Case Name: THE PEOPLE, Appellants, v. LAFARGE and BALL, Respondents
Court: Supreme Court of California
Jurisdiction: California
Decision Date: 1853-04
Citations: 3 Cal. 130
Docket Number: 
Parties: THE PEOPLE, Appellants, v. LAFARGE and BALL, Respondents.
Judges: 
Reporter: California Reports
Volume: 3
Pages: 130–136

Head Matter:
THE PEOPLE, Appellants, v. LAFARGE and BALL, Respondents.
The respondents were bail in a recognizance conditioned for the appearance of M., to answer at court, upon an indictment found against him, on the 19tli April, 1852. M. appeared at the proper term, which was the June Term following, and on the 17th Juncmoved to quash the indictment,for causes assigned, which was ordered by the court. Another indictment on the same charge was found by the grand jury, then in session, at the same term, on the 18th June, upon which M., being called, made default. Afterwards suit was brought upon the recognizance, against the bail, and judgment obtained thereon. Held, that the bail were entitled to relief against the said judgment.
The District Court is not limited by the present act as to the time within which it may grant relief upon a judgment unjustly or improperly obtained.
No particular form is required by the statute in which application shall be made for such relief. All that is required is, that the facts shall be set forth, and if they show a case coming within the rule, it is sufficient.
Where the application for such relief charges fraud, among other causes, and the applicant does not rely upon the fraud alone, for his relief, there is no error in the court granting the relief without first directing an issue to try the fraud.
Whether good cause is shown, is a question properly addressed to the discretion of the court.
All courts having chancery jurisdiction have power to set aside a judgment improperly obtained.
Appeal from the Fifth Judicial District, County of San Joaquin.
This was an application, in the form of a bill in equity, for relief against a judgment, obtained by the appellants against the respondents, under the following circumstances:—
On the 9th December, 1852, the respondents petitioned the .District Court, praying the court to vacate, annul, and set aside a judgment obtained by the appellants against them at October Term, 1852, on a recognizance given by respondents to appellants, and that they might be allowed to answer and have a trial on the merits of the questions involved, and in the mean time for an injunction to restrain the respondents from pursuing the said judgment.
The case exhibited the following facts:—An indictment was found against one Benjamin Marshall in the Court of Sessions of Joaquin County, on the 19th April, 1852, at the April Term, for an assault on one James B. Smith, with intent to commit murder ; and a warrant of arrest issued against Marshall, who was arrested thereon, and gave the recognizance above mentioned for his appearance to answer the said charge, vrhich was signed by A. B„ Lafarge, and H. M. Ball, the defendants, as bail.
At the June Term of said Court of Sessions, 1852, Marshall appeared, to answer to the charge, and a motion was made by his attorney, that the said indictment be set aside, for grounds set forth in the motion, and which was set aside by the court. The court then, on motion of the District Attorney, at the same term, re-submitted the case to the grand jury, then in session, who found a true bill against the said Marshall for the same crime, and which was returned and filed in the said Court of Sessions, on the 18th June aforesaid. On the T9th June, the defendant in the said indictment, Marshall, was duly called, and failing to appear, the recognizance of respondents, on motion of appellants’ attorney, was forfeited. And upon the recognizance thus forfeited, the judgment was obtained, against which the defendants prayed to be relieved.
The action on the recognizance was commenced 1st July, 1852, and judgment had thereon by default, at October Term, 1852. The recognizance was dated May 5, 1852, in the sum of $3000, and recites that the indictment was found on the 19th April, 1852, in the Court of Sessions of San Joaquin County, charging Marshall with the crime, &c., and then proceeds to say, that the condition of the obligation is, that if the said Marshall shall appear and answer the charge, then this obligation to be void, otherwise of force, &c.
The court, having heard the case, ordered the judgment to be opened, with permission to the petitioners to answer, &c.
And from this order the plaintiffs appealed.
Hastings, Attorney-General, for appellants.
The Judge did not find the facts, and the cause falls within the rule of Russel v. Amador.
The District Court have no power to set aside a judgment of a . previous term against a defendant on motion.
The respondents have filed a regular bill in equity, to set aside a judgment, on the ground of fraud, and have not applied by motion under the statute. The judgment was set aside, without trying the issue of fraud, all of which was irregular, and the Judge had no power to cancel a judgment of a prior term, except upon a finding of the fraud. A court of equity may cancel a judgment for fraud, but it must be established by an issue and trial.
Yale and Parley, for respondents.
The parties themselves have agreed upon the facts, and a statement thereof is contained in the record. The District Court has power to set aside a judgment of a previous term: Kerns v. Bidleman, May Term, 1852,-decided by this court.
The court had power to set aside a judgment, at any time within a year, by the last Practice Act, sect. 68, now repealed. By the present act, the court is not limited to any particular period.
The charge of fraud was not relied upon alone, to sustain the motion, and the mere mentioning this would not vitiate the other grounds alleged.
This was not an original bill. The parties were not reversed. No answer was filed on behalf of the State. A rule was granted to the District Attorney, to show cause why the application should not be granted.
The only condition of the bond was, that the principal “should appear and answer to the court.” This is not a statutory bond, taken according to the 523d sect, of the act of 1852, to regulate proceedings in criminal cases. It has none of the conditions of the statutory bond; it does not state when the party was to appear, or what charge he was to answer.
The obligors could only be compelled to have Marshall before the court to answer to the charge in the indictment of 19th April. His mere appearance was a full compliance with this condition, and this extinguished the bond.
Neither he nor his sureties knew of the finding of the second indictment; the hail were not required to produce him to answer it: the forfeiture of the bond was therefore illegal, and as a, penal bond it should have received a strict construction. 3 Yerger, 282 ; 6 do. 354.
The complaint on which the judgment was obtained, does not set forth the setting aside of the first indictment, and the finding of another at a subsequent term; there is no averment that the parties are bound to answer the latter by their recognizance. And yet this is the gist of the action, and the judgment was obtained on facts not set forth in the complaint; the defendants are therefore entitled to relief.
The defendants were deceived and misled by the complaint, and if this was done intentionally, it comes within the definition of fraud: “any artifice or deception used to circumvent or deceive another;” and thus fraud may be inferred, in a court of equity, from the facts and circumstances of the case.
Under the order of the court, the appellants have the right to answer, and to a trial on the merits.

Opinion:
Heydeneeldt, Justice,
delivered the opinion of the court.
This was a bill in equity, to set aside a judgment which was improperly obtained; the reasons assigned are, that there was no cause of action and no notice to the parties. This remedy is well recognized in all courts having chancery jurisdiction, and the case made out by the complainants is one which fully entitles them to the interposition of the court.
The Chancellor having heard the evidence, and decided that the parties were entitled to the relief sought, we see nothing, either in the pleadings or statement of the case, which will authorize this court to disturb the decree.
Affirmed, with costs.