Case Name: State ex rel. Thompson, Atty. Gen., et al. v. Dixie Finance Co.
Court: Tennessee Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Tennessee
Decision Date: 1925-12
Citations: 152 Tenn. 306
Docket Number: 
Parties: State ex rel. Thompson, Atty. Gen., et al. v. Dixie Finance Co.
Judges: 
Reporter: Tennessee Reports
Volume: 152
Pages: 306–328

Head Matter:
State ex rel. Thompson, Atty. Gen., et al. v. Dixie Finance Co.
(Nashville.
December Term, 1925.)
1. STATUTES. Affirmative recitals of Senate Journal held to preclude presumption that bill' was returned by Governor to clerk of Senate or chairman of enrolled bills.
Where Senate Journal plainly recited that a bill was returned to the Senate by thé Governor, through his secretary, on a certain day, there was no room for presumption that the bill was returned earlier to clerk of Senate or the chairman on enrolled bills. (Post, pp. 315, 316.)
Acts cited and construed: Acts 1925; ch. 134; Pub. Acts 1917, ch. 62; Pub. Acts 1925, ch. 76.
Cases cited and approved: Johnson City v. Eastern Electric Co., 133 Tenn., 632; Harpending v. Haight, 39 Cal., 189.
Constitution cited and construed: Sec. 18, art. 3.
2. EVIDENCE. Stipulation of counsel contradicting recitals of Senate Journal could not be considered by Supreme Court.
Stipulation of counsel constituting direct contradiction of recitals of Senate Journal as to date of return of bill by Governor could not be considered by the Supreme Court. (Post, pp. 316, 317.)
3. STATUTES. .Recitals of Senate Journal are entitled to absolute - verity, and cannot be impeached even for mistake or fraud.
Recitals of Senate Journal are entitled to absolute verity, and cannot be impeached even for mistake or fraud! (Post, pp. 316, 317.)
■ 4. STATES, House itself is only tribunal authorized to correct error in legislative Journal.
■ House itself is only tribunal authorized to correct error in legislative Journal. (Post, pp. 316, 317.)
5. STATUTES. Legislative bill, which recitals of Senate Journal showed was not returned by Governor within time prescribed, became law.
Senate Bill No. 355 of 1925-, regulating small loans which recitals of Senate Journal showed was not returned by Governor with his veto within time prescribed by Constitution, article 3, section 18, became law. (Post, pp. 316, 317.)
6. PAWNBROKERS AND MONEY LENDERS. Statute repealed by revision.
Senate Bill No. 355, regulating small loans, held to repeal Pub. Acts 1917, chapter 62, because there was a complete revision of the subject-matter dealt with by the 1917 act. (Post, pp. 316, 317.)
7. STATUTES. Act amending repealed act was void.
Since Senate Bill No. 355 repealed Pub. Acts 1917, chapter .62, Pub. Acts 1925, chapter 76, attempting to amend latter act, was void. (Post, pp. 316, 317.)
Cases cited and approved: Heiskell v. Knox County, 132 Term., 180; United States v. Allen, 36 F., 174.
Resbonse to Petition to Rehear.
8. PAWNBROKERS AND MONEY LENDERS. Statute, declaring business conducted without “license” nuisance, held inapplicable, “or other authority organized under' laws.”
Pub. Acts 1919, chapter 158, providing that the practicing of any profession, business, or occupation for which a license issued by some board or other authority organized under laws of State is required, is a nuisance, is not applicable to a loan company required to pay privilege tax or license; the phrase “of other authority organized under laws of State” having reference to organized authority or body vested with power to issue licenses after examination, and in the exercise of discretion, and “license” meaning one issued by a board clothed with discretion. (Post, pp. 317-320.)
9. STATUTES. Statutes levying taxes or duties on citizens are strictly construed in favor of citizen and against government. Statutes levying taxes or duties on citizens are strictly construed in favor of citizen and against government. (Post, p. 320.)
Cases cited and approved: Memphis v. Bing, 94 Tenn., 644; Watts v. Hauk, 144 Tenn., 215; McMillan v. City of Knoxville, 139 Tenn., 319; Nashville v. Linck, 80 Tenn., 507; Davis v. Hailey, 143 Tenn., 247.
10. NUISANCE. When State may abate nuisance in equity stated. >
State may not seek to abate nuisance in equity,' unless jurisdiction is clearly given by statute, or purpresture or other such nuisances recognized under common law exist. (Post, p. 321.)
11. LICENSES. Statute as to privilege taxes held impliedly repealed.
Acts 1867-68, chapter 79, section 16 (Shannon’s Code, sections 1004, 1005, 1006), held impliedly repealed by subsequent revenue acts covering general subject relating to payment of privilege taxes. (Post, pp. 321, 322.)
Acts cited and construed: Acts 1867-68, ch. 79, sec. 16;
Cases cited and approved: State v. Manz, 46 Tenn., 557; Zickler v. Bank, 104 Tenn., 277; Poe v. State, 85 Tenn., 495; Lewis v. Mynatt, 105 Tenn., 511; Malone v. Williams, 118 Tenn., 445; Druggist Cases, 85 Tenn., 450.
Code cited and construed: Secs. 1004, 1005, 1006(S.).
12. STATUTES. Statute creating definite punishment repeals former mode.
Statute creating definite punishment repeals former mode. (Post, pp. 322, 323.)
Cases cited and approved: Roberts v. State, 2 Tenn., 423; Wharton v. . State, 45 Tenn., 6.
13. STATUTES. Subsequent act, containing complete scheme of legislation, operates as repeal of prior act on same subject.
Subsequent act, containing complete scheme of legislation upon subject which it covers, operates as repeal of prior act on same subject. (Post, p. 323.)
14. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. Loan company entitled to raise validity of statute, and. to have subsequent opportunity to comply.
Since there was a serious question whether Senate Bill No. 356, which required a loan company to have license, became a law, the company was entitled to raise the question whether it ever became law, and to have reasonable opportunity to comply therewith after it was held valid. {Post, p. 323.)
Acts cited and construed: Acts 1919, ch. 158.
15. LICENSES. State held entitled to recover unpaid privilege taxes and penalties, in suit for injunction.
State held entitled to recover unpaid privilege taxes and penalties provided by Acts 1925, chapter 134, in suit to enjoin the carrying on of the business, especially where the bill sought such recovery. (Post, pp. 323-326.)
Acts cited and construed: Acts 1925, ch. 134; Acts 1877, ch. 97.
Cases cited and approved: State & Davidson County v. Hirsch Bros., 84 Tenn., 40; State v. Nashville Savings Bank, 84 Tenn., Ill; Me--Creary v. First Nat. Bank, 109 Tenn., 128; .State v. Memphis & C. R. Co., 82 Tenn., 62; State v. Duncan, 71 Tenn., 688; Dollar Savings Bank v. United States, 19 Wall., 240; Mayor & Aldermen of Jones-boro v. McKee, 10 Tenn., 170.
16. STATES. Governor's message is part of Senate Journal entry.
Governor’s message, returning bill is part of Senate Journal entry concerning the return of the bill, in which it is set out. (Post, pp. 326-328.)
17. STATUTES. Governor’s message held to show that he received legislative bill for approved five days before date on message.
Governor’s message to Senate, dated April 1st, appearing in Senate Journal, and stating that he held bill therewith returned without approved “until the last moment” showed that the bill was received by him five days previous to such date, or March 26th. (Post, pp. 326-328.)
FROM DAVIDSON.
Appeal from the Chancery Court of Davidson County. —Hon. James B. Newman, Judge.
Seth M. Walker and Vm. Waller, for appellant.
W. C. Cherry and Thomas A. Shriver, Jr., for ap-pellees.
Headnotes 1. Statutes, 36 Cyc., p. 1250 (Anno); 2. Evidence, 22 C. J., Section 1422; 3. States, 36 Cyc., p. 851; Statutes 36 Cyc., p. .1248; 4. States, 36 Cyc., p. 851; 5. Statutes, 36 Cyc., p. 963; 6. Statutes, 36 Cyc., p. 1165; 7. Statutes, 36 Cyc., p. 1055; 8. Statutes, 36 Cyc, p. 1165; 9, Statutes, 36 Cyc., p. 1187; 10. Nuisances, 29 Cyc., p. 1238; 11. Licenses, 37 C. J., Section 67; 12. Statutes, 36 Cyc., p. 1073; 13. Statutes, 36 Cyc., p. -1079; 14. Constitutional Law, 12 C. J., Section 177; 15. Licenses, 37 C. J., Section 123; 16. Statutes, 36 Cyc., p. 851; 17. Statutes, 36 dye., p. 1249.

Opinion:
Mr. Justice Hall
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The bill in this cause was filed by the State, on relation of A. S. Caldwell, its commissioner of insurance and banking, J. D. Senter, its commissioner of finance and taxation, and Frank M. Thompson, its Attorney General, on May 13, 1925, against the defendant, Dixie Finance Company, a Delaware corporation, having an office and agent, and doing business in the city of Nashville, Davidson county, Tenn.
The bill was filed for two purposes:
(1) To enjoin the defendant from engaging in the business of lending money on wages and salaries, at interest rates in excess of ten per cent, per annum, unless and until it should obtain the proper licenses required by law for engaging in said business.
(2) To collect delinquent privilege taxes alleged to be due from the defendant to the state and county.
The Revenue Act of 1925 (Acts 1925, chapter 134), which became effective May 1, 1925, imposed a privilege tax and required a license for lending money on salaries or household furniture, and also imposed a privilege tax and required a license for lending money at rates of interest in excess of ten per cent, per annum. Chapter 62 of the Public Acts of 1917, as amended by chapter 76' of the Public Acts of 1925, required an additional license of persons and corporations like the defendant engaged in the business of lending money on wages or salaries.
The bill alleged that the defendant was doing business without the required licenses, and sought:
(1) A decree against defendant for the amount of privilege taxes, with interest, penalties, and costs.
(2) An injunction restraining the defendant from collecting or attempting to collect any money from any person to whom it had hitherto made illegal loans, or from bringing any suits or procuring any judgments for such loans, and from taking any steps or procuring others to take any steps to collect any judgments already taken.
(3) That an injunction issue restraining the defendant from lending money on wages or salaries, except as authorized by the Public Acts of 1917 and 1925, unless and until the defendant complied with said acts in every particular and has paid privilege taxes and obtained a license as a loan company.
The writ of injunction was granted, as prayed for, in the nature of a stay order, until application for an injunction could be made on May 20, 1925,
On May 20, 1925, defendant filed its demurrer incorporated in an answer to the bill. The demurrer set up numerous defenses, among them, that chapter 76 of the Public Acts of 1925, which attempted to amend chapter 62 of the Public Acts of 1917, was unconstitutional and void, in that:
A bill, being a complete act of legislation upon the entire subject-matter of chapter 62 of the Public Acts of 1917, was regularly passed by the General Assembly of 1925, the same being Senate Bill No. 355, known as the "Small Loan Bill," and the samq became a law as shown by the Journal of the Senate; the Governor not having returned the same with his veto within the time prescribed by the Constitution of the State.
The cause was heard by the chancellor May 20, 1925, and, of his own motion, he modified the injunction, so as not to prevent the defendant from collecting the principal sums loaned to its customers; but the court otherwise granted the injunction prayed for in the bill, holding chapter 76, Acts of 1925 which attempted to amend chapter 62, Acts of 1917; valid and in full force and effect; and further holding that Senate Bill No. 355 did not become a law of the land, and declined to further modify the injunction, to which action the defendant excepted.
Then the cause came on to be further heard, upon motion of the defendant to dispose of its demurrer, whereupon the court overruled the demurrer, except to that part of the bill which prayed for a forfeiture of the prin - cipal sums loaned by the defendant.
From this decree defendant appealed to this court, and Has assigned errors.
,It is conceded by counsel for complainants in their brief in the canse of State of Tennessee ex rel. Frank M. Thompson, Attorney General, et al. v. J. B. Hatley, a companion cause also appealed from the chancery court of Davidson county, and heard by this court along with the instant cause, that, if Senate Bill No. 355 became a law by reason of the alleged failure of the Governor to return the bill with his veto within five days as required by section 18 of article 3 of our Constitution, then chapter 62 of the Public Acts of 1917 was repealed by implication, and chapter 76 of the Public Acts of 1925, being an amendment of a nonexisting act, is void and of no effect. The question then is, Did Senate Bill No. 355 become a law by reason of the failure of the Governor to' return it with his veto within the time required by the constitutional provision above referred to?
Section 18 of article 3 of our Constitution provides, in part, as follows: "If the Governor shall fail to return any bill, with his objections within five days (Sundays excepted) after it shall have been presented to him, the same shall become a law without his signature, unless the General Assembly, by its adjournment, prevents its return, in which case it shall not become a law."
With reference to Senate Bill No. 355, the Senate Journal contains the following recital:
"Thursday, April 2, 1925. Sixty-Eifth Day.
"The Senate met at 9:30 a. m. and was called to order by Mr. Speaker Hill.
"The proceedings were opened by prayer by Chaplain R. J. Craig.
"On call of the roll thirty-three senators were found to be present.
"On motion the reading of the Journal was dispensed with.
"Message from the Governor.
' ' ' Mr. Speaker: I am directed by the Governor to return herewith the following Senate Bill without his approval, and the message in writing. Senate Bill No. 355.
" M. D. Talley, Secretary.'
' ' On motion the message was received, ordered read by the clerk, and spread upon the Journal, which is as follows : [Then follows the Governor's message]."
In Johnson City v. Eastern Electric Co., 133 Tenn., 632, 182 S. W., 587, it appeared that the Governor failed to return the bill there involved with his veto within five days, but that before the expiration of the five days the legislature had taken a recess for thirty days. The bill was returned with the Governor's veto immediately after that body again assembled pursuant to adjournment. This court held that the bill became a law for the reason that it was not contemplated by the constitutional provision above quoted that the return of the bill be to the house in open session. On the contrary, it held that a proper return of a bill can be made to any proper agent of the house in which the bill originated, such as a clerk, or some member of the committee on enrolled bills. The word "adjournment," as used in the Constitution, means a final adjournment of both houses, not a temporary adjournment.
To the same effect is the holding of the court in Harpending v. Haight, 39 Cal., 189, 2 Am. Rep., 432. In that case the Governor sent a messenger with the bill and his veto message to the house in which the bill originated, on the afternoon of the fifth day. When the messenger arrived, the honse had adjourned. He thereupon carried the bill back to the Governor. The court held that the bill became a law, for the reason that the Governor should have sent the bill finally and definitely to some agent of the house; it not being necessary that it be returned to the house in open session.
The recitations of the Senate Journal hereinbefore quoted are affirmative, clear, and unequivocal. They show when and how Senate Bill No. 355 was returned to the Senate without the Governor's approval. The Journal entry recites that it was presented in person by the secretary of the Governor on the 2d day of April, 1925. The entry then proceeds: "On motion the message was received," etc. Therefore it cannot be presumed that it was returned to either of the other parties authorized to receive it, to-wit, the clerk of the Senate or the chairman on enrolled bills. There is no room for any presumption that such was the case, because, as before stated, the recitals of the Journal entry are affirmative, clear, and plain that it was returned by the Governor, through his secretary, on the 2d day of April, 1925, which date, it is conceded by complainants, was the sixth day after the bill was received by the Governor.
A stipulation of counsel is relied on by complainants to explain the Journal entry hereinbefore set out. This stipulation, it seems, was filed by counsel for the respective parties after the cause had been appealed to this court. It reads as follows:
"In this cause, it is agreed, subject to objections for competency, that the message of the Governor vetoing Senate Bill 355 at the last session of the legislature, and the hill itself, were delivered in his behalf to the clerk of the Senate a few minutes before midnight on April 1, 1925, and was then receipted by the clerk, Hunt, signing his name thereto.
"Further, that the Supreme Court may, if it will, consider this stipulation as a part of the record, and as though set forth as á part of the original bill.
[Signed] ¥i. Waller.
"Seth Walker,
Counsel for Complainants.
"W. C. Cheery.
"Thos. A. ShexvER, Jr."
This stipulation of counsel is a direct contradiction of the recitals of the Senate Journal and cannot be considered by the court. It was held in Heiskell v. Knox County, 132 Tenn., 180, 177 S. W., 483, Ann. Cas., 1916E, 1281, that the recitals in the Journals of the legislature are conclusive. They are entitled to absolute verity, and cannot even be impeached on the ground of mistake or fraud. If there are errors in them, the House itself is the only tribunal authorized to correct them. Therefore the recitals of the Senate Journal above set out affirmatively showing that the bill was not returned by the Governor with his veto within the time prescribed by the Constitution, it became a law of the land and repealed chapter 62 of the Public Acts of 1917, because it was a complete revision of the subject-matter dealt with by that act. It also follows as a necessary consequence that the amendatory act of 1925 is void and of no effect, because the act which it attempted to amend did not exist, haying been repealed by the passage of Senate Bill No. 355.
The case of United States v. Allen (C. C.), 36 F., 174, which is relied upon by complainants in support of their contention that extrinsic evidence can be introduced to explain the entry appearing on the Senate Journal and show the true facts, is not in point. In that case the House Journal of February 25, 1887, to the effect that' the speaker on that day laid the President's message before the House, did not state when the message was received, and was in no respect inconsisted with the explanation furnished by the Journal clerk, which the court held was competent in such circumstances.
It results that the chancellor's decree will be reversed the injunction dissolved, and complainants' bill dismissed, with costs.