Case Name: Bobby Ray ROBERTS, Jr. v. Joseph T. BENOIT, The City of New Orleans, Parish of Orleans, Criminal Sheriff for the Parish of Orleans, State of Louisiana, Charles Foti, Individually, and XYZ Insurance Companies
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1991-01-17
Citations: 574 So. 2d 1256
Docket Number: No. 89-CA-1104
Parties: Bobby Ray ROBERTS, Jr. v. Joseph T. BENOIT, The City of New Orleans, Parish of Orleans, Criminal Sheriff for the Parish of Orleans, State of Louisiana, Charles Foti, Individually, and XYZ Insurance Companies.
Judges: Before ARMSTRONG, PLOTKIN and BECKER, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 574
Pages: 1256–1270

Head Matter:
Bobby Ray ROBERTS, Jr. v. Joseph T. BENOIT, The City of New Orleans, Parish of Orleans, Criminal Sheriff for the Parish of Orleans, State of Louisiana, Charles Foti, Individually, and XYZ Insurance Companies.
No. 89-CA-1104.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fourth Circuit.
Jan. 17, 1991.
Writs Granted March 22, 1991.
Ronald A. Welcker, Glorioso & Welcker, and Frank D’Amico, New Orleans, for plaintiff/appellant Bobby Ray Roberts, Jr.
Jacob J. Amato, Jr., Lisa A. Dunn, Ama-to & Creely, Gretna, for plaintiffs/appei-lees Kathy Roberts, Nikisha Roberts, Jámi-la Roberts and Bobby Ray Roberts, III.
S. Guy deLaup, Hall, Lentini, Mouledoux & Wimberly, Metairie, for defendant/appellant Joseph T. Benoit.
T. Allen Usry, Fred Schroeder, Usry & Weeks, Metairie, for appellants Charles C. Foti, Jr. and The Ins. Guar. Ass’n.
Before ARMSTRONG, PLOTKIN and BECKER, JJ.

Opinion:
BECKER, Judge.
This appeal arises from a lawsuit instituted by the plaintiff, Bobby Ray Roberts, Jr., for damages he sustained when defendant, Joseph T. Benoit, discharged his gun. Defendant Benoit, at the time of the incident, was a commissioned deputy sheriff with the Criminal Sheriffs Office for the Parish of Orleans. In the suit, plaintiff named as defendants, Joseph T. Benoit, The City of New Orleans, the Parish of Orleans, the Criminal Sheriff for the Parish of Orleans, the State of Louisiana, Charles Foti individually and Southern American Insurance Company, the insurer for the Criminal Sheriffs Office. Plaintiffs wife, Kathy Roberts, individually, and on behalf of their three minor children, intervened in the action.
Prior to trial, defendants, the City of New Orleans and the State of Louisiana, were dismissed from the action. Southern American Insurance Company, the insurer for the Criminal Sheriffs Office, was found to have gone bankrupt, and the Insurance Guaranty Association took over the defense for the insurance company and the Criminal Sheriffs Office.
After a bench trial, judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiff in the amount of $785,000.00 against defendants, Joseph T. Benoit, the Criminal Sheriff for the Parish of Orleans, and Insurance Guaranty Association. Intervenor, Kathy Roberts, was awarded damages of $25,000.00 for herself individually and $10,000.00 for each of the three minor children.
Plaintiff appeals, seeking an increase in damages. Defendant, Joseph T. Benoit also appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in awarding excessive damages, in failing to find the plaintiff comparatively negligent, and in failing to allow counsel for Benoit to recall one of its witnesses, Merlin Fontenette. Defendants, Charles Foti as Criminal Sheriff for the Parish of Orleans and Insurance Guaranty Association, contend on appeal that the trial court erred in holding the criminal sheriff liable for defendant Benoit's action, in awarding excessive damages, and in failing to find the plaintiff comparatively negligent.
In 1979, defendant, Joseph T. Benoit, was hired by Sheriff Charles Foti as a cook in the Orleans Parish Criminal Sheriffs Office. Benoit became commissioned as a deputy sheriff in January 1981. The kitchen personnel were commissioned as deputy sheriffs in order to obtain state supplemental pay. Prior to being commissioned, Be-noit and the other kitchen workers completed a training course.
The training received by defendant Be-noit was performed on an intermittent basis. The training consisted of approximately three days a week for a few hours a day over a six week period. There was only one day devoted to firearms training at the firing range which lasted approximately eight hours. Upon completion of this training, Benoit became a commissioned deputy sheriff thereby becoming authorized to make arrests, enforce the law, wear a badge and carry a gun "on duty" as well as "off duty" pursuant to his commission.
The incident sued upon occurred on Sunday, October 25, 1981. On that day, Benoit had worked at the Sheriffs Office performing his regular kitchen duties on a twelve hour shift until 2:30 p.m. He then went home, bathed and went to his mother-in-law's home. Benoit then proceeded to his sister's home. While there, he consumed a beer. Then, Benoit, and his brother-in-law, Merlin Fontenette, drove to the plaintiff's home. The purpose of going to the plaintiff's home was to have the plaintiff, Roberts, repair a light in Benoit's vehicle.
On arrival at Roberts' home, Benoit had another beer in his hand. The plaintiff, at this time, was involved in putting a stereo system in his brother-in-law's, Roy Farria, vehicle. While at plaintiff's home, Benoit drank a glass of wine. Defendant had in his possession two weapons; an Ml carbine rifle in the trunk of his car, and a .38 Charter Arms revolver in an ankle holster strapped to his leg. Benoit removed the revolver from the holster and handed the gun to his brother-in-law, Merlin Fonten-ette. Fontenette then handed the revolver back to Benoit. Benoit continued to handle the weapon. At one point, he opened the cylinder of the revolver, and the bullets fell out of the gun. Plaintiff helped Benoit retrieve the bullets and told Benoit to put the gun away. Plaintiff had asked Benoit several times to put the gun back in the holster. At some point, while Benoit was handling the weapon, the gun discharged injuring the plaintiff, Bobby Ray Roberts, Jr.
As a result of the shooting, plaintiff lost his right eye as well as a portion of the right temporal lobe of his brain. The plaintiff has lost fifty percent of his vision in his left eye from the removal of the damaged brain matter, thus resulting in a loss of seventy-five percent of his total vision. Plaintiff also suffers from neuralgia, an irritated nerve that causes pain to the right side of his face. Roberts has a severe memory loss problem, and a visual perception problem, defined as an inability to acquire information rapidly. The visual perception disability has affected plaintiffs fine motor skills, resulting in plaintiffs inability to continue in his occupation as a mechanic. The plaintiff has also suffered from behavioral changes, e.g. irritability, slowness, loss of coordination and disorientation.
Plaintiff and defendants all seek a review of the damages awarded by the trial court. Plaintiff argues that the damages are inadequate while the defendants contend the award is excessive. The law is clear that much discretion is generally left to the trier of fact in the assessment of damages in a tort suit. C.C. article 1999; Perniciaro v. Brinch, 384 So.2d 392 (La.1980); Gormley v. Grand Lodge of State of Louisiana, 503 So.2d 181 (La.App. 4th Cir.1987), writ denied, 506 So.2d 1227 (1987). Before a court of appeal may disturb such an award, the record must clearly reveal that the trier of fact abused its "much" discretion in making the award. Coco v. Winston Industries, Inc., 341 So.2d 332 (La.1977). Once an award is found to be insufficient or excessive, the appellate court may examine comparable cases for guidance in determining an appropriate award. Reck v. Stevens, 373 So.2d 498 (La.1979). Even then, an appellate court can only raise (or lower) the award to the lowest (or highest) point which was within the lower court's discretion. Coco, supra.
A review of the trial record reveals that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding damages of $785,000.00 to the plaintiff. As a result of the incident, Mr. Roberts has completely lost his right eye as well as a portion of the right temporal lobe of his brain. Additionally, he has lost fifty percent of the vision in his left eye, resulting in a loss of seventy-five percent of his total vision. The plaintiff also suffers from neuralgia, an irritated nerve which causes pain to the right side of his face.
As a result of the loss of brain tissue, plaintiff has severe memory loss problems, a visual perception problem, and behavioral problems. Dr. Richard Strub, a neurologist, examined the plaintiff on November 8, 1985. Dr. Strub, testified that the plaintiff had difficulty with coordination and balance, as well as difficulty with verbal memory and expression. Dr. Strub noted that these deficits are permanent and that the plaintiff had reached his maximum recovery. Plaintiffs behavioral problems included disorientation, depression, frustration, irritability, and slowness. Dr. Strub related these problems directly to plaintiffs injury.
The plaintiff was also evaluated by Dr. William Black, a neuropsychologist. At trial, Dr. Black testified that the plaintiff had significant behavioral problems which would affect his interaction with others. Dr. Black also noted that the plaintiff was impaired in the areas of verbal comprehension and abstract reasoning. Dr. Black further testified that plaintiffs visual perception problems resulted in a significant impairment in plaintiffs fine motor skills. Dr. Black stated that these problems are indicative of the type of brain injury suffered by the plaintiff. Dr. Black suggested that the plaintiff should receive treatment intermittently for the rest of his life as the plaintiff is at greater risk for developing future emotional and behavioral problems.
Furthermore, both witnesses testified that the plaintiff would have problems find ing employment as a result of his memory problems. At the time of trial, Mr. Roberts was employed as an operating engineer with a local hotel. Mr. Joseph Williams, plaintiffs immediate supervisor, testified that he watches over the plaintiff and has taken the blame for several of the plaintiffs mistakes. In fact, Mr. Williams acknowledged that he has arranged for plaintiff to have the same days off as he has so that Williams can directly supervise plaintiffs actions.
Mr. Williams' testimony corroborates the testimony of Dr. Robert D. Vooght, a rehabilitation counselor, who evaluated the plaintiff on February 26, 1988. Dr. Vooght testified that Mr. Roberts has problems with memory and distractibility. According to Dr. Vooght, the plaintiff is not competitively employable and needs supervision in whatever job he may take on.
Dr. Melvin Wolfson, plaintiffs economist, testified that Mr. Robert's actual lost wages to the date of the trial was $70,-527.00. At the time of trial, plaintiff was still working and receiving a salary of $16,-000.00 a year. Dr. Wolfson testified that if the plaintiff stopped working immediately, his future lost wages would be $455,000.00. However, if plaintiff was employed for another year, his lost future wages would be $301,000.00. If plaintiff worked for six years, there would be lost future wages of $266,185.00. And if plaintiff was to continue to be employable for eleven years, Mr. Roberts' lost future wages would be $260,-000.00.
Defendant's economist, Kenneth Bou-dreaux, testified that Mr. Roberts' lost wages from the date of the incident to the date of trial were $174,120.00. Mr. Bou-dreaux further testified that the plaintiff did not incur any loss of future wages as plaintiff's income with his present employer was significantly higher that what he had earned on a continuous basis prior to the accident.
Considering the evidence presented, we can not say that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding plaintiff damages of $785,000.00.
Defendants also contend that the trial court erred in not finding the plaintiff comparatively negligent. Plaintiff and defendants produced at trial two versions as to how the shooting occurred. Defendant, Benoit, and his brother-in-law, Merlin Fon-tenette, testified that the gun discharged as plaintiff was returning the weapon to Benoit. The trial court, when faced with the two versions, made a credibility decision. The trial judge, in his reasons for judgment stated,
"The deputy attempted to justify his actions by suggesting that Mr. Roberts might have contributed to his own injury. This Court was not impressed. As a matter of fact the record is replete with statements which demonstrate that the deputy had difficulty honoring his oath to speak the truth. This Court is obligated to observe that when comparing the testimony of the several witnesses who were on the scene at the time of the actual incident, Deputy Benoit's is least likely to be accurate.
This Court finds that the descriptive events leading up to the wounding of plaintiff, Bobby Ray Roberts, Jr., as stated by plaintiff's witnesses, is rational, consistent and believable."
The Louisiana Supreme Court has consistently held that
"when there is evidence before the trier of fact which, upon its reasonable evaluation of credibility, furnishes a reasonable factual basis for the trial court's finding, on review the appellate court should not disturb this factual finding in the absence of manifest error. Stated another way, the reviewing court must give great weight to factual conclusions of the trier of fact; where there is conflict in the testimony, reasonable evaluations of credibility and reasonable inferences of fact should not be disturbed on review, even though the appellate court may feel that its own evaluations and inferences are as reasonable." Canter v. Koehring Co., 283 So.2d 716, 724 (La.1983).
Proper review requires that the appellate court determine from the record whether the trial court's findings are clearly wrong or manifestly erroneous. Watson v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Insurance Co., 469 So.2d 967 (La.1985); Arceneaux v. Domingue, 365 So.2d 1330, 1333 (La.1978).
The trial court did not commit error in failing to find the plaintiff comparatively negligent. Faced with the two versions of how the incident occurred, the trial judge, within his discretion, made reasonable credibility determinations. The trial judge chose to believe the plaintiff and his witnesses. There is more than sufficient evidence to support the credibility determinations and factual findings of the trial judge. We conclude that the trial court's findings as to the absence of plaintiff's comparative negligence are not manifestly erroneous or clearly wrong.
Defendants, Charles Foti, as the Criminal Sheriff for the Parish of Orleans and Insurance Guaranty Association allege that the trial court erred in holding Sheriff Foti liable for Deputy Benoit's actions. The trial court specifically found that "(i)n commissioning Deputy Benoit, without adequate training, . the Criminal Sheriff failed to act reasonably or responsibly," and that the "inaction of Sheriff Foti and his staff . contributed mightily to the disastrous shooting of plaintiff, Bobby Ray Roberts, Jr."
The trial court further stated,
"This Court believes that Sheriff Foti has a duty of extrordinary care to see to it that his deputies are properly trained in the use of a dangerous instrumentality-
⅜! Jfc ⅜ *
[Sheriff Foti] was solely responsible for the shortcomings of his deputy with respect to the deputy's training or lack thereof. He put a badge, a commission and a loaded gun into the hands of Deputy Bonoit when he was totally unprepared to accept'this awesome responsibility."
Defendants argue that Sheriff Foti's alleged failure to properly train Deputy Be-noit was not a cause-in-fact or legal cause of plaintiff's injury. They further contend that the Sheriff had no duty to protect the plaintiff against the risk of being shot by Deputy Benoit.
The evidence presented at trial appears to support plaintiff's allegations of negligent training and negligent hiring. Deputy Benoit and other defense witnesses testified that the training given to the kitchen personnel was done on an intermittent basis. Deputy Benoit further testified that for over a period of six weeks, he received classroom instructions three days a week for approximately four to six hours a day. There was only one day, i.e. eight hours, of instruction and practice on the firing range.
Annelle Ishmael, the program manager for the Police Officers Standard in Training Council, testified that the POST training requirements for law enforcement officers was a minimum of two hundred and forty hours of instruction, of which thirty hours was to be in firearms training. Ms. Ishmael also testified that in 1979-1980 her office was examining deputy sheriffs submitted by Sheriff Foti for accreditation. However, her records indicate that there was no examination made of Deputy Benoit.
Dr. George Kirkham, plaintiff's expert on police training, testified that the training received by Deputy Benoit in regards to the use of firearms was grossly deficient. In particular, Deputy Benoit was not conversant in the mechanical operations of the gun. He did not know the difference between the cylinder and the chamber of a gun. Further, when asked to differentiate between a single action and double action weapon, Benoit was unable to do so.
Further, Benoit did not know how to safely handle a gun. Dr. Kirkham testified that it is never safe to pass around a loaded weapon. Benoit testified that he was not informed never to pass around a loaded weapon. Nor was he instructed on the proper way to hand a gun to another person. Dr. Kirkham testified that these deviations, among others, in Benoit's training significantly contributed to the shooting incident.
Defendants contend that the incident occurred solely through Deputy Benoit's neg ligence in handling a weapon while consuming alcoholic beverages. Defendants argue that Sheriff Foti had written regulations against such actions. However, Deputy Benoit testified that he never did receive any such written regulations.
Furthermore, it should be noted that the Sheriffs office was not only negligent in training Deputy Benoit, but also in hiring him in the first place. Benoit admitted on cross-examination that he lied on his employment application with the Sheriffs Office. Benoit stated on the application that he had a high school diploma. Benoit testified that he really only had a ninth grade education. Benoit also admitted while he stated on the application that he had no convictions, he had been convicted of driving while intoxicated. Benoit was also required to take a general intelligence test when he applied for employment with the Sheriffs office. He received an unsatisfactory grade on the test. Dr. Kirkham testified that, under professional standards, a person, such as defendant Benoit, who falsifies an employment application and receives an unsatisfactory score on an intelligence test, would not be eligible for a commissioned law enforcement position.
In fact, L.S.A.-R.S. 33:1432.1, which provides for the employment and commissioning of deputy sheriffs, requires that all candidates for such commissions have a high school education and receive within one year of employment, four weeks or one hundred and sixty hours training at an accredited law enforcement school. Further, L.S.A.-R.S. 40:2401 et seq, required in 1981, that "every peace officer . shall successfully complete a basic law enforcement training course conducted by a training center accredited by the council" on police standards and training. L.S.A.-R.S. 40:2405. Under the definitional statute, a peace officer includes any "fulltime appointed or commissioned employee of a sheriffs department." R.S. 40:2402(1). Clearly, under the facts of this case, Deputy Benoit should not have been commissioned as a criminal deputy sheriff. The trial court did not commit manifest error in its findings that Sheriff Foti negligently hired and/or trained Deputy Benoit.
Thus, the next question is whether the Sheriff's negligence was a legal cause of the plaintiff's injuries. It must be noted Deputy Benoit testified that it was only pursuant to his commission that he was carrying the weapon which injured the plaintiff.
A defendant's conduct is actionable under the duty-risk analysis where it is both a cause in fact of the injury, and a legal cause of the harm incurred. Sinitiere v. Lavergne, 391 So.2d 821 (La.1980); Fowler v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Insurance Company, 485 So.2d 168 (La.App. 2nd Cir.1986), writ denied, 487 So.2d 441 (La.1986). The cause in fact test requires that but for the defendant's conduct, the injuries would not have been sustained. The legal cause test requires that there be a substantial relationship between the conduct complained of and the harm incurred. Sinitiere v. Lavergne, supra. Further, there can be more than one cause in fact of an accident as long as each cause bears a proximate relation to the harm which occurs and is substantial in nature. Nix v. Brasly, 489 So.2d 1038 (La.App. 1st Cir.1986); Bodoin v. Daigle, 452 So.2d 828 (La.App. 3rd Cir.1984), writ denied, 458 So.2d 485 (La.1984).
The determination of causation in fact is merely the first step in determining liability under the duty-risk analysis. The court must also determine what duty was imposed on the defendant under the particular circumstances, whether there was a breach of that duty that resulted in damages, and whether the risk which resulted in the damages was encompassed within the scope of the protection extended by the imposition of that duty. Dixie Drive It Yourself System v. American Beverage Company, 242 La. 471, 137 So.2d 298 (1962); Pierre v. Allstate Insurance Co., 257 La. 471, 242 So.2d 821 (1970); Sibley v. Gifford Hill and Co., Inc., 475 So.2d 315 (La.1985).
While the causal relation issue involves an analysis of the defendant's conduct as a contributing factor in the injury, the duty issue is a policy inquiry into whether the defendant's duty to the victim included protection against the particular injury. Green, The Causal Relation Issues in Negligence Law, 60 Mich.L.Rev. 543 (1962); Sibley v. Gifford Hill and Co., Inc., supra.
Reviewing the law and evidence, we find that the trial court did not commit manifest error in finding that Sheriff Foti's negligence in commissioning defendant Benoit as a deputy sheriff was a cause in fact of the plaintiff's injuries. Benoit himself admitted that he was carrying the gun only pursuant to the commission. Further, the weapon was not purchased by Benoit until after he received his commission as a deputy sheriff. Benoit also testified that he considered this gun to be his "off-duty" weapon, which he was allowed to carry pursuant to the commission. There appears to be no uncertainty that if Benoit had not been commissioned as a deputy sheriff, he would not have been carrying the weapon on the day in question.
Thus, the next question to be answered is whether Sheriff Foti had any duty to protect the plaintiff from defendant's actions. The granting of a deputy sheriff commission places much responsibility on the shoulders of the person commissioned. Upon becoming a commissioned deputy sheriff, a person becomes authorized to make arrests, to enforce the law, to wear a badge and carry a gun "on duty" as well as "off duty". Sheriff Foti has unfettered control in the granting of criminal deputy sheriff commissions. As such, Sheriff Foti has the obligation to ensure that those who are commissioned as deputy sheriffs have sufficient training, most particularly in the area of the use of firearms.
The law is clear that a loaded gun is a dangerous instrument and imposes a duty of care on those who have control of it. Webb v. Smith, 555 So.2d 556, 558 (La.App. 4th Cir.1989); Tolleson v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co., 449 So.2d 105 (La.App. 1st Cir.1984), writ denied, 450 So.2d 968 (La.1984). Likewise, Sheriff Foti has a duty to ensure that the people whom he commissions as deputy sheriffs are adequately trained in the use and handling of firearms. We agree with the trial judge's statement that "the trusting public, who permits Sheriff Foti to hire his deputies, has a right to expect that they will be well trained and fully qualified in the proper and proficient use of firearms. The plaintiffs as a part of that public are beneficiaries of that trust."
We find that the evidence supports the trial court's determination that Sheriff Foti did indeed breach his duty to ensure that Deputy Benoit, as a commissioned deputy sheriff, was adequately trained in the use of firearms. The failure to adequately train Deputy Benoit clearly was a cause in fact of plaintiff's injuries. But for his commission as a deputy sheriff, defendant Be-noit would not have been carrying the weapon which caused plaintiff's injuries.
Defendant Benoit's last assignment of error concerns the trial court's refusal to allow the defendant to recall Merlin Fon-tenette. Defendant Benoit attempted to recall Mr. Fontenette to refute the testimony of Wayne Centanni. Mr. Centanni, a private investigator, had obtained a taped statement from Mr. Fontenette concerning the incident sued upon. Apparently, this statement was taken close in time to the actual incident. Plaintiff called Mr. Cen-tanni as a rebuttal witness when Fonten-ette gave a version of the incident inconsistent with the taped statement. Defendant argued that Mr. Fontenette should have been allowed to refute the statement as plaintiff was not able to confirm, through any evidence, that Mr. Centanni actually spoke with Fontenette. Further, defendant suggests that the testimony of Mr. Fontenette in question went to the issue of comparative negligence.
Mr. Centanni testified that although he had taken the statement over the telephone, he had never met Mr. Fontenette prior to trial. Centanni also admitted he was not an expert in the comparison of voices. Even though the trial court may have committed error in not allowing defendant to recall Mr. Fontenette, such error is harmless. The trial court had more than sufficient testimony from all the other witnesses presented to determine the issue of comparative negligence. Any testimony by Mr. Fontenette refuting the statement would not have had any significant impact on the trial court's findings.
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
PLOTKIN, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with written reasons.