Case Name: STATE OF HAWAII, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JAMES E. COTTON, Defendant-Appellant
Court: Supreme Court of the State of Hawaii
Jurisdiction: Hawaii
Decision Date: 1973-12-03
Citations: 55 Haw. 138
Docket Number: NO. 5399
Parties: STATE OF HAWAII, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JAMES E. COTTON, Defendant-Appellant.
Judges: RICHARDSON, C.J., MARUMOTO, ABE, LEVINSON and KOBAYASHI, JJ.
Reporter: Hawaii Reports
Volume: 55
Pages: 138–148

Head Matter:
STATE OF HAWAII, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JAMES E. COTTON, Defendant-Appellant.
NO. 5399
DECEMBER 3, 1973
RICHARDSON, C.J., MARUMOTO, ABE, LEVINSON and KOBAYASHI, JJ.

Opinion:
OPINION OF THE COURT BY
LEVINSON, J.
On November 17, 1972, the defendant was arrested in Honolulu for operating his motorcycle without wearing a helmet, as required by HRS § 286-81 (1) (A). Against the defendant's vigorous constitutional objections, a district judge found him guilty of this offense and fined him in the amount of five dollars. We affirm.
The thrust of the defendant's main argument is that HRS § 286-81 (1) (A) constitutes a burdensome imposition by the State on his personal freedom without any corresponding benefit to society as a whole which would make that imposition constitutionally permissible. Cf. State v. Kantner, 53 Haw. 327, 339, 493 P.2d 306, 313 (1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 948 (1972) (Levinson, J., dissenting). To accept this argument, of course, we would have to overrule our previous opinion upholding the State motorcycle helmet requirement, State v. Lee, 51 Haw. 516, 465 P.2d 573 (1970).
At the outset we note that the Federal Constitution does not require us to strike down HRS § 286-81 (1) (A). Simon v. Sargent, 346 F. Supp. 277 (D. Mass.), aff'd mem., 409 U.S. 1020 (1972) (rejecting constitutional arguments attacking the Massachusetts motorcycle helmet law which were virtually identical to those made by the defendant in this case). Instead, the defendant would have us read the Hawaii Constitution to afford him greater protection than that of the Federal Constitution against legislative infringement of his right to be let alone, and specifically, of his freedom to choose whether to assume the risks of helmetless motorcycle riding. Cf. State v. Santiago, 53 Haw. 254, 492 P.2d 657 (1971).
We accept now, as we did in State v. Lee, supra, the fundamental tenet that the relationship between the individual and the state leaves no room for regulations which have as their purpose and effectsoZeZy the protection of the individual from his own folly. But to say that a motorcycle helmet law has as its primary objective the protection of the wearer from head injuries is not to say that ipso facto it is unconstitutional. There may be significant secondary harms to society as a whole which it is the purpose of the statute to remedy and which, if realistic, bottom the statute in policies which are constitutionally acceptable.
A wide range of possible justifications for mandatory helmet laws have been articulated by courts and commentators. They include: (1) the "flying missile" theory, i.e., helmets shield cyclists from foreign objects which might cause loss of control and consequent accidents with others, see State v. Fetterly, 254 Or. 47, 49-50, 456 P.2d 996-97 (1969); (2)the "public ward"theory, i.e., helmetlaws, by limiting the extent of motorcycle injuries, curtail public expenditures for emergency and hospital care for the cyclist and also minimize welfare costs resulting from the cyclist's post-accident inability to care for himself and his dependents, see Note, Motorcycle Helmets and the Constitutionality of Self-Protective Legislation, 30 Ohio State L. J. 355, 370-72 (1969); (3) the "modelling" theory, i.e., the helmetless rider may cause others, and particularly children, to imitate his behavior without first making a conscious choice rejecting the arguably safer use of a helmet, see Kaplan, The Role of Law in Drug Control, 1971 Duke L.J. 1065, 1067; and (4) the "broad social impact" theory, i.e., motorcycle injuries resulting in serious injury or death are "so alarming, so widespread and of such grave dimension that [they] threaten[] the very fabric of society," State v. Lee, supra at 519, 465 P.2d at 576, and hence that the State may adopt measures such as mandatory helmet laws, reasonably aimed at protecting the social order. While the "flying missile" and "modelling" theories are arguable justifications for mandatory helmet laws, they are inherently implausible and hence highly disingenuous. We prefer to rest our analysis on the "public ward" and "broad social impact" theories, the elements of which present the only realistic justifications for the law in question.
Both theories maintain that though helmet laws are directed on a primary level toward protecting the individual from head injuries, on a secondary level they protect much broader social interests. Viewed without limit, of course, "secondary harm" arguments could justify an impermissibly wide range of governmental interference with private liberties. See, e.g., State v. Lee, supra at 524, 527, 465 P.2d at 578, 579-80 (Abe, J., dissenting). We agree with Professor Kaplan, however, that Kaplan, supra at 1070.
[m]erely because protecting the public from secondary harms could logically justify a vast range of governmental interferences with individual liberty, and merely because we could define secondary harms as including anything lessening the full development of an individual's perfection, this does not mean that such interference is always improper.
As in so many areas of the law, the problem of deciding when secondary harms are sufficiently great in magnitude to justify remedial legislation aimed at primary behavior is one of enlightened judicial line-drawing. We start the process in this case with the observation that statistical evidence at the legislature's command indicates that the rate of increase of highway accidents and fatalities, as compared with other kinds of accidents, is alarmingly high. See, e.g., Note, supra at 357. Moreover, there is evidence that the extent of motorcycle accidents, and particularly head injuries resulting thereform, is at least as alarming as the general trend. See, e.g., Simon v. Sargent, supra at 279. Finally, the appropriateness of mandatory helmet laws as a remedy for this situation is likewise statistically demonstrable. See, e.g., State v. Lee, supra at 519-20, 465 P.2d at 576.
With the great danger of primary harm to helmetless cyclists as well as the rationality of helmet wearing as a safeguard thus statistically supported, the magnitude of secondary harms of the nature indicated above is sufficiently great to justify the law at issue in this case. In answer to the reductio ad absurdum argument of the dissent in this case with respect to the extent of governmental intrusions justifiable by secondary harm analysis, we refer to the statement in Lee that "this holding is limited to this case. " 51 Haw. at 521, 465 P.2d at 577. Particularly, we note that a tool which has aided us significantly in drawing the line between the police power and individual freedom in this case is the well-established doctrine that in regulating the use of public highways, the state has always been afforded exceptionally broad discretion. Certainly it is not beyond the permissible scope of legislation to mitigate by mandatory safety laws the tremendous economic and social costs occasioned by the extent of present-day highway carnage.
James E. Cotton, defendant-appellant, pro se.
Stephen Y. Lau, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney (Barry Chung, Prosecuting Attorney, City & County of Honolulu, of counsel) for plaintiff-appellee.
The foregoing analysis adequately answers the defendant's argument that HRS § 286-81 (1) (A) exceeds the police power of the State under Article I, sections 2 and 4 of the Hawaii Constitution. In response to his equal protection argument, we quote and adopt the reasoning of the three-judge federal district court in Simon v. Sargent, supra at 279:
Finally, we see no merit in plaintiff's claim that the statute denies him the equal protection of the laws. It is not difficult to discern a rational basis for the legislature's distinction between motorcyclists and, for example, automobile drivers, whose vehicle affords them substantially more protection than does a motorcycle.
See also McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426 (1961).
We therefore decline to overrule St ate v. Lee, supra, and affirm the defendant's conviction.
Tlie relevant State constitutional provisions are article I, section2, guaranteeing the rights of "life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness," and article I, section 4, providing that "[n]o person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law, nor be denied the equal protection of the laws."
The defendant would have us accept as definitive numerous recent studies indicating that motorcycles are as safe as cars and that helmets increase rather than decrease the range of hazards inherent in motorcycle riding. These studies were not introduced in evidence at trial and hence are not properly before us now. Even were we to take judicial notice of them, however, other studies alluded to in the body of this opinion arrive at diametrically opposite conclusions. It is not our function to weigh the relative merits of this data, but rather to determine whether "the legislature was unreasonable in linking protective headgear to safer motorcycling." Simon v. Sargent, supra at 279. We conclude that it was not. Compare REA v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949).
See, e.g., Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520, 523, 524 (1959) ("The power of the State to regulate the use of its highways is broad and pervasive," and "safety measures [on our highways] carry a strong presumption of validity when challenged in court"); Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 783 (1945) ("[Highway] regulation is akin to quarantine measures, game laws, and like local regulations of rivers, harbors, piers, and docks, with respect to which the State has exceptional scope for the exercise of its regulatory power") (dicta); REA v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 109 (1949) (Regulation of traffic is "one of the most intensely local and specialized of all municipal problems").