Case Name: Willie P. MONTGOMERY v. Jessie M. Sartin, Wife of Willie P. MONTGOMERY
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1980-05-13
Citations: 383 So. 2d 1384
Docket Number: No. 11076
Parties: Willie P. MONTGOMERY v. Jessie M. Sartin, Wife of Willie P. MONTGOMERY.
Judges: Before GULOTTA, SCHOTT and CHE-HARDY, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 383
Pages: 1384–1387

Head Matter:
Willie P. MONTGOMERY v. Jessie M. Sartin, Wife of Willie P. MONTGOMERY.
No. 11076.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fourth Circuit.
May 13, 1980.
Singerman, Cosentino, Broussard, Toups & Troyer, Olden C. Toups, Jr., New Orleans, for defendant-appellant.
James P. Screen, Anthony J. Milazzo, Jr.,. New Orleans, for plaintiff-appellee.
Before GULOTTA, SCHOTT and CHE-HARDY, JJ.

Opinion:
GULOTTA, Judge.
The defendant wife appeals from a judgment awarding temporary custody of the fourteen-year-old minor, Willie C. Montgomery, to the husband. According to the wife, because the separation suit is pending and no judgment of separation has been granted, the trial judge erred in failing to award custody to the mother absent a finding by the court of "strong reasons to deprive her" of that custody.
It is clear from the record that the minor resided with his father from the date of separation (either May 28, 1979 or June 6, 1979) to the date of the rule (July 6, 1979). It is clear also that the father and the minor live in the family home in the same neighborhood as relatives and friends of the minor, and apparently close to the school the boy attends. Although the mother is gainfully employed at a full-time job while the father is temporarily unemployed while recuperating from a recent operation, the father receives disability payments and rental income. The trial judge stated that he recognized "the paramount right of the mother to the custody of children of tender years," but he concluded such a consideration, in this case, "is out weighed by the fact that the child was fourteen years of age and has been residing with his father."
The wife argues the trial judge erred because he apparently applied LSA-C.C. art. 157 (regarding custody after judgment of separation or divorce) rather than LSA-C.C. art. 146 (regarding pendente lite custody). She contends that, prior to amendment of those articles in 1979, the trial judge had to grant custody to the wife in temporary custody matters unless he found "strong reasons" (i. e. the wife contends, unfitness of the mother) to deprive her of custody. As pointed out by the wife, the pre-1979 amendment versions of articles 146 and 157 set forth differing tests for custody pendente lite and permanent custody. We agree that, because the suit was filed on June 26, 1979' and the custody rule heard on July 6,1979, the earlier versions of the codal articles apply because the 1979 amendment had not yet become effective.
Although a number of earlier cases applying the former LSA-C.C. art. 146 have equated "strong reasons to deprive her" with unfitness of the mother, the welfare of the child is always the paramount consideration in custody proceedings. Moreover, LSA-C.C. art. 146 itself, prior to the 1979 amendment, stated that determination of whether there were "strong reasons" to deprive the mother of custody "is left to the discretion of the judge". Furthermore, great weight is accorded to the discretion of trial judge in custody matters and absent a finding of an abuse of that discretion, the judgment will not be disturbed. Guillory v. Guillory, 221 La. 374, 59 So.2d 424 (1952). We find no such abuse in the instant case.
The trial judge had the opportunity to view the opposing parties and to weigh the effect the change from a settled environment would have on the 14-year-old boy. The judge concluded that it was best for the minor's welfare.to remain with his father in the already established home. We find no error.
Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
SCHOTT, J., concurs and assigns reasons.
. Prior to their amendment by-Act 718 of 1979, these articles stated as follows, in pertinent part:
"Art. 146. If there are children of the marriage, whose provisional keeping is claimed by both husband and wife, the suit being yet pending and undecided, it shall be granted to the wife, whether plaintiff or defendant; unless there should be strong reasons to deprive her of it, either in whole- or in part, the decision whereof is left to the discretion of the judge."
"Art. 157.A. In all cases of separation and divorce, permanent custody of the child or children shall be granted to the husband or the wife in accordance with the best interest of the child or children. "
. By Acts 1979, # 718 § 1, Articles 146 and 157 were amended to read as follows, in pertinent part:
"Art. 146. If there are children of the marriage, whose provisional keeping is claimed by both husband and wife, the suit being yet pending and undecided, it shall be granted to the husband or the wife in accordance with the best interest of the children. In all cases, the court shall inquire into the fitness of both the mother and the father and shall award custody to the parent the court finds will in all respects be in accordance with the best interest of the child or children. ."
"Art. 157.A. In all cases of separation and divorce, and changes of custody after an original award, permanent custody of the child or children shall be granted to the husband or the wife, in accordance with the best interest of the child or children, without any preference being given on the basis of the sex of the parent..
. The effective date of the 1979 amendment was September 7, 1979.