Case Name: In the Matter of the City of New York, Acting For and On Behalf of the New York City Housing Authority, Respondent, Relative to Acquiring Title to Real Property Within the Area Bounded by Dyre Avenue and Other Streets, in the Borough of The Bronx, Duly Selected as a Site for a Federally-Aided Public Housing Project Known as Boston-Secor Houses. Peninnah E. Rusciano et al., Appellants
Court: New York Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1969-12-03
Citations: 25 N.Y.2d 430
Docket Number: 
Parties: In the Matter of the City of New York, Acting For and On Behalf of the New York City Housing Authority, Respondent, Relative to Acquiring Title to Real Property Within the Area Bounded by Dyre Avenue and Other Streets, in the Borough of The Bronx, Duly Selected as a Site for a Federally-Aided Public Housing Project Known as Boston-Secor Houses. Peninnah E. Rusciano et al., Appellants.
Judges: 
Reporter: New York Reports
Volume: 25
Pages: 430–433

Head Matter:
In the Matter of the City of New York, Acting For and On Behalf of the New York City Housing Authority, Respondent, Relative to Acquiring Title to Real Property Within the Area Bounded by Dyre Avenue and Other Streets, in the Borough of The Bronx, Duly Selected as a Site for a Federally-Aided Public Housing Project Known as Boston-Secor Houses. Peninnah E. Rusciano et al., Appellants.
Argued September 30, 1969;
decided December 3, 1969.
John Trubin and David R. Paley for appellants.
I. Special Term’s award for Damage Parcel 1 was not excessive and the Appellate Division’s reduction of the award was improper and erroneous. (Matter of City of New York [Throgs Neck Expressway-Marshall], 8 A D 2d 365, 16 A D 2d 570, 13 N Y 2d 700; Matter of City of New York [2460 Jerome Ave. Realty Corp.], 18 A D 2d 991; Latham Holding Co. v. State of New York, 16 N Y 2d 41.) II. Special Term’s award for Damage Parcel 1 is amply supported by all the credible evidence. (Matter of City of New York [Coogan], 20 N Y 2d 618.)
J. Lee Rankin, Corporation Counsel (Irving Genn and Stanley Buchsbaum of counsel), for respondent.
The weight of evidence supports the Appellate Division award. (Matter of City of New York [A & W Realty Corp.], 1 N Y 2d 428; Matter of City of New York [2460 Jerome Ave. Realty Corp.], 18 A D 2d 991; Matter of City of New York [Cadman Project-Jackline Realty Corp.], 22 A D 2d 946, 16 N Y 2d 763; Ruston v. State of New York, 25 A D 2d 944; Board of Educ. of Cent. School Dist. No. 1 of Town of Vestal v. State of New York, 24 A D 2d 686; Matter of City of New York [Blackwell’s Is. Bridge], 118 App. Div. 272, 189 N. Y. 512; Masten v. State of New York, 11 A D 2d 370, 9 N Y 2d 796; Dennis v. State of New York, 24 A D 2d 924; Latham Holding Co. v. State of New York, 16 N Y 2d 41; Matter of City of New York [Throgs Neck Expressway-Marshall], 13 N Y 2d 700.)

Opinion:
Gibson, J.
A decree granted at Special Term in Bronx County awarded $883,754 for the appropriation by the City of New York of 554,779 square feet of land for purposes of the New York City Housing Authority. On review, the Appellate Division reduced the award to $467,000 and the claimants appealed to this court.
We find that the reduction of the award was unwarranted and that the decision of the Special Term was conformable with the weight of evidence. (Matter of City of New York [Coogan], 20 N Y 2d 618, 623.)
Although conceding, as, indeed, the condemnor itself had done, the marked increase in values subsequent to the condemnee's purchase, the Appellate Division found the ' ' most cogent evidence of value " to be the purchase price; and then, after approving the Special Term's finding that the sales in evidence were not truly comparable, proceeded nevertheless to measure damages by applying to the purchase price the rate of assessment increase — approximately 250%— proven with respect to these very same properties. Additionally, and while it thus, in its words, ' ' gauged ' ' the increase in value, the court at the same time ignored the approximately 413% rate of increase applicable to the bulk of the subject property itself. The error lies, first, in the obvious built-in inconsistencies, and, second, in the near-total reliance placed upon assessment figures as demonstrative of market value. Assessed valuation may, of course, be shown as one of many recognized factors to be considered in connection with market value, which is the ultimate and basic factor, but it is not market value. Assessment figures may also be offered as tending to bind the condemning authority when it is seeking to impose values that are lower (Matter of City of New York [Coogan], 20 N Y 2d 618, 627, supra); but it does not follow that the condemning authority can set market value by the assessments it chooses to impose (see 1 Orgel, Valuation Under Eminent Domain [2d ed.], ch. XIII, especially § 152, at p. 641).
The order so far as appealed from should be reversed and the decree of Special Term reinstated as to Damage Parcel No. 1, with costs.