Case Name: STATE of Louisiana v. Sammie L. ADDISON & Demetrius Addison
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1996-11-13
Citations: 684 So. 2d 477
Docket Number: No. 94-KA-1423
Parties: STATE of Louisiana v. Sammie L. ADDISON & Demetrius Addison.
Judges: Byrnes, J., dissented in part 'with reasons.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 684
Pages: 477–488

Head Matter:
STATE of Louisiana v. Sammie L. ADDISON & Demetrius Addison.
No. 94-KA-1423.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fourth Circuit.
Nov. 13, 1996.
Byrnes, J., dissented in part 'with reasons.
Harry Connick, District Attorney and Mark D. Pethke, Assistant District Attorney, New Orleans, for the State of Louisiana.
Donald 0. Pinkston, New Orleans, for Defendants.
Before BARRY, BYRNES and MURRAY, JJ.

Opinion:
11 MURRAY, Judge.
Sammie Addison appeals his conviction for attempted possession with intent to distrib- • ute cocaine, and his brother, Demetrius Addison, appeals his conviction for possession with intent to distribute cocaine. The latter defendant also appeals his adjudication under the multiple offender statute. For the reasons which follow, we affirm the convictions but vacate the multiple offender adjudications, and remand for further proceedings.
FACTS
On the evening of June 4, 1992, uniformed New Orleans Police officers Wilbert Williams and James B. Adams were on routine patrol in a marked car when they observed a dark-colored Cadillac with four occupants disregard a stop sign. With blue lights flashing, the officers pulled along the side of the Cadillac to stop it and observed the driver, Sammie Addison, throw something down to the |2floor. Sammie Addison was ordered out of the car, which was stopped beneath a street light. As the officers walked towards the vehicle, which was lit by the interior lights from Mr. Addison's open door, they looked inside for weapons. Bags of crack cocaine were clearly visible on the floorboard by the driver's seat, between the legs of the passenger on the left rear, Demetrius Addison, and a large rock of cocaine was seen between the legs of a juvenile seated in the right rear of the vehicle. The bag near Sammie Addison, the driver, contained fifty-nine rocks of cocaine, while the other bag between Demetrius Addison's legs contained thirty-four rocks of cocaine.
Both Sammie and Demetrius Addison testified that the cocaine all belonged to Demetrius and the juvenile and that Sammie was just giving them a ride and knew nothing about it. Demetrius Addison admitted that he possessed the cocaine and that his intent was to sell it.
SAMMIE ADDISON'S PRO SE ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
Assignments one and two
Sammie Addison asserts that the trial court erred in its failure to advise the defendants of the dangers of joint representation and its failure to ascertain that the defendants understood that a conflict could arise during the trial. Generally, a criminal defendant who raises the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel based on joint representation of co-defendants prior to trial is entitled to automatic reversal on a showing of actual conflict of interest; no proof of prejudice is required. Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 98 S.Ct. 1173, 55 L.Ed.2d 426 (1978). However, if the defendant fails to raise the issue until after trial, he must prove prejudice in addition to actual conflict of interest. Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 100 S.Ct. 1708, 64 L.Ed.2d 333 (1980); See State v. Edwards, 430 So.2d 60, 62 (La.1983).
In the present case, there could have been a conflict if each of the Addison brothers accused the other of possessing all of the cocaine. However, both brothers testified that Demetrius and the juvenile were in possession of the cocaine, and that Sammie, the defendant making this claim, did not know that the others had drugs on them. The fact that the trier of fact failed to believe their story is not the fault of the joint representation. In any event, any conflict would have prejudiced Demetrius in this case, as the defense presented clearly was intended to protect Sammie. However, Demetrius would likewise be unable to prove prejudice, as he testified first and admitted every element of the offense. These assignments thus have no merit.
Assignment three
Sammie Addison next contends that the trial court erred in taking testimony on a second count of possession with intent to distribute, on which he was found not guilty, before ruling on the first, thus placing him in double jeopardy. However, the charges were for two separate but similar offenses, both triable by a twelve-person jury. Article 493 of the Code of Criminal Procedure states that "[t]wo or more offenses may be charged in the same indictment or information . if the offenses . are of the same or similar character" and are "triable by the same mode of trial." Therefore, the two charges were properly tried together. The fact that the state put forth the evidence first as to one count and then the other did not make separate trials necessary. Double jeopardy applies when one is tried twice for the same offense, not when two offenses are tried together. This assignment is also without merit.
Assignment four
Sammie Addison also argues that trial counsel was ineffective because he recommended a judge trial, was inexperienced in handling eases of joint representation, was unprepared for trial, and he faded to discuss the issues with the defendants.
Generally, the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel is a matter more properly addressed in an application for post-conviction relief, filed in the trial court where a full evidentiary hearing can be conducted. State v. Prudholm, 446 So.2d 729 (La.1984). Only if the record discloses sufficient evidence to rule on the merits of the claim do the interests of judicial economy justify consideration of the issues on appeal. State v. Seiss, 428 So.2d 444 (La.1983).
In this case, counsel's recommendation of a bench trial falls within the ambit of trial strategy, which does not establish ineffective assistance of counsel. State v. Bienemy, 483 So.2d 1105,1107 (La.App. 4th Cir.1986). The record is insufficient to determine the merit of the other claims on appeal; they may be raised by an application for post-conviction relief.
Assignment five
Sammie Addison next asserts that the trial court erred in admitting evidence seized pursuant to an illegal search. He contends that he got out of the car and walked towards the police officer after the stop, thereby making it unnecessary for the police to look inside the vehicle. However, there was no testimony to that effect at either the hearing on the motion to suppress evidence or at trial. Instead, the evidence shows that Mr. Addison remained near his car as the officers approached him.
IsA law enforcement officer may stop a person in a public place whom he reasonably believes is committing, has committed, or is about to commit an offense. La.Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 215.1. "Reasonable suspicion" for an investigatory stop is something less than the probable cause required for an arrest, and the reviewing court must look to the facts and circumstances of each case to determine whether the detaining officer had sufficient articulable facts within his knowledge to justify an infringement of the suspect's rights. State v. Matthews, 94-2112 (La.App. 4th Cir. 4/26/95), 654 So.2d 868; State v. Vance, 93-1389 (La.App. 4th Cir. 2/25/94), 633 So.2d 819. An officer's past experience, training and common sense may be considered in determining if his inferences from the facts at hand were reasonable. State v. White, 27,188, p. 3 (La.App. 2d Cir. 8/23/95), 660 So.2d 515, 519. Once an individual is stopped, an officer may make a protective search of the suspect for his own safety and the safety of others. La.Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 215.1 B; Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968); State v. Davis, 92-1623, p. 22 (La.5/23/94), 637 So.2d 1012, 1025, cert. denied, Davis v. Louisiana, — U.S. —, 115 S.Ct. 450, 130 L.Ed.2d 359 (1994).
In this case, the officers properly made an investigatory stop after the driver of the vehicle disregarded a stop sign. Because Sammie Addison was seen "fidgeting" and "throwing something down" before the officers approached the car, in which several others remained, they were justified in looking inside for weapons for their own safety. Additionally, the officers lawfully seized the cocaine pursuant to the "plain view" exception to the warrant requirement:
For evidence to be seized under [the plain view] exception, "(1) there must be a prior justification for the intrusion into a protected area; (2) in the course of which the evidence is inadvertently [sic] discovered; and (3) where it is immediately apparently [sic] without close | ¡inspection that. the items are evidence or contraband." State v. Hernandez, 410 So.2d 1381, 1383 (La. 1982). See also State v. Taylor, 531 So.2d 1137 (La.App. 4th Cir.1988). In Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 110 S.Ct. 2301, 110 L.Ed.2d 112 (1990), the Court held that evidence found in plain view need not have been found "inadvertently" in order to fall within this exception to the warrant . requirement, although in most cases evidence seized pursuant to this exception will have been discovered inadvertently.
State v. Tate, 623 So.2d 908, 917 (La.App. 4th Cir.), writs denied, 629 So.2d 1126, 1140 (La. 1993). Therefore, this assignment of error has no merit.
Assignment six
Sammie Addison finally contends that the state failed to produce the initial police report to defense counsel before trial, despite counsel's request. The record is insufficient to consider this claim on appeal. If Mr. Addison's attorney requested the report and it was not furnished, counsel may have waived production if he failed to object prior to trial. Additionally, unless the report contained evidence favorable to the defense, or there were material differences in the testimony of state witnesses and the report, there would be no prejudice. Like the claim for ineffective assistance of counsel, this claim may be raised by a post-conviction application so that there can be a full evidentiary hearing on the issue.
DEMETRIUS ADDISON'S PRO SE ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
Assignment one
Demetrius Addison asserts first that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction. The standard for reviewing a claim of insufficient evidence is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecutor, a rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); State v. Rosiere, 488 So.2d 965 (La.1986).
|7In the present case, Demetrius Addison testified and admitted that the cocaine was his and that he had it for the purpose of selling it. Moreover, the officers testified that he was found with thirty-four rocks of crack cocaine between his legs, from which intent to distribute could be inferred. The essential elements of the offense were estab lished beyond a reasonable doubt, and this assignment is thus without merit.
Assignment two
Demetrius Addison next argues that the trial court erred in permitting a waiver of a jury trial without advising the defendants of their right to a jury trial. The record indicates that each defendant was separately questioned as to the waiver of the right to a jury trial. In addition, Mr. Addison admits that counsel advised that he waive this right and that he accepted the advice of his attorney. Therefore, this defendant's claim.that he did not know he had a right to trial by jury is without merit.
Assignment three
Demetrius Addison submits that the trial court erred in its failure to fully advise the defendants of their rights at the multiple bill hearing. We also review this issue with respect to Sammie Addison.
Because the multiple bill hearing is not a trial of a substantive offense, a guilty plea to a multiple bill is not the equivalent of a guilty plea to a criminal offense where the defendant must be read his Boykin rights. The multiple offender statute, La.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 15:529.1, mandates that a defendant be advised of his right to a formal hearing at which the state must prove its case for the multiple offender status. Implicit in this requirement is the additional requirement that the defendant be advised of his constitutional right to remain silent. State v. Johnson, 432 So.2d 815, 817 (La.1983); State v. Desmond, 524 So.2d 147 (La.App. 4th Cir.1988). Although § 15:529.1 D(3) has been amended numerous times since Desmond, there has been no alteration in this substantive requirement. See, e.g., State v. Holmes, 95-0208 (La.App. 4th Cir. 2/29/96), 670 So.2d 573; State v. Winborn, 604 So.2d 177 (La. App. 4th Cir.1992); State v. Noel, 585 So.2d 652 (La.App. 4th Cir.1991); State v. Causey, 533 So.2d 1050 (La.App. 4th Cir.1988); and cases cited therein.
In the present case, the state filed certified copies of the prior convictions in the record, and the court advised both defendants that the state had the burden of proving they were the same individuals who had been convicted of those offenses and that the five-year cleansing period had not elapsed. The court also advised them that a guilty plea relieved the state of proving these elements, and of their right to counsel. However, the transcript of the multiple offender proceeding establishes that the trial court did not advise either Sammie or Demetrius Addison of the right to remain silent.
Although evidence of the prior convictions was presented, proof that the accused is the same person previously convicted is a separate element of the habitual offender adjudication. This was made clear in State v. Brown, 514 So.2d 99, 106 (La.1987), cert. denied, Brown v. Louisiana, 486 U.S. 1017, 108 S.Ct. 1754, 100 L.Ed.2d 216 (1988): 'While it is permissible for the state to introduce | gcertified copies of court records evidencing prior convictions, we have determined that § 15:529.1 requires independent proof that the defendant was the same person identified in the records."
Other than the guilty pleas, nothing was presented in this case to link either defendant to the convictions evidenced by the certified copies. Thus, the trial court's failure to advise the defendants of their right to remain silent prior to acceptance of their guilty pleas requires that the multiple offender adjudications be vacated and the matter remanded.
Demetrius Addison's final assignment of error, that he was given a constitutionally excessive sentence, is pretermitted.
ERRORS PATENT REVIEW/COUNSEL'S MOTION TO WITHDRAW
Appellate counsel filed an errors patent brief and a motion to -withdraw from his representation of these defendants.
This Court has performed an independent, thorough review of all the pleadings filed in the district court, all minute entries of the district court proceedings, the bill of information and all transcripts contained in the appeal record. The defendants were property-charged by bill of information with violations of La.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 40:967(B)(1), and the bill was signed by an assistant district attorney. Defendant Demetrius Addison was present and represented by counsel at arraignment, all hearings, trial, and sentencing. Although Sammie Addison was not arraigned, "[a] failure to arraign the defendant . is waived if the defendant enters upon the trial without objecting thereto, and it shall be considered as if he had pleaded not guilty." La.Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 555. This defendant was present and represented at all other stages of the proceedings. The state proved every element of the offenses for which the | ^defendants were eonvieted beyond a reasonable doubt. This court's independent review reveals no non-frivolous issues other than that discussed above, and a review of all transcripts contained in the appellate record reveals no other trial court rulings which arguably support the appeal.
In view of the further proceedings necessitated by our remand, counsel's motion to withdraw is denied.
CONVICTIONS AFFIRMED; MULTIPLE OFFENDER ADJUDICATIONS VACATED; MOTION TO WITHDRAW DENIED; MATTER REMANDED.
BYRNES, J., dissents in part with reasons.
. The requirements that a defendant must be informed of rights prior to a guilty plea or an admission of identity to a multiple bill are provided by La.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 15:529.1., and appellate review must assess compliance with the statutory requirements. However, the Supreme Court did not state in Johnson whether adequate compliance is sufficient or whether the rights had to be recited in a specific manner. On post-conviction relief, the reviewing court must only determine whether the multiple bill proceeding was so fundamentally unfair as to constitute a deprivation of due process so that it is unconstitutional. State v. Harris, 95-0900 (La.5/19/95), 654 So.2d 680; State v. Firmin, 522 So.2d 1181 (La.App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 532 So.2d 759 (La.1988); State v. Covington, 522 So.2d 1168 (La.App. 4th Cir.1988).