Case Name: Jeffrey Bernard HAILE, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1996-03-20
Citations: 672 So. 2d 555
Docket Number: No. 94-03806
Parties: Jeffrey Bernard HAILE, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: FULMER, J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 672
Pages: 555–558

Head Matter:
Jeffrey Bernard HAILE, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. 94-03806.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
March 20, 1996.
James Marion Moorman, Public Defender, Bartow, and Brad Permar, Assistant Public Defender, Clearwater, for Appellant.
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and William I. Munsey, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appel-lee.

Opinion:
FRANK, Acting Chief Judge.
Jeffrey Haile, who was convicted of first degree murder and attempted first degree murder, contends that he should be granted a new trial because the court allowed an impermissible peremptory challenge to a potential juror. Because the trial court did not sufficiently examine the prosecutor's reason for the peremptory challenge, to expose whether it was racially motivated, we reverse.
During voir dire, when the prosecutor challenged the sole remaining African American member of the panel, the defense attorney objected. The prosecutor explained his challenge:
, The problem I have with Ms. King is the same problem I have with Ms. Walker and the same problem I have with Mrs. Platt is, Judge, they read the Bible. Judge, I don't want people on this jury in a forgiving mood. I know from my own personal experience, people who read the Bible also believe in forgive and forget. Based on that, I don't want them and if the Court wants me to, I'll strike Mrs. Platt now, but any of these people that read the Bible, I want nothing to do with.
Without much more discussion, the prosecutor's reasoning was accepted and he was allowed to strike Ms. King. The defense attorney's objection set in motion the requirement for the conduct of an inquiry pursuant to State v. Neil, 457 So.2d 481 (Fla.1984). The judge, however, merely accepted the state's reason—that Ms. King reads the Bible—as nondiscriminatory.
The court erred by failing to inquire more deeply into the reasons advanced by the state for exercising a peremptory challenge aimed at Ms. King. The court should have conducted a more penetrating inquiry into what appears to be a pretextual reason; the defendant is entitled to a new trial.
In State v. Sloppy, 522 So.2d 18 (Fla.1988), the Florida Supreme Court listed five nonexclusive factors that "weigh against the legitimacy of a race-neutral explanation." Of these factors, three are present in this case: "(1) the alleged group bias not shown to be shared by the juror in question, (2) failure to examine the juror or perfunctory examination, . and (4) the prosecutor's reason is unrelated to the facts of the case.... " As in Sloppy, the "utter failure" to question Ms. King about her religious beliefs and their possible effect on her ability to serve as a juror is a source of immediate suspicion. Furthermore, this court cannot conclude, without evidence related to the facts of the case, that the reading of the Bible, a practice embraced by a significant percentage of the American public, would render that portion of the population inherently partial.
We find this case strikingly similar to Hicks v. State, 591 So.2d 662 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991), in which the prosecutor challenged an elementary school music teacher who was married to a high school band director on the ground that musicians "have more frequenting in and of themselves of occupations with illegal drugs, alcohol, substance abuse in general than other members of the population." 591 So.2d at 662. Without further inquiry into the challenged juror's political beliefs or ability to serve as a juror, such an apparently race-neutral reason must be deemed pretex-tual. See also Stroud v. State, 656 So.2d 195 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995) (state faded to show that peremptory challenge to prospective African American juror was not pretextual when she was rejected because the prosecutor did not like her brief answer to what she thought of the criminal justice system and no further inquiry was held); Stroder v. State, 622 So.2d 585 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993) (peremptory challenge of elementary school teacher of emotionally disturbed students, on the ground that such groups are in a "helping" rather than a punishing mode, was pretextual in absence of any questioning of prospective juror about alleged trait); Gibson v. State, 603 So.2d 711 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992) (challenge on ground that African American fruit picker would feel animosity toward the victims, Haitian fruit pickers, was held pretextual where no questions were posed of prospective juror on that subject).
The state has urged us to affirm this ease on the authority of Purkett v. Elem, — U.S. -, 115 S.Ct. 1769, 131 L.Ed.2d 834 (1995). The prosecutor in Elem rejected two prospective African American jurors on the basis that they had long hair and beards, which "looked suspicious" to the prosecutor. This reason, according to the Court, was race neutral and nondiscriminatory, for a " 'legiti mate reason'" is not a reason that makes sense, but a reason that does not deny equal protection." — U.S. at -, 115 S.Ct. at 1771. Once the prosecutor provided a race-neutral explanation for the peremptory challenge, it was then the opponent's burden to prove purposeful racial discrimination. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986). "At that stage, implausible or fantastic justifications may (and probably will) be found to be pretexts for purposeful discrimination. But to say that a trial judge may choose to disbelieve a silly or superstitious reason at step 3 is quite different from saying that a trial judge must terminate the inquiry at step 2 when the race-neutral reason is silly or superstitious." Elem, — U.S. at -, 115 S.Ct. at 1771. Thus, Elem requires the further inquiry that we are demanding in this ease.
To the extent that the effect of Elem might provide wider avenues of exclusion from jury duty based upon bias or prejudice toward protected groups, we are mindful of the philosophy of the Slappy court:
In interpreting our own Constitution, this Court in . Neil . recognized a protection against improper bias in the selection of juries that preceded, foreshadowed and exceeds the current federal guarantees. We today reaffirm this state's continuing commitment to a vigorously impartial system of selecting jurors based on the Florida Constitution's explicit guarantee of an impartial trial. See Art. I, § 16, Fla. Const.
522 So.2d at 20-1.
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons we reverse Haile's convictions and remand for a new trial.
FULMER, J., concurs.
PARKER, J., dissents with opinion.