Case Name: CHRISTENSEN v. THE STATE (two cases)
Court: Court of Appeals of Georgia
Jurisdiction: Georgia
Decision Date: 2000-07-14
Citations: 245 Ga. App. 165
Docket Number: A00A0517, A00A0518
Parties: CHRISTENSEN v. THE STATE (two cases).
Judges: C. J., Pope, P. J., Blackburn, P. J., and Phipps, J., concur. Barnes and Mikell, JJ, dissent.
Reporter: Georgia Appeals Reports
Volume: 245
Pages: 165–178

Head Matter:
A00A0517, A00A0518.
CHRISTENSEN v. THE STATE (two cases).
(537 SE2d 446)

Opinion:
Eldridge, Judge.
We have consolidated two appeals from appellant Mark Christensen. One challenges his criminal conviction for aggravated battery, and the second challenges the trial court's denial of his motion to recuse.
Case No. A00A0517
A Muscogee County jury found Christensen guilty of aggravated battery arising from an incident that occurred during a pick-up soccer game involving Christensen and other professional players. During heated play, Christensen punched another player in the eye. The victim's eye socket was fractured, and he received multiple stitches; pictures introduced at trial showed that his eye was severely blackened. Christensen appeals his conviction, raising nine enumerations of error. Upon review, we find Christensen's contentions meritless and affirm.
1. Christensen first claims that the trial court erred by failing to charge the jury on (a) simple battery, and (b) "opprobrious words" as a defense thereto. We disagree.
(a) While the trial court did not charge on misdemeanor simple battery under OCGA § 16-5-23 (a) (1), the court charged on misdemeanor battery under OCGA § 16-5-23.1 (a) and (b). This is because the State proved that the victim sustained a substantially blackened eye. There was no evidence to the contrary. A charge on simple battery would be applicable if the State does not prove that the harm is visible per OCGA § 16-5-23.1 (b) or if there is some question in that regard which might create a jury issue. In this case, however, there was no evidence to support a simple battery charge under OCGA § 16-5-23 because it went undisputed that the injury to the victim consisted of "visible bodily harm" and that the victim's eye was substantially blackened as a result of Christensen's punch.
Further, harm as well as error must be shown to warrant reversal. "Battery" is a more aggravated offense than "simple battery" because, while both offenses are misdemeanors and share the same elements, "battery" requires proof of the additional element of "substantial physical harm or visible bodily harm." The offense of "aggravated battery" is a felony which requires additional proof of (i) malice, and (ii) bodily harm which disfigures or renders a member of the victim's body useless.
In this case, the trial court gave the jury the option to find Christensen guilty of the lesser included offense of misdemeanor battery or of felony aggravated battery as indicted. By its verdict, the jury found the additional aggravating circumstances necessary to convict on the greater felony offense. Since the jury rejected misdemeanor battery and found the additional aggravating elements to warrant felony conviction, we reject the idea that the jury might have reached a different result had they also been charged on the even less culpable misdemeanor of simple battery. Accordingly, "any error in this instruction on the lesser included offense was rendered harmless by the jury's verdicts finding defendant guilty of the greater offense of [aggravated battery] in each alleged instance."
(b) Opprobrious or "abusive language" can be a justification for simple battery. However, Christensen was not charged with simple battery, and simple battery was not a lesser included offense in this case. Accordingly, "abusive language" is not an applicable defense. "By its clear terms, the defense is limited to the offense of simple battery; it does not apply to the offense of battery."
Further, Christensen specifically testified that he hit the victim, not because of any abusive language used, but because he thought the victim was going to hit him:
[Christensen:] I was afraid he was going to hit me with his right hand when he dropped his shoulder to step back and if you swing from the right hand side, that's the side that you would block the punch if he was throwing right handed. . . .
[Defense counsel:] Okay. And the reason you did that, you were afraid he was about to hit you?
[Christensen:] Yes, sir.
Christensen took the stand and testified as to his intent in committing the act. Without any claim whatsoever by Christensen that he committed the offense because of abusive language, he was not entitled to a jury charge on abusive language as a justification for his committing the offense.
Finally, the jury rejected the misdemeanor offense of battery and found the additional elements necessary to convict on felony aggravated battery. "Abusive language" is not a defense to felony aggravated battery. Since, as a matter of law, an "abusive language" defense under OCGA § 16-5-25 would not apply to the offense for which Christensen was convicted, the failure to give such instruction is rendered harmless.
2. There was no error in the trial court's charge to the jury on the offense of aggravated battery. The court charged on the language of the statute, the elements of the offense, and that the State must prove each element beyond a reasonable doubt.
Also, we find no conflict between the trial court's charge that the victim's loss of the use of his eye need not be permanent and the allegation in the indictment that Christensen rendered the victim's eye "useless." The court's charge was a correct statement of the law. "The fortuitous fact that complete and permanent blindness did not result hardly suffices to create a fatal variance between allegata and probata."
3. Christensen next asserts that the trial court erred in denying his motion for directed verdict. A motion for directed verdict is authorized only when there is no evidence to support a conviction. In this case, the testimony of the victim and several eyewitnesses regarding Christensen's unprovoked attack on the victim, as well as pictures of the severity of the injury to the victim's eye and expert testimony with regard thereto, was sufficient evidence to sustain the conviction. The expert medical testimony offered in rebuttal to the State's evidence provides no basis to reverse. Such is addressed to the credibility of the witnesses, and an appellate court does not weigh the evidence or determine the credibility of witnesses. In this case, the refusal to direct a verdict of acquittal based on sufficiency grounds was proper.
4. The trial court admitted evidence of a similar transaction incident wherein Christensen punched a man in the face as a result of "road rage." On appeal, Christensen does not contest his identity as the perpetrator of the prior act. Nor does he contest the similarity of the independent offense. His contention is that the trial court should not have permitted the investigating officer to testify as to a statement made by the victim of the prior act.
The trial court found that the victim's statement was made 18 minutes after the incident, while the victim was still on the side of the road holding his bleeding face. The court determined that such statement was part of the res gestae of the prior offense, and the court permitted the officer to testify as to his investigation into the facts of incident, including the victim's res gestae statement. "A trial court's determination that evidence is admissible as part of the res gestae will not be disturbed unless it is clearly erroneous." Under the facts of this case and Christensen's error as enumerated, we do not find the trial court's admission of the evidence to be clearly erroneous.
5. Christensen contends that the trial court erred in refusing to permit him to recall in surrebuttal two defense witnesses to rebut the testimony of Christensen's ex-wife, Linda. However, we find no error.
Linda Christensen was called by the State and testified that Christensen beat her about the head and face with his fists after he came home one evening upset because he had been ejected from a soccer game. Pictures of the injuries sustained by Linda Christensen were introduced. Thereafter, the defense wished to call two surrebuttal witnesses — not to refute the fact that Christensen had beaten his ex-wife — but to testify that Christensen had never been ejected from a soccer game. We find that this evidence would have only tan gentially rebutted the substance of Linda Christensen's testimony. Moreover, both witnesses had testified previously that Christensen had never been ejected from a soccer game. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to permit the witnesses to testify.
6. At the onset of the trial court's charge to the jury, the judge instructed the jury regarding the indictment as a legal document. The court's instructions included an explanation of the evidentiary significance of the indictment as "not evidence of his [Christensen's] guilt nor is it evidence of his innocence by his plea of not guilty."
We disapprove of this portion of the trial court's instruction since a defendant need not supply "evidence of his innocence." A criminal defendant is presumed innocent until proven guilty, and the trial court's instruction as to "evidence of innocence" can serve only to confuse, even if such explanation was made solely in relation to the evidentiary value of an indictment.
However, jury instructions are not to be read in isolation. In this case, the trial court properly instructed the jury on Christensen's presumption of innocence and the State's burden to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. While the trial court's preliminary charge in relation to the indictment was confusing, it was not reversible error in light of the jury charge as a whole.
7. We find no error in the trial court's instruction to the jury that "[t]he outcome of this case has absolutely nothing to do with the civil case that the victim has filed against the defendant and the CYSA [Cobb Youth Soccer Association]." From the context in which this charge was given, it is clear that the court was instructing the jury that the outcome of this case, i.e., Christensen's guilt or innocence, should be decided based on the evidence and the charge of the court, without regard to the outcome's effect on the civil case. This was a correct statement of the law, and the trial court did not limit the legitimate purpose for which evidence of the civil case was introduced, i.e., as a challenge to the credibility of the victim.
8. Christensen contends that the trial court's recharge on aggravated battery gave "undue weight" to that offense. We do not agree. Generally, "the scope and content of additional jury instructions are left to the sound discretion of the trial court, and the trial court may address only the jury's request on a particular point or give additional instructions." In this case, the jury requested a recharge on aggravated battery. The record shows the jury wanted clarification as to the elemental differences between battery and aggravated battery: "[Foreperson:] We were just trying to determine the difference between the two charges. What makes battery aggravated and what doesn't." The trial court then recharged on both battery and aggravated battery substantially as the court had originally charged. We find no abuse of discretion in the recharge.
9. The trial court did not err by refusing to give a jury charge on the law relating to "retreat." While Christensen claimed self-defense in that he thought the victim was going to hit him, there was no contention by the State that Christensen should have run away or otherwise "retreated" from the confrontation. Accordingly, the issue of "retreat" was not raised by the evidence or placed in issue.
Case No. A00A0518
On April 9, 1999, Christensen believed that the trial judge had a bias against him in the judicial proceedings. On April 12, 1999, his counsel had an affidavit and motion to recuse prepared and read into the record prior to trial. However, a motion to recuse was not filed. On May 26, 1999, the trial court entered an order that prior to filing the trial transcript, the trial court would review the transcript for errors.
After trial and sentencing, Christensen filed a motion to recuse on July 14, 1999, based upon conduct of the trial court during trial and the order regarding the transcript inspection, which was denied as untimely by the trial court on July 23, 1999. On June 25,1999, the trial court vacated its order as it pertained to inspecting the transcript prior to filing. On July 14, 1999, the defendant also filed an extraordinary motion for new trial based upon newly discovered evidence dealing with the trial court's order that the trial court review the transcript of the trial for errors prior to filing. On July 23, 1999, this extraordinary motion was also denied as not setting forth legal grounds for recusal.
10. Defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to recuse the trial judge. We do not agree.
Upon filing a motion to recuse under Uniform Superior Court Rule 25.3, the trial judge has the immediate duty to determine (1) if the motion has been timely filed; (2) the legal sufficiency of the affidavit; and (3) if the motion to recuse states a legal ground for recusal, i.e., assuming the facts alleged are true "whether recusal would be warranted." USCR 25.1 requires that the motion to recuse be made within five days after first learning of the basis for recusal, and not later than ten days prior to trial or hearing, or "unless good cause be shown for failure to meet such time requirements."
(a) In regard to the motion to recuse of July 14, 1999, the trial court determined that it was untimely, which is the first duty of such judge when a motion to recuse is filed. The bases for recusal were matters that were known on April 12, 1999, occurred during trial, or arose out of the entry of the order of May 26, 1999. The trial court properly ruled that the motion was untimely, because the most recent in time grounds was the order of May 26, 1999, which was entered approximately 48 days prior to filing the motion to recuse. Unless the affidavit sets forth facts, reasons, and circumstances for the delayed filing of the motion that constitute good cause shown, such exception in the rule does not arise and would not be considered by the trial court in determining timeliness; the movant must invoke specifically such "good cause shown" exception.
(b) The trial court properly determined that the motion did not state legally sufficient grounds for recusal in that the defendant did not show extrajudicial bias or abuse of discretion of the trial judge in ordering that the transcript be prepared and reviewed by the trial court prior to filing; the objected-to portion of the order was vacated prior to the completion of the transcript so that it caused no delay in the appeal process.
(c) USCR 25.6 provides that, when the motion for recusal is transferred to another judge to pass upon the motion, such other judge will hear the matter based upon affidavit only at a hearing, "but may, in the exercise of discretion, convene an evidentiary hearing."
Thus, Christensen is not entitled to have an evidentiary hearing unless his motion is found to be (1) timely; (2) the affidavit legally sufficient; and (3) the grounds legally sufficient; then the judge, hearing the recusal motion on the evidence, must exercise sound discretion to grant such evidentiary hearing. USCR 25.
11. Christensen contends that the trial court erred in denying his extraordinary motion for new trial based upon newly discovered evidence. We do not agree.
An extraordinary motion for new trial based upon newly discovered evidence is an improper vehicle to raise a motion to recuse; a motion to recuse can only be raised pursuant to USCR 25, which incorporates by rule approved by the Supreme Court the procedures to be followed in all cases of recusal. To allow an extraordinary motion for new trial based on newly discovered evidence to be a vehicle to raise the issue of recusal would allow by indirection what is prohibited by direction, i.e., untimely motions to recuse, and would render the USCR 25 procedure meaningless; therefore, such motion cannot be used in such fashion. Further, the holding in Division 1 governs this Division as well.
Judgment affirmed. Johnson,
C. J., Pope, P. J., Blackburn, P. J., and Phipps, J., concur. Barnes and Mikell, JJ, dissent.
A person commits the offense of battery when he or she intentionally causes . . . visible bodily harm to another. As used in this Code section, the term "visible bodily harm" means bodily harm capable of being perceived by a person other than the victim and may include, but is not limited to, substantially blackened eyes, substantially swollen lips or other facial or body parts, or substantial bruises to body parts.
OCGA § 16-5-23.1 (a), (b).
Ross v. State, 214 Ga. App. 385 (448 SE2d 52) (1994).
OCGA § 16-5-23.1 (a).
Paradise v. State, 212 Ga. App. 166, 170 (4) (b) (441 SE2d 497) (1994).
Compare OCGA § 16-5-23; 16-5-23.1.
OCGA § 16-5-24 (a).
Paradise v. State, supra at 170 (4) (b).
A person charged with the offense of simple assault or simple battery may introduce in evidence any opprobrious or abusive language used by the person against whom force was threatened or used; and the trier of facts may, in its discretion, find that the words used were justification for simple assault or simple battery.
OCGA § 16-5-25.
Danzis v. State, 198 Ga. App. 136, 137 (3) (400 SE2d 671) (1990).
Justification goes to negate criminal intent. See Green v. State, 240 Ga. App. 774, 776 (525 SE2d 154) (1999).
Childers v. State, 228 Ga. App. 214, 215 (1) (491 SE2d 456) (1997).
Taylor v. State, 178 Ga. App. 817, 818 (2) (344 SE2d 748) (1986); Blackwood v. State, 224 Ga. App. 486, 489 (2) (b) (480 SE2d 914) (1997).
Webb v. State, 228 Ga. App. 624, 625-626 (492 SE2d 312) (1997).
(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Id. at 626. Further, whether a victim's injury meets the evidentiary criteria to elevate a battery to aggravated battery is a question for the jury. Thus, we decline Christensen's additional invitation to define the types of injuries that can meet such standard.
Yawn v. State, 237 Ga. App. 206, 207 (515 SE2d 182) (1999).
Jones v. State, 242 Ga. App. 357, 359 (2) (529 SE2d 644) (2000).
(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Brinson v. State, 208 Ga. App. 556, 557 (1) (430 SE2d 875) (1993).
Since the evidence was properly admitted under a res gestae exception to the hearsay rule, we will not address Christensen's contention that the State failed to prove the evidence was admissible under a necessity theory. "Georgia law has never required proof of unavailability of the declarant to admit res gestae. [Cit.]" (Punctuation omitted.) Stovall v. State, 216 Ga. App. 138 (1) (453 SE2d 110) (1995).
Rayburn v. State, 194 Ga. App. 676, 677-678 (4) (391 SE2d 780) (1990).
Huzzie v. State, 236 Ga. App. 192, 197 (6) (512 SE2d 5) (1999).
Lawson v. State, 224 Ga. App. 645, 649 (4) (481 SE2d 856) (1997).
Compare Jackson v. State, 237 Ga. App. 746, 747 (516 SE2d 792) (1999).
Wainwright v. State, 197 Ga. App. 43, 44-45 (2) (397 SE2d 456) (1990).
State v. Fleming, 245 Ga. 700 (267 SE2d 207) (1980).
Birt v. State, 256 Ga. 483, 484 (1) (350 SE2d 241) (1986).
See Quarterman v. Quarterman, 268 Ga. 807, 808-809 (4) (493 SE2d 146) (1997); Wellons v. State, 266 Ga. 77, 88-89 (19) (463 SE2d 868) (1995); Baptiste v. State, 229 Ga. App. 691, 698 (2) (494 SE2d 530) (1997).
See id.; Threatt v. State, 211 Ga. App. 630 (2) (440 SE2d 61) (1994); Foody v. State, 200 Ga. App. 230 (407 SE2d 469) (1991).
State v. Fleming, supra at 702 (1); see also Wellons v. State, supra at 88 (18); Birt v. State, supra at 486 (4); King v. State, 246 Ga. 386, 390 (7) (271 SE2d 630) (1980); Baptiste v. State, supra at 694 (1).
See Pace v. State, 271 Ga. 829, 833 (6) (524 SE2d 490) (1999); OCGA § 9-11-43 (b); Johnson v. Aetna Finance, 139 Ga. App. 452, 453-454 (2) (228 SE2d 299) (1976); Price v. Star Svc. &c. Corp., 119 Ga. App. 171, 178-179 (3) (166 SE2d 593) (1969).
See in general State v. Fleming, supra at 702-703; Stevens v. Wakefield, 160 Ga. App. 353, 356 (2) (287 SE2d 49) (1981), rev'd on other grounds, Wakefield v. Stevens, 249 Ga. 254 (290 SE2d 58) (1982); Howard v. Dept. of Human Resources, 157 Ga. App. 306, 308 (1) (277 SE2d 301) (1981).
See Threatt v. State, supra at 630 (2).