Case Name: City of New Orleans v. Mrs. J. C. de St. Romes
Court: Louisiana Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1854-12
Citations: 9 La. Ann. 573
Docket Number: 
Parties: City of New Orleans v. Mrs. J. C. de St. Romes.
Judges: (Spoffoed, J., not taking part in the case.)
Reporter: Louisiana Annual Reports
Volume: 9
Pages: 573–584

Head Matter:
City of New Orleans v. Mrs. J. C. de St. Romes.
That part of the 3d section of the Act of 1852, (an Act providing for the subscription by parishes and municipal corporations of the State to the stock of corporations undertaking works of internal improvement,) which requires that the police jury or municipal corporation shall cause to be furnished to the commissioners of election a properly certified list of the authorized voters, is directory only, anda failure to furnish said list, cannot be regarded as a condition precedent to the validity of the subscription.
"Where a formality is not absolutely necessary for the observance of justice, but is intended to facilitate its observance, its omission, unless there is an annulling clause in the law, will not annul the act.
A statute is to be considered as imperative in every particular which is essential to the thing required to be done, and merely directory as to those which are immaterial. Buc7imum, J., dissenting.
The legislative injunction contained in the 3d section of the Act of 3852, to furnish to the commissioners of election a certified list of voters who were landed proprietors, was imperative, and the furnishing of such lista condition precedent to the holding of a valid election under the statute, in default of which the ordinances subscribing to stock remained without effect. Buclmnwti^ J., dissenting.
Under tlie Act of 1S52, the city is made the mandatary of the landed proprietors, for the purpose of subscribing to the stock of railroad companies. Bucha/n-mVy J., dissenting.
It is a general rule of the contract of mandate, that the principal is only bound to execute the engagements of his agents, conformably to the power which has been conferred. C. 0. 2290. Bu-clicmcm, J., dissenting.
A mandatary, under a special power, must confine himself strictly within the limits assigned to him, and those dealing with him must, at their peril, see that he does not exceed his authority — but they need not, in search of his powers and their limitations, look beyond the instrument of mandate. Bicchajian^J., dissenting.
If the clause of the Act of 1852, under consideration, was not a condition precedent, the omission of which imported a nullity of the ordinances by the terms of the statute itself, it was, at least, a condition subsequent, essential to the validity of the election held under the ordinances. Sucha-newt, J., dissenting.
APPEAL from the Fourth District Court of New Orleans, Reynolds, J.
Labatt & Eustis, Jr., and liandell Hunt, for plaintiff and appellant:
In B. v. Woodslanton, 1 Bott, 010, (cited in Dwarris on St., 714,) the distinction between directory and compulsory statutes was applied to st. 43, El. c. 2, s. 5, which enacted that male apprentices should be bound out by the parish till the age of 24; yet a binding till 21 was held to confer a settlement— for the statute is only directory in this respect.
In R. v. Lonsdale, 1 Burr., 447, Lord Mansfield says, there is a known distinction between circumstances which are of the essence of the thing required to be done by an act of Parliament, and causes merely directory.
In Banin of the Northern Liberties v. Gresson, 12 Serg. & Rawle, 314, the court recognize this distinction, and say: Under our land laws, the act of assembly directs the surveyor to run and mark the lines on the ground, and further enacts, that all surveys made before the warrant authorizing' it comes to his hands, shall be accounted clandestine, and shall be void and of no effect. The first injunction is directory, the latter provision is imperative and peremptory.
In Banin of the United Slates v. Dandridge, 12 Wheat. 81, there are man}' cases where an act is prescribed by law to be done, and record made thereof, and nevertheless, if left unrecorded, the act is valid. By the English Marriage Acts, registers of marriages are required to be kept in public books in every parish, and signed by the parties and the minister, and attested by two witnesses. Yet it has been decided that such an entry is not necessary to the validity of the marriage, and that an erroneous entry will not vitiate it. If a regulation be merely directory, then any deviation from it, though it may subject the officers to responsibility, &c., cannot be taken advantage of by third persons.
In Dwarris on St., 716, the same doctrine is cited.
19 Wendell, page 135, Molurnh and Hudson Railroad Company.
19 Wendell, page 630, Ghenung Qounty Insurance Gompany.
Larue & Whitaker, for defendant:
This suit is brought to recover from defendant a sum of money for the benefit of the New Orleans, Opelousas and Great Western Railroad Company, and the New Orleans, Jackson and Great Northern Railroad Company. The plaintiffs claim that it is a legitimate tax which the defendant is bound to pay— and it is either a tax, a forced expropriation of private property for the benefit of two private corporations, or a forced subscription to the stock of said corporations — at all events, it is taking the property of the individual for public or private uses. Whichsoever of these it may be, there can be no doubt that the law, if any, under which the claim is made, should, on the part of the plaintiffs, have been strictly complied with before any judgment could be rendered in their favor. Hiriari v. Morgan, 5 L. R. 45. Winchester v. Gain, 1 R. R., 424. Morris v. Grolcer, 4 L. R. 150.
The last quoted case was one in which the validity of a title under a sale for taxes was involved, and the court remarks: “It was a sale for taxes, and in such sales, according to the principles of jurisprudence established by several decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States, and which prevail generally in the several States of the Union, the purchasers are bound in order to give force and validity to their titles, to show that all the formalities required by law in alienations of this kind, have been fully and faithfully complied with. These principles we consider to be founded in justice and sound policy. Sacrifices of property of great value are frequently made in consequence of slight inattention of owners or their agents, by officers of the government in the collection of taxes, and avarice and immoral cupidity often lead purchasers to avail themselves of advantages acquired under legal pretexts, contrary to the moral precept which requires men, to act towards their neighbors as they would think just towards themselves under similar circumstances.”
If this principle be true of sales for taxes, it is equally true of the act of taxation itself; for it would matter but little how a sale took place, or the judgment upon which it is founded were obtained, if the original exercise of the taxing power was in violation of right and law. The Constitution of the State directs how taxes shall be imposed by the general assembly — the charter of New Orleans is equally explicit in relation to taxation in the corporation. If one or the other should pass an act or an ordinance imposing taxation violating the organic law or the city charter, could the court give any effect to such acts ? Is this railroad tax, as it is called, different from any other, in such matter as takes it out of the general and just rule ?
The tax, or whatever it may be, is claimed under an Act approved March 12th, 1852, allowing police juries and municipal corporations, &c., to subscribe to the stock of corporations for internal improvements. But the 3d section of that act declares, “ that no ordinance passed under the provisions of this act shall be valid or take effect, until it shall have been appi-oved and ratified by a majority of the voters on whose property the tax is proposed to be levied, at an election to be held specially for that purpose, by order of the police jury or municipal corporation passing,the ordinance ; and the said police jury or municipal corporation shall prescribe the manner of holding such election, and shall cause to be furnished to the commissioners of the same, a properly certified list of the voters,” &c.
This section should be so construed, “ that no clause, sentence, or word in it, be superfluous, void or insignificant.” Reynolds v. Baldwin, 1 An. 166.
And being so considered, what does it require ?
1st. That the ordinance should be approved and ratified by a majority of the voters upon whose property the tax was proposed to be laid — that is, a majority of the owners of real estate in the city of New Orleans, otherwise entitled to vote.
2d. That such voters, so qualified, shall be designated to the commissioners by properly certified lists of their names.
The defendant contends that neither the one nor the other of these prerequisites, without which the ordinance is null, and of no effect, has been complied with.
It appears to the counsel for the defendant, that these certified lists which the law requires, were not au unmeaning and insignificant form. That they were intended for something more than to employ a certain number of agents in their preparation ; that, indeed, they were meant to be a guide to the commissioners in the reception of votes; that they should have been carefully prepared by the proper assessors of the city, by an enumeration of the voters, and by ascertaining which of such voters were owners of real estate, and properly certified according to law, and that when so prepared, they should have been used as any other registry of voters, by the commissioners of the election. It might be well assumed, that the course above indicated, is'the only way in which it could be determined who were properly voters under the law, but whatever opinion may be entertained on that point, it is apparent that this certified list of voters owning real estate, was the sole security which the property holders of New Orleans had against perjury, fraud, and what many of them deemed oppression. It was the sole means by which they could ascertain the right of persons to vote away their property for the benefit of corporations, the existence, objects and management of which, they might not approve. The law designated no other. It is therefore respectfully urged that the list as required by law, should have been made and furnished to the commissioners of the election, and that they should have acted upon it, and that its not having- been done, vitiates the whole proceeding. It is true that the preparation of such a list would have required some time and labor, and the railroad ordinance might not have passed with railroad speed, if passed at all, but that is no reason why the prerequisite conditions imposed by the law to give it efficacy, should not have been complied with.

Opinion:
Ogden, J.
(Spoffoed, J., not taking part in the case.)
The Sd section of the Act of the Legislature of 1852, providing for the subscription by the parishes and municipal corporations of the State to the stock of corporations undertaking works of internal improvements, is in the following words:
"That no ordinance passed under the provisions of this act, shall be valid or take effect, until it shall have been approved and ratified by a majority of the voters, on whose property the tax is proposed to be levied, at an election to be held specially for that purpose, by order of the police jury or municipal corporation passing the ordinance; and said police jury or municipal corporation shall prescribe the manner of holding such election, and shall cause to be furnished to the commissioners of the same, a properly certified list of the authorized voters; and such election shall be preceded by a notice of thirty days, published in one or more newspapers in the parish or municipal corporation where such election shall be held. Provided, however, that if such ordinance shall be rejected by the majority of the voters, it shall be lawful, at any subsequent period, again to take the sense of the voters, in the same manner as at the first election, and at intervals of not less than six months."
The defendant being sued for the tax levied on her property, to meet installments due by the city on their subscription to the stock of the New Orleans, Jackson and Great Northern Railroad Oompanjq and of the New Orleans, Opelousas and Great Western Railroad Company, in conformity with an ordinance of the common council, resists the payment on several grounds, as set forth in an original and supplemental answer. There are three grounds taken in the answer first filed, to wit:
1st. " She denies that the- city has ever subscribed to the stock of the railroad companies aforesaid.
2d. " That if it has so subscribed, she denies that it has any authority of law to do so, and that all its acts, in relation to said pretended subscription if made, are null and void.
3d. " That if it has made any such subscription, that she is neither in law nor in equity liable to pay any portion thereof."
The defence, so far, extends only to a denial that there was any subscription to stock by the city, and of the existence of any law and of any ordinance of the council, authorizing such subscription. The subscriptions to the stock of both companies, by two separate ordinances, and the acceptance of those subscriptions by the companies, are shown by the evidence, and the real de-fence relied on by the council, is that contained in the supplemental answer, and is expressed in the following words: " That under the city's subscription alleged, if any such exist, she (the defendant) cannot in any manner or form, be held liable to the said city of New Orleans, inasmuch as it does not appear that said municipal corporation ' caused to be furnished to the commissioners of the election, to be held under the provisions of the Act of the Legislature, approved March 12th, 1852, a properly certified list of the authorized voters,' as said corporation was bound to do, in order to the validity of the ordinances referred to in plaintiffs' suit; or, in fact, that said corporation furnished any list whatever to said commissioners, that satisfied the provisions of said law, but that, on the contrary, many hundreds of persons voted at the said election, who were not the owners of real estate, who were not on the assessment rolls as such, and who were not on any list, however defective, which may have been furnished to the commissioners by said corporation, and that the whole election is therefore null and void."
As it is not alleged in this answer, and is not shown by the evidence that a sufficient number of illegal votes were received to affect the result of the election, the defence may be considered as resting on the alleged failure of the municipal corporation to cause to be furnished to the commissioners of the election, a properly certified list of the voters, which it is contended was a prerequisite by the Act of the Legislature to the validity of the ordinance, and the election to be held under it.
It is our duty to ascertain the intention of the Legislature, and to give effect to it; if it was their intention, according to a fair and liberal construction which we are bound to give to an act passed by them, with a view to the accomplishment of great public good, by the promotion of internal improvements, that the furnishing a properly certified list of the authorized voters to the commissioners, should be a condition precedent to the validity of the election, and such list was not furnished, then it would be our duty to pronounce the election null and void. If, on the other hand, that clause in the act, according to such construction, ought to be viewed as merely directory, we should be usurping the power of the Legislature by declaring a consequence to follow from the omission to comply with their direction, which they did not think proper to declare themselves; and which, if such had been their intention, it was their duty to have expressly declared, unless from the nature of such preceptory clause in the law, such intention was sufficiently manifest without being declared. The intention of the Legislature is expressed in this section of the act, that the ordinance shall not be valid, until it shall have been approved by a majority of the voters on whose property the tax is to be levied, at an election to be held for that special purpose, by order of the corporation ; that part of the law is prohibitory' — the corporation are prohibited from enforcing the ordinance for the collection of the tax, until they had caused the same to be approved by a majority of the authorized voters, at an election to be ordered by them — it is a prohibition made in the interest of the tax payers — and if it could be shown that at the election so held, unauthorized votes had been received to a sufficient number to have affected the result, the election, which resulted in favor of the tax, would be declared null, and a prerequisite of the law not having been complied with, the ordinance would not take effect.
Is the intention expressed in the same manner, or can such intention be reasonably inferred, that a failure to comply with the formality prescribed in the subsequent part of the section, of furnishing to the commissioners a certified list of the voters, should prevent the ordinance from taking effect, although approved and ratified by a majority of the votes cast at the election. The intention is not expressed by the Legislature, and from the nature of that part of the law which appears to us to be directory, such intention cannot be inferred on legal principles, applicable to the interpretation of statutes. The rule is, that when a formality is not absolutely necessary for the observance of justice, but is introduced to facilitate-its observance, its omission, unless there is an annulling clause in the law, will not annul the act. Touillier, vol. —.
The object of the Legislature was to facilitate the observance by the com missioners of justice in regard to the admission or rejection of votes. The act does not say by whom the list of authorized voters should bo certified. As no registry of voters existed, such list, no matter by whom certified, would only have furnished a partial guide to the commissioners, as there would necessarily have been many persons legally entitled to vote as owners of property, on whom the tax was to be levied, and whose names were not on the last assessment roll, which was the only official document from which any list could be made. A literal compliance with the law in that respect, was impracticable. The evidence show's that copies of lists of voters from the last assessment roll were furnished, and if this part of the law, which we consider as separate from that which contains a condition precedent, was not literally complied with, either because it was impracticable, or because the proper authorities neglected their duty. Considering it to be merely directory, we cannot construe that provision into a condition precedent. See case of Whitney v. Emmet, 1 Baldwin's C. C. R. 316.
It is therefore ordered and adjudged, that the judgment of the court below be reversed ; and that there be judgment in favor of the plaintiffs for the sum of four hundred and fifty-five dollars, with eight per cent, per annum interest thereon, from the 1st of July, 1853, until paid; and also five per cent, commissions, to w'it, the sum of twenty-two dollars and seventy-five cents, to be paid to the Assistant Attorney of the city, and that the defendant pay the costs in both courts.