Case Name: Cecil French, Respondent, v. Bankverein Suisse, a Corporation, Appellant
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1917-05-18
Citations: 179 A.D. 371
Docket Number: 
Parties: Cecil French, Respondent, v. Bankverein Suisse, a Corporation, Appellant.
Judges: 
Reporter: Appellate Division Reports
Volume: 179
Pages: 371–374

Head Matter:
Cecil French, Respondent, v. Bankverein Suisse, a Corporation, Appellant.
First Department
May 18, 1917.
Sheriff — poundage — settlement of action without consideration.
Where a plaintiff discontinued an action without a consideration of any nature upon the admission that he had no cause of action and desired to withdraw the action brought, the sheriff holding property of the defendant under an attachment is not entitled, prior to Laws of 1917, chapter 265, to poundage or to retain the property until the same is paid. Although there has been a “ settlement ” of the action, there has been no sum paid upon which poundage can be reckoned, and, hence, no right of poundage under the terms of the statute, which is the sole source of the sheriff’s right.
Laughlin, J., dissented, with opinion.
Appeal by the defendant, Bankverein Suisse, from, so much of an order of the Supreme Court, made at the New York Special Term and entered in the office of the clerk of the county of New York on the 13th day of April, 1917, as authorizes the sheriff to retain property of the defendant which he had attached, until his poundage has been paid.
The order further discontinued the action and discharged the attachment.
Henry Escher, Jr., for the appellant.
A. S. Gilbert [Godfrey Cohen with him on the brief], for the respondent Max S. Grifenhagen, formerly sheriff, etc.

Opinion:
Shearn, J.:
The order appealed from involves the right of the sheriff of New York county to retain property attached until poundage is paid, where the attachment was vacated on consent, the stipulation reciting " that the plaintiff has no cause of action against the defendant under the facts set forth in the complaint or otherwise and that he desires to withdraw the action brought." It is - undisputed "that no consideration of any sort passed from the defendant to the plaintiff, directly or indirectly, in consideration of the discontinuance of this action or the making of this stipulation." This is not, therefore, a case where the attachment was vacated by the court because it was invalid or unwarranted; neither is it a case where the attachment was discharged by the defendant. The court correctly held that this was. a case of a settlement, and the statute then in effect — prior to Laws of 1917, chapter 265 — provided (Laws of 1915, chap. 565, amdg. Laws of 1890, chap. 523, § 17): " If the action is settled, either before or after judgment, the sheriff is entitled to poundage, upon the value of the property attached, not exceeding the sum at which the settlement is made." The right of a sheriff to his fees is purely statutory. (Campbell v. Cothran, 56 N. Y. 279.) The difficulty of the sheriff in this case is that there is no basis upon which poundage can be reckoned because no sum was paid in settlement. Ordinarily, there is some consideration for the settlement of an action, either direct or indirect, and where a case afforded an indication that, despite the recitals in the stipulation, there was some concealed consideration, the courts would go far in assisting the sheriff to disclose the facts. But where it is unchallenged that not only was there no consideration for the settlement, but that there was no basis for instituting the action, it would violate the fundamental law to require the defendant to pay the sheriff for having seized and held his property against the will of the defendant and without any fault on the part of the defendant. (Bowe v. United States Reflector Co., 36 Hun, 407.)
It. follows that the order so far as appealed from authorizing the sheriff to retain the property of the defendant was unwarranted and must be reversed, with ten dollars costs and disbursements to the defendant.
. Clarke, P. J., Scott and Davis, JJ., concurred; Laughlin, J., dissented.