Case Name: Doris Mae BERGERON, born Nix, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. John Gespor BERGERON, Defendant-Appellant
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1997-04-09
Citations: 693 So. 2d 199
Docket Number: No. 96-1586
Parties: Doris Mae BERGERON, born Nix, Plaintiff—Appellee, v. John Gespor BERGERON, Defendant—Appellant.
Judges: Before DOUCET, C.J., and YELVERTON and WOODARD, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 693
Pages: 199–204

Head Matter:
Doris Mae BERGERON, born Nix, Plaintiff—Appellee, v. John Gespor BERGERON, Defendant—Appellant.
No. 96-1586.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Third Circuit.
April 9, 1997.
Stephen Ronald Streete, Lake Charles, for Doris Mae Bergeron born Nix.
Alvis J. Roche, Lake Charles, for John Gespor Bergeron.
Before DOUCET, C.J., and YELVERTON and WOODARD, JJ.

Opinion:
liYELVERTON, Judge.
The main issue in this appeal is the classification of an annuity account in a community property partition. The trial judge found that it was almost entirely community property. We find that this was error, and we will amend the judgment to state the correct proportions of what was community and what was separate.
John and Doris Bergeron were married in 1981 and divorced in 1995. John had $216,000 in settlement funds for injuries he received before the marriage. In 1985 he deposited $100,000 of the settlement in an annuity account with Minnesota Mutual Life Insurance Company.
RFrom 1988 to January 17, 1994 John made seven withdrawals of interest. On January 17, 1994, John made a withdrawal of $21,905.96. This withdrawal consisted of all of the remaining interest accrued to that time, plus $10,000 of the principal. When the account was closed on April 4,1995, it had an ending balance, of $90,000 in principal and $5,664.50 of interest.
It was never disputed — in fact, conceded throughout — that the $100,000 deposit was separate property. When the account was opened John did not file an affidavit to reserve the interest as his separate property, as he might have done by virtue of La. Civ. Code art. 2339. He did not file such an affidavit until July 7, 1993. As a consequence, John acknowledged that, prior to the affidavit, all interest earned on the account became community property.
The parties also never contested that up until the $10,000 in principal was withdrawn on January 17, 1994, all of the withdrawals were of interest, with no invasion of the principal. John and Doris each so testified. Jeanne Boudreaux, an employee of Ben Terrell & Associates, the local Lake Charles firm which handled the Minnesota Mutual annuity account, was familiar with the account, and she testified that these withdrawals were interest withdrawals. She also testified that on January 17, 1994, the $21,905.96 withdrawal consisted of $11,905.96 in interest and $10,000 in principal. She said that the account balance on April 4, 1995 was $5,664.50 of interest and $90,000 of principal. Documentation from Minnesota Mutual filed in evidence confirms these figures, and itemizes the total of interest earned amounting to $90,061.90, which includes the interest of $5,664.50 earned after the last withdrawal on January 17,1994.
|sThe trial judge recognized that the initial deposit of $100,000 was separate property and that most of the interest earned on the deposit was a civil fruit of the separate property which by application of La.Civ.Code art. 2339 became community property. However, the trial judge ruled that $89,967.90 of the $95,664.50 that remained in the account on April 4, 1995 was also community property, and only the balance, or $5,696.60, was separate. The trial judge's mathematical reasoning in reaching these figures is not hard to follow, but it is hard to understand. He reasoned that, based purely on the documentary evidence, there was no clear indication as to whether the withdrawals invaded the principal or the interest of the account, and that therefore an inseparable commingling had occurred which required that all of the remaining balance be classified community. The only exception, his reasons for judgment indicated, was the item of $5,696.60, which was the difference between the total withdrawals and the initial investment: that difference, he believed, retained its classification as separate property.
The law on which the trial court relied in reaching this conclusion was the case of Cutting v. Cutting, 625 So.2d 1112 (La.App. 3 Cir.1993), writ denied, 93-2770 (La.1/7/94), 631 So.2d 453. The trial judge correctly understood the Cutting case as holding that, when community and separate funds are commingled in the same account, any withdrawals from that account are presumed to first deplete the spouse's separate funds, absent contrary evidence. The trial judge in our present case believed that the burden of proof was on John to show that the withdrawals were not from his separate funds. Because the trial judge's interpretation of the evidence was that John|4had failed in his proof, the judge indulged in the assumption that all eight withdrawals were from the principal, i.e., John's separate funds, and not from the community fruits.
The evidence is to the contrary. The trial judge was clearly wrong and made an error of fact in finding that the character of the withdrawals could not be identified as principal or interest. All of the evidence, including even the testimony of Doris, established that the withdrawals were from interest only until the $10,000 principal withdrawal was made on January 17, 1994. Every witness said so, the documents said so, and the record discloses that this was the common understanding of the parties and them attorneys throughout the trial of this cause. Throughout the transcript of testimony, the questions and answers repeatedly distinguished between the withdrawals as interest and the remainder of the deposit as principal. A proper analysis of the evidence shows that, until July 7, 1993, there was a commingling of community and separate property in the annuity account, only in the sense that in the same account there was interest and also principal. Beyond that, very little difficulty is encountered in identifying the separate property and tracing the origin of the amounts withdrawn.
It follows that the separate property remained intact and only the interest was withdrawn until January 17, 1994, at which time $10,000 of the principal was taken out. Until July 7, 1993, interest earned on the deposit was community. After the filing of the affidavit establishing separateness of the fruits on July 7, 1993, there were withdraw- ais of interest totaling $23,683.96 which occurred on August 30, 1993 and January 17, 1994. Because these withdrawals occurred after the filing of the affidavit, some part of the interest was necessarily separate property; however, no evidence was ^introduced to establish what part. As to the $23,583.96 of interest withdrawn after the 1993 affidavit, the separate property cannot be identified; we would have to guess. So this was an instance of commingling, and we will recognize all of that withdrawal as community property.
The withdrawal on January 17, 1994, depleted the interest, and, hence, all the community funds in the account. That withdrawal also included $10,000 of separate money. So all interest earned on the account after January 17, 1994,.that being $5,664.50, was separate property. We calculate, accordingly, that as of the date it was closed on April 4, 1995, what remained in the account, $95,664.50, was separate property.
John also argues on appeal that he should be reimbursed for ½ of the payments he made, after termination of the community, on the truck note, a community obligation. The payments came from his separate funds. The trial judge did not allow this reimbursement. This was not error. Although this issue was not addressed in the written reasons for judgment, the record reflects that John had possession of the truck after the community terminated. In the partition, he acquired full ownership of the truck. We assume that the trial judge did not allow the reimbursement credit because this court has held, in Preis v. Preis, 94-442 (La.App. 3 Cir. 11/2/94), 649 So.2d 593, writ denied, 94-2939 (La.1/27/95), 649 So.2d 392, that a spouse, who had the possession and exclusive use of a former community vehicle, was not entitled to reimbursement for the notes paid with separate funds. The Preis holding applies to the present case. John is not entitled to reimbursement for the payments he made on the truck note after the community terminated.
| cAt the conclusion of the trial court's reasons for judgment the court ordered a detailed partition. For the reasons assigned above, we amend the partition in the following particulars:
In the list of Community Assets, Item (9), designated as Minnesota Retirement Account, is deleted entirely. The Total of Community Assets is changed to read $139,-427.34. The Recapitulation of Community Assets is changed to read $133,429.15.
Under the section describing the partition of the community that was allocated to Doris Mae Bergeron, Item (4), the Pro-rata Share of Minnesota Annuity Funds, is deleted entirely and the net value of her portion is changed to read $58,712.08. Under the community allocated to John Gespor Bergeron, Item (4), his designated Pro-rata Share of Minnesota Annuity Funds, is deleted entirely and the net value of his share of the community is changed to read $74,687.00.
Under credits due John Gespor Bergeron, the two figures listed in Items (1) and (2) having to do with the amount of his separate funds used to pay off the Mercury Marquis and the Prowler camper, are eliminated and the single sum of $5,000 is substituted for both, representing one-half of $10,000 as his separate property used for the payoff of these items. The total of credits due John Gespor Bergeron is changed to read $7,132.58. The amount of the equalizing payment owed, now from John Gespor Bergeron to Doris Mae Bergeron, is $1,776.36.
In all other respects the partition as ordered by the trial judge is affirmed. Doris Mae Bergeron will pay the costs of this appeal.
AMENDED, AND AS AMENDED, AFFIRMED.
WOODARD, J., concurs and assigns written reasons.