Case Name: Clifton Shirting Co., Inc., Appellant, v. Bronne Shirt Co., Inc., Respondent
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1925-05-15
Citations: 213 A.D. 239
Docket Number: 
Parties: Clifton Shirting Co., Inc., Appellant, v. Bronne Shirt Co., Inc., Respondent.
Judges: 
Reporter: Appellate Division Reports
Volume: 213
Pages: 239–246

Head Matter:
Clifton Shirting Co., Inc., Appellant, v. Bronne Shirt Co., Inc., Respondent.
First Department,
May 15, 1925.
Sales —- contract for delivery “ June, July, August delivery may be made any time until last day of last month — contract not to be construed as installment contract upon evidence of usage or custom — reversible error to refuse plaintiff’s application to adjourn trial to enable it to rebut testimony as to usage or custom not pleaded — defense as to usage or custom is without merit.
It seems, that a contract for the sale of merchandise, which provides for delivery “ June, July, August,” will be satisfied by the seller if delivery is made at any time prior to the last day of the last month, and that it is improper to introduce evidence to show a custom or usage that under such a contract deliveries must be made proportionately during the three months specified.
It was prejudicial error for the court to refuse plaintiff’s timely application to adjourn the trial for a reasonable time to permit it to procure witnesses to repudiate the testimony as to usage or custom, which was not pleaded, and upori which plaintiff claimed to have been taken by surprise. The action of the court deprived the plaintiff of its right to a fair trial upon the alleged usage or custom.
It seems, the defense as to usage or custom is without merit and was clearly interposed to avoid payment solely because of a falling market.
Merrell and McAvot, JJ., dissent, with opinion.
Appeal by the plaintiff, Clifton Shirting Co., Inc., from a judgment of the Supreme Court in favor of the defendant, entered in the office of the clerk of the county of New York on the 20th day of March, 1924, upon the verdict of a jury.
Bondy & Schloss [Eugene L. Bondy of counsel; F. Sidney Williams with him on the brief], for the appellant.
Rogers & Sawyer [E. <7. Rogers of counsel], for the respondent.

Opinion:
Burr, J.:
The facts are sufficiently stated in the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Merrbll.
It has been repeatedly decided and laid down as a rule of law by this court that where a sales contract provides for delivery of merchandise by the use of words similar to those contained in this contract, to wit: " Delivery June, July, August," such words mean the seller has until the last day of the last month named in which to make delivery thereunder. (Stern v. Wohl, South & Co., 212 App. Div. 154; Bahnsen & Co., Inc., v. Leaf, 203 id. 618; Crown Embroidery Works v. Gordon, 190 id. 472; Childs & Bro., Inc., v. Hirsch & Co., 202 N. Y. Supp. 226; Morel v. Stearns, 37 Misc. 486; 43 id. 639.) The terms of the contract are not denied. In the light of the rule laid down by the court the meaning of the words used is entirely clear. It was, therefore, improper to allow defendant to give testimony to establish a custom or usage giving to such words an entirely different meaning particularly when no such custom or usage had been pleaded. (Healy v. Brandon, 66 Hun, 515; Britton v. Ferrin, 171 N. Y. 235, 242; Ford v. Snook, 205 App. Div. 194, 197; Mutual Chemical Co. v. Marden, Orth & Hastings Co., Inc., 200 id. 121, 124; Home Ins. Co. v. Continental Ins. Co., 180 N. Y. 389, 397; Poland v. Hollander, 62 Misc. 523, 525.)
" That usage or custom cannot be proved for the purpose of controlling rules of law or to contradict the agreement between the parties, is not and cannot be denied." (Britton v. Ferrin, supra, 242.)
" The effect of the evidence was to contradict the plain language of the policy, after its meaning had been settled by the construction of the courts. Usage cannot control law, nor change the legal meaning of a contract." (Home Ins. Co. v. Continental Ins. Co., supra, 397.)
Because of the evidence of usage or custom introduced by defendant over objection of plaintiff the contract was twisted into an installment contract, although section 126 of the Personal Property Law (as added by Laws of 1911, chap. 571), known as the Sales of Goods Act, provides: " Unless otherwise agreed, the buyer of goods is not bound to accept delivery thereof by installments."
The refusal of plaintiff's timely application to adjourn, the trial for a reasonable time to permit plaintiff to procure witnesses to rebut the testimony as to usage or custom not pleaded and by which plaintiff claimed to have been taken by surprise, deprived plaintiff of its right to a fan trial upon the alleged usage or custom and in itself requires a new trial.
I am of the opinion the defense is without merit and was clearly interposed to avoid payment solely because of a falling market.
The judgment should, therefore, be reversed and a new trial ordered, with costs to the appellant to abide the event.
Clarke, P. J., concurs; Dowling, J., concurs in the reversal on the last ground assigned; Merrell and McAvoy, JJ., dissent.