Case Name: The STATE, Respondent, V. Frances Ann PRICE, Appellant
Court: Supreme Court of South Carolina
Jurisdiction: South Carolina
Decision Date: 1982-08-23
Citations: 278 S.C. 266
Docket Number: 21779
Parties: The STATE, Respondent, V. Frances Ann PRICE, Appellant.
Judges: Lewis, C.J., and Littlejohn and Gregory, JJ., concur.
Reporter: South Carolina Reports
Volume: 278
Pages: 266–274

Head Matter:
21779
The STATE, Respondent, V. Frances Ann PRICE, Appellant.
(294 S. E. (2d) 426)
Deputy Appellate Defender David W. Carpenter, of S. C. Com’n of Appellate Defense, Columbia, for appellant.
Atty. Gen. Daniel R. McLeod and Asst. Attys. Gen. Harold M. Coombs, Jr., and Preston F. McDaniel, Columbia, and Sol. Claude A. Taylor, Jr., Spartanburg, for respondent.
Aug. 23, 1982.

Opinion:
Ness, Justice:
Appellant was convicted by a jury of accessory after the fact of murder, and sentenced to nine years' imprisonment. She alleges the trial court made several errors requiring a reversal of her conviction. We disagree and affirm.
On September 6, 1980, around midnight, police officers found the body of eight year old Tracie Ann Whiteside in a plastic bag in the attic of appellant's vacant house in Una, South Carolina. Appellant, her husband, and her two boys, Jeffrey age 11 and Randy age 12, lived in a house on the adjoining lot. Appellant's brother and sister-in-law, the par ents of the victim, lived with their two children in the adjacent house on the other side of appellant.
Appellant's two sons testified that they had been playing with the victim in the vacant house when Randy and the victim began to argue. The victim hit Randy's head with a bottle. Randy testified that he thereafter smelled an alcohol odor, placed his hands on the victim's neck and then lost control of his body. When he removed his hands from the victim's neck, she did not move. He returned home and told appellant about the incident. She accompanied the two boys to the vacant house, helped place the victim's body in a plastic garbage bag and then in a box and subsequently carried it to the attic. Thereafter, she and her two sons went to a movie.
Appellant denied that her sons had told her of the victim's death and that she had helped them conceal the body. In addition, appellant asserts that Randy was unconscious when he killed the victim; therefore, no felony had been committed to which appellant could be an accessory.
During trial, appellant's counsel made an offer of proof as to the testimony of a potential defense witness. Over the State's objection, defense counsel sought to have the psychiatrist, who examined Randy at the South Carolina State Hospital after the incident testify:
"... that at the time Randy Price strangled this girl it was committed during the process or the progress of a temporal lobe epileptic seizure during which time Randy Price was unconscious. It was during the postitcal, i-t-ca-1, stage of that seizure and this witness will relate in court that a person in the postitcal stage of a frontal lobe seizure has no capacity to do anything voluntary or to do anything."
The State objected "... that if appellant was able to avail herself of the principal's defenses, then that in itself would be an obstruction of justice." Citing State v. Massey, 267 S. C. 432, 229 S. E. (2d) 332 (1976), the trial judge refused to allow the defense witness to testify. We agree.
It is easy to conceive of a case in which the person who actually committed a homicide could not or might not be convicted by reason of incapacity or some other valid defense, but where the person who procured the commission of the crime and/or, the accessory's culpability is clear.
"There is a variety of reasons why a jury trying only a principal might fail to convict the principal,... To permit a guilty accessory to interpose the fact of the principal's acquittal as a bar to his own trial is a rule which would effectively constitute an obstruction of justice." State v. Massey, supra, 267 S. C. at 446, 229 S. E. (2d) 332.
We cannot accept a doctrine which could exempt a perpetrator from any punishment.
The principal felon, Randy Price, was permitted to testify fully as to the facts surrounding his homicide of the victim and it was further stipulated by the State that he may be suffering from epilepsy. The requirement that the jury in the trial of the accessory must find as a fact the principal did actually commit the crime involved is still the rule. The question of Randy's capacity to commit a criminal act at the time of the homicide was before the jury. "This rule affords the accused accessory the necessary degree of protection." State v. Massey, supra, 267 S. C. at 446, 229 S. E. (2d) 332. The testimony of the psychiatrist as to Randy Price's capacity at the time of the homicide could only be based on a hypothetical question, which could be cumulative on the issue and was properly excluded. In any event the issue of the capacity of Randy Price would only relate to his intent. Moreover, following the testimony of Randy Price the trial court read into the record a stipulation of the parties that the State would recommend in the family court that Randy be allowed to enter a plea to manslaughter. (Tr. p. 531, f. 16).
The trial court has broad discretion in the admission of evidence, State v. Gregory, 198 S. C. 98, 16 S. E. (2d) 532 (1941), and this along with the stipulation of the parties was sufficient to authorize the trial court to refuse to permit the psychiatrist to testify to a hypothetical set of facts. State v. McDowell, 272 S. C. 203, 249 S. E. (2d) 916 (1978); State v. Lee, et al., 203 S. C. 536, 28 S. E. (2d) 402 (1943); 149 ALR 1300.
We further hold the defense of Randy's incapacity is not available to appellant, under the facts of this case, as he testified the victim hit him after an argument, (Tr. 490, f. 23) and that he was angry with the victim. (Tr. 501, f. 6). This Court held in State v. Coyle, 86 S. C. 81, 67 S. E. 24 (1910):
" 'Insanity' arising during the progress of a difficulty voluntarily brought on by defendant, and as the result of a blow rightfully inflicted by his adversary, should not constitute excuse for his after conduct in such difficulty."
Here Randy was already arguing with and angry with the victim. The unconsciousness brought on by the blow to his head during the argument does not constitute a defense to his crime, it only relates to the degree of culpability. The evidence of the psychiatrist was properly excluded.
Appellant next challenges the charge of the trial court where the court charged:
"When you have weighed all of testimony produced by the State and on behalf of the Defendant, Frances Price, and then have applied the law as I charged it to you you are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant knew Randy Price had murdered Trade Whiteside or caused her death and knowing these facts she sheltered, gave aid or in some way assisted Randy Price, it will be your duty to find the Defendant, Frances Price, guilty of being an accessory after the fact ." (Emphasis added).
She asserts this misled the jury. However, the court properly instructed the jury in accordance with State v. Nicholson, et al., 221 S. C. 399, 70 S. E. (2d) 632 (1952) in charging the State must establish beyond a reasonable doubt that Tracie White-side had been murdered and the defendant Frances Price had knowledge that Randy Price had committed the murder. Considering the charge as a whole we find no error. We overrule this exception and affirm.
Affirmed.
Lewis, C.J., and Littlejohn and Gregory, JJ., concur.
Harwell, J., dissents.
We held in State v. Hyde, 90 S. C. 296, 73 S. E. 180 (1912) that where partial or temporary incompetency is asserted, medical experts who had not examined the defendant at the time of the offense cannot testify as to his mental capacity at that time but may testify only to hypothetical questions.