Case Name: GULF COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD, Appellant, v. Ernest WASHINGTON and Unemployment Appeals Commission, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1989-05-25
Citations: 544 So. 2d 288
Docket Number: No. 88-1783
Parties: GULF COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD, Appellant, v. Ernest WASHINGTON and Unemployment Appeals Commission, Appellee.
Judges: WENTWORTH, J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 544
Pages: 288–291

Head Matter:
GULF COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD, Appellant, v. Ernest WASHINGTON and Unemployment Appeals Commission, Appellee.
No. 88-1783.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
May 25, 1989.
Cecil G. Costin, Jr. of Costin & Costin, Port St. Joe, for appellant.
John D. Maher, General Counsel, Unemployment Appeals Com’n, Tallahassee, for appellee.

Opinion:
ERVIN, Judge.
Gulf County School Board appeals from the order of the Unemployment Appeals Commission affirming the decision of the referee to award claimant/appellee, Ernest Washington, unemployment compensation. We affirm.
Mr. Washington was employed as a school teacher by the Gulf County School Board in August, 1984 under a temporary certificate for the '84-85 school year. Because he was licensed to teach in another state, he was able to teach in Florida for three years while holding temporary teaching certificates, pending passage of the Florida Teacher's Examination. During that time, he sat for and failed the Florida Teacher's Examination three times. Because he had not passed the examination and could not obtain another temporary certificate, the school board terminated his employment.
The referee, interpreting Section 443.101, Florida Statutes (1987), determined that because the claimant had not engaged in any misconduct connected with his work, he was not disqualified for unemployment compensation benefits. Section 443.101, in relevant part, provides:
Disqualification for benefits. — An individual shall be disqualified for benefits:
(l)(a) For the week in which he has voluntarily left his employment without good cause attributable to his employer or in which he has been discharged by his employing unit for misconduct connected with his work, if so found by the division.
It is indisputable that claimant engaged in no misconduct. The single issue presented on appeal is whether, by operation of certain case law to be discussed below, the claimant "voluntarily left his employment without good cause attributable to his employer." § 443.101, Fla.Stat.
In School Bd. of Lee County v. Florida Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 500 So.2d 253 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986), this court reversed the award of unemployment compensation benefits to a teacher who had resigned her employment after once failing the teacher certification examination. Although appellant argues that Lee requires reversal, Lee is distinguishable from the instant case because the teacher there, after once failing the teacher examination, made no good faith effort to perform the known and accepted condition of employment — passing the examination. Instead, she chose to resign her employment. In contrast, appellee at bar has made a good faith effort to perform — he sat for the examination three times. Furthermore, there is record evidence to support the conclusion that he was preparing to sit for the examination a fourth time when he was notified that his employment would be terminated. In view of these factual distinctions, we do not regard Lee as controlling. Nevertheless, appellant argues that a comparison of Lee to the case at hand reveals no differences in the principles of law involved. This is incorrect, however, because the material facts in Lee differ from the material facts in the instant case. Specifically, the teacher in Lee did not make a good faith effort to comply with known employment conditions, whereas the claimant here has. See Goodhart, Determining The Ratio Decidendi of a Case, 40 Yale L.J. 161 (1930).
Section 443.031, Florida Statutes (1987), provides that Chapter 443 is to be "liberally construed" to accomplish its purpose, which includes providing for "the payment of compensation to individuals with respect to their unemployment." In view of this intended construction, denying benefits to one who has made a good faith effort to comply with employment requirements would contravene public policy. Obviously, by providing a grace period during which a teacher can be temporarily certified, the legislature has expressed a policy intended to encourage the application and employment of persons not yet fully qualified in this state.
Appellant also argues that Florida Sheriffs Youth Fund v. Department of Labor and Employment Sec., 436 So.2d 332 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983), cited with approval by this court in Lee, requires reversal. In Youth Fund, the Second District considered the compensation award to an employee hired as part of a team (with her husband), for the purpose of creating a "family environment" in a home for dependent girls. Husband-wife teams placed in charge of cottages understood that each member had to perform satisfactorily, and that upon the resignation or discharge of one, the other would likewise be discharged. Reversing the compensation award to the wife (who had satisfactorily performed her job) of a man discharged for misconduct, and holding that the wife had "voluntarily" left her employment, the court stated: "Whether or not this failure [to meet a known condition of employment] was the employee's fault . was immaterial; the issue was whether [her] . failure to meet [her] . job requirements was due to good cause attributable to [her] . employer." Id. at 334. Contrary to Youth Fund, we do not agree with this construction of section 443.101, because, when an employee makes a good faith effort to meet employment conditions, but fails to do so, an essentially different issue is presented than when an employee fails to make a reasonable effort to comply —in the former case the employee has not left his employment "voluntarily"; in the latter case he has. Nevertheless, because Youth Fund is in conflict with our decision today, we certify the conflict to the Florida Supreme Court.
For these reasons, the decision awarding compensation is affirmed.
WENTWORTH, J., concurs.
BOOTH, J., dissents.