Case Name: Monroe-Livingston Sanitary Landfill, Inc., Appellant, v. Town of Caledonia, Respondent
Court: New York Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1980-12-22
Citations: 51 N.Y.2d 679
Docket Number: 
Parties: Monroe-Livingston Sanitary Landfill, Inc., Appellant, v Town of Caledonia, Respondent.
Judges: Chief Judge Cooke and Judges Jasen and Gabrielli concur with Judge Wachtler; Judge Fuchsberg dissents and votes to reverse in a separate opinion in which Judges Jones and Meyer concur.
Reporter: New York Reports
Volume: 51
Pages: 679–691

Head Matter:
Monroe-Livingston Sanitary Landfill, Inc., Appellant, v Town of Caledonia, Respondent.
Argued October 15, 1980;
decided December 22, 1980
POINTS OF COUNSEL
Robert G. Harvey and G. Robert Witmer, Jr., for appellant.
I. Caledonia’s landfill permit requirement is preempted by article 27 of the New York Environmental Conservation Law. (Town of Black Brook v State of New York, 41 NY2d 486; Zumbo v Town of Farmington, 60 AD2d 350; Matter of Kress & Co. v Department of Health of City of N. Y., 283 NY 55; Jewish Consumptives’ Relief Soc. v Town of Woodbury, 230 App Div 228, 256 NY 619; Wiggins v Town of Somers, 4 NY2d 215; Town of Plattekill v Dutchess Sanitation, 56 AD2d 150, 43 NY2d 662; Town of Stillwater v Doughty, 25 NY2d 986; Trio Distr. Corp. v City of Albany, 2 NY2d 690.) II. Adoption of the Sanitary Landfill Ordinance on July 17, 1976, exceeded the town’s police powers. (Lighthouse Shores v Town of Islip, 41 NY2d 7; Health Ins. Assn. of Amer. v Harnett, 44 NY2d 302; People v Bunis, 9 NY2d 1; Matter of Belle Harbor Realty Corp. v Kerr, 35 NY2d 507; Arverne Bay Constr. Co. v Thatcher, 278 NY 222; Matter of Charles v Diamond, 41 NY2d 318; Pacific Blvd. Assoc. v City of Long Beach, 48 AD2d 857; Town of Lima v Harper, 55 AD2d 405; Matter of Harper v Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Town of Lima, 43 NY2d 980; Good Humor Corp. v City of New York, 290 NY 312; Len's Amoco v Town of Gates, 97 Misc 2d 900.) III. Exclusion of wastes generated outside Caledonia from disposal at privately owned sites within Caledonia violates the commerce clause of the United States Constitution, the equal protection, privileges and immunities, and due process clauses of the United States and New York Constitutions, and section ,80 of the New York General Municipal Law. (Hughes v Oklahoma, 441 US 322; Philadelphia v New Jersey, 437 US 617; Gibbons v Ogden, 9 Wheat [22 US] 1; Monroe-Livingston Sanitary Landfill v Town of Caledonia, 72 AD2d 957; Pike v Bruce Church, 397 US 137; United States v Rock Royal Co-op., 307 US 533; United States v Sullivan, 332 US 689; Raymond Motor Transp. v Rice, 434 US 429; Perez v United States, 402 US 146.) IV. Application of Caledonia’s ordinance to plaintiff constitutes a taking of its property without just compensation. (Pennsylvania Coal Co. v Mahon, 260 US 393; Moore v East Cleveland, 431 US 494; Lutheran Church in Amer. v City of New York, 35 NY2d 121; French Investing Co. v City of New York, 39 NY2d 587.)
Patrick M. Keefe for respondent.
I. The landfill permit requirement of the Town of Caledonia’s Sanitary Landfill Ordinance is not pre-empted by article 27 of the New York Environmental Conservation Law. (Town of Porter v Chem-Trol Pollution Servs., 91 Misc 2d 42; Monroe-Livingston Sanitary Landfill v Town of Caledonia, 72 AD2d 957; Philadelphia v New Jersey, 437 US 617; Matter of Belle Harbor Realty Corp. v Kerr, 35 NY2d 507.) II. Adoption of the Sanitary Landfill Ordinance by the Town of Caledonia on July 17, 1976 did not exceed the town’s police powers. (Wiggins v Town of Somers, 4 NY2d 215; Town of Stillwater v Doughty, 25 NY2d 986; Town of Plattekill v Dutchess Sanitation, 43 NY2d 662; Rodgers v Village of Tarrytown, 302 NY 115; Shepard v Village of Skaneateles, 300 NY 115; Matter of Original R. Tyson, Inc. v Tyler, 24 NY2d 671; Lincoln Bldg. Assoc. v Barr, 1 NY2d 413; United States v Carotene Prods. Co., 304 US 144; Town of Hempstead v Goldblatt, 9 NY2d 101; Lighthouse Shores v Town of Islip, 41 NY2d 7.) III. Exclusion of wastes generated outside of the Town of Caledonia from disposal at privately owned sites within the Town of Caledonia does not violate the commerce clause of the United States Constitution, the equal protection, privileges and immunities, and due process clauses of the United States and New York Constitutions, and section 80 of the New York State General Municipal Law. (Hughes v Oklahoma, 441 US 322; Pike v Bruce Church, 397 US 137; Huron Cement Co. v Detroit, 362 US 440; Philadelphia v New Jersey, 437 US 617; Monroe-Livingston Sanitary Landfill v Town of Caledonia, 72 AD2d 957; Salamar Bldrs. Corp. v Tuttle, 29 NY2d 221; Dean Milk Co. v Madison, 340 US 349; Toomer v Witsell, 334 US 385; Hicklin v Orbeck, 437 US 518; Town of Plattekill v Dutchess Sanitation, 56 AD2d 150, 43 NY2d 662.) IV. The application of Caledonia’s ordinance to plaintiff does not constitute a taking of its property without just compensation. (Matter of Wulfsohn v Burden, 241 NY 288; Dauernheim, Inc. v Town Bd. of Town of Hempstead, 33 NY2d 468; Mugler v Kansas, 123 US 623; Goldblatt v Hempstead, 369 US 590; Matter of Albert Simon, Inc. v Myerson, 36 NY2d 300; Nebbia v New York, 291 US 502; Defiance Milk Prods. Co. v Du Mond, 309 NY 537; Pacific Blvd. Assoc. v City of Long Beach, 48 AD2d 857; Wiggins v Town of Somers, 4 NY2d 215; Averne Bay Constr. Co. v Thatcher, 278 NY 222.) V. If plaintiff-appellant has a preexisting nonconforming use, it is not immune from the Sanitary Landfill Ordinance adopted by the Town Board of the Town of Caledonia on July 17,1976. (Town of Platte-kill v Dutchess Sanitation, 56 AD2d 150, 43 NY2d 662.)

Opinion:
OPINION OF THE COURT
Wachtler, J.
The plaintiff owns and operates a 190-acre State licensed sanitary landfill in the Town of Caledonia, Livingston County. While the plaintiff was negotiating a contract with Monroe County to handle all of that county's refuse, the Town of Caledonia enacted its Sanitary Landfill Ordinance of July 17,1976. Subdivision C of section 7 of that ordinance provides: "Refuse generated outside of the Town of Caledonia, New York, will not be accepted at facilities licensed by the Town of Caledonia unless authorized by the Town Board and consistent with the regional comprehensive plan as it relates to solid waste management."
The plaintiff brought this declaratory judgment action seeking a determination that the ordinance, and particularly subdivision C of section 7, is unconstitutional. During a lengthy trial both sides presented extensive testimony as to whether or not the town and private water supplies would be contaminated if an increased volume of refuse were permitted at the landfill.
The trial court found that the zoning board's determination of the potential safety hazard was supported by the record and that the plaintiff had failed to rebut the presumption that the ordinance was a constitutional and legitimate exercise of the town's police power to protect the public health. This determination was unanimously affirmed by the Appellate Division.
On this appeal plaintiff argues, first, that article 27 of the Environmental Conservation Law dealing with solid waste disposal supersedes and by pre-emption nullifies the town ordinance. To draw this conclusion, however, would require us to say that the mere fact that the State deals with a subject it automatically pre-empts it. We have never construed the principle of pre-emption that broadly. Indeed, where local government is otherwise authorized to act, it will be prohibited from legislating on a subject only if the State pre-empts the field through legislation evidencing a State purpose to exclude the possibility of varying local legislation (People v Cook, 34 NY2d 100, 109). When this occurs a local law may be said to be inconsistent with a State law because it prohibits something which the State law would consider acceptable (e.g., Wholesale Laundry Bd. of Trade v City of New York, 12 NY2d 998). But that is not present here.
In fact the statute in express terms disclaims any State purpose to either supersede or preclude the enactment of local ordinances so long as they are consistent "with at least the minimum applicable requirements" of those regulations promulgated by the statute (ECL 27-0711) and speaks specifically, not of the preclusion, but rather the in elusion of local government in the planning and control of problems endemic to waste management (ECL 27-0101, subds 1, 2; 27-0703, subd 3; 27-0707, subds 3, 4).
Plaintiff's second contention, relying upon the Supreme Court's decision in Philadelphia v New Jersey (437 US 617), is that the town's ordinance violates the interstate commerce clause of the Federal Constitution. In the Philadelphia case there was, at the time of the enactment of the prohibited legislation, actual dumping in New Jersey of refuse generated outside of the State of New Jersey. In that case the discrimination against interstate commerce would seem apparent; however, on the facts of the case now before us, it is hard to see how it can be said that the practical effect of the ordinance is to discriminate against interstate commerce.
The ordinance is not aimed at interstate refuse, but excludes any refuse from outside the town. Although most of the plaintiff's business involves refuse from surrounding communities, all of those communities are located within the State and there is no contention or indication" that any of the refuse originates beyond the State borders. Nor is there any suggestion that the ordinance affects other Caledonia business concerns which would deal in interstate refuse or that the plaintiff has contracted for, reasonably anticipates, or intends to accept interstate refuse. In fact, through the assertion in its briefs that most if not all of its refuse business is and will continue to be derived from communities within the State, plaintiff has itself succeeded in negating any possible inference that the ordinance has an actual impact on interstate commerce. In the present suit it simply seeks to maintain the status of its business prior to the enactment of the ordinance.
Nor can it be successfully argued that the ordinance in question affects interstate commerce by the threat of a "ripple effect" through the imposition of "cumulative burdens" (see United States v Rock Royal Co-op., 307 US 533, 569-570). To do so we would have to say that this ordinance interferes with interstate commerce because Monroe County would be forced to deposit its refuse elsewhere thereby in directly displacing out-of-State refuse which would otherwise be shipped to the landfill sites that Monroe would be using. Few local ordinances relating to the planned development of a community could withstand constitutional scrutiny if subjected to that type of analysis. For example, a zoning restriction upon the size or number of dwelling units that may be built within a town would have an effect upon interstate commerce, in that it would reduce the flow of building materials across State lines. Surely it cannot be maintained that, for this reason, the commerce clause precludes the adoption of such zoning ordinances by local governments.
In view of the fact that the plaintiff, the operator of the only privately owned landfill in the town which is open to the public, is not engaged in the importation of refuse from out of State, there has been no showing that, in practice, the ordinance has the effect of inhibiting or discriminating against interstate commerce. Neither the cases cited by the plaintiff nor the general principles stated in the case of Dutchess Sanitation Serv. v Town of Plattekill (51 NY2d 670 [decided herewith]) compel a contrary conclusion. In the absence of something more definitive, the presumption of constitutionality should be sufficient to sustain the ordinance.
Accordingly the order of the Appellate Division should be affirmed, with costs.