Case Name: Joseph J. KELLY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Dennis HOCKING, Defendant-Appellee
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 2014-10-28
Citations: 581 F. App'x 567
Docket Number: No. 14-1474
Parties: Joseph J. KELLY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Dennis HOCKING, Defendant-Appellee.
Judges: 
Reporter: West's Federal Appendix
Volume: 581
Pages: 567–568

Head Matter:
Joseph J. KELLY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Dennis HOCKING, Defendant-Appellee.
No. 14-1474.
United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.
Submitted Oct. 27, 2014.
Decided Oct. 28, 2014.
Before WILLIAM J. BAUER, Circuit Judge, FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge, DIANE S. SYKES, Circuit Judge.
After examining the briefs and the record, we have concluded that oral argument is unnec essary. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(a); Cir. R. 34(f).

Opinion:
Order
Joseph Kelly was on supervised release when Dennis Hocking, a police officer from Peru, Illinois, accompanied police from Ottawa, Illinois, in a search of Kelly's home there. The search uncovered a cache of property stolen from local storage units, and Kelly was convicted in state court on multiple counts of burglary. He contends in this suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 that Hocking violated the Fourth Amendment. This action is proper, notwithstanding Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994), because contentions that police violated the Fourth Amendment during an investigation do not necessarily draw a conviction's validity into question. See Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 127 S.Ct. 1091, 166 L.Ed.2d 973 (2007).
Kelly maintains that Hocking violated the Fourth Amendment by participating in the execution of a warrant that was not supported by probable cause and by seizing items that, Kelly insists, were not described by the warrant. The district court's opinion demonstrates that neither of these contentions is correct.
More than that: neither the warrant nor probable cause was necessary for this search. Kelly agreed to terms of supervised release under which he consented in advance to a search of his home. Such consents are valid, see Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 126 S.Ct. 2193, 165 L.Ed.2d 250 (2006), so the police did not need a warrant or probable cause. See also, e.g., United States v. Huart, 735 F.3d 972, 975 (7th Cir.2013); People v. Wilson, 228 Ill.2d 35, 43-52, 319 Ill.Dee. 353, 885 N.E.2d 1033 (2008) (demonstrating that the Illinois system of "mandatory supervised release" is functionally the same as California's system of parole discussed in Samson).
Kelly's remaining arguments have been considered but do not require discussion.
Affirmed