Case Name: Vera HICKS a/k/a Vera Rachelle Hicks, Appellant, v. STATE of Mississippi, Appellee
Court: Mississippi Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Mississippi
Decision Date: 2004-11-30
Citations: 902 So. 2d 626
Docket Number: No. 2003-KA-01110-COA
Parties: Vera HICKS a/k/a Vera Rachelle Hicks, Appellant, v. STATE of Mississippi, Appellee.
Judges: KING, C.J., IRVING, MYERS AND BARNES, JJ„ CONCUR. CHANDLER, J., CONCURS IN PART AND DISSENTS IN PART WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION JOINED BY BRIDGES AND LEE, P.JJ. AND GRIFFIS, J.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 902
Pages: 626–630

Head Matter:
Vera HICKS a/k/a Vera Rachelle Hicks, Appellant, v. STATE of Mississippi, Appellee.
No. 2003-KA-01110-COA.
Court of Appeals of Mississippi.
Nov. 30, 2004.
Rehearing Denied March 15, 2005.
Certiorari Denied May 26, 2005.
Anthony J. Buckley, Laurel, attorney for appellant.
Office of the Attorney General by: Billy L. Gore, attorney for appellee.

Opinion:
ISHEE, J.,
for the Court.
¶ 1. Vera Hicks was convicted in the Circuit Court of Lauderdale County on the charges of felony shoplifting and receiving stolen property. Hicks has appealed asserting that: (1) the trial court erred in not granting the defendant's request for a continuance as to count two of the indictment as the charge was less than one week old; and (2) the State's evidence was legally insufficient to establish the crime of shoplifting. We affirm the conviction as to count one, and reverse and remand as to count two.
STATEMENT OF FACTS AND DISCUSSION
¶ 2. Vera Hicks was originally indicted in Cause No. 167-02 for the charge of felony shoplifting from a K-Mart Department Store on or about January 16, 2002. This cause was set for trial on August 28, 2002. At the trial, the State moved nolle prose-qui on the charge before the jury was seated on the grounds that they wished to re-indict Hicks to show that Hicks had committed felony shoplifting, which was her third offense. Hicks's defense counsel did not object to the nolle prosequi at that time because Hicks had wished to retain new counsel for her defense.
¶3. On November 20, 2002, the grand jury returned a new indictment against Hicks. She was re-indicted in Cause No. 705-02 for the amended charge of felony shoplifting. The grand jury also issued a second count for the felony of receiving stolen property. Hicks was not served with this new indictment until five-o'clock, Friday, December 6, 2002 with her case being set for trial on Monday, December 9, 2002.
¶ 4. When Hicks was served on Friday, December 6, 2002, it was discovered that she had not hired new counsel as she had indicated at her previous court appearance. Therefore, the original trial attorney was called to defend her on her new indictment that Monday morning. The trial attorney stated to the court that he was prepared to go forward on count one, the felony shoplifting charge, but could not try count two, receiving stolen property. .The stolen property count was a brand new charge of which he had no notice because Hicks had only been served with process three days earlier; two of those three days were a weekend in which the courthouse was closed.
¶ 5. Trial counsel made timely objections to trying count two because he had literally only seen the new indictment "three minutes before trial." It is also established in the record that Hicks was served with her new indictment less than seventy-two hours prior to trial. Although the State apparently did not object to a continuance made at Hick's request, the trial court noted that the defense counsel's continuing objection to trying count two would force Hicks to go to trial on both counts.
¶ 6. This Court has-repeatedly said that trial judges have vested in them broad discretionary powers in granting or refusing to grant a continuance. McClendon v. State, 335 So.2d 887 (Miss.1976). Furthermore, unless the trial court abuses its discretion to the prejudice of the defendant, his actions will not be held in error nor will the denial of a motion for continuance be grounds for reversal unless it is shown to have resulted in "manifest injustice." Coleman v. State, 697 So.2d 777 (Miss.1997); Atterberry v. State, 667 So.2d 622 (Miss.1995). In this case, it is clear that it was a manifest injustice to proceed to trial because Hicks had only been indicted less than twenty days prior to trial and had only received the indictment which included a new charge less than sevénty-two hours prior to trial. Furthermore, Hicks was incarcerated and was unable to reach her attorney until the actual morning of the trial. Hicks's attorney had no time to conduct discovery or review any of the matters involving the felony shoplifting charge, including verifying any previous convictions, determining whether or not Hicks had been represented by counsel, or whether she had waived representation in other matters that could go toward a valid defense,
¶ 7. To . uphold Hicks's conviction for possession of stolen property, which occurred approximately seventy-two hours after service of the indictment, would be a manifest injustice to Hicks. Therefore, Hicks's conviction for possession of stolen property is reversed and remanded for a new trial on the ground cited herein. This Court finds Hicks's other issue to be without merit.
¶ 8. THE JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT OF LAUDERDALE COUNTY OF CONVICTION OF COUNT I, FELONY SHOPLIFTING, AND SENTENCE OF FIVE YEARS IN THE CUSTODY OF THE MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS WITHOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF EARLY RELEASE OR PAROLE IS AFFIRMED; COUNT II, POSSESSION OF STOLEN PROPERTY, IS REVERSED AND REMANDED FOR A NEW TRIAL. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO LAUD-ERDALE COUNTY.
KING, C.J., IRVING, MYERS AND BARNES, JJ" CONCUR. CHANDLER, J., CONCURS IN PART AND DISSENTS IN PART WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION JOINED BY BRIDGES AND LEE, P.JJ. AND GRIFFIS, J.