Case Name: COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. David MURPHY, Appellant
Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
Jurisdiction: Pennsylvania
Decision Date: 1985-10-18
Citations: 346 Pa. Super. 438
Docket Number: No. 54
Parties: COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. David MURPHY, Appellant.
Judges: Before WIEAND, CIRILLO and JOHNSON, JJ.
Reporter: Pennsylvania Superior Court Reports
Volume: 346
Pages: 438–455

Head Matter:
499 A.2d 1080
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. David MURPHY, Appellant.
Superior Court of Pennsylvania.
Argued April 10, 1985.
Filed Oct. 18, 1985.
John H. Corbett, Jr., Public Defender, Pittsburgh, for appellant.
Eric J. Woltshock, Assistant District Attorney, Pittsburgh, for Commonwealth, appellee.
Before WIEAND, CIRILLO and JOHNSON, JJ.

Opinion:
CIRILLO, Judge:
This is an appeal from the judgment of sentence imposed on a conviction for murder in the third-degree. We affirm.
The charges lodged against the appellant, David Murphy, arose out of the death of Thomas Joyce. Joyce spent a day visiting with his children and his estranged wife, Sharon Joyce. The victim's wife told him that Murphy tried to rape her the night before. Joyce then left, but returned a short time later. He informed Sharon that he had been to Murphy's residence but that no one answered the door. A few hours later, Joyce, this time accompanied by Daniel Hunt, again went to Murphy's house to confront him about the alleged rape attempt. Thomas Joyce knocked on the door and appellant's wife told him to go away. He then proceeded to break a picture window and slash it with a hunting knife. While doing this he said, "I want you, Murphy." Hunt attempted to pull Joyce off the window sill and at the same instant, Murphy fired a, shot, from inside the house, which hit Joyce in the neck. As Joyce and Hunt ran off the porch, Murphy fired a second shot which also hit Joyce. He died on the way to the hospital as a result of the gunshot wounds.
Following a jury trial, Murphy was convicted of murder in the third-degree and was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of seven and one-half to fifteen years. Post-trial motions were timely filed and denied.
On direct appeal appellant raises the following issues:
1) Whether evidence introduced at trial denied Mr. Murphy his Constitutional right to a trial before an impartial jury?
2) Whether defense counsel's failure to object to the introduction of irrelevant and prejudicial testimony of a prior criminal act resulted in the ineffective assistance of counsel?
We find the first issue to be waived. At trial, Sharon Joyce testified that she told her husband that Murphy had tried to rape her. Additionally, two other witnesses testified to being told by Sharon and Thomas Joyce of the alleged attempted rape. Appellant contends that this testimony denied him his constitutional right to a trial before an impartial jury. However, because trial counsel failed to object to the testimony concerning the alleged prior criminal act of Murphy, this issue was not preserved for appellate review. See Commonwealth v. Northington, 494 Pa. 155, 430 A.2d 1164 (1981); Commonwealth v. Griffin, 271 Pa. Super. 228, 412 A.2d 897 (1979).
Appellant also contends that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the testimony concerning the alleged rape. Further, he argues that the testimony was highly prejudicial to his defense. We find appellant's claim to be without merit. Since counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to pursue a meritless argument, Commonwealth v. Carter, 329 Pa.Super. 490, 478 A.2d 1286 (1984), the judgment of sentence is affirmed.
The challenged evidence in the case at bar presents a classic textbook example for the application of the "same transaction" or "res gestae" exception to the general rule that "evidence of criminal activity not charged in the indictment or information on which the defendant is being tried cannot be introduced at trial." Commonwealth v. Fuller, 479 Pa. 353, 357, 388 A.2d 693, 694-95 (1978). In Commonwealth v. Williams, 307 Pa. 134, 148, 160 A. 602, 607 (1932), the Supreme Court spelled out the "same transaction" exception stating that such evidence is admissible where the "prior conviction or criminal act formed a part of a chain, or was one of a sequence of acts, or became part of the history of the event on trial, or was part of the natural development of the facts." Accord Commonwealth v. Brown, 462 Pa. 578, 342 A.2d 84 (1975); Commonwealth v. Evans, 343 Pa.Super. 118, 494 A.2d 383 (1985); Commonwealth v. Shirey, 333 Pa.Super. 85, 481 A.2d 1314 (1984); Commonwealth v. Robinson, 316 Pa.Super. 152, 462 A.2d 840 (1983) (allocatur denied); Commonwealth v. Davenport, 286 Pa. Super. 212, 428 A.2d 647 (1981).
The "same transaction" exception has been viewed by our courts as a supplement to the five well-recognized exceptions to the general rule that evidence of other crimes is inadmissible to prove the crime for which the defendant is being tried. Shirey, supra; Commonwealth v. Stufflet, 276 Pa.Super. 120, 419 A.2d 124 (1980); see also McCormick, Evidence § 190 (2d Ed.1972); J. Wigmore, supra at § 218. These exceptions include:
(1) motive; (2) intent; (3) absence of mistake or accident; (4) a common scheme, plan or design embracing commission of two or more crimes so related to each other that proof of one tends to prove the others; or (5) to establish the identity of the person charged with the commission of the crime on trial, in other words, where there is such a logical connection between the crimes that proof of one will naturally tend to show that the accused is the person who committed the other. Thus, although the law does not allow use of evidence which tends solely to prove that the accused has a "criminal disposition," evidence of other crimes is admissible for certain purposes if the probative worth of this evidence outweighs the tendency to prejudice the jury, (citations omitted).
Commonwealth v. Morris, 493 Pa. 164, 175, 425 A.2d 715, 720 (1981); Commonwealth v. Styles, 494 Pa. 524, 528, 431 A.2d 978, 980 (1981); Shirey, supra 333 Pa.Super. at 123, 481 A.2d at 1334.
We are compelled to note that there has been much controversy surrounding the use of the phrase "res gestae" when referring to evidence of a prior criminal act that becomes part of the history of the event on trial. Indeed, in our recent decision in Commonwealth v. Evans, 343 Pa.Super. 118, 494 A.2d 383 (1985), we refrained from using the term "res gestae" at all when referring to the admissibility of "evidence of other criminal activity [which] forms part of the history of the event or serves to enhance the natural development of the facts." Id., 343 Pa.Superior Ct. at 132, 494 A.2d at 390. It has even been suggested by Professor Wigmore that the term "res gestae" be abandoned as a useless and confusing phrase. Wigmore, supra at § 218. Further, it has been proposed that the "res gestae" exception is not really an exception at all, but rather a well-established principle of multiple admissibility. Id. at § 215, 216.
In light of the foregoing, we adopt the view that the term "res gestae" should be abandoned. However, this should be limited to the situation where the crime charged arose from the prior criminal activity and evidence of the prior act is needed to complete the full picture of the event on trial.
Once it is established that the "same transaction" exception is applicable, the court must then balance the prejudicial impact of the evidence against its probative value to determiné admissibility. Absent a flagrant abuse of discretion, that determination will not be disturbed on appeal. Commonwealth v. Shirey, supra. We cannot embrace the appellant's contention in this instance that the prejudicial impact of the testimony concerning the alleged rape outweighed its probative value. Moreover, we cannot agree that the jury could not sufficiently erase the testimony from its mind, despite the trial court's strong cautionary charge.
This is not a case such as Commonwealth v. Ewell, 318 Pa.Super. 397, 465 A.2d 13 (1983), which also addressed the issue of admitting evidence of a prior criminal act. In Ewell the defendant was tried for driving while under the influence of alcohol. A prosecution witness testified that the defendant told him that he had been involved in a prior incident for drunken driving. We found this testimony to be highly prejudicial despite the trial court's cautionary charge. However, Ewell is distinguishable for several reasons. First, the testimony elicited by the Commonwealth in Ewell was introduced to show the state of mind of the defendant at the time he made his statement concerning a prior incident for drunk driving. Here, the testimony was introduced to show that the alleged attempted rape and the murder were part of one and the same transaction. Second, in Ewell the witness for the Commonwealth testified that the defendant had told him of the prior incident; he had no personal knowledge, nor was there any corroborating testimony. In the instant case, Sharon Joyce had personal knowledge of the first alleged criminal activity; there were also two witnesses who corroborated her testimony. Lastly, the two instances of crime in Ewell were so similar in nature that even the cautionary instruction given by the trial judge could not neutralize the prejudice resulting from admission of the testimony. In contrast, the two crimes in this instance, the alleged attempted rape and the murder, were undeniably dissimilar.
Any possible prejudice resulting from admission of the challenged testimony under the "same transaction" exception is heavily outweighed by the probative value of establishing the history of the event on trial. The reason for the victim's presence at the appellant's home is a fact which is essential to a jury's understanding of the issues to be decided in this case. Further, in light of the trial judge's strong cautionary instruction, we find that the testimony has little potential for prejudice. Accordingly, we find that the trial court properly admitted the testimony under the "same transaction" exception.
We have also considered the possibility of admitting the testimony concerning the alleged attempted rape under the "motive" exception. The Commonwealth introduced the evidence to establish Thomas Joyce's provocation in initiating the confrontation that led to his death. The trial court permitted Sharon Joyce to repeat what she had told her husband as long as the jury heard no details. The court concluded that the testimony of the alleged attempted rape was both relevant and material and therefore was properly admissible.
Appellant claims that evidence of the victim's motive was "improper, since it was irrelevant and highly prejudicial." While we express no opinion whether the "motive" of the victim of a crime is not a basis for the exception to the general rule that evidence of prior criminal activity is inadmissible, we find in the instant case that we are also faced with the motive of the appellant. The alleged attempted rape of Sharon Joyce motivated the victim's actions, which in turn provoked the appellant to shoot and kill him. Murphy's act of shooting Joyce was a reaction to Joyce's own behavior. It is highly unlikely that Murphy would have reacted so violently if he were not concerned about Thomas Joyce's attempt at retaliation. Thus, the testimony is clearly relevant and impacts on the appellant's motive for shooting the victim. See Commonwealth v. Sparks, 342 Pa.Super. 202, 492 A.2d 720 (1985); Commonwealth v. Smith, 341 Pa.Super. 564, 492 A.2d 9 (1985). Moreover, any possible prejudice resulting from admission of the testimony is outweighed by its probative value. Accordingly, we find that the evidence is admissible under the "motive" exception as well as under the "same transaction" exception.
Therefore, since appellant's claim has no arguable merit, there is no need to address the issue of whether defense counsel had a reasonable basis for not objecting to the testimony admitted into evidence. See Commonwealth ex rel. Washington v. Maroney, 427 Pa. 599, 235 A.2d 349 (1967); Carter, supra. We find no abuse of discretion by the trial judge.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
WIEAND, J., files a concurring opinion.
JOHNSON, J., files a dissenting opinion.
. We are not suggesting that the generic term "res gestae" be abandoned in the context of the four distinct exceptions to the hearsay rule identified in Commonwealth v. Pronkoskie, 477 Pa. 132, 136-37, 383 A.2d 858, 860 (1978):
(1) declarations as to present bodily conditions; (2) declarations of present mental states and emotions; (3) excited utterances; and (4) declarations of present sense impressions.