Case Name: WYOMING STATE BOARD OF EXAMINERS OF OPTOMETRY, Appellant (Plaintiff), v. PEARLE VISION CENTER, INC., a corporation, and Robert L. Holly, O.D., an individual, Appellees (Defendants)
Court: Supreme Court of Wyoming
Jurisdiction: Wyoming
Decision Date: 1989-01-04
Citations: 767 P.2d 969
Docket Number: No. 86-323
Parties: WYOMING STATE BOARD OF EXAMINERS OF OPTOMETRY, Appellant (Plaintiff), v. PEARLE VISION CENTER, INC., a corporation, and Robert L. Holly, O.D., an individual, Appellees (Defendants).
Judges: Before CARDINE, C.J., THOMAS, URBIGKIT and MACY, JJ., and BROWN, J., Retired.
Reporter: Pacific Reporter 2d
Volume: 767
Pages: 969–989

Head Matter:
WYOMING STATE BOARD OF EXAMINERS OF OPTOMETRY, Appellant (Plaintiff), v. PEARLE VISION CENTER, INC., a corporation, and Robert L. Holly, O.D., an individual, Appellees (Defendants).
No. 86-323.
Supreme Court of Wyoming.
Jan. 4, 1989.
Steven F. Freudenthal, Freudenthal, Salzburg, Bonds & Rideout, P.C., Cheyenne, for appellant (plaintiff).
Brent R. Kunz, Hathaway, Speight, Kunz, Trautwein & Barrett, Cheyenne, for appellee (defendants), Pearle Vision Center, Inc.
Dennis M. Grant, Grant & Osborn, Cheyenne, for appellee (defendant), Robert L. Holly, O.D.
Before CARDINE, C.J., THOMAS, URBIGKIT and MACY, JJ., and BROWN, J., Retired.

Opinion:
THOMAS, Justice.
At issue in this case is whether a franchise agreement for the marketing of optical products and services, entered into between a certificated optometrist and a corporation, results in fee splitting or the employment of a "steerer," both in violation of § 33 — 23—110(b)(i), W.S.1977. Additional questions are raised as to whether the franchiser was engaged in the practice of optometry without a valid certificate of registration in violation of § 33-23-103, W.S. 1977, or, as a general business corporation, was engaged indirectly in the practice of optometry in violation of § 33-23-lll(b)(iv), W.S.1977. Section 33-23-110(b)(i), W.S.1977, provides:
"(b) 'Unprofessional and dishonest conduct' as used in this act is hereby declared to mean:
"(i) The loaning of his license by any licensed optometrist to any person; the employment of 'cappers' or 'steerers' to obtain business, 'splitting' or dividing a fee with any person or persons, the advertising by any means whatsoever of optometric practice or treatment or advice in which untruthful, improbable,
misleading or impossible statements are made;
Section 33-23-103, W.S.1977, provides:
"(a) It is unlawful for any person in the state of Wyoming to practice or attempt to practice optometry or to advertise, or hold himself out as qualified to fit or adjust any lenses or lens in any manner or form as an aid to human eyesight, without first obtaining a certificate to practice optometry."
Section 33-23-lll(b), W.S.1977, provides:
"(b) It is unlawful:
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"(iv) For any person or persons not holding a certificate or any corporation, directly or indirectly, to practice optometry by employment of or contract with a person holding a certificate, or otherwise, provided that one holding a certificate may accept employment from a person, partnership, association or corporation to practice optometry with respect to the employees of such person, partnership, association or corporation."
The district court denied the injunctive relief sought by the Wyoming State Board of Examiners of Optometry (Board), holding that the arrangement between Pearle Vision Center, Inc. (Pearle), as the franchiser, and Robert L. Holly (Holly), a Board certificated optometrist as franchisee, did not transgress any of these statutory provisions. We are in accord with the judgment of the district court, and we affirm that judgment.
As appellant, the Board states the following issues in urging a reversal of the district court:
"1. Consideration of all the pleadings, affidavits, depositions, stipulated exhibits, and evidence presented to the District Court discloses that the District Court erroneously granted summary judgment in favor of the deféndants.
"2. Consideration of all pleadings, affidavits, depositions, stipulated exhibits, and evidence presented to the District Court discloses that there was no genuine issue of material fact, and that Plaintiff was entitled to judgment as a matter of law."
Pearle, as appellee, restates the issues on appeal in this way:
"1. Whether Defendants Pearle and Holly, by virtue of their having executed a franchise agreement and attendant agreements, have established a relationship which places Defendant Holly under the direction and control of Defendant Pearle?
"2. Whether the relationship between Defendants Pearle and Holly constitutes indirect practice of optometry by a corporation in violation of W.S. § 33-23-lll(b)(iv)?"
Holly also defends the decision of the district court in his favor, and his statement of the issues is:
"1. Did the District Court err in granting summary judgment in favor of Defendant, Robert L. Holly?
"2. Does the evidence presented to the District Court, in the way of pleadings, affidavits, depositions, exhibits and oral argument, support the district court's finding that there was no genuine issue of material fact and that Defendant, Robert L. Holly, was entitled to judgment as a matter of law?"
On September 16, 1985, the Board brought an action seeking injunctive relief and monetary damages against Holly and Pearle. This action followed the formal opinion of the Wyoming attorney general issued on August 20, 1985 which, in pertinent part, said:
"Section 33-23-lll(b)(iv), W.S.1977, precludes a corporation from the practice of optometry in Wyoming. This restriction includes any attempt by a corporation to practice optometry indirectly through the services of an individual who holds a certificate to practice optometry. A franchise agreement between a corporation and an individual licensed to practice optometry gives the franchiser a certain amount of control over the licensed practitioner. Therefore, this form of corporate control is also prohibited by statute."
The Board alleged in its complaint that Holly and Pearle were engaged in fee splitting in violation of § 33-23-110(b)(i), W.S. 1977; Holly was employing Pearle as a "steerer" to obtain business in violation of § 33-23-110(b)(i), W.S.1977; Pearle and/or Holly were engaged in "canvassing" in violation of § 33-23-lll(b)(i), W.S.1977; Pearle was engaged in the practice of optometry without a valid certificate of registration in violation of § 33-23-103, W.S. 1977; and Pearle, a general business corporation, was engaged indirectly in the practice of optometry in violation of § 33-23-lll(b)(iv), W.S.1977.
Holly and Pearle filed separate answers to the Board's complaint. In each answer, the respective defendant alleged that the relationship between Holly and Pearle was not prohibited by statute or, to the extent it might be prohibited by statute, the prohibition is unconstitutional. Discovery was pursued, and the several parties then moved for summary judgment on all issues. A hearing was set on the motions for summary judgment and, prior to that hearing, the Board withdrew its claim for monetary damages and dropped its allegations that Pearle and/or Holly were engaged in canvassing. The district court received briefs and heard oral argument and then granted summary judgment to Pearle and Holly on all remaining issues and denied the summary judgment sought by the Board.
Pearle is a Texas corporation, and it owns and operates retail optical stores in several states. Holly was licensed as an optometrist in Wyoming in 1983. Early in 1985, Holly wrote to Pearle and suggested that he would be interested in acquiring a Pearle franchise. Several letters from Pearle to Holly explaining various arrangements by which Holly could acquire a Pearle franchise are included in the record. Ultimately, Holly and Pearle agreed to an arrangement that required Holly to enter into a sublease of office space and a separate franchise agreement with Pearle. The action filed by the Board challenged the relationship between Pearle and Holly pursuant to the franchise agreement. The complaint did not allege that the agreement is a sham, or that the true relationship between Pearle and Holly was anything other than what was set forth in the agreement.
The sublease was for office space at the Frontier Mall in Cheyenne, Wyoming. Pursuant to the sublease, Holly agreed to pay Pearle a base rate and, in addition, a percentage of his total sales in excess of an established amount each month. Approximately two-thirds of the subleased office space was used for dispensing optical goods, and the remaining space was used by Holly to treat patients and perform op-tometric services. Pictures of the office demonstrate that a wall divided the two areas, separate entrances were available for each area in the office, and a common doorway provided internal access between the two offices.
The franchise agreement provided for the purchase by Holly of a Pearle franchise. The total consideration was $155,-000, and $15,000 was paid in cash with the remaining $140,000 financed by a ten-year loan from Pearle with an interest rate of three percent over the current prime rate. The purchase agreement for the franchise is a carefully drawn and detailed document. It sets forth the duties of the franchiser and the franchisee, and delineates the manner in which the franchisee is expected to operate the franchise. In forty-five pages, the agreement sets forth eighteen separate provisions with several subsections in each provision. The specific terms of both the sublease and the franchise purchase agreement will be discussed in connection with the disposition of the several issues.
Essentially, the Board's two issues are treated together in a series of arguments. The first argument of the Board is that the trial court erred because it did not find that Holly and Pearle violated the provision of § 33 — 23—110(b)(i), W.S.1977, which prohibits " 'splitting' or dividing a fee." The Board supports its claim that Holly was "splitting" or dividing fees with Pearle by reference to a required royalty which the franchise agreement provided in favor of Pearle. In pertinent part, the franchise agreement provides:
"7.4 Franchise Royalty
"(A) Except as provided in paragraph 7.4(D), during the term hereof Franchisee shall pay Pearle a non-refundable monthly royalty equal to eight and one-half percent (8½%) of Franchisee's monthly Gross Revenues (as hereinafter defined) from the sale of goods and services at, from or in conjunction with the Pearle Vision Center. Royalties shall be paid monthly on or before the fifteenth (15th) day of the month following the month during which such goods or services were sold. In the event Franchisee's annual statement of Gross Revenues required pursuant to Paragraph 9.2 hereof discloses a deficiency in royalty payments paid for such year, Franchisee shall pay Pearle the amount of such deficiency at the time the annual statement is delivered. No portion of the royalties collected by Pearle shall be refundable under any circumstances.
"(B) Definition of Gross Revenues "The term 'Gross Revenues' as used in this Agreement shall include all sums charged (whether under third party reimbursement programs or to regular customers and patients and whether or not received in full at time of sale) for optical and ophthalmic goods, merchandise and services and (as permitted by law) opto-metric and ophthalmologic services and merchandise sold or provided at, from or in conjunction with the Pearle Vision Center licensed herein. The term Gross Revenues excludes federal, state, county, and city sales taxes or other similar taxes levied upon customers on the basis of sales transactions and Allowable Sales Deductions (as hereinafter defined). 'Allowable Sales Deductions' include the balance due on customers' unclaimed orders, reimbursements and price adjustments to insurance carriers and governmental agencies and cash refunds to customers. Allowable Sales Deductions do not include monies lost on returned checks, credit card service charges or any other amounts not specifically included herein.
"(C) If Franchisee is not permitted by law to include in Gross Revenues sums charged for optometric or ophthalmologic services, or does not have access to information necessary to calculate such sums, then Gross Revenues for all purposes of this Agreement shall mean Gross Revenues as determined under 7.4(B) hereof (without including sums charged for op-tometric and ophthalmologic services) multiplied by 1.2. Pearle and Franchisee agree that such resulting amount is reasonably equivalent to the Gross Revenues the Franchisee would have under paragraph 7.4(B) hereof if Franchisee had included in Gross Revenues the sums charged for optometric and ophthalmo-logic services.
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"7.7 Impossibility
"If, by operation of law or otherwise, the royalty described in Paragraph 7.4 above cannot be based upon Gross Revenues as herein defined, the parties shall thereupon renegotiate a royalty applicable to revenues from such products and services as may lawfully be included in Gross Revenues or an alternative fee, which shall be sufficient to pay Pearle a return equal to the royalty provided for herein."
The franchise agreement unequivocally requires that monies received by Holly for optometric services be included in calculating the amount of royalty due under the agreement. Whether this requirement transgresses the statutory prohibition described as " 'splitting' or dividing a fee" depends upon a conclusion with respect to the nature of the conduct the legislature intended to proscribe. See McArtor v. State, 699 P.2d 288 (Wyo.1985); Hurst v. State, 698 P.2d 1130 (Wyo.1985).
In determining the intention of the legislature, we first examine the language of the statute in light of the purposes sought to be accomplished. K N Energy, Inc. v. City of Casper, 755 P.2d 207 (Wyo.1988); Amoco Production Company v. State Board of Equalization, 751 P.2d 379 (Wyo. 1988); Hurst, 698 P.2d at 1130; School Districts Nos. 2, 3, 6, 9 and 10 in Campbell County v. Cook, 424 P.2d 751 (Wyo. 1967). In considering the statutory language, words are accorded their plain and ordinary meaning unless some indication is present that the legislature intended a different meaning. Amoco, 751 P.2d at 379; Wyoming State Department of Education v. Barber, 649 P.2d 681 (Wyo.1982); Crox-ton v. Board of County Commissioners of Natrona County, 644 P.2d 780 (Wyo.1982). We assume the legislature intended to invoke a well-settled meaning of a word in the law at the time of its usage unless an unmistakable indication to the contrary is found. Sorenson v. State, 604 P.2d 1031 (Wyo.1979); Johnson v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 568 P.2d 908 (Wyo.1977).
The purpose of legislation prohibiting the " 'splitting' or dividing of a fee," as the context demonstrates in this instance, is to protect members of the consuming public; it is not to promote the economic welfare of optometrists. See People v. Sterling Optical Company, 26 Misc.2d 412, 209 N.Y. S.2d 953 (1960); State ex rel. Sisemore v. Standard Optical Company of Oregon, 182 Or. 452, 188 P.2d 309 (1947); Golding v. Schubach Optical Company, 93 Utah 32, 70 P.2d 871 (1937). When the express language of the statute is examined in the context of a purpose of public protection, it is clear that the activity which the legislature intended to prohibit is that which historically has been perceived as detrimental to the public welfare. That activity is described by invoking the slang terminology of "fee splitting," which is defined in Webster's Third International Unabridged Dictionary (1971) as "a dividing of a professional fee for a specialist's medical services with the recommending physician." That purpose would not extend to any conclusion that the legislature intended to prohibit every business relationship in which an optometrist agreed to pay a percentage of his optometric proceeds for a consideration furnished to him unless that consideration included providing patients or referring patients to the optometrist. See also, Lieberman v. Connecticut State Board of Examiners in Optometry, 130 Conn. 344, 34 A.2d 213 (1943).
The Board did not establish any facts sufficient to raise an issue with respect to whether Holly divides his fees with Pearle. The record establishes that Holly does not pay Pearle to send or direct patients to him. Considered in the context of the agreement, the royalty payment is for the privilege of operating the Pearle Vision Center. The fact that the consideration for that privilege is based in part upon a percentage of the proceeds derived from furnishing optometric services does not make it an agreement for " 'splitting' or dividing a fee" any more than would a consideration for the sublease which was based in part upon a percentage of the optometrist's income. The Board concedes that this latter is not prohibited. Furthermore, this franchise agreement encompasses alternative methods for computing the appropriate royalty fee. We do not understand that the Board would argue that, should Pearle charge a set franchise fee for the operation of the Pearle Vision Center, Holly would be prohibited by the statute from paying the set fee with monies he received from patients for optometric services.
In the absence of some evidence that Pearle in fact sent or referred patients to Holly for remuneration, the district court correctly concluded that there was no genuine issue of material fact with respect to any practice of " 'splitting' or dividing a fee." There, indeed, was evidence that Holly's optometric office was adjacent to the Pearle Vision Center which he managed, and there was a common doorway. The mere placement of an office in a clearly desirable business location, without more, could not lead to a conclusion that the statute was violated. We hold that the district court correctly entered summary judgment in favor of Pearle and Holly on that contention by the Board.
We have not ignored the Board's perfunctory contention that Pearle's "advertising specifically directed or encouraged 'patients' to go to Holly." This claim is more closely related to the Board's allegation that Holly employed "cappers" or "steer-ers" to obtain business. The Board did not present evidence by affidavit, or otherwise, to support this statement and, ordinarily, its resolution would be a finding of fact to be made by the appropriate arbiter if there were some evidence to pose a material issue in that regard. In the absence of evidence structuring an issue of material fact with respect to whether Holly paid Pearle to direct patients to him through Pearle's advertising, the trial court was not foreclosed from entering the summary judgment on the issue of dividing of fees. See Bettencourt v. Pride Well Service, Inc., 735 P.2d 722 (Wyo.1987).
The only evidence that might lead to an inference in this regard is copies of advertisements which were inserted in the record. A review of those advertisements discloses that the consumers are directed to Pearle and not to Holly for optometric services. Pearle and Holly each have a legitimate interest in promoting the services of Pearle and, therefore, both pay a portion of the advertising costs. In the advertisements introduced into the record, Holly's name is used only as the owner and operator of Pearle, although in one advertisement he is alluded to by a statement that a doctor of optometry "who is right next door" can give any customer a complete eye examination. These advertisements fall short of demonstrating, however, that Pearle, or Holly in collaboration with Pearle, encouraged or solicited patients for Holly's optometric services. All of the advertisements promote the activities of Pearle, and it would be a leap in logic to conclude that this demonstrated the division of Holly's fee for optometric services.
The Board has not directed us to any statute, nor have we found one, which prohibits an optometrist from owning and operating an optical dispensing establishment. Holly, as owner of the store, has a legitimate interest in attracting customers by lawful means. The record does not lend itself to any conclusion that Holly is inhibited from using his own name to attract customers to his Pearle Vision Center. We note that the legislature has prohibited any advertising that consists of "untruthful, improbable, misleading or impossible statements Section 32 — 23—110(b)(i), W.S.1977. It has not chosen, however, to prohibit optometrists from advertising and, if the optometrist may advertise his services, we can conceive no reason that would inhibit his joint advertisement of the services of his franchised optical dispensing store so long as the advertisements do not consist of "untruthful, improbable, misleading or impossible statements." The evidence of advertisements certainly did not structure a genuine issue of material fact with respect to the division of fees.
We must address the advertisements in the context of the Board's contention that Holly violated § 33-23-110, W.S. 1977, because he engaged in "the employment of 'cappers' or 'steerers' to obtain business The Board, in presenting this argument, relies upon the advertising contribution provision contained in the franchise agreement. It insists that this provision places Pearle in the position of steering customers to Holly. The essence of the accused provision, Section 8.1 of the franchise agreement, requires that Holly, the franchisee, make an advertising contribution of eight percent of gross monthly revenues to Pearle. Three-fourths of that amount, six percent of the gross monthly revenues, is used by Pearle for the purchase of advertising, both local and national, promoting the various Pearle Vision Centers, whether company-owned or franchises. One-fourth, two percent of gross monthly revenues, is used by Holly, the franchisee, for local advertising placed through Pearle's regional manager of marketing. Section 8.4 of the agreement also provides that Holly, as franchisee, may engage in advertising and promoting his Pearle Vision Center and the products and services offered at his own expense, but requires that the advertising be submitted to Pearle for its prior written approval. The essence of the Board's argument is that this advertising contribution is different from "advertising placed by an optometrist on a fee basis with radio station, newspaper, or through an advertising agency, where payment is independent of a percentage of the optometrist's gross revenues and the optometrist retains final authority on advertising content." We concede that the Board is correct; the advertising relationship between Pearle and Holly is different from that of a buyer and seller of advertising. We cannot concede, however, that the difference makes the relationship one prohibited by statute. Furthermore, we do not accept the contention that the retention by Pearle of the right to control the content of advertising constitutes prohibited activity because it has an interest in maintaining a uniform consistency in the advertisements utilizing its name.
As we did in our consideration of the issue about " 'splitting' or dividing a fee," we conclude that the legislature intended to prohibit a specific style of conduct that is harmful to the consuming public. In the statute, the words "cappers" or "steerers" were used to define the prohibited conduct. These words both have an established definition which we must assume that the legislature intended. Black's Law Dictionary (rev. 4th ed.1968) defines a "capper" as "a decoy or lure for purpose of swindling," citing Barron v. Board of Dental Examiners of California, 109 Cal.App. 382, 293 P. 144, 145 (1930). Relying upon the same California case, Black's Law Dictionary, supra, then defines a "steerer" as "one who gains the confidence of the person intended to be fleeced and who may be said to steer or lead the victim to the place where the latter is to be robbed or swindled." See also People v. Simmons, 125 A.D. 234, 109 N.Y.S. 190,194 (1908) ("A 'steerer' in slang vocabulary is a person of plausible manners and address, who gains the confidence of the person intended to be fleeced.") These words connote some element of fraud or deceit practiced upon an innocent victim. The Board has neither alleged nor demonstrated, in this regard, any facts which would serve to structure a genuine issue of material fact as to the presence of fraud, deceit, or overreaching on the part of Holly or Pearle. In the absence of some showing of fraud, deceit, or overreaching that was practiced upon and resulted in harm to the consuming public, Holly could not have been said to have employed Pearle as a "capper" or "steerer." As a matter of law, the district court ruled correctly in entering summary judgment in favor of Holly and Pearle on that claim of statutory violation.
We turn finally to the contentions by the Board that Pearle was engaged in the corporate practice of optometry in violation of § 33-23-lll(b), W.S.1977, and that it was engaged in the practice of optometry without a valid certificate in violation of § 33-23-103, W.S.1977, and the claim that the district court erred in ruling to the contrary. We first recall the relevant statutory provisions.
Section 33-23-103(a) provides, in pertinent part:
"It is unlawful for any person in the state of Wyoming to practice or attempt to practice optometry or to advertise, or hold himself out as qualified to fit or adjust any lenses or lens in any manner or form as aid to human eyesight, without first obtaining a certificate to practice optometry."
Section 33-23-lll(b) provides, in pertinent part:
"It is unlawful:
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"(iv) for any person or persons not holding a certificate or any corporation, directly or indirectly, to practice optometry by employment of or contract with a person holding a certificate, or otherwise, provided that one holding a certificate may accept employment from a person, partnership, association or a corporation to practice optometry with respect to the employees of such person, partnership, association or corporation."
Section 33-23-101 defines the practice of optometry as:
"(a) The practice of optometry is the employment of any means other than surgery for diagnosing and treating ocular pathology and for the measurement of the powers or range of human vision or the determination of the accommodative and refractive status of the human eye or the scope of its functions in general or the adaptation of lenses or frames for the aid thereof.
"(b) The provisions of this chapter do not prevent a duly licensed physician and surgeon, from treating or fitting glasses to the human eye, or a duly licensed physician and surgeon, oculist, or optometrist from filling prescriptions or orders, nor do they prevent the replacing, duplicating or repairing of ophthalmic lenses or the frames or fittings thereof by persons qualified to write or fill prescriptions or orders under the provisions of this act, nor prevent the doing of the merely mechanical work upon such lenses or upon the frames or fittings thereof by an optical mechanic."
With respect to the claims asserted against Pearle, the Board's basic position is that the district court did not apply the statutory definition of optometry to the facts of this case in reaching its conclusion that Pearle was not practicing optometry in violation of Wyoming law. The Board asserts that, instead, the district court erroneously determined, first, the question of whether optometry should be considered a learned profession in Wyoming and, second, whether Holly was an employee of Pearle. The Board also argues that the district court failed to determine whether the franchise agreement had the effect of involving Pearle in the practice of optometry.
The premise of the Board's argument is the contents of the decision letter issued by the district court on October 14,1986. Our rule, however, is that we look to the final order rather than the decision letter to determine the findings and conclusions of the trial court. Broadhead v. Broadhead, 737 P.2d 731 (Wyo.1987); DeRoche v. R.L. Manning Company, 737 P.2d 332 (Wyo. 1987). In this instance, the technique that the district court adopted was to specifically incorporate by reference its decision letter in its order granting summary judgment in favor of Holly and Pearle. Under these circumstances, we will review the reasoning and findings of the district court incorporated in its decision letter, but we still must uphold its decision on any legal grounds that the record is sufficient to sustain. Ferguson v. Ferguson, 739 P.2d 754 (Wyo.1987).
We do not understand the decision letter of the district court to be premised upon whether optometry should be considered a learned profession in Wyoming. When the letter is read in its entirety, it simply sets forth the proposition that, in general, a decision as to whether optometry is a learned profession or a mechanical art or craft may affect the level of scrutiny to be applied in determining whether a particular course of conduct constitutes the practice of optometry as defined in a particular statute, citing Annotation, What Constitutes Practice of "Optometry", 88 A.L. R.2d 1290 (1963). In a similar vein, the district court noted that, in decisions in which courts have found a corporation to be practicing optometry without a valid certificate, a critical factor was the fact that the corporation employed optometrists in an optometric capacity in violation of a state statute, citing Pearle Optical of Mon-roeville, Inc. v. State Board of Examiners in Optometry, 219 Ga. 364, 133 S.E.2d 374 (1963); State of Iowa v. Plymouth Optical Company, 211 N.W.2d 278 (Iowa 1973). The decision letter is not premised upon the employment proposition either, and the district court did not state that it relied upon it in making its determination. A thorough reading of the entire decision letter discloses that the district court did make a proper determination as to whether Pearle was guilty of directly or indirectly practicing optometry, either through the technique of the employment of Holly or by virtue of the franchise agreement with him. In conclusion, the district court stated:
"[T]his court has determined that defendant Pearle is not guilty of indirectly or illegally practicing optometry, in that said corporate defendant has no control over any other functions specifically involved with the practice of optometry as that term is defined in the statute. Further, it is clear that defendant Pearle does not employ or pay defendant Holly for his services. All charges for examination by Holly are paid directly to him by the clients or patients."
It is apparent that the district court correctly invoked the criteria of the extent of control which Pearle could exert with respect to Holly's capacity as an optometrist. Whether Pearle had a greater degree of control by virtue of its relationship with Holly in his non-optometric services, that is those services provided at the Pearle Vision Center, is not important with respect to the Board's position.
The Board finds fault with the reasoning of the district court, but it has not presented to this court any facts from the record or a legal theory which persuades us that the district court's determination was erroneous. The Board urges us to follow the decision of the California Court of Appeals in the case of California Association of Dispensing Opticians v. Pearle Vision Center, Inc., 143 Cal.App.3d 419, 191 Cal. Rptr. 762 (1983). This case is the primary authority relied upon by the Board in pursuing this litigation, and it was the premise of the attorney general's opinion upon which the Board acted. The California court held that a royalty provision similar to the one in the franchise agreement in issue here resulted in violations of the California statutes. The court's holding reached the proposition of division of fees as well as a conclusion that the arrangement was in violation of the statutory prohibition in California against the practice of optometry by a corporation through a li censed optometrist. The opinion discloses, however, that there are significant differences between the California statutes and the Wyoming statutes. The statute in California is more inclusive with respect to the prohibition of profit sharing between an optometrist and a lay person; the prohibition against profit sharing is broader and different from one that inhibits " 'splitting' or dividing a fee." As we have indicated, we choose not to broaden the choice manifested by the legislature in Wyoming when it limited the prohibition as it did. We do not think that construction is necessary because the legislature in Wyoming did not manifest an intention to inhibit the freedom of an individual optometrist to engage in other legitimate business activities. We agree with the determination by the district court to reject the invitation of the Board to follow the California rule. Clearly, as the district court noted, the statutes in California are more extensive and more restrictive in terms of their prohibitions than the statutory scheme in Wyoming.
In addition, our understanding of the California case persuades us that the court there failed to examine the appropriate factors in reaching its determination as to whether a corporation exercised sufficient control over an optometrist franchisee so that it, in effect, was engaged in the practice of optometry through the optometrist. The California court determined that corporate control was manifested by: (1) Pearle's right to approve the site of the office and improvements and fixtures therein; (2) the provision which permitted the franchisee to finance payment for the franchise through Pearle; (3) the provisions that required that the franchise fee and the advertising contributions be based on gross proceeds; (4) the provision that required the franchisee to submit to periodic audits by Pearle; (5) the franchise requirement that a franchisee stock Pearle's approved line of eyewear; and (6) the provision that made the franchisee's choice of laboratory equipment subject to Pearle's approval. All of these factors, relied upon by the California court, are factors of control that relate to the relationship between Pearle and its franchisee in non-optometric functions. The fact that Pearle exercises control over franchisees in their optical dispensaries does not govern with respect to whether Pearle has any right to control the practice of optometry and, therefore, could be held to be practicing optometry through the franchisee. A finding that Pearle is engaged in the practice of optometry because of a contractual relationship or employment of a licensed optometrist could only be premised upon facts demonstrating that Pearle exercised control over the optometrist in his practice of optometry. It is incumbent upon the Board to demonstrate facts that constitute a violation of the statute rather than only to assert a theory that the franchise arrangement could function in a way that would violate the statutes.
An examination of the franchise agreement persuades us, as it did the district court, that Pearle does not exercise control over Holly in his practice of optometry. It does not set the fees he charges to his patients; it does not purport to control the manner in which he performs his optomet-ric functions; it does not address his work schedule in the practice of optometry; it does not say anything about the patients whom he may or may not see; it does not send statements to Holly's patients; it does not receive payments made for Holly's op-tometric service from either the patients or Holly; nor does it purport to direct or control the conduct of Holly's practice of optometry in any other way. We conclude that the significant concern is control over the optometrist in his practice of optometry that might inhibit the freedom necessary for the optometrist to practice in a manner which assures that the interests of the patient are given primary consideration. That is the reason that the legislature may restrict the practice of optometry from corporate influence under its police power. The public is entitled to that protection. K N Energy, 755 P.2d at 207; Matter of Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph Company, 745 P.2d 563 (Wyo.1987). We cannot conclude that the legislature intended to restrict the practice of an optometrist, or to prohibit a corporation from contracting with an optometrist, however, unless the arrangement permitted the corporation to exercise control over the optometrist in his optometric practice.
In stating the facts in its brief, the Board listed the requirements under the franchise agreement which it perceived as demonstrating the control exercised by Pearle over Holly. That itemization of requirements under the franchise agreement supports our holding. Every one of the factors that the Board points to as demonstrating the extent of Pearle's control over Holly relates only to the non-optometric activities of Holly as a franchisee of Pearle. This franchise agreement entered into by Holly with Pearle is a carefully drafted document, which perhaps tests the permissible limits of rights which Pearle may incorporate in its franchising agreements in Wyoming. Even though it may test those legally permissible limits, this agreement does not transgress the statutory inhibitions. We recognize that activities under such a franchise agreement could be carried on in such a way as to infringe upon the statutory prohibitions, but the Board has not demonstrated facts showing improper activities to be present.
The Board has called to our attention one advertisement which Holly placed that says, in part, "Our experienced doctor of optometry will give you a thorough eye exam It is not clear from the context whether Holly was held out as an employee of Pearle in this particular advertisement, and the Board has not included a claim of unlawful advertising in its theory of the case. We do agree that Pearle and Holly cannot justifiably argue that Holly is not an employee of Pearle if, at the same time, the advertisements published by either imply that Holly is an employee of Pearle. The fact is that Holly is not employed by Pearle, and it would be improper under § 33-23-110(b)(i), W.S.1977, for either to indicate to the public that Holly is employed by Pearle. The presence of this one advertisement, however, is not sufficient to affect our holding with respect to this case.
We conclude that the district court did not err in granting a summary judgment in favor of Holly and Pearle. We are in accord with the rationale of the district court's determination, and we affirm the district court in its judgment.
. We conclude that cases in which the facts have been found to be sufficiently close to providing or referring patients or customers, and thus to involve fee splitting, are distinguishable. See e.g., State v. Abortion Information Agency, Inc., 69 Misc.2d 825, 323 N.Y.S.2d 597 (1971) (the provision by a corporation of salary and hospital facility to a doctor while the corporation billed patients for the doctor's services was held to constitute fee splitting); Hanks v. Hamilton, 339 So.2d 1122 (Fla.App.1976) (the written agreement between a broker and a non-registered real estate salesman pursuant to which the salesman was paid a specified commission for his sale of real property was held to be fee splitting).
. The argument of the Board on this issue is premised essentially upon the franchise agreement requirement for an advertising contribution, and not on the content of the advertisements. A consideration of the content of the advertisements, however, does not disclose a statutory violation with respect to the relationship between Pearle and Holly. In this respect, it has no more significance than it had with respect to the suggestion that it demonstrated a division of fees.