Case Name: STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, v. JOSEPH VINCENT SLOCKBOWER, DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT
Court: New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New Jersey
Decision Date: 1976-12-13
Citations: 145 N.J. Super. 480
Docket Number: 
Parties: STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, v. JOSEPH VINCENT SLOCKBOWER, DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT.
Judges: 
Reporter: New Jersey Superior Court Reports
Volume: 145
Pages: 480–494

Head Matter:
STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, v. JOSEPH VINCENT SLOCKBOWER, DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT.
Superior Court of New Jersey Appellate Division
Argued October 26, 1976
Decided December 13, 1976.
Before Judges Halpeen, Allcobn and Bottee.
Mr. Lawrence H. Posner, Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause for appellant [Mr. James T. O’Halloran, Hudson County Prosecutor, attorney).
Mr. Jon P. Campbell' argued the cause for respondent (Mr. Eric A. Summerville, Director, Patrick House Legal Clinic, attorney).

Opinion:
Per Curiam.
By our leave granted, the State appeals from an interlocutory order suppressing evidence seized by the police without a warrant from an automobile driven by defendant. The uncontroverted proofs offered by the State at the suppression motion — defendant did not testify — revealed the following facts:
On March 13, 1975, at about 12:30 p.m., Detectives Prank Roth and Phillip Koscielecki, of the Jersey City Police Department, stopped and arrested defendant while he was driving on a street in Jersey City. Admittedly, there was an outstanding arrest warrant against defendant, issued Janu ary 9, 1975, for driving while on the revoked list. After arresting defendant and removing him from the ear he was driving and which was owned by his wife, the detectives, in accordance with their established standard police procedure, impounded the car, intending to drive it to police headquarters. While inventorying the ear's contents at the scene of arrest in his presence, the police found a loaded .22-calibre pen gun in the unlocked glove compartment. After a more complete inventory was made at police headquarters, and after a standard impounding sheet was completed and signed by the officers, the car was removed to a pound. We pause here to say that the validity of the inventory or search did not depend on whether it was made at the scene or at police headquarters. See Texas v. White, 423 U. S. 67, 96 S. Ct. 304, 46 L. Ed. 2d 209 (1975).
Based upon the above undisputed facts, the trial judge suppressed the seizure of the gun because he found, among other things, the impoundment not to be normal police procedure and, in any event, it did not occur prior to the search of the glove compartment. In addition, he found the police had no valid reason to impound the ear because they could have locked it and safely left it in the street or make inquiry of the owner to remove it. We disagree with the result reached and reverse.
We start with the basic premise that the Pourth Amendment proscribes only unreasonable searches, including warrantless searches. United States v. Gravitt, 484 F. 2d 375, 378 (5 Cir. 1973), cert. den. 414 U. S. 1135, 94 S. Ct. 879, 38 L. Ed. 2d 761 (1974); State v. Davis, 50 N. J. 16, 22 (1967), cert. den. 389 U. S. 1054, 88 S. Ct. 805, 19 L. Ed. 2d 852 (1968). The test is not whether the police followed the wisest course of action, but whether they acted reasonably under the circumstances.
We believe the instant case is controlled by South Dakota v. Opperman, - U. S. -, 96 S. Ct. 3092, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1000, decided July 6, 1976, about six months after the trial judge rendered his opinion herein. Opperman reiterated the long-established rule that significantly less rigorous warrant requirements govern car searches than those relating to searches of homes or offices. It also recognized and approved the standard police procedure of impounding, inventorying and taking custody of a car when its occupant is arrested and removed therefrom. These care-taking procedures were approved in order to protect the owner's property while in police custody; to protect the police against the claims or disputes of disgruntled arrestees as to the contents of the car when police custody was assumed, and to protect the police from potential danger. Opperman further held that an inventory car search conducted after the police assume custody is a reasonable intrusion and, therefore, constitutionally permissible. It follows, therefore, that evidence obtained during such inventory process is admissible. In particular, and relevant to the instant case, Opperman points to many cases holding that "standard inventories often include an examination of the glove compartment
With these principles in mind, we turn to the proofs in the instant case to determine whether the detectives acted reasonably in impounding and inventorying defendant's ear. Defendant concedes the validity of his arrest based upon the outstanding arrest warrant. Having removed defendant from the car and assumed control over it, they merely complied with police regulations when they impounded and inventoried the car. Furthermore, N. J. S. A. 39 :4r-136 would appear to permit the police to remove and store a motor vehicle which cannot be moved by the operator, or is improperly parked and left unattended upon a roadway. Nor are the police circumscribed by express statutory authority to impound motor vehicles. The inherent power of the police to impound motor vehicles may arise in a myriad of factual situations too numerous to attempt to define.
We find no support in the record for the trial judge's finding that defendant's car was searched before it was impounded. As indicated, the undisputed testimony is to the contrary. The existence of printed inventory sheets attests to the fact that the police merely used standard inventory procedures in the instant case. In refusing to accept officer Eoth's testimony that impoundment was a normal police procedure, the trial judge relied upon the completed im-poundment sheet which contained as the reason for the im-poundment "Pen Gun found in auto." The impoundment sheet was signed by officers Frank Eoth, Kenneth Calabrese and Phillip Kuscielecki, but it does not indicate which one filled in the report. In view of Eoth's unequivocal and un-contradicted testimony, given before Opperman was decided, giving his reasons under oath for the impoundment, the mistaken or carelessly given reason on the impoundment sheet should not vitiate an otherwise valid search. The good faith of the police has in no way been impugned, and there is nothing in this record to justify the conclusion that Roth orchestrated his testimony to meet constitutional standards. Since the philosophy behind the Fourth Amendment is to deter future police behavior violative of the amendment, our suppression of the instant search where no misbehavior exists would be counterproductive and injurious to the well-being of society. See State v. Hock, 54 N. J. 526 (1969), cert. den. 399 U. S. 930, 90 S. Ct. 2254, 26 L. Ed. 2d 797 (1970).
It appears entirely reasonable to us that the police should impound defendant's car rather than leave it unattended on the streets of Jersey City, with all the attendant risks of vandalism, theft or unfounded charges against them for doing so. While other alternatives may have been available to them, their failure to adopt those suggested by the trial judge does not make their actions unreasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. As previously indicated, and in all fairness to the trial judge, had Opperman been decided before he rendered his decision, he might well have sustained the legality of the search.
We have also considered whether as a matter of state law and policy we should impose more stringent standards when dealing with inventory searches than were established by Opperman, but decline to do so. Although we have such right, the philosophy expressed in Opperman comports with the standard of reasonableness in this type of case and, therefore, a more stringent approach should not be adopted. Our views are reinforced by the American Law Institute's Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure, § 230.6(3), adopted May 20, 1975 and which provides:
Vehicles impounded in consequence of an arrest, or retained in official custody for other good cause, may be searched at such times and to such extent as is reasonably necessary for safekeeping of the vehicle and its contents.
In light of our determination that the inventory search was unassailable, we do not pass upon the issues of whether the search was sustainable as a car search under Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U. S. 42, 90 S. Ct. 1975, 26 L. Pd. 2d 419 (1970), or as a search incidental to a lawful arrest under United States v. Robinson, 414 U. S. 218, 94 S. Ct. 467, 38 L. Pd. 2d 427 (1973) and Chimel v. California, 395 U. S. 752, 89 S. Ct. 2034, 23 L. Ed. 2d 685 (1969).
The judgment suppressing the search is reversed.
Ofiieer Frank Roth testified as to the arrest and impoundment tbusly:
Q What happened after you pulled the vehicle over?
A Told him to step out of the auto. He stepped out of the auto. We placed him under arrest.
Q Why did you place him under arrest?
A Because of the outstanding warrant.
Q What happened then?
A Then Detective Koscieleeki was going to take it to the precinct. We searched the vehicle and in the glove compartment we found a small pen gun. It was loaded.
* sis'
Q Why was the car searched and why did you go into the glove compartment?
A Well, on arrest it's police procedure that a vehicle — when a man is operating a vehicle the vehicle is impounded and a search of the vehicle is necessary for the contents of the vehicle and it's put on the impounding sheet.
Q Was an impounding sheet made out in this ease, sir?
A Yes, it was.
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THE COURT: As I understand it, you told the defendant to get out, you arrested him and you impounded the vehicle there?
THE WITNESS: Yes.
THE COURT: Then you and your partner searched the vehicle?
THE WITNESS: Yes.
It seems obvious to us that the impoundment occurred prior to the search of the glove compartment.
See State v. Talbot, 71 N. J. 160, 167 (1976) ; State v. Deatore, 70 N. J. 100, 112-113 (1976).
See State v. Hock, 54 N. J. 526, 533-535 (1969), cert. den. 399 U. S. 930, 90 S. Ct. 2254, 26 L. Ed. 2d 797 (1970).