Case Name: Robert H. PENNY et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. W. George BOWDEN, Jr., et al., Defendants-Appellees
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1967-02-15
Citations: 199 So. 2d 345
Docket Number: No. 1837
Parties: Robert H. PENNY et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. W. George BOWDEN, Jr., et al., Defendants-Appellees.
Judges: 
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 199
Pages: 345–353

Head Matter:
Robert H. PENNY et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. W. George BOWDEN, Jr., et al., Defendants-Appellees.
No. 1837.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana. Third Circuit.
Feb. 15, 1967.
On Rehearing June 1, 1967.
Bernard Kramer, Alexandria, for plaintiffs-appellants.
Gist, Methvin & Trimble, by H. B. Gist, Jr., Alexandria, for defendants-appellees.

Opinion:
FRUGÉ, Judge.
The plaintiffs, three former police officers presently retired from the Police Department of the City of Alexandria, seek to mandamus the City of Alexandria to pay into the Alexandria Police Pension Fund amounts allegedly due under the state statute establishing the fund. The Mayor of the City of Alexandria, the Commissioner of Finance and Utilities, the Commissioner of Streets and Parks, and the City Council were made defendants in their capacity as representatives of the City. The defendants answered the plaintiffs' petition, raising numerous exceptions and defenses, and the trial judge, after a hearing on the merits, sustained an exception to the plaintiffs' lack of procedural capacity and dismissed the suit. From the adverse ruling below, the plaintiffs have appealed to this court.
The facts are undisputed. In 1954 the Legislature provided for the financing of a police pension fund as follows:
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"If the municipality has a population of fifty thousand or less, it shall set aside for the fund, twenty-five percent of the fines collected by its municipal courts for the infraction of municipal ordinances and twenty percent of the money collected for licenses, privilege taxes, or permits for the sale of beverages containing alcohol. The municipality shall appropriate and pay out of its general alimony taxes, into the fund, annually at the beginning of the fiscal year, an amount equal to any deficit which occurs in the operation of the fund for the preceding year. As amended Acts 1954, No. 246, § 1."
For a few years after the passage of this statute, the balance of the Alexandria fund continued to increase without any municipal appropriations under the above "deficit" provision because few policemen had attained the requisite length of service to retire under the act. In 1958 the level of the Alexandria fund reached $192,397.23. Beginning in 1959, however, more and more policemen became eligible under the act and the benefits paid from the fund exceeded the statutory revenues as provided by R.S. 33:2222 in the following amounts:
1959 $ 3,477.84
1960 9,996.45
1961 27,974.15
1962 27,787.32
1963 18,906.63
1964 15,577.57
1965 12,687.40
1966 16,901.04
Thus, as of April 30, 1966, the total assets of the fund had declined from a high of $192,397.23 to the present level of $62,566.67. The record establishes that at no time during the last eight years, (the alleged "deficit" years) has the City of Alexandria appropriated and paid into the fund any amount of money as the plaintiffs contend is required by the revenue provisions of the statute. The object of this suit, therefore, is to compel the City by writ of mandamus to appropriate and pay into the fund the sum of the past yearly deficits incurred in the operation of the fund.
EXCEPTIONS
The defendants filed, among others, an exception to the plaintiffs' procedural capacity and the trial judge, after hearing on the merits, sustained this exception, holding that the Board of Trustees of the fund has exclusive control over the proceeds and is therefore the only party who could properly bring this action. The Board of Trustees is established by the Police Pension Statute and has charge of the management of the fund, pension applications and assessment of police officers' salaries for deposit in the fund. R.S. 33:2225. The membership of the Board of Trustees for the Alexandria fund is composed of the Mayor, the Chief of Police, the City Attorney, a representative elected by the Police Department, and the City Clerk. R.S. 33:2224.
The issue thus presented is not whether the Board of Trustees is a proper party to bring this action, but whether it is the only party who may sue to compel performance under the statute.
A party, in order to sue, must possess a real and actual interest which he asserts in the action. LSA-C.C.P. Art. 681. The trial judge, in his written reasons for judgment, analogized the interests of the present plaintiffs to the interests of welfare recipients in receiving welfare benefits from the State, and to the interest of a city employee in having the City Council budget sufficient funds for his salary for the ensuing year. We agree that welfare recipients, as gratuitous beneficiaries of the legislative will, could not mandamus the State Legislature to appropriate welfare funds. We also feel that under ordinary circumstances a city employee could not mandamus the City Council to compel future salary appropriations (but see Annotation at 81 A.L.R. 1253 for cases where mandamus did lie in this situation).
It is stipulated in the instant suit that the plaintiffs are now retired and receiving full benefits under the act. The interests of the plaintiffs herein, therefore, are in the nature of vested rights since they have fulfilled the qualifications for retirement under the statute and, while active employees, contributed a portion of their salary toward the establishment of the fund. Meyer v. Board of Trustees, 199 La. 633, 6 So.2d 713 (1942); Annotation, 52 A.L.R.2d 437. Prior to actual retirement, rights in pension funds are generally not considered vested. Bowen v. Board of Trustees of Police Pension Fund, 76 So.2d 430 (Orl.La.App.1954). But where employees contribute a portion of their salary to the establishment of the fund, the nature of the pension is deferred compensation, and municipal employees have contractual or quasi-contractual rights therein. 67 C.J.S. Officers § 92, pages 331— 334. Since the plaintiffs are presently retired and have in the past contributed a portion of their salaries to the funds, it is our view that they possess a "real and actual interest" which they seek to assert in this mandamus suit. LSA-C.C.P. Art. 681'. Undoubtedly the Board of Trustees of the pension fund would have less difficulty in bringing this action than the present plaintiffs. That the Board has not seen fit to do so is understandable, however, in view of the fact that a majority of the Board is composed of city officials, some of whom are the object of the instant mandamus suit. It is our opinion, therefore, that the exception to the plaintiffs' procedural capacity should not have been maintained and that the plaintiffs possess the requisite interest to prosecute this action.
The city further excepts to the plaintiffs' petition for mandamus on the grounds that the Board of Trustees of the pension fund was not joined as an indispensable party to the suit. In this regard, LSA-C.C.P. Art. 641 provides:
"Indispensable parties to an action are those whose interests in the subject matter are so interrelated, and would be so directly affected by the judgment, that a complete and equitable adjudication of the controversy cannot be made unless they are joined in the action.
"No adjudication of an action can be made unless all indispensable parties are joined therein."
Is the Board of Trustees' interest in this suit so interrelated and so directly affected by the judgment that a complete and equitable adjudication of the controversy cannot be made without its joinder? We think not. Assuming that this court grants the relief for which the plaintiffs pray, the only action required of the Board would be to receive the funds appropriated by the City, a duty with which the Board is already charged under the express provisions of the statutes establishing it. R.S. 33:2225, R.S. 33:2227. We conclude, therefore, that the Board of Trustees is merely a ministerial stakeholder and is not an indispensable party to the present action.
The defendants further urge that the plaintiffs' prayer for relief is premature since the parties-plaintiff are receiving full benefits due them under the pension fund and since they have failed to allege or show that they have suffered any damage or harm. This contention is without merit, for the object of the plaintiffs' suit is not to exact damages from the city but to compel the city to comply with an allegedly mandatory duty to appropriate money, which duty, if it exists, is purely ministerial in nature under the mandatory provisions of a state law. The plaintiffs do not seek to recoup personal loss, but rather pray for a mandamus to require the City of Alexandria to comply with a public duty. It is settled that where persons can show the existence of a special interest apart from that possessed by the general public, mandamus will lie to enforce a public duty affecting that interest. 55 C.J.S. Mandamus § 47 a, p. 79; State ex rel. Schoeffner v. Dowling, 158 La. 706, 104 So. 624 (1925).
Despite the defendants' arguments to the contrary, there can be no question as to the propriety of the remedy chosen by the plaintiffs if it is established that a positive legal duty to appropriate the funds exists (an issue we shall shortly decide). For it is settled that a municipality may be compelled by mandamus to appropriate funds for a specific purpose designated by statute, and that mandamus will lie to compel a public officer to perform a duty made ministerial by statute. 38 C.J. § 390, p. 758; 55 C.J.S. Mandamus § 208, pp. 410-412; Wise v. First National Bank of Nogales, 49 Ariz. 146, 65 P.2d 1154 (1937); State ex rel. Richardson v. Board of Trustees, 29 So.2d 489 (La.App.1st Cir. 1947) ; New York State Employees Retirement System et al. v. Board of Super visors of Tioga County, 157 Misc. 87, 283 N.Y.S. 405 (1935), affirmed 278 N.Y. 496, 15 N.E.2d 434 (1938); State of Louisiana ex rel. Goudeau et al. v. State Mineral Board, 141 So.2d 32 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1962).
We therefore conclude that the procedural exception interposed by the defendants should be overruled, and we proceed forthwith to a discussion and determination of the case on its merits.