Case Name: Zonald Watson WEATHERFORD, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1990-05-07
Citations: 561 So. 2d 629
Docket Number: No. 88-2897
Parties: Zonald Watson WEATHERFORD, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: ERVIN, J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 561
Pages: 629–638

Head Matter:
Zonald Watson WEATHERFORD, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. 88-2897.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
May 7, 1990.
Rehearing Denied June 7, 1990.
Michael E. Allen, Public Defender, and Kathleen Stover, Asst. Public Defender, Tallahassee, for appellant.
Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., and Bradley R. Bischoff, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, for appellee.

Opinion:
ZEHMER, Judge.
Zonald Weatherford appeals his conviction, pursuant to a jury verdict, for committing a lewd act upon a child in violation of section 800.04, Florida Statutes. Weather-ford argues on appeal that the trial court erred in admitting hearsay evidence, allowing an expert witness to vouch for the child's credibility, and permitting improper impeachment of a defense witness. Finding error on all three points, we reverse and remand for a new trial.
The state charged Weatherford with sexual battery of T.J. by penetrating her vagina with his finger and by penetrating her anus with his finger, in violation of section 794.011, Florida Statutes. The case proceeded to trial at which the following occurred.
The state's first witness was Charlotte Chadik. She testified that she was a member of the Child Protection Team, an affiliate of the Department of Pediatrics at the University of Florida. (R. 38). The court qualified Ms. Chadik as an expert "in the field of investigating and interviewing children" with regard to alleged sexual abuse. (R. 27). Upon objection by the defendant, the state proffered her testimony as follows: Ms. Chadik interviewed T.J. pursuant to a referral from the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (R. 27); T.J. told her that she stopped going to her babysitter because of Weatherford and that Weatherford was a bad man (R. 29); T.J. proceeded to tell her "[he] touched me on my privates" and pointed to her breasts and vaginal area when she made that statement (R. 29); T.J. indicated that at the time of the occurrence she was with her babysitter at Weatherford's house and had gone into the bathroom (R. 29); when T.J. got off the toilet, Weatherford was in the bathroom with her and he touched her on her breasts and put his finger inside her vagina (R. 30); T.J. indicated that the touching hurt her (R. 30); T.J. stated Weatherford asked her if she would "touch him down here," pointing to the penis on a male doll, but she did not touch him (R. 30). When Chadik was asked if she did anything to determine whether T.J.'s report to her was reliable, Chadik stated that she had done a number of things to determine reliability, and explained that: T.J. reported the incident in her own words, not adult language; T.J. didn't know the names of some body parts and indicated those parts on dolls; T.J. did not change her story, even when Chadik challenged it or tried to confuse her; and Chadik was satisfied that T.J. passed these reliability tests. (R. 30-32). At the conclusion of the proffer, defense counsel objected to Chadik's testimony of T.J.'s statements on hearsay grounds. (R. 37). The court overruled defense counsel's objections and allowed Chadik to testify. (R. 37). Chadik's testimony before the jury was essentially identical to that proffered. (R. 41-45).
The state next presented T.J. as a witness. (R. 52). T.J. testified that she was six years old and in the first grade (R. 55); she went to Weatherford's house for a barbecue and while she was there she had to go to the bathroom; Weatherford showed her where the bathroom was and he went inside with her (R. 58); after she went to the bathroom Weatherford touched her on her "private parts," indicating on a doll the places where Weatherford touched her (R. 59-61); when Weatherford touched her it hurt, and he touched her with his fingers (R. 61); Weatherford's finger did not go inside of her and he did not touch her on the "behind" (R. 62-63); after Weatherford touched her he left (R. 62); when she left the bathroom she told her babysitter what had happened, and she told her mother at a later time. (R. 67-69). When asked whether Weatherford told her not to tell anyone that he had touched her, T.J. replied "No." (R. 63). When asked if she saw the man that touched her in the courtroom, T.J. said "No," and when the prosecutor pointed to Weatherford and asked if that was "Zeke" (the name by which T.J. referred to Weatherford), she shook her head negatively. (R. 64).
The state next presented a proffer of the testimony of T.J.'s mother. (R. 71). The mother testified that: T.J. told her about the incident a couple of weeks after it happened (R. 73); T.J. had not wanted to go to her babysitter's house during that period (R. 73); T.J. told her that she was at "Zeke's" house for a barbecue, that she had to go to the bathroom, and that Weath-erford showed her to the bathroom and went inside with her (R. 74); T.J. said that while she was in the bathroom Weather-ford touched her "in her private parts" and indicated, by pointing, that he had touched her between her legs and stuck his finger inside of her (R. 74-76); and T.J. said that the touching had hurt her and that she had not told her babysitter (R. 76). Defense counsel objected to the mother's testifying as to what T.J. had told her on the ground it was hearsay and lacked trustworthiness (R. 76). The court overruled the objection, and allowed her to testify. (R. 78). Her testimony before the jury was essentially identical to that proffered. (R. 79-89).
Michelle Govin, T.J.'s babysitter, next testified for the state. (R. 89). Ms. Govin stated that: she, her fiancé, her two children, T.J., and T.J.'s little brother, were at a barbecue when the incident happened (R. 91-92); T.J. asked to go to the bathroom and Weatherford said he would show her to the bathroom (R. 92); she saw Weatherford take T.J. back toward the bathroom, and he had his hand on her shoulder showing her the way; she did not see whether he went into the bathroom with her (R. 93, 99-100); T.J. was very upset when she returned from the bathroom and asked to go home (R. 94); she took T.J. to her own house because T.J.'s mother was still at work and she fed T.J. dinner (R. 94); T.J. acted very withdrawn and after she ate dinner, she became sick and vomited "all over everything" (R. 94); when she undressed T.J. that evening to give her a bath, she saw a dark brown stain in the crotch of T.J.'s underwear, and at the time, she thought some of the vomit had stained T.J.'s underwear. (R. 95). On cross-examination, Michelle testified that she became concerned that Weatherford may have harmed T.J. when Amy Weatherford, Weatherford's daughter-in-law, became angry with Weath-erford and expressed things to her about Weatherford's past. (R. 97, 102, 115-116). She went on to state that it was not until Amy expressed those things to her that she talked to TJ.'s mother. (R. 102).
Virgil Hart, Govin's fiancé, testified that he was at the barbecue and heard T.J. ask to go to the bathroom. (R. 117). He stated that: he heard Weatherford volunteer to take T.J., but that he did not actually see Weatherford go into the bathroom (R. 117); T.J. walked up to Govin after returning from the bathroom and made it clear that she wanted to go home (R. 118); they returned to Govin's apartment, and T.J. vomited after eating a small amount of dinner (R. 118-119); she got some of the vomit on herself, and Govin cleaned her up (R. 119); later that evening, while Govin was cleaning T.J.'s underwear, he examined the underwear and saw what appeared to be dried blood in the lower back part of the crotch. (R. 120).
The state next proffered the testimony of Ethel McCormick, a Protective Investigator for H.R.S. Children Services. Ms. McCormick stated that she interviewed T.J. upon receiving the child abuse report, and that T.J. stated: while she was at Weather-ford's house for a barbecue she needed to go to the bathroom (R. 130); Weatherford showed her the way to the bathroom and entered the room with her, and he remained in the room while she used the potty (R. 131); when she got off of the toilet, she thought that Weatherford was going to help her pull her panties back up but that he put his hands between her legs and played with her instead (R. 131). She stated that she asked T.J. whether Weath-erford had put his fingers inside of her, and that T.J. was not sure. (R. 131). Ms. McCormick further testified that T.J. said she did not want to go back to Weather-ford's house because she was afraid he would hurt her, and that she said, "He said if I told, that he would hurt me." (R. 132). After the proffer examination, defense counsel objected to McCormick's testimony on hearsay grounds; the court overruled the objections and allowed McCormick to testify. (R. 134-135). Ms. McCormick's testimony before the jury was essentially the same as her testimony during the proffer examination. (R. 135-139).
Dr. Mark Brown, a pediatrician, testified as an expert in the field of pediatrics and the medical examination of sexually abused children. (R. 155). He stated that T.J. was referred to him by the Child Protection Team and that he examined her to determine whether there was medical evidence of sexual abuse. (R. 155). He stated that his examination revealed that T.J.'s vaginal opening was approximately three times the normal size, and that in his opinion there had been some type of vaginal penetration. (R. 156-157). He further stated that T.J. described an incident to him where a person inserted a finger into her vagina and wiggled it around and also inserted a finger into her rectal area. (R. 157). After Dr. Brown's testimony, the state rested.
Defense counsel moved for a judgment of acquittal. The court granted the motion as to count II, penetration of the anus, but denied the motion as to count I. The defendant then called his witnesses.
Nancy Hedspeth, Weatherford's girlfriend, testified that she was at Weather-ford's house the day of the incident, and was standing at the stove cooking when T.J. said she had to go to the bathroom (R. 178-179); her 11-year-old daughter, Mary, took T.J. to the bathroom and Weatherford stayed in the kitchen (R. 180); she left at one point to change her clothes, but Weath-erford followed right behind her. (R. 180).
Mary Hedspeth, Nancy's 11-year-old daughter, testified that she was in the kitchen when T.J. asked to go to the bathroom, and Weatherford asked her to take T.J. to the bathroom (RII. 7); she took T.J. to the bathroom, closed the door, and waited outside the bathroom door until T.J. was finished (RII. 8); and after T.J. finished they went outside to play. (RII. 5-9).
Ester Hedspeth, Mary's 12-year-old sister, testified that she was also in the kitchen when T.J. asked to go to the bathroom, and that she saw her sister take her. (RII. 14-17).
Eugene Weatherford, appellant Weather-ford's 26-year-old son, testified that he was on the back porch barbecuing on the date in question and that the bathroom was off of the back porch. (RII. 29). He did not remember seeing his father take a child to the bathroom. (RII. 28).
Weatherford testified in his own defense that he remembered T.J. asking Govin if she could use the bathroom and stated that he told his stepdaughter Mary to take her. (RII. 38). He and Nancy walked out the front door at about that time. (RII. 38). His daughter-in-law Amy was angry with him regarding a custody fight over her daughter. (RII. 40).
At the conclusion of the trial, the court denied the renewed motion for judgment of acquittal. The jury found Weatherford guilty of the lesser-included offense of committing a lewd act upon a child and the trial court entered judgment on the verdict.
Appellant first argues that the trial court erred in admitting the testimony of Ms. Chadik, the mother, and investigator McCormick concerning T.J.'s out-of-court statements, because these statements constituted hearsay and the procedural safeguards of section 90.803(23), Florida Statutes (1987), the hearsay exception for child victims of sexual abuse, were not met. Section 90.803(23)(c), requires the court to make specific findings of fact on the record, setting forth the reasons the court determined the out-of-court statements to be reliable, and the reason it discounted any indications of a lack of reliability. Griffin v. State, 526 So.2d 752, 757 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988). In this case, the court did not comply with this requirement of the statute before admitting the testimony of any of these witnesses who testified to T.J.'s out-of-court statements. This was clear error. Fricke v. State, 561 So.2d 597 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990) (evidence of out-of-court statements by child abuse victim admitted pursuant to the recently created exception to the hearsay rule provided by section 90.803(23) violates the defendant's Sixth Amendment right of confrontation unless statutory requirements are strictly satisfied).
The state argues that any error on this point was harmless because substantially the same testimony was presented through T.J. and other witnesses. The record shows, however, that T.J. provided the only eyewitness .account of Weatherford taking her into the bathroom. Furthermore, all of the statements that were attributed to T.J. were inconsistent with each other and with the testimony of T.J. in material respects. For example, while T.J. testified that Weatherford did not put his finger inside of her, Chadik and T.J.'s mother testified that T.J. told them Weatherford had put his finger inside of her and McCormick testified . that T.J. indicated she was unsure whether Weatherford had put his finger inside of her. T.J. also testified that Weatherford did not warn her not to tell anyone what he had done, but McCormick testified that T.J. told her that Weather-ford had threatened to hurt her if she told anyone. This child's credibility was a critical element in the proof of the charges against Weatherford, and the trial court's findings with regard to trustworthiness of these hearsay statements were essential. We cannot find the trial court's error in failing to make these findings on the record was harmless, and we reverse on this point. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967); State v. DeGuilio, 491 So.2d 1129 (Fla.1986). To treat this inadmissible hearsay as merely cumulative would ignore the reality of the effect of repetitive assertions of a fact on the minds of jurors.
Weatherford next argues on appeal that the trial court also erred in allowing Ms. Chadik to testify that she used a number of techniques to determine whether T.J.'s statements to her were reliable and that she was satisfied that these statements were truthful. We conclude that the court erred in admitting this testimony. The law is well-settled that a witness's testimony offered to vouch for the credibility of another is inadmissible. See Tingle v. State, 536 So.2d 202 (Fla.1988); Norris v. State, 525 So.2d 998 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988). It is most important to note that Ms. Cha-dik was not tendered as an expert in determining whether a child exhibited symptoms consistent with those of sexually abused children. Cf., Ward v. State, 519 So.2d 1082 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988). On the contrary, she was tendered as an expert in the so-called field of "investigating and interviewing children involved in alleged sexual abuse." (R. 27). Her qualifications in this area were limited primarily to investigating incidents and interviewing children. The techniques used by her (see note 1 supra) differed little from those employed by a skillful cross-examiner in the courtroom, where such techniques normally should be employed to permit the jury, rather than an expert witness, to decide the credibility issue for themselves. In another sense, this expert on interviewing and determining the credibility of witnesses performed a test for credibility that, although different in substance, has the same purpose as an inadmissible lie detector test administered by a polygraph examiner. See Davis v. State, 520 So.2d 572 (Fla.1988) (polygraph evidence is admissible only upon the oral or written stipulation of the parties). Nor can we treat this error as harmless. The testimony vouching for T.J.'s credibility was provided by an "expert" witness, and as the supreme court stated in Tingle v. State, "in cases such as this, 'some expert testimony may be helpful, but putting an impressively qualified expert's stamp of truthfulness on a witness' story goes too far' [citation omitted]." 536 So.2d at 205. The trial court erred in admitting the testimony of Ms. Chadik and we reverse on this point.
Finally, Weatherford argues that the trial court erred in permitting the state to inquire of him why four of Ms. Hed-speth's children were not living with her. After an appropriate objection to the prosecutor's question was overruled, Weather-ford responded that these children remained in North Carolina because that state had taken custody of the children from Ms. Hedspeth and her former husband. Obviously, the reason the children were not living with Hedspeth was a purely collateral matter and irrelevant to any issue being tried in this proceeding. The facts established by this testimony did not tend to impeach the credibility of the witness, and the state's brief admits this. Rather, the question and compelled answer served only the improper purpose of embarrassing and discrediting Ms. Hedspeth, a defense witness, on a collateral matter. Ehrhardt, Florida Evidence § 608.1 (2d ed. 1984). We reject the state's sole argument in response, that defense counsel opened the door to these improper questions. The trial court erred in overruling defense counsel's objection to this inquiry. Cf. McLain v. State, 395 So.2d 1164 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981).
The dissent's characterization of our holding in this case as indulging "a fascination with trial technique and gamesmanship, at the expense of additional emotional and psychological trauma for the child victim" misses the point of this appeal. We are not insensitive to the fact that our ordering a retrial may have a serious emotional impact on the child victim. But that is not the applicable standard of review on appeal. Our function is to review the challenged action of the trial court below to determine whether it failed to comport with the applicable law and constitutional requirements so as to deprive the appellant of a fair trial, applying the harmless error test enunciated in the cited supreme court decisions. Required courtroom procedures and rules governing the admissibility of evidence are not simply courtroom techniques and are not appropriately characterized as courtroom gamesmanship. These procedures and evidentiary rules have been carefully developed over many decades to insure that the parties before the court are accorded due process of law and their fundamental constitutional rights. The trial court in this case departed from these requirements and deprived the appellant of a fair trial. Thus, having found error that is not harmless under the law, we have no choice but to reverse and order a new trial, notwithstanding compassion we feel for the child victim. If indeed the child victim will suffer significant "emotional and psychological trauma" or harm as a result of participating in a new trial, the statutory provisions governing courtroom procedure supply appropriate mechanisms to limit or avoid such harm to the child. See Fricke v. State, 561 So.2d 597.
The judgment is REVERSED and the cause is REMANDED for a new trial.
ERVIN, J., concurs.
WENTWORTH, J., dissents with opinion.
. Ms. Chadik's testimony before the jury with regard to the reliability of T.J.'s statements was as follows:
Whenever I meet with a child in order to do an investigative interview, there are a number of things I want to check out about this child's report. One is, what I have already mentioned, how much of it is in the child's own language. I felt real satisfied, very satisfied that what [T.J.] was saying to me was in her own language.
Another thing that I will do is I will question the child and give them confusing information about what they have told me, and in some way try to challenge them. Will they change their story. So I might say to [T.J.], you mean this happened in the kitchen? and [T.J.] would say, no. This was the bathroom. So she would always clarify, come back to the original allegation. That helps me to believe in her ability to be consistent in her story. Thereby suggesting to me that she was telling the truth.
I also talked with [T.J.] about the distinction between fact and fantasy. Did she understand the difference between that. And did she understand the difference between the truth and a lie. And again, I went over that with [T.J.], as I do with all the children that I interview, and felt very satisfied that she was able to distinguish between the difference and she was giving me a truthful report.
(R. 44) (emphasis added).
. Ms. Chadik testified to the following educational qualifications:
A. I have a Bachelor's Degree in education. I have a Masters and Educational Specialist Degree in counselor education, and I have completed all my course work for my Ph.D. in counselor education. I lack my dissertation.
*
A. . I received particular training on how to deal with investigative interviewing regarding child sexual abuse. Also training involved with violence in families, abuse in families, and how to intervene in those situations and to investigate them.
. There are, of course, exceptions to this usual practice in respect to child witnesses where the court makes a finding pursuant to section 90.-803(23), Florida Statutes, that such interrogation should take place outside the courtroom because it has been shown that the child will suffer harm if compelled to testify in court. See Fricke v. State, 561 So.2d 597. But even then, the same techniques of questioning the child can be used by the examiner to establish or attack the child's credibility as a witness.