Case Name: CASSIDY v. McGOVERN
Court: Michigan Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1980-06-04
Citations: 98 Mich. App. 100
Docket Number: Docket No. 44507
Parties: CASSIDY v. McGOVERN
Judges: Before: Allen, P.J., and M. F. Cavanagh and C. W. Simon, JJ.
Reporter: Michigan appeals reports; cases decided in the Michigan Court of Appeals.
Volume: 98
Pages: 100–103

Head Matter:
CASSIDY v. McGOVERN
Docket No. 44507.
Submitted March 6, 1980, at Grand Rapids.
Decided June 4, 1980.
Leave to appeal applied for.
Leo T. Cassidy was injured in a collision between his car and an automobile owned by Seaton Industries, Inc., and driven by Terrance McGovern. Leo and his wife, Ardith M. Cassidy, brought an action for damages under the automobile no-fault act against McGovern and Seaton. Prior to trial, the defendants admitted liability, reserving for trial only the issues of any damages and whether plaintiffs met the threshold requirement of serious impairment of body function or permanent serious disfigurement under the no-fault act. The plaintiffs moved for a directed verdict and the trial judge deferred his ruling. The jury returned a verdict of no cause of action. The judge then denied plaintiff’s motion for a directed verdict and entered judgment for defendants, Emmet Circuit Court, Martin B. Breighner, J. Upon appeal, this Court in Cassidy v McGovern, 86 Mich App 321 (1978), remanded the case to the trial court with instructions that the trial judge is not forced in all circumstances to send the issue of serious impairment to the jury and that he may grant a directed verdict for plaintiffs if the nature of Leo Cassidy’s injury was such as to meet the threshold of serious impairment as a matter of law. Upon remand the trial judge found that there was ample medical testimony and circumstantial evidence to warrant reasonable men to differ as to whether Leo Cassidy truly suffered a serious impairment of body function. He again denied plaintiffs’ motion for a directed verdict. Plaintiffs appeal from the order denying their motion for a directed verdict.
1. The proper test for determining whether a motion for a directed verdict in favor of plaintiffs should be granted is whether reasonable men could reach different conclusions from facts taken in the light most favorable to the defendants.
2. The trial court did not err in denying plaintiffs’ motion for a directed verdict since reasonable men could reach different conclusions as to whether plaintiff Leo Cassidy suffered a serious impairment of body function.
References for Points in Headnotes
75 Am Jur 2d, Trial § 482.
57 Am Jur 2d, Negligence §§ 6, 7.
Affirmed.
M. F. Cavanagh, J., concurred. The phrase "serious impairment of body function” presents a question of fact that is within the exclusive province of the triers of fact and warrants its determination as a matter .of law only where the injury falls squarely on either end of the spectrum. Although it is hard to conceive how reasonable minds could differ that Leo Cassidy’s injuries constituted a serious impairment of body function, they did differ in that the jury determined that a serious impairment did not exist. He would also affirm.
Opinion of the Court
1. Motions and Orders — Directed Verdict — Standard.
The proper test for determining whether a motion for a directed verdict in favor of plaintiffs should be granted is whether reasonable men could reach different conclusions from the facts taken in the light most favorable to the defendants.
Concurrence by M. F. Cavanagh, J.
2. Negligence — Fact Question — Question of Law.
The phrase "serious impairment of body function’’ presents a question of fact that is within the exclusive province of the trier of fact and warrants its determination as a matter of law only where the injury falls squarely on either end of the spectrum.
John D. Hayes, for plaintiff.
Carpenter, Fenner, Barney & Hofmann, for defendant.
Before: Allen, P.J., and M. F. Cavanagh and C. W. Simon, JJ.
Circuit judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.

Opinion:
Per Curiam.
Plaintiffs appeal as of right from a March 20, 1979, order denying their motion for a directed verdict on the basis that plaintiff Leo Cassidy's injuries incurred in an automobile acci dent constituted a serious impairment of body function as a matter of law.
This decision was made after trial pursuant to a remand ordered by this Court in Cassidy v McGovern, 86 Mich App 321; 272 NW2d 644 (1978). This Court held that the trial court used an erroneous standard when ruling on plaintiffs' motion for directed verdict because the court believed that he was forced to send the threshold question of tort liability under MCL 500.3135(1); MSA 24.13135(1) to the jury.
On remand, the trial court found that there was ample medical testimony and circumstantial evidence to warrant reasonable men to differ as to whether Leo Cassidy truly suffered a serious impairment of body function. The lower court ruled that as a matter of law the injuries did not qualify as a serious impairment of body function.
On appeal, plaintiffs argue that a directed verdict in their favor is compelled as a matter of law.
The proper test for determining whether a motion for a directed verdict in favor of the plaintiffs should be granted is whether reasonable men could reach different conclusions from the facts taken in the light most favorable to the defendants. Armstrong v LeBlanc, 395 Mich 526, 532; 236 NW2d 419 (1975).
In the present case, liability was admitted; the sole issue submitted to the jury being whether serious impairment of body function had occurred. The jury rejected plaintiffs' position and found no serious impairment of body function, showing that reasonable men can differ.
We hold that the trial court did not err in denying plaintiffs' motion for directed verdict. From our review of the testimony offered by plain tiffs, we find that reasonable men can reach different conclusions. Thus, the trial court was correct in submitting this issue to the jury.
Affirmed. Costs to defendants.