Case Name: KNICKERBOCKER v. GENERAL RY. SIGNAL CO.
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1909-07-06
Citations: 118 N.Y.S. 82
Docket Number: 
Parties: KNICKERBOCKER v. GENERAL RY. SIGNAL CO.
Judges: 
Reporter: West's New York Supplement
Volume: 118
Pages: 82–88

Head Matter:
KNICKERBOCKER v. GENERAL RY. SIGNAL CO.
(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Fourth Department.
July 6, 1909.)
1. Master and Servant (§• 278 ) — Injuries to Servant — Actions — Sufficiency of Evidence.
Where, in an action for injury to an employé who fell and was caught by the automatic gate of an elevator descending as the car went upward, the proof simply showed that the car started upward as the employé was getting in, but why it started or how the employer or any of its employés were responsible for the upward movement was not disclosed, there was a total failure of proof of negligence.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Master and Servant, Cent. Dig. § 954; Dec. Dig. § 278. ]
2. Master and Servant (§ 157 )—Injuries to Servant—Warning.
A signal by an employé about to operate a freight elevator, where it moves slowly and only a distance of 15 feet, may well be deemed adequate warning and more effective for the protection of others than: a bell or other mechanical contrivance.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Master and Servant, Cent. Dig.- § 303; Dec. Dig. § 157. ]
3. Master and Servant (§ 132 )—Injuries to Servant—Degree of Care.
An employer is not called upon to adopt the best possible method for ■ operating a freight elevator, but merely to operate it in a manner reasonably safe for employés.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Master and Servant, Cent. Dig. § 267; Dec. Dig. § 132. ]
4. Master and Servant (§ 141 )—Injuries to Servant—Duty to Promulgate Rules.
The failure to promulgate rules governing the operation of a freight elevator was not negligence by an employer where there was neither any intricacy in its running, nor obvious necessity for the adoption of rules to prevent accidents.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Master and Servant, Cent. Dig. § 283; Dec. Dig. § 141. ]
McLennan, P. J., dissenting.
'Appeal from Trial Term, Monroe County.
Personal injury action by Edward F. Knickerbocker against the General Railway Signal Company. From a judgment for plaintiff for $700 and an order denying a new trial, defendant appeals.
Reversed.
Argued before McLENNAN, P. J., and SPRING, WIFFIAMS, KRUSE, and ROBSON, JJ.
Fred C. Goodwin, for appellant.
Cogswell Bentley, for respondent.
Tor other cases see same topic & § number in Dec. & Am. Digs. 1907 to date, & Rep’r Indexes

Opinion:
SPRING, J.
The defendant is a corporation engaged in the manufacture of devices and appliances for use in the construction and operation of railway signals. In October, 1906, it carried on its business near the city of Rochester in a building about 200 feet in length and 100 feet in width and one story in height, except that there was a gallery above and extending over a part of this story. From the ground floor to the floor of the gallery was 15 feet. There were from 200 to 250 men employed in the building, the greater number on the lower floor. There was a freight elevator in one corner of the building operated by a steel cable with hydraulic pressure; and, as the cable was pulled up, the car descended, and, when pulled down, it was lifted upward. The elevator well was closed on the north and east sides, and the front or south side was open, and there was a wire partition on the west side. When it was at the gallery floor, it was open on three sides, and a person could. readily see from that floor to the entrance way of the elevator on the floor below. There was a catch operating automatically which stopped the car at either floor. The car moved very slowly, ordinarily making the 15 feet in 22 seconds, and with maximum speed in 15 seconds. Gates were provided which also operated automatically. When the car was on the ground floor, the lower part of the gate was 7 feet above the floor, and, as the car moved upward, the gate descended, closing up the entrance to the well when the car reached the gallery floor. There were no rules for the operation of the car. It was used principally for the carriage of castings and appliances which were assembled in the gallery. When one of the employés desired to use it, if it was on the ground floor, he looked down, called out or shook the cable as a warning. All knew of this plan. The men below could easily see up the 15 feet, and ascertain if the way was clear.
On the 27th of October, 1906, the plaintiff, a man 29 years of age, had been at work for the defendant operating this elevator for three weeks, carrying articles up and down on a truck. In the afternoon he came down, the car with a block signal on a truck, and wheeled it away when the car stopped at the ground floor. He returned to the car, pushed the truck on, and, as he was getting on, the car started upward, he fell down for what reason does not appear, and was caught by the automatic gate descending as the car went upward, and he was seriously injured. He claims that the defendant should have provided some signaling device to warn employés that the car was to be set in motion; and that proper rules for its operation should have been promulgated. In the first place, there is an utter absence of proof of any failure to give adequate warning. So far as appears in the record, the man who started the car, if it was started from the gallery floor, may have called out to the plaintiff or may have shaken the cable, giving the recognized warning signal. There is no evidence bearing upon that subject. The plaintiff may have set the car in motion himself. The proof simply shows that the car started upward as he was getting in. Why it started, or in what way the defendant or any of its employés was responsible for the upward motion, is not disclosed. The plaintiff charges the defendant with negligence, and has failed to prove this essential part of his case, and the discussion might end here. However, the plaintiff has not proven the necessity of any other warning signals than those used by all the employes, including the plaintiff. The expert on the part of the plaintiff and those testifying for the defendant agreed that they never saw an elevator operating only between two floors equipped with a bell or other warning signal device. In cars running in buildings consisting of several stories devices of that kind are common. A signal by the person about to operate the car where it moves slowly and only a distance of 15 feet may well be deemed adequate warning, and more effective for the protection of others than any mechanical contrivance. The efficiency of the plan by common practice prevailing in this manufactory had been demonstrated by long use, and apparently no injuries had been sustained by any of the many employés who had used this car. The defendant was required to operate its car in a manner reasonably safe for its servants. It was not called upon to adopt the best possible method. Bennett v. L. I. R. R. Co., 163 N. Y. 1, 5, 57 N. E. 79; Stringham v. Hilton et al., 111 N. Y. 188, 195, 18 N. E. 870, 1 L. R. A. 483 et seq.; Healey v. B. R. & P. R. R. ,Co., 111 App. Div. 618, 620, 97 N. Y. Supp. 801.
The rule applicable is thus well stated in Stringham v. Hilton et al., 111 N. Y. 196, 18 N. E. 872, 1 L. R. A. 483:
"The test is not whether the master omitted to do something he could have done, but whether in selecting tools and machinery.tor their use he was reasonably prudent and careful, not whether better machinery might not have been obtained, but whether that provided was, in fact, adequate and proper for the use to which it was to be applied."
The plan which the good judgment of the employés alert for their own safety had long adopted by common consent had resulted in their security, and the defendant would not be expected to depart from the method tried by experience and experiment with some device the usefulness of which had not been demonstrated, for no other like elevator seems to have been equipped with any mechanical contrivance whatsoever.
Nor was the defendant liable for negligence, in that it had not adopted rules for the operation of the car. Just what especial rule should have been promulgated is not suggested by the counsel for the respondent, and none was suggested to the jury. The employés by their own volition and with the acquiescence of the defendant had adopted their own method, and, so far as the evidence shows, had adhered to it without variation. Rules are important where the conduct of the business is complicated or dangerous, or their utility has been proven, or where it is obvious their adoption and enforcement are necessary precautions in preventing accidents. Morgan v. Hudson River Ore & Iron Co., 133 N. Y. 666, 31 N. E. 234; Berrigan, as Adm'r, v. N. Y., L. E. & W. R. R. Co., 131 N. Y. 582, 30 N. E. 57; Kapella v. Nichols Chemical Co., 83 App. Div. 45, 82 N. Y. Supp. 477. There was no mystery and no intricacy in running this elevator. The defendant could not have foreseen the accident, which was unusual and not to be apprehended. The only expert who testified on the subject of rules in response to a question by the counsel for the plaintiff said it was not "customary to have rules posted in factories governing the men in the use, management, and operation of freight elevators."
The judgment should be reversed.
Judgment and order reversed, and a new trial granted, with costs to the appellant to abide event. All concur, except McLENNAN, P. J., who dissents in an opinion.