Case Name: Shadow ROBINSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Mississippi, Appellee
Court: Mississippi Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Mississippi
Decision Date: 2004-04-06
Citations: 875 So. 2d 230
Docket Number: No. 2002-KA-01238-COA
Parties: Shadow ROBINSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Mississippi, Appellee.
Judges: KING, P.J., BRIDGES, THOMAS, LEE, AND MYERS, JJ., CONCUR. GRIFFIS, J., DISSENTS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION JOINED BY MCMILLIN, C.J., SOUTHWICK, P.J., AND CHANDLER, J.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 875
Pages: 230–251

Head Matter:
Shadow ROBINSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Mississippi, Appellee.
No. 2002-KA-01238-COA.
Court of Appeals of Mississippi.
April 6, 2004.
Rehearing Denied June 29, 2004.
Thomas W. Powell, Lisa Mishune Ross, Jackson, attorneys for appellant.
Office of the Attorney General by John R. Henry, attorney for appellee.

Opinion:
IRVING J"
for the Court.
¶ 1. Shadow Robinson was indicted and tried for the murder of Lennell Moore. The jury found her guilty of manslaughter, and the trial judge sentenced her to twenty years in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections. Robinson has appealed and raises nine issues which we state verbatim:
1. Whether the trial court committed reversible error when it failed to review Moore's medical records and take testimony from Moore's psychotherapist before ruling that Moore had not waived the medical privilege by taking Shadow to his psychotherapy session.
2. Whether the trial court committed reversible error when it failed to review Moore's medical records and allow the records to be redacted to show only the relevant, material, and exculpatory evidence.
3. Whether the exclusion of Shadow's testimony regarding statements Moore made when she attended one of Moore's psychotherapy session unconstitutionally interfered with Shadow's right to defend against the charges.
4. Whether the trial court committed reversible error when it allowed Moore's mother to assert the medical privilege via affidavit and did not appoint a guardian ad litem when the court recognized the privilege belonged to Moore's children.
5. Whether the trial court committed reversible error when it prevented defense counsel from telling the jury in opening statements about other fights between Moore and Shadow and Shadow's state of mind as a result of those violent acts.
6. Whether the evidence was insufficient to support the jury's rejection of Shadow's self-defense claim when the jury did not have all the evidence which when viewed would lead a reasonable person to conclude that Shadow acted objectively reasonable on March 8, 2001.
7. Whether the cumulative errors in this case denied Shadow a right to a fair trial.
8. Whether the trial court erred when it denied Shadow's appeal bond immediately after the trial and later raised the bond in the absence of evidence that Shadow was a flight risk.
9. Whether the trial court's sentencing of Shadow was so harsh that it is cruel and unusual.
¶ 2. We find no reversible error; therefore, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court.
FACTS
¶ 3. The recitation of facts surrounding the circumstances of the tragic death of Lennell Moore comes from the defendant, Shadow Robinson. Only three witnesses, Moore, Robinson, and Robinson's boyfriend, Shontarri Cobbins, witnessed the shooting. Because Moore was killed, we do not have the benefit of what his version of the events would have been. Cobbins did not testify during the State's case-in-chief. He did, however, give rebuttal testimony.
¶ 4. On the evening of March 8, 2001, Shadow Robinson called Moore and asked him to pick up their daughter in Canton and bring her home to Robinson's apartment in Ridgeland. Initially, Moore indicated that he was not going to honor Robinson's request. However, sometime later Moore arrived at Robinson's apartment with the daughter. When he arrived, Robinson's new boyfriend, Shontarri Cobbins, was present. Cobbins opened the door and let Moore into the apartment.
¶ 5. According to Robinson, Moore walked into the apartment "talking off the wall . and yelling" at her because she had been hanging up the telephone on him. She told Moore to go lay their daughter in the bed in the bedroom. Moore complied but, according to Robinson, came out of the bedroom "walking fast and pointing down in [her] face . going off, cussing [her] out, [and] calling [her] names." Robinson testified that Moore told her that "he was going to slap the s— out of [her] because [she] would not shut up." Robinson further testified that Moore then "drew his hand back to slap [her] but 'Shon' [Shontarri Cobbins] grabbed him" and told Robinson to run into the bedroom. Robinson testified that she ran into the bedroom, but Moore came in "so fast" that he tore the canopy over their daughter's bed. Moore then hit Robinson, knocking her on her side over the bed and against the wall. She "bounced up and hit him, and he hit [her]." Moore was on top of her when Cobbins came into the room and pulled Moore off of Robinson. After Cobbins pulled Moore off of Robinson, Robinson went outside to get her daughter. She then came back inside the apartment and watched Cobbins and Moore fight for a while. Thereafter, at some point, Moore, while still being restrained by Cobbins, jumped at Robinson, grabbed a glass from a table in the living room and raised his hand to throw it, but Cobbins hit him on the hand and the glass fell. Robinson picked up the glass and threw it at Moore. She missed and the glass hit the wall and broke. According to Robinson, "he [Moore] sho nuff [sic] got to bucking then." As Moore and Cobbins struggled, Robinson watched, while, at the same time, she "was just snapping, going off, cussing him [Moore] out, cussing back, going back off on him . telling him to get out . hit the door" because he did not pay any bills there.
¶ 6. Cobbins told Robinson to go back in the room where the children were and to lock the door. She went in the room but did not lock the door. She remained in the room two to three minutes. Moore did not attempt to come into the room. While Robinson was in the room, she retrieved her pistol and turned up the volume on the television. She then emerged from the room with the gun and watched Moore and Cobbins tussle for six to eight minutes although neither of them saw her.
¶ 7. What happened next is best related through the following colloquy which occurred on direct examination between Robinson and her attorney:
Q. So at what point did he try to come at you or did he calm down? What happened next after that?
A. He said he was going to go. He told Shon [Shontarri Cobbins]. Shon had him around his waist, and he .told Shon, f— it, I'm fixing to go.
Q. Okay.
A. And he knocked Shon's hands off his waist, and that's when he — he wasn't fixing to go. He was coming back at me.
Q. Okay. And what happened when he came back at you?
A. The gun went up, and he turned, and he turned, and he turned, and I — I mean, I wasn't trying — (pauses) — I wasn't trying to shoot him. He just got shot.
Q. So did he act like he was walking out of the door?
A. No.
Q. What did he do?
A. He jumped at me.
Q. Okay. And he jumped at you, and what happened when he jumped at you?
A. I raised the gun.
Q. And did you mean to discharge the gun?
A. No, because I didn't know it was loaded. I didn't know nothing was in it. It wasn't but one bullet. Who would want to kill somebody with one bullet?
¶ 8. According to Robinson, Moore and Cobbins fought approximately thirty to forty minutes before she fired the fatal shot.
¶ 9. The shooting incident was investigated by Officer Donald Scott Martin of the Ridgeland Police Department. When he arrived at Robinson's apartment, he found her uncooperative although she admitted that she had shot Moore. Martin saw nothing about Moore or Robinson's person indicating that either of them had been in any type physical struggle. Further, Martin testified that there were no signs that a fight or physical struggle of any sort had occurred in the apartment. No furniture was broken, and no walls were damaged. Everything appeared to be in place except a picture in the children's room which was resting next to a wall.
¶ 10. Additional facts will be related during the discussion of the issues.
ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION OF THE ISSUES
1. Waiver of Medical Privilege
¶ 11. Robinson's first four issues are interrelated and revolve around the trial judge's finding that Moore did not waive the medical privilege and the judge's ruling that Libby Johnson, a psychotherapist who conducted only two counseling sessions with Moore, could not testify concerning communications presumably made by Moore to her during one of the sessions. At least one of the counseling sessions was allegedly attended by Robinson with Moore's consent. Because we find the waiver, or lack thereof, of the medical privilege to be irrelevant on the facts of this case, we pretermit a detailed discussion of these issues.
¶ 12. We begin our discussion with the observation that Robinson did not testify that she attended either of the two sessions, and there was no evidence produced at trial which proves Robinson's presence at either of the counseling sessions allegedly attended by Moore. The only sug-gestión in the record that Robinson may have attended one of the sessions came during the hearing on the motion in li-mine when the attorney for the State, while not admitting that Robinson was present during one of the sessions, said that it was his understanding that Robinson's presence was necessary for the treatments. However, the record upon which the trial judge relied does not contain any proof that Robinson did in fact attend either of the sessions, and there was no stipulation to that effect by the parties.
¶ 13. Although it is questionable as to whether the record is sufficient to support a finding that Robinson attended one of the sessions, we note that the State does not take issue in its brief with this questionable fact. Therefore, for purposes of this opinion, we assume that Robinson did in fact attend one of the sessions.
¶ 14. The trial judge refused, because of the medical privilege, to allow Johnson to testify concerning her counseling sessions with Moore. It appears that in making this decision, the trial judge accepted the assertion made by the attorneys that Robinson did in fact attend one of the sessions. Robinson argues that Moore waived the privilege when he freely took her to one of the counseling sessions.
¶ 15. When the trial judge refused to allow Johnson's testimony, the parties agreed to making a proffer of Johnson's testimony by offering her notes of her counseling sessions with Moore. The dissent argues that the trial judge denied Robinson's attorney the opportunity to proffer Johnson's testimony through Johnson. This is simply not the case as the following colloquy proves:
MS. ROSS: Libby Johnson is the psychotherapist. We'd like to do a proffer on her testimony if you are going-to grant their motion.
⅜ ⅜ ⅜ *
THE COURT: Well, I'm hesitant about letting the person to whom the communication was made make a proffer because I would not want that person to violate Section 13 — 1—21 because there are criminal penalties associated with that. I'm going to try to look at that and see.
MS. ROSS: Well, Your Honor, if we could seal the proffer so that the Supreme Court or Court of Appeals, whoever is reviewing this record, would be able to consider the proffer when reviewing the error, if any.
⅜ ⅜ ⅜ ⅜
THE COURT: Is there any way we can mark the records and seal them? And whatever is in the records is what she would testify to, I would guess.
MR. POWELL: Yes, sir.
MS. ROSS: Your Honor, if you won't allow us to call her to go into detail, if we could just put her on the stand and say that she would testify to the documentation in the records if called, then that could be our proffer, along with the records. Your Honor, we don't mean to prolong this, but we would ask the Court to also look at Rule 501 of the Rules of Evidence that says that no person has a privilege, and subsection 4, to prevent another from being a witness or disclosing any matter or producing any item or writing.
⅜ ⅜ ⅜ ⅜
THE COURT: The comment is pretty interesting to that rule. Normally this wouldn't come up until the defense puts on a case or puts on witnesses, but the State filed the motion, and so I guess we need to dispense with the motion prior to beginning the trial, being a motion in limine. How do you intend to proceed with the witness? Are you going to do like Ms. Ross said and just put the witness on and let the witness say that they're going to testify as to what was in the medical records and then submit the records under seal?
MR. POWELL: Yes. If you're not going to allow her to testify what's in the notes,
Your Honor, that's correct.
THE COURT: Well, I'm not going to let her testify unless there's- a waiver of that privilege. What I'm trying to figure out is, do I need to dear the courtroom on the proffer to maintain the confidentiality, but, see, if you're going to just ask her did she treat him, does she have her medical records and if that's what she- would testify to, is what's in the medical records, then I see no reason to clear the courtroom. And I understand that there must be a 24-hour notice given to the press if we're going to close the trial.
MR. WILKINSON: Your Honor, it's the State's position that it would be confidential
for her to even say she treated the victim.
THE COURT: Well, 13-1-21' talks about a voluntary disclosure. Well, it speaks in terms of willful violation of the provisions, and if she's testifying under subpoena, I don't know that that would be a willful violation. Have you got any objection to making a stipulation that if she testified that she'd testify 'to what was in the medical records?
MR. WILKINSON: No, Your Honor.
THE COURT: No?
MR. WILKINSON: We have no objection to that.
THE COURT: Okay. If they make a stipulation, then you don't have to put her on, put the medical records in with the stipulation that that's what she would testify to, would that accomplish the same purpose, rather than her just coming in here and saying, that's what I'd do. I'm trying to figure out a way to do this so it won't put her in any kind of jeopardy and still preserve the records in the matter.
MS. ROSS: Just a minute, Your Honor. We're trying to make sure her notes are legible so that they could be read.
THE COURT: You're trying to determine legibility, and she's a doctor?
MS. ROSS: Yes, Your Honor. Her writing is not as bad as most doctors. THE COURT: Oh.
MR. POWELL: We would agree with that, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Okay.
MR. POWELL: We just need to make a copy of it.
¶ 16. It seems fairly clear from the discussion quoted above that the trial judge struggled with the logistics of accommodating Robinson's counsel in getting the proffer done and preserving the confidentiality of the disclosures made by Moore to the psychotherapist, but there is no doubt that the trial judge was prepared to allow Robinson's counsel to make an unfettered proffer. While the trial judge was firm in his refusal to allow Johnson to testify in the trial, he did not attempt to limit Robinson's counsel's right to make an appropriate proffer through Johnson. He was prepared to clear the courtroom so that could be done.
¶ 17. The State objected to allowing the proffer to be done through Johnson, but to assert, as does the dissent, that the trial judge required the proffer to be made through the tendering of Johnson's notes is not borne out by the record. Rather than requiring that the proffer be made through the tendering of the notes, the trial judge simply inquired as to whether that process would be acceptable. Any fair interpretation of the quoted conversation compels the conclusion that, at the end of the esctended discussions about how to do the proffer, Shadow's counsel freely agreed to submit Johnson's written notes as the proffer of what Johnson would testify to if she were called as a witness. That discussion also demonstrates that the trial judge never refused to allow the proffer to be done differently.
¶ 18. The trial judge did not review the notes before making his decision to disallow Johnson's testimony. However, the notes were sealed and submitted with the appellate record for our review. The notes reflect that Johnson saw Moore only twice for anger management in May and June of an unspecified year. Robinson shot Moore on March 8, 2001. Since the sessions occurred in May and June, they would have had to have taken place at the latest in May or June of 2000, if not in some earlier year. If the discussions occurred a year or two prior to the killing, or even nine or ten months earlier, it would be difficult, for at least three reasons, to see how they could possibly hold any beneficial value to Robinson's defense.
¶ 19. First, the fact that Moore had been treated for anger management in a prior unspecified year does not prove that, during the period of time leading up to the killing, he had engaged in such aggressive and violent behavior with Robinson so as to warrant her having a reasonable apprehension that, in any altercation between them, he was likely to do her serious bodily harm. Second, Robinson did not testify that Moore was still engaging in aggres sive and uncontrollable behavior toward her or that his past behavior toward her left her apprehensive of him. Thirdly, there was no addendum or supplement to Johnson's dated report indicating the current status of Moore's anger management problem. It may be that when this incident occurred, Moore had the problem under control.
¶20. Notwithstanding the temporal problem with the notes, we have reviewed them and find nothing relevant or exculpatory in them. We reject Robinson's claim that information from Moore's counseling sessions with Johnson would have aided her defense. Although Robinson argues in her brief that she shot Moore in self-defense, her trial testimony, as set forth in the fact portion of this opinion, belies this assertion. In light of Robinson's testimony, we cannot conceive under any scenario how information about Moore's counseling sessions with Johnson would have been relevant or helpful to her defense. She never contended or testified that fear of Robinson, based on his history of relating to her, caused her to fire the fatal shot. While her attorney, through leading questions, got her to eventually say that she feared Moore would get free of Cobbins's grip and come after her, the uncontradict-ed fact is that she shot Moore in the back, and she testified that she did not intend to shoot him. Based on Robinson's testimony, despite the leading by her attorney, no case of self-defense was established. It is clear that it was her un-coached position that the shooting was somehow an accident, that the gun just discharged. On this evidence, we need not decide whether Moore waived the privilege by taking Robinson to one of the counseling sessions. However, even if he did, nothing contained in Johnson's notes, the contents of which were withheld from the jury, prejudiced Robinson's defense.
¶ 21. The dissent, citing several cases which discuss the interplay between the privilege and a defendant's right to obtain relevant and exculpatory evidence covered by the privilege, argues that the information contained in Johnson's notes is relevant and that the trial judge committed reversible error in not conducting an in camera review of the notes and the evidence to be offered through Johnson. The basis for the dissent's argument is that Robinson's defense was self-defense, and that this evidence was relevant on the question of whether Robinson had a reasonable apprehension of fear.
¶ 22. The obvious problem with the dissent's argument is that it assumes or accepts the assertion that the facts support Robinson's claim of self-defense. The claim of self-defense must be fact grounded. It is not enough to verbally claim self-defense but testify, as did Robinson, that the shooting was an accident. Further, the determination of whether a reasonable apprehension of fear exists cannot be made in a vacuum. Whether Robinson had a "reasonable apprehension of fear" that she was about to suffer death or some serious bodily injury at the hands of Moore must be considered under the totality of the circumstances that existed at the point in time when she fired the fatal shot. What were those circumstances?
¶ 23. First, and of critical importance, Moore was not armed. Second, a scruti-nization of Robinson's own testimony reveals that she had not shown any apprehension or fear of Moore during their fight earlier that night. As to that fight, she testified that Moore hit her and that she bounced up and hit him back. She further testified that he cussed her, that she cussed him back, and that she "was just snapping, going back off . on him." Third, after Cobbins pulled Moore off of Robinson, she testified that she went out side, got her daughter, came back in and watched Cobbins and Moore struggle for a while. Fourth, she went into the children's bedroom, retrieved her pistol, came back out and observed Moore and Cobbins for six to eight minutes although they did not see her. Lastly, according to Robinson, Moore was in the apartment struggling with Cobbins, including the altercation with her, for thirty to forty minutes, yet, she never called the police despite ample opportunities to do so. These facts, along with Robinson's testimony that she did not intend to shoot Moore, dispel any credible notion that she shot Moore out of a "reasonable apprehension of fear" that he was about to do serious bodily injury to her.
¶24. Even if we were to hold that Robinson's claim of self-defense is grounded in the facts, we would still find no reversible error in the trial judge's failure to conduct an in camera review of Johnson's notes. We reach this decision because of two reasons. First, as we have already mentioned, Johnson's notes contain no exculpatory information. Second, Robinson failed to show that the anger management problem, for which Moore had been treated in some unspecified prior year, had not abated and that he had continued to exhibit, until the time of the shooting, aggressive and violent behavior toward her. Therefore, even if Moore's problem with controlling his anger and his desire to control Robinson through intimidation might be admissible in her trial for murdering him, there would still be the need to show the relevancy of his conduct from a temporal standpoint. That was not done here. It follows that the dissent's argument that this case should be reversed because the trial judge failed to make an in camera review and redaction of the notes misses the mark. Even if a review had taken place, no portion of the notes should have been admitted as they contained nothing exculpatory and their relevancy was not established.
2. Abridgement of Right to Make Appropriate Opening Statement
¶25. Robinson contends that the trial judge prevented her attorneys from mentioning, in their opening statement, previous acts of violence perpetrated upon her by Moore. Robinson misstates what occurred. The trial judge ruled that Robinson could not mention any acts of violence on the part of Moore until she offered evidence that Moore was the aggressor on the night in question and that he perpetrated an overt act against her. This ruling comports with the jurisprudence of this state. See Freeman v. State, 204 So.2d 842 (Miss.1967); M.R.E 404. This issue is without merit; therefore, we affirm the ruling of the trial judge.
S. Sufficiency of the Evidence
¶26. Robinson argues that had the jury been allowed to hear testimony from Johnson regarding her counseling sessions with Moore, the jury "may have concluded . [that] the killing of Moore . was objectively real to [her] and [that] she acted as a reasonable person under the circumstances then and there existing." Apparently, Robinson concludes that the evidence which was presented was insufficient because other evidence was omitted. This is flawed reasoning.
¶27. Our reading of the record convinces us that the jury was more than generous to Robinson in not returning a verdict of murder. Robinson testified that she was in a back room with her children while Moore and Cobbins struggled in a front room. Cobbins told Robinson to lock the door, but she refused. There is no evidence that Moore ever made any at tempt to enter the room where Robinson was prior to Robinson's emerging from the room and firing the fatal shot. In fact, there is evidence that Robinson deliberately and intentionally went into the room to get her pistol to kill Moore. She turned up the volume on the television just before she left the room to fire the fatal shot. A very logical inference to be drawn from that act is that she turned the volume up so that the children would not hear the fatal shot that she was preparing to deliver to their father. When she emerged from the room with the gun, according to her testimony, she watched Moore and Cob-bins tussle for six to eight minutes although neither of them saw her. Of course, Robinson's assertion about all the fighting that took place over a period of thirty to forty minutes is circumstantially contradicted by Officer Martin's testimony that the apartment was not in disarray and that neither Moore nor Robinson appeared to have been in a fight. This issue is without merit.
U. Cumulative Errors
¶ 28. We have determined that Robinson was not prejudiced by the trial judge's ruling regarding the medical waiver because nothing contained in Moore's medical file was relevant to her defense based on the facts as testified to by Robinson herself. This ruling of the trial judge formed the basis of Robinson's first four issues. Since we have found that Robinson was not prejudiced by the trial judge's ruling on the medical waiver issue, it necessarily follows that there can be no cumulative prejudice flowing from the ruling no matter the number of issues predicated upon the notion that the ruling was erroneous.
5. Appeal Bond
¶ 29. Robinson contends that the trial court erred in refusing to allow her to remain free after the verdict. Robinson misstates the trial court's position. The court advised Robinson's attorneys that it would not allow her to remain free after the verdict was returned until she had in fact posted an appeal bond. Apparently, the trial court set the appeal bond at $150,000. It was later raised to $200,000 as a result of the State's motion that Robinson constituted a flight risk. Robinson contends that the trial court erred when it raised her bond without making findings of fact.
¶ 30. Since we have affirmed Robinson's conviction, we find these issues to be moot, but even if they were not moot, we would find no abuse of discretion on the part of the trial judge in not allowing Robinson to remain free post-conviction until she had posted a proper appeal bond. After her conviction, she was not entitled to remain free pursuant to any appearance bond that she may have posted to guarantee her appearance in the trial court. A new bond was needed to guarantee Robinson's presence in the Mississippi Supreme Court, although, depending on what arrangements Robinson had with her bonding company, that may have been accomplished without her paying an additional fee assuming she had utilized a commercial bonding company.
6. Harshness of Sentence
¶ 31. Robinson contends that her sentence of twenty years for her manslaughter conviction was "so excessive given the nature and details of her crime, as to be cruel and inhumane and disproportionate when viewed against similar sentences given for like offenses." The State points out that this issue is procedurally barred because it was not raised in the trial court. We agree. However, procedural bar notwithstanding, we also note that Robinson also neglects to provide us with any statistics regarding her proportionality argument. Therefore, we offer no further comment on this issue. Suffice it to say that the law of this state provides a maximum sentence of twenty years for manslaughter.. Sentences which are within the statutory limit are not considered cruel and unusual punishment. Ferrell v. State, 810 So.2d 607(¶20) (Miss.2002). Robinson cites Davis v. State, 724 So.2d 342 (Miss.1998) in support of her contention that her sentence should be reversed. We find no applicability of Davis to the facts here. This issue is wholly without merit.
¶ 32. THE JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT OF MADISON COUNTY OF CONVICTION OF MANSLAUGHTER AND SENTENCE OF TWENTY YEARS IN THE CUSTODY OF THE MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS IS AFFIRMED. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO MADISON COUNTY.
KING, P.J., BRIDGES, THOMAS, LEE, AND MYERS, JJ., CONCUR. GRIFFIS, J., DISSENTS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION JOINED BY MCMILLIN, C.J., SOUTHWICK, P.J., AND CHANDLER, J.
. Robinson and Moore had two children together although they were never married and their relationship had ended.
. Moore was still alive and begging for help when Martin arrived at the apartment.
. The dissent argues that the record does not contain sufficient evidence for the trial judge to have made a determination as to whether the medical privilege even applies. However, in the same breath, the dissent also argues that Moore's taking Robinson to one of the sessions waived the privilege. The record indicates that Johnson is a psychotherapist. Pursuant to Rule 503 of the Mississippi Rules of Evidence, a psychotherapist is a person authorized to practice medicine and is bound by the medical privilege.