Case Name: METROPOLITAN GOVERNMENT OF NASHVILLE AND DAVIDSON COUNTY, Tennessee, Appellant, v. Maggie B. MILES, Appellee
Court: Tennessee Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Tennessee
Decision Date: 1975-01-20
Citations: 524 S.W.2d 656
Docket Number: 
Parties: METROPOLITAN GOVERNMENT OF NASHVILLE AND DAVIDSON COUNTY, Tennessee, Appellant, v. Maggie B. MILES, Appellee.
Judges: COOPER and HENRY, JJ., concur.
Reporter: South Western Reporter Second Series
Volume: 524
Pages: 656–664

Head Matter:
METROPOLITAN GOVERNMENT OF NASHVILLE AND DAVIDSON COUNTY, Tennessee, Appellant, v. Maggie B. MILES, Appellee.
Supreme Court of Tennessee.
Jan. 20, 1975.
Rehearing Denied June 9, 1975.
Harbison, J., concurred in part and dissented in part and filed opinion in which Fones, C. J., concurred.
Fones, C. J., and Harbison, J., concurred in part and dissented in part on denial of petition to rehear.
Robert B. Eadie, Nashville, for appellant.
Avon N. Williams, Jr., Nashville, for ap-pellee.

Opinion:
OPINION
BROCK, Justice.
The appellee, Maggie B. Miles, was arrested by police officers of the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County, Tennessee, and charged with interfering with a police officer, which in the warrant of arrest was denominated "the offense of violation Metropolitan Code Chapter 34 Section 1 — 1." The penalty for this violation is a fine of fifty dollars while failure to pay it results in imprisonment for not more than three months. See: Attached Appendix. Thereafter her case came on for trial before the General Sessions Court for the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County and after a trial on the merits was dismissed on July 3, 1973. In due course the Metropolitan Government appealed this decision to the Sixth Circuit Court of Tennessee in and for the County of Davidson for a trial de novo. The appellee then filed a motion in the Circuit Court to dismiss the appeal upon the grounds that (1) Section 14.26 of the Metropolitan Charter, relied upon by the appellant, does not by its terms provide for an appeal de novo by the Metropolitan Government from a decision of the General Sessions Court dismissing on the merits a charge of violation of a Metropolitan ordinance, and, (2) that if the Metropolitan Charter provision above-mentioned were construed to provide for an appeal de novo, it would, in that event, be in violation of Article 1, Section 10 of the Constitution of the State of Tennessee and of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States which provide that "no person shall, for the same offense, be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb."
After due consideration of said motion to dismiss the Circuit Court rendered a written opinion agreeing with the appellee on both points, holding that Section 14.26 of the Metropolitan Charter did not grant to the Metropolitan Government a right of appeal de novo from a judgment of dismissal of a charge of violating a city ordinance and, secondly, that if said charter provision were construed to grant such appeal it would violate the double jeopardy clauses of the State and Federal Constitutions as above-mentioned. Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed and from this judgment of the Circuit Court the Metropolitan Government has appealed to this Court, there being no disputed issues of fact.
The Metropolitan Government insists that the Circuit Court erred in dismissing the appeal and asserts that Section 14.26 of the Metropolitan Charter and T.C.A., Section 27-509, grant to the Metropolitan Government the right to appeal de novo to the Circuit Court a judgment of the General Sessions Court dismissing on the merits a charge of violation of a city ordinance, the punishment for which is the imposition of a fine; and, that such right of appeal does not violate the constitutional provisions, above-mentioned, prohibiting double jeopardy. The appeal here sought is not one merely for the correction of errors of the lower court; it is de novo, that is, a completely new trial at which either side may call such witnesses as it desires and the higher court makes an independent determination of guilt or innocence.
The Metropolitan Charter provision and the state statute relied upon for granting to the Metropolitan Government a right of appeal in the circumstances of this case are as follows, to wit:
"Section 14.26. Appeals.
". . . Appeals on behalf of the defendant from a judgment in any criminal case tried by the court may be taken to the criminal court of Davidson County, Tennessee. Such appeal shall be prayed and granted within ten days from the rendition of the judgment or as otherwise provided by law, and shall not act as a stay or supersedeas of the judgment unless the defendant shall execute an appeal bond with good and solvent surety, to pay the fines at costs and other costs adjudged upon appeal. Provided, that this section shall not be construed to require the Metropolitan Government to make bond to perfect any appeal taken hereunder. Any such appeal shall be perfected by written notice from the director of the Metropolitan Department of Law or any assistant thereof, addressed to the court clerk of the Metropolitan General Sessions Court." Metropolitan Charter, Section 14.26.
"27-509. Appeal from general sessions court. — Any party may appeal from an adverse decision of the general sessions court to the circuit court of the county within a period of ten (10) days on complying with the law as now provided for appeals from justices of the peace courts. This provision allowing ten (10) days in which to perfect an appeal shall apply in every county in Tennessee, any provision of any private act to the contrary notwithstanding, it being the legislative intent to establish a uniform period of ten (10) days in which any such appeal may be perfected in any county in Tennessee. Any appeal shall be heard de novo in the circuit court. If no appeal is taken within the time provided, then execution may issue." T.C.A., Section 27-509.
We find that Section 14.26 of the Metropolitan Charter leaves much to be desired in the way of clarity and that it fails to expressly grant the asserted right of appeal, although, it may do so by implication.
There is no doubt, however, that T.C.A., Section 27-509, does grant an appeal from the judgment of a General Sessions Court in a civil action. Of course, the insistence of the Metropolitan Government that this provision applies in this case upon the theory that this is a "civil" case begs the question. We must decide the constitutional questions asserted.
In addition to the fact that Article 1, Section 10 of the Constitution of Tennessee affords protection from double jeopardy the citizen is given a like protection by the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 89 S.Ct. 2056, 23 L.Ed.2d 707 (1969). It has been said that the doctrine is so ancient that it is impossible to trace its origin. Commonwealth v. Payne, 245 S.W.2d 581 (Ky.). Such an ancient right is not to be given a narrow construction.
In Waller v. Florida, 397 U.S. 387, 90 S.Ct. 1184, 25 L.Ed.2d 435, it was held that the trial of a person in a municipal court of a state for alleged violation of a "municipal ordinance" constituted jeopardy and prohibited a later trial in a trial court of general jurisdiction of that state for violation of a "state law" based upon the same facts. That case disposed of the argument that a municipality should be treated as a separate sovereign from that of the state of which it is a political subdivision and, thus, that one could be tried for the same offense in both a municipal court and a state court of general jurisdiction without violation of the double jeopardy clause.
However, the Metropolitan Government in this case asserts that the proceeding against the appellee is a "civil" one as distinguished from a "criminal" action. This assertion is somewhat anomalous since the appellant relies upon Section 14.26 of the Metropolitan Charter, above quoted, which refers to "appeals . in any criminal case . . . may be taken to the criminal court." (Underscoring added.) The Metropolitan Government relies upon the decisions of this Court in O'Haver v. Montgomery, 120 Tenn. 448, 111 S.W. 449 (1908); O'Dell v. City of Knoxville, 214 Tenn. 237, 379 S.W.2d 756 (1963). These cases do, indeed, support the contention of the Metropolitan Government that a proceeding for violation of a municipal ordinance is a civil, as distinguished from a criminal, action and that judgment of a municipal court does not prevent a second trial in the Circuit Court. Nevertheless, those cases have been, at least impliedly, overruled by the decision of this Court in State v. Jackson, 503 S.W.2d 185 (Tenn.1973). There it was held that a juvenile who had been found not guilty in the juvenile court in a proceeding considered "civil" could not be tried again for the same offense upon an appeal de novo to the Circuit Court. The Court adopted the following statement from United States of America v. Dickerson, 168 F.Supp. 899 (D.C.1958), to wit:
"Ineluctable logic leads to the conclusion that the constitutional protection against double jeopardy, as is the case with the right of counsel and the privilege against self-incrimination, is applicable to all proceedings, irrespective of whether they are denominated criminal or civil, if the outcome may be deprivation of liberty of the person. Necessarily, therefore, this is true of proceedings in the Juvenile Court. Precious constitutional rights cannot be diminished or whittled away by the device of changing names of tribunals or modifying the nomenclature of legal proceedings. The test must be the nature and the essence of the proceeding rather than its title. If the result may be a loss of personal liberty, the constitutional safeguards apply." (Underscoring added.)
It is to be noted that in the Jackson case it was the liberty of the citizen which was protected by the double jeopardy clause. This leaves remaining unanswered the question whether or not the double jeopardy clause protects one from a second trial in which, if found guilty, a "fine," rather than imprisonment, may be imposed. In effect, the holding of the United States Supreme Court in Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. 163, 168-169, 21 L.Ed. 872, 877, 878 (1873), was that such protection is provided. It was there held that a judgment of conviction and imposition of a fine could not be re-opened by the government to allow the additional infliction of imprisonment. The Court said:
"If there is anything settled in the jurisprudence of England and America, it is that no man can be twice lawfully punished for the same offense." (Underscoring added.)
The Court also said that double jeopardy protection applies to "felonies, minor crimes and misdemeanors alike . . ." Again, in Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 58 S.Ct. 630, 82 L.Ed. 917, Mr. Justice Bran-déis, speaking for the Court, said:
"Where the objective of the subsequent action likewise is punishment, the acquittal is a bar, because to entertain the second proceeding for punishment would subject the defendant to double jeopardy . . . " (58 S.Ct. 630, 632) (Underscoring added.)
And, in Pennywell v. McCarrey, 9 Cir., 255 F.2d 735, 17 Alaska 580, it was held that "A defendant who has paid a fine imposed for violation of law is placed in double jeopardy by a subsequent proceeding to collect the same fine a second time." We hold that the imposition of a fine is punishment.
It was also held in Helvering v. Mitchell, supra, that in order for an alleged "civil" action to be considered beyond the protection of the double jeopardy clause it was necessary that such action be "remedial in nature" and not intended to have the effect of inflicting "punishment" upon the citizen in order to vindicate public justice. The Georgia Court of Appeals in Cushway v. State Bar, 120 Ga.App. 371, 170 S.E.2d 732, 735-736 (1969) has reached a like conclusion and employed language which we adopt, to wit:
"A matter is criminal only if imprisonment or the assessment of a fine may follow conviction . . . only actions intended to authorize criminal punishment as distinguished from remedial actions subject the defendant to 'jeopardy.' '[T]he double jeopardy clause prohibits merely punishing twice, or attempting a second time to punish criminally, for the same offense.' "
The appellant also asserts that the de novo nature of the second trial which is sought in the Circuit Court prevents the application of the double jeopardy clause upon the theory that the judgment of the General Sessions Court is "wiped clean" and cannot, therefore, be considered a former jeopardy. We are not impressed with this argument. It, too, begs the question at issue. It has, in effect, already been answered contrary to the insistence of the Metropolitan Government by the decision of this Court in the Jackson case, supra, because the second trial of the juvenile in Jackson was, likewise, a "de novo" hearing in the Circuit Court which this Court held to be a violation of the double jeopardy clause. The double jeopardy clause protects not only from a second punishment for the same offense, it also forbids a second trial for the same offense. Ex parte Lange, supra; Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. 100, 24 S.Ct. 797, 49 L.Ed. 114; Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 78 S.Ct. 221, 2 L.Ed.2d 199 (1957); Price v. Georgia, 398 U.S. 323, 90 S.Ct. 1757, 26 L.Ed.2d 300 (1970); Pettyjohn v. Evatt, 369 F.Supp. 865 (D.C.1974).
We, therefore, hold that a proceeding in a municipal court for the imposition of a fine upon a person for allegedly violating a city ordinance is criminal rather than civil in substance, in that, it seeks punishment to vindicate public justice and, therefore, constitutes jeopardy under the double jeopardy clauses of the Tennessee and Federal Constitutions, and, consequently, the alleged offender, whether acquitted or convicted, cannot again be tried for the same offense in a state trial court of general jurisdiction over the timely objection of the defendant. Thus, T.C.A., Section 27— 509, and Metropolitan Charter, Section 14.-' 26, cannot be construed to authorize the appeal sought herein because, if so construed, they would be unconstitutional.
In conclusion, we affirm the action of the trial court in holding that neither the Metropolitan Government Charter, Section 14-26, nor T.C.A., Section 27-509, authorizes the Metropolitan Government to appeal and have another trial de novo in the Circuit Court for the same offense and, concur in the action of the trial court in dismissing said appeal.
All costs of this appeal will be adjudged against the appellant, Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County, Tennessee.
COOPER and HENRY, JJ., concur.
HARBISON, J., concurs in part, dissents in part.
FONES, C. J., concurs in part in the opinion of HARBISON, J.
APPENDIX
"§ 1-1-7 Metropolitan Code § 1-1-8 "Sec. 1-1-7. General penalty.
"Whenever in this Code or in any other ordinance or resolution of the metropolitan government or in any rule, regulation or order promulgated by any officer or agency of the metropolitan government under authority duly vested in him or it [sic] any act is prohibited or is made or declared to be unlawful or an offense or a misdemeanor, or the doing of any act is required or the failure to do any act is declared to be unlawful or an offense or a misdemeanor, where no specific penalty is provided therefor, the violation of any such provision of such Code or any other ordinance or resolution of the metropolitan government or such rule, regulation or order shall be punished by a fine not exceeding fifty dollars. For failure to pay any such fine, the offender may be imprisoned in the metropolitan jail or metropolitan workhouse for not more than three months.
"Except where otherwise provided, every day any violation of this Code or any other ordinance or resolution of the metropolitan government or such rule, regulation or order shall continue shall constitute a separate offense.
"Sec. 1-1-8. Commitment to workhouse upon failure to pay or secure fine.
"Upon the failure of any person to pay or secure any fine imposed by a judge of division I, division II or division III of the metropolitan courts, he shall be committed to the metropolitan workhouse and there required to perform such manual labor as may be required of him until such fine is paid off at the rate provided for county workhouses in Tennessee Code Annotated, section 41-1223, or any amendments thereto. No prisoner shall be discharged upon the act of insolvency nor before such fine has been worked out, fully paid or secured, or unless he is pardoned or paroled in accordance with the provisions of the Metropolitan Charter. (66-18, § 1.)"
. "Sec. 34 — 1-1. Resisting or interfering with officers.
"It shall be unlawful for any person to resist any police officer, any member of the police department or any person duly empowered with police authority, while in the discharge or apparent discharge of his duty, or in any way to interfere with or hinder him in the discharge or apparent discharge of his duty. (66-928, § 66.)" Metropolitan Code.
"7. As to courts and imprisonment, see ch. 12 of this Code. As to penalty for violation of regulations adopted by traffic and parking commission, see § 27-1-21."