Case Name: THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, Respondent, v. FRANK MONDON, Appellant
Court: New York Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1885-11
Citations: 45 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 188
Docket Number: 
Parties: THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, Respondent, v. FRANK MONDON, Appellant.
Judges: 
Reporter: Supreme Court Reports (Hun)
Volume: 45
Pages: 188–201

Head Matter:
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, Respondent, v. FRANK MONDON, Appellant.
Confession of a person accused of crime — what is included in the term as used in section 395 of the Code of Criminal Procedure — when the prisoner’s examination before the coroner is admissible — what evidence in addition to a confession is necessa/ry to a/athoriae a conviction.
The defendant, an Italian laborer, while under arrest upon a charge of murder, was taken by the sheriff before the coroner, and after being sworn was examined as to the relations existing between him and the deceased, and as to his own conduct at or about the time of the homicide. He confessed no fact tending to convict him of the crime, the acts and declarations as to which he testified being material only in so far as they were afterwards proved to be in some respects false. He had no counsel, and the coroner did not advise him that he need not answer any of the questions put to him or submit to an examination.
Upon the trial of the defendant for murder in the first degree the statements made by him upon his examination before the coroner were, against the objection and exception of his counsel, admitted in evidence.
Held, that the term “ confession,” as used in section 395 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, providing that “ a confession of a defendant whether in the corase of judicial proceedings or to a private person, can be given in evidence against Mm, unless made under tbe influence of fear produced by threats,” is not to be restricted to admissions of guilt alone, but is intended to include statements as to Ms conduct and declarations at and about tbe time of tbe commission of tbe crime.
That 1he statements were admissible under tbe said section and that tbe court did not err in receiving them. (Follett, J., dissenting.)
People v. McG-loin (91 N. Y., 241) followed. '
Tbe counsel for tbe defendant requested tbe court to charge that if there was not sufficient evidence to satisfy tbe jury, aside from tbe admissions of tbe defendant that be committed tbe crime charged, they must acquit him. Tbe court refused so to charge, but did charge that tbe confession was not sufficient without additional proof that tbe crime bad been committed.
Held, no error.
Appeal from a judgment convicting the defendant of murder in the first degree, and from an order denying a motion for a new trial.
The defendant was accused of having killed one John Weishart, whose body was found in a ditch in the vicinity of the defendant’s-house. TJpon the trial, testimony given by the defendant upon his examination under oath before the coroner was, against the objection and exception of his counsel, received in evidence. The counsel for the defendant requested the court to charge the jury that if there is not sufficient evidence to satisfy the jury, aside from the admissions of the defendant that he committed the crime charged, they must acquit him.
The Court — Do you mean by that that they cannot convict unless they are satisfied after throwing out the confession %
The defendant’s counsel — Yes, sir.
The Court — I refuse to charge that, but I charge, as I have-before, that the confession is not sufficient without additional proof that the crime has been committed. To the refusal to charge and to the qualification made by the court the defendant excepted.
J. J. Huddleston and H. Olay Hall, for the appellant.
A, B. Steele, district attorney, for the respondent.

Opinion:
Boardman, J.:
The defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree in killing John 'Weishart. At the inquest held to ascertain the cause of his death, the defendant then under arrest charged with the murder, was brought by the sheriff before the coroner and sworn-While denying his guilt he made statements touching his relations with deceased, and about his own conduct at or about the time of the homicide. These statements were proved upon the trial, under the defendant's objection and exception, but no ground of objection was stated to the court, so far as the papers show. Assuming, however, that the objections and exceptions were sufficient in form, we have to consider whether the defendant's declarations made before the coroner under oath while under arrest on suspicion, but without warrant charged with this crime, were admissible in evidence.
By section 395 of the Code of Criminal Procedure " a confession of a defendant, whether in the course of judicial proceedings or to a private person, can be given in evidence against him, unless made under the influence' of fear produced by threats," etc. The remainder of the section has no relation to the question before us. The evidence offered was not a confession but, on the contrary, a denial of his guilt of the crime. The statements made will not, however, be treated I apprehend, by any harsher rule than if they were confessions in the strictest sense of guilt. They were confessions or statements of his conduct and declarations about the time of the murder and where he was and what he knew or saw of the deceased at the same time. I shall hold that such statements are controlled by the section cited and that it will not be restricted by the courts to admissions of guilt alone. The purpose of the law, I submit, is to allow such evidence to be given to a jury, provided it is not made under the influence of fear produced by threats. The jury, from all the circumstances surrounding the case, is left to give to it such weight and credit as seems proper. The section was doubtless intended to make a definite and certain rule where formerly, if the authorities were not conflicting, they were obscure, refined and difficult to follow or distinguish. The commission of a crime is easy and prompt. The punishment of the criminal is often a task of great difficulty, involving a great expense of time and money. It is therefore wise in the legislature to render easy and certain, so far as may safely be done, the rules of evidence to be observed in criminal trials. The competency of such evidence is fully supported, I think, by the case of the People v. McGloin (91 N. Y., 241; S. C., at Genl. Term, 1 Crim. Pep., 105). Judge Brady, at General Term, says this section, " in phraseology at least, limits the objection to a confession to the ground simply that it was made under the influence of fear produced by threats." And therefore whatever may have been the rule heretofore, such confessions, with the exception named and possibly one other, may be admitted in •evidence against the prisoner. In the Court of Appeals Chief Judge Huger would have been content to rest the decision of the court upon Judge Beady's opinion were not a human life involved. He therefore proceeds to discuss the several grounds of objection taken in that case.
Fvrst. That the confession was made under the influence of fear produced by threats.
Second. Because it was taken before a magistrate after the defendant was accused of, and under arrest for, the perpetration of the crime, and
Thvrd. That it was not voluntarily made, being a sworn deposition. He finds in the case no evidence of threats, and so dismisses the first ground. A summary statement of the law as well settled prior to the Criminal Code, is his answer to the second objection. He says, page 247:
1st That all confessions material to the issue, voluntarily made by a party, whether oral or written, and however authenticated, were admissible as evidence against him on a trial for a criminal offense. (People v. Wentz, 37 N. Y., 303.)
2d. It was no objection to the admissibility of such confessions, that they had been taken under oath from a person attending before a coroner, in obedience to a subpoena upon an inquiry conducted pursuant to law into the causes of a homicide. (Hendrickson v. People, 10 N. Y., 28; Teachout v. People, 41 id., 7.)
3d. That the confession or declaration sought to be given in evidence was in writing and purported to be sworn to was no objection to its admissibility, unless it also appeared that it was taken before a magistrate upon a judicial investigation against the person accused of the commission of the crime. The learned judge proceeds to show that the examination before a coroner is extra judicial and is not included in the third proposition quoted and is not embraced in sections 188 to 200 of Criminal Code.
In the McGloin case the statement, purporting to be under oath, was made before the coroner. But if under oath it was decided that under the authorities it was in no respect a compulsory state ment and was at common-law admissible in evidence against the defendant. Then after reciting section 395 of Criminal Code it is further said : " It is thus found that neither at common-law, nor by the statute, was this evidence open to any of the grounds of objection raised."
The McGloin case seems to me to sustain the rulings of the learned justice on the trial. The language of the Criminal Code is broad, distinct and positive. It allows the evidence to be put in on the trial and its weight and value to be adjudged by the jury. Why shall we not accept it as it reads and according to its plain intent ? Why shall we again go back to the vague and nebulous hypotheses of possible influences upon the mind of the prisoner, of his fear and anxiety and confusion arising from his situation ? He is now a competent witness in his own behalf and can explain his declarations and conduct after abundant time for reflection. The acts and declarations of the prisoner, as sworn to by him, tended to exculpate him from the alleged crime and were of no consequence except as they were afterwards in some respects proved to be false. He confessed no fact before the coroner tending to convict him of the crime now charged upon him. Why, then, shall it be presumed that he was acting under the influence of fear, instead of cunning, in the absence of evidence ? Why shall it be presumed in the like absence of evidence that his evidence so given was not voluntarily and willingly given ? True, the coroner should have advised him that he need not answer any of the questions put to him or submit to an examination. But in the absence of such advice the law will not presume his answers were compulsory and against his will. A person accused of crime should have the protecting mantle of the law thrown around him. That is done by giving a prisoner every right of exception while the people have none. It is always safe for a court to rule against the people in criminal cases, for there can be no review or reversal on that account. So that step by step the tendency is to protect the prisoner by all recognized lawful means and also to give him the benefit of every doubtful ruling on the trial. If the present evidence shall be held incompetent on appeal, the trial courts are again thrown back into the slough of dpubt and uncertainty. Presumptions will again be invoked to deprive the jury of the prisoner's declarations, admissions and conduct when the fact was recent and when honest and innocent men are likely to tell the truth. The Criminal Code will be disregarded by holding it incompetent. A rule of evidence adopted by the legislature should not be deprived of all its virtue by judicial construction in hostility to its plain intent.
The request to charge was clearly untenable. The jury was told it could not convict upon the defendant's confession alone. But it is not the law that there must be evidence enough to satisfy of guilt outside of the confessions. The jury has the right to resort to the confessions to aid the other evidence in the case and upon the whole determine as to the guilt. Upon the merits the verdict of the jury is sustained by the evidence in the case. An examination of the other exceptions in the case does not show any error to the prejudice of the defendant, nor do any of such exceptions call for special consideration.
The judgment and order should be affirmed.
'Hardin, P. J.:
Prior to the adoption of the Code of Criminal Procedure, it was held that declarations or confessions of a person were not involuntary because made after his arrest and while in custody. (Murphy v. People, 63 N. Y., 591; Willett v. People, 27 Hun, 469.) When section 395 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was adopted, the legislature declared that confessions of a defendant " whether in the course of judicial proceedings or to a private person " can be given in evidence.
Two exceptions were declared to the rule : (1.) If the confessions were made under the influence of fear produced by threats. (2.) If made upon stipulation of the district attorney that the person should not be prosecuted therefor. The case before us does not fall within either of the exceptions. There was nothing in the evidence before the trial court, at the time the declarations of the defendant made before the coroner were received, to indicate that the declarations were " made under the influence of favor produced by threats."
The test as to whether the ruling was correct must be made upon the evidence as it stood when the declarations were ruled upon and received. (Murphy v. People, supra.) We look into the evidence in vain for any features of it which carry the case within the exceptions in the section of the Code of Criminal Procedure under consideration. Thus we are brought to say that the general rule pre. scribed by the section allows the declarations of the defendant to be received in evidence. Furthermore the construction put upon the section by the Court of Appeals in People v. McGloin (91 N. Y., 245) it seems is in point, and it is our duty to follow and apply that construction in this case. It may be observed that there was not evidence in the case before us that called for a close discrimination upon the question of whether or not the "influence of fear produced by threats as was found in the McG-loin case."
¡Second. A subsequent part of the section, from which the quotation has been made, declares that " a confession is not sufficient to warrant his conviction without additional proof that the crime charged has been committed." The learned trial judge applied this statutory rule to the case in hand. In reply to a request he said, " I charge as I have before, that the confession is not sufficient without additional proof that the crime has been committed." He also charged that there must be corroboration of the confession tending to connect the defendant with the crime. The language of the trial judge quoted, carried to the jury the rule laid down by the statute. (People v. Williams, 29 Hun, 520.)
Third. There was no error in refusing to charge the jury that they " must not consider the evidence of Louise Mondon." The effect, force and credit to be given to that evidence was properly left for the jury to say. (Chapman Exrs. v. Ins. Co., MS. opinion? Fourth Dept.) The jury were instructed that " they might disregard her evidence." " It is a question for them whether they would give any weight to it and what weight; " the charge in that regard was sufficiently favorable to the defendant. (Coleman v. People, 58 N. Y., 555.) The case seems to have been carefully tried, and the questions of fact very fairly and faithfully submitted to the jury.
In Murphy v. People (4 Hun, 102; S. C., affirmed, 63 N. Y., 590) it was held that " to authorize a conviction in criminal cases upon circumstantial evidence it is not necessary for the prosecution to prove the case, to the exclusion of every possibility that the crime was committed by a person other than the prisoner; it is sufficient if the evidence satisfy the understanding and conscience of the jury3 and exclude from their minds all reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused." In the case in hand the suggestion that another, or even others may have been concerned in and in complicity with the defendant in the crime is not sufficient to warrant a distrust and disturbance of the verdict of the jury. Concurring with brother Boardman who has said "the verdict of the jury is sustained by the evidence in the case," and believing that there was no error in the progress of the trial, I must vote for affirmance.