Case Name: Clyde Chandler v. The State
Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1921-06-22
Citations: 89 Tex. Crim. 599
Docket Number: No. 6255
Parties: Clyde Chandler v. The State.
Judges: 
Reporter: Texas Criminal Reports
Volume: 89
Pages: 599–603

Head Matter:
Clyde Chandler v. The State.
No. 6255.
Decided June 22, 1921.
1. —Intoxicating Liquors—Posssession—Accomplice.
Where, upon trial of unlawful possession of intoxicating liquors, one of the State’s witnesses was an accomplice as a matter of law, and his uncorroborated testimony would not support a conviction, but the other State’s witness, whose testimony tended to connect the defendant with the commission of the offense and who was not an accomplice as a matter of law, and no requested charge to submit this question of fact to the jury appeared in the record on appeal, the jury were privileged to find that said last witness was not an accomplice, and the conviction was sustained.
2. —Same—Rehearing—Former Jeopardy—Distinct Offenses.
Selling intoxicating liquor is a distinct offense from possessing such liquor under the Dean Law. The two acts, that is, selling and possession, are separate acts under the law, and there was no error in the court’s failure to submit the question of former jeopardy in the instant case, although defendant had been convicted for the sale of such intoxicating liquor. Distinguishing Thomas v. State, 230 S. W. Rep., 159.
3. —Same—Accomplice Testimony—Buie Stated.
Upon trial of having unlawful possession of intoxicating liquors, there was no error in failing to charge on accomplice’s testimony where the record showed that appellant was in possession of other liquor than that sold and about which the accomplice testimony was admitted in evidence.
4. —Same—State and Federal Law—Precedent—Conflict of Law.
Where the contentions relative to the apparent conflict between the State and national liquor laws have been heretofore adversely decided to defendant’s contention, they need not be again considered.
Appeal from the District Court of Kaufman. Tried below before the Honorable Joel R. Bond.
Appeal from a conviction of unlawful possession of intoxicating liquors; penalty, one year imprisonment in the penitentiary.
The opinion states the case.
Miller & Miller, Huffmaster & Huffmaster, and Wynne & Wynne, for appellant.
On question of former jeopardy. Etheridge v. State, 173 S. W. Rep., 1031; Thomas v. State, 230 S. W. Rep., 159.
R. H. Hamilton, Assistant Attorney General, for the State.

Opinion:
MORROW, Presiding Judge.
Conviction is for the unlawful possession of intoxicating liquors.
Holley testified, in behalf of the State, that after going to the home of John Chandler, and failing to find him, he, in company with Jenkins, went to see John Chandler at another place, learning from him that on his premises, there was a cotton picker named Slim who could furnish the witness with some whisky. The witness, on going to the home of John Chandler, saw Clyde Chandler and Slim and discussed the purchase of a quart of whisky. Clyde and Slim went into the house, leaving the witness outside. Rater, they called him in, and upon entering the room, he found some whisky in fruit jars. He left some money and took the whisky.
Jenkins testified that he accompanied Holley to the home of John Chandler and saw Holley talk to him but heard no part of the conversation; that upon their return to John Chandler's home, he saw Slim and Clyde Chandler, Clyde having a bucket in his hand. They went to the well and then to the house. Upon leaving, Holley was in possession of some whisky, of which the witness took a drink. Jenkins admitted that he drank some of the liquor, but claimed that he had no connection with the purchase and no knowledge of Holley's intention to obtain the intoxicant.
Holley's connection with the offense made him an accomplice witness, as a matter of law. Franklin v. State, 88 Texas Crim. Rep., 342, 227 S. W. Rep., 486. His testimony, uncorroborated, would not support the conviction. Code of Crim. Procedure, Art. 801. The facts related by Jenkins tended to connect appellant with the commission of the offense, and unless Jenkins was an accomplice, the evidence is sufficient to support the verdict.
There are facts revealed which would have justified the court in calling upon the jury to determine whether Jenkins was an accomplice witness or not; and on request, he would have been obliged to so charge the jury. Huggins v. State, 85 Texas Crim. Rep., 205, 210 S. W. Rep., 804. Jenkins was not an accomplice, as a matter of law. He disclaimed any participation in the offense or any knowledge of the unlawful intent of Holley or of the appellant. From his testimoney, his sole connection with the transaction consisted in his presence and the fact that he took a drink of the whisky which was in Holley's possession. Upon this testimony the jury was privileged to find that he was not an accomplice witness. The verdict implies that this was done.
The evidence, we think, is sufficient to show that the appellant's possession of the liquor was for the purpose of making an unlawful sale. The definite testimony of Holley, who was an accomplice, being sufficiently corroborated by the testimony of Jenkins, who is not shown to have been an accomplice, renders the evidence sufficient to support the conviction.
The judgment is therefore affirmed.
Affirmed.