Case Name: Veronica VINCENT, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CHICAGO ASSOCIATION OF REALTORS, et al., Defendants-Appellees
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 2008-02-20
Citations: 266 F. App'x 472
Docket Number: No. 07-3962
Parties: Veronica VINCENT, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CHICAGO ASSOCIATION OF REALTORS, et al., Defendants-Appellees.
Judges: Before FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Chief Judge, JOEL M. FLAUM, Circuit Judge, and TERENCE T. EVANS, Circuit Judge.
Reporter: West's Federal Appendix
Volume: 266
Pages: 472–473

Head Matter:
Veronica VINCENT, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CHICAGO ASSOCIATION OF REALTORS, et al., Defendants-Appellees.
No. 07-3962.
United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.
Submitted Feb. 7, 2008.
Decided Feb. 20, 2008.
Veronica Vincent, Oak Park, IL, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
Peter M. Friedman, Holland & Knight, Alan S. King, Drinker, Biddle, Gardner & Carton, Paul H. Burmeister, City Colleges of Chicago, Chicago, IL, Ford Realty Inc., Oak Park, IL, for Defendants-Appellees.
Before FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Chief Judge, JOEL M. FLAUM, Circuit Judge, and TERENCE T. EVANS, Circuit Judge.
This successive appeal has been submitted to the original panel under Operating Procedure 6(b). After examining the briefs and the record, we have concluded that oral argument is unnecessary. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(a); Cir. R. 34(f).

Opinion:
Order
On remand after our prior opinion, Vincent v. City Colleges of Chicago, 485 F.3d 919 (7th Cir.2007), the district court held a bench trial and found against plaintiff on all material factual issues. The judge concluded that plaintiff had agreed that the City Colleges may use the phrase "Smart Foreclosure Buying" without restriction; that the initials in the course materials were "V.N." and not "V.V." as plaintiff had alleged; that these initials do not refer to a course's instructor (so there was no false representation); that as soon as the Association received notice from plaintiff it stopped selling the copyrighted materials; and that the phrase "Smart Foreclosure Buying" does not have a secondary meaning associating it with plaintiff, so that the trademark claim fails.
Plaintiff does not contend that any of these findings is clearly erroneous. Instead she says that she was entitled to a jury trial. But neither her complaint nor any other document filed within 10 days of the last pleading — the time limit established by Fed.R.Civ.P. 38(b)(1) — demanded a jury trial. Plaintiff did not make that request until trial was impending. The district court denied the motion as Untimely-
Appellate review of such a decision is deferential, see Lac du Flambeau Band of Indians v. Stop Treaty Abuse, 991 F.2d 1249, 1254 (7th Cir.1993), and we conclude that the district judge did not abuse his discretion. The delay was substantial (about two years after the last pleading), and a request on the eve of trial exposes the other side to cost and potential prejudice. As the district judge remarked, "there are important differences in preparing for a bench trial and a jury trial such as exhibits, witness questioning, preparing jury instructions and the like." The only reason that plaintiff offers for her long delay is that she did not focus on the subject until after the summary-judgment stage. That is not, however, a justification; the Civil Rules expressly require the decision to be made early in the case, and a litigant's disagreement with that approach (or inattention to the choices that must be made) does not require the court to go along. See McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113, 113 S.Ct. 1980, 124 L.Ed.2d 21 (1993).
Affirmed.