Case Name: Nicholas Jarcke ads. The State
Court: South Carolina Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: South Carolina
Decision Date: 1837-02-20
Citations: 1 Ril. 296
Docket Number: 
Parties: Nicholas Jarcke ads. The State.
Judges: 3. S RICHARDSON,
Reporter: South Carolina Law Reports
Volume: 22
Pages: 296–298

Head Matter:
Nicholas Jarcke ads. The State.
Tried before his Honor Judge Gantt, Charleston, May Term1,-1836.
The defendant was found guilty, on the charge exhibited in the indictment, for selling liquor to a slave, named Joe, the property of George W. Egleston, and on evidence which I thought justified the veidict. My notes of the evideuce accompany this report.
On the first and second grounds taken for a new trial, it is correctly alleged, that the proof did shew that Mr. Egleston had no absolute right of property in the negro man, Joe.
Mr. Egleston, who was a witness in the defence, testified, that Joe was trust property, and settled for the benefit of his family; but he proved also, that Joe was in his possession, and that he exercised authority as a master over him. I thought the prestjmp.- five evidence of ownership, arising from possession, and exercising the authority of a master over the negro, Joe, sufficient,' in law, to support the indictment. I distinctly charged the jury, that the defendant having procured a license to retail, would not justify him in selling liquor to the slave, Joe, in contravention of the act of assembly ; and that any usage, or custom, of the city, in support of such practice, being against law, should be disregarded by the jury.
RICHARD GANTT»
Grounds of Appeal,
1. Because the negro, Joe, was proved not to be the slave of George W, Egleston, that gentleman having testified, that said negro was not his slave, that he was held by a trustee, for the benefit of witness’ family, and that he, witness, was not the owner of the slave, not having even a life estate in him.
2. Because the evidence of Mr. Egleston shewed that he was not the owner of the slave named in the indictment, but only the person having the care or management of the said slave.
3. Because his honor erred in charging the jury, that Mr.' Egleston’s possession of the slave, made the slave his, within the meaning of the act of 1834.
4. Because the defendant produced, or proved, a license from the City Council of Charleston, to retail liquors, covering the period of the commission of the alleged offence, and under the usage of the city, and the law of the contract, defendant was entitled to retail liquors to slaves, without permit, until the expiration of his license.
5. Because his Honor erred in charging the jury, that the above .mentioned usage was unlawful, being against the act of 1817, forbidding dealing and trafficking with slaves.
0. Because the verdict was otherwise contrary to law and evidence.
YEADON & MACBETH, Defendant's Attorneys.

Opinion:
Mr. Justice Gantt
delivered the opinion of the court.
The defendant was indicted for selling liquor to a slave, named Joe, alleged to be the slave of George W. Egleston — verdict, « guilty."
Mr. Egleston proved, on the trial, that the negro, Joe, was held in trust, for the benefit of witness' family ; that be was not the owner of the slave, nor had he a life estate in him ; that he had Only the care or management of him. The presiding judge thought, and so instructed the jury, that Mr. Egleston's possession was prima facie evidence of a right of ownership, and was sufficient, in law, to support the allegation in the indictment. So long as Mr. Egles-ton exereised authority over the slave, and had the care and ma. «agemeat of him, he might well be presumed to bd the owner. The gist of the offence was selling liquor to a slave, and the evf* derice of identity was complete, whether Mr. Egleston was, or was not, the real owner, and such is the opinion of the whole court. They also concur in the opinion expressed by the presiding judge to the jury, in reference to the license granted by the City Council of Charleston, to the defendant, to retail, that although it covered the period when this offence was committed, neither the law of the contract, nor the usage to sell liquor to slaves, under it, could justify the practice — a practice forbidden by the act of as. sembly, under which the defendant was indicted, and against which no usage could prevail.
Ye a don and Phillips, for motion.
Attokjstey General, contra.
Filed 20th February, 1837.
The motion must, thei'efore, fail on all the grounds taken.
RICHARD GANTTS
We concur,
3. S RICHARDSON,
JOSIAU 3. EVANS*
J. B. O'NE-aLL,