Case Name: The STATE of Texas, Appellant, v. Joseph Frank BASSANO, III, Appellee
Court: Texas Courts of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1992-03-19
Citations: 827 S.W.2d 557
Docket Number: No. 13-90-505-CR
Parties: The STATE of Texas, Appellant, v. Joseph Frank BASSANO, III, Appellee.
Judges: NYE, C.J., dissenting.
Reporter: South Western Reporter Second Series
Volume: 827
Pages: 557–563

Head Matter:
The STATE of Texas, Appellant, v. Joseph Frank BASSANO, III, Appellee.
No. 13-90-505-CR.
Court of Appeals of Texas, Corpus Christi.
March 19, 1992.
Discretionary Review Refused June 24, 1992.
George J. Filley, III, Dist. Atty., Michael M. Kelly, Asst. Dist. Atty., Victoria, for appellant.
Bernard T. Klimist, Victoria, for appel-lee.

Opinion:
OPINION
SEERDEN, Justice.
An information charged appellee, Joseph Frank Bassano, III, with possession of more than two ounces, but not more than four ounces, of marihuana. He filed a motion to suppress all of the evidence which was seized from his house and from a car parked on his house's driveway. After a hearing, the trial court denied the motion to suppress the evidence seized from his house, but granted the motion to suppress the evidence seized from the car. The State appeals by two points of error. We affirm.
At the motion to suppress hearing, Officer Thomas J. Turner of the Victoria County Sheriff's Office testified that a confidential informant reported to the sheriff's office that the persons living in a house at 805 Sundance Street, Victoria, Texas, were selling marihuana out of that house. Ap-pellee owned this house, and he and his wife, Kimberly Bassano, lived there. Officers Turner and Seger began their surveillance of the house about 5:00 p.m. on July 23, 1990. Officer Turner left and obtained a search warrant, and it was signed at 5:16 p.m. that day. Officer Turner then returned to the house and observed it until about 6:20 p.m., when officers Turner and Seger drove past the house and stopped at a point just beyond the next intersection south of the house. From the time they began their surveillance until about 6:25 p.m., they did not see any vehicles in the house's driveway, nor did they see any activity around the house. About 6:25 p.m., Officer Turner saw an Oldsmobile parked in the house's driveway. He did not see the Oldsmobile arrive at the house, nor did he see anybody inside of it. He kept the Oldsmobile under surveillance until 6:33 p.m. No one was seen near the Oldsmobile from 6:25 p.m. to 6:33 p.m. At 6:33 p.m., Officers Turner and Seger, along with other officers, executed the search warrant. Officers Turner and Seger met appellee at the front door of the house. He was given his Miranda warnings and was detained in the living room during the search. Officer Turner searched the Oldsmobile and found a 1.25 gallon cooler inside the trunk. A clear plastic baggy containing a green leafy substance suspected of being marihuana was inside the cooler. A partially smoked cigarette containing suspected marihuana was found on the Oldsmobile's console. Appellee was arrested for possession of marihuana.
Appellee's motion to suppress alleged, in relevant part, that the search of the Oldsmobile violated the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 1, § 9 of the Texas Constitution because it was conducted pursuant to an invalid search warrant. The motion alleged that: the affidavit upon which the search warrant was based was insufficient; the search of the Oldsmobile was not conducted pursuant to a valid search warrant; there was reasonable doubt, as a matter of law, that appellee possessed any contraband found inside the Oldsmobile; and the informant lacked credibility. The trial court granted the motion to suppress all of the evidence seized from the Oldsmobile.
By point one, the State complains that the trial court erred in sustaining the motion to suppress the evidence of marihuana found in the Oldsmobile because ap-pellee did not have standing to contest the search of that vehicle. Generally, the right to challenge the lawfulness of a search is limited to persons with "standing," that is, to those who have been aggrieved by a search and seizure. Goehring v. State, 627 S.W.2d 159, 164 (Tex.Crim.App.1982). When a search is contested, the accused establishes standing, viz: his right to complain of the search, by showing that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the area searched. Chapa v. State, 729 S.W.2d 723, 725-29 (Tex.Crim.App.1987). A mere allegation by an accused that he was a victim of an illegal search or seizure, if not disputed by the State, is sufficient to establish standing to challenge a search or seizure. Russell v. State, 717 S.W.2d 7, 9 n. 6 (Tex.Crim.App.1986). Once the State challenges the allegation, the accused carries the burden of proof. Russell, 717 S.W.2d at 9 n. 6.
In Chapa, the Court of Criminal Appeals announced the standard for determining whether an individual has a reasonable or legitimate expectation of privacy:
In Rakas v. Illinois, supra [439 U.S. 128, 99 S.Ct. 421, 58 L.Ed.2d 387], the substantive question of what constitutes a "search" for purposes of the Fourth Amendment was effectively merged with what had been a procedural question of "standing" to challenge such a search. It became a matter, not only of whether some "reasonable," "justifiable" or "legitimate expectation of privacy" in a particular place exists, which has been breached by governmental action, Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740, 99 S.Ct. 2577, 2580, 61 L.Ed.2d 220, 226 (1979), but also of who reasonably, justifiably or legitimately harbored that expectation. The litmus for determining existence of a legitimate expectation of privacy as to a particular accused is twofold: first, did he exhibit by his conduct "an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy^]" and second, if he did, was that subjective expectation "one that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable.' " Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. at 740, 99 S.Ct. at 2580, 61 L.Ed.2d at 226-27.
Chapa, 729 S.W.2d at 727. The United States Supreme Court in Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 99 S.Ct. 2577, 61 L.Ed.2d 220 (1979), explained the first inquiry in Rakas as whether "the individual has shown that 'he seeks to preserve [something] as private.' " Smith, 442 U.S. at 739, 99 S.Ct. at 2580. The Smith court explained the second inquiry in Rakas as whether "the individual's expectation, viewed objectively, is 'justifiable' under the circumstances." Smith, 442 U.S. at 739, 99 S.Ct. at 2580.
Here, appellee owned the house at 805 Sundance Street, and he and his wife, Kimberly, lived there. The Oldsmobile, which was registered to Kimberly, was parked in the house's driveway at the time the search warrant was executed. The suspected marihuana was in a cooler which was inside the Oldsmobile's trunk. Appellee had, under Texas community property laws, a pos-sessory right of use and control of his wife's Oldsmobile. This right of possession, combined with the fact that the suspected marihuana was found in a cooler inside the Oldsmobile's trunk, showed that appellee sought to preserve the suspected marihuana as private and that his expectations, viewed objectively, were justifiable under the circumstances. The State argues that appellee lacks standing because, according to Officer Turner's hearsay statement, appellee said that the Oldsmobile belonged to his wife and that any marihuana found inside of it belonged to her. However, in Chapa, supra, the Court of Criminal Appeals stated that an accused's failure to assert ownership in contraband is relevant to a challenge of its seizure, but when, as in this case, the accused challenges the search, of which the contraband was a fruit, so long as he establishes a reasonable expectation of privacy in the area searched, he has shown standing. Chapa, 729 S.W.2d at 725-26 n. 1. We hold that appellee established a reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of the 1.25 gallon cooler, and, therefore, has standing to challenge the search of his wife's Oldsmobile. Point one is overruled.
By point two, the State complains that the trial court erred in sustaining ap-pellee's motion to suppress the evidence found in the Oldsmobile because the search was conducted pursuant to a valid search warrant. In State v. Barnett, 788 S.W.2d 572 (Tex.Crim.App.1990), the affidavit and warrant were essentially the same as those in this case. In Barnett, a person not named in the affidavit or warrant drove his vehicle to the residence in question while the search warrant was being executed and a search of his vehicle revealed contraband. In determining that the warrant did not authorize the search in question, the Court stated "that the presence of an automobile on suspected premises, without more, does not give rise to search that automobile." Barnett, 788 S.W.2d at 575.
The place named in the search warrant affidavit was "[a] single story brownish colored brick residence located at 805 Sun-dance, Victoria, Texas . and any and all outhouses, edifices, structures, openings, enclosures, curtilage and vehicles at said suspected place." The affiant's probable cause was that a confidential informant told him that marihuana was being sold from "the suspected place." In his testimony at the hearing on the motion to suppress the officer's only testimony concerning the information relating to the informer's information was that "marijuana was being dealt out of that residence." While the evidence concerning whether the officers set up their surveillance of the residence before or after obtaining the warrant was conflicting, there was no question that they had the premises under surveillance between an hour and an hour and one-half after obtaining the warrant, and there were no vehicles at the residence until only a few minutes before the warrant was executed. There was also no question but that the officers did not see the vehicle in question arrive at the premises nor did they see anyone get into or exit the vehicle. The evidence also showed that at the time the officers searched the vehicle they had no information about its ownership. The officer testified that he determined the ownership of the vehicle "at a later date." The State's second point is overruled. Because we find Barnett controlling, we affirm the trial court's order.
NYE, C.J., dissenting.
FEDERICO G. HINOJOSA, Jr., J., not participating.
. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).
. Appellee's standing was raised during the hearing on the motion to suppress. While ap-pellee's counsel had Officer Turner on direct examination, counsel requested the State to stipulate to standing. The State replied that it would not.