Case Name: In the Matter of VERMILION PARISH SCHOOL BOARD to Perpetuate the Testimony of Dr. James P. Morgan
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1978-04-11
Citations: 357 So. 2d 1295
Docket Number: No. 6420
Parties: In the Matter of VERMILION PARISH SCHOOL BOARD to Perpetuate the Testimony of Dr. James P. Morgan.
Judges: Before WATSON, GUIDRY and FORET, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 357
Pages: 1295–1298

Head Matter:
In the Matter of VERMILION PARISH SCHOOL BOARD to Perpetuate the Testimony of Dr. James P. Morgan.
No. 6420.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Third Circuit.
April 11, 1978.
Dan A. Spencer and James M. Dunnam, Houston, Tex., Joseph R. Oelkers, III, Baton Rouge, for defendant-appellant.
Roger C. Edwards, Abbeville, Broussard, Broussard & Moresi by Marcus A. Brous-sard, Jr., Abbeville, for plaintiff-appellee.
Before WATSON, GUIDRY and FORET, JJ.

Opinion:
FORET, Judge.
On May 24, 1977, the Vermilion Parish School Board filed a petition to take the deposition of Dr. James P. Morgan. The petition alleges that the Vermilion Parish School Board, believing itself to be the owner of various lands situated within a body of water known as Whitelake in Vermilion Parish, Louisiana, intends to bring an action against all persons producing minerals from its land. Named as expected adverse parties are Superior Oil Company, Union Oil Company of California, the State of Louisiana, and Southdown Land Company. The Vermilion Parish School Board desires to take the deposition of Dr. James P. Morgan upon the belief that he made a study of Whitelake to determine whether or not it was navigable in 1812.
On June 23, 1977, the Superior Oil Company filed a Motion to Deny the Petition to Take the Testimony of Dr. James P. Morgan. A hearing was held on June 27, 1977, and on August 31, 1977, the court rendered judgment in favor of plaintiff authorizing the taking of Dr. Morgan's deposition.
On September 13, 1977, Superior Oil Company (hereafter Superior) was granted a suspensive appeal from the judgment rendered on August 31,1977. In an abundance of caution, Superior sought supervisory writ in order to avoid the possibility of losing all right to appellate review of the district court judgment. Writ was denied on December 5, 1977 because the realtor had a remedy by appeal.
DENIAL OF WRIT AND APPEALABILITY OF JUDGMENT GRANTING PETITION TO PERPETUATE TESTIMONY
Superior's application for writs of certiorari, # 6428, was denied on December 5, 1977 because the Court was of the opinion the realtor had a remedy by appeal. There are no reported Louisiana cases presenting the issue of whether or not an appeal lies from a judgment granting a Petition to Perpetuate Testimony. Therefore, we deem it worthwhile to discuss this issue, although the appellee makes no mention of it in its brief; the appellant does, however, discuss the appealability of such a judgment. The issue, of course, that must be resolved is whether such a judgment is final so as to bring it within the scope of L.C.C.P. § 2083.
The source of C.C.P. Art. 1429 is Federal Rule 27(a)(1); the provisions are almost verbatim. In Mosseller v. United States, 2 Cir., 158 F.2d 380, plaintiff petitioned for an order authorizing her to take the deposition of her son for the purpose of perpetuating his testimony in accordance with Federal Rule 27(a)(1). The United States appealed the granting of the petition. As to the finality and appealability of the order authorizing the taking of the deposition, the court stated:
"Nor do we see grounds to reconsider our earlier decision denying petitioner's motion to dismiss the appeal. The order authorizing the taking of the deposition is a final order for the purpose of appeala-bility, because it grants all the relief sought in the petition and disposes of the proceeding. . If such orders were not held final and appealable, a plaintiff who had taken a deposition could wait several years before deciding to bring suit and the putative defendant could not during this time question the propriety of the order by an appeal. .
We see no conflict between this conclusion and the emphasis, noted above, upon the ancillary nature of the proceeding. Necessarily a proceeding for ancillary relief may often result in a final order which is reviewed on appeal." (all case citations omitted.)
In Ash v. Cort, 3 Cir., 512 F.2d 909, the court was faced with the question of whether or not a district court order denying a motion to perpetuate testimony pending appeal under Federal Rule 27(b) was a final, appealable order. In concluding that the order was final and appealable, the court analogized Rule 27(b) dealing with perpetuation of testimony pending appeal, with Rule 27(a). The court stated:
Unlike the usual discovery motion, the denial or grant of which has been considered interlocutory and non-appealable,8 motions to perpetuate testimony must be judged by different standards.9 In Mosseller v. United States, 158 F.2d 380 (2nd Cir., 1946), the Second Circuit held ap-pealable the granting of a Rule 27(a) motion to perpetuate testimony in advance of trial. The court reasoned that the district court order authorizing depositions was a final order under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 "because it grant[ed] all the relief sought in the petition and dispose[d] of the proceeding." 158 F.2d at 383.10 Accord Martin v. Reynolds Metals Corporation, 297 F.2d 49, 52 (9th Cir., 1961). '
The denial of a motion to perpetuate testimony would also seem to require immediate review. "An action refusing relief under Rule 27 would appear to be even more final [than the granting of such a motion], for it may have the effect of making it impossible for the petitioner to maintain an action or defense." Moore 9 Federal Practice ¶ 110.13[3] at 159 (1970).
Although there are no cases specifically addressing the question of appealability of Rule 27(b) orders,11 we perceive no reason for treating these differently than Rule 27(a) motions. The same narrow purpose of perpetuating testimony for later use obtains under both 27(a) and 27(b). The Rule 27(a) order is deemed final because it is the only matter pending in the district court at a time when no complaint has yet been filed. Similarly, when an appeal has been lodged in a higher court, a Rule 27(b) motion is the only matter pending before the district court. Since it, is the only matter in the district court, a denial or grant of a Rule 27(b) motion is final in just the way the Second Circuit characterized as final, the grant of a 27(a) motion in Mosseller.12
There are several Louisiana cases which suggest that no order granting or denying discovery is appealable. Those cases, however, involve discovery during a pending suit; none of those examined involved a presuit Petition to Perpetuate Testimony.
Among the purposes of requiring a final judgment is the desire to avoid piecemeal litigation and prevent dilatory misuse of the right to appeal. Vernor v. Drexel Homes, Inc., 311 So.2d 493 (La.App. 4 Cir. 1975). As mentioned by the Federal courts, supra, there is no danger of delaying the litigation in cases like this. The Federal court's determination is the correct approach to be taken by the state's courts in considering L.C.C.P. § 1429. Although the Federal decisions are only persuasive authority, where the L.C.C.P. article which is being interpreted is essentially based upon one of the Federal rules, as L.C.C.P. § 1429, the Louisiana courts rely upon prior interpretation by the Federal courts as a persuasive guide to the intended meaning of a similar Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article. Kay v. Carter, 243 La. 1095, 150 So.2d 27 (1963); Simon v. Castille, 174 So.2d 660 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1965).