Case Name: Brenda K. McCLISH, etc., Appellant, v. Mark E. LEE, etc., Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1994-02-11
Citations: 633 So. 2d 56
Docket Number: No. 93-243
Parties: Brenda K. McCLISH, etc., Appellant, v. Mark E. LEE, etc., Appellee.
Judges: HARRIS, C.J., and DAUKSCH, COBB, GOSHORN, PETERSON, GRIFFIN and DIAMANTIS JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 633
Pages: 56–61

Head Matter:
Brenda K. McCLISH, etc., Appellant, v. Mark E. LEE, etc., Appellee.
No. 93-243.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
Feb. 11, 1994.
Raymond A. McLeod, McLeod, McLeod & McLeod, P.A., Apopka, for appellant.
Brett L. Swigert, Gaylord & Gaylord, P.A., Eustis, for appellee.

Opinion:
ON REHEARING EN BANC
HARRIS, Chief Judge.
After a short marriage and two children, Mark and Brenda Lee (now Brenda McClish) divorced in 1974. Pursuant to a property settlement agreement incorporated in the Final Judgment, Mark was required to pay Brenda twenty-five dollars per week as a contribution toward the child support for the children whose custody was awarded to her.
Mark has paid no support under the Final Judgment. However, in 1975, the parties entered into a new agreement under which Mark agreed to give up his visitation rights and, in consideration therefor, Brenda released Mark from any obligation to pay support in the future. This agreement was filed with the court on February 18, 1976. Neither party, at that time, petitioned the court to approve the agreement.
Brenda honored the agreement throughout the minority of the children. Both children were emancipated by July, 1991. One child is now deceased; the other has disclaimed any interest in delinquent child support payments.
In 1991, Mark inherited some money from his father. Soon thereafter Brenda, for the first time, filed a contempt action to collect $36,125.43 in child support arrearages accruing during the sixteen years she had remained silent. The trial court, instead of awarding the entire arrearage, awarded her only that portion of the court-ordered support that accrued from the date of the Final Judgment until the date of her agreement waiving any further support. She appeals; we affirm.
Brenda was not seeking the arrearages on behalf of the children, but rather for reimbursement to her to compensate her for moneys she may have expended in raising the children. In other words, she was seeking money owed to her.
Clearly, parties to a marriage cannot, as a matter of law and public policy, contract away the child's right to support. This principle is so well established that it needs no citation of authority. Just as clear ly, however, parties do have the right to contract as between themselves as to whom will assume particular obligations. For example, a mother who earns a high income and is well able to provide all necessary child support should be permitted, as between herself and her husband, to agree to provide the child support in exchange for the husband's interest in the marital home. Such an agreement cannot be interpreted as "contracting away the child's right of support." If the mother thereafter becomes unable or unwilling to provide the child support, as between the child and the father, the father would have an absolute obligation to provide the support. But if he does, he should have an action over against the wife, in contract, for a return of his interest in the home.
In our case, the wife is seeking money due her which she contracted away. The issue, therefore, is whether the contract is a valid basis for denying the mother's claim. The mother contends that there was a failure of consideration because, even though the father contractually gave up his right to visitation, he continued, with her consent, to exercise some visitation. We see a distinction, however, between visitation as a matter of enforceable right and visitation based on the goodwill of the former wife. Mark clearly gave up something in exchange for the agreement. The question, then, is whether the mother who received the benefit of her bargain, can repudiate the agreement after the children reach majority.
Although we are concerned with the public policy implications of permitting a father to contract away his visitation rights (which quite obviously will also affect the child's right to the companionship of his father) and might hold such agreement invalid in a suit brought on the child's behalf to set it aside, we recognize, as did this court in Robinson v. State Dept. of Health & Rehab., 473 So.2d 228 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985), that under certain circumstances the absence of a parent's visitation may be beneficial to the family unit. For that reason we hold that such an agreement is, at most, voidable and not void.
Consistent with Robinson, we agree with the trial court's implicit finding that the mother's delay until the visitation issue is no longer relevant, constitutes laches which bars her now from challenging the agreement.
The final issue concerns the determination of attorney's fees. The trial judge indicated that he would bifurcate the proceedings and conduct a separate hearing on the issue of attorney's fees. As a result of his statement, neither McClish nor Lee placed evidence in the record as to Lee's ability to pay attorney's fees. Although it is within a trial court's discretion to grant or deny attorney's fees, Lester v. Lester, 547 So.2d 1241, 1243 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989), there has to be an evidentiary basis for the determination. See § 61.16, Fla.Stat. (1991). The court did hear testimony that McClish could not afford an attorney unless she entered into a contingency fee arrangement with her trial counsel. The court also heard that Lee was able to pay her attorney's fees and child support arrearage based upon an admission he filed. The trial judge's order is not consistent with the testimony presented. We remand the issue to the trial court so evi dence can be presented for a factual determination of this issue. Jones v. Jones, 606 So.2d 748, 749 (Fla. 6th DCA 1992), quashed on other grounds by 624 So.2d 263 (Fla.1993). Parenthetically, the trial judge raised the question of whether the Florida Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 4 — 1.5(f), allows an attorney to take this case on a contingency arrangement. This issue should be fully argued by both counsel.
AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and REMANDED for determination of attorney's fees.
HARRIS, C.J., and DAUKSCH, COBB, GOSHORN, PETERSON, GRIFFIN and DIAMANTIS JJ., concur.
THOMPSON, J., dissents with opinion in which W. SHARP, J., concurs.
. This same distinction is made in Robinson v. State Dept. of Health & Rehab., 473 So.2d 228 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985):
Here, the former wife filed the action for ar-rearages shortly before the last of the children reached majority. Thus, the children's welfare would not be jeopardized by denying the ar-rearages. The former wife is not pursuing the children's current needs, but seeking to recoup payments she and her current husband expended for the children during their minority.
.The dissent would hold that after the judgment of dissolution, the parties are not free to agree, as between themselves, to alter any provisions of the judgment without first obtaining the court's approval. While we agree that the court might refuse to recognize the amendments made by the parties that it has not approved, in this case the court did, in fact, approve and enforce the parties' modification. Concerning the dissent's point that there were no pleadings before the court that would authorize the court to approve the parties' amendment, we submit that the filing of the amendment with the court is in the nature of a stipulation. We find the court had the discretion to approve the agreement and find no error.
. Perhaps at her insistence. As the trial judge court found: "The children were left with the former husband's mother during substantial periods of time, and were left at the former husband's home at the former wife's request on at least two occasions."
. The trial court found, "the former husband complied with the agreement and the time that he has lost with the minor children can never be recouped. One child is now deceased and the second child is above the age of majority."