Case Name: STATE of Louisiana v. John R. NEYREY
Court: Louisiana Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1976-05-17
Citations: 341 So. 2d 319
Docket Number: No. 57163
Parties: STATE of Louisiana v. John R. NEYREY.
Judges: DIXON, J., dissents being of the opinion the procedure here followed constituted compliance with the constitutional provision, and with the full consent of the district attorney.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 341
Pages: 319–327

Head Matter:
STATE of Louisiana v. John R. NEYREY.
No. 57163.
Supreme Court of Louisiana.
May 17, 1976.
On Rehearing Oct. 6, 1976.
Rehearing Denied Nov. 5, 1976.
Michael S. Fawer, Matthew H. Green-baum, New Orleans, for defendant-relator.
William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Kendall Vick, Barbara Rutledge, J. Wensles Parra, Jr., and George T. Mustakas, Asst. Attys. Gen., Robert L. Livingston, Jr., W. Glenn Burns, Former Asst. Attys. Gen., for plaintiff-respondent.
William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Barbara Rutledge, Asst. Atty. Gen., John M. Mamoulides, Dist. Atty., Abbott J. Reeves, Director, Research and Appeals Division, Parish of Jefferson, Metairie, for amicus-curiae.

Opinion:
SANDERS, Chief Justice.
On the strength of two affidavits filed by a former associate, alleging theft of $16,-152.00, John R. Neyrey was arrested. The next day, March 17, 1972, Neyrey was released on bond. On March 23, 1972, because of a possible conflict of interest on the part of staff members, the District Attorney of Jefferson Parish by letter assigned "the complete handling of this matter to the Attorney General's Office including the investigation of same and/or prosecution."
On January 7, 1975, an Assistant Attorney General filed a bill of information charging Neyrey with the theft for which he had been arrested in 1972. Defendant filed a motion to quash the indictment, alleging that under Article 4, Section 8 of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974, the Attorney General had not followed the requirements for instituting prosecution and that he had been denied his right to a speedy trial. After a hearing, a trial court denied the motion, but stayed all proceedings, pending final disposition of an application for writs. On defendant's application, we granted supervisory writs, La., 325 So.2d 269 (1976).
This Court granted writs to consider Article 4, Section 8 of the 1974 Louisiana Constitution and its application to the procedures of this case. The pertinent part of that section provides:
"As necessary for the assertion or protection of any right or interest of the state, the attorney general shall have authority (1) to institute, prosecute, or intervene in any civil action or proceeding; (2) upon the written request of a district attorney, to advise and assist in the prosecution of any criminal case; and (3) for cause, when authorized by the court which would have original jurisdiction and subject to judicial review, (a) to institute, prosecute, or intervene in any criminal action or proceeding, or (b) to supersede any attorney representing the state in any civil or criminal action."
Although the relator was arrested in 1972, the Attorney General's office filed no bill of information until 1975. At the time of relator's arrest, the Louisiana Constitution of 1921 outlined the powers of the Attorney General's office in Article 7, Section 56, as follows:
"The Attorney General and the assistants shall be learned in the law and shall have actually resided and practiced law, as duly licensed attorneys, in the State for at least five years preceding their election and appointment. They, or one • of them, shall attend to, and have charge of all legal matters in which the State has an interest, or to which the State is a party, with -power and authority to institute and prosecute or to intervene in any and all suits or other proceedings, civil or criminal, as they may deem necessary for the assertion or protection of the rights and interests of the State. They shall exercise supervision over the several district attorneys throughout the State, and perform all other duties imposed by law." (Italics ours.)
In 1972, under the 1921 Constitution, the Attorney General clearly had general authority to institute and prosecute criminal proceedings. The Attorney General, however, filed the present bill of information after the 1974 Constitution became effective.
The relator asserts that under the new Constitution the Attorney General is authorized to institute criminal proceedings only under the conditions specified in Subsection (3) (a), which requires prior judicial authorization upon a showing of cause by the Attorney General. He argues, there fore, that because there was no judicial authorization before the filing of the bill of information, the bill was defective, and the motion to quash should have been sustained.
On the other hand, the State argues that Sub-section (3) (a) prescribes the manner in which the Attorney General may institute criminal proceedings without the concurrence of the district attorney. The State reasons that filing a bill of information is within the ambit of the authority to "advise and assist." Alternatively, the State maintains that if judicial authorization was required in this case, the defect in the bill of information was cured when the trial court issued an Order for Authorization to Proceed with Prosecution on the same day that it denied the relator's motion to quash.
In support of their arguments, both parties cite excerpts from the Proceedings of the Constitutional Convention. After a thorough reading of the debate on this Constitutional provision, we conclude that the Constitutional Convention did not specifically consider whether the Attorney General's office was authorized to institute a criminal proceeding upon the request of the district attorney without authorization by the trial court for cause.
However, when generally discussing the Attorney General's authority to institute a criminal prosecution under the new provision, the consensus was that this authority vested after he obtained a court order.
Besides the change in terminology vesting the Attorney General with the authority to institute criminal prosecutions, it is also clear from the proceedings that the intent of the Constitutional Convention delegates was definitely to restrict the Attorney General's power to institute criminal proceedings.
When the new provision is analyzed in the light of the general intent, only one reasonable interpretation follows: the Attorney General can institute a criminal proceeding for cause only after authorization by the court. This conclusion is buttressed by the numerical classification of authority in the provision. The authority to advise and assist in the prosecution of a criminal case is separated in a numbered section from the third distinct authority, to institute, prosecute or intervene for cause when authorized by the court.
The State alternatively argues that even if the proper procedures for instituting suit were not followed in filing the bill of information, this defect was cured when the trial court authorized the Attorney General to proceed with the prosecution. In support of this argument, the State cites Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure Article 487, which provides for the correction of a bill of information by amendment. Article 487 provides:
"An indictment that charges an offense in accordance with the provisions of this Title shall not be invalid or insufficient because of any defect or imperfection in, or omission of, any matter of form only, or because of any miswriting, misspelling, or improper English, or because of any use of any sign, symbol, figure, or abbreviation, or because any similar defect, imperfection, omission, or uncertainty exists therein. The court may at any time cause the indictment to be amended in respect to any such formal defect, imperfection, omission, or uncertainty.
"Before the trial begins the court may order an indictment amended with respect to a defect of substance. After the trial begins a mistrial shall be ordered on the ground of a defect of substance."
This article is inapplicable to the present case. As the Assistant Attorney Gen eral had no authority to sign and file the bill of information without first securing court authorization, it was null ab initio.
For the reasons assigned, the district court judgment denying the relator's motion to quash is reversed, the motion to quash is sustained, and the defendant is discharged from custody under the present bill of information.
DIXON, J., dissents being of the opinion the procedure here followed constituted compliance with the constitutional provision, and with the full consent of the district attorney.
DENNIS, J., dissents and assigns reasons.
. Judge (now Justice) Dennis, Chairman of the Judiciary Committee, reiterated the meaning of the new provision stating, " . (L)ets make it crystal clear that the attorney general can, after he gets a court order, start a prosecution where one is warranted." (Emphasis added.) XI Proceedings (35th day) 78. Later that day he stated, " . an attorney general can go get a court order and start a criminal prosecution, if the court finds that he shows cause." Id. at 80.