Case Name: Loretta A. Riggs et al., App'lts, v. Elmer E. Palmer et al., Resp'ts
Court: New York Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1889-10-08
Citations: 26 N.Y. St. Rep. 198
Docket Number: 
Parties: Loretta A. Riggs et al., App’lts, v. Elmer E. Palmer et al., Resp’ts.
Judges: 
Reporter: New York State Reporter
Volume: 26
Pages: 198–207

Head Matter:
Loretta A. Riggs et al., App’lts, v. Elmer E. Palmer et al., Resp’ts.
(Court of Appeals,
Filed October 8, 1889.)
1. Will.
Where the legatee under a will, to obtain the speedy enjoyment and immediate possession of his property, wilfully murders the testator, he cannot take any of the property as heir. Gbay, J., dissenting.
Z. Same — Statute—Construction op.
In some cases the letter of a legislative act is restrained hy an equitable construction; in others it is enlarged; in others the construction is contrary to the letter. _
Appeal from judgment of general term, third department
Leslie W. Russell, for app’lts; W. M. Hawkins, for resp’ts.

Opinion:
Earl, J.
On the 13tli day of August, 1880, Francis B. Palmer made his last will and testament, in which he gave small legacies to his two daughters, Mrs. Biggs and Mrs. Preston, the plaintiffs in this action, and the remainder of his estate to his grandson, the defendant, Elmer E. Palmer, subject to the support of Susan Palmer, his mother, with a gift over to the two daughters, subject to the support of Mrs. Palmer, in case Elmer should survive him and die under age, unmarried and without any issue. The testator at the date of his will owned a farm and considerable personal property. He was a widower, and thereafter, in March, 1882, he was married to Mrs.Bresee, with whom before his marriage he entered into an ante-nuptial contract, in which he agreed that in lieu of dower and all other claims upon his estate, in case she survived him, she should have her support upon his farm during her life, and such support was expressly charged upon the farm. At the date of the will, and subsequently to the death of the testator, Elmer lived with him as a member of his family, and at his death was sixteen years old. He knew of the provisions made in his favor in the will, and that he might prevent his grandfather from revoking such provisions, which he had manifested some intention to do, and to obtain the speedy enjoyment and immediate -possession of his property, he wilfully murdered him by poisoning him. He now claims the property, and the sole question for our determination is, can he have it ?
The defendants say that the testator is dead; that his will was made in due form, and has been admitted to probate, and that, therefore, it must have effect according to the letter of the law.
It is quite true that statutes regulating the making, proof and effect of wills and the devolution of property, if literally construed and if their force and effect can in no way and under no circumstances be controlled or modified, give this property to the murderer.
The purpose of those statutes was to enable testators to dispose of their estates to the objects of their bounty at death, and to carry into effect their final wishes legally expressed; and in considering and giving effect to them this purpose must be kept in view.
It was the intention of the law-makers that the donees in a will should have the property given to them. But it never could have been their intention that a donee who murdered the testator to make the will operative should have any benefit under it. If such a case had been present to their minds, and it had been supposed necessary to make some provision of law to meet it, it cannot be doubted that they would have provided for it. It is a familiar canon of construction that a thing which is within the intention of the makers of a statute is as much within the statute as if it were within the letter; and a thing which is within the letter of the statute is not within the statute unless it be within the intention of the makers.
The writers of laws do not always express their intention perfectly, but either exceed it or fall short of it, so that judges are to collect it from probable or rational conjectures only, and this is called rational interpretation; and Rutherforth in his Institutes, p. 407, says: " When we make use of rational interpretation, sometimes we restrain the meaning of the writer so as to take in less, and sometimes we extend or enlarge his meaning so as to take in more than his words express."
Such a construction ought to be put upon a statute as will best answer the intention which the makers had in view, for qui haeret in litera, haeret in cortice. In Bacon's Abr., Statutes, I, 5; Puffendorf, book 5, chap. 12; Rutherforth, 422, 427, and in Smith's Commentaries, 814, many cases are mentioned where it was held that matters embraced in the general words of statutes nevertheless were not within the statutes, because it could not have been the intention of the .law makers that they should be included. They were taken out of the statutes by an equitable construction, and it is said in Bacon: "By an equitable construction, a case not within the letter of the statute is sometimes holden to be within the meaning because it is within the mischief for which a remedy is provided. The reason for such construction is that the law makers could not set down every case in express terms. In order to form a right judgment whether a case be within the equity of a statute, it is a good way to suppose the law maker present, and that you have asked him this question, Did you intend to comprehend this case ? Then you must give yourself such answer as you imagine he, being an upright and reasonable man, would have given. If this be that he did mean to comprehend it, you may safely hold the case to be within the equity of statute; for while you do no more than he would have done, you do not act contrary to the statute, but in conformity thereto." In some cases the letter of a legislative act is restrained by an equitable construction; in others it is enlarged; in others the construction is contrary to the letter. The equitable construction which restrains the letter of a statute is defined by Aristotle, as frequently quoted, in this manner: Aequitas est correctio legis generaliter laiae qua parti deficit. If the law makers could as to this case be consulted' would they say that they intended by their general language that the property of a testator or of an ancestor should pass to one who had taken his life for the express purpose of getting his property? In 1 Blackstone's Commentaries, page 91, the learned author speaking of the construction of statutes says: "If there arise out of them collaterally any absurd consequences manifestly contradictory to common reason, they are with regard to those collateral consequences void. When some collateral matter arises out of the general words, and happen to be unreasonable, then the judges are in decency to conclude that this consequence was not foreseen by the parliament, and therefore they are at liberty to expound the statute by equity and only quoad hoc disregard it," and he gives as an illustration, if an act of parliament gives a man power to try all causes that arise within his manor of Dale, yet if a cause should arise in which he himself is party, the act is construed not to extend to that, because it is unreasonable that any man should determine his own quarrel.
There was a statute in Bologna that whoever drew blood in the streets should be severely punished, and yet it was held not to apply to the case of a barber who opened a vein in the street. It is commanded in the Decalogue that no work shall be done upon the Sabbath, and yet giving the command a rational interpretation founded upon its design, the Infallible Judge held that it did not prohibit works of necessity, charity or benevolence on that day.
What could be more unreasonable than to suppose that it was the legislative intention in the general laws passed for the orderly, peaceable and just devolution of property that they should have operation in favor of one who murdered his ancestor that he might speedily come into the possession of his estate ? Such an inten-. tian is inconceivable. We need not, therefore, be much troubled by the general language contained in the laws.
Besides, all laws, as well as all contracts, may be controlled in their operation and effect by general, fundamental maxims of the common law. No one shall be permitted to profit by his own fraud, or to take advantage of his own wrong, or to found any claim upon his own iniquity, or to acquire property by his own crime. These maxims are dictated by public policy, have their foundation in universal law administered in all civilized countries, and have nowhere been superseded by statutes. They were applied in the decision of the case of The New York Mutual Life Ins. Co., v. Armstrong, 117 U. S., 599. There it was held that the person who procured a policy upon the life of another, payable at his death, and then murdered the assured to make the policy payable, could not recover thereon.
Mr. Justice Field, writing the opinion, said: " Independently of any proof of the motives of Hunter in obtaining the policy, and even assuming that they were just and proper, he forfeited all rights under it when, to secure its immediate payment, he murdered the assured. It W'ould be a reproach to the jurisprudence of the country if one could recover insurance money payable on the death of a party whose life he had feloniously taken. As well might he recover insurance money upon a building that he had willfully fired."
These maxims, without any statute giving them force or operation, frequently control the effect and nullify the language of wills. A will procured by fraud and deception like any other instrument may be decreed void and set aside, and so a particular portion of a will may be excluded from probate or held inoperative is induced by the fraud or undue influence of the person in whose favor it is. Allen v. McPherson, 1 H. of L. Cases, 191; Harrison's Appeal, 48 Conn., 202. So a will may contain provisions which are immoral, irreligious or against public policy, aucl they will be held void.
Here there was no certainty that this murderer would survive the testator, or that the testator would not change his will, and there was no certainty that he would get this property if nature was allowed to take its course. He therefore murdered the testator expressly to vest himself with an estate. Under such circumstances what law, human or divine, will allow him to take the estate and enjoy the fruits of his crime? The will spoke and' became operative at the death of the testator. He caused that death and thus by his crime made it speak and have operation. Shall it speak and operate in his favor? If he had met the testator and taken his property by force he would have had no title to it Shall he acquire title by murdering him ? If he had gone to the testator's house and by force compelled Mm or by fraud or undue influence had induced him to will Mm his property, the law would not allow him to hold it. But can he give effect and operation to a will by murder and yet take the property ? To answer these questions in the affirmative it seems to me would be a reproach to the jurisprudence of our state and an offense against-public policy.
Under the civil law, evolved from the general principles of natural law and justice by many generations of juris-consults, philosophers and statesmen, one cannot take property by inheritance or will from an ancestor or benefactor whom he has murdered. Domat., part 2, book 1, tit. 1, § 3; Code Napoleon, § 727; Mackeldey's Roman Law, 530, 550. In the Civil Code of Lower Canada the provisions on the subject in the Code Napoleon have been substantially copied. But, so far as I can find, in no country where the common law prevails has it been deemed important to enact a law to provide for such a case. Our revisers and law-makers were familiar with the civil law, and they did not deem it important to incorporate into our statutes its provisions upon this subject This is not a casus omissus. It was evidently supposed that the maxims of the common law were sufficient to regulate such a case, and that a specific enactment for that purpose was not needed.
For the same reasons the defendant, Palmer, cannot take any of this property as heir. Just before the murder he was not an heir, and it was not certain that he ever would be. He might have died before his grandfather, or might have been disinherited by him. He made himself an heir by the murder, and he seeks to take property as the fruit of his crime. What has before been said as to him as legatee applies to Mm with equal force as an heir. He cannot vest himself with title by crime.
My view of this case does not inflict upon Elmer any greater or other punishment for his crime than the law specifies. It takes-from him no property, but simply holds that he shall not acquire property by his crime and thus be rewarded for its commission.
Our attention is called to Owens v. Owens, 100 North Carolina, 240, as a case quite like this. There a wife had been convicted, of being an accessory before the fact to the murder of her hus band, and it was held that she was, nevertheless, entitled to dower. I am unwilling to assent to the doctrine of that case. The statutes provide dower for a wife who has the misfortune to survive her husband, and thus lose his support and protection. It is clearly beyond their purpose to make provision for a Avife who, by her own crime, makes herself a widow, and wilfully and intentionally deprives herself of the support and protection of her husband. As she might have died before him, and thus never have been his AvidoAV, she cannot by her crime vest herself with an estate. The principle which lies at the bottom of the maxim volenti non fit injuria should be applied to such a case, and a widoAv should not, for the purpose of acquiring as such property rights, be permitted to allege a Avidowhood which she has wickedly and intentionally created.
The facts found entitled the plaintiffs to the relief they seek. The error of the referee was in ms conclusion of law. Instead of granting a new trial, therefore, I think the proper judgment upon the facts found should be ordered here. The facts have been passed upon twice with the same result, first upon the trial of Palmer for murder, and then by the referee in this action. We are, therefore, of opinion that the ends of justice do not require that they should again come in question.
The judgment of the general term, and that entered upon the report of the referee, should, therefore, be reversed, and judgment should be entered as follows: That Elmer E. Palmer and the administrator be enjoined from using any of the personalty or real estate left by the testator for Elmer's benefit; that the devise and bequest in the will to Elmer be declared ineffective to pass the title to him; that by reason of the crime of murder committed upon the grandfather he is deprived of any interest in the estate left by him; that the plaintiffs are the true owners of the real and personal estate left by the testator, subject to the charge in favor of Elmer's mother and the widow of the testator, under the ante-nuptial agreement, and that the plaintiffs have costs in all the courts against Elmer.