Case Name: The People of the State of New York ex rel. Press Publishing Company v. James J. Martin and Others, Commissioners, etc.
Court: New York Supreme Court, General Term
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1893-10
Citations: 79 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 354
Docket Number: 
Parties: The People of the State of New York ex rel. Press Publishing Company v. James J. Martin and Others, Commissioners, etc.
Judges: O’Brien, J., concurred.
Reporter: Supreme Court Reports (Hun)
Volume: 79
Pages: 354–369

Head Matter:
The People of the State of New York ex rel. Press Publishing Company v. James J. Martin and Others, Commissioners, etc.
Certiorari — where a board is authorised to act on the “ best information” it can obtain.
In a proceeding by certiorari to review the action of tlie police commissioners of tlie city of New York in designating certain newspapers, it appeared that tlie relator published in the city of New York a newspaper known as the World; that the defendants composed the board of police commissioners of the city of New York, and were authorized by statute to designate at least two newspapers in which were to be published a list of the candidates for election; that the statute provided for the selection by the board, under certain limitations, of the papers having the largest circulation in the city of New York, and that this was to he determined by “the best information the board can obtain.”
Tlie relator furnished, certain evidence of the circulation of its papers, and on the last day, when the board was about to determine the question, furnished additional evidence (an affidavit) showing that it had the largest circulation.
Held, that the statute left to the board the decision as to what sources of information it might consider best, and did not restrict it to legal evidence. (Follett, J., dissenting.)
That an affidavit presented at the last moment that the board had authority to act could not form the foundation of a reversal of its decision.
Semble (per Follett, J.), that the action of the board was judicial and subject to review; that the relator had a sufficient interest in the question to enable it to prosecute this proceeding, and that the fact that the time within which the lists were to be published had expired did not require a dismissal of the writ.
Certiorari issued out of the Supreme Court and attested November 2, 1892, directed to James J. Martin, diaries E. MacLean, John M'cClave and Jolm C. Slieehan, as police commissioners of the city of New York, constituting the board of police commissioners of the city of New York, commanding them to-certify and return to this court their proceedings in relation to the designation of four newspapers published in the city of New York for the publication of the list of all nominations of candidates for offices to be filled at the election to be held in the city of New York on November 8, 1892, with all things appertaining thereto, and any rules or regulations prescribed by the board of police commissioners of the city of New York relating to such designation, etc.
The statute under which the action sought to be reviewed was taken reads as follows :
“ One of such publications shall be made in a newspaper which advocates the principles of the political party that at the last preceding election cast the largest number of votes in the State, and another of such publications shall be made in a newspaper which advocates the principles of the political party that at tlie last preceding election cast the next largest number of votes in the State.
“ The clerk or board in selecting the respective papers for such publication shall select those which, according to the best information he can obtain, have the largest circulation within such county or city. In making additional publications the clei’k or board shall keep in view the object of giving information so far as possible ■ to the voters of all political parties; and in no event shall additional publications be made in two newspapers representing the same political party.”
J. If. Bowers, for the appellant.
G. L. Sterling, for the respondent.

Opinion:
Yan Brunt, P. J.:
I cannot agree in the conclusion at which Mr. Justice Follett has arrived in the case at bar.
It will be observed that in the statutes considered and the cases cited by Him the language was essentially different from the statute under which this proceeding arises. In the case of The People v. Brennan (39 Barb. 651), the language of the statute (Chap. 227, Laws of 1863, §2) was: "No portion of the sums which shall hereafter be raised by taxes or assessments in said city and county of New York shall be paid for advertising, except the same shall have been incurred for advertisements in the newspapers authorized by the mayor and comptroller of said city, who shall designate four jiapers having the largest daily circulation, and any six others in their discretion, not to exceed ten in all." The mayor insisted that the term " daily circulation " meant the largest general circulation, and the comptroller that it meant the largest circulation within the city; and the question discussed by the court was as to which of these contentions was correct.
It is true that in discussing the question it was said: " But as the determination of the question of fact which four papers have the largest daily circulation, involves the consideration of evidence, and an adjudication upon such evidence by the mayor and the comptroller, we do not see upon what principle a mandamus can issue corn-man ding the comptroller to unite with the mayor in designating four certain papers, naming them in the mandamus." But, as already suggested, the language then under consideration was essentially different from the one under which this application arises.
By the law of 1863 the mayor and comptroller were compelled to designate four papers having the largest daily circulation. There Avas no provision as to Avhat evidence or proof they should take, in order to establish the fact of circulation, and the courts held that they were bound to take evidence upon that point, which necessarily meant legal evidence, and to decide upon such evidence.
In the case at bar, the provision of the statute is, that the board in selecting the respective papers for such publication shall select those which, according to the best information the board can obtain, have the lai'gest circulation within said city, clearly giving the board the greatest latitude as to the sources from, which information is to be derived, and expressly excluding the idea that legal evidence only could be acted upon. This statute -was passed and this,language was used, evidently because of the difficulties arising from the strict phraseology of the act of 1863 and other acts of a similar character; and it was the manifest intention of the Legislature to give the board greater discretionary powers than those which either of these previous acts had conferred.
So in the case of The People ex rel. Francis v. Common Council of Troy (78 N. Y. 33), section 3 of title 2 of chapter 813 of the Laws of 1873 was under consideration, which provided that the common council shall designate not to exceed four papers, having the largest circulation in the city, in which said advertising shall be done. And in that case it was held that no mode of ascertaining which papers have the largest circulation being pointed out, the question was left open as one of fact to be determined by the common council, and that the determination of such question of fact was a judicial duty, and though the common council might be compelled by mandamus to determine the facts, it could not be directed to decide in a particular way, however clearly it might be made to apj>ear what the decision ought to be. It appeared in that case that the common council designated the papers without any evidence before it as to which had the largest circulation, and it was held that it was the duty of the council to make the designation on evidence, and that its duties were judicial and not ministerial.
But in the case at bar they are not restricted to evidence, but are to get the best information they may obtain, thus leaving it discretionary with the board as to what sources of infonnation they may consider to be the best. Because the court is of the opinion that better information may be obtained, it cannot control the judgment of the board as to what it considers best.
And furthermore, in the case at bar, the relator had furnished proof which was clearly insufficient to entitle it to the designation ; and at the last meeting of the board on the last day on which the designation could be made, they presented additional and amended affidavits claiming that the board, without having any opportunity to test in any respects tbe statements therein contained, was bound to accept them in their entirety. I do not think, after this relator had presented its evidence, and the board was acting upon it, upon the last day in which it had any authority to act, that the presentation to it of an affidavit can form the foundation of a reversal of such action. Such a ruling would make it impossible for the board to guard against the presentation of alleged facts which might have no existence in reality, or to apply any ordinary tests to only alleged proof in order to ascertain its value.
.1 am of the opinion that the writ should be dismissed.
O'Brien, J., concurred.