Case Name: JANE MOONEY, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. THE HUDSON RIVER RAILROAD COMPANY, impleaded, Defendants and Appellants
Court: New York Superior Court
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1869-06-11
Citations: 1 Sweeny 325
Docket Number: 
Parties: JANE MOONEY, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. THE HUDSON RIVER RAILROAD COMPANY, impleaded, Defendants and Appellants.
Judges: 
Reporter: Reports of cases argued and determined in the Superior Court of the city of New York
Volume: 31
Pages: 325–331

Head Matter:
JANE MOONEY, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. THE HUDSON RIVER RAILROAD COMPANY, impleaded, Defendants and Appellants.
A railroad company may be held liable for negligence in propelling its cars, while persons are upon its track, precisely to the same extent as the owner of an ordinary carriage would, under like circumstances; indeed, greater care might be required from the former, as their cars are stopped with difficulty and cannot be turned out of their course.
The right of a railroad company to run its cars in a' particular place is not exclusive; all other cars, carriages, and persons who are authorized by law to use the same place, have the same rights as the company, but the same degree of care and caution must be exercised by each. Sixteen hundred dollars will not be regarded as excessive damages for injuries sustained by a laboring woman, so badly bruised as to be unable to work for a long time.
Before Barbour, C.J., Jones and Fithian, JJ.
[Decided June 11, 1869.]
This action was tried before Chief-Justice Robertson and a jury.
This action was brought to recover damages sustained by a collision between a car of the Central Park, North and East River Railroad Company, and a locomotive of the Hudson River Railroad Company. On the 30th of July, 1866, the plaintiff entered one of the cars of the Central Park, North and East River Railroad Company, intending to ride as far as Eorty-first street and Tenth avenue. The complaint alleged that on the Tenth avenue, at or near Thirtieth street, through the negligence and carelessness of both defendants, the cars of both defendants came into collision, and that she was violently thrown out of the car which she was in and received severe injuries, for which she brought this action. The answer of the Central Park, North and East River Railroad Company admitted the collision, but denied that the plaintiff sustained any injury, or that the injury was occasioned by their negligence. The answer of the Hudson River Railroad Company admitted the collision, but charged that it was caused by the negligence of the street car, and that the plaintiff contributed to her injuries by her own negligence.
The evidence is fully stated in the opinions.
The jury found a verdict against both defendants.
A motion was made by the defendants The Hudson River Railroad Company to set, aside the verdict as to them, on the ground that the verdict was against the weight of evidence, and the damages excessive, which motion was denied. The defendants the Hudson River Railroad Company appealed to General Term from this order and also from the judgment.
Mr. Frank Loomis for appellant.
The damages are excessive. The amount given by the jury is so grossly disproportionate to the extent and effect of plaintiff’s injuries as to compel the conclusion that the jury were influenced by partiality, prejudice, or passion. The verdict should be reduced or a new trial granted (Clapp v. Hudson R. R.R. Co., 19 Barb., 461; Blum v. Higgins, 8 Abbott, 104; Murray v. Hudson R. R.R. Co., 47 Barb., 196).
The motions of the appellants for nonsuit was erroneously denied (24 N. Y., 433; 30 N. Y., 235; 22 How., 431; 29 Barb., 226).
The motion of the appellants for a separate trial as between plaintiff and each of the defendants, as provided hy sec. 258 of the Code, should have been granted. The defences of the defendants were entirely distinct; their respective answers imputed negligence to each other, and a joint trial was calculated to and did prejudice the rights of the appellants and placed them at a disadvantage. The complaint alleged negligence on the 'part of the defendants, The Central Park, Horth and East River Railroad Company, having charge of the car upon which plaintiff was a passenger. The evidence showed such negligence. The jury by their verdict found the defendants The Central Park, North and East River Railroad Company guilty of such negligence. The negligence of those having charge of the street car must be regarded as the negligence of the plaintiff, and the judgment, as against appellants, cannot be maintained (Brown v. N. Y. C. R.R. Co., 32 N. Y., p. 597; 5 Robertson, 548).
The verdict is contrary to the weight of evidence and should be set aside (49 Barb., 583; 25 N. Y., 363).
Mr. Alexander H. Reavey for respondent.
The action was well brought against both corporations. The car and locomotive having collided and caused the injury, was of itself prima fade evidence of negligence on the part of both. There was evidence tending to show that the collision was the fault of the appellants. The respondent entered the car as a passenger and paid the usual fare, and, while being carried to her place of destination, received the injuries, without negligence on her part (Colgrave v. N. Y. & New Haven and New York & Harlem R.R. Co’s, 2 N. Y. Rep., 492).
There was evidence establishing the fact that the collision was occasioned by the cojicurrent negligence of both defendants, and the learned judge could not do otherwise than submit the case to the jury. The respondent was free from all contributing negligence ; she neither had the management of the car she was in, nor any control of the appellants’ locomotive (Wilds v. Hudson R. R.R., 33 Barb. Rep., 503; Brown v. N. Y. Central R.R., 32 N. Y. Rep., 597; Beisiegel v. N. Y. Central R.R., 34 N. Y. Rep., 622 ; Ernst v. Hudson R. R.R., 35 N. Y. Rep., 9).
Even if it be conceded that there is a conflict of evidence, and that the evidence strongly preponderates in the appellants’ favor, the Court will not, and should not, for that reason, disturb the verdict of the jury; nor because the Court would have come to a different conclusion on the force or weight of the testimony (27 Barb. Rep., 528; 29 Barb. Rep., 491-504; 33 Barb. Rep., 127; 44 Barb. Rep., 554).
The damages are not excessive, and the Court would not be justified in reducing the amount, or in granting a new trial upon that ground, unless it clearly appears from the evidence that the jury were Massed or prejudiced, or committed gross error in their consideration of the evidence, or, in other words, that they acted from passion, partiality, or corruption.

Opinion:
By the Court:
Barbour, C.J.
This was an action for a personal injury alleged to have been caused by the negligence of the defendants.
Upon the trial it appeared that the plaintiff, while a passenger in a street railroad car, and standing upon the platform thereof, was struck by a car of the defendants which was being propelled by steam upon a track'crossing that of the street railroad, and thereby was wounded and injured.
Without looking into the facts to see whether there was any actual negligence beyond what may be inferred from this statement, I am of the opinion that a verdict in favor of the plaintiff was justified by the evidence.
Indeed, I see no reason why a railroad company may not, subject, of course, to the particular circumstances appearing in each case, be held liable for negligence in propelling its cars at all, while people are standing upon its track, precisely to the same extent as the owner of an ordinary carnage would be under like circumstances. Indeed, greater care and caution might well be required from the former; as their cars are stopped with difficulty, and cannot be turned out of their course at all.
A railroad company, it is true, is expressly authorized by its charter to run its cars in a particular place. But that right is not exclusive. All other cars, carriages, and persons who are authorized by law to rise the same place, as was the case at the point in question, have precisely the same rights that such company has. As a matter of course, however, let what may be the degree of negligence on the part of the company in such a case, a corresponding degree of care and caution must be exercised by the persons endangered, as, otherwise, the latter will themselves be guilty of negligence, and thereby furnish a good defence to the others.
The defendant objects, also, to the amount of the recovery as excessive.
The evidence shows that the plaintiff, a poor laboring woman, was struck by the car and thrown into the street, and so badly bruised in various parts of her person as to be unable for a long time to go out; that she yet remained, at the time of the trial, wholly unable to perform any work whatever, and still continued to suffer great pain. Several physicians, also, testified that such injuries might become permanent.
"Who can say that all this bodily pain and mental anguish suffered by this woman, together with the loss of her power to obtain a subsistence by her labor, perhaps for life, is over-compensated by a verdict of $1,600 %
The judgment should be affirmed.