Case Name: Ashley v. Cornwell
Court: Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia
Jurisdiction: Virginia
Decision Date: 1811-04-30
Citations: 2 Munf. 268
Docket Number: 
Parties: Ashley v. Cornwell.
Judges: 
Reporter: Virginia Reports
Volume: 16
Pages: 453–454

Head Matter:
Ashley v. Cornwell.
Tuesday, April 30th, 1811.
Duties —Act of Congress — Construction. — Construction of the act of congress "laying- duties on stamped vellum, parchment and paper,” with respect to charter-parties. Under that act, a writing altering or explaining a charter-party, was not to he considered a charter-party, and as such, subject to the duty.
In the year 1801, John Cornwell instituted an action of assumpsit in the county court of Norfolk, against Warren Ashley, who pleaded the general issue ; and (the cause coming on to be tried at the June session, 1804) offered in evidence a writing executed by the plaintiff and himself, altering and explaining a former agreement for the affreightment of a vessel. The plaintiff objected to the reception of that writing ; because (as he alleged) it was not stamped according to the act of congress, entitled “An act laying duties on stamped vellum, parchment and paper,” passed the 6th of July, 1797. The court sustained the objection, and the defendant filed a bill of exceptions.
Verdict and judgment for the plaintiff,
which, upon appeal, was affirmed by the district court of Suffolk ; whereupon the defendant obtained a writ of supersedeas from a judge of this court; stating, in his petition, that the act of congress did not require such a writing as that offered in evidence to be stamped; and “the act being no longer in force, the provisions thereof ceased.”
The cause was argued on both points, by Wickham, for the plaintiff in error, and George K. Taylor, for the defendant,
but decided by the court here, upon the first point only, which is fully discussed in the following opinions, delivered on Friday, the 3d of May.

Opinion:
JUDGE} CABEEE.
The act of congress having laid a tax, by way of stamp, of one dollar on every charter-party, "-proceeds afterwards to declare "that every deed, instrument, note, memorandum, letters, or other writing between the captain or master, or owner of any ship or vessel, and any merchant, trader, or other person, in respect to the hire or freight of such ship or vessel, for conveyance of any money, goods,wares, merchandise or effects, laden, or to be laden, on board of such ship or vessel, shall be deemed and adjudged to be a charter-parLy."
It is essential to the nature of a charter-party that it should embrace the whole hire or freight of a vessel, and, of course, there cannot be two subsisting charter-parties, at the same time, for the same voyage. Any construction of the act of congress, therefore, that should multiply taxes on the same contract for the affreightment of a vessel, must .be contrary to the true intent and meaning of that act, which imposes but one I tax on any one entire contract, however various may be its modifications. It was not intended to change the substantial nature of a charter-party, but (for the purpose of preventing all doubts or evasions) to declare that every contract for the affreightment of a vessel shall be deemed and taken to be a charter-party, and, of course, subject to the tax; whether that contract assumed the form of a deed, note, memorandum, letter, or other writing The application of these principles will afford a ready solution of the first question made in this case, whether the writing excluded by the county court from going to the jury as evidence, was such a writing as, under the act of congress, was required to be stamped. Is it a charter-party ? Most certainly it is not, of itself, a new, distinct substantive contract for the affreightment of a vessel. It is silent as to the port of departure, and of destination, and as to the time of commencing or completing the voyage. But it refers to a former agreement, of which it is expressly a mere modification, both together forming one entire contract ; and, of course, no new tax was necessary. *T think, therefore, that the county court erred in excluding it from the jury; and (without giving any opinion on the other point) I am, on this ground, for reversing both judgments, and remanding the cause to the county court, with instructions to admit the evidence.