Case Name: NOAH HOBBS v. WESTERN UNION TELEGRAPH COMPANY
Court: Supreme Court of North Carolina
Jurisdiction: North Carolina
Decision Date: 1934-03-21
Citations: 206 N.C. 313
Docket Number: 
Parties: NOAH HOBBS v. WESTERN UNION TELEGRAPH COMPANY.
Judges: 
Reporter: North Carolina Reports
Volume: 206
Pages: 313–321

Head Matter:
NOAH HOBBS v. WESTERN UNION TELEGRAPH COMPANY.
(Filed 21 March, 1934.)
1. Telegraph Companies A c — Proof of failure to deliver message in reasonable time establishes prima facie case of negligence.
Where it has been shown that a telegraph company failed to deliver a death message between its offices within the State in twenty-four hours a prima facie case of negligence is made out, placing the burden on defendant to rebut the prima facie case, if it chooses to do so, the burden remaining on plaintiff on the issue of defendant’s negligence.
2. Same — Where there is no conflict in telegraph company’s evidence in rebuttal of prima facie case, directed verdict in its favor is not error.
Where all the evidence introduced by defendant telegraph company tends to rebut a prima facie case of negligence on its part in delivering a telegram, and there is no conflict in the evidence as to the facts constituting such rebuttal, the company is entitled to an instruction that if the jury finds the facts to be as testified by the witnesses to answer the issue of negligence in defendant company’s favor.
S. Telegraph Companies A b — Where address indicates that sendee lives beyond free delivery limits, company need not advise sender of fact.
Where the address given on a telegram shows that the sendee and the person in whose care the message is sent lives on a rural free delivery mail route from the terminal office beyond the free delivery limits of the telegraph company and probably beyond the limits of the city, the company may assume that the sender knew the facts and had given, the best address known, and it is not under duty to send a service message to sender giving notice that the telegram could not be delivered by messenger without the payment of an additional charge, and having failed, after due diligence, to locate the sendee or the person in whose care the message was sent by telephone, it is justified in delivering the message by posting it at the terminal office.
Clarkson, J., dissenting.
Appeal by plaintiff from Shaw, Emergency Judge, at March Special Term, 1933, of DavidsoN.
Affirmed.
This is an action to recover damages for mental anguish suffered by plaintiff as the result of the alleged negligent failure of the defendant to deliver, within a reasonable time after its receipt at defendant’s office in Lexington, N. O., a telegram addressed to the plaintiff, advising him of his mother’s death.
At 9 :16 a.m., on 1 September, 1932, a telegram was delivered to the defendant at its office in Monroe, N. 0., by Mrs. E. M. Flow, a sister of the plaintiff, for transmission and delivery to the plaintiff, at his home near Lexington, N. C., which was in words as follows:
“Monroe, N. Car. 9 :16 A 1 Sept. 1932.
Noah Hobbs
R. E. D. 5. Care J. S. Deal, Lexington, N. Car. Mother died this morning at 6 :30. Mrs. M. E. Flow.”
This telegram was received at defendant’s office in Lexington, N. C., at 9 :23, on 1 September, 1932. It was delivered to the plaintiff, by mail, at his home on R. E. D. No. 5, near Lexington, N. C., at 12:30 p.m., on 2 September, 1932, by the wife of J. S. Deal, who had found the telegram in an envelope addressed to the plaintiff, in her husband’s mail box. The envelope containing the telegram was deposited in the mail box by the carrier who had left Lexington at 9 :00 a.m. that morning, as required by his daily schedule.
Upon his receipt of the telegram, the plaintiff immediately left his home in Davidson County in an automobile, and drove to Monroe, in Union County, a distance of 70 miles. Upon his arrival at Monroe, at about 5 :00 o’clock, p.m., on 2 September, 1932, the plaintiff had learned that his mother’s funeral had been held that morning at 11:30 o’clock. He testified that the fact that he had not attended his mother’s funeral affected him deeply, causing him great suffering in both mind and body. He said: “If I had got the telegram in time, I could have attended my mother’s funeral.”
The manager of defendant’s office at Lexington, N. C., testified as follows:
“At 9:23 a.m., on 1 September, 1932, a telegram addressed to Noah Hobbs, R. E. D. 5, care J. S. Deal, Lexington, N. C., came to my office from Monroe, N. C. I did not know Mr. Hobbs or Mr. Deal. I -did not know where either of them lived. Upon receipt of the telegram, which was a death message, I got the telephone directory of the city of Lexington to see if either Mr. Hobbs or Mr. Deal had a telephone. I found that neither of them had a telephone. Their names were not in the directory. I then called the rural operator, and was informed by him that neither Mr. Hobbs nor Mr. Deal had a telephone connecting with tbe city exchange. I then called Reed’s Exchangee, which is in Davidson County, about five or six miles from my office — in the country. I was informed that neither Mr. Hobbs nor Mr. Deal had a telephone connecting with Reed’s Exchange. No one at the exchange knew either of them. I then called Ohurchland Exchange, which is a little further in the country from Lexington than Reed’s Exchange. I was informed that neither Mr. Hobbs nor Mr. Deal had a telephone connecting with Ohurchland Exchange. No one at the exchange knew either of them. The reason I called these two exchanges was that route No. 5 from Lexington goes in the direction of these exchanges, and persons living on said route are served by these exchanges. After I had been unable to locate either Mr. Hobbs or Mr. Deal, I called the agent of the defendant at Monroe, by wire, and advised him that I had been unable to locate either Mr. Hobbs or Mr. Deal, that neither of them had a telephone, and that I had mailed the telegram to Mr. Hobbs, at the address given in the telegram. I mailed the telegram some time before dinner, as I now remember, on 1 September, 1932. The mail for route No. 5, leaves Lexington each morning at 9 :00 o’clock. The telegram addressed to the plaintiff left Lexington on the first mail which went out of Lexington for route No. 5 after its receipt.
“The defendant’s free delivery limits at Lexington extend one mile from its office. Both Mr. Hobbs and Mr. Deal live beyond the free delivery limits. I did not know either of them on 1 September, 1932, and did not know where either of them lived. Sometimes when I know where the addressee in a telegram lives, beyond the free delivery limits, I take a chance and send the telegram by special mssenger, expecting him to pay the charge for delivery. If I know where the addressee lives, and his home is beyond the free delivery limits, I have the sender advised, so that the extra charge for delivery may be paid or guaranteed by him, if he desires us to deliver the telegram by messenger.”
Mrs. E. M. Flow, the sender of the message, testified that she paid the amount charged by the defendant’s agent at Monroe for the transmission and delivery of the telegram to the plaintiff, and that she was not informed by said agent or by any one else, that an extra charge would be made for the delivery of the telegram to her brother, by a special messenger. She would have been willing to pay the extra charge, if advised by the defendant that such charge was required.
At the conclusion of all the evidence, the court refused to allow defendant’s motion for judgment as' of nonsuit, but intimated that it would instruct the jury that if they should find the facts to be as testified by the witnesses, they should answer the first issue, to wit: “Did the defendant negligently fail to transmit and deliver the telegram from Monroe, N. C., as alleged in the complaint,” “No.”
Upon tbis intimation by tbe court, tbe plaintiff submitted to a non-suit, and appealed to tbe Supreme Court.
D. L. Pichará for plaintiff.
Walser & Walser, Chas. W. Tillett and Francis B. Stark for defendant.

Opinion:
CoNNOR, J".
It is not contended on tbis appeal tbat there was any evidence at tbe trial of tbis action tending to show negligence on tbe part of tbe defendant in transmitting tbe telegram addressed to tbe plaintiff from Monroe to Lexington. All tbe evidence showed tbat tbe telegram was filed at defendant's office in Monroe at 9 :16 a.m. and was received at defendant's office in Lexington at 9 :23 a.m., on tbe same day. Tbe defendant fully performed its contract with tbe sender and its duty to tbe sendee of tbe telegram with respect to its transmission from Monroe to Lexington. On tbe facts shown by all tbe evidence, there is and can be no contention to tbe contrary.
Tbe telegram, however, although received by defendant at its office in Lexington at 9 :23 a.m., on 1 September, 1932, was not delivered to tbe plaintiff until 12 :30 p.m. on 2 September, 1932. There was a delay of more than twenty-four hours in tbe delivery of tbe telegram after its receipt by tbe defendant at its office in Lexington. Nothing else appearing in tbe case, such delay would constitute at least evidence of negligence on tbe part of tbe defendant, with respect to tbe delivery of tbe telegram, sufficient to carry tbe case to tbe jury, and if unaccounted for by tbe defendant would entitle tbe plaintiff to a verdict on which tbe defendant would be liable to tbe plaintiff for tbe damages sustained by him and resulting from tbe negligence of tbe defendant. It is well settled tbat where a telegraph company has received a telegram for transmission and delivery to tbe sendee, and after its prompt transmission to its terminal office, has failed to deliver tbe telegram to tbe sendee within a reasonable time, because of its failure to exercise due diligence to make a prompt delivery, tbe company is prima facie liable to- tbe sendee for any damages be has sustained which resulted from tbe unreasonable delay to deliver tbe telegram to him. Hendricks v. Telegraph Co., 126 N. C., 304, 35 S. E., 43. In such case tbe burden is on tbe defendant, if it denies liability, to offer evidence to rebut tbe prima facie case for tbe plaintiff. Tbe burden of tbe issue involving liability, however, remains on tbe plaintiff. Such burden is not shifted to tbe defendant, who may or may not offer evidence to rebut tbe prima facie case made by tbe evidence offered by tbe plaintiff. Speas v. Bank, 188 N. C., 524, 125 S. E., 398. Where all tbe evidence offered by tbe defendant rebuts tbe prima facie case made by tbe evidence offered by tbe plaintiff, and there is no controversy between the parties as to the facts shown by the evidence, the defendant is entitled to an instruction of the court to the jury that if the jury shall find the facts to be as all the evidence tends to show, they should answer the issue involving the liability of the defendant to the plaintiff, in the negative. McIntosh Prac. & Pro., p. 632; Bank v. Nolle, 203 N. C., 300, 165 S. E., 722; Somersette v. Stanaland, 202 N. C., 685, 163 S. E., 804; Reinhardt v. Ins. Co., 201 N. C., 785, 161 S. E., 528. This principle is not in conflict with the right to trial by jury of controverted issues of fact but affords parties to the action the protection of the law, when there is no controverted issue of fact.
In the instant case, the address of the sendee as shown by the telegram delivered by the sender to the defendant at Monroe, and received by the defendant at Lexington, showed that the plaintiff, Noah Hobbs, and the person in whose care the telegram was to be delivered, J. S. Deal, both lived on Rural Free Delivery Route No. 5, out of Lexington. All the evidence at the trial showed that defendant's'manager at Lexington did not know Mr. Hobbs or Mr. Deal, and did not know where either of them lived on Route No. 5. In such case, what was the duty of defendant's manager at Lexington with respect to the delivery of the telegram to the sendee?
The address given in the telegram showed that both Mr. Hobbs and Mr. Deal lived beyond the free delivery limits of the defendant at Lexington, and probably beyond the corporate limits of the city. It was a reasonable inference and the evidence shows such to be the fact, that the sender of the telegram knew these facts, and had given the defendant the only address of the sendee which she knew. In such case, the principle that when the sendee of a telegram cannot be located by the agent of the company, because of an insufficient or erroneous address, given by the sender, it is the duty of the agent to ask, by wire, for a better address, is not applicable. It was manifestly the duty of defendant's manager at Lexington to use reasonable diligence to locate Mr. Hobbs, or Mr. Deal, at the address given by the sender of the telegram. He undertook to perform this duty by the use of the telephone, and it was only after he had been unable to locate either Mr. Hobbs or Mr. Deal, by telephone, that he mailed the telegram to the address given by the sender. The telegram was delivered by mail to J. S. Deal, and by his wife to Mr. Hobbs. Whether the defendant's manager would have been justified in mailing the telegram before he used the telephone for the purpose of locating Mr. Hobbs, or Mr. Deal, under the principle on which Gainey v. Telegraph Co., 136 N. C., 262, 48 S. E., 653, was decided, need not be decided. Having failed to locate either Mr. Hobbs or Mr. Deal by telephone, he was justified in using the mail for the delivery of tbe telegram to tbe address given by tbe sender. On tbe facts shown by all tbe evidence, be was not required to notify tbe sender tbat tbe telegram could not be delivered at tbe address given by ber by special messenger. He bad a right to presume tbat she knew this, when she delivered tbe telegram to tbe defendant at Monroe.
Tbe intimation of tbe court as to tbe instruction which it would give tbe jury in this case is supported in principle by tbe decision in Gainey v. Telegraph Co., supra, and is in accord with tbe decision in Garner v. Telegraph Co., 100 S. C., 302, 84 S. E., 829. In tbat case it was held tbat tbe addressing of a telegram to tbe addressee, "R. E. D. 1," is a direction to tbe telegraph company to use tbe mail for delivery, and tbat tbe company was not liable for delay thereby occasioned. See 62 C. J., 169. Tbe judgment in tbe instant case is
Affirmed.