Case Name: European-American Colonization Society v. J. C. Reed
Court: Supreme Court of Texas
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1860-10
Citations: 25 Supp. Tex. 343
Docket Number: 
Parties: European-American Colonization Society v. J. C. Reed.
Judges: 
Reporter: Texas Reports
Volume: 25 Supp.
Pages: 343–353

Head Matter:
European-American Colonization Society v. J. C. Reed.
That the unappropriated -public land within the limits of Peters’ colony was open to general location and appropriated by the holders of valid land certificates when the plaintiff made his location, on 26th December, 1848, has been heretofore decided. (Stewart v. Crosby, 15 Tex., 546.)
A location and survey of an ordinary certificate appropriated the land within the surveyed district of Peters’ colony, and even in the district where there were no reservations of alternate sections in the contracts with the empresarios, as against all but a colonist with actual settlement and cultivation.
The 7th section of the act of 4th February, 1841, “ granting lands to - emigrants,” reads as follows: “ Not more than one section of six hundred and forty acres of land, to be located in a square, shall be given to any family comprehended in said contract, nor more than three hundred and twenty acres to a single man over the age of seventeen years." (Paschal's Dig., Art. 813, Note 400.)
This remained the law until the act of 1850, and during that time the colonist was confined tó a section, to be surveyed in the form of a square.
The 3d section of the act of the 21st January, 1850, about Peters’ colony, read as follows: “Where two or more colonists have settled on one and the same section,.half section, or fraction of a section, the oldest settler shall be entitled to the preference; in which case the party dispossessed shall be entitled to his or her proper quantity of land, to be, located on any of the vacant public domain within said colony limits.” (Paschal’s Dig., Art. 830, Note 404.)
To entitle a claimant to appropriate a particular section or half section, as the case might be, he must have an improvement upon "it, (when he proved up his right to the certificate.)
The 4th' section of that act reads as follows: “When two or more colonists shall have settled upon the same section, half section, or fraction of a section, by mutual consent, the same shall be divided according to agreement; and each colonist so settled shall be entitled to the residue which may remain unsatisfied of his or her claim, to be located on any vacant lands within the limits of said colony.” (Paschal’s Dig., Art. 831.) This was the first provision for dividing a section between two settlers and the location of the residue of their respective claims upon other lands. But where the land had been located by a head-right certificate before the land was settled by the colonist, the older location had the preference.
Neither the law of the 10th of February, 1852, nor that of the 8th of February, 1854, was intended to operatepor did operate, as a grant to Griffin or his assignee of the land in controversy. The object of the legislation manifestly was, not to grant titles to designated sections of land in particular, but to secure to the colonists the lands to which they then were, or might thereafter become, entitled: those which they had secured or should secure by surveys “ duly made upon vacant land.”
" Where the verdict was for a smaller amount of damages than the-judgment, the Supreme Court will reform the judgment.
Appeal from Dallas. The case was tried before Hon. Hat. M. Bureord, one of the district judges.
Reed sued the European-American Colonization Society in an action to recover land and for damages. The controversy turned upon the facts of the case and the peculiar facts growing out of the laws in relation to Peters’ colony. These laws are collected in Paschal’s Digest-, from Articles 810 to 885, and are modified by the ordinance of 1845. (Ib. 76, Rote 215.) The present case seems to have turned upon Articles 830 and 831, Rotes 400, 404, and 405. The parties agreed upon the following statement of facts:
“This suit is prosecuted by plaintiff to recover three hundred and twenty acres of land lying in Dallas county, being the east half of section 11 of the surveys made by the Peters Colony Company. The plaintiff introduced and read in evidence a transcript from the general land office, containing copy of certificate, transfer, &c. The plaintiff introduced his field-notes and plat of survey, showing that the land had been surveyed and field-notes recorded. The plaintiff proved that the McGowan certificate, under which he claimed, was a genuine certificate, and had been approved by the commissioner of claims. A. G..Walker testified, that, as a deputy surveyor of Robertson land district, he surveyed the land in controversy for the plaintiff in December, 1848; that Griffin, under whom defendants claim, forbade his making the survey; that, in answer to his inquiry, Griffin said he neither lived on, nor had any improvements on, any portion of section 11; that Griffin then resided on the east half of the section which adjoins the half section in controversy.
“ The plaintiff proved that the European-American Colonization Society, by their servants and employes, had taken from the land in controversy $500 or $600 worth of timber; that the land was principally valuable for its timber. The plaintiff proved that the European-American Colonization Society was a corporation, incorporated by the legislature.
“The defendants read in evidence the certificate of T. Y. Griffin, (which was a colonist’s certificate, issued by Thomas William Ward;) also the field-notes made out by Myers, a deputy surveyor of the Robertson land district, which field-notes had never been recorded. The defendants proved that T. Y. Griffin, under whom they claim, settled on the half of section No. 14 in 1847; that the half section on which he settled lies immediately south and adjoining the half section in controversy; that there was another settler on section Ho. 14, when Griffin made his statement; and that, by mutual consent, he and the other settler divided section 14; and that Griffin continued to reside on half section 14 until 1850, when he moved off. The defendants proved by Chesier, who was living on a portion of section 14 when Griffin made his settlement thereon, that Griffin claimed the half section in controversy as a part of his colony claim; that the half section on which Griffin lived and made his improvements was in the prairie, and adjoins the half section in controversy, which is all timber; that the half section on which Griffin made his improvements, when added or attached to the half section in controversy, makes a section two miles long and half a mile wide. Defendants proved that Griffin, from the time of his settlement, used timber from the land in controversy so long as he continued to live on section 14.
“The defendants proved that the land in controversy was within what was known in the colony contract of Peters as ‘The Fifteen-Mile Block,’ and had been sectionized by the colony contractors prior to making the plaintiff’s survey, (and that the company, by the contract, had the right to appropriate this block entire, without leaving alternate sections.)
“Plaintiff proved, by James Horton, that he had seen one Paul Richardson sick in a pole-pen on the land in controversy; and that, in a conversation with Griffin, after making Reed’s survey, Griffin said that Reed would not hold the land; that Richardson would hold the land by virtue of his colony settlement.
“Defendants proved a connected transfer from Griffin to them. Griffin died in the year 1851 or 1852.
“Plaintiff proved that Griffin had never resided on or made any kind of improvements on any portion of the section of land of which the one-half is now in controversy.”
The court charged the jury as follows:
“1. The plaintiff, having read in evidence a survey made on a genuine certificate, must recover, unless the defendants show a superior title, equitable or legal.
“2. At the date of making the plaintiff’s survey, in December, 1848, there was no law forbidding the making of such surveys in'Peters’ colony, provided the land, when surveyed, was vacant; that is, not settled on or improved by a colonist or surveyed by a land certificate.
“3. When two or more colonists had settled on the same section of land by consent, they could each hold one half of the section, and would be entitled to float the remainder of the certificate on any vacant land.
“4. If Griffin and Chesier lived on the same section of land by mutual consent, they could each hold half the section on which they live, and locate the balance of their certificate on any vacant land. To give Griffin such an equity as the law would protect and save from location, he must either have settled upon the land as a colonist, or made some kind of improvement thereon prior to the survey of plaintiff. If, prior to the making plaintiff’s survey, in December, 1848, Griffin was a settler on the land as a colonist, or had made improvements thereon, then in such case he would have a better right to the land, and you should find for him; otherwise, you will find for the plaintiff. If you find for the plaintiff, you can find for him the value of the timber removed from the land and appropriated to the use of defendants.
“If you find for defendants, simply say so.”
And refused to give the following charge asked by the defendant:
“ Settlement is an appropriation of this land equal in standing to an entry. It is not necessary that a party should absolutely live on .the land to make an appropriation of the same; but if he exercise ownership over it by notorious act, such as cutting and using timber, it is sufficient to give a party a title equal to an entry. The jury are at liberty to find for defendants, if they have an equitable ]3rior title; it is better than one purely legal.”
The jury found a verdict for the plaintiff of $500 damages, upon which, the court rendered a judgment for the recovery of the land and for said damages; ¥rom which judgment the defendant prosecuted error, and assigned for errors the admission of certain evidence and the charge of the court.
John M. Orockett, for appellant.
—Reed located the land in controversy, after' the 1st day of July, 1848, and prior to the 21st January, 1850, in Peters’ colony.
Griffin was entitled to six hundred and forty acres, unless it were diminished by a contract with the company. See Hart. Dig., Art. 2011, and near the end of first proviso to Art. 2103; also, sec. 1 of “an ordinance” appended to the constitution, containing this proviso: “ That all actual settlers under any contract shall be entitled to their quantity of land as colonists, hot to exceed six hundred and forty acres to the head of a family, and three hundred and twenty acres to a single man.” And this seems to have been the design from the inception of the colony contracts. (See Hart. Dig., Art. 2016.)
Under these statutes, Griffin immigrated to the State and placed himself at the disposition of the company. If they failed to discharge their duty, in placing him properly upon the lands, would he not, under the ordinance and Art. 2016 Hart." Dig., be entitled to his quantity of land in the colony, to the exclusion of all titles not emanating from the same source?
The legislature contemplated a failure on the part of the company, while it did every thing possible to encourage immigration by the most unequivocal assurances.
The lands of the colony were severed from the public domain for the benefit of the company and the settlers. The settlers’ title, as between them and the State, existed under the statutes of February 4, 1841, (Hart. Dig., Art. 2008, &e.,) and of January 16, 1843, (Art. 2103.) The company saw proper to qualify their title by the contracts.
In the case of Stewart et al. v. Stephen Crosby, 15 Tex., 546, this court determined that the lands in the colony (especially outside of the surveyed or sectionized portions) reverted back to the State after the 1st day of July, 1848, and were subject to .location by other certificates. This is certainly correct as to the Peters company, for they have so qualified their interests by the contracts. But the interests of the settlers, depending not upon the contracts, but on the public statutes, on the failure of the company were subject to be adjusted by the political authorities. The State, having guaranteed to them the quantity of lands specified in the colony limits, and not having provided means for them to secure their interests independent of the company, nor for the reverting of the lands back to the State, it would be hard to conclude that the legislature contemplated a failure on the part of the company, and did not contemplate providing the means, when it should become necessary, for the settlers to secure their rights. On the 1st of July, 1848, the settlers had no authority to survey, nor did they have until 1850, when Commissioner Ward was authorized to issue to them certificates; and’their only means of indicating their selection of lands was just as .Griffin did in this case. He had settled in the colony and made his improvement. He was thereby entitled to six hundred and forty acres of land. Being on a section of which one-half was occupied by another settler who was entitled to it, he was just as much authorized to make the selection of the other half section in one direction as another. Perhaps he made it ) in the only direction he could. He at least made it in a \ direction least likely to be selected or located by another, | and most advantageous to himself, being timbered. I think the second charge of the judge was wrong, in saying that “there was no law forbidding the making of such surveys in Peters’ colony, provided the land, when surveyed, was vacant: that is, not settled on or improved by a colonist, or surveyed by a land certificate,” and more specifically stated in the fourth charge. The colonists had no certificates to survey. Few of them could occupy a whole section with improvements. The land in controversy adjoins the half section on which his improvements were, and he gave notice to Reed that it was his selection. It is true, that it was on the end of his section; but suppose it had been on the side, there being a section-line to cross; the same objection would have been urged, and with equal force..
The charges of the court refer to statutes subsequent to Reed’s location. So much of them are inapplicable to the circumstances -of this case. If Griffin did not have an equitable title to the land on the 1st of July, 1848, he could derive no benefit from the act of January, 1850. If, however, the settlers had an equitable title to the lands in the colony, the act of 1850 related back to the inception of that title, and would supersede any intervening legal title.
JB. Warren Stone also filed a long argument for the appellant,
but the Reporter has been obliged to abridge Mr. Crockett’s argument, and to omit Mr. Stone’s altogether.
John J. Good, also for the appellant,
filed a long brief, in which he reviewed the whole history of the colonization laws.
John McCoy, for the appellee.
—This is a suit of tres pass to try title to three hundred and twenty acres of land, as well as for damages thereto, originally brought by J. C. Reed v. The European-American Colonization Society in Texas, on the 18th day of December, 1856, and subsequently the defendant’s vendors,. to wit, Sheppard and others, voluntarily made themselves parties defendants hereto.
The laws in relation to this colony, together with the contracts, required the colonist wishing to appropriate lands therein to settle upon the identical lands claimed, and put in cultivation and under fence at least fifteen acres thereof, and reside upon it for three years. (See Hart. Dig., Arts. 2012 2103; also Col. Con., p. 6.) The act of 21st January, 1850, (Hart. Dig., 2234 and 2238,) required and authorized surveys, &c., -as a mode of appropriating lands by colonists, and at the same time required them to be governed by the colony surveys, &c. Did Griffin, prior to the survey of Reed, acquire a right to the land in controversy?
As to what constitutes settlement, the court is referred to "Washington C. C., 18-22, and authorities there cited; and as to what was required of colonists in Peters’ colony, see Hart: Dig., Arts. 2012, 2103; also Col. Con., p. 6.

Opinion:
Wheeler, C. J.
—That the unappropriated public land within the limits of Peters' colony was open to general location and appropriation by the holders of valid land certificates, when the plaintiff made his location, on the 26th of December, 1848, has been heretofore decided. (Stewart v. Crosby, 15 Tex., 546.)
There can be no question that the plaintiff's was a legal appropriation of the land, and that he is entitled to recover in this action, unless the land had been previously appropriated by Griffin, under whom the defendants claim, by virtue of the rights secured to him by law as a colonist in Peters' colony. But, to give such right, actual settlement and cultivation were necessary, by the laws and contract of colonization, prior to the act of the 21st of January, 1850. (Crockett v. Robinson, 20 Tex., 487, 489; Myers v. Cockrill, 14 Tex., 343.)"
Griffin had neither made a settlement nor any improvement upon the land. He had settled upon an adjoining section, and the law then confined him to one section-, to be surveyed in the form of a square. (Hart. Dig., Art. 2011.) It was not until the enactment of the law of the 21st of January, 1850, that provision was made for dividing a section between two settlers, -and the location of the residue of their respective claims upon other land; and the law then required them to find vacant land upon which to make their location. (Id. Art. 2232.) The land in question was not then vacant. There had been a legal appropriation of it by the plaintiff, and. it was effectually withdrawn from the claim of Griffin. It was not within his power, then, to appropriate it to his colonist claim or certificate. He had done no act which, by virtue of any law existing at the time, or prior to the plaintiff's location, gave him any estate or interest in the land. He had no equity, on which any after-acquired right could operate by relation to invest him with the title. If he had subsequently acquired a patent, there was nothing upon which it could have relation back, so as to give it precedence to the right of the plaintiff. But he did not obtain a patent, or acquire any right or title whatever to the land here in question. There is no ground for the supposition that he acquired'it by a legislative grant. Neither the law of the 10th of February, 1852, nor that of the 8th of February, 1854, was intended to operate or did operate as a grant, to Griffin or his assignee, of the land in controversy. The object of the legislation manifestly was, not to grant titles to designated sections of land in particular, but to secure to the colonists the lands to which they then were, or might thereafter become, entitled; those which they had secured or should secure hy surveys " duly made " upon vacant land. Ro law had authorized them to make their surveys upon land which was not vacant. It was not the intention of the legislature, in their behalf, to give them such authority. The legislature contemplated no such injustice as the taking from one man that which he had lawfully acquired and giving it to another. They did not intend to take from those who had acquired the right to land, by said locations, the land they had thus secured, and give it to the colonists. There is nothing in the legislation upon the subject to give countenance to such a supposition; the contrary is manifest throughout. They are required to make their selections and locations upon vacant land. The question, therefore, does not arise in this case, whether it is within the legislative competency to divest the right of one, in order to confer the title upon another, if they were so disposed. They have manifested no such disposition in this instance. The defendants, manifestly have no title, legal or equitable, to the land in controversy.
The charge of the court presented, as we conceive, truly the law of the case, and the verdict was manifestly correct. But the judgment does not follow the verdict. The jury found for the plaintiff $500 damages, and the judgment is for $550. This is. an error in the rendition of the judgment, for which it must be reversed; and such judgment must be here rendered as the court below ought to have rendered.
Reversed and rendered accordingly.