beaver County, Thirty-sixth Judicial District), and Judge Albert H. Heimbach (Court of Common Pleas of Carbon County, Fifty-sixth Judicial District) having expired during the calendar year 1977 by reason of the mandatory retirement provision of Article V, Section 16(b), of the Constitution of Pennsylvania,
It is hereby ordered and directed that each of the above judicial offices be filled by election at the November 8, 1977, municipal election;
It is further ordered and directed that the Secretary of the Commonwealth give notice forthwith to the County Boards of Elections in the respective judicial districts, the Chairmen of the political parties in each of the above judicial districts, and all other persons entitled to notice under the Election Code, that the designated judicial offices shall be listed for election on the November 8,1977, ballot and that nomination certificates shall be received and treated as timely filed;
It is further ordered and directed that appellees-respondents and the designated Boards of Elections do and perform any and all other acts necessary or proper in order that the foregoing judicial offices may be filled at the November 8, 1977, municipal election.
The order of the Commonwealth Court is reversed. Opinions to follow.
Mr. Justice Nix and Mr. Justice Manderino dissent."
MANDERINO, J., filed a dissenting opinion in which NIX, J., joined.
. Act of June 3, 1937, P.L. 1333, § 905, as amended, 25 P.S. § 2865 (1963 & Supp.1977).
. Appellees argue that this delay constitutes laches. On the contrary, taking two weeks to bring a complex suit of some public importance is not undue delay.
. We hear this appeal pursuant to the Appellate Court Jurisdiction Act of 1970, Act of July 31, 1970, P.L. 673, art. II, § 203, 17 P.S. § 211.203 (Supp.1977).
. Pursuant to this order, the Election Code, and the Pennsylvania Constitution, these four judicial vacancies were filled at the November, 1977 election. The new judges duly received their commissions, took their oaths of office and are now serving their constitutional ten year terms of office.
. Appellees contend that appellant does not make out a cause of action under the Declaratory Judgment Act, Act of June 18, 1923, P.L. 840, § 1 et seq., as amended, 12 P.S. § 831 et seq. (1953 & Supp.1977). Appellant's interest in this case, which is sufficient to give him standing, along with his allegation of injury to that interest, makes him concretely adverse to appellees as required by the Declaratory Judgment Act. Appellees claim that section 976 of the Election Code, 25 P.S. § 2936, which allows candidates for office to challenge the rejection of nominating petitions, constitutes a statutory remedy for this wrong, barring relief under the Declaratory Judgment Act, 12 P.S. § 836. This remedy, however, is open to disappointed judicial candidates only, and is not open to appellant. There is no other statute giving appellant any remedy for the specific wrong he alleges he is suffering, and therefore he makes out a cause of action under the Declaratory Judgment Act.
. Berardocco and Leedom reject the result and the reasoning of Rogers v. Tucker, 443 Pa. 509, 279 A.2d 9 (1971) (plurality opinion). Thus appellees' reliance upon Rogers is misplaced.
. Ҥ 15. Tenure of justices, judges and justices of the peace
(a) The regular term of office of justices and judges shall be ten years and the regular term of office for judges in the municipal court and traffic court in the City of Philadelphia and of justices of the peace shall be six years. The tenure of any justice or judge shall not be affected by changes in judicial districts or by reduction in the number of judges.
(b) A justice or judge elected under section thirteen (a), appointed under section thirteen (d) or retained under this section fifteen (b) may file a declaration of candidacy for retention election with the officer of the Commonwealth who under law shall have supervision over elections on or before the first Monday of January of the year preceding the year in which his term of office expires. If no declaration is filed, a vacancy shall exist upon the expiration of the term of office of such justice or judge, to be filled by election under section thirteen (a) or by appointment under section thirteen (d) if applicable. If a justice or judge files a declaration, his name shall be submitted to the electors without party designation, on a separate judicial ballot or in a separate column on voting machines, at the municipal election immediately preceding the expiration of the term of office of the justice or judge, to determine only the question whether he shall be retained in office. If a majority is against retention, a vacancy shall exist upon the expiration of his term of office, to be filled by appointment under section thirteen (b) or under section thirteen (d) if applicable. If a majority favors retention, the justice or judge shall serve for the regular term of office provided herein, unless sooner removed or retired. At the expiration of each term a justice or judge shall be eligible for retention as provided herein, subject only to the retirement provisions of this article.
§ 16. Compensation and retirement of justices, judges and justices of the peace
(a) Justices, judges and justices of the peace shall be compensated by the Commonwealth as provided by law. Their compensation shall not be diminished during their terms of office, unless by law applying generally to all salaried officers of the Commonwealth.
(b) Justices, judges and justices of the peace shall be retired upon attaining the age of seventy years. Former and retired justices, judges and justices of the peace shall receive such compensation as shall be provided by law. No compensation shall be paid to any justice, judge or justice of the peace who is suspended or removed from office under section eighteen of this article or under article six.
(c) A former or retired justice or judge may, with his consent, be assigned by the Supreme Court on temporary judicial service as may be prescribed by rule of the Supreme Court."