Case Name: American Manufacturing Company of Texas v. The Heald Machine Company
Court: United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 1967-11-09
Citations: 55 C.C.P.A. 838
Docket Number: No. 7807
Parties: American Manufacturing Company of Texas v. The Heald Machine Company
Judges: Before Worley, Ohief Judge, and Judges Rich, Smith, Almond, Kirkpatrick
Reporter: Court of Customs and Patent Appeals Reports
Volume: 55
Pages: 838–844

Head Matter:
385 F. 2d 456; 155 USPQ 515
American Manufacturing Company of Texas v. The Heald Machine Company
(No. 7807)
United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals,
November 9, 1967
Herbert J. Brown (Munson H. Lane, of counsel) for appellant.
Norman 8. Blodgett for appellee.
[Oral argument October 5,1967 by Mr. Lane and Mr. Blodgett]
Before Worley, Ohief Judge, and Judges Rich, Smith, Almond, Kirkpatrick
Senior District Judge, Eastern District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation.
Petition for rehearing denied February 15,1968.

Opinion:
Almond, Judge,
delivered the opinion of the court:
American Manufacturing Company of Texas appeals from the decision of the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board sustaining the opposition of The Heald Machine Company to an application for registration of the mark "BOBMASTEB." for cross slide assemblies for metal working lathes. Appellant asserts continuous use since May 13, 1963. Begistration is sought in class 23 which relates to cutlery, machinery and tools, and parts thereof.
Appellee is the registrant of "BOBE-MATIC" for machines for the precision finishing of holes or bores in parts of metal, fiber and like materials (Beg. No. 292,921, issued March 29, 1932; renewed), also in class 23.
Both parties rely on affidavits accompanied by exhibits.
The record discloses that appellee is a large manufacturer of machine tools. Long prior to appellant's date of first use, appellee has used BOBE-MATIC on many types of boring machines, one of which possesses characteristics the same as those of a lathe. In addition to the above products, appellee manufactures hydraulic cross slides and manual cross slides which serve as attachments for its BOEE-MATIC machines. During the period since 1931, appellee has expended $2,000,000 in advertising its BOEE-MATIC machines with sales amounting to $62,000,000.
Appellant's proof, in material substance, is to the effect that it uses the registered mark SPEEDMASTEE for spindle assemblies for machine tools and BOEMASTEE for cross slide assemblies for metal working lathes. The spindle and cross slide assemblies are accessories for use on lathes which are sold under the mark AMCOT. The AMCOT lathes sell for approximately $50,000, and the BOE-MASTEE cross slide assemblies sell for approximately $5,500.
Priority of registration and use clearly reside with appellee. It is abundantly clear that the involved products are closely related and normally move through the same channels of trade to the same class of purchasers.
Appellant contends that, inasmuch as the only feature which the marks possess in common is the prefix "Bor" or "Bore," which is in the public domain and possesses little trademark significance and, further, that the goods of the parties are expensive and sold only to a prudent and discriminating class of purchasers, confusion is not likely to occur in the market place.
In sustaining the opposition, the board reasoned as follows:
While the prefix "BOB" or "BOBE" may be publiei juris as applied to boring machines, we must still consider the marks of the parties in their entireties and, when so considered, we conclude that applicant's "BOBMASTEB" so resembles "BOBE-MATIO" that, as applied to applicant's goods, there would be a likelihood of confusion or mistake. In so doing, we have given due consideration to applicant's argument that these products are sold to discriminating purchasers but do not believe that where, as here, the products of the parties are substantially the same, such factor is of controlling significance. See: In re Dobeck-mun Company, 128 USPQ 424 (COPA, 1961). While there may be some elements 'of doubt as to whether confusion would be likely because of the highly suggestive nature of the marks of the parties, we follow the established practice of resolving any such doubts in favor of the first user. [Citations omitted.]
We have considered the cases cited and relied on by appellant and the arguments advanced. We are persuaded, however, that the rationale employed by the court in the Dobeckmun case, 48 CCPA 810, 286 F.2d 187, 128 USPQ, 424, is pertinent here and was correctly applied by the board.
Here, as in Dobeokmun, we have closely related goods. The court stated:
The owner of the prior registered mark has the right to use his mark on such closely related goods.
Similarity of the products of appellant and of registrant is of greater legal significance in applying Section 2(d) than are the possible semantic differences ⅜ . Section 2(d) requires us to determine not whether the goods are identical but only whether applicant's mark so resembles the prior mark as to be likely when applied to its goods to cause confusion, or mistake, or to deceive purchasers.
Even though we are dealing here with expensive goods which are purchased by discriminating and sophisticated purchasers, the marks and the goods on which they are used are sufficiently close as to raise the question of likelihood of confusion. While we agree with the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board that there may be some elements of doubt as to whether confusion would be likely in this particular situation, such doubts must be resolved in favor of the first user.
Perceiving no reversible error in the decision of the board, we affirm.
147 USPQ 533.
Reg. No. 769,491, issued May 12,1964.