Case Name: Victor RALOSKY, Appellant, v. DYNAMIC BUILDERS, INC. and Hanover Insurance Company, Appellees
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1986-09-16
Citations: 500 So. 2d 193
Docket Number: No. BI-349
Parties: Victor RALOSKY, Appellant, v. DYNAMIC BUILDERS, INC. and Hanover Insurance Company, Appellees.
Judges: SHIVERS, J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 500
Pages: 193–197

Head Matter:
Victor RALOSKY, Appellant, v. DYNAMIC BUILDERS, INC. and Hanover Insurance Company, Appellees.
No. BI-349.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
Sept. 16, 1986.
Rehearing Denied Oct. 14, 1986.
Craig F. Hall of Hall & Hall, Gainesville, for appellant.
Jack A. Langdon, Gainesville, for appel-lees.

Opinion:
ERVIN, Judge.
In this workers' compensation appeal, claimant contends that the deputy commissioner erred in finding no causal connection between his work-related accident and injuries to his feet, thereby denying his claim for medical benefits. We reverse.
Claimant was injured in a compensable automobile accident on June 21, 1983, resulting in his complaints of pain mainly to his lower back, and numbness running down his toes. For three months following the accident, claimant followed a regimen of complete bed rest. During this period, he testified that he did not put weight on his feet more than three times a day. Claimant did not, however, complain of pain in his feet until almost a year following the accident, just a few days before his office visit with a podiatrist, Dr. Guidice.
Dr. Guidice testified that he initially examined claimant on June 20,1984, at which time claimant complained of pain in both his feet and legs. Dr. Guidice observed the presence of large calluses on both claimant's feet and concluded that this condition was the result of claimant's attempts to modify the weight distribution on his feet to relieve pain and discomfort. Dr. Guidice also found evidence of healed fractures with osteoporotic changes in both feet. According to Dr. Guidice's testimony, there was no other reason for this condition absent some kind of injury or insult. Dr. Guidice commented that it was not uncommon for a competent, treating physician to overlook fractures of the feet, and that claimant's lower back pain, which required medication, would have a tendency to mask pain in other areas of the body, such as the feet. He added that it was not unusual for the type of fractures that claimant had sustained to exhibit itself some two to six months following the accident, concluding that claimant's foot condition was consistent with the history given of the trauma— the compensable automobile accident.
Claimant's initial treating physician, Dr. Urban, a specialist in ambulatory and minor emergency care, testified that his records of claimant's office visits in June and July 1983 failed to disclose that claimant had complained of foot pain, or that there was anything else at that time to place him on notice that claimant had sustained any injury to his feet, in that claimant was then walking without aid. When confronted with Dr. Guidice's testimony, Dr. Urban responded that one would suspect clinically with reasonable certainty that the fractures would render ambulation extremely difficult. Dr. Urban, however, conceded that he would accept Dr. Guid-ice's opinion as to claimant's problem and that claimant's back pain may have masked pain in his feet.
Dr. Waters first treated claimant on November 14, 1983, and diagnosed his condition as chronic, low back pain syndrome. He, like Dr. Urban, testified that he had no record of foot pain during claimant's initial office visit. Later, however, he related that claimant complained of extreme foot pain. Thereafter, Dr. Waters examined claimant's feet but did not take any x-rays. Although he admitted that claimant's foot problems could be related to the automobile accident, he nonetheless was of the view that it would be highly unlikely for claimant to be unaware of any pain to his feet, if, in fact, the fractures had occurred during the accident.
After reviewing the record before us, we must conclude that the deputy's order denying medical benefits was in error. If the order were governed solely by the competent, substantial evidence rule, we would have no alternative but to affirm. The evidence — although conflicting — reveals that Dr. Urban was of the view that one would suspect, with reasonable medical certainty that a person who had sustained the type of fractures that claimant alleged he had suffered in the work-related accident would have difficulty ambulating shortly after the accident. Dr. Waters, moreover, similar to Dr. Urban, felt it was highly unlikely that claimant was not aware of pain to his feet until several months after-wards, if in fact claimant sustained the fractures at the time of the accident.
The issue before us, however, does not depend simply upon whether the findings on review are supported by competent, substantial evidence. We are asked to decide whether the deputy's finding that there was no causal relationship between the claimant's industrial accident and the injuries to his feet is legally supported by the evidence. In a case such as that at bar, "[w]here an injury is shown, and the evidence presents a sufficiently logical explanation of a causal relationship between the accident and the subsequent injury, the burden shifts to the employer/carrier to show a more logical cause." Poorman v. Muncy & Bartle Painting, 433 So.2d 1371, 1372 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983). Accord, McNew v. Southern Intermodal Logistics, 380 So.2d 1145, 1147 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980). Here claimant produced a sufficiently logical explanation through the testimony of Dr. Guidice that the injury to his feet was caused by the automobile accident. The employer/carrier failed to present any evidence establishing a more logical cause for the injury, other than the work-related accident, which was supported by the medical testimony disclosing extensive injuries to other parts of his body. Under the circumstances presented, the deputy erred in denying the claim for medical benefits.
REVERSED.
SHIVERS, J., concurs.
THOMPSON, J., dissents with written opinion.