Case Name: ADVISORY OPINION re CONSTITUTIONALITY OF 1974 PA 242
Court: Michigan Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1975-04-29
Citations: 394 Mich. 41
Docket Number: Docket No. 56354
Parties: ADVISORY OPINION re CONSTITUTIONALITY OF 1974 PA 242
Judges: T. G. Kavanagh, C. J., and M. S. Coleman and J. W. Fitzgerald, JJ., concurred with Swainson, J.
Reporter: Michigan Reports
Volume: 394
Pages: 41–58

Head Matter:
ADVISORY OPINION re CONSTITUTIONALITY OF 1974 PA 242
Docket No. 56354.
Argued January 8, 1975
(Calendar No. 9).
Decided April 29, 1975.
The Senate requested an advisory opinion on whether § 18(3) of Enrolled House Bill No. 6100 (1974 PA 242, effective July 26, 1974) is constitutional in relation to Const 1963, art 8, § 2, as amended, which prohibits state aid to nonpublic schools. Section 18(3) provides that the State Board of Education shall purchase textbooks and supplies and loan or provide them free of charge on an equal basis to all children of school age residing in each school district of the state and enrolled in grades 1 through 12. Held:
1. The Court’s review is properly restricted to the question specifically raised by the Senate in its request for an advisory opinion. There is no need to consider whether the challenged program benefits or penalizes religion but only whether it directly or indirectly aids or maintains a nonpublic school.
2. Incidental services may be provided to private schools consonant with the constitutional amendment as construed by the Supreme Court.
3. Textbooks and supplies are not commodities "incidental” to a school’s maintenance and support; they are essential aids that constitute a primary feature of the educational process and a primary element required for any school to exist.
4. Furnishing either school supplies or textbooks to private school students as called for in the statute violates Const 1963, art 8, § 2.
5. The language of § 18(3) should be read to apply only to public school students and thereby preserve its constitutionality.
Levin, J., who was joined by Williams, J., concurred in the scope of the advisory opinion and dissented on the construction and constitutionality of the statute on the grounds that:
1. The constitutional question should not be avoided by construing § 18(3) as referring only to children attending public schools, because the Senate would not have requested an advisory opinion if it were not intended that textbooks and supplies be loaned or provided to nonpublic-school children.
References for Points in Headnotes
[1-5, 9-13] 68 Am Jur 2d, Schools §§ 79, 289, 299.
[6-8] 16 Am Jur 2d, Constitutional Law § 111.
2. A program funded by the state which tends to support a general educational program of a nonpublic school is barred by the constitutional amendment unless the dominant effect of the program is the furtherance of a substantial governmental purpose, educational or noneducational, clearly distinguishable from support of general educational programs.
3. Whether the dominant effect of providing textbooks to nonpublic-school children is implementation of such a governmental purpose depends on a factual appraisal the Court cannot make because no factual record has been made.
4. The statute is unconstitutional insofar as it requires school districts to furnish nonpublic-school children with ordinary consumable supplies.
Opinion op the Court
1. Constitutional Law — Advisory Opinions — Statutes—Schools— Textbooks — Supplies.
The Supreme Court’s review in an advisory opinion on a statute providing that each school district shall purchase and loan or provide textbooks and supplies to all children of school age residing in such district and enrolled in grades 1-12 is restricted to the question specifically raised by the Senate in its request, which was whether the statute violates the constitutional provision that no public monies or property shall be used to aid or maintain any nonpublic school; any other state or Federal constitutional issues which might arguably arise in the course of reviewing that statute will not be considered and there is no need to consider whether the challenged program benefits or penalizes religion but only whether it directly or indirectly aids or maintains a nonpublic school (Const 1963, art 8, § 2; 1974 PA 242, § 18[3]).
2. Constitutional Law — Nonpublic Schools — Aid.
The constitutional provision that no public monies or property shall be used to aid or maintain any nonpublic school forbids aid that is a "primary” element of the support and maintenance of a private school but permits aid that is only "incidental” to the private school’s support and maintenance (Const 1963, art 8, § 2).
3. Schools and School Districts — Textbooks—Supplies.
Textbooks and supplies are not commodities "incidental” to a school’s maintenance and support; they are essential aids that constitute a "primary” feature of the educational process and a "primary” element required for any school to exist.
4. Constitutional Law — Private Schools — Public Support.
The constitutional provision which forbids the public support of private schools must be read to bar funding of primary and essential elements of a private school’s existence (Const 1963, art 8, § 2).
5. Constitutional Law — Schools—Supplies—Textbooks—Statutes —Construction.
Supplying either school supplies or textbooks to private school students as called for in a statute which provides that each school district shall purchase and loan or provide textbooks and supplies to all children of school age residing in such district and enrolled in grades 1-12 violates the constitutional provision that no public monies or property shall be used to aid or maintain any nonpublic school; however, the constitutionality of the statute should be preserved by reading it to apply only to public school students (Const 1963, art 8, § 2; 1974 PA 242, § 18[3]).
Opinion Dissenting in Part
Williams and Levin, JJ.
6. Constitutional Law — Advisory Opinions — Questions Considered.
A request to, the Supreme Court for an advisory opinion should particularize any claims of unconstitutionality; it is not the function of the Court to search the Constitution for "any other relevant provision" which may have been violated by an act of the Legislature.
7. Constitutional Law — Advisory Opinions — Statutes—Questions Considered.
The Supreme Court is not constitutionally authorized to furnish advisory opinions to the Attorney General or amici curiae; therefore, constitutional questions raised by the Attorney General and amici in addition to the specifc question raised by the Senate in its request for an advisory opinion are not considered (Const 1963, art 3, § 8).
8. Constitutional Law — Advisory Opinions — Statutes—Schools— Textbooks and Supplies — Questions Considered.
Whether the statute which provides that each school district shall purchase and loan or provide textbooks and supplies to all children of school age residing in such district enrolled in grades 1-12 violates the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment or the freedom of worship or title-body clauses of the Michigan Constitution is not considered where the Senate requested an advisory opinion on whether the statute was constitutional in relation to the constitutional provision that no public monies shall be used to aid or maintain any nonpublic school and "any other relevant provision of the state or Federal Constitutions” (US Const, Am I; Const 1963, art 1, § 4, art 4, §24, art 8, §2; 1974 PA 242, §18[3]).
9. Constitutional Law — Statutes—Schools—Textbooks—Supplies —Advisory Opinions.
The suggestion that a constitutional question be avoided by construing the statute which provides that each school district shall purchase and loan or provide textbooks and supplies to all children of school age residing in such district ami enrolled in grades 1-12 should be rejected because the Senate would not have requested an advisory opinion on the constitutionality of this provision if it were not intended that textbooks and supplies be loaned or provided to nonpublic-school children (1974 PA 242, § 18[3j).
10. Constitutional Law — Nonpublic Schools — Aid—Questions Considered — Religion.
The constitutional provision that no public monies shall be used to aid or maintain any nonpublic school does not speak of religion but of nonpublic schools and it does not preclude establishment or interference with religion; therefore, whether a statute challenged as violating this provision unduly beneñts or burdens religion need not be considered (Const 1963, art 8, §2).
11. Constitutional Law — Nonpublic Schools — Aid.
The constitutional provision barring the use of public monies or property to aid or maintain nonpublic schools does not seek to bar beneñts to nonpublic-school children, their parents, or persons employed by nonpublic schools as such, but, rather, beneñts to children, parents, or persons so employed which would subvert its purpose (Const 1963, art 8, § 2).
12. Constitutional Law — Nonpublic Schools — Aid—Governmental Purpose.
The constitutional provision barring the use of public monies or property to aid or maintain nonpublic schools clearly bars state support of a nonpublic school’s general educational programs but it does not bar all state action which tends to support such programs; a categorical program funded by the state which tends to support a general educational program of a nonpublic school is barred unless the dominant effect of the program is the furtherance of a substantial governmental purpose, educational or noneducational, clearly distinguishable from support of general educational programs (Const 1963, art 8, § 2).
13. Constitutional Law — Statutes—Schools—Textbooks—Supplies.
The statute which provides that each school district shall purchase and loan or provide textbooks and supplies to all children of school age residing in such district and enrolled in grades 1-12 is unconstitutional insofar as it requires school districts to furnish ordinary consumable supplies to nonpublic-school children; however, constitutionality of the textbook program cannot be resolved until the facts are further developed to show whether the dominant effect of providing textbooks to nonpublic-school children is to achieve a measure of guidance of nonpublic school instruction in the subjects for which such textbooks are adopted, guidance which would be a substantial governmental purpose clearly distinguishable from support of general educational programs (1974 PA 242, § 18[3j).
Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Robert A. Derengoski, Solicitor General, and Gerald F. Young and Charles F Keeley, Assistants Attorney General, supporting constitutionality.
Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Robert A. Derengoski, and George L. McCargar, Assistant Attorney General, opposing constitutionality.
Amici Curiae:
Fay O’Hare, for League of Women Voters of Michigan.
Hubbell, Blakeslee, McCormick & Houlihan (by Stuart D. Hubbell), for parents and school children.
Levin, Levin, Garvett & Dill (by Erwin B. Ellmann and Marshall W. Anstandig), for Michigan Education Association.
Harold Norris, Hershell Fink and Elaine Grand, for Michigan Regional Office of the American Jewish Congress, The Jewish Community Council of Metropolitan Detroit, and The Anti-Defamation League of B’nai B’rith of Michigan.
Douglas J. Robson, for Michigan Association of School Boards and Michigan Association of School Administrators.

Opinion:
Swainson, J.
I concur in sections I, II and III of Justice Levin's opinion, but find it necessary to disagree with his analysis and result expressed in part IV. In my opinion supplying either school supplies or textbooks to private school students as called for in 1974 PA 242, § 18(3), violates Const 1963, art 8, § 2 [Proposal C] as previously interpreted in Traverse City School Dist v Attorney General, 384 Mich 390; 185 NW2d 9 (1971).
A. The scope of the advisory opinion.
In sections I and III of his opinion Justice Levin limits the scope of the issues under consideration in two ways. First, in section I he restricts the Court's review to the question specifically raised by the Senate in its formal request for an advisory opinion:
"Is section 18(3) of Enrolled House Bill No. 6100 constitutional in relation to section 2 of Article VIII of the Constitution of Michigan, as amended, ?"
Then, in section III Justice Levin eschews consideration of any other state or Federal constitutional issues which might arguably arise in the course of reviewing § 18(3) in light of Const 1963, art 8, § 2. Justice Levin states:
"Proposal C [Const 1963, art 8, § 2, second paragraph] does not speak of religion but of nonpublic schools. Proposal C, in contrast with the First Amendment, does not preclude establishment or interference with religion.
"We therefore have no need to consider whether the challenged program unduly benefits or burdens religion but only whether it directly or indirectly aids or maintains a nonpublic school." (Footnote omitted.)
While the scope of review becomes exceedingly narrow under Justice Levin's formulation, I believe that he has proposed a reasonable approach for the Court to follow in this advisory opinion. By definition, we are required to proceed in a factual vacuum and interpret the law without the benefits of prior fact finding and legal review. We are accordingly forced to make assumptions concerning how the questioned statute would operate once effective. I think that it is wise for the Court to therefore limit its own range of conjecture as much as possible.
B. The Constitutionality of § 18(3) under Const 1963, art 8, § 2 (Proposal C).
In Traverse City School Dist v Attorney General, 384 Mich 390; 185 NW2d 9 (1971), this Court outlined the impact of Proposal C on various types of educational assistance programs. Proceeding from the premise that the voters in adopting Proposal C were simply intent on outlawing parochiaid, the Court found it unnecessary to adopt "a strict 'no benefits, primary or incidental' rule". 384 Mich 390, 413. Instead, the Court favored a reasonable construction of the amendments language. Under this construction the Court concluded that shared time programs — if properly controlled by the public school system — and auxiliary services such as health care and remedial reading programs could be provided to private schools consonant with the mandate of proposal C.
In my opinion the Court reached correct conclusions in the Traverse City School District case because the services examined therein were properly classified as "incidental" to a private school's establishment and existence. (See fn 2, supra). Such programs as shared time and auxiliary services, to be sure, do help a private school compete in today's harsh economic climate; but, they are not "primary" elements necessary for the school's survival as an educational institution. These incidental services are useful only to an otherwise viable school and are not the type of services that flout the intent of the electorate expressed through Proposal C.
A very different situation is presented, I find, in the case of the textbooks and supplies that would be made available to private schools under § 18(3). When we speak of textbooks and supplies we are no longer describing commodities "incidental" to a school's maintenance and support. Textbooks and supplies are essential aids that constitute a "primary" feature of the educational process and a "primary" element required for any school to exist. I quote from Bond v Ann Arbor School Dist, 383 Mich 693, 702; 178 NW2d 484; 41 ALR3d 742 (1970):
"Applying either the 'necessary elements of any school's activity' test or the 'integral fundamental part of the elementary and secondary education' test, it is clear that books and school supplies are an essential part of a system of free public elementary and secondary schools."
However Proposal C is to be construed, I believe that if the will of the electorate is to be respected it must be read to bar public funding for primary and essential elements of a private school's existence.
As I understand Justice Levin's opinion he does not actually read Proposal C differently than I do herein. He states, for example, that "Proposal C clearly bars state support of a nonpublic school's general educational programs"; and, he points to the same language from Bond v Ann Arbor School Dist that I have quoted above. Furthermore, he reaches the conclusion that providing school supplies to private schools does violate the prohibition of Proposal C. Turning to the textbooks, however, Justice Levin, at least for the moment, reaches a different result by engrafting a new test onto the interpretation of Proposal C expressed in Traverse City School Dist v Attorney General, supra. He argues that supplying textbooks to private schools is permissible if the "dominant effect of the program is furtherance of a substantial governmental purpose, educational or noneducational, clearly distinguishable from support of general educational programs." While I find this to be an interesting test, I do not think that it has any applicability to our present problem. Proposal C forbids the public support of private schools. I have failed to discover any indication in the language of Proposal C that the people intended to allow primary support for private schools if the private schools were willing to subject themselves to the textbook censorship of the local public school system.
C. Conclusion.
In my opinion, furnishing either textbooks or school supplies to private schools constitutes prohibited primary support under Proposal C. I would accordingly read the language of § 18(3) to apply only to public school students and thereby pre serve its constitutionality. Traverse City School Dist v Attorney General, supra, 384 Mich 390, 406.
T. G. Kavanagh, C. J., and M. S. Coleman and J. W. Fitzgerald, JJ., concurred with Swainson, J.
"As far as the voter was concerned, the result of all the preelection talk and action concerning Proposal C was simply this— Proposal C was an anti-parochiaid amendment — no public monies to run parochial schools — and beyond that all else was utter and complete confusion." 384 Mich 390, 410, fn 2.
The Court carried over to the non-support for private school provisions found in Proposal C the construction advanced in Advisory Opinion re Constitutionality of PA 1970, No 100, 384 Mich 82; 180 NW2d 265 (1970), for distinguishing between permissible and impermissible state assistance to parochial schools. Since Proposal C speaks broadly in terms of the support and maintenance of all private schools, I think it is a proper interpretation of the Traverse City School Dist v Attorney General rule to state that Proposal C forbids aid that is a "primary" element of the support and maintenance of a private school but permits aid that is only "incidental" to the private school's support and maintenance. 384 Mich 390, 413.
In Traverse City School Dist v Attorney General, supra, the Court adopted the description of auxiliary services set forth in MCLA 340.622; MSA 15.3622. In relevant part that section provides:
"Such auxiliary services shall include health and nursing services and examinations; street crossing guards services; national defense education act testing services; speech correction services; visiting teacher services for delinquent and disturbed children; school diagnostician services for all mentally handicapped children; teacher counsellor services for physically handicapped children; teacher consultant services for mentally handicapped or emotionally disturbed children; remedial reading; and such other services as may be determined by the legislature."
The words of § 18(3) provide that the textbooks and supplies are to be extended to "all children of school age residing in such district". In reality, and for the purposes of constitutional analysis, § 18(3) provides the aid to the private schools. Gaffney v State Department of Education, 192 Neb 358; 220 NW2d 550, 556 (1974).