Case Name: Burke vs. The Broadway and Seventh Avenue Railroad Company
Court: New York Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1867-06-03
Citations: 49 Barb. 529
Docket Number: 
Parties: Burke vs. The Broadway and Seventh Avenue Railroad Company.
Judges: 
Reporter: Barbour's Supreme Court Reports
Volume: 49
Pages: 529–536

Head Matter:
Burke vs. The Broadway and Seventh Avenue Railroad Company.
An infant, when suing in his own behalf for injuries to his person arising from the negligence of others, must be free from the imputation of negligence on his part tending to produce the damages sought to be recovered. The rule is the same whether the action be by an infant or an adult.
It is no excuse for the want of ordinary prudence by an infant, that he had less discretion than a man. He is required to exercise the prudence of a person of ordinary intelligence, before an action for damages can arise for an injury to his person, resulting from the carelessness of others.
An infant is required to take the same care of himself as 'any other person. All are held accountable for a reasonable degree of prudence, as to their own safety.
The father of an infant, suing for damages sustained by the latter through the negligence of others, can recover only under the same circumstances of prudence as would be, required if the action were in behalf of the infant.
APPEAL from a judgment rendered at the circuit upon the verdict of a jury in favor of the plaintiff, for $500, in an action brought to recover damages for loss of service of his minor child, a lad less than six years of age, who was run over by one of the defendants’ cars, in Thompson street, in the city of New York, on the 3d of May, 1865, through the alleged negligence of the defendants, their agents or servants, and so badly injured as to require the amputation of his leg. The material facts are stated in the opinions.
When the plaintiff rested, and again, at the close of the case, the defendants’ counsel moved to dismiss the complaint upon the grounds : “ That the plaintiff has failed to prove a cause of action. That no negligence on the part of the defendants or any of their agents or servants has been shown. That the evidence shows that the boy by his own negligence contributed to the injury. That the plaintiff has failed to show that the accident was occasioned solely by the negligence of the defendants. That the boy was himself in fault, and the plaintiff is not entitled to recover. That a party suing to recover damages for negligence must show himself . free from fault. That the plaintiff, as parent, is chargeable with negligence in allowing a child of such tender years to go to play in the public street in the city of New York without a guardian or protector.”
The motion was denied by the court, and the defendants’ counsel duly excepted.
Mr. Scribner, for the appellant.
L. K. Miller, for the respondent.

Opinion:
Leonard, P. J.
An infant, when suing in his own behalf for injuries to his person arising from the negligence of others, must be free from the imputation of negligence on his part tending to produce the damages sought to be recovered. The rule is the same, whether the action be by an infant or an adult. We would not hesitate to hold an adult person,, who should rush from the sidewalk, when a street fail car was passing near, (within four feet of the curb stone, where the proper allowance is made for the projection of the car body beyond the railroad track,) and lying down upon a heap of sand, placed in the narrow space between the track and the curb stone, seeking to recover an article which had fallen from his hand upon such narrow space, to be guilty of inexcusable negligence.
In reckless and childish haste the infant approached so near the car as to bump his head against it. It is no excuse that he did not see the car. It appears to be negligence not to have done so. Ordinary prudence would have prevented. Nor is it any excuse that the lad had less discretion than a man. He is required to exercise the prudence of a person of ordinary intelligence, before an action for damages arises for an injury to his person resulting partly from the carelessness of others. The lad was required to take the same care of himself as any other person. All are held accountable for a reasonable degree of prudence as to their own safety. That reasonable care is the same, whether the rule be applied to a simpleton or a wise man. An injury received without reasonable prudence, on the part of the person injured, gives no right to recover amends in pecuniary damages. The father can recover only under the same circumstances of prudence as would be required if the action were on behalf of the boy.
The negligence of the driver was, it is clear, a question for the jury, and it was properly submitted.
The motion to dismiss the complaint should have been sustained upon the other ground. The call of Mrs. Webber was a warning to the child as well as to the driver of the car. It is difficult to understand from the evidence that the driver could have managed the car so as to have prevented the accident ; but I lay no weight upon this question, and am of opinion, under the decision in the case of Ernst v. The Hudson River Railroad Company, (32 How. Pr. 61, 88,) that the case on this point should have been left to the jury, had it not been beyond doubt that the negligence of the- boy contributed to produce the injury.
The judgment should be reversed and a new trial granted, with costs to abide the event.
Clerks, J. concurred.