Case Name: The State, ex rel. The St. Joseph and Denver City Railroad Co., v. The Comm'rs of Nemaha Co.
Court: Kansas Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Kansas
Decision Date: 1871-01
Citations: 7 Kan. 542
Docket Number: 
Parties: The State, ex rel. The St. Joseph and Denver City Railroad Co., v. The Comm’rs of Nemaha Co.
Judges: Kingman, C. J., concurring.
Reporter: Kansas Reports
Volume: 7
Pages: 542–575

Head Matter:
The State, ex rel. The St. Joseph and Denver City Railroad Co., v. The Comm’rs of Nemaha Co.
1. Aid to Railroads — Validity of Statutes. The acts of the legislature of the State of Kansas authorizing counties and cities to subscribe for stock in railroad companies, and issue bonds in payment of the stock so subscribed for, are constitutional and valid. [Per Valentine, J., and Kingman, C. J., following Comm’rs of Leavenworth Co.v. Miller, ante, p. 4K).]
.2. [Brewer, J., dissenting, files an opinion reviewing the question and authorities, post, p. 549.]
Original Proceedings in Mandamus.
The principal question in this case was the same as ■that decided in the case of Comm’rs of Leavenworth Co. v. Miller, (ante, p. 479,) namely, the constitutionality of ch. 12, Laws of 1865, authorizing cities and counties to subscribe to the capital stock of railroad corporations and issue bonds in payment of such subscriptions. The facts are as follows : On the 8th of May, 1866, an election was held in Nemaha county, by order of the board of county commissioners, at which the qualified electors were authorized to vote upon the question whether the county of Nemaha should subscribe $125,000 to the capital stock of the St. Joseph $ Denver City Railroad Co. A majority of the votes cast were in favor of the proposition. On the 3d of January, 1870, the board of county commissioners, pursuant to the authority given by said, election, subscribed the said sum of $125,000 to the stock of said company. The proposed route of said road designated in the notice for the election traversed Nemaha county, and it is conceded that said railroad has been constructed through said county. After making said subscription the county commissioners refused to issue the bonds of the county in payment thereof. The said railroad company filed a petition or relation in this court, in the name of The State, for a mandamus to compel the commissioners to issue the bonds of their county. The petition alleged — “ That said St. Joseph $ Denver City Railroad Com-“party, the relator herein, has complied with each and all “ of the conditions upon which said subscription was “ made; and that after said conditions had all been so com- “ plied with by relator, said Board of County Commissioners “ refused to receive said stock, although the same was duly “tendered to it by relator, and also refused to issue said “ bonds, or to levy any tax to pay the same, or the interest “ thereon, as required by the terms of said subscription.” On filing the petition the relator moved for an alternative writ of mandamus, which motion was resisted by the defendants.
(References to authorities cited by counsel are very numerous, and being all cited in the opinion in the preceding case of Comm’rs of Leavenworth Co. v. Miller, they are omitted from the briefs.)
Jeff. Chandler, for the relator :
1. The subscription made by defendants was made under and by virtue of an act of the Legislature of the State of Kansas; which act at the time said subscription was made, was in full force and effect. (Laws of 1865, p. 41.) Said act is constitutional, as is shown by the following: 1st, Acts, in all material respects the same as the act in bar, have been sustained in nearly all of the Supreme Courts of the various States, as well as by the Supreme Court of the United States. 2d, Before the court can declare said act unconstitutional, it must be shown to be a clear and palpable violation of some provision of the constitution of Kansas. A doubt is not sufficient. 3d, It cannot be declared void merely because the court regard it as in conflict with natural justice. 4th, Nor can it be so adjudged on the ground that the tax which it provides for the payment of the bonds is not for a public purpose; as the Legislature is the sole judge of this. 5th, Nor can it be contended with reason that said act is in conflict with that provision of the constitution of the State of Kansas which provides that the State cannot be a party to internal improvements.
2. The subscription of said stock by the defendant, and its promise to pay for the same in its bonds, is a contract with the relator, such as has been held by this court in the case of Burnes v. The City of Atchison, 2 Kas., 454, is authorized by the laws of this State; and this court cannot by a later and subsequent decision impair the obligation of said contract made upon the faith of laws as expounded and construed by this court.
3. The board of county commissioners were exclusively authorized to determine whether thfe law was complied with; and having so determined, and made the subscription, they cannot now open that question.
And when the act is unconstitutional, if the subscription is in fact made, the county must pay. (9 Ind., 83; 32 Penn. St., 218, 229, 232, 235.)
4. The expression “ internal improvements,” is technical in polities, and was adopted to indicate improvements made within the limits, and jurisdiction of the States, and so claimed not to be in the power of the United States. It was never used to indicate improvements made by private persons or private corporations. On the contrary this term "originated and was used to apply to works done by the public alone, and for the public. See acts of congress relating to internal improvements.
[B. J?. Stririgfellow, also for the relator, in support of the motion for a mandamus, filed an elaborate argument in favor of the validity of ch. 12, laws of 1865, and reviewing at length the cases in 20 Michigan, 452, and 25 "Wisconsin, 167, which decide adversely to the constitutionality of legislation authorizing municipal aid to railroads. His argument is too long to insert entire, and it cannot well be abbreviated.]
Clough Wheat, and J. E. Taylor, for defendants:
1. It is not within the corporate powers of a county to subscribe to the capital stock of a railroad company, or-to issue bonds of the county in payment, or in pursuance of such subscription, or to levy a tax to raise funds for the purpose of paying such bonds; and the several acts, and parts of acts, of the legislature of the State of Kansas which purport to authorize counties to 'subscribe to the capital stock of railroad corporatiops, and to tax private property to raise funds with which to pay for such stock, are void. 1 Ohio St., 86 ; 19 Wis., 624; 25 Wis., 167; '57 Pa. St., 488; 20 Mich., 452.
So far as any matter material to this case is concerned, the House of Representatives and Senate of this State are only vested with legislative power by § 1, of Art. 2, of the Constitution of this State. And we submit that the enactment of so much of ch. 12, laws of 1865, and ch. 24, laws of 1866, as authorizes counties to subscribe for stock in a railroad, and issue bonds in payment thereof, is not, and was not, an exercise of legislative power.
2. By § 8 of Art. 11 of the constitution, the State is forbidden to be a party to the carrying on of any work of internal impx-ovement. Whatever a county does under the laws of the State, it does as an instrument of the State. A railroad is an internal improvement within the meaning of said § 8, and not a public improvement within the meaning of § 5, of art. 11 of our constitution. By-force of those two sections, as well as from the nature ■of the case and the meaning of the words, there is an ■ essential difference between public and internal improveunents, recognized by the law of this State, and in general 'business throughout the country.
The railroad, if built, and the capital stock of the company owning it, is, and will be private (not public) property. ■‘Such railroad will not be for public use like a state-house ■or court-house, or public highways and bridges thereon, -where all persons at proper times, and for proper purposes may go without fee or reward, as the public use .and convenience may require.' But, on the contrary a .railroad is only to be used, and only intended to be used, when and as such use is to be fully paid for. The public '.have not, in any corporate or other capacity, any more ¡right to use, or to the use of, a railroad, than any individual has to the use of conveyances of common carriers; and. if not, how can the construction thereof, and the appropriation of property therefor, be for a public use.
3. The acts authorizing the subscription of stock, and issue of bonds, authorize taxation to pay said bonds. We ■■submit the effect of said statutes is, if they are not void, to transfer the property of one person to another without compensation, which cannot be done by legislative enactment, even with compensation. Every person has a vested right to retain his own property for his own use, ¡subject to the right of taxation for public use, and to the ¡right of eminent domain, neither of which is called into ¡requisition, so far as any question in this case is con•cerned. A party cannot be deprived of a vested right by legislative enactments.
Where the right of eminent domain stops, there the right to incur any obligation for the public ends. (1 Ohio St., 96; 2 Kent’s Com., 389, 407.) The effect of the right of eminent domain against the individual “ amounts to nothing more than a power to oblige him to sell and convey, when the public necessities require it.” Cooley on Const. Lim., 559, note 4, and cases there cited. And therefore, an act permitting private property to be taken for public use, without requiring compensation to be made, and making provision therefor, is void. 4 Ohio St., 167, 494; 12 Wis., 213; 31 Mo., 181; 6 Wis., 605; 34 111., 203; 20 La. An., 497.
4. The relator claims that the defendants subscribed, on the 3d of January, 1870, for $125,000 of its capital stock, in pursuance of an election held on the 8th of May, 1866. This election was called, and the voting thereat was had, while ch. 12, laws of 1865,' and the amendatory act, ch. 24, laws of 1866, were in force. The votes cast, election held, and orders of the board of commissioners of Nemaha county made, in 1866, did not, either themselves, or with any other matter alleged, (other than the pretended subscription relied on,) constitute a contract, or render the county liable in any manner to any railroad company, or make it the duty of said county to subscribe to the capital stock of any company, or to issue any bonds of the county, or to levy any tax. See.the opinion of this court in the case of The L. G. Pailway and Trust Co., and U. P. Pailway Co., v. The Comm’rs of Davis Co., 6 Kas., 256.
5. A party asking for a writ of mandamus, must show an obligation on the respondents to perform the act, and that the party asking for the writ is legally entitled to have such act performed. And also, that the party against whom the writ is asked to be issued, is in default in the performance of a legal duty. 3 Kas., 88; 25 Maine, 333 ; 9 Mich., 328; Moses on Mandamus, 204.

Opinion:
The opinion of the court was delivered by
Valentine, J.:
This is an application for a writ of mandamus brought originally in this court- by the Saint Joseph and Denver City Railroad Company to compel the Board of County Commissioners of Nemaha county to issue $125,000 of the bonds of said county to said railroad company in payment for a like amount of the capital stock of said railroad company for which it is alleged the county has already subscribed. Many important questions are involved in this case, one of which is the constitutional validity of an act of the Legislature approved February 10th, 1865, authorizing counties and cities to make such subscriptions, and to issue their bonds in payment therefor. (Laws of 1865, ch. 12, p. 41.) This question has been very ably argued on both sides, and if we err in our decision it is our own fault. Our decision is in the affirmative. We think the said act is constitutional and valid.
Before this case was argued or submitted to us, a case from Leavenworth county involving the same question was submitted; (The Board of County Commissioners of the County of Leavenworth v. Edward Miller, ante, p. 479;) and since this case was submitted another case from Morris county supposed to involve the same question has been submitted; (Morris, et al., v. The Comm'rs of Morris County, post, p. 576.) So far as the constitutional validity of said act, or of similar acts; is concerned, we have considered all of these three cases together; and we now render our decision in this case and in that of Commissioners of Leavenworth Co. v. Miller at the same time. In the case last mentioned we give our reasons at length for holding said ch. 12, laws of 1865, to be valid, and it is not necessary to repeat them here. In this case we care fully refrain from expressing any opinion at this time upon the other questions involved. "We shall reserve the consideration of such questions until the return of the alternative' writ of mandamus, when an issue may be formed and the facts found, so that we may know the exact questions in the case.
The alternative writ is allowed.
Kingman, C. J., concurring.