Case Name: PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF MISSOURI, Appellant, v. ST. LOUIS-SAN FRANCISCO RAILWAY COMPANY
Court: Supreme Court of Missouri
Jurisdiction: Missouri
Decision Date: 1923-11-20
Citations: 301 Mo. 157
Docket Number: 
Parties: PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF MISSOURI, Appellant, v. ST. LOUIS-SAN FRANCISCO RAILWAY COMPANY.
Judges: Graves,-Walker and White, JJ., concur; James T. Blair, J., concurs in a separate opinion, in which David E. Blair, J., concurs; Woodson, G. J., dissents in a separate opinion.
Reporter: Missouri Reports
Volume: 301
Pages: 157–179

Head Matter:
PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF MISSOURI, Appellant, v. ST. LOUIS-SAN FRANCISCO RAILWAY COMPANY.
In Banc,
November 20, 1923.
1. PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION: Powers. The Public Service Commission is vested with sucb powers, and only sucb, as are conferred upon it by the Public Service Commission Law (Chap. 95, R. S. 1919). It is vested with the powers by that law expressly conferred, and all others necessary and proper to enable it to carry out fully and effectually all the purposes of the act.
2. -: General Order Without Hearing: Withdrawal of Trains. The statutes do not empower the Public Service Commission to make a general order forbidding all railroad companies from discontinuing the operation of any passenger train, previously operated wholly within this State, without securing the permission of the commission for such change.
Held, by WOODSON, C. X, dissenting, that there was no hearing upon the reasonableness of the order forbidding the discontinuance of the operation of any passenger train, and therefore the judgment of the circuit court dismissing the commission’s petition for a judgment upholding said order should be affirmed.
3. -: -: -: Initiation of Change. It is not ruled that the Public Service Commission is without power to make general rules or regulations other than those specified .in the Public Service Act, but a general rule requiring its permission before any passenger train can be withdrawn from service cannot be characterized as one “necessary or proper to enable it to carry out fully and effectually all the purposes” of the act. On the contrary, the act as a whole, in so far as it is applicable to common carriers, demonstrates that the legislative intention was to leave with the carrier the initiation of both service and rates, which means that so'far as service is concerned the carrier may, in the first instance, determine for itself the character and extent of the service, and may likewise make such changes therein from time to time as it may deem proper, and it is only when the service so inaugurated is or becomes “unreasonable, unsafe, improper or inadequate” that the commission may interfere.
Held, by JAMBS T. BLAIR, J., concurring, with whom DAVID E. BLAIR, J., concurs, that the Public Service Commission is empowered to sue to require the restoration or to prevent the abandonment of a previous service rendered by a public utility and abandoned or about to be abandoned without the permission of the commission, and the petition in this case is broad enough to justify such relief;* but as the trial was confined strictly to the validity of a general prder forbidding all common carriers from discontinuing the operation of any passenger train without having first obtained the permission of the commission, and the assignments of errors cover nothing else except the validity of that order, the judgment of the circuit court holding the order invalid must be affirmed.
Appeal from St. Louis City Circuit Court. — Hon. Robert W. Hall, Judge.
Affirmed.
L. H. Breuer, General Counsel, and James D. Lindsay, Assistant Counsel, for appellant.
(1) The order required no more of respondent, and other like carriers, than that, they should not discontinue a portion of the essential service to the public in this State, voluntarily undertaken by them, without a determination upon the facts in each instance, by the proper administrative body of the State, that public welfare and convenience — the conjoint interests of the carrier and of the public — justified the discontinuance. (2) The Public Service Commission has authority to make reasonable general regulations, or orders, applicable to railroad common carriers of passengers, adapted to promote public convenience and welfare, and conducive, to orderly procedure by the carriers, in making-important changes in the essential service undertaken by them in this State. R. S. 1919, sec. 10412, subdivs. 1, 3, 9; Sec. 10425; Secs. 104.36, 10450, 10456, 10457, 10460, 10534, 10538. (3) The order was made upon due notice given; after a hearing in which respondent and. other carriers appeared and were fully heard; was subject to review in a direct proceeding, and it does not violate the due process clauses of the Federal and State constitutions. State ex rel. M. K. & T. Ry. v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 277 Mo. 175; Vandalia R. R. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 242 U. S. 255; Chicago & N. W. R. Co. v. Dougherty, P. U. R, 1917 F, 617. (4) The compulsory continuance of performance of form or portion of an essential service to the public, voluntarily undertaken by a public utility, pending a determination by competent authority of the question whether the service is a reasonable one to require, is not a taking of property without just compensation, nor a denial of due process of law, within the State and Federal constitutions. State ex rel. M. K. & T. Ry. v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 277 Mo. 175; State ex rel. Pub. Serv. Comm. v. Ry. Co., 279 Mo. 455; Mo. So. Ry. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 281 Mo. 52; State ex rel. v. Postal Tel. Co., 96 Kan. 298,150 Pac. 544; Atlantic Coast Line Ry. Co. v. N. C. Corporation Comm., 206 U. S. 1. (5) The order was designed to require and promote adequate and reasonable passenger service to the public, within this State, by respondent and other carriers, and is not violative of the interstate commerce clause of the Federal Constitution or of Federal legislation. Sec. 10549, R. S. 1919; Article X Amendments, Const. United States; Atlantic Coast Line v. N. C. Comm., 206 U. S. 651; Mo. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Larabee Mills, 211 U. S. 612; Mo. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Kansas, 216 U. S. 262; Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U. S. 411; Hennington v. Georgia, 163 U. S. 317; Cleveland C. C. & St. Louis Ry. Co. v. Ulinois, 177 U. S'. 516; Vandalia Railroad Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 242 U. S. 255; Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co. v. Georgia, 234 U. S. 290:; Chicago, B. & Q. Ry. Co. v. Wisconsin Railroad Comm., 237 U. S. 226. (6) The State through the Public Service Commission, may provide regulations adapted to compel the respondent and other like carriers to meet the requirements of adequate passenger service within the State. Lake Shore Railroad Co. v. Ohio, 173 U. S. 285; Mo. Pac. Ry. Co, v, Kansas, 216 U. S. 262; Mississippi Railroad Comm. v. Illinois Central, 203 U. S. 335; State ex rel. v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 60 Fla. 465. (7) The Public Service Commission Act, and orders made thereunder, are to be “liberally construed with a view to the public welfare, efficient facilities, and substantial justice between patrons and public utilities.” R. S. 1919, sec. 10538; State ex inf. Baker v. K. C. Gas Co., 254 Mo. 515; State ex rel. v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 259 Mo. 704; State ex rel. M., K. & T. Ry. v. Comm., 277 Mo. 175. (8) Where a party whose interests are affected in an inquiry before the Public Service Commission, appears, participates in the inquiry, and makes full defense, he cannot complain of lack of notice of action taken within the scope of the inquiry. Baltimore & Ohio v. Pnb. Serv. Comm., 110 S. E. 475; P. U. R. 1922D, 270. (9) Grounds of objection to an order of the commission must be specifically set forth in the application for a rehearing, and grounds not so set forth may not be urged or relied on thereafter in any court. R. S. 1919, sec. 10521; State ex rel. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Atkinson, 269 Mo. 634; State ex rel. Buffum Tel. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 272 Mo. 627. (10) The order does not undertake to regulate unduly the management and operation of the railroads of the State. The order, in its general nature, merely provides that an essential service, undertaken by the carriers, or a certain part of it, presumably necessary, shall not be discontinued without a showing that the discontinuance is just and reasonable. The opportunity to make that showing is given. The showing made, it must be presumed that the permission will be given. (11) The order is not an attempt to directly regulate interstate commerce, nor does it impose an undue burden thereon. Congress has not acted upon this subject. It is one within the police power of the State. The interstate commerce clause does not of its own force, and without legislation by Congress, impair the authority of the states to establish reasonable regulations for the promotion of the safety, convenience and welfare of their people. Chicago Ry. Co. v. Arkansas, 219 U. S. 465; New York Railroad v. New York, 165 U. S. 631; W. IT. Tel. Co. v. Kansas, 216 IT. S. 27; M., K. & T. Ry. Co. v. Haber, 169 U. S. 627; Chicago Ry. Co. v. Solan, 169 U. S. 133. The order does not in any manner forbid, or hamper by conditions, the carriers ’ right to continue to pursue their intestate commerce operations as heretofore. Buck Stove Co. v. Vickers, 226 IT. S. 205; Crutcher v. Kentucky, 141 U. S. 47; Bowman v. Chicago Ry. Co., 125 IT. S, 465; Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U. S. 100. If a train is an interstate train operating within the State of Missouri, the order does not undertake to make it continue to operate interstate or to cease to do so. (12) This suit is based upon Section 10473, Revised Statutes 1919, and the ordinary rules applicable to mandamus are not applicable here. The section gives character to the procedure.
W. F. Evans, E. T. Miller and Frank II. Farris for respondent.
(1) The commission is an inferior tribunal, possessing limited powers, and it is essential to the validity of its orders that it proceed in conformity with the statute of its creation. Any material deviation therefrom makes void an order, though the subject-matter be within the commission’s jurisdiction. State ex rel. v. Comm., 270 Mo. 429; A. T. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Comm., 192 S. W. 460; L. & N. Railroad Co. v. Commonwealth, 226 S. W. 113; State ex rel. v. Railway, 179 N. W. 378. (2) The order of the commission was made pursuant to an order to show cause which omitted the subject-matter of the' order here involved, and was made without a sufficient evidentiary basis. The order deprived responden* of its property without due process of law in violation of Section 1, Article XIV, of the Federal Constitution. It is therefore void. Lusk v. Atkinson, 268 Mo. 109; S. W. Mo. Ry. Co. v. Comm., 281 Mo. 52; A. T. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Comm., 192' S. W. 460; Wisconsin Ry. Co. v. Jacobson, 179 U. S. 287; I. C. Commission v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 222 U. S. 541; State ex rel. Navigation Co. v. Comm., 224 U. S. 510; I. C. Commission v. L. & N. Railroad Co., 227 U. S. 88; Florida Ry. Co. v. United States, 234 U. S. 167; L. & N. Railroad Co. v. United States, 238 U. S. 1; Great Northern Ry. Co. v. State, 238 U. S. 340; Seaboard Air Line v. Comm., 240 U. S. 324; State ex rel. v. A. C. L. Railroad Co., 81 So. 489; In re Rutland Railroad Co., 64 Atl. 233; In re Coal Rates, 171 Pae. 506; Muskogee Gas Co. v. State, 186 Pac. 730. (3) The order is void because it does not show on its face the necessary jurisdictional facts to constitute a valid order. Leslie v. St. Louis, 47 Mo. 474; Chicago Ry. Co. v. Young, 96 Mo. 39; Seafield v. Bohne, 169 Mo. 537; State ex rel. v. Comm., 270 Mo. 547; State ex rel. v. Colbert, 273 Mo. 198; State ex rel. v. Gill, 220 S. W. 978; Eaton v. St. Charles, 8 Mo. App. 177; State ex rel. v. Page, 107 Mo. App. 213; Chandler v. Reading, 129 Mo. App. 63; Grant v. Suttlefield, 138 Mo. App. 555; Rogers v. Davis, 194 Mo. App. 378; New York Railroad Co. v. Croy, 127 N. E. 146; Sec. 10456, R. S. 1919. (4) The order is void because it is an assumption by the commission of a right to manage and operate the railroads of this State. Gustin v. Frisco, 1 Mo. P. S. C. Rep. 232; State ex rel. v. Bronson, 115 Mo. 271; State ex rel. v. Railroad, 50 So. 425. (5) The order violates Section 8, Article I, of the Constitution of the United States, in that it attempts to directly regulate interstate commerce or impose an undue burden thereon. State v. Railroad, 212 Mo. 658; State v. Railroad, 238 Mo. 21; Leloup v. Port of Mobile, 127 U. S. 640; Crutcher v. Kentucky, •141 U. S. 47; W. U. Tel. Co. v. Kansas, 216 IT. S. 1; Stuart v. Palmer, 74 N. Y. 183; State ex rel. v. Atlantic Coast Line, 60 Fla. 465. (6) The order of the commis-' sion is void and may be attacked directly'or collaterally in any proceeding in any court wherein its validity is drawn in question. State ex rel. v. Colbert, 273 Mo. 198; Wells v. Wells, 279 Mo. 57; Thompson v. Pinnell, 199 S. W. 1011; Gray v. Clements, 227 S. W. Ill; Ohio Valley Co. v. Ben Avon Borough, 253 U. S. 287; Seos. 10434,10473,10535, R. S. 1919. (7) The harden of proof is on appellant and it has failed to meet the requirements to sustain that burden. State ex rel. v. Associated Press, 159 Mo. 410; State ex rel. v. Bridg'e Co., 206 Mo. 74; State ex rel. v. Hudson, 226 Mo. 239; State ex. rel. v. Thomas, 245 Mo. 65; State ex iñf. v. Gas Co., 254 Mo. 515; State ex rel. v. Stone, 269 Mo. 334; State ex rel. v. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co., 280 Mo. 456. (8) There is no evidence of finding of fact as the basis of the order, the lack of which makes the order void for want of jurisdiction in the commission. Wichita Co. v. Pub. Utilities Comm., 43 U. S. Sup. Ct. Rep. 55. (9) The order of the commission is void in that it is an attempt at a direct regulation of interstate commerce. The order must be considered as a whole, and its validity must be determined not upon what the commission desired to be done by it, but what may be actually done under it. A. C. L. Co. v. Horton, 207 U. S. 334; K. C. S. Ry. v. Kaw Valley District, 233 TJ. S. 78; Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U. S. 401; McCabe v. A. T. & S. F. Ry., 186 Fed. 987; South Covington Ry. v. Covington, 235 U. S. 547; Walton v. State of ■Missouri, 91 U. S. 288; Hall v. DeCuir, 95 U. S. 488; Childs v. C. & O. Ry., 218 U. S. 76. (10) The Public Service Commission is not a legislative body and cannot assume or perform legislative functions. It is 'an administrative body, and the acts which it can lawfully perform are such as are authorized by law, and for the purpose of’ administering the law. If legislative functions were delegated to it by its act of creation, such act would be void. It must be in the performance of its duties, be clearly within the law, and they must be performed in the manner prescribed by law. Wichita Co. v. Pub. Utilities Comm., 43 U. S. S. C. R. 55; State ex rel. v. Postal Tel. Co., 96 Kan. 298; Pub. Serv. Comm. v. So. Ry., 279 Mo. 462.

Opinion:
RAGLAND. J.
On the 14th day of. April, 1921, the Public Service Commission, hereinafter referred to as the Commission, after notice and hearing, promulgated an order, to become effective July 5, 1921,' £ ' that no common carrier operating in the State of Missouri shall discontinue the operation of any passenger train . . . where such operation or service is performed in the State of Missouri, without securing the permission of tins Commission for such change." Thereafter on December 13, 1921, the respondent, St. Louis-San Francisco Railway Company, without first having obtained the consent of the Commission and without having made any application therefor, notified the Commission that on December 18, 1921, it would discontinue certain local passenger trains, which for a number of years it had been operating between the city of St. Louis and the town of Newberg and between Springfield and Monett, all within the State of Missouri. Thereupon the Commission commenced this action in the Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis, wherein it seeks by mandamus to compel respondent "to continue to operate as now and heretofore lately operated its said local passenger trains . . . until and unless permission for the discontinuance of said trains be duly obtained by order of the Commission." The gravamen of the action, as disclosed by the petition, is the threatened violation by respondent of the Commission's order with respect to the discontinuance of passenger trains. The cause comes here on the Commission's appeal from the judgment of the circuit court, denying it relief on the ground that the order just referred to is invalid.
In its return to the alternative writ respondent asserts the invalidity of the Commission's order on a number of grounds; among others, that the "order is a general order which if valid would have the force and effect of law, the making of which is not within relator's jurisdiction." With respect to this the position of the Commission is tersely set forth by its.general counsel in his brief as follows:
" The order here involved is a regulation as to future conduct, and legislative in its nature. It is a public policy formulated and announced, authorized by virtue of the general and special powers granted to the Commission. It is practical, and is necessary in the orderly performance by the Commission of its duty to supervise the performance of this essential duty of the carriers.
"It is an aid in procuring a speedy and authoritative determination of a question important alike to {he carrier and its patrons.
"It is designed to prevent the carrier from unauthorized action in disregard of the convenience of the public, and equally so, to relieve, in an orderly way, the carrier from a service which may be, by change of conditions, burdensome out of proportion to its benefits.
"The carrier cannot conclusively determine these questions for itself, without a hearing of the interests of the public.
"The sudden, unexplained discontinuance of a passenger train, long in voluntary operation, upon regular schedule for the service and convenience of the public, is a decision by one of the parties in interest without a hearing of the other party."
It thus appears that the principal question presented for determination is whether the Commission is empowered to make general orders of the character of the one involved here, operative in the future, and applicable alike to all common carriers by rail. There is little doubt but that the Legislature could have delegated authority to the Commission to make such a rule and regulation had it seen fit to do so. [State v. Atlantic Coast Line R. R. Co., 56 Fla. 617; 6 R C. L. 177.] The question is, did it?
The Commission is vested with such powers, and only such, as are conferred upon it by the Public Service Commission Law. [Chap. 95, R. S. 1919.] By that law it is vested with the powers therein expressly conferred and all others necessary and proper to enable it to carry out fully and effectually all the purposes of the act. [Sec. 10412, R. S. 1919.] Looking to those provisions of the statute dealing solely with the subject of the investiture of jurisdiction with respect to railroads, we find: ' ' The jurisdiction, supervision, powers and duties of the Public Service Commission herein created and established shall extend under this chapter . . . to all railroads within this State, . . . and to the person or corporation owning, leasing, operating or controlling the same." [Sec. 10425, R. S. 1919.] . "The Commission shall have the general supervision of all common carriers, railroads, . . . railroad corporations, . . . and shall have power to and shall examine the same and keep informed as to their general condition, their capitalization, their franchises and the manner in which their lines and property, owned, leased, controlled or operated are managed, conducted and operated, not only with respect to the adequacy, security and accommodation afforded by their service, but also with respect to their compliance with all the provisions of law, orders and decisions of the commission and charter requirements." [Sec. 10452, R. S. 1919.] These general provisions are followed by more specific ones prescribing the methods and procedure to be followed in the exercise of the power of supervision so conferred. From these it appears that the power may be exercised, broadly speaking, in two ways: first, through general orders applicable to all railroad carriers alike, and, second, through orders made in specific cases, based on findings of fact therein, after notice and hearing. With reference to the first, the statute expressly authorizes the Commission by general rules and regulations: (1) to prescribe the form of schedules showing the rates, fares and charges for the transportation of passengers and property within this State, and to modify the requirements of Section 10439 in respect to the publishing, posting and filing of such schedules, applicable to special or peculiar circumstances or conditions (Sec. 10438); (2) to prescribe the form of annual and periodic reports to be made by common carriers and the character of information to be contained therein (Sec. 10453); (3) to pre scribe the forms of account, records and memoranda to be kept by railroad corporations (Sec. 10461); (4) to regulate the furnishing and distribution of freight cars to shippers, the switching of the same for the loading and unloading thereof, the demurrage charges in respect thereto, and the weighing of cars and property offered for shipment or transported by any common carrier (Sec. 10447, subdiv. 2); (5) to provide the time within which express packages will be received, gathered, transported and delivered at destination, and the limits within which express packages -shall be gathered and distributed without extra charge (Sec. 10447, subdiv. 3); and (6) to provide for the transporting and moving of the car, device or facility used for testing track scales (Sec. 10448). The Commission is also authorized to prescribe, within defined limits, rules and regulations with respect to the issuance of stocks and bonds, notes and other evidences of indebtedness by railroad corporations and common carriers (Sec. 10463). The statute is voluminous and many of its provisions are not entirely free from ambiguity, but on its face the subject-matters above enumerated appear to be the only ones with respect to which it expressly authorizes the Commission to make general rules and regulations with reference to common carriers. Such rules, if reasonable and conformable to the general purposes of the statute, lie within the discretion of the Commission. All other orders expressly authorized must be made in conformity with a definite course of procedure.
The procedure above referred to consists of an investigation by the Commission, of its own motion'or upon complaint, in which, after due notice to the common carriers to be effected thereby, a hearing is had and a finding of facts is made on the evidence adduced thereat. Such finding constitutes the sole basis of any order that may be made as a result of the investigation. Under the statute these investigations, generally speaking, deal with the correlative subjects of service* and charges.
"The Commission may . . . make inquiry . . . as to any act or thing done or omitted to be done by any common carrier . . . [alleged to be] in violation of any provision of- law or in violation of any order or decision of the Commission" (Sec. 10455). If, after a hearing, it finds "that the regulations, practices, . . . or service of an}^ such common carrier . . . in respect to transportation of persons and property . . . are unjust, unreasonable, . . . improper or inadequate, it shall determine the just, reasonable, . . . adequate and proper regulations, practices . . . and service to be observed and used . . . and prescribe the same by order" (Sec. 10456, subdiv. 2). If it is of the opinion, after a hearing, "that the rates, fares or charges demanded, charged or collected by any common carrier, . or that the regulations or practices of such common carrier . . . affecting-such rates, are unjust, unreasonable, unjustly discriminatory or unduly preferential, . . . the Commission shall . . . determine the just and reasonable rates, fares and charges to be thereafter observed . . . and shall fix the same by order" (Sec. 10456, subdiv. 1).
In conducting the hearings the Commission does not sit as a legislative committee for the purpose of formulating a "public policy" and putting- it into effect by the issuance of general rules "legislative in . . . nature." Viewed from this particular angle it is to be regarded as a quasi-judicial body; specific acts of omission Or commission on the part of common carriers alone are the subjects committed to it for investigation, and its order made pursuant thereto can have no greater applicability.
It is' not necessary to hold, and we do not hold, that the Commission is .without power to make general rules or regulations other than those specified in the statute. It is entirely conceivable that the ^promulgation of others are "necessary or proper to enable it to carry out fully and effectually all the purposes" of the act. But a general rule requiring its permission before a passenger train can be withdrawn from service cannot be so characterized. A consideration of the Public Service Commission Law as a whole, so far as applicable to common carriers, convinces us that it was the intention of the Legislature to leave with the carriers the initiative as to both service and rates. There are certain restraints imposed by other statutory provisions in regard to rates, fares and charges, but so far as service is concerned the carriers may in the first instance determine for themselves its character and extent, and may likewise make such changes therein from time to time as they deém proper. It is only when the service so inaugurated or furnished is, or becomes, "unreasonable, unsafe, improper or inadequate" that the Commission may interfere. [Secs. 10455, 10456, 10460.] These views are not in conflict with State ex rel. Pub. Serv. Comm. v. Missouri South. Ry. Co., 279 Mo. 455, in which it was held that a railroad company cannot wholly abandon the operation of a part of its road without first obtaining the consent of the Commission.
As the general order in question was unauthorized by the statute it-is void. It follows that the judgment of the circuit court should be affirmed. It is so ordered.
Graves,-Walker and White, JJ., concur; James T. Blair, J., concurs in a separate opinion, in which David E. Blair, J., concurs; Woodson, G. J., dissents in a separate opinion.