Case Name: PEOPLE ex rel. ULSTER & D. R. CO. v. PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF STATE OF NEW YORK, SECOND DIST.
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1916-01-18
Citations: 156 N.Y.S. 1065
Docket Number: 
Parties: PEOPLE ex rel. ULSTER & D. R. CO. v. PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF STATE OF NEW YORK, SECOND DIST.
Judges: 
Reporter: West's New York Supplement
Volume: 156
Pages: 1065–1090

Head Matter:
PEOPLE ex rel. ULSTER & D. R. CO. v. PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF STATE OF NEW YORK, SECOND DIST.
(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Department.
January 18, 1916.)
1. Carriers —Public Service Commission—Railroad Law—Statutes —Construction.
The Public Service Commissions Law (Consol. Laws, c. 48) and the Railroad Law (Consol. Laws, c. 49) having both boon amended by the Legislature of 1910 in such manner as to disclose the legislative intention to harmonize the acts and render them consistent, it is the duty of the courts to construe such acts as though they were one statute, giving, if possible, the provisions of each such construction as will give some appropriate meaning and effect to every part of both, and not rendering nugatory or repealing any portion of either, keeping always in view the spirit and policy of the Legislature in making the enactments.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Carriers, Cent. Dig. §§ 4, 5; Dee. Dig. <S=>2.]
other eases see same topic & KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests & Indexes
2. Carriers @=12—Mileage Books—Maximum Rate—Public Service Commission—Power to Fix.
Under the provision of Public Service Commissions Law, § 49, as amended in 1910, and by Laws 1911, c. 546, empowering either commission to determine the maximum rates for reduced fare tickets by certain carriers, where that chargeable by them is not reasonably compensatory, and the provisions of section 33, subd. 4 that no provision of law shall be deemed to limit the commission’s power to prescribe maximum commutation and mileage ticket fares, the Public Service Commission has power to increase the maximum rates for mileage books over the two-cent maximum prescribed by Railroad Law, § 60.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Carriers, Cent. Dig. §§ 7-11, 15-20; Dec. Dig. <3=12.]
3. Carriers @=>12—Reduced! Fares—Fixing Maximum—Power of Commission.
The provision of the first paragraph of Public Service Commissions Law, § 49, empowering the commission to fix maximum rates generally, “notwithstanding that a higher rate, fare or charge has been heretofore authorized by statute,” does not affect the commission’s power to fix maximum rates for mileage books in excess of the maximum fixed by Railroad Law, § 60, since such provision applies only to the rates mentioned in such first paragraph.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Carriers, Cent. Dig. §§ 7-11, 15-20; Dec. Dig. @=>12.]
4. Carriers @=>12—Maximum Rates—Statutory Limit—Power of Commission-—Construction of Statutes.
The effect of such statutes is not to empower the commission to raise or lower maximum rates within the statutory limit only, since such construction would leave the acts as they were, before amendment, and would ignore the word “maximum” in Public Service Commissions Law, § 49, empowering the commission to fix maximum rates where the maximum chargeable is not compensatory, which power section 33 declares shall not be deemed limited by any other provision of law.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Carriers, Cent. Dig. §§ 7-11, 15-20; Dec. Dig. @=>12.]
Kellogg, P. J., and Woodward, J., dissenting.
<§==>For other cases see same topic & KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests & Indexes
Certiorari by the People, on the relation of the Ulster & Delaware Railroad Company, to- the Public Service Commission of the State of New York, Second District, to review denial of relator’s application for leave to issue mileage books at a greater rate than two cents per mile. Determination of commission annulled, and proceedings remitted.
Argued before KELLOGG, P. J., and LYON, HOWARD, WOODWARD, and COCHRANE, JJ.
Lewis B. Carir, of Albany, for relator.
Ledyard P. Hale, of Albany, for respondent.

Opinion:
COCHRANE, J.
The relator, the Ulster & Delaware Railroad Company, petitioned the Public Service Commission of the Second District for authority to increase its mileage book rates in excess of two cents per mile as fixed by section 60 of the Railroad Law. The commission, after investigation, determined that the facts justified such increase, but denied the application, because of a want of statutory power in the commission to make the necessary order. The question for determination is whether the Public Service Commissions Law gives to the commission the power which such commission has denied to itself.
Section 60 of the Railroad Law, so far as germane to this question, provides that certain railroad corporations therein described, and which description includes the relator—
"shall issue mileage books having either five hundred or one thousand coupons attached thereto, entitling the holder thereof, upon complying with the conditions hereof, to travel either five hundred or one thousand miles on a line or lines of such railroad, for which the corporation may charge a sum not to exceed two cents per mile."
The Public Service Commissions Law and the Railroad Law were each revised and amended by the Legislature of 1910, and on the same day in that year became respectively chapters 480 and 481 of the Laws of 1910, and chapters 48 and 49 of the Consolidated Laws. Various provisions of the former Railroad Law deemed to be inconsistent with the Public Service Commissions Law were omitted, and the act throughout bears evidence of an attempt to harmonize it and make it consistent with the provisions of the Public Service Commissions Law. Ror instance, section 8 of the Railroad Law, declaring the power of railroad corporations, begins with the words:
"Subject to the limitations and requirements- of this chapter and of the Public Service Commissions Law."
Section 57, dealing with the question of rates of fare, begins with the words:
"Subject to the provisions of the Public Service Commissions Law."
So that there can be no doubt that the two acts were amended and revised with reference to each other, and that such portions of the Railroad Law were eliminated as were deemed to- be offensive to the provisions of the Public Service Commissions Law. The two acts are to be construed together and constitute one harmonious system, applicable to the subject concerning which both relate. Section 60 of the Railroad Law should receive the same consideration, as bearing on the question now before us, as if it were a part of the Public Service Commissions Law. Considering the circumstances of their revision and enactment, the two statutes arc to- be construed practically, so far as the question before us is concerned, as if they were one statute. No portion of either should be given such a construction as would repeal or render nugatory any portion of either, if such a result can reasonably be obviated. But, on the other hand, in accordance with a cardinal rule of statutory construction, every pari of both statutes should be so construed, if possible, as to give some appropriate meaning and effect to every part of both statutes. And in working out such a result due regard should also be had to- the spirit and policy of the Legislature in making the enactments in question.
Section 49 of the Public Service Commissions Law, as amended and re-enacted in 1910, and amended by chapter 546 of the Laws of 1911, contains, among other things, this provision:
"Whenever either commission shall be oí opinion, after a hearing had upon its own motion or upon a complaint that the maximum rates, fares or charges, chargeable by any such common carrier, railroad or street railroad corporation are insufficient to yield reasonable compensation for the service rendered, and are unjust and unreasonable, the commission shall with due regard among other things to a reasonable average return upon the value of the property actually used in the public service and to the necessity of making reservation out of income for surplus and contingencies, determine the just and reasonable rates, fares and charges to be thereafter observed and in force as the maximum to be charged for the service to be performed, notwithstanding that a higher rate, fare or charge has been heretofore authorized by statute, and shall fix the same by order to be served upon all common carriers, railroad corporations, or street railroad corporations by whom such rates, fares and charges are thereafter to be observed."
And section 33, in subdivision 4, as amended by chapter 546 of the Laws of 1911, provides as follows:
"Nothing in this section or in any other provision of law shall be deemed to limit the power of the commission to require the sale of and upon investigation prescribe reasonable and just fares as the maximum to be charged for, commutation, school or family commutation, mileage tickets over railroads or street railroads, joint interchangeable mileage tickets, round trip excursion tickets, or any other form of reduced rate passenger tickets over such railroads or street railroads."
Said chapter 546 of the Laws of 1911 also amended said section 49 by adding to it, among other things, in addition to the above quotation, the following, viz.:
"Whenever either commission shall be of the opinion, after a hearing had upon its own motion, or upon a complaint, that the maximum rates, fares or charges collected or charged for any of such forms of reduced fare passenger transportation tickets by any such common carrier, railroad or street railroad corporation are insufficient to yield reasonable compensation for the service rendered and are unjust and unreasonable, the commission shall determine and prescribe the reasonable and just rates, fares and charges to be thereafter observed and enforced as the maximum to be charged for any of such form of ticket or tickets for the transportation of persons within the state. "
Nothing like these provisions in sections 49 and 33 had ever existed before. In all the previous history of the Public Service Commissions Law the power of the commission had been confined to reducing rates, or at least to regulating rates within the statutory limitations. The law contemplated simply a reduction of rates by the commission in the interests of the public, and not an increase, even though such increase might be just and reasonable to the carriers. The effect of this new legislation was, I think, to make the commission superior to section 60 of the Railroad Law, fixing limitations on thé rates of fare. Those limitations remained on the railroads, but not on the power of the commission. Sections 49 and 33 of the Public Service Commissions Law and the provisions of the Railroad Law fixing and limiting fares, as we have seen, must be construed to all intents and purposes as if they were found in one statute, and must be construed accordingly. My opinion is that section 60 of the Railroad Law establishes the maximum rate for mileage books in the absence of an order by the commission. It represents the law on the subject so long as the commission takes no action. But sections 49 and 33 of the Public Service Commissions Law authorized the commission to make an investigation, and where it appears that the statutory rate oE two cents per mile is insufficient the commission may by order increase the rate above that amount.
Attention is called to the following words in the first paragraph of section 49 of the Public Service Commissions Law, viz.:
"Notwithstanding that a higher rate, Tare or charge has been heretofore authorized by statute."
And it is argued that those words indicate that the power of the commission to adjust rates must be exercised within the limitations fixed by other statutory provisions. Conceding the force of the argument, it only applies to the rates mentioned in said first paragraph of section 49, and does not apply to the reduced rates which are made the subject of the second paragraph of the first subdivision of said section 49, nor to the fourth subdivision of section 33. If the presence of those words in the first paragraph of section 49 has the force claimed for them, then the absence of them in the second paragraph of said section 49 and in the fourth subdivision of section 33 becomes more significant, and indicates the opposite effect from that which their presence in the first paragraph of section 49 is claimed to indicate.
We are dealing now with section 60 of the Railroad Law, and it cannot be claimed that said section is affected by the words last quoted from section 49 of the Public Service Commissions Law. Whether or not those words have the effect claimed for them with reference to ordinary rates of fare need not now be considered. We are now simply dealing with the question of reduced rates to which those words clearly do not apply. I think that one of the purposes of said sections 49 and 33 of the Public Service Commissions Law was to place the question of rate fixing, so far as reduced rates, at least, are concerned, within the power of the commission, and to give it jurisdiction to act without statutory limitation or restraint. Where it does not investigate or act, the carriers are limited by statute in their maximum charges. But the commission is not subject to the limitation or restraint which is placed on the carriers themselves. I know of no other interpretation which will render effective both the provisions of the Railroad Law and the provisions of sections 49 and 33 of the Public Service Commissions Law above quoted, and other similar provisions.
It is argued that the meaning of the statutes is that the commission may raise or lower rates within the statutory limitations, but that the statute fixes the maximum above which the commission cannot go. To this there are two answers. First. That was the effect of the law before the revision and amendments of 1910 and 1911. The amendments of those years to sections 49 and 33 above set forth had some purpose, but they have accomplished nothing if they have simply left the statutes where they were before. They were certainly not needed in order to give the commission power to adjust rates within the existing statutory limitations and they have served no purpose whatever unless they have removed those limitations from the power of the commission. Second. The language of the amendments is not fairly susceptible to that construction. It is the "maximum rates, fares or charges chargeable by any such common carrier," in section 49, that are made the subject of the investigation by the commission) and if the commission on such investigation finds that such "maximum rates, fares or charges" are insufficient, the commission may then determine the "reasonable and just rates, fares and charges to be thereafter observed and enforced as the maximum." And in section 33 it is the "maximum to be charged" concerning which no "other provision of law shall be deemed to limit the power of the commission." It is the "maximum" charges which are being considered in all sections. This same word is used) in sections 33 and 49 of the Public Service Commissions Law and section 60 of the Railroad Law. As construed by the commission, no significance is given to the word "maximum" in section 49. If that word be eliminated from tire section, it might then be construed as it has been construed by the commission. In the construction of statutes some meaning should be given as far as possible to every word and every phrase. The construction contended for makes the word "maximum" surplusage.
The determination of the commission should therefore be annulled, and the proceeding remitted to tire commission for further action. All concur, except KELLOGG, P. J., and WOODWARD, J.