Case Name: SEARS v. STEEL, STATE TREASURER
Court: Oregon Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Oregon
Decision Date: 1910-02-15
Citations: 55 Or. 544
Docket Number: 
Parties: SEARS v. STEEL, STATE TREASURER.
Judges: 
Reporter: Oregon Reports
Volume: 55
Pages: 544–587

Head Matter:
Argued January 12,
decided February 15, 1910.
SEARS v. STEEL, STATE TREASURER.
[107 Pac. 3.]
Highways—Constitutional Provisions.
1. The purpose of Section 23, Article IV, Constitution of Oregon, prohibiting the passage of any special or local laws for laying, opening, working, and supervising highways, when considered in view of the practice of the territorial legislature of passing special acts authorizing the laying out of territorial roads, which acts were published in a volume, entitled “Local Laws,” is to divorce the State from the business of special road building, and to leave that matter to be attended to by the counties under the general laws, and it prevents the invasion by the State of the regular method of laying out, opening, working, and supervising highways provided by general laws.
Statutes—Local Laws.
2. A statute making an appropriation for the construction of a State road, and permitting the county courts of the - counties through which the proposed road runs to lay a burden on the taxpayers of the county not shared equally by the taxpayers of the other parts of the State, is local, within Section 23, Article IV, Constitution of Oregon, prohibiting the legislature from passing local laws for laying, opening, and working on highways.
Statutes—Local Laws.
3. A statute making an appropriation for the construction of a road, which* when constructed, shall be a county road in each of the counties through which it passes, imposes taxes on the people of the rest of the State for the construction of a county road in the counties through which it passes, and is local, within Section 23, Article IV, Constitution of Oregon.
Statutes—Local Laws.
4. Laws 1909, p. 278, making an appropriation for the construction of a State road through two designated counties, to be available when such counties have appropriated a specified sum therefor, and providing for the appointment of a commission co-operating with the county courts of the counties in the construction of the road, etc., is a local law, within Section 23, Article IV, Constitution of Oregon, because it operates only in two counties, though the title of the act indicates that the proposed road shall be a State road to extend entirely across the State, for no provision is made for the laying out of any road except through the two counties, and though the construction of the road would be a great public utility.
Statutes—Constitutional Provisions—“Highways"—Local Laws.
5. ' The word “highways” in Section 23, Article IV, Constitution of Oregon, prohibiting the legislature from passing any special or local law for laying, opening, working, or supervising highways, means ordinary roads, and not railroads or canals.
Prom dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice King.
Statutes—Special or Local Laws.
1. An act (Laws 1909, p. 278), authorizing any public road which in its nature is more beneficial to the community at large than to the inhabitants in the immediate locality of the road is a public and not a special or local law, within Section 23, Article IV, Constitution of Oregon, prohibiting the passage of any special or local laws for laying, opening, working, and supervising highways.
Statutes—Constitutional Provisions—Highways.
2. The word “highways” in Section 23, Article IV, Constitution of Oregon, prohibiting the passage of any special or local law for laying, opening, working, or supervising highways, is used in the sense recognized and applied by the law writers on the subject, and includes every thoroughfare used by the public.
From Marion: William Galloway, Judge.
Statement by Mr. Justice McBride.
This, is a suit brought by James K. Sears, a citizen and taxpayer of Oregon, against Geo. A. Steel and F. W. Benson, respectively, .as State Treasurer and Secretary of State, to enjoin the issuance and payment of a warrant under an act entitled “An Act appropriating $100,000 to aid in the construction of a State road from the Pacific Ocean via Crater Lake to the Idaho boundary, and to provide for the appointment of a commission to supervise the expenditure of such money and to superintend the con struction of such road.” This act is found on pages 278 and 279 of the Session Laws of 1909, and is as follows:
“Be it enacted by the People of the State of Oregon:
“Be it enacted by the Legislative Assembly of the State of Oregon:
“Section 1. There is hereby appropriated out of any moneys in the hands of the Treasurer of the State of Oregon, and not otherwise appropriated, the sum of $100,000 to be expended for the purpose of aiding in the construction of a State road from the Pacific Ocean to the Idaho boundary, via Crater Lake; the first section of the road to be constructed to be from Medford, Jackson County, Oregon, to the city of Klamath Falls, Klamath County.
“Sec. 2. Whenever the Governor of this State shall be advised that Jackson County has appropriated the sum of $50,000 to aid the construction of a road in said county from Medford, Jackson County, to a point on the west line of the Cascade Forest Reserve, on the route to Crater Lake, he shall appoint a commission to be known as the Crater Lake Road Commission, to consist of seven members, two of whom shall be residents of Jackson County, Oregon, two of Klamath County, Oregon, and thereupon twenty-five per cent of the sum hereby appropriated shall be available for use in Jackson County, $12,500 the first year, and $12,500 for each succeeding year for three years, and upon Klamath County appropriating $50,000 to aid the construction of a road from Klamath Falls to the east line of the Cascade Forest Reserve on the route to Crater Lake, the balance of the sum herewith appropriated shall be available for use in Klamath County, $12,500 the first year, and $12,500 for each succeeding year for three years.
“Sec. 3. That said commission shall receive no compensation for their services, except their actual expenses when engaged in the business of such commission. The business of such commission shall be to co-operate with the county courts of the several counties through [which] said road passes, and the proper federal authorities in the selection of a proper and feasible route for a road that may be constructed by the federal government through the government reserve surrounding Crater Lake, and to supervise the expenditure of said sum of $100,000, appro priated by the State; the $50,000 appropriated by Jackson County; the $50,000 appropriated by Klamath County, and all other moneys provided for the construction of the said road not in the boundaries of government reserve. Said commission shall have entire charge of construction of said State ro,ad.
“Sec. 4. That such money shall be expended only upon a county road, legally established, and no part shall be expended for securing a right of way for said road.
“Sec. 5. That said commission shall elect a president who shall preside at all meetings and a secretary who shall keep a record of all proceedings of the commission, and accounts of all moneys received and expended by the commission, and shall make a quarterly report of all the transactions of the commission, to be filed in the office of the Secretary of State.
“Sec. 6. That all moneys .appropriated hereunder shall be paid out by the Treasurer of the State upon warrants of the Secretary of State upon the orders or vouchers of the commission, signed by the president and secretary.
“Sec. 7. The commission shall make all needful rules or regulations for the transaction of business and its places of meeting shall be Medford, Jackson County, Oregon, or at Klamath Falls, Klamath County, Oregon. Four members of the board shall constitute a quorum for the transaction of business, but a less number shall adjourn from time to time.
“Sec. 8. If a vacancy occurs in said commission, the Governor shall fill the same by appointment.
“Filed in the office of the Secretary of State February 23, 1909.”
The complaint alleges that the Governor has been advised by the officials of Jackson County that said county has appropriated $50,000 to aid the construction of a road in said county from Medford to a’point on the west line of the Cascade Forest Reserve on the route to Crater Lake, and that the Governor of the State has, in accordance with Section 2 of said act, appointed a commission of seven members, two from Jackson County, and two from Klamath County, known as the “Crater Lake Road Commission,” to supervise the expenditure of said sum of $100,000' and the sum of $50,000 appropriated by Jackson County, ,and the sum of $50,000 to be appropriated by Klamath County, and that said commission has duly organized and elected a president and entered upon the discharge of its duties; that the defendant Benson,' as Secretary of State, threatens to, and will unless restrained, draw warrants upon vouchers issued by said commission and that the Treasurer will pay the same; that said act is in contravention of Section 7 of Article XI and Section 23 of Article IV of the Constitution of the State of Oregon; that the sole purpose of said act is to assist the counties of Jackson and Klamath in constructing an automobile and carriage road from Medford to Crater Lake and from Klamath Falls to Crater Lake for the use of tourists and pleasure seekers, and not for the purpose of constructing a State road from the Pacific Ocean to the Idaho boundary. After interposing a general demurrer, which was overruled the defendants answered, denying .generally every allegation of the complaint except the passage of the act and the proceedings had thereunder, and further setting up, by way of affirmative defense, the following facts:
“That by the terms of said act the Legislative Assembly of the State of Oregon contemplated the construction of a State road from the Pacific Ocean to the Idaho boundary via Crater Lake, the first section of which was to be constructed from Medford, Jackson County, Oregon, to the city of Klamath Falls, Klamath County, Oregon. That the construction of said road will, when completed, connect the Pacific Ocean by the way of Curry, Josephine, Jackson, Klamath, Lake, Harney, and Malheur counties with the state of Idaho, and will, when completed, enable communication by way of such highway to be conveniently, economically, and effectively made between the counties of Curry, Josephine, and Jackson, west of the Cascade Mountains to the counties of Klamath, Lake, Harney, and Malheur particularly, east of the Cascade Mountains, and in general with the entire portion of the State of Oregon east of the Cascade Mountains. That the said Cascade Mountains are a rugged chain of mountains separating the two sections of the State of Oregon, leaving about one-third of the State west thereof and about two-thirds of the State east thereof, and that the said contemplated road will, when constructed, pass over, through and along the most practicable available route between said respective sections of the State, and will afford to the inhabitants of said State and of the state of Idaho and to the general public the only available, practical, direct highway between said sections, connecting the Pacific Ocean with the state of Idaho.
“That the said counties of Malheur, Harney, Lake, and Klamath, and the said counties of Curry and Josephine are largely undeveloped, and without the construction of such highway will be practically inaccessible; that there is now no railway communication from any portion of Western Oregon to any portion of Eastern Oregon, excepting by way of the Columbia River on the northern boundary of said State, and that there is no railroad into the entire Southern Oregon territory excepting a railroad from the city of Portland to San Francisco, passing through the southwest portion of Jackson County and the northwest portion of Josephine County, and that the only railroad in Southern Oregon, other than this, or in any part thereof, is a portion of the California Northeastern Railway line from Weed, in Siskiyou County, in the state of California,'to Klamath Falls, now under construction ¡and about to be opened for transportation, which said line of road of the California Northeastern Railway Company extends into said Klamath County to Klamath Falls, a distance of approximately twenty miles.
“That said highway so to be constructed will pass over and across the Crater Lake National Park, situated in Klamath County, a small portion of which is situated in Douglas^ County, Oregon, which said Crater Lake National Park was credited by act of Congress approved May 22, 1902, (Act May 22, 1902, c. 820, 82 Stat. 202 [U. S, Comp. St. Supp. 1909, p. 617]), and constitutes a tract of land bounded on the north by the parallel 43 degrees 4 minutes north latitude; south by 42 degrees 48 minutes north latitude; east by the meridian 122 degrees west longitude; and west by the meridian 122 degrees 16 minutes west longitude, having an area of 249 square miles in the State of Oregon, and including Crater Lake, which said Crater Lake National Park is under the exclusive control of the Secretary of the Interior, but which is a great national attraction, and that the construction of said highway will develop and constantly increase the commercial, business, and social intercourse of the citizens of other states and countries with the citizens of the State of Oregon, bringing to the people of the State of Oregon large sums of money, in the aggregate exceeding many times the cost and expense of constructing said highway; that said road will connect said national park and said Crater Lake with the outside world, and will render said lake and said park accessible.
“That it is now and for many years past has been the policy, rule, and custom of the executive department of the United States to build and construct through such of its national parks that contain scenic attractions roads and highways at enormous expense to the United States; that before expending such sums, or any part thereof, for such purposes, the United States require as a condition precedent thereof that the states in which said scenic wonders are located shall first cause said park to be connected with the outside world by public highways, properly and conveniently constructed and maintained; that in consideration of the establishment of the passage of said act hereinbefore mentioned and described in the amended complaint, and in consideration of the proposed construction of said highway therein authorized, the United States has, by its duly constituted authorities, commenced the preliminary work necessary to the construction of said highway over and across the Crater Lake National Park, and will, if the State shall construct said road, so authorized as aforesaid, complete the segment of road crossing said Crater Lake National Park, so as to make a continuous highway from Medford to Klamath, as aforesaid, and so that when the remaining segment of said road, between the Pacific Ocean and Medford and Klamath and the Idaho boundary state line, shall be constructed, said road will be a continuous highway crossing the entire State.
“Said defendants further answering herein allege that they are respectively Treasurer of the State of Oregon and Secretary of State of the State of Oregon, and have no personal or political interest in this cause, but present herewith the facts in relation to the said act and said highway as known to them. And defendants further answering allege and aver that the said act mentioned and described in the plaintiff’s amended complaint was duly enacted by the legislative assembly of the State of Oregon and filed in the office of the Secretary of State on February 3 [23], 1909, and is printed and published as Chapter 191 of the Laws of Oregon for the year 1909, and that the said act does not attempt to nor will it create any debt against the State of Oregon of more than $50,000 or any sum in violation of Section 7 of Article XI of the Constitution of the State of Oregon, or otherwise, but the defendants allege that there are and will be funds available for the payment of any warrants that may be drawn pursuant to said act.
“And defendants further answer and aver that the said act is not special or local law for the opening or working on highways, or for the election or appointment of supervisors, or for the collection or assessment of taxes for State, county, or road purposes, or a local or special law, or any other than a general public statute in the interests of the public, and the same will greatly benefit the people of the State of Oregon, including the plaintiff.”
The reply put in issue the new matter in the answer, except as to certain matters not here deemed material.
Affirmed.
For appellants there was a brief over the names of Mr. William P. Lord, Jr., Mr. William D. Fenton, Mr. Lionel R. Webster and Messrs. Colvig & Reames, with oral arguments by Mr. Fenton and Mr. Clarence L. Reames.
For respondent there was a brief with oral arguments by Mr. L. H. McMahan and Mr. Andrew M. Crawford, Attorney General.

Opinion:
Mr. Justice McBride
delivered the opinion qf the court.
1. The first objection to the constitutionality of the act in question is predicated upon the ground that it is in violation of Section 23, Article IV, of the constitution of this State. Said section is as follows: "The legislative assembly shall not pass special or local laws in any of the following enumerated cases, that is to say,— 7. For laying, opening and working on highways, and for the election or appointment of supervisors." Is the act in question an act for laying, opening or working a highway, and, if so, is it a special or local act? If both these conditions concur, the act must be declared void. If either of them is lacking, it must be upheld.
In determining this question, we will first consider the intent with which this provision was placed in our constitution and the mischief which it was designed to remedy or prevent. "Under the provisional government as early as June 22, 1844, Oregon had a system of laying out and locating highways, probably taken from the Iowa Code, and in 1847 an act was passed by the provisional legislature providing for a complete system of road work with supervisors who reported to the county commissioners, and which, in its general scope, was not essentially different from methods now in vogue. But at this early date, the provisional legislature seems habitually to have created territorial roads and appointed commissioners to locate and lay them out. Thus, we find an act passed December 12, 1846, appointing commissioners to locate and lay out a territorial road from the "town of Portland on the Willamette River" to the mouth of Mary's River in Polk County. Another, to authorize the laying out of a territorial road from Oregon City to the "Calipooyah" River. Another, from Oxford on the Willamette to John McCoy's farm on Muddy Creek in Linn County. Another from "Linn City to Zed Martis." Another, to improve and open the road "known as the southern route leading from the United States to Oregon." The employees on this enterprise were prudently required to furnish their own tools, "arms and ammunition." Another act provided for a public road from "Multnomah City" to the mouth of Mary's River. Still another, authorized the location of a territorial road from "Tuality Plains to Clatsop Plains." Passing over the intervening years till the session of the territorial legislature of 1850-51, we find eight special acts authorizing the laying out of territorial roads in various parts of the territory, all passed within the space of less than a month, indicating that the practice of logrolling among the fathers of the State was not confined entirely to that specie of the employment necessary in clearing up their farms. It is a well-known fact that few of these roads, which, in the aggregate, must have cost the infant community a considerable sum of money for laying out and working, were ever of any practical value or use, beyond the emoluments they furnished to the commissioners and surveyors designated to select the route. Under these circumstancés, it was no doubt thought by the framers of the constitution that it would be well to divorce the State from the business of special road building, and leave that matter to be attended to by the counties under general laws. It has not been noticed in previous decisions, but seems worthy of mention here, that after the organization of the Oregon territory, acts of the character above mentioned were not published among the general laws, but were included in a separate pamphlet or volume and entitled "Local Laws." This practice, existing before and up to the adoption of the constitution, tends to throw light upon the meaning attached to the phrase "Local laws for the laying, opening, and working of highways" as therein used. And in. the absence of anything denoting an intent to the contrary, we may fairly assume that the framers of the constitution had in mind laws of the character then treated as local by the officers of the territory whose practice and duty it was to compile and publish the acts passed at each session of the legislature.
2. For several years after the adoption of the constitution, the State Legislature took little or no part in the construction of roads from one part of the State to another, except in those cases where the State was made trustee of some grant or fund provided by the general government, such as The Dalles and Canyon City Military Road and others of like character. In Allen v. Hirsch, 8 Or. 412, the majority of the court lay special stress upon the fact that the road was to be built and paid for out' of the 5 per centum of the net proceeds of the sales of public lands, which by the terms, of the act admitting Oregon into the Union were to be devoted to internal improvements, and from the proceeds of sales of swamp lands, suggesting that no general tax upon the people was involved in th"e expenditure. It was also suggested that the road then in question was designed to unite the two great sections of the State, eastern and western Oregon, and was a State improvement for the benefit of the whole State and therefore not special. The decision in that case was by a divided court, Justice Boise dissenting, and the case has not been followed in its general scope in any subsequent decision. Thus, in Manning v. Klippel, 9 Or. 373, the court, having under consideration an act which prescribed different schedules of fees for county clerks in different counties of the State, says: "The act in question is a local act because, for one reason, it enlarges the sources of revenue from the counties therein, beyond those excluded from its provisions. One county, for instance, has a source of general revenue under the act denied to another. It follows that the act is local, and is, consequently, void."
Applying this rule to the act in question, if the proposed road is a State road, it permits the county courts of Jackson and Klamath to lay a burden upon the taxpayers of those counties not shared equally by the taxpayers of the other parts of the State. If, on.the other hand, it is to be regarded as a county road in each of the counties through which it passes, it imposes taxes upon the people of the rest of the State for the construction of county roads in Jackson and Klamath counties, and in either case it is local. See, also, Ellis v. Frazier, 38 Or. 468 (63 Pac. 642: 53 L. R. A. 454). In Crawford v. Linn County, 11 Or. 499 (5 Pac. 738), Mr. Chief Justice Waldo calls attention to the fact that it was not claimed in Allen v. Hirsch that the act was local, but that it was special, which is an entirely different matter. The decision of the court in Allen v. Hirsch seems to have opened the way for legislation of a similar character. In the session laws of 1885, we find an act appropriating $15,000 for the construction of a wagon road from a locality, bearing the significant' name of "Ilogem," to Cornucopia, in Union County. The act contains ' all the necessary "whereases," as to its public and general character, that were indicated by the court in Allen v. Hirsch, and no action seems to have been taken to prevent the expenditure of the money. The legislature of 1889, taking the cue from the decision in Allen v. Hirsch, passed nine road bills, appropriating sums varying in amounts from $8,000 to $15,000 and aggregating considerably above $100,000, seeming to fairly open up the flood gates for the unlimited increase of such appropriations, until the decision of this court in Maxwell v. Tillamook County, 20 Or. 495 (26 Pac. 803), which arrested further appropriations of this character until the last session of the legislature. Since we consider that case decisive of the one at bar, we shall briefly consider the points suggested and decided therein.
3. The title of the act in that case is "An act to appropriate ten thousand dollars to aid Tillamook County in the construction of a wagon road from the Nehalem River, in the north end of said county, to the Fuqua toll road, in the south end of the county," etc. Acts 1889, p. 169. The act designated certain persons as commissioners to locate the road, and provided that they might employ a superintendent to construct the same. The commissioners were required to make a complete report to the county court of Tillamook County, whereupon said court should cause a verified statement of expenses of building the road to be filed with the Secretary of State who should thereupon draw his warrant on the State Treasurer. The last section of the act declared the great benefit that would accrue to the residents of Tillamook County and to a large number of people of the Willamette Valley by the speedy completion of the road, evidently with a view to bringing the road within the doctrine announced in Allen v. Hirsch. But these tconsiderations do not seem to have substantially moved the flinty hearts of the members of the Supreme Court, as no attention is paid to them in the opinion.
The same question was raised on the trial that is raised here, namely, that the act was local and therefore in violation of Article IV, Section 23, subd. 7, of the Constitution. That able and learned jurist, Judge W. W. Thayer, appeared for the plaintiff Maxwell, and contended earnestly that there was no material difference between the case then at bar and that of Allen v. Hirsch, 8 Or. 412. We quote the following from his brief on file in this court:
"The respondent's counsel in the court below contended that the act was such a violation of the clause of the constitution of the State which provides, that: 'The legislative assembly shall not pass special or local laws: 7. For laying, opening, and working on highways, and for the selection and appointment of supervisors'—as to render it void in toto; and so the court held, although its decision was in direct conflict with the decision of this court in Allen v. Hirsch, 8 Or. 412. There is no material difference in the two cases. In Allen v. Hirsch the legislature created a commission to survey, lay out, and construct a public road from the Sandy River in Multnomah County to Dalles City in Wasco County, appropriated $50,000 for its construction, and prescribed the duties of the commissioners in conducting the work. In the case at bar the legislature appropriated the sum of $10,000 for the construction of a wagon road from the Nehalem River to the Fuqua toll road, also from a certain point on said road to Netarts Bay, appointed commissioners for a similar purpose, required said county of Tillamook to pay certain incidental expenses attending the work, and provided that upon completion of the proposed roads and rendition of an account of the expenses thereof, etc., to the Secretary of State, he should draw his warrant upon the State Treasurer for the amount expended, to the extent of the appropriation; and if the former act was not a special or local one, within the meaning of the said provision of the constitution, then the latter was not. The act in question was in its nature more beneficial to the community at large by far than to the inhabitants in the immediate locality of. the roads; it had the effect to open, between the people of the Willamette Valley and a community Occupying a section of country which extends more than fifty miles along the seacoast, includes three bays, and is sufficient in area to make several counties, an inland communication and commerce; and if the State is to be so hampered by its constitution that it is unable by means of a reasonable and judicious appropriation, to establish between two sections of it, separated by physical causes, so beneficial, necessary, and important a connection, its inhabitants should speedily take steps to relieve themselves from such narrow and ridiculous restrictions."
The court held this act to be both special and local; special, because it was limited to a particular county for a special purpose, and local, because it operated only on one county and had no application outside of it.
Now, the only difference that can be suggested between the case last referred to and the one at bar is that the present act operates on two counties instead of one. But we conceive that the act is still local in characer, notwithstanding this difference. "If a local act is one operating within a limited territory, or a special locality— 'one operatng upon persons or property in a single county or two or three counties would be local'—the act in question must be obnoxious to that objection." Maxwell v. Tillamook County, pages 503, 504, of 20 Or. (26 Pac. 805). "If the true criterion by which to determine whether an act is local or general is to inquire whether under it the people of the State may be affected by its operation, the answer to that question as regards the present act must be that it is local and not general. It operates in the county of Tillamook only, and has no force or effect in any other part of the State. If such a law is not local, it is difficult to understand in the light of the authorities, what species of legislation would constitute :a local law." Now, applying the foregoing doctrine to the case at bar, the act operates only in two counties, Jackson and Klamath, and has no force or effect in any other county in the State. There is no escape from the conclusion that it is a local law.
4. But it is urged that the road proposed in the act, now under consideration, is a State road, intended, when completed, to extend entirely across the State and to unite remote sections thereof. It is true that the title so indicates, but, by the body of the act, no provision is made for the laying out, opening, or working of any road except through the counties of Jackson and Klamath, or in case both of these counties do not see fit to accept the overtures of the State and appropriate the required $50,000, then through Jackson County alone. And it is provided that such road shall be a county road, not a State road. Section 4 of the act is as follows:
"That such money shall be expended only upon a county road legally established."
The local character of the act is further indicated by the provision that as soon as Jackson County has made its appropriation of $50,000 to aid in the construction of a road from Medford, Jackson County, to a point on the west line of the Cascade Forest Reserve, on the route to Crater Lake, the Governor shall appoint a commission and thereupon twenty-five per cent of the sum appropriated shall become available for use in Jackson County and $12,500 each year for three years thereafter, and upon Klamath County making a like appropriation, the same amounts become available in like manner. Each county stands alone. If Jackson County aprpopriates $50,000 and Klamath County does not, Jackson County, at the end of three years, has a county road, the beginning and terminus of which is selected by the State, and practically designated by the act itself. And there the road ends, as it begins, entirely within the confines of one county and is a county road. If Klamath County accepts the State's offer, we have two county roads, one in each county, entirely beyond the supervision of the State. We think that the constitutional provision invoked in this case was passed to prevent the invasion of the State of the regular method of laying' out, opening, working, and supervising highways provided by general laws, and that this act violates the constitution in these particulars: First, that it requires the proposed county highways to begin at a particular point; second, that it appoints a commission to supervise not only the expenditure of the sum appropriated by the State, but that appropriated by the counties interested, and to have entire charge of the construction of the road, which is expressly declared in the act itself to be a county road.
5. These provisions make the act a local act for the "laying out, opening, and working of highways," as these terms are used in the constitution, and bring this case fully within the reasoning of the court in Maxwell v. Tillamook County, 20 Or. 495 (26 Pac. 803). It is urged that the construction of the road, here proposed, would be of great public utility, which, in a sense, is probably true. While the route indicated in the act does not suggest that the road would be of great commercial importance, and the Government publication submitted in evidence suggests that, owing to the altitude, a portion of the county traversed by it would be obstructed by heavy snowfalls for part of the year, still there can be no doubt that the wonderful formation and the grandeur of the scehery at and in the vicinity of Crater Lake would attract to this route great numbers of tourists from every part of the country. But this cannot alter the fact that the act interferes with the plain defined by the general laws for the "laying out, opening, and working of highways," and in that respect is special and local. Whether the State, by general laws, may enter upon the construction of public highways, to be built, owned, and managed by the State, is not before us for decision, and upon that subject we express no opinion. The fact that locks have been built at Oregon City, and a portage railway at Celilo, by moneys contributed by the State, and that these improvements are in a sense highways, is also foreign to the question here under consideration, as it is very evident, from an examination of Section 28, Article IV, of the Constitution, that the highways therein alluded to are roads. The language "special or local laws for the laying, opening, or working on highways and for the election and appointment of supervisors" sufficiently indicates that ordinary roads, not railroads nor canals, were the subjects in the minds of the framers of the constitution when this provision was inserted. Neither can we consider the fact that the southern portion of the State has, to s great extent, been overlooked by the legislature in the matter of other public improvements, and perhaps in the local of other State institutions. It is no doubt true, and perhaps unfortunate, that such has been the case, but we are called upon to interpret the law, not to remedy wrongs or omissions which are only within the province of the lawmaking power to be corrected, either by general legislation or amendment of our constitution. The decree of the circuit court is affirmed. Affirmed.