Case Name: George Barnes v. The State
Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1914-03-11
Citations: 75 Tex. Crim. 188
Docket Number: No. 2689
Parties: George Barnes v. The State.
Judges: 
Reporter: Texas Criminal Reports
Volume: 75
Pages: 188–213

Head Matter:
George Barnes v. The State.
No. 2689.
Decided March 11, 1914.
Rehearing denied May 20, 1914.
1.—Intoxicating Liquors—Soliciting Orders—Cold Storage—Validity of Laws.
The statute making it unlawful to solicit and take orders for intoxicating liquors in local option territory without license, as well as the one for keeping and maintaining a cold storage where intoxicating liquors are kept for others without license, are valid. Following Edmanson v. State, 64 Texas Crim. Rep., 413, and other cases. Davidson, Judge, dissenting.
3.—Same—Club—Soliciting Orders for Intoxicating Liquors.
Where the evidence showed that the members of the Elks’ Lodge organized an auxiliary club for the purpose of obtaining intoxicating liquors for their members in local option territory, and whereby they evaded the law against soliciting orders for intoxicating liquors, and also keeping the same in cold storage, a conviction for these offenses was sustained. Davidson, Judge, dissenting.
3.—Same—Case Stated—Soliciting Orders for Intoxicating Liquors.
Where said club was organized, a place rented, bar-room fixtures installed, a porter employed who was to fill the place of bar tender, and the members agreed among themselves that each one who desired intoxicating liquors should write his name on a slip of paper, place' it in an envelope with the amount of money for the amount of liquor he desired and drop the envelope in a box, from which it was taken by said bar tender, the liquor ordered' by him- and a card issued to each member, showing the amount of liquor he was entitled to, etc., the person so ordering said liquors without license for soliciting such orders violated the law under chapter 20 of the Acts of 1909. Davidson, Judge, dissenting.
4. —Same—Cold Storage—Club—Subterfuge.
Where a member of 'a club bought the ice, paid the rent and porter hire, received the beer at the depot, hauled the same to the rented place, and there placed the same on ice, and there kept the same for members contributing the money for its purchase, etc., he rendered himself guilty under the cold-storage statute, Davidson, Judge, dissenting.
5. —Same—Cold Storage—Accommodation.
Where defendant claimed that he ordered the intoxicating liquors and -kept the same in cold storage as an accommodation for members of a certain club, but the facts showed that he did so as a member one week, with the understanding that some other member of the club would do the same for the next week, and another the week after, etc., he violated both the spirit and letter of the cold-storage statute, and the soliciting-orders statute. Davidson, Judge, dissenting.
6. —Same—Statutes Construed—Constitutional Law.
Chapter 20 of the Acts of 1909, levying a tax upon the business of selling liquor by soliciting and taking orders therefor in local option territory, and also levying a tax upon persons, firms, etc., pursuing the business of operating a cold storage in local option territory is constitutional, and is not an act the effect of which is to license the sale of intoxicating liquors in territory where this is prohibited. Distinguishing State v. Texas Brewing Co., 157 S. W. Rep., 1166. Davidson, Judge, dissenting.
7. —Samé—Legislative Intent—Sale-—Taking Orders for Liquor.
In passing chapter 20 of Act of 1909, it was not the intent of the Legislature to license the sale of intoxicating liquors in local option territory, but the intent and purpose of the Legislature was to levy a heavy tax on those who pursued the business of taking orders for the sale of intoxicating liquors in prohibition territory, because the transfer of title takes place at the point where the order is accepted and filled and delivered to the carrier outside of said prohibition territory.
8. —Same—Statutes Construed—In Bari Materia.
Where the same Legislature, not only passed the Act taxing the business of soliciting and taking orders for intoxicating liquors in prohibition territory, but also passed the Act making it a felony to pursue the occupation of selling intoxicating liquors in prohibition territory, as well as making it a felony to make a single sale of such liquors in such territory, all these statutes must be considered in pari materia and must be treated as having formed in the legislative mind a connected whole, though considered by the Legislature at different dates. Following Ex parte Schmidt, 2 Texas Crim. App., 196, and other cases. Davidson, Judge, dissenting.
9. —Same—Sale—Soliciting—Statutes Construed—Supreme Court of Texas.
If it be intended by the Supreme Court of Texas, in the ease of State v. Texas Brewing Co., supra, to hold, as -contended by appellant, that the law levying a license fee on those making sales by soliciting and taking orders of intoxicating liquors in prohibition territory, would authorize one to engage in the sale of such liquors in said territory, this court can not concur in such construction, as the sale is not where the order is solicited, but at the point where the order is filled and delivered to the carrier, and this was the evil the Legislature sought to correct. Davidson, Judge, dissenting.
10. —Same—Court of Criminal Appeals—Supreme Court.
While this court has the utmost respect for the ability and learning of the members of the Supreme Court of Texas, yet this court is of equal dignity to the Supreme Court and has final jurisdiction in all criminal matters, and the soliciting and taking of orders, for the sale of intoxicating liquors in prohibition territory without paying the fee therein fixed is a penal offense and a matter coming under the jurisdiction of this court, which declares the same to be constitutional. Davidson, Judge, dissenting.
11,—Same—Legislative Intent—Evil Intended to Be Corrected.
The evil to which the legislative mind was directed in the passage of chapter 20 of the Acts of 1909 was the one that had grown up wherever prohibition had been adopted, towit, the soliciting 'and taking orders for intoxicating liquors to be filled by licensed dealers elsewhere to be shipped into prohibition territory; this intention is made manifest by the Act itself as well as by the other Acts passed by the same Legislature making it a felony to pursue the occupation of selling intoxicating liquors as well as making a sale in prohibition territory. Following Edmanson v. Statd, 64 Texas Crim. Rep., 413, and other cases. Davidson Judge, dissenting.
18.—Same—Sale—Soliciting.
This court does not hold that defendant was guilty of selling intoxicating liquors in prohibition territory, but holds that he is guilty of soliciting and taking orders therefor in prohibition territory, and also of keeping the same in cold storage for others without paying the license fee.
Appeal from the County Court of Harrison. Tried below before the Hon. Geo. L. Huffman.
Appeal from a conviction of soliciting and taking orders for intoxicating liquors in prohibition territory without license, and also of engaging in the business of operating cold storage in local option territory without license; penalty, a fine of $6000 and ninety days imprisonment in the county jail.
The opinion states the case.
J. H. T. Bill and S. P. Jones and Bill & Scott, for appellant.
—On question of unconstitutionality of law: State v. Brewing Co., 157 S. W. Rep., 1166; dissenting opinion in Edmanson v. State, 64 Texas Crim. Rep., 413, 142 S. W. Rep., 887.
On question that-the acts of defendant did not come within the provisions of what is commonly known as the statute prohibiting the sale of liquor by soliciting orders therefor: Jones v. State, 60 Texas Crim. Rep., 611, 132 S. W. Rep., 934; Golightly v. State, 90 S. W. Rep., 26; Rigsby v. State, 142 S. W. Rep., 901; Clay v. State, 65 Texas Crim. Rep., 402, 144 S. W. Rep., 280; Jones v. State, 66 Texas Crim. Rep., 403, 147 S. W. Rep., 251; Lafrentz v. State, 59 Texas Crim. Rep., 464, 125 S. W. Rep., 32; Short v. State, 91 S. W. Rep., 1087; Winslow v. State, 98 S. W. Rep., 241; Hood v. State, 34 S. W. Rep., 935; Wright v. State, 34 S. W. Rep., 935; Rector v. State, 90 S. W. Rep., 41.
On question of keeping and operating a cold storage: Standford v. State, 16 Texas Crim. App., 331; Halfin v. State, 18 id., 410; Wells v. State, 18 id., 417; Merritt v. State, 19 id., 435; Williams v. State, 23 id., 499, and cases above cited.
O. B. Lane, Assistant Attorney General, for the State.

Opinion:
HARPER, Judge.
—Appellant was prosecuted under complaint and information containing two counts, one charging him with soliciting and taking orders for intoxicating liquors, the other for keeping and maintaining a cold storage, a place where intoxicating liquors were kept for others.
Appellant waived a jury and submitted his case to the court, and he was found guilty on both counts. The validity of both of these laws has heretofore been passed on by this court, and both have been sustained. (Edmanson v. State, 64 Texas Crim. Rep., 413, 142 S. W. Rep., 887, and Ex parte Flake, 67 Texas Crim. Rep., 216, 149 S. W. Rep., 146.) After a careful review of this question we see no reason to change our views as to the validity of these laws. So the only question presented by this record is, does the evidence show that appellant has been guilty of violating these laws.
The evidence would show that when prohibition was adopted in Marshall some members of the Elks' Lodge at that place organized an auxiliary society, the purpose of which was to obtain and keep for their own use intoxicating liquors. A plan was adopted which, it may be said, in behalf of those joining this auxiliary society, they did not think would be in violation of the law, 'but their good faith in this matter can not avail them, for if they were mistaken it would be a mistake of law and not a mistake of fact. They employed attorneys to devise for them a scheme or plan whereby they could obtain and keep-intoxicating liquors on hand to be used by them in such quantities and at such times as they desired. But it appears to us that in an effort to evade the law, instead of doing so, a plan was devised that would be in violation of almost every law we have regulating and prohibiting the sale of intoxicating liquors, and if this scheme could be lawfully carried out our prohibitory laws instead of being denominated prohibitory, should be labeled "laws, to enable liquor to be sold without any regulation and without paying any tax."
The society was organized, a place rented, bar-room fixtures installed, a porter employed, who was to fill the place of bar-tender in the ordinary saloon. Ño orders were solicited in words, but they agreed amongst themselves they would place a locked box on the end of the bar counter, and each member who desired intoxicating liquor should write his name on a slip of paper, place in an envelope the amount of money he desired to expend that week for liquors, and drop the envelope in the box. It was first stipulated that a secretary should be elected, who would carry the key to this box, and would take out the name, money, etc., and order .the liquors. When it was received by the society the secretary would then issue to him a card entitling him to the amount of liquor he had ordered, to be drunk when he pleased during that week. The evidence would show that only beer has been ordered, and if a man placed in a dollar, he would get a ticket entitling him to twenty glasses of beer, and so on, the beer always being calculated at 5 cents a glass, the same as the price at a regular saloon. The secretary was to take the money, figure the cost of rent, ice, etc., for one week,- deduct this amount, and then order beer in bulk with the remainder of the money, and when received, keep it on ice, and have it dealt out to the holder of the ticket .by the porter when called for. It is claimed if the beer did not hold out a man lost that much of his ticket, but if there was more beer than the ticket called for, then it ivas drunk indiscriminately by the members of the society free. In this wise a regular beer saloon was maintained by the members of the society and they could get their ice cold • beer on tap at any and all times. However, the evidence would show that no secretary was elected, and the first year it was operated-Mr. Clark, who was an officer of the lodge, attended to all the duties supposed to be performed by the secretary of the society; carried the key to the box, once weekly took out the mon'ey, calculated the expense, and then ordered beer with the remainder; issued tickets to those contributing the money, and had the porter keep it on ice and serve the members. When he ceased to be an officer appellant took over the business for one week and attended to it, and since then it has been understood and agreed that some member of. the society should do so weekly. The only pay or consideration that lie was to or would receive would be that if he attended to it one week, some other member would voluntarily attend to the business the next week. But each and every one was informed that if he desired intoxicating liquors it was only necessary to place the money in the box, with his name, and it would be forthcoming the next week. The placing of this box on the bar counter, with the understanding that the beer would be ordered, was but an invitation to do so, as much as if express personal solicitation had been made. It was an attempted evasion of the law, while the very thing to be done was what the law prohibited. He took the orders for beer out of the box, ordered "the beer, and had it delivered to the person giving the order. He violated not only the express letter of the law, but its spirit and intent as well.
Again he sa]rs, that taking a portion of the money they placed in the box, paying the rent and porter hire with it, buying the ice, etc., receiving the beer at the depot, having it hauled to the rented apartment, and there placed on ico, and kept for those contributing the money, would not render him guilty under the cold storage statute. He claims he did all this as an accommodation, but the facts show that he did so one week, with the understanding that some other member of the auxiliary society would do the same fo,r him the next week, and another the week after, etc. We are of the opinion these acts violate both the spirit and letter of the cold storage statute. Ray Clark testified in behalf of appellant that he was with appellant when he opened the box, and he and Mr. Barnes made out a list of those who had placed money in the box, and the amount each had placed in there; that there was $26.50 taken out of the box by Mr. Barnes; that they took out $5 for rent, $1.80 for ice, $3.25 for express, $1 for gas, 35 cents for telephone, and 10 cents for exchange, leaving $15, and with this appellant ordered three half barrels of beer, and gave to the men contributing the money tickets call ing for a glass of beer for each 5 cents contributed. The express agent testified: "T am the agent for the Wells Fargo Express Company in tbn City of Marshall. This company does a general express business and brings liquor to Marshall, and this is the liquor book which I have with me. It contains a complete record of our shipments. Yes, it shows shipments of liquor on the first day of April, 1913, and shows that Mr. George Barnes received a half barrel of beer from Palestine, Texas. On page 78 it shows that on the 2nd day of April Mr. George Barnes received two half barrels of beer from Palestine, and Mr. Barnes signed for both of these shipments. Yes, there is a shipment to Mr. Barnes on page 99, that is on April 4th. Two half barrels of beer from Palestine, Texas, on page 116, there is a shipment of two half barrels of beer from Palestine, Texas, it was signed for by Mr. Barnes, this was on April 5th." When Mr. Clark was asked about the other shipments shown to have been received by Mr. Barnes during this week, he testified: "Yo, the club did not order more than fifteen ($15) dollars worth of beer, the other that was ordered, the club had nothing whatever to do with, but it was dispensed with the same apparatus and the same porter. The first three half barrels cost us fifteen ($15) dollars or five ($5) dollars per half barrel and after that was gone the Elks Lodge donated the five ($5) dollars and bought another half barrel. There wasn't any tickets issued or used for this half barrel, and Mr. Barnes or the porter signed for it for the express company. I don't remember what time it was ordered, but it was some time during the week. Yes, the half barrel that the express eompanjf's books show, under date April 1st, was the beer which was ordered by telephone; on Wednesday we received two more half barrels and my recollection is that we wrote for this; we also received two more half barrels on Friday. I am pretty sure that was ordered by mail, that the two half barrels received on Saturday was ordered by mail also, but shipped at different times. Sometimes it was ordered shipped as we needed it and sometimes it is not. Yes, we issued tickets to those parties who deposited the money that week, and after the three half barrels or the fifteen ($15) dollars worth was used up by those parties who had tickets, then any one who came up there drank up the other beer that was ordered after that. It was on tap free to the members of the Elks Lodge, as the lodge had contributed the five ($5) dollars to pay for it. The other three half barrels that were received that week was ordered by individual members of the Elks Lodge, and the social club had nothing to do with that. I think that the club's beer had gave out and some of the members wanted some more beer, and a crowd got together and each contributed some money and ordered the other three half barrels. Mr. Barnes ordered it for them and he received it there at the lodge rooms." So it is seen that appellant not only ordered the beer for the society, but also three half barrels of beer besides the amount the $15 and $5 rent paid for. The record also discloses he had it carried to the apartment; had it there kept on ice, and dispensed by the porter.
Without going further into the facts, we think the court was justified in finding appellant guilty, and the judgment is affirmed.
Affirmed.
DAVIDSON, Judge, dissents.