Case Name: Ronald SCHULTZ, et al., Petitioners, v. LOVE PGI PARTNERS, LP, et al., Respondents
Court: Florida Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1999-04-01
Citations: 731 So. 2d 1270
Docket Number: No. 92,803
Parties: Ronald SCHULTZ, et al., Petitioners, v. LOVE PGI PARTNERS, LP, et al., Respondents.
Judges: HARDING, C.J., SHAW and WELLS, JJ., and OVERTON, Senior Justice, concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 731
Pages: 1270–1272

Head Matter:
Ronald SCHULTZ, et al., Petitioners, v. LOVE PGI PARTNERS, LP, et al., Respondents.
No. 92,803.
Supreme Court of Florida.
April 1, 1999.
Clark A. Stillwell of Brannen, Stillwell & Perrin, P.A., Inverness, Florida, for Petitioners.
Enola T. Brown, Robert L. Rocke and Christopher L. Griffin of Annis, Mitchell, Cockey, Edwards & Roehn, P.A., Tampa, Florida, for Respondents. .
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, and Joseph C. Mellichamp, III, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, and Robert A. Ginsburg, Dade County Attorney, and Melinda S. Thornton, Assistant County Attorney, Miami, Florida, for Florida Department of Revenue and Dade County Property Appraiser, Amici Curiae.

Opinion:
PER CURIAM.
We have for review Love PGI Partners, LP v. Schultz, 706 So.2d 887 (Fla. 6th DCA 1998), which expressly and directly conflicts with Robbins v. Yusem, 559 So.2d 1185 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990). We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const.
The issue presented by the conflicting decisions is whether zoned use of land is, as a matter of law, determinative of the actual, good faith agricultural use of the land for ad valorem tax assessment purposes under article VII, section 4(a) of the Florida Constitution and section 193.461(3)(b), Florida Statutes (1993). The Fifth District Court of Appeal held below that when determining the actual, good faith use of the land for tax purposes, the zoned use is but one factor that an assessor or reviewing court may consider along with the other specified factors provided in section 193.461(3)(b)l — 7, Florida Statutes (1993), and that zoning alone is not determinative as a matter of law. Love PGI Partners, 706 So.2d at 892-893.
The Fifth District reasoned that the determination must be based on an evaluation of the various factors surrounding the alleged agricultural use as provided in section 193.461(3) (b), which include the duration and continuity of the use, the purchase price and size of the land, whether the land is cared for in a manner to support the alleged use, whether there is a lease and, if so, its terms, and "[sjuch other factors" as may be apparent. Love PGI Partners, 706 So.2d at 891-92 (quoting § 193.461(3)(b)). Not having been included as a factor by the legislature, the zoned use of the land enters the analysis via the catchall factor that allows the taxing authority to consider any relevant factor not specifically mentioned. § 193.461(3)(b)7, Fla. Stat. (1993); Love PGI Partners, 706 So.2d at 892. The court also stressed that "the key to determining entitlement to [an] agricultural classification is the actual physical activity being conducted on the land. Bass v. Gen. Dev. Corp. 374 So.2d 479 (Fla.1979)[.]" Love PGI Partners, 706 So.2d at 891. Thus, making the good faith agricultural use determination based exclusively on zoned use as a matter of law, would violate the broad examination required by statute, which is properly focused on the actual physical use of the land.
We find the Fifth District's reasoning to be sound and add that the holding is consistent with our opinion in Greenwood v. Oates, 251 So.2d 665 (Fla.1971), wherein we stated: "It is clear . that any deter mination of a bona fide forestry operation must be arrived at upon consideration of all practices and indicia existing in each case, and on a case by case basis. It would be an impossible and unwise task for this Court, or any appellate court, to attempt to establish inflexible, definite criteria to be arbitrarily applied on a statewide or even area basis." Id. at 667-68.
Accordingly, we approve the Fifth District's decision below, and disapprove Robbins v. Yusem to the extent it is inconsistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
HARDING, C.J., SHAW and WELLS, JJ., and OVERTON, Senior Justice, concur.
ANSTEAD, J., dissents with an opinion, in which PARIENTE, J., and KOGAN, Senior Justice, concur.
. Sugarmill and Love PGI Partners both litigated this case below; however, only Sugar-mill, as a taxpayer, remains a party at this stage of the proceedings.