Case Name: Harry Thomas CHANNELL, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1958-10-01
Citations: 107 So. 2d 284
Docket Number: No. 319
Parties: Harry Thomas CHANNELL, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: ALLEN and SHANNON, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 107
Pages: 284–292

Head Matter:
Harry Thomas CHANNELL, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. 319.
District Court of Appeal of Florida. Second District.
Oct. 1, 1958.
Petitions for Rehearing Denied Dec. 23, 1958.
Joseph A. Varón, Hollywood, and Phillips & Hathaway, West Palm Beach, for appellant.
Richard W. Ervin, Atty. Gen., and John C. Reed, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

Opinion:
KANNER, Chief Judge.
Appellant was informed against on three counts: one, breaking and entering a certain dwelling house with intent to commit a felony, grand larceny; two, knowingly receiving stolen property, a ring of the value of over $50; and three, knowingly receiving stolen property, a ring of the value of over $50. Trial on these charges was before the same jury; the appellant was found guilty on each count and sentenced under count one to fifteen years; under count two to four years, said sentence to run consecutively to the sentence under count one; and under count three to four years, said sentence to run consecutively to the sentences under counts one and two. The offenses were three separate crimes involving different owners and properties.
Appellant urges that the denial by the trial court of his motion to quash was error. Primarily, the basis of his argument is that there was a misjoinder of offenses in that each count concerned a felony distinct and separate from the others, and with no showing that the charges arose out of the same transaction.
A reference to the motion to quash reveals that it contained five grounds, none of which attacked the information because of misjoinder of offenses. Mainly the fundament of the attack was that the information was vague or failed to charge any crime known to the laws of the State of Florida. A motion to quash must specify distinctly the ground of the objection relied on. Section 909.03(1), Florida Statutes, F.S.A. The motion here was completely devoid of any objection to misjoinder of offenses. Because of this failure, an attempt to raise this objection 'by appellant for the first time in his brief now comes too late, and especially so since there was no specification of such objection in the assignments of error. Moreover, it is not made to appear that the information in the instant case as to mis-joinder of offenses or for other cause was so vague, indistinct, and indefinite as to mislead or embarrass the appellant in the preparation of his defense, nor to subject him to the danger of a new prosecution for the same offense. Section 906.25, Florida Statutes, F.S.A.
Appellant further urges that the trial court erred in denying his motion that the state elect as to which count it would stand upon for conviction. It is an acknowledged rule in the Florida jurisdiction that, if various counts composing an information or indictment are not repugnant to or inconsistent with one another, the granting or the denial of a motion to elect rests within the sound judicial discretion of the trial court. Pearce v. State, 1940, 143 Fla. 347, 196 So. 685; Mayers v. State, 1936, 126 Fla. 640, 171 So. 824; and Houchins v. State, 1944, 154 Fla. 283, 17 So.2d 82. It takes only a cursory examination of the information here to observe that the counts are neither repugnant nor inconsistent one with the other; nor does it appear that a conviction under any of the counts would preclude conviction under either of the two remaining counts. Nothing is revealed to indicate that the trial court committed an abuse of discretion by his refusal to grant the motion to elect.
The first count charged breaking and entering a dwelling house with intent to commit a felony, to wit, grand larceny. Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction under this count. There was positive testimony that appellant was in and was seen leaving the dwelling house involved, that the doors and windows and places of entrance were closed, and that he fled the scene and was pursued. However, there was no showing that appellant took anything from the house and no showing of the value of the property that was in the house. But there was testimony that there was property in the house and testimony by a maid that she heard a noise like a closet door and dresser drawers being opened and closed. It could reasonably be inferred from the circumstances and from the testimony that the breaking and entering was with the intent to take personal property of some value.
The evidence introduced by the state, although inadequate to meet the test required to sustain a verdict for the higher offense, was sufficient for the case to he submitted to the jury for determination of whether appellant was guilty or innocent of breaking and entering a dwelling house with intent to commit a misdemeanor, to wit, petit larceny. See cases of Green v. State, 1933, 113 Fla. 237, 151 So. 898, and Jalbert v. State, Fla.1957, 95 So.2d 589. The appellate court under such circumstance is authorized to reverse the judgment where it is established that the accused is guilty of a lesser degree or offense necessarily included in the offense charged, directing the trial court to enter judgment for the lesser offense and pass sentence accordingly. Section 924.34, Florida Statutes, F.S.A.; Bronson v. State, 1942, 152 Fla. 28, 10 So.2d 718; and Jalbert v. State, supra.
Appellant attacks the sufficiency of the verdicts under counts two and three to support the judgment and sentences consequent upon them. In form and substance the verdicts returned as to counts two and three are alike, except as to the count number. Thus the verdict as to count two reads:
"We, the jury, at Fort Lauderdale, Broward County, Florida, this 21st day of March, A.D.1957, find the defendant guilty as to receiving stolen property and the value to be more than ($50.00) Fifty Dollars as to Count II. So Say We All."
Appellant contends that the verdicts are a nullity and relies upon the case of Harris v. State, 1907, 53 Fla. 37, 43 So. 311. The verdict in that case reads:
"We, the jury, find the defendant guilty of receiving stolen goods; so say we all."
The Supreme Court held that this verdict was not responsive to the charge contained in the indictment and was a nullity in that an essential element of the crime is the knowledge on the part of the accused that the property received was stolen.
Verdicts rendered in criminal cases are required to be certain and should signify a definite meaning devoid of ambiguity-However, they should be considered with respect to the indictment or information and the entire record, and any words which impart beyond a reasonable doubt the meaning and intention of the jury are sufficient, and all fair intendments will be-effectuated to sustain the verdict. Chavers v. State, Fla.1950, 45 So.2d 180.
In the case of Licata v. State, 1929, 81 Fla. 649, 88 So. 621, 622, the following verdict was returned.
"We, the jury, find the defendant guilty of receiving stolen goods as charged in the information to the amount of one case of cigarettes, valued at $80. So say we all."
The Supreme Court in construing this verdict and information together, because of the express reference in the verdict to-the information, determined that the qualifying phrase "as charged in the information" related to the reception of the goods and defined the character of the act, the effect of which was a finding on each of the material elements of the crime charged. The verdict was sustained as being adequate.
Whitefield v. State, 1939, 137 Fla. 552,. 188 So. 361, 364, was also a case in which, the appellant was convicted of unlawfully purchasing, concealing, and aiding in the-concealment of certain property which was alleged to have been stolen and to have been, received by the appellant with knowledge by him that it had been stolen. The verdict of the jury was:
"We, the jury, at Miami, Dade County, Florida, this 2nd day of March,. A.D., 1938, find the defendant Dewey-Whitefield alias Tish Whitefield Guilty/ as charged. So say we all."
This verdict was construed as responsive to the information and as being sufficiently certain.
So when we consider these verdict cases as they apply to the offenses under counts two and three, the words in the verdicts here specifically make reference to the respective counts upon which the verdicts were rendered. The distinction between the Harris case and the cases above referred to is easily discernible, since the verdict in the Harris case assesses guilt through receipt by the accused of "stolen goods", while the verdicts in the other cases by reference to the information express the essential element of knowledge. We, therefore, hold that the words in the two verdicts, referring to the count numbers thus, "as to count II" and "as to count III", are equivalent in effect to the words, "as charged", employed in the verdicts and construed in the cases of Licata v. State, and Whitefield v. State, and consequently are responsive to the offenses charged.
The sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the verdicts of guilty under counts two and three is also questioned. The legal principle is recognized in Florida that the possession of goods recently stolen does not as a matter of law raise a presumption of guilt of the possessor of knowingly receiving stolen goods, but the inference arising from such possession is purely a matter of fact to be passed upon by a jury. Hayward v. State, 1943, 152 Fla. 608, 12 So.2d 458, and King v. State, 1946, 156 Fla. 817, 24 So.2d 573. There was testimony that, immediately after his apprehension by a police officer, appellant concealed in a handkerchief certain rings shown to have been previously stolen from the owners named in counts two and three and divested himself of their possession by surreptitiously tossing them into a planter or a flower pot. Under the facts and surrounding circumstances the innocence or guilt of the appellant was a question for determination by the jury. The cases of Davis v. State, 1924, 87 Fla. 505, 100 So. 739; Bryan v. State, 1941, 148 Fla. 61, 3 So.2d 509; and Tidwell v. State, 1940, 143 Fla. 397, 196 So. 837, involving receipt of stolen goods known to have been stolen, sustain the instant case as to the sufficiency of the evidence.
Finally appellant contends that the judgment entered upon the verdicts returned under counts two and three of the information is materially defective. The judgment reads:
"You, Harry Thomas Channell, having been convicted by a jury of .
II. Receiving Stolen Property III. Receiving Stolen Property
"The Court now adjudges you to be guilty of said offense."
The judgment thus rendered is defective because there is no proper adjudication of guilt in that the judgment omitted the material element that the accused knew the goods were stolen. The judgment should be reversed with direction to the trial court that a proper and lawful judgment be entered. Mathis v. State, 1938, 134 Fla. 352, 184 So. 89.
It may be observed that appellant's sole defense was his testimony that he had never been in the home charged to have been broken into, nor had he ever had possession of the rings involved. On cross-examination by the state he admitted that he had been previously convicted of a felony. The evidence was conflicting and it is apparent that the jury placed no credence in his testimony.
To conclude, the judgment and sentence imposed under count one is hereby reversed and the trial court is directed to render proper judgment and sentence accordingly; and the judgment entered upon the verdicts under counts two and three is reversed and the trial court is directed to enter a proper and lawful judgment. This case is remanded to the court below for proceedings not inconsistent with the opinion of this court.
Reversed.
ALLEN and SHANNON, JJ., concur.