Case Name: John M. BYERS, as Personal Representative of the Estate of John M. Byers, Jr., deceased, Appellant, v. David RITZ and Paul Barcinas, Appellees
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 2003-11-26
Citations: 859 So. 2d 1282
Docket Number: No. 3D01-3585
Parties: John M. BYERS, as Personal Representative of the Estate of John M. Byers, Jr., deceased, Appellant, v. David RITZ and Paul Barcinas, Appellees.
Judges: Before GODERICH, GREEN, and RAMIREZ, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 859
Pages: 1282–1291

Head Matter:
John M. BYERS, as Personal Representative of the Estate of John M. Byers, Jr., deceased, Appellant, v. David RITZ and Paul Barcinas, Appellees.
No. 3D01-3585.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
Nov. 26, 2003.
Eversole & Rudd, P.A.; Albert Gordon; Hersch & Talisman, P.A., and Patrice Talisman, for appellant.
Lane, Reese, Aulick, Summers & Field and Paul Field; David K. Markarian, for appellees.
Before GODERICH, GREEN, and RAMIREZ, JJ.

Opinion:
GODERICH, Judge.
The plaintiff, John M. Byers etc. [the Estate], appeals from a final judgment in favor of the defendants, David Ritz and Paul Barcinas, in a wrongful death action. The defendants cross-appeal, in part, from the denial of their motion for summary judgment on the issue of worker's compensation immunity. We reverse and remand for a new trial consistent with this opinion.
John M. Byers, Jr. [Officer Byers] died as a result of an accident that occurred on Ocean Reef the day after Hurricane Andrew. The accident occurred when a backhoe, which was taken without permission, was being used to push a tree. The Estate filed a wrongful death action against Officer Byers' supervisors, Ritz and Barcinas, based on the "criminal acts" exception to worker's compensation immunity. § 440.11(1), Fla. Stat. (1991). Following discovery, the trial court granted partial summary judgment in favor of the Estate finding that "the use and taking of the backhoe constituted a violation of law for which the maximum penalty exceeds sixty days." The trial court, however, did not make any findings as to who committed the theft. The defendants defended the action, in part, by claiming that there was no theft of the backhoe because its taking was justified by the emergency present at the time.
At trial, the evidence showed that Ritz was the community administrator of the Ocean Reef Community Association [ORCA], Two of ORCA's departments were the Ocean Reef Public Safety Department and the Ocean Reef Volunteer Fire Department [collectively referred to as Departments], Barcinas was the captain of the Departments, and Byers was an officer of the Departments. The day after Hurricane Andrew, Officer Byers and his co-workers were manually clearing debris and trees. Officer Delgado, one of Officer Byers' co-workers, saw a backhoe that was owned by a construction company at a local gas station. Officer Delgado testified that he went back to the command center to share this information with Ritz, Barci-nas, and others. The consensus of the group, including Ritz and Barcinas, was that using this backhoe was a good idea. Officer Delgado then went back to the gas station and hot-wired the backhoe without attempting to contact the owner because there was no phone service. Officer Delgado used the backhoe to clear debris at the Public Safety Building. Several of Officer Byers' co-workers testified that Ritz and Barcinas either gave instruction to Officer Delgado regarding the use of the backhoe or saw Delgado operate the backhoe. Later that day, as instructed, Officers Delgado and Byers went to Sunset Cay to remove a large tree that had fallen across the road. While they were removing the tree, the fatal accident occurred.
At trial, Ritz testified that he did not remember one way or the other whether he had talked to Delgado regarding the backhoe. Barcinas, however, testified that he did not authorize the use of the backhoe.
The Estate requested that the jury be given the following jury instruction on theft which is derived directly from the Florida Standard Jury Instructions (Criminal):
A theft is committed when a person knowingly obtains or uses the property of another with the intent to either temporarily or permanently appropriate the property to his own use or to the use of any person or entity not entitled to it. "Obtains or uses" means any manner of taking or exercising control over the property or making any unauthorized use, disposition or transfer of the property.
The trial court, however, refused to give the last sentence of the instruction defining the term "obtains or uses." The trial court, over the Estate's objection, also instructed the jury on the defense of necessity, after denying the defendants' motion for directed verdict on that defense.
The jury found that neither defendant was guilty of theft, and therefore, did not answer the remaining questions on the verdict form. Thereafter, the Estate's motion for new trial was denied. This appeal and cross appeal followed.
First, we agree with the Estate that the trial court committed reversible error by not instructing the jury with the complete instruction on criminal theft where the requested instruction contained an accurate statement of the law, the facts in the case supported the giving of the complete instruction, and the instruction, as requested, was necessary for the jury to properly resolve the issues in this case. L.K. v. Water's Edge Ass'n, 532 So.2d 1097, 1098 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988).
On cross appeal, the defendants contend that the trial court erred by denying their motion for summary judgment on the issue of worker's compensation immunity. We disagree.
Specifically, the defendants contend that the "criminal acts" exception to worker's compensation immunity is not applicable in the instant case. Pursuant to section 440.11(1), Florida Statutes (1991), the "criminal acts" exception is applicable when "the conduct which caused the alleged injury arose within the course and scope of said managerial or policymaking duties and was not a violation of a law, whether or not a violation was charged, for which the maximum penalty which may be imposed exceeds 60 days imprisonment as set forth in s. 775.082.... " Although Officer Byers' injury did not occur during the theft of the backhoe, we agree that the theft of the backhoe "caused the alleged injury." The evidence demonstrated that Officer Byers would not have been injured if a backhoe was not being used to move the tree. Therefore, we find that the "criminal acts" exception is applicable and that the trial court properly granted the Estate's motion for summary judgment on the issue of worker's compensation immunity.
Because we are reversing and remanding for a new trial, we address one other issue raised by the Estate. The Estate argues that the trial court erred by instructing the jury on the defense of necessity. We agree.
A defendant is entitled to have the jury instructed on his theory of defense if there is any evidence presented which supports the defendant's theory. Bozeman v. State, 714 So.2d 570, 572 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998); L.K., 532 So.2d at 1098. In order to have a jury instructed on the defense of necessity, the evidence must show
(1) that the defendant reasonably believed that his action was necessary to avoid an imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury to himself or others, (2) that the defendant did not intentionally or recklessly place himself in a situation in which it would be probable that he would be forced to choose the criminal conduct, (3) that there existed no other adequate means to avoid the threatened harm except the criminal conduct, (4) that the harm sought to be avoided was more egregious than the criminal conduct perpetrated to avoid it, and (5) that the defendant ceased the criminal conduct as soon as the necessity or apparent necessity for it ended.
Bozeman, 714 So.2d at 572.
The evidence at trial established that the backhoe was merely taken to expedite the clearing of trees and debris following Hurricane Andrew. When the theft of the backhoe occurred, there was no indication that either the trees or the debris posed an immediate danger to anyone. Therefore, we agree with the Estate that the trial court improperly instructed the injury on the defense of necessity where the evidence failed to establish that the theft of the backhoe was "necessary to avoid an imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury to himself or others."
In our opinion, the remaining issues raised by the parties lack merit.
Reversed and remanded.
. Section 440.11(1), Florida Statutes (1991), provides, in part, as follows:
The same immunity provisions enjoyed by an employer shall also apply to any . supervisor, or other person who in the course and scope of his duties acts in a managerial or policymaking capacity and the conduct which caused the alleged injury arose within the course and scope of said managerial or policymaking duties and was not a violation of a law, whether or not a violation was charged, for which the maximum penally which may be imposed exceeds 60 days imprisonment as set forth in s. 775.082.