Case Name: Homero MERUELO and Belinda Meruelo, Appellants, v. The Honorable Steven D. ROBINSON, Vito Caggiano and Tom Gibbons, Appellees
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1983-02-08
Citations: 426 So. 2d 1164
Docket Number: No. 82-1191
Parties: Homero MERUELO and Belinda Meruelo, Appellants, v. The Honorable Steven D. ROBINSON, Vito Caggiano and Tom Gibbons, Appellees.
Judges: Before SCHWARTZ, C.J., and NESBITT and FERGUSON, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 426
Pages: 1164–1165

Head Matter:
Homero MERUELO and Belinda Meruelo, Appellants, v. The Honorable Steven D. ROBINSON, Vito Caggiano and Tom Gibbons, Appellees.
No. 82-1191.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
Feb. 8, 1983.
Rehearing Denied March 10, 1983.
Malcolm B. Wiseheart, Jr. and Elizabeth W. Joyce, Miami, for appellants.
Ronald S. Golub, Miami, for appellees.
Before SCHWARTZ, C.J., and NESBITT and FERGUSON, JJ.

Opinion:
PER CURIAM.
Dade County Circuit Court Administrative Order 79-9 which creates seven county court districts within separate geographical boundaries is not jurisdictional in nature, and a Petition for Writ of Prohibition by the landlord will not lie to discontinue the trial of a landlord-tenant action which was commenced by the landlord in the wrong county court. Jurisdiction, the inherent power of the county court to decide a landlord and tenant case, is fixed by statute. Section 34.011, Fla.Stat. (1981). The administrative order in question merely assigns the place where a county court may determine the case, and, so, is a designation of venue, which can be waived, as by a failure to make a timely objection. Tucker v. State, 417 So.2d 1006 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982).
The prohibition proceeding arose out of an action to enforce the rental agreement, which agreement contains a provision allowing attorney's fees to the landlord. Because the tenants/appellees are the prevailing parties, they are entitled to a reasonable attorney's fee, Section 83.48, Florida Statutes (1981), the amount of which is to be determined by the Appellate Division of the Circuit Court — the court having original jurisdiction over the Petition for Writ of Prohibition.
Affirmed and remanded for further consistent proceedings.