Case Name: STEIN v. SOUTHEASTERN MICHIGAN FAMILY PLANNING PROJECT, INC; RIFKIN v. UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN HOSPITAL
Court: Michigan Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1989-04-03
Citations: 432 Mich. 198
Docket Number: Docket Nos. 80388, 80695
Parties: STEIN v SOUTHEASTERN MICHIGAN FAMILY PLANNING PROJECT, INC RIFKIN v UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN HOSPITAL
Judges: Riley, C.J., and Levin, Brickley, Cavanagh, Boyle, and Archer, JJ., concurred.
Reporter: Michigan Reports
Volume: 432
Pages: 198–207

Head Matter:
STEIN v SOUTHEASTERN MICHIGAN FAMILY PLANNING PROJECT, INC RIFKIN v UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN HOSPITAL
Docket Nos. 80388, 80695.
Argued January 7, 1988
(Calendar Nos. 5-6).
Decided April 3, 1989.
Rehearing denied in Stein, post, 1236.
Catherine Stein and Michael Stein, her husband, brought a medical malpractice action in the Wayne Circuit Court against Southeastern Michigan Family Planning Project, Inc., P. Eastin, R.N., and the Wayne County General Hospital. Thereafter, Ross v Consumers Power Co (On Rehearing), 420 Mich 567 (1984), was decided, redefining the doctrine of governmental immunity. The hospital subsequently moved for summary disposition on the ground of governmental immunity. The court, Charles C. Kauftnan, J., granted summary disposition for the hospital in light of Ross. The decision in Ross was then clarified with respect to public general hospitals in Hyde v Univ of Mich Bd of Regents, 426 Mich 223 (1986). The Court of Appeals, Cynar, P.J., and Gillis and Walsh, JJ., affirmed in an opinion per curiam, holding that the hospital’s failure to raise the defense of governmental immunity until after Ross was decided did not make Ross inapplicable (Docket No. 89020). The plaintiffs appeal.
James M. Rifkin and Leonard Eston, as representatives of the estate of Richard P. Brown, deceased, brought a medical malpractice action in the Court of Claims against the University of Michigan Hospital prior to the decision in Ross. The hospital moved for and the court, Carolyn Stell, J., granted summary judgment on the ground of governmental immunity in light of Ross. The Court of Appeals, Michael J. Kelly, P.J., and Holbrook, Jr., and T. M. Green, JJ., reversed in an opinion per curiam in light of Hyde, holding that since the defendant failed to raise the defense of governmental immunity until after Ross was decided, the defendant was not entitled to governmental immunity (Docket No. 86991). The defendant appeals.
In an opinion per curiam, signed by Chief Justice Riley and Justices Levin, Brickley, Cavanagh, Boyle, and Archer, the Supreme Court held:
A hospital owned by a governmental entity that did nothing to raise a challenge to Parker v Highland Park, 404 Mich 183 (1978), or to assert a defense of governmental immunity before Ross was decided and, after Ross was decided, for the first time filed a motion for summary disposition on the basis of Ross, did not raise and preserve the issue of governmental immunity.
1. Hyde held that the diagnosis, treatment, and care of patients at a public general hospital or medical facility, when expressly or impliedly mandated or authorized by the constitution, statute, or other law, is a governmental function, and that Ross impliedly overruled Parker to the extent that Parker had held that such activity was not a governmental function. Hyde declared that the rule of Ross would apply in all cases commenced after January 22, 1985, and to cases then pending in the trial and appellate courts in which the issue of governmental immunity was properly raised and preserved.
2. Hyde stated a rule of limited retroactivity. The overruling of Parker created a window of immunity for causes of action that accrued before July 1, 1986, the effective date of 1986 PA 175. That act, adopting the concept expressed in Parker that a governmental agency operating a general hospital was subject to tort liability, provided that the governmental tort liability act does not grant immunity to a governmental agency with respect to the ownership or operation of a hospital.
Stein, reversed.
Rifkin, affirmed.
Justice Griffin, dissenting, stated that on the basis of case law subsequent to the amendment of MCR 2.111(F)(3)(a), a plaintiff still is required to allege facts in avoidance of governmental immunity to plead a cause of action against the state or its agencies, and a governmental entity cloaked with immunity still is not required to plead immunity as an affirmative defense.
It is ironic and unjust that as a result of the Court’s decision similarly situated plaintiffs who filed defective pleadings prior to Ross will benefit, while those who followed the rules then in existence and pleaded facts in avoidance of immunity will be penalized. Reliance by parties on the state of the law should be •an important factor in determining the application of a decision which changes the law.
In these cases, the plaintiffs relied on Parker and did not plead facts in avoidance of immunity. Likewise, the defendants did not file what under the law at that time would have been a frivolous motion for summary disposition on the basis of governmental immunity. Shortly after Ross was decided, the defendants did move for summary disposition on immunity grounds, timely raising and preserving the issue in the only way that made sense at that time.
158 Mich App 702; 405 NW2d 147 (1987) reversed.
159 Mich App 254; 406 NW2d 202 (1986) affirmed.
Sommers, Schwartz, Silver & Schwartz, P.C. (by Richard D. Toth), for the plaintiffs in Stein.
Rifkin & Kingsley, P.C. (by Lori D. Weisberg and Rebecca A. Roberts), for the plaintiffs in Rifkin.
Samuel A. Turner, Corporation Counsel, and Alan B. Havis and Glen H. Downs, Assistant Corporation Counsel, for Wayne County General Hospital.
Plunkett & Cooney, P.C. (by D. J. Watters and Christine D. Oldani), for defendant University of Michigan Hospital.
Amici Curiae:
Neal & Lengauer, P.C. (by Stephanie A. Nelson), for Michigan Defense Trial Counsel.
Lopatin, Miller, Freedman, Bluestone, Erlich, Rosen & Bartnick (by Richard E. Shaw) for Michigan Trial Lawyers Association.
Cozadd, Shangle, Smith & Andrews (by John R. Day) for Peoples Community Hospital Authority.

Opinion:
Per Curiam.
This Court held in Hyde v Univ of Michigan Bd of Regents, 426 Mich 223; 393 NW2d 847 (1986), that the diagnosis, treatment, and care of patients at a public general hospital or medical facility, when expressly or impliedly mandated or authorized by the constitution, statute, or other law, is a governmental function and that to the extent Parker v Highland Park, 404 Mich 183, 273 NW2d 413 (1978), had ruled such activity does not constitute a governmental function, it was impliedly overruled by Ross v Consumers Power Co (On Rehearing), 420 Mich 567; 363 NW2d 641 (1984).
The Court in Hyde then declared that the new rule of Ross would apply to all cases commenced after January 22, 1985, when Ross was decided, and to those cases then pending either in trial or appellate courts in which a governmental immunity issue "was properly raised and preserved."
Hyde thus stated a rule of "limited" retroactivity. The new rule would apply only in cases commenced after the overruling decision and in pending cases where the issue had been raised and preserved.
The cases consolidated in this appeal were filed during the interim between decisions in Parker and Ross and were disposed of at the trial level prior to our decision in Hyde. The procedural histories involved are best understood through the following sequence:
A. Stein
December 27,1978 Parker decided.
February 21, 1984 Plaintiffs Stein filed a complaint against defendants Southeastern Michigan _Family Planning Project, P. Eastin, and Wayne County General Hospital alleging medical malpractice.
January 22, 1985 Ross released.
July 1,1985 Defendant Wayne County General Hospital moved for summary disposition on the basis of governmental immunity.
November 8, 1985 Defendant hospital was granted summary disposition.
October 3, 1986 Hyde decided.
February 6, 1987 The Court of Appeals affirmed the order granting summary disposition. 158 Mich App 702; 405 NW2d 147 (1987).
B. Rifkin
December 27, 1978 Parker decided.
August 20,1981 Plaintiffs filed a complaint against defendant University of Michigan Hospital, alleging medical malpractice.
January 22, 1985 Ross released.
April 11, 1985 Defendant moved for summary disposition on the basis of governmental immunity.
August 7, 1985 Defendant was granted summary disposition.
October 3, 1986 Hyde decided.
December 30, 1986 The Court of Appeals reversed the order granting summary disposition and remanded the case for further proceedings. 159 Mich App 254; 406 NW2d 202 (1986).
The question presented in these cases is whether a hospital owned by a governmental entity that had not challenged the correctness of this Court's decision in Parker or raised a defense of governmental immunity before Ross was decided and, after Ross was decided, for the first time filed a motion for summary disposition on the basis of Ross, raised and preserved a challenge to Parker.
We answer the question directly. A hospital owned by a governmental entity that did nothing to raise a challenge to Parker or assert a defense of governmental immunity before Ross was decided had not raised and preserved the issue.
The overruling of Parker created a window of immunity for causes of action that accrued before July 1, 1986, the effective date of 1986 PA 175.
Act 175, providing that the governmental tort liability act "does not grant immunity to a governmental agency with respect to the ownership or operation of a hospital," MCL 691.1407(4); MSA 3.996(107)(4), adopted the concept expressed in Parker that a governmental agency operating a general hospital was subject to tort liability.
This Court, in providing in Hyde that the overruling of Parker would be accorded limited retro-activity, limited the window of immunity. Our clarification of this today accords with the clearly expressed intent of the Legislature.
We reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals in Stein and affirm the decision in Rifkin.
Riley, C.J., and Levin, Brickley, Cavanagh, Boyle, and Archer, JJ., concurred.
This Court declared in Parker v Highland Park, 404 Mich 183; 273 NW2d 413 (1978), that the operation of a generad hospital was not a governmental function within the meaning of the governmental tort liability act, MCL 691.1407; MSA 3.996(107), and thus that the City of Highland Park was subject to tort liability for medical malpractice in the emergency room of Highland Park General Hospital.
In Ross, this Court "redefined the term 'governmental function,' " but "[n]one of the nine consolidated cases decided in Ross involved the tort liability of a public general hospital . . . ." Hyde, supra, pp 229-230.
Hyde, supra, p 230.