Case Name: THE LAND MORTGAGE CO. v. GILLAM
Court: Supreme Court of South Carolina
Jurisdiction: South Carolina
Decision Date: 1897-05-11
Citations: 49 S.C. 345
Docket Number: 
Parties: THE LAND MORTGAGE CO. v. GILLAM.
Judges: Mr. Justice Pope concurs in the above opinion.
Reporter: South Carolina Reports
Volume: 49
Pages: 345–372

Head Matter:
THE LAND MORTGAGE CO. v. GILLAM.
1. Issues — Circuit Judge — Reversing Order. — A Circuit Judge is not reviewing a previous Circuit order, refusing to refer issues to a jury, by sending out issues, because be may refer issues to enlighten his own conscience, independently of sec. 274a of the Code.
2. This Exception too general, and not in proper form. Method of excepting to matter not passed on by Circuit Judge stated. Divided Cotort.
3. Evidence — Agency may be shown by the acts of the agent and surrounding circumstances.
4. Agent — The Finding oe Fact, that the Corbin Banking Company was the agent of plaintiff in placing the loan, sustained. Divided Court.
5. Ibid. — Usury.—Where the agent of mortgagee, with its knowledge, retains twenty per cent, from the principal of a loan as commissions, and then accepts eight per cent, interest on face of note, it is usury. The Cotirt is divided as to the fact that plaintiff knew these commissions were retained.
6. Counter-Claim — Usury.—Statute oe Limitations. — Claim for penalty for accepting usurious interest is not barred in three years when set up as a counter-claim. Mr. Chiee JUSTICE MclvER dissenting.
7. Usury — Counsel Fee not allowed in this case, because contract held to be usurious, and under such contract plaintiff can only recover amount actually advanced.
8. Insurance — Damages.—In this case, the mortgagee was required to keep the house insured for one-third of the amount loaned, and upon its failure to do so, and the destruction of the property by fire, the mortgagor can recover such one-third with interest.
9. PETITION Eon Rehearing refused.
Before Gary, J., Edgefield, June, 1896.
Affirmed.
Action in foreclosure by the Band Mortgage Investment and Agency Company of America, Limited, against Mattie S. Gillam, S. B. Burton, and Bank of Edgefield, asking for a sale of the mortgaged premises and a judgment for deficiency, and was begun on 14th October, 1892. The complaint, which was served on the defendant, Mattie S. Gillam, on 23d November, 1892, alleges that on the 24th day of December, 1886, the plaintiff, at the request of the defendant, Mattie S. Gillam, advanced and lent her the sum of $1,000, and thereupon the said defendant made and delivered to the plaintiff her principal note, dated on that day and payable on 24th December, 1891, at the office of the Corbin Banking Company in New York city, for $1,000, besides coupons for the interest due before maturity, interest is stipulated in said note to be at the rate of eight per cent, per annum, payable annually; that in order to secure the said note and the covenants contained in the mortgage, the said Mattie S. Gillam executed and delivered to the plaintiff her mortgage, dated January 1st, 1887, recorded January 29th, 1887, covering the lands described in the complaint. The complaint also alleges that the said mortgage contains covenant on part of mortgagor that in the event of foreclosure of mortgage in Court, the mortgagor agrees to pay attorney fee of $100, for which the said mortgage shall stand as security; and the complaint further alleges that the defendants, the Bank of Edgefield and S. B. Burton, claim to have interests or liens on the mortgaged premises that arose subsequently to the lien of plaintiff’s mortgage.
The answer of the defendant, Mattie S. Gillam, which was served on December 13th, 1892, is as follows:
The defendant, Mattie S. Gillatn, answering the complaint herein by Croft & Chafee, her attorneys:
1. Admits that she signed such a note and mortgage as are referred to in the complaint, but that she did not receive the amount of money called for by said note and mortgage, but that she only received the sum of $775, the sum of $25 being retained by the plaintiffs for the purpose of insuring the buildings on the premises of this defendant, and the further sum of $200 was retained by Fred. T. Lockhart, the agent of the plaintiff, as commissions for the benefit in part of said company; and this defendant was required to pay interest on the whole amount of said note, which makes the interest paid in fact by this defendant at the rate of ten per cent, per annum on the money actually borrowed by this defendant, and that said contract is, therefore, usurious, and the plaintiff is not entitled to recover any interest upon the principal suin' of said note.
2. This defendant, further answering the complaint herein, and by way of counter-claim, alleges that she has paid to the plaintiff the sum of $80 for interest on the 1st day of December, 1887, and the sum of $80 on the 1st day of December, 1888, 1889, 1890, respectively, the same being charged as interest on the said note. That this defendant only received the loan of $800, although her note was given for $1,000, so that the interest actually paid by this defendant to the plaintiff was at the rate of ten per cent, per annum on the money borrowed, and that the plaintiffs are, therefore, guilty of usury in making such contract, and in receiving such amount of interest; and that by reason of such unlawful acton the part of the plaintiffs this defendant is entitled to receive of the plaintiffs the sum of $192, with interest on $48 from the 1st day of December, 1887, and interest on $48 from the 1st day of December, 1888, and interest on $48 from the 1st day of December, 1889, and interest on $48 from the 1st day of December, 1890.
3. This defendant, further answering the complaint herein, and by way of a second counter-claim, alleges that at the time of the execution of said note and mortgage, the plaintiffs, through their agent, retained $25 of the money which was charged in the loan to this defendant, which they alleged was for the purpose of insuring the buildings on the mortgaged premises, for the purpose of securing said loan, and which insurance the plaintiffs, through their agent, agreed to take out to the amount of $1,000, but that the plaintiffs and their agent were so negligent and unmindful of their agreement, that they failed so to do.
4. That on or about the 12th day of December, 1891, the dwelling house on said premises was destroyed by fire, thereby causing a loss to and damage to this defendant in the sum of $1,000, and this defendant charges that said lóss and damage was caused solely by the negligence of the plaintiffs and their agent to effect said insurance as they agreed to do, to the damage of this defendant in the sum of $1,300.
5. This defendant, further answering the complaint, denies each and every other allegation therein contained, which has not hereinbefore been specifically admitted. Wherefore, this defendant demands judgment that the complaint be dismissed.
2. For the sum of $192, with interest as aforesaid, as demanded in the first counter-claim.
3. For the sum of $1,300, her damage sustained, as alleged in the second counter-claim.
4. For such other relief as may be just, and the costs of this action.
Exhibit ■
The Corbin Banking Company, No. 115 Broadway, N. Y. [Stamp.] In order to save the wrapper notice instruction on the back how to open. New York, Feb. 9, 5.30 P. M. ’87. M. S. Gillam, Winter Seat, S. C. No. 41315. Very important! 1st. Preserve this carefully. 2d. If you sell your farm, give this to the purchaser. 3d. The payments named below must be made at “The Corbin Banking Company’s office” in New York, promptly, with all charges prepaid. Better always have money there a few days before due. Failure to pay promptly causes the whole debt to become due, and the mortgage may be foreclosed at once. 4th. In thirty days after you send remittance you should have an answer. -If you do not, write the company for explanation. 5th. Always refer in every letter to the No. of your loan, as at the head of this paper. 6th. It is important to keep this paper, because you will get no further notice, and this gives the amounts to be paid, and when, and a failure to pay as named exposes you to danger of costs and trouble. 7th. The principal and interest of all loans negotiated through the Corbin Banking Company are payable only at the company’s office, No. 115 Broadway, N. Y. 8th. The company has no agents who are authorized to receive payments. 9th. No payments made to bankers or others for remittance will in any case be recognized until the money reaches the company’s- office. 10th. Money paid elsewhere than at said office will be at borrower’s own risk. 11th. Payments mature as follows: December 1st, 18 . Interest, $ . Commission note, $ December 1st, 1887. Interest, $74.66. Commission note, $ December 1st, 1888. Interest, $80.00. Commission note, $ December 1st, 1889. Interest, $80.00. Commission note. $ December 1st, 1890. Interest, $80.00. Commission note, $ December 24, 1891. Interest, $85.34. Commission note, $ December 24, 1891. Principal, $1,000.
Exhibit 3.
The Corbin Banking Company, 192 Broadway and 11 John street, New York, 1-16-92. Mrs. Mattie A. Gillam, No. 901 Broad st., Augusta, Ga. — Dear Madam: We have yours of the 13th, stating that on the 12th of December your house burned down, and you stated the fact to Mr. Bockhart, and asked him. to communicate with us, and he has told you that he could not hear from us in relation to this matter. His letter, dated December 19th, was received by us December 23d in relation to this matter. We replied to him on the 24th of December, stating that no policy had been sent us in connection with your loan; that no demand was ever made by the lender or us for such policy. If, as you state, you paid Mr. Lockhart a premium for insurance, you will have settle with him that matter. Allow us, however, to call your attention to the fact that your loan is delinquent since December 24, 1891, at which date principal and interest amounted to $1,085.34. It is necessary that you should communicate to us what you are going to do in relation to this payment. Yours truly, The Corbin Bkg. Co.
Exhibit “Z>” — Agreement.
Edgefield County, S. C., January 1st, 1887. The Corbin Banking Company. I hereby constitute you my agents, and request and authorize you as such to negotiate for me a loan of $1,000, on five years1 time, with interest at eight per cent, per annum, payable annually, at such place as you may name; said loan to be evidenced by my note of the form used by you; and said note and loan to be secured by a mortgage on or an absolute deed (consented to by my wife) to my farm, consisting of 264 acres, situated about five miles of the town of Troy, in Edgefield County, South Carolina. Said mortgage or deed is to be of the form used by you, and in case an absolute deed is given, the lender to give bond to reconvey said property to me on compliance with the terms and conditions stated therein, according to the printed blánks used by you in pursuance of sections 1969, 1970, and 1971 of the Code of Georgia of 1873, interest to commence on the day this application is accepted by the lender from whom you obtain the money. I further agree to pay you for negotiating said loan a commission of $200, to be paid at the time of closing the loan; and if I decline to accept the loan fof any reason, I agree to pay said commission at once. I also authorize you to pay off all liens (including taxes due) against said property; and I hereby certify that the total amount of indebtedness against said property does not exceed $ . I hereby am thorize you to insure said property for $ , for years, in such company as you may select, and pay the premium out of the loan. I further certify that there has been no building or improvement to building made on said premises during the last three months. I also hereby agree to pay the cost of recording my deed or mortgage, as also the cost of an abstract of title covering property offered as security for this loan. Mattie S. Gillam.
South Carolina, Edgefield County. Personallyappeared before me, Mrs. Mattie S. Gillam, and made oath she signed the within agreement for the uses and purposes herein mentioned. Sworn to before me, January 6th, 1887. [l. S.] Wiley Timmerman, Notary Public So. Ca.
The Circuit decree is as follows:
This is an action by the plaintiff to foreclose a mortgage executed by the defendant, Mattie S. Gillam, on her house and lot in Edgefield County, on the 1st day of January, 1887, to secure the payment of a note made by her on the 24th day of December, 1886, in the sum of $1,000, and more particularly described in the complaint. The defendant, Mattie S. Gillam, admitted in her answer to the said complaint that she signed the said note and mortgage, but alleged that she did not receive the amount of money therein mentioned; that she only received the sum of $775, the sum of $25 having been retained by the plaintiff for the purpose of insuring the dwelling on said premises, and the further sum of $200 being retained by Ered. T. Eockhart, the agent of the plaintiff, as commissions for the benefit in part of s^id compan}'; that she was required to pay interest on the whole amount of said note, and that the interest paid on the amount actually loaned was at the rate of ten per cent, per annum, and, therefore, usurious. The defendant, Mattie S. Gillam, also set up a counter-claim, alleging that she has paid to the plaintiff as interest the sum of $80 on the 1st day of December, 1887, 1888, 1889, and 1890, respectively, and that by reason of this usurious interest she is entitled to recover from the plaintiff the sum of $192, with interest, as therein mentioned. She also set up a counter-claim for $1,300 damages, alleged to have been incurred by reason of the fact that the plaintiff failed to insure her house, which was destroyed by fire on the 12th day of December, 1891 — the said sum of $25, as she alleges, having been reserved from the money borrowed for the purpose of insuring said building.
The plaintiff replied to the counter-claim, denying the same; and pleaded the statute of limitations as to payments of usurious interest, made three years prior to the 12th December, 1892 (the date of the service of the counter-claim). The real issues in the case, therefore, are: 1st. Usury; and, 2d. The liability of the plaintiff for damages incurred by reason of the failure to insure the building which was destroyed by fire.
I will first consider the question of usury. The case of Brown v. Brown, 38 S. C., 173, decides that, if the plaintiff has knowledge, at the time the contract was entered into, of the exorbitant commissions charged by the Corbin Banking Company, then such contract was usurious. After a careful consideration of all the testimony, I am inclined to the opinion that the Corbin Banking Company acted as the agent of the plaintiff in negotiating the loan, and also that the plaintiff had actual knowledge of the “exorbitant” commissions charged by the Corbin Banking Company. But now, if such was not the case, I am satisfied, and find as matter of fact, that the facts and circumstances connected with the loan were sufficient to have put the plaintiff on inquiry, and that such inquiry, if it had been pursued with due diligence, would have disclosed the fact that the '•'■exorbitant^ commissions aforesaid would have been charged. Black v. Childs, 14 S. C., 312; Aulman v. Moy, 34 S. C., 561. The litigation throughout the country to which this plaintiff has been subjected on account of the exorbitant commissions which the Corbin Banking Company has for years been charging, and the great number of loans which the Corbin Banking Company has negotiated with the plaintiff (so many that it could not tell the number), were sufficient to have caused inquiry in any one, except those who might find it to their advantage to remain in ignorance of the facts. The defense of tmiry is, therefore, sustained.
The plea of the statute of limitations is overruled, as it has no application to this case.
The remaining question in the case, arises out of the defense interposed by way of counter-claim, alleging damages sustained by the defendant on account of the plaintiff’s failure to insure her dwelling house according to agreement. It appears that, at the time the note and mortgage were executed, Mr. F. T. Lockhart retained the sum of $25 of the money which was charged in the loan to this defendant for the purpose of insuring the dwelling house on the mortgaged premises. He failed to have the building insured, which was destroyed by fire on or about the 12th day of December, 1891. An issue of fact was framed, submitting to a jury the question as to the value of the said dwelling house at the time it was destroyed by fire. The jury rendered a verdict, finding that said building was of the value of $1,053.90 at the time of the fire. I find as a matter of fact that the plaintiff agreed to insure the property destroyed by fire as aforesaid. I also find as a matter of fact that the dwelling house was of the value of $1,000, and should have been insured, under the said agreement, for three-fourths of its value, to wit: $750. I, therefore, sustain the verdict of the jury to this extent.
I conclude, as matter of law, that the second counterclaim should be sustained to the amount of $750, with interest thereon from the date of said fire.
It is ordered and decreed, that this cause be referred to the master for Fdgefield County to compute the amount now due, .in accordance with the principles herein announced, and that the parties hereto have leave to apply at the foot of this decree for such orders as may be necessary to carry into effect the views herein stated.
From this decree the plaintiff appeals.
Messrs. Allen J. Green and John T. Sloan, for appellant,
cite: Order referring isstie to jury after previous Circuit order referring to master 'is void: 16 S. C., 362; 47 S. C., 547; 13 S. C., 368; 21 S. E. R., 3; 3 Strob., 36.' Usury: 39 S. C., 175; 37 S. C., 579; 38 S. C., 173; 44 S. C., 93; 20 U. S. C. C. of App., 306; 1 S. C., 227. One dealing with agent must show atithority to bind principal: 10 Rich. R., 338; 27 S. C., 134; 39 S. C., 535; 33 S. C., 231; 44 S. C., 478; 96 Ga., 227; 82 Ga., 299; 58 Fed. R., 613. Lender mustpar-ticipate in lisurious charges: Rev. Stat., 1390,1391; 54 Ark., 40; 13 Stewart Eq., 502; 43 N. J., 15; 100 Ill., 611; 141 U. S., 402; 58 Fed. Rep., 613. Statitie of limitations: 18 S. C., 282.
Messrs. G. W. Croft and Sheppard Bros., contra,
cite: Any Judge may refer issues to jury: 21 S. E. R., 3. Proof of agency: 22' S. E. R., 601; 33 S. C., 233; 31 S. C., 89. Usury: 38 S. C., 173; 32 Fed. Rep., 113; 145 W. Rep., 769.
May 11, 1897.

Opinion:
The opinions in this case were filed on April 3,1897, but the remittitur was stayed on petition for rehearing until
The opinion of the Court was delivered by
Mr. Justice Gary.
The facts out of which the issues herein arose, are set forth in the Case, and they, together with the decree of his Honor, Judge Gary, will be incorporated in the report of the case.
The appellant's exception to the order of Judge Townsend is as follows: "Plaintiff excepts to the order of Judge Townsend, of 16th August, 1895, referring certain issues to a jury; because the said order is without jurisdiction and void, in that it disregards and reverses the order of Judge Witherspoon, refusing to refer issues to a jury in this case." Even if it should be conceded that the defendant, Mattie S. Gillam, was precluded by the order of his Honor, Judge Witherspoon, dated 23d March, 1893, from having a trial by jury, under section 274a of the Code, as to the issue tried by the jury before Judge Gary, this exception could not be sustained. Independently of section 274a of the Code, the Circuit Judge has the right, in a chancery case, to refer issues to a jury for the enlightenment of his conscience. Hammond v. Foreman, 43 S. C., 264. The order of Judge Townsend must be regarded as an exercise of this right. No doubt this was why Judge Witherspoon refused to vacate the order of Judge Townsend, and why Judge Gary decided the issue of fact which had been referred to the jury, which he would not have had the power to do if the issue had been referred to the jury, under section 274a of the Code.
The first exception to Judge Gary's decree is as follows: "1. That his Honor erred in not ruling out, on the objection of plaintiff, as incompetent and irrelevant, the following testimony: (a) All the testimony of Mattie S. Gillam and J. B. Gillam, her husband, as to acts and declarations of Fred. T. Lockhart at the time of the transaction, tending to show whom he represented, 'and for whom he was acting in the transaction, the same being an attempt to prove agency, by the acts and declarations of the very person whose agency is the question at issue. (¿) All the testimony of Mattie S. Gillam and her husband, as to the agency of Fred. T. Lockhart with the plaintiff company, the same being conclusions and deductions drawn from the acts and declarations of the person whose agency is sought to be established." This exception is too general for consideration, in that it fails to point out any particular error—Sims v. Jones, 43 S. C., 99—and for the further reason, it does not appear that the Circuit Judge ruled, or was requested to rule, on the competency of said testimony. If the Circuit Judge had been requested to rule on the competency of said testimony, and had failed to do so, the proper exception would have been to complain of error on the part of the Circuit Judge in failing to rule upon its competency, but not of error in not ruling out said testimony. Willis v. Tozer, 44 S. C., 16.
But even waiving all technical objections to the excep tion, it cannot be sustained. J. B. Gillam and Mattie S. Gillam both testified that i/ockhart was acting as the agent of the Corbin Banking Co., but neither of them testified to any declarations of Lockhart that he was the agent of plaintiff or any one else. The acts of Lockhart, tending to show whom he represented, were competent evidence, to be considered, in connection with the other facts in the case, in determining the question of agency.
The second exception to Judge Gary's decree alleges error in holding that the contract sued on was usurious. In reaching a conclusion upon this question, it is very important to determine whether the Corbin Banking Co. was the agent of the plaintiff in negotiating the loan. After carefully considering all the testimony in the case, the Court is of the opinion that the Corbin Banking Co. was the agent of the plaintiff in negotiating the loan, and that it was in pursuance of a scheme on the part of the plaintiff and the Corbin Banking Co. to evade the usury laws; and, as might naturally be expected in such cases, the question of agency has, to a great extent, to be shown by circumstances instead of direct evidence. Without attempting to detail all the circumstances inducing such belief, we will mention some which are very material: The witness, J. B. Gillam, says: " that the interest called to be paid in 1887, 1888, 1889, and 1890, he paid by sending to the Corbin Banking Co, Every time that witness would send this money the Corbin Banking Co. would send him back an interest coupon The plaintiff never called upon him for any money. All the communications were from -the Corbin Banking Co." To the same effect is the testimony of Mrs. Mattie S. Gillam. The circular and the letter of' the Corbin Banking Co. to Mrs. Gil-lam, marked "exhibit 2" and "exhibit 3," which will be set out in the report of the case, also tend strongly to prove agency on the part of the Corbin Banking Co. The testimony tended to show that all papers were prepared by the Corbin Banking Co., that they sent the money to be disbursed, collected all interest for the plaintiff, sent the coupons to the defendant, Mattie S. Gillam, when they were paid, required all the money to be paid to the Corbin Banking Co., and all communications were to be addressed to said company. The testimony also showed that the plaintiff made other loans through the Corbin Banking Co.
Having determined the question of agency, we proceed to consider the question of usury.. The mortgage sued upon was executed on 1st January, 1887; to secure note of 24th December, 1886, for $1,000, payable in five years, with annual interest until paid at the rate of eight per cent, per annum, unpaid interest to bear interest after maturity at the rate of ten per cent, per annum, and also an attorney's fee of ten per cent, of the principal and interest due, as provided in the notes and .mortgage. When the loan was consummated, the Corbin Banking Company deducted • commissions, amounting to $200, besides other sums hereinafter mentioned. This was done with knowledge on the part of the plaintiff. Under the case of Brown v. Brown, 38 S. C., 173, these facts constitute usury. The appellant asked and was granted leave to review the case of Brown v. Brown, supra. This case has been affirmed in subsequent cases by reference to its authority; and, after careful consideration, this Court sees no reason to depart from its principles. The appellant's attorneys contend that even if the contract was rendered usurious by deducting the $200 commissions, still it was not usury for the plaintiff to receive the interest, as it did not exceed ten per cent, per annum on the amount which the defendant, Mattie S. Gillam, actually received, to wit: $800 — the law at the time of the contract allowing the lender to charge ten per cent, where it was expressed in a written instrument. There might be force in this argument were it not that the agreement as to commissions and the payment of interest formed parts of a single transaction. Sections 1390 and 1391 of the Rev. Stat. are as follows: Section 1390. "No greater rate of interest than (7) seven per centum per annum shall be charged, taken, agreed upon or allowed upon any contract arising in this State for the hiring, lending or use of money or other commodity, except upon written contracts, wherein, by express agreement, a rate of interest not exceeding eight per cent, [formerly ten] may be charged. No person or corporation lending or advancing money or other commodity upon a. greater rate of interest shall be allowed to recover in any Court in this State any portion of interest so unlawfully charged; and the principal sum, amount or value so lent or advanced, without any interest, shall be deemed and taken by the Courts of this State to be the true legal debt or measure of damages, to all intents and purposes whatsoever, to be recovered without costs. Section 1391. Any person or corporation who shall receive as interest any greater amount than is provided for in the preceding section shall, in addition to the forfeiture therein provided for, forfeit, also, double the sum received, to be collected by separate action or allowed as a counterclaim to any action brought to recover the principal sum." Usury as to the $200 commissions falls within the provisions of the section first set out, while that arising from the receipt of unlawful interest comes within the other section. Under the first section, the lender can only collect the amount actually advanced without costs; but under the second section, the lender receiving unlawful interest shall also forfeit double the sum so received, collectable in a separate action or allowable as a counter-claim to an action to recover the principal snm.
The third exception complains of error on the part of the Circuit Judge in overruling the plea of the statute of limitations. The appellant contends that the claim for an usurious charge of interest is in the nature of a penalty, and is barred after three years before the Commencement of the action. This view is in direct conflict with section 1391, supra. Under that section the party who has paid usurious interest has two remedies, one is to bring a separate action, and the other is to set up a counterclaim to the action for the sum lent to him. Without undertaking to say what effect the statute of limitations would have, where a separate action is brought, the statute of limitations has no application to this case.
The next exception complains of error on the part of the Circuit Judge in not allowing the counsel fee provided for in the mortgage. The intention of section 1390 is to allow the plaintiff to recover only the sum actually advanced; and to allow a fee for foreclosure of the mortgage would be to add to the statute. The plaintiff is not even allowed costs, and for as strong a reason counsel fees cannot be allowed.
The fifth exception questions the correctness of his Honor's'ruling in regard to the insurance. This exception is partly disposed of by what has been said herein-before as to agency. The facts show that the plaintiff was bound by the agreement, and we will proceed to consider whether there was error as to the amount allowed. The fifth section of the mortgage shows that the property was to be insured to an amount equal to one-third of the principal of the loan. The true principal of the loan was |800. One-third of $800 is, therefore, the amount which should be allowed, with interest from the date of the fire.
The sixth exception cannot be sustained, because the defendant, Mattie S. Gillam, was not notified that the property had not been insured.
It is the judgment of this Court, that the judgment of the Circuit'Court be modified as to the amount due for failure to insure the property, but that in all other respects it be affirmed.
Mr. Justice Pope concurs in the above opinion.