Case Name: Fay Parker v. The State
Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1917-06-29
Citations: 83 Tex. Crim. 81
Docket Number: No. 4564
Parties: Fay Parker v. The State.
Judges: 
Reporter: Texas Criminal Reports
Volume: 83
Pages: 81–86

Head Matter:
Fay Parker v. The State.
No. 4564.
Decided June 29, 1917.
Rehearing denied February 20, 1918.
1 Pandering—Bills of Exception—Rehearing.
Where the bills of exception were filed after the time for filing had expired, they will be stricken out on motion by the State. However, the record being corrected in connection with the motion for rehearing, the cause will be considered on its merits.
2. —Same—Sufficiency of the Evidence—Promise to Encourage Inmate of House of Prostitution.
Where, upon trial of encouraging an inmate of a house of prostitution to remain therein as such inmate, the evidence sustained the conviction under article 506a, P. C., there was no reversible error.
3. —Same—Evidence—Acts of Defendant.
Where, upon trial of pandering, the evidence showed that defendant whipped the female who was in the house of prostitution for not staying there, etc., there was no error in admitting testimony that she gave money to the defendant, because he was sore and cursed her out for not doing so.
4. —Same—Evidence—Acts of Defendant—Making Bond—Promise.
Where, upon trial of pandering, the evidence showed that the defendant’s promise to the female was that he would make bail for her whenever she was arrested, etc., there was no error in admitting testimony that the defendant promised her to make bond for her when she was arrested as an inducement to her to continue to ply her vocation, and this did not contravene any constitutional right of defendant.
5. —Same—Evidence—Act of Defendant.
Upon trial of pandering there was no error to admit testimony to show relation of defendant with the prostitute, such as delivery by her to him of money she made by prostitution, and the fact that he whipped her because she would not stay in the house of prostitution, etc.
8.—Same—Evidence—Acts of Defendant.
Upon trial of pandering there was no error in admitting testimony that defendant made inquiry of officers who were watching the house of prostitution in which said prostitute remained as inmate, and that he was in said house with her, etc., and whipped her for not remaining there.
7. —Same—Evidence—Other Offenses—Bes Gestae.
Upon trial of pandering there was no error in admitting testimony that defendant had struck the inmate of the house of prostitution because she did not get enough money for him and remain in a certain house, and there was nothing in the contention that this did not support the allegations of the indictment, as there was no particular house named in the indictment during the relation of defendant with said female inmate in a house of prostitution, as all this was part of the res gestae.
8. —Same—Bequested Charges.
Where the requested charges were embraced in the court’s main charge, there was no error in refusing them.
9. —Same—Contradictory Testimony.
The fact that the female inmate in a house of prostitution, kept there by the defendant, made some contradictory statements, is not available to sustain defendant’s contention that her evidence was thereby destroyed as a matter of law.
Appeal from the Criminal District Court of Dallas. Tried below before the Hon. C. A. Pippen.
Appeal from a conviction of pandering; penalty, five years imprisonment in the penitentiary.
The opinion states the case.
A. S. Baskett, for appellant.
E. B. Hendricks, Assistant Attorney General, for the State.

Opinion:
MORROW, Judge.
Appellant was convicted of pandering and his punishment assessed at five years confinement in the State penitentiary.
The prosecution is under the pandering statute, article 506a, Penal Code. Ho defects are pointed out and none discovered. The evidence which is disclosed by the statement of facts is sufficient to support the finding of the jury. The court gave a written charge to which it appears there were some exceptions filed. It is also apparent that there are exceptions taken to matters of procedure occurring in the course of the trial. These, as well as the exceptions to the charge, appellant undertook to bring before the court by bills of exception. It appears, however, that owing to the delay in filing these bills we are precluded by the law from considering them. The term of court at which appellant's trial took place began January 1 and ended March 30, 1917. His motion for a new trial was overruled March 12th, at which time he was accorded sixty days within which to file bills of exceptions. On Maj 11th an additional extension of ten days was granted, and on May 26th he, by motion, sought and obtained an additional extension of seven days
The State, through the Assistant Attorney General, in a motion filed-brings to the attention of the court the facts recited above with reference to the several dates mentioned, and calls attention to the fact that the bills of exception were filed on the 1st day of June, 1917, and insists that the court is required by law to ignore them. The particular contention made by the State was that the order of the court made May 26th allowing seven additional days was not effective because on May 21st, prior to the date of the order named, the time for filing the bills of exceptions allowed in previous orders, had expired, and that after its expiration the court lost control of the matter. Supporting this contention, the State's counsel cites decisions of this court in the Armstrong case, 60 Texas Crim. Rep., 59, and Presley v. State, 60 Texas Crim. Rep., 102. These decisions, in construing the statutes with reference to the extension of time for filing bills of exceptions, article 845, Code of Criminal Procedure, have construed them in accord with the State's contention, and this construction makes it necessary for us to sustain the State's motion.
Having examined the statement of facts and such matters in the record as, under the rules, we are privileged to pass upon, and being precluded from passing upon the questions raised by the bills of exceptions, see Vernon's Code of Criminal Procedure, article 744, and notes; and there having been brought to our attention no reversible error, and no fundamental error discovered, the judgment of the lower court is affirmed.
Affirmed.