Case Name: David NORDIN v. HARTMAN PUBLIC SCHOOLS
Court: Arkansas Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Arkansas
Decision Date: 1981-12-14
Citations: 274 Ark. 402
Docket Number: 81-131
Parties: David NORDIN v. HARTMAN PUBLIC SCHOOLS
Judges: Adkisson, C.J., concurs.
Reporter: Arkansas Reports
Volume: 274
Pages: 402–410

Head Matter:
David NORDIN v. HARTMAN PUBLIC SCHOOLS
81-131
625 S.W. 2d 483
Supreme Court of Arkansas
Opinion delivered December 14, 1981
Cearley, Gitchel, Mitchell ¿r Bryant, by: Richard W. Roachell, for appellant.
Bethell, Callaway & Robertson by: Edgar B. Bethell, for appellee.

Opinion:
Robert H. Dudley, Justice.
The sole issue in this case is whether the Teacher Fair Dismissal Act, Ark. Stat. Ann. § 80-1264 — 80-1264.10 (Repl. 1980) confers jurisdiction on the circuit court to hear an appeal from the decision of a school board to nonrenew the teaching contract of a probationary teacher when no constitutional issues are involved. Appellant, David Nordin, taught school in the Hartman Public School District under a one-year contract for the 1979-80 school year. The superintendent notified appellant by letter that he would not recommend renewal of appellant's contract. Appellant then requested and was granted a hearing before the school board. The board followed the superintendent's recommendation and voted for nonrenewal. Appellant subsequently filed a notice of appeal in the Johnson County Circuit Court. The appeal stated that the school board's violation of its own policies and of state law constituted a breach of contract. The school board moved to dismiss the appeal. The circuit court refused to dismiss the appeal holding that a right of appeal exists if the probationary teacher was nonrenewed on constitutionally impermissible grounds. The board did not appeal that ruling and that issue is not before us. Counsel then stipulated that no federal constitutional issues were involved. The board subsequently filed a motion to dismiss and the trial court held that the Teacher Fair Dismissal Act does not confer jurisdiction on the circuit court to hear an appeal from the decision of a school board to nonrenew the teaching contract of a probationary teacher when no constitutional issues are involved.
Appellant now contends that the circuit court erred in dismissing the case because the act provides the right to an appeal to circuit court by a probationary teacher. Appellee does not cross-appeal that part of the ruling holding that there is a right of appeal when constitutional issues are involved. We affirm the trial court's action in dismissing the appeal.
A thorough analysis of the Teacher Fair Dismissal Act, supra, reveals that it symmetrically deals with separate categories of school employees, "teachers" and "probationary teachers." Section 80-1264.1 provides:
The term"teacher" as used in this Act [§§ 80-1264 — 80-1264.10] shall be defined as any person, exclusive of the superintendent or assistant superintendent(s), employed in an Arkansas public school district who is required to hold a teaching certificate from the Arkansas Department of Education as a condition of employment.
The term "probationary teacher" as used in this Act shall be defined as a teacher who has not completed three (3) successive years of employment in the school district in which the teacher is currently employed.
Nowhere in the act is there a specific provision for appeal to circuit court by a probationary teacher whose contract has not been renewed. Appellant contends that the last sentence of the appeals section, § 80-1264.9 (b), should be interpreted to provide a right of appeal to probationary teachers. It states:
. . . The exclusive remedy for any person aggrieved by the decision of the school board shall be appealed [an appeal] therefrom to the circuit court of the county in which the school district is located, within thirty (30) days of the date of written notice of the action of the school board.
We reject the contention that this sentence is applicable to this case for a number of reasons. First, § 80-1264.9 (a) rather than (b) is the section which deals with probationary teachers and § (a) does not provide a right to appeal for nonrenewal by probationary teachers. Second, § (b), which gives the right of appeal in event of nonrenewal, is applicable to the category it mentions in the first sentence, "Any teacher who has been employed continuously by the school district for three years or more. . ." Third, such a strained interpretation would break the symmetry and logic of the act. The act provides that any teacher, probationary or otherwise, is entitled to a hearing before the school board and a subsequent appeal to circuit court when the contract is "terminated" as opposed to "nonrenewed." § 80-1264.4, 1264.5 and 1264.9. In the case at bar we are not concerned with termination as this probationary teacher's contract was nonrenewed. The nonrenewal sections of the act provide that all teachers' contracts shall be renewed each year unless the teacher is given proper notice of nonrenewal. § 80- 1264.3. After the notice is given, meaningful statutory differences exist between probationary teachers and other teachers. A teacher who has completed three successive years of employment in the school district is entitled to a statement of reasons for nonrenewal. § 80-1264.3. Nó similar statutory provision is made for probationary teachers. Since the reasons for nonrenewal need not be given, and since a hearing does not have to be held, there simply is nothing to appeal to circuit court. There is no logical basis for an appeal from nothing.
We interpret the appeal statute, § 80-1264.9 to provide for an appeal by any teacher in case of termination and to provide for an appeal upon renewal by a teacher who has completed three successive years of employment in the school district. We do not interpret it to provide for appeal by a probationary teacher on nonconstitutional grounds.
Recently we have dealt with a number of cases involving the Teacher Fair Dismissal Act, but this is the first time this particular issue has been squarely before us. In the cases of Maxwell v. Southside School District, 273 Ark. 89, 618 S.W. 2d 148 (1981) and. McElroy v. Jasper School District, 273 Ark. 143, 617 S.W. 2d 356 (1981) we discussed appeals by probationary teachers to the circuit court, but the statutory right to appeal was not put in issue. The case of Springdale School District v. Jameson, 274 Ark. 78, 621 S.W. 2d 860 (1981) was before us on a writ of prohibition and we held that the circuit court could not be said to be wholly without jurisdiction.
Affirmed.
Adkisson, C.J., concurs.