Case Name: Keith BAREIS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1998-03-13
Citations: 708 So. 2d 622
Docket Number: No. 97-946
Parties: Keith BAREIS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: ANTOON, J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 708
Pages: 622–625

Head Matter:
Keith BAREIS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. 97-946.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
March 13, 1998.
Rehearing Denied April 28, 1998.
James B. Gibson, Public Defender, and Rebecca M. Becker, Assistant Public Defender, Daytona Beach, for Appellant.
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Kelli R. Omdorff, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appel-lee.

Opinion:
GOSHORN, Judge.
Appellant challenges the upward departure sentence imposed following his failure to appear for his initial sentencing. He argues that because he was never specifically advised that failing to abide by a condition of his plea would permit the court to impose an upward departure sentence, it was error for the court to enter the departure sentence. We affirm.
Appellant entered into a written plea agreement with the State in which he acknowledged:
I understand and agree that if I fail to comply with any of the conditions set forth above I will have breached my plea agreement. In that event, I will not be allowed to withdraw my plea and the Judge may sentence me to any sentence authorized by law for the offense(s) to which I have pled.
(Emphasis supplied). The trial court accepted Appellant's plea and, after setting the case for sentencing, stated,
Mr. Bareis, you have entered into a plea agreement with me whereby you agree to get your drug evaluation and pre-sentence investigation done and come to court on time, sober and ready for sentencing.
You understand?
íH ‡ íH
All you have to do is show up where you're supposed to. We'll give you instructions on how to do that and where you have to go.
I want you to know if you don't do these things, I'm not bound by the penalty agreement of the plea document.
You understand?
Appellant answered affirmatively.
Unfortunately, Appellant failed to appear for sentencing. When he was finally brought before the court for sentencing, the trial court entered a departure sentence, writing, "Defendant failed to comply with the conditions of the plea agreement by failing to appear for sentencing and failing to 'get his drug evaluation[.] Quarterman v. State, 527 So.2d 1380 (Fla.1988)." Appellant's subsequent rule 3.800(b) motion to correct the sentence was denied. Appellant argues on appeal that the sentence was an improper departure. We disagree.
In Quarterman, the defendant was informed that a term of his plea agreement included that if he failed to show up for court, "the Court's offer would not be binding on the Court and the Court could sentence him to anything in the Court's discretion." 527 So.2d at 1381. The defendant agreed to these conditions, then failed to appear for sentencing. The trial court imposed a departure sentence. On appeal, the supreme court affirmed the departure sentence because it was based not only on the fact of nonappearance, but .also on the plea agreement itself.
Quarterman controls the instant case as there is no meaningful distinction between an agreement to be sentenced to "anything" and an agreement to be sentenced to "any sentence authorized by law." Certainly implicit in "anything" is the requirement that the sentence be "authorized by law." A departure sentence is, assuredly, authorized by law and hence comes -within the terms of the agreement. Accordingly, we conclude that a departure sentence was within the contemplation of the plea agreement and was properly imposed upon Appellant's failure to appear. Bright v. State, 679 So.2d 1218 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996) is distinguishable in that there, the agreement did not provide for any possible legal sentence if the defendant failed to appear, but rather provided that upon the defendant's failure to appear, the state's recommendation for an agreed-to sentence would be withdrawn. The agreement in Bright did not open the door to the possibility of a departure sentence; rather, it closed the door on the agreed-to sentence.
AFFIRMED.
ANTOON, J., concurs.
GRIFFIN, C.J., dissents, with opinion.