Case Name: POPULIST PARTY of ARKANSAS, Ralph Nader and Peter Miguel Camejo, et al. v. Linda CHESTERFIELD and Democratic Party of Arkansas
Court: Arkansas Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Arkansas
Decision Date: 2004-10-01
Citations: 359 Ark. 58
Docket Number: 04-994
Parties: POPULIST PARTY of ARKANSAS, Ralph Nader and Peter Miguel Camejo, et al. v. Linda CHESTERFIELD and Democratic Party of Arkansas
Judges: Brown, J., concurs.
Reporter: Arkansas Reports
Volume: 359
Pages: 58–74

Head Matter:
POPULIST PARTY of ARKANSAS, Ralph Nader and Peter Miguel Camejo, et al. v. Linda CHESTERFIELD and Democratic Party of Arkansas
04-994
195 S.W.3d 354
Supreme Court of Arkansas
Opinion delivered October 1, 2004
Mike Beebe, Att’y Gen., by: Wendy L. Kelley, Deputy Att’y Gen., and Hilburn, Calhoon, Harper, Pruniski & Calhoon, Ltd., by: Sam Hilburn, for appellants.
Vickery & Carroll, P.A., by: RobinJ. Carroll; and Brian D. Greer, for appellees.

Opinion:
Betty C. Dickey, Chief Justice.
This is an appeal from Pulaski Circuit D. Fox's decision granting a writ of mandamus. Linda Chesterfield and the Democratic Party of Arkansas contested the certification of the Populist Party of Arkansas's Presidential and Vice Presidential candidates. Judge Fox granted the writ of mandamus, and the Populist Party, Presidential candidate Ralph Nader, and Vice Presidential candidate Peter Miguel Camejo bring five points for reversal: (1) whether the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction due to lack of standing; (2) whether the trial court had personal jurisdiction over Nader; (3) whether the trial court interpreted the requirements of Ark. Code Ann. § 7-8-302(5)(B) in a constitutional manner; (4) whether the trial court misinterpreted Ark. Code Ann. § 7-1-101(18); and, (5) whether the Secretary of State should be ordered to verify Nader and Camejo on the ballot even if the trial court's writ of mandamus is valid because the trial court did not remove Camejo from the ballot.
For the reasons explained below, we vacate Judge Fox's order granting the writ of mandamus and order the Populist Party of Arkansas's candidates, Ralph Nader and Peter Miguel Camejo, to be included on the 2004 presidential ballot.
Procedural History
On September 10, 2004, Linda Chesterfield and the Democratic Party of Arkansas filed a complaint and petition for writ of mandamus and declaratory judgment seeking the disqualification of Ralph Nader and Peter Camejo from the general election ballot as nominees for President and Vice President of the United States. Judge Fox heard the matter on September 17, 2004, first addressing Nader and Camejo's "motion to dismiss plaintiffs' complaint and petition for writ of mandamus and declaratory judgment by special appearance for lack of jurisdiction," filed September 17, 2004.
Judge Fox did not make a ruling on the motion to dismiss but took testimony and evidence. He summarized the arguments by stating:
I believe these are the areas that are in play. That The Populist Party of Arkansas, at least at some point in time, somebody signed as The Better Life of Arkansas, that it's not qualified as a party or a new party because it didn't receive three percent or more of the vote in the last Presidential election for a candidate . And the next thing that happens is that you have to get at least 1,000 signatures that are in the proper form and from qualified folks to sign petitions. So those are two separate things. Then also the plaintiffs are arguing that the defendants Nader and Camejo have accepted the nomination in other states from parties that are different than The Populist Party and that they are therefore ineligible as candidates for that party in Arkansas pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. § 7-7-204 . . . the petition forms themselves are invalid regardless of the number of signatures, because they do not identify The Populist Party sponsorship of the candidates and they don't contain a canvasser's verification.
On September 20, 2004, after the hearing, Judge Fox issued a memorandum opinion determining that jurisdiction was proper as to Nader but that it did not have jurisdiction as to Camejo. Judge Fox also found that the petitions did not comply with the requirement of Ark. Code Ann. § 7-8-302(5)(B). The trial court wrote:
The General Assembly has established many requirements for "political parties" with respect to their participation in the election process. "Political parties" have to receive at least three percent (3%) of the votes cast in the last general election for Governor or nominees for presidential electors. If "political parties" fail to receive three percent (3%) they lose their status. In order to become a new "political party" a "political group" has to obtain the signatures of qualified electors, whichever is less, at the last preceding election. And "political parties" are required to hold primary elections.
But the law is clear and unambiguous that the qualified electors signing the petitions of a "political group" must declare that the names to be printed on the ballot be "the names of their candidate". The petitions submitted by the defendant "political group" do not meet such threshold requirement. Accordingly, a writ of mandamus will issue to the defendant Daniels to recall the certified list and to remove the name of Ralph Nader from the certified fist as a candidate for the defendant "political group."
Judge Fox ordered the immediate recall of the certification of full lists of all candidates to all county boards of election commissioners issued in accordance with Ark. Code Ann. § 7-5-203(a) and ordered the Secretary of State to issue a new list of candidates after removing the name of Nader as the candidate for the office of President.
Appellants filed a notice of appeal on Tuesday, September 21, 2004, and a brief oral argument on the issue of whether to stay the trial court's order was heard in this court on Thursday, September 23, 2004. This court then issued an order directing the Secretary of State to advise the counties not to print any other ballots until this case was resolved. Upon review of the briefs filed and arguments made to this court we now vacate the trial court's issuance of the writ of mandamus. "In making our decision in this case we are guided by the overriding constitutional principles in favor of ballot access." The Reform Party of Florida v. Black, 2004 WL 2075415 (Fla.) (Sept. 17, 2004).
Before turning to the merits of Nader's argument regarding statutory interpretation, we note that the Populist Party, as a political group, is the party in interest in this case. Under Arkansas law, it is the political group that has a right to place names on the ballot for the office of President and Vice President of the United States. Thus, Nader was not a necessary and indispensable party here. Furthermore, Judge Fox found there is no statutory requirement for the name of the "political group" to be on the petition. As to the issue of standing, it was waived by the Populist Party, as no objection was raised to the trial court below.
The Democratic Party of Arkansas and Chesterfield contend that the Populist Party did not have a valid political convention. However, on August 24, 2004, electors of the Populist Party met by conference call for their convention. Minutes were taken and a vote was taken on the delegates. Arkansas does not define what constitutes a convention and this court cannot say that the telephone conference convention is insufficient under Ark. Code Ann. § 7-8-302(5)(E).
Writ of Mandamus
This court has held that an action for mandamus is the proper method of enforcing the right set forth in Ark. Code Ann. § 7-5-207 (b). State v. Craighead County Bd. of Election Comm'rs, 300 Ark. 405, 779 S.W.2d 169 (1989). Mandamus is traditionally regarded as a remedy to be used on all occasions where the law has established no specific remedy, and justice and good government require it. Id.; Ex parte Trapnall, 6 Ark. 9 (1845). It is a writ which is used to enforce an established right. Id.; Gregg v. Hartwick, 292 Ark. 528, 731 S.W.2d 766 (1987). The right the appellant seeks to enforce is contained in Ark. Code Ann. 7-5-207(b) (1987). Id. That statute created a right in the people to the proper administration of election laws by prohibiting the inclusion of ineligible candidates on the ballot. Id.
Presidential Group Candidate Petition
The Populist Party argues that the trial court's interpretation of Ark. Code Ann. § 7-8-302(5) (B) was unconstitutional. We agree.
Judge Fox determined that the petition forms, used by the Populist Party, failed to comply with the technical requirements of Ark. Code Ann. § 7-8-302(5)(B), which states:
(B) A political group desiring to have the names of its candidates for President and Vice President printed on the ballot shall file a petition with the Secretary of State by noon on the first Monday of August. The petition shall contain at the time of filing the names of one thousand (1,000) qualified electors of the state declaring their desire to have printed on the ballot the names of their candidate for President and Vice President. The Secretary of State shall verify the sufficiency of the petition within ten (10) days from the filing of the petition. If the petition is determined to be insufficient, the Secretary of State shall notify in writing the political group through its designated agent and shall set forth his or her reasons for so finding. When notice is delivered, the sponsors shall have an additional ten (10) days in which to do any or all of the following:
(i) Solicit and obtain additional signatures;
(ii) Submit proof to show that the rejected signatures or some of them are good and should be counted; or
(iii) Make the petition more definite and certain.
Ark. Code Ann. § 7-8-302(5)(B) (Supp. 2003). Judge Fox found that the petitions were insufficient because petitioners did not state on the petition that Nader and Camejo were "their" candidates. Rather, the petitions stated a desire to have "the" particular candidates on the ballot. Specifically, the petition stated:
We, the undersigned, propose the name of Ralph Nader and Pete Miguel Camejo as President and Vice President to be placed on the ballot as Presidential group candidate in the General Election to he held on November 2, 2004, and each of us for himself or herself says: I have personally signed this petition; I am a legal voter of the State of Arkansas, and my printed name, date of birth, residence, city or town of residence, and date of signing are correctly written after my signature.
However, there is no statutory requirement that each person who signs the nominating petition be a member of the group circulating the petition. Ark. Code Ann. § 7-8-302(5)(B) only requires that those persons signing the petition express their desire to have the group's candidates on the ballot and that the petitioners be qualified electors who are registered voters under Ark. Code Ann. § 7-1-101(22).
Moreover, the Populist Party is not required to use either of the two forms contained in the "2004 Candidate Information" handbook published by the Secretary of State's Office because Ark. Code Ann. § 7-8-302(5) (B) does not prescribe a certain form. Under Ark. Code Ann. § 7-8-302(5)(B), the Secretary of State's Office is required to accept any form that contains at the time of filing "the names of one thousand (1,000) qualified electors. . . declaring their desire to have printed on the ballot the names of their candidates for President and Vice President." Ark. Code Ann. § 7-8-302(5)(B). The petition used here by the Populist Party, and its candidates, clearly met this requirement
Further, there is no specific requirement that the petitioners declare their intention to actually vote for the candidate on the petition. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit dealt with this issue in Anderson v. Mills, 664 F.2d 600 (6th Cir 1981). In that case, the court found a Kentucky petition-signature statute unconstitutional. The court wrote:
Of course, the "desire to vote" provision is not precisely analogous to the factual situations previously discussed. However, this provision, as did the lack of partitions and the thin ballots, results in publicizing the way one intends to vote. Certainly, it can be claimed that the latter two were actual revelations for whom the subscriber voted, while the former is only a declaration of one's desire and intention to vote in a future election. However, we refuse to adopt such an artificial distinction because all such practices jeopardize the right to secrecy of the ballot. The declaration operates to discourage citizens from participation in the electoral process simply because they do not wish people to know how they will vote. Such a revelation invokes the fears sought to be quelled by the secrecy of voting laws in this country, and subjects an elector to the pressure of his neighbors, employers, and social peers. Since the declaration abridges the right to a secret ballot in such a direct and unacceptable manner, it cannot stand.
Id. at 608-609. We agree with the rationale of the Sixth Circuit that a law may not require an electorate to name "their" candidates for President and Vice-President. Further, a petitioning law may only require that the signers state their desire that the named candidate, or named party, appear on the ballot. Id. Otherwise, a party who is uncertain about whom he will support in the general election, but has an interest in the candidate, would be unable to sign the petition because of the requisite declaration. Id. Furthermore, "the possibility of having new candidates with unusual and creative political philosophies is greatly reduced. As a result this requirement fosters a system which favors the status quo, while discouraging independent candidates and new political parties." Id. at 609.
Our own court has recognized that the right to become a candidate for public office is, under our form of government, a fundamental right, which should not be in any manner curtailed without good cause. Fisher v. Taylor, 210 Ark. 380, 196 S.W.2d 217 (1946). Any law or party rule, by which this inherent right of the citizen is diminished or impaired ought always to receive a liberal construction in favor of the citizen desiring to exercise the right. Id.
Statutes are not only presumed to be constitutional, but a court must construe a statute as constitutional if at all possible. Bunch v. State, 344 Ark. 730, 43 S.W.3d 132 (2001). As the Supreme Court has recognized, trial courts cannot impose a restriction that denies a group their right to associate or denies them access to the ballot unless narrowly tailored to meet a compelling state interest. Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709, 94 S.Ct. 1315 (1974).
Here, the manner in which the trial court's interpretation of Ark. Code Ann. § 7-8-302(5) (B) leads not only to an absurd result, but also renders the provision unconstitutional. This unconstitutional reading of the petitioning provision at issue infringes upon one of the fundamental civil liberties of our democracy, that of the secret ballot. Anderson, 664 F.2d 600. In sum, section Ark. Code Ann. § 7-8-302(5)(B) does not state that an electorate name "their" candidate for President or Vice President. The statute only requires that the signer of the petition state their desire that the named candidates appear on the ballot.
Having vacated the writ of mandamus, we need not address the other issues raised in this appeal, such as the trial court's interpretation of Ark. Code Ann. § 7-1-101(18) or whether the Secretaty of State should be ordered to verify Nader and Camejo on the ballot.
For the reasons stated above, the writ of mandamus is vacated. Our September 23, 2004, order to the Secretary of State advising the County Board of Election Commissioners to not initiate the further printing of ballots relating to the presidential election is hereby dissolved. The mandate shall issue immediately and the Secretary of State's Office is ordered to certify the ballot with the names of the Populist Party of Arkansas, Presidential Candidate Ralph Nader, and Vice Presidential candidate Peter Miguel Camejo.
Brown, J., concurs.
Glaze, Imber, and Hannah, JJ., dissent.