Case Name: PEOPLE v. LIPSKI
Court: Michigan Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1950-06-27
Citations: 328 Mich. 194
Docket Number: Docket No. 67, Calendar No. 44,613
Parties: PEOPLE v. LIPSKI.
Judges: Boyles, C. J., and North, Carr, and Sharpe, JJ., concurred with Bushnell, J.
Reporter: Michigan Reports
Volume: 328
Pages: 194–201

Head Matter:
PEOPLE v. LIPSKI.
1. Criminal Law—Assault—Felony—Specific Intent—Statutes.
Statute providing punishment for assault “with intent to commit any burglary, or any other felony” does not limit the assault to felonies of a typo similar to burglary but does include only felonies of which “a specific intent” is a necessary element (CL 1948, § 750.87).
2. Same—Manslaughter—Specific Intent to Assault.
A specific intent to assault is not a necessary element of the crime of manslaughter.
3. Same—Adultery—Intent.
Adultery is a felony in which an intent is a necessary element.
4. Adultery—Statutes—Definition.
Adultery, as defined by statute, is the sexual intercourse of 2 persons, either of whom is married to a third person (CL 1948, § 750.29).
References for Points in I-Ieadnotes
[1, 7, 8] 4 Am Jur, Assault and Battery, §§ 27, 29.
[2] 26 Am Jur, Homicide, §§ 17-19.
[3] 1 Am Jur,-Adultery, § 10.
[4-6, 8] 1 Am Jur, Adultery, § § 7-9, 12.
5. Same—Statutes—Protection Afforded.
The statute defining adultery not only guards the sanctity of marriage and protects each nonparticipating spouse, but also protects the refusing and resisting woman who is' assaulted and who would be guilty of adultery if she condoned the assaulter’s advances (CL 1948, § 750.29).
6. Same—Protection of Marriage—Statutes—Consent.
The controlling factor in the crime of adultery is the marriage relation, a factor which exists whether the intercourse occurs with or without consent, and consent, not being expressed nor implied by the language of the statute defining adultery, will not be inserted therein judicially (CL 1948, § 750.29).
7. Criminal Law—Assault with Intent to Commit Adultery— Statutes.
A charge of assault with intent to commit adultery is within the scope of the statute providing punishment for assault “with intent to commit any burglary, or any other felony” (CL 1948, §§ 750.29, 750.87).
8. Same—Assault with Intent to Commit Adultery.
Trial of defendant on charge of assault with intent to commit a felony is required, where facts disclosed show defendant, a married man, held the arms of the wife of another married man, displayed his affections for her, requested sexual relations with her, was refused, and made no attempt to force her against her will, but admitted he would have had such relations had she allowed him to do so (CL 1948, §§ 750.29, 750.87).
Reid, Dethmers and Butzel, JJ., dissenting.
Appeal from Lenawee; Rathbun (George A.), J.
Submitted April 13, 1950.
(Docket No. 67, Calendar No. 44,613.)
Decided June 27, 1950.
Richard Lipski was charged with assault with intent to commit felony of adultery. Motion to quash granted. The people appeal.
Reversed and remanded.
Stephen J. Roth, Attorney General, Rex B. Martin, Prosecuting Attorney, and Paul T. Betz, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for the people.
Lawrence J. Hammond, for defendant,

Opinion:
Bushnell, J.
Defendant Richard Lipski, a married man, drove his truck off the highway and stopped an automobile being driven by a married woman. Lipski got out of his truck, opened the left door by the driver's seat of the other car and slid in beside the woman. He held her arms, displayed his affections upon her and asked her to have sexual relations with him. She refused. He made no attempt to force her against her will, but admitted that he would have had such relations had she allowed him to do so. The record is silent as to any previous acquaintance between the parties.
An information charging assault with intent to have sexual relations with a married woman, but not with intent to rape her, was filed against Lipski. The court reduced the charge to assault and battery and quashed the remainder. Thereafter the prosecuting attorney nolle prossed that case. Another complaint was signed by the married woman's husband. The second information charged Lipski with assault on the person named therein, "a married woman, with intent to commit a felony, to-wit: Adultery, he being a married man, but not being then and there married to her."
Defendant moved to quash this information. The trial judge, after considering the briefs and oral arguments, filed a written opinion. He held that, except as to the charge of assault, no such offense existed as that charged in the information. The State was granted leave to appeal from the court's order.
The statute under which the information was drawn, CL 1948, § 750.87 (Stat Ann § 28.282) reads as follows:
"Any person who shall assault another, with intent to commit any burglary, or any other felony, the punishment of which assault is not otherwise in this act prescribed, shall be guilty of a felony, punish able by imprisonment in the State prison not more than 10 years, or by fine of not more than 5,000 dollars."
The scope of this statute is broad and the assault is not limited to felonies of a type similar to burglary. Neither does the language include all other felonies because "a specific intent" is requisite. People v. Lilley, 43 Mich 521, 529.
Adultery, unlike manslaughter which by definition precludes such an intent, is a felony in which intent is a necessary element. 1 Am Jur, p 685.
Defendant argues that adultery, like incest, requires the consent of both parties, and that such consent, being inconsistent with the nature of an assault, negatives the assault and is therefore not a crime under the statute. See, in this connection, DeGroat v. People, 39 Mich 124, and People v. Burwell, 106 Mich 27.
Adultery is defined by statute as "the sexual intercourse of 2 persons, either of whom is married to a third person." CL 1948, § 750.29 (Stat Ann § 28.218). This statute guards the sanctity of marriage. Where both parties are married it protects each nonparticipating spouse. The spouse of the assaulter should be shielded just as much where the intercourse is with force as where it is with consent. In like manner, the woman who is assaulted and who would be guilty of adultery if she condoned the assaulter's advances, should have her status fully protected when she refuses and resists.
The controlling factor is the marriage relation, and that exists whether intercourse occurs with or without consent. Consent is not expressed nor implied by the language of the statute, and will not be judicially inserted therein.
A charge of assault with intent to commit adultery is within the scope of the statute under which this information was laid. The facts disclosed in this record place defendant sufficiently within the purview of the statute as to require his trial.
The order quashing the information is vacated and the cause is remanded.
Boyles, C. J., and North, Carr, and Sharpe, JJ., concurred with Bushnell, J.