Case Name: TERRITORY OF NEW MEXICO, Appellee, v. JESSE R. HICKS, Appellant
Court: Supreme Court of New Mexico
Jurisdiction: New Mexico
Decision Date: 1892-08-24
Citations: 6 N.M. 596
Docket Number: No. 519
Parties: TERRITORY OF NEW MEXICO, Appellee, v. JESSE R. HICKS, Appellant.
Judges: O’Beien, O. J., and Seeds and Fbeeman, JJ., concur.
Reporter: New Mexico Reports
Volume: 6
Pages: 596–610

Head Matter:
[No. 519.
August 24, 1892.]
TERRITORY OF NEW MEXICO, Appellee, v. JESSE R. HICKS, Appellant.
Criminal Law — Murder—Appeal, Motion to Dismiss. — On a motion to dismiss an appeal from a conviction of murder, on the grounds that the appellant had failed to file a transcript of the record in the cause within ten days before the first day of the term of the court to which it was returnable, though appellant filed the record with the clerk on the first day of the term; and that it was a common law action, and should have been brought by writ of error, — Held: In cases where the appeal does not operate as a stay of proceedings, the transcript is not made out and forwarded to the appellate court unless on the application of the appellant. But in cases, as in the case at bar, where the appeal does operate as a stay of the proceedings, it is the duty of the district clerk, under section 2476, Compiled Laws, without any application on the part of appellant, to file with the clerk of the supreme court a transcript of the record without delay; and his failure to do so will not subject the appellant to a dismissal of his appeal. Neither section 2189, Compiled Laws, nor the act of 1891, in relation to appeals in equity eases and writs of error in common law cases, has any application to appeals in criminal eases.
Id. — Venue, Proof of. — It is not necessary in a trial for murder that the venue be affirmatively proven, it is sufficient if the evidence incidentally given in connection with the facts in the case shows that the venue was properly laid, as in this case, where it appears from the evidence that the person alleged to have been murdered died in the county where the venue was laid. Comp. Laws,-sec. 2460; State v. Dent, 3 Am. Crim. Rep. 421.
Id. — Motion For New Trial, Requisites of — Exceptions—Waiver.— A new trial will not be granted, in such ease, on the ground that the interpretation of the testimony and the argument of the counsel were incorrect, and prejudicial to defendant, and that at the time no exception was taken, because neither the defendant nor his counsel were aware of such incorrect interpretation, where the motion fails to set out the exact words of the witness and counsel, and the exact words used by the interpreter in interpreting them in the language in which they were so interpreted, so that the court below, or the appellate eourt, may pass intelligently upon the question to determine whether such interpretation was erroneous or not. In such case an objection is not sufficient; an exception must be taken; and a failure to except is a waiver of the objection.
Id. — Motion in Arrest of Judgment — Special Term. — In view of section 552a, Compiled Laws, providing that, "when, in the discretion of the judge of any district court, a furtherance of justice may require it, a special term of the district court may he called,” etc., and section 553, Compiled Laws, providing that, “Any special term of the district court that may he ordered under the provisions of this act shall he held for the purpose of hearing all causes that may he depending in said court, both eivil and criminal,” etc., a motion in arrest of judgment, on the ground that the term of the court at which the defendant was tried and convicted was a special term, and unauthorized hy law, and the proceedings of the term eoram non judice, will not he sustained.
Id. — Conflict of Testimony. — On appeal in a cause the appellate eouxfi will not weigh the evidence where there is a direct conflict.
Appeal, from a judgment convicting defendant of murder in the third degree, from the Third Judicial District Court, Dona Ana County.
Judgment affirmed.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.
A. B. Fall for appellant.
The court erred in overruling defendant’s motion for instruction to the jury to return a verdict in his behalf. State v. Turpey, 59 Cal. 371; 51 Id. 319; Whar. Crim. Ev. 107.
As to setting aside a verdict, see United States v. Daubner, 17 Fed. Eep. 807.
The interpretation of the testimony in this case, together with the interpretation of the argument of counsel, was incorrect and prejudicial to defendant’s case. Whar. Crim. Ev. 449, and cases cited'; U. S. v. Garber, 2 Sum. 19; Schiner v. People, 23 111. 17.
Defendant’s motion in arrest of judgment raises not only special but general jurisdictional questions, and rights are affected which could not be waived in any case, particularly in one of this character. 25 Pac. Eep. 294; Wyoming Territory v. Price, 1 Wy. 168; Spencer v. Com. of Va., 12 S. E. Eep. 10, 979.
If the legislature can delegate to a judge the. authority to call a special term, as attempted to be done by sections 552, 558, Compiled Laws, 1884, it can delegate to the same judge the power to fix both time and place for each of its regular terms; and yet by the organic act and subsequent acts, the power is given to the legislature alone to fix the time and place of holding court in the different counties. Winters v. Hughes, 25 Pac. Rep. (Utah) 759; Loeb v. Matthews, 37 Ind.; Cooley’s Const. Lim. 139-155.
If the sections of the laws referred to supra, and under which this call was made are unconstitutional or in conflict with the organic act and subsequent acts of congress, then all the acts of this so-called special term of court in Dona Ana county were coram non judice, in fact an absolute nullity. Smith v. Rice, 11 Mass.; 3 Vermont, 114; 9 Cal. 173;- Freem. on Judgments, 121.
If the legislature had power to enact laws providing for a special term of court, then this court has only special powers, as conferred by statutes, and must, in all its proceedings be governed by the statutes, as would a court of special or limited jurisdiction, and no presumption as to the regularity of its proceedings will be entertained. Freem. on Judgments, 123; 18 Wall. 350; 54 Tex. 154; Cooley’s Const. Lim. 407; 55 Cal. 212; 5 Mass. 434; 10 Wend. 590; 20 Pac. Rep. 842; 8Ore. 317; Suth. Stat. Con., secs. 391, 454. See, also, Suth. Stat. Con., sec. 121, pp. 448, 449; Kelly v. State, 34 Ohio St. 239; 5 Mass. 434 ; 2 Yeates, 493; 9 Harris, 147; Buck v. State, 38 Ohio St. 664; 11 S. E. Rep. 665; 1 Neb. 397; 3 Fed. Rep. 283; Thompson & Merriam on Juries, 79; Suth. Stat. Con., secs. 391, 394, 395, 454.
If, according to the decision of the court below, section 23 of the laws of 1891 was unconstitutional, section 555, Compiled Laws, not having been followed in the selection of the jury, the term being a special term, necessitating the strict observance of statutory requirements to obtain jurisdiction and render its acts legal, — the twelve men acting as a jury were not a jury, the court without jurisdiction, the verdict a nullity, and the sentence without' authority of law. Cox v. People, 19 Hun (N. Y.), 430; 80 N. Y. 500; State v. Judges Third City Court, 2 So. Rep. 786; 49 N. W. Rep. 174; 92 111. 187; 100 U. S. 339.
As to following statutes in drawing juries see 3 Yt. 114; 80 Ya. 551; State v. Jones, 97 N. C. 469; Wyers v. State, 2 S. W. Rep. 722; 81 Pa. St. 349; 63 N. Y. 36; Loeb v. Matthews, 37 Ind. See, also, State v. Deslonde, 27 La. Ann. 71; Cockey v. Cole, 28 Md.; 62 Mo. 585.
When the expression “term of court” is used in a statute, a regular, not a special, term is always meant. Thompkins v. Clackamas Co., 4 Pac. Rep. 1210.
Edward L. Bartlett, solicitor general, for appellee.
The proof of place where Martin died was all that was necessary. This was in accordance with the statute governing such cases. Sec. 2460, Comp. Laws, 1884, p. 1146; State v. Dent, 3 Am. Crim. Rep., p. 421.
The special term at which defendant was tried was a legal term. Organic Act, p. 63, Comp. Laws, sec. 1874; Id., secs. 552, 552a, 553. See, also, Organic Act, see. 1865, Comp. Laws, p. 62; Organic Act, sec. 1915, Comp. Laws, p. 71.
The proviso in section 23 of the Act of February 26, 1891, is invalid, and void. It must be strictly construed, and takes no case out of the enacting clause which does not fall fully within its terms. Dugan v. Bridge Co., 27 Pa. St. 303; Intoxicating Liquor Cases, 25 Kan. 524; H. S. v. Dickson, 15 Pefc. (U. S.) 141-165; Epps y. Epps, 17 111. App. 196; Suth. on St-at. Con., sec. 223, pp. 297 and 298.
The present jury law of 1891 was prepared in view of the decision of this court in Territory v. Luciano Baca et ah, at the present term, construing the jury law of 1889, and holding it to be special legislation and void under the act of congress of July 30, 1886. See McCarthy v. Commonwealth, 2 Atlantic Rep. (Pa.) 423; State v. Inhabitants of Bloomfield, 2 Atlantic Rep. (N. J.) 249; State ex rel. Randolph v. Wood, 7 Id. 286, and cases cited.
Judgment can only be arrested for such errors as are apparent on the face of the record, or for some matter which ought to appear of record but does not. 12 Am. & Eng. Encyclopedia of Law, p. 147b, and cases cited; 1 Bish. Crim. Proc., sec. 1282.
As to what constitutes the “record,” see: U. S. v. Barnhart, 17 Fed. Rep. 581; Warren v. Flagg, 2 Pick. (Mass.) 448; Bouv. Law Diet., title “Record,” Black’s Law Diet., title “Record; ”1 Bish. Crim. Proc., secs. 1341-1347.
The writ of error only reaches errors apparent on the face of the record, not extending to preliminary steps. 1 Bish. Crim. Proc., sec. 1368.
“The supreme court shall examine the record, and on the facts therein contained, alone, shall award a new trial, reverse or affirm the judgment.” Comp. Laws, sec. 2190; Laws, 1889, pp. 3, 4.
Objections to the drawing and impaneling of a trial jury can not for the first time be raised on a motion for a new trial. People v. Coffman, 24 Cal. 230-235.
Any matter in abatement, or defect in summoning or impaneling the grand or petit jury can not be reached by motion in arrest. Stone v. People, 2 Scam. (111.) 326; Hanley v. State, 6 Ohio, 399; Veatch v. State, 56 Ind. 584; 1 Bish. Crim. Proc., sec. 1285.
“If the defendant pleads he admits the jurisdiction.” The objection to the jurisdiction must be first raised in the court below pr it can not be considered in this court, unless the want of power to hear and determine is clearly apparent upon the record. Winters v. Hughes, 24 Pac. Rep. 760; Candill v. Tharp, 1 G. Green, 95; Starr v. Wilson, 1 Morris (Iowa), 577.

Opinion:
OPINION ON MOTION TO DISMISS.
Lee, J.
This cause is first presented to us on motion to dismiss. The territory, by E. L. Bartlett, solicitor general, produces the record in this cause, and moves the court to dismiss the appeal from the judgment of the court below, upon the grounds that said appellant has failed to file a transcript of the record and proceedings in this cause within ten days before the first day of the present term of this court, though appellant filed said record with the clerk on the first day of the term; that it is a common law action, and should have been brought into this court by a writ of error. Section 2469 of the Compiled Laws provides that in all cases of final judgment renclereci upon an indictment an appeal to the supreme court shall be allowed if appealed from during the term at which said indictment was rendered. Section 2476 provides that when an appeal shall be taken which operates as a stay of proceedings it shall be the duty of the clerk of the district court to make out a transcript of the record of the cause, and to certify and return the same to the office of the clerk of the supreme court without delay. Section 2477 provides that when an appeal does not operate as a stay of proceedings, such transcript shall be made out, ratified, and returned on application of the appellant. It will be noticed that when an appeal operates as a stay of proceedings it becomes the duty of the clerk of the district court without delay to make out the transcript, and forward the same to the clerk of the supreme court. In cases where the appeal does not operate as a stay of proceedings the transcript is not made out and forwarded to the supreme court unless an application for the same is made by the appellant. This case being one where the appeal operates as a stay of proceedings, it was the duty of the district clerk, without any application or motion on the part of the appellant, to send a transcript of the record, as it appeared in his office, to the clerk of the supreme court; and his failure to do so in the ten days before the commencement of the term of the supreme court to which it would be returnable should not visit upon the appellant the consequence of a dismissal of his appeal. This view is fully sustained under statutes substantially the same as ours, and in the case of State v. Pratt, 20 Iowa, 268, that court held that, though the appellant failed to file the transcript, the state might file the same, and it would be the duty of the supreme court to examine the record, and upon it to render such judgment as the law might demand; the defendant in that state, as here, not being required to assign or join in error. Section 2189 of the Compiled Laws was not intended to, and does not, apply to appeals in criminal cases; nor does the act of the legislature of 1891, in regard to appeals in equity cases and writs of error in common law cases, have any application to appeals in criminal cases. The motion to dismiss the appeal will be overruled.