Case Name: MILLIMAN v. ROCHESTER RY. CO.
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1896-03
Citations: 39 N.Y.S. 274
Docket Number: 
Parties: MILLIMAN v. ROCHESTER RY. CO.
Judges: 
Reporter: West's New York Supplement
Volume: 39
Pages: 274–280

Head Matter:
(3 App. Div. 109.)
MILLIMAN v. ROCHESTER RY. CO.
(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Fourth Department.
March, 1896.)
Trial—Instructions—Inference from Failure to Question Witness Fully.
In an action for injuries caused by a collision between plaintiff’s buggy and defendant’s car, where the testimony was conflicting, and plaintiff’s daughter, who was with him at the time of the injury, had testified on the points to which her attention was called by plaintiff’s counsel, it was not reversible error to instruct that, where a witness is put on the stand who knows or may know what the facts are, “and is not called by the person to whom he or she is friendly to swear as to what the facts are,” the jury “may, if they see fit, assume that the reason why that witness was not asked a question in regard to the matter is because, if she had been asked, she would not have given a favorable answer.” AVard, J., dissenting.
Appeal from special term, Monroe county.
Action by Rowland T. Milliman against the Rochester Railway Compan j. There was a judgment for defendant, and from an order denying a motion for new trial plaintiff appeals.
Affirmed.
Argued before HARDIN, P. J., and FOLLETT, ADAMS, WARD, and GREEN, JJ.
John Van Voorhis, for appellant.
C. J. Bissell, for respondent.

Opinion:
FOLLETT, J.
This action was begun July 7, 1892, to recover damages for a personal injury, and for an injury to plaintiff's horse, harness, and phaeton, caused, it is alleged, by the negligence of defendant's motorman. September 4, 1891, the plaintiff Avas riding with his daughter and grandchild, two years old, in a phaeton drawn by one horse. The top of the carriage was up, and the side and back curtains were closed. The plaintiff sat on the right side, his daughter on the left side, and the child between them. They were driving eastward on Monroe avenue, on the south side of defendant's track. Meigs street crosses Monroe avenue, and, at the place where these streets cross, one of the defendant's east-bound cars collided with the plaintiff's phaeton, overturning and injuring it, and also injuring the plaintiff and his horse. The accident occurred about midday. The car was going eastward, and moving about the same rate of speed as the plaintiff's horse,—five to seven miles an hour. A steam roller stood on the south side of the avenue, and near the Meigs street crossing. As the plaintiff's horse approached he was frightened by the escaping steam, shied suddenly to the left (north), and entered on defendant's track. The plaintiff testified that the car followed along behind the phaeton for 125 or 150 feet, and ran into his phaeton. He testified that the first notice of danger he had was the screams of persons behind the wagon, which his daughter heard first, and called his attention to; that he immediately pulled his horse to the left, to get clear of the track, but, before he got off, was run into. The daughter was called as a witness for her father, and testified that she heard no gong, but heard voices shouting, and that immediately afterwards the collision occurred. She was not asked by the counsel of either litigant how long after the horse entered upon the track, or how far they had traveled on it, before the collision occurred. Four witnesses called by the defendant testified that the collision occurred immediately after the horse shied onto the track, and three of them (the motorman and two citizens) testified that before the collision the phaeton was being driven along on the south side of the track, and not more than 15 or 20 feet ahead of the car; that both were traveling at about the same rate of speed, and when the horse saw the escaping steam he shied away from it, and the collision occurred.
The liability of the defendant turned upon the issue whether the collision1 occurred immediately after the horse entered upon the track, or whether the car followed the phaeton for 125 feet or more, overtook it, and ran it down. The plaintiff's daughter was not examined upon this question when on the stand, nor was she recalled after this vital issue had been so clearly presented by the defendant's witnesses. The learned trial judge, in his charge, clearly presented this issue, and, after some appropriate remarks upon the burden of proof, called the attention of the jury to the fact that the plaintiff's daughter had not been examined on this issue, although she had had the same opportunity of knowing the facts as the plaintiff, and charged that this omission might be taken into account, in determining on which side the truth lay. The learned counsel for the plaintiff excepted to this instruction, and now urges that it was error, for which a new trial should be granted. In case a litigant fails to produce a person known to be friendly to him and to his cause, who is so situated that he must have knowledge of the facts in issue, the jury is permitted to presume that the testimony of that person would not have been favorable to the party. Kenyon v. Kenyon, 88 Hun, 211, 34 N. Y. Supp. 720, and cases there cited; Thomp. Trials, § 989, 1045; Tayl. Ev. (8th Ed.) § 117. The existence of this rule is not disputed, but it is urged that it is not applicable to this case, because the daughter was produced as a witness, and that no presumption arises, from the plaintiff's failure to interrogate her, that her testimony would have been unfavorable to him. I think the rule is as applicable to a case in which a party fails to interrogate a friendly witness, so situated as to be presumed to have knowledge of the existence or nonexistence of the vital facts in issue, as it is to the case of a failure to produce such a witness. Indeed, I think the omission to interrogate a friendly witness in respect to facts presumably within his knowledge is more significant than the failure to call such a person as a witness, and that the presumption that the testimony would not have been favorable to the party's case is stronger than the one which arises from the failure to produce such a person as a witness. Eldridge v. Hawley, 115 Mass. 410, was an action by an indorsee against the maker of a promissory note which had been transferred after it fell due. The defense was that the maker and payee had been partners; that the note was given on a settlement of their accounts, and was procured' hy fraud. The plaintiff called the payee, who testified that the full amount of the note was due, as shown by the books of the firm, which were then in his possession. The defendant requested the witness to produce the books, but he did not. The court instructed the jury "that, inasmuch as the books are not in the custody of the plaintiff, no inference is to be drawn from the nonproduction of the books, it being in the power of either party to sum mon the witness with the books." To this instruction the defendant excepted, and it was held to be error. It was held that, whether an inference should be drawn, from the failure to produce the books, against the credibility of the witness, or against the plaintiff's theory that the amount for which the note was given was shown by the books to have been owdng the payee, was a question for the jury. In that case the defendant's counsel could have subpoenaed the payee to produce the books, but he was not bound to make the plaintiff's witness his own; and, if the plaintiff failed to have the books produced, his conduct exposed him to unfavorable inferences, if the jury saw fit to draw them. In the case at bar the defendant was not bound to attempt to prove its defense by the plaintiff's daughter and witness, and the burden was on the plaintiff to interrogate her as to facts presumably within her knowledge, or expose himself to the hazard of unfavorable inferences. The learned judge did not instruct the jury that they were required to presume that the testimony of the daughter would not have been favorable to the plaintiff, had she been interrogated, but simply that they might take the omission into consideration, in determining how the issue should be decided.
The instruction given was not erroneous, and the order should be affirmed, with costs.
HARDIN, P. J., and ADAMS and GREEN, JJ., concur.