Case Name: Jessica WISTUK, Appellant v. LOWER MT. BETHEL TOWNSHIP ZONING HEARING BOARD and Lower Mt. Bethel Township Board of Supervisors
Court: Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania
Jurisdiction: Pennsylvania
Decision Date: 2005-11-23
Citations: 887 A.2d 343
Docket Number: 
Parties: Jessica WISTUK, Appellant v. LOWER MT. BETHEL TOWNSHIP ZONING HEARING BOARD and Lower Mt. Bethel Township Board of Supervisors.
Judges: BEFORE: COLINS, President Judge, and McGINLEY, Judge, and PELLEGRINI, Judge, and FRIEDMAN, Judge, and COHN JUBELIRER, Judge, and SIMPSON, Judge, and LEAVITT, Judge.
Reporter: West's Atlantic Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 887
Pages: 343–351

Head Matter:
Jessica WISTUK, Appellant v. LOWER MT. BETHEL TOWNSHIP ZONING HEARING BOARD and Lower Mt. Bethel Township Board of Supervisors.
Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania.
Submitted on Briefs Oct. 19, 2005.
Decided Nov. 23, 2005.
Peter C. Layman, Bangor, for appellant.
Dwight L. Danser, Easton, for appellee, Lower Mt. Bethel Township Zoning Hearing Board.
Christopher T. Spadoni, Bethlehem, for appellee, Lower Mt. Bethel Township Board of Supervisors.
BEFORE: COLINS, President Judge, and McGINLEY, Judge, and PELLEGRINI, Judge, and FRIEDMAN, Judge, and COHN JUBELIRER, Judge, and SIMPSON, Judge, and LEAVITT, Judge.

Opinion:
OPINION BY
Judge PELLEGRINI.
Jessica Wistuk (Wistuk) appeals from an order of the Court of Common Pleas of Northampton County (trial court) affirming the decision of the Zoning Hearing Board of Lower Mt. Bethel Township (Board) denying her request for a deemed approval of a variance and special exception to operate a dog kennel on her property located in Lower Mt. Bethel Township (Township).
Wistuk owns approximately 17 acres of land in an Agricultural Zoning District of the Township where she owns many farm animals, including horses, donkeys, hens, goats and chickens. She also owns pigs and steer which she slaughters. These animals are permitted in that area pursu ant to Section 310 of the Zoning Code which provides: "ANIMAL HUSBANDRY. The raising and keeping of livestock and poultry for capital gain, not including household and farm pets." She initially began raising puppies in the basement of her home as a breeder for purposes of selling them and then decided to expand her business into kennel operations. Apparently prior to obtaining the proper permits, Wistuk began her kennel operations, and she was issued an enforcement notice by the Township Zoning Officer charging her with operating a commercial dog kennel in the Township's Agricultural Zoning District without a permit.
Wistuk filed an appeal to the Board requesting that it 1) allow her to continue to operate a commercial kennel within an Agricultural Zoning District pursuant to Section 310 of the Zoning Ordinance as falling within the definition of animal husbandry; 2) grant a special exception to operate the kennel in an Agricultural Zoning District; 3) grant a vested rights permit to allow her to continue a commercial kennel operation within an Agricultural District; and 4) grant her a variance to have a dog run located within 300 feet of the nearest adjoining residence. Evidence was presented at five hearings before the Board on April 16, 2002; May 7, 2003; July 15, 2003; August 14, 2003; and September 30, 2003. At the close of the September 30, 2003 Board meeting, the Board announced that the record was closed effective September 30, 2003, and it would deliberate the matter on October 22, 2003. It stated that no testimony or oral arguments would be permitted on October 22, 2003, but that legal arguments could be submitted via briefs by counsel for consideration.
The Board held its meeting on October 22, 2003, at which no counsel from the September 30, 2003 hearing appeared. The Board issued a written decision on November 28, 2003, denying Wistuk's request to classify a commercial dog kennel as falling within the definition of animal husbandry under Section 310 of the Zoning Ordinance; denying her request for a special exception to operate a commercial dog kennel at her property in an Agricultural Zoning District; denying her request for a vested rights permit to continue a commercial dog kennel operation within an Agricultural Zoning District; and denying her request for a variance to have a dog run located within 300 feet of the nearest adjoining residence.
From that decision, Wistuk filed with the trial court a complaint in mandamus against the Board arguing that she was entitled to a deemed approval of her application for a variance and special exception because the Board failed to render a written decision within 45 days after the last hearing on September 30, 2003, as mandated by Section 908(9) of the Municipalities Planning Code (MPC). Wistuk alleged that the Board did not issue its written decision until November 28, 2003, which was 59 days after the last Board hearing, and she did not agree on the record or in writing to extend the 45-day period for rendering its decision. In response, the Board argued that its last hearing was on October 22, 2003, and its November 28, 2003 written decision was well within the mandated 45-day period as it was issued 37 days later.
The trial court denied Wistuk's request for a deemed approval of her requested variance and special exception finding that the October 22, 2003 meeting was the last hearing and the 45-day period ran from that date. The trial court relied on this court's decision in Hogan v. Pequea Township Zoning Board, 162 Pa.Cmwlth. 282, 638 A.2d 464, petition for allowance of appeal denied, 538 Pa. 651, 647 A.2d 905 (1994), where we held that the MPC did not limit the term "hearing" to proceedings where the Board only received substantive evidence. The trial court further found that Wistuk had waived her right to argue that October 22, 2003, was the last hearing because both she and her counsel appeared at the September 30, 2003 hearing, and neither objected to the post-September 30, 2003 briefing period or questioned the effect briefing would have after the close of the evidence on the 45-day decision period.
Wistuk then filed this appeal, still maintaining that the October 22, 2003 Board meeting did not constitute a "hearing" because no testimony was taken, and just because briefs were submitted after the close of the September 30, 2003 hearing did not make the October 22, 2003 meeting a "hearing." She also argues that she did not waive the issue of the 45-day deemed approval rule at either the September 30, 2003 hearing or the October 22, 2003 meeting. We need only address the waiver argument because we agree with the trial court that she did, in fact, waive her right to contest that the October 22, 2003 meeting was the last hearing, making it unnecessary to reach the first issue raised.
In Hogan, this Court dealt with the similar issue of waiver and a board hearing involving the 45-day decision. There, a board similarly closed the record at the end of a July 23, 1991 hearing on a special exception requested by Hogan, but indicated that oral argument would occur on the next hearing date on September 19, 1991. Hogan did not object to that next hearing date. Between those two dates, the parties filed proposed findings of facts and conclusions of law. Hogan filed a legal memorandum on September 6, 1991, which was exactly 45 days after the July 23, 1991 hearing. On September 13, 1991, Hogan notified the parties that he believed he was entitled to a deemed approval and refused to participate in the September 19 hearing. Regardless, the board held its hearing denying his special exception. Hogan appealed the Board's decision and the trial court determined there was no deemed approval. On appeal to this Court, we affirmed because Hogan did not object to the September 19, 1991 date as a additional hearing date, stating: "Even if Hogan otherwise would have been entitled to a deemed approval of its special exception application, it waived its right to that deemed approval by failing to object to the previously announced argument date." Id. at 499, 638 A.2d 464. Wistuk argues that because this case is factually different in that oral argument was allowed at the next hearing where, here, no argument was allowed, it is inapplicable.
While the cases may be slightly different in that respect, it is right on point as to the waiver issue. While the evidentiary hear ing in this case ended at the September 30, 2003 hearing, the Board made it clear that the record would remain open until October 22, 2003, to receive briefs. As the trial court in this case pointed out, at no time did Wistuk or her counsel object to the post-September 30, 2003 briefing period or question the effect the briefing offered by the Board on the 45-day decision period. When she failed to object to allowing the record to remain open until October 22, 2003, to receive briefs, Wistuk, like the applicant in Hogan, waived her right to contend that the 45 days began from the September 30, 2003.
Accordingly, the order of the trial court is affirmed.
ORDER
AND NOW, this 23rd day of November, 2005, the order of the Court of Common Pleas of Northampton County, dated December 8, 2004, is affirmed.
. No issue has been raised regarding whether her other animals are kept for capital gain.
. Act of July 31, 1968, P.L. 805, as amended, 53 P.S. § 10908(9). Section 908(9) of the MPC provides, in relevant part:
The board . shall render a written decision or, when no decision is called for, make written findings on the application within 45 days after the last hearing before the board . where the board fails to render the decision within the period required by this subsection . the decision shall be deemed to have been rendered in favor of the applicant unless the applicant has agreed in writing or on the record to an extension of time.
. Our scope of review of an order denying mandamus is limited to determining whether the trial court has abused its discretion or committed an error of law. Malone v. West Marlborough Township Board of Supervisors, 131 Pa.Cmwlth. 347, 570 A.2d 147 (1990).