Case Name: Michael A. French vs. William H. Campbell et al.
Court: Supreme Court of the District of Columbia
Jurisdiction: District of Columbia
Decision Date: 1883-03-26
Citations: 2 Mackey 321
Docket Number: Equity. No. 6,628
Parties: Michael A. French vs. William H. Campbell et al.
Judges: i The Chief Justice and Justices Hagner and Cox sitting.
Reporter: Reports of cases argued and determined in the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia (District of Columbia - reported by Mackey)
Volume: 13
Pages: 321–331

Head Matter:
Michael A. French vs. William H. Campbell et al.
Equity. No. 6,628.
( Decided March 26, 1883.
i The Chief Justice and Justices Hagner and Cox sitting.
A general devise over after the creation, of a life estate in the same property will pass the fee.
STATEMENT OE THE'CASE.
The bill'in this case was filed to remove a cloud upon the -complainant’s title and obtain a construction of the will of Mary French. At the hearing below a decree was passed . divesting the defendants of all claim or title to the property in question, and investing Michael A. French with the title in fee simple. The question before the court was whether the complainant took a life estate or a fee simple, under the following will:
“ I, Mary French, of the city of Washington and District of Columbia, being of sound mind and disposing memory, calling to mind the uncertainty of life and the certainty of death, and wishing to make proper arrangements with reference to the property of which I am possessed, do make, •ordain and publish this as my last will and testament.
“ I request that my executor, hereinafter named, shall have my body decently, though plainly, interred, and that a plain marble headstone be placed at the head of my grave, with a suitable inscription thereon, to mark the place where my mortal remains repose.
“ I request that my funeral expenses and just debts be paid ■so soon after my decease as possible.
“ 1 give and bequeath into Michael A. French, the house and lot on 8th street, being part of lot No. 4, in square No. 425, the same I purchased from Aza Gladman.
“I give and bequeath unto my husband, Thomas French, during his natural life, the houses and lot numbered 7, in ■square 403, being the same that was conveyed by Clement Cox and wife to Lewis Edwards, as trustee for Mary French, by deed bearing date the 7th day of May, 1838, the said property aforesaid lying and being in the city of Washington.
“This bequest to my husband, Thomas French, is.with this limitation and restriction ; that is, if the said Thomas French shall again intermarry, then his interest in said property is to cease, and the benefits and interest thereof are to-go to Michael A. French.
“ Upon the decease of the said Thomas French, or if he shall marry again, I give and bequeath the said lot No. 7 in square 403 to the said Michael A. French.
“I hereby appoint my friend, French S. Evans, executor of this, my last will and testament.”
Bradley & Duvall for complainants :
It is a fundamental maxim upon which the construction of every will must depend that the intention of the testator,, as disclosed by the will, shall be fully carried into effect if it be not in contradiction of some established rule of law. This intention must be drawn from the whole context of the will. And it is not necessary to look alone at the words of the gift itself to ascertain the intention as to the quantum of the estate devised, if it can be gathered from expressions used in any part of it, what he supposed or intended to be the nature and extent of it. That words of inheritance are necessary to convey a fee is certainly a good, general rule of the common law ; but, in the case of wills, it is entirely subordinate to expressions of the testator’s intention. The statute respecting wills allows men to dispose of their lands not by any technical terms, but at their will and pleasure. Abbot vs. Essex Co., 18 How., 202, 215; Smith vs. Bell, 6 Pet., 68, 75; Lambert’s Lessee vs. Paine, 3 Cr., 47.
The intention is to be gathered.from the “whole context,” the “ four corners,” of the will. The introductory clause, or preamble, as it is sometimes called, has always been considered in manifesting the intention, it has been designated the key of that intention ; and from the earliest reported cases, where the introductory clause expresses an intention to dispose of the whole of testator’s estate, the courts have brought this clause down and coupled it with the devise, where the words of the devise admit of passing a greater estate than for life, to assist in ascertaining the intention. Kennon vs. McRoberts, 1 Wash., 96, 100; Wright vs. Dunn, 10 Wheat., 204; Burwell vs. Mandeville’s Execr., 2 How., 560, 577; Finley vs. King, 3 Pet., 346, 378; McConn vs. Lay, 5 Cr. C. C., 548; Schriver vs. Meyer, 19 Pa. St., 87; Fogg vs. Clark, 1 N. H., 163; Doe vs. Haiter, 7 Blackf’d, 488.
The language used by the testatrix in the case at bar in the introductory clause of her will is : “ Wishing to make proper arrangements with reference to the property of which I am possessed ; ” and in the devise itself, after limiting a life estate to her husband, Thomas : “ If the said Thomas French shall again intermarry, then his interest in said property is to cease, and the benefits and interest thereof are to-go to Michael A. French. Upon the decease of said Thomas,, or if he shall marry again, I give and bequeath the said lot No. 7, in square 403, to the said Michael A. French.” It will be observed that the testatrix knew how to give a life-estate if she intended only that estate to pass to complainant.
The words “pr-operty ” and “interest,” like the ‘-'estate,”' will pass a fee. 2 Jarman (4th edition), 133, note, 140-41; Pitman vs. Stevens, 15 East, 505; Pearson vs. Housel, 17 Johns., 281; Burwell vs. Mandeville’s Ex’r, 2 How., at 577, 578; Andrew vs. Southouse, 5 Term R., 292.
Again, it is very common to construe what seems a life estate in terms, to create a fee in remainder, because of a prior life estate having been expressly created in another in regard to the same property. Chief Justice Shaw denominates this a rule of construction, and says the presumption'' is that such devise was, in the mind of the testator, a final-disposition of that part of his estate, and to effect that purpose it must be a fee. Plimpton vs. Plimpton, 12 Cush., 458, 463; Motzer vs. Cassin, 2310 Equity, S. C. D. C.; 1 Redf. Wills, 466; Butler vs. Little, 3 Greenlf., 239; Cook vs. Holmes, 11 Mass., 528; Butler vs. Butler, Wash. Law Reporter, Dec, 8, 1882, Vol. X, No. 49; 2 Jarman on Wills, (4th edition) 189; 2 Washburne Real Prop., 752.
'We submit, then, that the court below properly construed this devise to carry the fee to complainant ; that such was the intention of the testatrix, and that such intention can not only be extracted from her words with reasonable certainty in view of the whole will, and that no other reasonable intention can be imputed to her.
Wm. F. Mattingly and J. J. Johnson for defendants:
The introductory words of this will are relied upon to enlarge the estate of the devisee from a life estate to a fee.
In the first place, it is to be noted that the introductory words in this will do not manifest any intention on the part of the testatrix to dispose of her entire estate ; and the language of the will itself shows that she did not dispose of her personal estate. It is to be presumed from the face of the will that she had personal estate, for she directs her executor to have her buried, and to place a marble headstone at the head of her grave, and directs that her funeral"expenses and just debts be paid as soon as possible.
The introductory words are : “ And wishing to make proper arrangements with reference to the property of which I am possessed.”
The devisee, Michael A. French, was her step-son, being the son of her husband by a previous wife.
Is any one to say that testatrix did not consider it proper arrangement to give her husband an estate for life in this lot. or so long as he remained unmarried, and upon his death or marriage that his son should have it during his life ?
The law favors the heir-at-law, and he is to be disinherited only by an express devise with words of limitation, or by necessary implication. The conceded rule of interpretation is that a general devise, without words of limitation, passes but a life estate, notwithstanding a previous devise of a life estate in the same property.
The rule as to the office of introductory words in a will is as stated by Chancellor Kent, [4 Kent, 541, n. 1]. He says :
“ Introductory words to a will cannot vary the construction so as to enlarge the estate to a fee, unless there be words in the devise itself sufficient to carry the interest; such introductory words are like a preamble to a statute, to be used only as a key to disclose the testator’s meaning.”
See also Wright vs. Denn, 10 Wh., 204; Jackson vs. Wells, 9 John., 222; Jackson vs. Bull, 10 John., 148; Beall vs. Holmes, 6 H. & J., 205. [The court in this case refers to all preceding leading cases, and lays down the rule in Maryland. It.is cited and approved by Kent.] 2 Jarman on Wills, 125 [171], 138 [187-8].

Opinion:
Mr. Chief Justice Cartter
delivered the opinion of the court.
In this case the court have come to the conclusion to affirm the decree below. The case involves the construction of a will, and the question is, whether the complainant takes a fee-simple or a life estate only. The question is not novel in this court. The issue has been once made and determined in an essentially parallel case, in which we came to the conclusion that the language used here conveyed an estate of inheritance. It is contended, however', that our decision is in conflict with early and repeated decisions both in Great Britain and this country, which have always held that a general devise over, without words of inheritance, after the creation of a prior life estate in the property devised, will pass but a life estate. But, while this may be so, we are constrained to. believe that our judgment is in thorough consonance with good sense and with that principle which pronounces the intention of the testator the supreme and overruling consideration governing the construction of wills. The construction put upon this class of devises in the cases alluded to appears to be in contravention of the rule of construction adopted by the courts in ascertaining the will of the testator, and, marvellously enough, the courts confess it. We might just as well say, following that line of decisions, "although we believe the testatrix designed in this instance to devise an estate of inheritance, we never theless decide that the devisee shall not have it because the technical terms of the conveyance do not import it: and although a will, unlike all other conveyances, is not dependent upon technical terms, but such terms are overruled by the intention of the testator, nevertheless we determine that these technical terms shall rule to the suppression of the purpose of the testatrix." That is what we would be saying if we followed these decisions. Of course it is important that established rules of construction should be preserved, even though it be at the cost of sometimes sacrificing the intention of a testator. But it has always been held that where a rule of judicial interpretation obviously fails to answer the purpose for which it was created and plainly operates in contravention of the intention of the testator, then the rule loses its application. What was the intention of testatrix here ? Did she intend to pass a life estate or an estate of inheritance ? Here is the language :
" I give and bequeath unto my husband, Thomas French, dui'ing his natural life, the houses and lot numbered 7, in square 403, being the same that was conveyed by Clement Cox and wife to Lewis Edwards, as trustee for Mary French, by deed bearing date the 7th day of May, 1838, the said property aforesaid lying and being in the city of Washington.
" This bequest to my husband is with this limitation and restriction; that is if the said Thomas French shall again intermarry, then his interest in said property is to cease and the benefits and interests thereof are to go to Michael A. French."
She put two unmistakable qualifications to the title of Thomas French, one was marriage, and the other death. There can be no mistake about the estate created in his case. It was less than an estate of inheritance, and it left the remainder of the property to pass on to somebody and in some way. Then she proceeds to say that upon the decease of the said Thomas French, or if he shall marry again, she gives and bequeaths the said lot No. 7, in square 403, to Michael A. French.
Now, in an ordinary reading of the English language as estimated by those who speak and write it, the conclusion would be spontaneous that this testatrix intended to give alife estate to Thomas French and an estate of inheritance to Michael A. French. That is the way it would be understood by all laymen. Nobody would hesitate about it a single moment. And still it is claimed that, read in the light of the law, this language means another life estate. Where was it to go then when that had expired ? She had no children. In the ascending line it was to go to collaterals, or their descendants. Now, did she contemplate such a disposition of her property as that ? In our opinion she never intended any such thing. 'That would be simply leaving the disposition of her estate to accident, and would be a mark of want of intention. Whereas the very making of a last will and testament is an evidence, of the testator having an intention. We think that this language means that, after.the determination of Thomas French's life estate in this property, Michael French is to take whatever remains of the estate the testatrix possessed. That is what this court held in a case similar to this, and it has been so held in a like case in Massachusetts, in a very learned and able decision, reported in 12 Cushing. Plimpton vs. Plimpton, 458. That decision alone, if there were no others, ought in my opinion to consecrate so self-evident a rule of reason, especially as against a line of authorities which do not profess that they are following reason but simply precedent.