Case Name: Beverly J. THOMAS v. HIGHLANDS INSURANCE COMPANY and Brown and Root USA, Inc.
Court: Louisiana Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1993-04-12
Citations: 617 So. 2d 877
Docket Number: No. 92-C-2177
Parties: Beverly J. THOMAS v. HIGHLANDS INSURANCE COMPANY and Brown and Root USA, Inc.
Judges: HALL, J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 617
Pages: 877–880

Head Matter:
Beverly J. THOMAS v. HIGHLANDS INSURANCE COMPANY and Brown and Root USA, Inc.
No. 92-C-2177.
Supreme Court of Louisiana.
April 12, 1993.
Jeffrey H. Thomas, Donald G. Kelly, Kelly, Townsend & Thomas, Natchitoches, for applicant.
Alexander S. Lyons, Mayer, Smith, & Roberts, Shreveport, for respondent.

Opinion:
CALOGERO, Chief Justice.
In this worker's compensation case, the district court rendered a judgment in favor of the injured worker and against the defendants after concluding that the plaintiff suffered a severe injury to his left foot and ankle when he dropped a steel plate weighing approximately 450 pounds on it. The parties did not dispute the injuries to the plaintiff's foot; however, they disagreed as to whether the accident caused injury to the plaintiffs ankle. After considering the demeanor and credibility of the witnesses and after evaluating the nature of the injury in this case, the trial court concluded that the plaintiff's ankle injury was attributable to the accident. Accordingly, the trial court entered judgment in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants for all unpaid past medical expenses with legal interest and reasonable attorney fees of $3,000.00. The trial judge also ordered the defendants to provide a letter of guarantee to the plaintiffs treating physician for recommended ligament surgery and related rehabilitation.
Defendants' appealed and the court of appeal reversed the trial court's judgment, finding that the district court erred in its factual findings. We granted this writ, as we did in another case rendered this day, to decide whether the Court of Appeal misapplied the appropriate standard of review when it found that the trial court was clearly wrong or manifestly erroneous in its conclusion that the plaintiff's ankle injury was attributable to the accident.
For the same reasons assigned in Sto-bart, but based upon the record in this case, we conclude that the court of appeal in this case misapplied the appellate standard of review of fact.
Moreover, we reject the defendants' assertion that Louisiana Revised Statute § 23:1291 implicitly overrules the jurisprudence decided under the prior law concerning letters of guarantee. This court recognizes that the an award for an injured employee's medical bills cannot occur until the expenses are actually incurred. Wilson v. EBASCO Services, Inc., 393 So.2d 1248 (La.1981) ("A workmen's compensation claimant is not entitled to an award for future medical expenses, but the right to claim such expenses is reserved to her."). The court reasoned:
The rule applies to an award of medical expenses, not a judicial determination that the employer will be liable for the expense of future medical treatment. In many hospitals admittance is contingent upon the patient's ability to pay. The refusal of an employer or insurer to guarantee payment for necessary treatment effectively denies admittance to the patient. If an employee cannot gain admittance for treatment, no expenses will be incurred . The humanitarian purposes of the workers' compensation act are not served by keeping an injured employee out of a hospital with such revolving door logic.
Defendants contend that when the workers' compensation act was amended the letter of guarantee rule was implicitly overruled by Louisiana Revised Statute § 23:1291 which authorized the Office of Workers' Compensation to adopt standards of review of all medical and non-medical services to injured employees. Defendants explain that pursuant to this statutory requirement, the Office of Workers' Compensation adopted utilization procedures which require health-care providers to obtain pre-admission certification prior to rendering services.
This Court does not favor legislative repeals by implication. State v. Randall, 219 La. 578, 53 So.2d 689 (1951). In determining whether a statute implicitly repeals .existing law, this court has consistently relied upon "those well established principles of law, reiterated in State v. Standard Oil Co. of La., 188 La. 978, 178 So. 601, 626 (1937), that 'repeals by implication are not favored and will not be indulged if there is any other reasonable construction .' . that prior laws are repealed by subsequent laws only in case of positive enactment or clear repugnancy .; that nothing short of irreconcilable conflict between two statutes works a repeal by implication .; that where a statute is ambiguous and susceptible of two constructions, the courts will give that construction which best comports with the principles of reason, justice, and convenience, for it is to be presumed that the Legislature intended such excep tions to its language as would avoid its leading to injustice, oppression, or absurd consequences." Id.
In the present case, the statute did not specifically overrule the jurispruden-tially created rule which permits the trial court to order the defendant to provide a letter of guarantee to the plaintiff in certain cases. Likewise, the statute does not create an irreconcilable conflict with this jurisprudential rule.
We conclude that the statute and the letter of guarantee rule can operate in tandem. We believe that a health care provider may be more inclined to provide an injured worker who possesses a letter of guarantee, with services, than one who does not; albeit, the provider must obtain pre-admission certification. Our determination is premised on the belief that a letter of credit may facilitate a plaintiffs ability to procure a health care provider who is willing to obtain the necessary certification.
REVERSED; DISTRICT COURT JUDGMENT REINSTATED.
HALL, J., concurs.
ORTIQUE, J., concurs with reasons.
LEMMON, J., dissents and assigns reasons.
Kimball, J., not on panel. For the procedure employed in assigning cases after January 1, 1993 to rotating panels of seven justices, see State v. Barras, 615 So.2d 285, 286 n. 1 (La.1993).
. Shirley Stobart v. State of Louisiana, Through Department of Transportation and Development, 617 So.2d 880 (La.1993).