Case Name: In the Matter of the Claim of Benjamin Lorchitsky, Respondent, against Gotham Folding Box Company et al., Appellants. The State Industrial Commission, Respondent
Court: New York Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1920-11-16
Citations: 230 N.Y. 8
Docket Number: 
Parties: In the Matter of the Claim of Benjamin Lorchitsky, Respondent, against Gotham Folding Box Company et al., Appellants. The State Industrial Commission, Respondent.
Judges: 
Reporter: New York Reports
Volume: 230
Pages: 8–19

Head Matter:
In the Matter of the Claim of Benjamin Lorchitsky, Respondent, against Gotham Folding Box Company et al., Appellants. The State Industrial Commission, Respondent.
Workmen's Compensation Law —• evidence — what evidence required to establish presumption that injuries of claimant arose out of and in course of the employment — findings by industrial commission — opinion of commission not properly part of findings — when evidence insufficient to sustain award.
1. It is not the law that mere proof of an accident without other evidence creates the presumption under section.21 of the Workmen’s Compensation Law (Cons. Laws, ch. 67) that the accident arose out of and in the course of the employment. On the contrary, it has been frequently held, directly and indirectly, that there must be some evidence from wMch the conclusion can be drawn that the injuries did arise out of and in the course of the employment.
2. The statute requires the commission to make findings of fact, and this contemplates a more precise and decisive statement of the facts than is apt to be.found in-an opinion which discusses in a general way the various features of the claim and weighs the evidence upon the hearing.
3. Where the findings, proper, merely state, as á finding, a eon- • elusion that while claimant was in the regular course of his employment he received certain injuries and that these injuries arose out of and in the course of his employment, and it appears from the opinion of the commission, made a part of the findings, that it has simply been found that the claimant’s injuries resulted from one or the other of two causes, the award cannot be sustained, unless each of the two causes was of such a character as would authorize and justify the award.
4. It appears from such opinion that, while claimant was engaged in his work, an outsider offered to assist him and against claimant’s objection attempted so to do; that such outsider, resenting epithets used by claimant, struck him several blows; that some time thereafter and while claimant was engaged in his work, he fell to the floor, his fall, so far as appears, not being caused by anything then connected with his work; and that after these two occurrences — the assault and the fall — the claimant had the injuries complained of; but there are no findings which indicate that such fall was in any manner connected with or incidental to the employment and there are statements in the opinion which would seem to indicate that it was more liable to have resulted from a diseased condition of the claimant in- no wise connected with or resulting from his employment. Held, that, under these circumstances, if claimant’s injuries resulted from the fall, as it must be assumed they did, the findings do not justify the conclusion that they ar'ose out of his employment, and hence that no award could properly be made therefor.
Matter of Lorchitsky v. Gotham Folding Box Co., 190 App. Div. 923, reversed.
(Argued October 12, 1920;
decided November 16, 1920.)
Appeal, by permission, from an order of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the third judicial department, entered January 14, 1920, unanimously affirming an award of the state industrial commission made under the Workmen’s Compensation Law.
The facts, so far as material, are stated in the opinion.
M. Linn Bruce and William Warren Dimmich for appellants.
The specific circumstances, included in the findings, which gave rise to the injuries in this case, show that there was no accident and that the injuries sustained by the claimant did not arise out of his employment and as a natural incident of his work. (Matter of Mclnerney v. B. & S. R. R. Corp., 225 N. Y. 130; Heitz v. Ruppert, 218 N. Y. 148; Griffin v. Roberson & Son, 176 App. Div. 6; De Filippis v. Falkenberg, 170 App. Div. 153; 219 N. Y. 581; Pierce & Boyer v. Van Kueran L. & C. Co., 156 N. W. Rep. 509; Walter v. American Paper Co., 99 Atl. Rep. 263; Fowler v. Reisdorph Bottling Co., 175 App. Div. 224; Moore v. Lehigh Valley R. R. Co., 169 App. Div. 177; Matter of Woodruff v. Howes Const. Co., 228 N. Y. 276.) The conclusion of the commission that the claimant’s injuries arose out of his employment and were received as a natural incident of his work is not justified by the facts found. (Matter of Mclnerney v. B. & S. R. R. Co., 225 N. Y. 130; Glatzl v. Stumpp, 220 N. Y. 75; Matter of Heitz v. Ruppert, 218 N. Y. 148; Stillwagon v. Callan Bros., 183 App. Div. 141.)
Charles D. Newton, Attorney-General {E. C. Aiken of counsel), for respondents.
The assault upon the claimant arose out of and in the course of his employment. (Heitz v. Ruppert, 218 N. Y. 148; Carbone v. Loft, 219 N. Y. 579; Sassano v. Praino, 226 N. Y. 699; Verschleiser v. Stern & Sons, 229 N. Y. 192.) The findings of fact support the conclusion of law that the claim comes within the provisions of the Workmen’s Compensation Law. (Green v. Roworth, 113 N. Y. 462.)

Opinion:
Hiscock, Ch. J.
A substantial award was made to the claimant because of injuries received by him while in the employ of the appellant box company. It is insisted by appellants that while these injuries arose in the course of his employment, they did not arise out of it. Since the award has been unanimously affirmed we are confined in a consideration of this claim to the facts as found by the commission.
At the outset of our consideration we encounter a practice by the commission which we regard as unfortunate. This is the one of incorporating the opinion written by the commission as part of the findings. The statute requires the commission to make findings of fact and this contemplates a more precise and decisive statement of the facts than is apt to be found in an opinion which discusses the general features of a claim, the conflicting contentions of the parties, and the nature of the evidence tending to support those claims. As is illustrated in the present proceeding, a discussion which is entirely appropriate as a means of reaching and justifying the conclusions of a trial court, is apt to be very unsatisfactory as a statement of the final and material facts which are found to have been established.
The findings proper state that while claimant was in the regular course of his employment he received certain injuries and that these injuries arose out of and in the course of his employment. This latter statement is a mere conclusion and an award ought not to rest upon so general and inadequate a basis. But further than this the findings then state that his injuries were sustained as set forth in the opinion of the commissioner writing in the case " which is adopted herein as if set forth in full." We, therefore, are not only permitted but required to turn to this opinion in the endeavor to find out what did happen to the claimant and to ascertain how his injuries arose.
It appears therefrom that while claimant was engaged in Ms work an outsider offered to assist him and notwithstanding claimant's rejection of Ms offer he attempted to do so. He bungled his work and thereupon claimant applied an opprobrious epithet to him. This the stranger resented by striking the claimant several blows. Sometime thereafter while claimant was engaged in his work he fell to the floor, his fall, so far as appears, not being caused by anything then connected with his employment. After these two occurrences — the assault and the fall — were over, the claimant had the injuries complained of and the commissioner writing the opinion proceeds to a discussion of the facts in the attempt to decide which caused the injuries. In the end, however, he does not decide this question but simply reaches the conclusion that the injuries resulted from either one cause or the other, being of the opinion that it was unnecessary to determine which was the cause because where " there is distinct proof of an accident section 21 of the Compensation Law raises the presumption that it arose out of and in the course of the employment."
This view of the law was erroneous and did not furnish any excuse for not determining which of the two causes resulted in claimant's injuries. It is not the law that mere proof of an accident without other evidence creates the presumption under section 21 of the Workmen's Compensation Law (Cons. Laws, ch. 67) that the accident arose out of and in the course of the employment. On the contrary, it has been frequently held, directly and indirectly, that there must be some evidence from which the conclusion can be drawn that the injuries did arise out of and in the course of the employment. (Matter of Eldridge v. Endicott, Johnson & Co., 228 N. Y. 21; Matter of Woodruff v. Howes Const. Co., 228 N. Y. 276; Matter of Hansen v. Turner Const. Co., 224 N. Y. 331; Matter of Belcher v. Carthage Machine Co., 224 N. Y. 326.)
Therefore, treating this opinion as stating findings of fact, as we are required to do by the action of the commission, we have it that it has simply been found that the claimant's injuries resulted from one or the other of two causes, and it is too well settled to require citation of authorities that such alternative findings are insufficient to sustain the award which has been made unless each of the two causes was of such a character as would authorize and justify it. That is not the case.
There is some difference of opinion amongst the members of the court whether the assault committed upon the claimant was so connected with and incidental to his employment that it would justify an award. In view of the fact that a new hearing must be had we shall not attempt now finally to decide this question, but leave it to be decided hereafter if it becomes necessary on the evi-. dence as it may then be presented to us. We are all agreed, however, that if the injuries resulted from claimant's fall there were no findings which indicated that such fall was in any manner connected with or incidental to the employment. In fact some of the statements contained in the opinion would seem to indicate that it was more liable to have resulted from a diseased condition of the claimant in no wise connected with or arising from his employment. Under these circumstances, if claimant's injuries resulted from the fall, as for the purpose of testing the award we must assume they did, the findings do not justify the conclusions that they arose out of his employment and no award could properly be made therefor. (Matter of Hansen v. Turner Const. Co., 224 N. Y. 332.)
Therefore the order and award must be reversed and a new hearing granted, with costs to abide the event.