Case Name: Robert Douglass et al., Appellants, v. John W. Cissna, Respondent
Court: Missouri Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Missouri
Decision Date: 1885-03-23
Citations: 17 Mo. App. 44
Docket Number: 
Parties: Robert Douglass et al., Appellants, v. John W. Cissna, Respondent.
Judges: Ellison, J., concurs; Hall, J., not sitting.
Reporter: Missouri Appeal Reports
Volume: 17
Pages: 44–66

Head Matter:
Robert Douglass et al., Appellants, v. John W. Cissna, Respondent.
March 23, 1885.
1. Practice. — The habit of multiplying instructions animadverted upon.
2. Attachment Act — Grounds for Attachment — Construction of.— Under the seventh clause, or subdivision, of section 398 of the Attachment act of this state (Revised Statutes), if a deed of conveyance or assignment of property or effects is, in and of itself, fraudulent, it would be as matter of law, a fraudulent conveyance or assignment, within the meaning of such section, and would support that allegation of the affidavit, in a suit under it. The intent, the motive which prompted the conveyance or assignment (in the absence of a secret trust, or understanding dehors the instrument), could have no effect; it is the legal effect of the deed which makes it valid or fraudulent. The intent is only applied to the instances under the fifth and sixth clauses of said section 398, concerning attachments. — See Reid v. Pelletier, 28 Mo. 177; Bullene v. Smith, 73 Mo. 151.
3. Same — Further Construction of. — Each of the several clauses of said section 398, Revised Statutes, presents a separate, distinct, and independent ground of attachment. The legislature did not employ the several specified grounds as convertible terms. Each enumeration constitutes a cause of action, and each of the terms employed possesses its own peculiar meaning and office in law. Therefore a fraudulent disposition of property will not support a charge of a fraudulent conveyance or assignment, and vice versa. Following Bullene v. Smith, 73 Mo. 151.
4. Assignment — Deed of — Provision as to Surplus. — Where a deed in the nature of a deed of assignment contains a provision that any surplus remaining after the satisfaction of the grantor’s debts-should be returned or paid to -him; this cannot be held to be a fraudulent reservation to his use as against creditors, for that is-precisely what the law, in the absence of any such stipulation, would direct. — Burrill on Assignments, 4th ed. sects. 206, 207.
5. Same — If for the Benefit of Creditors Generally, not Subject to Proceedings Under Attachment Act. — If, as matter of law, the-effect and operation of a deed constitutes an assignment for the benefit of creditors generally, pari passu, it is difficult to conceive how it can be said that the assignment was fraudulent so as-to hinder, or delay, the creditors. The law, on the contrary, favors such assignments, as they operate for the protection and equality of all the creditors. — Hilliken v. Dart, 26 Hun. (N. Y.) 24.
6. Same — Delay in Making Statement Required by Assignment Act —Effect of. — A failure to make a statement at the time of executing the assignment and accompanying it, as contemplated by the statute (Rev. Stat. sect. 362), will not defeat the conveyance in favor of creditors, as they had no control over the assignor in performing a duty imposed on him by the statute, after the making of the deed. — Hardcastle v. Fisher, 24 Mo. 70; Duvall v. Raisin, 7 Mo. 499; Robert v. Casey, 25 Mo. 590.
On Rehearing :
7. Same — Parties to — Acceptance of Trust. — An assignment for the benefit of creditors may be made to a single individual, or to several. And when it is made to several, it is not essential to its validity that all should accept. Only those who do accept are required to act. An assignment to partners is good and the acceptance of the trust by -one of the firm is sufficient.— Burrill on Assignments, sect. 91, 4th ed.; Forbes v. Scannel, 13 Cal. 243 et seq. The delivery of the deed and putting it on record is an acceptance, and the deed becomes operative at once, and the assignee being in possession,of the assigned property, the deed would prevail over any process intervening between that date and the giving of the bond by the assignee. The assignee may have the time allowed him by law in which to qualify. No act or word of either the assignor or assignee, subsequent to the delivery of the deed, can, without the consent of the creditors, in any wise, affect the validity and operation of the conveyance. — Union Bk. v. Bk. Commerce, 94 Ill. 27; Gates v. Lebeaume, 19 Mo. 27; Valentine v. Decker, 43 Mo. 544.
Appeal from Nodaway Circuit Court, Hon. H. S. Kelley, Judge.
Affirmed.
Motion for rehearing denied.
Statement of case by the court.
This is an action of attachment. The affidavit for the writ is as follows :
“This.affiant states that the plaintiffs in the above entitled cause have a just demand against the defendant herein, all past due, except $55.10, and that the amount which this affiant believes the plaintiffs ought to recover, after allowing all just credits and set-offs, is two hundred and eighty-five dollars and nineteen cents, and that this affiant has good reason to believe, and does believe, that the defendant has fraudulently conveyed and assigned his property and effects so as to hinder and delay his creditors. That defendant is about to fraudulently convey and assign his property and effects so as to hinder and delay his creditors. That the defendant has frandulently concealed, removed, and disposed of his property and effects so as to hinder and delay his creditors, and that he is about to so conceal, remove, and dispose of his property and effects.”
The action grew out of the following state of facts:
The defendant, in 1881, was merchandizing at the town of Clearmont, in Nodaway county. He owed, according to the evidence, the 1st of December, debts unsecured amounting to about $5000.00. His stock of goods and other assets amounted to about $6000.00, by rough estimate. His principal créditor was the firm of Tootle, Hosea & Co., of St. Joseph. Being behind with his payments, his creditors began to press him with their demands. On or about the 3rd day of December, C. W. Campbell, of the firm of Tootle, Hosea & Co., visited the defendant, and urged him to secure their claim in some way. The result of which was, that on the 5th of December, Cissna agreed to execute to Tootle, Hosea & Co., the following instrument:
“ This indenture made and entered into this fifth day of December, 1881, by and between John W. Cissna, of the town of Clearmont, Nodaway Co., Missouri, and Tootle, Hosea & Co., said firm composed of Milton Tootle, Win. E. Hosea, Chas. W. Campbell, W. W. iWheeler, and Joshua Motter, of the city of St. Joseph, Missouri. Witnesseth: That the said Jno. W. Cissna, being justly indebted to said Tootle, Hosea & Co., in the sum of $1,988.40, embraced in two notes as follows: One note dated July 20th, 1881, for $1,061.73, and bearing 10 per cent, interest from date, and one note dated December 3d, 1881, for $887.43, bearing 10 per cent, interest from date — $1,988.40. Now, for the purpose of discharging said obligation and paying said notes in full, which are herein acknowledged just and due, and for the further consideration of one dollar in hand paid, which is hereby acknowledged receipt of, I, J. W. Cissna, do bargain and sell and convey to Tootle, Hosea & Co., of Saint Joseph, Mo., and do give possession this day of my entire stock of dry goods, groceries, queensware, boots and shoes, hats and caps, and all other goods and furniture contained in my two-story frame store building, situated upon lot (2), block (2), in the town of Clearmont, Nodaway Co., Mo., or so much thereof as will pay and satisfy in full the aforementioned notes given to Tootle, Hosea & Co. for goods purchased of them. This sale is made to Tootle, Hosea & Co., for the express purpose of 1st, to pay Tootle, Hosea & Co. in full the sum of $1,988.40 and interest, and the. residue, after being carefully disposed of by said Tootle, Hosea & Co., shad be divided pro rata between my creditors, as follows, as their claims may appear : Schuster, Tootle & Co., $800; Patterson, Noyes & Co., $278; D. M. Steele & Co., $750; Nave, McCord & Co., $200 ; Y. B. Buck & Co., $300 ; S. Lockwood & Co., $500; and for the further satisfaction of all my creditors, if any there be whose names are not here set forth, I transfer to Tootle, Hosea & Co. all my book accounts and notes to collect and distribute pro rata as claims may appear. In consideration of the sale and transfer, and possession as above made, the said Tootle, Hosea & Co. agree to bind themselves to correctly invoice said stock of goods and furniture at cost for such as are worth it, and all such as are depreciated at value, and to sell the same to the very best advantage and interest of all concerned, and first pay themselves the amount of their notes and interest, as stated, and then distribute pro rata to each and every creditor of J. W. Cissna, whether above named or not. The said Tootle, Hosea & Co. further agree to schedule all the notes and accounts of Jno. W. Cissna, and use all due diligence in the collection of them, and ppy the proceeds of said collection, after their notes are paid, to each and every creditor pro rata. The said Tootle, Hosea & Co. agree to use all mercantile care and diligence in the sale of the above named goods, and in the collection of the said notes and accounts, and upon the demand of any of the aforementioned creditors, or other creditors, of J. W. Cissna, after said Tootle, Hosea & Co. have received their pay in full, to turn over all residue of cash, merchandise, notes or accounts to whomsoever a majority of the aforementioned creditors, and my other creditors, if . omitted in said mention, may elect, they agreeing to dispose of all balances as before mentioned, pro rata, and any residue after paying all my creditors, shall be paid over to John W. Cissna, or his assigns. It is further agreed and understood between J. W. Cissna and Tootle, Hosea & Co., that all legitimate expenses attending the sale of goods and collection of notes and accounts should be paid out of the proceeds of the sale of said goods and the collection of said notes and accounts; and should the amount due each creditor be incorrectly given, or should any creditor’s name be omitted given, it is understood they shall share pro rata, as their claims may appear, it being tlie object of J. W. Cissna to pay all of Ms creditors in full if possible.
Witness onr hands and seals, this 5th day of December, 1881.”
On the 6th of December, the foregoing instrument was duly executed, acknowledged and put to record the same day; and Campbell took immediate possession of the goods. By this time other creditors appeared upon the scene, among them the plaintiffs, who urged the defendant to provide for all Ms creditors equally. Some of these deferred creditors claim that Cissna and Campbell both represented to them that the goods had been sold to Tootle, Hosea & Co.; but a copy of the deed was exhibited to them by defendant. The plaintiffs failing to secure their claim, instituted this attachment suit on the same day of the execution of the deed, but subsequent thereto.
On the trial of the issues, made up on the plea in abatement, much evidence was introduced by plaintiffs showing the history of the transaction in question, and endeavoring chiefly to show that the defendant’s object in making said deed was to prefer Tootle, Hosea & Co., and defer the other creditors to secure to himself an advantage. Among other facts developed on the trial was the following telegram sent Campbell from his house in St. Joseph:
“Dated St. Joe, Mo., Dec. 6, 1881.
Received at Clearmont, Mo., at 5:50 p. m.
To Q. W. Campbell,—
Judson says to make the sale good, you must buy the stock and accounts for a specific amount.
Tootle, Hosea & Co.”
This was after the said deed was executed and filed for record. It seems that on the receipt of this telegram, Campbell drew up and had Cissna sign the following paper:
“Cleakmont, Mo., December 6, 1881.
For and in consideration of the sum of two thousand dollars, to me in hand paid, the receipt of which is herein acknowledged, I sell my stock of dry goods, groceries, queensware, boots, shoes, hats and caps, and store furniture contained in the two-story frame building situate on lot (2), block (2), town of Clearmont, formerly occupied by me. Also all my books and accounts, and deliver the same to Tootle, Hosea & Co., sixth day of December, 1881, to have and to hold for their exclusive benefit.
John W. Cissna.
W. Gr. Craig, witness.”
This paper had the following endorsement on the back:
“Clearmont, Mo., December 6th, 1881.
The object of this bill of sale, as named within, is not to deprive any creditor of their pro rata division, but to more absolutely confirm the sale of December 5th to Tootle, Hosea & Co., for the purpose named in said sale. They agreeing to carry it out in all its provisions, and make the pro rata division as provided for in said sale, after receiving their pay in full.
J. W. Cissna,
Tootle, Hosea & Co.
Witness, W. G-. Craig.”
Whether this endorsement was made at the instant of the execution of the bill of sale or shortly thereafter, was affirmed by the one party, and denied or questioned by the other.
There, was no evidence tending to show any secret arrangement between the defendant and Campbell, by which any property was concealed or otherwise- disposed of than is expressed on the face of the deed. There was a statement of defendant, to the effect that he expected Tootle, Hosea & Co. to put other goods or buy other goods to keep up stock so as the better to sell the goods transferred; and that his purpose in making the deed was to give Tootle, Hosea & Co. a preference, and that the other creditors were not to be paid until T., H. & Co.’s debt was satisfied. But his evidence tended strongly to show that his purpose was to have his prop erty. held to the payment of all his debts, and that he did not expect any returns to himself out of the property conveyed until after the satisfaction- of all of his creditors.
There was other evidence, but. in view of -the grounds upon which the opinion herein is placed, it is not deemed important to give it. in detail.
The jury, after, instructions from the court, returned a verdict for defendant, and judgment was entered accordingly ; from which the plaintiffs prosecute this appeal.
Strong & Mosman, and Ira K. Alderman, for the appellants.
I. It is unnecessary to prove any combination or confederation between the maker and transferee to hinder or delay creditors. It is enough to show that an intent such as the statute prohibits, prompted the-parties to make the transfer. — Bengert v. Burchert, 59 Mo. 80; Werden v. Hawes, 10 Conn. 50; Stevens v. Chouteau, 11 Mo. 383.
II. Under' the statute this instrument was not a voluntary assignment for the benefit, of creditors. — Kellogg v. Richardson, U. S. Dist. C., Apr. term, 1883; Federal Reporter, vol. 19, No. 2, Feb. 1884; Potter v. McDowell, 31 Mo. 62.
III. The court improperly refused the first, second and third instructions asked by plaintiffs., The intent to hinder, delay, and even to prevent, seizure and sale of property by the creditors was 'admitted as the purpose of respondent. The fraud follows as matter of law. Hence the law, the evidence, and the weight of evidence, was ■disregarded by the verdict.
IY. The court excluded, by instruction, legal and competent evidence. Though the court admitted, during the trial, the conversations and acts of respondent, yet they were taken from the jury by so presenting abstract principles of law in instructions 10, 11 and 12 (page 50), that the jury were necessarily misled in giving to such evidence the proper consideration. The inference that a deed, valid on its face, cannot be conceived in fraud, or executed for an illegal purpose, is erroneous. — Potter v. McDowell, 31 Mo. 69; Bengert v. Burchert, 59 Mo. 83.
V. Respondent’s intent to postpone plaintiffs in the collection of their debt was participated in by the assignees or transferees, and hence the plea of good faith on their part will not avail them or respondent anything-Crow v. Beardsley, 68 Mo. 435; Bump on Fraud. Conveyances, 363.
VI. The following additional authorities are cited as-sustaining appellants’ theory of the whole case: Pope v. Wilson, 7 Ala. 699; Green v. Tanner, 8 Metc. (Mass.) 411; Partete v. Harris, 26 Conn. 480; Bancroft v. Blizzard, 13 Ohio 30; Chouteau v. Sherman, 11 Mo. 385; Tripp v. Child, 14 Barb. 85; Goodrich v. Downs, 6 Hill 483.
VII. The court erred in refusing judgment for plaintiffs after jury sworn and before evidence given, for reasons heretofore assigned touching the pleadings. Amendment without condition at this stage was error.
Johnston & Anthony, with Lafe Dawson, for respondent.
I. There was no evidence tending to prove the second,, third and fourth charges in the affidavit. The sole issue remaining was: Did defendant fraudulently convey and assign his property and effects so as to delay and hinder his creditors ?
II. Whether the papers evidencing the transaction between defendant and Tootle, Hosea & Co. (or Campbell, one of that firm), bear upon their face evidence of fraud, it was for the court so to declare as matter of law, and not for the jury as matter of fact. — McKay v. Underwood, 47 Mo. 185; Hangman v. Hersey, 43 Mo. 122; Pea v. Ferguson, 72 Mo. 225; Price et al. v. Evans, 49 Mo. 396; State v. Baber, 74 Mo. 292; Brooks v. Wimer, 20 Mo. 503; Bigelow v. Stringer, 40 Mo- 195; Robinson's Exrs. v. Robards, 15 Mo. 459.
III. No evidence was excluded to- which exception was saved. There was ,no admission of improper evidence.
IV. The assignment would not fail or be defeated by the fact of failure to file statement along with deed..— Hardcastle v. Fisher, 24 Mo. 70-
V. Instructions Nos. 1, 2, 3, 6, 7, 7\, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17 (twelve altogether) were properly refused.
VI. Taken as a whole, the instructions for defendant placed the intent fairly before the jury, and as favorably to plaintiffs as the law would warrant. But plaintiffs failed to save exceptions to the giving of defendant’s instructions.
VII. The amendment allowing the notary to affix his seal to a jurat, was properly permitted, before motion for judgment was determined. Pleas in abatement, like other pleadings, may be amended. — Hamblin v. Dunn, 53 Mo. 137; Coyce v. Ragsdale, 17 Mo. 32; Jump v. Batton’s Exrs., 35 Mo. 193.
VIII. The only fraud that will vitiate an assignment is fraud in its concoction. If there was no fraud in its inception, no subsequent conduct on the part of the assignee or assignor can avoid it, or render it null.— Bump on Fraud. Conveyances, 352 and cases ; Gates v. Lebeaume, 19 Mo. 17; Goodwin v. Kerr, Mo. S. C. (not reported). (
IN. The result of the whole transaction was this : An assignment of all his property for the equal benefit of all his creditors in equal proportion to their respective demands. — Pike v. Bacon, 21 Mo. 280; Bump on Fraud. Con. 347; Horwith v. Ellinger, 31 Md. 492; Hoffman v. McAll, 5 Ohio St. 124.

Opinion:
Opinion by
Philips, P. J.
In this case the plaintiffs asked twenty instructions, of which the court gave eight. The court also gave twelve instructions on behalf of defendant. We are asked in this case to review all those refused and those given. The habit of counsel in thus multiplying instructions, has time and again been animadverted upon and censured by the supreme court. But instead of curing the evil practice, it seems to be on the increase. If the court decline to accept the pressing invitation of counsel to look carefully and minutely through such a labyrinth of propositions to discover, if possible, some inconsistency or incongruity as the basis of error, it must be understood that the court is satisfied that, taking the instructions altogether which the trial court gave, the issues were fairly presented, or that they are immaterial, and that our duty is to administer the law in the interest of justice.
The case seems to have been tried throughout by the' plaintiffs on the theory that the motive and intent of the defendant in making the deed to Tootle, Hosea & Co. was' the main issue, • and so the instructions given by the court, as well as those refused; placed the case principally on the theory that if defendant intended to prefer one creditor to another, and to postpone one creditor until another was paid, etc., it was sufficient to maintain the attachment.
As, under the undisputed facts of record, the deed in' question, whatever it may be called, had been fiiade, and the real ground of controversy is as to the effect of the instrument, the inquiry should be limited to the seventh clause of section 398 of the Attachment act.
That inquiry isHas the defendant fraudulently conveyed or assigned his property -or 'effects so as to hinder' or delay his creditors? If this deed was fraudulent in and of itself, as matter of law it would be a fraudulent conveyance or assignment within the meaning of said section. And if the judgment of the law denounced it as fraudulent, it would support that allegation of the affidavit. — Reed v. Pelletier, 28 Mo. 177.
The intent, the motive which prompted the conveyance or assignment, in the absence of a secret trust or understanding dehors the instrument, could have no effect, because the intent to defraud might have been entertained by the grantor and yet the legal effect, of the deed make valid the conveyance, so . that as matter of law it would and could not hinder or delay any creditor.
It is to be borne in mind that the intent,- the motive of the grantor, is applied only to instances under the 5th and 6th clauses of said section concerning attachments. So Richardson, J., in Reed v. Pelletier, supra, said:
"There are thirteen cases in which an attachment may issue under our statute, and it will be observed that the 'intent' of the party liable to the writ is not a necessary ingredient except for the causes enumerated in the fifth and sixth clauses of the first section. The affidavit will be good if it follows the language of either of the clauses, and it is never necessary to prove more than the party is required to swear to. If the attachment is based on either the seventh, eighth, ninth, or tenth clauses, it will be sustained on proof that the defendant fraudulently had or was about fraudulently to do any of the prohibited acts; and whether the act be fraudulent will depend on the judgment which the law pronounces upon it."
This section of the statute again came under review; in the supreme court of this state in the case of Bullene v. Smith (73 Mo. 151), where the proposition is well sus-' tained that each of the several clauses of said section presents a separate, distinct, and independent ground of attachment; and that the legislature did not employ the several specified grounds as convertible terms. Each enumeration constitutes a cause of action and each of the terms employed possesses its own peculiar meaning and office in law. Therefore, the supreme court holds that a fraudulent disposition of property will not support a charge of a fraudulent conveyance or assignment, and vice versa.
Now there is no just pretence in the case at bar of any other attempt to transfer the property in question, than what is expressed or consummated by the written instruments in evidence. All other allegations, therefore, of fraud contained in the affidavit and the issues taken thereunder, may be eliminated from this inquiry. Nor does the proof, giving to it the most rigid scrutiny. in quest of the evil design of the defendant, in our judgment warrant any jury in finding there existed in the breast of the defendant any purpose inconsistent with' the language employed in the written instrument. We fail to discover in this record any tangible proof of the existence of any secret trust or hidden arrangement between the parties for the benefit or protection of the defendant against the just rights of his creditors, outside of the papers themselves.
The fact that the deed contains a provision that any surplus remaining after the satisfaction of the grantor's debts should be returned or paid to him, cannot be held .to be a fraudulent reservation to his use as against creditors, for that is precisely what the law, in the absence of any such stipulation, would direct. He reserves to himself no interest as against any of his creditors or the assignee, but only stipulated that the surplus, if any after satisfying all of his creditors, should be returned to him. This the law would accomplish for him with or without such express provision. And what the courts would enforce cannot be held to be fraudulent. — Burrill on Assignments, 4 ed. sects 206, 207..
This case, in this respect, is unlike that of Bigelow et al. v. Stringer et al. (40 Mo. 195), in its facts. There it appeared on the face of the deed that the debtor had conveyed an amount of property largely in excess of the aggregate of his debts; and by the very terms of the instrument, he tied up his property in the hands of the trustee, postponing his general creditors, for two years, manifesting thereby a purpose to secure to himself an increased surplus; again, by delaying and hindering his creditors in the collection of their debts. That was a fraud in law apparent on the face of the instrument. We fail to discover in this record, fairly and reasonably interpreted, any such disparity between the value of the property conveyed and the aggregate of the defendant's debts as would warrant the impeachment of the deed on .that ground. In fact it is not too much to say, on this record, in view of the actual results of sales of such property under trustees or assignees, that if the creditors should realize the amount of their debts it would be quite unusual.
Nor are we able to perceive how the fact of the execution of the bill of sale, which Campbell induced the defendant to make, after the execution, delivery, and recording of the deed, can be construed as an abandonment of the assignment. The transfer by deed was an accomplished fact, and no subsequent act of the debtor, without the consent of all parties thereto, could effect the legal operation of the consummated conveyance. Nor do we think it just, under the circumstances disclosed by the evidence, to say that it furnished such proof of a fraudulent combination between the debtor and the trustee, as to have warranted the jury in pronouncing a verdict thereon in favor of the plaintiffs. It is but fair to presume that Campbell supposed from the telegram received that the firm's lawyer had advised that the deed made might not avail for the protection of his house, and that he sought by taking the bill of sale to strengthen his case. That it was not designed to constitute an abandonment of the deed, is manifested by the fact that it was expressly stipulated on the back, of the bill of sale that it should not so operate.
The issue, on trial, being: had the defendant.fraudulently conveyed or assigned his property or effects so as to hinder or delay his creditors, it mattered not what opinion the grantor or assignor entertained as to the import of the terms employed in the instrument of conveyance. Its construction and effect are for the court as a question of law. If, as a matter of law, the effect and operation of the deed constituted an assignment for the benefit of creditors generally, pari passu, it is difficult to conceive how it can be said the defendant has fraudulently assigned his property so as to hinder or delay his creditors. The law, on the contrary, favors such assignments, as they operate for the protection and equality of all the creditors. — Milliken v. Dart, 26 Hun. 24.
There does not appear to be any serious controversy between counsel that the legal effect of the deed is an assignment under the statute; and such, we are of opinion, is its correct construction. — State ex rel. v. Benoist at al., 37 Mo. 500, 508; Burrill on Assign., sects. 2, 3, et seq.; Page v. Smith, 24 Wis. 371, 372; Lord v. Devendorf, 54 Wis. 491; Norton v. Kearney, 10 Wis. 443.
Campbell appears to have qualified as assignee under the deed. Then by virtue of the statute, the transfer inured to the benefit of all creditors, pari passu, notwithstanding the expressed desire of the debtor to prefer one of his named creditors. — Rev. Stat., sect. 354; Hard-castle v. Fisher, 24 Mo. 70; Shapleigh v. Baird, 26 Mo. 326; Crow v. Beardly, 68 Mo. 455; Lord v. Devendorf, supra.
Should the plaintiff maintain his action he thereby seeks to accomplish that of which he complains, a preference over the other creditors, — an inequality and injustice which it is the design of the assignment law to prevent. It is held in New York that an attachment cannot be levied on property in the hands of an assignee under a general assignment of the debtor, notwithstanding the assignment is fraudulent in law. — Thurber v. Blank, 50 N. Y. 80; Smith v. Longmire, 24 Hun. 257.
Appellants make the objection to the assignment that the assignor failed, at the time of the execution of the instrument, to make a statement accompanying it, as required by statute. — Rev. Stat. sect. 362. The deed was executed and put to record on the 6th day of December, and the required statement was made on the 8th. We do not think this delay of the assignor would defeat the conveyance in favor of the creditors, as they had no control of the assignor in performing a duty imposed on him by the statute, after the making of the deed.— Hardcastle v. Fisher, supra; Duvall v. Raisin, 7 Mo. 499; Robert v. Casey, 25 Mo. 590.
We are of opinion that on the real issue .in this case the plaintiffs had a fair trial, and that the ends of justice will be best subserved by affirming the judgment of the circuit court, which is accordingly done.
Ellison, J., concurs; Hall, J., not sitting.