Case Name: CLOSTIO'S HEIRS v. SINCLAIR REFINING CO. et al.
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1948-06-30
Citations: 36 So. 2d 283
Docket Number: No. 3008
Parties: CLOSTIO’S HEIRS v. SINCLAIR REFINING CO. et al.
Judges: ELLIS, J., absent; J. J. DAVIDSON, acting as Judge ad hoc.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 36
Pages: 283–290

Head Matter:
CLOSTIO’S HEIRS v. SINCLAIR REFINING CO. et al.
No. 3008.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, First Circuit.
June 30, 1948.
Rehearing Denied Oct. 5, 1948.
See 37 So.2d 44.
J. Minos Simon, of Lafayette, for appellants.
Helm & Simon, of New Iberia, for ap-pellees.

Opinion:
J. J. DAVIDSON, Judge ad hoc.
The heirs of Mrs. Homer Clostio have instituted this suit for damages resulting from the death of their mother, who was accidentally killed in an automobile accident which occurred in the Town of Abbe-ville in Vermilion Parish, Louisiana, on August 27, 1946. The suit is directed against Joseph Romero, the driver of the automobile, A. D. LeBlanc, employee cf the Sinclair Refining Company, the Sinclair Refining Company, and its insurer, Zurich General Accident & Liability Insurance Company, Limited.
The petition alleges that A. D. LeBlanc, who was an agent of the Sinclair Refining Company and was acting in the course of his agency at the time, took his automobile to a garage in the Town of Abbeville operated by one West Richard, for the purpose of having a glass in the door of the car changed. That A. D. LeBlanc thereupon requested West Richard to have someone take him home in his car and then bring the car back to the shop for the repairs. Richard pointed out one of his employees to LeBlanc to take him to his business or to his home, but LeBlanc objected to using this particular employee and thereupon approached Joseph Romero and specifically requested that Romero drive him to his home or his place of business, and Romero agreed to do so. A. D. LeBlanc drove his automobile to his place of business and dismounted, and Joseph Romero started back to the garage with the automobile. On the way back to the garage, the mother of the plaintiffs was struck by the car driven by Joseph Romero as she was walking across the street, and it is alleged that the accident was the result of the negligence of the said Joseph Romero. The petition specifically avers that Romero was operating the automobile with the express permission and at the specific request of A. D. LeBlanc, and then alleges that the Zurich General Accident and Liability Insurance 'Company, Limited, had issued a policy of public liability insurance covering the Sinclair Refining Company and A. D. LeBlanc and any person who was using the automobile in question with the permission of LeBlanc, or the Sinclair Refining Company. The petition also alleges that Joseph Romero was an independent contractor working in the same garage where West Richard worked; that Romero went to work whenever he so desired, his hours being his own, and West Richard had no control over the said Joseph Romero.
Exceptions of no right of action were filed on behalf of Sinclair Refining Company, A. D. LeBlanc and Zurich General Accident and Liability Insurance Company, Limited. In the exception filed on behalf of Zurich General Accident and Liability Insurance Company, Limited, specific reference is made to Section 3 of the policy of insurance which is usually referred to as the "omnibus clause" and which reads as follows:
"III. Definition of 'Insured.' The unqualified word 'insured' wherever used in coverages A and B and in other parts of this policy, when applicable to such coverages, includes the named insured and except where specifically stated to the contrary, also includes any person while using the automobile and any person or organization legally responsible for the use thereof, provided the actual use of the automobile is with the permission of the named insured. The insurance with respect to any person or organization other than the named insured does not apply:
"(c) to any person or organization, or to any agent or employee thereof, operating an automobile repair shop, public garage, sales agency, service station or public parking place with respect to any accident arising out of the operation thereof;"
Exceptions of no cause or right of action were filed on behalf of Joseph Romero and with reservation of the exception, an answer has been filed on Romero's part.
The exceptions of no right of action filed by Sinclair Refining Company, A. D. Le-Blanc and Zurich General Accident and Liability Insurance Company, Limited, were taken up, evidence was introduced thereunder, and after submission to the court, the District Court rendered judgment maintaining the exceptions and dismissing the suit of the plaintiff against the defendants named. From this judgment the present appeal has been taken.
Motion to Dismiss
When this case was called for argument in this court, a motion was filed on behalf of the appellees to dismiss the appeal on the ground that at the time the exceptions were tried in the District Court, it had been agreed that the District Court could render judgment in vacation, reserving to either party the right to appeal "by petition" with the same force and effect as though rendered in regular term in open court. The motion to dismiss declares that judgment dismissing the plaintiffs' suit was rendered during vacation in August, 1947, and plaintiffs moved for an appeal in open court by oral motion in open court on October 1, 1947, which was a subsequent term of court to the one in which judgment was rendered, and, therefore, the plaintiffs having failed' to take the appeal by petition and citation, the appeal should be dismissed.
The plaintiffs and appellants take the position that inasmuch as the judgment was rendered during vacation, and not during any prior term of court, and inasmuch as the appeal was taken as soon as court opened, the motion for appeal was not made at a "subsequent" term of court but should be considered to have been taken at the "same term" as required by Article 573 of the Code of Practice. The record shows that the term of court ended on June 30th, and the next term convened in September. The judgment was rendered by the court in vacation in accordance with the stipulation between the parties, and a motion for appeal was made by the attorney for the plaintiffs in open court on October 1st, and at that time, pursuant to the said motion, an order was entered "ordering that all necessary parties be notified and cited of this appeal." Pursuant to this motion and order, the citation of appeal was issued and all of the parties presently before the court were duly cited and notified.
The judgment was rendered by the Court during vacation, under an agreement of counsel, and while the agreement gave the judge the right to grant an order of appeal at that time, he did not exercise that right, and the order of appeal was not granted until Court resumed after vacation. For all intents and purposes, therefore, the judgment may be said to have been rendered at the same term just as well as it can be said to have been rendered at a prior term before court went into vacation. However, in any event we do not believe the motion to dismiss is well founded. The law favors the granting of appeals.
There are a number of decisions which point out that where the motion to dismiss the appeal strikes at the foundation of the right of the appeal itself, the motion should be maintained, whereas if the motion relates, to some informality in connection with the appeal which does not affect the right of appeal itself or the jurisdiction of the Appellate Court, such informality should not result in preventing a review of the case by the Appellate Court. Coreil v. Town of Welsh, 120 La. 557, 45 So. 438; Haydel v. Major, La.App., 19 So. 2d 628; Watson v. Young, La.App., 34 So.2d 86.
In the present case, the order directed the parties defendant to be notified of the appeal, and a citation and notice of appeal was actually issued and served upon the parties defendant. All parties had full notice of the appeal and of all action which was taken through service of the notice and citation, to the same extent as though the procedure had been by "petition." The motion to dismiss was filed some time thereafter when the case was called for argument in the Appellate Court'. It is clear that no harm has resulted to any of the parties from the procedure taken, that all were fully advised in ample time to protect themselves fully, and that the procedure used in perfecting the appeal, if not strictly complying with the statutory law, was an informality only and should not result in preventing a review of the case by this court.
The motion to dismiss the appeal is therefore overruled.