Case Name: ELIZABETH LUDLOW, Respondent, v. THE HUDSON RIVER RAILROAD COMPANY, Appellant
Court: New York Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1875-04
Citations: 11 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 239
Docket Number: 
Parties: ELIZABETH LUDLOW, Respondent, v. THE HUDSON RIVER RAILROAD COMPANY, Appellant.
Judges: 
Reporter: Supreme Court Reports (Hun)
Volume: 11
Pages: 239–244

Head Matter:
ELIZABETH LUDLOW, Respondent, v. THE HUDSON RIVER RAILROAD COMPANY, Appellant.
Lateral support—when owner of adjoining lamds estopped from asserting right to — Effect of deed with habendum “ to the uses and purposes ” of a raib'dad.
The plaintiff conveyed certain land to the defendant, “ for materials,” “ to have and to hold * * * to the uses and purposes of said railroad, and for no other or different purpose.” It was understood hy the parties that a part of the land was taken as a source from which to obtain material for other portions of the railroad. By reason of the excavation made for that purpose on such part, the other land of plaintiff was deprived of its lateral support, and slid into the excavation. Reid, in an action brought to recover damages sustained by plaintiff by reason of such slide, that she was estopped from claiming the right to the lateral support by her deed, which contemplated the use made of the land by the defendant.
This is an appeal from a judgment for plaintiff, entered on the verdict of a jury at the Columbia Circuit, and from an order denying a motion for a new trial.
The action was brought to recover for damages to land of the plaintiff, by the same sliding down and caving in by reason of excavations and removing of earth by the defendant, at the time of the construction of its road.
F. Loomis, for the appellant.
J. C. Newkirk, for the respondent.

Opinion:
James, J.:
This action was brought to recover for damages sustained by the plaintiff by the sliding down of her land into an excavation made by the defendant adjoining thereto in obtaining materials for the construction of its road-bed. The excavation was made in 1851, 1852, and 1853, and the sliding down was in 1864. The plaintiff had a verdict and judgment.
The principal and the important question presented by this case, is as to the plaintiff's right to the lateral support of the land excavated and removed, under the facts of this case.
Previous to February, 1851, the plaintiff owned all the land in question. In that month of that year, she, for a valuable consideration, sold and conveyed to the defendant a strip of land across her farm, 100 feet wide, for a roadway for defendant's railroad, and also another piece of land east of the east line of said roadway, "for material," to have and to hold said parcels of land to said defendant as a corporation, " its successors and assjgns, to the uses and purposes of said railroad, and for no other or different purpose." In 1851, the defendant entered upon said parcels of land and began the construction of its road-bed, and continued until finished, and, at the same time, to obtain materials wherewith to construct said road-bed, the defendant excavated and removed the soil from said last named piece, until the excavation reached the depth of thirty feet, thus weakening the lateral support to adjoining lands of plaintiff, to such a degree that the soil slid down into said excavation as alleged in the complaint.
The question of negligence does not arise on this appeal, because the court instructed the jury, " if they found the sliding down of plaintiff's land was occasioned by excavation on, and the removal of the earth from, the parcel sold 'for materials, the defendant was liable under the law; " and the same in substance was repeated and assented to by the court, in answer to repeated requests to charge by the counsel for plaintiff.
. The purposes for which defendant desired the land were well known to the plaintiff at the time of executing her deed, and were quite clearly expressed therein; and the presumption is that a price therefor was asked and given commensurate with its value and the consequences likely to follow from its excavation and use for the purposes contemplated.
It is clearly apparent that these parcels of land were "of no particular value to the defendant, except for railroad purposes, and the one parcel was only desired for the material which might he obtained from it for the purposes of constructing its railroad; and if taken and used for that purpose, it could not longer furnish lateral support to adjoining lands. As the plaintiff owned the entire territory, the part excavated as well as the part which slid down, and saw fit to sell a portion thereof for removal, with the right to excavate and remove, it amounted to a legal consent that the lateral support furnished by such piece of land. to her other land adjoining, might be withdrawn, and thereby released the grantee and his assigns from any damages which might arise to such adjoining soil by any excavation or removal of soil therefrom. The plaintiff is therefore estopped by her deed from claiming damages.
An estoppel arises where one has done some act, or executed and delivered some deed, which precludes him from averring the contrary. Here the defendant did an act authorized by the deed — an act contemplated and expressly authorized by the deed; and hence the plaintiff cannot complain of, or recover for, damages naturally resulting from a proper exercise of the rights authorized. This parcel of land in the hands of the defendant, was not subservient to the obligation of lateral support to adjoining land owned by the plaintiff. The defendant has not a fee-simple, but only a qualified fee; the mere right to excavate and remove earth therefrom for material for its road-bed, terminating with the use, and then reverting to the plaintiff; in substance and legal effect, a license to excavate and remove. In principle, this ease is like that of Ryckman v. Gillis, recently decided in the Commission of Appeals. In that case the defendant sold a-parcel of land, reserving the right to take clay and sand from a portion of it for making brick. Excavations were made, clay and sand removed,,, and a slide into the excavation resulted, as in this case. The court held - that " the doctrine of lateral support, incident to and affecting adjoining lands owned by different proprietors, did not apply to such case." I repeat, in principle the cases are exactly alike, and both should be decided the same way.
Judgment reversed, and new trial granted, costs to abide the event.