Case Name: BORDEN, INC. v. Billy C. ESKRIDGE
Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Mississippi
Decision Date: 1991-11-20
Citations: 604 So. 2d 1071
Docket Number: No. 89-CC-0787
Parties: BORDEN, INC. v. Billy C. ESKRIDGE.
Judges: ROY NOBLE LEE, C.J., and PRATHER, ROBERTSONi SULLIVAN and BANKS, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 604
Pages: 1071–1079

Head Matter:
BORDEN, INC. v. Billy C. ESKRIDGE.
No. 89-CC-0787.
Supreme Court of Mississippi.
Nov. 20, 1991.
Concurring Opinion Aug. 19, 1992.
Rehearing Denied Aug. 19, 1992.
Dan McCullen, R. Andrew Taggart, Butler Snow, O’Mara, Stevens & Cannada, for appellant.
H.J. Davidson, Jr., Carter & Davidson, Columbus, for appellee.

Opinion:
HAWKINS, Presiding Justice,
for the Court:
Borden, Inc., has appealed a judgment of the circuit court of Oktibbeha County affirming a total temporary disability award by the Mississippi Workers Compensation Commission (the Commission) to Billy Charles Eskridge for a "major depression of psychotic proportions." Borden argues on appeal that this mental disability unaccompanied by any physical injury, even if work related, is nevertheless non-eompen-sable because it could only have resulted from "ordinary incidents of employment." Fought v. Stuart C. Irby, 523 So.2d 314, 318 (Miss.1988). The administrative law judge and the Commission (one member dissenting) found, however, that a proximate cause of Eskridge's disability was not an incident of ordinary employment, but a "course of conduct" on the part of Borden's plant supervisor Láveme Kinard "de signed to cause the claimant and his wife to leave the employment of Borden, Inc." There was substantial evidence supporting this finding by the Commission, and we affirm.
FACTS
Eskridge is a high school graduate with almost three years in college. While in college he worked summers at Borden's plant in Starkville. After two years service in the United States Navy, he worked two or three years in his father's sawmill, and began full-time employment at Borden's in 1960 as a manual laborer, working as janitor, loading boxcars and packaging. In 1968 he was made supervisor of the cleaning crew and sanitation. In July, 1972, he was promoted to assistant plant superintendent.
At that time Kinard was promoted to plant superintendent.
Eskridge served as assistant plant superintendent until 1979, when he was demoted to quality control supervisor. David Ho-vet, an assistant manager at a Borden potato chip factory in North Dakota, was imported to replace Eskridge. In July, 1980, Eskridge was again demoted to supervisor in shipping and receiving, being replaced by Bill McNeil, who was promoted from shipping and receiving to quality control supervisor.
Eskridge's wife June, who worked in the Borden office for 22 years prior to quitting in August, 1983, testified that in June, 1978, while she and Kinard were in the coffee room at the plant, he kissed her on the neck. She told him to be affectionate with his own wife. She testified that thereafter Kinard began to ignore her husband. She also heard Kinard tell Norman Stone, a company executive, that the "red-headed so-b," referring to Eskridge, was not going to stay, one or the other had to leave. She also overheard other disparaging remarks Kinard made about Eskridge.
Likewise, following the coffee room incident, there was a precipitate cooling of Kinard towards Mrs. Eskridge, and he avoided any conversation with her. She never told her husband about the Kinard advance.
Eskridge began keeping a diary in 1978. Kinard chastised Eskridge in the presence of an engineer from company headquarters in Columbus, Ohio, for not getting a lock for a control panel, and would not let him explain. In the installation of the vacuum pan, Kinard ignored Eskridge's efforts to assist. Kinard stopped inviting him to the Mississippi Dairy Products annual conventions on the coast. He was shunned by Kinard and the other plant supervisors, and never invited to their coffee room discussions. All other supervisors were invited to informal gatherings.
Kinard never gave Eskridge any reason for the demotions, and would not discuss Eskridge's problems with him. Eskridge called company headquarters in Columbus, Ohio, who informed him the company would back Kinard's decisions. Only in September, 1983, after he and his wife had both quit their jobs did a representative of the company come to Eskridge's home and listen to his complaints.
Eskridge testified that it was increasingly difficult to work under Kinard because of his attitude. Although his pay was not reduced, neither did he receive pay raises as the others. He was required to fill in for other supervisors on vacation or leave, requiring longer work hours. His work load was not reduced, and he was given more responsibilities. A rumor circulated through the plant in 1982 that he and his wife were going to be fired. He lived in fear of being fired, and his fellow employees lost respect for him. When he asked an employee to do a task, he would be told he was not in authority.
Eskridge was overweight and had high blood pressure for which he began taking regular medication in 1977.
He admitted having run-ins with other supervisors, and that he made mistakes.
A series of performance reports prepared by Kinard were introduced into evidence. Eskridge's 1978 report showed "very good" performance and that his potential was developing. The 1979-1982 reports were crit ical and stated he was not a candidate for promotion.
Eskridge stated that Kinard's treatment of him caused him to be nervous, anxious, inattentive, unable to sleep, and depressed.
On Friday, January, 28, 1983, when Esk-ridge was in a Sturgis cafe following work hours, his blood pressure went up to stroke level, and he blacked out. He was examined by his doctor, Kermit Laird, M.D., and a friend took him home. Eskridge reported this blackout spell to Borden the following Monday. Thereafter Eskridge had increasing dizzy spells, irritability and nervousness, and recurring nightmares.
In March, 1983, Dr. Laird referred Esk-ridge to Earl Sudduth, M.D., a Jackson internist, who, after hospitalizing Eskridge and having tests run, diagnosed his problem as acute toxic labyrinthitis, hypertension and mild obesity.
In May Dr. Laird referred Eskridge to Allen Boyd, M.D., a Memphis neurologist. Dr. Boyd had Eskridge hospitalized for eight days, beginning May 12, for tests. He found no evidence of any neurological disorder.
Eskridge quit work on May 31, 1983. At the time he was 51 years old. Mrs. Esk-ridge quit her job in August.
In July, 1983, Dr. Boyd referred Esk-ridge to Melvyn Levitch, M.D., a board certified psychiatrist, who treated him over the next two and a half years. From the history Eskridge gave him and his examination of Eskridge, he found him to be a very depressed and anxious person, emotion-filled and on the verge of being violent. He placed Eskridge on anti-depressant drugs, and had him admitted to the Baptist Hospital in Memphis for psychological testing.
Dr. Levitch testified that Eskridge suffered from a major depression of psychotic proportions. He was overwhelmed with a sense of helplessness, hopelessness and feeling of being worthless. He stated Esk-ridge was unable to withstand pressure or stress of any sort. Beginning with his treatment in July, 1983, Eskridge's condition had only improved slightly, and his prognosis was guarded. He was of the opinion that Eskridge was totally disabled from doing any management type job, but could work around the house or farm so long as no one was there to agitate him.
Dr. Levitch was of the professional opinion that Eskridge's condition of employment was a significant cause of his mental illness. He found no other etiological factor in Eskridge's condition.
There were employees at the plant who corroborated Eskridge's testimony, and Ki-nard and other Borden employees hotly disputed Eskridge's claims. There is no occasion to detail this evidence because there was substantial evidence supporting the above-related facts.
On January 17, 1985, Eskridge filed a petition to controvert with the Commission, alleging he had suffered a compensable injury on January 28, 1983. Hearing was held in May, 1986, following which the administrative law judge awarded Eskridge temporary total disability weekly benefits of $112 until he reached maximum recovery. The Commission, one member dissenting, affirmed.
LAW
I. COMPENSABLE DISABILITY
As we stated in Fought:
Today's case arises in an area that has not been without controversy. Many would deny compensability of mental or psychological injuries altogether, as they are difficult to prove both in experience and work connection. As proof is difficult, feigning and malingering are thought easy, thus opening the system to fraud.
523 So.2d at 317.
When a worker seeks compensation benefits for disability resulting from a mental or psychological injury, he must not only prove a (1) disability that is (2) work-related, but also, (3) and again as we stated in Fought:
Furthermore, to be compensable, a mental injury, unaccompanied by physical trauma, must have been caused by some thing more than the ordinary incidents of employment. (Emphasis added)
523 So.2d at 318.
Also, as in Fought, "this appeal turns in the end on the Commission's finding of fact." 523 So.2d at 318.
As we have stated upon numerous occasions, the Commission is the "trier and finder of facts" and will not be reversed if its findings of fact are supported by "substantial evidence." Dunn, Mississippi Workers' Compensation, § 284, 286, 288, 289 (3rd ed. 1982); Fought, 523 So.2d at 317.
The claimant Fought sought, as did Esk-ridge, workers' compensation benefits for psychological disability unaccompanied by any physical trauma. The significant difference between Fought and this case is that in Fought the Commission found as fact that Fought had failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that: (1) there was a connection between her work and disability, and also (2) that her mental disability was attributable to a pre-existing personality disorder.
In this case, the administrative law judge found that Borden's course of conduct aggravated Eskridge's pre-existing condition. The Commission, however, found that Eskridge's mental disability was caused by a deliberate course of conduct by his employer, and that there was nothing in his psychological background to suggest a pre-existing personality disorder.
There is substantial credible evidence to support the Commission's findings, and we are not persuaded by Borden's argument to the contrary. Dr. Levitch, a reputable board certified psychiatrist who treated Eskridge for over two years, testified that Eskridge was psychologically disabled and his work played a significant part in causing it. Testimony from Eskridge and his wife, corroborated in part by fellow employees, established a protracted pattern by Kinard to put pressure and stress upon Eskridge. It takes no extraordinary discernment to detect in a man of Eskridge's age, skill and one-industry training, ample reason for a normal person to be under stress and pressure because of an inability, through no fault of his own, to please his employer and a prospect at advanced middle age of joining the ranks of the unemployed.
In fairness, we add that there was substantial credible evidence to support the opposite conclusion. Unfortunately for Borden, the Commission as fact finder, as in Brown & Root Const. Co. v. Duckworth, 475 So.2d 813 (Miss.1985), found a compensable mental disability, and under our standard of appellate review, we are not at liberty to reverse this finding. The Commission obviously found, contrary to its finding in Fought, 523 So.2d at 318, that stresses to which Eskridge was subjected were "more than the ordinary incidents of employment," and were "untoward events or unusual occurrences" culminating in his blackout on January 28, 1983, and subsequent disability.
II. CREDIT FOR SALARY AND PENSION PLAN BENEFITS PAID
III. IS ANY PENALTY DUE?
Borden, a self-insurer, also had in effect a long term disability benefit plan whereby Eskridge was paid $1,070.40 per month. Under the plan Eskridge was to receive sixty percent of his yearly salary payable twice each month, but in computing this sum, all sums paid him by workers' compensation benefits and social security income disability benefits were to be included. After adding these, the pension plan paid the remainder in order to reach a sum equal to sixty percent of his monthly salary. Borden began paying Eskridge benefits under the plan, and subsequently Esk-ridge began receiving social security income disability benefits. When Eskridge began receiving these benefits, the monthly payments under the plan were reduced accordingly. The plan in effect with Borden was analogous to the plans we addressed in Western Electric, Inc. v. Ferguson, 371 So.2d 864, 868 (Miss.1979), and South Central Bell Telephone Company v. Aden, 474 So.2d 584, 596 (Miss.1985).
Paragraph 2 of the order of the administrative law judge concluded with the following sentence:
Any benefits paid to claimant as a result of a long term disability benefits plan and for any salary paid to the claimant for periods of time since the 28th day of January, 1983, during which the claimant might have worked for the employer should also be credited against money owed the claimant in compensation benefits.
Borden appealed to the Commission on the issue of whether or not there was a com-pensable injury and Eskridge cross-appealed only on the issue of credits for disability payments.
The Commission's order concluded as follows:
1. Temporary total disability benefits at the rate of $112.00 per week beginning January 25, 1983, and continuing until such time as the date of maximum medical recovery is established by competent medical evidence; and
2. All medical services and supplies required by the nature of claimant's injury or the process of his recovery as provided in Miss.Code Ann., Section 71-3-15 (1972).
IT IS ALSO ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that a ten percent (10%) penalty shall be assessed on untimely installments of compensation pursuant to Miss.Code Ann., Section 71-3-37(5) (1972). (Emphasis added)
Rather than seek clarification from the Commission on its order, Borden upon appeal informs us that it is not sure what the Commission meant in its order, insofar as credits due for payments made in salary to Eskridge and the amounts paid him under the pension plan.
If there is something about a Commission order which is unclear to the parties, that forum is the proper place to get the matter clarified. Moreover, the question as to how benefits are to be applied as between carrier and pension plans is for another forum.
Accordingly, we do not address Borden's assignment of error as to credits for salary and pension plan payments.
Borden also objects to the assessment of any statutory penalty. The Commission did not assess any penalty on disability payments due under the Act, but "untimely installments," i.e., installments due but not paid in some way, either compensation benefits, or by salary or under the pension plan. As provided in Miss. Code Ann. § 71-3-37(5), Borden is only liable for the ten percent statutory penalty on any installment "not paid within fourteen (14) days after it becomes due." The Commission only assessed a penalty .on delinquent installments.
The circuit judge affirmed the order of the Commission. Finding the order of the Commission supported by substantial evidence and containing no reversible error, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court.
AFFIRMED AND REMANDED TO THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS CONSISTENT WITH THIS OPINION.
ROY NOBLE LEE, C.J., and PRATHER, ROBERTSONi SULLIVAN and BANKS, JJ., concur.
McRAE, J., specially concurs with written opinion to follow.
DAN M. LEE, P.J., and PITTMAN, J., dissent with separate written opinion.