Case Name: The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Jason Paul MCGLAUGHLIN, Defendant-Appellant.
Court: Colorado Court of Appeals, Division VII
Jurisdiction: Colorado
Decision Date: 2018-08-09
Citations: 428 P.3d 691
Docket Number: 15CA2008
Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Jason Paul MCGLAUGHLIN, Defendant-Appellant.
Judges: 
Reporter: Pacific Reporter 3d
Volume: 428
Pages: 691–706

Head Matter:
The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Jason Paul MCGLAUGHLIN, Defendant-Appellant.
15CA2008
Colorado Court of Appeals, Division VII.
Announced August 9, 2018
Cynthia H. Coffman, Attorney General, Gabriel P. Olivares, Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee
Krista A. Schelhaas, Alternate Defense Counsel, Littleton, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant

Opinion:
Opinion by JUDGE BERGER
¶ 1 Like many states, Colorado permits law students to represent defendants in criminal cases under limited circumstances and subject to specific requirements that must be met by both the law student and the supervising lawyer. C.R.C.P. 205.7.
¶ 2 After pleading guilty to third degree assault and violation of a protection order, defendant, Jason Paul McGlaughlin, moved to vacate his plea and the resulting convictions, claiming that he was deprived of his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel when he was represented only by a law student, not a licensed lawyer, at his plea hearing.
¶ 3 The postconviction court denied McGlaughlin's Crim. P. 35(c) motion without a hearing, concluding that the record disproved McGlaughlin's claim. We disagree with the postconviction court's analysis and disposition and reverse the court's order.
I. Relevant Facts and Procedural History
¶ 4 McGlaughlin was involved in a fight with his ex-girlfriend's new boyfriend. The prosecution charged him with second degree assault (a felony) and a related traffic offense.
¶ 5 Based on McGlaughlin's alleged conduct, his ex-girlfriend obtained a temporary protection order that prohibited McGlaughlin from contacting her. McGlaughlin allegedly violated the order twice, which resulted in the filing of two additional misdemeanor charges.
¶ 6 McGlaughlin resolved all these charges by pleading guilty to one count of third degree assault (a misdemeanor) and to one count of violating a protection order (also a misdemeanor). At his plea hearing, McGlaughlin was represented by a law student extern practicing under C.R.C.P. 205.7. The court accepted McGlaughlin's plea and sentenced him to two years of probation.
¶ 7 McGlaughlin alleged the following material facts in his Crim. P. 35(c) motion, which sought to vacate his plea and conviction:
• The deputy public defender who was assigned to supervise the law student was not present in the courtroom when he pleaded guilty.
• He was unaware, until after the plea hearing, that the student was not, in fact, a licensed lawyer.
• While he pleaded guilty only to misdemeanors, he was charged with a felony, and law students are prohibited from representing defendants in felony proceedings.
• He never consented, in writing or otherwise, to representation by a law student.
• The law student did not make a record during the plea hearing that she was an extern, and the court was not aware that she was one.
¶ 8 The postconviction court denied his motion without a hearing, concluding that (1) the record established that the deputy public defender was, in fact, present at the plea hearing; (2) McGlaughlin was adequately represented by counsel at all critical stages of the proceedings; (3) the record established that McGlaughlin was not entitled to relief on the basis of his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel; and (4) McGlaughlin's plea was entered knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.
II. The Postconviction Court Erred by Denying McGlaughlin's Claim Without a Hearing
¶ 9 McGlaughlin argues that his plea was constitutionally invalid under the Sixth Amendment because he was not represented by a licensed lawyer at a critical stage of his criminal case. He also asserts that the assistance that he received from the law student who represented him was ineffective because the deputy public defender did not adequately supervise her.
A. Colorado's Law Student Practice Rule
¶ 10 As relevant to our analysis, C.R.C.P. 205.7 imposes the following conditions and limitations on the representation of criminal defendants by law students:
• They cannot represent a defendant who "has been charged with a felony." C.R.C.P. 205.7(2)(a)(i).
• The defendant must consent, in writing, to the law student's representation. C.R.C.P. 205.7(2)(a)(i)(B).
• The defendant's written consent "shall be made in the record of the case and shall be brought to the attention of the judge of the court." C.R.C.P. 205.7(2)(a)(ii).
• When representing the office of the state public defender and its clients, the law student must be "under the supervision of the public defender or one of his or her deputies." C.R.C.P. 205.7(2)(a)(i)(B).
• The supervising lawyer must sign and approve all pleadings, briefs, and other legal documents. C.R.C.P. 205.7(2)(a)(iii).
B. The Effect of a Violation of C.R.C.P. 205.7
¶ 11 There is no serious disagreement that a number of these conditions were violated in this case. Indeed, the postconviction court so found. The question we must decide, then, is the effect, if any, of those violations on McGlaughlin's guilty pleas and resulting convictions.
¶ 12 A criminal defendant has a Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of counsel at all critical stages of his criminal case. U.S. Const. amend. VI ; Wheat v. United States , 486 U.S. 153, 158-59, 108 S.Ct. 1692, 100 L.Ed.2d 140 (1988) ; People v. Arguello , 772 P.2d 87, 92 (Colo. 1989). "[T]he acceptance of a plea offer and the entry of a guilty plea is a critical stage, creating an entitlement to counsel." Carmichael v. People , 206 P.3d 800, 805 (Colo. 2009). The interpretation and application of the Sixth Amendment is a matter of federal, not Colorado, law. Cmty. Hosp. v. Fail , 969 P.2d 667, 672 (Colo. 1998).
¶ 13 The licensure of lawyers, however, is a matter of state law. People v. Coria , 937 P.2d 386, 389 (Colo. 1997). The Colorado Supreme Court has the "sole authority to license attorneys . and to prescribe the rules and circumstances under which a person may appear as counsel in Colorado courts." Id. Thus, conceivably, the supreme court could, as a matter of state law, authorize law students to engage in the plenary practice of law. We need not address any Sixth Amendment ramifications of doing so, because the supreme court has refused to exercise any such authority.
¶ 14 In Coria , the court rejected the argument that law students are the equivalent of licensed lawyers when they practice under C.R.C.P. 205.7. Id. There, the defendant argued that his Sixth Amendment rights were violated when the trial court refused him his counsel of choice - a law student extern. Id. The supreme court held that the defendant's Sixth Amendment rights were not violated because "the law student intern was neither a deputy public defender nor a licensed Colorado practitioner. Defendants do not have a right under the Sixth Amendment to be represented by unlicensed persons. '[A]n advocate who is not a member of the bar may not represent clients . in court.' " Id. (quoting Wheat , 486 U.S. at 159, 108 S.Ct. 1692 ). It follows that a law student is an "unlicensed person[ ]," not a licensed lawyer. Id.
1. The Supervising Lawyer's Presence
¶ 15 C.R.C.P. 205.7 does not explicitly require the presence of the supervising lawyer in the courtroom during critical stages of criminal cases, unlike the rules of virtually every other state that authorizes the limited practice of law by law students. See, e.g. , Ill. Sup. Ct. R. 711(c)(2)(iii) (stating that a law student may participate in criminal proceedings "as an assistant of the supervising member of the bar, who shall be present and responsible for the conduct of the proceedings"); Miss. Code Ann. § 73-3-207(e) (West 2017) ("Law students may appear and participate in trials and hearings in courts if the supervising attorney or clinical teacher is present and supervising the student."); Wash. Admission & Practice R. 9 (detailing the activities a law student may do without the presence of the supervising lawyer and those where the supervising lawyer must be present).
¶ 16 The Sixth Amendment, however, requires that a defendant have a licensed lawyer at the critical stages of his criminal case, Wheat , 486 U.S. at 158-59, 108 S.Ct. 1692, and, as noted, the Colorado Supreme Court has held that law students are not licensed lawyers, Coria , 937 P.2d at 389. Thus, the Sixth Amendment requires that a licensed lawyer be present in the courtroom when a law student represents a criminal defendant during a critical stage of his criminal case.
¶ 17 If the supervising lawyer is not in the courtroom during those critical stages, no licensed lawyer is present, and the defendant is denied his constitutional right to counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. Such a complete deprivation of counsel is a structural error, requiring reversal without regard to any showing of prejudice. United States v. Cronic , 466 U.S. 648, 659 n.25, 104 S.Ct. 2039, 80 L.Ed.2d 657 (1984) ; Hagos v. People , 2012 CO 63, ¶ 10, 288 P.3d 116.
2. Other Violations of C.R.C.P. 205.7
¶ 18 Having determined that it is a violation of C.R.C.P. 205.7 for the supervising lawyer not to be present during critical stages of a criminal case, and that such a violation constitutes structural error, we now turn to the question of how to evaluate other possible violations of C.R.C.P. 205.7. No Colorado appellate case has addressed this question; however, a number of other states (applying similar statutes or rules) have.
¶ 19 One line of cases holds that even if a licensed lawyer appears at the proceeding, the substantial involvement by a law student (such as the examination of witnesses), without the client's consent to representation by the law student, is a structural error. See People v. Miller , 89 Cal.App.3d Supp. 14, 152 Cal.Rptr. 707, 709 (1979) ; In Interest of C.B. , 546 So.2d 447, 448 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989) ; see also In re Denzel W. , 237 Ill.2d 285, 341 Ill.Dec. 460, 930 N.E.2d 974, 986 (2010) (Freeman, J., dissenting).
¶ 20 This conclusion is premised on the theory that allowing a non-lawyer to participate in the proceeding without the defendant's actual consent constitutes a partial waiver of the right to counsel. Miller , 152 Cal.Rptr. at 709. Such a waiver must be knowingly, voluntarily, and intentionally made. Id.
¶ 21 Another line of cases holds that all violations of the rules governing student practice - other than the threshold question of the supervising lawyer's presence - are evaluated under the Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), test governing the ineffective assistance of counsel. Washington v. Moore , 421 F.3d 660, 662 (8th Cir. 2005) ; Denzel W. , 341 Ill.Dec. 460, 930 N.E.2d at 983-84 ; State v. Loding , 296 Neb. 670, 895 N.W.2d 669, 676-82 (2017).
¶ 22 We agree with those decisions that apply Strickland to violations other than the absence of the supervising lawyer. They appropriately distinguish the situation in which the defendant is not represented by counsel at all - when only a non-licensed law student is representing the defendant during a critical stage of his criminal case - from the very different circumstance in which the defendant is represented by a licensed lawyer but the representation allegedly falls below the level of competence demanded by the Constitution, due in part to the participation of the law student.
¶ 23 While the presence or absence of a supervising lawyer in the courtroom is a binary choice, other possible violations of C.R.C.P. 205.7, such as the quality and quantity of supervision, or whether consent was given (orally, in writing, or both), are more nuanced. Once it has been determined that the defendant was represented by a licensed lawyer, it is entirely appropriate to determine the adequacy of that representation by the test for ineffective assistance of counsel announced in Strickland , 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052. See Denzel W. , 341 Ill.Dec. 460, 930 N.E.2d at 983.
C. Analysis of McGlaughlin's Crim. P. 35(c) Motion
¶ 24 The supreme court has repeatedly held that a postconviction court must hold an evidentiary hearing on a Crim. P. 35(c) motion "unless the motion, the files, and the record clearly establish that the allegations in the motion lack merit and do not entitle the defendant to relief." Kazadi v. People , 2012 CO 73, ¶ 17, 291 P.3d 16 (emphasis added) (citing White v. Denver Dist. Court , 766 P.2d 632, 634 (Colo. 1988) ). "Summary denial of a postconviction relief motion is also appropriate if the claims raise only an issue of law, or if the allegations, even if true, do not provide a basis for relief." People v. Venzor , 121 P.3d 260, 262 (Colo. App. 2005). "Likewise, if the claims are bare and conclusory in nature, and lack supporting factual allegations, the motion may also be denied without a hearing." Id.
¶ 25 We review de novo a postconviction court's denial of a Crim. P. 35(c) motion without a hearing. People v. Gardner , 250 P.3d 1262, 1266 (Colo. App. 2010) ; see also People v. Higgins , 2017 COA 57, ¶ 11, 413 P.3d 298 ; People v. Smith , 2017 COA 12, ¶ 12, 413 P.3d 195 ; People v. Phipps , 2016 COA 190M, ¶ 20, 411 P.3d 1157.
¶ 26 At the same time, we recognize the tension between de novo review and the supreme court rule authorizing postconviction courts to make some findings of fact without a hearing in deciding Crim. P. 35(c) motions. See Crim. P. 35(c)(3)(V). But, contrary to the dissent's contention, not every disputed question of fact can be decided without a hearing. Were that the case, the supreme court's default rule that a hearing is required unless an exception applies would be swallowed by the exception itself.
¶ 27 To give effect to the supreme court's default rule, deference to a postconviction court's factual finding by application of the clearly erroneous standard is warranted only when the factfinding was made using accepted procedures and when the record clearly establishes the fact. Neither requirement was met here.
¶ 28 Ordinarily, of course, in order to properly find disputed facts, a court holds a hearing and considers all (not just some) of the relevant evidence, documentary and testimonial, before making a factual finding. See, e.g. , J.A. Walker Co. v. Cambria Corp. , 159 P.3d 126, 130 (Colo. 2007) (applying this rule to a fraudulent inducement challenge to an arbitration agreement); Archangel Diamond Corp. v. Lukoil , 123 P.3d 1187, 1190 (Colo. 2005), as modified on denial of reh'g (Dec. 19, 2005) (applying this rule in the C.R.C.P. 12(b)(2) context); People v. Wunder , 2016 COA 46, ¶ 34, 371 P.3d 785 ("[A] trial court may not, consistent with procedural due process, enter judgments for civil penalties and restitution on disputed facts without holding an evidentiary hearing.").
¶ 29 Here, the postconviction court relied on some evidence to find that the public defender was present in the courtroom during McGlaughlin's plea hearing. But, the court did not consider all of the evidence, some of which would support a finding that the public defender was not present. And, indisputably, it did not consider the evidence perhaps most probative of the question - testimony by the public defender and even the presiding judge. For this reason alone, the court's factual finding is not entitled to deference under the clearly erroneous standard of review.
¶ 30 Moreover, the second requirement for deference is also lacking - the fact is not "clearly established" by the existing record.
¶ 31 To effectuate the supreme court's relevant holdings, postconviction courts may only dispense with a hearing when the record clearly establishes that the defendant is not entitled to relief. Kazadi , ¶ 17. That is, when a disputed issue of material fact is central to the determination of whether the defendant has alleged a meritorious postconviction claim, that fact may be determined by the court only when the fact itself is "clearly established." See IV ABA Standards for Criminal Justice § 22-4.6(a) (2d ed. 1980) ("A plenary hearing to receive evidence, by testimony or otherwise, is required whenever there are material questions of fact which must be resolved in order to determine the proper disposition of the application for relief."). It follows that a postconviction court may make a dispositive factual finding without a hearing only when the fact in question is "clearly established."
¶ 32 For the reasons we articulate below, the historical finding of fact that the public defender was present at the plea hearing is not clearly established by the existing record. As a result, contrary to the dissent's suggestion, we may not defer to that factual finding. We must instead remand for the postconviction court to hold an evidentiary hearing on that question and then make findings of fact after considering all of the relevant evidence.
1. The Public Defender's Presence
¶ 33 As noted, McGlaughlin specifically alleged in his Crim. P. 35(c) motion that the deputy public defender was not present in the courtroom when he pleaded guilty.
¶ 34 In finding that the deputy public defender was present at the plea hearing, the postconviction court primarily relied on the plea court's minutes. Based on our review of the court's minutes (reproduced below), we are convinced that those minutes alone cannot properly be the basis of the court's factual finding made without a hearing.
¶ 35 First, the minutes relied on by the postconviction court reflect two separate proceedings: the plea hearing, which took place on November 19, 2012, and the sentencing hearing, which took place on January 10, 2013. Even if the deputy public defender was present at the sentencing hearing (and he apparently was based on the transcript of that hearing), such a determination is not dispositive of the question whether the deputy public defender also was present at the critical plea hearing.
¶ 36 We cannot determine from the face of the minutes whether the deputy public defender was present at the plea hearing, the sentencing hearing, or both. Nor can we determine when the apparently different handwritten notations were made by the presiding judicial officer. Importantly, we cannot tell if the name of the deputy public defender (A. Egizi) was inserted at the sentencing hearing or at the plea hearing.
¶ 37 Second, there is other evidence in the record that supports a finding that the public defender was not present. The transcript of the plea hearing, for example, does not reflect the appearance of the deputy public defender in any respect. He is not listed on the portion of the hearing transcript that traditionally contains the names of the lawyers who were present and participated in the hearing. So far as can be gleaned from the transcript, the deputy public defender never entered his appearance or introduced the law student to the court at the hearing as required by C.R.C.P. 205.7(2)(b)(i)(D). See Coria , 937 P.2d at 390.
¶ 38 The plea court also never addressed the deputy public defender at the hearing (indeed, from the context of the presiding judge's statements, we cannot tell whether the judge was aware that the person representing McGlaughlin was not a licensed lawyer, but instead a law student).
¶ 39 Third, the law student alone signed the "Attorney Certificate to the Court" in McGlaughlin's plea agreement and Crim. P. 11 advisement. Although the signature line is labeled as "Attorney's Signature," only the law student (who is not a lawyer) signed the document. The deputy public defender's name does not appear anywhere on the plea agreement.
¶ 40 While the court minutes constitute relevant evidence on the question of whether the deputy public defender was present at the plea hearing, they are by no means conclusive of that question, and they do not rise to the level of certainty required to dispense with an evidentiary hearing. In other words, the court minutes do not, together with any other information in the record, "clearly establish" that the deputy public defender was at the plea hearing. It follows that the postconviction court erred in deciding this quintessentially factual question without a hearing.
2. Effectiveness of McGlaughlin's Counsel
¶ 41 Just as we cannot on this record sustain the postconviction court's finding that the deputy public defender was present during McGlaughlin's plea hearing, we also cannot sustain the court's findings and conclusions without a hearing that the law student was adequately supervised - which was central to its conclusion that McGlaughlin received the effective assistance of counsel.
¶ 42 The postconviction court concluded - based in part on its erroneous finding that the deputy public defender was present at the plea hearing - that the law student was supervised in her representation of McGlaughlin. It also found that the law student was "involved in a supervised capacity with two licensed attorneys well before [McGlaughlin] entered a guilty plea." While that finding may be supported by the record, we conclude that absent a hearing, it is insufficient to support a further finding that the deputy public defender adequately supervised (or supervised at all) the law student in connection with the plea hearing.
¶ 43 Irrespective of whether the law student previously represented McGlaughlin or appeared on his behalf at other hearings, applying the Kazadi standard, the record does not "clearly establish" the quantity or quality of supervision respecting the legal advice provided in connection with the plea hearing. Therefore, the postconviction court erred in deciding this question without the benefit of a hearing.
3. An Evidentiary Hearing is Required
¶ 44 We therefore remand the case to the postconviction court for an evidentiary hearing. Based on the evidence presented at that hearing, the postconviction court must first determine if the deputy public defender was present during the plea hearing. If it finds that the deputy public defender was not present at McGlaughlin's plea hearing, then McGlaughlin was deprived of his constitutional right to counsel - a structural error - and the postconviction court must vacate McGlaughlin's plea and judgment of conviction, and reinstate the original charges. See Denzel W. , 341 Ill.Dec. 460, 930 N.E.2d at 982 ; see also Hagos , ¶ 10 ; Carmichael , 206 P.3d at 805.
¶ 45 If, on the other hand, the postconviction court finds that the deputy public defender was present during the plea hearing, it must then reanalyze McGlaughlin's remaining claims - including his claim that the law student was not adequately supervised - under Strickland . See Denzel W. , 341 Ill.Dec. 460, 930 N.E.2d at 983 ; see also Moore , 421 F.3d at 662 ; Loding , 895 N.W.2d at 680-81.
¶ 46 Finally, if, based on the evidence presented, the court finds that the deputy public defender was present during McGlaughlin's plea hearing and that McGlaughlin did not meet his burden under Strickland to show that he was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel, McGlaughlin is not entitled to relief and the court should again deny his Crim. P. 35(c) motion.
III. Conclusion
¶ 47 The order denying McGlaughlin's Crim. P. 35(c) motion is reversed, and the case is remanded for the proceedings directed above.
CHIEF JUDGE LOEB concurs.
JUDGE BERNARD dissents.
At the time of McGlaughlin's plea, the requirements for law practice by a law student were contained in both statutes, sections 12-5-116.1 and -116.2, C.R.S. 2012, and rules promulgated by the supreme court, C.R.C.P. 226.5 (2012). See People v. Coria , 937 P.2d 386, 389 (Colo. 1997) (generally discussing the statutes' requirements). In 2014, the supreme court promulgated C.R.C.P. 205.7, which replaced C.R.C.P. 226.5, Rule Change 2014(09), Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure (Amended and Adopted by the Court En Banc, Sept. 1, 2014), https://perma.cc/2LPT-3UQJ, and the legislature later relocated the pertinent statutes to sections 13-93-202 and -203, C.R.S. 2017, Ch. 192, sec. 1, § 13-93-202, -203, 2017 Colo. Sess. Laws 701-03. No substantive changes were made when the court promulgated C.R.C.P. 205.7. Because the requirements of both the rule and the statutes are essentially identical, we address only the rule.
The title of C.R.C.P. 205.7 is "Law Student Practice," and the rule refers to practice by "Law Student Externs." But in Coria , 937 P.2d at 389, the supreme court referred to the law student there as a "certified law student intern." We perceive no distinction between an intern and an extern, and we consider those terms to be synonymous.
We note that there is some question whether subsection (2)(a)(iii) applies to the law student practice governed by C.R.C.P. 205.7(2)(a)(i) or whether it is only applicable in situations that are not governed by C.R.C.P. 205.7(2)(a)(i). Given our disposition, it is unnecessary for us to decide this question.
We have no jurisdiction to address, and therefore express no opinions on, the regulatory or disciplinary consequences, if any, of any of these violations. See Colo. Supreme Court Grievance Comm. v. Dist. Court , 850 P.2d 150, 152 (Colo. 1993).
By citing these cases, which addressed statutes or rules that required the client's consent to be in writing, we do not address whether the Sixth Amendment, as opposed to rules governing student lawyer practice, requires written consent. See People v. Miller , 89 Cal.App.3d Supp. 14, 152 Cal.Rptr. 707, 709 (1979) ; In Interest of C.B. , 546 So.2d 447, 448 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
In that respect, we note that the judge who decided the postconviction motion was not the same judge who presided over the plea hearing. Thus, the postconviction court could have had no personal knowledge that the public defender was present at the plea hearing.
The rule that the interpretation of an unambiguous writing is a question of law, see O'Brien v. Vill. Land Co. , 794 P.2d 246, 249 (Colo. 1990), provides no support for the postconviction court's finding. In this case, no single writing is dispositive of the question of whether the public defender was present at the plea hearing. Indeed, to make a reasoned determination of that question, a fact finder must consider multiple writings (the court minutes, transcripts of the plea hearing, and the documents executed in connection with the plea hearing) as well as testimony of percipient witnesses: the defendant, the public defender, the prosecutor, and even the judge that presided over the hearing.