Case Name: Edward A. Schillawski et al., Appellants, v. State of New York, Respondent; S. E. B. Holding Corporation, Appellant, v. State of New York, Respondent
Court: New York Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1961-03-02
Citations: 9 N.Y.2d 235
Docket Number: Claim No. 32769; Claim No. 32760
Parties: Edward A. Schillawski et al., Appellants, v. State of New York, Respondent. S. E. B. Holding Corporation, Appellant, v. State of New York, Respondent.
Judges: 
Reporter: New York Reports
Volume: 9
Pages: 235–242

Head Matter:
Edward A. Schillawski et al., Appellants, v. State of New York, Respondent. S. E. B. Holding Corporation, Appellant, v. State of New York, Respondent.
(Claim No. 32769.)
(Claim No. 32760.)
Argued November 16, 1960;
decided March 2, 1961.
Vincent A. O’Neil for Edmund A. Schillawski and others, appellants.
I. There can be no presumption of a 99-foot highway over claimants’ properties. (Blackman v. Riley, 138 N. Y. 318; Matter of Rochester Elec. Ry. Co., 123 N. Y. 351; Miller v. Brown, 56 N. Y. 383; Saunders v. State of New York, 148 Misc. 712; Matter of City of New York [Brooklyn Ferry], 140 App. Div. 238.) II. No map of the Seneca Turnpike was filed in the Cayuga County Clerk’s office as required by statute. (Bromley v. Mollnar, 179 Misc. 713; Peckham v. Henderson, 27 Barb. 207; Harriman v. Howe, 78 Hun 280, 155 N. Y. 683; Goldrich v. Franklin Gardens Corp., 282 App. Div. 698; Harlow v. Humiston, 6 Cow. 189; People v. Judges of Cortland County, 24 Wend. 491; Talmage v. Huntting, 39 Barb. 654, 29 N. Y. 447; City of Buffalo v. Hoffeld, 6 Misc. 197; Marvin v. Pardee, 64 Barb. 353.) III. The statute was not complied with regarding the acquisition of title to a 6-rod roadbed. (Matter of Water Commissioners of Amsterdam, 96 N. Y. 351; Auburn & Cato Plank Road Co. v. Douglass, 9 N. Y. 444; Crouch v. State of New York, 218 App. Div. 356; People ex rel. Washburn v. Common Council, 128 App. Div. 44; Crisafulli v. State of New York, 198 Misc. 941; Bromley v. Mollnar, 179 Misc. 713.) IV. It does not appear that a 99-foot road was ever “laid out”. (People v. Judges of Cortland County, 24 Wend. 489; Iselin v. Village of Cold Spring, 120 App. Div. 576; Matter of Department of Public Parks, 86 N. Y. 437; Walker v. Caywood, 31 N. Y. 51.) V. The construction of the Seneca Turnpike statutes by the courts below violates the State and Federal Constitutions. (Sage v. City of Brooklyn, 89 N. Y. 189; Chapman v. Gates, 54 N. Y. 132; People ex rel. New York Cent. & H. R. R. R. Co. v. Priest, 206 N. Y. 274.) VI. Any right to a 6-rod right of way has long been abandoned. (Walker v. Caywood, 31 N. Y. 51; Mangam v. Village of Sing Sing, 26 App. Div. 464, 164 N. Y. 560; Barnes v. Midland R. R. Term. Co., 218 N. Y. 91; Driggs v. Phillips, 103 N. Y. 77; Shipston v. City of Niagara Falls, 187 App. Div. 421; Gucker v. Lewis, 249 App. Div. 858.) VII. Claimants’ properties were appropriated by the State. (People v. Sutherland, 252 N. Y. 86; Jones v. Cederquist, 1 Misc 2d 1020; Jones v. Delaware, L. & W. R. R. Co., 208 N. Y. 40; Rochford v. State of New York, 153 Misc. 239, 245 App. Div. 794; Reese v. State of New York, 190 Misc. 316; City of Buffalo v. Pratt, 131 N. Y. 293; Raymond v. State of New York, 4 A D 2d 62, 4 N Y 2d 961.)
Joseph W. Bryan for S. E. B. Holding Corporation, appellant.
Chapter 78 of the Laws of 1800 is unconstitutional, illegal and void. (Sweet v. Rechel, 159 U. S. 380; Sage v. City of Brooklyn, 89 N. Y. 189; Matter of Mayor, Aldermen & Commonalty of City of N. Y., 99 N. Y. 569; Brewster v. Rogers Co., 169 N. Y. 73; Litchfield v. Bond, 186 N. Y. 66; St. Regis Tribe of Mohawk Indians v. State of New York, 4 Misc 2d 110; Bloodgood v. Mohawk & H. R. R. R. Co., 18 Wend. 9; Matter of Rochester Elec. Ry. Co., 123 N. Y. 351; People ex rel. New York Cent. & H. R. R. R. Co. v. Priest, 206 N. Y. 274.)
Louis J. Lefkowitz, Attorney-General {Jean M. Goon and Paxton Blair of counsel), for respondent.
I. Present U. S. Route 20 in the vicinity of claimants’ properties is the Seneca Turnpike established by early State statutes and the State’s highway right of way in Route 20 in that area is 99 feet in width. (Leland v. Cameron, 31 N. Y. 115; People v. Diamond, 199 App. Div. 497, 233 N. Y. 130; Matter of Whitman, 225 N. Y. 1; Hamilton v. Erie R. R. Co., 219 N. Y. 343; Schieffelin v. Goldsmith, 253 N. Y. 243; Kane v. Walsh, 295 N. Y. 198; Matter of Magnotta v. Gerlach, 301 N. Y. 143; Columbia Distilling Co. v. State of New York, 183 App. Div. 345, 227 N. Y. 636; Youmans v. State of New York, 284 App. Div. 823, 309 N. Y. 653.) II. So long as any portion of the width of a highway right of way is opened for travel, the failure to use the remainder of the authorized width does not constitute abandonment of the unused portion of the right of way. (City of Cohoes v. Delaware & Hudson Canal Co., 134 N. Y. 397; Walker v. Caywood, 31 N. Y. 51; Niagara, L. & O. Power Corp. v. State of New York, 187 Misc. 527; Beisheim v. People, 26 Misc 2d 684.) III. Appellants have no standing on this appeal to question the constitutionality of chapter 78 of the Laws of 1800. (Flagg v. Nichols, 307 N. Y. 96; Matter of Zellner [Brooklyn Trust Co.], 299 N. Y. 243; Leviten v. Sandbank, 291 N. Y. 352; Friedman v. Universal Mercerizing Co., 238 App. Div. 805; Bolivar v. Monnat, 232 App. Div. 33.)

Opinion:
Dye, J.
These appeals, by our permission, involve claims for damages arising out of an alleged de facto appropriation of land for use in the reconstruction of a State highway known as U. S. Route 20, which runs in an easterly-westerly direction between the City of Auburn and the Village of Skaneateles. The subject properties are located on a highway east of Auburn. In the course of the work done in 1951-1952, the two-lane concrete sections of the road were widened from 20 feet to 48 feet. The appellants claim that in performing this work the State encroached on lands owned by them.
In the Court of Claims the issue turned on whether the lands in question were within the boundaries of a pre-existing highway easement. The State demonstrated that U. S. Route 20, in the controverted area, originally came into existence as a part of the Seneca Turnpike pursuant to chapter 78 of the Laws of 1800, and the trial court so found. That statute provided for the establishment of the Seneca Road Company and authorized it to build the Seneca Turnpike from Utica to Cayuga Lake and westward to Canandaigua. The statute provided for a right of way six rods in width. The road was to follow as closely as possible the road of the existing Genesee road, also six rods in width.
The extensive proof offered by the claimants to show that the Seneca Turnpike was not improved to its full width does not afford any basis for extinguishing the right to the portion not so improved. Where a road has obtained its character as a public highway by user, its width is determined by the width of the improvement (People v. Sutherland, 252 N. Y. 86; cf. Beisheim v. People, 26 Misc 2d 684). But where the road has been laid out under a statute, it is the statute and not the user that determines the width (Walker v. Caywood, 31 N. Y. 51 [1865]). Nor does the failure of the State to occupy the full width, or to improve the road in the manner provided, constitute an abandonment of the easement of the unused portion (High way Law, § 205; Walker v. Caywood, supra; Beckwith v. Whalen, 65 N. Y. 322; Mangam v. Village of Sing Sing, 26 App. Div. 464, affd. 164 N. Y. 560). Indeed, the statute itself only required improvement over a width of 24 feet.
Marvin v. Pardee (64 Barb. 353), cited by the appellants, dealt with a situation arising under chapter 75 of the Laws of 1806, which was an amendment to the prior act, affecting the Seneca Road Company by requiring the Commissioners to file an accurate map or survey of lands acquired by them in the office of the clerk of the county through which the road passed. There being no proof of statutory compliance as to filing, the court found there was no satisfactory evidence of acquisition. Here, on the other hand, we deal with a situation arising under the Laws of 1800 and that, by its terms, required no filing. That point is, in any event, not decisive.
It was established as a fact, and so found, that Route 20 is the old Seneca Turnpike as laid out pursuant to chapter 78 of the Laws of 1800. Since the Seneca Turnpike was laid out under color of statute, it must be deemed that the State acquired a right of way by prescription to a width of 99 feet as provided for in the statute. This result is in accordance with the widely recognized rule that, where a highway is defectively laid out under color of statutory authority, it will be deemed to create a prescriptive right to the width prescribed by the statute, although greater than the extent of actual user (e.g., Pillsbury v. Brown, 82 Me. 450; State v. Auchard, 22 Mont. 14; McNab v. Town of Trenton, 55 N. S. 160, 63 D. L. R. 306, 13 B. R. C. 734; see 1 Elliott, Roads and Streets [4th ed.], § 193, and numerous cases cited). The statute was notice to all that the road was three rods in width on either side of the center line. In fact, these claimants' own abstracts of title identify this road as the Seneca Turnpike and describe the property conveyed as beginning in the center of the turnpike road subject to the easement for highway purposes. In this light the appellants' contention as to lack of payment is of no consequence. This being so, the alleged encroachment on the north being within the right of way, compensation was properly disallowed. The parcels lying on the south side of the highway were outside of the right of way. However, since the claimants had not established any measure of damages relating to that encroachment no award was made.
The attack on the constitutional validity of the Laws of 1800, raised for the first time in this court, need not detain us. We may consider only issues raised in the court below (Flagg v. Nichols, 307 N. Y. 96, 99). Even if we assume, for sake of argument, that the statute is defective, nothing could be gained by these appellants in having the statute declared invalid since, in any event, the State had acquired a valid prescriptive right of way of 99 feet in width under color of statutory right.
The judgments appealed from should be affirmed, with costs.