Case Name: Willie Lee FAULK, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee
Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1978-11-29
Citations: 574 S.W.2d 764
Docket Number: No. 54141
Parties: Willie Lee FAULK, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.
Judges: Before ROBERTS, PHILLIPS and VOL-LERS, JJ.
Reporter: South Western Reporter Second Series
Volume: 574
Pages: 764–770

Head Matter:
Willie Lee FAULK, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.
No. 54141.
Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, Panel No. 3.
Nov. 29, 1978.
Rehearing En Banc Denied Jan. 10, 1979.
John J. C. O’Shea, Lubbock, for appellant.
Alton R. Griffin, Dist. Atty., and B. Jackson Jones, Jr., Asst. Dist. Atty., Lubbock, for the State.
Before ROBERTS, PHILLIPS and VOL-LERS, JJ.

Opinion:
OPINION
PHILLIPS, Judge.
This is an appeal from a conviction for the offense of aggravated robbery. Upon his plea of not guilty before a jury, the appellant was found guilty and his punishment was assessed by the jury at confinement for a period of seven years.
In appellant's Ground of Error No. 1 he complains that the trial court erred in failing to grant his motion to suppress certain evidence which he alleges was obtained as a result of an unlawful search and seizure.
On July 19, 1975, an armed robbery occurred at a Seven-Eleven convenience store located near the intersection of 49th Street and Memphis Avenue in Lubbock, Texas. After the victim released herself from the cold storage vault, she called the police and told them that she had just been robbed by a young black male wearing a multicolored shirt. No further description was given according to her testimony at the motion to suppress hearing. She testified that while in the cold storage vault she observed the robber exit the store and run to the south, which happened to be in the direction of 50th Street. It should also be noted that it was also probably in the direction of 51st Street, 52nd Street, 53rd Street, and every other consecutively numbered street to the south. However, 50th Street has been emphasized since it is a six-lane thoroughfare that connects east and west Lubbock. It also appears that a large segment of the black community in Lubbock lives in east Lubbock and the location of this robbery was west Lubbock. No vehicle was observed by the victim and the last she saw of the robber was his departure on foot to the south, as mentioned. This even less than general description was radioed over the police broadcast network and was received by Officer Brackeen when he was two miles from the scene of the crime. After travel-ling approximately half a mile he observed several vehicles heading east on 50th Street, one of which was occupied by a young black male. The officer made a U-turn at which point he observed the young black male's automobile speed up slightly, the young male bend forward and to the right and then again reduce his speed. It is important to note that at no time did the young black male commit a traffic offense or any other offense within view of Officer Brack-een. On these facts, Officer Brackeen stopped the vehicle with the young black male. The vehicle stopped, Officer Brack-een ordered the occupant to exit, which order was complied with. At the time Officer Brackeen made his request, he had his weapon drawn. Upon the arrival of other officers at the scene, Officer Brackeen had the occupant out of his vehicle with his hands on top of the car and had his weapon holstered. The other police officers to arrive at the scene then proceeded to search the young black male's automobile and discovered under the seat a hat and blue money pouch. Officer Brackeen discovered a weapon under the dash of the young black male's vehicle.
Although appellant's first ground of error is couched in terms of both an unreasonable and illegal search and seizure and a search and seizure of excessive scope, the discussion and arguments under that ground of error are sufficient to identify the issues for this Court to pass upon. See Article 40.-09(9) and (13), V.A.C.C.P. One of the critical and initial issues to be addressed was whether Officer Brackeen had probable cause to stop the young black male's vehicle. In Brown v. State, 481 S.W.2d 106, this Court stated:
. . Probable cause for an officer to detain a person temporarily for investigative purposes exists where the circumstances reasonably indicate that that particular person either has or is preparing to commit a crime. [Footnote and citations omitted.]
"The inarticulate hunch, suspicion, or good faith of an arresting officer is insufficient to constitute probable cause under any of the three above named classes. [Citations omitted.] For '[i]f subjective good faith alone were the test, the protections of the Fourth Amendment would evaporate, and the people would be "secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects," only in the discretion of the police.' Beck v. Ohio, [379 U.S. 89, 85 S.Ct. 223, 11 L.Ed.2d 604 (1964)]."
Brown v. State, supra, is instructive also in determining the appropriate disposition of the instant case, besides the general propositions of law set forth therein. In that case, it was known that a robbery was committed by three armed men who escaped on foot; that the men were described by race and approximate size; that they were observed 24 hours later riding in an automobile; that they looked at the police officer; that they were observed at 1:30 a. m. on a poorly lighted and sparsely trav-elled street; and that two of the individuals made "furtive gestures" by moving their shoulders while observing the police officer. This Court noted that the fact that they were in an automobile was of no value in determining whether probable cause existed. As in this case, there was no testimony as to what type of car the armed robbers might have used or whether they used one at all. The Court resolved the question to this:
"Thus, we must first determine whether the general description of the armed robbers coupled with the movements of Ellis and Nezey would lead a reasonable and prudent man to believe that the appellants were the armed robbers."
As mentioned in Brown v. State, supra, and of equal applicability to the case at hand, "[T]he description of the robbers contained no identifiable characteristics which would serve to distinguish them from the general populace[.]" and the "furtive gestures" of the two individuals who were looking at the police officer could not operate to "transform" the investigating officer's "vague suspicion . . 'into probable cause for arrest' " since such movement was " 'ambiguous conduct which the arresting officers themselves have provoked.' " Id. at 111, quoting from Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963).
It is abundantly clear that in the case at hand the police officer who stopped appellant had only one fact to connect the appellant to the armed robbery — that he was a young black male. Nowhere in the record does it disclose that the police officer observed the appellant wearing a multicolored shirt before he ordered him to exit his vehicle. Further, the so-called "furtive gestures" are as consistent with innocent activity as anything else. Also, his bending over could have resulted in the slight increase in speed of the vehicle and it is noted that the police officer stated that he observed no traffic offenses. Finally, such so-called "furtive gestures" do not bear with them the indicia of a guilty mens rea as they would had the stopping police officer been occupying a marked police vehicle. In this case, it was an unmarked police vehicle.
The only question left is whether the close temporal proximity of the armed robbery and Brackeen's observation of the appellant in his automobile constituted a circumstance which pointed to the appellant as the robber. In Brown v. State, supra, the police officer made his observations 24 hours after the armed robbery. In the instant case, the appellant was stopped within a very short time of the robbery. We do not believe that this fact alone contributes anything to an officer's determination of whether probable cause exists to make a stop. If it did, it would be creating a new rule which would provide that the "inarticulate hunch, suspicion, or good faith" of a police officer is sufficient grounds for making an investigatory stop so long as it is made within a specific time frame. However, where do we draw the line? There is no room for such manipulation of the probable cause doctrine. See also Scott v. State, 549 S.W.2d 170.
As was stated by this Court on rehearing in Armstrong v. State, 550 S.W.2d 25:
. . While a temporary investigative detention is allowed under certain circumstances, these circumstances must be such as to distinguish the activity of the detained person from that of any other citizen and must be based on an objective perception of events rather than the subjective feelings of the detaining officer. There must be reasonable suspicion by the law enforcement officer that some activity out of the ordinary is or had occurred, some suggestion to connect the detained person with the unusual activity, and some indication that the activity is related to crime. [Citations omitted.] Where the events are as consistent with innocent activity as with criminal activity, a detention based on those events is unlawful." Id. at 30-31.
This Court has consistently held that the fruits of a search do not justify the initial stop or arrest. Brown v. State, supra.
Neither are there grounds for a stopping of the appellant's vehicle under Article 14.-03, V.A.C.C.P., since there is no showing that the appellant was seen in a suspicious place and "under circumstances which reasonably show that [he was] guilty of some felony or breach of the peace, or threatened], or [was] about to commit some offense . . . ."
Thus, there being no probable cause for the stopping of appellant's vehicle, the trial court erred in failing to grant appellant's motion to suppress the evidence seized pursuant to the unlawful stop. See Article I, Section 9, Texas Constitution; United States Constitution, Fourth Amendment.
Since we cannot conclude that the use of this illegally seized evidence was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, the judgment is reversed and the cause remanded.
. It should be noted that in Brown v. State, supra, the victims gave a description "as to race and an approximation as to height and weight" of the robbers. In the instant case, the only description given was a "young colored male with a multicolored shirt."