Case Name: The Real Estate Bank vs. Rawdon et al.
Court: Arkansas Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Arkansas
Decision Date: 1842-07
Citations: 5 Ark. 558
Docket Number: 
Parties: The Real Estate Bank vs. Rawdon et al.
Judges: 
Reporter: Arkansas Reports
Volume: 5
Pages: 558–595

Head Matter:
The Real Estate Bank vs. Rawdon et al.
Where a case is tried in the court below, without the intervention of a jury, upon a written statement of the facts, made out, and agreed upon by the parties, if the court below decides the law incorrectly, as arising on this — agreed facts, the decision will be corrected here on error. The case stands precisely as if there had been a special verdict, finding the same facts, when the agreed case is incorporated in a bill of exceptions.
Any mode of payment by an agent, accepted and received by the other contracting party as an absolute payment, will discharge the principal, whether he be known or unknown, or whether it be in the usual course of business or not.
The question in cases of this sort, is not so much one of law, as one of fact: — whether • the note is received as a conditional, or as an absolute payment; whether it is received with the knowledge that there is another principal; and whether there is an exclusive credit given to the agent.
If a creditor of the principal settles with the agent, and takes a note, or bond or obligation from the latter, for the amount due by the principal, although, as between the parties, it is intended only as a conditional payment, yet, if the creditor gives a receipt, as if the money were received, or the security an absolute payment, so that the agent is thereby enabled to settle, and does settle with his principal, as if the debt had been actually discharged, and the principal would be otherwise prejudiced, the debt will be deemed, as to the latter, absolutely discharged.
If the principal settle with the agent on the faith of a receipt in full, as for money, he is entirely discharged.
And so he is, if he settle on the faith of a receipt given thus, “ Rec’d. payment as follows, from T. T. W. to wit: his note at six months, $7047 79: ditto $7047 79: cash $7047 79.” Such a receipt warrants the principal in settling with the agent.
No receipt is conclusive evidence of absolute payment. A receipt “in full by cash” may be explained or contradicted, as well as a receipt in full by note.
The legal presumption arisirig from the fact of drawing a negotiable order, or making a negotiable note, which is received by the creditor, is, that it was intended to be, and in fact is, an extinguishment of the original demand or cause of action. This presumption may be rebutted by the agreement of the parties, or proof of usage, or circumstances inconsistent with it.
The circumstances that will defeat such presumption, are such as would induce a court of equity to set aside the contract: as, mistake, fraud or surprise. The proof of either of these, will defeat the effect of the receipt. If given with a knowledge of the circumstances, and there is no mistake or surprise on the one part, or fraud or misrepresentation on the other, it will effectually defeat all further claim.
Giving a negotiable note for a prior debt of another, is such a payment as will support an action of assumpsit for money paid.
And if the party receiving the note, delays for a long time after it is due, to make any claim on the principal, this fortifies the presumption, and aids to show the receipt to be prima facie evidence of payment.
Whether a case can be re-considered on motion, ,in this court, after opinion delivered, judgment entered, and the term expired — dub. per Paschal, J.
But, on the whole, the question considered as one, not of power but of practice. Id.
This court has no power to open and reverse its own judgments, deliberately given, settled and recorded, at a previous term. -Pci- Lacy J. and Sebastian J.
No application for a re-hearing, after the term, should be considered, unless the court order the judgment to be suspended during the term when it is rendered, and while it is in fieri and under the control of the court.
The former decision of the court, as to all the points, affirmed. Per Sebastian J.
This was an action of assumpsit, tried in the Pulaski circuit court, at September term, 1841, before the Hon. John J. Clendenin, one of the circuit judges. Rawdon, Wright and Hatch, engravers of New York, were the plaintiffs, and. The Real Estate Bank, defendant. The case was tried before the court, without the intervention of a jury, and all the facts are presented by a single bill of exceptions; which was taken the day after the trial, time having been given, by consent, to file it, and which, commencing thus, “Be it remembered, that on the trial of this cause, the same being submitted by consent to the court sitting as ajury, and the following facts being in evidence,” states the facts thus: In February, 1838, Thomas T. Williamson and Ambrose H. Sevier were appointed by the Bank commissioners to sell the bonds of the State belonging to the Bank, and were instructed by the President of the Bank, in case they sold the bonds, to procure the engraving in the eastern States, of the notes and bills of the Bank, and other engravings for the Bank; which instruction was contained in a letter of instructions, copied into the letter book of the Bank. In the summer of the same year, Williamson, in his character of such agent for the Bank, his character of agent being known to the plaintiffs,, contracted with the plaintiffs for the engraving of the notes and bills for the Bank and its Branches, and certain other engravings therefor. The engravings so contracted for was done by the plaintiffs, and their bill for it, at the usual prices, amounted to. $21,143 37-100, which was admitted by Williamson to be correct. Before the settlement of the account, Williamson paid them, in cash, $7047 79 and gave for the residue his two individual notes, each payable to them, dated October 6, 1838, each due at 6 months, and each for $7047 79 cents; which were received by the plaintiffs upon the settlement: the plaintiffs made out their account against the Bank, amounting to $21,143 37 cents; and receipted it thus — “Rec’d. payment as follows, fromThos. T. Williamson, viz: his note at 6 mos. ‡7047 49 - — ditto $7049 79 — cash $7049 79. New York, Oct. 6, 1838. Rawdon, Wright & Hatch.”
Upon the return of Williamson to Little Rock, he brought with him this receipted account, and in his account with the Bank, made and filed by him for himself and Sevier, for settlement, he charged the Bank with the sum of $21,143 37 cents, advanced for the Bank in New Hork, to the plaintiffs, and filed their receipted account in the Bank, as a voucher in support of the charge. Their account, and the account of the plaintiffs, were acted upon by the proper authority of the Bank, and a settlement made, on the 15th of December, 1838. Upon this settlement, it being found, that after crediting Williamson with the amount of his two notes to the plaintiffs, claimed by him as an advance made for the Bank, the balance in his favor was $11,731 13 cents, which was directed by the Bank to be paid over to Williamson, and was on the same day paid over accordingly. Williamson was charged by theJBanfe, in this settlement, with $422 36, “interest on deferred payment to Rawdon, Wright & Hatch.” Williamson’s notes were not before the Bank or finance committee, when the settlement was made. The plaintiffs’ receipted account was. The Bank afterwards received all the engravings, and used them.
On the 6th of November, 1840, the plaintiffs’ agents and attorneys, by letter, enclosing the account of the plaintiffs against the Bank, and Williamson’s notes, demanded payment of the account from the Bank, and informed the Bank that if she agreed to settle the account, she could retain the notes, but otherwise must restore them. On thet21st of December, 1840, the Bank returned the notes, and refused to pay the account. Shortly before the suit was brought, (29th Jan. 1841,) Williamson learned that one of the attorneys had the notes, and called upon him, and attempted to arrange the notes, by an agreement to pay one-half out of his then nest year’s crop, and the other half out of the crop of the year thereafter. The attorney responded that he did not consider himself authorized to make such an agreement; but there 'was a sort of general authority at the end of plaintiffs’ letter, under which he would make the arrangement, if Williamsion would make him peifectly secure, by giving good security; which he did not do.
The notes of Williamson were not paid, when the case was tried5 and were still in the attorneys’ hands. The Bank had then large claims against Williamson, sent her for"collection, which she was unable to collect; and if she had been compelled to make the amount here sued for, out of Williamson, she would have had great difficulty in doing so.
After stating these facts, the bill of exceptions thus concludes’» “which being all the evidence in the case, it was submitted to the court, upon this state of fact, to decide whether, upon the facts so proven and established, the Bank was or was not liable to the plaintiffs for the amount for which they had taken said Williamson’s notes. Whereupon the court decided that the Bank was so liable, and rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs against the Bank, for the amount of said notes, with interest from the time when said notes fell due; being for the amount of the balance of their account and interest: To which opinion and decision of the court, so deciding the defendant to be liable, and so giving judgment against the defendant, the defendant excepted,” &c., with the usual conclusion.
The Bank brought the case into this court by writ of error.
Pike & Baldwin, for plaintiff in error.
Any mode of payment by an agent, accepted and received as such by the other contracting party, as an absolute payment, will discharge the principal, whether he be known or unknown, and whether it be in the usual course of business or not. The question in most cases of this sort, is not, generally, so much a question of law, as of fact: that is to say, whether the note is received as a conditional payment, or as an absolute payment; whether it is received with the knowledge that there is another principal or not; and whether there is an exclusive credit given to the agent or not. Story on Agency 440, 441.
If a creditor of the principal settles with the agent, and takes a note or other security from the latter for the amount due by the principal, although, as between the parties, it is intended only as a conditional payment, yet, if the creditor gives a receipt, as if the money were received, or the security were an absolute payment, so that the agent is thereby enabled to settle, and does settle, with the principal, as if the debt had been actually discharged, or the principal would otherwise be prejudiced, the debt will be deemed, as to the latter, absolutely discharged. Story on Agency 443, 444. Reed vs. White, 5 Esp. 122. Wyatt vs. Marquis or Hertford, 3 East. 147. Schermer-horn vs. Loins, 7 J. R. 311.
It is perfectly clear that if the principal settles with the agent, on the faith of a receipt in full, as for money, he is entirely discharged. Does the form of the receipt in this case make any difference ?
The receipt here is “as if the security were an absolute payment Rawdon, Wright & Hatch receipt for the notes just precisely as they do for the money. They knew the principal. There is no distinction between such a receipt and one in full, simply, if the principal settles on the faith of it. Muldon vs. Whitlock, I Cowen 304.
No doubt, taking anote for a pre-existing debt is not conclusive evidence of payment, unless it be expressly agreed to take as payment, and to run the risk of its being paid. Toby vs. Barber, 5 J. R. 68. Arnold vs. Camp, 12 J. R. 409.
But the question here is not, whether this receipt would be sufficient evidence of absolute payment, on a trial at law; but whether it war. ranted the Bank in settling with Williamson, and gave him a right to demand a settlement.
No receipt is conclusive. A receipt in lull, simply, may be explained or contradicted by part testimony, as well as a receipt in full by note.
The legal presumption arising from the fact of drawing a negotiable order, or making a negotiable note, which is received by the creditor, is, that it was intended to be, and in fact is, an extinguishment of the original demand or cause of action. This presumption may be controlled or explained by the agreement of the parties, or proof of usages or circumstances inconsistent with such presumption. Varner vs. JVo-°bleborough, 2 Greenl. 121.
Such circumstances only as would lead a court of equity to set aside a contract, (such as fraud, mistake or surprise,) can be shown at law to destroy the effect of a receipt. If given with a knowledge of the circumstances, and there is no mistake or surprise on one part, or fraud or imposition on the other, it will be effectual to defeat a further claim. Fuller vs. Crittenden, 9 Conn. 401.
Giving a negotiable note,for the prior debt of another, is such a payment of it, as will support against him an action of assumpsit for money-paid. Cornwall vs. Gould, 4 Pick. 446. Bartlay et al. vs. Gooch, 2 Esp. 571. Witherby vs. Mann, 11 J. R. 518. Douglas vs. Moody, 9 Mass. 553.
The plaintiffs below undertook, in effect, to loan Williamson $> 14,-000 belonging to the Bank. The first notice ever given to the Bank that they looked to her for payment, was given eighteen months after the notes fell due, and two years after they were executed.
That this was not due diligence, see Dayton vs. Hull, 23 Wend. 345.
And where a negotiable note has been given for a prior debt, the plaintiff" cannot recover on the original consideration, unless he shows the note to have been lost, or produces and cancels it at the trial. Hughes vs. Wheeler, 8 Cowen 80. Holmes & Drake vs. DeCamp, 1 3. R. 34. Angel vs. Felton, 8 J. R, 149. Pincard vs.- Tacking, 10 J. R. 105. Bendick vs. Green, 15 J. R. 247. Raymond vs. Merchant, 3 Cowen 150.
The receipt in this case was at least prima facie evidence of payment. 8 Greenl. 298. 6 Mass. 143. 7 Mass. 36. 11 Mass. 359. 11 Mass. 47. 4 Mass. 93. 4 Pick. 228. 8 Pick. 522. 10 Pick. 525. 12 Pick. 269.
Ashley & Watkins, contra.
A promissory note is not a payment or extinguishment of the original indebtedness. A bill of exchange or promissory note either of the debtor or any other person, is not a payment of the precedent debt, unless it be so expressly agreed. Green-woods vs. Curtis, 6 Mass. Rep. 388; 4 same 93. Johnson vs. Johnson, 11 Mass. Rep. 361. Goodenow vs. Tyler, 7 Mass. Rep 36. Barnell vs. Brown, 1 McCord 449. Clark vs. Young, 1 Crunch 181. S. C. Cond. Rep. 287. Sheeby vs. Mandeville et al. 6 Cranch. 253. S. C. 2 Cond. Rep. 363. United States vs. Lyman, 1 Mason 482. Chilly on Bills p. 200. Chamberlain vs. Delaxire,2 Wilson 353. Ward vs. Evans, 2 Ld. Raym. 930. So if the creditor had passed away the bill or note, and it was outstanding in a third person’s handss he could not maintain an action on the original consideration. Bindenvs. Halton, 1 Moore & P. 223. 4 Bingham 454. Kean vs. Dupeern, 3 Serg. & Rawle 233. But if the defendant was the acceptor of the bill or maker of the note, then it suffices merely to produce the instrument on the trial in order to show that it is not outstanding in a third person’s hands — Hadzoen vs. Mendigable, 10 Moore 477. S. C. 2 Car. & P. 20, or proving it in his possession or control. And where an agent buys goods for his principal and gives his own notes,they are considered, so far as the question whether they operate as payment is concerned, as the notes of the principal himself. Porter vs. Talcott, 1 Cowen 359. In England the taking of a bill or note in satisfaction of a former simple contract, debt, or of a simple contract debt created at the time, is at the most, but a suspension of the remedy (as against the acceptor or maker) and an extension of credit during the time the bill or note has to run. See Kearslake vs. Morgan, 5 T. R. 513. Steadman vs. Gooch, I Esp. 3. The taking of a bill or note in payment does not preclude the right of distraining for rent even before the bill or note becomes due. 3 Price 272. An express and clear agreement by the creditor to take a bill as payment at all events, and whether bound or not, would amount to the payment of the debt. Brown vs. Kenley, 2 Bos. & Pul. 518. But in the absence of such a stipulation, even a partner of the debtor unknown until the dishonor, may be sued. Robinson vs. Wilkins, 3 Price 538. The comparatively recent case of Robinson vs. Reed, 9 Barn. & Cres. 449, is a verv strong one, and similar to the one now before the court.
In New York, where the transactions involved in this case took place, the law on this point is settled in numerous cases. Raymond vs. Merchant, 3 Cowen 147. Porter vs. Talcott, 1 Cowen 359. Mul-den vs. Whitlock, 1 Cowen 290. Smith & Rogers vs. Berment, 17 Johnson Rep. 340. Gumming vs. Hackley, 8 John. Rep. 202. Putnam vs. Lewis. 8 John. R. 389. Ren vs. Barber. 3 Con. 272. Tobey vs. Barber, 8 John. Rep. 68. Murray vs. Governour, 2 John. Cas. 438. Hening vs. Lange, 2 John. Cas. 71. Schemerhorn vs. Loines, 7 John. Rep. 311. Johnson vs. Weed, 9 John. Rep. 310. And in Massachusetts, held in the case Vancleefvs. Therasson, 3 Pickering 12, that a negotiable note given for a demand, not being payment in N. York of a note made in that State, will not be considered payment in a suit in the courts of Massachusetts.
According to the authorities, the question whether the note was taken absolutely as payment or not, is a question of fact for the jury. Jlnihon’s J\fisi Prius Cas. 49. United States vs. Lyman, I Mason 482. Story on Agency, p. 441.
The taking of the note of an agent at an extended credit for goods furnished'for the benefit of the principal, does not discharge the principal unless it is affirmatively shown on his part, that on the supposition that the debt was paid, or the personal responsibility of the agent accepted for it, he dealt differently with the agent than he would have done had the note not been taken and the extended credit given. Rothbone vs. Tucker, 15 Wend. 498.
Where a person is employed by an agent, he may call upon the principal, for payment for the services rendered; and he may do so, although he knows that the agent has charged the demand to the principal and received the amount, unless he agreed to discharge the principal and rely upon the responsibility of the agent. Lincoln vs. Battles, 6 Wend. 475. Porter vs. Lalcats, 1 Con. 350. The case of . Cheever vs. Smith, 15 John. Rep. 276, would apply where an agent pays an account against his principal in money, and the creditor receipts the account in full, but by mistake the money actually paid by the agent falls short of the account, in such case the creditor, if he would recover the deficiency of the principal, must notify him of the mistake, otherwise, and if he settles with the agent, supposing the account to have been paid in full by the agent, the remedy of the creditors against the principal would be lost. No such state of facts exists in this case. The Bank, at and from the time she settled with Williamson knew how the account of the plaintiffs against her had been liquidated. See also, the case of Muldonvs. Whitlock, I Cozoen 290, where the credit was given to the Ship’s Husbands, who were part owners, and their note taken for stores at an extended credit of three months, giving a receipt for the note as in full for the stores; this note not being paid, and the Ship’s Husbands, who gave the note, becoming insolvent, held that the other owners were not thereby discharged, but were liable in assumpsit for the original consideration. In this case the Ship’s Husbands are to be regarded as agents for the owners of the vessel. See also, Tempest vs. Ord, 1 Maddock 89, as to the effect in general of a bill given by an agent. Robinson vs. Read, 9 Bam. & Ores. 449.
The doctrine laid down in Story on Bills, p. 443, that if the creditor gives a receipt, as if the money were received, or the security were an absolute payment, so that the agent is thereby enabled to settle, and does settle with the principal as if the debt had been actually discharged and the principal would otherwise be prejudiced, the debt will be deemed, as to the latter, absolutely discharged, does not apply to this case; because, when the Bank settled with Williamson, she knew that he had only paid a part of the plaintiffs account against her. She paid him money in her own wrong, and before the time of credit extended to her by the plaintiffs had expired, and witHout any evidence before her that the plaintiffs had taken the notes of Williamson as an absolute payment, and the note immediately afterwards, ib.p. 444, stated by the author in illustration of the doctrine, that where work and labor was done for the principal, and the account was presented to his steward, who gave his own check on a banker for the amount; and thereupon the creditor gave a receipt jfor the money on account of the principal; and upon the dishonor of the check, the agent accepted a draft for the amount, payable on time; it was held that if the principal had in the mean time settled his account with the steward, or had dealt with him differently, in consequence of that receipt, so that he would be prejudiced thereby, the principal would be discharged, shows clearly that it cannot apply to a case like the one now before the court.
According to the authorities, the question whether the notes taken absolutely as payment or not, is a question of fact for the jury. An-then's Nisi Prius Cas. Copper vs. Power 49. United Slates vs. Lyman, 1 Mason 482. Story on Agency 441. The court below in this case, sitting as a jury, by authority of law providing that as a mode of trial, where neither party requires a jury, Rev. Slat. p. 633, sec. 98, has passed upon this question of intention'of fact, and found from the evidence or facts submitted, that the notes of Williamson were not received as an absolute payment of the account against the Bank, and we are at a loss to see how that as a question of fact can be enquired into in this court.
At July term, 1842,

Opinion:
the opinion of the court was delivered by
Dickinson, J.
The only question in this case is as to the plaintiffs' right to recover of the defendant upon the facts stated. As a question of practice may possibly be raised in this case, we will first examine and decide that point before passing to the consideration of the main en-quiry raised by the record.
The facts were admitted upon the trial on an agreed case. The court was required to decide the law arising upon these facts. The case stands in the same situation as if there had been a special finding by a jury — the law of the case being referred to the court. The practice in such a case has been settled, as it has been expressly ruled in this court in the case of Hanly and another, and Porter and another. In that case there was a special' finding by the jury. The court decided the law wrong upon the facts, and we reversed its decision because the judgment was erroneous. The object of the finding of the jury is to ascertain the truth of the facts, and when this is done, if the law is erroneously applied, it is the duty of the supervising tribunal to correct the error. We can see no possible distinction between facts established to be true by the special finding of a jury, or facts admitted to be true upon an agreed case of the parties themselves. If any conceivable distinction can exist, the truth of the facts must be more clear and conclusive in a case where they are admitted to be true by the parties themselves to the record, than in a case where they are only ascertained to be true by a special finding. In both, however, there can be no contrariety of opinion as to the truth of the facts. They are not a matter of dispute before the court or between the parties. The only question in litigation is as to the law of the case, and if the court decide this wrong, shall not the party, who excepts to that decision, have the benefit of it, if there be error in the judgment? To deny him this privilege involves the absurdity of sustaining the judgment of the court when the law of the whole case has been erroneously decided, and that too where an exception is regularly put in to the opinion. To require him in such case to ask for a new trial is to do a useless and unmeaning thing. It could not be to correct the facts of the case, for they are undeniably true and verified by the contract. It certainly could not be to correct thedaw in the case, because that had been just decided and the exception not abandoned. By moving for a new trial the party waives his exception. How then could he afterwards have the benefit of it. All he complains of is, that the law of the case has been incorrectly a<i- judged against him, and this is the point upon error he desires to correct. Our statute, by giving to the parties the privilege of waiving thet rial by jury, puts both the law and the facts submitted to the court. And this court in inspecting the transcript, as there can be no doubt about the facts when they are put upon the record, will unquestionably reverse the judgment below, if the law of the case has been decided, wrong.
This brings ussto the second enquiry, which is, was the Bank upon the agreed case made liable for the amount of Williamson's notes? The doctrine in case of this kind is slated with great perspicuity and force by Justice Story in his admirable treatise upon agency. In these cases, says that learned judge, any mode of payment by the agent, accepted and received by the other contracting party as an absolute payment, will discharge the principal, whether he be known or unknown, or whether it be in the usual course of business or not. The question in most cases of this sort, is not generally so much a question of law as of' fact: That is to say, whether the note is received as a conditional payment or as an absolute payment. Whether it is received with the knowledge that there is another principal or not, and whether there is an exclusive credit given to the agent or not. Story, Com. on Agency, 440, 441. Paley on Agency, by Lloyd, 357. Smith vs. Ferrand, B. & C. 10. Johnson vs. Weed, 9 J. R. 310.
If a creditor of the principal settles with the agent and takes .a note or bond, or obligation from the latter for the amount due by the principal, although as between the parties it is intended only as a conditional payment, yet if the creditor gives a receipt, as if the money were received, or the security an absolute payment, so that the agent is thereby enabled to settle and does settle with his principal, as if the debt has been actually discharged, and the principal would be otherwise prejudiced, the debt will be deemed as to the latter absolutely discharged. Reed vs. White, 1 Esp. 122. Wyatt vs. Marquis of Hertford, 3 Esp. 147. Schemerhorn vs. Loomis, 7 J. R. 311. It is perfectly clear that if the principal settles with the agent on the faith of a receipt in full as for money, he is entirely discharged. Does the form of the receipt vary the principle ? The receipt here is as if the security were an absolute payment for Hawdon, Wright & Hatch, receipted for the notes precisely as they receipted for the money. They released the principal and elected to take the agent's responsibility, and he, upon the faith of the receipt, settled with his principal, the Bank. No doubt, taking a note for a pre-existing debt is not conclusive evidence of payment, unless it is expressly agreed to be taken as payment, and at the risk of the creditor. Toby vs. Barber, 1 J. R. 68. Arnold vs. Camp, 12 J. R. 407. Did the receipt here warrant the Bank in settling with Williamson? It unquestionably did. No receipt is conclusive evidence of absolute payment. A receipt in full by cash may be explained or contradicted as well as a receipt in full by note. The legal presumption arising from the fact of drawing a negotiable order or making a negotiable note, which is received by the creditor, is that it was intended to be and in fact is an extinguishment of the original demand or cause of action. This presumption may be contradicted or explained by the agreement of the parties or proof of usage, as circumstances inconsistent with such inference. Varner vs. Nobleborough, 2 Greenleaf 121.
Now, the circumstances that defeat the presumption of such payment, are such as would induce a court of equity to set aside the contract. As, for instance, mistake, fraud or surprise. The proof of any of these things will defeat the effect of the receipt. If given with a knowledge of the circumstances, and there is no mistake or surprise upon the one part, or fraud or misrepresentation upon the other, it would effectually defeat all further claim. Fuller vs. Crittenden, 9 Conn. 401.
Giving a negotiable note for a prior debt of another is such a payment as will support an action of assumpsit for money paid. Cornwall vs. Gould, 4 Pick. 446. Barday et al. vs. Gooch, 2 Esp. 571. Witherbee vs. Mann, 11 J. R. 518. Douglass vs. Moody, 9 Mass. 553. The first notice that was ever given to the Bank that the plaintiff looked to her for payment of Williamson's note, was about eighteen months after they fell due, and two years after their execution, and a considerable length of time after the Bank had settled with Williamson upon the faith of the receipt and paid him over the balance due. This delay upon the part of the plaintiffs goes far to explain the true nature and character of the receipt, and fortifies the legal presumption arising upon it, that it was prima facie evidence of an absolute payment: or, in any event, it was such a payment as the principal, after he had settled with the agent, had a right to consider as conclusive evidence of the creditor's demand. The receipt in this case is prima facie evidence of payment, and as the plaintiffs have failed to show any circumstances or facts overthrowing this presumption, it must stand as full proof of the fact, and therefore of the case. This position all the authorites support. 8 Greenl. 298. 6 Mass. 143. 7 Mass. 36. 11 Mass. 359. 10 Mass. 47. 4 Mass. 93. 4 Pick. 228. 8 Pick. 522. 10 Pick. 525. 12 Pick. 269. The judgment is therefore reversed with costs.