Case Name: Calvin J. LEONARD, Jr. v. JAMES INDUSTRIAL CONSTRUCTORS
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 2004-05-14
Citations: 879 So. 2d 724
Docket Number: No. 2003 CA 0040
Parties: Calvin J. LEONARD, Jr. v. JAMES INDUSTRIAL CONSTRUCTORS.
Judges: Before: CARTER, C.J., FOIL, WHIPPLE, PARRO, FITZSIMMONS, KUHN, GUIDRY, PETTIGREW, DOWNING, GAIDRY, MCDONALD, and MCCLENDON, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 879
Pages: 724–735

Head Matter:
Calvin J. LEONARD, Jr. v. JAMES INDUSTRIAL CONSTRUCTORS.
No. 2003 CA 0040.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, First Circuit.
May 14, 2004.
Charles R. Davoli, Baton Rouge, Counsel for Claimant/Appellee Calvin J. Leonard, Jr.
David T. Butler, Jr., Baton Rouge, Counsel for Defendant/Appellant James Industrial Constructors.
Before: CARTER, C.J., FOIL, WHIPPLE, PARRO, FITZSIMMONS, KUHN, GUIDRY, PETTIGREW, DOWNING, GAIDRY, MCDONALD, and MCCLENDON, JJ.

Opinion:
| .MCDONALD, J.
An employer appeals a judgment finding that a work-related accident occurred and awarding penalties and attorney fees based on the finding that the employer had no reasonable basis to controvert the claim. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Claimant, Calvin J. Leonard, Jr. was employed by James Industrial Constructors (JIC) on July 14, 1999, when he fell approximately 10 to 20 feet, from a pipe rack onto a stack of lumber. Leonard immediately complained of back pain and was sent to the tool room by JIC, then told to take some time off to see if he would get better. A week later, Leonard returned to work requesting medical treatment. He was taken to Ascension Medical Clinic where he was evaluated and a drug screening was administered. The drug screen came back positive for Benzozyloconin(ph), a cocaine metabolite. Based on the positive drug screen, the claim for benefits was denied.
On July 27, 1999, Leonard filed a disputed claim for compensation. The matter was heard before the Office of Workers' Compensation (OWC) on May 29, 2002. Oral reasons for judgment were issued, and a judgment was signed July 15, 2002, finding that Leonard had sustained an accident in the course and scope of his employment on July 14, 1999, entitling him to temporary total disability benefits from July 14, 1999 to August 8, 1999; that Calvin Leonard had violated La. R.S. 23:1208 as of August 8, 1999, and therefore had forfeited his rights to all workers' compensation benefits from that date forward; that Leonard's claim was not reasonably controverted and therefore JIC was subject to a two thousand dollar ($2,000.00) penalty and three thousand dollar ($3,000.00) attorney fee, as well as a two thousand |sdollar ($2,000.00) penalty and three thousand dollar ($3,000.00) attorney fee for failure to pay medical benefits; and that JIC was responsible for all medical bills of Dr. Jack Loupe, the July 28, 1999 emergency room visit, and an MRI bill. JIC timely filed a suspensive appeal.
Appellant asserts four errors for review: 1. the OWC judge committed error in finding Leonard suffered an accident in the course and scope of his employment with JIC; 2. the OWC judge committed error in finding Leonard did not violate La. R.S. 23:1208.1; 3. the OWC judge committed error in finding Leonard did not violate La. R.S. 23:1208 prior to August 8, 1999; and 4. the OWC judge committed error in awarding workers' compensation benefits, medical expenses, penalties and attorney's fees where a violation of La. R.S. 23:1208 was found.
LAW AND ANALYSIS
The claimant in a compensation action has the burden of establishing a work-related accident by a preponderance of the evidence. Nelson v. Roadway Express, Inc., 588 So.2d 350 (La.1991).. A worker's testimony alone may be sufficient to discharge this burden of proof, provided two elements are satisfied: (1) no other evidence discredits or casts serious doubt about the worker's version of the incident; and (2) the worker's testimony is corroborated by the circumstances following the alleged accident. Bruno v. Harbert Intern. Inc., 593 So.2d 357 (La.1992).
JIC argues that voluminous evidence calls into question Leonard's credibility, and whether he experienced an accident in the course and scope of his employment is, to a large extent, dependent upon his credibility since there were no witnesses who actually saw Leonard fall. There is no doubt that Leonard's credibility is suspect, considering the documented evidence of his lying and the OWC judge's comment that he could not be believed. LHowever, at this point the focus of our inquiry is on the alleged accident. Leonard's veracity is only at issue to the extent that circumstances do not corroborate his testimony or other evidence discredits or casts serious doubt upon his allegations.
The OWC judge's determination as to whether the worker's testimony is credible and whether the worker has discharged his or her burden of proof are factual determinations not to be disturbed on review unless clearly wrong or mani festly erroneous. Gonzales v. Babco Farm, Inc., 535 So.2d 822, 824 (La.App. 2d Cir.), writ denied, 536 So.2d 1200 (La.1988). The OWC judge not only had the testimony of Leonard that he fell, but also the corroborating testimony of his coworker, Erven Albarado. Albarado testified that he was working in close proximity to Leonard and had seen him working prior to the fall. Although not actually witnessing the fall, Albarado heard the fall and saw Leonard on the lumber. We find that the evidence supports the OWC judge's finding that a work-related accident did occur.
The workers' compensation statutes provide two separate anti-fraud forfeiture provisions, which employers may use to affirmatively defend against paying a claim. Louisiana Revised Statutes 23:1208.1 is applied when a falsity was made on an employer's medical questionnaire, before the accident or injury. Wise v. J.E. Merit Constructors, Inc., 97-0684 (La.1/21/98), 707 So.2d 1214, 1218. JIC argues that Leonard's pre-employment questionnaire denies any prior back or neck difficulties; however, medical records introduced into evidence demonstrate preexisting back and neck difficulties. The Louisiana Supreme Court has clearly enunciated when the forfeiture provision of La. R.S. 23:1208.1 is applicable. In Wise, the court noted that the significance of the falsity on the questionnaire is that an |5untruthful statement regarding a preexisting condition is prejudicial to the employer's ability to recover from the second injury fund. The court then restated its holding in Resweber v. Haroil Construction Co., 94-2708, 94-3138 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 7 that the forfeiture penalty of La. R.S. 23:1208.1 is only imposed when an employer is prejudiced. An employer is prejudiced only when the false statement directly relates to the medical condition for which a claim is made or affects the employer's ability to receive reimbursement from the second injury fund. Wise, 707 So.2d at 1218. Forfeiture is a harsh remedy and statutory forfeiture must be strictly construed. An employer has the burden of proving each element within the statute, and the lack of any one of the elements is fatal to an employer's avoidance of liability. Wise, 707 So.2d at 1218.
In the instant case, JIC relied upon medical records showing that Leonard reported to the emergency room of several hospitals on numerous occasions prior to. the accident at issue, complaining of low back pain. However, Leonard also testified that , he had lied about his back pain on those occasions for the purpose of obtaining pain medication because of a drug addiction. He denied actually having any prior back problems. As the trier of fact, the OWC judge may accept, in whole or in part, the testimony of any witness. See Alcorn v. City of Baton Rouge, 2002-0952 (La.App. 1st Cir.6/27/03), 851 So.2d 1194. Clearly, the OWC judge accepted Leonard's testimony that he had not had any prior back problems and therefore, had not given an untruthful answer on his pre-employment questionnaire.
The OWC judge reviewed all of the medical evidence regarding Leonard and noted that he did have a preexisting degenerative back condition that was aggra: vated by the work accident. However, this finding was based upon diagnostic studies conducted after the accident. The OWC | ¿judge also found that the accident, involving a fall of 10 to 20 feet, with Leonard landing on his back on a stack of 4 x 4 lumber, could not be sustained without injury. While Leonard complained of back pain prior to the accident, the record is devoid of medical evidence, such as diagnostic studies or physician's reports, that document a degenerative back condition prior to his employment with JIC. Review of the medical records indicates that Leonard would report to the emergency room with a complaint of back pain, seeking pain medication. According to the emergency room records, very rarely were diagnostic tests of any kind conducted to verify his complaints, and none of the records indicate a specific diagnosis of a degenerative back condition. They simply show the diagnosis as "low back pain" or some similar generic diagnosis.
JIC failed to demonstrate that any allegedly false statements made by Leonard on the pre-employment questionnaire affected its ability to receive second injury fund relief. The issue of whether an allegedly false statement by a claimant requires forfeiture of his workers' compensation benefits is one of fact, which is not to be reversed on appeal absent manifest error. Short v. Gaylord Chemical Corp., 98-0606 (La.App. 1st Cir.4/1/99), 731 So.2d 493, 499. We find no error in the OWC judge's failure to find Leonard in violation of La. R.S. 23:1208.1.
Similarly, the issue of whether an allegedly false statement or misrepresentation by an employee requires forfeiture of workers' compensation benefits pursuant to La. R.S. 23:1208 is one of fact, which is not to be reversed on appeal absent manifest error. The party who requests that benefits be forfeited must show that the claimant's statements were not only false, but must also show that the statements were willful and deliberately made with the intent to obtain benefits. Williams v. Sheridan Construction Co., Inc., 2000-1697 (La.App. 1st Cir.9/28/01), 811 So.2d 8, writ denied, 01-2865 (La.01/11/02), 807 So.2d 239. After meticulously reviewing the medical evidence in this matter, the OWC judge found that Leonard had a history of seeking pain medication because he had "a big drug problem." In general, his complaints when he sought medication were of back pain, and he had told physicians that he had ruptured and shattered discs. Upon being questioned in his deposition as to whether he had ever had any back problems, Leonard said, "No, I was lying to get drugs." In addition to the pre-accident drug-seeking incidents, the OWC Judge found that Leonard had lied to get drugs on August 8, 1999. Because drugs is a workers' compensation benefit that claimant lied to secure, the OWC judge found him in violation of La. R.S. 23:1208 and ordered his workers' compensation benefits forfeited from that date forward. We find no error in this decision by the OWC judge.
Finding no manifest error in the OWC judge's determination that the first false statement for the purpose of obtaining benefits occurred on August 8, 1999, the issue we must now address is whether the OWC judge committed legal error in ordering the forfeiture of benefits effective from the date of the misrepresentation. In LeBlanc v. Grand Isle Shipyard, Inc., 95-2452 (La.App. 1st Cir.6/28/96), 676 So.2d 1157, 1164, this court held that the statutory language in La. R.S. 23:1208 does not limit the forfeiture of benefits to the time period after the claimant makes the false statements or misrepresentations.
In LeBlanc, the OWC judge had limited the employee's forfeiture of benefits to only those benefits that would have accrued after the date of the misrepresentation. This court, however, concluded that the OWC judge erred in awarding the employee any benefits, noting that the language of La. |sR.S. 23:1208 was clear and required forfeiture of any benefits. This was interpreted to include benefits both prior to and subsequent to the misrepresentation.
Further, JIC argues that a finding of a violation of La. R.S. 23:1208 requires forfeiture of any benefits from the time of the injury, relying on St. Bernard, Parish Police Jury v. Duplessis, 2002-0632 (La.12/4/02), 831 So.2d 955. In Duplessis, the employee, who had been receiving workers' compensation benefits for nine years, falsified mileage reports for the purpose of obtaining more mileage reimbursement than the amount actually owed. The OWC judge found that the employee had willfully submitted false mileage reports, violating La. R.S. 23:1208, but that only the mileage benefit would be forfeited and not other benefits. The court of appeal affirmed the judgment. The Supreme Court reversed, finding that although the willfully false statement related only to the claim for mileage reimbursement, the statute provides that any employee found to be in violation of La. R.S. 23:1208 would "forfeit any right to compensation benefits." Therefore, the court held that forfeiture of all workers' compensation benefits, not just those benefits that the false statement concerned, was mandated.
Significantly, however, the court did not address when the forfeiture was to be effective, and we do not find that Duples-sis requires the result for which JIC argues. Regarding the point at which forfeiture applies, we note that in Resweber, the Louisiana Supreme Court stated that La. R.S. 23:1208 "applies to any false statement or misrepresentation, including one concerning a prior injury, made specifically for the purpose of obtaining workers' compensation benefits and therefore generally becomes applicable at the time of an employee's accident or claim." Resweber, 660 So.2d at 9 |9(emphasis added). This language suggests that there is no inflexible rule on when the forfeiture is effective. Specifically, where, as here, the misrepresentation is not made at the time of the accident, but occurs at some later time, we believe that the forfeiture should be effective at the time of the misrepresentation, rather than the time of the accident.
Interpreting La. R.S. 23:1208 to require forfeiture of benefits from the time of the misrepresentation prospectively, and not retroactively, comports with the law and jurisprudential rules on statutory interpretation. The word "any" in the statute is quantitative, not temporal. As noted previously, statutory forfeiture of workers' compensation benefits is a harsh remedy and, as such, must be strictly construed. It is also noteworthy that the statute is quasi-penal, and such statutes are to be strictly construed. See Faught v. Ryder/P*I*E Nationwide, Inc., 543 So.2d 918, 921 (La.App. 1st Cir.1989), writ denied, 545 So.2d 1040 (La.1989). Further, retroactive application would not result in a "forfeiture" of benefits, but, in effect, a "denial" of benefits, if it included benefits to which the employee was undis-putedly entitled. Therefore, we overrule the decision of this court in LeBlanc to the extent that it requires forfeiture of benefits pursuant to La. R.S. 23:1208 prior to the date of the misrepresentation.
Penalties and Attorney Fees in La. R.S. 23:1208 Forfeiture
JIC argues that the OWC judge committed legal error in awarding indemnity benefits, medical expenses, penalties, and attorney fees after finding that Leonard had violated La. R.S. 23:1208. Citing St. Bernard Parish Police Jury v. Duplessis, 2002-0632 (La.12/4/02), 831 So.2d 955, JIC asserts that the Louisiana Supreme Court has taken an "all or nothing" approach to the forfeiture of benefits and all benefits should have been linforfeited by Leonard, including penalties and attorney-fees. We do not agree.
Penalties and attorney fees are not benefits awarded to an employee; they are sanctions imposed on an employer, subject to the same standard of appellate review as any other factual determination made by the OWC judge. This is clear from the relevant statutory provisions, as well as the supreme court's discussion of the multiple penalty issues in Fontenot v. Reddell Vidrine Water District, 02-0439, 02-0442, 02-0478 (La.1/14/03), 836 So.2d 14. The penalties imposed by the OWC judge are authorized by law and well supported in the reasons for judgment. The attorney fees are similarly authorized and are reasonable. We find no error in the OWC judge's judgment imposing penalties and attorney fees.
Attorney fees for Answering Appeal
Leonard filed a timely answer to this appeal seeking additional attorney fees for defending JIC's appeal. Workers' compensation claimants are entitled to increased attorney fees to reflect additional time and effort spent in defending an employer's unsuccessful appeal. Gallien v. Winn-Dixie, 96-832 (La.App. 3rd Cir.12/11/96), 685 So.2d 531, 537. We find Leonard's request for attorney fees to be supported in law and reasonable. Therefore, we find that Leonard is entitled to collect attorney fees for the prosecution of this proceeding in the amount of $2,500.00.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons assigned herein the judgment of the OWC judge is affirmed. Judgment is further rendered in favor of Calvin J. Leonard, Jr. for attorney fees in the amount of $2,500.00. Costs are assessed to James Industrial Constructors.
AFFIRMED.
FITZSIMMONS, J., concurs for the reasons assigned by Judge KUHN.
PARRO, J., concurs.
CARTER, J., dissents with written reasons.
FOIL, J., dissents.
WHIPPLE, J., concurs and assigns reasons.
KUHN, J., concurs and assigns reasons.
GUIDRY, J., concurs.
McCLENDON, J., concurs and assigns reasons.
. See Lasyone v. Phares, 2001-1785 (La.App. 1st Cir.5/22/02), 818 So.2d 1068, 1071.