Case Name: SMITH, Appellant, v. McCORMICK et al., Respondents
Court: Montana Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Montana
Decision Date: 1916-04-28
Citations: 52 Mont. 324
Docket Number: No. 3,646
Parties: SMITH, Appellant, v. McCORMICK et al., Respondents.
Judges: Mr. Chief Justice Brantly and Mr. Justice Sanner concur.
Reporter: Montana Reports
Volume: 52
Pages: 324–327

Head Matter:
SMITH, Appellant, v. McCORMICK et al., Respondents.
(No. 3,646.)
(Submitted March 28, 1916.
Decided April 28, 1916.)
[157 Pac. 1010.]
Default Judgments—Setting Aside—Insufficient Showing—Expiration of Time Limit—Cities and Towns—Eire Department —State Eire Marshal—Destruction of Private Property—> Police Power.
Default Judgments—When Vacation Error.
1. Under section 6589, Bevised Codes, a default may not be vacated in any case, upon the expiration of six months after its entry.
Same—-Insufficient Showing.
2. An affidavit in support of a motion to set aside a judgment entered for want of appearance, which did not state when defendant first learned that judgment had been taken against him; that it had been taken through his inadvertence, mistake or excusable neglect; that it exceeded the fair value of the property sued for; or allege facts constituting a defense, held insufficient to move the trial court’s discretion to vacate the judgment'.
[As to- right to have default judgment set aside after satisfaction thereof, see note in Ann. Cas. 1914D, 233.]
Cities and Towns—-Police Power — Destruction of Private Property — State Eire Marshal.
3. To warrant a- city in destroying, through its chief of the fire department, under its police power, or the state fire marshal in ordering destroyed, private property for the public welfare, faets constituting an emergency justifying an invasion of private rights must appear; hence it was no defense, for a chief of a city fire department, in an action to recover damages for the destruction of a building, to aver, without stating facts, that he obeyed the orders of the state fire marshal in acting as he did.
Appeal from District Court, Lewis and Clark County; J. M. Clements, Judge.
Action by Pat P. Smith against’ John F. McCormick and Thomas Daly. From an order setting aside a default judgment on application of defendant Daly, plaintiff appeals.
Reversed.
Mr. Wellington D. Rankin, for Appellant, submitted a brief and argued the cause orally.
Mr. Ed. Horsky, for Respondents, appearing as amicus curiae, submitted a brief and argued the cause orally.

Opinion:
MR. JUSTICE HOLLOWAY
delivered the opinion of the court.
In this action personal service of summons was made upon defendant Daly on August 21, 1913, and his default entered on September 11, for want of an appearance. Thereafter proof was submitted by the plaintiff and a verdict in his favor returned and judgment entered. On June 5, 1914, defendant Daly moved the court to set aside the default and permit him to answer. The motion was granted and plaintiff appealed.
Section 6589, Revised Codes, authorizes a court to set aside a default entered through mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect, provided application therefor be made within a reasonable time, but in no case exceeding six months after such default was entered. In State ex rel. Happel v. District Court, 38 Mont. 166, 129 Am. St. Rep. 636, 35 L. R. A. (n. s.) 1098, 99 Pac. 291, we considered this section, and eon-' eerning its meaning and effect said: "Under the statute (Rev. Codes, sec. 6589), the motion in such cases must be made within a reasonable time after the date of the entry of judgment, but in no case exceeding six months, and the statute is the limit of the court's power in such eases. After the expiration of the time fixed therein, the power of the court over the judgment absolutely ceases, and it is without jurisdiction to vacate or modify it." That construction was approved and adopted in State ex rel. Smotherman v. District Court, 51 Mont. 495, 153 Pac. 1019.
Upon the expiration of six months from the entry of default, the authority of the court over it ceased and the order made more than nine months after September 11, 1914, is void for want of jurisdiction in the court to make it, and for that reason is reversed.
Reversed.
Mr. Chief Justice Brantly and Mr. Justice Sanner concur.