Case Name: WIGHT v. DANIELS
Court: Texas Courts of Civil Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1920-12-09
Citations: 226 S.W. 473
Docket Number: No. 2308
Parties: WIGHT v. DANIELS.
Judges: Chief Justice WILLSON does not agree to the conclusion of the majority of'the court and dissents therefrom.
Reporter: South Western Reporter
Volume: 226
Pages: 473–477

Head Matter:
WIGHT v. DANIELS.
(No. 2308.)
(Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. Texarkana.
Dec. 9, 1920.
Rehearing Denied Dec. 23, 1920.)
1. Railroads <&wkey;>222(5) — Conclusion held to show damages allowed only for construction of switch.
Where the court, though finding that considerable noise and smoke were made by the operation of trains on a newly constructed switch, concluded as a matter of law that the railway company was liable for damage to adjacent property by constructing the embankment and the track complained of, the compensation awarded was allowed only for damages accruing from the construction of the switch-track, and not from the operation of trains thereon.
2. Eminent domain <&wkey;l 13 — Railroad not liable for damage to adjoining property by presence of switch track on right of way.
A railroad company is not liable to the owner of adjoining property for the depreciation of the value of such property caused by the mere presence of a newly constructed switch track upon the railroad right of way adjoining the property.
Willson, O. J., dissenting.
Appeal from District Court, Gregg County; Chas. L. Brachfield, Judge.
Action hy Oliver Daniels against Pearl Wight, as receiver of the Texas & Pacific Railway Company. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals.
Reversed and remanded.
The appellee owns a lot with a two-story residence on it in Longview. The lot and house are on the east side of Second street, and the premises adjoin the right of way of the Texas & Pacific Railway Company on the south side. The main line of the railway, constructed some years ago, runs east and west through the middle of the right of way, and is 120 feet distant from the residence. In November, 1917, a switch track was laid on an embankment constructed on the right of way, north of the main line. The switch track was distant about 40 feet from the residence, and was entirely on the right of way, and no part of it was on the plaintiff’s lot. Plaintiff brought the suit for damages, claiming that the building of the switch track and the operation of trains on same depreciated the value of the house and lot. The defendant answered by denial, and specially that the switch track and embankment were constructed by the defendant as receiver under authority of the federal court for the western district of Louisiana, and that the construction of the switch track was a necessity in order for the railway, chartered as a federal corporation, to handle the interstate commerce tendered for transportation. The case .was tried before the court without a jury, and judgment entered for the plaintiff.
The court made the following findings of fact: '
“(1) That the defendant is the receiver of the property of the Texas & Pacific Railway Company, and that he was appointed as such receiver by the United States District Judge of the Western District of Louisiana on October 27, 1916, and as such receiver acting under the authority of the court he had the track and embankment constructed near the premises of the plaintiff as it is.
“(2) That the defendant constructed the embankment and track on the right of way of the Texas & Pacific Railway Company, and that no part of it was constructed on the property of the plaintiff; the house of the plaintiff being about 49 feet from the edge of the embankment.
“(3) That from the time of the construction of the said track and embankment the defendant has operated engines, ears, and trains over the said track, and that considerable noises and smoke have been made by reason of the operation of said trains, cars, and engines over the said track.
“(4) That the construction of the said track and embankment at that place, damaged the property of the plaintiff in the sum of $1,375, in that the construction of the track and embankment reduced the market value of the plaintiff’s property in the sum- of $1,375.
“(5) That it was necessary for the defendant to construct the track and embankment where they were constructed and where they are now, for the purpose of handling the interstate and intrastate commerce handled by him as receiver of the Texas & Pacific Railway Company, and it was necessary to construct them and maintain them at such place in order for the railway company to handle interstate and intrastate commerce intrusted to it.
“(6) That the Texas & Pacific Railway Company is a corporation duly organized and incorporated under the laws of the Unitdd States by act of Congress approved March 3, 1871, and acts amendatory thereof on May 2,1872, March 3, 1S73, June 22, 1874.
“(7) That the defendant at the time of the construction of the track and embankment was receiver of the properties of the Texas & Pacific Railway Company and operating same for the purpose of carrying interstate commerce.”
Young & Stinchcomb, of Longview, for appellant.
F. B. Martin and. W. E. Beall, both of Long-view, for appellee.

Opinion:
LEVY, J.
(after stating the facts as above). A switch track was built on the right of way of the railway company, and engines and cars were operated over it. The appellee's property adjoined the right of way. The trial court made the following finding:
"I find that the defendant has operated engines and cars over said track, and that considerable noises and smoke have been made by reason of the operation of said trains and engines over the said track."
The court then further finds as follows:
"I find that the construction of the said track and embankment at that place damaged the property of the plaintiff in the sum of $1,375 in that the construction of the track and embankment reduced the market value of the plaintiff's property in the sum of $1,375."
And the court made the following conclusion of law:
"I conclude as a matter of law that the defendant is liable to the plaintiff for the damage to his property by constructing the track and the embankment on the right of way of the Texas & Pacific Railway Company near to the property of the plaintiff, and that the damages he suffered amounted to $1,375."
The appellant insists that the findings and the conclusion of the court clearly and specifically show that compensation was allowed only for damages accruing from the "construction of said track and embankment."
The court finds that "considerable noises and smoke have been made by reason of the operation of said trains," but, as insisted, does not include and allow compensation therefor as damages. The compensation was, we think, allowed only for damages accruing from the construction of the switch track, and the pertinent question for decision under the precise facts is: Docs the mere bodily presence óf a switch track near tLe property of another give rise to the liability here asserted, which, is depreciation in the market value of the property? We think that the mere bodily presence of the switch track in this case does not of itself, unaccompanied, as here, by some special damage, render the appellant liable for compensation to the adjoining owner. Ry. Co. v. Shaw, 99 Tex. 559, 92 S. W. 30, 6 L. R. A. (N. S.) 245, 122 Am. St. Rep. 663; Richards v. Washington Terminal Co., 233 U. S. 546, 34 Sup. Ct. 654, 58 L. Ed. 1088, L. R. A. 1915A, 887; I. C. J. p. 965. It is because a physical damage or injury is not shown to the abutting property in suit. The damage to abutting property allowable in the various reported eases is based on operation and construction of the works, or construction of the works causing some special injury physically to the adjoining property. Consequently, we think, the cases have no application to the peculiar facts in this case. The writer thinks the case of Wight, Receiver, v. J. E. Belcher (just decided by this court) 226 S. W. 472, is different from this ease on the facts. There the switch track and embankment caused the adjoining land to be flooded with water.
The judgment is reversed, and the cause is remanded.
Chief Justice WILLSON does not agree to the conclusion of the majority of'the court and dissents therefrom.
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