Case Name: AMOS KLOCK, Appellant, v. NOAH W. BEEKMAN, JOHN G. BEEKMAN AND BENJAMIN BEEKMAN, Respondents
Court: New York Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1879-09
Citations: 25 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 502
Docket Number: 
Parties: AMOS KLOCK, Appellant, v. NOAH W. BEEKMAN, JOHN G. BEEKMAN AND BENJAMIN BEEKMAN, Respondents.
Judges: Bocees, J., concurs; LearNED, P. J., dissents.
Reporter: Supreme Court Reports (Hun)
Volume: 25
Pages: 502–506

Head Matter:
AMOS KLOCK, Appellant, v. NOAH W. BEEKMAN, JOHN G. BEEKMAN AND BENJAMIN BEEKMAN, Respondents.
Statements of a deceased pcvrtner to third persons — admissibility of against the sw'mvor.
In an action against the surviving member of a firm, to recover money lent to the deceased partner, where the defence is that the money was not borrowed or used for firm purposes, declarations of the deceased partner to third persons, made after the money was borrowed, to the effect that it was borrowed and used for firm purposes, are admissible as against the surviving partner. (Learned, P. J., dissenting.)
Appeal from a judgment of the Montgomery County Court in favor of the defendants, and. from an order denying a motion for a new trial, made upon a case and exceptions. The action was brought to recover $100.63 the price of goods sold and delivered by the plaintiff to the defendants. The latter set up as a counter-claim the loan by them of $200 to the firm of Klock & Walrath, composed of the plaintiff and Harlow P. Walrath, who died in April, 1873, the loan having been made in September, 1872. The plaintiff, who had taken all the personal property of the firm and agreed to pay all its debts and liabilities, denied that the money was loaned to or used by the firm, and claimed that it was borrowed by Walrath individually.
Upon the trial two witnesses named Ackerman were allowed, against the plaintiff’s objection and exception, to testify to statements made to them by Walrath, after the money was borrowed, showing that it was borrowed and used for the purposes of the firm. The admission of this evidence was the principal question raised by this appeal.
J. D. & F. F. Wendell, for the appellant.
Smith & Nellis, for the respondents.

Opinion:
BoakdmaN J.:
By the verdict of the jury it is determined that the defendants lent Walrath, a deceased partner of plaintiff, the $200 set up by way of counter-claim, for the use of the partnership of plaintiff and Walrath. The evidence of such loan consists of the declarations and admissions of the deceased Walrath made to two persons by the name of Ackerman. If this evidence was competent it ivas sufficient to establish the fact of this loan, and the judgment and order appealed from must stand, unless some error occurred upon the trial or in the charge which should be found fatal.
During the existence of a partnership one partner may bind the firm by his admissions, representations and declarations made in relation to the partnership business in good faith. (Parsons on Part., 184, et seq., and 191, et seq.] 1 Greenl. Ev., § 112, 174, 177, 180; Whitaker v. Brown, 16 Wend., 505; Walden v. Sherburne, 15 Johns., 409; Gow on Part., 37, et seq.) This principle, which is believed to be unquestionable, disposes of the objections to' the testimony of the Ackermans, the exceptions to the charge and the refusal to direct a verdict. It is not necessary to show the application of the money to the uses of the firm. (Whitaker v. Brown, ante.)
It was of no consequence whether Klock knew of the borrowing of the money or not. The evidence that he was ignorant of the loan was not competent, and however strongly established would of itself have boon no protection • against his liability for Walrath's acts. It was not proposed to connect it with other evidence. But a little later Klock testifies that he does not know whether Walrath did or did not borrow the money. So the question was, in fact, answered.
Klock had testified that about the time of the alleged borrowing the firm did not need the money, having a balance of cash on hand. In answer to this, and for the purpose of overcoming the presumption arising therefrom, it was proper to prove that Klock himself, in about a week from that time, wanted to borrow of defendants $150 for the use of Klock & Walrath.
We find no error in the case calling for a new trial.
The judgment and order appealed from are therefore affirmed, with costs.
Bocees, J., concurs; LearNED, P. J., dissents.