Case Name: STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Douglas KLIPHOUSE, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 2000-09-27
Citations: 771 So. 2d 16
Docket Number: No. 4D99-1608
Parties: STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Douglas KLIPHOUSE, Appellee.
Judges: FARMER, J., dissents with opinion.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 771
Pages: 16–32

Head Matter:
STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Douglas KLIPHOUSE, Appellee.
No. 4D99-1608.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
Sept. 27, 2000.
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Robert R. Wheeler, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellant.
Dan W. Moses, Boca Raton, for appellee.

Opinion:
TAYLOR, J.
The state appeals from an order suppressing the results of a blood alcohol test conducted on a blood sample taken from an unconscious motorist by medical per-s'onnel at the request of the police. We affirm.
Appellee was driving a motorcycle when he was struck by a car and rendered unconscious. A police officer stated that when he arrived at the scene he smelled the odor of alcohol on appellee's breath. After appellee was transported to the hospital, the officer requested medical personnel to withdraw a blood sample to determine appellee's blood alcohol level. Appellee was still unconscious at the time. The results of the blood draw showed a blood alcohol content of .09 percent. Ap-pellee was later charged by information with driving under the influence, in violation of Florida Statutes section 316.193(1) (1997).
Before trial, appellee filed a motion to suppress the blood alcohol results. He contended that the police lacked reasonable cause to have blood involuntarily withdrawn from him. At the hearing on the motion, the parties stipulated that appel-lee's driving was not a contributing cause of the accident and that the only indicia of appellee's impairment was the odor of alcohol on his breath. The trial court granted the motion to suppress the test results, determining that the mere odor of alcohol was insufficient for reasonable cause to believe that appellee was under the influence of alcohol. The state appealed the suppression order and the county court certified two questions of great public importance, which we rephrase as follows:
WHETHER FLORIDA STATUTE SECTION 316.1932(l)(c), WHICH AUTHORIZES A POLICE OFFICER TO ORDER BLOOD TESTING OF A PERSON WHO APPEARS FOR TREATMENT AT A HOSPITAL OR OTHER MEDICAL FACILITY AND IS UNCONSCIOUS AND INCAPABLE OF REFUSING SUCH TESTING, REQUIRES THAT THE OFFICER HAVE REASONABLE CAUSE TO BELIEVE THAT THE PERSON WAS DRIVING OR IN ACTUAL PHYSICAL CONTROL OF A MOTOR VEHICLE WHILE UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGES (OR CHEMICAL OR CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES) TO THE EXTENT THAT HIS OR HER NORMAL FACULTIES WERE IMPAIRED.
DOES THE MERE ODOR OF ALCOHOL ON THE BREATH OF AN UNCONSCIOUS DRIVER, WHO WAS INVOLVED IN AN ACCIDENT NOT IN ANY WAY ATTRIBUTABLE TO SAID DRIVER, WITHOUT OTHER INDICIA OF IMPAIRMENT, GIVE AN OFFICER REASONABLE CAUSE TO BELIEVE THAT THE DRIVER WAS UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF ALCOHOL, WITHIN THE MEANING OF FLORIDA STATUTE SECTION 316.1932(l)(c)?
The legislature has narrowly defined the circumstances in which a blood draw may be performed in place of a breath or urine test without the driver's express consent. One circumstance allowing for forcible extraction of a blood sample is set forth in Florida Statutes section 316.1933(1) (1997). This section authorizes a blood test where an officer has probable cause to believe a driver under the influence of alcoholic beverages has caused death or serious injury to a human being, including himself. The situation presented in this case does not fall within section 316.1933(1), because, as the parties stipulated, the police officer did not reasonably believe that appellee caused the injuries resulting from the accident.
The other circumstance in which a police officer may obtain an involuntary blood .sample is described in section 316.1932(l)(c). The requirements for this section are: (1) reasonable cause to believe the person was driving under the influence of alcoholic beverages or chemical or controlled substances; (2) the person ap pears for treatment at a hospital, clinic,o^ medical facility, and (3) the administration of a breath or urine test is impractical '.or impossible or the person is incapable of refusal due to unconsciousness or other mental or physical condition.
The trial judge correctly determined that- section 316.1932(l)(c) applies to^.the facts in this case. He suppressed thé blood test results, however, because .he ' determined that the requirement for "reasonable cause to believe that the defendant-was under the influence of alcoholic beverages" was not met. In so ruling, the trial court followed the Fifth District Court of; Appeal's definition of "under the influence" in State v. Brown, 725 So.2d 441 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999). In Brown,the district court stated that the phrase "under the influence of alcoholic beverages" is synonymous with being "impaired" by alcohol, and that-bq-ing impaired meant something more than simply having consumed alcohol. Although the trial judge disagreed with this interpretation of "under the influence," Be-. followed it and ruled that the blood sample was illegally obtained from appellee since the mere odor of alcohol on appellee's-' breath did not provide the officer with reasonable cause to believe that he was , under the influence of alcohol. It simply showed that he had consumed alcohol to an unknown extent.
In Brown, the defendant's blood was tested under section 316.1933(1), because" the officer believed that the defendant . caused fatal injuries to a bicyclist while the defendant was driving under the influence, of alcohol. Similar to section ' 316.1932(l)(c), this section requires the officer to have probable cause to believe that the driver was "under the influence of alcoholic- beverages." The fifth district noted that: ;
The .statute does not define what is. meant by 'under the influence of alcoholic beverages,' nor does it go on and say, as does section 316.193 to the extent ; that the person's 'normal faculties are .impaired.' We agree with the trial judge in this case that 'under the influence' means something more than just having consumed an alcoholic beverage.
Id. at 443.
The court in Brawn went on to discuss the meaning of "under the influence" as defined in Black's Law Dictionary:
'Under the influence' . as used by statutes or ordinances, . covers not only all well-known and easily recognized conditions and degrees of intoxication, but any abnormal mental or physical condition which is the result of indulging in any degree in intoxicating liquors, and which tends to deprive one of that clearness of intellect and control of himself which he would otherwise possess. Any condition where intoxicating liquor has so far affected the nervous system, brain or muscles of the driver so as to impair, to an appreciable degree, his ability to operate his automobile in the manner that an ordinary, prudent and cautious man, in full possession of his faculties, using reasonable care, would operate or drive under like condi-Cions.
725 So.2d at 443, quoting Black's Law Dictionary 1369 (5th ed.1979) (emphasis supplied).
; Although the district court reversed the trial court's suppression of the blood alco- - hoi test results in Brown, it did so because of factors present in that case, other than the mere odor of alcohol, that indicated impairment — i.e., the defendant's blood shot eyes, erratic driving pattern, and be"havior after the accident.
We first address the question whether the term "under the influence of alcoliol" means "impaired" by alcohol under Florida Statute section 316.1932(l)(e). In deciding this issue, we apply the cardinal rule of statutory analysis that we must construe a statute to effectuate the intent of, the legislature. See Parker v. State, 406 So.2d 1089, 1092 (Fla.1981); Armstrong v. City of Edgewater, 157 So.2d 422, 425 (Fla.1963). To determine legislative intent, we must view the entire statute and give full effect to all statutory provisions, construing related provisions in harmony with one another. See Young v. Progressive Southeastern Ins. Co., 753 So.2d 80 (Fla.2000); Forsythe v. Longboat Key Beach Erosion Control Dist., 604 So.2d 452 (Fla.1992); State v. Rodriquez, 365 So.2d 157, 159 (Fla.1978).
Section 316.193, Florida Statutes, prohibits a person from driving or being in physical control of a vehicle while under the influence of alcoholic beverages or chemical or controlled substances (DUI). A person is deemed to be under the influence of alcoholic beverages when (1) affected to the extent that the person's normal faculties are impaired or (2) when the person has a blood-alcohol level of 0.08 percent or higher. The Implied Consent Laws (sections 316.1932 through 316.1934) provide procedures for gathering and testing physical evidence for DUI investigations and prosecutions. They require Florida drivers to submit to breath or blood testing to determine the alcohol concentration in their blood at the time of driving.
Although the compulsory administration of a blood test plainly constitutes a "search" of a person, it is well-established that forcible blood extraction from a defendant does not violate the Fourth Amendment prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures when the defendant is under arrest for DUI provided (1) there is probable cause to arrest the defendant for DUI and (2) the blood is extracted in a reasonable manner by medical personnel pursuant to medically approved procedures. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966); State v. Mitchell, 245 So.2d 618 (Fla.1971), receded from on other grounds by, Brackin v. Boles, 452 So.2d 540 (Fla.1984); State v. Slaney, 653 So.2d 422 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995).
In approving the police procedures utilized to obtain blood samples in Schmer-ber, the Supreme Court stressed the fact that the petitioner was under a lawful arrest and that the facts in that case clearly established probable cause for the officers to arrest the petitioner for driving an automobile while under the influence of alcohol. The Court stated:
The interests in human dignity and privacy which the Fourth Amendment protects forbid any such intrusions on the mere chance that desired evidence might be obtained. In the absence of a clear indication that in fact such evidence will be found, these fundamental human interests require law officers to suffer the risk that such evidence may disappear unless there is an immediate search.
Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 769-770, 86 S.Ct. 1826.
The Florida Supreme Court has held that the Fourth Amendment does not require an arrest prior to administering a blood test to an incapacitated or unconscious person treated at a medical facility. Mitchell, 245 So.2d at 623; Filmon v. State, 336 So.2d 586 (Fla.1976). Yet, the court acknowledged the constitutional significance of probable cause for a DUI arrest as a prerequisite for blood testing. Mitchell noted the Supreme Court's conclusion in Schmerber that the involuntary blood withdrawal in that case was not an unreasonable search and seizure because "there was plainly probable cause for the. officer to believe that Schmerber was under the influence of intoxicating liquor:"' Id. at 621. The Mitchell court explained:.
The question is not whether the driver-has been formally placed under arrest at the time the blood sample was taken¡ but whether there was a 'clear indication' of 'relevance and likely success óf a test of petitioner's blood for alcohol' . The officers in the instant case had suffb, cient 'clear indication' that a blood test was called for.
Id. at 622.
It follows, then, that forcible blood extraction under section 316.1932(l)(c) requires a "clear indication" or probable cause that a DUI crime has been committed. For as the Supreme Court stated in» Schmerber, " the facts which established-, probable cause to arrest . also suggested the required relevance and likely success of [i.e., probable cause for] a test of', . blood for alcohol." 384 U.S. at 770, 86 S.Ct. 1826.
In Brown, the fifth district reasoned ". that the probable cause necessary for a search (blood withdrawal) under section 316.1933(1) involves the same findings for probable cause for a DUI arrest. Probable cause for a DUI arrest under section.. 316.193 is based upon a belief that the , driver is under the influence of alcoholic beverages to the extent that his normal faculties are impaired. ' For that reason, the fifth district interpreted the phrase "under the influence of alcoholic beverag-, es" in section 316.1933(1) as equivalent to "impairment" and not the mere consumption of alcohol. Cf. Jackson v. State, 456 So.2d 916 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984).
In Jackson,the First District Court of Appeal reached a different conclusion. It acknowledged that probable cause for a DUI arrest is required under section 316.1933(1) but determined that the phrase "under the influence of alcoholic beverages" is not equivalent to the term "intoxicated" or "impaired." The court stated:
The purpose of the blood test taken under section 316.1933(1) is to aid in determining whether the driver causing a serious automobile accident, when reasonably believed to be under the influence of alcoholic beverages, had his normal faculties impaired by alcohol. The statutory provision contains sufficient requirements to establish' probable ' cause to believe a criminal offense has been committed because, in addition to the required showing that the driver is 'under the influence,' the statute also requires that the driver 'has caused the ♦ death or serious bodily injury of a human being.'
Id. at 919.
Thus, the first district determined that evidence that a person has been drinking alcohol, coupled with evidence that the person has caused a serious or fatal accident, is enough to provide an officer with probable cause to believe that the person has committed a DUI offense. In other words, drinking alcohol plus causing an accident equal probability of impairment. Citing Jackson, we reached a similar conclusion in State v. Cesaretti 632 So.2d 1105 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994). In Cesaretti we reversed the suppression of blood alcohol test results upon determining that the .smell of alcohol on the driver's breath, along with evidence that the driver had caused serious bodily injury, gave the officer sufficient probable cause to request a blood test under section 316.1933(1).
We point out, however, that the blood sample in this case was ordered under a different statute. Unlike section 316.1933(1), the section applicable to the blood draw herein, section 316.1932(l)(c), doés'not require that the driver cause death or serious bodily injury to someone. It merely requires that the driver be "under the influence of alcoholic beverages," in need of medical treatment, and unable to'take a breath or urine test. There is no "accident" factor that can provide a reliable indicator of impairment — i.e, dangerous or erratic driving. Without the addi tional "causing serious injury" factor found in section 316.1933(1), this statute does not contain sufficient requirements for probable cause to believe a crime has been committed, unless driving "under the influence of alcoholic beverages" is interpreted to include the phrase "to the extent that normal faculties are impaired or blood or breath alcohol level is .08 or higher." Probable cause for a DUI arrest must be based upon more than a belief that a driver has consumed alcohol; it must arise from facts and circumstances that show a probability that a driver is impaired by alcohol or has an unlawful amount of alcohol in his system. Once established, probable cause can then provide the means for measuring degrees of impairment or blood alcohol concentration through breath or blood testing.
We conclude that section 316.1932(l)(c) requires a police officer to have "reasonably trustworthy information" sufficient to cause a person of reasonable caution to believe that the driver is under the influence of alcoholic beverages to the extent that the driver's normal faculties are impaired or the driver's blood or breath alcohol level is .08 or higher. Although section 316.1932(l)(c) contains no express language corresponding to the statutory elements of DUI, we find that such additional language is necessarily implicit in the reasonable cause requirement of this section in order for compulsory blood withdrawals to comport with Fourth Amendment principles.
Furthermore, construing the two subsections, (a) and (c) of section 316.1932, in pari materia to ascertain legislative intent, we think it is clear that the legislature intended that reasonable or probable cause for a DUI arrest exist prior to administering compulsory blood tests under this statute. The statutory language evinces legislative intent that a subsection (c) blood test serve only as a substitute for a subsection (a) breath or urine test. Its use by law enforcement officers without express consent is permitted as a matter of convenience and only when the driver's physical or mental condition is such that the administration of a breath or urine test is. impractical or impossible. Significantly, subsection (a) requires an actual arrest before an officer can request a breath or urine test. In not requiring an arrest for blood testing, which arguably involves a greater intrusion into personal privacy, the legislature foresaw "the difficulty and inu-tility of attempting to arrest an unconscious person or one in shock or on the operating table of a hospital." Mitchell, 245 So.2d at 622. However, we do not believe it intended to omit probable cause for a DUI arrest as a prerequisite to compulsory blood testing, and, thereby, set a lesser standard for police conduct than that required by the Fourth Amendment. We, therefore, answer the first certified question in the affirmative.
We next consider whether the mere odor of alcohol on the breath of the unconscious driver, who was determined not to have caused or contributed "to the accident that led to serious injuries, furnished reasonable cause to believe that the driver was under the influence of alcohol to the extent that his normal faculties were impaired.
In suppressing the results of the blood test, the trial judge found that "the mere odor of alcohol only shows that alcohol was relatively recently imbibed by the defendant" and that the officer "could not possibly determine, from the facts of this case, that the defendant was impaired by alco- hoi,'no matter how strongly an alcoholic odor may exist on [his] breath." As the trial court observed, the presence of an odor of alcohol alone is generally not considered an accurate and reliable measure of impairment and, thus, is rarely deemed sufficient for a finding of probable cause. Usually, the odor of alcohol must be combined with other factors. See Demers and Gayle, Florida DUI Handbook § 4.6(c)-(1999). While the odor of alcohol on' a driver's breath is considered a critical factor, .other components central to developing probable cause may include the defendant's reckless or dangerous operation of a vehicle, slurred speech, lack of balance or.. dexterity, flushed face, bloodshot eyes, admissions, and poor performance on field sobriety exercises. As the fifth district explained in State v. Brown, 725 So.2d 441, 444 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999):
Whether a person has consumed sufficient alcohol to be deemed 'under the influence' or impaired to an appreciable .degree . is a judgment call made by a police officer. It must be based on objective facts and circumstances observed by the officer at the time and place of the accident, and reliable information given to the officer by others . Further, Florida courts require that the underlying facts, circumstances and information be sufficient to allow a person of reasonable caution to make the probable «'cause determination.
(Citations omitted).
"In this case, witnesses at the scene of the accident reported that appellee had been operating his motorcycle in a safe arid normal manner for several miles before the accident and that he did not cause the accident that led to his injuries. The driver of the other vehicle was cited for violating a traffic control device and colliding with appellee. Other than the odor of alcohol on appellee's breath, the police officer was unable to observe anything else about appellee's conduct or appearance that would justify a reasonable inference that his normal faculties were impaired at the time of driving .or that he had an. unlawful blood alcohol level. Thus, there was no "clear indication" of the "relevance and likely success of a test of [appellee's] blood for alcohol."
We, therefore, agree with the trial court's ruling that the sole evidence of an odor of alcohol on appellee's breath was insufficient reasonable cause for the officer to believe that appellee was "under the influence" of alcoholic beverages and subject him to a blood draw under section 316.1932(l)(c), Florida Statutes. Accordingly, we answer the second certified question in the negative, but limit our holding to cases with the unique circumstances presented in this case, wherein the investigating officer possesses no information about the driver that indicates impairment by alcohol, other than the odor of alcohol on the driver's breath, and, where having completed an accident investigation, the officer can conclusively rule out the defendant as a sole or contributing cause of the accident.
For the reasons stated above, we affirm the order suppressing appellee's blood alcohol test results.
AFFIRMED.
FARMER, J., dissents with opinion.
KLEIN, J., concurs specially with opinion.
. In 1996, the legislature amended subsection (c) of Florida Statutes section 316.1932(1) and inserted the requirement for "reasonable . cause to believe the person was driving or in actual physical control of a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcoholic bever- ' ages ."
. DUI may be established in two ways: by proof of impaired normal faculties or proof of unlawful blood or breath alcohol level. See Dejerez v. State, 580 So.2d 656 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991); see also State v. Rolle, 560 So.2d 1154 (Fla. 1990).
. The blood sample obtained in Mitchell was authorized under Florida Statutes section 322.261(1)(b) (1989), a predecessor to section 316.1932(1)(c). See also Kenson v. State, 577 So.2d 694 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991)(under section 316.1932 an arrest is not a prerequisite for a blood test request).
. States are privileged under their state law to adopt higher, but not lower, standards for police conduct than those required by the Fourth Amendment. State v. Slaney, 653 So.2d 422, 425 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995), citing Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 62, 87 S.Ct. 788, 17 L.Ed.2d 730 (1967). However, 1982 amendments to Article I, section 12, Florida Constitution, require Florida's search and seizure laws to conform with all decisions of the United States Supreme Court rendered both before and subsequent to the adoption of the amendment. Bernie v. State, 524 So.2d 988 (Fla.1988).
. See, State v. Kolb, 7 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 548 (Fla. 12th Jud. Cir.2000)("It is uncontra-dicted that odor alone is evidence of nothing more than the subject had, at some point, ingested a beverage that may have contained alcohol. Even a trained law enforcement officer cannot determine how much a person has had'to drink, or when, simply from the odor of alcohol. Certainly, the odor, without more, is no indication of impairment."); State v. Longacre, 2 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 571 (Fla. 11th Jud. Cir.l994)(odor of alcohol, without evidence of impairment, not sufficient to establish probable cause necessary to require driver to submit to field sobriety test); Davis v. State, 40 Fla. Supp.2d 35, 36 (Fla. 15th Jud. Cir.1989); State v. Marshall, 36 Fla. Supp.2d 34, 35 (Fla. 4th Jud. Cir.l989)(mere odor of_ alcohol, absent other sufficient indicia of impairment, does not provide requisite probable cause' for field sobriety tests); Chait v. State,. 27 Fla. Supp.2d 115 (Fla. 11th Cir.1988)(traf-fic accident and odor of alcohol, without more, did not constitute probable cause for DUI arrest); People v. Roybal, 655 P.2d 410, 413 (Colo.1982)(odor of alcoholic beverages is not ineonsistent with ability to operate a motor vehicle in compliance with the law).
. State v. Cesaretti, 632 So.2d 1105 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994)(officer had cause to request blood test of motorist who had odor of alcohol on her breath and caused serious bodily injury);' State v. Silver, 498 So.2d 580 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986)(officer authorized to order blood sample from defendant who had odor of alcohol on breath and was driver of vehicle involved in traffic fatality); Williams v. State, 731 So.2d 48 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999)(smell of alcohol on defendant's breath, coupled with traffic fatality and statement that defendant was driver, gave officer probable cause to draw defendant's blood); State v. Brown, 725 So.2d 441 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999) (police had probable cause to order blood test of driver who had collided with bicyclist and officer observed that driver had odor of alcohol on breath and blood-shot eyes); Keeton v. State, 525 So.2d 912 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988)(probable cause to administer blood test existed where officers smelled strong odor of alcoholic beverages on defendant's breath and defendant operated vehicle which caused at least one death); Jackson v. State, 456 So.2d 916 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984)(state met burden of proving probable cause where trooper smelled alcohol on defendant's breath and knew defendant was driver of motor vehicle which caused a death).
. See Mendez v. State, 678 So.2d 388 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996)(upon completion of field sobriety tests, officer developed probable cause to arrest defendant for DUI and search his vehicle incident to a lawful arrest).