Case Name: D. C. KNAPP, Appellant, v. MINNEAPOLIS, ST. PAUL, & SAULT STE. MARIE RAILWAY COMPANY, a Corporation, Respondent
Court: North Dakota Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: North Dakota
Decision Date: 1919-07-23
Citations: 43 N.D. 291
Docket Number: 
Parties: D. C. KNAPP, Appellant, v. MINNEAPOLIS, ST. PAUL, & SAULT STE. MARIE RAILWAY COMPANY, a Corporation, Respondent.
Judges: Bronson, J. I concur in the result.
Reporter: North Dakota Reports
Volume: 43
Pages: 291–298

Head Matter:
D. C. KNAPP, Appellant, v. MINNEAPOLIS, ST. PAUL, & SAULT STE. MARIE RAILWAY COMPANY, a Corporation, Respondent.
(173 N. W. 945.)
Actions — Former adjudication not avoided toy commencing new action in different county.
A party may not evade the force and effect of a former adjudication' by commencing a second action in a different county, or by changing the form of his complaint.
Opinion filed July 23, 1919.
Rehearing denied September 8, 1919.
Appeal from the District Court of Ward County, Honorable K. E. Leighton, Judge.
Affirmed.
F. B. Lambert, for appellant.
“In order for the first judgment to be binding the issues must be the same in both cases.” Noyes v. Belding (S. D.) 62 N. W. 953; Fahey v. Esterly Mach. Co. 3 N. D. 223.
“A bill of lading is an instrument of a twofold character. It is at once a receipt and a contract. In the former character it is an acknowledgment of the receipt of property on board his vessel by the owner of the vessel. In the latter it is a contract to carry and deliver. The receipt of the goods lies at the foundation of the contract to carry and deliver. If no goods are actually received there can be no valid contract to carry and deliver.” Citing’ King v. The Lady Franklin, 75 U. S. 325, 19 L. ed. 455; Pollard v. Winton, 105 U. S, 7, 6 L. ed. 998; Reeves v. Bruening, 13 N. D. 157; Alsterberg v. Bennett, 14 N. D. 596.
Parol evidence was inadmissible. National Bank v. Lang, 2 N. D. 66; Hutchinson v. Cleary, 3 N. D. 270; 1 Hutchinson, Carr. 3d ed. §§ 158, 160; N. W. Fuel Co. v. Burns, 1 N. D. 137; Prairie Twp. v. Haselen, 3 N. D. 328.
Greene & Stenersen, for respondent.
“A judgment on the same cause of action means a case where the same evidence will support both actions, though they happen to be granted on different writs. Thus, where the plaintiff sued in trespass for the taking of staves, and failed after trial on the merits on the ground that he had no right to the staves, he could not thereafter waive the tort and bring assumpsit on the same proof, the two actions being for the same cause.” Rice v. King, 7 Johns. 21; Williamson v. C. P. R. I. & P. R. Co. 51 N. W. 62; 1 Freeman, Judgm. § 272; Jacobson v. Miller, 1 N. W. 1015; Roney v. Westlake, 9 Ann. Cas. 186.
“If upon the trial because of insufficiency in the proof there is a dismissal of the complaint, such a dismissal does not prevent the bringing of another action even for the same cause or upon the same or a different theory. Where, however, an action is tried and there is a dismissal upon the merits, the judgment entered upon such dismissal upon the merits is a bar to bringing a new action with respect to any and every issue that was necessarily involved, or that should have teen raised in that action.” Molder v. Wexler, 182 N. Y. 519, 87 N. Y. Supp. 400; 9 Ann. Cas. 188, note; Miller v. Manice, 6 Hill, 114.
Where there is an opportunity for full presentation 'of all the facts in the case, the party relying, thereon must make a full disclosure thereof if known to him or suffer for a failure to do so. He cannot be permitted to conceal a part of his action or defense or to negligently overlook it, and thus prolong indefinitely the final settlement of the case. 122 N. W. 579 ; Zalesky v. Insurance Co. 114 IoAva, 516, 87 N. W. 428; Re Cook (S. D.) 122 N. W. 578; Sullivan v. Colby, 18 C. C. A. 193, 71 Fed. 460, 9 N. W. 726, 727; Board of Directors, etc. v. People, 189 111. 438, 59 N. W. 977; Re Assessment of Property, 206 111. 64, 60 N. E. 75; 9 Ann. Cas. 187; Roney v. Westlake, 216 Pac. 374, 9 Ann. Cas. 184. " ' ' ' ' ......

Opinion:
Robinson, J.
On October 17, 1916, this action was commenced in Ward county to recover from defendant $960 for the loss of 1,000 bushels of wheat in August, 1910. Aside from a general denial, the answer avers that the cause of action did not accrue within six years, and that in a former action, in the district court of Burke county, between the same parties for the same identical cause of action, after trial on the merits, it was by the court duly adjudged that the action be dismissed on its merits. In this case the court sustained the plea of a former adjudication and dismissed the action. The case was before this court, as shown by the reports, 34 N. D. 466-497, 159 N. W. 81. The first action was to recover from defendant for the loss of 1,000 bushels of wheat at 94 cents a bushel,, with interest from November 1, 1910. It is manifest that each action was brought for the same identical cause, by the same plaintiff against the same defendant, to recover for the loss of the same wheat'. In each case the parties and the cause of action are identical. In such a ease a party may not evade the force and effect of a former adjudication by varying the form of the complaint or by bringing actions in different counties.
It also appears that this action was not brought within six years from the date the cause of action accrued.
Judgment affirmed.
Bronson, J. I concur in the result.