Case Name: Salwinder SINGH, Petitioner, v. Loretta E. LYNCH, Attorney General, Respondent
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 2016-06-21
Citations: 667 F. App'x 198
Docket Number: No. 14-72580
Parties: Salwinder SINGH, Petitioner, v. Loretta E. LYNCH, Attorney General, Respondent.
Judges: Before: BEA, WATFORD, and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges.
Reporter: West's Federal Appendix
Volume: 667
Pages: 198–199

Head Matter:
Salwinder SINGH, Petitioner, v. Loretta E. LYNCH, Attorney General, Respondent.
No. 14-72580
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
Submitted June 14, 2016
FILED June 21, 2016
Robert Bradford Jobe, Esquire, Attorney, Law Offices of Robert B. Jobe, San Francisco, CA, for Petitioner.
Jeremy M. Bylund, Trial Attorney, OIL, DOJ—U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Division/Office of Immigration Litigation, Washington, DC, Chief Counsel ICE, Office of the Chief Counsel, Department of Homeland Security, San Francisco, CA, for Respondent.
Before: BEA, WATFORD, and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges.
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

Opinion:
MEMORANDUM
Salwinder Singh, a native and citizen of India, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals' ("BIA") order dismissing his appeal from an immigration judge's decision denying his motion to reopen to rescind his deportation order issued in absentia. We review for abuse of discretion the denial of a motion to reopen. Mohammed v. Gonzales, 400 F.3d 785, 791 (9th Cir. 2005). We defer to the BIA's interpretations of the Immigration and Nationality Act in an unpublished, nonpre-cedential decision depending on the thoroughness, reasonableness, consistency, and persuasiveness of the BIA's analysis. Zumel v. Lynch, 803 F.3d 463, 471 (9th Cir. 2015). We deny the petition for review.
The agency did not abuse its discretion in denying Singh's motion to reopen on the ground that notice was proper under 8 U.S.C. § 1252b(a)(2)(A) (1994). Singh was personally served the Order to Show Cause ("OSC"), and his attorney was served the notice for the August 27, 1996 hearing, which informed Singh of the time, date, and place of the hearing and contained advisals warning him of the consequences of failing to appear. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252b(a)(2) (1994) (setting forth notice requirements); Garcia v. INS, 222 F.3d 1208, 1209 (9th Cir. 2000) (notice to the attorney of record constitutes notice to the alien).
The BIA reasonably interpreted former 8 U.S.C. § 1252b in concluding that the notice of hearing adequately explained the consequences of failing to appear as required by former subsections 1252b(a)(2) and (c)(1). See Zumel, 803 F.3d at 471. First, the BIA reasonably interpreted these provisions to require notice of the consequences of failure to appear, namely that an order of deportation may issue in absentia, and not other details of the statutory framework such as time limits for filing a motion to rescind and the effect on judicial review of an in absentia deportation order. See Matter of Villalba-Sinaloa, 21 I. & N. Dec. 842, 844 (BIA 1997) (generally, the notice provided to an alien in the OSC need not be an exact recitation of the language set forth in the statute, as long as it is reasonable under all the circumstances). Second, the warning in the notice of hearing that a hearing "may be held in your absence," and that an "order of deportation will be entered against you if the Immigration and Naturalization Service establishes" proper notice and deport-ability suitably reflects the statutory directives. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252b(c)(1) (1994) (an alien "shall be ordered deported . if the Service establishes" proper written notice and alien's deportability).
PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.