Case Name: State ex rel. Owen, Attorney General, vs. Donald, Secretary of State
Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Wisconsin
Decision Date: 1915-06-08
Citations: 161 Wis. 188
Docket Number: 
Parties: State ex rel. Owen, Attorney General, vs. Donald, Secretary of State.
Judges: Siebeceer and Kerwih, JJ., concur in the foregoing dissent.
Reporter: Wisconsin Reports
Volume: 161
Pages: 188–198

Head Matter:
State ex rel. Owen, Attorney General, vs. Donald, Secretary of State.
May 8
June 8, 1915.
Taxation: Mineral rights: Constitutional law: Equal protection of the laws: Classification.
See. 1042.?, Stats, (cfc. 367, Laws 1913), relating to the taxation of mineral rights and providing, among other things, that they shall he sold for nonpayment of taxes only to the owner of the fee or to the state, is unconstitutional in that it violates the guaranties of equal protection of the laws contained in the state and federal constitutions. The classification of real property thereby attempted cannot be justified. Winslow, O. J., and Sie-becker and Kerwin, JJ., dissent.
MaNdam:us action commenced in this court to compel tbe secretary of state to audit orders of tbe commissioners of public lands for payment to Ashland county of $253.04 for tax claims on mineral rights acquired, in form, by tbe state under cb. 367, Laws 1913.
The petition stated all tbe facts necessary to a cause of action for tbe relief prayed for, if tbe act of 1913 aforesaid be constitutional. Issue was duly joined in respect thereto and tbe cause submitted for decision on tbe 8th day of May, 1915.
Tbe legislative enactment claimed by defendant to be unconstitutional is embodied in sec.,1042/ and sub. 1, sec. 172— 37, Stats., as follows:
“Section 1042/. 1. Any and all rights and reservations to enter upon and take away any mineral from any lands within tbe state of Wisconsin, granted by or reserved in any deed or conveyance of such lands, tbe title to which right or reservation is vested or may hereafter become vested in any person or corporation other than tbe owner of tbe fee to which such right or reservation is attached, is hereby declared to be taxable; and the same shall be separately assessed for taxation, and like proceedings shall be had thereon relating to the levy, collection, and sale thereof for the nonpayment of taxes against said reservation, as are in force from time to time for tbe levy and collection of taxes on real estate and tbe sale of tbe same for tbe nonpayment thereof. Provided, that sncb reservations and rights reserved prior to tbe passage and publication of this act shall be sold for nonpayment of taxes only to tbe owner of tbe fee to which sncb right or reservation is attached, or to tbe state as hereinafter provided; and provided further, that such reservations and rights reserved after the passage and publication of this- act and sold for taxes shall be sold only to such owner or to the state. Whenever any such reservations or rights are sold to the state for unpaid taxes, the owner of the fee shall have the right at any time within three years to purchase from the state the tax certificates held by it upon such reservations or rights by paying the total amount paid by the state plus ten per cent, interest per annum on such amount.' The county treasurer of each county shall furnish the commissioners of public lands a list of all such rights to be sold to the state, together with a description of each parcel and the taxes and charges thereon, and the amount of such taxes and charges shall be paid to the county treasurer of such county from any moneys appropriated from the general fund of the state to carry out the provisions of this section on the order of the commissioners of public lands after being audited by the secretary of state.
“2. No such right to reservation so acquired by the state shall be completely alienated or sold but may be leased for limited periods of time on a royalty basis; but such lease shall provide for a just and reasonable remuneration to said owner of the fee for any damage to the surface, resulting from the exercise of the right so acquired by the state to enter upon and take away any mineral from the land; and all such payments shall be made from the appropriation made for carrying out the provisions of this section.
“3. The assessing officer of the several assessment districts may require the owner of any such title to or reservation of the right to enter upon and take away mineral from any lands in the state to make return under oath to him of the value of such right, and in case the owner of such right shall refuse or neglect to make such return to the assessor of the district where said lands are situated the assessor of such district may assess and yalue the rights reserved at what in his opinion and judgment shall be its fair market value, and in such case the owner of such reserved right shall not he heard to-complain because of the value placed thereon by the assessing officer; however, in case such reserved interest is valued by the owner, the assessing officer shall not be bound by the value fixed thereon by such owner, but may, notwithstanding, assess such interest at such sum as shall, in his best judgment,, be the true value of the same.
“4. Nothing in this act, however, shall extend to mining leases, made as such in good faith, which are terminable upon failure to fulfil the terms and conditions of such leases.”
“Section 172 — 37. 1. There is annually appropriated on July first, such sums as may be necessary payable from any moneys in the general fund, not otherwise appropriated, for the commissioners of the public lands to carry into effect the provisions of section 1012]'.”
The Attorney General, for the plaintiff.
F. JR. Bentley, special counsel, for the defendant.

Opinion:
Marshall, J.
Does the quoted legislative enactment violate the guaranties of equal protection of the laws contained in the state and federal constitutions, by putting the particular species of real estate in a class by itself and treating the same for public revenue purposes and the owners thereof materially different than other forms of real estate and the owners thereof are treated %
Though the constitutionality of the act in question was challenged by defendant upon several grounds, only those covered by the stated question were considered in deciding the case. It is the opinion of the court, the Chief Justice and Justices Siebeckee and Kebwikt dissenting, that the classification made by such act cannot be justified under even the very liberal rules on that subject, and hence the question must be answered in the affirmative, requiring the defendant's motion to quash the writ of mandamus upon the ground that such act is unconstitutional to be granted.
By the Gourt. — It is so ordered, and the proceedings dismissed.