Case Name: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Joseph M. ARPAIO, Sheriff, Defendant-Appellant.
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 2018-04-17
Citations: 887 F.3d 979
Docket Number: No. 17-10448
Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Joseph M. ARPAIO, Sheriff, Defendant-Appellant.
Judges: 
Reporter: Federal Reporter 3d Series
Volume: 887
Pages: 979–986

Head Matter:
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Joseph M. ARPAIO, Sheriff, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 17-10448
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
Filed April 17, 2018
John Wilenchik and Dennis I. Wilenchik, Wilenchik & Bartness P.C., Phoenix, Arizona; Mark D. Goldman, Goldman & Zwillinger PLLC, Scottsdale, Arizona; for Defendant-Appellant.
John D. Keller, Deputy Chief; James I. Pearce, Trial Attorney; United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.; for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Before: A. Wallace Tashima, William A. Fletcher, and Richard C. Tallman, Circuit Judges.

Opinion:
Dissent by Judge Tallman
ORDER
This case is on appeal from the district court's denial of Defendant-Appellant's request for vacatur of his conviction for criminal contempt. The validity of the district court's denial will be addressed by the merits panel assigned to this case. We address only the question of whether to appoint a special prosecutor to defend the district court's decision in light of the United States' letter informing this Court that "[t]he government does not intend to defend the district court's order." For the reasons discussed below, we will appoint a special prosecutor to provide briefing and argument to the merits panel.
I. Background
Defendant-Appellant former Maricopa County Sheriff Joseph M. Arpaio ("Sheriff Arpaio") was referred for criminal contempt on August 19, 2016. The United States prosecuted Sheriff Arpaio and obtained a conviction on July 31, 2017. On August 25, 2017, President Donald J. Trump pardoned Sheriff Arpaio, noting that Sheriff Arpaio's sentencing was "set for October 5, 2017."
On August 28, 2017, Sheriff Arpaio moved for two forms of relief. First, Sheriff Arpaio moved "to dismiss this matter with prejudice." Second, Sheriff Arpaio asked the district court "to vacate the verdict and all other orders in this matter, as well as the Sentencing on October 5th."
The district court granted Sheriff Arpaio's first request. On October 4, 2017, the district court dismissed with prejudice the action for criminal contempt. No timely notice of appeal from the dismissal order was filed. We denied a late-filed request for the appointment of counsel to "cross-appeal the District Court's Order dismissing the charges."
The district court denied Sheriff Arpaio's second request. On October 19, 2017, the district court denied vacatur and refused to grant "relief beyond dismissal with prejudice." That same day, Sheriff Arpaio filed a timely notice of appeal. In response to a request for the appointment of counsel to "defend the District Court's Order denying Arpaio's request for vacatur," we ordered the United States to "file a statement indicating whether it intends to enter an appearance and file an answering brief in this appeal."
The United States responded that it "does not intend to defend the district court's order from October 19, 2017 .; instead, the government intends to argue, as it did in the district court, that the motion to vacate should have been granted." The United States took "no position on whether the Court should appoint counsel to make any additional arguments."
II. Discussion
Because the United States has abandoned any defense of the district court's decision with respect to vacatur, the merits panel of our court that will decide this appeal will not receive the benefit of full briefing and argument unless we appoint a special prosecutor to defend the decision of the district court. For the reasons that follow, we will appoint a special prosecutor.
First, we conclude that we have the authority to appoint counsel under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 42, which prescribes procedures for dealing with criminal contempt. Rule 42(a)(2) provides:
Appointing a Prosecutor . The court must request that the contempt be prosecuted by an attorney for the government, unless the interest of justice requires the appointment of another attorney. If the government declines the request, the court must appoint another attorney to prosecute the contempt.
In Rule 42(a)(2)'s most common application, the district court appoints a special prosecutor to investigate and try a criminal contempt when the government declines to perform that function. See , e.g. , Hollingsworth v. Perry , 570 U.S. 693, 725, 133 S.Ct. 2652, 186 L.Ed.2d 768 (2013) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (" Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 42(a)(2) allows a court to appoint a private attorney to investigate and prosecute potential instances of criminal contempt.").
But the operation of Rule 42(a)(2) is not confined to investigations and trials in the district court. A private attorney appointed under the rule has the authority to act as a special prosecutor not only in the district court but also in the court of appeals. See , e.g. , Young v. U.S. ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A. , 481 U.S. 787, 808-09, 107 S.Ct. 2124, 95 L.Ed.2d 740 (1987) (invalidating the appointment of special prosecutor because he was an interested party, not because he prosecuted an appeal); United States v. Cutler , 58 F.3d 825, 827, 831-32 (2d Cir. 1995) (accepting without comment a special prosecutor's briefing and argument in an appeal by a contemnor); Matter of Providence Journal Co. , 820 F.2d 1342, 1345 (1st Cir. 1986) (same). Our attention has not been directed to, nor have we found, a case in which a special prosecutor was appointed by a court of appeals after the government declined to oppose the contemnor's arguments on appeal. However, we see no reason why such appointment should not take place under Rule 42(a)(2).
Second, independent of any authority under Rule 42(a)(2), we have inherent authority to appoint a special counsel to represent a position abandoned by the United States on appeal. "[I]t is long settled that courts possess inherent authority to initiate contempt proceedings for disobedience to their orders, authority which necessarily encompasses the ability to appoint a private attorney to prosecute the contempt." Young , 481 U.S. at 793, 107 S.Ct. 2124. "The fact that we have come to regard criminal contempt as a crime in the ordinary sense does not mean that any prosecution of contempt must now be considered an execution of the criminal law in which only the Executive Branch may engage." Id. at 799-800, 107 S.Ct. 2124 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
The long-standing practice of the United States Supreme Court is to use its inherent authority to appoint disinterested counsel to represent the position taken by the United States below when the United States refuses to defend its prior position. See United States v. Brainer , 691 F.2d 691, 693 (4th Cir. 1982) ("When the government confesses error in the Supreme Court, and thus abandons a position taken in a lower court, the Court commonly appoints an amicus to assert the abandoned cause.") (citing cases); Letter to Anton Metlitsky, Esq., Lucia v. SEC , - U.S. -, 138 S.Ct. 923, 199 L.Ed.2d 620 (2018) (inviting a private attorney "to brief and argue this case, as amicus curiae, in support of the judgment below"); Brief for the Respondent at 9-10, Lucia v. SEC , No. 17-130 (U.S. Nov. 29, 2017) (notifying the Court that the government would no longer defend the decision below and urging the Court to "appoint an amicus curiae" to do so).
The Supreme Court has relied on its inherent judicial power to appoint appellate counsel specifically in the context of contempt. In United States v. Providence Journal Co. , 485 U.S. 693, 108 S.Ct. 1502, 99 L.Ed.2d 785 (1988), the Court held that a special prosecutor appointed under Rule 42 needs the permission of the Solicitor General to litigate a contempt case in the Supreme Court. Id. at 699 n.5, 108 S.Ct. 1502. The Court noted that the independence of the judiciary "might appear to be threatened" by this holding, especially in cases in which the contemnor was convicted by the district court, the Court of Appeals affirmed, and the Solicitor General refused to either defend the judgment below or authorize the special prosecutor to do so. Id. at 703-04, 108 S.Ct. 1502. However, the Supreme Court explained that "[t]his threat . is inconsequential" because of the Court's inherent authority to appoint an amicus to appear before the Court to defend the judgment below: "[I]t is well within this Court's authority to appoint an amicus curiae to file briefs and present oral argument in support of that judgment." Id. at 704, 108 S.Ct. 1502.
Conclusion
We will appoint special counsel and address all other pending motions by separate order.
SO ORDERED.