Case Name: John ARMAND, Individually and on Behalf of His Interdicted Daughter, Joni I. Armand v. LOUISIANA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY and Jefferson Parish Department of Roads & Bridges
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1986-01-15
Citations: 482 So. 2d 802
Docket Number: No. CA-2337
Parties: John ARMAND, Individually and on Behalf of His Interdicted Daughter, Joni I. Armand v. LOUISIANA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY and Jefferson Parish Department of Roads & Bridges.
Judges: Before SCHOTT, BARRY, BYRNES, WARD and WILLIAMS, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 482
Pages: 802–807

Head Matter:
John ARMAND, Individually and on Behalf of His Interdicted Daughter, Joni I. Armand v. LOUISIANA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY and Jefferson Parish Department of Roads & Bridges.
No. CA-2337.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fourth Circuit.
Jan. 15, 1986.
Writ Denied March 21, 1986.
Carey D. Bearden, Leonard A. Radlauer, New Orleans, and Wilson M. Montero, Jr., Metairie, for plaintiffs-appellees.
Andrew P. Carter and George F. Riess, Monroe & Lemann, New Orleans, for defendants-appellants.
Before SCHOTT, BARRY, BYRNES, WARD and WILLIAMS, JJ.

Opinion:
BARRY, Judge.
This tragic one-car accident presents two issues: whether the defendant utility company was negligent because its transmission pole was too close to a roadway, and if the pole's design caused the severe injuries.
Joni Armand, a 20 year old waitress, got off work at 11 p.m. She and her boyfriend, John Kelly, went to a party in LaPlace for three hours, drinking and playing pool. They drove back to Metairie for breakfast, but argued in the restaurant's parking lot. John loaned his car to Joni (a new Toyota) to go home. Instead, she went to a bar in Fat City, arrived about 4 a.m. and met Wayne Clouatre. They talked briefly then Joni left for a West End bar and Wayne followed. There was conflicting testimony that Joni drove between 35-50 mph (35 mph speed limit) in a misting rain on a wet and dark West Esplanade Ave.
Wayne said a car approached from the opposite direction on the two lane street and Joni "got over" to the right. Up to that point Wayne said Joni's driving appeared normal. The Toyota slid to the left, then right and went into a spin. The car jumped a 5½"-6" curb, slammed sideways into a La. Power & Light Co. pole, and was demolished. The pole was 29"-30" from the curb on the grassy elevated border of a wide, open drainage canal. The car's front wheels stopped a few feet from the canal's sloping embankment.
Joni was taken to East Jefferson Hospital and blood drawn at 6:00 a.m. revealed .30% alcohol content. A crime lab sample taken at 6:50 a.m. showed .23% alcohol content. Joni suffered severe injuries, is a quadriplegic and was interdicted.
John Armand, individually and on his daughter Joni's behalf, sued LP & L and the Jefferson Parish Dept, of Roads and Bridges. Prior to trial plaintiff settled for $20,000 with the parish and its third party defendants, the car owner and his insurer and all were dismissed. Plaintiff waived a strict liability claim, and LP & L did not argue its right to have any recovery reduced in proportion to the percentage of fault (if any) assigned to the parish. The jury found plaintiff 20% negligent and LP & L 80% negligent for the design, installation, location and maintenance of the pole. The $1.5 million award was reduced to $1.2 million. The parish is insulated against any claim for contribution.
LP & L contends the law and evidence does not support the jury's findings of causation, negligence, apportionment of fault and quantum. We conclude the location and design of LP & L's pole was not a cause-in-fact of plaintiff's injuries and reverse the judgment.
LP & L's pole is one of a series of steel towers carrying transmission lines. The towers were erected in 1961 by LP & L before West Esplanade was upgraded several years later to a collector road. Both sides presented experts who said there are no industrial or governmental standards of safety for construction or placement of utility structures beside roads. All agreed LP & L could have relocated, reshaped or shielded the pole, but differed as to the feasibility and efficiency of possible safety measures.
In order for LP & L's conduct to be considered the legal cause of Joni's injuries, it's conduct must be a cause-in-fact of the injuries. The risk and harm encountered by a plaintiff must fall within the scope of protection afforded by a defendant's duty which was breached by its negligence. Dartez v. City of Sulphur, 179 So.2d 482 (La.App. 3rd Cir.1965). See generally McNamara, The Duties and Risks of the Duty-Risk Analysis, 44 LA.L.REV. 1227 (1984). Negligent conduct is a cause-in-fact of harm to another if it is considered a substantial factor in bringing about the harm. Thomas v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Company, 466 So.2d 1280 (La.1985).
The cause must play a significant role in causing the injury. Lastrapes v. South Central Bell Telephone Company, 473 So.2d 115 (La.App. 3rd Cir.1985); Carter v. Dr. Pepper Bottling Company, 470 So.2d 496 (La.App. 1st Cir.1985). One must speculate as to what would have happened if the conduct in question had not taken place. Since this requires surmise, probabilities necessarily come into play. If the victim probably would not have encountered the harm but for the defendant's conduct, the conduct can be considered a cause-in-fact. See generally, Malone, Ruminations on Dixie Drive It Yourself v. American Beverage Company, 30 LA.L. REV. 363 (1970).
The location of the pole did not create an unreasonable risk of harm. To so hold would create absolute liability. We are cognizant of the inestimable number of poles and trees which line our streets, many next to or a few inches off the roadways. LP & L's pole is no more a legal cause of Joni's injuries than if she had hit an object in the road, lost control, then struck the pole. The pole's location in the elevated, parish approved, designated right of way was not a cause-in-faet of the accident, nor was it a substantial contributing factor. A utility company has no obligation to guard against rare exigencies such as an out of control vehicle leaving a traveled roadway.
Plaintiff claims the pole's size and square design (instead of round) caused the crushing type injuries. It is purely speculative whether a guard rail on such a pole would have resulted in less severe injuries.
Plaintiff's reliance on Lang v. Prince, 447 So.2d 1112 (La.App. 1st Cir.1984), writ denied 450 So.2d 1309, 1311 (La.1984), is misplaced. There liability was predicated on the utility pole's location in the middle of an improved shoulder.
It is obvious a serious accident would have occurred whether or not the pole was 29 inches from the road. Joni's reckless driving on the slippery roadway caused her to lose control of the car, but her intoxication either precipitated the initial slide or prevented her from regaining control. Joni's blood alcohol content, whether .30% or .23%, does not create a presumption of intoxication because the La.R.S. 32:662 presumption applies only in criminal cases. Nevertheless, all experts agreed that .30% or .23% would impair the motor abilities and judgment of anyone. Such an inordinately high alcohol content could have induced sleep, but certainly impacted Joni's normal senses to react. According to the experts, if the car had not hit the pole it would have gone into the canal. Joni would have drowned or been severely injured.
A motorist has a duty to control an automobile and to maintain a proper lookout. Russo v. Guillory, 322 So.2d 233 (La.App. 4th Cir.1975) writ denied, 325 So.2d 608 (La.1976); Hebert v. Lefty's Moving Service, 389 So.2d 855 (La.App. 4th Cir.1980). The accident was avoidable even if Joni was sober and maintained control, but her negligence breached this duty and was the sole cause of the accident.
The location and design of defendant's transmission pole was not the cause-in-faet of the accident. To hold otherwise was clearly wrong.
The trial court judgment is reversed. There is judgment in favor of defendant, Louisiana Power and Light Company, and against plaintiff, John Armand, dismissing his suit at his cost.
REVERSED.
BARRY, J., joins in the majority.
WARD, J., dissents.
BYRNES, J., joins in WARD, J., dissent.
BARRY, Judge, joins the majority:
The LP & L structure was not on a shoulder. The eases cited by the dissent involve an area designated for vehicles to voluntarily drive onto when leaving a primary roadway.
LP & L's structure was on an approved right-of-way — above an elevated curb and access to that area required the driver to jump the curb. To get onto any shoulder only requires voluntarily driving to that area which is designed for vehicular traffic.