Case Name: MIDVALE CITY CORPORATION, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. John HALTOM, an individual, and Doctor John's, Inc., dba Doctor John's Lingerie and Novelty Boutique, Defendants and Appellants
Court: Utah Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Utah
Decision Date: 2003-05-16
Citations: 73 P.3d 334
Docket Number: No. 20010794
Parties: MIDVALE CITY CORPORATION, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. John HALTOM, an individual, and Doctor John's, Inc., dba Doctor John's Lingerie and Novelty Boutique, Defendants and Appellants.
Judges: T 79 Associate Chief Justice DURRANT, Justice RUSSON, and Justice WILKINS concur in Judge JACKSON's opinion.
Reporter: Pacific Reporter 3d
Volume: 73
Pages: 334–357

Head Matter:
2003 UT 26
MIDVALE CITY CORPORATION, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. John HALTOM, an individual, and Doctor John's, Inc., dba Doctor John's Lingerie and Novelty Boutique, Defendants and Appellants.
No. 20010794.
Supreme Court of Utah.
May 16, 2003.
Rehearing Denied July 2, 2003.
Peter Stirba, Corbin B. Gordon, Benson L. Hathaway, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff.
John Fahle, San Antonio, Texas, and W. Andrew McCullough, Midvale, for defendants.

Opinion:
JACKSON, Judge:
T1 Defendants John Haltom and Doctor John's, Inc. (Dr. John's) appeal the trial court's issuance of a permanent injunction prohibiting Dr. John's from doing business in Midvale City. We affirm.
12 Associate Chief Justice Durrant, Justice Russon, and Justice Wilkins concur in Judge Jackson's opinion. However, Associate Chief Justice Durrant, joined by Justice Russon and Justice Wilkins, writes separately to set forth an alternative rationale for denying Dr. John's facial challenge, to address Dr. John's "as applied" challenge, and to clarify that the "good cause" exception does not need to be severed or given a limiting construction at this time.
BACKGROUND
13 The operative facts of this case are undisputed. - Defendants, acting primarily through John Haltom (Haltom), commenced business in Midvale City as Dr. John's Lingerie and Novelty Boutique (Dr. John's) in June of 2000, and applied 'for a commercial business license.
{4 On June 14, 2000, Haltom filled out an application where he described his business as selling "lingerie, swimwear, roses & gifts." On June 15, 2000, Susan Shreeve (Shreeve), the Midvale City Business License Administrator, asked Haltom for a definition of the novelties he intended to sell at his business. Haltom described such items as "candles and lotions." He failed to mention a legion of sexual devices and hundreds of associated products.
T5 On June 28, 2000, Shreeve visited Dr. John's on a business license inspection as scheduled by Haltom, and decided that some of the novelties constituted sexually oriented products as defined by the Midvale City Code. Shreeve admonished Haltom to apply for a sexually oriented business (SOB) license, and revealed that she could not approve his current business license, presumably because he had affirmatively misrepresented the items he was going to sell. On July 29, 2000, Dr. John's began operating without a business license.
T6 On August 8, 2000, the district court entered a Temporary Restraining Order that prohibited defendants from operating. On the same date, the parties appeared, were represented by counsel, and reached a specific agreement, as reflected in the order, that if "Haltom remov[ed] the product lines which [were] considered sexual[ly] oriented as de-seribed in the SOB ordinance, . the City [would] not take further action in terms of the business operating and [would] consider the operation pursuant to the general business license application submitted on June 14, 2000."
T7 For a brief time after the issuance of the Temporary Restraining Order, defendants removed all inventory covered by the ordinance, were issued a license, and continued to operate. On October 2, 20, and 24, and November 7, 2000, Midvale's City Code Enforcement Officer, Vicki Siegal, made inspections of Dr. John's and observed several hundred sexual gratification devices.
T8 On November 21, 2000, the trial court held a hearing wherein it determined that Dr. John's was doing business as an SOB without an SOB license. Since defendants never submitted an application to Midvale City for an SOB license, the trial court issued a permanent injunction prohibiting it from doing business in Midvale City. Dr. John's appeals.
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
9 Dr. John's presents four challenges to the trial court's injunction. First, it challenges the trial court's determination that Midvale City's SOB ordinance was not unconstitutionally vague or overbroad. Second, it challenges the trial court's determination that injunctive relief is an available remedy in this case. Third, Dr. John's challenges the trial court's determination that the ordinance in question is a valid time, place, and manner restriction. Fourth, Dr. John's challenges the trial court's determination that the Utah Constitution does not offer broader protection than the United States Constitution.
1 10 These are all questions of law that we review for correctness. See Grand County v. Emery County, 969 P.2d 421, 422 (Utah 1998) (holding a trial court's conclusion that a statute or ordinance is constitutional presents a question of law reviewed for correctness); Alta v. Ben Hame Corp., 886 P.2d 797, 804 (Utah Ct.App.1992) (determining availability of injunctive relief as matter of law); Whitmer v. City of Lindon, 948 P.2d 226, 228 (Utah 1997) (reviewing trial court's ruling on state constitutional claims for correctness).
ANALYSIS
1 11 We are called upon to decide whether a municipality may classify certain businesses as sexually oriented businesses, and require them to apply for a different license prior to engaging in business. There is no constitutional right to be free from classification. Accordingly, we hold that a city may classify businesses without implicating the First Amendment as long as the licensing process at issue does not adversely affect such businesses.
I. STANDING
112 We first discuss whether Dr. John's had standing to file suit, The district court made no factual findings that could support standing, and after careful review, it appears that this issue is dispositive. "[It is the burden of the 'party who seeks the exercise of jurisdiction in his favor [to clearly allege] facts essential to show jurisdiction. If [it] faills] to make the necessary allegations, [it has] no standing." FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 498 U.S. 215, 281, 110 S.Ct. 596, 608, 107 L.Ed.2d 608 (1990) (citations omitted).
{13 Because of the unique manner in which this case arose, the issue of standing is somewhat complicated. The issuance of an injunction conferred standing on Dr. John's as to licensing, and in effect, the constitutional challenge was bootstrapped in light of the dispute regarding classification. In essence, Dr. John's argues that unbridled discretion as to classification bears some relation to unbridled licensing discretion. We disagree.
¶ 14 A claim of prior restraint, valid or not, properly elicits a court's attention. "[Thhe judiciary is vigilant in its oversight of prior restraints because of the fear that they deprive or delay access to information, and because restraints that lack procedural safeguards may lead to content-based discrimination." Groff v. City of Chicago, 986 F.2d 1055, 1068 (7th Cir.1993) (en bane). "While [plrior restraints are not unconstitutional per se . [alny system of prior restraint . comes to [the Court] bearing a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity." FW/PBS, Inc., 498 U.S. at 225, 110 S.Ct. at 604 (citations omitted) (first and second alteration in original).
T15 A facial challenge is permitted where the licensing system "is directed narrowly and specifically at expression or conduct associated with expression," City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ'g Co., 486 U.S. 750, 760, 108 S.Ct. 2188, 2145, 100 L.Ed.2d 771 (1988), because when a licensing scheme implicates protected speech, "applicants [may] be intimidated into censoring their own speech by not applying for a license," (Graff, 986 F.2d at 1073.
116 "[A] facial challenge lies whenever a licensing law gives a government official or agency substantial power to discriminate based on the content or viewpoint of speech by suppressing disfavored speech or disliked speakers." City of Lakewood, 486 U.S. at 759, 108 S.Ct. at 2145. "To a large extent, then, one's ability to mount a facial challenge depends on the resolution of the substantive questions of whether speech is implicated and whether decision makers have excessive authority." Graff 986 F.2d at 1061.
$17 Even when a licensing scheme does not directly suppress communication, courts may properly entertain a facial challenge "where the licensing scheme vests unbridled discretion in the decisionmaker [or fails to confine the time in which a decision is made] and where the regulation is challenged as overbroad." FW/PBS, Inc., 498 U.S. at 228, 110 S.Ct. at 608 (citing City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 798 & n. 15, 104 S.Ct. 2118, 2125 & n. 15, 80 L.Ed.2d 772 (1984)).
¶ 18 Still, courts are reluctant to entertain facial attacks because the statute may be declared unconstitutional in all instances. "The usual approach is to wait until a statute is applied in the suspected and offensive way." Graff, 986 F.2d at 1072 (citing FW/ PBS, Inc., 498 U.S. at 228, 110 S.Ct. at 608); see also City of Lakewood, 486 U.S. at T74, 108 S.Ct. at 2158 (White, J., disnsenting). "[Wle cannot sustain [a] facial attack unless the ordinance is 'substantially overbroad, judged in relation to the statute's plainly legitimate sweep." FW/PBS, Inc., 498 U.S. at 259, 110 S.Ct. at 622 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
$19 Thus, there are two ways in which an appellant can attain standing: (1) He can raise an overbreadth challenge, alleging either impermissible time restraints or unbridled discretion; or (2) he can raise an as-applied challenge, alleging that the ordinance as applied has harmed or is likely to harm his interests. Both attempts fail in this case.
120 First, Dr. John's cannot mount a facial challenge because, even in the most restrictive light, the statute only regulates the type of license for which one must apply. To mount a facial attack in a prior restraint case, an appellant must demonstrate that the ordinance at issue restricts, or will restrict, communication in some discernible manner. Dr. John's offers no evidence that the purpose of the ordinance is "to restrict stores, as opposed to addressing the secondary effects of such stores." The Pack Shack, Inc. v. Howard County, 188 Md.App. 59, 770 A.2d 1028, 1034 (2001).
¶ 21 Even if Dr. John's had demonstrated unbridled discretion, it must also show that it suffered more onerous treatment or adverse consequences than a regular commercial establishment. Otherwise, its challenge must fail. "An injury-in-fact is an ' "invasion of a legally protected interest" that is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent, ie., not conjectural or hypothetical Causation requires a showing that the injury is ° "fairly trace[able] to the challenged action of the defendant." ' " 2.J. Gifts v. City of Littleton, 311 F.8d 1220, 1226 (10th Cir.2002) (alteration in original) (quoting Lyjan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560, 112 S.Ct. 2180, 21836, 119 L.Ed.2d 851 (1992)).
122 Dr. John's best argument is that it is "engage[d] in a course of conduct arguably affected with a constitutional interest, but proscribed by a statute, and there exists a credible threat of prosecution." Babbitt v. United Farm Workers Nat'l Union, 442 U.S. 289, 298, 99 S.Ct. 2801, 2809, 60 L.Ed.2d 895 (1979) (noting that standing exists when fear of criminal prosecution under allegedly unconstitutional statute is not imaginary or wholly speculative). The record indicates that the city attempted to enforce the ordinance against Dr. John's. The record also indicates, however, that had Dr. John's applied for the correct license he would have received one.
123 While normally, "[alpplying for and being denied a license . is not a condition precedent to bringing a facial challenge to an unconstitutional law," it is a central factor where the law presents no constitutional concerns. ACORN v. Municipality of Golden, 744 F.2d 789, 744 (10th Cir.1984). Thus, Dr. John's standing turns on problems arising from the application for an SOB license.
24 Dr. John's has not alleged any harm arising from the licensing proceedings except for the classification of the business as an SOB. It is thus "pure conjecture" that any harm will flow from this classification. See Essence, Inc. v. City of Fed. Heights, 285 F.3d 1272, 1280 (10th Cir.2002) (holding adult business did not have standing to challenge a city's provisions for granting a license because the business faced no adverse effects). Dr. John's may not manufacture standing by refusing to apply for the proper license simply because he disagrees with the preapplication process of classification. Ultimately, Dr. John's fails to allege that he will suffer any harm from the classification or the licensing process itself, and the record is devoid of anything that might affect Dr. John's.
125 Absent evidence that the classification functions as some governmental mark of Cain, the licensing requirements are constitutionally sound because they have no effect on businesses. "An ordinance requiring applicants to 'divulge such personal infor mation as full name, height, weight, hair eolor, eye color, date of birth, current residential address, and all residential addresses for the prior three years' further(s the] 'substantial governmental interest in eradicating the secondary effects of sexually oriented businesses' " and does not violate the First Amendment. D&4 Vu of Cincinnati v. Union Township, 826 F.3d 791, 2008 U.S.App. LEXIS 7720, 2008 FED App. O122P (6th Cir.2008) (quotations and citations omitted).
126 The issues of discretionary classification and licensing may appear inextricably intertwined. - Discretionary - classification, however, does not implicate First Amendment protection, and discretionary licensing does so only when the process itself threatens some type of restriction on communication. The Midvale ordinance threatens no restriction whatsoever, save for the issuance of a different business license. "[T]he city does not exercise discretion by passing judgment on the content of any protected speech. Rather, the city reviews the general qualifications of each license applicant, a ministerial action that is not presumptively invalid." FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 498 U.S. 215, 229, 110 S.Ct. 596, 607, 107 L.Ed.2d 608 (1990).
127 In sum, Dr. John's does not have standing to mount a facial attack on the Midvale ordinance because it has not shown that the ordinance has any deterrent effect on expression. The Midvale ordinance requires a sexually oriented business to complete a business license application truthfully. Nothing in the record suggests that the ordinance restricts anything besides business owners who would operate without a license.
II. OVERBREADTH AND VAGUENESS CLAIMS
128 Although standing is dispositive, we will analyze Dr. John's constitutional arguments insofar as they have been raised and insofar as Chief Justice Durham addresses them in her dissent.
A. Sexual Novelties as Expressive Conduct
1. - Level of Serutiny
129 Dr. John's argues that the sexual novelties at issue here amount to expressive conduct protected by the First Amendment. The trial court assumed arguendo that marginal protection applied to proceed with the substantive analysis. It is far from clear, however, that the sale of sexual devices deserves any First Amendment protection. Whatever the intellectual attraction may be in treating sexual devices as marginally protected "symbolic speech," it is clear from Haltom's testimony that Dr. John's interest in selling the products was purely commercial. A product's mere shock value does not trigger protected speech considerations, especially where the challenger would use the First Amendment as a prophylactic shield against valid government licensing regulations. The district court's use of mid-level serutiny was thus overly generous to Dr. John's.
1 30 As the district court held, absent some perceptible communicative or expressive function, the sexually oriented novelties should be examined using the lowest level of serutiny afforded commercial speech. This would place the analysis squarely within the well-established Hoffman framework and defeat any claims of vagueness or overbreadth because the ordinance implicates no constitutionally protected conduct. See generally Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, 455 U.S. 489, 497, 102 S.Ct. 1186, 71 LEd.2d 362 (1982). Dr. John's has failed to demonstrate any speech interest in the products it sells, and in fact affirmatively denied such an interest.
Accordingly, we decline to infer a communicative purpose in these products. Whatever level of speech or communicative quality may lie hidden in the sexual novelties Dr. John's sells, the government may require that Dr. John's apply for and receive a valid business license.
2. - Symbolic Speech and Mid-Level Scrutiny
{ 31 The United States Supreme Court has noted that certain sexually expressive items and conduct are "entitled to some quantum of protection under the First Amendment." City of Erie v. Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 285, 120 S.Ct. 18382, 1888-89, 146 LEd.2d 265 (2000). The items sold at Dr. John's, however, are at best "symbolic speech," falling within the "outer ambit of the protection" and subject to evaluation under the O'Brien framework. See United States v. O'Brien, 891 U.S. 867, 88 S.Ct. 1678, 20 LEd.2d 672 (1968). "[T)he sordid business of pandering is constitutionally unprotected-... the sale of material solely to produce sexual arousal . does not escape regulation because the [material] has been dressed up as speech, or in other contexts might be recognized as speech." FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 225-26, 110 S.Ct. 596, 604-05, 107 LEd.2d 608 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring) (omission and second alteration in original). Thus, the district court was overly generous in applying mid-level serutiny to the ordinance.
¶ 32 Under the four-part O'Brien content-neutral test used for analyzing symbolic speech, government regulation is sufficiently justified if (1) it is within the constitutional power of the government; (2) it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; (8) the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and (4) the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest. See O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377, 88 S.Ct. at 1679.
¶ 83 The Midvale ordinance clearly passes constitutional muster because it is unrelated to expression and Dr. John's has failed to demonstrate any communication that it might actually suppress. Dr. John's residual claim that the ordinance is unconstitutionally vague because it fails to denote exactly what constitutes items of a "sexual nature" also fails. It is clear that the sexual novelties sold by Dr. John's represent items of a "sexual nature." See IDK, Inc. v. County of Clark, 599 F.Supp. 1402, 1410-11 (D.Nev.1984) (holding any ambiguity in language classifying SOB and subsequent licensing requirements was not unconstitutionally vague where plaintiff's business was clearly an SOB).
T34 That a city official may exercise discretion when classifying a business as an SOB is of no constitutional significance. Absent some type of different treatment, negative effect, or more onerous review process, city officials may classify a particular business any way they see fit. See FW/PBS, Inc., 498 U.S. at 217, 110 S.Ct. at 604-05.
B. Prior Restraint
1. - Inapplicability of Prior Restraint
1[ 35 The district court was correct in ruling that the determinative issue was licensing rather than censorship, and that the doctrine of prior restraint was simply inapplicable. A ministerial action as to licensing is not presumptively invalid, and unlike most prior restraints, the city is not required to justify its decision in court on every occasion. See FW/PBS, Inc., 498 U.S. at 229, 110 S.Ct. at 606-07. This distinction is important because the constitutionality of the statute turns on whether the licensing scheme functions as a content-neutral time, place, and manner restriction or a censoring wolf in sheep's clothing that would trigger Freedman's rigid analysis.
1 86 Prior restraint is only at issue where the government exercises some form of cen sorship or indirectly represses the communication of ideas before their dissemination. Generally, ordinances that have failed under prior restraint have either delegated unbridled discretion to state officials or lacked sufficient time restraints for the licensing process. See FW/PBS, Inc., 498 U.S. at 225-26, 110 S.Ct. at 604-05.
837 Prior restraint, notwithstanding Dr. John's nearly talismanic reliance on the mere assertion of the phrase, is not implicated by the ministerial requirement of a completed application. The mere invocation of the words "prior restraint" should not transmogrify a personal battle for lazer sexual mores into a constitutional issue, lest this court be led toward ruling on an issue of fundamental importance when Dr. John's harm is illusory and the restraint self-iim-posed. The record indicates that had Mr. Haltom truthfully filled out the proper form he would have been granted a license. As a practical matter, it is only Mr. Haltom's refusal to permit classification as an SOB that has allowed him to manufacture a fight with the government. - Classification is clearly permissible without implicating any constitutional concerns. "The mere fact that . material protected by the First Amendment is subject to . licensing requirements is not a sufficient reason for invalidating [anl ordinancle]." Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 62, 96 S.Ct. 2440, 2448, 49 L.Ed.2d 310 (1976).
138 The narrow question presented in this case is whether a municipality may require an SOB to complete a different application than a nonsexually oriented business. This question presents no intellectual challenge. The First Amendment has nothing to do with a wholly ministerial requirement that a business apply for and obtain a valid business license, even if that license is somehow different from other commercial establishments. There is no fundamental right to be free from government classification of a business as a certain type, nor a ministerial licensing provision, so long as the process does not restrict or otherwise negatively impact business owners. See Young, 427 U.S. at 70-71, 96 S.Ct. at 2452 ("[Wle hold that the State may legitimately use the content of [sexually explicit] materials as the basis for placing them in a different classification...."); Riley v. Nat'l Fed'n of Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 812, 108 S.Ct. 2667, 2686, 101 L.Ed.2d 669 (1988) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (stating that "the statute differentiates between professional fundraisers and volunteer([s}] . [but] this fact alone does not impose an impermissible burden on protected speech, nor does it require that the licensing provisions be subjected to strict scrutiny").
139 Because municipalities may generally impose licensing requirements for purposes of regulation and zoning, and because the constitutionality of applying a more stringent application process for SOBs has been thoroughly examined by other courts, we forego a rigorous constitutional analysis and uphold the district court's decision. See Schults v. City of Cumberland, 26 F.Supp.2d 1128, 1149 (W.D.Wis.1998) (holding licensing requirement mandating disclosure of prior eriminal convictions not unconstitutional prior restraint); IDK, Inc. v. County of Clark, 599 F.Supp. 1402, 1410-11 (D.Nev.1984) (holding any ambiguity in language classifying SOB and subsequent licensing requirements not unconstitutionally vague where as applied to plaintiff it was clear that business was SOB); St. Louis County v. B.A.P., Inc., 18 S.W.3d 397, 408-17 (Mo.Ct.App.2000) (holding licensing ordinances governing SOBs sufficiently narrowly tailored to satisfy constitutional concerns). See generally Lee R. Russ, Annotation, Validity of Statutes or Ordinances Requiring Sex-Oriented Businesses to Obtain Operating Licenses, 8 AL.R.4th 180 (1981) (listing recent cases where ordinances have been found to be both constitutional and unconstitutional as prior restraints).
2. Prior Restraint Analysis
€$40 The district court correctly determined that the Midvale licensing scheme does not constitute a prior restraint on speech. A court may not properly engage in a prior restraint analysis prior to determining the level of protection afforded the subject matter and the manner in which the ordinance restricts expression. To do so places the cart before the horse. The propri ety of the analysis does not change because the regulation is facially attacked as unconstitutional. It is still necessary for the petitioner to demonstrate how the regulation affects expression, even if the restraint is hypothetical. In this case, even if the material were found to warrant protection under prior restraint analysis, the ordinance is constitutionally sound.
T41 Prior restraint exists when speech or an analogue is conditioned upon the prior approval of public officials. Prior restraints are presumptively invalid because they typically involve "two evils that will not be tolerated": (1) the risk of censorship associated with the vesting of unbridled discretion in government officials; and (2) "the risk of indefinitely - suppressing - permissible speech" when a licensing law fails to provide for the prompt issuance of a license. FW/ PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 498 U.S. 215, 227, 110 S.Ct. 596, 605, 107 LEd.2d 608 (1990). As the district court correctly held, the Midvale ordinance contains sufficient safeguards to redeem it from a facial assault.
42 In FW/PBS, Inc., the Supreme Court applied Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 58-59, 85 S.Ct. 784, 788-39, 18 L.Ed.2d 649 (1965), to a film censorship regulation. See FW/PBS, Inc., 498 U.S. at 225-27, 110 S.Ct. at 604-05. Freedman provides a paradigmatic tripartite framework for analysis that is used in all prior restraint claims where the effect of the licensing provision is to restrict communication. See, eg., Riley v. Nat'l Fed'n of Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 802, 108 S.Ct. 2667, 2680-81, 101 L.Ed.2d 669 (1988); Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 558-64, 95 S.Ct. 1239, 1246-49, 48 L.Ed.2d 448 (1975) United States v. Thirty-Seven Photographs, 402 U.S. 368, 367-75, 91 S.Ct. 1400, 1408, 28 L.Ed.2d 822 (1971).
T 43 Although the fractured opinion in FW/ PBS, Inc. has been the subject of some controversy, the framework it provides for analyzing licensing regulations is controlling where the regulation has at least some potential to restrict expression. However, as the Supreme Court has made clear through decisions following FW/PBS, Inc., mere business licensing does not trigger Freedman or FW/ PBS, Inc. analysis absent some discernible restriction on expression. See Riley, 487 U.S. at 795-96, 108 S.Ct. at 2676-77; Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 62-63, 96 S.Ct. 2440, 2448-49, 49 L.Ed.2d 810 (1976); City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 54, 106 S.Ct. 925, 982, 89 L.Ed.2d 29 (1986). Nevertheless, the instant case provides an appropriate forum in which to comment on the analysis and may provide municipalities with some guidance in this complex area of constitutional law.
144 FW/PBS, Inc. involves the following tripartite framework. First, the licensing decision must be made within a brief and determinate period; second, the process must assure a prompt judicial decision in case of denial; and third, the scheme must place the burden of litigating a denial on the government. See FW/PBS, Inc., 498 U.S. at 227, 110 S.Ct. at 606. Importantly, the plurality concluded that the third Freedman requirement, proving the unprotected nature of the speech, is inapplicable when a system of prior restraint does not require a public official to pass judgment on the content of any speech. See 498 U.S. at 229-80, 110 S.Ct. at 606-07.
45 The current problem does not involve the third requirement because it is only applicable where a form of censorship obtains and not where the content of the speech is merely incidental to the categorization of a business. That is, the third requirement applies where an official is making a yes or no licensing decision based on the content of the speech. See id. Here, the decision to categorize only results in the need for a different license and review process, rather than the ultimate decision regarding approval. Though there has been some disagreement in using an abbreviated Freedman test for content-neutral ordinances, it has never been suggested that a mere licensing regulation should be subject to the level of serutiny Dr. John's suggests.
146 Thus, even if a prior restraint analysis were appropriate here, the Midvale ordinance is clearly constitutional. First, the ordinance is devoid of any unbridled official discretion that might render the ordinance constitutionally infirm. Second, there are no temporal ambiguities that might result in unreasonably delaying licensing. - Lastly, though the ordinance does not guarantee a prompt judicial determination as required by FW/PBS, Inc., until the United States Supreme Court clarifies this problematic concept, a combination of provisional licensing and prompt judicial access will have to suffice. See City News & Novelty, Inc. v. City of Waukesha, 531 U.S. 278, 281, 121 S.Ct. 7483, 746, 148 LEd.2d 757 (2001) (noting that "[eclourts have divided over the meaning of FW/PBS's 'prompt judicial review' requirement," granting certiorari to resolve the conflict, and subsequently finding issue not "genuinely presented" resulting in dismissal). Absent an action by the city to restrict business operation while the issue is litigated, the "decision" language is not dispositive because the city granted a de facto provisional license.
a. - Unbridled Official Discretion
147 Dr. John's suggests that unbridled official discretion exists in the Midvale ordinance. A prior restraint involving official discretion exists when speech is conditioned upon the prior approval of public officials. See, e.g., Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 556, 95 S.Ct. 1239, 1245-46, 48 L.Ed.2d 448 (1975) (finding prior restraint where approval of musical was conditioned on municipal board's decision). Although officials may exercise discretion in deciding that products are sexually oriented, this is not the type of discretion prohibited by FW/PBS, Inc. See Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 61, 96 S.Ct. 2440, 2448, 49 L.Ed.2d 310 (1976) (finding vagueness relating to decision regarding threshold "sexually explicit activity" acceptable where ordinance described threshold as "characterized by an emphasis" on such matter).
T48 Dr. John's fails to allege any harm deriving from the classification itself. Moreover, the explicit and mandatory language of the ordinance and lack of individual discretion in the licensing process effectively negate any concern that an official may delay or short-cireuit the procedure. See, eg., City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ'g Co., 486 U.S. 750, 755-56, 108 S.Ct. 2138, 2148, 100 L.Ed.2d 771 (1988) (holding ordinance vesting discretion in official unconstitutional). Accordingly, the Midvale ordinance does not exhibit unbridled discretion.
b. Fixed and Reasonable Time Restraints
149 The Midvale licensing scheme prescribes fixed and reasonable time periods for application review and does not contain language that might cause undue delay. The licensor must make the decision whether to issue the license within a specified time period and the appeals process subsequent to a denial is clear and unambiguous. The time periods for initial decision and appeal are mandatory and, at forty-five to sixty days, are well within limits that have been deemed acceptable by other courts. See City of Colorado Springs v. Baby Dolls, 896 P.2d 272, 282 (Colo.1995) (upholding forty-day limit); Nightclubs, Inc. v. City of Paducah, 202 F.3d 884, 892 (6th Cir.2000) (noting that under Supreme Court case law, processes including judicial review with " 'potential delays of over five months are impermissible' " (citations omitted)).
150 Moreover, the ordinance requires timely review, specified appeals processes, and mandatory approvals in cases where the city fails to act. See, eg., Midvale City, Utab, Midvale City Code § 5.56.180(E) (1998) (if agency fails to approve within 15-day extension, premises shall be deemed approved). These provisions are of the type and kind specifically found to be reasonable under FW/PBS, Inc. and Freedman. See generally Lee R. Russ, Annotation, Validity of Statutes or Ordinances Requiring Sex-Oriented Businesses to Obtain Operating Licenses, 8 A.L.R.Ath 180 (1981) (listing cases where ordinances have been found to be both constitutional and unconstitutional as prior restraints).
{ 51 Chief Justice Durham argues that the relatively innocuous phrase "good cause" injects the possibility of indeterminacy into the licensing process. This is a mistake. First, the record contains no suggestion that the phrase has ever been invoked. Second, the phrase is omnipresent in the legal field, and is very likely surplusage as used here. Third, we can find no authority to support the concept that this phrase has ever been found to supply a level of indeterminacy nee-essary to void legislation. Finally, as we discuss below, even if we were to find this phrase problematic, the proper course of action would be to sever the offending words from the ordinance and leave intact the municipality's intent.
I 52 Even if we were to determine that the likely unintentional inclusion of the phrase "good cause" in the ordinance renders it constitutionally suspect, we must determine if that phrase is severable. The fact that the phrase has failed to attract judicial consideration in any similar context notwithstanding, the words are surplusage and clearly severa-ble without affecting the legitimate purpose of the statute.
153 When reviewing the construction of statutes, "the general rule is 'that statutes, where possible, are to be construed so as to sustain their constitutionality. Accordingly, if a portion of the statute might be saved by severing the part that is unconstitutional, such should be done. " State v. Lopes, 1999 UT 24, 18, 980 P.2d 191 (quoting Celebrity Club, Inc. v. Utah Liquor Control Comm'n, 657 P.2d 1298, 1299 (Utah 1982)).
¶ 54 In determining whether an unconstitutional portion is severable, "we look to legislative intent." Lopes, 1999 UT 24 at 119, 980 P.2d 191. When the legislature's intent is not expressly stated, we "turn to the statute itself, and examine the remaining constitutional portion of the statute in relation to the stricken portion. If the remainder of the statute is operable and still furthers the intended legislative purpose, the statute will be allowed to stand." Id.; see also Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., T17 P.2d 670, 686 (Utah 1985) (" 'Severability, where part of an act is unconstitutional, is primarily a matter of legislative intent[,]' which gener'ally is determined by whether the remaining portions of the act can stand alone and serve a legitimate purpose." (Citations omitted)). "The test fundamentally is whether the legislature would have passed the statute without the objectionable [i.e., the unconstitutional] part. ." Union Trust Co. v. Simmons, 116 Utah 422, 429, 211 P.2d 190, 198 (1949); see also Berry, 717 P.2d at 686.
$55 Although the ordinance does not include any indication of legislative intent regarding severability, it is indisputable that the ordinance is not only operable without the phrase, but completely unchanged. The phrase "good cause" is present in countless statutes, court rules, and contracts for no greater reason than word smiths believe it sounds lawyerly. In the present ordinance, the phrase serves no express or clear purpose, and is severable without any effect on the legitimate purpose of the ordinance. Thus, we must not smite the entire ordinance, leaving it neither root nor branch. Rather, pruning the vine would offer a more cireumspect solution.
c. Prompt Judicial Review
156 Most problematic is FW/PBS, Inc.'s requirement that the licensing process provide for not just prompt judicial access, but rather prompt judicial determination. The obvious dilemma created by the United States Supreme Court has been the subject of vociferous debates among the federal circuits and resulted in a split of authority as to what the Court "actually meant." See J. David Guerrera, The Meaning Of Prompt Judicial Review Under The Prior Restraint Doctrine After FWIPBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 62 Brook. L.Rev. 1217 (1996) (explaining split among cireuits).
157 Since municipalities clearly lack any control over the judiciary and the timeliness of a decision, the "prompt judicial review" requirement is a veritable Pandora's box because it contains the most dangerous potential for indefinite and thus unconstitutional delays. At least one circuit has noted that a provisional license or equivalent measure exorcises the demons of delay, and we agree. See Nightclubs, Inc. v. City of Paducah, 202 F.3d 884, 894 (6th Cir.2000). But see Deja Vu of Nashville v. Metro. Gov't of Nashville, 274 F.3d 377, 403 n. 8 (6th Cir.2001) (reaching the opposite conclusion under a different
€58 Although it is indisputable that FW/ PBS, Inc. mandates prompt judicial determi nation and not mere access, the remarkable split of authority among circuits, combined with the Supreme Court's refusal to rectify the acknowledged confusion in City News & Novelty, Inc. v. City of Waukesha, 581 U.S. 278, 285-86, 121 S.Ct. 748, 748, 148 L.Ed.2d 757 (2001), persuades us to advance an interim solution such as that suggested by the Sixth Circuit in Nightclubs, Inc., 202 F.8d at 894. Thus, any city procedure, however informal, that maintains existence of the status quo pending judicial review, will suffice until the United States Supreme Court devises some way out of this imbroglio.
III. INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
A. Appropriateness of Injunctive Relief
159 The trial court correctly determined that injunctive relief is available to a municipality under certain circumstances. Dr. John's claim that injunctive relief is always an inappropriate tool with which to halt the sale of expressive materials is misplaced. Although injunctive relief should be a measure of last resort and require a clear showing of irreparable harm, a municipality may obtain an injunction against a business selling protected material when that business operates without a license or violates some valid regulatory provision. Ogden City v. Eagle Books, 586 P.2d 486 (Utah 1978). Otherwise, any business with a newspaper rack could thwart the most mundane regulations under the guise of the First Amendment.
T 60 As we noted in Hagle Books, a city may employ a range of legal measures, including injunctions, to achieve compliance. Even with an otherwise valid regulation, however, when the materials sold represent clearly protected speech, injunctions must be a method of last resort. Moreover, in cases where expression is time sensitive, municipalities must exercise extreme caution in seeking court intervention, and courts must require a clear showing of irreparable harm before granting an injunction, however temporary. Regardless of any statutorily imposed time constraints, judicial review of any prior restraint claim must be expedited and err on the side of permitting the communication. Where applicable, interlocutory review should be sought and granted expeditiously so as to ensure a prompt judicial determination.
T61 The nature of prior restraint magnifies any shortcomings in an ordinance where the administrative appeals process contains uncertainty regarding the method, manner, and time limits placed on the review. A constitutionally sound licensing scheme must provide an applicant with a swift administrative decision and an administrative appeals process that ensures prompt review and results. The Midvale ordinance contains none of the shortcomings found in constitutionally infirm regulations that have been examined by other courts.
IV. TIME, PLACE, AND MANNER RESTRICTIONS
A. Is the Ordinance a Valid Time, Place, and Manmer Restriction?
62 Recent decisions by the United States Supreme Court indicate municipalities may regulate the placement and ownership of sexually oriented businesses through time, place, and manner restrictions. See City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 5385 U.S. 425, 440-41, 122 S.Ct. 1728, 1787, 152 L.Ed.2d 670 (2002). Such restrictions are termed content-neutral since they lack any form of censorship. Some difficulty in this area has arisen, however, because the analytical framework between content-neutral and content-based regulations is not altogether clear. As Justice Brennan noted in FW/ PBS, Inc., where a regulation is aimed at a specific type of business, the distinction between censorship and licensing may be illusory. See FW/IPBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 498 U.S. 215, 241, 110 S.Ct. 596, 618, 107 L.Ed.2d 603 (1990) (Brennan, J., concurring). Finally, even if a licensing scheme is determined to be a content-neutral time, place, and manner regulation, when such an ordinance fails to provide adequate procedural safeguards, it is nonetheless unconstitutional.
1 63 FW/PBS, Inc. declined to elaborate on this issue, and as a result, courts are left with little to guide them in this area. See id. at 228, 110 S.Ct. at 608. However, other jurisdictions have held that an otherwise constitu tional ordinance that seeks to regulate the placement and ownership of SOBs may properly be termed a content-neutral scheme. While the motives underlying a licensing scheme should be examined in regard to the stated goals of controlling secondary effects of SOBs, a municipality surely has a justifiable interest in obtaining information on the business owner and restricting licensing in this respect.
164 Content-neutral means the regulation "is not aimed at the content of the speech but rather at the secondary effects of [the SOB] on the surrounding community." City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 47, 106 S.Ct., 925, 929, 89 LEd.2d 29 (1986) (emphasis omitted). A regulation meets content-neutral time, place, and manner requirements if it (1) is content neutral; (2) is designed to serve a substantial government interest; and (8) does not unreasonably limit alternative avenues of expression. See id. at 46-55, 106 S.Ct. at 928-38.
I 65 The clear weight of jurisprudence in this area indicates that most courts consider the subject matter in this case as commercial speech and the regulation as a time, place, and manner restriction, resulting in a significantly lower level of scrutiny. See id. at 50, 106 S.Ct. at 980; Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 68-69, 96 S.Ct. 2440, 2451-52, 49 L.Ed.2d 310 (1976); City of Erie v. Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 289, 120 S.Ct. 1382, 1391, 146 L.Ed.2d 265 (2000); Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 770-71, 96 S.Ct. 1817, 1880, 48 LEd.2d 346 (1976). Nevertheless, while licensing schemes pose less substantial risks to protected speech than censorship schemes, the fact that a licensing process differentiates between certain types of businesses militates in favor of a slightly higher level of serutiny than would be afforded commercial speech. See FW/PBS, Inc., 498 U.S. at 226-28, 110 S.Ct. at 605-06.
166 There is significant disagreement in this area, which is perhaps best exemplified by the fractured nature of the Supreme Court's opinion in FW/PBS, Inc., where Justice White, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia, noted that it was unwise to apply prior restraint doctrine to licensing schemes aimed at preventing secondary effects. This tension is apparent in prior restraint cases that have followed FW/PBS, Inc., and likely reflects the fact that it is impossible to neatly separate a licensing scheme's good intentions from its practical effects. Even a perfectly constitutional li-cenging scheme with carefully drafted procedural safeguards may have an altogether unforeseeable, unconstitutional effect in certain instances, and it is folly to expect municipalities to surmount this intractable problem.
T 67 If any central premise can be gleaned from FW/PBS, Inc. and its progeny, it is that licensing schemes should be analyzed with an eye toward prior restraint doctrine simply because First Amendment jurisprudence is one tough nut. Furthermore, "[ilf courts were compelled to wait until the government discriminated on the basis of content, they would lack the power to review licensing schemes in advance of their application and to require procedural safeguards." (Graff v. City of Chicago, 986 F.2d 1055, 1067 (7th Cir.1993) (en bane).
168 Under the most restrictive interpretation, the Midvale ordinance regulates not conduct, but rather ownership, and is therefore clearly a content-neutral time, place, and manner restriction unrelated to expression. See Renton, 475 U.S. at 48-49, 106 S.Ct. at 929. Because the city does not exercise discretion over any particular expressive speech, the regulation is a "ministerial action that is not presumptively invalid." FW/PBS, Inc., 498 U.S. at 229, 110 S.Ct. at 607. Under the Renton test, the ordinance is constitutional if it is narrowly tailored to serve a substantial governmental interest and allows for alternative avenues of communication. See Renton, 475 U.S. at 50, 106 S.Ct. at 980. - As it now stands, an SOB may locate anywhere as long as the owner completes the proper application.
169 Clearly "[alny effect on the overall expression is de minimus [sic]." Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. at 294, 120 S.Ct. at 1898. "If States are to be able to regulate secondary effects, then such de minimus [sic] intrusions on expression cannot be sufficient to render the ordinance content based." Id. at 294, 120 S.Ct. at 1894. At best, Dr. John's sexually explicit products rise to the level of expression found in the nude dancing in Pap's A.M. and should be afforded no more than marginal protection, rather than the cherubim and a flaming sword Dr. John's proposes.
T 70 Having determined that the licensing scheme is a valid time, place, and manner restriction would generally not end the inquiry. If the city sought to regulate the time, place, and manner of expression, the court would need to measure the city's proposed interests in regulating conduct and the availability of other channels of communication. See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45, 108 S.Ct. 948, 954-55, 74 L.Ed.2d 794 (1988). However, although the ordinance classifies certain businesses differently, it does not treat them differently and thus need not be tested by the strict serutiny applied when government action impinges upon expression. The policy, therefore, need only rationally further a legitimate state purpose, and classification of SOBs is surely such a purpose.
B. Did Midvale Meet Its Burden?
171 Regulations that affect expressive, conduct require that the municipality bear the burden of demonstrating that the restriction is necessary and no broader than necessary to achieve the stated purpose. Midvale's express purpose in adopting the ordinance was to regulate secondary effects of sexually oriented businesses.
I 72 Remarkably, although the restrictions require different licensing procedures, the ordinance is a restriction of the weakest sort. Viewing the ordinance as a mere licensing scheme, as the district court did, that fmpli-cates no perceptible restriction on expression, the burden the city must bear is minimal and is clearly met here.
V. STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS
178 Though Dr. John's correctly asserts that the state constitution can provide protections that differ from those available under the federal Constitution, the failure to define the nature of those protections is fatal to this claim. A litigant who would appeal to the protections afforded by Utah's constitution must adequately brief state constitutional law issues rather than "making federal constitutional arguments and then mentioning, as an afterthought, that the act in question 'also' violates state constitutional law, without further explanation." State v. Davis, 972 P.2d 388, 394 (Utah 1998) (Durham, J., dissenting).
T74 This court has consistently declined to address state constitutional claims that have been inadequately briefed. See State v. Norris, 2001 UT 104, 128, 48 P.3d 872; State v. Lafferty, T49 P.2d 12839, 1247 (Utah 1988). "Nominally alluding to [state constitutional provisions] without any analysis before the trial court does not sufficiently raise the issue to permit consideration by this court on appeal." State v. Johnson, Til P.2d 326, 828 (Utah Ct.App.1989), rev'd on other grounds, State v. Johnson, 805 P.2d 761 (Utah 1991). For the court to consider a state constitutional claim, a litigant must at least define the nature of that protection and provide some argument as to how legal precedent supports its position. See State v. Bobo, 808 P.2d 1268, 1272-78 (Utah Ct.App. 1990).
75 Without analysis, the court can make no informed decision regarding whether the state constitutional provision in question was intended to mirror its federal counterpart, or whether it was intended to expand the scope of First Amendment guarantees. Dr. John's offers no analysis whatsoever in support of the argument for interpreting the Utah Constitution more broadly than the First Amendment. The fact that the Utah Supreme Court has interpreted article I, section 14 (search and seizure protections akin to the federal Fourth Amendment) does not mean that another, unrelated provision of the constitution should be expanded.
VI. COMMERCIAL SPEECH
T 76 Because we determine that Dr. John's has no standing to facially attack the Midvale ordinance, it is unnecessary to address Mid-vale's commercial speech argument. We would decline to address it in any event, however, because it has not been adequately briefed, and it thus is not squarely before us. See Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 805, 313 (Utah 1998) ("It is well established that an appellate court will decline to consider an argument that a party has failed to adequately brief.").
CONCLUSION
177 The trial court performed an admirable job of sorting through the facts and reaching the true issue: A business owner looking for a fight with government refused to complete an application that classified his business correctly.
178 We affirm the trial court's order. A contrary result would invite any business owner with a magazine rack and a grudge against government to invoke the beatified phrases "prior restraint" and First Amendment. The issue before the court is neither unique nor novel. Municipalities may require businesses to apply for and obtain business licenses prior to operating, and remain well within the boundaries of the constitution. While the First Amendment and the doctrine of prior restraint are deserving of aggressive protection, it is likely that the court will soon enough have a case appropriate for this purpose.
T 79 Associate Chief Justice DURRANT, Justice RUSSON, and Justice WILKINS concur in Judge JACKSON's opinion.
1 80 Justice HOWE did not participate herein; Court of Appeals Judge NORMAN H. JACKSON sat.
. A plaintiff may have standing if an ordinance has a deterrent effect on legitimate expression. However, he may not manufacture standing, as Dr. John's has here, by picking a fight about proper classification.
. What Dr. John's actually challenges is the ability of a single city official to choose what kind of business license Dr. John's must have. While it is not clear on what grounds Dr. John's might challenge this aspect of Midvale's business licensing scheme, we are certain it has precious little to do with the Constitution of the United States.
. Indeed, any message of sexual expression or freedom is clearly secondary to the sale and subsequent use of the products. Whatever communicative aspects a sexual device might convey to its potential purchaser, its emotive impact is certainly incidental to its purchase and primary use. Justice Scalia's comment in Pap's A.M. is instructive: The statute was constitutional " 'not because it survive[d] some lower level of First Amendment scrutiny, but because, as a general law regulating conduct and not specifically directed at expression, it [was] not subject to First Amendment scrutiny at all' "_ City of Erie v. Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 285, 120 S.Ct. 1382, 1388-89, 146 L.Ed.2d 265 (2000) (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 572, 111 S.Ct. 2456, 2463, 115 L.Ed.2d 504 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring)).