Case Name: GENERAL MOTORS ACCEPTANCE CORPORATION, Appellant, v. Ronald LAESSER, and Ed Morse Operations, Inc., a Florida corporation, Appellees
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 2001-07-18
Citations: 791 So. 2d 517
Docket Number: No. 4D97-2395
Parties: GENERAL MOTORS ACCEPTANCE CORPORATION, Appellant, v. Ronald LAESSER, and Ed Morse Operations, Inc., a Florida corporation, Appellees.
Judges: STONE and GROSS, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 791
Pages: 517–522

Head Matter:
GENERAL MOTORS ACCEPTANCE CORPORATION, Appellant, v. Ronald LAESSER, and Ed Morse Operations, Inc., a Florida corporation, Appellees.
No. 4D97-2395.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
July 18, 2001.
Rehearing Denied Aug. 22, 2001.
Douglas B. Brown of Rumberger, Kirk & Caldwell, P.A., Orlando, for appellant.
Diane H. Tutt of Diane H. Tutt, P.A., Plantation, for Appellee Ronald Laesser.

Opinion:
ON AMENDED MOTION TO REVIEW APPELLATE ATTORNEY'S FEE AWARD
PER CURIAM.
Ronald Laesser seeks review of the trial court's award of appellate fees to General Motors Acceptance Corporation (GMAC) under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.400(c), which states, "Review of orders rendered by the lower tribunal under this rule [appellate costs and attorneys' fees] shall be by motion filed in the court within 30 days of rendition." We affirm the order under review.
Background
In May, 1997, a jury awarded Ronald Laesser $25,000 against GMAC for its violations of the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act, sections 501.201-501.213, Florida Statutes (1991). Laesser successfully claimed that GMAC deceptively helped the automobile dealer in question steal Laesser's trade-in vehicle and "flip" him from a car purchase to a lease. On GMAC's appeal, this court reversed. See Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Laesser, 718 So.2d 276 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998). On September 9, 1998, this court also ordered that GMAC was entitled to an award of appellate fees under section 501.2105.
On remand, the trial court, pursuant to this court's mandate, entered a directed verdict in GMAC's favor and held a hearing on the amount of fees to be awarded to GMAC. GMAC showed that eleven people comprised of attorneys and paralegals worked on the appeal for a total of 494 hours. GMAC's appellate attorney, a specialist in section 501.201 issues, testified that the case was extraordinary and important. GMAC's fee expert testified that all the time spent was reasonable, especially in light of the multiple and unique issues.
The trial court took into consideration the testimony of the fact and expert witnesses, the novelty and complexity of the issues on appeal, the effect and outcome of the appeal and circumstances of the appeal. It determined that 415 of the hours spent by GMAC's attorneys on the appeal were reasonable and awarded GMAC $53,387.97 in appellate fees.
Merits
Among the several issues presented in his motion, Laesser argues the appellate attorney's fee award here is excessive. The abuse of discretion standard governs this court's review of the award. See First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n of Palm Beaches v. Bezotte, 740 So.2d 589, 590 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999), rev. denied, 753 So.2d 563 (Fla.2000).
In Florida Patient's Compensation Fund v. Rowe, 472 So.2d 1145, 1150 (Fla.1985), the supreme court adopted the federal lodestar approach as the basis.for setting reasonable fee awards. The "lodestar figure" is determined by multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation by a reasonable hourly rate for the services of the prevailing party's attorney. Id. at 1151. In determining the lodestar, the trial court must consider separately the reasonableness of the hourly rate and the number of hours expended. See id. at 1150-51.
"Reasonably expended" means the time that ordinarily would be spent by lawyers in the community to resolve this particular type of dispute. It is not necessarily the number of hours actually expended by counsel in the case. Rather, the court must consider the number of hours that should reasonably have been expended in that particular case.... In this respect, the magnitude of the case should be a consideration.
Centex-Rooney Constr. Co. v. Martin County, 725 So.2d 1255, 1258 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999) (quoting In re Estate of Platt, 586 So.2d 328, 383-34 (Fla.1991)) (emphasis omitted).
In determining the reasonableness of the attorneys' fees, the court should utilize the following criteria:
(1) The time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the question involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly.
(2) The likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the particular employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer.
(3) The fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services.
(4) The amount involved and the results obtained.
(5) The time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances.
(6) The nature and length of the professional relationship with the client.
(7) The experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the services.
(8) Whether the fee is fixed or contingent.
Id. (citing Rowe, 472 So.2d at 1150).
Here, the trial judge made specific findings as to the time reasonably expended and the hourly rate. She also found that the case was novel and complex, and that it produced a favorable result. She indicated that she considered the other Rowe factors. The findings of the trial court arrive on appeal cloaked with the presumption of correctness and, as long as competent substantial evidence exists to support its determinations, the appellate court should affirm. See Oceanic Int'l Corp. v. Lantana Boatyard, 402 So.2d 507, 511 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981). Such evidence exists. We simply cannot reject the trial court's findings of fact and substitute our own judgment on these issues and, therefore, must affirm.
Laesser suggests, however, that section 501.2105 was intended to provide for an award of attorney's fees only to the prevailing party plaintiff. That is not what the statute says. Rather, where a plaintiff brings a claim under the Act, an award of attorneys' fees to a prevailing defendant is mandatory. See Rustic Village, Inc. v. Friedman, 417 So.2d 305, 306 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982). Because Laesser brought his claim against GMAC under sections 501.201-501.213, he became liable for the latter's reasonable appellate attorney's fees when he lost on appeal.
As to all the other issues raised in this motion, we affirm as unpersuasive.
AFFIRMED.
STONE and GROSS, JJ., concur.
OWEN, WILLIAM C., Jr., Senior Judge, dissents with opinion.
. Ronald Laesser secured a $30,000 judgment against the dealer as well. The dealer never appealed.
. It also awarded General Motors Acceptance Corporation $8,046.40 in appellate costs.
. After Laesser's cause of action arose, the legislature amended section 501.2105 to place an award of such fees and costs within the discretion of the trial court. See Ch. 94 298, § 4, at 2064, Laws of Fla.