Case Name: STATE of Louisiana v. John A. DUPART and Reginald Adams
Court: Louisiana Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1979-11-12
Citations: 383 So. 2d 1226
Docket Number: No. 64767
Parties: STATE of Louisiana v. John A. DUPART and Reginald Adams.
Judges: DIXON, J., concurs with reasons.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 383
Pages: 1226–1230

Head Matter:
STATE of Louisiana v. John A. DUPART and Reginald Adams.
No. 64767.
Supreme Court of Louisiana.
Nov. 12, 1979.
Dissenting Opinion May 23, 1980.
William Noland, New Orleans, for defendant-appellant Reginald Adams.
James S. Weidner, Jr., Gretna, for defendant-appellant John Dupart.
William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Barbara Rutledge, Asst. Atty. Gen., John M. Mam-oulides, Dist. Atty., Abbott J. Reeves, William W. Hall, Asst. Dist. Attys., for plaintiff-appellee.

Opinion:
MARCUS, Justice.
John A. Dupart and Reginald Adams were charged in the same information with simple burglary in violation of La.R.S. 14:62. Defendants pleaded not guilty at the arraignment. After the trial judge denied defendants' motions to suppress physi cal evidence, the state amended the information to charge defendants with receiving stolen things valued at two Hundred dollars in violation of La.R.S. 14:69. Defendants moved to withdraw their former pleas of not guilty and to enter pleas of guilty to the amended charge, expressly reserving their right to appeal the court's denial of their pre-plea motions to suppress. The trial judge accepted the pleas of guilty after determining that the pleas were made voluntarily with understanding of the nature of the charges. Dupart was sentenced to serve two years at hard labor; Adams was sentenced to serve eighteen months at hard labor. On appeal, defendants rely on two assignments of error for reversal of their convictions and sentences.
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR NOS. 1 AND 2
Defendants contend the trial judge erred in denying their motions to suppress physical evidence. They argue the police officers did not have reasonable cause to stop their automobile. Hence, the subsequent search of the vehicle was invalid and the items seized therein should have been suppressed.
At 10:29 on the night of September 26, 1978, Deputy Richard Schomaker, who had six years experience with the Jefferson Parish Sheriff's Office, was notified of a burglary in progress at 3730 Jean Street in Metairie, Louisiana. When he arrived at the scene, the deputy was advised by several officers already present that one or more suspects had fled on foot south from Jean Street and were being chased by several other officers. Deputy Schomaker proceeded south from Jean Street on Division Street. At Stefano Street, one block south of Jean Street, he observed a vehicle containing two occupants turn south from a stop sign on Stefano Street onto Division Street. The automobile was traveling at approximately ten miles per hour in a twenty mile per hour zone. Believing that the burglars might be in this slow-moving car, Deputy Schomaker decided to stop it and turned on his red light and sounded his horn. At this time, the vehicle accelerated to approximately thirty-five miles per hour and the deputy noticed a "great deal of activity inside the car." About four blocks further down Division Street, he managed to pull the vehicle over. The two occupants (defendants herein) were ordered out of the car and to place their hands on the police vehicle; the doors of defendants' vehicle were left open. The deputy quickly searched defendants for weapons and walked over to their car and noticed through an open door several pieces of jewelry on the right side of the front seat. The inside of the car was illuminated by its interior light. After other officers arrived to assist, Deputy Schomaker searched the vehicle and found more pieces of jewelry, a sledge hammer, two screw drivers, a flashlight and brown gloves.
In determining the validity of the warrantless search of the vehicle, there are three points in time which must be examined: the initial stop of the vehicle, the police officer's observation of the jewelry on the front seat, and the subsequent search of the vehicle. If the initial stop was not justified, then the subsequent acts are illegal fruits of the poisonous tree. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963). The right of law enforcement officers to stop and interrogate one reasonably suspected of criminal conduct is recognized by La.Code Crim.P. art. 215.1, as well as both the federal and state jurisprudence. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968); State v. Chopin, 372 So.2d 1222 (La.1979); State v. Drew, 360 So.2d 500 (La.1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1059, 99 S.Ct. 820, 59 L.Ed.2d 25 (1979). Probable cause is not required to justify an investigatory stop; reasonable suspicion is sufficient. Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 92 S.Ct. 1921, 32 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972); United States v. Hall, 557 F.2d 1114 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 907, 98 S.Ct. 308, 54 L.Ed.2d 195 (1978); State v. Chopin, supra; State v. Drew, supra. Terry v. Ohio and Adams v. Williams approved investigatory stops of individuals based on reasonable suspicion. The standards set forth in Terry and Adams have been applied to the stopping of automobiles based on reasonable suspicion. United States v. Wright, 565 F.2d 486 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 974, 98 S.Ct. 1621, 56 L.Ed.2d 67 (1978); United States v. Hall, supra; State v. Rogers, 324 So.2d 403 (La.1975); State v. Weathers, 320 So.2d 892 (La.1975); State v. Scott, 307 So.2d 291 (La.1975); State v. Herron, 301 So.2d 312 (La.1974); State v. Jefferson, 284 So.2d 882 (La.1973).
In the instant case, the police officer was justified in stopping defendants' vehicle for investigatory purposes. The officer spotted the vehicle in the immediate vicinity of the crime, in an area toward which the suspects had fled, immediately after the occurrence of the crime. They were driving very slowly. Moreover, defendants' conduct after the officer turned on his red light and sounded his horn was consistent with one who had just committed , a crime. Defendants' attempt to escape and their activities in the car increased the officer's suspicion that the burglars were in the car. Clearly, the officer had reasonable cause to make an investigatory stop of the vehicle and to question defendants.
Having made the investigatory stop, Deputy Schomaker, through the open door in the lighted car, saw jewelry on the front seat. Objects falling in the plain view of an officer who has a right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure. Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234, 88 S.Ct. 992, 19 L.Ed.2d 1067 (1968); State v. Rogers, supra; State v. Scott, supra; State v. Herron, supra; State v. Jefferson, supra.
We believe that the officer's observation of the jewelry on the front seat of the car together with the previous suspicious circumstances gave Deputy Schomak-. er probable cause to believe that evidence of the burglary was inside the vehicle. When probable cause exists for the searching of a vehicle and circumstances render securing a warrant impractical, a warrant-less search of the automobile does not violate the fourth amendment. Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 90 S.Ct. 1975, 26 L.Ed.2d 419 (1970); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 45 S.Ct. 280, 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925); State v. Hollingsworth, 292 So.2d 516 (La.1974). In the instant case, the suspects' vehicle was stopped on a public street at night in the immediate area where the crime had just previously been committed. Clearly, the circumstances rendered securing a warrant impractical. Since there were probable cause and exigent circumstances, the warrantless search of the suspects' vehicle was not unconstitutional. The trial judge did not err in denying defendants' motions to suppress the evidence. Assignments of Error Nos. 1 and 2 are without merit.
DECREE
For the reasons assigned, defendants' convictions and sentences are affirmed.
DIXON, J., concurs with reasons.
CALOGERO, J., concurs and assigns reasons.
DENNIS, J., dissents and assigns reasons.
Chief Judge Paul B. Landry, Retired, is sitting by assignment as Associate Justice Ad Hoc in place of Tate, J., upon this case.
. State v. Crosby, 338 So.2d 584 (La.1976).
. Apparently, Deputy Schomaker did not actually seize the jewelry from the front seat of the car at this time. The record indicates that, after Schomaker checked the vehicle, he waited for assistance to arrive. After assistance arrived, he made a search of the vehicle and seized all the items found therein.