Case Name: Henry MANSON, III, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. David G. SMITH, M.D.; Avindra Brar, M.D., Defendants-Appellees
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 2012-11-20
Citations: 487 F. App'x 422
Docket Number: No. 11-15821
Parties: Henry MANSON, III, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. David G. SMITH, M.D.; Avindra Brar, M.D., Defendants-Appellees.
Judges: Before: CANBY, TROTT, and W. FLETCHER, Circuit Judges.
Reporter: West's Federal Appendix
Volume: 487
Pages: 422–423

Head Matter:
Henry MANSON, III, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. David G. SMITH, M.D.; Avindra Brar, M.D., Defendants-Appellees.
No. 11-15821.
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
Submitted Nov. 13, 2012.
Filed Nov. 20, 2012.
Henry Manson, III, Coalinga, CA, pro se.
Peter Anthony Meshot, Esquire, Deputy Attorney General, AGCA — Office of the California Attorney General, Kathleen Jane Williams, Matthew Ross Wilson, Esquire, Williams & Associates, Sacramento, CA, for Defendants-Appellees.
Avindra Brar, M.D., Sacramento, CA, pro se.
Before: CANBY, TROTT, and W. FLETCHER, Circuit Judges.
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

Opinion:
MEMORANDUM
Henry Manson, III, appeals pro se from the district court's summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging that prison medical staff were deliberately indifferent to his left shoulder injuries. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo, Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1056 (9th Cir.2004), and we affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment for defendants Brar and Smith because Manson failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether these defendants knew of and disregarded an excessive risk to Manson's health and safety, and the undisputed evidence shows that these defendants provided Manson treatment that they believed was appropriate based on their diagnoses. See id. at 1057-58 (explaining that a prison official is deliberately indifferent only if he knows of and disregards an excessive risk to an inmate's health and safety, mere negligence in diagnosing or treating a medical condition does not constitute deliberate indifference, and where there is a difference of medical opinion, a prisoner must show that the chosen course of treatment was both medically unacceptable under the circumstance and chosen in disregard of an excessive risk to his health).
AFFIRMED.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.