Case Name: STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Milton Talliaferro CADIEU, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1977-11-29
Citations: 353 So. 2d 150
Docket Number: No. FF-141
Parties: STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Milton Talliaferro CADIEU, Appellee.
Judges: MILLS, Acting Chief Judge, concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 353
Pages: 150–152

Head Matter:
STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Milton Talliaferro CADIEU, Appellee.
No. FF-141.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
Nov. 29, 1977.
Rehearing Denied Jan. 13, 1978.
Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., Wallace E. Allbritton, Asst. Atty. Gen., Raymond T. McNeal, Asst. State Atty., for appellant.
John E. Futch, Fore & Futch, P.A., Ocala, for appellee.

Opinion:
SMITH, Judge.
The State appeals from a trial court order arresting judgment on Cadieu's conviction for violation of Section 800.04, Florida Statutes (1975), providing:
"Any person who shall handle, fondle or make an assault upon any child under the age of 14 years in a lewd, lascivious or indecent manner . . . without the intent to commit involuntary sexual battery shall be guilty of a felony of the second degree . . .
Following a jury verdict of guilty, the court on Cadieu's motion arrested judgment and discharged Cadieu on the ground "The information upon which the Defendant was tried is so defective that it will not support a conviction . . . Fla.R.Cr.P. 3.610(a)(1). We reverse.
The information charged in four counts that Cadieu on stated dates "did unlawfully handle, fondle or make an assault upon [name] a female child of the age of [under 14 years] in a lewd, lascivious or indecent manner, without the intent to commit Involuntary Sexual Battery . . . The trial court held the information fatally vague because it did not specify the "lewd, lascivious or indecent manner" in which the accused allegedly handled the children. Had the information been timely challenged before or upon arraignment, by motion to dismiss pursuant to Fla.R.Cr.P. 3.190(b) and (c), we would unhesitatingly agree with the trial court that the information fails to give the accused adequate notice of the particular act of which he was accused. State ex rel. Swanboro v. Mayo, 155 Fla. 330, 19 So.2d 883 (1944). But, because no such motion was made — we disregard as dehors the record and as not quite relevant the representation in Cadieu's brief that an oral motion to dismiss was made "at the commencement of the trial" — the information is to be judged post-trial by a different and more liberal standard. Fountain v. State, 92 Fla. 262, 109 So. 463 (1926). The information is cast in the statutory language. Though it is imperfect because it does not descend from statutory generalities to essential particulars, the information is not so defective that it "will not support a judgment of conviction" and is vulnerable to initial post-trial attack. When confronted with an information that is defective only in failing to charge particulars within a generic statutory description of proscribed conduct, the accused must either challenge the information by motion, thus providing opportunity for a new and curative information, or be satisfied with resolving his doubts by discovery and a motion for statement of particulars. The law does not favor a strategy of withholding attack on the information until the defendant is in jeopardy, then moving to bar the prosecution entirely. Sinclair v. State, 46 So.2d 453 (Fla.1950).
Swanboro, which supports Cadieu's criticism of this information, was rendered after conviction on petition for habeas corpus at a time when Section 920.05, Florida Statutes (1941), provided for arrest of judgment on the ground "the indictment or information does not charge an offense." The corresponding ground of present Rule 3.610(a)(1) is that the indictment or information "is so defective that it will not support a conviction." The change was made
"to better take into account the fact that an accusatorial writ which would not withstand a motion to qaush (dismiss) might well support a judgment of conviction if no such motion is filed." Committee Note on Rule 3.610, 34 F.S.A. 229 (1975).
REVERSED.
MILLS, Acting Chief Judge, concurs.
ERVIN, J., specially concurring.