Case Name: Albert William SCHLEICHER, Movant-Appellant, v. STATE of Missouri, Respondent
Court: Supreme Court of Missouri
Jurisdiction: Missouri
Decision Date: 1972-07-17
Citations: 483 S.W.2d 393
Docket Number: No. 56508
Parties: Albert William SCHLEICHER, Movant-Appellant, v. STATE of Missouri, Respondent.
Judges: DONNELLY, MORGAN, HOLMAN and HENLEY, JJ., concur; FINCH, C. J., concurs in separate concurring opinion filed; BARDGETT, J., concurs in result and concurs in separate, concurring opinion of FINCH, C. J.; SEILER, J., dissents in separate dissenting opinion filed.
Reporter: South Western Reporter Second Series
Volume: 483
Pages: 393–395

Head Matter:
Albert William SCHLEICHER, Movant-Appellant, v. STATE of Missouri, Respondent.
No. 56508.
Supreme Court of Missouri, En Banc.
July 17, 1972.
Earl Susman, Leonard Komen, Susman, Wilier, Rimmel & Elbert, St. Louis, for appellant.
John C. Danforth, Atty. Gen., G. Michael O’Neal, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, for respondent.

Opinion:
HOLMAN, Presiding Judge.
Movant (hereinafter referred to as defendant) has appealed from an order of the circuit court, made after an evidentiary hearing, overruling his motion to vacate filed pursuant to S.Ct. Rule 27.26, V.A.M. R.
At a trial by jury defendant was convicted of burglary, second degree, and stealing and was sentenced by the court (under § 556.280, V.A.M.S.) to four years' imprisonment for the burglary and four years for the stealing, the sentences to run consecutively. He appealed and this court affirmed. State v. Schleicher, Mo.Sup., 442 S.W.2d 19.
The motion to vacate alleges as its sole ground that "illegal and inadmissible evidence (fingerprints) were introduced into evidence at trial in violation of Article I, § 15, Missouri Constitution, and Fourth Amendment." A brief statement of facts will suffice. On November 16, 1966, a burglary occurred at the residence of Joseph Stelman in St. Louis. The police lifted fingerprints from a plastic tray and they were placed in the latent fingerprint file. There is a conflict in the evidence concerning the exact time of defendant's arrest. However, there is evidence to support the trial court's finding that he was arrested on February 3, 1967, upon suspicion that he had burglarized Jack's Lounge in St. Louis. On February 4, 1967, he was again arrested (while still in custody) upon a fugitive warrant for a burglary in St. Louis County. He was processed and fingerprinted. Later that day it was discovered that defendant's prints matched those found at the Stelman home and he was charged with that burglary. At the trial the fingerprint evidence was the only evidence which connected defendant with the offense. No motion to suppress the fingerprint evidence was filed, no objection was made to it at the trial, and it was not mentioned in the motion for new trial or on appeal.
As indicated, defendant seeks to vacate the judgment of conviction on the contention that his fingerprints were inadmissible and the admission thereof violated the constitutional provisions cited. Defendant says that his arrest was illegal because there was no warrant nor probable cause and hence his fingerprints should have been excluded. He cites Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 89 S.Ct. 1394, 22 L.Ed.2d 676, and Bynum v. United States, 104 U.S.App.D.C. 368, 262 F.2d 465, which appear to support the view that the Fourth Amendment would preclude the admission of fingerprints which were the product of a defendant's unlawful detention.
We have the view that we need not determine the issue concerning the validity of defendant's arrest. This for the reason that we agree with the finding of the trial court that "movant has waived the right to raise at this time any question pertaining to his arrest and 'booking' by failure to properly raise and preserve the point by pre-trial motion, trial objection, motion for new trial, or on original appeal. The case of Bynum v. United States, supra, was decided December 15, 1958, and the principle was not novel at the time of movant's trial in September 1967. Unless raised by pretrial motion the same cannot be the subject of a collateral attack under Rule 27.26, State v. Caffey, Mo., 457 S.W.2d 657; Collins v. State, Mo., 454 S.W.2d 917."
In State v. Caffey, Mo.Sup., 457 S.W.2d 657, at 659, we stated that "a claim of illegal search and seizure is not such a matter as may be raised in a collateral attack upon a judgment of conviction. State v. Holland, Mo.Sup., 412 S.W.2d 184. 'Not only must defendant file a motion to suppress the controverted evidence, but he has the burden of presenting evidence to sustain his contentions.' He must also keep the question alive by timely objection, State v. Tunnell, 302 Mo. 433, 259 S.W. 128; State v. Hepperman, 349 Mo. 681, 162 S.W.2d 878, and by preservation of the issue in a motion for new trial." The issue relating to fingerprint evidence is analogous to search and seizure and the contention of its inadmissibility in this case is based on the constitutional provisions prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures.
Defendant seeks to avoid a ruling that he has waived the right to question the admissibility of the evidence by asserting that he was deprived of his constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel by failure of his trial counsel to object to its admission. This contention cannot be considered because it is mentioned for the first time on this appeal. There was no allegation relating to it in the motion, no evidence concerning it and, of course, no finding by the trial court upon that point.
Finally, defendant requests that we review the question concerning the admissibility of his fingerprints under S.Ct. Rule 27.20(c). We reject that request because we are not convinced that this presents a question involving "plain error" which has resulted in "manifest injustice."
Judgment affirmed.
PER CURIAM.
The foregoing opinion by HOLMAN, J., is adopted as the opinion of the Court En Banc.
DONNELLY, MORGAN, HOLMAN and HENLEY, JJ., concur; FINCH, C. J., concurs in separate concurring opinion filed; BARDGETT, J., concurs in result and concurs in separate, concurring opinion of FINCH, C. J.; SEILER, J., dissents in separate dissenting opinion filed.