Case Name: STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Pamela Sue COLE, Appellant
Court: Minnesota Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Minnesota
Decision Date: 1999-05-11
Citations: 594 N.W.2d 197
Docket Number: No. C1-98-1144
Parties: STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Pamela Sue COLE, Appellant.
Judges: Considered and decided by SHUMAKER, Presiding Judge, RANDALL, Judge, and HARTEN, Judge.
Reporter: North Western Reporter 2d
Volume: 594
Pages: 197–207

Head Matter:
STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Pamela Sue COLE, Appellant.
No. C1-98-1144.
Court of Appeals of Minnesota.
May 11, 1999.
Mike Hatch, Attorney General, James B. Early, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul, for respondent.
John M. Stuart, State Public Defender, Lawrence W. Pry, Assistant Public Defender, Minneapolis, for appellant.
Considered and decided by SHUMAKER, Presiding Judge, RANDALL, Judge, and HARTEN, Judge.

Opinion:
OPINION
HARTEN, Judge.
Appellant was convicted of first degree criminal sexual conduct after statements made by the victim, her three-and-a-half-year-old son, were admitted into evidence. She challenges the district court's admission of these statements. Because we see no abuse of discretion, we affirm.
FACTS
Appellant Pamela Cole is the mother of T.R.C., now six years old. T.R.C. has spent most of his life in foster care, but he visited appellant. In July 1996, while he was living with foster parent Judy Frink, he had three 48-hour visits with appellant. After the third visit, he told Frink, using age-appropriate vocabulary, that he and his mother played games during which she touched his penis and inserted her finger into his anal opening. Frink reported the incident to the county social services department and, at its direction, took T.R.C. to the police station for an interview and to a physician for an examination.
Appellant was charged with one count of criminal sexual conduct in the first degree. Although T.R.C. was ruled incompetent to testify, the videotape of his interview with the police officer was admitted into evidence. The physician, a specialist in child abuse and child sexual abuse, testified that she found a small tear in T.R.C.'s perianal area consistent with child sexual abuse and that, when she asked T.R.C. if anyone had touched him in that area, he answered, "My mother." The physician also told Frink that unsupervised contact with appellant was a possible risk for sexual abuse of T.R.C.
Frink testified that the night after T.R.C. returned from visiting his mother, he said they had played games. Frink asked him what games his mother played, and he replied that he and his mother went under a blanket, that his mother touched his penis and put her finger into his anus, that it bled, and that he did not like it. Over appellant's objection, the testimony of Frink and the physician as to T:R.C.'s statements was admitted.
Appellant challenges her conviction of one count of criminal sexual conduct in the first degree on the ground that evidence of T.R.C.'s statements to Frink, the physician, and the police officer was inadmissible.
ISSUE
Did the district court abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of statements made by a child too young to testify?
ANALYSIS
Rulings on evidentiary matters are within the sound discretion of the trial court. Caldwell v. State, 347 N.W.2d 824, 826 (Minn.App.1984). The trial court admitted evidence of T.R.C.'s statements pursuant to Minn.Stat. § 595.02, subd. 3, (1996) providing that an out-of court statement made by a child under the age of ten concerning sexual abuse is admissible as substantive evidence if:
(a) the court finds ⅜ that the time, content, and circumstances of the statement and the reliability of the person to whom the statement is made provide sufficient indicia of reliability; and
(b) the child either:
(i) testifies at the proceedings; or
(ii) is unavailable as a witness and there is corroborative evidence of the act[.]
State v. Lanam, 459 N.W.2d 656 (Minn.1990), sets out the criteria for reliability:
The court must consider, among other things, the spontaneity of the statements, the consistency of the statements, the knowledge of the declarants, the motives of the declarant and witnesses to speak truthfully and the proximity in time between the statement and the events described. ⅝ The court should evaluate * ⅜ * also any corroborating physical evidence.
Id. at 660. The district court's statements show that these factors were considered. The district court observed that, "I do not hear any argument that the people providing any of this information are unreliable in and of themselves," and found (1) that the time and circumstances of T.R.C.'s statements to Ms. Frink were appropriate, (2) that the time, content, and circumstances of the video interview with the police officer were appropriate, and (3) that T.R.C.'s statements to the physician were for the purpose of medical diagnosis, which was the reason for the examination. In light of these findings, appellant's argument that the findings are "boilerplate" rather than "individualized" is unpersuasive.
Appellant cites Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 108 S.Ct. 2798, 101 L.Ed.2d 857 (1988), to argue that findings must be "individualized." Coy is factually distinguishable; it struck down an Iowa statute designed to protect child victims of sexual abuse by permitting them to testify from behind a screen in part because "there have been no individualized findings that these particular witnesses needed special protection." Id. at 1021, 108 S.Ct. at 2803. Here, witness protection was not an issue.
Finally, appellant argues that it was error for the district court to admit T.R.C.'s statements to the physician under Minn. R. Evid. 803(4) as "statements for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment" because, when the district court accepted the evidence, there was not yet foundation testimony that T.R.C. knew he was speaking to a medical doctor and knew he should tell her the truth. But even if T.R.C.'s statements were inadmissible under Minn. R. Evid. 803(4), they were admissible under Minn.Stat. § 595.02, subd. 3, so any error was harmless.
DECISION
We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting T.R.C.'s statements to his foster mother, the police officer, and the physician.
Affirmed.