Case Name: MARK R. KRZYKALSKI AND MICHELE KRZYKALSKI, PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS, v. DAVID T. TINDALL, DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT
Court: New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New Jersey
Decision Date: 2016-12-05
Citations: 448 N.J. Super. 1
Docket Number: 
Parties: MARK R. KRZYKALSKI AND MICHELE KRZYKALSKI, PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS, v. DAVID T. TINDALL, DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT.
Judges: Before Judges Fisher, Leone and Vernoia (Judge Leone concurring).
Reporter: New Jersey Superior Court Reports
Volume: 448
Pages: 1–17

Head Matter:
150 A.3d 1
MARK R. KRZYKALSKI AND MICHELE KRZYKALSKI, PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS, v. DAVID T. TINDALL, DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT.
Superior Court of New Jersey Appellate Division
Submitted September 13, 2016
Decided December 5, 2016
Before Judges Fisher, Leone and Vernoia (Judge Leone concurring).
Law Offices of Robert F. Rwpinski, attorneys for appellant Michele Krzykalski (Robert F. Rwpinski, on the brief).
Andres & Berger, P.C., attorneys for appellant Mark R. Krzy-kalski (Kenneth G. Andres, Jr., of counsel; Abraham Tran, on the brief).
Parker Young & Antinoff, attorneys for respondent (Brad A. Parker, on the brief).

Opinion:
The opinion of the court was delivered by
FISHER, P.J.A.D.
Plaintiff Mark R. Krzykalski commenced this action, alleging the negligence of both defendant David T. Tindall and a John Doe in the operation of their vehicles that caused an accident in which he was injured. In their separate appeals, which we consolidated, plaintiff and his ex-wife, Michele, argue the jury's award of damages was against the weight of the evidence and constituted a miscarriage of justice; plaintiff also contends, among other things, that the judge erred in allowing the jury to apportion liability between defendant and the fictitiously-named John Doe. We find no merit in their arguments and affirm.
The auto accident in question occurred on October 24, 2009, at the intersection of Hornberger Avenue and Route 130 in Florence Township. Plaintiffs vehicle was in front of and in the same lane as Tindall's vehicle on northbound Route 130; both had slowed to allow an emergency vehicle enter onto Route 130 from Hornber-ger Avenue. Once their vehicles began to move forward, a vehicle driven by the fictitious John Doe passed them from the right lane of the northbound Route 130 lanes and crossed their lane to make a left turn onto Hornberger Avenue. Both plaintiff and Tindall braked as a result of Doe's actions. Plaintiff was able to stop without striking the vehicle in front of him; Tindall's vehicle struck the rear of plaintiffs vehicle.
By way of pre-verdict motions, the judge denied plaintiff a directed verdict on liability against Tindall and also rejected plaintiffs request that Doe's negligence, or the apportionment of liability between Tindall and Doe, be kept from the jury. The jury found both Tindall and Doe negligent, and found Tindall three percent and Doe ninety-seven percent responsible for plaintiffs injuries. Damages were awarded in plaintiffs favor in the amount of $107,890 ; no damages were awarded to Michele. In molding the verdict, the judge entered judgment in favor of plaintiff and against Tindall in the amount of $8,236.70. Later motions for a new trial or additur were denied.
Both plaintiff and Michele appealed. Plaintiff argues:
I. THE TRIAL COURT REVERSIBLY ERRED BY DENYING PLAINTIFF['S] MOTION FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT ON LIABILITY AS TO DEFENDANT TINDALL, AND THE LIABILITY VERDICT OF 97% AS TO THE PHANTOM JOHN DOE, AND 3% AS TO DEFENDANT TINDALL, WHO REAR-ENDED PLAINTIFF'S STOPPED VEHICLE, IS A MISCARRIAGE OF JUSTICE.
II. THE TRIAL COURT REVERSIBLY ERRED IN PLACING THE PHANTOM "JOHN DOE" ON THE JURY VERDICT SHEET.
III. THE TRIAL COURT REVERSIBLY ERRED IN BARRING PLAIN-TIFFt'S] THOMAS JEFFERSON UNIVERSITY HOSPITAL RECORDS FROM EVIDENCE.
IV. THE TRIAL COURT REVERSIBLY ERRED IN PERMITTING DEFENDANT TO PRESENT TESTIMONY AND ARGUE THAT PLAINTIFF['S] INJURIES WERE CAUSED BY HIS RIDING A ROLLER COASTER.
V. THE DAMAGE VERDICT AS TO PLAINTIFF . IN THE AMOUNT OF $91,250.00 FOR PAIN AND SUFFERING, DISABILITY AND IMPAIRMENT, AND LOSS OF ENJOYMENT OF LIFE, DESPITE THE FACT THAT EVERY DOCTOR TESTIFIED PLAINTIFF HAD PERMANENT RESIDUAL BRAIN DAMAGE AND PERMANENT PARTIAL VISION LOSS, AND DEFENDANT STIPULATED THAT PLAINTIFF HAD INJURIES WHICH PIERCED THE LIMITATION ON LAWSUIT THRESHOLD, IS A MISCARRIAGE OF JUSTICE.
A. Plaintiff is Entitled to a New Trial, in Light of the Extent of Plaintifffs] Injuries.
B. The Damage Verdict as to Plaintiff . in the Amount of $91,250.00 was a Miscarriage of Justice and Shocking to the Conscience, and a New Trial Should be Granted Pursuant to He v. Miller.
VI. THE DAMAGE VERDICT AS TO PLAINTIFF . IN THE AMOUNT OF $16,540.00 FOR PAST LOST WAGES AND $0 FOR FUTURE LOST WAGES, ALTHOUGH THE EVIDENCE DEMONSTRATED THAT [PLAINTIFF'S] PAST AND FUTURE LOST WAGES AMOUNTED TO $850,000 AND $1,554,800.00, RESPECTIVELY, IS A MISCARRIAGE OF JUSTICE.
VII. THE DAMAGE VERDICT OF ZERO AS TO PLAINTIFF MICHELLE KRZYKALSKI FOR HER PER QUOD CLAIM, DESPITE THE EVIDENCE SHOWING THAT [PLAINTIFF'S] INJURIES DESTROYED THEIR FAMILY, IS A MISCARRIAGE OF JUSTICE AND REFLECTS THE TRAVESTY OF THE ENTIRE VERDICT.
Michele argues, in a single point, that the jury's decision to award her nothing was against the weight of the evidence and represented a miscarriage of justice.
We turn first to whether the trial judge properly permitted the jury's consideration and apportionment of John Doe's liability, as well as whether the jury's verdict that Tindall was only three percent responsible was against the weight of the evidence. Thereafter, we briefly examine the arguments concerning the jury's award of damages.
I
In urging our reliance on statements in our case law that "a fictitious party is not a party to a suit," Bencivenga v. J.J.A.M.M., Inc., 258 N.J.Super. 399, 407, 609 A.2d 1299 (App. Div.) (emphasis added), certif. denied, 130 N.J. 598, 617 A.2d 1220 (1992), and the statutory direction that the trier of fact determine "[t]he extent, in the form of percentage, of each party's negligence," N.J.S.A. 2A:15-5.2(b) (emphasis added), plaintiff contends that the trial judge erred in directing the jury to determine whether John Doe was negligent and, if so, the percentage to which he was responsible. Although it gives the appearance of some syllogistic logic, we do not find this argument persuasive.
Consideration of an alleged tortfeasor's negligence and degree of responsibility is not governed by whether that tortfeasor may be said to be a "party" but turns on whether the other tortfeasor "will be affected by the verdict." See Ramos v. Browning Ferris Indus. of S. Jersey, Inc., 194 N.J.Super. 96, 106, 476 A.2d 304 (App. Div. 1984), rev'd on other grounds, 103 N.J. 177, 610 A.2d 1152 (1986). The law is best served, as the Court observed in Town of Kearny v. Brandt, 214 N.J. 76, 102, 67 A.3d 601 (2013), when the factfinder is allowed to evaluate the liability of all those potentially responsible. So, although, for example, an employer insulated by workers compensation laws will not have its responsibility apportioned, Ramos, supra, 103 N.J. at 184, 510 A.2d 1152, other tortfeasors, such as those who have sought or obtained the protection of bankruptcy laws, and therefore are no longer answerable in damages, should nevertheless be considered, Brodsky v. Grinnell Haulers, Inc., 181 N.J. 102, 115, 853 A.2d 940 (2004); see also Town of Kearny, supra, 214 N.J. at 103, 67 A.3d 601 (providing other examples of tortfeasors whose liability was considered and apportioned despite plaintiffs inability to recover from them in whole or in part).
Because the Comparative Negligence Act would be disserved by exalting the "party" label in adjudicating responsibility for a plaintiffs claim, we have recognized that a non-settling defendant has a right to have a jury apportion the liability of a settling defendant once it has been proven at trial that the settling defendant was, in fact, negligent. See Green v. Gen. Motors Corp., 310 N.J.Super. 507, 545-46, 709 A.2d 205 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 156 N.J. 381, 718 A.2d 1210 (1998); Mort v. Besser Co., 287 N.J.Super. 423, 431, 671 A.2d 189 (App. Div. 1996), certif. denied, 147 N.J. 577, 688 A.2d 1053 (1997). Consequently, we have held that the comparative negligence of a phantom driver, such as John Doe here, should be considered by a jury in a trial brought by an injured party against another tortfeasor. See Cockerline v. Menendez, 411 N.J.Super. 596, 618-19, 988 A.2d 575 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 201 N.J. 499, 992 A.2d 793 (2010).
Plaintiff argues this case differs from Cockerline because in that case a uninsured motorist (UM) carrier standing in the shoes of the fictitious driver settled with plaintiff prior to trial and, here, the proceedings between plaintiff and his UM insurer have yet to be resolved. Despite that factual difference, however, there remains in both instances a need to apportion responsibility between the two tortfeasors. In short, if plaintiff and the UM insurer had settled prior to trial, apportionment would be required because Tindall, the remaining defendant, would be "chargeable with the total verdict less that attributable to the settling defendant's percentage share." Cartel Capital Corp. v. Fireco of N.J., 81 N.J. 548, 569, 410 A.2d 674 (1980). We see no distinction worthy of creating a different rule and drawing a different conclusion where the plaintiff and the UM insurer have not yet litigated then-disputes. To allow plaintiff to obtain from Tindall the full amount of damages assessed by the jury and, later, seek recovery from the UM carrier, could result in a windfall, contrary to our prior holdings. As we said in Cockerline, "to preclude defendants from seeking an apportionment of liability against the phantom vehicles does not advance the purposes of the UM law and frustrates the purposes of the joint tortfeasor and comparative fault law." 411 N.J.Super. at 619, 988 A.2d 575. We, thus, reject plaintiffs contention that, because John Doe may not be labeled a "party," his negligence should not have been apportioned by the jury.
We also reject plaintiffs argument that the jury's finding that John Doe was ninety-seven percent responsible and Tindall only three percent responsible was against the weight of the evidence. Plaintiff chiefly relies on Dolson v. Anastasia, 55 N.J. 2, 10-12, 258 A.2d 706 (1969), which held that a new trial was required when a jury failed to find defendant negligent when his vehicle struck plaintiffs vehicle from the rear. Contrary to what required a new trial in Dolson, the jury here found Tindall negligent and his negligence a proximate cause of plaintiffs injuries. The question posed here — in the context of the trial judge's denial of a motion for a new trial on this point — simply concerns whether the jury's apportioning of responsibility between two tortfeasors was against the weight of the evidence.
A judge shall grant a motion for a new trial "if, having given due regard to the opportunity of the jury to pass upon the credibility of the witnesses, it clearly and convincingly appears that there was a miscarriage of justice under the law." R. 4:49-1(a). In applying this standard, the judge must evaluate the evidence with an eye toward correcting "clear error or mistake by the jury." Dolson, supra, 55 N.J. at 6, 258 A.2d 706. The judge is to "take into account, not only tangible factors relative to the proofs as shown by the record, but also appropriate matters of credibility, generally peculiarly within the jury's domain, and the intangible 'feel of the case' which it has gained by presiding over the trial." Kita v. Borough of Lindenwold, 305 N.J.Super. 43, 49, 701 A.2d 938 (App. Div. 1997). Even then, we will not reverse the judge's ruling on the motion unless "it clearly appears that there was a miscarriage of justice under the law." R. 2:10-1.
In ruling on the motion for a new trial, the judge correctly observed that the jury was faced with the consequence of two negligent acts committed by two separate individuals. Tindall failed to keep sufficient distance from plaintiffs vehicle to avoid striking it from behind, and John Doe cut off plaintiffs vehicle, Tindall's vehicle, and others, by crossing the northbound lanes to make a left turn off the roadway. The degree of responsibility between these two tortfeasors presented a fact-sensitive question for the jury. In the jurors' eyes, John Doe was far more blameworthy than Tindall. And the trial judge observed the witnesses, and gained a feel of the ease, found no miscarriage of justice in what the jury concluded. After close examination of the record in light of our standard of review, we cannot conclude that it "clearly appears" the verdict was "a miscarriage of justice." R. 2:10-1.
II
We find insufficient merit in plaintiffs contention that the jury's award of damages, either separately or collectively examined, constituted a miscarriage of justice to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11 — 3(e)(1)(E). We come to the same conclusion with regard to Michele's contention that the jury's verdict on her claim for damages also constituted a miscarriage of justice. We add only the following few brief comments.
In his third point, plaintiff argues the trial judge erred in barring admission of plaintiffs Thomas Jefferson University Hospital records. In his brief, plaintiff did not refer us to where in the record this ruling was made and he did not identify the particular records in question. Based on our own review of the record, we assume plaintiff refers in this point to hospital records he offered into evidence for the first time shortly before summations. The record suggests that although medical experts may have either alluded to or based their opinions on their review of some hospital records, Tindall objected because there were things mentioned in the records in question that had not been addressed by any witness. The judge sustained that objection.
We find no abuse of discretion in the judge's ruling. To the extent the records contained information not previously mentioned by a witness, the judge correctly excluded them. And to the extent they were offered to corroborate an expert's testimony, their exclusion was harmless.
Lastly, we reject the arguments of both plaintiff and his ex-wife that the verdict on damages was against the weight of the evidence and represented a miscarriage of justice. To be sure, plaintiff has advocated his injuries were extensive and that the jury was mistaken in rendering an award far short of what he believes is fair and just. The fact of the matter is, however, that the extent and significance of plaintiffs injuries was much in dispute, and the jury was entitled to exercise its judgment in crediting or rejecting plaintiffs claims. By the same token, the jury's decision to award nothing to Michele likely was based in part on its view that plaintiff was not injured as severely as he claimed. Also, Michele took on no additional responsibilities due to the accident and, with the deterioration of their marriage that started prior to the accident, she incurred no loss as a result of the accident. We have been presented with no principled reason for second-guessing the jury's determinations on damages.
Affirmed.
Plaintiff Michele Krzykalski asserted a per quod claim for loss of consortium and services. The evidence revealed the marriage was troubled; they separated in June 2012 and later divorced.
$91,250 in pain and suffering, disability and impairment, loss of enjoyment of life, and other non-economic losses, and $16,640 in lost past wages.
During the pendency of this appeal, the Supreme Court rejected many aspects of its earlier holding in He v. Miller, 207 N.J. 230, 24 A.3d 251 (2011). See Cuevas v. Wentworth, 226 N.J. 480, 144 A.3d 890 (2016).
We find insufficient merit in plaintiff's argument in his Point I that the judge erred in denying his motion for a directed verdict on Tindall's negligence to warrant discussion in a written opinion, R. 2:ll-3(e)(l)(E), because the jury in fact found Tindall negligent.
According to the parties' submissions, plaintiff previously refused his UM carrier's offer of the policy limits both before and during trial, leaving that matter to be determined upon an eventual demand for UM arbitration.
It may, at first blush, appear that our holding today and, for that matter, our holding in Cockerline, are inconsistent with our earlier decision in Bencivenga, where we upheld a decision not to submit a fictitious defendant's liability to the factfinder for apportionment. Such an assumption would be mistaken. In deciding Bencivenga, we were persuaded that the defendant nightclub was in the best position to identify the fictitious defendant, who was one of its bouncers, and that it would have been inequitable to allow the nightclub to receive a potential benefit from its reticence. 258 N.J.Super. at 410, 609 A.2d 1299. Similarly, our holdings here and in Cockerline also provide a more equitable result. See also Kranz v. Schuss, 447 N.J.Super. 168, 181-82, 146 A.3d 647 (App. Div. 2016), certif. denied, — N.J. -, — A.3d -(2016) (holding that the only "equitable result" in this New Jersey suit — when an earlier New York suit against a New York defendant settled with that defendant's payment of $2,000,000 — was to have the New Jersey jury assign and allocate the fault of both the New Jersey defendant and the New York tortfeasor, even though the New York tortfeasor could never be a "party" to the New Jersey suit due to lack of personal jurisdiction).