Case Name: SALAS v. CLEMENTS
Court: Michigan Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1976-12-27
Citations: 399 Mich. 103
Docket Number: Docket No. 56624
Parties: SALAS v CLEMENTS
Judges: Kavanagh, C. J., and Levin, Coleman, Fitzgerald, and Lindemer, JJ., concurred with Williams, J.
Reporter: Michigan Reports
Volume: 399
Pages: 103–115

Head Matter:
SALAS v CLEMENTS
Docket No. 56624.
Argued May 4, 1976
(Calendar No. 1).
Decided December 27, 1976.
Rafael Salas, Jr., and Gilbert Garza brought an action for damages under the dramshop act and for failure to maintain safe premises against Mary E. Clements, owner of the Memory Club Bar. Plaintiffs allege that they were assaulted and injured while in the defendant’s tavern by an unknown person who had been served alcohol while he was intoxicated. The defendant was granted summary judgment by Wayne Circuit Court, Thomas J. Foley, J., for failure of the plaintiffs to comply with the amendment of the dramshop act which requires a plaintiff to "name and retain” the assailant as a defendant. The Court of Appeals, Bashara, P. J., and Danhof and Van Valkenburg, JJ., affirmed (Docket No. 17779). The plaintiffs appeal to challenge the constitutionality of the "name and retain” amendment. Held:
1. The dramshop act amendment applies only to those injured persons who do not "name and retain” the intoxicated person as a defendant where they know the identity of the intoxicated person.
2. A fundamental rule of statutory construction is that departure from the literal construction of a statute is justified when such construction would produce an absurd and unjust result and would be clearly inconsistent with the purposes and policies of the act in question. The object of the "name and retain” provision is to eliminate the common practice whereby the intoxicated person enters into a settlement with the injured plaintiff for a token sum, and thereafter assists the plaintiff with the prosecution of a suit against the tavern owner. If a plaintiff does not know the identity of the intoxicated person there is no danger of collusion by the plaintiff with him, and such a requirement would encourage collusion between the liquor licensee and tortfeasor to hide the identity of the tortfeasor from the injured plaintiff. The Legislature would not have intended these patently absurd results; therefore, the Supreme Court need not decide the constitutional issue.
References for Points in Headnotes
[1, 3, 7] 45 Am Jur 2d, Intoxicating Liquors § 561 et seq.
[2, 4] 73 Am Jur 2d, Statutes § 260.
[5] 73 Am Jur 2d, Statutes §§ 430-438.
[6] 16 Am Jur 2d, Constitutional Law §§ 198-201.
73 Am Jur 2d, Statutes § 197.
3. Whether or not the injured plaintiff knows the identity of the intoxicated person shall be determined by the judge at a hearing. The injured plaintiff must show that he did not, in fact, know the identity of the intoxicated person and that he exercised due diligence in attempting to ascertain that identity.
Reversed.
Justice Ryan dissented on the ground that the "name and retain” amendment has a number of purposes and the conclusion that one purpose, to eliminate collusion between the intoxicated person and the injured plaintiff, is not furthered in an individual application of the amendment is not to say that the amendment produces absurd and unjust results clearly inconsistent with the purpose of the Legislature. Other purposes of the amendment include (1) to ensure that statutory dramshop actions are not conducted in a speculative or abstract manner, that is, in the absence of the alleged unlawful vendee, regardless of the reason for plaintiffs failure to "name and retain” that person as a defendant, and (2) to protect tavern owners from harassment suits based on fictitious intoxicated persons. When a remedy is given by statute, all requirements imposed by the statute must be complied with. Absent a transgression of constitutional limitations, arguments as to the wisdom of the amendment are properly addressed to the Legislature.
57 Mich App 367; 226 NW2d 101 (1975) reversed.
Opinion of the Court
1. Intoxicating Liquors — Dramshop Act — "Name and Retain”— Statutes — Construction.
The “name and retain” amendment of the dramshop act applies only to those injured persons who do not "name and retain” the intoxicated person as a defendant where they know the identity of the intoxicated person (MCL 436.22; MSA 18.993).
2. Statutes — Literal Construction — Unjust Result.
A fundamental rule of statutory construction is that departure from the literal construction is justified where such a construction would produce an absurd and unjust result, and would be clearly inconsistent with the purposes and policies of the act in question.
3. Intoxicating Liquors — Dramshop Act — "Name and Retain”— Identity of Intoxicated Person.
An injured person who brings an action under the dramshop act, but does not "name and retain” the allegedly intoxicated person as a defendant must show that he did not, in fact, know the identity of the alleged intoxicated person and that he exercised due diligence in attempting to ascertain that identity (MCL 436.22; MSA 18.993).
Dissenting Opinion
Ryan, J.
4. Statutes — Construction—Legislative Purpose — Application.
The conclusion that one of several legislative purposes is not furthered in an individual application of a statutory amendment is not to say that the amendment produces absurd and unjust results clearly inconsistent with the purpose of the Legislature which would justify departure from the literal construction of the statute.
5. Action — Statutes—Remedy.
All statutory requirements must be complied with when the remedy sought by the complaint is provided by statute.
6. Statutes — Constitutional Law — Separation of Powers.
Arguments concerning the wisdom of legislation, absent a transgression of constitutional limitation, are properly addressed to the Legislature, not to the Supreme Court.
7. Intoxicating Liquors — Dramshop Act — "Name and Retain”— Identity of Intoxicated Person.
Application of the "name and retain” amendment of the dram-shop act to a plaintiff who does not know the identity of the allegedly intoxicated tortfeasor does not produce a result which is so absurd, unjust or inconsistent with the legislative purposes of the amendment as to justify departure from the literal construction of the statute (MCL 436.22; MSA 18.993).
Lopatin, Miller, Bindes & Freedman (Michael H. Feiler, of counsel) for plaintiffs.
Leonard A. Baun for defendant.

Opinion:
Williams, J.
The issue in this case is whether plaintiffs, who claim they do not know the identity of an alleged intoxicated person who injured them, are barred from maintaining a cause of action under the Michigan dramshop act, because they did not "name and retain" the alleged intoxicated person as defendant as required by the "name and retain" amendment to the act.
We hold that the "name and retain" amendment only applies to those injured plaintiffs who know the identity of the intoxicated person. Accordingly, we reverse the Court of Appeals and the trial court and remand to the trial court for disposition of this case in a manner not inconsistent with this opinion.
I — Facts
At approximately one o'clock on the morning of November 23, 1972, plaintiffs were assaulted by an unknown person while at defendant's tavern. On April 19, 1973 plaintiffs commenced this action in Wayne County Circuit Court, alleging that defendant furnished and continued to furnish intoxicating beverages to this person while he was in an intoxicated state. Because plaintiffs were unable to ascertain the identity of this person, he was not named a defendant in this action as required by the "name and retain" amendment (1972 PA 196) to MCLA 436.22; MSA 18.993, which provides in pertinent part that "no action against a retailer shall be commenced unless the alleged intoxicated person is a named defendant in the action and is retained in the action until the litigation is concluded by trial or settlement". Consequently, the trial court granted defendant's motion for summary judgment on the grounds that plaintiffs failed to comply with this statutory requirement.
On January 7, 1975, the Court of Appeals af firmed the trial court, holding that this amendment does not violate the equal protection and due process clauses of the Michigan Constitution or the comparable provisions of the Federal Constitution.
Plaintiffs applied for leave to appeal. This Court granted leave July 23, 1975.
II — Discussion
As stated, supra, the essential issue in this case is whether plaintiffs, who claim they do not know the identity of the alleged intoxicated person who injured them, are barred from maintaining a cause of action under the Michigan dramshop act, MCLA 436.22; MSA 18.993, because they did not "name and retain" the alleged intoxicated person as defendant, as required by the "name and retain" amendment to the act.
The "name and retain" amendment provides, in pertinent part:
"No action against a retailer shall be commenced unless the alleged intoxicated person is a named defendant in the action and is retained in the action until the litigation is concluded by trial or settlement." (1972 PA 196.)
The dramshop act is part of the Liquor Control Act. As the Court of Appeals in Gray v Blackman, 30 Mich App 212, 213; 186 NW2d 76 (1971) observed:
"The object of the liquor control act, as indicated in its title, is the regulation and control of liquor traffic."
In Flower v Witkovsky, 69 Mich 371, 375; 37 NW 364 (1888), this Court stated the essential purpose of the dramshop act:
"The main purpose of the act is to regulate and prohibit the sale of liquors, to provide when it shall be lawful and when it shall be unlawful, and what remedies may be resorted to in cases of unlawful selling and injuries resulting from such unlawful sales.
"These things all belong to one primary object, which is the distinguishing of lawful from unlawful sales under the law, and providing penalties and remedies against unlawful sales, and the natural consequences resulting therefrom."
Accordingly, as one means of regulating and controlling the sale of liquor, the dramshop act provides (in part):
"Every wife, husband, child, parent, guardian or other persons who shall be injured in person or property, means of support or otherwise, by a visibly intoxicated person by reason of the unlawful selling, giving or furnishing to any such persons any intoxicating liquor, and the sale is proven to be a proximate cause of the injury or death, shall have a right of action in his or her name against the person who shall by such selling, or giving of any such liquor have caused or contributed to the intoxication of said person or persons or who shall have caused or contributed to any such injury ." MCLA 436.22; MSA 18.993.
In 1972, the dramshop act was amended to include the so-called "name and retain" provision, stated supra. In the instant case, the Court of Appeals accurately characterized the object of this amendment as follows:
"The provision will eliminate the common practice whereby the intoxicated person enters into a settlement with the injured plaintiff for a token sum, and thereafter energetically assists the plaintiff with the prosecution of a suit against the tavern owner. The provisions will also discourage possible collusion and perjury by those too weak to resist the obvious temptation inher ent in the original dramshop act, which has now been recognized by the Legislature and corrected through this amendment." 57 Mich App 367, 372; 226 NW2d 101 (1975).
In determining whether plaintiffs in this case are barred from suing under the dramshop act, we must keep in mind the fundamental rule of statutory construction that departure from the literal construction of a statute is justified when such construction would produce an absurd and unjust result and would be clearly inconsistent with the purposes and policies of the act in question. Pacific Insurance Co, Limited v Oregon Automobile Insurance Co, 53 Hawaii 208, 211; 490 P2d 899, 901 (1971). See, also, Attorney General v Detroit U R Co, 210 Mich 227, 257; 177 NW 726, 177 NW 1023 (1920); In re Petition of State Highway Commission, 383 Mich 709, 714-715; 178 NW2d 923 (1970); Holy Trinity Church v United States, 143 US 457, 458, 460; 12 S Ct 511; 36 L Ed 226 (1892). See also, 2A Sutherland Statutory Construction (Sands, 4th ed), § 45.12.
Literally construed, the "name and retain" amendment bars an injured person from maintaining a cause of action under the dramshop act if, in fact, he does not "name and retain" the alleged intoxicated person as defendant — regardless of whether the injured person knows the identity of the alleged intoxicated person. We believe this literal construction produces an unreasonable, unjust result, a result which is inconsistent with the purpose of the "name and retain" amendment and the dramshop act itself. To suggest that an injured plaintiff "name and retain" as defendant an intoxicated person whose identity he does not know in order to prevent collusion between the intoxicated person and the injured plaintiff is patently absurd. If a plaintiff does not know the identity of the intoxicated person, there is no basis for concern that such a person, in collusion with plaintiff, could "energetically [assist] the plaintiff with the prosecution of a suit against the tavern owner". Furthermore, the requirement that an injured person "name and retain" as defendant an intoxicated person whose identity he does not know in order to maintain a cause of action under the dramshop act frustrates the essential purpose of the act. Such a requirement would encourage collusion, tempting the liquor licensee and a tortfeasor to hide the identity of the tortfeasor from the injured plaintiff. A liquor licensee who in fact created or continued in the creation of the state of the intoxicant would thus be able to escape liability from suit under the dramshop act. We do not believe the Legislature intended these kinds of results.
Accordingly, we hold that the "name and retain" amendment only applies to those injured plaintiffs who know the identity of the alleged intoxicated person. Whether or not an injured plaintiff knows the identity of the alleged intoxicated person shall be determined by the judge at a hearing. The injured plaintiff must show that he did not, in fact, know the identity of the alleged intoxicated person and that he exercised due diligence in attempting to ascertain the identity of the alleged intoxicated person.
Having decided the opinion on these grounds, we find it unnecessary to discuss the constitutional questions raised in this appeal.
We reverse the Court of Appeals and the trial court and remand to the trial court for disposition of this case in a manner not inconsistent with this opinion.
No costs, a public question.
Kavanagh, C. J., and Levin, Coleman, Fitzgerald, and Lindemer, JJ., concurred with Williams, J.