Case Name: WILLIAM LANGER, Plaintiff, v. THE COURIER NEWS, a corporation, WM. LEMKE, GEORGE F. McPHERSON, and HERBERT E. GASTON, Defendants
Court: North Dakota Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: North Dakota
Decision Date: 1921-07-01
Citations: 48 N.D. 280
Docket Number: 
Parties: WILLIAM LANGER, Plaintiff, v. THE COURIER NEWS, a corporation, WM. LEMKE, GEORGE F. McPHERSON, and HERBERT E. GASTON, Defendants.
Judges: Christianson, Bronson, Grace, and Birdzell, JJ., concur.
Reporter: North Dakota Reports
Volume: 48
Pages: 280–285

Head Matter:
WILLIAM LANGER, Plaintiff, v. THE COURIER NEWS, a corporation, WM. LEMKE, GEORGE F. McPHERSON, and HERBERT E. GASTON, Defendants.
(183 N. W. 1009.)
Appeal and error — application to supreme court for order fixing amount of supersedeas bond denied where similar application pending before district court.
1. An application to the Supreme Court for an order allowing and fixing a supersedeas bond on appeal from an order denying an application for a change of venue will be denied where it appears that a similar application is pending before the District Court, which has neither refused nor neglected to act.
Opinion filed July 1, 1921.
Original application for an order fixing the amount and conditions of a supersedeas undertaking on appeal.
Denied.
Per Curiam Opinion.
Harry Lashkowits, for motion.
W. S. Lauder, and A. G. Divet, contra.

Opinion:
PER CURIAM:
This is an original application to this court for an order fixing the amount and conditions of a supersedeas undertaking on appeal. The facts, briefly stated, are:
This action was commenced in the District Court of Cass county. The defendants demurred to the complaint on the ground that it did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. The trial court overruled the demurrer and on appeal to this court the complaint was held to be sufficient. Langer v. The Courier News, et al., 179 N. W. 909. Subsequently the defendants moved for a change of venue from the county of Cass. An order was accordingly entered transferring the case to Richland county for trial. Afterw'ards defendants made an application for a change of venue from Richland county. The District Court of Richland county denied the application for a change of venue. The defendants appealed from such order by serving and filing notice of appeal and the usual cost bond. It is undisputed that an application similar to that now made to this court was pending before the district court at the time the application to this court was made. The application was made to this court and the order to show cause issued June 22d. It is undisputed that an application was served June 21st and noticed to be heard before! the District Court of Richland county on June 23d. There is no' showing that the trial judge has neglected or refused to act on the application. On the contrary, on the hearing in this court the trial judge filed a verified return, wherein he says: "That the matter of granting or refusing a stay of proceedings pending said appeal was never in any proper or formal way presented to him that he knew of the pendency of said motion returnable on June 23d, 1921; that he expected to hear such motion and after the same had been heard to determine the same on the merits that he has not yet determined such motion and that the defendants' application for a stay of proceedings has not been denied that he had no intention of trying the said cause or permitting the same to be tried until after the defendants' said motion for a stay of proceedings had been fully heard and determined."
Upon the' hearing before this court, respondent's counsel urged that it was for the trial court in the first instance to say whether the stay should .be granted and that this court is vested with authority only to review the decision of the trial court. In our opinion this objection is well taken, where, as in this case, it appears that the trial court has not refused to act. § 7832, C. L. 1913, provides:
"When the appeal is from an order the execution or performance thereof shall not be delayed, except upon compliance with such conditions as the court or presiding judge thereof shall direct, and, when so required, an undertaking shall be executed on the part of the appellant by at least two sureties in such sums and to such effect as the court or presiding judge thereof shall direct; such effect shall be directed in accordance with the nature of the order appealed from, corresponding to the foregoing provisions in respect to appeals from judgments, when applicable and such provision shall be made in all cases as will properly protect the respondent and no appeal from an intermediate order before judgment shall stay proceedings unless the court or presiding judge thereof shall in his discretion so specially order."
This section is directly applicable to the situation before us. We must assume that the trial court will do its duty and render such decision as the ends of justice require and that the legal discretion with which it is vested will be fairly and honestly exercised to the end that the rights of all the parties may be protected and that all parties may have the fair trial to which they are entitled under our laws. Manifestly this court may not anticipate a decision one way or the other and has no more right to instruct the trial court how this question should be decided than any other question properly triable to the District Court in the first instance. We deem § 7832 controlling in the light of the facts before us. Accordingly, the application here is denied and the order to show cause vacated.
Christianson, Bronson, Grace, and Birdzell, JJ., concur.