Case Name: Charlie West PHILLIPS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1978-08-02
Citations: 360 So. 2d 1310
Docket Number: No. II-394
Parties: Charlie West PHILLIPS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: BOOTH, J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 360
Pages: 1310–1313

Head Matter:
Charlie West PHILLIPS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. II-394.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
Aug. 2, 1978.
Michael J. Minerva, Public Defender, and Janice G. Scott, Asst. Public Defender, for appellant.
Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., and A. S. Johnston, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

Opinion:
BOYER, Acting Chief Judge.
Appellant pleaded nolo contendere to a charge of possession of a concealed weapon reserving his right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress, asserting that since there was no probable cause to believe that he was armed with a dangerous weapon, the frisk of his person was improper.
The testimony at the hearing on the motion to suppress revealed that in the early afternoon police officers received a call concerning a shoplifting of three packs of Colt .45 Malt Liquor at a convenience store. Upon arrival at the scene, the cashier provided the officer with a description of a young black male shoplifter. Another individual reported that a young black male had exited the area in the company of another black male, specifically describing the ear. A short distance from the scene, a vehicle matching the description given by the witness was located and stopped by' Officer Crosby. Crosby could readily ascertain that the passenger of the vehicle appeared to fit the description given of the alleged shoplifter. After the vehicle stopped, both the driver (appellant) and the passenger got out. Crosby observed in the back seat two six-packs of Colt .45 Malt Liquor. Because Officer Crosby felt that "all passengers or any persons that were in the area or associated with the particular suspect that might have done the crime could be a threat to [his] person", he conducted a pat-down search of each individual. A .25 caliber pistol was found in appellant's left rear pocket. Although prior to the search Officer Crosby had observed a slight bulge in appellant's pocket, he indicated that "it [the bulge] was in the place a wallet might be at."
P.S. 901.151, recognizes the principles set forth in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1969). In that case,the Supreme Court of the United States held that a police officer has a narrowly drawn authority to conduct a reasonable., search for weapons where he has reason to believe that he is dealing with an armed and dangerous individual, even though probable cause to arrest such individual is absent. The issue was formulated as follows: "whether a reasonable prudent man in the circumstances, would be warranted in the belief that his safety or that of others was in danger." (Id. at 27, 88 S.Ct. at 1883.) The court there further noted that due weight should be given to the specific reasonable inferences which the officer is entitled to draw from the facts in the light of his experience.
' Florida courts have examined the totality of the circumstances to determine whether the officer's belief that a person temporarily detained is armed with a dangerous weapon is a reasonable one rather than one based on some "inchoate and un-particularized suspicion or 'hunch' ", specifically condemned in Terry v. Ohio, supra. Observation of a bulge in the clothing of the detainee may justify an officer's belief that the detainee is armed. (Phillips v. State, 284 So.2d 485 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973); Thomas v. State, 250 So.2d 15 (Fla. 1st DCA 1971). See also McNamara v. State, 357 So.2d 410 (Fla.1978); State v. Francois, 355 So.2d 127 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978); Williams v. State, 294 So.2d 37 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974).) The officer's belief that the detainee is armed may be reasonable where the officer has prior knowledge of the detainee, including hearsay reports that the individual is armed. (McNamara v. State, supra; State v. Francois, supra; Ingram v. State, 264 So.2d 109 (Fla. 4th DCA 1972).) The nature of the suspected offense which prompted the officer to initially detain the individual may also bolster the reasonableness of the officer's belief that the individual is armed and dangerous. (Wilson v. State, 324 So.2d 700 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976). See also McNamara v. State, supra; Brown v. State, 358 So.2d 596 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978); Laster v. State, 354 So.2d 1262 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978). Cf. State v. Lundy, 334 So.2d 671 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976).) Additional factors to be considered are the locale and time of the detention and whether the officer is alone at the time of the encounter. (See, e. g., Wilson v. State, supra; Williams v. State, supra; State v. Brooks, 281 So.2d 55 (Fla. 2d DCA 1973).)
Considering the totality of the circumstances, we find the facts here justified both the temporary detention of appellant's vehicle and the limited protective search of both appellant and his passenger. Officer Crosby, pursuing a proper investigative function in the performance of his duties, stopped appellant's vehicle. Once the vehicle was stopped, Crosby observed the alleged fruits of the reported crime in the back seat of the vehicle. At that point, Crosby was confronted with not only the vehicle which apparently had been used incident to a crime, but also with a suspected criminal and perhaps his accomplice. Absent a total dereliction of his duties, Crosby could not at that point turn his back and depart from the situation. (See Ingram v. State, 264 So.2d 109 (Fla. 4th DCA 1972). Neither could he reasonably proceed further without reasonably ascertaining that it was reasonably safe for him to do so.
AFFIRMED.
BOOTH, J., concurs.
SMITH, J., dissents.