Case Name: Sally COSGROVE, By and Through her guardian ad litem, Linda WINFREE; and Linda Winfree, individually, Plaintiffs-appellants, v. MERRELL DOW PHARMACEUTICALS, INC., Defendant-respondent
Court: Idaho Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Idaho
Decision Date: 1989-06-08
Citations: 117 Idaho 470
Docket Number: No. 17451
Parties: Sally COSGROVE, By and Through her guardian ad litem, Linda WINFREE; and Linda Winfree, individually, Plaintiffs-appellants, v. MERRELL DOW PHARMACEUTICALS, INC., Defendant-respondent.
Judges: HUNTLEY and JOHNSON, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Idaho Reports
Volume: 117
Pages: 470–491

Head Matter:
788 P.2d 1293
Sally COSGROVE, By and Through her guardian ad litem, Linda WINFREE; and Linda Winfree, individually, Plaintiffs-appellants, v. MERRELL DOW PHARMACEUTICALS, INC., Defendant-respondent.
No. 17451.
Supreme Court of Idaho.
June 8, 1989.
On Rehearing March 29, 1990.
Imhoff & Lynch, Boise, Harney, Wolfe, Pagliuso, Shaller & Carr, Los Angeles, Cal., .for plaintiffs-appellants. David H. Harney and Michael W. Moore, Boise, argued.
Quane, Smith, Howard & Hull, Boise, Dickson, Carlson & Campillo, Santa Monica, Cal., for defendant-respondent. Robert Dato and Jeffrey Carlson, argued.
SHEPARD, J., sat and participated fully in the opinion prior to his untimely death.

Opinion:
BAKES, Chief Justice.
Plaintiffs Linda Winfree and her daughter, Sally Cosgrove, sued defendant Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (Merrell Dow), for birth defects suffered by Cosgrove, allegedly as a result of Winfree's ingestion of the "anti-morning sickness" drug, Bendectin, during her pregnancy. This is one of a series of Bendectin cases filed nationwide. Summary judgment was granted for defendant on Winfree's individual claims because the I.C. § 5-219(4) 2-year statute of limitations had run. The claims of infant Cosgrove, however, were not barred by the statute of limitations, and those claims continued to trial. The jury returned a unanimous special verdict for defendant Merrell Dow, finding that Bendectin was not the proximate cause of Cos-grove's birth defects. Judgment was entered accordingly and plaintiffs appeal. We affirm.
I
Plaintiff Linda Cosgrove Winfree (Win-free) conceived plaintiff Sally Cosgrove (Sally) on approximately March 24, 1975. Early in her pregnancy Winfree began experiencing nausea and vomiting. While on a family vacation in California, on April 17, 1975, Winfree was seen at the St. Francis Hospital emergency room in Santa Barbara, and she obtained a prescription for Bendectin there. Winfree subsequently ingested Bendectin to treat her morning sickness. Sally was born on December 17, 1975, missing her left forearm and hand. It is alleged that Winfree's ingestion of Bendectin was the cause of Sally's birth defects. Bendectin was manufactured and distributed on the American market by defendant Merrell Dow from 1956 until June 9, 1983, on which date its production was suspended worldwide.
Plaintiffs initiated this action on September 13, 1983, seeking both compensatory and punitive damages. Defendant Merrell Dow answered and, after extensive discovery, moved for summary judgment on Winfree's individual claims. The court granted the motion because Winfree's claim was time barred under I.C. § 5-219(4). Just prior to trial the court dismissed all of the "Doe" defendants, at which time defendant Merrell Dow removed the case to federal court, based upon diversity of citizenship. Ultimately, the case was remanded to state court. Trial commenced on February 2, 1988, and took approximately five weeks. On March 10, 1988, the jury returned a unanimous special verdict in favor of defendant Merrell Dow, finding that Bendectin was not the proximate cause of Sally Cosgrove's injuries. Judgment was entered on both plaintiffs' claims on March 22, 1988. Plaintiffs appeal.
II
Appellants raise numerous issues on appeal. Most of the issues concern the admission or rejection of evidence, much of it offered through expert witnesses. Accordingly, we preface our analysis by reviewing the discretionary authority granted to trial judges regarding rulings on the admission. of evidence. The applicable law was recently set out in Soria v. Sierra Pacific Airlines, Inc., 111 Idaho 594, 606, 726 P.2d 706, 718 (1986):
Idaho grants trial judges "broad discretion as to the admission of evidence and the exercise of that discretion will not be overturned absent the clear showing of abuse. Cheney v. Palos Verdes Investment Corp., 104 Idaho 897, 900, 665 P.2d 661, 664 (1983). (Citations omitted) (emphasis added.) Trial judges also are granted broad discretion in determining relevancy." [Citations omitted.]
The trial court's broad discretion particularly applies to the admission of expert testimony, IHC Hospitals, Inc. v. Board of Comm'rs, 108 Idaho 136, 697 P.2d 1150 (1985), and that discretion will not be disturbed on appeal absent a showing of abuse:
Admissibility of expert opinion testimony is discretionary with the trial court and will not be disturbed absent a showing of an abuse of discretion.
Stoddard v. Nelson, 99 Idaho 293, 297, 581 P.2d 339, 343 (1978).
With the applicable standard of review in mind, we begin by discussing four evidentiary issues concerning (1) excluding evidence of warnings on other products; (2) precluding evidence of advertisements which allegedly proved over-promotion; (3) precluding evidence that Merrell Dow had removed Bendectin from the market; and (4) evidence of habit. Preliminarily, we note that each of these issues were rendered essentially moot by the unanimous jury verdict which found that the drug Bendectin was not the proximate cause of the plaintiff Cosgrove's birth defects. The excluded evidence was directed to issues which the jury did not reach because of its express finding that Bendectin was not the proximate cause of plaintiff's birth defects. Therefore, even if the trial court's rulings had been erroneous, they would have been harmless error. Nevertheless, we will review each of the trial court's rulings on these evidentiary matters.
First, the trial court did not err when it precluded the introduction of testimony regarding other Merrell Dow drugs, MER/29 and Thalidomide, which plaintiff claimed arguably showed a habit of fraud, falsification of scientific data, and a general pattern of deceit as to the FDA and the consuming public. The trial court rejected the claim of a general pattern and found that the proffered evidence was not sufficiently probative and did not bear "any relevance to any issue properly before the court and jury in this case." Trial judges are granted broad discretion in determining relevancy, and on this record we can find no clear abuse of discretion in her ruling regarding the probative value and the relevancy of that evidence.
Next, the trial court did not err in precluding plaintiffs from mentioning the fact that Bendectin was no longer available on the market after Merrell Dow ceased production of it. The fact that Merrell Dow ceased the production of Bendectin did not tend to prove a fact at issue in the trial more or less probable. I.R.E. 407 precludes the introduction of post-event conduct to prove negligence. As I.R.E. 407 states, "Whenever, after an event, measures are taken which, if taken previously, would have made the event less likely to occur, evidence of the subsequent measures is not admissible to prove negligence or culpable conduct in connection with the event."
Third, the trial court did not err in allegedly precluding the use of advertisements and the testimony of Merrell Dow's salesmen to prove over-promotion of Bendectin in support of plaintiffs' claim that Merrell Dow negligently failed to warn of the possible consequences of taking Bendectin. Plaintiff argued that evidence of over-promotion was admissible in support of its claims of strict liability and negligence. We need not resolve the issue of whether evidence of over-promotion of a drug is relevant evidence in proving claims of strict liability or of negligently failing to warn of the dangers in the drug. Contrary to appellants' allegations, we note that Plaintiffs' Exhibit 102C (Merrell Dow advertisement for Bendectin) was admitted, and that the advertisement was used by two of plaintiffs' witnesses; it was also used to cross examine Dr. Goddard, an expert witness for the defense. We find no clear error in the trial court's handling of this issue. Furthermore, the jury's finding that Bendectin did not cause plaintiff's birth defects renders this issue moot.
Finally, the trial court did not err in allegedly excluding evidence of warnings on products other than Bendectin which contained one of the same active ingredients as did Bendectin. The trial court did allow plaintiffs' counsel to introduce evidence of some other warnings, including that on Bonadoxin, which was read at length into the record immediately before the Bendectin warnings were read. There is no showing of clear error in the trial court's exercise of discretion on this issue. Again, the jury's unanimous finding of no proximate causation renders this and the other previous issues moot. We affirm the trial court's actions on these evidentiary matters.
Ill
Appellants also contest the trial court's decision to preclude the taking of depositions of various employees, officers, past employees and past officers of the defendant Merrell Dow. Appellants were not allowed to take their depositions because appellants made no showing of a need for information that was not already contained in the federal multi-district Bendectin litigation entitled, In re Richardson-Merrell, Inc., "Bendectin" Products Liability Litigation, 624 F.Supp. 1212 (S.D.Ohio 1985), aff'd in part, and vacated and remanded in part, 857 F.2d 290 (6th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1006, 109 S.Ct. 788, 102 L.Ed.2d 779, 57 U.S.L.W. 3452 (1989). All materials generated in the federal multi-district litigation were available to appellants for a reasonable charge.
The trial court's order was effective only as to particular depositions; it did not affect appellants' interrogatories or motions for production of documents. In her protective order, the trial judge stated:
The depositions taken in [the federal multi-district litigation] cover the areas which the plaintiffs now seek to enter. At oral argument on the Motion for Protective Order, this court repeatedly asked plaintiffs' counsel what information was sought that was not already contained in the depositions which have already been taken in the multi-district litigation. Counsel's only response was the vague statement that they would like to approach the case in their own way. . The plaintiffs are entitled to obtain discovery of all relevant evidence and of all evidence which may lead to relevant evidence. However, the depositions taken already accomplish that purpose. . If more specific information is provided to the court showing that there are areas which have not previously been the subject of discovery, the court would permit discovery into those matters.
Under I.R.C.P. 26(c), the trial court was well within its authority to so limit appellants' discovery efforts. No showing of a need for more specific information was ever made. Neither have appellants dem onstrated prejudice resulting from the trial court's order. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court's order constituted a proper exercise of discretion under I.R.C.P. 26(c) and we affirm.
IV
Appellants next contend that the trial court erred in granting Merrell Dow's motion for summary judgment on Win-free's individual cause of action. Appellants contend that Allen v. A.H. Robins Co., Inc., 752 F.2d 1365 (9th Cir.1985), is on point and mandates that Winfree's cause of action accrued when she knew of, or reasonably should have been put on inquiry regarding, her damages. Allen, however, is inapposite. The court in Allen found evidence of fraudulent concealment of the damage to plaintiff which, under I.C. § 5-219(4), would have prevented the statute of limitations from running. Accordingly, the Allen court held that summary judgment was improperly issued because there was a factual issue regarding fraudulent concealment of damage. The trial court here, however, found no evidence of fraudulent concealment on the part of Merrell Dow, nor do we.
Under I.C. § 5-219(4), a cause of action is deemed to "accrue" at the time of the occurrence, act or omission complained of. However, in interpreting that statute, this Court held in Stephens v. Stearns, 106 Idaho 249, 254, 678 P.2d 41, 46 (1984), and Blake v. Cruz, 108 Idaho 253, 260, 698 P.2d 315, 322 (1985), that "the statute of limitations does not begin to run against a negligence action until some damage has occurred." In Blake v. Cruz, this Court held, in another birth defect case, that the fact of damage in a wrongful birth/defective birth arises when the defective child is born. In this case, Cosgrove was born on December 17,1975, with the defective hand and arm. Her mother, plaintiff Winfree, began to incur medical expenses shortly thereafter in 1976. As held in Blake, "some damage has occurred" at the time of the defective birth and immediately thereafter as Winfree began to incur medical expenses. However, Winfree did not file her action until 1983, almost seven years after the birth of Sally Cosgrove with the defective hand and arm. The two-year statute of limitations in I.C. § 5-219(4) had long since run. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in dismissing plaintiff Winfree's complaint.
Appellants claim nevertheless that Win-free did not "discover" the cause of Cos-grove's birth defect until 1983. There is, however, no "discovery" exception in Idaho except for the leaving of foreign objects in the body. I.C. § 5-219(4); Davis v. Moran, 112 Idaho 703, 735 P.2d 1014 (1987); Wing v. Martin, 107 Idaho 267, 688 P.2d 1172 (1984).
V
Appellants contend that the trial court erred in excluding drug experience reports (DER's) regarding congenital malformations insofar as those reports could be used to establish, in part, the capability of Bendectin to cause limb defects in human beings. DER's are submitted to drug companies primarily by practicing doctors, but also by researchers, patients, lawyers, and other interested persons. DER's report individual patients' post-ingestion experiences with particular drugs. The record contains expert testimony that the experiences related in the reports are anecdotal in nature and should not form the basis for any conclusions, expert or otherwise. Under this scenario, and in the exercise of the discretion recognized in Soria v. Sierra Pacific Airlines, Inc., 111 Idaho 594, 726 P.2d 706 (1986), the trial court limited the use of the DER's to the issue of notice.
Appellants essentially claim that the DER's should have been admitted for the truth of the matters asserted in them. The observations and information contained in DER's are clearly hearsay, however, and appellants have not asserted or come within any exception to I.R.E. 802, the hearsay rule, which would allow their admission to prove that Bendectin was either defective or the cause of Cosgrove's birth defect. Accordingly, we see no clear abuse of discretion in the trial court's refusing their admission, for the truth of the matters contained therein, because of their unreliable hearsay nature.
VI
Appellants contend that the trial court erred in permitting Merrell Dow's expert witnesses, Goddard and Lamm, to testify relying upon illustrative exhibits which allegedly were based upon unreliable hearsay. Merrell Dow used two basic types of sales charts as exhibits at trial. The first was based upon new therapy starts, while the second was based on the total number of Bendectin tablets distributed. These charts demonstrated that the level of birth defects remained relatively constant through the period of time in which Bendectin sales initially rose and then declined to zero. In analyzing both limb defects and limb reduction defects, the charts demonstrated that there was no relationship between Bendectin sales and birth defects. The witnesses explained that the sales charts were based on data that was either relied upon on a daily basis by the pharmaceutical industry, or was required to be submitted to the Food & Drug Administration (FDA). The trial court concluded that the nature of the data itself guaranteed its trustworthiness, and that the exhibits should be admitted.
The charts are admissible under any of three exceptions to the hearsay rule. The first is the business records exception, I.R.E. 803(6). Under the business records exception, both the new therapy starts chart and the tablets distributed chart were derived from data compiled in the regular course of Merrell Dow's business. The exhibits were also admissible under a second exception to the hearsay rule, the public records exception, I.R.E. 803(8). Under the public records exception, "matters observed pursuant to duty imposed by law and as to which there was a duty to report" are admissible. I.R.E. 803(8). The FDA required Merrell Dow to submit data showing the number of Bendectin tablets distributed. The tablets distributed data was then compared with birth defect data obtained from the Centers for Disease Control (CDC). Numerous cases have held that CDC data is admissible under the public records exception, see, e.g., Ellis v. International Playtex, Inc., 745 F.2d 292 (4th Cir.1984), and Kehm v. Proctor & Gamble Mfg. Co., 724 F.2d 613 (8th Cir.1983). The exhibits were also admissible under a third exception to the hearsay rule, the market reports exception, I.R.E. 803(17). The exhibits which showed new therapy starts were derived from data compiled by independent sources and then sold to various pharmaceutical manufacturers. This is a classic example of a market report, and the charts would properly have been admitted under this hearsay exception. Appellants failed to convince the trial court that the evidence was either misleading or untrustworthy; therefore, the trial court did not err in admitting the exhibits and permitting the jury to determine how much weight should be given them. Accordingly, we conclude that the Idaho Rules of Evidence provided ample exceptions to the hearsay rule to allow the admission of Merrell Dow's charts.
VII
Appellants next contend that the trial court erred in refusing to admit the tax returns of Dr. Harbison, an expert witness for Merrell Dow, to show his alleged bias, prejudice, and perjury. On cross examination, plaintiffs attempted to show that Dr. Harbison had earned far more from testifying in court than the figure he initially testified to. They attempted to prove his alleged perjury by offering into evidence Dr. Harbison's income tax returns. Dr. Harbison's tax returns listed a substantial income from private consulting, but did not show how much was from testifying in court. After allowing plaintiffs' counsel considerable latitude in attempting to impeach the witness, and after overruling a number of defendant's objections, the trial judge observed:
[Sjome inquiry into this area is always proper with expert witnesses of either side, and it's information customarily provided to the jury, but this is being done in such a confusing form, that I think we are consuming too much time with it.
I also think it's been addressed and the witness has said he doesn't know the answer [how much was from testifying in court]. If you have something you want to show him to refresh his recollection, go ahead.
Plaintiffs attempted to refresh Dr. Harbison's recollection by showing him copies of his tax returns for the years 1982-1986. Subsequently, the jury was excused, and an exchange among counsel, the court, and Dr. Harbison ensued. Defendant moved for a mistrial, but the motion was denied. Ultimately the court asked plaintiffs' counsel to form a question specifically aimed at asking how much Dr. Harbison earned from testifying in court. Plaintiffs' counsel was unable to formulate a proper question, and the trial judge was forced to intervene and ask the question herself, to which Dr. Harbison answered, "around $10,000, maybe 15,000 per year."
The entire issue was reargued the next court day. The court then reviewed all of Dr. Harbison's testimony again and, in still a third hearing, the court found that plaintiff's method of cross examination was "extremely confusing"; nevertheless, the cross examination testimony was allowed to stand. However, the court held that the tax returns themselves were not admissible:
I reviewed all the testimony. And it is my conclusion that the tax returns do not impeach the witness's earlier testimony____ [I]t's my basic view that the tax returns are extrinsic, since they don't impeach him____ They are thus cumulative, and evolved into a situation that was unnecessarily time consuming. . [I]n this case the fact that experts are getting paid has almost a nil effect, because everyone has had to do it, and he wouldn't testify he didn't. So over all, I just don't think it was prejudicial.
The scope of cross examination rests in the court's discretion. Quick v. Crane, 111 Idaho 759, 727 P.2d 1187 (1986); State v. Wheeler, 109 Idaho 795, 711 P.2d 741 (Ct.App.1985). The refusal of the trial court to admit the tax returns as impeachment evidence was based upon the trial court's determination that the tax returns did "not impeach the witness's earlier testimony." On such evidentiary rulings, we defer to the discretion of the trial court unless a clear showing of abuse is made. Soria v. Sierra Pacific Airlines, Inc., 111 Idaho 594, 726 P.2d 706 (1986). On this record we cannot find an abuse of that discretion, nor have appellants shown that their case was prejudiced. State v. Wheeler, 109 Idaho 795, 711 P.2d 741 (Ct.App.1985). Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's handling of the matter.
VIII
Appellants contend that the trial court erred because it arranged the interrogatories on the special verdict form in such a way as to invite a quick and non-deliberative verdict by placing the issue of proximate causation first. Question number 1 on the special verdict form reads as follows:
QUESTION NO. 1: Was Bendectin the proximate cause of the plaintiffs' injuries and any resulting damages?
Yes_ No _X_
If your answer to Question No. 1 is "no", please sign the verdict form. Do not answer any other questions. If your answer is "yes", please answer the next question.
Plaintiffs' complaint alleged claims both in strict liability for a defective product, and negligence on the part of Merrell Dow. These claims, together with the claim that the product was the proximate cause of the plaintiffs' injuries, were all issues submitted to the jury by appropriate instructions. Of necessity, one of those three issues had to be presented first on the special verdict form. It was hardly an abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court to submit the question of proximate cause to the jury first, since if they found that the product did not cause the appellants' injuries, then the jury would not have to struggle with the other complex scientific issues of whether the product was defective and unreasonably dangerous, or whether Mérrell Dow was guilty of negligence. There was no showing that the special verdict form confused the jury, and the jury was correctly instructed on the definition of proximate cause in an instruction patterned after IDJI 230. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not err in arranging the order of the questions on the special jury verdict form.
IX
Appellants contend that the trial court erred in excluding Plaintiffs' Exhibit No. 237 from evidence. Exhibit' 237 purported to summarize 106 studies that had been done on Bendectin, and upon which Dr. Done, plaintiffs' expert witness, based his expert opinion that Bendectin caused Sally's birth defect. Appellants contend that the 90% confidence level methodology utilized by Dr. Done in assembling Exhibit 237 is generally accepted in the scientific community, but that the trial court rejected the exhibit because a 95% confidence level was not used.
Appellants' argument, however, misstates the basis of the trial court's ruling. Exhibit 237 was not excluded for failing to meet a 95% statistical confidence level. Rather, the court found numerous other fundamental problems rendering the exhibit inadmissible. The problems the trial court noted include the following: (1) Exhibit 237 relied on evidence previously ruled inadmissible; (2) the exhibit utilized investigations not involving Bendectin; and (3) the 106 studies purportedly underlying the exhibit were in reality 50 studies which had been restructured by Dr. Done to appear as though 106 separate studies had been performed. The trial court concluded that, as presented, the exhibit was confusing and misleading, and its admission would result in time consumption that was not justified by its utility to the jury.
Additionally, the court's final ruling came only after this issue was addressed by counsel, and ruled on by the trial court, at two separate junctures during the trial. When the issue was first raised, the trial court heard the arguments of counsel, took a recess, and then returned to state:
THE COURT: I have given the matter considerable thought. The purpose of all expert testimony is to be helpful to the jury in resolving the issues before it. The proposed exhibit is all I'm going to address, proposed Exhibit 237.
Proposed Exhibit 237 relies upon evidence that I previously ruled is inadmissible in evaluating whether or not the drug Bendectin causes birth defects. Specifically, I have previously ruled that D.E.R.'s are not relevant to be considered for that purpose. The exhibit refers to investigations not involving Bendectin, although I realize that the assertion is that it involves drugs of that class.
I do not think, however, that that is sufficient. I think that the exhibit will tend to confuse the issues. It is not sufficiently helpful and does not have the necessary basis for admissibility in this case.
The trial continued and following the noon recess plaintiffs' counsel pressed the issue again. Further argument was heard, and at the conclusion of that argument the trial court stated:
It's not clear to me that this [Exhibit 237] fairly summarizes the information that it is supposed to be summarizing. I have no way of independently addressing any of this____
Now, I understand what this graphic technique is and that is not the issue that I am concerned about. But this approach of going to studies, studies that individually one wouldn't rely upon. And in summarizing it in this fashion, is certainly something I'm not familiar with. And secondly, it's not something for which the proper foundation has been laid.
THE COURT: . The issue is, this is a summary of studies not in evidence. Now, the — and it's my memory, and I will check it, that the witness has not laid a foundation, that counsel just referred to, and that is the foundation that the court requires and that foundation has not been laid.
Each time that the question has been asked, the witness has tracked off into some other response and has not directly answered that question. That is the response that is needed.
A recess was again taken, after which additional argument was, for the final time, had before the court. At the end of the argument, and after the trial judge had questioned the witness herself, the trial judge made this final explanation and ruling:
THE COURT: .
Obviously, a foundation has to be laid for the admissibility of the data used in the chart. That hasn't been done in court. It's obviously not stipulated to.
And I don't see how the fact that it has been reduced to a chart can get us over the point that evidence to be admissible in court has to be referring to either documents which are in evidence or in the case of studies of those reasonably relied upon by experts in the field.
I don't think it's necessary that the witness be an epidemiologist, but I do think that it's absolutely essential that the basic legal requirements of a foundation be laid before a document is introduced. Now, there is nothing that I have addressed that says that Dr. Done can't give an opinion about the matters about which he has already testified.
He has already offered testimony expressing his view that Bendectin is a teratogen. There is nothing wrong with that. [By this time Dr. Done had also expressed his expert opinion that Bendectin caused Sally's birth defect.]
What we are addressing at this point is solely Exhibit No. 237, which foundation has not been laid, so I'm going to sustain the objection and we will proceed.
Exhibit 237 was offered to illustrate Dr. Done's testimony, yet no foundation was laid explaining what the exhibit portrayed. Neither were the studies purportedly underlying the exhibit in evidence. Exhibit 237 contained information that had already been ruled inadmissible. Further, the trial court found it to be confusing and misleading. The exhibit restructured 50 studies (defendant claims that the number is closer to 30) and made it appear as though 106 separate data sets had been independently accumulated. The record amply supports the trial court's conclusion that the exhibit was confusing and misleading. Further more, even though the trial court refused the admission of Plaintiffs' Exhibit 237, Dr. Done was allowed to express his expert opinion that Bendectin is a teratogen and that it was the cause of Sally's birth defect. Plaintiffs' case, therefore, was not prejudiced by the non-admission of the exhibit. The trial court's refusal to admit Exhibit 237 was not error.
X
Appellants next contend that the trial court erred in permitting Dr. Done to be cross examined regarding findings made by a District of Columbia trial judge in the case of Oxendine v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., D.C.Superior Ct. No. 1245-82 (February 11, 1988). In Oxendine, the trial judge found that Dr. Done had perjured his testimony in certain respects. Accordingly, during the course of cross examination in the instant case, defense counsel attempted to elicit from Dr. Done the findings made in the Oxendine case.
Contrary to appellants' assertions, however, defense counsel was not allowed to cross examine Dr. Done regarding the Oxendine court's findings of perjury. Without exception, each time defense counsel attempted to explore the perjury charges, the objection of plaintiffs' counsel was sustained. Further, at no time during the cross examination did plaintiffs' counsel request the court to admonish the jury regarding defendant's cross examination of Dr. Done; nor did plaintiffs' counsel request the court to instruct defense counsel to cease further inquiries and move to another area of inquiry. In fact, at one point during the cross examination, defense counsel specifically asked the court, "May I inquire further in this area, Your Honor?" The court responded, "Ask your next question. I have sustained the objection [to an earlier attempt to impeach Dr. Done]."
The record clearly shows that the trial court did not permit defense counsel to cross examine Dr. Done regarding the trial court's perjury findings in the Oxendine case. Accordingly, appellants' contention is without merit.
XI
Appellants contend that the trial court violated appellants' due process rights when it, on the day following the jury verdict in this case, issued an order prohibiting the jurors from discussing the case with counsel. Appellants argue that this order prohibited them from determining whether post trial misconduct was committed by the judge, the jury, or opposing counsel. The record before us demonstrates that appellants' claims are without foundation.
The record reflects the following factual scenario. On March 10, 1988, after the jury had rendered its verdict and the decision was announced in open court, defense counsel asked the court if it was permissible to speak to the jury after court was adjourned. Judge Bail replied, "Well, we will discuss it. It is their decision." The judge and jury, along with the bailiff and court clerk, then retired to an empty courtroom to discuss, inter alia, defense counsel's request to interview the jurors themselves. Defense counsel waited outside this courtroom, but plaintiffs' counsel apparently left the area. When Judge Bail finished meeting with the jury, she left the courtroom. The bailiff then indicated that the jurors wanted to speak with the attorneys, so defense counsel entered the courtroom and began conversing with the jury. A short time later, counsel for plaintiffs arrived and entered the courtroom, and the jury/counsel colloquy continued for a little while longer. Later that evening plaintiffs' counsel contacted at least two jurors. One juror then called Judge Bail and complained about the contact. As Judge Bail stated:
He expressed very serious concern to me that the plaintiffs' counsel was manipu lating him and twisting his remarks. He expressed grave concern about what was going on, grave concern about whether or not other jurors might be harassed____
On this basis, Judge Bail issued an order instructing the jurors not to discuss the case with the attorneys until further notice. She stated "that I thought it might be wise, considering how charged up things were, to instruct the jury not to talk to anybody until further order from the court, since it seemed to me at that point some very unwise decisions were being made in terms of the contact with the jury." On March 14,1988, plaintiffs filed a motion for relief from the order prohibiting juror contact, ostensibly to attempt to determine if there was any type of misconduct. The motion was denied on June 8, 1988.
The decision to limit juror contact rests in the sound discretion of the trial court. See, e.g., State v. Beam, 109 Idaho 616, 710 P.2d 526 (1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1153, 106 S.Ct. 2260, 90 L.Ed.2d 704 (1986). A lawyer's contact with the jury after the jury's discharge must be accompanied by or following reasonable notice to the opposing counsel and other interested counsel. Model Code of Professional Responsibility, DR 7-108(D) (1980); Umphrey v. Sprinkel, 106 Idaho 700, 715, 682 P.2d 1247, 1262 (1983) (Bakes, J., dissenting). This rule guarantees the respective parties their basic right to be notified and have the opportunity to be present should any other party contact a juror, and, as the record shows, it was complied with in the instant case. At the end of the trial, and in open court, plaintiffs' counsel was put on notice that defense counsel wanted to contact the jury following adjournment. Plaintiffs' counsel had the same opportunity as defense counsel had to be present when defense counsel spoke with the jury. In fact, the record demonstrates that even though plaintiffs' counsel was not present initially, plaintiffs' counsel was present later during the post adjournment counsel/jury session. Additionally, given the conduct of plaintiffs' counsel later that evening in contacting individual jurors, and given the jurors reaction to that contact, we cannot find error in the trial court's decision to issue an order prohibiting further juror/counsel contact. We conclude that the trial court properly exercised its discretion, and we affirm its actions in this matter.
XII
Respondent prays for attorney fees on appeal pursuant to I.R.C.P. 54(e)(1) and I.C. § 12-121, alleging that appellants have only attempted to find a more sympathetic trier of fact, and that there is no factual or legal substance to any of the issues raised by appellants in their attack on the jury's unanimous verdict. After reviewing the voluminous record, exhibits, transcripts, and briefs in this case, and after re-listening to the oral arguments presented by the parties on appeal, we are left with the abiding belief that the appeal was brought and pursued frivolously, unreasonably and without foundation. I.R. C.P. 54(e)(1). Accordingly, this Court awards attorney fees on appeal to respondent.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. Costs and attorney fees on appeal to respondent.
HUNTLEY and JOHNSON, JJ., concur.
SHEPARD, J., concurs, except for the award of attorney fees.
. Appellants may well have no standing to assert this issue as an error on appeal. The following discussion between the court and counsel took place near the close of trial:
Mr. Carlson [defense counsel]: The remaining matter, Your Honor, would be the special verdict. Our proposal to eliminate juror confusion with the special verdict is to begin with the question, simple question, whether or not Bendectin caused the plaintiff Sally Crosgrove's birth defect.
The Court: I like your suggestion on that and it is being revised, I think that is a good idea. Mr. Carlson: Okay.
Mr. Tate [plaintiffs' counsel]: We accepted that, Your Honor.
Appellants cannot assert error in the special verdict form when their counsel approved it at trial, even if the issue is somehow properly preserved for appeal. In their reply brief, appellants assert that the transcript is inaccurate, and argue that what Mr. Tate actually said was, "We excepted to that, Your Honor." Attached to Appellants' Reply Brief is a copy of a letter from counsel to the court reporter requesting that the transcript be corrected to reflect that change. However, the court reporter made no change in the transcript, and no objection to the transcript was filed with the court within the 21-day time period provided by Idaho Appellate Rule 29, which would have permitted the trial court to resolve the question of whether the appellants did or did not "accept" the form of the special verdict, based upon the trial court's personal recollection of the statements by counsel at the jury instruction conference. Appellants did file an Objection to Clerk's Transcript on Appeal on July 13, 1988, but their objections dealt with matters other than the transcript correction at issue here. Accordingly, we must rely on the transcript as submitted to this Court.
. Even on appeal counsel for appellants, at oral argument, was not able to explain what Exhibit 237 portrayed. When asked specific questions relative to Exhibit 237, Mr. Harney replied, "I cannot represent, Your Honor, what that [the intent of the apparent sweep line to the right] is." Additionally, when asked specifically regarding Line 92, Mr. Harney responded, "Again, Your Honor, I cannot represent why. This was constructed by Dr. Done who read all of the studies. I did not. I relied upon Dr. Done and his expertise." Finally, the court asked, "Did you establish any foundation as to the questions I just asked you about item number 92?" Mr. Harney answered, "Only in general. I didn't, as I recall, pick out item number 92 and say why do we have that formation at that particular point? . I can't answer that question." From the appellants' argument on appeal we are even more convinced that the trial court was correct in concluding that Plaintiffs' Exhibit 237 was confusing and misleading.