Case Name: STATE v. YOKUM
Court: Louisiana Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1923-02-26
Citations: 155 La. 846
Docket Number: No. 25662
Parties: STATE v. YOKUM.
Judges: By the WHOLE COURT.
Reporter: Louisiana Reports
Volume: 155
Pages: 846–878

Head Matter:
(99 South. 621)
No. 25662.
STATE v. YOKUM.
(Feb. 26, 1923.
On Rehearing, June 30, 1923. On Second Rehearing, March 8, 1924.)
(Syllabus by Editorial’ Staff.)
1. Criminal law <§=>202(3) — Acquittal of manufacturing and selling liquor not a bar to prosecution for possession.
In a prosecution for possessing intoxicating liquor, it was n9t error to overrule a plea of autrefois acquit based on a former trial and acquittal for manufacturing and selling the same-liquor.
2. Intoxicating liquors <§=>216 — Information for possessing homemade corn whisky good with-' out statutory definition.
No statutory definition'of intoxicating liquors is necessary to sustain an information for possessing intoxicating liquors where it appears that the liquor was homemade corn whisky.
3. Judges <@=>47(2) — Presiding at trial for manufacturing and selling intoxicating liquor no ground for recusing judge in trial for possessing the same.
In a prosecution for possessing intoxicating liquors, where it appeared that defendant had previously been charged with manufacturing and selling the same liquor before the same judge, it was not error for the trial judge to refuse to recuse himself under Code Prac. art. 338, § 5, as amended by Act No. 203 of 1918, on the ground of having performed a judicial act in the cause in any other court.
4. Intoxicating liquors <§=>224 — Burden on defendant in prosecution for possessing liquor to show that he was within exception.
In a prosecution for possessing intoxicating liquors, the burden was on defendant to prove that he was within the exception of the statute, and was lawfully in possession of,such liquors for the use of himself and his family, and it was not the duty of the state to prove as a part of its ease that the defendant was not within such exception.
5. Criminal law @=968(8) — Sufficiency of proof cannot be considered,, on motion in arrest of judgment.
The sufficiency of the proof cannot be considered under a motion in arrest of judgment in a criminal prosecution.
On First Rehearing.
6. Criminal law @=|73 — When “jeopardy” attaches in case tried without jury stated.
Under Const. 1921, art. 1, § 9, relating to double jeopardy, “jeopardy” attaches when the case is tried by the court without, a jury the moment it is qalled for trial, and the trial has begun by the reading of the indictment to the court, or, when that instrument is not formally read, when the first witness is sworn.
[Ed. Note. — For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, Jeopardy (In Criminal Law).]
On Second Rehearing.
7. Criminal law @=162 — Statute permitting discharge of accused before verdict held to violate constitutional guaranty against double jeopardy.
Rev. St. § 1055, providing that, if in a criminal prosecution it appears that the facts in evidence amount in law to some other offense, defendant shall not by reason thereof be entitled to an acquittal of the offense charged, and that no person tried for such offense shall be liable to be afterwards prosecuted for such other offense on the same facts unless the court shall think fit in its discretion to discharge the jury from giving any verdict on such trial, and to direct such person to be indicted for the offense shown to have been committed, is in conflict with Const. 1921, art. 1, § 9, relating to double jeopardy, in empowering the trial judge in his discretion to deny defendant the right to an acquittal of the crime charged. (Per Land, Dawkins, Overton, and Rogers, JJ.)
8. Criminal law @=161 — “Jeopardy” defined.
“Jeopardy” is used in the state Constitution to designate the'danger of conviction and punishment which a defendant in a criminal prosecution incurs when a valid indictment has been found or a valid information or complaint presented, and a pe'tit jury has been impaneled and sworn to try the case and to give a verdict in a court of competent jurisdiction.
9. Criminal law @=172 — Statute prohibiting prosecution for offense proved on former trial applicable only to jury trials.
Rev. St. 1870, § 1055, providing that, if the evidence shows another offense than that charged, defendant shall not be afterwards prosecuted therefor unless the court discharges the jury before verdict, is not applicable except to trials before a jury. (Per St. Paul, J.)
10. Criminal law @=172 — Constitution guarantees only against double jeopardy, but not right to a verdict.
The Constitution does not guarantee to an accused the right to a “verdict,” whether of acquittal or otherwise, but only that he shall not be “put in jeopardy again” for the same offense. (Per St. Paul, J.)
O’Niell, O. J., and Brunot and Leche, JJ., dissenting.
Appeal from Fifteenth Judicial District Court, Parish of Calcasieu; Thos. F. Porter, Jr., Judge.
Mat Yokum was convicted of possessing intoxicating liquor, and he appeals.
Affirmed.
Thos. Arthur Edwards, of Lake Charles, for appellant.
A. Y. Coco, Atty. Gen., Griffin T. Hawkins, Dist. Atty., of Lake Charles, and IVÍark C. Piekrel, Asst. Dist. Atty., of Oakdale (T. S. Walmsley, of New Orleans, of counsel), for the State.
By the WHOLE COURT.

Opinion:
DAWKINS, J.
Defendant appeals from a conviction and sentence for possessing intoxicating liquors, relying upon six bills of exception for reversal of the judgment below.
Bill No. 1.
The first bill was reserved to the overruling of a plea of autrefois acquit, based upon a former trial and acquittal for manufacturing and selling the. same liquor. It appears that there was found in defendant's bathroom some 15 gallons of homemade corn whisky, and he was indicted and tried for manufacturing, selling, and disposing of the said intoxicant; but upon trial, it was found that the liquor was in the possession of defendant before 'the Hood Bill (Act 39, 1921) went into effect, and, no proof -being made of any sale, he was acquitted of the charges so made.
However, the district attorney thereafter filed a bill of information for unlawful possession of said liquor for beverage purposes, and it was upon this charge that the conviction involved in this appeal was had.
While it is true, as a physical fact, that one cannot manufacture or sell intoxicants without possessing the same, either in person or through an agent, still, a charge of violating the .law in those two respects in no way involves the offense of unlawful possession; in neither case could the accused be convicted of such illegal possession, for the reason that it is not, an ingredient of either. All three might be charged in separate counts of the same bill, and conviction or acquittal had upon one or all, without regard to the others.
The ruling was therefore correct. 2 Wharton's Orim. Law (11th Ed.) p. 1991 et seq., and authorities in footnotes.
Bill No. 2.
Bill No. 2 assails the ruling of the lower court in denying a motion to quash the information. Among the grounds relied upon is that of the unconstitutionality of Act 39, 1921, and while a multitude of reasons why the law was unconstitutional were alleged the only one discussed in brief or argument is that the said act adopts a foreign system or code of laws by reference, meaning, of course, the adoption by reference to federal legislation the definition of certain kinds of intoxicants. Hence we will not consider the other points except to say that they appear to be without merit. The liquor in this case was homemade corn whisky, and, as said in State v. Coco, 152 La. 241, 92 South. 883, and several later cases, no definition is required, either by the statute or in practical experience to determine that corn whisky is intoxicating.
None of the other grounds of the motion made in the alternative have been mentioned by appellant, and, finding no merit therein, -we shall not consider them in detail.
The ruling was correct.
Bill No. 3.
The third bill was retained to the refusal of the trial judge to recuse himself when that action was opposed by the counsel for the state.
The only basis of the said motion was that the judge who sat in the former cases in which defendant was acquitted stated in the trial of the present case that, if the evidence was the same, that is, as to .the kind and quantity, circumstances, etc., of the liquor found in defendant's bathroom, he would convict the accused of unlawful possession.
We find nothing in these circumstances to support the motion to recuse. Defendant cites section 5 of article 338 of the Code of Practice, as amended by Act 20-3 of 1918, which provides, among .other grounds for recusing a judge: "His having performed any judicial act in the cause in any other, court." Appellant also cites State v. Lee, 46 La. Ann. 623, 15 South. 159.
The section of the article referred to clearly has no application here, for the judge had not only not performed any judicial act in any other court, but none in this particular case or charge anywhere else. The reference to the 46 La. Ann. 623, 15 South. 159, must have been an error, for there was no question of realisation raised in that case. State v. Lee.
We find no error.
Bill No. 4.
The fourth bill presents for our review the ruling refusing certain special charges which defendant requested the trial court to give or hold as follows:
"(1) The court will charge itself that the state must prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt, and, in view of the fact that the two deputy sheriffs (the only witnesses in the case) who took the stand testified that the dwelling of defendant was entered and about 15 gallons of whisky was found in the bathroom of his dwelling, not concealed, in unbroken crates, one large bottle of alcohol, not crated, and no evidence having been adduced to show when the liquors had been acquired, whether before or after the enactment of the present law. No evidence of the manufacture thereof, no evidence of any sale, no evidence of unlawful transportation thereof, or other circumstance to show unlawful possession, the act not defining the term 'lawful possession,' nor fixing any specific quantity, and it not being averred in the information that possession of said liquors was not exclusive of any of the exceptions provided for in said Act. !S(o. 39 of the Legislature of 1921, and no proof having been offered by the state to show that the defendant's possession of said liquors did not come within the exceptions, the defendant under such statement of facts and circumstances is entitled to an acquittal.
" (2) The court is further requested to charge itself that the defendant is not required to prove his innocence, but the state must prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and, in the absence of any proof by the state of any act or deed on the part of defendant to show unlawful possession, the law specially providing that he may have intoxicating liquors in his dwelling for personal use, etc., and with no limit as to quantity, the burden of proof of unlawful possession rests upon the state, and defendant is entitled to be acquitted.
"(3) The court is requested to charge itself that an accused has the legal right to have and possess in his dwelling intoxicating liquors, and the law having failed to express any rule of what shall constitute a prima facie case, or to fix a maximum quantity, and there being no proof whatever of an unlawful possession or unlawful use of said liquors, defendant must be found not guilty."
The judge gives as his reason for the ruling the. following:
"In this case the court found that on or about the time alleged in the bill of information, in the parish of Calcasieu, the defendant had in his dwelling house two 5-gallon glass water bottle containers full of homemade or moonshine whisky, in a homemade crate unpacked, and one 5-gallon glass water bottle container about one-third 'or one-half full of homemade or moonshine whisky, a one-gallon glass jug or bottle pajrtly full of a liquid containing a high percentage of alcohol, being what is commonly called 'white mule,' and another. gallon bottle partly full of homemade or moonshine whisky, which was about the same color as ordinary, commercial whisky, and which was the color of the whisky contained in the 5-gallon glass bottle containers.
"The defendant did not take the stand himself and offered no evidence whatever.
"The court refused all three of the special charges requested by the defendant, for the reason that they did not correctly state the law. The law as applied by the court in this case is as follows:
" 'An accused is presumed innocent until his guilt is established by the state to the satisfaction of the court and beyond a reasonable doubt, but where the state established (as it did in this case) beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant possessed in his dwelling house intoxicating liquors for beverage purposes, and where the accused relied, as a matter of defense, on an exception in the statute, which is not in the enacting clause by which the offense is described and forbidden, he had the burden of proving that he was within the exception, and it was not the duty of the state to prove as a part of its case that' the defendant was not within the exception. See 16 C. J. 531; 1 Wharton's Crim. Law (10th Ed.) p. 348; Underhill on Crim. Evidence, p. 43; State v. Cain, 106 La. 708, 714, 31 South. 300; State v. Barrow, 31 La. Ann. 693.
"The law makes it an offense to possess intoxicating liquor even in a dwelling house for beverage purposes, and while the same statute permits a man to keep intoxicating liquor in a dwelling house for beverage purposes for his own use, and for all his family and guests, if he wishes to urge that defense he must establish it affirmatively, and the state is under no obligation to show that the liquors in his house were not lawfully acquired and were not for the use of himself and his family."
The ruling was correct.
Bill No. 5.
Bill No. 5 was reserved to the overruling of a motion for a new trial, which was based both upon the allegation that the judgment was contrary to the law and the evidence, and upon the matters covered by the several bills of exception heretofore considered.
We find no error in the ruling.
Bill No. 6.
The last bill was to the overruling of a motion in arrest of judgment, in which it was alleged:
That no crime had been charged under the laws and Constitution; that the bill did not allege that the possession of the liquor in his dwelling was exclusive of any exceptions provided by said Act 39 of 1921; that no proof was adduced to warrant a conviction; that he was deprived of his liberty and property without due process of law; and places him in jeopardy twice for the same offense.
Of course, the sufficiency of the proof cannot be considered under a motion in arrest of judgment; and all the other matters raised are covered by the preceding bills and rulings thereon.
For the reasons assigned, the judgment appealed from is affirmed.
O'NTEDL, C. J., concurs in the result.