Case Name: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Tom REED, a/k/a Thomas Wayne Reed, Defendant-Appellant
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 2001-12-10
Citations: 24 F. App'x 145
Docket Number: No. 00-4634
Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Tom REED, a/k/a Thomas Wayne Reed, Defendant-Appellant.
Judges: 
Reporter: West's Federal Appendix
Volume: 24
Pages: 145–147

Head Matter:
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Tom REED, a/k/a Thomas Wayne Reed, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 00-4634.
United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.
Submitted Nov. 26, 2001.
Decided Dec. 10, 2001.
Robert Allen Ratliff, Cincinnati, OH, for appellant. Melvin W. Kahle, United States Attorney, Sam G. Nazzaro, Assistant United States Attorney, Paul T. Camilletti, Assistant United States Attorney, Wheeling, WV, for appellee.
Before WIDENER and GREGORY, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion:
OPINION
PER CURIAM.
Thomas Reed appeals his conviction, pursuant to a guilty plea, of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute and to distribute cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C.A. § 846 (West 1999). Reed was sentenced to twenty years imprisonment, to be followed by five years supervised release.
On appeal, Reed challenges the validity of his conviction in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 580 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000). He asserts that his indictment was invalid because it did not identify drug quantity as an element of the offense; that his guilty plea was invalid because he was unaware that drug quantity would have to be proved to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt; and that the district court did not adequately inform him of the nature of the charge against him, as required in Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(c)(1), because the court did not identify drug quantity as an element of the offense.
Reed was indicted for conspiracy, in violation of § 846, to possess with intent to distribute and to distribute cocaine base, as prohibited by 21 U.S.C.A. § 841(a)(1) (West 1999 & Supp.2001). Section 846 provides that one guilty of conspiracy to commit a drug offense is subject to the same penalties as those applicable for the underlying offense. Section 841(b)(1) defines the applicable penalties for violation of § 841(a)(1) in terms of the quantity of drugs involved. This court held in United States v. Promise, 255 F.3d 150, 156 (4th Cir.2001), that § 841(b)(1)(C) is applicable when an identifiable but unspecified drug quantity has been charged in the indictment. The maximum sentence authorized under § 841(b)(1)(C) is twenty years. As Reed received a twenty-year sentence, the absence of a specific quantity in the indictment does not constitute error. See Promise, 255 F.3d at 160 (holding the error was not in Promise's indictment or conviction, but in his thirty-year sentence); United States v. Dinnall, 269 F.3d 418, 423, n. 3 (4th Cir.2001) (holding error of thirty-year sentence does not arise from indictment or guilty plea, but from sentence beyond the statutory maximum for crime indicted for and pled guilty to). Therefore, we reject Reed's attacks on his indictment and plea.
Reed also alleges that § 841 is unconstitutional as written, since it purports to remove from the jury the right to increase a sentence beyond the statutory maximum. We have recently rejected this argument. United States v. McAllister, 272 F.3d 228, 231 (4th Cir.2001). Therefore, Reed is entitled to no relief on this claim.
We affirm Reed's conviction and sentence. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials be fore the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED.
The Government urges that we dismiss Reed's appeal because Reed waived his right to challenge his sentence on appeal. We conclude that the waiver did not include Reed's right to challenge the validity of the conviction itself. See United States v. Brown, 232 F.3d 399, 403-06 (4th Cir.2000) (holding that plain language of waiver provision controls its extent).