Case Name: THE VILLAGE OF STAMFORD, Appellant, v. JOHN H. FISHER, Respondent
Court: New York Supreme Court, General Term
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1892-02
Citations: 70 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 123
Docket Number: 
Parties: THE VILLAGE OF STAMFORD, Appellant, v. JOHN H. FISHER, Respondent.
Judges: ITabdiN, P. J., concurred.
Reporter: Supreme Court Reports (Hun)
Volume: 70
Pages: 123–133

Head Matter:
THE VILLAGE OF STAMFORD, Appellant, v. JOHN H. FISHER, Respondent.
Hawking and peddling — what constitutes peddling — there must he a concurrent exposure for sale and delivery — residence of vendor immaterial.
Under the act (chap. 465 of the Laws of 1883) authorizing the trustees of specially incorporated villages “ to restrain, regulate or prevent hawking and peddling in the streets, except the peddling and sale of meats, fish, fruits and farm, produce,” the village of Stamford passed an ordinance forbidding such acts, and imposed a. penalty for a violation thereof. One Fisher, who had no store in the village, but had one in another town, went to residences in the village of Stamford, delivered groceries and like articles to customers who had ordered them about a month before, received pay for them and took orders for future deliveries.
In an action brought by the village against him to recover the penalty imposed for a violation of its ordinance:
Held, that he was not a “ peddler ” within the meaning of the act.
That.as his sales were made under prior orders it was apparent that he was not carrying goods with him for the purpose of concurrent sale and delivery, which was essential to the character of a peddler.
That tlie circumstance that he did not sell “in the streets” might properly bo considered.
That the fact that he lived in another town was not made hv the statute material.
(Martin, J., dissenting.)
Appeal by the plaintiff, the Village of Stamford, from a judgof the County Court of Delaware county, entered in the clerk’s office of said county on the 20th day of July, 1891, reversing a judgment of a Justice’s Court in favor of plaintiff for ten dollars ■damages and costs, with notice of an intention to bring up for review upon such appeal the judgment of the County Court, and the decision and order of said court upon which it was rendered, and all the proceedings in said court.
The plaintiff was a village duly incorporated by chapter 798 of the Laws of 1870.
The action was brought to enforce the payment of a penalty alleged to have been incurred by the defendant by reason of his having engaged in peddling in the streets of the defendant.
The judgment of the justice in favor of the plaintiff was reversed upon the ground that the defendant was not a hawker or peddler, or engaged in peddling in the public streets of the plaintiff.
O. I. Andrus, for the appellant.
Edwin D. Wagner, for the respondent.

Opinion:
MebwiN, J.:
On the 8th of September, 1890, the board of trustees of the village of Stamford, the plaintiff above named, passed a resolution reading as follows:
" Resolved, That from and after the passage of this resolution all persons are prohibited from hawking or peddling in the public streets within the corporate limits of the village of Stamford, or selling at auction in the streets of said village of any goods, wares or merchandise of any kind or description, excepting meats, fish, fruits and farm products, until such person or persons shall have first obtained a license therefor as provided in the next section."
The section that followed, after stating the manner in which licenses should be obtained and the price to be paid therefor, proceeded as follows: " Any such person failing or refusing to comply with this resolution, or to procure such licenses or pay such fee, shall forfeit the sum of ten dollars and costs of prosecution for each offense as a penalty therefor."
These resolutions were passed under the authority given by chapter 465 of the Laws of 1883, which provided as follows :
" The trustees of any village in this State, incorporated under special act of the legislature, and who have not the powers hereinafter conferred, shall, from and after the passage of this act, have' power and authority to restrain, regulate or prevent hawking and peddling in the streets; except the peddling and sale of meats, fish, fruits and farm produce, to regulate, restrain or prohibit sales by auction, and grant licenses to peddlers and auctioneers, and fix the amount to be paid therefor." •
The claim of the plaintiff is, that on or about the 29th of October, 1890, the defendant was a peddler, and, as such, was engaged in peddling goods, other than the excepted articles, in the public streets of-the village of Stamford without a license, and that thereby he incurred the penalty of ten dollars. The plaintiff recovered before the justice. The County Court reversed the judgment upon the ground, as indicated by the opinion of the county judge, that the evidence before the justice did not-show that the defendant was a hawker or peddler, or engaged in peddling in the public streets of the village.
There is no particular dispute about the facts. The defendant resides in the village of Oneonta, which, we may assume, is a few miles distant from Stamford, and in a county adjoining Delaware county. On the 29th of October, 1890, the defendant was in the village of Stamford with a horse and wagon. Upon that occasion he stopped at several residences, and in each case took from his wagon one or more small packages of tea and coffee, and in one case á cup and saucer and plate, and in another case a bottle of lemon extract, agid delivered them in the house, receiving then the pay therefor. In every instance these deliveries were made in pursuance of orders taken by him about a month before. In some of the cases, when he made these deliveries, he solicited and took orders for like articles to be delivered about a month thereafter. It does not appear where the goods came from that were delivered, nor whether the defendant was owner. There is evidence that he had a place of business in Oneonta and did not have any in Stamford.
In substance, tbe defendant went from bouse to bouse and obtained orders for standard goods, to be delivered in tbe future; and thereafter, with a borse and wagon, and prepared packages, made deliveries in pursuance of tbe orders and received tlien tbe pay, and at the same time took or solicited like orders for subsequent delivery. Tbe claim of tbe defendant is, that this manner of doing business did not make tbe defendant a peddler. Reliance is placed on tbe circumstance that tbe defendant bad no goods except wliat bad been previously bargained for. It is, therefore, argued fhat there was no carrying to sell or exposing for sale, which are claimed to be essential characteristics of the occupation of a peddler.
Our statute does not define tbe term "peddler." We may, however, to some extent, infer tbe legislative idea from tbe provisions of title 4, chapter 17, part 1 of tbe Revised Statutes, entitled, " Of Hawkers and Peddlers." By section 1 of that title, as amended by chapter 72 of the Laws of 1880, it is provided that " no person shall be authorized to travel from place to place within this State for tbe purpose of carrying to sell, or exposing for sale, any goods, wares or merchandise of the growth, produce or manufacture of any foreign countiy other than family groceries and provisions, unless he shall have obtained a license as a hawker and peddler in the manner hereinafter directed." Inferentially, it may be said that a person who travels from place to place for the purpose of carrying to sell, or exposing for sale, any goods, wares or merchandise, would be deemed a peddler. The ordinary meaning of the term is, one who travels about the country with merchandise for the purpose of selling it. (2 Bouv. Law Diet.)
In Rex v. McKnight (10 Barn. & C., 734) the defendant, as agent for a party living in a neighboring village, went about the country once a fortnight getting orders for tea, and on a subsequent occasion made deliveries. This was held not to be an exposing for sale, or carrying to sell, within the meaning of an act requiring any peddler or other trading person, going from town to town, or to other men's houses, carrying to sell or exposing to sale, any goods, wares or merchandise, to take out a license. Emphasis was placed on the circumstance that the bargain for the goods and the delivery were on different occasions.
A similar view is taken in Commonwealth v. Ober (12 Cush., 498); Commonwealth v. Gardner (133 Pa. St., 289); Ballou v. The State (87 Ala., 145). In tlie latter case it is said tliat tlie distinctive feature of a peddler is that lie goes from house to house carrying his articles of merchandise with him, and concurrently sells and delivers. In Commonwealth v. Eichenberg (140 Pa. St., 160), it seems to have been held that a merchant going about the country and getting orders, which he subsequently fills, is not a peddler. In Graffty v. The City of Rushville (107 Ind., 502), it was held that it made no difference whether the goods were taken along for present delivery, or orders taken for future delivery.
It will be noticed that the statute of 1883 gives authority to regulate or prevent hawking and peddling " in the streets," while it gives authority to regulate or prohibit sales by auction without that limitation. This is a circumstance that may be properly considered in determining whether the defendant was within the prohibition. He did not, in fact, in the street, sell or offer to sell any goods. The case of Bradley v. The City of Rochester (26 N. Y. St. Rep., 823), cited by the counsel for plaintiff, involved a different question.
A penal statute is to be strictly construed. (Cameron v. Seaman, 69 N. Y., 401; The City of Buffalo v. Mulchady, 1 Sheldon, 431.) Many of the evils that are supposed in some of the cases to attach to the business of the peddler would not occur in business done after the manner of defendant. If a merchant living at Stamford, by himself or his agent, had been accustomed to do just what the defendant did, it would hardly be claimed that he was a peddler. Still the statute makes no distinction in the matter of residence.
The foregoing considerations lead to the conclusion that the defendant was not shown to be engaged in peddling in the streets of the village within the meaning of the statute. It follows that the judgment should be affirmed.
ITabdiN, P. J., concurred.