Case Name: Jerry CHATMAN v. Willard MILLIS, Jr.
Court: Arkansas Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Arkansas
Decision Date: 1975-01-13
Citations: 257 Ark. 451
Docket Number: 74-139
Parties: Jerry CHATMAN v. Willard MILLIS, Jr.
Judges: Jones, J., concurs.
Reporter: Arkansas Reports
Volume: 257
Pages: 451–466

Head Matter:
Jerry CHATMAN v. Willard MILLIS, Jr.
74-139
517 S.W. 2d 504
Opinion delivered January 13, 1975
Boyett & Morgan, P.A., by: Comer Boyett, Jr., for appellant.
Pickens, Boyce, McLarty & Watson, by: James A. McLarty, for appellee.

Opinion:
Carleton Harris, Chief Justice.
The question in this case is whether appellee, a psychologist, can be held liable to appellant for malpractice under the facts hereinafter set out. The facts as set forth in appellant's complaint are as follows. Mrs. Robbie Chatman was divorced from her husband, appellant herein. Appellant had visitation privileges with the couple's 2Vi year old son. Mrs. Chatman, partly because of actions of the child, became concerned that her ex-husband had subjected the child to homosexual conduct, and, as a matter of terminating the father's visiting privileges, sought the aid of appellee in evaluating appellant's conduct. After talking with Mrs. Chatman and the child, appellee wrote her attorney a letter advising that Mrs. Chatman and her child had been referred to him by Dr. Ben Lowery for the purpose of his providing assistance in determining whether or not the child (Christopher) had been sexually molested by his father, and if so, the future implications for Christopher's psychosex-ual development. In this letter, Dr. Millis, Jr. went into detail as to comment made to him by Christopher and concluded his letter by stating:
"While it will be the Court's decision, and not mine, 1 feel that it would not be a good idea to allow Chris to continue to visit his father at all. If it is necessary that visitation rights be continued, I would strongly urge that the presence of a third person, preferably a relative, be in their presence at all times.
"As I mentioned in our telephone conversation of April 10, 1973 I would be willing to testify in Court about my interview or the statements made in the letter above."
Thereafter, Chatman instituted suit in the Circuit Court of White County, home of Chatman, alleging both defamation of character, and malpractice against appellee. Service was had on appellee at his residence in Jackson County. Millis responded to the complaint with a special appearance and motion to quash asserting that venue in White County was improper in that appellee was neither a citizen not resident of White County, and further, was not served in White County.
On hearing, the court held no action for malpractice exists in this state against a psychologist; that even if such an action were permitted in this jurisdiction, there would have to be a doctor - patient relationship or some similar relationship between the parties, and that the complaint in the instant litigation alleged, and counsel had admitted, that Chatman had never been examined by Millis, and in fact, was not even known to the doctor; accordingly, there could be no action for malpractice. The court then found:
"Since there is no cause of action for malpractice the only cause of action left is defamation of character the proper venue of which is not in White County the motion to quash the service of summons upon the defendant should be granted."
Appellant admits after the holding of the court that there was a iack of relationship between the parties to support the malpractice action, the complaint was correctly dismissed because of improper venue on the remaining count of defamation.
It is not necessary, in determining this litigation, to pass on the question of whether there is a cause of action in Arkansas for malpractice available against a psychological examiner or psychologist, since we are of the view that, even though such a cause of action exists, the allegations of appellant's complaint do not state a cause of action.
We do not flatly state that a cause for malpractice must be predicated upon a contractual agreement between a doctor (psychologist) and patient, but we do say that a doctor-patient relationship must exist, i.e., there must be a duty, asa doctor, owed from the practitioner to the patient. Under the allegations before us, Millis made no examination of Chat-man; in fact, he did not even know Chatman, and had never seen him. Appellant was not a patient of Millis, and the diagnosis reached was not for the benefit of Chatman. Even if the findings of the psychologist were negligently made, Chat-man did not rely upon this diagnosis to his detriment.
Of course, all persons owe a duty to refrain from defaming others, but this is simply a duty that all citizens have toward each other, and has nothing to do with a doctor-patient relationship. After all, Chatman was not damaged by the allegedly negligent diagnosis — he was damaged by the alleged defamation. An example given by appellee appears pertinent to illustrate the point. Let us assume that a physician is engaged in lighthearted pleasure at a large cocktail party. Assume further that this physician openly refers to a non-patient individual, and by name, refers to him as a homosexual. Certainly, under these circumstances, the physician might be found to have slandered that person's character, and, if so found, held to be answerable to that person for damages sustained. However, the fact that the speaker happened to be a physician does not mean that what was said constituted malpractice.
Concisely stated, we simply reiterate that under the facts alleged, appellee owed no duty, as a doctor, to appellant, and this duty must be in existence before appellant can recover because of negligence, constituting malpractice.
Since we agree that, under the allegations, no action for malpractice exists, and it being admitted that the complaint was correctly dismissed because of improper venue on the defamation count, the judgment quashing the service is affirmed.
It is so ordered.
Jones, J., concurs.
Brown and Fogleman, JJ., dissent.