Case Name: THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. TERRANCE WOODS, Defendant-Appellant
Court: Illinois Appellate Court
Jurisdiction: Illinois
Decision Date: 1997-09-11
Citations: 292 Ill. App. 3d 172
Docket Number: No. 4-96-0065
Parties: THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. TERRANCE WOODS, Defendant-Appellant.
Judges: 
Reporter: Illinois Appellate Court Reports, Third Series
Volume: 292
Pages: 172–184

Head Matter:
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. TERRANCE WOODS, Defendant-Appellant.
Fourth District
No. 4 — 96—0065
Opinion filed September 11, 1997.
COOK, J., dissenting.
Daniel D. Yuhas and Khalil Cox, both of State Appellate Defender’s Office, of Springfield, for appellant.
Patrick W. Kelley, State’s Attorney, of Springfield (Norbert J. Goetten, Robert J. Biderman, and David E. Mannchen, all of State’s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor’s Office, of counsel), for the People.

Opinion:
PRESIDING JUSTICE STEIGMANN
delivered the opinion of the court:
In November 1995, a jury convicted defendant, Terrance Woods, of. first degree murder, home invasion, and armed robbery (720 ILCS 5/9 — 1, 12 — 11, 18 — 2 (West 1994)). The trial court later sentenced him to consecutive terms of 60, 30, and 30 years in prison, respectively. Defendant appeals, arguing only that the prosecutor committed reversible error by commenting during closing argument on defendant's failure to call an alibi witness. We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
We review the trial evidence only to the extent necessary to put defendant's argument in context. Springfield police officer Tim Young testified that as part of his investigation into the murder of Bill Meyers, Young questioned defendant, who told Young that on the night of the murder he had been at his mother's house with his mother, Dorothy Williams, and his girlfriend, Ira Jean Bolden. At trial, defendant presented an alibi defense through the testimony of Williams, who corroborated the story defendant gave Young. Defendant did not testify.
During closing argument, the prosecutor made the following comments:
"But remember what the [defendant said to the police. He said my mother and my girlfriend, [Bolden], can back up my story. They can verify that I was home all day at my mother's house.
And we heard a little bit about [Bolden], * [B]ut at some point, somebody decided that they didn't want you to hear what [Bolden] had to say."
Defendant objected but the trial court overruled the objection, noting that defense counsel had indicated in his opening statement that he would call Bolden to testify regarding defendant's whereabouts on the night of the shooting. In fact, defense counsel had made no mention of Bolden as an alibi witness in opening statement.
II. THE PROSECUTOR'S CLOSING ARGUMENT
Defendant argues the prosecutor committed reversible error by commenting during closing argument on defendant's failure to call Bolden as an alibi witness. The State concedes the trial court mischaracterized defendant's opening statement but argues that the prosecutor's comments were nevertheless proper in light of Williams' testimony. We agree with the State.
In People v. Fly, 249 Ill. App. 3d 730, 736, 619 N.E.2d 821, 825 (1993), quoting People v. Eddington, 129 Ill. App. 3d 745, 777, 473 N.E.2d 103, 125 (1984), this court wrote the following:
" 'As a general rule, it is improper for the prosecution to comment on a defendant's failure to present witnesses when such witnesses are equally accessible to both parties. [Citation.] An exception to the rule exists where potential alibi witnesses are interjected into the case by the defendant but are not produced at trial.' "
Further, in People v. Kubat, 94 Ill. 2d 437, 498, 447 N.E.2d 247, 275 (1983), the supreme court addressed the defendant's contention that the prosecutor improperly commented upon the defendant's failure to present an alibi witness where the State initially had brought out at trial the name of the defendant's alibi. In Kubat, a police officer testified that in response to officers' questions after his arrest, the defendant stated that he was with a female friend in another state on the date of the offense. A witness later testified for the defense that she saw the female friend with a man fitting defendant's description on either the day before or the day of the offense. Consistent with People v. Blakes, 63 Ill. 2d 354, 348 N.E.2d 170 (1976), the supreme court in Kubat (94 Ill. 2d at 498, 447 N.E.2d at 275) held that "where a defendant injects into the case the name of an alibi witness and then fails to call the witness, the prosecutor may legitimately comment on the lack of such evidence although it may not be relied upon as proof of the charge."
In Blakes, the supreme court held that it was not improper for the prosecutor to comment on the defendant's failure to produce any witnesses from the club where the defendant had testified he spent five hours on the night of the offense. The supreme court reasoned as follows:
" '[I]f it is developed in a trial that a witness exists, presumably under the control of a defendant, who can throw light upon a vital matter, and he is not produced, certainly a jury may fairly consider that fact, and, likewise, counsel would have a legitimate right to comment thereon. * [TJhough failure to call a witness or produce evidence may not be relied on as substantial proof of the charge, nonetheless, if other evidence tends to prove the guilt of a defendant and he fails to bring in evidence within his control in explanation or refutation, his omission to do so is a circumstance entitled to some weight in the minds of the jury, and, as such, is a legitimate subject of comment by the prosecution.' " Blakes, 63 Ill. 2d at 359-60, 348 N.E.2d at 174, quoting People v. Williams, 40 Ill. 2d 522, 528-29, 240 N.E.2d 645, 649 (1968).
Here, although the State initially brought up defendant's alibi when Young testified about his conversation with defendant at the detective bureau, defendant clearly injected Bolden's name into this case when Williams testified for the defense that defendant had been with her and Bolden on the night of the murder. Also, we note that defendant had indicated his intention to inject Williams and Bolden into the case as alibi witnesses irrespective of any State witness' testimony. Prior to trial, defendant disclosed to the State that he intended "to tender an alibi defense at any hearing or trial in this matter," and he specifically listed Bolden and Williams as two of four alibi witnesses. See People v. Nevitt, 135 Ill. 2d 423, 451, 450, 553 N.E.2d 368, 379 (1990) (where the supreme court held that the prosecutor improperly commented on defendant's failure to call alibi witnesses "when there is no evidence that a witness exists" and "[djefendant's only reference to an alibi was contained in a pretrial pleading not in evidence").
Under these circumstances — where defendant clearly injected Bolden's name into this case through Williams' testimony — we conclude that the prosecutor's comments regarding defendant's failure to call Bolden as an alibi witness were not improper.
In so concluding, we note that the cases defendant relies upon are inapposite. In Eddington (129 Ill. App. 3d at 776-77, 473 N.E.2d at 125), this court held that the prosecutor committed reversible error by commenting on the defendant's failure to call three alibi witnesses. However, crucial to this decision was the fact that the existence of these potential alibi witnesses was interjected into the case solely through a witness for the State. As the Eddington court noted, "the only evidence that [the three potential witnesses] could offer alibi testimony was elicited by the State from its own witness." Eddington, 129 Ill. App. 3d at 777, 473 N.E.2d at 125. In contrast, here, defendant called Williams to testify in support of his alibi, and she testified defendant was with her and Bolden on the night in question.
To the extent People v. Lawrence, 259 Ill. App. 3d 617, 631 N.E.2d 852 (1994), holds that this court's decision in Eddington stands for anything more than the proposition that the State may not comment on a defendant's failure to produce alibi witnesses when the State, and the State only, suggests such alibi witnesses exist, we decline to follow it. Moreover, we note that in Lawrence — unlike the present case — the defendant had attempted to subpoena at least one of the alibi witnesses upon whom the State had commented in closing, and the evidence was close and came down to the complainant's testimony versus the defendant's.
People v. Popely, 36 Ill. App. 3d 828, 345 N.E.2d 125 (1976), is likewise distinguishable. In Popely, the court concluded that the defendant was denied a fair trial by the prosecutor's prejudicial comments regarding the defendant's failure to call a potential third-party witness to the crime. Popely involved an occurrence witness, not an alibi witness who could be expected to testify favorably to the defendant. The court in Popely specifically noted that the defendant "in no way indicated that this third party would support his theory of the case." Popely, 36 Ill. App. 3d at 836, 345 N.E.2d at 131.
In sum, the prosecution may properly comment on a defendant's failure to call alibi witnesses in certain circumstances. In general, the State may do so whenever the defendant has injected the existence of such witnesses into a case. A defendant may do so by suggesting in opening argument that such witnesses exist and will be produced at trial. He may also inject alibi witnesses into a case through the testimony of other defense witnesses (as in this case) or his own testimony. We fail to see what difference it makes whether the defendant is testifying on cross-examination or on direct — in either case he chooses to take the witness stand voluntarily. See People v. Talley, 152 Ill. App. 3d 971, 984, 504 N.E.2d 1318, 1326 (1987) (when a defendant gives such limited testimony on direct "that the assertion of an alibi, as well as the names of potential alibi witnesses, are raised first on cross-examination, he is not automatically insulated from the inferences which naturally flow from" his failure to present those witnesses); see also People v. Anderson, 250 Ill. App. 3d 439, 454, 620 N.E.2d 1281, 1291 (1993) (prosecutor properly commented on defendant's failure to call an alibi witness where prosecu tor brought out name of the alibi witness on cross-examination of defendant). To the extent People v. Mays, 3 Ill. App. 3d 512, 277 N.E.2d 547 (1972), holds otherwise, we decline to follow it. Nor does it matter that a State witness initially suggests potential alibi witnesses to the trier of fact. Only where the sole evidence of an alibi is introduced through a State witness is the prosecution precluded from making similar comments. Eddington, 129 Ill. App. 3d at 777, 473 N.E.2d at 125.
Nonetheless, we note that the issue before this court — namely, to what extent can the prosecutor comment upon the defendant's failure to call an alibi witness who was first injected into the case as a result of the testimony of a State witness — should never have arisen. Indeed, the issue should never have arisen in any of the following cases where similar events occurred because it makes no sense for the State ever to present a defendant's alibi through the State's witnesses: Kubat (94 Ill. 2d at 498, 447 N.E.2d at 275 (where the State initially had brought out at trial the name of the defendant's alibi witness yet a defense witness also testified regarding defendant's alibi, the prosecutor properly commented upon defendant's failure to call the witness)); Eddington (129 Ill. App. 3d at 777, 473 N.E.2d at 125 (where the only evidence of defendant's alibi witnesses was introduced through a State witness, the prosecutor improperly commented upon defendant's failure to call alibi witnesses)); and Lawrence (259 Ill. App. 3d at 627-28, 631 N.E.2d at 860 (where the State initially had brought out at trial the defendant's alibis and defendant later testified regarding numerous alibi witnesses, the prosecutor improperly commented upon defendant's failure to call alibi witnesses)).
In the present case, for example, Young testified that he arrested defendant, who then said that he was not involved in the murder nor did he know anything about it. He further told the officer that, although he knew his alleged accomplices, he had not seen them for a month.
After eliciting this testimony, the prosecutor then asked Young if defendant said where he was on the evening in question. In response, Young testified that defendant told Young of the purported alibi, identifying his mother and Bolden as his apparent alibi witnesses.
The record reveals no possible benefit to the prosecutor's eliciting defendant's purported alibi from the police officer. Not only was doing so bad trial tactics, it also provided defendant with his only argument that reversible error had been committed by the prosecutor during his closing argument when he commented upon defendant's failure to call Bolden to testify.
Defendant would have had no basis to challenge the prosecutor's closing argument on this point if the prosecutor had not initially presented defendant's alibi. Only because the prosecutor first elicited reference to Bolden through the officer does this court now have to address the issue regarding the allegedly improper closing argument.
Had the prosecutor not asked the officer about defendant's whereabouts on the evening in question — thus establishing defendant's alibi through the officer's testimony — defendant would not have been permitted on cross-examination of the officer to elicit the same testimony. That is because statements made by a party opponent are admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule if otherwise relevant (People v. Shaw, 278 Ill. App. 3d 939, 951, 664 N.E.2d 97, 105 (1996))— here, the State could introduce defendant's statements — but the party himself cannot introduce his prior statements (People v. Patterson, 154 Ill. 2d 414, 452, 610 N.E.2d 16, 33 (1992) ("[s]elf-serving statements by an accused are inadmissible hearsay"); People v. Barnwell, 285 Ill. App. 3d 981, 989, 675 N.E.2d 148, 154 (1996) (criminal defendant's exculpatory statements made to police constitute inadmissible hearsay, as would be the case with any out-of-court, self-serving declaration by a party not subject to any exception recognized by the hearsay rule); M. Graham, Cleary & Graham's Handbook of Illinois Evidence § 802.1, at 669-72 (6th ed. 1994)). In almost all circumstances, if a defendant wishes to inform the trier of fact of where defendant personally claims to have been when the crime at issue was committed, he must testify at trial.
Perhaps uncertainty by prosecutors regarding this rule accounts for the large number of cases in which the State first presents the defendant's alibi through witnesses for the State. As a matter of simple trial tactics, trial lawyers — including prosecutors — should ask themselves when conducting direct examination of the witnesses they call, "how does eliciting the following information help my case and damage the other side?" Judged accordingly, for a prosecutor to elicit a defendant's alibi through State witnesses simply makes no sense.
III. DEFENDANT'S SUPPLEMENTAL PRO SE BRIEF
In January 1996, the trial court appointed the office of the State Appellate Defender (OSAD) to represent defendant. In December 1996, OSAD filed a brief on defendant's behalf in this case. Defendant subsequently filed a pro se supplemental brief, which set forth several issues OSAD did not raise. In People v. Handy, 278 Ill. App. 3d 829, 836, 664 N.E.2d 1042, 1046 (1996), this court held that a pro se motion filed while defendant in a criminal case is represented by counsel is "not properly before the court." In Handy, this court wrote:
" '[A trial court has] no responsibility to entertain [a] defendant's pro se motions during the time he was represented by counsel. * A defendant, when represented by competent counsel, must not be permitted to proceed unfettered, to file a stream of pro se motions *. * [A] defendant is not entitled to a "hybrid trial" where he alternates between proceeding pro se and being represented by counsel.' " Handy, 278 Ill. App. 3d at 836, 664 N.E.2d at 1047, quoting People v. Pondexter, 214 Ill. App. 3d 79, 87-88, 573 N.E.2d 339, 345 (1991).
In People v. Neal, 286 Ill. App. 3d 353, 355, 675 N.E.2d 130, 131 (1996), this court held that a pro se motion to reduce sentence filed while the defendant was represented by appellate counsel was not properly before the trial court. In so holding, this court wrote as follows:
"[D]efendant had the benefit of trial counsel who did not deem the filing of a motion to reduce sentence to be appropriate. The defendant had the benefit of the original appeal upon all of the issues OSAD chose to raise. Moreover, we note that OSAD, on this appeal, rejected the grounds set forth in defendant's pro se motion."
Although Handy and Neal address matters at the trial level, their rule applies equally at the appellate level. If a defendant is represented by appellate counsel (either appointed or private), he has no right to a "hybrid appeal" in which he alternates between being represented by counsel and proceeding pro se by filing a supplemental pro se brief. Thus, on this court's own motion, we strike defendant's pro se brief and decline to address it or consider it in any way.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court's judgment.
Affirmed.
KNECHT, J" concurs.