Case Name: SHERIDAN ROAD BAPTIST CHURCH v. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION
Court: Michigan Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1986-11-24
Citations: 426 Mich. 462
Docket Number: Docket No. 73665
Parties: SHERIDAN ROAD BAPTIST CHURCH v DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION
Judges: Brickley, J., concurred with Boyle, J.
Reporter: Michigan Reports
Volume: 426
Pages: 462–581

Head Matter:
SHERIDAN ROAD BAPTIST CHURCH v DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION
Docket No. 73665.
Argued November 13, 1985
(Calendar No. 14).
Decided November 24, 1986.
Rehearing denied 427 Mich 1202.
The Sheridan Road Baptist Church and the First Baptist Church of Bridgeport and their pastors, parents of children attending schools run by the churches, and certain members of the faculties of the schools brought an action in the Ingham Circuit Court against the Department of Education, seeking a declaration that the requirement of the nonpublic schools statute that teachers in nonpublic schools be certified by the state is unconstitutional. The court, Ray C. Hotchkiss, J., found the certification requirements unconstitutional as interfering with the plaintiffs’ rights to the free exercise of religion and creating excessive government entanglement with religion. The Court of Appeals, M. J. Kelly, P.J., and Hood and Shepherd, JJ., reversed, holding that the requirements violated neither the Free Exercise nor the Establishment Clauses of the First Amendment of the United States Constitution (Docket No. 69050). The plaintiffs appeal.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed by an equally divided Court.
Chief Justice Williams would hold that the interest of the state in ensuring that all teachers meet certain minimum requirements outweighs the slight burden placed on the plaintiffs’ rights to the free exercise of religion by the certification requirements. As applied, the requirements are not discriminatory and do not require adherence to a particular religious outlook. They are not violative of the Establishment Clause; nor do they lead to excessive entanglement of church and state.
1. To teach in a school in Michigan, a teacher must be certified by the State Board of Education as meeting certain minimum requirements promulgated by the board. Objections to state regulations on the ground that they violate a person’s right to the free exercise of religion are analyzed by determining whether the plaintiff’s claims are rooted in religious beliefs; whether the regulation infringes upon the plaintiff’s right; if so, whether any incidental burden on the right is justified by a compelling state interest in the regulation; and whether a less obtrusive form of regulation is available to the state. Where an objection to a regulation is raised on the ground that it is violative of the Establishment Clause, the state must show that it has a secular legislative purpose for the requirement, that the regulation’s principal, primary effect neither advances nor inhibits religion, and that it does not foster an excessive government entanglement with religion.
2. In this case, while the plaintiffs’ objections are premised on their religious beliefs, any minimal infringement on their right of free exercise of religion is outweighed by the compelling interest of the state in furthering the education of its citizens through competent teachers by requiring teacher certification. As applied, the certification requirements do not enable the board to discriminate on the basis of religious belief. No less intrusive method of satisfying the state’s interest was shown. The regulations at issue have a secular purpose and do not have the primary effect of advancing or inhibiting religion. In addition, it is clear that the certification requirements do not impermissibly entangle government with religion. The state merely enforces minimum standards with regard to persons who wish to teach. Once a teacher is certified, there is no continuing relationship between the government and the churches and schools.
Justice Boyle, joined by Justice Brickley, concurring with Chief Justice Williams, would hold that at issue primarily in this case is whether the teacher certification requirement imposed by the state impinges upon the plaintiffs’ First Amendment right of freedom of religion. In evaluating free exercise claims, it must be determined whether the government has shown that an unusually important interest is at stake and that the granting of an exemption to the challenged requirement would do substantial harm to the interest. Application of the standard, at a minimum, must involve a balancing process, requiring great circumspection in weighing the state’s legitimate social interest and the request for religious exemption.
1. The Freedom of Religion Clause of the First Amendment embraces the freedom to believe and the freedom to act. The freedom to believe is absolute, but the freedom to act is subject to regulation. Where the state regulates conduct by enacting a neutral law within its power for the purpose and effect of furthering its secular goals, the statute may be valid despite an indirect burden on religious conduct unless the purpose may be achieved through less burdensome means.
2. The standard for determining free exercise claims involves a balancing that countenances shifting burdens of persuasion in proportion to the proofs admitted at trial. A mathematically certain formula cannot be created which will account for the internal evaluation of each factor and its relative weight with respect to each other factor. The essential judicial task is to evaluate the asserted conflicts between private rights and public interests to ensure that neither is compromised or destroyed.
3. In this case, the teacher certification requirements constitute, at most, an indirect and minimal burden on the plaintiffs’ free exercise rights, and the interest of the state is of such a high order as to override the interest for which protection is claimed. Alone, the regulation compels the plaintiffs neither to refrain from religiously motivated conduct nor to engage in conduct they find objectionable. The requirements represent a compelling state interest and a state regulation narrowly drawn to achieve the broader goal of quality education. The alternative offered by the plaintiffs does not fulfill the prophylactic goal of the state requirement to prevent children from being exposed to unqualified teachers.
Justice Riley, joined by Justices Levin and Cavanagh, would hold that the plaintiffs’ religious practice with regard to employment of teachers is protected by the First Amendment, and the regulation as applied is constitutionally suspect. The trial court found that the plaintiffs’ refusal to comply with the certification requirement is based upon sincerely held religious beliefs and that the requirement affirmatively interferes with the free exercise of those beliefs. The crucial question is whether the state established that enforcement of the requirement is essential to the fulfillment of a compelling governmental interest. It was incumbent upon the state to show that exempting the plaintiffs would unduly impair its interest in compulsory education and that enforcing the requirement is the least intrusive means by which to accomplish the objective. The state failed to meet its burden. The record firmly establishes that accommodating the plaintiffs’ religious practice with regard to the hiring of teachers will have no adverse effect on the state’s interest in compulsory education, and that less intrusive means are available by which the state could adequately supervise and ensure the future fulfillment of the legitimate public interests underlying the compulsory education law. Establishing that the teacher certification regulation is rationally related to the state’s interest is insufficient to demonstrate the necessity of overriding the plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights. The teacher certification employment regulation alone, however, does not violate the Establishment Clause.
Justice Archer took no part in the decision of this case.
132 Mich App 1; 348 NW2d 263 (1984) affirmed by equal division.
Ball & Skelly (by William Bentley Ball, Philip J. Murren, and Sandra E. Wise) and Michael E. Thomas for the plaintiffs.
Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Louis J. Caruso, Solicitor General, and Gerald F. Young and Paul J. Zimmer, Assistant Attorneys General, for the defendants.
Amici Curiae:
Steven F. McDowell, General Counsel, and Lawson, Marcus & Portko (by Jeffrey R. Portko) for Catholic League for Religious and Civil Rights.
Foster, Swift, Collins & Coey, P.C. (by James A. White and William K. Fahey), for Michigan Education Association.
Miller, Cohen, Martens & Ice, P.C. (by Mark H. Cousens and Glenda L. Pittman), for Michigan Federation of Teachers, AFL-CIO.

Opinion:
Williams, C.J.
This case involves primarily a free exercise of religion challenge based on the First, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution and art 1, § 4, and art 8, § 1, of the Michigan Constitution to the state statute requiring teachers in nonpublic schools to be certified by the state. The lower court also found that the regulations resulted in an Establishment Clause violation.
Specifically, the free exercise challenge is in two parts. The first part is phrased as follows in plaintiffs' reply brief:
To repeat: the Churches' point is not that a certified teacher may not teach in the Churches' schools' [sic]; it is that restricting the freedom of churches to engaging only government-certified teachers in its school ministry is abhorrent to their Scriptural beliefs. It is not for the State to play theologian in this matter. [Emphasis in original.]
The second part involves objections to the teacher certification rules. The plaintiffs' reply brief states:
[T]he certification rules . . . intrude upon or threaten the operation of the church-schools in their selection of their teachers . [T]he rules clearly evidence reservation of the ultimate State subjective control over important aspects of the making of a teacher in areas portending deep philosophical and religious differences between the plaintiff church-schools and prevailing secular philosophies concerning education matters. See, e.g. Roth testimony supra re "skills essential to . . . inquiry in modern society. "[ ]
Using the balancing analysis developed by the United States Supreme Court in Wisconsin v Yoder, 406 US 205; 92 S Ct 1526; 32 L Ed 2d 15 (1972), and Sherbert v Verner, 374 US 398; 83 S Ct 1790; 10 L Ed 2d 965 (1963), we find that the state's interest in ensuring that all teachers have met certain minimum requirements outweighs the slight burden the regulatory scheme poses to plaintiffs' free exercise rights. As applied, we find that the certification requirements are not discriminatory and do not require plaintiffs to adhere to any particular religious outlook. We also find that there is no Establishment Clause violation as the regulations do not lead to excessive entanglement between church and state.
We decline to reach the other issues initially raised by the plaintiffs as it appears they are no longer in controversy. Plaintiffs, both at oral argument and in their brief, and defendants at oral argument, indicated that there was agreement between the church and the state on the other points.
I. FACTS
In September, 1979, the Department of Education, acting under the authority of the state's nonpublic school statute, 1921 PA 302, MCL 388.551 et seq.; MSA 15.1921 et seq., sought to obtain information about student enrollment and teacher qualifications from two church schools. The schools refused to comply with the requests, and, as a result, the state scheduled an administrative hearing to determine whether the schools were in violation of the statute.
On December 6, 1980, the schools, the church pastors, members of thé schools' faculties, and parents of children enrolled in the schools filed a declaratory action in the Ingham Circuit Court, alleging that the statute which the state sought to enforce was unconstitutional on the basis of the First, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution, and art 1, § 4, and art 8, § 1, of the Michigan Constitution. Plaintiffs' request for a restraining order was granted, but subsequently vacated, after the state agreed to take no further action until the case was decided. On February 12, 1981, the defendants filed a counterclaim requesting that the court declare the nonpublic school statute constitutional on its face and as applied to the plaintiffs.
A six-day bench trial was held in April before Judge Ray C. Hotchkiss. At trial, it was established that Sheridan Road Baptist Church operates the Sheridan Road Christian School, and that First Baptist Church of Bridgeport operates the Bridgeport Baptist Academy. Both schools offer a kindergarten through grade twelve program. The plaintiffs were identified as the church schools, the pastors of the churches, and certain teachers at the schools and parents of students attending the schools.
In an opinion dated December 29, 1982, the trial court found that § 3 of 1921 PA 302, requiring teacher certification, was unconstitutional because it violated plaintiffs' free exercise rights and created excessive government entanglement with religion.
Defendants appealed this decision to the Court of Appeals which reversed the circuit court, holding that the certification requirements violated neither the Free Exercise nor the Establishment Clauses of the First Amendment. Sheridan Road Baptist Church v Dep't of Education, 132 Mich App 1; 348 NW2d 263 (1984).
Plaintiffs' application for leave to appeal to this Court originally was denied, 419 Mich 916 (1984), but, after reconsideration, leave was granted on April 5, 1985, 422 Mich 857 (1985).
II. FREE EXERCISE OBJECTION TO CERTIFICATION
A. STATE SYSTEM OF REGULATION
The Legislature has determined that teachers in all schools in the state must be certified. MCL 388.551; MSA 15.1921 and MCL 388.553; MSA 15.1923, respectively, provide in relevant parts:
It is the intent of this act that the sanitary conditions of such schools, the courses of study therein, and the qualifications of the teachers thereof shall be of the same standard as provided by the general school laws of the state.
No person shall teach or give instruction . in any private, denominational or parochial school within this state who does not hold a certificate such as would qualify him or her to teach in like grades of the public schools of the state .
The regulations governing teacher qualifications are promulgated by the State Board of Education and contained in the Teacher Certification Code, 1979 AC, R 390.1101 et seq., 1981 AACS, R 390.1101 et seq. In order to obtain a provisional teaching certificate, an applicant must demonstrate the following:
1) completion of at least forty semester hours in a program of general or liberal education and demonstration of an acquaintance with the substance, concepts, and methods of the principal areas of human knowledge and skills essential to communication and inquiry in modern society;
2) completion of a program providing for depth in the substantive field to be taught;
3) completion of twenty semester hours in education courses (including at least six hours of directed teaching);
4) completion of a major of at least thirty semester hours and a minor of twenty semester hours (or for an elementary certificate completion of either a major of at least thirty semester hours or three minors of twenty semester hours each);_
5) a bachelor's degree obtained from an approved Michigan college or university or an acceptable certificate issued by another state.
Under these regulations, the State Board of Education has issued thousands of provisional certificates to out-of-state college graduates, including graduates of Catholic and fundamentalist Christian schools.
B. TEST FOR ANALYZING FREE EXERCISE OBJECTIONS TO STATE REGULATIONS
The United States Supreme Court has developed a method of analyzing free exercise objections to state statutes. The following three quotations will serve as a basis for our development of a four-part test for this analysis.
The first quotation is from Wisconsin v Yoder, 406 US 215, and reads as follows:
[T]o have the protection of the Religious Clauses, the claims must be rooted in religious belief.
The second quotation is from Sherbert v Verner, 374 US 403, and reads as follows:
If therefore, the decision of the South Carolina Supreme Court is to withstand appellant's constitutional challenge, it must be either because her disqualification as a beneficiary [of unemployment compensation] represents no infringement by the State of her constitutional rights of free exercise, or because any incidental burden on the free exercise of appellant's religion may be justified by a "compelling state interest in the regulation of a subject within the State's constitutional power to regulate . . . ." NAACP v Button, 371 US 415, 438 [83 S Ct 328; 9 L Ed 2d 405 (1963)].
The third quotation is also from Sherbert, 374 US 407, and reads as follows:
[I]t would plainly be incumbent upon the appellees to demonstrate that no alternative forms of regulation would combat such abuses without infringing First Amendment rights.
From these three quotations we derive the following four rules with which to analyze the instant case:
1. Plaintiffs' "claims must be rooted in religious belief." Yoder.
2. If the regulation poses "no infringement by the State of [plaintiffs'] constitutional right[ ] of free exercise," Sherbert, the regulations will be upheld. If the regulation is upheld for this reason, rules three and four are inapplicable.
3. "[A]ny incidental burden on the free exercise of [plaintiffs'] religion may be justified by a 'compelling state interest in the regulation of a subject within the State's constitutional power to regulate .'" Sherbert.
4. No less obtrusive form of regulation is available to the state. Sherbert.
1. THE RELIGIOUS NATURE OF THE CLAIMS
There is no dispute as to the religious nature of the plaintiffs' objections to the certification requirement. The trial court found that
[p]laintiffs are members of the Fundamentalist Christian movement . The fundamentalist movement believes the church to be not only a place of worship but [a] place for instruction of the young. An outgrowth of this belief is the belief that the school is an extension of the church or a ministry of the church . As fundamentalists, plaintiffs object to state regulation of their schools which they consider a mission ordained by God. They further object to the certification of their teachers, believing that the course of study required to obtain a certificate teaches a humanistic rather than a religious approach to education.
Defendants note that they agree that plaintiffs' objections to the statute are premised on their religious beliefs.
2. BURDEN ON FREE EXERCISE RIGHTS
The churches advance two ways in which the regulations burden their religious interests. The primary objection is that "no one may carry out a teaching ministry in a church-school without a government permit to do so." We accept plaintiffs' claim that such licensing has an effect on their free exercise rights, and we therefore must determine whether this burden is outweighed by a compelling state interest. Second, they object to the discretion given to the state to determine whether an applicant is qualified to receive a provisional teaching certificate. The regulations require an applicant to demonstrate "an acquaintance with the substance, concepts, and methods of the principal areas of human knowledge, and skills essential to communication and inquiry in modern society." 1979 AC, R 390.1122. Other portions of these regulations enable the state to implement this with virtually unlimited discretion because it is the board which determines the acceptability of particular courses from out-of-state institutions, the acceptability of out-of-state candidates with certificates from their states and the acceptability of the educational institutions themselves in Mich igan. We acknowledge that the regulation could be applied in a manner which discriminates against those taught at religious colleges or universities.
The other plaintiffs also testified about the burden certification posed to them. A teacher at the Bridgeport Baptist Academy testified at trial that her rights would be infringed upon if she were forced to comply with the state certification requirements since attending courses taught at a state-approved school would force her to violate the Biblical command not to listen to instruction causing one to err. She stated that if compliance with the statute were ordered, she would be unable to fulfill her religious calling to teach. Parents of children attending the church schools stated that they would not want their children taught by those who were themselves taught other philosophies. For reasons discussed later, we do not find these claims to be supported by the record.
3. COMPELLING STATE INTEREST IN EDUCATION
In Sherbert, 374 US 403, the United States Supreme Court stated that if there were any "incidental burden" on a free exercise right, it must "be justified by a 'compelling state interest within the State's constitutional power to regulate
There is no doubt that a state has a compelling interest in the education of its citizens. In Pierce v Society of Sisters, 268 US 510, 534; 45 S Ct 571; 69 L Ed 1070 (1925), the Court, while ruling that a state cannot compel all students to be educated in public schools, noted that
[n]o question is raised concerning the power of the State reasonably to regulate all schools, to inspect, supervise and examine them, their teachers and pupils; to require that all children of proper age attend school, that teachers shall be of good moral character and patriotic disposition, that certain studies plainly essential to good citizenship must be taught, and that nothing be taught which is manifestly inimical to the public welfare.
In Brown v Topeka Bd of Ed, 347 US 483, 493; 74 S Ct 686; 98 L Ed 873 (1954), the Supreme Court again emphasized the magnitude of the state's interest:
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and local governments. Compulsory school attendance laws and the great expenditures for education both demonstrate our recognition of the importance of education to our democratic society. It is required in the performance of our most basic public responsibilities, even service in the armed forces. It is the very foundation of good citizenship. Today it is a principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him for later professional training, and in helping him to adjust normally to his environment. In these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education.
Finally, in Central Dist No 1 Bd of Ed v Allen, 392 US 236, 245-247; 88 S Ct 1923; 20 L Ed 2d 1060 (1968), the Supreme Court explicitly acknowledged the state's interest in private schools:
[A] substantial body of case law has confirmed the power of the States to insist that attendance at private schools, if it is to satisfy state compulsory-attendance laws, be at institutions which provide minimum hours of instruction, employ teachers of specified training, and cover prescribed subjects of instruction. . . . [I]f the State must satisfy its interest in secular education through the instrument of private schools, it has a proper interest in the manner in which those schools perform their secular educational function.
Michigan particularly has a significant and deeply rooted interest in education. Our Constitution, art 8, § 1, reflects the language of the Northwest Ordinance of 1787:
Religion, morality and knowledge being necessary to good government and the happiness of mankind, schools and the means of education shall forever be encouraged.
Governor James Blanchard elaborated on this in his January 18, 1984, State of the State address:
For decades, the promise of education has been the ladder of opportunity in this state. Hard-working people, honest people, lived here or came here, knowing that they themselves could earn a decent living working with their hands — but even more important, that their children could find an even better future working with their minds because of Michigan's fine schools and colleges and universities.
See also Michigan Female Seminary v Secretary of State, 115 Mich 118, 120; 73 NW 131 (1897) ("It has always been the policy of this State, as indicated by the provisions of its Constitution and a long line of legislative enactments, to encourage the cause of education.").
It is clear that Michigan's interest in education is long-standing and of the highest importance.
A compelling state interest in education does not necessarily justify all forms of educational regulation. For example, in Yoder, 406 US 236, the United States Supreme Court balanced the religious claims of the Amish against the state's interest in requiring compulsory education until age sixteen. The Court concluded that despite the state's "admittedly strong interest in compulsory education," it had failed to demonstrate with sufficient particularity how its interest would be adversely affected by granting an exemption to the Amish. The Court placed great emphasis on the adequacy of the Amish vocational education alternative to secondary education, the fact that the Amish children were not going to live in society at large, but in a closed, farming society, and the fact that compulsory high school education could ultimately destroy the Amish community. Yoder, 406 US 212. None of these factors are relevant in this case, and, more importantly, the state's interest here is not how much time should be spent in school, but the qualifications of the teachers themselves.
The state's interest in education necessarily extends to an interest in teachers because a primary and vital ingredient to a good education is good teachers. James Garfield expressed this sentiment in the following manner:
I am not willing that this discussion should close without mention of the value of a true teacher. Give me a log hut, with only a simple bench, Mark Hopkins on one end and I on the other, and you may have all the buildings, apparatus and libraries without him. [Address to Williams College Alumni, New York, December 28, 1871. Bartlett's Familiar Quotations (14th ed), p 741a.]
Michigan has long recognized the importance of qualified teachers. In 1843, O. C. Comstock, Superintendent of Public Instruction, stated:
Eligible teachers are all-important. This fact is now more deeply and generally impressed on the public mind than formerly . It was once imagined that almost every man of a competent education could teach a school. But to this proposition there are many exceptions. It does not follow that because a man has received a liberal education, he is therefore a lawyer or physician . And, by parity of reasoning, it is plain that an acquaintance with general literature and science does not, of necessity, prepare one for the arduous but delightful business of educating the underlying mind. Such preparation is chiefly derived from the study of the science and art of teaching. [Jackson, State Control of Public Instruction in Michigan, pp 154-155 (1926) (quoting O. C. Comstock).]
Therefore, to the extent that certification of teachers furthers education, it can be considered a compelling state interest. Those certification requirements which involve gaining expertise in a particular substantive field, taking classes in a program of general or liberal education, student teaching, and taking a few basic courses in educa tion, are clearly aimed at and closely related to the goal of producing competent teachers.
4. state's interest outweighs the minimal INFRINGEMENT
While complying with the certification requirements may mean that schools will have a smaller pool of applicants from which to select their teachers, there is no evidence that acceptable, certified people are not available. Parents have stated that they have no religious objection to having their children taught by certified teachers as long as they are also religiously acceptable to them. Religious school teachers may have to receive more training in order to become certified, but the regulations do not require anyone to attend courses taught from a perspective contrary to their beliefs. The teachers can fulfill all the state certification requirements while attending either a religious or nonreligious institution. For these reasons, we find the infringement on free exercise rights is minimal and is outweighed by the state's interest.
Other state courts confronted with religious objections to the state certification of teachers have found for the state. In State v Rivinius, 328 NW2d 220 (ND, 1982), cert den 460 US 1070 (1983), the North Dakota Supreme Court balanced the state's interest in education against parents' right to educate their children in the religion of their choice. The court found that the state law, which included a requirement that all teachers be certified by the state, did impose a burden on religion. However, the court found that the compelling state interest in education "outbalances the resulting strain or imposition on the defendants' religious beliefs." Rivinius, 328 NW2d 229. The court relied in part on the fact that there was no evidence suggesting that a certified teacher was unable to teach in a manner consistent with the religious beliefs of the parents. See also Nebraska ex rel Douglas v Faith Baptist Church, 207 Neb 802; 301 NW2d 571 (1981), app dis 454 US 803 (1981) (state law requiring a baccalaureate degree as a prerequisite to teaching at any school upheld); State v Shaver, 294 NW2d 883 (ND, 1980) (certification requirement upheld, in part because religious convictions of the parents did not prohibit the use of certified teachers). Cf. Kentucky State Bd of Ed v Rudasill, 589 SW2d 877, 879, n 3 (Ky, 1979), cert den 446 US 938 (1980) (certification requirements for private school teachers held unconstitutional under the state constitution. The court noted, "it is obvious that Section 5 of the Kentucky Constitution is more restrictive of the power of the state to regulate private and parochial schools than is the first amendment").
5. THE REGULATIONS HAVE NOT BEEN APPLIED IN A DISCRIMINATORY MANNER
The plaintiffs' second allegation is that the certification regulations give the board the power to withhold certificates on the basis of an applicant's religious beliefs. Those portions of the regulations, discussed in part ii(b)(2), which give the board the discretion to grant or withhold a certificate on the basis of vague and subjective criteria certainly could be applied in a discriminatory manner. Such provisions are also less clearly related to the state's goal of producing competent teachers. However, there is no evidence that any applicant who has fulfilled the objective requirements has been denied a certificate because of religious beliefs. Graduates of religious institutions, including both fundamentalist Christian and Catholic schools, have been certified. We assume from this that the board is concerned with the applicant's compliance with the objective requirements and that it does not attempt to determine whether an applicant has a "humanistic" world view or has taken courses taught from that perspective. We therefore find that the certification regulations, as applied, directly further the state's interest in education and do not enable the board to discriminate on the basis of religious beliefs.
6. NO LESS INTRUSIVE METHOD IS AVAILABLE TO THE STATE
We are also satisfied that there is no less intrusive method by which the state could satisfy its interest in the education of its citizens. The only alternative which has been proposed is standardized testing of private school students. This is an inadequate substitute because deficiencies in teaching would be discovered only after the damage has occurred. State v Shaver, 294 NW2d 883 (ND, 1980). Further, we are not persuaded that testing would guarantee less intrusion by the state into the functioning of the private schools. See, e.g., Rivinius, supra, 328 NW2d 229. See also Johnson v Charles City Community Schools, 368 NW2d 74, 79 (Iowa, 1985), cert den 474 US —; 88 L Ed 2d 574 (1985) ("[wjhatever limitations are imposed on the state's general right and duty to see to the education of its youth, the right extends beyond occasional testing").
III. OBJECTION TO CERTIFICATION REQUIREMENT ON THE BASIS OF THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
In Lemon v Kurtzman, 403 US 602, 612; 91 S Ct 2105; 29 L Ed 2d 745 (1971), the Supreme Court stated that in order to survive an Establishment Clause challenge, a statute must meet a three-part test:
First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion, finally, the statute must not foster "an excessive government entanglement with religion." [Citations omitted.]
See also Grand Rapids School Dist v Ball, 473 US 373, —; 105 S Ct 3216; 87 L Ed 2d 267, 277 (1985) ("We therefore reaffirm that state action alleged to violate the Establishment Clause should be measured against the Lemon criteria.").
The parties here have not discussed the first two parts of this test because it is clear that the statute involved in this case has a secular purpose and that it does not have a primary effect of either advancing or inhibiting religion. With respect to the third part of the test, the circuit court found that teacher certification did cause excessive government entanglement with religion.
In reviewing this conclusion, we are aware that the United States Supreme Court has stated:
Our prior holdings do not call for total separation between church and state; total separation is not possible in an absolute sense. Some relationship between government and religious organizations is inevitable. Fire inspections, building and zoning regulations, and state requirements under compulsory school-attendance laws are examples of necessary and permissible contacts. [Lemon, 403 US 614. Citations omitted.]
Those kinds of state actions which have been found to violate this third prong are those which create "an intimate and continuing relationship between church and state." Lemon, 403 US 622. See also Walz v New York City Tax Comm, 397 US 664; 90 S Ct 1409; 25 L Ed 2d 697 (1970); Wolman v Walker, 433 US 229; 97 S Ct 2593; 53 L Ed 2d 714 (1977) (finding that the use of state funds for nonpublic school field trips would require close supervision of the nonpublic school teachers, thus creating excessive entanglement).
In this case, it is clear that requiring all teachers to be certified does not impermissibly tangle government with religion. The state is merely enforcing minimum standards with regard to individuals. The requirement does not involve the government in any continuing relationship with the churches or the schools. Once the individual teacher is certified, the state does not require the individual to teach from any particular perspective. We find, therefore, that there is no unconstitutional government entanglement with religion.
IV. CONCLUSION
We agree with the Court of Appeals that requiring all teachers in the state to be certified is not unconstitutional. Neither the Free Exercise nor the Establishment Clauses of the First Amendment support claims to the contrary.
United States constitutional provisions:
I. Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof .
IX. The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.
XIV. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
Michigan constitutional provisions:
Every person shall be at liberty to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience. No person shall be compelled to attend, or, against his consent, to contribute to the erection or support of any place of religious worship, or to pay tithes, taxes or other rates for the support of any minister of the gospel or teacher of religion. No money shall be appropriated or drawn from the treasury for the benefit of any religious sect or society, theological or religious seminary; nor shall property belonging to the state be appropriated for any such purpose. The civil and political rights, privileges and capacities of no person shall be diminished or enlarged on account of his religious beliefs. [Const 1963, art 1, § 4.]
Religion, morality and knowledge being necessary to good government and the happiness of mankind, schools and the means of education shall forever be encouraged. [Const 1963, art 8, § 1.]
Another issue raised in the briefs is the applicability of the emergency teacher permit provision. Defendants suggest that if religious schools were unable to find certified teachers who also met their religious qualifications, 1979 AC, R 390.1145 would allow emergency permits to be issued. Plaintiffs respond by noting that the regulation gives the public school authorities the ability to recommend that such permits be issued. They express some doubt about whether these officials would define emergency so as to include situations in which state certified and religiously qualified applicants were unavailable.
Because there is no evidence in the record that there is a shortage of certified teachers deemed religiously qualified by the plaintiffs or that the plaintiffs have been unable to fill their teaching positions, we offer no opinion as to the applicability of this provision in those circumstances.
Both state and church herein are agreed that, as the State interprets the Michigan statutes, no constitutional issue with respect to curriculum, licensing, or the reporting of enrollment or courses of study is presented.
PRIVATE, DENOMINATIONAL, AND PAROCHIAL SCHOOLS Act 302,1921, p 560; eff August 18.
An act to provide for the supervision of private, denominational and parochial schools; to provide the manner of securing funds in payment of the expense of such supervision; to provide the qualifications of the teachers in such schools; and to provide for the endorsement of the provisions hereof.
The People of the State of Michigan enact:
Sec. 1. The superintendent of public instruction is hereby given supervision of all the private, denominational and parochial schools of this state in such matters and manner as is hereinafter provided. He shall employ such assistants and employes as may be necessary to comply with the provisions hereof and fix the compensation thereof; the number of assistants and employes and the compensation payable thereto being subject to the approval of the state administrative board. Such salaries and expenses shall be paid by the treasurer of the state of Michigan upon the warrant of the auditor general from the fund as herein designated, at such time and in such manner as other state officers and employes are paid. The superintendent of public instruction shall have the authority to remove any appointee under this act at any time that he may deem such removal advisable. It is the intent of this act that the sanitary conditions of such schools, the courses of study therein, and the qualifications of the teachers thereof shall be of the same standard as provided by the general school laws of the state. [MCL 388.551; MSA 15.1921.]
Sec. 2. A private, denominational or parochial school within the meaning of this act shall be any school other than a public school giving instruction to children below the age of 16 years, in the first 8 grades as provided for the public schools of the state, such school not being under the exclusive supervision and control of the officials having charge of the public schools of the state. [MCL 388.552; MSA 15.1922.]
Sec. 3. No person shall teach or give instruction in any of the regular or elementary grade studies in any private, denominational or parochial school within this state who does not hold a certificate such as would qualify him or her to teach in like grades of the public schools of the state: Provided, however, That any person who shall have taught in any- elementary school or schools of the standard specified in this act for a period of 10 years or more preceding the passage of this act, shall, upon filing proof of service with the superintendent of public instruction, be entitled to a certificate by said superintendent of public instruction in such form as he shall prescribe, to teach in any of the said schools within the state: Provided further, That teaching in such schools shall be equivalent to teaching in the public schools for all purposes in obtaining a certificate: Provided further, That the teachers affected by this act may take any examination as now provided by law and that the superintendent of public instruction may direct such other examinations at such time and place as he may see fit. In all such examinations 2 sets of questions shall be prepared in subjects ordinarily written on Saturday, 1 of which sets shall be available for use on Wednesday by applicants who observe Saturday as their Sabbath; Provided further, That any certificate issued under or by virtue of this act shall be valid in any county in this state for the purpose of teaching in the schools operated under this act; Provided further, That any person holding a certificate issued by the authorities of any recognized or accredited normal school, college or university of this or other state shall be entitled to certification as now provided by law: Provided, however, That teachers employed in such private, denominational or parochial schools when this act takes effect shall have until September first, 1925, to obtain a legal certificate as herein provided. [MCL 388.553; MSA 15.1923.]
Sec. 4. In event of any violation of this act the superintendent of public instruction shall serve the person, persons, corporation, association or other agencies who operate, maintain and conduct a private, denominational or parochial school within the meaning of this act with a notice, time and place of hearing, such hearing to take place within 15 days after the date of said notice and at a place located in or conveniently near the county where such violation took place, accompanied by a copy of the complaint stating the substance of said violation: Provided, That no person shall be called to attend any such hearing on any day observed by him as the Sabbath. If at such hearing the superintendent of public instruction shall find that the violation complained of has been established he shall then serve said person, persons, corporation, association or other agencies with an order to comply with the requirements of this act found to have been violated within a reasonable time not to exceed 60 days from the date of such order: Provided, That in the event that such order refers to sanitary conditions that the said person, persons, corporation, association or other agencies shall have 6 months in which to remedy the defect. If the order of the superintendent of public instruction as specified in said notice shall not have been obeyed within the time specified herein said superintendent of public instruction may close said school and prohibit the said person, persons, corporation, association or other agencies operating or maintaining such private, denominational or parochial school from maintaining said school or from exercising any of the functions hereunder until said order of the superintendent of public instruction has been complied with. The children attending a private, denominational or parochial school refusing to comply with the requirements hereof after proceedings herein set forth shall be compelled to attend the public schools or approved private, denominational or parochial school under the provisions of the compulsory education act, the same being Act. No. 200 of the Public Acts of 1905, as amended. And it shall be the duty of the person or persons having charge of the enforcement of the said compulsory education act, upon notice from the superintendent of public instruction that said private, denominational or parochial school has not complied with the provisions hereof, to compel the attendance of the children of said school or schools at the public schools or approved private, denominational or parochial school. [MCL 388.554; MSA 15.1924.]
Sec. 5. The superintendent of public instruction by himself, his assistants, or any duly authorized agent, shall have authority at any time to investigate and examine into the conditions of any school operating under this act as to the matters hereinbefore set forth and it shall be the duty of such school to admit such superintendent, his assistants or authorized agents and to submit for examination its sanitary condition, the records of enrollment of pupils, its courses of studies as set forth in section 1 of this act and the qualifications of its teachers. Any refusal to comply with provisions herein on the part of such school or teacher shall be considered sufficient cause to suspend the operation of said school after proceedings taken as stated in section 4 of this act.
The court also found § 1 of the act, requiring that "the courses of study [in private schools] and the qualifications of the teachers thereof shall be of the same standard as provided by the general school laws of the state" was unconstitutional because of excessive government involvement with religion. Section 5 of the act, providing for examination of school records to determine compliance with the act, was upheld, with the restriction that information obtained be used only for statistical or comparative purposes. Section 4 of the act, providing for hearings and sanctions for violations of the act, was upheld.
The court also found that the curriculum requirements were constitutional and that the trial court had erred in limiting the purposes for which statistical data from nonpublic schools could be used. Plaintiffs' contentions that the regulatory scheme was vague or that it created a danger of future abuses were not accepted by the court.
Upon receiving a degree from an undergraduate institution, an applicant is entitled to only a provisional certificate. To acquire a continuing certificate, a teacher must complete three years of successful teaching and complete 18 post-graduate semester hours or obtain a master's degree. 1981 AACS, R 390.1132.
1979 AC, R 390.1115 provides:
The state board reserves the right to determine the acceptability of credits presented for certification from approved teacher education institutions located in other states.
1979 AC, R 390.1125 provides:
An applicant for a provisional certificate shall have been granted a bachelor's degree and shall be recommended by a Michigan college or university approved for teacher education by the state hoard.
1979 AC, R 390.1130 provides:
The state board may issue a provisional certificate to a person who has, or who is reported eligible for, a teaching certificate issued by the certificating authority of any state in which requirements for certification are deemed equivalent to those in effect in this state. [Emphasis added.]
As one writer has noted:
It can . be assumed that a teacher with a college degree will in almost all cases be a better teacher than one with little or no education. The teacher with a college degree, has, at the very least, demonstrated the mastery of certain basic skills. [Baker, Regulation of fundamentalist Christian schools: Free exercise of religion v the state's interest in quality education, 67 Ky L J 415, 427 (1979).]