Case Name: People of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Sotirios T. Manikas, Defendant-Appellant
Court: Illinois Appellate Court
Jurisdiction: Illinois
Decision Date: 1969-02-25
Citations: 106 Ill. App. 2d 315
Docket Number: Gen. No. 68-87
Parties: People of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Sotirios T. Manikas, Defendant-Appellant.
Judges: ABRAHAMSON, P. J. and SEIDENFELD, J., concur.
Reporter: Illinois Appellate Court Reports, Second Series
Volume: 106
Pages: 315–329

Head Matter:
People of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Sotirios T. Manikas, Defendant-Appellant.
Gen. No. 68-87.
Second District.
February 25, 1969.
Rehearing denied and supplemental opinion April 1, 1969.
Klein, Thorpe, Kasson and Jenkins, of Chicago (Constance Kasson, of counsel), for appellant.
William V. Hopf, State’s Attorney of Du Page County, of Wheaton, and J. Michael Fitzsimmons, Jr., Assistant State’s Attorney, for appellee.

Opinion:
MR. JUSTICE DAVIS
delivered the opinion of the court.
The defendant, who was charged with having committed the offense of driving while his operator's license was revoked, in violation of section 6-303 of the Illinois Motor Vehicle Act (Ill Rev Stats 1965, c 95½, par 6-303), waived his right to trial by jury, was tried by the court, found guilty and sentenced to ten days in the county jail, with credit for three days, considered as served. He appealed from this judgment.
He was arrested on the East-West Tollway in Du Page County and was issued a traffic ticket and complaint charging him with the violation of section 6-119 (d) of the Act (Ill Rev Stats 1965, c 95½, par 6-119 (d)) in that he was driving in violation of the restrictions imposed by his restricted driver's permit. One week later, the arresting officer filed the complaint under which the defendant was tried and sentenced, and thereafter, the complaint, charging a violation of section 6-119 (d) of the Act, was dismissed.
At the trial, the People offered, and the court admitted in evidence, a certificate of the Secretary of State (herein called Secretary) which set forth the defendant's record with reference to the status of his operator's license. It reflected that his license had been revoked on August 5, 1965; that a restricted driver's permit was issued to him on October 6, 1965, to expire October 6, 1966; that the Secretary received a report of the defendant's conviction of a motor vehicle violation, and on December 20, 1965, extended the revocation of the defendant's operator's license until August 5, 1967; and that the defendant did not have a valid operator's license on the date of said certificate: August 23, 1966. The arresting officer testified on behalf of the People.
The defendant did not testify, but did offer—and the court received in evidence—a copy of his restricted driving permit which carried an expiration date of October 6, 1966. It reflected that the restrictions permitted the defendant to operate his car between the hours of 9:00 a. m. and 1:00 p. m., and 5:00 p. m. and 9:00 p. m., Monday through Saturday of each week, within the Chicago area, for his transportation while performing his duties as an insurance salesman.
It was 10:25 p. m., on August 6, 1966, when the defendant was arrested. He had visited his father in Aurora and, at the time of his arrest, was en route to Chicago. It would, thus, appear that he was then and there in violation of both the time and place restrictions specified in his driving permit.
Upon appeal, the defendant contends that his conviction for driving while his operator's license was revoked is not authorized by section 6-303 of the Act since that section exempts from its provisions, any person who is allowed to drive by a restricted driving permit; that the complaint under which he was convicted failed to set forth the nature and elements of the offense of driving in violation of the restrictions which were imposed; and that the court erred in admitting into evidence the said Secretary's certificate.
The People contend that the issuance of a restricted driving permit to a person whose operator's license has been revoked, suspends the terms of such revocation only during the times and under the circumstances specified in the restricted permit; and that at all other times, the revocation is in full force and effect.
Section 6-303 of the Illinois Motor Vehicle Act provides that any person who drives a motor vehicle on any highway of this State at a time when his operator's license is revoked as provided under the Act, except as may be allowed by a restricted driving permit issued under this Act, shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than seven days nor more than one year and there may be imposed in addition a fine of not more than $1,000.
Section 1-157 of the Act defines the terms, "Revocation of operator's . . . license" as follows:
"The termination by formal action of the Secretary of a person's license . to operate a motor vehicle on the public highways, which termination shall not be subject to renewal or restoration except that an application for a new license may be presented and acted upon by the Secretary after the expiration of at least one year after the date of revocation."
Section 6-208 (b) of the Act states that once an operator's license has been revoked, he is not entitled to have it renewed or restored, but rather, he may apply to the Secretary for a new license, after the expiration of at least one year from the date of revocation.
Section 6-205 of the Act provides for the mandatory revocation of an operator's license upon the Secretary receiving a report of the operator's conviction of the offenses therein listed. And, section 6-206 thereof provides for the discretionary revocation by the Secretary, of an operator's license under the circumstances therein enumerated. Each of said sections authorizes the Secretary to issue a driving permit to a person whose operator's license has been revoked, which will grant to him the privilege of driving his car between his residence and place of employment or other proper limits, in order to prevent undue hardship; and each section provides:
"A restricted driving permit issued hereunder shall be subject to cancellation, revocation and suspension by the Secretary of State in like manner and for like cause as an operator's or chauffeur's license issued hereunder may be cancelled, revoked or suspended; except that a conviction upon one or more offenses against laws or ordinances regulating the movement of traffic shall be deemed sufficient cause for the revocation or suspension of a restricted driving permit."
Under the provisions of section 6-210 of the Act, any person whose operator's license has been revoked shall not drive a motor vehicle on a public highway in Illinois after such revocation, until an operator's license has been obtained as permitted under the Act, except as permitted by a restricted driver's permit issued under the provisions of section 6-205 (a).
It is apparent from these provisions, when read together, that it was the intention of the legislature that there should be no automatic restoration of an operator's license after the one-year period of its revocation, or after such revocation as extended; and that the issuance of a restricted driving permit to a person whose operator's license has been revoked, does not ipso facto restore or renew the operator's license which has been revoked, but rather, such driver's permit authorizes the licensee to drive a car upon the highways of the State, subject to the restrictions provided therein, and not otherwise. A driver's permit is not an operator's license, rather, it is a special type of permit issued to a driver whose operator's license has been revoked, in order that he may drive his car subject to the restrictions specified and thereby avoid the undue hardship which would otherwise be imposed upon him and his family. If the restricted driver violates the restrictions specified in the permit, the permit may be revoked by the Secretary.
In the light of these statutory provisions, we believe it was the obvious intent of the legislature that a driver—whose operator's license has been revoked and to whom a restricted driving permit has been issued— who drives in violation of the restrictions imposed by the permit, is guilty of the offense of driving while his operator's license is revoked. We find no ambiguity in this legislation.
The defendant's operator's license was revoked. He was granted a restricted driving permit to alleviate a hardship situation. He was permitted to drive in accordance with the restrictions of his permit. Under the provisions of section 6-303 of the Act, any person who drives a motor vehicle on the public highways while his operator's license is revoked except as may be allowed by a restricted driving permit, shall be punished as provided therein.
Section 6-119 of the Act authorizes the Secretary, for good cause shown, to impose restrictions suitable to the licensee's driving ability, with respect to the type of, or special mechanical control device required on, a motor vehicle which the licensee may operate, or such other restrictions applicable to the licensee as the Secretary may determine to be appropriate to assure safe operation of the vehicle by the licensee. The defendant in the case at bar was not under a restriction with reference to any mechanical control which was applicable to him by virtue of some physical handicap. Consequently, section 6-119 had no application or pertinency in the case at bar.
The defendant also urges that the complaint against him failed to set forth the nature and elements of the offense with which he was charged. It read,
"that at or about the hour of 10:25 P. M. on or about the 9th day of August A. D. 1966 in said County and State Sotirios T. Manikas hereinafter called the defendant committed the offense of driving while license revoked in violation of Section 6-303 of Chapter 95% of the Illinois Revised Statutes of said State, in this, to wit; That the said defend ant operated a motor vehicle, to-wit; a 1966 Chevrolet bearing 1966 Illinois motor vehicle registration number PD2497, along and upon the East-West Tollway at or near milepost 11%; that at said time and place defendant was operating a motor vehicle while his operator's license was revoked."
The defendant was not charged with the violation of the restrictions of his driving permit; he was charged with operating a motor vehicle while his operator's license was revoked. At no time did he file a motion for a bill of particulars pursuant to section 114-2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Ill Rev Stats 1965, c 38, par 114—2).
We are of the opinion that the complaint was sufficiently specific to inform the defendant of the nature of the charge that he was called upon to defend, and that the record of his conviction is a bar to a subsequent prosecution for the same offense. See: People v. Crockett, 41 Ill2d 226, 242 NE2d 235, 236, 237 (1968); People v. White, 24 Ill App2d 324, 329-332 incl., 164 NE2d 823 (1960).
The defendant also urges that the trial court erred in admitting into evidence, on behalf of the People, the certificate of the Secretary relative to the status of his operator's license. Duly authenticated or certified copies, or transcripts of public records, are admissible in evidence whenever the originals thereof would be admissible. People v. White, supra, 333.
Section 6-123 of the Act provides that "The Secretary of State shall maintain appropriate records of all licenses and permits refused, cancelled, revoked or suspended and of the revocation and suspension of driving privileges of persons . . . ." Section 6-124 provides that the Secretary may furnish, upon request, an abstract of a driver's record.
A certified copy of these records of the Secretary, maintained pursuant to statutory mandate, under his signature and seal, are admissible in evidence. Thus, the trial court properly admitted into evidence the Secretary's certificate relative to the status of the defendant's operator's license. People v. White, supra, 333.
Section 6-303 of the Act was amended in 1967 by adding thereto a provision that "an abstract issued by the Secretary of State pursuant to section 6-124 . on request of a law enforcement agency, for the record of a named person as to the status of his motor vehicle operator's license shall be prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated . . . ."
In Lubezny v. Ball, 389 Ill 263, 59 NE2d 645 (1945), at page 266 the court stated:
"In ascertaining the meaning and intent of the General Assembly in the construction of statutes, where no specific provision appears to aid such construction, recourse may be had to the language of subsequent acts of the same lawmaking body."
If any question ever existed as to the propriety of admitting the Secretary's certificate in evidence, it was removed by the amendment to section 6-303.
The defendant offered no rebuttal evidence to the record of the Secretary. He did not attempt to prove that he was driving in accord with the restrictions contained in his restricted driving permit. The evidence was sufficient to prove the identity of the defendant, establish the corpus delicti, and to prove that the defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
On review, we will not disturb the judgment finding the defendant guilty on the basis that the evidence is not sufficient to convict, unless the evidence is so palpably contrary to the judgment, or unreasonable, improbable or unsatisfactory as to justify entertaining doubt as to the defendant's guilt. Such doubt does not exist in the case at bar. Consequently, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
ABRAHAMSON, P. J. and SEIDENFELD, J., concur.