Case Name: Sharon WEBER, Appellant, v. Carolyn WEBER and Robert Weber, Appellees
Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
Jurisdiction: Pennsylvania
Decision Date: 1987-02-17
Citations: 362 Pa. Super. 262
Docket Number: No. 00483
Parties: Sharon WEBER, Appellant, v. Carolyn WEBER and Robert Weber, Appellees.
Judges: Before BROSKY, MONTGOMERY and HESTER, JJ.
Reporter: Pennsylvania Superior Court Reports
Volume: 362
Pages: 262–269

Head Matter:
524 A.2d 498
Sharon WEBER, Appellant, v. Carolyn WEBER and Robert Weber, Appellees.
Superior Court of Pennsylvania.
Argued July 17, 1986.
Filed Feb. 17, 1987.
Reargument Denied May 1, 1987.
Petition for Allowance of Appeal Granted Sept. 9, 1987.
Eileen D. Yacknin, Pittsburgh, for appellant.
Louis Vaira, Pittsburgh, for appellees.
Before BROSKY, MONTGOMERY and HESTER, JJ.

Opinion:
MONTGOMERY, Judge:
This appeal is from an order granting summary judgment and dismissing appellant's complaint for partial custody of Jennifer Weber, appellant's sister and appellees' minor daughter. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
Appellees Carolyn and Robert Weber are the parents of both appellant Sharon Weber and Jennifer Weber, who is still a minor. Jennifer resides with her parents. Sharon is an adult who is unmarried and resides with an unmarried man in a residence separate from her parents and sister. Because Mrs. Weber does not approve of Sharon's living arrangements, she refused to permit Jennifer to visit with Sharon at Sharon's residence or other places outside the parents' home. Sharon therefore filed a complaint seeking partial custody of Jennifer. Appellees filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting that Sharon had not stated a cause of action. The trial court agreed and granted the motion, dismissing Sharon's complaint. We agree that, absent statutory authority, an adult sister does not have standing to bring an action for partial custody of a minor child over the objections of the minor child's parents.
The issue in this case is not simply whether Sharon and Jennifer should be permitted to visit with one another. Rather, the issue encompasses the more difficult question of whether and to what extent the courts can interfere in a decision made by parents of a minor child regarding who that child may associate with.
The right to raise one's children has long been recognized as one of our basic civil rights. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 45 S.Ct. 571, 69 L.Ed. 1070 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 43 S.Ct. 625, 67 L.Ed. 1042 (1923); In re Rinker, 180 Pa.Super. 143, 117 A.2d 780 (1955). Freedom of personal choice in matters of family life, and the concomitant freedom from unwarranted governmental intrusion, is a fundamental liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 102 S.Ct. 1388, 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982). For these reasons, governmental intrusion into the family is warranted only in exceptional circumstances. The statutory bases for court interference with the parents' right to custody are limited and specific, reflecting that philosophy. See, 11 P.S. § 2208 (taking an abused child into protective custody); 23 P.S. § 301 (custody and visitation rights between parents in a divorce action); 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511 (involuntary termination of parental rights); 23 Pa.C.S. § 5311-5313 (grandparents visitation); 42 Pa.C.S. § 6351, 6352 (disposition of dependent and delinquent children).
Appellant concedes that this case does not fall within any of the statutory bases for jurisdiction. Further, appellant does not challenge the fitness of appellees as custodians of Jennifer. Rather, she questions the wisdom of their decision not to expose Jennifer to a life style of which they disapprove. Whether this is a wise decision or not is irrelevant; the point is that it is their decision and they have a right to make it.
In a similar case, this court held that grandparents do not have standing to seek visitation or partial custody, over the parents' objection, unless they come within the purview of the Grandparents' Visitation Act. Herron v. Seizak, 321 Pa.Super. 466, 468 A.2d 803 (1983). In that case, too, the issue was not whether the parents had made a wise decision but whether the court had the power to overrule the parents' decision, absent statutory authority. In that case, the court noted that neither case nor statutory law "legitimizes such an intrusion by the courts into family life." Id., 321 Pa.Superior Ct. at 470, 468 A.2d 805. Since the grandparents had not made any "allegation that would justify an interference with [the parents'] decision not to permit visitation" the court refused to "intervene in this family matter in which no legal rights are at issue." Id. We believe that analysis to be appropriate to this case as well. Finding that appellant has not alleged a right to court intervention into this family matter, we affirm the order dismissing appellant's petition.
BROSKY, J., files a concurring opinion.
. Appellant's brief mentions the possible abuse of Jennifer by an older brother. We do not believe this issue is relevant to the determination of whether Sharon has standing to bring a partial custody action. If Sharon believes Jennifer to be in danger of abuse, she has the right, if not the duty to report same to the appropriate authorities and/or file a dependency petition in juvenile court. 11 P.S. § 2005; 42 Pa.C.S. § 6334.
. We have been unable to discover any Pennsylvania cases where visitation or partial custody actions have been entertained absent (1) a divorce or separation, (2) the death of one of the natural parents who would ordinarily have protected the petitioner's visitation privileges, (3) a delinquency or dependency proceeding, or (4) a situation where the petitioner had physical custody whether through court order or informally. The New Jersey case relied on by appellant involved a situation where the natural mother, who might have been expected to preserve the sister's visitation privileges, was deceased. L. v. G., 203 N.J.Super. 385, 497 A.2d 215 (1985).