Case Name: PALATINE INS. CO., LIMITED, OF LONDON, ENGLAND, v. PETROVICH
Court: Texas Courts of Civil Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1917-03-26
Citations: 235 S.W. 929
Docket Number: No. 7338
Parties: PALATINE INS. CO., LIMITED, OF LONDON, ENGLAND, v. PETROVICH.
Judges: 
Reporter: South Western Reporter
Volume: 235
Pages: 929–938

Head Matter:
PALATINE INS. CO., LIMITED, OF LONDON, ENGLAND, v. PETROVICH.
(No. 7338.)
(Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. Galveston.
March 26, 1917.
Rehearing Denied Oct. 24, 1921.
Dissenting Opinion Nov. 23, 1921.)
1. Insurance <@=»423 — Tornado policy held not to cover loss caused partly by water.
A tornado insurance policy, which expressly exempted the company against loss occasioned directly or indirectly through tidal wave, high water, or overflow, insures the property against damage by wind alone, and not against damage occasioned partly by wind and partly by high water.
On Motion for Rehearing.
2. Insurance <®=»665(4) —Evidence held not to sustain -finding destruction of house was caused by wind.
In an action on a tornado insurance policy, evidence which showed that the house insured collapsed only after the water had risen several feet above its floor held to show that the loss of the house was not occasioned by wind alone.
3. Appeal and error <©=>1010 (f) — Finding is erroneous, if’ contrary to the only reasonable conclusion.
On review of the trial court’s findings of fact, the question is, not whether some testimony could be culled from the record which might support the finding, or whether the finding was so against the weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be clearly wrong, but whether, considering the entire body of evidence as a whole, a conclusion could be reasonably drawn from it which would support the finding.
Pleasants, C. J., dissenting.
Error from Galveston County Court; Geo. E. Mann, Judge.
Action by Steve Petrovich against the Palatine Insurance Company, Limited, of London, England. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant brings error.
Reversed, and judgment rendered for defendant.
Williams & Neethe, of Galveston, and Locke & Locke, of Dallas, for plaintiff in error.
McDonald & Wayman. and O. G. Dibrell, all of Galveston, for defendant in error."

Opinion:
GRAVES, J.
This was a suit to recover on a tornado policy for the alleged destruction in the storm of August, 1915, at Galveston, of a building occupied by the plaintiff as a dwelling. The company defended on the ground that the loss or damage resulted from causes excepted from the policy, which provided that the company should not be liable for any loss or damage occasioned directly or indirectly by any tidal wave, high water, overflow, or cloudburst,. or for any loss or damage caused by water or rain, whether driven by wind or not, unless the building insured should first sustain an actual damage to the roof or walls of same by the direct force of the wind, and that the company should then be liable only for such damage to the interior as might be caused by water or rain entering through openings first made by the direct action of the wind.
The case was tried before the court, and resulted in a judgment for the plaintiff for $1,000, the amount of the policy, with interest from date of judgment, and costs of suit. The defendant filed a motion for new trial, which having been overruled, this writ of error was properly sued out, and assignments of error duly filed.
The court, at the request of the defendant, filed findings of fact and conclusions of law; the material ones, for the purposes of this opinion, being as follows:
"(b) While said policy was in full force and effect, on the 16th and 17th days of August, A. D. 1915, as a direct result of a tornado, windstorm, and cyclone of terrifio violence, the insured property was totally demolished, destroyed, blown away, and was a total loss to plaintiff."
"(d) • I specially find'that'east wall of the house was blown out at time wind reached its highest velocity, and immediately after this wall was blown out the rest of the house went to pieces in the hurricane and by it."
"(f) The loss and damage suffered by plaintiff does not come within any of the exceptions in the 'policy relieving defendant from liability; and in this connection I find that the loss and damage was not due directly or indirectly to high water or a tidal wave." |
The promise of the company, as printed on the face of the policy, is, so far as material, as follows:
"The Palatine Insurance Company, Limited, of London, England, does insure Steve Petrovich against all direct loss or damage by tornado, windstorm, or cyclone, except as hereinafter provided, to an amount not exceeding one thousand dollars to the following described property. The policy -is made and accepted . * subject to the following stipulations and conditions printed on back hereof, which are hereby specially referred to and made a part of this policy."
On the back of the policy are provisions as follows:
"This company shall not be liable for any loss or damage caused by hail, whether driven by wind or not. nor for loss or damage occasioned directly or indirectly by or through any tidal wave, high water, overflow, cloudburst. This company shall not be liable for any loss or damage caused by water or rain, whether driven by wind or not, unless the building insured, or containing the property insured, shall first sustain an actual damage to the roof or walls of same by the direct force of the wind, and shall then bo liable only for such damage to the interior of the building or the insured property therein as may bo caused by water or rain entering the building through openings in the roof or walls made by the direct action of the wind."
The exception referred to in the last paragraph in the preceding quotation from the policy is inapplicable. The suit in the present case was not for damage to the interior of the insured dwelling, but for the total loss of the same; the whole structure having been demolished, and the ground left bare.
There are only two assignments presented; the first challenging the correctness of the trial court's judgment on the ground that the loss sustained was not covered by the terms and provisions of the policy, but was expressly excepted out of them, and the second on the ground that the evidence was insufficient to support the court's finding that the destruction of the property, and the consequent loss, was caused by the direct action of the wind alone, and was not caused or occasioned directly or indirectly by high water or a tidal wave.
We think the contentions under both assignments must be upheld, and that the policy by its terms was essentially and plainly a wind damage policy. In making the contract with the insured therein contained it was very evidently intended by the insurance company not to insure him against the very kind of a loss he here sustained;_ that is, one caused either directly or indirectly by water.
Without refining upon the degree of causation by the high water necessary, we think it is sufficient to say that, to our minds, it is quite clear that the water was at least a contributing cause of the loss suffered, and that is enough, under our interpretation of the contract of insurance as made, to bring it within the exceptions. The obligation, as undertaken by the insurance company, was not a divisible one, under which it might be held liable for any part of the loss or damage shown to have been proximately caused by or through the high water, although the other part was due to the direct action of the wind alone. If such had been the legal effect of the contract, it would have been necessary for the court and jury to distinguish between these two recoverable elements of damage, and, however difficult it may have proven, to both find and apportion to each its proper and proportionate amount of the actual loss. Warmcastie v. Scottish U. & N. Ins. Co., 201 Pa. 302, 50 Atl. 941.
But the contract here does not so read. It is an insurance against wind alone, and not against loss occasioned partly by wind and partly by high water. The physical conditions surrounding the property at the time, which both parties must be held to have had in contemplation in making the contract, leave no doubt of their intention to except from the policy just such a loss as the present one.
Galveston Island, on which the insured building stood, has no lakes, streams, or rivulets. The building itself was on dry land, several feet above the sea level, and entirely secure, save in extraordinary winds, from water damage. The exceptions in this wind damage policy could have had reference only to the water damage occurring during, or as a result of, such extraordinary winds. Without further discussion, we quote with approval, as applying the principle ruling our stated conclusion in this case, from the opinion in National Fire Ins. Co. v. Crutchfield, 160 Ky. 802, 170 S. W. 187, L. R. A. 1915B, 1094, by the Kentucky Court of Appeals, involving the construction of a tornado policy practically identical in its provisions with those of the policy here, as follows:
"It is therefore perfectly apparent that neither the wind, acting independently of the flood, nor the action of the flood, apart from the high wind, would have caused the damage, and the question is: Under the terms of the contract above quoted, were the appellants liable? The contract was to insure appellee 'against all direct loss or damage by tornado, windstorm, or cyclone' except 'for loss or damage occasioned directly or indirectly by or through high water [or] overflow.' Can it be said, under the facts of this case, that the injury was not at least indirectly occasioned by the high water? The evidence is conclusive that, except for the existence of the flood at the time of the windstorm, there would have been no damage.- Neither of these agencies, independent of the other, would have produced the damage. The plaintiffs were insured against loss by one of them, and not from loss by the other." National Fire Ins. Co. v. Crutchfield, 160 Ky. 802, 170 S. W. 187, L. R. A. 1917B, 1094; Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Nelson, 64 Kan. 115, 67 Pac. 440; Warmcastie v. Scottish U. & N. Ins. Co., 201 Pa. 302, 50 Atl. 941; Maryland Casualty Co. v. Finch (U. S. C. C. A., 8th Ct.) 147 Fed. 388, 77 C. C. A. 566, 8 L. R. A. (N. S.) 308; Stover v. Insurance Co., 3 Phila. (Pa.) 38; Beakes v. Insurance Co., 143 N. Y. 402, 38 N. E. 453, 26 L. R. A. 267; Holmes v. Insurance Co., 98 Fed. 240, 39 C. C. A. 45, 47 L. R. A. 308.
With the policy construed, as we have thus concluded it must be, we think the further conclusion is irresistible from the evidence that the loss was, within the meaning of these exceptions, occasioned directly or indirectly by or through the high water. It is deemed unnecessary to detail the evidence, or to do more than state its salient and controlling features, as follows:
The defendant in error's house was located at 5410 K street in the city of Galveston. The section of the city in which the house stood had originally been a low, wet, marshy section, with a slough running through it. Some three or four years before the August, 1915, storm, this section.had been filled in' by pumping sand into the low area and erecting or building up what is commonly known as "made" ground. The ground on which defendant in error's house stood was between 4 and 8 feet above sea level. The house stood on a 25-foot lot, and it had a width of 24 feet and a length of 38 feet. The house had four rooms and a hall, with a small porch built in under the roof on the southeast corner of the house. K street extends east and west, and defendant in error's house stood on the north side of this street, facing south. The house had as a foundation No. 6x6 posts, and stood from 6 to 8 feet oft" the ground. It was braced by "tongue and groove" baseboards, which formed a basement under the house without openings, save doors at the front and rear. The floor of the house had an elevation of 6 to 8 feet above the ground. It is not disclosed by the evidence whether the posts went down into the ground or sat on top of the ground. The sea wall ended at Fifty-First street, according to the testimony of one witness, and at Fifty-Third street, according to the testimony of another.
There was but one eyewitness to the destruction of the house, J. Jernigan, who lived next door, but who spent the night in the house in question, was in it throughout the storm and until it collapsed, and he was thrown into the water. During the storm, the water first came southward from the bay, filling all low places, surrounding the house, and flowing by with an ever-increasing velocity. The witness Jernigan described it as of such force that it washed away his fence, even before he went over to the plaintiff's house at about 6 or 7 o'clock in the evening. The water then, as nearly as Jernigan could recall, was waist deep on the ground. It continued to rise from that time until the house collapsed at between 1 and 2 o'clock on the following morning. In the meantime it had risen to such a height in the house that Jernigan had to place a large chest on the bed to keep it from floating away, and later this chest began to float with him, and it became necessary for him to swim or wade to the transom, where the water rose as high as his neck. While hanging from the transom, several minutes before the collapse of the house, the house began.to "rock like a cradle," as if it was off its foundation. Jer-nigan had observed from plaintiff's house at earlier hours in the night four or five houses, situated directly across the street from plaintiff's house, drift toward the Gulf in the rising waters. Jernigan estimated the depth of "the water, at the time it reached its highest point, so far as he was able to observe, as 12 feet; but other witnesses put it at only 6 or 7 feet.
When the sun rose upon the waters the next day, not a house for a distance of 200 or 300 yards was left standing. Not one pole of the foundation of defendant in error's house remained. The ground adjoining was washed away to a depth of 4 or 5 feet, and in its place was a big pond of water. Some few of Jernigan's statements were:
"In my opinion, from my observation and the conditions as I saw them there then, this house of Steve Petrovich's would have stood, but for the water. If there had not been any water there, I believe the house would have stood; no water at all, the house would have stood. You might say it was a new house and strong." "I first began to notice the rocking sensation which I have described a few minutes before the house went to pieces; that is, the trembling. The rocking was after I got to the transom, and that was a very few minutes before it went to pieces. I don't know whether. the house was on its foundation at the time I felt the rocking. I don't hardly think it was at the time it was rocking, because the water came up way past my waist." "As to whether there was anything being blown by the wind prior to the destruction of Petrovich's' house, such as signs and other débris, I didn't see any débris. I noticed nothing blown about until the destruction of that house." "As to whether the statement that the wind and water carried this house away was largely a guess on my part; will say it went away, and it had plenty of wind and water both. Yes; it went away when the wind was. at its highest." "If it hadn't been any water on the island, I think the house would have stood the wind,, because other house's stood in lots of places where it was high and dry; old houses, older than it is; houses 20 years old."
The mere opinion of this sole eyewitness, given by him both ways, as to whether it was the wind or the water that caused the destruction of the house sinks into unimportance as against the overwhelming weight of the array of facts he states, showing that it was the combined effect of both elements. Indeed, these facts demonstrate that his seemingly paradoxical opinion was really correct; and this court, after the most painstaking examination of the entire testimony, is compelled to agree with him, and to hold that, under the policy -as we have construed it, reasonable minds could have reached no other conclusion.
From these conclusions, it necessarily fol- lows that the judgment of the trial court must be reversed, and judgment here rendered for plaintiff in error; and it is so ordered. Railway Co. v. Rowell, 45 S. W. 763; Railway Co. v. Holland, 27 Tex. Civ. App. 397, 66 S. W. 68; Railway Co. v. Lee, 32 Tex. Civ. App. 23, 74 S. W. .345: Cart wright v. Canode, 106 Tex. 502, 171 S. W. 696; Flynn v. Radford Co., 174 S. W. 902; Gonzales v. Adoue, 56 S. W. 543-548; Choate v. Railway Co., 90 Tex. 82, 30 S. W. 247, 37 S. W. 319; Lumber Co. v. Railway Co., 164 S. W. 402; B. Ass'n v. Wolfshohl, 155 S. W. 644, bottom of page 647; Railway Co. v. Moses, 144 S. W. 1037; Flores v. Railway Co., 24 Tex. Civ. App. 328, 66 S. W. 709.
The case has been admirably briefed and presented upon both sides, and expression of appreciation is here made to counsel.
Reversed and rendered.