Case Name: COOPER v. WASHTENAW COUNTY
Court: Michigan Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 2006-04-04
Citations: 270 Mich. App. 506
Docket Number: Docket Nos. 262141, 262903
Parties: COOPER v WASHTENAW COUNTY
Judges: Before: COOPER, PJ., and JANSEN and MARKEY, JJ.
Reporter: Michigan appeals reports; cases decided in the Michigan Court of Appeals.
Volume: 270
Pages: 506–518

Head Matter:
COOPER v WASHTENAW COUNTY
Docket Nos. 262141, 262903.
Submitted January 31, 2006, at Detroit.
Decided April 4, 2006, at 9:10 a.m.
Leave to appeal sought.
Dawn Cooper, as personal representative of the estate of Demetrius Morton, deceased, brought an action against Washtenaw County, the city of Ann Arbor, and law enforcement officers of the county and of the city, claiming negligence relating to the decedent’s suicide while he was a prisoner confined in a holding cell at the 15th District Court. The law enforcement defendants moved for summary disposition, arguing that the proximate cause of the decedent’s death was his conduct, not that of the defendant law enforcement officers. The court, Timothy E Connors, J., denied the motion of the Ann Arbor law enforcement officers, but granted the motion of the county law enforcement officers. The city law enforcement officers appealed, the plaintiff appealed by leave granted with respect to the dismissal of her claim against the county law enforcement officers, and the appeals were consolidated.
The Court of Appeals held-.
The city and county law enforcement officers were entitled to summary disposition on the basis of governmental immunity. The proximate cause, that is, the one most immediate, efficient, and direct cause, of decedent’s death was his own conduct. MCL 691.1407(2). The actions of the city and county law enforcement officers cannot be considered the proximate cause of the death.
Affirmed in part and reversed in part.
Cooper, EJ., dissenting, would affirm the denial of summary disposition for the city law enforcement officers, reverse the grant of summary disposition for the county law enforcement officers, and remand the case for trial. The defendants are immune from tort liability on the basis of governmental immunity unless their conduct amounted to gross negligence that is the proximate cause of the injury, MCL 691.1407(2)(c). Gross negligence is conduct so reckless that it demonstrates a substantial lack of concern for whether an injury results, MCL 691.1407(7)(a). Genuine issues of material fact remain concerning whether the defendants’ alleged gross negligence in failing to monitor a prisoner they knew to be suicidal was the proximate cause of the decedent’s death and whether the decedent’s actions constituted an intervening and superseding cause. Those issues preclude summary disposition and require resolution by the trier of fact.
Governmental Immunity — Governmental Employees — Gross Negligence — Proximate Cause.
An employee of a governmental agency is governmentally immune from tort liability unless the employee’s conduct amounts to gross negligence that is the one most immediate, efficient, and direct cause of the injury or damage (MCL 691.1407[2][c]).
Fieger, Fieger, Kenney & Johnson, EC. (by Victor S. Valenti), for Dawn Cooper.
Reach, Ranney & Carpenter, EC. (by Cynthia L. Reach), for Washtenaw County, Anthony Woodford, Pamela Raciti, and Eugene Hahn.
Stephen K. Postema, City Attorney, and David W. Swan and Robert W. West, Assistant City Attorneys, for the city of Ann Arbor, Michael Watchowski, and Steve Lawrence.
Before: COOPER, PJ., and JANSEN and MARKEY, JJ.

Opinion:
JANSEN, J.
In Docket No. 262141, defendants Ann Arbor Police Officers Michael Watchowski and Steve Lawrence appeal as of right the trial court's order denying their motion for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(7) and (8). In Docket No. 262903, plaintiff appeals by leave granted an order granting summary disposition to defendants Washtenaw County and individual county law enforcement personnel Anthony Woodford, Pamela Raciti, and Eugene Hahn. Plaintiff challenges the dismissal of the individual county defendants only. We conclude that all individual city defendants and the individual county defendants were entitled to summary disposition on the basis of governmental immunity. We therefore reverse the order denying the individual city defendants' motion and affirm the order granting summary disposition in favor of the individual county defendants. These consolidated appeals are being decided without oral argument pursuant to MCR 7.214(E).
This action arises from the death of plaintiffs decedent, Demetrius Morton, who committed suicide while confined in a holding cell at the 15th District Court. At issue in these appeals is whether the individual defendants, law enforcement personnel involved in Morton's confinement, are entitled to summary disposition on the basis of governmental immunity, MCL 691.1407(2), because their alleged conduct was not "the proximate cause" of Morton's death.
This Court reviews de novo rulings on summary disposition motions. Van v Zahorik, 460 Mich 320, 326; 597 NW2d 15 (1999).
MCL 691.1407(2) provides individual immunity for governmental employees under certain circumstances. The statute states, in part:
Except as otherwise provided in this section,... each officer and employee of a governmental agency... is immune from tort liability for an injury to a person... caused by the officer, employee... while acting on behalf of a governmental agency if all of the following are met:
(a) The officer, employee... is acting or reasonably believes he or she is acting within the scope of his or her authority.
(b) The governmental agency is engaged in the exercise or discharge of a governmental function.
(c) The officer's, employee's... conduct' does not amount to gross negligence that is the proximate cause of the injury or damage. [MCL 691.1407(2) (emphasis added).]
The phrase "the proximate cause" within subdivision c "is best understood as meaning the one most immediate, efficient, and direct cause preceding an injury." Robinson v Detroit, 462 Mich 439, 459; 613 NW2d 307 (2000).
We agree with defendants that the one most immediate, efficient, and direct cause of Morton's death was his own conduct. This case is analogous to Kruger v White Lake Twp, 250 Mich App 622, 626-627; 648 NW2d 660 (2002). There, the plaintiff asked the police to take her daughter into custody because the daughter was intoxicated and posed a danger to herself and others. The police took her into custody and handcuffed her in a booking room. She escaped from the police station, ran into traffic, was hit by a vehicle, and died. This Court held that police officers were entitled to governmental immunity because their actions could not be considered "the proximate cause" of the death. The Court stated that "there were several other more direct causes of Kathryn's injuries than defendant officers' conduct, e.g., her escape and flight from the police station, her running onto M-59 and into traffic, and the unidentified driver hitting plaintiffs decedent. Any gross negligence on the defendant officers' part is too remote to be 'the' proximate cause of Katherine's injuries." Id., p 627.
It is plaintiffs position here that Morton's actions should not be considered the proximate cause of his death because, at least in prisoner suicide cases, causation is intertwined with foreseeability. Therefore, if Morton's actions were foreseeable, then those actions are not a superseding cause, and, thus, defendants' conduct may be deemed "the proximate cause." Plaintiff primarily relies on an unpublished federal district court opinion, Schreiber v Crawford Co, 2002 WL 1907974; 2002 US Dist LEXIS 15349 (ED Mich, 2002).
We decline plaintiffs invitation to adopt the reasoning in Schreiber. The decisions of this Court and our Supreme Court that address the issue of "the proximate cause" under MCL 691.1407(2) in circumstances in which there were multiple causes of the harm do not discuss the concepts of intervening and superceding causation and do not indicate that foreseeability of an intervening cause is relevant to whether it may be deemed "the proximate cause" under the statute. For example, in Robinson, supra at 462, "the proximate cause" of injuries and deaths resulting from a collision following a police pursuit was the reckless conduct of the driver of the fleeing vehicle, rather than the pursuit of the individual police officers. Whether the reckless conduct or the flight of the vehicle was foreseeable to the officers was not mentioned. In Curtis v City of Flint, 253 Mich App 555, 562-563; 655 NW2d 791 (2002), the proximate cause of the plaintiffs injuries when her vehicle collided with the back of a car that abruptly changed lanes and stopped for an emergency vehicle was the abrupt movement and stopping of the vehicle that she hit, not the actions of the driver of the emergency vehicle. Whether the evasive movements were foreseeable to the driver of the emergency vehicle was not considered. There is no discussion of intervening causation or foreseeability in these cases and no indication that the cause that is the most immediate, efficient, and direct cause preceding an injury may not be deemed "the proximate cause" for purposes of MCL 691.1407(2) if it was foreseeable to the governmental actors.
Because the alleged conduct of the individual defendants in this case was not "the proximate cause" of Morton's death, these defendants are immune from tort liability pursuant to MCL 691.1407(2). Therefore, we reverse the order denying the individual city defendants' motion for summary disposition and affirm the order granting summary disposition in favor of the individual county defendants.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for entry of judgment in favor of the individual city defendants.
Markey, J., concurred.