Case Name: PEOPLE v. REDWINE
Court: Michigan Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1976-12-10
Citations: 73 Mich. App. 83
Docket Number: Docket No. 27365
Parties: PEOPLE v REDWINE
Judges: Before: Bashara, P. J., and M. F. Cavanagh and D. T. Anderson, JJ.
Reporter: Michigan appeals reports; cases decided in the Michigan Court of Appeals.
Volume: 73
Pages: 83–87

Head Matter:
PEOPLE v REDWINE
Opinion of the Court
1. Criminal Law — Sentences—Indeterminate Sentences — Repeat Offenders — Habitual Criminal — Statutes.
The indeterminate sentencing statute does apply to a defendant who is a repeat offender where the defendant was not charged or convicted under the habitual criminal act (MCLA 769.8, 769.12; MSA 28.1080, 28.1084).
Dissent by D. T. Anderson, J.
2. Criminal Law — Sentencing—Indeterminate Sentences — Statutes — Amendments—Legislative Intent — First Convictions.
The general sentencing statute grants to trial judges the authority to sentence but restricts the penalty so that it will not be greater than the penalty prescribed by law; the general sentencing authority is further limited by the "indeterminate sentence” section of the statute; this is in turn limited to those convicted "for the ñrst time”; the addition of the term "for the ñrst time” to the original statute indicates a legislative intent for this statute to mandate an indeterminate sentence only for a defendant’s ñrst conviction (MCLA 769.1, 769.8; MSA 28.1072, 28.1080).
3. Criminal Law — Sentences—Sentencing Options — Indeterminate Sentences — Determinate Sentences — Discretion.
The sentencing options available to a court are (1) an indeterminate sentence (mandatory) for a ñrst offense, (2) a determinate sentence (discretionary), or an indeterminate sentence, for a second or subsequent offense, and (3) upon special application by the prosecutor, a supplemental determinate or indeterminate sentence for a second, third or fourth offense, with increased máximums.
References for Points in Headnotes
21 Am Jur 2d, Criminal Law §§ 245, 253, 254.
Indeterminate sentence: validity of sentence fixing identical minimum and maximum terms of imprisonment. 29 ALR2d 1344.
Appeal from Genesee, Ollie B. Bivins, Jr., J.
Submitted July 6, 1976, at Lansing.
(Docket No. 27365.)
Decided December 10, 1976.
Leave to appeal applied for.
Larry L. Redwine was convicted, on his plea of guilty, of attempted larceny in a building. Defendant appeals.
Affirmed with modified sentence.
Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Robert A. Derengoski, Solicitor General, Robert F. Leonard, Prosecuting Attorney, and Donald A. Kuebler, Chief, Appellate Division, for the people.
Gary W Brasseur, for defendant.
Before: Bashara, P. J., and M. F. Cavanagh and D. T. Anderson, JJ.
Circuit judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.

Opinion:
M. F. Cavanagh, J.
Defendant pled guilty to attempted larceny in a building, MCLA 750.360; MSA 28.592, and was sentenced to a term of 23 to 24 months in prison. He does not appeal the conviction but only the sentence.
Defendant cites People v Tanner, 387 Mich 683; 199 NW2d 202 (1972), and claims that the sentence imposed violated the indeterminate sentencing act, MCLA 769.8; MSA 28.1080. The people disagree, arguing that the indeterminate sentencing act does not apply to habitual or multiple criminal offenders and rely on People v Ungurean, 51 Mich App 262; 214 NW2d 873 (1974), for the proposition that prior felony convictions preclude the defendant from claiming he is entitled to an indeterminate sentence in this case.
We are persuaded that Ungurean, supra, does not control for two reasons. First, here, unlike Ungurean, the defendant was not charged or con victed under the habitual criminal act, MCLA 769.12; MSA 28.1084. Secondly, the Supreme Court has applied Tanner to cases in which the defendant had committed prior felonies. In the case of People v Haggitt, 33 Mich App 95; 189 NW2d 842 (1971), the defendant had received a 14 year 11 month to 15 year sentence. This Court upheld the sentence on the basis of the "trial court's discretion", which could take into consideration the defendant's prior record. People v Jordan, 33 Mich App 15; 189 NW2d 851 (1971), involved another prior felony offender who had received the same sentence as Haggitt. Judge Levin dissented in both Haggitt and Jordan on the grounds later adopted by the Supreme Court in Tanner. No one discussed the "first conviction" language in the sentencing statute, although Judge Levin argued that since the defendants had not been charged under the habitual criminal act, the sentence could not be upheld by reference to those sections. The Supreme Court reversed both Jordan and Haggitt, and remanded for sentencing in accord with Tanner. 388 Mich 773; 200 NW2d 321 (1972). The issue of prior convictions was never discussed.
Accordingly, defendant's minimum sentence is modified to 16 months pursuant to GCR 1963, 820.1(7). See People v Duffy, 67 Mich App 266; 240 NW2d 771 (1976).
Affirmed as modified.
Bashara, P. J., concurred.