Case Name: STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Walter A. BELL, Appellant
Court: Iowa Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Iowa
Decision Date: 1997-12-24
Citations: 572 N.W.2d 910
Docket Number: No. 96-2254
Parties: STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Walter A. BELL, Appellant.
Judges: Considered by HARRIS, P.J., and LARSON, CARTER, LAVORATO, and SNELL, JJ.
Reporter: North Western Reporter 2d
Volume: 572
Pages: 910–916

Head Matter:
STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Walter A. BELL, Appellant.
No. 96-2254.
Supreme Court of Iowa.
Dec. 24, 1997.
James L. Beres of Sween & Beres, P.C., Eldora, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Mary Tabor, Assistant Attorney General, Richard N. Dunn, County Attorney, and Chad Frese and Tim Eppler, Assistant County Attorneys, for appellee.
Considered by HARRIS, P.J., and LARSON, CARTER, LAVORATO, and SNELL, JJ.

Opinion:
LARSON, Justice.
Walter Bell pled guilty to possession of marijuana in violation of Iowa Code section 124.401(3) (1995). As part of the sentence, the court ordered that Bell's driver's license be revoked as provided by 1996 Iowa Acts chapter 1218, section 68 (now codified at Iowa Code section 901.5(10) (1997)). Bell appealed on the grounds that the revocation order violated the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the United States and Iowa Constitutions. U.S. Const, amends. V, XIV, § 1, Iowa Const, art. I, § 9 (due process); U.S. Const, amend. XIV, § 1, Iowa Const, art. I, § 6 (equal protection). We affirm.
Because Bell raises constitutional claims, we review the case de novo. Bruns v. State, 503 N.W.2d 607, 609 (Iowa 1993). Because of their similarity, we will treat the issues under the federal and state constitutional provisions simultaneously. Bell concedes that his driving privilege does not rise to the level of a fundamental right and that the statute does not create a suspect classification; therefore, his constitutional claims are examined under a rational-basis analysis. Glowacki v. State Bd. of Med. Exam'rs, 501 N.W.2d 539, 541 (Iowa 1993). Under this analysis, a statute is constitutional "unless it is patently arbitrary and bears no rational relationship to a legitimate governmental interest." Id. Under the rational-basis test, (1) the statute must serve a legitimate governmental interest, and (2) the means employed by the statute must bear a rational relationship to that interest. Id.
The statute in question, Iowa Code § 901.5(10) (1997), provides:
In addition to any sentence imposed pursuant to chapter 902 [felonies] or 903 [misdemeanors], the court shall order the state department of transportation to revoke the defendant's driver's license or motor vehicle operating privilege for a period of one hundred eighty days . if the defendant is being sentenced for any of the following offenses:
a. A controlled substance offense under section 124.401_
Statutes are presumed to be constitutional, and the challenger carries a heavy burden of rebutting this presumption. Glowacki, 501 N.W.2d at 541. We are reluctant to interfere with the legislature's latitude in fixing punishment, and to be found unconstitutional, a statute "must clearly, palpably, and without doubt infringe upon the constitution." Id. (citations omitted). The prevailing view is that statutes similar to the one in this case are valid under the rational-basis test for due process and equal protection. See generally Jeffrey T. Walter, Annotation, Validity and Application of Statute or Regulation Authorizing Revocation or Suspension of Driver's License for Reason Unrelated to Use of, or Ability to Operate, Motor Vehicle, 18 A.L.R.5th 542, 551 (1994 & Supp. 1997).
I. The Due Process Claim.
Bell argues that the revocation requirement is an extreme response to a minor offense such as possession of marijuana. He contends that the revocation of driving privileges bears no significant relationship to the legislative objective of public safety on the highway. However, under the rational-basis test, it is not enough for a party challenging the statute to show that the connection between the governmental purpose and the means used is "insignificant." The challenger must show that the statute bears no rational relationship to the government's interest. Glowacki, 501 N.W.2d at 541.
A number of courts in other jurisdictions have held that similar statutes are valid under the rational-basis test. See, e.g., People v. Zinn, 843 P.2d 1351, 1354 (Colo.1993) (revocation sanction reasonable in view of governmental objective to prevent possession, use, or sale of controlled substances); Lite v. State, 617 So.2d 1058, 1060 (Fla.1993) (penalty rationally related to deterrence goal); Quiller v. Bowman, 262 Ga. 769, 425 S.E.2d 641, 642-43 (1993) (license suspension furthers state's goal of deterring illegal drug use and transportation of illegal drugs); Mitchell v. State, 659 N.E.2d 112, 116 (Ind. 1995) (statute bears rational relationship to legitimate state interest in punishing and deterring lawbreaking).
We conclude, as have these and other courts, that punishment in the form of a license revocation is rationally related to the goals of the legislature in punishing and deterring the commission of crime.
II. The Equal Protection Claim.
Bell contends that this statute singles out drug offenders from other criminal defendants without a rational basis for doing so. He claims that the limitation to drug offenders is arbitrary because the mandatory revocation provision could also effectively deter crimes such as theft, burglary, and rape. He also points out that the statute imposes "the same penalty upon casual users of marijuana and repeat dealers of crack cocaine," thereby suggesting that the statute is overbroad.
We have held that all persons need not be treated alike to meet constitutional standards for equal protection. Hack v. Auger, 228 N.W.2d 42, 43 (Iowa 1975). Moreover, the legislature has wide discretion in defining the limits of classes when a statute involves classifications of persons or things. If a classification is a reasonable one and operates equally , upon all within the class, it is a valid classification. State v. Hall, 227 N.W.2d 192, 194 (Iowa 1975).
We have stated the test for equal protection as follows:
"[T]he classification must be sustained unless it is patently arbitrary and bears no rational relationship to a legitimate governmental interest. It does not deny equal protection simply because in practice it results in some inequality; practical problems of government permit rough accommodations; and the classification will be upheld if any state of facts reasonably can be conceived to justify it."
Id. (quoting Lunday v. Vogelmann, 213 N.W.2d 904, 907 (Iowa 1973) (citations omitted)).
There are a number of possible state interests that the statute advances. The legislature may have concluded that individuals convicted of drug offenses are more likely to cause dangerous conditions on public roads than are other criminal defendants because their drug use actually may impair their driving abilities. Moreover, the legislature may have believed that the statute would cut down on the transportation and trafficking of drugs and, therefore, the use of drugs, while it may not have believed that a similar revocation statute for more violent crimes would have reduced the incidence of such crimes. Any of these reasons would be sufficient to show that the statute is not patently arbitrary and therefore does not violate the Equal Protection Clause.
Decisions from other states have upheld similar statutes on equal protection grounds. In fact, this appears to be the majority view. For example, the Georgia Supreme Court upheld a statute that required the suspension of the driver's license of anyone who was convicted of possession of a controlled substance or marijuana. Quiller, 425 S.E.2d at 642. The court concluded:
[T]he statute does not violate equal protection. The disparate treatment between persons convicted of illegal drug possession and persons convicted of other crimes bears a reasonable relationship to the statute's purpose in deterring drug use, curtailing the distribution of drugs, and protecting motorists. Committing the crimes of murder, assault, rape, and other violent acts, although dangerous, do not normally interfere with the driving ability of the offender. In contrast, the driving judgment and ability of a person who possesses and uses illegal drugs, like a juvenile who illegally possesses and drinks alcohol, is likely to be impaired.
Id., at 643.
Likewise, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts found no equal protection violation in a statute that required the automatic suspension of the driver's license of anyone convicted of violating the state's Controlled Substances Act. Rushworth v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles, 418 Mass. 265, 596 N.E.2d 340, 341-42 (1992). The court outlined the possible goals of the legislature and its means for achieving those goals, noting:
The Legislature appears to have determined that persons convicted of less serious drug offenses should suffer the penalty of license suspension while more serious offenders should be incarcerated. The Legislature may also have decided that added measures were needed to discourage drug use among "casual" drug users and to prevent impaired driving. That [the statute], in practice, may have an impact in a disproportionate manner on drug offenders who operate motor vehicles does not offend the equal protection clause.... Under the rationality test, [the statute] is clearly constitutional.
Id., at 345 (citation omitted).
The Iowa Legislature may have had similar objectives in mind when it promulgated Iowa Code section 901.5(10). We have in analogous circumstances held that the legislature may treat different types of criminals differently for various purposes. See, e.g., State v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 508 N.W.2d 692, 694 (Iowa 1993) (statute preventing third-degree sex offenders from receiving bail does not violate equal protection); State v. Fagen, 323 N.W.2d 242, 243 (Iowa 1982) (statute imposing mandatory term of imprisonment for forcible felony does not violate equal protection).
Bell relies on language in Hills v. Iowa Department of Transportation, 534 N.W.2d 640 (Iowa 1995), which, he claims, supports his argument that there is no rational basis for connecting drug use and motor vehicle safety. In Hills we said:
Persons who illegally possess drugs are of course subject to appropriate criminal punishment. But many such persons choose not to drive. When they do not, they do not affect highway safety. Any connection between drugs, driving, and public safety is at most indirect. The amended statute [Iowa Code section 321.209(8)] authorizing this license revocation was aimed essentially at enhancing punishment for controlled substance possession. As such it was quasi-criminal and not civil in nature. Ex post facto principles therefore prohibit application of the amended statute.
Id. at 642.
Hills is distinguishable from the present case for several reasons. Hills held that the license revocation statute was quasi-criminal, not civil, and therefore was subject to challenge as an ex post facto law because it enhanced the penalty for the earlier criminal investigation. Id. Hills was not an equal protection case. While it characterized the connection between drugs and highway safety as "indirect," it did not hold the connection to be irrational. Bell, in the present case, demonstrated that; the drugs were seized from a car occupied by him.
In a case following Hills, Dressler v. Iowa Department of Transportation, 542 N.W.2d 563 (Iowa 1996), we again said that the revocation statute, Iowa Code section 321.209(8) (which was later amended, apparently in response to Dressier), was penal, not civil, and
[bjeeause section 321.209(8) twice punishes Dressier for the same offense — possession of a controlled substance — in a separate proceeding, we conclude it unconstitutionally contravenes Dressler's double jeopardy guarantees.
Id. at 566. Dressler, again, did not involve an equal protection argument, and nothing in that case suggests that the connection be tween drug usage and highway safety could not provide a rational basis for the statute.
In addition to a rational basis in promoting highway safety, the legislature may have rationally intended that the revocation provision curtail the distribution of drugs, an activity directly related to the use of motor vehicles. See Quiller, 425 S.E.2d at 643.
We conclude that Bell has failed to demonstrate that the license-revocation statute lacks any rational basis for treating drug offenders differently from other criminal offenders. Therefore, we reject his equal protection argument.
AFFIRMED.
All justices concur except SNELL, J., who dissents.