Case Name: The Administrators of John Satterwhite vs. Daniel M'Kie
Court: Constitutional Court of South Carolina
Jurisdiction: South Carolina
Decision Date: 1824-11
Citations: 1 Harp. 397
Docket Number: 
Parties: The Administrators of John Satterwhite vs. Daniel M'Kie.
Judges: ColcocJc, Huger, Richardson and Johnson, Justices, concurred.
Reporter: South Carolina Law Reports
Volume: 16
Pages: 397–398

Head Matter:
The Administrators of John Satterwhite vs. Daniel M'Kie.
Defendant made a note of hand, payable at twelve months, anil unless paid at the day, to bear interest from the date; held that defendant having failed to pay at the day, was hound for the . -interest.
Daniel M‘Kie gave a promissory note to the administrators of John Satterwhitc deceased, payable in twelvemonths after date; but if not then paid, the note to carry interest from .the date. M‘Kie failed to pay the note when it became due. The administrators commenced an action thereon, and M‘Kie the defendant confessed a judgment, with iaterest from the date of the note;-which was duly entered up and execution issued thereon. At the Spring Term, 3824, it was moved that the interest which had accrued between the date pf the note and the time when it became due, should be stricken from the judgment. This motion was granted. The object of the present appeal was to reverse that order.

Opinion:
The opiifon of the Court teas delivered by
Jdr. Justice Gantt.
Irby, for motion,
Thompson, contra.
The law by which a contract is. to be governed, is resolved into the terms whereby it is entered into; provided that the contract be consistent with morality and notrepngnanttolaw or the principles of public policy. In this case, it'was certainly competent for M'Kie, who had received a full and adequate consideration, to contract for the payment of interest upon the debt he owed, from any point of time after he had received the consid--oration for which he became a debtor. The case would not be varied by supposing that the note had been drawn with interest from the. date, but the interest to be remitted on his paying the sum due, on the day assigned for the payment. This is the ob-viotls meaning and intent of the parties to the contract. The laches of M'Kie could alone render him responsible for interest, and having incurred this responsibility by his default of payment, he voluntarily confessed a judgment, according to the tenor of his contract. This was doing no more than what the law and good faith required of him. The judgment as entered up on the confession of the defendant, must stand, and the order made for striding out interest is reversed.
ColcocJc, Huger, Richardson and Johnson, Justices, concurred.