Case Name: Donald HOLLENBECK, Appellant, v. John Franklin HOOKS, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 2008-08-21
Citations: 993 So. 2d 50
Docket Number: No. 1D06-5504
Parties: Donald HOLLENBECK, Appellant, v. John Franklin HOOKS, Appellee.
Judges: BROWNING, C.J., concurs; KAHN, J., dissents with written opinion.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 993
Pages: 50–55

Head Matter:
Donald HOLLENBECK, Appellant, v. John Franklin HOOKS, Appellee.
No. 1D06-5504.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
Aug. 21, 2008.
Rehearing Denied Oct. 17, 2008.
John S. Mills and Rebecca Bowen Creed of Mills & Creed, Jacksonville; Jeffrey R. Bankston, Jacksonville Beach, for Appellant.
Arthur Hernandez of Arthur Hernandez, P.A., Jacksonville; Elizabeth C. Wheeler of Elizabeth C. Wheeler, P.A., Orlando, for Appellee.

Opinion:
THOMAS, J.
We address whether the statement of Appellee's trial counsel during voir dire of the jury requires reversal of the jury verdict. Appellee's trial counsel stated, "I'm a consumer justice attorney, and I represent John Hooks, a merchant marine, not some fancy company, not some conglomerate." We find the trial court reversibly erred in denying Appellant's motion for mistrial based on this statement.
Appellant immediately objected following this statement, asserting that Appel-lee's trial counsel was in fact retained by Appellee's insurer; therefore, he did represent "one of those big companies." The trial court required Appellee's trial counsel to explain the definition of a "consumer justice attorney." Counsel replied that he represented a "client who is a consumer and who is here for justice," and explained that his statement should be considered in the context of Appellant's voir dire questions regarding large verdicts and whether the venire believed in "caps."
The trial court sustained Appellant's objection, noting that courts do not tell juries about insurance companies and explaining that "we strive not to actively misrepre sent facts, and certainly it is true that you represent the insured. But I actually was concerned about . playing on the sympathies of the jury for an individual as opposed to a corporation, and even a corporation would be entitled to justice in our courts." The trial court denied Appellant's motion for mistrial, finding that counsel's remark had no "visible impact on the jury." Appellant renewed his motion for mistrial before the jury was sworn and again during the questioning of one of Appellee's witnesses. After the verdict was returned, Appellant timely moved for a new trial, based in part on counsel's statement.
We review the trial court's denial of Appellant's motion for new trial under the abuse of discretion standard. Bocher v. Glass, 874 So.2d 701, 704 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004). Based on Appellee's counsel's statement, we find that the trial court abused its discretion in denying Appellant's motion for new trial.
Counsel's misleading statement implied that an award of damages would be paid solely by the individual and was nothing less than an appeal to the jury to protect that individual from a harmful verdict. See Padrino v. Resnick, 615 So.2d 698 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992). As the trial court noted, a jury trial must be focused solely on the merits of the case, and it is not appropriate to appeal to a jury's sympathy; appeals to sympathy and attempts to inject a party's wealth, or lack thereof, are improper. Batlemento v. Dove Fountain, Inc., 593 So.2d 234, 242 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991); Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Smith, 53 Fla. 375, 43 So. 235 (1907). Counsel's statement did not expressly contrast Appellee's status as an individual with a corporation; nevertheless, his status was inappropriately injected into the case. See Sossa By & Through Sossa v. Newman, 647 So.2d 1018, 1019-20 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994).
As Appellant notes, counsel's statements were impossible to refute at trial. It would have been clear error for the trial court to inform the venire that, in fact, Appellee's counsel was retained by an insurance company to represent Appellee. Thompson v. Fla. Drum Co., 651 So.2d 180, 182 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995). In addition, the venire could have easily assumed that Appellee did not have insurance coverage and determined that he would unduly suffer from an award of damages.
We further agree with Appellant that the error cannot be considered harmless. Both parties diligently argued the case, and the jury at one point considered a finding of no permanent injury; while it ultimately found that Appellant suffered a permanent injury, it rejected any liability on the part of Appellee for future economic or non-economic damages, despite extensive testimony to the contrary. The harmless error statute requires that this court affirm despite the error, unless we determine that "after an examination of the entire case it shall appear that the error complained of has resulted in a miscarriage of justice. This section shall be liberally construed." § 59.041, Fla. Stat. The result here was a miscarriage of justice, in light of the egregious nature of counsel's comment and the fact that Appellant provided evidence that his future economic damages alone will exceed $100,000. We therefore reverse and remand for a new trial. We decline to address any other issues raised, including Appellee's cross-appeal, which is now moot.
REVERSED and REMANDED.
BROWNING, C.J., concurs; KAHN, J., dissents with written opinion.